

HISTORICAL DIVISION



THE U.S. ARMED FORCES
GERMAN YOUTH ACTIVITIES PROGRAM
1945 - 1955

HEADQUARTERS
UNITED STATES ARMY, EUROPE

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HEADQUARTERS,
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1956**

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F O R E W O R D

The purpose of this monograph is to relate the history of the efforts of the United States armed forces to assist German youth, both organized and unorganized, during the 10-year occupation period following World War II. After tracing the development of the program from its informal beginnings in 1945 through its formal organization in the spring of 1946, the study analyzes the operation of the program in its peak years and concludes with a discussion of the phase-out and termination of the program. Among the topics discussed are the establishment of youth centers, the activities sponsored by the program, personnel and support problems, and relationships with the German communities.

The study was prepared by the staff of the Current History Branch, Historical Division, based on research conducted in USAREUR headquarters files and in the command's retired files, which were recalled from the Kansas City Records Center, Kansas City, Missouri. Additional information was obtained from interviews with key personnel at both staff and operating levels.

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Edward B. James

EDWARD B. JAMES

Colonel AGC

Chief, Historical Division

August 1956

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German orphans greeting U.S. soldiers, 1945

CHAPTER 1

Immediate Postwar Period

In the spring of 1945 the American troops taking up occupation duty in the defeated Third Reich found ruins and rubble where once splendid cities had stood. As the long columns of troops threaded their way through the ruins, they were watched with sullen or frightened curiosity by the crowds of weary and hungry civilians in the shattered cities. To the average soldier these shabby crowds were one with the mounds of rubble. At first he was indifferent to both, having seen too much of the destruction of war and too many frightened people crowding the roads over which he had fought. Then, the small children who frequently clustered about the soldiers during halts in towns and villages caught the soldier's attention and often his sympathy. Many soldiers enjoyed the smiles which came to the faces of the children when they were given candy, chewing gum, and bits of food from the military rations. Broken and hesitatingly shy efforts at conversation and games soon followed the handouts of candy and food. From such spontaneous beginnings developed the first concerted actions by which American military personnel befriended German youth. Probably without realizing it, let alone without being trained or prepared for it, these men were dealing with one of the many formidable social problems emerging from the chaos of war.

1. The Youth Problem Anticipated

Several months before V-E Day Supreme Headquarters Allied Expeditionary Forces (SHAEP) had already been aware of the German youth problem that impending victory would bring to the Allies. The Education and Religious Affairs Branch and the Welfare Branch, both in the SHAEP G-5 Division, had vied for the assumption of responsibility for the supervision of German youth activities. The former had anticipated the demands of German schools and churches to establish or restore youth or other organizations. Military government and education officers had been advised not to heed such requests unless the purposes of military government were to be served thereby. The publications of the Welfare Branch had described youth organizations under the Weimar and Nazi regimes and had predicted in April 1945 that youth activities would be

one of the most important functions of military government and that a program of youth activities would have to be instituted. Before April 1945 Supreme Headquarters had assigned responsibility for the supervision of a youth program to the Education and Religious Affairs Branch.¹ The branch retained this responsibility through the succession of postwar theater reorganizations.²

2. Early Official Policies

a. Military Government. In the period immediately following V-E Day military government regulations specifically prohibited all German youth organizations. Military commanders were directed particularly to prevent the reconstitution or activity of Nazi youth groups. The records and property of these groups were confiscated. Such property was sometimes made available for use by approved educational organizations. No youth groups could be formed or revived without the Supreme Commander's (or USFET commander's) permission. In July 1945 religious groups were allowed to conduct youth, sports, and welfare activities and to receive contributions for their support. In the same month military government required local German officials to prepare a work program for children before the reopening of the schools. This included cleaning public buildings and streets, clearing rubble and gathering salvageable construction materials, and assisting in crop harvesting and other agricultural work.³ Youth Offices (Jugendaemter) were established by military government, and staffed by Germans, to supervise and to provide care for orphaned, needy, and delinquent German youth. The enormity of this problem ultimately foiled military government's intention of retaining only a directive responsibility for youth activities and welfare.

¹German Youth Activities of the U.S. Army, Occupation Forces in Europe Series, 1945-46; First Year, Vol. 15 (hereafter cited as GYA Study), p. 2. In USAREUR Hist Div Ref Lib.

²SHAEF, as the combined British-American command, was dissolved to make way for a U.S. command in charge of the American troops in the European theater. The European Theater of Operations, U.S. Army (ETOUSA) was both the wartime supply and administration agency and the transitional organization used to dissolve SHAEF. ETOUSA was redesignated U.S. Forces, European Theater (USFET), on 1 July 1945. SHAEF was officially dissolved on 14 July. The G-5 Division of ETOUSA and the American element of the SHAEF G-5 Division were consolidated into the G-5 Division of USFET headquarters. The U.S. Group, Control Council, the American element of the Allied Control Council and the policy-determining agency for the U.S. Zone, was redesignated the Office of Military Government, U.S. (OMGUS), on 1 October 1945.

³(1) GYA Study, pp. 2-3. (2) USFET ltr, 7 Jul 45, sub: Sec VII Part I Education Par 12 (Administration of Military Government in U.S. Zone of Germany). AG 014.1-1 (6).

OCCUPIED ZONES OF GERMANY
1945

MAP 1



LEGEND:

----- Laender BOUNDARY

KILOMETERS

0 20 40 60 80 100

Consequently, military government's responsibilities could not and did not cease with the setting up of Jugendaemter and other welfare agencies.⁴

b. Nonfraternization. As so often happens, official policy had to be adjusted to existing facts. Initially, the controversial nonfraternization policy prohibited friendly contacts with Germans. Military personnel had been instructed not to mingle with Germans upon terms of friendliness, or intimacy, whether individually or in groups in official or unofficial dealings. But no amount of orientation or regimentation could convince the soldier of the soundness of this policy, especially as it related to children. Widespread violation of the nonfraternization policy began with the establishment of friendly relations between American soldiers and German children. Command recognition of the situation began on 8 June 1945 when U.S. troops were permitted to associate with German children. Contacts with the children led to contacts with the parents, and on 10 July 1945 further relaxation of the nonfraternization restrictions permitted troops to engage in conversation with Germans in public places, a development that led to a complete breakdown of the nonfraternization rule in many localities. All restrictions on fraternization except for known Nazi elements were removed in Austria by 24 August 1945; these restrictions were also lifted in Germany on 1 October 1945.⁵

3. The First Program

Even before the total collapse of the nonfraternization policy U.S. military personnel in July 1945 had made sporadic efforts in several localities to establish youth groups among Germans. Although this activity was contrary to nonfraternization rules and was therefore without official support, it achieved considerable success, especially in the Bremen Enclave. In September 1945 Seventh Army instituted the first broad program of German youth activities in the area then known as the Western Military District, comprising Greater Hesse and Wuerttemberg-Baden. Chaplains and other military personnel were encouraged to organize youth activities.⁶

Lt. Gen. Geoffrey Keyes, the Seventh Army commander, directed that the youth activities be organized on a local basis, that they be coordinated with local military government authorities, where necessary, and that they be conducted within the bounds of the fraternization regulations. Idle and restless youth, subject to possible subversive influences, were the concern of the Seventh Army program. No distinction was

⁴GYA Study, p. 4.

⁵EUCOM Hist Div, Occupation Forces in Europe Series, 1945-46, The First Year of the Occupation, Pt. V, pp. 81-93.

⁶EUCOM Hist Div, Occupation Forces In Europe Series, 1945-46, Fraternization with the Germans in World War II, pp. 139-40.

to be made between the children of Nazi or anti-Nazi parents, because the program was intended to assist in the democratic reorientation of German youth. This was to be achieved by acquainting the young people with such activities and interests as woodcrafts and athletics that were normal to youths of similar age in the United States.⁷

Military government opposed the Seventh Army interim youth program because it was inaugurated before the issuance of new regulations, which were being prepared in order to set up a broad youth program. The crucial point of difference was that the army actively organized and supported youth groups, contrary to military government policy of making the Germans themselves responsible for such activity. The continuation of this practice by the military forces in the U.S. Zone of Germany later gave rise to a thorny question: namely, was the Army the appropriate agency to sponsor German youth activities, a function regarded by opponents of military sponsorship as a civilian one? Military government objected to the use of Army chaplains in youth work because the functions of chaplains pertained strictly to military personnel. Nevertheless, the chaplains continued their work. The question of whether organizing German youth was within the bounds of the fraternization ban was removed from contention on 1 October 1945, when, as noted above, all restrictions were lifted.⁸

4. The Theater-wide Program

In October 1945 USFET set up on a zone-wide scale the procedure whereby German youth groups were to be organized and supervised. The commanding generals of the Eastern and Western Military Districts and the subordinate commands of the U.S. Zone of Germany were directed to encourage the formation of voluntary youth groups for cultural, religious, and recreational purposes. Youth committees, composed of German educational and religious leaders as well as trade union representatives, were organized at Kreis (county) and Land (state) levels for the purpose of initiating and supervising youth activities. The Germans themselves were given the responsibility for establishing youth activities programs under the over-all control of the local military government agencies. Selection of the leadership personnel for the youth groups approved by the Kreis and Land youth committees, while initially a responsibility of the various committees, was subject to final approval by the local

⁷ Seventh Army ltr, West Mil Dist, 14 Sep 45, sub: Organization of Youth Activities. AG 353. 8/2.

⁸ Ibid., pp. 6-7.

military government officer.⁹

While youth groups were forbidden to discriminate on grounds of race or religion, as well as on socio-economic grounds, the churches were permitted to organize youth along denominational lines, and the trade unions were authorized to re-create their youth auxiliaries of the Weimar period. In effect, the groundwork for the re-creation of German youth programs as they had existed in the years of the Weimar Republic, had been laid, except that all militaristic, nationalistic, or totalitarian practices were forbidden.

Seventh Army revised its original directive on the organization of youth activities to conform with the terms of the theater directive. As military occupation units were withdrawn from communities, local youth groups formerly assisted by the military were in danger of being left without sponsors. For this reason the control of such youth groups was to be turned over to the local Kreis youth committees in accordance with pertinent military government regulations. Even in areas where military units still remained on occupation duty, formal control of all youth groups under unit sponsorship was to be turned over to the Kreis committees in accordance with military government regulations, and the army units were to continue their youth work in cooperation with the Kreis youth committees.¹⁰

5. The Kreis Youth Committees

The Kreis Youth Committees were composed of German men and women representing the schools, the churches, the youth welfare office, the local health authorities, and various economic groups, such as the trade unions. If possible, a prominent public official, such as the Landrat (State Councilor) or the Oberbuergermeister (Lord Mayor), was appointed chairman of the committee. Applications to form organized youth groups had to be submitted to a Kreis committee that was responsible for carefully screening the sponsors and leaders of these groups. After the

⁹USFET ltr, CG's East & West Mil Dists, 25 Oct 45, sub: Amendment to Part I (Education), Section VII (Education and Religious Affairs), Administration of Military Government in the U.S. Zone of Germany, 7 Jul 45. AG 014.1 GEC-AGO. As the subject indicates, this letter directive was the result of the revision of military government regulations pertaining to the youth program. In August and September a new set of regulations had been written to provide greater uniformity in the type of activities undertaken by the new groups. Every effort was to be made to prevent the subversion of these groups by undemocratic or antidemocratic political elements. On 7 September 1945 representatives from the Office of Military Government for Greater Hesse, USFET, and U.S. Group, Control Council, discussed these regulations and approved their publication. See GYA Study, p. 8.

¹⁰Seventh Army ltr, 10 Dec 45, sub: Youth Activities. AG 322 CA.

application had been approved by the committee, it was forwarded to the military governor at the state level for final approval. Once a youth group had been formed, the Kreis committee became directly responsible for the group in compliance with the directives and regulations of military government.¹¹

Existing directives, however, gave military government no operating responsibility for the organized German youth activities. Active sponsorship of such activities was a function of the Kreis committees, while the military government officials merely exercised general supervisory authority.¹²

Additional youth committees were established at the Land level under the respective ministers of education. The staff of the committees included full-time state employees assigned to work with the various Kreis committees as representatives of the Land government. By March 1946 each of the three Laender in the U.S. Zone had organized its own Land youth committees, and by December 1946 every Kreis in the three Laender had a youth committee.

Bavaria, the largest of the three Laender in the U.S. Zone of Germany, was perhaps typical in its methods of forming Kreis youth committees. The Bavarian youth committee was established on 24 May 1946. This committee was divided into 6 working committees which included sport groups and youth hostels, cultural affairs, religious affairs, publicity, social, and economic affairs. Local Kreis youth committees were then established with the assistance of the Land committee. By the end of July 1946 these committees had approved the formation of more than 70 youth groups with about 100,000 participants.¹³

Forming the committees was a slow process. Approximately 10 months after publication of the directive only 64 out of the 168 Kreise in Bavaria had formed their youth committees. A large number of the counties in Bavaria were predominantly rural, which probably accounted for this delay. In rural areas the youth were generally fully employed in farm work; whereas in urban areas, which had suffered more severely from the destruction of war, youth problems were more urgent. Moreover, the reluctance of the peasants to allow their children to join youth organizations hindered what efforts were made to promote youth activities among rural youth.¹⁴

¹¹USFET ltr, 25 Oct 45, cited above.

¹²Military Government Weekly Information Bulletin, No. 38, 22 Apr 46, p. 7.

¹³Ltr, OMGUS for Bavaria to Director, OMGUS Bavaria, 20 Jul 46. In SGS 353.81 Ger (1946), Vol. I, Item 49B.

¹⁴(1) Ibid. (2) "Youth Activities," OMGUS Rept on German Youth, Second Year of the Occupation, 1 Apr 46-31 Mar 47.

CHAPTER 2

The Organizational Phase, 1946-47

6. The Beginning of Army Assistance

a. The Need. Before the Kreis youth committees were established, troop units stationed in some cities had sponsored certain youth activities. Though informally organized on an emergency basis, these efforts were moderately successful in dealing with some of the problems of German youth. The assignment by military government of major organizational and operational responsibilities for youth activities to the Land and Kreis youth committees had coincided with the withdrawal of occupation troops from many localities. This had left many of the Kreis committees without support in obtaining facilities and equipment necessary to conduct a youth program. By the end of 1945 it had become evident that unless these committees received some form of logistical support, their role in restoring a democratic German youth program would be either sharply curtailed or eliminated. With its requisitioning authority and its extensive logistical organization, USFET was the logical agency to assist the Kreis committees in securing buildings and equipment. Earlier USFET directives had dealt only with the procedural aspects of organizing German youth activities and with the relationship of the Army to them. Hence, additional guidance was required if the Army was to assist the youth groups with urgently needed logistical support.

b. Logistical Problems. On 15 April 1946 USFET provided such guidance and authorized Army units to provide limited logistical and personnel support to German youth organizations in the U.S. Zone. Specifically, USFET ordered the direct issue of captured German military equipment to the Kreis committees. Surplus American equipment was to be made available to the education sections of the Offices of Military Government for distribution to youth groups in the U.S. Zone and the Berlin area. In addition to releasing athletic equipment to the Germans, troop commanders were instructed to survey existing athletic and recreational facilities in their administrative areas for the purpose of sharing them, at least on a part-time basis, with the German youth

organizations. Qualified U.S. personnel were requested to participate in the youth activities program with a view to applying the highest democratic ideals and most effective methods to the German youth program. To support these efforts, during the month of April 1946 one hour of the troop information and education program was devoted to explaining to the troops the importance of soldier participation in the German youth programs and to indicating how they might contribute to these activities.¹

c. Responsibilities. Unit commanders were specifically directed to assist the development of the youth activities program in several ways. They were to establish close liaison with the education sections of the appropriate military government offices and offer assistance to the local youth committees. The latter were to be assisted in sponsoring the formation of Jugendheime (youth centers) for various youth activities. This was the first mention of the concept of youth centers, around which the Army-sponsored German youth activities program gradually developed.

Other activities whose sponsorship by the Kreis committees was to be assisted by the Army were showings of appropriate films, athletic competitions between local German teams, informal trade and handicraft classes, repair and reconstruction projects. Beginning in May 1946 subordinate commanders were to prepare monthly reports on the services and assistance rendered by their troops to the youth committees and organizations.

The role of the Office of Military Government (OMGUS) in relation to the youth program could be summed up in the term "responsibility." Broadly and briefly, OMGUS responsibility included developing policy and standards governing all youth activities; screening applications for founding new groups; appointing Germans who would be responsible for organization and reports; approving members of youth committees, as well as leaders and sponsors of youth groups; and enforcing all OMGUS regulations governing youth activities, especially those involving membership requirements, uniform prohibitions, and other forbidden activities.

