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AMANULLAII

hundreds of thousands of irregular troops, banded into
small forces, which inhabited the hills. They were
always ready for war. Their lives were taken up with
feuds and domestic squabbles which fitted them admir-
ably for being considered as a reserve force* They
were never more pleased than when they could forget
their private disagreements to unite against a common
.-.foe*', Their objects were the acquisition of loot, more
than .national pride or arrogance, and their highest
motive in ^taking up arms for their country was the
possibility of adding more laurels to their family
tradition.

They were fighting men born and bred. They knew
their hills, and could survive with the minimum of
provision for their comfort. They wore tireless, fearless,
and elusive. They did not respond well to discipline,
but they were unsurpassed in fust-moving warfare in
which personal bravery counted us much as military
efficiency.

Within a few days reports received in India justified
the gloomy forebodings of war on the Frontier. It was
the worst time of the year for white soldiers. The sun
beat down ferociously on the bleak hills, giving no cover.
At no time in the last hundred years had British
commanders been less enamoured of the prospect of a
campaign. Yet here were the facts,

Amanullah moved a picked force of 2000 men down
to Dacca, a few miles from the barbed wire of the
Frontier leading to the Khyber Pass. There was soon
another force of 2000 men at Khost. Another 1500
were at Kandahar. And early in May British pickets
at Landi Khana were in a short and sharp affray with
an irregular band of Afghan hillmen who had sneaked
over the Border.

It was a bad time for Great Britain,   The sharp-

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