By ns ed ra FEE = ae ears * Ay 4 ar COLLECTED ESSAYS By T. H. HUXLEY VOLUME II DARWINIANA ESSAYS BY THOMAS H. HUXLEY London MACMILLAN AND CO., LIMITED NEW YORK: THE MACMILLAN COMPANY 1907 All rights reserved RICHARD CLAY AND Sons, LIMITED, BREAD STREET HILL, E.C., AND BUNGAY, SUFFOLK. First Edition printed 1893. Rebrinted 1894, 1899, 1902, 1907. PREFACE I HAVE entitled this volume “ Darwiniana” because the pieces republished in it either treat of the ancient doctrine of Evolution, rehabilitated and placed upon a sound scientific foundation, since and in consequence of, the publication of the “ Origin of Species ;” or they attempt to meet the more weighty of the unsparing criticisms with which that great work was visited for several years after its appearance ; or they record the impression left by the personality of Mr. Darwin on one who had the privilege and the happiness of enjoying his friendship for some thirty years; or they endeavour to sum up his work and indicate its enduring influence on the course of scientific thought. Those who take the trouble to read the first two essays, published in 1859 and 1860, will, I think, do me the justice to admit that my zeal to secure fair play for Mr. Darwin, did not drive me into the position of a mere advocate ; and that, while doing justice to the greatness of the argu- v1 PREFACE ment I did not fail to indicate its weak points. I have never seen any reason for departing from the position which I took up in these two essays ; and the assertion which I sometimes meet with nowa- days, that I have “recanted” or changed my opinions about Mr. Darwin’s views, is quite unin- telligible to me. As I have said in the seventh essay, the fact of evolution is to my mind sufficiently evidenced by — palzontology ; and I remain of the opinion ex- pressed in the second, that until selective breeding is definitely proved to give rise to varieties infertile with one another, the logical foundation of the theory of natural selection is incomplete. We still remain very much inthe dark about the causes of variation; the apparent inheritance of acquired characters in some cases; and the struggle for existence within the organism, which probably lies at the bottom of both of these phenomena. Some apology is due to the reader for the repro- duction of the “Lectures to Working Men” in their original state. They were taken down in shorthand by Mr. J. Aldous Mays, who requested me to aJlow him to print them. I was very much pressed with work at the time ; and, asI could not revise the reports, which I imagined, moreover, would be of little or no interest to any but my auditors, I stipulated that a notice should be pre- fixed to that effect, This was done ; but it did not PREFACE. Vil prevent a considerable diffusion of the little book in this country and in the United States, nor its translation into more than one foreign language. Moreover Mr. Darwin often urged me to revise and expand the lectures into a systematic popular exposition of the topics of which they treat. I have more than once set about the task: but the proverb about spoiling a horn and not making a spoon, is particularly applicable to attempts to remodel a piece of work which may have served its immediate purpose well enough. So I have reprinted the lectures as they stand, with all their imperfections on their heads. It would seem that many people must have found them useful thirty years ago; and, though the sixties appear now to be reckoned by many of the rising generation as a part of the dark ages, I am not without some grounds for suspecting that there yet remains a fair sprinkling even of “philosophic thinkers” to whom it may be a profitable, perhaps even a novel, task to descend from the heights of speculation and go over the A BC of the great biological problem as it was set before a body of shrewd artisans at that remote epoch, die: BE: HopEs.LEA, EAsTBourNgE, April 7th, 1893. © ’ c= a si Ea Me . aes ic a Bee eee CONTENTS I THE DARWINIAN HYPOTHESIS [1859] II THE ORIGIN OF SPECIES [1860] Ill CRITICISMS ON ‘* THE ORIGIN OF SPECIES” [1864] IV THE GENEALOGY OF ANIMALS [1869] MR. DARWIN'S CRITICS[1871] ..... is VI EVOLUTION IN BIOLOGY [1878] VOL, I eS) Ry eS Gee PAGE 22 80 107 120 187 x CONTENTS VII PAGE THE COMING OF AGE OF ‘‘THE ORIGIN OF SPECIES” PROCUl eG «1 a4 6 ae. Ba we a ole: ae ee tae ak Vill CHARLES DARWIN [1882]... ......4.066--+0.4-6 244 Ix THE DARWIN MEMORIAL [1885]. ........... 248 ».€ OBITUARY [1888] . . 2. 4. s Shs didn a se 2. ie Ae eee XI SIX LECTURES TO WORKING MEN ‘‘ON OUR KNOWLEDGE OF THE CAUSES OF THE PHENOMENA OF ORGANIC WATURS" TIS08)] Gas WI Gekko. so a eee ee COLLECTED ESSAYS VOLUME II I THE DARWINIAN HYPOTHESIS [1859] THE hypothesis of which the present work of Mr. Darwin is but the preliminary outline, may be stated in his own language as follows :— “ Species originated by means of natural selection, or through the preservation of the favoured races in the struggle for life.” To render this thesis intelligible, it is necessary to interpret its terms. In the first place, what isa species? The question is a simple one, but the right answer to it is hard to find, even if we appeal to those who should know most about it. It is all those animals or plants which have descended from a single pair of parents; it is the smallest distinctly definable group of living organisms; it is an eternal and immutable entity ; it is a mere abstraction of the human intellect having no existence in nature. Such are a few of the significations attached to VOL, II B b= 2 THE DARWINIAN HYPOTHESIS I this simple word which may be culled from authoritative sources; and if, leaving terms and theoretical subtleties aside, we turn to facts and endeavour to gather a nieaning for ourselves, by studying the things to which, in practice, the name of species is applied, it profits us little. For practice varies as much as theory. Let two botanists or two zoologists examine and describe the productions of a country, and one will pretty certainly disagree with the other as to the number, limits, and definitions of the species into which he groups the very same things. In these islands, we are in the habit of regarding mankind as of one species, but a fortnight’s steam will land us in a country where divines and savants, for once in agreement, vie with one another in loudness of assertion, if not in cogency of proof, that men are of different species; and, more particularly, that the species negro is so distinct from our own that the Ten Commandments have actually no reference to him. Even in the calm region of entomology, where, if anywhere in this sinful world, passion and prejudice should fail to stir the mind, one learned coleopterist will fill ten attractive volumes with descriptions of species of beetles, nine-tenths of which are immediately declared by his brother beetle-mongers to be no species at all. The truth is that the number of distinguishable living creatures almost surpasses imagination. At least 100,000 such kinds of insects alone have been I THE DARWINIAN HYPOTHESIS 3 described and may be identified in collections, and the number of separable kinds of living things is under-estimated at half a million. Seeing that most of these obvious kinds have their accidental varieties, and that they often shade into others by imperceptible degrees, it may well be imagined that the task of distinguishing be- tween what is permanent and what fleeting, what is a species and what a mere variety, is sufficiently formidable. But is it not possible to apply a test whereby a true species may be known from a mere variety ? Is there no criterion of species? Great authori- ties affirm that there is—that the unions of members of the same species are always fertile, while those of distinct species are either sterile, or their offspring, called hybrids, are so. It is affirmed not only that this is an experimental fact, but that it is a provision for the preservation of the purity of species. Such a criterion as this would be invaluable ; but, unfortunately, not only is 1t not obvious how to apply it in the great majority of cases in which its aid is needed, but its general validity is stoutly denied. The Hon. and Rev. Mr. Herbert, a most trustworthy authority, not only asserts as the result of his own observa- tions and experiments that many hybrids are quite as fertile as the parent species, but he goes so far as to assert that the particular plant Crinwmn capense is much more fertile when crossed by a B 2 4 THE DARWINIAN HYPOTHESIS I distinct species than when fertilised by its proper pollen! On the other hand, the famous Gaertner, though he took the greatest pains to cross the Primrose and the Cowslip, succeeded only once or twice in several years; and yet it is a well- established fact that the Primrose and the Cow- slip are only varieties of the same kind of plant, Again, such cases as the following are well estab- lished. The female of species A, if crossed with the male of species B, is fertile ; but, if the female of B is crossed with the male of A, she remains barren. Facts of this kind destroy the value of the supposed criterion. If, weary of the endless difficulties involved in the determination of species, the investigator, contenting himself with the rough practical distinction of separable kinds, endeavours to study them as they occur in nature—to ascertain their relations to the conditions which surround them, their mutual harmonies and discordancies of structure, the bond of union of their present and their past history, he finds himself, according to the received notions, in a mighty maze, and with, at most, the dimmest adumbration of a plan. If he starts with any one clear conviction, it is that every part of a living creature is cunningly adapted to some special use in its life. Has not his Paley told him that that seemingly useless organ, the spleen, is beautifully adjusted as so much packing between the other organs? And I THE DARWINIAN HYPOTHESIS 5 yet, at the outset of his studies, he finds that no adaptive reason whatsoever can be given for one- half of the peculiarities of vegetable structure. He also discovers rudimentary teeth, which are never used, in the guins of the young calf and in those of the foetal whale; insects which never bite have rudimental jaws, and others which never fly have rudimental wings; naturally blind creatures have rudimental eyes; and the halt have rudimentary limbs. So, again, no animal or plant puts on its perfect form at once, but all have to start from the same point, however various the course which each has to pursue. Not only men and horses, and cats and dogs, lobsters and beetles, periwinkles and mussels, but even the very sponges and animaleules commence their existence under forms which are essentially undistinguishable ; and this is true of all the infinite variety of plants. Nay, more, all living beings march, side by side, along the high road of development, and separate the later the more like they are ; like people leaving church, who all go down the aisle, but having reached the door, some turn into the parsonage, others go down the village, and others part only in the next parish, A man in his development runs for a little while parallel with, though never passing through, the ‘form of the meanest worm, then travels for a space beside the fish, then journeys along with the bird and the reptile for his fellow travellers ; 6 THE DARWINIAN HYPOTHESIS i and only at last, after a brief companionship with the highest of the four-footed and four-handed world, rises into the dignity of pure manhood. No competent thinker of the present day dreams of explaining these indubitable facts by the notion of the existence of unknown and undiscoverable adaptations to purpose. And we would remind those who, ignorant of the facts, must be moved by authority, that no one has asserted the incom- petence of the doctrine of final causes, in its application to physiology and anatomy, more strongly than our own eminent anatomist, Professor Owen, who, speaking of such cases, says (“On the Nature of Limbs,” pp. 39, 40)—*«I think it will be obvious that the principle of final adaptations fails to satisfy all the conditions of the problem.” But, if the doctrine of final causes will not help us to comprehend the anomalies of living structure, the principle of adaptation must surely lead us to understand why certain living beings are found in certain regions of the world and not in others. The Palm, as we know, will not groW in our climate, nor the Oak im Greenland. The white bear cannot live where the tiger thrives, nor vice versd, and the more the natural habits of animal and vegetable species are examined, the more do they seem, on the whole, limited to particular provinces, But when we look into the facts established by the study of the geographical I THE DARWINIAN HYPOTHESIS 4 distribution of animals and plants it seems utterly hopeless to attempt to understand the strange and apparently capricious relations which they exhibit. One would be inclined to suppose ad priori that every country must be naturally peopled by those animals that are fittest to live and thrive in it. And yet how, on this hypothesis, are we to account for the absence of cattle in the Pampas of South America, when those parts of the New World were discovered? It is not that they were-wafit for cattle, for millions of cattle now run wild there; and the like holds good of Australia and New Zealand. It is a curious circumstance, in fact, that the animals and plants of the Northern Hemisphere are not only as well adapted to live in the Southern Hemisphere as its own autochthones, but are, im many cases, absolutely better adapted, and so overrun and extirpate the aborigines. Clearly, therefore, the species which naturally inhabit a country are not necessarily the best adapted to its climate and other conditions. The inhabitants of islands are often distinct from any other known species of animal or plants (witness our recent examples from the work of Sir Emerson Tennent, on Ceylon), and yet they have almost always a sort of general family resemblance to the animals and ‘plants of the nearest mainland. On the other hand, there is hardly a species of fish, shell, or crab common to the opposite sides of the narrow 8 THE DARWINIAN HYPOTHESIS I isthmus of Panama.! Wherever we look, then, living nature offers us riddles of difficult solution, if we suppose that what we see is all that can be known of it. But our knowledge of life is not confined to the existing world. Whatever their minor differences, geologists are agreed as to the vast thickness of the accumulated strata which compose the visible part of our earth, and the inconceivable immensity of the time the lapse of which they are the imperfect but the only accessible witnesses. Now, through- out the greater part of this long series of stratified rocks are scattered, sometimes very abundantly, multitudes of organic remains, the fossilised exuvie of animals and plants which lived and died while the mud of which the rocks are formed was yet soft ooze, and could receive and bury them. It would be a great error to suppose that these organic remains were fragmentary relics. Our museums exhibit fossil shells of immeasurable antiquity, as perfect as the day they were formed ; whole skeletons without a limb disturbed ; nay. the changed flesh, the developing embryos, and even the very footsteps of primeval organisms. Thus the naturalist finds in the bowels of the earth species as well defined as, and in some groups of animals more numerous than, those which breathe the upper air, But, singularly enough, the majority of these entombed species are wholly 1 [See page 60 Note. ] I THE DARWINIAN HYPOTHESIS 9 distinct from those that now live. Nor is this un- likeness without its rule and order. As a broad fact, the further we go back in time the less the buried species are like existing forms ; and, the fur- ther apart the sets of extinct creatures are, the less they are like one another. In other words, there has been a regular succession of living beings, each younger set, being in a very broad and general sense, somewhat more like those which now live. It was once supposed that this succession had been the result of vast successive catastrophes, destructions, and re-creations en masse; but catastrophes are now almost eliminated from geological, or at least palaeontological speculation ; and it is admitted, on all hands, that the seeming breaks in the chain of being are not absolute, but only relative to our imperfect knowledge; that species have replaced species, not in assemblages, but one by one; and that, if it were possible to have all the phenomena of the past presented to us, the convenient epochs and formations of the geologist, though having a certain distinctness, would fade into one another with limits as undefinable as those of the distinct and yet separable colours of the solar spectrum. Such is a brief summary of the main truths which have been established concerning species. Are these truths ultimate and irresolvable facts, or are their complexities and perplexities the mere expressions of a higher law ? 10 THE DARWINIAN HYPOTHESIS Y A large number of persons practically assume the former position to be correct. They believe that the writer of the Pentateuch was empowered and commissioned to teach us scientific as well as other truth, that the account we find there of the creation of living things is simply and literally correct, and that anything which seems to con- tradict it is, by the nature of the case, false. All the phenomena which have been detailed are, on this view, the immediate product of a creative fiat and, consequently, are out of the domain of science altogether, Whether this view prove ultimately to be true or false, it is, at any rate, not at present sup- ported by what is commonly regarded as logical proof, even if it be capable of discussion by reason ; and hence we consider ourselves at liberty to pass it by, and to turn to those views which profess to rest on a scientific basis only, and there- fore admit of being argued to their consequences. And we do this with the less hesitation as it so happens that those persons who are practically conversant with the facts of the case (plainly a considerable advantage) have always thought fit to range themselves under the latter category. The majority of these competent persons have up to the present time maintained two positions— the first, that every species is, within certain de- fined limits, fixed and incapable of modification ; the second, that every species was originally pro- t THE DARWINIAN HYPOTHESIS li duced by a distinct creative act. The second position is obviously incapable of proof or disproof, the direct operations of the Creator not being subjects of science; and it must therefore be regarded as a corollary from the first, the truth or falsehood of which is a matter of evidence. Most persons imagine that the arguments in favour of it are overwhelming; but to some few minds, and these, it must be confessed, intellects of no small power and grasp of knowledge, they have not brought conviction. Among these minds, that of the famous naturalist Lamarck, who possessed a greater acquaintance with the lower forms of life than any man of his day, Cuvier not excepted, and was a good botanist to _ boot, occupies a prominent place. Two facts appear to have strongly affected the course of thought of this remarkable man—the one, that finer or stronger links of affinity connect all living beings with one another, and that thus the highest creature grades by multitudinous steps into the lowest; the other, that an organ may be developed in particular directions by exerting itself in particular ways, and that modi- fications once induced may be transmitted and become hereditary. Putting these facts together, Lamarck endeavoured to account for the first by the operation of the second. Place an animal in new circumstances, says he, and its needs will be altered ; the new needs will create new desires, and 12 THE DARWINIAN HYPOTHESIS I the attempt to gratify such desires will result in an appropriate modification of the organs exerted. Make aman a blacksmith, and his brachial muscles will develop in accordance with the demands made upon them, and in like manner, says Lamarck, “the efforts of some short-necked bird to catch fish without wetting himself have, with time and perseverance, given rise to all our herons and long-necked waders.” The Lamarckian hypothesis has long since been justly condemned, and it is the established prac- tice for every tyro to raise his heel against the carcase of the dead lion. But it is rarely either wise or instructive to treat even the errors of a really great man with mere ridicule, and in the present case the logical form of the doctrine stands on a very different footing from its substance. If species have really arisen by the operation of natural conditions, we ought to be able to find those conditions now at work; we ought to be able to discover in nature some power adequate to modify any given kind of animal or plant in such a manner as to give rise to another kind, which would be admitted by naturalists as a distinct species. Lamarck imagined that he had discovered this vera causa in the admitted facts that some organs may be modified by exercise ; and that modifications, once produced, are capable of hereditary transmission. It does not seem to have occurred to him to inquire whether there is I THE DARWINIAN HYPOTHESIS 13 any reason to believe that there are any limits to the amount of modification producible, or to ask how long an animal is likely to endeavour to gratify an impossible desire. The bird, in our example, would surely have renounced fish dinners long before it had produced the least effect on leg or neck, Since Lamarck’s time, almost all competent naturalists have left speculations on the origin of species to such dreamers as the author of the “ Vestiges,” by whose well-intentioned efforts the Lamarckian theory received its final condemnation in the minds of all sound thinkers. Notwith- standing this silence, however, the transmutation theory, as it has been called, has been a “ skeleton in the closet” to many an honest zoologist and botanist who had a soul above the mere naming of dried plants and skins. Surely, has such an one thought, nature is a mighty and consistent whole, and the providential order established in the world of life must, if we could only see it rightly, be consistent with that dominant over the multi- form shapes of brute matter. But what is the history of astronomy, of