































THE EPISTLES OF ST. PAUL  
TO THE  
THESSALONIANS, GALATIANS, ROMANS.

WITH CRITICAL NOTES AND DISSERTATIONS.

VOL. II.



THE HISTORY OF ST. PAUL

BY

THE REV. JOHN WATSON, B.A.

WITH ORIGINAL NOTES AND ILLUSTRATIONS

BY

LONDON  
PRINTED BY SPOTTISWOODE AND CO.  
NEW STREET SQUARE.

# THE EPISTLES OF ST. PAUL

TO THE

## THESSALONIANS, GALATIANS, ROMANS.

WITH CRITICAL NOTES AND DISSERTATIONS

BY THE REV. BENJAMIN JOWETT, M.A.

REGIUS PROFESSOR OF GREEK IN THE UNIVERSITY OF OXFORD.

IN TWO VOLUMES.—VOL. II.

Second Edition.

LONDON

JOHN MURRAY, ALBEMARLE STREET.

1859





# CONTENTS

OF

## THE SECOND VOLUME.



### THE EPISTLE TO THE ROMANS.

	Page
INTRODUCTION . . . . .	3
Subject of the Epistle . . . . .	29
Time and Place . . . . .	36
CHAPTER I. . . . .	41
On the Connexion of Immorality and Idolatry . . . . .	70
On the State of the Heathen World . . . . .	74
CHAPTER II. . . . .	78
On the Abstract Ideas of the New Testament, in connexion with Romans, I. 17 . . . . .	96
On the Modes of Time and Place in Scripture . . . . .	110
CHAPTER III. . . . .	117
CHAPTER IV. . . . .	142
The Old Testament . . . . .	156
CHAPTER V. . . . .	160
On the Imputation of the Sin of Adam . . . . .	180
CHAPTER VI. . . . .	188
CHAPTER VII. . . . .	204
On Conversion and Changes of Character . . . . .	222
CHAPTER VIII. . . . .	250
CHAPTERS IX.—XI. . . . .	268
Contrasts of Prophecy . . . . .	318
CHAPTERS XII — XVI. . . . .	337
CHAPTER XIII. . . . .	356



	Page
CHAPTER XIV. . . . .	368
Casuistry . . . . .	384
CHAPTER XV. . . . .	408
CHAPTER XVI. . . . .	422
Natural Religion . . . . .	430
The Law as the Strength of Sin . . . . .	495
On Righteousness by Faith . . . . .	523
On Atonement and Satisfaction . . . . .	547
On Predestination and Free-will . . . . .	596

THE EPISTLE  
TO  
THE ROMANS.





THE  
EPISTLE TO THE ROMANS.

---

---

INTRODUCTION.

THE Epistle to the Romans has ever been regarded as first in importance among the Epistles of St. Paul, the cornerstone of that Gospel which he preached among the Gentiles. Not only does it present more completely than other parts of Scripture the doctrine of righteousness by faith, but it connects this doctrine with the state of mankind in general, embracing Jew and Gentile at once in its view, alternating them with each other in the counsels of Providence. It looks into the world within, without losing sight of the world which is without. It is less than the other Epistles concerned with the disputes or wants of a particular Church, and more with the greater needs of human nature itself. It turns an eye backward on the times of past ignorance both in the individual and mankind, and again looks forward to the restoration of the Jews and to the manifestation of the sons of God. It speaks of the law itself in language which even now "that the law is dead to us and we to the law," still pierces to the dividing asunder of the flesh and spirit. No other portion of the New Testament gives a similarly connected view of the ways of God to man; no other is spread over truths so far from us and yet so near to us.

It is not, however, this higher and more universal aspect of the Epistle to the Romans with which we are at present immediately con-

cerned. Our first question is a critical and historical one: What was the Roman Church, and in what relation did it stand to the Apostle? The difficulty in answering this question partly arises from the very universality of the subject of the Epistle. The great argument takes us out of the accidents of time and place. We cannot distinctly recognise what we but remotely see, the particular and individual features of which are lost in the width of the prospect. Could the Apostle himself have had, and therefore is it to be expected that he could communicate to us, the same vivid personal conception of the Church at Rome as of Churches whose members were individually known to him, whom, in his own language, he had himself begotten in the Gospel? In an Epistle written from a distance to converts unknown to him by face, it is not to be supposed that there will be found even the materials for conjecture which are supplied by the Epistles to the Galatians and Corinthians. Naturally the personality of the writer, and still more of those whom he is addressing, falls into the background. He writes upon general topics which are equally applicable to almost all Churches, which fail, therefore, to throw any light on the particular Church to which the Epistle is addressed. Nor can this dimness of the critical eye receive any assistance from external sources. With the exception of the well-known command of Claudius to the Jews to depart from Rome about fifteen years previously, to which we may add the faint traces of a Christian Church which was apparently distinct from the Jews, in Acts, xxviii. 15., and the separate mention of Christians in Tacitus and Suetonius, nothing has come down to us which throws any light, however uncertain, on the beginnings of the Roman Church.

It is natural that this deficiency of real knowledge should produce many different theories respecting the general scope of the Epistle and the elements out of which the Roman Church was composed. That it was addressed to Jews, that it was addressed to Gentiles, that it was addressed to a mixed community of Jews and Gentiles, that it is a doctrinal treatise, that it arose out of the circumstances of the converts themselves, that it was written rather from the



Apostle's own mind than adapted to the thoughts or state of those whom he is addressing, — are all of them opinions which find some degree of support from passages in the Epistle itself. While to some the Epistle to the Romans appears like an enlarged edition of that to the Galatians, containing the same opposition of Jew and Gentile, there are other minds who think they find in it a nearer analogy and resemblance to the Epistle to the Hebrews, or even to the Corinthians. Nor is the inquiry on which we are entering really separable from the larger inquiry into the general state of the Apostolical age. The manner in which the transition was effected from Judaism to Christianity, — the steps by which men were led to reflect the light of the world upon the Law and the Prophets, — the degree of opposition which existed between the old and new, — are questions which, though far from being absolutely determined, must nevertheless be taken into consideration in any attempt to define the position and character of the Roman Church.

The interest that attaches to the origin of that great ecclesiastical dominion which was to cover the world, though connected by little more than a name with the earlier Greek community which is the subject of our investigation, and the yet stronger interest in “gathering up the fragments that remain, that nothing be lost,” respecting the great Epistle of the Gentile Apostle, will justify our lingering awhile around the probabilities and points of view which have been suggested by commentators. No pains can be too great to illustrate even the least words that bear upon the history of the Apostolical age. Small as the result may be, yet the inquiry will be fruitful. Nor need we be afraid of multiplying uncertainties. The light of theory seems to be needed to make us observe facts. The opinions of almost all have probably contributed something to the increasing clearness and distinctness with which we are able to determine the limits of our knowledge on this subject.

The Epistle to the Romans has been regarded as a sort of theological treatise on the great question of Jewish and Gentile differences; addressed, it has been sometimes said, to the metropolis of

the world, as the Epistle to the Hebrews is addressed to the Jewish nation generally. In support of such a view may be urged the continuity of the Epistle itself, in which a single theme is worked out at great length and in many points of view; also, the comparative absence of personal allusions, which are confined to the first and the two last chapters. All the earlier Epistles of St. Paul overflow with expressions of feeling and interest; they are full of himself and of his converts, abounding in hopes and fears, in joys and anxieties. He constantly refers in them to what he has been told, and has much to say in return to those to whom he is writing. It is otherwise with the Epistle to the Romans. We have only to cut off from the main body of the Epistle its commencement and conclusion, to be aware of its great difference from the Galatians and Corinthians. It is an Epistle of which the admiring readers might still say, "His letters are weighty and powerful," and in writing which the Apostle would become increasingly conscious of the new source of influence which had opened to him; but it is also an Epistle unlike his earlier ones,—more methodical in its arrangement, arising out of no previous information conveyed to him from the Church itself, and referring to no circumstances that imply any precise knowledge of its actual state.

Yet we have reason to hesitate before we ascribe to the Apostle a treatise on Justification by Faith, because the expression itself introduces associations inconsistent with the simplicity of the Apostolical age. The Epistles of St. Paul were not to the first disciples what time has made them to us. They were a part of his ministry, in style oral rather than written, and very unlike a regular literary work. He who lived inwardly the life of all the churches did not sit down at a desk to compose a book. Even the change which has been alluded to was probably unobserved by himself. What he wrote was the accident of what he was; the expansion of an ordinary letter into the only topics which had any interest for himself or the first believers, in which the common things of life had become absorbed and extinguished, that the hidden things

might be revealed. There is no reason to suppose that he wrote to the Christians in Rome with any peculiar feeling of the dignity of the imperial city; or that its greatness roused in him any new sense of his high calling as the Apostle of the Gentiles. Amid that vast multitude of all countries and nations, and in all that varied scene of power and magnificence, his only concern was with those few brethren, the report of whom had reached him in Greece and Asia, who were called by the name of Christ, with whom he desires to make acquaintance by letter, not without a hope that he may one day see them.

But if the Epistle is not to be regarded as a treatise, if it be written as a man writes to his friends, not without reference to their feelings and circumstances, the question from which we digressed again arises, "What was the origin of the Roman Church, and what were the elements of which it was composed?" Was it Jewish or Gentile, or made up equally of Jews and Gentiles? or a Church of which the majority were one or the other, or one which, though of Jewish origin, was gradually opening the door wide to the Gentiles, or which, consisting originally of Gentiles, was Jewish in its practice and teaching, as being founded by the party of the circumcision, resting on "those who seemed to be pillars" (Gal. ii. 9.), the Apostles, as they are described by St. Paul, that "were in Christ before him" (Rom. xvi. 7.)? The Gentile Apostle is often "fearful of building upon another man's foundation." Who are they whom he nevertheless addresses, and to whom he stands in a sort of personal relation, though not his own converts? Only an imperfect answer can be given to these questions, the materials for which must be sought mainly in the character and tendency of the Epistle itself. An examination of some of the principal opinions on the subject will be a convenient way of bringing together the facts which bear upon it.

1. Neander is of opinion that the Epistle to the Romans was addressed to a Church consisting mainly of Gentile Christians; "to whom," he says, "the Gospel had been published by men of the



Pauline School, independently of the Mosaic Law, and to whom Paul, as the Apostle of the Gentiles, felt himself called upon to write." The Roman Church had grown up without him, but seemed to have a claim upon him to receive from his lips that Gospel which he preached among other Gentiles. Though at a distance from him, it was his proper field of labour. The Christians at Rome would not have been addressed by him had they been Jews. Least of all would he have included his own countrymen in the general term "other Gentiles" (i. 5.). But if so, we are compelled to admit that the Epistle could not have been addressed to a Church composed of Jewish Christians.

Other subsidiary proofs may be urged on the same side of the argument:—First, Tacitus' brief notice of the Neronian persecution, in which the Christians are spoken of as a distinct body and known by a separate name, which would not have been the case had they been of Jewish origin. Such a mention of them, at any rate, falls in with the supposition of a Gentile rather than a Jewish Church. To which may be added, secondly, the argument of Olshausen, that the discrepancy between the last chapter of the Acts and the Epistle to the Romans can be reconciled only by supposing that the Jews at Rome must have been widely separated from the Roman Church, the fame of which even before St. Paul's visit "is known throughout the world." (Rom. i. 8.) For in the narrative, at the end of the Acts, of St. Paul's visit to Rome, he appears as introducing himself to the Jews, who had heard nothing of the proceedings against him in Judea, and desired him "to instruct them concerning that way which was everywhere spoken against." Must they not have been strangers to the Christians at Rome, if they had not heard of these things? and could that have been a Jewish Christian Church which was unknown to the Jews in the same city?

On the two latter of these arguments little stress can be laid. The mention of the Christians under their proper name in the Neronian persecution, by a writer who lived nearly fifty years afterwards, can

hardly be taken as a proof that in the reign of Nero the Christians were already looked upon as a distinct body from the Jews; still less can the further deduction be admitted that they could not have been so regarded at Rome, unless they had been of Gentile origin. In reference to the second argument from the comparison of the last chapter of the Acts, it may be observed, that to assume a fact in order to reconcile a discrepancy between two writers is an extremely precarious mode of reasoning — “it must be so, not because either the Acts or the Epistle says so, but because otherwise there will be a disagreement between them.” These circuitous reconcilements do more than discrepancies to sap the historical foundations of Christianity. In the present instance, even after the assumption of Olshausen, the difficulty remains nearly where it was. It is singular, though not perhaps impossible, that the Jews should know nothing of the Christians residing in the same city; whether the latter are Jews or Gentiles makes little difference. These arguments, however, are not the real strength of Neander’s case. Their weakness cannot invalidate the express statement of St. Paul, that he is writing to Gentiles; and by Gentiles he could never have meant Jews. When he says that he longed to see them, that he might have fruit among them, even as “among other Gentiles” (i. 13.), or that he “had received grace and Apostleship for obedience to the faith among all the Gentiles for his name, among whom are ye also the called of Jesus Christ” (ver. 5, 6.), we are no longer resting on doubtful inferences, but on the express language of the Apostle himself.

2. On the other hand, a strong case may be made out from the Epistle itself in proof of the position that it was written not for Gentiles, but for Jews. The critic by whom this view of the subject has been most ably maintained is Baur of Tubingen. The Epistle to the Romans, he argues, like all the other Epistles, must have arisen out of circumstances. There must have been something personal and occasional, which might naturally furnish the subject of a letter. But the whole Epistle would have the vaguest possible connexion with those to whom it was addressed, if it was written to

a Gentile Church. How inappropriate, how discouraging, to be perpetually reminding them that the Jews were first called, afterwards the Gentiles; how unlike the manner of him who was "all things to all men!" What interest could the question of the restoration of the Jews have for Gentiles? We do not naturally express passion to those who do not themselves feel it, nor would the Apostle have poured forth his "heart's desire for Israel," in a strain like that of the Psalmist, "if I forget thee, Jerusalem," to cold and uninterested listeners.

The minute references throughout the Epistle to the Law and the Prophets may be taken as a further proof that the Apostle is speaking to Jews. We can scarcely imagine a Gentile Church so completely passing over into the Jewish point of view as to recognise in the Gospel a fulfilment of promises made to the Patriarchs, of whose very names a few years previous they had been ignorant. The argument of the seventh chapter of the Romans seems to presuppose not only a passing knowledge of the writers of the Old Testament, but a sort of traditional acquaintance with it, and experience of its practical influence. How could those who, a few years before, had not even heard of the Law, be now feeling it as a burden on the conscience? Though, as Baur admits, the Apostle in addressing Gentiles does sometimes use illustrations from the Prophets; that is, speaks to them from what we should conceive to have been his point of view rather than theirs, this is very different from the use of the Law in the Epistle to the Romans, which carries us into another world, and presupposes states of mind and feelings common to the Apostle and those to whom he is writing, which are inconceivable in Gentiles. Unless he is using unmeaning words to them, they must be supposed to have had a minute verbal acquaintance with the Law and the Prophets; and even with the text of the LXX.

But if we can assume that we are addressing a Jewish community, we have only to invert the order of the Epistle to find an appropriate meaning and occasion for it. St. Paul has begun with the universal principle, righteousness by faith without the deeds of the Law; ad-



mission of Jew and Gentile alike to the communion and fellowship of Christ. But what in writing to the Jewish Roman Church was nearest his heart, was not the admission of the Gentiles, but the restoration of the Jews. The offer of salvation, through Christ, was made to the Jew first, and afterwards to the Gentile; yet facts seemed, as it were, to disprove this, for the Jews were being rejected and the Gentiles received. With strange feelings the early Jewish Church must have watched the glory departing from their race, and the door of the tabernacle opening ever wider for the admission of the Gentiles. Some, perhaps, there were who acknowledged that the hand of God was against them; others, possibly, like the author of the Hebrews, acquiesced in the spiritual meaning of the tabernacle and the sacrifices; few, if any, like St. Paul, were ready to acknowledge that God was the God of the Gentiles equally with the Jews. To minds in such a state as this, St. Paul seeks to justify the ways of God, not so much by an appeal to the eternal principles of truth and justice, as by the language of the Old Testament, and the analogy of God's dealings with the chosen people.

The arguments that he uses to them are twofold. First, that the Jews are rejected by their own fault; and, secondly, that their rejection was just like the punishment of their fathers. It is singular, that throughout the Prophets we have the double consciousness; first, that they are the chosen people of God, and also (as it has been expressed) that "they were never good for much at any time." The same double consciousness is traceable in the Epistle to the Romans, especially in the tenth and eleventh chapters. To make his view appear reasonable to them, the Apostle enters into the depth of the mystery, which aforetime had not been revealed. Without going into the whole scheme of Divine Providence, they could neither comprehend the reason for the rejection of their brethren nor the hope of their restoration. They must begin by acknowledging that God had superseded the Law, or they could not possibly understand how their brethren could be punished for holding fast to it. The latter had gone the wrong way, seeking to establish their own righteousness,

and had missed salvation. It was a necessary consequence of a new revelation being given, that those who did not receive it were excluded from its benefits. And yet, when it was remembered that that revelation was a revelation of mercy; that the Jews were rejected not to narrow, but to widen, the way of salvation; there might seem to be a good hope that mercy would yet rejoice against judgment, and the way be made wider still for Jew as well as Gentile to enter in. "And so God concluded all under sin that he might have mercy upon all."

In such a view of the Epistle it may be remarked that there is an analogy between St. Paul's treatment of the case of the individual believer and that of the Jewish people. The believer must first be made conscious of his sin before he can receive the gift of grace; so the Jewish nation must be rejected before it can be received; and the believing Jew be made sensible that the Law has passed away before he can see the hope of his countrymen's restoration. He who has begun the good work will carry it on to the end. He who gave his Son to die for mankind, while yet sinners, how shall He not, when they are now reconciled, freely give them all things? He who inverted his natural order, and placed the Gentile before the Jew, shall He not much more restore the Jew to his original privileges?

A few other points may be adduced in support of Baur's views. Such are the inculcation of obedience to the powers that be, in the xiiiith chapter, which may be thought to be more appropriate to a Jewish than a Gentile Church. In a Jewish community only should we be likely to find the "fifth-monarchy" men of that day, whether zealots for the Law or expectants of a Messiah's kingdom. Gentile Christians we might expect rather to present the innocent, peaceful image which we gather of the believers from Pliny's letters, who could have needed no such warning. A further indication which may be thought to connect the Epistle in the same manner with a Jewish rather than a Gentile Church, is the allusion

to the scruple respecting meats and drinks, and the opinions on the observance of days.

When weighed in the scales of criticism, it must be admitted that much stress cannot be laid on the two last arguments. The utmost we can concede to them is, that the allusions referred to in the Epistle agree rather better with the hypothesis of a Jewish than of a Gentile community. Yet more shadowy seem the proofs derived from the Clementine Homilies and the Shepherd of Hermas; which, even if it be granted that they were written by members of the Roman Church, yet, being the work of a century later and appearing in a time of transition, cannot be adduced to support the view that the first believers at Rome were Jews, still less that the earliest spirit of the Roman Church was of a Jewish Gnostic character.

Omitting then, on either side, the weaker arguments, and confining ourselves to strong and simple grounds, we seem at first sight to come to two utterly irreconcilable and contradictory views: the Epistle was addressed to Gentiles, because St. Paul expressly says so; the Epistle was addressed to Jews, because its contents are suited only to a Jewish habit of thought and education. Our object must now be to find some middle term which will reconcile the two opposing theories,—which will admit of the Roman Church being partly Jewish and partly Gentile, or, in a certain sense, Jewish, in another, Gentile.

The old belief was, that the Roman Church consisted partly of Jews and partly of Gentiles, and that the Epistle was written with the intention of adjusting the disputes that had arisen between them. The latter part of this statement finds no support from the Epistle itself, and appears to be nothing more than an arbitrary assumption suggested by the analogy of the Corinthians and the Galatians. The former part need not be wholly denied: for in every Christian Church there were probably some Jews and some Gentiles. Yet it does not follow from this that the community was divided between them, or that both were numerous enough to form separate



parties. The Epistle affords no intimation of such parties existing side by side, whether peaceably or otherwise, in the Roman communion. St. Paul never speaks of Jew and Gentile as in actual contact, disputing about circumcision, or purification, or meats and drinks, or sabbath days. The relation which he supposes between them is wholly ideal; that is, in the purposes of God, not in their assemblies or daily life. They divide the world and time; they have nothing to do with each other as individuals. Nor does the theory that the Roman Church was a half Jewish, half Gentile community agree with either of the facts stated above—the fact that the name Gentiles is applied to all, while the tone and style of the Epistle are wholly Jewish.

It is more reasonable, as well as far more in accordance with the indications of the Epistles, to regard the Churches planted by the Apostles, not as divided into two sections of Jew and Gentile, circumcision and uncircumcision, but as always in a state of transition between the two, dropping gradually their Jewish customs, and opening the door wider and wider to their Gentile brethren, slowly, but at length entirely, convinced that it was not “at this time the kingdom was to be restored to Israel.” Such must, at any rate, have been the case with the Churches not founded by St. Paul. It was long ere the curtains of the tabernacle were drawn aside, or the veil rent in twain, or the earthly and visible temple exchanged for that building in the heavens, the house not made with hands. Disputes about the outward rite of circumcision would be succeeded by another stage of controversy respecting the inward obligation of the Law on the conscience, and the authority of St. Paul and the Twelve. There were cases, also, in which an idealised or Alexandrianised Judaism had been the soil in which the Gospel was originally planted. Here the transition would be more rapid; the faith of the earliest believers would linger less around the weak and beggarly elements; they would more easily harmonise the old and new; they would more readily comprehend the length and breadth of the purposes of God. The change required of them

would be in their ways of thought rather than in their habits of life ; and the latitude which such converts allowed themselves would react on the stricter Jewish communities.

Changes like these may be supposed to have been passing over the Roman Church. At the time St. Paul wrote to them, there was no question of circumcision ; that, if it had ever been, was now left behind. But in a more general way the same difficulty still pressed upon them. What was the obligation of the Law? And, as they looked upon the passing scene, and saw the chosen race becoming a spectacle to the world, to angels, and to men, they could not but ask also, "What God intended respecting it?" Whether were they to melt away among the Gentiles, or to preserve their name and heritage? While men were pondering such thoughts in their hearts, of the Law and its sabbaths, and ceremonies, and sacrifices, of the consolation of Israel, and the restoration of the kingdom, we may conceive the Apostle to have written this Epistle with a view of meeting their doubts, and adjusting their thoughts, and vindicating the ways of God to man, and revealing the way of salvation. He gave them the full truth for the half-truth, the day for the twilight, and established their faith in Christ, not by drawing back, but by going further than they had imagined, and resting the Gospel on an immutable moral foundation (Rom. ii. 11. ; iii. 29).

Such we conceive to have been the state of feeling in the Roman Church, because such is the state of feeling to which the words of the Apostle are appropriate. Neither the earlier one, in which men said, "except ye be circumcised ye cannot be saved," and an Apostle himself withdrew and refused to eat with the Gentiles ; nor the later one, in which it was clearly understood that all such differences were done away in Christ, are suitable to the argument of the Epistle to the Romans. The Apostle was still seeking to teach a Jewish Church the great lesson of the admission of the Gentiles more perfectly. So far the hypothesis of Baur affords a good key to the interpretation of the Epistle. But still the expression in the fifth verse of the first chapter has not been disposed

of. In what sense could they be said to be Gentiles? For supposing the Roman Church to have consisted of Jews gradually passing into the state of Gentiles, we have an explanation of the frequent dwelling on the Law, and the relation of Jew and Gentile, but none of the term, "other Gentiles," under which the Apostle comprehends them. No gradual change in their opinions and circumstances could have justified him in calling those Gentiles who were originally Jews. Nor, however much he might "magnify his office," would he have included the chosen people under the common name, which he everywhere opposed to them. The very meaning of the Apostle of the Gentiles would have been lost had the term "nations" extended itself to them.

The attempt to solve this difficulty runs up into the general question of the state and circumstances of the early Church: our inquiry respecting which must, however, be restricted to the single point which bears upon the present subject; viz. how far the Gentile Churches were originally in feeling Jewish,—whether to the Gentiles also the gate of the New Testament was through the Old? For if it could be shown that Jewish and Gentile Christianity were not so much opposed as successive—that the Gospel of the Jewish Apostles was the first, and that of St. Paul the subsequent, stage in the history of the Apostolic Church,—then the difficulty of itself disappears, and the double aspect of the Epistle to the Romans is what we should expect.

Our conception of the Apostolical age is necessarily based on the Acts of the Apostles and the Epistles of St. Paul. It is in vain to search ecclesiastical writings for further information; the pages of Justin and Irenæus supply only the evidence of their own deficiency. Confining ourselves, then, to the original sources, we cannot but be struck by the fact, that of the first eighteen years after the day of Pentecost, hardly any account is preserved to us in the Acts, and that to this scanty record no addition can be made from the Epistles of St. Paul. Isolated facts are narrated, but not events in their order and sequence: there is no general prospect of the Chris-



tian world. Churches are growing up every where: some the result of missions from Jerusalem, others of unknown origin; yet none of them standing in any definite relation to the Apostles of the circumcision. It seems as if we had already reached the second stage in the history of the Apostolic Church, without any precise knowledge of the first. That second period, if we terminate it with the supposed date of the Apostle's death, extends over about fourteen or fifteen years,—years full of life, and growth, and vicissitude. Could the preceding period have been less so, or does it only appear to be so from the silence of history? Is it according to the analogy of human things, or of the workings of Divine power in the soul of man, that during the first part of its existence, Christianity should have slumbered, and after fifteen years of inaction have suddenly gone forth to conquer the world? Or, are we falling under that common historical illusion, that little happened in a time of which we know little?

And yet how are we to supply this lost history out of the single verse of the Acts (xi. 19.), "They which were scattered abroad upon the persecution that arose about Stephen travelled as far as Phenice and Cyprus and Antioch, preaching the word to none but unto the Jews only." What reply is to be made to the inquiry respecting the origin of the Christian Church in the two cities which in after-ages were to exercise the greatest influence on its history, Alexandria and Rome? We cannot tell. Our slender materials only admit of being eked out by some general facts which do not fill up the void of details, but are of the greatest importance in illustrating the spirit and character of the earliest Christian communities. Foremost among these facts is the dispersion of the Jews. The remark has been often made that the universality of the Roman Empire was itself a preparation for the universality of the Gospel, its very organisation throughout the world being the image, as it may have been the model, of the external form of the Christian Church. But not less striking as an image of the external state of the earliest Christian communion is the dispersion of the ten tribes

throughout the world, and not less worthy of observation as it was an inward preparation for Christianity is the universal diffusion of that religion, the spirit of which seemed at the time to be most narrow and contracted within itself, and at first sight most hostile to the whole human race. Of all religions in the world it was probably the only one capable of making proselytes,—which had the force, as it had the will, to draw men within its circle. Literally, and not only in idea, “the Law was a schoolmaster to bring men to Christ.” The compassing sea and land “to make one proselyte” was not without its results. Seneca, who did not know, or at least has not told anything of the Christians, says of the Jews, “Victoribus victi leges dederunt.” The Roman satirists were aware of their festivals, and speak of them in a way which implies not only converts to Judaism, but a degree of regard for their opinions. They had passed into a proverb in Horace’s time for their zeal in bringing men over to their opinions. (1 Sat. iv. 143.) Philo mentions the suburb beyond the Tiber in which they were domiciled by Augustus, the greater number of the inhabitants of which are said to have been freedmen: Leg. ad Caium, 23. Tacitus’s account of their origin is perhaps an unique attempt in a Roman writer to investigate the religious antiquities of an Eastern people, implying of itself, what it also explicitly states, the tendency towards them. No other religion had been sustained for centuries by contributions from the most remote parts of the empire to a common centre; contributions the very magnitude of which is ascribed to the zeal of numerous converts. (Tacitus, Hist. v. 5.; Cicero pro Flacco, c. 28.) According to Josephus, whole tribes in the neighbourhood of Judea had submitted to the rite of circumcision. (Ant. xiii. 9. 1.; 11. 3.; 15. 4.) The women of Damascus in particular are mentioned as not trusted by their husbands in a massacre of the Jews, because they were “favourable to the Jews’ religion.” The Jews in Alexandria occupied two of the five quarters into which the city was divided: and the whole Jewish population of Egypt was rated by Philo at a million. Facts like these speak volumes for the importance and influence of the Jews.

In one sense it is true that the Jewish religion seemed already about to expire. To us, looking back from the vantage ground of the Gospel, nothing is clearer than that it contained within itself the seeds of its own destruction. "The Law and the Prophets were until John, and now the kingdom of heaven suffereth violence, and the violent take it by force." Before Christ — after Christ — this is the great landmark that divides Judaism from Christianity, while for a few years longer the devoted nation, already within the coils of its own destiny, lingers about its ancient seat. It was otherwise to its contemporaries. To them the Jewish people was not declining, but growing. There seemed to be no end to its wealth and influence. The least of all peoples in itself, it was a nation within a nation in every city. In the wreck of the heathen religions, Judaism alone remained unchanged. Nor is there anything strange in its retaining undiminished this power over the human mind, when its own national glory had already departed. Its objects of faith were not lessened, but magnified by distance. It contained in itself that inward life which other religions were seeking for, and for the want of which they expired. It could not but communicate to others the belief in the unity of God, which had sunk for ages into the heart of the race; — to the educated Greek "one guess among many," — to the Israelite a necessary truth. It formed a sort of meeting point of East and West, which in the movement of either towards the other naturally exercised a singular influence. Many elements of Greek cultivation had insensibly passed into the mind of the Jewish people, as of other Asiatic nations, before the reaction of the Maccabean wars; cities with Greek names covered the land: even after that time the rugged Hebrew feeling was confined within narrow limits. The Gospel as it passed from the lips of our Lord and the Twelve had not far to go in Palestine itself before it came in contact with the Greek world. In other countries the diffusion of the Greek Version of the Old Testament is a proof that a Hellenised Judaism was growing up everywhere. The Alexandrian philosophy offered a link with heathen literature and



mythology. Judaism was no longer isolated but wandering far and wide. Clinging to its belief in Jehovah and abating nothing of its national pride, it was nevertheless capable of assuming to itself new phases without losing its essential character, of dropping its more repulsive features and entering into and penetrating the better heathen mind both of East and West.

The heads of many subjects of inquiry are summed up in these reflections, which lead us round to the question from which we started, "Whether to the Gentiles also the gate of the New Testament was through the Old?" And they suggest the answer to the question, that "so it was," not because the minds of the first teachers were unable to rise above the "rudiments of the Law," but because the soil for Christianity among the Gentiles was itself prepared in Judaism. It was the natural growth of the Gospel in the world as it then was. The better life of the Jewish people passed into the earliest Christian Church; the meaning of prophecy was lost to the Jew and found to the believer in Christ. And the facts recorded in the Acts of the Apostles represent the outward side of this inward tendency: it was the Jewish proselyte who commonly became the Christian convert. Such were Cornelius and the Ethiopian eunuch, and the deputy Sergius Paulus, who "of his own accord desired to hear the word of God." The teachers themselves wore the habit of Jews, and they came appealing to the authority of the Old Testament. That garb and form and manner which we insensibly drop in thinking of the early teachers of Christianity, could not have failed to impress its Jewish character on their first hearers. It would be their first conception of the Gospel, that it was a kind of Judaism to which they were predisposed by the same kind of feelings which led them towards Judaism itself.

The question receives the same answer when reconsidered from another point of view, in connexion with the general narrative of the first propagation of the Gospel, in the Acts and the Epistles of St. Paul. Read them on any other hypothesis and they become unintelligible. For they imply that there was a time when the

Gospel was preached to Jews only, when the disciples were not called Christians, if indeed they ever were so at Jerusalem, when the preaching of the truth was mainly in the hands of the Apostles of the circumcision. They imply further, that another Gospel was taught by the Apostle St. Paul, yet still taught through the Old Testament, to those who heard and desired to be under the Law; often with doubtful success, so widely spread and deeply rooted were the doctrines of the circumcision, so strong the tendency to relapse into them. Only at Lystra in Lycaonia, and at Athens, the Apostle appears to have preached,—with what result the narrative of the Acts does not clearly inform us,—to pure heathens. And it is remarkable as falling in with these facts, that in some of the Epistles, as, for example, the Thessalonians and Galatians, we are in a degree of uncertainty whether the persons to whom the Apostle is writing are Jewish or Gentile converts.

The earlier Jewish aspect of Christianity has passed away, now that we are dead to the Law. We can scarcely imagine a time when all the heathen converts were in the position of proselytes of the gate, the only question being, whether they were to proceed to the further stage of initiation into Judaism and become proselytes of righteousness. We cannot conceive the feelings with which the Old Testament was regarded by those to whom it was not only half, but the whole of the word of God,—to whom the danger was not that they would reject it, but that they would remain too exclusively within its circle. Numberless as are the indications of Judaising tendencies in the Epistles, no vestige is discernible of any repugnance to the Mosaical law, or any unwillingness to admit its Divine authority. Such feelings of antagonism to the Law as are observable in Marcion and some of the early heretics, do not belong to the Apostolical age. St. Paul does not hold the balance between those who gave it too much and too little honour; he himself is the centre of the opposition to it; few probably went as far in the same direction. The weight and sacredness of the Apostle's name were not to the rebellious Corinthians or Galatians what they are to us.

Nor must his influence on the Jewish Christian Church be measured by the proportion which his writings bear to the rest of the New Testament or their effect upon the world in after ages. Those are mournful words which he utters at the end of his life (2 Tim. i. 15.), "Thou knowest that all they which are in Asia are turned away from me."

But besides the constant tendency of the converts to relapse into Judaism, the manner in which the Apostle argues with them out of the Old Testament in four at least of his Epistles, as well as in the greater number of his discourses in the Acts, is a further evidence of the close historical connexion between Judaism and the Gospel. Such appeals, it will be readily acknowledged, imply a profound faith in the Apostle's mind, in the Divine origin of the religion of his fathers, which in another point of view he yet regards as the "weak and beggarly elements," nay, even as "the strength of sin." But more than this, they imply also the certainty that those to whom he was writing would understand the force of his appeals. For we cannot suppose that the Apostle, in quoting texts out of the Law, was uttering unmeaning sounds, was speaking from his own mind what was unintelligible to those whom he is addressing. Without one word of preface or explanation, he repeats again and again the language of the Old Testament, the very sacredness of which consisted in the familiarity of its sound, the point of which lay in the novelty and spirituality of the interpretation given to it. Must he not be speaking to those who lived in the same world with himself, who, like Timothy, had long known the Holy Scriptures, who were brought up in the same traditions, and in all points—circumcision only excepted—though Gentiles in name and origin, were really Jews.

Now if the history of Judaism in the Augustan age, no less than the indications of the New Testament itself, leads to the inference that the first disciples, even in Gentile cities, were commonly Jewish converts, or, at any rate, such as were acquainted with the Law and the Prophets, and were disposed to receive with reverence Jewish teachers, the difficulty in the Epistle to the Romans is solved,



at the same time that the fact of its solution is an additional confirmation of the view which has been just taken. The Roman Church appeared to be at once Jewish and Gentile; Jewish in feeling, Gentile in origin. Jewish, because the Apostle everywhere argues with them as Jews; Gentile, because he expressly addresses them by name as such. In this double fact there is now seen to be nothing strange or anomalous: it typifies the general condition of Christian Churches, whether Jewish or Gentile; whether founded by St. Paul, or by the Apostles of the circumcision. It was not only in idea that the Old Testament prepared the way for the New, by holding up the truth of the unity of God; but the spread of that truth among the Gentiles, and the influence of the Jewish Scriptures, were themselves actual preparatives for the Gospel.

To those who were Gentiles by birth, but had received the Gospel originally from Jewish teachers, the subject of the Epistle to the Romans would have a peculiar interest. It expressed the truth on the verge of which they stood, which seemed to be peculiarly required by their own circumstances, which explained their position to themselves. It purged the film from their eyes, which prevented them from seeing the way of God perfectly. Hitherto they had acquiesced in the position which public opinion among the heathen assigned to them, that they were a Jewish sect: and they had implicitly followed the lives as well as the lessons of their first instructors in Christ. But a nobler truth was now to break upon them. God was not the God of the Jews only, but of the Gentiles also. And this wider range of vision involved a new principle, not the Law, but faith. If nations of every language and tongue were to be included in the Gospel dispensation,—barbarian, Scythian, bond and free,—the principle that was to unite them must be superior to the differences that separated them. In other words, it could not be an institution or a Church, but an inward principle, which might belong alike to all mankind. This principle was faith, the view of which in St. Paul's mind is never separated from the redemption of mankind at large.

It may be remarked, as confirmatory of what has been said, that no allusion occurs in the Epistle to the Romans to the question of circumcision. There could hardly have failed to have been such allusions had the Church been divided between two parties of Jew and Gentile, or had it been originally a Jewish Church ever opening the door wider to the Gentiles. The absence of such allusions is, however, perfectly consistent with the fact that it was addressed to a community, the majority of whose members had not undergone the rite of circumcision.

The reference to disputes respecting meats and drinks, and the whole aspect of the Law as a burden on the conscience, would have at least as much meaning to Gentiles against their nature brought up in its observance as to Jews themselves. The burden which neither the Jews of that day nor their fathers were able to bear, would be still heavier, more unmeaning, and more perplexing, when pressing upon the necks of Gentiles. They would at once understand the Apostle's reasoning respecting it, and at the same time their own admission to the privileges of the Gospel would be the highest internal witness to the truth which he taught. What they knew and felt respecting themselves, they would know and feel also was the grace of God to all mankind. Christian humility, as well as Christian charity, was ready to assent to the universal redemption of all nations. And, as in the alternations of thought, they came round to the case of the Jew, they would sympathise with St. Paul's feelings, as, if not Israelites themselves, having received the Gospel from Israelites.

As a test of the above argument, it is thought desirable to bring together before the reader, in one view, the passages in the Epistle which throw a light on the state of the Roman Church.

Chap. i. 5. By whom we have received grace and apostleship, for obedience to the faith among all Gentiles, for his name. Among whom are ye also the called of Jesus Christ.

14. That I might have fruit among you also, as among other Gentiles.

16. For I am not ashamed of the Gospel of Christ: for it is the power of God unto salvation to every one that believeth; to the Jew first, and also to the Gentile.

The two first are the passages alluded to in the preceding Essay, which make it impossible for us to suppose that the Epistle to the Romans was addressed to a purely Jewish Church.

The third may seem to warrant no inference. Yet it is improbable that a writer of such tact as St. Paul would have placed in the foreground of his Epistle the announcement "to the Jew first, and also to the Gentile," had he been writing to a purely Gentile Church, or to one unable to enter into the privileges of the Jew. Comp. c. ii. 9, 10.; also, ii. 14. "For when the Gentiles, which have not the Law, do by nature the things contained in the Law, these, not having the Law, are a Law unto themselves." The Gentiles are here spoken of in the third person, as at c. iii. 1. the Jews. There was nothing in the doctrine here laid down, any more than in the words of our Saviour, "Many shall come from the east and west," which was new to the Jews, who, as appears from Philo, acknowledged that the sinful Jew would be condemned by the believing Gentile.

Chap. ii. 1. 17. "Therefore thou art inexcusable, O man, whosoever thou art," &c. — "But if thou art called a Jew and retest in the Law and makest thy boast of God," &c. Among the slighter indications of the truth of the view urged above, may be mentioned the more covert way in which the Jew is attacked in comparison with the Gentile. In the latter part of the chapter, St. Paul is not immediately addressing the Roman Church, but speaking of Judaism in the abstract.

Chap. iii. 1 — 17. This passage is so full of quotations from the Old Testament, and has a tone of thought so peculiar, that it is impossible to suppose it would have been addressed to those who had not received a Jewish education. Is it likely that a Gentile convert would have understood that peculiar Jewish difficulty respecting the ways of God to man? See notes and introduction to c. iii.

19. "Whatsoever things the Law saith, it saith to them that are



under the law." It has ever been a difficulty with commentators on this passage, how St. Paul could have brought Gentile as well as Jew under the imprecations of the Law. The true point of this difficulty seems to be, not that it is an unfair argument to apply passages of the Old Testament to a use for which they were not at first apparently intended (for this we must grant to be the case with regard to many other of St. Paul's quotations), but that the Gentile should have been brought to admit that they were applicable to his case. But if we try to put ourselves in the position of a Gentile who had received the Gospel at the hands of Jews, — who had been accustomed to appropriate to himself the words of the Law, — the difficulty disappears. The Law was a witness that the Gentile who had received a Jewish education would be no more disposed to reject than the Jew himself.

21. But now the righteousness of God without the Law is manifested, being witnessed by the Law and the Prophets.

Chap. iv. The argument from Abraham and David, familiar to the Jew, would be unintelligible to Gentile Christians.

Chap. v. affords another instance of the intimate acquaintance with the Old Testament, presupposed in those whom the Apostle is addressing.

Chap. vii. The same acquaintance with the Law is implied in the instance of the woman who has lost her husband; as is also a practical experience of its influence on the human heart, in the latter part of the chapter.

Chap. ix.—xi. are almost entirely based on the words of the prophets, and the analogy of God's dealings with the Jews. No Gentile Christian could have taken the warm interest in the subject of these chapters, which is evidently required by the interest St. Paul himself exhibits in them. St. Paul is at first earnest to prove that the Jews are rejected, and then, again, that they are restored. Neither the first nor the last would seem an appropriate theme if addressed to Gentiles.

Chap. xi. 13. "For I speak to you Gentiles, inasmuch as I am the

Apostle of the Gentiles, I magnify mine office." St. Paul is not in these words addressing the Roman Church, but apostrophising the Gentile, as at ii. 17. the Jew.

Chap. xiii. 1. Let every soul be subject unto the higher powers For there is no power but of God : the powers that be are ordained of God.

Chap. xiv. 1. Him that is weak in the faith receive ye, but not to doubtful disputations. For one believeth that he may eat all things; another, who is weak, eateth herbs.

5. One man esteemeth one day above another ; another esteemeth every day alike.

14. I know, and am persuaded in the Lord Jesus, that there is nothing unclean of itself.

Chap. xv. 8. Now I say that Jesus Christ was a minister of the circumcision for the truth of God, to confirm the promises made to the fathers. And that the Gentiles might glorify God for his mercy; as it is written, For this cause I will confess to thee among the Gentiles, and sing unto thy people.

15. I have written the more boldly unto you in some sort, as putting you in mind, because of the grace that is given unto me.

16. That I should be the minister of Jesus Christ to the Gentiles, ministering the Gospel of God, that the offering up of the Gentiles might be acceptable, being sanctified by the Holy Ghost.

20. Yea, so have I strived to preach the Gospel, not where Christ was named, lest I should build upon another man's foundation.

Chap. xvi. Out of twenty-four names of persons who are saluted, only one, Mary, is a Jewish name.

3. 5. Greet Priscilla and Aquila, and the Church that is in their house.

The above passages imply, that the persons addressed were Gentiles, on whom, as the Apostle of the Gentiles, St. Paul had a claim, who were, however, converted by others, and therefore occasioned the Apostle a delicacy in extending his sphere of labour to them. They were intimately acquainted with, and

capable of being convinced by arguments from, the Law ; they were apparently, though Gentiles, ignorant of God's purposes to the Gentile world at large, and they were capable of feeling an interest in the future fortunes of the Jewish people. They were scrupulous about meats and drinks, and a lengthened admonition to obey the powers that were was not considered by the Apostle as inappropriate or superfluous. All these facts no other theory seems adequate to explain, but the one here offered,—that they were a Gentile Church but Jewish converts,—a theory which is supported by the reason of the thing, as well as by the analogy of other Christian communities.



## SUBJECT OF THE EPISTLE.

THE Gentile origin and Jewish character of the Roman Church are a sufficient explanation of the style and subject of the Epistle to the Romans. The condemnation of the Jew first, and afterwards of the Gentile,—the justification of the Jew first, and afterwards of the Gentile,—the actual fact of the rejection of the Jews, and the hope of their restoration,—are all of them topics appropriate to what we may conceive to have been the feeling of the Roman converts, in whom a Jewish education had not obliterated a Gentile origin, and whom a Gentile origin did not deprive of the hope of Jewish promises. The Apostle no longer appears to be speaking to the winds of heaven, what, after being borne to and fro upon the earth, might return to the profit of the Church after many days, but what had an immediate interest for it, and arose naturally out of its actual state.

Assuming the results of the preceding essay, we may consider the structure of the Epistle, with the view of tracing the relation of the parts to each other and to the whole. What was primary, what secondary, in the Apostle's thoughts? Is the order of the composition the same as the order of ideas? Do we proceed from without inwards,—that is, from the admission of the Gentiles to the justification of the individual believer? or from within outwards,—that is, from the individual believer to the world at large? Is the episode of the restoration of the Jews subordinate or principal,—a correction of the first part of the Epistle, or, as Baur supposes, the kernel of the whole? These are subtle and delicate inquiries, respecting which it is not possible to attain absolute certainty, and in the prosecution of which we are always in danger of attributing to the Apostle more

of method and plan than he really had. Such inquiries can only be made by a comparison of other writings of the Apostle, and an accurate examination of the Epistle itself.

We may begin by asking, "Whether there is any subject which the Epistle to the Romans has in common with the other Epistles, which is specially identified with the life and working of the Apostle?" There is. While the doctrine of righteousness by faith without the deeds of the Law is but slightly referred to in the other Epistles of St. Paul, and is but once mentioned in the Acts of the Apostles, there is another truth, which is everywhere and at all times insisted upon by him, and everywhere connected with his name, which recurs in almost every one of his Epistles, and is everywhere dwelt upon in the Acts as the result of his Apostleship,—the admission of the Gentiles. He speaks of himself, and is always spoken of, as the Apostle of the Gentiles; his conversion itself is bound up with this labour of universal love; in "the beginning of the Gospel" he stands up for their rights, among "the Apostles that were before him;" all through his life he is proclaiming in a more or less spiritual manner, "God hath made of one blood all nations of the earth." (Acts, xvii. 26.) "Is he the God of the Jews only, is he not also of the Gentiles?" (Rom. iii. 29.) All are one in Christ, in whom "neither circumcision nor uncircumcision avail any thing, but a new creature" (Gal. iii. 28., vi. 15.); or, according to another form of expression, "in whose circumcision the Gentiles also are circumcised." (Col. ii. 11.) Compare 1 Cor. xii. 13.; Eph. i. 10., iii. 3—6.

Such repeated reference to the same subject justifies our regarding it as the leading thought of the Apostle's mind, the great truth which the power of God had inspired him to teach. Yet, itself had a twofold aspect, for the differences of Jew and Gentile were done away with, not on the ground of any abstract equality of the human race in the sight of God, but as they became one in Christ. It is union with Christ which breaks through all other ties of race and language, and knits men together into a new body which is His

Church. So while looking at the external world we seem almost at once to pass inward, and to blend the assertion of the general principle with the experience of the individual soul. The chord of love which encircles all men has its beginning too in the believer's heart. "There is neither barbarian nor Scythian, bond nor free," not on any speculative grounds of morality, but because his own spiritual instinct tells him that all these differences are done away in Christ.

But with this outward aspect of Christianity is connected also another thought, which follows it as the shadow does the light, "the times of that ignorance which God winked at," "the passing by of past sins" (Rom. iii. 25.), "which was kept secret since the world began" (Rom. xvi. 25.), "which in other ages was not made known — that the Gentiles should be fellow heirs, and of the same body" (Eph. iii. 6.). It was strange to look at the world around, and see the Gentiles also pressing into the Kingdom of Heaven. But it was not less, but perhaps even more strange, to think of the Gentiles in past times who seemed to have so little relation to the God who made them; in the world of darkness and silence, on which the eye could rest, but which it could not pierce. Nor was the same thought inapplicable to those who were under the Law. They too, though with many "advantages," were still subject to ordinances, shut up in prison until the time appointed. The prior states of Jew and Gentile were not wholly dissimilar: the Law was the glass which might be held up to both to convict them of sin; in which, world within world, mirror within mirror, the Jew was first seen, afterwards the Gentile. Jew and Gentile, the times before and the times after, are the outlines or divisions of the book in the volume of which are contained the purposes of God.

Such is the external aspect of the Apostle's teaching so far as it can be separated from the inward life, which penetrates the individual and the Church alike. But there is a world within as well as a world without, nor can we view one except through the medium of the other. The knowledge which the



Apostle himself has of the works of God, is transferred to the heathen ; the consciousness which he feels of his own union with Christ is the living proof of the acceptance of all mankind ; the remembrance of his struggle under the Law, is the image of the state of those under the Law. Though the thought comes upon him daily of his mission to the Gentiles everywhere, he does not look upon them as they appear in the pages of ancient authors, or on their modes of worship, as they present themselves to the student of mythology. He is not writing a philosophy of history, but a religion of history. He does not, in modern phraseology, put himself in the position of the heathen, or even of the Jew, but retains his own. Nor must we, in our interpretation of the Epistle, endeavour to force his words, from this simple and natural point of view, into one more in accordance with our tastes and feelings.

An illustration from heathen philosophy may serve to indicate the peculiar nature of this transition from the individual mind to the world at large. All modern commentators on Plato admit that in the Republic the individual and the state pass into one another. The virtues, duties, distinctions of one are also those of the other ; the consideration of the one seems to lead the philosopher on to the deeper and more enlarged consideration of the other. Not altogether unlike this is the manner in which the individual conscience in the Epistles of St. Paul is the reflection not only of itself, but of the world at large ; and in which the thought of the world at large, and the Church, of which he is a member, re-acts upon the inmost feelings of the believer. The kingdom of God is not yet separated into outward and visible, and inward and spiritual ; nor election into that of nations and individuals.

As the Apostle looks upon the face of the world, he sees all men, by the light of revelation in himself, returning, through Christ, into union with the God who made them. There is no distinction of Jew or Gentile, circumcision or uncircumcision. Soon he passes over into another point of view, "setting the world in their hearts." Two dispensations are in the bosom of every man who comes to the

knowledge of the truth ; these are symbolised by two words, the Law and Faith. The one is slavery, the other freedom ; the one death, the other life ; the one strife, the other peace ; the one alienation from God, the other reconciliation with him. Not at once does the one dispensation take the place of the other. There is a period of natural life first ; the Law enters and plants the seeds of mortal disease. Will and knowledge, the common sources of human action, begin to decompose, the will to evil struggling with the knowledge of good. The creature is made powerless to act by his consciousness of sin ; the Law only terrifies—he dies at the very sight of it : it is a dry “eye” turning every way upon his misery. The soul, hanging between good and evil, is in a state of paralysis, doing what it would not, and hating itself for what it does. But, again, the soul is persuaded by many arguments that “the Law is dead ;” it throws away the worsser half, and clings to its risen Lord. Faith is the hand by which it is united to Him—the instrument whereby it is accepted, renewed, sanctified—the sense through which it looks up to God, revealing Himself in man, and around on creation.

These two, the Law and Faith, are so inseparable, that they seem each to derive their meaning from the other. Faith is not the Law ; the Law is not Faith. Whatever is not Faith is the Law ; whatever is not the Law is Faith. The Law, no less than Faith, is an inward feeling—a tablet of stone, yet written also on fleshly tables of the heart. Yet the Apostle’s manner of speaking of both is such as, at first sight, prevents our perception of this. Through a great portion of the Epistle he drops their subjective character, and represents them to us as powers, almost as persons—the symbols of the past and present—of the followers of Moses and Christ, arrayed against each other in the battlefield of the world and the human heart ; blended in the example of Abraham ; typified in the first and second Adam ; the figures of two kinds of death, in sin and to sin.

In the course of the Epistle we pass more and more inward to the dividing asunder of the flesh and spirit, until darkness takes the place of light, and death of life. More than once the shadow of

peace rests upon us in passing, but we must first enter into the depths of human nature, and take part in the struggle, ere we can attain finally to that rest which is in Christ Jesus. At length the body of death slips from us: the law of the spirit of life prevails over the law of sin. And yet the fleshly body, though dead to sin, still cleaves to us: it has ceased to strive against the spirit, but is not yet adopted into the fellowship of Christ. But, though groaning within ourselves, we have the inward witness of the Spirit; we know that all things are working together for good: we ask in triumph, "If God be for us, who can be against us?"

Thus far we have proceeded from without inwards,—that is to say, from the relation of the Gospel to Jew and Gentile, and its place in the history of the world, to its influence on the heart and conscience. At this point the former aspect of the Epistle re-appears. The question of salvation is no longer personal, but national. All mankind have been included under sin; all mankind, even as Abraham, are righteous by faith: "As in Adam all die, even so in Christ shall all be made alive." Thence the Apostle digressed to guard against practical inferences; to describe the inward need of pardon as before the outward. But still there was one exception to the offer of universal salvation. All the world was included; but the favoured nation seemed by its own act to exclude itself from the gracious circle. As a nation the Jews had rejected the Gospel; and to them the Apostle returns, first, to justify their rejection, secondly, to prophesy their restoration.

It has been remarked above that Baur considers these chapters as the substance of the Epistle, and views the eight previous ones as a mere introduction. It is certainly true that St. Paul is writing on a subject of the deepest interest to himself, as we may gather from the very vehemence of his tone, and, as we should naturally infer, not less interesting to those whom he is addressing. The chapters which speak of the restoration of the Jews are not a mere digression from his previous subject; without them the scheme of Providence would be incomplete, and the elder dispensation unmeaning and unexplained; the hope of universal redemption, too, at variance with the



fact. They are an integral portion of the Epistle, and connect with the early chapters, in which the same objections which are there met struggle vainly for utterance (c. iii.). But it disturbs the whole balance and proportion of the Epistle to maintain that all the great subjects that have preceded meet in one point, which is contained in a few verses of the eleventh chapter. For it must be observed that the greater part even of the three chapters themselves is taken up with the justification of the rejection of the Jews, and a small section only with their restoration. The restoration of the Jews themselves is not a mere isolated act of the grace of God, but an enlargement of the whole scheme, in which the Gentiles also are to have part. "So then God concluded all under sin that he might have mercy upon all."

The remainder of the Epistle is a practical exhortation to Christian graces and moral virtues; commencing with a general invitation to a holy life, or, as the Apostle expresses it in language borrowed from the Law, to present the body a living sacrifice. The ground of this invitation is the mercy of God, as set forth in the scheme of Providence:—"So then God concluded all under sin that he might have mercy upon all;" "I beseech you, therefore." Thence the Apostle passes onwards, as towards the conclusion of several Epistles, to a series of practical precepts, some of which have a peculiar reference to the state and circumstances of the early Church. Here the connexion with the main subject of the Epistle appears to drop, and the very want of connexion leads us to remark that the separate duties are not regarded by the Apostle as absorbed in the single truth of righteousness by faith, but are stated by him independently of it. Throughout the twelfth, thirteenth, and fourteenth chapters there is scarcely the least reference to the preceding portions of the Epistle. Thence the Apostle digresses still further to a personal narrative, in which, as towards the conclusion of the Epistle to the Galatians, in a few pregnant verses, the main subject of the Epistle is again introduced; whence he returns once more to himself and his intended visit, and his mission to Jerusalem, and concludes with salutations of the brethren.

## TIME AND PLACE.

THE time and place of writing the Epistle to the Romans are distinctly marked in the fifteenth chapter. The Apostle is on his way to Jerusalem, "ministering to the saints," xv. 25., in accordance with his half-expressed intention in 1 Cor. xvi. 4. He is carrying up the contributions of Macedonia and Achaia, for the poor at Jerusalem, ver. 26. Having completed his labours in Asia Minor and Greece, xv. 23. (compare 2 Cor. x. 13.), when his mission to Jerusalem is accomplished, ver. 28., he hopes to visit the Roman converts on his way to Spain, ver. 22.; a purpose which he has often entertained, xv. 22., but never fulfilled, i. 12. (Compare Acts, xix. 21.) The mention of Cenchrea, the port of Corinth, on the Saronic Gulf, in xvi. 1., agrees with the other circumstances, in indicating his second visit to Corinth as the time and place of writing the Epistle. In reference to these allusions it may be remarked: — (1.) That the Apostle, though on his way to Rome, has no intention of making Rome the resting-place from his labours. He is the Apostle of the whole world, hastening onward, ere his sun sets, "to the extreme west" of Clement. His preference of Spain above other countries might be suggested by the circumstance that the Gospel had not yet spread there, and that he went to plant it. Or, more probably, considering the definite manner in which he speaks of his intention, he was led to choose Spain rather than Africa or Italy, from some acquaintance with, or invitation from, Jews or Christians already settled there. As there is no reason to suppose that the journey was ever accomplished, it is useless to speculate further on the motive of it. (2.) It is observable also that he wrote the Epistle to the Romans from Corinth, or

its neighbourhood, and therefore after the second Epistle to the Corinthians, which already indicates that a reaction had taken place in the Corinthian Church in favour of the Apostle; a change of feeling which might probably be confirmed by the Apostle's visit. Supposing this to have been the case, the Apostle, though in the midst of that city of factions, was writing the Epistle to the Romans at a time when their violence was abated. This agrees with the conciliatory tone of the Epistle, as pointed out in the two preceding essays, which also harmonizes with the immediate occasion of his journey to Jerusalem. For (3.) at the very time of writing, the Gentile Apostle was engaged in carrying up alms to the Jewish Church at Jerusalem, much after the manner that other Jewish pilgrims brought gifts from distant parts of the Empire for the service of the Temple. He was fearful of the violence of his countrymen in Judea, and not without apprehension of the feeling with which the Church might regard him, xv. 31. Yet "his heart's desire towards Israel" was not dead within him, notwithstanding his fears and sufferings. He had been for a long time previously gathering the alms in Asia, 1 Cor. xvi. 1., as well as in Greece, according to an agreement which he had entered into with the Apostles at Jerusalem on a previous visit, Gal. ii. 10. Speaking after the manner of men, may we not say that no one could be long employed in such mission of charity, without feeling his soul melt towards those who were its objects? What had never been personal hostility to the Church at Jerusalem, must soon have given way, in a mind so sensitive as St. Paul's, to the liveliest sympathy with them. In his own words to the Corinthians it might be said: — "His heart is enlarged towards them; they are not straitened in him, but in themselves." Nor could this insensible change have occurred, without drawing his thoughts to their place in the scheme of Providence. The feelings of his own mind would inevitably cast a distant light and shade on the Jewish and Gentile world.

The Epistle to the Romans is naturally compared with the



Epistle to the Galatians ; the subjects are the same, or nearly so, the illustrations often similar, and minute resemblances of language surprisingly numerous. Yet the Epistle to the Galatians would have been in great measure unintelligible to us, but for the larger growth and fuller development of the same truths in the Epistle to the Romans. The first mentioned Epistle is personal and occasional ; it has much of passion and sadness ; it bears the impress everywhere of the struggle which agitated the Galatian converts, and could only have been written to a Church which was known by face to the Apostle. On the other hand, the Epistle to the Romans, except in one or two passages, has a tone of calmness and deliberation : it is spiritual and ideal ; the distance at which the Apostle places himself from the strifes of the Church, enabling him to take a more extended survey of the purposes of God. The difference between the two Epistles is further analogous to the difference between proselytes of the gate, and the so-called proselytes of righteousness. The question in the one case is "circumcision," the outward symbol of the Jewish law, which affected the minds of the converts much, we may suppose, as that of caste would occupy the minds of the Hindoos at the present day, or as some ritual or legal question might prevail over the better religious feeling among ourselves. The other Epistle never touches on the subject of circumcision, as an obligation to be enforced, or not enforced ; but only as the seal of God's mercy to all mankind, in the instance of the Father of the faithful, Rom. iv. The mind of the writer is absorbed in the contemplation of the world as divided into Jew and Gentile, past and present, the Law and Faith. The beginnings of this contemplation are discernible in the Epistle to the Galatians ; but more as a feeling or spiritual instinct, less as a system or scheme of Providence. "In Christ Jesus neither circumcision availeth anything, nor uncircumcision, but a new creature." But there is a height not yet attained to, at which every obstacle disappears, and the ways of God are justified finally, the circumcision accepted through faith, and the uncircumcision ; the circumcision again returning to God in Christ, and the

length and breadth of Divine love made manifest. This is only reached in the Epistle to the Romans.

No certain inference respecting the length of time by which the Epistle to the Romans is separated from the Epistle to the Galatians can be drawn from these considerations. It is of more importance to remark, that in reading the Epistle to the Romans, we have already advanced in the series of Epistles a step onward towards the Epistles of the Imprisonment.





ΠΡΟΣ ῬΩΜΑΙΟΥΣ.

## ΠΡΟΣ ῬΩΜΑΙΟΥΣ.

ΠΑΥΛΟΣ δούλος Ἰησοῦ χριστοῦ, κλητὸς ἀπόστολος ἀφωρισμένος εἰς εὐαγγέλιον θεοῦ, ὃ προεπηγγέλατο διὰ τῶν προφη-

I. 1—7. The introduction to the Epistle to the Romans is marked by two striking characteristics of the Apostle: (1.) a rhetorical one, the aggregation of clauses, which seems to arise out of the inadequacy of the Apostle's language to master or contain his thought; (2.) a consciousness (which is characteristic also of the whole Epistle, and of all St. Paul's writings) of the continuousness of the work of Providence, in the Old and the New dispensations, in Christ and in the Apostle himself.

δούλος Ἰησοῦ χριστοῦ, *the servant.*] The servant of Christ, "who is the Lord of all," as Moses and David, in the Old Testament, are called the servants of God; and in a more spiritual sense, the servant of Christ, as expressing devotedness and humility; as opposed to the pleaser of men (Gal. i. 10.: "For if I yet pleased men, I should not be the servant of Christ"); and, lastly, with an allusion to his ministerial duty and labour of love in the Gospel, "your servant for Jesus' sake" (2 Cor. iv. 5.). The alteration in the meaning of the word may remind us of the change through which the Greek language had itself passed, and of the still greater change

which it was destined to pass through, as "the weak things of this world began to confound the strong." Compare John, xii. 15.; 1 Cor. vii. 22.

κλητὸς ἀπόστολος, *called an apostle.*] The two words are to be taken together, as below, κλητοῖς ἁγίοις. In such expressions the predicate does not necessarily define the subject (as though the Apostle had intended to contrast himself with other Apostles, who were not called), but only describes it, or draws out an idea already involved in it. The other mode of construing the phrase, according to which κλητὸς is made a substantive, as in v. 6., and separated from ἀπόστολος, does not suit either the rhythm or sense of 1 Cor. i. 1., "Παῦλος κλητὸς ἀπόστολος Ἰησοῦ χριστοῦ" or the use of κλητοῖς ἁγίοις, immediately after ἡγιασμένοις, in ver. 2.; and cannot, therefore, be adopted here.

ἀφωρισμένος, *separated.*] In the same sense as in Gal. I. 15.: [ὁ θεός] ὁ ἀφορίσας με ἐκ κοιλίας μητρὸς μου (where, however, the meaning is modified by the context, because the Apostle is describing the separation as it existed from his very birth in the purposes of God), and as in Acts, xiii. 2., where the Holy Ghost says—"Separate me"

## ROMANS.

1 PAUL, a servant of Jesus Christ, called \* an apostle,  
2 separated unto the gospel of God, which he had pro-

(ἀφορίσατε δὴ μοι) Barnabas and Saul for the work.

εἰς εὐαγγέλιον, *to the Gospel.*] Either to be a believer of the Gospel, or to be a preacher of the Gospel, or both. As the two ideas are inseparable in the Apostle's mind, as in the earliest ages it was hardly possible to be a believer, and not a preacher of the Gospel, and as the word itself was not yet strictly defined in use, it is not necessary for us to attempt to distinguish them. εὐαγγέλιον, in the sense of preaching the Gospel, occurs also in 2 Cor. ii. 12. :—'Ἐλθὼν δὲ εἰς τὴν Τρωάδα εἰς τὸ εὐαγγέλιον τοῦ χριστοῦ: and x. 14.—ἄχρι γὰρ καὶ ἡμῶν ἐφθάσαμεν ἐν τῷ εὐαγγελίῳ.

Ἐσοῦ, *of God.*] The meaning of the genitive case (whether in Greek or English makes no difference) is especially difficult to determine in the New Testament, where it refers to God or Christ: εὐαγγέλιον Θεοῦ may either mean the Gospel about God or the Divine Gospel, or the Gospel of which God is the author. The same difficulty occurs respecting the parallel expression εὐαγγέλιον χριστοῦ, in 2 Cor. xi. 7. In both places the genitive may be considered as implying all the relations in which God or Christ stands to the Gospel, whether as

author, teacher, or subject. Compare Matt. iv. 23., εὐαγγέλιον τῆς βασιλείας τοῦ θεοῦ; Eph. i. 13., τὸ εὐαγγέλιον τῆς σωτηρίας; 2 Cor. iv. 4., τὸ εὐαγγέλιον τῆς δόξης τοῦ χριστοῦ; yet the word "of" is plainer than any explanation can make it.

The indefiniteness of the language of the New Testament harmonises with the infinity of the subject. It has not the precision of Attic Greek; but could the precision of Attic Greek have expressed the truths of the Gospel? would it have correctly represented the imperfection of human knowledge respecting Divine things? We cannot imagine an individual separated from his age; no more can we imagine the truths of Christianity separated from the time at which they appeared, or from the stage of language in which they came to the birth. It may be truly said that, as the style of Plato corresponds to the bloom of Greek philosophy, so does the imperfection of the style of the New Testament correspond to our imperfect conception of what is above us. With "stammering lips and another tongue" the Gospel spoke to the child and to the simple.

ὁ προεπηγγείλατο, *which he promised before.*] The drift of



τῶν αὐτοῦ ἐν γραφαῖς ἀγίαις περὶ τοῦ υἱοῦ αὐτοῦ, τοῦ γε-<sup>3</sup>  
νομένου ἐκ σπέρματος Δαυεὶδ κατὰ σάρκα, τοῦ ὀρισθέντος<sup>4</sup>  
υἱοῦ θεοῦ ἐν δυνάμει κατὰ πνεῦμα ἀγνωσύνης ἐξ ἀναστά-

this parenthetical allusion is not, as elsewhere, to call the prophets as witnesses of the Gospel, or even to show that God had prepared the way for it long before, a thought which also occurs in Gal. iii. 8., and in several other passages, but simply to set forth the majesty of the Gospel. It is a part of its greatness that it was heralded by prophecy.

διὰ τῶν προφητῶν.] “The Prophets” include Moses in Luke xxiv. 27., and Samuel in Acts iii. 24; xiii. 20., not only those to whose writings the term is commonly applied.

ἐν γραφαῖς ἀγίαις.] For the use of γραφή without the article, compare Tim. iii. 16.; with words like γραφή, θεός, πνεῦμα, νόμος, the article is omitted or retained, without affecting the sense. Like proper names, they are sufficiently defined by themselves, as we say in English indifferently “Scripture” or “the Scripture.”

2—6. The marks of parenthesis in the English Version are better omitted. The series of relative clauses which are inserted between them, delay the sense, rather than interrupt it.

3. περὶ τοῦ υἱοῦ αὐτοῦ, concerning his Son.] These words may be connected, either with εὐαγγέλιον θεοῦ in the first verse, or with προεπηγγείλατο in the second; either the Gospel of which Christ the Son of God is the subject, or the Gospel which God by the prophets promised before respecting his Son. The last is the more natural order.

The verses that follow are some of the most difficult in the Epistles of St. Paul; we cannot express their meaning adequately, we can only approach it. This difficulty arises partly from the dimness of the thought as it presents itself to our minds compared with its intensity to St. Paul; partly from the inversion of modes of thought, so that what is with us the effect is to the Apostle the cause, or conversely; and also from the imperfect and fragmentary character of the antithesis, which is begun, but not carried out fully, and in which it is vain to look for the correspondence of the different members, as it breaks off almost as soon as we observe it.

κατὰ σάρκα, according to the flesh,] opposed to the words in the following verse, “according to the spirit of holiness,” as γενομένου ἐκ σπέρματος Δαυεὶδ τοῦ ὀρισθέντος υἱοῦ θεοῦ. The nature of the opposition will be seen by a comparison of other passages. σάρξ is opposed to πνεῦμα, as the outward, human, perishable to the invisible and eternal. Thus in Gal. iv. 29., Ishmael, the type of the law, is κατὰ σάρκα; Isaac, the child of promise, is κατὰ πνεῦμα. Abraham is spoken of in Rom. iv. 1. as a “progenitor according to the flesh,” or as “having found benefits” according to the flesh, and the Apostle speaks of himself as having once known “Christ according to the flesh,” that is, probably, as a temporal Messiah (2 Cor. v.

mised afore by his prophets in the Holy Scriptures,  
 3 concerning his Son, who \* came of the seed of David  
 4 according to the flesh; appointed \* to be the Son  
 of God with power, according to the spirit of holi-

16.). In the two latter passages is implied a latent allusion to circumcision, the sign of which was "outward in the flesh" (Eph. ii. 11.). By a further development *σάρξ* is used for the corruption of the flesh, as *πνεῦμα* for the communion of the Spirit of God. It is difficult to circumscribe exactly the associations of the expression *κατὰ σάρκα* in this passage; the clause may be paraphrased, "concerning his Son, who by fleshly descent in His outward human nature, and in relation to the Jewish dispensation, was of the seed of David." Compare ix. 3—5; also, for the general meaning, John i. 14., *ὁ λόγος σὰρξ ἐγένετο*.

Antithesis is a favourite figure in the writings of St. Paul; almost (may we not say?) the very form in which he conceives the Gospel itself. There are times before and times after, a first Adam and a second Adam, the Law and Faith, the flesh and spirit, the old man and the new man, death, life, burial, resurrection, the identity and difference of the believer and his Lord: "All things are double one against the other." Even the same truths have two aspects; what is death when looked at from one side is life from another. This opposition is traceable in the least things as well as in the greatest, not only in the essential antitheses of the Gospel, but also in turns of thought and forms of

speech. It is the dialectical frame in which the ideas of the Apostle are arranged; it is the grammatical frame in which his sentences are cast. Comp. Rom. i. 32.; iv. 25.; x. 10.

4. *ὁρισθέντος υἱοῦ Θεοῦ.*] The translation of these words in the English version rather evades their difficulty; the Greek *ὁρισθέντος* meaning determined, appointed, and not "declared." But how could Christ have been made or appointed to be the Son of God by the resurrection from the dead, who was so, as St. Paul himself declares, eternally? (Col. i. 16.) We may answer in the Apostle's own words, "he is speaking as a man" from a human point of view, as the truth appeared to the disciples who followed the successive stages of our Lord's ministry.

Contrasted with this language of time, is another mode under which the Apostle sometimes describes the great facts of the Gospel, which may be termed in the language of philosophy "the contemplation of them under the form of eternity;" that is, the conception of them as they are anticipated in the purposes of God. Examples of this opposite usage are such expressions as God choosing men before the foundation of the world, Eph. i. 4.; also ver. 3. 5.; Rev. xiii. 8.; Mic. v. 2. But human language and thought do not easily sustain themselves at this height; hence



σεως νεκρῶν, Ἰησοῦ χριστοῦ τοῦ κυρίου ἡμῶν, δι' οὗ ἐλάβομεν χάριν καὶ ἀποστολὴν εἰς ὑπακοὴν πίστεως ἐν πάσιν

the Apostle sometimes mingles both modes of speech,—sometimes falls into the opposite, as in this passage.

ἐν δυνάμει.] Opposed, together with κατὰ πνεῦμα ἁγιωσύνης, to κατὰ σάρκα: and answering to ἐξ ἀναστάσεως νεκρῶν, the symbol everywhere of the great power of God.

κατὰ πνεῦμα ἁγιωσύνης, according to the spirit of holiness.] The simple antithesis would have been κατὰ σάρκα and κατὰ πνεῦμα: the latter member is expanded by St. Paul into κατὰ πνεῦμα ἁγιωσύνης. What is πνεῦμα ἁγιωσύνης? and how is it connected with Christ being appointed to be the Son of God? By πνεῦμα ἁγιωσύνης is not meant the Holy Spirit, in that more precise sense in which this term is used in other passages of Scripture, and still less in the yet more defined one of the creeds; but that invisible power or principle, whereby Christ holds communion with the Father and with His Church, as σὰρξ is the principle of frailty or humanity, by which he is linked to human nature and to the Jewish dispensation. So in 1 Peter, iii. 18. it is said: "Christ hath once suffered for our sins, being put to death in the flesh, but quickened in the Spirit." So in 1 Tim. iii. 16.:—"God was manifest in the flesh, justified in the Spirit;" and in Rom. vi. 10. the same double order of things is implied, though differently expressed—"In that he died, he died unto sin once; in that he liveth, he liveth unto God;" as it is further extended in Rom. viii. 11, 12. to the Christian who is in the image

of Christ, as well as to Christ himself—"But if Christ be in you, the body is dead, because of sin; but the spirit is life, because of righteousness;" and the resurrection, as in this passage, is connected with the indwelling Spirit of Christ—"But if the Spirit of him that raised up Jesus from the dead dwelleth in you, he that raised up Christ from the dead shall also quicken your mortal bodies by his Spirit that dwelleth in you."

The ideas of Christ, life, the Spirit, holiness, are essentially connected, and hardly separable in Scripture. So Acts, ii. 27.:—"Thou wilt not suffer thy holy one to see corruption." Eternal life is also spiritual life, as physical death is nearly allied to spiritual death. But the particular order in which the links of the chain succeed each other, is accidental and uncertain. It might have been said of Christ, that He was Holy, because He was the Son of God, and therefore rose from the dead; or that He was made the Son of God by the resurrection of the dead, because He was holy. The very arbitrariness of relations of thought when applied to Divine things, is of itself a limit in the explanation of this passage, which, as far as we can analyse it, appears to unite two thoughts. St. Paul speaks of Christ as raised up by holiness to His Divine estate, as he might also have spoken of Him as quickened by the Spirit. The two expressions meet in the words "Spirit of holiness," with which agrees (κατὰ) the fact that he was "ap-



5 ness, by resurrection\* of the dead, Jesus Christ our Lord\* ; by whom we\* received grace and apostle-

pointed to be the Son of God." Following the trains of thought which have been suggested by the previous remarks, we may paraphrase the passage thus:—"Concerning Christ who belonged to two worlds, a former and a latter one: the first, earthly, human, Jewish; the other, spiritual and invisible: the Son of David appointed to be the Son of God, as He was holy, and had the Spirit of God dwelling in Him." All this is not fully or definitely expressed in this passage; but is yet so closely connected with it, that the attempt to explain the several words becomes almost unmeaning without such a prolongation of them.

ἐξ ἀναστάσεως νεκρῶν, *by resurrection of the dead.*] Still another "cause," as it were, of Christ's divinity. The English translation "by the resurrection from the dead," obliges us to understand ἐκ before νεκρῶν, which is said to be omitted, in consequence of the ἐκ preceding with ἀναστάσεως. But the words ἀνάστασις νεκρῶν occur fourteen times in the New Testament, and always in the ordinary sense of the resurrection of the dead; we cannot therefore assume a new one for them, in this passage. Christ is appointed to be the Son of God, not after or in consequence of His own resurrection, but by resurrection of the dead, in which He and mankind are thought of as united: "He is the firstfruits of them that sleep."—Yet how can the resurrection, either of Himself or of mankind in general, be regarded as the cause of His eternal being? We must admit that our

order of thought would have been different. Often there are cases, as metaphysicians tell us, in which ideas of cause and effect seem to run up into one another, especially in the spiritual world to which the very notion of cause and effect is hardly applicable. So little consequence is it which comes first, that here language not only identifies, but transposes them. What are acts become attributes; and the attributes of Christ or God, causes or instruments. We should have begun with speaking of the divinity of Christ, as witnessed by His resurrection; and of our rising again because He had risen. Here the course of the thought is the very reverse. The resurrection is not a state which He passes through, but a power embodied in Him, in the same way as life or the spirit might be described as embodied in Him, nearly as Christ Himself says (John, xi. 25.):—"I am the resurrection and the life.

ἐκ denotes the cause, or, more precisely, the point of origin, not the proof; as in Herod. ii. 63.: ἀποθνήσκουσιν ἐκ τῶν τραμάτων; James ii. 18., δειξὼ ἐκ τῶν ἔργων μου τὴν πίστιν; in which latter the idea of proof is not derived from the preposition, but from the verb.

5. δι' οὗ ἐλάβομεν.] The Apostle uses the plural when speaking of himself alone, as 1 Thess. ii. 17, 18. The aorist is not put for the perfect; though here, as elsewhere in the New Testament, it is employed in a way of which the English idiom hardly admits. The Apostle might equally well speak of his reception of the

τοῖς ἔθνεσιν ὑπὲρ τοῦ ὀνόματος αὐτοῦ, ἐν οἷς ἔστὲ καὶ ὑμεῖς 6  
 κλητοὶ Ἰησοῦ χριστοῦ, πᾶσιν τοῖς οὖσιν ἐν Ῥώμῃ ἀγαπη- 7  
 τοῖς θεοῦ κλητοῖς ἀγίοις. χάρις ὑμῖν καὶ εἰρήνη ἀπὸ θεοῦ  
 πατρὸς ἡμῶν καὶ κυρίου Ἰησοῦ χριστοῦ.

Πρῶτον μὲν εὐχαριστῶ τῷ θεῷ μου διὰ Ἰησοῦ χριστοῦ 8

Apostleship as aorist or perfect; that is, with or without reference to his present state. Compare v. 13.

εἰς ὑπακοὴν πίστεως ἐν πᾶσιν τοῖς ἔθνεσιν.] ὑπακοή is used absolutely, for obedience or reception of the Gospel, in Rom. xv. 18. Here the addition of πίστεως contrasts the obedience of the Gospel with the obedience of the Law. The simplest way of taking the words ἐν πᾶσιν τοῖς ἔθνεσιν is with ἐλάβομεν . . . ἀποστολήν. "Through whom we received grace and the office of an Apostle among the Gentiles, to the intent that they might receive the faith." Compare xvi. 25.:— μυστηρίου εἰς ὑπακοὴν πίστεως εἰς πάντα τὰ ἔθνη γνωρισθέντος.

ὑπὲρ τοῦ ὀνόματος αὐτοῦ, for his name.] "For the setting forth of his name," may depend either on ἐλάβομεν or on ὑπακοὴν πίστεως. For a similar ambiguity or double order of words, compare ver. 3. and 5., and the preceding note. As in the Old Testament, in the name of God is implied the remembrance of what He had done for His people Israel; so in the name of Christ is summed up what He had done and was, what the Christian ever bore in mind, the seal which marked him, the name wherewith he was named.

6. κλητοὶ Ἰησοῦ χριστοῦ.] κλητὸς is a substantive; not called of Jesus Christ, but called ones who are Jesus Christ's, like κλητοὶ τοῦ Ἀδωνίου in 3 Kings, 1. 47. δέσμιος Ἰησοῦ χριστοῦ, Phil. 1.

The calling of men in Scripture, as the initiative act, is not attributed to Christ, but to God, Rom. xi. 29.; Gal. i. 6.; 2 Thess. iv. 7.

7. ἀγαπητοῖς θεοῦ κλητοῖς ἀγίοις, beloved of God, called saints.] Could the Apostle, who was unknown by face to the Christians of Rome, speak thus confidently of them? It may be answered, that he uses the language of hope and charity; he conceives of them in idea, in reference to the new state into which they had passed, and the privileges of which they are made partakers. What is said of them would have been said by the Apostle of all Christians, who had passed from death into life, by the very fact of their separating themselves from the Jewish or Gentile world. Yet stronger language of apparent commendation in the first Epistle to the Corinthians, is not inconsistent with the imputation of grave delinquency to the whole Church. Like the chosen people of old, even amid sins and infirmities they are the elect of God.

χάρις . . . καὶ εἰρήνη.] See 1 Thess. i. 1.

The preceding verses may be regarded as an amplification of Παῦλος Ῥωμαίοις χαίρειν. But in this simple form, the Apostle has inserted his own office and authority to preach the Gospel, the subject of the Gospel which is Christ, who is not only the Messiah of the Jews, but the appointed Son of God, who made



ship, for obedience to the faith among all the Gentiles  
 6 for his name: among whom are ye also the called of  
 7 Jesus Christ: to all that be in Rome, beloved of God,  
 called \* saints: Grace to you and peace from God our  
 Father, and the Lord Jesus Christ.

8 First, I thank my God through Jesus Christ for you

him an Apostle, and gave him the Gentiles for his field of labour, among whom they are included who dwell at Rome, to whom, returning to his exordium, he wishes health and peace, “not as the world giveth” (John, xiv. 27.), but as one believer would to another, from God the Father and the Lord Jesus Christ.

8, 9. It is characteristic of the Apostle, that all his Epistles, with the exception of the Galatians, begin with language of conciliation. As in ordinary life we first address one another with courteous salutation, so does the Apostle introduce himself to his readers, with the words of Christian charity. He lingers for an instant around that pleasant impression of a Church without spot, such as it never will be in this world, before he passes onward to reprove and exhort those whom he is addressing. It is an ideal Church that he contemplates, elect, spiritual, heavenly, going on to perfection, the image of which seems ever to blend with, and to overshadow those who bear its glorious titles.

πρῶτον μὲν,] as in iii. 2. and elsewhere, with no “secondly.”

τῷ θεῷ μου.] Compare Acts, xxvii. 23.—“The angel of God, whose I am, and whom I serve.”

διὰ Ἰησοῦ χριστοῦ.] A general Christian formula. “I give

thanks, as I do all things, through Christ.” In the introductions to the Epistles the language of common life is idealised and spiritualised. The manner is Eastern, a circumstance which, from our familiarity with the New Testament, we often fail to recognise; it is also that of the Apostle and his time. Were we to translate verses 8—10. into common words, they might be expressed as follows:—“I rejoice to hear of your faith everywhere, for I solemnly declare that I never forget you; it is one of my first prayers to come to you.” But, partly from the intensity of his feelings, partly from the style of the age and country in which he wrote, most of all from the circumstance that the ordinary events of life come to him with a Divine power, and seem, as it were, to be occurring in a spiritual world, his words fall into a different mould. He employs language, according to our sober colours of expression, too strong for the occasion; as where he says that their faith is spoken of throughout the whole world; or where he calls God to witness of his desire to come to them, though there was no reason for them to doubt this. So again in 1 Thess. i. 8.:—“For from you sounded out the word of the Lord, not only in Macedonia and Achaia, but also in every place your faith to God-



περὶ<sup>1</sup> πάντων ὑμῶν, ὅτι ἡ πίστις ὑμῶν καταγγέλλεται ἐν ὅλῳ 9  
 τῷ κόσμῳ. μάρτυς γάρ μου ἐστὶν ὁ θεός, ᾧ λατρεύω ἐν 10  
 τῷ πνεύματί μου ἐν τῷ εὐαγγελίῳ τοῦ υἱοῦ αὐτοῦ, ὡς ἀδια- 11  
 λείπτως μνεΐαν ὑμῶν ποιοῦμαι πάντοτε ἐπὶ τῶν προσευχῶν 12  
 μου δεόμενος, εἴ πως ἤδη ποτὲ εὐδοωθήσομαι ἐν τῷ θελή-  
 ματι τοῦ θεοῦ ἐλθεῖν πρὸς ὑμᾶς. ἐπιποθῶ γὰρ ἰδεῖν ὑμᾶς,  
 ἵνα τι μεταδῶ χάρισμα ὑμῖν πνευματικὸν εἰς τὸ στηριχθῆ-  
 ναι ὑμᾶς, τοῦτο δὲ ἐστὶν συμπαρακληθῆναι ἐν ὑμῖν διὰ τῆς

<sup>1</sup> ἑπέρ.

ward is spread abroad; so that we need not speak any thing." Yet, at the time of writing these words, the Apostle could hardly have travelled beyond the limits of Macedonia and Achaia.

Comp. Phil. i. 8. as an instance of the same affection towards those "unknown to him by face;" and, as an example of the same intensity of language, Gal. i. 20., where he calls God to witness that "he lies not" about the details of his visits to Jerusalem.

ὅτι ἡ πίστις ὑμῶν, *that your faith.*] No commentary could throw half as much light on the Epistle as a knowledge of the state of those whose faith is thus described. Had the Roman Church long ago or recently been converted to the Gospel? May we suppose that the news of it was carried thither by the "strangers of Rome" who about twenty-five years previously had been present at the day of Pentecost? Is it possible that the name of Christ himself had reached the metropolis of the world during his life-time? Had Priscilla and Aquila any acquaintance with the Gospel before they met with St. Paul at Corinth? Who were those brethren whom the prisoner Paul

found at Puteoli, or who came to meet him at Appii forum? No answer can be given to these questions, yet the statement of them is not without interest. There were many in the Roman Church whose names were known to the Apostle; some whom he describes as of note among the Apostles who were before him. Comp. Acts. xxviii. 15—31. Rom. xvi.

ᾧ λατρεύω, *whom I serve.*] "The God whom I serve" is an Old Testament expression, Dan. vi. 16. ἐν τῷ πνεύματί μου, that is, in my inmost soul, which is also my spiritual being.

ὡς ἀδιαλείπτως.] The balance of the clauses is best preserved by taking these words with *μνεΐαν ὑμῶν ποιοῦμαι*, and *πάντοτε* with *δεόμενος*: how unceasingly I make mention of you, ever praying for you.

10. εἴ πως ἤδη ποτὲ εὐδοωθήσομαι.] εἴ πως, if as I hope; ἤδη, now; ποτέ, at length; εὐδοωθήσομαι, I shall prosper, or have a prosperous journey. The derivation of *εὐδοωθήσομαι*, from *ἔδος*, does not commonly enter into its meaning. (1 Cor. xvi. 2.; 3 John, 2.; Jer. ii. 37.) Yet there is no reason why St. Paul, whose style is so full of plays of language,

9 all, that your faith is spoken of in \* all the world. For  
 God is my witness, whom I serve with my spirit in the  
 gospel of his Son ; how without ceasing I make mention  
 10 of you, always in my prayers making request, if by  
 any means now at length I may have a prosperous  
 11 journey by the will of God to come unto you. For I  
 long to see you, that I may impart unto you some  
 12 spiritual gift, to the end ye may be established ; that is,  
 that I may be together comforted in \* you by the mutual

should not have revived its etymological sense, which occurs in Tobit, v. 18. 21. ἐν τῷ θελήματι: for the use of ἐν compare Thucydides, i. 77.: ἐν τοῖς ὁμοίοις νόμοις τὰς κρίσεις ποιήσαντες. In such expressions the preposition, though conveniently translated “by,” really expresses a closer relation, the action being regarded in a figure as inhering or consisting in the object.

11. χάρισμα ὑμῖν πνευματικόν.] Not a miraculous gift, as appears from the following verse. Compare 2 Cor. i. 15.: — “I was minded to come unto you, that ye might have a second benefit” (δευτέραν χάριν ἔχητε); and Rom. xv. 29.

12. τοῦτο δὲ ἐστίν.] Not wishing to “Lord it over their faith;” but rather, to “be a helper of their joy;” the Apostle corrects his former expressions. “My desire is to instruct you, and do you good; that is, for us to instruct and do one another good. In giving I shall also receive.” Compare, for the feeling, what may be termed the circle of Christian sympathy, in 2 Cor. i. 4—8., and, for a similar correction of a word, with τοῦτό ἐστι, Rom. vii. 18.

συμπαρακληθῆναι, *comforted.*]

The English Version has a slight inaccuracy in the words “together with you;” for which may be substituted, “that I may be together comforted in you.” The meaning of the word παρακαλεῖν, as of παράκλητος, wavers between consolation and exhortation, or includes both. In the LXX., the former sense is the prevailing one; here both are combined. What the progress of language and the analysis of Christian feelings have separated into two, was, in the age of the Apostles, one idea and one word, with a scarcely perceptible diversity of meaning. The idea of “consolation” implied in it does not, however, refer to comfort or sympathy in any particular sorrow, but rather to the conscious communion of Christians in this present evil world. Nor is there implied in the notion of exhortation the bringing forward of statements or precepts respecting the Christian faith, but the imparting of a new spirit or temper of mind. If, allowing for the great difference between our own and the Apostolic times, we could imagine a person who had listened to a preacher, or received the counsel of a friend, who exactly touched the chords of his soul, such a

ἐν ἀλλήλοις πίστεως, ὑμῶν τε καὶ ἐμοῦ. οὐ θέλω δὲ ὑμᾶς 13  
 ἀγροεῖν, ἀδελφοί, ὅτι πολλάκις προθέμην ἐλθεῖν πρὸς  
 ὑμᾶς, καὶ ἐκωλύθη ἄχρι τοῦ δεῦρο, ἵνα τινὰ καρπὸν <sup>1</sup> σχῶ  
 καὶ ἐν ὑμῖν καθὼς καὶ ἐν τοῖς λοιποῖς ἔθνεσιν. Ἐλλησίην 14  
 τε καὶ βαρβάρους, σοφοῖς τε καὶ ἀνοήτοις ὀφειλέτης εἰμί·  
 οὕτω τὸ κατ' ἐμὲ πρόθυμον καὶ ὑμῖν τοῖς ἐν Ῥώμῃ εὐ- 15  
 αγγελίσασθαι, οὐ γὰρ ἐπαισχύνομαι τὸ εὐαγγέλιον <sup>2</sup>, 16  
 δύναμις γὰρ θεοῦ ἐστὶν εἰς σωτηρίαν παντὶ τῷ πιστεύοντι,  
 Ἰουδαίῳ τε [πρῶτον] καὶ Ἑλληνι· δικαιοσύνη γὰρ θεοῦ 17

<sup>1</sup> καρπὸν τινα.

<sup>2</sup> Add τοῦ χριστοῦ.

one might express himself in one word as comforted and instructed; that word would be παρακαλεῖσθαι. For a similar connexion of παρακαλεῖν and στηρίζειν, compare 1 Thess. iii. 2.; 2 Thess. ii. 17.

ὑμῶν τε καὶ ἐμοῦ,] is an exegesis of ἐν ἀλλήλοις, that is, "I by your faith, and you by mine."

13. οὐ θέλω δὲ ὑμᾶς ἀγροεῖν.] "But I would not have you ignorant;" "but I want to tell you;" a common formula with St. Paul, 1 Cor. xii. 1.; 2 Cor. i. 8.; 1 Thess. iv. 13.

καὶ ἐκωλύθη.] "I purposed to come and I could not;" a more natural mode of expression would have been, "though I could not." As in many other places, the Apostle uses adversative particles where the English idiom requires only the copulative conjunction; so here he uses the copulative conjunction where the English prefers the adversative particle. It is not necessary on this ground to assume a parenthesis, which would spoil the emphasis; for what the Apostle wishes the Romans to know, is not only that he was intending to

come to them, but also that he was hindered. Compare Acts, xvi. 6.; Rom. xv. 24.; 2 Cor. xiii. 1.; 1 Thess. ii. 18., as illustrating what may be termed the uncertainty of times and seasons in the Apostle's journeys. He was hindered, either "because Satan hindered him," 1 Thess. ii. 18.; or because the spirit suffered him not, Acts, xvi. 6, 7.; or because he had a feeling of delicacy, such as he speaks of in Rom. xv. 22., 2 Cor. x. 15., in intruding on another's field of labour, or, for anything that appears to the contrary, because his time had been taken up with preaching the Gospel in other places. Rom. xv. 23.

14. ὀφειλέτης εἰμί.] "I owe it to all the world that I should preach the Gospel, to the civilised as well as the uncivilised; the wise as well as the foolish." We need not raise the question which some interpreters have discussed, "in which half the Romans are to be placed." The world in which the Apostle lived was not Roman, but Greek.

It is not, in the Apostle's view, a matter of choice, or freewill,



13 faith both of you and me. Now I would not have you ignorant, brethren, that oftentimes I purposed to come unto you,\* and was let hitherto, that I might have some  
14 fruit among you also, even as among other Gentiles. I am debtor both to the Greeks, and to the Barbarians ;  
15 both to the wise, and to the unwise. So, as much as in me is, I am ready to preach the gospel to you that are  
16 at Rome also. For I am not ashamed of the gospel<sup>1</sup>; for it is the power of God unto salvation to every one that believeth; to the Jew first, and also to the Greek ;  
17 for therein is the righteousness of God revealed from

<sup>1</sup> *Add of Christ.*

whether he shall preach the Gospel or not ; but a debt which he owes to himself, mankind, and God. Compare 1 Cor. ix. 16. :—“Necessity is laid upon me, and woe is me, if I preach not the gospel.” He will not allow himself to consider it as voluntary ; he delights to increase the obligation, claiming the Romans by a sort of right, as Apostle of the Gentiles, to be included in his labours, ver. 6.

15. οὕτω τὸ κατ' ἐμὲ πρόθυμον, *So as much as in me is.*] Either “So ready am I ;” or better and more in accordance with the Apostle’s style with a pause after οὕτω, “Even so, I am ready,” that is, as owing a debt to you as well as them. The two ways of taking the passage may be further modified by connecting or separating τὸ κατ' ἐμὲ and πρόθυμον, either “I am ready,” or, “touching myself there is readiness.”

“I am ready to preach the Gospel in Rome, for I glory in it, for it is not weak, but mighty, a Divine power to save.” The Apostle exults in the greatness of his

mission. He is to preach the Gospel at Rome, before the wise, in that great city.

δύναμις Θεοῦ, a Divine power, like δικαιοσύνη Θεοῦ below.

17. Passing onward to the height of his great argument, the Apostle involves reason within reason, four times in three successive verses. Such is the over-logical form of Hellenistic Greek. “I preach the Gospel, *for* I glory in it; *for* it is not weak but strong, a power to save to him that has faith, *for* it is a revelation of the righteousness of God through faith; *for* the times of that ignorance God no longer winks at,” &c. The repetition of γὰρ does but represent the different stages and aspects of the Apostle’s thought.

δικαιοσύνη γὰρ Θεοῦ.] Viewing these words by the light of later controversy, interpreters have asked whether the righteousness here spoken of, is to be regarded as subjective or objective, inherent or imputed, as revealed by God or accepted by man. These are the “after-thoughts”

ἐν αὐτῷ ἀποκαλύπτεται ἐκ πίστεως εἰς πίστιν, καθὼς γέγραπται Ὁ δὲ δίκαιος ἐκ πίστεως ζήσεται.

of theology, which have no real place in the interpretation of Scripture. We cannot define what is not defined by the Apostle himself. But if, leaving later controversies, we try to gather from the connexion itself a more precise meaning, another uncertainty remains. For the righteousness of God may either mean that righteousness which existed always in the Divine nature, once hidden but now revealed; or may be regarded as consisting in the very revelation of the Gospel itself, in the world and in the heart of man.

The first step to a right consideration of the question, is to place ourselves within the circle of the Apostle's thoughts and language. The expression δικαιοσύνη Θεοῦ was familiar to the Israelite, who, without any reference to St. Paul's distinction of faith and works, used it in a double sense for an attribute of God and the fulfilment of the Divine law. Compare James, i. 20.:—ὁργὴ γὰρ ἀνδρὸς δικαιοσύνην Θεοῦ οὐκ κατεργάζεται. Rom. x. 3.:—ἀγνοοῦντες γὰρ τὴν τοῦ Θεοῦ δικαιοσύνην, καὶ τὴν ἰδίαν ζητοῦντες σῆσαι, τῇ δικαιοσύνῃ τοῦ Θεοῦ οὐχ ὑπετάγησαν. The law, the fulfilment of the law, and the Divine Author of the law, pass into each other; the mind is carried on imperceptibly from one to the other. The language of all religion, consisting as it must in mediation between God and man, or in the manifestation of God in man, is full of these and similar ambiguities, which we

should only gain a false clearness by attempting to remove. Such expressions in the phraseology of philosophy necessarily involve subject and object, a human soul in which they are made conscious, a Divine Being from whom they proceed, and to whom they have reference. It is generally confusing to ask to which of these they belong. Christianity is the communion of God and man in Christ, and, therefore, the words which are used to express its leading thoughts are neither here nor there, neither in the soul of man nor in the nature of God; nor yet are they mere abstract terms, denoting as they do the joint working of both. And so the expression "righteousness of God," instead of being confined to one abstract point of view or meaning, seems to swell out into several: the attribute of God, embodied in Christ, manifested in the world, revealed in the Gospel, communicated to the individual soul; the righteousness not of the law, but of faith.

ἀποκαλύπτεται, *revealed*.] The idea of "revelation" is opposed in Scripture to *μυστήριον*: it is the day that follows the night, the knowledge of God that supersedes "the times of that ignorance." Compare Rom. xvi. 25—26.:—"Now to him that is of power to stablish you according to my gospel, and the preaching of Jesus Christ, according to the revelation of the mystery, which was kept secret, since the world began, but now is made manifest,

faith to faith: as it is written, But\* the just shall live by faith.

and by the scriptures of the prophets, according to the commandment of the everlasting God, made known to all nations for the obedience of the faith." For similar trains of thought, see also Acts, xiv. 15, 16.; xvii. 30.; Col. i. 26, 27. To the first believers of Christianity, the thought of "revelation" was ever associated with the thought of the world that had preceded, and of the world that still surrounded them lying in darkness. It was continuous with another revelation, that of the sons of God, in comparison of which it was, as it were, darkness, as the night of ages had been darkness in comparison with the Gospel. Not that the outward face of mankind was changed; the light was within, the revelation in the soul itself.

*ἐκ πίστεως εἰς πίστιν, from faith to faith.*] Either: (1.) beginning and ending in faith (like 2 Cor. iii. 18., changed from glory to glory, ἀπὸ δόξης εἰς δόξαν: or Psalm lxxxiii. 7., going from strength to strength); springing from faith, and producing faith, going from one stage of faith to another; whether that first faith be regarded as the faith of the Gentile who was a law to himself; or the faith of the Old Testament, such as Abraham's was, or such as is described in the passage from the prophet Habakkuk; or the faith of him who said, "Lord, I believe, help thou mine unbelief:" or, (2.) the words *εἰς πίστιν*, "to faith," may be considered as a repetition of

*παντὶ τῷ πιστεύοντι* in the preceding verse, to them that believe. "The righteousness of God is revealed by faith to those that have faith." Compare 2 Cor. ii. 15, 16.:—*ὅτι χριστοῦ ἐνώδια ἐσμέν τῷ θεῷ ἐν τοῖς σωζομένοις καὶ ἐν τοῖς ἀπολλυμένοις, οἷς μὲν ὁσμηθῆναι εἰς θάνατον, οἷς δὲ ὁσμηθῆναι εἰς ζωὴν.* Compare also our Lord's words, "Whoso hath, to him shall be given." Or, (3.) lastly, the repetition of the word with *εἰς* (compare with this way of taking the words, also 2 Cor. ii. 16.) may denote a purpose, as in Rom. vi. 19.:—*ὡσπερ γὰρ παρεστήκατε τὰ μέλη ὑμῶν δοῦλα τῇ ἀκαθαρσίᾳ καὶ τῇ ἀνομίᾳ εἰς τὴν ἀνομίαν, ἰ. e.* with the intent to work iniquity,—to produce faith, an explanation of these passages, which, though it has less point, is more in accordance with the style of St. Paul than the preceding ones, and may be defended by the quotation from Habakkuk, which shows that the real stress of the passage is not on *εἰς πίστιν*, but on *ἐκ πίστεως*.

*καθὼς γέγραπται, as it is written.*] Scarcely any of the quotations from the Old Testament which occur in the New, are taken precisely in their original sense and connexion. They may be classed, in general, under three heads: (1.) Those which have an analogous meaning, like the words which follow from the prophet Habakkuk, in which a particular faith in God is identified with that faith in Christ which is the general condition of the Gospel, or, as in



Ἀποκαλύπτεται γὰρ ὀργὴ θεοῦ ἀπ' οὐρανοῦ ἐπὶ πᾶσαν  
ἀσέβειαν καὶ ἀδικίαν ἀνθρώπων τῶν τὴν ἀλήθειαν ἐν ἀδι-

the quotation respecting the faith of Abraham, in chap. iv., where every one will admit that "the New Testament lies hidden in the Old." (2.) Verbal allusions, such as Matth. i. 15. 17., "Out of Egypt have I called my son;" "Rachel weeping for her children." (3.) Passages from the Old Testament taken figuratively and typically, such as 1 Cor. ix. 9.:—"Thou shalt not muzzle the ox that treadeth out the corn," or Gal. iv. 25., where Agar and Sinai are the image of the two covenants. In this class of instances there is often a connected symbolical meaning, as in 1 Cor. x. 1—11., where the temptations of the Israelites in the wilderness shadow forth the temptations of the Corinthian Church. The Epistle to the Hebrews furnishes a system of such symbols derived from the history and ceremonial of the Old Testament.

Most of the quotations in the Epistles of St. Paul belong to the first of these three classes, a few of them to the third. Like the other writers of the New Testament, the Apostle detaches them from their context. He seems hardly to have thought of the connexion in which they originally occurred. He quotes as persons in the present day might quote, who are unaccustomed to the critical study of Scripture. His aim is to seize the common spirit of the Old Testament and the New; to bring forward that side of the Old Testament which is the anticipation of the New. Hence he rarely dwells on simi-

larity of words, but on passages which speak of forgiveness of sins, of the nearness of God to man, of faith counted for righteousness.

The age in which St. Paul wrote was remarkable for its fragmentary use of ancient writings. The Rabbis quoted single verses from the Old Testament, without regard to their connexion; and a similar mystical use was made of Homer and Hesiod by the Alexandrian writers, who cited them in single lines as authorities. In modern times the force of a quotation is, in like manner, supposed to consist in the authority that is adduced. It is an appeal to a revered name.

But another notion of the force of a quotation must also be allowed. A striking passage from Shakspeare appositely cited does not necessarily impress us with any weight of authority; if the words themselves are appropriate, no matter in what connexion they occur. So in quaint usages of Scripture in the writings of Bacon, Fuller, or any of our old divines, it may be often rather the dissimilitude than the resemblance of the original and adopted meaning that gives them their true force. One of the most striking uses of ancient sayings is their adaptation to express new thoughts; and the more familiar the old sense, the more striking and, as it were, refreshing the new one.

Something of this kind is true of modern no less than of ancient, of sacred as well as of profane writings. It is an element that

18 For the wrath of God is revealed from heaven against all ungodliness and unrighteousness of men, who hinder

must be allowed for in the interpretation of Scripture. When men heard the truths of the Gospel drawn forth from the treasury of the Psalms and the Prophets, their feeling must have been one of surprise; they would greet the familiar sound and marvel that they, for the first time, saw its meaning. The words which they had so often repeated, which, like the ceremonies themselves, had been a mere ceremonial, had a new life breathed into them. The mode in which this new truth was drawn out and elicited was not analogous to any critical or intellectual process; rather it might be compared to the manner in which the poor appropriate to themselves the warnings or promises of Scripture, led by some hidden law of association or spiritual influence which makes them wiser than the learned. The evidences or reasons by which men were induced to accept the truths veiled to them in "dark sayings of old," might be summed up in one—the witness of their own spirit. For a fuller discussion of this subject, see "Essay on the Quotations in the Writings of St. Paul from the Old Testament."

ὁ δὲ δίκαιος ἐκ πίστεως, *but the just.*] The LXX. have ἐκ πίστεώς μου. Hab. ii. 4. Heb. by his faith. The English Version translates, "The just shall live by faith," which is the natural mode of connecting the words in the original passage. It is not, however, quite certain, and not very important to determine whether

here and in the parallel passage, Gal. iii. 11., the Apostle intends the words ἐκ πίστεως to be taken with δίκαιος or with ζήσεται, whether the just by faith shall live, or the just shall live by faith. Whether ζήσεται would be used thus absolutely may be doubted. Compare Gal. iii. 12.

The theme of the Epistle has been already stated in the quotation from Habakkuk. In the eighteenth verse we enter on its first division, the subject of which is the world as it existed before the revelation of the righteousness which is of faith and also co-exists with it. It is subdivided into two parts, the Gentile and Jewish world, which here as elsewhere (compare iii. 19.) are not precisely separated. Throughout the first chapter the Apostle is speaking of the Gentiles; but it is not until the seventeenth verse of the next chapter, that we are made clearly aware that he has been speaking of the Jews. To both he holds up the law as the mirror in which the human race should see itself, as he had himself learned to condemn himself by its dictates.

The point of view in which the Apostle regards the heathen, is partly inward and partly outward; that is to say, based on the contemplation of the actual facts of human evil which he saw around, but at the same time blending with this, the sense and consciousness of sin which he felt within him. The Apostle himself had been awakened suddenly to the perception of his own state: in the language of



κία κατεχόντων, διότι τὸ γνωστὸν τοῦ θεοῦ φανερόν ἐστιν ἐν 19  
αὐτοῖς· ὁ θεὸς γὰρ αὐτοῖς ἐφανέρωσεν. τὰ γὰρ ἀόρατα 20

this chapter, "the wrath of God from heaven" had been revealed in him; "the righteousness of God, which is by faith" in Jesus Christ, had been also revealed in him. Alive without the law once, he had become conscious of sin and finally sensible of deliverance. And now transferring the thoughts of his own heart to an evil world, he tries it in like manner by the law of God and nature: it seems to him to be in the first stage of the great change, to have knowledge and to be self-condemned. The knowledge of God it always had latent in the works of creation; and now it has fallen below itself and is convicted by itself. It is true that the Apostle, like all other teachers, supplies from within what did not consciously exist in the mind of man. What he sees before him, might have seemed to another as nothing more than a dead inert mass of heathenism and licentiousness. But there are two lights by which he regards it: first, the light of his own experience, which seems to stir and quicken it into life; secondly, the light of God's law, by which, when brought near to it, it is condemned, and thus enters, as it were, on a new epoch, condemned and forgiven at once.

18. γὰρ, *for*.] Either: (1.) as proving the whole by the part, for one aspect of the righteousness of God, or of the preparation for the kingdom of heaven, is revealed in the anger of God and self-condemnation of men; or, (2.) with stress on ἀποκαλύ-

πτεται, for "God no longer suffers every man to walk in his own way."

ἀπ' οὐρανοῦ, *from heaven*.] Either, "because the Lord's house is in heaven," or with an allusion to the suddenness of lightning; or better, a figure of speech, partly taken from the Day of Judgment, "the Son of man coming in the clouds." Matth. xxiv. 29.; 1 Thess. iv. 16.

πᾶσαν.] Perhaps intended to comprehend both Jew and Gentile, although in what immediately follows the Apostle is speaking of the Gentiles only. Compare the stress laid on πᾶς in Rom. ii. 9., iii. 20., x. 11, 12.

κατεχόντων.] The word κατέχειν is used in the New Testament in two senses: (1.) in that of "keep, hold fast," as in 1 Cor. xi. 12.; 1 Thess. v. 21.; or, (2.) in that of "hinder, restrain," as in Luke iv. 42.; 2 Thess. ii. 6. So in this passage we might say, either upon all unrighteousness of men who hold the truth, or who hinder the truth, in unrighteousness. The first explanation would seem to agree with the context, as the Apostle is speaking of men sinning, not against, but with light and knowledge. But the word κατέχειν rather means to hold fast than merely passively to retain, and it would be unmeaning to say of the heathen that they "held fast the truth in unrighteousness." We might say, "hold fast that which is good," 1 Thess. v. 21.; "hold fast the traditions," 1 Cor. xi. 2.; "hold fast the confession," Heb. x. 23.; but not hold fast that



19 the truth in unrighteousness; because that which \* is  
 known of God is manifest in them; for God\* manifests  
 20 it unto them. For the invisible things of him from the

which was only held passively and uncertainly. The simpler interpretation is better, "of those who hinder the truth by unrighteousness." The words thus become an epexegetis merely of ἐπὶ πᾶσαν ἀδικίαν ἀνθρώπων.

19. διότι τὸ γνωστὸν, *because that which is known* ] Where there is no law, says the Apostle, there is no transgression. In like manner it might be said, that where there is no knowledge of God, there is excuse. But this is not the case of the heathen. What can be known of God is manifested in them, for God himself makes it manifest. ἐφάνησαν, Aorist in a general statement.

The heathen knew the truth, and did not know it. They had the elements of knowledge, but not knowledge itself. As the laws of nature, though unknown to man, existed from the first; so did the God of nature, though unknown to man, exist before the worlds. Yet how can that be termed knowledge which was ignorance?

The Apostle is speaking, not from within the circle of the heathen world, but from without. He is describing what he felt respecting them, not what the heathen felt respecting themselves. Yet the strain which he adopts, might have received confirmation from the writings of "their own prophets," and have found an echo in the better mind of the age itself. He brings them into the presence of nature, "the heavens declaring his glory, and

the firmament shewing his handiwork," and condemns them before it. There was a witness in the world, that might have taught them, and seemed intended to teach them, which contrasted with the human idols of Greece, and with the winged and creeping things of Egypt and the East. It does not follow, that individuals among them could separate themselves from the ties of habit and education, and read the lesson spread before them. Yet even thus, it was a condemnation of the existing polytheism.

20. τὰ γὰρ ἀόρατα αὐτοῦ, κ. τ. λ., *for the invisible things, &c.* ] may be taken in four different ways: either, (1.) his attributes, which, since the creation of the world, are invisible, are seen by his works; a thought, however, contrary to the usual language of Scripture, in which the works of creation are regarded as the manifestation, not as the concealment of the Divine glory; or, (2.) better, like the expression in xvi. 25.: μυστήριον σεσιγημένον χρόνοις αἰωνίοις, the things unseen "from the beginning," without any express reference to the creation of the world having concealed them; or, (3, 4.) ἀπὸ κτίσεως κόσμου may be taken, not with ἀόρατα, but with καθορᾶται, and balanced with τοῖς ποιήμασιν νοούμενα, ἀπὸ marking either the time or the source whence the invisible things are seen either by or ever since the creation of the world. Compare Arist. de Mundo, ch. 6.: πασῇ θνητῇ φύσει γερόμενος

αὐτοῦ ἀπὸ κτίσεως κόσμου τοῖς ποιήμασιν νοούμενα καθοράται, ἢ τε αἰδῖος αὐτοῦ δύναμις καὶ θειότης, εἰς τὸ εἶναι αὐτοὺς ἀναπολογήτους, διότι γνόντες τὸν θεὸν οὐχ ὡς θεὸν 21

ἀθεώρητος ἀπ' αὐτῶν τῶν ἔργων θεωρεῖται ὁ θεός.

νοούμενα καθοράται.] The things that are unseen are seen by knowledge of his creatures; seen "in the mind's eye," by creation. Compare ii. 1. for a similar play of words.

εἰς τὸ εἶναι αὐτοὺς ἀναπολογήτους.] They were without excuse, because they were confronted by this knowledge. Compare John, iii. 19. :—"This is the condemnation, that light is come into the world, and men loved darkness rather than light, because their deeds were evil." The knowledge which the Apostle attributes to the heathen in the following verse, is in some degree a figure of speech: without them were the means of knowledge, but within the eye was darkened, that seeing they should not see, and hearing they should not understand. Knowledge and action, reason and will, are to ourselves fundamental distinctions which have permanently impressed themselves on human thought and speech. But there was a time in the earlier stage of Greek philosophy, in which virtue was said to be knowledge, and vice ignorance. A similar inversion of our ordinary modes of thought occurs also in Scripture. Knowledge and obedience, light and life, are sometimes distinguished from each other, at other times identified. Hence it is not surprising that a degree of ambiguity should arise in the Scriptural use of the word know-

ledge, when employed to signify two ideas so different as knowledge, or the possibility of knowledge in the abstract, as in this passage, and knowledge unto life.

The sense in which they knew and did not know, admits of another illustration from the workings of conscience, which may further remind the student of Aristotle's Ethics, of the discussion which is entered upon by the great master, of another form of the Socratic opinion. There are moral as well as spiritual truths, which we know and we do not know; know at one moment and forget the next; know and do not know at the same instant; for our ignorance of which we cannot help blaming ourselves, even though it were impossible that we should know them; and which, when presented to us, work conviction and sorrow for the past. And so if St. Paul be judging the heathen from his own point of view rather than theirs, he is also holding up before them a picture, the truth of which, as they became Christians, they would themselves recognise.

It is natural to ask of whom St. Paul is speaking in this description? What class among the heathen had he in his thoughts when he said, they knew God, and worshipped him not as God? He is not speaking of the vulgar certainly, nor yet of the educated in the highest sense; that is, not of the true wisdom of heathen



creation of the world are clearly seen, being understood by the things that are made, even his eternal power and Godhead; so that they are without excuse: because that,

antiquity, but of the sophist, the mystic, the Athenian ever desirous to hear some new thing; the Greek in the cities of Asia; the Alexandrian Jew mingling all opinions, human and divine, in his system of knowledge, falsely so called; the half-educated, on whom the speculations of Stoics or Epicureans exercised a kind of secondary influence; the traditional lore of Egypt, enhanced, doubtless by the fame of its new learning, which seemed so strangely to contrast with the meanness and grotesqueness of its superstition. These were the forms of heathen life and philosophy with which the Apostle must generally have come in contact, which it is, therefore, reasonable to suppose that he had in view in this description.

It is a further question, how far St. Paul was acquainted with those master-pieces of heathen learning which have exerted so great power on the thoughts of men. Had he read Plato, or Aristotle, or the writings of the Stoics? Can we suppose him to have heard of Seneca, with whom his name is connected by an ancient and widely received forgery? Is it of these that he says: "affirming they were wise, they became fools?" There is no reason to suppose that St. Paul was skilled in any Greek learning but the Alexandrian philosophy, and that rather as a current mode of thought of his time than as a system which he had especially cultivated. But

as little reason is there to suppose that unless he had ceased to be himself, he would have viewed these great classical works in any other way than he regarded heathen literature in general, or have received them in the spirit of the later Fathers, as semi-inspired works, or have recognised in them the simplicity or grand moral lesson which has preserved them to our time. Sacred and profane literature fly from the touch of each other; they belong to two different worlds. Nor is it likely that the first teachers of Christianity would have sought to connect them, nor conceivable to us how the Gospel could have converted mankind, if, in its infancy, it had to come into collision with the dialectics of Plato, or the severe self-control of the Stoic. It must gain a form and substance of its own, ere it could leaven the world. Afterwards it might gather into itself the elements of good in all things. Nor is there reason to think that it could have drawn to itself the nobler spirits of heathen antiquity, any more than it could have taken from them. Had Tacitus known ever so much of that "exitiabilis superstitio," is it natural, humanly speaking, to suppose that he would have bowed at the foot of the cross?

21 διότι γνόντες τὸν Θεὸν, *because when they knew God,*] is a repetition in the concrete of what had been previously stated in the abstract in verse 19. The



ἐδόξασαν ἢ ἠὺχαρίστησαν, ἀλλ' ἐματαιώθησαν ἐν τοῖς  
 διαλογισμοῖς αὐτῶν, καὶ ἐσκοτίσθη ἡ ἀσύνετος αὐτῶν  
 καρδία. φάσκοντες εἶναι σοφοὶ ἐμωράνθησαν καὶ ἥλλαξαν 22  
 τὴν δόξαν τοῦ ἀφθάρτου θεοῦ ἐν ὁμοιώματι εἰκόνης φθαρ- 23  
 τοῦ ἀνθρώπου καὶ πετεινῶν καὶ τετραπόδων καὶ ἔρπετῶν.  
 διὸ<sup>1</sup> παρέδωκεν αὐτοὺς ὁ θεὸς ἐν ταῖς ἐπιθυμίαις τῶν καρ- 24

<sup>1</sup> Add καὶ.

same thought is heightened in ver. 23. 25. 28. 32. as the consequences are also thrice repeated in ver. 24. 26. 27. 29—31. A similar "antistrophic" structure is traceable in vii. 7—24. and viii. 1—11., and elsewhere.

ἐματαιώθησαν,] were made foolish, or were made nought, not merely erred. 2 Sam. xxiv. 10.; Judith, vi. 8. Comp. v. 22.

διαλογισμοῖς,] conceits, as commonly in the LXX. in a bad sense, Ps. xxiii. 11., cxxxvii. 19.

ἐσκοτίσθη ἡ ἀσύνετος αὐτῶν καρδία.] Either their heart was darkened so that it became foolish, as in Sophocles, τῶν σῶν ἀδέρκτων ὀμμάτων τητῶμενος; or Matt. xii. 13., ἀποκατεστάθη (ἡ χεὶρ) ὑγιῆς ὡς ἡ ἄλλη; or better, their foolish heart was yet further darkened.

The senselessness of the heathen religions and their worshippers, was an aspect of them far more striking to contemporary Jews or Christians than to ourselves. We gaze upon the fragments of Phidias and Praxiteles, and fancy human nature almost ennobled by the "form divine." Our first notions of patriotism are derived from Marathon and Thermopylæ. The very antiquity of heathenism gives it a kind of sacredness to us. The charms of classical literature add

a grace. It was otherwise with the Jews and first believers. They saw only "cities wholly given to idolatry," whose gods were but stocks and stones, described in the sarcasm of the prophet, "The workman maketh a graven image."

22. φάσκοντες εἶναι σοφοί, *professing to be wise,*] is a continuation of the idea already implied in διαλογισμοῖς. Comp. 1 Cor. iii. 20.: — κύριος γινώσκει τοὺς διαλογισμοὺς τῶν σοφῶν, ὅτι εἰςὶ μάταιοι, which are quoted from Ps. xciv. 11., where, however, the two words τῶν σοφῶν do not occur in the original. The Scripture is ever repeating to man the lesson that the wisdom of this world is foolishness with God. It is a part of the contrast which the Gospel presents to the experience of mankind. The rich are poor, the learned ignorant, the strong weak, the living dead, the things that are as though they were not in the sight of God. The more they assert their existence, the less have they a true existence before him. There is an irony in sacred as well as profane writings, which inverts the order of things, and, withdrawing from the world around, places itself above human opinions by placing itself below them.

when they knew God; they glorified him not as God, neither were thankful; but became vain in their imaginations, and their foolish heart was darkened. Professing \* to be wise, they became fools, and changed the glory of the uncorruptible God into an image made like to corruptible man, and to birds, and four-footed beasts, and creeping things. Wherefore <sup>1</sup> God gave them up to uncleanness in \* the lusts of their own hearts, to

<sup>1</sup> Add also.

ἀφθάρτου Θεοῦ,] contrasted with φθαρτοῦ ἀνθρώπου.

23. ἐν ὁμοιώματι.] So in Ps. cv. 20. ἠλλάξαντο ἐν ὁμοιώματι. In such passages the use of the preposition ἐν may be explained by a confusion of rest and motion (ἠλλάξαν ὥστε εἶναι ἐν ὁμοιώματι); or better, the object may be regarded as that in which the change consists. Compare v. 25.

φθαρτοῦ ἀνθρώπου . . . καὶ ἐρπέτων.] The former words refer to the Greek anthropomorphism, such as we may imagine the Apostle gazing upon from Mars Hill; the latter to the symbolism of Egypt and the East, the worship of the ibis, apes, serpents, crocodiles.

24. διὸ παρέδωκεν.] The same connexion between the blindness of the understanding, and fleshly sins, occurs in Eph. iv. 18, 19. "Having the understanding darkened, being alienated from the life of God through the ignorance that is in them, because of the blindness of their hearts: who, being past feeling, have given themselves over unto lasciviousness, to work all uncleanness with greediness."

παρέδωκεν, gave them up.] Origen and several of the Fathers

soften the meaning of the word, παρέδωκεν, by interpreting εἶσεν, permitted to be given over, rather than delivered over. Such explanations are not interpretations of Scripture, but only adaptations of it to an altered state of feeling and opinion. They are "afterthoughts of theology," as much as the discussions and definitions alluded to above, designed, when the question has begun to occupy the mind of man, to guard against the faintest supposition of a connexion between God and evil. So in modern times we say God is not the cause of evil: he only allows it; it is a part of his moral government, incidental to his general laws. Without considering the intimate union of good and evil in the heart of man, or the manner in which moral evil itself connects with physical, we seek only to remove it, as far as possible, in our language and modes of conception, from the Author of good. The Gospel knows nothing of these modern philosophical distinctions, though revolting, as impious, from the notion that God can tempt man. The mode of thought of the Apostle is still the same as that implied in the aphorism: — "Quem Deus

διῶν αὐτῶν εἰς ἀκαθαρσίαν τοῦ ἀτιμάζεσθαι τὰ σώματα αὐτῶν ἐν αὐτοῖς<sup>1</sup>, οἷτινες μετέλλαξαν τὴν ἀλήθειαν τοῦ θεοῦ ἐν τῷ ψεύδει καὶ ἐσεβάσθησαν καὶ ἐλάτρευσαν τῇ κτίσει παρὰ τὸν κτίσαντα, ὃς ἐστὶν εὐλογητὸς εἰς τοὺς αἰῶνας, ἀμήν. διὰ τοῦτο παρέδωκεν αὐτοὺς ὁ θεὸς εἰς πάθη ἀτιμίας· αἶ τε γὰρ θήλειαι αὐτῶν μετέλλαξαν τὴν φυσικὴν χρῆσιν εἰς τὴν παρὰ φύσιν, ὁμοίως δὲ καὶ οἱ ἄρσενες ἀφέντες τὴν φυσικὴν χρῆσιν τῆς θηλείας ἐξεκαύθησαν ἐν τῇ ὀρέξει αὐτῶν εἰς ἀλλήλους, ἄρσενες ἐν ἄρσεσιν τὴν ἀσχημοσύνην κατεργαζόμενοι καὶ τὴν ἀντιμισθίαν ἣν ἔδει τῆς πλάνης αὐτῶν ἐν ἑαυτοῖς ἀπολαμβάνοντες. καὶ καθὼς οὐκ ἔδοκίμασαν τὸν θεὸν ἔχειν ἐν ἐπιγνώσει, παρέδωκεν αὐτοὺς ὁ θεὸς εἰς ἀδόκιμον νοῦν, ποιεῖν τὰ μὴ καθήκοντα,

<sup>1</sup> ἑαυτοῖς.

vult perdere, prius dementat." To preserve this is essential, or we shall confuse what the Epistles do say, and what we suppose that they ought to have said; the words used to express the operation of the Divine Being, and the general impression of Divine goodness which we gather from Scripture as a whole.

ἐν ταῖς ἐπιθυμίαις, in their state of lust; compare ἐν τῇ ὀρέξει, v. 27.

εἰς ἀκαθαρσίαν τοῦ ἀτιμάζεσθαι.] Not to the uncleanness of dishonouring which would require τὴν before ἀκαθαρσίαν; in the language of the old grammarians, χάριν, or ἔνεκα, may be supplied or to speak more correctly the genitive is used to signify the remoter object which, at the same time, is an explanation of ἀκαθαρσίαν. For the word ἀτιμάζεσθαι, in this sense, compare the expression which occurs in 1 Thess. iv. 4., κτᾶσθαι σκεῦος ἐν τίμῃ.

The general question, how far

God is spoken of in Scripture as the Author of evil, will be discussed on Rom. ix. One remark may, however, be made by way of anticipation, that while we reject the distinction of God causing and permitting evil as unsuited to Scripture, a great difference must, nevertheless, be admitted between sin as the penalty of sin, or, as we should say, the natural consequence of sin, and sin in its first origin. In the latter sense the authorship of evil is no where attributed to God; in the former, it is. God makes man to sin, in the language of Scripture, only when he has already sinned, when, to the eye of man, he is hopelessly hardened. In this point of view, the metaphysical difficulty, which is not here entered upon, still remains; but the practical one is in a great degree removed.

21—28. are worth observing, as illustrative of the style of St. Paul, consisting as they do of a



25 dishonour their own bodies between themselves: who changed the truth of God into a lie, and worshipped and served the creature rather\* than the Creator, who  
 26 is blessed for ever. Amen. For this cause God gave them up unto vile affections: for\* their women did change the natural use into that which is against  
 27 nature: and likewise also the men, leaving the natural use of the woman, burned in their lust one toward another; men with men working that which is unseemly and receiving in themselves that recompence of their  
 28 error which was meet. And\* as they did not like to retain God in their knowledge, God gave them over to a reprobate mind, to do those things which are not con-

thrice repeated statement of the sin of the heathen, and their punishment. 21—24.: They knew God, but worshipped idols, therefore God punished them with unnatural lusts. 25—27.: They turned the truth of God into a lie; therefore men and women alike were given over to sensual abominations. 28. to the end: They would not know God; therefore God took away from them the sense of knowledge. Then follows the description of their state in its last aggravation.

25. *οἵτινες μετήλλαξαν.*] A new aspect of idolatry; it changes the truth that God teaches about Himself (*ἀλήθεια Θεοῦ*) into a lie.

*παρὰ τὸν κτίσαντα,*] and not the Creator. The preposition *παρὰ* is here used in the sense of "rather than," as frequently with comparative expressions, such as, *ἄλλος, ἕτερος*. So 1 Cor. iii. 11., *θεμέλιον ἄλλον παρὰ τὸν κείμενον*.

*ὅς ἐστιν εὐλογητός.*] The doxology expresses the antipathy of

St. Paul to what has preceded. At the mention of such things, he utters a hymn of praise, lest the honour of God should seem impaired. Compare iii. 5., for a similar feeling; also ix. 5.

26. *θήλειαι* and *ἄρσενες* rather than *ἄνδρες* and *γυναῖκες*, because of the relation of sex in which the Apostle is speaking of them. *εἰς πάθη ἀτιμίας*, to affections of dishonour, with an allusion to *ἀτιμάζεσθαι* which has preceded.

27. *ὁμοίως δὲ καὶ οἱ ἄρσενες.*] These words may be connected, either with what follows or with what precedes; either as in the English translation; or, "And so the men; leaving the natural use of the women, they burned in their lust," &c.

*τὴν ἀντιμισθίαν ἣν ἔδει τῆς πλάνης,*] not a recompense of their sin with one another, but of their error respecting God.

28. *καθὼς οὐκ ἐδοκίμασαν.*] The original meaning of the word *δοκιμάζειν* is: (1.) to try as metals, or, in a figurative sense of public

πεπληρωμένους πάση ἀδικία, κακία, πονηρία, πλεονεξία<sup>1</sup>. με- 29  
 στοὺς φθόνου, φόνου, ἔριδος, δόλου, κακοηθείας· ψιθυριστὰς, 30  
 καταλάλους, θεοστυγεῖς, ὑβριστὰς, ὑπερηφάνους, ἀλαζόνας,  
 ἐφευρετὰς κακῶν, γονεῦσιν ἀπειθεῖς, ἀσυνέτους, ἀσυνθέτους 31  
 ἀστόργους<sup>2</sup>, ἀνελεήμονας, οἴτινες τὸ δικαίωμα τοῦ θεοῦ ἐπι- 32  
 γνόντες, ὅτι οἱ τὰ τοιαῦτα πράσσοντες ἄξιοι θανάτου εἰσίν,

<sup>1</sup> Add *πορνεία*, and read *κακία* after *πλεονεξία*.

<sup>2</sup> Add *ἀσπόνδους*.

officers ; (2.) to approve on trial ; (3.) to determine, think fit, as in Thucyd. ii. 35., and more commonly, and with less idea of the original signification, in later Greek. In the present passage it may be translated, — “Who did not think fit.” There is also a *παρονομασία* with *ἀδόκιμος*, which in English is hardly translatable. Not approving to have God in their knowledge, they become reprobrates ; or, because they did not discern to have God in knowledge, God gave them over to an undiscerning mind. Other instances of *παρονομασία* in the Epistle are, ii. 1., iii. 27., and, above, v. 26. So Christ himself, Matt. viii. 22., xvi. 12.

29. *πεπληρωμένους πάση ἀδικία, . . . πονηρία.*] For similar lists of sins, compare Gal. v. 19. ; 2 Tim. iii. 3. ; the order in which they are placed, seems sometimes to follow associations of sound, sometimes of sense.

*πονηρία*] may be distinguished from *κακία*, as the stronger and more exact expression from the weaker and more general one, as villany from evil and vice.

*πλεονεξία*,] perhaps here, as in Ephes. v. 3., Col. iii. 5., in the sense of lust.

*κακοηθείας, malignity*,] implies secret, inveterate evil in a man's nature.

30. *ψιθυριστὰς*,] secret, as opposed to *καταλάλους*, open slanderers.

*θεοστυγεῖς, hated of God.*] The use of the word in classical Greek, as well of the analogous word *βροτοστυγής*, requires the passive sense. To this it is objected, that it is unmeaning to single out a particular class as hateful to God, because all sinners are so. With the view of avoiding this difficulty, it has been proposed to render the word actively after the analogy of *θεομίσης* in Arist. Aves, 1555.

*μισῶ δ' ἅπαντας τοὺς θεούς, ὡς οἰσθᾶν, νῆ τὸν Δεῖ ἀεὶ δῆτα θεομίσης ἔφους.*

Compare also the word *θεοσεχθρία* in Arist. Vesp. 418. and *θεόσυλος* in Philo, vol. ii. 642. ; also Rom. viii. 7. Notwithstanding this departure from ordinary use, the word is still somewhat pointless. It is safer, with such a writer as St. Paul, or rather with all writers, to take language in its usual sense, of which we are much more certain, than we can ever be of the intention of a writer in a particular passage. Here, either the active or passive sense is deficient in point ; yet a fair meaning may be given to the passive usage. *θεοστυγής* does not signify hateful to God in the same degree that all sinners may be said to be so,

29 venient ; being filled with all unrighteousness, evil, wickedness<sup>1</sup>, villany\*, covetousness ; full of envy, murder, 30 debate, deceit, malignity ; whisperers, backbiters, hated\* of God, despiteful, proud, boasters, inventors of evil 31 things, disobedient to parents, without understanding, covenant-breakers, without natural affection<sup>2</sup>, unmerciful : 32 who knowing the judgment of God, that they which

<sup>1</sup> Add fornication.<sup>2</sup> Add implacable.

but more than this, “reprobate,” “marked with the seal of the Divine wrath,” in a special sense and pre-eminently above other men “hated of God.”

ἕβριστὰς, brutal and injurious to others.

ὑπερηφάνους, haughty.

ἀλαζόνας, vain boasters,] the Gnathos and Thrasos of the comic writers.

30. ἐφευρετὰς κακῶν, inventors of new forms of evil. Compare κακῶν εὑρεταί in Philo, Lib. in Flac. 520.

ἀσυνέτους, without understanding,] in the Hebrew sense implying moral degradation. Ps. xci. 6.

ἀσπόργους, without natural affection,] e. g. mothers who exposed their children, emperors or satraps who put to death their brothers.

ἀσυνθέτους, perfidious.] Jer. iii. 8. 11.

[ἀσπόνδους, in the Textus Receptus, is probably spurious, perhaps a gloss on ἀσυνθέτους.]

32. The Apostle concludes the long catalogue of sins as he had begun it, with a reference to the fact that men committed them in the face of knowledge ; they could not otherwise have had the nature of sin. It has been some-

times thought that a higher degree of guilt was intended to be intimated by συνευδοκοῦσιν, “have pleasure in them,” than by πρᾶσσοῦσι, “do them.” To encourage evil in others without the incentive of passion in a man’s self, might seem to denote a higher degree of moral depravity than any mere licentiousness which was the gratification of passion.

It may be objected to the suggested interpretation that the thought is too subtle, and also that a stronger meaning is assigned to the word συνευδοκοῦσι than it will fairly bear. There is a considerable difference between passively assenting to or approving, and encouraging or taking delight in. The climax breaks down if we translate the words in their legitimate sense, “who not only do, but assent to those who do them.” Nor is the climax appropriate at one in this place, nor can it be maintained, as a general proposition, that it is worse to approve than to do evil.

The difficulty has led some interpreters to propose a change of reading, which has considerable manuscript authority. The various readings are as follow : —

οἵτινες τὸ δίκαιωμα τοῦ θεοῦ ἐπιγύοντες, [ἐπιγινώσκοντες, B.]



οὐ μόνον αὐτὰ ποιοῦσιν, ἀλλὰ καὶ συνευδοκοῦσιν τοῖς πρᾶσσοισιν.

[Add οὐκ ἐνόησαν, Δ Gfgv. Cypr. Luc.] ὅτι οἱ τὰ τοιαῦτα πρᾶσσοντες ἄξιοι θανάτου εἰσίν, οὐ μόνον αὐτὰ ποιοῦσιν, ACΔG [ποιοῦντες, Bfgv], ἀλλὰ καὶ συνευδοκοῦσιν ACΔG [συνευδοκοῦντες] τοῖς πρᾶσσοισιν. If we combine the alteration of B with the addition of ΔG, the sense will be as follows:—“Who, knowing the judgment of God, do not perceive that they who do such things are worthy of death, not only in that they do them themselves, but in that they consent to those who do them.” The feebleness of the

last clause, and the deficiency of MS. authority, are sufficient objections to such a mode of evading the difficulty.

Another explanation has been offered of the original text. συνευδοκοῦσιν, it has been thought, is not intended to express any higher degree of guilt than ποιοῦσιν, but merely that the Gentiles do evil, and judge favourably of evil. This it is sought to connect with the first verse of the next chapter:—“Therefore thou art inexcusable, O man, whosoever thou art that judgest,

commit such things are worthy of death, not only do the same, but have pleasure in them that do them.

and thy judgment of another is a condemnation of thyself; for thou judgest and doest too." But the transition of meaning from *συνευδοκεῖν* to *κρίνειν* is not defensible.

It has been already remarked, that the form of St. Paul's writings is often more artificial and rhetorical than the thought. May not this be the explanation of the passage which we are considering? The opposition is really one of particles, not of ideas. The Apostle does not

mean to say "who do them, and, more than that, have pleasure in those that do them," but simply "who do them, and assent to those who do them." (Compare 2 Cor. viii. 10., *οἵτινες οὐ μόνον τὸ ποιῆσαι, ἀλλὰ καὶ τὸ θέλειν προενήρξασθε ἀπὸ πέρουσι*, which is probably to be explained in the same way, and where the commentators have recourse to similar forced interpretations.) He is aggravating the picture by another, but not necessarily a deeper shade of guilt.

## ON THE CONNEXION OF IMMORALITY AND IDOLATRY.

“AN idol is nothing in the world,” says the Apostle; “yet he that commits fornication sins against his own body.” It is foolishness to bow to an idol; but immorality and licentiousness are real and essential evil. No mere outward act can make a man different from what he was before, while no inward act can leave him the same after as before its performance. A belief about Jupiter or Hades is not necessarily inconsistent with truth and purity of life. The evils, whether of a heathen or of a Christian country, are not always associated with the corruptions of religion. Whence, then, the connexion often spoken of by theologians, and not unfelt by the heathen themselves, between immorality and idolatry?

It is first to be sought for in their origin. As the Christian religion may be regarded as the great pillar and rock of morality, so the heathen religions sprang up in an age prior to morality. We see men in the dawn of human history just raised above the worship of stocks and stones, “making themselves gods to go before them.” Like children they feed upon the creations of their own minds; they live in a world of their own and are satisfied. No thought occurs to them of the higher laws of human life; they have no sense of shame or its opposite; the abstract terms for “right and wrong” have not yet been heard in their vocabulary. The Gods who have possession of the heart of man are half-physical, half-magical, and in part also human, beings, not purely evil any more than man himself, but leaning to the worse rather than to the better side of man’s nature, of which they are the vacant and magnified images. The deities of the Homeric poems are not better than men, but rather worse; compared with heroes, they have a fainter sense of truth and justice, less certainly of moral greatness. After ages felt that the Homeric gods were unworthy of a civi-



lised race. And yet it might have been fortunate for mankind had no deeper leaven of evil ingrained itself in the religions of the ancient world; for mythology at a later, or in some nations at an earlier, stage, dived into a gulf below, out of which rose powers of evil — furies pursuing the homicide, inevitable destiny, capricious vengeance, wild justice for imaginary crimes. Human nature grew and human beings spread over the earth; but they carried with them, wherever they went, the traditional load of superstition, with which their separate existence as a nation seemed to be bound up. Far otherwise would it have been if the good of states, or the dictates of natural feeling and affection, had been made the standard to which religion was to conform. And accordingly it has everywhere happened, that as reflection has gained ground, or civilisation spread, mankind have risen up against the absurdities and barbarities of early mythology, either openly disowning them or secretly explaining them away; and thus in either case bearing witness that idolatry is not on a level with man's reason, but below it. In the case of the Greeks, especially, many of the grosser forms of religion disappeared from the light of day into the seclusion of the mysteries.

The whole civilised world in modern times are worshippers of an unseen God; the whole civilised world in ancient times were idolaters. The vastness and uniformity of this latter fact lead us to look upon idolatry as rooted in a natural instinct. It is not an error into which men reason themselves, or a lesson propagated by false teachers, or the trick of priests imposing on the credulity of mankind; a lower stage of human nature is implied in it. Its birth and origin we scarcely see; most of the effects which are commonly attributed to it being an after-growth of civilised and historical times. And this of itself was an element of immorality; it continued in a world which had lost its first meaning, whose convictions of right and truth gradually became opposed to it, whose very ideas of decency were inconsistent with its grosser forms. In old times

man had wondered at his own power of bringing into being a creature in his own image ; religious awe had blended with the sensual impulse ; at shrines and sacred places “ the people had come together to eat and to drink, and risen up to play.” And, ever after, sensual love remained as a pervading element of the Pagan religions, consecrated by antiquity, in later ages graced and half-concealed by art. The introduction of the Bacchanalia at a comparatively recent epoch in the history of Greece, and the attempted introduction of them at Rome, indicate the reawakening of the same religious passions when older modes of faith failed to satisfy them. Yet more monstrous forms of evil arose when in things not to be named men seemed to see a likeness to the operations and powers of nature. The civilised Greek and Roman knew well that there were frenzies of religious licentiousness unworthy of a rational being, improper and dangerous for a government to allow. As East and West met and mingled, the more did these strange rites spread themselves, passing from Egypt and Phœnicia to Greece, from the mountains of Phrygia to the streets and temples of Rome.

But, besides this direct connexion between idolatry and forms of moral evil, there is also an indirect and general influence which it exercised, even in its better aspect, adverse to morality. Not from religion, but from philosophy, come the higher aspirations of the human soul in Greece and Rome. Idolatry detains men in the world of sight ; it offers an outward form to the eye and imagery to the fancy ; it draws the many-coloured veil of art over the corruption of human nature. It heals the strife of man with himself superficially. It takes away the conscious want of the higher life, but leaves the real need. But morality has to do with an unseen world : it has no form nor comeliness, when separated from the hope which the Gospel holds out ; it is severe and stoical in its demands. It tells men to look within ; it deepens the battle with self. It presents duty almost as an abstraction which in the face of death they must pursue, though there be no reward here, though their name perish for evermore. The spirit of all idolatry is the very opposite of this ;

it bids men rest in this world, it pacifies them about another. The nature of God, who is the ideal and perfection of all morality, it lowers to the level of man; the virtue which is above, the truth which is beyond us, it embodies in the likeness of the human form, or the wayward and grotesque fancies of the human mind. It bids us seek without for what can only be found within.

There remains yet a further parallel to be drawn between immorality and idolatry in the age in which St. Paul himself lived, when the ancient religions had already begun to be discredited and explained away. At this time they had become customs rather than beliefs—maxims of state rather than opinions. It is, indeed, impossible to determine how far in any minds they commanded respect, or how much of the reverence that was refused to established modes of worship was accorded to the claims of newly imported deities. They were in harmony with the outer world of the Roman Empire—that is, with its laws, institutions, traditions, buildings; but strangely out of harmony with its inner life. No one turned to the mythology of Greece and Rome to find a rule of life. Perhaps no one had ever done so, but now least of all. Their hold was going or gone; there was a space in the mind of man which they could no longer fill up, in which Stoic and Epicurean philosophers were free to walk; the chill darkness of which might receive a ray of light and warmth from the Alexandrian mystic; where, too, true voices of philosophy and experience might faintly make themselves heard, and the heart ask itself and find its own solution of the problem, “What is truth?” In all this latter period the relation of morality to religion might be said to be one of separation and antagonism. And, upon the whole, this very freedom was favourable to right and truth. It is difficult to determine how far the spectacle of a religion which has outlived its time may corrupt the moral sense, how far the necessary disbelief of an existing superstition tends to weaken and undermine the intellectual faculties of mankind; but there can be little doubt that it does so less than if it were still believed and still ministered to the sensuality or ignorance of the world.



## ON THE STATE OF THE HEATHEN WORLD.

NOT to dwell at length on a subject from which the Christian gladly turns away, it will not be without use, as an illustration of the preceding chapter, to sum up briefly a few of the leading features which distinguish the heathen from the Christian world; most of which have never existed in Christian times, and which we have no reason to think ever will or can exist again as prevailing practices in a Christian or civilised society.

1. Παιδεραστία and in general unnatural crimes.
2. Exposure of offspring.
3. Licentiousness of religious worship, as shown —
  - i. In the representations of the theatre, where the worst parts of the heathen mythology were publicly performed.
  - ii. In the mysteries, especially those of Cybele and of Ceres and Bacchus, which consisted partly of a frantic licentiousness, partly of a consecration of those things which are done in secret by mankind.
  - iii. In the religious ceremonies of Egypt and the East, especially the worship of Cotytto, Astarte, Isis, and Mendes.
4. Cruelty, as shown not merely in maxims or practices of war or the crimes of individuals, but in the offering of human sacrifices, which continued to the age of the Emperor Adrian.

To which may be added, as less revolting characteristics of ancient times,—

1. Slavery ;
2. Condition of women: both of which are gradually ameliorated by Christianity.

The picture suggested by these features is not equally true of the heathen world in all ages, nor of Greece and the East, nor of Rome and Greece, nor of Rome itself in the earlier years of the republic and under the emperors. In the Iliad and Odyssey the fouler Greek vices are found, if anywhere, only among the Gods : while the Greek Lyric and Elegiac poets are deeply infected with them. Old Italian life was simpler and better. It could hardly have been the mere fond recollection of the past that made the Roman tell of the Sabine morals of his ancestors, or of the dignity of Roman matrons, or of the lessons of truth and virtue to be gathered from the examples of consuls and dictators. It is probable that Rome was long preserved from the impurities of Greece and the East, yet, as it seems, only reserved for a deeper contamination and pollution. To see the old world in its worst estate we turn to the age of the satirists and of Tacitus, when all the different streams of evil coming from east, west, north, south, the vices of barbarism and the vices of civilisation, remnants of ancient cults and the latest refinements of luxury and impurity, met and mingled on the banks of the Tiber. What could have been the state of society when Tiberius, Caligula, Nero, Domitian, Heliogabalus were the rulers of the world? To a good man we should imagine that death itself would be more tolerable than the sight of such things coming upon the earth.

Strange it seems, at first sight, that anything of good, or patriotism or noble feeling, anything of purity in women or manliness in men, should have subsisted side by side with shameless indecency and impurity. Living, mingling, acting in this world below nature, were men like Seneca, Tacitus, or Agricola, of whom it might be truly said, "these not having the law are a law unto themselves." The explanation of this anomaly is, perhaps, to be sought in the fact, that in the worst of times good men are better and more entirely separated from the vices of their age. At the same time it can hardly be supposed that they could have regarded the sins which the Apostle describes with that natural horror that they would awaken among ourselves. The feeling which makes the perpetrator of such sins an

outcast and an exile upon the earth had as yet no existence: shameful as they were admitted to be, they could still be made the subject of a jest or of a poetical allusion. Nor must the extreme confusion be overlooked which religion had introduced into the natural sense of mankind respecting them, consecrating them by the example of gods and heroes, and representing even the worst of them as religious mysteries. Least of all would the increase of refinement tend to their diminution. It was not to the elegant and luxurious senator such abominations were peculiarly odious, but to the antique Roman, rude in speech and knowledge, hating the contamination of foreign manners, lingering in thought around the liberties of the republic.

Two reflections naturally append themselves on this subject. The first, that as St. Paul tells us that the Gentiles knew or might have known the truth of God, so there never was a time—at least in the history of Greece and Rome, with which we are best acquainted—in which nature and reason did not bear witness against these impurities. Plato and Socrates in their way, and Aristophanes in his, alike protested against the degrading vices of their age; the first by endeavouring to give a nobler and more spiritual character to that which to Christian ideas is absolutely incapable of being associated with anything true or spiritual; the latter, while admitting the universality of such vices, by making them subjects of ridicule and satire, and also to a certain extent claiming for himself the praise of greater decency than his contemporary comic writers. In the times of the emperors the lash of the satirist gave no quarter to the depravity of the age; while the historian, and better men generally, remembered the tradition of a time when purity and decency of manners had not yet been lost, and the Stoic philosopher, if his stoicism were not a mere mask, stood apart, naturally compelled to an austere virtue by the vices of all mankind.

The other is a sad reflection, which we would feign conceal from ourselves, and yet cannot avoid making, when contemplating the glorious Athens, its marvels of art and beauty, its deeds of patriotism, its speculations of wisdom and philosophy; not, perhaps, without the



thought flashing across our minds that there was a phase of human life in that old Paganism which in Christianity has never been developed in equal perfection, and from which truly Christianity may be said to have borrowed something which it has incorporated with itself. The reflection is this :— That if the inner life had been presented to us of that period which in political greatness and in art is the most brilliant epoch of humanity, we should have turned away from the sight with loathing and detestation. The greatest admirer of old heathen virtues, the man endowed with the finest sensibilities for beauty and form, would feel at once that there was a great gulf fixed between us and them, which no willingness to make allowance for the difference of ages or countries would enable us to pass. There are vices which have existed in modern times to a far greater extent than in ancient ; there were virtues in ancient times which have never been exceeded ; but there were vices also which are not even named among us. It is a sad but useful lesson, that the noblest simplicity in art may go along with

“ Rank corruption mining all within.”

Neither is it untrue to say, that there was a thread by which they were linked together.

## CHAP. II.

THE second chapter of the Romans has often been regarded as containing the exclusive condemnation of the Jew for hypocrisy, as the first chapter contains the condemnation of the Gentile for sins below nature. This statement, however, is not quite exact. That the Apostle intended to include both Jew and Gentile under sin, may be inferred from chap. iii. 9. ; the two heads of the proof do not, however, precisely correspond to the divisions of the chapters. The course of his thought may be traced as follows :—He has been speaking of the inhuman and unnatural vices of the Gentiles, and now passes on to another class of sins—hypocrisy and deceit,—in which he loses sight of the Gentiles, and addresses man in the abstract. Assuming that all mankind are guilty before God, the judgment of others is a condemnation of self. But whence is this assumption? Not strictly deducible from the preceding chapter, in which the Apostle has been speaking only, or chiefly, of the Gentiles, yet in spirit agreeing with it; for the judgment of others is a higher degree of that knowledge of God which “hinders the truth in unrighteousness.” Still there is a link wanting. We must allow the Apostle to make a silent transition from the Gentile to mankind in general, just as in chap. iii. 19. he has included the Gentile under the condemnation of the Jew. Full of the general idea of the universal sinfulness of man, he follows his own thought without looking back at the connexion. There would have been no difficulty had he spoken first of the sinfulness of the Gentile and then of the sinfulness of the Jew; and, thirdly, of the additional guilt incurred by either in hypocrisy and judgment of others. But the sinfulness of

the Jew being greatly increased by or mainly consisting in this last, he has sunk the mention of other sins, leaving them to be inferred or suggested from the general description that preceded.

With the first verse of the second chapter the style changes; the contemplation of the heathen world is ended, and the Apostle proceeds to reason with an imaginary opponent, whom he draws within the circle of human evil and will not allow him to escape, under the pretence of judging others, which does but aggravate his guilt. Such a one is trying to deceive God, but only deceives himself. Gradually we approach the Jew. In the third verse there is a glimpse of the notion that God would judge the heathen but spare the sons of Abraham; in the fourth and fifth verses is presented to us a picture, like those in the Old Testament, of the rebellious spirit of the Jew, and the long-suffering of God towards him; in the tenth and eleventh verses occurs a declaration of God's equal justice to all; in the twelfth and thirteenth the spirit of the law is opposed to the letter, and the believing Gentile to the unbelieving Jew; until at last, in v. 17., the Apostle turns to make the direct attack on the Jew, for which, in the previous verses, he has been indirectly preparing: "But if thou art called a Jew, and retest in the law and gloriest in God."

Throughout this paragraph, as elsewhere, the connexion is in a great measure formed by the repetition of words in the successive verses and clauses. Thus *πράσσοντας* and *κρῖμα* connect verses 1. and 2.; *τοὺς τὰ τοιαῦτα πράσσοντας* is taken up from v. 2. in v. 3.; in the latter part of v. 4. *τὸ χρηστὸν τοῦ Θεοῦ* is a repetition of *τοῦ πλούτου τῆς χρηστότητος* in the former part of the verse; *ὅς ἀποδώσει, κ.τ.λ.*, in v. 6. is an expansion of the word *δικαιοκρισίας* in v. 5.; *δόξα δὲ καὶ τιμὴ*, in the tenth verse, is a resumption of the same words in the seventh.



