THE MARCH ON ROME 273
passing the word round among his friends that he would
eventually do without the fascists altogether.
On October 23, at Turin, Giolitti met Corradini, his
one-time Undersecretary of State, the prefect Lusignoli, the
ministers Bertone (Popolare] and Teofilo Rossi, Zanetti,
editor of the Sera of Milan, and Giovanni Borelli, who, at
the last liberal congress in Bologna, had spoken in favour of
alliance with the fascists. These discussions and negotiations
had in view the formation of a new government, but any
decision was postponed until after the speech Mussolini was
to make in Naples. The same day Lupi, who had acted
as Mussolini's mouthpiece in the Chamber in August,1
announced that the fascists agreed to the elections being
held in March ; this would have been a concession to
Giolitti and a possible basis of compromise with him.
Salandra fell straight into the trap set for him. He cherished
the secret hope of gaining fascist support and becoming prime
minister once more. When the fasci of Capitanata held a
congress in Troia, his native town, they sent a delegation to
pay him their respects. Much flattered, Salandra replied
* that he considered himself an honorary fascist, and would
sign on as a militant one if he were not seventy years old.'
Pointless to talk of a dictatorship in Italy : * There is no
danger of it/ he insisted, c the right man, the dictator, is
missing.' Italy was to have another Salandra ministry, in
which there would be, of course, plenty of room for the
fascists.
As for Nitti, Mussolini knew that he was suspicious, and
that a tempting bait must be prepared. The accident which
put d* Annunzio out of action in August had also interrupted
the negotiations between Nitti and Mussolini.2 But Mussolini
resumed them on his own towards the end of September.
He sent SchifF-Giorgini to Acquafredda, who told Nitti :
c I have come from Mussolini. Italy is being ruined.
Facta is an idiot. Mussolini has been approached by
Giolitti, he has an understanding with Salandra, but he is
convinced that only you can succeed. An extra-parlia-
mentary crisis must be provoked. You must make a
1 P. 1233. 2 Pp. 960-^61.
18