In contrast, the key word defining the Army's role in German youth activities at this time was "assistance." The formal title designating the over-all youth assistance program originated at the same time: Army Assistance Program to German Youth Activities (GYA).²

On 29 July 1946 the German Youth Activities (GYA) Section was created within the G-3 Division, Headquarters, USFET, to supervise the youth assistance program. Later this section functioned as a part of the Operations, Plans, Organization, and Training Division (OPOT) of

¹USFET ltr, 15 Apr 46, sub: Army Assistance to German Youth Activities, U.S. Zone. AG 353.8 GCT-AGO.

²Ibid.

EUCOM when that headquarters replaced USFET.³

The name of the program was changed again in the summer of 1948 to reflect the unification of the Armed Forces in September 1947. The program was eventually redesignated the Armed Forces Assistance Program to German Youth Activities, because the Air Force, which had participated in GYA when it had been part of the Army, continued to do so as a separate service.

d. Air Force Reaction. The U.S. Air Forces in Europe (USAFE), one of the subordinate commands of USFET, entertained serious doubts concerning the program as it was then constituted. Recognizing the youth program as an important part of the basic problem of social and cultural reconstruction of Germany, USAFE maintained that the German people needed extensive reeducation in democratic principles. USFET's proposed program to assist in this reeducation would be inadequate because sufficient qualified personnel were not available. Moreover, since military units were scattered in relatively few locations, assistance could be provided to only a small segment of the U.S. Zone. Every acceptable German would be needed to implement a thoroughgoing reeducation program. Any program based on voluntary work would be handicapped by the German disinclination to take any initiative and the American lack of experience and training in assisting German youth.

To provide for an effective program, USAFE proposed that USFET recruit an adequate number of specialists in the United States to administer the program; institute an American program of training for German teachers, youth instructors, and social workers; organize an extensive program of work and reeducation camps for youth; provide suitable books, periodicals and films to implement the educational program; provide a thorough adult education program; utilize prisoners of war returning from the United States in the youth program; and send selected German youths to the United States for one year and use them as youth workers upon their return. If such a program could not be enacted, USFET ought to leave the entire responsibility for youth assistance to OMGUS and the German civil authorities.⁴

³Oliver J. Fredericksen, The American Military Occupation of Germany, 1945-1953 (USAREUR Hist Div, 1953), pp. 129-38. Further reorganizations and redesignations of the United States forces in Europe occurred within the period covered by this narrative. Thus, USFET became the European Command (EUCOM) on 15 March 1947, and EUCOM was redesignated U.S. Army, Europe (USAREUR), on 1 August 1952.

⁴Ltr, CG USAFE to CG USFET, 29 Jun 46, sub: The Problem of German Youth and the Army Assistance to German Youth Program. In USAREUR Hist Div GYA files.

Before the Army's official youth assistance program had been a few months old, the Air Force had accurately predicted the chief difficulties that the program would encounter. Insofar as the suggested measures for alleviating the difficulties were carried out, the program was successful. The inability to solve all the complicated problems of youth assistance reflected the natural limitations of a military agency in dealing with a nonmilitary mission.

7. The USFET Program

a. Athletics. With the end of hostilities the Army had been faced with the problem of keeping large numbers of young soldiers active in wholesome Army-supervised activities. The zone-wide sports and handicraft programs were the Army's answer to the problem of idle and restless troops. It was logical to extend this answer to the problem of idle and homeless German youth. During the summer of 1946 formal attempts were made to include German youth in the athletic program. At the summer session of the Theater Athletic School held in Stuttgart that June, approximately 350 young Germans--in addition to the regular military students--were given instruction in coaching methods, games demonstrations, and opportunities to participate actively in athletic contests. Instruction was given in all sports except golf and hard baseball, with the greatest interest being shown by the youths in tennis and softball. The favorable response to this program led the USFET headquarters to consider the desirability of conducting similar programs on a zone-wide basis.⁵

b. Handicrafts. With the response to its athletic program so favorable, the Army decided to extend to German youth its well-organized handicrafts program, which had been created for the U.S. forces following the end of hostilities. On 25 November 1946 USFET headquarters authorized all units to admit German youth to the Special Services manual arts installations for the purpose of working with American military personnel on gifts of a practical nature.⁶ In view of the existing difficulties in purchasing the most elementary household items and the abject poverty of millions of homeless people, the handicrafts program provided young people with wholesome as well as rewarding work opportunities and brought them in contact with American personnel and ideas. During the severe winter of 1946-47 the Army assistance program rendered invaluable help to many local youth groups by providing heated rooms for indoor activities. Similar programs sponsored by the Germans during the same period were faltering due to the general lack of materials. The U.S. armed forces thus provided vitally needed assistance at a time when German youth groups and committees were unable to help themselves.⁷

⁵USFET ltr, to CG Third Army, CG Berlin Dist, etc., 22 Jul 46. In file above, Item 50.

⁶USFET ltr, 25 Nov 46, sub: Theater Special Services Manual Arts Program for Assistance to GYA. In file above, Item 85B.

⁷"Youth Activities," OMCUS Rept on German Youth, Second Year of the Occupation, 1 Apr 46-31 Mar 47.



Instructing German youth in American basketball, Bamberg, 1946

c. The Unit-Sponsored Centers. The spontaneous efforts of military units since the beginning of the program had been made largely in behalf of young people who were not being served by organized groups. The youth centers had been set up on an open-door principle to attract those who might drift in off the streets or who had no other place to go for entertainment.

The story of the creation of the Wendl Dietrichstrasse GYA center in Munich illustrates this point. A quartermaster unit was stationed in a barracks on that street, near a large, rubble-filled lot where the neighborhood children frequently gathered to play. The soldiers watching the children play in these ruins decided to help make the lot a more pleasant playground. In their spare time and with Army equipment the soldiers cleared the lot and soon built a fine playground for the children. On the edge of the playground stood a former youth hostel confiscated by the Army and badly in need of repair. When rain interrupted their outdoor activities, the children would take shelter in the empty building. Some of the soldiers then decided to rehabilitate the building, utilizing scrap and salvage material, as a club house for the children. Eventually, with the coming of cold weather, all types of childrens' activities were going on inside the club house; these consisted of games and handicraft work as well as reading and discussion groups under the supervision of soldiers who volunteered their free time for such work.⁸

As can be seen from the foregoing example, such efforts were generally undertaken for younger children--usually from the poorer neighborhoods--who were not members of established youth clubs. This remained true of the GYA assistance program throughout the years of its existence.

8. German-Sponsored Groups

Meanwhile the German authorities of the three Laender in the U.S. Zone were organizing their own youth activities. By the end of 1945 the revival of the German youth activities had manifested itself largely in the organization of Boy Scout groups, youth hostels (international hiking and camping organizations), and youth camps. By the summer of 1946 the first postwar general youth rally in Baden-Wuerttemberg was held at Kirchheim-Teck, where more than 1,000 youths gathered for a Landesjugendtag (State Youth Day). Representatives of various youth organizations took part in a program of folk dancing and community singing and in the celebration of the traditional summer solstice with the burning of St. John's Fire. Heinrich Hassinger of the Land Education Ministry and Richard Schirrmann, the founder of the International

⁸ Interv, Mr. L. W. Walker, USAREUR Hist Div, with Miss Elizabeth van Ow, 10 Apr 54.

Youth Hostel Movement, spoke to the gathering.⁹ With the encouragement of military government, trade unions and churches throughout the U.S. Zone took interest in re-creating their own youth groups. At Land trade union conferences held in Baden-Wuerttemberg and in Greater Hesse the delegates showed a readiness to tackle the problem of the younger workers. Moreover, the trade unions acquired in August 1946 an important medium of expression for discussing, among other things, the problem of youth: namely, three semimonthly trade union publications published in the three Laender of the U.S. Zone and in West Berlin.¹⁰

The main stimulus, however, to youth work came generally from such organizations as German churches, sport groups, and trade unions. Approximately 90 percent of the German youth activities were sponsored by these groups, which would undoubtedly have organized such activities even without assistance from the occupation forces.¹¹

9. Youth Amnesty

One of the larger groups of juvenile delinquents in the early occupation period had been former members of the Hitler youth formations. Military government regulations had automatically classified these youngsters as members of the Nazi Party and had thus denied them positions of responsibility in youth organizations and opportunities to seek a higher education. If they could find work, it was only as unskilled labor.¹² If these young people were to be rehabilitated, they could no longer be excluded from the society in which they would have to live and work. Consequently, in August 1946 the Office of Military Government declared an amnesty for young people born after 1 January 1919.¹³ This step opened the German youth movement to a wider group of young people, many of whom were potential leaders.

Leadership training for German-sponsored youth groups was a problem for which no solution was found prior to 1948. Although military government encouraged the training of youth organization leaders, no leadership training schools were actually opened in the U.S. Zone during the first three years of the occupation.¹⁴

⁹Military Government Weekly Information Bulletin, No. 49, 8 Jul 46, p. 32.

¹⁰Military Government Weekly Information Bulletin, No. 79, 9 Dec 46, p. 26.

¹¹OMGUS Rept, "German Youth Between Yesterday and Tomorrow," 1 Apr 47-30 Apr 48.

¹²Memo, USFET IG to USFET COFS, 15 Apr 46, sub: Youth Program. In SGS 353.81 Ger (1946), Vol. I, Item 22B.

¹³Lucius D. Clay, Decision in Germany (Garden City, L. I., 1950), p. 260.

¹⁴"Youth Activities," OMGUS Rept cited above, p. 30.

10. Defining the Army's Role

a. Youth Program Conference. The contribution of the military units in the command to the activities of German youth was disappointing. Personnel difficulties, problems of supply and transportation, liaison inadequacies, and German apathy or antagonism were the chief factors militating against the success of the Army's assistance program. By the summer of 1946 it was apparent that the official program of assistance launched the previous spring had to be broadened in scope and strengthened to allow the Army to grant more aid to greater numbers. For this purpose representatives of the major commands and of military government met on 7-9 August in the first of a series of conferences on the youth assistance program.

This conference was significant in that it provided the basis for the Army's assumption of an operational role in the over-all German youth program. The point of emphasis was shifted from assisting German youth centers to organizing new centers. The military government officials attending the conference emphasized placing responsibility on German civilian agencies; in their opinion the role of the occupation forces would be to determine and guide policy and maintain a degree of security. A program centered around athletics and sports would be wholesome and effective, especially in combating delinquency, but would not go far enough. The objective of the program would be the democratic reeducation of German youth, which was part of the larger goal of re-orienting the entire nation to democracy. The question of who should plan for this type of program was raised and answered by military government. A civilian agency ought to plan such a program with the Army's full cooperation and help. If the Army played too prominent a part, there might be not only a negative Congressional reaction but an unfortunate result with German youth, especially when the role of militarism in German history is considered. Finally, the military government representatives felt that the program of reorientation was not a military operation.

Despite this position, or perhaps because of it, the conferees agreed that the Army ought to initiate the organizing of new groups. Close liaison would have to be kept with military government and local youth committees so that eventually greater responsibility could be given to the German people. In defining the ultimate goal of the youth program, the conferees agreed to strive for the reeducation and rehabilitation of German youth.¹⁵

b. General Clay's Views. Shortly after the conference Gen. Lucius D. Clay, then deputy commander of USFET and deputy Military Governor, expressed his views on the youth program. He thought that both the Army and military government ought to stay out of the operational field in

¹⁵Min, Conf on Army Assistance to GYA, USFET G-3 Div, 7-9 Aug 46. In USAREUR Hist Div GYA files.

German Youth Activities, especially below the Land level. The program of reeducation would have to be handled by the Germans, with the Americans encouraging and supporting suitable German leaders. The assistance given the youth groups by the occupation forces would have to be indirect. Such assistance would supplement the already existing German-sponsored youth program, but was not intended to replace or to compete with such programs.¹⁶ This position was restated substantially in another conference on youth activities, on 22 October 1946, soon after USFET authorized the formation of new youth centers under Army sponsorship. Youth assistance was not to be regarded as a philanthropic enterprise, but as a program to help German youth in building a sound and democratic movement, a point emphasized previously. American guidance and advice was to be given only when needed and to encourage the youth groups to develop their own resources so as to carry on when American assistance would be withdrawn.¹⁷

c. Implementation. The policies discussed and the decisions reached at the summer conference were implemented in October 1946 by USFET. Military government retained primary responsibility for reeducation and for youth activities; the occupation forces' positive military mission was active assistance to organized and unorganized German youth. The assistance given was to be within the organizational pattern and policy established by OMGUS, whose responsibilities for youth activities remained essentially unchanged. The participation of the commands in GYA and the functions of the German youth committees also remained substantially the same. Briefly, the functional organization of assistance to GYA was as follows: U.S. Army personnel gave assistance to the Youth Activities Section in the Education and Religious Affairs Branch of each Land Military Government office and to each youth committee within the Laender. Army assistance functioned normally through the chain of command from EUCOM headquarters through the operational commands and the zonal organization of military districts and military posts. The U.S. Constabulary, USAFE, Headquarters Command EUCOM, and the Bremerhaven Port of Embarkation were directed to conduct the assistance program in all subordinate commands and component units. Military posts, supervised directly by the military districts, were charged with coordinating, assisting, and advising on the operations of units within their respective geographical areas. Military post personnel also conducted their own programs and activities and supervised the units assigned to the post (Chart 1).


The shortage of supervisory personnel was to be alleviated by permitting the dependents of military and U.S. civilian personnel to assist in the program. Within existing strength ceilings German

¹⁶ Ltrs, Gen L. D. Clay to Gen J. T. McNarney, 10 Sep 46, and to Lt Gen C. R. Huebner, 28 Sep 46. Both in SGS 353.81 Ger (1946), Vol. I, Item 61.

¹⁷ Military Government Weekly Information Bulletin, No. 67, 11 Nov 46, pp. 6-7.

ORGANIZATIONAL CHART, GERMAN YOUTH PROGRAM

Theater Commander and Military Governor



————— Command
-----Coordination and Assistance

Tactical units coordinated laterally with each other.

Source: Incl 1 to USFET ltr, 5 Oct 46. AG 353 GCT-AGO.

civilians could also be employed as playground attendants, athletic storehouse employees, and clerks, but not as supervisors or program planners. Supplies and equipment were to be turned over to German youth on a permanent basis and were to be drawn from four major sources: indigenous supplies, captured enemy material, supplies and equipment excess to theater requirements, and unit supplies and organizational equipment.

To counteract a potential rise in juvenile delinquency during the winter months, when outdoor youth activities declined, the command authorized the establishment of a suitable building in the vicinity of each military community for the exclusive use of youth groups. In addition all commanders were to try to obtain the part-time use of churches, schools, and other public buildings for German youth organizations.¹⁸

11. The Creation of Army Youth Centers

The authority to obtain buildings for the use of youth groups in effect meant that the Army was directly sponsoring the creation of German youth centers. Properties were requisitioned, sometimes including public welfare installations. Many units established centers without determining from the local youth committees whether there was an actual need for this type of activity in the community. Throughout 1947 American-sponsored GYA centers were opened wherever U.S. military units were stationed in the U.S. Zone of Germany. By the end of that year 323 centers were operating in the zone and in Berlin. This marked the high point in the number of centers because growing official and unofficial opposition curtailed the creation of additional centers.

a. German Opposition. Despite the good intentions of the Army in supervising and operating the youth centers, this activity aroused antagonism and resentment in the German community for several reasons. One was the requisitioning of additional properties. The general failure of U.S. military units to coordinate and maintain effective liaison with the Kreis youth committees was another source of friction. German youth leaders charged that the Army's assistance program organized rival youth groups and, to some extent, proselyted already existing organizations. Another difficulty lay in the fact that U.S. military personnel could not work in youth organizations under German supervision and, hence, served in supervisory or advisory capacities. However, since few military personnel were qualified by education or experience to assume these responsibilities successfully, German youth groups were reluctant to accept assistance on American terms, that is, direct sponsorship and operation of German youth centers.

¹⁸USFET ltr, 5 Oct 46, sub: Army Assistance to German Youth Activities, U.S. Zone, AG 353.8 GCT-AGO.



GYA Center at Schwabing, near Munich, 1948

b. OMGUS Position. Since the point of emphasis in U.S. Army assistance had shifted from helping organized groups to organizing new centers, the military government system of channeling assistance to organized groups through the local committees was affected. This development tended to weaken the system of civil-military cooperation that OMGUS had hoped to use to assist in the re-creation of a free, democratic German youth movement. To counteract this trend OMGUS redefined and clarified the Army's mission in giving assistance to German youth. First, the Army was to determine from German youth leaders and committees the needs of their organizations and to make plans for sharing the necessary facilities with the Germans. Second, the Army was to encourage the initiation of activities of interest to youth and around which a group might later be organized. Finally, the Army was to sponsor informal events such as picnics, motion picture shows, and excursions, which would require neither the participation of German organizations nor the authority of military government.¹⁹ With the formation of new Army youth centers, practice obviously did not conform to policy.

