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COLLECTED ESSAYS
By T. H. HUXLEY
VOLUME II
DARWINIANA
ESSAYS
BY
THOMAS H. HUXLEY
London
MACMILLAN AND CO., LIMITED
NEW YORK: THE MACMILLAN COMPANY
1907
All rights reserved
RICHARD CLAY AND Sons, LIMITED,
BREAD STREET HILL, E.C., AND
BUNGAY, SUFFOLK.
First Edition printed 1893.
Rebrinted 1894, 1899, 1902, 1907.
PREFACE
I HAVE entitled this volume “ Darwiniana”
because the pieces republished in it either treat of
the ancient doctrine of Evolution, rehabilitated and
placed upon a sound scientific foundation, since
and in consequence of, the publication of the
“ Origin of Species ;” or they attempt to meet the
more weighty of the unsparing criticisms with
which that great work was visited for several years
after its appearance ; or they record the impression
left by the personality of Mr. Darwin on one who
had the privilege and the happiness of enjoying his
friendship for some thirty years; or they endeavour
to sum up his work and indicate its enduring
influence on the course of scientific thought.
Those who take the trouble to read the first
two essays, published in 1859 and 1860, will, I
think, do me the justice to admit that my zeal to
secure fair play for Mr. Darwin, did not drive me
into the position of a mere advocate ; and that,
while doing justice to the greatness of the argu-
v1 PREFACE
ment I did not fail to indicate its weak points. I
have never seen any reason for departing from the
position which I took up in these two essays ; and
the assertion which I sometimes meet with nowa-
days, that I have “recanted” or changed my
opinions about Mr. Darwin’s views, is quite unin-
telligible to me.
As I have said in the seventh essay, the fact of
evolution is to my mind sufficiently evidenced by —
palzontology ; and I remain of the opinion ex-
pressed in the second, that until selective breeding
is definitely proved to give rise to varieties infertile
with one another, the logical foundation of the
theory of natural selection is incomplete. We still
remain very much inthe dark about the causes of
variation; the apparent inheritance of acquired
characters in some cases; and the struggle for
existence within the organism, which probably
lies at the bottom of both of these phenomena.
Some apology is due to the reader for the repro-
duction of the “Lectures to Working Men” in
their original state. They were taken down in
shorthand by Mr. J. Aldous Mays, who requested
me to aJlow him to print them. I was very much
pressed with work at the time ; and, asI could not
revise the reports, which I imagined, moreover,
would be of little or no interest to any but my
auditors, I stipulated that a notice should be pre-
fixed to that effect, This was done ; but it did not
PREFACE. Vil
prevent a considerable diffusion of the little book
in this country and in the United States, nor its
translation into more than one foreign language.
Moreover Mr. Darwin often urged me to revise and
expand the lectures into a systematic popular
exposition of the topics of which they treat. I
have more than once set about the task: but the
proverb about spoiling a horn and not making a
spoon, is particularly applicable to attempts to
remodel a piece of work which may have served its
immediate purpose well enough.
So I have reprinted the lectures as they stand,
with all their imperfections on their heads. It
would seem that many people must have found
them useful thirty years ago; and, though the
sixties appear now to be reckoned by many of the
rising generation as a part of the dark ages, I am
not without some grounds for suspecting that
there yet remains a fair sprinkling even of
“philosophic thinkers” to whom it may be a
profitable, perhaps even a novel, task to descend
from the heights of speculation and go over the
A BC of the great biological problem as it was
set before a body of shrewd artisans at that remote
epoch,
die: BE:
HopEs.LEA, EAsTBourNgE,
April 7th, 1893.
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CONTENTS
I
THE DARWINIAN HYPOTHESIS [1859]
II
THE ORIGIN OF SPECIES [1860]
Ill
CRITICISMS ON ‘* THE ORIGIN OF SPECIES” [1864]
IV
THE GENEALOGY OF ANIMALS [1869]
MR. DARWIN'S CRITICS[1871] ..... is
VI
EVOLUTION IN BIOLOGY [1878]
VOL, I
eS) Ry eS Gee
PAGE
22
80
107
120
187
x CONTENTS
VII
PAGE
THE COMING OF AGE OF ‘‘THE ORIGIN OF SPECIES”
PROCUl eG «1 a4 6 ae. Ba we a ole: ae ee tae ak
Vill
CHARLES DARWIN [1882]... ......4.066--+0.4-6 244
Ix
THE DARWIN MEMORIAL [1885]. ........... 248
».€
OBITUARY [1888] . . 2. 4. s Shs didn a se 2. ie Ae eee
XI
SIX LECTURES TO WORKING MEN ‘‘ON OUR KNOWLEDGE
OF THE CAUSES OF THE PHENOMENA OF ORGANIC
WATURS" TIS08)] Gas WI Gekko. so a eee ee
COLLECTED ESSAYS
VOLUME II
I
THE DARWINIAN HYPOTHESIS
[1859]
THE hypothesis of which the present work of
Mr. Darwin is but the preliminary outline, may
be stated in his own language as follows :—
“ Species originated by means of natural selection,
or through the preservation of the favoured races
in the struggle for life.” To render this thesis
intelligible, it is necessary to interpret its terms.
In the first place, what isa species? The question
is a simple one, but the right answer to it is hard
to find, even if we appeal to those who should
know most about it. It is all those animals or
plants which have descended from a single pair of
parents; it is the smallest distinctly definable
group of living organisms; it is an eternal and
immutable entity ; it is a mere abstraction of the
human intellect having no existence in nature.
Such are a few of the significations attached to
VOL, II B
b=
2 THE DARWINIAN HYPOTHESIS I
this simple word which may be culled from
authoritative sources; and if, leaving terms and
theoretical subtleties aside, we turn to facts and
endeavour to gather a nieaning for ourselves, by
studying the things to which, in practice, the
name of species is applied, it profits us little. For
practice varies as much as theory. Let two
botanists or two zoologists examine and describe
the productions of a country, and one will pretty
certainly disagree with the other as to the number,
limits, and definitions of the species into which he
groups the very same things. In these islands, we
are in the habit of regarding mankind as of one
species, but a fortnight’s steam will land us in a
country where divines and savants, for once in
agreement, vie with one another in loudness of
assertion, if not in cogency of proof, that men are
of different species; and, more particularly, that
the species negro is so distinct from our own that
the Ten Commandments have actually no reference
to him. Even in the calm region of entomology,
where, if anywhere in this sinful world, passion
and prejudice should fail to stir the mind, one
learned coleopterist will fill ten attractive volumes
with descriptions of species of beetles, nine-tenths
of which are immediately declared by his brother
beetle-mongers to be no species at all.
The truth is that the number of distinguishable
living creatures almost surpasses imagination. At
least 100,000 such kinds of insects alone have been
I THE DARWINIAN HYPOTHESIS 3
described and may be identified in collections, and
the number of separable kinds of living things is
under-estimated at half a million. Seeing that
most of these obvious kinds have their accidental
varieties, and that they often shade into others
by imperceptible degrees, it may well be
imagined that the task of distinguishing be-
tween what is permanent and what fleeting,
what is a species and what a mere variety,
is sufficiently formidable.
But is it not possible to apply a test whereby a
true species may be known from a mere variety ?
Is there no criterion of species? Great authori-
ties affirm that there is—that the unions of
members of the same species are always fertile,
while those of distinct species are either sterile,
or their offspring, called hybrids, are so. It is
affirmed not only that this is an experimental
fact, but that it is a provision for the preservation
of the purity of species. Such a criterion as this
would be invaluable ; but, unfortunately, not only
is 1t not obvious how to apply it in the great
majority of cases in which its aid is needed, but
its general validity is stoutly denied. The Hon.
and Rev. Mr. Herbert, a most trustworthy authority,
not only asserts as the result of his own observa-
tions and experiments that many hybrids are
quite as fertile as the parent species, but he goes
so far as to assert that the particular plant Crinwmn
capense is much more fertile when crossed by a
B 2
4 THE DARWINIAN HYPOTHESIS I
distinct species than when fertilised by its proper
pollen! On the other hand, the famous Gaertner,
though he took the greatest pains to cross the
Primrose and the Cowslip, succeeded only once or
twice in several years; and yet it is a well-
established fact that the Primrose and the Cow-
slip are only varieties of the same kind of plant,
Again, such cases as the following are well estab-
lished. The female of species A, if crossed with
the male of species B, is fertile ; but, if the female
of B is crossed with the male of A, she remains
barren. Facts of this kind destroy the value of
the supposed criterion.
If, weary of the endless difficulties involved in
the determination of species, the investigator,
contenting himself with the rough practical
distinction of separable kinds, endeavours to
study them as they occur in nature—to ascertain
their relations to the conditions which surround
them, their mutual harmonies and discordancies of
structure, the bond of union of their present and
their past history, he finds himself, according to
the received notions, in a mighty maze, and with,
at most, the dimmest adumbration of a plan.
If he starts with any one clear conviction, it is
that every part of a living creature is cunningly
adapted to some special use in its life. Has not
his Paley told him that that seemingly useless
organ, the spleen, is beautifully adjusted as so
much packing between the other organs? And
I THE DARWINIAN HYPOTHESIS 5
yet, at the outset of his studies, he finds that no
adaptive reason whatsoever can be given for one-
half of the peculiarities of vegetable structure.
He also discovers rudimentary teeth, which are
never used, in the guins of the young calf and in
those of the foetal whale; insects which never
bite have rudimental jaws, and others which
never fly have rudimental wings; naturally blind
creatures have rudimental eyes; and the halt
have rudimentary limbs. So, again, no animal or
plant puts on its perfect form at once, but all have
to start from the same point, however various the
course which each has to pursue. Not only men
and horses, and cats and dogs, lobsters and
beetles, periwinkles and mussels, but even the
very sponges and animaleules commence their
existence under forms which are essentially
undistinguishable ; and this is true of all the
infinite variety of plants. Nay, more, all living
beings march, side by side, along the high road of
development, and separate the later the more like
they are ; like people leaving church, who all go
down the aisle, but having reached the door, some
turn into the parsonage, others go down the
village, and others part only in the next parish,
A man in his development runs for a little while
parallel with, though never passing through, the
‘form of the meanest worm, then travels for a
space beside the fish, then journeys along with
the bird and the reptile for his fellow travellers ;
6 THE DARWINIAN HYPOTHESIS i
and only at last, after a brief companionship with
the highest of the four-footed and four-handed
world, rises into the dignity of pure manhood. No
competent thinker of the present day dreams of
explaining these indubitable facts by the notion
of the existence of unknown and undiscoverable
adaptations to purpose. And we would remind
those who, ignorant of the facts, must be moved
by authority, that no one has asserted the incom-
petence of the doctrine of final causes, in its
application to physiology and anatomy, more
strongly than our own eminent anatomist,
Professor Owen, who, speaking of such cases, says
(“On the Nature of Limbs,” pp. 39, 40)—*«I
think it will be obvious that the principle of final
adaptations fails to satisfy all the conditions of
the problem.”
But, if the doctrine of final causes will not
help us to comprehend the anomalies of living
structure, the principle of adaptation must surely
lead us to understand why certain living beings are
found in certain regions of the world and not in
others. The Palm, as we know, will not groW in
our climate, nor the Oak im Greenland. The
white bear cannot live where the tiger thrives,
nor vice versd, and the more the natural habits of
animal and vegetable species are examined, the
more do they seem, on the whole, limited to
particular provinces, But when we look into the
facts established by the study of the geographical
I THE DARWINIAN HYPOTHESIS 4
distribution of animals and plants it seems
utterly hopeless to attempt to understand the
strange and apparently capricious relations which
they exhibit. One would be inclined to suppose
ad priori that every country must be naturally
peopled by those animals that are fittest to live
and thrive in it. And yet how, on this hypothesis,
are we to account for the absence of cattle in the
Pampas of South America, when those parts of
the New World were discovered? It is not that
they were-wafit for cattle, for millions of cattle
now run wild there; and the like holds good of
Australia and New Zealand. It is a curious
circumstance, in fact, that the animals and plants
of the Northern Hemisphere are not only as well
adapted to live in the Southern Hemisphere as
its own autochthones, but are, im many cases,
absolutely better adapted, and so overrun and
extirpate the aborigines. Clearly, therefore, the
species which naturally inhabit a country are not
necessarily the best adapted to its climate and
other conditions. The inhabitants of islands are
often distinct from any other known species of
animal or plants (witness our recent examples
from the work of Sir Emerson Tennent, on
Ceylon), and yet they have almost always a sort
of general family resemblance to the animals and
‘plants of the nearest mainland. On the other
hand, there is hardly a species of fish, shell, or
crab common to the opposite sides of the narrow
8 THE DARWINIAN HYPOTHESIS I
isthmus of Panama.! Wherever we look, then,
living nature offers us riddles of difficult solution,
if we suppose that what we see is all that can
be known of it.
But our knowledge of life is not confined to the
existing world. Whatever their minor differences,
geologists are agreed as to the vast thickness of the
accumulated strata which compose the visible part
of our earth, and the inconceivable immensity of
the time the lapse of which they are the imperfect
but the only accessible witnesses. Now, through-
out the greater part of this long series of stratified
rocks are scattered, sometimes very abundantly,
multitudes of organic remains, the fossilised
exuvie of animals and plants which lived and
died while the mud of which the rocks are formed
was yet soft ooze, and could receive and bury
them. It would be a great error to suppose that
these organic remains were fragmentary relics.
Our museums exhibit fossil shells of immeasurable
antiquity, as perfect as the day they were formed ;
whole skeletons without a limb disturbed ; nay.
the changed flesh, the developing embryos, and
even the very footsteps of primeval organisms.
Thus the naturalist finds in the bowels of the earth
species as well defined as, and in some groups
of animals more numerous than, those which
breathe the upper air, But, singularly enough,
the majority of these entombed species are wholly
1 [See page 60 Note. ]
I THE DARWINIAN HYPOTHESIS 9
distinct from those that now live. Nor is this un-
likeness without its rule and order. As a broad
fact, the further we go back in time the less the
buried species are like existing forms ; and, the fur-
ther apart the sets of extinct creatures are, the less
they are like one another. In other words, there
has been a regular succession of living beings, each
younger set, being in a very broad and general
sense, somewhat more like those which now live.
It was once supposed that this succession had
been the result of vast successive catastrophes,
destructions, and re-creations en masse; but
catastrophes are now almost eliminated from
geological, or at least palaeontological speculation ;
and it is admitted, on all hands, that the seeming
breaks in the chain of being are not absolute, but
only relative to our imperfect knowledge; that
species have replaced species, not in assemblages,
but one by one; and that, if it were possible to
have all the phenomena of the past presented to
us, the convenient epochs and formations of the
geologist, though having a certain distinctness,
would fade into one another with limits as
undefinable as those of the distinct and yet
separable colours of the solar spectrum.
Such is a brief summary of the main truths
which have been established concerning species.
Are these truths ultimate and irresolvable facts,
or are their complexities and perplexities the
mere expressions of a higher law ?
10 THE DARWINIAN HYPOTHESIS Y
A large number of persons practically assume
the former position to be correct. They believe
that the writer of the Pentateuch was empowered
and commissioned to teach us scientific as well as
other truth, that the account we find there of the
creation of living things is simply and literally
correct, and that anything which seems to con-
tradict it is, by the nature of the case, false. All
the phenomena which have been detailed are, on
this view, the immediate product of a creative
fiat and, consequently, are out of the domain of
science altogether,
Whether this view prove ultimately to be true
or false, it is, at any rate, not at present sup-
ported by what is commonly regarded as logical
proof, even if it be capable of discussion by
reason ; and hence we consider ourselves at liberty
to pass it by, and to turn to those views which
profess to rest on a scientific basis only, and there-
fore admit of being argued to their consequences.
And we do this with the less hesitation as it so
happens that those persons who are practically
conversant with the facts of the case (plainly a
considerable advantage) have always thought fit
to range themselves under the latter category.
The majority of these competent persons have
up to the present time maintained two positions—
the first, that every species is, within certain de-
fined limits, fixed and incapable of modification ;
the second, that every species was originally pro-
t THE DARWINIAN HYPOTHESIS li
duced by a distinct creative act. The second
position is obviously incapable of proof or disproof,
the direct operations of the Creator not being
subjects of science; and it must therefore be
regarded as a corollary from the first, the truth
or falsehood of which is a matter of evidence.
Most persons imagine that the arguments in
favour of it are overwhelming; but to some few
minds, and these, it must be confessed, intellects
of no small power and grasp of knowledge, they
have not brought conviction. Among these
minds, that of the famous naturalist Lamarck,
who possessed a greater acquaintance with the
lower forms of life than any man of his day,
Cuvier not excepted, and was a good botanist to
_ boot, occupies a prominent place.
Two facts appear to have strongly affected the
course of thought of this remarkable man—the
one, that finer or stronger links of affinity connect
all living beings with one another, and that thus
the highest creature grades by multitudinous
steps into the lowest; the other, that an organ
may be developed in particular directions by
exerting itself in particular ways, and that modi-
fications once induced may be transmitted and
become hereditary. Putting these facts together,
Lamarck endeavoured to account for the first by
the operation of the second. Place an animal in
new circumstances, says he, and its needs will be
altered ; the new needs will create new desires, and
12 THE DARWINIAN HYPOTHESIS I
the attempt to gratify such desires will result in an
appropriate modification of the organs exerted.
Make aman a blacksmith, and his brachial muscles
will develop in accordance with the demands made
upon them, and in like manner, says Lamarck,
“the efforts of some short-necked bird to catch
fish without wetting himself have, with time and
perseverance, given rise to all our herons and
long-necked waders.”
The Lamarckian hypothesis has long since been
justly condemned, and it is the established prac-
tice for every tyro to raise his heel against the
carcase of the dead lion. But it is rarely either
wise or instructive to treat even the errors of a
really great man with mere ridicule, and in the
present case the logical form of the doctrine stands
on a very different footing from its substance.
If species have really arisen by the operation
of natural conditions, we ought to be able to find
those conditions now at work; we ought to be
able to discover in nature some power adequate
to modify any given kind of animal or plant in
such a manner as to give rise to another kind,
which would be admitted by naturalists as a
distinct species. Lamarck imagined that he had
discovered this vera causa in the admitted facts
that some organs may be modified by exercise ;
and that modifications, once produced, are capable
of hereditary transmission. It does not seem to
have occurred to him to inquire whether there is
I THE DARWINIAN HYPOTHESIS 13
any reason to believe that there are any limits to
the amount of modification producible, or to ask
how long an animal is likely to endeavour to
gratify an impossible desire. The bird, in our
example, would surely have renounced fish dinners
long before it had produced the least effect on leg
or neck,
Since Lamarck’s time, almost all competent
naturalists have left speculations on the origin of
species to such dreamers as the author of the
“ Vestiges,” by whose well-intentioned efforts the
Lamarckian theory received its final condemnation
in the minds of all sound thinkers. Notwith-
standing this silence, however, the transmutation
theory, as it has been called, has been a “ skeleton
in the closet” to many an honest zoologist and
botanist who had a soul above the mere naming of
dried plants and skins. Surely, has such an one
thought, nature is a mighty and consistent whole,
and the providential order established in the
world of life must, if we could only see it rightly,
be consistent with that dominant over the multi-
form shapes of brute matter. But what is the
history of astronomy, of all the branches of physics,
of chemistry, of medicine, but a narration of the
steps by which the human mind has been com-
pelled, often sorely against its will, to recognise
the operation of secondary causes in events where
ignorance beheld an immediate intervention of a
higher power? And when we know that living
14 THE DARWINIAN HYPOTHESIS I
things are formed of the same elements as the
inorganic world, that they act and react upon it,
bound by a thousand ties of natural piety, is it
probable, nay is it possible, that they, and they
alone, should have no order in their seeming
disorder, no unity in their seeming multiplicity,
should suffer no explanation by the discovery
of some central and sublime law of mutual
connection ?