Διὸ ἀναπολόγητος εἶ, ὦ ἄνθρωπε πᾶς ὁ κρίνων· ἐν ᾧ 2  
 γὰρ κρίνεις τὸν ἕτερον, σεαυτὸν κατακρίνεις· τὰ γὰρ αὐτὰ 2  
 πράσσεις ὁ κρίνων. οἶδαμεν δὲ ὅτι τὸ κρίμα τοῦ θεοῦ 2  
 ἐστὶν κατὰ ἀλήθειαν ἐπὶ τοὺς τὰ τοιαῦτα πράσσοντας· 3  
 λογίζη δὲ τοῦτο, ὦ ἄνθρωπε ὁ κρίνων τοὺς τὰ τοιαῦτα 3  
 πράσσοντας καὶ ποιῶν αὐτά, ὅτι σὺ ἐκφεύξῃ τὸ κρίμα τοῦ 4  
 θεοῦ; ἢ τοῦ πλούτου τῆς χρηστότητος αὐτοῦ καὶ τῆς ἀνο- 4  
 χῆς καὶ τῆς μακροθυμίας καταφρονεῖς, ἀγνοῶν ὅτι τὸ

Διὸ] appears to have a double reference in the context:—first, to what has preceded, “Because of this revelation of wrath and mercy, because of this universal sinfulness, because of this just judgment of God;” secondly, to what follows, “therefore thou art without excuse, because in condemning others you are condemning yourself.” A conclusion which is bound up by a further link: “For thou that judgest doest the same things.” For a similar use of διὸ . . . ἵνα, as here, διὸ . . . ἐν ᾧ γάρ, comp. Heb. xiii. 12.:—διὸ καὶ Ἰησοῦς ἵνα ἀγίασῃ διὰ τοῦ ἰδίου αἵματος τὸν λαόν, ἔξω τῆς πύλης ἔπαθεν. Comp. i. 20. for ἀναπολόγητος; for the play on κρίνεις and κατακρίνεις, c. v. 16. κρίμα ἐξ ἐνὸς εἰς κατάκριμα.

2. οἶδαμεν δέ.] But although you judge others and deceive yourself, God will judge you as you really are. δέ implies an antithesis to the general idea of the preceding verse, “You are a hypocrite, but you cannot deceive God.”

κατὰ ἀλήθειαν,] not according to their judgment of themselves, but according to truth.

3. δὲ again adversative to the preceding verse: “But do you think this, O man, that your

judging others will give you a claim of exemption from the Divine judgments? That would not be according to truth. Do you suppose that you will be judged by anything but what you are?”

Hypocrisy is almost always unconscious; it draws the veil over its own evil deeds, while it condemns its neighbours; it deceives others, but begins by deceiving the hypocrite himself. It is popularly described as “pretending to be one thing, and doing, thinking, or feeling another;” in fact, it is very different. Nobody really leads this sort of unnatural and divided existence. A man does wrong, but he forgets it again; he sees the same fault in another, and condemns it; but no arrow of conscience reaches him, no law of association suggests to him that he has sinned too. Human character is weak and plastic, and soon reforms itself into a deceitful whole. Indignation may be honestly felt at others by men who do the same things themselves; they may often be said to relieve their own conscience, perhaps, even to strengthen the moral sentiments of mankind by their expression of it. The worst hypocrites are bad as we can imagine, but they are not such as we

2 Therefore thou art inexcusable, O man, whosoever  
 thou art that judgest : for wherein thou judgest another,  
 thou condemnest thyself ; for thou that judgest doest  
 2 the same things. But we are sure that the judgment  
 of God is according to truth against them which commit  
 3 such things. And thinkest thou this, O man, that  
 judgest them which do such things, and doest the same,  
 4 that thou shalt escape the judgment of God ? Or despisest thou the riches of his goodness and forbearance and longsuffering ; not knowing that the goodness of

imagine. The Scribes and Pharisees, "hypocrites," were unlike what they seem to us ; much more would they have regarded their own lives in another light from that in which our Lord has pictured them. Their hypocrisy, too, might be described as weakness and self-deception, only heightened and made more intense by the time and country in which they lived. It was the hypocrisy of an age and of a state of society blinder, perhaps, and more fatal for this very reason, but less culpable in the individuals who were guilty of it. Those who said, "we have a law, and by our law he ought to die," were not without "a zeal for God," though seeking to take away him in whom only the law was fulfilled.

But although experience of ourselves and others seems to show that hypocrisy is almost always unconscious, such is not the idea that we ordinarily attach to the word "hypocrite." This singular psychological phenomenon is worth our observing. The reason is, first, that the strong contrast we observe between the seeming and the reality, between the acts and words of the hypocrite, leads us to speak

as though the contrast was present and conscious to himself. We cannot follow the subtle mazes through which he leads himself ; we see only the palpable outward effect. Secondly, the notion that hypocrisy is self-deception or weakness, is inadequate to express our abhorrence of it. Thirdly, our use of language is adapted to the common opinions of mankind, and often fails of expressing the finer shades of human nature.

4. ἡ τοῦ πλούτου.] Or is it that you openly defy God ? The connexion with the previous verse may be traced as follows:—What account do you give of yourself, O man ? Do you expect to escape ? or is it that his mercy hardens your heart ? It is this mercy in delaying to punish, that gives you the opportunity of self-deception. How different are your feelings to Him from His to you ! Comp. Rom. ix. 22 : "What, if God, willing to shew his wrath, and make his power known, endured with much longsuffering the vessels of wrath fitted for destruction !" The thought of Divine vengeance in both passages, shades off into that of mercy. In the Apostle's view, it is not



χρηστὸν τοῦ θεοῦ εἰς μετάνοιάν σε ἄγει; κατὰ δὲ τὴν 5  
 σκληρότητά σου καὶ ἀμετανόητον καρδίαν θησαυρίζεις  
 σεαυτῷ ὀργὴν ἐν ἡμέρᾳ ὀργῆς καὶ ἀποκαλύψεως δικαιο-  
 κρισίας τοῦ θεοῦ; ὃς ἀποδώσει ἐκάστῳ κατὰ τὰ ἔργα 6  
 αὐτοῦ, τοῖς μὲν καθ' ὑπομονὴν ἔργου ἀγαθοῦ δόξαν καὶ 7  
 τιμὴν καὶ ἀφθαρσίαν ζητοῦσιν ζωὴν αἰώνιον· τοῖς δὲ ἐξ 8

God's severity that punishes, but his goodness that for a time puts off the punishment. Comp. for the language, Phil. Leg. Alleg. p. 46., τὴν ὑπερβολὴν τοῦ πλούτου καὶ τῆς ἀγαθότητος αὐτοῦ.

5. Once more, δὲ is adversative, though the opposition is too faint to be exactly expressed by any corresponding particle in English. The impenitence and hardness of man's heart is contrasted with the goodness and gentleness of God. The contrast may be carried out, either with or without a question. "And as thou art hardened and unrepenting, thou treasurest up for thyself (or dost thou treasure up for thyself?) wrath in the day of wrath." The present is used for the future (comp. below, ver. 16.); or rather the day of judgment is thought of as already present. The idiom is similar in the words of our Saviour, Matt. vi. 20.: *θησαυρίζετε ὑμῖν θησαυροὺς ἐν οὐρανῷ*. The word *θησαυρίζετε* in the passage we are considering, contains an allusion to τοῦ πλούτου τῆς χρηστότητος.

*ἀποκαλύψεως δικαιοκρισίας*. The wrath of God and the righteousness of God are already revealed, i. 16, 17., iv. 25.; but there is yet a further stage of revelation in which the sons of God are to be manifested, Rom. viii. 19., and the justice of God finally vindicated.

*ὃς ἀποδώσει ἐκάστῳ, κ. τ. λ.* These words are an expegesis of δικαιο-

*κρισίας*; they are almost an exact quotation from Psalm lxii. 12., Prov. xxiv. 12., and are repeated in the New Testament in Matt. xvi. 27., xxv. 31.

It has been asked, what does the Apostle mean by saying that we shall be judged by our works, when the whole tenor of the Epistle goes to prove that we are to be justified by faith?

Many answers may be given to this question:—First, the Apostle has not yet taught the doctrine of righteousness by faith, and therefore cannot properly adopt what in modern times might be termed the language of Pauline theology. He is speaking exoterically, it might be said, in words borrowed from the Old Testament, on the level of Jews, or heathens, not of Christians, from the same point of view as in 9, 10. Secondly, the words τὰ ἔργα in this passage are not opposed to faith, but to pretensions, self-deceptions, and may be paraphrased in the expression that follows ὑπομονὴν ἔργου ἀγαθοῦ. But thirdly, the Apostle needs these excuses to make him consistent, not with himself, but with some of his interpreters. He says, indeed:— "We are justified by faith without the deeds of the law." But he uses other language also:— "Now abideth faith, hope, love; and the greatest of these is love." Nor does the expression "righte-



5 God leadeth thee to repentance? But after thy hard-  
 ness and impenitent heart treasurest up unto thyself  
 wrath in the day of wrath and revelation of the  
 6 righteous judgment of God; who will render to every  
 7 man according to his deeds: to those who patiently\*  
 endure in a good work, seeking for\* eternal life, glory  
 8 and honour and immortality: but unto them that are

ousness by faith" occur at all in several of his Epistles. We may not "straiten" the Apostle where he is not "straitened" in his own writings. There are occasions on which we can conceive him using the language of St. James as a corrective to the abuse of his own. A subject so vast and various as the salvation of man, cannot be bound within the withs of logic. As with our Lord, so with his Apostles the message is, first—"Believe, and thou mayest be saved;" but secondly,—"The hour is coming, and now is, when they that are in the graves shall hear his voice."

It is the strongest presumption that the difficulty is not a real one, that the Apostle himself is wholly unconscious of it: we cannot imagine him discussing whether faith in Christ, or the love of Christ, or the inward life of Christ, are the sources of justification. Is it irreverent to say, that disputes of this kind would hardly have been intelligible to him? No more can we conceive him regarding the case of the heathen, after, as well as before, Christianity, in any other spirit than, "God is no respecter of persons."

7. There are three possible ways of construing this passage:

(1.) As in the English transla-

tion, "To those who by patient continuance in well doing, seek for glory and honour and immortality, he will render eternal life." This is favoured by the order of the Greek, but seems open to the objection of an anticlimax. It is hardly good sense to say—"God will give eternal life to those who ask him for the greatest conceivable blessings;" but rather—"God will give the greatest conceivable blessings to them that ask for eternal life." The stronger expression has a false emphasis, unless it refers, not to what man asks, but to what God gives.

Or (2.) the order of the words may be varied by taking *ἔργον ἀγαθοῦ* either with *ὑπομονὴν* or *δόξαν*. It is better, however, to take it with *ὑπομονὴν*, as the expression *δόξαν ἔργου ἀγαθοῦ* is singular, and the words *ἔργον ἀγαθοῦ* cannot be connected equally with *τιμὴν καὶ ἀφθαρσίαν*.

(3.) To those who by patient endurance in a good work seek for eternal life, he will render glory and honour and immortality. This mode of taking the passage, notwithstanding the inversion of the order, is on the whole preferable, and is favoured by the repetition of *δόξα καὶ τιμή*, in ver. 10.

8. *τοῖς δὲ ἐξ ἐπιθείας*.] The word *ἐπιθεία* is derived, not from

ἐριθείας καὶ ἀπειθοῦσι<sup>1</sup> τῇ ἀληθείᾳ, πειθομένοις δὲ τῇ ἀδικίᾳ, ὀργὴ καὶ θυμός.<sup>2</sup> θλίψις καὶ στενοχωρία ἐπὶ πᾶσαν ψυχὴν ἀνθρώπου τοῦ κατεργαζομένου τὸ κακόν, Ἰουδαίου τε πρώτον καὶ Ἑλληνας· δόξα δὲ καὶ τιμὴ καὶ εἰρήνη παντὶ τῷ ἐργαζομένῳ τὸ ἀγαθόν, Ἰουδαίῳ τε πρώτον καὶ Ἑλληνι.

Οὐ γὰρ ἔστιν προσωποληψία παρὰ τῷ θεῷ. ὅσοι

<sup>1</sup> ἀπειθοῦσι μὲν.

<sup>2</sup> θυμὸς καὶ ὀργή.

ἔρις but from ἔριθος, and its original meaning signifies labour for hire. A secondary signification is hence obtained of "intrigue for hire;" and in Aristotle's Politics, v. 2. 6., the word has acquired a further sense of "party," "faction." This last has been probably modified in the New Testament by the supposition of a second derivation from ἔρις, as we should be inclined to infer from the juxta-position in which the word occurs in Gal. v. 20. ἔρις, ζηλοί, θυμοί, ἐριθείαι, 2 Cor. xii. 20., James iii. 16.

ἀπειθοῦσι τῇ ἀληθείᾳ.] By the truth is meant the law of right, and the will of God generally. The ideas of truth and right are not separated in Scripture, as they are in our way of speaking, or in the forms of thought of the Greek Philosophy. There is no "division of the soul," in Aristotle's language, into moral and intellectual. Hence, knowledge in Scripture is often spoken of as a moral quality, and with the word "truth" are associated expressions denoting acts and states of the will rather than of the intellect. See i. 20.

The construction is changed, perhaps, because the words ὀργή and θυμός did not suit the previous verb. This change occasions

the Apostle to repeat another parallel clause in the tenth verse. θυμός is distinguished from ὀργή by some of the lexicographers, as the more transient from the more permanent feeling. But the last thing that the Apostle thought of when accumulating words, is the precise shade of meaning by which one may be distinguished from the other. The second is really a rhetorical strengthening of the first, as two words, even if synonymous, always mean more than one.

πειθομένοις δὲ τῇ ἀδικίᾳ,] who disobey the law of God and make unrighteousness their law. Compare 1 Cor. xiii. 6. for a similar contrast of clauses.

9. θλίψις καὶ στενοχωρία.] Compare 2 Corinth. iv. 8. θλιβόμενοι, ἀλλ' οὐ στενοχωρούμενοι: where the words are opposed, as a less degree of tribulation to a greater.

The parallelism of the clauses is best preserved by arranging them with Lachmann in four members, with a full stop after θυμός. Here, as elsewhere, repetition adds emphasis; the thought which is first conceived in ver. 7, 8., is fully and distinctly enunciated in 9, 10.

ψυχὴν] may be used here, either as the seat of the feelings, as in



contentious, and do not obey the truth, but obey un-  
 9 righteousness, indignation, and wrath. Tribulation and  
 anguish, upon every soul of man that doeth evil, of the  
 10 Jew first, and also of the Gentile; but glory, honour,  
 and peace, to every man that worketh good, to the Jew  
 first, and also to the Gentile.

11 For there is no respect of persons with God. For  
 12

our Lord's words "My soul is exceeding sorrowful even unto death," Mark, xiv. 34.; or simply for "person" as in Rom. xiii. 1. "Let every soul be subject to the higher powers."

Ἰουδαίου τε πρῶτον καὶ Ἑλλη-  
 ληνος.] The Jew as the type of the world, is the first recipient of God's mercies and of his judgments.

11—15. In the verses which follow, the Apostle involves reason within reason, as at ver. 17. of ch. i. All men shall have their reward, (1.) *for* God is no respecter of persons; (2.) *for* with or without law the wicked shall alike perish; (3.) *for* not the hearers, but the doers of the law shall be righteous with God; (4.) *for* the Gentiles, if they be doers of the law, shall be approved in the day of the Lord. (1.) is a general truth which is the foundation of what has preceded, and of which (2.) may be regarded as the consequence in fact, and the proof to us; (3.) is a negative statement of it and a proof of so much of (2.) as relates to the Jew, and (4.) a further proof by contrast of so much of (2.) as relates to the Gentile, and a strengthening of the general principle by a particular instance.

11. οὐ γὰρ ἔστιν προσωποληψία.] Compare Acts, x. 34., where, in reference to the admission of the

Gentiles, Peter says: "Of a truth I perceive God is no respecter of persons. But in every nation he that feareth him and worketh righteousness, is accepted of him," Eph. vi. 9.; Col. iii. 25., where the same truth is applied to the relative duties of masters and slaves.

It was one of the first ideas that the Israelite had of God, that he was no respecter of persons: Deut. x. 17.; 2 Chron. xix. 7.; Job, xxxiv. 19. But this disregard of persons was only in his dealings with individuals of the chosen people. St. Paul used the expression in the wider sense of not making a difference of persons between Jew and Gentile, circumcision or uncircumcision, bond or free, just as he adapted the words "there is one God" to the meaning of God one and the same to all mankind, in iii. 30. and elsewhere. Nothing could be less like the spirit of his countrymen than this sense of the universal justice of God. Still it might be asked of the Apostle himself, how the fact of their ever having been a privileged people, was consistent with the belief of this equal justice to all mankind. Like many other difficulties, we can answer this by parallel difficulties among ourselves. Though living in the full light of the Gospel, there are many things which



γὰρ ἀνόμως ἤμαρτον, ἀνόμως καὶ ἀπολοῦνται· καὶ ὅσοι  
 ἐν νόμῳ ἤμαρτον, διὰ νόμου κριθήσονται. οὐ γὰρ οἱ <sup>13</sup>  
 ἀκροαταὶ νόμου<sup>1</sup> δίκαιοι παρὰ [τῷ] θεῷ ἀλλ' οἱ ποιηταὶ  
 νόμου<sup>2</sup> δικαιωθήσονται (ὅταν γὰρ ἔθνη τὰ μὴ νόμον ἔχοντα <sup>14</sup>  
 φύσει τὰ τοῦ νόμου ποιῶσιν<sup>3</sup>, οὗτοι νόμον μὴ ἔχοντες  
 ἑαυτοῖς εἰσὶν νόμος, οἷτινες ἐνδείκνυνται τὸ ἔργον τοῦ <sup>15</sup>  
 νόμου γραπτὸν ἐν ταῖς καρδίαις αὐτῶν, συμμαρτυρούσης  
 αὐτῶν τῆς συνειδήσεως καὶ μεταξὺ ἀλλήλων τῶν λογισμῶν  
 κατηγορούντων ἢ καὶ ἀπολογουμένων) ἐν ἡμέρᾳ ἧ<sup>4</sup> κρινεῖ ὁ <sup>16</sup>

<sup>1</sup> τοῦ νόμου.<sup>2</sup> τοῦ νόμου.<sup>3</sup> ποιῇ.<sup>4</sup> ὅτε.

to us also "God hath put in his own power," and which we believe rather than know to be reconcilable with his justice. What to us the heathen are still, standing apparently on the outskirts of God's moral government, that to St. Paul and the believers of the first age were "the times of that ignorance that God winked at." Are we not brought by time to a later stage of the same difficulty?

12. ὅσοι γὰρ ἀνόμως ἤμαρτον.] For God will deal alike with all; He will punish without law those that sinned without law, and judge by the law those that sinned under the law. Not "he that knew not his Lord's will, shall be beaten with few stripes:" this though true is not to the point here, but "the soul that sinneth it shall die."

ἐν νόμῳ.] The preposition may be equally well rendered in English, "in," "with," "under;" none of these, however, precisely give its meaning, which is rather "in the state or sphere of the law" a metaphorical use of ἐν derived from the original local one.

13. For not every one who says Lord, Lord, the hearer of the law, boasting his descent from

Abraham, is just before God, but the doers of the law shall be justified. The future, here and in ver. 12., is used like the present in a general statement, as in Matt. iv. 4. οὐκ ἐπ' ἄρτῳ μόνῳ ζήσεται ὁ ἄνθρωπος; as in English, "he who does so will suffer punishment;" or, perhaps, as expressing the intention of Providence or nature.

The Apostle here speaks of the doers of the law as to be justified, and yet a few verses afterwards, he himself intimates that by the deeds of the law no flesh shall be justified. Again, this contradiction may be illustrated by an analogous way of speaking among ourselves. The heathen, we say, are without the pale of salvation, and yet we acknowledge that individual heathens are nevertheless saved.

14—16. are commonly included, as by Lachmann, in a parenthesis, which, for reasons that will be stated at ver. 16., is not here admissible; ver. 14. is closely connected with ver. 13., of which it forms an indirect proof. "It is not the hearers, but the doers of the law who are justified, for the Gentiles are sometimes justified who know not the law."

as many as sinned\* without law shall also perish without law: and as many as sinned\* in the law shall be judged by the law; for not the hearers of the law are just before God, but the doers of the law shall be justified; for when the Gentiles, which have not the law, do by nature the things contained in the law, these, having not the law, are a law unto themselves: which shew the work of the law written in their hearts, their conscience also bearing witness, and thoughts accusing or else excusing them one with another\*; in the day when God shall judge

φύσει] may either be taken with ποιῶσιν as in the English Version, or with νόμον ἔχοντα. "When the Gentiles who have not the law by nature or originally." The latter mode of construing the passage is in some degree confirmed by Gal. ii. 15. ἡμεῖς φύσει Ἰουδαῖοι: Eph. ii. 3. τέκνα φύσει ὀργῆς: and v. 27. ἡ ἐκ φύσεως ἀκροβυστία. ἔθνη, not "Gentiles," but "the Gentiles," as in ch. xi. 12, 13., and elsewhere.

ἐαυτοῖς εἰσὶν νόμος.] Compare Arist. Eth. iv. 14.: — ὁ δὲ χαρίεις καὶ ἐλευθέριος οὕτως ἕξει ὅσον νόμος ὦν ἐαυτῷ.

15. οἴτινες, which show.] Who manifest the reality of the law; or who manifest the law not in word, but in act; which, unwritten though it be, is written on their hearts. Compare 2 Cor. iii. 2. "Ye are our epistle written in our hearts, known and read of all men." οἴτινες = quippe qui.

συμμαρτυρούσης,] sc. τῷ νόμῳ, συνειδήσεως. The act rather than the faculty of conscience in the sense in which the term is used by moral philosophers.

μεταξύ.] Not as in the Eng-

lish Version, "meanwhile," but with ἀλλήλων, "one with another," as in Matt. xviii. 15.:—μέταξυ σοῦ καὶ αὐτοῦ μόνου. ἀλλήλων refers, not to λογισμῶν, which would be too violent a personification, but to αὐτῶν.

ἢ καὶ] is well translated in the English Version "or else;" it merely expresses the connexion of the two alternatives.

The 14th and 15th verses contain an analysis of the natural feeling of right and wrong, in three states or stages. First, the unconscious stage, in which the Gentiles not having the law, show its real though latent existence in their own hearts; of which, secondly, they have a faint though instinctive perception in the witness of conscience; which, thirdly, grows by reflection into distinct approval or disapproval of their own acts and those of others.

"Blessed are they, who fall into the hands of this accuser," say the Rabbis; "blessed also are they, who fall not into his hands," quoted from Sohar, Exodus, fol. 67. col. 266., by Schœttgen, vol. i. p. 496.

θεὸς τὰ κρυπτὰ τῶν ἀνθρώπων κατὰ τὸ εὐαγγέλιόν μου διὰ  
 Ἰησοῦ χριστοῦ. εἰ δὲ <sup>1</sup> σὺ Ἰουδαῖος ἐπονομάζῃ καὶ ἐπανα- 17  
 παύῃ νόμῳ <sup>2</sup> καὶ καυχᾶσαι ἐν θεῷ καὶ γινώσκεις τὸ θέλημα 18  
 καὶ δοκιμάζεις τὰ διαφέροντα, κατηχούμενος ἐκ τοῦ νόμου,  
 πέποιθᾶς τε σεαυτὸν ὁδηγὸν εἶναι τυφλῶν, φῶς τῶν ἐν 19  
 σκοτει, παιδευτὴν ἀφρόνων, διδάσκαλον νηπίων, ἔχοντα 20

<sup>1</sup> ἰδέ.<sup>2</sup> τῷ νόμῳ.

16. A difficulty occurs in the construction of this verse, the future ἢ κρινεῖ being joined with the present ἐνδείκνυνται, or as some interpreters think with κατηγορούντων and ἀπολογουμένων. The English Version has inclosed ver. 13—15. in a parenthesis, to escape the difficulty; an expedient which it has frequently adopted, as at ch. v. 13—18.; Eph. iv. 9, 10., but which is peculiarly unsuited to the unravelling of the tangle of discourse, in such a writer as St. Paul. The thread of any broken construction may in this way be resumed; yet unless the parenthesis really had a place in the author's mind, our supposed explanation will be a mere grammatical figment like the "word understood," in explanation of a difficult construction. A real parenthesis is the insertion of a clause, or of a thought, between two points of a sentence, the meaning of which should be clearly broken off at its beginning, and clearly resumed at its conclusion. The parenthetical thought, as it is hurried over in discourse, should be really an afterthought, yet necessary to the comprehension of the sentence. The present passage does not come within this rule, and therefore a parenthesis has no place here. It is far more probable

that, as elsewhere, St. Paul wrote without perfect sequence, than that he suspended his meaning through several verses, and resumed it unimpaired.

We will take the words, therefore, in their plain but ungrammatical construction with ἐνδείκνυνται, "which shew the work of the law . . . in the day which is to come." The day which is to come is not only future, but present; anticipated in the heart and conscience of every man, as well as in the history of the world. It is "the day that is coming and now is," John, v. 25., the presence (παρουσία) of Christ. And the Apostle passes from one tense to the other, unconscious of the solecism.

For a parallel union of dissimilar times compare above Ξησαυρίζεις σεαυτῷ ὄργην ἐν ἡμέρᾳ ὀργῆς. 2 Cor. i. 14.: καθὼς καὶ ἐπέγνωτε ἡμᾶς ἀπὸ μέρου, ὅτι καύχημα ὑμῶν ἐσμέν καθάπερ καὶ ὑμεῖς ἡμῶν ἐν τῇ ἡμέρᾳ τοῦ κυρίου Ἰησοῦ. Eph. i. 3.: Εὐλογητὸς ὁ Θεὸς καὶ πατὴρ τοῦ κυρίου ἡμῶν Ἰησοῦ χριστοῦ, ὁ εὐλόγησας ἡμᾶς ἐν πάσῃ εὐλογίᾳ πνευματικῇ ἐν τοῖς ἐπουρανίοις ἐν χριστῷ. See note at the end of the chapter on the modes of time and place in Scripture.

κατὰ τὸ εὐαγγέλιόν μου, *according to my Gospel.*] The Apostle means to express that the fact of a



the secrets of men by Jesus Christ according to my gos-  
 17 pel. But if<sup>1</sup> thou art called a Jew, and retest in the law,  
 18 and gloriest in God, and knowest his will, and approvest  
 the things that are more excellent, being instructed  
 19 out of the law; and art confident that thou thyself art  
 a guide of the blind, a light of them which are in dark-  
 20 ness, an instructor of the foolish, a teacher of babes,

<sup>1</sup> Behold.

judgment of the world by Christ (Rom. xiv. 10.) was in accordance with his Gospel, not that his Gospel would be the rule of judgment. It is a fancy of several of the Fathers that he is appealing in these words to a written Gospel of his own or to St. Luke's.

17—29. From this point to the end of the chapter, the Apostle exerts all the force of his eloquence to unmask the Jew. All the imaginations with which he flatters himself, all the titles that he delights to heap upon himself, are suggestive of the contrast between what he is and what he seems, which is further heightened by the previous mention of the Gentile who knew not the law and did by nature the things contained in the law, and pointed at the conclusion by a verse from the Old Testament. At ver. 26. the Gentile reappears and the order is finally inverted, uncircumcision which fulfils the law taking the place of circumcision which transgresses the law, and the idea of the Jew in spirit forming a middle term between Jew and Gentile.

17. *εἰ δέ*, A.B.D.E.K.] *ἰδέ* is a correction, the object of which is to avoid the anacoluthon. The English translation should therefore run:—“But if thou art called a Jew.” The apodosis of

the thought is sufficiently expressed in ver. 21., though the length of the sentence and the rhetorical accumulation of clauses have prevented the Apostle from resuming the thread of the grammar.

*δέ* indicates a subdued contrast with what has preceded: “There are Gentiles who fulfil the law; and [but] dost thou, who hast all the feelings of a Jew and all the pride of thy race, break it?” The latter thought the Apostle expands into six verses, from 17. to 23.

*καυχᾶσαι ἐν θεῷ*, *gloriest in God.*] For the feeling expressed in these words comp. Deut. iv. 7.: “For what nation is there so great, who hath God so nigh unto them, as the Lord our God is in all things that we call upon him for?” and Psalm cxlvii. 19, 20.: “He sheweth his word unto Jacob, his statutes and his judgments unto Israel. He hath not dealt so with any nation.”

18. *γινώσκεις τὸ θέλημα.*] Comp. Rom. xii. 2.:—*εἰς τὸ δοκιμάζειν ὑμᾶς τί τὸ θέλημα τοῦ θεοῦ.*

*καὶ δοκιμάζεις τὰ διαφέροντα.*] Not “discernest the differences of things,” but approvest, or knowest by proof, the things that are more excellent. Compare Philip. i. 10. *εἰς τὸ δοκιμάζειν ὑμᾶς τὰ διαφέροντα*; Rom. xii. 2., where the word *δοκιμάζειν* occurs in the

τὴν μόρφωσιν τῆς γνώσεως καὶ τῆς ἀληθείας ἐν τῷ νόμῳ, ὁ οὖν διδάσκων ἑταυτὸν οὐ διδάσκεις ; ὁ κηρύσσων 21  
 μὴ κλέπτειν κλέπτεις ; ὁ λέγων μὴ μοιχεύειν μοιχεύεις ; ὁ 22  
 βδελυσσόμενος τὰ εἰδῶλα ἱεροσυλεῖς ; ὃς ἐν νόμῳ καυχᾶσαι, 23  
 διὰ τῆς παραβάσεως τοῦ νόμου τὸν θεὸν ἀτιμάζεις ; τὸ γὰρ 24  
 ὄνομα τοῦ θεοῦ δι' ὑμᾶς βλασφημεῖται ἐν τοῖς ἔθνεσιν,  
 καθὼς γέγραπται. περιτομὴ μὲν γὰρ ὠφελεῖ, ἐὰν νόμον 25

same sense ; and Wisd. ii. 19., where it is used as here, interchangeably with *γίνωσκειν*.

20. *ἔχοντα τὴν μόρφωσιν.*] In that thou hast *τὴν μόρφωσιν*, not as in 2 Tim. iii. 5., the form as opposed to the substance, but the substance itself in an outward form, the visible presence of knowledge and truth in the law.

21. At length the Apostle turns to strike : the thought for which throughout the chapter he had been preparing, is now uttered with its full force. He cuts short the apodosis with a question, which is also an inference : Is the result of all this that thou who judgest doest the same thing ? “Dost thou,” we might repeat in the language of the Gospels, “who art paying tithe of mint, of rue, and of cumin, devour widows’ houses ? Art thou, who castest stones at others, free from the sin of adultery thyself ?”

*ὁ βδελυσσόμενος, thou who abhorrest.*] But “how could a Jew commit sacrilege ?” And what opposition is there between “committing sacrilege” and “abhorring idols ?” The last difficulty might be removed by considering the words “Dost thou who abhorrest idols ?” as equivalent to “Dost thou who art zealous for God ?” (Compare the description in Joseph. Ant. xviii. 3. 1., of the horror of the Jews

at Pilate commanding the Roman standards to be brought into Jerusalem, and upon his refusal to remove them, their laying their necks bare to his soldiers ; the passionate detestation of idols shown on this and similar occasions might fairly be considered as zeal for God.) But the other inquiry is still unanswered :—How could a Jew rob a temple ? Various instances are brought forward of alleged sacrilege, such as the dedication of property by saying Corban, to evade the duty of supporting parents ; or the buying and selling in the Temple, which made the Lord’s house a house of merchandise ; or, lastly, embezzlement of the Temple revenues, as in the case of Fulvia, mentioned in Josephus, Antiqq. xviii. 3. 5. But these offences, though in a metaphorical sense they might be termed sacrilege, give a feeble and inadequate opposition in the present passage.

The most literal mode of taking the words is also the freest from objections :—“Dost thou who abhorrest idols, rob the idol’s temple ?” Such an offence might be very possibly committed by a Jew, whom no “*religio loci*” would restrain ; and it would occur to St. Paul, as an inhabitant of a Gentile city, to mention it. This explanation is confirmed by the use of the word *ἱεροσύλους* in



which hast the form of knowledge and of the truth in  
 21 the law—thou therefore which teachest another, teachest  
 thou not thyself? thou that preachest a man should  
 22 not steal, dost thou steal? thou that sayest a man  
 should not commit adultery, dost thou commit adultery?  
 23 thou that abhorrest idols, dost\* thou rob temples? thou  
 that makest thy boast of the law, through breaking the  
 24 law dishonourest thou God? For the name of God is  
 blasphemed among the Gentiles through you, as it is  
 25 written. For circumcision verily profiteth, if thou keep

Acts, xix. 37., curiously translated in the English Version “robbers of churches” (compare 2 Mac. iv. 42., where it is similarly translated, though referring to the Jewish temple), and by the remarkable interpretation of Exodus, xxii. 28., in Joseph. Ant. iv. 8. § 10.—“Let no one blaspheme those gods whom other cities esteem such, nor any one steal what belongs to strange temples; nor take away the gifts that are dedicated to any God.”

23. The sum of all these questions is:—“Are you who are glorying in the law, dishonouring God by the transgression of the law?” For the language compare Eccles. xxxix. 8., *ἐν νόμῳ διαθήκης κυρίου κανθήσεται.*

24. It is not only I who say this; you are described in the Old Testament. With the exception of the connecting particle *γὰρ*, the words of the quotation correspond exactly with Isaiah lii. 5., according to the version of the LXX., which has received a different impress from the original. The words, however, both of the LXX. and the Hebrew refer alike to the dishonour done to God, by the oppression of the Israelites under their enemies.

The spirit of the passage, according to either version, is different therefore from the spirit in which it is here quoted. The thought which the Apostle has elicited from it—“The name of God is blasphemed, because of the wickedness of his worshippers” is expressed elsewhere, though not with so near a correspondence of language, 2 Samuel, xii. 14.; Nehem. v. 9.; Ezek. xxxvi. 23. It is a sarcasm on the chosen race that they who are glorying in the law are themselves the cause of God’s name being evil spoken of.

25. *περιτομή μὲν γὰρ ὠφελεῖ, for circumcision profiteth.]* I do not say that circumcision is vain, if you have also “the other circumcision of the heart.” Comp. iii. 11. (As we might argue, the sacrament is a means of grace to those that receive it faithfully.) But to you, and such as you, it is vain.

This is one of that class of questions which, in ancient as well as modern times, is seldom brought to the distinct issue of the Apostle. The Rabbi would have hesitated to say that a wicked Jew had a part in Messiah’s kingdom, or that the virtuous heathen was necessarily excluded from it. The Christian,



πράσσης· ἂν δὲ παραβάτης νόμου ἦς, ἡ περιτομή σου ἀκροβυστία γέγονεν. ἂν οὖν ἡ ἀκροβυστία τὰ δικαιώματα τοῦ νόμου φυλάσση, οὐχ ἡ ἀκροβυστία αὐτοῦ εἰς περιτομὴν λογισθήσεται, καὶ κρινεῖ ἡ ἐκ φύσεως ἀκροβυστία τὸν νόμον τελούσα σὲ τὸν διὰ γράμματος καὶ περιτομῆς παραβάτην νόμον; οὐ γὰρ ὁ ἐν τῷ φανερῷ Ἰουδαῖός ἐστιν, οὐδὲ ἡ ἐν τῷ φανερῷ ἐν σαρκὶ περιτομῇ, ἀλλὰ ὁ ἐν τῷ κρυπτῷ Ἰουδαῖος, καὶ περιτομῇ καρδίας ἐν πνεύ-

in modern times at least, would shrink from affirming that an unbaptized infant is “a child of wrath,” or that the baptized could hardly, if in any case, fail of salvation at the last. But many even among Christians would gladly, if possible, turn away from the inquiry: they would wish to be allowed to hold premises without pushing them to their conclusions; to take issue upon a word, and not to determine the point of morality or justice.

This is what the Apostle has not done. With him circumcision becomes uncircumcision, if it transgress the law. Uncircumcision becomes circumcision, if it keep the law.

It is true that the spiritual meaning of circumcision was implied in the law itself, and occasionally taught by the doctors of the law. (Deut. x. 16.; Philo, ii. 258.) But the habitual feeling of the Jew was the other way. To him circumcision was the seal of the covenant; the charm which protected him from the wrath of God; the sign which had once been characteristic of the nation, and was still appropriated to the individuals who composed it. Like the old prophets in spirit, though in form logical and antithetical, the Apostle answers him by assert-

ing the superiority of the moral to the ceremonial law; he repeats the universal lesson which the whole current of Jewish history tended to obliterate, the same which was once heard in other words from the Saviour’s lips, “Think not to say with yourselves we have Abraham to our Father.”

The following passage, quoted from Schœttgen’s *Horæ Hebraicæ*, vol. i. 499., is a singular instance of an attempt to reconcile the privileges of circumcision with the moral law:—*Dixit R. Berechias, “Ne hæretici et apostatæ et impii ex Israelitis dicant, quandoquidem circumcisi sumus in inferiora non descendimus.”* The Rabbi answers the difficulty in a different spirit from St. Paul:—“*Quid agit Deus, sanctus, benedictus? Mittit angelum et præputia ipsorum atrahit ita ut ipsi in infernum descendant.*”

26. *ἂν οὖν, if then,*] is a corollary of the preceding verse:—“If the transgressor of the law passes into the state of uncircumcision, it follows by an easy transition that the fulfiller of the law passes into the state of circumcision.”

27. *καὶ κρινεῖ ἡ ἐκ φύσεως ἀκροβυστία.*] And shall not uncircumcision, which is by nature,

the law : but if thou be a breaker of the law, thy circum-  
 26 cision is made uncircumcision. Therefore if the  
 uncircumcision keep the\* judgments of the law, shall not  
 27 his uncircumcision be counted for circumcision? And  
 shall not uncircumcision which is by nature, if it fulfil  
 the law, judge thee, who with\* the letter and circum-  
 28 cision dost transgress the law? For he is not a Jew,  
 which is one outwardly; neither is that circumcision,  
 29 which is outward in the flesh: but he is a Jew, which  
 is one inwardly; and circumcision is that of the heart,

if it fulfil the law, judge you? a further step in the inversion of the order of the world; not only shall the Gentile take the place of the Jew, but shall condemn him.

Compare Ezekiel, v. 7, 8. for an approach to the same thought: —“Because ye multiplied more than the nations that are round about you, and have not walked in my statutes, neither have kept my judgments, neither have done according to the judgments of the nations that are round about you; Therefore, thus saith the Lord God, Behold, I, even I, am against thee, and will execute judgments in the midst of thee in the sight of the nations.”

*ἐκ φύσεως*, like *φύσει* in ver. 14., admits of two constructions: either “the uncircumcision which is by nature fulfilling the law,” like *ἡμεῖς φύσει Ἰουδαῖοι*, Gal. ii. 15.; or the uncircumcision which by nature, and without the law, fulfils the law.

*σὲ τὸν διὰ γράμματος καὶ περιτομῆς παραβάτην νόμου;*] *διὰ* the state, or better, the instrument: “You whom the letter and circumcision only make a transgressor of the law;” “you who with all your advantages do but transgress the law.”

28. This verse may be regarded as the reason of what has preceded: “The Jew shall be condemned by the Gentile; for such a Jew as I have been describing is not the true Jew.” Or equally as an inference from what has preceded, or a repetition of it in a slightly altered form. The simplest way of construing the passage is to make *Ἰουδαῖος* and *περιτομή* predicates of the sentence “For not he that is one outwardly is a Jew.” *ἐν σαρκὶ* is an explanation of *ἐν τῷ φανερωῷ*.

29. The Apostle uses in a new sense the expression familiar to all. Compare our Lord’s words “an Israelite indeed;” and St. Paul in the Epistle to the Gal. vi. 16.: “Peace be upon them, and mercy, and upon the Israel of God.” Such expressions are used not merely because the Jewish Church was the type of the Christian, but because to the first believers they were the natural mode of describing the new elect people of God.

The expression *περιτομή καρδίας* occurs in Deut. x. 16., xxx. 6.; Jer. iv. 4.

*ἐν πνεύματι*,] in the inward man, not in the written letter. Comp. 2 Cor. iii. 6.: —“Who hath made

ματι οὐ γράμματι, οὐδὲ ὁ ἔπαινος οὐκ ἐξ ἀνθρώπων ἀλλ' ἐκ τοῦ θεοῦ.

us able ministers of the New Testament, not of the letter, but of the spirit; for the letter killeth, but the Spirit giveth life."

It is the object of the two pre-

ceding chapters to bring Jew and Gentile under the same condemnation. It has been also the object of the Apostle to contrast the Jew with the Gentile, and to bring



in the spirit, and not in the letter; whose praise is not of men, but of God.

him to a perception of the moral law, by the supposition of its fulfilment in the person of a Gentile. But if the Gentile can, and

the Jew does not, fulfil the law, what profit is there in circumcision? That is the question. See Introduction to Chap. III.

ON THE ABSTRACT IDEAS OF THE NEW  
TESTAMENT, IN CONNEXION WITH RO-  
MANS, I. 17.

RELIGION and philosophy have often been contrasted as moving in different planes, in which they can never come into contact with each other. Yet there are many meeting points at which either passes into the circle of the other. One of these meeting points is language, which loses nothing of its original imperfection by being employed in the service of religion. Its plastic nature is an element of uncertainty in the interpretation of Scripture; its logical structure is a necessary limit on human faculties in the conception of truths above them; whatever growth it is capable of, must affect also the growth of our religious ideas; the analysis we are able to make of it, we must be able also to extend to the theological use of it. Religion cannot place itself above the instrument through which alone it speaks to man; our true wisdom is, therefore, to be aware of their interdependence.

One of the points in which theology and philosophy are brought into connexion by language, is their common usage of abstract words, and of what in the phraseology of some philosophers are termed "mixed modes," or ideas not yet freed from associations of time or sense. Logicians speak of the abstract and concrete, and of the formation of our abstract ideas: Are the abstractions of Scripture the same in kind with those of philosophy? May we venture to analyse their growth, to ask after their origin, to compare their meaning in one age of the world and in another? The same words in different languages have not precisely the same meaning. May not this be the case also with abstract terms which have passed from the Old Testament into the New, which have come down to us from the

times of the Apostles, hardened by controversy, worn by the use of two thousand years? These questions do not admit of a short and easy answer. Even to make them intelligible, we have to begin some way off, to enter on our inquiry as a speculation rather of logic than of theology, and hereafter to return to its bearing on the interpretation of Scripture.

It is remarked by a great metaphysician, that abstract ideas are, in one point of view, the highest and most philosophical of all our ideas, while in another they are the shallowest and most meagre. They have the advantage of clearness and definiteness; they enable us to conceive and, in a manner, to span the infinity of things; they arrange, as it were, in the frames of a window the many-coloured world of phenomena. And yet they are "mere" abstractions removed from sense, removed from experience, and detached from the mind in which they arose. Their perfection consists, as their very name implies, in their idealism: that is, in their negative nature.

For example: the idea of "happiness" has come down from the Greek philosophy. To us it is more entirely freed from etymological associations than it was to Aristotle, and further removed from any particular state of life, or, in other words, it is more of an abstraction. It is what everybody knows, but what nobody can tell. It is not pleasure, nor wealth, nor power, nor virtue, nor contemplation. Could we define it, we seem at first as if we should have found out the secret of the world. But our next thought is that we should only be defining a word, that it consists rather in a thousand undefinable things which, partly because mankind are not agreed about them, partly because they are too numerous to conceive under any single idea, are dropt by the instinct of language. It means what each person's fancy or experience may lead him to connect with it; it is a vague conception to his own mind, which nevertheless may be used without vagueness as a middle term in conversing with others.

It is the uniformity in the use of such words that constitutes their true value. Like all other words, they represent in their origin things of sense, facts of experience. But they are no longer pictured



by the sense, or tinged by the affections ; they are beyond the circle of associations in which they arose. When we use the word happiness, no thought of chance now intrudes itself ; when we use the word righteousness, no thought of law or courts ; when the word virtue is used, the image no longer presents itself of manly strength or beauty.

The growth of abstract ideas is an after-growth of language itself, which may be compared to the growth of the mind when the body is already at its full stature. All language has been originally the reflection of a world of sense ; the words which describe the faculties have once referred to the parts of the body ; the name of God himself has been derived in most languages from the sun or the powers of nature. It is indeed impossible for us to say how far, under these earthly and sensual images, there lurked among the primitive peoples of mankind a latent consciousness of the spiritual and invisible ; whether the thought or only the word was of the earth earthy. From this garment of the truth it is impossible for us to separate the truth itself. In this form awhile it appears to grow ; even the writers of the Old Testament, in its earlier portion, finding in the winds or the light of heaven the natural expression of the power or holiness of Jehovah. But in process of time another world of thought and expression seems to create itself. The words for courage, strength, beauty, and the like, begin to denote mental and moral qualities ; things which were only spoken of as actions, become abstract ideas, the name of God loses all sensual and outward associations ; until at the end of the first period of Greek philosophy, the world of abstractions, and the words by which they are expressed, have almost as much definiteness and preciseness of meaning as among ourselves.

This process of forming abstractions is ever going on — the mixed modes of one language are the pure ideas of another ; indeed, the adoption of words from dead languages into English has, above all other causes, tended to increase the number of our simple ideas, because the associations of such words, being lost in the transfer, they are at once refined from all alloy of sense and experience.

Different languages, or the same at different periods of their history, are at different stages of the process. We can imagine a language, such as language was, as far as the vestiges of it allow us to go back, in its first beginnings, in which every operation of the mind, every idea, every relation, was expressed by a sensible image; a language which we may describe as purely sensual and material, the words of which, like the first written characters, were mental pictures: we can imagine a language in a state which none has ever yet reached, in which the worlds of mind and matter are perfectly separated from each other, and no clog or taint of the one is allowed to enter into the other. But all languages which exist are in reality between these two extremes, and are passing from one to the other. The Greek of Homer is at a different stage from that of the Greek tragedians; the Greek of the early Ionic philosophers, at a different stage from that of Plato; so, though in a different way (for here there was no advancement), the Greek of Plato as compared with the Neo-Platonist philosophy. The same remark is applicable to the Old Testament, the earlier and later books of which may be, in a similar way, contrasted with each other; almost the whole of which (though here a new language also comes in) exhibits a marked difference from the Apocrypha. The structure of thought insensibly changes. This is the case with all languages which have a literature — they are ever becoming more and more abstract — modern languages, more than ancient; the later stages of either, more than the earlier. It by no means follows that as Greek, Latin, and English have words that correspond in a dictionary, they are real equivalents in meaning, because words, the same, perhaps, etymologically, may be used with different degrees of abstraction, which no accuracy or periphrasis of translation will suffice to express, belonging, as they do generally, to the great underlying differences of a whole language.

Another illustration of degrees of abstraction may be found in the language of poetry, or of common life, and the language of philosophy. Poetry, we know, will scarcely endure abstract terms, while they form the stock and staple of morals and metaphysics. They are

the language of books, rather than of conversation. Theology, on the other hand, though its problems may seem akin to those of the moralist and metaphysician, yet tends to reject them in the same way that English tends to reject French words, or poetry to reject prose. He who in paraphrasing Scripture spoke of essence, matter, vice, crime, would be thought guilty of a want of taste ; the reason of which is, that these abstract terms are not within the circle of our Scripture associations. They carry us into another age or country or school of thought — to the ear of the uneducated they have an unusual sound, while to the educated they appear to involve an anachronism or to be out of place. Vice, they say, is the moral, sin the theological term ; nature and law are the proper words in a treatise on physiology, while the actions of which they are the imaginary causes would in a prayer or sermon be suitably ascribed to the Divine Being.

Our subject admits of another illustration from the language of the Fathers as compared with that of Scripture. Those who have observed the circumstance naturally ask why it is that Scriptural expressions when they reappear in the early patristic literature slightly change their signification ? that a greater degree of personality is given to one word, more definiteness to another, while a third has been singled out to be the centre of a scheme of doctrine ? The reason is, that use, and reflection, and controversy do not allow language to remain where it was. Time itself is the great innovator in the sense of words. No one supposes that the meaning of conscience or imagination exactly corresponds to the Latin “*conscientia*” or “*imaginatio*.” Even within the limits of our own language the terms of the scholastic philosophy have acquired and lost a technical signification. And several changes have taken place in the language of creeds and articles, which, by their very attempt to define and systematize, have slightly though imperceptibly departed from the use of words in Scripture.

The principle of which all these instances are illustrations leads to important results in the interpretation of Scripture. It tends to show,



that in using the same words with St. Paul we may not be using them in precisely the same sense. Nay, that the very exactness with which we apply them, the result of the definitions, oppositions, associations, of ages of controversy, is of itself a difference of meaning. The mere lapse of time tends to make the similarity deceitful. For if the language of Scripture (to use an expression which will have been made intelligible by the preceding remarks) be really at a different stage of abstraction, great differences in the use of language will occur, such as in each particular word escape and perplex us, and yet, on a survey of the whole, are palpable and evident.

A well known difficulty in the interpretation of the Epistles is the seemingly uncertain use of *δικαιοσύνη, ἀλήθεια, ἀγάπη, πίστις, δόξα, &c.*, words apparently the most simple, and yet taking sometimes in the same passage different shades and colours of meaning. Sometimes they are attributes of God, in other passages qualities in man; here realities, there mere ideas, sometimes active, sometimes passive. Some of them, as *ἁμαρτία, πίστις*, have a sort of personality assigned to them, while others, as *πνεῦμα*, with which we associate the idea of a person, seem to lose their personality. They are used with genitive cases after them, which we are compelled to explain in various senses. In the technical language of German philosophy, they are objective and subjective at once. For example: in the first chapter of the Romans, ver. 17., it is asked by commentators, "Whether the righteousness of God, which is revealed in the Gospel," is the original righteousness of God from the beginning, or the righteousness which he imparts to man, the righteousness of God in himself or in man. So again, in ch. v. ver. 5., it is doubted whether the words *ὅτι ἡ ἀγάπη τοῦ Θεοῦ ἐκκέχυται ἐν ταῖς καρδίαις*, refer to the love of God in man, or the love of God to man. So *πνεῦμα Θεοῦ* wavers in meaning between a separate existence, or the spirit of God, as we should say the "mind of man," and the manifestation of that spirit in the soul of the believer. Similar apparent ambiguities occur in such expressions as *πίστις Ἰησοῦ χριστοῦ, ὑπομονὴ χριστοῦ, ἀλήθεια Θεοῦ, δόξα Θεοῦ, σοφία Θεοῦ*, and several others.

A difficulty akin to this arises from the apparently numerous senses in which another class of words, such as νόμος, ζωή, θάνατος are used in the Epistles of St. Paul. That νόμος should sometimes signify the law of Moses, at other times the law of the conscience, and that it should be often uncertain whether ζωή referred to a life spiritual or natural, is inconceivable, if these words had had the same precise and defined sense that the corresponding English words have amongst ourselves. The class of expressions before mentioned seems to widen and extend in meaning as they are brought into contact with God and the human soul, or transferred from things earthly and temporal to things heavenly and spiritual. The subtle transformation which these latter words undergo, may be best described as a metaphorical or analogous use of them: not, to take a single instance, that the meaning of the word "law" is so widened as to include all "law," but that the law of Moses becomes the figure or type of the law written on the heart, or of the law of sin and death, and ζωή, the natural life, the figure of the spiritual. Each word is a reflector of many thoughts, and we pass from one reflection of it to another in successive verses.

That such verbal difficulties occur much more often in Scripture than in any other book, will be generally admitted. In Plato and Aristotle, for example, they can be hardly said to exist at all. What they meant by εἶδος or οὐσία is hard to conceive, but their use of the words does not waver in successive sentences. The language of the Greek philosophy is, on the whole, precise and definite. A much nearer parallel to what may be termed the infinity of Scripture is to be found in the Jewish Alexandrian writings. There is the same transition from the personal to the impersonal, the same figurative use of language, the same tendency to realise and speak of all things in reference to God and the human soul. The mind existed prior to the ideas which are therefore conceived of as its qualities or attributes, and naturally coalesced with it in the Alexandrian phraseology.

The difficulty of which we have been speaking, when considered in

its whole extent, is its own solution. It does but force upon us the fact, that the use of language and the mode of thought are different in the writings of the Apostle from what they are amongst ourselves. It is the difficulty of a person who should set himself to explain the structure of a language which he did not know, by one which he did, and at last, in despair, begin to learn the new idiom. Or the difficulty that a person would have in understanding poetry, who imagined it to be prose. It is the difficulty that Aristotle or Cicero found in understanding the philosophers that were before them. They were familiar with the meaning of the words used by them, but not with the mode of thought. Logic itself had increased the difficulty to them of understanding the times before logic.

This is our own difficulty in the interpretation of Scripture. Our use of language is more definite, our abstractions more abstract, our structure more regular and logical. But the moment we perceive and allow for this difference in the use of language in Scripture and among ourselves, the difficulty vanishes. We conceive ideas in a process of formation, falling from inspired lips, growing in the minds of men. We throw ourselves into the world of "mixed modes," and seek to recall the associations which the technical terms of theology no longer suggest. We observe what may be termed the difference of level in our own ideas and those of the first Christians, without disturbing the meaning of one word in relation to another.

The difficulty while it is increased, is also explained by the personifying character of the age. Ideas in the New Testament are relative to the mind of God or man, in which they seem naturally to inhere so as scarcely, in the usage of language, to have an independent existence. There is ever the tendency to speak of good and virtue and righteousness as inseparable from the Divine nature, while in evil of every sort a reflection of conscience seems to be included. The words *δικαιοσύνη*, *ἀλήθεια*, *ἀγάπη*, are not merely equivalent to righteousness, truth, love, but connect imperceptibly with "the Author and Father of lights." There is no other righteousness or truth but that of God, just as there is no sin without the consciousness



of sin in man. Consequently, the two thoughts coalesce in one, and what are to us ideas, which we can imagine existing even without God, are to the Israelite attributes of God himself. Still, in our "mixed modes" we must make a further step; for as these ideas cannot be separated from God, so neither can they be conceived of, except as revealed in the Gospel, and working in the heart of man. Man who is righteous has no righteousness of his own, his righteousness is the righteousness of God in him. Hence, when considering the righteousness of God, we must go on to conceive of it as the revelation of his righteousness, without which it would be unknown and unmeaning to us. The abstract must become concrete, and must involve at once the attribute of God and the quality in man. This "concrete" notion of the word righteousness is different from the abstract one with which we are familiar. Righteousness is the righteousness of God; it is also the communion of that righteousness with man. It is used almost with the same double meaning as we attribute to the will of God, which we speak of actively, as intending, doing, and passively, as done, fulfilled by ourselves.

A part of this embarrassment in the interpretation of Scripture arises out of the unconscious influence of English words and ideas on our minds, in translating from Hellenistic Greek. The difficulty is still more apparent, when the attempt is made to render the Scriptures into a language which has not been framed or moulded on Christianity. It is a curious question, the consideration of which is not without practical use, how far the nicer shades either of Scriptural expression or of later theology are capable of being made intelligible in the languages of India or China.

Yet, on the other hand, it must be remembered, that neither this nor any of the other peculiarities here spoken of, is a mere form of speech, but enters deeply into the nature of the Gospel. For the Gospel has necessarily its mixed modes, not merely because it is preached to the poor, and therefore adopts the expressions of ordinary life; nor because its language is incrustated with the phraseology of the Alexandrian writers; but because its

subject is mixed, and, as it were, intermediate between God and man. Natural theology speaks clearly, but it is of God only; moral philosophy speaks clearly, but it is of man only: but the Gospel is, as it were, the communion of God and man, and its ideas are in a state of transition or oscillation, having two aspects towards God and towards man, which it is hard to keep in view at once. Thus, to quote once more the example just given, the righteousness of God is an idea not difficult to us to comprehend, human justice and goodness are also intelligible; but to conceive justice or righteousness as passing from heaven to earth, from God to man, *actu et potentiâ* at once, as a sort of life, or stream, or motion, is perplexing. And yet this notion of the communion of the righteousness of God being what constitutes righteousness, is of the very essence of the Gospel. It was what the Apostle and the first believers meant and felt, and what, if we could get the simple unlettered Christian, receiving the Gospel as a little child, to describe to us his feelings, he would describe.

Scripture language may thus be truly said to belong to an intermediate world, different at once both from the visible and invisible world, yet partaking of the nature of both. It does not represent the things that the eye sees merely, nor the things that are within the veil of which those are the images, but rather the world that is in our hearts; the things that we feel, but nobody can express in words. His body is the communion of His body; His spirit is the communion of His spirit; the love of God is "loving as we are loved;" the knowledge of God is "knowing as we are known;" the righteousness of faith is Divine as well as human. Hence language seems to burst its bounds in the attempt to express the different aspects of these truths, and from its very inadequacy wavers and becomes uncertain in its meaning. The more intensely we feel and believe, and the less we are able to define our feelings, the more shall we appear to use words at random; employing sometimes one mode of expression, sometimes another; passing from one thought to another, by slender threads of association; "going off upon a word,"

as it has been called ; because in our own minds all is connected, and, as it were, fulfilled with itself, and from the abundance of the heart the mouth speaks. To understand the language of St. Paul it is necessary, not only to compare the uses of words with one another, or to be versed in Alexandrian modes of thought, but to lead the life of St. Paul, to have the mind of St. Paul, to be one with Christ, to be dead to sin. Otherwise the world within becomes unmeaning to us. The inversion of all human things of which he speaks, is attributed to the manner of his time, or the peculiarity of his individual character ; and at the very moment when we seem to have attained most accurately the Apostle's meaning, it vanishes away like a shadow.

No human eye can pierce the cloud which overhangs another life ; no faculty of man can "by understanding find out" or express in words the Divine nature. Yet it does not follow that our ideas of spiritual things are wholly indefinite. There are many symbols and images of them in the world without and below. There is a communion of thoughts, feelings, and affections, even on earth, quite sufficient to be an image of the communion with God and Christ, of which the Epistles speak to us. There are emotions, and transitions, and passings out of ourselves, and states of undefined consciousness, which language is equally unable to express as it is to describe justification, or the work of grace, or the relation of the believer to his Lord. All these are rather intimated than described or defined by words. The sigh of sorrow, the cry of joy or despair, are but inarticulate sounds, yet expressive, beyond the power of writing, or speech. There are many such "still small voices" of warning or of consolation in Scripture, beyond the power of philosophy to analyse, yet full of meaning to him who catches them aright. The life and force of such expressions do not depend on the clearness with which they state a logical proposition, or the vividness with which they picture to the imagination a spiritual world. They gain for themselves a truth in the individual soul. Even logic itself affords negative helps to the feebleness of man in the conception of



things above him. It limits us by our own faculties; it guards us against identifying the images of things unseen with the "very things themselves;" it bars remote inferences about terms which are really metaphorical. Lastly, it helps us to define by opposition. Though we do not know what spirit is, we know what body is, and we conceive of spirit as what body is not. "There is a spiritual body, and there is a natural body." We imagine it at once both like and unlike. We do not know what heaven, or the glory of God, or his wisdom, is; but we imagine them unlike this world, or the wisdom of this world, or the glory of the princes of this world, and yet, in a certain way, like them, imaged and symbolised by what we see around us. We do not know what eternity is, except as the negative of time; but believing in its real existence, in a way beyond our faculties to comprehend, we do not confine it within the limits of past, present, or future. We are unable to reconcile the power of God and the freedom of man, or the contrast of this world and another, or even the opposite feelings of our own minds about the truths of religion. But we can describe them as the Apostle has done, in a paradox: 2 Cor. iv. 12., vi. 8—10.

There is yet a further way in which the ideas of Scripture may be defined, that is, by use. It has been already observed that the progress of language is from the concrete to the abstract. Not the least striking instance of this is the language of theology. Embodied in creeds, it gradually becomes developed and precise. The words are no longer "living creatures with hands and feet," as it were, feeling after the hearts of men; but they have one distinct, unchanging meaning. When we speak of justification or truth, no question arises whether by this is meant the attribute of God, or the quality in man. Time and usage have sufficiently circumscribed the diversities of their signification. This is not to be regarded as a misfortune to Scriptural truth, but as natural and necessary. Part of what is lost in power and life is regained in certainty and definiteness. The usage of language itself would forbid us, in a discourse or sermon, to give as many senses to the word "law" as are attri-

buted to it by St. Paul. Only in the interpretation of Scripture, if we would feel as St. Paul felt, or think as he thought, it is necessary to go back to that age before creeds, in which the water of life was still a running stream.

The course of speculation which has been adopted in this essay, may seem to introduce into Scripture an element of uncertainty. It may seem to cloud truth with metaphysics, and rob the poor and uneducated of the simplicity of the Gospel. But perhaps this is not so. Whether it be the case that such speculations introduce an element of uncertainty or difficulty into Scripture or not, they introduce a new element of truth. For without the consideration of such questions as that of which a brief sketch has been here attempted, there is no basis for Scriptural interpretation. We are ever liable to draw the meaning of words this way or that, according to the theological system of which we are the advocates; to fall under the slavery of an illogical logic, which first narrows the mind by definitions, and then wearies it with far-fetched inferences. Metaphysics must enter into the interpretation of Scripture, not for the sake of intruding upon it a new set of words or ideas, but with the view of getting rid of metaphysics and restoring to Scripture its natural sense.

But the Gospel is still preached to the poor as before, in the same sacred yet familiar language. They could not understand questions of grammar before; they do not understand modes of thought now. It is the peculiar nature of our religious ideas that we are able to apply them, and to receive comfort from them, without being able to analyse or explain them. All the metaphysical and logical speculations in the world will not rob the poor, the sick, or the dying of the truths of the Gospel. Yet the subject which we have been considering is not without a practical result. It warns us to restore the Gospel to its simplicity, to turn from the letter to the spirit, to withdraw from the number of the essentials of Christianity points almost too subtle for the naked eye, which depend on modes of thought or Alexandrian usages, to require no more of preciseness or definition

than is necessary to give form and substance to our teaching. Not only the feebleness of human faculties, but the imperfection of language itself will often make silence our truest wisdom. The saying of Scaliger, taken not seriously but in irony, is full of meaning:—“Many a man has missed of his salvation from ignorance of grammar.”

To the poor and uneducated, at times to all, no better advice can be given for the understanding of Scripture than to read the Bible humbly with prayer. The critical and metaphysical student requires another sort of rule for which this can never be made a substitute. His duty is to throw himself back into the times, the modes of thought, the language of the Apostolic age. He must pass from the abstract to the concrete, from the ideal and intellectual to the spiritual, from later statements of faith or doctrine to the words of inspiration which fell from the lips of the first believers. He must seek to conceive the religion of Christ in its relation to the religions of other ages and distant countries, to the philosophy of our own or other times; and if in this effort his mind seems to fail or waver, he must win back in life and practice the hold on the truths of the Gospel which he is beginning to lose in the mazes of speculation.



## OF THE MODES OF TIME AND PLACE IN SCRIPTURE.

*οὔτινες ἐνδείκνυνται τὸ ἔργον τοῦ νόμου γραπτὸν ἐν ταῖς καρδίαις αὐτῶν, συμμαρτυρούσης αὐτῶν τῆς συνειδήσεως καὶ μεταξὺ ἀλλήλων τῶν λογισμῶν κατηγορούντων ἢ καὶ ἀπολογουμένων, ἐν ἡμέρᾳ ἣ κρινεῖ ὁ θεὸς τὰ κρυπτά τῶν ἀνθρώπων κατὰ τὸ εὐαγγελίον μου διὰ Ἰησοῦ χριστοῦ. — Rom. ii. 15, 16.*

THE change in the tense of *κρινεῖ* causes a difficulty in the explanation of this passage, which some have endeavoured to remove by a parenthesis, extending from *οὐ γὰρ* or *δικαιωθήσονται* to *ἀπολογουμένων*, and carrying back the sense of the 16th verse to the end of the 12th or 13th (either as many as sinned in the law shall be judged by the law in the day, &c. ; or the doers of the law shall be justified in the day). Such a parenthesis is a fiction. Nor does the attempt succeed better to separate *συμμαρτυρούσης* from *ἐνδείκνυνται* and connect it with *ἐν ἡμέρᾳ*, as thus : — “ Who shew the word of the law written on their hearts, their consciences also bearing them witness in the day of judgment.”

The only other way of taking the passage is, as the order of the words suggests, to connect *ἐν ἡμέρᾳ* with *ἐνδείκνυνται*. Nothing apparently can get over the grammatical solecism, involved in the change from the present to the future. For the doing and manifesting forth the works of the law is in this present life ; but the day in which God shall judge is future — the day of judgment.

Can we say that the Apostle, in the same way that he sometimes adopts one meaning of the law, sometimes another, so also glances from past to present, from earth to heaven ? This assumed confusion of times and places can only be justified, if at all, by the production of parallel passages, and the general consideration of the modes of time and place in Scripture.

How there can be more than one mode of conceiving time and place may be illustrated as follows:—

A child is perfectly well aware that to-day is different from yesterday, evening from morning. It has an idea also of duration of time. But it does not follow from this that it has an idea of past time, such as has elapsed from the time of William the Conqueror to the present day, or from the Flood to the Christian era. Nor again of future time, even of the threescore years of its own future life, or of another person's, still less of time in history, or of a continuation of time to the end of the world. Its ideas of time are almost exclusively present.

So with respect to place. It is not wholly ignorant of place and distance, but it has no idea of the immensity of the world; it is rooted on its own little spot, and conceives of other places as much nearer to its home than they really are. If it speaks of the world, it has not the vaguest conception what is implied in this; the world is to it a sort of round infinity.

So the ancients may be said to have a very different idea of time and space from the moderns, barbarous people from civilised, Hindoos from Englishmen.

So we can conceive a state in which the past was unknown, "a mystery" kept secret, thought of only in some relation to the present, in which the future too seemed to blend with and touch the present, and this world and the next met in the inward consciousness of the believer. To us, it is true, there is a broad line of demarcation between them. But we can imagine, however unlike the fact, that we too, like children, might be living under the influence of present impressions, scarcely ever permitting ourselves to dwell on the distant and indistinct horizon of the past or future.

Something like what has been described was really the case with the first believers. Their modes of time differed in several respects from our own.

First:—In the very idea of the latter days. The world seemed to be closing in upon them: 1 Cor. x. 11. They had no conception

of posterity, or of new kingdoms, or of a vista of futurity : *ὁ καιρὸς συνεσταλμένος*. Now was the day of salvation ; now was their salvation nearer than when they believed. Rom. xiii. 11.

Secondly : — In the conception of the duration of time. Living, as they did, in the daily expectation of the coming of Christ, seeing the face of the world change in the few years of their own life, time to them was crowded with events. A moment was sufficient for the greatest act of life ; another moment would be sufficient for the act of judgment. There is no idea of gradually growing up from heathenism to the Gospel, but always of sudden conversion, in an instant, in the twinkling of an eye. This is why even the shortest periods of time seem so filled with changes and experiences ; why a few short months are sufficient for the conversion and the lapse of whole Churches. Time was to them at once short and long ; short, absolutely ; long, in reference to the events that hurried by.

Thirdly : — In relation to this life and a future, which to ourselves are set one against the other, divided by the gate of death. To them another life was one with, and the continuation of this. Both were alike embraced in the expression “eternal life.” They were “waiting for the revelation of the Lord” (1 Cor. i. 7.) ; and yet the things “that eye had not seen, nor ear heard,” had already been revealed to them through the Spirit (1 Cor. ii. 4.). So in reference to a future judgment. It was at once present and future. So far as it resembled the judgments of Sinai, it was future ; so far as it was inward and spiritual, it was present. Compare John, v. 24, 25. : — “He that believeth on me hath everlasting life, and cometh not into condemnation, but is passed from death unto life. Verily, verily, I say unto you, the hour is coming, and *now* is, when the dead shall hear the voice of the Son of God, and they that hear shall live.”

Fourthly : — In reference to past time, a difference is observable in its being less vivid and distinct than to ourselves. This seems to be the reason why in many passages of Scripture the divinity of Christ dates from his manifestation on earth. The first believers did not uniformly think of Christ as existing from all eternity.



They conceived Him as they had seen Him on earth at last entering into His glory, "ordained to be the Son of God with power." It was not settled by the language of any creed that He was the only-begotten of the Father, begotten before the worlds. The question had not been asked, the doubt had not arisen. So little did the idea of time enter into their conception of His existence, that they could speak of Him at once as "ordained to be the Son of God with power," and also as "the firstborn of every creature," as "speaking by the prophets," and yet also as contrasted with them and following them. Heb. i. 2.

The general result of our inquiry thus far is, that the modes of time in the New Testament converge towards the present moment. Not, of course, that there is no past or no future; but that they meet in the *τέλη τῶν αἰώνων*, which are at once the revelation of both.

Hence, however great the grammatical irregularity, the passage from the present to the future, which, like the unseen, was present and realised by faith. The transition was natural from the judgment of conscience here to the day of the Lord hereafter.

Compare the following:—

*Φησαυρίζεις σεαυτῷ ὀργὴν ἐν ἡμέρᾳ ὀργῆς καὶ ἀποκαλύψεως δικαιοκρισίας τοῦ Θεοῦ.* Rom. ii. 5.

*ὁ εὐλογήσας ἡμᾶς ἐν πάσῃ εὐλογίᾳ πνευματικῇ ἐν τοῖς ἐπουρανίοις ἐν χριστῷ.* Eph. i. 3.

In the first of these passages, there is nearly the same confusion of times as in Rom. ii. 16.:—"You are treasuring up for yourself something future in the day of judgment."

In the second, the confusion seems to be precisely parallel, if it be not rather one of place than of time:—"Who hath blessed us here present upon earth with all future and heavenly blessings."

So 1 Thess. ii. 19.:—*τίς γὰρ ἡμῶν ἐλπὶς ἢ χαρὰ ἢ στέφανος καυχήσεως, ἢ οὐχὶ καὶ ὑμεῖς, ἔμπροσθεν τοῦ κυρίου ἡμῶν Ἰησοῦ ἐν τῇ αὐτοῦ παρουσίᾳ;* 1 Cor. i. 8.: *ὅς καὶ βεβαιώσει ὑμᾶς ἕως τέλους ἀνεγκλήτους ἐν τῇ ἡμέρᾳ τοῦ κυρίου ἡμῶν Ἰησοῦ Χριστοῦ;* 2 Cor. i. 14.: *καθὼς καὶ ἐπέγνωτε ἡμᾶς ἀπὸ μέρους, ὅτι καύχημα ὑμῶν ἐσμὲν καθάπερ καὶ ὑμεῖς*

ἡμῶν ἐν τῇ ἡμέρᾳ τοῦ κυρίου [ἡμῶν] Ἰησοῦ; Col. iii. 6., for a weaker expression of the same.

These latter passages are sufficiently parallel with the one which we are considering, to justify the grammatical irregularity of connecting ἐνδείκνυται with ἐν ἡμέρᾳ τοῦ κυρίου. We say, the sentence of conscience anticipates a higher tribunal. To the Apostle the testimony of conscience enters within the veil, and is already in the presence of God. His thoughts are so transferred to the day of judgment, that in that, and through that only, he measures all things.

Parallel to the modes of time, though less important, are what may be termed the modes of place in the New Testament.

First:—In reference to the word αἰὼν, which is at once a period of time, and also the world which is to subsist in that period. αἰὼν οὐτός and αἰὼν ὁ μέλλων originally mean the times before and after Messiah's coming; but are also opposed, not merely as we should oppose this life and a future, but as this world and another.

Secondly:—In the indistinctness of the idea of heaven, which is at once a different place from the earth, and co-existing with it in the same sense that the stars and the sky co-exist with it; and also the kingdom of God within the spiritual dwelling-place in which ideas of time and place are no more. Thus it is said,—“I beheld Satan as lightning fall from heaven,” Luke, x. 18.: and again, “The heaven open, and the angels of God ascending and descending upon the Son of man,” John, i. 51., in which a sort of pictorial image is presented to the mind. So 2 Cor. xii. 2.:—“I knew a man in Christ above fourteen years ago, (whether in the body or out of the body I cannot tell,) such an one caught up into the third heaven.” But, on the other hand:—“We have our conversation in heaven,” or, “who hath blessed us with all spiritual blessings in heavenly (places),” ἐν τοῖς ἐπουρανίοις, Eph. i. 3., where heaven cannot be thought of as a distinct place from earth.

Thirdly:—There is a certain degree of indistinctness in the ideas of place as applied only to the earth. As the ends of the world seem to meet in the present moment in the consciousness of the believer,

so also the idea of the earth itself is narrowed to that spot in which the struggle is going on, which is all the world to him. A vivid consciousness of past time was, we saw, different from that general and undefined conception of the "ages of ages" which we find in Scripture. So also a geographical idea of all the countries of the earth, with their peoples, climates, languages, is quite different from that, shall we say, spiritual notion of place which occurs in the Epistles. Here, where the Apostle himself is, is the scene of the great struggle; the places which he has visited, are the whole world, in which the powers of good and evil are arrayed against one another; a small spot of ground, like a small period of time, is fraught with the fortunes of mankind; the more earthly measure of place and distance is lost. This spiritual notion of time and place is not possible to ourselves, but only to an age which has an imperfect conception of past history, and an indistinct knowledge of the countries of the world. To the Apostle it was natural. In this way, allowing also something for Oriental modes of speech, we are to account for such expressions as the following:—"I thank my God that your faith is made known in the whole world," Romans, i. 8.; or, the salutation of 1 Cor. i. 2.,—"Unto the Church of God which is at Corinth, sanctified in Christ Jesus, chosen saints, with all that call upon the name of our Lord Jesus Christ, in every place both their's and our's;" where "in every place" is probably to be interpreted by the first chapter of the second epistle, ἐν ὅλῃ τῇ Ἀχαΐᾳ. Compare also, 1 Thess. i. 8.:—"For from you hath sounded forth the word of the Lord, not only in Macedonia and Achaia, but in every place your faith to Godward is spread abroad, so that we have no need to say any thing." And yet the Apostle, at the time of writing this, could hardly have been anywhere but in Macedonia and Achaia.

These mixed modes of time and place are no longer mixed to us, but clear and distinct. We live in the light of history and of nature, and can never mingle together what is inward and what is without us. We cannot but imagine everywhere, and at all times, heaven to be different from earth, the past from the future and present. No



inward conscience can ever efface the limits that separate them. No "contemplation of things under the form of eternity" will take us from the realities of life. We sometimes repeat the familiar language of Scripture, but always in a metaphorical sense. If we desire to understand, and not merely to explain it away, we must throw ourselves back to the age of the Apostle, and gather his meaning from his own words."

## CHAP. III.

THE force of the Apostle's argument in the first verses of the following chapter, may be illustrated by a parallel which comes home to ourselves. We may suppose a person enlarging, in a sermon or in conversation, on the comparative state of the heathen and Christian world, dwelling first of all on the enormities and unnatural vices of India or China, and then on the formalism and hypocrisy and conventionality of Christians throughout the world, until at last he concludes by saying that many heathen are better than most Christians, and that at the last day the heathen may judge us; and that as God is no respecter of persons, it matters little whether we are called Christians or not, if we follow Christ. Christian or heathen, "he can't be wrong," it might be said, "whose life is in the right." Then would arise the question, What profit was there in being a Christian if, as with the Jews of old, many should come from the East and the West, and sit down with Christ and his Apostles in the kingdom of heaven, while those bearing the name of Christians were cast out? To which there would be many answers; first, that of St. Paul respecting the Jews, "because that unto us are committed the oracles of God;" and above all, that we have a new truth and a new power imparted to us. Still difficulties would occur as we passed beyond the limits of the Christian world. Passages of Scripture would be quoted, which seemed to place the heathen also within the circle of God's mercies; and again, other passages which seemed to exclude them. It might be doubted whether in any proper sense there was a Christian world; so little did there seem to be anything resembling the first company of believers; so faint was the bond of communion which the name of Christian made amongst men; so slender the line of demarcation

which mere Christianity afforded, compared with civilisation and other influences. Suppose, now, a person, struggling with these and similar difficulties, to carry the question a stage further back, and to urge that Christianity, failing of its end, this is of itself an impeachment of the truth and goodness of God. For if there were any who did not accept the Gospel, then it could not be said that an Omnipotent Being who had the power, and an Omniscient Being who knew the way, had also the will that all mankind should be saved. Why should the Unchangeable punish men for sins that could not affect Himself? Why should He execute a vengeance which He was incapable of feeling? And so he would lead us on to the origin of evil and the eternal decrees, and the everlasting penalty. Speaking as a philosopher, he might say, that we must change our notion of a Divine Being, in the face of such facts. Those who were arguing with him, might be unable or unwilling to discuss speculative difficulties, and might prefer to rest their belief on two simple foundations: first, the truth and justice and holiness of God; and, secondly, the moral consequences of the doctrine of their opponents. It makes no difference whether we suppose the argument carried on between disputants, or whether we suppose a religious sceptic arguing with himself on the opposite aspects of those great questions, which in every age, from that of Job and Ecclesiastes, have been more or less clearly seen in various forms, Jewish as well as Christian, as problems of natural or of revealed religion, common alike to the Greeks and to ourselves, and which have revived again and again in the course of human thought.

The train of reflection which has been thus briefly sketched, is not unlike that with which St. Paul opens the third chapter. The Jew and the Gentile have been reduced to a level by the requirements of the moral law. The circumcision of the heart and the uncircumcision of the letter take the place of the circumcision of the letter and uncircumcision of the heart. Such a revolution naturally leads the Jew to ask what his own position is in the dispensations of Providence. What profit is there in being sons of Abraham, if of these



stones God was raising up children unto Abraham? To which the Apostle replies, first, that they had the Scriptures. But it might be said, "they believed not." Such an objection is suggested by the Apostle himself, who draws it out of the secret soul of the Jew, that he may answer it more fully. "Shall their unbelief make the promise of God of none effect." Such promises are "yea and amen;" but they are also conditional. God forbid that they should be called in question, because man breaks their conditions. Imagine all men faithless, yet does God remain true.

Still the objector or the objection returns, in the fifth verse, from another point of view, which is suggested by the quotation which immediately precedes, "that thou mayest be justified in thy sayings, and mayest overcome when thou art judged." In any case then God is justified; why doth He yet punish? If we do no harm to Him, why does He do harm to us? We are speaking as one man does of another; but is not God unjust? To which the Apostle replies (according to different explanations of *τὸν κόσμον*), either, "shall not the Judge of all the earth do rightly?" or, how can you, who are a Jew, suppose that the God whose attribute it is "to judge among the heathen" is one who may be called unjust? In this question is contained the answer to those who say, "My unrighteousness commends the righteousness of God, and therefore God has no right to take vengeance on me." Still the objection is repeated in a slightly altered form, not now, "If my unrighteousness commends the righteousness of God;" but, "If my falsehood abounds to the glory of His truth, why am I still judged as a sinner?" To which St. Paul replies, not by dwelling further on the truth or justice of God, but by ironically stating the consequence of the doctrine, "Let us do evil that good may come, let us sin to the glory of God, let us lie to prove his truth;" and, then dropping the strain of irony, he adds seriously in his natural style, "whose damnation is just."

The chief difference between this argument and the one which, for the sake of illustration, is prefixed to it, is that the great questions which are suggested in the first, are here narrowed to the Jewish

point of view. The objector does not find any general difficulty in justifying the ways of God to man, but in harmonising the rejection of the Jews with the privileges of the chosen race. What seemed to him injustice, was justice to all mankind. He is animated by a sort of moral indignation at being reduced to the same level as the rest of the world.

The substance of the Apostle's argument is the same as that of chap. ix. 19, 20., in which he again assumes the person of an objector : —“ Thou wilt then say unto me, ‘ Why does He yet find fault, for who hath resisted His will ? ’ Nay, but O man, who art thou that repliest against God ? Shall the thing formed say to him that formed it, why hast thou made me thus ? ” It is an anticipation of the subject of chapters ix., x., xi., the passing thought of which is intimated in the word *ὠφέλει*, in ver. 25. of the preceding chapter (compare ver. 1. *τίς ἡ ὠφέλεια*), which stands in the same relation to chap. iii. ver. 1—8., as the conclusion of the second chapter to what follows in the third.





τί οὖν τὸ περισσὸν τοῦ Ἰουδαίου, ἢ τίς ἢ ὠφέλεια τῆς περιτομῆς ; πολὺ κατὰ πάντα τρόπον. πρῶτον<sup>1</sup> μὲν ὅτι ἐπιστεύθησαν τὰ λόγια τοῦ θεοῦ. τί γὰρ εἰ ἠπίστησάν τινες ; μὴ ἡ ἀπιστία αὐτῶν τὴν πίστιν τοῦ θεοῦ καταργήσει ; μὴ γένοιτο · γινέσθω δὲ ὁ θεὸς ἀληθής, πᾶς δὲ ἄνθρωπος ψεύστης, καθὼς γέγραπται Ὅπως ἂν δικαιοθῆς ἐν τοῖς λόγοις σου καὶ νικήσης ἐν τῷ κρίνεσθαί σε. εἰ δὲ ἡ ἀδικία

<sup>1</sup> μὲν γάρ.

2. κατὰ πάντα τρόπον, *in every way.*] The Apostle mentions one way, and is entangled in a new series of thoughts.

πρῶτον μὲν, *first.*] There is no “secondly;” not that St. Paul breaks off, as Olshausen suggests, because he felt that, in the single point of the knowledge of the Scriptures, he had included all. The irregularity is a matter of style. Compare i. 8., πρῶτον μὲν εὐχαριστῶ ἐπιστεύθησαν, sc. οἱ Ἰουδαῖοι, as in 1 Cor. ix. 17., οἰκονομίαν πεπίστευμαι.

τὰ λόγια τοῦ Θεοῦ, *the oracles of God,*] applied in Numbers, xxiv. 15. ( ἀκούων λόγια θεοῦ) to the prophecy of Balaam ; in Acts, xviii. 38. to the ten commandments and to the law ; here, rather to the Scriptures generally.

In what follows, “Is the Apostle speaking of himself, or in the person of some other man?” Both, or neither ; in one sense he is, in another he is not. That is to say ; partly from defect in power of expression, partly also from the imaginative cast of his mind, which leads him to place vividly before himself the opposite view to his own, he seems to desert his original standing ground, and to alternate between the two sides of his own mind. Especially is this the case where

the very elements of his former and present life are in conflict. He almost goes over into the enemy’s camp, and then revolts from it. Though not really objecting, he assumes the person of an objector, and repeats what he would have said himself and what he had heard others say. Comp. vii. 7—25., ix. 14—22.; 1 Cor. x. 28—32.

3. τί γὰρ εἰ ἠπίστησάν τινες ; *for what if some did not believe ?*] Not the objection, but the answer to the objection. You will perhaps say, “they did not believe;” that makes no difference. But the objection is not yet crushed ; it reappears in the next clause, suggested by the word ἠπίστησαν itself. The very question I mean to ask is, whether “their unbelief will make the grace of God of none effect.”

μὴ is used in the New Testament indifferently, either in questions intended to have an affirmative answer, or implying an inclination to the opposite (Luke, vi. 39.), or in mere doubts (John, viii. 22.). That in this passage the answer would have been an affirmative, follows from μὴ γένοιτο in the next verse, which deprecates the intended assent. Though the two questions follow one another, the tone of them is

3 What advantage then hath the Jew? or what profit  
 2 is there of circumcision? Much every way: chiefly,  
 because\* they were entrusted with the oracles of  
 3 God. For what if some did not believe? whether\* shall  
 their unbelief make the faith of God without effect?  
 4 God forbid: yea, let God be true, but every man a liar;  
 as it is written, That thou mightest be justified in thy  
 sayings, and mightest overcome when thou art judged.

different. The first, τὶ γὰρ εἰ ἠπίσ., is intended to have a negative answer. "It makes no difference; if some did not believe what of that?" But the second conveys an objection to the first, to which the Apostle for a moment gives way, which is followed up and finally answered by μὴ γένοιτο in the following verse.

ἡ ἀπιστία, *unbelief.*] The unbelief here referred to might consist, either in the rebellion of the Jews in the wilderness, or in their rejection of Christ; or better, the former may be a figure of the latter, as in Rom. ix.; and 1 Cor. x. 7—10.

τὴν πίστιν τοῦ Θεοῦ, *the faith of God,*] like δικαιοσύνη Θεοῦ above. The play of words is hardly translateable in English. "Shall their want of faith make of none effect the good faith of God." From the sense of "the faith" which men have in God, πίστις passes into the meaning of the faith which God exercises towards men. (Comp. ἀγάπη Θεοῦ, ver. 5.)

Thus we leave the first stage of the objection. May not the unbelief of man mar the faithfulness of God? The second being — But if their unbelief established the righteousness of God, ver. 5. The third — But

if their untruth reflected the glory of God.

4. μὴ γένοιτο. *God forbid.*] That be far from us. Be it ours rather to affirm that God is true, though every man be a liar. The paronomasia on γένοιτο and γινέσθω was probably intentional. Comp. above, 2, 3. ἐπιστεύθησαν and ἠπίστησαν; also ἀπιστία and πίστιν.

To argue against this mode of explaining the passage that the Apostle could not have meant seriously to wish that every man should be a liar, is the error of "rhetoric turned logic." See in chap. ix. 3. It is needless, with the view of avoiding this objection, to translate γινέσθω, "let it be according to the saying," let the words of Scripture be fulfilled, "God is true, though all men are liars," — a sense which is not sufficiently supported by 1 Cor. xv. 34., where the position of the word is different.

ἐν τῷ κρίνεσθαι σε, *when thou art judged.*] κρίνεσθαι is used in a passive as well as active or middle sense, both in the Old Testament and in the New. For the first compare Lam. iii. 36., 1 Cor. vi. 2.; for the second Judges, xxi. 22., 1 Cor. vi. 1.; in the latter use with the meaning



ἡμῶν θεοῦ δικαιοσύνην συνίστησι, τί ἐροῦμεν; μὴ ἄδικος ὁ θεὸς ὁ ἐπιφέρων τὴν ὀργὴν; κατὰ ἄνθρωπον λέγω. μὴ γένοιτο· ἐπεὶ πῶς κρινεῖ ὁ θεὸς τὸν κόσμον; εἰ γὰρ ἡ ἀλήθεια τοῦ θεοῦ ἐν τῷ ἐμῷ ψεύσματι ἐπερίσσειεν εἰς τὴν δόξαν αὐτοῦ, τί ἔτι καὶ γὰρ ὡς ἁμαρτωλὸς κρίνομαι; καὶ μὴ καθὼς βλασφημούμεθα καὶ καθὼς φασὶν τινες ἡμᾶς λέγειν ὅτι ποιήσωμεν τὰ κακὰ ἵνα ἔλθῃ τὰ ἀγαθὰ; ὧν τὸ κρίμα ἔνδικόν ἐστιν.

not precisely of judging but rather of going to law, or entering into judgment.

If we translate "that thou mightest overcome when thou art judged," the sentence gains a new point. The word *κρίνεσθαι* refers to the previous objection: "that thou mightest overcome when (as had just been done) thou art judged." The parallelism of the clauses, on the other hand, is better preserved by the active — "when thou enterest into judgment."

It is a favourite figure of the Old Testament Scriptures to represent impiety rising up against God and challenging His ways. The wicked are allowed to assert themselves against Him that they may be crushed by His might. There is a terrible irony in the way in which Almighty power is described, as playing with them for a while, and then launching upon them its vengeance.

5. Notwithstanding the recoil of the Apostle, the objector returns to the charge, finding materials for a new objection in the answer to the previous one. But if, as you say, nothing can impair the truth or holiness of God, if our unrighteousness does but establish it, if in any case God is justified, is He not unjust for

bringing wrath upon us? if He cannot be harmed of any, why should He harm us?

*μὴ ἄδικος.*] See note on ver. 3. Here *μὴ* implies in the answer the belief that this is so, and the pretended wish that it were not so.

*κατὰ ἄνθρωπον λέγω.*] I use a human figure of speech. I do but speak as I can imagine men speaking. The Apostle apologises for the mere hypothesis which he has put into the mouth of another, of injustice in God.

6. *μὴ γένοιτο, forbid it.*] "For how shall God, if he be unjust, judge the heathen?" (*τὸν κόσμον*). The Jews drew a distinction between the judgment of themselves and the heathen, which has been sometimes thought to have a place in this passage. It was founded upon such passages as "He shall judge among the heathen;" whence it was inferred, that the heathen were to be judged, but not the chosen people: just as it is sometimes said among Christians, the wicked are to be judged, the elect not. It agrees better, however, with the spirit of St. Paul to take *τὸν κόσμον* for the whole world, without distinction of Jew or Gentile; as in Rom. iii. 19. the whole world is spoken of as becoming subject to the just judgment of God. The



But if our unrighteousness commend the righteousness of God, what shall we say? Is not \* God unrighteous  
 6 who taketh vengeance? (I speak as a man) God forbid,  
 7 for then how shall God judge the world? For if the  
 truth of God hath more abounded through my lie unto  
 8 his glory; why notwithstanding \* am I still judged as a  
 sinner? and not rather, (as we be slanderously reported,  
 and as some affirm that we say,) Let us do evil, that  
 good may come? whose damnation is just.

general meaning will be the same as that expressed in Gen. xviii. 25.:—"Shall not the judge of all the earth do right?"

7. Still unsatisfied, the objector, or St. Paul in the person of the objector, repeats the objection of ver. 5. in a slightly altered form; not "if my unrighteousness establishes the righteousness of God," but "if my untruth abounds to the glory of His truth, why am I still judged as a sinner;" *καὶ*, not "why am I as well as the Gentile?" or, "why am I, even though I be a sinner?" but simply, "why am I still?" In such expressions *καὶ* is a softened way of saying, "in spite of that fact;" why am I, over and above contributing to the glory of God, which should be set down to my credit, to be punished too? Comp. the use of *καὶ* in 1 Cor. xv. 29., *εἰ ὅλως νεκροὶ οὐκ ἐγείρονται, τί καὶ βαπτίζονται ὑπὲρ αὐτῶν;*

8. And why not draw the wicked and absurd conclusion, "Let us do evil that good may come, 'pecca, fortiter pecca,' to the glory of God?"

*καθὼς βλασφημούμεθα.* We can only conjecture who they were, who charged the Apostle with doing evil that good may come.

From the Epistle of St. James it may be inferred, that there were among the Jews those whom we should term anti-nomians; who preached faith without works; who, as Philo informs us, held it sufficient to keep the spirit of the law without conforming to its ceremonies or other requirements. (De Migr. Abrah. Mangey, i. 450.) In the teaching of St. Paul, there was sufficient to form the groundwork of such an accusation. That he was sensitive to the charge, and apprehensive of the abuse of his doctrine, is evident from chap. vi. 1.

The construction seems to arise out of a confusion of *τί μὴ ποιήσωμεν*, why should we not do? and *ποιήσωμεν*, let us do, the word *ὅτι*, which has slipped in from the attraction of *λέγειν*, being the cause of a wavering between the oratio recta and obliqua.

9—27. At this point the Apostle leaves the digression into which he had been drawn, and returns to the main subject; describing, in the language of the Old Testament, the evil of those who are under the law, that is, of the whole former world; and revealing the new world in which

Τί οὖν ; προεχόμεθα ; οὐ πάντως · προηγιασάμεθα γὰρ 9  
 Ἰουδαίους τε καὶ Ἕλληνας πάντας ὑφ' ἁμαρτίαν εἶναι, 10  
 καθὼς γέγραπται ὅτι οὐκ ἔστιν δίκαιος οὐδὲ εἷς, οὐκ ἔστιν 11  
 συνίων<sup>1</sup>, οὐκ ἔστιν [ὁ] ἐκζητῶν τὸν θεόν· πάντες ἐξέκλιναν, 12  
 ἅμα ἠχρειώθησαν· οὐκ ἔστιν ποιῶν χρηστότητα, οὐκ ἔστιν 13  
 ἕως ἐνός. τάφος ἀνεωγμένος ὁ λάρυγξ αὐτῶν, ταῖς γλώσ-  
 σαις αὐτῶν ἐδολιούσαν, ἰὸς ἀσπίδων ὑπὸ τὰ χεῖλη αὐτῶν .  
 ὦν τὸ στόμα [αὐτῶν] ἀρᾶς καὶ πικρίας γέμει. ὀξεῖς οἱ 14  
 πόδες αὐτῶν ἐκχέαι αἷμα, σύντ ριμμα καὶ ταλαιπωρία ἐν 15  
 ταῖς ὁδοῖς αὐτῶν, καὶ ὁδὸν εἰρήνης οὐκ ἔγνωσαν. οὐκ 16  
 17  
 18

<sup>1</sup> ὁ συνίων.

God manifests forth his righteousness in Christ Jesus. In the previous chapter, he had not distinctly denied the privileges of the Jew; or had, at least, veiled the purely moral principle for which he was contending, under the figure of "the Jew inwardly," and "circumcision of the heart." At the commencement of the third chapter, he brought forward the other side of the argument, from which he is driven by the extravagance of the Jew. At length, dropping his imperfect enumeration of the advantages of the Jew, he boldly affirms the result, that the Jew is no better than the Gentile, and that all need the salvation, which all may have.

9. *Τί οὖν; προεχόμεθα;*] Like *τί οὖν; ἁμαρτήσωμεν;* vi. 15. "What then? are we better than they? No, by no means." This way of taking the passage gives the best sense, and does the least violence to the language. The objection to it is that the middle, which would ordinarily have the signification of "to hold before," "put forward as a pretext," is here used like the active in the

sense of "surpass," "excel." The mode of taking the passage which connects *τί οὖν* with *προεχόμεθα*; either in the sense of what pretext do we allege? or what advantage have we? furnishes no proper sense for *οὐ πάντως*, and is open to the further objection that no other instance occurs of *τί οὖν* being used where *τί* is the remote object of a verb, in the writings of St. Paul. The emphatic use of *προεχόμεθα* in the sense of "have we a pretext?" is still more contrary to analogy than the confusion of the middle and active voice.

The Apostle had previously spoken of the Jews in the third person. Now he is about to utter an unpalatable truth. Is it an over refinement to suppose that he changes the person to soften the expression by identifying himself with them? Compare 1 Cor. iv. 6. "These things I have transferred in a figure to myself and Apollos, for your sakes."

*οὐ πάντως*, *no surely.*] Comp. the use of *πάντως* in 1 Cor. v. 10., ix. 10. The Apostle is not thinking of *πολύ κατὰ παντὰ τρόπον*,

9 What then? are we better than they? No, in no  
 wise: for we have before proved both Jews and Gen-  
 10 tiles, that they are all under sin; as it is written, There  
 11 is none righteous, no, not one: there is none that  
 understandeth, there is none that seeketh after God.  
 12 They are all gone out of the way, they are together  
 become unprofitable; there is none that doeth good,  
 13 no, not one. Their throat is an open sepulchre; with  
 their tongues they have used deceit; the poison of asps  
 14 is under their lips: whose mouth is full of cursing and  
 15 bitterness. Their feet are swift to shed blood, afflic-  
 16 tion\* and misery are in their ways, and the way of  
 17 peace have they not known. There is no fear of God

which has preceded in ver. 1., but of the general condemnation which is to follow.

*πάντας,*] not a mere hyperbole, or put, as Grotius supposes, for “most,” but as in ver. 12. 19.

10. *καθώς γέγραπται,* as it is written.] In what follows the Apostle quotes different passages of Scripture; descriptive either of the enemies of the psalmist, or containing denunciations of the prophets against the iniquities of Israel at particular times to illustrate the sinfulness of men in general.

The words *ὅτι οὐκ ἔστιν δίκαιος οὐδὲ εἷς* may be either an introduction of the Apostle’s own, in which he gives the substance of the following quotations, or an imperfect recollection of the first verse of Psalm liii., *οὐκ ἔστι ποιῶν ἀγαθόν,* or of Ps. xiv., *οὐκ ἔστιν ποιῶν χρηστότητα.*

The eleventh verse is slightly altered in sense from the second verse of Psalm xiv. in the LXX.: — *κύριος ἐκ τοῦ οὐρανοῦ διέκλυεν ἐπὶ τοὺς υἱοὺς τῶν ἀνθρώπων τοῦ*

*ἰδεῖν εἰ ἔστι συνίων ἢ ἐκζητῶν τὸν θεόν.*

12—17. have been inserted from this passage in the Alexandrian MS. of the LXX. at Ps. xiv. 3.

13. quoted from the LXX. Ps. v. 9. down to *ἐδοιοῦσαν.* The meaning is, that men fall into their snares as into open graves among the rocks. Comp. Ps. vii. 15.

*ἰὸς . . . ἀντῶν.* Ps. cxl. 3.

14. slightly altered from the LXX. Ps. x. 7.

15—17. quoted, not after the LXX., from Isaiah, lix. 7., where the prophet is describing the depraved state of Israel.

18. From the LXX. of Psalm xxxvi. 1. What does the Apostle intend to prove by these quotations? — That at various times mankind have gone astray, and done evil; that in particular cases the prophets and psalmists energetically denounced the wickedness of the Jews, or of their enemies. This is all that can be strictly gathered from them, and yet not enough to sup-



ἔστιν φόβος θεοῦ ἀπέναντι τῶν ὀφθαλμῶν αὐτῶν. οἶδαμεν δὲ ὅτι ὅσα ὁ νόμος λέγει τοῖς ἐν τῷ νόμῳ λαλεῖ, ἵνα πάντοτε στόμα φραγῆ καὶ ὑπόδικος γένηται πᾶς ὁ κόσμος τῷ θεῷ. διότι ἐξ ἔργων νόμου οὐ δικαιοθήσεται πᾶσα σὰρξ ἐνώπιον

port what is termed the Apostle's argument. From the fact that the enemies of David were perfidious and deceitful, that the children of Israel, in the time of the prophet Isaiah, were swift to shed blood, we can draw no conclusions respecting mankind in general. Because Englishmen were cruel in the times of the civil wars, or because Charles the First had bitter and crafty enemies, we could not argue that the present generation, not to say the whole world, fell under the charge of the same sin. Not wholly unlike this, however, is the adaptation which the Apostle makes of the texts which he has quoted from the Old Testament. He brings them together from various places to express the thought which is passing through his mind; and he quotes them with a kind of authority, as we might use better language than our own to enforce our meaning. In modern phraseology, they are not arguments, but illustrations. The use of them is exactly similar to our own use of Scripture in sermons, where the universal is often inferred from the particular, and precepts or events divested of the particular circumstances which accompany them, or the occasions on which they arose, are made to teach a general lesson. It was after the manner of the Apostle's age, and hardly less after the manner of our own.

19. οἶδαμεν δὲ ὅτι, *but we know.*] Is St. Paul referring here to the Jews or to mankind in general? If the former, there arises a difficulty respecting the meaning of the words, "every mouth," "all the world," which seem coextensive with "those under the law."

(1.) We may suppose that the Apostle, having already concluded the Gentiles under sin in the first chapter, is using these texts against the Jews, to complete the proof against men in general. "We know that whomsoever these words out of the law touch, they must touch the Jew, who is under the law, so that he forms no exception, and the whole world including the Jew, come under the judgment of God." Or, (2.) The Jew is regarded by him as the type of the Gentile; and having convicted the one, he assumes, *à fortiori*, the conviction of the other.

It cannot be denied, that either of the two explanations is far-fetched, and also ill-suited to the connexion. For in the 9th verse which introduced these passages, nothing was said of their special application to the Jews. "For we before proved all both Jews and Gentiles to be under sin, as it is written." But (3.) if the words τοῖς ἐν τῷ νόμῳ cannot be confined to the Jew, their meaning must extend to mankind in general. The law of Moses, it may be said, is with the Apostle the image of law in general, and

19 before their eyes. Now we know that what things  
 soever the law saith, it saith to them who are under the  
 law : that every mouth may be stopped, and all the  
 20 world come into judgment before God. Because\* by  
 the deeds of the law there shall no flesh be justified in

mankind have been already spoken of as having a law written on the heart. According to this view, the meaning of the passage might be :—“ We know that whatsoever things the law or the prophets say, they say to those who in any sense are under the law.”

Considering the numerous transitions of meaning which occur in the use of the word *νόμος* (comp. Rom. vii. 21., viii. 1—4. ; and the use of *πνεῦμα*, in 1 Cor. ii. 10.), it cannot be held a fatal objection to this interpretation that it explains the word *νόμος* in different senses in successive lines. There is nothing inconsistent in this with the style of St. Paul. But still those “ who are under the law ” would be an abrupt and obscure expression, for “ those who have the law written on their hearts.” And in this instance there is an absolute unmeaningness and want of point in saying “ we know that whatsoever things the written law saith, it saith to them who have not the written law.”

Another (4.) and more probable point of view, in which the explanation that applies *τοῖς ἐν τῷ νόμῳ* to all mankind, may be regarded, is the following :—The Apostle has found words in the law which describe the sinfulness of man, who, from this very circumstance, may be said to be

under or in the law. He does not mean to say that the law speaks to those who are under the law, but that those to whom the law speaks are under the law. All those who are thus described, are drawn within the law, and belong to the prior dispensation. Or, more simply :—The law in saying these things speaks to persons over whom it has authority (comp. vii. 1., *ὁ νόμος κυριεύει τοῦ ἀνθρώπου*) ; it is not a mere abstraction.

This interpretation, though difficult, is in accordance with the style and spirit of the Apostle. As, in the first chapter, he spoke of the Gentiles as knowing God, and condemned by their knowledge, so in this passage, he regards all mankind as under the sentence of the law of Moses. It is further rendered necessary and confirmed by the following verse, as well as by what has preceded. For not only in the verse which precedes the citation from the Old Testament, has the Apostle made no distinction between Jew and Gentile, but in ver. 20. he expressly speaks of Gentile as well as Jew, as incapable of justification by the deeds of the law.

20. *διότι ἐξ ἔργων νόμον, because by the deeds of the law.*] Is this to be understood of the ceremonial or of the moral law ? It would be arbitrary to narrow



αὐτοῦ διὰ γὰρ νόμου ἐπίγνωσις ἁμαρτίας. νυνὶ δὲ χωρὶς νόμου δικαιοσύνη θεοῦ πεφανέρωται, μαρτυρουμένη ὑπὸ

the meaning of these words to the ceremonial law, even if we were not prevented from doing so by the universality of the expression *πᾶσα σὰρξ*, which includes the Gentiles, who had nothing to do with the ceremonial law.

The object of Arminian and Romanist divines has ever been to confine the "works of the law" to the ceremonial law, thereby gaining a supposed immunity for the doctrine of justification by works in another sense. Calvinists and Lutherans, with a truer perception of the Apostle's purpose, have affirmed that the moral law could, as little as the ceremonial, be made the groundwork of acceptance with God. They have truly urged, that there is no indication in the writings of St. Paul of the existence of such a distinction. The law is to him one law, the whole law, the figure, indeed, of many things, but never separated into the portion that relates to ceremonies, and the portion that relates to moral precepts.

It may be further maintained, not only that there is no such distinction in the mind of the Apostle, but that, consistently with the modes of thought of his age, there could not have been such. It is what has been termed before an afterthought of theology, which would naturally arise when the ceremonial law had died away—a sort of separation of body and soul when life is extinct. Not that to St. Paul, or the Jews who were his con-

temporaries, all the precepts of the law seemed of equal importance. The prophets had constantly opposed the blood of bulls and goats "to the doing justice, and loving mercy, and walking humbly with God." But it does not follow from this, that the moral and ceremonial law were separated from each other in such a sense, that the Scribes and Pharisees placed some precepts under the one head and others under the other. Rather, they were blended together in one, like Ethics and Politics in the early Greek philosophy. When a Jew spoke of the law, it never occurred to him to ask whether he meant the moral or ceremonial law; or when he spoke of sin, to distinguish whether he intended moral evil or ceremonial impurity.

*οὐ δικαιοθήσεται πᾶσα σὰρξ.*] No flesh shall be justified: *οὐ . . πᾶς* with a verb interposed has the force of a universal negative, the *οὐ* adhering to the verb; as in Luke i. 37.; 1 Cor. xv. 29. The two words when following one another are usually (but not always) taken in the sense of a particular "not all." Compare, however, Apoc. ix. 4., and above, *οὐ πάντως*.

The expression *οὐ . . πᾶς* in the first sense is not altogether strange to classical Greek. Comp. Plat. Phæd. 91. E.: *πότερον ἔφη, πάντας τοὺς ἔμπροσθεν λόγους οὐκ ἀποδέχεσθε ἢ τοὺς μὲν τοὺς δ' οὐ*; It is fuller and more direct than *οὐδεὶς*, and therefore more emphatic. The passages in which *πᾶς* or *εἷς* comes first, such as



21 his sight; for by the law is the knowledge of sin. But now the righteousness of God without the law has been\*

Αποκ. xxii. 3. : πᾶν κατάθεμα οὐκ ἔσται ἔτι; or Matt. x. 29. : ἐν ἐξ αὐτῶν οὐ πεσεῖται, are the best illustrations of the nature of the usage.

The whole clause is taken from Ps. cxliii. 2. : ὄτι οὐ δικαιωθήσεται ἐνώπιον σοῦ πᾶς ζῶν, for which latter words the Apostle substitutes πᾶσα σὰρξ, not without an allusion to the weakness of the flesh in the presence of God. Comp. Matt. xxiv. 22. : οὐκ ἂν ἐσώθη πᾶσα σὰρξ.

διὰ γὰρ νόμον, for by the law.] We naturally ask why "for?" What connexion is there between the inference and the reason assigned to it? To us the knowledge of sin would seem like the first step to justification, not opposed to it.

For the answer to this question see Essays on "Justification," and on the "Law as the Strength of Sin," in which the antagonism is pointed out between the law as the knowledge of sin, and the after sense of acceptance and forgiveness. Comp. Rom. vii. 7., 8. : — "I had not known sin, but by the law: for I had not known lust, except the law had said, Thou shalt not covet. But sin, taking occasion by the commandment, wrought in me all manner of concupiscence. For without the law sin was dead."

"Without the law there is no transgression;" or, as we might say—"Without conscience there is no sin." No man, therefore, can be justified by the law or conscience; for this is what makes sin to be what it is. The nature of sin arises out of the knowledge

of sin, which is derived from the law.

21—23. But now, independent of the law, yet not without witness from the law, the righteousness of God has been manifested forth—a righteousness of God unlike that of the law, through faith in Jesus Christ, unto all who have faith; for there is no difference, for all have the same need, all alike are freely justified.

21. νυνὶ δέ.] It has been argued that νυνὶ does not here refer to time, because in what has preceded there is no express mention of past time. Yet what the Apostle has been saying previously does refer to the prior dispensation.

Although it is true that νῦν and νυνὶ are frequently used by St. Paul to express the conclusion of an argument or the summary of a previous statement, yet it is more probable that in this passage he is referring to time. It is a thought ever present to his mind, that now is the age of the Gospel, the time of fulfilment, not of anticipation; the latter days which all former times pointed to, in which the truth is living, present, and mighty among men. He loves to oppose ποτὲ μὲν—νυνὶ δέ, as they had followed in his own life, and as they seemed to follow in the dispensations of God to man. And where, as in this passage, the contrast of ποτὲ μὲν is omitted, still the thought of the Gospel as neither past nor future, but present and immediate, remains. Compare below, ver. 26. ἐν τῷ νῦν καιρῷ: v. 11. δι' οὗ νῦν τὴν καταλλαγὴν ἐλάβομεν: xvi.

τοῦ νόμου καὶ τῶν προφητῶν, δικαιοσύνη δὲ θεοῦ διὰ 22  
πίστεως χριστοῦ<sup>1</sup>, εἰς πάντας<sup>2</sup> τοὺς πιστεύοντας. οὐ γάρ 23  
ἔστιν διαστολή· πάντες γὰρ ἤμαρτον καὶ ὑστεροῦνται τῆς 24  
δόξης τοῦ θεοῦ, δικαιούμενοι δωρεὰν τῇ αὐτοῦ χάριτι διὰ 24  
τῆς ἀπολυτρώσεως τῆς ἐν χριστῷ Ἰησοῦ, ὃν προέθε- 25  
το ὁ θεὸς ἰλαστήριον διὰ πίστεως<sup>3</sup> ἐν τῷ αὐτοῦ αἵμα-

<sup>1</sup> Ἰησοῦ χριστοῦ.<sup>2</sup> Add καὶ ἐπὶ πάντας.<sup>3</sup> τῆς πίστεως.

26., μυστηρίου χρόνοις αἰωνίοις σε-  
σιγημένον φανερωθέντος δὲ νῦν.

πεφανέρωται, *has been mani-  
fested.*] This righteousness no  
longer resides only in the bosom  
of God, "a mystery since the  
world began;" it has been called  
forth into light and may be seen  
of men; cf. chap. xvi. 25.; Eph.  
iii. 8, 9. The perfect marks the  
continuance of the manifestation:  
it is not only a point in past time,  
but living and present.

μαρτυρουμένη, *witnessed.*] Comp.  
chap. i. 2. 17.; Acts, x. 43.

The Gospel is independent of  
the law, and yet the law and the  
prophets bear it witness. They  
speak of justification by faith,  
Gen. xv. 5, 6., of the just who  
live by faith, Hab. ii. 4., of for-  
giveness of sins, Ps. xxxiii. 1, 2.,  
of the nearness of God to man,  
Deut. xxx. 14., of the remnant  
who were to be saved, Isai. x. 23.,  
of the deliverer out of Sion, Isai.  
lix. 20.; but these scattered rays  
are very different from the truth  
of Christ, taught by St. Paul.

ὑπὸ τοῦ νόμου,] forms a verbal  
antithesis to χωρὶς νόμου.

22. δικαιοσύνη δέ.] But a  
righteousness of another kind,  
of God through faith in Christ,  
unto all that believe.

πιστεύοντας] answers to διὰ  
πίστεως, as πάντας to πᾶς ὁ κόσμος,  
in ver. 19. The latter is further

emphasised by the clause οὐ γάρ  
ἔστιν διαστολή (Comp. chap. x, 11,  
12.), the reason of which universal  
need of salvation is, in ver. 23.,  
laid in the universal sinfulness  
of the prior dispensation, the  
statement of which again serves  
as a kind of support of the truth  
with which it alternates, in ver.  
24., the free gift of the grace of  
God.

[εἰς πάντας καὶ ἐπὶ πάντας.]  
Though the addition καὶ ἐπὶ πᾶν-  
τας of the Tex. Rec. is supported  
by insufficient MS. authority  
(*Δ. C. f. g. v.*), and may have arisen  
from a double reading of εἰς and  
ἐπὶ noted in the margin (καὶ ἐπὶ  
πάντας), the repetition is not  
unlike the manner of St. Paul.  
Of the two prepositions, εἰς re-  
presents the more internal and  
spiritual relation of the Gospel  
to the individual soul, as ἐπὶ, its  
outward connexion with man-  
kind collectively.]

23. ἤμαρτον, *have sinned.*] In  
classical Greek, and still more  
often in the Greek of the New  
Testament, the aorist is used with-  
out any precise notion of time,  
where in English the perfect  
would be employed to mark the  
connexion of a past event with  
present time, or the present to  
express a general statement.  
Compare προέθετο, v. 25.; ἐξε-  
κλείσθη, v. 27.

manifested, being witnessed by the law and the prophets; even the righteousness of God which is by faith of<sup>1</sup> Christ unto all them<sup>2</sup> that believe: for there is no difference: for all have sinned, and come short of the glory of God; being justified freely by his grace through the redemption that is in Christ Jesus: whom God hath set forth to be a propitiation through faith\*,

<sup>1</sup> Add Jesus.<sup>2</sup> Add and upon all.

τῆς δόξης τοῦ Θεοῦ.] Not the image of God in which man was created, an interpretation which is supported in some degree by 1 Cor. xi. 7. :—ἀνὴρ . . . εἰκὼν καὶ δόξα Θεοῦ: nor the praise or approval of God, for which latter sense comp. John, v. 44., xii. 43.; but rather a higher spiritual state, an ideal which shall one day be realised,—the kingdom of heaven, the manifestation of the sons of God, presented under another aspect. Comp. 2 Cor. iii. 18. :—“But we all, with open face beholding as in a glass the glory of the Lord, are changed into the same image from glory to glory; also, Rom. v. 2.—“This grace wherein we stand and rejoice in hope of the glory of God.” For ὑπεροῦνται comp. Heb. xii. 15. :—μή τις ὑπεροῶν ἀπὸ τῆς χάριτος τοῦ Θεοῦ.

24. δικαιούμενοι δωρεάν.] Some regard this as the principal clause, expressed by a participle, instead of a verb:—“Having fallen short of the glory of God, they are justified freely.” It is better to lay the emphasis on δωρεάν, and take δικαιούμενοι with an allusion to δικαιοσύνη, in ver. 22. :—“There is no difference, for all are sinners, and fall short of the kingdom of heaven, and

in that they are justified they are so freely by the grace of God.”

ἀπολυτρόσεως, redemption,] as of a captive from slavery. Comp. Gal. iii. 15. :—χριστὸς ἡμᾶς ἐξηγόρασεν, and our Lord's own words, Matt. xx. 28. : “The Son of Man came not to be ministered to, but to minister and to give his soul a ransom for many.”

25. ὃν προέθετο,] = exhibited, set forth to view, as in Ps. liii. 3., and Thuc. ii. 34., τὰ μὲν ὄσ-τᾶ προτίθενται τῶν ἀπογενομένων. Comp. εἰς ἔνδειξιν and πεφανέρω-ται: also Gal. iii. :—οἷς κατ' ὀφθαλμοὺς Ἰησοῦς χριστὸς προε-γράφη ἑσταυρωμένος.

ἱλαστήριον] has three senses given it by commentators on this passage:—First, as in Heb. ix. 5., “mercy-seat,” a meaning of the word supposed to have arisen from a misconception of the LXX. respecting the Hebrew חַרְטֹם, the covering of the ark, which they wrongly connected with כַּפַּיִם, to expiate or cover sin. This interpretation is too obscure and peculiar for the present passage:—(1.) it would require the article; (2.) it is inappropriate, because St. Paul is not here speaking of the mercy, but of the righteousness of God; (3.) the image, if used, should be assisted by the surrounding



τι, εἰς ἔνδειξιν τῆς δικαιοσύνης αὐτοῦ, διὰ τὴν πάρεσιν τῶν προγεγονότων ἁμαρτημάτων ἐν τῇ ἀνοχῇ τοῦ θεοῦ, πρὸς τὴν<sup>1</sup> ἔνδειξιν τῆς δικαιοσύνης αὐτοῦ ἐν τῷ νῦν καιρῷ,

<sup>1</sup> Om. τὴν.

phraseology. Two other explanations offer themselves:—either (1.) ἰλαστήριον may be a masculine adjective in apposition with ὄν, “whom God set forth as propitiatory,” or better, (2.) a neuter adjective, which has passed into a substantive,—whom God has set forth as a “propitiation,” like σωτήριον, Ex. xx. 24.; cf. xxix. 28.

διὰ πίστεως ἐν τῷ αὐτοῦ αἵματι.] No such expression occurs in Scripture as faith in the blood, or even in the death of Christ. Nor is πίστις followed by ἐν in the New Testament, though faith, like all other Christian states, is often spoken of as existing in Christ. (Gal. iii. 26.) The two clauses should therefore be separated, “through faith—by his blood.”

εἰς ἔνδειξιν τῆς δικαιοσύνης αὐτοῦ.] There are three ways in which this manifestation may be conceived:—(1.) as the life and death of Christ are an example to all mankind; (2.) as His death was the penalty for sin; (3.) as He is the sum of that revelation which the Apostle terms “the righteousness of God through faith by his blood;” the latter words being an explanation from the objective side of what διὰ πίστεως expresses from the subjective, and connecting with ἰλαστήριον as διὰ πίστεως with δικαιούμενοι. Comp. v. 9.: —δικαιούμενοι ἐν τῷ αἵματι.

διὰ τὴν πάρεσιν τῶν προγεγονότων ἁμαρτημάτων, because of the letting go of sins that are past.] These words are trans-

lated in the English Version “for the remission of sins that are past.” To this it may naturally be objected:—“Why of sins that are past, rather than of sins in general.” Sins are past to the individual when they are forgiven; but St. Paul is not here speaking of individuals, but of the world, in which they are ever going on. The words of the Epistle to the Hebrews, ix. 15.:—εἰς ἀπολύτρωσιν τῶν ἐπὶ τῇ πρώτῃ διαθήκῃ παραβάσεων, offer an apparent rather than a real parallel. Nor is there any trace of the word πάρεσις (which is not found in the New Testament except in this passage) occurring elsewhere in the sense of “forgiveness.”

The natural translation of the words is:—“Because of the letting go or omission of past sins.” That is the reason why God manifests forth his righteousness, because formerly he had hidden himself, and seemed not to observe sin. “The times of that ignorance God winked at, but now commands all men everywhere to repent.” There was a moral necessity which made the old dispensation the cause of the new one. God was not willing that men should be forever ignorant of his true nature.

On the other side it has been argued, that when past sins are spoken of, it is not necessary to think of them as the sins of a past world, or a prior dispensation. The Apostle is laying stress on the fact that “at this

by his blood, to declare his righteousness because of the letting go\* of sins that are past through the forbearance of God, for the declaration of his righteousness\* at

very time a new revelation was made to man." Those who received this new revelation regarded their sins as past in reference to it; and so the Apostle himself regards them. According to this view, the sense of the passage could be brought out more clearly if the clause *διὰ τὴν πάρεσιν τῶν προγεγονότων ἁμαρτημάτων* were translated "for the remission of their past sins," the article referring back to the 23rd and 24th verses. The word *πάρεσις* is rendered *ἄφεσις* by Hesychius, and occurs in the Epistles of Phalaris in the sense of remission of a debt.

Once more, to resume the other side of the argument, it may be truly urged that the words *ἐν τῇ ἀνοχῇ τοῦ θεοῦ*, v. 26., agree better with the thought that God had passed over the former sins of the world "in his long-suffering," than to his having forgiven them. Long-suffering is not the word to apply to the forgiveness of sins, but rather to the period before they were forgiven, or to the delay in taking vengeance for them. And on the whole it seems better to suppose that St. Paul refers, though obscurely, to that "mystery which was kept secret since the world began," Rom. xvi. 26., of which he elsewhere speaks, than that he uses words without point or in doubtful significations.

26. *ἐν τῇ ἀνοχῇ τοῦ θεοῦ*, by the long suffering of God.] These words are closely connected with what precedes; "the overlooking

of sin" was an act of mercy. Comp. ix. 22., where the delay of appointed vengeance is also spoken of as mercy:—"But if God, willing to manifest forth his wrath, and to make his power known, endured with much long suffering the vessels of wrath appointed unto destruction."

*πρὸς τὴν ἔνδειξιν τῆς δικαιοσύνης αὐτοῦ*, for declaration of His righteousness.] Not, as in the English Version, a mere resumption of the previous *εἰς ἔνδειξιν*, "for the manifestation, I say, of his righteousness at this time." The words *πρὸς τὴν ἔνδειξιν τῆς δικαιοσύνης* are in juxtaposition with *ἐν τῇ ἀνοχῇ τοῦ θεοῦ*, and closely connected with *διὰ τὴν πάρεσιν*, as *ἐν τῷ νῦν καιρῷ* corresponds to *προγεγονότων ἁμαρτημάτων*. It was partly owing to the long suffering of God, that he "winked at" past sins; but there was likewise a further object, that he should set forth His righteousness at the time appointed. He hid himself that He might be revealed. The manifestation of His righteousness was the counterpart of His neglect and long suffering. When the *ἐνδειξις* was first mentioned this point of view was not touched upon; it is now indicated by the article. Comp. for a similar mode of connecting the two halves of the dispensation, ver. 20.: "The law came in that sin might abound, but where sin abounded, grace did much more abound."

εἰς τὸ εἶναι αὐτὸν δίκαιον καὶ δικαιοῦντα τὸν ἐκ πίστεως Ἰησοῦ.

Ποῦ οὖν ἡ καύχησις; ἐξεκλείσθη. διὰ ποίου νόμου; τῶν ἔργων; οὐχί, ἀλλὰ διὰ νόμου πίστεως. λογιζόμεθα γὰρ δικαιοῦσθαι πίστει ἄνθρωπον<sup>1</sup> χωρὶς ἔργων νόμου. ἢ Ἰουδαίων ὁ θεὸς μόνον, οὐχί<sup>2</sup> καὶ ἔθνῶν; ναὶ καὶ ἔθνῶν, εἴ περ<sup>3</sup> εἰς ὁ θεὸς ὃς δικαιοῦσει περιτομὴν ἐκ πίστεως καὶ

<sup>1</sup> λογιζόμεθα οὖν, πίστει δικαιοῦσθαι ἄνθρωπον.

<sup>2</sup> Add δέ.

<sup>3</sup> ἐπέπερ.

εἰς τὸ εἶναι αὐτὸν δίκαιον.] That he may vindicate his ways, and be the justifier of him that believes,—an exegesis of πρὸς τὴν ἔνδειξιν, “that his own righteousness may be clear, and, as a further step, that he may clear the believer in Christ.”

27. Ποῦ οὖν ἡ καύχησις, *where then is boasting?*] Comp. 1 Cor. i. 31.:—“He that glorieth, let him glory in the Lord.” The boasting of the Jew has no room left for it; it has been excluded by faith.

ἐξεκλείσθη, *it has been excluded.*] Such is the result of the argument which preceded. “Upon what principle?” the Apostle further asks, applying the word νόμος in a new sense to πίστις as well as ἔργα. The “law of faith” is another name for the Gospel, as the “Jew inwardly” for the believer, and the “Israel of God” for the church. For the paronomasia compare vii. 21., — εὐρίσκω ἄρα τὸν νόμον τῷ θελοντι ἐμοὶ ποιεῖν τὸ καλόν, ὅτι ἐμοὶ τὸ κακὸν παράκειται: ii. 14., — ὅταν . . . γὰρ ἔθνη τὰ τοῦ νόμου ποιῶσιν, οὗτοι νόμον μὴ ἔχοντες ἑαυτοῖς εἰσὶν νόμος: and viii. 2., — ὁ γὰρ νόμος τοῦ πνεύματος τῆς ζωῆς.

28. λογιζόμεθα οὖν, *we consider then.*] Let us hear once more the conclusion of the whole

matter:—“We consider that man is justified by faith, without the deeds of the law.”

When the expression “without the deeds of the law” is used, does this mean without the deeds of the ceremonial or the moral law, or without the fruits of faith, or without love, or without holiness? or, when the Apostle says “justified,” does he mean thereby to distinguish “justified” from “sanctified,” or a first from a second justification, or to identify justification with baptism or with conversion? On such questions, in past times, have hung the fates of nations and of Churches. May we venture to supply the Apostle’s answer to them? He might have replied, that he meant only that men were justified from within, not from without; from above, not from below; by the grace of God, and not of themselves; by Christ, not by the law; not by the burden of ordinances; but by the power of an endless life. Comp. “Essay on Righteousness by Faith.”

29. ἢ Ἰουδαίων ὁ θεὸς μόνον; *Is he the God of the Jews only?*] As in chap. iv., where the fact of Abraham’s being justified by faith is immediately coupled with the other fact, that he was justified in uncircumcision, that he might



this time: that he might be just, and the justifier of him which believeth in Jesus.

27 Where is boasting then? It has\* been excluded.  
 28 By what law? of works? Nay: but by the law of  
 29 faith. For<sup>1</sup> we conclude that a man is justified by faith  
 30 without the deeds of the law. Is he the God of the Jews  
 only? is he not also of the Gentiles? Yes, of the  
 30 Gentiles also: seeing it is one God, which shall justify  
 the circumcision by faith, and uncircumcision through

<sup>1</sup> Therefore.

be the father of all them that have faith; as in Gal. iii. 25—28.; when faith comes, all mankind are one in Christ Jesus; as in the discourse on Mars' hill, Acts, xvii. 26., the unity of God insensibly leads on the Apostle to speak of the unity from man; so in the present passage, the other aspect of the great theme flashes suddenly upon the Apostle's mind. He had already said, that the righteousness of God was revealed unto all them that believe. Now, he expressly includes the Gentile in the circle of the faithful.

30. εἰ περ εἷς ὁ θεός.] For God, as the law said, is one God (Deut. vi. 4.); one in another sense too, knowing no distinction of circumcision or uncircumcision, barbarian, Scythian, bond or free.

ὃς δικαιοῦσει, who will justify.] The future is used with reference to the day of judgment; or better, more generally with a view to the completion of a work, which in this world was but beginning, whether in each individual or in mankind generally.

ἐκ πίστεως and διὰ τῆς πίστεως.] What distinction can be made

between the uses of these two prepositions? We can hardly believe that the Apostle uses them ironically, as some have supposed; as though he said, the difference between the gift of salvation to Jew and Gentile is about as great as the difference between the prepositions ἐκ and διὰ. It may be suggested, that ἐκ πίστεως be taken with the substantive, and διὰ τῆς πίστεως with the verb, "There is one God who will justify the circumcision that is of faith (*i. e.* not that circumcision which is outward in the flesh), and the uncircumcision through faith;" or, in other words, "Who will justify faithful Israel and the Gentiles equally through faith." The expression, περιτομὴν ἐκ πίστεως, is thus made a sort of paronomasia, like νόμος πίστεως. Comp. Col. ii. 11.:— περιτομὴ τοῦ χριστοῦ. Conjectures may also be hazarded that the Apostle has employed ἐκ πίστεως to denote the natural inward connexion of faith and circumcision, which did not equally exist in the case of uncircumcision; or as a better antithesis to ἐξ ἔργων, which (and not δι' ἔργων) would have expressed the tenet

ἀκροβυστίαν διὰ τῆς πίστεως. νόμον οὖν καταργοῦμεν διὰ τῆς πίστεως ; μὴ γένοιτο, ἀλλὰ νόμον ἱστάνομεν. 31

against which he is contending (cf. iv. 2.), and which he may be supposed to have in his mind.

It is perhaps safer to discard such refinements and say only that we have a similar awkwardness of expression to that which occurs in chap. v. ver. 7., where, as here, different words appear to be used where we should expect the same (ὑπὲρ δικαίου, ὑπὲρ τοῦ ἀγαθοῦ). Compare, as in some degree parallel, Gal. ii. 16. : εἰδότες ὅτι οὐ δικαιοῦται ἄνθρωπος ἐξ ἔργων νόμου, ἐὰν μὴ διὰ πίστεως Ἰησοῦ χριστοῦ.

31. Do we then make void the law through faith? That be far from us. Nay: we establish the law. But how so? We might reply, in the same sense that our Saviour said, "I do not come to destroy the law, but to fulfil;" to establish the law by requiring obedience to a higher law, and making obedience to the law in any degree possible. The context, however, requires us to narrow our interpretation: either (1.) with reference to νόμος τῆς πίστεως in ver. 27., we establish the law, in that we have a new

31 faith. Do we then make void the law through faith? God forbid: yea, we establish the law.

law instead of an old one, a law of faith instead of a law of works; or, as it is further developed hereafter, "Christ, the end of the law to every one that believes." Or, (2.) with reference to what follows:—"We establish the law, in that the law says, that Abraham our father was justified by faith and not by works." Neither of these paraphrases suits the connexion. The first lays too much stress on the words *νόμος τῆς πίστεως*, which are but a passing expression, too far off to explain the allusion in

*νόμον ἰστάνομεν*. The second is inconsistent with the adversative *τί οὖν*, of the next Chapter. Most probably, the Apostle is either referring to the commencement of the chapter, in which he had proved all men to be under sin from the law, or following a similar train of thought. In this sense we establish the law, because we appeal to it to convict men of sin; and this conviction of sin is an integral part of the dispensation of mercy, both in the individual and in the world. Comp. ver. 21.



εἰς ὃ θεὸς ὁς δικαιοῦσται. — iii. 30.

LET us turn aside for a moment to consider how great this thought was in that age and country; a thought which the wisest of men had never before uttered, which at the present hour we imperfectly realise, which is still leavening the world, and shall do so until the whole is leavened, and the differences of races, of nations, of castes, of religions, of languages, are finally done away. Nothing could seem a less natural or obvious lesson in the then state of the world, nothing could be more at variance with experience, or more difficult to carry out into practice. Even to us it is hard to imagine that the islander of the South Seas, the pariah of India, the African in his worst estate, is equally with ourselves God's creature. But in the age of St. Paul how great must have been the difficulty of conceiving barbarian and Scythian, bond and free, all colours, forms, races, and languages alike and equal in the presence of God who made them! The origin of the human race was veiled in a deeper mystery to the ancient world, and the lines which separated mankind were harder and stronger; yet the "love of Christ constraining" bound together in its cords, those most separated by time or distance, those who were the types of the most extreme differences of which the human form is capable.

The idea of this brotherhood of all mankind, the great family on earth, implies that all men have certain ties with us, and certain rights at our hands. The truest way in which we can regard them is as they appear in the sight of God, from Whom they can never suffer wrong; nor from us, while we think of them as His creatures equally with ourselves. There is yet a closer bond with them as our

brethren in the Gospel. No one can interpose impediments of rank or fortune, or colour or religious opinion, between those who are one in Christ. Beyond and above such transitory differences is the work of Christ, "making all things kin." Moreover, the remembrance of this brotherhood is a rest to us when our "light is low," and the world and its distinctions are passing from our sight, and our thoughts are of the dark valley and the solitary way. For it leads us to trust in God, not as selecting us, because He had a favour unto us, but as infinitely just to all mankind. It links our fortunes with those of men in general, and gives us the same support in reference to our eternal destiny, that we receive from each other in a narrow sphere in the concerns of daily life. To think of ourselves, or our church, or our country, or our age, as the particular exceptions which a Divine mercy makes, whether in this life or another, is not a thought of comfort, but of perplexity. Lastly:—It relieves us from anxiety about the condition of other men, of friends departed, of those ignorant of the Gospel, of those of a different form of faith from our own; knowing that God who has thus far lifted up the veil, "will justify the circumcision through faith, and the uncircumcision by faith;" the Jew who fulfils the law, and the Gentile who does by nature the things contained in the law.

## CHAP. IV.

AGAIN the Apostle appears as at the commencement of the third chapter, either in the person of an objector, or as ready to answer the objections of others, and puts a question which has, however, no direct answer. He had asked above, "What advantage, then, had the Jew, if Jew and Gentile are alike concluded under sin?" This question in the previous chapter was shortly disposed of, as the Apostle was hurrying on to enforce his main thesis, "that all mankind were under sin." Now it returns upon us again in an altered form, no longer asked in reference to the Jew whose prerogative is admitted to have passed away, but to Abraham the father of the Jewish race. It might be that the Jew had no advantage, but that Abraham had—what shall we say then?

At the end of the second chapter the Apostle had almost declared that Jew and Gentile were both alike; of this he stopt short and spoke in a figure of the spiritual Israelite. In the same way in the fourth chapter, he answers the question which he himself raises, by putting the spiritual in the place of the fleshly Abraham. "What shall we say that Abraham found, our progenitor according to the flesh? or what shall we say, that Abraham our progenitor found according to the flesh?" The intended answer according to either way of reading the question is "nothing;" for what he found was not an advantage of that kind for which the Israelite hoped; it was an advantage not according to the flesh, but according to the spirit. But St. Paul avoids the harshness of this inference by a digression in which he points out that the blessedness of Abraham was not of works, but of faith. In this digression he takes up a thread of the



argument at the conclusion of the last chapter in which glorying is excluded. "If Abraham were justified by works, he would have whereof to glory:" this, however, is impossible, and expressly contradicted by the words of Scripture, which says, "Abraham believed God, and it was counted to him for righteousness." This is the indirect answer to the question, "What shall we say that Abraham found, our progenitor according to the flesh?"

Subordinate to this assertion of the general principle in the person of Abraham, is the minor question respecting the time of which the words were spoken "not in circumcision, but in uncircumcision," in which little fact the Apostle read their universal import. Circumcision came afterwards; it had nothing to do with the faith or with the promise that had preceded; it only conveyed through Abraham the privileges of which it was the seal to the faithful everywhere. (Compare Gal. iii. 17.) The sign of circumcision was but the accident of that higher relation in which the Patriarch stood already to God and man. As in the last chapter the words, "a man is justified by faith without the deeds of the law" (ver. 28.), were quickly followed by the declaration (ver. 29.), that "God was the God of the Gentiles also;" so here the statement that Abraham "believed God, and it was counted to him for righteousness," leads the Apostle instantly to think of him as the "heir of the world," a title with which the pride of the Israelite delighted to invest him. Is he the father of the Jews only, is he not also of the Gentiles? Yes; both aspects of the Gospel are seen in him. And the narrative of the birth of Isaac — the calling of the living out of the dead — is repeated by the Apostle with a kind of triumph as a lesson of new and universal interest.

τί οὖν ἐροῦμεν εὐρηκέαι Ἀβραὰμ τὸν προπάτορα ἡμῶν 4  
κατὰ σάρκα<sup>1</sup>; εἰ γὰρ Ἀβραὰμ ἐξ ἔργων ἐδικαιώθη, ἔχει 2  
καύχημα, ἀλλ' οὐ πρὸς θεόν.<sup>2</sup> τί γὰρ ἡ γραφή λέγει; 3  
Ἐπίστευσεν δὲ Ἀβραὰμ τῷ θεῷ, καὶ ἐλογίσθη αὐτῷ εἰς  
δικαιοσύνην. τῷ δὲ ἐργαζομένῳ ὁ μισθὸς οὐ λογίζεται 4

<sup>1</sup> ἐροῦμεν Ἀβραὰμ τὸν πατέρα ἡμῶν εὐρηκέαι κατὰ σάρκα.

<sup>2</sup> τὸν θεόν.

IV. How then do we meet the case of Abraham? The Apostle replies by giving a spiritual meaning to the narrative in Genesis and to other passages of the Old Testament.

τί οὖν is adversative, not "what then if the case be so with the law, shall we say that Abraham hath found," but a resumption of the train of thought with which the third chapter commenced, *τί οὖν τὸ περίσσειον τοῦ Ἰουδαίου*, which was suppressed in what followed, and again resumed at v. 9. and suppressed. The Apostle once more takes up the same point, but in a softened tone, and is about to show that Abraham the father of the faithful is a middle term between the old and new, as "the Israelite indeed" was at the end of chap. ii.

*κατὰ σάρκα*,] by some opposed to *κατὰ πνεῦμα*, comp. i. 3:4.; what then shall we say that Abraham found, not according to the spirit but according to the flesh? comp. Gal. iv. 29. Without introducing the idea of this opposition, the meaning will be nearly the same, "What then shall we say that Abraham found, as the portion of his fleshly inheritance," or "as receiving the sign outward, in the flesh," comp. Eph. ii. 11. *κατὰ σάρκα* may be also taken with *τὸν προπάτορα ἡμῶν*, comp. 2 Cor. v. 16., *χριστὸς κατὰ σάρκα*: which of the two con-

structions we adopt depends partly upon the order of words in the manuscripts, which is itself doubtful.

2. *εἰ γὰρ Ἀβραὰμ ἐξ ἔργων ἐδικαιώθη, ἔχει καύχημα*, for if Abraham were justified by works, he hath whereof to glory.] These words refer to the 27th verse of the previous chapter, in which glorying is excluded, not by the law of works, but of faith: as if the Apostle had said — "What shall we say that Abraham found, our progenitor according to the flesh? For we are in danger of contradicting ourselves if we maintain that Abraham was justified by works; he would then have whereof to glory. But in his relation to God this is impossible, for the Scripture expressly says, 'he was justified by faith.'" Here are two arguments to show that Abraham was not justified by works: — (1.) from what precedes, because he would have had whereof to glory; which is confirmed (2.) by the statement of Genesis which is to follow.

*ἀλλ' οὐ πρὸς θεόν*, but not before God.] This clause may be taken in three ways: — (1.) We may place a stop after *καύχημα*, and suppose what follows to be an ejaculation, the very abruptness of which gives emphasis to the denial of the Apostle. "For if Abraham was justified by works, he hath some-

4 What shall we then say that Abraham hath found,  
 2 our progenitor according to the flesh? <sup>1</sup> For if Abraham  
 were justified by works, he hath whereof to glory; but  
 3 not before God. For what saith the scripture? But \*  
 Abraham believed God, and it was counted unto him  
 4 for righteousness. Now to him that worketh is the

<sup>1</sup> Our father as pertaining to the flesh hath found.

thing according to the flesh, he hath whereof to glory." Nay, says the Apostle, half forgetful that the impossibility is already implied; before God this is impossible. Comp. ἔχω καύχησιν ἐν χριστῷ Ἰησοῦ τὰ πρὸς τὸν Θεόν, Rom. xv. 17. Or (2.) The words οὐ πρὸς Θεόν may be taken with ἐδικαιώθη. But no, it was only an external justification that Abraham or any man could have; not a justification πρὸς Θεόν if it was by works. Compare the opposition of *ἰδία δικαιοσύνη* and *ἡ τοῦ θεοῦ δικαιοσύνη*, in x. 3. Or, (3.) the last two clauses of ver. 2. may be taken as one, and the adversative ἀλλά regarded as an abrupt and imperfect expression for "although." The Apostle would say:—"For if Abraham was justified by works he had whereof to glory in himself, although it is admitted not before God." The latter words thus become a qualification of the objection rather than an answer to it. For a similar wavering between two opposite statements, comp. chap. iii. 3. 5., v. 13. (which also contains an attempt to meet an objection arising out of a previous train of thought), vii. 25. The chief difficulty according to this mode of taking the passage is the failure of connexion with the words that follow, which must then be referred back to ver. 1.

τί γὰρ ἡ γραφὴ λέγει; *for what saith the scripture?*] Gen. xv. 6. from the LXX. δέ a part of the quotation, but also adversative, as in Rom. i. 17.

The faith of Abraham was not first adduced by St. Paul. It is enlarged upon by Philo, and was familiar to the Jews. Though not the same with a faith in Christ, it was analogous to it:—(1.) as it was a faith in unseen things, Heb. xi. 17—19.; (2.) as it was prior to and independent of the law, Gal. iii. 17—19.; and, (3.) as it related to the promised seed in whom Christ was dimly seen, Gal. iii. 8.

4. τῷ δὲ ἐργαζομένῳ, *now to him that worketh.*] A play upon the word ἐργων in ver. 2.; "but it is otherwise with him that works," &c. δέ is adversative to the previous verse. The Apostle is preparing to show that Abraham did not "work." He lays down an axiom drawn from common life:—"The worker has his hire, of debt not of favour." But this was not the case with Abraham; he belonged to the other class, of those who have faith without works.

That the stress of the Apostle's argument falls partly upon λογίζεται seems to follow from the threefold recurrence of the word, as also from its signification of "counted," "reckoned." Faith



κατὰ χάριν, ἀλλὰ κατὰ ὀφείλημα<sup>1</sup>. τῷ δὲ μὴ ἐργαζομένῳ, 5  
 πιστεύοντι δὲ ἐπὶ τὸν δικαιοῦντα τὸν ἄσεβῆ, λογίζεται ἡ  
 πίστις αὐτοῦ εἰς δικαιοσύνην. καθάπερ καὶ Δαυεὶδ λέγει 6  
 τὸν μακάρισμὸν τοῦ ἀνθρώπου ᾧ ὁ θεὸς λογίζεται δικαιο-  
 σύνην χωρὶς ἔργων, Μακάριοι ὧν ἀφέθησαν αἱ ἀνομίαι καὶ 7  
 ὧν ἐπεκαλύφθησαν αἱ ἁμαρτίαι· μακάριος ἀνὴρ ᾧ οὐ μὴ 8  
 λογίσηται κύριος ἁμαρτίαν. ὁ μακαρισμὸς οὖν οὗτος ἐπὶ 9  
 τὴν περιτομήν, ἣ καὶ ἐπὶ τὴν ἀκροβυστίαν; λέγομεν γὰρ  
 [ὅτι] ἐλογίσθη τῷ Ἀβραάμ ἡ πίστις εἰς δικαιοσύνην.  
 πῶς οὖν ἐλογίσθη; ἐν περιτομῇ ὄντι, ἢ ἐν ἀκροβυστίᾳ; 10  
 οὐκ ἐν περιτομῇ, ἀλλ' ἐν ἀκροβυστίᾳ, καὶ σημεῖον ἔλα- 11  
 βεν περιτομῆς, σφραγίδα τῆς δικαιοσύνης τῆς πίστεως  
 τῆς ἐν τῇ ἀκροβυστίᾳ, εἰς τὸ εἶναι αὐτὸν πατέρα πάν-

<sup>1</sup> τὸ ὄφ.

was counted, reckoned, to Abraham for righteousness. But it cannot be said that reward is "counted" of grace to him that doeth works; it is his due. A slight obscurity arises from the inaccurate use of the same word in both cases, the real meaning being, οὐκ ἐλογίσθη κατὰ χάριν, ἀλλὰ ἐστὶ κατ' ὀφείλημα. The expression is a Hebraism; it occurs also in Ps. cvi. 31 (said of Phinehas, ἐλογίσθη αὐτῷ εἰς δικαιοσύνην), and elsewhere.

5. The case of Abraham is lost sight of in the case of mankind generally. As elsewhere, faith and works are diametrically opposed to each other. The Apostle does not mean to say that it is to him who partly or imperfectly works that faith is imputed. But he conceives the state of faith and of works as antithetical and mutually exclusive of each other. Comp. xi. 6.:—εἰ δὲ χάριτι, οὐκέτι ἐξ ἔργων, ἐπεὶ ἡ χάρις οὐκέτι γίνεται χάρις.

6—8. Similar to this is the language which David uses of

the blessedness of him to whom God imputes righteousness without works, of the forgiveness of sins, the covering of sins, the non-imputation of sins, Psalm xxxii. 1, 2. The similarity is not in the words, but in the thought; justification and forgiveness of sins being two different aspects of the same idea. This is the true harmony of the Old Testament and the New, consisting not in minute coincidences of words or events, but in communion of spirit; David and Isaiah saying at one time:—"Blessed is the man to whom the Lord will not impute sin;" and, "Though your sins were as scarlet, they shall be white as snow." And our Saviour and St. Paul at another time:—"Believe, and thy sins shall be forgiven thee;" and, "Being justified freely by his grace, through the redemption of Jesus Christ."

9. ὁ μακαρισμὸς,] not this blessedness, but this declaration of blessedness; this word blessed, is it applied to the circumcised only

5 reward not reckoned of grace, but of debt. But to  
 him that worketh not, but believeth on him that justifieth  
 the ungodly, his faith is counted for righteousness.  
 6 Even as David also describeth the blessedness of the  
 man, unto whom God imputeth righteousness without  
 7 works, saying, Blessed are they whose iniquities are  
 8 forgiven, and whose sins are covered; blessed is the  
 9 man to whom the Lord will not impute sin. This declaration  
 \* of blessing is it to the circumcision only that  
 it is spoken, or to the uncircumcision also? for we say  
 that faith was reckoned to Abraham for righteousness.  
 10 How was it then reckoned? when he was in circumcision,  
 or in uncircumcision? Not in circumcision, but in un-  
 11 circumcision. And he received the \* mark of circumci-  
 sion, a seal of the righteousness of the faith which he  
 had in his \* uncircumcision: that he might be the father

or to the uncircumcised also? cf. Gal. iv. 15. The Apostle "goes off upon a word," which he makes a stepping-stone to his former subject. He might have said, "All this applies to all mankind, Jew as well as Gentile." But he prefers to reason out his argument from the case of Abraham in the Old Testament. What more shall we say of this blessedness? does it belong to the uncircumcision or to the circumcision only? For, not to lose sight of our former instance, we assert that faith was reckoned to Abraham for righteousness. Let us ask the further question:—"How was it reckoned to him?" The answer is, not in circumcision, but uncircumcision.

The argument may seem slight to us; it was forcible to the Jew. The state which was odious and almost loathsome to him, was the

state in which the father of the faithful found favour of God. Abraham too was once uncircumcised.

11, 12. And circumcision came afterwards, as the effect not the cause, the seal not the instrument, of the faith which Abraham had had in a previous state. The object of this was that he might be the spiritual parent of all those who like him have faith, yet being uncircumcised, that the righteousness that was sealed in him might be counted to them. There was a further object, that he might link together in one circumcision and uncircumcision, and be a father of circumcision to those who walk in the footsteps of the faith, which he had in his prior state. *σημείον*, like *σφραγίς*, refers to the outward mark of circumcision, which is also a sign of the promise. *εἰς τὸ εἶναι . . . εἰς τὸ λογισμ.*, not in the



των τῶν πιστευόντων διὰ ἀκροβυστίας, εἰς τὸ λογι-  
σθῆναι αὐτοῖς<sup>1</sup> τὴν δικαιοσύνην, καὶ πατέρα περιτομῆς, τοῖς<sup>12</sup>  
οὐκ ἐκ περιτομῆς μόνον, ἀλλὰ καὶ τοῖς στοιχοῦσιν τοῖς  
ἴχνεσιν τῆς ἐν ἀκροβυστία<sup>2</sup> πίστεως τοῦ πατρὸς ἡμῶν  
Ἀβραάμ. οὐ γὰρ διὰ νόμον ἢ ἐπαγγελία τῷ Ἀβραάμ ἢ τῷ<sup>13</sup>  
σπέρματι αὐτοῦ, τὸ κληρονόμον αὐτὸν εἶναι κόσμου<sup>3</sup>, ἀλλὰ

<sup>1</sup> καὶ αὐτοῖς.<sup>2</sup> ἐν τῇ ἀκροβυστία.<sup>3</sup> τοῦ κοσμοῦ.

thoughts of Abraham, but in the purpose of God.

τὴν δικαιοσύνην is a resumption of σφραγιδα τῆς δικαιοσύνης at the commencement of the verse, as τῶν πιστευόντων διὰ ἀκροβυστίας, and τῆς ἐν ἀκροβυστία πίστεως in ver. 12. of the words τῆς πίστεως τῆς ἐν τῇ ἀκροβυστία, which precede. δι' ἀκροβυστίας is not materially different from ἐν ἀκροβυστία. The notion of the mean or instrument passes into that of the state or circumstance.

πατέρα περιτομῆς,] *i. e.* a father conveying the benefits of circumcision. Comp. the nearly parallel expressions, Eph. i. 17. : ὁ πατὴρ τῆς δόξης, 2 Cor. i. 3. : ὁ πατὴρ τῶν οἰκτιρμῶν, and the parallel thought in Rom. xv. 8, 9. : "Now I say that Jesus Christ was a minister of the circumcision for the truth of God, to confirm the promises made to the fathers; and that the Gentiles might glorify God for his mercy."

It is not quite clear whether the words ἀλλὰ καὶ τοῖς στοιχοῦσιν refer to believing Jews, or to believers in general, whether Jew or Gentile. If the first, they are a limitation on the preceding clause:—"A father of circumcision to those who are not only circumcised but believing, who, like Abraham, have the sign in the flesh, and also walk in the footsteps of the faith which he had when uncircum-

cised." This mode of taking the passage has the advantage of retaining the words τοῖς οὐκ in their natural order. A want of point, however, is felt in the clause "which he had when uncircumcised." For although the faith of Abraham might be generally regarded as a source of blessing equally to Jew or Gentile, "the faith which he had when uncircumcised" had no peculiar significance for the Jew. The τοῖς before στοιχοῦσιν is also against this way of explaining the clause. And, notwithstanding the inaccuracy of expression, the form of the first clause, τοῖς οὐκ ἐκ περιτομῆς μόνον, is so similar as to lead to the inference that it must have the same meaning with οὐ τῷ ἐκ τοῦ νόμου μόνον, in ver. 16.

It is simpler and better to refer ἀλλὰ καὶ τοῖς στοιχοῦσιν to the Gentiles. The meaning of the latter part of ver. 11, 12. will then be as follows:—That he might as he had faith himself be the father of those who had faith; and as he was circumcised himself, be a father conveying the benefits of circumcision to those who walk in the footsteps of the faith which he had when uncircumcised. Or, in other words, that he might be the father of the faithful, whether Jew or Gentile, and convey to them the privileges of Jews.