12. Adjusting Practice to Policy

The effect of authorizing the creation of new centers was to expand the entire GYA program considerably. General Clay thought that the program had reached such huge proportions that further drastic expansion would be undesirable. The general further opposed the requisitioning of additional facilities for the program because of the adverse effect such action would have upon the rehabilitation of the German economy.²⁰

a. Clarifying GYA Objectives. Stressing the goal of increasing the caliber and the effectiveness of the existing program rather than increasing the number of youth being assisted, the Army redirected its youth assistance program in July 1947. Personnel, facilities, and materials available for GYA were to be employed primarily for assisting organized and approved youth groups--that is, groups with written constitutions and whose existence had been approved by the local Kreis youth committee. Youth groups not yet organized but striving toward that goal were second in order of priority for Army assistance, while unorganized youth were third. Close and friendly liaison was to be maintained between individual Army units and local Kreis youth committees so that the U.S. forces could fulfill the mission of youth assistance as originally conceived. Units that had not already

¹⁹ Memo, Col J. W. Curtis, C/USFET OPOT Div TI&E Br to OPOT Div, 27 Jul 47, sub: Conference at OMGUS re GYA Matters. In USAREUR Hist Div GYA files.

²⁰ Ltr, Lt Gen C. R. Huebner, EUCOM COFS, to Maj Gen W. A. Burress, CG US Constab, 25 Jul 47. In SGS 353.81 Ger:(1947); Vol. I, Item 55B.

established such liaison were ordered to do so without delay.²¹ As a result, some units succeeded in consolidating their own youth centers with the established youth groups--generally sport clubs--and in maintaining close and effective relations with the Kreis youth committees.²²

b. Limiting Formation of Youth Centers. During the same summer OMGUS requested EUCOM not to organize any additional youth centers unless the responsible German youth committee agreed that such a center was needed. Also, the Germans would have to be willing to assume responsibility for the center after it had been established and to maintain it after the American units had left the area. Youth centers that had already been established would be continued, but every effort was to be made to enlist community support.²³ On 3 October 1947 General Clay ordered that no more youth centers be established. He also wanted the USFET assistance program operated outside of military government's jurisdiction, but within the framework of its regulations. This view was very close to the Army's original concept of a program functioning independently within that framework, but differed from what the USFET and OMGUS youth activities officials had believed the Army assistance program to be--a well-organized, closely supervised implementation of military government policy on youth reeducation.²⁴ General Clay's views reflected his concern over the growth of a large organizational structure to carry on the youth assistance program and over the role of civilians (in military government) in what was regarded as a military operation.

13. The Civic Centers

The civic youth center idea, an extension of the GYA center program, was inaugurated during May 1947 in an effort to relieve the bleakness of life in the overcrowded cities. The first center was established in Heidelberg and similar centers were created with varying degrees of success in other cities. Through the civic centers the entire family was to be brought together to share in and understand the activities of their children. The Heidelberg civic center consisted of the ground floor and basement of a former store, in addition to a 16-room house that was used as a girls' center and a similar house for boys. The program, approved by a German committee and carried out by a staff of German instructors under American supervision, included instruction in music, sewing, dancing, art, woodworking, photography, and English.²⁵

²¹USFET ltr, 25 Jul 47, sub: Clarification of German Youth Activities, Policies and Procedures. AG 353.8 GOT AGO. In SGS 353.81 Ger (1947), Vol. I, Item 57B, Tab A.

²²Occupation Chronicle, September 26, 1947.

²³Memo, Lt Col R. C. Hall, C/EUCOM OPOT Div GYA Sec to C/OPOT Div TI&E Br, 25 Aug 47, sub: Report on Conference with OMGUS re GYA Guide. In USAREUR Hist Div GYA files.

²⁴EUCOM OPOT Div Rept on Conf with OMGUS and Gen Clay for Revision of Army Assistance Program, 6 Oct 47. In USAREUR Hist Div GYA files.

²⁵HICOG Weekly Information Bulletin, No. 109, 8 Sep 47, pp. 7-9.



The Biederstein Youth Center in construction



The Biederstein Youth Center completed, 1951

Each child was required to bring a letter from his parents indicating that they were aware of the child's membership in GYA and were familiar with the purpose of the organization. Another approach was to invite the parents to observe and to participate in the activities of the center, to take part in group discussions, dances, social evenings, and athletic events, or, in some cases, to participate as instructors in various handicraft activities.²⁶

Shortages of funds and personnel to operate the civic centers greatly limited their scope, and the smaller centers therefore remained the primary vehicle for assistance to German youth.

14. The Personnel Problem

In 1946 the command attempted informally to attract soldier personnel to participate in GYA. By the beginning of the next year an official indoctrination program was inaugurated to encourage soldier participation in the youth program. Despite these efforts the youth assistance program suffered from a shortage of volunteer personnel.²⁷

a. Volunteer Workers. Faithful volunteer workers, as for example, PFC Milton Kefauver of the 686th Army Air Force Band who spent his 2-week leave leading a group of 40 German Boy Scouts on a hiking trip and who served in his free time as a scoutmaster of a local Boy Scout troop, were comparatively rare.²⁸

The work of Sgt. Patrick J. Moriarty and his colleagues of the Bremerhaven Port of Embarkation was an outstanding example of volunteer assistance to GYA. Early in 1947 Sgt. Moriarty advertised in a Bremen newspaper that ten American soldiers were willing to spend their free time organizing a club for German boys aged 10-17. They soon had over 7,000 applications from interested boys, and selected their first boys' club from this group.²⁹ While these examples of military personnel giving unselfishly of their free time to serve the GYA program attracted wide and well-deserved attention, they were, unfortunately, not characteristic of the over-all situation.

²⁶ Ltr, USFET to CG OMGUS, CG Third Army Area, CG USAFE, etc., 18 Jan 47. In SGS 353.81 Ger (1947), Vol. I, Item 3A.

²⁷ USFET ltr, 5 Oct 46, sub: Army Assistance to GYA, U.S. Zone. AG 353.8 GOT-AGO.

²⁸ Wiesbaden Post, January 3, 1947.

²⁹ USFET I&E Bulletin, Vol. 2, No. 10, 9 Mar 47, "Youth Programs that are Winning the Peace."

b. Personnel Shortages. The shortage of sufficiently trained American supervisory personnel was one of the most important factors hampering the effectiveness of GYA. Only a few of the estimated 134 military personnel and 25 Department of Army civilians working full-time in the youth assistance program were specifically provided for in unit tables of organization or authorized civilian spaces. The majority of such personnel were charged against other assignments and frequently rotated. This meant that their services were available to the GYA program for a very limited period. Moreover, because T/O's provided no spaces for GYA positions, personnel employed in youth activity work were often at a disadvantage in obtaining proper ratings in their particular MOS. Capable and promising personnel were often reluctant to accept such assignments, and many unit commanders were unwilling to assign such personnel to GYA for the same reason.³⁰ Consequently, inspections revealed that many units were assigning unfit personnel to GYA duties simply to comply with the requirement that a GYA officer or NCO be appointed in each unit.³¹

c. Female Supervisors. Proper supervision of girls' activities remained a problem throughout the duration of the GYA program. The active cooperation of American women dependents of U.S. military personnel as well as of German women, especially school teachers, was constantly sought by the Army.³² Personnel from the Women's Army Corps were brought into the picture by USFET to help provide leadership for girls' activities of the youth assistance program. The placement of a WAC officer was authorized for military government headquarters at the Land level to supervise the girls' activities phase of GYA. At the same time, USFET authorized the assignment of qualified WAC officer or enlisted personnel to the staff of the youth activities officers operating at stations where WAC detachments were located. Such WAC personnel devoted their entire time to organizing and conducting girls' activities. Extension of their services to youth groups in outlying localities, however, was permitted only if they remained billeted with their own WAC detachments.³³

It was planned to assign a WAC officer to each military post as the GYA officer for girls' activities. This plan, however, was blocked because no spaces were available for the assignment of WAC personnel except by displacing an equal number of male officers. To overcome this

³⁰"Youth Activities," OMGUS Rept on German Youth, Second Year of the Occupation, 1 Apr 46-31 Mar 47. (2) Cable S-2050, USFET to CG OMGUS Berlin, 14 Aug 47. In SGS 353.81 Ger (1947), Vol. II, Item 60B.

³¹Ltr, USFET G-3 TI&E Br to ACOFS G-3, 10 Feb 47. In SGS 353.81 Ger (1947), Vol. I, Item 8C.

³²Cable SC-21078, USFET to All Conc, 4 Nov 46. In SGS 353.81 Ger (1946), Vol. I, Item 79A.

³³Cable SC-23120, USFET to All Conc, 23 Dec 46. In file above, Item 83A.

obstacle it was proposed to secure the services of high grade civil service women employees who would become advisors to the post commanders on GYA matters for girls.³⁴

This plan was impractical because the Army's limited control over civilian employees' assignment and station precluded the use of civilians in this type of work. Moreover, it seemed doubtful that a sufficient number of qualified civilian employees would be available in the command.³⁵ The Army therefore continued to use Wacs whenever possible to supervise girls' activities, with civilian women employees and volunteer dependent wives lending assistance. This, however, proved to be generally unsatisfactory due to the lack of coordination and continuity of effort.³⁶ Nevertheless, efforts were made to improve the quality of leadership and to encourage greater participation in the GYA by volunteer women dependents. To this end a zone-wide GYA training conference attended by more than 250 women was held in Berlin in May 1947. At this time there were 32 WAC officer and enlisted personnel assigned to full-time duty with GYA at the 6 major commands and 9 military posts. They were responsible for the recruitment and training of women volunteers to assist in leading discussion groups and in giving instruction in sewing, music, handicrafts, dancing, home nursing, home economics, and dramatics. It was estimated at the time that there was an approximate average monthly part-time participation of 1,000 dependent wives in this phase of GYA.³⁷

d. Employment of German Civilians. Although the employment of German civilians to assist in the implementation of the program was authorized, their use in supervisory or planning activities in the youth centers was not intended. However, the shortage of American personnel made U.S. participation in the operation of the centers more and more irregular and ultimately led to virtual German control. The only continuity of the GYA program ever attained at center level was provided by the German civilian employees. A total of 935 German employees formed the bulk of the full-time personnel engaged in operating the youth centers. Their assistance was all the more necessary because most of the U.S. military volunteer personnel participated in the GYA program mainly during the Christmas season.

³⁴Ltr, EUCOM OPOT Div to COFS, 10 Apr 47. In SGS 353.81 Ger (1947), Vol. I, Item 28B-1.

³⁵Memo, EUCOM COFS, to EUCOM OPOT Div, 12 Jun 47. In file above, Item 42B.

³⁶DF, EUCOM OPOT Div to C/OMGUS Internal Aff & Comm Div, Off of Sp Educ & Religious Br, 3 May 47. In file above, Item 36B.

³⁷OMGUS Rept, German Youth Between Yesterday and Tomorrow, 1 Apr 47-30 Apr 48, p. 10.

15. Logistical Support

In analyzing the problem of logistical support of GYA, it is important to distinguish between military assistance and civilian charity by supplying needy young people with food, clothing, and shelter. The first problem was never solved satisfactorily because, apart from private donations from the United States and Europe and levies on the German economy by means of drawing funds from the occupation costs budget, the armed forces were never granted authority to use appropriated funds in the GYA program. Consequently, the logistical support of GYA from its inception was irregular with great variations from unit to unit. Since no appropriated funds were involved, the records of GYA expenditures remained incomplete. However, EUCOM authorized the commanders of military posts, military districts, and exempt air installations to create a nonappropriated fund for exclusive GYA use. These funds could accept private contributions or the revenues from minor profit-making activities directly connected with the GYA program. Such activities had to have the approval of the board of directors or of the officer responsible for the fund.³⁸

a. Transportation. Gasoline and the use of Army vehicles to meet the basic transportation requirements were the principal items of logistical support provided by the U.S. armed forces. The supply of gasoline and vehicles often fell short of requirements, and, consequently, impeded operation of the program. Early in 1947 in the Munich area the GYA program virtually stopped for lack of gasoline and vehicles to transport GYA personnel. Moreover, the shortage of transportation hindered the participation of dependents in the activity; and the lack of funds for even routine operations made the conduct of the Munich youth activities increasingly difficult. Despite these problems the Munich GYA program was considered outstanding in the U.S. Zone.³⁹

b. Sources of Supplies. In addition to the logistical support previously mentioned, money and supplies for the GYA program came from limited amounts of surplus Army stocks turned over to the German economy through military government. Moreover, commanders had been authorized to issue athletic and recreational equipment to local youth committees from captured enemy stocks, provided the equipment was not needed for the performance of the occupation mission. Captured enemy materiel was placed under the exclusive jurisdiction of OMGUS, which in turn transferred all such materiel to a German organization established expressly for this purpose. GYA requirements for such materiel were submitted to appropriate Land Economics Offices for approval and release of supplies. The issue of athletic and recreational equipment from these stocks was

³⁸EUCOM Cir 20, 22 Apr 47, sub: Nonappropriated Funds for German Youth Activities.

³⁹Ltr, USFET G-3 Tng & Ed Br to ACOFS G-3, 10 Feb 47. In SGS 353.81 Ger (1947), Vol. I, Item 8C.

thus taken out of the control of the military commands.⁴⁰ In many instances former Wehrmacht supplies, such as skis and soccer shoes, were turned over to local sport clubs at a time when such items were virtually unobtainable on the local economy.

In the spring of 1947 military government transferred U.S. Army surplus property valued at \$1,500,000 to the Kreis youth committees, after the Bi-partite Economic Panel had agreed to place the cost of this equipment as a charge against the German economy. This was the second such requisition approved, the first having been slightly under a half million dollars. Most of the equipment consisted of tents, cots, blankets, and sleeping bags, all of which the various committees turned over to the youth hostels throughout the U.S. Zone to support the summer camping program.⁴¹

There were many occasions when American military personnel assigned to GYA duties used their initiative to solve the ever-recurring crisis of supplies for the centers. For instance, the youth center in Garmisch received a large quantity of ping-pong balls through a distribution of surplus Army supplies, but failed to get any paddles or tables. The non-commissioned officer in charge of German youth activities promptly borrowed two paddles from the Special Services club, turned the paddles over to the carpenter fathers of several of the young participants in the youth center program, and within a week sufficient paddles and tables were produced to promote a ping-pong competition at the center.⁴² In other areas the local troop units helped, as in the town of Huenfeld and neighboring communities, to repair a damaged gymnasium and several sports arenas so that the youth groups could carry on their sport programs.⁴³

16. Christmas Parties

The Christmas of 1945 had seen the first large-scale efforts on the part of the U.S. forces to help German youth. Christmas parties organized throughout the U.S. Zone and in the U.S. Sector of Berlin had included the traditional puppet shows, the clowns, and the singing of carols around the piano. For the average German child the parties had meant primarily an opportunity to eat a good, hot meal, and for many of the younger children the first chance in their lives to taste ice

⁴⁰USFET ltr, 5 Oct 46, sub: Army Assistance to GYA, U.S. Zone. AG 353.8 GOT-AGO.

⁴¹USFET I&E Bulletin, Vol. II, No. 15, 11 May 47, "Tomorrow's Leaders," p. 9.

⁴²Ibid.

⁴³USFET I&E Bulletin, Vol. II, No. 10, 9 Mar 47, "Youth Programs that are Winning the Peace."

cream, chocolate, and fresh meat of any kind.