all the branches of physics, of chemistry, of medicine, but a narration of the steps by which the human mind has been com- pelled, often sorely against its will, to recognise the operation of secondary causes in events where ignorance beheld an immediate intervention of a higher power? And when we know that living 14 THE DARWINIAN HYPOTHESIS I things are formed of the same elements as the inorganic world, that they act and react upon it, bound by a thousand ties of natural piety, is it probable, nay is it possible, that they, and they alone, should have no order in their seeming disorder, no unity in their seeming multiplicity, should suffer no explanation by the discovery of some central and sublime law of mutual connection ? Questions of this kind have assuredly often arisen, but it might have been long before they received such expression as would have commanded the respect and attention of the scientific world, had it not been for the publication of the work which prompted this article. Its author, Mr. Darwin, inheritor of a once celebrated name, won his spurs in science when most of those now distinguished were young men, and has for the last twenty years held a place in the front ranks of British philosophers. After a circumnavigatory voyage, undertaken solely for the love of his science, Mr. Darwin published a series of researches which at once arrested the attention of naturalists and geologists; his generalisations have since received ample confirmation and now command universal assent, nor is it questionable that they have had the most important influence on the progress of science. More recently Mr. Darwin, with a versatility which is among the rarest of gifts, turned his attention to a most difficult question of I THE DARWINIAN HYPOTHESIS 15 zoology and minute anatomy; and no living naturalist and anatomist has published a better monograph than that which resulted from his labours. Such a man, at all events, has not entered the sanctuary with unwashed hands, and when he lays before us the results of twenty years’ investigation and reflection we must listen even though we be disposed to strike. But, in reading his work, it must be confessed that the attention which might at first be dutifully, soon becomes willingly, given, so clear is the author's thought, so outspoken his conviction, so honest and fair the candid expression of his doubts. Those who would judge the book must read it: we shall endeavour only to make its line of argu- ment and its philosophical position intelligible to the general reader in our own way. The Baker Street Bazaar has just been exhibit- ing its familiar annual spectacle. Straight-backed, small-headed, big-barrelled oxen, as dissimilar from any wild species as can well be imagined, contended for attention and praise with sheep of half-a-dozen different breeds and styes of bloated preposterous pigs, no more like a wild boar or sow than a city alderman is like an ourang-outang. The cattle show has been, and perhaps may again be, succeeded by a poultry show, of whose crowing and clucking prodigies it can only be certainly predicated that they will be very unlike the aboriginal Phasianus gallus. If the seeker after 16 THE DARWINIAN HYPOTHESIS I animal anomalies is not satisfied, a turn or two in Seven Dials will convince him that the breeds of pigeons are quite as extraordinary and unlike one another and their parent stock, while the Horti- cultural Society will provide him with any number of corresponding vegetable aberrations from nature’s types. He will learn with no little surprise, too, in the course of his travels, that the proprietors and producers of these animal and vegetable anomalies regard them as distinct species, with a firm belief, the strength of which is exactly proportioned to their ignorance of scientific biology, and which is the more remark- able as they are all proud of their skill in originat- ing such “species.” On careful inquiry it is found that all these, and the many other artificial breeds or races of animals and plants, have been produced by one method. The breeder—and a skilful one must be a person of much sagacity and natural or acquired perceptive faculty—notes some slight difference, arising he knows not how, in some individuals of his stock. If he wish to perpetuate the difference, to form a breed with the peculiarity in question strongly marked, he selects such male and female indi- viduals as exhibit the desired character, and breeds from them. Their offspring are then carefully examined, and those which exhibit the peculiarity the most distinctly are selected for breeding; and this operation is repeated until the desired amount I THE DARWINIAN HYPOTHESIS 17 of divergence from the primitive stock is reached, It is then found that by continuing the process of selection—always breeding, that is, from well- marked forms, and allowing no impure crosses to interfere—a race may be formed, the tendency of which to reproduce itself is exceedingly strong ; nor is the limit to the amount of divergence which may be thus produced known; but one thing is certain, that, if certain breeds of dogs, or of pigeons, or of horses, were known only in a fossil state, no naturalist would hesitate in regarding them as distinct species. But in all these cases we have human interfer- ence. Without the breeder there would be no selection, and without the selection no _Tace, Before admitting the possibility of natural species having originated j in any similar way, it must be proved that there is in Nature some power which takes the place of man, and performs a selection sud sponte, It is the claim of Mr, Darwin that he professes to have discovered the existence and the modus operandi of this “natural selection,” as he terms it; and, if he be right, the process is per- fectly simple and comprehensible, and irresistibly deducible from very familiar but well nigh for- gotten facts. Who, for instance, has duly reflected upon all ' the consequences of the marvellous struggle for existence which is daily and hourly going on among living beings? Not only does every animal VOL. Il C f 18 THE DARWINIAN HYPOTHESIS 1 live at the expense of some other animal or plant, but the very plants are at war. The ground is full of seeds that cannot rise into seedlings; the seedlings rob one another of air, light and water, the strongest robber winning the day, and ex- tinguishing his competitors. Year after year, the wild animals with which man never interferes are, on the average, neither more nor less numerous than they were ; and yet we know that the annual produce of every pair is from one to perhaps a million young; so that it is mathematically certain that, on the average, as many are killed by natural causes as are born every year, and those only escape which happen to be a little better fitted to resist destruction than those which die. The individuals of a species are like the crew of a foundered ship, and none but good swimmers have a chance of reaching the land. Such being unquestionably the necessary con- ditions under which living creatures exist, Mr. Darwin discovers in them the instrument of natural selection, Suppose that in the midst of this in- cessant competition some individuals of a species (A) present accidental variations which happen to fit them a little better than their fellows for the struggle in which they are engaged, then the chances are in favour, not only of these individuals being better nourished than the others, but of their predominating over their fellows in other ways, and of having a better chance of leaving I THE DARWINIAN HYPOTHESIS 19 offspring, which will of course tend to reproduce the peculiarities of their parents. Their offspring _ will, by a parity of reasoning, tend to predominate over their contemporaries, and there being (sup- pose) no room for more than one species such as A, the weaker variety will eventually be destroyed by the new destructive influence which is thrown into the scale, and the stronger will take its place. Surrounding conditions remaining unchanged, the new variety (which we may call B)—supposed, for argument’s sake, to be the best adapted for these conditions which can be got out of the original stock—will remain unchanged, all accidental devia- tions from the type becoming at once extinguished, as less fit for their post than B itself. The tend- ency of B to persist will grow with its persistence through successive generations, and it will acquire all the characters of a new species. But, on the other hand, if the conditions of life change in any degree, however slight, B may no longer be that form which is best adapted to with- stand their destructive, and profit by their sus- taining, influence ; in which case if it should give rise to a more competent variety (C), this will take its place and become a new species ; and thus, by natural selection, the species B and C will be suc- cessively derived from A. That this most ingenious hypothesis enables us to give a reason for many apparent anomalies in the distribution of living beings in time and space, Cc 2 20 THE DARWINIAN HYPOTHESIS I and that it is not contradicted by the main phen- omena of life and organisation appear to us to be unquestionable ; and, so far, it must be admitted to have an immense advantage over any of its prede- cessors. But it is quite another matter to affirm absolutely either the truth or falsehood of Mr. Darwin’s views at the present stage of the inquiry. Goethe has an excellent aphorism defining that state of mind which he calls “ Thitige Skepsis ” —active doubt. It is doubt which so loves truth that it neither dares rest in doubting, nor extin- guish itself by unjustified belief ; and we commend this state of mind to students of species, with respect to Mr. Darwin’s or any other hypothesis, as to their origm. The combined investigations of another twenty years may, perhaps, enable naturalists to say whether the modifying causes and the selective power, which Mr. Darwin has satisfactorily shown to exist in Nature, are com- petent to produce all the effects he ascribes to them ; or whether, on the other hand, he has been led to over-estimate the value of the principle of natural selection, as greatly as Lamarck over- estimated his vera causa of modification by exercise. But there is, at all events, one advantage pos- sessed by the more recent writer over his pre- decessor. Mr. Darwin abhors mere speculation as nature abhorsa vacuum. He is as greedy of cases and precedents as any constitutional lawyer, and all the principles he lays down are capable of being I THE DARWINIAN HYPOTHESIS 21 brought to the test of observation and experiment. The path he bids us follow professes to be, not a mere airy track, fabricated of ideal cobwebs, but a solid and broad bridge of facts, If it be so, it will carry us safely over many a chasm in our knowledge, and lead us to a region free from the snares of those fascinating but barren virgins, the Final Causes, against whom a high authority has so justly warned us, “ My sons, dig in the vineyard,” were the last words of the old man in the fable: and, though the sons found no treasure, they made their fortunes by the grapes. IT THE ORIGIN OF SPECIES [1860] Mr. Darwiy’s long-standing and well-earned scientific eminence probably renders him indiffer- ent to that social notoriety which passes by the name of success; but if the calm spirit of the philosopher have not yet wholly superseded the ambition and the vanity of the carnal man within him, he must be well satisfied with the results of his venture in publishing the “ Origin of Species.” Overflowing the narrow bounds of purely scientific circles, the “species question ” divides with Italy and the Volunteers the attention of general society. Everybody has read Mr. Darwin’s book, or, at least, has given an opinion upon its merits or demerits ; pietists, whether lay or ecclesiastic, decry it with the mild railing which sounds so charitable; bigots denounce it with ignorant invective; old ladies of both sexes consider it a II THE ORIGIN OF SPECIES 23 decidedly dangerous book, and even savants, who have no better mud to throw, quote antiquated writers to show that its author is no better than an ape himself ; while every philosophical thinker hails it as a veritable Whitworth gun in the armoury of liberalism ; and all competent natural- ists and physiologists, whatever their opinions as to the ultimate fate of the doctrines put forth, acknowledge that the work in which they are embodied is a solid contribution to knowledge and inaugurates a new epoch in natural history. Nor has the discussion of the subject been restrained within the limits of conversation, When the public is eager and interested, reviewers must minister to its wants; and the genuine littératewr is too much in the habit of acquiring his knowledge from the book he judges—as the Abyssinian is said to provide himself with steaks from the ox which carries him—to be withheld from criticism of a profound scientific work by the mere want of the requisite preliminary scien- tific acquirement ; while, on the other hand, the men of science who wish well to the new views, no less than those who dispute their validity, have naturally sought opportunities of expressing their opinions. Hence it is not surprising that almost all the critical journals have noticed Mr. Darwin’s work at greater or less length; and so many dis- quisitions, of every degree of excellence, from the poor product of ignorance, too often stimulated by 24 THE ORIGIN OF SPECIES n prejudice, to the fair and thoughtful essay of the candid student of Nature, have appeared, that it seems an almost hopeless task to attempt to say anything new upon the question. But it may be doubted if the knowledge and acumen of prejudged scientific opponents, and the subtlety of orthodox special pleaders, have yet exerted their full force in mystifying the real issues of the great controversy which has been set afoot, and whose end is hardly likely to be seen by this generation ; so that, at this eleventh hour, and even failing anything new, it may be useful to state afresh that which is true, and to put the funda- mental positions advocated by Mr. Darwin in such a form that they may be grasped by those whose special studies lie in other directions, And the adoption of this course may be the more advisable, because, notwithstanding its great deserts, and indeed partly on account of them, the “ Origin of Species” is by no means an easy book to read—if by reading is implied the full comprehension of an author’s meaning. We do not speak jestingly in saying that it is Mr. Darwin’s misfortune to know more about the question he has taken up than any man living. Personally and practically exercised in zoology, in minute anatomy, in geology ; a student of geogra- phical distribution, not on maps and in museums only, but by long voyages and laborious collection ; having largely advanced each of these branches of II THE ORIGIN OF SPECIES 25 science, and having spent many years in gathering and sifting materials for his present work, the store of accurately registered facts upon which the author of the “ Origin of Species” is able to draw at will is prodigious. But this very superabundance of matter must have been embarrassing to a writer who, for the present, can only put forward an abstract of his views; and thence it arises, perhaps, that notwith- standing the clearness of the style, those who attempt fairly to digest the book find much of it a sort of intellectual pemmican—a mass of facts crushed and pounded into shape, rather than held together by the ordinary medium of an obvious logical bond; due attention will, without doubt, discover this bond, but it is often hard to find. Again, from sheer want of room, much has to be taken for granted which might readily enough be proved ; and hence, while the adept, who can supply the missing links in the evidence from his own knowledge, discovers fresh proof of the singu- lar thoroughness with which all difficulties have been considered and all unjustifiable suppositions avoided, at every reperusal of Mr. Darwin’s preg- nant paragraphs, the novice in biology is apt to complain of the frequency of what he fancies is gratuitous assumption, Thus while it may be doubted if, for some years, any one is likely to be competent to pronounce judgment on all the issues raised by Mr. Darwin, 26 THE ORIGIN OF SPECIES it there is assuredly abundant room for him, who, assuming the humbler, though perhaps as useful, office of an interpreter between the “Origin of Species” and the public, contents himself with endeavouring to point out the nature of the prob- lems which it discusses; to distinguish between the ascertained facts and the theoretical views which it contains ; and finally, to show the extent to which the explanation it offers satisfies the re- quirements of scientific logic. At any rate, it is this office which we purpose to undertake in the following pages. It may be safely assumed that our readers have. a general conception of the nature of the objects to which the word “species” is applied; but it has, perhaps, occurred to a few, even to those who are naturalists ea professo, to reflect, that, as com- monly employed, the term has a double sense and denotes two very different orders of relations, When we call a group of animals, or of plants, a species, we may imply thereby, either that all these animals or plants have some common peculi- arity of form or structure ; or, we may mean that they possess some common functional character. That part of biological science which deals with form and structure is called Morphology—that which concerns itself with function, Physiology— so that we may conveniently speak of these two senses, or aspects, of “ species ”—the one as mor- phological, the other as physiological, Regarded it THE ORIGIN OF SPECIES oF from the former point of view, a species is nothing more than a kind of animal or plant, which is distinctly definable from all others, by certain constant, and not merely sexual, morphological peculiarities. Thus horses form a species, because the group of animals to which that name is applied is distinguished from all others in the world by the following constantly associated characters. They have—1, A vertebral column; 2, Mamme ; 3, A placental embryo; 4, Four legs; 5, A single well-developed toe in each foot provided with a hoof; 6, A bushy tail; and 7, Callosities on the inner sides of both the fore and the hind legs. The asses, again, form a distinct species, because, with the same characters, as far as the fifth in the above list, all asses have tufted tails, and have callosities only on the inner side of the fore-legs. If animals were discovered having the general characters of the horse, but sometimes with eal- losities only on the fore-legs, and more or less tufted tails; or animals having the general char- acters of the ass, but with more or less bushy tails, and sometimes with callosities on both pairs of legs, besides being intermediate in other re- spects—the two species would have to be merged into one. They could no longer be regarded as morphologically distinct species, for they would not be distinctly definable one from the other. However bare and simple this definition of species may appear to be, we confidently appeal to 28 THE ORIGIN OF SPECIES 0 all practical naturalists, whether zoologists, botan- ists, or palzontologists, to say if, in the vast majority of cases, they know, or mean to affirm, anything more of the group of animals or plants they so denominate than what has just been stated, Even the most decided advocates of the received doctrines respecting species admit this, : **T apprehend,” says Professor Owen,! ‘‘ that few naturalists nowadays, in describing and proposing a name for what they call ‘a new species,’ use that term to signify what was meant by it twenty or thirty years ago; that is, an originally distinct creation, maintaining its primitive distinction by obstructive generative peculiarities. The proposer of the new species now intends to state no more than he actually knows; as, for example, that the differences on which he founds the specific character are constant in individuals of both sexes, so far as observation has reached ; and that they are not due to domes- tication or to artificially superinduced external circumstances, or to any outward influence within his cognizance ; that the species is wild, or is such as it appears by Nature,” If we consider, in fact, that by far the largest proportion of recorded existing species are known only by the study of their skins, or bones, or other lifeless exuvize ; that we are acquainted with none, or next to none, of their physiological peculiarities, beyond those which can be deduced from their structure, or are open to cursory observation; and that we cannot hope to learn more of any of those extinct forms of life which now constitute no inconsiderable proportion of the known Flora and 99-4 1 “*On the Osteology of the Chimpanzees and Orangs ” 5 Transactions of the Zoological Society, 1858. . II THE ORIGIN OF SPECIES 29 Fauna of the world: it is obvious that the defini- tions of these species can be only of a purely structural, or morphological, character. It is probable that naturalists would have avoided much confusion of ideas if they had more fre- quently borne the necessary limitations of our knowledge in mind, But while it may safely be admitted that we are acquainted with only the morphological characters of the vast majority of species—the functional or physiological, peculiari- ties of a few have been carefully investigated, and the result of that study forms a large and most interesting portion of the physiology of reproduc- tion, The student of Nature wonders the more and is astonished the less, the more conversant he becomes with her operations; but of all the perennial miracles she offers to his inspection, perhaps the most worthy of admiration is the development of a plant or of an animal from its embryo. Examine the recently laid egg of some common animal, such as a salamander or newt. It is a minute spheroid in which the best microscope will reveal nothing but a structureless sac, enclosing a glairy fluid, holding granules in suspension.! But strange possibilities lie dormant in that semi-fluid globule. Let a moderate supply of warmth reach its watery cradle, and the plastic matter undergoes changes 1 [When this sentence was written, it was generally believed that the original nucleus of the egg (the germinal vesicle) disappeared. 1893.] 