Questions of this kind have assuredly often arisen,
but it might have been long before they received
such expression as would have commanded the
respect and attention of the scientific world, had
it not been for the publication of the work which
prompted this article. Its author, Mr. Darwin,
inheritor of a once celebrated name, won his spurs
in science when most of those now distinguished
were young men, and has for the last twenty
years held a place in the front ranks of British
philosophers. After a circumnavigatory voyage,
undertaken solely for the love of his science, Mr.
Darwin published a series of researches which at
once arrested the attention of naturalists and
geologists; his generalisations have since received
ample confirmation and now command universal
assent, nor is it questionable that they have had
the most important influence on the progress of
science. More recently Mr. Darwin, with a
versatility which is among the rarest of gifts,
turned his attention to a most difficult question of
I THE DARWINIAN HYPOTHESIS 15
zoology and minute anatomy; and no living
naturalist and anatomist has published a better
monograph than that which resulted from his
labours. Such a man, at all events, has not
entered the sanctuary with unwashed hands, and
when he lays before us the results of twenty
years’ investigation and reflection we must listen
even though we be disposed to strike. But, in
reading his work, it must be confessed that the
attention which might at first be dutifully, soon
becomes willingly, given, so clear is the author's
thought, so outspoken his conviction, so honest
and fair the candid expression of his doubts.
Those who would judge the book must read it:
we shall endeavour only to make its line of argu-
ment and its philosophical position intelligible to
the general reader in our own way.
The Baker Street Bazaar has just been exhibit-
ing its familiar annual spectacle. Straight-backed,
small-headed, big-barrelled oxen, as dissimilar
from any wild species as can well be imagined,
contended for attention and praise with sheep of
half-a-dozen different breeds and styes of bloated
preposterous pigs, no more like a wild boar or sow
than a city alderman is like an ourang-outang.
The cattle show has been, and perhaps may again
be, succeeded by a poultry show, of whose crowing
and clucking prodigies it can only be certainly
predicated that they will be very unlike the
aboriginal Phasianus gallus. If the seeker after
16 THE DARWINIAN HYPOTHESIS I
animal anomalies is not satisfied, a turn or two in
Seven Dials will convince him that the breeds of
pigeons are quite as extraordinary and unlike one
another and their parent stock, while the Horti-
cultural Society will provide him with any number
of corresponding vegetable aberrations from
nature’s types. He will learn with no little
surprise, too, in the course of his travels, that the
proprietors and producers of these animal and
vegetable anomalies regard them as distinct
species, with a firm belief, the strength of which
is exactly proportioned to their ignorance of
scientific biology, and which is the more remark-
able as they are all proud of their skill in originat-
ing such “species.”
On careful inquiry it is found that all these, and
the many other artificial breeds or races of animals
and plants, have been produced by one method.
The breeder—and a skilful one must be a person
of much sagacity and natural or acquired perceptive
faculty—notes some slight difference, arising he
knows not how, in some individuals of his stock.
If he wish to perpetuate the difference, to form a
breed with the peculiarity in question strongly
marked, he selects such male and female indi-
viduals as exhibit the desired character, and breeds
from them. Their offspring are then carefully
examined, and those which exhibit the peculiarity
the most distinctly are selected for breeding; and
this operation is repeated until the desired amount
I THE DARWINIAN HYPOTHESIS 17
of divergence from the primitive stock is reached,
It is then found that by continuing the process of
selection—always breeding, that is, from well-
marked forms, and allowing no impure crosses to
interfere—a race may be formed, the tendency of
which to reproduce itself is exceedingly strong ;
nor is the limit to the amount of divergence which
may be thus produced known; but one thing is
certain, that, if certain breeds of dogs, or of pigeons,
or of horses, were known only in a fossil state, no
naturalist would hesitate in regarding them as
distinct species.
But in all these cases we have human interfer-
ence. Without the breeder there would be no
selection, and without the selection no _Tace,
Before admitting the possibility of natural species
having originated j in any similar way, it must be
proved that there is in Nature some power which
takes the place of man, and performs a selection
sud sponte, It is the claim of Mr, Darwin that he
professes to have discovered the existence and the
modus operandi of this “natural selection,” as he
terms it; and, if he be right, the process is per-
fectly simple and comprehensible, and irresistibly
deducible from very familiar but well nigh for-
gotten facts.
Who, for instance, has duly reflected upon all
' the consequences of the marvellous struggle for
existence which is daily and hourly going on
among living beings? Not only does every animal
VOL. Il C
f
18 THE DARWINIAN HYPOTHESIS 1
live at the expense of some other animal or plant,
but the very plants are at war. The ground is
full of seeds that cannot rise into seedlings; the
seedlings rob one another of air, light and water,
the strongest robber winning the day, and ex-
tinguishing his competitors. Year after year, the
wild animals with which man never interferes are,
on the average, neither more nor less numerous
than they were ; and yet we know that the annual
produce of every pair is from one to perhaps a
million young; so that it is mathematically certain
that, on the average, as many are killed by natural
causes as are born every year, and those only escape
which happen to be a little better fitted to resist
destruction than those which die. The individuals
of a species are like the crew of a foundered ship,
and none but good swimmers have a chance of
reaching the land.
Such being unquestionably the necessary con-
ditions under which living creatures exist, Mr.
Darwin discovers in them the instrument of natural
selection, Suppose that in the midst of this in-
cessant competition some individuals of a species
(A) present accidental variations which happen to
fit them a little better than their fellows for the
struggle in which they are engaged, then the
chances are in favour, not only of these individuals
being better nourished than the others, but of
their predominating over their fellows in other
ways, and of having a better chance of leaving
I THE DARWINIAN HYPOTHESIS 19
offspring, which will of course tend to reproduce
the peculiarities of their parents. Their offspring
_ will, by a parity of reasoning, tend to predominate
over their contemporaries, and there being (sup-
pose) no room for more than one species such as
A, the weaker variety will eventually be destroyed
by the new destructive influence which is thrown
into the scale, and the stronger will take its place.
Surrounding conditions remaining unchanged, the
new variety (which we may call B)—supposed, for
argument’s sake, to be the best adapted for these
conditions which can be got out of the original
stock—will remain unchanged, all accidental devia-
tions from the type becoming at once extinguished,
as less fit for their post than B itself. The tend-
ency of B to persist will grow with its persistence
through successive generations, and it will acquire
all the characters of a new species.
But, on the other hand, if the conditions of life
change in any degree, however slight, B may no
longer be that form which is best adapted to with-
stand their destructive, and profit by their sus-
taining, influence ; in which case if it should give
rise to a more competent variety (C), this will take
its place and become a new species ; and thus, by
natural selection, the species B and C will be suc-
cessively derived from A.
That this most ingenious hypothesis enables us
to give a reason for many apparent anomalies in
the distribution of living beings in time and space,
Cc 2
20 THE DARWINIAN HYPOTHESIS I
and that it is not contradicted by the main phen-
omena of life and organisation appear to us to be
unquestionable ; and, so far, it must be admitted to
have an immense advantage over any of its prede-
cessors. But it is quite another matter to affirm
absolutely either the truth or falsehood of Mr.
Darwin’s views at the present stage of the inquiry.
Goethe has an excellent aphorism defining that
state of mind which he calls “ Thitige Skepsis ”
—active doubt. It is doubt which so loves truth
that it neither dares rest in doubting, nor extin-
guish itself by unjustified belief ; and we commend
this state of mind to students of species, with
respect to Mr. Darwin’s or any other hypothesis,
as to their origm. The combined investigations
of another twenty years may, perhaps, enable
naturalists to say whether the modifying causes
and the selective power, which Mr. Darwin has
satisfactorily shown to exist in Nature, are com-
petent to produce all the effects he ascribes to
them ; or whether, on the other hand, he has been
led to over-estimate the value of the principle of
natural selection, as greatly as Lamarck over-
estimated his vera causa of modification by exercise.
But there is, at all events, one advantage pos-
sessed by the more recent writer over his pre-
decessor. Mr. Darwin abhors mere speculation as
nature abhorsa vacuum. He is as greedy of cases
and precedents as any constitutional lawyer, and
all the principles he lays down are capable of being
I THE DARWINIAN HYPOTHESIS 21
brought to the test of observation and experiment.
The path he bids us follow professes to be, not a
mere airy track, fabricated of ideal cobwebs, but a
solid and broad bridge of facts, If it be so, it
will carry us safely over many a chasm in our
knowledge, and lead us to a region free from the
snares of those fascinating but barren virgins, the
Final Causes, against whom a high authority has so
justly warned us, “ My sons, dig in the vineyard,”
were the last words of the old man in the fable:
and, though the sons found no treasure, they made
their fortunes by the grapes.
IT
THE ORIGIN OF SPECIES
[1860]
Mr. Darwiy’s long-standing and well-earned
scientific eminence probably renders him indiffer-
ent to that social notoriety which passes by the
name of success; but if the calm spirit of the
philosopher have not yet wholly superseded the
ambition and the vanity of the carnal man within
him, he must be well satisfied with the results of
his venture in publishing the “ Origin of Species.”
Overflowing the narrow bounds of purely scientific
circles, the “species question ” divides with Italy
and the Volunteers the attention of general
society. Everybody has read Mr. Darwin’s book,
or, at least, has given an opinion upon its merits
or demerits ; pietists, whether lay or ecclesiastic,
decry it with the mild railing which sounds so
charitable; bigots denounce it with ignorant
invective; old ladies of both sexes consider it a
II THE ORIGIN OF SPECIES 23
decidedly dangerous book, and even savants, who
have no better mud to throw, quote antiquated
writers to show that its author is no better than
an ape himself ; while every philosophical thinker
hails it as a veritable Whitworth gun in the
armoury of liberalism ; and all competent natural-
ists and physiologists, whatever their opinions as
to the ultimate fate of the doctrines put forth,
acknowledge that the work in which they are
embodied is a solid contribution to knowledge
and inaugurates a new epoch in natural history.
Nor has the discussion of the subject been
restrained within the limits of conversation,
When the public is eager and interested, reviewers
must minister to its wants; and the genuine
littératewr is too much in the habit of acquiring
his knowledge from the book he judges—as the
Abyssinian is said to provide himself with steaks
from the ox which carries him—to be withheld
from criticism of a profound scientific work by
the mere want of the requisite preliminary scien-
tific acquirement ; while, on the other hand, the
men of science who wish well to the new views,
no less than those who dispute their validity, have
naturally sought opportunities of expressing their
opinions. Hence it is not surprising that almost
all the critical journals have noticed Mr. Darwin’s
work at greater or less length; and so many dis-
quisitions, of every degree of excellence, from the
poor product of ignorance, too often stimulated by
24 THE ORIGIN OF SPECIES n
prejudice, to the fair and thoughtful essay of the
candid student of Nature, have appeared, that it
seems an almost hopeless task to attempt to say
anything new upon the question.
But it may be doubted if the knowledge and
acumen of prejudged scientific opponents, and the
subtlety of orthodox special pleaders, have yet
exerted their full force in mystifying the real issues
of the great controversy which has been set afoot,
and whose end is hardly likely to be seen by this
generation ; so that, at this eleventh hour, and even
failing anything new, it may be useful to state
afresh that which is true, and to put the funda-
mental positions advocated by Mr. Darwin in such
a form that they may be grasped by those whose
special studies lie in other directions, And the
adoption of this course may be the more advisable,
because, notwithstanding its great deserts, and
indeed partly on account of them, the “ Origin of
Species” is by no means an easy book to read—if
by reading is implied the full comprehension of an
author’s meaning.
We do not speak jestingly in saying that it is
Mr. Darwin’s misfortune to know more about the
question he has taken up than any man living.
Personally and practically exercised in zoology, in
minute anatomy, in geology ; a student of geogra-
phical distribution, not on maps and in museums
only, but by long voyages and laborious collection ;
having largely advanced each of these branches of
II THE ORIGIN OF SPECIES 25
science, and having spent many years in gathering
and sifting materials for his present work, the
store of accurately registered facts upon which the
author of the “ Origin of Species” is able to draw
at will is prodigious.
But this very superabundance of matter must
have been embarrassing to a writer who, for the
present, can only put forward an abstract of his
views; and thence it arises, perhaps, that notwith-
standing the clearness of the style, those who
attempt fairly to digest the book find much of it
a sort of intellectual pemmican—a mass of facts
crushed and pounded into shape, rather than held
together by the ordinary medium of an obvious
logical bond; due attention will, without doubt,
discover this bond, but it is often hard to find.
Again, from sheer want of room, much has to
be taken for granted which might readily enough
be proved ; and hence, while the adept, who can
supply the missing links in the evidence from his
own knowledge, discovers fresh proof of the singu-
lar thoroughness with which all difficulties have
been considered and all unjustifiable suppositions
avoided, at every reperusal of Mr. Darwin’s preg-
nant paragraphs, the novice in biology is apt to
complain of the frequency of what he fancies is
gratuitous assumption,
Thus while it may be doubted if, for some years,
any one is likely to be competent to pronounce
judgment on all the issues raised by Mr. Darwin,
26 THE ORIGIN OF SPECIES it
there is assuredly abundant room for him, who,
assuming the humbler, though perhaps as useful,
office of an interpreter between the “Origin of
Species” and the public, contents himself with
endeavouring to point out the nature of the prob-
lems which it discusses; to distinguish between
the ascertained facts and the theoretical views
which it contains ; and finally, to show the extent
to which the explanation it offers satisfies the re-
quirements of scientific logic. At any rate, it is
this office which we purpose to undertake in the
following pages.
It may be safely assumed that our readers have.
a general conception of the nature of the objects
to which the word “species” is applied; but it
has, perhaps, occurred to a few, even to those who
are naturalists ea professo, to reflect, that, as com-
monly employed, the term has a double sense and
denotes two very different orders of relations,
When we call a group of animals, or of plants, a
species, we may imply thereby, either that all
these animals or plants have some common peculi-
arity of form or structure ; or, we may mean that
they possess some common functional character.
That part of biological science which deals with
form and structure is called Morphology—that
which concerns itself with function, Physiology—
so that we may conveniently speak of these two
senses, or aspects, of “ species ”—the one as mor-
phological, the other as physiological, Regarded
it THE ORIGIN OF SPECIES oF
from the former point of view, a species is nothing
more than a kind of animal or plant, which is
distinctly definable from all others, by certain
constant, and not merely sexual, morphological
peculiarities. Thus horses form a species, because
the group of animals to which that name is applied
is distinguished from all others in the world by
the following constantly associated characters.
They have—1, A vertebral column; 2, Mamme ;
3, A placental embryo; 4, Four legs; 5, A single
well-developed toe in each foot provided with a
hoof; 6, A bushy tail; and 7, Callosities on the
inner sides of both the fore and the hind legs.
The asses, again, form a distinct species, because,
with the same characters, as far as the fifth in the
above list, all asses have tufted tails, and have
callosities only on the inner side of the fore-legs.
If animals were discovered having the general
characters of the horse, but sometimes with eal-
losities only on the fore-legs, and more or less
tufted tails; or animals having the general char-
acters of the ass, but with more or less bushy
tails, and sometimes with callosities on both pairs
of legs, besides being intermediate in other re-
spects—the two species would have to be merged
into one. They could no longer be regarded as
morphologically distinct species, for they would
not be distinctly definable one from the other.
However bare and simple this definition of
species may appear to be, we confidently appeal to
28 THE ORIGIN OF SPECIES 0
all practical naturalists, whether zoologists, botan-
ists, or palzontologists, to say if, in the vast
majority of cases, they know, or mean to affirm,
anything more of the group of animals or plants
they so denominate than what has just been stated,
Even the most decided advocates of the received
doctrines respecting species admit this, :
**T apprehend,” says Professor Owen,! ‘‘ that few naturalists
nowadays, in describing and proposing a name for what they
call ‘a new species,’ use that term to signify what was meant by
it twenty or thirty years ago; that is, an originally distinct
creation, maintaining its primitive distinction by obstructive
generative peculiarities. The proposer of the new species now
intends to state no more than he actually knows; as, for
example, that the differences on which he founds the specific
character are constant in individuals of both sexes, so far as
observation has reached ; and that they are not due to domes-
tication or to artificially superinduced external circumstances, or
to any outward influence within his cognizance ; that the species
is wild, or is such as it appears by Nature,”
If we consider, in fact, that by far the largest
proportion of recorded existing species are known
only by the study of their skins, or bones, or other
lifeless exuvize ; that we are acquainted with none,
or next to none, of their physiological peculiarities,
beyond those which can be deduced from their
structure, or are open to cursory observation; and
that we cannot hope to learn more of any of those
extinct forms of life which now constitute no
inconsiderable proportion of the known Flora and
99-4
1 “*On the Osteology of the Chimpanzees and Orangs ” 5
Transactions of the Zoological Society, 1858. .
II THE ORIGIN OF SPECIES 29
Fauna of the world: it is obvious that the defini-
tions of these species can be only of a purely
structural, or morphological, character. It is
probable that naturalists would have avoided
much confusion of ideas if they had more fre-
quently borne the necessary limitations of our
knowledge in mind, But while it may safely be
admitted that we are acquainted with only the
morphological characters of the vast majority of
species—the functional or physiological, peculiari-
ties of a few have been carefully investigated, and
the result of that study forms a large and most
interesting portion of the physiology of reproduc-
tion,
The student of Nature wonders the more and is
astonished the less, the more conversant he becomes
with her operations; but of all the perennial
miracles she offers to his inspection, perhaps the
most worthy of admiration is the development of
a plant or of an animal from its embryo. Examine
the recently laid egg of some common animal,
such as a salamander or newt. It is a minute
spheroid in which the best microscope will reveal
nothing but a structureless sac, enclosing a glairy
fluid, holding granules in suspension.! But strange
possibilities lie dormant in that semi-fluid globule.
Let a moderate supply of warmth reach its watery
cradle, and the plastic matter undergoes changes
1 [When this sentence was written, it was generally believed
that the original nucleus of the egg (the germinal vesicle)
disappeared. 1893.]
30 THE ORIGIN OF SPECIES II
so rapid, yet so steady and purposelike in their
succession, that one can only compare them to
those operated by a skilled modeller upon a form-
less lump of clay. As with an invisible trowel,
the mass is divided and subdivided into smaller
and smaller portions, until it is reduced to an
aggregation of granules not too large to build withal
the finest fabrics of the nascent organism, And,
then, it is asif a delicate finger traced out the line
to be occupied by the spinal column, and moulded
the contour of the body; pinching up the head
at one end, the tail at the other, and fashioning
flank and limb into due salamandrine proportions,
in so artistic a way, that, after watching the process
hour by hour, one is almost involuntarily possessed
by the notion, that some more subtle aid to vision
than an achromatic, would show the hidden artist,
with his plan before him, striving with skilful
manipulation to perfect his work.