The Christmas parties of 1946 were organized far more efficiently and with more Army support than those of the previous year, which were characterized by spontaneous expressions of sympathy and generosity. Children of displaced persons (DP's), of whom there were 84,500 in the U.S. Zone, were not forgotten. USFET released from Army stocks enough foodstuffs to provide each DP child with 18 ounces of fruit juice, 4 ounces of chocolate, and 8 ounces of sugar. In addition 100,000 toys procured from the German economy were distributed to the children. Approximately 77 percent of the DP children were entertained at Christmas parties as compared with about 18 percent of the German children in the U.S. Zone.⁴⁴

There was a total of 2,663 Christmas parties throughout the American Zone including Berlin, to which 794,023 German and 47,786 DP children came. About 27,500 soldiers and 5,500 civilians and dependents took part in arranging and staging these parties. Over a million candy bars and thousands of dollars worth of clothing, food, and toys were contributed by Americans through voluntary donations throughout the U.S. Zone.⁴⁵ The active participation of U.S. personnel and the generous contributions from Army resources reflected the systematic official support given the Christmas welfare activities. This was the apogee of such assistance given by the Army to German and DP youth.⁴⁶

From time to time various youth organizations in the United States would adopt one of the GYA centers and send it food, clothing, and toys at Christmas, usually in answer to letters from a home-town boy on duty in Germany with the armed services. These soldiers had interested their fellow citizens in the wretched plight of the German children and had appealed for used clothing and equipment to help the more needy cases. Such operations, however, were generally spontaneous expressions of good will during the first two years of GYA, and it was not until 1948-49, with the formation of the Gen. Lucius D. Clay Fund under the auspices of Mrs. Jouett Shouse of Washington, D.C., that the welfare support of GYA from the United States really became an organized and highly publicized activity.

⁴⁴Cable S-7394, USFET to AGWAR, 27 Dec 46. In SGS 353.81 Ger (1946), Vol. I, Item 94A-1.

⁴⁵Memo, ACOFS G-3 to USFET COFS, 27 Dec 46, sub: Statistics on Christmas Parties for Children. In file above, Item 9.

⁴⁶EUCOM Hist Div, Occupation in Europe Series, 1945-46. Fraternalization with the Germans in World War II, pp. 140-41.



Christmas party sponsored by Americans stationed in Nuremberg, 1945

17. Welfare

At the outset food, shelter, and warmth were the biggest drawing cards for the GYA centers. During the period 1945-47 these needs were understandably uppermost in the minds of all Germans. In some instances military units assisted young people in gardening projects, procuring seeds and implements for the projects, and turning over the produce to needy youths.⁴⁷ In April 1947 the Army turned over to the Frankfurt welfare association two Niessen huts in the vicinity of the main railroad station to shelter the homeless, transient youth of both sexes who loitered about the station. This shelter was a part of the GYA program of the 1st Military Policy Service Group stationed in Frankfurt.⁴⁸ Frequently the Army would act as the distributing agency for CRALOG⁴⁹ in supplying food to various summer camps throughout the zone. Hundreds of children from the larger cities of Germany were sent for short visits to these camps, where they were given an opportunity to gain strength and weight.⁵⁰ Many children had received food during 1945-46, but after October 1946 U.S. personnel were authorized to voluntarily donate food to German children, provided such food and beverages were consumed in the presence of the donors.⁵¹ In Heidelberg all cooked and perishable foods from Army messes that could not be used in left-over menus were picked up twice a day and distributed to orphanages in the area. This was supplemented by the work of an investigating committee, under the auspices of GYA, which checked cases of needy children and then coordinated relief efforts of the U.S. residents in the Heidelberg area to meet the relief requirements.⁵² German children occasionally expressed their gratitude for this help. At Christmas 1946 over 9,000 Darmstadt school children between the ages of 6 and 14 gave thousands of handmade toys to U.S. dependent children living in the Darmstadt area as an expression of thanks for the American-sponsored school lunch program, which was supplied by food shipments from CRALOG and distributed with the help of the Army units in the Darmstadt area. Toys left over from the initial selection were shipped to the United States for distribution to American orphanages.⁵³

⁴⁷The Stars and Stripes (Eur. ed.), January 27 and May 5, 1947.

⁴⁸Occupation Chronicle, April 1947.

⁴⁹The Council of Relief Agencies Licensed for Operation in Germany.

⁵⁰EUCOM I&E Bulletin, Vol. II, No. 19, 11 May 47, "Tomorrow's Leaders," p. 9.

⁵¹USFET ltr, 5 Oct 46, cited above.

⁵²The Stars and Stripes (Eur. ed.), August 15, 1947.

⁵³Military Government Weekly Information Bulletin, No. 73, 23 Dec 46, pp. 18-19.

Throughout this period of greatest need on the part of the German youth, American military officials stressed that the food and clothing distributed in GYA centers had been contributed voluntarily by interested Americans, military and civilians, and were not the result of an Army charity drive. The armed forces continually challenged the concept, which was prevalent both among Americans and Germans, that the GYA program was essentially a vehicle for providing food, clothing, and shelter to needy German youth.⁵⁴

18. Preventive Medicine

In addition to aiding in the distribution of food and clothing to needy children, GYA assisted in area programs of preventive medicine. With the help of local German physicians the GYA, sponsored by an Army engineer company in Zwingenbourg near Darmstadt, enabled 23 mothers of the community to bring their babies to the local youth center for free medical examinations. These examinations, supplemented by courses in first aid, were conducted at the GYA center for parents.⁵⁵

Physical examinations for children attending the Fuerstenfeldbruck schools were sponsored by the Air Force GYA center in that area. From 30 to 60 children were examined each Saturday by German physicians at the GYA center. If the parents were financially unable to pay for the necessary treatment, which might be indicated as a result of the examination, the local GYA officer took steps to obtain the required assistance.⁵⁶ A similar program was conducted by the USAFE-sponsored GYA center in Erlangen.

19. Appraisal of GYA

a. By German Youth. An opinion survey conducted by OMGUS in April 1947 among youths in Frankfurt, Kassel, Heidelberg, and Munich indicated the majority of the boys and girls questioned had never heard of a GYA program. The percentage of those who claimed to have knowledge of GYA was 17 in Frankfurt, 22 in Kassel, 22 in Heidelberg, and 15 in Munich. Only a small percentage of those questioned had taken part in the GYA program, while a large majority said that they had never attended GYA meetings.

Concerning the attitudes of those participating in the GYA program, the majority of the young people questioned in the poll indicated that they came to the GYA centers for candy and food. When asked what was the most important portion of the GYA program, over 51 percent replied that they attended the GYA to obtain supplementary food.

⁵⁴OMGUS Rept, German Youth Between Yesterday & Tomorrow, 1 Apr 47-30 Apr 48, pp. 9-10.

⁵⁵Darmstadt Detonator, October 17, 1947.

⁵⁶The Stars and Stripes (Eur. ed.), August 22, 1947.

A relatively small percentage of those taking part in the GYA reported that they had gained a much better understanding of democracy as a result of the program; the figures were 9 percent in Frankfurt, 19 in Kassel, 9 in Heidelberg, and 12 in Munich. These young people indicated that their understanding of democracy was enhanced through their participation in the GYA programs. Very few of the youths attending GYA had been able to establish contact with Americans, because they rarely had an opportunity to meet U.S. personnel at the centers. Consequently, their opinions regarding the quality of U.S. leadership in GYA as well as Americans in general were based mostly on acquaintance with Americans outside the GYA program, on other observations, or on hearsay.⁵⁷

b. Soldier Opinion. At about the same time that OMGUS had completed the above opinion survey, the command completed a report on the attitudes and opinions of the occupation forces on the Army's German youth assistance program. The sample of 2,393 enlisted men and 305 officers constituted a representative cross-section of the American troops in Europe. The extent of participation in the program was 24 percent for the enlisted men and 41 percent for the officers. The participation was mostly voluntary in that 62 percent of the enlisted personnel used their free time and only 16 percent used duty time for GYA work. Among the officers 47 percent used free time and 19 percent duty time. Many used both free and duty hours. The personnel who participated in GYA, compared with those who didn't, were better educated, had more previous experience in club work, were able to speak and understand German, were more favorably disposed towards the Germans, and had been in the command longer. Most of those who took part in the program had heard about it through troop information and education orientation. Otherwise, the chief source of information about GYA matters was The Stars and Stripes.

Most of those surveyed, whether they were participants in the program or not, thought that GYA was a fairly good idea. Most participants thought the Army was doing a good job in preventing delinquency and in teaching democratic principles. The majority of those participating thought that benefits from the program accrued to both Germans and Americans. Enlisted men indicated that their chief personal gains were in the opportunity for the discussion of world problems and in help with their education. A majority of the participants thought that most German youth liked the GYA program, even though the German boy's or girl's desire for a "handout" and a place to keep warm was an important factor. Finally, a large percentage of those interviewed wanted to take part in the program.⁵⁸

⁵⁷ OMGUS ICD Opinion Survey, Rept No. 56, 26 Apr 47, sub: German Children Appraise the Youth Program. In USAREUR Hist Div Doc Br files.

⁵⁸ Rept No. E-10-87, 15 Jun 47, sub: Soldier Opinion Concerning the Army's Assistance to the German Youth Program in the European Command. In SGS 353.81 Ger (1947), B/P.

20. Communist Reactions

American attempts to democratically reorient German youth through GYA aroused both East German and Soviet opposition. For example, in November 1947 Marshal Vassily Sokolovsky, the Russian member of the Allied Control Council, accused the American forces of engaging in subversive youth activities and of fostering a sports program in the U.S. Zone as a cover-up for the military training of German youth.⁵⁹

On another occasion the Communists exploited the propaganda value of an incident involving a few boys who happened to be members of GYA. These boys became acquainted with a circus performer who had recently fled from the Russian Sector of Berlin. Among the possessions he had left behind were four prize horses. The boys went to East Berlin in an attempt to "liberate" the horses but were apprehended and spent a few days in a communist jail. The fact that the boys were members of a Berlin GYA center was effectively exploited by the Communists in a propaganda campaign which charged, among other things, that the GYA centers were supervised by American gangsters and horse thieves and were being used to train young Germans to be criminals.⁶⁰

In a concentrated effort to win young converts in Western Germany, the Communists flooded the U.S. Zone with youth literature. At one time about 60 percent of the youth publications read in the U.S. Zone originated in the Russian Zone.⁶¹ In these publications GYA was often subjected to attack. In August 1948 Military Government in Land Hesse suspended the information sheet of the Freie Deutsche Jugend (FDJ)--the Soviet-sponsored German youth organization operating mainly in the East Zone, but with some members in the Western Zones--for printing malicious criticism of GYA.⁶²

Taking advantage of West Berlin's isolated position within the Russian-controlled zone, the FDJ was especially active in attempting to disrupt GYA operations in that city. In compliance with their open-door policy, GYA leaders invited all youth of the Soviet Sector of the city to participate in center activities; many youths took advantage of this opportunity. The Lichtenrade center, which was located a little more than 200 yards from the zonal border, was particularly popular with

⁵⁹ Lucius D. Clay. Decision in Germany (Garden City, N.Y., 1950), pp. 64, 161.

⁶⁰ Interv, Mr. L. W. Walker, USAREUR Hist Div, with Mrs. Lotte Roessler, GYA Secy, Berlin, 16 Jun 54.

⁶¹ OMGUS Rept, German Youth Between Yesterday and Tomorrow, 1 Apr 47-30 Apr 48, pp. 24-25.

⁶² News of Germany, 17 Aug 48, p. 4.

East Zone children. Eventually, the Communists used these opportunities to infiltrate into the GYA groups; however, the agitators who repeatedly attempted to disrupt the youth councils and to discredit the American supervisors failed to accomplish their purpose. In fact, some infiltrators were converted to democratic views as a result of their associations in the GYA centers.⁶³

⁶³Intervs, Mr. L. W. Walker, USAREUR Hist Div, with Mr. Robert Behr, 17 Jun 54; Mrs. Roessler, 18 Jun 54.

CHAPTER 3

Operation, 1948-51

21. Financing the Program

Since the U.S. military authorities considered youth programs as a responsibility of German civil administration and as a financial responsibility of the German people, they did not contemplate the support of the German youth groups or of the Army assistance program to GYA from appropriated funds.

The GYA program was financed from appropriated funds to the extent that personnel of the occupation forces were employed full- or part-time in youth activities. Supplies and materials bought on the German economy were paid for out of RACAOA (Relief and Certain Aid in Occupied Areas) Funds, and later out of GARIOA (Government and Relief in Occupied Areas) Funds, both of which were monies appropriated by Congress for military government purposes.¹ In May 1947 the GYA assistance program was officially designated a responsibility of the German civil authorities and was therefore chargeable as a nonoccupation cost--cost not incurred for the direct upkeep of the occupation forces, but nevertheless assessed on a mandatory basis--in the EUCOM indigenous budget. This meant that beginning with fiscal year 1948 indigenous funds would be allotted for expenditure in the GYA program. These funds were drawn on for paying the salaries of the German employees in GYA, as well as expenditures for rental, utilities, communications, maintenance, and other services. During the 1948-1951 period the GYA program operated on an over-all annual budget of approximately DM 8½ million or the equivalent of \$2 million.²

¹(1)EUCOM Hist Div, German Youth Activities of the U.S. Army, 1 Jul 46-30 Jun 47, pp. 87-90, in Occupation Forces in Europe Series, 1946-47. (2) GYA Briefing Notes for the U.S. HICOG, Dr. Conant, n.d. Date estimated at Jan 53. In USAREUR Hist Div GYA files.

²Ibid.

22. The General Clay Fund

Another source of funds for the GYA program, as indicated before, was derived from voluntary donations of individuals in the U.S. Zone and in the United States. Official policy from the start of the program had been to publicize GYA to the widest possible extent through all available channels in order to obtain German and American moral and financial support for the program. Such publicity was also expected to enhance the prestige of the U.S. occupation forces in Germany.³

In 1948 an organization was created in the United States to increase the amount of support coming from that quarter to GYA. Through the vigorous efforts of Mrs. Jouett Shouse--prominent in Washington society and in the General Federation of Women's Clubs, and a cofounder of the Women's National Democratic Club--stateside interest in GYA was stimulated, support was organized, and aid was dispatched. Mrs. Shouse first became interested in the cause of German youth on a visit to Germany during the summer of 1948, when she learned of the Army's active youth program and of its additional needs.

Mrs. Shouse's acquaintance with many prominent people enabled her to expedite plans for creating an organization to raise money and collect materials to help support GYA. General Clay, who had always been interested in GYA, readily assented to Mrs. Shouse's project, while General Omar N. Bradley, then Army Chief of Staff, was instrumental in obtaining the necessary departmental approval. The General Clay Fund for German Youth Activities was thus created in December 1948.⁴ Lacking the resources to function as an operating agency, the fund coordinated the efforts of clubs and other organizations, including business enterprises, in collecting materials and raising funds for GYA. At first the distribution of packages and materials--donated or purchased with voluntary contributions--was entrusted to CARE (Cooperative for American Relief in Europe). This organization was already sending assistance in the form of food parcels to German youth. Mrs. Shouse helped to raise over \$65,000 by the end of 1948 for the purchase of CARE packages for Christmas. Since only \$30,000 was raised to buy parcels for the 1949 GYA Christmas program, Mrs. Shouse arranged for future direct collections and shipments of materials to Germany by the General Clay Fund.⁵

³EUCOM Hist Div, German Youth Activities of the U.S. Army, 1 Jul 46-30 Jun 47, cited above, pp. 80-81.

⁴Ltr, Mrs. J. Shouse to Mr. R. A. Duffy (formerly GYA Off in Berlin), 10 Apr 53. In USAREUR Hist Div GYA files.

⁵(1) Ltr, Mrs. Shouse to Gen Huebner, 18 Nov 48. In SGS 353.81 (1948), Vol. I, Item 62A. (2) See correspondence between 1 Oct and 31 Dec 49 from Shouse to Huebner. In SGS 353.81 (1949), Vol. I. (3) Paper, n.d., sub: GYA Cooperation in United States. In USAREUR Hist Div GYA files.

Some of the activities initiated or directly sponsored by the fund during this period included Bishop Sheil's Candy Caravan, the Darien Book Plan whereby used books were collected for GYA libraries, and the Tide of Toys, a project organized by the American Legion for collecting toys to be sent to German children with GYA assisting in the distribution. In addition, Mrs. Shouse persuaded the General Federation of Women's Clubs to participate by collecting sewing materials and conducting fund-raising projects for GYA. The collected materials and money were given to the General Clay Fund, which in turn forwarded them to Germany. The Girl Scouts also collected sewing as well as arts and crafts materials and donated them to the fund for GYA. Very often the GYA centers sent samples of the finished products, for which the American materials had been used, to the Scouts for exhibition purposes.

Many business firms donated materials for the GYA arts and crafts program or supplied them at cost or for a small handling charge. These costs or charges were paid for out of the General Clay cash fund.⁶

23. General Activities

The German Youth Activities program expanded during the period 1948 to 1951, although the chronic problems of shortage of personnel and funds, lack of recognition, and unsatisfactory liaison with other U.S. agencies remained unsolved. Moreover, because of the tense international situation, U.S. military commanders had little time to devote to the problems of German youth. After the parties and activities of Christmas 1947, the GYA program settled again into the less spectacular routine of operating the youth centers. The number of German youth attending the centers dropped during the first three months of 1948 to less than 400,000, which was about half of the number participating in the previous Christmas activities. The number of U.S. military personnel detailed to duty with the GYA centers declined proportionately from a high of 869 during November 1947 to a few more than 400 during early 1948.⁷ The decrease in the number of volunteers was even sharper. Even though need for volunteer help at the GYA centers had been stressed, the number of military and dependent personnel participating on a volunteer basis dropped from over 2,000 in December 1947 to 725 in January and to 419 during February 1948.⁸ The following tabulation shows subsequent fluctuations in the number of American personnel participating in the GYA program from 1949 to 1954:⁹

⁶Paper, n.d., cited above.