It does not follow that the



of all them that believe, though they be not circumcised,  
 12 that the\* righteousness might be imputed unto them<sup>1</sup>,  
 and the father of circumcision\* not to them who are of  
 the circumcision only, but to them also who walk in the  
 steps of that faith of our father Abraham, which he  
 13 had being yet uncircumcised. For the promise,  
 that he should be the heir of the world, was not  
 to Abraham, or to his seed, through the law, but

<sup>1</sup> Add also.

class represented in the first member of the division (τοῖς οὐκ ἐκ περιτομῆς μόνον) are excluded from the second; any more than in Gal. vi. 16., "As many as shall walk according to this rule, peace be on them, and mercy, and upon the Israel of God," it follows that the Israel of God can be distinguished from those mentioned in the first part of the sentence. The division of the Apostle is not logical, but spiritual; that is, it is a division, not of persons, but of the aspects under which they may be regarded. In the present passage the importance of the second clause has obscured the first. Comp. for a similar imperfect division the passage quoted above, Rom. xv. 8, 9., and below, ver. 16.

13. The Apostle had been arguing that Abraham received the gift of righteousness, not in circumcision, but in uncircumcision. He proceeds to generalise his previous statement. The words that follow, that it was not "through the law, that the promise was made to Abraham that he should be the heir of the world," we may regard either as the ground of what has preceded, or a deduction from it. That would be inconsistent with

the universality of the promise, and with the express words of Scripture, that "Abraham was justified by faith." The reason is partly gathered from what precedes, partly repeated in what follows; the purport of which is to show the diametrical opposition of faith and the law, in their nature and in their effects.

πατέρα τοῖς πιστεύουσι.] As in Apocal. xxi. 7.: ἔσομαι αὐτῷ θεός, τοῖς ἔχουσιν, dat. of place.

τὸ κληρονόμον αὐτὸν εἶναι τοῦ κόσμου.] The Apostle is alluding to Gen. xv. 7.: ἐγὼ ὁ Θεὸς ὁ ἐξαγαγὼν σε ἐκ χώρας Χαλδαιῶν ὥστε δοῦναι σοὶ τὴν γῆν ταύτην κληρονομήσαι. Compare also Gen. xvii. 5.: πατέρα πολλῶν ἐθνῶν τέθεικά σε; and xiii. 15.: ὅτι πᾶσαν τὴν γῆν ἦν σὺ ὀρέῃς σοὶ δώσω αὐτήν καὶ τῷ σπέρματί σου ἕως αἰῶνος. The Rabbis extended this promise to the whole earth. So Mechilta, upon Exodus, xiv. 31., quoted by Tholuck, "Our father Abraham possesses the world that now is, and that which is to come, not by inheritance, but by faith."—In this passage the Apostle has similarly enlarged it. The expression may be regarded either: (1.) as a hyperbole, as Jerusalem is said in the Psalms to be "the joy of the

διὰ δικαιοσύνης πίστεως. εἰ γὰρ οἱ ἐκ νόμου κληρονόμοι, 14  
 κεκένωται ἢ πίστις καὶ κατήρηται ἢ ἐπαγγελία· ὁ γὰρ 15  
 νόμος ὀργὴν κατεργάζεται. οὐ δὲ οὐκ<sup>1</sup> ἔστιν νόμος, οὐδὲ  
 παράβασις. διὰ τοῦτο ἐκ πίστεως, ἵνα κατὰ χάριν, εἰς τὸ 16  
 εἶναι βεβαίαν τὴν ἐπαγγελίαν παντὶ τῷ σπέρματι, οὐ τῷ ἐκ  
 τοῦ νόμου μόνον, ἀλλὰ καὶ τῷ ἐκ πίστεως Ἀβραάμ, ὅς ἐστιν

<sup>1</sup> οὐ γὰρ οὐκ.

whole earth," or as darkness is said to have "come over the whole earth" at the Crucifixion; or (2.) the promised land may be taken as the type of the world. On the one hand, it must not be forgotten, in the explanation of this and similar expressions, that the world did not present to the ancients the same distinct idea and conception as to ourselves; nor, on the other hand, that the thought of the promised land was inseparable to the true Israelite from the thought of a world to come. The words of the book of Genesis themselves might seem to the Apostle to promise more than had been or could be fulfilled in this world. He was fixing his mind on something higher than the occupation of the promised land by the Israelites. It was this which gave the promise to Abraham a new meaning.

14. εἰ γὰρ οἱ ἐκ νόμου κληρονόμοι, *for if they of the law be heirs.*] When it is said that Abraham is the heir of the world, is it his descendants under the law, who are to be regarded as heirs with him? That cannot be, as faith would then be no longer faith, and the promise no longer a promise. What may be termed the substratum of the Apostle's argument, is the mutually exclusive character of faith

and the law, separated as they were by time, belonging to two orders of ideas and opposed in their effects on the heart of man? In the third chapter of the Epistle to the Galatians, a similar opposition is drawn out between the promise, as a blessing, and the law, as a curse; and the promise is, in like manner, identified with the Gospel. The argument from time is again used, as showing the priority of faith.

15. For the law is the very opposite of grace and faith and the promise; it works wrath not mercy; it takes men away from God instead of drawing them to him; it makes transgressions where they were not before.

οὐ δὲ οὐκ ἔστιν νόμος, *and where there is no law.*] Comp. ver. 20. of the preceding chapter: "Therefore, by the deeds of the law shall no flesh be justified in his sight, for by the law is the knowledge of sin." So here:—"The law worketh wrath, and where there is no law there is no transgression."

οὐ δὲ οὐκ ἔστιν,] seems like a gloss at first sight. It is not really so, however, its apparent want of point only arising from the form of the sentence, which is more adversative than its meaning. Comp. Rom. xiii. 1. It may be paraphrased, "and makes transgressions."

14 through the righteousness of faith. For if they which  
 are of the law be heirs, faith is made void, and the  
 15 promise made of none effect: for\* the law worketh  
 wrath: and<sup>1</sup> where no law is, there is no transgression.  
 16 Therefore it is of faith, that it might be by grace; to  
 the end the promise might be sure to all the seed; not  
 to that only which is of the law, but to that also which  
 is of the faith of Abraham; who is the father of us all,

<sup>1</sup> For.

For a fuller explanation of these passages, the reader is referred to the Essay on the Strength of Sin is the Law. The real difficulty respecting them arises from the state without law being an imaginary one. We readily admit that, if anywhere there is no knowledge and no conscience, as in the case of a child, a savage, or a madman, there it is impossible there can be transgression. Of such we should say that they were not to be judged by our standard; that what to our moral notions was an offence was no offence to them; that in their case the laws of civilised countries did not apply. Our difficulty is to conceive the same absence of responsibility in rational beings. The truth is, that there is no absence of responsibility, except in that imaginary state of which the Apostle is speaking; a state without knowledge and without law, and, therefore, conceived of, as without evil and without crime. This the Apostle describes in the words — “Where there is no law there is no transgression;” or, “sin is not imputed where there is no law.” Only the law of which he is

speaking is not a mere external rule, but within and without at once, piercing “even to the dividing asunder of the soul and spirit.” Hence it works wrath, not merely in inflicting penalties for sin, but as itself the punishment of the poor human creature who falls under its influence.

16. Again the Apostle gathers up in a conclusion the links of his argument, not without allusion to his former statements in ver. 4. 11. 12.:—therefore, that is, because it was not and could not be of the law, the promise was of faith, that it might be according to grace, and stand firm to all his spiritual children, circumcised as well as uncircumcised; to all, that is, who have the faith of Abraham, who is the father, not of the Jew only, but of us all.

*ἐκ πίστεως.*] Either *ἡ κληρονομία* may be supplied from what precedes, or *ἡ ἐπαγγελία* from what follows, or, better still, the ambiguity may remain, as in E. V. *ἵνα* and *εἰς τὸ* waver in meaning between “result” and “object.” *κατὰ χάριν*: *εἴη* is omitted on account of the following *εἶναι παντὶ τῷ σπέρματι*, that is, to the children of the faith of Abra-



πατήρ πάντων ἡμῶν (καθὼς γέγραπται ὅτι πατέρα πολλῶν 17  
 ἔθνων τέθεικά σε) κατέναντι οὗ ἐπίστευσεν θεοῦ, τοῦ  
 ζωοποιούντος τοὺς νεκροὺς καὶ καλοῦντος τὰ μὴ ὄντα ὡς  
 ὄντα. ὃς παρ' ἐλπίδα ἐφ' ἐλπίδι ἐπίστευσεν, εἰς τὸ γενέσθαι 18  
 αὐτὸν πατέρα πολλῶν ἔθνων κατὰ τὸ εἰρημένον Οὕτως ἔσται  
 τὸ σπέρμα σου. καὶ μὴ ἀσθενήσας τῇ πίστει κατενόησεν<sup>1</sup> 19  
 τὸ ἑαυτοῦ σῶμα [ἤδη] νεκρωμένον, ἑκατονταέτης που  
 ὑπάρχων, καὶ τὴν νέκρωσιν τῆς μητέρας Σάρρας, εἰς δὲ τὴν 20  
 ἐπαγγελίαν τοῦ θεοῦ οὐ διεκρίθη τῇ ἀπιστίᾳ, ἀλλ' ἐνεδυνα-

<sup>1</sup> οὐ κατενόησε.

ham as well as to the children of circumcision, the whole seed spoken of in verse twelve (comp. Gal. iii. 16., where τῷ σπέρματι is applied not to believers, but to Christ). τῷ ἐκ πίστεως: either τῷ σπέρματι τοῦ Ἀβραάμ ἐκ πίστεως, or τῷ σπέρματι ἐκ πίστεως τοῦ Ἀβραάμ.

17. Even as the Scripture implies that Abraham was not the father of one nation only, but of many, Gen. xvii. 5. quoted literally from the LXX.

κατέναντι οὗ ἐπίστευσεν Θεοῦ, before God whom he believed.] κατέναντι has been sometimes taken in the sense of "like" God whom he believed, as though Abraham the father of the Jewish race, were to be regarded as the type of "the God and Father of us all." But such a parallel between the creature and the Creator is unlike the language of Scripture, and the word κατέναντι, in six other passages where it occurs, has always the meaning of "over against," "opposite to." It is the genuine reading in 2 Cor. ii. 17. (κατέναντι Θεοῦ), where it can only have the sense of "before," "in the presence of," which must therefore be its meaning in the present passage. Either we may suppose that a particular reference is intended

to the fact that these nations had as yet no existence but in the presence of God, who calleth "the things that are not as though they were;" or the expression may be merely designed to set forth the solemnity of the occasion and the reality of the promise, as the angels of children are said ever "to behold his face," Matt. xviii. 10.; or as in Eph. i. 4., the Church is said to be holy and blameless in his presence. As if to realise it, St. Paul transfers the scene of the promise to the presence of God.

οὗ ἐπίστευσεν.] Attraction commonly takes place only when the relative would otherwise be in the accusative case: here, and in other comparatively rare instances, for the dative.

τοῦ ζωοποιούντος τοὺς νεκρούς, who quickeneth the dead,] contains a threefold allusion, (1.) to the resurrection of Christ, cf. ver. 24.; (2.) to the quickening of Sarah's womb; (3.) to the new birth of the Gentiles.

καλοῦντος τὰ μὴ ὄντα ὡς ὄντα.] Not "God calls things that are not into being;" the expression is stronger—God calls things that are not, as though they were—indifferently things that are not, and things that are.

17 (as it is written, I have made thee a father of many nations,) before him whom he believed, even God, who quickeneth the dead, and calleth those things  
 18 which be not as though they were. Who against hope believed in hope, that he might become the father of many nations, according to that which was  
 19 spoken, So shall thy seed be. And not as one weak in faith<sup>1</sup> he considered his own body now dead when he was about an hundred years old, and the deadness of  
 20 Sarah's womb: he staggered not at the promise of God through unbelief; but was strong in faith, giving glory

<sup>1</sup> And being not weak in faith he considered not.

The words refer primarily to the creation, which is a figure of the admission of the Gentiles. The same God who called the world out of nothing, made Abraham the father of a spiritual Israel, when as yet there was none of them. Comp. 1 Cor. i. 28.:—*ἐξελέξατο ὁ θεὸς τὰ μὴ ὄντα, ἵνα τὰ ὄντα καταργήσῃ.*

18. *ὃς παρ' ἐλπίδα ἐφ' ἐλπίδι ἐπίστυσεν, who against hope believed in hope.*] Who believed in hope beyond or against hope, whose faith supplied hope when there was no hope. Abraham considered not the grounds of hope or of despair, but simply believed.

*εἰς τὸ γενέσθαι αὐτόν, that he might become.*] This was, strictly speaking, the result ("and the consequence was that he became"), but in the language of the New Testament it is described as the object. Comp. v. 16.

*οὕτως ἔσται.*] Compare Gen. xv. 4.: "And he brought him forth abroad and said, Look now toward heaven and tell the stars if thou be able to number them. And he said unto him, So shall thy seed be."

19. *καὶ μὴ ἀσθεν. τῇ πίστει κατεν.*

A. B. C.; *οὐ κατενόησεν, Δ. G. f. g.* The first reading has far greater manuscript authority; it is urged, however, that it is a correction taken from Gen. xvii. 7. It may be replied that the remembrance of this passage (*Ἀβραάμ εἶπεν ἐν τῇ διανοίᾳ αὐτοῦ, λέγων, Ἐἰ τῷ ἑκατονταετεί γενήσεται υἱός; καὶ εἰ ἡ Σάρρα ἐννεήκοντα ἐτῶν τέξεται;*) is as likely to have been in the Apostle's mind as in the corrector's. For the general meaning, compare Heb. xi. 12.: "Therefore sprang there even of one, and him as good as dead, so many as the stars of the sky in multitude, and as the sand which is by the sea shore innumerable."—And ver. 19.: "Accounting that God was able to raise him up, even from the dead; from whence also he received him in a figure." The strangeness of the birth of the Gentiles is parallel with the improbability of the birth of Isaac.

20. *εἰς δὲ τὴν ἐπαγγελίαν τοῦ θεοῦ, but at the promise of God.*] These words are best taken after *ἐνεδυναμώθη τῇ πίστει*, or rather after the one idea presented by the contrast of *οὐ διεκρίθη τῇ*



μῶθη τῇ πίστει, δούς δόξαν τῷ θεῷ καὶ πληροφορηθεὶς ὅτι ὁ 21  
 ἐπήγγελται δυνατός ἐστιν καὶ ποιῆσαι. διὸ [καὶ] ἐλογίσθη 22  
 αὐτῷ εἰς δικαιοσύνην. οὐκ ἐγράφη δὲ δι' αὐτὸν μόνον, ὅτι 23  
 ἐλογίσθη αὐτῷ, ἀλλὰ καὶ δι' ἡμᾶς, οἷς μέλλει λογίζεσθαι, 24  
 τοῖς πιστεύουσιν ἐπὶ τὸν ἐγείραντα Ἰησοῦν τὸν κύριον  
 ἡμῶν ἐκ νεκρῶν, ὃς παρεδόθη διὰ τὰ παραπτώματα ἡμῶν 25  
 καὶ ἠγέρθη διὰ τὴν δικαίωσιν ἡμῶν.

ἀπιστία, ἀλλ' ἐνεδυναμώθη τῇ πίστει.  
 δούς δόξαν τῷ θεῷ, *giving glory to God,*] as though the blessing were already received.

22. Therefore his faith was counted to him for righteousness. The stream of the Apostle's discourse ends as it began.

23. And this passage in the history of Abraham is intended to be a lesson for us, who, like him, are justified by faith. For the meaning compare 2 Peter i. 20.: *πᾶσα προφητεία γραφῆς ἰδίας ἐπιλύσεως οὐ γίνεται*: that is, all Scripture has a universal and spiritual meaning; and 1 Cor. ix. 9, 10.: "Doth God take care for oxen? Or saith he it altogether for our sakes?" Compare the Rabbinical Commentary Bereschit Rabba, quoted by Tholuck:—"What is written of Abraham, is written also of his children;" also the expression in Gal. iv. 24., *ἀτινά ἐστιν ἀλληγορούμενα*. St. Paul drew no distinction such as is familiar among ourselves, between the application of Scripture and its original meaning. To him its first and original meaning was the great truth of the Gospel.

24. *τοῖς πιστεύουσιν*, in the English version, "*if we believe*." Rather, who do believe, the believers in God who raised up Christ from the dead. The parable of Abraham "receiving Isaac from the dead in a figure," is slightly alluded to.

24. For the use of the word *παρεδόθη*, compare 1 Cor. xiii 3., Rom. viii. 30., Gal. ii. 20., Eph. v. 2.

A difficulty arises in reference to this verse, from the division of the clauses. There would be nothing to require explanation in such a form of expression as "Who died and rose again for our sins and our justification." But why "died for our sins and rose again for our justification?" May not our justification equally with our sins be regarded as the object or cause of Christ's death?

We might answer that St. Paul often employs an antithesis of words, where there is no antithesis of meaning. Compare, for example, Rom. x. 9, 10.:—"If thou shalt confess with thy mouth the Lord Jesus, and believe in thy heart that God raised him from the dead, thou shalt be saved. For with the heart it is believed unto righteousness, and with the mouth confession is made unto salvation." In this passage, were we to transpose the words righteousness and salvation, the meaning would be unaltered. There is no real opposition between them, any more than there appears to be here between "dying for our sins, and rising for our justification."

Yet there is a certain analogy on which the Apostle proceeds in the last-mentioned expression.



21 to God; and being fully persuaded that, what he has\*  
 22 promised, he is\* able also to perform. And therefore  
 23 it was imputed to him for righteousness. But it was  
 not written for his sake alone, that it was imputed to  
 24 him; but for us also, to whom it shall be imputed, who  
 believe on him that raised up Jesus our Lord from the  
 25 dead; who was delivered for our offences and was raised  
 again for our justification.

The Christian is one with his Lord, and his life, like that of Christ, falls asunder into two divisions, death and life, condemnation and justification. Comp. Rom. vi. 5, 6.:—"For if we have been planted in the likeness of his death, we shall be also in the likeness of his resurrection: knowing this, that our old man is crucified with him, that the body of sin might be done away." So in ver. 10, 11.:—"For in that he died, he died unto sin once: but in that he liveth, he liveth unto God. Likewise reckon ye also yourselves to be dead indeed unto sin, but alive unto God through Jesus Christ our Lord." A still nearer parallel is afforded by viii. 10.:—"But if Christ be in you, the body is dead because of sin; but the spirit is life because of righteousness. But if the spirit of him that raised up Christ from the dead dwell in you," etc. Comp. also a more subtle trace of the same thought, in Rom. viii. 34., where *κατακρίνων* is opposed to *ἐγερθεῖς*. It would not be in accordance with St. Paul's usual language to invert the order of these terms, or to say, "who died for our justification and rose again for our sins." Sin and death, justification and renewal or resurrection, whether

in the believer or Christ, are the parallel or cognate ideas.

Had the Apostle said, "Who by his death was one with us in our sins, by his resurrection one with us in our renewal," in such a mode of expression there would have been nothing contrary to his usual language. But, as has been already remarked, in describing the work of salvation, forms of thought are fluctuating, because they are inadequate; that which is sometimes the cause being equally, from another point of view, the effect, as in the present instance, the cause is not a cause, but a mode of expressing a more general connexion between two ideas. (See note on i. 4.) We should err in defining exactly that which is in its nature inexact; better to lose sight of the precise terms in the general meaning. It is a slight transition in the language of St. Paul from the form "who rose again for our justification," to the other form, "who was one with us in his resurrection." This slight change is the source of our difficulty.

25. *διὰ τὰ παραπτώματα ἡμῶν.*]  
 (1.) as he bore our sins, (2.) as he died by the hand of sinners, (3.) as he died to do away the law which was the strength of sin, and death its penalty.

## THE OLD TESTAMENT.

*Ἡνίκα δ' ἂν ἐπιστρέψῃ πρὸς κύριον, περιαιρεῖται τὸ κάλυμμα.*—2 Cor. iii. 16.

THUS we have reached another stage in the development of the great theme. The new commandment has become old; faith is taught in the Book of the Law. "Abraham had faith in God, and it was counted to him for righteousness." David spoke of the forgiveness of sins in the very spirit of the Gospel. The Old Testament is not dead, but alive again. It refers not to the past, but to the present. The truths which we daily feel, are written in its pages. There are the consciousness of sin and the sense of acceptance. There is the veiled remembrance of a former world, which is also the veiled image of a future one.

To us the Old and New Testaments are two books, or two parts of the same book, which fit into one another, and can never be separated or torn asunder. They are double one against the other, and the New Testament is the revelation of the Old. To the first believers it was otherwise: as yet there was no New Testament; nor is there any trace that the authors of the New Testament ever expected their own writings to be placed on a level with the Old. We can scarcely imagine what would have been the feeling of St. Paul, could he have foreseen that later ages would look not to the faith of Abraham in the law, but to the Epistle to the Romans, as the highest authority on the doctrine of justification by faith; or that they would have regarded the allegory of Hagar and Sarah, in the Epistle to the Galatians, as a difficulty to be resolved by the inspiration of the Apostle. Neither he who wrote, nor those to whom he wrote

could ever have thought, that words which were meant for a particular Church, were to give life also to all mankind; and that the Epistles in which they occurred were one day to be placed on a level with the Books of Moses themselves.

But if the writings of the New Testament were regarded by the contemporaries of the Apostle in a manner different from that of later ages, there was a difference, which it is far more difficult for us to appreciate, in their manner of reading the Old Testament. To them it was not half, but the whole, needing nothing to be added to it or to counteract it, but containing everything in itself. It seemed to come home to them; to be meant specially for their age; to be understood by them, as its words had never been understood before. "Did not their hearts burn within them?" as the Apostles expounded to them the Psalms and Prophets. The manner of this exposition was that of the age in which they lived. They brought to the understanding of it, not a knowledge of the volume of the New Testament, but the mind of Christ. Sometimes they found the lesson which they sought in the plain language of Scripture; at other times, coming round to the same lesson by the paths of allegory, or seeming even in the sound of a word to catch an echo of the Redeemer's name. Various as are the writings of the Old Testament, composed by such numerous authors, at so many different times, so diverse in style and subject, in them all they read only—the truth of Christ. They read without distinctions of moral and ceremonial, type and antitype, history and prophecy, without inquiries into the original meaning or connexion of passages, without theories of the relation of the Old and New Testaments. Whatever contrast existed was of another kind, not of the parts of a book, but of the law and faith; of the earlier and later dispensations. The words of the book were all equally for their instruction; the whole volume lighted up with new meaning.

What was then joined cannot now be divided or put asunder. The New Testament will never be unclothed of the Old. No one in later ages can place himself in the position of the heathen convert who learnt the name of Christ first, afterwards the law and the



prophets. Such instances were probably rare even in the first days of the Christian Church. No one can easily imagine the manner in which St. Paul himself sets the Law over against the Gospel, and at the same time translates one into the language of the other. Time has closed up the rent which the law made in the heart of man; and the superficial resemblances on which the Apostle sometimes dwells, have not the same force to us which they had to his contemporaries. But a real unity remains to ourselves as well as to the Apostle, the unity not of the letter, but of the spirit, like the unity of life or of a human soul, which lasts on amid the changes of our being. The Old Testament and the New do not dovetail into one another like the parts of an indenture; it is a higher figure than this, which is needed to describe the continuity of the Divine work. Or rather, the simple fact is above all figures, and can receive no addition from philosophical notions of design, or the observation of minute coincidences. What we term the Old and New dispensation is the increasing revelation of God, amid the accidents of human history: first, in Himself; secondly, in His Son, gathering not one nation only, but all mankind into His family. It is the vision of God Himself, true and just, and remembering mercy in one age of the world; not ceasing to be true and just, but softening also into human gentleness, and love, and forgiveness, and making his dwelling in the human heart in another. The wind, and the earthquake, and the fire pass by first, and after that "the still small voice." This is the great fulfilment of the Law and the Prophets in the Gospel. No other religion has anything like it. And the use of language, and systems of theology, and the necessity of "giving ideas through something," and the prayers and thoughts of eighteen hundred years, have formed another connexion between the Old and New Testament, more accidental and outward, and also more intricate and complex, which is incapable of being accurately drawn out, and ought not to be imposed as an article of faith; which yet seems to many to supply a want in human nature, and gives expression to feelings which would otherwise be unuttered.

It is not natural, nor perhaps possible, to us to cease to use the figures in which "holy men of old" spoke of that which belonged to their peace. But it is well that we should sometimes remind ourselves, that "all these things are a shadow, but the body is of Christ." Framed as our minds are, we are ever tending to confuse that which is accidental with that which is essential, to substitute the language of imagery for the severity of our moral ideas, to entangle Divine truths in the state of society in which they came into the world or in the ways of thought of a particular age. "All these things are a shadow;" that is to say, not only the temple and tabernacle, and the victim laid on the altar, and the atonement offered once a year for the sins of the nation; but the conceptions which later ages express by these words, so far as anything human or outward or figurative mingles with them, so far as they cloud the Divine nature with human passions, so far as they imply, or seem to imply, anything at variance with our notions of truth and right, are as much, or even more a shadow than that outward image which belonged to the elder dispensation. The same Lord who compared the scribe instructed in the kingdom of heaven to a householder who brought forth out of his treasure things new and old, said also in a figure, that "new cloth must not be put on an old garment" or "new wine into old bottles."

## CHAP. V.

EVERY pause in the Epistle may be made the occasion for taking a glance backward, and surveying the whole. In the construction of the work we observe that the same threads again and again reappear, tangling the web of discourse, and are never finished and worked off. Thus the commencement of the fifth chapter is but the anticipation of the eighth : —

Therefore being justified by faith, we have peace with God through our Lord Jesus Christ.

There is therefore now no condemnation to them which are in Christ Jesus.

Compare again the following : —

(1.) ch. iii. 1. What advantage then hath the Jew ?

9. What then are we better than they ?

27. Where then is boasting ?

iv. 1. What shall we say then that Abraham hath found, our progenitor according to the flesh ?

(2.) ch. vi. 1. What shall we say then ? are we to continue in sin that grace may abound ?

15. What then shall we sin, because we are not under the law, but under grace ?

vii. 7. What shall we say then ? is the law sin.

(3.) Also the first verse of ch. ix., x., xi.

ix. 1. I say the truth in Christ in that I have great sorrow for Israel.

x. 1. Brethren, my heart's desire and prayer to God for Israel is, that they might be saved.

xi. 1. I say then, hath God cast aside his people ?

where the Apostle thrice returns to the same point in his argument, and begins again with the same theme.



Similarities of form and repetitions of thought may also be noted in successive verses.

Compare : —

v. 8—10. : “But God commended his love to us in that, while we were yet sinners, Christ died for the ungodly. Much more then, being now justified by his blood, we shall be saved from wrath through him. For if, when we were enemies, we were reconciled to God by the death of his Son ; much more, being reconciled, we shall be saved by his life.” These words are followed by the favourite “not only so,” which has already occurred at the beginning of ver. 3.

Compare also verses 15., 17, 18, 19., and i. 24., 26., 28. ; vii. 15., 19. ; 17., 22. ; as instances of a structure in which the same ideas are repeated rather than developed, and in some of which the form of the first sentence prescribes the form of the second.

Many slight inaccuracies appear on the surface when we look at the Epistle to the Romans through a microscope. It will be often found that the successive clauses are not logically connected, or that qualifications are introduced which are not duly subordinated to the principal thought ; or the latter end of a sentence may seem to forget the beginning of it, or for an instant the Apostle may hesitate between two alternatives. But flaws of this kind disappear when we remove to a little distance ; the irregularity of the details is lost in the general effect. It might be said of the Apostle in his own language that he is not speaking with “the persuasive words of man’s wisdom, but with demonstration of the spirit and with power.” It does not impair the force of what he says that he repeats a word, or that he uses a particle where it is not needed, or that he has so framed a particular clause that its bearing on the next clause is doubtful. It does not interfere with the unity of his writings that they have not the symmetrical character of a modern composition. We often speak of his style ; according to modern notions he can hardly be said to have a style. He uses the rhetorical forms of his age because

he cannot help doing so : they are his only way of expressing himself. He is not free to mould language with the hand of a master. Yet, in general, his meaning is perfectly clear. If, following Locke's rule, we read the Epistle through at a single sitting, the broken thoughts come together, and a new kind of unity begins to arise ; the unity not of a whole with many parts aptly disposed, but of a single idea, appearing and reappearing everywhere. The stream is one, though parting into two branches — the universality of salvation, and the doctrine of righteousness by faith. To the end of the eleventh chapter there is nothing irrelevant, nothing that does not bear on one or other of these two aspects of the great truth. Imagine the writer full of these two thoughts, yet incapable of mastering the language in which he wrote, incumbered with formulas and modes of speech ; eager to declare the whole counsel of God, yet conscious of the way in which men might wrest it to their own destruction ; seeking “to entwine the new with the old, and to make the old ever new ;” and you would expect a composition similar in texture to the Epistle to the Romans.

The Epistle is full of repetitions, yet the repetitions carry us onward. The revelation of righteousness by faith is first made in the seventeenth verse of the first chapter. Then, after the necessity for it has been shown from the self-condemnation of the world, it is repeated at the twenty-first verse of the third chapter. Here it might seem as if the Apostle's task was over. But another link has yet to be wrought into the chain. Is it the Apostle only who is saying these things ? Saith not the law also ? Yes ; the doctrine of justification and forgiveness of sins is contained in the book of the law. Abraham as well as ourselves was justified by faith, and not by works. Then the Apostle states his doctrine once more in the form of a conclusion to an argument, and proceeds to display it as embodied in the type and antitype, the first and second Adam. Still he has to guard against inferences that might be deduced from it, such as the antinomianism at which he had before hinted, “Let us continue in sin that grace may abound, let us do evil that good may

come." Then he returns to the same note which he had struck before, the confirmation of his doctrine from the book of the law. Lastly, he fights the battle over again; not now in the world at large, but in the narrower sphere of the individual soul; he describes the last state of paralysis and death, until at length the agony is at its height and the victory is won; and, having now turned to view the scheme of redemption in every aspect—in reference to the former state of the world, divided between Jew and Gentile, in reference to the patriarchs, in reference to human nature itself, in reference to possible consequences as well as the inward experience of the soul,—he repeats the conclusion which in chap. v. had been already anticipated, chanting, as it were, the hymn of peace after victory, "There is, therefore, now no condemnation to them which are in Christ Jesus."



Δικαιωθέντες οὖν ἐκ πίστεως εἰρήνην ἔχομεν πρὸς τὸν θεὸν 5  
 διὰ τοῦ κυρίου ἡμῶν Ἰησοῦ χριστοῦ, δι' οὗ καὶ τὴν προσα- 2  
 γωγὴν ἐσχήκαμεν [τῇ πίστει] εἰς τὴν χάριν ταύτην ἐν ᾗ  
 ἐστήκαμεν, καὶ καυχώμεθα ἐπ' ἐλπίδι τῆς δόξης τοῦ θεοῦ.  
 οὐ μόνον δέ, ἀλλὰ καὶ καυχώμεθα ἐν ταῖς θλίψεσιν, εἰδότες 3

V. 1. Δικαιωθέντες οὖν ἐκ πίστεως, *Therefore, being justified by faith.*] Therefore, *i. e.*, as an inference from what has been said of the sinfulness of Jew and Gentile, of the revelation of Christ, of the witness of Abraham, and the Old Testament.

εἰρήνην ἔχομεν,] B. G. *we have peace*; ἔχωμεν, *let us have peace*, A. C. Δ. *f. g. v.* Neither the MS. nor the sense offers a sufficient criterion to enable us to decide between the two. We may say with equal propriety, "Therefore being justified by faith we have peace with God," as though peace were already involved in justification (compare chap. viii. 1.): or peace may be regarded as a further stage in the consciousness of what God has done for us. "Therefore being justified, let us go on to be at peace." εἰρήνην, peace after strife, the opposite of the state described in Romans, vii. 7—25., πρὸς τὸν θεόν, with God. So in classical Greek, εἰρήνην ἄγειν, ποιῆσθαι πρὸς τινα, Plat. Rep. 465. B.; Alcib. I. 107. D.

προσαγωγή.] Cf. 1 Peter, iii. 18.: ἵνα ἡμᾶς προσαγάγῃ τῷ θεῷ, not with any idea of admission at a court. ἐσχήκαμεν, not we have, but we have had. ἐστήκαμεν, in which we stand, *i. e.* not merely in which we are, but in which we stand fast, as in Rom. xi. 20., and commonly in the Epistles to describe the perseverance of the believer.

2—13. In the verses that follow, the truth of justification by faith is brought home to the feelings of the individual believer. It is the source of all that varied experience of joy and sorrow, hope and love, which each one is conscious of, which arises out of the thought that Christ died for us in our weak estate, which is accompanied by a yet stronger assurance, that He who has begun the good work in us will continue it unto the end. At ver. 13. the external and universal aspect of the work of redemption is resumed, and displayed, as it were, on the theatre of the world in the persons of the first and second Adam.

2. δι' οὗ καὶ τὴν προσαγωγήν ἐσχήκαμεν, *by whom also we have had the access.*] This clause may be explained in two ways:—(1.) by connecting τὴν προσαγωγήν and εἰς τὴν χάριν ταύτην, "by whom we have (or rather have had) access [by faith] unto this grace wherein we stand," as in the English version; or (2.) the word προσαγωγή, as in Ephesians iii. 12., may be taken absolutely and explained by προσαγωγήν πρὸς τὸν πατέρα, which occurs in ii. 18. of the same Epistle:—"Through whom we have had the access by faith," the words εἰς τὴν χάριν ταύτην ἐν ᾗ ἐστήκαμεν being regarded as the result or effect of what has preceded, (so as to at-

5 Therefore being justified by faith, we have peace with  
 2 God through our Lord Jesus Christ: by whom also we  
 have had the \* access by faith into this grace wherein  
 3 we stand, and rejoice in hope of the glory of God. And  
 not only so, but we rejoice\* in tribulations also: know-

tain) unto this grace wherein we stand.

καὶ καυχώμεθα, and rejoice,] or glory, not "of work," iv. 2., nor in ourselves, but in God. Compare 2 Cor. xi. 30., xii. 1. These words may be connected either with ἔχομεν or with δι' οὗ ἐσχήκαμεν, or better with ἐν ᾗ ἐστήκαμεν.

ἐπ' ἐλπίδι τῆς δόξης τοῦ Θεοῦ, in hope of the glory of God.] Compare iii. 23.: ὑπεροῦνται τῆς δόξης τοῦ Θεοῦ, and Romans vii. 19.:—"For the earnest expectation of the creature waiteth for the manifestation of the sons of God;" and ver. 24., "For we are saved by hope, but hope that is seen is not hope." Δόξα τοῦ Θεοῦ is the fuller revelation of God, exceeding not merely the glory of the old covenant, but the present manifestation of the Gospel. Compare 2 Cor. iii. 8.:—πῶς οὐχὶ μᾶλλον ἢ διακονία τοῦ πνεύματος ἔσται ἐν δόξῃ.

3. And not only so, but the element of sorrow which is in this present life cannot countervail our joy. καυχώμεθα ἐν, we rejoice not "among," but "in," as in Gal. vi. 14., answering to ἐπ' ἐλπίδι.

In the life of Christ, as well as of his followers, is traceable the double character of sorrow and joy, humiliation and exaltation, not divided from each other by time, but existing together, and

drawn out alternately by the external circumstances of their lives. Christ himself said, "I, if I be lifted up from the earth, shall draw all men after me." And just before he suffered, "The hour is come that the Son of man should be glorified." So he told his disciples, Matt. v. 12.: "In the day of persecution rejoice and be exceeding glad." And St. Paul, at the commencement of the second Epistle to the Corinthians, speaks as if sorrow brought its own joy and consolation with it; you can hardly tell whether he is sorrowful or joyful, so quickly is his sorrow turned into joy. There is the same mixed feeling of triumph in affliction in the remarkable words, 1 Cor. iv. 9.: "I think that God hath set forth us the apostles last, as if we were appointed unto death: for we are made a spectacle to the world, to angels, and to men." And even where external afflictions are wanting, the mere consciousness of this "present evil world," "the whole creation groaning together until now," the remembrance of having once felt the sentence of death in himself, will make the believer rejoice with trembling for what he feels within or witnesses in others. Compare the aphorism of Lord Bacon, "Prosperity is the blessing of the Old Testament, adversity of the New."

ὅτι ἡ θλίψις ὑπομονὴν κατεργάζεται, ἡ δὲ ὑπομονὴ δοκιμὴν, 4  
 ἡ δὲ δοκιμὴ ἐλπίδα· ἡ δὲ ἐλπίς οὐ καταισχύνει, ὅτι ἡ ἀγάπη 5  
 τοῦ θεοῦ ἐκκέχυται ἐν ταῖς καρδίαις ἡμῶν διὰ πνεύματος  
 ἁγίου τοῦ δοθέντος ἡμῖν. ἔτι γὰρ χριστὸς ὄντων ἡμῶν ἀσθε- 6  
 νῶν ἔτι<sup>1</sup> κατὰ καιρὸν ὑπὲρ ἀσεβῶν ἀπέθανεν (μόλις γὰρ ὑπὲρ 7  
 δικαίου τις ἀποθανεῖται ὑπὲρ γὰρ τοῦ ἀγαθοῦ τάχα τις

<sup>1</sup> Om. ἔτι.

4. The circle of Christian graces comes round at last, from hope, through the chastening of sorrow, to hope again.

Tribulation, patience, experience, hope never failing because it is absorbed in love, are the grades and stages of Christian life. Or, in other words, we suffer and are patient, and this very patience assures us of our faith, and this assurance changes the attitude of our mind from patience to hope.

δοκιμή,] passively for provedness, confidence in self after trial. Comp. 2 Cor. ii. 9.: ἵνα γινῶ τὴν δοκιμὴν ὑμῶν; and James i. 3., where the same words are used in a different order: τὸ δοκίμιον ὑμῶν τῆς πίστεως κατεργάζεται ὑπομονήν.

For a "golden chain" of the same kind, compare the following quotation from Schœttgen, i. 511. "R. Pinchas filius Jair dixit, 'Alacritas nos perducit ad innocentiam, innocentia ad pietatem, pietas ad Spiritum Sanctum, Spiritus Sanctus ad resurrectionem mortuorum, resurrectio mortuorum ad Eliam prophetam.'"

5. οὐ καταισχύνει,] literally, "does not put to the blush," a Hebraism for "fail." Compare Wis. ii. 10. and Ps. cxix. 116.: μὴ καταισχύνης με ἀπὸ τῆς προσδοκίας μου.

ὅτι ἡ ἀγάπη.] These words follow καταισχύνει. Hope never

faileth, because it has so strong and ever diffused a motive in love. Compare 1 John, ii. 5., 1 Cor. xiii. 8.: "ἡ ἀγάπη οὐδέποτε πίπτει." ἡ ἀγάπη τοῦ θεοῦ may either mean the love of God towards us, or our love towards God; or rather both "because we love him, and he loves us." Compare Essay on the Abstract Ideas of Scripture.

It may be asked, why should hope never fail, because the love of God is diffused in our hearts, any more than because the righteousness of God, or the belief in God, is shed abroad in us? The only answer to this question is that love expressed the feeling of the Apostle at the time; because dwelling on the love of God, which showed itself in the death of Christ (v. 8.), he found a never failing support. It may be truly said, in the interpretation of the New Testament, that those "who ask a reason for all things destroy reason." The same association of love and the Spirit occurs, though in a different order, in 1 John, iv. 12, 13.: "If we love one another, God dwelleth in us, and his love is perfected in us. Hereby know we that we dwell in him, and he in us, because he hath given us of his Spirit."

6. There is great variation of



4 ing that tribulation worketh patience; and patience,  
 5 experience; and experience, hope: and hope maketh  
 not ashamed; because the love of God is shed abroad in  
 our hearts by the Holy Ghost which is given unto us.  
 6 For when we were yet without strength, yet<sup>1</sup> in due  
 7 time Christ died for the ungodly. For scarcely for a  
 righteous man will one die: yet peradventure for the\*

<sup>1</sup> Omit yet.

reading in the first word of this verse. All the principal MSS. and versions agree in the second *ἔτι*, which is omitted in the Textus Receptus: while the first is supported by A. C. D; *εἰ γὰρ*, v.; *εἰς τὴν γὰρ*, G. f. g. v. Iren. 207.; *εἰ γε*, B. It may be argued that the occurrence of the second *ἔτι* is against the genuineness of the first, or, on the other hand, that it has been the cause of the other corrections.

It is not improbable that *εἰ γὰρ*, *εἰ γε*, or *εἰ δὲ* may be the true reading, which, as in c. ii. 17., may have been altered to avoid the anacoluthon, the real apodosis being v. 9., as the apodosis of v. 12. is v. 19. The word *ἔτι* can hardly have been repeated twice in the same clause.

*ἔτι γὰρ χριστός.*] Compare 1 John, iv. 10.: "Herein is love, not that we loved God, but that he loved us."

*γὰρ.*] For this is the proof of the love of God; or this is the reason why we should love God.

*ὄντων ἡμῶν ἀσθενῶν ἔτι*, when we were yet without strength.] The point of these words is, not that while we were yet sinners Christ died for us, but rather that the love of God, like that of a parent to a child, was called forth by our helplessness.

*κατὰ καιρὸν*, in due time.] The time of Christ's coming into the world is everywhere spoken of as "the appointed time." It is the fulness of time, the meeting point of the ends of the world.

7. This verse has been taken in four ways:—

- (1.) Christ died for the ungodly: this was a great instance of love; for hardly for a just man will one die; yet peradventure, for that exalted character, the good man, some one may even dare to die; or,
- (2.) Yet, peradventure, for the beneficent man, some would even dare to die; or,
- (3.) Yet, peradventure, for the good in the abstract, some would even dare to die.

The distinctions between *δικαιος* and *ἀγαθός*, which are required by the first two modes of explanation, are really assumed to avoid the difficulty of the passage. It is singular that the word *ἀγαθός* used of a person occurs nowhere else in the writings of St. Paul. To the third explanation there are many objections: (1.) the Apostle could hardly have used *δικαίου* of a person, and *τοῦ ἀγαθοῦ* of a thing; (2.) it is doubtful whether the neuter *τὸ ἀγαθόν* would have been used in the sense of moral

καὶ τολμᾶ ἀποθανεῖν)· συνίστησι δὲ τὴν ἑαυτοῦ ἀγάπην 8  
 εἰς ἡμᾶς ὁ θεός, ὅτι ἔτι ἀμαρτωλῶν ὄντων ἡμῶν χριστὸς 9  
 ὑπὲρ ἡμῶν ἀπέθανεν· πολλῶ οὖν μᾶλλον δικαιοθέντες νῦν  
 ἐν τῷ αἵματι αὐτοῦ σωθησόμεθα δι' αὐτοῦ ἀπὸ τῆς ὀργῆς.  
 εἰ γὰρ ἐχθροὶ ὄντες κατηλλάγημεν τῷ θεῷ διὰ τοῦ θανάτου 10  
 τοῦ υἱοῦ αὐτοῦ, πολλῶ μᾶλλον καταλλαγέντες σωθησόμεθα  
 ἐν τῇ ζωῇ αὐτοῦ, οὐ μόνον δέ, ἀλλὰ καὶ καυχώμενοι ἐν τῷ 11

good; (3.) the notion of dying for an abstract idea is entirely unlike the language of the New Testament, or of the age in which the New Testament was written, nor does it give the opposition which the Apostle requires.

(4.) The remaining explanation of *δικαίου* and *τοῦ ἀγαθοῦ* makes them synonymous. The Apostle corrects his former expression, — “For Christ died, when we had no power to help ourselves, for the ungodly.” But this is unlike what men do for one another; for hardly will one die for a righteous man. Admitting that this statement requires correction (which the word *μόλις* already seems to imply), say, that for the good man some one may even dare to die, still the case is different, for it was while we were yet sinners that Christ died for us. It is not necessary to suppose any opposition between *δικαίου* and *τοῦ ἀγαθοῦ*; the clause *ὑπὲρ τοῦ ἀγαθοῦ* may be regarded, not as subordinate to the previous clause, but as parallel with it, and dependent on the preceding verse. The use of a different word, though without a distinction in meaning, may arise either from a slight sense of the awkwardness of retracting what had just gone before, or from the wish to avoid tautology. Com-

pare John xvi. 21.: *ἡ γυνὴ ὅταν τίκτη, λύπην ἔχει, ὅταν δὲ γεννήσῃ τὸ παιδίον οὐκ ἔτι μνημονεύει τῆς θλίψεως*, for a similar repetition, and for the thought, Rom. ix. 3., where the Apostle offers himself to be accursed from Christ for his brethren's sake.

8. But the case is otherwise with the love of God to man; while we were yet sinners Christ died for us.

A singular various reading occurs in ver. 8, 9.; *ὅτι εἰ ἔτι*, in ver. 8. G. f. Cyp. Hil., with which is connected the omission of *οὖν*, in v. 9 Δ. G. f. g. v. Iren. Cyp. Hil. The present *συνίστησι* and the sense would be much against this reading even were the weight of MS. authority in its favour.

9. If God took the first step, much more will he complete the good work in us. We could hardly have expected that Christ would have died for us; but now that he has died we may feel assured that he will save us from the future penalty. The Apostle is not distinguishing between justification and sanctification; but passing onward in thought from this world to the next. He is expressing the natural feeling of the believer, which admits of no separation between the present consciousness of the grace of

8 good man some would even dare to die. But God \*  
 establishes his love toward us, in that, while we were  
 9 yet sinners, Christ died for us. Much more then, being  
 now justified by his blood, we shall be saved from wrath  
 10 through him. For if, when we were enemies, we were  
 reconciled to God by the death of his Son, much more,  
 11 being reconciled, we shall be saved by his life. And not

God and the assurance of final salvation.

ἐν τῷ αἵματι,] not by the sprinkling of his blood, nor by his death, but by the shedding of his blood.

ἀπὸ τῆς ὀργῆς.] Cf. 1 Thess. i. 10.: τὸν ρυόμενον ἡμᾶς ἀπὸ τῆς ὀργῆς τῆς ἐρχομένης: the punishment in the world to come—ὀργή, (1.) the wrath of God; (2.) its effect; that is, the punishment which it inflicts (as in Rom. iii. 8.).

8—11. Here is another and another instance of the Apostle's tendency to reduplication of his thoughts. The 10th verse is a repetition of the 9th, the 8th of the 6th, the 11th is a composition of the 2nd and the 10th.

10. "We are reconciled to God" (here and 2 Cor. v. 20.), or (2 Cor. v. 18.) "God reconciling us to himself through Jesus Christ," or "God in Christ reconciling the world to himself" (2 Cor. v. 19.), are the modes of expression in Scripture used to describe the work of redemption. God is unchangeable; it is we who are reconciled to Him, not He to us. (Compare the use of καταλλάσσεισθαι, applied to the woman who is reconciled to her husband in 1 Cor. vii. 11.) But, on the other hand, the first spring and motive of redemption comes not from ourselves but from Him.

Much stress, it is true, cannot be laid on the precise use of language; for the Apostle might have spoken in a figure of God being angry with us and of us as hated by Him. And this may seem to be implied in the word ἐχθρὸς in the present passage. But the comparison of Coloss. i. 21.: ἀπηλλοτριωμένους καὶ ἐχθρὸς τῇ διανοίᾳ . . . παραστήσαι, shows that ἐχθρὸς may have an active, as well as passive meaning.

διὰ τοῦ θανάτου . . . ἐν τῇ ζωῇ.] Here, again, as at iv. 24., the state of the Christian parts asunder into two heads, corresponding to the death and life of Christ. There it was said, "He died for our sins and rose again for our justification." Here the partition of Christian life is somewhat different, "We were reconciled by his death and shall be saved by his life." It is unnecessary to suppose that the Apostle meant further to say, "If he was mighty in his death much more will he be so in his life."

11. οὐ μόνον δέ, ἀλλὰ καὶ καυχώμενοι, and not only so, but we also joy.] One way of taking these words is to supply ἐσμέν: or καυχώμενοι may be regarded as a more advanced stage of καταλλαγέντες, "we shall be saved, not only reconciled but rejoicing." These explanations save the grammar at the expense of the sense.



θεῶ δια τοῦ κυρίου ἡμῶν Ἰησοῦ χριστοῦ, δι' οὗ νῦν τὴν καταλλαγὴν ἐλάβομεν.

Διὰ τοῦτο ὡσπερ δι' ἐνὸς ἀνθρώπου ἡ ἁμαρτία εἰς τὸν 12

For the Apostle's meaning is, "not only shall we be saved, but we shall rejoice in our salvation." An exactly similar failure of construction occurs in 2 Cor. viii. 18, 19.: — *συνεπέψαμεν δὲ μετ' αὐτοῦ τὸν ἀδελφόν, οὗ ὁ ἔπαινος ἐν τῷ εὐαγγελίῳ διὰ πασῶν τῶν ἐκκλησιῶν οὐ μόνον δέ, ἀλλὰ καὶ χειροτονηθεὶς ὑπὸ τῶν ἐκκλησιῶν συνέκδημος ἡμῶν, where no verb follows. Compare also 2 Cor. v. 12.; in neither place can the preceding verb be appropriately repeated.*

For the thought comp. ver. 3., of which it is an echo, *οὐ μόνον δέ, ἀλλὰ καὶ καυχώμεθα ἐν τοῖς θλίψεσιν. τὴν καταλλαγὴν, referring to καταλλαγέντες, in ver. 11. νῦν, opposed to the future σωθησόμεθα.*

12—21. As a preface to the following passage, every verse and almost every particle of which bears the traces of theological warfare in the pages of commentators, it will be convenient to state very briefly the chief points in dispute in the Pelagian controversy. Other controversies, it may be truly said, pass away with the age that gave birth to them. This, as involving the first question of the relation of God to man, must in some form or other last as long as the world itself.

The hinge of the Pelagian controversy is the free agency of man. Is human nature, of itself, capable of refusing evil and choosing good? Can the will, by its unaided power, accept and appropriate the work of salvation? Re-

specting what God and Christ have done for man, there is, between Pelagian and Augustinian, Protestant and Catholic, no difference of opinion. The question is, at what point man himself is to be introduced as a party: whether, in the chain let down from heaven to earth, he is a separate link, or whether, to continue the same figure, he is not a link in the chain at all, but a weight attached to it, ever sinking towards his native element.

Pelagius would have said that man was free, independent, isolated, needing nothing for his salvation but his own free will and better mind, requiring neither grace preventive nor grace co-operative, but relying on himself for acceptance with God, according to the terms of the Gospel.

The Calvinist, on the other hand, consistently denies the free agency of man. Grace is with him the beginning, middle, and end of the work of salvation. Man is as far as possible gone from original righteousness, without power even to lay hold on the gift of God.

Two modifications of these views may be further mentioned:—(1.) The view according to which human nature is not regarded as absolutely and necessarily evil; but yet, even in the state of childhood and innocency, as guilty before God because of the sin of Adam, which is imputed to it. This imputation of the sin of Adam, the Protestant

only so, but we also joy in God through our Lord Jesus Christ, by whom we have now received the reconciliation.\*

12 Wherefore, as by one man sin entered into the world,

theologian considers as done away by the imputation of the merits of Christ, which are apprehended and appropriated by faith, while, according to Catholic theologians, it is purged away, with the other consequences of original sin, by the waters of baptism.

(2.) Another view, while agreeing with the former in maintaining the partial corruption of human nature, denies the doctrine of imputation. Human nature is sinful: this we know as a fact, nor can we imagine how it could be otherwise. But the fact which we feel to be deep-seated within us we have no sufficient reason to connect with any single act of an individual man.

It is between these two last-mentioned views of doctrine that the interpretations of this portion of the Epistle to the Romans chiefly oscillate; the main point of difference being whether the sin and the righteousness spoken of as flowing from the person of Adam and of Christ, are to be regarded as imputed or inherent. When the Apostle said—"Death came upon all men for that all sinned," did he mean sinned in Adam or sinned in themselves? When he spoke of those "who did not sin after the similitude of Adam's transgression," does he mean who did not, like Adam, violate an express command, or who were unlike Adam, in not committing actual sin?

Prior to the inquiry, which of these two modes of interpretation is the true one, is another, "Were

either of them in the Apostle's mind?" Did he not conceive the subject in a more general way, in which the distinctions of Calvinist and Arminian, Pelagian and Catholic, were not yet drawn out? The threads of later controversy are too fine for the Apostolical age; they belong to another stage of human thought and culture. To entangle ourselves with them in the interpretation of Scripture can never help us to enter into the true meaning of the Apostle, the living elements of whose thoughts can only be traced in the writings of himself and his contemporaries.

12. *Διὰ τοῦτο.*] The principal meaning of this latter portion of the chapter may be summed up in the words of 1 Cor. xv. 22., "As in Adam all die, even so in Christ shall all be made alive." The latter clause, however, is not regularly expressed. After the words, "As by one man sin entered into the world," we expect that there will follow, "even so by one man righteousness entered into the world." Instead, however, of this regular parallelism between Adam and Christ, the Apostle, in the 13th verse, turns aside to answer a difficulty arising from his previous statement, that "where there is no law there is no transgression;" and, while stopping to meet the supposed inconsistency, loses sight of the construction required by the preceding sentence.

Various expedients have been proposed for completing the con-

κόσμον εἰσῆλθεν, καὶ διὰ τῆς ἁμαρτίας ὁ θάνατος, καὶ οὕτως εἰς πάντας ἀνθρώπους ὁ θάνατος διῆλθεν, ἐφ' ᾧ πάντες ἥμαρτον — ἄχρι γὰρ νόμου ἁμαρτία ἦν ἐν κόσμῳ, 13

struction:—First, The device of a parenthesis extending from ver. 13. to ver. 18.: the last expedient which should be resorted to in a writer so irregular in his syntax as the Apostle. Secondly, The missing apodosis has been sought for in ver. 12. itself, either in the words διὰ τῆς ἁμαρτίας ὁ θάνατος, or in the clause which follows, either:—

“As by one man sin entered into the world;”

“Death also came by sin:”

or,  
“As by one man sin entered into the world, and death by sin;”

“Even so death came upon all men.”

Both these explanations, however, do violence to the language in the meaning which they give to καὶ — καὶ οὕτως, and are also inconsistent with the general drift of the passage, which is not to show that “as sin came into the world,” death followed in its train, but that “as in Adam all died, even so in Christ shall all be made alive.”

If, disregarding the grammar, we look only to the sense, the missing apodosis is easily supplied both from what has preceded, and from what follows: “Therefore we receive reconciliation by Jesus Christ, as by one man sin entered into the world.” Comp. δι’ οὗ and δι’ ἐνός ἀνθρώπου, in the 11th and 12th verses. It is further hinted at in the words ὅς ἐστιν τύπος τοῦ μέλλοντος at the end of the 14th

verse; it is indirectly supplied in ver. 15. and involved in the whole remainder of the chapter.

Admitting the irregularity of the construction, let us dismiss the grammar to follow the thought. The Apostle is about to speak of Adam, the type of sin, as Christ is the type of righteousness. The sin of Adam is the sin of man, as the righteousness of Christ is the righteousness of man. But how is the fact of sin reconcilable with the previous statements of the Apostle:—“Where there is no law there is no transgression”? Such is the doubt which seems to cross the Apostle’s mind, which he answers; first, by saying, that there “was sin in the world before the giving of the law” (though he had said before, “where there is no law there is no transgression”), and then, as if aware of his apparent inconsistency, he softens his former expression into — “sin is not imputed where there is no law.” An indirect answer is also supplied by the verse that follows:—“Howbeit death reigned from Adam to Moses,” *i. e.* men died before the time of Moses, and therefore they must have sinned.

The difficulty of this as of some other passages (Rom. iii. 1—8., ix. 19—23.) arises out of the conflict of opposite thoughts in the Apostle’s mind. Suppose him to have said, “As by one man sin entered into the world and death by sin (for this is possible though there was no law — when



and death by sin ; and so death passed upon all men, for  
13 that all have sinned \* — for until the law sin was in the

I said, οὐδὲ δὲ οὐκ ἔστι νόμος οὐδὲ παράβασις, I only meant that sin is not imputed, but that it exists is proved by the fact of death reigning over all before the time of Moses). But long before we have arrived at this point the thread of the main sentence has been lost. The Apostle makes an attempt to recover it in the words ὅς ἔστι τύπος τοῦ μέλλοντος, and more regularly repeats the parallel in ver. 15. 17.

ἡ ἁμαρτία εἰσηλθε.] Comp. Gal. iii. 23. : — πρὸ τοῦ δὲ ἔλθειν τὴν πίστιν, for a similar personification. In Rom. vii. 9. : — ἡ ἁμαρτία ἀνέζησεν. In 2 Cor. xi. 3. the Apostle speaks of Eve being deceived by the serpent. An inconsistency is alleged between these words, and still more between 1 Timothy ii. 14. (“And Adam was not deceived, but the woman, being deceived, transgressed,”) and the present passage. It is hardly worth while meeting the supposed inconsistency with the answer that the Jews reckoned their genealogies by men, or that the female sex was so looked down upon in ancient times as to be thought unworthy to bring sin into the world. It was natural for the Apostle to oppose Adam and Christ, but not Eve and Christ.

ἁμαρτία,] neither original sin nor actual, nor the guilt of sin as distinguished from sin itself (for such differences had no existence in the Apostle’s age), nor, like ἀμάρτημα, confined to the act of sin. Though not absolutely excluding this last meaning ; as its plural use shows, ἁμαρτία de-

scribes sin rather as a mental state or in relation to the mind (compare ἀδικία, ἀδικημα). It is often the power of sin, or sin collectively, sometimes, as here, the personification of it.

καὶ διὰ τῆς ἁμαρτίας ὁ θάνατος, and death by sin.] The Apostle plainly states that “Sin brought death into the world ;” but what death, spiritual or physical, or whether he has always distinguished the two, is a question not so easily determined.

That the sin of Adam was the cause of the death of Adam was the common belief of the Jews in St. Paul’s time. The oldest trace of this belief is found in the Book of Wisdom, ii. 24. : “For God created man without corruption, and made him after the image of his own likeness. Nevertheless, through envy of the devil, came death into the world, and they that hold of his side prove it.” The death of Adam, and of all mankind in him, is again referred to by the Apostle in 1 Cor. xv. 21. ; respecting which latter passage two things are observable : first, that the Apostle makes no allusion to the sin of Adam as the cause of his death — rather this is a consequence of his and of other men’s earthly nature, 1 Cor. xv. 48. 50. ; and, secondly, that the death spoken of is plainly, from the contrast, not spiritual, but physical.

And such it is commonly supposed to be in the present passage. Such an interpretation is clear and definite, and one with which most readers will be satisfied.

ἀμαρτία δὲ οὐκ ἐλλογείται μὴ ὄντος νόμου, ἀλλ' ἐβασίλευσεν 14  
ὁ θάνατος ἀπὸ Ἀδὰμ μέχρι Μωυσέως καὶ ἐπὶ τοὺς μὴ

Yet it may be doubted whether, from the mere difference of modes of thought in his time and our own, we do not give it a greater degree of definiteness than it possessed to the Apostle himself. To us sin and death have no natural connexion. So far as they are united, we regard them as united by an act of God. But the Apostle joins them together in the same way that we might join together disease and death, or life and health. The flesh and the body are to him the natural seats both of physical and moral corruption.

It must be allowed that in other passages St. Paul as distinctly speaks of death for spiritual death, as he is here supposed to do for physical death. Compare vii. 9, 10. — "Sin revived, and I died;" and ver. 13.—"Was it then that which was good that became death unto me." In other passages, again, θάνατος has an equally distinct meaning of spiritual and physical death at once. For example, in Rom. vi. 21., the word appears, at first sight, to refer only to spiritual evil; but the parallel of eternal life in the next clause, shows that physical death is not excluded. In like manner it may be fairly argued that St. Paul does not connect sin and death in this chapter in any other sense than he connects life and righteousness. But as he could not have meant that the continuance of existence after death depended on the righteousness of Christ, so neither can he mean that temporal death depended on Adam's sin.

Nor can it be left out of sight that in the 15th chapter of the 1 Cor. the Apostle makes no reference to a prior state of innocence from which Adam fell. "The first man is of the earth, earthy: the second man is the Lord from heaven. As is the earthy so are they that are earthy; as is the heavenly so are they also that are heavenly." Adam and Christ are here contrasted, not in reference to any act performed by Adam, but to their own nature. It would surely be an error to lay stress on the precise points of view taken by the Apostle in this chapter, considering that a different view occurs in the parallel passage.

These considerations lead us to doubt how far St. Paul distinctly recognised the interpretations which later ages have given to his words. Could the consequences which have been drawn from them have been present to his mind, he might have told us that "these things are an allegory," like the bondwoman and the freewoman, or the baptism of the Fathers unto Moses in the cloud and in the sea.

The two clauses that follow are parallel to the two preceding ones, though the order is inverted:—

"As by one man sin entered into the world, and death by sin,"

"And in like manner, as all men sinned, so all men died."

ἐφ' ᾧ πάντες ἥμαρτον, *because all have sinned.*] Does this mean that all men sinned in Adam's sin? (Compare ver. 19., διὰ τῆς παρακοῆς τοῦ ἐνὸς ἀνθρώπου ἁμαρτωλοὶ κατεστάθησαν οἱ



world: but sin is not imputed where there is no law.

14 Nevertheless death reigned from Adam to Moses, even

πολλοί), in the same way that "Levi paid tithes in Abraham;" and as it is said in 2 Cor. v. 15., "If one died for all then all died;" or that death was the penalty of actual sin, as in the case of Adam, so of all mankind. The last way of taking the passage gives the most point to the following verse. For if St. Paul had been speaking of "sinning in Adam," it would have been hardly necessary to guard against the inconsistency of sinning without law; and throughout the epistle he has spoken not of imputed, but of actual sin. Compare iii. 9. 23. ἐφ' ᾧ has been translated "under the idea that," a meaning of the words, which somewhat softens the harshness of the first of the interpretations given above, "All men died under the idea that all sinned in Adam." This explanation is insufficiently confirmed by the passages adduced in support, such as 2 Cor. v. 4.; Phil. iii. 12. Again we must ask, had so subtle a difference any existence in the mind of the Apostle?

13. ἄχρι γὰρ νόμου, *for until the law.*] But sin is inseparable from the law, as has been repeated above, "where there is no law there is no transgression." How was it, then, that in the interval between Adam and Moses men could have sinned? We answer this difficulty by changing the form of our expression without materially altering its meaning; not, "where there is no law there is no transgression," but, "sin is not imputed where

there is no law." Sin, in other words, was not exceeding sinful; it did not abound or show itself in its true nature, yet it existed still. Comp. ver. 20.

It is true in the abstract to say that, without knowledge or consciousness there is no transgression; or, in other words, that an irrational being is incapable of sin; but, in proportion as the idea of νόμος is narrowed to the Jewish law or even the commandment of God in general, the statement must be qualified.

The words ἀμαρτία δε οὐκ ἔλλογείται μὴ ὄντος νόμου are connected both with what follows and what precedes. On the one hand, they are the answer to the objection, that without law there could be no sin. On the other hand, the adversative ἀλλά, in the next verse, implies that they are opposed to what follows, "sin is not imputed where there is no law; but [that it really exists is proved by the fact that] death reigned from Adam to Moses." Or the three clauses together may be connected as follows:—"I say all men died because all men sinned. For there was sin before the law, but unimputed. But this non-imputation of sin is no proof of its non-existence. As there was death during the interval, there was also sin." Or, once more, the argument may be expressed in the form of a syllogism as follows:—

[v. 1. All who died sinned.

But those to whom sin is not imputed died.

∴ They sinned.



ἀμαρτήσαντας ἐπὶ τῷ ὁμοιώματι τῆς παραβάσεως Ἀδάμ, ὃς ἐστὶν τύπος τοῦ μέλλοντος. ἀλλ' οὐχ ὡς τὸ παράπτωμα οὕτως καὶ τὸ χάρισμα. εἰ γὰρ τῷ τοῦ ἐνὸς παραπτώματι οἱ πολλοὶ ἀπέθανον, πολλῶ μᾶλλον ἢ χάρις τοῦ θεοῦ καὶ ἡ δωρεὰ ἐν χάριτι τῇ τοῦ ἐνὸς ἀνθρώπου Ἰησοῦ χριστοῦ εἰς τοὺς πολλοὺς ἐπερίσσευσεν. καὶ οὐχ ὡς δι' ἐνὸς ἀμαρτήσαντος τὸ δώρημα· τὸ μὲν γὰρ κρῖμα ἐξ ἐνὸς εἰς κατάκριμα, τὸ δὲ χάρισμα ἐκ πολλῶν παραπτωμάτων εἰς δικαίωμα. εἰ γὰρ [ἐν<sup>1</sup> τῷ] ἐνὶ παραπτώματι ὁ θάνατος

<sup>1</sup> Om. ἐν.

For similar instances of ambiguous clauses, comp. Gal. ii. 4., Rom. iii. 3.

For the general meaning of the passage, comp. Acts xvii. 30. : "The times of that ignorance God winked at." Rom. iii. 25. : *διὰ τὴν πάρεσιν τῶν προγεγονότων ἀμαρτημάτων.* John, xv. 22. : *If I had not come and spoken to them they had not had sin."*

ἄχρι is used in its ordinary sense of duration of time up to a point, "until," "up to the time of." Yet the expression is inaccurate, because the point of time here mentioned, the giving of the law, is not the limit of the continuance of sin. That the idea of "after" cannot be excluded is also shown by *μέχρις*, in the next verse, in the use of which there is a similar inaccuracy.

14. *ἐπὶ μὴ τοὺς ἀμαρτήσαντας, over them that had not sinned,*] is commonly interpreted, according as what may be termed the Augustinian or Pelagian view of the passage is preferred, either, who did not commit actual sin like Adam, but only inherited Adam's imputed sin; or, who did commit actual sin, but not like Adam

against a positive law or commandment.

A third way of explaining the words, though it necessitates what may be termed the Augustinian interpretation, is worthy of attention. *ἐπὶ τῷ ὁμοιώματι* may be connected with *ἐβασίλευσεν*, as a further explanation of *ἐπὶ τοὺς μὴ ἀμαρτήσαντας*. "But death reigned from Adam to Moses upon those who had not sinned, because of the likeness of the sin of Adam"—the "likeness" only, if, where no law is, there is no direct imputation of sin. Comp. ch. vi. 5. : — *εἰ γὰρ σύμφυτοι γεγόναμεν τῷ ὁμοιώματι τοῦ θανάτου αὐτοῦ, ἀλλὰ καὶ τῆς ἀναστάσεως ἐσόμεθα.* All men are thus identified with the sin of Adam, as they are to be identified with the righteousness of Him that was to come. Better than any of these subtle modes it is to take the passage in a more general sense : — "But death reigned from Adam to Moses even upon those who had not sinned expressly and consciously, to whom sin therefore could not be imputed in the same sense as it was to Adam." Compare verse 13.

over them that had not sinned after the similitude of Adam's transgression, who is the figure of him that was to come. But not as the offence, so also is the free gift. For if through the offence of one many died\*, much more the grace of God, and the gift by grace, which is by one man, Jesus Christ, hath abounded unto many. And not as it was by one that sinned, so is the gift: for the judgment was by one to condemnation, but the free gift is of many offences unto justification. For if by one\* offence death reigned through\* one; much more

ὅς ἐστιν τύπος,] who is the figure or image of the second Adam; or of whom Christ is the antitype. Compare for the use of *τύπος*, Acts, vii. 44.: *κατὰ τὸν τύπον ὃν ἑώρακει*, and the corresponding word *ἀντίτυπος*, which occurs in 1 Pet. iii. 21.: *ὁ καὶ ἡμᾶς ἀντίτυπον νῦν σώζει βάπτισμα*.

15. "But the case is different with the offence and with the free gift." These words are the theme of what follows in the four next verses.

The common antithesis in St. Paul's Epistles is between the law and the promise, faith and works. Here the same opposition is stated more objectively and universally between Adam and Christ. The law is for the present lost sight of in the more general point of view now taken.

*οἱ πολλοί*, not many as opposed to all, but a number of men as opposed to one.

*πολλῷ μᾶλλον*, *much more*.] If God is just, much more is he merciful. Comp. above ver. 10.: "If while we were enemies we were reconciled, much more being reconciled shall we be saved." xi 24.: If the Gentile is grafted on the good olive, how much

more the Jew on the olive that is his own.

*ἡ χάρις καὶ ἡ δωρεά*, the grace of God and the gift which goes with it. *ἐπερίσσειεν*: abounded unto many, or abounded in that it came to many.

16. The Apostle goes on to show that the balance is yet further on the side of mercy. He has already said that many died through the act of one man, and much more that the grace of God by one man abounded unto many. He has now to contrast the effect of the offence and the effect of the free gift — condemnation in the one case, justification in the other. He also draws out further the opposition of the one and many. One man's offence brought condemnation on many, but many offences return to one act of pardon. From one to many, from many to one, is the reckoning of the justice and mercy of God.

17. is a heightening of v. 15.: "If by the offence of one man many died, — if by one offence death reigned—much more shall grace abound unto many—much more shall they, which partake of grace, reign in life through

ἐβασίλευσεν διὰ τοῦ ἐνός, πολλῶ μᾶλλον οἱ τὴν περισσείαν  
 τῆς χάριτος καὶ [τῆς δωρεᾶς] τῆς δικαιοσύνης λαμβάνοντες  
 ἐν ζωῇ βασιλεύσουσιν διὰ τοῦ ἐνός Ἰησοῦ χριστοῦ. ἄρα 18  
 οὖν ὡς δι' ἐνός παραπτώματος εἰς πάντας ἀνθρώπους εἰς  
 κατάκριμα, οὕτως καὶ δι' ἐνός δικαιώματος εἰς πάντας ἀν- 19  
 θρώπους εἰς δικαίωσιν ζωῆς· ὥσπερ γὰρ διὰ τῆς παρα-  
 κοῆς τοῦ ἐνός ἀνθρώπου ἁμαρτωλοὶ κατεστάθησαν οἱ πολλοί,  
 οὕτως καὶ διὰ τῆς ὑπακοῆς τοῦ ἐνός δίκαιοι καταστα- 20  
 θήσονται οἱ πολλοί. νόμος δὲ παρεισήληθεν, ἵνα πλεονάσῃ 21  
 τὸ παράπτωμα· οὗ δὲ ἐπλεόνασεν ἡ ἁμαρτία, ὑπερεπερίσ-  
 σευσεν ἡ χάρις, ἵνα ὥσπερ ἐβασίλευσεν ἡ ἁμαρτία ἐν τῷ  
 θανάτῳ, οὕτως καὶ ἡ χάρις βασιλεύσῃ διὰ δικαιοσύνης εἰς  
 ζωὴν αἰώνιον διὰ Ἰησοῦ χριστοῦ τοῦ κυρίου ἡμῶν.

one." Compare, for a similar repetition, ch. vii. 16, 17. 19, 20.

18. εἰς δικαίωσιν ζωῆς, *to justification of life.*] Compare ζωὴν αἰώνιον, below, and ζωὴ and δικαιοσύνη, in the previous verse. Out of the two latter the expression is constructed, in accordance with that analogy by which St. Paul speaks of justification as a resurrection with Christ (ch. vi. 4—8.). The whole verse may be regarded as a repetition of v. 16., into which a new thought has found its way from the words ἐν ζωῇ βασιλεύσουσιν, which have preceded; it also contains a summing up of the whole argument.

20. From the more universal point of view the Apostle returns to the more particular. He repeats what he had before touched upon at ver. 13. It was not that there was, strictly speaking, no sin where there was no law; there *was* sin, but it was not imputed. Now, the law came in that the offence might abound; or, as we might express it, that men might awaken to their real state. The same thought is expressed in Gal. iii. 19.—“Wherefore then serveth the law?” it was added because of transgressions: and below, Rom. vii. 13.—“Sin, that it might appear sin, working death unto me through



they which receive the \* abundance of grace and of the gift of righteousness shall reign in life through \* one, Jesus Christ. Therefore as by one \* offence judgment came upon all men to condemnation; even so by one act of righteousness the free gift came upon all men unto justification of life. For as by one man's disobedience many were made sinners, so by the obedience of one shall many be made righteous. But \* the law came in besides, that the offence might abound. But where sin abounded, grace did much more abound: that as sin \* reigned in \* death, even so might grace reign through righteousness unto eternal life by Jesus Christ our Lord.

that which is good, that sin might become exceeding sinful."

*οὐ δὲ ἐπλεόνασεν.*] But here, too, mercy overbalanced justice.

21. There was yet, however, a higher purpose for which the law came in, as the other half of a scheme of mercy, in which the reign of sin and evil was first to be made manifest, that the reign of grace and righteousness might also begin.

The leading thought of the preceding section has been, "As in Adam all die, even so in Christ shall all be made alive." But there is a great difference between the act of sin and the act of justification. If many died through the first, much more

shall they be redeemed by the second; if there was one offence to condemn, there are many offences to be forgiven: where death and condemnation are, much more there are life and grace; as one comes to all men through one, so likewise the other. The five verses from 15—19. consist almost wholly of a repetition of the same thought, in the form either of a parallel between the act of Adam and of Christ, or of a climax in which the grace of Christ is contrasted in its effects with Adam's sin. The law came to increase the sum of transgressions, but grace still exceeded. The law came in with this very object, that as sin had triumphed, grace might triumph also.

## ON THE IMPUTATION OF THE SIN OF ADAM.

THAT so many opposite systems of Theology seek their authority in Scripture is a fair proof that Scripture is different from them all. That is to say, Scripture often contains in germ, what is capable of being drawn to either side; it is indistinct, where they are distinct; it presents two lights, where they present only one; it speaks inwardly, while they clothe themselves in the forms of human knowledge. That indistinct, intermediate, inward point of view at which the truth exists but in germ, they have on both sides tended to extinguish and suppress. Passing allusions, figures of speech, rhetorical oppositions, have been made the foundation of doctrinal statements, which are like a part of the human mind itself, and seem as if they could never be uprooted, without uprooting the very sentiment of religion. Systems of this kind exercise a constraining power, which makes it difficult for us to see anything in Scripture but themselves.

For example, how slender is the foundation in the New Testament for the doctrine of Adam's sin being imputed to his posterity — two passages in St. Paul at most, and these of uncertain interpretation. The little cloud, no bigger than a man's hand, has covered the heavens. To reduce such subjects to their proper proportions, we should consider: — First, what space they occupy in Scripture; Secondly, how far the language used respecting them is literal or figurative; Thirdly, whether they agree with the more general truths of Scripture and our moral sense, or are not “rather repugnant thereto;” Fourthly, whether their origin may not be prior to Christianity, or traceable in the after history of the Church; Fifthly, whether the words of Scripture may not be confused with logical inferences which are

appended to them ; Sixthly, in the case of this and of some other doctrines, whether even poetry has not lent its aid to stamp them in our minds in a more definite and therefore different form from that in which the Apostles taught them ; Lastly, how far in our own day they are anything more than words.

The two passages alluded to are Rom. v. 12—21., 1 Corinthians, xv. 21, 22. 45—49., in both of which parallels are drawn between Adam and Christ. In both the sin of Adam is spoken of, or seems to be spoken of, as the source of death to man : “ As by one man’s transgression sin entered into the world, and death by sin,” and “ As in Adam all die.” Such words appear plain at first sight ; that is to say, we find in them what we bring to them : let us see what considerations modify their meaning. If we accept the Pelagian view of the passage, which refers the death of each man to actual sin, there is an end of the controversy. But it does not equally follow that, if what is termed the received interpretation is given to the words, the doctrine which it has been attempted to ground upon them would have any real foundation.

We will suppose, then, that no reference is contained in either passage to “ actual sin.” In some other sense than this mankind are identified with Adam’s transgression. But the question still remains, whether Adam’s sin and death are merely the type of the sin and death of his posterity, or, more than this, the cause. The first explanation quite satisfies the meaning of the words “ As in Adam all die ;” the second seems to be required by the parallel passage in the Romans : “ As by one man sin came into the world,” and “ As by one man many were made sinners,” if taken literally.

The question involves the more general one, whether the use of language by St. Paul makes it necessary that we should take his words literally in this passage. Is he speaking of Adam’s sin being the cause of sin and death to his posterity, in any other sense than he spoke of Abraham being a father of circumcision to the uncircumcised ? (chap. iv.) Yet no one has ever thought of basing a doctrine on these words. Or is he speaking of all men dying in Adam, in any



other sense than he says in 2 Cor. v. 15., that if one died for all, then all died. Yet in this latter passage, while Christ died literally, it was only in a figure that all died. May he be arguing in the same way as when he infers from the word "seed" being used in the singular, that "thy seed is Christ"? Or, if we confine ourselves to the passage under consideration:—Is the righteousness of Christ there imputed to believers, independently of their own inward holiness? and if so, should the sin of Adam be imputed independently of the actual sins of men?

I. A very slight difference in the mode of expression would make it impossible for us to attribute to St. Paul the doctrine of the imputation of the sin of Adam. But we have seen before how varied, and how different from our own, are his modes of thought and language. Compare i. 4., iv. 25. To him, it was but a slight transition, from the identification of Adam with the sins of all mankind, to the representation of the sin of Adam as the cause of those sins. To us, there is the greatest difference between the two statements. To him, it was one among many figures of the same kind, to oppose the first and second Adam, as elsewhere he opposes the old and new man. With us, this figure has been singled out to be made the foundation of a most exact statement of doctrine. We do not remark that there is not even the appearance of attributing Adam's sin to his posterity, in any part of the Apostle's writings in which he is not drawing a parallel between Adam and Christ.

II. The Apostle is not speaking of Adam as fallen from a state of innocence. He could scarcely have said, "The first man is of the earth, earthy," if he had had in his mind that Adam had previously existed in a pure and perfect state. He is only drawing a parallel between Adam and Christ. The moment we leave this parallel, all is uncertain and undetermined. What was the nature of that innocent life? or of the act of Adam which forfeited it? and how was the effect of that act communicated to his posterity? The minds of men in different ages of the world have strayed into these and similar inquiries. Difficulties about "fate, predestination, and free-

will" (not food for angels' thoughts), cross our path in the garden of Eden itself. But neither the Old or New Testament give any answer to them. Imagination has possessed itself of the vacant spot, and been busy, as it often is, in proportion to the slenderness of knowledge.

III. There are other elements of St. Paul's teaching, which are either inconsistent with the imputation of Adam's sin to his posterity, or at any rate are so prominent as to make such a doctrine if held by him comparatively unimportant. According to St. Paul, it is not the act of Adam, but the law that

"Brought sin into the world and all our woe."

And the law is almost equivalent to "the knowledge of sin." But original sin is, or may be, wholly unconscious — the fault of nature in the infant equally with the man. Not so the sin of which St. Paul speaks, which is inseparable from consciousness, as he says himself: — "I was alive without the law once," that is, before I came to the consciousness of sin.

IV. It will be admitted that we ought to feel still greater reluctance to press the statement of the Apostle to its strict logical consequences, if we find that the language which he here uses is that of his age and country. From the circumstance of our first reading the doctrine of the imputation of Adam's sin to his posterity in the Epistles of St. Paul, we can hardly persuade ourselves that this is not its original source. The incidental manner in which it is alluded to, might indeed lead us to suppose that it would scarcely have been intelligible, had it not been also an opinion of his time. But if this inference should seem doubtful, there is direct evidence to show that the Jews connected sin and death, and the sins and death of mankind, with the sin of Adam, in the same way as the Apostle. The earliest trace of such a doctrine is found in the apocryphal Book of Wisdom, ii. 24.: "But God created man to be immortal, and made him to be an image of his own eternity. Nevertheless, through envy of the devil came death into the world; and they that do hold of

his side do find it." And Eccles. xxv. 24. : "Of the woman came the beginning of sin, and through her we all die." It was a further refinement of some of their teachers, that when Adam sinned the whole world sinned ; because, at that time, Adam was the whole world, or because the soul of Adam comprehended the souls of all, so that Adam's sin conveyed a hereditary taint to his posterity. It was a confusion of a half physical, half logical or metaphysical notion, arising in the minds of men who had not yet learnt the lesson of our Saviour—"That which is from without defileth not a man." That human nature or philosophy sometimes rose up against such inventions is certainly true ; but it seems to be on the whole admitted, that the doctrine of Augustin is in substance generally agreed to by the Rabbis, and that there is no trace of their having derived it from the writings of St. Paul. Compare the passages quoted in Fritzsche, vol. i. pp. 293—296. and Schœttgen.

But not only is the connexion of sin and death with each other, and with the sin of Adam, found in the Rabbinical writings ; the type and antitype of the first and second Adam are also contained in them. In reading the first chapters of Genesis, the Jews made a distinction between the higher Adam, who was the light of the world, and had control over all things, who was mystically referred to where it is said, they two shall be one flesh ; and the inferior Adam, who was Lord only of the creation ; who had "the breath of life," but not "the living soul." Schœttgen, i. 512—514., 670—673. By some, indeed, the latter seems to have been identified with the Messiah. By Philo, on the other hand, the *λόγος* is identified with the *πρῶτος Ἀδάμ*, who is without sex, while the *ἄνθρωπος χαίκοις* is created afterwards by the help of the angels. De Creat. Mund. p. 30. It is not the object of this statement to reconcile these variations, but merely to indicate, first, that the idea of a first and second Adam was familiar to the Jews in the time of St. Paul, and that one or other of them was regarded by them as the Word and the Messiah.

V. A slighter, though not less real foundation of the doctrine has



been what may be termed the logical symmetry of the imputation of the righteousness of Christ and of the sin of Adam. The latter half is the correlative of the former; they mutually support each other. We place the first and second Adam in juxtaposition, and seem to see a fitness or reason in the one standing in the same relation to the fallen as the other to the saved.

VI. It is hardly necessary to ask the further question, what meaning we can attach to the imputation of sin and guilt which are not our own, and of which we are unconscious. God can never see us other than we really are, or judge us without reference to all our circumstances and antecedents. If we can hardly suppose that He would allow a fiction of mercy to be interposed between ourselves and Him, still less can we imagine that He would interpose a fiction of vengeance. If He requires holiness before He will save, much more, may we say in the Apostle's form of speech, will He require sin before He dooms us to perdition. Nor can anything be in spirit more contrary to the living consciousness of sin of which the Apostle everywhere speaks, than the conception of sin as dead unconscious evil, originating in the act of an individual man, in the world before the flood.

VII. A small part of the train of consequences which have been drawn out by divines can be made to hang even upon the letter of the Apostle's words, though we should not take into account the general temper and spirit of his writings. Logical inferences often help to fill up the aching void in our knowledge of the Spiritual world. They seem necessary; in time they receive a new support from habit and tradition. They hide away and conceal the nature of the original premisses. They may be likened to the superstructure of a building which the foundation has not strength to bear; or, rather, perhaps, when compared to the serious efforts of human thought, to the plaything of the child who places one brick upon another in wondering suspense, until the whole totters and falls, or his childish fancy pleases itself with throwing it down. So, to apply these remarks to our present subject, we are contented to repeat the simple words of the Apostle, "As in Adam all die, even so in Christ

shall all be made alive." Perhaps we may not be able to recall all the associations which they conveyed to his mind. But neither are we willing to affirm his meaning to be that the sin of one man was the cause of other men's sins, or that God condemned one part of the human race for a fault not their own, because He was going to save another part; or that original sin, as some say, or the guilt of original sin, as is the opinion of others, is washed away in baptism. There is a terrible explicitness in such language touching the realities of a future life which makes us shrink from trusting our own faculties amid far-off deductions like these. We feel that we are undermining, not strengthening, the foundations of the Gospel. We fear to take upon ourselves a burden which neither "we nor our fathers are able to bear." Instead of receiving such statements only to explain them away, or keep them out of sight, it is better to answer boldly in the words of the Apostle, "God forbid! for how shall God judge the world."

On the whole, then, we are led to infer that in the Augustinian interpretation of this passage, even if it agree with the letter of the text, too little regard has been paid to the extent to which St. Paul uses figurative language, and to the manner of his age in interpretations of the Old Testament. The difficulty of supposing him to be allegorising the narrative of Genesis is slight, in comparison with the difficulty of supposing him to countenance a doctrine at variance with our first notions of the moral nature of God.

But when the figure is dropped, and allowance is made for the manner of the age, the question once more returns upon us—"What is the Apostle's meaning?" He is arguing, we see, *κατ' ἀνθρώπων*, and taking his stand on the received opinions of his time. Do we imagine that his object is no other than to set the seal of his authority on these traditional beliefs? The whole analogy, not merely of the writings of St. Paul, but of the entire New Testament, would lead us to suppose that his object was not to reassert them, but to teach, through them, a new and nobler lesson. The Jewish Rabbis would have spoken of the first and second Adam; but which

of them would have made the application of the figure to all mankind? Which of them would have breathed the quickening Spirit into the dry bones? The figure of the Apostle bears the impress of his own age and country; the interpretation of the figure is for every age, and for the whole world. A figure of speech it remains still, an allegory after the manner of that age and country, but yet with no uncertain or ambiguous signification. It means that "God hath made of one blood all the nations of the earth;" and that "he hath concluded all under sin, that he may have mercy upon all." It means a truth deep yet simple,—the fact which we recognise in ourselves and trace everywhere around us—that we are one in a common evil nature, which, if it be not derived from the sin of Adam, exists as really as if it were. It means that we shall be made one in Christ, by the grace of God, in a measure here more fully and perfectly in another world. It means that Christ is the natural head of the human race, the author of its spiritual life. It shows Him to us as he enters within the veil, in form as a man, the "first fruits of them which sleep." It is a sign or intimation which guides our thoughts in another direction also, beyond the world of which religion speaks, to observe what science tells us of the interdependence of soul and body—what history tells of the chain of lives and events. It leads us to reflect on ourselves not as isolated, independent beings;—not such as we appear to be to our own narrow consciousness; but as we truly are—the creatures of antecedents which we can never know, fashioned by circumstances over which we have no control. The infant, coming into existence in a wonderful manner, inherits something, not from its parents only, but from the first beginning of the human race. He too is born into a family of which God in Christ is the Father. There is enough here to meditate upon—"a mystery since the world was"—without the "weak and beggarly" elements of Rabbinical lore. We may not encumber St. Paul "with the things which he destroyed."



## CHAP VI.

THERE are some errors in religion which are ever attendant on the truths connected with them. Not only have men blessed with the grace of God greater powers and responsibilities than others, but they have also dangers, if not greater, yet peculiar to them, and seeming from the very constitution of the human mind itself to be inseparable from their religious state. There are faults, delusions, prejudices, tendencies to evil, to which they are liable, and which religion itself seems to foster in the weakness of human nature. One of these tendencies is antinomianism, or the tendency to rest in feeling, without knowledge or action. It is a corruption not peculiar to Christianity, but common to all religions which have had anything of spiritual life or power; in the case of individuals often exercising a subtle influence among those who disavow it in words. It already existed among the Jews in the time of St. Paul, as we may gather from the Epistle of St. James, and are informed by Philo. *De Migr. Abrah. Mangey. i. 450.*

Against this corruption the Apostle sets himself in the present chapter. There was nothing more natural if grace abounded, than that men should continue in sin, that it might yet more abound. Experience sadly proves that there is a faith without works, hope of forgiveness without repentance, final assurance without moral goodness. There are religious states in which the eye of the soul seems to lose its clear insight into right and truth, and even obscures with the consolations of the Gospel its sterner sense of the holiness of God. In the hour of death especially, nature herself seems to assist in the delusion. In the first ages, as in all other times of religious excitement, such a delusion was more than ordi-

narily likely to prevail. It was a charge made against the Apostle himself that he said: "Let us do evil that good may come."<sup>4</sup>

At this point, therefore, in his great argument, when the abundance of Divine grace has been already developed, the Apostle pauses to guard against the dangerous inference. His manner of doing so is characteristic of his view of the doctrine itself. He does not seek to test the Christian state by external acts, but to exalt our inward notion of it. He does not say, a true faith is that which brings forth good works, or that which is known like a tree by its fruits. To him, the very idea of Christian life is death to sin, and death with Christ. In the previous chapter no language seemed too strong to express the fulness and freedom of the grace of God. That might tempt us to continue in sin. But no, we are dead to sin. The state of grace itself is a state of union with Christ, in which we follow Him through the various stages of His life. When we think of it as death, sin dies within us; when we think of it as life, we are risen with Him.

An analogy may be traced between this chapter and the commencement of chap. iii., which may be said to be directed against Jewish, as this against Christian antinomianism. They both treat of the same subject considered under different points of view, as the error of the Jew, relying on the promises to Abraham and the non-interference of God with the evil from which he is himself exempt; secondly, as the error of the believer in Christ, whose soul is absorbed in the thought of His grace, which he nevertheless regards, like the Jew, as the imparting of an outward gift or privilege, not of an inward spirit.

Besides this general parallelism with the third chapter, other parallelisms occur also in the structure of the sixth chapter itself. It is divided into two leading sections, which correspond to each other, the text of the first of which is—"We may not sin, because we are dead to sin;" of the second—"We may not sin, because if we do we shall become the servants of sin." In each of these sections are several reduplications. The eighth verse answers to the

fifth, the ninth to the sixth; the tenth stands in the same relation to the ninth as the seventh to the sixth; the eleventh corresponds to the tenth, the fifteenth to the first; the nineteenth is a composition of the sixteenth and thirteenth. There is also a somewhat less obvious connexion between the eighteenth and fourteenth verses. In the earlier half of the chapter, verses three and four correspond respectively to the two members of verse two; five is a further confirmation of three and four; six and eight are confirmations of five; nine and eleven are a hortatory statement of verse five.





Τί οὖν ἐροῦμεν ; ἐπιμένωμεν<sup>1</sup> τῇ ἁμαρτίᾳ, ἵνα ἡ χάρις 6  
 πλεονάσῃ ; μὴ γένοιτο. οἷτινες ἀπεθάνομεν τῇ ἁμαρτίᾳ, 2  
 πῶς ἔτι ζήσομεν ἐν αὐτῇ ; ἢ ἀγνοεῖτε ὅτι ὅσοι ἐβαπτίσθημεν 3  
 εἰς χριστὸν Ἰησοῦν, εἰς τὸν θάνατον αὐτοῦ ἐβαπτίσθημεν ;

<sup>1</sup> ἐπιμενοῦμεν.

VI. 1. Τί οὖν ἐροῦμεν ; *What shall we say, then ?*] What shall we say, then ? if this be the case with the law, are we to continue in sin that grace may abound ? The connexion of the thought is with the whole previous chapter, and especially with ver. 20. If “the law came in that the offence might abound, and so grace yet more abound,” there might seem to be a sort of “doing evil that good may come” in the purposes of Providence. The Apostle shows that this law of “bringing good out of evil” does not apply to the lives of men. In chapter iii. a similar suggestion had intruded :—“Why if my sin redounds to the glory of God, am I still judged as a sinner ?” which is suppressed as impious and immoral. Here in the same way the thought that the law was intended to increase sin, might lead to the conclusion that what God wanted was the increase of sin. Sin as much as you can, yet God’s grace will still exceed. To which the Apostle replies, “That be far from us.” The state of grace into which we have passed, is a state of death unto sin. How can we still live in it ?

2. ἀπεθάνομεν τῇ ἁμαρτίᾳ is said like ζῆν τῇ ἁμαρτίᾳ, from which the form of the expression is borrowed ; just as below, v. 20., ἐλεύθεροι τῇ δικαιοσύνῃ receives its meaning from opposi-

tion to δουλοῦσθαι τῇ δικαιοσύνῃ. Compare Gal. ii. 20., διὰ νόμον νόμῳ ἀπέθανον ἵνα θεῷ ζήσω ; 1 Pet. ii. 24., ἵνα ταῖς ἁμαρτίαις ἀπογενόμενοι θεῷ ζήσωμεν. The Apostle is speaking of the general state of Christians being one of death to sin. The symbol of this is baptism, as he explains in the following verse.

3. ἢ ἀγνοεῖτε ;] Know ye not that as many of us as were baptized into Christ, were baptized into his death ?

βαπτίζεσθαι εἰς.] So the Israelites εἰς τὸν Μωϋσῆν, 1 Cor. x. 2. ; εἰς ἄφεσιν ἁμαρτιῶν, Mark i. 4. : so, εἰς τὸ Ἰωάννου βάπτισμα, Acts xix. 3. ; εἰς τὸ ὄνομα Παύλου, 1 Cor. i. 13. ; εἰς τὸ ὄνομα τοῦ Πατρὸς, καὶ τοῦ Υἱοῦ, καὶ τοῦ ἁγίου Πνεύματος, Matt. xxviii. 19. Compare ὀμνύναι εἰς Ἱεροσόλυμα. εἰς cannot be explained in these passages as meaning “with the thought of” or “looking to :” the relation expressed is purely objective, and not always the same. εἰς τὸν Μωϋσῆν means “before Moses,” or “at the command of Moses.” In the words εἰς ἄφεσιν ἁμαρτιῶν, εἰς signifies the result or object ; so probably in εἰς τὸ Ἰωάννου βάπτισμα. βαπτίζεσθαι εἰς ὄνομα only differs in the mode of thought from βαπτίζεσθαι ἐπὶ ὀνόματι, both meaning to be baptized “in the name of,” with a

6 WHAT shall we say then? Are we to<sup>1</sup> continue in  
 2 sin, that grace may abound? God forbid. How shall  
 3 we, that are dead to sin, live any longer therein? Know  
 ye not, that so many of us as were baptized into<sup>2</sup> Christ  
 4 Jesus were baptized into his death? Therefore we

<sup>1</sup> Shall we.<sup>2</sup> Jesus Christ.

reference to the baptismal formula.

The expression in the text is somewhat different from any of these.

To be baptized into Christ is to be baptized so as to be one with Christ, or to become a member of Christ by baptism. Compare 1 Cor. xii. 13., *εις εν σώμα ἐβαπτίσθησαν*, between which and the present passage a connecting link is formed by Rom. vii. 4.: *ἐθανατώθητε τῷ νόμῳ διὰ τοῦ σώματος τοῦ χριστοῦ*. So the Apostle says: "By being baptized into Christ we were baptized into a common death."

Philosophy, as Plato says in the Phædo, is death; so the Apostle says that Christian life is death. It is a state in which we are dead to the temptations of the world, dead to all those things which penetrate through the avenues of sense, dead to the terrors of the law, withdrawn from our own nature itself, shrunk and contracted, as it were, within a narrow space, hidden with Christ and God. It is death and life at once,—death in relation to earth, and life in relation to God.

4. From the death of Christ, the Apostle passes on to the burial of Christ, which is again the link of transition to his resurrection. The second member

of ver. 2. is here taken up:—  
 "We are dead to sin, and can no longer live in it;" for two reasons, (1.) because we are baptized into the death of Christ, and (2.) because the resurrection of Christ is the type of our new life.

The meaning of this verse will be more clearly brought out if we recall the picture of Baptism in the apostolic age, when the rite was performed by immersion, and Christians might be said to be buried with Christ; and the passing of the Israelites through the cloud and the sea (1 Cor. x. 1, 2.), and even the Deluge itself (1 Pet. iii. 21.), seemed no inappropriate types of its waters. Imagine not infants, but crowds of grown up persons already changed in heart and feelings; their "life hidden with Christ and God," losing their personal consciousness in the laver of regeneration; rising again from its depths into the light of heaven, in communion with God and nature; met as they rose from the bath with the white raiment, which is "the righteousness of the saints," and ever after looking back on that moment as the instant of their new birth, of the putting off of the old man, and the putting on of Christ. Baptism was to them the figure of death, burial, and resurrection all in one, the most apt expres-



συνετάφημεν οὖν αὐτῷ διὰ τοῦ βαπτίσματος εἰς τὸν 4  
θάνατον, ἵνα ὡσπερ ἠγέρθη χριστὸς ἐκ νεκρῶν διὰ τῆς  
δόξης τοῦ πατρὸς, οὕτως καὶ ἡμεῖς ἐν καινότητι ζωῆς περι-  
πατήσωμεν. εἰ γὰρ σύμφυτοι γεγόναμεν τῷ ὁμοιώματι τοῦ 5  
θανάτου αὐτοῦ, ἀλλὰ καὶ τῆς ἀναστάσεως ἐσόμεθα, τοῦτο 6  
γινώσκοντες, ὅτι ὁ παλαιὸς ἡμῶν ἄνθρωπος συνεσταυρώθη,

sion of the greatest change that can pass upon man, like the sudden change into another life when we leave the body.

The Apostle introduces the word "buried" instead of "died," to recall and assist the image of baptism.

For similar allusions, compare Gal. iii. 27.:—ὅσοι γὰρ εἰς χριστὸν ἐβαπτίσθητε χριστὸν ἐνεδύσασθε, and Coloss. ii. 12.: *συνταφέντες αὐτῷ ἐν τῷ βαπτίσματι, ἐν ᾧ καὶ συνηγέρθητε*; also 1 Cor. xii. 13.: *ἐν πνεῦμα ἐποτίσθημεν*, in which there is a trace of the same imagery.

*εἰς τὸν θάνατον* is to be taken with *διὰ τοῦ βαπτίσματος*, as in the preceding verse, *εἰς τὸν θάνατον αὐτοῦ ἐβαπτίσθημεν*.

*διὰ τῆς δόξης τοῦ πατρὸς.*] Not "in the glory of God the Father," as though Christ rose up in the Divine presence and suddenly became irradiated with its glory; but "through the glory of the Father," which, as in other places "the power of the Father," is here spoken of as an instrument. This is a simpler way of taking the words, than as a pleonastic expression for the Father himself. We have before remarked, that St. Paul speaks of that as an instrument which we should consider as a mode. Nor can it be wondered at, that language should be peculiarly wavering and uncertain on sub-

jects that altogether transcend language. Compare Col. i. 11.: *ἐν πάσῃ δυνάμει δυναμούμενοι κατὰ τὸ κράτος τῆς δόξης αὐτοῦ*.

*οὕτως καὶ ἡμεῖς.* As in Rom. xiii. 11—14., 1 Thess. v. 5—11., John, v. 24—28., the Apostle passes from resurrection to renewal, from the coming of Christ (*παρουσία*) to his presence in the soul of man.

5. *σύμφυτοι, united with him.*] May either be taken absolutely, "if we have been united with him by the likeness of his death," or "united with the likeness of his death." In the first way of construing the passage, *σύμφυτοι τῷ ὁμοιώματι* is equivalent to *σύμφυτοι τῷ ὁμοίῳ εἶναι*, "if we are united with Him, by being like Him in his death." According to the second explanation we are said to be united not with Him, but with the likeness of His death; that is, with the death of sin, which is the image of the death of Christ. "Planted together" in the English version is too strong a translation for *σύμφυτοι*, which has lost the idea of *φύω*. *ἀλλὰ καὶ* is emphatic, and is equivalent to "immo etiam." Compare two other usages of *ἀλλὰ καὶ*, which afford together the nearest trace of this use of it in the apodosis: with *οὐ μόνον*, as Phil. i. 8.; *οὐ μόνον δὲ χαίρω ἀλλὰ καὶ χαρήσομαι*; and at the commencement of sentences, as

were \* buried with him by baptism into death: that like as Christ was raised up from the dead by the glory of the Father, even so we also should walk in newness of life. For if we have been \* united with him by the likeness of his death, we shall be also \* by the likeness of his resurrection: knowing this, that our old man is crucified with him, that the body of sin might be de-

in Luke xxiv. 22.: ἀλλὰ καὶ γυναικίς τινες, "nay and" or "nay but."

τῆς ἀναστάσεως,] sc. τῷ ὁμοιώματι.

ἐσόμεθα, we shall be.] In the eleventh verse, the Apostle speaks of our living through Christ in this present world. Hence it has been supposed that in this passage he is blending in one the resurrection which is present, or the renewal that he mentioned just before, and the resurrection which is to come. And it is true that in the Apostle's mode of thinking they are always nearly connected. But here it seems rather as though he were dwelling on the resurrection that is to come, as a motive for renewal here. As though he said:—"We are dead with Christ, therefore let us be dead to sin; we shall rise with Christ hereafter, therefore let us walk in newness of life." Compare 1 Cor. xv. 49., "And as we have borne the image of the earthly, we shall also bear the image of the heavenly;" and Phil. iii. 9—11., "And be found in Him, not having mine own righteousness, which is of the law, but that which is through the faith of Christ, the righteousness which is of God by faith: that I may know Him, and the power of His resurrection, and the fellowship

of His sufferings, being made conformable unto His death: if by any means I might attain unto the resurrection of the dead." So 1 Thess. v. 4, 5.

6. τοῦτο γινώσκοντες, knowing this,] "and we know this." Compare 2 Pet. i. 20., iii. 3.

ὁ παλαιὸς ἡμῶν ἄνθρωπος.] The image of the Christian, as one with Christ, is still carried on. Man falls asunder into two parts corresponding to the two divisions of Christ's life, and leaves one of those parts hanging upon the cross. ὁ παλαιὸς ἡμῶν ἄνθρωπος—our former self. Compare: ἀποθέσθαι ἑμᾶς κατὰ τὴν προτέραν ἀναστροφὴν τὸν παλαιὸν ἄνθρωπον . . . καὶ ἐνούσασθαι τὸν καινὸν ἄνθρωπον, Eph. iv. 22—24.; ὁ νεὸς ἄνθρωπος, Col. iii. 10.; ψυχικὸς ἄνθρωπος, 1 Cor. ii. 14.; also for the general sense 2 Cor. v. 17., "Therefore if any man be in Christ, he is a new creature: old things are passed away; behold, all things are become new." Coloss. ii. 14., "Having blotted out the handwriting of ordinances that was against us, . . . and nailed it to his cross." The figure is somewhat varied: our death to sin, v. 3, 4., is blended with the death of sin, in v. 6., represented under the image of the old man who is left behind on the cross. The other aspect of the figure returns in ver. 7.



ἵνα καταργηθῇ τὸ σῶμα τῆς ἁμαρτίας, τοῦ μηκέτι δουλεύειν ἡμᾶς τῇ ἁμαρτία· ὁ γὰρ ἀποθανὼν δεδικαίωται ἀπὸ τῆς ἁμαρτίας. εἰ δὲ ἀπεθάνομεν σὺν χριστῷ, πιστεύομεν ὅτι καὶ συνζήσομεν αὐτῷ, εἰδότες ὅτι χριστὸς ἐγερθεὶς ἐκ νεκρῶν οὐκέτι ἀποθνήσκει. θάνατος αὐτοῦ οὐκέτι κυριεύει. ὁ γὰρ ἀπέθανεν, τῇ ἁμαρτία ἀπέθανεν ἐφάπαξ. ὁ δὲ ζῆ, ζῆ 10

τὸ σῶμα τῆς ἁμαρτίας has been taken in four ways:—

(1.) The mass of sin.

(2.) The sinful body, the body which is of sin, belongs to sin, like *σῶμα τῆς σαρκός*, in Col. ii. 11. the fleshly body.

(3.) Sin which adheres to men as a body, like Rom. vii. 24., “the body of this death,” according to its most probable explanation. Or,

(4.) The body of sin may be a continuation of the figure of the old man who is identified with sin, and has a body attributed to him.

The last of these interpretations is most in accordance with the symbolism of the passage, while the first two are plainly repugnant to it.

τοῦ μηκέτι δουλεύειν ἡμᾶς] expresses in the concrete, what had previously been expressed in the abstract, in the words ἵνα καταργηθῇ τὸ σῶμα τῆς ἁμαρτίας.

7. ὁ γὰρ ἀποθανὼν δεδικαίωται, *he that is dead has been justified.*] The legal terms right and wrong no longer apply to him. It is a principle of the law itself which the Apostle is adducing. Compare vii. 1.:—“The law hath power over the man as long as he liveth.” There is also an allusion in the word *δεδικαίωται* to the doctrine of righteousness by faith, which is heightened by the associations of the previous verse:—“Not only he

that is dead sins no more, but he has left his crimes behind him, and paid the last penalty for sin.”

It is not quite clear whether these words refer only to Christ, or to the believer who is in his image also. The latter is most agreeable to the context. The nerve of the Apostle’s argument was: “How shall we who are dead to sin live any longer therein?” Continuing this thought, he says: “We are dead and buried with Christ, and therefore should rise with him to newness of life. We have left the old man on the cross with him, that the body of sin may be done away. For death is the quittance of sin.” “How then shall we any longer live in it?”—is still the Apostle’s inference; not only “how shall we who are dead to sin,” but, “how shall we who are justified by death.”

δικαιοῦσθαι ἀπὸ τῆς ἁμαρτίας,] not to be justified, and so separated or freed from sin, *structurâ prægnanti*, as it is termed, but like *δικαιωθῆναι ἀπὸ πάντων*, Acts, xiii. 39.

8. A repetition of ver. 5. in a slightly altered form, a new turn being given to the words by their juxtaposition with the previous clause. As the dead is justified, we believe that, as we are dead, we shall rise again. The connexion which is here latent between resurrection and justifica-



7 stroyed, that henceforth we should not serve sin. For  
 8 he that is dead has been justified \* from sin. But \* if  
 we be dead with Christ,\* we believe that we shall also  
 9 live with him: knowing that Christ being raised from  
 the dead dieth no more; death hath no more dominion  
 10 over him. For in that he died, he died unto sin once:

tion is more clearly brought out in iv. 25., v. 18.

In ver. 4., the Apostle had been chiefly speaking of walking in newness of life; here the words πιστεύομεν ὅτι imply that he is referring to another life, as in 2 Tim. ii. 11, 12.; Col. i. 5.

9. We hope to be partakers of his resurrection, knowing that he dies no more. Sin and death are connected together: he that is dead is freed from sin, therefore death hath no more dominion over him. Such appears to be the under current of the Apostle's thought, which is more fully drawn out in the following verse.

10. ὁ γὰρ ἀπέθανεν, *in that he died.*] The first question respecting these words is, how we may assign a uniform sense to the dative in both members of the sentence. A near parallel to them occurs in Soph. Aj. 1106. θεὸς γὰρ ἐκσώζει με, τῷδε δ' οἴχομαι, which might be translated into the New Testament Greek, τῷδε τέθνηκα, ζῶ θεῷ. "In relation to sin, or as far as sin is concerned, he died, in relation to God he lives." Compare 2 Cor. xiii. 4.: εἰ ἐσταυρώθη ἐξ ἄσθενείας, ἀλλὰ ζῆ ἐκ δυνάμεως θεοῦ.

The construction of ὁ may be explained either by supposing it to be the case after ἀπέθανεν or in apposition with it: "for the death which he died, or in that

he died;" either way passing into a conjunction.

But what is the meaning of dying unto sin, or in relation to sin, so far as sin is concerned, once? Sin and death are conceived of as inseparably connected with each other, and as both appertaining to Christ on earth. Sin is the sin of man by whom he suffered, the sins of mankind with which he united himself, the terrors of the law, according to which he fell under the curse; sin in every sense in which figuratively or ideally it can be applied to Christ (ch. iv. 25.: compare ὅς παρεδόθη διὰ τὰ παραπτώματα ἡμῶν καὶ ἠγέρθη διὰ τὴν δικαιοσιν ἡμῶν). Of all this he was quitted and cleared by death. His death was but a single, momentary act (ἐφάπαξ), which gave *death*, that king of terrors, no real dominion over Him. It was but a death unto sin, the laying aside of a certain relation in which He had stood to a former dispensation. But His life is infinitely real, He lives in communion with God. Compare Luke xx. 38.: "For all live unto Him." We might paraphrase the passage as follows:—

Death hath no more dominion over Him.

For His death was but the negation of sin and death. His life is a communion with the source of life.

τῷ θεῷ. οὕτως καὶ ὑμεῖς λογιζέσθε ἑαυτοὺς νεκροὺς μὲν τῇ 11  
 ἁμαρτίᾳ<sup>1</sup>, ζῶντας δὲ τῷ θεῷ ἐν χριστῷ Ἰησοῦ.<sup>2</sup> μὴ οὖν βασι- 12  
 λευέτω ἡ ἁμαρτία ἐν τῷ θνητῷ ὑμῶν σώματι εἰς τὸ ὑπακούειν<sup>3</sup>  
 ταῖς ἐπιθυμίαις αὐτοῦ, μηδὲ παριστάνετε τὰ μέλη ὑμῶν ὄπλα 13  
 ἀδικίας τῇ ἁμαρτίᾳ, ἀλλὰ παραστήσατε ἑαυτοὺς τῷ θεῷ  
 ὡσεὶ ἐκ νεκρῶν ζῶντας καὶ τὰ μέλη ὑμῶν ὄπλα δικαιοσύνης  
 τῷ θεῷ. ἁμαρτία γὰρ ὑμῶν οὐ κυριεύσει· οὐ γὰρ ἔστε 14  
 ὑπὸ νόμον, ἀλλὰ ὑπὸ χάριτι.

Τί οὖν; ἁμαρτήσωμεν<sup>4</sup>, ὅτι οὐκ ἔσμὲν ὑπὸ νόμον ἀλλὰ 15  
 ὑπὸ χάριτι; μὴ γένοιτο. οὐκ οὔδατε ὅτι ᾧ παριστάνετε 16

<sup>1</sup> εἶναι.<sup>2</sup> τῷ κυρίῳ ἡμῶν.<sup>3</sup> αὐτῇ ἐν.<sup>4</sup> ἁμαρτήσωμεν.

Throughout this passage the Apostle is identifying Christ and the believers; and conceptions, primarily applicable or more intelligible in reference to the one, are transferred to the other. We shall better apprehend his meaning, by beginning in a different order. "For in that we die, we die unto sin; in that we live, we live unto God." Our death with Christ is the renunciation of sin once for all, and the opening of a new life unto God. Under this figure of what the believer feels in himself, the Apostle describes the work of Christ. Death and life are one but yet two in the individual soul—the negative and positive side of the change which the Gospel makes in him—so they are also in Christ.

11. As He dies and lives for evermore, so also consider that ye are dead, indeed, unto sin, but alive unto God through Jesus Christ. ἐν, instrumental, as in ver. 23.

12. The Apostle had said above:—"How shall we who are dead to sin, live any longer therein?" He now says:—"Let not sin reign in your mortal

body." We should rather have expected:—"Let not sin reign in your body, which is already dead." Various modes have been adopted of avoiding the difficulty: (1.) Let not sin reign in your flesh; or, (2.) in your body, which is appointed to die,—of which it is a solemn reflection that it shall one day die; or, (3.) in which death is a figure of a death unto sin.

The same use of the word θνητός occurs in two other passages: ὁ ἐγείρας χριστὸν [Ἰησοῦν] ἐκ νεκρῶν ζωοποιήσκει τὰ θνητὰ σώματα ὑμῶν, Rom. viii. 11.; and in 2 Cor. iv. 11.: αἰεὶ γὰρ ἡμεῖς οἱ ζῶντες εἰς θάνατον παραδιδόμεθα διὰ Ἰησοῦν, ἵνα καὶ ἡ ζωὴ τοῦ Ἰησοῦ φανερωθῇ ἐν τῇ θνητῇ σαρκὶ ἡμῶν. In neither of these passages can the sense be "liable to death, mortal." The Apostle is speaking of a state, not of possible, but of actual death. Your "corrupt" bodies, or your bodies which are in a state of death, would be a more exact translation.

So in the passage we are considering, the word itself has acquired a new meaning, from the different point of view in

11 but in that he liveth, he liveth unto God. Likewise  
 reckon ye also yourselves<sup>1</sup> dead indeed unto sin,  
 12 but alive unto God through Jesus Christ.<sup>2</sup> Let not  
 sin therefore reign in your mortal body, that ye should  
 13 obey<sup>3</sup> the lusts thereof. Neither yield ye your members  
 as instruments of unrighteousness unto sin: but yield  
 yourselves unto God, as those that are alive from the  
 dead, and your members as instruments of righteousness  
 14 unto God. For sin shall not have dominion over you :  
 for ye are not under the law, but under grace.  
 15 What then ? are we to sin<sup>4</sup>, because we are not under  
 16 the law, but under grace? God forbid. Know ye not,

<sup>1</sup> Add to be.<sup>2</sup> Add our Lord.<sup>3</sup> Add it in.<sup>4</sup> Shall we sin.

which the Apostle regards death. Let not sin reign in your "dead body," or your "body which is in a state of death unto sin," is his meaning. The figurative use of *ὀνητῶ* is exactly parallel with *ὀνητῆ σαρκί*, in 2 Cor. iv. 11.

13. *μηδὲ παριστάνετε.*] Comp. 1 Cor. v. 16.:—"Shall I take the members of Christ and make them the members of an harlot?" Rom. xii. 1.:—*παραστήσαι τὰ σώματα ὑμῶν θυσίαν ζῶσαν.*

14. It might seem, at first sight, tautology to say, "Let not sin reign over you, for sin shall not reign over you." A slightly different turn restores the meaning. Do it, as we might say, for you are able to do it. Present yourselves to God as those who are alive from the dead; who were dead once, but now alive; under the law once, but under grace now. Instead of the outward and positive rule, you have the inward union with Christ; for the strength of sin, the consciousness of forgiveness; for fear, love; for bondage, freedom; for slavery, son-

ship; for weakness, power. Such an enlargement of the words of the Apostle may be gathered from other places. The *γαρ* expresses the ground of motive and encouragement.

15. Thus far the Apostle has argued, that we cannot continue in sin because we are dead with Christ. Going off upon the words of the last verse, he now puts the same argument in another point of view: "We cannot serve two masters." His servants we are to whom we render our service, of sin unto death, or of obedience unto righteousness.

What then? because we have the promise that sin shall not prevail over us, because we are not bound merely by an external obligation, but endowed with an inward power, shall we sin? Not so; we cannot sin without being the servants of sin; whether we choose for our masters sin or righteousness, we are their servants.

16. It seems like tautology to say:—"Whose servants ye make



ἑαυτοὺς δούλους εἰς ὑπακοήν, δοῦλοί ἐστε ᾧ ὑπακούετε,  
 ἦτοι ἁμαρτίας εἰς θάνατον ἢ ὑπακοῆς εἰς δικαιοσύνην ;  
 χάρις δὲ τῷ θεῷ, ὅτι ἦτε δούλοι τῆς ἁμαρτίας, ὑπηκούσατέ 17  
 δὲ ἐκ καρδίας εἰς ὃν παρεδόθητε τύπον διδαχῆς· ἐλευθερω- 18  
 θέντες δὲ ἀπὸ τῆς ἁμαρτίας ἐδουλώθητε τῇ δικαιοσύνῃ.  
 ἀνθρώπινον λέγω διὰ τὴν ἀσθένειαν τῆς σαρκὸς ὑμῶν. 19  
 ὥσπερ γὰρ παρεστήσατε τὰ μέλη ὑμῶν δούλα τῇ ἀκα-  
 θαρσίᾳ καὶ τῇ ἀνομίᾳ εἰς τὴν ἀνομίαν, οὕτω νῦν παραστή-  
 σατε τὰ μέλη ὑμῶν δούλα τῇ δικαιοσύνῃ εἰς ἁγιασμόν. ὅτε 20

yourselves, his servants ye are." Accordingly, Lachmann, in his preface, has given up the word  $\phi$ , and conjectures  $\omega$ . It may be objected that the emendation is weak, and that the words as they stand are very much after the manner of St. Paul. They admit, moreover, of a sufficient sense, even supposing the Apostle to have meant nothing more than an emphatic repetition:—"Know ye not that what ye are, ye are." But what he says is not precisely this, but—"Know ye not that what ye make yourselves, ye are?" the first clause expressing a voluntary and temporary act, and the second its permanent consequence. "To whomsoever ye offer yourselves as slaves, his slaves ye are, and will not cease to be." There is a line drawn between the two services of sin and righteousness which you cannot pass.

As if unable to find another word, the Apostle repeats *ὑπακοή* in the latter part of the sentence in a new sense. The antithesis of *δικαιοσύνη* and *θανατός* belongs to the form rather than the meaning. Comp. Rom. x. 10.

In Greek we often find a participle where, in a modern language, a verb would be employed,

and a sentence made independent. In the Greek of the New Testament the opposite, however, sometimes happens; we have a verb used where a participle would be more natural. Thus, in the present passage, the meaning is:—"Thanks be to God, that having been the servants of sin, ye became the servants of righteousness,"—"that ye were and became,"—the two clauses being regarded as one. Compare Eph. v. 8: *ἦτε γὰρ ποτε σκότος, νῦν δὲ φῶς ἐν Κυρίῳ.*

17. *ὑπηκούσατέ εἰς ὃν παρεδόθητε τύπον διδαχῆς* = *ὑπηκούσατε τῷ τύπῳ διδαχῆς εἰς ὃν παρεδόθητε.* The singularity of this attraction of the antecedent into the case of the relative, consists in the circumstance that the dative is thus resolved. Comp. Rom. iv. 17.; Acts xxi. 16., *ἄγοντες παρ' ᾧ ξενοισθῶμεν Μνάσωνι*, where, notwithstanding the attempt of Winer (§§ 31, 2.) to show that *ἄγειν* may govern a dative, the inverted attraction is far more natural.

18. Ye were freed from sin and made the servants of righteousness.

19. *ἀνθρώπινον λέγω* = *κατ' ἀνθρώπον λέγω.*] I use human language. Sometimes, as in 1 Cor. ix. 8., opposed to the words of the

that to whom ye yield yourselves servants to obey, his servants ye are to whom ye obey; whether of sin unto death, or of obedience unto righteousness? But God be thanked, that ye were the servants of sin, but ye have obeyed from the heart that form of doctrine whereto ye were delivered\*; and\* being made free from sin, ye became the servants of righteousness. I speak after the manner of men because of the infirmity of your flesh. For as ye have yielded your members servants to uncleanness and to iniquity unto iniquity; even so now yield your members servants to righteousness unto\* sanctification. For when ye were the servants of sin,

law, ἡ κατ' ἀνθρώπον ταῦτα λαλῶ ἢ καὶ ὁ νόμος ταῦτα οὐ λαλεῖ; or as in Rom. iii. 5., used as a sort of apology for a seemingly profane mode of speech; or, as in Gal. iii. 15., ἀδελφοί, κατὰ ἀνθρώπον λέγω, ὅμως ἀνθρώπου κεκυρωμένην διαθήκην οὐδεὶς ἀθετεῖ ἢ ἐπιδιατάσσεται, where it means simply, "I use a human figure of speech," as in this passage, in reference to the expression, "slavery to righteousness."

διὰ τὴν ἀσθένειαν τῆς σαρκὸς ὑμῶν.] I speak of a service after the manner of men; because your flesh is still weak, and therefore with you to be righteous, is to be the servant of righteousness; or because ye are slow of understanding (compare Heb. v. 11, 12.), and therefore I speak of your present state under a figure derived from your former one.

Comp. viii. 20.:—"For the creature was made subject to vanity, not willingly, but by reason of Him who hath subjected the same in hope, for the creature itself also shall be delivered from the bondage of corruption

into the glorious liberty of the children of God."

τῇ ἀνομίᾳ εἰς τὴν ἀνομίαν.] With no other end but lawlessness.

20, 21. The connexion of these two verses has been traced as follows:—there was a time when you were in the opposite state, when you were the slaves of sin, and had a seeming freedom from righteousness. Compare the two states. What does your experience tell you of the fruit of sin? Things of which you are now ashamed, for the end of those things is death.

Adopting Lachmann's punctuation, it must be admitted that, according to this way of taking the passage, the point of τὸ μὲν γὰρ τέλος ἐκείνων θάνατος is lost in some degree; for these words supply a good answer to the question, "What fruit had ye?" but are an inappropriate reason "for their being ashamed of these things."

It may be objected also that the relative clause is a harsh and abrupt answer to the question.

γὰρ δούλοι ἦτε τῆς ἁμαρτίας, ἐλεύθεροι ἦτε τῇ δικαιοσύνῃ.  
 τίνα οὖν καρπὸν εἶχετε τότε; ἐφ' οἷς νῦν ἐπαισχύνεσθε· 21  
 τὸ μὲν<sup>1</sup> γὰρ τέλος ἐκείνων θάνατος· νυνὶ δὲ ἐλευθερωθέντες 22  
 ἀπὸ τῆς ἁμαρτίας, δουλωθέντες δὲ τῷ θεῷ, ἔχετε τὸν  
 καρπὸν ὑμῶν εἰς ἁγιασμόν, τὸ δὲ τέλος ζωὴν αἰώνιον.  
 τὰ γὰρ ὀψώνια τῆς ἁμαρτίας θάνατος, τὸ δὲ χάρισμα 23  
 τοῦ θεοῦ ζωὴ αἰώνιος ἐν χριστῷ Ἰησοῦ τῷ κυρίῳ ἡμῶν.

<sup>1</sup> Omit μὲν.

It is better to take the words ἐφ' οἷς νῦν ἐπαισχύνεσθε neither as the answer to the question, nor as a part of the question, but as a parenthesis thrown in by the way.

As though the Apostle had said:—"For when you were the servants of sin, you were not the servants of righteousness. What fruit had you then of those things? (which I cannot mention without telling you that you are now ashamed of them)." The

answer is implied in what follows: "You had no fruit, for the end of those things is death. But now ye are the servants of righteousness, and not the servants of sin, you have a fruit, the end of which is not death, but eternal life." There is an exact parallelism between ver. 20, 21, and 22., with the exception that the words of the question τίνα οὖν καρπὸν εἶχετε; are exchanged for ἔχετε τὸν καρπὸν ὑμῶν in the succeeding verse.



21 ye were free\* as touching\* righteousness. What fruit  
 had ye then? things whereof ye are now ashamed; for  
 22 the end of those things is death. But now being made  
 free from sin, and become servants to God, ye have your  
 fruit unto sanctification\*, and the end everlasting life.  
 23 For the wages of sin is death; but the gift of God is  
 eternal life in\* Jesus Christ our Lord.

*ἐλεύθεροι τῇ δικαιοσύνῃ.*] Righteousness was not your master; you were free as far as she was concerned. The dative may be explained either by the parallelism of *δοῦλος* or as a dative of relation.

23. The evil that we receive at the hand of God is deserved, but the good undeserved. Sin has its wages, and yet eternal life is a free gift. How can we maintain this paradox, which is, moreover, a form of expression natural to us?

It is quite true that the good and evil which we receive at the hands of God is exactly proportioned by his justice and wisdom to our deserts. But what we intend to express by such forms of speech is:—(1.) Our feeling that he is, in a special sense, the author of our salvation as well as of all good; (2.) That whatever may be our deserts in his eye, they would lose their very nature if we regarded them as deserts.

## CHAP. VII.

Ver. 1—7.

IN the same way that in 1 Cor. ix. 9, 10., the Apostle argues from the verse in the law — “Thou shalt not muzzle the ox that treadeth out the corn,” adding that—“this was written for our sakes,” he proceeds, at the commencement of this chapter, to argue from a principle of the law which we have observed to have been already in his thoughts in ver. 7. of the chapter preceding. Such an argument, although by ourselves it would be regarded as a figure of speech or an illustration, was after the manner of those times, and came home with peculiar force to the mind of the Jew. The form of authority with which he introduces it, does not allow us to suppose that he intended it himself as an illustration. It would be more true to say that such a distinction as that between “illustration” and “argument” had no existence in the mind of the Apostle.

According to the similitude which the Apostle here uses, the relation of the Jew to the law is likened to the case of a wife who has lost her husband. As a widow the law, of course, said that she might marry again; her husband had no claim on her. Even so the law itself was dead, and the Jew was free to marry again to Christ, who was not dead, but risen from the dead.

There is, however, a difficulty in the application of the similitude in ver. 4, 5, 6. This arises from the believer being regarded in two points of view. In the figure he is compared to the wife, while in the application he seems to change places, and become identified with the husband, who, in a certain sense, as well as the wife, is freed from the law; for “he that is dead, has been freed from sin.” For this change there seem to be two reasons:—First, In working out the figure, the resemblance of the Christian to the husband as

well as to the wife, strikes the Apostle; for as the husband is dead, so also is the Christian dead to the law. Secondly, The change may be regarded as a sort of euphemism to Jewish ears. The Apostle avoids the harshness of saying that "the law is dead," by substituting "ye are dead to the law."

"The wife is dead to the law" in reference to a single point; that is, "she is loosed from the law of the husband" (ver. 2.), "she may marry again" (ver. 3.).

So also the chain is snapped by which the believer is bound to the law itself; he may marry again to "Him that is raised from the dead."

Instead, however, of drawing out further "the death of the law," the Apostle turns the figure round, and compares the believer no longer to the living wife, but to the dead husband (read ἀποθανόντες, in ver. 6.).

"The husband is dead to the law" in general; it has no more dominion over him: he is quit of it not in one point but in all. The dead husband, in ver. 4, 5, 6., equally with the surviving wife, in ver. 1, 2, 3., is an image of the relation in which the Christian stands to the law, as dying to it, although he survives it. See notes.

Besides the slighter verbal connexion of this passage with ver. 7. of the previous chapter (ὁ γὰρ ἀποθανὼν δεδικαίωται ἀπὸ τῆς ἁμαρτίας), which has been already mentioned, there is a deeper connexion also with the whole of the preceding subject.

In the previous chapter the believer had been described as dead unto sin, but alive unto righteousness. "Sin," said the Apostle, "shall have no more dominion over you; for ye are not under the law, but under grace." This thought he carries out further in the present passage, illustrating it by the particular case of the woman and the husband, which, in the language of the Epistle to the Galatians, shows, in a figure, "that the law is dead to us, and we to the law." The only difference is that in the last chapter what the Apostle was speaking of was a "death unto sin;" here rather of what in his view is so closely connected as to be almost identical with it, "a death unto the law." It is the close connexion between them that leads him to guard, in verse 7., against the possible inference that "the law is sin."



\* *Ἡ ἀγνοεῖτε, ἀδελφοί, (γινώσκουσιν γὰρ νόμον λαλῶ) ὅτι ὁ νόμος κυριεύει τοῦ ἀνθρώπου ἐφ' ὅσον χρόνον ζῆ; ἡ γὰρ ὑπανδρος γυνὴ τῷ ζῶντι ἀνδρὶ δέδεται νόμῳ· ἐὰν δὲ ἀποθάνῃ ὁ ἀνὴρ, κατήργηται ἀπὸ τοῦ νόμου τοῦ ἀνδρός. ἄρα οὖν ζῶντος τοῦ ἀνδρός μοιχαλὶς χρηματίζει, ἐὰν γένηται ἀνδρὶ ἐτέρῳ· ἐὰν δὲ ἀποθάνῃ ὁ ἀνὴρ, ἐλευθέρα ἐστὶν ἀπὸ τοῦ νόμου, τοῦ μὴ εἶναι αὐτὴν μοιχαλίδα, γενομένην ἀνδρὶ ἐτέρῳ. ὥστε, ἀδελφοί μου, καὶ ὑμεῖς ἐθανατώθητε τῷ νόμῳ διὰ τοῦ σώματος τοῦ χριστοῦ, εἰς τὸ γενέσθαι ὑμᾶς ἐτέρῳ, τῷ ἐκ νεκρῶν ἐγερθέντι, ἵνα καρποφορήσωμεν τῷ θεῷ. ὅτε γὰρ ἦμεν ἐν τῇ σαρκί, τὰ παθήματα τῶν ἁμαρτιῶν τὰ διὰ τοῦ νόμου ἐνηργεῖτο ἐν τοῖς μέλεσιν ἡμῶν εἰς τὸ καρπο-*

VII. The Apostle begins by asserting the general principle, and illustrates it by a particular case. He reminds the Roman Church that they knew the law (a passing allusion not without interest and importance to us. See Introduction). Now the power of the law, as they also knew, did not extend beyond life; the proof of this being the familiar case of the dissolution by death of the relations of husband and wife.

1. *τοῦ ἀνθρώπου, of the man.*] Not the husband, but the subject of the law.

*ἐφ' ὅσον χρόνον ζῆ.*] Not "so long as the law liveth" (which, if the expression were itself tolerable, would be a self-evident and unmeaning proposition); but, "so long as he, that is, the man liveth, who is the subject of the law."

*δέδεται, κατήργηται,* "has been and is," the perfect expressing the continuance of the state of bondage or freedom from the law. The word *καταργεῖσθαι*, "to be set at nought, made void," is here used *structurâ prægnanti*;

that is, it is followed by *ἀπὸ* as though some other verb had preceded. Compare Gal. v. 4.: *κατηργήθητε ἀπὸ τοῦ χριστοῦ.*

*χρηματίζειν*, in its earlier sense, means to do business, to give audience: hence its two meanings in the New Testament: (1.) simply to be called or have a title, as Polybius (v. 57. 2.) uses the expression, *βασιλέα χρηματίζειν*, and here *μοιχαλίς χρηματίζει*; Acts xi. 26., *χρηματῖσαι χριστιανούς*: (2.) in the passive *χρηματίζεσθαι*, to be warned, or receive an answer or intimation, as in the phrase *χρηματισθεὶς κατ' ὄναρ*, Matt. ii. 22.

4. *ὥστε ὑμεῖς ἐθανατώθητε.*] The Apostle changes the figure. The words *ἐθανατώθητε* and *ἀποθανόντες* are too strong to allow us to suppose that he is still describing the death of the believer to the law under the image of the wife; who is not dead, but only freed by death. This latter image, however, reappears in the next words, *εἰς τὸ γενέσθαι ὑμᾶς ἐτέρῳ*. For a similar change, comp. ch. vi. 5, 6, 7.; 1 Thess. v. 2. 4.

*διὰ τοῦ σώματος τοῦ χριστοῦ.*]

7 Know ye not, brethren, (for I speak to them that  
 know the law,) how that the law hath dominion over a  
 2 man as long as he liveth? For the woman which hath  
 an husband is bound by the law to her husband\* that  
 liveth; but if the husband be dead, she is loosed from  
 3 the law of her husband. So then if, while her husband  
 liveth, she be married to another man, she shall be  
 called an adulteress: but if her husband be dead, she is  
 free from that law; so that she is no adulteress, though  
 4 she be married to another man. Wherefore, my brethren,  
 ye also are become dead to the law by the body of  
 Christ; that ye should be married to another, to him who  
 is raised from the dead, that we should bring forth fruit  
 5 unto God. For when we were in the flesh, the motions  
 of sins, which were by the law, did work in our members

These words have been paraphrased by some interpreters:—  
 “Through the body of Christ, which is the substance of which the law is the shadow,” as in Col. ii. 17.: ὁ ἐστὶν σκιά τῶν μελόντων, τὸ δὲ σῶμα τοῦ χριστοῦ. Here, however, σῶμα is only used for substance, in opposition to σκιά. In our present passage, it is better to understand διὰ τοῦ σώματος τοῦ χριστοῦ, as meaning “by the death of Christ,” which is thus signified by his mortal part, in opposition to ἐγεθέντι. The word σῶμα may have been chosen instead of θάνατος, to express the accessory idea of a communion of many members in one body, as in Col. i. 24., “The body of Christ which is the church.” Comp. above vi. 3., ἐβαπτίσθητε εἰς τὸν θάνατον; and the Christian use of the figure of marriage, Eph. v. 32., “This is a great mystery, but I speak concerning Christ and the church;” also 1 Cor. vi. 17., ὁ

κολλώμενος τῷ κυρίῳ ἐν πνεύμα ἔστιν.

καρποφορῆσαι,] here and in v. 5., is an allusion to the word καρπός, in ver. 21, 22., of the previous chapter.

5. Goes back a step to contrast the previous with the present state; γὰρ is explanatory:—“For when we were in the state of sinful flesh, that is, when we were under the law, the sinful affections which the law created, wrought in our members to bring forth fruit unto death.”

The Apostle here takes the same view of the relation of the law and sin as in the following paragraph. Death is not the consequence of sin, but rather the joint result of sin and of the law.

τὰ παθήματα τῶν ἁμαρτιῶν.] The affections which spring from sins or which cause sins; or better, more generally, which belong to sins. Compare πάθη ἐπιθυμίας.

φορηῆσαι τῷ θανάτῳ· νυνὶ δὲ κατηργήθημεν ἀπὸ τοῦ νόμου, ἀποθανόντες<sup>1</sup> ἐν ᾧ κατειχόμεθα, ὥστε δουλεύειν [ἡμᾶς] ἐν καινότητι πνεύματος καὶ οὐ παλαιότητι γραμματος.

<sup>1</sup> ἀποθανόντος.

τὰ διὰ τοῦ νόμου] not "in the state of the law," but "of which the law is the instrument." Comp. ver. 8. and ch. v. ver. 19.

6. νυνὶ δὲ κατηργήθημεν ἀπὸ τοῦ νόμου, ἀποθανόντος τοῦ θανάτου ἐν ᾧ κατειχόμεθα, Δ. G. f. g. v.

νυνὶ δὲ κατηργήθημεν ἀπὸ τοῦ νόμου ἀποθανόντες ἐν ᾧ κατειχόμεθα, A. B. C.

The latter reading, which is adopted by Lachmann, is probably the true one. It is sometimes translated "Being dead to that wherein we were held." It is simpler to connect ἐν ᾧ with ἀπὸ τοῦ νόμου. "But now, by dying, we are separated from the law in which we were held."

ὥστε δουλεύειν ἡμᾶς.] Comp. vi. 22. The moral and the positive, the written and the unwritten, the letter that killeth and the Spirit that giveth life, are contrary the one to the other.

7—25. The question which naturally arises in reading the following passage, is that of the Eunuch to Philip:—"Of whom saith the Apostle this, of himself or of another?" or, in other words:—"Is he speaking of the regenerate or of the unregenerate man?" Accordingly as we answer this question, the doctrine of the Epistle assumes a different character. If we say "of himself and the regenerate man," might we not add in his own words?—"Your faith is vain, ye are yet in your sins." The Gospel has done nothing more

than strengthen and deepen the consciousness of sin. By the Gospel, no less than by the law, shall "no flesh be justified;" "for," as we may reason with the Apostle (iii. 20.), "by the gospel is the knowledge of sin." Then is the believer "of all men most miserable;" for, assuredly, the heathen is not subject to that distraction of nature, which is here described. He has passed into a state in which he is not one but two; instead of being reconciled with God, he is at war with self. The light of peace is not within him, but at a distance from him; seen, for a moment only, revealing the nature of the struggle.

Nothing but the exigencies of controversy would have induced Augustine, against his better mind and the authority of the earlier Fathers, to refer this passage to the condition of the regenerate man. He was led to this interpretation, as others have been, by the equal, if not greater, difficulty of referring the description of the Apostle to the unregenerate.

The latter interpretation is plainly repugnant to the spirit of the passage; for whom shall we conceive the Apostle to be describing? or, rather, which is the same thing, whom do we ourselves mean by the term unregenerate? Is it the Jew, or the heathen, or the hypocrite, or the sensualist? To none of these characters will



6 to bring forth fruit unto death. But now, being dead, we are delivered from the law<sup>1</sup> wherein we were held; and so\* we serve in newness of spirit, and not in the oldness of the letter.

<sup>1</sup> *Omit* "being dead," and add "that being dead" after "the law."

such a description refer. They know of no struggle between the things they would and would not; they live in no twilight between good and evil; their state is a lower and less conscious one. Who would speak of the unregenerate heart of Cæsar or of Achilles? Language itself teaches us the impropriety of such expressions. And the reason of the impropriety is, that we feel with the Apostle, though our point of view may be somewhat different, that the guilt of sin is inseparable from the knowledge of sin. Those who never heard the name of Christ, who never admit the thought of Christ, cannot be brought within the circle of Christian feelings and associations.

There have been few more frequent sources of difficulty in theology, than the common fallacy of summing up inquiries under two alternatives, neither of which corresponds to the true nature of the case. We may admit the logical proposition that all things are animal or not animal, vegetable or not vegetable, mineral or not mineral. But we cannot say that all men are civilised or uncivilised, Christian or unchristian, regenerate or unregenerate. Such a mode of division is essentially erroneous. It exercises a false influence on the mind, by tending to confuse fixed states and transitions, differences in degree with

differences in kind. All things may be passing out of one class into another, and may therefore belong to both or neither. The very attempt to classify or divide them may itself be the source of an illusion.

Obvious as such a fallacy is, it is only by the light of experience that theology can be freed from it. From "the oppositions of knowledge falsely so called," we turn to the human heart itself. Reading this passage by what we know of ourselves and other men, we no longer ask the question:—"Whether the Apostle is speaking of the regenerate or unregenerate man?"—That is an "after-thought," which has nothing to correspond to it in the world, and nothing to justify it in the language of the Apostle. Mankind are not divided into regenerate and unregenerate, but are in a state of transition from one to the other, or too dead and unconscious to be included in either. What we want to know is the meaning of the Apostle, not in the terms of a theological problem, but in the simpler manner in which it presented itself to his own mind.

He is speaking of a conflict in the soul of man, the course of which, notwithstanding its sudden and fitful character, is nevertheless marked by a certain progress. It commences in childish and unconscious ignorance—"I was alive without the law

Τί οὖν ἐροῦμεν; ὁ νόμος ἁμαρτία; μὴ γένοιτο· ἀλλὰ 7  
 τὴν ἁμαρτίαν οὐκ ἔγνων εἰ μὴ διὰ νόμου. τὴν τε γὰρ  
 ἐπιθυμίαν οὐκ ᾔδεν, εἰ μὴ ὁ νόμος ἔλεγεν, Οὐκ ἐπιθυμήσεις·  
 ἀφορμὴν δὲ λαβοῦσα ἡ ἁμαρτία διὰ τῆς ἐντολῆς κατειργά- 8

once”), which is succeeded by the deep consciousness of sin, which the law awakens, and so hovering between death and life, passes on to the last agony and final deliverance. The stages of this contest are not exactly defined. In the earliest of them is an element of reason and of good; in the latest, we seem only to arrive at a more intense conviction of human misery. The progress is not a progress from works to faith, or from the law to grace, but a growing separation and division, in which the soul is cut in two — into the better and the worse mind, the inner and the outer man, the flesh and the Spirit. The law is the dividing principle, “sharper than any two-edged sword,” which will not allow them to unite. On the one side remains the flesh, as it were, a decomposing body of death; on the other, the mind and spirit flutter in lawless aspirations after good which they have no means or instruments to attain. The extremity of the conflict is the moment of deliverance; when completely in the power of sin, we are already at the gate of heaven.

In this spiritual combat, in the description of which he adopts the first person, is he really speaking of himself or of some other man? The question with which we began has been already answered. The description which has just been given, could not have been meant as an epitome of his own

daily experience. It may describe the struggle of Luther at a particular crisis of his life, not the habitual temper of St. Paul. We cannot imagine him daily “doing the things that he would not, and not doing the things that he would.” Least of all can we suppose him to say this of himself just after the words which have preceded, in which he has been contrasting the present service of the believer “in newness of Spirit,” with oldness of the letter. One might ask further, which of the many states which are described in this passage (vii. 7—viii. 17.) is the state of the Apostle himself? On the other hand, it is true that the use of the first person is not merely rhetorical. It seems as though the Apostle were speaking partly from recollections of his former state, partly from the emotions of sin, which he still perceived in his members, now indeed pacified and kept under control, yet sufficiently sensible to give a liveliness to the remembrance, and make him feel his dependence on Christ. So much of the struggle continued in him as he himself describes in such passages as 2 Cor. i. 9, 10., or xii. 7. He who says, “without were fightings, within fears” (2 Cor. v. 7.), who had “the sentence of death in himself,” and “a messenger of Satan to buffet him,” could not have lived always in an unbroken calm of mind, any more than we can imagine him to have been



- 7 What shall we say then? Is the law sin? God forbid. Nay, I had not known sin, but by the law: for I had not known lust, except the law had said, Thou shalt not lust.\* But sin, taking occasion by the com-

constantly repeating, "O wretched man that I am!" Further, we may remark, that the combat, as it deepens, becomes more ideal, — that is, removes further away from the actual consciousness of mankind; the Apostle is describing tendencies in the heart of man which go beyond the experience of individuals.

7. *Τί οὖν ἐροῦμεν; What shall we say then?*] If the law was the instrument whereby the motions of sins worked in our members (ver. 5.), if we are freed from sin by being dead to the law (ver. 6.), what shall we say? "Is the law sin?" It has been nearly identified in what precedes, it is all but sin in what follows. There is reason for us to pause before going further.

*ὁ νόμος, the law.*] But what law? the Mosaic, or the law written on the heart? We can only gather from the passage itself, which leads us rather to think of a terrible consciousness of sin, than of questions of new moons, and sabbaths. "What shall we say then," we might paraphrase, "is conscience sin?"

To shift the meaning of *νόμος*, or to assign remote and different significations to the word in successive verses, may seem like a trick of the interpreter. Whether it really be so or not, must depend on the fact of how St. Paul uses the word, and on the general use of language in his age. Compare Col. ii. 16—23. for three distinct uses of the word *σῶμα*; also vii.

21—viii. 4. for several changes in the sense of *νόμος*, and viii. 19—22. for similar changes in the sense of *κτίσις*.

*μὴ γένοιτο.*] If by being freed from the law, we are freed from sin what shall we say? "Is the law sin?" It comes indeed very near to being so, because sin is inseparable from the consciousness of sin which, considered objectively, is the law. But on the other hand, such is the paradoxical nature of the law, that in another point of view it delivers us from sin. Without the law there is no sin, and no possibility of avoiding sin. We feel its evil, we cannot also avoid acknowledging its truth. *ἀλλὰ* emphatically introduces an adverse fact, "nay; so far is the law from being sin — I should never have known of sin but for the law." *οὐκ ἔγνων*: *ἂν* is omitted, as in ix. 3. and with *οὐκ ἤδειν*, the omission adding force, as, in English, "I had" is a stronger expression than "I should have had."

*τήν τε γὰρ ἐπιθυμίαν,*] has no reference to particular precepts. The Apostle means to say, "I had never known lust, which is the parent of sin (cf. James i. 15.), but for the law: lust would not have been lust to me but for the general command of the law, 'Thou shalt not lust.'" *ἤδειν* and *ἔγνων*, in the sense of acquaintance with a person.

8. In this verse the Apostle turns to the other side of the argument. The extremes meet.



σατο ἐν ἐμοὶ πᾶσαν ἐπιθυμίαν. χωρὶς γὰρ νόμου ἁμαρτία 9  
 νεκρά, ἐγὼ δὲ ἔζων χωρὶς νόμου ποτέ· ἐλθούσης δὲ τῆς  
 ἐντολῆς ἡ ἁμαρτία ἀνέζησεν, ἐγὼ δὲ ἀπέθανον, καὶ εὐρέθη 10  
 μοι ἡ ἐντολὴ ἡ εἰς ζωὴν, αὕτη εἰς θάνατον· ἡ γὰρ ἁμαρτία 11  
 ἀφορμὴν λαβοῦσα διὰ τῆς ἐντολῆς ἐξηπάτησέν με καὶ δι'  
 αὐτῆς ἀπέκτεινεν. ὥστε ὁ μὲν νόμος ἅγιος, καὶ ἡ ἐντολὴ 12

The law forbade me to sin, and yet sin took its occasion and origin through the law. For sin without the law is dead, non-existent, not sin at all.

The law is sin, for without the law sin could not exist.

The law is not sin, for the law itself says — “Thou shalt not commit sin.”

So far as sin is inseparable from the consciousness of sin, the law is the strength of sin.

So far as the knowledge of sin is the first step to amendment, the law is the opposite of sin.

It may be asked, How can the law increase the temptation to sin? It may not make men better; how does it make them worse? Human nature errs under the influence of passion, from propensities, as Bishop Butler terms them, towards external objects, not because there is a law which forbids them. For a fuller answer to this difficulty the reader is referred to the Essay on the Law as the Strength of Sin, the heads of which may be summed up as follows:—

First, By sin the Apostle means the consciousness of sin, *conscientia peccati*, not any mere external act vicious or criminal. This consciousness of sin is the reflection of the law in the mind of the subject. The law = the consciousness of sin; the consciousness of sin = sin, *i. e.* the

law is almost sin. But secondly, It must not be lost sight of that, by the law, the Jewish law is also partly meant, with its ever increasing burden of ordinances, which in an altered world it was impossible to obey, seeming by its hostility to the preaching of the Gospel to be an element of discord in the world, like the consciousness of evil in the soul of man. Thirdly, The state which the Apostle describes in the following verses, is in some degree ideal and imaginary. It begins with absolute ignorance (I was alive without the law once), and ends with the utter disruption of the soul between will and knowledge. But these extreme cases do not exist in fact, though they may be truly used to exhibit tendencies in human nature. If we imagine Adam in a state of innocence, a child not yet in the simplicity of its nature come to a knowledge of right and wrong, and at the other extreme a sinner plunged in the recklessness of despair by the contrast of his life and the holiness of God, and at some point of this progress the law coming in that the offence may abound, there will be less difficulty in comprehending the Apostle's meaning; the real difficulty being to fix the point of view from which the description is drawn.

9. *χωρὶς γὰρ νόμου* gives a second

9 mandment, wrought in me all manner of lust.\* For  
 without the law sin was dead, and\* I was alive without  
 the law once: but when the commandment came, sin  
 10 revived, and I died. And the commandment, which  
 11 was to life, I found to be unto death. For sin, taking  
 occasion by the commandment, deceived me, and by it  
 12 slew me. Wherefore the law is holy, and the command-

reason why "I had not known sin," which is the first expressed over again in a negative form: "For the commandment quickened sin; for, without the law, sin was dead." ἐγὼ δὲ is opposed to ἀμαρτία, as ἀνέζησε to ἐζών, and ἀπέθανον to ἀνέζησε.

Sin and the law came into existence in me at once. "There was a time before the law when I was alive." Perhaps, in childhood, as the Apostle says in I Cor. xiii. 11., "When I was a child, I thought as a child;" or, without any particular reference, "I was alive when I was unconscious of the law," whether the state of unconsciousness be that of childhood, or of what we sometimes term the childhood of the human race, ere the law was given.

"But when the commandment came, sin revived, and I died." The Apostle is not speaking of his committing actual sin and suffering death as a penalty. What is here termed death is the state which he is about to describe, in which the soul has no harmony either with the natural or the spiritual world.

10. And the commandment which was to life, was found by me to be unto death.

An illustration may assist us in realising the Apostle's meaning. Suppose a person liable to

two bodily disorders of a different kind. He is weak, but the means taken to restore health and strength raise a fever in his veins. If we could keep him weak, he might live; as it is, he dies. So it might be said of the law, that it is too strong a medicine for the human soul.

11. ἐξηπάτησεν, *deceived me.*]

The passions of men's nature carry them away from the service of God and virtue. But the law has a further operation; it is the instrument of deception which is employed in the service of sin. (Compare 2 Cor. xi. 3.: "As the serpent deceived Eve.") We may figure sin pointing to the law; it says, "Lo! this is what God requires of thee. Sin boldly, for thou canst not obey." The soul, taught out of the law, knows the truth of this. It cannot answer the reasonings of sin, which has found an occasion against it out of the law itself. Compare v. 13.

The difficulty of the verse arises from its figurative character. In plain language, the Apostle means generally what he had said before, that the law made sin to be what it is. The word ἐξηπάτησε only implies further, that the law causes the insidiousness of sin; it makes sin to be sin and also deception.

12. is connected with the whole of the preceding passage. "Is



ἀγία καὶ δικαία καὶ ἀγαθή· τὸ οὖν ἀγαθὸν ἐμοὶ ἐγένετο<sup>1</sup> 13  
 θάνατος; μὴ γένοιτο, ἀλλ' ἡ ἁμαρτία, ἵνα φανῇ ἁμαρτία,  
 διὰ τοῦ ἀγαθοῦ μοι κατεργαζομένη θάνατον, ἵνα γένηται  
 καθ' ὑπερβολὴν ἁμαρτωλὸς ἡ ἁμαρτία διὰ τῆς ἐντολῆς.  
 οἶδαμεν γὰρ ὅτι ὁ νόμος πνευματικός ἐστίν, ἐγὼ δὲ σάρ- 14

<sup>1</sup> γέγονε.

the law sin?" After balancing the two sides of this question, the conclusion at which the Apostle arrives is, that the law is "holy, just, and good." It was the law that made sin to be what it was, and it is true that this comes very near to the law being itself sin. But the other side has also to be put forward. Sin is the active cause, the law only the occasion, the deceiver being human nature itself, and the law forbidding sin at the moment it seems to create it. So that the law, in itself, is no more polluted than the sun in the heavens by the corruption on which it looks. The obscurity in this, as in many other passages, arises from the Apostle, in the alternation of thought, dwelling too long on that side of the argument, which, for the sake of clearness, should have been subordinate. In this instance, he has said so much of the commandment being found unto death and the occasion of sin, that he is obliged to make a violent resumption of the thought with which he commenced.