As life advances, and the young amphibian
ranges the waters, the terror of his insect con-
temporaries, not only are the nutritious particles
supplied by its prey, by the addition of which to
its frame, growth takes place, laid down, each in
its proper spot, and in such due proportion to the
rest, as to reproduce the form, the colour, and the
size, characteristic of the parental stock ; but even
the wonderful powers of reproducing lost parts
possessed by these animals are controlled by the
same governing tendency. Cut off the legs, the
I THE ORIGIN OF SPECIES 31
tail, the jaws, separately or all together, and, as
Spallanzani showed long ago, these parts not only
grow again, but the redintegrated limb is formed
on the same type as those which were lost. The
new jaw, or leg, is a newt’s, and never by any
accident more like that of a frog. What is true
of the newt is true of every animal and of every
plant; the acorn tends to build itself up again
into a woodland giant such as that from whose
twig it fell; the spore of the humblest lichen
reproduces the green or brown incrustation which
gave it birth ; and at the other end of the scale of
life, the child that resembled neither the paternal
nor the maternal side of the house would be
regarded as a kind of monster.
So that the one end to which, in all living
beings, the formative impulse is tending—the one
scheme which the Archzeus of the old speculators
strives to carry out, seems to be to mould the
offspring into the likeness of the parent. It is
the first great law of reproduction, that the
offspring tends to resemble its parent or parents,
more closely than anything else.
Science will some day show us how this law is a
necessary consequence of the more general laws
which govern matter; but, for the present, more
ean hardly be said than that it appears to be in
harmony with them. We know that the phe-
nomena of vitality are not something apart from
other physical phenomena, but one with them ;
32 THE ORIGIN OF SPECIES II
and matter and force are the two names of the
one artist who fashions the living as well as the
lifeless. Hence living bodies should obey the’
same great laws as other matter—nor, throughout
Nature, is there a law of wider application than
this, that a body impelled by two forces takes the
direction of their resultant. But living bodies
may be regarded as nothing but extremely complex
bundles of forces held in a mass of matter, as the
complex forces of a magnet are held in the steel
by its coercive force; and, since the differences
of sex are comparatively slight, or, in other words,
the sum of the forces in each has a very similar
tendency, their resultant, the offspring, may reason-
ably be expected to deviate but little from a course
parallel to either, or to both,
Represent the reason of the law to ourselves by
what physical metaphor or analogy we will, how-
ever, the great matter is to apprehend its existence
and the importance of the consequences deducible
from it. For things which are like to the same
are like to one another; and if, ina great series of
generations, every offspring is like its parent, it
follows that all the offspring and all the parents
must be like one another; and that, given an
original parental stock, with the opportunity of
undisturbed multiplication, the law in question
necessitates the production, in course of time, of
an indefinitely large group, the whole of the mem-
bers of which are at once very similar and are blood
II THE ORIGIN OF SPECIES oo
relations, having descended from the same parent,
or pair of parents. The proof that all the members
of any given group of animals, or plants, had thus
descended, would be ordinarily considered sufficient
to entitle them to the rank of physiological species,
for most physiologists consider species to be de-
finable as “the offspring of a single primitive
stock.”
But though it is quite true that all those
groups we call species may, according to the
known laws of reproduction, have descended from
a single stock, and though it is very likely they
really have done so, yet this conclusion rests on
deduction and can hardly hope to establish itself
upon a basis of observation, And the primitive-
ness of the supposed single stock, which, after all,
is the essential part of the matter, is not only a
hypothesis, but one which has not a shadow of
foundation, if by “ primitive” be meant “indepen-
dent of any other living being.” A scientific
definition, of which an unwarrantable hypothesis
forms an essential part, carries its condemnation
within itself; but, even supposing such a
definition were, in form, tenable, the physiologist
who should attempt to apply it in Nature would
soon find himself involved in great, if not in-
extricable, difficulties. As we have said, it is
indubitable that offspring tend to resemble the
parental organism, but it is equally true that the
similarity attained never amounts to identity
VOL, II D
84 THE ORIGIN OF SPECIES II
either in form or in structure. There is always a
certain amount of deviation, not only from the
precise characters of a single parent, but when, as
in most animals and many plants, the sexes are
lodged in distinct individuals, from an exact mean
between the two parents. And indeed, on
general principles, this slight deviation seems as
intelligible as the general similarity, if we reflect
how complex the co-operating “ bundles of forces ”
are, and how improbable it is that, in any case,
their true resultant shall coincide with any mean
between the more obvious characters of the two
parents. Whatever be its cause, however, the
co-existence of this tendency to minor variation
with the tendency to general similarity, is of vast
importance in its bearing on the question of the
origin of species.
As a general rule, the extent to which an
offspring differs from its parent is slight enough ;
but, occasionally, the amount of difference is much
more strongly marked, and then the divergent
offspring receives the name of a Variety. Maulti-
tudes, of what there is every reason to believe are
such varieties, are known, but the origin of very
few has been accurately recorded, and of these we
will select two as more especially illustrative of
the main features of variation, The first of them
is that of the “Ancon” or “Otter” sheep, of
which a careful account is given by Colonel
David Humphreys, F.R.S., in a letter to Sir
i: THE ORIGIN OF SPECIES 35
Joseph Banks, published in the “ Philosophical
Transacticns” for 1813. It appears that one Seth
Wright, the proprietor of a farm on the banks
of the Charles River, in Massachusetts, possessed
a flock of fifteen ewes and a ram of the ordinary
kind. In the year 1791, one of the ewes
presented her owner with a male lamb, differing,
for*no assignable reason, from its parents by a
proportionally long body and short bandy legs,
whence it was unable to emulate its relatives in
those sportive leaps over the neighbours’ fences,
in which they were in the habit of imdulging,
much to the good farmer’s vexation.
The second case is that detailed by a no less
unexceptionable authority than Réaumur, in his
“Art de faire éclore les Poulets.” A Maltese
couple, named Kelleia, whose hands and feet were
constructed upon the ordinary human model, had
born to them a son, Gratio, who possessed six per-
fectly movable fingers on each hand, and six toes,
not quite so well formed, on each foot. No cause
could be assigned for the appearance of this unusual
variety of the human species.
Two circumstances are well worthy of remark in
both these cases. In each, the variety appears to
have arisen in full force, and, as it were, per saltuim ;
a wide and definite difference appearing, at once,
between the Ancon ram and the ordinary sneep ;
between the six-fingered and six-toed Gratio Kelleia
and ordinary men. In neither case is it possible
D 2
36 THE ORIGIN OF SPECIES I!
to point out any obvious reason for the appearance
of the variety. Doubtless there were determining
causes for these as for all other phenomena; but
they do not appear, and we can be tolerably certain
that what are ordinarily understood as changes in
physical conditions, as in climate, in food, or the
like, did not take place and had nothing to do with
the matter. It was no case of what is commonly
called adaptation to circumstances; but, to use a
conveniently erroneous phrase, the variations arose
spontaneously, The fruitless search after final
causes leads their pursuers a long way; but even
those hardy teleologists, who are ready to break
through all the laws of physics in chase of their
favourite will-o’-the-wisp, may be puzzled to dis-
cover what purpose could be attained by the stunted
legs of Seth Wright’s ram or the hexadactyle
members of Gratio Kelleia,
Varieties then arise we know not why ; and it is
more than probable that the majority of varieties
have arisen in this “spontaneous ” manner, though
we are, of course, far from denying that they may
be traced, in some cases, to distinct external in-
fluences ; which are assuredly competent to alter
the character of the tegumentary covering, to
change colour, to increase or diminish the size of
muscles, to modify constitution, and, among plants,
to give rise to the metamorphosis of stamens into
petals, and so forth. But however they may have
arisen, what especially interests us at present is, to
II THE ORIGIN OF SPECIES 37
remark that, once in existence, many varieties obey
the fundamental law of reproduction that like tends
to produce like; and their offspring exemplify it by
tending to exhibit the same deviation from the
parental stock as themselves, Indeed, there seems
to be, in many instances, a prepotent influence
about a newly-arisen variety which gives it what
one may call an unfair advantage over the normal
descendants from the same stock. This is strik-
ingly exemplified by the case of Gratio Kelleia,
who married a woman with the ordinary penta-
dactyle extremities, and had by her four children,
Salvator, George, André, and Marie. Of these
children Salvator, the eldest boy, had six fingers
and six toes, like his father ; the second and third,
also boys, had five fingers and five toes, like their
mother, though the hands and feet of George
were slightly deformed. The last, a girl, had five
fingers and five toes, but the thumbs were slightly
deformed, The variety thus reproduced itself
purely in the eldest, while the normal type
reproduced itself purely in the third, and almost
purely in the second and last: so that it would
seem, at first, as if the normal type were more
powerful than the variety. But all these children
grew up and intermarried with normal wives and
husband, and then, note what took place : Salvator
had four children, three of whom exhibited the
hexadactyle members of their grandfather and
father, while the youngest had the pentacactvle
38 THE ORIGIN OF SPECIES II
limbs of the mother and grandmother; so that
here, notwithstanding a double pentadactyle
dilution of the blood, the hexadactyle variety had
the best of it. The same pre-potency of the
variety was still more markedly exemplified in the
progeny of two of the other children, Marie and
George. Marie (whose thumbs only were de-
formed) gave birth to a boy with six toes, and
three other normally formed children ; but George,
who was not quite so pure a pentadactyle, begot,
first, two girls, each of whom had six fingers and
toes ; then a girl with six fingers on each hand and
six toes on the right foot, but only five toes on
the left; and lastly, a boy with only five fingers
and toes. In these instances, therefore, the
variety, as it were, leaped over one generation to
reproduce itself in full force in the next. Finally,
the purely pentadactyle André was the father of
many children, not one of whom departed from
the normal parental type. :
If a variation which approaches the nature of a
monstrosity can strive thus forcibly to reproduce
itself, it is not wonderful that less aberrant
modifications should tend to be preserved even
more strongly ; and the history of the Ancon sheep
is, in this respect, particularly instructive. With
the “’cuteness ” characteristic of their nation, the
neighbours of the Massachusetts farmer imagined
it would be an excellent thing if all his sheep
were imbued with the stay-at-home tendencies
II THE ORIGIN OF SPECIES 39
enforced by Nature upon the newly-arrived ram ;
and they advised Wright to kill the old patriarch
of his fold, and install the Ancon ram in his place.
The result justified their sagacious anticipations,
and coincided very nearly with what occurred to
the progeny of Gratio Kelleia. The young lambs
were almost always either pure Ancons, or pure
ordinary sheep.’ But when sufficient Ancon
sheep were obtained to interbreed with one
another, it was found that the offspring was
always pure Ancon. Colonel Humphreys, in fact,
states that he was acquainted with only “one
questionable case of a contrary nature.” Here,
then, is a remarkable and_ well-established
instance, not only of a very distinct race being
established per saltwm, but of that race breeding
“true” at once, and showing no mixed forms,
even when crossed with another breed.
By taking care to select Ancons of both sexes,
for breeding from, it thus became easy to establish
an extremely well-marked race; so peculiar that,
1 Colonel Humphreys’ statements are exceedingly explicit on
this point :—‘* When an Ancon ewe is impregnated by a com-
mon ram, the increase resembles wholly either the ewe or the
ram. The increase of the common ewe impregnated by an
Ancon ram follows entirely the one or the other, without
blending any of the distinguishing and essential peculiarities
of both. Frequent instances have happened where common
ewes have had twins by Ancon rams, when one exhibited the
complete marks and features of the ewe, the other of the ram.
The contrast has been rendered singularly striking, when one
short-legged and one long-legged lamb, produced at a birth,
have been seen sucking the dam at the same time.’’—Philoso-
phicat Transactions, 1813, Pt. I. pp. 89, 90. ;
40 THE ORIGIN OF SPECIES II
even when herded with other sheep, it was noted
that the Ancons kept together. And there is
every reason to believe that the existence of this
breed might have been indefinitely protracted ;
but the introduction of the Merino sheep, which
were not only very superior to the Ancons in wool
and meat, but quite as quiet and orderly, led to
the complete neglect of the new breed, so that, in
1813, Colonel Humphreys found it difficult to
obtain the specimen, the skeleton of which was
presented to Sir Joseph Banks. We believe that,
for many years, no remnant of it has existed in
the United States.
Gratio Kelleia was not the progenitor of a race
of six-fingered men, as Seth Wright's ram became
a nation of Ancon sheep, though the tendency of
the variety to perpetuate itself appears to have
been fully as strong in the one case as in the
other. And the reason of the difference is not
far toseek. Seth Wright took care not to weaken
the Ancon blood by matching his Ancon ewes
with any but males of the same variety, while
Gratio Kelleia’s sons were too far removed from
the patriarchal times to intermarry with their
sisters ; and his grand-children seem not to have
been attracted by their six-fingered cousins. In
other words, in the one example a race was pro-
duced, because, for several generations, care was
taken to select both parents of the breeding stock
from animals exhibiting a tendency to vary in the
II THE ORIGIN OF SPECIES 41
same direction ; while, in the other, no race was
evolved, because no such selection was exercised.
A race is a propagated variety ; and as, by the laws
of reproduction, offspring tend to assume the
parental forms, they will be more likely to pro-
pagate a variation exhibited by both parents than
that possessed by only one.
_ There is no organ of the body of an animal
which may not, and does not, occasionally, vary
more or less from the normal type ; and there is no
variation which may not be transmitted and which,
if selectively transmitted, may not become the
foundation of a race. This great truth, sometimes
forgotten by philosophers, has long been familiar
to practical agriculturists and breeders ; and upon
it rest all the methods of improving the breeds of
domestic animals, which, for the last century, have
been followed with so much success in England.
Colour, form, size, texture of hair or wool, pro-
portions of various parts, strength or weakness of
constitution, tendency to fatten or to remain lean,
to give much or little milk, speed, strength, tem-
per, intelligence, special instincts; there is not one
of these characters the transmission of which is not
an every-day occurrence within the experience of
cattle-breeders, stock-farmers, horse-dealers, and
dog and poultry fanciers. Nay, it is only the other
day that an eminent physiologist, Dr. Brown-
Sequard, communicated to the Royal Society his
discovery that epilepsy, artificially produced in
42 THE ORIGIN OF SPECIES IT
guinea-pigs, by a means which he has discovered,
is transmitted to their offspring.?
But a race, once produced, is no more a fixed
and immutable entity than the stock whence it
sprang ; variations arise among its members, and
as these variations are transmitted like any others,
new races may be developed out of the pre-exist-
ing one ad infinitum, or, at least, within any limit
at present determined. Given sufficient time and
sufficiently careful selection, and the multitude of
races which may arise from a common stock is as
astonishing as are the extreme structural differ-
ences which they may present. A remarkable
example of this is to be found in the rock-pigeon,
which Mr. Darwin has, in our opinion, satisfactorily
demonstrated to be the progenitor of all our
domestic pigeons, of which there are certainly
more than a hundred well-marked races. The
most noteworthy of these races are, the four great
stocks known to the “ fancy ” as tumblers, pouters,
carriers, and fantails; birds which not only differ
most singularly in size, colour, and habits, but in the
form of the beak and of the skull: in the pro-
portions of the beak to the skull; in the number
of tail-feathers ; in the absolute and relative size of
the feet ; in the presence or absence of the uropygial
gland ; in the number of vertebrz in the back ;
in short, in precisely those characters in which
1 [Compare Weismann’s Essays Upon Heredity, p. 310, et seq.
1893. ]
Ir THE ORIGIN OF SPECIES 43
the genera and species of birds differ from one
another.
And it is most remarkable and instructive to
observe, that none of these races can be shown to
have been originated by the action of changes in
what are commonly called external circumstances,
upon the wild rock-pigeon. On the contrary,
from time immemorial pigeon-fanciers have had
essentially similar methods of treating their pets,
which have been housed, fed, protected and cared
for in much the same way in all pigeonries. In
fact, there is no case better adapted than that of
the pigeons to refute the doctrine which one sees
put forth on high authority, that “no other
characters than those founded on the development
of bone for the attachment of muscles” are
capable of variation. In precise contradiction of
this hasty assertion, Mr. Darwin’s researches
prove that the skeleton of the wings in domestic
pigeons has hardly varied at all from that of the
wild type ; while, on the other hand, it is in exactly
those respects, such as the relative length of the
beak and skull, the number of the vertebrae, and
the number of the tail-feathers, in which muscular
exertion can have no important influence, that
the utmost amount of variation has taken place.
We have said that the following out of the
properties exhibited by physiological species would
lead us into difficulties, and at this point they begin
A THE ORIGIN OF SPECIES II
to be obvious; for if, as the result of spontaneous
variation and of selective breeding, the progeny of
a common stock may become separated into groups
distinguished from one another by constant, not
sexual, morphological characters, it is clear that
the physiological definition of species is likely to
clash with the morphological definition. No one
would hesitate to describe the pouter and the
tumbler as distinct species, if they were found fossil,
or if their skins and skeletons were imported, as
those of exotic wild birds commonly are—and with-
out doubt, if considered alone, they are good and
distinct morphological species, On the other hand,
they are not physiological species, for they are
descended from a common stock, the rock-pigeon.
Under these circumstances, as it is admitted con
all sides that races occur in Nature, how are we to
know whether any apparently distinct animals are
really of different physiological species, or not,
seeing that the amount of morphological difference
is no safe guide? Is there any test of a physio-
logical species? The usual answer of physiologists
is in the affirmative. It is said that such a test is
to be found in the phenomena of hybridisation—
in the results of crossing races, as compared with
the results of crossing species,
So far as the evidence goes at present, in-
dividuals, of what are certainly known to be mere
races produced by selection, however distinct they
may appear to be, not only breed freely together,
Ii THE ORIGIN OF SPECIES 45
but the offspring of such crossed races are perfectly
fertile with one another, Thus, the spaniel and
the greyhound, the dray-horse and the Arab, the
pouter and the tumbler, breed together with perfect
freedom, and their mongrels, if matched with other
mongrels of the same kind, are equally fertile.
On the other hand, there can be no doubt that
the individuals of many natural species are either
absolutely infertile if crossed with individuals of
other species, or, if they give rise to hybrid
offspring, the hybrids so produced are infertile
when paired together. The horse and the ass,
for instance, if so crossed, give rise to the mule,
and there is no certain evidence of offspring ever
having been produced by a male and female
mule. The unions of the rock-pigeon and the
ring-pigeon appear to be equally barren of result.
Here, then, says the physiologist, we have a means
of distinguishing any two true species from any
two varieties. If a male and a female, selected
from each group, produce ‘offspring, and that off-
spring is fertile with others produced in the same
way, the groups are races and not species. If, on
the other hand, no result ensues, or if the offspring
are infertile with others produced in the same
way, they are true physiological species. The
test would be an admirable one, if, in the first
place, it were always practicable to apply it, and
if, in the second, it always yielded results suscep-
tible of a definite interpretation. Unfortunately,
46 THE ORIGIN OF SPECIES II
in the great majority of cases, this touchstone for
species is wholly inapplicable.
The constitution of many wild animals is so
altered by confinement that they will not breed
even with their own females, so that the negative
results obtained from crosses are of no value; and
the antipathy of wild animals of different species
for one another, or even of wild and tame members
of the same species, is ordinarily so great, that it
is hopeless to look for such unions in Nature,
The hermaphrodism of most plants, the difficulty
in the way of insuring the absence of their own
or the proper working of other pollen, are obsta-
cles of no less magnitude in applying the test to
them, And, in both animals and plants, is super-
added the further difficulty, that experiments
must be continued over a long time for the purpose
of ascertaining the fertility of the mongrel or
hybrid progeny, as well as of the first crosses from
which they spring.
Not only do these great practical difficulties lie
in the way of applying the hybridisation test, but
even when this oracle can be questioned, its replies
are sometimes as doubtful as those of Delphi.