⁷Memo, EUCOM OPOT Div to Brig Gen V. E. Prichard, Dir OPOT Div, 12 Oct 48, sub: Armed Forces Assistance Program to GYA. In USAREUR Hist Div GYA files.

⁸EUCOM OPOT Div GYA Br Summary of GYA for Jan, Feb, and Mar 48. In file cited above.

⁹Tab G to memo, USAREUR ACOFS G1 to COFS, 21 Mar 55, sub: Termination of GYA Program. AG 353.8 GPA. In USAREUR ACOFS G1 Pers Svcs Br files (1955)

| | <u>Assigned</u> | <u>Voluntary</u> |
|--------|-----------------|------------------|
| Jul 49 | 260 | 1,891 |
| Jul 50 | 393 | 798 |
| Jul 51 | 222 | 481 |
| Jul 52 | 163 | 240 |
| Jul 53 | 72 | 46 |
| Jul 54 | 42 | 22 |

The activities at GYA centers varied widely. Since all centers were housed in requisitioned property, the facilities were not of uniform quality. However, the operating efficiency of each center depended largely on the type of supervisory personnel assigned. Fortunately, many of the GYA workers were serious, conscientious, and unselfish. They organized discussion groups, classes in handicrafts, sports, sewing, and similar activities. In the summer time the more active centers organized gardening projects and summer camps. Many of the centers had regular programs of moving pictures, for which they used films approved and furnished by the Army. One of the most popular activities with young Germans--though much criticized by their parents--was the program of evening dances. Another popular activity was the boxing tournament. Under the tutelage of several former American Golden Gloves winners, German boys participated in locally sponsored GYA boxing tournaments. During the summer of 1948 the first U.S. zone-wide championship matches were held in Munich;¹⁰ this event was so successful that it was repeated during subsequent years.

24. The Chief GYA Projects

Further illustrating the variety of the GYA program were the three special projects initiated in 1949 on a zone-wide basis.

a. Soapbox Derbies. One of the most successful of these was the Soapbox Derby. After the popularity of several races held on a limited scale in various sections of the U.S. Zone had been demonstrated, EUCOM assumed in 1949 zone-wide sponsorship for the event. Through the Soapbox Derby German youth would be taught the principles of sportsmanship and fair play, interest in GYA among the German communities would be aroused, and good public relations would be promoted. General Motors Corporation, which operated the All-American Soapbox Derby in Akron, Ohio, became interested in the program. Through its German subsidiary, the Adam Opel Company, the first of the zone-wide derbies was held during the summer of 1949 in Munich. Using GYA center workshops, an estimated 15,000 boys, 10 to 15 years of age, built soapbox racers and participated in the more than 500 elimination races. The final race was held in Munich and was witnessed by a crowd of more than 12,000 spectators. The winner of the finals received, for himself and his father, a 2-week tour of the United States. The Army furnished the

¹⁰Military Government Information Bulletin, No. 152, 11 Jan 49, pp. 20-21.



1st and 2d prize winners of one of the first Soapbox Derbies

transportation and the Opel Company paid for all other expenses. The following year the number of boys competing throughout the U.S. Zone increased to approximately 20,000. The Adam Opel Company again cooperated with GYA by furnishing, through its dealers, the officially recognized wheels and axles for the racers. Translations of the General Motors' official rule book brought the German Soapbox Derby into line with the requirements for the All-American races. The finals were held in Stuttgart in July 1950 and received wide-spread publicity and favorable comment in the German press.¹¹ Among the competitors was an unidentified East Zone youth who was so anxious to enter the contest that he risked the danger of crossing the zonal border with his soapbox racer. Although he didn't win any of the races, the Soapbox Derby Committee awarded him a special prize.¹² The first prize winner of the derby won a trip to the United States and the right to compete in the All-American Soapbox Derby in Akron. Despite the huge success of the derbies as a GYA activity, EUCOM turned over its sponsorship to the Adam Opel Company after the 1950 contest. By that time EUCOM was considering the transfer of the entire GYA program to the Germans.

b. Handicrafts Contest. Another successful activity was the U.S. Zone Handicrafts Contest for girls first held in 1949 and repeated thereafter for several years. Each of the 12 military posts in the U.S. Zone of Germany sponsored contests and selected the best entries in art, needlework, woodwork, sculpture, plastics, and several other types of handicraft. Winning items from these contests were sent to the final zone-wide contest, which was usually held in Heidelberg. This was one of the activities in which Mrs. Shouse took an active interest, since much of the cloth and other material furnished by the General Clay Fund was used by the contestants in making their entries. In the first handicraft contest in 1949, over 50 girls received prizes which included trips to Switzerland, new bicycles, and materials for making clothing.¹³ In succeeding contests boys were eligible for participation, which increased the number of entries as well as the number of awards. Of the thousands of entries in the 1950 competition 1,200 items were exhibited in the final judging; 168 of these were awarded various prizes including cameras, bicycles, and cash. During the following years participation in this type of contest declined gradually. By 1954 the number of final

¹¹ (1) Ltr, EUCOM to sub comds, 26 May 49, sub: 1949 GYA zone-wide Soapbox Derby. In SGS 353.81 (1949), Vol. I, Item 49A. (2) EUCOM History of the Soapbox Derbies, 11 Jul 51. In USAREUR Hist Div GYA files.

¹² Interv, Mr. L. W. Walker, USAREUR Hist Div, with Mrs. Roessler, Berlin GYA Secy, 16 Jun 54.

¹³ Ltr, Gen Huebner to Mrs. Shouse, 13 Jul 49. In SGS 353.81 (1949) Vol. I, Item 62.

entries judged in the contest in Heidelberg dropped to 305.¹⁴

c. Meistersinger Contest. The GYA officer of the Nuremberg Military Post inaugurated in 1949 the Meistersinger Contest as one of the cultural activities of the GYA program. The first Meistersinger contest had been held in Nuremberg in the 16th century and it was therefore thought appropriate to invite a German committee to set up the rules and to run the contest according to traditional practice. Any German boy or girl (except professional singers) between the ages of 18 and 25 who lived in the U.S. Zone of Germany and Berlin was eligible to participate.¹⁵ From 1950 to 1954 elimination contests were held by Army military posts and Air Force organizations throughout the American Zone and in West Berlin. The first, second, and third place winners of the local contests were eligible for the final competition held each year on the stage of the Nuremberg Opera House. The winners of the final contests generally received cash prizes, scholarships for further musical training in the United States, and opportunities for concert tours and performances with leading opera companies.¹⁶ The GYA-sponsored Meistersinger contest attracted hundreds of talented young singers and thousands of spectators and, as a result, contributed substantially to the postwar cultural revival of Western Germany.

25. Other Projects

The soapbox derbies and the Meistersinger and handicrafts contests became probably the three most important features of the GYA program. Even after these activities ceased to be the direct responsibility of the EUCOM GYA Section, they continued to be identified with the program. Some other projects, also sponsored by GYA but less successful than the above-mentioned ones, nevertheless reflected the diversification of the program.

a. Youth Helps Youth Program. One of these projects was the Youth Helps Youth program, which was initiated in 1948 by the EUCOM GYA Section to promote mutual understanding between American and German youth, to teach German youth about democracy, and to procure additional material aid from youth organizations in the United States. The program

¹⁴(1) The Stars and Stripes (Eur. ed.), May 16, 9, 1950. (2) HICOG, Information Bulletin (July 1951), inside back cover. (3) USAREUR AYA-GYA Bulletin, Sep 54, p.3.

¹⁵C/N 2, EUCOM OPOT Div to SGS, 6 Mar 51, to C/N 1, SGS to OPOT Div, 5 Mar 51, sub: Letter from General Handy to General Bixby. In SGS 353.81 Ger (1951), Vol. I, Item 21A.

¹⁶(1) The Stars and Stripes (Eur. ed.), 15, 17 Nov, 21 Dec 50; 30 Jan, 2 Mar 51. (2) USAREUR Information Bulletin, Vol. 8, No. 4 (1953), p. 10. (3) USAREUR AYA-GYA Bulletin, Sep 54, p. 3.



Preparing entries for Handicraft Contest at GYA Center, Berlin, 1953

consisted of youth groups in Germany writing to similar groups in the United States. The GYA Section wrote the initial letters to determine what youth groups in the United States were interested in contacting their counterparts in Germany. From this emerged a system of pairing groups according to type of group, age, and sex of its members, etc., so that the number of paired groups grew from nearly 300 in 1948 to 700 in 1949.¹⁷ Although the tendency to write individual letters was strong, and even encouraged, GYA was convinced that Youth Helps Youth was not a "pen pal" program. For unexplained reasons this project lapsed after 1950.

b. Rural Youth Project. In 1950 and 1951 the Rural Youth Project was conducted to enable selected German youth to live in selected farm homes in the United States, to assist the host family, to observe community events and neighborhood life, and to take part in rural youth activities. Through the combined efforts of EUCOM, the Extension Service of the U.S. Department of Agriculture, and Mrs. Shouse, 6 German boys and girls attended the 4-H Club encampment in Washington, D.C., in June of 1951 and 1952. They then spent three months with selected farm families. GYA paid the youths' expenses from their homes in Germany to their arrival in the United States, where the Department of Agriculture assumed sponsorship.

GYA enjoyed favorable publicity as a result of the Rural Youth Project, but the chief benefits were limited to the individual Germans who had been selected. Although worthwhile, the project was duplicated on a larger scale by the HICOG Exchange Program. These considerations, in addition to budgetary difficulties, caused the termination of the project early in 1952.¹⁸

c. Community Service Contest. The original purpose of the Community Service Contest was to transmit the concept of "community spirit" to young Germans and to promote voluntary constructive work of a kind that would meet the actual needs of the community. This project had lain dormant for about two years for lack of funds. In January 1951 Mrs. Shouse contributed enough money from the General Clay Fund to launch the contest. Competition was first conducted on a local level with the military posts, Twelfth Air Force, and Bremerhaven Port of Embarkation submitting a total of 30 entries. These consisted of building, repairing, or adapting facilities for use as community playgrounds, youth centers, education centers, parks, sports fields, libraries, etc. Six winners were chosen, one from each of the participating areas. The final zone-wide competition took place in February

¹⁷Notes 3d, 4th, and 6th Tng Confs, GYA, 16-17 Sep 48, 28-29 Apr 49.

¹⁸(1) Ltrs, Mrs. Shouse to Gen Huebner, Dept of Agric to Mrs. Shouse, both 3 Feb 50. Both in SGS 353.81 (1950), Vol. I, Items 15A, 18A. (2) Memo, Lt Col Robert A. Norman, C/EUCOM OPOT Div GYA Br, to Dir OPOT Div, 18 Feb 52, sub: Discontinuance of the GYA Rural Youth Project. In USAREUR Hist Div GYA files.

1952, when three winners were chosen by an American-German judging team, headed by the Chief of the EUCOM GYA Branch and Prof. Otto Bartning, president of the German Architects Association.

The chief difficulty in conducting the project was that German civic leaders and organizations failed to grasp the significance of the idea of "community service." This failure was reflected in the inability to translate the term accurately into German. Although deemed worthwhile, the project was not repeated because the financial difficulties of the GYA program became more acute at this time.¹⁹

26. Personnel Difficulties

Military personnel working with GYA were the necessary and irreducible core of the entire youth assistance program. Therefore, regardless of the numbers of trained Germans and volunteers who helped in the centers, the program could only be as good as the soldiers assigned to it. Conscious of the program's deficiencies, Lt. Gen. Clarence R. Huebner (then CINCEUR) attributed GYA's weaknesses to the failure of the subordinate commanders--especially those of smaller units--to assign enough personnel who were adequately trained in youth work. He felt that many subordinate commanders paid lipservice to GYA while assigning misfits to it and lending little or no real support. According to General Huebner, this situation was extremely detrimental to the success of the GYA program.²⁰ Related to the problem of assigning appropriately trained men and women to the GYA program was the command- and Army-wide problem of personnel turnover. An analysis of the turnover of GYA-assigned military personnel during 1949 showed that the average length of the period of assignment to GYA was six months.²¹

Some centers were supervised by soldiers who lacked both the training and the inclination to work with young people. Often assigned to GYA work because they were misfits in their own units, these men were responsible for much of the ill feeling on the part of the Germans toward GYA. Many of the unfavorable stories that circulated about the program throughout its existence were based on incidents caused by inadequate supervision. Illustrating this was an outing for young people arranged by a center in Nuremberg in the spring of 1949. The soldiers in charge of the afternoon activities turned over some bats, balls, and gloves to the boys who were present, told them to produce the equipment again at

¹⁹GYA Jnl, 9 Apr 52. In USAREUR Hist Div GYA files.

²⁰Memo, to CINCEUR, 24 Feb 49. In SGS 353.81 (1949), Vol. I, Item 24.

²¹(1) Memo to Dir OPOT Div, 5 Jan 50, sub: Military Personnel on GYA Duty. (2) Memo, EUCOM to CINCEUR, 18 Jan 50, sub: Military Personnel Assigned to Duty with GYA. Both in SGS 353.81 (1950), Vol. I, Items 7, 7A and atchd.

1600 hours, and then disappeared for the afternoon with their German girl friends who had come with them.²² Another instance of irresponsibility occurred in the Stuttgart area. Early in 1948 EUCOM inspectors found that the GYA program at the Esslingen center was at a complete standstill, and that a lack of supervision and interest on the part of the responsible persons had completely defeated the purpose of the program in that area. After reporting this condition, the inspectors returned to make a follow-up inspection in September. Conditions had not improved. EUCOM asked for immediate action to correct the deficiencies, but when its representatives visited the centers the following January they found only superficial improvement. The German employees were either unnecessary or incompetent; there were shortages of equipment, poor supervision, and a general lack of interest and enterprise on the part of the Army personnel at this center.²³

27. Reduction of U.S. Constabulary Aid

The problems of personnel support were aggravated by the efforts of the U.S. Constabulary--aside from the 1st Infantry Division the only major tactical command in the U.S. Zone at that time--to reduce its participation and responsibility in connection with assistance to the GYA program. The Constabulary was required to furnish not less than 3 field-grade and 21 company-grade officers as well as 114 enlisted men for full-time GYA duty.²⁴ Stating that it could no longer furnish these men because they were needed for tactical assignments, the Constabulary proposed a reduction of its contribution to the GYA program to 4 officers and 5 enlisted men on a part-time basis. This suggestion was not acceptable to EUCOM because the GYA program was a primary military mission. Any radical reduction in support, as proposed by the Constabulary, would impair the continuity of the program and leave its implementation to the whims of local commanders.²⁵ The Constabulary also recommended placing the burden of responsibility for Army assistance on the military posts, a change that EUCOM was already considering at the time. General Huebner, then commander of EUCOM, was anxious to relieve

²²(1) Memo, Mrs. B. Schalet to Col R. C. Hall, 11 Jun 49. (2) Notes, 3d Tng Conf, EUCOM, 16-17 Sep 48, sub: The Armed Forces Assistance Program to GYA. (3) Repts on Opns of GYA Program for 1948, submitted by Col R. C. Hall to C/OPOT Div Tng & Educ Br. All in USAREUR Hist Div GYA files.

²³(1) Ltr, EUCOM to CG, Stuttgart Mil Post, 4 Oct 48, sub: Deficiencies in GYA Program at Esslingen Subpost. In SGS 353.81 (1948), Vol. I, Item 48A. (2) IRS, EUCOM OPOT Div to DCOFS, 26 Jan 49, same sub. In SGS 353.81 (1949), Vol. I, Item 5.

²⁴USFET ltr, 5 Oct 46, sub: Army Assistance to GYA, U.S. Zone. 353.8 GCT-AGO.