13. But a person might ask, How can I call it good? Did that which was good, become death unto me? The answer admits of being taken in two ways:—(1.) Not so; but sin, that it might appear sin, was working death to me through the good (sup. ἦν); or, (2.) Not so; it was not the good, but sin that became death, that

it might appear, as it really was, working death through the good.

The first and second ἵνα admit of being construed in three ways: either they may be co-ordinated so that the second is the epexegetis of the first, as thus, "Sin, that it might appear sin, that it might become more sin;" or the second ἵνα may be made subordinate and regarded as carrying the thought a step further, "Sin, that it might appear sin, and by appearing become yet more sin,"—a thought which seems to be much after the manner of St. Paul; or, lastly, the second ἵνα may be connected with the clause immediately preceding, as follows:—

ἡ ἁμαρτία [ἐγένετο θάνατος] ἵνα φανῇ ἁμαρτία.

διὰ τοῦ ἀγαθοῦ μοι κατεργαζομένη θάνατον, ἵνα γένηται καθ' ὑπερβολὴν ἁμαρτωλὸς.

We can imagine a state of mind in an individual, or a condition in society, in which vice loses "half its grossness," and some of its real evil, either by the veil of refinement beneath which it is concealed, or by the very naturalness to the human mind of vice itself. Suppose the person or society here spoken of, to wake up on a sudden to a consciousness of the holiness of God and the requirements of his law; suppose further, they were made aware of the contrast between their own life and the Divine rule, yet were powerless to



<sup>13</sup> ment holy, and just, and good; was then that which is good made death unto me? God forbid. But sin, that it might appear sin, working death to\* me by that which is good; that sin by the commandment might  
<sup>14</sup> become exceeding sinful. For we know that the law is

change, knowing everything, yet able to accomplish nothing, sensitive to the pangs of conscience, yet "unequal to the performance of any duty;" of such it might be said, in a figure—"Sin became death that it might appear sin, working death to us through that which is good, that sin might become exceeding sinful."

Thus far in tracing the progress of the spiritual conflict, the Apostle has employed the aorist; at ver. 14. he introduces the present. This has led some commentators, who agree in the view that it is neither of the regenerate nor of the unregenerate the Apostle can be speaking exclusively, to suppose further that the change of tense which he here adopts, is an indication of the transition from one to the other. This change, however, is more probably attributable to liveliness of style; at any rate, it is sufficiently accounted for by the greater reality which the Apostle gives to the latter part of his description.

The progress of which St. Paul is speaking may be arranged in six stages:—

(1.) The state of nature: "I was alive without the law once." ver. 9.

(2.) The awakening of nature to the requirements of the law, and the death of sin. ver. 9—11.

(3.) The growing consciousness of right and severance of the soul into two parts, as the sense of right prevails. ver. 15—23.

(4.) Sin, which was originally a mere perversion, strengthening into a law which opposes itself to the law of God. ver. 23, 24.

(5.) Laying aside of the worse half of the soul, that is, justification. ver. 25.

(6.) Peace and glory. viii. 1.

It would be unlike the manner of St. Paul to draw out these stages in perfectly regular order. Here, as elsewhere, he goes to and fro, and returns upon his former thought. In chapter viii., for example, when the soul has already entered into its rest, he again casts his eye upon the believer's state from his earthly side, "groaning within himself, waiting for the redemption of the body."

14—23. In what follows the Apostle deepens the opposition between the law and self, or (what is nearly the same) between the better and the worse self, as they belong to two orders of things, and are of two natures, the one spiritual, the other fleshly; the proof (*γὰρ*) that man falls under the latter being his very distraction with self, which is a witness to the truth of the law, and which seems almost to transfer his actions from himself to the sin which is personified in him; for (*γὰρ*) this is the whole man, nothing more of him remaining, but the scarcely surviving will to do what is right. v. 18—20. Both these principles may be recognised under the

κινός<sup>1</sup> εἰμι πεπραμένος ὑπὸ τὴν ἁμαρτίαν. ὁ γὰρ κατεργάζομαι, οὐ γινώσκω· οὐ γὰρ ὁ θέλω, τοῦτο πράσσω, ἀλλ' ὁ μισῶ, τοῦτο ποιῶ. εἰ δὲ ὁ οὐ θέλω, τοῦτο ποιῶ, σύμφημι τῷ νόμῳ ὅτι καλός· νυνὶ δὲ οὐκέτι ἐγὼ κατεργάζομαι αὐτό, ἀλλὰ ἡ οἰκοῦσα ἐν ἐμοὶ ἁμαρτία. οἶδα γὰρ ὅτι οὐκ οἰκεί ἐν ἐμοί, τουτέστιν ἐν τῇ σαρκί μου, ἀγαθόν. τὸ γὰρ θέλειν παράκειται μοι, τὸ δὲ κατεργάζεσθαι τὸ καλὸν οὐ.<sup>2</sup> οὐ γὰρ

<sup>1</sup> σα, κινός.<sup>2</sup> Add εἶρσκα.

form of a law: the law of sin dwelling in its fleshly seat, which corresponds to the first of them; the law of God, which is the law of the mind, which corresponds to the latter.

14. For we know that there is a contrariety between me and the law—the law is spiritual, I am carnal. γὰρ contains the proof of the goodness of the law, and also the reason for its being an element of discord.

The language of the New Testament does not conform to any received views of psychology. It is the language partly of the Old Testament, but still more of the Alexandrian philosophy, which is defined neither by popular nor by scientific use. In modern times we do not divide the soul into its better and worse half, but into will, reason, consciousness, and other faculties which, for the most part, belong equally to good and bad. Such is, however, the fundamental division of the Apostle. There is a heavenly and earthly, a higher and a lower principle; the first, whereby we hold communion with God himself, the Spirit; the second, the flesh, or corrupt soil of sin, scarcely distinguishable from sin itself. These two do not correspond to mind and body,

which are only the figures under which they are expressed.

15. ὁ γὰρ κατεργάζομαι, *for what I do.*] Not, “I do not approve what I do;”—a meaning which the word γινώσκω does not admit, — but simply, “I know not what I do.” In the state of which the Apostle is speaking, the mind knows not, from very distraction, what it does. It is darkened as in the confusion of a storm, or the din and cloud of a battle. This is the proof that he is sold under sin, a blind slave.

It may be argued that this explanation is inconsistent with what follows. For in the next clause it is not defect of knowledge that is touched upon; but rather defect of power to do what he desired, and therefore knew to be right. Such an analysis is too minute to catch the true spirit of the Apostle. He is only presenting successive images of the distraction of the soul, first, in not knowing what it did; secondly, in doing what it would not. No one would feel that there was a contradiction if, in describing a scene of hurry and confusion, some one were to say, “I knew not what I was about. I did the very opposite of what I intended.”

Θέλω is emphatic, as is seen by

15 spiritual: but I am carnal, sold under sin. For what \* I  
do I know \* not: for what I would, that do I not; but  
16 what I hate, that do I. If then I do that which I would  
17 not, I consent unto the law that it is good: and now \*  
it is no more I that do it, but sin that dwelleth in me.  
18 For I know that in me (that is, in my flesh) dwelleth  
no good thing: for to will is present with me; but how  
19 to perform that which is good,<sup>1</sup> not. For the good that

<sup>1</sup> Add I find.

its opposition to *μισῶ* in the following clause; not what I will, but what I wish. The Apostle is describing a state, not in which the better mind is passive and the worse mind active, but in which they are both together active; in which for every bad act which a man does, conscience rebukes him and makes him feel that it has a pain equal to its pleasures. For illustration of such a state comp. Xenoph. Cyr. vi. 1.: *Δύο γὰρ σαφῶς ἔχω ψυχάς· οὐ γὰρ δὴ μία γε οὕσα ἅμα ἀγαθὴ καὶ ἐστὶ καὶ κακὴ, οὐδ' ἅμα καλῶν τε καὶ αἰσχροῶν ἔργων ἐρά, καὶ ταῦτα ἅμα βούλεται τε καὶ οὐ βούλεται*: also the *ἀκρατής* of Aristotle's Ethics, and the fine figure of the soul being like the palsied limbs, in the first book; and Plato, Rep. iv. p. 43.

16. This very unwillingness to do wrong is a witness to the law. The law, it is true, is the occasion of sin; and yet this very sin done against the admonitions of the law, is a witness to that which occasioned it. The law made me sin and made me acknowledge the sin at once.

17. *νυνὶ δέ, and now.*] That is, considering this, I may fairly say it is no more I that do it, but sin that dwelleth in me. First

came the state of death, that is, of absolute discord; secondly, the consciousness of this; thirdly, a dim light of salvation springs up from the sense that it is not ourselves, but the infirmity of sin that does the evil. It is not I that do it; but sin, my master, takes up his abode with me, and carries me whither I would not.

In this passage, between ver. 14. and 25., the Apostle may be said three times to change his identity:—First of all, he is one with his worse nature, which, as having the power to turn the balance of his actions, claims to be the whole man; secondly, with his better nature, which makes a perceptible though ineffectual struggle against the power of evil; and, thirdly, he separates himself from both, and overlooks the strife between them, ver. 21—23.

18. Here is a further change in the personality of the speaker:—“I know that in me,” which is explained to mean “in my flesh,” there is, as it were standing by my side, the wish for the good, but not the accomplishment of the good. *οὐχ εὐρίσκω*, the reading of the Text. Recep. and of Δ. G. f. g. v., if genuine, is a continuation of the figure of *παράκειται*; cf. ver. 21.

19, 20. A repetition, with



ὃ θέλω ποιῶ ἀγαθόν, ἀλλ' ὃ οὐ θέλω κακόν, τοῦτο πράσσω.  
 εἰ δὲ ὃ οὐ θέλω<sup>1</sup>, τοῦτο ποιῶ, οὐκέτι ἐγὼ κατεργάζομαι 20  
 αὐτό, ἀλλ' ἡ οἰκοῦσα ἐν ἐμοὶ ἁμαρτία. εὐρίσκω ἄρα τὸν 21  
 νόμον τῷ θέλοντι ἐμοὶ ποιεῖν τὸ καλόν, ὅτι ἐμοὶ τὸ κακόν  
 παράκειται· συνήδομαι γὰρ τῷ νόμῳ τοῦ θεοῦ κατὰ τὸν 22  
 ἔσω ἄνθρωπον, βλέπω δὲ ἕτερον νόμον ἐν τοῖς μέλεσίν μου 23  
 ἀντιστρατευόμενον τῷ νόμῳ τοῦ νοός μου καὶ αἰχμαλωτί-  
 ζοντά με τῷ νόμῳ τῆς ἁμαρτίας τῷ ὄντι ἐν τοῖς μέλεσίν  
 μου. ταλαίπωρος ἐγὼ ἄνθρωπος· τίς με ῥύσεται ἐκ τοῦ 24

<sup>1</sup> Add ἐγώ.

slightly altered phraseology, of 15, 16., "If I do it not;" it is now said, not I agree to the law that it is good—but "sin that dwelleth in me doeth it." Compare Gal. ii. 20. for a similar personification.

21. The various interpretations of this verse, accordingly as ὅτι is rendered by "that" or "because," may be divided into two classes. First, with ὅτι, in the sense of because: "I find out, or am made conscious of the law, because evil is present with me." The thought thus elicited is not unlike the manner of St. Paul, but the use of εὐρίσκω is indefensible. We are thus driven to the other interpretation of ὅτι, "that;" the clause dependent on which may be explained in two ways:—either, "I find then when I desire to do well, that the law as the evil is present with me;" or, what seems better and more in accordance with the words τὸ θέλειν παράκειται in the eighteenth verse, "I find then the law (like the law in the members below) that when I desire to do well, evil is present with me." The slight play in the expression is analogous to the νόμος τῆς

πίστεως in the third chapter, and the νόμος τῆς ἁμαρτίας in the eighth.

22. For if I may make a distinction in myself of the inner man and outer man (compare I Pet. iii. 4.: ὁ κρυπτός τῆς καρδίας ἄνθρωπος. Eph. iii. 16.: κραταιωθῆναι διὰ τοῦ πνεύματος αὐτοῦ εἰς τὸν ἔσω ἄνθρωπον), "in my heart of hearts" I rejoice in the law of God. Withdraw man from the flesh, from the passions and their objects, and there is something within which acknowledges the supremacy of right, whether we term it reason, or the inner man, or the true self. No one loves evil for its own sake.

συνήδομαι, according to Hesychius, is sometimes put for ἐφήδομαι: the case which follows is also said by grammarians to be governed of the verb, not of the preposition. It is more natural to suppose a double construction, σὺν expressing consciousness, as in σύννοια, συμμαρτυρῶ: "Conscious of the law I delight in it."

23. In the short space between the twenty-first and the twenty-third death which clings to me as a body?

I would I do not : but the evil which I would not, that  
 20 I do. Now if I do that I would not, it is no more I that  
 21 do it, but sin that dwelleth in me. I find then the\*  
 law, that, when I would do good, evil is present with me.  
 22 For I delight in the law of God after the inward man:  
 23 but I see another law in my members, warring against  
 the law of my mind, and bringing me into captivity to  
 24 the law of sin which is in my members. O wretched  
 man that I am ! who shall deliver me from the body of

third verses there occur five modifications of the word νόμος :—  
 (1.) The play of words alluded to above, “the law that evil is present with him.” (2.) The law of God, that is, the law of Moses “in the Spirit,” not “in the letter ;” or, as we might express it, “idealised.” (3.) The same law presented under a different aspect, as νόμος τοῦ νοός, or conscience. (4.) νόμος ἐν τοῖς μέλεσιν. (5.) νόμος τῆς ἁμαρτίας. Borrowing the language of philosophical distinctions, we may arrange them as follows :—

Subject.  
 νόμος τοῦ νοός.  
 νόμος ἐν τοῖς μέλεσιν.

Object.  
 νόμος τοῦ Θεοῦ.  
 νόμος τῆς ἁμαρτίας.

See on ver. 7.

The 23rd verse describes a further progress in the conflict. At first the two “laws” are opposed to each other ; but at length the worse “law” gets the better, and the soul passes on to consider evil as a sort of internal necessity to which it is by nature liable. The ἕτερος νόμος is only distinguished from the νόμος τῆς ἁμαρτίας, as the wavering emotion of the will from the settled

inward principle. The first is the temptation of the natural desires ; the second, the law of despair.

The Gospel is often opposed to the law, as the inward to the outward. Here the law of sin is equally figured as internal ; though within, that is, in the flesh and the members, it is still incapable of harmonising with our better life. We might illustrate its relation to the soul, by the example of those poisons whose introduction into the body is said to destroy life because they never become a part of the human frame.

αἰχμαλωτίζοντα.] For the figure compare πεπραμένος, ver. 16.

24. At last we arrive at the crisis :—“O wretched man that I am ! who shall deliver me from the body of this death ?” Of the last words, τοῦ σώματος τοῦ θανάτου τούτου ; no less than four explanations may be given :—

(1.) Who will deliver me from this mortal body ? or,

(2.) Who will deliver me from this mass of death ? or,

(3.) Who will deliver me from this frame or structure of death, of which, as it were, my members are parts ? or,

(4.) Who will deliver me from

σώματος τοῦ θανάτου τούτου ; χάρις<sup>1</sup> τῷ θεῷ διὰ Ἰησοῦ <sup>25</sup>  
 χριστοῦ τοῦ κυρίου ἡμῶν. ἄρα οὖν αὐτὸς ἐγὼ τῷ μὲν νοῦ  
 δουλεύω νόμῳ θεοῦ, τῇ δὲ σαρκὶ νόμῳ ἁμαρτίας.

<sup>1</sup> εὐχαριστῶ.

No. 1. is ill suited to the connexion; (2.) *σῶμα* does not mean a mass; (3.) the idea of the members which occurs in the previous verse may possibly be included; (4.) is most in accordance with the style of St. Paul. As in Rom. vi. 6. sin, so here death is itself the body, death in this passage being nothing more than the last stage of sin. The two expressions "body of sin," "body of death," may be regarded as precisely parallel. A remote allusion is probably intended to the words *ἐν τοῖς μέλεσιν*, which precede. This, however, should not be taken as if the body consisted

of the members. For while it is natural to speak as in 1 Cor. vi. 15. of the members of the body of Christ, it is not so to speak of the members of "the body of death."

25. *χάρις τῷ θεῷ.*] A great variety of readings occur at these words, which have probably arisen from the difficulty of explaining the text as it stands in the best manuscripts. We are expecting an answer to ver. 24., and the Apostle gives no other answer but such as is implied in the doxology itself. "Thanks be to God through Jesus Christ our Lord."



25 this death? Thanks be to God<sup>1</sup> through Jesus Christ our Lord. So then with the mind I myself serve the law of God; howbeit with the flesh the law of sin.

<sup>1</sup> I thank God.

This is one of the many passages in the Apostle's writings, which lead us to conclude that he dictated rather than himself wrote. Such a slip in the construction could hardly have occurred to any one with the written page before him.

ἄρ' οὖν] contains the summing up of the whole previous passage.

αὐτὸς ἐγὼ] has been variously explained: either (1.) I by myself or I in my unaided state; or (2.) I myself as well as others, both of which are inconsistent with the connexion; or (3.), I, the same person, which is contrary to the language, and would

require ἐγὼ ὁ αὐτός; or, lastly (4), as seems best, I, "myself," that is, "in my true self," serve the law of God; the remainder of the sentence may be regarded as an afterthought, in which the Apostle checks his aspiration, δὲ being exactly expressed in English by "howbeit." Compare ver. 8.: ἀφορμὴν δὲ λαβοῦσα. This is not the grammatical form of the sentence, in which, of course, δὲ answers to μὲν. That it is the order of the thought, however, is inferred, from the difficulty in connecting the words τῇ δὲ σαρκὶ νόμῳ ἁμαρτίας either with αὐτὸς ἐγὼ or with what follows.

## ON CONVERSION AND CHANGES OF CHARACTER.

THUS have we the image of the life-long struggle gathered up in a single instant. In describing it we pass beyond the consciousness of the individual into a world of abstractions; we loosen the thread by which the spiritual faculties are held together, and view as objects what can, strictly speaking, have no existence, except in relation to the subject. The divided members of the soul are ideal, the combat between them is ideal, so also is the victory. What is real that corresponds to this, is not a momentary, but a continuous conflict, which we feel rather than know,—which has its different aspects of hope and fear, triumph and despair, the action and reaction of the Spirit of God in the depths of the human soul, awakening the sense of sin and conveying the assurance of forgiveness.

The language in which we describe this conflict is very different from that of the Apostle. Our circumstances are so changed that we are hardly able to view it in its simplest elements. Christianity is now the established religion of the civilised portion of mankind. In our own country it has become part of the law of the land; it speaks with authority, it is embodied in a Church, it is supported by almost universal opinion, and fortified by wealth and prescription. Those who know least of its spiritual life, do not deny its greatness as a power in the world. Analogous to this relation in which it stands to our history and social state, is the relation in which it stands also to the minds of individuals. We are brought up in it, and unconsciously receive it as the habit of our thoughts and the condition of our life. It is without us, and we are within its circle; we do not become Christians, we are so from our birth. Even

in those who suppose themselves to have passed through some sudden and violent change, and to have tasted once for all of the heavenly gift, the change is hardly ever in the form or substance of their belief, but in its quickening power; they feel not a new creed, but a new spirit within them. So that we might truly say of Christianity, that it is "the daughter of time;" it hangs to the past, not only because the first century is the era of its birth, but because each successive century strengthens its form and adds to its external force, and entwines it with more numerous links in our social state. Not only may we say, that it is part and parcel of the law of the land, but part and parcel of the character of each one, which even the worst of men cannot wholly shake off.

But if with ourselves the influence of Christianity is almost always gradual and imperceptible, with the first believers it was almost always sudden. There was no interval which separated the preaching of Peter on the day of Pentecost, from the baptism of the three thousand. The eunuch of Candace paused for a brief space on a journey, and was then baptized into the name of Christ, which a few hours previously he had not so much as heard. There was no period of probation like that which, a century or two later, was appropriated to the instruction of the Catechumens. It was an impulse, an inspiration passing from the lips of one to a chosen few, and communicated by them to the ear and soul of listening multitudes. As the wind bloweth where it listeth, and we hear the sounds thereof; as the lightning shineth from the one end of the heaven to the other; so suddenly, fitfully, simultaneously, new thoughts come into their minds, not to one only, but to many, to whole cities almost at once. They were pricked with the sense of sin; they were melted with the love of Christ; their spiritual nature "came again like the flesh of a little child." And some, like St. Paul, became the very opposite of their former selves; from scoffers, believers; from persecutors, preachers; the thing that they were, was so strange to them, that they could no longer look calmly on the earthly scene which they hardly seemed to touch, which was already lighted up with the wrath and



mercy of God. There were those among them who "saw visions and dreamed dreams," who were "caught up," like St. Paul, "into the third heaven," or, like the twelve, "spake with other tongues as the Spirit gave them utterance." And sometimes, as in the Thessalonian Church, the ecstasy of conversion led to strange and wild opinions, such as the daily expectation of Christ's coming. The "round world" itself began to reel before them, as they thought of the things that were shortly to come to pass.

But however sudden were the conversions of the earliest believers, however wonderful the circumstances which attended them, they were not for that reason the less lasting or sincere. Though many preached "Christ of contention," though "Demas forsook the Apostle," there were few who, having once taken up the cross, turned back from "the love of this present world." They might waver between Paul and Peter, between the circumcision and the uncircumcision; they might give ear to the strange and bewitching heresies of the East; but there is no trace that many returned to "those that were no gods," or put off Christ; the impression of the truth that they had received, was everlasting on their minds. Even sins of fornication and uncleanness, which from the Apostle's frequent warnings against them we must suppose to have lingered, as a sort of remnant of heathenism in the early Church, did not wholly destroy their inward relation to God and Christ. Though "their last state might be worse than the first," they could never return again to live the life of all men after having tasted "the heavenly gift and the powers of the world to come."

Such was the nature of conversion among the early Christians, the new birth of which by spiritual descent we are ourselves the offspring. Is there anything in history like it? anything in our own lives which may help us to understand it? That which the Scripture describes from within, we are for a while going to look at from a different point of view, not with reference to the power of God, but to those secondary causes through which He works,—the laws which experience shows that he himself imposes on the operations of his

spirit. Such an inquiry is not a mere idle speculation ; it is not far from the practical question, "How we are to become better." Imperfect as any attempt to analyse our spiritual life must ever be, the changes which we ourselves experience or observe in others, compared with those greater and more sudden changes which took place in the age of the Apostle, will throw light upon each other.

In the sudden conversions of the early Christians we observe three things which either tend to discredit, or do not accompany, the working of a similar power among ourselves. — First, that conversion was marked by ecstatic and unusual phenomena ; secondly, that, though sudden, it was permanent ; thirdly, that it fell upon whole multitudes at once.

When we consider what is implied in such expressions as "not many wise, not many learned" were called to the knowledge of the truth, we can scarcely avoid feeling that there must have been much in the early Church which would have been distasteful to us as men of education ; much that must have worn the appearance of excitement and enthusiasm. Is the mean conventicle, looking almost like a private house, a better image of that first assembly of Christians which met in the "large upper room," or the Catholic church arrayed in all the glories of Christian art ? Neither of them is altogether like in spirit perhaps, but in externals the first. Is the dignified hierarchy that occupy the seats around the altar, more like the multitudes of first believers, or the lowly crowd that kneel upon the pavement ? If we try to embody in the mind's eye the forms of the first teachers, and still more of their followers, we cannot help reading the true lesson, however great may be the illusions of poetry or of art. Not St. Paul standing on Mars' hill in the fulness of manly strength, as we have him in the cartoon of Raphael, is the true image ; but such a one as he himself would glory in, whose bodily presence was weak and speech feeble, who had an infirmity in his flesh, and bore in his body the marks of the Lord Jesus.

And when we look at this picture, "full in the face," however we might by nature be inclined to turn aside from it, or veil its details

in general language, we cannot deny that many things that accompany the religion of the uneducated now, must then also have accompanied the Gospel preached to the poor. There must have been, humanly speaking, spiritual delusions where men lived so exclusively in the spiritual world; there were scenes which we know took place such as St. Paul says would make the unbeliever think that they were mad. The best and holiest persons among the poor and ignorant are not entirely free from superstition, according to the notions of the educated; at best they are apt to speak of religion in a manner not quite suited to our taste; they sing with a loud and excited voice; they imagine themselves to receive Divine oracles, even about the humblest cares of life. Is not this, in externals at least, very like the appearance which the first disciples must have presented, who obeyed the Apostle's injunction, "Is any sad? let him pray; is any merry? let him sing psalms"? Could our nerves have borne to witness the speaking with tongues, or the administration of Baptism, or the love feasts as they probably existed in the early Church?

This difference between the feelings and habits of the first Christians and ourselves, must be borne in mind in relation to the subject of conversion. For as sudden changes are more likely to be met with amongst the poor and uneducated in the present day, it certainly throws light on the subject of the first conversions, that to the poor and uneducated the Gospel was first preached. And yet these sudden changes were as real, nay, more real than any gradual changes which take place among ourselves. The Stoic or Epicurean philosopher who had come into an assembly of believers speaking with tongues, would have remarked, that among the vulgar religious extravagances were usually short-lived. But it was not so. There was more there than he had eyes to see, or than was dreamed of in a philosophy like his. Not only was there the superficial appearance of poverty and meanness and enthusiasm, from a nearer view of which we are apt to shrink, but underneath this, brighter from its very obscurity, purer from the meanness of the raiment in which it was appalled, was the life hidden with Christ and God.



There, and there only, was the power which made a man humble instead of proud, self-denying instead of self-seeking, spiritual instead of carnal, a Christian instead of a Jew; which made him embrace, not only the brethren, but the whole human race in the arms of his love.

But it is a further difference between the power of the Gospel now and in the first ages, that it no longer converts whole multitudes at once. Perhaps this very individuality in its mode of working may not be without an advantage in awakening us to its higher truths and more entire spiritual freedom. Whether this be so or not; whether there be any spiritual law by which reason, in a measure, takes the place of faith, and the common religious impulse weakens as the power of reflection grows, we certainly observe a diminution in the collective force which religion exercises on the hearts of men. In our own days the preacher sees the seed which he has sown gradually spring up; first one, then another begins to lead a better life; then a change comes over the state of society, often from causes over which he has no control; he makes some steps forwards and a few backwards, and trusts far more, if he is wise, to the silent influence of religious education than to the power of preaching; and, perhaps, the result of a long life of ministerial labour is far less than that of a single discourse from the lips of the Apostles or their followers. Even in missions to the heathen the vital energies of Christianity cease to operate to any great extent, at least on the effete civilisation of India and China; the limits of the kingdoms of light and darkness are nearly the same as heretofore. At any rate it cannot be said that Christianity has wrought any sudden amelioration of mankind by the immediate preaching of the word, since the conversion of the barbarians. Even within the Christian world there is a parallel retardation. The ebb and flow of reformation and counter-reformation have hardly changed the permanent landmarks. The age of spiritual crises is past. The growth of Christianity in modern times may be compared to the change of the body, when it has already arrived at its full stature. In one half-century so vast a progress was made, in

a few centuries more the world itself seemed to "have gone after Him," and now for near a thousand years the voice of experience is repeating to us, "Hitherto shalt thou go, but no further."

Looking at this remarkable phenomenon of the conversion of whole multitudes at once, not from its Divine but from its human aspect (that is, with reference to that provision that God himself has made in human nature for the execution of his will), the first cause to which we are naturally led to attribute it, is the power of sympathy. Why it is that men ever act together is a mystery of which our individual self-consciousness gives no account, any more than why we speak a common language, or form nations or societies, or merely in our physical nature are capable of taking diseases from one another. Nature and the Author of nature have made us thus dependent on each other both in body and soul. Whoever has seen human beings collected together in masses, and watched the movements that pass over them, like "the trees of the forest moving in the wind," will have no difficulty in imagining, if not in understanding, how the same voice might have found its way at the same instant to a thousand hearts, without our being able to say where the fire was first kindled, or by whom the inspiration was first caught. Such historical events as the Reformation, or the Crusades, or the French Revolution, are a sufficient evidence that a whole people, or almost, we may say, half a world, may be "drunk into one spirit," springing up, as it might seem, spontaneously in the breast of each, yet common to all. A parallel yet nearer is furnished by the history of the Jewish people, in whose sudden rebellion and restoration to God's favour, we recognise literally the momentary workings of, what is to ourselves a figure of speech, a national conscience.

In ordinary cases we should truly say that there must have been some predisposing cause of a great political or religious revolution; some latent elements acting alike upon all, which, though long smouldering beneath, burst forth at last into a flame. Such a cause might be the misery of mankind, or the intense corruption of human society, which could not be quickened except it die, or the long-suppressed

yearnings of the soul after something higher than it had hitherto known upon earth, or the reflected light of one religion or one movement of the human mind upon another. Such causes were actually at work, preparing the way for the diffusion of Christianity. The law itself was beginning to pass away in an altered world, the state of society was hollow, the chosen people were hopelessly under the Roman yoke. Good men refrained from the wild attempt of the Galilean Judas; yet the spirit which animated such attempts was slumbering in their bosoms. Looking back at their own past history, they could not but remember, even in an altered world, that there was One who ruled among the kingdoms of men, "beside whom there was no God." Were they to suppose that His arm was straitened to save? that He had forgotten His tender mercies to the house of David? that the aspirations of the prophets were vain? that the blood of the Maccabean heroes had sunk like water into the earth? This was a hard saying; who could bear it? It was long ere the nation, like the individual, put off the old man—that is, the temporal dispensation—and put on the new man—that is, the spiritual Israel. The very misery of the people seemed to forbid them to acquiesce in their present state. And with the miserable condition of the nation sprang up also the feeling, not only in individuals but in the race, that for their sins they were chastened, the feeling which their whole history seemed to deepen and increase. At last the scales fell from their eyes; the veil that was on the face of Moses was first transfigured before them, then removed; the thoughts of many hearts turned simultaneously to the Hope of Israel, "Him whom the law and the prophets foretold." As they listened to the preaching of the Apostles, they seemed to hear a truth both new and old; what many had thought, but none had uttered; which in its comfort and joyousness seemed to them new, and yet, from its familiarity and suitableness to their condition, not the less old.

Spiritual life, no less than natural life, is often the very opposite of the elements which seem to give birth to it. The preparation for the



way of the Lord, which John the Baptist preached, did not consist in a direct reference to the Saviour. The words "He shall baptize you with the Holy Ghost and with fire," and "He shall burn up the chaff with fire unquenchable," could have given the Jews no exact conception of Him who "did not break the bruised reed, nor quench the smoking flax." It was in another way that John prepared for Christ, by quickening the moral sense of the people, and sounding in their ears the voice "Repent, for the kingdom of heaven is at hand." Beyond this useful lesson, there was a kind of vacancy in the preaching of John. He himself, as "he was finishing his course," testified that his work was incomplete, and that he was not the Christ. The Jewish people were prepared by his preaching for the coming of Christ, just as an individual might be prepared to receive Him by the conviction of sin and the conscious need of forgiveness.

Except from the Gospel history and the writings of Josephus and Philo, we know but little of the tendencies of the Jewish mind in the time of our Lord. Yet we cannot doubt that the entrance of Christianity into the world was not sudden and abrupt; that is, an illusion which arises in the mind from our slender acquaintance with contemporary opinions. Better and higher and holier as it was, it was not absolutely distinct from the teaching of the doctors of the law either in form or substance; it was not unconnected with, but gave life and truth to, the mystic fancies of Alexandrian philosophy. Even in the counsels of perfection of the Sermon on the Mount, there is probably nothing which might not be found, either in letter or spirit, in Philo or some other Jewish or Eastern writer. The peculiarity of the Gospel is, not that it teaches what is wholly new, but that it draws out of the treasure-house of the human heart things new and old, gathering together in one the dispersed fragments of the truth. The common people would not have "heard Him gladly," but for the truth of what He said. The heart was its own witness to it. The better nature of man, though but for a moment, responded to it, spoken as it was with authority, and not as the scribes; with simplicity, and not as the great teachers of the law;

and sanctified by the life and actions of Him from whose lips it came, and "Who spake as never man spake."

And yet, after reviewing the circumstances of the first preaching of the Gospel, there remains something which cannot be resolved into causes or antecedents ; which eludes criticism, and can no more be explained in the world than the sudden changes of character in the individual. There are processes of life and organisation about which we know nothing, and we seem to know that we shall never know anything. "That which thou sowest is not quickened, except it die;" but the mechanism of this new life is too complex, and yet too simple for us to untwist its fibres. The figure which St. Paul applies to the resurrection of the body, is true also of the renewal of the soul, especially in the first ages of which we know so little, and in which the Gospel seems to have acted with such far greater power than among ourselves."

Leaving further inquiry into the conversion of the first Christians at the point at which it hides itself from us in mystery, we have now to turn to a question hardly less mysterious, though seemingly more familiar to us, which may be regarded as a question either of moral philosophy or of theology,—the nature of conversion and changes of character among ourselves. What traces are there of a spiritual power still acting upon the human heart? What is the inward nature, and what are the outward conditions of changes in human conduct? Is our life a gradual and insensible progress from infancy to age, from birth to death, governed by fixed laws ; or is it a miracle and mystery of thirty, or fifty, or seventy years' standing, consisting of so many isolated actions or portions knit together by no common principle?

Were we to consider mankind only from without, there could be no doubt of the answer which we should give to the last of these questions. The order of the world would scarcely even *seem* to be infringed by the free will of man. In morals, no less than in physics, everything would appear to proceed by regular law. Individuals have certain capacities, which grow with their growth and strengthen

with their strength ; and no one by taking thought can add one cubit to his stature. As the poet says :— “ The boy is father to the man.” The lives of the great majority have a sort of continuity : as we know them by the same look, walk, manner ; so when we come to converse with them, we recognise the same character as formerly. They may be changed ; but the change in general is such as we expect to find in them from youth to maturity, or from maturity to decay. There is something in them which is not changed, by which we perceive them to be the same. If they were weak, they remain so still ; if they were sensitive, they remain so still ; if they were selfish or passionate, such faults are seldom cured by increasing age or infirmities. And often the same nature puts on many veils and disguises ; to the outward eye it may have, in some instances, almost disappeared ; when we look beneath, it is still there.

The appearance of this sameness in human nature has led many to suppose that no real change ever takes place. Does a man from a drunkard become sober ? from a knight errant become a devotee ? from a sensualist a believer in Christ ? or a woman from a life of pleasure pass to a romantic and devoted religion ? It has been maintained that they are the same still ; and that deeper similarities remain than the differences which are a part of their new profession. Those who make the remark would say, that such persons exhibit the same vanity, the same irritability, the same ambition ; that sensualism still lurks under the disguise of refinement, or earthly and human passion transfuses itself into devotion.

This “ practical fatalism,” which says that human beings can be what they are and nothing else, has a certain degree of truth, or rather, of plausibility, from the circumstance that men seldom change wholly, and that the part of their nature which changes least is the weakness and infirmity that shows itself on the surface. Few, comparatively, ever change their outward manner, except from the mere result of altered circumstances ; and hence, to a superficial observer, they appear to change less than is really the fact. Probably, St. Paul never lost that trembling and feebleness which was one of the



trials of his life. Nor, in so far as the mind is dependent on the body, can we pretend to be wholly free agents. Who can say that his view of life and his power of action are unaffected by his bodily state? or who expects to find a firm and decided character in the nervous and sensitive frame? The commonest facts of daily life sufficiently prove the connexion of mind and body; the more we attend to it the closer it appears. Nor, indeed, can it be denied that external circumstances fix for most men the path of life. They are the inhabitants of a particular country; they have a certain position in the world; they rise to their occupations as the morning comes round; they seldom get beyond the circle of ideas in which they have been brought up. Fearfully and wonderfully as they are made, though each one in his bodily frame, and even more in his thoughts and feelings, is a miracle of complexity, they seem, as they meet in society, to reunite into a machine, and society itself is the great automaton of which they are the parts. It is harder and more conventional than the individuals which compose it; it exercises a kind of regulating force on the wayward fancies of their wills; it says to them in an unmistakable manner that "they shall not break their ranks." The laws of trade, the customs of social life, the instincts of human nature, act upon us with a power little less than that of physical necessity.

If from this external aspect of human things, we turn inward, there seems to be no limit to the changes which we deem possible. We are no longer the same, but different every hour. No physical fact interposes itself as an obstacle to our thoughts any more than to our dreams. The world and its laws have nothing to do with our free determinations. At any moment we can begin a new life; in idea at least, no time is required for the change. One instant we may be proud, the next humble; one instant sinning, at the next repenting; one instant, like St. Paul, ready to persecute, at another to preach the Gospel; full of malice and hatred one hour, melting into tenderness the next. As we hear the words of the preacher, there is a voice within telling us, that "now, even now, is the day

of salvation ;” and if certain clogs and hindrances of earth could only be removed, we are ready to pass immediately into another state. And, at times, it seems as though we had actually passed into rest, and had a foretaste of the heavenly gift. Something more than imagination enables us to fashion a divine pattern to which we conform for a little while. The “new man” unto which we become transformed, is so pleasant to us that it banishes the thought of “the old.” In youth especially, when we are ignorant of the compass of our own nature, such frames of mind are perpetually recurring ; perhaps, not without attendant evils ; certainly, also, for good.

But besides such feelings as these, which we know to be partly true, partly illusive, every one’s experience of himself appears to teach him, that he has gone through many changes and had many special providences vouchsafed to him ; he says to himself that he has been led in a mysterious and peculiar way, not like the way of other men, and had feelings not common to others ; he compares different times and places, and contrasts his own conduct here and there, now and then. In other men he remarks similarity of character ; in himself he sees chiefly diversity. They seem to be the creatures of habit and circumstance ; he alone is a free agent. The truth is, that he observes himself ; he cannot equally observe them. He is not conscious of the inward struggles through which they have passed ; he sees only the veil of flesh which conceals them from his view. He knows when he thinks about it, but he does not habitually remember, that, under that calm exterior, there is a like current of individual thoughts, feelings, interests, which have as great a charm and intensity for another as the workings of his own mind have for himself.

And yet it does not follow, that this inward fact is to be set aside as the result of egotism and illusion. It may be not merely the dreamy reflection of our life and actions in the mirror of self, but the subtle and delicate spring of the whole machine. To purify the feelings or to move the will, the internal sense may be as necessary to us as external observation is to regulate and sustain them. Even to

the formula of the fatalist, that "freedom is the consciousness of necessity," it may be replied, that that very consciousness, as he terms it, is as essential as any other link in the chain in which "he binds fast the world." Human nature is beset by the contradiction, not of two rival theories, but of many apparently contradictory facts. If we cannot imagine how the world could go on without law and order in human actions, neither can we imagine how morality could subsist unless we clear a space around us for the freedom of the will.

But not in this place to get further into the meshes of the great question of freedom and necessity, let us rather turn aside for a moment to consider some practical aspects of the reflections which precede. Scripture and reason alike require that we should entirely turn to God, that we should obey the whole law. And hard as this may seem at first, there is a witness within us which pleads that it is possible. Our mind and moral nature are one; we cannot break ourselves into pieces in action any more than in thought. The whole man is in every part and in every act. This is not a mere mode of thought, but a truth of great practical importance. "Easier to change many things than one," is the common saying. Easier, we may add, in religion or morality, to change the whole than the part. Easier because more natural, more agreeable to the voice of conscience and the promises of Scripture. God himself deals with us as a whole; he does not forgive us in part any more than he requires us to serve Him in part. It may be true that, of the thousand hearers of the appeal of the preacher, not above one begins a new life. And some persons will imagine that it might be better to make an impression on them little by little, like the effect of the dropping of water upon stone. Not in this way is the Gospel written down on the fleshly tables of the heart. More true to our own experience of self, as well as to the words of Scripture, are such ideas as renovation, renewal, regeneration, taking up the cross and following Christ, dying with Christ that we may also live with him.

Many a person will tease himself by counting minutes and providing small rules for his life, who would have found the task an



easier and a nobler one, had he viewed it in its whole extent, and gone to God in a "large and liberal spirit," to offer up his life to Him. To have no "arrière pensée" in the service of God and virtue is the great source of peace and happiness. Make clean that which is within, and you have no need to purify that which is without. Take care of the little things of life, and the great ones will take care of themselves, is the maxim of the trader, which is sometimes, and with a certain degree of truth, applied to the service of God. But much more true is it in religion that we should take care of the great things, and the trifles of life will take care of themselves. "If thine eye be single, thy whole body will be full of light." Christianity is not acquired as an art by long practice; it does not carve and polish human nature with a graving tool; it makes the whole man; first pouring out his soul before God, and then "casting him in a mould." Its workings are not to be measured by time, even though among educated persons, and in modern times, sudden and momentary conversions can rarely occur.

For the doctrine of conversion, the moralist substitutes the theory of habits. Good actions, he says, produce good habits; and the repetition of good actions makes them easier to perform, and "fortifies us indefinitely against temptation." There are bodily and mental habits — habits of reflection and habits of action. Practice gives skill or sleight of hand; constant attention, the faculty of abstraction; so the practice of virtue makes us virtuous, that of vice, vicious. The more meat we eat, to use the illustration of Aristotle, in whom we find a cruder form of the same theory, the more we are able to eat meat; the more we wrestle, the more able we are to wrestle, and so forth. If a person has some duty to perform, say of common and trivial sort, to rise at a particular hour in the morning, to be at a particular place at such an hour, to conform to some rule about abstinence, we tell him that he will find the first occasion difficult, the second easy, and the difficulty is supposed to vanish by degrees until it wholly disappears. If a man has to march into a battle, or to perform a surgical operation, or to do anything else

from which human nature shrinks, his nerves, we say, are gradually strengthened ; his head, as was said of a famous soldier, clears up at the sound of the cannon ; like the grave-digger in Hamlet, he has soon no "feeling of his occupation."

From a consideration of such instances as these, the rule has been laid down, that, "as the passive impression weakens, the active habit strengthens." But is not this saying of a great man founded on a narrow and partial contemplation of human nature? For, in the first place, it leaves altogether out of sight the motives of human action ; it is equally suited to the most rigid formalist, and to a moral and spiritual being. Secondly, it takes no account of the limitation of the power of habits, which neither in mind nor body can be extended beyond a certain point ; nor of the original capacity or peculiar character of individuals ; nor of the different kinds of habits, nor of the degrees of strength and weakness in different minds ; nor of the enormous difference between youth and age, childhood and manhood, in the capacity for acquiring habits. Old age does not move with accumulated force, either upwards or downwards ; they are the lesser habits, not the great springs of life, that show themselves in it with increased power. Nor can the man who has neglected to form habits in youth, acquire them in mature life ; like the body, the mind ceases to be capable of receiving a particular form. Lastly, such a description of human nature agrees with no man's account of himself ; whatever moralists may say, he knows himself to be a spiritual being. "The wind bloweth where it listeth," and he cannot "tell whence it cometh, or whither it goeth."

All that is true in the theory of habits seems to be implied in the notion of order or regularity. Even this is inadequate to give a conception of the structure of human beings. Order is the beginning, but freedom is the perfection of our moral nature. Men do not live at random, or act one instant without reference to their actions just before. And in youth especially, the very sameness of our occupations is a sort of stay and support to us, as in age it may be described as a kind of rest. But no one will say that the mere repetition of ac-

tions until they constitute a habit, gives any explanation of the higher and nobler forms of human virtue, or the finer moulds of character. Life cannot be explained as the working of a mere machine, still less can moral or spiritual life be reduced to merely mechanical laws.

But if, while acknowledging that a great proportion of mankind are the creatures of habit, and that a great part of our actions are nothing more than the result of habit, we go on to ask ourselves about the changes of our life, and fix our minds on the critical points, we are led to view human nature, not only in a wider and more generous spirit, but also in a way more accordant with the language of Scripture. We no longer measure ourselves by days or by weeks ; we are conscious that at particular times we have undergone great revolutions or emotions ; and then, again, have intervened periods, lasting perhaps for years, in which we have pursued the even current of our way. Our progress towards good may have been in idea an imperceptible and regular advance ; in fact, we know it to have been otherwise. We have taken plunges in life ; there are many eras noted in our existence. The greatest changes are those of which we are the least able to give an account, and which we feel the most disposed to refer to a superior power. That they were simply mysterious, like some utterly unknown natural phenomena, is our first thought about them. But although unable to fathom their true nature, we are capable of analysing many of the circumstances which accompany them, and of observing the impulses out of which they arise.

Every man has the power of forming a resolution, or, without previous resolution, in any particular instance, acting as he will. As thoughts come into the mind one cannot tell how, so too motives spring up, without our being able to trace their origin. Why we suddenly see a thing in a new light, is often hard to explain ; why we feel an action to be right or wrong which has previously seemed indifferent, is not less inexplicable. We fix the passing dream or sentiment in action ; the thought is nothing, the deed may be every-



thing. That day after day, to use a familiar instance, the drunkard will find abstinence easier, is probably untrue ; but that from once abstaining he will gain a fresh experience, and receive a new strength and inward satisfaction, which may result in endless consequences, is what every one is aware of. It is not the sameness of what we do, but its novelty, which seems to have such a peculiar power over us ; not the repetition of many blind actions, but the performance of a single conscious one, that is the birth to a new life. Indeed, the very sameness of actions is often accompanied with a sort of weariness, which makes men desirous of change.

Nor is it less true, that by the commission, not of many, but a single act of vice or crime, an inroad is made into our whole moral constitution, which is not proportionably increased by its repetition. The first act of theft, falsehood, or other immorality, is an event in the life of the perpetrator which he never forgets. It may often happen that no account can be given of it ; that there is nothing in the education, nor in the antecedents of the person, that would lead us, or even himself, to suspect it. In the weaker sort of natures, especially, suggestions of evil spring up we cannot tell how. Human beings are the creatures of habit ; but they are the creatures of impulse too ; and from the greater variableness of the outward circumstances of life, and especially of particular periods of life, and the greater freedom of individuals, it may, perhaps, be found that human actions, though less liable to wide-spread or sudden changes, have also become more capricious, and less reducible to simple causes, than formerly.

Changes in character come more often in the form of feeling than of reason, from some new affection or attachment, or alienation of our former self, rather than from the slow growth of experience, or a deliberate sense of right and duty. The meeting with some particular person, the remembrance of some particular scene, the last words of a parent or friend, the reading of a sentence in a book, may call forth a world within us of the very existence of which we were previously unconscious. New interests arise such as we never before

knew, and we can no longer lie grovelling in the mire, but must be up and doing ; new affections seem to be drawn out, such as warm our inmost soul and make action and exertion a delight to us. Mere human love at first sight, as we say, has been known to change the whole character and produce an earthly effect, analogous to that heavenly love of Christ and the brethren, of which the New Testament speaks. Have we not seen the passionate become calm, the licentious pure, the weak strong, the scoffer devout? We may not venture to say with St. Paul, " This is a great mystery, but I speak concerning Christ and the Church." But such instances serve, at least, to quicken our sense of the depth and subtlety of human nature.

Of many of these changes no other reason can be given than that nature and the Author of nature have made men capable of them. There are others, again, which we seem to trace, not only to particular times, but to definite actions, from which they flow in the same manner that other effects follow from their causes. Among such causes none are more powerful than acts of self-sacrifice and devotion. A single deed of heroism makes a man a hero ; it becomes a part of him, and, strengthened by the approbation and sympathy of his fellow-men, a sort of power which he gains over himself and them. Something like this is true of the lesser occasions of life no less than of the greatest ; provided in either case the actions are not of such a kind that the performance of them is a violence to our nature. Many a one has stretched himself on the rack of asceticism, without on the whole raising his nature ; often he has seemed to have gained in self-control only what he has lost in the kindlier affections, and by his very isolation to have wasted the opportunities which nature offered him of self-improvement. But no one with a heart open to human feelings, loving not man the less, but God more, sensitive to the happiness of this world, yet aiming at a higher, — no man of such a nature ever made a great sacrifice, or performed a great act of self-denial, without impressing a change on his character, which lasted to his latest breath. No man ever took his besetting sin, it

may be lust, or pride, or love of rank and position, and, as it were, cut it out by voluntarily placing himself where to gratify it was impossible, without sensibly receiving a new strength of character. In one day, almost in an hour, he may become an altered man; he may stand, as it were, on a different stage of moral and religious life; he may feel himself in new relations to an altered world.

Nor, in considering the effects of action, must the influence of impressions be lost sight of. Good resolutions are apt to have a bad name; they have come to be almost synonymous with the absence of good actions. As they get older, men deem it a kind of weakness to be guilty of making them; so often do they end in raising "pictures of virtue, or going over the theory of virtue in our minds." Yet this contrast between passive impression and active habit, is hardly justified by our experience of ourselves or others. Valueless as they are in themselves, good resolutions are suggestive of great good; they are seldom wholly without effect on our conduct; in the weakest of men they are still the embryo of action. They may meet with a concurrence of circumstances in which they take root and grow, coinciding with some change of place, or of pursuits, or of companions, or of natural constitution, in which they acquire a peculiar power. They are the opportunities of virtue, if not virtue itself. At the worst they make us think; they give us an experience of ourselves; they prevent our passing our lives in total unconsciousness. A man may go on all his life making and not keeping them; miserable as such a state appears, he is perhaps not the worse, but something the better for them. The voice of the preacher is not lost, even if he succeed but for a few instants in awakening them.

A further cause of sudden changes in the moral constitution is the determination of the will by reason and knowledge. Suppose the case of a person living in a narrow circle of ideas, within the limits of his early education, perplexed by difficulties, yet never venturing beyond the wall of prejudices in which he has been brought up, or changing only into the false position of a rebellion against



them. A new view of his relation to the world and to God is presented to him; such, for example, as in St. Paul's day was the grand acknowledgment that God was "not the God of the Jews only;" such as in our own age would be the clear vision of the truth and justice of God, high above the clouds of earth and time, and of his goodwill to man. Convinced of the reasonableness of the Gospel, it becomes to him at once a self-imposed law. No longer does the human heart rebel; no longer has he "to pose his understanding" with that odd resolution of Tertullian, — "certum quia impossibile." He perceives that the perplexities of religion have been made, not by the appointment of God, but by the ingenuity of man.

Lastly. Among those influences, by the help of which the will of man learns to disengage itself from the power of habit, must not be omitted the influence of circumstances. If men are creatures of habit, much more are they creatures of circumstances. These two, nature without us, and "the second nature" that is within, are the counterbalancing forces of our being. Between them (so we may figure to ourselves the working of the mind) the human will inserts itself, making the force of one a lever against the other, and seeming to rule both. We fall under the power of habit, and feel ourselves weak and powerless to shake off the almost physical influence which it exerts upon us. The enfeebled frame cannot rid itself of the malady; the palsied springs of action cannot be strengthened for good, nor fortified against evil. Transplanted into another soil, and in a different air, we renew our strength. In youth especially, the character seems to respond kindly to the influence of the external world. Providence has placed us in a state in which we have many aids in the battle with self; the greatest of these is change of circumstances.

---

We have wandered far from the subject of conversion in the early Church, into another sphere in which the words "grace, faith, the spirit," have disappeared, and notions of moral philosophy have taken

their place. It is better, perhaps, that the attempt to analyse our spiritual nature should assume this abstract form. We feel that words cannot express the life hidden with Christ and God; we are afraid of declaring on the housetop, what may only be spoken in the closet. If the rites and ceremonies of the elder dispensation, which have so little in them of a spiritual character, became a figure of the true, much more may the moral world be regarded as a figure of the spiritual world of which religion speaks to us.

There is a view of the changes of the characters of men which begins where this ends, which reads human nature by a different light, and speaks of it as the seat of a great struggle between the powers of good and evil. It would be untrue to identify this view with that which has preceded, and scarcely less untrue to attempt to interweave the two in a system of "moral theology." No addition of theological terms will transfigure Aristotle's Ethics into a "Summa Theologiæ." When St. Paul says — "O wretched man that I am, who shall deliver me from the body of this death?" "I thank God through Jesus Christ our Lord;" he is not speaking the language of moral philosophy, but of religious feeling. He expresses what few have truly felt concentrated in a single instant, what many have deluded themselves into the belief of, what some have experienced accompanying them through life, what a great portion even of the better sort of mankind are wholly unconscious of. It seems as if Providence allowed us to regard the truths of religion and morality in many ways which are not wholly unconnected with each other, yet parallel rather than intersecting; providing for the varieties of human character, and not leaving those altogether without law, who are incapable in a world of sight of entering within the veil.

As we return to that "hidden life" of which the Scripture speaks, our analysis of human nature seems to become more imperfect, less reducible to rule or measure, less capable of being described in a language which all men understand. What the believer recognises as the record of his experience is apt to seem mystical to the rest of the world. We do not seek to thread the mazes of the human soul,

or to draw forth to the light its hidden communion with its Maker, but only to present in general outline the power of religion among other causes of human action.

Directly, religious influences may be summed up under three heads: — The power of God; the love of Christ; the efficacy of prayer.

(1.) So far as the influence of the first of these is capable of analysis, it consists in the practical sense that we are dependent beings, and that our souls are in the hands of God, who is acting through us, and ever present with us, in the trials of life and in the work of life. The believer is a minister who executes this work, hardly the partner in it; it is not his own, but God's. He does it with the greatest care, as unto the Lord and not to men, yet is indifferent as to the result, knowing that all things, even through his imperfect agency, are working together for good. The attitude of his soul towards God is such as to produce the strongest effects on his power of action. It leaves his faculties clear and unimpassioned; it places him above accidents; it gives him courage and freedom. Trusting in God only, like the Psalmist, "he fears no enemy;" he has no want. There is a sort of absoluteness in his position in the world, which can neither be made better nor worse; as St. Paul says: — "All things are his, whether life or death, or things present or things to come."

In merely human things, the aid and sympathy of others increase our power to act: it is also the fact that we can work more effectually and think more truly, where the issue is not staked on the result of our thought and work. The confidence of success would be more than half the secret of success, did it not also lead to the relaxation of our efforts. But in the life of the believer, the sympathy, if such a figure of speech may be allowed, is not human but Divine; the confidence is not a confidence in ourselves, but in the power of God, which at once takes us out of ourselves and increases our obligation to exertion. The instances just mentioned have an analogy, though but a faint one, with that which we are considering. They are shadows of the support which we receive from the In-



finite and Everlasting. As the philosopher said that his theory of fatalism was absolutely required to insure the repose necessary for moral action, it may be said, in a far higher sense, that the consciousness of a Divine Providence is necessary to enable a rational being to meet the present trials of life, and to look without fear on his future destiny.

(2.) But yet more strongly is it felt that the love of Christ has this constraining power over souls, that here, if anywhere, we are unlocking the twisted chain of sympathy, and reaching the inmost mystery of human nature. The sight, once for all, of Christ crucified, recalling the thought of what, more than 1800 years ago, he suffered for us, has ravished the heart and melted the affections, and made the world seem new, and covered the earth itself with a fair vision, that is, a heavenly one. The strength of this feeling arises from its being directed towards a person, a real being, an individual like ourselves, who has actually endured all this for our sakes, who was above us, and yet became one of us and felt as we did, and was like ourselves a true man. The love which He felt towards us, we seek to return to Him; the unity which He has with the Divine nature, He communicates to us; His Father is our Father, His God our God. And as human love draws men onwards to make sacrifices, and to undergo sufferings for the good of others, Divine love also leads us to cast away the interests of this world, and rest only in the noblest object of love. And this love is not only a feeling or sentiment, or attachment, such as we may entertain towards a parent, a child, or a wife, in which, pure and disinterested as it may be, some shadow of earthly passions unavoidably mingles; it is also the highest exercise of the reason, which it seems to endow with the force of the affections, making us think and feel at once. And although it begins in gentleness, and tenderness, and weakness, and is often supposed to be more natural to women than men, yet it grows up also to "the fulness of the stature of the perfect man." The truest note of the depth and sincerity of our feelings towards our fellow crea-

tures is a manly, — that is, a self controlled — temper : still more is this true of the love of the soul towards Christ and God.

Every one knows what it is to become like those whom we admire or esteem ; the impress which a disciple may sometimes have received from his teacher, or the servant from his Lord. Such devotion to a particular person can rarely be thought to open our hearts to love others also ; it often tends to weaken the force of individual character. But the love of Christ is the conducting medium to the love of all mankind ; the image which He impresses upon us is the image not of any particular individual, but of the Son of Man. And this image, as we draw nearer to it, is transfigured into the image of the Son of God. As we become like Him, we see Him as He is ; and see ourselves and all other things with true human sympathy. Lastly, we are sensible that more than all we feel towards Him, He feels towards us, and that it is He who is drawing us to Him, while we seem to be drawing to Him ourselves. This is a part of that mystery of which the Apostle speaks, “of the length, and depth, and breadth of the love of Christ,” which passeth knowledge. Mere human love rests on instincts, the working of which we cannot explain, but which nevertheless touch the inmost springs of our being. So, too, we have spiritual instincts, acting towards higher objects, still more suddenly and wonderfully capturing our souls in an instant, and making us indifferent to all things else. Such instincts show themselves in the weak no less than in the strong ; they seem to be not so much an original part of our nature as to fulfil our nature, and add to it, and draw it out, until they make us different beings to ourselves and others. It was the quaint fancy of a sentimentalist to ask whether any one who remembers the first sight of a beloved person, could doubt the existence of magic. We may ask another question, Can any one who has ever known the love of Christ, doubt the existence of a spiritual power ?

(3.) The instrument whereby, above all others, we realise the power of God, and the love of Christ, which carries us into their

presence, and places us within the circle of a Divine yet personal influence, is prayer. Prayer is the summing up of the Christian life in a definite act, which is at once inward and outward, the power of which on the character, like that of any other act, is proportioned to its intensity. The imagination of doing rightly adds little to our strength; even the wish to do so is not necessarily accompanied by a change of heart and conduct. But in prayer we imagine, and wish, and perform all in one. Our imperfect resolutions are offered up to God; our weakness becomes strength, our words deeds. No other action is so mysterious; there is none in which we seem, in the same manner, to renounce ourselves that we may be one with God.

Of what nature that prayer is which is effectual to the obtaining of its requests is a question of the same kind as what constitutes a true faith. That prayer, we should reply, which is itself most of an act, which is most immediately followed by action, which is most truthful, manly, self-controlled, which seems to lead and direct, rather than to follow, our natural emotions. That prayer which is its own answer because it asks not for any temporal good, but for union with God. That prayer which begins with the confession, "We know not what to pray for as we ought;" which can never by any possibility interfere with the laws of nature, because even in extremity of danger or suffering, it seeks only the fulfilment of His will. That prayer which acknowledges that our enemies, or those of a different faith, are equally with ourselves in the hands of God; in which we never unwittingly ask for our own good at the expense of others. That prayer in which faith is strong enough to submit to experience; in which the soul of man is nevertheless conscious not of any self-produced impression, but of a true communion with the Author and Maker of his being.

In prayer, as in all religion, there is something that it is impossible to describe, and that seems to be untrue the moment it is expressed in words. In the relations of man with God, it is vain to attempt to separate what belongs to the finite and what to the infinite.



We can feel, but we cannot analyse it. We can lay down practical rules for it, but can give no adequate account of it. It is a mystery which we do not need to fathom. In all religion there is an element of which we are conscious;—which is no mystery, which ought to be and is on a level with reason and experience. There is something besides, which, in those who give way to every vague spiritual emotion, may often fall below reason (for to them it becomes a merely physical state); which may also raise us above ourselves, until reason and feeling meet in one, and the life on earth even of the poor and ignorant answers to the description of the Apostle: “Having your conversation in heaven.”

This partial indistinctness of the subject of religion, even independently of mysticism or superstition, may become to intellectual minds a ground for doubting the truth of that which will not be altogether reduced to the rules of human knowledge, which seems to elude our grasp, and retires into the recesses of the soul the moment we ask for the demonstration of its existence. Against this natural suspicion let us set two observations: first, that if the Gospel had spoken to the reason only, and not to the feelings—if “the way to the blessed life” had to be won by clearness of ideas, then it is impossible that “to the poor the Gospel should have been first preached.” It would have begun at the other end of society, and probably remained, like Greek philosophy, the abstraction of educated men. Secondly, let us remark that even now, judged by its effects, the power of religion is of all powers the greatest. Knowledge itself is a weak instrument to stir the soul compared with religion; morality has no way to the heart of man; but the Gospel reaches the feelings and the intellect at once. In nations as well as individuals, in barbarous times as well as civilised, in the great crises of history especially, even in the latest ages, when the minds of men seem to wax cold, and all things remain the same as at the beginning, it has shown itself to be a reality without which human nature would cease to be what it is. Almost every one has had the witness of it in himself. No one, says Plato, ever passed from youth

to age in unbelief of the gods, in heathen times. Hardly any educated person in a Christian land has passed from youth to age without some aspiration after a better life, some thought of the country to which he is going.

As a fact, it would be admitted by most, that, at some period of their lives, the thought of the world to come and of future judgment, the beauty and loveliness of the truths of the Gospel, the sense of the shortness of our days here, have wrought a more quickening and powerful effect than any moral truths or prudential maxims. Many a one would acknowledge that he has been carried whither he knew not; and had nobler thoughts, and felt higher aspirations, than the course of his ordinary life seemed to allow. These were the most important moments of his life for good or for evil; the critical points which have made him what he is, either as he used or neglected them. They came he knew not how, sometimes with some outward and apparent cause, at other times without,—the result of affliction or sickness, or “the wind blowing where it listeth.”

And if such changes and such critical points should be found to occur in youth more often than in age, in the poor and ignorant rather than in the educated, in women more often than in men,—if reason and reflection seem to weaken as they regulate the springs of human action, this very fact may lead us to consider that reason, and reflection, and education, and the experience of age, and the force of manly sense, are not the links which bind us to the communion of the body of Christ; that it is rather to those qualities which we have, or may have, in common with our fellow-men, that the Gospel is promised; and that it is with the weak, the poor, the babes in Christ,—not with the strong-minded, the resolute, the consistent,—that we shall sit down in the kingdom of heaven.

Οὐδὲν ἄρα νῦν κατάκριμα τοῖς ἐν χριστῷ Ἰησοῦ<sup>1</sup>. ὁ γὰρ 8  
νόμος τοῦ πνεύματος τῆς ζωῆς ἐν χριστῷ Ἰησοῦ ἠλευθέ- 2  
ρωσέν με ἀπὸ τοῦ νόμου τῆς ἁμαρτίας καὶ τοῦ θανάτου. τὸ 3  
γὰρ ἀδύνατον τοῦ νόμου, ἐν ᾧ ἡσθένει διὰ τῆς σαρκὸς, ὁ

<sup>1</sup> Add μὴ κατὰ σάρκα περιπατοῦσιν ἀλλὰ κατὰ πνεῦμα.

VIII. 1—15. The struggle has passed away, and the conqueror and the conquered are side by side. The two laws mentioned in the last chapter, have changed places, the one becoming mighty from being powerless, the other powerless from being mighty. The helplessness of the law has been done away in Christ, that its righteous requirement may be fulfilled in us, who walk not after the flesh but after the spirit. The Apostle returns upon his former track that he may contrast the two elements, not, as in the previous chapter, in conflict with each other, hopelessly entangled by "occasion of the commandment," but in entire separation and opposition. These two, the flesh and the spirit, stand over against one another, as life and death, as peace and enmity with God. Do what it will, the flesh can never be subjected to the law of God. And this antagonism is not an antagonism of ideas only, but of persons also. It is another mode of expressing the same thought, to say that they that are in the flesh cannot please God. "But ye," the Apostle adds, "are not in the flesh, but in the Spirit, which is the Spirit of God and Christ, and have the body dead, and the Spirit that is in you life; and as God raised up Christ from the dead, he will raise you up, because you have His Spirit dwell-

ing in you. Are we not debtors then to live according to the Spirit, which is the only source of life and immortality, under the guidance of which, too, we are no longer the servants but the sons of God?"

1. ἄρα.] To those, then, who are dead with Christ, who struggle against sin, who with the mind serve the law of God, there is therefore now no condemnation. The connexion is with the whole of the previous subject.

νῦν.] At this point of our argument we may say. Compare *ῥωμ.*, vii. 17.

τοῖς ἐν χριστῷ,] may be compared with οἱ ἀμφὶ Πλάτωνα, Πυθαγόραν, and the like. Yet the preposition ἐν expresses, also, the different relation in which the disciple of Christ and of a heathen philosopher stood to their master.

The accidental division of the chapter seems to correspond, in this passage, with the actual break in the sense. The crisis has passed not again to return, and the soul, though in its earthly state, is, nevertheless, at rest.

[The words, μὴ κατὰ σάρκα περιπατοῦσιν ἀλλὰ κατὰ πνεῦμα, are omitted in B. C. D. F. G. They have been introduced into the text from ver. 4., perhaps to correct the apparently antinomian tendency of the Apostle's doctrine.]

2. The Gospel has been some-



8 There is therefore now no condemnation to them  
 2 which are in Christ Jesus.<sup>1</sup> For the law of the Spirit  
 of life in Christ Jesus hath made me free from the law  
 3 of sin and death. For what the law could not do, in

<sup>1</sup> *Add* who walk not after the flesh but after the Spirit.

times represented as a law, sometimes as a spirit; as a rule to which we must conform, and also as a power with which we are endowed. Both aspects are united in the expression, "the law of the Spirit of life," which is a kind of paradox, and may be compared with "the law of faith," at the end of the third chapter. Strictly speaking, in the language of St. Paul, sin stands on the one side, and the Spirit of God on the other; they answer respectively to the worse and the better element of human nature; while, between the two is placed the straight and unbending rule of the law. But the law is used in two other senses also, first, for the rule of sin to which man has subjected himself, and, secondly, for the growth of the higher life, the spirit which becomes a law, the habit which strengthens into a second and better nature. Law, in the first of these two senses, is but a figure to express the strength and uniformity of the power of evil; in the second, it is the harmony of human things in communion with God and Christ: the first is the law under which the first Adam fell: the second, the law, by the fulfilment of which the second Adam redeemed mankind.

2. νόμον τῆς ἁμαρτίας καὶ τοῦ θανάτου, *the law of sin and death.*] But what law is thus characterised? The strength of

the language would not be a positive proof that the Apostle is not here speaking of the law of Moses, if we may take the expressions in Gal. iii. and iv. 3., and 1 Cor. xv. 56., where he seems to speak of the law as synonymous with "elements of the world," and even as "the strength of sin," as a measure of his words. Such a view of the words would also agree with the following verse, which speaks of the powerlessness of "the law through the flesh," an expression hardly suitable to the "law in the members" that preceded, which was not powerless, but simply evil. Nor can we suppose that in the "law of sin and death," no allusion is implied to the law of Moses, even if the two be not absolutely identical. Still it is less liable to objection, to take the law of sin and death in the same general sense in which the law of sin and the body of death were spoken of in the preceding chapter. It is the law of Moses, and what the law of Moses in its influence on the heart and conscience has grown up into and become, the law which is the strength of sin, which is almost sin, which was made death.

3. τὸ γὰρ ἀδύνατον τοῦ νόμου, *for what the law, &c.*] (1.) For God condemned sin in the flesh, which was a thing that the law could not do, τὸ ἀδύνατον τοῦ νόμου being in apposition with

θεὸς τὸν ἑαυτοῦ υἱὸν πέμψας ἐν ὁμοιώματι σαρκὸς ἁμαρ-  
 τίας καὶ περὶ ἁμαρτίας κατέκρινεν τὴν ἁμαρτίαν ἐν τῇ  
 σαρκί, ἵνα τὸ δικαίωμα τοῦ νόμου πληρωθῇ ἐν ἡμῖν τοῖς  
 μὴ κατὰ σάρκα περιπατοῦσιν ἀλλὰ κατὰ πνεῦμα. οἱ γὰρ  
 κατὰ σάρκα ὄντες τὰ τῆς σαρκὸς φρονοῦσιν, οἱ δὲ κατὰ  
 πνεῦμα τὰ τοῦ πνεύματος· τὸ γὰρ φρόνημα τῆς σαρκὸς

κατέκρινε, κ.τ.λ.; or (2.) making τὸ ἀδύνατον independent, for touching the powerlessness of the law, in that it was weak through the flesh, &c. This mode of taking the passage sacrifices the grammar to the meaning. For τὸ ἀδύνατον τοῦ νόμου begins one sentence, and is met by ὁ θεός, κ.τ.λ., which begins another. Simplicity is, however, a better guide to the order of words in St. Paul than classical refinement of construction.

To pass on to the sense. The law was powerless, not in itself, but because it was without instruments for the service of God. The weakness of the flesh could never fulfil the requirements of the law; it seemed rather to justify disobedience. But God sent His own Son, in the likeness of sinful flesh, and for sin, and condemned sin in the flesh. The sinless life of Christ showed that even in the flesh sin was not natural or necessary. So we might speak in a figure of the life or conduct of another convicting or condemning ourselves; he might show, that is, some virtue or self-denial to be possible which would otherwise have seemed impossible. Some such analogy as this is working in the Apostle's mind. The other mode of taking the words which refers them to the death of Christ, regarded either as a sacrifice for sin, or as the

punishment for sinful flesh, is inconsistent with τὸ ἀδύνατον τοῦ νόμου. There is also an allusion in the word κατέκρινεν to κατάκριμα, in ver. 1., "There is no condemnation, because God condemned sin in the flesh."

The meaning of the clause derives some additional light from the words that follow. In Scripture Christ is often said to be in all points like ourselves; and all that we are, and are not, and might have been, is transferred to Him, either to be done away with in us, or to be imparted to us. Thus, in the language of St. Paul, He died, that we might be saved from death; He became a curse, to free us from the curse of the law; He condemned sin in the flesh, that to us there might be no condemnation. (Compare ver. 1. and διὰ τὸν ὑποτάξαντα, in ver. 20.) Also he condemned sin that we might condemn it too; or, in other words, that the righteousness of the law might be fulfilled in us, who walk not after the flesh, but after the spirit (ver. 4.): what is expressed in the words κατέκρινεν τὴν ἁμαρτίαν ἐν τῇ σαρκί is another aspect of ἵνα τὸ δικαίωμα τοῦ νόμου πληρωθῇ. ἐν ὁμοιώματι,] in the likeness, that is, the outward form or figure of, as in Rev. ix. 7. σὰρξ ἁμαρτίας, flesh of sin, i. e. which belongs to sin, is identified with sin.

that it was weak through the flesh, God sending his own Son in the likeness of sinful flesh, and for sin, condemned  
 4 sin in the flesh : that the righteousness of the law might  
 be fulfilled in us, who walk not after the flesh, but after  
 5 the Spirit. For they that are after the flesh do mind  
 the things of the flesh; but they that are after the  
 6 Spirit the things of the Spirit. For the mind of the

*περὶ ἁμαρτίας.*] Better in the general sense of “for sin” than as in Heb. x. 4. “for a sin offering.”

Compare for the sense Heb. iv. 15.: *πεπειρασμένον δὲ κατὰ πάντα καθ’ ὁμοίωτα χωρὶς ἁμαρτίας.*

4. *ἵνα τὸ δίκαιωμα τοῦ νόμου.*] “That the righteous requirement of the law may be fulfilled in us, who walk not after the flesh but after the spirit.” These words have received three interpretations. They may be supposed to refer :—(1.) to Christ’s fulfilment of the law, which is transferred to us ; or, (2.) to our participation in his fulfilment of the law by union with him ; or, (3.) to our fulfilment of the law by the holiness which he imparts to us. In other words, they may relate :—(1.) to an external righteousness ; or, (2.) to a righteousness, external, but imparted ; or, (3.) to inherent righteousness. Instead of selecting one of these interpretations, the meaning of any of which is defined by its antagonism to the other two, we must go back to the predoctrinal age of the Apostle himself, ere such distinctions existed. The whole Christian life flows with him from union with Christ. Whether this union is conscious or unconscious, whether it gives or merely imputes the righteousness of Christ, is a question which he does not analyse. But in think-

ing of it, he perceives a sort of balance and contrast between the humiliation of Christ and the exaltation of the Christian. The believer seems to gain what his master has lost. He throws on Christ the worse half of self, that the better half may be endued with the spirit of life.

5. In the fifth verse the Apostle expresses in the concrete what in the sixth he repeats in the abstract.

For they that walk according to the flesh, have the mind and do the deeds of the flesh, and therefore cannot fulfil the law. Their being in the flesh is no mere imaginary state ; it implies having the wishes and desires of the flesh.

6. *φρόνημα τῆς σαρκός.*] “Which some do expound the wisdom, some sensuality, some the affection, some the desire of the flesh.” Art. ix.

“The mind” in the sense of “will, intention,” more nearly answers to the Greek than any of these.

In this and the following verses the Apostle, as in vii. 8., returns upon the track of the preceding chapter. He is speaking of the struggle which is now past, the elements of which no longer exist together in the same human soul, but are the types of classes of men living in two dif-



θάνατος, τὸ δὲ φρόνημα τοῦ πνεύματος ζωὴ καὶ εἰρήνη. διότι τὸ φρόνημα τῆς σαρκὸς ἔχθρα εἰς θεόν· τῷ γὰρ 7 νόμῳ τοῦ θεοῦ οὐχ ὑποτάσσεται, οὐδὲ γὰρ δύναται. οἱ 8 δὲ ἐν σαρκὶ ὄντες θεῷ ἀρέσαι οὐ δύναται. ὑμεῖς δὲ 9 οὐκ ἔστε ἐν σαρκὶ ἀλλ' ἐν πνεύματι, εἴ περ πνεῦμα θεοῦ οἰκεῖ ἐν ὑμῖν. εἰ δέ τις πνεῦμα χριστοῦ οὐκ ἔχει, οὗτος οὐκ ἔστιν αὐτοῦ. εἰ δὲ χριστὸς ἐν ὑμῖν, τὸ μὲν 10 σῶμα νεκρὸν διὰ ἁμαρτίαν, τὸ δὲ πνεῦμα ζωὴ διὰ δικαιοσύνην. εἰ δὲ τὸ πνεῦμα τοῦ ἐγείραντος τὸν 11 Ἰησοῦν ἐκ νεκρῶν οἰκεῖ ἐν ὑμῖν, ὁ ἐγείρας χριστὸν<sup>1</sup> [Ἰησοῦν] ἐκ νεκρῶν ζωοποιήσει καὶ τὰ θνητὰ σώματα

<sup>1</sup> τὸν Χρ. Om. Ἰησοῦν.

ferent worlds. In ver. 6. we have what may be termed a further exegesis of ver. 5., as ver. 5. was of ver. 4., both being connected by the favourite γὰρ. As in ver. 5. he took up the words σὰρξ and πνεῦμα from ver. 4., so here he takes up the word φρονεῖν from ver. 5.

θάνατος.] Not physical, but spiritual death, the state of discord which he had described in the preceding chapter, which in the next verses he describes as enmity against God, opposed to the state of life and peace.

7. For the mind of the flesh is that state which we have described above of "enmity against God;" for it is not subject to the law of God, for it cannot be: it involves, as we should say, a moral, almost a physical impossibility, for it to conform to a rule. Compare above, vii. 18. :—"For I know that in me (that is, in my flesh) dwelleth no good thing."

8. οἱ δὲ ἐν σαρκὶ ὄντες.] The δὲ in this passage may be regarded either as a mere connecting particle, or may be explained

as arising out of the general opposition of σὰρξ and πνεῦμα which runs through the passage.

9. εἴ περ . . . ὑμῖν.] Compare John, xiv. 23. :—"My father will love him, and we will come unto him and make our abode with him."

As in chapter vi. St. Paul spoke of the Christian as being dead with Christ, so in this he speaks of his living with Him. These are the two stages of the believer's being, which have many names and aspects :—slavery, freedom, strife, peace; the flesh, the spirit, death, resurrection, suffering, glory.

The spirit is spoken of in Scripture indifferently as the Spirit of God or of Christ, Phil. i. 19.; or of the Son, Gal. iv. 6.; sometimes under the more general term of the Spirit of the Lord, as in 2 Cor. iii. 17, 18. Here the Apostle makes a sudden transition from the Spirit of God to that of Christ, and returns again in the eleventh verse to speak of "the Spirit of Him that raised up Christ from the dead."

flesh\* is death; but the mind of the Spirit\* is life and  
 7 peace. Because the mind of the flesh\* is enmity against  
 God: for it is not subject to the law of God, neither in-  
 8 deed can be; and\* they that are in the flesh cannot  
 9 please God. But ye are not in the flesh, but in the  
 Spirit, if so be that the Spirit of God dwell in you.  
 Now if any man have not the Spirit of Christ, he is none  
 10 of his. But\* if Christ be in you, the body is dead be-  
 cause of sin; but the Spirit is life because of righteous-  
 11 ness. But if the Spirit of him that raised up Jesus from  
 the dead dwell in you, he that raised up Christ Jesus<sup>1</sup>

<sup>1</sup> *Om. Jesus.*

The change is not accidental; it is designed to give point to the words *ὄντος οὐκ ἔστιν αὐτοῦ*. But if a man have not that spirit, which (being the Spirit of God) is also that of Christ, he is not Christ's.

10. "But if Christ be in you, the body is dead because of sin; but the Spirit is life, because of righteousness." The same question which was asked at chap. iv. ver. 25. again recurs, "What is the meaning of the antithesis?" and must again receive the same answer, that the antithesis belonging rather to the form than to the substance of the Apostle's thought, must not be too closely pressed. There is no difficulty in the second member of the sentence, which may be paraphrased:—"The Spirit is life, because of the righteousness imputed to it and inherent in it, its own and Christ's." It is not clear, however, in what sense the body can be said to be dead because of sin. Either, it may be, (1.) dead because sin would otherwise live, of which the body is the seat (comp. ver. 13.), or (2.), dead because sin is its destroying power—"sin revived and I died," as described

in the preceding chapter; or (3.), dead because the sinful body has no element of immortality in itself. but will be hereafter raised, not of itself, but by the Spirit which dwells in it. According to either of the two last ways of taking the passage, the death of the body is not looked upon as a good, but as an evil, which is compensated for by the quickening of the Spirit. For a time the body is dead either in a spiritual or a natural sense; either inert and incapable of the service whether of God or sin, or devoid of the seed of a future life. But God will revive it whether to natural or spiritual life or both: if the Spirit which raised up Christ is the Spirit which also dwells in us.

11. The spiritual resurrection suggests the thought of the actual resurrection, as in John, v. 25. In this world the quickening Spirit and the mortal body exist separate from each other; but hereafter the Spirit shall reanimate the body, as it is the Spirit of Him who raised up Christ from the dead;—who will do as much for us as he did for

ὑμῶν διὰ τοῦ<sup>1</sup> ἐνοικοῦντος αὐτοῦ πνεύματος ἐν ὑμῖν. ἄρα οὖν, ἀδελφοί, ὀφειλέται ἐσμὲν οὐ τῇ σαρκὶ τοῦ κατὰ 12  
 σάρκα ζῆν. εἰ γὰρ κατὰ σάρκα ζήτε, μέλλετε ἀπο- 13  
 θνήσκειν· εἰ δὲ πνεύματι τὰς πράξεις τοῦ σώματος  
 θανατοῦτε, ζήσεσθε. ὅσοι γὰρ πνεύματι θεοῦ ἄγονται, 14  
 οὗτοι υἱοὶ εἰσιν θεοῦ.<sup>2</sup> οὐ γὰρ ἐλάβετε πνεῦμα δουλείας 15  
 πάλιν εἰς φόβον, ἀλλὰ ἐλάβετε πνεῦμα υἰοθεσίας, ἐν ᾧ  
 κράζομεν Ἀββᾶ ὁ πατήρ.

Αὐτὸ τὸ πνεῦμα συμμαρτυρεῖ τῷ πνεύματι ἡμῶν, ὅτι 16  
 ἐσμὲν τέκνα θεοῦ. εἰ δὲ τέκνα καὶ κληρονόμοι· κληρο- 17

<sup>1</sup> τὸ ἐνοικοῦν . . . πνεῦμα.

<sup>2</sup> εἰσιν υἱοὶ θεοῦ.

Christ. τὰ θνητὰ σώματα, your bodies that would die were it not for His quickening Spirit. Compare vi. 12.

διὰ τὸ ἐνοικοῦν αὐτοῦ πνεῦμα, has a large majority of patristic, as διὰ τοῦ ἐνοικοῦντος αὐτοῦ πνεύματος of MS. authority in its favour. It makes little difference whether we look upon the Holy Spirit as the cause, or as the instrument of the resurrection, the mode of which so far transcends human language and thought.

12. Knowing that the body is dead, because of sin, and the Spirit is life, because of righteousness, and looking forward to the resurrection of the dead, ought we to live according to the flesh?

The thought is the same, though less strongly expressed than in chap. vi. 2.:—"How shall we, who are dead to sin, live any longer therein?" which is worked out in a similar manner in the following verses: "That as Christ rose from the dead in the glory of the Father, so we also may walk in newness of life."

13. The Apostle returns upon ver. 6., repeating, as his manner

is, in the concrete what he had thrice said in the abstract, and alluding again to the actual death and resurrection, the thought of which had been introduced in ver. 11.: "For if ye live according to the flesh, that is not only present but future death; but if ye by the Spirit put to death the deeds of the body, ye shall live."

Comp. Gal. v. 24., "And they that are Christ's have crucified the flesh with the affections and lusts;" and Col. iii. 5., "Mortify, therefore, your members which are upon the earth."

14. The Apostle proceeds to describe the relation of the regenerate to God by a yet nearer figure; they are the sons of God as Christ is, they are the members of his family, they feel towards him as a Father, they are the heirs of His glory. In their love to him, and in his to them, in the forgiveness of their offences, in the rest of their eternal home, they are conscious that they are his children

γάρ expresses the ground of ζήσεσθε: "You shall live, for you are the sons of God, for the



from the dead shall also quicken your mortal bodies by  
 12 his Spirit that dwelleth in you. Therefore, brethren, we  
 13 are debtors, not to the flesh, to live after the flesh. For  
 if ye live after the flesh, ye shall die: but if ye through  
 the Spirit do mortify the deeds of the body, ye shall  
 14 live. For as many as are led by the Spirit of God, they  
 15 are the sons of God. For ye have not received the  
 spirit of bondage again to fear; but ye have received  
 the Spirit of adoption, whereby we cry, Abba, Father.  
 16 The Spirit itself beareth witness with our spirit, that  
 17 we are the children of God: and if children, then heirs;

Spirit which you have received is the Spirit of adoption."

This new relation between God and man is introduced by the Gospel. It is not literally true that, in the Old Testament, the children of Israel are not spoken of as the sons of God, but only as his subjects and servants; but it is true that in their essential character the law and the Gospel are thus opposed, as the spirit of bondage again to fear, and the Spirit of adoption, whereby we acknowledge God as a father.

15. The Apostle brings home to the Roman converts the nature of the Gospel by an appeal to their own experience. For a similar appeal, compare Gal. iii. 2.: *ἐξ ἔργων νόμον τὸ Πνεῦμα ἐλάβετε ἢ ἐξ ἀκοῆς πίστεως.* The repetition of *ἐλάβετε* is emphatic, as in Heb. xii. 8.; Eph. ii. 17. 19. Compare, again, for this and the following verse, Gal. iv. 6, 7.: — *ὅτι δὲ ἐστε υἱοί, ἐξαπέστειλεν ὁ Θεὸς τὸ πνεῦμα τοῦ υἱοῦ αὐτοῦ εἰς τὰς καρδίας ἡμῶν, κρᾶζον Ἀββᾶ ὁ πατήρ. ὥστε οὐκέτι εἰ δούλος, ἀλλὰ υἱός· εἰ δὲ υἱός, καὶ κληρονόμος διὰ Θεοῦ.* The two words mean the same. *Ἀββᾶ* is the vocative. The origin of the

common formula in which they were both retained is uncertain.

16. *Αὐτὸ τὸ πνεῦμα, the Spirit itself.*] The Spirit has been spoken of already as the Spirit of adoption (v. 15.), as the Spirit of God, in v. 9., also as the Spirit of Christ, and, v. 11., the Spirit of them that raised up Christ from the dead. It now becomes more abstract and personal; comp. 1 Cor. ii. 11.; 2 Cor. iii. 17. We may conceive of two Spirits, the dwelling-place of both being the human soul: the first a higher, which is the Spirit of God, and a lower, which is our own; the one bears witness with the other that we are the children of God. For *συμμετρῶν* comp. 1 John, v. 10., "He that believeth in the Son of God hath the witness in himself;" and below, ver. 26.; also, ix. 1., "My conscience also bearing me witness in the Holy Spirit." The Spirit is essentially the communion of the spirit and the conscious witness of itself.

17. The Apostle follows the train of thought suggested by the human figure, which he has just employed:—"If we be the

νόμοι μὲν θεοῦ, συγκληρονόμοι δὲ χριστοῦ, εἶ περ  
 συμπάσχομεν, ἵνα καὶ συνδοξασθῶμεν. λογίζομαι γὰρ <sup>18</sup>  
 ὅτι οὐκ ἄξια τὰ παθήματα τοῦ νῦν καιροῦ πρὸς τὴν  
 μέλλουσαν δόξαν ἀποκαλυφθῆναι εἰς ἡμᾶς. ἡ γὰρ ἀπο- <sup>19</sup>  
 कारαδοκία τῆς κτίσεως τὴν ἀποκάλυψιν τῶν υἱῶν τοῦ  
 θεοῦ ἀπεκδέχεται. τῇ γὰρ ματαιότητι ἡ κτίσις ὑπετάγη, <sup>20</sup>

sons of God, we are his heirs, and partakers of the inheritance of Christ, as in His sufferings so also in His glory." Comp. John, xvii. 22., Rev. iii. 21.; also, Col. iii. 4, 5., 2 Tim. ii. 12., 1 Peter, iv. 13.

The new thought is carried on to a climax, and then surrounded with the imagery in which the Apostle habitually describes the relation of the believer to Christ.

18. λογίζομαι γάρ, *for I reckon.*] Expressive, not of doubt, but of reflection:—"For when I speak of our present sufferings and our future glory, I consider that there is no comparison between them."

In Scripture, the glory of the saints is sometimes spoken of as future, sometimes as present; sometimes as at a distance, at other times upon the earth; sometimes as an external state or condition; at other times as an inward and spiritual change, to be revealed in them as they are transformed from glory to glory. In the writings of St. Paul it is the spiritual sense of a future life which chiefly prevails, as in this passage. He does not paint scenes of the world to come: he is lost in it; "whether in the body or out of the body he cannot tell."

19. ἀποκαραδοκία,] Phil. i. 20.; ἀποκαραδοκεῖν, τῇ κεφαλῇ προελέπειν, Etym. Mag.: "For this revelation of the sons of God is what shall be, and what the in-

tense desire of the creature waiting for it intimates."

As we turn from ourselves to the world around us, the prospect on which we cast our eyes seems to reflect the tone and colour of our own minds, and to share our joy and sorrow. To the religious mind it seems also to reflect our sins. We cannot, indeed, speak of the misery of the brute creation, of whose constitution we know so little; nor do we pretend to discover in the loveliest spots of earth, indications of a fallen world. But when we look at the vices and diseases of mankind, at their life of labour in which the animals are our partners, at the aspect in modern times of our large towns, as in ancient of a world given to idolatry, we see enough to give a meaning to the words of the Apostle. The evil in the world bears witness with the evil and sorrow in our own hearts. And the hope of another life springs up unbidden in our thoughts, for the sake of ourselves and of our fellow creatures.

The exact meaning of the word κτίσις, in ver. 19. 22., has been a subject of great difference of opinion among commentators. Some have referred it, (1.) to the inanimate, others (2.) to the brute creation; while others have thought they saw in it (3.) the Gentile as opposed to the Jewish world. The first two of these three interpretations have little

heirs of God, and joint-heirs with Christ; since\* we suffer with him, that we may be also glorified together. For I reckon that the sufferings of this present time are not worthy to be compared with the glory which shall be revealed unto\* us. For the earnest expectation of the creature waiteth for the manifestation of the sons of God. For the creature was made subject to vanity,

except, perhaps, poetical figures to support them, common to all nations; while the last of them seems narrow as well as inappropriate to the present passage, in which the acceptance of the Gentiles having been the subject of the whole Epistle, could not be spoken of as a distant aspiration, but as an actual and present fact. Considering the various uses which we have already observed of the words, *νόμος*, *πνεῦμα*, &c., in successive verses, there would be nothing extravagant in supposing that the word *κτίσις*, which occurs four times, was not to be taken in each of the four verses in which it is used, in precisely the same sense. It may refer to the creature considered from within, in which sense it is a personified *σάρξ*, which is the best explanation of it in ver. 19.; or to the creature considered from without, as the figure of a former dispensation, which is the sense to which it inclines in ver. 20, 21.; or to the creation collectively, of which man is, nevertheless, the principal part, as in ver. 22. That even this last is not to be pressed too strictly, we shall see in considering ver. 23., the form of which seems to exclude the believer from the circle of creation.

20. *ματαιότητι*, vanity, nothingness, what is afterwards termed

*δουλεία τῆς φθορᾶς*. The connexion of this verse with the preceding is as follows:—“The creature desires redemption; for though it is subject to vanity, it was not of its own will that it became subject.”

It never fell, we may paraphrase, to the level of the brutes, but had always a wish for better things, a monitor which witnessed of its better state.

*ἀλλὰ διὰ τὸν ὑποτάξαντα*, but by reason of him who hath subjected.] These words can scarcely be supposed to refer to Adam, who, “as in him all died,” might indeed indirectly be considered as the cause of salvation. But the meaning of the word *ὑποτάσσειν* is ill-suited to express this indirect effect; nor is it likely that *ὁ ὑποτάξας*, used thus generally, could refer to any but God or Christ.

It is not quite clear, however, whether it is to God or Christ the words are to be referred. The Apostle is speaking here, as elsewhere, of the double character of the scheme of Providence, consisting, as it did, of two parts, one of which had a reference to the other. As afterwards he says (xi. 32.)—“God concluded all under sin that he might have mercy upon all;” so here—The creature was made subject to evil against its will, and with the hope of restoration, because



οὐχ ἑκοῦσα ἀλλὰ διὰ τὸν ὑποτάξαντα ἐπ' ἐλπίδι, ὅτι καὶ <sup>21</sup>  
 αὐτὴ ἢ κτίσις ἐλευθερωθήσεται ἀπὸ τῆς δουλείας τῆς  
 φθορᾶς εἰς τὴν ἐλευθερίαν τῆς δόξης τῶν τέκνων τοῦ  
 θεοῦ. οἶδαμεν γὰρ ὅτι πᾶσα ἢ κτίσις συστενάζει καὶ <sup>22</sup>  
 συνωδίνει ἄχρι τοῦ νῦν· οὐ μόνον δέ, ἀλλὰ καὶ αὐτοὶ <sup>23</sup>  
 τὴν ἀπαρχὴν τοῦ πνεύματος ἔχοντες [ἡμεῖς]<sup>1</sup> καὶ αὐτοὶ ἐν  
 ἑαυτοῖς στενάζομεν νιοθεσίαν ἀπεκδεχόμενοι, τὴν ἀπολύτρω-  
 σιν τοῦ σώματος ἡμῶν. τῇ γὰρ ἐλπίδι ἐσώθημεν· ἐλπίς δέ <sup>24</sup>

<sup>1</sup> καὶ ἡμεῖς αὐτοί.

of him who subjected the same; or the creature was made subject because of him who subjected the same, in hope that, etc. Connecting ἐπ' ἐλπίδι with the following clause, "the creature," we might paraphrase, "had no love for this helpless state. He was subjected to it because of him that subjected him, in the hope that grace might yet more abound." But who is "he who subjected?" First, Christ, on account of whose special work the creature was made subject to vanity. (The preposition διὰ has no proper meaning, if the word ὑποτάξας is referred exclusively to God.) He subjected the creature as he condemned sin in the flesh in his own person, by subjecting Himself. And yet though the work of redemption be attributed to Him, it seems inappropriate to regard Him also as the author of the fallen condition of man. There is the same impropriety in such a mode of expression as there would be in saying "Christ concluded all under sin that he might have mercy upon all." In the language of St. Paul, he is the instrument of our redemption, not its first author. More truly, in the word ὑποτάξαντα God and Christ seem to meet. "God in Christ reconciling the world

to Himself:" as the Creator considered as the Author and Appointer of all His creatures; as the Redeemer, the final cause and end of their sinful state. In defence of this twofold meaning of ὑποτάξας, compare the transition from God to Christ in ver. 9. 11.; also Col. i. 15.

ἐπ' ἐλπίδι] refers partly to what precedes and also to what follows.

21. ὅτι,] either "because" or "in hope that." If the latter sense is adopted, the meaning will be either—"It was subjected because of him that subjected it in hope that;" or "it was subjected in hope that." It is, however, more in accordance with the idiom of the Apostle to put a stop after ἐπ' ἐλπίδι (which may be connected either with ὑπετάγη or with ὑποτάξαντα), and to regard the clause dependent on ὅτι as a further explanation from the objective side of what ἐλπίς expresses subjectively.

εἰς τὴν ἐλευθ. is put in what is termed a pregnant construction after ἐλευθερωθήσεται: τῆς δόξης parallel with τῆς φθορᾶς. Compare Gal. iv. 26.: "But the Jerusalem that is above is free."

The creation is to those who have the first fruits of the Spirit, as the body to the soul. As the first shall partake of the glorious

not willingly, but by reason of him who hath subjected  
 21 the same in hope, because\* the creature itself also shall  
 be delivered from the bondage of corruption into the  
 22 liberty of the\* glory of the children of God. For we  
 know that the whole creation groaneth and travaileth in  
 23 pain together until now. And not only they, but our-  
 selves also which have the first-fruits of the Spirit, even  
 we ourselves groan within ourselves, waiting for the adop-  
 24 tion, to wit, the redemption of our body. For we are  
 saved by hope: but hope that is seen is not hope: for

liberty of the sons of God, so also the body shall be redeemed in the sons of God themselves. For their sonship is not yet attained; like the rest of creation, they are waiting for it.

22. For we know how great is the contrast of its present state which yet continues. ἄχρι τοῦ νῦν contains an allusion to the speedy termination of this state.

23. τὴν ἀπαρχὴν τοῦ πνεύματος ἔχοντες.] These words may bear four different meanings:—either, (1.) we who have the gift of the Spirit; or, (2.) who have the first fruits of the Spirit, as being first called; or, (3.) who have the first fruits, in the sense of the choicest gifts of the Spirit; or, (4.) who have the earnest or anticipation of the Spirit. The last explanation is the best, the very idea of first fruits implying an earnest: “Even we who have here on earth the beginnings of that Spirit, with which we shall have a fuller communion in glory.” Comp. ἀρράβων τοῦ πνεύματος, 1 Cor. i. 22.; ἀρράβων τῆς κληρονομίας, Eph. i. 14.

For the thought compare the passages in which St. Paul speaks of the contradiction of the Chris-

tian life, 2 Cor. v. 4.:—“For we that are in this tabernacle do groan, being burdened: not that we would be unclothed, but clothed upon, that mortality might be swallowed up of life.”

αὐτοὶ...[ἡμεῖς]καὶ αὐτοὶ ἐν ἑαυτοῖς, we ourselves.] We believers; the repetition of αὐτοὶ ... ἡμεῖς αὐτοὶ is not intended to confine the words to the Apostles, but to emphasize the consciousness of this sadness in the believer's soul. It will be said, if all creation is comprehended in the previous verse, how can the believer be excluded? Must we not confine the meaning of πᾶσα ἡ κτίσις to the world in opposition to the elect? We have seen before, in Gal. vi. 16. and Rom. iv. 12., that it is not necessary to regard the rules of logic to the injury of the sense. In this passage the Apostle first thought of the whole world in a general manner, and then singled out a particular class, which to the spiritual eye “was not in the world,” without remembering that he had previously included it.

ἀπολύτρωσις, κ. τ. λ.,] not “redemption from the body” (which is not to the Apostle's present purpose (v. 21.), and is also in-

βλεπομένη οὐκ ἔστιν ἐλπίς· ὁ γὰρ βλέπει τις, τί<sup>1</sup> ἐλπίζει; εἰ δὲ ὁ οὐ βλέπομεν ἐλπίζομεν, δι' ὑπομονῆς ἀπεκδεχόμεθα. 25

Ἦσαύτως δὲ καὶ τὸ πνεῦμα συναντιλαμβάνεται τῇ 26  
ἀσθενείᾳ ἡμῶν.<sup>2</sup> τὸ γὰρ τί προσευξόμεθα καθὼς δεῖ οὐκ  
οὔδαμεν, ἀλλ' αὐτὸ τὸ πνεῦμα ὑπερευτυγχάνει<sup>3</sup> στεναγμοῖς  
ἀλαλήτοις· ὁ δὲ ἔρευνῶν τὰς καρδίας οἶδεν τί τὸ φρόνημα 27  
τοῦ πνεύματος, ὅτι κατὰ θεὸν ἐντυγχάνει ὑπὲρ ἁγίων.  
οὔδαμεν δὲ ὅτι τοῖς ἀγαπῶσι τὸν θεὸν πάντα συνεργεῖ 28  
ὁ θεὸς<sup>4</sup> εἰς τὸ ἀγαθόν, τοῖς κατὰ πρόθεσιν κλητοῖς οὔσω.  
ὅτι οὗς προέγνω, καὶ προώρισεν συμμόρφους τῆς εἰκόνας 29

<sup>1</sup> τί καί.<sup>2</sup> ταῖς ἀσθενείαις.<sup>3</sup> ὑπ. ὑπὲρ ἡμῶν.<sup>4</sup> Omit ὁ θεός.

consistent with the active meaning of the word ἀπολύτρωσις), but “redemption of the body.”

24. For what we are saved by is hope, which is not yet swallowed up in sight; and (δέ) there would be no meaning in it, if it were. γάρ implies that our salvation is not inconsistent with this sorrowing expectation.

25. The very mode of our redemption implies patient expectation. ἀπεκδεχόμεθα alludes to ἀπεκδεχόμενοι, in ver. 23.

23—30. The connexion of these verses may be traced as follows:—

(1.) We walk feebly by hope and not by sight, waiting for the redemption of the body. 23—25.

(2.) But this feebleness the Spirit helps, and ever makes earnest intercession for us. 26, 27.

(3.) And there is another side to this view of creation groaning together; viz. that in all things God is working together for good to them that love Him; there are many steps in the ladder of God's Providence—foreknowledge, predestination, vocation, justification, glory.

The use of the particle δέ five times in as many verses, is almost

as difficult to analyse as in other places the still more favourite γάρ. In ver. 24, 25. the repetition of δέ is slightly adversative. “But we must not suppose that hope is sight.” “But we must not expect immediate fruition of what we hope for.” In ver. 26, 27, 28. the δέ, which is three times repeated, is also adversative. In all three cases δέ is best taken coordinately; they express the other side of the Apostle's argument which is also the confirmation of what has preceded.

26. Ἦσαύτως, likewise.] That is, the movement of the Spirit of God corresponds and coincides with this patient expectation in ourselves [comp. above ver. 16.: the Spirit beareth witness with our Spirit]. “We are saved by hope, not by sight, and with this our imperfect condition it agrees well that we have the Spirit for our help.” For in our very prayers we know not what to ask as we ought; but when language fails, the Spirit utters for us a cry inexpressible: comp. Eph. vi. 18., “Praying always with all prayer and supplication in the Spirit;” and 1 Cor. ii. 11. quoted above.



25 what a man seeth, why doth he<sup>1</sup> hope for? But if we hope for that we see not, we with patience wait for it.

26 Likewise the Spirit also helpeth our infirmity<sup>2</sup>: for we know not what we should pray for as we ought: but the Spirit itself maketh intercession<sup>3</sup> with

27 groanings which cannot be uttered. And he that searcheth the hearts knoweth what is the mind of the Spirit, that\* it\* maketh intercession for the saints

28 according to the will of God. And we know that<sup>4</sup> in all things God works together for good to them that love God, to them who are the called according to his purpose.

29 For whom he did foreknow, he also did predestinate to be

<sup>1</sup> Add yet.    <sup>2</sup> Infirmities.    <sup>3</sup> Add for us.    <sup>4</sup> All things work together.

ἀσθενείᾳ.] Comp. 2 Cor. xii. 5.: “For myself I will not glory except in mine infirmities.”

τὸ γὰρ. The article includes under it the words that follow (τί . . . δεῖ), which may be regarded as its substantive.

ὑπερευτυχάνει, makes request.] In this passage only used for ἐντυχάνει, see ver. 27. and xi. 2.

ἀλαλήτοις, unutterable.] Comp. 1 Peter, i. 8., ἀνεκλάλητος; 2 Cor. xi. 15., ἀνεκδήγητος.

It sounds strangely to us at first, that the Spirit should be spoken of as “uttering cries.” But the Spirit of God bearing witness with our spirits takes part in all our acts. It is we who cry aloud for help to God, and God knows this is the cry of those who are moved by his Spirit.

27. Comp. 1 John, iii. 21.: — “Beloved, if our heart condemn us, God is greater than our heart and knoweth all things.”

ὅτι, κ. τ. λ.] not because, but “that;” the clause following explains τί τὸ φρόνημα τοῦ πνεύματος.

κατὰ θεόν] = according to the will of God. Comp. κατὰ πρόθεσιν, ver. 28., and ἐλυπήθητε κατὰ θεόν, 2 Cor. vii. 9. 28.

28. Not only have we hope, and patience, and the gift of the Spirit; but we know that in all things God works together for good with them that love Him; or, according to the reading of the Textus Receptus (the authority for which is nearly evenly balanced), “but we know that all things work together for good to them that love God;” who moreover are chosen according to His purpose. In these latter words the Apostle indicates a further ground of hope and comfort.

29. ὅτι οὗς προέγνω καὶ προώρισεν, whom he did foreknow.] This verse is a further explanation of the previous words τοῖς κατὰ πρόθεσιν κλητοῖς οὖσιν. About the meaning of προέγνω, which from its use in this passage has become a sort of keynote in theology, commentators are disagreed. Three principal

τοῦ υἱοῦ αὐτοῦ, εἰς τὸ εἶναι αὐτὸν πρωτότοκον ἐν πολλοῖς ἀδελφοῖς· οὓς δὲ προώρισεν, τούτους καὶ ἐκάλεσεν· καὶ 30  
οὓς ἐκάλεσεν, τούτους καὶ ἐδικαίωσεν· οὓς δὲ ἐδικαίωσεν,  
τούτους καὶ ἐδόξασεν.

Τί οὖν ἐροῦμεν πρὸς ταῦτα; εἰ ὁ θεὸς ὑπὲρ ἡμῶν, 31  
τίς καθ' ἡμῶν; ὅς γε τοῦ ἰδίου υἱοῦ οὐκ ἐφείσατο, 32  
ἀλλὰ ὑπὲρ ἡμῶν πάντων παρέδωκεν αὐτόν, πῶς οὐχὶ καὶ

significations have been assigned to it:—(1.) Whom he fore-determined; or (2.) whom he fore-approved; or, (3.), whom he fore-knew,—he fore-determined. As the first explanation may be used to support predestination irrespective and absolute, so the third may be appealed to in support of that view of predestination which makes it conditional and dependent on fore-knowledge. Accordingly, the Calvinistic and Arminian commentators have respectively supported these two lines of interpretation. The use of the word *προέγνω* is sufficiently uncertain to afford some ground on which to maintain either.

In most passages of the New Testament where *προγινώσκειν* and cognate words occur, as Rom. xi. 2., 1 Pet. i. 2., i. 20., Acts, ii. 23., the meaning of “pre-determined, fore-appointed,” is the more natural. “God hath not cast off his people whom he fore-appointed” (οὓς *προέγνω*). “By the determinate counsel and fore-appointment of God” (*τῆ ὀρισμένη βουλῇ καὶ προγνώσει*). Yet, on the other hand, Acts, xxvi. 5., 2 Pet. iii. 17., admit only of the meaning of “know beforehand,” but not in reference to the Divine or prophetic fore-knowledge, and have, therefore, no bearing on the present passage.

The idea of fore-knowledge, it may be observed, as distinct from predestination, is scarcely discernible in Scripture, unless, perhaps, a trace of it be found in Acts, xv. 18.:—“Known unto God are all his works from the beginning.” The Israelite believed that all things were according to the counsel and appointment of God. Whether this was dependent on his previous knowledge of the intentions of man, was a question which, in that stage of human thought, would hardly have occurred to him. The theories of predestination, which have been built upon the words in the Latin or English version of them, “whom he did fore-know, them he did predestinate,” are an afterthought of later criticism.

We are thus led to consider the interpretation of fore-appointed, fore-acknowledged, as the true one. We might still translate fore-knoweth in the sense in which God is said to “know” them that are His. There might be a degree of difference in meaning between *προέγνω*, “fore-knew,” as the internal purpose of God, if such a figure of speech may be allowed, and “predestined,” as the solemn external act by which He, as it were, set apart His chosen ones. Such a distinction would be in keeping with the gradation of the words

conformed to the image of his Son, that he might be the  
 30 firstborn among many brethren. Moreover whom he  
 did predestinate, them he also called: and whom he  
 called, them he also justified: and whom he justified,  
 them he also glorified.

31 What shall we then say to these things? If God  
 32 be for us, who can be against us? He that spared  
 not his own Son, but delivered him up for us all,

that follow; it might also be gained in another way, by taking *προώρισεν* closely with *συμμόρφους*: either “whom he fore-determined them he fore-appointed;” or “whom he fore-determined he fore-determined to be like his Son.” *τοῦτο δὲ εἰπεῖν μεταφοράς ἐστὶν εἰπεῖν ἀνθρωπίνας.* The Apostle is overflowing with the sense of the work of God: what he chiefly means to say is, that all its acts and stages are His, now and hereafter, on earth and in heaven.

*εἰς τὸ εἶναι,*] the end being that Christ should not be the only-begotten Son of God, but the first-begotten among many.

*πρωτότοκον.*] As in Col. i. 15. Christ is called the firstborn of every creature, a figure which in Col. i. 18. is also applied to his resurrection — *πρωτότοκος ἐκ τῶν νέκρων.*

30. To predestine refers to the act, on God's part, external to man, as to call to the act in man by which the Divine presence is first signified to him. To justify is the completion of the work of God upon earth, when the spirit of man no longer strives with him, as to glorify is its final fulfilment and accomplishment in the kingdom of heaven.

31—39. All creation is groaning together; but the Spirit

helps us, and God has chosen us according to His purpose, and in all things God is working with us for good. The Lord is on our side; and as He has given us His Son, will give us all else as well. Is it God that justifies who will accuse? Is it Christ who intercedes that will condemn? On the one side are ranged persecution, and famine, and sword, and nakedness; on the other, the love of Christ, from which nothing in heaven or earth, or the changes of life or death, can us part.

Compare Is. l. 8, 9., the thought of which words seems to be passing before the Apostle's mind: *ὅτι ἐγγίξει ὁ δικαίωσας με· τίς ὁ κρινόμενός μοι; ἀντιστήτω μοι ἅμα· καὶ τίς ὁ κρινόμενός μοι; ἐγγισάτω μοι ἰδοὺ κύριος βοηθήσει μοι· τίς καλώσει με; κ. τ. λ.*

*ὅς γε τοῦ ἰδίου υἱοῦ οὐκ ἐφείσατο.*] *ἰδίου* is used as a term of endearment; as in John, iii. 16., it is said — “God so loved the world that he gave his only-begotten Son.”

In ver. 33—35. the chief doubt relates to the punctuation. The rhythm of the passage may be brought out by either of the two following arrangements: —

(1.) 31. *εἰ ὁ Θεὸς ὑπὲρ ἡμῶν — τίς καθ' ἡμῶν;*

32. *ὅς γε τοῦ ἰδίου υἱοῦ οὐκ ἐφείσατο, κ. τ. λ. — πῶς οὐχὶ καὶ*



σὺν αὐτῷ τὰ πάντα ἡμῖν χαρίζεται; τίς ἐγκαλέσει κατὰ 33  
 ἐκλεκτῶν θεοῦ; θεὸς ὁ δικαίων; τίς ὁ κατακρινῶν<sup>1</sup>; 34  
 χριστὸς [Ἰησοῦς] ὁ ἀποθανών, μᾶλλον δὲ<sup>2</sup> ἐγερθείς, ὃς  
 [καὶ] ἔστω ἐν δεξιᾷ τοῦ θεοῦ, ὃς καὶ ἐντυγχάνει ὑπὲρ  
 ἡμῶν; τίς ἡμᾶς χωρίζει ἀπὸ τῆς ἀγάπης τοῦ χριστοῦ; 35  
 θλίψις ἢ στενοχωρία ἢ διωγμὸς ἢ λιμὸς ἢ γυμνότης  
 ἢ κίνδυνος ἢ μάχαιρα; καθὼς γέγραπται ὅτι ἔνεκεν σοῦ 36  
 θανατοῦμεθα ὅλην τὴν ἡμέραν, ἐλογίσθημεν ὡς πρόβατα  
 σφαγῆς. ἀλλ' ἐν τούτοις πᾶσι ὑπερνικῶμεν διὰ τοῦ 37  
 ἀγαπήσαντος ἡμᾶς. πέπεισμαι γὰρ ὅτι οὔτε θάνατος 38  
 οὔτε ζῶή, οὔτε ἄγγελοι οὔτε ἀρχαί<sup>3</sup>, οὔτε ἐνεστῶτα οὔτε  
 μέλλοντα, οὔτε δυνάμεις οὔτε ὑψωμα οὔτε βάθος οὔτε τις 39  
 κτίσις ἑτέρα δυνήσεται ἡμᾶς χωρίσαι ἀπὸ τῆς ἀγάπης  
 τοῦ θεοῦ τῆς ἐν χριστῷ Ἰησοῦ τῷ κυρίῳ ἡμῶν.

<sup>1</sup> κατακρινῶν.<sup>2</sup> δὲ καί.<sup>3</sup> οὔτε δυνάμεις post ἀρχαί.

σὺν αὐτῷ τὰ πάντα ἡμῖν χαρίζεται;

33. τίς ἐγκαλέσει κατὰ ἐκλεκτῶν θεοῦ;—θεὸς ὁ δικαίων.

34. τίς ὁ κατακρινῶν;—χριστὸς ὁ ἀποθανών, κ. τ. λ.=χριστός ὁ ἐντυγχάνων.

35. τίς ἡμᾶς χωρίζει ἀπὸ τῆς ἀγάπης τοῦ χριστοῦ; θλίψις ἢ στενοχωρία, κ. τ. λ.

(2.) Differs in the arrangement of verses 33, 34. by making the latter clauses questions:—

Who shall lay anything to the charge of God's elect?

Is it God that justifies?

Who is he that will condemn?

Is it Christ who died and intercedes for us?

The last mode which agrees with the text of Lachmann is adopted in the following remarks as the more pointed and forcible.

33. Who shall lay anything to the charge of God's elect? Is God who justifies, their accuser? Does he justify and accuse at

once? It were a contradiction to suppose this.

34. Who is he that condemneth? Is the condemner Christ who ever lives to intercede for us? Comp. Heb. vii. 25., "Who ever liveth to make intercession for us;" and 1 John, ii. 1., "We have an advocate with the Father."

ὁ ἀποθανών, who died, or more truly rose again, of whom we now speak rather as of one passed into the heavens. The words μᾶλλον δὲ, or μᾶλλον δὲ καί, further intimate the inconsistency of Christ condemning us, not only because he died for us, but also, which is an additional reason, because he rose again "for our justification," iv. 25.; and what is a yet further reason, because he is our advocate.

35. τίς better than τίς, as a continuation of the questions: Who shall separate us from the love of Christ? Who shall make us give

how shall he not with him also freely give us all things? Who shall lay any thing to the charge of God's elect? Shall\* God that justifieth? Who is he that will condemn?<sup>1</sup> Will Christ that died,<sup>2</sup> rather, that is risen again, who is also at the right hand of God, who also maketh intercession for us? Who shall separate us from the love of Christ? shall tribulation, or distress, or persecution, or famine, or nakedness, or peril, or sword? As it is written, For thy sake we are killed all the day long: we are accounted as sheep for the slaughter. Nay, in all these things we are more than conquerors through him that loved us. For I am persuaded, that neither death, nor life, nor angels, nor principalities, nor things present, nor things to come, nor powers, nor height, nor depth, nor any other creature, shall be able to separate us from the love of God, which is in Christ Jesus our Lord.

<sup>1</sup> That condemneth.

<sup>2</sup> Add yea.

up Christ, or Christ give up us? Not afflictions of any sort. In verses 34. and 39. Christ's love to us, rather than ours to Him, seems spoken of; in ver. 35. ours towards Him. Yet there is no occasion, in either place, to separate one from the other. We love Him as we are loved of Him: we know Him as we are known of Him.

36. The quotation is taken literally from the LXX. Ps. xlv.22.

37. ἀλλ' ἐν τούτοις πᾶσι.] We conquer *far* through his love to us.

38. For I am persuaded that neither life, nor death, nor evil angels, nor principalities, nor things present nor future, nor powers, nor the height of heaven, nor depths of hell, nor any other created thing, can separate us from the love of Christ.

To ask the exact meaning of each of these words, would be like asking the precise meaning of single expressions in the line of Milton:—

“ Thrones, dominations, principedoms, virtues, powers.”

The leading thought in the Apostle's mind is that “nothing ever at any time or place can separate us from the love of Christ.” Of the signification of the particular words we can only form a notion, by attempting to conceive the invisible world, as it revealed itself by the eye of faith to the Apostle's mind, as inward, and yet outward; as present, and yet future; as earthly, and yet heavenly. Compare 1 Peter, iii. 22.: ὅς ἐστιν ἐν δεξιά τοῦ θεοῦ, πορευθεὶς εἰς οὐρανὸν ὑποταγέντων αὐτῷ ἀγγέλων καὶ ἐξουσιῶν καὶ δυνάμεων.

## CHAP. IX.—XI.

THE chapters that have preceded have been connected with each other by a sort of network, some of the threads of which have never ceased or been intermitted. At this point we come to a break in the Epistle. What follows has no connexion with what immediately precedes. The sublime emotion with which chapter viii. concludes is in another strain from that with which chapter ix. opens. We might almost imagine that the Apostle had here made a pause, and only after a while resumed his work of dictating to "Tertius who wrote this Epistle." It is on a more extended survey of the whole that order begins to reappear, and we see that the subject now introduced, which was faintly anticipated at the commencement of the third chapter, has also an almost necessary place in the Apostle's scheme.

The three chapters IX.—XI. have been regarded by an eminent critic as containing the true germ and first thought of the Epistle. Such a view may be supported by various arguments. It may be said that a letter must arise out of circumstances, and that this portion of the Epistle only has an appropriate subject ;—that we can imagine the Apostle, though unknown by face to the Church which was at Rome, writing to Jewish Christians on a topic in which they, as well as he, were so deeply interested as the restoration of their countrymen ; but that we cannot imagine him sitting down to compose a treatise on justification by faith ;—that to explain the dealings of God with his people, it was necessary for him to go back to the first principles of the Gospel of Christ, and that this mode of overlaying and transposing what to us would seem the natural order



of thought is quite in accordance with his usual manner. (Compare, *e. g.* the structure of 1 Cor. x.) It may be urged, that in several passages, as, for example, at the commencement of the third and fourth chapters, he has already hinted at the maintenance of the privileges of the Jews. All such arguments, ably as they have been stated by Baur, yet fail to convince us that what is apparently prominent and on the surface, and also occupies the greater part of the Epistle, is really subordinate, and that what is apparently subordinate and supplementary, held the first place in the Apostle's thoughts. See Introduction.

The theory of Baur is, however, so far true, as it tends to bring into prominence, as a main subject of the Epistle, the admission of the Gentiles. To the Apostle himself and his contemporaries, this was half, or more than half, the whole truth, not less striking or absorbing than the other half, of "righteousness by faith only." It is with this aspect of the doctrine of St. Paul that the portion of the Epistle on which we are now entering is to be connected. "Is he the God of the Jews only? is he not also of the Gentiles? Yes, of the Gentiles also." But granting this, innumerable difficulties and perplexities arose in the mind of the Israelites or of the reader of the Old Testament. What is the meaning of a chosen people? What advantage hath the Jew? and above all, what is to be his final end? When the circle of God's mercy is extended to the whole world, is he to be the only exception? Thrice the Apostle essays to answer this question; thrice he turns aside, rather to justify God's present dealings in casting away His chosen, than to hold out the hope with which he concludes, that all Israel shall be saved.

We have seen elsewhere (chap. iii. 1—8., v. 12—21., vii. 7—11.) that in many passages the Apostle wavers between the opposite sides of a question, before he arrives at a final and permanent conclusion. The argument in such passages may be described as a sort of struggle in his own thoughts, an alternation of natural feelings, a momentary conflict of emotions. The stream of discourse flows onward in two channels, occasionally mingling or contending with each other, which meet at the

last. There are particular instances of this peculiarity of style in the chapters which follow, ix. 19., x. 14. But the most striking illustration of it is the general character of the whole three chapters, in which the Apostle himself seems for a time in doubt between contending feelings, in which he first prays for the restoration of Israel, and then reasons for their rejection, and then finally shows that in a more extended view of the purposes of God their salvation is included. He hears the echo of many voices in the Old Testament, by which the Spirit spoke to the Fathers, and in all of them there is a kind of unity, though but half expressed, which is not less the unity of his own inmost feelings towards his kinsmen according to the flesh. He is like one of the old prophets himself, abating nothing of the rebellions of the house of Israel, yet still unable to forget that they are the people of God. As an Israelite and a believer in Christ, he is full of sorrow first, of consolation afterwards; two opposite feelings struggle together in his mind, both finally giving way to a clearer insight into the purposes of God towards the chosen nation.

When the first burst of his emotion has subsided, he proceeds to show that the rejection of Israel was not total, but partial, and that this partial rejection is in accordance with the analogy of God's dealings with their fathers. The circle of God's mercy to them had ever been narrowing. First, the seed of Abraham was chosen; then Isaac only; then Jacob before Esau, and this last quite irrespective of any good or evil that either of them had done. There was a preference in each case of the spiritual over the fleshly heir. Shall we say that here is any ground for imputing unrighteousness to God? He Himself had proclaimed this as His mode of dealing with mankind. The words of the law are an end of controversy. He does it, therefore it is just; he tells it us, therefore it is true. Who are we that we should call in question His justice, or challenge His ways? The clay might as well reason with the potter, as man argue against God. And, after all, this election of some to wrath, others to mercy, is but justice in mercy delayed, or an alternation of mercy and justice. The rejection of the Jews is the admission of the Gentiles. And to this truth the

prophets themselves bear witness. They speak of "a remnant," of "another people," of "a cutting short upon the earth," of "a rock of offence." The work that God has done is nothing unjust or unexpected, but a work of justice and mercy upon the house of Israel, of which their own prophets witness ; of which they are themselves the authors, as they sought to establish their own righteousness, and rejected the righteousness that is of faith.

But the subject of God's dealings with the Jews is not yet finished ; it is, indeed, scarcely begun. The first verses of the ninth chapter gave an intimation that this would not be the final course of the Apostle's thought. Israel had sought to establish their own righteousness, and rejected the righteousness that was of faith. But this very rejection, which was their condemnation, was not without excuse, in that it arose from a mistaken zeal for God. That mistake consisted in their not perceiving the difference between the righteousness of the law and the righteousness of faith ; the one a strait and unbending rule ; the other, "very nigh, even in thy mouth and thy heart," and extending to all mankind. "But," we expect the Apostle to say at the end of the contrast, "notwithstanding this, Israel may yet be saved." The time for this is not yet come. In what follows, to the end of the chapter, he digresses more and more ; first, as at ver. 14—19. of the previous one, to state the objections of the Jew ; secondly, to show that those objections are of no weight, and are disproved by the words of their own prophets.

Nowhere does the logical control over language, that is, the power of aptly disposing sentences so as to exhibit them in their precise relation to each other, so fail the Apostle as at the conclusion of the tenth chapter. We see his meaning, but his emotions prevent him from expressing it. At the commencement of the eleventh chapter, finding that he is so far away from his original subject, he makes an effort to regain it. "Hath God then cast away his people?" The Apostle is himself a living proof that this is not so. Though Israel "hath not obtained it," the elect, who are part of Israel, who are the true Israel, have obtained it. The fall of the rest is but for a time, and is itself



an argument for their final restoration. The rejection of the Jews is the admission of the Gentiles, and the admission of the Gentiles comes round in the end to be the restoration of the Jews. And besides, and beneath all this, amid these alternations of thought and vicissitudes of human things, there is an immutable foundation on which we rest in the promises of God to Israel. The friend of the patriarchs cannot forget their children; the Unchangeable cannot desert the work of His hands.



Ἀλήθειαν λέγω ἐν χριστῷ, οὐ ψεύδομαι, συμμαρ- 9  
 τυρούσης μοι τῆς συνειδήσεώς μου ἐν πνεύματι ἁγίῳ,  
 ὅτι λύπη μοί ἐστιν μεγάλη καὶ ἀδιάλειπτος ὀδύνη τῇ 2  
 καρδία μου· ἠὺχόμην γὰρ ἀνάθεμα εἶναι αὐτὸς ἐγὼ<sup>1</sup> ἀπὸ 3  
 τοῦ χριστοῦ ὑπὲρ τῶν ἀδελφῶν μου, τῶν συγγενῶν μου  
 κατὰ σάρκα, οἵτινές εἰσιν Ἰσραηλῖται, ὧν ἡ υἰοθεσία καὶ ἡ 4

<sup>1</sup> αὐτὸς ἐγὼ ἀνάθεμα εἶναι.

IX. 1. ἀλήθειαν λέγω, *I say the truth.*] In the language of St. Paul, everything that the Christian is and does is said "to be in Christ." Christ is the element in which his soul moves, as he says in Gal. ii. 20.: "Yet not I, but Christ within me." To speak the truth in Christ is not a form of adjuration, but an expression of the same kind as "to be in Christ."

συμμαρτυρούσης μοι τῆς συνειδήσεως, *my conscience witnesses that I speak the truth.*] Comp. ii. 15., "Who show the work of the law written on their hearts, their conscience also bearing them witness;" and viii. 16., "The Spirit itself also beareth witness with our spirit that we are the children of God." So here conscience witnesses to the truth of his words, but it is a conscience which passes out of itself, and is identified and lost in the Spirit of God.

It may be asked why should St. Paul asseverate with such warmth what no one would doubt or deny. Such is his manner in other passages, as in Gal. i. 20., "Now the things which I write unto you, behold, before God, I lie not;" although the things that he wrote merely related to his journeys to Jerusalem. But there was a matter behind, which was of vital importance to himself

and the church, viz. his claim to independence of the other Apostles. Hence the strong feeling which he shows. Compare also 2 Cor. xi. 31.: "The God and Father of our Lord Jesus Christ knoweth that I lie not;" viz. in the narrative of his sufferings. So here the intensity of his language expresses only the strength of his feelings, not the suspicion that any one would doubt his words. In the first part of the Epistle it might perhaps have been argued that he had lost sight of his own people; he returns to them with a burst of affection.

2. No such ties ever bound together any other nation of the world, as united the Jews. Patriotism is a word too weak to express the feeling with which they clung to their country, to their law and their God. And St. Paul himself, although, to use his own words, "his bowels had been enlarged" to include the Gentiles, comes back to the feelings of his youth, as with the vehemence of a first love. He sorrows over his people, like the prophets of old, not without an example in the Saviour himself, Luke, xix. 42.: "If thou hadst known, even thou, at least in this thy day, the things which belong unto thy peace! but now they are hid from thine eyes."

3. Great ingenuity has been



9 I SAY the truth in Christ, I lie not, my conscience also  
 2 bearing me witness in the Holy Ghost, that I have great  
 3 heaviness and continual sorrow in my heart. For I  
 could wish that myself were accursed from Christ for  
 4 my brethren, my kinsmen according to the flesh: who  
 are Israelites; whose\* is the adoption, and the glory,

exercised to evade the natural meaning of this verse, in consequence of the supposed impiety of St. Paul's devotion of himself to everlasting damnation. Hence the words *ἀνάθεμα ἀπὸ τοῦ χριστοῦ* have been regarded as signifying "set apart by Christ," in violation both of grammar and sense, and *ἠνχόμην* has been made to refer to the state of the Apostle before his conversion, "For I used to pray that I might be what I now call anathema from Christ." To such expedients the interpreter is obliged to resort, when he begins by laying down the principle that St. Paul could not have bartered his eternal salvation for the good of others.

This is the error of "rhetoric turned logic;" that is to say, the error of explaining the language of feeling, as though it were that of reasoning and reflection. The Apostle is not thinking of everlasting damnation. He means only to express in the strongest manner his affection for his kinsmen, and his willingness to make any sacrifice, if he might save some of them. As Moses says, *Exod. xxxii. 32.* — "Blot me, O Lord, out of the book that thou hast written;" as David says, *2 Sam. xviii. 33.* — "Would God I had died for thee, my son, my son;" so St. Paul, absorbed in a single feeling, and hardly considering the strength of his own words, is for a

moment willing to be accursed from Christ, that he might be exchanged for them; an impossible prayer it may be, but to be regarded only as an instance of the devoted love and zeal of the Apostle.

[*Ἰσραηλῖται.*] The name refers us back to the Father of the Jewish race, who was called Israel, that is, Striver with God, by God Himself, *Gen. xxxii. 28.* *Comp. xi. 1., also 2 Cor. xi. 22.* :—"Are they Hebrews? so am I. Are they Israelites? so am I. Are they the seed of Abraham? so am I;" and *Acts, xxii. 3.*

[*ἡ υἰοθεσία.*] *Comp. Deut. xiv. 1.* :—"Ye are the children of the Lord your God;" and for a contrast, *Gal. iv. 1.* :—"But I say that the heir, so long as he is a child, differeth nothing from a servant, though he be Lord of all."

The sonship of the Israelite has sometimes been contrasted with the sonship of the believer, as an external with a spiritual adoption. The one had the name of son; the other the feeling whereby we cry, *Abba, Father.* In this passage, however, no such opposition is justified, because the Apostle is speaking of the adoption of the Israelite in its first idea and origin—"whose great privilege it was to be called the sons of God,"—whose was the *Shechinah*, or visible presence of God, the

δόξα καὶ ἡ διαθήκη<sup>1</sup> καὶ ἡ νομοθεσία καὶ ἡ λατρεία καὶ αἱ ἐπαγγελίαι, ὧν οἱ πατέρες, καὶ ἐξ ὧν ὁ χριστὸς τὸ κατὰ 5  
σάρκα. ὁ ὧν ἐπὶ πάντων θεὸς εὐλογητὸς εἰς τοὺς αἰῶνας.  
ἀμήν. οὐχ οἶον δὲ ὅτι ἐκπέπτωκεν ὁ λόγος τοῦ θεοῦ. οὐ 6

<sup>1</sup> αἱ διαθήκαι.

“angel of his presence,” as it is termed in other passages. Comp. the expression:—ὁ θεὸς τῆς δόξης, Acts, vii. 2.; ὁ πατήρ τῆς δόξης, Eph. i. 17.; χερουεὶμ τῆς δόξης, Heb. ix. 5.; also, 2 Cor. iii. 7., where δόξα is used for the glory on Moses’ face, which is contrasted with the higher glory of the new dispensation; also its use in Rom. iii. 23., v. 2., where, as elsewhere, it is applied to the glorified state of which the believer is hereafter to be a partaker.

ἡ λατρεία.] The service of the temple and tabernacle.

ἐπαγγελίαι.] Comp. Rom. xv. 8., αἱ ἐπαγγελίαι τῶν πατέρων in Gal. iii. 16. opposed to the law.

5. ὧν οἱ πατέρες.] To whom belong Abraham, Isaac, and Jacob, whose God is the God of Israel. Comp. Exod. iii. 13. :—“The God of your fathers hath sent me unto you.”

τὸ κατὰ σάρκα.] Comp. 1—3.

ὁ ὧν ἐπὶ πάντων, who is over all.] It is a question to which we can hardly expect to get an answer unbiased by the interests of controversy, whether the clause, ὁ ὧν ἐπὶ πάντων θεὸς εὐλογητὸς εἰς τοὺς αἰῶνας, is to be referred to Christ, “of whom is Christ according to the flesh, who is God over all blessed for ever;” or, as in Lachmann, to be separated from the preceding words and regarded as a doxology to God the Father, uttered by the Apostle, on a review of

God’s mercy to the Jewish people.

The emendations of the text, such as the suppression of θεός, and the inversion of ὁ ὧν into ὧν ὁ, have no authority. Neither can tradition be of any real value, except so far as it preserves to us some fact or meaning of a word which we should not otherwise have known. Where it is repugnant to the style and phraseology of an author, it is in error; where it agrees with them, it hardly affords any additional confirmation.

Against those who refer the ambiguous clause to God and not to Christ it is argued :—

(1.) That the doxology thus inserted in the midst of the text is unmeaning.

(2.) That here, as in Rom. i. 3., the words κατὰ σάρκα need some corresponding clause expressive of the exaltation of Christ.

(3.) That the grammar is defective and awkward.

It is replied to the first objection, that the introduction of such doxologies in the midst of a sentence is common in Jewish writers. See Schoettgen on 2 Cor. xi. 31., though the passages there quoted do not justify the abrupt introduction of the doxology where the name of God has not preceded.

To the second it is answered, that St. Paul is not here contrasting the humiliation and ex-

and the covenant<sup>1</sup>, and the giving of the law, and the  
 5 service of God, and the promises; whose are the fathers,  
 and of whom as concerning the flesh Christ came. God,  
 6 who is over all, is\* blessed for ever. Amen. Not as

<sup>1</sup> Covenants.

altation of Christ, which would be out of place in this passage, but simply declaring the fact that "Messiah was of the Jews."

To the third, which is the strongest objection, that the omission of the verb is usual in such formulas:—

It may be added: (1.) That the language here applied to Christ is stronger than that used elsewhere, even in the strongest passages; Titus, ii. 13. (1 Tim. iii. 16., where *ὁς*, and not *θεός*, is the true reading); Col. ii. 9.

Had St. Paul ever spoken of Christ as God, he would many times have spoken of him as such, not once only and that by accident.

(2.) That in other places the Apostle speaks of one God, as in 1 Cor. viii. 4., Eph. iv. 6., and in 1 Tim. ii. 5., of one God and one Mediator between God and man.

(3.) That nearly the same expression, *ὁ ὢν... εὐλογητός εἰς τοὺς αἰῶνας*, occurs also in 2 Cor. xi. 31.; but that it is applied, not to Christ himself, but to "the God and Father of our Lord Jesus Christ." So in Rom. i. 25.

(4.) That the introduction of the doxology, if it be referred to Christ, is too abrupt a transition, in a passage the purport of which is, not to honour Christ, but to recount the glories of the Jewish race, in the passionate remembrance of which the Apostle is carried on to the praises of God.

(5.) That in the phraseology of St. Paul, *κατὰ σάρκα* is not naturally contrasted with *θεός*, but always with *ἐξ ἐπαγγελίας*, *κατὰ πνεῦμα*, and is often used without contrast.

(6.) That the word *εὐλογητός*, is referred in the New Testament (as the corresponding word in Hebrew) exclusively to God the Father, and not to Christ. Mark, xiv. 61.; Luke, i. 68.; Rom. i. 25.

Patristic authority is in favour of referring the words in dispute to Christ. Wetstein has led himself and others into error, by assuming that the fathers who denied that the predicate *ὁ ἐπὶ πάντων θεός* could be applied to Christ, would have refused to apply to Him the modified form, *ὁ ὢν ἐπὶ πάντων θεός*. The evidence of Iren. adv. Hær. iii. 16. 3.; Tertull. adv. Prax. 13.; Origen and Theodoret on this passage; Athanasius, Hilary, and Cyril (Chrysostom is uncertain), shows clearly the manner of reading the words in the third or fourth century. But the testimony of the third century cannot be set against that of the first, that is, of parallel passages in St. Paul himself.

According to a third way of taking the passage, the words *ὁ ὢν ἐπὶ πάντων* are separated from the remainder of the clause, "of whom came Christ, according to the flesh, who is over all;" upon which follows the doxology



γὰρ πάντες οἱ ἐξ Ἰσραὴλ, οὗτοι Ἰσραὴλ· οὐδ' ὅτι εἰσὶν σπέρμα Ἀβραάμ, πάντες τέκνα, ἀλλ' Ἐν Ἰσαὰκ κληθήσεται σοι σπέρμα. τουτέστιν, οὐ τὰ τέκνα τῆς σαρκός, ταῦτα <sup>8</sup> τέκνα τοῦ θεοῦ, ἀλλὰ τὰ τέκνα τῆς ἐπαγγελίας λογιζέται εἰς σπέρμα. ἐπαγγελίας γὰρ ὁ λόγος οὗτος, Κατὰ τὸν <sup>9</sup> καιρὸν τοῦτον ἐλεύσομαι καὶ ἔσται τῇ Σάρρα υἱός. οὐ <sup>10</sup> μόνον δέ, ἀλλὰ καὶ Ῥεβέκκα ἐξ ἑνὸς κοίτην ἔχουσα Ἰσαὰκ

as the conclusion of the whole :—  
“God is blessed for ever.”

6. For the construction compare Phil. iv. 11., οὐκ ὅτι καθ' ὑστέρησιν λέγω. In the present passage, οὐχ οἷον δέ=οὐ τοιοῦτον δὲ λέγω οἷον ὅτι ἐκπέπτωκεν ὁ λόγος τοῦ Θεοῦ.

For the meaning compare the beginning of the third chapter :—  
“For what if some did not believe ; that makes no difference in the steadfastness and truth of God.” So here : “The Jews are the heirs of all the promises, and yet the word of God has not failed. For the promises were made only to the true Israel.” And “He is not a Jew who is one outwardly, nor is that circumcision which is outward in the flesh.”

7—13. Two lines of argument run through the following passage :—(1.) There was a spiritual as well as a fleshly heir. (2.) God chose according to his own free will. ἀντὶ ἐστὶν ἀλληγορούμενα, the history of the patriarchs is a figure of the Gospel.

7. οὐδ' ὅτι εἰσὶν σπέρμα, neither because they are the seed.] The Apostle had just said, that not every Israelite was an Israelite indeed. Here he repeats the same thing. The Old Testament used the word κληθήσεται, in speaking of the seed of Isaac :

— “In Isaac shall thy seed be called ;” meaning that the line of Isaac shall be called by the name “seed of Abraham.” To this word (κληθήσεται) the Apostle here gives an evangelical sense, as he did to λογιζομαι, in chap. iv. The restriction of the promises to the seed of Isaac seemed to him exactly to represent what was taking place before his eyes.

8. τουτέστιν, that is.] The meaning of this is, that the children of the promise, not the children of the flesh, are the seed of God. The contrast is carried out further in Rom. iv. and Gal. iv. There were many circumstances that marked Isaac out as the type of the spiritual. He was (like the Gentile) born out of due time ; he was the true heir of the promises, the son, not of the bondwoman, but of the free.

The promise is the anticipation of the Gospel. It is in the Old Testament what grace and forgiveness are in the New. Compare Gal. iii. 18., Rom. iv. 13, 14.

In the passage which follows the Apostle is speaking, according to the Calvinist interpreter, of absolute, according to his opponents, of conditional predestination. The first urges that he is referring to individuals ; the

though the word of God hath failed.\* For they are  
 7 not all Israel, which are of Israel: neither, because they  
 are the seed of Abraham, are they all children: but, In  
 Isaac shall thy seed be called. That is, They which are  
 8 the children of the flesh, these are not the children of  
 God: but the children of the promise are counted for  
 a \* seed. For this is the word of promise, At this time  
 9 will I come, and Sarah shall have a son. And not only  
 10 this; but when Rebecca also had conceived by one, even

second, to nations; the first dwells on the case of Pharaoh, as stated by the Apostle; the second returns to the language of the Old Testament, which says not only "the Lord hardened Pharaoh's heart," but "Pharaoh hardened his own heart." The former, it has been observed, takes chap. ix. separate from chap. x. and xi., which speak, not merely of the rejection, but of the sins of Israel; while the latter confines his view to chap. x. and xi., and appears to do away with the election of God in chap. ix.

What we aim at in modern times in the consideration of such questions is "consistency;" and the test which we propose to ourselves of the truth of their solution, is whether they involve a contradiction in terms. Nothing can be more unlike the mode in which the Apostle conceives them, which is not logical at all. Sometimes he is overpowered by the goodness and mercy of God; at other times he is filled with a sense of the deservedness of man's lot; now, as we should say, for predestination, now for free-will; at one time only forbidding man to arraign the justice of God, and at another time asserting it.

Logically considered, such opposing aspects of things are inconsistent. But they are true practically; they are what we have all of us felt at different times, and are not more contradictory than the different phases of thought and feeling which we express in conversation. There are two views of these subjects, a philosophical and a religious one: the first balancing and systematising them and seeking to form a whole of speculative truth; the latter partial and fragmentary, speaking to the heart and feelings of man. The latter is that of the Apostle.

9. For the word of promise is that which speaks particularly of the son who was to be born to Sarah.

10 οὐ μόνον δέ.] And not only so; there is the yet stronger case of Jacob and Esau, who were the legitimate sons of Isaac and Rebecca. The words ἀλλὰ καὶ Πελέκκα have no verb; the construction being changed to ἐρρέθη αὐτῇ in ver. 12.

ἐξ ἐνόος.] εἷς here unemphatically, for τις, as with substantives, Matt. viii. 19., and elsewhere. To make a contrast between the one husband of Rebecca

τοῦ πατρὸς ἡμῶν· μή πω γὰρ γεννηθέντων μηδὲ πραξάντων 11  
 τι ἀγαθον ἢ φαῦλον<sup>1</sup>, ἵνα ἢ κατ' ἐκλογὴν<sup>2</sup> πρόθεσις τοῦ  
 θεοῦ μένη, οὐκ ἐξ ἔργων ἀλλ' ἐκ τοῦ καλοῦντος, ἐρρήθη 12  
 αὐτῇ ὅτι ὁ μείζων δουλεύσει τῷ ἐλάσσονι, καθὼς γέγραπται 13  
 Τὸν Ἰακώβ ἠγάπησα, τὸν δὲ Ἡσαῦ ἐμίσησα.

Τί οὖν ἐροῦμεν; μή ἀδικία παρὰ τῷ θεῷ; μή γένοιτο. 14  
 τῷ Μωσῆ γὰρ<sup>3</sup> λέγει Ἐλεήσω ὃν ἂν ἐλεῶ, καὶ οἰκτειρήσω 15  
 ὃν ἂν οἰκτειρώ. ἄρα οὖν οὐ τοῦ θέλοντος οὐδὲ τοῦ τρέ- 16  
 χοντος, ἀλλὰ τοῦ ἐλεῶντος θεοῦ. λέγει γὰρ ἡ γραφή τῷ 17  
 Φαραὼ ὅτι εἰς αὐτὸ τοῦτο ἐξήγειρά σε, ὅπως ἐνδείξωμαι  
 ἐν σοὶ τὴν δύναμίν μου καὶ ὅπως διαγγελῆ τὸ ὄνομά μου ἐν

<sup>1</sup> κακόν.<sup>2</sup> τοῦ θεοῦ πρόθ.<sup>3</sup> τῷ γὰρ Μωσῆ.

and the two wives of Abraham is ridiculous.

It is characteristic of Jewish history that the younger is preferred to the elder. "And not only this," we might say with the Apostle, "but Ephraim, and Moses, and David, and Samuel, and Abraham himself" were all instances of the same preference.

11. The Apostle expressly points to the fact from which we should naturally have withdrawn our minds, that as it were to preserve the prerogative of God intact, the election of Jacob took place, before there could be any ground for favour arising out of the actions of either. It was not of works, though in this case it could not be of faith, but of Him that calleth.

ἢ κατ' ἐκλογὴν πρόθεσις.] The purpose of God according to election, that is, the purpose of God irrespective of men's actions (comp. οἱ κατὰ πρόθεσιν κλητοί, viii. 28.). μένη refers either to the establishment of the belief in election, "might stand firm and be acknowledged;" or merely to

the firmness of the Divine purpose. Comp. Heb. xii. 27.

12. Gen. xxv. 23. Where, however, the words (which are here exactly quoted from the LXX.) refer not to Jacob and Esau, but to the two nations who were to spring from them.

13. These words are exactly quoted from the LXX., with a very slight alteration in their order. Their meaning must be gathered from the connexion of the Apostle's argument, not from any preconceived notion of the attributes of God. In the prophet (Mal. i. 2, 3.) God is introduced as reproaching Israel for their ingratitude to Him, though he had "loved Jacob and hated Esau." Here no stress is to be laid on the words "loved" and "hated," which are poetical figures, the thought expressed by them being subordinate to the prophet's main purpose. It is otherwise in the quotation; there the point is that God preferred one, and rejected another of his own free will. As of old, he preferred Jacob, so now he may reject him.



11 by our father Isaac; for the children being not yet  
born, neither having done any good or evil, that the  
purpose of God according to election might stand, not  
12 of works, but of him that calleth: it was said unto her,  
13 that \* the elder shall serve the younger. As it is written,  
Jacob \* I loved, but Esau \* I hated.

14 What shall we say then? Is there not \* unrighteous-  
15 ness with God? God forbid. For he saith to Moses, I  
will have mercy on whom I will have mercy, and I will  
16 have compassion on whom I will have compassion. So  
then it is not of him that willeth, nor of him that run-  
17 neth, but of God that sheweth mercy. For the scripture  
saith unto Pharaoh, that \* for this same purpose I have  
raised thee up, that I might shew my power in thee, and

Any further inference from the unconditional predestination of nations to that of individuals, does not come within the Apostle's range of view.

14, 15. What shall we say then? is not God unjust for this arbitrary election? The Apostle answers the objection which he himself suggests by an appeal to the book of the law, as the end of all controversy. "So far from being unjust, it is the very rule of action which God announces to Moses." Beyond this circle, he does not at this time advance. Yet the three chapters taken together imply a further answer.

The quotation is from Ex. xxxiii. 19., taken word for word from the LXX. It refers in the original passage to the favour shown by God to Moses when he made "his glory to pass before him."

16. And so it is proved, not that God is unjust, but that man neither wills, nor does, and that all is the work of Divine mercy.

17. The Apostle passes on to a yet stronger instance in which God raised up a monument, not of his mercy, but of his vengeance.

The quotation must be interpreted with a reference to the connexion, and not with a view to the refutation of Calvinistic excesses. And the connexion requires, not that "God permitted Pharaoh's heart to be hardened," or that "Pharaoh hardened his own heart," but that "God hardened Pharaoh's heart." The words do not precisely agree with the LXX., in which the first is changed into the second person. Exod. ix. 16.:—*ἐνεκεν τούτου διετηρήθης ἵνα ἐνδείξωμαι ἐν σοὶ τὴν ἰσχύον μου καὶ ὅπως διαγγεῖν τὸ ὄνομά μου ἐν πάσῃ τῇ γῆ.*

For *διετηρήθης* the Apostle substitutes the stronger expression *ἐξήγειρα*, which agrees with the Hebrew in the person, though neither *διετηρήθης* (thou wast preserved alive), nor *ἐξήγειρα* (raised

πάσῃ τῇ γῆ. ἄρα οὖν ὃν θέλει ἐλεεῖ, ὃν δὲ θέλει σκλη- 18  
 ρύνει. ἐρεῖς μοι οὖν τί οὖν ἔτι<sup>1</sup> μέμφεται; τῷ γὰρ βου- 19  
 λήματι αὐτοῦ τίς ἀνθέστηκεν; ὃ ἄνθρωπε, μενοῦν γε<sup>2</sup> 20  
 σὺ τίς εἶ ὁ ἀνταποκρινόμενος τῷ θεῷ; μὴ ἐρεῖ τὸ πλάσμα  
 τῷ πλάσαντι τί με ἐποίησας οὕτως; ἢ οὐκ ἔχει ἐξουσίαν 21  
 ὁ κεραμεὺς τοῦ πηλοῦ, ἐκ τοῦ αὐτοῦ φυράματος ποιῆσαι  
 ὁ μὲν εἰς τιμὴν σκεῦος, ὁ δὲ εἰς ἀτιμίαν; εἰ δὲ θέλων ὁ 22  
 θεὸς ἐνδείξασθαι τὴν ὀργὴν καὶ γνωρίσαι τὸ δυνατὸν αὐτοῦ

<sup>1</sup> ἐρεῖς οὖν μοι τί ἔτι.<sup>2</sup> μενοῦνγε ὃ ἄνθ.

thee up, brought thee into existence), is an exact translation of the word used, which means "made to stand, established."

18. In the word *σκληρύνει*, "hardens," a trace again appears of the Old Testament narrative respecting Pharaoh. Compare Exodus, ix. 12., *ἔσκληρυνε κύριος τὴν καρδίαν Φαραώ.* ix. 34., *Φαραώ ἐβάρυνεν αὐτοῦ τὴν καρδίαν.* 35., *ἔσκληρύνθη ἡ καρδία Φαραώ.* The inference is drawn partly from the word *ἐξήγειρα*, but chiefly from the clause that follows:—The words in which God speaks of raising up Pharaoh, to display his power in him, are a proof that He does what He will with His creatures.

Can we avoid the fatal consequence that God is here regarded as the author of evil? It may be replied that throughout the passage St. Paul is speaking, not of himself, but in the language of the Old Testament, the line drawn in which is not precisely the same with that of the New, though we cannot separate them with philosophical exactness. It was not always a proverb in the house of Israel, that "God tempted no man." In the overpowering sense of the Creator's being, the free agency of the creature

was lost, and it seemed to the external spectator as if the evil that men did, was but the just punishment that he inflicted on them for their sins. Comp. Ezek. xiv. 9.

The portions of the New Testament which borrow the language or the Spirit of the Old must not be isolated from other passages, which take a more comprehensive view of the dealings of God with man. God tempts no man to evil who has not first tempted himself. This is the uniform language of both Old and New Testament; the difference seems to lie in the circumstance that in the Old Testament, God leaves or gives a man to evil who already works evil, while the prevailing tone of the New Testament is that evil in all its stages is the work of man himself. (See Essay on the Contrasts of Prophecy, at the end of chap. xi.)

19. Again, as in the 3rd chapter, human nature seems to rise up against so severe a statement of the attributes of God. We trace the indistinct sense of the great question of the origin of evil:—*τί ἔτι καὶ ὡς ἀμαρτωλὸς κρίνομαι*; iii. 7.

*τί οὖν ἔτι μέμφεται*;] The

that my name might be declared throughout all the  
 18 earth. So \* then he hath mercy on whom he will, and  
 19 whom he will he hardeneth. Thou wilt say then unto  
 me, Why then<sup>1</sup> doth he yet find fault? For who hath  
 20 resisted his will? Nay rather, O man, who art thou  
 that repliest against God? Shall the thing formed say  
 to him that formed it, Why hast thou made me thus?  
 21 Hath not the potter power over the clay, of the same  
 lump to make one vessel unto honour, and another unto  
 22 dishonour? \* And if God, willing to shew his wrath,

<sup>1</sup> *Om.* then.

thought will insinuate itself into the soul that He who can prevent, ought not to punish evil. But such thoughts must be put down with a strong hand.

20. *μενούν γε, nay but,*] is used to correct or oppose an assertion (Rom. x. 18.; Luke, xi. 18.), as in classical writers, though in the latter not placed at the beginning of a sentence. The answer to the objection is of the same kind as at ver. 15.: “Rather O man, who art thou to bandy words with God?” Without maintaining the justice of God, the Apostle denies the right to impugn it. He appeals to the single consideration that he is the Creator. “Shall the thing formed say to him that formed it, Why hast thou made me thus?” He does not do it, because it is just; it is just, because he does it. The words *μη ἐρεῖ* down to *οὕτως* are taken, with some verbal alteration, from Isaiah, xxix. 16.

21. The conception of God as the potter, and his creatures as the clay, occurs in several passages of the Old Testament, as Jer. xviii. 3—10., where the prophet goes down to the potter’s

house and sees the vessel which he had in his hands marred (ver. 4., *καὶ ἔπεσε τὸ ἀγγεῖον ὃ αὐτὸς ἐποίει ἐν ταῖς χερσίν αὐτοῦ καὶ πάλιν αὐτὸς ἐποίησεν αὐτὸ ἀγγεῖον ἕτερον*), and another vessel put on the wheel, threatening in a figure the destruction of Israel; also in another spirit, Isaiah, lxiv. 8.: — “But now, O Lord, thou art our Father; we are the clay and thou our potter, and we all are the work of thy hands.” The first of these quotations has probably suggested the words of this passage, the second more nearly resembles the tone of the following verses, which seem to say: — “We are his, therefore he has an absolute right over us; therefore, also, as we acknowledge his right over us, will he have mercy upon us.” Compare Isaiah, xlv. 9.