For example, cases are cited by Mr. Darwin, of
plants which are more fertile with the pollen of |
another species than with their own; and there
are others, such as certain Fuci, the male element
of which will fertilise the ovule of a plant of
distinct species, while the males of the latter
Ir THE ORIGIN OF SPECIES 47
species are ineffective with the females of the
first. So that, in the last-named instance, a
physiologist, who should cross the two species in
one way, would decide that they were true species;
while another, who should cross them in the
reverse way, would, with equal justice, according
to the rule, pronounce them to be mere races.
Several plants, which there is great reason to
believe are mere varieties, are almost sterile when
crossed; while both animals and plants, which
have always been regarded by naturalists as of
distinct species, turn out, when the test is applied,
to be perfectly fertile. Again, the sterility or
fertility of crosses seems to bear no relation to the
structural resemblances or differences of the
members of any two groups.
Mr. Darwin has discussed this question with
singular ability and circumspection, and his con-
clusions are summed up as follows, at page 276 of
his work :—
** First crosses between forms sufficiently distinct to be ranked
as species, and their hybrids, are very generally, but not
universally, sterile. The sterility is of all degrees, and is often
so slight that the two most eareful experimentalists who have
ever lived have come to diametrically opposite conclusions in
ranking forms by this test. The sterility is innately variable
in individuals of the same species, and is eminently susceptible
of favourable and unfavourable conditions. The degree of
sterility does not strictly follow systematic affinity, but is
governed by several curious and complex laws. It is generally
different and sometimes widely different, in reciprocal crosses
4S THE ORIGIN OF SPECIES IT
between the same two species. It is not always equal in degree
in a first cross, and in the hybrid produced from this cross.
*‘In the same manner as in grafting trees, the capacity of
one species or variety to take on another is incidental on
generally unknown differences in their vegetative systems ; so
in crossing, the greater or less facility of one species to unite
with another is incidental on unknown differences in their
reproductive systems, There is no more reason to think that
species have been specially endowed with various degrees of
sterility to prevent them crossing and breeding in Nature, than
to think that trees have been specially endowed with various
and somewhat analogous degrees of difficulty in being grafted
together, in order to prevent them becoming inarched in our
forests.
‘**The sterility of first crosses between pure species, which
have their reproductive systems perfect, seems to depend on
several circumstances ; in some cases largely on the early death of
the embryo. The sterility of hybrids which have their repro-
ductive systems imperfect, and which have had this system
and their whole organisation disturbed by being compounded
of two distinct species, seems closely allied to that sterility
which so frequently affects pure species when their natural con-
ditions of life have been disturbed. This view is supported by
a parallelism of another kind: namely, that the crossing of
forms, only slightly different, is favourable to the vigour and
fertility of the offspring ; and that slight changes in the con-
ditions of life are apparently favourable to the vigour and
fertility of all organic beings. It is not surprising that the
degree of difficulty in uniting two species, and the degree of
sterility of their hybrid offspring, should generally correspond,
though due to distinct causes ; for both depend on the amount
of difference of some kind between the species which are crossed.
Nor is it surprising that the facility of effecting a first cross,
the fertility of hybrids produced from it, and the capacity of
being grafted together—though this latter capacity evidently
depends on widely different cireumstances—should all run to a
certain extent parallel with the systematic affinity of the forms
which are subjected to experiment; for systematic affinity
I THE ORIGIN OF SPECIES 49
attempts to express all kinds of resemblance between all
species.
‘‘Tirst crosses between forms known to be varieties, or
sufficiently alike to be considered as varieties, and their mon-
grel offspring, are very generally, but not quite universally,
fertile. Nor is this nearly general and perfect fertility sur-
prising, when we remember how liable we are to argue in a
circle with respect to varieties in a state of Nature; and when
we remember that the greater number of varieties have been
produced under domestication by the selection of mere external
differences, and not of differences in the reproductive system.
In all other respects, excluding fertility, there is a close general
resemblance between hybrids and mongrels.” —Pp. 276—8.
We fully agree with the general tenor of this
weighty passage ; but forcible as are these argu-
ments, and little as the value of fertility or
infertility as a test of species maybe, it must not
be forgotten that the really important fact, so far
as the inquiry into the origin of species goes, is,
that there are such things in Nature as groups of
animals and of plants, the members of which are in-
capable of fertile union with those of other groups ;
and that there are such things as hybrids, which
_are absolutely. sterile when crossed with other
hybrids. For, if such phenomena as these were
exhibited by only two of those assemblages of
living objects, to which the name of species
(whether it be used in its physiological or in its
morphological sense) is given, it would have to be
-accounted for by any theory of the origin of
' species, and every theory which could not account
for it would be, so far, imperfect.
VOL. II E
50 THE ORIGIN OF SPECIES Ir
Up to this point, we have been dealing with
matters of fact, and the statements which we
have laid before the reader would, to the best of
our knowledge, be admitted to contain a fair
exposition of what is at present known respecting
the essential properties of species, by all who
have studied the question. And whatever may
be his theoretical views, no naturalist will prob-
ably be disposed to demur to the following
summary of that exposition :—
Living beings, whether animals or plants, are
divisible into multitudes of distinctly definable
kinds, which are morphological species. They are
also divisible into groups of individuals, which
breed freely together, tending to reproduce their
like, and are physiological species. Normally
resembling their parents, the offspring of members
of these species are still liable to vary; and the
variation may be perpetuated by selection, as a
race, which race, in many cases, presents all the
characteristics of a morphological species. But
it is not as yet proved that a race ever exhibits,
when crossed with another race of the same
species, those phenomena of hybridisation which
are exhibited by many species when crossed with
other species. On the other hand, not only is it
not proved that all species give rise to hybrids
infertile inter se, but there is much reason to
believe that, im crossing, species exhibit every
gradation from perfect sterility to perfect fertility.
it THE ORIGIN OF SPECIES 51
Such are the most essential characteristics of
species. Even were man not one of them—a
member of the same system and subject to the
same laws—the question of their origin, their
causal connexion, that is, with the other phzno-
mena of the universe, must have attracted his
attention, as soon as_ his intelligence had raised
itself above the level of his daily wants.
Indeed history relates that such was the case,
and has embalmed for us the speculations upon
the origin of living beings, which were among the
earliest products of the dawning intellectual activity
of man. In those early days positive knowledge
was not to be had, but the craving after it needed,
at all hazards, to be satisfied, and according to the
country, or the turn of thought, of the speculator,
the suggestion that all living things arose from the
mud of the Nile, from a primeval egg, or from some
more anthropomorphic agency, afforded a sufficient
resting-place for his curiosity. The myths of
Paganism are as dead as Osiris or Zeus, and the
man who should revive them, in opposition to the
knowledge of our time, would be justly laughed to
scorn ; but the coeval imaginations current among
the rude inhabitants of Palestine, recorded by
writers whose very name and age are admitted by
every scholar to be unknown, have unfortunately
not yet shared their fate, but, even at this day, are
regarded by nine-tenths of the civilised world as
the authoritative standard of fact and the criterion
E 2
52 THE ORIGIN OF SPECIES II
of the justice of scientific conclusions, in all that
relates to the origin of things, and, among them,
of species. In this nineteenth century, as at the
dawn of modern physical science, the cosmogony
of the semi-barbarous Hebrew is the incubus of
the philosopher and the opprobrium of the ortho-
dox. Who shall number the patient and earnest
seekers after truth, from the days of Galileo until
now, whose lives have been embittered and their
good name blasted by the mistaken zeal of Biblio-
laters? Who shall count the host of weaker men
whose sense of truth has been destroyed in the effort
to harmonise impossibilities—whose life has been
wasted in the attempt to force the generous new
wine of Science into the old bottles of Judaism,com-
pelled by the outcry of the same strong party ?
It is true that if philosophers have suffered, their
cause has been amply avenged. Extinguished
theologians lie about the cradle of every science as
the strangled snakes beside that of Hercules ; and
history records that whenever science and ortho-
doxy have been fairly opposed, the latter has been
forced to retire from the lists, bleeding and crushed
if not annihilated ; scotched, if not slain. But
orthodoxy is the Bourbon of the world of thought.
It learns not, neither can it forget; and though,
at present, bewildered and afraid to move, it is as
willing as ever to insist that the first chapter of
Genesis contains the beginning and the end of
sound science; and to visit, with such petty
iat THE ORIGIN OF SPECIES 53
thunderbolts as its half-paralysed hands can hurl,
those who refuse to degrade Nature to the level of
primitive Judaism.
Philosophers, on the other hand, have no such
aggressive tendencies. With eyes fixed on the
noble goal to which “per aspera et ardua” they
tend, they may, now and then, be stirred to
momentary wrath by the unnecessary obstacles
with which the ignorant, or the malicious, encum-
ber, if they cannot bar, the difficult path ; but why
should their souls be deeply vexed? The majesty
of Fact is on their side, and the elemental forces
of Nature are working for them. Not astar comes
to the meridian at its calculated time but testifies
to the justice of their methods—their beliefs are
“one with the falling rain and with the growing
corn.” By doubt they are established, and open
inquiry is their bosom friend. Such men have no
fear of traditions however venerable, and no respect
for them when they become mischievous and
obstructive ; but they have better than mere anti-
quarian business in hand, and if dogmas, which
ought to befossil but are not, are not forced upon
their notice, they are too happy to treat them as
non-existent.
The hypotheses respecting the origin of species
which profess to stand upon a scientific basis, and,
as such, alone demand serious attention, are of two
kinds. The one, the “ special creation ” hypothesis,
54 THE ORIGIN OF SPECIES II
presumes every species to have originated from one
or more stocks, these not being the result of the
modification of any other form of living matter—or
arising by natural agencies—but being produced,
as such, by a supernatural creative act.
The other, the so-called “ transmutation ”
hypothesis, considers that all existing species are
the result of the modification of pre-existing
species, and those of their predecessors, by agencies
similar to those which at the present day produce
varieties and races, and therefore in an altogether
natural way; and it is a probable, though not a
necessary consequence of this hypothesis, that all
living beings have arisen from a single stock.
With respect to the origin of this primitive stock,
or stocks, the doctrine of the origin of species is
obviously not necessarily concerned. The trans-
mutation hypothesis, for example, is perfectly
consistent either with the conception of a special
creation of the primitive germ, or with the
supposition of its having arisen, as a modification
of inorganic matter, by natural causes.
The doctrine of special creation owes its exist-
ence very largely to the supposed necessity of
making science accord with the Hebrew cos-
mogony ; but it is curious to observe that, as the
doctrine is at present maintained by men of
science, it is as hopelessly inconsistent with the
Hebrew view as any other hypothesis.
If there be any result which has come more
II THE ORIGIN OF SPECIES 55
clearly out of geological investigation than another,
it is, that the vast series of extinct animals and
plants is not divisible, as it was once supposed to
be, into distinct groups, separated by sharply-
marked boundaries. There are no great gulfs
between epochs and formations—no_ successive
periods marked by the appearance of plants, of
water animals, and of land animals, en masse.
Every year adds to the list of links between
what the older geologists supposed to be widely
separated epochs: witness the crags linking the
drift with older tertiaries; the Maestricht beds
linking the tertiaries with the chalk; the St.
Cassian beds exhibiting an abundant fauna of
mixed mesozoic and palzeozoic types, in rocks of an
epoch once supposed to be eminently poor in life ;
witness, lastly, the incessant disputes as to whether
a given stratum shall be reckoned devonian or
carboniferous, silurian or devonian, cambrian or
silurian,
This truth is further illustrated in a most
interesting manner by the impartial and highly
competent testimony of M. Pictet, from whose
calculations of what percentage of the genera of
animals, existing in any formation, lived during
the preceding formation, it results that in no case
is the proportion less than one-third, or 33 per
cent. It is the triassic formation, or the com-
mencement of the mesozoic epoch, which has
received the smallest inheritance from preceding
56 THE ORIGIN OF SPECIES II
ages. The other formations not uncommonly
exhibit 60, 80, or even 94 per cent. of genera in
common with those whose remains are imbedded
in their predecessor. Not only is this true, but
the subdivisions of each formation exhibit new
species characteristic of, and found only in, them ;
and, in many cases, as in the lias for example, the
separate beds of these subdivisions are distin-
guished by well-marked and peculiar forms of life.
A section, a hundred feet thick, will exhibit, at
different heights, a dozen species of ammonite,
none of which passes beyond its particular zone
of limestone, or clay, into the zone below it or into
that above it; so that those who adopt the doc-
trine of special creation must be prepared to admit,
that at intervals of time, corresponding with the
thickness of these beds, the Creator thought fit
to interfere with the natural course of events for
the purpose of making a new ammonite. It is
not easy to transplant oneself into the frame of
mind of those who can accept such a conclusion
as this, on any evidence short of absolute demon-
stration; and it is difficult to see what is to be
gained by so doing, since, as we have said, it is
obvious that such a view of the origin of living
beings is utterly opposed to the Hebrew cos-
mogony. Deserving no aid from the powerful
arm of Bibliolatry, then, does the received form of
the hypothesis of special creation derive any
support from science or sound logic? Assuredly
+
a THE ORIGIN OF SPECIES 57
not much. The arguments brought forward in its
favour all take one form: If species were not
supernaturally created, we cannot understand the
facts xv, or y, or 2; we cannot understand the
structure of animals or plants, unless we suppose
they were contrived for special ends; we cannot
understand the structure of the eye, except by
supposing it to have been made to see with; we
cannot understand instincts, unless we suppose
animals to have been miraculously endowed with
them.
As a question of dialectics, it must be admitted
that this sort of reasoning is not very formidable
to those who are not to be frightened by conse-
quences. It is an argumentum ad ignorantiam—
take this explanation or be ignorant. But suppose
we prefer to admit our ignorance rather than
adopt a hypothesis at variance with all the teach-
ings of Nature? Or, suppose for a moment we
admit the explanation, and then seriously ask
ourselves how much the wiser are we; what does
the explanation explain? Is it any more than a
grandiloquent way of announcing the fact, that we
really know nothing about the matter? ¢ > 6
“ Obscure ideas,” “metaphysical jargon,” “ pre-
tcentious and empty language,” ‘‘puerile and
superannuated personifications.” Mr, Darwin has
many and hot opponents on this side of the
Channel and in Germany, but we do not recollect
to have found precisely these sins in the long
catalogue of those hitherto laid to his charge. It
is worth while, therefore, to examine into these
discoveries effected solely by the aid of the
“lucidity and solidity” of the mind of M.
_Flourens,
According to M. Flourens, Mr. Darwin’s great
error is that he has personified Nature (p. 10),
and further that he has
‘*imagined a natural selection: he imagines afterwards that
this power of selecting (pouvoir @ élire) which he gives to Nature
is similar to the power of man. ‘These two suppositions ad-
H 2
100 CRITICISMS ON “ THE ORIGIN OF SPECIES” qr
mitted, nothing stops him: he plays with Nature as he likes,
and makes her do all he pleases.” (P. 6.)
And this is the way M. Flourens extinguishes
natural selection : |
‘**Voyons done encore une fois, ce qu'il peut y avoir de fondé
dans ce qu’on nomme élection naturelle.
** Délection naturelle n’est sous un autre nom que la nature,
Pour un étre organisé, la nature n’est que l’organisation, ni plus
ni moins.
‘*Tl faudra donc aussi personnifier /’organisation, et dire que
Porganisation choisit Vorganisation. L’élection natwrelle est
cette furme substanticlle dont on jouait autrefois avec tant de
facilité. Aristote disait que ‘Si l’art de batir était dans le bois,
cet art agirait comme la nature.’ A la place de V’art de bdtir
M. Darwin met V’élection naturelle, et c’est tout un: l'un n’est
pas plus chimérique que l’autre.” (P. 31.)
And this is really all that M. Flourens can make
of Natural Selection. We have given the original,
in fear lest a translation should be regarded as a
travesty ; but with the original before the reader,
we may try to analyse the passage. “For an
organised being, Nature is only organisation,
neither more nor less.”
Organised beings then have absolutely no
relation to inorganic nature: a plant does not,
depend on soil or sunshine, climate, depth in the
ocean, height above it; the quantity of saline
matters in water have no influence upon animal
life ; the substitution of carbonic acid for oxygen
in our atmosphere would hurt nobody! That
these are absurdities no one should know better
ut CRITICISMS ON “ THE ORIGIN OF SPECIES” 101
than M. Flourens; but they are logical deductions
from the assertion just quoted, and from the
further statement that natural selection means
only that “organisation chooses and _ selects
organisation.”
For if it be once admitted (what no sane man
denies) that the chances of life of any given
organism are increased by certain conditions (A)
and diminished by their opposites (B), then it is
mathematically certain that any change of con-
ditions in the direction of (A) will exercise a
selective influence in favour of that organism,
tending to its increase and multiplication, while
any change in the direction of (B) will exercise a
selective influence against that organism, tending
to its decrease and extinction.
Or, on the other hand, conditions remaining the
same, let a given organism vary (and no one
doubts that they do vary) in two directions : into
one form (a) better fitted to cope with these con-
ditions than the original stock, and a second ())
less well adapted to them. Then it is no less certain
that the conditions in question must exercise a
selective influence in favour of (a) and against (0),
so that (a) will tend to predominance, and ()) to
extirpation.
That M. Flourens should be unable to perceive
the logical necessity of these simple arguments,
which he at the foundation of all Mr. Darwin’s
reasoning ; that he should confound an irrefragable
102 CRITICISMS ON “THE ORIGIN OF SPECIES” nr
deduction from the observed relations of organisms
to the conditions which lie around them, with a
metaphysical “ forme substantielle,” or a chimerical
personification of the powers of Nature, would be
incredible, were it not that other passages of his
work leave no room for doubt upon the subject.
‘*On imagine une élection naturelle que, pour plus de ménage-
ment, on me dit étre inconsciente, sans s’apercevoir que le contre-
sens littéral est précisément 1a: élection inconsciente.” (P. 52.)
** J’ai déja dit ce qu'il faut penser de 7’élection naturelle. Ou
Vélection naturelle n’est rien, ou c’est la nature: mais la nature
douée d’élection, mais la nature personnifiée : derniére erreur du
dernier sitcle : Le xix® ne fait plus de personnifications,” (P.
53.)
M. Flourens cannot imagine an unconscious
selection—it is for him a contradiction in terms.
Did M. Flourens ever visit one of the prettiest
watering-places of “la belle France,” the Baie
d’Arcachon? If so, he will probably have passed
through the district of the Landes, and will have
had an opportunity of observing the formation of
“dunes” on a grand scale. What are these
“dunes”? The winds and waves of the Bay of
Biscay have not much consciousness, and yet they
have with great care “selected,” from among an
infinity of masses of silex of all shapes and sizes,
which have been submitted to their action, all the
grains of sand below a certain size, and have
heaped them by themselves over a great area,
This sand has been “ unconsciously selected ” from
ur CRITICISMS ON “THE ORIGIN OF SPECIES” 103
amidst the gravel in which it first lay with as
much precision as if man had “consciously
selected” it by the aid of a sieve. Physical
Geology is full of such selections—of the picking
out of the soft from the hard, of the soluble from
the insoluble, of the fusible from the infusible, by
natural agencies to which we are certainly not in
the habit of ascribing consciousness.
But that which wind and sea are to a sandy
beach, the sum of influences, which we term the
“conditions of existence,” is to living organisms,
The weak are sifted out from the strong. A frosty
night “selects” the hardy plants in a plantation
from among the tender ones as effectually as if it
were the wind, and they, the sand and pebbles, of
our illustration; or, on the other hand, as if the
intelligence of a gardener had been operative in
cutting the weaker organisms down. ‘The thistle,
which has spread over the Pampas, to the de-
struction of native plants, has been more effectually
“selected” by the unconscious operation of natural
conditions than if a thousand agriculturists had
spent their time in sowing it.