30 THE ORIGIN OF SPECIES II so rapid, yet so steady and purposelike in their succession, that one can only compare them to those operated by a skilled modeller upon a form- less lump of clay. As with an invisible trowel, the mass is divided and subdivided into smaller and smaller portions, until it is reduced to an aggregation of granules not too large to build withal the finest fabrics of the nascent organism, And, then, it is asif a delicate finger traced out the line to be occupied by the spinal column, and moulded the contour of the body; pinching up the head at one end, the tail at the other, and fashioning flank and limb into due salamandrine proportions, in so artistic a way, that, after watching the process hour by hour, one is almost involuntarily possessed by the notion, that some more subtle aid to vision than an achromatic, would show the hidden artist, with his plan before him, striving with skilful manipulation to perfect his work. As life advances, and the young amphibian ranges the waters, the terror of his insect con- temporaries, not only are the nutritious particles supplied by its prey, by the addition of which to its frame, growth takes place, laid down, each in its proper spot, and in such due proportion to the rest, as to reproduce the form, the colour, and the size, characteristic of the parental stock ; but even the wonderful powers of reproducing lost parts possessed by these animals are controlled by the same governing tendency. Cut off the legs, the I THE ORIGIN OF SPECIES 31 tail, the jaws, separately or all together, and, as Spallanzani showed long ago, these parts not only grow again, but the redintegrated limb is formed on the same type as those which were lost. The new jaw, or leg, is a newt’s, and never by any accident more like that of a frog. What is true of the newt is true of every animal and of every plant; the acorn tends to build itself up again into a woodland giant such as that from whose twig it fell; the spore of the humblest lichen reproduces the green or brown incrustation which gave it birth ; and at the other end of the scale of life, the child that resembled neither the paternal nor the maternal side of the house would be regarded as a kind of monster. So that the one end to which, in all living beings, the formative impulse is tending—the one scheme which the Archzeus of the old speculators strives to carry out, seems to be to mould the offspring into the likeness of the parent. It is the first great law of reproduction, that the offspring tends to resemble its parent or parents, more closely than anything else. Science will some day show us how this law is a necessary consequence of the more general laws which govern matter; but, for the present, more ean hardly be said than that it appears to be in harmony with them. We know that the phe- nomena of vitality are not something apart from other physical phenomena, but one with them ; 32 THE ORIGIN OF SPECIES II and matter and force are the two names of the one artist who fashions the living as well as the lifeless. Hence living bodies should obey the’ same great laws as other matter—nor, throughout Nature, is there a law of wider application than this, that a body impelled by two forces takes the direction of their resultant. But living bodies may be regarded as nothing but extremely complex bundles of forces held in a mass of matter, as the complex forces of a magnet are held in the steel by its coercive force; and, since the differences of sex are comparatively slight, or, in other words, the sum of the forces in each has a very similar tendency, their resultant, the offspring, may reason- ably be expected to deviate but little from a course parallel to either, or to both, Represent the reason of the law to ourselves by what physical metaphor or analogy we will, how- ever, the great matter is to apprehend its existence and the importance of the consequences deducible from it. For things which are like to the same are like to one another; and if, ina great series of generations, every offspring is like its parent, it follows that all the offspring and all the parents must be like one another; and that, given an original parental stock, with the opportunity of undisturbed multiplication, the law in question necessitates the production, in course of time, of an indefinitely large group, the whole of the mem- bers of which are at once very similar and are blood II THE ORIGIN OF SPECIES oo relations, having descended from the same parent, or pair of parents. The proof that all the members of any given group of animals, or plants, had thus descended, would be ordinarily considered sufficient to entitle them to the rank of physiological species, for most physiologists consider species to be de- finable as “the offspring of a single primitive stock.” But though it is quite true that all those groups we call species may, according to the known laws of reproduction, have descended from a single stock, and though it is very likely they really have done so, yet this conclusion rests on deduction and can hardly hope to establish itself upon a basis of observation, And the primitive- ness of the supposed single stock, which, after all, is the essential part of the matter, is not only a hypothesis, but one which has not a shadow of foundation, if by “ primitive” be meant “indepen- dent of any other living being.” A scientific definition, of which an unwarrantable hypothesis forms an essential part, carries its condemnation within itself; but, even supposing such a definition were, in form, tenable, the physiologist who should attempt to apply it in Nature would soon find himself involved in great, if not in- extricable, difficulties. As we have said, it is indubitable that offspring tend to resemble the parental organism, but it is equally true that the similarity attained never amounts to identity VOL, II D 84 THE ORIGIN OF SPECIES II either in form or in structure. There is always a certain amount of deviation, not only from the precise characters of a single parent, but when, as in most animals and many plants, the sexes are lodged in distinct individuals, from an exact mean between the two parents. And indeed, on general principles, this slight deviation seems as intelligible as the general similarity, if we reflect how complex the co-operating “ bundles of forces ” are, and how improbable it is that, in any case, their true resultant shall coincide with any mean between the more obvious characters of the two parents. Whatever be its cause, however, the co-existence of this tendency to minor variation with the tendency to general similarity, is of vast importance in its bearing on the question of the origin of species. As a general rule, the extent to which an offspring differs from its parent is slight enough ; but, occasionally, the amount of difference is much more strongly marked, and then the divergent offspring receives the name of a Variety. Maulti- tudes, of what there is every reason to believe are such varieties, are known, but the origin of very few has been accurately recorded, and of these we will select two as more especially illustrative of the main features of variation, The first of them is that of the “Ancon” or “Otter” sheep, of which a careful account is given by Colonel David Humphreys, F.R.S., in a letter to Sir i: THE ORIGIN OF SPECIES 35 Joseph Banks, published in the “ Philosophical Transacticns” for 1813. It appears that one Seth Wright, the proprietor of a farm on the banks of the Charles River, in Massachusetts, possessed a flock of fifteen ewes and a ram of the ordinary kind. In the year 1791, one of the ewes presented her owner with a male lamb, differing, for*no assignable reason, from its parents by a proportionally long body and short bandy legs, whence it was unable to emulate its relatives in those sportive leaps over the neighbours’ fences, in which they were in the habit of imdulging, much to the good farmer’s vexation. The second case is that detailed by a no less unexceptionable authority than Réaumur, in his “Art de faire éclore les Poulets.” A Maltese couple, named Kelleia, whose hands and feet were constructed upon the ordinary human model, had born to them a son, Gratio, who possessed six per- fectly movable fingers on each hand, and six toes, not quite so well formed, on each foot. No cause could be assigned for the appearance of this unusual variety of the human species. Two circumstances are well worthy of remark in both these cases. In each, the variety appears to have arisen in full force, and, as it were, per saltuim ; a wide and definite difference appearing, at once, between the Ancon ram and the ordinary sneep ; between the six-fingered and six-toed Gratio Kelleia and ordinary men. In neither case is it possible D 2 36 THE ORIGIN OF SPECIES I! to point out any obvious reason for the appearance of the variety. Doubtless there were determining causes for these as for all other phenomena; but they do not appear, and we can be tolerably certain that what are ordinarily understood as changes in physical conditions, as in climate, in food, or the like, did not take place and had nothing to do with the matter. It was no case of what is commonly called adaptation to circumstances; but, to use a conveniently erroneous phrase, the variations arose spontaneously, The fruitless search after final causes leads their pursuers a long way; but even those hardy teleologists, who are ready to break through all the laws of physics in chase of their favourite will-o’-the-wisp, may be puzzled to dis- cover what purpose could be attained by the stunted legs of Seth Wright’s ram or the hexadactyle members of Gratio Kelleia, Varieties then arise we know not why ; and it is more than probable that the majority of varieties have arisen in this “spontaneous ” manner, though we are, of course, far from denying that they may be traced, in some cases, to distinct external in- fluences ; which are assuredly competent to alter the character of the tegumentary covering, to change colour, to increase or diminish the size of muscles, to modify constitution, and, among plants, to give rise to the metamorphosis of stamens into petals, and so forth. But however they may have arisen, what especially interests us at present is, to II THE ORIGIN OF SPECIES 37 remark that, once in existence, many varieties obey the fundamental law of reproduction that like tends to produce like; and their offspring exemplify it by tending to exhibit the same deviation from the parental stock as themselves, Indeed, there seems to be, in many instances, a prepotent influence about a newly-arisen variety which gives it what one may call an unfair advantage over the normal descendants from the same stock. This is strik- ingly exemplified by the case of Gratio Kelleia, who married a woman with the ordinary penta- dactyle extremities, and had by her four children, Salvator, George, André, and Marie. Of these children Salvator, the eldest boy, had six fingers and six toes, like his father ; the second and third, also boys, had five fingers and five toes, like their mother, though the hands and feet of George were slightly deformed. The last, a girl, had five fingers and five toes, but the thumbs were slightly deformed, The variety thus reproduced itself purely in the eldest, while the normal type reproduced itself purely in the third, and almost purely in the second and last: so that it would seem, at first, as if the normal type were more powerful than the variety. But all these children grew up and intermarried with normal wives and husband, and then, note what took place : Salvator had four children, three of whom exhibited the hexadactyle members of their grandfather and father, while the youngest had the pentacactvle 38 THE ORIGIN OF SPECIES II limbs of the mother and grandmother; so that here, notwithstanding a double pentadactyle dilution of the blood, the hexadactyle variety had the best of it. The same pre-potency of the variety was still more markedly exemplified in the progeny of two of the other children, Marie and George. Marie (whose thumbs only were de- formed) gave birth to a boy with six toes, and three other normally formed children ; but George, who was not quite so pure a pentadactyle, begot, first, two girls, each of whom had six fingers and toes ; then a girl with six fingers on each hand and six toes on the right foot, but only five toes on the left; and lastly, a boy with only five fingers and toes. In these instances, therefore, the variety, as it were, leaped over one generation to reproduce itself in full force in the next. Finally, the purely pentadactyle André was the father of many children, not one of whom departed from the normal parental type. : If a variation which approaches the nature of a monstrosity can strive thus forcibly to reproduce itself, it is not wonderful that less aberrant modifications should tend to be preserved even more strongly ; and the history of the Ancon sheep is, in this respect, particularly instructive. With the “’cuteness ” characteristic of their nation, the neighbours of the Massachusetts farmer imagined it would be an excellent thing if all his sheep were imbued with the stay-at-home tendencies II THE ORIGIN OF SPECIES 39 enforced by Nature upon the newly-arrived ram ; and they advised Wright to kill the old patriarch of his fold, and install the Ancon ram in his place. The result justified their sagacious anticipations, and coincided very nearly with what occurred to the progeny of Gratio Kelleia. The young lambs were almost always either pure Ancons, or pure ordinary sheep.’ But when sufficient Ancon sheep were obtained to interbreed with one another, it was found that the offspring was always pure Ancon. Colonel Humphreys, in fact, states that he was acquainted with only “one questionable case of a contrary nature.” Here, then, is a remarkable and_ well-established instance, not only of a very distinct race being established per saltwm, but of that race breeding “true” at once, and showing no mixed forms, even when crossed with another breed. By taking care to select Ancons of both sexes, for breeding from, it thus became easy to establish an extremely well-marked race; so peculiar that, 1 Colonel Humphreys’ statements are exceedingly explicit on this point :—‘* When an Ancon ewe is impregnated by a com- mon ram, the increase resembles wholly either the ewe or the ram. The increase of the common ewe impregnated by an Ancon ram follows entirely the one or the other, without blending any of the distinguishing and essential peculiarities of both. Frequent instances have happened where common ewes have had twins by Ancon rams, when one exhibited the complete marks and features of the ewe, the other of the ram. The contrast has been rendered singularly striking, when one short-legged and one long-legged lamb, produced at a birth, have been seen sucking the dam at the same time.’’—Philoso- phicat Transactions, 1813, Pt. I. pp. 89, 90. ; 40 THE ORIGIN OF SPECIES II even when herded with other sheep, it was noted that the Ancons kept together. And there is every reason to believe that the existence of this breed might have been indefinitely protracted ; but the introduction of the Merino sheep, which were not only very superior to the Ancons in wool and meat, but quite as quiet and orderly, led to the complete neglect of the new breed, so that, in 1813, Colonel Humphreys found it difficult to obtain the specimen, the skeleton of which was presented to Sir Joseph Banks. We believe that, for many years, no remnant of it has existed in the United States. Gratio Kelleia was not the progenitor of a race of six-fingered men, as Seth Wright's ram became a nation of Ancon sheep, though the tendency of the variety to perpetuate itself appears to have been fully as strong in the one case as in the other. And the reason of the difference is not far toseek. Seth Wright took care not to weaken the Ancon blood by matching his Ancon ewes with any but males of the same variety, while Gratio Kelleia’s sons were too far removed from the patriarchal times to intermarry with their sisters ; and his grand-children seem not to have been attracted by their six-fingered cousins. In other words, in the one example a race was pro- duced, because, for several generations, care was taken to select both parents of the breeding stock from animals exhibiting a tendency to vary in the II THE ORIGIN OF SPECIES 41 same direction ; while, in the other, no race was evolved, because no such selection was exercised. A race is a propagated variety ; and as, by the laws of reproduction, offspring tend to assume the parental forms, they will be more likely to pro- pagate a variation exhibited by both parents than that possessed by only one. _ There is no organ of the body of an animal which may not, and does not, occasionally, vary more or less from the normal type ; and there is no variation which may not be transmitted and which, if selectively transmitted, may not become the foundation of a race. This great truth, sometimes forgotten by philosophers, has long been familiar to practical agriculturists and breeders ; and upon it rest all the methods of improving the breeds of domestic animals, which, for the last century, have been followed with so much success in England. Colour, form, size, texture of hair or wool, pro- portions of various parts, strength or weakness of constitution, tendency to fatten or to remain lean, to give much or little milk, speed, strength, tem- per, intelligence, special instincts; there is not one of these characters the transmission of which is not an every-day occurrence within the experience of cattle-breeders, stock-farmers, horse-dealers, and dog and poultry fanciers. Nay, it is only the other day that an eminent physiologist, Dr. Brown- Sequard, communicated to the Royal Society his discovery that epilepsy, artificially produced in 42 THE ORIGIN OF SPECIES IT guinea-pigs, by a means which he has discovered, is transmitted to their offspring.? But a race, once produced, is no more a fixed and immutable entity than the stock whence it sprang ; variations arise among its members, and as these variations are transmitted like any others, new races may be developed out of the pre-exist- ing one ad infinitum, or, at least, within any limit at present determined. Given sufficient time and sufficiently careful selection, and the multitude of races which may arise from a common stock is as astonishing as are the extreme structural differ- ences which they may present. A remarkable example of this is to be found in the rock-pigeon, which Mr. Darwin has, in our opinion, satisfactorily demonstrated to be the progenitor of all our domestic pigeons, of which there are certainly more than a hundred well-marked races. The most noteworthy of these races are, the four great stocks known to the “ fancy ” as tumblers, pouters, carriers, and fantails; birds which not only differ most singularly in size, colour, and habits, but in the form of the beak and of the skull: in the pro- portions of the beak to the skull; in the number of tail-feathers ; in the absolute and relative size of the feet ; in the presence or absence of the uropygial gland ; in the number of vertebrz in the back ; in short, in precisely those characters in which 1 [Compare Weismann’s Essays Upon Heredity, p. 310, et seq. 1893. ] Ir THE ORIGIN OF SPECIES 43 the genera and species of birds differ from one another. And it is most remarkable and instructive to observe, that none of these races can be shown to have been originated by the action of changes in what are commonly called external circumstances, upon the wild rock-pigeon. On the contrary, from time immemorial pigeon-fanciers have had essentially similar methods of treating their pets, which have been housed, fed, protected and cared for in much the same way in all pigeonries. In fact, there is no case better adapted than that of the pigeons to refute the doctrine which one sees put forth on high authority, that “no other characters than those founded on the development of bone for the attachment of muscles” are capable of variation. In precise contradiction of this hasty assertion, Mr. Darwin’s researches prove that the skeleton of the wings in domestic pigeons has hardly varied at all from that of the wild type ; while, on the other hand, it is in exactly those respects, such as the relative length of the beak and skull, the number of the vertebrae, and the number of the tail-feathers, in which muscular exertion can have no important influence, that the utmost amount of variation has taken place. We have said that the following out of the properties exhibited by physiological species would lead us into difficulties, and at this point they begin A THE ORIGIN OF SPECIES II to be obvious; for if, as the result of spontaneous variation and of selective breeding, the progeny of a common stock may become separated into groups distinguished from one another by constant, not sexual, morphological characters, it is clear that the physiological definition of species is likely to clash with the morphological definition. No one would hesitate to describe the pouter and the tumbler as distinct species, if they were found fossil, or if their skins and skeletons were imported, as those of exotic wild birds commonly are—and with- out doubt, if considered alone, they are good and distinct morphological species, On the other hand, they are not physiological species, for they are descended from a common stock, the rock-pigeon. Under these circumstances, as it is admitted con all sides that races occur in Nature, how are we to know whether any apparently distinct animals are really of different physiological species, or not, seeing that the amount of morphological difference is no safe guide? Is there any test of a physio- logical species? The usual answer of physiologists is in the affirmative. It is said that such a test is to be found in the phenomena of hybridisation— in the results of crossing races, as compared with the results of crossing species, So far as the evidence goes at present, in- dividuals, of what are certainly known to be mere races produced by selection, however distinct they may appear to be, not only breed freely together, Ii THE ORIGIN OF SPECIES 45 but the offspring of such crossed races are perfectly fertile with one another, Thus, the spaniel and the greyhound, the dray-horse and the Arab, the pouter and the tumbler, breed together with perfect freedom, and their mongrels, if matched with other mongrels of the same kind, are equally fertile. On the other hand, there can be no doubt that the individuals of many natural species are either absolutely