22. The construction of this passage involves an anacoluthon. As in ii. 17., *εἰ δὲ σὺ Ἰουδαίος ἐπονομάζῃ*, there is no apodosis to *εἰ δέ*. The thread of the sentence is lost in the digression of verses 23, 24, 25. The corresponding clause should have been, What is that to thee? or, Who art thou



ἤνεγκεν ἐν πολλῇ μακροθυμίᾳ σκευὴ ὀργῆς κατηρτισμένα  
 εἰς ἀπώλειαν, καὶ ἵνα γνωρίσῃ τὸν πλοῦτον τῆς δόξης 23  
 αὐτοῦ ἐπὶ σκευὴ ἐλέους, ἃ προητοίμασεν εἰς δόξαν; οὓς καὶ 24  
 ἐκάλεσεν ἡμᾶς οὐ μόνον ἐξ Ἰουδαίων ἀλλὰ καὶ ἐξ ἔθνων,  
 ὡς καὶ ἐν τῷ Ὡσηὲ λέγει Καλέσω τὸν οὐ λαὸν μου λαὸν μου 25  
 καὶ τὴν οὐκ ἠγαπημένην ἠγαπημένην· καὶ ἔσται ἐν τῷ τό- 26  
 πῳ οὗ ἐρρέθη [αὐτοῖς] Οὐ λαός μου ὑμεῖς, ἐκεῖ κληθήσονται  
 υἱοὶ θεοῦ ζῶντος. Ἡσαΐας δὲ κράζει ὑπὲρ τοῦ Ἰσραὴλ Ἐὰν 27  
 ἦ ὁ ἀριθμὸς τῶν υἱῶν Ἰσραὴλ ὡς ἡ ἄμμος τῆς θαλάσσης,  
 τὸ<sup>1</sup> ὑπόλειμμα σωθήσεται· λόγον γὰρ συντελῶν καὶ συν 28

<sup>1</sup> κατάλειμμα.

who hast an answer to God? There is, however, a further complexity in the passage. The simple thought would have been as follows:—But if God shows forth his righteous vengeance on men, what is that to thee?—But side by side with this creeps in another feeling, that even in justice he remembers mercy.—“He punishes, and you have no right to find fault with Him for anything which he does.” Still it is implied that he only punishes those who ought to have been punished long before. There would have been no difficulty in the passage had the Apostle said:—“He punishes some and spares others.” But he has given a different turn to the thought—“He spares those whom he punishes.” “May not God,” he would say, “be like the potter dashing in pieces one vessel, and showing his mercy to another; merciful even in the first, which he puts off as long as he can, and only executes with a further purpose of mercy to others.” δὲ, adver.: “The potter does this, AND may not God do it?”

23. ἵνα γνωρίσῃ,] may be taken either as parallel with θέλω, or

with ἐνδείξασθαι, or with γνωρίσαι. The last verse implied that in judgment He remembered mercy. But now the further purpose of God is unfolded, that mercy should alternate with justice,—mercy to the Gentiles, with judgment on the House of Israel. As is more explicitly repeated in chap. xi., the Jew was rejected that the Gentile might be received. As in chap. v. 20, 21., or in viii. 3, 4., the two parts of His work must be taken as one.

τὸν πλοῦτον τῆς δόξης.] δόξα is the glory of God revealed to man. Compare Eph. iii. 16.; Rom. ii. 4., τοῦ πλοῦτου τῆς χρηστότητος: Col. i. 11., τὸ κράτος τῆς δόξης αὐτοῦ: or the still more complicated expression, ὁ πλοῦτος τῆς δόξης τοῦ μυστηρίου τούτου ἐν τοῖς ἔθνεσιν, i. 27. The word πλοῦτος occurs again in Rom. xi. 12., in reference to the admission of the Gentiles. So here the thought of ver. 24., ἀλλὰ καὶ ἐξ ἔθνων is dimly anticipated in it.

οὓς καὶ ἐκάλεσεν ἡμᾶς.] As which persons He hath also called (as well as prepared) us. Compare viii. 30.: οὓς προώρισεν τούτους καὶ ἐκάλεσεν.

and to make his power known, endured with much long-  
 23 suffering\* vessels of wrath fitted to destruction: and  
 that he might make known the riches of his glory on  
 the vessels of mercy, which he had afore prepared  
 24 unto glory? Even us, whom he hath called, not of the  
 25 Jews only, but also of the Gentiles, as he saith also in  
 Osee, I will call them my people, which were not my  
 26 people; and her beloved, which was not beloved. And  
 it shall come to pass, that in the place where it was said  
 unto them, Ye are not my people; there shall they be  
 27 called the children of the living God. Esaias also crieth  
 concerning Israel, Though the number of the children  
 of Israel be as the sand of the sea, a remnant shall be  
 28 saved. For the Lord will accomplish his word finish-

25, 26. The passages here quoted from Hosea are as follows in the LXX. :—

ii. 23. : *καὶ σπερῶ αὐτήν ἐμαντῶ ἐπὶ τῆς γῆς καὶ ἀγαπήσω τὴν οὐκ ἠγαπημένην καὶ ἐρῶ τῶ οὐ λαῶ μου, Λαός μου εἶ σύ.*

i. 10. : *καὶ ἔσται ἐν τῶ τόπῳ οὗ ἐῤῥέθη αὐτοῖς οὐ λαός μου ὑμεῖς κληθήσονται καὶ αὐτοὶ υἱοὶ θεοῦ ζῶντος.* The prophet is speaking of the rejection and acceptance of the ten tribes.

In the quotation it is not necessary to give the words *ἐν τῶ τόπῳ* a precise meaning. There is no point in saying, with some interpreters, that in Palestine also the Gentiles should be called the Sons of God.

27, 28. The quotation is from Isa. x. 22, 23., and in the "Textus Receptus" agrees almost exactly with the LXX. The latter verse is, however, entirely different from the Hebrew text, the meaning of which, according to Gesenius and Ewald, is as follows :—

"The extermination is determined; it streams forth, bringing righteousness, for the Lord God of Hosts executeth the appointed destruction in all the land." The great difference between the Hebrew and the LXX. is supposed to have arisen from a mistranslation of Hebrew words.

It was not only in accordance with the prophecies of the Old Testament that Israel should be rejected. They spoke yet more precisely of a remnant being saved. If any one marvelled at the small number of believers of Jewish race, it was "written for their instruction" that "a remnant should be saved."

[*Ἡσαίας δέ.*] *δέ* marks the transition to another prophet; *ὑπὲρ* either "respecting" or "over."

28. The two best MSS., A. and B., omit *ἐν δικαιοσύνῃ . . . συντηρημένον*. As they occur in the LXX., it may be justly argued that they are more likely to have

τέμνων ποιήσει<sup>1</sup> κύριος ἐπὶ τῆς γῆς. καὶ καθὼς προεῖρηκεν 29  
 Ἡσαΐας, Εἰ μὴ κύριος σαβαώθ ἐγκατέλιπεν ἡμῖν σπέρμα,  
 ὡς Σόδομα ἂν ἐγενήθημεν καὶ ὡς Γόμορρα ἂν ὁμοιωθῆμεν.

Τί οὖν ἐροῦμεν; ὅτι ἔθνη τὰ μὴ διώκοντα δικαιοσύνην 30  
 κατέλαβεν δικαιοσύνην, δικαιοσύνην δὲ τὴν ἐκ πίστεως,  
 Ἰσραὴλ δὲ διώκων νόμον δικαιοσύνης εἰς νόμον<sup>2</sup> οὐκ ἔφθα 31  
 σεν. διὰ τί; ὅτι οὐκ ἐκ πίστεως, ἀλλ' ὡς ἐξ ἔργων<sup>3</sup> προσέ- 32  
 κοψαν<sup>4</sup> τῷ λίθῳ τοῦ προσκόμματος, καθὼς γέγραπται, Ἴδου 33  
 τίθημι ἐν Σιών λίθον προσκόμματος καὶ πέτραν σκανδάλου,  
 καὶ<sup>5</sup> ὁ πιστεύων ἐπ' αὐτῷ οὐ καταισχυνηθήσεται.

<sup>1</sup> Add ἐν δικαιοσύνῃ ὅτι λόγον συντεταγμένον.

<sup>2</sup> Add δικαιοσύνης.

<sup>3</sup> Add νόμον.

<sup>4</sup> Add γάρ.

<sup>5</sup> Add πᾶς.

been inserted as a correction than omitted in this passage. If the words are retained, as in the Textus Receptus, Tischendorf, and several MSS. and Versions, *ἔστι* must be supplied with *συντελῶν* and *συντέμνων*.

The passage of Isaiah taken in the sense in which it was understood by the Apostle, may be paraphrased as follows:—Isaiah lifts up his voice in regard to Israel, and says, “Though the house of Israel be as the sand of the sea, the remnant only shall be saved. For God is accomplishing and cutting short his work, for a short work will God make upon the earth,” or (according to Lachmann’s reading), “For God will perform his work, accomplishing and cutting it short upon the earth.” The application of this to the present circumstances of the house of Israel is, that few out of many Israelites should be saved, for that God was judging them as of old he had judged their fathers. They were living in the latter days, and the time was short.

29. In their original connexion these words have a different bearing. The prophet is describing the desolation of the land in which all but a few had perished. He is not speaking of those who are saved, but of those who are lost. The succeeding verse is — Give ear now, O ye rulers of Sodom; hear the word of the Lord, ye people of Gomorrah.

30. What then is the conclusion? That the Gentile who sought not after righteousness, attained righteousness, but the righteousness that is of faith. But Israel, who did seek after it, attained not to it. What was the reason of this? because they sought it not of faith, but *ὡς ἐξ ἔργων*, under the idea that it might be gained by works of the law they stumbled at the rock of offence. We are again upon the track of chap. iii.

31. *νόμον δικαιοσύνης.*] Like *νόμος τοῦ πνεύματος τῆς ζωῆς*, in ch. viii. Compare also Gal. iii. 21., “If there had been a law given which could have given life, verily righteousness should have



29 ing and cutting it short upon the earth.<sup>1</sup> And as Esaias said before, Except the Lord of Sabaoth had left us a seed, we had been as Sodoma, and been made like unto Gomorrha.

30 What shall we say then? That the Gentiles, which followed not after righteousness, have attained to righte-  
31 ousness, but\* the righteousness which is of faith. But Israel, which followed after the law of righteousness,  
32 hath not attained to the law.<sup>2</sup> Wherefore? Because not\* of faith, but as it were of works<sup>3</sup> they stumbled  
33 at the\* stumblingstone; as it is written, Behold, I lay in Sion a stumblingstone and rock of offence: and he who<sup>4</sup> believeth on him shall not be ashamed.

<sup>1</sup> For he is finishing the work, and cutting it short in righteousness; because a short work will the Lord make upon the earth.

<sup>2</sup> Add of righteousness.

<sup>3</sup> Add of the law. For.

<sup>4</sup> Whosoever.

been by the law." The Apostle means that the Israelites did not succeed in attaining true righteousness by the law. This he expresses by saying, that Israel, pursuing after a law as the source of righteousness, or as belonging to righteousness, failed in attaining to this law. *οὐκ ἔφθασε*, arrived not at; the sense of anticipation is lost.

32. *διὰ τῆς κ. τ. λ.*] In the words that follow it is most convenient to take the first clause, *οὐκ ἐκ πίστεως*, with some idea gathered from what has preceded, "Because they did it, *i. e.* pursued the law of righteousness, and not of faith." The words *ὡς ἐξ ἔργων* have probably a double relation, they form an antithesis with *οὐκ ἐκ πίστεως*, and are also joined with *προσέκοψαν*.

The expression *λίθῳ προσκόμματος* is taken from *Isa. viii. 14.*

(in the LXX. *λίθον προσκόμματι*). The remainder of the passage is from *Isa. xxviii. 16.*, the words of which are as follows:—*ἰδοὺ ἐγὼ ἐμβάλλω εἰς τὰ θεμέλια Σιών λίθον πολυτελῆ ἐκλεκτόν, ἀκρογωνιαῖον, ἔντιμον εἰς τὰ θεμέλια αὐτῆς καὶ ὁ πιστεύων οὐ μὴ κατασχυρθῆ.*

While following the spirit of this latter passage, the Apostle has inserted the words *λίθον προσκόμματος*, so as to give a double notion of the Rock, which is at once a stone of stumbling and rock of offence, and a foundation stone on which he who rests shall not be made ashamed. Compare *Luke, xx. 17, 18.* for a similar double meaning:—*λίθον ὃν ἀπεδοκίμασαν οἱ οἰκοδομοῦντες, οὗτος ἐγενήθη εἰς κεφαλὴν γωνίας. πᾶς ὁ πεσὼν ἐπ' ἐκείνον τὸν λίθον συνθλασθήσεται· ἐφ' ὃν δ' ἂν πίσῃ λικμήσει αὐτόν.*

Ἀδελφοί, ἡ μὲν εὐδοκία τῆς ἐμῆς καρδίας καὶ ἡ δέησις<sup>1</sup> 10  
 πρὸς τὸν θεὸν ὑπὲρ αὐτῶν<sup>2</sup> εἰς σωτηρίαν. μαρτυρῶ γὰρ 2  
 αὐτοῖς ὅτι ζῆλον θεοῦ ἔχουσιν, ἀλλ' οὐ κατ' ἐπίγνωσιν·  
 ἀγνοοῦντες γὰρ τὴν τοῦ θεοῦ δικαιοσύνην, καὶ τὴν ἰδίαν 3  
 ζητοῦντες στήσαι, τῇ δικαιοσύνῃ τοῦ θεοῦ οὐκ ὑπετά-  
 γησαν. τέλος γὰρ νόμου χριστὸς εἰς δικαιοσύνην παντὶ τῷ 4

<sup>1</sup> Add ἡ.<sup>2</sup> τοῦ Ἰσραὴλ ἔστιν.

X. The commencement of this chapter, as well as of the one which follows, affords a remarkable instance of a sudden transition of feeling in the mind of the Apostle. At the end of the previous chapter, he had passed out of the sorrowful tone in which he began, to prove that very truth over which he sorrowed — the rejection of Israel. But at this point he drops the argument, and resumes the strain which he had laid aside. The character of the passage may be illustrated by the parallel passage in chap. iii. 1—8. There he had been arguing that the Gentiles were better than the Jews, or at least as good; because they, not having the law, were a law unto themselves. Then to correct the impression that might have arisen from what he had been saying, he goes on to point out that the Jew too had advantages. Now, a similar contrast is working in his mind. There was something that the Jew had, though not the righteousness of faith. He was not a sinner of the Gentiles, he had a zeal for God, he had the mark of distinction which it has been said made Jacob to be preferred to Esau; “he was a religious man.” But almost before the thought of his heart is fully uttered, the Apostle returns to

his former subject — “the righteousness of faith, Christ the end of the law to every one that believeth;” and gathers fresh proof from the prophecies that the rejection of Israel was but according to the will of God.

1. μὲν answers to a suppressed δέ, which is indicated in v. 3., “But they would not;” or “But it was not the will of God.”

εἰς σωτηρίαν] is equivalent to ἵνα σώθωσι. Comp. εἰς ὑπακοὴν πίστεως, ch. i. 5., εἰς δικαιοσύνην, ver. 4.; also i. 16.

2. ζῆλον θεοῦ, *zeal for God.*] Compare 2 Cor. xi. 2., ζηλω γὰρ ὑμᾶς θεοῦ ζήλω, and the Apostle’s description of himself in Gal. i. 14., περισσοτέρως ζηλωτῆς ὑπάρχων. The word zeal is peculiarly appropriate to the Jewish people, “all zealots for the law,” Acts, xxi. 20.; “Ready to endure death like immortality rather than suffer the neglect of the least of their national customs,” Philo, Leg. ad Caium, 1008. They were not like the Gentiles indifferent about religion; it was not the power, but rather the truth of the law that had died away. Many of them were ready to compass sea and land to make one proselyte. If religion did not include morality, there would have been no nation more religious.

οὐ κατ' ἐπίγνωσιν, *not accord-*

10 Brethren, my heart's desire and prayer to God for  
 2 them<sup>1</sup> is, that they might be saved. For I bear them  
 record that they have a zeal of God, but not according  
 3 to knowledge. For they being ignorant of God's right-  
 eousness, and going about to establish their own right-  
 eousness, are not subject\* unto the righteousness of  
 4 God. For Christ is the end of the law for righteousness

<sup>1</sup> For Israel.

*ing to knowledge.*] These words are not added to extenuate their fault, as though St. Paul said — “They have a zeal for God, but know not their Lord's will;” but are merely an explanation of how they could have a zeal for God, and yet be rejected. In what follows he explains in what this ignorance consists.

3. Their ignorance consisted in not obeying the righteousness of God, and in setting up their own righteousness in its place.

Three questions arise on this verse:—(1.) What is meant by the righteousness of God? The righteousness of God plainly means the righteousness of faith, the new revelation of which the Apostle spoke, Rom. i. 17., which is the power of God unto salvation to every one that believeth. (2.) What is meant by their own righteousness? Either the word *ἴδιος* may simply indicate opposition to *θεοῦ*, “their own” as opposed to God's; or it may have a further meaning of private individual righteousness, consisting only in a selfish isolated obedience to the law, not in communion with God or their fellow-creatures. But, (3.) what is meant by *οὐχ ἰπετάγησαν*? Not something entirely different from *ἀγνωοῦντες* in the first clause; only as that expressed their wilful blindness

in not recognising the Gospel, this indicates the effect on their life and conduct. The expression is analogous to *ὑπακοὴ πίστεως, χριστοῦ, ἀληθείας*.

4. *τέλος νόμου, the end of the law.*] Either the aim of the law, or the termination of the law, or the fulfilment of the law; the law itself meaning either the law of Moses, or that higher law which was reflected in it. These different senses of the two words insensibly pass into each other, and there is nothing unreasonable in supposing that all of them may have been intended by the Apostle; that is to say, that the expression which he has employed, when analysed, may include these various allusions. It was Christ to whom the law pointed, or seemed to point, who was its fulfilment and also its destruction. It was of Him “Moses in the law, and the prophets spoke;” it was He who was the body of those things of which the law was the shadow. It was He who was to “destroy this temple, and raise up another temple, not made with hands.” It was He who came to fulfil the law, in all the senses in which it could be fulfilled.

It has been said by those who confine the idea of the word *τέλος* to the sense of end or ter-



πιστεύοντι. Μωυσῆς γὰρ γράφει τὴν δικαιοσύνην τὴν 5  
 ἐκ τοῦ νόμου, ὅτι ὁ ποιήσας [αὐτὰ] ἄνθρωπος ζήσεται ἐν  
 αὐτῇ.<sup>1</sup> ἢ δὲ ἐκ πίστεως δικαιοσύνη οὕτως λέγει, Μὴ εἴπῃς 6  
 ἐν τῇ καρδίᾳ σου Τίς ἀναβήσεται εἰς τὸν οὐρανόν; τοῦτ'  
 ἔστιν χριστὸν καταγαγεῖν· ἢ Τίς καταβήσεται εἰς τὴν 7  
 ἄβυσσον; τοῦτ' ἔστιν χριστὸν ἐκ νεκρῶν ἀναγαγεῖν.  
 ἀλλὰ τί λέγει; Ἐγγύς σου τὸ ῥῆμά ἐστιν, ἐν τῷ στόματί 8

<sup>1</sup> αὐτοῖς.

mination, that in the Apostle's view the law and Christ are in extreme opposition to each other. This is true. But it is not true that this is his only view, as is shown by such passages as Romans, iv. 25., Gal. iii. 26., 1 Cor. x. 1., and the context (ver. 6—8.) in this place.

For the meaning of the word τέλος, compare Eccles. xii. 13.: τέλος λόγου τὸ πᾶν ἄκουε; Rom. vi. 22.: τὸ δὲ τέλος, ζωὴν αἰώνιον; 1 Tim. i. 5.: τὸ δὲ τέλος τῆς παραγγελίας; and for a similar ambiguity in its use, 2 Cor. iii. 13.:—οὐ καθάπερ Μωυσῆς ἐτίθει κάλυμμα ἐπὶ τὸ πρόσωπον αὐτοῦ πρὸς τὸ μὴ ἀτενίσαι τοὺς υἱοὺς Ἰσραὴλ εἰς τὸ τέλος τοῦ καταργουμένου· which may be construed either to the intent that the children of Israel should not look to the reality or fulfilment of what was being done away (that is, to the glory behind), or that they should not look to the passing away or termination of it.

γάρ.] For this is the righteousness of God, Christ the end of the law; or, For the true notion of righteousness is that the law is done away in Christ, working the effect of righteousness in every one that believeth.

5. γάρ.] “For Moses describes legal righteousness in one way,

and righteousness by faith in another.”

As in Gal. iii. 10—13., the Apostle contrasts the nature of the law and faith, as characterised in the law itself. The words which he first quotes (from Lev. xviii. 5.) imply external acts: “He who has *done* the commandments of the law, shall have life in the righteousness of the law” (from the LXX., in which the word αὐτὰ refers to the statutes and judgments that have preceded). Compare 1 Tim. iv. 8.:—“Godliness is profitable unto all things, having the promise of the life that now is, and of that which is to come.” ζήσεται, as elsewhere, used by the Apostle in a fuller sense than its original one.

6—8. The language of Deut. xxx. 13. (the book of Moses, which has been regarded almost as an evangelization of the law, and as standing in the same relation to the other books of Moses as the Gospel of St. John to the three first Gospels,) is far different. There our duty to God is not spoken of, as outward obedience or laborious service. There the word is described as “very nigh to us, even in our mouth and in our heart.” Surely this is the righteousness that is of faith.

5 to every one that believeth. For Moses describeth the  
 righteousnes which is of the law, That the man which  
 6 doeth those things shall live in it<sup>1</sup> But the righteous-  
 ness which is of faith speaketh on this wise, Say not  
 in thine heart, Who shall ascend into heaven? (that is,  
 7 to bring Christ down from above:) or, Who shall de-  
 scend into the deep? (that is, to bring up Christ again  
 8 from the dead). But what saith it? The word is nigh

<sup>1</sup> By them.

The Apostle quotes this passage in a manner which is in several ways remarkable:—(1.) As there is no word in the passage itself which exactly suits the meaning which he requires; it is the spirit, not the letter, which he is quoting, as in Rom. iv. 6. (2.) To each clause he adds an explanation, “Who shall ascend up into heaven? (that is, to bring down Christ from above:) or, Who shall descend into the deep? (that is, to bring up Christ from below.)” Comp. ix. 8.; Gal. iv. 25.; 2 Cor. iii. 17. (3.) He has altered the words, so as to suit them to the application which he makes of them. Compare ix. 17.; *infra*, ver. 11. Lastly, he puts them into the mouth of righteousness by faith, who speaks as a person in the words of Moses; cf. ver. 5.

The principal difference between the passage as quoted by St. Paul, and as it occurs in the LXX., from which the Hebrew very slightly varies, is, that in ver. 7. we have *τίς καταβήσεται εἰς τὴν ἄβυσσον*; instead of *τίς διαπεράσει ἡμῖν εἰς τὸ πέραν τῆς θαλάσσης*, in the LXX. Much ingenuity has been expended in reconciling these variations. Some have referred the words, *εἰς τὸ*

*πέραν τῆς θαλάσσης*, to a heathenish notion of Islands of the Blest, “beyond the Western wave;” while others have supposed that some copy of the LXX. or some other version of the Scriptures may have read *εἰς τὴν ἄβυσσον*, in the meaning of “the sea,” which has had another sense put upon it by the Apostle.

It would not be inconsistent with sound criticism to admit even very improbable conjectures, to account for the Apostle’s inaccurate quotation, if we found such quotations occurring in a single instance only. But as they occur many times, sound criticism and true faith require equally that we should admit the fact, and acknowledge that the Apostle quotes without regard to verbal exactness, apparently because he is dwelling rather on the truth that he is expounding, than on the words in which it is conveyed, not verifying references by a book, but speaking from the fulness of the heart.

The truth seems to be that the parallel required in the words, “to bring up Christ from the dead,” has led the Apostle to alter the text in Deuteronomy, so as to admit of his introducing them. The general meaning of ver. 6. to

σου καὶ ἐν τῇ καρδίᾳ σου. τοῦτ' ἔστιν, τὸ ῥῆμα τῆς πίστεως  
 ὃ κηρύσσομεν, ὅτι ἐὰν ὁμολογήσῃς ἐν τῷ στόματί σου 9  
 κύριον Ἰησοῦν, καὶ πιστεύσῃς ἐν τῇ καρδίᾳ σου ὅτι ὁ θεὸς  
 αὐτὸν ἤγειρεν ἐκ νεκρῶν, σωθήσῃ· καρδίᾳ γὰρ πιστεύεται 10  
 εἰς δικαιοσύνην, στόματι δὲ ὁμολογεῖται εἰς σωτηρίαν.  
 λέγει γὰρ ἡ γραφή Πᾶς ὁ πιστεύων ἐπ' αὐτῷ οὐ κατα- 11  
 σχυνθήσεται. οὐ γάρ ἐστιν διαστολὴ Ἰουδαίου τε καὶ 12

8. is as follows:—"The righteousness of faith uses a different language. It says, 'Deem it not impossible; do not ask the unbeliever's question: who shall go up into heaven, by which I mean to bring down Christ from above; or who shall descend into hell, by which I mean to bring up Christ from below?' But what saith it? the word is nigh unto thee, even in thy mouth and in thy heart. And by the word I mean, the word of faith which we preach."

It was doubtless the last verse which induced the Apostle to quote the whole passage: "The word is within thee, ready to come to thy lips." Here is a description of faith. To the words which precede the Apostle has given a new tone. In the book of Deuteronomy they mean: "The commandment which I give you is not difficult or afar off; it is not in the heaven above, nor beyond the sea." Here they refer, not to action, but to belief. They might be paraphrased in the language of modern times:—

"Do not raise sceptical doubts about Christ having come on earth, or being risen from the dead: there is a Christ within whom you have not far to seek for."

Compare Eph. iv. 9, 10.: "Now that he ascended, what is it but

that he also descended first into the lower parts of the earth? He that descended is the same also that ascended;" which is in like manner based on Psalm lxxviii. 18.: "Thou hast ascended on high, thou hast led captivity captive, and received gifts for men."

9. As in ver. 8. the Apostle had given an explanation of the word ῥῆμα, he proceeds to give a similar explanation of στόματι and καρδίᾳ. The word ῥῆμα means ῥῆμα τῆς πίστεως, and the words στόμα and καρδίᾳ refer to the confession with the lips of the Lord Jesus, and the belief with the heart of his resurrection. Compare 1 Peter, i. 24, 25.: ἐξηράνθη ὁ χόρτος, καὶ τὸ ἄνθος αὐτοῦ ἐξέπεσεν· τὸ δὲ ῥῆμα κυρίου μένει εἰς τὸν αἰῶνα, τοῦτο δὲ ἐστὶν ῥῆμα τὸ εὐαγγελισθὲν εἰς ὑμᾶς.

10. The Apostle adds a further explanatory clause:—"For by the heart we believe, and with the mouth we confess." Various attempts have been made to preserve the opposition. (1.) The words εἰς δικαιοσύνην have been supposed to refer to justification; εἰς σωτηρίαν, to final salvation. But it may be answered, that confession has no special connexion with final salvation; if it had, the confession of the lips would be more important than the belief of the heart. Or, (2.) The words δικαιοσύνη and σωτηρία



thee, in thy mouth, and in thy heart: that is, the word  
 9 of faith, which we preach; that if thou shalt confess with  
 thy mouth the Lord Jesus, and shalt believe in thine  
 heart that God hath raised him from the dead, thou  
 10 shalt be saved. For with the heart man believeth unto  
 righteousness; and with the mouth confession is made  
 11 unto salvation. For the scripture saith, Whosoever be-  
 12 lieveth on him shall not be ashamed. For there is no  
 difference between the Jew and the Greek: for the same

have been opposed, as inward justification and outward membership of the Church. "For by the heart we are justified, and by the confession of the lips we are made members of the Church." This offers a good sense, but the meaning given to *σωτηρία* is not justified by such a use of the word *σωζομένους*, as occurs in Acts, ii. 47.

Instead of adopting explanations so forced, it is better to acknowledge that the antithesis of *δικαιοσύνη* and *σωτηρία* is one of style, as at iv. 25., which need not be insisted upon. The Apostle means only "that the heart and lips agree together, in faith and confession, and their end righteousness and everlasting life."

11. The link of connexion is again a word, *πιστεύων*. The Apostle had explained a passage from the Old Testament, 6—9., the words of which he had further drawn out in ver. 10.; he adds now a new confirmation. For the Scripture says:—"For every one that believeth on him shall not be ashamed." *ὁ πιστεύων* seems to refer to the first of the preceding clauses; *ὃν κατασχυν-*

*θήσεται*, to the second: "For every one that believeth on him shall not be made ashamed in the day of the Lord."

The citation is slightly altered from Isa. xxviii. 16. as it stands in the LXX., *ὁ πιστεύων οὐ μὴ κατασχυνθῆ*, where it is remarkable that the word *πᾶς*, by which St. Paul connects this with the verse following, does not occur.

The addition, however, is not inconsistent with the general sense of the original; the Apostle has only emphasised the thought which was already implied without it. The alteration was probably suggested by the words of Joel, which are quoted in v. 13.

12. As the tenth and eleventh verses, so also the eleventh and twelfth, hang together by a word.

The Scripture says "every one," meaning hereby to include Jew and Greek. For there is the same Lord, rich in mercy to all who call upon Him. As at ch. iii. 29., we have already passed from the inward truth of righteousness by faith to the correlative which was never wanting to it in the Apostle's mind,— "admission of the Gentiles."

Ἕλληνας· ὁ γὰρ αὐτὸς κύριος πάντων, πλουτῶν εἰς πάντας  
 τοὺς ἐπικαλουμένους αὐτόν. Πᾶς γὰρ ὃς ἂν ἐπικαλέσῃται 13  
 τὸ ὄνομα κυρίου, σωθήσεται. πῶς οὖν ἐπικαλέσονται<sup>1</sup> εἰς 14  
 ὃν οὐκ ἐπίστευσαν; πῶς δὲ πιστεύσωσιν<sup>2</sup> οὐ οὐκ ἤκουσαν;  
 πῶς δὲ ἀκούσωσιν<sup>2</sup> χωρὶς κηρύσσοντος; πῶς δὲ κηρύξω- 15  
 σιν<sup>2</sup>, ἐὰν μὴ ἀποσταλῶσιν; καθὼς γέγραπται Ὡς ὠραῖοι οἱ

<sup>1</sup> ἐπικαλέσονται.<sup>2</sup> πιστεύσωσιν, ἀκούσωσιν, κηρύξουσιν.

ὁ γὰρ αὐτὸς κύριος.] Whether by κύριος is meant God or Christ is uncertain. Compare Phil. ii. 11. : πᾶσα γλῶσσα ἐξομολογήσεται ὅτι κύριος Ἰησοῦς, where the title is given to Christ in a similar connexion; also, κύριον Ἰησοῦν, in v. 9. It may be God or Christ, or God in Christ reconciling the world to himself, who is in the Apostle's mind. The application to Christ is supported by the reading χριστοῦ, which Lachmann has received into the text in ver. 17.

13. Again the connecting link is a word which is taken up by a quotation from the Old Testament, Joel, ii. 32. (καὶ ἔσται ὃς ἂν ἐπικαλέσῃται τὸ ὄνομα κυρίου σωθήσεται), which, as if well known, the Apostle does not formally cite (so ix. 7., and infra, v. 18.). The same passage is quoted by St. Peter on the day of Pentecost, as referring to the times of Christ. In the place where it originally occurs, it contains no reference to the Gentiles.

14—21. The passage which follows is, in style, one of the most obscure portions of the Epistle. The obscurity arises from the argument being founded on passages of the Old Testament. The structure becomes disjointed and unmanageable from the number of the quotations. Some trains of thought are car-

ried on too far for the Apostle's purpose, while others are so briefly hinted at as to be hardly intelligible. Yet if, instead of entangling ourselves in the meshes of the successive clauses, we place ourselves at a distance and survey the whole at a glance, there is no difficulty in understanding the general meaning. No one can doubt that the Apostle intends to say that the prophets had already foretold the rejection of the Jews and the acceptance of the Gentiles. But the texts by which he seeks to prove or to express this, are interspersed, partly with difficulties which he himself felt; partly, also, with general statements about the mode in which the Gospel was given.

Going off from the word ἐπικαλουμένους and ἐπικαλέσῃται, he touches first on an objection which might naturally be urged: "No one has preached the Gospel to them." His mode of raising the objection is such that we are left in uncertainty whether this is said by him in the person of an objector, or in his own (cf. iii. 1—8., v. 13, 14., ix. 20, 21.). From one step in the rhetorical climax he passes on to another, until the words of the prophet are brought by association into his mind. "How beautiful are the feet of those who

- 13 Lord\* is over all, rich unto all that call upon him. For  
 14 whosoever shall call upon the name of the Lord shall be  
 15 saved. How then are they to call<sup>1</sup> on him in whom they  
 have not believed? and how are they to<sup>2</sup> believe in him\*  
 whom they have not heard? and how are they to<sup>2</sup> hear  
 without a preacher? and how are they to<sup>2</sup> preach, except  
 they be sent? as it is written, How beautiful are the

<sup>1</sup> Shall they call.<sup>2</sup> Shall they.

preach good tidings!" He is now far away from his original point. At ver. 16. he returns to it, and answers the question, "How are they to call?" &c., by saying that there had been a hearing of the Gospel, but some had not obeyed what they heard. This was implied in the words of the prophet, "who believed our report?" the inference from which is "that faith cometh by hearing;" and (we may add) hearing by the word of God. After this interpretation the Apostle returns to his first thought:—"How shall they believe on him whom they have not heard?" The answer is:—"Nay, but they have heard." All the world has heard. I repeat the question that it may be again answered, "Did not Israel know?" Moses and the prophets told them in the plainest terms that the Israelites should be rejected, and another nation made partakers of the mercies of God.

*πῶς οὖν ἐπικαλέσονται; How are they to call?*] The conjunctive in questions expresses doubt or deliberation under some previous supposition.

14. It is remarkable that St. Paul should state the objection in so animated and forcible a manner, while the answer given

to it is so fragmentary and imperfect: and also that here, as in ch. iii., he should interweave his own thoughts with the objection. The whole of the passage is an amplification of the thought—"How can they call upon God, except they be taught?" But in the words *ἐὰν μὴ ἀποσταλώσιν*, and in the quotation which follows, the Apostle is thinking of himself and the other ministers of the Gospel as appointed by God "Apostles of the Churches."

*οὗ οὐκ ἤκουσαν;*] "whom they have not heard?" as in Eph. iv. 21., it is said *εἰ αὐτὸν ἠκούσατε*, as in Acts, iii. 22., *αὐτοῦ ἀκούσεσθε*; not "about whom they have not heard," which, though supported by Iliad, Ω. 490., *σέθεν ζώντος ἀκούων*, is only a poetical construction of the Genitive.

15. The passage in Isaiah (lii. 7.) is suggested by the thought of the preachers' going forth, and the Apostle is led to quote it from association. It has, however, a bearing on his argument, as it implies that there must be those who are to preach the Gospel. In this passage the LXX. has *ὡς ὥρα ἐπὶ τῶν ὁρέων, ὡς πόδες εὐαγγελιζομένου ἀκοὴν εἰρήνης, ὡς εὐαγγελιζόμενος ἀγαθα*. The Hebrew, according to Ewald, is as follows:—"How lovely upon



πόδες τῶν εὐαγγελιζομένων<sup>1</sup> ἀγαθά. ἀλλ' οὐ πάντες ὑπή- 16  
 κουσαν τῷ εὐαγγελίῳ. Ἡσαΐας γὰρ λέγει Κύριε, τίς ἐπί- 17  
 στευσεν τῇ ἀκοῇ ἡμῶν; ἄρα ἡ πίστις ἐξ ἀκοῆς, ἡ δὲ ἀκοῇ 17  
 διὰ ῥήματος χριστοῦ.<sup>2</sup> ἀλλὰ λέγω, μὴ οὐκ ἤκουσαν; μενοῦν 18  
 γε εἰς πᾶσαν τὴν γῆν ἐξῆλθεν ὁ φθόγγος αὐτῶν, καὶ εἰς τὰ 19  
 πέρατα τῆς οἰκουμένης τὰ ῥήματα αὐτῶν. ἀλλὰ λέγω, 19  
 μὴ Ἰσραὴλ οὐκ ἔγνω<sup>3</sup>; πρῶτος Μωυσῆς λέγει Ἐγὼ παρα-  
 ζηλώσω ὑμᾶς ἐπ' οὐκ ἔθνει, ἐπὶ ἔθνει ἀσυνέτῳ παροργιῶ  
 ὑμᾶς. Ἡσαΐας δὲ ἀποτολμᾷ καὶ λέγει Εὐρέθην [ἐν]<sup>4</sup> τοῖς 20  
 ἐμὲ μὴ ζητοῦσιν, ἐμφανῆς ἐγενόμην [ἐν] τοῖς ἐμὲ μὴ ἐπε-  
 ρωτῶσιν. πρὸς δὲ τὸν Ἰσραὴλ λέγει Ὁλην τὴν ἡμέραν 21

<sup>1</sup> Add εἰρήνην τῶν εὐαγγελιζομένων τὰ.

<sup>3</sup> μὴ οὐκ ἔγνω Ἰσραὴλ.

<sup>2</sup> Θεοῦ.

<sup>4</sup> Om. ἐν.

the mountains are the feet of him that proclaimeth joy!"

The citation in the New Testament is rather nearer to the Hebrew than to the LXX., which, however, as the Apostle has changed the number and omitted the beautiful figure ἐπὶ τῶν ὀρέων, it is not certain that he is quoting. See Essay on Quotations, vol. i.

16. But here is an explanation of our difficulty. It was not that they were without the glad tidings of the Gospel, but that they refused to listen to them. (Comp. ch. iii. 3. :—"For what if some did not believe?") This, too, was shadowed forth in the words of prophecy. When the prophet says, "Who hath believed our report?" he clearly implies that some did not believe. There the link was wanting, not in the preaching of the Gospel (comp. ἐπίστευσεν), but in the belief of the hearer.

17. The words of Isaiah are made the ground of a further inference, which is also the answer to the question which was started

in ver. 14. : "How are they to believe him whom they have not heard?" So far, at any rate, we may conclude that "Faith cometh by hearing," to which the Apostle adds, as if led on by verbal association, and "hearing comes by words, the word of Christ."

18. Again the Apostle pursues the word ἀκοή in a different direction. How faith comes in general we know; but did it come to them? To which the Apostle replies, by an abrupt exclamation—"But I say, have they not heard?" ἀλλὰ is a passionate adversative. He had been previously speaking of Jews; here he includes Jews and Gentiles. We may answer, he says, in the words of the Psalmist,— "Their sound is gone out into all lands, and their voice into the ends of the earth." Ps. xix. 4. from the LXX.

19. But I say (to put the case more precisely), Did not Israel know? Did not know, what?—the Gospel, or the word of God in general, or the rejection

feet of them <sup>1</sup> that bring glad tidings of good things!  
 16 But they have not all obeyed the gospel. For Esaias  
 17 saith, Lord, who hath believed our report? So then  
 faith cometh by hearing, and hearing by the word of  
 18 Christ.<sup>2</sup> But I say, Have they not heard? Nay rather\*,  
 their sound went into all the earth, and their words  
 19 unto the ends of the world. But I say, Did not Israel  
 know? First Moses saith, I will provoke you to jealousy  
 by them that are no people, and by a foolish nation I  
 20 will anger you. But Esaias is very bold, and saith, I  
 was found in<sup>3</sup> them that sought me not; I was made  
 21 manifest in<sup>3</sup> them that asked not after me. But to

<sup>1</sup> Add That preach the gospel of peace and.

<sup>2</sup> God.

<sup>3</sup> Unto.

of the Jews in particular? The latter agrees best with the words which follow:—“First, Moses prophesies of the Jews being provoked to anger by the Gentiles.” But, on the other hand, what the previous context requires is, not the rejection of the Jews, but the Gospel or the Word of God in general; nor would the laws of language allow us to anticipate what follows as the subject of *ἔγνω*. “But I say, did not Israel know of the rejection of the Jews, of which I am about to speak?” The truth seems to be, that what was to be supplied after *ἔγνω*, was not precisely in the Apostle’s mind. He was thinking of the Gospel; but with the Gospel the rejection of the Jews was so closely connected, that he easily makes the transition from one to the other.

*πρῶτος Μωυσῆς.*] First, that is, before all others, Moses, as after him the prophets. The words which follow, are quoted from

the LXX. (Deut. xxxii. 21.), which differs in reading *αὐτοὺς* for *ἡμᾶς*.

*παραζηλώσω.*] Comp. xi. 13.

20. *Ἡσαίας δέ.*] Moses speaks first obscurely; but afterwards Esaias freely and boldly, and, as it were, without fear of the Jews, says, “I was found of them that sought me not.”

*εὐρέθην.*] What is already past, in the language of the prophet, is made present in the application by the Apostle.

21. But to the Jews far different is his language. In addressing them he says:—“All day long I stretched forth my hands to a disobedient and gainsaying people.” Both passages are taken from Isa. lxxv. 1, 2., with slight variations from the version of the LXX., which is as follows:—*ἐμφανῆς ἐγενήθη τοῖς ἐμὲ μὴ ἐπερωτῶσιν. εὐρέθην τοῖς ἐμὲ μὴ ζητοῦσιν· εἶπα, ἰδοὺ εἰμι τῷ ἔθνει, οἱ οὐκ ἐκάλεσάν μου τὸ ὄνομα. ἐξεπέτασα τὰς χεῖράς μου ὄλην τὴν ἡμέραν*

ἐξεπέτασα τὰς χεῖράς μου πρὸς λαὸν ἀπειθοῦντα καὶ ἀντιλέγοντα.

πρὸς λαὸν ἀπειθοῦντα καὶ ἀντιλέγοντα. Here it is obvious that the nation referred to is in both verses the same, viz. the Jews. The Apostle was perhaps led by the sound of the word ἔθνος to apply the first verse to the Gentiles.

—  
Such is the mode in which the Apostle clothes his thoughts.

The language of the Old Testament is not the proof of the doctrine which he is teaching, but the expression of it. He sees the great fact before him of the acceptance of the Gentiles and the rejection of the Jews, and reads the prophecies by the light of that fact. The page of the Old Testament sparkles before his eyes with intimations of



Israel he saith, All day long I have stretched forth my hands unto a disobedient and gainsaying people.

the purposes of God. There is an analogy between the circumstances of Israel, now and formerly, dimly visible. To the mind of the Apostle this analogy does not present itself as to the mind of the author of the Hebrews, as embodied in the whole constitution and history of the Jewish people, but in particular

events or separate expressions. Hence, when passing from the law to the Gospel, he is like one declaring dark sayings of old. And his language appears to us fragmentary and unconnected, because he takes his citations in unusual senses, and places them in a new connexion.

λέγω οὖν, μὴ ἀπόσατο ὁ θεὸς τὸν λαὸν αὐτοῦ, [<sup>1</sup> ὄν προέ- 11  
γνω;] μὴ γένοιτο· καὶ γὰρ ἐγὼ Ἰσραηλίτης εἰμί, ἐκ σπέ-  
ματος Ἀβραάμ, φυλῆς Βενιαμείν. οὐκ ἀπόσατο ὁ θεὸς 2  
τὸν λαὸν αὐτοῦ, ὃν προέγνω. ἢ οὐκ οἶδατε ἐν Ἡλίᾳ τί λέγει  
ἡ γραφή; ὡς ἐντυγχάνει τῷ θεῷ κατὰ τοῦ Ἰσραήλ<sup>2</sup>, Κύριε, 3  
τοὺς προφήτας σου ἀπέκτειναν<sup>3</sup>, τὰ θυσιαστήριά σου κα-

<sup>1</sup> Om. ὃν προέγνω.<sup>2</sup> Add λέγων.<sup>3</sup> Add καί.

XI. The whole of the three chapters viii., ix., x. may be regarded as the passionate struggle of conflicting emotions in the Apostle's mind,—*πότε μὲν νυνὶ δε*—of his present and former self. Are Israel saved, or not? They must be, for I also am one of them. At last, the purpose of God respecting them clears before his eyes. That they are rejected is a fact; but it is only for a time, that the Gentiles may be received. Hitherto he has been occupied with laying the broad foundation of a universal Gospel. Is he the God of the Jews only? is he not also of the Gentiles? Yes; of the Gentiles also; and of the Gentiles exclusively it seemed, but for the remnant who are saved. Such was the impression to which his own reception would naturally have led the Apostle, as he went from city to city, finding no hearers of the word, but Gentiles only. Of the two divisions of mankind, he seemed to lose one, and gain the other. The meditation of this fact had revealed to him a new page in God's dealings with mankind. But now a further insight into the purposes of God breaks upon him. In the order of Providence came the Jew first, and afterwards the Gentile; and the Jew last re-

turning to the inheritance of his fathers. The erring branch that has twined with the briars of the wilderness, is brought back to its own olive, and the tree covers the whole earth.

1. The prophets spoke in parables of the acceptance of the Gentiles, and of the rejection of the Jews. What is the inference that we are to draw from this? That God has cast off his people? The Apostle starts back from the conclusion which, up to this point, he has been seeking to illustrate and enforce:—"I say, God forbid! for I also am one of them."

*ἀπόσατο* contains an allusion to the ninety-fourth Psalm, from which the Apostle has borrowed the expression, *ὅτι οὐκ ἀπόσεται Κύριος τὸν λαὸν αὐτοῦ*, ver. 14.

*ὃν προέγνω*, A. Δ. f., om. B. C. G. g. v. It has probably been inserted from v. 2. Compare viii. 1. for an instance of a similar insertion.

*καὶ γὰρ ἐγώ*, [For I also.] The Apostle feels that the future of his countrymen is bound up with his own; as if he said, "They cannot be cast off, for then I should be rejected; and they will be accepted, because I am accepted." He recoils from the one consequence, and is assured of the other. He whom God

I say then, Hath God cast away his people [<sup>1</sup> which he  
<sup>2</sup> foreordained\*]? God forbid. For I also am an Israelite,  
of the seed of Abraham, of the tribe of Benjamin. God  
hath not cast away his people which he foreordained.\*  
<sup>3</sup> Wot ye not what the scripture saith of Elias? how he  
maketh intercession to God against Israel<sup>2</sup>, Lord, they  
have killed thy prophets<sup>3</sup>, digged down thine altars;

<sup>1</sup> Omit which he foreknew.

<sup>2</sup> Add saying.

<sup>3</sup> And.

chose to be the Apostle to the Gentiles could not be a cast-away. This is one way of drawing out his thought. More simply, and perhaps truly, it may be said, that he is expressing the feeling as of a parent over a prodigal son, that "he cannot be lost," the true ground of which is the affection which will not bear to be separated from him.

For a similar particularity of statement respecting his own claim as an Israelite, compare Phil. iii. 5.

2. God has not cast off his people; but, as heretofore, has fulfilled his purpose towards a remnant. The words *λαὸν ὃν προέγνω* have been translated "which he foreknew," in the English Version, in accordance with the signification of the word *προγινώσκειν* in some other passages (Acts, xxvi. 5., 2 Pet. iii. 17.). This, however, affords no good opposition to *ἀπόστατο*, if it can be said to have any meaning at all. The clause is better explained "which he foreordained," or "respecting which he had a purpose." So in 1 Pet. i. 20., our Saviour is called "a Lamb fore-ordained before the foundation of the world." The Apostle means to intimate that all which related to Israel was predetermined. It is a reason for believing that they

are not rejected, that nothing happens to them which is not *ὀρι-σμένη βουλή* καὶ *προγνώσει τοῦ Θεοῦ*. The consolation is of the same kind as is implied in the words of the heathen poet:—"Non hæc sine numine divum eveniunt."

*ἐν Ἡλίᾳ,*] in the place about Elias (1 Kings, xix. 10.). This is an instance of a common custom among the Jews of using proper names as landmarks for passages of Scripture; so, in Gabriele, Dan. ix. 21., that is, in the passage about Gabriel. The quotation which follows is abridged from the LXX.

*ἐντυγχάνει,*] "goes to God" against Israel; *ἐντυγχάνω*, according to the analogy of *ἄντομαι*, and other Greek words, from the sense of "meeting with," "going to," acquires in the later and ecclesiastical Greek a secondary notion of "prayer, supplication to."

3, 4. Is it only I that say this? Does not the Scripture say so too? Elias comes to God as a man might do now, and complains that all Israel are rejected, and that there is but one godly man left. And the answer of God gives him the same consolation that we now have: "Yet have I left to myself seven thousand men that have not bowed the knee to Baal."

It is doubtful with what de-



τέσκαψαν, καὶ γὰρ ὑπελείφθην μόνος, καὶ ζητοῦσι τὴν ψυχὴν μου. ἀλλὰ τί λέγει αὐτῷ ὁ χρηματισμός; Κατέλιπον 4 ἐμαντῷ ἑπτακισχιλίους ἄνδρας, οἵτινες οὐκ ἔκαμψαν γόνυ τῇ Βάαλ. οὕτως οὖν καὶ ἐν τῷ νῦν καιρῷ λείμμα κατ' 5 ἐκλογὴν χάριτος γέγονεν· εἰ δὲ χάριτι, οὐκέτι ἐξ ἔργων, 6 ἐπεὶ ἡ χάρις οὐκέτι γίνεται χάρις.<sup>1</sup> τί οὖν; ὁ ἐπιζητεῖ 7 Ἰσραὴλ, τοῦτο<sup>2</sup> οὐκ ἐπέτυχεν; ἡ δὲ ἐκλογὴ ἐπέτυχεν· οἱ

<sup>1</sup> Add εἰ δὲ ἐξ ἔργων, οὐκ ἔτι ἐστὶ χάρις· ἐπεὶ τὸ ἔργον οὐκ ἔτι ἐστὶν ἔργον. <sup>2</sup> τούτου.

gree of precision the Apostle would have applied the details of the prophecy to the Jews of his own day. He may, perhaps, be thinking of himself as answering to the person of Elias in the words "I only am left alone;" he may possibly intend an allusion to "those who killed the Lord Jesus," in the words "Lord they have slain thy prophets;" whether such analogies were present to his mind or not, his main purpose is clear, that purpose being to inculcate the general lesson that, when once before Israel had been rejected, the oracle of God said that a remnant should be saved.

4. ὁ χρηματισμός.] The oracular response in the passage of 1 Kings, xix. 12. the "still small voice." The quotation which follows is designedly altered, to give point to the Apostle's words. In the original it does not come immediately after the complaint of the prophet, but is introduced in connexion with the cruelties of Jehu and Hazeal, 1 Kings, xix. :

Ver. 17. "And it shall be, that him that is saved from the sword of Hazeal Jehu shall slay: and him that is saved from the sword of Jehu shall Elisha slay."

Ver. 18. "And thou shalt leave

in Israel 7000 men, all the knees which have not bowed the knee to Baal, and every mouth which hath not kissed him."

It is remarkable that the number 7000 occurs in the next chapter as the number of the valiant men of Israel. The Apostle is citing from memory; he is not likely to have turned to the original passage to select what would suit his purpose.

τῇ Βάαλ.] (1.) Older interpreters explain the feminine article before Βάαλ, by supposing the word εἰκονι to be understood, but no other example is adduced of such an omission. (2.) It has been thought by Gesenius that the feminine is here used as a mode of contempt, as in some other instances in Hebrew. It is doubtful, however, how far such an idiom, if it exist in any precisely parallel case in Hebrew, would be transferred to the Hellenistic Greek. Would a Jew have said ἡ Ζεὺς by way of contempt? (3.) A more probable supposition is, that there was a goddess, as well as a god Baal; like Lunus and Luna, in Latin. This feminine occurs in several passages of the LXX. :—

Judges, ii. 13. ἐλάτρευσαν τῇ Βάαλ καὶ ταῖς Ἀστάρταις.

Judges, x. 6. ἐλάτρευσαν ταῖς

4 and I am left alone, and they seek my life. But what  
 saith the answer of God unto him? I have reserved to  
 myself seven thousand men, who have not bowed the  
 5 knee to Baal. Even so then at this present time also  
 there is a remnant according to the election of grace  
 6 And if by grace, then is it no more of works: otherwise  
 7 grace is no more grace.<sup>1</sup> What then? hath not Israel<sup>2</sup>  
 obtained that which he seeketh for? But the elec-  
 8 tion hath obtained it, and the rest were blinded (accord-

<sup>1</sup> Add But if it be of works, then it is no more grace: otherwise work is  
 no more work. <sup>2</sup> Israel hath not.

Βαάλειμ καὶ ταῖς Ἀσάρταις.

So Hosea, ii. 10.; Jer. xi. 13.;  
 Tob. i. 5.

5. So now, at the present time, God has chosen a remnant. In the days of Elias there were more worshippers of the true God than any one could have imagined, in Israel. Even so now, from the Jews themselves, there are a great company of believers.

κατ' ἐκλογὴν χάριτος,] according to the election which grace makes; gen. of the subject.

6. As in many other passages, the Apostle is led back by the association of words to the great antithesis. Compare chap. iv 4., τῷ δὲ ἐργαζομένῳ ὁ μισθὸς οὐ λογίζεται κατὰ χάριν, κ. τ. λ.; Eph. ii. 9., οὐκ ἐξ ἔργων ἵνα μή τις κυχῆσθαι. "But if of grace, not as the Jews suppose by obedience to the law; for grace ceases to be grace, when we bring in works." In these words the Apostle is already taking up the other side of the argument, that is, he is showing why Israel was rejected, not why a remnant was spared.

In the Textus Receptus is added the parallel clause, resting on

very inferior though ancient MS. authority, and even thus requiring help from emendation, — εἰ δὲ ἐξ ἔργων, οὐκ ἔτι ἐστὶ χάρις, ἐπεὶ τὸ ἔργον οὐκέτι ἐστὶν ἔργον. It is not necessary to argue whether or not this clause is in character with the style of St. Paul, on which ground probably no fair objection could be raised to it, when the want of external evidence sufficiently condemns it.

7. τί οὖν;] What is the conclusion then? The Apostle checks the digression which was once more carrying him away. Is Israel saved? Is Israel lost? Neither, exactly. It has not attained what it is seeking for, but a portion of Israel has attained it.

Such is the way of taking the passage according to the Textus Receptus and the English version, against which, as the question is only one of a stop, manuscript authority cannot be set in the scale.

The connexion will have to be drawn out somewhat differently if, with Lachmann, we place a note of interrogation after ἐπέτυχεν. "What is the



δὲ λοιποὶ ἐπωρώθησαν, καθὼς γέγραπται Ἔδωκεν αὐτοῖς ὁ  
 θεὸς πνεῦμα κατανύξεως, ὀφθαλμοὺς τοῦ μὴ βλέπειν καὶ  
 ὄτα τοῦ μὴ ἀκούειν, ἕως τῆς σήμερον ἡμέρας. καὶ Δαυεὶδ  
 λέγει, Γενηθήτω ἡ τράπεζα αὐτῶν εἰς παγίδα καὶ εἰς θήραν  
 καὶ εἰς σκάνδαλον καὶ εἰς ἀνταπόδομα αὐτοῖς, σκοτισθή-  
 τωσαν οἱ ὀφθαλμοὶ αὐτῶν τοῦ μὴ βλέπειν, καὶ τὸν νῶτον  
 αὐτῶν διὰ παντὸς σύγκαμψον.

conclusion then? Has not Israel obtained what it seeks for? It may be, not. This makes no difference; the election has obtained it, and the hardness of heart of the rest only fulfilled the predictions of prophecy." According to this way of punctuating the passage, the question is tentative, as in Rom. iii. 3.

ἐπιζητεῖ,] which has far greater MS. authority in its favour than the imperfect ἐπεζήτει, G. f. g. v., may be explained by supposing a reference to the expectation of the Messiah among the Jews in the days of the Apostle.

8. As in chap. iv., Moses and the Psalmist are quoted in succession, to illustrate the Apostle's statement. This was only what Moses said—"God gave them the spirit of torpor, eyes that they should not see, and ears that they should not hear unto this day" (as was then said, and we still repeat).

The quotation is taken, though not precisely as it stands, from Deut. xxix. 4., where the last words occur with a slight change; probably there is also a recollection of the passage so often quoted in the Gospels and Acts, Isaiah, vi. 10. The expression πνεῦμα κατανύξεως is introduced from Isaiah, xxix. 10.

κατάνυξις is derived from κατα-νόσσω, to pierce, wound. Both

words are used in a metaphorical sense, the substantive meaning "sadness," the verb "to arouse sadness." They acquire in the LXX. a further sense of "torpor," "to cause torpor," as in Ps. lx. 5., Is. xxix. 10., analogous to the transition of ideas in the words smitten or stricken in English; "torpor" is the meaning of κατάνυξις in this passage.

9, 10. And David (in Ps. lxxix. 23.) uses the same language:—"Let their table be made a snare unto them, and a gin and an offence and a retribution. Let them have the evils of old age, blindness and bent limbs."

St. Paul quotes this passage, not in its original sense of a malediction against the enemies of God, but as a proof of the rejection of the Jews. The original passage is one of those which in all ages have been a stumbling-block to the readers of Scripture, in which the spirit of the Old Testament appears most unlike the spirit of the New. With the view of escaping from what is revolting to Christian feelings, it has not been uncommon to construe the imperative moods as future tenses. The Psalmist or prophet is supposed to be predicting, not imprecating, the destruction of his enemies. But the spirit of these passages cannot be altered by a change of tense



8 ing as it is written, God hath given them the spirit of  
torpor\*, eyes that they should not see, and ears that  
9 they should not hear;) unto this day. And David saith,  
Let their table be made a snare, and a trap, and a  
10 stumblingblock, and a recompense unto them: let their  
eyes be darkened, that they may not see, and bow down  
their back alway.

or mood; neither is it consistent, in such a psalm, for example, as the lxxviii., to read the first portion of the psalm as a prayer or wish, and refuse to consider the remainder as an imprecation. It is better to admit, what the words of the passage will not allow us to deny, that the Psalmist is imprecating God's wrath against his own enemies. But first his enemies are God's enemies, so that his bitter words against them lose the character of merely private enmity. Secondly, the state of life in which such a prayer could be uttered by a "man after God's own heart," is altogether different from our own. It was a state in which good and evil worked with greater power in the same individual, and in which a greater mixture of good and evil, of gentleness and fierceness, existed together than we can easily imagine. The Spirit of God was working "in the untamed chaos of the affections," but also leaving them often in their original strength and lawlessness. David curses his enemies, believing them to be the enemies of God. The Christian cannot curse even the enemies of God, still less his own. This contrast we need not hesitate to admit; if the writers of the Old Testament did not scruple to dis-

own "the visitation of the sins of the fathers upon the children;" neither need we refuse to say with Grotius, "Eis ex spiritu legis optat Davides paria."

9. ἡ τράπεζα.] Let their table, spread with the banquet, be a snare to them. We need not think, with some commentators, of the table of the Lord, which is a snare to the unworthy partakers of it, or of the Paschal Lamb, which may be said, in a certain sense, to have ensnared the Jews at the destruction of Jerusalem; still less of the tables of the money-changers, and least of all of the Temple, which is regarded as synonymous with the altar of the Temple, and this with the table here spoken of. The meaning is better illustrated by the words of Shakespeare:—  
"Poison be their drink. Gall, worse than gall, the daintiest that they taste."

Comp. the preceding verse of the psalm: "They gave me gall for my meat, and in my thirst they gave me vinegar to drink."

εἰς θήραν,] either "for a cause of their becoming a prey," or probably, in Alexandrian Greek, "for a trap or gin." Such appears to be the meaning of the word in Ps. xxxiv. 8., ἡ θήρα ἣν ἔκρουψε, where as here πάγισ has preceded.

10. τὸν νῶτον αὐτῶν.] Bow

Λέγω οὖν, μὴ ἔπταισαν ἵνα πέσωσιν; μὴ γένοιτο· ἀλλὰ 11  
 τῷ αὐτῶν παραπτώματι ἢ σωτηρία τοῖς ἔθνεσιν εἰς τὸ 12  
 παραζηλώσαι αὐτούς. εἰ δὲ τὸ παράπτωμα αὐτῶν πλοῦτος 12  
 κόσμος καὶ τὸ ἥττημα αὐτῶν πλοῦτος ἐθνῶν, πόσῳ μᾶλλον  
 τὸ πλήρωμα αὐτῶν. ὑμῖν δὲ<sup>1</sup> λέγω τοῖς ἔθνεσιν. ἐφ' ὅσον 13  
 μὲν οὖν<sup>2</sup> εἰμὶ ἐγὼ ἐθνῶν ἀπόστολος, τὴν διακονίαν μου 13  
 δοξάζω; εἴ πως παραζηλώσω μου τὴν σάρκα καὶ σώσω 14  
 τινὰς ἐξ αὐτῶν. εἰ γὰρ ἡ ἀποβολὴ αὐτῶν καταλλαγὴ κόσ- 15

<sup>1</sup> γάρ.<sup>2</sup> Om. οὖν.

down their neck, either with old age or slavery.

11. Language like this would seem to imply that Israel has fallen. The cup of God's wrath must be full against those of whom such things are said. But the Apostle has not forgotten the other side of his argument, from which he digressed for a moment. Is their stumble a fall? he asks (the very word ἔπταισαν prepares the way for the conclusion at which he is aiming); or (if we take the words ἔπταισαν and πέσωσιν in a metaphorical sense), have they erred so as utterly to fall away from grace? The Apostle, with the words of Moses, which he had quoted in the previous chapter, still in his mind, replies: "Not so;" their fall was but a Divine economy, in which the Gentiles alternated with the Jews. The temporary precedence of the Gentiles was intended to have, and may have, the effect of arousing them to jealousy. As in other passages, the Apostle recovers the lost theme by repeating the same formula with which he commenced — Λέγω οὖν.

ἢ σωτηρία,] the salvation which answers to this fall or which is given to the Gentiles; τοῖς ἔθνεσι,

a possessive dative after ἢ σωτηρία, or more probably after a verb understood. The word παραζηλώσω alludes to the passage from Deut. (xxxii. 21.), which has been already referred to (x. 19.)

12. πλοῦτος κόσμος,] the enrichment of the world. The word κόσμος is general, though here the connexion shows the Gentiles to be chiefly in the Apostle's mind.

καὶ τὸ ἥττημα αὐτῶν,] Their inferiority, being ἡττωνες, ἡττώμενοι, is opposed to πλοῦτος ἐθνῶν, and also τὸ πλήρωμα, their fullness. In the latter word is included the fulfilment of God's purposes (a secondary thought, which enters also into the meaning of πλήρωμα τοῦ χρόνου, τῶν καιρῶν), as well as the filling up of the numbers of the elect. Israel may be said to be filled up when all Israelites are included and there is no more room left in the measures of Providence.

13. ὑμῖν δὲ λέγω τοῖς ἔθνεσιν,] But in saying this, I am as one addressing those who are without. I speak not to the Jews themselves, but to you Gentiles. As though he said, "Judge ye what I say, who are spectators of this work of God, and know what blessings you have received by the partial rejection of the Jews."

11 I say then, Have they stumbled that they should fall? God forbid: but rather through their fall is salvation unto the Gentiles come, for to provoke them to jealousy.

12 Now if the fall of them be the riches of the world, and the diminishing of them the riches of the Gentiles; how

13 much more their fulness? But<sup>1</sup> to you Gentiles I speak, nay rather<sup>2\*</sup>, inasmuch as I am the apostle of the Gen-

14 tiles, I magnify mine office: if by any means I may provoke to emulation them which are my flesh, and

15 may\* save some of them. For if the casting away of them be the reconciling of the world, what shall the re-

<sup>1</sup> For.<sup>2</sup> *Om.* nay rather.

ἐφ' ὅσον μὲν οὖν εἰμὶ ἐγώ.] It is better, with Lachmann, to separate these words by a full stop from the preceding. The Apostle is beginning a new thought, in which he applies the argument which has been just used, to his own position as Apostle of the Gentiles. He "goes off" upon the word Gentiles. "Nay, I do not hide but rather magnify mine office of Apostle of the Gentiles, in the hope that I may rouse my kinsmen to jealousy, and save, I will not venture to say all, but a few of them." The name of apostleship of the Gentiles was odious to the Jews. The Apostle does seek to mitigate this hatred or put away the odious name. His hope mounts higher that a wholesome shame at the conversion of the heathen may bring back his countrymen to the truth. Compare παραζηλώσαι in ver. 11.

According to another way of taking the passage, the Apostle is supposed to say—"As the Apostle of the Gentiles, I magnify mine office to include the Jews; the term ἔθνη is ambiguous and com-

prehends both." This is more than is contained in the text, and destroys the point of the words, ἐφ' ὅσον μὲν οὖν εἰμὶ ἐγὼ ἔθνῶν ἀπόστολος.

According to a third view the Apostle is excusing himself to the Gentiles for the honour he may be supposed to have done to the Jews in the preceding words, in extenuation of which he pleads that it is the glory of his office as Apostle of Gentiles to rouse the Jews to jealousy as this would be the enrichment of the Gentiles, and of all mankind. Too much has here also to be supplied; and the connexion, though more continuous, is obscure and laboured.

15. Neither is it a merely visionary hope that some of them shall be saved. "For as I said above, so say I now again; if the casting away of them be the reconciling of the world, what shall the receiving of them be but life from the dead." In more senses than one, it might be said, that the casting away of the Jews was the reconciliation of the world, (1.) as they were simultaneous;



μου, τίς ἢ πρόσλημψις εἰ μὴ ζωὴ ἐκ νεκρῶν; εἰ δὲ ἡ ἀπαρχὴ 16  
 ἁγία, καὶ τὸ φύραμα· καὶ εἰ ἡ ῥίζα ἁγία, καὶ οἱ κλάδοι. εἰ 17  
 δέ τινες τῶν κλάδων ἐξεκλάσθησαν, σὺ δὲ ἀγριέλαιος ὢν  
 ἐνεκεντρίσθης ἐν αὐτοῖς καὶ συγκοινωνὸς τῆς ῥίζης καὶ τῆς  
 πίότητος τῆς ἐλαίας ἐγένου, μὴ κατακαυχῶ τῶν κλάδων· 18  
 εἰ δὲ κατακαυχᾶσαι, οὐ σὺ τὴν ῥίζαν βαστάζεις, ἀλλ' ἡ

(2.) as without the doing away of the law of Moses, the Gentiles could not have been admitted.

The words *ζωὴ ἐκ νεκρῶν* had more than one meaning assigned to them:—(1.) Life out of death; the house of Israel who are dead, shall be alive again. Compare chap. iv. 17—20. But the connexion requires that the benefit should be one in which Gentiles as well as Jews are partakers. There would be a want of point in saying, “If their casting away be reconciliation to the world, what shall their acceptance be, but the quickening of the Jews into life?” (2.) It is better, therefore, to take *ζωὴ ἐκ νεκρῶν* of some undefined spiritual good, of which Gentile and Jew alike have a share, and which, in comparison of their former state may be regarded as resurrection; the thought, however, of their prior state, is subordinate. Least of all in a climax, should the meaning of each word which the Apostle uses be exactly analysed. Words fail him, and he employs the strongest that he can find, thinking rather of their general force than of their precise meaning.

16. The last argument might be described in modern language as an argument from analogy; this which follows, as an argument from tendencies. As the beginning is, so shall the comple-

tion be; as the cause is, so shall the effect be; as the part, so the whole. In a similar way the Apostle argues in the 1 Cor. vii. 14., that “the unbelieving husband is sanctified in the wife,” that children are holy if their parents are so; that “if while we were yet sinners Christ died for us, much more being justified we shall be saved” (Rom. v. 9.); that “he which hath begun a good work will perform it until the day of Jesus Christ” (Phil. i. 6.). The figures *ἀπαρχή* and *ρίζα* seem intended to express two different phases of the Apostle’s argument. *Ἀπαρχή* = the firstfruits of the Gospel; *φύραμα*, the mass from which the firstfruits are taken, and which is consecrated by their oblation (Num. xv. 21.). The image is a favourite one with St. Paul, occurring in 1 Cor. v. 6, Gal. v. 9., as well as here. Stripped of its figure, the meaning of the clause will be:—As some Jews are believers, all Jews shall one day become so; the “firstfruits” of the Gospel consecrate the nation to God. The word *ρίζα*, on the other hand, may have several associations. It may either mean the patriarchs (cf. below, verse 28., “beloved for the fathers’ sakes”); or the Jewish dispensation generally; or the Christian Church, which was the stock, new yet old, from which the branches were broken off.

- 16 ceiving of them be, but life from the dead? And\* if the  
 firstfruit be holy, the lump is also holy: and if the root  
 17 be holy, so are the branches. But\* if some of the  
 branches be broken off, and thou, being a wild olive tree,  
 wert grafted in among them, and with them becamest\*  
 18 partaker of the root and fatness of the olive tree; boast  
 not against the branches. But if thou boast, thou bearest

This last interpretation best preserves the parallelism of the clauses, and is most in keeping with ver. 18. For the use of the word *ἀγία*, comp. ch. vii. 12. :—  
 “So then the law is holy, and the commandment holy, and just, and good.”

17. *εἰ δὲ τινες.*] The Apostle anticipates an objection, “that some of the branches were broken off.” It is the ever recurring *τί γάρ εἰ ἠπίστησάν τινες* (iii. 3.) in a new form. In the words *ἀγριέλαιος* and *συγκοινωνός τῆς ῥίζης* the Apostle is preparing his answer.

The paronomasia in *κλάδοι* and *ἐξεκλάσθησαν*, which is repeated in v. 19., is hardly translatable in English: “If some of the branches ceased to be branches,” &c.; comp. ii. 1., xii. 3., 1 Cor. xi. 31, 32., and many other passages for similar plays of words, in which the Apostle is said to have a peculiar delight, or rather which he often seems to employ from a defect of expression.

The olive tree, like the vine, is used in the Old Testament (Jer. xi. 16.) as a figure of the house of Israel. No image could be more natural to an inhabitant of Palestine. The relative dignity rather than the fruitfulness of the cultivated and wild olive is here the point of similarity. Those who are acquainted with the subject

of grafting trees, observe that the comparison fails, because it is not the new which derives strength from the old, but the old from the new. Such an observation may be placed on a level with the remark which is sometimes thought to reflect light on the meaning of the parable of the wheat and tares, “that wheat is only another kind of tares.” Our Lord and St. Paul speak not as botanists or men of science, but in the familiar language of ordinary life.

18. *εἰ δὲ κατακ. . . ῥίζα σε.*] But if you *do* boast, remember this: it is you who are dependent on the root, not the root on you. The Apostle is not speaking of the Old Testament as the root of the New, but of the Christian Church, the spiritual Israel, which is old and new at once, the root on which the Gentiles are ingrafted branches, and from which the Jews are broken off.

19. The thought already latent in ver. 17. is distinctly brought out; “therefore you will say:—I was put in their place.” They were broken off that I might be grafted in.

20. I grant it. [St. Paul has already said the same in other words at ver. 11.] But it is another and a more practical lesson I would have you learn from the same fact. They were broken

ρίζα σέ. ἐρεῖς οὖν Ἐξεκλάσθησαν<sup>1</sup> κλάδοι, ἵνα ἐγὼ ἐγκεν- 19  
 τρισθῶ. καλῶς. τῇ ἀπιστία ἐκλάσθησαν, σὺ δὲ τῇ πίστει 20  
 ἔστηκας. μὴ ὑψηλοφρόνει, ἀλλὰ φοβοῦ. εἰ γὰρ ὁ θεὸς τῶν 21  
 κατὰ φύσιν κλάδων οὐκ ἐφείσατο, οὐδὲ σοῦ φείσεται.<sup>2</sup> ἴδε 22  
 οὖν χρηστότητα καὶ ἀποτομίαν θεοῦ. ἐπὶ μὲν τοὺς πεσόν-  
 τας ἀποτομία<sup>3</sup>, ἐπὶ δὲ σὲ χρηστότης θεοῦ<sup>4</sup>, ἐὰν ἐπιμείνης  
 τῇ χρηστότητι· ἐπεὶ καὶ σὺ ἐκκοπήσῃ. κἀκεῖνοι δέ, ἐὰν 23  
 μὴ ἐπιμείνωσιν τῇ ἀπιστία, ἐγκεντρισθήσονται· δυνατὸς  
 γάρ ἐστιν ὁ θεὸς πάλιν ἐγκεντρίσαι αὐτούς· εἰ γὰρ σὺ 24  
 ἐκ τῆς κατὰ φύσιν ἐξεκόπης ἀγριελαίου καὶ παρὰ φύσιν  
 ἐνεκεντρίσθης εἰς καλλιέλαιον, πόσῳ μᾶλλον οὗτοι οἱ κατὰ  
 φύσιν ἐγκεντρισθήσονται τῇ ἰδίᾳ ἐλαίᾳ.

<sup>1</sup> Add οἱ. <sup>2</sup> μήπως οὐδὲ ... φείσεται <sup>3</sup> ἀποτομίαν. <sup>4</sup> χρηστότητα, om. θεοῦ.

off because of unbelief, and you stand by the faith which they had not. Be humble and fear for yourselves.

τῇ ἀπιστία.] Comp. ver. 30. τῇ τούτων ἀπειθείᾳ. They are datives of the reason or cause, as in Soph. Antig. 387. : σχολῆ γ' ἂν ἤξειν δεῦρ' ἂν ἐξηύχουν ἐγὼ ταῖς σαῖς ἀπειλαῖς.

21. What was true of them is still more true of you. The original branches had a sort of claim on God, and yet he did not spare them. No, and he will not spare you.

οὐδὲ σοῦ φείσεται.] Two other readings, one of which is that of the Textus Receptus, μήπως οὐδὲ σοῦ φείσεται, and μήπως οὐδὲ σοῦ φείσεται, express, with different degrees of emphasis, the same meaning.

Let us cast a look over the connexion of the last ten verses. At ver. 12. the Apostle had spoken of the "diminishing of the Israelite" being the "enrichment of the Gentile." This led to the thought of the still greater

gain which was to accrue to the Gentile from the restoration of the Israelite. Therefore also the restoration of Israel naturally formed a part of that Gospel which he preached among the Gentiles. And that Gospel he would make much of and thrust forward, if only that it might react upon his countrymen. For that Israel would be restored was as true as that the firstfruits consecrated the lump, or that the root implied the tree. And the Gentile should remember that he was not the original stock, but the branch which was afterwards grafted in. Still the Apostle observes a loophole in the argument through which Gentile pretensions may creep in. He may say, Granted; I am not the root only the branch, but it was they who gave place to me; they were cut off that I might be grafted in. Good, says the Apostle, learn of them but another lesson. Not "they were cut off that I might be grafted in;" but "I may be cut off too."



19 not the root, but the root thee. Thou wilt say then,  
 The branches were broken off, that I might be grafted  
 20 in. Well; because of unbelief they were broken off,  
 and thou standest by faith. Be not highminded, but  
 21 fear: for if God spared not the natural branches, take  
 22 heed lest he also spare not thee. Behold therefore the  
 goodness and severity of God: on them which fell, severe-  
 rity; but toward thee, goodness, the goodness of God<sup>1</sup>  
 if thou continue in his goodness: otherwise thou also  
 23 shalt be cut off. And they also, if they abide not in  
 unbelief, shall be grafted in: for God is able to graff  
 24 them in again. For if thou wert cut out of the olive  
 tree which is wild by nature, and wert grafted contrary  
 to nature into a good olive tree: how much more shall  
 these, which be the natural branches, be grafted into

<sup>1</sup> *Om.* of God.

22. Behold, a twofold lesson: mercy and severity; mercy to you, severity to them. And yet this lesson is one that may make you rejoice with trembling; for you may yet change places.

Like *δικαιοσύνη, χάρις, θέλημα*, and other words, *χρηστότης* is used in this passage, for the effect as well as the cause; for the state produced in man, as well as for the goodness of God, which produces that state. "Mercy if you abide in his mercy," is said in the same way as grace if you abide in his grace. See Essay on Abstract ideas of the New Testament, at the end of ch. ii.

For the change in construction from the accusative to the nominative, compare chapter ii. 7, 8.

*ἐπεὶ καὶ σὺ.*] Since, if you do not; an elliptical form of expression in which the protasis is

supplied from the connexion. Comp. v. 6. *ἐπεὶ ἡ χάρις οὐκέτι γίνεται χάρις.*

23. You shall change places; you shall be cut off, and they, if they cease from unbelief, shall be grafted in. For it is only their unbelief, and not any defect in the power of God, that prevents their being again engrafted.

Comp. 2 Cor. iii. 15, 16., "But even unto this day, when Moses is read, the veil is upon their heart. Nevertheless, when he shall turn to the Lord, the veil shall be taken away."

24. is an amplification of 23., "God is able to graft them in again." It is an easier and more natural thing to restore them to their own olive, than to graft you into it. It is uncertain, and is of no great importance, whether *οἱ* is the article or the re-

Οὐ γὰρ θέλω ὑμᾶς ἀγνοεῖν, ἀδελφοί, τὸ μυστήριον τοῦτο, 25  
 ἵνα μὴ ᾗτε παρ' ἑαυτοῖς φρόνιμοι, ὅτι πώρωσις ἀπὸ μέρους  
 τῶ Ἰσραὴλ γέγονεν ἄχρις οὗ τὸ πλήρωμα τῶν ἐθνῶν εἰς- 26  
 ἔλθῃ. καὶ οὕτως πᾶς Ἰσραὴλ σωθήσεται, καθὼς γέγρα-  
 πται Ἡξεί ἐκ Σιών ὁ ῥυόμενος,<sup>1</sup> ἀποστρέψει ἀσεβείας ἀπὸ

<sup>1</sup> Add καί.

lative; whether, that is, the last clause is to be translated, "How much more shall these who are the natural branches be engrafted in their own olive?" or, "How much more shall these (*i. e.* be engrafted), who will be engrafted according to nature in their own olive?"

25. For I would have you know, brethren, that this is the secret purpose of God.

Comp. Eph. iii. 3—6: "How that by revelation he made known unto me the mystery; . . . which in other ages was not made known unto the sons of men, as it is now revealed unto his holy apostles and prophets by the Spirit; that the Gentiles should be fellow heirs, and of the same body."

μυστήριον,] in reference to the heathen mysteries, is a revealed secret, a secret into which a person is admitted, not one from which they are excluded. Analogous to this is the use of *μυστήριον* in the New Testament. It is applied to a secret which God has revealed, known to some and not to others, manifested in the latter days, but hidden previously. Thus the Gospel is spoken of in Matt. xiii. 11. as the mystery of the kingdom of God. So Rom. xvi. 25: "Now to him that is able to establish you according to my Gospel, and the preaching of

Jesus Christ, according to the revelation of the mystery, which hath been kept silent through endless ages." In Eph. v. 2. the rite of marriage is spoken of as a great mystery, typifying Christ and the Church. So "the mystery of godliness," 1 Tim. iii. 16.; the mystery of iniquity, 2 Thess. ii. 7.; "the mystery of the seven stars," Rev. i. 20.; "Mystery Babylon the great," xvii. 5. In all these passages reference is made:—(1.) to what is wonderful; or, (2.) to what is veiled under a figure; or, (3.) to what has been long concealed or is so still to the multitude of mankind; and in all there is the correlative idea of revelation. The use of the word *μυστήριον* in Scripture, affords no grounds for the popular application of the term "mystery" to the truths of the Christian religion. It means not what is, but what was a secret, into which, if we may use heathen language, the believer has become initiated, which there is no purpose to conceal from mankind; rather which he "would not have other men ignorant of:" so far as it remains a secret it is so because it is spiritually discerned, and some Christians, or those who are not Christians, have not the power of discernment.

ἵνα μὴ ᾗτε παρ' ἑαυτοῖς φρόνι-

25 their own olive tree? For I would not, brethren, that ye should be ignorant of this mystery, lest ye should be wise in your own conceits; that blindness in part is happened to Israel, until the fulness of the Gentiles be come in. And so all Israel shall be saved: as it is written, There shall come out of Sion the Deliverer; <sup>1</sup> he

<sup>1</sup> And.

μοι.] The present position of the Gentiles in relation to the Jews was temporary and accidental; it was not to be made a ground of boasting for any.

πάρωσις ἀπὸ μέρους,] a partial hardening of the heart. Whether the Apostle means "a hardening of heart" which came over a part of Israel, or a degree of hardening of heart coming over the whole people, is not expressed. The Apostle is arguing against the Gentiles being puffed up, and at the same time extenuating the fault of his countrymen. "For I would wish you to know, brethren, that this rejection of the Jews is not total, but partial; it is but for a time, until the number of the Gentiles is filled up."

πλήρωμα τῶν ἐθνῶν,] the full number of the Gentiles, all that were contained in the purposes of God; like πλήρωμα τοῦ χρόνου, Gal. iv. 4.

εἰσέλθῃ.] Compare Heb. iii. 19. where, as here, the word is used absolutely. The first portion of ver. 25. is closely connected with ver. 26.; the mystery was not so much the partial rejection of Israel as their final salvation.

26. πᾶς Ἰσραήλ,] i. e. the Israelites who are hardened, as well as those who believe.

It is evident, by the opposition to the Gentiles that St. Paul is here speaking, not of the spiritual, but of the literal Israel. His words should not, however, be so pressed as to imply universal salvation, which was not in his thoughts. The language of prophecy, and the feelings of his own heart, alike told him that Israel should be saved. But he is thinking of the nation which is to be accepted as a whole, not of the individuals who composed it. It may be said that even in this modified sense the words of the prophecy or aspiration have not been fulfilled. We must answer, no more has the Apostle's belief in the immediate coming of Christ; it was the near wish and prayer of his heart, but in its accomplishment far off, and to be realised only in the final victory of good over evil.

Modern criticism detaches the meaning of the Apostle from the event of the prophecy. It has no need to pervert his words, from a determination as it may be called, such as Luther expresses, that the Jews shall not be saved, or with Calvin to transfer them to the Israel of God, because the time seems to have passed for their literal fulfilment. Happy would it have been for the for-



Ἰακώβ· καὶ αὕτη αὐτοῖς ἢ παρ' ἐμοῦ διαθήκη, ὅταν ἀφέ- 27  
 λωμαι τὰς ἁμαρτίας αὐτῶν. κατὰ μὲν τὸ εὐαγγέλιον ἐχθροὶ 28  
 δι' ὑμᾶς, κατὰ δὲ τὴν ἐκλογὴν ἀγαπητοὶ διὰ τοὺς πατέρας·  
 ἀμεταμέλητα γὰρ τὰ χαρίσματα καὶ ἡ κλήσις τοῦ θεοῦ. 29  
 ὥσπερ γὰρ<sup>1</sup> ὑμεῖς ποτὲ ἠπειθήσατε τῷ θεῷ, νῦν δὲ ἠλεή- 30  
 θητε τῇ τούτων ἀπειθείᾳ, οὕτως καὶ οὗτοι νῦν ἠείθησαν 31  
 τῷ ὑμετέρῳ ἑλέει, ἵνα καὶ αὐτοὶ [νῦν]<sup>2</sup> ἐλεηθῶσιν· συνέ- 32  
 κλεισεν γὰρ ὁ θεὸς τοὺς πάντας εἰς ἀπείθειαν, ἵνα τοὺς

<sup>1</sup> Add καί.<sup>2</sup> Om. νῦν.

tunes of the Jewish race and the honour of the Christian name had they never been wrongly applied! (See on ver. 32.)

γέγραπται.] The words quoted are from Isaiah, lix. 20., a Messianic prophecy. The citation is not exact, as in the LXX. we read, instead of ἐκ Σιών, ἔνεκεν Σιών. In the Hebrew the difference is greater, the meaning being, "The Redeemer shall come to Zion and unto them that turn from transgression in Jacob."

27. The remaining clause, ὅταν ἀφέλωμαι τὰς ἁμαρτίας αὐτῶν, is taken, with the alteration of a letter, from Isaiah, xxvii. 9., the former part of which verse nearly resembles the quotation which precedes:—διὰ τοῦτο ἀφαιρεθήσεται ἀνομία Ἰακώβ, καὶ τοῦτό ἐστιν ἡ εὐλογία αὐτοῦ, ὅταν ἀφέλωμαι τὴν ἁμαρτίαν αὐτοῦ. Αὕτη is explained by the words ὅταν ἀφέλωμαι, "This," viz., "when or that I take away their sins;" cf. 1 John, v. 2.

28. Their case, the Apostle says, may be looked at in two ways. In reference to the Gospel, they are rejected (ἐχθροὶ), and this you must regard as a part of the mercy of God to you; but they are still elect for the

sake of their fathers, whom God loved.

Compare Philo (De Justitiâ, ii. 366. Mangey), where he says that God will always show mercy to the Jewish people, because of the virtues of the patriarchs; and (De Exsec. ii. 436.), that God will receive their prayers for their descendants.

29. ἀμεταμέλητα γὰρ τὰ χαρίσματα καὶ ἡ κλήσις τοῦ Θεοῦ.] In the same spirit in which the Apostle says, "He that hath begun a good work in you, will continue it to the end;" he says, also, in reference not to individuals, but to nations, "God is unchangeable, what He has once given, He cannot take back; those whom He has once called, He will not cast out." We know what the Apostle teaches elsewhere, that the gifts and calling of God are not irrespective of our acceptance and obedience. But in this passage he makes abstraction of the condition; he thinks only of the purpose of God, who is not a man that He should change His will arbitrarily, and be one thing one day, and another thing another, to the objects of His favour. He feels that God cannot desert the work of His hands. Neither need we stop to

27 shall turn away ungodliness\* from Jacob: and\* this is  
 my covenant unto them, when I shall take away their  
 28 sins. As concerning the gospel, they are enemies for  
 your sakes: but as touching the election, they are be-  
 29 loved for the fathers' sakes. For the gifts and calling  
 30 of God are without repentance. For as ye in times  
 past have disobeyed\* God, yet have now obtained mercy  
 31 through their disobedience\*: even so have these also  
 now not believed through mercy to you\*, that they  
 32 also now<sup>1</sup> may obtain mercy. For God shut\* up all  
 together in unbelief, that he may\* have mercy upon  
 all.

<sup>1</sup> *Om. now.*

reason whether or in what way this is reconcilable with the Divine justice. The whole relations of man to God and nature can never be perceived at once: we see them "in part" "through a glass," under many aspects, of which this is one.

30. God has inverted the order of things; you were once disobedient, and now He has made their disobedience a source of mercy to you.

31. "So they are disobedient (1.) by reason of the mercy shown to you, that they also may themselves receive mercy;" or (2.) "that they may receive mercy by reason of the mercy shown to you." The latter way of construing gives the most point to the passage; the former agrees best with the order of words and the parallelism of the previous clause.

32. *συνέκλεισεν,*] shut up: the *σύν* is emphatic. Compare Gal. iii. 22., *συνέκλεισεν ἡ γραφή τὰ πάντα ὑφ' ἁμαρτίαν.* verse 23. *ἔφρουροῦντο συγκλειόμενοι.*

Such is the conclusion of the doctrinal portion of the Epistle.

God concluded all under sin, as was shown in the first chapters, "that he might have mercy upon all." The steps by which the Apostle has arrived at this conclusion, might be termed in modern language, "an argument from analogy." In the Old Testament the younger was preferred to the elder, and God seemed to deal with men irrespective of their actions, and in the utter subversion of the true religion a remnant was still preserved. We may argue from the ways of God then, to the ways of God now. But, again, the very rejection of the Jews is a kind of argument from analogy for their acceptance: what they were, the Gentiles are; therefore, what the Gentiles are, they will become. And if the chosen are rejected, "a fortiori" shall they be again accepted. They have in them the root, the germ, the firstfruits of holiness, in the patriarchs who are their fathers, and in the true Israel who have already received the Gospel. It is in accordance with the principle formerly laid down by the

πάντας ἐλεήσῃ. ὦ βάθος πλούτου καὶ σοφίας καὶ γνώσεως 33  
 θεοῦ, ὡς ἀνεξερεύνητα τὰ κρίματα αὐτοῦ καὶ ἀνεξιχνίαστοι  
 αἱ ὁδοὶ αὐτοῦ. Τίς γὰρ ἔγνω νοῦν κυρίου; ἢ τίς σύμ- 34  
 βουλος αὐτοῦ ἐγένετο; ἢ τίς προέδωκεν αὐτῷ, καὶ ἀντα- 35  
 ποδοθήσεται αὐτῷ; ὅτι ἐξ αὐτοῦ καὶ δι' αὐτοῦ καὶ εἰς 36  
 αὐτὸν τὰ πάντα· αὐτῷ ἢ δόξα εἰς τοὺς αἰῶνας, ἀμήν.

Apostle, "where sin abounded, grace did much more abound," that their rejection should be the hope of their salvation.

And yet it will be urged, and cannot be denied, that the Jewish people are as they were; in the language of the Apostle, "even unto this day when Moses is read the veil is upon their hearts" (2 Cor. iii. 15.). Judging humanly, might we not say that every century, if it has not increased their animosity to the Gospel, has rendered more inveterate those differences of thought and habit, which to nations as to men become a second nature, and cannot be laid aside? How is this to be reconciled with the language of the Apostle? Rather let us admit that it is not to be reconciled, and yet that the truth of the Gospel may remain with us still. It is "I," not the Lord, who am speaking, as an Israelite of Israelites, within the circle of the Jewish dispensation, after the manner of the time, according to the received mode of interpreting prophecy in the schools of Philo and the Rabbis. "I cannot but utter what I hope and feel." There is no irreverence in supposing that St. Paul, who after the lapse of a few years

looked, not for the coming of Christ, but rather for his own departure to be with Christ, would have changed his manner of speech when, after eighteen centuries, he found "all things remaining as they were from the beginning." His spirit itself bids us read his writings not in the letter but in the spirit. He who felt his views of God's purposes gradually extending, who read the voice within him by the light of daily experience, could never have found fault with us for not attempting to reach beyond the horizon within which God has shut us up.

33. is wrongly translated in the English Version,—“O the depth of the riches, both of the wisdom and knowledge of God.” There is no meaning in the word “both,” because there is no opposition between “the wisdom and knowledge of God.” The expression *πλοῦτος Θεοῦ*, in the attempt to get rid of which the mistranslation has probably arisen, is sufficiently defended by Phil. iv. 19., *ὁ δὲ Θεός μου πληρώσει πᾶσαν χρείαν ὑμῶν κατὰ τὸ πλοῦτος αὐτοῦ*. Compare *πλοῦτος ἔθνων* for the metaphorical use of the word *πλοῦτος*, which may be well applied to God, who is “the author



33 O the depth of the riches and\* the wisdom and  
 knowledge of God! how unsearchable are his judg-  
 34 ments, and his ways past finding out! For who hath  
 known the mind of the Lord? or who hath been his  
 35 counsellor? or who hath first given to him, and it shall  
 36 be recompensed unto him again? For of him, and  
 through him, and to him, are all things: to him\* be  
 glory for ever. Amen.

of every good and perfect gift," and "who giveth to all men liberally, and upbraideth not." As σοφία and γνῶσις are connected with ver. 34., so πλοῦτος with ver. 35.

σοφία and γνῶσις are opposed chiefly as the more or less abstract and general terms. Besides this, σοφία may be described as the intellectual quality most akin to moral ones; the word γνῶσις implying the idea of acquired information, or of knowledge not naturally known. σοφία Θεοῦ may be referred to the general providence of God; γνῶσις, to the knowledge which he possessed of all his works from the beginning: the first answers to σὺμβουλος, the second to νοῦς κυρίου, in the 34th verse. Compare Theodoret (quoted by Fritsche): τὰ τρία ταῦτα πρὸς τὰ τρία τέθεικε, τὸν πλοῦτον καὶ τὴν σοφίαν καὶ τὴν γνῶσιν· τὸ μὲν τίς ἐγνώ νοῦν κυρίου πρὸς τὴν γνῶσιν, τὸ δὲ τίς σὺμβουλος αὐτοῦ ἐγένετο πρὸς τὴν σοφίαν, τὸ δὲ τίς προέδωκεν αὐτῷ καὶ ἀνταποδοθῆσεται αὐτῷ πρὸς τὸν πλοῦτον.

At chapter ix. ver. 5., when contemplating the former mercies

of God to Israel, he burst forth into a doxology; now, as beholding the circle of his providence complete, he is lost in ecstasy. Jew and Gentile are alike concluded under sin, that they may be alike saved, and the one takes the place of the other for a season, only that the other may be in turn restored. Who, looking at the present state, or at the past history of the world, could have imagined this? But such are the ways of God, as set forth to us by the prophet. (Is. xl. 13., which is again quoted in 1 Cor. ii. 16.)

36. ἐξ αὐτοῦ,] from Him all things spring; δι' αὐτοῦ, by Him they are maintained; εἰς αὐτόν, to Him they all tend. As if the Apostle has said:—He is the beginning, middle, and end of all things; the source whence they proceed; the mean by which they are wrought; the end at which they aim. This is the reason why no man "hath first given to him;" for all things are his. Comp. 1 Cor. viii. 6.:—ἐξ οὗ τὰ πάντα καὶ ἡμεῖς εἰς αὐτόν.

## CONTRASTS OF PROPHECY.

EVERY reader of the Epistles must have remarked the opposite and apparently inconsistent uses, which the Apostle St. Paul makes of the Old Testament. This appearance of inconsistency arises out of the different and almost conflicting statements, which may be read in the Old Testament itself. The law and the prophets are their own witnesses, but they are witnesses also to a truth which is beyond them. Two spirits are found in them, and the Apostle sets aside the one, that he may establish the other. When he says that—"the man that doeth these things shall live in them," x. 5., and again two verses afterwards—"the word is very nigh unto thee, even in thy mouth and in thy heart," he is using the authority of the law, first, that out of its own mouth he may condemn the law; secondly, that he may confirm the Gospel by the authority of that which he condemns. Still more striking are the contrasts of prophecy in which he reads, not only the rejection of Israel, but its restoration; the overruling providence of God, as well as the free agency of man; not only as it is written, "God gave unto them a spirit of heaviness," but, "who hath believed our report;" nor only, "all day long I have stretched forth my hand to a disobedient and gainsaying people," but "there shall come out of Sion a deliverer and He shall turn away iniquities from Jacob." Experience and faith seem to contend together in the Apostle's own mind, and alike to find an echo in the two voices of prophecy.

It were much to be wished that we could agree upon a chronological arrangement of the Old Testament, which would approach more nearly to the true order in which the books were written, than

that in which they have been handed down to us. Such an arrangement would throw great light on the interpretation of prophecy. At present, we scarcely resist the illusion exercised upon our minds by "four prophets the greater, followed by twelve prophets the less;" some of the latter being of a prior date to any of the former. Even the distinction of the law and the prophets as well as of the Psalms and the prophets leads indirectly to a similar error. For many elements of the prophetic spirit enter into the law, and legal precepts are repeated by the prophets. The continuity of Jewish history is further broken by the Apocrypha. The four centuries before Christ were as fruitful of hopes and struggles and changes of thought and feeling in the Jewish people as any preceding period of their existence as a nation, perhaps more so. And yet we piece together the Old and New Testament as if the interval were blank leaves only. Few if any English writers have ever attempted to form a conception of the growth of the spirit of prophecy, from its first beginnings in the law itself, as it may be traced in the lives and characters of Samuel and David, and above all, of Elijah and his immediate successor; as it reappears a few years later, in the written prophecies respecting the house of Israel, and the surrounding nations (not even in the oldest of the prophets, without reference to Messiah's kingdom); or again after the carrying away of the ten tribes, as it concentrates itself in Judah, uttering a sadder and more mournful cry in the hour of captivity, yet in the multitude of sorrows increasing the comfort; the very dispersion of the people widening the prospect of Christ's kingdom, as the nation "is cut short in righteousness," God being so much the nearer to those who draw near to Him.

Other reasons might be given why the study of the prophetic writings has made little progress among us. It often seems as if the only thing which could properly be the subject of study,—namely, the meaning of prophecy, as it presented itself to the prophet's own mind—had been wholly lost sight of. There has been a jealousy of attempts to explain by contemporary history what we would rather regard as a



light from heaven shining on some distant future. We have been unwilling to receive any help, however imperfect, toward the better understanding of the nature of prophecy, which might be drawn from the comparison of "the religion of the Gentiles." No account has been taken of prophecy as a gift of the mind, common to early stages of the world and of society, and to no other. The material imagery which was its mode of thought ("I saw the Lord high and lifted up, and his throne also filled the temple"), is resolved into poetical ornament. The description in the prophecies themselves, of the manner in which the prophet received the word of the Lord, whether by seeing of the eye or hearing of the ear, and in which he wrote it down and uttered it, has also been little considered. The repetitions of the earlier prophets in the later ones have been noted only as parallel passages in the margin of the Bible. Principles of interpretation have been assumed, resting on no other basis than the practice of interpreters. The fulfilment of prophecy has been sought for in a series of events which have been sometimes bent to make them fit, and one series of events has frequently taken the place of another. Even the passing circumstances of to-day or yesterday, at the distance of about two thousand years, and as many miles, which are but shadows flitting on the mountains compared with the deeper foundations of human history, are thought to be within the range of the prophet's eye. And it may be feared that, in attempting to establish a claim which, if it could be proved, might be made also for heathen oracles and prophecies, commentators have sometimes lost sight of those great characteristics which distinguish Hebrew prophecy from all other professing revelations of other religions: (1.) the sense of the truthfulness, and holiness, and loving-kindness of the Divine Being, with which the prophet is as one possessed, which he can no more forget or doubt than he can cease to be himself; (2.) their growth, that is, their growing perception of the moral nature of the revelation of God to man, apart from the commandments of the law or the privileges of the house of Israel.

It would be a great external help to the perception of this increasing

purpose of prophecy, if the study of the prophetic writings were commenced with an inquiry into the order in which the books of the Old Testament follow one another. Yet, in the present day, how could we come to an understanding about the first principles upon which such an inquiry ought to be conducted? Not the prophecies only, but the superstructures of interpreters of prophecy, would be considered. Nor does criticism seem equal to the task of arranging, on grounds often of internal evidence alone, not merely books, but parts of books, in their precise order. Even the real arguments that might be urged in favour of a particular arrangement, arising out of doubtful considerations, or considerations of a kind which, however certain, are hardly appreciable to any but critical scholars, could not be expected to prevail when weighed in the balance against religious feelings or the supposed voice of antiquity or agreement of the Christian world.

The difficulty of arranging the prophecies of the Old Testament in an exact chronological order, need not, however, prevent our recognising general differences in their spirit and structure, such as arise, partly out of the circumstances under which they were written at different periods of Jewish history, partly also out of a difference of feeling in contemporary prophets; sometimes from what may be termed the action and reaction in the prophet's own mind, which even in the same prophecy will not allow him to forget that the God of judgment remembers mercy. There are some prophecies more national, of which the fortunes of the Jewish people are the only subject; others more individual, seeming to enter more into the recesses of the human soul, and which are, at the same time, more universal, rising above earthly things, and passing into the distant heaven. At one time the prophet embodies "these thoughts of many hearts" as present, at another as future; in some cases as following out of the irrevocable decree of God, in others as dependent on the sin or repentance of man. At one moment he is looking for the destruction of Israel, at another for its consolation; going from one of these aspects of the heavenly vision to another, like

St. Paul himself in successive verses. And sometimes he sees the Lord's house exalted in the top of the mountains, and the image of the "Wonderful Counsellor, the Mighty Prince, the Everlasting God." At other times, his vision is of the Servant whom it "pleased the Lord to bruise," whose form was "marred more than that of the sons of men," who was "led as a lamb to the slaughter."

National, individual, — spiritual, temporal, — present, future, — rejection, restoration, — faith, the law, — Providence, freewill, — mercy, sacrifice, — Messiah suffering and triumphant, — are so many pairs of opposites with reference to which the structure of prophecy admits of being examined. It is true that such an examination is nothing more than a translation or decomposition of prophecy into the modes of thought of our own time, and is far from reproducing the living image which presented itself to the eyes of the prophet. But, like all criticism, it makes us think; it enables us to observe fresh points of connexion between the Old Testament and the New; it keeps us from losing our way in the region of allegory or of modern history. Many things are unlearnt as well as learnt by the aid of criticism; it clears the mind of conventional interpretations, teaching us to look amid the symbols of time and place for the higher and universal meaning.

Prophecy has a human as well as a divine element: that is to say, it partakes of the ordinary workings of the mind. There is also something beyond which the analogy of human knowledge fails to explain. Could the prophet himself have been asked what was the nature of that impulse by which he was carried away, he would have replied that "the God of Israel was a living God" who had "ordained him a prophet before he came forth from the womb." Of the divine element no other account can be given;—"it pleased God to raise up individuals in a particular age and country, who had a purer and loftier sense of truth than their fellow men." Prophecy would be no longer prophecy if we could untwist its soul. But the human part admits of being analysed like poetry or history, of which it is a kind of union; it is written with a man's pen in a known



language; it is cast in the imaginative form of early language itself. The truth of God comes into contact with the world, clothing itself in human feelings, revealing the lesson of historical events. But human feelings and the lesson of events vary, and in this sense the prophetic lesson varies too. Even in the workings of our own minds we may perceive this; those who think much about themselves and God cannot but be conscious of great changes and transitions of feeling at different periods of life. We are the creatures of impressions and associations; and although Providence has not made our knowledge of himself dependent on these impressions, he has allowed it to be coloured by them. We cannot say that in the hours of prosperity and adversity, in health and sickness, in poverty and wealth, our sense of God's dealings with us is absolutely the same; still less, that all our prayers and aspirations have received the answer that we wished or expected. And sometimes the thoughts of our own hearts go before to God; at other times, the power of God seems to anticipate the thoughts of our hearts. And sometimes, in looking back at our past lives, it seems as if God had done everything; at other times, we are conscious of the movement of our own will. The wide world itself also, and the political fortunes of our country have been enveloped in the light or darkness which rested on our individual soul.

Especially are we liable to look at religious truth under many aspects, if we live amid changes of religious opinions, or are witnesses of some revival or reaction in religion, or supposing our lot to be cast in critical periods of history, such as extend the range and powers of human nature, or certainly enlarge our experience of it. Then the germs of new truths will subsist side by side with the remains of old ones; and thoughts that are really inconsistent, will have a place together in our minds, without our being able to perceive their inconsistency. The inconsistency will be traced by posterity; they will remark that up to a particular point we saw clearly; but that no man is beyond his age — there was a circle which we could not pass. And some one living in our own day may look into

the future with "eagle eye;" he may weigh and balance with a sort of omniscience the moral forces of the world, perhaps with something too much of confidence that the right will ultimately prevail even on earth; and after ages may observe that his predictions were not always fulfilled or not fulfilled at the time he said.

Such general reflections may serve as an introduction to what at first appears an anomaly in prophecy,—that it has not one, but many lessons; and that the manner in which it teaches those lessons is through the alternations of the human soul itself. There are failings of prophecy, just as there are failings in our own anticipations of the future. And sometimes when we had hoped to be delivered it has seemed good to God to afflict us still. But it does not follow that religion is therefore a cunningly devised fable, either now or then. Neither the faith of the people, nor of the prophet, is shaken in the God of their fathers because the prophecies are not realised before their eyes; because "the vision," as they said, "is delayed;" because in many cases events seem to occur which make it impossible that it should be accomplished. A true instinct still enables them to separate the prophets of Jehovah from the numberless false prophets with whom the land swarmed; they are gifted with the "same discernment of spirits" which distinguished Micaiah from the 400 whom Ahab called. The internal evidence of the true prophet we are able to recognise in the written prophecies also. In the earliest as well as the latest of them there is the same spirit one and continuous, the same witness of the invisible God, the same character of the Jewish people, the same law of justice and mercy in the dealings of Providence with respect to them, the same "walking with God" in the daily life of the prophet himself.

"*Novum Testamentum in vetere latet,*" has come to be a favourite word among theologians, who have thought they saw in the truths of the Gospel the original design as well as the evangelical application of the Mosaical law. With a deeper meaning, it may be said that prophecy grows out of itself into the Gospel. Not, as some extreme critics have conceived, that the facts of the Gospel history

are but the crystallisation of the imagery of prophecy. Say, rather, that the river of the water of life is beginning again to flow. The Son of God himself is "that prophet"—the prophet, not of one nation only, but of all mankind, in whom the particularity of the old prophets is finally done away, and the ever-changing form of the "servant in whom my soul delighteth" at last finds rest. St. Paul, too, is a prophet who has laid aside the poetical and authoritative garb of old times, and is wrapped in the rhetorical or dialectical one of his own age. The language of the old prophets comes unbidden into his mind; it seems to be the natural expression of his own thoughts. Separated from Joel, Amos, Hosea, Micah, and Isaiah by an interval of about 800 years, he finds their words very near to him "even in his mouth and his heart;" that is the word which he preached. When they spoke of forgiveness of sins, of non-imputation of sins, of a sudden turning to God, what did this mean but righteousness by faith? when they said "I will have mercy, and not sacrifice," here also was imaged the great truth, that salvation was not of the law. If St. Paul would have "no man judged for a new moon or sabbath," the prophets of old time had again and again said in the name of Jehovah "Your new moons and sabbaths I cannot away with." Like the elder prophets, he came not "to build up a temple made with hands," but to teach a moral truth; like them he went forth alone, and not in connexion with the Church at Jerusalem. His calling is to be Apostle of the Gentiles; they also sometimes pass beyond the borders of Israel, to receive Egypt and Assyria into covenant with God.

It is not, however, this deeper unity between St. Paul and the prophets of the old dispensation that we are about to consider further, but a more superficial parallelism, which is afforded by the alternation or successive representation of the purposes of God towards Israel, which we meet with in the Old Testament, and which recurs in the Epistles to the Romans. Like the elder prophets, St. Paul also "prophesies in part," feeling after events rather than seeing them, and divided between opposite aspects of the dealings of



Providence with mankind. This changing feeling often finds an expression in the words of Isaiah or the Psalmist, or the author of the book of Deuteronomy. Hence a kind of contrast springs up in the writings of the Apostle, which admits of being traced to its source in the words of the prophets. Portions of his Epistles are the *disjecta membra* of prophecy. Oppositions are brought into view by him, and may be said to give occasion to a struggle in his own mind, which were unobserved by the prophets themselves. For so far from prophecy setting forth one unchanging purpose of God, it seems rather to represent a succession of purposes conditional on men's actions; speaking as distinctly of the rejection as of the restoration of Israel; and of the restoration almost as the correlative of the rejection; often too making a transition from the temporal to the spiritual. Some of these contrasts it is proposed to consider in detail as having an important bearing on St. Paul's Epistles, especially on the Epistles to the Thessalonians, and on chapters x.—xii. of the Epistles to the Romans.

(1.) All the prophets are looking for and hastening to "the day of the Lord," the "great day," "which there is none like," "the day of the Lord's sacrifice," the "day of visitation," of "the great slaughter," in which the Lord shall judge "in the valley of Jehoshaphat," in which "they shall go into the clefts of the rocks and into the tops of the ragged rocks for fear of the Lord, and for the glory of his majesty, when he ariseth to shake terribly the earth." That day is the fulfilment and realisation of prophecy, without which it would cease to have any meaning, just as religion itself would cease to have any meaning to ourselves, were there no future life, or retribution of good and evil. All the prophets are in spirit present at it; living alone with God, and hardly mingling with men on earth, they are fulfilled with its terrors and its glories. For the earth is not to go on for ever as it is, the wickednesses of the house of Israel are not to last for ever. First, the prophet sees the pouring out of the vials of wrath upon them; then, more at a distance, follows the vision of mercy, in which they are to be comforted, and their enemies, the

ministers of God's vengeance on them, in turn punished. And evil and oppression everywhere, so far as it comes within the range of the prophet's eye, is to be punished in that day, and good is to prevail.

In these "terrors of the day of the Lord," of which the prophets speak, the fortunes of the Jewish people mingle with another vision of a more universal judgment, and it has been usual to have recourse to the double senses of prophecy to separate the one from the other, an instrument of interpretation which has also been applied to the New Testament for the same purpose. Not in this way could the prophet or apostle themselves have conceived them. To them they were not two, but one; not "double one against the other," or separable into the figure and the thing signified. For the figure is in early ages the mode of conception also. More true would it be to say that the judgments of God on the Jewish people were an anticipation or illustration of his dealings with the world generally. If a separation is made at all, let us rather separate the accidents of time and place from that burning sense of the righteousness of God, which somewhere we cannot tell where, at some time we cannot tell when, must and will have retribution on evil; which has this other note of its divine character, that in judgment it remembers mercy, pronouncing no endless penalty or irreversible doom, even upon the house of Israel. This twofold lesson of goodness and severity speaks to us as well as to the Jews. Better still to receive the words of prophecy as we have them, and to allow the feeling which it utters to find its way to our hearts, without stopping to mark out what was not separated in the prophet's own mind and cannot therefore be divided by us.

Other contrasts are traceable in the teaching of the prophets respecting the day of the Lord. In that day the Lord is to judge Israel, and he is to punish Egypt and Assyria; and yet it is said also, the Lord shall heal Egypt, and Israel shall be the third with Egypt and Assyria whom the Lord shall bless. (Is. xix. 25.) In many of the prophecies also the judgment is of two kinds; it is a judgment on Israel, which is executed by the heathen; it is a judgment against the

heathen and in favour of Israel, in which God himself is sometimes said to be their advocate as well as their judge "in that day." A singular parallel with the New Testament is presented by another contrast which occurs in a single passage. That the day of the Lord is near, "it cometh, it cometh;" is the language of all the prophets; and yet there were those who said also in Ezekiel's time, "The days are prolonged, and every vision faileth; tell them, therefore, thus saith the Lord God; I will make this proverb to cease, and they shall no more use it as a proverb in Israel, but say unto them, The days are at hand, and the effect of every vision." (xii. 22.) (Compare 2 Pet. iii. 4., "Where is the promise of his coming?") On the other hand, in the later chapters of Isaiah (xl. seq.) we seem to trace the same feeling as in the New Testament itself: the anticipation of prophecy has ceased; the hour of its fulfilment has arrived; men seem to be conscious that they are living during the restoration of Israel as the disciples at the day of Pentecost felt that they were living amid the things spoken of by the prophet Joel.

(2.) A closer connexion with the Epistle to the Romans is furnished by the double and, on the surface, inconsistent language of prophecy respecting the rejection and restoration of Israel. These seem to follow one another often in successive verses. It is true that the appearance of inconsistency is greater than the reality, owing to the lyrical and concentrated style of prophecy (some of its greatest works being not much longer than this "cobweb"\* of an essay); and this leads to opposite feelings and trains of thought being presented to us together, without the preparations and joinings which would be required in the construction of a modern poem. Yet, after making allowance for this peculiarity of the ancient Hebrew style, it seems as if there were two thoughts ever together in the prophet's mind: captivity, restoration,—judgment, mercy,—sin, repentance,—"the people sitting in darkness, and the great light."

There are portions of prophecy in which the darkness is deep and enduring, "darkness that may be felt," in which the prophet is

\* Carlyle.



living amid the sins and sufferings of the people ; and hope is a long way off from them,—when they need to be awakened rather than comforted ; and things must be worse, as men say, before they can become better. Such is the spirit of the greater part of the book of Jeremiah. But the tone of prophecy is on the whole that of alternation ; God deals with the Israelites as with children ; he cannot bear to punish them for long ; his heart comes back to them when they are in captivity ; their very helplessness gives them a claim on him. Vengeance may endure for a time, but soon the full tide of his mercy returns upon them. Another voice is heard, saying, “Comfort ye, comfort ye, my people.” “Speak ye comfortably to Jerusalem, and say unto her that she hath received of the Lord’s hand double for all her sins.” So from the vision of God on Mount Sinai, at the giving of the Law amid storms and earthquakes, arises that tender human relation in which the Gospel teaches that he stands, not merely to his Church as a body, but to each one of us.

Naturally this human feeling is called forth most in the hour of adversity. As the affliction deepens, the hope also enlarges, seeming often to pass beyond the boundaries of this life into a spiritual world. Though their sins are as scarlet, they shall be white as snow ; when Jerusalem is desolate, there shall be a tabernacle on Mount Sion. The formula in which this enlargement of the purposes of God is introduced, is itself worthy of notice. “It shall be no more said, The Lord liveth, that brought up the children of Israel out of the land of Egypt ; but, The Lord liveth, that brought up the children of Israel from the land of the North, and from all the lands whither he had driven them.” Their old servitude in Egypt came back to their minds now that they were captives in a strange land, and the remembrance that they had already been delivered from it was an earnest that they were yet to return. Deeply rooted in the national mind, it had almost become an attribute of God himself that he was their deliverer from the house of bondage.

With this narrower view of the return of the children of Israel from captivity, not without a remembrance of that great empire

which had once extended from the River of Egypt to the Euphrates, there blended also the hope of another kingdom in which dwelt righteousness — the kingdom of Solomon “become the kingdom of Christ and God.” The children of Israel had been in their origin “the fewest of all people,” and the most alien to the nations round about. The Lord their God was a jealous God, who would not suffer them to mingle with the idolatries of the heathen. And in that early age of the world, when national life was so strong and individuals so feeble, we cannot conceive how the worship of the true God could have been otherwise preserved. But the day had passed away when the nation could be trusted with the preservation of the faith of Jehovah; “it had never been good for much at any time.” The prophets, too, seem to withdraw from the scenes of political events; they are no longer the judges and leaders of Israel; it is a part of their mission to commit to writing for the use of after ages the predictions which they utter. We pass into another country, to another kingdom in which the prospect is no more that which Moses saw from Mount Pisgah, but in which the “Lord’s horn is exalted in the top of the mountains and all nations flock to it.”

In this kingdom the Gentiles have a place, still on the outskirts, but not wholly excluded from the circle of God’s Providence. Sometimes they are placed on a level with Israel, the “circumcised with the uncircumcised,” as if only to teach the Apostle’s lesson, “that there is no respect of persons with God.” Jer. ix. 25, 26.; compare Rom. ii. 12—28. At other times they are themselves the subjects of promises and threatenings. Jer. xii. 14—17. It is to them that God will turn when His patience is exhausted with the rebellions of Israel; for whom it shall be “more tolerable” than for Israel and Judah in the day of the Lord. They are those upon whom, though at a distance, the brightness of Jehovah must overflow; who, in the extremities of the earth, are bathed with the light of His presence. Helpers of the joy of Israel, they pour with gifts and offerings through the open gates of the city of God. They have a part in Messiah’s kingdom, not of right, but because without them it would

be imperfect and incomplete. In one passage only, which is an exception to the general spirit of prophecy, Israel "makes the third" with Egypt and Assyria, "whom the Lord of Hosts shall bless." Is. xix. 18—25.

It was not possible that such should be the relation of the Gentiles to the people of God in the Epistles of St. Paul. Experience seemed to invert the natural order of Providence — the Jew first and afterwards the Gentile. Accordingly, what is subordinate in the prophets, becomes of principal importance in the application of the Apostle. The dark sayings about the Gentiles had more meaning than the utterers of them were aware of. Events connected them with the rejection of the Jews, of which the same prophets spoke. Not only had the Gentiles a place on the outskirts of the people of God, gathering up the fragments of promises "under the table;" they themselves were the spiritual Israel. When the prophets spoke of the Mount Sion, and all nations flowing to it, they were not expecting literally the restoration of the kingdom to Israel. They spoke of they knew not what — of something that had as yet no existence upon the earth. What that was, the vision on the way to Damascus, no less than the history of the Church and the world, revealed to the Apostle of the Gentiles.

(3.) Another characteristic of Hebrew prophecy is the transition from the nation to the individual. That is to say, first the nation becomes an individual; it is spoken of, thought of, dealt with, as a person, it "makes the third" with God and the prophet. Almost a sort of drama is enacted between them, the argument of which is the mercy and justice of God; and the Jewish nation itself has many parts assigned to it. Sometimes she is the "adulterous sister," the "wife of whoredoms," who has gone astray with Chaldean and Egyptian lovers. In other passages, still retaining the same personal relation to God, the "daughter of my people" is soothed and comforted; then a new vision rises before the prophet's mind, — not the same with that of the Jewish people, but not wholly distinct from it, in which the suffering prophet himself, or Cyrus



the prophet king, have a part, — the vision of “the servant of God,” “the Saviour with dyed garments” from Bosra ; — “he shall grow up before him as a tender plant ;” “he is led as a lamb to the slaughter.” Isaiah, liii. 2. 7. ; compare Jer. xi. 19. Yet there is a kind of glory even on earth in this image of gentleness and suffering. “A bruised reed shall he not break, and smoking flax shall he not quench, until he hath brought forth judgment unto victory.” We feel it to be strange, and yet it is true. So we have sometimes seen the image of the kingdom of God among ourselves, not in noble churches or scenes of ecclesiastical power or splendour, but in the face of some child or feeble person, who, after overcoming agony, is about to depart and be with Christ.

Analogies from Greek philosophy may seem far-fetched in reference to Hebrew prophecy, yet there are particular points in which subjects the most dissimilar receive a new light from one another. In the writings of Plato and Aristotle, and the philosophers who were their successors, moral truths gradually separate from politics, and the man is acknowledged to be different from the mere citizen : and there arises a sort of ideal of the individual, who has a responsibility to himself only. The growth of Hebrew prophecy is so different ; its figures and modes of conception are so utterly unlike ; there seems such a wide gulf between morality which almost excludes God, and religion which exists only in God, that at first sight we are unwilling to allow any similarity to exist between them. Yet an important point in both of them is really the same. For the transition from the nation to the individual is also the more perfect revelation of God himself, the change from the temporal to the spiritual, from the outward glories of Messiah’s reign to the kingdom of God which is within. Prophets as well as apostles teach the near intimate personal relation of man to God. The prophet and psalmist, who is at one moment inspired with the feelings of a whole people, returns again to God to express the lowliest sorrows of the individual Christian. The thought of the Israel of God is latent in prophecy itself, not requiring a great nation or com-

pany of believers; "but where one is" there is God present with him.

There is another way also in which the individual takes the place of the nation in the purposes of God; "a remnant shall be saved." In the earlier books of the Old Testament, the whole people is bound up together for good or for evil. In the law especially, there is no trace that particular tribes or individuals are to be singled out for the favour of God. Even their great men are not so much individuals as representatives of the whole people. They serve God as a nation; as a nation they go astray. If, in the earlier times of Jewish history, we suppose an individual good man living "amid an adulterous and crooked generation," we can scarcely imagine the relation in which he would stand to the blessings and cursings of the law. Would the righteous perish with the wicked? That be "far from thee, O Lord." Yet "prosperity, the blessing of the Old Testament," was bound up with the existence of the nation. Gradually the germ of the new dispensation begins to unfold itself; the bands which held the nation together are broken in pieces; a fragment only is preserved, a branch, in the Apostle's language, cut off from the patriarchal stem, to be the beginning of another Israel.

The passage quoted by St. Paul in the eleventh chapter of the Romans is the first indication of this change in God's mode of dealing with his people. The prophet Elijah wanders forth into the wilderness to lay before the Lord the iniquities of the people: "The children of Israel have forsaken thy covenant, thrown down thine altars, and slain thy prophets with the sword." "But what," we may ask with the Apostle, "saith the answer of God to him?" Not "They are corrupt, they are altogether become abominable," but "Yet I have seven thousand men who have not bowed the knee to Baal." The whole people were not to be regarded as one; there were a few who still preserved, amid the general corruption, the worship of the true God.

The marked manner in which the answer of God is introduced, the contrast of the "still small voice" with the thunder, the storm,

and the earthquake, the natural symbols of the presence of God in the law,—the contradiction of the words spoken to the natural bent of the prophet's mind, and the greatness of Elijah's own character—all tend to stamp this passage as marking one of the epochs of prophecy. The solitude of the prophet and his separation in "the mount of God," from the places in which "men ought to worship," are not without meaning. There had not always "been this proverb in the house of Israel;" but from this time onwards it is repeated again and again. We trace the thought of a remnant to be saved in captivity, or to return from captivity, through a long succession of prophecies,—Hosea, Amos, Micah, Isaiah, Jeremiah, Ezekiel;—it is the text of almost all the prophets, passing, as a familiar word, from the Old Testament to the New. The voice uttered to Elijah was the beginning of this new Revelation.

(4.) Coincident with the promise of a remnant is the precept, "I will have mercy and not sacrifice," which, in modern language, opposes the moral to the ceremonial law. It is another and the greatest step onward towards the spiritual dispensation. Moral and religious truths hang together; no one can admit one of them in the highest sense, without admitting a principle which involves the rest. He who acknowledged that God was a God of mercy and not of sacrifice, could not long have supposed that he dealt with nations only, or that he raised men up for no other end but to be vessels of his wrath or monuments of his vengeance. For a time there might be "things too hard for him," clouds resting on his earthly tabernacle, when he "saw the ungodly in such prosperity;" yet had he knowledge enough, as he "went into the sanctuary of God," and confessed himself to be "a stranger and pilgrim upon the earth."

It is in the later prophets that the darkness begins to be dispelled and the ways of God justified to man. Ezekiel is above all others the teacher of this "new commandment." The familiar words, "when the wicked man turneth away from his wickedness, and doeth that which is lawful and right, he shall save his soul alive," are the theme of a great part of this wonderful book. Other prophets have



more of poetical beauty, a deeper sense of divine things, a tenderer feeling of the mercies of God to his people; none teach so simply this great moral lesson, to us the first of all lessons. On the eve of the captivity, and in the midst of it, when the hour of mercy is past, and no image is too loathsome to describe the iniquities of Israel, still the prophet does not forget that the Lord will not destroy the righteous with the wicked: "Though Noah, Daniel, and Job were in the land, as I live, saith the Lord, they shall deliver neither son nor daughter; they shall deliver but their own souls by their righteousness (xiv. 20.). Yet, behold, therein shall be left a remnant; and they shall know that I have not done without cause all that I have done, saith the Lord." ver. 22.

It is observable that, in the Book of Ezekiel as well as of Jeremiah, this new principle on which God deals with mankind, is recognised as a contradiction to the rule by which he had formerly dealt with them. At the commencement of chap. xviii., as if with the intention of revoking the words of the second commandment, "visiting the sins of the fathers upon the children," it is said:—

"The word of the Lord came unto me again, saying,

"What mean ye, that ye use this proverb concerning the land of Israel, saying, The fathers have eaten sour grapes, and the children's teeth are set on edge?

"As I live, saith the Lord God, ye shall not have *occasion* any more to use this proverb in Israel.

"Behold, all souls are mine; as the soul of the father, so also the soul of the son is mine: the soul that sinneth, it shall die."

Similar language occurs also in Jer. xxxi. 29., in a connexion which makes it still more remarkable, as the new truth is described as a part of that fuller revelation which God will give of Himself, when he makes a new covenant with the house of Israel. And yet the same prophet, as if not at all times conscious of his own lesson, says also in his prayer to God (Lam. v. 7.), "Our fathers have sinned and are not, and we have borne their iniquities." The truth which he felt was not one and the same always, but rather two

opposite truths, like the Law and the Gospel, which, for a while, seemed to struggle with one another in the teaching of the prophet and the heart of man.

And yet this opposition was not necessarily conscious to the prophet himself. Isaiah, who saw the whole nation going before to judgment, did not refrain from preaching the lessons, "If ye be willing and obedient," and "Let the wicked forsake his way, and the unrighteous man his thoughts." Ezekiel, the first thought and spirit of whose prophecies might be described in modern language as the responsibility of man, like Micaiah in the Book of Kings, seemed to see the false prophets inspired by Jehovah himself to their own destruction. As in the prophet, so in the Apostle, there was no sense that the two lessons were in any degree inconsistent with each other. It is an age of criticism and philosophy, which, in making the attempt to conceive the relation of God to the world in a more abstract way, has invented for itself the perplexity, or, may we venture to say, by the very fact of acknowledging it, has also found its solution. The intensity with which the prophet felt the truths that he revealed, the force with which he uttered them, the desire with which he yearned after their fulfilment, have passed from the earth; but the truths themselves remain an everlasting possession. We seem to look upon them more calmly, and adjust them more truly. They no longer break through the world of sight with unequal power; they can never again be confused with the accidents of time and place. The history of the Jewish people has ceased to be the only tabernacle in which they are enshrined; they have an independent existence, and a light and order of their own.

## CHAP. XII.—XVI.

THE last five chapters may be considered as a third section of the Epistle to the Romans, in which, as in the latter portion of the Galatians, Colossians, Ephesians, Thessalonians, exhortation takes the place of doctrinal statement, and the imperative mood becomes the prevailing form of sentence. There is less of plan than in what has preceded, and more that throws light on the state of the Church. At first sight, it seems as if the Apostle were dictating to an amanuensis unconnected precepts, which his experience, not of the Roman converts, to whom he was unknown by face, but of the Church and the world in general, led him to think useful or necessary.

Yet these fragments, including in them ch. xii. 1—xv. 7., at which point the Apostle returns briefly to his main theme, and concludes with a personal narrative, are not wholly deficient in order, especially that recurring order which was remarked in the introduction to the fifth chapter, and which consists in the repetition, at certain intervals, of a particular subject. The great argument is now ended; what follows is its practical application:—“For God concluded all under sin, that he might have mercy upon all;” the inference from which is not, “Let us continue in sin that grace may abound,” but rather, “How shall we, who are dead to sin, live any longer therein?” which the Apostle expresses once more in language borrowed from the law:—“I beseech you, therefore, brethren, by the mercies of God, to present your bodies a living sacrifice.” Leaving this thought, he passes on at ver. 3. to another, which can hardly be said to be connected with it in any other than that general way in which all the different portions of Christian



truth or practice are connected with each other, or in which the part may be always regarded as related to the whole. This new thought is Christian unity, which is introduced here much in the same manner as love of the brethren in the Epistle to the Thessalonians. The ground of this unity is humility, each one retiring into his own duties, that the whole may be harmonious, remembering that he is a member of the body of Christ, in which there are diversities of gifts, which the members of that body are severally to use. Thence the Apostle goes on to the mention of Christian graces, apparently unconnected with each other, among which, at ver. 16., the first thought of humility, which is the true source of sympathy, reappears, with which peace and forgiveness of injuries meet in one. At the commencement of chap. xiii. what may be termed the key-note of this portion of the Epistle returns,—the order of the Church, not now considered in reference to the members of the same body, but to those that are without the Church—the heathen rulers with whom they came into contact, whom they were to obey as to the Lord and not to men. The remainder of this chapter stands in the same relation to the former part as the latter portion of chap. xii. to the commencement; that is to say, it consists of precepts which arise out of the principal subject; here honesty in general, out of the duty of paying tribute, which leads, by a play of words, to the endless debt of love, which is the fulfilment of the law; all which is enforced by the near approach of the day of the Lord, corresponding to the argument of the preacher from the shortness of life among ourselves.

The remaining section of the Epistle, from chap. xiv. to xv. 6., is taken up with a single subject,—the treatment of weak brethren, who doubt about meats and drinks and the observance of days. This subject is distinct from what has preceded, and forms a whole by itself; yet, in the mode of handling it, vestiges of former topics reappear. It is a counsel of peace, to show consideration to the doubters; and for the doubters themselves, it is a proper humility not to judge others, chap. ii. 1.: and in our conduct towards the

weak brethren, it must be remembered how awful a thing is the conscience of sin, which is inseparable from doubt, "for whatever is not of faith, is sin." And here we come back once more to our original text, — "Be of the same mind one with another."

At this point, the Apostle returns from his digression to the main subject of the Epistle, which he briefly sums up under the figure of Jesus Christ a minister of the circumcision to the Gentiles, and once more clothes in the language of the prophets. Yet a certain degree of difference is discernible between his treatment of it in this and in the earlier portions of the Epistle. It is less abstract and more personal. He seems to think of the truths which he taught more in connexion with his own labours as Apostle of the Gentiles. A similar image to that of Christ the minister of the circumcision he applies to himself, — the minister of Christ, the offerer up of the sacrifice of the Gentiles. Still, Apostle of the Gentiles as he is, he is careful not to intrude on another man's labours. He has fulfilled his mission where he is, and does but follow the dictates of natural feeling in going first to Jerusalem, and then to the Christians of the West; for the success of which new mission he desires their prayers, that it may be acceptable to his friends and without danger from enemies, and may end in his coming to them with joy.

The last chapter consists almost entirely of salutations. Among these are interspersed a few of the former topics, some of which occur also at the end of other Epistles, such as peace and joy at the success of the Gospel. There are names of servants of God, among whom are Aquila and Priscilla, and others of whom no record has been elsewhere preserved. One expression raises without satisfying our curiosity, "distinguished among those who were Apostles before me." The Epistle, as it began with a summary of the Gospel, concludes with a thanksgiving — in which the subject of the Epistle is once more interwoven — to God the author of the Gospel, which was once hidden, but now revealed that the Gentiles also might be obedient to the faith.

Παρακαλῶ οὖν ὑμᾶς, ἀδελφοί, διὰ τῶν οἰκτιρμῶν τοῦ 12  
 θεοῦ, παραστῆσαι τὰ σώματα ὑμῶν θυσίαν ζῶσαν ἁγίαν  
 εὐάρεστον τῷ θεῷ, τὴν λογικὴν λατρείαν ὑμῶν, καὶ μὴ 2

XII. The last chapter ended with a doxology. All the world was reconciled to God, and Jew as well as Gentile included in the circle of His grace. Therefore the Apostle did not refrain himself from uttering a song of triumph at the end "of his great argument." Now he proceeds to draw the cords of divine love closer about the hearts and consciences of individual men.

At the commencement of the Epistle we were led to regard mankind, not as they appeared, but as they were in the light of the new revelation. We were spectators of the human race looking far and wide on Jew and Gentile, backwards and forwards on Adam and Christ. The victory over the law was won; the banished Israelite restored to the favour of God. And now we return from this wider view of the counsels of Providence to ourselves again. It is the individual rather than the world, which is first in the Apostle's thoughts:—"Seeing, then, all these things, what manner of persons ought we to be?" This connexion is indicated in the word *οἰκτιρμῶν*, which refers to ver. 32. of the preceding chapter:—"I exhort you through the mercies of that God who has mercy upon Jew and Gentile alike, who concluded all under sin that he might have mercy upon all."

The latter part of the chapter is remarkable for the irregularity of its construction and the want of connexion in its clauses. It

would be a mistaken ingenuity to invent a system where no system is intended. Precepts occur to the Apostle's mind without any regular sequence, or with none that we can trace. In some instances he appears to go off upon a word, without even remembering the sense of it. Thus, in ver. 13. of this chapter, he passes from *τὴν φιλοξενίαν διώκοντες*, to *εὐλογεῖτε τοὺς διώκοντας ὑμᾶς*, which we might have been disposed to regard as an accidental coincidence, were it not that a nearly similar instance occurs in ver. 7, 8. of the following chapter:—*Ἀπόδοτε οὖν πᾶσι τὰς ὀφειλάς*, and *μηδένι μηδὲν ὀφείλετε εἰ μὴ τὸ ἀγαπᾶν ἀλλήλους*, κ. τ. λ. Such passages are instructive, as showing how little the style of St. Paul can be reduced to the ordinary laws of thought and language, how entirely we must learn to know him from himself.

*Παρακαλῶ.*] Rather exhort than beseech, as appears from the tone of ver. 3.:—"But I say unto you through the grace given unto me."

*οὖν, therefore.*] That is, seeing the mercy of God to Jew and Gentile alike.

*διὰ.*] Probably, in its ordinary sense, to mark the instrument. The mercies of God are in a figure the instrument or medium of the Apostle's exhortation, as in 2 Cor. x. 1.:—*Αὐτὸς δὲ ἐγὼ Παῦλος παρακαλῶ ὑμᾶς διὰ τῆς πρᾶτης καὶ ἐπιεικειᾶς τοῦ χριστοῦ*. *διὰ* is not found with verbs



12 I EXHORT\* you therefore, brethren, through\* the mercies of God, to\* present your bodies a living sacrifice, holy, acceptable unto God, which is your worship\*

of swearing; which leads to the inference, in this and similar passages, that it is not used as a sign of adjuration, and necessitates the translation, though harsh in English of "through."

*παρρησιαί, to present,*] has no sacrificial allusion here, any more than in other passages in which it occurs in the New Testament: Rom. vi. 13. 16. 19.; 2 Cor. xi. 2., &c. The idea of sacrifice is introduced in what follows.

*τὰ σώματα ὑμῶν,*] not "yourselves," but "your bodies," as opposed to the mind. Compare ver. 2.:—*τῇ ἀνακαινώσει τοῦ νοός.* In ch. viii. 10. the body was described as "dead because of sin," but the spirit "life because of righteousness;" and in ver. 23. the believer was said to be "waiting for the redemption of the body." Here the image is different: the body though offered to God is still alive. And yet the Apostle would have us add in the language of Gal. ii. 20.: "It is not I that live but Christ liveth in me; and the life that I now live in the flesh I live in faith of the Son of God."

*θυσίαν ζῶσαν, a living sacrifice.*] Comp. for a similar play of words, 1 Cor. xv. 44., *σῶμα πνευματικόν*; 1 Pet. ii. 5., *πνευματικῆ θυσία*; and *λογικῆ λατρεία* below. The sacrifice is dead, but the believer is alive, like his Lord suffering on the cross; the image is yet stronger in Gal. ii. 20., "I am crucified with Christ."

The body of the Christian is called a sacrifice, first, because in one sense it is dead, as the Apostle says in the expression just now quoted; and, secondly, as it is wholly dedicated to God. As he is one with Christ in His crucifixion, death, burial, resurrection, he is also like Him in being a sacrifice, not because of the sins of others, but to put an end to sin in himself, Eph. v. 2.

*ἀγίαν εὐάρεστον τῷ Θεῷ.*] Such an offering might in a new sense be termed holy, acceptable, such as the Levitical law required,—a sacrifice like that of Christ himself, who was "the lamb without spot;" 1 Pet. i. 19.

*τὴν λογικὴν λατρείαν ὑμῶν, which is your worship in thought,*] in apposition with the preceding sentence, as in the well-known classical instance, *Ἐλένην κτάνομεν Μενέλεω λύπην πικράν*: that is to say, the reasonable service is not the living sacrifice, but the offering up of the body as a living sacrifice. The translation, "reasonable service," in the English version, is not an accurate explanation of *λογικῆ λατρεία*, which is an oxymoron or paradoxical expression, meaning "an ideal service, a ceremonial of thought and mind." The word *λατρεία* signifies a service which consists of outward rites, which in this case is *λογικῆ*, that is, not outward, but in the mind, the symbol of a truth, the picture of an idea. In the Epistle to the Hebrews the whole Mosaic law may be said to pass into a *λογικῆ*

συσχηματίζεσθαι<sup>1</sup> τῷ αἰῶνι τούτῳ, ἀλλὰ μεταμορφοῦσθαι<sup>2</sup> τῇ ἀνακαινώσει τοῦ νοός<sup>3</sup>, εἰς τὸ δοκιμάζειν ὑμᾶς τί

<sup>1</sup> συσχηματίζεσθε.

<sup>2</sup> μεταμορφοῦσθε.

<sup>3</sup> ὑμῶν.

λατρεία, a law which, from being ceremonial, became ideal.

Compare the following parallel passages:—

πνευματικᾶς θυσίας εὐπροσδέκτους τῷ θεῷ, 1 Pet. ii. 5. οἱ ἄγγελοι προσφέρουσι κυρίῳ ὄσμην εὐωδίας, λογικὴν καὶ ἀναίμακτον προσφοράν, Test. XII. Patriarch. ch. 3. ὁ μὲν οὖν τούτοις διακεκοσμημένος ἴτω θάρρων εἰς οικειότατον αὐτῷ τῶν νεῶν ἐνδιαίτημα πάντων ἄριστον ἱερεῖον ἐπιδειξόμενος ἑαυτόν, Philo de Victimis, 849. παρὰ θεῷ μὴ τὸ πλήθος τῶν καταθυμένων εἶναι τίμιον, ἀλλὰ τὸ καθαρώτατον τοῦ θύοντος πνεῦμα λογικόν, 850. Qui justus est sacrificium est Dei sancti benedicti, non vero sic etiam injustus. Synopsi Sohar. p. 94.

The words λογικὴ λατρεία and the use which St. Paul makes in other places of ceremonial language (Rom. xv. 8. 16. and elsewhere), suggest the inquiry, "In what way the rites and ceremonies of the Mosaic law became appropriated to the truths of the Gospel? Had the Israelite of old seen in them anticipations of Him who was to come? had any before the times of the Apostles made a similar application of them? There is no reason to think that Simeon and Anna, or any of those who were waiting for the consolation of Israel, saw in the ritual of the Temple-worship anything which led their minds to a knowledge of the Gospel. Nor is there any indication of a spiritual use of the ceremonies of the law in other

periods of Jewish history. Moses gave the law without comment or explanation: its hidden meanings were the discoveries of after ages, to whom the original one had become unsuited. That meaning was in the earliest times inseparable from its use; not "allegory, but tautegory," in the quaint language of Coleridge. In process of time many meanings sprang up, but those meanings were not the fruit of antiquarian research, such as we find in some modern works on this subject: nor were they based on ancient tradition; they were fanciful associations of words and things.

The parallel of Philo throws light on the question we are considering, because it shows how readily the human mind could find in the law that which in reality it brought to the law. New truths were to be taught; new thoughts were to be given; and they must be given through something. The revelation of the Gospel was not a mere blaze of light; it contained objects to be distinguished, new relations between God and man to be explained, a scheme of Providence to be set forth. Some tongue of men or angels must be the medium of communion between heaven and earth. Accordingly, the sacred things of the Israelites became, by a sort of natural process, the figures of the true; the Old Testament was the mystery of the New, the New the revelation of the Old. They were not connected by any system of rules;

2 in thought. And not to be<sup>1</sup> conformed to this world: but to be<sup>2</sup> transformed by the renewing of the<sup>3</sup>

<sup>1</sup> Be ye not.

<sup>2</sup> Be ye.

<sup>3</sup> Your.

out of the fulness of the heart the mouth spoke. The mind needed not to be taught, but taught itself the new meaning of old words. Often the believing Israelite must have stood by the altar and seen the priests moving to and fro in the courts of the temple, and thought of that other altar which they had no right to partake of who served the tabernacle, and of the priest not after the order of Aaron, and of the holy place, that holiest of all, not yet revealed to his longing eyes. His attention would no more dwell, if it had ever done so, with minute particularity on the details of the ritual; he might lift up his heart to the truths which he associated with it,—the circumcision of the heart, the building not made with hands, the everlasting priesthood, the living sacrifice. Such may have been the thoughts of James, the Bishop of Jerusalem, the Nazarite from his mother's womb, as described in the narrative of Hegesippus, kneeling daily in the temple, "until his knees became as hard as a camel's," praying for the sins of the people.

Yet it must be remarked also, that the application of the ceremonies of the law to the thoughts of the Gospel is not so much an application of what men saw around them—the practice of Judaism at that day, as of the words of Scripture. Thus the author of the Hebrews argues almost solely from the description of the temple and tabernacle

which he found written. The words rather than the ceremonies of the law were the links which connected the Old and New Testament; and the more entirely the minds of men became possessed with the new truth, the slenderer was the thread of association by which they were enabled to connect them.

2. καὶ μὴ συσχηματίζεσθαι, and not to be conformed.] Dependent on παρακαλώ. I exhort you, brethren, not to be conformed. Comp. 1 Cor. vii. 31., τὸ σχῆμα τοῦ κόσμου τούτου.

τῷ αἰῶνι τούτῳ, this world,] contains an allusion to the Jewish distinction between ὁ αἰὼν οὗτος and ὁ αἰὼν ἐρχόμενος, μέλλων, &c., as the times before and the times after the Messiah; expressions which are continued, for the most part in the same sense, in the New Testament, or with only such a modification of meaning as necessarily arises from the new nature of Messiah's kingdom. That kingdom was not merely future; it was opposed to the present state which the believer saw around him, as good to evil, as the world of those who rejected Christ to the world of those who accepted him. This present world (ὁ νῦν αἰὼν, 2 Tim. i. 10.) was to the first disciples emphatically an αἰὼν πονηρός (Gal. i. 4.), which had a god of its own, and children of its own (2 Cor. iv. 4.), and was full of invisible powers fighting against the truth. Hence it is in a stronger sense than we speak of the world, which in the



τὸ θέλημα τοῦ θεοῦ τὸ ἀγαθὸν καὶ εὐάρεστον καὶ τέλειον.  
λέγω γὰρ διὰ τῆς χάριτος τῆς δοθείσης μοι παντὶ τῷ ὄντι 3  
ἐν ὑμῖν, μὴ ὑπερφρονεῖν παρ' ὃ δεῖ φρονεῖν, ἀλλὰ φρονεῖν  
εἰς τὸ σωφρονεῖν, ἐκάστῳ ὡς ὁ θεὸς ἐμέρισεν μέτρον πί- 4  
στεως. καθάπερ γὰρ ἐν ἐνὶ σώματι πολλὰ μέλη<sup>1</sup> ἔχομεν,

<sup>1</sup> μέλη πολλά.

language of modern times has become a sort of neutral power of evil, that the Apostle exhorts his converts not to be conformed to this world, which is the kingdom, not of God, but of Satan. Comp. note on Gal. i. 4.

ἀλλὰ μεταμορφοῦσθαι, *but to be transformed.*] No more reason can be given why the Apostle should have changed the word, than if we were to say, "and not to be conformed to this world, but to be transfigured by the renewal of your minds." (Comp. the change of δίκαιος into ἀγαθός in Rom. v. 7.) The words which follow, τῇ ἀνακαινώσει τοῦ νοῦς ὑμῶν, are opposed to the first verse: "I exhort you to sacrifice the body; but renew the mind." The same opposition occurs in Eph. iv. 22, 23: "That ye put off concerning the former conversation the old man, which is corrupt according to the deceitful lusts, and be renewed (ἀνανεοῦσθε) in the spirit of your minds."

νοῦς is here opposed to body, as elsewhere to πνεῦμα, 1 Cor. xiv. 14. Like the English word "mind," it is a general term, and includes the will. (Eph. iv. 17.) It is idle to raise metaphysical distinctions about words which the Apostle uses after the fleeting manner of common conversation, or to search the index of Aristotle for illustration of their meaning which the connexion in which

they occur can alone supply. Compare note on 1 Thess. v. 23.

εἰς τὸ δοκιμάζειν ὑμᾶς, *that you may prove.*] δοκιμάζειν signifies, first, to try, examine; secondly, to have experience of, know, approve: "Be so unlike the world, that the will of God may be its own witness to you"—"that ye may know by experience what the will of God working in you is." Yet, in the words that follow, the "will of God" is supposed to be active rather than passive. It is what God wills, not what we perform, which is described as the good, the acceptable (to God), the perfect.

It has been shown in other places, that such a confusion of the objective and subjective is quite in harmony with St. Paul's style. Those who deny that the same word can have two different senses in the same passage, find no better means of explaining the words τί τὸ θέλημα τοῦ θεοῦ than by taking them in the sense of "what God wills you to do, the thing which is good, acceptable, and perfect (comp. 1 Thess. iv. 3., τοῦτο γὰρ ἐστὶ θελημα τοῦ θεοῦ ὁ ἀγίασμος ὑμῶν); or, construing θελημα as a verbal, "respecting the thing that is good."

The clause εἰς τὸ δοκιμάζειν ὑμᾶς has a further connexion, first with the previous verse through the repetition of εὐάρεστον, which recalls the thought of the accept-

mind, that ye may prove what is that good, and acceptable, and perfect will of God. For I say, through the grace given unto me, to every man that is among you, not to think of himself more highly than he ought to think; but to think unto\* sobriety, according as God hath dealt to every man the measure of faith. For as we have many members in one body, and all members

able sacrifice, and also with ver. 34. of the former chapter, "Who hath known the mind of God?" which is referred to here in the words, "Be ye renewed in the spirit of your minds, that ye may have practical experience of what the mind of God is." Compare 1 Cor. ii. 11. 16., for a similar transition of thought from the incomprehensibility of the Divine nature to the knowledge of it.

3. For I say, though not of myself, but by the grace given unto me (comp. the still more pointed expressions, 1 Cor. vii. 25., γνώμην δὲ δίδωμι ὡς ἡλεημένος ὑπὸ κυρίου πιστός εἶναι), to every one that is among you, "if there be any who seems to be somewhat," not to think of himself too much, beyond what he ought, but to have thoughts of himself only with the view of thinking soberly of himself, according as God has given to each one a measure of faith or spiritual capacity.

γάρ, for.] Why "for"? One of the greatest moral impediments to this renewal is spiritual pride, the desire to appropriate in an especial sense to self, the grace common to all believers. Hence the Apostle argues from the part to the whole: "I exhort you to be transfigured; for I tell you as a part of this that ye must be hum-

ble." Comp. ἀποκαλύπτεται γάρ, in Rom. i. 17. In both passages the Apostle uses γάρ rather from an instinct of the connexion than an express consciousness of it.

φρονεῖν εἰς τὸ σωφρονεῖν, to think unto sobriety.] "To let moderation in thought be the limit or end of your thought," or as the paronomasia may be turned rather more loosely, to be minded to be of a sound mind. Comp. 2 Cor. x. 13.: οὐκ εἰς τὰ ἄμετρα καυχησόμεθα, ἀλλὰ κατὰ τὸ μέτρον τοῦ κανόνος, ὃν ἐμέρισεν ἡμῖν ὁ Θεὸς μέτρον. Eph. iv. 7.

μέτρον πίστεως, the measure of faith.] All things are done by faith; but faith itself is given in different proportions to different men. As in temporal things we say, "do not be straining after things beyond your power," so St. Paul says, "be not ambitious after things beyond your spiritual power, and remember that this too is not your own, but given you by God." Even "the stature of the perfect man," who is the image of the Church (Eph. iv. 13.), is not without measure.

4. The connexion of this verse with what has preceded is as follows. Let us not be high-minded, but all keep our proper place, according to the measure which God has given us. For we are like the body, in which

τὰ δὲ μέλη πάντα οὐ τὴν αὐτὴν ἔχει πράξι, οὕτως οἱ 5  
πολλοὶ ἐν σῶμά ἐσμεν ἐν χριστῷ, τὸ δὲ καθ' εἰς<sup>1</sup> ἀλλήλων  
μέλη. ἔχοντες δὲ χαρίσματα κατὰ τὴν χάριν τὴν δοθεῖσαν 6  
ἡμῖν διάφορα, εἴτε προφητείαν, κατὰ τὴν ἀναλογίαν τῆς

<sup>1</sup> ὁ δὲ καθ' εἰς.

there are many members with different offices. Compare 1 Cor. xii. 14. 31., also Phil. ii. 3, 4.: "Let nothing be done through strife or vainglory, but in lowliness of mind let each esteem other better than themselves. Look not every man on his own things, but every man also on the things of others." Where there is the same connexion between thinking of others and not thinking of ourselves, a connexion which we may trace in our own lives and characters as well as in the words of Scripture. For "egotism" is the element secretly working in the world, which is the most hostile to the union of men with one another, which destroys friendly and Christian relations.

5. Where the Church is spoken of as a body, three modes of expression may be noted. It is the body of which Christ is the head, as in Col. ii. 19.; or simply the body of Christ, as in 1 Cor. xii. 27., Eph. iv. 12. (comp. Eph. i. 22, 23., where both points of view are united, the church, of which He is the head, being also spoken of as "His body, the fulness of Him which filleth all in all"); or, lastly, we are one body in Christ, in the same sense that as Christians we are all things in Christ.

τὸ δὲ καθ' εἰς, and in what concerns each.] τὸ καθ' εἰς = quod attinet ad singulos, Mark, xiv. 19. The form τὸ καθ' εἰς rarely if ever occurs elsewhere even in

Hellenistic Greek; it is, however, the reading of the principal manuscripts, and is supported by the analogy of τὸ καθ' ἡμέραν, τὸ κατὰ φύσιν, &c., the use of the nominative having probably arisen out of a confusion of the other formula, εἰς καθ' εἰς.