It is one of Mr. Darwin’s many great services
to Biological science that he has demonstrated the
significance of these facts. He has shown that—
given variation and given change of conditions—
the imevitable result is the exercise of such an
influence upon organisms that one is helped and
another is impeded; one tends to predominate,
104 CRITICISMS ON “THE ORIGIN OF SPECIES” or
another to disappear; and thus the living world
bears within itself, and is surrounded by, impulses
towards incessant change,
But the truths just stated are as certain as any
other physical laws, quite independently of the
truth, or falsehood, of the hypothesis which Mr.
Darwin has based upon them; and that M.
Flourens, missing the substance and grasping at a
shadow, should be blind to the admirable exposi-
tion of them, which Mr. Darwin has given, and see
nothing there but a “derniére erreur du dernier
siccle””»—a personification of Nature—leads us
indeed to ery with him: “O lucidité! O solidité
de l’esprit Francais, que devenez-vous ? ”
M. Flourens has, in fact, utterly failed to com-
prehend the first principles of the doctrine which
he assails so rudely. His objections to details are
of the old sort, so battered and hackneyed on this
side of the Channel, that not even a Quarterly
Reviewer could be induced to pick them up for
the purpose of pelting Mr. Darwin over again.
We have Cuvier and the mummies; M. Roulin
and the domesticated animals of America; the
difficulties presented by hybridism and by Palzon-
tology; Darwinism a rifacciamento of De Maillet
and Lamarck; Darwinism a system without a
commencement, and its author bound to believe in
M. Pouchet, &. &. How one knows it all by
heart, and with what relief one reads at p. 65—
“¢ Je laisse M. Darwin!”
ut CRITICISMS ON “ THE ORIGIN OF SPECIES” 105
But we cannot leave M. Flourens without calling
our readers’ attention to his wonderful tenth
chapter, “De la Préexistence des Germes et de
PEpigénése,” which opens thus :—
‘**Spontanéous generation is only a chimera. This point
established, two hypotheses remain: that of pre-existence and
that of epigenesis. The one of these hypotheses has as little
foundation as the other.” (FP. 163.) '
‘* The doctrine of evigencsis is derived from Harvey : follow-
ing by ocular inspection the development of the new being in
the Windsor does, he saw each part appear successively, and
taking the moment of appearance for the moment of formation
he imagined epigenesis.” (P. 165.)
On the contrary, says M. Flourens (p. 167),
‘**The new being is formed at a stroke (tout d'un cowp), asa
whole, instantaneously ; it is not formed part by part, and at
different times. It is formed at once at the single individuat
moment at which the conjunction of the male and female
elements takes place.”
It will be observed that M. Flourens uses
language which cannot be mistaken. For him,
the labours of Von Baer, of Rathke, of Coste, and
their contemporaries and successors in Germany,
France, and England, are non-existent: and, as
Darwin “imagina” natural selection, so Harvey
“qmagina” that doctrine which gives him an even
greater claim to the veneration of posterity than
his better known discovery of the circulation of
the blood.
Language such as that we have quoted is, in
fact, so preposterous, so utterly incompatible with
106 CRITICISMS ON “'THE ORIGIN OF SPECIES” qt
anything but absolute ignorance of some of the
best established facts, that we should have passed
it over in silence had it not appeared to afford
some clue to M. Flourens’ unhesitating, & priori,
repudiation of all forms of the doctrine of pro-
gressive modification of living beings. He whose
mind remains uninfluenced by an acquaintance
with the phenomena of development, must indeed
lack one of the chief motives towards the
endeavour to trace a genetic relation between
the different existing forms of life. Those who
are ignorant of Geology, find no difficulty in
believing that the world was made as it is; and
the shepherd, untutored in history, sees no reason
to regard the green mounds which indicate the
site of a Roman camp, as aught but part and
parcel of the primeval hill-side. So M. Flourens,
who believes that embryos are formed “ tout d’un
coup,” naturally finds no difficulty in conceiving
that species came into existence in the same
way.
IV
THE GENEALOGY OF ANIMALS!
[1869]
CONSIDERING that Germany now takes the lead of
the world in scientific investigation, and particu-
larly in biology, Mr. Darwin must be well pleased
at the rapid spread of his views among some of
the ablest and most laborious of German
naturalists,
Among these, Professor Haeckel, of Jena, is the
Coryphzus. I know of no more solid and import-
ant contributions to biology in the past seven
years than Haeckel’s work on the “ Radiolaria,”
and the researches of his distinguished colleague
Gegenbaur, in vertebrate anatomy; while in
Haeckel’s “ Generelle Morphologie” there is all
the force, suggestiveness, and, what I may term
1 The Natural History of Creation. By Dr. Ernst Haeckel.
[Natiirliche Schipfungs-Geschichte.—Von Dr. Ernst Haeckel,
Professor an der Universitat Jena.] Berlin, 1868.
108 THE GENEALOGY OF ANIMALS Iv
the systematising power, of Oken, without his ex-
travagance. The “Generelle Morphologie” is, in
fact, an attempt to put the Doctrine of Evolution,
so far as it applies to the living world, into a logical
form ; and to work out its practical applications to
their final results. The work before us, again, may
be said to be an exposition of the “Generelle
Morphologie” for an educated public, consisting,
as it does, of the substance of a series of lectures
delivered before a mixed audience at Jena, in the
session 1867-8.
“The Natural History of Creation,’—or, as
Professor Haeckel admits it would have been
better to call his work, “The History of the
Development or Evolution of Nature,’—deals, in
the first six lectures, with the general and _his-
torical aspects of the question and contains a very
interesting and lucid account of the views of Lin-
neus, Cuvier, Agassiz, Goethe, Oken, Kant,
Lamarck, Lyell, and Darwin, and of the historical
filiation of these philosophers.
The next six lectures are occupied by a well-
digested statement of Mr. Darwin’s views. The
thirteenth lecture discusses two topics which are
not touched by Mr. Darwin, namely, the origin of
the present form of the solar system, and that of
living matter. Full justice is done to Kant, as the
originator of that “cosmic gas theory,” as the
Germans somewhat quaintly call it, which is
commonly ascribed to Laplace. With respect to
ke ae a
Iv THE GENEALOGY OF ANIMALS 109
spontaneous generation, while admitting that there
is no experimental evidence in its favour, Professor
Haeckel denies the possibility of disproving it, and
points out that the assumption that it has occurred
is a necessary part of the doctrine of Evolution.
The fourteenth lecture, on “ Schopfungs-Perioden
und Schépfungs-Urkunden,” answers pretty much
to the famous disquisition on the “Imperfection
of the Geological Record” in the “ Origin of
Species.”
The following five lectures contain the most
original matter of any, being devoted to “ Phylo-
geny,” or the working out of the details of the
process of Evolution in the animal and vegetable
kingdoms, so as to prove the line of descent of
each group of living beings, and to furnish it
with its proper genealogical tree, or “ phylum.”
The last lecture considers objections and sums
up the evidence in favour of biological Evolution.
I shall best testify to my sense of the value of
the work thus briefly analysed if I now proceed to
note down some of the more important criticisms
which have been suggested to me by its perusal.
I. In more than one place, Professor Haeckel
enlarges upon the service which the “Origin of
Species” has done, in favouring what he terms
the “causal or mechanical” view of living nature
as opposed to the “teleological or vitalistic” view.
And no doubt it is quite true that the doctrine of
Evolution is the most formidable opponent of all
110 THE GENEALOGY OF ANIMALS IV
the commoner and coarser forms of Teleology.
But perhaps the most remarkable service to the
philosophy of Biology rendered by Mr. Darwin is
the reconciliation of Teleology and Morphology,
and the explanation of the facts of both which his
views offer.
The Teleology which supposes that the eye,
such as we see it in man or one of the higher Verte-
brata, was made with the precise structure which
it exhibits, for the purpose of enabling the animal
which possesses it to see, has undoubtedly received
its death-blow. Nevertheless it is necessary to
remember that there is a wider Teleology, which
is not touched by the doctrine of Evolution, but is
actually based upon the fundamental proposition
of Evolution, That proposition is, that the whole
world, living and not living, in the result of the
mutual interaction, according to definite laws, of
the forces possessed by the molecules of which the
primitive nebulosity of the universe was composed.
If this be true, it is no less certain that the existing
world lay, potentially, in the cosmic vapour ; and
that a sufficient intelligence could, from a know-
ledge of the properties of the molecules of that
vapour, have predicted, say the state of the Fauna
of Britain in 1869, with as much certainty as one
can say what will happen to the vapour of the
breath in a cold winter’s day.
Consider a kitchen clock, which ticks loudly,
shows the hours, minutes, and seconds, strikes,
i init tat hid) aerial Carat ih: mW ae iy NS
yee
Se ee ee oe ee ee a rT
IV THE GENEALOGY OF ANIMALS ili
cries “cuckoo!” and perhaps shows the phases of
the moon. When the clock is wound up, all the
phenomena which it exhibits are potentially con-
tained in its mechanism, and a clever clockmaker
could predict all it will do after an examination of
its structure.
If the evolution theory is correct, the mole-
cular structure of the cosmic gas stands in
the same relation to the phenomena of the
world as the structure of the clock to its pheno-
mena.
Now let us suppose a death-watch, living in the
clock-case, to be a learned and intelligent student
of its works. He might say, “I find here nothing
but matter and force and pure mechanism from
beginning to end,” and he would be quite right.
But if he drew the conclusion that the clock was
not contrived for a purpose, he would be quite
wrong. On the other hand, imagine another
death-watch of a different turn of mind. He,
listening to the monotonous “tick! tick!” so
exactly like his own, might arrive at the conclusion
that the clock was itself a monstrous sort of
death-watch, and that its final cause and purpose
was to tick, How easy to point to the clear
relation of the whole mechanism to the pendulum,
to the fact that the one thing the clock did always
_ and without intermission was to tick, and that all
the rest of its phenomena were intermittent and
subordinate te ticking! For all this, it is certain
bb he THE GENEALOGY OF ANIMALS IV
that kitchen clocks are not contrived for the
purpose of making a ticking noise.
Thus the teleological theorist would be as wrong
as the mechanical theorist, among our death-
watches ; and, probably, the only death-watch who
would be right would be the one who should
maintain that the sole thing death-watches could
be sure about was the nature of the clock-works
and the way they move; and that the purpose of
the clock lay wholly beyond the purview of beetle
faculties.
Substitute “cosmic vapour” for “clock,” and
“molecules” for “works,” and the application
of the argument is obvious. The teleological
and the mechanical views of nature are not,
necessarily, mutually exclusive. On the contrary,
the more purely a mechanist the speculator is, the
more firmly does he assume a primordial mo-
lecular arrangement, of which all the phenomena
of the universe are the consequences; and
the more completely is he thereby at the
mercy of the teleologist, who can always defy
him to disprove that this primordial molecular
arrangement was not intended to _ evolve
the phenomena of the universe. On the other
hand, if the teleologist assert that this, that, or
the other result of the working of any part of the
mechanism of the universe is its purpose and final
cause, the mechanist can always inquire how he
knows that it is more than an unessential incident
ae
Iv THE GENEALOGY OF ANIMALS 113
—the mere ticking of the clock, which he mistakes
for its function. And there seems to be no reply
to this inquiry, any more than to the further, not
irrational, question, why trouble one’s self about
matters which are out of reach, when the working
of the mechanism itself, which is of infinite
practical importance, affords scope for all our
energies ?
Professor Haeckel has invented a new and con-
venient name “ Dysteleology,” for the study of
the “ purposelessnesses” which are observable in
living organisms—such as the multitudinous cases
of rudimentary and apparently useless structures.
T confess, however, that it has often appeared to
me that the facts of Dysteleology cut two ways.
If we are to assume, as evolutionists in general do,
that useless organs atrophy, such cases as the
existence of lateral rudiments of toes, in the foot
of a horse, place us in a dilemma. For, either
these rudiments are of no use to the animal, in
which case, considering that the horse has existed
in its present form since the Phocene epoch, they
surely ought to have disappeared; or they are of
some use to the animal, in which case they are of
no use as arguments against Teleology. A similar,
but still stronger, argument may be based upon
the existence of teats, and even functional mam-
‘mary glands, in male mammals. Numerous cases
of “ Gynaecomasty,’ or functionally active breasts
in men, are on record, though there is no mam-
VOL, Il I
114 THE GENEALOGY OF ANIMALS Iv
malian species whatever in which the male nor-
mally suckles the young. ‘Thus, there can be
little doubt that the mammary gland was as
apparently useless in the remotest male mam-
malian ancestor of man as in living men, and yet
it has not disappeared. Is it then still profitable
to the male organism to retain it? Possibly ; but
in that case its dysteleological value is gone.}
II. Professor Haeckel looks upon the causes
which have led to the present diversity of living
nature as twofold. Living matter, he tells us, is
urged by two impulses: a centripetal, which tends
to preserve and transmit the specific form, and
which he identifies with heredity; and a centri-
fugal, which results from the tendency of external
conditions to modify the organism and effect its
adaptation to themselves. ‘The internal impulse
is conservative, and tends to the preservation of
specific, or individual, form ; the external impulse
is metamorphic, and tends to the modification of
specific, or individual, form.
In developing his views upon this subject,
Professor Haeckel introduces qualifications which
disarm some of the criticisms I should have been
disposed to offer; but I think that his method of
stating the case has the inconvenience of tending
to leave out of sight the important fact—which is
a cardinal point in the Darwinian hypothesis—
1 [The recent discovery of the important part played by the
Thyroid gland should be a warning to all speculators about
useless organs. 1893.]
Seay ate
Iv THE GENEALOGY OF ANIMALS 115
that the tendency to vary, in a given organism, may
have nothing to do with the external conditions to
which that individual organism is exposed, but
may depend wholly upon internal conditions. No
one, I imagine, would dream of seeking for the
cause of the development of the sixth finger and
toe in the famous Maltese, in the direct influence
of the external conditions of his life,
I conceive that both hereditary transmission
and adaptation need to be analysed into their
constituent conditions by the further application
of the doctrine of the Struggle for Existence. It
is a probable hypothesis, that what the world is to
organisms in general, each organism is to the
inolecules of which it is con piled: Muititudes of
these, having diverse tendencies, are competing
with one another for opportunity to exist and
multiply ; and the organism, as a whole, is as
much the product of the molecules which are
victorious as the Fauna, or Flora, of a country is
the product of the victorious organic beings in it.
On this hypothesis, hereditary transmission is
the result of the victory of particular molecules
contained in the impregnated germ. Adaptation
to conditions is the result of the favouring of the
multiplication of those molecules whose organising
_tendencies are most in harmony with such
conditions. In this view of the matter, conditions
are not actively productive, but are passively
permissive ; they do not cause variation in any
12
116 THE GENEALOGY OF ANIMALS IV
given direction, but they permit and favour a
tendency in that direction which already exists,
It is true that,in the long run, the origin of
the organic molecules themselves, and of their
tendencies, is to be sought in the external world ;
but if we carry our inquiries as far back as this,
the distinction between internal and external
impulses vanishes. On the other hand, if we
confine ourselves to the consideration of a single
organism, I think it must be admitted that the
existence of an internal metamorphic tendency
must be as distinctly recognised as that of an
internal conservative tendency; and that the
influence of conditions is mainly, if not wholly,
the result of the extent to which they favour the
one, or the other, of these tendencies.
III. There is only one point upon which I
fundamentally and entirely disagree with Professor
Haeckel, but that is the very important one of
his conception of geological time, and of the
meaning of the stratified rocks as records and
indications of that time. Conceiving that the
stratified rocks of an epoch indicate a period of
depression, and that the intervals between the
epochs correspond with periods of elevation of
which we have no record, he intercalates between
the different epochs, or periods, intervals which he
terms “Ante-periods.” Thus, instead of con-
sidering the Triassic, Jurassic, Cretaceous, and
Kocene periods, as continuously successive, he
a -
:
;
3
’
*
¥
IV THE GENEALOGY OF ANIMALS 117
interposes a period before each, as an “ Antetrias
zeit,” “ Antejura-zeit,” “Antecreta-zeit,’ “ Anteo-
cenzeit,” &c. And he conceives that the abrupt
changes between the Faune of the different forma-
tions are due to the lapse of time, of which we have
no organic record, during their “ Ante-periods.”
The frequent occurrence of strata containing
assemblages of organic forms which are inter-
mediate between those of adjacent formations, is,
to my mind, fatal to this view. In the well-
known St. Cassian beds, for example, Paleozoic
and Mesozoic forms are commingled, and, between
the Cretaceous and the Eocene formations, there
are similar transitional beds. On the other hand,
in the middle of the Silurian series, extensive
unconformity of the strata indicates the lapse of
vast intervals of time between the deposit of
successive beds, without any corresponding change
in the Fauna.
Professor Haeckel will, I fear, think me unreason-
able, if I say that he seems to be still overshadowed
by geological superstitions ; and that he will have
to believe in the completeness of the geological
record far less than he does at present. He assumes,
for example, that there was no dry land, nor any
terrestrial life, before the end of the Silurian epoch,
simply because, up to the present time, no indica-
' tions of fresh water, or terrestrial organisms, have
been found in rocks of older date. And, in
speculating upon the origin of a given group, he
118 THE GENEALOGY OF ANIMALS Iv
rarely goes further back than the “ Ante-period,”
which precedes that in which the remains of
animals belonging to that group are found. Thus,
as fossil remains of the majority of the groups of
Reptilia are first found in the Trias, they are
assumed to have originated in the “Antetriassic”
period, or between the Permian and _ Triassic
epochs.
I confess this is wholly incredible to me. The
Permian and the Triassic deposits pass completely
into one another ; there is no sort of discontinuity
answering to an unrecorded “ Antetrias”; and,
what is more, we have evidence of immensely
extensive dry land during the formation of these
deposits. We know that the dry land of the Trias
absolutely teemed with reptiles of all groups
except Pterodactyles, Snakes, and perhaps Tor-
toises ; there is every probability that true Birds
existed, and Mammalia certainly did. Of the in-
habitants of the Permian dry land, on the contrary,
all that have left a record are a few lizards. Is it
conceivable that these last should really represent
the whole terrestrial population of that time, and
that the development of Mammals, of Birds, and
of the highest forms of Reptiles, should have been
crowded into the time during which the Permian
conditions quietly passed away, and the Triassic
conditions began? Does not any such supposition
become in the highest degree improbable, when,
in the terrestrial or fresh-water Labyrinthodonts,
a my
IV THE GENEALOGY OF ANIMALS 119
which lived on the land of the Carboniferous epoch,
as well as on that of the Trias, we have evidence
that one form of terrestrial life persisted, through-
out all these ages, with no important modification ?
For my part, having regard to the small amount
of modification (except in the way of extinction)
which the Crocodilian, Lacertilian, and Chelonian
Reptilia have undergone, from the older Mesozoic
times to the present day, I cannot but put the
existence of the common stock from which they
sprang far back in the Palaeozoic epoch; and I
should apply a similar argumentation to all other
groups of animals.
[The remainder of this essay contains a discussion of questions
of taxonomy and phylogeny, which is now antiquated. I have
reprinted the considerations about the reconciliation of Teleology
with Morphology, about ‘‘ Dysteleology,” and about the struggle
for existence within the organism, because it has happened to
me to be charged with overlooking them.