infertile if crossed with individuals of other species, or, if they give rise to hybrid offspring, the hybrids so produced are infertile when paired together. The horse and the ass, for instance, if so crossed, give rise to the mule, and there is no certain evidence of offspring ever having been produced by a male and female mule. The unions of the rock-pigeon and the ring-pigeon appear to be equally barren of result. Here, then, says the physiologist, we have a means of distinguishing any two true species from any two varieties. If a male and a female, selected from each group, produce ‘offspring, and that off- spring is fertile with others produced in the same way, the groups are races and not species. If, on the other hand, no result ensues, or if the offspring are infertile with others produced in the same way, they are true physiological species. The test would be an admirable one, if, in the first place, it were always practicable to apply it, and if, in the second, it always yielded results suscep- tible of a definite interpretation. Unfortunately, 46 THE ORIGIN OF SPECIES II in the great majority of cases, this touchstone for species is wholly inapplicable. The constitution of many wild animals is so altered by confinement that they will not breed even with their own females, so that the negative results obtained from crosses are of no value; and the antipathy of wild animals of different species for one another, or even of wild and tame members of the same species, is ordinarily so great, that it is hopeless to look for such unions in Nature, The hermaphrodism of most plants, the difficulty in the way of insuring the absence of their own or the proper working of other pollen, are obsta- cles of no less magnitude in applying the test to them, And, in both animals and plants, is super- added the further difficulty, that experiments must be continued over a long time for the purpose of ascertaining the fertility of the mongrel or hybrid progeny, as well as of the first crosses from which they spring. Not only do these great practical difficulties lie in the way of applying the hybridisation test, but even when this oracle can be questioned, its replies are sometimes as doubtful as those of Delphi. For example, cases are cited by Mr. Darwin, of plants which are more fertile with the pollen of | another species than with their own; and there are others, such as certain Fuci, the male element of which will fertilise the ovule of a plant of distinct species, while the males of the latter Ir THE ORIGIN OF SPECIES 47 species are ineffective with the females of the first. So that, in the last-named instance, a physiologist, who should cross the two species in one way, would decide that they were true species; while another, who should cross them in the reverse way, would, with equal justice, according to the rule, pronounce them to be mere races. Several plants, which there is great reason to believe are mere varieties, are almost sterile when crossed; while both animals and plants, which have always been regarded by naturalists as of distinct species, turn out, when the test is applied, to be perfectly fertile. Again, the sterility or fertility of crosses seems to bear no relation to the structural resemblances or differences of the members of any two groups. Mr. Darwin has discussed this question with singular ability and circumspection, and his con- clusions are summed up as follows, at page 276 of his work :— ** First crosses between forms sufficiently distinct to be ranked as species, and their hybrids, are very generally, but not universally, sterile. The sterility is of all degrees, and is often so slight that the two most eareful experimentalists who have ever lived have come to diametrically opposite conclusions in ranking forms by this test. The sterility is innately variable in individuals of the same species, and is eminently susceptible of favourable and unfavourable conditions. The degree of sterility does not strictly follow systematic affinity, but is governed by several curious and complex laws. It is generally different and sometimes widely different, in reciprocal crosses 4S THE ORIGIN OF SPECIES IT between the same two species. It is not always equal in degree in a first cross, and in the hybrid produced from this cross. *‘In the same manner as in grafting trees, the capacity of one species or variety to take on another is incidental on generally unknown differences in their vegetative systems ; so in crossing, the greater or less facility of one species to unite with another is incidental on unknown differences in their reproductive systems, There is no more reason to think that species have been specially endowed with various degrees of sterility to prevent them crossing and breeding in Nature, than to think that trees have been specially endowed with various and somewhat analogous degrees of difficulty in being grafted together, in order to prevent them becoming inarched in our forests. ‘**The sterility of first crosses between pure species, which have their reproductive systems perfect, seems to depend on several circumstances ; in some cases largely on the early death of the embryo. The sterility of hybrids which have their repro- ductive systems imperfect, and which have had this system and their whole organisation disturbed by being compounded of two distinct species, seems closely allied to that sterility which so frequently affects pure species when their natural con- ditions of life have been disturbed. This view is supported by a parallelism of another kind: namely, that the crossing of forms, only slightly different, is favourable to the vigour and fertility of the offspring ; and that slight changes in the con- ditions of life are apparently favourable to the vigour and fertility of all organic beings. It is not surprising that the degree of difficulty in uniting two species, and the degree of sterility of their hybrid offspring, should generally correspond, though due to distinct causes ; for both depend on the amount of difference of some kind between the species which are crossed. Nor is it surprising that the facility of effecting a first cross, the fertility of hybrids produced from it, and the capacity of being grafted together—though this latter capacity evidently depends on widely different cireumstances—should all run to a certain extent parallel with the systematic affinity of the forms which are subjected to experiment; for systematic affinity I THE ORIGIN OF SPECIES 49 attempts to express all kinds of resemblance between all species. ‘‘Tirst crosses between forms known to be varieties, or sufficiently alike to be considered as varieties, and their mon- grel offspring, are very generally, but not quite universally, fertile. Nor is this nearly general and perfect fertility sur- prising, when we remember how liable we are to argue in a circle with respect to varieties in a state of Nature; and when we remember that the greater number of varieties have been produced under domestication by the selection of mere external differences, and not of differences in the reproductive system. In all other respects, excluding fertility, there is a close general resemblance between hybrids and mongrels.” —Pp. 276—8. We fully agree with the general tenor of this weighty passage ; but forcible as are these argu- ments, and little as the value of fertility or infertility as a test of species maybe, it must not be forgotten that the really important fact, so far as the inquiry into the origin of species goes, is, that there are such things in Nature as groups of animals and of plants, the members of which are in- capable of fertile union with those of other groups ; and that there are such things as hybrids, which _are absolutely. sterile when crossed with other hybrids. For, if such phenomena as these were exhibited by only two of those assemblages of living objects, to which the name of species (whether it be used in its physiological or in its morphological sense) is given, it would have to be -accounted for by any theory of the origin of ' species, and every theory which could not account for it would be, so far, imperfect. VOL. II E 50 THE ORIGIN OF SPECIES Ir Up to this point, we have been dealing with matters of fact, and the statements which we have laid before the reader would, to the best of our knowledge, be admitted to contain a fair exposition of what is at present known respecting the essential properties of species, by all who have studied the question. And whatever may be his theoretical views, no naturalist will prob- ably be disposed to demur to the following summary of that exposition :— Living beings, whether animals or plants, are divisible into multitudes of distinctly definable kinds, which are morphological species. They are also divisible into groups of individuals, which breed freely together, tending to reproduce their like, and are physiological species. Normally resembling their parents, the offspring of members of these species are still liable to vary; and the variation may be perpetuated by selection, as a race, which race, in many cases, presents all the characteristics of a morphological species. But it is not as yet proved that a race ever exhibits, when crossed with another race of the same species, those phenomena of hybridisation which are exhibited by many species when crossed with other species. On the other hand, not only is it not proved that all species give rise to hybrids infertile inter se, but there is much reason to believe that, im crossing, species exhibit every gradation from perfect sterility to perfect fertility. it THE ORIGIN OF SPECIES 51 Such are the most essential characteristics of species. Even were man not one of them—a member of the same system and subject to the same laws—the question of their origin, their causal connexion, that is, with the other phzno- mena of the universe, must have attracted his attention, as soon as_ his intelligence had raised itself above the level of his daily wants. Indeed history relates that such was the case, and has embalmed for us the speculations upon the origin of living beings, which were among the earliest products of the dawning intellectual activity of man. In those early days positive knowledge was not to be had, but the craving after it needed, at all hazards, to be satisfied, and according to the country, or the turn of thought, of the speculator, the suggestion that all living things arose from the mud of the Nile, from a primeval egg, or from some more anthropomorphic agency, afforded a sufficient resting-place for his curiosity. The myths of Paganism are as dead as Osiris or Zeus, and the man who should revive them, in opposition to the knowledge of our time, would be justly laughed to scorn ; but the coeval imaginations current among the rude inhabitants of Palestine, recorded by writers whose very name and age are admitted by every scholar to be unknown, have unfortunately not yet shared their fate, but, even at this day, are regarded by nine-tenths of the civilised world as the authoritative standard of fact and the criterion E 2 52 THE ORIGIN OF SPECIES II of the justice of scientific conclusions, in all that relates to the origin of things, and, among them, of species. In this nineteenth century, as at the dawn of modern physical science, the cosmogony of the semi-barbarous Hebrew is the incubus of the philosopher and the opprobrium of the ortho- dox. Who shall number the patient and earnest seekers after truth, from the days of Galileo until now, whose lives have been embittered and their good name blasted by the mistaken zeal of Biblio- laters? Who shall count the host of weaker men whose sense of truth has been destroyed in the effort to harmonise impossibilities—whose life has been wasted in the attempt to force the generous new wine of Science into the old bottles of Judaism,com- pelled by the outcry of the same strong party ? It is true that if philosophers have suffered, their cause has been amply avenged. Extinguished theologians lie about the cradle of every science as the strangled snakes beside that of Hercules ; and history records that whenever science and ortho- doxy have been fairly opposed, the latter has been forced to retire from the lists, bleeding and crushed if not annihilated ; scotched, if not slain. But orthodoxy is the Bourbon of the world of thought. It learns not, neither can it forget; and though, at present, bewildered and afraid to move, it is as willing as ever to insist that the first chapter of Genesis contains the beginning and the end of sound science; and to visit, with such petty iat THE ORIGIN OF SPECIES 53 thunderbolts as its half-paralysed hands can hurl, those who refuse to degrade Nature to the level of primitive Judaism. Philosophers, on the other hand, have no such aggressive tendencies. With eyes fixed on the noble goal to which “per aspera et ardua” they tend, they may, now and then, be stirred to momentary wrath by the unnecessary obstacles with which the ignorant, or the malicious, encum- ber, if they cannot bar, the difficult path ; but why should their souls be deeply vexed? The majesty of Fact is on their side, and the elemental forces of Nature are working for them. Not astar comes to the meridian at its calculated time but testifies to the justice of their methods—their beliefs are “one with the falling rain and with the growing corn.” By doubt they are established, and open inquiry is their bosom friend. Such men have no fear of traditions however venerable, and no respect for them when they become mischievous and obstructive ; but they have better than mere anti- quarian business in hand, and if dogmas, which ought to befossil but are not, are not forced upon their notice, they are too happy to treat them as non-existent. The hypotheses respecting the origin of species which profess to stand upon a scientific basis, and, as such, alone demand serious attention, are of two kinds. The one, the “ special creation ” hypothesis, 54 THE ORIGIN OF SPECIES II presumes every species to have originated from one or more stocks, these not being the result of the modification of any other form of living matter—or arising by natural agencies—but being produced, as such, by a supernatural creative act. The other, the so-called “ transmutation ” hypothesis, considers that all existing species are the result of the modification of pre-existing species, and those of their predecessors, by agencies similar to those which at the present day produce varieties and races, and therefore in an altogether natural way; and it is a probable, though not a necessary consequence of this hypothesis, that all living beings have arisen from a single stock. With respect to the origin of this primitive stock, or stocks, the doctrine of the origin of species is obviously not necessarily concerned. The trans- mutation hypothesis, for example, is perfectly consistent either with the conception of a special creation of the primitive germ, or with the supposition of its having arisen, as a modification of inorganic matter, by natural causes. The doctrine of special creation owes its exist- ence very largely to the supposed necessity of making science accord with the Hebrew cos- mogony ; but it is curious to observe that, as the doctrine is at present maintained by men of science, it is as hopelessly inconsistent with the Hebrew view as any other hypothesis. If there be any result which has come more II THE ORIGIN OF SPECIES 55 clearly out of geological investigation than another, it is, that the vast series of extinct animals and plants is not divisible, as it was once supposed to be, into distinct groups, separated by sharply- marked boundaries. There are no great gulfs between epochs and formations—no_ successive periods marked by the appearance of plants, of water animals, and of land animals, en masse. Every year adds to the list of links between what the older geologists supposed to be widely separated epochs: witness the crags linking the drift with older tertiaries; the Maestricht beds linking the tertiaries with the chalk; the St. Cassian beds exhibiting an abundant fauna of mixed mesozoic and palzeozoic types, in rocks of an epoch once supposed to be eminently poor in life ; witness, lastly, the incessant disputes as to whether a given stratum shall be reckoned devonian or carboniferous, silurian or devonian, cambrian or silurian, This truth is further illustrated in a most interesting manner by the impartial and highly competent testimony of M. Pictet, from whose calculations of what percentage of the genera of animals, existing in any formation, lived during the preceding formation, it results that in no case is the proportion less than one-third, or 33 per cent. It is the triassic formation, or the com- mencement of the mesozoic epoch, which has received the smallest inheritance from preceding 56 THE ORIGIN OF SPECIES II ages. The other formations not uncommonly exhibit 60, 80, or even 94 per cent. of genera in common with those whose remains are imbedded in their predecessor. Not only is this true, but the subdivisions of each formation exhibit new species characteristic of, and found only in, them ; and, in many cases, as in the lias for example, the separate beds of these subdivisions are distin- guished by well-marked and peculiar forms of life. A section, a hundred feet thick, will exhibit, at different heights, a dozen species of ammonite, none of which passes beyond its particular zone of limestone, or clay, into the zone below it or into that above it; so that those who adopt the doc- trine of special creation must be prepared to admit, that at intervals of time, corresponding with the thickness of these beds, the Creator thought fit to interfere with the natural course of events for the purpose of making a new ammonite. It is not easy to transplant oneself into the frame of mind of those who can accept such a conclusion as this, on any evidence short of absolute demon- stration; and it is difficult to see what is to be gained by so doing, since, as we have said, it is obvious that such a view of the origin of living beings is utterly opposed to the Hebrew cos- mogony. Deserving no aid from the powerful arm of Bibliolatry, then, does the received form of the hypothesis of special creation derive any support from science or sound logic? Assuredly + a THE ORIGIN OF SPECIES 57 not much. The arguments brought forward in its favour all take one form: If species were not supernaturally created, we cannot understand the facts xv, or y, or 2; we cannot understand the structure of animals or plants, unless we suppose they were contrived for special ends; we cannot understand the structure of the eye, except by supposing it to have been made to see with; we cannot understand instincts, unless we suppose animals to have been miraculously endowed with them. As a question of dialectics, it must be admitted that this sort of reasoning is not very formidable to those who are not to be frightened by conse- quences. It is an argumentum ad ignorantiam— take this explanation or be ignorant. But suppose we prefer to admit our ignorance rather than adopt a hypothesis at variance with all the teach- ings of Nature? Or, suppose for a moment we admit the explanation, and then seriously ask ourselves how much the wiser are we; what does the explanation explain? Is it any more than a grandiloquent way of announcing the fact, that we really know nothing about the matter? ¢ > 6 “ Obscure ideas,” “metaphysical jargon,” “ pre- tcentious and empty language,” ‘‘puerile and superannuated personifications.” Mr, Darwin has many and hot opponents on this side of the Channel and in Germany, but we do not recollect to have found precisely these sins in the long catalogue of those hitherto laid to his charge. It is worth while, therefore, to examine into these discoveries effected solely by the aid of the “lucidity and solidity” of the mind of M. _Flourens, According to M. Flourens, Mr. Darwin’s great error is that he has personified Nature (p. 10), and further that he has ‘*imagined a natural selection: he imagines afterwards that this power of selecting (pouvoir @ élire) which he gives to Nature is similar to the power of man. ‘These two suppositions ad- H 2 100 CRITICISMS ON “ THE ORIGIN OF SPECIES” qr mitted, nothing stops him: he plays with Nature as he likes, and makes her do all he pleases.” (P. 6.) And this is the way M. Flourens extinguishes natural selection : | ‘**Voyons done encore une fois, ce qu'il peut y avoir de fondé dans ce qu’on nomme élection naturelle. ** Délection naturelle n’est sous un autre nom que la nature, Pour un étre organisé, la nature n’est que l’organisation, ni plus ni moins. ‘*Tl faudra donc aussi personnifier /’organisation, et dire que Porganisation choisit Vorganisation. L’élection natwrelle est cette furme substanticlle dont on jouait autrefois avec tant de facilité. Aristote disait que ‘Si l’art de batir était dans le bois, cet art agirait comme la nature.’ A la place de V’art de bdtir M. Darwin met V’élection naturelle, et c’est tout un: l'un n’est pas plus chimérique que l’autre.” (P. 31.) And this is really all that M. Flourens can make of Natural Selection. We have given the original, in fear lest a translation should be regarded as a travesty ; but with the original before the reader, we may try to analyse the passage. “For an organised being, Nature is only organisation, neither more nor less.” Organised beings then have absolutely no relation to inorganic nature: a plant does not, depend on soil or sunshine, climate, depth in the ocean, height above it; the quantity of saline matters in water have no influence upon animal life ; the substitution of carbonic acid for oxygen in our atmosphere would hurt nobody! That these are absurdities no one should know better ut CRITICISMS ON “ THE ORIGIN OF SPECIES” 101 than M. Flourens; but they are logical deductions from the assertion just quoted, and from the further statement that natural selection means only that “organisation chooses and _ selects organisation.” For if it be once admitted (what no sane man denies) that the chances of life of any given organism are increased by certain conditions (A) and diminished by their opposites (B), then it is mathematically certain that any change of con- ditions in the direction of (A) will exercise a selective influence in favour of that organism, tending to its increase and multiplication, while any change in the direction of (B) will exercise a selective influence against that organism, tending to its decrease and extinction. Or, on the other hand, conditions remaining the same, let a given organism vary (and no one doubts that they do vary) in two directions : into one form (a) better fitted to cope with these con- ditions than the original stock, and a second ()) less well adapted to them. Then it is no less certain that the conditions in question must exercise a selective influence in favour of (a) and against (0), so that (a) will tend to predominance, and ()) to extirpation. That M. Flourens should be unable to perceive the logical necessity of these simple arguments, which he at the foundation of all Mr. Darwin’s reasoning ; that he should confound an irrefragable 102 CRITICISMS ON “THE ORIGIN OF SPECIES” nr deduction from the observed relations of organisms to the conditions which lie around them, with a metaphysical “ forme substantielle,” or a chimerical personification of the powers of Nature, would be incredible, were it not that other passages of his work leave no room for doubt upon the subject. ‘*On imagine une élection naturelle que, pour plus de ménage- ment, on me dit étre inconsciente, sans s’apercevoir que le contre- sens littéral est précisément 1a: élection inconsciente.” (P. 52.) ** J’ai déja dit ce qu'il faut penser de 7’élection naturelle. Ou Vélection naturelle n’est rien, ou c’est la nature: mais la nature douée d’élection, mais la nature personnifiée : derniére erreur du dernier sitcle : Le xix® ne fait plus de personnifications,” (P. 53.) M. Flourens cannot imagine an unconscious selection—it is for him a contradiction in terms. Did M. Flourens ever visit one of the prettiest watering-places of “la belle France,” the Baie d’Arcachon? If so, he will probably have passed through the district of the Landes, and will have had an opportunity of observing the formation of “dunes” on a grand scale. What are these “dunes”? The winds and waves of the Bay of Biscay have not much consciousness, and yet they have with great care “selected,” from among an infinity of masses of silex of all shapes and sizes, which have been submitted to their action, all the grains of sand below a certain size, and have heaped them by themselves over a great area, This sand has been “ unconsciously selected ” from ur CRITICISMS ON “THE ORIGIN OF SPECIES” 103 amidst the gravel in which it first lay with as much precision as if man had “consciously selected” it by the aid of a sieve. Physical Geology is full of such selections—of the picking out of the soft from the hard, of the soluble from the insoluble, of the fusible from the infusible, by natural agencies to which we are certainly not in the habit of ascribing consciousness. But that which wind and sea are to a sandy beach, the sum of influences, which we term the “conditions of existence,” is to living organisms, The weak are sifted out from the strong. A frosty night “selects” the hardy plants in a plantation from among the tender ones as effectually as if it were the wind, and they, the sand and pebbles, of our illustration; or, on the other hand, as if the intelligence of a gardener had been operative in cutting the weaker organisms down. ‘The thistle, which has spread over the Pampas, to the de- struction of native plants, has been more effectually “selected” by the unconscious operation of natural conditions than if a thousand agriculturists had spent their time in sowing it. It is one of Mr. Darwin’s many great services to Biological science that he has demonstrated the significance of these facts. He has shown that— given variation and given change of conditions— the imevitable result is the exercise of such an influence upon organisms that one is helped and another is impeded; one tends to predominate, 104 CRITICISMS ON “THE ORIGIN OF SPECIES” or another to disappear; and thus the living world bears within itself, and is surrounded by, impulses towards incessant change, But the truths just stated are as certain as any other physical laws, quite independently of the truth, or falsehood, of the hypothesis which Mr. Darwin has based upon them; and that M. Flourens, missing the substance and grasping at a shadow, should be blind to the admirable exposi- tion of them, which Mr. Darwin has given, and see nothing there but a “derniére erreur du dernier siccle””»—a personification of Nature—leads us indeed to ery with him: “O lucidité! O solidité de l’esprit Francais, que devenez-vous ? ” M. Flourens has, in fact, utterly failed to com- prehend the first principles of the doctrine which he assails so rudely. His objections to details are of the old sort, so battered and hackneyed on this side of the Channel, that not even a Quarterly Reviewer could be induced to pick them up for the purpose of pelting Mr. Darwin over again. We have Cuvier and the mummies; M. Roulin and the domesticated animals of America; the difficulties presented by hybridism and by Palzon- tology; Darwinism a rifacciamento of De Maillet and Lamarck; Darwinism a system without a commencement, and its author bound to believe in M. Pouchet, &. &. How one knows it all by heart, and with what relief one reads at p. 65— “¢ Je laisse M. Darwin!” ut CRITICISMS ON “ THE ORIGIN OF SPECIES” 105 But we cannot leave M. Flourens without calling our readers’ attention to his wonderful tenth chapter, “De la Préexistence des Germes et de PEpigénése,” which opens thus :— ‘**Spontanéous generation is only a chimera. This point established, two hypotheses remain: that of pre-existence and that of epigenesis. The one of these hypotheses has as little foundation as the other.” (FP. 163.) ' ‘* The doctrine of evigencsis is derived from Harvey : follow- ing by ocular inspection the development of the new being in the Windsor does, he saw each part appear successively, and taking the moment of appearance for the moment of formation he imagined epigenesis.” (P. 165.) On the contrary, says M. Flourens (p. 167), ‘**The new being is formed at a stroke (tout d'un cowp), asa whole, instantaneously ; it is not formed part by part, and at different times. It is formed at once at the single individuat moment at which the conjunction of the male and female elements takes place.” It will be observed that M. Flourens uses language which cannot be mistaken. For him, the labours of Von Baer, of Rathke, of Coste, and their contemporaries and successors in Germany, France, and England, are non-existent: and, as Darwin “imagina” natural selection, so Harvey “qmagina” that doctrine which gives him an even greater claim to the veneration of posterity than his better known discovery of the circulation of the blood. Language such as that we have quoted is, in fact, so preposterous, so utterly incompatible with 106 CRITICISMS ON “'THE ORIGIN OF SPECIES” qt anything but absolute ignorance of some of the best established facts, that we should have passed it over in silence had it not appeared to afford some clue to M. Flourens’ unhesitating, & priori, repudiation of all forms of the doctrine of pro- gressive modification of living beings. He whose mind remains uninfluenced by an acquaintance with the phenomena of development, must indeed lack one of the chief motives towards the endeavour to trace a genetic relation between the different existing forms of life. Those who are ignorant of Geology, find no difficulty in believing that the world was made as it is; and the shepherd, untutored in history, sees no reason to regard the green mounds which indicate the site of a Roman camp, as aught but part and parcel of the primeval hill-side. So M. Flourens, who believes that embryos are formed “ tout d’un coup,” naturally finds no difficulty in conceiving that species came into existence in the same way. IV THE GENEALOGY OF ANIMALS! [1869] CONSIDERING that Germany now takes the lead of the world in scientific investigation, and particu- larly in biology, Mr. Darwin must be well pleased at the rapid spread of his views among some of the ablest and most laborious of German naturalists, Among these, Professor Haeckel, of Jena, is the Coryphzus. I know of no more solid and import- ant contributions to biology in the past seven years than Haeckel’s work on the “ Radiolaria,” and the researches of his distinguished colleague Gegenbaur, in vertebrate anatomy; while in Haeckel’s “ Generelle Morphologie” there is all the force, suggestiveness, and, what I may term 1 The Natural History of Creation. By Dr. Ernst Haeckel. [Natiirliche Schipfungs-Geschichte.—Von Dr. Ernst Haeckel, Professor an der Universitat Jena.] Berlin, 1868. 108 THE GENEALOGY OF ANIMALS Iv the systematising power, of Oken, without his ex- travagance. The “Generelle Morphologie” is, in fact, an attempt to put the Doctrine of Evolution, so far as it applies to the living world, into a logical form ; and to work out its practical applications to their final results. The work before us, again, may be said to be an exposition of the “Generelle Morphologie” for an educated public, consisting, as it does, of the substance of a series of lectures delivered before a mixed audience at Jena, in the session 1867-8. “The Natural History of Creation,’—or, as Professor Haeckel admits it would have been better to call his work, “The History of the Development or Evolution of Nature,’—deals, in the first six lectures, with the general and _his- torical aspects of the question and contains a very interesting and lucid account of the views of Lin- neus, Cuvier, Agassiz, Goethe, Oken, Kant, Lamarck, Lyell, and Darwin, and of the historical filiation of these philosophers. The next six lectures are occupied by a well- digested statement of Mr. Darwin’s views. The thirteenth lecture discusses two topics which are not touched by Mr. Darwin, namely, the origin of the present form of the solar system, and that of living matter. Full justice is done to Kant, as the originator of that “cosmic gas theory,” as the Germans somewhat quaintly call it, which is commonly ascribed to Laplace. With respect to ke ae a Iv THE GENEALOGY OF ANIMALS 109 spontaneous generation, while admitting that there is no experimental evidence in its favour, Professor Haeckel denies the possibility of disproving it, and points out that the assumption that it has occurred is a necessary part of the doctrine of Evolution. The fourteenth lecture, on “ Schopfungs-Perioden und Schépfungs-Urkunden,” answers pretty much to the famous disquisition on the “Imperfection of the Geological Record” in the “ Origin of Species.” The following five lectures contain the most original matter of any, being devoted to “ Phylo- geny,” or the working out of the details of the process of Evolution in the animal and vegetable kingdoms, so as to prove the line of descent of each group of living beings, and to furnish it with its proper genealogical tree, or “ phylum.” The last lecture considers objections and sums up the evidence in favour of biological Evolution. I shall best testify to my sense of the value of the work thus briefly analysed if I now proceed to note down some of the more important criticisms which have been suggested to me by its perusal. I. In more than one place, Professor Haeckel enlarges upon the service which the “Origin of Species” has done, in favouring what he terms the “causal or mechanical” view of living nature as opposed to the “teleological or vitalistic” view. And no doubt it is quite true that the doctrine of Evolution is the most formidable opponent of all 110 THE GENEALOGY OF ANIMALS IV the commoner and coarser forms of Teleology. But perhaps the most remarkable service to the philosophy of Biology rendered by Mr. Darwin is the reconciliation of Teleology and Morphology, and the explanation of the facts of both which his views offer. The Teleology which supposes that the eye, such as we see it in man or one of the higher Verte- brata, was made with the precise structure which it exhibits, for the purpose of enabling the animal which possesses it to see, has undoubtedly received its death-blow. Nevertheless it is necessary to remember that there is a wider Teleology, which is not touched by the doctrine of Evolution, but is actually based upon the fundamental proposition of Evolution, That proposition is, that the whole world, living and not living, in the result of the mutual interaction, according to definite laws, of the forces possessed by the molecules of which the primitive nebulosity of the universe was composed. If this be true, it is no less certain that the existing world lay, potentially, in the cosmic vapour ; and that a sufficient intelligence could, from a know- ledge of the properties of the molecules of that vapour, have predicted, say the state of the Fauna of Britain in 1869, with as much certainty as one can say what will happen to the vapour of the breath in a cold winter’s day. Consider a kitchen clock, which ticks loudly, shows the hours, minutes, and seconds, strikes, i init tat hid) aerial Carat ih: mW ae iy NS yee Se ee ee oe ee ee a rT IV THE GENEALOGY OF ANIMALS ili cries “cuckoo!” and perhaps shows the phases of the moon. When the clock is wound up, all the phenomena which it exhibits are potentially con- tained in its mechanism, and a clever clockmaker could predict all it will do after an examination of its structure. If the evolution theory is correct, the mole- cular structure of the cosmic gas stands in the same relation to the phenomena of the world as the structure of the clock to its pheno- mena. Now let us suppose a death-watch, living in the clock-case, to be a learned and intelligent student of its works. He might say, “I find here nothing but matter and force and pure mechanism from beginning to end,” and he would be quite right. But if he drew the conclusion that the clock was not contrived for a purpose, he would be quite wrong. On the other hand, imagine another death-watch of a different turn of mind. He, listening to the monotonous “tick! tick!” so exactly like his own, might arrive at the conclusion that the clock was itself a monstrous sort of death-watch, and that its final cause and purpose was to tick, How easy to point to the clear relation of the whole mechanism to the pendulum, to the fact that the one thing the clock did always _ and without intermission was to tick, and that all the rest of its phenomena were intermittent and subordinate te ticking! For all this, it is certain bb he THE GENEALOGY OF ANIMALS IV that kitchen clocks are not contrived for the purpose of making a ticking noise. Thus the teleological theorist would be as wrong as the mechanical theorist, among our death- watches ; and, probably, the only death-watch who would be right would be the one who should maintain that the sole thing death-watches could be sure about was the nature of the clock-works and the way they move; and that the purpose of the clock lay wholly beyond the purview of beetle faculties. Substitute “cosmic vapour” for “clock,” and “molecules” for “works,” and the application of the argument is obvious. The teleological and the mechanical views of nature are not, necessarily, mutually exclusive. On the contrary, the more purely a mechanist the speculator is, the more firmly does he assume a primordial mo- lecular arrangement, of which all the phenomena of the universe are the consequences; and the more completely is he thereby at the mercy of the teleologist, who can always defy him to disprove that this primordial molecular arrangement was not intended to _ evolve the phenomena of the universe. On the other hand, if the teleologist assert that this, that, or the other result of the working of any part of the mechanism of the universe is its purpose and final cause, the mechanist can always inquire how he knows that it is more than an unessential incident ae Iv THE GENEALOGY OF ANIMALS 113 —the mere ticking of the clock, which he mistakes for its function. And there seems to be no reply to this inquiry, any more than to the further, not irrational, question, why trouble one’s self about matters which are out of reach, when the working of the mechanism itself, which is of infinite practical importance, affords scope for all our energies ? Professor Haeckel has invented a new and con- venient name “ Dysteleology,” for the study of the “ purposelessnesses” which are observable in living organisms—such as the multitudinous cases of rudimentary and apparently useless structures. T confess, however, that it has often appeared to me that the facts of Dysteleology cut two ways. If we are to assume, as evolutionists in general do, that useless organs atrophy, such cases as the existence of lateral rudiments of toes, in the foot of a horse, place us in a dilemma. For, either these rudiments are of no use to the animal, in which case, considering that the horse has existed in its present form since the Phocene epoch, they surely ought to have disappeared; or they are of some use to the animal, in which case they are of no use as arguments against Teleology. A similar, but still stronger, argument may be based upon the existence of teats, and even functional mam- ‘mary glands, in male mammals. Numerous cases of “ Gynaecomasty,’ or functionally active breasts in men, are on record, though there is no mam- VOL, Il I 114 THE GENEALOGY OF ANIMALS Iv malian species whatever in which the male nor- mally suckles the young. ‘Thus, there can be little doubt that the mammary gland was as apparently useless in the remotest male mam- malian ancestor of man as in living men, and yet it has not disappeared. Is it then still profitable to the male organism to retain it? Possibly ; but in that case its dysteleological value is gone.} II. Professor Haeckel looks upon the causes which have led to the present diversity of living nature as twofold. Living matter, he tells us, is urged by two impulses: a centripetal, which tends to preserve and transmit the specific form, and which he identifies with heredity; and a centri- fugal, which results from the tendency of external conditions to modify the organism and effect its adaptation to themselves. ‘The internal impulse is conservative, and tends to the preservation of specific, or individual, form ; the external impulse is metamorphic, and tends to the modification of specific, or individual, form. In developing his views upon this subject, Professor Haeckel introduces qualifications which disarm some of the criticisms I should have been disposed to offer; but I think that his method of stating the case has the inconvenience of tending to leave out of sight the important fact—which is a cardinal point in the Darwinian hypothesis— 1 [The recent discovery of the important part played by the Thyroid gland should be a warning to all speculators about useless organs. 1893.] Seay ate Iv THE GENEALOGY OF ANIMALS 115 that the tendency to vary, in a given organism, may have nothing to do with the external conditions to which that individual organism is exposed, but may depend wholly upon internal conditions. No one, I imagine, would dream of seeking for the cause of the development of the sixth finger and toe in the famous Maltese, in the direct influence of the external conditions of his life, I conceive that both hereditary transmission and adaptation need to be analysed into their constituent conditions by the further application of the doctrine of the Struggle for Existence. It is a probable hypothesis, that what the world is to organisms in general, each organism is to the inolecules of which it is con piled: Muititudes of these, having diverse tendencies, are competing with one another for opportunity to exist and multiply ; and the organism, as a whole, is as much the product of the molecules which are victorious as the Fauna, or Flora, of a country is the product of the victorious organic beings in it. On this hypothesis, hereditary transmission is the result of the victory of particular molecules contained in the impregnated germ. Adaptation to conditions is the result of the favouring of the multiplication of those molecules whose organising _tendencies are most in harmony with such conditions. In this view of the matter, conditions are not actively productive, but are passively permissive ; they do not cause variation in any 12 116 THE GENEALOGY OF ANIMALS IV given direction, but they permit and favour a tendency in that direction which already exists, It is true that,in the long run, the origin of the organic molecules themselves, and of their tendencies, is to be sought in the external world ; but if we carry our inquiries as far back as this, the distinction between internal and external impulses vanishes. On the other hand, if we confine ourselves to the consideration of a single organism, I think it must be admitted that the existence of an internal metamorphic tendency must be as distinctly recognised as that of an internal conservative tendency; and that the influence of conditions is mainly, if not wholly, the result of the extent to which they favour the one, or the other, of these tendencies. III. There is only one point upon which I fundamentally and entirely disagree with Professor Haeckel, but that is the very important one of his conception of geological time, and of the meaning of the stratified rocks as records and indications of that time. Conceiving that the stratified rocks of an epoch indicate a period of depression, and that the intervals between the epochs correspond with periods of elevation of which we have no record, he intercalates between the different epochs, or periods, intervals which he terms “Ante-periods.” Thus, instead of con- sidering the Triassic, Jurassic, Cretaceous, and Kocene periods, as continuously successive, he a - : ; 3 ’ * ¥ IV THE GENEALOGY OF ANIMALS 117 interposes a period before each, as an “ Antetrias zeit,” “ Antejura-zeit,” “Antecreta-zeit,’ “ Anteo- cenzeit,” &c. And he conceives that the abrupt changes between the Faune of the different forma- tions are due to the lapse of time, of which we have no organic record, during their “ Ante-periods.” The frequent occurrence of strata containing assemblages of organic forms which are inter- mediate between those of adjacent formations, is, to my mind, fatal to this view. In the well- known St. Cassian beds, for example, Paleozoic and Mesozoic forms are commingled, and, between the Cretaceous and the Eocene formations, there are similar transitional beds. On the other hand, in the middle of the Silurian series, extensive unconformity of the strata indicates the lapse of vast intervals of time between the deposit of successive beds, without any corresponding change in the Fauna. Professor Haeckel will, I fear, think me unreason- able, if I say that he seems to be still overshadowed by geological superstitions ; and that he will have to believe in the completeness of the geological record far less than he does at present. He assumes, for example, that there was no dry land, nor any terrestrial life, before the end of the Silurian epoch, simply because, up to the present time, no indica- ' tions of fresh water, or terrestrial organisms, have been found in rocks of older date. And, in speculating upon the origin of a given group, he 118 THE GENEALOGY OF ANIMALS Iv rarely goes further back than the “ Ante-period,” which precedes that in which the remains of animals belonging to that group are found. Thus, as fossil remains of the majority of the groups of Reptilia are first found in the Trias, they are assumed to have originated in the “Antetriassic” period, or between the Permian and _ Triassic epochs. I confess this is wholly incredible to me. The Permian and the Triassic deposits pass completely into one another ; there is no sort of discontinuity answering to an unrecorded “ Antetrias”; and, what is more, we have evidence of immensely extensive dry land during the formation of these deposits. We know that the dry land of the Trias absolutely teemed with reptiles of all groups except Pterodactyles, Snakes, and perhaps Tor- toises ; there is every probability that true Birds existed, and Mammalia certainly did. Of the in- habitants of the Permian dry land, on the contrary, all that have left a record are a few lizards. Is it conceivable that these last should really represent the whole terrestrial population of that time, and that the development of Mammals, of Birds, and of the highest forms of Reptiles, should have been crowded into the time during which the Permian conditions quietly passed away, and the Triassic conditions began? Does not any such supposition become in the highest degree improbable, when, in the terrestrial or fresh-water Labyrinthodonts, a my IV THE GENEALOGY OF ANIMALS 119 which lived on the land of the Carboniferous epoch, as well as on that of the Trias, we have evidence that one form of terrestrial life persisted, through- out all these ages, with no important modification ? For my part, having regard to the small amount of modification (except in the way of extinction) which the Crocodilian, Lacertilian, and Chelonian Reptilia have undergone, from the older Mesozoic times to the present day, I cannot but put the existence of the common stock from which they sprang far back in the Palaeozoic epoch; and I should apply a similar argumentation to all other groups of animals. [The remainder of this essay contains a discussion of questions of taxonomy and phylogeny, which is now antiquated. I have reprinted the considerations about the reconciliation of Teleology with Morphology, about ‘‘ Dysteleology,” and about the struggle for existence within the organism, because it has happened to me to be charged with overlooking them. In discussing Teleology, I ought to have pointed out, as I have done elsewhere (Life and Letters of Charles Darwin, vol. ii. p. 202), that Paley ‘‘ proleptically accepted the modern doctrine of Evolution,” (Natural Theology, chap. xxiii.). 