The general meaning of the verse is as follows: For as the body has many members, which have each of them distinct offices, so we, being many, are one body in Christ, diverse and one too, interdependent members of each other. Compare 1 Cor. xii. 27, 28., Eph. iv. 11—16., where the same thought is still more fully worked out with a similar reference to the different offices and gifts of the Church.

An organised being has been described, in the language of metaphysical writers, as a being in which every means is an end, and every end is a means, or in which the whole is prior to the part. The Apostle has another form of speech of a very different kind, but not less expressive of close and intimate union: "We are baptized into one body; we are drunk of one spirit."

6. ἔχοντες δὲ χαρίσματα. *But having gifts.*] These words are sometimes joined with what precedes, "We are one body in Christ, and individually interdependent members, howbeit, with divers gifts." In this way, however, the long sentence, which must be



5 have not the same office : so we, being many, are one  
 body in Christ, and every one members one of another.  
 6 But\* as we have gifts differing according to the grace  
 that is given to us, whether prophecy, let us prophesy  
 7 according to the proportion of faith ; or ministry, let\*

continued to the end of ver. 18., greatly drags, and the hortatory tone of the first part of the chapter is dropped, and only resumed again at ver. 18. Further, the opposition implied by *δέ* to the *ἐν σῶμά ἐσμεν ἐν χριστῷ*, is already anticipated in the clause, *τὸ δὲ καθ' εἶς*.

A better way of explaining the passage is, to oppose *ἔχοντες δέ* to the previous exhortation in ver. 3. "Let us not be high-minded, for we are the members of one body ; but as we have different gifts, let us seek to use them according to the measure of grace and faith which we have." The words, *ἔχοντες δὲ χαρίσματα*, carry on the thought of ver. 3. The imperative which is required in what follows may also be supplied from ver. 3., the recollection of which is recalled at ver. 6. in the words, *κατὰ τὴν ἀναλογίαν τῆς πίστεως*, which answer to the clause, *ἐκάστῳ ὡς ὁ θεὸς ἐμέρισε μέτρον πίστεως*. "But, as we have diverse gifts, according to the grace given unto us, it may be prophecy, let us have it according to the proportion of faith, or the gift of ministering, let us have it for use in the ministry ; or, if a man be a teacher, let him use his gift in teaching ; or an exhorter, let him use his gift in exhortations." That is to say, "We have divers gifts, let us have them, not beyond, but within measure, to be used not

to exalt ourselves, but in that whereunto they are appointed."

Philosophy, as well as religion, Plato and Aristotle, as well as St. Paul, speak of "a measure in all things ; of one in many, and many in one ;" of "not going beyond another ;" of *φρόνησις* and *σωφροσύνη* ; of a society of another kind, "fitly joined together," in which there are divers orders, and no man is to call anything his own, and all are one. As the shadow to the substance, as words to things, as the idea to the spirit, so is that form of a state of which philosophy speaks, to the communion of the body of Christ.

The construction is twice varied. Instead of saying, *εἴτε προφητείαν, εἴτε διακονίαν, εἴτε παράκλησιν, εἴτε διδασχὴν, κατὰ τὴν ἀναλογίαν τῆς πίστεως*, the Apostle adds in the second clause, *ἐν τῇ διακονίᾳ* (which indirectly implies the same thought — "let him confine himself to his office"), and further changes the person in the words *ὁ διδάσκων*. For a parallel omission of the verb, compare 1 Pet. iv. 11., *εἴ τις λαλεῖ ὡς λόγια θεοῦ, εἴ τις διακονεῖ ὡς ἐξ ἰσχύος ἢ χρηρηγεῖ ὁ θεός* : also 2 Cor. viii. 13.

*προφητείαν, prophecy.*] The gift of prophecy, common to the new, as well as to the old dispensation ; not simply teaching or preaching, but the gift of extraordinary men in an extraordinary

πίστεως, εἴτε διακονίαν, ἐν τῇ διακονίᾳ, εἴτε ὁ διδάσκων, 7  
 ἐν τῇ διδασκαλίᾳ εἴτε ὁ παρακαλῶν, ἐν τῇ παρακλήσει, ὁ 8  
 μεταδιδούς ἐν ἀπλότητι, ὁ προϊστάμενος ἐν σπουδῇ, ὁ  
 ἐλεῶν ἐν ἰλαρότητι. ἡ ἀγάπη ἀνυπόκριτος. ἀποστρυγούντες 9  
 τὸ πονηρόν, κολλώμενοι τῷ ἀγαθῷ, τῇ φιλαδελφίᾳ, εἰς 10  
 ἀλλήλους φιλόστοργοι, τῇ τιμῇ ἀλλήλους προηγούμενοι,

age. It was the gift of the Apostles and their converts, more than any other characteristic of the first beginnings of the Gospel, the utterance of the Spirit in the awakened soul, the influence and communion of which was caught by others from him who uttered it; not an intellectual gift, but rather one in which the intellectual faculties were absorbed, yet subject to the prophets, higher and more edifying than tongues, failing and transient in comparison with love (1 Cor. xii., xiii., xiv.). Compare note.

κατὰ τὴν ἀναλογίαν τῆς πίστεως.] Let him have it according to that proportion of faith which makes a man a prophet; *i. e.* let him prophesy as he has faith for it; or, let him prophesy in proportion to the degree of his faith.

7. διακονίαν may (1.) either relate to the general duty of a minister of Christ; just as *πίστις* occurs in 1 Cor. xii. among special gifts; it is not necessary here any more than there, or in Eph. iv. 11, 12., that the meaning of each word should be precisely distinguished: or (2.) may refer to the office of a deacon in its narrower sense, of which we know nothing, and cannot be certain even that it was confined to the object of its first appointment mentioned in Acts, vi. 1., *viz.*, the care of the poor, and the administration of the goods of the

Church. ἐν τῇ διακονίᾳ. Compare 1 Tim. iv. 15., ἐν τούτοις ἴσθι.

ὁ διδάσκων.] The teacher or preacher, as distinct from the prophet.

8. παράκλησις is distinguished, as sympathy and exhortation, from instruction (*διδαχή*).

Comp. 1 Cor. xii. 4., *διαίρέσεις δὲ χαρισμάτων εἰσίν, τὸ δὲ αὐτὸ πνεῦμα*, and Eph. iv. 11, 12., *καὶ αὐτὸς ἔδωκεν τοὺς μὲν ἀποστόλους, τοὺς δὲ προφήτας, τοὺς δὲ εὐαγγελιστάς, τοὺς δὲ ποιμένας καὶ διδασκάλους, πρὸς τὸν καταρτισμὸν τῶν ἁγίων, εἰς ἔργον διακονίας, εἰς οἰκοδομήν τοῦ σώματος τοῦ χριστοῦ.*

ἐν ἀπλότητι.] Not, liberally, but, in singleness of heart, "as unto the Lord, and not unto men," with no other thought than that of pure love.

ὁ προϊστάμενος.] Not the patron of strangers, but the ruler of the Church, or any one who bears authority over others. Compare 1 Thess. v. 12.

ἐν σπουδῇ.] In the spirit of those who do whatsoever their hand finds to do with all their might.

ὁ ἐλεῶν ἐν ἰλαρότητι, *he that showeth mercy, with cheerfulness.*] Let a man find pleasure in doing good to the unfortunate. There should be a contrast between the cheerfulness of his deportment and the sadness of his errand.

us use our gift in ministering: or he that teacheth, in teaching; or he that exhorteth, in exhortation: he that giveth, let him do it with simplicity; he that ruleth, with diligence; he that sheweth mercy, with cheerfulness. Let love be without dissimulation. Abhor that which is evil; cleave to that which is good. Be kindly affectioned one to another in\* the love of the brethren;

All these exhortations may be summed up in the general precept which follows:

9. ἡ ἀγάπη ἀνυπόκριτος.] Let love be real, and not merely put on. The words which follow ἀποστρυγούντες τὸ πονηρὸν, κολλώμενοι τῷ ἀγαθῷ, are in no construction. It has been proposed to connect them with ἀγαπάτε ἀλλήλους, understood in ἡ ἀγαπῆ ἀνυπόκριτος. But while the grammar is not much helped, the sense is greatly injured by this mode of taking them. As they are unconnected in construction, it is better to disconnect them in meaning, and take the several clauses as so many detached precepts, dictated by the Apostle to an amanuensis, perhaps with many pauses, as they occurred to him.

It may be questioned whether these words are an imperative or an indicative. In point of sense the indicative is equally good, and the omission of the indicative verb ἐστὶ much more common than of the imperative; but in this passage, as imperatives precede and follow, it might be argued that the imperative sense is more naturally continued. Yet the imperative sense can hardly be continued through all three verses. The truth seems to be, that the Apostle, who had never distinctly expressed the

imperative mood, has here lost sight of it altogether, and passed from exhortation to description. Nor is there much difference between them. For every description of the Christian character is also an exhortation to Christians.

10. τῇ φιλαδελφίᾳ.] Not, as in the English version, with brotherly love, but (as in 1 Thess. iv. 9.) “in your love to the brethren, affectionate one toward another.” φιλόστοργοι, as of parents to children or of children to parents.

τῇ τιμῇ ἀλλήλους προηγούμενοι.] Not, in honour preferring one another (as in Phil. ii. 3., τῇ ταπεινοφροσύνῃ ἀλλήλους ἡγούμενοι ὑπερέχοντας ἑαυτῶν), in defence of which something may be urged on the ground of the Apostle having made an etymological adaptation of the word (cf. προεγράφη, Gal. iii. 1.), and the rarity, if it is ever found, of the construction with the accusative case—but as Theophylact and some of the ancient versions, “going before or anticipating one another in paying honour:” “leading the way to one another,” like προπορευόμενοι, and the Latin “anteire.”

τῇ σπουδῇ μὴ ὀκνηροί.] Not wanting in the energy of action.

τῷ πνεύματι ζέοντες, fervent in spirit,] opposed to what preceded, as the inward to the outward:



τῇ σπουδῇ μὴ ὀκνηροί, τῷ πνεύματι ζέοντες, τῷ κυρίῳ<sup>1</sup> 11  
 δουλεύοντες, τῇ ἐλπίδι χαίροντες, τῇ θλίψει ὑπομένοντες, 12  
 τῇ προσευχῇ προσκαρτεροῦντες, ταῖς χρείαις τῶν ἁγίων 13  
 κοινωνοῦντες, τὴν φιλοξενίαν διώκοντες. εὐλογεῖτε τοὺς 14  
 διώκοντας ὑμᾶς· εὐλογεῖτε, καὶ μὴ καταρᾶσθε. χαίρειν 15  
 μετὰ χαιρόντων<sup>2</sup>, κλαίειν μετὰ κλαιόντων. τὸ αὐτὸ εἰς 16  
 ἀλλήλους φρονοῦντες, μὴ τὰ ὑψηλὰ φρονοῦντες, ἀλλὰ τοῖς

<sup>1</sup> καιρῷ.<sup>2</sup> Add καί.

“energetic in act, fervent in soul.”

τῷ κυρίῳ δουλεύοντες, *serving the Lord.*] Considerable weight of MS. authority attaches to the reading καιρῷ δουλεύοντες (Δ. G. f. g.); either, “adapting yourselves to the necessities of the time,” which comes in strangely among precepts to simplicity and zeal, though, if a good meaning be put upon the words, not unlike the spirit of the Apostle in other places, Acts, xvi. 3, 1 Cor. ix. 20.; or (2.) in a higher sense, “serving the time;” because the time is short, and the day of the Lord is at hand:—an interpretation which, like the former one, connects better with what follows, than with what precedes. Later editors, however, agree with the Textus Receptus in reading τῷ κυρίῳ δουλεύοντες, which, on the whole, has the greater weight of external evidence (A. B. v.) in its favour. Nor can any objection be urged on internal grounds, except that of an apparent want of point, the slightest of all objections to a reading or interpretation in the writings of St. Paul. And even this is really groundless, if we regard St. Paul as summing up in these words what had gone before:—“Be diligent, zealous, doing

all things unto the Lord, and not unto men. Remembering in all things that you are the servants of Christ.” The difficulty is, in any case, no greater than that a χάρισμα πίστεως should occur among other special graces in Cor. xii., or that the word θεοστυγεῖς should be found in a long catalogue of particular sins. Rom. i. 30.

12. τῇ ἐλπίδι χαίροντες.] With joy in time of hope and prosperity, with patience in time of affliction. τῇ θλίψει might be a dative after ὑπομένοντες, “constant to affliction,” but is probably an ablative—“constant in affliction;” the construction of the previous clause being continued.

13. ταῖς χρείαις τῶν ἁγίων κοινωνοῦντες.] Not, having a portion in the needs of the saints; but, imparting to the saints who have need. Compare Acts, xx. 34., Gal. vi. 6., Rom. xv. 20. The variation in the text, ταῖς μνείαις τῶν ἁγίων κοινωνοῦντες, Δ. a. f. g., holding communion with the memories of the saints, is a curious instance of a reading supported by ancient authorities, in which ideas of the fourth or fifth century are transferred to the first.

τὴν φιλοξενίαν διώκοντες. In the same strain as in the preceding clause, the Apostle con-

11 in honour leading\* the way one to another; not back-  
 12 ward in diligence; fervent in spirit; serving the Lord;  
 13 rejoicing in hope; patient in tribulation; continuing  
 instant in prayer; distributing to the necessity of  
 14 saints; given to hospitality. Bless them which perse-  
 15 cute you: bless, and curse not. Rejoice with them  
 16 that do rejoice<sup>1</sup>, weep with them that weep. Be of  
 the same mind one toward another: minding\* not

<sup>1</sup> *Add and.*

tinues:—“Relieving the wants of the saints, and given to receiving them hospitably.” The connexion leads us to suppose that the Apostle is speaking of hospitality specially to Christians, perhaps pilgrims at Rome, and not to men in general.

14. εὐλογεῖτε τοὺς διώκοντάς ἡμᾶς, *bless them that persecute you,*] remind us of our Lord’s words recorded in Matt. v. 44.:—“Bless them that curse you.” The similarity is, however, not close enough to be urged as a proof that St. Paul was acquainted with our Gospels. The word διώκοντες in the preceding verse, appears to have suggested the thought which the Apostle, as his manner is, expresses first positively and then negatively.

15. It is proposed by some interpreters to connect κλαίειν μετὰ κλαιόντων with the preceding verse, so as to give the following sense:—“Bless them that persecute you: bless and curse not, so that ye may be able to sympathise with all their good and ill fortune, thinking of one another with like thoughts.” This is another instance of the sacrifice of sense to an attempt at grammar and connexion. To say:—“Bless your enemies, that you may weep with them that

weep,” is extremely far-fetched. The infinitive is better taken for the imperative, as in Phil. iii. 16., Luk. ix. 3., that is to say, the construction is changed, and the sentence proceeds as if λέγω παρακαλῶ, or a similar word, had gone before.

16. τὸ αὐτὸ.] Either with εἰς ἀλλήλους, (1.) Thinking of yourselves as you would have others think of you—the reverse of placing yourselves above one another (μὴ τὰ ὑψηλά φρονοῦντες); or with φρονεῖν preserving the ordinary sense of τὸ αὐτὸ φρονεῖν in other passages (cf. τὸ αὐτὸ φρονεῖν ἐν ἀλλήλοις). (2.) “Be of the same mind one with another,” a counsel not of humility, but of unity, of which humility is also a part. Compare ver. 4.

ἀλλὰ τοῖς ταπεινοῖς συναπαγομένοι.] It is doubted whether in this passage ταπεινοῖς is neuter or masculine: the word ὑψηλά, which precedes, would incline us to suppose the former; the common use of ταπεινός is in favour of the latter. Let us suppose the first, and take ταπεινός in the sense in which it is most opposed to ὑψηλός, not “miserable,” as in James, i. 10, but “lowly.” Then, amid precepts of sympathy and humility, or unity, the Apostle may be



ταπεινοῖς συναπαγόμενοι. μὴ γίνεσθε φρόνιμοι παρ' ἑαυτοῖς. μηδενὶ κακὸν ἀντὶ κακοῦ ἀποδιδόντες, προνοούμενοι 17  
καλὰ [ἐνώπιον τοῦ θεοῦ καὶ<sup>1</sup>] ἐνώπιον τῶν<sup>2</sup> ἀνθρώπων· εἰ 18  
δυνατόν, τὸ ἐξ ὑμῶν μετὰ πάντων ἀνθρώπων εἰρηνεύοντες,  
μὴ ἑαυτοὺς ἐκδικοῦντες, ἀγαπητοί, ἀλλὰ δότε τόπον τῇ 19  
ὀργῇ· γέγραπται γάρ Ἐμοὶ ἐκδίκησις, ἐγὼ ἀνταποδώσω,

<sup>1</sup> Om. ἐνωπ. . . καί.<sup>2</sup> πάντων.

supposed to proceed as follows: "Thinking of yourselves as on a level with one another, minding not high things, not struggling against lowly ones;" or with ταπεινοῖς as a maxims, "Minding not high things, but descending to be with the lowly." The two opposed clauses thus serve as a new expression of the general thought, τὸ αὐτὸ εἰς ἀλλήλους φρονοῦντες, which is again resumed in ver. 17.: "Be on a level;—there are ὑψηλά and ταπεινά or ταπεινοί;—do not seek to rise to one, or strive against descending to the other." So far all is clear. The difficulty is how to insert the notion of "force" or "constraint" which is contained in the word συναπαγόμενοι. It may possibly be nothing more than the misuse or exaggeration in the use of a word which arises from an imperfect command over language; but it may also be fairly explained as referring to the struggle in our own minds, or the violence we do to our own feelings. The Apostle might have said τοῖς ταπεινοῖς συνομιλοῦντες or σὺν τοῖς ταπεινοῖς ταπεινούμενοι. Remembering that the human heart is apt to be in rebellion against lessons of humility, he uses, not with perfect clearness, the more precise word συναπαγόμενοι.

μὴ γίνεσθε φρόνιμοι παρ' ἑαυτοῖς, *be not wise in your own opinions.*] These words are a short summary of what has preceded; they have also a reference to what follows. As above the Apostle connected lowly thoughts of ourselves with consideration of others, so pride leads in its train retaliation; it will not hear of the Gospel precept, "If any man smite you on the right cheek, turn to him the other also."

προνοούμενοι καλά.] It is a favourite thought of the Apostle that the believer should walk seemly to those that are without, careful of the sight of man no less than of God. Comp. 2 Cor. viii. 21., where, speaking of the collection to be made for the poor saints, the Apostle says that he had one chosen to go up with him to Jerusalem with the alms: προνοούμεν γὰρ καλὰ οὐ μόνον ἐνώπιον κυρίου, ἀλλὰ καὶ ἐνώπιον ἀνθρώπων: as in this passage. Cf. Prov. iii. 4., καὶ προνοοῦ καλά ἐνώπιον κυρίου καὶ ἀνθρώπων.

18. εἰ δυνατόν, τὸ ἐξ ὑμῶν.] If it be possible, live peaceably with all men. To which the Apostle adds, as a limitation, τὸ ἐξ ὑμῶν: if other men will not, yet, as far as you are concerned, live peaceably; at any rate, it is possible for you.

19. δότε τόπον τῇ ὀργῇ, *give*



high things, but going along\* with the lowly. Be not  
 17 wise in your own conceits. Recompense to no man  
 evil for evil. Provide things honest<sup>1</sup> [in the sight of  
 18 God and] in the sight of<sup>2</sup> men. If it be possible, as  
 much as lieth in you, be\* at peace with all men.  
 19 Dearly beloved, avenge not yourselves, but rather give  
 place unto wrath : for it is written, Vengeance is mine;

<sup>1</sup> *Om.* in the sight of God and.<sup>2</sup> *Add* all.

*place to wrath.*] These words have received three explanations: — (1.) Make room for the wrath of your enemy, *i. e.* let the wrath of your enemy have its way; or, (2.) Make room for your anger to cool, “date spatium iræ,” give your anger a respite; or, (3.) Make way for the wrath of God. The second of these explanations is equally indefensible on grounds of language and sense. It is only as a translation of a Latinism we can suppose the phrase to have any meaning at all, and the meaning thus obtained, “defer your wrath,” is poor and weak. According to the first and third explanations the words *δότε τόπον* are taken in the same sense (which also occurs in Eph. iv. 27. — *μηδὲ δίδοτε τόπον τῷ διαβόλῳ*), the doubt being whether the word *ὀργῆ* refers to the wrath of our enemy or of God. The latter is supposed to be required by the context, “Give place to the wrath of God, who has said, Vengeance is mine.” The last clause, however, may be equally well connected with the words, avenge not yourself; nor is it easy to conceive that if the Apostle had intended the wrath of God, he would have expressed himself so concisely and obscurely as in the words *τῇ ὀργῇ*. The first ex-

planation is, therefore, the true one. “Dearly beloved, avenge not yourself, but let your enemy have his way.” It has been objected that common prudence requires that we should defend ourselves against our enemies. This is true, and yet the fact, that the same objection applies equally to the words of our Saviour in the Gospel (Matt. v. 34—48.), is a sufficient answer; — *ὁ δυνάμενος χωρεῖν χωρεῖτω.*

*γέγραπται γάρ.*] The words that follow are from Deut. xxxii. 35. The spirit in which they are cited by the Apostle, is somewhat different from that in which they occur in the Old Testament; not, “avenge not yourself, for God will avenge you, and so your enemy will not escape free;” but, “avenge not yourself, because you are intruding on the office and province of God.”

The principle here laid down may be sometimes a counsel of perfection; that is to say, a principle which, in the mixed state of human things, it is impossible to carry out in practice. But it is worthy of remark that it is also a maxim acted upon by civilised nations in the infliction of penalties for crime. There is no vindictiveness in punishment, neither

λέγει κύριος. ἀλλὰ Ἐὰν<sup>1</sup> πεινᾷ ὁ ἐχθρός σου, ψώμιζε αὐτόν· ἐὰν διψᾷ, πότιζε αὐτόν. τοῦτο γὰρ ποιῶν ἄνθρακας πυρὸς σωρεύσεις ἐπὶ τὴν κεφαλὴν αὐτοῦ. μὴ νικῶ ὑπὸ τοῦ κακοῦ, ἀλλὰ νίκα ἐν τῷ ἀγαθῷ τὸ κακόν.

<sup>1</sup> Om ἀλλὰ: add οὖν after ἐάν.

retaliation for the injury done to the individual nor to the state, nor, if so be, for the impiety against God. The preservation of society is its only object. Human law begins by acknowledging that God alone is the judge; it is not even the executioner of his anger against sin, much less of man's wrath against his fellows. Conscious of its own impotence and of the awful responsibilities which surround it, it only seeks to accomplish, in a superficial and external manner, what is barely necessary for self-defence.

[ἐὰν οὖν. If οὖν were genuine, this and the preceding verse might be connected as follows: — Therefore seeing you have no right to avenge yourself, do good only to your enemy. There is no need, however, to invent a connexion in a passage the general character of which is so abrupt, more especially as the particle οὖν is probably spurious.]

The words which follow, τοῦτο γὰρ ποιῶν ἄνθρακας πυρὸς σωρεύ-

σεις ἐπὶ τὴν κεφαλὴν αὐτοῦ, "for in so doing thou shalt heap coals of fire upon his head," are a well-known difficulty. It must not be overlooked that they are a quotation from Prov. xxv. 21., taken verbatim from the LXX., which, however, has an additional clause, ὁ δὲ κύριος ἀνταποδώσει σοι ἀγαθά. The meaning of the words, in their original connexion, has been thus given: — "Do good to your enemies, for so you shall undo them with grief and indignation at themselves, but God shall reward you." To this it may be objected that the adversative particle δέ (ὁ δὲ κύριος) has no force, and also that the expression, "thou shalt heap coals of fire on his head," is an image of destruction, and cannot be distorted into the metaphor of destroying another with grief and indignation.

But, secondly, the context in the New Testament in which the expression occurs, has reference to the forgiveness of injuries, and in some way or other a meaning

20 I will repay, saith the Lord. Rather "if<sup>1</sup> thine enemy  
 hunger, feed him; if he thirst, give him drink: for it\* is  
 21 by doing this that thou shalt heap coals of fire on his  
 head." Be not overcome of evil, but overcome evil with  
 good.

<sup>1</sup> Therefore.

must be found for the words, "thou shalt heap coals of fire upon his head," which is in accordance with this precept. The explanation, "thou shalt melt thine enemy like wax," may be at once set aside as inconsistent with the words. Nor is the other interpretation, "thou shalt make his soul burn with remorse," really more defensible. What appropriateness is there in the expression, "heaping coals of fire on the head," to express inward remorse and indignation? or how would the desire even to excite remorse in an enemy be consistent with Christian forgiveness? It is impossible to harmonise such an interpretation with what precedes or follows. Better, therefore, to take the words in their literal sense as an image of destruction, which is, however, ironically applied by the Apostle, in the spirit of the New Testament, rather than of the Old, so as to reverse

the meaning. "Instead of avenging yourselves, say rather (with them of old time), if thine enemy hunger, feed him; if he thirst, give him drink, for *this* is the right way of undoing and destroying him; *this* is the true mode of retaliation; *this* is the Christian's revenge." There is an emphasis on *τοῦτο*: "In *so* doing thou shalt inflict on him the true vengeance." The omission of the final words (but the Lord shall reward thee), which would be inappropriate, if the first part of the passage is to have this turn given to it, is a strong argument that the suggested interpretation is the correct one.

21. The explanation just given is further confirmed by the verse which follows. He has just said, "Destroy your enemy with deeds of mercy." Following out the same thought he adds, "Do not be carried away by his evil, but carry him away by your good."



## CHAP. XIII.

IN the previous chapter the Apostle had spoken of the unity of the Church, and of the offices of its members. He had gone on to scatter admonitions, following each other in order sometimes of sound, sometimes of meaning, which, like the precepts of the sermon on the Mount, went beyond the maxims of heathen virtue, or the sayings of "them of old time." Men were to think humbly of themselves, to return good for evil, to feed their enemies, to live peaceably with all. Continuing in the same spirit, he adds, "they are to be obedient to the powers that be." This is a part of the Christian's duty, which he will more easily fulfil if he regards the magistrate as he truly is, as "the minister of God for good."

The earnestness with which St. Paul dwells upon his theme, as well as the allusions to the same subject in other passages of the New Testament (Tit. iii. 1., 1 Pet. ii. 13—18.), are proofs that he is guarding against a tendency to which he knew the first believers to be subject. He is speaking to the Christians at Rome, as a bishop of the fourth or fifth century might have addressed the multitudes of Alexandria; preaching counsels of moderation to "the fifth monarchy men" of that day. They were more in the eye of the Christian world than believers elsewhere, more likely to come into conflict with the imperial power, perhaps in greater danger of being led away with the dream of another kingdom. The spirit of rebellion, against which the Apostle is warning them, was not a mere misconception of the teaching of the Gospel; it lay deep in the circumstances of the age and in the temper of the Jewish people. It is impossible to forget, however slight may be their historical ground-

work, the well-known words of Suetonius, Claud. c. 25., "Judæos impulsore Chresto assidue tumultuantes Româ expulit." (Acts, xviii. 2.) The narrative of Scripture itself affords indications of similar agitations, so far as they can be expected to cross the peaceful path of our Saviour and his disciples. The words of the prophecy, as it is termed, of Caiaphas respecting our Lord, however unfounded, imply a political fear more than a religious enmity. The question of the Pharisees, "Is it lawful to give tribute to Cæsar," and the argument with which the Jews wrought on the fears of Pilate, are also not without significance. The account of Judas the Gaulonite, in Josephus, "who rose up about the time of the taxing," and whom Josephus terms "the founder of the fourth philosophy of the Jews," Ant. xviii. c. 1. §§ 1. 6., is a more explicit evidence of the spirit of insubordination. That "philosophy" consisted in an inviolable attachment to liberty, and "in calling no man Lord" but God himself (§ 6.), a principle which was maintained by its adherents with indescribable constancy. The author of the movement was no ordinary man, and the movement itself so far from being a transient one, that it continued through above half a century, and is regarded by Josephus, as "laying the foundation of the miseries" of the Jewish war. (xvii. c. 1. § 1.)

The account of Josephus himself, unwilling as he is to do them justice, shows that in their first commencement the Zealots were animated by noble thoughts, their testimony to which they were ready to seal by tortures and death. Many of these "Galileans" (for in this country they were chiefly found) were probably among the first converts. Like the Essenes, they stood in some relation that we are unable to trace to the followers of John the Baptist and of Christ. We cannot suppose that in all cases the temper of the Zealot had died away in the bosom of the Christian. A very slight misunderstanding of the manner in which "the kingdom was to be restored to Israel" might suffice to rekindle the flame. If our Lord himself had said,—Peace I leave with you, He had also said, I come not to bring peace on earth, but a sword; if He had commanded Peter to put up his sword into the sheath, He had also commanded

them each to sell his garment and buy one ; if He had paid tribute, He had also declared that the children of the kingdom were free from the tribute. We could hardly wonder if those who heard His words sometimes mistook the result for the object, or confused the Jewish belief of the kingdom of heaven upon earth with the kingdom of God that is within. The after history of the Church teaches how near such a confusion lay to the truth itself. Not once only, nor during our Lord's lifetime only, there have been those who have "taken him by force to make him a king."

The words "the powers that be are ordained of God" have been made the foundation of many doctrines of passive obedience and non-resistance. Out of the Apostle's "counsels of moderation" have developed themselves the Divine right of government, however exercised and under all circumstances, and even of particular forms of government. The party feelings of an age have been clothed in the language of Scripture, and established on the ground of antiquity. If the first Christians were to obey the heathen emperors, how can we ever be justified in shaking off the yoke of a Christian sovereign? If St. Paul said this under Nero, how much more is it true of the subjects of King Charles I.?

Such arguments are two-edged ; for as many passages may be quoted from Scripture which indirectly tend to the subversion, as can be adduced for the maintenance, of order or of property. The words of the psalmist, "to bind their kings in chains, their nobles in fetters of iron," are in the mouth of one class ; "shall I lift up my hand to slay the Lord's anointed?" of another ; and in peace and prosperity men turn to the one, in the hour of revolution to the other. Many are the texts which we either silently drop or insensibly modify, with which the spirit of modern society seems almost unavoidably to be at variance. The blessing on the poor, and the "hard sayings" respecting rich men, are not absolutely in accordance even with the better mind of the present age. We cannot follow the simple precept, "Swear not at all," without making an exception for the custom of our courts of law. We dare not quote the words,



“Go sell all thou hast and give to the poor,” without adding the caution, “Beware, lest in making the copy thou break the pattern.” We are not so often exhorted “to obey God rather than man,” as warned against the misapplication of the words.

These instances are sufficient to teach us how moderate we should be in reasoning from particular precepts, even where they agree with our preconceived opinions. The truth seems to be that the Scripture lays down no rule applicable to individual cases, or separable from the circumstances under which it is given. Still less does it furnish a political or philosophical system—“My kingdom is not of this world,” which it scarcely seems to touch. No one can infer from the passage that we are considering that St. Paul believed it wrong to rise against wicked rulers in any case, because they were the appointment of God, any more than from his speaking of wrestling against principalities and powers we can conclude that he supposed, with some of the Ebionitish sects, that all power was of the devil. It never occurred to him that the hidden life which he thought of only as to be absorbed in the glory of the sons of God, was one day to be the governing principle of the civilised world. Though “he has written this in an epistle,” he would not have us use it “altogether” without regard to the state of this world. Only in reference to the time at which he is writing, looking at the infant community in relation to the heathen world, he exhorts them to suffer rather than oppose; and if ever the thought rises in their minds that those whom they obey are the oppressors of God and His Church, to remember that without His appointment they could not have been, and that, after all, it is for their own faults they themselves are most likely to endure evil even at the hands of Gentile magistrates.

Πᾶσα ψυχὴ ἐξουσίαις ὑπερέχουσαις ὑποταστέσθω. οὐ 13  
 γὰρ ἔστιν ἐξουσία εἰ μὴ ὑπὸ<sup>1</sup> θεοῦ, αἱ δὲ οὖσαι ὑπὸ θεοῦ<sup>2</sup>  
 τεταγμένοι εἰσίν. ὥστε ὁ ἀντιτασσόμενος τῇ ἐξουσίᾳ τῇ<sup>2</sup>  
 τοῦ θεοῦ διαταγῇ ἀνθέστηκεν· οἱ δὲ ἀνθεστηκότες ἑαυτοῖς  
 κρίμα λήμψονται. οἱ γὰρ ἄρχοντες οὐκ εἰσὶν φόβος τῷ<sup>3</sup>  
 ἀγαθῷ ἔργῳ, ἀλλὰ τῷ κακῷ.<sup>3</sup> θέλεις δὲ μὴ φοβεῖσθαι τὴν  
 ἐξουσίαν; τὸ ἀγαθὸν ποίει, καὶ ἕξεις ἔπαινον ἐξ αὐτῆς·  
 θεοῦ γὰρ διάκονός ἐστιν σοὶ εἰς τὸ ἀγαθόν. εἰ δὲ τὸ<sup>4</sup>  
 κακὸν ποιῆς φοβοῦ· οὐ γὰρ εἰκῆ τὴν μάχαιραν φορεῖ·  
 θεοῦ γὰρ διάκονός ἐστιν ἔκδικος εἰς ὀργὴν τῷ τὸ κακὸν

<sup>1</sup> ἀπό.<sup>2</sup> ἐξουσίαις ὑπὸ τοῦ θεοῦ.<sup>3</sup> τῶν ἀγαθῶν ἔργων ἀλλὰ τῶν κακῶν.

πᾶσα ψυχὴ, every soul,] is used here as the word soul or body in English, simply for "person." Compare 1 Pet. iii. 20. ὁκτὼ ψυχαι.

ἐξουσίαις ὑπερέχουσαις, to powers above them.] Comp. 1 Pet. ii. 13. :— ὑποτάγητε πάσῃ ἀνθρωπίνῃ κτίσει διὰ τὸν κύριον, εἴτε βασιλεῖ, ὡς ὑπερέχοντι, εἴτε ἡγεμόσιν, ὡς δι' αὐτοῦ πεμπόμενοις.

οὐ γὰρ ἔστιν ἐξουσία, κ. τ. λ., for there is no power.] "For there is no power but has a Divine source, and those that exist are appointed by God." The second clause is not a mere repetition; it gives emphasis; what in the first clause was a principle, is a fact in the second. "All power is of God; those which exist among us, under which we live, are his express appointment." The same thought occurs in the Wis. of Sol. vi. 1—3., "Hear, O ye kings . . . . for power is given you of the Lord and sovereignty from the Highest, who shall try your works and search out your counsels."

The MS. authority is nearly equally balanced between ἀπό θεοῦ,

the reading of the Textus Receptus, in the first clause, and ὑπὸ θεοῦ, which is Lachmann's. The former of the two readings gives the best sense, as it agrees best with the generality of the first clause. As οὖσαι corresponds to ἔστιν, so ὑποταστέσθω το τεταγμένοι, which latter paronomasia is carried on in the next verse by ἀντιτασσόμενος and διαταγῇ. It may be rendered in English— "Let every one be in his place under the powers above him, for they have their place from God himself."

2. So that he who arrays himself against the power, opposes the appointment of God, a consequence of the previous verse; and (δέ slightly adversative = and whatever they may think) they that oppose, shall receive to themselves condemnation. From whom? From the magistrate apparently. Yet St. Paul does not merely mean that they shall suffer temporal punishment. As in Matth. v. 21, 22., the punishment of the magistrate is the symbol of a higher penalty which they are to suffer, because he has

13 Let every soul be subject unto the higher powers. For there is no power but of God: the powers that be  
 2 are ordained of God. Whosoever therefore resisteth the power, resisteth the ordinance of God: and they that  
 3 resist shall receive to themselves damnation. For rulers are not a terror to the good work<sup>1</sup>, but to the evil. And\* wilt thou not be afraid of the power? do that which is good, and thou shalt have praise of the same: for he is  
 4 the minister of God to thee for good. But if thou do that which is evil, be afraid; for he beareth not the sword in vain: for he is the minister of God, a revenger

<sup>1</sup> Good works.

the authority of God. By some commentators the second verse is connected with what follows: —“Thou shalt be punished; for rulers are a terror, not to good works, but to evil, which is a proof that your resistance to authority is evil.” This is far-fetched; the latter words are better taken in connexion, not with the clause *οἱ δὲ ἀνθεστηκότες*, but with the general sense of the two previous verses.

3. *οἱ γὰρ ἄρχοντες*, for rulers.] The dative (*τῷ ἔργῳ*), which is supported by a great preponderance of MS. authority, is the true reading. The Apostle goes on to give another reason why it is our duty to obey magistrates, besides their being divinely appointed, because they are a terror, not to the good work, but to the evil. And would you be without fear of the magistrate? Do well, and he shall praise you as a good citizen.

It may be observed:—(1.) That St. Paul cannot have intended to rule absolutely the question of obedience to authority, if for no

other reason than this, that the only case he supposes is that of a just ruler. (2.) That the manner in which he speaks of rulers, is a presumption that the Christians at Rome could not have been at this time subject to persecution from the authorities; whence it may be inferred also that it was in reference to the temper of the early Christians rather than to any systematic persecution likely to arouse it, these precepts were given.

4. He will praise you, if you do well, for he is the minister of God to you (*sc.* if you do well) for good. But if thou doest ill, be afraid; for he does not bear the sword without purpose. For he is the minister of God, an avenger to execute wrath on him that does evil.

Is the Apostle speaking of rulers of this world as they are, or as they ought to be? Of neither, but of the feeling with which the Christian is to regard them. In general, he will be slow to think evil of others; in particu-



πράσσουντι. διὸ ἀνάγκη ὑποτάσσεσθαι, οὐ μόνον διὰ τὴν 5  
 ὀργήν, ἀλλὰ καὶ διὰ τὴν συνείδησιν. διὰ τοῦτο γὰρ καὶ 6  
 φόρους τελεῖτε· λειτουργοὶ γὰρ θεοῦ εἰσὶν εἰς αὐτὸ τοῦτο  
 προσκαρτεροῦντες. ἀπόδοτε<sup>1</sup> πᾶσιν τὰς ὀφειλάς, τῷ τὸν 7  
 φόρον τὸν φόρον, τῷ τὸ τέλος τὸ τέλος, τῷ τὸν φόβον τὸν  
 φόβον, τῷ τὴν τιμὴν τὴν τιμὴν. μηδενὶ μηδὲν ὀφείλετε, εἰ 8  
 μὴ<sup>2</sup> τὸ ἀλλήλους ἀγαπᾶν. ὁ γὰρ ἀγαπῶν τὸν ἕτερον νόμον  
 πεπλήρωκεν· τὸ γὰρ οὐ μοιχεύσεις, οὐ φονεύσεις, οὐ κλέ- 9  
 ψεις<sup>3</sup>, οὐκ ἐπιθυμήσεις, καὶ εἴ τις ἕτερα ἐντολή, ἐν τῷ λογῷ  
 τούτῳ<sup>4</sup> ἀνακεφαλαιοῦται, [ἐν τῷ] ἀγαπήσεις τὸν πλησίον

<sup>1</sup> Add οὖν.

<sup>3</sup> Add οὐ ψευδομαρτυρήσεις.

<sup>2</sup> τὸ ἀγαπᾶν ἀλλήλους.

<sup>4</sup> ἐν τούτῳ τῷ λόγῳ.

lar, of rulers. His temper will be that of submission and moderation. He will acknowledge that almost any government is tolerable to the man who walks innocently, and that the governments of mankind in general have more of right and justice in them than the generality of men are apt to suppose. And lastly, he will feel that, whatever they do, they are in the hands of God, who rules among the children of men; and, in general, that his relations to them, like all the other relations of Christian life, are to God also.

5. Therefore we must obey, not only from fear of punishment, but for conscience sake. Comp. 1 Pet. ii. 13., ὑποτάγητε πάσῃ ἀνθρωπίνῃ κτίσει διὰ τὸν κύριον. In obeying the magistrate, you are obeying God; you are “in foro conscientiae,” and you cannot disobey without “the conscience being defiled.” 1 Cor. viii. 7.

ὀργή, punishment, as in iii. 5., iv. 15., like the English word “vengeance,” including the act of execution as well as the feeling which prompts it.

6. διὰ τοῦτο, *therefore,*] is at once the proof and the conse-

quence of what has preceded, and may be referred to ver. 5., “Because you must be subject for conscience sake;” or better, to the whole preceding passage, “Because of the Divine appointment of rulers,” which is again repeated in the next clause.

The same remark which was made in ver. 4. holds good here. We are not to conceive St. Paul as arguing absolutely that Cæsar had a right to tribute, but only setting forth one side of the question, that is, the feeling with which a religious man should regard the exactions of a heathen government. As though he had said:—“When you see the tribute gatherer sitting at the receipt of custom, restrain the feelings that might arise in your mind, with the thought that he too is the minister of God. ‘Render unto Cæsar the things that are Cæsar’s,’ because in so doing ye are rendering unto God the things that are God’s.”

εἰς αὐτὸ τοῦτο] may either be explained (1.) by εἰς τὸ λειτουργεῖν τῷ θεῷ, understood in λειτουργοὶ θεοῦ, or (2.) referred to what precedes—“for the very

5 to execute wrath upon him that doeth evil. Wherefore  
 ye must needs be subject, not only for wrath, but also  
 6 for conscience sake. For for this cause pay ye tribute  
 also: for they are God's ministers, attending continually  
 7 for\* this very thing. Render<sup>1</sup> to all their dues: tri-  
 bute to whom tribute is due; custom to whom custom;  
 8 fear to whom fear; honour to whom honour. Owe no  
 man any thing, but to love one another: for he that  
 9 loveth another hath fulfilled the law. For this, Thou  
 shalt not commit adultery, Thou shalt not kill, Thou  
 shalt not steal<sup>2</sup>, Thou shalt not covet; and if there be  
 any other commandment, it is briefly comprehended in  
 this<sup>3</sup>, namely, Thou shalt love thy neighbour as thy-

<sup>1</sup> Add therefore.<sup>2</sup> Add thou shalt not bear false witness.<sup>3</sup> Add saying.

purpose of receiving tribute;" the point is, that the Divine authority of magistrates is brought home to the rebellious spirit in the vulgar case of their receiving tribute.

7. The Apostle goes on to comprehend the particular instance of duty to magistrates under a general head. [*οὖν*, which would imply an inference, is probably corrupt.] *τῷ τὸν φόρον* is governed of some passive verb understood in *ὀφειλάς*. For the omission, comp. 2 Cor. viii. 15.

8. The precept of the previous verse is repeated in a stronger negative form:—"Owe no man any thing." To which the Apostle adds, but "to love one another."

Some have taken the word *ὀφείλετε* in different senses in the two clauses. "Owe no man any thing, only ye ought to love one another." It is simpler, without such a paronomasia, to explain

the words of the endless debt of love: "Owe no man anything, but to love one another;" that debt, we may add, which "owing owe's not" and is always due.

*ὁ γὰρ ἀγαπῶν τὸν ἕτερον.*] For to owe this debt is the payment of all debts. He that loveth his neighbour, hath fulfilled the law. Comp. Matt. xxii. 37, 38.

9. The Apostle, quoting apparently from Exodus, xx. 13., Deut. v. 18, 19., not according to the Hebrew, but according to copies of the LXX., which Philo must have had (De Decalogo, § 12. 24. 32.), like him, places the seventh commandment before the sixth. The same order is observed in the quotation of the Evangelists, Luke, xviii. 20., Mark, x. 19.; the places of the seventh and eighth being also transposed in the Vatican MS. of the LXX.

*εἰ τις ἕτερα ἐντολή.*] The ninth commandment is omitted.

σου ὡς σεαυτόν. ἡ ἀγάπη τῷ πλησίον κακὸν οὐκ ἐργά- 10  
 ζεται· πλήρωμα οὖν νόμου ἡ ἀγάπη. καὶ τοῦτο εἰδότες 11  
 τὸν καιρὸν, ὅτι ὦρα ἤδη ὑμᾶς<sup>1</sup> ἐξ ὕπνου ἐγερθῆναι· νῦν γὰρ  
 ἐγγύτερον ἡμῶν ἡ σωτηρία ἢ ὅτε ἐπιστεῦσαμεν. ἡ νύξ<sup>2</sup> 12  
 προέκοιψεν, ἡ δὲ ἡμέρα ἤγγικεν· ἀποθώμεθα οὖν τὰ ἔργα  
 τοῦ σκοτούς, ἐνδυσώμεθα<sup>2</sup> δὲ τὰ ὄπλα τοῦ φωτός. ὡς ἐν 13  
 ἡμέρᾳ εὐσχημόνως περιπατήσωμεν, μὴ κώμοις καὶ μέθαις,  
 μὴ κοίταις καὶ ἀσελγείαις, μὴ ἔριδι καὶ ζήλῳ ἀλλ' ἐνδύ- 14

<sup>1</sup> ὦρα ἡμῶς ἤδη.<sup>2</sup> καὶ ἐνδυσ.

10. Or to come to the conclusion in a different way. Love works no ill to our neighbour; that is to say, it breaks none of the commandments of the law which have been just mentioned, therefore, in other words, love fulfils the law. (11—13.) What follows, the Apostle has clothed in an allegory. The night is far spent, the day is at hand. It is midnight still, and yet he seems to see the morning light. He has been awake, while others slept. Surely the night is far spent, he says, it cannot be so long as it was.

11. καὶ τοῦτο, *and this too.*] 1 Cor. vi. 6—8.; Eph. ii. 8.

It has been remarked that in the New Testament we find no exhortations grounded on the shortness of life. As if the end of life had no practical importance for the first believers, compared with the day of the Lord. Like one of the old prophets, St. Paul already seems to see “the morning spread upon the mountains.” The night has endured long enough, and the ends of the world are come. Comp. 1 Thess. v. 1—5., and Essay in Vol. I. On Belief in the Coming of Christ.

νῦν γὰρ ἐγγύτερον ἡμῶν ἡ σω-

*τηρία, for now our salvation is nearer than when we believed.*] So much time has elapsed since we first received the Gospel, that he cannot long delay his coming. Yet the very consciousness of this is not unlike the feeling expressed in 2 Peter, iii. 4.:—“Where is the promise of his coming? for since the fathers fell asleep, all things continue as they were from the beginning of the creation.”

Comp. Ezekiel, xii. 22, 23.: “Son of man, what is that proverb that ye have in the land of Israel, saying, The days are prolonged, and every vision faileth?”

“Tell them therefore, Thus saith the Lord God, I will make this proverb to cease, and they shall no more use it as a proverb in Israel; but say unto them, The days are at hand, and the effect of every vision.”

ἡμῶν may be taken either with ἡ σωτηρία, Eph. i. 13., Phil. ii. 12., or with ἐγγύτερον.

But why should the Apostle address the Roman Christians in such startling language? Had they been asleep like the heathen around them? It is the language of the preacher now and then, and in the old time before that



10 self. Love worketh no ill to his neighbour: therefore  
 11 love is the fulfilling of the law. And this,\* knowing the  
 time, that now it is high time to awake out of sleep: for  
 12 now is our salvation nearer than when we believed. The  
 night is far spent, the day is at hand: let us therefore  
 cast off the works of darkness, and let us put on the  
 13 armour of light. Let us walk honestly, as in the day;  
 not in rioting and drunkenness, not in chambering and  
 14 wantonness, not in strife and envying. But put ye on

—“Awake thou that sleepest, and arise from the dead,” which, however often repeated, finds men sleeping still.

12. ἡ νύξ προέκοψεν, *the night is far spent.*] The night is far spent; let us lay aside the garment of the night, that is, the deeds of darkness. The idea of a garment is contained in ἀποθώμεθα, which is opposed to ἐνδύσμεθα in what follows. “And let us put on the armour of light;” compare Eph. vi. The Greek Fathers give several reasons why in the first clause the Apostle should have used the word ἔργα, and in the second ὄπλα. If any reason is necessary, it may be said to arise from the latter word being more appropriate to express the position of the Christian in this world, arrayed for the conflict against evil.

13. As in the face of day, let us walk decently. Two figures of speech here blend. Let us walk as in the light of day, let us walk as in the day of the Lord; let us walk as men commonly do in the eyes of their fellow-men, remembering that we are walking in the eye of God.

μὴ κώμοις . . . μὴ κοίταις.] On what analogy are these cases to

be explained? Those who regard them as datives of relation, say that they are governed of the idea of ζῶμεν contained in the words εὐσχημόνως περιπατήσωμεν. But datives of relation cannot be assumed at pleasure, and although ζῆν θεῷ, or even ζῆν κοίταις, may be Greek, it does not follow that περιπατεῖν κοίταις, in the sense of to walk for, or in reference to, something, will be an allowable expression, unless assisted by some similar use of the dative with another verb in a parallel clause. Some other explanation of the cases in question is required. It is not, however, necessary that the grammarian should confine himself to any single way of conceiving the relation expressed by them. Either they follow the analogy of ὀδῶ περιπατεῖν, or ἐν is omitted (a mode of speech which may be fairly used where ἐν is commonly inserted), or they are datives of the rule as it is termed, like τοῖς ἔθεσι περιπατεῖν, in Acts, xxi. 21., or grammar fails, and, as often in Sophocles, an obscure sense of two or three imperfect constructions may make up a good one.

14. ἐνδύσασθε, *put on.*] Compare Gal. iii. 27., where the word

σασθε τὸν κύριον Ἰησοῦν χριστόν, καὶ τῆς σαρκὸς πρό-  
νοιαν μὴ ποιεῖσθε εἰς ἐπιθυμίαν.

occurs, as perhaps also here, with an allusion to the garment in which the baptized person was clothed after coming up out of the water;—“For as many of you as were baptized into Christ,

the Lord Jesus Christ, and make not provision for the flesh, unto\* the lusts thereof.

have put on Christ." Compare result and object; as elsewhere,  
notes on 1 Thess. v. 1—10. "which thing tends to lust."

*εις επιθυμίας.*] Confusion of



## CHAP XIV.

It has been already stated, that we hardly know anything of the Roman Church. Hence the illustrations of the present chapter must rather consist in references to the floating opinions of the time than to precise facts. Even in regard to what we may seem to gather from the Epistle itself, it is not quite certain whether St. Paul is speaking from a knowledge of the circumstances of a Church which he had never visited, or from what he knew of the state of other Churches and of general tendencies in the mind of the first believers, or in the age generally. He may have had among his numerous acquaintances (xvi.) some who, like the household of Chloe at Corinth, brought him news of what passed among the Christians at Rome. On the other hand, it may be remarked that a mention of similar observances to those here spoken of, recurs in the Epistle to the Colossians; and that a like scrupulosity of temper appears to have existed among the converts at Corinth.

The practices about which the first believers had scruples and on which the Apostle here touches, were — the use of animal food, and the observance of special days. The most probable guess at the nature of these scruples is that they were of half-Jewish, half-Oriental origin; similar practices existed among Jewish Essenes or Gentile Pythagoreans. Abstinence from animal food may be regarded as one among many indications of the ever-increasing influence of the East upon the West; unnatural as it seems to us, like circumcision it had become a second nature to a great portion of mankind. Fancy represented the eating of flesh as a species of cannibalism, and the Ebionites declared the practice to be an

nvention of evil demons (Clem. Hom. viii. 10—16.). And with those who were far from superstitions of this kind, the fear of eating things offered to idols, or forbidden by the Mosaic law, operated so as to make them abstain where there was a danger of contact with Gentiles. Instances of such scruples occur in the book of Daniel and the Apocrypha. It was the glory of Daniel and the three holy children that they would “not defile themselves with the portion of the King’s food;” Dan. i. 8. So Tobit “kept himself from eating the bread of the Gentiles;” i. 10, 11. Judas Maccabeus and nine others, living “in the mountains after the manner of beasts, fed on herbs continually, lest they should become partakers of the pollution;” 2 Macc. v. 27. Such examples show what the Jews had learned to practise or admire in the centuries immediately preceding the Christian era. So John the Baptist, in the narrative of the Gospels, “fed on locusts and wild honey.” A later age delighted to attribute a similar abstinence to James the brother of the Lord (Heges. apud Euseb. H. E. ii. 23.); and to Matthew (Clem. Alex. Pæd. ii. 1. p. 174.); heretical writers added Peter to the list of these encratites (Epiph. Her. xxx. 2., Clem. Hom. xii. 6.). The Apostolical canons (li. liii.) admit an ascetic abstinence, but denounce those who abstain from any sense of the impurity of matter. See passages quoted in Fritsche, vol. iii. pp. 151, 152.

Jewish, as well as Alexandrian and Oriental influences, combined to maintain the practice of abstinence from animal food in the first centuries. Long after it had ceased to be a Jewish scruple, it remained as a counsel of perfection. In earlier ages, it was the former more than the latter. Those for whom the Apostle is urging consideration are the weak, rather than the strong; not the ascetic, delighting to make physical purity the outward sign of holiness of life — against him it might have been necessary to contend for the freedom of the Gospel, — but “the babe in Christ,” feeble in heart and confused in head, who could not disengage himself from opinions or practices which he saw around him; for whom, nevertheless, Christ died.

Respecting the second point of the observance of days, we know no more than may be gathered from Gal. iv. 9, 10. 17., "How turn ye again to the weak and beggarly elements whereunto ye again desire to be in bondage? ye observe days, and months, and times, and years;" where the Apostle is writing to a Church entangled in Judaism, which he therefore thinks it necessary to denounce: and Col. ii. 16., "Let no man therefore judge you in respect of an holyday or a new moon, or of the sabbath days:" where the Apostle also reproves the same spirit as inconsistent with the close connexion or rather identity of the believer with his Lord. Whether in the Epistle to the Romans he is alluding to the Jewish observance of the Sabbath is uncertain; his main point is that the matter, whatever it was, should be left indifferent, and not determined by any decision of the Church. Superstitions of another kind may have also found their way among the Roman as well as the Colossian and Galatian converts. Astrology was practised both by Jew and Gentile; nor is it improbable that something of a heathen mingled with what was mainly of a Jewish character; the context of the two passages just quoted (Col. ii. 18. 20., Gal. iv. 9.), would lead us to think so. It is true that the words, *ὅς μὲν κρίνει ἡμέραν παρ' ἡμέραν, ὅς δὲ κρίνει πᾶσαν ἡμέραν* (ver. 5.), probably mean only that "one man fasts on alternate days, another fasts every day." But the expression *ὁ φρονῶν τὴν ἡμέραν*, in ver. 6., implies also the observance of particular days.

It has been already intimated, that this chapter furnishes no sure criterion that the Roman converts were either Jews or Gentiles. If it be admitted that it has any bearing at all on the state of the Roman converts, it tends to show that they were, not simply Gentiles converted from the ancient religion of Rome to Judaism or Christianity, but persons into whose minds Oriental notions had previously insinuated themselves, who with or before Christianity had received distinctions of days, and of meats and drinks, which in St. Paul's view were the very opposite of it. If, on the other hand, we suppose St. Paul to have written without any precise knowledge of



the state of the Roman Church, we may regard this chapter, and part of that which follows, as characteristic of the general feeling in the Churches to which the Apostle preached.

The subject recurs in the eighth and tenth chapters of the First Epistle to the Corinthians. Here, as there, the Apostle knows but one way of treating these scruples and distinctions which were so alien to his own mind. It may be shortly described as absorbing the letter in the Spirit. When you see the weak brother doubting about his paltry observances, remember that the strength of God is sufficient for him ; when you feel disposed to judge him, consider that he is another's servant, and that God will judge both him and you ; when you rejoice in your own liberty, do not forget that this liberty may be to him "an occasion of stumbling." Place yourself above his weaknesses by placing yourself below them, remembering that your very strength gives him a claim on you for support."

· Τὸν δὲ ἀσθενοῦντα τῇ πίστει προσλαμβάνεσθε μὴ εἰς 14  
 διακρίσεις διαλογισμῶν. ὃς μὲν πιστεύει φαγεῖν πάντα, ὁ 2  
 δὲ ἀσθενῶν λάχανα ἐσθίει. ὁ ἐσθίων τὸν μὴ ἐσθίοντα μὴ 3  
 ἐξουθενεῖτω, ὁ δὲ μὴ ἐσθίων<sup>1</sup> τὸν ἐσθίοντα μὴ κρινέτω·  
 ὁ θεὸς γὰρ αὐτὸν προσελάβετο. σὺ τίς εἶ ὁ κρίνων ἀλ- 4  
 λότριον οἰκέτην; τῷ ἰδίῳ κυρίῳ στήκει ἢ πίπτει· σταθή-  
 σεται δὲ, δυνατεῖ γὰρ<sup>2</sup> ὁ κύριος στήσαι αὐτόν. ὃς μὲν 5  
 [γὰρ<sup>3</sup>] κρίνει ἡμέραν παρ' ἡμέραν, ὃς δὲ κρίνει πᾶσαν ἡμέ-

<sup>1</sup> καὶ ὁ μὴ ἐσθίων.<sup>2</sup> δυνατὸς γὰρ ἐστί.<sup>3</sup> Om. γὰρ.

XIV. 1. τὸν ἀσθενοῦντα τῇ πίστει, *him that is weak in the faith.*] These words do not mean him that has a half-belief in Christianity, but him that doubteth, him that has not an enlightened belief, who has not “knowledge,” whose “conscience being weak,” is liable “to be defiled.” Comp. 1 Cor. viii. 1. 7.

μὴ εἰς διακρίσεις διαλογισμῶν, *not to judge his doubtful thoughts.*] From the word διακρίνεσθαι in ver. 23. being used for to doubt, it is inferred in the English version, that the word διάκρισις may be used in the sense of doubtings, “not to doubtful disputations.” This is the fallacy of paronymous words; the real meaning of διάκρισις is “discerning, determining.” “Receive him that is weak, not to determinations of matters of dispute.” “Receive him that is weak,” says the Apostle; but then occurs the afterthought, “do not determine his scruples; that might be injurious to the Church, and narrow its pale by excluding others who have another kind of scruple.”

2. ὃς μὲν πιστεύει, *one man believeth.*] Not as in the English Version, one man believeth that he may eat all things, but in the same sense as πίστις of the pre-

ceding verse — “one man has faith so that he eats all things.” The play of words in πίστις and πιστεύει is confirmed by numberless similar instances in St. Paul’s writings. Compare ver. 22., σὺ πίστιν ἔχεις.

ὁ δὲ ἀσθενῶν.] “But the weak, of whom I spoke before;” not opposed to ὃς μὲν, but referring to ver. 1.

3. ὁ ἐσθίων, *let not him that eateth.*] If the clause in which these words are contained refers to what immediately precedes, ὁ ἐσθίων must have λάχανα supplied after it. “Let not him that eateth herbs, despise him that eateth all things;” or, in other words, does not maintain the same ascetic purity as himself. But then what is to be made of what follows?—“Let not him that eateth not herbs (specially) judge him that eateth.” For we should expect that the more scrupulous should judge the less so, not the reverse.

It is better to take the words generally, without reference to preceding λάχανα ἐσθίει. The Apostle means to distinguish two classes, those who eat and those who abstain; the characteristic which he feared in the former class being contempt of others; in the latter censoriousness. This

14 Him that is weak in the faith receive ye, not to judge\*  
 2 his doubtful thoughts. For one has\* faith to eat all  
 3 things : but\* he that is weak, eateth herbs. Let not  
 4 him that eateth despise him that eateth not ; and let  
 5 not him which eateth not judge him that eateth : for God  
 hath received him. Who art thou that judgest another's  
 servant ? to his own Lord\* he standeth or falleth.  
 And holden up he shall be\* : for the Lord is able to  
 make him stand. One man approves\* every other day :  
 another approves every day. Let every man be fully

is expressed in the opposition of *ἐξουθενείτω* and *κρινέτω*. Narrow-minded scrupulous men judge others by their own petty standard ; men of the world are hardly less intolerant in despising scruples.

ὁ θεὸς γὰρ αὐτὸν προσελάβετο.] For it is not you who receive him into the Church, but God. Strictly speaking, these words refer only to the preceding clause, but they may be applied by analogy to the previous one. Compare xv. 7:—*διὸ προσλαμβάνεσθε ἀλλήλους, καθὼς καὶ ὁ χριστὸς προσελάβετο ἡμᾶς εἰς δόξαν τοῦ θεοῦ.*

4. The Apostle speaks generally, intending to include both the cases mentioned in the previous verse. As he argued in the last chapter — “You ought to pay tribute, for it is a debt to God ;” so here he urges, that to judge our brother in matters indifferent, is taking a liberty with another man's servant. “Who art thou who judgest the servant of another man ? It is no concern of yours ; not to you but to his own Master is he accountable, whether he stand or fall.” And then, as if it were a word of ill omen even to suggest that he

should fall, he adds, but he shall stand, as we may in faith believe, for God is able to make him stand. He is a weak brother, I speak as a man, therefore he is likely to fall. But, believing in the omnipotence of God, I say he is so much more likely to stand also, for “my strength is perfected in weakness.” Compare James, iv. 12., “There is one lawgiver who is able to save and to destroy ; who art thou that judgest another ?” and Rom. ix. 20.

5. *ὃς μὲν κρίνει ἡμέραν παρ' ἡμέραν, one man approves every other day,* is parallel to the second verse. The Apostle takes up the subject in reference to another scruple. The words have been explained, (1.) one approves alternate days, another every day ; or, (2.) one judges one day before another, another judges every day to be the same ; or, (3.) one man approves alternate days [for eating flesh], another every day.

The third of these interpretations gives a good sense, but requires too great an addition to the words of the original, *κρίνει* (*sc. ἐσθίειν*), to be admissible. The



ραν· ἕκαστος ἐν τῷ ἰδίῳ νοῦ πληροφορεῖσθω. ὁ φρονῶν 6  
 τὴν ἡμέραν κυρίῳ φρονεῖ.<sup>1</sup> καὶ ὁ ἐσθίων κυρίῳ ἐσθίει·  
 εὐχαριστεῖ γὰρ τῷ θεῷ· καὶ ὁ μὴ ἐσθίων κυρίῳ οὐκ ἐσθίει  
 καὶ εὐχαριστεῖ τῷ θεῷ. οὐδεὶς γὰρ ἡμῶν ἑαυτῷ ζῆν, καὶ 7  
 οὐδεὶς ἑαυτῷ ἀποθνήσκει· εἴαν τε γὰρ ζῶμεν, τῷ κυρίῳ 8  
 ζῶμεν, εἴαν τε ἀποθνήσκομεν<sup>2</sup>, τῷ κυρίῳ ἀποθνήσκομεν.  
 εἴαν τε οὖν ζῶμεν εἴαν τε ἀποθνήσκομεν, τοῦ κυρίου ἐσμέν.  
 εἰς τοῦτο γὰρ χριστὸς ἀπέθανεν καὶ ἔζησεν<sup>3</sup>, ἵνα καὶ νεκρῶν 9

<sup>1</sup> Add καὶ ὁ μὴ φρονῶν τὴν ἡμέραν κυρίῳ οὐ φρονεῖ.

<sup>2</sup> ἀποθνήσκομεν.

<sup>3</sup> ἀνέστη καὶ ἀνέζησεν.

second also gives a good sense, and agrees with the style of St. Paul in the play upon the word *κρίνει*, which has its meaning in the first clause carried on in the second. As we might say, "one man sets apart a seventh portion of time for a sabbath, another makes every day a sabbath."

No authority can, however, be adduced for *παρ' ἡμέραν* in the sense of "before another day," while the phrase *ἡμέραν παρ' ἡμέραν* is common in the sense of alternate days. We are therefore compelled to adopt the first interpretation. One man selects, approves, distinguishes alternate days; another man selects every day. The meaning of *κρίνει* in the first clause is played upon in the second. A further play on the word *κρίνω* occurs in ver. 13.

[ἕκαστος ἐν τῷ ἰδίῳ νοῦ.] Let each be satisfied in his own mind, not compelled by some external rule. This individual liberty of conscience is with the Apostle an essential part of the Gospel, a law for ourselves, and to be respected in others.

6. Whether we eat flesh and observe days or not, we are all Christians; we do not disagree in the main point, which is doing

all to the glory of God. He who eats, and he who abstains, agree in giving God thanks.

As our Lord answers the difficulties put to him by the Pharisees by stirring higher and deeper questions, as St. Paul himself concludes the discussion on marriage, by carrying it into another world, "It remaineth, that they that have wives be as though they had none," 1 Cor. vii. 29.; as touching meats offered to idols he allows the rule of Christian charity to weaker brethren to be superseded by the wider and more general principle, "Whether ye eat or drink, do all to the glory of God," 1 Cor. x. 31.: as the possibility of the Christian "living in sin that grace may abound," is dispelled by the thought of union with Christ; so too, scruples respecting meats and drinks are lost in the sense of our relation to Christ and God, which furnishes the practical rule for our treatment of them. The remembrance of this common relation is also an assurance both to the lax and the strict, that the brethren whom they judge or despise are believers equally with themselves.

7 and 8. "For in discussing

6 persuaded in his own mind. He that regardeth the day, regardeth it unto the Lord.<sup>1</sup> He that eateth, eateth to the Lord, for he giveth God thanks; and he that eateth not, to the Lord he eateth not, and giveth  
7 God thanks. For none of us liveth to himself, and no  
8 man dieth to himself. For whether we live, we live unto the Lord; and whether we die, we die unto the Lord: whether we live therefore, or die, we are the  
9 Lord's. For to this end Christ both died, and lived<sup>2</sup>, that he might be Lord both of the dead and living.

<sup>1</sup> Add and he that regardeth not the day, to the Lord doth not regard it.

<sup>2</sup> Rose. Add and revived.

these questions we are insensibly led on to higher thoughts. No one of us liveth unto himself, and none of us dieth unto himself. Whether we live, or whether we die, it is unto the Lord, whose we are. It is observable that the two expressions *ἐαυτῷ ζῆν* and *ἐαυτῷ ἀποθνῆσκει* are not taken in precisely the same sense, but with a difference similar to that in chap. vi. 10., *τῇ ἁμαρτίᾳ ἀπέθανεν ἐφ' ἅπαξ . . . ζῆ τῷ Θεῷ*.

What do all these things matter to him whose life is hid with Christ in God, who feels that nothing can separate him from Christ, who thinks of them in connexion only with the life of Christ?

8. As men and women may be said to live for one another, as Christ is said to live unto God, so the believer is said to live unto Christ. Compare 1 Cor. vi. 19., *οὐκ ἔστε ἑαυτῶν*, "ye are not your own;" and 1 Thess. v. 10., "Who died for us, that whether we wake or sleep, we should be the Lord's." The genitive expresses a closer and more intimate relation of Christ to the believer than the

dative, which precedes. We live and die to Him, and therefore are His: neither life nor death can make us cease to be so.

9. Here, as in ch. iv. ver. 25., there is a correspondence between the life of Christ and that of his followers — "We live and die unto the Lord, and this was the reason why Christ died and lived;" to which is added a further statement of the same reason, "that he might be our Lord in life and death." The order of the words *ἀπέθανεν καὶ ἐζήσεν* shows that the life here spoken of is the resurrection. Hence the word "lived" is not taken in precisely the same sense as "the living" in the following clause.

It is argued that we cannot suppose the Apostle to have meant that Christ died that he might rule the dead, and rose again that he might rule the living; but that the two clauses must be taken as one; "Christ died and rose again that he might be the ruler over all." The remarks made on iv. 25. are applicable here. The distribution

καὶ ζώντων κυριεύση. σὺ δὲ τί κρίνεις τὸν ἀδελφόν σου ; 10  
 ἢ καὶ σὺ τί ἐξουθενεῖς τὸν ἀδελφόν σου ; πάντες γὰρ πα- 11  
 ραστησόμεθα τῷ βήματι τοῦ θεοῦ.<sup>1</sup> γέγραπται γάρ Ζῶ 11  
 ἐγώ, λέγει κύριος, ὅτι ἐμοὶ κάμψει πᾶν γόνυ, καὶ ἐξομο- 12  
 λογήσεται πᾶσα γλῶσσα<sup>2</sup> τῷ θεῷ. ἄρα<sup>3</sup> ἕκαστος ἡμῶν 12  
 περὶ ἑαυτοῦ λόγον ἀποδώσει<sup>4</sup> [τῷ θεῷ]. μηκέτι οὖν ἀλλή- 13  
 λους κρίνωμεν, ἀλλὰ τοῦτο κρίνατε μᾶλλον, τὸ μὴ τιθέναι 14  
 πρόσκομμα τῷ ἀδελφῷ ἢ σκάνδαλον. οἶδα καὶ πέπεισμαι 14

<sup>1</sup> χριστοῦ.<sup>2</sup> πᾶσα γλῶσσα ἐξόμολ.<sup>3</sup> Add οὖν.<sup>4</sup> δώσει.

of the clauses in the present instance is to our mode of thought unnatural, but it was natural to St. Paul, who divides and subdivides Christ's life analogously to the life of the believer.

There appeared to the Apostle a certain fitness in Christ being like us, tempted in all points like as we are, and therefore able to succour them that are tempted ; crucified, even as we are to crucify the lusts of the flesh ; dying, that we may die with Him ; rising again, that we may rise with Him. It is not simply that He once overcame death for us, or was offered up a sacrifice for sin. The Apostle's view is more present and lively, though from its not having passed into the language of creeds and articles, and perhaps also from something which we feel in it that belongs to another age, it has fallen out of daily use. Not only is Christ the source of the believer's acts, but He is the image of him in the different parts of his life. The believer is transformed into His likeness, not merely by putting on Christ, that is, by being clothed with His holiness, or invested with His merits, but by going through the stages of His existence. We cannot precisely analyse what the

Apostle meant by this "identity," the superficial form of which is due to the peculiar rhetorical character of the age. the deeper and hidden thought being that, both inwardly and outwardly, as He was, so ought we to be, — so are we in this world.

κυριεύση.] Comp. κύριος, ver. 8.

10. σὺ δὲ τί κρίνεις ;] "But why dost thou judge thy brother?" As in other passages, the Apostle recapitulates his former thought (comp. ver. 4. and Rom. iii. 1., iv. 1.), the relation in which we all stand to Christ, on which he has been dwelling in the previous verses, being a new reason for abstaining from judging others.

δέ.] "But seeing that we are to live, not for ourselves, but for Christ, who also lived and died for us, why dost thou judge another?" The δέ also anticipates an opposition to the clause following. The words, κρίνειν and ἐξουθενεῖν, are repeated from ver. 3. ; they differ from each other as the spirit of cavilling or censoriousness from contempt. Compare the words of Christ, Matth. xviii. 6. 10, 11., "Whosoever shall offend one of these little ones which believe in me, it were better for him that a millstone were



10 But why dost thou judge thy brother? or why dost  
 thou set at nought thy brother? for we shall all stand  
 11 before the judgment seat of God.<sup>1</sup> For it is written,  
 As I live, saith the Lord, every knee shall bow to me,  
 12 and every tongue shall confess to God. So then every  
 13 one of us shall give account of himself to God. Let us  
 not therefore judge one another any more: but judge  
 this rather, that no man put a stumblingblock or an  
 14 occasion to fall in his brother's way. I know, and am

<sup>1</sup> Christ.

hanged about his neck, and that he were cast into the sea."

In ver. 4. the Apostle had said — "Who art thou who judgest another man's servant;" here he gives a new aspect to the thought — "Why dost thou judge thy brother? for he and you alike, and all of us, have another judge." Compare 2 Cor. v. 10., whence the various reading *χριστοῦ* is probably derived.

11. The prediction of a future judgment the Apostle further confirms from Isaiah, xlv. 23., which he quotes according to the Alexandrian MS. of the LXX. The *ὅτι* is dependent on the idea of asseveration contained in *ζῶ ἐγώ*.

*ἔξομολογήσεται, shall confess,*] but whether their sins, or the truth that God is God, is not precisely stated. The connexion favours the first sense; the parallel passage of Phil. ii. 11. tends to confirm the second. "Every tongue shall confess that Jesus Christ is Lord, to the glory of God the Father." The LXX. use *ὁμολογεῖσθαι* almost exclusively in the sense of "giving praises," "returning thanks to." And such is probably its meaning

in the original passage. But here, as often elsewhere, the meaning of the original is not a guide to the meaning of the application; the connexion especially with ver. 12. shows that the word is taken, as commonly in the N. T., in the sense of "confess."

12. So then it will not be about others, but about himself that each one of us will have to give an account. The emphasis is on *περὶ ἑαυτοῦ*.

13. Let us not, therefore, persist any longer in determining that this man is right, and that man wrong; but let us rather determine not to put a stumblingblock in our brother's way.

For the latter sense given to *κρίνω* in the paronomasia, comp. 2 Cor. ii. 1., *ἐκρίνα δὲ ἑμαυτῷ τοῦτο τὸ μὴ πάλιν ἐν λύπῃ πρὸς ὑμᾶς ἔλθεῖν*.

*ἡ σκάνδαλον*] is an explanation of *πρόσκομμα*.

14. The Apostle goes on to explain the feeling under which he says all this; not that he disagrees with the stronger brethren who suppose that all these things are indifferent. Indeed as a Christian (*ἐν κυρίῳ Ἰησοῦ*) he knows as

ἐν κυρίῳ Ἰησοῦ ὅτι οὐδὲν κοινὸν δι' αὐτοῦ<sup>1</sup>, εἰ μὴ τῷ  
 λογιζομένῳ τι κοινὸν εἶναι, ἐκείνῳ κοινόν. εἰ γὰρ<sup>2</sup> διὰ 15  
 βρώμα ὁ ἀδελφός σου λυπεῖται, οὐκέτι κατὰ ἀγάπην περι-  
 πατεῖς. μὴ τῷ βρώματί σου ἐκείνον ἀπόλλυε, ὑπὲρ οὗ  
 χριστὸς ἀπέθανεν. μὴ βλασφημείσθω οὖν ὑμῶν τὸ ἀγαθόν. 16  
 οὐ γὰρ ἔστιν ἡ βασιλεία τοῦ θεοῦ βρώσις καὶ πόσις, ἀλλὰ 17

<sup>1</sup> ἐαυτοῦ.<sup>2</sup> δέ.

well as they do, that the distinction of clean and unclean meats is a mere superstition. "Not that which goeth into a man defleth a man." He says so broadly and generally, but his object is to show that this makes no difference in the case of another. "Your conscience cannot judge for him, your knowledge will not pluck the scruple from his soul." Therefore, however much he knows all this, he will not act upon it; the right use of his strength is to support his brother's weakness.

The words ἐν κυρίῳ Ἰησοῦ do not mean as one taught by Christ, as one who has received a revelation from Christ. They are simply the form in which St. Paul expresses his living and doing all things in Christ, as in language colder and more natural to our time, we might say as "a Christian."

δι' αὐτοῦ, not "through Christ," but "in itself;" a meaning of the words which does not require αὐτοῦ any more than it is required in such expressions as αὐτοὶ κατ' αὐτῶν, &c., in the Tragic writers. The reading is frequently uncertain. But there is nothing contrary to the genius of the Greek language, in such a use of the demonstrative, which is not uncommon, especially in Homer, and may be compared with the

English reflexive use of the word "self."

15. "For reasoning with you I say that, if you pain your brother, you violate the law of love." That he may be so pained has been already intimated in the words, ἐκείνῳ κοινόν. γὰρ, which is not the reading of the Textus Receptus, but of the far greater number of MS., may also be referred back with more precision to ver. 13., "For if you do put an offence in your brother's way, you violate the rule of love."

The Gospel is the law of freedom, and cannot by any possibility admit scruples respecting meats and drinks. But when we have not our own case to consider, but that of our brethren, when (to bring the precept home to ourselves) the difference between us is the question of a sabbath day, the very same principle of freedom leads us to avoid giving offence by our freedom. Our brother sees strongly the sin and guilt of what we nevertheless know to be our Christian liberty, and love must induce us to abridge our rights for his sake. We must not take him by force, and compel him to witness what he supposes to be our evil; still less must we induce him to follow our example and defile his conscience. Yet we cannot say that we must give up everything

persuaded in\* the Lord Jesus, that there is nothing unclean of itself: but to him that esteemeth any thing  
 15 to be unclean, to him it is unclean. For<sup>1</sup> if thy brother be grieved with thy meat, now walkest thou not charitably. Destroy not him with thy meat, for whom Christ  
 16 died. Let not then your good be evil spoken of: for the  
 17

<sup>1</sup> But.

that offends our brother. Such a rule would be impracticable, and if not impracticable, often full of evil. It was not the rule which St. Paul himself adopted with the Judaizers, "to whom he gave way, no, not for an hour." It is not the rule which he enjoins when matters of importance are at stake; and the most indifferent things cease to be indifferent the moment an attempt is made to impose them upon others. Only in reference to the particular circumstances of the Church, and to the passions of men ever prone to exaggerate their party differences, the rule of consideration for others is the safer side.

μη τῷ βρώματι,] *sc.* by the eating flesh, comp. ver. 21. Either by being induced against his conscience to imitate the example set him; or more probably, by the antagonism which would be aroused in his bosom, towards his brethren.

ὑπὲρ οὗ χριστὸς ἀπέθανεν.] Destroy not him with thy meat, whom Christ thought of so much importance that he died for him; "Ne pluris feceris cibum tuum quam Christus vitam suam."—Bengel.

16. μη βλασφημεῖσθω οὖν ὑμῶν τὸ ἀγαθόν, *let not then your good be evil spoken of.*] Either the precept is general, "let us live innocently so as to give no place

to reproach," or, with more point, the words may be referred to the case of the stronger brethren. Let not that good or superiority which we have in our Christian freedom be a matter of reproach with others. In this latter case, if we read ὑμῶν, the Apostle is addressing the stronger brethren; if ἡμῶν, he is identifying himself with them.

It is a good thing, we might say, to know that Christ does not require of us the observance of the Jewish sabbath; it is a good thing to know that, without form of prayer or set times and places, "neither in Jerusalem nor on this mountain," we can worship the Father; to know that there is no rite or ceremony or ordinance that God cannot dispense with; or rather, that there is none which we are required to observe, except so far as they tend to a moral end. It is a good thing to know that Revelation can be interpreted by no other light than that of reason; it is a good thing to know that God is not extreme to mark human infirmities in our lives and conduct. But all this may serve for a cloak of licentiousness, may be a scandal among men, and humanly speaking, the destruction of those for whom Christ died.

17. οὐ γὰρ ἐστὶν ἡ βασιλεία τοῦ θεοῦ βρώσις καὶ πόσις.] For the kingdom of God does not consist



δικαιοσύνη καὶ εἰρήνη καὶ χαρὰ ἐν πνεύματι ἁγίῳ· ὁ 18  
 γὰρ ἐν τούτῳ<sup>1</sup> δουλεύων χριστῷ εὐάρεστος τῷ θεῷ καὶ  
 δόκιμος τοῖς ἀνθρώποις. ἄρα οὖν τὰ τῆς εἰρήνης διώ- 19  
 κωμεν καὶ τὰ τῆς οἰκοδομῆς τῆς εἰς ἀλλήλους. μὴ 20  
 ἔνεκεν βρώματος κατάλυε τὸ ἔργον τοῦ θεοῦ, πάντα  
 μὲν καθαρὰ, ἀλλὰ κακὸν τῷ ἀνθρώπῳ τῷ διὰ προσκόμ-  
 ματος ἐσθίουσι· καλὸν τὸ μὴ φαγεῖν κρέα μηδὲ πιεῖν 21  
 οἶνον μηδὲ ἐν ᾧ ὁ ἀδελφός σου προσκόπτει ἢ σκανδα-  
 λίζεται ἢ ἀσθενεῖ. σὺ πίστιν ἦν<sup>2</sup> ἔχεις<sup>3</sup> κατὰ σεαυτὸν 22

<sup>1</sup> τούτοις.<sup>2</sup> Om. ἦν.<sup>3</sup> ἔχεις;

of sensual goods, but of Christian graces. The kingdom of heaven of which the Apostle is speaking is the kingdom of God that is within, the life hidden with Christ and God; not the visible Church, or the doctrine which Christ and his Apostles taught.

ἀλλὰ δικαιοσύνη, κ. τ. λ.] In these words the Apostle describes generally the inward and moral character of the kingdom of God, with an allusion to the subject of their differences in the word peace.

χαρά.] The Christian character naturally suggests ideas of sorrow, of peace, of consolation; not so naturally to ourselves the thought of joy and glorying which constantly recurs in the writings of the Apostle. These seem to belong to that circle of Christian graces, of which hope is the centre, which have almost vanished in the phraseology of modern times. ἐν πνεύματι ἁγίῳ, a holy joy, like all the other feelings of the Christian, seeking for its ground in some power beyond him, that is to say, in communion with the Spirit of God.

18. ἐν τούτῳ,] not ἐν τούτοις, is the true reading, though the more

difficult to explain. It can scarcely be referred to anything, except ἐν πνεύματι ἁγίῳ, which precedes. For he who is the servant of Christ, not in the performance of external rites, but inwardly in communion with the Holy Spirit, is acceptable to God and accounted worthy among men. The last two expressions have reference to "the kingdom of God," in ver. 17.; and to the precept not to let our good be evil spoken of, in ver. 16.: "For he who in the Spirit serves Christ, has entered into the kingdom of God, and is not ill spoken of among men."

19. ἄρα οὖν τὰ τῆς εἰρήνης διώκωμεν καὶ τὰ τῆς οἰκοδομῆς τῆς εἰς ἀλλήλους.] So then, we pursue the things which tend to peace, and to the building up of one another in the faith. Compare 1 Cor. iii. 9.

20. is in part a repetition of ver. 15. with the addition of τὸ ἔργον τοῦ θεοῦ, which latter words may either be taken in connexion with the preceding (τὰ τῆς εἰρήνης and τὰ τῆς οἰκοδομῆς), as meaning the Christian life, which consists in peace and edifying, or better and more in St. Paul's manner, in reference to the weak brother

kingdom of God is not meat and drink ; but righteousness, and peace, and joy in the Holy Ghost. For he that in this<sup>1</sup> serveth Christ is acceptable to God, and approved of men. Let us therefore follow after the things which make for peace, and things where- with one may edify another. For meat destroy not the work of God. All things indeed are pure ; but it is evil for that man who eateth with offence. It is good neither to eat flesh, nor to drink wine, nor any thing whereby thy brother stumbleth, or is of- fended, or is made weak. The faith which thou hast

<sup>1</sup> These things.

himself, who, as other believers, might be termed the work of God. τὸ τοῦ Θεοῦ ἔργον thus becomes also a repetition of ἐκεῖνον, in ver. 15.

As in ver. 14. the Apostle admitted the objections which he himself put into the mouth of those who held meats and drinks to be indifferent, and replied to them, so here, he again expresses his agreement in principle with the stronger party, only to state with more force his precepts about the weaker brethren. "It is true that all things are pure, but woe to him who eateth with offence."

διὰ προσκόμματος.] With offence to whom? to himself, or to others? If we say to himself, the words will refer to the weak brother, who is induced to eat from seeing others eat; and his conscience being weak, is defiled; an interpretation which agrees with ver. 14. and with the parallel passage in 1 Cor. But the verses which follow, have plainly a reference to the offence given, not to a man's own conscience, but to

others. We are therefore led to take the words as equivalent to ἐν ᾧ ὁ ἀδελφός σου προσκόπτει, in ver. 21. The opposite view might, however, be confirmed by observing that the Apostle returns to the other side of the subject in ver. 23.

21. It is good not to eat meat, nor to drink wine, nor (to eat or drink) anything whereby thy brother stumbleth, or is entangled, or made weak.

The Apostle is using the expression to eat meat, or to drink wine generally, neither with particular reference to any customs of Nazarites or Essenes, nor to luxurious and dainty fare. He merely means—"It is good not to eat or drink anything whatever that will give offence to our brethren."

ἐν ᾧ is best explained by the repetition of φαγεῖν and πιεῖν.

22. Of the two readings, σὺ πίστιν ἔχεις, with an interrogative, σὺ πίστιν ἦν ἔχεις, without an interrogative, the latter has the greater MS. authority, the former is more like St. Paul. Hast

ἔχε ἐνώπιον τοῦ θεοῦ. μακάριος ὁ μὴ κρίνων ἑαυτὸν ἐν  
 ᾧ δοκιμάζει· ὁ δὲ διακρινόμενος ἐὰν φάγη κατακέκριται, ὅτι <sup>23</sup>  
 οὐκ ἐκ πίστεως· πᾶν δὲ ὁ οὐκ ἐκ πίστεως, ἁμαρτία ἐστίν.

thou faith, keep it to thyself. "Blessed is he who judgeth not himself in that which he alloweth." It is a happy thing not to have a scrupulous conscience. I admit your superiority, I am not saying that you are not better than he. Only keep it to yourself and the presence of God. Compare 1 Cor. xiv. 28., *ἑαυτῷ δὲ λαλείτω καὶ τῷ θεῷ.*

23. The Apostle adds a reason for the stronger respecting the scruples of the weaker. But

the case of the weaker brother is very different, he is condemned if he doubts, because doubt is inconsistent with faith, and whatever is not of faith is sin.

It has been often remarked that St. Paul's conception of sin is inseparable from the consciousness of sin. A trace of the same thought occurs in the present passage. He who is not confident of what is right has not faith, and is therefore a sinner. As above,



have to thyself<sup>1</sup> before God. Happy is he that condemneth not himself in that thing which he alloweth.  
 23 And he that doubteth is damned if he eat, because he eateth not of faith: for whatsoever is not of faith is sin.

<sup>1</sup> Hast thou faith? Have it to thyself.

faith delivered men from the law of sin and death; so here, where the sense of sin is, faith is wanting, and sin reassumes its former power. The law in one of its many forms returns, saying, not "thou shalt not covet," but "thou shalt not eat meats offered to idols;" introducing doubt and perplexity into the soul. That which makes sin to be what it is is the law; what in this parti-

cular instance makes the thing wrong, is the sense that it is so. As above, the law and faith were opposed, and the law was regarded as almost sin; so here, sin and faith are the antagonists. See Essay on the Law as the Strength of Sin.

For the doxology which in some MS. occurs in this place, see the end of the Epistle.

## CASUISTRY.

RELIGION and morality seem often to become entangled in circumstances. The truth which came, not "to bring peace upon earth, but a sword," could not but give rise to many new and conflicting obligations. The kingdom of God had to adjust itself with the kingdoms of this world ; though "the children were free," they could not escape the fulfilment of duties to their Jewish or Roman governors ; in the bosom of a family there were duties too ; in society there were many points of contact with the heathen. A new element of complexity had been introduced in all the relations between man and man, giving rise to many new questions, which might be termed, in the phraseology of modern times, "cases of conscience."

Of these the one which most frequently recurs in the Epistles of St. Paul, is the question respecting meats and drinks, which appears to have agitated both the Roman and Corinthian Churches, as well as those of Jerusalem and Antioch, and probably, in a greater or less degree, every other Christian community in the days of the Apostle. The scruple which gave birth to it was not confined to Christianity ; it was Eastern rather than Christian, and originated in a feeling into which entered, not only Oriental notions of physical purity and impurity, but also those of caste and of race. With other Eastern influences it spread towards the West, in the flux of all religions, exercising a peculiar power on the susceptible temper of mankind.

The same tendency exhibited itself in various forms. In one form it was the scruple of those who ate herbs, while others "had faith" to eat any thing. The Essenes and Therapeutæ among the Jews, and the Pythagoreans in the heathen world, had a similar feeling respecting the use of animal food. It was a natural association which led to such an abstinence. In the East, ever ready to connect,

or rather incapable of separating, ideas of moral and physical impurity,—where the heat of the climate rendered animal food unnecessary, if not positively unhealthful ; where corruption rapidly infected dead organised matter ; where, lastly, ancient tradition and ceremonies told of the sacredness of animals and the mysteriousness of animal life,—nature and religion alike seemed to teach the same lesson, it was safer to abstain. It was the manner of such a scruple to propagate itself. He who revolted at animal food could not quietly sit by and see his neighbour partake of it. The ceremonialism of the age was the tradition of thousands of years, and passed by a sort of contagion from one race to another, from Paganism or Judaism to Christianity. How to deal with this “second nature” was a practical difficulty among the first Christians. The Gospel was not a gospel according to the Essenes, and the church could not exclude those who held the scruples, neither could it be narrowed to them ; it would not pass judgment on them at all. Hence the force of the Apostle’s words : “Him that is weak in the faith receive, not to the decision of his doubts.”

There was another point in reference to which the same spirit of ceremonialism propagated itself, viz. meats offered to idols. Even if meat in general were innocent and a creature of God, it could hardly be a matter of indifference to partake of that which had been “sacrificed to devils ;” least of all, to sit at meat in the idol’s temple. True, the idol was “nothing in the world”—a block of stone, to which the words good or evil were misapplied ; “a graven image” which the workman made, “putting his hand to the hammer,” as the old prophets described in their irony. And such is the Apostle’s own feeling, 1 Cor. viii. 4., x. 19. But he has also the other feeling which he himself regards as not less true (1 Cor. x. 20.), and which was more natural to the mind of the first believers. When they saw the worshippers of the idol revelling in impurity, they could not but suppose that a spirit of some kind was there. Their warfare, as the Apostle had told them, was not “against



flesh and blood, but against principalities, against powers, against the rulers of the darkness of this world." Evil angels were among them; where would they more naturally take up their abode than around the altars and in the temples of the heathen? And if they had been completely free from superstition, and could have regarded the heathen religions which they saw enthroned over the world simply with contempt, still the question would have arisen, What connexion were they to have with them and with their worshippers? a question not easy to be answered in the bustle of Rome and Corinth, where every circumstance of daily life, every amusement, every political and legal right, was in some way bound up with the heathen religions. Were they to go out of the world? if not, what was to be their relation to those without? It was a branch of this more general question, the beginning of the difficulty so strongly felt and so vehemently disputed about in the days of Tertullian, which St. Paul discusses in reference to meats offered to idols. Where was the line to be drawn? Were they to visit the idol's temple; to sacrifice like other men to Diana or Jupiter? That could hardly be consistent with their Christian profession. But granting this, where were they to stop? Was it lawful to eat meats offered to idols? But if not, then how careful should they be to discover what was offered to idols? How easily might they fall into sin unawares? The scruple once indulged would soon gather strength, until the very provision of their daily food would become difficult by their disuse of the markets of the heathen.

A third instance of the same ceremonialism so natural to that age, and to ourselves so strange and unmeaning, is illustrated by the words of the Jerusalem Christians to the Apostle, — "Thou wentest in unto men uncircumcised, and didst eat with them;" a scruple so strong that, probably, St. Peter himself was never entirely free from it, and at any rate yielded to the fear of it in others when withstood by St. Paul at Antioch. This scruple may be said in one sense to be hardly capable of an explanation, and in another not to need one. For, probably, nothing can give our minds any conception of the

nature of the feeling, the intense hold which it exercised, the concentration which it was of every national and religious prejudice, the constraint which was required to get rid of it as a sort of "horror naturalis" in the minds of Jews; while, on the other hand, feelings at the present day not very dissimilar exist, not only in Eastern countries, but among ourselves. There is nothing strange in human nature being liable to them, or in their long lingering and often returning, even when reason and charity alike condemn them. We ourselves are not insensible to differences of race and colour, and may therefore be able partially to comprehend (allowing for the difference of East and West) what was the feeling of Jews and Jewish Christians towards men uncircumcised.

On the last point St. Paul maintains but one language: — "In Christ Jesus there is neither circumcision nor uncircumcision." No compromise could be allowed here, without destroying the Gospel that he preached. But the other question of meats and drinks, when separated from that of circumcision, admitted of various answers and points of view. Accordingly there is an appearance of inconsistency in the modes in which the Apostle resolves it. All these modes have a use and interest for ourselves; though our difficulties are not the same as those of the early Christians, the words speak to us, so long as prudence, and faith, and charity are the guides of Christian life. It is characteristic of the Apostle that his answers run into one another, as though each of them to different individuals, and all in their turn, might present the solution of the difficulty.

Separating them under different heads, we may begin with 1 Cor. x. 25., which may be termed the rule of Christian prudence: — "Whatsoever is sold in the shambles, that eat, asking no question for conscience sake." That is to say: — "Buy food as other men do; perhaps what you purchase has come from the idol's temple, perhaps not. Do not encourage your conscience in raising scruples, life will become impossible if you do. One question involves another and another and another without end. The manly and the Christian way is to cut them short; both as tending to weaken the

character and as inconsistent with the very nature of spiritual religion."

So we may venture to amplify the Apostle's precept, which breathes the same spirit of moderation as his decisions respecting celibacy and marriage. Among ourselves the remark is often made that "extremes are practically untrue." This is another way of putting the same lesson: — If I may not sit in the idol's temple, it may be plausibly argued, neither may I eat meats offered to idols; and if I may not eat meats offered to idols, then it logically follows that I ought not to go into the market where idols' meat is sold. The Apostle snaps the chain of this misapplied logic: there must be a limit somewhere; we must not push consistency where it is practically impossible. A trifling scruple is raised to the level of a religious duty, and another and another, until religion is made up of scruples, and the light of life fades, and the ways of life narrow themselves.

It is not hard to translate the Apostle's precept into the language of our time. Instances occur in politics, in theology, in our ordinary occupations, in which beyond a certain point consistency is impossible. Take for example the following: — A person feels that he would be wrong in carrying on his business, or going to public amusements, on a Sunday. He says: If it be wrong for me to work, it is wrong to make the servants in my house work; or if it be wrong to go to public amusements, it is wrong to enjoy the recreation of walking on a Sunday. So it may be argued that, because slavery is wrong, therefore it is not right to purchase the produce of slavery, or that of which the produce of slavery is a part, and so on without end, until we are forced out of the world from a remote fear of contagion with evil. Or I am engaged in a business which may be in some degree deleterious to the health or injurious to the morals of those employed in it, or I trade in some articles of commerce which are unwholesome or dangerous, or I let a house or a ship to another whose employment is of this description. Numberless questions of the same kind relating to the profession of a clergy-



man, an advocate, or a soldier, have been pursued into endless consequences. Is the mind of any person so nicely balanced that "every one of six hundred disputed propositions" is the representative of his exact belief? or can every word in a set form of prayer at all times reflect the feeling of those who read or follow it? There is no society to which we can belong, no common act of business or worship in which two or three are joined together, in which such difficulties are not liable to arise. Three editors conduct a newspaper, can it express equally the conviction of all the three? Three lawyers sign an opinion in common, is it the judgment of all or of one or two of them? High-minded men have often got themselves into a false position by regarding these questions in too abstract a way. The words of the Apostle are a practical answer to them which may be paraphrased thus: "Do as other men do in a Christian country," Conscience will say, "He who is guilty of the least, is guilty of all." In the Apostle's language it then becomes "the strength of sin," encouraging us to despair of all, because in that mixed condition of life in which God has placed us we cannot fulfil all.

In accordance with the spirit of the same principle of doing as other men do, the Apostle further implies that believers are to accept the hospitality of the heathen. (1 Cor. x. 27.) But here a modification comes in, which may be termed the law of Christian charity or courtesy:—Avoid giving offence, or, as we might say, "Do not defy opinion." Eat what is set before you; but if a person sitting at meat pointedly says to you, "This was offered to idols," do not eat. "All things are lawful, but all things are not expedient," and this is one of the not expedient class. There appears to be a sort of inconsistency in this advice, as there must always be inconsistency in the rules of practical life which are relative to circumstances. It might be said: "We cannot do one thing at one time, and another thing at another; now be guided by another man's conscience, now by our own." It might be retorted, "Is not this the dissimulation which you blame in St. Peter?" To

which it may be answered in turn: "But a man may do one thing at one time, another thing at another time, 'becoming to the Jews a Jew,' if he do it in such a manner as to avoid the risk of misconstruction." And this again admits of a retort. "Is it possible to avoid misconstruction? Is it not better to dare to be ourselves, to act like ourselves, to speak like ourselves, to think like ourselves?" We seem to have lighted unawares on two varieties of human disposition; the one harmonising and adapting itself to the perplexities of life, the other rebelling against them, and seeking to disentangle itself from them. Which side of this argument shall we take; neither or both? The Apostle appears to take both sides; for in the abrupt transition that follows, he immediately adds, "Why is my liberty to be judged of another man's conscience? what right has another man to attack me for what I do in the innocence of my heart?" It is good advice to say, "Regard the opinions of others;" and equally good advice to say, "Do not regard the opinions of others." We must balance between the two; and over all, adjusting the scales, is the law of Christian love.

Both in 1 Cor. viii. and Rom. xiv. the Apostle adds another principle, which may be termed the law of individual conscience, which we must listen to in ourselves and regard in others. "He that doubteth is damned; whatsoever is not of faith is sin." All things are lawful to him who feels them to be lawful, but the conscience may be polluted by the most indifferent things. When we eat, we should remember that the consequence of following our example may be serious to others. For not only may our brother be offended at us, but also by our example be drawn into sin; that is, to do what, though indifferent in itself, is sin to him. And so the weak brother, for whom Christ died, may perish through our fault; that is, he may lose his peace and harmony of soul and conscience void of offence, and all through our heedlessness in doing some unnecessary thing, which were far better left undone.

Cases may be readily imagined, in which, like the preceding, the rule of conduct here laid down by the Apostle would involve dis-

simulation. So many thousand scruples and opinions as there are in the world, we should have "to go out of the world" to fulfil it honestly. All reserve, it may be argued, tends to break up the confidence between man and man; and there are times in which concealment of our opinions, even respecting things indifferent, would be treacherous and mischievous; there are times, too, in which things cease to be indifferent, and it is our duty to speak out respecting the false importance which they have acquired. But, after all qualifications of this kind have been made, the secondary duty yet remains, of consideration for others, which should form an element in our conduct. If truth is the first principle of our speech and action, the good of others should, at any rate, be the second. "If any man (not see thee who hast knowledge sitting in the idol's temple, but) hear thee discoursing rashly of the Scriptures and the doctrines of the Church, shall not the faith of thy younger brother become confused? and his conscience being weak shall cease to discern between good and evil. And so thy weak brother shall perish for whom Christ died."

The Apostle adds a fourth principle, which may be termed the law of Christian freedom, as the last solution of the difficulty:—"Therefore, whether ye eat or drink, do all to the glory of God." From the perplexities of casuistry, and the conflicting rights of a man's own conscience and that of another, he falls back on the simple rule, "Whatever you do, sanctify the act." It cannot be said that all contradictory obligations vanish the moment we try to act with simplicity and truth; we cannot change the current of life and its circumstances by a wish or an intention; we cannot dispel that which is without, though we may clear that which is within. But we have taken the first step, and are in the way to solve the riddle. The insane scruple, the fixed idea, the ever-increasing doubt begins to pass away; the spirit of the child returns to us; the mind is again free, and the road of life open. "Whether ye eat or drink, do all to the glory of God;" that is, determine to seek only the will of God, and you may have a larger measure of Christian liberty



allowed to you; things, perhaps wrong in others, may be right for you.

The law, then, of Christian prudence, using that moderation which we show in things pertaining to this life; or the law of Christian charity, resolving, and as it were absorbing, our scruples in the love of other men; or the law of the individual conscience, making that right to a man in matters in themselves indifferent which seems to be so; or the law of freedom, giving us a spirit, instead of a letter, and enlarging the first principles of the doctrine of Christ; or all together,—shall furnish the doubting believer with a sufficient rule of faith and conduct. Even the law of Christian charity is a rule of freedom rather than of restraint, in proportion as it places men above questions of meats and drinks, and enables them to regard such disputes only by the light of love to God and man. For there is a tyranny which even freedom may exercise, when it makes us intolerant of other men's difficulties. "Where the Spirit of the Lord is, there is liberty;" but there is also a liberty without the Spirit of the Lord. To eat with unwashen hands defileth not a man; but to denounce those who do, or do not do so, may, in St. Paul's language, cause not only the weak brother, but him that fancieth he standeth, to fall; and so, in a false endeavour to preach the Gospel of Christ, men "may perish for whom Christ died."

The general rule of the Apostle is, "Neither circumcision availeth anything, nor uncircumcision;" "neither if we eat not are we the better, neither if we eat are we the worse." But then "all things are lawful, but all things are not expedient," even in reference to ourselves, and still more as we are members one of another. There is a further counsel of prudence, "Receive such an one, but not to the determination of his doubt." And lastly, as the guide to the spirit of our actions, remember the words: "I will eat no meat as long as the world standeth, lest I make my brother to offend."

Questions of meats and drinks, of eating with washen or un-

washen hands, have passed from the stage of religious ordinances to that of proprieties and decencies of life. Neither the purifications of the law of Moses, nor the seven precepts of Noah, are any longer binding upon Christians. Nature herself teaches all things necessary for health and comfort. But the spirit of casuistry in every age finds fresh materials to employ itself upon, laying hold of some question of a new moon or a sabbath, some fragment of antiquity, some inconsistency of custom, some subtilty of thought, some nicety of morality, analysing and dividing the actions of daily life; separating the letter from the spirit, and words from things; winding its toils around the infirmities of the weak, and linking itself to the sensibility of the intellect. Out of this labyrinth of the soul the believer finds his way, by keeping his eye fixed on that landmark which the Apostle himself has set up:—“In Christ Jesus neither circumcision availeth anything, nor uncircumcision, but a new creature.”

There is no one probably, of any religious experience, who has not at times felt the power of a scrupulous conscience. In speaking of a scrupulous conscience, the sense of remorse for greater offences is not intended to be included. These may press more or less heavily on the soul; and the remembrance of them may ingrain itself, with different degrees of depth, on different temperaments; but whether deep or shallow, the sorrow for them cannot be brought under the head of scruples of conscience. There are “many things in which we offend all,” about which there can be no mistake, the impression of which on our minds it would be fatal to weaken or do away. Nor is it to be denied that there may be customs almost universal among us which are so plainly repugnant to morality, that we can never be justified in acquiescing in them; or that individuals of clear head and strong will have been led on by feelings which other men would deride as conscientious scruples into an heroic struggle against evil. But quite independently of real sorrows for sin, or real protests against evil, most religious persons in the course of their lives have felt unreal scruples

or difficulties, or exaggerated real but slight ones; they have abridged their Christian freedom, and thereby their means of doing good; they have cherished imaginary obligations, and artificially hedged themselves in a particular course of action. Honour and truth have seemed to be at stake about trifles light as air, or conscience has become a burden too heavy for them to bear in some doubtful matter of conduct. Scruples of this kind are ever liable to increase: as one vanishes, another appears; the circumstances of the world and of the Church, and the complication of modern society, have a tendency to create them. The very form in which they come is of itself sufficient to put us on our guard against them; for we can give no account of them to ourselves; they are seldom affected by the opinion of others; they are more often put down by the exercise of authority than by reasoning or judgment. They gain hold on the weaker sort of men, or on those not naturally weak, in moments of weakness. They often run counter to our wish or interest, and for this very reason acquire a kind of tenacity. They seem innocent, mistakes, at worst, on the safe side, characteristic of the ingenuousness of youth, or indicative of a heart uncorrupted by the world. But this is not so. Creatures as we are of circumstances, we cannot safely afford to give up things indifferent, means of usefulness, instruments of happiness to ourselves, which may affect our lives and those of our children to the latest posterity. There are few greater dangers in religion than the indulgence of such scruples, the consequences of which can rarely be seen until too late, and which affect the moral character of a man at least as much as his temporal interests.

Strange as it may appear, it is nevertheless true, that scruples about lesser matters almost always involve some dereliction of duty in greater and more obvious ones. A tender conscience is a conscience unequal to the struggles of life. At first sight it seems as if, when lesser duties were cared for, the greater would take care of themselves. But this is not the lesson which experience teaches. In our moral as in our physical nature, we are finite beings, capable only of a certain degree of tension, ever liable to suffer disorder



and derangement, to be over-exercised in one part and weakened in another. No one can fix his mind intently on a trifling scruple or become absorbed in an eccentric fancy, without finding the great principles of truth and justice insensibly depart from him. He has been looking through a microscope at life, and cannot take in its general scope. The moral proportions of things are lost to him; the question of a new moon or a Sabbath has taken the place of diligence or of honesty. There is no limit to the illusions which he may practice on himself. There are those, all whose interests and prejudices at once take the form of duties and scruples, partly from dishonesty, but also from weakness, and because that is the form in which they can with the best grace maintain them against other men, and conceal their true nature from themselves.

Scruples are dangerous in another way, as they tend to drive men into a corner in which the performance of our duty becomes so difficult as to be almost impossible. A virtuous and religious life does not consist merely in abstaining from evil, but in doing what is good. It has to find opportunities and occasions for itself, without which it languishes. A man has a scruple about the choice of a profession; as a Christian, he believes war to be unlawful; in familiar language, he has doubts respecting orders, difficulties about the law. Even the ordinary ways of conducting trade appear deficient to his nicer sense of honesty; or perhaps he has already entered on one of these lines of life, and finds it necessary to quit it. At last, there comes the difficulty of "how he is to live." There cannot be a greater mistake than to suppose that a good resolution is sufficient in such a case to carry a man through a long life.

But even if we suppose the case of one who is endowed with every earthly good and instrument of prosperity, who can afford, as is sometimes said, to trifle with the opportunities of life, still the mental consequences will be hardly less injurious to him. For he who feels scruples about the ordinary enjoyments and occupations of his fellows, does so far cut himself off from his common nature. He is an isolated being, incapable of acting with his fellow-men.

There are plants which, though the sun shine upon them, and the dews water them, peak and pine from some internal disorder, and appear to have no sympathy with the influences around them. So is the mind corroded by scruples of conscience. It cannot expand to sun or shower; it belongs not to the world of light; it has no intelligence of or harmony with mankind around. It is insensible to the great truth, that though we may not do evil that good may come, yet that good and evil, truth and falsehood, are bound together on earth, and that we cannot separate ourselves from them.

It is one of the peculiar dangers of scruples of conscience, that the consequence of giving way to them is never felt at the time that they press upon us. When the mind is worried by a thought secretly working in it, and its trial becomes greater than it can bear, it is eager to take the plunge in life that may put it out of its misery; to throw aside a profession it may be, or to enter a new religious communion. We shall not be wrong in promising ourselves a few weeks of peace and placid enjoyment. The years that are to follow we are incapable of realising; whether the weary spirit will require some fresh pasture, will invent for itself some new doubt; whether its change is a return to nature or not, it is impossible for us to anticipate. Whether it has in itself that hidden strength which, under every change of circumstances, is capable of bearing up, is a question which we are the least able to determine for ourselves. In general we may observe, that the weakest minds, and those least capable of enduring such consequences, are the most likely to indulge the scruples. We know beforehand the passionate character, hidden often under the mask of reserve, the active yet half-reasoning intellect, which falls under the power of such illusions.

In the Apostolic Church "cases of conscience" arose out of religious traditions, and what may be termed the ceremonial cast of the age; in modern times the most frequent source of them may be said to be the desire of logical or practical consistency, such as is irreconcilable with the mixed state of human affairs and the febleness of the human intellect. There is no lever like the argument from

consistency, with which to bring men over to our opinions. A particular system or view, Calvinism perhaps, or Catholicism, has taken possession of the mind. Shall we stop short of pushing its premises to their conclusions? Shall we stand in the midway, where we are liable to be overridden by the combatants on either side in the struggle? Shall we place ourselves between our reason and our affections; between our practical duties and our intellectual convictions? Logic would have us go forward, and take our stand at the most advanced point — we are there already, it is urged, if we were true to ourselves, — but feeling, and habit, and common sense bid us stay where we are, unable to give an account of ourselves, yet convinced that we are right. We may listen to the one voice, we may listen also to the other. The true way of guiding either is to acknowledge both; to use them for a time against each other, until experience of life and of ourselves has taught us to harmonise them in a single principle.

So, again, in daily life cases often occur, in which we must do as other men do, and act upon a general understanding, even though unable to reconcile a particular practice to the letter of truthfulness or even to our individual conscience. It is hard in such cases to lay down a definite rule. But in general we should be suspicious of any conscientious scruples in which other good men do not share. We shall do right to make a large allowance for the perplexities and entanglements of human things; we shall observe that persons of strong mind and will brush away our scruples; we shall consider that not he who has most, but he who has fewest scruples approaches most nearly the true Christian. The man whom we emphatically call “honest,” “able,” “upright,” who is a religious as well as a sensible man, seems to have no room for them; from which we are led to infer that such scruples are seldom in the nature of things themselves, but arise out of some peculiarity or eccentricity in those who indulge them. That they are often akin to madness, is an observation not without instruction even to those whom God has blest with the full use of reason.



So far we arrive at a general conclusion like St. Paul's: — "Whether ye eat or drink, do all to the glory of God;" and, "Blessed is he who condemneth not himself in that which he alloweth." "Have the Spirit of truth, and the truth shall make you free;" and the entanglements of words and the perplexities of action will disappear. But there is another way in which such difficulties have been resolved, which meets them in detail; viz., the practice of confession and the rules of casuistry, which are the guides of the confessor. When the spirit is disordered within us, it may be urged that we ought to go out of ourselves, and confess our sins one to another. But he who leads, and he who is led, alike require some rules for the examination of conscience, to quicken or moderate the sense of sin, to assist experience, to show men to themselves as they really are, neither better nor worse. Hence the necessity for casuistry.

It is remarkable, that what is in idea so excellent that it may be almost described in St. Paul's language as "holy, just, and good," should have become a by-word among mankind for hypocrisy and dishonesty. In popular estimation, no one is supposed to resort to casuistry, but with the view of evading a duty. The moral instincts of the world have risen up and condemned it. It is fairly put down by the universal voice, and shut up in the darkness of the tomes of the casuists. A kind of rude justice has been done upon the system, as in most cases of popular indignation, probably with some degree of injustice to the individuals who were its authors. Yet, hated as casuistry has deservedly been, it is fair also to admit that it has an element of truth which was the source of its influence. This element of truth is the acknowledgment of the difficulties which arise in the relations of a professing Christian world to the church and to Christianity. How, without lowering the Gospel, to place it on a level with daily life is a hard question. It will be proper for us to consider the system from both sides — in its origin and in its perversion. Why it existed, and why it has failed, furnish a lesson in the history of the human mind of great interest and importance.

The unseen power by which the systems of the casuists were brought into being, was the necessity of the Roman Catholic Church. Like the allegorical interpretation of Scripture, they formed a link between the present and the past. At the time of the Reformation the doctrines of the ancient, no less than of the Reformed, faith awakened into life. But they required to be put in a new form, to reconcile them to the moral sense of mankind. Luther ended the work of self-examination by casting all his sins on Christ. But the casuists could not thus meet the awakening of men's consciences and the fearful looking for of judgment. They had to deal with an altered world, in which nevertheless the spectres of the past, purgatory, penance, mortal sin, were again rising up; hallowed as they were by authority and antiquity they could not be cast aside; the preacher of the Counter-reformation could only explain them away. If he had placed distinctly before men's eyes, that for some one act of immorality or dishonesty they were in a state of mortal sin, the heart true to itself would have recoiled from such a doctrine, and the connexion between the Church and the world would have been for ever severed. And yet the doctrine was a part of ecclesiastical tradition; it could not be held, it could not be given up. The Jesuits escaped the dilemma by holding and evading it.

So far it would not be untrue to say that casuistry had originated in an effort to reconcile the Roman Catholic faith with nature and experience. The Roman system was, if strictly carried out, horrible and impossible; a doctrine not, as it has been sometimes described, of salvation made easy, but of universal condemnation. From these fearful conclusions of logic the subtilty of the human intellect was now to save it. The analogy of law, as worked out by jurists and canonists, supplied the means. What was repugnant to human justice could not be agreeable to Divine. The scholastic philosophy, which had begun to die out and fade away before the light of classical learning, was to revive in a new form, no longer hovering between heaven and earth, out of the reach of experience, yet below the region of spiritual truth, but, as it seemed, firmly based in the life

and actions of mankind. It was the same sort of wisdom which defined the numbers and order of the celestial hierarchy, which was now to be adapted to the infinite modifications of which the actions of men are capable.

It is obvious that there are endless points of view in which the simplest duties may be regarded. Common sense says, — “A man is to be judged by his acts,” “there can be no mistake about a lie,” and so on. The casuists proceed by a different road. Fixing the mind, not on the simplicity, but on the intricacy of human action, they study every point of view, and introduce every conceivable distinction. A first most obvious distinction is that of the intention and the act: ought the one to be separated from the other? The law itself seems to teach that this may hardly be; rather the intention is held to be that which gives form and colour to the act. Then the act by itself is nothing, and the intention by itself almost innocent. As we play between the two different points of view, the act and the intention together evanesce. But, secondly, as we consider the intention, must we not also consider the circumstances of the agent? For plainly a being deprived of free will cannot be responsible for his actions. Place the murderer in thought under the conditions of a necessary agent, and his actions are innocent; or under an imperfect necessity, and he loses half his guilt. Or suppose a man ignorant, or partly ignorant, of what is the teaching of the Church, or the law of the land, — here another abstract point of view arises, leading us out of the region of common sense to difficult and equitable considerations, which may be determined fairly, but which we have the greatest motive to decide in favour of ourselves. Or again, try to conceive an act without reference to its consequences, or in reference to some single consequence, without regarding it as a violation of morality or of nature, or in reference solely to the individual conscience. Or imagine the will half consenting to, half withdrawing from its act; or acting by another, or in obedience to another, or with some good object, or under the influence of some imperfect obligation, or of opposite obligations.



Even conscience itself may be at last played off against the plainest truths.

By the aid of such distinctions the simplest principles of morality multiply to infinity. An instrument has been introduced of such subtilty and elasticity that it can accommodate the canons of the Church to any consciences, to any state of the world. Sin need no longer be confined to the dreadful distinction of mortal and venial sin ; it has lost its infinite and mysterious character ; it has become a thing of degrees, to be aggravated or mitigated in idea, according to the expediency of the case or the pliability of the confessor. It seems difficult to perpetrate a perfect sin. No man need die of despair ; in some page of the writings of the casuists will be found a difference suited to his case. And this without in any degree interfering with a single doctrine of the Church, or withdrawing one of its anathemas against heresy.

The system of casuistry, destined to work such great results, in reconciling the Church to the world and to human nature, like a torn web needing to be knit together, may be regarded as a science or profession. It is a classification of human actions, made in one sense without any reference to practice. For nothing was further from the mind of the casuist than to inquire whether a particular distinction would have a good or bad effect, was liable to perversion or not. His object was only to make such distinctions as the human mind was capable of perceiving and acknowledging. As to the physiologist objects in themselves loathsome and disgusting may be of the deepest interest, so to the casuist the foulest and most loathsome vices of mankind are not matters of abhorrence, but of science, to be arranged and classified, just like any other varieties of human action. It is true that the study of the teacher was not supposed to be also open to the penitent. But it inevitably followed that the spirit of the teacher communicated itself to the taught. He could impart no high or exalted idea of morality or religion, who was measuring it out by inches, not deepening men's idea of sin, but attenuating it ; " mincing into nonsense " the first principles of right and wrong.

The science was further complicated by the "doctrine of probability," which consisted in making anything approved or approvable that was confirmed by authority; even, as was said by some, of a single casuist. That could not be very wrong which a wise and good man had once thought to be right, — a better than ourselves perhaps, surveying the circumstances calmly and impartially. Who would wish that the rule of his daily life should go beyond that of a saint and doctor of the Church? Who would require such a rule to be observed by another? Who would refuse another such an escape out of the labyrinth of human difficulties and perplexities? As in all the Jesuit distinctions, there was a kind of reasonableness in the theory of this; it did but go on the principle of cutting short scruples by the rule of common sense.

And yet, what a door was here opened for the dishonesty of mankind! The science itself had dissected moral action until nothing of life or meaning remained in it. It had thrown aside, at the same time, the natural restraint which the moral sense itself exercises in determining such questions. And now for the application of this system, so difficult and complicated in itself, so incapable of receiving any check from the opinions of mankind, the authority not of the Church, but of individuals, was to be added as a new lever to overthrow the last remains of natural religion and morality.

The marvels of this science are not yet ended. For the same changes admit of being rung upon speech as well as upon action, until truth and falsehood become alike impossible. Language itself dissolves before the decomposing power; oaths, like actions, vanish into air when separated from the intention of the speaker; the shield of custom protects falsehood. It would be a curious though needless task to follow the subject into further details. He who has read one page of the casuists has read all. There is nothing that is not right in some particular point of view, — nothing that is not true under some previous supposition.

Such a system may be left to refute itself. Those who have strayed so far away from truth and virtue are self-condemned. Yet

it is not without interest to trace, by what false lights of philosophy or religion, good men revolting themselves at the commission of evil were led, step by step, to the unnatural result. We should expect to find that such a result originated not in any settled determination to corrupt the morals of mankind, but in an intellectual error; and it is suggestive of strange thoughts respecting our moral nature, that an intellectual error should have had the power to produce such consequences. Such appears to have been the fact. The conception of moral action on which the system depends, is as erroneous and imperfect as that of the scholastic philosophy respecting the nature of ideas. The immediate reduction of the error to practice through the agency of an order made the evil greater than that of other intellectual errors on moral and religious subjects, which, springing up in the brain of an individual, are often corrected and purified in the course of nature before they find their way into the common mind.

1. Casuistry ignores the difference between thought and action. Actions are necessarily external. The spoken word constitutes the lie; the outward performance the crime. The Highest Wisdom, it is true, has identified the two: "He that looketh on a woman to lust after her hath already committed adultery with her in his heart." But this is not the rule by which we are to judge our past actions, but to guard our future ones. He who has thoughts of lust or passion is not innocent in the sight of God, and is liable to be carried on to perform the act on which he suffers himself to dwell. And, in looking forward, he will do well to remember this caution of Christ; but in looking backward, in thinking of others, in endeavouring to estimate the actual amount of guilt or trespass, if he begins by placing thought on the level of action, he will end by placing action on the level of thought. It would be a monstrous state of mind in which we regarded mere imagination of evil as the same with action; hatred as the same with murder; thoughts of impurity as the same with adultery. It is not so that we must learn Christ. Actions are one thing and thoughts another in the eye of conscience, no less than



of the law of the land; of God as well as man. However important it may be to remember that the all-seeing eye of God tries the reins, it is no less important to remember also that morality consists in definite acts, capable of being seen and judged of by our fellow-creatures, impossible to escape ourselves.

2. What may be termed the frame of casuistry was supplied by law, while the spirit is that of the scholastic philosophy. Neither afforded any general principle which might correct extravagancies in detail, or banish subtilties, or negative remote and unsafe inferences. But the application of the analogy of law to subjects of morality and religion was itself a figment which, at every step, led deeper into error. The object was to realise and define, in every possible stage, acts which did not admit of legal definition, either because they were not external, but only thoughts or suggestions of the mind, or because the external part of the action was not allowed to be regarded separately from the motives of the agent. The motive or intention which law takes no account of except as indicating the nature of the act, becomes the principal subject of the casuist's art. Casuistry may be said to begin where law ends. It goes where law refuses to follow with legal rules and distinctions into the domain of morality. It weighs in the balance of precedent and authority the impalpable acts of a spiritual being. Law is a real science which has its roots in history, which grasps fact; seeking, in idea, to rest justice on truth only, and to reconcile the rights of individuals with the well-being of the whole. But casuistry is but the ghost or ape of a science; it has no history and no facts corresponding to it; it came into the world by the ingenuity of man; its object is to produce an artificial disposition of human affairs, at which nature rebels.

3. The distinctions of the casuist are far from equalling the subtilty of human life, or the diversity of its conditions. It is quite true that actions the same in name are, in the scale of right and wrong, as different as can be imagined; varying with the age, temperament, education, circumstances of each individual. The casuist is

not in fault for maintaining this difference, but for supposing that he can classify or distinguish them so as to give any conception of their innumerable shades and gradations. All his folios are but the weary effort to abstract or make a brief of the individuality of man. The very actions which he classifies change their meaning as he writes them down, like the words of a sentence torn away from their context. He is ever idealizing and creating distinctions, splitting straws, dividing hairs; yet any one who reflects on himself will idealize and distinguish further still, and think of his whole life in all its circumstances, with its sequence of thoughts and motives, and, withal, many excuses. But no one can extend this sort of idealism beyond himself; no insight of the confessor can make him clairvoyant of the penitent's soul. Know ourselves we sometimes truly may, but we cannot know others, and no other can know us. No other can know or understand us in the same wonderful or mysterious way; no other can be conscious of the spirit in which we have lived; no other can see us as a whole or get within. God has placed a veil of flesh between ourselves and other men, to screen the nakedness of our soul. Into the secret chamber He does not require that we should admit any other judge or counsellor but Himself. Two eyes only are upon us, — the eye of our own soul — the eye of God, and the one is the light of the other. That is the true light, on the which if a man look he will have a knowledge of himself, different in kind from that which the confessor extracts from the books of the casuists.

4. There are many cases in which our first thoughts, or, to speak more correctly, our instinctive perceptions, are true and right; in which it is not too much to say, that he who deliberates is lost. The very act of turning to a book, or referring to another, enfeebles our power of action. Works of art are produced we know not how, by some simultaneous movement of hand and thought, which seem to lend to each other force and meaning. So in moral action, the true view does not separate the intention from the act, or the act from the circumstances which surround it, but regards them as one and abso-

lutely indivisible. In the performance of the act and in the judgment of it, the will and the execution, the hand and the thought are to be considered as one. Those who act most energetically, who in difficult circumstances judge the most truly, do not separately pass in review the rules, and principles, and counter principles of action, but grasp them at once, in a single instant. Those who act most truthfully, honestly, firmly, manfully, consistently, take least time to deliberate. Such should be the attitude of our minds in all questions of right and wrong, truth and falsehood: we may not inquire, but act.

5. Casuistry not only renders us independent of our own convictions, it renders us independent also of the opinion of mankind in general. It puts the confessor in the place of ourselves, and in the place of the world. By making the actions of men matters of science, it cuts away the supports and safeguards which public opinion gives to morality; the confessor in the silence of the closet easily introduces principles from which the common sense or conscience of mankind would have shrunk back. Especially in matters of truth and falsehood, in the nice sense of honour shown in the unwillingness to get others within our power, his standard will probably fall short of that of the world at large. Public opinion, it is true, drives men's vices inwards; it teaches them to conceal their faults from others, and if possible from themselves, and this very concealment may sink them in despair, or cover them with self-deceit. And the soul—whose "house is its castle"—has an enemy within, the strength of which may be often increased by communications from without. Yet the good of this privacy is on the whole greater than the evil. Not only is the outward aspect of society more decorous, and the confidence between man and man less liable to be impaired; the mere fact of men's sins being known to themselves and God only, and the support afforded even by the undeserved opinion of their fellows, are of themselves great helps to a moral and religious life. Many a one by being thought better than he was has become better; by being thought as bad or worse has become worse. To communicate our sins to those who have no



claim to know them is of itself a diminution of our moral strength. It throws upon others what we ought to do for ourselves; it leads us to seek in the sympathy of others a strength which no sympathy can give. It is a greater trust than is right for us commonly to repose in our fellow-creatures; it places us in their power; it may make us their tools.

To conclude, the errors and evils of casuistry may be summed up as follows:—It makes that abstract which is concrete, scientific which is contingent, artificial which is natural, positive which is moral, theoretical which is intuitive and immediate. It puts the parts in the place of the whole, exceptions in the place of rules, system in the place of experience, dependence in the place of responsibility, reflection in the place of conscience. It lowers the heavenly to the earthly, the principles of men to their practice, the tone of the preacher to the standard of ordinary life. It sends us to another for that which can only be found in ourselves. It leaves the highway of public opinion to wander in the labyrinths of an imaginary science; the light of the world for the darkness of the closet. It is to human nature what anatomy is to our bodily frame; instead of a moral and spiritual being, preserving only “a body of death.”

ὀφείλομεν δὲ ἡμεῖς οἱ δυνατοὶ τὰ ἀσθενήματα τῶν ἀδύ- 15  
 νάτων βαστάζειν καὶ μὴ ἑαυτοῖς ἀρέσκειν. ἕκαστος<sup>1</sup> 2  
 ἡμῶν τῷ πλησίον ἀρεσκέτω εἰς τὸ ἀγαθὸν πρὸς οἰκοδο- 3  
 μήν. καὶ γὰρ ὁ χριστὸς οὐχ ἑαυτῷ ἤρесе, ἀλλὰ καθὼς  
 γέγραπται Οἱ ὀνειδισμοὶ τῶν ὀνειδιζόντων σε ἐπέπεσαν  
 ἐπ' ἐμέ. ὅσα γὰρ προεγράφη, εἰς τὴν ἡμετέραν διδασκα- 4

<sup>1</sup> Add γάρ.

The commencement of this chapter is closely connected with the preceding. "He who doubts if he eats, is condemned." But we who are strong and do not doubt, ought to bear the weaknesses of others. As Christ pleased not himself, so neither ought we to please ourselves. The words of the prophets, which speak of the reproaches that fell on Him, may still instruct us. They were written beforehand, to teach us to be of one mind, that we should receive others, even as Christ received us. At ver. 8. the argument takes a new turn. While exhorting the Roman Church to unity, the other subject of discord arises in the Apostle's mind, not the disputes of strong and weak about meats and drinks, but the greater and more general dispute about Jew and Gentile, the old and the new, the law and the Gospel. He returns upon the former theme, and repeats language of reconciliation, which he had used before. Christ came not to destroy the prophets, but to fulfil; the minister of the circumcision to the uncircumcision; the performer of the promises made to the patriarchs—to all mankind. The Gentiles and the Jews rejoice together; the root of Jesse is the hope of both. The Apostle then passes on to matters personal: an

apology for writing so boldly; his intended journeys to Rome, Spain, and Jerusalem; the contribution for the poor saints; with the allusions to which, however, he blends religious thoughts and feelings.

ὀφείλομεν δέ,] but we ought. δέ is closely connected with the preceding chapter. "And it is our part to take upon ourselves the infirmities of the weak, as they may lead them into sin." δέ expresses the practical result of the former statement, viewed from another aspect in reference to ourselves.

The division of the chapters is obviously unnatural. Yet that of Lachmann is not much better, who includes the first verse of XV. in the previous chapter, and thereby separates τῷ πλησίον in the second verse, and ἑαυτῷ in the third, from ἑαυτοῖς in the first. In a style like that of St. Paul, in which the divisions of the subject are irregular, the distribution into chapters of convenient length is necessarily artificial, and often bears no relation to the breaks in the sense. Chapter and verse are only marks in the margin to facilitate reference.

A better break occurs at ver. 8. and at ver. 14.

ἡμεῖς οἱ δυνατοί.] The Apostle identifies himself with the

15 Now\* we that are strong ought to bear the infirmi-  
 2 ties of the weak, and not to please ourselves. Let every  
 3 one of us please his neighbour for his good to edi-  
 4 fication. For Christ too\* pleased not himself; but, as  
 it is written, The reproaches of them that reproached  
 thee fell on me. For whatsoever things were written

stronger party, to give force to his words. As if he said:—“You and I, who are strong and enlightened, should bear the infirmities of others. My side is that of the strong, not against but for the weak; we who are whole should take care of those who are sick.” It is a stage of the Gospel to know that “that which goeth into a man defileth not a man;” it is a higher stage to know it and not always to act upon it. *βαστάζειν*, more precise than *φέρειν*, as “to carry” is more precise than “to bear.” Compare Gal. vi. 2., *ἀλλήλων τὰ βάρη βαστάζετε*.

*καὶ μὴ ἑαυτοῖς ἀρέσκειν.*] The Apostle touches upon selfishness as the root of these differences with each other. Above he had said —“We are not our own, but Christ’s;” in a similar strain he continues, we ought not to please ourselves, for Christ pleased not himself.

*εἰς τὸ ἀγαθόν, for good.*] Of which *πρὸς οἰκοδομήν* is a more exact explanation;—“for good, with a view to edifying.” To this interpretation it is objected that *οἰκοδομήν* should have had the article, as well as *ἀγαθόν*, and, therefore, that it is better to give the words, *εἰς τὸ ἀγαθόν* the explanation, “touching the good.” The awkwardness of such a use of *εἰς*, where a simpler construction is possible, is a greater objection to this mode of taking the

passage than can be urged against the other, from the want of parallelism in the clauses. *τὸ ἀγαθόν* may have the article, either as an adjective turned into a substantive by the addition of the article, or as implying a reference to what has preceded, or to the idea of good in the mind of the person addressed.

Here, as elsewhere, *οἰκοδομή* is the practical principle which is to determine questions and disputes. Comp. 1 Cor. xiv. 26.; 2 Cor. x. 8.

3. For in doing this we are but imitating the example of Christ, who pleased not himself. For ye know the grace of our Lord Jesus Christ, that though he was rich, yet for our sakes he became poor. Comp. 2 Cor. viii. 9., and Phil. ii. 6. As was said of him in Psalm lxix. (in the latter part of the ninth verse), “The reproaches of them that reproached thee, O God, are fallen upon me.” That is, Christ pleased not himself, but endured all the reproaches of the enemies of God which were heaped upon him. A similar application of the former words of the same verse to Christ is made in John ii. 17., “The zeal of thy house hath eaten me up.”

*ὅσα γὰρ προεγράφη, for whatsoever things were written aforetime.*] It is observable that in quotations from the Old Testament, St. Paul does not say “this



λίαν ἐγράφη<sup>1</sup>, ἵνα διὰ τῆς ὑπομονῆς καὶ διὰ<sup>2</sup> τῆς παρακλήσεως τῶν γραφῶν τὴν ἐλπίδα ἔχωμεν. ὁ δὲ θεὸς τῆς 5  
 ὑπομονῆς καὶ τῆς παρακλήσεως δώη ὑμῖν τὸ αὐτὸ φρονεῖν  
 ἐν ἀλλήλοις κατὰ χριστὸν Ἰησοῦν, ἵνα ὁμοθυμαδὸν ἐν ἐνὶ 6  
 στόματι δοξάζητε τὸν θεὸν καὶ πατέρα τοῦ κυρίου ἡμῶν  
 Ἰησοῦ χριστοῦ. διὸ προσλαμβάνεσθε ἀλλήλους, καθὼς 7  
 καὶ ὁ χριστὸς προσελάβετο ὑμᾶς<sup>3</sup> εἰς δόξαν τοῦ<sup>4</sup> θεοῦ.  
 λέγω γὰρ<sup>5</sup> χριστὸν διάκονον γενέσθαι περιτομῆς ὑπὲρ 8

<sup>1</sup> προεγράφη.<sup>4</sup> Om. τοῦ.<sup>2</sup> Om. διὰ.<sup>5</sup> δέ. Add Ἰησοῦν.<sup>3</sup> ἡμᾶς.

is the original meaning of these words," but rather, "hence we are to learn this lesson." "Doth God take care for oxen? or saith he it altogether for our sakes?" 1 Cor. ix. 9, 10.

We may ask, "But did the Apostle suppose that words like these were intended to bear this and no other meaning? and that they were understood in this sense by their original authors?" The answer to these questions is that the Apostle never asked them. The last thought that would have entered into his mind, would have been what in modern language we should term the reproduction to himself of the life and circumstances of the writers. He read the Old Testament, seeing "Christ in all things, and all things in Christ."

4. διὰ τῆς ὑπομονῆς καὶ διὰ τῆς παρακλήσεως τῶν γραφῶν, *through patience and through comfort of the Scriptures,*] may mean, either "by the examples of patience and consolation which the Scriptures afford;" or rather, "by patiently meditating and receiving consolation from the Scriptures;" the genitive case denoting, either origin, or a more general idea of relation and con-

nexion. Such words would describe those who, like Simeon and Anna, were waiting "for the consolation of Israel," suggested by the Psalms and the prophets.

The reading of Lachmann, who inserts a second διὰ, has a considerable preponderance of MS. authority in its favour. Internal evidence is on the other side, as the connexion of the verses preceding and following shows that ὑπομονή as well as παράκλησις is to be joined with τῶν γραφῶν. The insertion of διὰ is, therefore, unnecessary and rather awkward.

5. But when I speak of patience and consolation, I would add a prayer that God, who is the author of every good and perfect gift, and of those in particular, may give you the spirit of unity.

κατὰ χριστὸν Ἰησοῦν, *according to Jesus Christ,*] either like Christ or according to the will of Christ. Comp. κατὰ Ἰσαάκ, Gal. iv. 28., "That we may love one another as Christ also loved us; that we may show such a spirit as Christ showed in submitting to his Father's will." Comp. ver. 3. and 7.

τὸν θεὸν καὶ πατέρα, *the God and Father.*] Not God, even

aforetime were written for our learning, that we through  
 patience and through <sup>1</sup> comfort of the scriptures might  
 5 have hope. Now the God of patience and consolation  
 grant you to be likeminded one toward another according  
 6 to Christ Jesus: that ye may with one mind and one  
 mouth glorify the God\* and Father of our Lord Jesus  
 7 Christ. Wherefore receive ye one another, as Christ also  
 8 received us<sup>2</sup> to the glory of God. For<sup>3</sup> I say that<sup>4</sup>  
 Christ was a minister of the circumcision for the truth

<sup>1</sup> Omit through.<sup>2</sup> You.<sup>3</sup> Now.<sup>4</sup> Add Jesus.

the Father of our Lord Jesus Christ, as in the English Version; a translation which apparently arises out of a fear of calling God, the God of our Lord Jesus Christ; but, "the God and Father of our Lord Jesus Christ," as in Gal. i. 4. God is called, "our God and Father;" and in Ephes. i. 17., "That the God of our Lord Jesus Christ may give you the spirit of wisdom." Cf. John, xx. 17., "My God and your God;" 1 Cor. xi. 3., "the head of Christ is God;" and Heb. i. 9., "God even thy God;" also 2 Cor. xi. 31.

7. Wherefore receive one another, the weak the strong, and the strong the weak; the Jew the Gentile, and the Gentile the Jew; as Christ also received you to the glory of God.

The seventh verse is connected with both the sixth and eighth. "Be of one mind, that ye may glorify God, and receive one another as friends, as Christ also received you to the glory of God." For I say that he has received both Jew and Gentile.

8. λέγω γάρ, for I say.] This verse has been explained as fol-

lows:— "For (or if we read *δέ*, now) I say that Christ is the minister of the circumcision, that is, the minister of the Jews, for the truth of God, to establish the promises made unto the fathers, and that the Gentiles may glorify God for His mercy;" in other words, "Christ has received the circumcision into His glory, as he has also received the Gentiles." According to this way of taking the words, there would have been no difficulty in the construction, had the order been different, or if the words *καθὼς προσελάβετο τὰ ἔθνη εἰς δόξαν*, or *ἵνα δοξάσωσι τὸν θεόν*, had followed, so as to recall the words *προσελάβετο ὑμᾶς* which preceded.

A strong objection to this mode of explaining the passage is the use of the word *περιτομή*, without the article, for the Jews. Even supposing the grammatical difficulty to be removed, the language is still unlike that of St. Paul, whose tone is not that there were two Gospels, one for the Jew, another for the Gentile, or that Christ was the minister of the circumcision to the Jew, and of the uncircumcision to the Gentile, but that he is the medium

ἀληθείας θεοῦ εἰς τὸ βεβαιῶσαι τὰς ἐπαγγελίας τῶν πατέρων, τὰ δὲ ἔθνη ὑπὲρ ἐλέους δοξάσαι τὸν θεόν, καθὼς γέγραπται Διὰ τοῦτο ἐξομολογήσομαί σοι ἐν ἔθνεσιν, καὶ τῷ ὀνόματί σου ψαλῶ. καὶ πάλιν λέγει Εὐφράνθητε ἔθνη μετὰ τοῦ λαοῦ αὐτοῦ. καὶ πάλιν λέγει<sup>1</sup> Αἰνεῖτε πάντα τὰ ἔθνη τὸν κύριον, καὶ ἐπαινεσάτωσαν<sup>2</sup> αὐτὸν πάντες οἱ λαοί. καὶ πάλιν Ἡσαΐας λέγει Ἔσται ἡ ρίζα τοῦ Ἰησοῦ, καὶ ὁ ἀνιστάμενος ἄρχειν ἐθνῶν, ἐπ' αὐτῷ ἔθνη ἑλπιούσιν. ὁ δὲ θεὸς τῆς ἐλπίδος πληρώσαι ὑμᾶς πάσης χαρᾶς καὶ εἰρήνης ἐν τῷ πιστεῦναι, εἰς τὸ περισσεύειν ὑμᾶς ἐν τῇ ἐλπίδι ἐν δυνάμει πνεύματος ἁγίου.

<sup>1</sup> Om. λέγει. Leg. Αἰνεῖτε τὸν κύριον πάντα.

<sup>2</sup> ἐπαινέσατε.

of communion with the Jewish dispensation, whereby the privileges of the Jew are extended to all mankind. As Abraham is called a father of circumcision to all them that are uncircumcised, so Christ, "born under the law," is the minister of the circumcision to the Gentiles. The reception of the Gentiles was itself included in the promise to Abraham, according to St. Paul's interpretation of it. Hence the second clause, τὰ δὲ ἔθνη, is only a more distinct enunciation of what is already implied in the first. St. Paul "asserts" that Jesus Christ is the minister of circumcision, to establish the promises made to the fathers, in the same sense that it is said that he was to build the Temple, or to fulfil the law; another aspect of which ministration is that the Gentiles should glorify God for the mercy which they have obtained of him. Compare the introduction to c. iv., and note on iv. 12.

ὑπὲρ ἀληθείας θεοῦ, *for the truth of God,*] "to make good the truth of God," the meaning of

which is explained by the words immediately following; "to confirm the promises made unto the Fathers." Compare iv. 16., εἰς τὸ εἶναι βεβαίαν τὴν ἐπαγγελίαν παντὶ τῷ σπέρματι, οὐ τῷ ἐκ τοῦ νόμου μόνον, and, as a remoter parallel, Rom. iii. 26., εἰς τὸ εἶναι αὐτὸν δίκαιον.

εἰς τὸ βεβαιῶσαι.] It is not certain whether, in these words, St. Paul is referring to the fulfilment of the promises to the Jews (see c. xi.), or to the transfer of them which he had made in the fourth chapter to the Gentiles. Either would in his view have been a true performance of them.

τὰ δὲ ἔθνη,] governed of εἰς: δὲ intimates the new aspect under which this fulfilment is regarded: "Howbeit that the Gentiles," etc.

9. Διὰ τοῦτο ἐξομολογήσομαι, *therefore I will give thanks.*] These words, which are exactly quoted from the LXX., Ps. xviii. 49., are in their original meaning an expression of triumph after a victory, for which the victor says he will give thanks among the



9 of God, to confirm the promises made unto the fathers :  
 and that the Gentiles might glorify God for his mercy ;  
 as it is written, For this cause I will confess to thee  
 10 among the Gentiles, and sing unto thy name. And  
 11 again\* it saith, Rejoice, ye Gentiles, with his people.  
 And again, it saith<sup>1</sup>, Praise the Lord, all ye Gentiles ;  
 12 and let all the people laud him.<sup>2</sup> And again, Esaias  
 saith, “There shall be the\* root of Jesse, and he that shall  
 rise to reign over the Gentiles ; in him shall the Gentiles  
 13 hope.\* Now the God of hope fill you with all joy and  
 peace in believing, that ye may abound in hope, through  
 the power of the Holy Ghost.

<sup>1</sup> *Om.* it saith.

<sup>2</sup> Laud him all ye people.

subject people. In the applica-  
 tion made of them by St. Paul,  
 they are supposed to be uttered  
 by a Gentile, and the word *ἔθνη*  
 receives, as elsewhere, a new  
 sense.

10. *καὶ πάλιν λέγει, and again  
 it saith.*] *sc.* ἡ γραφή, “the Scrip-  
 ture,” as in Rom. ix. 17. and else-  
 where. The words which follow  
 are taken from Deut. xxxii. 43.,  
 in which passage Moses exhorts  
 the heathen to sing the praises  
 of God for his dealings with the  
 Jewish people. The verse in  
 the LXX. is greatly interpolated,  
 and in the midst of the interpo-  
 lation exhibits the words here  
 quoted.

11. *Δινεῖτε πάντα τὰ ἔθνη τὸν  
 κύριον.*] These words are taken,  
 with a slight change in their  
 order, from Ps. cxvii. 1. As in  
 the previous verse, the word  
*ἔθνη* has received a new meaning.  
 The writer meant to say, “Praise  
 the Lord, all ye nations, for His  
 goodness to Israel His people.”  
 The application which St. Paul

makes of the words is, “Praise  
 the Lord, O ye Gentiles, for he  
 has given you a share in his  
 mercies to the house of Israel.”

12. *Ἔσται, κ.τ.λ.*] The quotation  
 is from the LXX., which reads :  
 — ἔσται ἐν τῇ ἡμέρᾳ ἐκείνῃ ἡ ῥίζα  
 τοῦ Ἰεσσαὶ καὶ ὁ ἀνιστάμενος ἄρχειν  
 ἐθνῶν, ἐπ’ αὐτῷ ἔθνη ἐλπιοῦσιν.  
 (Is. xi. 10.) These words are  
 not, however, an exact translation  
 of the Hebrew, which is as fol-  
 lows :—“And in that day shall the  
 shoot of Jesse, which is set up for  
 a banner, be sought of the Gen-  
 tiles.”

13. But says the Apostle, go-  
 ing off upon the word *ἐλπιοῦσιν*  
 of the previous verse, as at ver. 5.  
 on the words *ὑπομονή* and *παρά-  
 κλησις*, May the God of hope,  
 who is the hope of the Gentiles,  
 fill you—he adds, not without  
 reference to his previous exhor-  
 tations to unity—with joy and  
 peace, in believing ; that you  
 may have yet more of that hope,  
 by the instrumentality of His  
 Holy Spirit!

Πέπεισμαι δέ, ἀδελφοί μου, καὶ αὐτὸς ἐγὼ περὶ ὑμῶν 14  
 ὅτι καὶ αὐτοὶ μεστοί ἐστε ἀγαθωσύνης, πεπληρωμένοι  
 πάσης γνώσεως, δυνάμενοι καὶ ἀλλήλους νουθετεῖν· τολ- 15  
 μηρότερον δὲ ἔγραψα<sup>1</sup> ὑμῖν ἀπὸ μέρους, ὡς ἐπαναμιμνή-  
 σκων ὑμᾶς διὰ τὴν χάριν τὴν δοθεῖσάν μοι ὑπὸ τοῦ θεοῦ  
 εἰς τὸ εἶναί με λειτουργὸν χριστοῦ Ἰησοῦ<sup>2</sup> εἰς τὰ ἔθνη, 16  
 ἱερουργοῦντα τὸ εὐαγγέλιον τοῦ θεοῦ, ἵνα γένηται ἡ προσ-  
 φορὰ τῶν ἐθνῶν εὐπρόσδεκτος, ἡγιασμένη ἐν πνεύματι  
 ἀγίῳ. ἔχω οὖν τὴν<sup>3</sup> καύχησιν ἐν χριστῷ Ἰησοῦ τὰ πρὸς 17  
 τὸν θεόν· οὐ γὰρ τολμήσω τι λαλεῖν<sup>4</sup> ὧν οὐ κατειργάσατο 18

<sup>1</sup> ἀδελφοί.<sup>2</sup> Ἰησοῦ χριστοῦ.<sup>3</sup> Om. τήν.<sup>4</sup> λαλεῖν τι.

14.—xvi. 27. is a resumption of the personal narrative. The Apostle began by offering commendation; he concludes in the same spirit by apologising for giving advice. The salutation with which he opened, like the doxology with which he ends, contained in few words a summary of the Gospel.

“But I know, brethren, that you need not these words of mine.” I myself, who give this advice, am persuaded that you are able too (καί) to advise one another.

15. But I have taken this liberty, brethren, to a certain extent, as an Apostle of Christ. These last words St. Paul softens by a periphrasis ὡς ἐπαναμιμνήσκων ὑμᾶς διὰ τὴν χάριν δοθεῖσάν μοι, as one who has “received grace and apostleship,” and who ventures not to teach, but to call to remembrance things that you know, and this not of myself but by the grace given to me. For the feeling, compare 1 Cor. vii. 25. : — γνώμην δὲ δίδωμι ὡς ἡλεημένος ὑπὸ τοῦ κυρίου πιστὸς εἶναι : and Rom. i. 5. Such withdrawing of self reminds us of the quaint expression of Coleridge, “St. Paul

was a man of the finest manners ever known.”

ἀπὸ μέρους,] “in some degree,” (1.) may be either taken with τολμηρότερον ἔγραψα, “I have taken this liberty, to a certain extent, and with the object of reminding you,” etc. : or, (2.) with ὡς ἐπαναμιμνήσκων, “I have taken this liberty : my object partly is to remind you of what you know ; and this only because I have received grace.”

διὰ τὴν χάριν — εἰς τὸ εἶναι.] Compare i. 5., δι’ οὗ ἐλάβομεν χάριν καὶ ἀποστολήν.

16. The whole passage, from ὡς ἐπαναμιμνήσκων ὑμᾶς down to πνεύματι ἀγίῳ, may be summed up in two words, “as the Apostle of the Gentiles.” The simple thought is “transfigured” into the language of sacrifice, in which the Apostle describes himself and his office. Elsewhere he loves to identify the believer and his Lord ; here he applies the same imagery to his own work, which is elsewhere applied to the work of Christ, partly because the use of such figures was natural to him, and partly, also, because such language was intelligible

14 And I myself also am persuaded of you, my brethren,  
 15 that ye also are full of goodness, filled with all know-  
 ledge, able also to admonish one another. Nevertheless,  
 brethren, I have written the more boldly unto you in  
 some sort, as putting you in mind, because of the grace  
 16 that is given to me of God, that I should be the minister  
 of Jesus Christ to the Gentiles, doing the work of a priest  
 of \* the gospel of God, that the offering up of the Gen-  
 tiles might be acceptable, being sanctified by the Holy  
 17 Ghost. I have therefore \* my glorying through Jesus  
 18 Christ in those things which pertain to God. For I

and expressive to those whom he is addressing.

*ἱερουργούντα,*] performing the priestly office in relation to the Gospel.

*ἵνα γένηται.*] That the Gentiles offered as a sacrifice, may be acceptable, consecrated not by man, but by the Holy Spirit.

The whole passage, retaining the figure throughout, may be paraphrased as follows:—

I speak to you by the grace which God has given me, the intent of which is, that I should be the minister of Christ, the priest of the Gospel to the Gentiles, that the Gentiles who are presented to God as an offering, may be acceptable to him, consecrated in the Holy Spirit.—Or, dropping the figure:—

I speak to you as the Apostle of the Gentiles, whom I present to God, sanctified by the Spirit.

17, 18. I have then my glorying (*τὴν καύχησιν*) in Christ Jesus. Compare 2 Cor. xi. 30. The article signifies “the glorying which belongs to me, or the glorying which I have as a minister of Christ.”

The train of thought in the Apostle’s mind seems rather to

carry him back to his opponents at Corinth, where he was then staying, than to be directed to those whom he is addressing. The delicate alternations of feeling in the verses which follow, and the transition from hesitation to boldness, remind us of several passages in the Epistles to the Corinthians. 2 Cor. x. 15, 16. There, too, he had been careful to guard against appearing to intrude in another’s vineyard. Here his object is to assert in the gentlest manner possible, as in the Epistle to the Galatians in the strongest, his Apostleship of the Gentiles; at the same time making a similar disclaimer. In the two preceding verses he had said,—I wrote to you the more boldly, because of the grace of God which made me a minister of Christ unto the Gentiles.

I am not wrong, therefore, in using this boldness, for I have the glorying which belongs to me as the minister of God.

For I will not be bold to speak of anything which Christ has not wrought by me to make the Gentiles obedient.

Thus *ἔχω . . . καύχησιν* connects with *τολμηρότερος*, “I am bold



χριστὸς δι' ἐμοῦ εἰς ὑπακοὴν ἔθνῶν, λόγῳ καὶ ἔργῳ ἐν δυνάμει σημείων καὶ τεράτων, ἐν δυνάμει πνεύματος ἁγίου<sup>1</sup>, ὥστε με ἀπὸ Ἱερουσαλήμ καὶ κύκλῳ μέχρι τοῦ Ἰλλυρικοῦ πεπληρωκέναι τὸ εὐαγγέλιον τοῦ χριστοῦ. οὕτως δὲ φιλοτιμοῦμαι<sup>2</sup> εὐαγγελίζεσθαι, οὐχ ὅπου ὠνομάσθη χριστός, ἵνα μὴ ἐπ' ἀλλότριον θεμέλιον οἰκοδομῶ, ἀλλὰ καθὼς γέγραπται Οἷς οὐκ ἀνηγγέλη περὶ αὐτοῦ, ὄψονται, καὶ οἱ οὐκ ἀκηκόασιν συνήσουσιν. διὸ καὶ ἐνεκοπτόμην πολλάκις<sup>3</sup> τοῦ ἐλθεῖν πρὸς ὑμᾶς, νυνὶ δὲ μηκέτι τόπον ἔχων ἐν τοῖς

<sup>1</sup> θεοῦ.<sup>2</sup> φιλοτιμούμενον.<sup>3</sup> τὰ πολλά.

and have whereof to be bold," which is again taken up in the *τολμήσω* of ver. 18. : — "For I will not go beyond the sphere which Christ has appointed me;" or a little expanded, "For though I have used the word 'bold' in speaking of myself, I will not have the boldness," etc. The 17th verse is further connected by the words *τὰ πρὸς τὸν θεόν*, "in my relation to God," with ver. 15, 16. ; and the 17th and 18th verses are in a similar way connected with each other by *ἐν χριστῷ Ἰησοῦ*, and the words *τι λαλεῖν ὧν οὐ κατειργάσατο χριστὸς δι' ἐμοῦ*.

