THE PRELUDE TO WAR 93 to the Entente Powers that there was a vital difference be- tween the role played by a host of German officers led by General von der Goltz, training the Turkish army, and the mission of Liman von Sanders who, with headquarters in the Turkish capital, appeared to dispose of far greater powers and influence. Russia, being most immediately con- cerned, made strong representations to Germany immedi- ately after the nature of Sanders' functions became known in the fall of 1913, but without any success. For not only was Germany eager to tighten her hold on Turkey, but a point of German prestige was also involved: it had been a German-trained Turkish army which was defeated by the Balkan allies. Finding Germany intransigent, Sazonow sought to obtain the joint intervention of the Entente in Constantinople, but found both England and France rather reluctant to make a European issue out of the incident.23 After several weeks during which the incident threatened to develop into a first-class crisis, Germany suddenly gave way: Liman von Sanders was promoted to a higher rank, as Inspector General, and he was thus automatically relieved of the more modest but real army post of corps commander. The incident served to focus Russia's attention more than ever on the Straits. Already at the beginning of December, 1913, Sazonow had submitted a memorandum to the Czar, analyzing Russian policy in the Straits and asking for a conference of the Russian leaders concerned to examine the questions raised.24 Sazonow's thesis as developed in the 23 England particularly was in an embarrassing position since a British naval officer, Admiral Limpus, was commander of the Turkish navy with headquarters also in Constantinople, technically in the position of Liman von Sanders with respect to the Turkish army. 24 For text, see Un lime noir, Vol. II, pp. 3635?.; for a