1893.] i MR. DARWIN’S CRITICS? [1871] THE gradual lapse of time has now separated us by more than a decade from the date of the publi- cation of the ‘ Origin of Species ”— and whatever may be thought or said about Mr. Darwin’s doc- trines, or the manner in which he has propounded them, this much is certain, that, in a dozen years, the “Origin of Species” has worked as complete a revolution in biological science as the “ Principia ” did in astronomy—and it has done so, because, in the words of Helmholtz, it contains “ an essentially new creative thought.” 2 And as time has slipped by, a happy change 1 1. Contributions to the Theory of Natural Selection. By A. R. Wallace. 1870.—2. The Genesis of Species. By St. George Mivart, F.R.S. Second Edition. 1871.—3. Darwin’s Descent of Man. Quarterly Review, July 1871. 2 Helmholtz: Ueber das Ziel und die Fortschritie der Natur- wissenschaft. Kroffnungsrede fiir die Naturforscherversamm- lung zu Innsbruck. 1869. ~ —— ee ee ee Vv MR. DARWIN'S CRITICS 121 has come over Mr. Darwin’s critics. The mixture of ignorance and insolence which, at first, character- ised a large proportion of the attacks with which he was assailed, is no longer the sad distinction of anti-Darwinian criticism. Instead of abusive non- sense, which merely discredited its writers, we read essays, which are, at worst, more or less intelligent and appreciative; while, sometimes, like that which appeared in the “ North British Review ” for 1867, they have a real and permanent value. The several publications of Mr. Wallace and Mr. Mivart contain discussions of some of Mr. Darwin’s views, which are worthy of particular attention, not only on account of the acknowledged scientific competence of these writers, but because they ex- hibit an attention to those philosophical questions which underlie all physical science, which is as rare as it is needful. And the same may be said of an article in the “ Quarterly Review” for July 1871, the comparison of which with an article in the same Review for July 1860, is perhaps the best evidence which can be brought forward of the change which has taken place in public opinion on “ Darwinism.” The Quarterly Reviewer admits “the certainty of the action of natural selection” (p. 49); and further allows that there is an d@ priori probability in favour of the evolution of man from some lower animal form, if these lower animal forms them- selves have arisen by evolution. 122 MR. DARWIN’S CRITICS Vv Mr. Wallace and Mr. Mivart go much further than this, They are as stout believers in evolution as Mr. Darwin himself; but Mr. Wallace denies that man can have been evolved from a lower animal by that process of natural selection which he, with Mr. Darwin, holds to have been sufficient for the evolution of all animals below man; while Mr. Mivart, admitting that natural selection has been one of the conditions of the evolution of the animals below man, maintains that natural se- lection must, even in their case, have been supple- mented by “some other cause””—of the nature of which, unfortunately, he does not give us any idea. Thus Mr. Mivart is less of a Darwinian than Mr. Wallace, for he has less faith in the power of natural selection. But he is more of an evolutionist than Mr. Wallace, because Mr. Wallace thinks it necessary to call in an intelligent agent—a sort of supernatural Sir John Sebright—to produce even the animal frame of man; while Mr. Mivart re- quires no Divine assistance till he comes to man’s soul. Thus there is a considerable divergence between Mr. Wallace and Mr. Mivart. On the other hand, there are some curious similarities between Mr. Mivart and the Quarterly Reviewer, and these are sometimes so close, that, if Mr. Mivart thought it worth while, I think he might make out a good case of plagiarism against the Reviewer, who studiously abstains from quoting him. ee hme ee Vv MR. DARWIN’S CRITICS 123 Both the Reviewer and Mr. Mivart reproach Mr. Darwin with being, “like so many other physic- ists,’ entangled in a radically false metaphysical system, and with setting at nought the first principles of both philosophy and religion. Both enlarge upon the necessity of a sound philo- sophical basis, and both, I venture to add, make a conspicuous exhibition of its absence. The Quarterly Reviewer believes that man “ differs more from an elephant or a gorilla than do these from the dust of the earth on which they tread,” and Mr. Mivart has expressed the opinion that there is more difference between man and an ape than there is between an ape and a_ piece of granite. And even when Mr. Mivart (p. 86) trips ina matter of anatomy, and creates a difficulty for Mr. Darwin out of a supposed close similarity between the eyes of fishes and cephalopods, which (as Gegenbaur and others have clearly shown) does not exist, the Quarterly Reviewer adopts the argument without hesitation (p. 66). There is another important point, however, in which it is hard to say whether Mr, Mivart diverges from the Quarterly Reviewer or not. The Reviewer declares that Mr. Darwin has, “with needless opposition, set at nought the first ‘principles of both philosophy and religion” (p. 90). 1 See the Tablet for March 11, 1871. 124 MR. DARWIN'S CRITICS Vv It looks, at first, as if this meant, that Mr. Darwin’s views being false, the opposition to “religion” which flows from them must be need- less. But I suspect this is not the right view of the meaning of the passage, as Mr. Mivart, from whom the Quarterly Reviewer plainly draws so much inspiration, tells us that “the consequences which have been drawn from evolution, whether exclusively Darwinian or not, to the prejudice of religion, by no means follow. from it, and are in fact illegitimate ” (p. 5). I may assume, then, that the Quarterly Reviewer and Mr. Mivart admit that there is no necessary opposition between “ evolution whether exclusively Darwinian or not,” and religion. But then, what do they mean by this last much- abused term? On this point the Quarterly Reviewer is silent. Mr. Mivart, on the contrary, is perfectly explicit, and the whole tenor of his remarks leaves no doubt that by “religion” he means theology ; and by theology, that particular variety of the great Proteus, which is expounded by the doctors of the Roman Catholic Church, and held by the members of that religious community to be the sole form of absolute truth and of saving faith. _ According to Mr. Mivart, the greatest and most orthodox authorities upon matters of Catholic doctrine agree in distinctly asserting “ derivative creation” or evolution ; “and thus their teachings vy MR. DARWIN’S CRITICS 125 harmonise with all that modern science can possibly require ” (p. 305). I confess that this bold assertion interested me more than anything else in Mr. Mivart’s book. What little knowledge I possessed of Catholic doctrine, and of the influence exerted by Catholic authority in former times, had not led me to expect that modern science was likely to find a warm welcome within the pale of the greatest and most consistent of theological organisations. And my astonishment reached its climax when I found Mr, Mivart citing Father Suarez as his chief witness in favour of the scientific freedom enjoyed by Catholics—the popular repute of that learned theologian and subtle casuist not being such as to make his works a likely place of refuge for liberality of thought. But in these days, when Judas Iscariot and Robespierre, Henry VIII. and Catiline, have all been shown to be men of admirable virtue, far in advance of their age, and consequently the victims of vulgar prejudice, it was obviously possible that Jesuit Suarez might be in like case. And, spurred by Mr. Mivart’s unhesitating declaration, I hastened to acquaint myself with such of the works of the great Catholic divine as bore upon the question, hoping, not merely to acquaint myself with the true teachings -of the infallible Church, and free myself of an unjust prejudice ; but, haply, to enable myself, at a pinch, to put some Protestant bibliolater to 126 MR. DARWIN’S CRITICS y shame, by the bright example of Catholic freedom from the trammels of verbal inspiration, I regret to say that my anticipations have been cruelly disappointed. But the extent to which my hopes have been crushed can only be fully appreciated by citing, in the first place, those passages of Mr. Mivart’s work by which they were excited. In his introductory chapter I find the following passages :— “The prevalence of this theory [of evolution] need alarm no one, for it is, without any doubt, perfectly consistent with the strictest and most orthodox Christian! theology ” (p. 5). “Mr. Darwin and others may perhaps be excused if they have not devoted much time to the study of Christian philosophy ; but they have no right to assume or accept without careful ex- amination, as an unquestioned fact, that in that philosophy there is a necessary antagonism between the two ideas ‘ creation ’ and ‘ evolution,’ as applied to organic forms. “Tt is notorious and patent to all who choose to seek, that many distinguished Christian thinkers have accepted, and do accept, both ideas, 7.e. both ‘creation’ and ‘ evolution.’ “As much as ten years ago an eminently Christian writer observed : ‘ The creationist theory does not necessitate the perpetual search after 1 It should be observed that Mr. Mivart employs the term Christian” as if it were the equivalent of ‘‘ Catholic.” Vv MR. DARWIN’S CRITICS 127 manifestations of miraculous power and perpetual “catastrophes.” Creation is not a miraculous interference with the laws of Nature, but the very institution of those laws. Law and regularity, not arbitrary intervention, was the patristic ideal of creation. With this notion they admitted, without difficulty, the most surprising origin of living creatures, provided it took place by law. They held that when God said, “ Let the waters produce,” “ Let the earth produce,’ He conferred forces on the elements of earth and water which enabled them naturally to produce the various species of organic beings. This power, they thought, remains attached to the elements throughout all time.’ The same writer quotes St. Augustin and St. Thomas Aquinas, to the effect that, ‘in the institution of Nature, we do not look for miracles, but for the laws of Nature.’ And, again, St. Basil speaks of the continued operation of natural laws in the production of all organisms, “So much for the writers of early and medizval times. As to the present day, the author can confidently affirm that there are many as well versed in theology as Mr. Darwin is in his own department of natural knowledge, who would not be disturbed by the thorough demonstration of his theory. Nay, they would not even be in the least painfully affected at witnessing the generation of animals of complex organisation by the skilful 128 MR. DARWIN'S CRITICS Vv artificial arrangement of natural forces, and the production, in the future, of a fish by means analogous to those by which we now produce urea. | “And this because they know that the possi- bility of such phenomena, though by no means actually foreseen, has yet been fully provided for in the old philosophy centuries before Darwin, or even centuries before Bacon, and that their place in the system can be at once assigned them without even disturbing its order or marring its harmony. “ Moreover, the old tradition in this respect has never been abandoned, however much it may have been ignored or neglected by some modern writers. In proof of this, it may be observed that perhaps no post-medizval theologian has a wider reception amongst Christians throughout the world than Suarez, who has a separate section ! in opposition to those who maintain the distinct creation of the various kinds—or substantial forms—of organic life” (pp. 19--21). Still more distinctly does Mr. Mivart express himself in the same sense, in his last chapter, entitled “ Theology and Evolution” (pp. 302-5). “Tt appears, then, that Christian thinkers are perfectly free to accept the general evolution theory. But are there any theological authorities to justify this view of the matter ? 1 Suarez, Metaphysica. Edition Vivés. Paris, 1868, vol. i. Disput. xv. § 2. Vv MR. DARWIN'S CRITICS 129 “Now, considering how extremely recent are these biological speculations, it might hardly be expected @ priori that writers of earlier ages should have given expression to doctrines harmonising in any degree with such very modern views; nevertheless, this is certainly the case, and it would be easy to give numerous examples. It will be better, however, to cite one or two authorities of weight. Perhaps no writer of the earlier Christian ages could be quoted whose authority is more generally recognised than that of St. Augustin. The same may be said of the medieval period for St. Thomas Aquinas: and since the movement of Luther, Suarez may be taken as an authority, widely venerated, and one whose orthodoxy has never been ques- tioned. “Tt must be borne in mind that for a consider- able time even after the last of these writers no one had disputed the generally received belief as to the small age of the world, or at least of the kinds of animals and plants inhabiting it. It becomes, therefore, much more striking if views formed under such a condition of opinion are found to harmonise with modern ideas con- cerning ‘Creation’ and organic Life. “ Now St. Augustin insists ina very remarkable -manner on the merely derivative sense in which God’s creation of organic forms is to be under- stood ; that is, that God created them by conferring VOL, I K 130 MR. DARWIN’S CRITICS Vv on the material world the power to evolve them under suitable conditions.” Mr. Mivart then cites certain passages from St. Augustin, St. Thomas Aquinas, and Cornelius & Lapide, and finally adds :— ‘** As to Suarez, it will be enough to refer to Disp. xv. sec. 2, No. 9, p. 508, t. i. edition Vivés, Paris ; also Nos. 13—15. Many other references to the same effect could easily be given, but these may suffice. ‘*Tt is then evident that ancient and most venerable theo- logical authorities distinctly assert derivative creation, and thus their teachings harmonise with all that modern science can possibly require.” It will be observed that Mr. Mivart refers solely to Suarez’s fifteenth Disputation, though he adds, “Many other references to the same effect could easily be given.” I shall look anxiously for these references in the third edition of the “ Genesis of Species.” For the present, all I can say is, that I have sought in vain, either in the fifteenth Disputation, or elsewhere, for any passage in Suarez’s writings which, in the slightest degree, bears out Mr. Mivart’s views as to his opinions.! The title of this fifteenth Disputation is “De causa formali substantiali,” and the second section of that Disputation (to which Mr. Mivart refers) is headed, “Quomodo possit forma substantialis fieri in materia et ex materia?” 1 The edition of Suarez’s Disputationes from which the follow- ing citations are given, is Birekmann’s, in two volumes folio, and is dated 1630. Vv MR. DARWIN’S CRITICS 131 The problem which Suarez discusses in this place may be popularly stated thus: According to the scholastic philosophy every natural body has two components—the one its “ matter” (materia prima), the other its “substantial form ” (forma substantialis). Of these the matter is everywhere the same, the matter of one body being indis- tinguishable from the matter of any other body. That which differentiates any one natural body from all others is its substantial form, which inheres in the matter of that body, as the human soul inheres in the matter of the frame of man, and is the source of all the activities and other properties of the body. Thus, says Suarez, if water is heated, and the source of heat is then removed, it cools again. The reason of this is that there is a certain “ inti- mius principium” in the water, which brings it back to the cool condition when the external impediment to the existence of that condition is removed. This intimius principiwm is the “ sub- stantial form ” of the water. And the substantial form of the water is not only the cause (radix) of the coolness of the water, but also of its moisture, of its density, and of all its other properties. It will thus be seen that “substantial forms ” play nearly the same part in the scholastic philosophy as “ forces” do in modern science ; the general tendency of modern thought being to conceive all bodies as resolvable into material K 2 132 MR. DARWIN’S CRITICS Vv particles and forces, in virtue of which last these particles assume those dispositions and exercise those powers which are characteristic of each particular kind of matter. But the Schoolmen distinguished two kinds of substantial forms, the one spiritual and the other material. ‘The former division is represented by the human soul, the anima rationalis; and they affirm as a matter, not merely of reason, but of faith, that every human soul is created out of nothing, and by this act of creation is endowed with the power of existing for all eternity, apart from the materia prima of which the corporeal frame of man is composed, And the anima rationalis, once united with the materia prima of the body, becomes its substantial form, and is the source of all the powers and faculties of man—of all the vital and sensitive phenomena which he exhibits—just as the substantial form of water is the source of all its qualities. The “material substantial forms” are those which inform all other natural bodies except that of man; and the object of Suarez in the present Disputation, is to show that the axiom “ ex nihilo nihil fit,” though not true of the substantial form of man, is true of the substantial forms of all other bodies, the endless mutations of which constitute the ordinary course of nature. The origin of the difficulty which he discusses is easily comprehensible. Suppose a piece of bright iron Vy MR. DARWIN’S CRITICS 1338 to be exposed to the air. The existence of the iron depends on the presence within it of a sub- stantial form, which is the cause of its properties, e.g. brightness, hardness, weight. But, by degrees, the iron becomes converted into a mass of rust, which is dull, and soft, and light, and, in all other respects, is quite different from the iron. As, in the scholastic view, this difference is due to the rust being informed by a new substantial form, the grave problem arises, how did this new sub- stantial form come into being? Has it been created ? or has it arisen by the power of natural causation? If the former hypothesis is correct, then the axiom, “ex nihilo nihil fit,” is false, even in relation to the ordinary course of nature, seeing that such mutations of matter as imply the continual origin of new substantial forms are occurring every moment. But the harmonisation of Aristotle with theology was as dear to the Schoolmen, as the smoothing down the differences between Moses and science is to our Broad Church- men, and they were proportionably unwilling to contradict one of Aristotle’s fundamental proposi- tions. Nor was their objection to flying in the face of the Stagirite likely to be lessened by the fact that such flight landed them in flat Pantheism. So Father Suarez fights stoutly for the second hypothesis ; and I quote the principal part of his argumentation as an exquisite specimen of that speech which is a “darkening of counsel.” 