In discussing Teleology, I ought to have pointed out, as I
have done elsewhere (Life and Letters of Charles Darwin, vol. ii.
p. 202), that Paley ‘‘ proleptically accepted the modern doctrine
of Evolution,” (Natural Theology, chap. xxiii.). 1893.]
i
MR. DARWIN’S CRITICS?
[1871]
THE gradual lapse of time has now separated us by
more than a decade from the date of the publi-
cation of the ‘ Origin of Species ”— and whatever
may be thought or said about Mr. Darwin’s doc-
trines, or the manner in which he has propounded
them, this much is certain, that, in a dozen years,
the “Origin of Species” has worked as complete a
revolution in biological science as the “ Principia ”
did in astronomy—and it has done so, because, in
the words of Helmholtz, it contains “ an essentially
new creative thought.” 2
And as time has slipped by, a happy change
1 1. Contributions to the Theory of Natural Selection. By
A. R. Wallace. 1870.—2. The Genesis of Species. By St. George
Mivart, F.R.S. Second Edition. 1871.—3. Darwin’s Descent
of Man. Quarterly Review, July 1871.
2 Helmholtz: Ueber das Ziel und die Fortschritie der Natur-
wissenschaft. Kroffnungsrede fiir die Naturforscherversamm-
lung zu Innsbruck. 1869. ~
—— ee ee ee
Vv MR. DARWIN'S CRITICS 121
has come over Mr. Darwin’s critics. The mixture
of ignorance and insolence which, at first, character-
ised a large proportion of the attacks with which
he was assailed, is no longer the sad distinction of
anti-Darwinian criticism. Instead of abusive non-
sense, which merely discredited its writers, we read
essays, which are, at worst, more or less intelligent
and appreciative; while, sometimes, like that
which appeared in the “ North British Review ” for
1867, they have a real and permanent value.
The several publications of Mr. Wallace and Mr.
Mivart contain discussions of some of Mr. Darwin’s
views, which are worthy of particular attention, not
only on account of the acknowledged scientific
competence of these writers, but because they ex-
hibit an attention to those philosophical questions
which underlie all physical science, which is as rare
as it is needful. And the same may be said of an
article in the “ Quarterly Review” for July 1871,
the comparison of which with an article in the
same Review for July 1860, is perhaps the best
evidence which can be brought forward of the
change which has taken place in public opinion
on “ Darwinism.”
The Quarterly Reviewer admits “the certainty
of the action of natural selection” (p. 49); and
further allows that there is an d@ priori probability
in favour of the evolution of man from some lower
animal form, if these lower animal forms them-
selves have arisen by evolution.
122 MR. DARWIN’S CRITICS Vv
Mr. Wallace and Mr. Mivart go much further
than this, They are as stout believers in evolution
as Mr. Darwin himself; but Mr. Wallace denies
that man can have been evolved from a lower
animal by that process of natural selection which
he, with Mr. Darwin, holds to have been sufficient
for the evolution of all animals below man; while
Mr. Mivart, admitting that natural selection has
been one of the conditions of the evolution of the
animals below man, maintains that natural se-
lection must, even in their case, have been supple-
mented by “some other cause””—of the nature of
which, unfortunately, he does not give us any idea.
Thus Mr. Mivart is less of a Darwinian than Mr.
Wallace, for he has less faith in the power of
natural selection. But he is more of an evolutionist
than Mr. Wallace, because Mr. Wallace thinks it
necessary to call in an intelligent agent—a sort of
supernatural Sir John Sebright—to produce even
the animal frame of man; while Mr. Mivart re-
quires no Divine assistance till he comes to man’s
soul.
Thus there is a considerable divergence between
Mr. Wallace and Mr. Mivart. On the other hand,
there are some curious similarities between Mr.
Mivart and the Quarterly Reviewer, and these
are sometimes so close, that, if Mr. Mivart thought
it worth while, I think he might make out a
good case of plagiarism against the Reviewer, who
studiously abstains from quoting him.
ee hme ee
Vv MR. DARWIN’S CRITICS 123
Both the Reviewer and Mr. Mivart reproach Mr.
Darwin with being, “like so many other physic-
ists,’ entangled in a radically false metaphysical
system, and with setting at nought the first
principles of both philosophy and religion. Both
enlarge upon the necessity of a sound philo-
sophical basis, and both, I venture to add, make a
conspicuous exhibition of its absence. The
Quarterly Reviewer believes that man “ differs
more from an elephant or a gorilla than do these
from the dust of the earth on which they tread,”
and Mr. Mivart has expressed the opinion that
there is more difference between man and an ape
than there is between an ape and a_ piece of
granite.
And even when Mr. Mivart (p. 86) trips ina
matter of anatomy, and creates a difficulty for Mr.
Darwin out of a supposed close similarity between
the eyes of fishes and cephalopods, which (as
Gegenbaur and others have clearly shown) does
not exist, the Quarterly Reviewer adopts the
argument without hesitation (p. 66).
There is another important point, however, in
which it is hard to say whether Mr, Mivart
diverges from the Quarterly Reviewer or not.
The Reviewer declares that Mr. Darwin has,
“with needless opposition, set at nought the first
‘principles of both philosophy and religion” (p.
90).
1 See the Tablet for March 11, 1871.
124 MR. DARWIN'S CRITICS Vv
It looks, at first, as if this meant, that Mr.
Darwin’s views being false, the opposition to
“religion” which flows from them must be need-
less. But I suspect this is not the right view of
the meaning of the passage, as Mr. Mivart, from
whom the Quarterly Reviewer plainly draws so
much inspiration, tells us that “the consequences
which have been drawn from evolution, whether
exclusively Darwinian or not, to the prejudice of
religion, by no means follow. from it, and are in
fact illegitimate ” (p. 5).
I may assume, then, that the Quarterly
Reviewer and Mr. Mivart admit that there is no
necessary opposition between “ evolution whether
exclusively Darwinian or not,” and religion. But
then, what do they mean by this last much-
abused term? On this point the Quarterly
Reviewer is silent. Mr. Mivart, on the contrary,
is perfectly explicit, and the whole tenor of his
remarks leaves no doubt that by “religion” he
means theology ; and by theology, that particular
variety of the great Proteus, which is expounded
by the doctors of the Roman Catholic Church, and
held by the members of that religious community
to be the sole form of absolute truth and of saving
faith.
_ According to Mr. Mivart, the greatest and most
orthodox authorities upon matters of Catholic
doctrine agree in distinctly asserting “ derivative
creation” or evolution ; “and thus their teachings
vy MR. DARWIN’S CRITICS 125
harmonise with all that modern science can
possibly require ” (p. 305).
I confess that this bold assertion interested me
more than anything else in Mr. Mivart’s book.
What little knowledge I possessed of Catholic
doctrine, and of the influence exerted by Catholic
authority in former times, had not led me to
expect that modern science was likely to find
a warm welcome within the pale of the greatest
and most consistent of theological organisations.
And my astonishment reached its climax when
I found Mr, Mivart citing Father Suarez as his
chief witness in favour of the scientific freedom
enjoyed by Catholics—the popular repute of that
learned theologian and subtle casuist not being such
as to make his works a likely place of refuge for
liberality of thought. But in these days, when
Judas Iscariot and Robespierre, Henry VIII.
and Catiline, have all been shown to be men of
admirable virtue, far in advance of their age, and
consequently the victims of vulgar prejudice, it
was obviously possible that Jesuit Suarez might
be in like case. And, spurred by Mr. Mivart’s
unhesitating declaration, I hastened to acquaint
myself with such of the works of the great Catholic
divine as bore upon the question, hoping, not
merely to acquaint myself with the true teachings
-of the infallible Church, and free myself of an
unjust prejudice ; but, haply, to enable myself, at
a pinch, to put some Protestant bibliolater to
126 MR. DARWIN’S CRITICS y
shame, by the bright example of Catholic freedom
from the trammels of verbal inspiration,
I regret to say that my anticipations have been
cruelly disappointed. But the extent to which
my hopes have been crushed can only be fully
appreciated by citing, in the first place, those
passages of Mr. Mivart’s work by which they were
excited. In his introductory chapter I find the
following passages :—
“The prevalence of this theory [of evolution]
need alarm no one, for it is, without any doubt,
perfectly consistent with the strictest and most
orthodox Christian! theology ” (p. 5).
“Mr. Darwin and others may perhaps be
excused if they have not devoted much time to
the study of Christian philosophy ; but they have
no right to assume or accept without careful ex-
amination, as an unquestioned fact, that in that
philosophy there is a necessary antagonism
between the two ideas ‘ creation ’ and ‘ evolution,’
as applied to organic forms.
“Tt is notorious and patent to all who choose to
seek, that many distinguished Christian thinkers
have accepted, and do accept, both ideas, 7.e. both
‘creation’ and ‘ evolution.’
“As much as ten years ago an eminently
Christian writer observed : ‘ The creationist theory
does not necessitate the perpetual search after
1 It should be observed that Mr. Mivart employs the term
Christian” as if it were the equivalent of ‘‘ Catholic.”
Vv MR. DARWIN’S CRITICS 127
manifestations of miraculous power and perpetual
“catastrophes.” Creation is not a miraculous
interference with the laws of Nature, but the very
institution of those laws. Law and regularity,
not arbitrary intervention, was the patristic ideal
of creation. With this notion they admitted,
without difficulty, the most surprising origin of
living creatures, provided it took place by law.
They held that when God said, “ Let the waters
produce,” “ Let the earth produce,’ He conferred
forces on the elements of earth and water which
enabled them naturally to produce the various
species of organic beings. This power, they
thought, remains attached to the elements
throughout all time.’ The same writer quotes
St. Augustin and St. Thomas Aquinas, to the
effect that, ‘in the institution of Nature, we do not
look for miracles, but for the laws of Nature.’
And, again, St. Basil speaks of the continued
operation of natural laws in the production of all
organisms,
“So much for the writers of early and medizval
times. As to the present day, the author can
confidently affirm that there are many as well
versed in theology as Mr. Darwin is in his own
department of natural knowledge, who would not
be disturbed by the thorough demonstration of his
theory. Nay, they would not even be in the least
painfully affected at witnessing the generation of
animals of complex organisation by the skilful
128 MR. DARWIN'S CRITICS Vv
artificial arrangement of natural forces, and the
production, in the future, of a fish by means
analogous to those by which we now produce
urea. |
“And this because they know that the possi-
bility of such phenomena, though by no means
actually foreseen, has yet been fully provided for
in the old philosophy centuries before Darwin, or
even centuries before Bacon, and that their place in
the system can be at once assigned them without
even disturbing its order or marring its harmony.
“ Moreover, the old tradition in this respect has
never been abandoned, however much it may have
been ignored or neglected by some modern writers.
In proof of this, it may be observed that perhaps
no post-medizval theologian has a wider reception
amongst Christians throughout the world than
Suarez, who has a separate section ! in opposition
to those who maintain the distinct creation of the
various kinds—or substantial forms—of organic
life” (pp. 19--21).
Still more distinctly does Mr. Mivart express
himself in the same sense, in his last chapter,
entitled “ Theology and Evolution” (pp. 302-5).
“Tt appears, then, that Christian thinkers are
perfectly free to accept the general evolution
theory. But are there any theological authorities
to justify this view of the matter ?
1 Suarez, Metaphysica. Edition Vivés. Paris, 1868, vol. i.
Disput. xv. § 2.
Vv MR. DARWIN'S CRITICS 129
“Now, considering how extremely recent are
these biological speculations, it might hardly be
expected @ priori that writers of earlier ages
should have given expression to doctrines
harmonising in any degree with such very
modern views; nevertheless, this is certainly
the case, and it would be easy to give numerous
examples. It will be better, however, to cite one
or two authorities of weight. Perhaps no writer
of the earlier Christian ages could be quoted whose
authority is more generally recognised than that
of St. Augustin. The same may be said of the
medieval period for St. Thomas Aquinas: and
since the movement of Luther, Suarez may
be taken as an authority, widely venerated,
and one whose orthodoxy has never been ques-
tioned.
“Tt must be borne in mind that for a consider-
able time even after the last of these writers no
one had disputed the generally received belief as
to the small age of the world, or at least of the
kinds of animals and plants inhabiting it. It
becomes, therefore, much more striking if views
formed under such a condition of opinion are
found to harmonise with modern ideas con-
cerning ‘Creation’ and organic Life.
“ Now St. Augustin insists ina very remarkable
-manner on the merely derivative sense in which
God’s creation of organic forms is to be under-
stood ; that is, that God created them by conferring
VOL, I K
130 MR. DARWIN’S CRITICS Vv
on the material world the power to evolve them
under suitable conditions.”
Mr. Mivart then cites certain passages from St.
Augustin, St. Thomas Aquinas, and Cornelius &
Lapide, and finally adds :—
‘** As to Suarez, it will be enough to refer to Disp. xv. sec. 2,
No. 9, p. 508, t. i. edition Vivés, Paris ; also Nos. 13—15.
Many other references to the same effect could easily be given,
but these may suffice.
‘*Tt is then evident that ancient and most venerable theo-
logical authorities distinctly assert derivative creation, and
thus their teachings harmonise with all that modern science
can possibly require.”
It will be observed that Mr. Mivart refers solely
to Suarez’s fifteenth Disputation, though he adds,
“Many other references to the same effect could
easily be given.” I shall look anxiously for these
references in the third edition of the “ Genesis of
Species.” For the present, all I can say is, that
I have sought in vain, either in the fifteenth
Disputation, or elsewhere, for any passage in
Suarez’s writings which, in the slightest degree,
bears out Mr. Mivart’s views as to his opinions.!
The title of this fifteenth Disputation is “De
causa formali substantiali,” and the second section
of that Disputation (to which Mr. Mivart refers)
is headed, “Quomodo possit forma substantialis
fieri in materia et ex materia?”
1 The edition of Suarez’s Disputationes from which the follow-
ing citations are given, is Birekmann’s, in two volumes folio,
and is dated 1630.
Vv MR. DARWIN’S CRITICS 131
The problem which Suarez discusses in this
place may be popularly stated thus: According to
the scholastic philosophy every natural body has
two components—the one its “ matter” (materia
prima), the other its “substantial form ” (forma
substantialis). Of these the matter is everywhere
the same, the matter of one body being indis-
tinguishable from the matter of any other body.
That which differentiates any one natural body
from all others is its substantial form, which
inheres in the matter of that body, as the human
soul inheres in the matter of the frame of man,
and is the source of all the activities and other
properties of the body.
Thus, says Suarez, if water is heated, and the
source of heat is then removed, it cools again.
The reason of this is that there is a certain “ inti-
mius principium” in the water, which brings it
back to the cool condition when the external
impediment to the existence of that condition is
removed. This intimius principiwm is the “ sub-
stantial form ” of the water. And the substantial
form of the water is not only the cause (radix) of
the coolness of the water, but also of its moisture,
of its density, and of all its other properties.
It will thus be seen that “substantial forms ”
play nearly the same part in the scholastic
philosophy as “ forces” do in modern science ; the
general tendency of modern thought being to
conceive all bodies as resolvable into material
K 2
132 MR. DARWIN’S CRITICS Vv
particles and forces, in virtue of which last these
particles assume those dispositions and exercise
those powers which are characteristic of each
particular kind of matter.
But the Schoolmen distinguished two kinds of
substantial forms, the one spiritual and the other
material. ‘The former division is represented by
the human soul, the anima rationalis; and they
affirm as a matter, not merely of reason, but of
faith, that every human soul is created out of
nothing, and by this act of creation is endowed
with the power of existing for all eternity, apart
from the materia prima of which the corporeal
frame of man is composed, And the anima
rationalis, once united with the materia prima of
the body, becomes its substantial form, and is the
source of all the powers and faculties of man—of
all the vital and sensitive phenomena which he
exhibits—just as the substantial form of water is
the source of all its qualities.
The “material substantial forms” are those
which inform all other natural bodies except that
of man; and the object of Suarez in the present
Disputation, is to show that the axiom “ ex nihilo
nihil fit,” though not true of the substantial form
of man, is true of the substantial forms of all
other bodies, the endless mutations of which
constitute the ordinary course of nature. The
origin of the difficulty which he discusses is easily
comprehensible. Suppose a piece of bright iron
Vy MR. DARWIN’S CRITICS 1338
to be exposed to the air. The existence of the
iron depends on the presence within it of a sub-
stantial form, which is the cause of its properties,
e.g. brightness, hardness, weight. But, by degrees,
the iron becomes converted into a mass of rust,
which is dull, and soft, and light, and, in all other
respects, is quite different from the iron. As, in
the scholastic view, this difference is due to the
rust being informed by a new substantial form,
the grave problem arises, how did this new sub-
stantial form come into being? Has it been
created ? or has it arisen by the power of natural
causation? If the former hypothesis is correct,
then the axiom, “ex nihilo nihil fit,” is false, even
in relation to the ordinary course of nature, seeing
that such mutations of matter as imply the
continual origin of new substantial forms are
occurring every moment. But the harmonisation
of Aristotle with theology was as dear to the
Schoolmen, as the smoothing down the differences
between Moses and science is to our Broad Church-
men, and they were proportionably unwilling to
contradict one of Aristotle’s fundamental proposi-
tions. Nor was their objection to flying in the face
of the Stagirite likely to be lessened by the fact
that such flight landed them in flat Pantheism.
So Father Suarez fights stoutly for the second
hypothesis ; and I quote the principal part of his
argumentation as an exquisite specimen of that
speech which is a “darkening of counsel.”
184 MR. DARWIN’S CRITICS Vv
“13. Secundo de omnibus aliis formis substantialibus [se.
materialibus] dicendum est non fieri proprie ex nihilo, sed ex
potentia prejacentis materie educi : ideoque in effectione harum
formarum nil fieri contra illud axioma, Hx nihilo nihil fit, si
recte intelligatur. Hc assertio sumitur ex Aristotelel, Phy-
sicorum per totum et libro 7, Metaphyss. et ex aliis auctoribus,
quos statim referam. Et declaratur breviter, nam fieri ex
nihilo duo dicit, unum est fieri absolute et simpliciter, aliud est
quod talis effectio fit ex nihilo. Primum proprié dicitur de re
subsistente, quia ejus est fieri, cujus est esse: id autem proprie
quod subsistit et habet esse ; nam quod alteri adjacet, potius est
quo aliud est. Ex hac ergo parte, forme substantiales mate-
riales non fiunt ex nihilo, quia proprie non fiunt. Atque hanc
rationem reddit Divus Thomas 1 parte, questione 45, articulo
8, et questione 90, articulo 2, et ex dicendis magis explicabitur,
Sumendo ergo ipsum fier? in hac proprietate et rigore, sic fieri
ex nihilo est fieri secundum se totum, id est nulla sui parte
presupposita, ex quo fiat. Et hac ratione res naturales dum de
novo fiunt, non fiunt ex nihilo, quia fiunt ex presupposita
materia, ex qua componuntur, et ita non fiunt, secundum se
tote, sed secundum aliquid sui. Forme autem harum rerum,
quamvis revera totam suam entitatem de novo accipiant, quam
antea non habebant, quia vero ipse non fiunt, ut dictum est,
ideo neque ex nihilo fiunt. Attamen, quia latiori modo sumendo
verbum illud fiert negari non potest: quin forma facta sit, eo
modo quo nune est, et antea non erat, ut etiam probat ratio
dubitandi posita in principio sectionis, ideo addendum est,
sumpto jieri in hac amplitudine, fieri ex nihilo non tamen
negare habitudinem materialis cause intrinsecé componentis id
quod fit, sed etiam habitudinem cause materialis per se causantis
et sustentantis formam que fit, seu confit. Diximus enim in
superioribus materiam et esse causam compositi et forme
dependentis ab illa: ut res ergo dicatur ex nihilo fieri uterque
modus causalitatis negari debet ; et eodem sensu accipiendum
est illud axioma, ut sit verum: Ez nihilo nihil fit, scilicet
virtute agentis naturalis et finiti nihil fieri, nisi ex presupposito
subjecto per se concurrente, et ad compositum et ad formam, si
utrumque suo modo ab eodem agente fiat. Ex his ergo recté
Vv MR. DARWIN’S CRITICS 135
concluditur, formas substantiales materiales non fieri ex nihilo,
quia fiunt ex materia, que in suo genere per se concurrit, et
influit ad esse, et fieri talium formarum ; quia, sicut esse non
possunt nisi affixe materiz, a qua sustententur in esse : ita nec
fieri possunt, nisi earum effectio et penetratio in eadem materia
sustentetur. Et hec est propria et per se differentia inter
effectionem ex nihilo, et ex aliquo, propter quam, ut infra
ostendemus, prior modus efficiendi superat vim finitam natu-
raliam agentium, non vero posterior.