18. The Apostle means to say, "I will not glory when I ought not, in speaking of things," either (1.) of which Christ did not make me his minister; or, (2.) which I did by myself, and not of Christ.

19. The tone is changed, and the construction of the preceding verse forgotten. The Apostle is speaking, not of what Christ did not do, but of what He did, and by his means; "I will only speak of what Christ did, and what he did was," etc. Comp. 2 Cor. xii. 12. : "Truly the signs of an

Apostle were wrought among you in all patience, in signs and wonders, and mighty deeds."

*ἐν δυνάμει σημείων* refers to the working of miracles, such as the casting out of devils, and the restoration of Eutyches mentioned in the Acts; *ἐν δυνάμει πνεύματος ἁγίου*, to the power of the Apostle's preaching over the hearts of men. Compare 1 Cor. ii. 4.

*πεπληρωκέναι*, *have fulfilled*,] has received seven, or even a greater number of interpretations: — (1.) have preached; (2.) have widely preached; (3.) have successfully preached; (4.) have completed preaching; (5.) have fulfilled the duty of preaching; (6.) have fully preached; (7.) have supplied what was lacking; (8.) have provided. Either 4. or 5. is the true one.

*κύκλῳ*, *going round*.] So that from Jerusalem, and round about as far as Illyricum, I had fulfilled the preaching of the Gospel. We need not suppose by the word *κύκλῳ* the whole space enclosed in the circle is intended. Illyricum itself lay without, not within the Apostle's missionary labours, unless we assume journeys to

will not dare to speak of any of those things which Christ hath not wrought by me, to make the Gentiles  
 19 obedient, by word and deed, through mighty signs and wonders, by the power of the Holy Spirit<sup>1</sup>; so that from Jerusalem, and round about unto Illyricum, I have fully  
 20 preached the gospel of Christ. Yea, so have I strived to preach the gospel, not where Christ was named, lest  
 21 I should build upon another man's foundation: but as it is written, To whom he was not spoken of, they shall  
 22 see: and they that have not heard shall understand. For which cause also I have been much hindered from  
 23 coming to you. But now having no more place in these

<sup>1</sup> Spirit of God.

have been undertaken by him which are unrecorded in the Acts. Compare Acts, xx. 1, 2.: —“And after the uproar was ceased, Paul called unto him the disciples and embraced them, and departed for to go into Macedonia. And when he had gone over those parts, and had given them much exhortation, he came into Greece.”

20, 21. But though eager to preach the Gospel, this is the condition that I impose upon myself, that it should not be where the name of Christ is known. *οὕτως* is explained by *οὐχ ὅπου*; *δέ*, but though I have preached in this wide circuit; *ἀλλά*, still adversative, to the words “build upon another man's foundation:” — But that instead of doing so, I may fulfil the prophecy, “They shall see to whom it was not told, and they shall understand who have not heard.” Isa. lii. 15., quoted as it stands in the Alexandrian manuscript of the LXX.

22. *Διό*,] and this was the

reason, viz., my preaching to those who knew not the Gospel, in fulfilment of the prophecy of Isaiah, why I was hindered those many times in coming to you. Compare chap. i. 13. — *ἐκωλύθη ἄχρι τοῦ δεῦρο*.

23. But now, having exhausted those countries, no longer finding any place in them in which Christ is not preached, and having for many years past a desire to come unto you (I will come) whenever I go into Spain.

If we follow the authority of nearly every MS., in omitting *ἐλεύσομαι πρὸς ὑμᾶς*, the sentence must be regarded as an anacoluthon (parallel to chap. v. 12.) of which the apodosis is implied, ver. 28. The Apostle meant to say,—“I have longed to see you for many years, and intend to pay you a passing visit, on my way to Spain, which will not be yet, for I am now going to carry the contributions to Jerusalem.” As in some other passages, the conflict of emotions in the mind of the Apostle may

κλίμασι τούτοις, ἐπιποθίαν δὲ ἔχων [τοῦ] ἔλθειν πρὸς ὑμᾶς ἀπὸ πολλῶν ἐτῶν, ὡς ἂν<sup>1</sup> πορεύωμαι εἰς τὴν Σπανίαν<sup>2</sup>, (ἐλ- 24  
πίζω γὰρ διαπορευόμενος θεάσασθαι ὑμᾶς καὶ ἀφ'<sup>3</sup> ὑμῶν προπεμφθῆναι ἐκεῖ, εἰ ἂν ὑμῶν πρῶτον ἀπὸ μέρους ἐμπλησθῶ) νυνὶ δὲ πορεύομαι εἰς Ἱερουσαλήμ διακονῶν τοῖς 25  
ἀγίοις. εὐδόκησαν γὰρ Μακεδονία καὶ Ἀχαΐα κοινωσίαν 26  
τινὰ ποιήσασθαι εἰς τοὺς πτωχοὺς τῶν ἀγίων τῶν ἐν Ἱερουσαλήμ. εὐδόκησαν γάρ, καὶ ὀφειλέται εἰσὶν αὐτῶν<sup>4</sup>. εἰ 27  
γὰρ τοῖς πνευματικοῖς αὐτῶν ἐκοινώνησαν τὰ ἔθνη, ὀφείλουσιν καὶ ἐν τοῖς σαρκικοῖς λειτουργῆσαι αὐτοῖς. τοῦτο 28  
οὖν ἐπιτελέσας καὶ σφραγισάμενος αὐτοῖς τὸν καρπὸν τοῦ-

<sup>1</sup> εἰάν.<sup>2</sup> Add ἐλεύσομαι πρὸς ὑμᾶς.<sup>3</sup> ὑφ'.<sup>4</sup> αὐτῶν εἰσιν.

have led to the anomaly in the construction. He may have felt a slight embarrassment in expressing that he was only making them a passing visit: many thoughts were in his mind at once; the longing that he had for them, the apparent inconsistency of this with the shortness of his stay amongst them, the present intention of going to Jerusalem, the distant journey to Spain.

If the Apostle fulfilled this last-mentioned intention, no trace of his journey has been preserved. His long imprisonment at Rome and Cesarea may have hindered its accomplishment; or the stream of tradition, setting in another direction, has obliterated the memory of it. Could it be established that by the words, ἐπὶ τὸ τέρμα τῆς δόσεως ἐλθῶν, in the famous passage of Clement, 1 Ep. ad Cor. v., the Pillars of Hercules were meant, we might suppose that the true and more ancient tradition had disappeared before the later one. If we could recover a Chronicon of the end of the first century, there would be

no reason for surprise in our finding mention of the martyrdom of St. Paul in Spain. So slender is the authority by which any other tradition of his death is supported, so inextricably blended in the very earliest accounts with fables respecting himself and St. Peter. Dionys. Cor. apud Euseb. H. E. ii. 25.

εἰ ἂν ὑμῶν πρῶτον ἀπὸ μέρους ἐμπλησθῶ.] "If I be first of all filled with you in my love, in some degree;" *i. e.* not so much as I wish, yet as long as I am able. The rhetoric of Chrysostom adds a fine touch, which is hardly, however, contained in the original words, — οὐδεὶς γὰρ με χρόνος ἐμπληῆσαι δύναται, οὐδ' ἐμποιῆσαί μοι κόρον τῆς συνουσίας ὑμῶν.

25. But at present I go to Jerusalem, ministering to the saints. These words are meant to defer the expectation of the Apostle's coming, which they might have gathered from the previous verses.

26. For the singular evidence which this passage affords of the genuineness of the Epistle, and



parts, and having a great desire these many years to  
 24 come unto you; whensoever I take my journey into  
 Spain<sup>1</sup>—(for I trust to see you in my journey, and to be  
 brought on my way thitherward by you, if first I be  
 25 somewhat filled with your company). But now I go  
 26 unto Jerusalem to minister unto the saints. For it  
 hath pleased them of Macedonia and Achaia to make a  
 certain contribution for the poor among\* the saints  
 27 which are at Jerusalem. It hath pleased them verily;  
 and their debtors they are. For if the Gentiles have been  
 made partakers of their spiritual things, their duty is also  
 28 to minister unto them in carnal things. When therefore  
 I have performed this, and have sealed to them this fruit,

<sup>1</sup> Add I will come to you.

what is more important, as it has been impugned, of this chapter in particular, see Paley's *Horæ Paulinæ*, chap. ii. No. 1.

27. *εὐδόκησαν γάρ.*] “For they were pleased to do it; and their debtors they are.” Who are the debtors? and of whom? First, let us suppose the Apostle to mean that the Churches of Judea are the debtors of those in Macedonia. This thought certainly agrees with the repetition of the *εὐδόκησαν*, and with the *καί*; and agrees also with the gracious manner of St. Paul, but is inconsistent with what follows, which requires, not that the Churches in Judea should be the debtors of those in Macedonia, but that they should have a claim on the Churches in Macedonia for temporal things, in return for their spiritual things. On the other hand, if we translate — “And they,” *i. e.* the Macedonians, “are their debtors,” we get a sense somewhat ungracious in so courteous a writer as St. Paul, and

inconsistent with the relation expressed by *καί*. Reading over the two clauses in English, we perceive that, if such is the intended connexion, the copula is faulty: the words *ὀφειλέται εἰσὶν αὐτῶν* are logically, that is in idea, prior to *εὐδόκησαν*. We can only escape the dilemma by supposing that the clause *εἰ γὰρ τοῖς πνευματικοῖς αὐτῶν*, though suggested by the sound of the word *ὀφειλέται*, is not really connected with what has preceded, but with a thought latent in the Apostle's mind; and that, in a similar way, *ὀφείλουσιν* is a false echo of *ὀφειλέται*. Compare ver. 19. for a similar confusion and for the suggestion of a thought by a word, xii. 13, 14.; also observe that the idea of ver. 27. occurs nearly in the same words in 1 Cor. ix. 11., *εἰ ἡμεῖς ὑμῖν τὰ πνευματικὰ ἐσπέσαμεν, μέγα εἰ ἡμεῖς ὑμῶν τὰ σαρκικὰ θερίσομεν; σφραγισάμενος.*] “Having set my seal upon;” *i. e.* having given the seal of my Apostolical

τον ἀπελεύσομαι δι' ὑμῶν εἰς<sup>1</sup> Σπανίαν. οἶδα δὲ ὅτι ἐρ-<sup>29</sup>  
χόμενος πρὸς ὑμᾶς ἐν πληρώματι εὐλογίας<sup>2</sup> χριστοῦ ἐλεύ-  
σομαι. παρακαλῶ δὲ ὑμᾶς, ἀδελφοί, διὰ τοῦ κυρίου ἡμῶν<sup>30</sup>  
'Ιησοῦ χριστοῦ καὶ διὰ τῆς ἀγάπης τοῦ πνεύματος, συνα-  
γωνίσασθαί μοι ἐν ταῖς προσευχαῖς ὑπὲρ ἐμοῦ πρὸς τὸν  
θεόν, ἵνα ῥυσθῶ ἀπὸ τῶν ἀπειθούντων ἐν τῇ Ἰουδαίᾳ καὶ<sup>31</sup>  
ἡ δωροφορία μου ἢ ἐν Ἱερουσαλήμ<sup>3</sup> εὐπρόσδεκτος τοῖς  
ἀγίοις γένηται<sup>4</sup>, ἵνα ἐν χαρᾷ ἔλθω πρὸς ὑμᾶς διὰ θελήμα-<sup>32</sup>  
τος κυρίου Ἰησοῦ.<sup>5</sup> ὁ δὲ θεὸς τῆς εἰρήνης μετὰ πάντων<sup>33</sup>  
ὑμῶν [ἀμήν].

<sup>1</sup> Add τῆν.

<sup>2</sup> ἵνα ἡ διακονία μου ἢ εἰς Ἱερουσαλήμ.

<sup>2</sup> Add τοῦ εὐαγγελίου τοῦ.

<sup>4</sup> γένηται τοῖς ἀγίοις.

<sup>5</sup> Om. κυρ. Ἰησ. Add θεοῦ καὶ συναναπαύσωμαι ὑμῖν.

authority to this fruit they have borne; or, having completed and put the finishing stroke to the fruit which they offer. For the use of the word *καρπός* comp. Phil. iv. 17.—*οὐχ ὅτι ἐπιζητῶ τὸ δόμα, ἀλλ' ἐπιζητῶ τὸν καρπὸν τὸν πλεονάζοντα εἰς λόγον ὑμῶν.*

29. ἐν πληρώματι εὐλογίας χριστοῦ.] I know that coming to you I will come in the fulness of the blessing of Christ.

These words naturally carry us back to the first chapter, in which he says, "I desire to come unto you, that I may impart some spiritual gift." So in this passage he is thinking that he will richly endow them, even as God has endowed him. Yet how can we free the words from a sort of ego-

tism? First inasmuch as he himself tells us that all his graces are inseparably bound up in his union with Christ, and his glorying no man can make void, because he glories in the Lord; and secondly as the thought of the good he will do them is quickened by his affection for them. Compare 2 Cor. xi. 30., xii. 1.

30, 31. διὰ τῆς ἀγάπης τοῦ πνεύματος,] through the love which the Spirit creates in us; as in Gal. v. 22., love is numbered among the gifts of the Spirit.

συναγωνίσασθαί.] Comp. Col. vi. 12. ἀγωνιζόμενος ὑπὲρ ὑμῶν ἐν ταῖς προσευχαῖς. The words ὑπὲρ ἐμοῦ may be taken either with *συναγωνίσασθαί* or with *προσευχαῖς*.

Here, as in Acts, xx. 22, 23.,

29 I will come by you into Spain. And I am sure that,  
 when I come unto you, I shall come in the fulness  
 30 of the blessing<sup>1</sup> of Christ. Now I beseech you, bre-  
 thren, for the Lord Jesus Christ's sake, and for the  
 love of the Spirit, that ye strive together with me  
 31 in your prayers to God for me; that I may be delivered  
 from them that do not believe in Judæa; and that the  
 offering of my gift at Jerusalem<sup>2</sup> may be accepted of  
 32 the saints; that I may come unto you with joy by the  
 33 will of the Lord Jesus.<sup>3</sup> Now the God of peace be with  
 you all. Amen.

<sup>1</sup> Add "of the Gospel."

<sup>2</sup> My service which I have for Jerusalem.

<sup>3</sup> Of God, and may with you be refreshed.

to the elders of Ephesus, in accordance with the warning of Agabus, xxi. 11. (comp. 1 Thess. ii. 14.), and on other occasions (2 Tim. iv. 18.), the Apostle anticipates the evil coming upon him at the hands of the Jews, whose temper he well knew.

31. The Apostle seems to fear not only the violence of those who did not believe, but also the unwillingness of the brethren to receive offerings at his hands. The words, *ἵνα ἡ δωροφορία μου . . . εὐπρόσδεκτος τοῖς ἁγίοις*, imply a difference between himself and the Church of Jerusalem, such as made it possible that they might not receive the offerings that he brought. Why else should he doubt, or even pray,

that the collection of alms which he had undertaken at the request of Apostles "who seemed to be pillars" might be acceptable? Compare the account in Acts, xxi., in which a slender line of demarcation appears to be drawn between the multitude of Jews that believe, all zealous for the law, and the rest of the nation.

32. *ἵνα ἐν χαρᾷ ἔλθω*,] that I may come to you and be joyful; that no circumstance may take away the joy that I feel in coming to you.

33. *ὁ δὲ Θεὸς τῆς εἰρήνης*.] As elsewhere, not without an allusion to the counsels of peace which he has given in this and almost every Epistle.



Συνίστημι δὲ ὑμῖν Φοίβην τὴν ἀδελφὴν ἡμῶν, οὖσαν 16  
 διάκονον τῆς ἐκκλησίας τῆς ἐν Κεγχραιῖς, ἵνα προσδέξησθε 2  
 αὐτὴν<sup>1</sup> ἐν κυρίῳ ἀξίως τῶν ἀγίων καὶ παραστήτε αὐτῇ ἐν ᾧ  
 ἂν ὑμῶν χρῆζῃ πράγματι· καὶ γὰρ αὐτὴ προστάτις πολλῶν  
 ἐγενήθη καὶ ἐμοῦ αὐτοῦ.<sup>2</sup>

Ἀσπάσασθε Πρίσκαν<sup>3</sup> καὶ Ἀκύλαν τοὺς συνεργοὺς μου 3  
 ἐν χριστῷ Ἰησοῦ, οἵτινες ὑπὲρ τῆς ψυχῆς μου τὸν ἑαυτῶν 4  
 τράχηλον ὑπέθηκαν, οἷς οὐκ ἐγὼ μόνος εὐχαριστῶ ἀλλὰ καὶ  
 πᾶσαι αἱ ἐκκλησίαι τῶν ἔθνῶν, καὶ τὴν κατ' οἶκον αὐτῶν 5  
 ἐκκλησίαν. ἀσπάσασθε Ἐπαίνετον τὸν ἀγαπητόν μου, ὅς  
 ἐστὶν ἀπαρχὴ τῆς Ἀσίας<sup>4</sup> εἰς χριστόν. ἀσπάσασθε Μα- 6  
 ρίαν, ἣτις πολλὰ ἐκοπίασεν εἰς ὑμᾶς.<sup>5</sup> ἀσπάσασθε Ἀνδρό- 7  
 νικον καὶ Ἰουνίαν τοὺς συγγενεῖς μου καὶ συναιχμαλώτους

<sup>1</sup> αὐτὴν προσδέξησθε. <sup>2</sup> καὶ αὐτοῦ ἐμοῦ. <sup>3</sup> Πρίσκιλλαν. <sup>4</sup> Ἀχαΐας. <sup>5</sup> ἡμᾶς.

XVI. 1. Phebe, probably the bearer of the Epistle.

To the name of deaconess of the Church in the New Testament can only be added the conjecture, that the institution came from the desire to avoid the scandal which would be occasioned by the admixture of men and women in some of the offices of the Church. Comp. 1 Cor. ix. 5. :— "Have we not power to lead about a sister, a wife, . . . as the brethren of the Lord, and Cephas."

ἐν Κεγχραιῖς.] The port of Corinth on the Saronic Gulf, distant from Corinth itself, according to Strabo, about 70 stadia, or rather less than 9 miles.

2. That ye may receive her to you in the Lord: ἀξίως, (1.) in the way ye ought to receive the saints; or, (2.) in the way ye as the saints ought to receive others, and assist her in whatever she may need of you; for she herself hath been the patroness of many, yea, and of myself also.

3. [Priscilla, the reading of the Textus Receptus, is the diminutive of Prisca, like Drusilla, Livilla, Quintilla.]

4. οἵτινες ὑπὲρ τῆς ψυχῆς μου, *who laid down their necks.*] Perhaps in the tumult to which the Apostle is probably referring when he says, "after the manner of men I fought with beasts at Ephesus," 1 Cor. xv. 32., Acts xix.; or on the occasion, if it be not the same, mentioned in 2 Cor. i.

5. "The Church that is in their house:" either, (1.) their family which by a figure of speech might be so termed; or, (2.) an assembly of Christians which they permitted to be held under their roof, as at Ephesus, 1 Cor. xvi. 19., where they had been helpers of the Apostle not more than a year previously. In the second Epistle to Timothy they are again at Ephesus, iv. 19., though originally dwellers at Rome, whence they were driven by the command of Claudius

16 I commend unto you Phebe our sister, which is a  
 2 servant of the church which is at Cenchrea: that ye re-  
 ceive her in the Lord, as becometh saints, and that ye  
 succour\* her in whatsoever business she hath need of  
 you: for she too\* hath been a succourer of many, and  
 3 of my own\* self. Greet Prisca<sup>1</sup> and Aquila my helpers  
 4 in Christ Jesus: who have for my life laid down their  
 own necks: unto whom not only I give thanks, but also  
 5 all the churches of the Gentiles. Likewise greet the  
 church that is in their house. Salute my wellbeloved  
 6 Epenetus, who is the firstfruits of Asia<sup>2</sup> unto Christ.  
 7 Greet Mary, who bestowed much labour on you.<sup>3</sup> Salute  
 Andronicus and Junia, my kinsmen, and my fellow-

<sup>1</sup> Priscilla.<sup>2</sup> Achaia.<sup>3</sup> Us.

(Acts, xviii. 2.) to Corinth, where they first met with the Apostle, who joined them in their occupation of tentmaking.

Epenetus the firstfruits. So in 1 Cor. xvi. 15., Stephanas is mentioned as the firstfruits of Achaia, whence the very ancient various reading 'Αχαΐας has probably crept into this passage.

Ewald, who admits the genuineness of the fifteenth chapter, suspects that the sixteenth has been inserted from a lost Epistle to the Ephesians. It must be admitted that the number of persons who are supposed to be acquaintances of St. Paul at Rome; the mention of Prisca and Aquila, who are at Ephesus both before and after the time at which the Epistle was written; also of Epenetus the firstfruits of Asia, and of others who had been fellow-workers with St. Paul in Asia or Greece, two of whom are also called his fellow-prisoners at a time when he himself was not in prison, and all of whom are

now at Rome, where we should not expect to find them, lends countenance to the suspicion. Whether Ewald be right or not is a matter of slight importance. It is impossible either to prove or disprove the conjecture.

6. ἡτις] marks the reason, "for she."

εις ἡμᾶς.] Introduced by Lachmann into the Text. But the Apostle could not say appropriately, Salute Mary, who laboured much for you. Better with B. εις ἡμᾶς.

7. Salute Andronicus and Junia, my fellow-prisoners. The latter (Ἰουρία) is the name of a woman. Priscilla, Junia, the household of Chloe, the sisters who accompanied Paul and the brethren of the Lord and Cephas, the Athenian woman named Damaris, Phebe, Dorcas, the women who followed Christ and ministered to him of their substance, besides others who are mere names to us, show the part which

μου, οἷτινές εἰσιν ἐπίσημοίεν τοῖς ἀποστόλοις, οἱ καὶ πρὸ  
 ἔμου γέγοναν ἐν χριστῷ. ἀσπάσασθε Ἀμπλίαν τὸν ἀγα- 8  
 πητόν μου ἐν κυρίῳ. ἀσπάσασθε Οὐρβανὸν τὸν συνεργὸν 9  
 ἡμῶν ἐν κυρίῳ<sup>1</sup>, καὶ Στάχυν τὸν ἀγαπητόν μου. ἀσπά- 10  
 σασθε Ἀπελλὴν τὸν δόκιμον ἐν χριστῷ. ἀσπάσασθε τοὺς  
 ἐκ τῶν Ἀριστοβούλου. ἀσπάσασθε Ἡρωδίωνα τὸν συγ- 11  
 γενῆ μου. ἀσπάσασθε τοὺς ἐκ τῶν Ναρκίσσου τοὺς ὄντας  
 ἐν κυρίῳ. ἀσπάσασθε Τρύφαιναν καὶ Τρυφῶσαν τὰς 12  
 κοπιώσας ἐν κυρίῳ. [ἀσπάσασθε Περσίδα τὴν ἀγαπητήν,  
 ἣτις πολλὰ ἐκοπίασεν ἐν κυρίῳ.] ἀσπάσασθε Ροῦφον τὸν 13  
 ἐκλεκτὸν ἐν κυρίῳ, καὶ τὴν μητέρα αὐτοῦ καὶ ἔμου. ἀσπά- 14  
 σασθε Ἀσύγκριτον Φλέγοντα Ἑρμῆν Πατρόβαν Ἑρμῶν  
 καὶ τοὺς σὺν αὐτοῖς ἀδελφούς. ἀσπάσασθε Φιλόλογον καὶ 15  
 Ἰουλίαν, Νηρέα καὶ τὴν ἀδελφὴν αὐτοῦ, καὶ Ὀλυμπᾶν,  
 καὶ τοὺς σὺν αὐτοῖς πάντας ἁγίους. ἀσπάσασθε ἀλλή- 16  
 λους ἐν φιλήματι ἁγίῳ. ἀσπάζονται ὑμᾶς αἱ ἐκκλησῖαι  
 πᾶσαι<sup>2</sup> τοῦ χριστοῦ.

Παρακαλῶ δὲ ὑμᾶς, ἀδελφοί, σκοπεῖν τοὺς τὰς διχοστα- 17  
 σίας καὶ τὰ σκάνδαλα παρὰ τὴν διδαχὴν ἣν ὑμεῖς ἐμάθετε  
 ποιοῦντας, καὶ ἐκκλίνατε ἀπ' αὐτῶν· οἱ γὰρ τοιοῦτοι τῷ 18  
 κυρίῳ ἡμῶν<sup>3</sup> χριστῷ οὐ δουλεύουσιν, ἀλλὰ τῇ ἑαυτῶν κοι-

<sup>1</sup> χριστῷ.<sup>2</sup> Om. πᾶσα.<sup>3</sup> Add Ἰησοῦ.

women took in the first preach-  
 ing of the Gospel.

τοὺς συγγενεῖς.] Literally, my  
 kinsmen. There appears nothing  
 improbable in Paul having had  
 such at Rome. Comp. ver. 11. 21.

οἷτινές εἰσιν ἐπίσημοι, *who are  
 distinguished.*] These words form  
 one of the very few references  
 that we find to the state of the  
 Church, prior to the preaching  
 of St. Paul.

It is uncertain whether by  
 those who were Apostles before  
 him, St. Paul means the Twelve  
 (an opinion in favour of which

might be quoted his own words  
 in 1 Cor. xv. 8., "Last of all he  
 was seen of me"); or whether he  
 is using the term Apostle in its  
 more general sense.

Amplias contracted from Am-  
 pliatius, like Lucas, Silas, from  
 Lucanus and Silvanus.

10. The name Apelles occurs  
 in the well-known line, Hor. i.  
 Sat. v. 100.: "Credat Judæus  
 Apella."

τοὺς ἐκ τῶν Ἀριστοβούλου,] *i. e.*  
 the Christians of Aristobulus's  
 household.

11. Herodion, a name formed



8 prisoners, who are of note among the apostles, who also  
 9 were in Christ before me. Greet Amplias my beloved  
 10 in the Lord. Salute Urbane, our helper in the Lord<sup>1</sup>,  
 11 and Stachys my beloved. Salute Apelles approved in  
 12 Christ. Salute them which are of Aristobulus' house-  
 13 hold. Salute Herodion my kinsman. Greet them that  
 14 be of the household of Narcissus, which are in the Lord.  
 15 Salute Tryphena and Tryphosa, who labour in the Lord.  
 16 [Salute the beloved Persis, which laboured much in the  
 17 Lord.] Salute Rufus chosen in the Lord, and his mother  
 18 and mine. Salute Asyncritus, Phlegon, Hermes, Pa-  
 19 trobas, Hermas, and the brethren which are with them.  
 20 Salute Philologus, and Julia, Nereus, and his sister, and  
 21 Olympas, and all the saints which are with them. Salute  
 22 one another with an holy kiss. All<sup>2</sup> the churches of  
 23 Christ salute you.

24 Now I beseech you, brethren, mark them which  
 25 cause divisions and offences contrary to the doctrine  
 26 which ye have learned; and avoid them. For they  
 27 that are such serve not our Lord<sup>3</sup> Christ, but their

<sup>1</sup> Christ.<sup>2</sup> Om. All.<sup>3</sup> Add Jesus.

from Herod, like Cesarion from Cesar. Narcissus may have been the freedman of Claudius.

13. Rufus may have been the son of Simon the Cyrenian mentioned in Mark, xv. 21.

τὴν μητέρα αὐτοῦ καὶ ἐμοῦ,] his mother whom I love as mine. Compare our Lord's words:—"Son, behold thy mother," John xix. 26, 27.

14. Hermas, erroneously identified with Hermas the brother of Pius, bishop of Rome about A. D. 150, and the author of the Shepherd. Origen ad hunc locum. Euseb. H. E. iii. 3.

Patrobas, a name occurring in

Martial, ii. 32. 3.; it is a shortened form of Patrobius.

16. ἀσπάσασθε ἀλλήλους ἐν φιλήματι ἀγίῳ,] with the mystic kiss, the kiss that is the seal of brotherly love as in 1 Peter, v. 14.; or merely the kiss usual in the assembly of the saints.

16. "All the churches of Christ salute you." Insert πᾶσαι, which has been omitted by the copyists, apparently because they could not understand how St. Paul could express the feeling of all Churches to the Roman Church. Compare 1 Corinthians, i. 2.

17, 18. Compare Phil. i. 15.

λία, καὶ διὰ τῆς χρηστολογίας, καὶ εὐλογίας ἐξαπατῶσιν  
τὰς καρδίας τῶν ἀκάκων. ἡ γὰρ ὑμῶν ὑπακοὴ εἰς πάντας 19  
ἀφίκετο· ἐφ' ὑμῖν οὖν χαίρω<sup>1</sup>, θέλω δὲ ὑμᾶς σοφοὺς<sup>2</sup> εἶναι  
εἰς τὸ ἀγαθόν, ἀκεραίους δὲ εἰς τὸ κακόν. ὁ δὲ θεὸς 20  
τῆς εἰρήνης συντρίψει τὸν σατανᾶν ὑπὸ τοὺς πόδας ὑμῶν  
ἐν τάχει.

Ἡ χάρις τοῦ κυρίου ἡμῶν Ἰησοῦ χριστοῦ μεθ' ὑμῶν.

Ἀσπάζεται<sup>3</sup> ὑμᾶς Τιμόθεος ὁ συνεργός μου, καὶ Λούκιος 21  
καὶ Ἰάσων καὶ Σωσίπατρος οἱ συγγενεῖς μου. ἀσπάζομαι 22  
ὑμᾶς ἐγὼ Τέρτιος ὁ γράψας τὴν ἐπιστολὴν ἐν κυρίῳ. ἀσπά- 23  
ζεται ὑμᾶς Γάϊος ὁ ξένος μου καὶ ὄλης τῆς ἐκκλησίας<sup>4</sup>  
ἀσπάζεται ὑμᾶς Ἐραστός ὁ οἰκονόμος τῆς πόλεως, καὶ 24  
Κούαρτος ὁ ἀδελφός.<sup>5</sup>

Τῷ δὲ δυναμένῳ ὑμᾶς στηρίξαι κατὰ τὸ εὐαγγέλιόν μου 25

<sup>1</sup> χαίρω οὖν τὸ ἐφ' ὑμῖν.

<sup>2</sup> Add μέν.

<sup>3</sup> ἀσπάζονται.

<sup>4</sup> τῆς ἐκκλησίας ὄλης.

<sup>5</sup> Add ἡ χάρις τοῦ κυρίου ἡμῶν Ἰησοῦ χριστοῦ μετὰ πάντων ὑμῶν.

(written from Rome a few years later):—“Some indeed preach Christ even of envy and strife; and some also of goodwill: the one preach Christ of contention, not sincerely, supposing to add affliction to my bonds.”

18. Comp. again Phil. iii. 19.,  
ὣν ὁ θεὸς ἡ κοιλία.

19. The connexion of this verse with the preceding is obscure. The Apostle may either mean: (1.) “They deceive the hearts of such as you, for you are known throughout the world to be simple and guileless (ἀκακοί); or, (2.) “Avoid these deceivers, for otherwise you will mar that good fame which is gone out respecting you into all the world;” or, (3.) the Apostle may be harping back on the word doctrine (διδασχί), in ver. 17. He adds: “Therefore I rejoice; howbeit I would have you wise ‘as serpents’ in reference to what is

good, while you retain your innocence and purity in relation to its opposite.”

20. Compare above, c. xv. ver. 33., where there seems to be a similar reference to their divisions. “But the God of peace shall shortly bruise Satan, who is the author of these divisions, under your feet.”

21. Timotheus, Acts, xvi. 1., xx. 4. See 1 Thess. i. 1.

Jason of Thessalonica, Acts, xvii. 5.; Sosipater of Berea, Acts, xx. 4.

22. That St. Paul dictated his Epistles appears from this passage, which may be compared with 1 Cor. xvi. 21., where he adds, “The salutation of me Paul with mine own hand.” Gal. iv. 11.: “Ye see in what large letters I have written to you with mine own hand.” Coloss. iv. 18.: “The salutation by the hand of me Paul.” 2 Thess. iii. 17.: “The

own belly; and by good words and fair speeches  
 19 deceive the hearts of the simple. For your obedience  
 is come abroad unto all men. I am glad therefore on  
 your behalf: but yet I would have you wise unto that  
 20 which is good, and pure concerning evil. And the  
 God of peace shall bruise Satan under your feet  
 shortly. The grace of our Lord Jesus Christ be with  
 you. Amen.

21 Timotheus my workfellow, and Lucius, and Jason,  
 22 and Sosipater, my kinsmen, salute you. I Tertius, who  
 23 wrote this epistle, salute you in the Lord. Gaius mine  
 host, and of the whole church, saluteth you. Erastus  
 the chamberlain of the city saluteth you, and Quartus  
 24 a brother.<sup>1</sup>

25 Now to him that is of power to stablish you according

<sup>1</sup> The grace of our Lord Jesus Christ be with you all.

salutation of Paul with mine own hand, which is the token in every epistle: so I write.”

ἐγὼ Τέρτιος.] Who Tertius was is unknown. Not the same with Silas, as some fancied, in consequence of the similarity of sound in the Hebrew numeral for three, as Silas is but a shortened form of the Latin Silvanus.

23. “Gaius mine host, and of the whole church.” Comp. above the same turn of expression—“his mother and mine.”

Erastus, “the chamberlain of the city,” the same, probably, who accompanied St. Paul in his travels. Grotius remarks, “Vides jam ab initio, quanquam paucos, aliquos tamen fuisse Christianos in dignitatibus positos.” Κούαρτος the brother, *i. e.* the disciple.

24. Farewell, and again farewell. The grace of our Lord Jesus Christ be with you all, and

again I repeat, “The grace of our Lord Jesus Christ be with you all.”

25. τῷ δὲ δυναμένῳ.] The construction may be supplied by some such word as ἐνχαριστῶμεν; or, more probably, was intended to terminate with ἡ δόξα. Owing to the length of the sentence, the latter end has forgotten the beginning; and consequently, ἡ δόξα is inserted in a relative clause.

στηρίζαι,] in reference to their divisions and weaknesses.

κατὰ τὸ εὐαγγέλιόν μου.] According to the Gospel which has been committed to me to preach. Comp. Rom. ii. 16., and 2 Tim. iv. 17.:—ἵνα δι' ἐμοῦ τὸ κήρυγμα πληροφορηθῇ καὶ ἀκούσῃ πάντα τὰ ἔθνη.

καὶ τὸ κήρυγμα Ἰησοῦ χριστοῦ] is an explanation of τὸ εὐαγγέλιόν μου; as though he had said too much in calling it his Gospel, he adds, according to the preach-



καὶ τὸ κήρυγμα Ἰησοῦ χριστοῦ, κατὰ ἀποκάλυψιν μυστη-  
 ρίου χρόνοις αἰωνίοις σεσιγημένου, φανερωθέντος δὲ νῦν 26  
 διὰ τε γραφῶν προφητικῶν κατ' ἐπιταγὴν τοῦ αἰωνίου θεοῦ  
 εἰς ὑπακοὴν πίστεως εἰς πάντα τὰ ἔθνη γνωρισθέντος, μόνῳ 27  
 σοφῷ θεῷ, διὰ Ἰησοῦ χριστοῦ, ᾧ ἡ δόξα εἰς τοὺς αἰῶνας  
 τῶν αἰῶνων<sup>1</sup>, ἀμήν.<sup>2</sup>

<sup>1</sup> Omit τῶν αἰῶνων.

<sup>2</sup> Add Πρὸς Ῥωμαίους ἐγράφη ἀπὸ Κορίνθου διὰ Φοίβης τῆς διακόνου τῆς ἐν  
 Κεγχραῖς ἐκκλησίας.

ing of Christ, that is, according to the Gospel of Christ preached by me.

κατά,] in the same sense as above. This clause may be regarded as in apposition with the preceding. "According to the Gospel of Christ, according to the revelation of the mystery which was kept silent since the world began."

The best commentary on this verse is the 1st chapter, in which the Gospel is set forth as a revelation of righteousness and of wrath to a world lying in darkness. In several other places St. Paul speaks of the mysteriousness of the past, the times of that ignorance which God winked at. Comp. 1 Cor. ii. 7. :—"We speak the wisdom of God in a mystery, even the hidden wisdom which God ordained before the world unto our glory ;" and Col. i. 26. :—"Even the mystery which hath been hid from ages and from generations, but now is made manifest unto the saints." As we sometimes ask the question, not without a certain strangeness, what God "has reserved for the heathen," so in these passages the Apostle seems to indicate a similar feeling respecting the ages that are past.

26. φανερωθέντος δὲ νῦν διὰ τε γραφῶν.] But now made manifest

through the writings of the prophets also. That is to say, the Gospel which had been concealed, was now made manifest, and received also a light and illustration from the prophets.

27. μόνῳ σοφῷ Θεῷ.] The only wise God as revealed in Jesus Christ.

ᾧ] refers to God, not to Christ. In addition to the arguments urged below, we may mention the anacoluthon of the doxology, as itself affording a proof of genuineness. There can be little inducement imagined for inventing these three verses, each of which (κατὰ τὸ εὐαγγέλιόν μου, καὶ τὸ κήρυγμα Ἰησοῦ χριστοῦ . . . αἰωνίου Θεοῦ . . . μόνῳ σοφῷ Θεῷ) bears special marks of the hand of St. Paul.

The great majority of early authorities (B.C.D., Clement, Origen) place the doxology at the end of the Epistle. A. has it here, and at the end of chap. xiv. as well ; in which latter place G. leaves a space for it, also inserting it at the end. There are several other traces of this variation, being as old as the fourth century. The antiquity of the two traditions renders it impossible to determine certainly which of them is the true one.

to my gospel, and the preaching of Jesus Christ, according to the revelation of the mystery, which was kept  
 26 secret since the world began, but now is made manifest, and by the scriptures of the prophets, according to the commandment of the everlasting God, made known to  
 27 all nations for the obedience of faith: to God only wise, be glory through Jesus Christ for ever and ever.<sup>1</sup> Amen.<sup>2</sup>

<sup>1</sup> *Omit* and ever.

<sup>2</sup> *Add* Written to the Romans from Corinth, and sent by Phebe servant of the church at Cenchrea.

The doubt respecting the position of the doxology, and the circumstance mentioned by Origen that Marcion ended the Epistle at the 23rd verse of the fourteenth chapter; also certain minute coincidences, which are observed chiefly between Rom. xv. 25—29., and 1 Cor. ix. 11., 2 Cor. viii. 4., ix. 1. 5.; lastly, the mention of the great number of persons resident at Rome, who were known to the Apostle, and in particular of his kinsmen and fellow-prisoners, have led to a suspicion of the genuineness of the last two chapters. To such a suspicion it may be replied: (1.) that, if spurious, they would be a forgery without a motive; (2.) that they have every mark of genuineness which characteristic thought and language can supply (observe xv. 8, 9. 14, 15. 20, 21. 23., compared with 2 Cor. x. 13. 16.; xvi. 13. 23.); (3.) that they present at least one minute coincidence with the history; (4.) that the occurrence of the doxology at the end of chap. xiv. is no proof that this was the end of the Epistle; the Apostle, after intending to finish, may have begun again, as in the Epistle to the Galatians, as in fact he has

added a postscript at ver. 21. of the sixteenth chapter, and made a conclusion at the end of chap. xv.; (5.) that the close connexion of the last verse of chap. xiv. and the beginning of chap. xv., is a presumption that the doxology has slipped into that place from some accidental cause; (6.) that the evidence of Marcion is inconclusive, unless his edition, whatever may have been its object, was based on earlier documents than the received version, an assumption of which there is no proof; lastly, that the extremely close and minute resemblances between the Ephesians and Colossians, or between the Galatians and the Romans (which latter are both admitted by Baur himself to be genuine writings of the Apostle), destroy the force of the presumption derived from a few similarities, nowhere extending to a whole verse, against the two last chapters of the Epistle to the Romans.

None of these arguments, it will be observed, afford any answer to the view of Ewald, who maintains, not the spuriousness, but the misplacement of chap. xvi. See above on ver. 5.

## NATURAL RELIGION.

THE revelation of righteousness by faith in the Epistle to the Romans, is relative to a prior condemnation of Jew and Gentile, who are alike convicted of sin. If the world had not been sitting in darkness and the shadow of death, there would have been no need of the light. And yet this very darkness is a sort of contradiction, for it is the darkness of the soul, which, nevertheless, sees itself and God. Such "darkness visible" St. Paul had felt in himself, and, passing from the individual to the world he lifts up the veil partially, and lets the light of God's wrath shine upon the corruption of man. What he himself in the searchings of his own spirit had become conscious of, was "written in large letters" on the scene around. To all Israelites at least, the law stood in the same relation as it had once done to himself; it placed them in a state of reprobation. Without law, "they had not had sin," and now, the only way to do away with sin, is to do away the law itself.

But, if "sin is not imputed where there is no law," it might seem as though the heathen could not be brought within the sphere of the same condemnation. Could we suppose men to be like animals, "nourishing a blind life within the brain," "the seed that is not quickened except it die" would have no existence in them. Common sense tells us that all evil implies a knowledge of good, and that no man can be responsible for the worship of a false God who has no means of approach to the true. But this was not altogether the case of the Gentile; "without the law sin was in the world;" as the Jew had the law, so the Gentile had the witness of God in creation. Nature was the Gentile's law, witnessing against his immoral and degraded state, leading him upward through the visible things to the



unseen power of God. He knew God, as the Apostle four times repeats, and magnified him not as God; so that he was without excuse, not only for his idolatry, but because he worshipped idols in the presence of God Himself.

Such is the train of thought which we perceive to be working in the Apostle's mind, and which leads him, in accordance with the general scope of the Epistle to the Romans, to speak of natural religion. In two passages in the Acts he dwells on the same subject. It was one that found a ready response in the age to which St. Paul preached. Reflections of a similar kind were not uncommon among the heathen themselves. If at any time in the history of mankind natural religion can be said to have had a real and independent existence, it was in the twilight of heathenism and Christianity. "Seeking after God, if haply they might feel after Him and find Him," is a touching description of the efforts of philosophy in its later period. That there were principles in Nature higher and purer than the creations of mythology was a reflection made by those who would have deemed "the cross of Christ foolishness," who "mocked at the resurrection of the dead." The Olympic heaven was no longer the air which men breathed, or the sky over their heads. The better mind of the world was turning from "dumb idols." Ideas about God and man were taking the place of the old heathen rites. Religions, like nations, met and mingled. East and West were learning of each other, giving and receiving spiritual and political elements; the objects of Gentile worship fading into a more distant and universal God; the Jew also traveling in thought into regions which his fathers knew not, and beginning to form just conceptions of the earth and its inhabitants.

While we remain within the circle of Scripture language, or think of St. Paul as speaking only to the men of his own age in words that were striking and appropriate to them, there is no difficulty in understanding his meaning. The Old Testament denounced idolatry as hateful to God. It was away from him, out of his sight; except where it touched the fortunes of the Jewish people, hardly within

the range either of His judgments or of His mercies. No Israelite, in the elder days of Jewish history, supposed the tribes round about, or the individuals who composed them, to be equally with himself the objects of God's care. The Apostle brings the heathen back before the judgment seat of God. He sees them sinking into the condition of the old Canaanitish nations. He regards this corruption of Nature as a consequence of their idolatry. They knew, or might have known, God, for creation witnesses of Him. This is the hinge of the Apostle's argument: "If they had not known God they had not had sin;" but now they know Him, and sin in the light of knowledge. Without this consciousness of sin there would be no condemnation of the heathen, and therefore no need of justification for him,—no parallelism or coherence between the previous states of Jew and Gentile, or between the two parts of the scheme of redemption.

But here philosophy, bringing into contrast the Scriptural view of things and the merely historical or human one, asks the question, "How far was it possible for the heathen to have seen God in Nature?" Could a man anticipate the true religion any more than he could anticipate discoveries in science or in art? Could he pierce the clouds of mythology, or lay aside language as it were a garment? Three or four in different ages, who have been the heralds of great religious revolutions, may have risen above their natural state under the influence of some divine impulse. But men in general do as others do; single persons in India or China do not dislocate themselves from the customs, traditions, prejudices, rites, in which they have been brought up. The mind of a nation has its own structure, which receives and also idealises in various degrees the forms of outward Nature. Religions, like languages, conform to this mental structure; they are prior to the thoughts of individuals; no one is responsible for them. Homer is not to blame for his conception of the Grecian gods; it is natural and adequate to his age. For no one in primitive times could disengage himself from that world of sense which grew to him and enveloped him; we might as well

imagine that he could invent a new language, or change the form which he inherited from his race into some other type of humanity.

The question here raised is one of the most important, as it is perhaps one that has been least considered, out of the many questions in which reason and faith, historical fact and religious belief, come into real or apparent conflict with each other. Volumes have been written on the connection of geology with the Mosaic account of the creation, — a question which is on the outskirts of the great difficulty, — a sort of advanced post, at which theologians go out to meet the enemy. But we cannot refuse seriously to consider the other difficulty, which affects us much more nearly, and in the present day almost forces itself upon us, as the spirit of the ancient religions is more understood, and the forms of religion still existing among men become better known.

It sometimes seems as if we lived in two, or rather many distinct worlds, — the world of faith and the world of experience, — the world of sacred and the world of profane history. Between them there is a gulph; it is not easy to pass from one to the other. They have a different set of words and ideas, which it would be bad taste to intermingle; and of how much is this significant? They present themselves to us at different times, and call up a different train of associations. When reading scripture we think only of the heavens “which are made by the word of God,” of “the winds and waves obeying His will,” of the accomplishment of events in history by the interposition of His hand. But in the study of ethnology or geology, in the records of our own or past times, a curtain drops over the Divine presence; human motives take the place of spiritual agencies; effects are not without causes; interruptions of Nature repose in the idea of law. Race, climate, physical influences, states of the human intellect and of society, are among the chief subjects of ordinary history; in the Bible there is no allusion to them; to the inspired writer they have no existence. Were men different, then, in early ages, or does the sacred narrative show them to us under a different point of view? The being of whom scripture gives



one account, philosophy another, — who has a share in Nature and a place in history, who partakes also of a hidden life, and is the subject of an unseen power, — is he not the same? This is the difficulty of our times, which presses upon us more and more, both in speculation and practice, as different classes of ideas come into comparison with each other. The day has passed in which we could look upon man in one aspect only, without interruption or confusion from any other. And Scripture, which uses the language and ideas of the age in which it was written, is inevitably at variance with the new modes of speech, as well as with the real discoveries of later knowledge.

Yet the Scriptures lead the way in subjecting the purely supernatural and spiritual view of human things to the laws of experience. The revocation in Ezekiel of the “old proverb in the house of Israel,” is the assertion of a moral principle, and a return to fact and Nature. The words of our Saviour, — “Think ye that those eighteen on whom the tower of Siloam fell, were sinners above all the men who dwelt in Jerusalem?” and the parallel passage respecting the one born blind, — “Neither this man did sin, nor his parents,” are an enlargement of the religious belief of the time in accordance with experience. When it is said that faith is not to look for wonders; or “the kingdom of God cometh not with observation,” and “neither will they be persuaded though one rose from the dead,” here, too, is an elevation of the order of Nature over the miraculous and uncommon. The preference of charity to extraordinary gifts is another instance, in which the spirit of Christ speaks by the lips of Paul, of a like tendency. And St. Paul himself, in recognising a world without the Jewish, as responsible to God, and subject to His laws, is but carrying out, according to the knowledge of his age, the same principle which a wider experience of the world and of antiquity compels us to extend yet further to all time and to all mankind.

It has been asked: “How far, in forming a moral estimate of an individual, are we to consider his actions simply as good or evil; or

how far are we to include in our estimate education, country, rank in life, physical constitution, and so forth?" Morality is rightly jealous of our resolving evil into the influence of circumstances: it will no more listen to the plea of temptation as the excuse for vice, than the law will hear of the same plea in mitigation of the penalty for crime. It requires that we should place ourselves within certain conditions before we pass judgment. Yet we cannot deny a higher point of view also,—of "Him that judged not as a man judgeth," in which we fear to follow only because of the limitation of our faculties. And in the case of a murderer or other great criminal, if we were suddenly made aware, when dwelling on the enormity of his crime, that he had been educated in vice and misery, that his act had not been unprovoked, perhaps that his physical constitution was such as made it nearly impossible for him to resist the provocation which was offered to him, the knowledge of these and similar circumstances would alter our estimate of the complexion of his guilt. We might think him guilty, but we should also think him unfortunate. Stern necessity might still require that the law should take its course, but we should feel pity as well as anger. We should view his conduct in a larger and more comprehensive way, and acknowledge that, had we been placed in the same circumstances, we might have been guilty of the same act.

Now the difference between these two views of morality is analogous to the difference between the way in which St. Paul regards the heathen religions, and the way in which we ourselves regard them, in proportion as we become better acquainted with their true nature. St. Paul conceives idolatry separate from all the circumstances of time, of country, of physical or mental states by which it is accompanied, and in which it may be almost said to consist. He implies a deliberate knowledge of the good, and choice of the evil. He supposes each individual to contrast the truth of God with the error of false religions, and deliberately to reject God. He conceives all mankind, "creatures as they are one of another," and

"Moving all together if they move at all,"

to be suddenly freed from the bond of nationality, from the customs and habits of thought of ages. The moral life which is proper to the individual, he breathes into the world collectively. Speaking not of the agents and their circumstances, but of their acts, and seeing these reflected in what may be termed in a figure the conscience, not of an individual but of mankind in general, he passes on all men everywhere the sentence of condemnation. We can hardly venture to say what would have been his judgment on the great names of Greek and Roman history, had he familiarly known them. He might have felt as we feel, that there is a certain impropriety in attempting to determine, with a Jesuit writer, or even in the spirit of love and admiration which the great Italian poet shows for them, the places of the philosophers and heroes of antiquity in the world to come. More in his own spirit, he would have spoken of them as a part of "the mystery which was not then revealed as it now is." But neither can we imagine how he could have become familiar with them at all without ceasing to be St. Paul.

Acquainted as we are with Greek and Roman literature from within, lovers of its old heroic story, it is impossible for us to regard the religions of the heathen world in the single point of view which they presented to the first believers. It would be a vain attempt to try and divest ourselves of the feelings towards the great names of Greek and Roman history which a classical education has implanted in us; as little can we think of the deities of the heathen mythology in the spirit of a Christian of the first two centuries. Looking back from the vantage ground of ages, we see more clearly the proportions of heathenism and Christianity, as of other great forms or events of history, than was possible for contemporaries. Ancient authors are like the inhabitants of a valley who know nothing of the countries beyond: they have a narrow idea either of their own or other times; many notions are entertained by them respecting the past history of mankind which a wider prospect would have dispelled. The horizon of the sacred writers too is limited; they do not embrace the historical or other aspects of the state of man to



which modern reflection has given rise ; they are in the valley still, though with the "light of the world" above. The Apostle sees the Athenians from Mars' Hill "wholly given to idolatry:" to us, the same scene would have revealed wonders of art and beauty, the loss of which the civilised nations of Europe still seem with a degree of seriousness to lament. He thinks of the heathen religions in the spirit of one of the old prophets ; to us they are subjects of philosophy also. He makes no distinction between their origin and their decline, the dreams of the childhood of the human race and the fierce and brutal lusts with which they afterwards became polluted ; we note many differences between Homer and the corruption of later Greek life, between the rustic simplicity of the old Roman religion and the impurities of the age of Clodius or Tiberius. More and more, as they become better known to us, the original forms of all religions are seen to fall under the category of nature and less under that of mind, or free will. There is nothing to which they are so much akin as language, of which they are a sort of after-growth,—in their fantastic creations the play or sport of the same faculty of speech ; they seem to be also based on a spiritual affection, which is characteristic of man equally with the social ones. Religions, like languages, are inherent in all men every where, having a close sympathy or connection with political and family life. It would be a shallow and imaginary explanation of them that they are corruptions of some primeval revelation, or impostures framed by the persuasive arts of magicians or priests. There are many other respects in which our first impressions respecting the heathen world are changed by study and experience. There was more of true greatness in the conceptions of heathen legislators and philosophers than we readily admit, and more of nobility and disinterestedness in their character. The founders of the Eastern religions especially, although indistinctly seen by us, appear to be raised above the ordinary level of mortality. The laws of our own country are an inheritance partly bequeathed to us by a heathen nation ; many of our philosophical and most of our political ideas are derived from a like source.

What shall we say to these things? Are we not undergoing, on a wider scale and in a new way, the same change which the Fathers of Alexandria underwent, when they became aware that heathenism was not wholly evil, and that there was as much in Plato and Aristotle which was in harmony with the Gospel as of what was antagonistic to it.

Among the many causes at present in existence which will influence "the Church of the future," none is likely to have greater power than our increasing knowledge of the religions of mankind. The study of them is the first step in the philosophical study of revelation itself. For Christianity or the Mosaic religion, standing alone, is hardly a subject for scientific inquiry: only when compared with other forms of faith do we perceive its true place in history, or its true relation to human nature. The glory of Christianity is not to be as unlike other religions as possible, but to be their perfection and fulfilment. Those religions are so many steps in the education of the human race. One above another, they rise or grow side by side, each nation, in many ages, contributing some partial ray of a divine light, some element of morality, some principle of social life, to the common stock of mankind. The thoughts of men, like the productions of Nature, do not endlessly diversify; they work themselves out in a few simple forms. In the fulness of time, philosophy appears, shaking off, yet partly retaining, the nationality and particularity of its heathen origin. Its top "reaches to heaven," but it has no root in the common life of man. At last, the crown of all, the chief corner-stone of the building, when the impressions of Nature and the reflections of the mind upon itself have been exhausted, Christianity arises in the world, seeming to stand in the same relation to the inferior religions that man does to the inferior animals.

When, instead of painting harsh contrasts between Christianity and other religions, we rather draw them together as nearly as truth will allow, many thoughts come into our minds about their relation to each other which are of great speculative interest as well as of practical importance. The joyful words of the Apostle: "Is he the

God of the Jews only, is he not also of the Gentiles?" have a new meaning for us. And this new application the Apostle himself may be regarded as having taught us, where he says: "When the Gentiles which know not the law do by nature the things contained in the law, these not having the law are a law unto themselves." There have been many schoolmasters to bring men to Christ, and not the law of Moses only. Ecclesiastical history enlarges its borders to take in the preparations for the Gospel, the anticipations of it, the parallels with it; collecting the scattered gleams of truth which may have revealed themselves even to single individuals in remote ages and countries. We are no longer interested in making out a case against the heathen religions in the spirit of party,—the superiority of Christianity will appear sufficiently without that,—we rather rejoice that, at sundry times and in divers manners, by ways more or less akin to the methods of human knowledge, "God spake in the past to the fathers," and that in the darkest ages, amid the most fanciful aberrations of mythology, He left not Himself wholly without a witness between good and evil in the natural affections of mankind.

Some facts also begin to appear, which have hitherto been unknown or concealed. They are of two kinds, relating partly to the origin or development of the Jewish or Christian religion; partly also independent of them, yet affording remarkable parallels both to their outward form and to their inner life. Christianity is seen to have partaken much more of the better mind of the Gentile world than the study of Scripture only would have led us to conjecture: it has received, too, many of its doctrinal terms from the language of philosophy. The Jewish religion is proved to have incorporated with itself some elements which were not of Jewish origin; and the Jewish history begins to be explained by the analogy of other nations. The most striking fact of the second kind is found in a part of the world which Christianity can be scarcely said to have touched, and is of a date some centuries anterior to it. That there is a faith\* which

\* Buddhism.



has a greater number of worshippers than all sects of Christians put together, which originated in a reformation of society, tyrannised over by tradition, spoiled by philosophy, torn asunder by caste,—which might be described, in the words of Scripture, as a “preaching of the Gospel to the poor;” that this faith, besides its more general resemblance to Christianity, has its incarnation, its monks, its saints, its hierarchy, its canonical books, its miracles, its councils, the whole system being “full blown” before the Christian era; that the founder of this religion descended from a throne to teach the lesson of equality among men—(“there is no distinction of” Chinese or Hindoo, Brahmin or Sudra, such at least was the indirect consequence of his doctrine)—that, himself contented with nothing, he preached to his followers the virtues of poverty, self-denial, chastity, temperance, and that once, at least, he is described as “taking upon himself the sins of mankind:”—these are facts which, when once known, are not easily forgotten; they seem to open an undiscovered world to us, and to cast a new light on Christianity itself. And it “harrows us with fear and wonder,” to learn that this vast system, numerically the most universal or catholic of all religions, and, in many of its leading features, most like Christianity, is based, not on the hope of eternal life, but of complete annihilation.

The Greek world presents another parallel with the Gospel, which is also independent of it; less striking, yet coming nearer home, and sometimes overlooked because it is general and obvious. That the political virtues of courage, patriotism, and the like, have been received by Christian nations from a classical source is commonly admitted. Let us ask now the question, Whence is the love of knowledge? who first taught men that the pursuit of truth was a religious duty? Doubtless the words of one greater than Socrates come into our minds: “For this end was I born, and for this cause came I into the world, that they might know the truth.” But the truth here spoken of is of another and more mysterious kind; not truth in the logical or speculative sense of the word, nor even in its ordinary use. The earnest inquiry after the nature of things, the

devotion of a life to such an inquiry, the forsaking all other good in the hope of acquiring some fragment of true knowledge,—this is an instance of human virtue not to be found among the Jews, but among the Greeks. It is a phenomenon of religion, as well as of philosophy, that among the Greeks too there should have been those who, like the Jewish prophets, stood out from the world around them, who taught a lesson, like them, too exalted for the practice of mankind in general; who anticipated out of the order of nature the knowledge of future ages; whose very chance words and misunderstood modes of speech have moulded the minds of men in remote times and countries. And that these teachers of mankind, “as they were finishing their course” in the decline of Paganism, like Jewish prophets, though unacquainted with Christianity, should have become almost Christian, preaching the truths which we sometimes hold to be “foolishness to the Greek,” as when Epictetus spoke of humility, or Seneca told of a God who had made of one blood all nations of the earth,—is a sad and touching fact.

But it is not only the better mind of heathenism in east or west that affords parallels with the Christian religion: the corruptions of Christianity, its debasement by secular influences, its temporary decay at particular times or places, receive many illustrations from similar phenomena in ancient times and heathen countries. The manner in which the Old Testament has taken the place of the New; the tendency to absorb the individual life in the outward church; the personification of the principle of separation from the world in monastic orders; the accumulation of wealth with the profession of poverty; the spiritualism, or child-like faith, of one age, and the rationalism or formalism of another; many of the minute controversial disputes which exist between Christians respecting doctrines both of natural and revealed religion;—all these errors or corruptions of Christianity admit of being compared with similar appearances either in Buddhism or Mahomedanism. Is not the half-believing half-sceptical attitude in which Socrates and others stood to the “orthodox” pagan faith very similar to that in which philo-

sophers, and in some countries educated men, generally have stood to established forms of Christianity? Is it only in Christian times that men have sought to consecrate art in the service of religion? Did not Paganism do so far more completely? or was it Plato only to whom moral ideas represented themselves in sensual forms? Has not the whole vocabulary of art, in modern times, become confused with that of morality? The modern historian of Greece and Rome draws our attention to other religious features in the ancient world, which are not without their counterpart in the modern,—“old friends with new faces,”—which a few words are enough to suggest. The aristocratic character of Paganism, the influence which it exerted over women, its galvanic efforts to restore the past, the ridicule with which the sceptic assails its errors, and the manner in which the antiquarians Pausanias and Dionysius contemptuously reply; also the imperfect attempts at reconciliation of old and new, found in such writers as Plutarch, and the obscure sense of the real connection of the Pagan worship with political and social life, the popularity of its temporary hierophants; its panics, wonders, oracles, mysteries,—these features make us aware that however unlike the true life of Christianity may have been even to the better mind of heathenism, the corruptions and weaknesses of Christianity have never been without a parallel under the sun.

Those religions which possess sacred books furnish some other curious, though exaggerated, likenesses of the use which has been sometimes made of the Jewish or Christian Scriptures. No believer in organic or verbal inspiration has applied more high-sounding titles to the Bible than the Brahmin or Mussulman to the Koran or the Vedas. They have been loaded with commentaries—buried under the accumulations of tradition; no care has been thought too great of their words and letters, while the original meaning has been lost, and even the language in which they were written ceased to be understood. Every method of interpretation has been practised upon them; logic and mysticism have elicited every possible sense; the aid of miracles has been called in to resolve difficulties and re-



concile contradictions. And still, notwithstanding the perverseness with which they are interpreted, these half-understood books exercise a mighty spell; single verses, misapplied words, disputed texts, have affected the social and political state of millions of mankind during a thousand or many thousand years. Even without reference to their contents, the mere name of these books has been a power in the Eastern world. Facts like these would be greatly misunderstood if they were supposed to reduce the Old and New Testament to the level of other sacred books, or Christianity to the level of other religions. But they may guard us against some forms of superstition which insensibly, almost innocently, spring up among Christians; and they reveal weaknesses of human nature, from which we can scarcely hope that our own age or country is exempt.

Let us conclude this digression by summing up the use of such inquiries; as a touchstone and witness of Christian truth; as bearing on our relations with the heathens themselves.

Christianity, in its way through the world is ever taking up and incorporating with itself Jewish, secular, or even Gentile elements. And the use of the study of the heathen religions is just this: it teaches us to separate the externals or accidents of Christianity from its essence; its local, temporary type from its true spirit and life. These externals, which Christianity has in common with other religions of the East, may be useful, may be necessary, but they are not the truths which Christ came on earth to reveal. The fact of the possession of sacred books, and the claim which is made for them, that they are free from all error or imperfection, if admitted, would not distinguish the Christian from the Mahomedan faith. Most of the Eastern religions, again, have had vast hierarchies and dogmatic systems; neither is this a note of divinity. Also, they are witnessed to by signs and wonders; we are compelled to go further to find the characteristics of the Gospel of Christ. As the Apostle says: "And yet I show you a more excellent way,"—not in the Scriptures, nor in the church, nor in a system of doctrines, nor in miracles, does Christianity consist, though some of these may be its necessary

accompaniments or instruments, but in the life and teaching of Christ.

The study of "comparative theology" not only helps to distinguish the accidents from the essence of Christianity; it also affords a new kind of testimony to its truth; it shows what the world was aiming at through many cycles of human history—what the Gospel alone fulfilled. The Gentile religions, from being enemies, became witnesses of the Christian faith. They are no longer adverse positions held by the powers of evil, but outworks or buttresses, like the courts of the Temple on Mount Sion, covering the holy place. Granting that some of the doctrines and teachers of the heathen world were nearer the truth than we once supposed, such resemblances cause no alarm or uneasiness; we have no reason to fable that they are the fragments of some primeval revelation. We look forwards, not backwards; to the end, not to the beginning; not to the garden of Eden, but to the life of Christ. There is no longer any need to maintain a thesis; we have the perfect freedom and real peace which is attained by the certainty that we know all, and that nothing is kept back. Such was the position of Christianity in former ages; it was on a level with the knowledge of mankind. But in later years unworthy fear has too often paralysed its teachers: instead of seeking to readjust its relations to the present state of history and science, they have clung in agony to the past. For the Gospel is the child of light; it lives in the light of this world; it has no shifts or concealments; there is no kind of knowledge which it needs to suppress; it allows us to see the good in all things; it does not forbid us to observe also the evil which has incrustated upon itself. It is willing that we should look calmly and steadily at all the facts of the history of religion. It takes no offence at the remark, that it has drawn into itself the good of other religions; that the laws and institutions of the Roman Empire have supplied the outer form, and heathen philosophy some of the inner mechanism which was necessary to its growth in the world. No violence is done to its spirit by the enumeration of the causes which have led to its success. It

permits us also to note, that while it has purified the civilisation of the West, there are soils of earth on which it seems hardly capable of living without becoming corrupt or degenerate. Such knowledge is innocent and a "creature of God." And considering how much of the bitterness of Christians against one another arises from ignorance and a false conception of the nature of religion, it is not chimerical to imagine that the historical study of religions may be a help to Christian charity. The least differences seem often to be the greatest; the perception of the greater differences makes the lesser insignificant. Living within the sphere of Christianity, it is good for us sometimes to place ourselves without; to turn away from "the weak and beggarly elements" of worn-out controversies to contemplate the great phases of human existence. Looking at the religions of mankind, succeeding one another in a wonderful order, it is hard to narrow our minds to party or sectarian views in our own age or country. Had it been known that a dispute about faith and works existed among Buddhists, would not this knowledge have modified the great question of the Reformation? Such studies have also a philosophical value as well as a Christian use. They may, perhaps, open to us a new page in the history of our own minds, as well as in the history of the human race. Mankind, in primitive times, seem at first sight very unlike ourselves: as we look upon them with sympathy and interest, a likeness begins to appear; in us too there is a piece of the primitive man; many of his wayward fancies are the caricatures of our errors or perplexities. If a clearer light is ever to be thrown either on the nature of religion or of the human mind, it will come, not from analyses of the individual or from inward experience, but from a study of the mental history of mankind, and especially of those ages in which human nature was fusile, still not yet cast in a mould, and rendered incapable of receiving new creations or impressions.

The study of the religions of the world has also a bearing on the present condition of the heathen. We cannot act upon men unless we understand them; we cannot raise or elevate their moral cha-



racter unless we are able to draw from its concealment the seed of good which they already contain. It is a remarkable fact, that Christianity, springing up in the East, should have conquered the whole western world, and that in the East itself it should have scarcely extended its border, or even retained its original hold. "Westward the course of Christianity has taken its way;" and now it seems as if the two ends of the world would no longer meet; as if differences of degree had extended to differences of kind in human nature, and that we cannot pass from one species to another. Whichever way we look, difficulties appear such as had no existence in the first ages: either barbarism, paling in the presence of a superior race, so that it can hardly be kept alive to receive Christianity, or the mummy-like civilisation of China, which seems as though it could never become instinct with a new life, or Brahminism, outlasting in its pride many conquerors of the soil, or the nobler form of Mahomedanism; the religion of the patriarchs, as it were, overliving itself, preaching to the sons of Ishmael the God of Abraham, who had not yet revealed himself as man. These great systems of religious belief have been subject to some internal changes in a shifting world: the effect produced upon them from without is as yet scarcely perceptible. The attempt to move them is like a conflict between man and nature. And in some places it seems as if the wave had receded again after its advance, and some conversions have been dearly bought, either by the violence of persecution or the corruption or accommodation of the truth. Each sect of Christians has been apt to lend itself to the illusion that the great organic differences of human nature might be bridged over, could the Gospel of Christ be preached to the heathen in that precise form in which it is received by themselves; "if we could but land in remote countries, full armed in that particular system or way after which we in England worship the God of our Fathers." And often the words have been repeated, sometimes in the spirit of delusion, sometimes in that of faith and love: "Lift up your eyes, and behold the fields that they are already white for harvest," when it

was but a small corner of the field that was beginning to whiten, a few ears only which were ready for the reapers to gather.

And yet the command remains: "Go forth and preach the Gospel to every creature." Nor can any blessing be conceived greater than the spread of Christianity among heathen nations, nor any calling nobler or higher to which Christians can devote themselves. Why are we unable to fulfil this command in any effectual manner? Is it that the Gospel has had barriers set to it, and that the stream no longer overflows on the surrounding territory; that we have enough of this water for ourselves, but not enough for us and them? or that the example of nominal Christians, who are bent on their own trade or interest, destroys the lesson which has been preached by the ministers of religion? Yet the lives of believers did not prevent the spread of Christianity at Corinth and Ephesus. And it is hard to suppose that the religion which is true for ourselves has lost its vital power in the world.

The truth seems to be, not that Christianity has lost its power, but that we are seeking to propagate Christianity under circumstances which, during the eighteen centuries of its existence, it has never yet encountered. Perhaps there may have been a want of zeal, or discretion, or education in the preachers; sometimes there may have been too great a desire to impress on the mind of the heathen some peculiar doctrine, instead of the more general lesson of "righteousness, temperance, judgment to come." But however this may be, there is no reason to believe that even if a saint or apostle could rise from the dead, he would produce by his preaching alone, without the use of other means, any wide or deep impression on India or China. To restore life to those countries is a vast and complex work, in which many agencies have to co-operate,—political, industrial, social; and missionary efforts, though a blessed, are but a small part; and the Government is not the less Christian because it seeks to rule a heathen nation on principles of truth and justice only. Let us not measure this great work by the number of communicants or converts. Even when wholly detached from Christianity, the

true spirit of Christianity may animate it. The extirpation of crime, the administration of justice, the punishment of falsehood, may be regarded, without a figure of speech, as "the word of the Lord" to a weak and deceitful people. Lessons of purity and love too flow insensibly out of improvement in the relations of social life. It is the disciple of Christ, not Christ himself, who would forbid us to give these to the many, because we can only give the Gospel to a very few. For it is of the millions, not of the thousands, in India that we must first give an account. Our relations to the heathen are different from those of Christians in former ages, and our progress in their conversion slower. The success which attends our efforts may be disparagingly compared with that of Boniface or Augustin; but if we look a little closer, we shall see no reason to regret that Providence has placed in our hands other instruments for the spread of Christianity besides the zeal of heroes and martyrs. The power to convert multitudes by a look or a word has passed away; but God has given us another means of ameliorating the condition of mankind, by acting on their circumstances, which works extensively rather than intensively, and is in some respects safer and less liable to abuse. The mission is one of governments rather than of churches or individuals. And if, in carrying it out, we seem to lose sight of some of the distinctive marks of Christianity, let us not doubt that the increase of justice and mercy, the growing sense of truth, even the progress of industry, are in themselves so many steps towards the kingdom of heaven.

In the direct preaching of the Gospel, no help can be greater than that which is gained from a knowledge of the heathen religions. The resident in heathen countries readily observes the surface of the world; he has no difficulty in learning the habits of the natives; he avoids irritating their fears or jealousies. It requires a greater effort to understand the mind of a people; to be able to rouse or calm them; to sympathise with them, and yet to rule them. But it is a higher and more commanding knowledge still to comprehend their religion, not only in its decline and corruption, but in its origin



and idea,—to understand that which they misunderstand, to appeal to that which they reverence against themselves, to turn back the currents of thought and opinion which have flowed in their veins for thousands of years. Such is the kind of knowledge which St. Paul had when to the Jews he became as a Jew, that he might win some; which led him while placing the new and old in irreconcilable opposition, to bring forth the new out of the treasure-house of the old. No religion, at present existing in the world, stands in the same relation to Christianity that Judaism once did; there is no other religion which is prophetic or anticipatory of it. But neither is there any religion which does not contain some idea of truth, some notion of duty or obligation, some sense of dependence on God and brotherly love to man, some human feeling of home or country. As in the vast series of the animal creation, with its many omissions and interruptions, the eye of the naturalist sees a kind of continuity,—some elements of the higher descending into the lower, rudiments of the lower appearing in the higher also,—so the Christian philosopher, gazing on the different races and religions of mankind, seems to see in them a spiritual continuity, not without the thought crossing him that the God who has made of one blood all the nations of the earth may yet renew in them a common life, and that our increasing knowledge of the present and past history of the world, and the progress of civilisation itself, may be the means which He has provided, working not always in the way which we expect,—“that his banished ones be not expelled from him.”

## § 2.

Natural religion, in the sense in which St. Paul appeals to its witness, is confined within narrower limits. It is a feeling rather than a philosophy; and rests not on arguments, but on impressions of God in nature. The Apostle, in the first chapter of the Romans, does not reason from first causes or from final causes; abstractions like these would not have been understood by him. Neither is he taking an historical survey of the religions of mankind; he touches, in a word only, on

those who changed the glory of God into the "likeness of man, and birds, and four-footed beasts, and creeping things" (Rom. i. 23.), as on the differences of nations, in Acts xviii. 26. More truly may we describe him in the language of the Psalmist, the very vacancy of which has a peculiar meaning: "He lifts up his eyes to the hills from whence cometh his salvation." He wishes to inspire other men with that consciousness of God in all things which he himself feels: "in a dry and thirsty land where no water is," he would raise their minds to think of Him "who gave them rain from heaven and fruitful seasons;" in the city of Pericles and Phidias he bids them turn from gilded statues and temples formed with hands, to the God who made of one blood all the nations of the earth, "who is not far from every one of us." Yet it is observable that he also begins by connecting his own thoughts with theirs, quoting "their own poets," and taking occasion, from an inscription which he found in their streets, to declare "the mystery which was once hidden, but now revealed."

The appeal to the witness of God in nature has passed from the Old Testament into the New; it is one of the many points which the Epistles of St. Paul and the Psalms and Prophets have in common. "The invisible things from the creation of the world are clearly seen, being understood by the things that are made," is another way of saying, "The heavens declare the glory of God; and the firmament showeth His handywork." Yet the conception of the Old Testament is not the same with that of the New: in the latter we seem to be more disengaged from the things of sense; the utterance of the former is more that of feeling, and less of reflection. One is the poetry of a primitive age, full of vivid immediate impressions; in the other nature is more distant,—the freshness of the first vision of earth has passed away. The Deity Himself, in the Hebrew Scriptures, has a visible form: as He appeared "with the body of heaven in his clearness;" as He was seen by the prophet Ezekiel out of the midst of the fire and the whirlwind, "full of eyes within and without, and the spirit of the living creature in the

wheels." But in the New Testament, "no man hath seen God at any time; the only begotten Son, who is in the bosom of the Father, He hath declared Him." And this difference leads to a further difference in His relation to His works. In what we term nature, the prophet beheld only the covering cherubim that veil the face of God: as He moves, earth moves to meet Him; "He maketh the winds His angels," "the heavens also bow before Him." His voice, as the Psalmist says, is heard in the storm: "The Highest gives His thunder; at Thy chiding, O Lord, the foundations of the round world are discovered." The wonders of creation are not ornaments or poetical figures, strewed over the pages of the Old Testament by the hand of the artist, but the frame in which it consists. And yet in this material garb the moral and spiritual nature of God is never lost sight of: in the conflict of the elements He is the free Lord over them; at His breath—the least exertion of His power—"they come and flee away." He is spirit, not light,—a person, not an element or principle; though creating all things by His word, and existing without reference to them, yet also, in His condescension, the God of the Jewish nation, and of individuals who serve Him. The terrible imagery in which the Psalmist delights to array His power is not inconsistent with the gentlest feelings of love and trust, such as are also expressed in the passage just now quoted: "I will love Thee, O Lord, my strength." God is in nature because He is near also to the cry of His servants. The heart of man expands in His presence; he fears to die lest he should be taken from it. There is nothing like this in any other religion in the world. No Greek or Roman ever had the consciousness of love towards his God. No other sacred books can show a passage displaying such a range of feeling as the eighteenth or twenty-ninth Psalm—so awful a conception of the majesty of God, so true and tender a sense of His righteousness and lovingkindness. It is the same God who wields nature, who also brought up Israel out of the land of Egypt; who, even though the mother desert "her sucking child," will not "forget the work of His hands."



But the God of nature in the Old Testament is not the God of storms or of battles only, but of peace and repose. Sometimes a sort of confidence fills the breast of the Psalmist, even in that land of natural convulsions: "He hath set the round world so fast that it cannot be moved." At other times the same peace seems to diffuse itself over the scenes of daily life: "The hills stand round about Jerusalem, even so is the Lord round about them that fear him." "He maketh me to lie down in green pastures: He leadeth me beside the still waters." Then again the Psalmist wonders at the contrast between man and the other glories of creation: "When I consider the heavens, the work of Thy hands, the moon and the stars that Thou hast ordained; what is man that Thou art mindful of him? or the son of man that Thou visitest him?" Yet these "glories" are the images also of a higher glory; Jerusalem itself is transfigured into a city in the clouds, and the tabernacle and temple become the pavilion of God on high. And the dawn of day in the prophecies, as well as in the Epistles, is the light which is to shine "for the healing of the nations." There are other passages in which the thought of the relation of God to nature calls forth a sort of exulting irony, and the prophet speaks of God, not so much as governing the world, as looking down upon it and taking His pastime in it: "It is He that sitteth upon the circle of the heavens, and the inhabitants thereof are as grasshoppers;" or "He measureth the waters in the hollow of His hand;" or "He taketh up the isles as a very little thing;" the feeling of which may be compared with the more general language of St. Paul: "We are the clay and He the potter." The highest things on earth reach no farther than to suggest the reflection of their inferiority: "Behold even the sun, and it shineth not; and the moon is not pure in His sight."

It is hard to say how far such meditations belong only to particular ages, or to particular temperaments in our own. Doubtless, the influence of natural scenery differs with difference of climate, pursuits, education. "The God of the hills is not the God of the valleys also;" that is to say, the aspirations of the human heart are

roused more by the singular and uncommon, than by the quiet landscape which presents itself in our own neighbourhood. The sailor has a different sense of the vastness of the great deep and the infinity of the heaven above, from what is possible to another. Dwellers in cities, no less than the inhabitants of the desert, gaze upon the stars with different feelings from those who see the ever-varying forms of the seasons. What impression is gathered, or what lesson conveyed, seems like matter of chance or fancy. The power of these sweet influences often passes away when language comes between us and them. Yet they are not mere dreams of our own creation. He who has lost, or has failed to acquire, this interest in the beauty of the world around, is without one of the greatest of earthly blessings. The voice of God in nature calls us away from selfish cares into the free air and the light of day. There, as in a world the face of which is not marred by human passion, we seem to feel "that the wicked cease from troubling, and the weary are at rest."

It is impossible that our own feeling towards nature in the present day can be the same with that of the Psalmist; neither is that of the Psalmist the same with that of the Apostle; while, in the Book of Job and Ecclesiastes we seem to catch the echo of a strain different from either. To us, God is not in the whirlwind nor in the storm, nor in the earthquake, but in the still small voice. Is it not for the attempt to bring God nearer to us in the works of nature than we can truly conceive him to be, that a poet of our own age has been subjected to the charge of pantheism? God has removed Himself out of our sight, that He may give us a greater idea of the immensity of His power. Perhaps it is impossible for us to have the wider and the narrower conception of God at the same time. We cannot see Him equally in the accidents of the world, when we think of Him as identified with its laws. But there is another way into His presence through our own hearts. He has given us the more circuitous path of knowledge; He has not closed against us the door of faith. He has enabled us, not merely

to gaze with the eye on the forms and colours of Nature, but in a measure also to understand its laws, to wander over space and time in the contemplation of its mechanism, and yet to return again to "the meanest flower that breathes," for thoughts such as the other wonders of earth and sky are unable to impart.

It is a simpler, not a lower, lesson which we gather from the Apostle. First, he teaches that in Nature there is something to draw us from the visible to the invisible. The world to the Gentiles also had seemed full of innumerable deities; it is really full of the presence of Him who made it. Secondly, the Apostle teaches the universality of God's providence over the whole earth. He covered it with inhabitants, to whom He gave their times and places of abode, "that they should seek the Lord, if haply they might feel after him, and find him." They are one family, "His offspring," notwithstanding the varieties of race, language, religion. As God is one, even so man is one in a common human nature,—in the universality of sin, no less than the universality of redemption. A third lesson is the connection of immorality and idolatry. They who lower the nature of God lower the nature of man also. Greek philosophy fell short of these lessons. Often as Plato speaks of the myths and legends of the gods, he failed to perceive the immorality of a religion of sense. Still less had any Greek imagined a brotherhood of all mankind, or a dispensation of God reaching backwards and forwards over all time. Its limitation was an essential principle of Greek life; it was confined to a narrow spot of earth, and to small cities; it could not include others besides Greeks; its gods were not gods of the world, but of Greece.

Aspects of Nature in different ages have changed before the eye of man; at times fruitful of many thoughts; at other times either unheeded or fading into insignificance in comparison of the inner world. When the Apostle spoke of the visible things which "witness of the divine power and glory," it was not the beauty of particular spots which he recalled; his eye was not satisfied with seeing the fairness of the country any more than the majesty of



cities. He did not study the fittings of shadows on the hills, or even the movements of the stars in their courses. The plainest passages of the book of nature were, equally with the sublimest, the writing of a Divine hand. Neither was it upon scenes of earth that he was looking when he spoke of the "whole creation groaning together until now." Whatever associations of melancholy or pity may attach to places or states of the heavens, or to the condition of the inferior animals who seem to suffer for our sakes; it is not in these that the Apostle traces the indications of a ruined world, but in the misery and distraction of the heart of man. And the prospect on which he loves to dwell is not that of the promised land, as Moses surveyed it far and wide from the top of Pisgah, but the human race itself, the great family in heaven and earth, of which Christ is the head, reunited to the God who made it, when "there shall be neither barbarian, Scythian, bond nor free, but all one in Christ," the Apostle himself also waiting for the fuller manifestation of the sons of God, and sometimes carrying his thoughts yet further to that mysterious hour, when "the Son shall be subject to him that put all things under him, that God may be all in all."

When thoughts like these fill the mind, there is little room for reflection on the world without. Even the missionary in modern times hardly cares to go out of his way to visit a picturesque country or the monuments of former ages. He is "determined to know one thing only, Christ crucified." Of the beauties of creation, his chief thought is that they are the work of God. He does not analyse them by rules of taste, or devise material out of them for literary discourse. The Apostle, too, in the abundance of his revelations, has an eye turned inward on another world. It is not that he is dead to Nature, but that it is out of his way; not as in the Old Testament, the veil or frame of the Divine presence, but only the background of human nature and of revelation. When speaking of the heathen, it comes readily into his thoughts; it never seems to occur to him in connection with the work of Christ. He does not read mysteries in the leaves of the forest, or see the image of the cross in the forms of the

tree, or find miracles of design in the complex structures of animal life. His thoughts respecting the works of God are simpler, and also deeper. The child and the philosopher alike hear a witness in the first chapter of the Romans, or in the discourse of the Apostle on Mars' hill, or at Lystra, which the mystic fancies of Neoplatonism, and the modern evidences of natural theology, fail to convey to them.

### § 3.

In the common use of language natural religion is opposed to revealed. That which men know, or seem to know, of themselves, which if the written word were to be destroyed would still remain, which existed prior to revelation, and which might be imagined to survive it, which may be described as general rather than special religion, as Christianity rationalised into morality, which speaks of God, but not of Christ,—of nature, but not of grace,—has been termed natural religion. Philosophical arguments for the being of a God are comprehended under the same term. It is also used to denote a supposed primitive or patriarchal religion, whether based on a primeval revelation or not, from which the mythologies or idolatries of the heathen world are conceived to be offshoots.

The line has been sometimes sharply drawn between natural and revealed religion; in other ages of the world, the two have been allowed to approximate, or be almost identified with each other. Natural religion has been often depressed with a view to the exaltation of revealed; the feebleness of the one seeming to involve a necessity for the other. Natural religion has sometimes been regarded as the invention of human reason; at other times, as the decaying sense of a primeval revelation. Yet natural and revealed religion, in the sense in which it is attempted to oppose them, are contrasts rather of words than of ideas. For who can say where the one begins and the other ends? Who will determine how many elements of Scriptural truth enter into modern philosophy or the opinions of the world in general? Who can analyse how much,

even in a Christian country, is really of heathen origin? Revealed religion is ever taking the form of the voice of nature within; experience is ever modifying our application of the truths of Scripture. The ideal of Christian life is more easily distinguishable from the ideal of Greek and Roman, than the elements of opinion and belief which have come from a Christian source are from those which come from a secular or heathen one. Education itself tends to obliterate the distinction. The customs, laws, principles of a Christian nation may be regarded either as a compromise between the two, or as a harmony of them. We cannot separate the truths of Christianity from Jewish or heathen anticipations of them; nor can we say how far the common sense or morality of the present day is indirectly dependent on the Christian religion.

And if, turning away from the complexity of human life in our own age to the beginning of things, we try to conceive revelation in its purity before it came into contact with other influences, or mingled in the great tide of political and social existence, we are still unable to distinguish between natural and revealed religion. Our difficulty is like the old Aristotelian question, how to draw the line between the moral and intellectual faculties. Let us imagine a first moment at which revelation came into the world; there must still have been some prior state which made revelation possible: in other words, revealed religion presupposes natural. The mind was not a *tabula rasa*, on which the characters of truth had to be inscribed; that is a mischievous notion, which only perplexes our knowledge of the origin of things, whether in individuals or in the race. If we say that this prior state is a Divine preparation for the giving of the Law of Moses, or the spread of Christianity, the difference becomes one of degree which admits of no sharp contrast. Revealed religion has already taken the place of natural, and natural religion extended itself into the province of revealed. Many persons who are fond of discovering traces of revelation in the religions of the Gentile world, resent the intrusion of natural elements into Scripture or Christianity. Natural religion they are willing to see identified with



revealed, but not revealed with natural; all Nature may be a miracle, but miracles are not reducible to the course of Nature. But here is only a play between words which derive their meaning from contrast; the phenomena are the same, but we read them by a different light. And sometimes it may not be without advantage to lay aside the two modes of expression, and think only of that "increasing purpose which through the ages ran." Religious faith strikes its roots deeper into the past, and wider over the world, when it acknowledges Nature as well as Scripture.

But although the opposition of natural and revealed religion is an opposition of abstractions, to which no facts really correspond, the term natural religion may be conveniently used to describe that aspect or point of view in which religion appears when separated from Judaism or Christianity. It will embrace all conceptions of religion or morality which are not consciously derived from the Old or New Testament. The favourite notion of a common or patriarchal religion need not be excluded. Natural religion, in this comprehensive sense, may be divided into two heads, which the ambiguity of the word nature has sometimes helped to confuse. First, (i.) the religion of nature before revelation, such as may be supposed to have existed among the patriarchs, or to exist still among primitive peoples, who have not yet been enlightened by Christianity, or debased by idolatry; such (ii.) more truly, as the religions of the Gentile world were and are. Secondly, the religion of nature in a Christian country; either the evidences of religion which are derived from a source independent of the written word, or the common sense of religion and morality, which affords a rule of life to those who are not the subjects of special Christian influences.

i. Natural religion in the first sense is an idea and not a fact. The same tendency in man which has made him look fondly on a golden age, has made him look back also to a religion of nature. Like the memory of childhood, the thought of the past has a strange power over us; imagination lends it a glory which is not its own. What can be more natural than that the shepherd, wandering over

the earth beneath the wide heavens, should ascend in thought to the throne of the Invisible? There is a refreshment to the fancy in thinking of the morning of the world's day, when the sun arose pure and bright, ere the clouds of error darkened the earth. Everywhere, as a fact, the first inhabitants of earth of whom history has left a memorial are sunk in helpless ignorance. Yet there must have been a time, it is conceived, of which there are no memorials, earlier still; when the Divine image was not yet lost, when men's wants were few and their hearts innocent, ere cities had taken the place of fields, or art of nature. The revelation of God to the first father of the human race must have spread itself in an ever-widening circle to his posterity. We pierce through one layer of superstition to another, in the hope of catching the light beyond, like children digging to find the sun in the bosom of the earth.

The origin of an error so often illustrates the truth, that it is worth while to pause for an instant and consider the source of this fallacy, which in all ages has exerted a great influence on mankind, reproducing itself in many different forms among heathen as well as Christian writers. In technical language, it might be described as the fallacy of putting what is intelligible in the place of what is true. It is easy to draw an imaginary picture of a golden or pastoral age, such as poetry has always described it. The mode of thought is habitual and familiar, the phrases which delineate it are traditional, handed on from one set of poets to another, repeated by one school of theologians to the next. It is a different task to imagine the old world as it truly was, that is, as it appears to us, dimly yet certainly, by the unmistakable indications of language and of mythology. It is hard to picture scenes of external nature unlike what we have ever beheld: but it is harder far so to lay aside ourselves as to imagine an inner world unlike our own, forms of belief, not simply absurd, but indescribable and unintelligible to us. No one, probably, who has not realised the differences of the human mind in different ages and countries, either by contact with heathen nations or the study of old language and mythology, with the help

of such a parallel as childhood offers to the infancy of the world, will be willing to admit them in their full extent.

Instead of this difficult and laborious process, we readily conceive of man in the earliest stages of society as not different, but only less than we are. We suppose him deprived of the arts, unacquainted with the truths of Christianity, without the knowledge obtained from books, and yet only unlike us in the simplicity of his tastes and habitudes. We generalise what we are ourselves, and drop out the particular circumstances and details of our lives, and then suppose ourselves to have before us the dweller in Mesopotamia in the days of Abraham, or the patriarchs going down to gather corn in Egypt. This imaginary picture of a patriarchal religion has had such charms for some minds, that they have hoped to see it realised on the wreck of Christianity itself. They did not perceive that they were deluding themselves with a vacant dream which has never yet filled the heart of man.

Philosophers have illustrated the origin of government by a picture of mankind meeting together in a large plain, to determine the rights of governors and subjects; in like manner we may assist imagination, by conceiving the multitude of men with their tribes, races, features, languages, convoked in the plains of the East, to hear from some inspired legislator as Moses, or from the voice of God Himself, a revelation about God and nature, and their future destiny; such a revelation in the first day of the world's history as the day of judgment will be at the last. Let us fix our minds, not on the Giver of the revelation, but on the receivers of it. Must there not have been in them some common sense, or faculty, or feeling, which made them capable of receiving it? Must there not have been an apprehension which made it a revelation to them? Must they not all first have been of one language and one speech? And, what is implied by this, must they not all have had one mental structure, and received the same impressions from external objects, the same lesson from nature? Or, to put the hypothesis in another form, suppose that by some electric power the same truth could have been



made to sound in the ears and flash before the eyes of all, would they not have gone their ways, one to tents, another to cities; one to be a tiller of the ground, another to be a feeder of sheep; one to be a huntsman, another to be a warrior; one to dwell in woods and forests, another in boundless plains; one in valleys, one on mountains, one beneath the liquid heaven of Greece and Asia, another in the murky regions of the north? And amid all this diversity of habits, occupations, scenes, climates, what common truth of religion could we expect to remain while man was man, the creature in a great degree of outward circumstances? Still less reason would there be to expect the preservation of a primeval truth throughout the world, if we imagine the revelation made, not to the multitude of men, but to a single individual, and not committed to writing for above two thousand years.

ii. The theory of a primitive tradition, common to all mankind, has only to be placed distinctly before the mind, to make us aware that it is the fabric of a vision. But, even if it were conceivable, it would be inconsistent with facts. Ancient history says nothing of a general religion, but of particular national ones; of received beliefs about places and persons, about animal life, about the sun, moon, and stars, about the Divine essence permeating the world, about gods in the likeness of men appearing in battles and directing the course of states, about the shades below, about sacrifices, purifications, initiations, magic, mysteries. These were the religions of nature, which in historical times have received from custom also a second nature. Early poetry shows us the same religions in a previous stage, while they are still growing, and fancy is freely playing around the gods of its own creation. Language and mythology carry us a step further back, into a mental world yet more distant and more unlike our own. That world is a prison of sense, in which outward objects take the place of ideas; in which morality is a fact of nature, and "wisdom at one entrance quite shut out." Human beings in that pre-historic age seem to have had only a kind of limited intelligence; they were the slaves, as we should say, of

association. They were rooted in particular spots, or wandered up and down upon the earth, confusing themselves and God and nature, gazing timidly on the world around, starting at their very shadows, and seeing in all things a superhuman power at the mercy of which they were. They had no distinction of body and soul, mind and matter, physical and moral. Their conceptions were neither here nor there; neither sensible objects, nor symbols of the unseen. Their gods were very near; the neighbouring hill or passing stream, brute matter as we regard it, to them a divinity, because it seemed inspired with a life like their own. They could not have formed an idea of the whole earth, much less of the God who made it. Their mixed modes of thought, their figures of speech, which are not figures, their personifications of nature, their reflections of the individual upon the world, and of the world upon the individual, the omnipresence to them of the sensuous and visible, indicate an intellectual state which it is impossible for us, with our regular divisions of thought, even to conceive. We must raze from the table of the mind their language, ere they could become capable of a universal religion.

But although we find no vestiges of a primeval revelation, and cannot imagine how such a revelation could have been possible consistently with those indications of the state of man which language and mythology supply, it is true, nevertheless, that the primitive peoples of mankind have a religious principle common to all. Religion, rather than reason, is the faculty of man in the earliest stage of his existence. Reverence for powers above him is the first principle which raises the individual out of himself; the germ of political order, and probably also of social life. It is the higher necessity of nature, as hunger and the animal passions are the lower. "The clay" falls before the rising dawn; it may stumble over stocks and stones; but it is struggling upwards into a higher day. The worshipper is drawn as by a magnet to some object out of himself. He is weak and must have a god; he has the feeling of a slave towards his master, of a child towards its parents, of the lower animals towards

himself. The Being whom he serves is, like himself, passionate and capricious; he sees him starting up everywhere in the unmeaning accidents of life. The good which he values himself he attributes to him; there is no proportion in his ideas; the great power of nature is the lord also of sheep and oxen. Sometimes, with childish joy, he invites the god to drink of his beverage or eat of his food; at other times, the orgies which he enacts before him, lead us seriously to ask the question "whether religion may not in truth have been a kind of madness." He propitiates him and is himself soothed and comforted; again he is at his mercy, and propitiates him again. So the dream of life is rounded to the poor human creature: incapable as he is of seeing his true Father, religion seems to exercise over him a fatal overpowering influence; the religion of nature we cannot call it, for that would of itself lead to a misconception, but the religion of the place in which he lives, of the objects which he sees, of the tribe to which he belongs, of the animal forms which range in the wilds around him, mingling strangely with the witness of his own spirit that there is in the world a Being above him.

Out of this troubled and perplexed state of the human fancy the great religions of the world arose, all of them in different degrees affording a rest to the mind, and reducing to rule and measure the wayward impulses of human nature. All of them had a history in antecedent ages; there is no stage in which they do not offer indications of an earlier religion which preceded them. Whether they came into being, like some geological formations, by slow deposits, or, like others, by the shock of an earthquake, that is, by some convulsion and settlement of the human mind, is a question which may be suggested, but cannot be answered. The Hindoo Pantheon, even in the antique form in which the world of deities is presented in the Vedas, implies a growth of fancy and ceremonial which may have continued for thousands of years. Probably at a much earlier period than we are able to trace them, religions, like languages, had their distinctive characters with corresponding differences in the first rude constitution of society. As in the case of languages, it is a fair subject



of inquiry, whether they do not all mount up to some elementary type in which they were more nearly allied to sense ; a primeval religion, in which we may imagine the influence of nature was analogous to the first impressions of the outward world on the infant's wandering eyesight, and the earliest worship may be compared with the first use of signs or stammering of speech. Such a religion we may conceive as springing from simple instinct ; yet an instinct higher, even in its lowest degree, than the instinct of the animal creation ; in which the fear of nature combined with the assertion of sway over it, which had already a law of progress, and was beginning to set bounds to the spiritual chaos. Of this aboriginal state we only "entertain conjecture ;" it is beyond the horizon, even when the eye is strained to the uttermost.

But if the first origin of the heathen religions is in the clouds, their decline, though a phenomenon with which we are familiar in history, of which in some parts of the world we are living witnesses, is also obscure to us. The kind of knowledge that we have of them is like our knowledge of the ways of animals ; we see and observe, but we cannot get inside them ; we cannot think or feel with their worshippers. Most or all of them are in a state of decay ; they have lost their life or creative power ; once adequate to the wants of man, they have ceased to be so for ages. Naturally we should imagine that the religion itself would pass away when its meaning was no longer understood ; that with the spirit, the letter too would die ; that when the circumstances of a nation changed, the rites of worship to which they had given birth would be forgotten. The reverse is the fact. Old age affords examples of habits which become insane and inveterate at a time when they have no longer an object ; that is an image of the antiquity of religions. Modes of worship, rules of purification, set forms of words, cling with a greater tenacity when they have no meaning or purpose. The habit of a week or a month may be thrown off ; not the habit of a thousand years. The hand of the past lies heavily on the present in all religions ; in the East it is a yoke which has never been shaken off.

Empire, freedom, among the educated classes belief may pass away, and yet the routine of ceremonial continues; the political glory of a religion may be set at the time when its power over the minds of men is most ineradicable.

One of our first inquiries in reference to the elder religions of the world is how we may adjust them to our own moral and religious ideas. Moral elements seem at first sight to be wholly wanting in them. In the modern sense of the term, they are neither moral nor immoral, but natural; they have no idea of right and wrong, as distinct from the common opinion or feeling of their age and country. No action in Homer, however dishonourable or treacherous, calls forth moral reprobation. Neither gods nor men are expected to present any ideal of justice or virtue; their power or splendour may be the theme of the poet's verse, not their truth or goodness. The only principle on which the Homeric deities reward mortals, is in return for gifts and sacrifices, or from personal attachment. A later age made a step forwards in morality and backwards at the same time; it acquired clearer ideas of right and wrong, but found itself encumbered with conceptions of fate and destiny. The vengeance of the Eumenides has but a rude analogy with justice; the personal innocence of the victim whom the gods pursued is a part of the interest, in some instances, of Greek tragedy. Higher and holier thoughts of the Divine nature appear in Pindar and Sophocles, and philosophy sought to make religion and mythology the vehicles of moral truth. But it was no part of their original meaning:

Yet, in a lower sense, it is true that the heathen religions, even in their primitive form, are not destitute of morality. Their morality is unconscious morality, not "man a law to himself," but "man bound by the will of a superior being." Ideas of right and wrong have no place in them, yet the first step has been made from sense and appetite into the ideal world. He who denies himself something, who offers up a prayer, who practises a penance, performs an act, not of necessity, nor of choice, but of duty; he does not simply follow

the dictates of passion, though he may not be able to give a reason for the performance of his act. He whose God comes first in his mind has an element within him which in a certain degree sanctifies his life by raising him above himself. He has some common interest with other men, some unity in which he is comprehended with them. There is a preparation for thoughts yet higher; he contrasts the permanence of divine and the fleeting nature of human things; while the generations of men pass away "like leaves;" the form of his God is unchanging, and grows not old.

Differences in modes of thought render it difficult for us to appreciate what spiritual elements lurked in disguise among the primitive peoples of mankind. Many allowances must be made before we judge them by our own categories. They are not to be censured for indecency because they had symbols which to after ages became indecent and obscene. Neither were they mere Fetish worshippers because they use sensuous expressions. Religion, like language, in early ages takes the form of sense, but that form of sense is also the embodiment of thought. The stream and the animal are not adored by man in heathen countries because they are destitute of life or reason, but because they seem to him full of mystery and power. It was with another feeling than that of a worshipper of matter that the native of the East first prostrated himself before the rising sun, in whose beams his nature seemed to revive, and his soul to be absorbed. The most childish superstitions are often nothing more than misunderstood relics of antiquity. There are the remains of Fetishism in the charms and cures of Christian countries; no one regards the peasant who uses them as a Fetish worshipper. Many other confusions have their parallel among ourselves; if we only knew it. For indeed our own ideas in religion, as in everything else, seem clearer to us than they really are, because they are our own. To expect the heathen religions to conform to other modes of thought, is as if the inhabitant of one country were to complain of the inhabitant of another for not speaking the same language with him. Our whole attitude towards nature is different from theirs :



to us all is "law;" to them it was all life and fancy, inconsecutive as a dream. Nothing is more deeply fixed to us than the dualism of body and soul, mind and matter; they knew of no such distinction. But we cannot infer from this a denial of the existence of mind or soul; because they use material images, it would be ridiculous to describe the Psalmist or the prophet Isaiah as materialists; whether in heathen poets or in the Jewish scriptures, such language belongs to an intermediate state, which has not yet distinguished the spheres of the spiritual and the sensuous. Childhood has been often used as the figure of such a state, but the figure is only partially true, for the childhood of the human race is the childhood of grown up men, and in the child of the nineteenth century there is a piece also of the man of the nineteenth century. Less obvious differences in speech and thought are more fallacious. The word "God" means something as dissimilar among ourselves and the Greeks as can possibly be imagined; even in Greek alone the difference of meaning can hardly be exaggerated. It includes beings as unlike each other as the muscular, eating and drinking deities of Homer, and the abstract Being of Parmenides, or the Platonic idea of good. All religions of the world use it, however different their conceptions of God may be — polytheistic, pantheistic, monotheistic: it is universal, and also individual; or rather, from being universal, it has become individual, a logical process which has quickened and helped to develop the theological one. Other words, such as prayer, sacrifice, expiation, in like manner vary in meaning with the religion of which they are the expression. The Homeric sacrifice is but a feast of gods and men, destitute of any sacrificial import. Under expiations for sin are included two things which to us are distinct, atonement for moral guilt and accidental pollution. Similar ambiguities occur in the ideas of a future life. The sapless ghosts in Homer are neither souls nor bodies, but a sort of shadowy beings. A like uncertainty extends in the Eastern religions to some of the first principles of thought and being: whether the negative is not also a positive; whether the mind of man is not also God; whether this world is not

another ; whether privation of existence may not in some sense be existence still.

These are a few of the differences for which we have to allow in a comparison of our own and other times and countries. We must say to ourselves, at every step, human nature in that age was unlike the human nature with which we are acquainted, in language, in modes of thought, in morality, in its conception of the world. Yet it was more like than these differences alone would lead us to suppose. The feelings of men draw nearer than their thoughts ; their natural affections are more uniform than their religious systems. Marriage, burial, worship, are at least common to all nations. There never has been a time in which the human race was absolutely without social laws ; in which there was no memory of the past ; no reverence for a higher power. More defined religious ideas, where the understanding comes into play, grow more different ; it is by comparison they are best explained ; like natural phenomena, they derive their chief light from analogy with each other. Travelling in thought from China, by way of India, Persia, and Egypt, to the northern shores of the Mediterranean Sea, we distinguish a succession of stages in which the worship of nature is developed ; in China as the rule or form of political life, almost grovelling on the level of sense ; in India rising into regions of thought and fancy, and allowing a corresponding play in the institutions and character of the people ; in Egypt wrapping itself in the mystery of antiquity, becoming the religion of death and of the past ; in Persia divided between light and darkness, good and evil, the upper and the under world ; in Phœnicia, fierce and licentious, imbued with the spirit of conquest and colonisation. These are the primary strata of the religions of mankind, often shifting their position, and sometimes overlapping each other ; they are distinguished from the secondary strata, as the religions of nations from the inspirations of individuals. Thrown into the form of abstraction, they express the various degrees of distinctness with which man realises his own existence or that of a Divine Being and the relations between them. But they are also powers

which have shaped the course of events in the world. The secret is contained in them, why one nation has been free, another a slave; why one nation has dwelt like ants upon a hillock, another has swept over the earth; why one nation has given up its life almost without a struggle, while another has been hewn limb from limb in the conflict with its conquerors. All these religions contributed to the polytheism of Greece; some elements derived from them being absorbed in the first origin of the Greek religion and language, others acting by later contact, some also by contrast.

“Nature through five cycles ran,  
And in the sixth she moulded man.”

We may conclude this portion of our subject with a few remarks on the Greek and Roman religions, which have a peculiar interest to us for several reasons: first, because they have exercised a vast influence on modern Europe, the one through philosophy, the other through law, and both through literature and poetry; secondly, because, almost alone of the heathen religions, they came into contact with early Christianity; thirdly, because they are the religions of ancient, as Christianity is of modern civilisation.

The religion of Greece is remarkable for being a literature as well as a religion. Its deities are “nameless” to us before Homer; to the Greek himself it began with the Olympic family. Whatever dim notions existed of chaos and primeval night—of struggles for ascendancy between the elder and younger gods, these fables are buried out of sight before Greek mythology begins. The Greek came forth at the dawn of day, himself a youth in the youth of the world, drinking in the life of nature at every pore. The form which his religion took was fixed by the Homeric poems, which may be regarded as standing in the same relation to the religion of Greece as sacred books to other forms of religion. It cannot be said that they aroused the conscience of men; the more the Homeric poems are considered, the more evident it becomes that they have no inner life of morality like Hebrew prophecy, no Divine presence of good slowly purging away the mist that fills the heart of man. What they implanted,



what they preserved in the Greek nation, was not the sense of truth or right, but the power of conception and expression—harmonies of language and thought which enabled man to clothe his ideas in forms of everlasting beauty. They stamped the Greek world as the world of art; its religion became the genius of art. And more and more in successive generations, with the co-operation of some political causes, the hand of art impressed itself on religion; in poetry, in sculpture, in architecture, in festivals and dramatic contests, until in the artistic phase of human life the religious is absorbed. And the form of man, and the intellect of man, as if in sympathy with this artistic development, attained a symmetry and power of which the world has never seen the like.

And yet the great riddle of existence was not answered: its deeper mysteries were not explored. The strife of man with himself was healed only superficially; there was beauty and proportion everywhere, but no "true being." The Jupiter Olympius of Phidias might seem worthy to preside over the Greek world which he summoned before him; the Olympic victor might stand godlike in the fulness of manly vigour; but where could the weak and mean appear? what place was found for the slave or captive? Could bereaved parents acquiesce in the "sapless shades" of Homer, or the moral reflections of Thucydides? Was there not some deeper intellectual or spiritual want which man felt, some taste of immortality which he had sometimes experienced, which made him dissatisfied with his earthly state?

No religion that failed to satisfy these cries of nature could become the religion of mankind. Greek art and Greek literature, losing something of their original refinement, spread themselves over the Roman world; except Christianity, they have become the richest treasure of modern Europe. But the religion of Greece never really grew in another soil, or beneath another heaven; it was local and national: dependent on the fine and subtle perceptions of the Greek race; though it amalgamated its deities with those of Egypt and Rome, its spirit never swayed mankind. It has a truer title to per-

manence and universality in the circumstance that it gave birth to philosophy.

The Greek mind passed, almost unconsciously to itself, from polytheism to monotheism. While offering up worship to the Dorian Apollo, performing vows to Esculapius, panic-stricken about the mutilation of the Hermaë, the Greek was also able to think of God as an idea, Θεός not Ζεύς. In this generalised or abstract form the Deity presided over daily life. Not a century after Anaxagoras had introduced the distinction of mind and matter, it was the belief of all philosophic inquirers that God was mind, or the object of mind. The Homeric gods were beginning to be out of place; philosophy could not distinguish Apollo from Athene, or Leto from Here. Unlike the saints of the middle ages, they suggested no food for meditation; they were only beautiful forms, without individual character. By the side of religion and art, speculation had arisen and waxed strong, or rather it might be described as the inner life which sprang from their decay. The clouds of mythology hung around it; its youth was veiled in forms of sense; it was itself a new sort of poetry or religion. Gradually it threw off the garment of sense; it revealed a world of ideas. It is impossible for us to conceive the intensity of these ideas in their first freshness: they were not ideas, but gods, penetrating into the soul of the disciple, sinking into the mind of the human race; objects, not of speculation only, but of faith and love. To the old Greek religion, philosophy might be said to stand in a relation not wholly different from that which the New Testament bears to the Old; the one putting a spiritual world in the place of a temporal, the other an intellectual in the place of a sensuous; and to mankind in general it taught an everlasting lesson, not indeed that of the Gospel of Christ, but one in a lower degree necessary for man, enlarging the limits of the human mind itself, and providing the instruments of every kind of knowledge.

What the religion of Greece was to philosophy and art, that the Roman religion may be said to have been to political and social life. It was the religion of the family; the religion also of the empire of

the world. Beginning in rustic simplicity, the traces of which it ever afterwards retained, it grew with the power of the Roman state, and became one with its laws. No fancy or poetry moulded the forms of the Roman gods; they are wanting in character and hardly distinguishable from one another. Not what they were, but their worship, is the point of interest about them. Those inanimate beings occasionally said a patriotic word at some critical juncture of the Roman affairs, but they had no attributes or qualities; they are the mere impersonation of the needs of the state. They were easily identified in civilised and literary times with the Olympic deities, but the transformation was only superficial. Greece never conquered the religion of its masters. Great as was the readiness in later times to admit the worship of foreign deities, endless as were the forms of private superstition, these intrusions never weakened or broke the legal hold of the Roman religion. It was truly the "established" religion. It represented the greatness and power of Rome. The deification of the Emperor, though disagreeable to the more spiritual and intellectual feelings of that age of the world, was its natural development. While Rome lasted the Roman religion lasted; like some vast fabric which the destroyers of a great city are unable wholly to demolish, it continued, though in ruins, after the irruption of the Goths, and has exercised, through the medium of the civil law, a power over modern Europe.

More interesting for us than the pursuit of this subject into further details is the inquiry, in what light the philosopher regarded the religious system within the circle of which he lived; the spirit of which animated Greek and Roman poetry, the observance of which was the bond of states. In the age of the Antonines, more than six hundred years had passed away since the Athenian people first became conscious of the contrariety of the two elements; and yet the wedge which philosophy had inserted in the world seemed to have made no impression on the deeply rooted customs of mankind. The everflowing stream of ideas was too feeble to overthrow the intrenchments of antiquity. The course of individuals might be turned by



philosophy; it was not intended to reconstruct the world. It looked on and watched, seeming, in the absence of any real progress, to lose its original force. Paganism tolerated; it had nothing to fear. Socrates and Plato in an earlier, Seneca and Epictetus in a later age, acquiesced in this heathen world, unlike as it was to their own intellectual conceptions of a divine religion. No Greek or Roman philosopher was also a great reformer of religion. Some, like Socrates, were punctual in the observance of religious rites, paying their vows to the gods, fearful of offending against the letter as well as the spirit of divine commands; they thought that it was hardly worth while to rationalise the Greek mythology, when there were so many things nearer home to do. Others, like the Epicureans, transferred the gods into a distant heaven, where they were no more heard of; some, like the Stoics, sought to awaken a deeper sense of moral responsibility. There were devout men, such as Plutarch, who thought with reverence of the past, seeking to improve the old heathen faith, and also lamenting its decline; there were scoffers, too, like Lucian, who found inexhaustible amusement in the religious follies of mankind. Others, like Herodotus in earlier ages, accepted with child-like faith the more serious aspect of heathenism, or contented themselves, like Thucydides, with ignoring it. The world, "wholly given to idolatry," was a strange inconsistent spectacle to those who were able to reflect, which was seen in many points of view. The various feelings with which different classes of men regarded the statues, temples, sacrifices, oracles, and festivals of the gods, with which they looked upon the conflict of religions meeting on the banks of the Tiber, are not exhausted in the epigrammatic formula of the modern historian: "All the heathen religions were looked upon by the vulgar as equally true, by the philosopher as equally false, by the magistrate as equally useful."

Such was the later phase of the religion of nature, with which Christianity came into conflict. It had supplied some of the needs of men by assisting to build up the fabric of society and law. It had left room for others to find expression in philosophy or art. But it

was a world divided against itself. It contained two nations or opinions "struggling in its womb;" the nation or opinion of the many, and the nation or opinion of the few. It was bound together in the framework of law or custom, yet its morality fell below the natural feelings of mankind, and its religious spirit was confused and weakened by the admixture of foreign superstitions. It was a world of which it is not difficult to find traces that it was self-condemned. It might be compared to a fruit, the rind of which was hard and firm, while within it was soft and decaying. Within this outer rind or circle, for two centuries and a half, Christianity was working; at last it appeared without, itself the seed or kernel of a new organisation. That when the conflict was over, and the world found itself Christian, many elements of the old religion still remained, and re-asserted themselves in Christian forms; that the "ghost of the dead Roman Empire" lingered "about the grave thereof;" that Christianity accomplished only imperfectly what heathenism failed to do at all, is a result unlike pictures that are sometimes drawn, but sadly in accordance with what history teaches of mankind and of human nature.

#### § 4, 5.

Natural religion is not only concerned with the history of the religions of nature, nor does it only reflect that "light of the Gentiles" which philosophy imparted; it has to do with the present as well as with the past, with Christian as well as heathen countries. Revealed religion passes into natural, and natural religion exists side by side with revealed; there is a truth independent of Christianity; and the daily life of Christian men is very different from the life of Christ. This general or natural religion may be compared to a wide-spread lake, shallow and motionless, rather than to a living water,—the overflowing of the Christian faith over a professing Christian world, the level of which may be at one time higher or lower; it is the religion of custom or prescription, or rather the unconscious influence of religion on the minds of men

in general ; it includes also the speculative idea of religion when taken off the Christian foundation. Natural religion, in this modern sense, has a relation both to philosophy and life. That is to say (4.), it is a theory of religion which appeals to particular evidences for the being of a God, though resting, perhaps more safely, on the general conviction that "this universal frame cannot want a mind." But it has also a relation to life and practice (5.), for it is the religion of the many ; the average, as it may be termed, of religious feeling in a Christian land, the leaven of the Gospel hidden in the world. St. Paul speaks of those "who knowing not the law are a law unto themselves." Experience seems to show that something of the same kind must be acknowledged in Christian as well as in heathen countries ; which may be conveniently considered under the head of natural religion.

Arguments for the being of a God are of many kinds. There are arguments from final causes, and arguments from first causes, and arguments from ideas ; logical forms, as they appear to be, in which different metaphysical schools mould their faith. Of the first sort the following may be taken as an instance :—A person walking on the sea shore finds a watch or other piece of mechanism ; he observes its parts, and their adaptation to each other ; he sees the watch in motion, and comprehends the aim of the whole. In the formation of that senseless material he perceives that which satisfies him that it is the work of intelligence, or, in other words, the marks of design. And looking from the watch to the world around him, he seems to perceive innumerable ends, and innumerable actions tending to them, in the composition of the world itself, and in the structure of plants and animals. Advancing a step further, he asks himself the question, why he should not acknowledge the like marks of design in the moral world also ; in passions and actions, and in the great end of life. Of all there is the same account to be given—"the machine of the world," of which God is the Maker.

This is the celebrated argument from final causes for the being of a God, the most popular of the arguments of natural religion, partly



because it admits of much ingenious illustration, and also because it is tangible and intelligible. Ideas of a Supreme Being must be given through something, for it is impossible that we should know Him as He is. And the truest representation that we can form of God is, in one sense, that which sets forth his nature most vividly ; yet another condition must also be remembered, viz. that this representation ought not only to be the most distinct, but the highest and holiest possible. Because we cannot see Him as He is, that is no reason for attributing to Him the accidents of human personality. And, in using figures of speech, we are bound to explain to all who are capable of understanding, that we speak in a figure only, and to remind them that names by which we describe the being or attributes of God need a correction in the silence of thought. Even logical categories may give as false a notion of the Divine nature in our own age, as graven images in the days of the patriarchs. However legitimate or perhaps necessary the employment of them may be, we must place ourselves not below, but above them.

(*a.*) In the argument from final causes, the work of the Creator is compared to a work of art. Art is a poor figure of nature ; it has no freedom or luxuriance. Between the highest work of art and the lowest animal or vegetable production, there is an interval which will never be spanned. The miracle of life derives no illustration from the handicraftsman putting his hand to the chisel, or anticipating in idea the form which he is about to carve. More truly might we reason, that what the artist is, the God of nature is not. For all the processes of nature are unlike the processes of art. If, instead of a watch, or some other piece of curious and exquisite workmanship, we think of a carpenter and a table, the force of the argument seems to vanish, and the illustration becomes inappropriate and displeasing. The ingenuity and complexity of the structure, and not the mere appearance of design, makes the watch a natural image of the creation of the world.

(*β.*) But not only does the conception of the artist supply no worthy image of the Creator and his work ; the idea of design

which is given by it requires a further correction before it can be transferred to nature. The complication of the world around us is quite different from the complexity of the watch. It is not a regular and finite structure, but rather infinite in irregularity; which instead of design often exhibits absence of design, such as we cannot imagine any architect of the world contriving; the construction of which is far from appearing, even to our feeble intelligence, the best possible, though it, and all things in it, are very good. If we fix our minds on this very phrase "the machine of the world," we become aware that it is unmeaning to us. The watch is separated and isolated from other matter; dependent indeed on one or two general laws of nature, but otherwise cut off from things around. But nature, the more we consider it, the more does one part appear to be linked with another; there is no isolation here; the plants grow in the soil which has been preparing for them through a succession of geological eras, they are fed by the rain and nourished by light and air; the animals depend for their life on all inferior existences.

( $\gamma$ .) This difference between art and nature leads us to observe another defect in the argument from final causes—that, instead of putting the world together, it takes it to pieces. It fixes our minds on those parts of the world which exhibit marks of design, and withdraws us from those in which marks of design seem to fail. There are formations in nature, such as the hand, which have a kind of mechanical beauty, and show in a striking way, even to an uneducated person, the wonder and complexity of creation. In like manner we feel a momentary surprise in finding out, through the agency of a microscope, that the minutest creatures have their fibres, tissues, vessels. And yet the knowledge of this is but the most fragmentary and superficial knowledge of nature; it is the wonder in which philosophy begins, very different from the comprehension of this universal frame in all its complexity and in all its minuteness. And from this elementary notion of nature, we seek to form an idea of the Author of nature. As though God were in the animal frame and not also in the dust to which it turns; in the

parts, and not equally in the whole ; in the present world, and not also in the antecedent ages which have prepared for its existence.

(δ.) Again, this teleological argument for the being of God gives an erroneous idea of the moral government of the world. For it leads us to suppose that all things are tending to some end ; that there is no prodigality or waste, but that all things are, and are made, in the best way possible. Our faith must be tried to find a use for barren deserts, for venomous reptiles, for fierce wild beasts, nay, for the sins and miseries of mankind. Nor does “there seem to be any resting place,” until the world and all things in it are admitted to have some end impressed upon them by the hand of God, but unseen to us. Experience is cast aside while our meditations lead us to conceive the world under this great form of a final cause. All that is in nature is best ; all that is in human life is best. And yet every one knows instances in which nature seems to fail of its end,—in which life has been cut down like a flower, and trampled under foot of man.

(ε.) There is another way in which the argument from final causes is suggestive of an imperfect conception of the Divine Being. It presents God to us exclusively in one aspect, not as a man, much less as a spirit holding communion with our spirit, but only as an artist. We conceive of Him, as in the description of the poet, standing with compasses over sea and land, and designing the wondrous work. Does not the image tend to make the spiritual creation an accident of the material? For although it is possible, as Bishop Butler has shown, to apply the argument from final causes, as a figure of speech, to the habits and feelings, this adaptation is unnatural, and open even to greater objections than its application to the physical world. For how can we distinguish true final causes from false ones? how can we avoid confusing what ought to be with what is—the fact with the law?

(ζ.) If we look to the origin of the notion of a final cause, we shall feel still further indisposed to make it the category under which we sum up the working of the Divine Being in creation. As



Aristotle, who probably first made a philosophical use of the term, says, it is transferred from mind to matter ; in other words, it clothes facts in our ideas. Lord Bacon offers another warning against the employment of final causes in the service of religion : "they are like the vestals consecrated to God, and are barren." They are a figure of speech which adds nothing to our knowledge. When applied to the Creator, they are a figure of a figure ; that is to say, the figurative conception of the artist embodied or idealised in his work, is made the image of the Divine Being. And no one really thinks of God in nature under this figure of human skill. As certainly as the man who found a watch or piece of mechanism on the sea-shore would conclude, "here are marks of design, indications of an intelligent artist," so certainly, if he came across the meanest or the highest of the works of nature, would he infer, "this was not made by man, nor by any human art." He sees in a moment that the sea-weed beneath his feet is something different in kind from the productions of man. What should lead him to say, that in the same sense that man made the watch, God made the sea-weed? For the sea-weed grows by some power of life, and is subject to certain physiological laws, like all other vegetable or animal substances. But if we say that God created this life, or that where this life ends, there his creative power begins, our analogy again fails, for God stands in a different relation to animal and vegetable life from what the artist does to the work of His hands. And, when we think further of God, as a Spirit without body, creating all things by His word, or rather by His thought, in an instant of time, to whom the plan and execution are all one, we become absolutely bewildered in the attempt to apply the image of the artist to the Creator of the world.

These are some of the points in respect of which the argument from final causes falls short of that conception of the Divine nature which reason is adequate to form. It is the beginning of our knowledge of God, not the end. It is suited to the faculties of children rather than of those who are of full age. It belongs to a stage of

metaphysical philosophy, in which abstract ideas were not made the subject of analysis ; to a time when physical science had hardly learnt to conceive the world as a whole. It is a devout thought which may well arise in the grateful heart when contemplating the works of creation, but must not be allowed to impair that higher intellectual conception which we are able to form of a Creator, any more than it should be put in the place of the witness of God within.

Another argument of the same nature for the being of a God is derived from first causes, and may be stated as follows:—All things that we see are the results or effects of causes, and these again the effects of other causes, and so on through an immense series. But somewhere or other this series must have a stop or limit ; we cannot go back from cause to cause without end. Otherwise the series will have no basis on which to rest. Therefore there must be a first cause, that is, God. This argument is sometimes strengthened by the further supposition that the world must have had a beginning, whence it seems to follow, that it must have a cause external to itself which made it begin ; a principle of rest, which is the source of motion to all other things, as ancient philosophy would have expressed it,—hovering in this as in other speculations intermediate between the physical and metaphysical world.

The difficulty about this argument is much the same as that respecting the preceding. So long as we conceive the world under the form of cause and effect, and suppose the first link in the chain to be the same with those that succeed it, the argument is necessary and natural ; we cannot escape from it without violence to our reason. Our only doubt will probably be, whether we can pass from the notion of a first cause to that of an intelligent Creator. But when, instead of resting in the word “cause,” we go on to the idea, or rather the variety of ideas which are signified by the word “cause,” the argument begins to dissolve. When we say, “God is the cause of the world,” in what sense of the word cause is this ? Is it as life or mind is a cause, or the hammer or hand of the workman, or light or air, or any natural substance ? Is it in that sense of the

word cause, in which it is almost identified with the effect? or in that sense in which it is wholly external to it? Or when we endeavour to imagine or conceive a common cause of the world and all things in it, do we not perceive that we are using the word in none of these senses; but in a new one, to which life, or mind, or many other words, would be at least equally applicable? "God is the life of the world." That is a poor and somewhat unmeaning expression to indicate the relation of God to the world; yet life is a subtle and wonderful power, pervading all things, and in various degrees animating all things. "God is the mind of the world." That is still inadequate as an expression, even though mind can act where it is not, and its ways are past finding out. But when we say, "God is the cause of the world," that can be scarcely said to express more than that God stands in some relation to the world touching which we are unable to determine whether He is in the world or out of it, "immanent" in the language of philosophy, or "transcendent."

There are two sources from which these and similar proofs of the being of a God are derived: first, analogy; secondly, the logical necessity of the human mind. Analogy supplies an image, an illustration. It wins for us an imaginary world from the void and formless infinite. But whether it does more than this must depend wholly on the nature of the analogy. We cannot argue from the seen to the unseen, unless we previously know their relation to each other. We cannot say at random that another life is the double or parallel of this, and also the development of it; we cannot urge the temporary inequality of this world as a presumption of the final injustice of another. Who would think of arguing from the vegetable to the animal world, except in those points where we had already discovered a common principle? Who would reason that animal life must follow the laws of vegetation in those points which were peculiar to it? Yet many theological arguments have this fundamental weakness; they lean on faith for their own support; they



lower the heavenly to the earthly, and may be used to prove anything.

The other source of these and similar arguments is the logical necessity of the human mind. A first cause, a beginning, an infinite Being limiting our finite natures, is necessary to our conceptions. "We have an idea of God, there must be something to correspond to our idea," and so on. The flaw here is equally real, though not so apparent. While we dwell within the forms of the understanding and acknowledge their necessity, such arguments seem unanswerable. But once ask the question, Whence this necessity? was there not a time when the human mind felt no such necessity? is the necessity really satisfied? or is there not some further logical sequence in which I am involved which still remains unanswerable? the whole argument vanishes at once, as the chimera of a metaphysical age. The 17th and 18th centuries have been peculiarly fertile in such arguments; the belief in which, whether they have any value or not, must not be imposed upon us as an article of faith.

If we say again, "that our highest conception must have a true existence," which is the well-known argument of Anselm and Des Cartes for the being of God, still this is no more than saying, in a technical or dialectical form, that we cannot imagine God without imagining that He is. Of no other conception can it be said that it involves existence; and hence no additional force is gained by such a mode of statement. The simple faith in a Divine Being is cumbered, not supported, by evidences derived from a metaphysical system which has passed away. It is a barren logic that elicits the more meagre conception of existence from the higher one of Divinity. Better for philosophy, as well as faith, to think of God at once and immediately as "Perfect Being."

Arguments from first and final causes may be regarded as a kind of poetry of natural religion. There are some minds to whom it would be impossible to conceive of the relation of God to the world under any more abstract form. They, as well as all of us, may ponder in amazement on the infinite contrivances of creation. We

are all agreed that none but a Divine power framed them. We differ only as to whether the Divine power is to be regarded as the hand that fashioned, or the intelligence that designed them, or an operation inconceivable to us which we dimly trace and feebly express in words.

That which seems to underlie our conception both of first and final causes, is the idea of law which we see not broken or intercepted, or appearing only in particular spots of nature, but every where and in all things. All things do not equally exhibit marks of design, but all things are equally subject to the operation of law. The highest mark of intelligence pervades the whole ; no one part is better than another ; it is all "very good." The absence of design, if we like so to turn the phrase, is a part of the design. Even the less comely parts, like the plain spaces in a building, have elements of use and beauty. He who has ever thought in the most imperfect manner of the universe which modern science unveils, needs no evidence that the details of it are incapable of being framed by anything short of a Divine power. Art, and nature, and science, these three,—the first giving us the conception of the relation of parts to a whole; the second, of endless variety and intricacy, such as no art has ever attained ; the third, of uniform laws which amid all the changes of created things remain fixed as at the first, reaching even to the heavens,—are the witnesses of the Creator in the external world.

Nor can it weaken our belief in a Supreme Being, to observe that the same harmony and uniformity extend also to the actions of men. Why should it be thought a thing incredible that God should give law and order to the spiritual, no less than the natural creation ? That human beings do not "thrust or break their ranks ;" that the life of nations, like that of plants or animals, has a regular growth ; that the same strata or stages are observable in the religions, no less than the languages of mankind, as in the structure of the earth, are strange reasons for doubting the Providence of God. Perhaps it is even stranger, that those who do not doubt should eye

with jealousy the accumulation of such facts. Do we really wish that our conceptions of God should only be on the level of the ignorant ; adequate to the passing emotions of human feeling, but to reason inadequate ? That Christianity is the confluence of many channels of human thought does not interfere with its Divine origin. It is not the less immediately the word of God because there have been preparations for it in all ages, and in many countries.

The more we take out of the category of chance in the world either of nature or of mind, the more present evidence we have of the faithfulness of God. We do not need to have a chapter of accidents in life to enable us to realise the existence of a personal God, as though events which we can account for were not equally His work. Let not use or custom so prevail in our minds as to make this higher notion of God cheerless or uncomfortable to us. The rays of His presence may still warm us, as well as enlighten us. Surely He in whom we live and move and have our being is nearer to us than He would be if He interfered occasionally for our benefit.

“The curtain of the physical world is closing in upon us :” What does this mean but that the arms of His intelligence are embracing us on every side ? We have no more fear of nature ; for our knowledge of the laws of nature has cast out fear. We know Him as He shows Himself in them, even as we are known of Him. Do we think to draw near to God by returning to that state in which nature seemed to be without law, when man cowered like the animals before the storm, and in the meteors of the skies and the motions of the heavenly bodies sought to read the purposes of God respecting himself ? Or shall we rest in that stage of the knowledge of nature which was common to the heathen philosophers and to the Fathers of the Christian Church ? or in that of two hundred years ago, ere the laws of the heavenly bodies were discovered ? or of fifty years ago, before geology had established its truths on sure foundations ? or of thirty years ago, ere the investigation of old language had revealed the earlier stages of the history



of the human mind. At which of these resting-places shall we pause to renew the covenant between Reason and Faith? Rather at none of them, if the first condition of a true faith be the belief in all true knowledge.

To trace our belief up to some primitive revelation, to entangle it in a labyrinth of proofs or analogies, will not infix it deeper or elevate its character. Why should we be willing to trust the convictions of the father of the human race rather than our own, the faith of primitive rather than of civilised times? Or why should we use arguments about the Infinite Being, which, in proportion as they have force, reduce him to the level of the finite; and which seem to lose their force in proportion as we admit that God's ways are not as our ways, nor His thoughts as our thoughts. The belief is strong enough without those fictitious supports; it cannot be made stronger with them. While nature still presents to us its world of unexhausted wonders; while sin and sorrow lead us to walk by faith, and not by sight; while the soul of man departs this life knowing not whither it goes; so long will the belief endure of an Almighty Creator, from whom we came, to whom we return.

Why, again, should we argue for the immortality of the soul from the analogy of the seed and the tree, or the state of human beings before and after birth, when the ground of proof in the one case is wanting in the other, namely, experience. Because the dead acorn may a century hence become a spreading oak, no one would infer that the corrupted remains of animals will rise to life in new forms. The error is not in the use of such illustrations as figures of speech, but in the allegation of them as proofs or evidences after the failure of the analogy is perceived. Perhaps it may be said that in popular discourse they pass unchallenged; it may be a point of honour that they should be maintained, because they are in Paley or Butler. But evidences for the many which are not evidences for the few are treacherous props to Christianity. They are always liable to come back to us detected, and to need some other fallacy for their support.

Let it be considered, whether the evidences of religion should be separated from religion itself. The Gospel has a truth perfectly adapted to human nature ; its origin and diffusion in the world have a history like any other history. But truth does not need evidences of the truth, nor does history separate the proof of facts from the facts themselves. It was only in the decline of philosophy the Greeks began to ask about the criterion of knowledge. What would be thought of a historian who should collect all the testimonies on one side of some disputed question, and insist on their reception as a political creed ? Such evidences do not require the hand of some giant infidel to pull them down ; they fall the moment they are touched. But the Christian faith is in its holy place, uninjured by the fall ; the truths of the existence of God, or of the immortality of the soul, are not periled by the observation that some analogies on which they have been supposed to rest are no longer tenable. There is no use in attempting to prove by the misapplication of the methods of human knowledge, what we ought never to doubt.

“There are two things,” says a philosopher of the last century ; “of which it may be said, that the more we think of them, the more they fill the soul with awe and wonder, — the starry heaven above, and the moral law within. I may not regard either as shrouded in darkness, or look for or guess at either in what is beyond, out of my sight. I see them right before me, and link them at once with the consciousness of my own existence. The former of the two begins with place, which I inhabit as a member of the outward world, and extends the connection in which I stand with it into immeasurable space ; in which are worlds upon worlds, and systems upon systems ; and so on into the endless times of their revolutions, their beginning and continuance. The second begins with my invisible self ; that is to say, my personality, and presents me in a world which has true infinity, but which the lower faculty of the soul can hardly scan ; with which I know myself to be not only as in the world of sight, in an accidental connection, but in a necessary and universal one. The first glance at innumerable worlds annihilates any importance which

I may attach to myself as an animal structure ; whilst the matter out of which it is made must again return to the earth (itself a mere point in the universe), after it has been endued, one knows not how, with the power of life for a little season. The second glance exalts me infinitely as an intelligent being, whose personality involves a moral law, which reveals in me a life distinct from that of the animals, independent of the world of sense. So much at least I may infer from the regular determination of my being by this law, which is itself infinite, free from the limitations and conditions of this present life.”

So, in language somewhat technical, has Kant described two great principles of natural religion. “There are two witnesses,” we may add in a later strain of reflection, “of the being of God ; the order of nature in the world, and the progress of the mind of man. He is not the order of nature, nor the progress of mind, nor both together ; but that which is above and beyond them ; of which they, even if conceived in a single instant, are but the external sign, the highest evidences of God which we can conceive, but not God Himself. The first to the ancient world seemed to be the work of chance, or the personal operation of one or many Divine beings. We know it to be the result of laws endless in their complexity, and yet not the less admirable for their simplicity also. The second has been regarded, even in our own day, as a series of errors capriciously invented by the ingenuity of individual men. We know it to have a law of its own, a continuous order which cannot be inverted ; not to be confounded with, yet not wholly separate from, the law of nature and the will of God. Shall we doubt the world to be the creation of a Divine power, only because it is more wonderful than could have been conceived by ‘them of old time ;’ or human reason to be in the image of God, because it too bears the marks of an overruling law or intelligence ? ”

#### § 5.

Natural religion, in the last sense in which we are to consider it, carries us into a region of thought more practical, and therefore



more important, than any of the preceding ; it comes home to us ; it takes in those who are near and dear to us ; even ourselves are not excluded from it. Under this name, or some other, we cannot refuse to consider a subject which involves the religious state of the greater portion of mankind, even in a Christian country. Every Sunday the ministers of religion set before us the ideal of Christian life ; they repeat and expand the words of Christ and his Apostles ; they speak of the approach of death, and of this world as a preparation for a better. It is good to be reminded of these things. But there is another aspect of Christianity which we must not ignore, the aspect under which experience shows it, in our homes and among our acquaintance, on the level of human things ; the level of education, habit, and circumstances on which men are, and on which they will probably remain while they live. This latter phase of religion it is our duty to consider, and not narrow ourselves to the former only.

It is characteristic of this subject that it is full of contradictions ; we say one thing at one time about it, another thing at another. Our feelings respecting individuals are different in their lifetime, and after their death, as they are nearly related to us, or have no claims on our affections. Our acknowledgment of sin in the abstract is more willing and hearty than the recognition of particular sins in ourselves, or even in others. We readily admit that "the world lies in wickedness ;" where the world is, or of whom it is made up, we are unable to define. Great men seem to be exempt from the religious judgment which we pass on our fellows ; it does not occur to persons of taste to regard them under this aspect ; we deal tenderly with them, and leave them to themselves and God. And sometimes we rest on outward signs of religion ; at other times we guard ourselves and others against trusting to such signs. And commonly we are ready to acquiesce in the standard of those around us, thinking it a sort of impertinence to interfere with their religious concerns ; at other times we go about the world as with a lantern, seeking for the image of Christ among men, and are zealous for the

good of others, out of season or in season. We need not unravel further this tangled web of thoughts and feelings, which religion, and affection, and habit, and opinion weave. A few words will describe the fact out of which these contradictions arise. It is a side of the world from which we are apt to turn away, perhaps hoping to make things better by fancying them so, instead of looking at them as they really are.

It is impossible not to observe that innumerable persons—shall we say the majority of mankind?—who have a belief in God and immortality, have nevertheless hardly any consciousness of the peculiar doctrines of the Gospel. They seem to live away from them in the routine of business or of society, “the common life of all men,” not without a sense of right, and a rule of truth and honesty, yet insensible to what our Saviour meant by taking up the cross and following Him, or what St. Paul meant by “being one with Christ.” They die without any great fear or lively faith; to the last more interested about concerns of this world than about the hope of another. In the Christian sense they are neither proud nor humble; they have seldom experienced the sense of sin, they have never felt keenly the need of forgiveness. Neither on the other hand do they value themselves on their good deeds, or expect to be saved by their own merits. Often they are men of high moral character; many of them have strong and disinterested attachments, and quick human sympathies; sometimes a stoical feeling of uprightness, or a peculiar sensitiveness to dishonour. It would be a mistake to say they are without religion. They join in its public acts; they are offended at profaneness or impiety; they are thankful for the blessings of life, and do not rebel against its misfortunes. Such persons meet us at every turn. They are those whom we know and associate with; honest in their dealings, respectable in their lives, decent in their conversation. The Scripture speaks to us of two classes represented by the Church and the world, the wheat and the tares, the sheep and the goats, the friends and enemies of God. We cannot say in which of these two divisions we should find a place for them.

The picture is a true one, and, if we turn the light round, some of us may find in it a resemblance of ourselves no less than of other men. Others will include us in the same circle in which we are including them. What shall we say to such a state, common as it is to both us and them? The fact that we are considering is not the evil of the world, but the neutrality of the world, the indifference of the world, the inertness of the world. There are multitudes of men and women everywhere, who have no peculiarly Christian feelings, to whom, except for the indirect influence of Christian institutions, the life and death of Christ would have made no difference, and who have, nevertheless, the common sense of truth and right almost equally with true Christians. You cannot say of them "there is none that doeth good; no, not one." The other tone of St. Paul is more suitable,—"When the Gentiles that know not the law do by nature the things contained in the law, these not knowing the law are a law unto themselves." So of what we commonly term the world, as opposed to those who make a profession of Christianity, we must not shrink from saying,—“When men of the world do by nature whatsoever things are honest, whatsoever things are lovely, whatsoever things are of good report, these not being conscious of the grace of God, do by nature what can only be done by His grace.” Why should we make them out worse than they are? We must cease to speak evil of them, ere they will judge fairly of the characters of religious men. That, with so little recognition of His personal relation to them, God does not cast them off, is a ground of hope rather than of fear,—of thankfulness, not of regret.

Many strange thoughts arise at the contemplation of this intermediate world, which some blindness, or hardness, or distance in nature, separates from the love of Christ. We ask ourselves "what will become of them after death?" "For what state of existence can this present life be a preparation?" Perhaps they will turn the question upon us; and we may answer for ourselves and them, "that we throw ourselves on the mercy of God." We cannot deny that in the sight of God they may condemn us; their moral worth



may be more acceptable to Him than our Christian feeling. For we know that God is not like some earthly sovereign, who may be offended at the want of attention which we show to him. He can only estimate us always by our fulfilment of moral and Christian duties. When the balance is struck, it is most probable, nay, it is quite certain, that many who are first will be last, and the last first. And this transfer will take place, not only among those who are within the gates of the Christian Church, but from the world also into the Church. There may be some among us who have given the cup of cold water to a brother, "not knowing it was the Lord." Some again may be leading a life in their own family which is "not far from the kingdom of heaven." We do not say that for ourselves there is more than one way; that way is Christ. But, in the case of others, it is right that we should take into account their occupation, character, circumstances, the manner in which Christianity may have been presented to them, the intellectual or other difficulties which may have crossed their path. We shall think more of the unconscious Christianity of their lives, than of the profession of it on their lips. So that we seem almost compelled to be Christian and Unchristian at once: Christian in reference to the obligations of Christianity upon ourselves; Unchristian, if indeed it be not a higher kind of Christianity, in not judging those who are unlike ourselves by our own standard.

Other oppositions have found their way into statements of Christian truth, which we shall sometimes do well to forget. Mankind are not simply divided into two classes; they pass insensibly from one to the other. The term world is itself ambiguous, meaning the world very near to us, and yet a long way off from us; which we contrast with the Church, and which we nevertheless feel to be one with the Church, and incapable of being separated. Sometimes the Church bears a high and noble witness against the world, and at other times, even to the religious mind, the balance seems to be even, and the world in its turn begins to bear witness against the Church. There are periods of history in which they both grow together.

Little cause as there may be for congratulation in our present state, yet we cannot help tracing, in the last half-century, a striking amelioration in our own and some other countries, testified to by changes in laws and manners. Many reasons have been given for this change: the efforts of a few devoted men in the last, or the beginning of the present, century; a long peace; diffusion of education; increase of national wealth; changes in the principles of government; improvement in the lives of the ministers of religion. No one who has considered this problem will feel that he is altogether able to solve it. He cannot venture to say that the change springs from any bold aggression which the Church has made upon the vices of mankind; nor is it certain that any such effort would have produced the result. In the Apostle's language it must still remain a mystery "why mankind collectively often become better;" and not less so, "why, when deprived of all the means and influences of virtue and religion, they do not always become worse." Even for evil, Nature, that is, the God of Nature, has set limits; men do not corrupt themselves endlessly. Here, too, it is, "Hitherto shalt thou go, but no further."

Reflections of this kind are not a mere speculation; they have a practical use. They show us the world as it is, neither lighted up with the aspirations of hope and faith, nor darkened beneath the shadow of God's wrath. They teach us to regard human nature in a larger and more kindly way, which is the first step towards amending and strengthening it. They make us think of the many as well as of the few; as ministers of the Gospel, warning us against preaching to the elect only, instead of seeking to do good to all men. They take us out of the straits and narrownesses of religion, into wider fields in which the analogy of faith is still our guide. They help us to reconcile nature with grace; they prevent our thinking that Christ came into the world for our sakes only, or that His words have no meaning when they are scattered beyond the limits of the Christian Church. They remind us that the moral state of mankind here, and their eternal state hereafter, are not wholly

dependent on our poor efforts for their religious improvement; and that the average of men who seem often to be so careless about their own highest interest, are not when they pass away uncared for in His sight.

Doubtless, the lives of individuals that rise above this average are the salt of the earth. They are not to be confounded with the many, because for these latter a place may be found in the counsels of Providence. Those who add the love of their fellow-creatures to the love of God, who make the love of truth the rule of both, bear the image of Christ until His coming again. And yet, probably, they would be the last persons to wish to distinguish themselves from their fellow-creatures. The Christian life makes all things kin; it does not stand out "angular" against any part of mankind. And that humble spirit which the best of men have ever shown in reference to their brethren, is also the true spirit of the Church towards the world. If a tone of dogmatism and exclusiveness is unbecoming in individual Christians, is it not equally so in Christian communities? There is no need, because men will not listen to one motive, that we should not present them with another; there is no reason, because they will not hear the voice of the preacher, that they should be refused the blessings of education; or that we should cease to act upon their circumstances, because we cannot awaken the heart and conscience. We are too apt to view as hostile to religion that which only takes a form different from religion, as trade, or politics, or professional life. More truly may religious men regard the world, in its various phases, as in many points a witness against themselves. The exact appreciation of the good as well as the evil of the world is a link of communion with our fellow-men; may it not also be, too, with the body of Christ? There are lessons of which the world is the keeper no less than the Church. Especially have earnest and sincere Christians reason to reflect, if ever they see the moral sentiments of mankind directed against them.

The God of peace rest upon you, is the concluding benediction of most of the Epistles. How can He rest upon us, who draw so many



hard lines of demarcation between ourselves and other men; who oppose the Church and the world, Sundays and working days, revelation and science, the past and present, the life and state of which religion speaks and the life which we ordinarily lead? It is well that we should consider these lines of demarcation rather as representing aspects of our life than as corresponding to classes of mankind. It is well that we should acknowledge that one aspect of life or knowledge is as true as the other. Science and revelation touch one another: the past floats down in the present. We are all members of the same Christian world; we are all members of the same Christian Church. Who can bear to doubt this of themselves or of their family? What parent would think otherwise of his child?—what child of his parent? Religion holds before us an ideal which we are far from reaching; natural affection softens and relieves the characters of those we love; experience alone shows men what they truly are. All these three must so meet as to do violence to none. If, in the age of the Apostles, it seemed to be the duty of the believers to separate themselves from the world and take up a hostile position, not less marked in the present age is the duty of abolishing in a Christian country what has now become an artificial distinction, and seeking by every means in our power, by fairness, by truthfulness, by knowledge, by love unfeigned, by the absence of party and prejudice, by acknowledging the good in all things, to reconcile the Church to the world, the one half of our nature to the other; drawing the mind off from speculative difficulties, or matters of party and opinion, to that which almost all equally acknowledge and almost equally rest short of—the life of Christ.

## THE LAW AS THE STRENGTH OF SIN.

“The strength of sin is the law.”—1 *Cor.* xv. 56.

THESE words occur parenthetically in the fifteenth chapter of the First Epistle to the Corinthians. They may be regarded as a summary of the seventh chapter of the Romans. The thought contained in them is also the undercurrent of several other passages in the Epistles of St. Paul, as, for example, Rom. v. 20., xiv. 22, 23.; Gal. ii. 17—21.; Col. ii. 14. The Apostle is speaking of that prior state out of which he passed into the liberty of the Gospel. When he asked himself what preceded Christ in his own life and in the dispensations of Providence, what he had once felt within warring against his soul, what he saw without contending against the cross, the answer to all was given in the same word, “the Law.”

But the singular description of the law as the strength of sin goes further, and has a deeper meaning; for it seems to make the law the cause of sin. Here is the difficulty. The law may have been defective—adapted, as we should say, to a different state of society, enforcing in some passages the morality of a half-civilised age, such as could never render the practisers thereof perfect, powerless to create a new life either in the Jewish nation collectively, or in the individuals who composed the nation; yet this imperfection and “unprofitableness” of the law are not what the Apostle means by the strength of sin. If we say, in the words of James, quoted in the Acts, that it was a burden too heavy for men to bear, still language like this falls short of the paradox, as it appears to us, of St. Paul. There is no trace that the law was regarded by him as given “because of the hardness of men’s hearts,” as our Saviour says; or that he is speak-

ing of the law as corrupted by the Pharisee, or overlaid by Jewish traditions. The Apostle is not contrasting, as we are apt to do, Moses and the prophets with the additions of those who sat in Moses's seat. The same law which is holy, and good, and just, is also the strength of sin.

There is another kind of language used respecting the law in Scripture which is very familiar, and seems to be as natural to our preconceived notions as the passage which we are now considering is irreconcilable with them. The law is described as the preparation of the Gospel; the first volume of the book, the other half of Divine Revelation. It is the veil on the face of Moses which obscured the excess of light, as the Apostle himself says in the Epistle to the Corinthians; or the schoolmaster to bring men to Christ, as in the Galatians; or the shadow of good things to come, as in the Hebrews. But all these figures of speech can only be cited here to point out how different the conception in them is from that which is implied in such words as "The strength of sin is the law." In these latter we have not the light shining more and more unto the perfect day, but the light and darkness; that is, the Gospel and the law opposed, as it were two hemispheres, dividing time and the world and the human heart.

Nor, again, if we consider the law in its immediate workings on the mind, as it might seem to be struggling within for mastery over the Gospel, as we may imagine Catholicism and Protestantism in the mind of Luther or of a modern convert, do we make a nearer approach to the solution of our difficulty. Even Luther, when denouncing the Pope as Antichrist, would not have spoken of the Catholic faith as the strength of sin. Still less would he have one instant described it as "holy, just, and good," and in the next as deceiving and slaying him. The struggle between one religion and another, or, even without any conflict of creeds, between hope and despair, may trouble the conscience, may enfeeble the will, may darken the intellect; still no sober-minded man would think of attributing his sins to having passed through such a struggle.



Once more, parallels from heathen authors, such as "Nitimur in vetitum semper," and the witness of the heart against itself, "that it is evil continually," have been quoted in illustration of the verse placed at the beginning of this Essay. The aphorisms alluded to are really metaphorical expressions, intended by satirists and moralists to state forcibly that men are prone to err, not that law is provocative or the cause of sin. Mankind offend in various ways, and from different motives,—ambition, vanity, selfishness, passion,—but not simply from the desire to break the law, or to offend God. So, again, as we multiply laws, we may seem to multiply offences: the real truth is, that as offences multiply the laws multiply also. To break the law for the sake of doing so, is not crime or sin, but madness. Nor, again, will it do to speak of the perversity of the human will,—of men, like children, doing a thing because, as we say in familiar language, they are told not to do it. This perversity consists simply in knowing the better and choosing the worse, in passion prevailing over reason. The better is not the cause of their choosing the worse, nor is reason answerable for the dictates of passion, which would be the parallel required.

All these, then, we must regard as half-explanations, which fail to reach the Apostle's meaning. When we ask what he can mean by saying that "the law is the strength of sin," it is no answer to reply, that the law was imperfect or transient, that it could not take away sin, that it had been made of none effect by tradition, that its ceremonial observances were hypocritical and unmeaning; or that we, too, use certain metaphorical expressions, which, however different in sense, have a sound not unlike the words of the Apostle. We require an explanation that goes deeper, which does not pare away the force of the expression, such as can be gathered only from the Apostle himself, and the writings of his time. The point of view from which we regard things may begin to turn round; to understand the meaning of the law, we may have to place ourselves within the circle of its influences; to understand the nature of sin, we may be compelled to imagine ourselves in the very act of sinning: this

inversion of our ordinary modes of thought may be the only means of attaining the true and natural sense of the Apostle's words.