184 MR. DARWIN’S CRITICS Vv “13. Secundo de omnibus aliis formis substantialibus [se. materialibus] dicendum est non fieri proprie ex nihilo, sed ex potentia prejacentis materie educi : ideoque in effectione harum formarum nil fieri contra illud axioma, Hx nihilo nihil fit, si recte intelligatur. Hc assertio sumitur ex Aristotelel, Phy- sicorum per totum et libro 7, Metaphyss. et ex aliis auctoribus, quos statim referam. Et declaratur breviter, nam fieri ex nihilo duo dicit, unum est fieri absolute et simpliciter, aliud est quod talis effectio fit ex nihilo. Primum proprié dicitur de re subsistente, quia ejus est fieri, cujus est esse: id autem proprie quod subsistit et habet esse ; nam quod alteri adjacet, potius est quo aliud est. Ex hac ergo parte, forme substantiales mate- riales non fiunt ex nihilo, quia proprie non fiunt. Atque hanc rationem reddit Divus Thomas 1 parte, questione 45, articulo 8, et questione 90, articulo 2, et ex dicendis magis explicabitur, Sumendo ergo ipsum fier? in hac proprietate et rigore, sic fieri ex nihilo est fieri secundum se totum, id est nulla sui parte presupposita, ex quo fiat. Et hac ratione res naturales dum de novo fiunt, non fiunt ex nihilo, quia fiunt ex presupposita materia, ex qua componuntur, et ita non fiunt, secundum se tote, sed secundum aliquid sui. Forme autem harum rerum, quamvis revera totam suam entitatem de novo accipiant, quam antea non habebant, quia vero ipse non fiunt, ut dictum est, ideo neque ex nihilo fiunt. Attamen, quia latiori modo sumendo verbum illud fiert negari non potest: quin forma facta sit, eo modo quo nune est, et antea non erat, ut etiam probat ratio dubitandi posita in principio sectionis, ideo addendum est, sumpto jieri in hac amplitudine, fieri ex nihilo non tamen negare habitudinem materialis cause intrinsecé componentis id quod fit, sed etiam habitudinem cause materialis per se causantis et sustentantis formam que fit, seu confit. Diximus enim in superioribus materiam et esse causam compositi et forme dependentis ab illa: ut res ergo dicatur ex nihilo fieri uterque modus causalitatis negari debet ; et eodem sensu accipiendum est illud axioma, ut sit verum: Ez nihilo nihil fit, scilicet virtute agentis naturalis et finiti nihil fieri, nisi ex presupposito subjecto per se concurrente, et ad compositum et ad formam, si utrumque suo modo ab eodem agente fiat. Ex his ergo recté Vv MR. DARWIN’S CRITICS 135 concluditur, formas substantiales materiales non fieri ex nihilo, quia fiunt ex materia, que in suo genere per se concurrit, et influit ad esse, et fieri talium formarum ; quia, sicut esse non possunt nisi affixe materiz, a qua sustententur in esse : ita nec fieri possunt, nisi earum effectio et penetratio in eadem materia sustentetur. Et hec est propria et per se differentia inter effectionem ex nihilo, et ex aliquo, propter quam, ut infra ostendemus, prior modus efficiendi superat vim finitam natu- raliam agentium, non vero posterior. **14. Ex his etiam constat, proprie de his formis dici non ereari, sed educi de potentia materiz.” ! If I may venture to interpret these hard say- ings, Suarez conceives that the evolution of substantial forms in the ordinary course of nature, is conditioned not only by the existence of the materia prima, but also by a certain “ concurrence and influence” which that materia exerts; and every new substantial form being thus conditioned, and in part, at any rate, caused, by a pre-existing something, cannot be said to be created out of nothing. But as the whole tenor of the context shows, Suarez applies this argumentation merely to the evolution of material substantial forms in the ordinary course of nature. How the substantial forms of animals and plants primarily originated, is a question to which, so far as I am able to discover, he does not so much as allude in his “ Metaphysical Disputations.” Nor was there any necessity that he should do so, inasmuch as he 1 Suarez, loc. cit. Disput. xv. § ii. 136 MR. DARWIN’S CRITICS v has devoted a separate treatise of considerable bulk to the discussion of all the problems which arise out of the account of the Creation which is given in the Book of Genesis. And it is a matter of wonderment to me that Mr. Mivart, who somewhat sharply reproves “ Mr. Darwin and others” for not acquainting themselves with the true teachings of his Church, should allow himself to be indebted to a heretic like myself for a knowledge of the existence of that “ Trac- tatus de opere sex Dierum,”? in which the learned Father, of whom he justly speaks, as “an authority widely venerated, and whose orthodoxy has never been questioned,” directly opposes all those opinions for which Mr, Mivart claims the shelter of his authority. In the tenth and eleventh chapters of the first book of this treatise, Suarez inquires in what sense the word “day,” as employed in the first chapter of Genesis, is to be taken. He discusses the views of Philo and of Augustin on this question, and rejects them. He suggests that the approval of their allegorising interpretations by St. Thomas Aquinas, merely arose out of St. Thomas’s modesty, and his desire not to seem openly to controvert St. Augustin—“ voluisse Divus Thomas 1 Tractatus de opere sex Dierwm, scw de Universi Creatione, quatenus scx diebus perfecta esse, in libro Genesis cap. i. refertur, ct presertim de productione hominis in statu innocentia. Ed, Birckmann, 1622, Vv MR. DARWIN’S CRITICS 137 pro sua modestia subterfugere vim argumenti potius quam aperte Augustinum inconstantie arguere.” Finally, Suarez decides that the writer of Genesis meant that the term “day” should be taken in its natural sense ; and he winds up the discussion with the very just and natural remark that “it is not probable that God, in inspiring Moses to write a history of the Creation which was to be believed by ordinary people, would have made him use language, the true meaning of which it is hard to discover, and still harder to believe.” ! p And in chapter xii. 3, Suarez further ob- serves :— ‘‘Ratio enim retinendi veram significationem diei naturalis est illa communis, quod verba Scripture non sunt ad metaphoras transferenda, nisi vel necessitas cogit, vel ex ipsa scriptura constet, et maximé in historica narratione et ad instructionem fidei pertinente : sed hee ratio non minus cogit ad intelligendum proprié dierum numerum, quam diei qualitatem, QUIA NON MINUS UNO MODO QUAM ALIO DESTRUITUR SINCERITAS, IMO ET VERITAS HISTORIA. Secundo hoc valde confirmant alia Scripture loca, in quibus hi sex dies tanquam veri, et inter se distincti commemorantur, ut Exod. 20 dicitur, Sex diebus operabis et facies omnia opera tua, septimo autem die Sabbatum Domini Det 1 «*Propter hee ergo sententia illa Augustini et propter nimiam obscuritatem et subtilitatem ejus difficilis creditu est: quia verisimile non est Deum inspirasse Moysi, ut historiam de creatione mundi ad fidem totius populi adeo necessariam per nomina dierum explicaret, quorum significatio vix inveniri et difficillime ab aliquo credi posset.” (Loe. cit. Lib. I. cap, xi. 42.) 188 MR. DARWIN’S CRITICS Vv tut est. Et infra: Sex enim diebus fecit Dominus celum et terram et mare et omnia que in eis sunt, et idem repetitur in cap. 31. In quibus locis sermonis proprietas colligi potest tum ex equiparatione, nam cum dicitur: scx diebus operabis, pro- priissimé intelligitur: tum quia non est verisimile, potuisse populum intelligere verba illa in alio sensu, et é contrario in- credibile est, Deum in suis preceptis tradendis illis verbis ad populum fuisse loquutum, quibus deciperetur, falsum sensum concipiendo, si Deus non per sex veros dies opera sua fecisset.” These passages leave no doubt that this great doctor of the Catholic Church, of unchallenged authority and unspotted orthodoxy, not only declares it to be Catholic doctrine that the work of creation took place in the space of six natural days ; but that he warmly repudiates, as inconsist- ent with our knowledge of the Divine attributes, the supposition that the language which Catholic faith requires the believer to hold that God inspired, was used in any other sense than that which He knew it would convey to the minds of those to whom it was addressed. And I think that in this repudiation Father Suarez will have the sympathy of every man of common uprightness, to whom it is certainly “incredible” that the Almighty should have acted in a manner which He would esteem dishonest and base in a man. But the belief that the universe was created in six natural days is hopelessly inconsistent with the doctrine of evolution, in so far as it applies to the stars and planetary bodies; and it can be Vv MR. DARWIN’S CRITICS 189 made to agree with a belief in the evolution of living beings only by the supposition that the plants and animals, which are said to have been created on the third, fifth, and sixth days, were merely the primordial forms, or rudiments, out of which existing plants and animals have been evolved; so that, on these days, plants and animals were not created actually, but only potentially. The latter view is that held by Mr. Mivart, who follows St. Augustin, and implies that he has the sanction of Suarez. But, in point of fact, the latter great light of orthodoxy takes no small pains to give the most explicit and direct contra- diction to all such imaginations, as the following passages prove. In the first ‘place, as regards plants, Suarez discusses the problem :— **Quomodo herba virens et cetera vegetabilia hoc [tertio| die Suerint producta,* ‘* Preecipua enim difficultas hic est, quam attingit Div. Thomas 1, par. qu. 69, art. 2, an hee productio plantarum hoc die facta intelligenda sit de productione ipsarum in proprio esse actuali et formali (ut sic rem explicerem) vel de productione tantum in semine et in potentia. Nam Divus Augustinus libro quinto Genes, ad liter. cap. 4 et 5 et libro 8, cap. 3, posteriorem partem tradit, dicens, terram in hoc die accepisse virtutem germinandi omnia vegetabilia quasi concepto omnium illorum semine, non tamen statim vegetabilia omnia produxisse. Quod primo suadet verbis illis capitis secundi. Jn die quo fecit Deus celum et terram et _ 1 Loe, cit. Lib. II. cap. vii. et viii. 1, 32, 35. 140 MR. DARWIN’S CRITICS y omne virgultum agri priusquam germinaret. Quomodo enim potuerunt virgulta fieri antequam terra germinaret nisi quia causaliter prius et quasi in radice, seu in semine facta sunt, et postea in actu producta? Secundo confirmari potest, quia verbum illud germinet terra optimé exponitur potestativé ut sic dicam, id est accipiat terra vim germinandi. Sicut in eodem capite dicitur crescite et multiplicamini. Tertio potest confirmari, quia actualis productio vegetabilium non tam ad opus creationis, quam ad opus propagationis pertinet, quod postea factum est. Et hance sententiam sequitur Eucherius lib. 1, in Gen. cap. 11, et illi faveat Glossa, interlii Hugo. et Lyran. dum verbum germinet dicto modo exponunt. NIHILOMINUS CONTRARIA SENTENTIA TENENDA EST: SCILICET, PRODUXISSE DEUM HOC DIE HERBAM, ARBORES, ET ALIA VEGETABILIA ACTU IN PROPRIA SPECIE ET NATURA. Hee est communis sententia Patrum.— Basil. homil. 5; Exemer. Ambros, lib. 3 ; Exemer. cap. 8, 11, et 16 ; Chrysost. homil. 5 in Gen. Damascene. lib. 2 de Fid. cap. 10 ; Theodor. Cyrilli. Bede, Gloss ordinarie et aliorum in Gen. Et idem sentit Divus Thomas, supra, solvens argumenta Augustini, quamvis propter reverentiam ejus quasi problematicé semper procedat. Denique idem sentiunt omnes qui in his operibus veram successionem et temporalem distinctionem agnoscant.” Secondly, with respect to animals, Suarez is no less decided :— ** De animalium ratione carentium productione quinto et sexto die facta.+ **32. Primo ergo nobis certum sit hee animantia non in virtute tantum aut in semine, sed actu, et in seipsis, facta fuisse his diebus in quibus facta narrantur. Quanquam Augustinus lib. 3, Gen. ad liter. cap. 5 in sua persistens sententia contrarium sentire videatur.” But Suarez proceeds to refute Augustin’s 1 Loe. cit. Lib. II. cap. vii. et viii. 1, 32, 35. Vv MR. DARWIN’S CRITICS 141 opinions at great length, and his final judgment may be gathered from the following passage :— ‘¢35. Tertio dicendum est, hec animalia omnia his diebus producta esse, IN PERFECTO STATU, IN SINGULIS INDIVIDUIS, SEU SPECIEBUS SUIS, JUXTA UNIUSCUJUSQUE NATURAM.... ITAQUE FUERUNT OMNIA CREATA INTEGRA ET OMNIBUS SUIS MEMBRIS PERFECTA.” As regards the creation of animals and plants, therefore, it is clear that Suarez, so far from “distinctly asserting derivative creating,” denies it as distinctly and positively as he can; that he is at much pains to refute St. Augustin’s opinions; that he does not hesitate to regard the faint acquiescence of St. Thomas Aquinas in the views of his brother saint as a kindly subter- fuge on the part of Divus Thomas; and that he affirms his own view to be that which is supported by the authority of the Fathers of the Church. So that, when Mr. Mivart tells us that Catholic theology is in harmony with all that modern science can possibly require ; that “to the general theory of evolution, and to the special Darwinian form of it, no exception ... need be taken on the ground of orthodoxy;” and that “law and regularity, not arbitrary intervention, was the Patristic ideal of creation,’ we have to choose between his dictum, as a theologian, and that of a great light of his Church, whom he him- self declares to be “widely venerated as an 142 MR. DARWIN’S CRITICS Vv authority, and whose orthodoxy has never been questioned.” But Mr. Mivart does not hesitate to push his attempt to harmonise science with Catholic orthodoxy to its utmost limit; and, while assuming that the soul of man “arises from immediate and direct creation,” he supposes that his body was “formed at first (as now in each separate individual) by derivative, or secondary creation, through natural laws ” (p. 331). This means, I presume, that an animal, having the corporeal form and bodily powers of man, may have been developed out of some lower form of life by a process of evolution; and that, after this anthropoid animal had existed for a longer or shorter time, God made a soul by direct creation, and put it into the manlike body, which, hereto- fore, had been devoid of that anima rationalis, which is supposed to be man’s distinctive character. This hypothesis is incapable of either proof or disproof, and therefore may be true; but if Suarez is any authority, it is not Catholic doctrine. “ Nulla est in homine forma educta de potentia materiz,” ? is a dictum which is absolutely inconsistent with the doctrine of the natural evolution of any vital manifestation of the human body. Moreover, if man existed as an animal before ! Disput. xv. § x. No. 27. Vv MR. DARWIN'S CRITICS 1438 he was provided with a rational soul, he must, in accordance with the elementary requirements of the philosophy in which Mr. Mivart delights, have possessed a distinct sensitive and vegetative soul, or souls. Hence, when the “ breath of life” was breathed into the manlike animal’s nostrils, he must have already been a living and feeling creature. But Suarez particularly discusses this point, and not only rejects Mr. Mivart’s view, but adopts language of very theological strength regarding it. ‘*Possent preeterea his adjungi argumenta theologica, ut est illud quod sumitur ex illis verbis Genes. 2. Formuavit Deus hominem ex limo terre et inspiravit in faciem ejus spiraculum vite et factus est homo in animam viventem : ille enim spiritus, quam Deus spiravit, anima rationalis fuit, et PER EADEM FACTUS EST HOMO VIVENS, ET CONSQUENTER, ETIAM SENTIENS. ‘¢ Aliud est ex VIII. Synodo Generali que est Constantinopol- itana IV. can. 11, qui sic habet. Apparet quosdam in tantum impictatis venisse ut homines duas animas habere dogmatizent : talis igitur impietatis inventores et similes sapientes, cum Vetus et Novum Testamentum omnesque Ecclesia patres unam animam rationalem hominem habere asseverent, Sancta et universalis Synodus anathematizat.” } Moreover, if the animal nature of man was the result of evolution, so must that of woman have been.” But the Catholic doctrine, according to Suarez, is that woman was, in the strictest and most literal sense of the words, made out of the rib of man. 1 Disput. xv. ‘‘ De causa formali substantiali,” § x. No. 24. 144 MR. DARWIN’S CRITICS Vv ‘* Nihilominus sententia Catholica est, verba illa Scripture esse ad literam intelligenda. Ac PROINDE VERE, AC REALITER, TULISSE DEUM CosTAM ADAM, ET, EX ILLA, CORPUS Ev” FORMASSE,”’ } Nor is there any escape in the supposition that some woman existed before Eve, after the fashion of the Lilith of the rabbis; since Suarez qualifies that notion, along with some other Judaic imaginations, as simply “ damnabilis.” ? After the perusal of the “'Tractatus de Opere” it is, in fact, impossible to admit that Suarez held any opinion respecting the origin of species, except such as is consistent with the strictest and most literal interpretation of the words of Genesis. For Suarez, it is Catholic doctrine, that the world was made in six natural days. On the first of these days the materia prima was made out of nothing, to receive afterwards those “substantial forms” which moulded it into the universe of things; on the third day, the ancestors of all living plants suddenly came into being, full-grown, perfect, and possessed of all the properties which now distinguish them; while, on the fifth and sixth days, the ancestors of all existing animals were similarly caused to exist in their complete and perfect state, by the infusion of their appro- priate material substantial forms into the matter 1 Tractatus de Opere, Lib. III. ‘‘ De hominis creatione,” cap. ii. No. 3. 2 Ibid. Lib. III. cap. iv. Nos. 8 and 9 Vv MR. DARWIN’S CRITICS 145 which had already been created. Finally, on the sixth day, the anima rationalis—that rational and immortal substantial form which is peculiar to man—was created out of nothing, and “ breathed into” a mass of matter which, till then, was mere dust of the earth, and so man arose. But the species man was represented by a solitary male individual, until the Creator took out one of his ribs and fashioned it into a female, This is the view of the “Genesis of Species” held by Suarez to be the only one consistent with Catholic faith: it is because he holds this view to be Catholic that he does not hesitate to declare St. Augustin unsound, and St. Thomas Aquinas guilty of weakness, when the one swerved from this view and the other tolerated the deviation. And, until responsible Catholic authority—say, for example, the Archbishop of Westminster— formally declares that Suarez was wrong, and that Catholic priests are free to teach their flocks that the world was not made in six natural days, and that plants and animals were nof created in their perfect and complete state, but have been evolved by natural processes through long ages from certain germs in which they were potentially contained, I, for one, shall feel bound to believe that the doctrines of Suarez are the only ones which are sanctioned by Infallible Authority, as represented by the Holy Father and the Catholic Church. VOL. I I, 146 MR. DARWIN'S CRITICS v I need hardly add that they are as absolutely denied and repudiated by Scientific Authority, as represented by Reason and Fact. The question whether the earth and the immediate progenitors of its present living population were made in six natural days or not is no longer one upon which two opinions can be held. The fact that it did not so come into being stands upon as sound a basis as any fact of history whatever. It is not true that existing plants and animals came into being within three days of the creation of the earth out of nothing, for itis certain that innumerable generations of other plants and animals lived upon the earth before its present population. And when, Sunday after Sunday, men who profess to be our instructors in righteousness read out the statement, “In six days the Lord made heaven and earth, the sea, and all that in them is,” in innumerable churches, they are either propagating what they may easily know, and, therefore, are bound to know, to be falsities ; or, if they use the words in some non- natural sense, they fall below the moral standard of the much-abused Jesuit. Thus far the contradiction between Catholic verity and Scientific verity is complete and absolute, quite independently of the truth or false- hood of the doctrine of evolution. But, for those who hold the doctrine of evolution, all the Catholic verities about the creation of living beings must Vv MR. DARWIN’S CRITICS 147 be no less false. For them, the assertion that the progenitors of all existing plants were made on the third day, of animals on the fifth and sixth days, in the forms they now present, is simply false. Nor can they admit that man was made suddenly out of the dust of the earth ; while it would be an insult to ask an evolutionist whether he credits the preposterous fable respecting the fabrication of woman to which Suarez pins his faith. If Suarez has rightly stated Catholic doctrine, then is evolution utter heresy. And such I believe it to be. In addition to the truth of the doctrine of evolution, indeed, one of its greatest merits in my eyes, is the fact that it occupies a position of complete and irreconcilable antagonism to that vigorous and consistent enemy of the highest intel- lectual, moral, and social life of mankind—the Catholic Church. No doubt, Mr. Mivart, like other putters of new wine into old bottles, is actuated by motives which are worthy of respect, and even of sympathy; but his attempt has met with the fate which the Scripture prophesies for all such. Catholic theology, like all theologies which are based upon the assumption of the truth of the account of the origin of things given in the Book of Genesis, being utterly irreconcilable with the doctrine of evolution, the student of science, who is satisfied that the evidence upon which the doctrine of evolution rests, is incomparably stronger and L 2 148 MR. DARWIN’S CRITICS Vv better than that upon which the supposed author- ity of the Book of Genesis rests, will not trouble himself further with these theologies, but will confine his attention to such arguments against the view he holds as are based upon purely scientific data—and by scientific data I do not merely mean the truths of physical, mathematical, or logical science, but those of moral and meta- physical science. For by science I understand all knowledge which rests upon evidence and reasoning of a like character to that which claims our assent to ordinary scientific propositions, And if any one is able to make good the assertion that his theology rests upon valid evidence and sound reasoning, then it appears to me that such theology will take its place as a part of science. The present antagonism between theology and science does not arise from any assumption by the men of science that all theology must necessarily be excluded from science, but simply because they are unable to allow that reason and morality have two weights and two measures ; and that the belief in a proposition, because authority tells you it is true, or because you wish to believe it, which is a high crime and misdemeanour when the sub- ject matter of reasoning is of one kind, becomes under the alias of “faith” the greatest of all virtues when the subject matter of reasoning is of another kind. The Bishop of Brechin said well the other Vv MR. DARWIN’S CRITICS 149 day :—“ Liberality in religion—I do not mean tender and generous allowances for the mis- takes of others—is only unfaithfulness to truth.” * And, with the same qualification, I venture to paraphrase the Bishop’s dictum: “ Kecle- siasticism in science is only unfaithfulness to truth.” Elijah’s great question, “ Will you serve God or Baal? Choose ye,” is uttered audibly enough in the ears of every one of us as we come to man- hood. Let every man who tries to answer it seriously ask himself whether he can be satisfied with the Baal of authority, and with all the good things his worshippers are promised in this world and the next. If he can, let him, if he be so inclined, amuse himself with such scientific imple- ments as authority tells him are safe and will not cut his fingers; but let him not imagine he is, or can be, both a true son of the Church and a loyal soldier of science. And, on the other hand, if the blind acceptance of authority appears to him in its true colours, as mere private judgment in excelsis, and if he have the courage to stand alone, face to face with the abyss of the eternal and unknowable, let him be content, once for all, not only to renounce the good things promised by “Infallibility,” but even to bear the bad things which it prophesies ; content 1 Charge at the Diocesan Synod of Brechin. Scotsman, Sept. 14, 1871. 