**14. Ex his etiam constat, proprie de his formis dici non
ereari, sed educi de potentia materiz.” !
If I may venture to interpret these hard say-
ings, Suarez conceives that the evolution of
substantial forms in the ordinary course of nature,
is conditioned not only by the existence of the
materia prima, but also by a certain “ concurrence
and influence” which that materia exerts; and
every new substantial form being thus conditioned,
and in part, at any rate, caused, by a pre-existing
something, cannot be said to be created out of
nothing.
But as the whole tenor of the context shows,
Suarez applies this argumentation merely to the
evolution of material substantial forms in the
ordinary course of nature. How the substantial
forms of animals and plants primarily originated,
is a question to which, so far as I am able to
discover, he does not so much as allude in his
“ Metaphysical Disputations.” Nor was there any
necessity that he should do so, inasmuch as he
1 Suarez, loc. cit. Disput. xv. § ii.
136 MR. DARWIN’S CRITICS v
has devoted a separate treatise of considerable
bulk to the discussion of all the problems which
arise out of the account of the Creation which is
given in the Book of Genesis. And it is a
matter of wonderment to me that Mr. Mivart,
who somewhat sharply reproves “ Mr. Darwin and
others” for not acquainting themselves with the
true teachings of his Church, should allow
himself to be indebted to a heretic like myself
for a knowledge of the existence of that “ Trac-
tatus de opere sex Dierum,”? in which the learned
Father, of whom he justly speaks, as “an
authority widely venerated, and whose orthodoxy
has never been questioned,” directly opposes all
those opinions for which Mr, Mivart claims the
shelter of his authority.
In the tenth and eleventh chapters of the first
book of this treatise, Suarez inquires in what sense
the word “day,” as employed in the first chapter
of Genesis, is to be taken. He discusses the
views of Philo and of Augustin on this question,
and rejects them. He suggests that the approval
of their allegorising interpretations by St. Thomas
Aquinas, merely arose out of St. Thomas’s
modesty, and his desire not to seem openly to
controvert St. Augustin—“ voluisse Divus Thomas
1 Tractatus de opere sex Dierwm, scw de Universi Creatione,
quatenus scx diebus perfecta esse, in libro Genesis cap. i. refertur,
ct presertim de productione hominis in statu innocentia. Ed,
Birckmann, 1622,
Vv MR. DARWIN’S CRITICS 137
pro sua modestia subterfugere vim argumenti
potius quam aperte Augustinum inconstantie
arguere.”
Finally, Suarez decides that the writer of
Genesis meant that the term “day” should be
taken in its natural sense ; and he winds up the
discussion with the very just and natural remark
that “it is not probable that God, in inspiring
Moses to write a history of the Creation which
was to be believed by ordinary people, would
have made him use language, the true meaning of
which it is hard to discover, and still harder to
believe.” ! p
And in chapter xii. 3, Suarez further ob-
serves :—
‘‘Ratio enim retinendi veram significationem diei naturalis
est illa communis, quod verba Scripture non sunt ad metaphoras
transferenda, nisi vel necessitas cogit, vel ex ipsa scriptura
constet, et maximé in historica narratione et ad instructionem
fidei pertinente : sed hee ratio non minus cogit ad intelligendum
proprié dierum numerum, quam diei qualitatem, QUIA NON
MINUS UNO MODO QUAM ALIO DESTRUITUR SINCERITAS, IMO ET
VERITAS HISTORIA. Secundo hoc valde confirmant alia Scripture
loca, in quibus hi sex dies tanquam veri, et inter se distincti
commemorantur, ut Exod. 20 dicitur, Sex diebus operabis et
facies omnia opera tua, septimo autem die Sabbatum Domini Det
1 «*Propter hee ergo sententia illa Augustini et propter nimiam
obscuritatem et subtilitatem ejus difficilis creditu est: quia
verisimile non est Deum inspirasse Moysi, ut historiam de
creatione mundi ad fidem totius populi adeo necessariam per
nomina dierum explicaret, quorum significatio vix inveniri et
difficillime ab aliquo credi posset.” (Loe. cit. Lib. I. cap, xi.
42.)
188 MR. DARWIN’S CRITICS Vv
tut est. Et infra: Sex enim diebus fecit Dominus celum et
terram et mare et omnia que in eis sunt, et idem repetitur in
cap. 31. In quibus locis sermonis proprietas colligi potest tum
ex equiparatione, nam cum dicitur: scx diebus operabis, pro-
priissimé intelligitur: tum quia non est verisimile, potuisse
populum intelligere verba illa in alio sensu, et é contrario in-
credibile est, Deum in suis preceptis tradendis illis verbis ad
populum fuisse loquutum, quibus deciperetur, falsum sensum
concipiendo, si Deus non per sex veros dies opera sua fecisset.”
These passages leave no doubt that this great
doctor of the Catholic Church, of unchallenged
authority and unspotted orthodoxy, not only
declares it to be Catholic doctrine that the work
of creation took place in the space of six natural
days ; but that he warmly repudiates, as inconsist-
ent with our knowledge of the Divine attributes,
the supposition that the language which Catholic
faith requires the believer to hold that God
inspired, was used in any other sense than that
which He knew it would convey to the minds of
those to whom it was addressed.
And I think that in this repudiation Father
Suarez will have the sympathy of every man of
common uprightness, to whom it is certainly
“incredible” that the Almighty should have acted
in a manner which He would esteem dishonest
and base in a man.
But the belief that the universe was created in
six natural days is hopelessly inconsistent with
the doctrine of evolution, in so far as it applies to
the stars and planetary bodies; and it can be
Vv MR. DARWIN’S CRITICS 189
made to agree with a belief in the evolution of
living beings only by the supposition that the
plants and animals, which are said to have been
created on the third, fifth, and sixth days, were
merely the primordial forms, or rudiments, out of
which existing plants and animals have been
evolved; so that, on these days, plants and
animals were not created actually, but only
potentially.
The latter view is that held by Mr. Mivart, who
follows St. Augustin, and implies that he has the
sanction of Suarez. But, in point of fact, the
latter great light of orthodoxy takes no small
pains to give the most explicit and direct contra-
diction to all such imaginations, as the following
passages prove. In the first ‘place, as regards
plants, Suarez discusses the problem :—
**Quomodo herba virens et cetera vegetabilia hoc [tertio| die
Suerint producta,*
‘* Preecipua enim difficultas hic est, quam attingit Div. Thomas
1, par. qu. 69, art. 2, an hee productio plantarum hoc die facta
intelligenda sit de productione ipsarum in proprio esse actuali et
formali (ut sic rem explicerem) vel de productione tantum in
semine et in potentia. Nam Divus Augustinus libro quinto Genes,
ad liter. cap. 4 et 5 et libro 8, cap. 3, posteriorem partem tradit,
dicens, terram in hoc die accepisse virtutem germinandi omnia
vegetabilia quasi concepto omnium illorum semine, non tamen
statim vegetabilia omnia produxisse. Quod primo suadet verbis
illis capitis secundi. Jn die quo fecit Deus celum et terram et
_
1 Loe, cit. Lib. II. cap. vii. et viii. 1, 32, 35.
140 MR. DARWIN’S CRITICS y
omne virgultum agri priusquam germinaret. Quomodo enim
potuerunt virgulta fieri antequam terra germinaret nisi quia
causaliter prius et quasi in radice, seu in semine facta sunt, et
postea in actu producta? Secundo confirmari potest, quia
verbum illud germinet terra optimé exponitur potestativé ut sic
dicam, id est accipiat terra vim germinandi. Sicut in eodem
capite dicitur crescite et multiplicamini. Tertio potest confirmari,
quia actualis productio vegetabilium non tam ad opus creationis,
quam ad opus propagationis pertinet, quod postea factum est.
Et hance sententiam sequitur Eucherius lib. 1, in Gen. cap. 11, et
illi faveat Glossa, interlii Hugo. et Lyran. dum verbum
germinet dicto modo exponunt. NIHILOMINUS CONTRARIA
SENTENTIA TENENDA EST: SCILICET, PRODUXISSE DEUM HOC
DIE HERBAM, ARBORES, ET ALIA VEGETABILIA ACTU IN PROPRIA
SPECIE ET NATURA. Hee est communis sententia Patrum.—
Basil. homil. 5; Exemer. Ambros, lib. 3 ; Exemer. cap. 8,
11, et 16 ; Chrysost. homil. 5 in Gen. Damascene. lib. 2 de Fid.
cap. 10 ; Theodor. Cyrilli. Bede, Gloss ordinarie et aliorum in
Gen. Et idem sentit Divus Thomas, supra, solvens argumenta
Augustini, quamvis propter reverentiam ejus quasi problematicé
semper procedat. Denique idem sentiunt omnes qui in his
operibus veram successionem et temporalem distinctionem
agnoscant.”
Secondly, with respect to animals, Suarez is no
less decided :—
** De animalium ratione carentium productione quinto et sexto
die facta.+
**32. Primo ergo nobis certum sit hee animantia non in
virtute tantum aut in semine, sed actu, et in seipsis, facta fuisse
his diebus in quibus facta narrantur. Quanquam Augustinus
lib. 3, Gen. ad liter. cap. 5 in sua persistens sententia contrarium
sentire videatur.”
But Suarez proceeds to refute Augustin’s
1 Loe. cit. Lib. II. cap. vii. et viii. 1, 32, 35.
Vv MR. DARWIN’S CRITICS 141
opinions at great length, and his final judgment
may be gathered from the following passage :—
‘¢35. Tertio dicendum est, hec animalia omnia his diebus
producta esse, IN PERFECTO STATU, IN SINGULIS INDIVIDUIS, SEU
SPECIEBUS SUIS, JUXTA UNIUSCUJUSQUE NATURAM....
ITAQUE FUERUNT OMNIA CREATA INTEGRA ET OMNIBUS SUIS
MEMBRIS PERFECTA.”
As regards the creation of animals and plants,
therefore, it is clear that Suarez, so far from
“distinctly asserting derivative creating,” denies
it as distinctly and positively as he can; that
he is at much pains to refute St. Augustin’s
opinions; that he does not hesitate to regard
the faint acquiescence of St. Thomas Aquinas in
the views of his brother saint as a kindly subter-
fuge on the part of Divus Thomas; and that he
affirms his own view to be that which is supported
by the authority of the Fathers of the Church.
So that, when Mr. Mivart tells us that Catholic
theology is in harmony with all that modern
science can possibly require ; that “to the general
theory of evolution, and to the special Darwinian
form of it, no exception ... need be taken on
the ground of orthodoxy;” and that “law and
regularity, not arbitrary intervention, was the
Patristic ideal of creation,’ we have to choose
between his dictum, as a theologian, and that
of a great light of his Church, whom he him-
self declares to be “widely venerated as an
142 MR. DARWIN’S CRITICS Vv
authority, and whose orthodoxy has never been
questioned.”
But Mr. Mivart does not hesitate to push his
attempt to harmonise science with Catholic
orthodoxy to its utmost limit; and, while
assuming that the soul of man “arises from
immediate and direct creation,” he supposes that
his body was “formed at first (as now in each
separate individual) by derivative, or secondary
creation, through natural laws ” (p. 331).
This means, I presume, that an animal, having
the corporeal form and bodily powers of man, may
have been developed out of some lower form of
life by a process of evolution; and that, after this
anthropoid animal had existed for a longer or
shorter time, God made a soul by direct creation,
and put it into the manlike body, which, hereto-
fore, had been devoid of that anima rationalis,
which is supposed to be man’s distinctive
character.
This hypothesis is incapable of either proof or
disproof, and therefore may be true; but if
Suarez is any authority, it is not Catholic
doctrine. “ Nulla est in homine forma educta de
potentia materiz,” ? is a dictum which is absolutely
inconsistent with the doctrine of the natural
evolution of any vital manifestation of the human
body.
Moreover, if man existed as an animal before
! Disput. xv. § x. No. 27.
Vv MR. DARWIN'S CRITICS 1438
he was provided with a rational soul, he must, in
accordance with the elementary requirements of
the philosophy in which Mr. Mivart delights, have
possessed a distinct sensitive and vegetative soul,
or souls. Hence, when the “ breath of life” was
breathed into the manlike animal’s nostrils, he
must have already been a living and feeling
creature. But Suarez particularly discusses this
point, and not only rejects Mr. Mivart’s view, but
adopts language of very theological strength
regarding it.
‘*Possent preeterea his adjungi argumenta theologica, ut est
illud quod sumitur ex illis verbis Genes. 2. Formuavit Deus
hominem ex limo terre et inspiravit in faciem ejus spiraculum
vite et factus est homo in animam viventem : ille enim spiritus,
quam Deus spiravit, anima rationalis fuit, et PER EADEM FACTUS
EST HOMO VIVENS, ET CONSQUENTER, ETIAM SENTIENS.
‘¢ Aliud est ex VIII. Synodo Generali que est Constantinopol-
itana IV. can. 11, qui sic habet. Apparet quosdam in tantum
impictatis venisse ut homines duas animas habere dogmatizent :
talis igitur impietatis inventores et similes sapientes, cum Vetus
et Novum Testamentum omnesque Ecclesia patres unam animam
rationalem hominem habere asseverent, Sancta et universalis
Synodus anathematizat.” }
Moreover, if the animal nature of man was the
result of evolution, so must that of woman have
been.” But the Catholic doctrine, according to
Suarez, is that woman was, in the strictest and
most literal sense of the words, made out of the
rib of man.
1 Disput. xv. ‘‘ De causa formali substantiali,” § x. No. 24.
144 MR. DARWIN’S CRITICS Vv
‘* Nihilominus sententia Catholica est, verba illa Scripture
esse ad literam intelligenda. Ac PROINDE VERE, AC REALITER,
TULISSE DEUM CosTAM ADAM, ET, EX ILLA, CORPUS Ev”
FORMASSE,”’ }
Nor is there any escape in the supposition that
some woman existed before Eve, after the fashion
of the Lilith of the rabbis; since Suarez qualifies
that notion, along with some other Judaic
imaginations, as simply “ damnabilis.” ?
After the perusal of the “'Tractatus de Opere”
it is, in fact, impossible to admit that Suarez held
any opinion respecting the origin of species, except
such as is consistent with the strictest and most
literal interpretation of the words of Genesis.
For Suarez, it is Catholic doctrine, that the world
was made in six natural days. On the first of
these days the materia prima was made out of
nothing, to receive afterwards those “substantial
forms” which moulded it into the universe of
things; on the third day, the ancestors of all
living plants suddenly came into being, full-grown,
perfect, and possessed of all the properties which
now distinguish them; while, on the fifth and
sixth days, the ancestors of all existing animals
were similarly caused to exist in their complete
and perfect state, by the infusion of their appro-
priate material substantial forms into the matter
1 Tractatus de Opere, Lib. III. ‘‘ De hominis creatione,” cap.
ii. No. 3.
2 Ibid. Lib. III. cap. iv. Nos. 8 and 9
Vv MR. DARWIN’S CRITICS 145
which had already been created. Finally, on the
sixth day, the anima rationalis—that rational and
immortal substantial form which is peculiar to
man—was created out of nothing, and “ breathed
into” a mass of matter which, till then, was mere
dust of the earth, and so man arose. But the
species man was represented by a solitary male
individual, until the Creator took out one of his
ribs and fashioned it into a female,
This is the view of the “Genesis of Species”
held by Suarez to be the only one consistent with
Catholic faith: it is because he holds this view to
be Catholic that he does not hesitate to declare
St. Augustin unsound, and St. Thomas Aquinas
guilty of weakness, when the one swerved from
this view and the other tolerated the deviation.
And, until responsible Catholic authority—say,
for example, the Archbishop of Westminster—
formally declares that Suarez was wrong, and
that Catholic priests are free to teach their flocks
that the world was not made in six natural days,
and that plants and animals were nof created in
their perfect and complete state, but have been
evolved by natural processes through long ages
from certain germs in which they were potentially
contained, I, for one, shall feel bound to believe
that the doctrines of Suarez are the only ones
which are sanctioned by Infallible Authority, as
represented by the Holy Father and the Catholic
Church.
VOL. I I,
146 MR. DARWIN'S CRITICS v
I need hardly add that they are as absolutely
denied and repudiated by Scientific Authority, as
represented by Reason and Fact. The question
whether the earth and the immediate progenitors
of its present living population were made in six
natural days or not is no longer one upon which
two opinions can be held.
The fact that it did not so come into being
stands upon as sound a basis as any fact of
history whatever. It is not true that existing
plants and animals came into being within three
days of the creation of the earth out of nothing, for
itis certain that innumerable generations of other
plants and animals lived upon the earth before
its present population. And when, Sunday after
Sunday, men who profess to be our instructors in
righteousness read out the statement, “In six
days the Lord made heaven and earth, the sea,
and all that in them is,” in innumerable churches,
they are either propagating what they may easily
know, and, therefore, are bound to know, to be
falsities ; or, if they use the words in some non-
natural sense, they fall below the moral standard of
the much-abused Jesuit.
Thus far the contradiction between Catholic
verity and Scientific verity is complete and
absolute, quite independently of the truth or false-
hood of the doctrine of evolution. But, for those
who hold the doctrine of evolution, all the Catholic
verities about the creation of living beings must
Vv MR. DARWIN’S CRITICS 147
be no less false. For them, the assertion that the
progenitors of all existing plants were made on the
third day, of animals on the fifth and sixth days,
in the forms they now present, is simply false.
Nor can they admit that man was made suddenly
out of the dust of the earth ; while it would be an
insult to ask an evolutionist whether he credits the
preposterous fable respecting the fabrication of
woman to which Suarez pins his faith. If Suarez
has rightly stated Catholic doctrine, then is
evolution utter heresy. And such I believe it to
be. In addition to the truth of the doctrine of
evolution, indeed, one of its greatest merits in
my eyes, is the fact that it occupies a position of
complete and irreconcilable antagonism to that
vigorous and consistent enemy of the highest intel-
lectual, moral, and social life of mankind—the
Catholic Church. No doubt, Mr. Mivart, like
other putters of new wine into old bottles, is
actuated by motives which are worthy of respect,
and even of sympathy; but his attempt has met
with the fate which the Scripture prophesies for
all such.
