THE PRELUDE TO  WAR	93
to the Entente Powers that there was a vital difference be-
tween the role played by a host of German officers led by
General von der Goltz, training the Turkish army, and the
mission of Liman von Sanders who, with headquarters in
the Turkish capital, appeared to dispose of far greater
powers and influence. Russia, being most immediately con-
cerned, made strong representations to Germany immedi-
ately after the nature of Sanders' functions became known
in the fall of 1913, but without any success. For not only
was Germany eager to tighten her hold on Turkey, but a
point of German prestige was also involved: it had been a
German-trained Turkish army which was defeated by the
Balkan allies. Finding Germany intransigent, Sazonow
sought to obtain the joint intervention of the Entente in
Constantinople, but found both England and France rather
reluctant to make a European issue out of the incident.^23
After several weeks during which the incident threatened to
develop into a first-class crisis, Germany suddenly gave
way: Liman von Sanders was promoted to a higher rank,
as Inspector General, and he was thus automatically relieved
of the more modest but real army post of corps commander.
The incident served to focus Russia's attention more than
ever on the Straits. Already at the beginning of December,
1913, Sazonow had submitted a memorandum to the Czar,
analyzing Russian policy in the Straits and asking for a
conference of the Russian leaders concerned to examine
the questions raised.^24 Sazonow's thesis as developed in the
^23	England particularly was in an embarrassing position since a British
naval officer, Admiral Limpus, was commander of the Turkish navy
with headquarters also in Constantinople, technically in the position of
Liman von Sanders with respect to the Turkish army.
^24	For text, see Un lime noir, Vol. II, pp. 3635?.; for a<good summary,
see Mandelstani, op. cit., pp. 734-38.