264 THE RISE OF ITALIAN FASCISM
bludgeons, and pistols, and even threw * hand-grenades,
which spread terror through the town 5. The treasurer of
the nationalist group was killed and many were wounded.
The fascists were angry because several deserters from the
local fasdo had joined the ranks of the nationalists. The
executives of both parties, fascist and nationalist, intervened
and deplored these incidents, c which could only help the
common enemy'. In a speech in Milan on the morning of
October 15 the nationalist deputy Federzoni heaped compli-
ments on Mussolini and fascism, but that afternoon in the
same town there was an adunata of e blueshirts 5 from
Bologna, Vicenza and Genoa. This did not fail to disturb
Mussolini, who had no intention of letting the nationalists
rob him of the fruits of his labour at the first opportunity.
The possibility of the formation of a Giolitti ministry was
the gravest danger that still remained. On October 7 the
cabinet had decided not to resign ; nevertheless a crisis
might break out at any moment. For Mussolini the problem
was rapidly resolving itself into the concrete question of the
direct seizure of power. At the last meeting of the Central
Committee of the National Fascist Party (August 13), Italo
Balbo and Michele Bianchi had proposed the following
resolution, which was passed unanimously : e The Central
Committee, after examining the military situation of fascism,
entrusts to a supreme command of three the task of carrying
out any military action that circumstances or the needs of
the fascist programme may demand.3 The party executive
appointed as triumvirs Italo Balbo, De Vecchi and General
De Bono. The last two met on September 15 to draw up
the new regulations of the fascist militia, which were first
published in the Popolo d*Italia on October 4. On October 6
Balbo went to see Mussolini, who questioned him on the
* possibilities of success for a revolutionary action against
Rome, asking not for general assurances, but for precise
information and accurate details '. Balbo's impression was
that Mussolini was inclined to attempt an insurrection.
The march on Rome was decided in principle on October 16
at a meeting of the general staff, which took place in Milan
in the presence of Mussolini and of the party secretary,
Bianchi, and at which the generals Fara and Ceccherini