Catholic theology, like all theologies which are
based upon the assumption of the truth of the
account of the origin of things given in the Book
of Genesis, being utterly irreconcilable with the
doctrine of evolution, the student of science, who is
satisfied that the evidence upon which the doctrine
of evolution rests, is incomparably stronger and
L 2
148 MR. DARWIN’S CRITICS Vv
better than that upon which the supposed author-
ity of the Book of Genesis rests, will not trouble
himself further with these theologies, but will
confine his attention to such arguments against
the view he holds as are based upon purely
scientific data—and by scientific data I do not
merely mean the truths of physical, mathematical,
or logical science, but those of moral and meta-
physical science. For by science I understand
all knowledge which rests upon evidence and
reasoning of a like character to that which claims
our assent to ordinary scientific propositions, And
if any one is able to make good the assertion that
his theology rests upon valid evidence and sound
reasoning, then it appears to me that such theology
will take its place as a part of science.
The present antagonism between theology and
science does not arise from any assumption by the
men of science that all theology must necessarily
be excluded from science, but simply because
they are unable to allow that reason and morality
have two weights and two measures ; and that the
belief in a proposition, because authority tells you
it is true, or because you wish to believe it, which
is a high crime and misdemeanour when the sub-
ject matter of reasoning is of one kind, becomes
under the alias of “faith” the greatest of all
virtues when the subject matter of reasoning is of
another kind.
The Bishop of Brechin said well the other
Vv MR. DARWIN’S CRITICS 149
day :—“ Liberality in religion—I do not mean
tender and generous allowances for the mis-
takes of others—is only unfaithfulness to truth.” *
And, with the same qualification, I venture
to paraphrase the Bishop’s dictum: “ Kecle-
siasticism in science is only unfaithfulness to
truth.”
Elijah’s great question, “ Will you serve God or
Baal? Choose ye,” is uttered audibly enough in
the ears of every one of us as we come to man-
hood. Let every man who tries to answer it
seriously ask himself whether he can be satisfied
with the Baal of authority, and with all the good
things his worshippers are promised in this world
and the next. If he can, let him, if he be so
inclined, amuse himself with such scientific imple-
ments as authority tells him are safe and will not
cut his fingers; but let him not imagine he is, or
can be, both a true son of the Church and a loyal
soldier of science.
And, on the other hand, if the blind acceptance
of authority appears to him in its true colours, as
mere private judgment in excelsis, and if he have
the courage to stand alone, face to face with the
abyss of the eternal and unknowable, let him be
content, once for all, not only to renounce the good
things promised by “Infallibility,” but even to
bear the bad things which it prophesies ; content
1 Charge at the Diocesan Synod of Brechin. Scotsman, Sept.
14, 1871.
150 MR. DARWIN’S CRITICS v
to follow reason and fact in singleness and honesty
of purpose, wherever they may lead, in the sure
faith that a hell of honest men will, to him, be
more endurable than a paradise full of angelic
shams.
Mr. Mivart asserts that “ without a belief in a
personal God there is no religion worthy of the
name.” This is a matter of opinion. But it may
be asserted, with less reason to fear contradiction,
that the worship of a personal God, who, on Mr.
Mivart’s hypothesis, must have used language
studiously calculated to deceive His creatures and
worshippers, is “no religion worthy of the name.”
“Tneredible est, Deum illis verbis ad populum
fuisse locutum quibus deciperetur,” is a verdict in
which, for once, Jesuit casuistry concurs with the
healthy moral sense of all mankind.
Having happily got quit of the theological
aspect of evolution, the supporter of that great
truth who turns to the scientific objections which
are brought against it by recent criticism, finds, to
his relief, that the work before him is greatly
lightened by the spontaneous retreat of the enemy
from nine-tenths of the territory which he occu-
pied ten years ago. Even the Quarterly Reviewer
not only abstains from venturing to deny that
evolution has taken place, but he openly admits
that Mr. Darwin has forced on men’s minds “a
recognition of the probability, if not more, of
Vv MR. DARWIN'S CRITICS 151
evolution, and of the certainty of the action of
natural selection” (p. 49).
I do not quite see, myself, how, if the action of
natural selection is certain, the occurrence of evolu-
tion is only probable; masmuch as the development
of a new species by natural selection is, so far as
it goes, evolution. However, it is not worth while
to quarrel with the precise terms of a sentence
which shows that the high water mark of intelli-
gence among those most respectable of Britons, the
readers of the Quarterly Review, has now reached
such a level that the next tide may lift them
easily and pleasantly on the once-dreaded shore of
evolution. Nor, having got there, do they seem
likely to stop, until they have reached the inmost
heart of that great region, and accepted the ape
ancestry of, at any rate, the body of man. For
the Reviewer admits that Mr. Darwin can be said
to have established :
“‘That if the various kinds of lower animals have been
evolved one from the other by a process of natural generation
or evolution, then it becomes highly probable, @ priori, that
man’s body has been similarly evolved; but this, in such a
case, becomes equally probable from the admitted fact that he is
an animal at all” (p. 65).
From the principles laid down in the last sen-
tence it would follow that if man were constructed
upon a plan as different from that of any other
animal as that of a sea-urchin is from that of a
whale, it would be “equally probable” that he
152 MR. DARWIN'S CRITICS Vv
had been developed from some other animal as it
is now, when we know that for every bone, muscle,
tooth, and even pattern of tooth, in man, there isa
corresponding bone, muscle, tooth, and pattern of
tooth, in an ape. And this shows one of two things
—either that the Quarterly Reviewer’s notions of
probability are peculiar to himself, or that he has
such an overpowering faith in the truth of evolution
that no extent of structural break between one
animal and another is sufficient to destroy his con-
viction that evolution has taken place.
But this by the way. The importance of the
admission that there is nothing in man’s physical
structure to interfere with his having been evolved
from an ape is not lessened because it is grudg-
ingly made and inconsistently qualified. And in-
stead of jubilating over the extent of the enemy’s
retreat, it will be more worth while to lay siege to
his last stronghold—the position that there is a
distinction in kind between the mental faculties
of man and those of brutes, and that in consequence
of this distinction in kind no gradual progress
from the mental faculties of the one to those of the
other can have taken place.
The Quarterly Reviewer entrenches himself
within formidable-looking psychological outworks,
and there is no getting at him without attacking
them one by one.
He begins by laying down the following pro-
position. “‘ Sensation’ is not ‘thought,’ and no
Vv MR. DARWIN’S CRITICS 153
amount of the former would constitute the most
rudimentary condition of the latter, though sen-
sations supply the conditions for the existence of
‘thought’ or ‘ knowledge’ ” (p. 67).
This proposition is true, or not, according to the
sense in which the word “thought” is employed.
Thought is not uncommonly used in a sense co-
extensive with consciousness, and, especially, with
those states of consciousness we callmemory. If I
recall the impression made by a colour or an odour,
and distinctly remember blueness or muskiness, I
may say with perfect propriety that I “think of”
blue or musk; and, so long as the thought lasts,
it is simply a faint reproduction of the state of
consciousness to which I gave the name in question,
when it first became known to me as a sensation.
Now, if that faint reproduction of a sensation,
which we call the memory of it, is properly termed
a thought, it seems to me to be a somewhat forced
proceeding to draw a hard and fast line of demar-
cation between thoughts and sensations. If sen-
sations are not rudimentary thoughts, it may be
said that some thoughts are rudimentary sensations.
No amount of sound constitutes an echo, but for
all that no one would pretend that an echo is some-
thing of totally different nature from a sound.
Again, nothing can be looser, or more inaccurate,
than the assertion that “sensations supply the
conditions for the existence of thought or know-
ledge.” If this implies that sensations supply the
154 MR. DARWIN’S CRITICS Vv
conditions for the existence of our memory of sen-
sations or of our thoughts about sensations, it is a
truism which it is hardly worth while to state so
solemnly. If it implies that sensations supply any-
thing else, it is obviously erroneous. And if it
means, as the context would seem to show it does,
that sensations are the subject-matter of all thought
or knowledge, then it is no less contrary to fact,
inasmuch as our emotions, which constitute a large
part of the subject-matter of thought or of know-
ledge, are not sensations.
More eccentric still is the Quarterly Reviewer's
next piece of psychology.
** Altogether, we may clearly distinguish at least six kinds of
action to which the nervous system ministers :—
‘J. That in which impressions received result in appropriate
movements without the intervention of sensation or thought, as
in the cases of injury above given.—This is the reflex action of
the nervous system.
‘TI. That in which stimuli from without result in sensations
through the agency of which their due effects are wrought out.
—Sensation.
**TIJ. That in which impressions received result in sensations
which give rise to the observation of sensible objects.—Sensible
perception.
‘‘TV. That in which sensations and perceptions continue to
coalesce, agglutinate, and combine in more or less complex
aggregations, according to the laws of the association of sensible
perceptions. —A ssociation.
‘The above four groups contain only indeliberate operations,
consisting, as they do at the best, but of mere presentative
sensible ideas in no way implying any reflective or representative
faculty. Such actions minister to and form Jnstinct. Besides these,
we may distinguish two other kinds of mental action, namely :—
v MR. DARWIN’S CRITICS 155
‘*V,. That in which sensations and sensible perceptions are
reflected on by thought, and recognised as our own, and we
ourselves recognised by ourselves as affected and perceiving.—
Self-consciousness.
‘*VI, That in which we reflect upon our sensations or
perceptions, and ask what they are, and why they are. —Reason.
**These two latter kinds of action are deliberate operations,
performed, as they are, by means of representative ideas imply-
ing the use of a reflective representative faculty. Such actions
distinguish the intellect or rational faculty. Now, we assert
that possession in perfection of all the first four ( presentative)
kinds of action by no means implies the possession of the last
two (representative) kinds. All persons, we think, must admit
the truth of the following proposition :—
**Two faculties are distinct, not in degree but in kind, if we
may possess the one in perfection without that fact implying
that we possess the other also. Still more will this be the case
if the two faculties tend to increase in an inverse ratio. Yet
this is the distinction between the instinctive and the intellectual
parts of man’s nature.
‘* As to animals, we fully admit that they may possess all the
first four groups of actions—that they may have, so to speak,
mental images of sensible objects combined in all degrees of
complexity, as governed by the laws of association. We deny
to them, on the other hand, the possession of the last two kinds
of mental action. We deny them, that is, the power of reflecting
on their own existences, or of inquiring into the nature of objects
and their causes. We deny that they know that they know or
know themselves in knowing. In other words, we deny them
reason. The possession of the presentative faculty, as above
explained, in no way implies that of the reflective faculty ; nor
does any amount of direct operation imply the power of asking
the reflective question before mentioned, as to ‘what’ and
‘why.’” (Loe, cit. pp. 67, 68.)
Sundry points are worthy of notice in this
remarkable account of the intellectual powers. In
the first place the Reviewer ignores emotion and
156 MR. DARWIN’S CRITICS y
volition, though they are no inconsiderable “ kinds
of action to which the nervous system ministers,”
and memory has a place in his classification only
by implication. Secondly, we are told that the
second “kind of action to which the nervous
system ministers ” is “that in which stimuli from
without result in sensations through the agency
of which their due effects are wrought out.—
Sensation.” Does this really mean that, in the
writer's opinion, “sensation” is the “agent” by
which the “due effect” of the stimulus, which
gives rise to sensation, is “wrought out”?
Suppose somebody runs a pin into me. The
“due effect” of that particular stimulus will
probably be threefold; namely, a sensation of
pain, a start, and an interjectional expletive.
Does the Quarterly Reviewer really think that
the “sensation” is the “agent” by which the
other two phenomena are wrought out ?
But these matters are of little moment to
anyone but the Reviewer and those persons who
may incautiously take their physiology, or psycho-
logy, from him. The really interesting point is
this, that when he fully admits that animals
“may possess all the first four groups of actions,”
he grants all that is necessary for the purposes of
the evolutionist. For he hereby admits that in
animals “ impressions received result in sensations
which give rise to the observation of sensible
objects,’ and that they have what he calls
Vv MR. DARWIN’S CRITICS 157
“sensible perception.’ Nor was it possible to
help the admission ; for we have as much reason
to ascribe to animals, as we have to attribute to
our fellow-men, the power, not only of perceiving
external objects as external, and thus practically
recognizing the difference between the self and the
not-self; but that of distinguishing between like
and unlike, and between simultaneous and suc-
cessive things. When a gamekeeper goes out
coursing with a greyhound in leash, and a hare
crosses the field of vision, he becomes the subject
of those states of consciousness we call visual
sensation, and that is all he receives from without.
Sensation, as such, tells him nothing whatever
about the cause of these states of consciousness;
but the thinking faculty instantly goes to work
upon the raw material of sensation furnished to it
through the eye, and gives rise to a train of
thoughts. First comes the thought that there is
an object at a certain distance; then arises
another thought—the perception of the likeness
between the states of consciousness awakened by
this object to those presented by memory, as, on
some former occasion, called up by a hare; this is
succeeded by another thought of the nature of an
emotion—namely, the desire to possess the hare;
then follows a longer or shorter train of other
thoughts, which end in a volition and an act—the
loosing of the greyhound from the leash. These
several thoughts are the concomitants of a process
158 MR. DARWIN’S CRITICS Vv
which goes on in the nervous system of the man.
Unless the nerve-elements of the retina, of the
optic nerve, of the brain, of the spinal cord, and
of the nerves of the arms, went through certain
physical changes in due order and correlation, the
various states of consciousness which have been
enumerated would not make their appearance. So
that in this, as in all other intellectual operations,
we have to distinguish two sets of successive
changes—one in the physical basis of conscious-
ness, and the other in consciousness itself ; one set
which may, and doubtless will, in course of time,
be followed through all their complexities by the
anatomist and the physicist, and one of which only
the man himself can have immediate knowledge.
As it is very necessary to keep up a clear
distinction between these two processes, let the one
be called newrosis, and the other psychosis, When
the gamekeeper was first trained to his work
every step in the process of neurosis was accom-
panied by a corresponding step in that of psychosis,
or nearly so. He was conscious of seeing some-
thing, conscious of making sure it was a hare,
conscious of desiring to catch it, and therefore to
loose the greyhound at the right time, conscious of
the acts by which he let the dog out of the leash.
But with practice, though the various steps of the
neurosis remain—for otherwise the impression on
the retina would not result in the loosing of the
dog—the great majority of the steps of the
v MR. DARWIN’S CRITICS 159
psychosis vanish, and the loosing of the dog follows
unconsciously, or as we say, without thinking about
it, upon the sight of the hare. No one will deny
that the series of acts which originally intervened
between the sensation and the letting go of the
dog were, in the strictest sense, intellectual and
rational operations. Do they cease to be so when
the man ceases to be conscious of them? That
depends upon what is the essence and what the
accident of those operations, which, taken to-
gether, constitute ratiocination.
Now ratiocination is resolvable into predication,
and predication consists in marking, in some way,
the existence, the co-existence, the succession, the
likeness and unlikeness, of things or their ideas.
Whatever does this, reasons ; and if a machine pro-
duces the effects of reason, I see no more ground
for denying to it the reasoning power, because it
is unconscious, than I see for refusing to Mr.
Babbage’s engine the title of a calculating machine
on the same grounds.
Thus it seems to me that a gamekeeper reasons,
whether he is conscious or unconscious, whether
his reasoning is carried on by neurosis alone, or
whether it involves more or less psychosis. And
if this is true of the gamekeeper, it is also true of
the greyhound, The essential resemblances in all
points of structure and function, so far as they can
be studied, between the nervous system of the man
and that of the dog, leave no reasonable doubt
160 MR. DARWIN’S CRITICS Vv
that the processes which go on in the one are just
like those which take place in the other. In the
dog, there can be no doubt that the nervous
matter which lies between the retina and the
muscles undergoes a series of changes, precisely
analogous to those which, in the man, give rise to
sensation, a train of thought, and volition.
Whether this neurosis is accompanied by such
psychosis as ours it is impossible to say; but
those who deny that the nervous changes, which,
in the dog, correspond with those which underlie
thought in a man, are accompanied by conscious-
ness, are equally bound to maintain that those
nervous changes in the dog, which correspond with
those which underlie sensation in a man, are also-
unaccompanied by consciousness. In other words,
if there is no ground for believing that a dog thinks,
neither is there any for believing that he feels,
As is well known, Descartes boldly faced this
dilemma, and maintained that all animals were
mere machines and entirely devoid of consciousness.
But he did not deny, nor can anyone deny, that in
this case they are reasoning machines, capable of
performing all those operations which are _per-
formed by the nervous system of man when he
reasons. For even supposing that in man, and in
man only, psychosis is superadded to neurosis—the
neurosis which is common to both man and animal
gives their reasoning processes a fundamental
unity. But Descartes’ position is open to very
v MR. DARWIN'S CRITICS 161
serious objections if the evidence that animals feel
is insufficient to prove that they really do so. What
is the value of the evidence which leads one to
believe that one’s fellow-man feels? The only
evidence in this argument of analogy is the
similarity of his structure and of his actions to
one’s own. And if that is good enough to prove
that one’s fellow-man feels, surely it is good
enough to prove that an ape feels. For the differ-
ences of structure and function between men and
apes are utterly insufficient to warrant the
assumption that while men have those states of
consciousness we call sensations apes have nothing
of the kind. Moreover, we have as good evidence
that apes are capable of emotion and volition as
we have that men other than ourselves are. But
if apes possess three out of the four kinds of states
of consciousness which we discover in ourselves,
what possible reason is there for denying them the
fourth? If they are capable of sensation, emotion,
and volition, why are they, to be denied thought
(in the sense of predication) ?
No answer has ever been given to these
questions. And as the law of continuity is as
much opposed, as is the common sense of man-
kind, to the notion that all animals are unconscious
machines, it may safely be assumed that no
- sufficient answer ever will be given to them.
There is every reason to believe that con-
sciousness is a function of nervous matter, when
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162 MR. DARWIN’S CRITICS v
that nervous matter has attained a certain degree
of organisation, just as we know the other
“actions to which the nervous system ministers,”
such as reflex action and the like, to be. As I
have ventured to state my view of the matter
elsewhere, “our thoughts are the expression of
molecular changes in that matter of life which is
the source of our other vital phenomena.”
Mr. Wallace objects to this statement in the
following terms :—
** Not having been able to find any clue in Professor Huxley’s
writings to the steps by which he passes from those vital pheno-
mena, which consist only, in their last analysis, of movements
by particles of matter, to those other phenomena which we term
thought, sensation, or consciousness ; but, knowing that so
positive an expression of opinion from him will have great weight
with many persons, I shall endeavour to show, with as much
brevity as is compatible with clearness, that this theory is not
only incapable of proof, but is also, as it appears to me,
inconsistent with accurate conceptions of molecular physics.”
With all respect for Mr. Wallace, it appears to
me that his remarks are entirely beside the ques-
tion. I really know nothing whatever, and never
hope to know anything, of the steps by which the
passage from molecular movement to states of
consciousness is effected; and I entirely agree
with the sense of the passage which he quotes
from Professor Tyndall, apparently imagining that
it is in opposition to the view I hold.
All that I have to say is, that,in my belief,
consciousness and molecular action are capable of
Vv MR. DARWIN’S CRITICS 168
being expressed by one another, just as heat and
mechanical action are capable of being expressed
in terms of one another. Whether we shall ever
be able to express consciousness in foot-pounds, or
not, is more than I will venture to say; but that
there is evidence of the existence of some corre-
lation between mechanical motion and conscious-
ness, is as plain as anything can be. Suppose the
poles of an electric battery to be connected by
a platinum wire.