²⁵Ltr, US Constab to CINCEUR, 20 Aug 48, sub: Constabulary Assistance to GYA Program, and 1st Ind, thereto. In SGS 353.81 (1948), Vol. 1, Item 42A

most combat units of their responsibilities for providing full-time personnel to GYA. The EUCOM Chief of Staff, Maj. Gen. Carter B. Magruder, suggested that OMGUS ought to provide all the needed full-time personnel, since from the outset that agency had assumed primary responsibility for the GYA program. Failing this, EUCOM had the alternative of hiring U.S. civilians for GYA.²⁶

None of these suggestions was followed through because EUCOM regarded the GYA assistance program as a distinct and separate operation, even though German youth activities were an OMGUS responsibility. Despite the reduction in GYA personnel during the year there were still 263 officers and enlisted men assigned to full-time duty with GYA by October 1948. By contrast, OMGUS had assigned only 12 civilians to youth activities, and General Clay had disapproved two earlier requests to increase that number. Several attempts to replace military personnel with Department of Army civilians were equally unsuccessful because they were disapproved by the Military Governor, who doubted that Congress would appropriate money for this purpose while he did not anticipate Congressional opposition to the use of soldiers whose time could be made available.²⁷


28. Modification of the Program

EUCOM was concerned about the necessity of maintaining an adequate personnel structure for the GYA program. Since the program was in flux, it followed that the personnel situation would change from time to time, necessitating examination and readjustment. Thus, in 1948 while military personnel working with GYA decreased, the number of requests for assistance and the number of youths receiving assistance increased during the later part of the year. This situation, coupled with the pressure from the U.S. Constabulary and other tactical units to be relieved of some of their obligations to GYA, led to another study of the EUCOM assistance program. In November 1948 the results were incorporated into a new directive, which consolidated the numerous publications pertaining to GYA operations and policy into one comprehensive document. The basic program was unchanged, but certain important modifications were made to overcome certain weaknesses.


²⁶(1) Ltr, 20 Aug 48, cited above. (2) IRS, EUCOM SGS to Dir OPOT Div, 30 Sep 48, sub: Letter from General White re Constabulary Assistance to GYA. In SGS 353.81 (1948), Vol. I, Item 47A.

²⁷(1) Memo, to Brig Gen V. E. Prichard, Dir EUCOM OPOT Div, 12 Oct 48, sub: Armed Forces Assistance Program for GYA. In USAREUR Hist Div GYA files. (2) IRS, EUCOM OPOT Div to SGS, 14 Oct 48, sub: Letter from General White re Constabulary Assistance to GYA. (3) IRS, EUCOM DCOFS to Dir OPOT Div, 19 Oct 48, same sub. Last two in SGS 353.81 (1948), Vol. I, Items 52B, 54

a. LIAISON CONTACTS BETWEEN EUCOM AND OMGUS AGENCIES



b. EUCOM LIAISON WITH AND ASSISTANCE TO GERMAN YOUTH AGENCIES



Source: Annex A to EUCOM Cir 149, 2 Nov 48, sub: The Armed Forces Assistance Program to German Youth Activities.

To insure balanced and well-coordinated programs in all areas of the U.S. Zone, major responsibility for all GYA programs was assigned to the military post commanders, including the Bremerhaven Port of Embarkation and the USAFE commanding general in the case of the Air Force installations. With the assignment of larger areas of responsibility, the military posts also assumed the personnel burden for GYA. Since unit commanders often evaded the fulfilling of the personnel assessment for GYA, EUCOM inaugurated a system of guaranteeing that assignments of military personnel to GYA would be filled. Liaison contacts between EUCOM and OMGUS agencies interested in GYA were as shown in Chart 2a. The purpose of this liaison was to keep OMGUS and EUCOM informed of all German youth activities of joint concern, to coordinate plans for new types of activities, and to report to each other policy violations, undesirable practices, and outstanding successes or failures. Liaison with and assistance to German youth agencies by EUCOM agencies were as shown in Chart 2b. The purpose of this liaison was to insure that armed forces assistance was achieving maximum effectiveness and was not duplicating the efforts of German agencies responsible for youth assistance. Standards were set up in the hiring, training, and supervision of German employees. The continuation of worthwhile cultural, recreational, vocational, and athletic activities was prescribed and encouraged because these had proven effective in reeducating and reorienting German youth. Finally, new channels were opened for the procurement of supplies and the raising of funds to support the program.

Although the military posts became responsible for the planning, implementation, supervision, and coordination of all armed forces assistance to GYA within the geographic limits of their commands, the Constabulary and the 1st Infantry Division were not relieved of all their obligations to this program. The tactical units were still required to support the program even though their principal mission involved extensive training and maneuvers. However, the demands upon their personnel were somewhat reduced.²⁸

29. Youth Leadership Training

To help overcome the shortage of adequately trained American and German personnel at the GYA centers, a series of training courses and conferences was instituted in the period from 1948 to 1951. Military Government had opened the first training center for training youth workers in 1948 at Wannsee near Berlin. This center had also been created to provide properly trained young leaders in the German youth organizations

²⁸(1) C/N 1, EUCOM OPOT Div to SGS, 25 Feb 49, sub: GYA Historical Material for the Commander in Chief, TAB A, 25 Feb 49, sub: History and Background of the Armed Forces Assistance Program to German Youth Activities. In SGS 353.81 (1949), Vol. I, Item 25A-1 atchd. (2) EUCOM Cir 149, 2 Nov 48, sub: The Armed Forces Assistance Program to German Youth Activities.

that had been formed since the end of World War II. In addition to presenting instruction in certain arts and skills, the center stressed free, nonpartisan discussion of political issues and encouraged independence of thought. Moreover, the organization of the school was designed to teach group program planning and participation. Over 700 people attended the center during its first year of operation.

In May 1949 EUCOM opened a youth leadership school at Ruit, near Stuttgart, exclusively for Germans working in GYA. Later in the year the school was taken over by the U.S. High Commission for Germany (HICOG).²⁹ Germans living in the U.S. Zone and West Berlin received instruction in the operation of the GYA centers and in conducting sports and physical training programs. The several hundred people who attended the school during 1949 and 1950 were able to exchange ideas and experiences that would aid in the running of the centers with a larger measure of zone-wide coordination.

Intensive leadership training for noncommissioned soldiers and airmen assigned to GYA centers was provided in 1949 in a special course set up at the EUCOM Intelligence School in Oberammergau. In addition to the training at special schools, GYA personnel received further instruction at monthly training conferences, which were usually held at military post level. From 1948 to 1951 semiannual training conferences were held on a zone-wide basis for key Army and Air Force officers and civilians participating in the GYA program. These conferences were held to train personnel in the techniques of GYA, to clarify GYA policies and directives, and to discuss problems encountered in the field.³⁰

30. Legality of the Program

a. OMGUS Evaluation. In April 1949 a group representing the General Clay Fund and CARE arrived in Germany for an inspection of the GYA centers. Mrs. Shouse was also in the visiting group. Near the end of the tour the visitors learned that some OMGUS officials no longer considered GYA a worthwhile activity. The chief of the Educational and Cultural Relations Division of OMGUS, Dr. Alonzo Grace, for instance, regarded GYA as just a program to give Coca-Cola and candy to German children. Alarmed at the prospects of the loss of official support for GYA, the group consulted with Dr. Lawrence E. Norrie, who was chief of the Youth Activities Section of the military government organization.

²⁹ With the establishment of the Federal Republic of Germany on 21 September 1949, the Occupation Statute and the Charter of the High Commission became effective. On the same date HICOG replaced the Office of Military Government, United States (OMGUS). HICOG, a Department of State agency, assumed responsibility for all nonmilitary occupation matters.

³⁰ (1) OMGUS, Information Bulletin, No. 162, 31 May 49, pp. 17-19. (2) HICOG, Information Bulletin, Jan 50, pp. 39-40. (3) See also Notes, 3d through 8th Tng Confs, 1948-51. In USAREUR Hist Div GYA files.

Emphasizing his interest in GYA, Dr. Norrie explained the original need for the program and noted his part in launching it. He then contrasted the past need with the existing situation of substantial economic recovery in Western Germany, and stressed the resurgence of youth activities under German leadership. He finally suggested that the task of reorienting German youth could be turned over to the German people for the following reasons: the soldiers assigned to the program were inadequately prepared for working with the German youth; a social program of the GYA type did not fit into the general pattern of Army policy; and the German people resented the program because nonoccupation funds were used for its support. In this connection the Germans claimed that the millions of Deutsche Marks spent on GYA could be better used by their own organizations. With no trained civilians available, the quality of leadership suffered because of the constant turnover of Army personnel.³¹

Dr. Norrie pointed out that his evaluation of the Army's GYA program was based on personal knowledge and on the opinion of leading American educators who had been brought to Germany on various occasions to examine the program. At that time a California educator was completing a survey according to which not one German parent interviewed had expressed approval of the GYA program. Finally, Dr. Norrie asserted that the GYA program was a direct violation of international law, but without elaborating how he arrived at this conclusion.³²

b. The Problem of German Funds. A few weeks later Dr. Grace summoned a conference of EUCOM and OMGUS representatives to discuss GYA activities. Also present at the conference was a State Department representative who was making a survey of U.S. activities concerned with the reorientation and reeducation of the German people. The purpose of his survey was to determine what economies the State Department could put into effect upon assuming control of this phase of the occupation. Actually, Dr. Grace's main reason for holding the conference was to explain to the Army representatives that he and the State Department representative doubted the legality of using nonoccupation funds for the GYA program. This procedure would probably have to be discontinued because it was contrary to international law, as stipulated by both the Hague and Geneva Conventions, to assess an occupied nation for funds necessary to carry out a program that was intended to assist the occupied nation itself.

The suggestion that GYA be operated without Deutsche Mark funds was not countenanced because it would have led to the collapse of the entire program. Even with these nonoccupation funds, no more than 20 percent of the German youth in the U.S. Zone had participated in GYA,

³¹ Memo, Beatrice B. Schalet to Col Robert C. Hall, 11 Jun 49. In SGS 353.81 (1949), Vol. I, Item 43A.

³² Ibid.

a percentage considered the bare minimum to justify the program.³³ While the amount of German funds used in support of the GYA program was only a small fraction of the over-all occupation costs, this money was vital to the program because it paid for the rental of the properties, the salaries of the German employees, and the materials for which dollar funds were not available. At that time more than 4 million Deutsche Marks was spent by EUCOM to support GYA, most of which went for salaries for approximately a thousand full-time supervisors, instructors, and other youth center personnel, all German nationals. About a fourth of that amount was used to pay rent on the requisitioned properties. In addition, the U.S. contribution to the program included military personnel paid from appropriated funds and more than 1,000 part-time volunteer workers as well as supplies and equipment, engineer custodial maintenance of the buildings, and about 15,000 gallons of gasoline per month. Finally, almost a quarter of a million dollars was donated in voluntary contributions (in 1948) from U.S. Zone personnel to support GYA Christmas activities, and some assistance was provided by the General Clay Fund.³⁴

c. The EUCOM Position. The problem of nonoccupation funds was all the more serious because the Office of Military Government had control over use of the Deutsche Mark funds. But EUCOM found specific authority to use the funds to support GYA in an agreement among the Military Governors of the three occupying powers, although that did not eliminate the international law aspects of the problem. In the following weeks evidence was gathered supporting the position that GYA continue to be financed with Deutsche Mark funds.³⁵

The position advanced by the Office of Military Government, in which it appeared to have the full backing of the State Department, was based upon the following provision of the Hague Conventions:³⁶ "Requisitions in kind and services shall not be demanded from municipalities or inhabitants except for the needs of the Army of Occupation. They shall be in proportion to the resources of the country, and of such nature as not to involve the inhabitants in the obligation of taking part in military operations against their own country." To refute the OMGUS-State Department argument, EUCOM sought to prove both that the Germans wanted the GYA program and that it was carried out not so much to benefit German youth but rather to fulfill a need of the Army of

³³ IRS, EUCOM OPOT Div to COFS, 8 Jul 49, sub: Financial Support of the GYA Program. In SGS 353.81 (1949), Vol. I, Item 60.

³⁴ IRS, EUCOM OPOT Div to SGS, 22 Jul 49, sub: Brief on Financial Support of GYA Program. In file above, Item 64A.

³⁵ Ibid.

³⁶ Agreements made at the First and Second Hague Conferences, 1899, 1907.

Occupation and was, therefore, in accord with international agreements.³⁷

To prove that the German people themselves liked the program and wanted it continued, EUCOM conducted a public opinion survey. Earlier surveys had indicated a critical attitude on the part of the Germans. An OMGUS survey made in Land Hesse during 1948 had shown that German adults and community leaders separated the GYA program from their communities by a wall of criticism and prejudice. At best they had considered GYA a well-meaning but blundering effort to introduce an American-style youth program.³⁸ A EUCOM public opinion survey in Bremen and Bremerhaven had been only slightly more favorable and, although some German adults had approved at least of the principle of U.S. Army-sponsored youth organizations, most had been openly antagonistic to the GYA methods.³⁹ To measure German reaction to the GYA program in July 1949, 80 Germans were asked for their opinion of GYA. They did not represent a cross section but were civic officials, church leaders, school and sports officials, and leaders of political parties or youth groups. Their answers indicated that reaction to the GYA program during its three and a half years of existence had ranged from hostility at the beginning to one of general approval and support by the middle of 1949. Seventy-nine of the 80 Germans questioned thought that GYA should be continued as an official mission of the occupation forces.⁴⁰

The line of reasoning used by EUCOM to establish GYA as a need of the Army of Occupation was that the program had been initiated primarily as a practical method of assuring greater security for the occupying forces by reducing juvenile delinquency among the local population. This view did not really conflict with the previously announced objective of GYA--namely, the democratic reorientation of German youth. Less emphasis, merely, had been placed on the reduction of juvenile delinquency because of the limited influence that a voluntary program like GYA could exert in this respect. After the GYA program had become effective, its scope had to be extended beyond that of a purely recreational nature, and the mission of reducing juvenile delinquency had to be broadened to include inculcating German youth with democratic ideas and practices in order to reduce their passive and active resistance to occupation measures.⁴¹

³⁷ IRS, EUCOM OPOT Div to JA Div, 22 Aug 49, sub: Legality of GYA Program under International Law. In file above, Item 75.

³⁸ Excerpt from Wkly Intel Sum No. 138, OMGUS for Hesse, 1948. Copy in USAREUR Hist Div GYA files.

³⁹ EUCOM Rept on German Attitudes Toward the Army Assistance Program to GYA, 4 Feb 48. In USAREUR Hist Div GYA files.

⁴⁰ IRS, EUCOM OPOT Div to SGS, 15 Aug 49, sub: Conference between HICOG and Act CINCEUR. In SGS 353.81 (1949), Vol. I, Item 74

⁴¹ IRS, EUCOM OPOT Div to JA Div, 22 Aug 49, sub: Legality of GYA Program under International Law. In SGS 353.81 (1949), Vol. I, Item 75.



GYA summer camp in Bavaria

The entire controversy over the legality of the program was not merely significant from the financial viewpoint since shortage of funds was a recurrent problem. The significance lay in the fact that Army responsibility for the GYA program had been challenged. The issue was resolved--even though the question of legality was not answered--when Mr. John J. McCloy, the American Military Governor, approved the scheduled Deutsche Mark budget for GYA.⁴² Thus the Army remained in control of the GYA program.

31. Democratic Reorientation Survey

Since one of the primary objectives of the GYA program was to assist in the democratic reorientation of German youth, the officials in charge of the program were anxious to determine the degree of success achieved. Quantitative measurements of the number of youth centers in operation and the number of participants, or of the amount of assistance rendered or of the number of individuals assisted were of limited value in gauging qualitative accomplishments. Consequently, in February and March of 1950 the GYA Branch conducted a special survey of a thousand German school children, over 16 years of age, of both sexes, and representing all the Laender (in the U.S. Zone), Berlin, and Bremerhaven. In consultation with American and German educators, the HICOG Education and Cultural Relations Division, and the Opinion Survey Branch of the EUCOM TI&E Division, GYA devised a questionnaire that would indicate the degree to which those questioned favored democracy. In order to establish standards of measurement that might indicate the tendency of youth to favor or not to favor democracy, a definition of the concept of democracy had to be agreed upon and adopted. Democracy was defined as a form of government in which the ultimate power rests with the people rather than with a leader or one party.⁴³ To test the questionnaire's validity, an English version was administered to 100 American high school boys and girls in Germany. Two-thirds of the group showed a positively favorable attitude toward democracy. The remaining third was undecided. None however positively opposed democracy. The second portion of the questionnaire determined the factors that might influence the attitude of German youth toward democracy. Included therefore were questions on membership in youth organizations and on opportunities to learn democracy by practice. Since another basic assumption was that many German youths equated democracy with America and Americans, other questions established attitudes toward Americans and the degree of personal contact with them.