150 MR. DARWIN’S CRITICS v to follow reason and fact in singleness and honesty of purpose, wherever they may lead, in the sure faith that a hell of honest men will, to him, be more endurable than a paradise full of angelic shams. Mr. Mivart asserts that “ without a belief in a personal God there is no religion worthy of the name.” This is a matter of opinion. But it may be asserted, with less reason to fear contradiction, that the worship of a personal God, who, on Mr. Mivart’s hypothesis, must have used language studiously calculated to deceive His creatures and worshippers, is “no religion worthy of the name.” “Tneredible est, Deum illis verbis ad populum fuisse locutum quibus deciperetur,” is a verdict in which, for once, Jesuit casuistry concurs with the healthy moral sense of all mankind. Having happily got quit of the theological aspect of evolution, the supporter of that great truth who turns to the scientific objections which are brought against it by recent criticism, finds, to his relief, that the work before him is greatly lightened by the spontaneous retreat of the enemy from nine-tenths of the territory which he occu- pied ten years ago. Even the Quarterly Reviewer not only abstains from venturing to deny that evolution has taken place, but he openly admits that Mr. Darwin has forced on men’s minds “a recognition of the probability, if not more, of Vv MR. DARWIN'S CRITICS 151 evolution, and of the certainty of the action of natural selection” (p. 49). I do not quite see, myself, how, if the action of natural selection is certain, the occurrence of evolu- tion is only probable; masmuch as the development of a new species by natural selection is, so far as it goes, evolution. However, it is not worth while to quarrel with the precise terms of a sentence which shows that the high water mark of intelli- gence among those most respectable of Britons, the readers of the Quarterly Review, has now reached such a level that the next tide may lift them easily and pleasantly on the once-dreaded shore of evolution. Nor, having got there, do they seem likely to stop, until they have reached the inmost heart of that great region, and accepted the ape ancestry of, at any rate, the body of man. For the Reviewer admits that Mr. Darwin can be said to have established : “‘That if the various kinds of lower animals have been evolved one from the other by a process of natural generation or evolution, then it becomes highly probable, @ priori, that man’s body has been similarly evolved; but this, in such a case, becomes equally probable from the admitted fact that he is an animal at all” (p. 65). From the principles laid down in the last sen- tence it would follow that if man were constructed upon a plan as different from that of any other animal as that of a sea-urchin is from that of a whale, it would be “equally probable” that he 152 MR. DARWIN'S CRITICS Vv had been developed from some other animal as it is now, when we know that for every bone, muscle, tooth, and even pattern of tooth, in man, there isa corresponding bone, muscle, tooth, and pattern of tooth, in an ape. And this shows one of two things —either that the Quarterly Reviewer’s notions of probability are peculiar to himself, or that he has such an overpowering faith in the truth of evolution that no extent of structural break between one animal and another is sufficient to destroy his con- viction that evolution has taken place. But this by the way. The importance of the admission that there is nothing in man’s physical structure to interfere with his having been evolved from an ape is not lessened because it is grudg- ingly made and inconsistently qualified. And in- stead of jubilating over the extent of the enemy’s retreat, it will be more worth while to lay siege to his last stronghold—the position that there is a distinction in kind between the mental faculties of man and those of brutes, and that in consequence of this distinction in kind no gradual progress from the mental faculties of the one to those of the other can have taken place. The Quarterly Reviewer entrenches himself within formidable-looking psychological outworks, and there is no getting at him without attacking them one by one. He begins by laying down the following pro- position. “‘ Sensation’ is not ‘thought,’ and no Vv MR. DARWIN’S CRITICS 153 amount of the former would constitute the most rudimentary condition of the latter, though sen- sations supply the conditions for the existence of ‘thought’ or ‘ knowledge’ ” (p. 67). This proposition is true, or not, according to the sense in which the word “thought” is employed. Thought is not uncommonly used in a sense co- extensive with consciousness, and, especially, with those states of consciousness we callmemory. If I recall the impression made by a colour or an odour, and distinctly remember blueness or muskiness, I may say with perfect propriety that I “think of” blue or musk; and, so long as the thought lasts, it is simply a faint reproduction of the state of consciousness to which I gave the name in question, when it first became known to me as a sensation. Now, if that faint reproduction of a sensation, which we call the memory of it, is properly termed a thought, it seems to me to be a somewhat forced proceeding to draw a hard and fast line of demar- cation between thoughts and sensations. If sen- sations are not rudimentary thoughts, it may be said that some thoughts are rudimentary sensations. No amount of sound constitutes an echo, but for all that no one would pretend that an echo is some- thing of totally different nature from a sound. Again, nothing can be looser, or more inaccurate, than the assertion that “sensations supply the conditions for the existence of thought or know- ledge.” If this implies that sensations supply the 154 MR. DARWIN’S CRITICS Vv conditions for the existence of our memory of sen- sations or of our thoughts about sensations, it is a truism which it is hardly worth while to state so solemnly. If it implies that sensations supply any- thing else, it is obviously erroneous. And if it means, as the context would seem to show it does, that sensations are the subject-matter of all thought or knowledge, then it is no less contrary to fact, inasmuch as our emotions, which constitute a large part of the subject-matter of thought or of know- ledge, are not sensations. More eccentric still is the Quarterly Reviewer's next piece of psychology. ** Altogether, we may clearly distinguish at least six kinds of action to which the nervous system ministers :— ‘J. That in which impressions received result in appropriate movements without the intervention of sensation or thought, as in the cases of injury above given.—This is the reflex action of the nervous system. ‘TI. That in which stimuli from without result in sensations through the agency of which their due effects are wrought out. —Sensation. **TIJ. That in which impressions received result in sensations which give rise to the observation of sensible objects.—Sensible perception. ‘‘TV. That in which sensations and perceptions continue to coalesce, agglutinate, and combine in more or less complex aggregations, according to the laws of the association of sensible perceptions. —A ssociation. ‘The above four groups contain only indeliberate operations, consisting, as they do at the best, but of mere presentative sensible ideas in no way implying any reflective or representative faculty. Such actions minister to and form Jnstinct. Besides these, we may distinguish two other kinds of mental action, namely :— v MR. DARWIN’S CRITICS 155 ‘*V,. That in which sensations and sensible perceptions are reflected on by thought, and recognised as our own, and we ourselves recognised by ourselves as affected and perceiving.— Self-consciousness. ‘*VI, That in which we reflect upon our sensations or perceptions, and ask what they are, and why they are. —Reason. **These two latter kinds of action are deliberate operations, performed, as they are, by means of representative ideas imply- ing the use of a reflective representative faculty. Such actions distinguish the intellect or rational faculty. Now, we assert that possession in perfection of all the first four ( presentative) kinds of action by no means implies the possession of the last two (representative) kinds. All persons, we think, must admit the truth of the following proposition :— **Two faculties are distinct, not in degree but in kind, if we may possess the one in perfection without that fact implying that we possess the other also. Still more will this be the case if the two faculties tend to increase in an inverse ratio. Yet this is the distinction between the instinctive and the intellectual parts of man’s nature. ‘* As to animals, we fully admit that they may possess all the first four groups of actions—that they may have, so to speak, mental images of sensible objects combined in all degrees of complexity, as governed by the laws of association. We deny to them, on the other hand, the possession of the last two kinds of mental action. We deny them, that is, the power of reflecting on their own existences, or of inquiring into the nature of objects and their causes. We deny that they know that they know or know themselves in knowing. In other words, we deny them reason. The possession of the presentative faculty, as above explained, in no way implies that of the reflective faculty ; nor does any amount of direct operation imply the power of asking the reflective question before mentioned, as to ‘what’ and ‘why.’” (Loe, cit. pp. 67, 68.) Sundry points are worthy of notice in this remarkable account of the intellectual powers. In the first place the Reviewer ignores emotion and 156 MR. DARWIN’S CRITICS y volition, though they are no inconsiderable “ kinds of action to which the nervous system ministers,” and memory has a place in his classification only by implication. Secondly, we are told that the second “kind of action to which the nervous system ministers ” is “that in which stimuli from without result in sensations through the agency of which their due effects are wrought out.— Sensation.” Does this really mean that, in the writer's opinion, “sensation” is the “agent” by which the “due effect” of the stimulus, which gives rise to sensation, is “wrought out”? Suppose somebody runs a pin into me. The “due effect” of that particular stimulus will probably be threefold; namely, a sensation of pain, a start, and an interjectional expletive. Does the Quarterly Reviewer really think that the “sensation” is the “agent” by which the other two phenomena are wrought out ? But these matters are of little moment to anyone but the Reviewer and those persons who may incautiously take their physiology, or psycho- logy, from him. The really interesting point is this, that when he fully admits that animals “may possess all the first four groups of actions,” he grants all that is necessary for the purposes of the evolutionist. For he hereby admits that in animals “ impressions received result in sensations which give rise to the observation of sensible objects,’ and that they have what he calls Vv MR. DARWIN’S CRITICS 157 “sensible perception.’ Nor was it possible to help the admission ; for we have as much reason to ascribe to animals, as we have to attribute to our fellow-men, the power, not only of perceiving external objects as external, and thus practically recognizing the difference between the self and the not-self; but that of distinguishing between like and unlike, and between simultaneous and suc- cessive things. When a gamekeeper goes out coursing with a greyhound in leash, and a hare crosses the field of vision, he becomes the subject of those states of consciousness we call visual sensation, and that is all he receives from without. Sensation, as such, tells him nothing whatever about the cause of these states of consciousness; but the thinking faculty instantly goes to work upon the raw material of sensation furnished to it through the eye, and gives rise to a train of thoughts. First comes the thought that there is an object at a certain distance; then arises another thought—the perception of the likeness between the states of consciousness awakened by this object to those presented by memory, as, on some former occasion, called up by a hare; this is succeeded by another thought of the nature of an emotion—namely, the desire to possess the hare; then follows a longer or shorter train of other thoughts, which end in a volition and an act—the loosing of the greyhound from the leash. These several thoughts are the concomitants of a process 158 MR. DARWIN’S CRITICS Vv which goes on in the nervous system of the man. Unless the nerve-elements of the retina, of the optic nerve, of the brain, of the spinal cord, and of the nerves of the arms, went through certain physical changes in due order and correlation, the various states of consciousness which have been enumerated would not make their appearance. So that in this, as in all other intellectual operations, we have to distinguish two sets of successive changes—one in the physical basis of conscious- ness, and the other in consciousness itself ; one set which may, and doubtless will, in course of time, be followed through all their complexities by the anatomist and the physicist, and one of which only the man himself can have immediate knowledge. As it is very necessary to keep up a clear distinction between these two processes, let the one be called newrosis, and the other psychosis, When the gamekeeper was first trained to his work every step in the process of neurosis was accom- panied by a corresponding step in that of psychosis, or nearly so. He was conscious of seeing some- thing, conscious of making sure it was a hare, conscious of desiring to catch it, and therefore to loose the greyhound at the right time, conscious of the acts by which he let the dog out of the leash. But with practice, though the various steps of the neurosis remain—for otherwise the impression on the retina would not result in the loosing of the dog—the great majority of the steps of the v MR. DARWIN’S CRITICS 159 psychosis vanish, and the loosing of the dog follows unconsciously, or as we say, without thinking about it, upon the sight of the hare. No one will deny that the series of acts which originally intervened between the sensation and the letting go of the dog were, in the strictest sense, intellectual and rational operations. Do they cease to be so when the man ceases to be conscious of them? That depends upon what is the essence and what the accident of those operations, which, taken to- gether, constitute ratiocination. Now ratiocination is resolvable into predication, and predication consists in marking, in some way, the existence, the co-existence, the succession, the likeness and unlikeness, of things or their ideas. Whatever does this, reasons ; and if a machine pro- duces the effects of reason, I see no more ground for denying to it the reasoning power, because it is unconscious, than I see for refusing to Mr. Babbage’s engine the title of a calculating machine on the same grounds. Thus it seems to me that a gamekeeper reasons, whether he is conscious or unconscious, whether his reasoning is carried on by neurosis alone, or whether it involves more or less psychosis. And if this is true of the gamekeeper, it is also true of the greyhound, The essential resemblances in all points of structure and function, so far as they can be studied, between the nervous system of the man and that of the dog, leave no reasonable doubt 160 MR. DARWIN’S CRITICS Vv that the processes which go on in the one are just like those which take place in the other. In the dog, there can be no doubt that the nervous matter which lies between the retina and the muscles undergoes a series of changes, precisely analogous to those which, in the man, give rise to sensation, a train of thought, and volition. Whether this neurosis is accompanied by such psychosis as ours it is impossible to say; but those who deny that the nervous changes, which, in the dog, correspond with those which underlie thought in a man, are accompanied by conscious- ness, are equally bound to maintain that those nervous changes in the dog, which correspond with those which underlie sensation in a man, are also- unaccompanied by consciousness. In other words, if there is no ground for believing that a dog thinks, neither is there any for believing that he feels, As is well known, Descartes boldly faced this dilemma, and maintained that all animals were mere machines and entirely devoid of consciousness. But he did not deny, nor can anyone deny, that in this case they are reasoning machines, capable of performing all those operations which are _per- formed by the nervous system of man when he reasons. For even supposing that in man, and in man only, psychosis is superadded to neurosis—the neurosis which is common to both man and animal gives their reasoning processes a fundamental unity. But Descartes’ position is open to very v MR. DARWIN'S CRITICS 161 serious objections if the evidence that animals feel is insufficient to prove that they really do so. What is the value of the evidence which leads one to believe that one’s fellow-man feels? The only evidence in this argument of analogy is the similarity of his structure and of his actions to one’s own. And if that is good enough to prove that one’s fellow-man feels, surely it is good enough to prove that an ape feels. For the differ- ences of structure and function between men and apes are utterly insufficient to warrant the assumption that while men have those states of consciousness we call sensations apes have nothing of the kind. Moreover, we have as good evidence that apes are capable of emotion and volition as we have that men other than ourselves are. But if apes possess three out of the four kinds of states of consciousness which we discover in ourselves, what possible reason is there for denying them the fourth? If they are capable of sensation, emotion, and volition, why are they, to be denied thought (in the sense of predication) ? No answer has ever been given to these questions. And as the law of continuity is as much opposed, as is the common sense of man- kind, to the notion that all animals are unconscious machines, it may safely be assumed that no - sufficient answer ever will be given to them. There is every reason to believe that con- sciousness is a function of nervous matter, when VOL. II M 162 MR. DARWIN’S CRITICS v that nervous matter has attained a certain degree of organisation, just as we know the other “actions to which the nervous system ministers,” such as reflex action and the like, to be. As I have ventured to state my view of the matter elsewhere, “our thoughts are the expression of molecular changes in that matter of life which is the source of our other vital phenomena.” Mr. Wallace objects to this statement in the following terms :— ** Not having been able to find any clue in Professor Huxley’s writings to the steps by which he passes from those vital pheno- mena, which consist only, in their last analysis, of movements by particles of matter, to those other phenomena which we term thought, sensation, or consciousness ; but, knowing that so positive an expression of opinion from him will have great weight with many persons, I shall endeavour to show, with as much brevity as is compatible with clearness, that this theory is not only incapable of proof, but is also, as it appears to me, inconsistent with accurate conceptions of molecular physics.” With all respect for Mr. Wallace, it appears to me that his remarks are entirely beside the ques- tion. I really know nothing whatever, and never hope to know anything, of the steps by which the passage from molecular movement to states of consciousness is effected; and I entirely agree with the sense of the passage which he quotes from Professor Tyndall, apparently imagining that it is in opposition to the view I hold. All that I have to say is, that,in my belief, consciousness and molecular action are capable of Vv MR. DARWIN’S CRITICS 168 being expressed by one another, just as heat and mechanical action are capable of being expressed in terms of one another. Whether we shall ever be able to express consciousness in foot-pounds, or not, is more than I will venture to say; but that there is evidence of the existence of some corre- lation between mechanical motion and conscious- ness, is as plain as anything can be. Suppose the poles of an electric battery to be connected by a platinum wire.