⁴² IRS, EUCOM OPOT Div to COFS, 8 Jul 49, sub: Financial Support of the GYA Program. In file above, Item 60

⁴³ Rept, Dr. W. P. Shofstall, Civilian Adviser, EUCOM GYA Br, to Lt Col L. B. Cole, C/OPOT Div GYA Br, sub: Will German Youth Choose Democracy? Survey of Youth's Attitudes toward Democracy in Relation to their Participation in the GYA Program, 24 Feb 50 to 10 Mar 50, Incl to Memo, C/GYA Br to Dir OPOT Div, 1 Jun 50, sub: GYA Democratic Reorientation Survey. In USAREUR Hist Div GYA files.

The results of the survey showed that almost half (47 percent) of the Germans tested were undecided in their attitude toward democracy, although more than twice as many (38 percent) favored it than were opposed (15 percent). German youth who had contact with the GYA program were significantly more favorable toward democracy than those who had little or no experience with it. A number of the features emphasized most in the GYA program, such as American-sponsored games, parties, etc., had the least amount of influence on democratic reorientation. Conversely, the features that were least emphasized in the GYA program, such as group practice in parliamentary procedure, were most influential in developing positive attitudes toward democracy. The strongest factor determining the preference of German youth for democracy was the way in which the Germans thought the Americans regarded them (i.e., whether the Americans respected Germans or considered them "second rate") The final conclusion based on the results of the survey was that the total impact of the occupation, including American over-all policies and individual actions, exerted more influence on the attitude of young Germans toward democracy than any one program such as GYA.⁴⁴

⁴⁴(1) Rept and memo cited above. (2) Notes from 6th Tng Conf, GYA, 17-18 Apr 50. In USAREUR Hist Div GYA files.

CHAPTER 4

The Phaseout, 1951-55

32. Plans for Transfer of GYA Responsibilities

As early as December 1948, EUCOM had considered developing a plan for eventually turning over the GYA program to properly constituted German youth agencies and dropping direct support by U.S. military agencies.¹

At the training conference for GYA personnel held in Heidelberg in April 1949 this theme had been strongly emphasized by Lt. Col. F. W. Hall, the chief of the EUCOM GYA Section, in his address to the conferees. He had stated that GYA workers must never lose sight of the eventual phaseout of GYA. All current and future efforts would have to be so oriented as to integrate the program into the German community and way of life. Only thus could the effect of the program endure past the termination of American assistance to it.²

While the Army antitipated turning over the program to the Germans and even conducted youth leadership training with that objective in mind,³ HICOG took the first practical steps in the matter. In January 1950 Mr. John J. McCloy stated to General Handy his conviction that the time had come to secure German community support and sponsorship for

¹Ltr, Dir OPOT Div to EUCOM COFS, 27 Dec 48, sub: The Armed Forces Assistance Program to German Youth Activities. In SGS 353.81 Ger (1948), Vol. I, Item 72A.

²Notes from the 4th Tng Conf, GYA, 28-29 Apr 49, p. 8. In USAREUR Hist Div GYA files.

³HICOG, Information Bulletin, Jan 50, p. 40.

the operational phases of GYA. This view was based on the Occupation Statute concept that those matters for which the Germans could assume responsibility ought to be turned over to them. Stressing the value of armed forces assistance in the past, Mr. McCloy asked that such assistance be continued during the transition period through the existing German youth services structure. He set no specific target date but hoped that progress would be made within six months.⁴

In March HICOG and EUCOM representatives discussed what action would have to be taken on Mr. McCloy's proposals. No definite decision was reached at that time, but the project remained of intense interest to EUCOM. By April EUCOM had decided to oppose any piecemeal transfer of GYA centers or its responsibilities. Only if HICOG became willing to take over the entire program would EUCOM agree to relinquish control.⁵

At a later HICOG-EUCOM conference the concept of gradual turnover of the GYA program was emphasized by Dr. Norrie of HICOG. EUCOM restated its paradoxical view that it was anxious to carry out the wishes of the High Commissioner but only if the latter would assume complete control of the program. This viewpoint was opposed by HICOG, who also indicated that future reductions in funds might make necessary a sudden curtailment of the program that would be far more harmful than a gradual transfer of it.⁶

In July HICOG advised EUCOM that the interest of the United States might best be served by retiring behind the scenes in youth programs. HICOG asserted that American influence in the operation of the youth program would be increased by relieving U.S. personnel from administrative duties and permitting them to observe and guide the over-all program.⁷ This consideration apparently modified General Handy's attitude of either completely turning over the program to the Germans or retaining full control. In effect, he agreed to continue volunteer and logistical support to centers after they had passed from armed forces control. This concession was made at the July HICOG-EUCOM

⁴Ltr, HICOG to CINCEUR, 20 Jan 50. In SGS 353.81 Ger (1950); Vol. I, Item 10.

⁵(1) IRS, Dir OPOT Div to EUCOM VCOFS, 28 Mar 50, sub: German Youth Activities. (2) Memo for rcd; Col Ralph W. Zwicker, Dep Dir OPOT Div Org & Tng, 3 Apr 50, sub: Transfer of Responsibility for Certain GYA Centers. Both in SGS 353.81 Ger (1950), Vol. I, Items 38, 41.

⁶IRS, Dir OPOT Div to VCOFS, 17 Apr 50, sub: HICOG-EUCOM Relationships: GYA. In file above, Item 53.

⁷IRS, POLAD to CINCEUR, 21 Jul 50, sub: Comments on German Youth Program. In file above, Item 86A.

conference, at which it was also agreed to begin plans for the transfer of centers that were too far from troop concentrations to make support by the armed forces practical. Both HICOG and EUCOM were satisfied with this beginning, and a list of such centers was drawn up for consideration as potential initial transfer projects.⁸

33. Initial Transfer Attempts

By the end of October tentative plans had been drawn up to turn over the Tauberbischofsheim GYA center to HICOG-German control. German sponsors would operate the center under HICOG supervision.⁹ A number of technical difficulties delayed action on the plans for several months. By the end of February 1951, however, HICOG and EUCOM agreed on the procedures and responsibilities each would undertake in the pilot transfer of this center.¹⁰ At this point further difficulties arose with German officials in Tauberbischofsheim. They were willing to furnish the property, but wanted U.S. sources to pay for operating costs. HICOG finally agreed to pay for support of the center for FY 1952 if no other solution could be found, but the Germans still refused to continue support for the center after the withdrawal of HICOG financial support on 1 July 1952. In view of the impossibility of reaching a mutually acceptable arrangement for the turnover of the Tauberbischofsheim center, the matter was finally dropped in June.¹¹

34. Consequence of Reduction of Funds

Eventually the issue of transferring the centers was forced when EUCOM requested an authorization of roughly DM 8.4 million from HICOG's counterpart funds for GYA operations in FY 1952. Due to a curtailment of funds, HICOG was able to authorize only DM 4.6 million.¹² Consequently, EUCOM ordered termination of operations in 120 GYA centers,

⁸Memo, C/GYA Br to Dir OPOT Div, 31 Jul 50, no sub. In file above, Item 96 atchd.

⁹Memo, Dir OPOT Div to EUCOM COFS, 27 Oct 50, sub: Logistical Support Outlined in Plan for Turnover of GYA Center from EUCOM to HICOG-German Control. In file above, Item 118A.

¹⁰IRS, Dir OPOT Div to EUCOM DCOFS for Admin, 1 Mar 51, sub: Publicity on Transfer of Tauberbischofsheim GYA Center. In SGS 353.81 Ger (1951), Vol. I, Item 14B.

¹¹IRS's, Dir OPOT Div to EUCOM DCOFS for Admin, 30 Mar, 4, 14, & 19 Jun 51, sub: Transfer of Tauberbischofsheim GYA Center. All in file above, Items 33, 55, 58, 59A.

¹²Ltr, EUCOM AG Div to HICOG, 10 Apr 51, no sub. In file above, Item 39A.

effective 30 June 1951. This left 108 centers under armed forces supervision. HICOG was requested to name German sponsors for the centers being terminated. In the event that sponsors were named, EUCOM directed subordinate commands to derequisition any buildings or property utilized by the centers; to release to the new sponsors any supplies and equipment purchased with GARIOA, RACAOA,¹³ or counterpart funds; and to transfer a proportion of the GYA fund, based upon youth participation figures as of February 1951, to the new sponsors. Distribution of donated materials and salvage continued as in the past; youths using the centers remained eligible for zone-wide GYA activities; and leaders of the centers were invited to attend GYA training conferences. Transportation was provided, when such support did not conflict with military needs, and volunteer assistance was encouraged. Limited logistical support was given at the local commander's discretion to centers that were released without a new sponsor, but in such cases the undertaking of operations or assistance was specifically forbidden.¹⁴

35. Transfer of Centers

Of the 120 centers released on 30 June 1951, 58 were transferred to German sponsors named by HICOG along with property valued at approximately DM 159,000. The other 62 centers were closed, with the properties either derequisitioned or converted to other military use.¹⁵

In effect, what this meant was that the GYA program had been reduced by more than 50 percent. The following tabulation shows the sharp declines in the enrollment of German youth in the centers after June 1951:¹⁶

| | <u>German Youth Enrolled in GYA</u> |
|--------|---|
| Jul 49 | 707,010 |
| Jul 50 | 542,652 |
| Jul 51 | 180,698 |
| Jul 52 | 100,643 |
| Jul 53 | 45,663 |
| Jul 54 | 32,528 |

¹³Government and Relief in Occupied Areas, and Relief and Certain Aid in Occupied Areas.

¹⁴(1) Ibid. (2) EUCOM ltr, 16 Apr 51, sub: German Youth Activities. AG 353.8 GOT. (3) Ltr, Mrs. J. Shouse to SA, 12 Oct 51, sub: Report on Trip to Germany. In SGS 353.81 Ger (1951), Vol. II, Item 90A atchd.

¹⁵IRS, D/OPOT to COFS, 29 Aug 51, sub: Consolidated Report on Release of GYA Centers. In SGS 353.81 Ger (1951), Vol. II, Item 82.

¹⁶Tab G to memo, USAREUR ACOFS G1 to COFS, 21 Mar 55; sub: Termination of GYA Program. AG 353.8 GPA.

The rapid phaseout of centers and sudden drop in enrollment was more than compensated for by the West German Government which established a youth program of its own and appropriated DM 53 million for it.¹⁷ Since the basic policy was to turn over to the Germans those things for which they were ready to assume responsibility, the U.S. armed forces might well have considered this as the appropriate time to get completely out of the youth activities field rather than to continue a half-strength program that was no longer vitally needed. However, it is often difficult to check the momentum of an organization, once established and operating. This apparently was the case with GYA. Moreover, General Eddy later maintained that an abrupt termination of all GYA operations might have had undesirable political consequences.¹⁸ Perhaps this possibility motivated the decision to continue the program on a smaller scale.

Realizing that there would be even less money for GYA in FY 1953, the competent authorities wanted to develop means of effecting a smooth turnover of responsibilities to the Germans. The criteria outlined by EUCOM for the mass transfer of centers that had taken place on 30 June were also followed in the transfer of the Mannheim-Rheinau GYA Center to German control. Following a period of observation to determine the success of the Germans in operating the center, similar transfers were to be attempted at each of the military posts. After two months of periodic visits and reports, GYA officials concluded that the transfer of the Mannheim-Rheinau center was successful. Subsequent transfer attempts were, unfortunately, somewhat less effective. During the remainder of FY 1952, 7 transfers were attempted. Despite careful study and cooperation between political and military officials only 4 of the 7 attempted transfers were successfully completed. Local German officials were held responsible for this bad record; German reluctance to accept responsibility for continuance of GYA center operations seemed due more to a lack of ideological conviction than an unwillingness to provide financial support.¹⁹

¹⁷ IRS, D/OPOT to DCOFS Admin, 6 Apr 51, sub: GYA Funding. In SGS 353.81 Ger (1951), Vol. I, Item 38.

¹⁸

Ltr, Lt Gen M. S. Eddy to Gen L. D. Clay, 15 Dec 52. In SGS 353.81 Ger (1952), Vol. I, Item 29A atchd.

¹⁹

(1) IRS, Dir OPOT Div to COFS, 3 Oct 51, sub: Transfer of Mannheim-Rheinau GYA Center. In SGS 353.81 Ger (1951), Vol. II, Item 90. (2) Notes, 8th Tng Conf, GYA, 29-30 Nov 51, pp. 4-5. (3) Memo, C/GYA Br to OPOT Div, 25 Jul 52, sub: Official Visit to EUCOM/OPOT Memo, 23 Jul 52. Last two in USAREUR Hist Div GYA files.

As had been anticipated, funds for FY 1953 were reduced considerably, necessitating further cuts in the GYA program. In addition to the 4 centers transferred during FY 1952, EUCOM decided to close 24 centers at the start of FY 1953. These actions, following a number of abandonments during the spring of 1952, left a total of 74 GYA centers in operation on 1 July 1952.²⁰

The funds for the operation of this curtailed program during FY 1953 came from four sources. HICOG allocated DM 1 million (\$238,000) for the salaries of German workers in the centers; logistical support provided by USAREUR²¹ amounted to an estimated \$200,000; collections of funds and materials by the General Clay Fund in the United States were valued at \$30,000; and nonappropriated funds of approximately \$130,000 were generated locally in the U.S. Zone by means of benefits, raffles, athletic events, payable collections, and the like.²²

36. The Joint USAREUR-HICOG Working Committee

At the beginning of FY 1953, HICOG stated that the DM 1 million for that year would have to be considered as terminal. In view of this fact, and considering the pending sovereignty of West Germany, HICOG recommended that a joint committee be formed with the command to implement the liquidation of GYA. The committee was to establish criteria for the disposition of centers either by elimination, by transfer to German sponsorship, or by converting them to joint military-German operation.²³ USAREUR agreed to the formation of such a committee, but refused to consider elimination or joint operation as a basis for discussion. The USAREUR view was that centers would either continue to be turned over to HICOG-recommended German sponsors as in the past or else be operated by the armed forces as long as funds would allow.²⁴ At the same time the USAREUR Civil Affairs Division expressed strong doubt that the program could or should be continued after FY 1953. According to the Department of State, GYA was in its last year, with its complete liquidation anticipated for the end of FY 1953. As soon as the Contractual Agreements making Germany a sovereign nation became effective, such a program would be an infringement on the rights and responsibilities of the German nation and, therefore, could have serious political repercussions.

²⁰Memo, OPOT Div to C/GYA Br, 20 Aug 52, sub: Survey of Current GYA Operations. In USAREUR Hist Div GYA files.

²¹EUCOM was redesignated USAREUR on 1 August 1952.

²²Memo, C/GYA Sec to DCOFS Admin, 20 Apr 53, no sub. In USAREUR Hist Div GYA files.

²³Ltr, HICOG to EUCOM Comp, 11 Jul 52, no sub. In USAREUR Hist Div GYA files.

²⁴Memo, C/GYA Sec to Dir OPOT Div, 6 Aug 52, sub: Establishment of USAREUR-HICOG Committee for GYA Integration. In file above.

Finally, another compelling reason for early liquidation of GYA was the Army's expectation that no more Deutsche Marks would be available for support of the program. Considering all these factors GYA was expected to survive only a few additional months.²⁵

The GYA Section of USAREUR headquarters failed to be impressed by these arguments. Two days before the first meeting of the joint committee the GYA Section asserted that the program was then approaching the peak of its effectiveness and formed a safeguard for German youth against totalitarian ideologies. Therefore, GYA ought to be continued, unless after ratification of the Contractual Agreements the West German Government objected to continuation of the program.²⁶

a. First Meeting. The first meeting of the Joint USAREUR-HICOG Working Committee was held on 17 October 1952. HICOG anticipated complete phaseout of GYA operations by 1 July 1953 and emphasized that no funds would be available for GYA support in the following fiscal year. Sufficient funds were available to carry the program through FY 1953. However, centers would continue to be transferred to German sponsors in accordance with the criteria upon which HICOG and EUCOM had agreed. If no funds became available for continuance of GYA in FY 1954, USAREUR agreed to eliminate centers that had not secured German sponsors by 30 June 1953.

USAREUR refused to take part in joint operations of centers with Germans. The command would either accept complete responsibility for the program, including control of funds, or limit its activities to providing assistance to German sponsors.²⁷

b. Results of Second Meeting. At the next meeting in December 1952 USAREUR recommended eliminating centers for which no German sponsors could be found if U.S. support could not be continued. The command also suggested initiating a public information program to win German support for the transfer project. It was agreed to transfer as many centers as possible before 30 June 1953. In this connection, it was also agreed to make joint HICOG-USAREUR press and radio releases to stimulate a campaign

²⁵ Memo, CAD to Dir OPOT Div, 16 Aug 52, sub: Transfer of Staff Responsibility for German Youth Activities. In file above.

²⁶ Stf Study, GYA Sec, 15 Oct 52, sub: The GYA FY 54 Outlook. In file above.

²⁷ Memo, C/Tng Br to Dir OPOT Div, 21 Oct 52, sub: Joint USAREUR-HICOG Working Committee on GYA Matters. In file above.

for getting German sponsors for GYA centers. But USAREUR would continue to operate any centers for which no sponsors could be found for as long as funds were available.²⁸ By using rent free properties to house the centers, encouraging more troop unit support of individual centers, and absorbing maintenance costs in the command budget, USAREUR hoped to be able to continue part of the program through FY 1954. The major problem of how German workers in the centers would be paid during FY 1954 was still unsolved.²⁹

37. Beginning of the End

a. FY 1954 Transfers. In May 1953 USAREUR directed the implementation of the transfer program. Indicating the anticipated lack of funds for FY 1954, USAREUR ordered area commanders to transfer GYA centers to German or local troop unit control before 1 July 1953. Any centers not so transferred would have to be closed.³⁰

In accordance with this directive, 34 centers were turned over to German sponsors with the understanding that the centers would continue to be operated under the "open door" policy and with adequate leadership. The armed forces released the centers with their equipment and supplies and offered limited logistical assistance for a period of six months after the transfer. Local troop units undertook to assume responsibility for the support of 22 centers for which no German sponsors were available. These centers continued to receive logistical support from USAREUR. The remaining 17 centers were closed.³¹

USAREUR emphasized, however, that direct support to GYA had been terminated only because of the lack of funds. Other assistance, such as distributing salvage, furnishing transportation, distributing materials and funds donated from the United States, and paying for logistical support of troop-operated centers would continue.³²

²⁸(1) IRS, Dir OPOT Div to DCOFS Admin, 24 Nov 52, sub: Joint USAREUR-HICOG Working Committee on GYA Matters. (2) Min, Mtg of HICOG-USAREUR Committee for GYA Matters, 9 Dec 52. Both in file above.

²⁹Ltr, Lt Gen M. S. Eddy to Gen L. D. Clay, 15 Dec 52. In SGS 353.81 Ger (1952), Vol. I, Item 29A atchd.

³⁰USAREUR ltr, 25 May 53, sub: Transfer of GYA Centers to German Sponsors. AG 353.8 GOT-AGO.

³¹Tab A to IRS, G3 to DCOFS Admin, 20 Oct 53, sub: GYA Briefing for Mr. McCloy. In USAREUR SGS 353.81 Ger (1953), Vol. II, Item 22.

³²(1) Memo, USAREUR COFS to Heads of All Stf Divs, 19 Aug 53, sub: GYA Activities. (2) Ltr, USAREUR COFS to all Area Comdrs and CG, Seventh Army, 28 Jul 53, no sub. Both in USAREUR Hist Div GYA files.



Preparing entries for Handicraft Contest at GYA Center workshop, Berlin, 1953

b. New Concept of GYA. At this point, the interpretation of the functions of GYA underwent a significant change. Gen. W. M. Hoge, CINCUSAREUR, informed his subordinate commanders that GYA no longer was concerned only with centers, but rather included all armed forces assistance given to German youth whether through a troop-supported or a German center, or to unorganized youth. He emphasized too that donated materials and funds from the United States were to be distributed to both transferred and troop-supported centers. In the event that the Meistersinger and Handicraft Contests were continued, they too would be open to all youth of former GYA centers as well as to the members of the troop-supported centers.³³

c. Continuation of Modified Program. In November 1953 USAREUR decided to phase out the modified GYA program on 30 June 1954. The Handicraft and Meistersinger contests to be held in May and June 1954 would serve as final phaseout activities. Efforts would be made to find German sponsors for these two activities, and transfer of troop-sponsored centers to German control was to be expedited.³⁴

This decision was not officially announced until March 1954. At the same time, however, CINCUSAREUR indicated that support would be continued on a voluntary basis by troop units and that plans were being made to continue the distribution of donations from agencies in the United States.³⁵

A last attempt to obtain funds to continue the program in FY 1955 was made in May 1954 when USAREUR requested authorization from the Department of the Army to utilize DM 350,000 of the funds available to the command to pay for the rents, utilities, and salaries of indigenous workers at the remaining centers. The reprieve came in June with the passage of Public Law 458--the FY 1955 Department of Defense Appropriation Act--which permitted the use of German funds as requested. Although funds were then available for another year of operation, all possible efforts were made to find German sponsors for the remaining centers.³⁶

³³ Statement, Gen Hoge to HICOG-Comdrs Conf, Oct 53, sub: Armed Forces Assistance Program to German Youth Activities. In SGS 353.81 Ger (1953), Vol. II, Item 22A, Tab H.

³⁴ Memo, ACOFS G3 to USAREUR COFS, 6 Nov 53, sub: Future of the Armed Forces Assistance Program to German Youth Activities. In file above, Item 22A.

³⁵ Statement, CINCUSAREUR to HICOG-Comdrs, Conf, Mar 54, sub: Armed Forces Assistance Program to German Youth Activities. In SGS 353.81 Ger (1954), Vol. I, Item 7, Tab A.

³⁶ (1) Cable SC-20170, USAREUR to DA for Compt, 12 May 54. (2) Cable SC-10131, USAREUR to Berlin Comd, BPOE, Area Comds, 1 Jul 54. (3) Cable DA-527500, DA to CINCUSAREUR, 1 Jul 54. All in file above, Items 8 and 12 atchd.

58. The Final Phaseout

Effective 2 August 1954, the responsibility for the GYA program was transferred from the Assistant Chief of Staff, G3, to G1 and combined with the newly formed American Youth Activities (AYA) program under control of the AYA-GYA Section.³⁷ Clearly GYA's days were numbered. By January 1955 only 19 GYA centers remained in operation. In April CINCUSAREUR, Gen. A. C. McAuliffe, directed the transfer of these centers to German sponsors by 30 June 1955. All armed forces financial support was to be terminated as of that date and those centers that had not found German sponsors were to be closed. Transportation and distribution of supplies from the General Clay Fund were to be continued in order to permit a smooth phaseout of that aspect of the program.³⁸ With the attainment of sovereignty in May 1955, West Germany assumed sole responsibility for its own youth program. Local commanders were permitted to give only occasional and limited support to German centers in the interest of troop-community relations. Later in the summer the AYA-GYA Section was redesignated the AYA Section.³⁹

In September, USAREUR terminated liaison with and transportation assistance to the General Clay Fund. Mrs. Shouse, chairman of the fund, was referred to the cultural attache at the U.S. Embassy in Bonn for liaison with the West German Government in youth program matters. USAREUR established 30 April 1956 as the cut-off date for its processing and handling of donated supplies.⁴⁰ In the meantime, however, any other assistance was specifically prohibited. No personnel were to be assigned to assist in German youth activities; military vehicles were not to be used, except in the distribution of the above-mentioned supplies; no military-controlled buildings would be utilized as centers; and no military supplies were to be made available to German youth organizations.⁴¹

³⁷(1) AYA-GYA Bul No. 1, Sep 54. In SGS 353.81 Ger (1954), Vol. I, Item 13. (2) Memo, ACOFS G1 to COFS, 17 Jun 54, sub: American Youth Activities. In SGS 005 (1954), Vol. I, Item 12A.

³⁸(1) Ltr, Gen A. C. McAuliffe to Mrs. Jouett Shouse, 7 Apr 55. (2) Ltr, C/AYA-GYA Sec to Mrs. Jouett Shouse, 2 Jun 55. Both in SGS 353.81 Ger (1955), Vol. I, Items 3A atchd and 8 atchd.

³⁹USAREUR ltr, CINCUSAREUR to CG SACOM, 6 Sep 55, sub: Transfer of GYA Centers to German Sponsors. In SGS 353.81 Ger (1955), Vol. I, Item 11A.

⁴⁰(1) Ltr, CINCUSAREUR to Mrs. J. Shouse, 22 Sep 55. In SGS 353.81 Ger (1955), Vol. I, Item 8 atchd. (2) Cable SC-14930, USAREUR to DA, 9 Feb 56. In SGS 005 (1956), Vol. I, Item 1A.

⁴¹USAREUR Cir 28-75, 18 Oct 55, sub: German Youth Activities.

At the recommendation of the Department of the Army, and in order to afford the General Federation of Women's Clubs sufficient opportunity to stop shipment of supplies, the cut-off date was extended to 30 June 1956.⁴² This was the dying gasp, and the U.S. armed forces assistance program to German Youth Activities officially ended on that date.

⁴²(1) Cable DA-382580, DA to CINCUSAREUR, 18 Jan 56. (2) Cable SC-14930, USAREUR to DA, 9 Feb 56. Both in SGS 005 (1956), Vol. I, Item 1A.

Glossary

This glossary contains all abbreviations used in this volume, except those listed in SR 320-50-1, 28 October 1949, and changes thereto.

| <u>Term</u> | <u>Definition</u> |
|-----------------------------------|--|
| AGWAR | Adjutant General, War Department (former designation) |
| AYA | American Youth Activities |
| BPOE | Bremerhaven Port of Embarkation |
| CAD | Civil Affairs Division, or Civil Administration Division (OMGUS) |
| CARE | Cooperative for American Relief in Europe |
| CINCEUR | Commander in Chief, European Command |
| CRALOG | Council of Relief Agencies Licensed for Operation in Germany |
| DM | Deutsche Mark |
| DP | displaced person |
| ETOUSA | European Theater of Operations, U.S. Army |
| EUCOM | European Command |
| GARIOA | Government and Relief in Occupied Areas |
| GYA | German Youth Activities |
| HICOG | U.S. High Commission(er) for Germany |
| <u>Ibid.</u> | <u>ibidem</u> , in the same place |
| ICD | Information Control Division (OMGUS) |
| IRS | internal route slip |
| Jugendamt (<u>Jugendaemter</u>) | Youth Office(s) |
| <u>Jugendheim(e)</u> | Youth Center(s) |
| <u>Kreis(e)</u> | county(ies) |

| <u>Term</u> | <u>Definition</u> |
|---------------------------|---|
| <u>Land (Laender)</u> | state(s) |
| <u>Landesjugendtag</u> | State Youth Day |
| <u>Landrat</u> | State Councilor |
| <u>Oberbuergermeister</u> | Lord Mayor |
| OMGUS | Office of Military Government, U.S. |
| OPOT | Operations, Plans, Organization, and Training |
| POLAD | Political Adviser |
| RACAOA | Relief and Certain Aid in Occupied Areas |
| SACOM | Southern Area Command |
| SHAEF | Supreme Headquarters, Allied Expeditionary Forces |
| USAFE | U.S. Air Forces in Europe |
| USAREUR | U.S. Army, Europe |
| USFET | U.S. Forces, European Theater |
| <u>Wehrmacht</u> | German Armed Forces |

Chronology

| <u>Date</u> | <u>Event</u> | <u>Page Reference</u> |
|-------------|--|-----------------------|
| <u>1945</u> | | |
| 1 Jul | ETOUSA is redesignated USFET | 2 |
| 14 Jul | SHAEF is officially dissolved; the G-5 Division of ETOUSA and the U.S. element of the SHAEF G-5 Division are consolidated into the USFET G-5 Division. | 2 |
| 14 Sep | Seventh Army begins first broad program of German youth activities in the Western Military District. | 4 |
| 1 Oct | The U.S. Group, Control Council, is redesignated the Office of Military Government, U.S. (OMGUS). | 2 |
| | Nonfraternization restrictions are lifted in U.S. Zone of Germany. | 5 |
| 25 Oct | USFET institutes procedures on zone-wide scale for organizing and supervising German youth activities. | 5-6 |
| <u>1946</u> | | |
| 15 Apr | USFET authorizes Army units to give limited logistical and personnel support to German youth organizations in the U.S. Zone. | 8-9 |
| 24 May | Bavarian Youth Committee is established. | 7 |
| Jun | First German youth are included in USFET athletics program. | 11 |
| 29 Jul | German Youth Activities (GYA) Section is created within USFET G-3 Division to supervise the youth assistance program. | 9 |
| Jul | First postwar general youth rally is held in Baden-Wuerttemberg at Kirchheim-Teck. | 12 |
| 7-9 Aug | First of a series of conferences is held to broaden and strengthen the Army youth assistance program. | 14 |

| <u>Date</u> | <u>Event</u> | <u>Page Reference</u> |
|-------------|--|-----------------------|
| <u>1946</u> | | |
| Aug | OMGUS declares amnesty for young Germans, thereby opening the German youth movement to more young people and more potential leaders. | 13 |
| 5 Oct | USFET authorizes the formation of new youth centers under Army sponsorship. | 15-16 |
| 25 Nov | German youth are authorized to work in Special Services manual arts installations. | 11 |
| <u>1947</u> | | |
| 15 Mar | USFET is redesignated the European Command (EUCOM); GYA Section functions as part of the EUCOM OPOT Division. | 10 |
| May | GYA training conference is held in Berlin to promote greater participation in GYA by volunteer women dependents. | 22 |
| May | GYA assistance program is designated a responsibility of the German civil authorities and becomes chargeable as a nonoccupation cost. | 31 |
| 25 Jul | USFET redirects its youth assistance program and clarifies GYA policies and procedures. | 18-19 |
| Nov | Marshal V. Sokolovsky, the Russian member of the Allied Control Council accuses GYA of being subversive cover-up for military training of German youth. | 29 |
| <u>1948</u> | | |
| 20 Aug | The U.S. Constabulary proposes reduction of its personnel support to GYA. | 39 |
| 2 Nov | EUCOM Cir 149 is published redefining program, policies, and responsibilities with respect to GYA; major responsibility is assigned to military post commanders; demands upon tactical units for support of GYA are reduced. | 40-42 |

| <u>Date</u> | <u>Event</u> | <u>Page Reference</u> |
|-------------------|---|-----------------------|
| <u>1948</u> | | |
| Dec | The General Clay Fund is created in the United States to help support some GYA activities. | 32 |
| <u>1949</u> | | |
| Apr | Controversy begins over the legality of the GYA assistance program. | 43-45 |
| May | First GYA-sponsored, zone-wide handicrafts contest for girls begins. | 35 |
| May | EUCOM opens youth leadership school for German GYA workers at Ruit, near Stuttgart. | 43 |
| Jun | Final judging concludes the first GYA Handicrafts Contest. | 35 |
| Jul | EUCOM survey indicates that German community leaders favor continuation of GYA. | 46 |
| Jul | First GYA-sponsored, zone-wide Soapbox Derby is held in Munich. | 34 |
| 21 Sep | Federal Republic of Germany is established; the Occupation Statute and the Charter of the High Commission become effective; HICOG replaces OMGUS. | 43 |
| <u>1950</u> | | |
| 24 Feb- 10 Mar | EUCOM GYA Branch conducts a democratic reorientation survey. | 47 |
| Apr | Finals of the first GYA-sponsored <u>Meistersinger</u> contest are held in Nuremberg. | 36 |
| Jul | HICOG advises CINCEUR that terminating the Army's role in youth activities might best serve U.S. interests. | 50 |
| Jul | EUCOM agrees to the gradual transfer of the GYA centers to the Germans. | 50 |

| <u>Date</u> | <u>Event</u> | <u>Page Reference</u> |
|-------------|--|-----------------------|
| <u>1951</u> | | |
| 30 Jun | EUCOM releases 120 GYA centers; 62 are closed and 58 are transferred to German sponsors. | 51-52 |
| <u>1952</u> | | |
| Feb | Zone-wide, GYA-sponsored Community Service Contest finals are held. | 37-38 |
| 1 Aug | EUCOM is redesignated U.S. Army, Europe (USAREUR). | 10 |
| 17 Oct | First meeting of Joint USAREUR-HICOG Working Committee on GYA matters is held. | 55 |
| <u>1953</u> | | |
| 25 May | USAREUR directs that all remaining GYA centers be transferred to German or local troop unit control by 1 July 1953. | 56 |
| Nov | USAREUR decides to phase out the GYA program on 30 June 1954. | 57 |
| <u>1954</u> | | |
| 2 Aug | Responsibility for GYA is transferred from the Assistant Chief of Staff, G3 to G1 and combined with AYA under control of the AYA-GYA Section. | 58 |
| <u>1955</u> | | |
| Apr | Gen. A. C. McAuliffe directs transfer or closing of the remaining 19 GYA centers by 30 June 1955. | 58 |
| 5 May | Federal Republic of Germany becomes sovereign and assumes sole responsibility for its youth program. | 58 |
| 22 Sep | USAREUR announces termination of the processing and handling of supplies donated from the United States and establishes 30 April 1956 as cut-off date. | 58 |

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