We are commencing an inquiry which lacks the sustaining interest of controversy, the data of which are metaphysical reasonings and points of view which cannot be even imagined without a considerable effort of mind, and which there will be the more indisposition to admit, as they run counter to the popular belief that the Bible is a book easily and superficially intelligible. Such feelings are natural; we are jealous of those who wrap up in mystery the Word of life, who carry us into an atmosphere which none else can breathe. We cannot be too jealous of Kant or Fichte, Schelling or Hegel, finding their way into the interpretation of Scripture. As jealous should we be also of any patristic or other system which draws away its words from their natural meaning. Still the Scripture has difficulties not brought but found there, a few words respecting which will pave the way for the inquiry on which we are entering.

The Bible is at once the easiest and the hardest of books. The easiest, in that it gives us plain rules for moral and religious duties which he that runs can read, an example that every one can follow, a work that any body may do. But it is the hardest also, in that it is fragmentary, written in a dead language, and referring to times and actions of which in general we have no other record, and, above all, using modes of thought and often relating to spiritual states, which amongst ourselves have long ceased to exist, or the influence of institutions which have passed away. Who can supply the external form of the primitive Church of the first century, whether in its ritual or discipline, from the brief allusions of the Gospels and Epistles? Who can imagine the mind of the first believers, as they sat "with their lamps lighted and their loins girded," waiting for the reappearance of the Lord? Who describe the prophesyings or speaking with tongues, or interpretation of tongues? Who knows the spirit of a man who consciously recognises in his ordinary life the inward workings of a Divine power? The first solution of such difficulties is to admit them, to acknowledge that the world in which

we live is not the world of the first century, and that the first Christians were not like ourselves.

Nor is this difficulty less, but greater, in reference to words which are common to us and to them, which are used by both with a certain degree of similarity, and with a sort of analogy to other words which puts us off our guard, and prevents our perceiving the real change of meaning. Such is the case with the words church, priest, sacrifice, and in general with words taken from the Mosaic dispensation; above all, with the word "law." Does not common sense teach us that whatever St. Paul meant by law, he must have meant something hard to us to understand, to whom the law has no existence, who are Europeans, not Orientals? to whom the law of the land is no longer the immediate direct law of God, and who can form no idea of the entanglements and perplexities which the attempt to adapt the law of Mount Sinai to an altered world must have caused to the Jew? Is it not certain that whenever we use the word "law" in its theological acceptation, we shall give it a meaning somewhat different from that of the Apostle? We cannot help doing so. Probably we may sum it up under the epithet "moral or ceremonial," or raise the question to which of these the Apostle refers, forgetting that they are distinctions which belong to us, but do not belong to him. The study of a few pages of the Mischna, which mounts up nearly to the time of the Apostles, would reveal to us how very far our dim indefinite notion of the "law" falls short of that intense life and power and sacredness which were attributed to it by a Jew of the first century; as well as how little conception he had of the fundamental distinctions which theologians have introduced respecting it.

But the consideration of these difficulties does not terminate with themselves; they lead us to a higher idea of Scripture; they compel us to adapt ourselves to Scripture, instead of adapting Scripture to ourselves. In the ordinary study of the sacred volume, the chief difficulty is the accurate perception of the connection. The words lie smoothly on the page; the road is trite and worn. Only just here



and there we stumble over an impediment; as it were a stone lying not loose, but deeply embedded in the soil; which is the indication of a world below just appearing on the surface. Such are many passages in the Epistles of St. Paul. There is much that we really understand, much that we appear to understand, which has, indeed, a deceitful congruity with words and thoughts of our own day. Some passages remain intractable. From these latter we obtain the pure ore; here, if anywhere, are traces of the peculiar state and feelings of the Church of the Apostles, such as no after age could invent, or even understand. It is to these we turn, not for a rule of conduct, but for the inner life of Apostles and Churches; rejecting nothing as designedly strange or mysterious, satisfied with no explanation that does violence to the language, not suffering our minds to be diverted from the point of the difficulty, comparing one difficulty with another; seeking the answer, not in ourselves and in the controversies of our own day, but in the Scripture and the habits of thought of the age; collecting every association that bears upon it, and gathering up each fragment that remains, that nothing be lost; at the same time acknowledging how defective our knowledge really is, not merely in that general sense in which all human knowledge is feeble and insufficient, but in the particular one of our actual ignorance of the facts and persons and ways of thought of the age in which the Gospel came into the world.

The subject of the present Essay is suggestive of the following questions:—"What did St. Paul mean by the law, and what by sin?" "Is the Apostle speaking from the experience of his own heart and the feelings of his age and country, or making an objective statement for mankind in general, of what all men do or ought to feel?" "Is there anything in his circumstances, as a convert from the law to the Gospel, that gives the words a peculiar force?" And lastly, we may inquire what application may be made of them to ourselves: whether, "now that the law is dead to us, and we to the law," the analogy of faith suggests anything, either in our social state or in our physical constitution or our speculative views, which

stands in the same relation to us that the law did to the first converts?

First, then, as has been elsewhere remarked, the law includes in itself different and contradictory aspects. It is at once the letter of the book of the law, and the image of law in general. It is alive, and yet dead; it is holy, just, and good, and yet the law of sin and death. It is without and within at the same time; a power like that of conscience is ascribed to it, and yet he who is under its power feels that he is reaching towards something without him which can never become a part of his being. In its effect on individuals it may be likened to a sword entering into the soul, which can never knit together with flesh and blood. In relation to the world at large, it is a prison in which men are shut up. As the Jewish nation is regarded also as an individual; as the kingdom of heaven is sometimes outward and temporal, sometimes inward and spiritual, used in reference either to the spread of the Gospel, or the second coming of Christ; as the parables of Christ admit of a similar double reference; in like manner, the law has its "double senses." It is national and individual at once; the law given on Mount Sinai, and also a rule of conduct. It is the schoolmaster unto Christ, and yet the great enemy of the Gospel; added to make men transgress, and yet affording the first knowledge of truth and holiness; applying to the whole people and to the world of the past, and also to each living man; though a law, and therefore concerned with actions only, terrible to the heart and conscience, requiring men to perform all things, and enabling them to accomplish nothing.

This ambiguity in the use of the word "law" first occurs in the Old Testament itself. In the prophecies and psalms, as well as in the writings of St. Paul, the law is in a great measure ideal. When the Psalmist spoke of "meditating in the law of the Lord," he was not thinking of the five books of Moses. The law which he delighted to contemplate was not written down (as well might we imagine that the Platonic idea was a treatise on philosophy); it was the will of God, the truth of God, the justice and holiness of God. In later

ages the same feelings began to gather around the volume of the law itself. The law was ideal still ; but with this idealism were combined the reference to its words, and the literal enforcement of its precepts. That it was the law of God was a solemn thought to those who violated the least of its commandments ; and yet its commandments were often such as in a changed world it was impossible to obey. It needed interpreters before it could be translated into the language of daily life. Such a law could have little hold on practice ; but it had the greatest on ideas. It was the body of truth, the framework of learning and education, the only and ultimate appeal in all controversies. Even its entire disuse did not prevent the Rabbis from discussing with animosity nice questions of minute detail. In Alexandria especially, which was far removed from Jerusalem and the scenes of Jewish history, such an idealising tendency was carried to the uttermost. Whether there was a temple or not, whether there were sacrifices or not, whether there were feasts or not, mattered little ; there was the idea of a temple, the idea of feasts, the idea of sacrifices. Whether the Messiah actually came or not mattered little, while he was discernible to the mystic in every page of the law. The Jewish religion was beginning to rest on a new basis which, however visionary it may seem to us, could not be shaken any more than the clouds of heaven, even though one stone were not left upon another.

This idealising tendency of his age we cannot help tracing in St. Paul himself. As to the Jew of Alexandria the law became an ideal rule of truth and right, so to St. Paul after his conversion it became an ideal form of evil. As there were many Antichrists, so also there were many laws, and none of them absolutely fallen away from their Divine original. In one point of view, the fault was all with the law ; in another point of view, it was all with human nature ; the law ideal and the law actual, the law as it came from God and the law in its consequences to man, are ever crossing each other. It was the nature of the law to be good and evil at once ; evil, because it was good ; like the pillar of cloud and fire, which was its image,



light by night and darkness by day,—light and darkness in successive instants.

But, as the law seems to admit of a wider range of meaning than we should at first sight have attributed to it, so also the word "sin" has a more extended sense than our own use of it implies. Sin with us is a definite act or state. Any crime or vice considered in reference to God may be termed sin; or, according to another use of it, which is more general and abstract, sin is the inherent defect of human nature, or that evil state in which, even without particular faults or vices, we live. None of these senses includes that peculiar aspect in which it is regarded by St. Paul. Sin is with him inseparable from the consciousness of sin. It is not only the principle of evil, working blindly in the human heart, but the principle of discord and dissolution piercing asunder the soul and spirit. He who has felt its power most is not the perpetrator of the greatest crimes, a Caligula or Nero; but he who has suffered most deeply from the spiritual combat, who has fallen into the abyss of despair, who has the sentence of death in himself, who is wringing his hands and crying aloud in his agony, "O wretched man that I am!" Sin is not simply evil, but intermediate between evil and good, implying always the presence of God within, light revealing darkness, life in the corruption of death; it is the soul reflecting upon itself in the moment of commission of sin. If we are surprised at St. Paul regarding the law—holy, just, and good as it was—as almost sin, we must remember that sin itself, if the expression may be excused, as a spiritual state, has a good element in it. It is the voice of despair praying to God, "Who shall deliver me from the body of this death?" It approximates to the law at the very instant in which it is repelled from it.

There are physical states in which the body is exquisitely sensitive to pain, which are not the sign of health, but of disease. So also there are mental states in which the sense of sin and evil, and the need of forgiveness, press upon us with an unusual heaviness. Such is the state which the Scriptures describe by the words, "they were pricked to the heart," when whole multitudes in sympathy with each

other felt the need of a change, and in the extremity of their suffering were saved, looking on the Lord Jesus. No such spiritual agonies occur in the daily life of all men. Crimes and vices and horrid acts there are, but not that of which the Apostle speaks. That which he sums up in a moment of time, which may be compared to the last struggle when we are upon the confines of two worlds, of which we are so intensely conscious that it is impossible for us permanently to retain the consciousness of it, is "Sin."

As there could be no sin if we were wholly unconscious of it, as children or animals are in a state of innocence, as the heathen world we ourselves regard as less guilty or responsible than those who have a clearer light in the dispensation of the Gospel, so in a certain point of view sin may be regarded as the consciousness of sin. It is this latter which makes sin to be what it is, which distinguishes it from crime or vice, which links it with our personality. The first state described by the Roman satirist—

"At stupet hic vitio et fibris increvit opimum  
Pingue; caret culpâ; nescit quid perdat,"—

is the reverse of what the Apostle means by the life of sin. In ordinary language, vices, regarded in reference to God, are termed sins; and we attempt to arouse the child or the savage to a right sense of his unconscious acts by so terming them. But, in the Apostle's language, consciousness is presupposed in the sin itself; not reflected on it from without. That which gives it the nature of sin is *conscientia peccati*. As Socrates, a little inverting the ordinary view and common language of mankind, declared all virtue to be knowledge; so the language of St. Paul implies all sin to be the knowledge of sin. *Conscientia peccati peccatum ipsum est.*

It is at this point the law enters, not to heal the wounded soul, but to enlarge its wound. The law came in that the offence might abound. Whatever dim notion of right and wrong pre-existed; whatever sense of physical impurity may have followed, in the language of the Book of Job, one born in sin; whatever terror the

outpouring of the vials of God's wrath, in the natural world, may have infused into the soul,—all this was heightened and defined by the law of God. In comparison with this second state, it might be said of the previous one, "Sin is not imputed where there is no law," and man "was alive without the law once; but when the law came sin revived, and he died." The soul condemned itself, it was condemned by the law, it is in the last stage of decay and dissolution.

If from the Apostle's ideal point of view we regard the law, not as the tables given on Mount Sinai, or the books of Moses, but as the law written on the heart, the difficulty is, not how we are to identify the law with the consciousness of sin, but how we are to distinguish them. They are different aspects of the same thing, related to each other as positive and negative, two poles of human nature turned towards God, or away from Him. In the language of metaphysical philosophy, we say that "the subject is identical with the object;" in the same way sin implies the law. The law written on the heart, when considered in reference to the subject, is simply the conscience. The conscience, in like manner, when conceived of objectively, as words written down in a book, as a rule of life which we are to obey, becomes the law. For the sake of clearness we may express the whole in a sort of formula. "Sin = the consciousness of sin = the law." From this last conclusion the Apostle only stops short from the remembrance of the Divine original of the law, and the sense that what made it evil to him was the fact that it was in its own nature good.

Wide, then, as might at first have seemed to be the interval between the law and sin, we see that they have their meeting point in the conscience. Yet their opposition and identity have a still further groundwork or reflection in the personal character and life of the Apostle.

I. The spiritual combat, in the seventh chapter of the Epistle to the Romans, which terminates with the words, "O wretched man that I am, who shall deliver me from the body of this death? I



thank God through Jesus Christ our lord," is the description, in a figure, of the Apostle's journey to Damascus. Almost in a moment he passed from darkness to light. Nothing could be more different or contrasted than his after and his former life. In his own language he might be described as cut in two by the sword of the Spirit; his present and previous states were like good and evil, light and darkness, life and death. It accords with what we know of human feelings, that this previous state should have a kind of terror for him, and should be presented to his mind, not as it appeared at the time when he "thought, verily, that he ought to do many things against Jesus of Nazareth," but as it afterwards seemed, when he counted himself to be the least of the Apostles, because twenty years before he had persecuted the Church of God; when he was amazed at the goodness of God in rescuing the chief of sinners. The life which he had once led was "the law." He thought of it, indeed, sometimes as the inspired word, the language of which he was beginning to invest with a new meaning; but more often as an ideal form of evil, the chain by which he had been bound, the prison in which he was shut up. And long after his conversion the shadow of the law seemed to follow him at a distance, and threatened to overcast his heaven; when, with a sort of inconsistency for one assured of "the crown," he speaks of the trouble of spirit which overcame him, and of the sentence of death in himself.

II. In another way the Apostle's personal history gives a peculiar aspect to his view of the law. On every occasion, at every turn of his life, on his first return to Jerusalem, when preaching the Gospel in Asia and Greece, in the great struggle between Jewish and Gentile Christians,—his persecutors were the Jews, his great enemy the law. Is it surprising that this enmity should have been idealised by him? that the law within and the law without should have blended in one? that his own remembrances of the past should be identified with that spirit of hatred and fanaticism which he saw around him? Not only when he looked back to his past life, and "the weak and beggarly elements" to which he had been in bondage, but also when

he saw the demoniac spirit which, under the name of Judaism, arrayed itself against the truth, might he repeat the words—"the strength of sin is the law." And, placing these words side by side with other expressions of the Apostle's, such as, "We wrestle not against flesh and blood, but against principalities, against powers, against spiritual wickedness in heavenly places," we can understand how heretics of the second century, who regarded the law and the Old Testament as the work of an evil principle, were induced to attach themselves specially to St. Paul.

III. The Gospel of St. Paul was a spirit, not a law; it nowhere enjoined the observance of feasts and sacrifices, and new moons and sabbaths, but was rather antagonistic to them; it was heedless of externals of any kind, except as matter of expediency and charity. It was a Gospel which knew of no distinction of nations or persons; in which all men had the offer of "grace, mercy, and peace from the Lord Jesus Christ;" which denounced the oldness of the letter; which contrasted "the tables of stone with fleshly tables of the heart;" which figured Christ taking the handwriting of ordinances and nailing them to his cross; which put faith in the place of works, and even prohibited circumcision. Such a Gospel was in extreme antagonism to the law. Their original relation was forgotten; the opposition between them insensibly passed into an opposition of good and evil. And yet a new relation sprang up also. For the law, too, witnessed against itself; and, to the Apostle interpreting its words after the manner of his age, became the allegory of the Gospel.

IV. Once more: it has been observed elsewhere (see note on the Imputation of the Sin of Adam), that the place which the law occupies in the teaching of St. Paul is analogous to that which the doctrine of original sin holds in later writings. It represents the state of wrath and bondage out of which men pass into the liberty of the children of God. It is the state of nature to the Jew; it is also a law of sin to him; he cannot help sinning, and this very impotency is the extremity of guilt and despair. Similar expres-

sions respecting original sin are sometimes used among ourselves; though not wholly parallel, they may nevertheless assist in shadowing forth the Apostle's meaning.

V. It is not, however, to the life of the Apostle, or to the circle of theological doctrines, that we need confine ourselves for illustration of the words, "the strength of sin is the law." Morality also shows us many ways in which good and evil meet together, and truth and error seem inseparable from each other. We cannot do any thing good without some evil consequences indirectly flowing from it; we cannot express any truth without involving ourselves in some degree of error, or occasionally conveying an impression to others wholly erroneous. Human characters and human ideas are always mixed and limited; good and truth ever drag evil and error in their train. Good itself may be regarded as making evil to be what it is, if, as we say, they are relative terms, and the disappearance of the one would involve the disappearance of the other. And there are many things, in which not only may the old adage be applied, — "*Corruptio optimi pessima*," but in which the greatest good is seen to be linked with the worst evil, as, for example, the holiest affections with the grossest sensualities, or a noble ambition with crime and unscrupulousness; even religion seems sometimes to have a dark side, and readily to ally itself with immorality or with cruelty.

Plato's kingdom of evil (*Rep. I.*) is not unlike the state into which the Jewish people passed during the last few years before the taking of the city. Of both it might be said, in St. Paul's language, "the law is the strength of sin." A kingdom of pure evil, as the Greek philosopher observed, there could not be; it needs some principle of good to be the minister of evil; it can only be half wicked, or it would destroy itself. We may say the same of the Jewish people. Without the law it never could have presented an equally signal example either of sin or of vengeance. The nation, like other nations, would have yielded quietly to the power of Rome; "it would have died the death of all men." But the spirit which said, "We have a law, and by our law he ought to die," recoiled upon itself; the in-



tense fanaticism which prevented men from seeing the image of love and goodness in that divine form, bound together for destruction a whole people, to make them a monument to after ages of a religion that has outlived itself.

VI. The law and the Gospel may be opposed, according to a modern distinction, as positive and moral. "Moral precepts are distinguished from positive, as precepts the reasons of which we see from those the reasons of which we do not see." Moral precepts may be regarded as the more general, while positive precepts fill up the details of the general principle, and apply it to circumstances. Every positive precept involves not merely a moral obligation to obey it so far as it is just, but a moral law, which is its ultimate basis. It will often happen that what was at first just and right may in the course of ages become arbitrary and tyrannical, if the enforcement of it continue after the reason for it has ceased. Or, as it may be expressed more generally, the positive is ever tending to become moral, and the moral to become positive; the positive to become moral, in so far as that which was at first a mere external command has acquired such authority, and so adapted itself to the hearts of men, as to have an internal witness to it, as in the case of the fourth commandment; the moral to become positive, where a law has outlived itself, and the state of society to which it was adapted and the feelings on which it rested have passed away.

The latter was the case with the Jewish law. It had once been moral, and it had become positive. Doubtless, for the minutest details, the colours of the sanctuary, the victims offered in sacrifice, there had once been reasons; but they had been long since forgotten, and if remembered would have been unintelligible. New reasons might be given for them; the oldness of the letter might be made to teach a new lesson after the lapse of a thousand years; but in general the law was felt to be "a burden that neither they nor their fathers were able to bear." Side by side with it another religion had sprung up, the religion of the prophets first, and of the zealots afterwards; religions most different indeed from each other, yet

equally different from the law ; in the first of which the voice of God in man seemed to cry aloud against sacrifice and offering, and to proclaim the only true offering, to do justice and to love mercy, and to walk humbly with God ; while in the second of them the national faith took the form of a fanatical patriotism. And yet the law still remained as a body of death, with its endless routine of ceremonial, its numberless disputes, its obsolete commands, never suffering the worshipper to be free, and enforcing its least detail with the curses of the book of the law and the terrors of Mount Sinai.

Much of this burden would have been taken off, had there existed among the Jews the distinction which is familiar to ourselves of a moral and ceremonial law. They would then have distinguished between the weightier matters of the law and the "tithe of mint, anise, and cumin." Such distinctions are great "peace-makers;" they mediate between the present and the past. But in Judaism all was regarded as alike of Divine authority, all subjected the transgressor to the same penalty. "He who offended in one point was guilty of all;" the least penalty was, in a figure, "death," and there was no more for the greatest offences. The infringement of any positive command tortured the conscience with a fearful looking for of judgment; the deepest moral guilt could do no more. Such a religion could only end in hypocrisy and inhumanity, in verily believing that the law demanded His death, in whom only "the law was fulfilled."

Let us imagine, in contrast with this, the Gospel with its spiritualising humanising influences, soothing the soul of man, the source of joy, and love, and peace. It is a supernatural power, with which the elements themselves bear witness, endowed with a fulness of life, and imparting life to all who receive it. It is not a law to which the will must submit, but an inward principle which goes before the will ; it is also a moral principle to which the heart and conscience instantly assent, which gives just what we want, and seems to set us right with the world, with ourselves, and with God. Yet, in a figure, it is a law also ; but in a very different sense from that of Moses : a

law within, and not without us; a law of the Spirit of life, not of death; of freedom, not of slavery; of blessing, not of cursing; of mercy, not of vengeance: a law which can be obeyed, not one to which, while it exacts punishment, obedience is impossible. When we look upon this picture, and upon that, is it strange that one who was filled with the mind of Christ should have regarded the law as the strength of sin?

Of what has been said, the sum is as follows:—When St. Paul speaks of “the law as the strength of sin,” he uses the term law partly for law in general, but more especially for the burden of the Jewish law on the conscience; when he speaks of sin, he means chiefly the consciousness of sin, of which it may be truly said, “Where there is no law, there is no transgression; and sin is not imputed where there is no law.” Thirdly, he speaks of the law from his own spiritual experience of “fears within, and of fightings without;” and from a knowledge of his own countrymen, who “please not God, but are contrary to all men.” Fourthly, he conceives the law as an ideal form of evil, analogous to original sin in the language of a later theology. Lastly, if there be anything apparently contradictory or to us unintelligible in his manner of speaking of the law, we must attribute this to the modes of thought of his age, which blended many things that are to us separate. Had St. Paul distinguished between the law and conscience, or between the law and morality, or between the moral and ceremonial portions of the law itself, or between the law in its first origin and in the practice of his own age, he would perhaps have confined the law to a good sense, or restricted its use to the books of Moses, and not have spoken of it in one verse as “holy, just, and good,” and in the next as being the means of deceiving and slaying him.

---

In another sense than that in which the Apostle employs the words, “the law is dead to us, and we to the law.” The lapse of ages has but deepened the chasm which separates Judaism from Christianity.



Between us and them there is a gulf fixed, so that few are they who pass from them to us, nor do any go from us to them. The question remains, What application is it possible for us to make of that which has preceded? Is there anything in the world around standing in the same relation to us that the law did to the contemporaries of St. Paul?

One answer that might be given is, "the Roman Catholic Church." The experience of Luther seems indeed not unlike that struggle which St. Paul describes. But whatever resemblance may be found between Romanism and the ancient Jewish religion,—whether in their ceremonial or sacrificial character, or in the circumstance of their both resting on outward and visible institutions, and so limiting the worship of Spirit and truth,—it cannot be said that Romanism stands in the same relation to us individually, that the law did to the Apostle St. Paul. The real parallels are more general, though less obvious. The law, St. Paul describes as without us, but not in that sense in which an object of sense is without us: though without us it exercises an inward power; it drives men to despair; it paralyses human nature; it causes evil by its very justice and holiness. It is like a barrier which we cannot pass; a chain wherewith a nation is bound together; a rule which is not adapted to human feelings, but which guides them into subjection to itself.

It has been already remarked that a general parallel to "the law as the strength of sin" is to be found in that strange blending of good and evil, of truth and error, which is the condition of our earthly existence. But there seem also to be cases in which the parallel is yet closer; in which good is not only the accidental cause of evil, but the limiting principle which prevents man from working out to the uttermost his individual and spiritual nature. In some degree, for example, society may exercise the same tyranny over us, and its conventions be stumbling-blocks to us of the same kind as the law to the contemporaries of St. Paul; or, in another way, the thought of self and the remembrance of our past life may "deceive and slay us." As in the description of the seventh chapter of the

Romans:—"It was I, and it was not I; and who can deliver me from the influence of education and the power of my former self?" Or faith and reason, reason and faith may seem mutually to limit each other, and to make the same opposition in speculation that the law and the flesh did to the Apostle in practice. Or, to seek the difficulty on a lower level, while fully assured of the truths of the Gospel, we may seem to be excluded from them by our mental or bodily constitution, which no influences of the Spirit or power of habit may be capable of changing.

I. The society even of a Christian country — and the same remark applies equally to a Church — is only to a certain extent based upon Christian principle. It rests neither on the view that all mankind are evil, nor that they are all good, but on certain motives, supposed to be strong enough to bind mankind together; on institutions handed down from former generations; on tacit compacts between opposing parties and opinions. Every government must tolerate, and therefore must to a certain degree sanction, contending forms of faith. Even in reference to those more general principles of truth and justice which, in theory at least, equally belong to all religions, the government is limited by expediency, and seeks only to enforce them so far as is required for the preservation of society. Hence arises a necessary opposition between the moral principles of the individual and the political principles of a state. A good man may be sensitive for his faith, zealous for the honour of God, and for every moral and spiritual good; the statesman has to begin by considering the conditions of human society. Aristotle raises a famous question, whether the good citizen is the good man? We have rather to raise the question, whether the good man is the good citizen? If matters of state are to be determined by abstract principles of morality and religion,—if, for the want of such principles, whole nations are to be consigned to the vengeance of heaven,—if the rule is to be not "my kingdom is not of this world," but, "we ought to obey God rather than man,"—there is nothing left but to supersede civil society, and found a religious one in its stead.

It is no imaginary spectre that we are raising, but one that acts powerfully on the minds of religious men. Is it not commonly said by many, that the government is unchristian, that the legislature is unchristian, that all governments and all legislatures are the enemies of Christ and his Church? Herein to them is the fixed evil of the world; not in vice, or in war, or in injustice, or in falsehood; but simply in the fact that the constitution of their country conforms to the laws of human society. It is not necessary to suppose that they will succeed in carrying out their principles, or that a civilised nation will place its liberties in the keeping of a religious party. But, without succeeding, they do a great deal of harm to themselves and to the world. For they draw the mind away from the simple truths of the Gospel to manifestations of opinion and party spirit; they waste their own power to do good; some passing topic of theological controversy drains their life. We may not "do evil that good may come," they say; and "what is morally wrong cannot be politically right;" and with this misapplied "syllogism of the conscience" they would make it impossible, in the mixed state of human affairs, to act at all, either for good or evil. He who seriously believes that not for our actual sins, but for some legislative measure of doubtful expediency, the wrath of God is hanging over his country, is in so unreal a state of mind as to be scarcely capable of discerning the real evils by which we are surrounded. The remedies of practical ills sink into insignificance compared with some point in which the interests of religion appear to be, but are not, concerned.

But it is not only in the political world that imaginary forms of evil present themselves, and we are haunted by ideas which can never be carried out in practice; the difficulty comes nearer home to most of us in our social life. If governments and nations appear unchristian, the appearance of society itself is in a certain point of view still more unchristian. Suppose a person acquainted with the real state of the world in which we live and move, and neither morosely depreciating nor unduly exalting human nature, to turn to the



image of the Christian Church in the New Testament, how great would the difference appear! How would the blessing of poverty contrast with the real, even the moral advantages of wealth! the family of love, with distinctions of ranks! the spiritual, almost supernatural, society of the first Christians, with our world of fashion, of business, of pleasure! the community of goods, with our meagre charity to others! the prohibition of going to law before the heathen, with our endless litigation before judges of all religions! the cross of Christ, with our ordinary life! How little does the world in which we live seem to be designed for the tabernacle of immortal souls! How large a portion of mankind, even in a civilised country, appears to be sacrificed to the rest, and to be without the means of moral and religious improvement! How fixed, and steadfast, and regular do dealings of money and business appear! how transient and passing are religious objects! Then, again, consider how society, sometimes in self-defence, sets a false stamp on good and evil; as in the excessive punishment of the errors of women, compared with Christ's conduct to the woman who was a sinner. Or when men are acknowledged to be in the sight of God equal, how strange it seems that one should heap up money for another, and be dependent on him for his daily life. Susceptible minds, attaching themselves, some to one point some to another, may carry such reflections very far, until society itself appears evil, and they desire some primitive patriarchal mode of life. They are tired of conventionalities; they want, as they say, to make the Gospel a reality; to place all men on a religious, social, and political equality. In this, as in the last case, "they are kicking against the pricks;" what they want is a society which has not the very elements of a social state; they do not perceive that the cause of the evil is human nature itself, which will not cohere without mixed motives and received forms and distinctions, and that Providence has been pleased to rest the world on a firmer basis than is supplied by the fleeting emotions of philanthropy, viz. self-interest. We are not, indeed, to sit with our arms folded, and acquiesce in human evil. But we must separate the accidents from the

essence of this evil: questions of taste, things indifferent, or customary, or necessary, from the weightier matters of oppression, falsehood, vice. The ills of society are to be struggled against in such a manner as not to violate the conditions of society; the precepts of Scripture are to be applied, but not without distinctions of times and countries; Christian duties are to be enforced, but not identified with political principles. To see the world,—not as it ought to be, but as it is,—to be on a level with the circumstances in which God has placed them, to renounce the remote and impossible for what is possible and in their reach; above all, to begin within,—these are the limits which enthusiasts should set to their aspirations after social good. It is a weary thing to be all our life long warring against the elements, or, like the slaves of some eastern lord, using our hands in a work which can only be accomplished by levers and machines. The physician of society should aid nature instead of fighting against it; he must let the world alone as much as he can; to a certain degree, he will even accept things as they are in the hope of bettering them.

II. Mere weakness of character will sometimes afford an illustration of the Apostle's words. If there are some whose days are "bound each to each by natural piety," there are others on whom the same continuous power is exercised for evil as well as good; they are unable to throw off their former self; the sins of their youth lie heavy on them; the influence of opinions which they have ceased to hold discolours their minds. Or it may be that their weakness takes a different form, viz., that of clinging to some favourite resolve, or of yielding to some fixed idea which gets dominion over them, and becomes the limit of all their ideas. A common instance of this may be found in the use made by many persons of conscience. Whatever they wish or fancy, whatever course of action they are led to by some influence obvious to others, though unobserved by themselves, immediately assumes the necessary and stereotyped form of the conscientious fulfilment of a duty. To every suggestion of what is right and reasonable, they reply only with the words—"their

consciences will not allow it." They do what they think right ; they do not observe that they never seem to themselves to do otherwise. No voice of authority, no opinion of others, weighs with them when put in the scale against the dictates of what they term conscience. As they get older, their narrow ideas of right acquire a greater tenacity ; the world is going on, and they are as they were. A deadening influence lies on their moral nature, the peculiarity of which is, that, like the law, it assumes the appearance of good, differing from the law only in being unconscious. Conscience, one may say, putting their own character into the form of a truth or commandment, "has deceived and slain them."

Another form of conscience yet more closely resembles the principle described in the seventh chapter of the Romans. There is a state in which man is powerless to act, and is, nevertheless, clairvoyant of all the good and evil of his own nature. He places the good and evil principle before him, and is ever oscillating between them. He traces the labyrinth of conflicting principles in the world, and is yet further perplexed and entangled. He is sensitive to every breath of feeling, and incapable of the performance of any duty. Or take another example : it sometimes happens that the remembrance of past suffering, or the consciousness of sin, may so weigh a man down as fairly to paralyse his moral power. He is distracted between what he is and what he was ; old habits and vices, and the new character which is being fashioned in him. Sometimes the balance seems to hang equal ; he feels the earnest wish and desire to do rightly, but cannot hope to find pleasure and satisfaction in a good life ; he desires heartily to repent, but can never think it possible that God should forgive. "It is I, and it is not I, but sin that dwelleth in me." "I have, and have never ceased to have, the wish for better things, even amid haunts of infamy and vice." In such language, even now, though with less fervour than in "the first spiritual chaos of the affections," does the soul cry out to God—"O wretched man that I am, who shall deliver me from the body of this death?"

III. There is some danger of speculative difficulties presenting



the same hindrance and stumbling-block to our own generation, that the law is described as doing to the contemporaries of St. Paul. As the law was holy, just, and good, so many of these difficulties are true, and have real grounds: all of them, except in cases where they spring from hatred and opposition to the Gospel, are at least innocent. And yet, by undermining received opinions, by increasing vanity and egotism, instead of strengthening the will and fixing the principles, their promulgation may become a temporary source of evil; so that, in the words of the Apostle, it may be said of them that, taking occasion by the truth, they deceive and slay men. What then? is the law sin? is honest inquiry wrong? God forbid! it is we ourselves who are incapable of receiving the results of inquiry; who will not believe unless we see; who demand a proof that we cannot have; who begin with appeals to authority, and tradition, and consequences, and, when dissatisfied with these, imagine that there is no other foundation on which life can repose but the loose and sandy structure of our individual opinions. Persons often load their belief in the hope of strengthening it; they escape doubt by assuming certainty. Or they believe "under an hypothesis;" their worldly interests lead them to acquiesce; their higher intellectual convictions rebel. Opinions, hardly won from study and experience, are found to be at variance with early education, or natural temperament. Opposite tendencies grow together in the mind; appearing and reappearing at intervals. Life becomes a patchwork of new and old cloth, or like a garment which changes colour in the sun.

It is true that the generation to which we belong has difficulties to contend with, perhaps greater than those of any former age; and certainly different from them. Some of those difficulties arise out of the opposition of reason and faith; the critical inquiries of which the Old and New Testament have been the subject, are a trouble to many; the circumstance that, while the Bible is the word of life for all men, such inquiries are open only to the few, increases the irritation. The habit of mind which has been formed

in the study of Greek or Roman history may be warned off the sacred territory, but cannot really be prevented from trespassing; still more impossible is it to keep the level of knowledge at one point in Germany, at another in England. Geology, ethnology, historical and metaphysical criticism, assail in succession not the Scriptures themselves, but notions and beliefs which in the minds of many good men are bound up with them. The eternal strain to keep theology where it is while the world is going on, specious reconcilements, political or ecclesiastical exigencies, recent attempts to revive the past, and the reaction to which they have given birth, the contrast that everywhere arises of old and new, all add to the confusion. Probably, no other age has been to the same extent the subject of cross and contradictory influences. What can be more unlike than the tone of sermons and of newspapers? or the ideas of men on art, politics, and religion, now, and half a generation ago? The thoughts of a few original minds, like wedges, pierce into all received and conventional opinions and are almost equally removed from either. The destruction of "shams," that is, the realisation of things as they are amid all the conventions of thought and speech and action, is also an element of unsettlement. The excess of self-reflection again, is not favourable to strength or simplicity of character. Every one seems to be employed in decomposing the world, human nature, and himself. The discovery is made that good and evil are mixed in a far more subtle way than at first sight would have appeared possible; and that even extremes of both meet in the same person. The mere analysis of moral and religious truth, the fact that we know the origin of many things which the last generation received on authority, is held by some to destroy their sacredness. Lastly, there are those who feel that all the doubts of sceptics put together, fall short of that great doubt which has insinuated itself into their minds, from the contemplation of mankind — saying one thing and doing another.

It is foolish to lament over these things; it would be still more foolish to denounce them. They are the mental trials of the age

and country in which God has placed us. If they seem at times to exercise a weakening or unsettling influence, may we not hope that increasing love of truth, deeper knowledge of ourselves and other men, will, in the end, simplify and not perplex the path of life. We may leave off in mature years where we began in youth, and receive not only the kingdom of God, but the world also, as "little children." The analysis of moral and religious truth may correct its errors without destroying its obligations. Experience of the illusions of religious feeling at a particular time should lead us to place religion on a foundation which is independent of feeling. Because the Scripture is no longer held to be a book of geology or ethnology, or a supernatural revelation of historical facts, it will not cease to be the law of our lives, exercising an influence over us, different in kind from the ideas of philosophical systems, or the aspirations of poetry or romance. Because the world (of which we are a part) is hypocritical and deceitful, and individuals go about dissecting their neighbours' motives and lives, that is a reason for cherishing a simple and manly temper of mind, which does not love men the less because it knows human nature more; which pierces the secrets of the heart, not by any process of anatomy, but by the light of an eye from which the mists of selfishness are dispersed.

IV. The relation in which science stands to us may seem to bear but a remote resemblance to that in which the law stood to the Apostle St. Paul. Yet the analogy is not fanciful, but real. Traces of physical laws are discernible everywhere in the world around us; in ourselves also, whose souls are knit together with our bodies, whose bodies are a part of the material creation. It seems as if nature came so close to us as to leave no room for the motion of our will: instead of the inexhaustible grace of God enabling us to say, in the language of the Apostle, "I can do all things through Christ that strengtheneth me," we become more and more the slaves of our own physical constitution. Our state is growing like that of a person whose mind is over sensitive to the nervous emotions of his own bodily frame. And as the self-consciousness becomes stronger



and the contrast between faith and experience more vivid, there arises a conflict between the spirit and the flesh, nature and grace, not unlike that of which the Apostle speaks. No one who, instead of hanging to the past, will look forward to the future, can expect that natural science should stand in the same attitude towards revelation fifty years hence as at present. The faith of mankind varies from age to age; it is weaker, or it may be stronger, at one time than at another. But that which never varies or turns aside, which is always going on and cannot be driven back, is knowledge based on the sure ground of observation and experiment, the regular progress of which is itself matter of observation. The stage at which the few have arrived is already far in advance of the many, and if there were nothing remaining to be discovered, still the diffusion of the knowledge that we have, without new addition, would exert a great influence on religious and social life. Still greater is the indirect influence which science exercises through the medium of the arts. In one century a single invention has changed the face of Europe: three or four such inventions might produce a gulf between us and the future far greater than the interval which separates ancient from modern civilisation. Doubtless God has provided a way that the thought of Him should not be banished from the hearts of men. And habit, and opinion, and prescription may "last our time," and many motives may conspire to keep our minds off the coming change. But if ever our present knowledge of geology, of languages, of the races and religions of mankind, of the human frame itself, shall be regarded as the starting-point of a goal which has been almost reached, supposing too the progress of science to be accompanied by a corresponding development of the mechanical arts, we can hardly anticipate, from what we already see, the new relation that will then arise between reason and faith. Perhaps the very opposition between them may have died away. At any rate experience shows that religion is not stationary when all other things are moving onward.

Changes of this kind pass gradually over the world; the mind of

man is not suddenly thrown into a state for which it is unprepared. No one has more doubts than he can carry; the way of life is not found to stop and come to an end in the midst of a volcano, or on the edge of a precipice. Dangers occur, not from the disclosure of any new, or hitherto unobserved, facts, for which, as for all other blessings, we have reason to be thankful to God; but from our concealment or denial of them, from the belief that we can make them other than they are; from the fancy that some *à priori* notion, some undefined word, some intensity of personal conviction, is the weapon with which they are to be met. New facts, whether bearing on Scripture, or on religion generally, or on morality, are sure to win their way; the tide refuses to recede at any man's bidding. And there are not wanting signs that the increase of secular knowledge is beginning to be met by a corresponding progress in religious ideas. Controversies are dying out; the lines of party are fading into one another; niceties of doctrine are laid aside. The opinions respecting the inspiration of Scripture, which are held in the present day by good and able men, are not those of fifty years ago; a change may be observed on many points, a reserve on still more. Formulas of reconciliation have sprung up: "the Bible is not a book of science," "the inspired writers were not taught supernaturally what they could have learned from ordinary sources," resting-places in the argument at which travellers are the more ready to halt, because they do not perceive that they are only temporary. For there is no real resting-place but in the entire faith, that all true knowledge is a revelation of the will of God. In the case of the poor and suffering, we often teach resignation to the accidents of life; it is not less plainly a duty of religious men, to submit to the progress of knowledge. That is a new kind of resignation, in which many Christians have to school themselves. When the difficulty may seem, in anticipation, to be greatest, they will find, with the Apostle, that there is a way out: "The truth has made them free."

## ON RIGHTEOUSNESS BY FAITH.

No doctrine in later times has been looked at so exclusively through the glass of controversy as that of justification. From being the simplest it has become the most difficult; the language of the heart has lost itself in a logical tangle. Differences have been drawn out as far as possible, and then taken back and reconciled. The extreme of one view has more than once produced a reaction in favour of the other. Many senses have been attributed to the same words, and simple statements carried out on both sides into endless conclusions. New formulas of conciliation have been put in the place of old-established phrases, and have soon died away, because they had no root in language or in the common sense or feeling of mankind. The difficulty of the subject has been increased by the different degrees of importance attached to it: while to some it is an "*articulus stantis aut cadentis ecclesiæ*," others have never been able to see in it more than a verbal dispute.

This perplexity on the question of righteousness by faith is partly due to the character of the age in which it began to revive. Men felt at the Reformation the need of a spiritual religion, and could no longer endure the yoke which had been put upon their fathers. The heart rebelled against the burden of ordinances; it wanted to take a nearer way to reconciliation with God. But when the struggle was over, and individuals were seeking to impart to others the peace which they had found themselves, they had no simple or natural expression of their belief. They were alone in a world in which the human mind had been long enslaved. It was necessary for them to go down into the land of the enemy, and get their



weapons sharpened before they could take up a position and fortify their camp.

In other words, the Scholastic Logic had been for six centuries previous the great instrument of training the human mind; it had grown up with it, and become a part of it. Neither would it have been more possible for the Reformers to have laid it aside than to have laid aside the use of language itself. Around theology it lingers still, seeming reluctant to quit a territory which is peculiarly its own. No science has hitherto fallen so completely under its power; no other is equally unwilling to ask the meaning of terms; none has been so fertile in reasonings and consequences. The change of which Lord Bacon was the herald has hardly yet reached it; much less could the Reformation have anticipated the New Philosophy.

The whole mental structure of that time rendered it necessary that the Reformers, no less than their opponents, should resort to the scholastic methods of argument. The difference between the two parties did not lie here. Perhaps it may be said with truth that the Reformers were even more schoolmen than their opponents, because they dealt more with abstract ideas, and were more concentrated on a single topic. The whole of Luther's teaching was summed up in a single article, "Righteousness by Faith." That was to him the Scriptural expression of a Spiritual religion. But this, according to the manner of that time, could not be left in the simple language of St. Paul. It was to be proved from Scripture first, then isolated by definition; then it might be safely drawn out into remote consequences.

And yet, why was this? Why not repeat, with a slight alteration of the words rather than the meaning of the Apostle, Neither justification by faith nor justification by works, but "a new creature"? Was there not yet "a more excellent way" to oppose things to words, — the life, and spirit, and freedom of the Gospel, to the deadness, and powerlessness, and slavery of the Roman Church? So it seems natural to us to reason, looking back after an interval of three centuries on the weary struggle; so absorbing to those who took part

in it once, so distant now either to us or them. But so it could not be. The temper of the times, and the education of the Reformers themselves, made it necessary that one dogmatic system should be met by another. The scholastic divinity had become a charmed circle, and no man could venture out of it, though he might oppose or respond within it.

And thus justification by faith, and justification by works, became the watchword of two parties. We may imagine ourselves at that point in the controversy when the Pelagian dispute had been long since hushed, and that respecting Predestination had not yet begun; when men were not differing about original sin, and had not begun to differ about the Divine decrees. What Luther sought for was to find a formula which expressed most fully the entire, unreserved, immediate dependence of the believer on Christ. What the Catholic sought for was so to modify this formula as not to throw dishonour on the Church by making religion a merely personal or individual matter; or on the lives of holy men of old, who had wrought out their salvation by asceticism; or endanger morality by appearing to undervalue good works. It was agreed by all, that men are saved through Christ;—not of themselves, but of the grace of God, was equally agreed since the condemnation of Pelagius;—that faith and works imply each other, was not disputed by either. A narrow space is left for the combat, which has to be carried on within the outworks of an earlier creed, in which, nevertheless, great subtlety of human thought and the greatest differences of character admit of being displayed.

On this narrow ground the first question that naturally arises is, how faith is to be defined? is it to include love and holiness, or to be separated from them? If the former, it seems to lose its apprehensive dependent nature, and to be scarcely distinguishable from works; if the latter, the statement is too refined for the common sense of mankind; though made by Luther, it could scarcely be retained even by his immediate followers. Again, is it an act or a state? are we to figure it as a point, or as a line? Is the whole of our spiritual

life anticipated in the beginning, or may faith no less than works, justification equally with sanctification, be conceived of as going on to perfection? Is justification an objective act of Divine mercy, or a subjective state of which the believer is conscious in himself? Is the righteousness of faith imputed or inherent, an attribution of the merits of Christ, or a renewal of the human heart itself? What is the test of a true faith? And is it possible for those who are possessed of it to fall away? How can we exclude the doctrine of human merit consistently with Divine justice? How do we account for the fact that some have this faith, and others are without it, this difference being apparently independent of their moral state? If faith comes by grace, is it imparted to few or to all? And in what relation does the whole doctrine stand to Predestinarianism on the one hand, and to the Catholic or Sacramental theory on the other?

So at many points the doctrine of righteousness by faith touches the metaphysical questions of subject and object, of necessity and freedom, of habits and actions, and of human consciousness, like a magnet drawing to itself philosophy, as it has once drawn to itself the history of Europe. There were distinctions also of an earlier date, with which it had to struggle, of deeper moral import than their technical form would lead us to suppose, such as that of congruity and condignity, in which the analogy of Christianity is transferred to heathenism, and the doer of good works before justification is regarded as a shadow of the perfected believer. Neither must we omit to observe that, as the doctrine of justification by faith had a close connection with the Pelagian controversy, carrying the decision of the Church a step further, making Divine Grace not only the source of human action, but also requiring the consciousness or assurance of grace in the believer himself: so it put forth its roots in another direction, attaching itself to Anselm as well as Augustin, and comprehending the idea of satisfaction; not now, as formerly, of Christ offered in the sacrifice of the mass, but of one sacrifice, once offered for the sins of men, whether considered as an expiation



by suffering, or implying only a reconciliation between God and man, or a mere manifestation of the righteousness of God.

Such is the whole question, striking deep, and spreading far and wide with its offshoots. It is not our intention to enter on the investigation of all these subjects, many of which are interesting as phases of thought in the history of the Church, but have no bearing on the interpretation of St. Paul's Epistles, and would be out of place here. Our inquiry will embrace two heads: (1.) What did St. Paul mean by the expression "righteousness of faith," in that age ere controversies about his meaning arose; and (2.) What do we mean by it, now that such controversies have died away, and the interest in them is retained only by the theological student, and the Church and the world are changed, and there is no more question of Jew or Gentile, circumcision or uncircumcision, and we do not become Christians, but are so from our birth. Many volumes are not required to explain the meaning of the Apostle; nor can the words of eternal life be other than few and simple to ourselves.

There is one interpretation of the Epistles of St. Paul which is necessarily in some degree false; that is, the interpretation put upon them by later controversy. When the minds of men are absorbed in a particular circle of ideas they take possession of any stray verse, which becomes the centre of their world. They use the words of Scripture, but are incapable of seeing that they have another meaning and are used in a different connection from that in which they employ them. Sometimes there is a degree of similarity in the application which tends to conceal the difference. Thus Luther and St. Paul both use the same term, "justified by faith;" and the strength of the Reformer's words is the authority of St. Paul. Yet, observe how far this agreement is one of words: how far of things. For Luther is speaking solely of individuals, St. Paul also of nations; Luther of faith absolutely, St. Paul of faith as relative to the law. With St. Paul faith is the symbol of the universality of the Gospel. Luther excludes this or any analogous point of view. In St. Paul there is no opposition of faith and love; nor does he further determine righteous-

ness by faith as meaning a faith in the blood or even in the death of Christ; nor does he suppose consciousness or assurance in the person justified. But all these are prominent features of the Lutheran doctrine. Once more: the faith of St. Paul has reference to the evil of the world of sight; which was soon to vanish away, that the world in which faith walks might be revealed; but no such allusion is implied in the language of the Reformer. Lastly; the change in the use of the substantive "righteousness" to "justification" is the indication of a wide difference between St. Paul and Luther; the natural, almost accidental, language of St. Paul having already passed into a technical formula.

These contrasts make us feel that St. Paul can only be interpreted by himself, not from the systems of modern theologians, nor even from the writings of one who had so much in common with him as Luther. It is the spirit and feeling of St. Paul which Luther represents, not the meaning of his words. A touch of nature in both "makes them kin." And without bringing down one to the level of the other, we can imagine St. Paul returning that singular affection, almost like an attachment to a living friend, which the great Reformer felt towards the Apostle. But this personal attachment or resemblance in no way lessens the necessary difference between the preaching of Luther and of St. Paul, which arose in some degree perhaps from their individual character, but chiefly out of the different circumstances and modes of thought of their respective ages. At the Reformation we are at another stage of the human mind, in which system and logic and the abstractions of Aristotle have a kind of necessary force, when words have so completely taken the place of things, that the minutest distinctions appear to have an intrinsic value.

It has been said (and the remark admits of a peculiar application, to theology), that few persons know sufficient of things to be able to say whether disputes are merely verbal or not. Yet, on the other hand, it must be admitted that, whatever accidental advantage theology may derive from system and definition, mere accurate state-

ments can never form the substance of our belief. No one doubts that Christianity could be in the fullest sense taught to a child or a savage, without any mention of justification or satisfaction or predestination. Why should we not receive the Gospel as "little children?" Why should we not choose the poor man's part in the inheritance of the kingdom of heaven? Why elaborate doctrinal abstractions which are so subtle in their meaning as to be in great danger of being lost in their translation from one language to another? which are always running into consequences inconsistent with our moral nature, and the knowledge of God derived from it? which are not the prevailing usage of Scripture, but technical terms which we have gathered from one or two passages, and made the key-notes of our scale? The words satisfaction and predestination nowhere occur in Scripture; the word regeneration only twice, and but once in a sense at all similar to that which it bears among ourselves; the word justification twice only, and nowhere as a purely abstract term.

But although language and logic have strangely transfigured the meaning of Scripture, we cannot venture to say that all theological controversies are questions of words. If from their winding mazes we seek to retrace our steps, we still find differences which have a deep foundation in the opposite tendencies of the human mind, and the corresponding division of the world itself. That men of one temper of mind adopt one expression rather than another may be partly an accident; but the adoption of an expression by persons of marked character makes the difference of words a reality also. That can scarcely be thought a matter of words which cut in sunder the Church, which overthrew princes, which made the line of demarcation between Jewish and Gentile Christians in the Apostolic age, and is so, in another sense, between Protestant and Catholic at the present day. And in a deeper way of reflection than this, if we turn from the Church to the individual, we seem to see around us opposite natures and characters, whose lives really exhibit a difference corresponding to that of which we are speaking. The



one incline to morality, the other to religion; the one to the sacramental, the other to the spiritual; the one to multiplicity in outward ordinances, the other to simplicity; the one consider chiefly the means, the other the end; the one desire to dwell upon doctrinal statements, the other need only the name of Christ; the one turn to ascetic practices, to lead a good life, and to do good to others, the other to faith, humility, and dependence on God. We may sometimes find the opposite attributes combine with each other (there have ever been cross divisions on this article of belief in the Christian world; the great body of the Reformed Churches, and a small minority of Roman Catholics before the Reformation, being on the one side; and the whole Roman Catholic Church since the Reformation, and a section of the Protestant Episcopalians, and some lesser communions, on the other); still, in general, the first of these characters answers to that doctrine which the Roman Church sums up in the formula of justification by works; the latter is that temper of mind which finds its natural dogmatic expression in the words "We are justified by faith."

These latter words have been carried out of their original circle of ideas into a new one by the doctrines of the Reformation. They have become hardened, stiffened, sharpened by the exigencies of controversy, and torn from what may be termed their context in the Apostolical age. To that age we must return ere we can think in the Apostle's language. His conception of faith, although simpler than our own, has nevertheless a peculiar relation to his own day; it is at once wider, and also narrower, than the use of the word among ourselves,—wider in that it is the symbol of the admission of the Gentiles into the Church, but narrower also in that it is the negative of the law. Faith is the proper technical term which excludes the law; being what the law is not, as the law is what faith is not. No middle term connects the two, or at least none which the Apostle admits, until he has first widened the breach between them to the uttermost. He does not say, "Was not Abraham our father justified by works (as well as by faith), when he had

offered up Isaac his son on the altar?" but only, "What saith the Scripture? Abraham believed God, and it was counted to him for righteousness."

The Jewish conception of righteousness was the fulfilment of the Commandments. He who walked in all the precepts of the law blameless, like Daniel in the Old Testament, or Joseph and Nathanael in the New, was righteous before God. "What shall I do to inherit eternal life? Thou knowest the Commandments. Do not commit adultery, do not steal, do not bear false witness. All these have I kept from my youth up." This is a picture of Jewish righteousness as it presents itself in its most favourable light. But it was a righteousness which comprehended the observance of ceremonial details as well as moral precepts, which confused questions of a new moon or a sabbath, with the weightier matters of common honesty or filial duty. It might be nothing more than an obedience to the law as such, losing itself on the surface of religion, in casuistical distinctions about meats and drinks, or vows or forms of oaths, or purifications, without any attempt to make clean that which is within. It might also pierce inward to the dividing asunder of the soul. Then was heard the voice of conscience crying, "All these things cannot make the doers thereof perfect." When every external obligation was fulfilled, the internal began. Actions must include thoughts and intentions,—the Seventh Commandment extends to the adultery of the heart; in one word, the law must become a spirit. (See "Essay on the Law as the Strength of Sin.")

But to the mind of St. Paul the spirit presented itself not so much as a higher fulfilment of the law, but as antagonistic to it. From this point of view, it appeared not that man could never fulfil the law perfectly, but that he could never fulfil it at all. What God required was something different in kind from legal obedience. What man needed was a return to God and nature. He was burdened, straitened, shut out from the presence of his Father,—a servant, not a son; to whom, in a spiritual sense, the heaven was become as iron, and the earth brass. The new righteousness must

raise him above the burden of ordinances, and bring him into a living communion with God. It must be within, and not without him, — written not on tables of stone, but on fleshly tables of the heart. But inward righteousness was no peculiar privilege of the Israelites; it belonged to all mankind. And the revelation of it, as it satisfied the need of the individual soul, vindicated also the ways of God to man; it showed God to be equal in justice and mercy to all mankind.

As the symbol of this inward righteousness, St. Paul found an expression — righteousness by faith — derived from those passages in the Old Testament which spoke of Abraham being justified by faith. It was already in use among the Jews; but it was the Apostle who stamped it first with a permanent and universal import. The faith of St. Paul was not the faith of the Patriarchs only, who believed in the promises made to their descendants; it entered within the veil — out of the reach of ordinances — beyond the evil of this present life; it was the instrument of union with Christ, in whom all men were one; whom they were expecting to come from heaven. The Jewish nation itself was too far gone to be saved as a nation: individuals had a nearer way. The Lord was at hand; there was no time for a long life of laborious service. As at the last hour, when we have to teach men rather how to die than how to live, the Apostle could only say to those who would receive it, "Believe; all things are possible to him that believes."

Such are some of the peculiar aspects of the Apostle's doctrine of righteousness by faith. To our own minds it has become a later stage or a particular form of the more general doctrine of salvation through Christ, of the grace of God to man, or of the still more general truth of spiritual religion. It is the connecting link by which we appropriate these to ourselves, — the hand which we put out to apprehend the mercy of God. It was not so to the Apostle. To him grace and faith and the Spirit are not parts of a doctrinal system, but different expressions of the same truth. "Beginning in the Spirit" is another way of saying "Being justified by faith." He



uses them indiscriminately, and therefore we cannot suppose that he could have laid any stress on distinctions between them. Even the apparently precise antithesis of the prepositions *ἐν*, *διὰ* varies in different passages. Only in reference to the law, faith, rather than grace, is the more correct and natural expression. It was Christ or not Christ, the Spirit or not the Spirit, faith and the law, that were the dividing principles: not Christ through faith, as opposed to Christ through works; or the Spirit as communicated through grace, to the Spirit as independent of grace.

Illusive as are the distinctions of later controversies as guides to the interpretation of Scripture, there is another help, of which we can hardly avail ourselves too much,—the interpretation of fact. To read the mind of the Apostle, we must read also the state of the world and the Church by which he was surrounded. Now, there are two great facts which correspond to the doctrine of righteousness by faith, which is also the doctrine of the universality of the Gospel: first, the vision which the Apostle saw on the way to Damascus; secondly, the actual conversion of the Gentiles by the preaching of the Apostle. Righteousness by faith, admission of the Gentiles, even the rejection and restoration of the Jews, are—himself under so many different points of view. The way by which God had led him was the way also by which he was leading other men. When he preached righteousness by faith, his conscience also bore him witness that this was the manner in which he had himself passed from darkness to light, from the burden of ordinances to the power of an endless life. In proclaiming the salvation of the Gentiles, he was interpreting the world as it was; their admission into the Church had already taken place before the eyes of all mankind; it was a purpose of God that was actually fulfilled, not waiting for some future revelation. Just as when doubts are raised respecting his Apostleship, he cut them short by the fact that he was an Apostle, and did the work of an Apostle; so, in adjusting the relations of Jew and Gentile, and justifying the ways of God, the facts, read aright, are the basis of the doctrine which he teaches. All that he

further shows is, that these facts were in accordance with the Old Testament, with the words of the Prophets, and the dealings of God with the Jewish people. And the Apostles at Jerusalem, equally with himself, admitted the success of his mission as an evidence of its truth.

But the faith which St. Paul preached was not merely the evidence of things not seen, in which the Gentiles also had part, nor only the reflection of "the violence" of the world around him, which was taking the kingdom of heaven by force. The source, the hidden life, from which justification flows, in which it lives, is—Christ. It is true that we nowhere find in the Epistles the expression "justification by Christ" exactly in the sense of modern theology. But, on the other hand, we are described as dead with Christ, we live with Him, we are members of His body, we follow Him in all the stages of His being. All this is another way of expressing "We are justified by faith." That which takes us out of ourselves and links us with Christ, which anticipates in an instant the rest of life, which is the door of every heavenly and spiritual relation, presenting us through a glass with the image of Christ crucified, is faith. The difference between our own mode of thinking and that of the Apostle is mainly this,—that to him Christ is set forth more as in a picture, and less through the medium of ideas or figures of speech; and that while we conceive the Saviour more naturally as an object of faith, to St. Paul He is rather the indwelling power of life which is fashioned in him, the marks of whose body he bears, the measure of whose sufferings he fills up.

When in the Gospel it is said, "Believe on the Lord Jesus Christ, and thou shalt be saved," this is substantially the same truth as "We are justified by faith." It is another way of expressing, "Therefore being justified by faith, we have peace with God through our Lord Jesus Christ." Yet we may note two points of difference, as well as two of resemblance, in the manner in which the doctrine is set forth in the Gospel as compared with the manner of the Epistles of St. Paul. First, in the omission of any connexion between

the doctrine of faith in Christ, and the admission of the Gentiles. The Saviour is within the borders of Israel ; and accordingly little is said of the "sheep not of this fold," or the other husbandmen who shall take possession of the vineyard. Secondly, there is in the words of Christ no antagonism or opposition to the law, except so far as the law itself represented an imperfect or defective morality, or the perversions of the law had become inconsistent with every moral principle. Two points of resemblance have also to be remarked between the faith of the Gospels and of the Epistles. In the first place, both are accompanied by forgiveness of sins. As our Saviour to the disciple who affirms his belief says, "Thy sins be forgiven thee;" so St. Paul, when seeking to describe, in the language of the Old Testament, the state of justification by faith, cites the words of David, "Blessed is the man to whom the Lord will not impute sin." Secondly, they have both a kind of absoluteness which raises them above earthly things. There is a sort of omnipotence attributed to faith, of which the believer is made a partaker. "Whoso hath faith as a grain of mustard seed, and should say unto this mountain, Be thou removed, and be thou cast into the sea, it shall be done unto him," is the language of our Lord. "I can do all things through Christ that strengtheneth me," are the words of St. Paul.

Faith, in the view of the Apostle, has a further aspect, which is freedom. That quality in us which in reference to God and Christ is faith, in reference to ourselves and our fellow-men is Christian liberty. "With this freedom Christ has made us free;" "where the spirit of the Lord is, there is liberty." It is the image also of the communion of the world to come. "The Jerusalem that is above is free," and "the creature is waiting to be delivered into the glorious liberty of the children of God." It applies to the Church as now no longer confined in the prison-house of the Jewish dispensation; to the grace of God, which is given irrespectively to all; to the individual, the power of whose will is now loosed; to the Gospel, as freedom from the law, setting the conscience at rest about questions of meats and drinks, and new moons and sabbaths; and, above all



to the freedom from the consciousness of sin : in all these senses the law of the spirit of life is also the law of freedom.

In modern language, assurance has been deemed necessary to the definition of a true faith. There is a sense, too, in which final assurance entered into the conception of the faith of the Epistles. Looking at men from without, it was possible for them to fall away finally ; it was possible also to fall without falling away ; as St. John says, there is a sin unto death, and there is a sin not unto death. But looking inwards into their hearts and consciences, their salvation was not a matter of probability ; they knew whom they had believed, and were confident that He who had begun the good work in them would continue it unto the end. All calculations respecting the future were to them lost in the fact that they were already saved ; to use a homely expression, they had no time to inquire whether the state to which they were called was permanent and final. The same intense faith which separated them from the present world, had already given them a place in the world to come. They had not to win the crown,—it was already won : this life, when they thought of themselves in relation to Christ, was the next ; as their union with Him seemed to them more true and real than the mere accidents of their temporal existence.

A few words will briefly recapitulate the doctrine of righteousness by faith as gathered from the Epistles of St. Paul.

Faith, then, according to the Apostle, is the spiritual principle whereby we go out of ourselves to hold communion with God and Christ ; not like the faith of the Epistle to the Hebrews, clothing itself in the shadows of the law ; but opposed to the law, and of a nature purely moral and spiritual. It frees man from the flesh, the law, the world, and from himself also ; that is, from his sinful nature, which is the meeting of these three elements in his spiritual consciousness. And to be “justified” is to pass into a new state ; such as that of the Christian world when compared with the Jewish or Pagan ; such as that which St. Paul had himself felt at the moment of his conversion ; such as that which he reminds the

Galatian converts they had experienced, "before whose eyes Jesus Christ was evidently set forth crucified;" an inward or subjective state, to which the outward or objective act of calling, on God's part, through the preaching of the Apostle, corresponded; which, considered on a wider scale, was the acceptance of the Gentiles and of every one who feared God; corresponding in like manner to the eternal purpose of God; indicated in the case of the individual by his own inward assurance; in the case of the world at large, testified by the fact; accompanied in the first by the sense of peace and forgiveness, and implying to mankind generally the last final principle of the Divine Government,—“God concluded all under sin that He might have mercy upon all.”

We acknowledge that there is a difference between the meaning of justification by faith to St. Paul and to ourselves. Eighteen hundred years cannot have passed away, leaving the world and the mind of man, or the use of language, the same as it was. Times have altered, and Christianity, partaking of the social and political progress of mankind, receiving, too, its own intellectual development, has inevitably lost its simplicity. The true use of philosophy is to restore this simplicity; to undo the perplexities which the love of system or past philosophies, or the imperfection of language or logic, have made; to lighten the burden which the traditions of ages have imposed upon us. To understand St. Paul we found it necessary to get rid of definitions and deductions, which might be compared to a mazy undergrowth of some noble forest, which we must clear away ere we can wander in its ranges. And it is necessary for ourselves also to return from theology to Scripture; to seek a truth to live and die in,—not to be the subject of verbal disputes, which entangle the religious sense in scholastic refinements. The words of eternal life are few and simple, “Believe on the Lord Jesus Christ and thou shalt be saved.”

Remaining, then, within the circle of the New Testament, which we receive as a rule of life for ourselves, no less than for the early Church, we must not ignore the great differences by which we are

distinguished from those for whom it was written. Words of life and inspiration, heard by them with rapture for the first time, are to us words of fixed and conventional meaning; they no longer express feelings of the heart, but ideas of the head. Nor is the difference less between the state of the world then and now; not only of the outward world in which we live, but of that inner world which we ourselves are. The law is dead to us, and we to the law; and the language of St. Paul is relative to what has passed away. The transitions of meaning in the use of the word law tend also to a corresponding variation in the meaning of faith. We are not looking for the immediate coming of Christ, and do not anticipate, in a single generation the end of human things, or the history of a life in the moment of baptism or conversion. To us time and eternity have a fixed boundary, between them there is a gulph which we cannot pass; we do not mingle in our thoughts earth and heaven. Last of all, we are in a professing Christian world, in which religion, too, has become a sort of business; moreover, we see a long way off truths of which the first believers were eye-witnesses. Hence it has become difficult for us to conceive the simple force of such expressions as "dead with Christ," "if ye then be risen with Christ,"—which are repeated in prayers or sermons, but often convey no distinct impression to the minds of the hearers.

The neglect of these differences between ourselves and the first disciples has sometimes led to a distortion of doctrine and a perversion of life; where words had nothing to correspond to them, views of human nature have been invented to suit the supposed meaning of St. Paul. Thus, for example, the notion of legal righteousness is indeed a fiction as applied to our own times. Nor, in truth, is the pride of human nature, or the tendency to rebel against the will of God, or to attach an undue value to good works, better founded. Men are evil in all sorts of ways: they deceive themselves and others; they walk by the opinion of others, and not by faith; they give way to their passions; they are imperious and oppressive to one another. But if we look closely, we perceive that most of



their sins are not consciously against God; the pride of rank, or wealth, or power, or intellect, may be shown towards their brethren, but no man is proud towards God. No man does wrong for the sake of rebelling against God. The evil is not that men are bound under a curse by the ever-present consciousness of sin, but that sins pass unheeded by: not that they wantonly offend God, but that they know Him not. So, again, there may be a false sense of security towards God, as is sometimes observed on a death-bed, when mere physical weakness seems to incline the mind to patience and resignation; yet this more often manifests itself in a mistaken faith, than in a reliance on good works. Or, to take another instance, we are often surprised at the extent to which men who are not professors of religion seem to practise Christian virtues; yet their state, however we may regard it, has nothing in common with legal or self-righteousness.

And besides theories of religion at variance with experience, which have always a kind of unsoundness, the attempt of men to apply Scripture to their own lives in the letter rather than in the spirit, has been very injurious in other ways to the faith of Christ. Persons have confused the accidental circumstances or language of the Apostolic times with the universal language of morality and truth. They have reduced human nature to very great straits; they have staked salvation upon the right use of a word; they have enlisted the noblest feelings of mankind in opposition to their "Gospel." They have become mystics in the attempt to follow the Apostles, who were not mystics. Narrowness in their own way of life has led to exclusiveness in their judgments on other men. The undue stress which they have laid on particular precepts or texts of Scripture has closed their minds against its general purpose; the rigidity of their own rules has rendered it impossible that they should grow freely to "the stature of the perfect man." They have ended in a verbal Christianity, which has preserved words when the meaning of them had changed, taking the form, while it quenched the life, of the Gospel.

Leaving the peculiar and relative aspect of the Pauline doctrine, as well as the scholastic and traditional one, we have again to ask the meaning of justification by faith. We may divide the subject, first, as it may be considered in the abstract; and, secondly, as personal to ourselves.

I. Our justification may be regarded as an act on God's part. It may be said that this act is continuous, and commensurate with our whole lives; that although "known unto God are all His works from the beginning," yet that, speaking as men, and translating what we term the acts of God into human language, we are ever being more and more justified, as in theological writers we are said also to be more and more sanctified. At first sight it seems that to deny this involves an absurdity; it may be thought a contradiction to maintain that we are justified at once, but sanctified all our life long. Yet perhaps this latter mode of statement is better than the other, because it presents two aspects of the truth instead of one only; it is also a nearer expression of the inward consciousness of the soul itself. For must we not admit that it is the unchangeable will of God that all mankind should be saved? Justification in the mind of the believer is the perception of this fact, which always was. It is not made more a fact by our knowing it for many years or our whole life. And this is the witness of experience. For he who is justified by faith does not go about doubting in himself or his future destiny, but trusting in God. From the first moment that he turns earnestly to God he believes that he is saved; not from any confidence in himself, but from an overpowering sense of the love of God and Christ.

II. It is an old problem in philosophy, — What is the beginning of our moral being? What is that prior principle which makes good actions produce good habits? Which of those actions raises us above the world of sight? Plato would have answered, the contemplation of the idea of good. Some of ourselves would answer, by the substitution of a conception of moral growth for the mechanical theory of habits. Leaving out of sight our relation to God, we can

only say, that we are fearfully and wonderfully made, with powers which we are unable to analyse. It is a parallel difficulty in religion which is met by the doctrine of righteousness by faith. We grow up spiritually, we cannot tell how; not by outward acts, nor always by energetic effort, but stilly and silently, by the grace of God descending upon us, as the dew falls upon the earth. When a person is apprehensive and excited about his future state, straining every nerve lest he should fall short of the requirements of God, overpowered with the memory of his past sins, — that is not the temper of mind in which he can truly serve God, or work out his own salvation. Peace must go before as well as follow after; a peace, too, not to be found in the necessity of law (as philosophy has sometimes held), but in the sense of the love of God to his creatures. He has no right to this peace, and yet he has it; in the consciousness of his new state there is more than he can reasonably explain. At once and immediately the Gospel tells him that he is justified by faith, that his pardon is simultaneous with the moment of his belief, that he may go on his way rejoicing to fulfil the duties of life; for, in human language, God is no longer angry with him.

III. Thus far, in the consideration of righteousness by faith, we have obtained two points of view, in which, though regarded in the abstract only, the truth of which these words are the symbol has still a meaning; first, as expressing the unchangeableness of the mercy of God; and, secondly, the mysteriousness of human action. As we approach nearer, we are unavoidably led to regard the gift of righteousness rather in reference to the subject than to the object, in relation to man rather than God. What quality, feeling, temper, habit in ourselves answers to it? It may be more or less conscious to us, more of a state and less of a feeling, showing itself rather in our lives than our lips. But for these differences we can make allowance. It is the same faith still, under various conditions and circumstances, and sometimes taking different names.

IV. The expression "righteousness by faith" indicates the per-



sonal character of salvation ; it is not the tale of works that we do, but we ourselves who are accepted of God. Who can bear to think of his own actions as they are seen by the eye of the Almighty? Looking at their defective performance, or analysing them into the secondary motives out of which they have sprung, do we seem to have any ground on which we can stand ; is there anything which satisfies ourselves? Yet, knowing that our own works cannot abide the judgment of God, we know also that His love is not proportioned to them. He is a Person who deals with us as persons over whom He has an absolute right, who have nevertheless an endless value to Him. When he might exact all, he forgives all ; “the kingdom of heaven” is like not only to a Master taking account with his Servants, but to a Father going out to meet his returning Son. The symbol and mean of this personal relation of man to God is faith ; and the righteousness which consists not in what we do, but in what we are, is the righteousness of faith.

V. Faith may be spoken of in the language of the Epistle to the Hebrews, as the substance of things unseen. But what are the things unseen? Not only an invisible world ready to flash through the material at the appearance of Christ ; not angels, or powers of darkness, or even God Himself “sitting,” as the Old Testament described, “on the circle of the heavens ;” but the kingdom of truth and justice, the things that are within, of which God is the centre, and with which men everywhere by faith hold communion. Faith is the belief in the existence of this kingdom ; that is, in the truth and justice and mercy of God, who disposes all things—not, perhaps, in our judgment for the greatest happiness of His creatures, but absolutely in accordance with our moral notions. And that this is not seen to be the case here, makes it a matter of faith that it will be so in some way that we do not at present comprehend. He that believes on God believes, first, that He is ; and, secondly, that He is the Rewarder of them that seek Him.

VI. Now, if we go on to ask what gives this assurance of the truth and justice of God, the answer is, the life and death of Christ,

who is the Son of God, and the Revelation of God. We know what He Himself has told us of God, and we cannot conceive perfect goodness separate from perfect truth; nay, this goodness itself is the only conception we can form of God, if we confess what the mere immensity of the material world tends to suggest, that the Almighty is not a natural or even a supernatural power, but a Being of whom the reason and conscience of man have a truer conception than imagination in its highest flights. He is not in the storm, nor in the thunder, nor in the earthquake, but "in the still small voice." And this image of God as He reveals Himself in the heart of man is "Christ in us the hope of glory;" Christ as He once was upon earth in His sufferings rather than His miracles,—the image of goodness and truth and peace and love.

We are on the edge of a theological difficulty; for who can deny that the image of that goodness may fade from the mind's eye after so many centuries, or that there are those who recognise the idea and may be unable to admit the fact? Can we say that this error of the head is also a corruption of the will? The lives of such unbelievers in the facts of Christianity would sometimes refute our explanation. And yet it is true that Providence has made our spiritual life dependent on the belief in certain truths, and those truths run up into matters of fact, with the belief in which they have ever been associated; it is true, also, that the most important moral consequences flow from unbelief. We grant the difficulty: no complete answer can be given to it on this side the grave. Doubtless God has provided a way that the sceptic no less than the believer shall receive his due; He does not need our timid counsels for the protection of the truth. If among those who have rejected the facts of the Gospel history some have been rash, hypercritical, inflated with the pride of intellect, or secretly alienated by sensuality from the faith of Christ,—there have been others, also, upon whom we may conceive to rest a portion of that blessing which comes to such as "have not seen and yet have believed."

VII. In the Epistles of St. Paul, and yet more in the Epistle to

the Hebrews, the relation of Christ to mankind is expressed under figures of speech taken from the Mosaic dispensation: He is the Sacrifice for the sins of men, "the Lamb of God that taketh away the sins of the world;" the Antitype of all the types, the fulfilment in His own person of the Jewish law. Such words may give comfort to those who think of God under human imagery, but they seem to require explanation when we rise to the contemplation of Him as the God of truth, without parts or passions, who knows all things, and cannot be angry with any, or see them other than they truly are. What is indicated by them, to us "who are dead to the law," is, that God has manifested Himself in Christ as the God of mercy; who is more ready to hear than we to pray; who has forgiven us almost before we ask Him; who has given us His only Son, and how will He not with Him also give us all things? They intimate, on God's part, that He is not extreme to mark what is done amiss; in human language, "He is touched with the feeling of our infirmities:" on our part, that we say to God, "Not of ourselves, but of thy grace and mercy, O Lord." Not in the fulness of life and health, nor in the midst of business, nor in the schools of theology; but in the sick chamber, where are no more earthly interests, and in the hour of death, we have before us the living image of the truth of justification by faith, when man acknowledges, on the confines of another world, the unprofitableness of his own good deeds, and the goodness of God even in afflicting him, and his absolute reliance not on works of righteousness that he has done, but on the Divine mercy.

VIII. A true faith has been sometimes defined to be not a faith in the unseen merely, or in God or Christ, but a personal assurance of salvation. Such a feeling may be only the veil of sensualism; it may be also the noble confidence of St. Paul. "I am persuaded that neither death, nor life, nor angels, nor principalities, nor powers, nor things present, nor things to come, nor height, nor depth, nor any other creature, shall be able to separate us from the love of God which is in Christ Jesus our Lord." It may be an emotion, resting on no other ground except that we believe; or, a conviction deeply



rooted in our life and character. Scripture and reason alike seem to require this belief in our own salvation: and yet to assume that we are at the end of the race may make us lag in our course. Whatever danger there is in the doctrine of the Divine decrees, the danger is nearer home, and more liable to influence practice, when our faith takes the form of personal assurance. How, then, are we to escape from the dilemma, and have a rational confidence in the mercy of God?

IX. This confidence must rest, first, on a sense of the truth and justice of God, rising above perplexities of fact in the world around us, or the tangle of metaphysical or theological difficulties. But although such a sense of the truth or justice of God is the beginning of our peace, yet a link of connexion is wanting before we can venture to apply to ourselves that which we acknowledge in the abstract. The justice of God may lead to our condemnation as well as to our justification. Are we then, in the language of the ancient tragedy, to say that no one can be counted happy before he dies, or that salvation is only granted when the end of our course is seen? Not so; the Gospel encourages us to regard ourselves, as already saved; for we have communion with Christ and appropriate His work by faith. And this appropriation means nothing short of the renunciation of self and the taking up of the cross of Christ in daily life. Whether such an imitation or appropriation of Christ is illusive or real, — a new mould of nature or only an outward and superficial impression, is a question not to be answered by any further theological distinction but by an honest and good heart searching into itself. Then only, when we surrender ourselves into the hands of God, when we ask Him to show us to ourselves as we truly are, when we allow ourselves in no sin, when we attribute nothing to our own merits, when we test our faith, not by the sincerity of an hour, but of months and years, we learn the true meaning of that word in which, better than any other, the nature of righteousness by faith is summed up, — peace.

“And now abideth faith, hope, and love, these three; but the

greatest of these is love." There seems to be a contradiction in love being the "greatest," when faith is the medium of acceptance. Love, according to some, is preferred to faith, because it reaches to another life; when faith and hope are swallowed up in sight, love remains still. Love, according to others, has the first place, because it is Divine as well as human; it is the love of God to man, as well as of man to God. Perhaps, the order of precedence is sufficiently explained by the occasion; to a Church torn by divisions the Apostle says, "that the first of Christian graces is love." Another thought, however, is suggested by these words, which has a bearing on our present subject. It is this, that in using the received terms of theology, we must also acknowledge their relative and transient character. Christian truth has many modes of statement; love is the more natural expression to St. John, faith to St. Paul. The indwelling of Christ or of the Spirit of God, grace, faith, hope, love, are not parts of a system, but powers or aspects of the Christian life. Human minds are different, and the same mind is not the same at different times; and the best of men nowadays have but a feeble consciousness of spiritual truths. We ought not to dim that consciousness by insisting on a single formula; and therefore while speaking of faith as the instrument of justification, because faith indicates the apprehensive, dependent character of the believer's relation to Christ, we are bound also to deny that the Gospel is contained in any word, or the Christian life inseparably linked to any one quality. We must acknowledge the imperfection of language and thought, and seek rather to describe than to define the work of God in the soul, which has as many forms as the tempers, capacities, circumstances, and accidents of our nature.

## ON ATONEMENT AND SATISFACTION.

“Sacrifice and offering thou wouldest not . . . then said I, Lo, I come to do thy will, O God.”—*Ps.* xc. 6—8.

THE doctrine of the Atonement has often been explained in a way at which our moral feelings revolt. God is represented as angry with us for what we never did; He is ready to inflict a disproportionate punishment on us for what we are; He is satisfied by the sufferings of His Son in our stead. The sin of Adam is first imputed to us; then the righteousness of Christ. The imperfection of human law is transferred to the Divine; or rather a figment of law which has no real existence. The death of Christ is also explained by the analogy of the ancient rite of sacrifice. He is a victim laid upon the altar to appease the wrath of God. The institutions and ceremonies of the Mosaical religion are applied to Him. He is further said to bear the infinite punishment of infinite sin. When He had suffered or paid the penalty, God is described as granting him the salvation of mankind in return.

I shall endeavour to show, 1. that these conceptions of the work of Christ have no foundation in Scripture; 2. that their growth may be traced in ecclesiastical history; 3. that the only sacrifice, atonement, or satisfaction, with which the Christian has to do, is a moral and spiritual one; not the pouring out of blood upon the earth, but the living sacrifice “to do thy will, O God;” in which the believer has part as well as his Lord; about the meaning of which there can be no more question in our day than there was in the first ages.



## § 1.

It is difficult to concentrate the authority of Scripture on points of controversy. For Scripture is not doctrine but teaching; it arises naturally out of the circumstances of the writers; it is not intended to meet the intellectual refinements of modern times. The words of our Saviour, "My kingdom is not of this world," admit of a wide application, to systems of knowledge, as well as to systems of government and politics. The "bread of life" is not an elaborate theology. The revelation which Scripture makes to us of the will of God, does not turn upon the exact use of language. ("Lo, O man, he hath showed thee what he required of thee; to do justly and to love mercy, and to walk humbly with thy God.") The books of Scripture were written by different authors, and in different ages of the world; we cannot, therefore, apply them with the minuteness and precision of a legal treatise. The Old Testament is not on all points the same with the New; for "Moses allowed of some things for the hardness of their hearts;" nor the Law with the Prophets, for there were "proverbs in the house of Israel" that were reversed; nor does the Gospel, which is simple and universal, in all respects agree with the Epistles which have reference to the particular state of the first converts; nor is the teaching of St. James, who admits works as a coefficient with faith in the justification of man, absolutely identical with that of St. Paul, who asserts righteousness by faith only; nor is the character of all the Epistles of St. Paul, written as they were at different times amid the changing scenes of life, precisely the same; nor does he himself claim an equal authority for all his precepts. No theory of inspiration can obliterate these differences; or rather none can be true which does not admit them. The neglect of them reduces the books of Scripture to an unmeaning unity, and effectually seals up their true sense. But if we acknowledge this natural diversity of form, this perfect humanity of Scripture, we must, at any rate in some general way, adjust the relation of the different

parts to one another before we apply its words to the establishment of any doctrine.

Nor again is the citation of a single text sufficient to prove a doctrine; nor must consequences be added on, which are not found in Scripture, nor figures of speech reasoned about, as though they conveyed exact notions. An accidental similarity of expression is not to be admitted as an authority; nor a mystical allusion, which has been gathered from Scripture, according to some method which in other writings the laws of language and logic would not justify. When engaged in controversy with Roman Catholics, about the doctrine of purgatory, or transubstantiation, or the authority of the successors of St. Peter, we are willing to admit these principles. They are equally true when the subject of inquiry is the atoning work of Christ. We must also distinguish the application of a passage in religious discourse from its original meaning. The more obvious explanation which is received in our own day, or by our own branch of the Church, will sometimes have to be set aside for one more difficult, because less familiar, which is drawn from the context. Nor is it allowable to bar an interpretation of Scripture from a regard to doctrinal consequences. Further, it is necessary that we should make allowance for the manner in which ideas were represented in the ages at which the books of Scripture were written which cannot be so lively to us as to contemporaries. Nor can we deny that texts may be quoted on both sides of a controversy, as for example, in the controversy respecting predestination. For in religious, as in other differences, there is often truth on both sides.

The drift of the preceding remarks is not to show that there is any ambiguity or uncertainty in the witness of Scripture to the great truths of morality and religion. Nay, rather the universal voice of the Old Testament and the New proclaims that there is one God of infinite justice, goodness, and truth: and the writers of the New Testament agree in declaring that Jesus Christ, the Son of God, is the Saviour of the world. There can never, by any possibility, be a doubt that our Lord and St. Paul taught the doctrine

of a future life, and of a judgment, at which men would give an account of the deeds done in the body. It is no matter for regret that the essentials of the Gospel are within the reach of a child's understanding. But this clearness of Scripture about the great truths of religion does not extend to the distinctions and developments of theological systems; it rather seems to contrast with them. It is one thing to say that "Christ is the Saviour of the world," or that "we are reconciled to God through Christ," and another thing to affirm that the Levitical or heathen sacrifices typified the death of Christ; or that the death of Christ has a sacrificial import, and is an atonement or satisfaction for the sins of men. The latter positions involve great moral and intellectual difficulties; many things have to be considered, before we can allow that the phrasology of Scripture is to be caught up and applied in this way. For we may easily dress up in the externals of the New Testament a doctrine which is really at variance with the Spirit of Christ and his Apostles, and we may impart to this doctrine, by the help of living tradition, that is to say, custom and religious use, a sacredness yet greater than is derived from such a fallacious application of Scripture language. It happens almost unavoidably (and our only chance of guarding against the illusion is to be aware of it) that we are more under the influence of rhetoric in theology than in other branches of knowledge; our minds are so constituted that what we often hear we are ready to believe, especially when it falls in with previous convictions or wants. But he who desires to know whether the statements above referred to have any real objective foundation in the New Testament, will carefully weigh the following considerations:— Whether there is any reason for interpreting the New Testament by the analogy of the Old? Whether the sacrificial expressions which occur in the New Testament, and on which the question chiefly turns, are to be interpreted spiritually or literally? Whether the use of such expressions may not be a figurative mode of the time, which did not necessarily recall the thing signified any more than the popular use of the term "Sacrifice" among ourselves? He will



consider further whether this language is employed vaguely, or definitely? Whether it is the chief manner of expressing the work of Christ, or one among many? Whether it is found to occur equally in every part of the New Testament; for example, in the Gospels, as well as in the Epistles? Whether the more frequent occurrence of it in particular books, as for instance, in the Epistle to the Hebrews, may not be explained by the peculiar object or circumstances of the writer? Whether other figures of speech, such as death, life, resurrection with Christ, are not equally frequent, which have never yet been made the foundation of any doctrine? Lastly, whether this language of sacrifice is not applied to the believer as well as to his Lord, and whether the believer is not spoken of as sharing the sufferings of his Lord?

I. All Christians agree that there is a connexion between the Old Testament and the New: "*Novum Testamentum in vetere latet; Vetus Testamentum in novo patet:*" "I am not come to destroy the law and the prophets, but to fulfil." But, respecting the nature of the revelation or fulfilment which is implied in these expressions, they are not equally agreed. Some conceive the Old and New Testaments to be "double one against the other;" the one being the type, and the other the antitype, the ceremonies of the Law, and the symbols and imagery of the Prophets, supplying to them the forms of thought and religious ideas of the Gospel. Even the history of the Jewish people has been sometimes thought to be an anticipation or parallel of the history of the Christian world; many accidental circumstances in the narrative of Scripture being likewise taken as an example of the Christian life. The relation between the Old and New Testaments has been regarded by others from a different point of view, as a continuous one, which may be described under some image of growth or development; the facts and ideas of the one leading on to the facts and ideas of the other; and the two together forming one record of "the increasing purpose which through the ages ran." This continuity, however, is broken at one point, and the parts separate and reunite like ancient and

modern civilisation, though the connexion is nearer, and of another kind; the Messiah, in whom the hopes of the Jewish people centre, being the first-born of a new creation, the Son of Man and the Son of God. It is necessary, moreover, to distinguish the connexion of fact from that of language and idea; because the Old Testament is not only the preparation for the New, but also the figure and expression of it. Those who hold the first of these two views, viz. the reduplication of the Old Testament in the New, rest their opinion chiefly on two grounds. First, it seems incredible to them, and repugnant to their conception of a Divine revelation, that the great apparatus of rites and ceremonies, with which, even at this distance of time, they are intimately acquainted, should have no inner and symbolical meaning; that the Jewish nation for many ages should have carried with it a load of forms only; that the words of Moses which they "still hear read in the synagogue every Sabbath Day," and which they often read in their own households, should relate only to matters of outward observance; just as they are unwilling to believe that the prophecies, which they also read, have no reference to the historical events of modern times. And, secondly, they are swayed by the authority of the Epistle to the Hebrews, the writer of which has made the Old Testament the allegory of the New.

It will be considered hereafter what is to be said in answer to the last of these arguments. The first is perhaps sufficiently answered, by the analogy of other ancient religions. It would be ridiculous to assume a spiritual meaning in the Homeric rites and sacrifices; although they may be different in other respects, have we any more reason for inferring such a meaning in the Mosaic? Admitting the application which is made of a few of them by the author of the Epistle to the Hebrews to be their original intention, the great mass would still remain unexplained, and yet they are all alike contained in the same Revelation. It may seem natural to us to suppose that God taught his people like children by the help of outward objects. But no *a priori* supposition of this kind, no fancy, however natural, of a symmetry or coincidence which may be traced between the Old

Testament and the New, nor the frequent repetition of such a theory in many forms, is an answer to the fact. That fact is the silence of the Old Testament itself. If the sacrifices of the Mosaical religion were really symbolical of the death of Christ, how can it be accounted for that no trace of this symbolism appears in the books of Moses themselves? that prophets and righteous men of old never gave this interpretation to them? that the lawgiver is intent only on the sign, and says nothing of the thing signified? No other book is ever supposed to teach truths about which it is wholly silent. We do not imagine the *Iliad* and *Odyssey* to be a revelation of the Platonic or Socratic philosophy. The circumstance that these poems received this or some other allegorical explanation from a school of Alexandrian critics, does not incline us to believe that such an explanation is a part of their original meaning. The human mind does not work in this occult manner; language was not really given men to conceal their thoughts; plain precepts or statements do not contain hidden mysteries.

It may be said that the Levitical rites and offerings had a meaning, not for the Jews, but for us, "on whom the ends of the world are come." Moses, David, Isaiah, were unacquainted with this meaning; it was reserved for those who lived after the event to which they referred had taken place to discover it. Such an afterthought may be natural to us, who are ever tracing a literary or mystical connexion between the Old Testament and the New; it would have been very strange to us, had we lived in the ages before the coming of Christ. It is incredible that God should have instituted rites and ceremonies, which were to be observed as forms by a whole people throughout their history, to teach mankind fifteen hundred years afterwards, uncertainly and in a figure, a lesson which Christ taught plainly and without a figure. Such an assumption confuses the application of Scripture with its original meaning; the use of language in the New Testament with the facts of the Old. Further, it does away with all certainty in the interpretation of Scripture. If we can introduce the New Testament into the Old, we may with equal right introduce Tradition or Church History into the New.



The question here raised has a very important bearing on the use of the figures of atonement and sacrifice in the New Testament. For if it could be shown that the sacrifices which were offered up in the Levitical worship were anticipatory only; that the law too declared itself to be "a shadow of good things to come;" that Moses had himself spoken "of the reproach of Christ;" in that case the slightest allusion in the New Testament to the customs or words of the law would have a peculiar interest. We should be justified in referring to them as explanatory of the work of Christ, in studying the Levitical distinctions respecting offerings with a more than antiquarian interest, in "disputing about purifying" and modes of expiation. But if not; if, in short, we are only reflecting the present on the past, or perhaps confusing both together, and interpreting Christianity by Judaism, and Judaism by Christianity; then the sacrificial language of the New Testament loses its depth and significance, or rather acquires a higher, that is, a spiritual one.

II. Of such an explanation, if it had really existed when the Mosaic religion was still a national form of worship, traces would occur in the writings of the Psalmists and the Prophets; for these furnish a connecting link between the Old Testament and the New. But this is not the case; the Prophets are, for the most part, unconscious of the law, or silent respecting its obligations.

In many places, their independence of the Mosaical religion passes into a kind of opposition to it. The inward and spiritual truth asserts itself, not as an explanation of the ceremonial observance, but in defiance of it. The "undergrowth of morality" is putting forth shoots in spite of the deadness of the ceremonial hull. Isaiah i. 13.: "Bring no more vain oblations; incense is an abomination unto me; the new moons and sabbaths, the calling of assemblies, I cannot away with; it is iniquity, even the solemn meeting." Micah. vi. 6.: "Wherewith shall I come before the Lord, or bow myself before the high God? shall I come before him with burnt offerings, with calves of a year old? Will the Lord be pleased with thousands of rams, or with ten thousands of rivers of oil." Psalm l. 10.: "All the beasts

of the forests are mine, and so are the cattle upon a thousand hills : If I were hungry I would not tell thee." We cannot doubt that in passages like these we are bursting the bonds of the Levitical or ceremonial dispensation.

The spirit of prophecy, speaking by Isaiah, does not say "I will have mercy as well as sacrifice," but "I will have mercy and not (or rather than) sacrifice." In the words of the Psalmist, "Sacrifice and offering thou wouldest not; then said I, Lo, I come to do thy will, O God;" "The sacrifices of God are a broken spirit:" or again, "A bruised reed shall he not break, and smoking flax shall he not quench; he shall bring forth judgment unto truth:" or again, according to the image both of Isaiah and Jeremiah (Is. liii. 7.; Jer. xi. 19.), which seems to have passed before the vision of John the Baptist (John i. 36.), "He is brought as a lamb to the slaughter, and as a sheep before her shearers is dumb." These are the points at which the Old and New Testaments most nearly touch, the (*τύποι*) types or ensamples of the one which we find in the other, the pre-notions or preparations with which we pass from Moses and the Prophets to the Gospel of Christ.

III. It is hard to imagine that there can be any truer expression of the Gospel than the words of Christ himself, or that any truth omitted by Him is essential to the Gospel. "The disciple is not above his master, nor the servant greater than his Lord." The philosophy of Plato was not better understood by his followers than by himself, nor can we allow that the Gospel is to be interpreted by the Epistles, or that the Sermon on the Mount is only half Christian and needs the fuller inspiration or revelation of St. Paul, or the author of the Epistle to the Hebrews. There is no trace in the words of our Saviour of any omission or imperfection; there is no indication in the Epistles of any intention to complete or perfect them. How strange would it have seemed in the Apostle St. Paul, who thought himself unworthy "to be called an Apostle because he persecuted the Church of God," to find that his own words were preferred in after ages to those of Christ himself!

There is no study of theology which is likely to exercise a more elevating influence on the individual, or a more healing one on divisions of opinion, than the study of the words of Christ himself. The heart is its own witness to them; all Christian sects acknowledge them; they seem to escape or rise above the region or atmosphere of controversy. The form in which they exhibit the Gospel to us is the simplest and also the deepest; they are more free from details than any other part of Scripture, and they are absolutely independent of personal and national influences. In them is contained the expression of the inner life, of mankind, and of the Church; there, too, the individual beholds, as in a glass, the image of a goodness which is not of this world. To rank their authority below that of Apostles and Evangelists is to give up the best hope of reuniting Christendom in itself, and of making Christianity a universal religion.

And Christ himself hardly even in a figure uses the word "sacrifice;" never with the least reference to His own life or death. There are many ways in which our Lord describes His relation to His Father and to mankind. His disciples are to be one with Him, even as He is one with the Father; whatsoever things He seeth the Father do He doeth. He says, "I am the resurrection and the life;" or, "I am the way, the truth, and the life;" and, "No man cometh unto the Father but by me;" and again, "Whatsoever things ye shall ask in my name shall be given you;" and once again, "I will pray the Father, and he shall give you another comforter." Most of His words are simple, like "a man talking to his friends;" and their impressiveness and beauty partly flow from this simplicity. He speaks of His 'decease too which he should accomplish at Jerusalem,' but not in sacrificial language. "And now I go my way to him that sent me;" and, "Greater love hath no man than this, that a man lay down his life for his friends." Once indeed He says, "The bread that I give is my flesh, which I give for the salvation of the world;" to which He himself adds, "The words that I speak unto you they are spirit and they are truth," a commentary which should be applied not only to these



but to all other figurative expressions which occur in the New Testament. In the words of institution of the Lord's supper, He also speaks of His death as in some way connected with the remission of sins. But among all the figures of speech under which He describes His work in the world, the vine, the good shepherd, the door, the light of the world, the bread of life, the water of life, the corner stone, the temple, none contains any sacrificial allusion.

The parables of Christ have a natural and ethical character. They are only esoteric in as far as the hardness or worldliness of men's hearts prevents their understanding or receiving them. There is a danger of our making them mean too much rather than too little, that is, of winning a false interest for them by applying them mystically or taking them as a thesis for dialectical or rhetorical exercise. For example, if we say that the guest who came to the marriage supper without a wedding-garment represents a person clothed in his own righteousness instead of the righteousness of Christ, that is an explanation of which there is not a trace in the words of the parable itself. That is an illustration of the manner in which we are not to gather doctrines from Scripture. For there is nothing which we may not in this way superinduce on the plainest lessons of our Saviour.

Reading the parables, then, simply and naturally, we find in them no indication of the doctrine of atonement or satisfaction. They form a very large portion of the sayings which have been recorded of our Saviour while He was on earth; and they teach a great number of separate lessons. But there is no hint contained in them of that view of the death of Christ which is sometimes regarded as the centre of the Gospel. There is no "difficulty in the nature of things" which prevents the father going out to meet the prodigal son. No other condition is required of the justification of the publican except the true sense of his own unworthiness. The work of those labourers who toiled for one hour only in the vineyard is not supplemented by the merits and deserts of another. The reward for the cup of cold water is not denied to those who

are unaware that he to whom it is given is the Lord. The parables of the Good Samaritan, of the Fig-tree, of the Talents, do not recognise the distinction of faith and works. Other sayings and doings of our Lord while He was on earth imply the same unconsciousness or neglect of the refinements of later ages. The power of the Son of Man to forgive sins is not dependent on the satisfaction which He is to offer for them. The Sermon on the Mount, which is the extension of the law to thought as well as action, and the two great commandments in which the law is summed up, are equally the expression of the Gospel. The mind of Christ is in its own place, far away from the oppositions of modern theology. Like that of the prophets, His relation to the law of Moses is one of neutrality; He has another lesson to teach which comes immediately from God. "The Scribes and Pharisees sit in Moses's seat —" or, "Moses, because of the hardness of your hearts, —" or, "Which of you hath an ox or an ass, —" or, "Ye fools, did not he that made that which is without make that which is within." He does not say, "Behold in me the true Sacrifice;" or, "I that speak unto you am the victim and priest." He has nothing to do with legal and ceremonial observances. There is a sort of natural irony with which He regards the world around him. It was as though He would not have touched the least of the Levitical commandments; and yet "not one stone was to be left upon another" as the indirect effect of His teaching. So that it would be equally true: "I am not come to destroy the law but to fulfil;" and "Destroy this temple and in three days I will raise it up again." "My kingdom is not of this world," yet it shall subdue the kingdoms of this world; and, the Prince of Peace will not "bring peace on earth, but a sword."

There is a mystery in the life and death of Christ; that is to say, there is more than we know or are perhaps capable of knowing. The relation in which He stood both to His Father and to mankind is imperfectly revealed to us; we do not fully understand what may be termed in a figure His inner mind or consciousness. Expressions occur which are like flashes of this inner self, and seem

to come from another world. There are also mixed modes which blend earth and heaven. There are circumstances in our Lord's life, too, of a similar nature, such as the transfiguration, or the agony in the garden, of which the Scripture records only the outward fact. Least of all do we pretend to fathom the import of His death. He died for us, in the language of the Gospels, in the same sense that He lived for us; He "bore our sins" in the same sense that "He bore our diseases." (Matt. viii. 17.) He died by the hands of sinners as a malefactor, the innocent for the guilty, Jesus instead of Barabbas, because it was necessary "that one man should die for that nation, and not for that nation only;" as a righteous man laying down his life for his friends, as a hero to save his country, as a martyr to bear witness to the truth. He died as the Son of God, free to lay down His life; confident that He would have power to take it again. More than this is meant; and more than human speech can tell. But we do not fill up the void of our knowledge by drawing out figures of speech into consequences at variance with the attributes of God. No external mode of describing or picturing the work of Christ realises its inward nature. Neither will the reproduction of our own feelings in a doctrinal form supply any objective support or ground of the Christian faith.

IV. Two of the General Epistles and two of the Epistles of St. Paul have no bearing on our present subject. These are the Epistles of St. James and St. Jude, and the two Epistles to the Thessalonians. Their silence, like that of the Gospels, is at least a negative proof that the doctrine of Sacrifice or Satisfaction is not a central truth of Christianity. The remainder of the New Testament will be sufficiently considered under two heads: 1st, the remaining Epistles of St. Paul; and, 2ndly, the Epistle to the Hebrews. The difficulties which arise respecting these are the same as the difficulties which apply in a less degree to one or two passages in the Epistles of St. Peter and St. John, and in the book of Revelation.

It is not to be denied that the language of Sacrifice and Sub-



stitution occurs in the Epistles of St. Paul. Instances of the former are furnished by Rom. iii. 23, 25., 1 Cor. v. 7.; of the latter by Gal. ii. 20., iii. 13.

Romans iii. 23—25.: “For all have sinned and come short of the glory of God; being justified freely by His grace through the redemption that is in Christ Jesus; whom God hath set forth to be a propitiation through faith by His blood, to declare His righteousness.”

1 Cor. v. 7.: “Christ our passover is sacrificed [for us]; therefore let us keep the feast, not with old leaven, neither with the leaven of malice and wickedness; but with the unleavened bread of sincerity and truth.”

These two passages are a fair example of a few others. About the translation and explanation of the first of them interpreters differ. But the differences are not such as to affect our present question. For that question is a general one, viz. whether these, and similar sacrificial expressions, are passing figures of speech, or appointed signs or symbols of the death of Christ. On which it may be observed:—

First: That these expressions are not the peculiar or characteristic modes in which the Apostle describes the relation of the believer to his Lord. For one instance of the use of sacrificial language, five or six might be cited of the language of identity or communion, in which the believer is described as one with his Lord in all the stages of His life and death. But this language is really inconsistent with the other. For if Christ is one with the believer, He cannot be regarded strictly as a victim who takes his place. And the stage of Christ's being which coincides, and is specially connected by the Apostle, with the justification of man, is not His death, but His resurrection. Rom. iv. 25.

Secondly: These sacrificial expressions, as also the vicarious ones of which we shall hereafter speak, belong to the religious language of the age. They are found in Philo; and the Old Testament itself had already given them a spiritual or figurative application. There

is no more reason to suppose that the word "sacrifice" suggested the actual rite in the Apostolic age than in our own. It was a solemn religious idea, not a fact. The Apostles at Jerusalem saw the smoke of the daily sacrifice; the Apostle St. Paul beheld victims blazing on many altars in heathen cities (he regarded them as the tables of devils). But there is no reason to suppose that they led him to think of Christ, or that the bleeding form on the altar suggested the sufferings of his Lord.

Therefore, thirdly, We shall only be led into error by attempting to explain the application of the word to Christ from the original meaning of the thing. That is a question of Jewish or classical archæology, which would receive a different answer in different ages and countries. Many motives or instincts may be traced in the worship of the first children of men. The need of giving or getting rid of something; the desire to fulfil an obligation or expiate a crime; the consecration of a part that the rest may be holy; the Homeric feast of gods and men, of the living with the dead; the mystery of animal nature, of which the blood was the symbol; the substitution, in a few instances, of the less for the greater; in later ages, custom adhering to the old rituals when the meaning of them has passed away;—these seem to be true explanations of the ancient sacrifices. (Human sacrifices, such as those of the old Mexican peoples, or the traditional ones in pre-historic Greece, may be left out of consideration, as they appear to spring from some monstrous and cruel perversion of human nature.) But these explanations have nothing to do with our present subject. We may throw an imaginary light back upon them (for it is always easier to represent former ages like our own than to realise them as they truly were); they will not assist us in comprehending the import of the death of Christ, or the nature of the Christian religion. They are in the highest degree opposed to it, at the other end of the scale of human development, as "the weak and beggarly elements" of sense and fear to the spirit whereby we cry Abba Father; almost, may we not say, as the instinct of animals to the reasoning faculties of man. For

sacrifice is not, like prayer, one of the highest, but one of the lowest acts of religious worship. It is the antiquity, not the religious import of the rite, which first gave it a sacredness. In modern times, the associations which are conveyed by the word are as far from the original idea as those of the cross itself. The death of Christ is not a sacrifice in the ancient sense (any more than the cross is to Christians the symbol of infamy); but what we mean by the word "sacrifice" is the death of Christ.

Fourthly: This sacrificial language is not used with any definiteness or precision. The figure varies in different passages; Christ is the Paschal Lamb, or the Lamb without spot, as well as the sin-offering; the priest as well as the sacrifice. It is applied not only to Christ, but to the believer who is to present his body a living sacrifice; and the offering of which St. Paul speaks in one passage is "the offering up of the Gentiles." Again, this language is everywhere broken by moral and spiritual applications into which it dissolves and melts away. When we read of "sacrifice," or "purification," or "redemption," these words isolated may for an instant carry our thoughts back to the Levitical ritual. But when we restore them to their context,—a sacrifice which is a "spiritual sacrifice," or a "spiritual and mental service," a purification which is a "purging from dead works to serve the living God," a redemption "by the blood of Christ from your vain conversation received by tradition from your fathers,"—we see that the association offers no real help; it is no paradox to say that we should rather forget than remember it. All this tends to show that these figures of speech are not the eternal symbols of the Christian faith, but shadows only which lightly come and go, and ought not to be fixed by definitions, or made the foundation of doctrinal systems.

Fifthly: Nor is any such use of them made by any of the writers of the New Testament. It is true that St. Paul occasionally, and the author of the Epistle to the Hebrews much more frequently, use sacrificial language. But they do not pursue the figure into details or consequences; they do not draw it out in logical form. Still



less do they inquire, as modern theologians have done, into the objective or transcendental relation in which the sacrifice of Christ stood to the will of the Father. St. Paul says, "We thus judge that if One died, then all died, and He died for all, that they which live shall not henceforth live to themselves, but unto Him which died for them and rose again." But words like these are far indeed from expressing a doctrine of atonement or satisfaction.

Lastly: The extent to which the Apostle employs figurative language in general, may be taken as a measure of the force of the figure in particular, expressions. Now there is no mode of speaking of spiritual things more natural to him than the image of death. Of the meaning of this word, in all languages, it may be said that there can be no doubt. Yet no one supposes that the sense which the Apostle gives to it is other than a spiritual one. The reason is, that the word has never been made the foundation of any doctrine. But the circumstance that the term "sacrifice" has passed into the language of theology, does not really circumscribe or define it. It is a figure of speech still, which is no more to be interpreted by the Mosaic sacrifices than spiritual death by physical. Let us consider again other expressions of St. Paul: "I bear in my body the marks of the Lord Jesus." "Who hath taken the handwriting of ordinances that was against us, and nailed it to His cross." "Filling up that which is behind of the afflictions of Christ in my flesh, for His body's sake, which is the Church." The occurrence of these and many similar expressions is a sufficient indication that the writer in whom they occur is not to be interpreted in a dry or literal manner.

Another class of expressions, which may be termed the language of substitution or vicarious suffering, are also occasionally found in St. Paul. Two examples of them, both of which occur in the Epistle to the Galatians, will indicate their general character.

Gal. ii. 20. : "I am crucified with Christ, nevertheless I live; yet not I, but Christ liveth in me, and the life which I now live in the flesh I live by the faith of the Son of God, who loved me and

gave himself for me." iii. 13.: "Christ hath redeemed us from the curse of the law, being made a curse for us.

This use of language seems to originate in what was termed before the language of identity. First, "I am crucified with Christ," and secondly, "Not I, but Christ liveth in me." The believer, according to St. Paul, follows Christ until he becomes like Him. And this likeness is so complete and entire, that all that he was or might have been is attributed to Christ, and all that Christ is is attributed to him. With such life and fervour does St. Paul paint the intimacy of the union between the believer and Christ: They two are "One Spirit." To build on such expressions a doctrinal system is the error of "rhetoric turned logic." The truth of feeling which is experienced by a few is not to be handed over to the head as a form of doctrine for the many.

The same remark applies to another class of passages, in which Christ is described as dying "for us," or "for our sins." Upon which it may be further observed, first, that in these passages the preposition used is not *ἀντί* but *ὑπέρ*; and, secondly, that Christ is spoken of as living and rising again, as well as dying, for us; whence we infer that He died for us in the same sense that He lived for us. Of what is meant, perhaps the nearest conception we can form is furnished by the example of a good man taking upon himself, or, as we say, identifying himself with, the troubles and sorrows of others. Christ himself has sanctioned the comparison of a love which lays down life for a friend. Let us think of one as sensitive to moral evil as the gentlest of mankind to physical suffering; of one whose love identified him with the whole human race as strongly as the souls of men are ever knit together by individual affections.

Many of the preceding observations apply equally to the Epistle to the Hebrews and to the Epistles of St. Paul. But the Epistle to the Hebrews has features peculiar to itself. It is a more complete transfiguration of the law, which St. Paul, on the other hand, applies by way of illustration, and in fragments only. It has the interest of an allegory, and, in some respects, admits of a comparison with

the book of Revelation. It is full of sacrificial allusions, derived, however, not from the actual rite, but from the description of it in the books of Moses. Probably at Jerusalem, or the vicinity of the actual temple, it would not have been written.

From this source chiefly, and not from the Epistles of St. Paul, the language of sacrifice has passed into the theology and sermons of modern times. The Epistle to the Hebrews affords a greater apparent foundation for the popular or Calvinistical doctrines of atonement and satisfaction, but not perhaps a greater real one. For it is not the mere use of the terms "sacrifice" or "blood," but the sense in which they were used, that must be considered. It is a fallacy, though a natural one, to confuse the image with the thing signified, like mistaking the colour of a substance for its true nature.

Long passages might be quoted from the Epistle to the Hebrews, which describe the work of Christ in sacrificial language. Some of the most striking verses are the following:—ix. 11—14.: "Christ being come an High Priest of good things to come, by a greater and more perfect tabernacle, not made with hands, that is to say, not of this building; neither by the blood of goats and calves, but by his own blood he entered in once into the holy place, having obtained eternal redemption for us. For if the blood of bulls and of goats, and the ashes of an heifer sprinkling the unclean, sanctifieth to the purifying of the flesh; how much more shall the blood of Christ, who through the eternal Spirit offered Himself without spot to God, purge your conscience from dead works to serve the living God." x. 12.: "This man, after he had offered one sacrifice for sins, for ever sat down on the right hand of God."

That these and similar passages have only a deceitful resemblance to the language of those theologians who regard the propitiatory sacrifice of Christ as the central truth of the Gospel, is manifest from the following considerations:—

1. The great number and variety of the figures. Christ is Joshua, who gives the people rest, iv. 8.; Melchisedec, to whom Abraham paid tithes, v. 6., vii. 6.; the high priest going into the most holy place



after he had offered sacrifice, which sacrifice He himself is, passing through the veil, which is His flesh.

2. The inconsistency of the figures: an inconsistency partly arising from their ceasing to be figures and passing into moral notions, as in ch. ix. 14.: "the blood of Christ, who offered Himself without spot to God, shall purge your conscience from dead works;" partly from the confusion of two or more figures, as in the verse following: "And for this cause He is the mediator of the New Testament," where the idea of sacrifice forms a transition to that of death and a testament, and the idea of a testament blends with that of a covenant.

3. The author of the Epistle to the Hebrews dwells on the outward circumstance of the shedding of the blood of Christ. St. Paul in the Epistle to the Galatians makes another application of the Old Testament, describing our Lord as enduring the curse which befell "One who hanged on a tree." Imagine for an instant that this latter had been literally the mode of our Lord's death. The figure of the Epistle to the Hebrews would cease to have any meaning; yet no one supposes that there would have been any essential difference in the work of Christ.

4. The atoning sacrifice of which modern theology speaks, is said to be the great object of faith. The author of the Epistle to the Hebrews also speaks of faith, but no such expression as faith in the blood, or sacrifice, or death of Christ is made use of by him, or is found anywhere else in Scripture. The faith of the patriarchs is not faith in the peculiar sense of the term, but the faith of those who confess that they are "strangers and pilgrims," and "endure seeing him that is invisible."

Lastly: The Jewish Alexandrian character of the Epistle must be admitted as an element of the inquiry. It interprets the Old Testament after a manner then current in the world, which we must either continue to apply or admit that it was relative to that age and country. It makes statements which we can only accept in a figure, as, for example, in ch. xi., "that Moses esteemed the reproach

of Christ greater riches than the treasures of Egypt." It uses language in double senses, as, for instance, the two meanings of *διαθήκη* and of *ἡ πρώτη* in ch. viii. 13., ix. 1.; and the connexion which it establishes between the Old Testament and the New, is a verbal or mystical one, not a connexion between the temple and offerings at Jerusalem and the offering up of Christ, but between the ancient ritual and the tabernacle described in the book of the law.

Such were the instruments which the author of this great Epistle (whoever he may have been) employed, after the manner of his age and country, to impart the truths of the Gospel in a figure to those who esteemed this sort of figurative knowledge as a kind of perfection, Heb. vi. 1. "Ideas must be given through something;" nor could mankind in those days, any more than our own, receive the truth except in modes of thought that were natural to them. The author of the Epistle to the Hebrews is writing to those who lived and moved in the atmosphere, as it may be termed, of Alexandrian Judaism. Therefore he uses the figures of the law, but he also guards against their literal acceptance. Christ is a priest, but a priest for ever after the order of Melchisedec; He is a sacrifice, but He is also the end of sacrifices, and the sacrifice which He offers is the negation of sacrifices, "to do Thy will, O God." Everywhere he has a "how much more," "how much greater," for the new dispensation in comparison with the old. He raises the Old Testament to the New, first by drawing forth the spirit of the New Testament from the Old, and secondly by applying the words of the Old Testament in a higher sense than they at first had. The former of these two methods of interpretation is moral and universal, the latter local and temporary. But if we who are not Jews like the persons to whom the Epistle to the Hebrews is addressed, and who are taught by education to receive words in their natural and *prima facie* meaning, linger around the figure instead of looking forward to the thing signified, we do indeed make "Christ the minister" of the Mosaic religion. For there is a Judaism not only of outward ceremonies or ecclesiastical hierarchies, or temporal rewards and

punishments, but of ideas also, which impedes the worship of spirit and truth.

The sum of what has been said is as follows : —

Firstly : That our Lord never describes His own work in the language of atonement or sacrifice.

Secondly : That this language is a figure of speech borrowed from the Old Testament, yet not to be explained by the analogy of the Levitical sacrifices ; occasionally found in the writings of St. Paul ; more frequently in the Epistle to the Hebrews ; applied to the believer at least equally with his Lord, and indicating by the variety and uncertainty with which it is used that it is not the expression of any objective relation in which the work of Christ stands to His Father, but only a mode of speaking common at a time when the rites and ceremonies of the Jewish law were passing away and beginning to receive a spiritual meaning.

Thirdly : That nothing is signified by this language, or at least nothing essential, beyond what is implied in the teaching of our Lord himself. For it cannot be supposed that there is any truer account of Christianity than is to be found in the words of Christ.

## § 2.

Theology sprang up in the first ages independently of Scripture. This independence continued afterwards ; it has never been wholly lost. There is a tradition of the nineteenth century, as well as of the fourth or fourteenth, which comes between them. The mystical interpretation of Scripture has further parted them ; to which may be added the power of system ; doctrines when framed into a whole cease to draw their inspiration from the text. Logic has expressed “the thoughts of many hearts” with a seeming necessity of form ; this form of reasoning has led to new inferences. Many words and formulas have also acquired a sacredness from their occurrence in liturgies and articles, or the frequent use of them in religious discourse. The true interest of the theologian is to restore



these formulas to their connexion in Scripture, and to their place in ecclesiastical history. The standard of Christian truth is not a logical clearness or sequence, but the simplicity of the mind of Christ.

The history of theology is the history of the intellectual life of the Christian Church. All bodies of Christians, Protestant as well as Catholic, have tended to imagine that they are in the same stage of religious development as the first believers. But the Church has not stood still any more than the world; we may trace the progress of doctrine as well as the growth of philosophical opinion. The thoughts of men do not pass away without leaving an impress, in religion, any more than in politics or literature. The form of more than one article of faith in our own day is assignable to the effort of mind of some great thinker of the Nicene or medieval times. The received interpretation of texts of Scripture may not unfrequently be referred to the application of them first made in periods of controversy. Neither is it possible in any reformation of the Church to return exactly to the point whence the divergence began. The pattern of Apostolical order may be restored in externals; but the threads of the dialectical process are in the mind itself, and cannot be disposed of at once. It seems to be the nature of theology that while it is easy to add one definition of doctrine to another, it is hard to withdraw from any which have been once received. To believe too much is held to be safer than to believe too little, and the human intellect finds a more natural exercise in raising the superstructure than in examining the foundations. On the other hand, it is instructive to observe that there has always been an under-current in theology, the course of which has turned towards morality, and not away from it. There is a higher sense of truth and right now than in the Nicene Church — after than before the Reformation. The laity in all Churches have moderated the extremes of the clergy. There may also be remarked a silent correction in men's minds of statements which have not ceased to appear in theological writings.

The study of the doctrinal development of the Christian Church has many uses. First, it helps us to separate the history of a doctrine from its truth, and indirectly also the meaning of Scripture from the new reading of it, which has been given in many instances by theological controversy. It takes us away from the passing movement, and out of our own particular corner into a world in which we see religion on a larger scale and in truer proportions. It enables us to interpret one age to another, to understand our present theological position by its antecedents in the past; and perhaps to bind all together in the spirit of charity. Half the intolerance of opinion among Christians arises from ignorance; in history as in life, when we know others we get to like them. Logic too ceases to take us by force and make us believe. There is a pathetic interest and a kind of mystery in the long continuance and intensity of erroneous ideas on behalf of which men have been ready to die, which nevertheless were no better than the dreams or fancies of children. When we make allowance for differences in modes of thought, for the state of knowledge, and the conditions of the ecclesiastical society, we see that individuals have not been altogether responsible for their opinions; that the world has been bound together under the influence of the past; moreover, good men of all persuasions have been probably nearer to one another than they supposed, in doctrine as well as in life. It is the attempt to preserve or revive erroneous opinions in the present age, not their existence in former ages, that is to be reprobated. Lastly, the study of the history of doctrine is the end of controversy. For it is above controversy, of which it traces the growth, clearing away that part which is verbal only, and teaching us to understand that other part which is fixed in the deeper differences of human nature.

The history of the doctrine of the atonement may be conveniently divided into four periods of unequal length, each of which is marked by some peculiar features. First, the Patristic period, extending to the time of Anselm, in which the doctrine had not attained to a perfect or complete form, but each one applied for himself the

language of Scripture. Secondly, the Scholastic period, beginning with Anselm, who may be said to have defined anew the conceptions of the Christian world respecting the work of Christ, and including the great schoolmen who were his successors. Thirdly, the century of the Reformation, embracing what may be termed the after-thoughts of Protestantism, when men began to reason in that new sphere of religious thought which had been called into existence in the great struggle. "Fragments of the great banquet" of the schoolmen survive throughout the period, and have floated down the stream of time to our own age. Fourthly, the last hundred years, during which the doctrine of the atonement has received a new development from the influences of German philosophy\*, as well as from the speculations of English and American writers.

1. The characteristics of the first period may be summed up as follows. All the Fathers agreed that man was reconciled to God through Christ, and received in the Gospel a new and divine life. Most of them also spoke of the death of Christ as a ransom or sacrifice. When we remember that in the first age of the Church the New Testament was exclusively taught through the Old, and that many of the first teachers, who were unacquainted with our present Gospels, had passed their lives in the study of the Old Testament Scriptures, we shall not wonder at the early diffusion of this sort of language. Almost every application of the types of the law which has been made since, is already found in the writings of Justin Martyr. Nor indeed, on general grounds, is there any reason why we should feel surprise at such a tendency in the first ages. For in all Churches, and at all times of the world's history, the Old Testament has tended to take the place of the New; the law of the Gospel;—the handmaid has become the mistress;—and the development of the Christian priesthood has developed also the idea of a Christian sacrifice.

The peculiarity of the primitive doctrine did not lie here, but in

\* In the following pages I have derived great assistance from the excellent work of Baur über die Versöhnungs-lehre.



the relation in which the work of Christ was supposed to stand to the powers of evil. In the first ages we are beset with shadows of an under world, which hover on the confines of Christianity. From Origen downwards, with some traces of an earlier opinion of the same kind, perhaps of Gnostic origin, it was a prevailing though not quite universal belief among the Fathers, that the death of Christ was a satisfaction, not to God, but to the devil. Man, by having sinned, passed into the power of the evil one, who acquired a real right over him which could not be taken away without compensation. Christ offered himself as this compensation, which the devil eagerly accepted, as worth more than all mankind. But the deceiver was in turn deceived; thinking to triumph over the humanity, he was himself triumphed over by the Divinity of Christ. This theory was characteristically expressed under some such image as the following: "that the devil snatching at the bait of human flesh, was hooked by the Divine nature, and forced to disgorge what he had already swallowed." It is common in some form to Origen, Augustin, Ambrose, Gregory of Nyssa, Gregory the Great, Isidore of Seville, and much later writers; and there are indications of it in Irenæus. (*Adv. Hær. v. i. 1.*) The meaning of this transaction with the devil it is hardly possible to explain consistently. For a real possession of the soul of Christ was not thought of; an imaginary one is only an illusion. In either case the absolute right which is assigned to the devil over man, and which requires this satisfaction, is as repugnant to our moral and religious ideas, as the notion that the right could be satisfied by a deception. This strange fancy seems to be a reflection or anticipation of Manicheism within the Church. The world, which had been hitherto a kingdom of evil, of which the devil was the lord, was to be exorcised and taken out of his power by the death of Christ.

But the mythical fancy of the transaction with the devil was not the whole, nor even the leading conception, which the Fathers had of the import of the death of Christ. It was the negative, not the positive, side of the doctrine of redemption which they thus ex-

pressed; nobler thoughts also filled their minds. Origen regards the death of Christ as a payment to the devil, yet also as an offering to God; this offering took place not on earth only, but also in heaven; God is the high priest who offered. Another aspect of the doctrine of the atonement is presented by the same Father, under the Neo-Platonist form of the *λόγος* (word), who reunites with God, not only man, but all intelligences. Irenæus speaks, in language more human and more like St. Paul, of Christ "coming to save all, and therefore passing through all the ages of man; becoming an infant among infants, a little one among little ones, a young man among young men, an elder with the aged (?), that each in turn might be sanctified, until He reached death, that He should be the first-born from the dead." (ii. 22, 147.) The great Latin Father, though he believed equally with Origen in the right and power of the devil over man, delights also to bring forward the moral aspect of the work of Christ. "The entire life of Christ," he says, "was an instruction in morals." (De Ver. Rel. c. 16.) "He died in order that no man might be afraid of death." (De Fide et Symbolo, c. 5.) "The love which He displayed in his death constrains us to love Him and each other in return." (De Cat. Rud. c. 4.) Like St. Paul, Augustine contrasts the second Adam with the first, the man of righteousness with the man of sin. (De Ver. Relig. c. 26.) Lastly, he places the real nature of redemption in the manifestation of the God-man.

Another connexion between ancient and modern theology is supplied by the writings of Athanasius. The view taken by Athanasius of the atoning work of Christ has two characteristic features: First, it is based upon the doctrine of the Trinity; — God only can reconcile man with God. Secondly, it rests on the idea of a debt which is paid, not to the devil, but to God. This debt is also due to death, who has a sort of right over Christ, like the right of the devil in the former scheme. If it be asked in what this view differs from that of Anselm, the answer seems to be, chiefly in the circumstance that it is stated with less distinctness; it is *a* form, not *the* form, which Athanasius gave to the doctrine. In the conception of

the death of Christ as a debt, he is followed, however, by several of the Greek fathers. Rhetoric delighted to represent the debt as more than paid; the payment was "even as the ocean to a drop in comparison with the sins of men." (Chrys. on Rom. Hom. x. 17.) It is pleasing further to remark that a kind of latitudinarianism was allowed by the Fathers themselves. Gregory of Nazianzen (Orat. xxxiii. p. 536.) numbers speculations about the sufferings of Christ among those things on which it is useful to have correct ideas, but not dangerous to be mistaken. On the whole the doctrine of the Fathers of the first four centuries may be said to oscillate between two points of view, which are brought out with different degrees of clearness. 1. The atonement was effected by the death of Christ; which was a satisfaction to the devil, and an offering to God: 2. The atonement was effected by the union in Christ of the Divine and human nature in the "logos," or word of God. That neither view is embodied in any creed is a proof that the doctrine of atonement was not, in the first centuries, what modern writers often make it, the corner stone of the Christian faith.

An interval of more than 700 years separates Athanasius from Anselm. One eminent name occurs during this interval, that of Scotus Erigena, whose conception of the atonement is the co-eternal unity of all things with God; the participation in this unity had been lost by man, not in time, but in eternity, and was restored in the person of Christ likewise from eternity. The views of Erigena present some remarkable coincidences with very recent speculations; in the middle ages he stands alone, at the end, not at the beginning, of a great period; — he is the last of the Platonists, not the first of the schoolmen. He had consequently little influence on the centuries which followed. Those centuries gradually assumed a peculiar character; and received in after times another name, scholastic, as opposed to patristic. The intellect was beginning to display a new power; men were asking, not exactly for a reason of the faith that was in them, but for a clearer conception and definition of it. The Aristotelian philosophy furnished distinctions which were applied



with a more than Aristotelian precision to statements of doctrine. Logic took the place of rhetoric ; the school of the Church ; figures of speech became abstract ideas. Theology was exhibited under a new aspect, as a distinct object or reality of thought. Questions on which Scripture was silent, on which councils and Popes would themselves pronounce no decision, were raised and answered within a narrow sphere by the activity of the human mind itself. The words " sacrifice," " satisfaction," " ransom," could no longer be used indefinitely ; it was necessary to determine further to whom and for what the satisfaction was made, and to solve the new difficulties which thereupon arose in the effort to gain clearer and more connected ideas.

2. It was a true feeling of Anselm that the old doctrine of satisfaction contained an unchristian element in attributing to the devil a right independent of God. That man should be delivered over to Satan may be just ; it is a misrepresentation to say that Satan had any right over man. Therefore no right of the devil is satisfied by the death of Christ. He who had the real right is God, who has been robbed of His honour ; to whom is, indeed, owing on the part of man an infinite debt. For sin is in its nature infinite ; the world has no compensation for that which a good man would not do in exchange for the world. (*Cur Deus Homo*, i. 21.) God only can satisfy Himself. The human nature of Christ enables Him to incur, the infinity of his Divine nature to pay, this debt. (ii. 6, 7.) This payment of the debt, however, is not the salvation of mankind, but only the condition of salvation ; a link is still wanting in the work of grace. The two parties are equalised ; the honour of which God was robbed is returned, but man has no claim for any further favour. This further favour, however, is indirectly a result of the death of Christ. For the payment of the debt by the Son partakes of the nature of a gift which must needs have a recompense (ii. 20.) from the Father, which recompense cannot be conferred on Himself, and is therefore made at his request to man. The doctrine ultimately rests on two reasons or grounds ; the first a

noble one, that it must be far from God to suffer any rational creature to perish entirely (*Cur Deus Homo*, i. 4., ii. 4.); the second a trifling one, viz. that God, having created the angels in a perfect number, it was necessary that man, saved through Christ, should fill up that original number, which was impaired by their fall. And as Anselm, in the spirit of St. Paul, though not quite consistently with his own argument, declares, the mercy of God was shown in the number of the saved exceeding the number of the lost. (*Cur Deus Homo*, i. 16, 18.)

This theory, which is contained in the remarkable treatise "*Cur Deus Homo*," is consecutively reasoned throughout; yet the least reasons seem often sufficient to satisfy the author. While it escapes one difficulty it involves several others; though conceived in a nobler and more Christian spirit than any previous view of the work of Christ, it involves more distinctly the hideous consequence of punishing the innocent for the guilty. It is based upon analogies, symmetries, numerical fitnesses; yet under these logical fancies is contained a true and pure feeling of the relation of man to God. The notion of satisfaction or payment of a debt, on the other hand, is absolutely groundless, and seems only to result from a certain logical position which the human mind has arbitrarily assumed. The scheme implies further two apparently contradictory notions; one, a necessity in the nature of things for this and no other means of redemption; the other, the free will of God in choosing the salvation of man. Anselm endeavours to escape from this difficulty by substituting the conception of a moral for that of a metaphysical necessity. (ii. 5.) God chose the necessity and Christ chose the fulfilment of His Father's commands. But the necessity by which the death of Christ is justified is thus reduced to a figure of speech. Lastly, the subjective side of the doctrine, which afterwards became the great question of the Reformation, the question, that is, in what way the death of Christ is to be apprehended by the believer, is hardly if at all touched upon by Anselm.

No progress was made during the four centuries which intervened

between Anselm and the Reformation, towards the attainment of clearer ideas respecting the relations of God and man. The view of Anselm did not, however, at once or universally prevail; it has probably exercised a greater influence since the Reformation (being the basis of what may be termed the evangelical doctrine of the atonement) than in earlier ages. The spirit of the older theology was too congenial to those ages quickly to pass away. Bernard and others continued to maintain the right of the devil: a view not wholly obsolete in our own day. The two great masters of the schools agreed in denying the necessity on which the theory of Anselm was founded. They differed from Anselm also respecting the conception of an infinite satisfaction; Thomas Aquinas distinguishing the "infinite" Divine merit, and "abundant" human satisfaction; while Dun Scotus rejected the notion of infinity altogether, declaring that the scheme of redemption might have been equally accomplished by the death of an angel or a righteous man. Abelard, at an earlier period, attached special importance to the moral aspect of the work of Christ; he denied the right of the devil, and declared the love of Christ to be the redeeming principle, because it calls forth the love of man. Peter Lombard also, who retained, like Bernard, the old view of the right of the devil, agreed with Abelard in giving a moral character to the work of redemption.

3. The doctrines of the Reformed as well as of the Catholic Church were expressed in the language of the scholastic theology. But the logic which the Catholic party had employed in defining and distinguishing the body of truth already received, the teachers of the Reformation used to express the subjective feelings of the human soul. Theology made a transition, such as we may observe at one or two epochs in the history of philosophy, from the object to the subject. Hence, the doctrine of atonement or satisfaction became subordinate to the doctrine of justification. The reformers begin, not with ideas, but with the consciousness of sin; with immediate human interests, not with speculative difficulties; not



with mere abstractions, but with a great struggle; "without were fightings, within were fears." As of Socrates and philosophy, so it may be also said truly of Luther in a certain sense, that he brought down the work of redemption "from heaven to earth." The great question with him was, "how we might be freed from the punishment and guilt of sin," and the answer was, through the appropriation of the merits of Christ. All that man was or might have been, Christ became, and was; all that Christ did or was, attached or was imputed to man: as God, he paid the infinite penalty; as man, he fulfilled the law. The first made redemption possible, the second perfected it. The first was termed in the language of that age, the "*obedientia passiva*," the second, the "*obedientia activa*."

In this scheme the doctrine of satisfaction is far from being prominent or necessary; it is a remnant of an older theology which was retained by the Reformers and prevented their giving a purely moral character to the work of Christ. There were differences among them respecting the two kinds of obedience; some regarding the "*obedientia passiva*" as the cause or condition of the "*obedientia activa*," while others laid no stress on the distinction. But all the great chiefs of the Reformation agreed in the fiction of imputed righteousness. Little had been said in earlier times of a doctrine of imputation. But now the Bible was reopened and read over again in one light only, "justification by faith and not by works." The human mind seemed to seize with a kind of avidity on any distinction which took it out of itself, and at the same time freed it from the burden of ecclesiastical tyranny. Figures of speech in which Christ was said to die for man or for the sins of man were understood in as crude and literal a sense as the Catholic Church had attempted to gain from the words of the institution of the Eucharist. Imputation and substitution among Protestant divines began to be formulas as strictly imposed as transubstantiation with their opponents. To Luther, Christ was not only the Holy One who died for the sins of men, but the sinner himself on whom the vials of divine wrath were poured out. And seeing in the Epistles to the Galatians and

Romans the power which the law exercised in that age of the world over Jewish or half-Jewish Christians, he transferred the state which the Apostle there describes to his own age, and imagined that the burden under which he himself had groaned was the same law of which St. Paul spoke, which Christ first fulfilled in his own person and then abolished for ever.

It was not unnatural that in the middle ages, when morality had no free or independent development, the doctrine of the atonement should have been drawn out on the analogy of law. Nor is there any reason why we should feel surprised that, with the revival of the study of Scripture at the Reformation, the Mosaic law should have exercised a great influence over the ideas of Protestants. More singular, yet an analogous phenomenon, is the attempt of Grotius to conceive the work of Christ by the help of the principles of political justice. All men are under the influence of their own education or profession, and they are apt to conceive truths which are really of a different or higher kind under some form derived from it; they require such a degree or kind of evidence as their minds are accustomed to, and political or legal principles have often been held a sufficient foundation for moral truth.

The theory of the celebrated jurist proceeds from the conception of God as governor of the universe. As such, he may forgive sins just as any other ruler may remit the punishment of offences against positive law. But although the ruler possesses the power to remit sins, and there is nothing in the nature of justice which would prevent his doing so, yet he has also a duty, which is to uphold his own authority and that of the laws. To do so, he must enforce punishment for the breach of them. This punishment, however, may attach not to the offender, but to the offence. Such a distinction is not unknown to the law itself. We may apply this to the work of Christ. There was no difficulty in the nature of things which prevented God from freely pardoning the sins of men; the power of doing so was vested in his hands as governor of the world. But it was inexpedient that he should exercise this power

without first making an example. This was effected by the death of Christ. It pleased God to act according to the pedantic rules of earthly jurisprudence. It is useless to criticise such a theory further; almost all theologians have agreed in reprobating it; it adopts the analogy of law, and violates its first principles by considering a moral or legal act without reference to the agent. The reason which Grotius assigns for the death of Christ is altogether trivial.

4. Later theories on the doctrine of the atonement may be divided into two classes, English and German, logical and metaphysical; those which proceed chiefly by logical inference, and those which connect the conception of the atonement with speculative philosophy.

Earlier English writers were chiefly employed in defining the work of Christ; later ones have been most occupied with the attempt to soften or moderate the more repulsive features of the older statements; the former have a dogmatical, the latter an apologetical character. The nature of the sufferings of Christ, whether they were penal or only quasi penal, whether they were physical or mental, greater in degree than human sufferings, or different in kind; in what more precisely the compensation offered by Christ truly consisted; the nature of the obedience of Christ, whether to God or the law, and the connexion of the whole question with that of the Divine decrees:—these were among the principal subjects discussed by the great Presbyterian divines of the seventeenth and eighteenth centuries. Continuing in the same line of thought as their predecessors, they seem to have been unconscious of the difficulties to which the eyes of a later generation have opened.

But at last the question has arisen within, as well as without, the Church of England: “How the ideas of expiation, or satisfaction, or sacrifice, or imputation, are reconcilable with the moral and spiritual nature either of God or man?” Some there are who answer from analogy, and cite instances of vica-



rious suffering which appear in the disorder of the world around us. But analogy is a broken reed ; of use, indeed, in pointing out the way where its intimations can be verified, but useless when applied to the unseen world in which the eye of observation no longer follows. Others affirm revelation or inspiration to be above criticism, and, in disregard alike of Church history and of Scripture, assume their own view of the doctrine of the atonement to be a revealed or inspired truth. They do not see that they are cutting off the branch of the tree on which they are themselves sitting. For, if the doctrine of the atonement cannot be criticised, neither can it be determined what is the doctrine of the atonement ; nor, on the same principles, can any true religion be distinguished from any false one, or any truth of religion from any error. It is suicidal in theology to refuse the appeal to a moral criterion. Others add a distinction of things above reason and things contrary to reason ; a favourite theological weapon, which has, however, no edge or force, so long as it remains a generality. Others, in like manner, support their view of the doctrine of the atonement by a theory of accommodation, which also loses itself in ambiguity. For it is not determined whether, by accommodation to the human faculties, is meant the natural subjectiveness of knowledge, or some other limitation which applies to theology only. Others regard the death of Christ, not as an atonement or satisfaction to God, but as a manifestation of his righteousness, a theory which agrees with that of Grotius in its general character, when the latter is stripped of its technicalities. This theory is the shadow or surface of that of satisfaction ; the human analogy equally fails ; the punishment of the innocent for the guilty is not more unjust than the punishment of the innocent as an example to the guilty. Lastly, there are some who would read the doctrine of the atonement "in the light of Divine love only ;" the object of the sufferings and death of Christ being to draw men's hearts to God by the vision of redeeming love (compare Abelard), and the sufferings themselves being the natural result of the passage of the Saviour through a world of sin and shame. Of

these explanations the last seems to do the least violence to our moral feelings. Yet it would surely be better to renounce any attempt at inquiry into the objective relations of God and man, than to rest the greatest fact in the history of mankind on so slender a ground as the necessity for arousing the love of God in the human heart, in this and no other way.

German theology during the last hundred years has proceeded by a different path; it has delighted to recognise the doctrine of the atonement as the centre of religion, and also of philosophy. This tendency is first observable in the writings of Kant, and may be traced through the schools of his successors, Fichte, Schelling, Hegel, as well as in the works of the two philosophical theologians Daub and Schleiermacher. These great thinkers all use the language of orthodoxy; it cannot be said, however, that the views of any of them agree with the teaching of the patristic or medieval Church, or of the Reformers, or of the simpler expressions of Scripture. Yet they often bring into new meaning and prominence texts on this subject which have been pushed aside by the regular current of theology. The difficulties which they all alike experience are two: first, how to give a moral meaning to the idea of atonement; secondly, how to connect the idea with the historical fact.

According to Kant, the atonement consists in the sacrifice of the individual; a sacrifice in which the sin of the old man is ever being compensated by the sorrows and virtues of the new. This atonement, or reconciliation of man with God, consists in an endless progress towards a reconciliation which is never absolutely completed in this life, and yet, by the continual increase of good and diminution of evil, is a sufficient groundwork of hope and peace. Perfect reconciliation would consist in the perfect obedience of a free agent to the law of duty or righteousness. For this Kant substitutes the ideal of the Son of God. The participation in this ideal of humanity is an aspect of the reconciliation. In a certain sense, in the sight of God, that is, and in the wish and resolution of the individual, the change from the old to the new is not gradual,

but sudden: the end is imputed or anticipated in the beginning. So Kant "rationalises" the ordinary Lutheran doctrine of justification; unconscious, as in other parts of his philosophy, of the influence which existing systems are exercising over him. Man goes out of himself to grasp at a reflection which is still — himself. The mystical is banished only to return again in an arbitrary and imaginative form; — a phenomenon which we may often observe in speculation as well as in the characters of individuals.

Schleiermacher's view of the doctrine of the atonement is almost equally different from that of Kant who preceded him, and of Hegel and others who were his contemporaries or successors: it is hardly more like the popular theories. Reconciliation with God he conceives as a participation in the Divine nature. Of this participation the Church, through the Spirit, is the medium; the individual is redeemed and consoled by communion with his fellow-men. If in the terminology of philosophy we ask which is the objective which the subjective part of the work of redemption, the answer of Schleiermacher seems to be that the subjective redemption of the individual is the consciousness of union with God; and the objective part, which corresponds to this consciousness, is the existence of the Church, which derives its life from the Spirit of God, and is also the depository of the truth of Christ. The same criticism, however, applies to this as to the preceding conception of the atonement, viz. that it has no real historical basis. The objective truth is nothing more than the subjective feeling or opinion which prevails in a particular Church. Schleiermacher deduces the historical from the ideal, and regards the ideal as existing only in the communion of Christians. But the truth of a fact is not proved by the truth of an idea. And the personal relation of the believer to Christ, instead of being immediate, is limited (as in the Catholic system) by the existence of the Church.

Later philosophers have conceived of the reconciliation of man with God as a reconciliation of God with Himself. The infinite must evolve the finite from itself; yet the true infinite consists in the



return of the finite to the infinite. By slow degrees, and in many stages of morality, of religion, and of knowledge, does the individual, according to Fichte, lay aside isolation and selfishness, gaining in strength and freedom by the negation of freedom, until he rises into the region of the divine and absolute. This is reconciliation with God; a half Christian, half Platonic notion, which it is not easy to identify either with the subjective feeling of the individual, or with the historical fact. Daub has also translated the language of Scripture and of the Church into metaphysical speculation. According to this thinker, atonement is the realisation of the unity of man with God, which is also the unity of God with Himself. "Deus Deum cum mundo conjunctum Deo manifestat." Perhaps this is as near an approach as philosophy can make to a true expression of the words, "That they all may be one, as thou Father art in me and I in thee, that they also may be one in us." Yet the metaphysical truth is a distant and indistinct representation of the mind of Christ which is expressed in these words. Its defect is exhibited in the image under which Fichte described it, — the absolute unity of light; in other words, God, like the being of the Eleatics, is a pure abstraction, and returning into himself is an abstraction still.

It is characteristic of Schelling's system that he conceives the nature of God, not as abstraction, but as energy or action. The finite and manifold are not annihilated in the infinite; they are the revelation of the infinite. Man is the son of God; of this truth Christ is the highest expression and the eternal idea. But in the world this revelation or incarnation of God is ever going on; the light is struggling with darkness, the spirit with nature, the universal with the particular. That victory which was achieved in the person of Christ is not yet final in individuals or in history. Each person, each age, carries on the same conflict between good and evil, the triumphant end of which is anticipated in the life and death of Christ.

Hegel, beginning with the doctrine of a Trinity, regards the atonement as the eternal reconciliation of the finite and the infinite

in the bosom of God himself. The Son goes forth from the Father, as the world or finite being, to exist in a difference which is done away and lost in the absoluteness of God. Here the question arises, how individuals become partakers of this reconciliation? The answer is, by the finite receiving the revelation of God. The consciousness of God in man is developed, first, in the worship of nature; secondly, in the manifestation of Christ; thirdly, in the faith of the Church that God and man are one, of which faith the Holy Spirit is the source. The death of Christ is the separation of this truth from the elements of nature and sense. Hegelian divines have given this doctrine a more Pantheistic or more Christian aspect; they have, in some instances, studiously adopted orthodox language; they have laid more or less stress on the historical facts. But they have done little as yet to make it intelligible to the world at large; they have acquired for it no fixed place in history, and no hold upon life.

Englishmen, especially, feel a national dislike at the "things which accompany salvation" being perplexed with philosophical theories. They find it easier to caricature than to understand Hegel; they prefer the most unintelligible expressions with which they are familiar to great thoughts which are strange to them. No man of sense really supposes that Hegel or Schelling is so absurd as they may be made to look in an uncouth English translation, or as they unavoidably appear to many in a brief summary of their tenets. Yet it may be doubted whether this philosophy can ever have much connexion with the Christian life. It seems to reflect at too great a distance what ought to be very near to us. It is metaphysical, not practical; it creates an atmosphere in which it is difficult to breathe; it is useful as supplying a light or law by which to arrange the world, rather than as a principle of action or warmth. Man is a microcosm, and we do not feel quite certain whether the whole system is not the mind itself turned inside out, and magnified in enormous proportions. Whatever interest it may arouse in speculative natures (and it is certainly of great value to a few), it will hardly find a home or welcome in England.

## § 3.

The silence of our Lord in the Gospels respecting any doctrine of atonement and sacrifice, the variety of expressions which occur in other parts of the New Testament, the fluctuation and uncertainty both of the Church and individuals on this subject in after ages, incline us to agree with Gregory Nazianzen, that the death of Christ is one of those points of faith "about which it is not dangerous to be mistaken." And the sense of the imperfection of language and the illusions to which we are subject from the influence of past ideas, the consciousness that doctrinal perplexities arise chiefly from our transgression of the limits of actual knowledge, will lead us to desire a very simple statement of the work of Christ; a statement, however, in accordance with our moral ideas, and one which will not shift and alter with the metaphysical schools of the age; one, moreover, which runs no risk of being overthrown by an increasing study of the Old Testament or of ecclesiastical history. Endless theories there have been (of which the preceding sketch contains only a small portion), and many more there will be as time goes on, like mystery plays, or sacred dramas (to adapt Lord Bacon's image), which have passed before the Church and the world. To add another would increase the confusion; it is ridiculous to think of settling a disputed point of theology unless by some new method. That other method can only be a method of agreement; little progress has been made hitherto by the method of difference. It is not reasonable, but extremely unreasonable, that the most sacred of all books should be the only one respecting the interpretation of which there is no certainty; that religion alone should be able to perpetuate the enmities of past ages; that the influence of words and names, which secular knowledge has long shaken off, should still intercept the natural love of Christians towards one another and their Lord. On our present subject there is no difficulty in finding a basis of reconciliation; the way opens when logical projections are removed, and we look at the truth in what may be rightly termed a more pri-



mitive and Apostolical manner. For all, or almost all, Christians would agree that in some sense or other we are reconciled to God through Christ; whether by the atonement and satisfaction which He made to God for us, or by His manifestation of the justice of God or love of God in the world, by the passive obedience of His death or the active obedience of His life, by the imputation of His righteousness to us or by our identity and communion with Him, or likeness to Him, or love of Him; in some one of these senses, which easily pass into each other, all would join in saying that "He is the way, the truth, and the life." And had the human mind the same power of holding fast points of agreement as of discerning differences, there would be an end of the controversy.

The statements of Scripture respecting the work of Christ are very simple, and may be used without involving us in the determination of these differences. We can live and die in the language of St. Paul and St. John; there is nothing there repugnant to our moral sense. We have a yet higher authority in the words of Christ himself. Only in repeating and elucidating these statements, we must remember that Scripture phraseology is of two kinds, simple and figurative, and that the first is the interpretation of the second. We must not bring the New Testament into bondage to the Old, but ennoble and transfigure the Old by the New.

First; the death of Christ may be described as a sacrifice. But what sacrifice? Not "the blood of bulls and of goats, nor the ashes of an heifer sprinkling the unclean," but the living sacrifice "to do Thy will, O God." It is a sacrifice which is the negation of sacrifice; "Christ the end of the law to them that believe." Peradventure, in a heathen country, to put an end to the rite of sacrifice "some one would even dare to die;" that expresses the relation in which the offering on Mount Calvary stands to the Levitical offerings. It is the death of what is outward and local, the life of what is inward and spiritual: "I, if I be lifted up from the earth, shall draw all men after me;" and "Neither in this mountain nor at Jerusalem shall ye worship the Father." It is the offering up of the old world on

the cross ; the law with its handwriting of ordinances, the former man with his affections and lusts, the body of sin with its remembrances of past sin. It is the New Testament revealed in the blood of Christ, the Gospel of freedom, which draws men together in the communion of one spirit, as in St. Paul's time without respect of persons and nations, so in our own day without regard to the divisions of Christendom. In the place of Churches, priesthoods, ceremonials, systems, it puts a moral and spiritual principle which works with them, not necessarily in opposition to them, but beside or within them, to renew life in the individual soul.

Again, the death of Christ may be described as a ransom. It is not that God needs some payment which He must receive before He will set the captives free. The ransom is not a human ransom, any more than the sacrifice is a Levitical sacrifice. Rightly to comprehend the nature of this Divine ransom, we must begin with that question of the Apostle : " Know ye not that whose servants ye yield yourselves to obey, his servants ye are to whom ye obey, whether of sin unto death, or of obedience unto righteousness ? " There are those who will reply : " We were never in bondage at any time. " To whom Christ answers : " Whosoever committeth sin is the servant of sin ; " and, " If the Son shall make you free, ye shall be free indeed. " Ransom is " deliverance to the captive. " There are mixed modes here also, as in the use of the term sacrifice — the word has a temporary allusive reference to a Mosaical figure of speech. That secondary allusive reference we are constrained to drop, because it is unessential ; and also because it immediately involves further questions — a ransom to whom ? for what ? — about which Scripture is silent, to which reason refuses to answer.

Thirdly, the death of Christ is spoken of as a death for us, or for our sins. The ambiguous use of the preposition " for, " combined with the figure of sacrifice, has tended to introduce the idea of substitution ; when the real meaning is not " in our stead, " but only " in behalf of, " or " because of us. " It is a great assumption, or an unfair deduction, from such expressions,

to say that Christ takes our place, or that the Father in looking at the sinner sees only Christ. Christ died for us in no other sense than He lived or rose again for us. Scripture affords no hint of His taking our place in His death in any other way than He did also in His life. He himself speaks of His "decease which He should accomplish at Jerusalem," quite simply: "greater love hath no man than this, that a man lay down his life for his friends." The words of Caiaphas, "It is expedient that one man should die for this nation," and the comment of the Evangelist, "and not for that nation only, but that he should gather together in one the children of God that are scattered abroad," afford a measure of the meaning of such expressions. Here, too, there are mixed modes which seem to be inextricably blended in the language of Scripture, and which theology has not always distinguished. For the thing signified is, partly, that Christ died for our sakes, partly that He died by the hands of sinners, partly that He died with a perfect and Divine sympathy for human evil and suffering. But this ambiguity (which we may silently correct or explain) need not prevent our joining in words which, more perhaps than any others, have been consecrated by religious use to express the love and affection of Christians towards their Lord.

Now suppose some one who is aware of the plastic and accommodating nature of language to observe, that in what has been written of late years on the doctrine of the atonement he has noticed an effort made to win for words new senses, and that some of the preceding remarks are liable to this charge; he may be answered, first, that those new senses are really a recovery of old ones (for the writers of the New Testament, though they use the language of the time, everywhere give it a moral meaning); and, secondly, that in addition to the modes of conception already mentioned, the Scripture has others which are not open to his objection. And those who, admitting the innocence and Scriptural character of the expressions already referred to, may yet fear their abuse, and therefore desire to have them excluded from articles of faith (just as many



Protestants, though aware that the religious use of images is not idolatry, may not wish to see them in churches);—such persons may find a sufficient expression of the work of Christ in other modes of speech which the Apostle also uses. (1.) Instead of the language of sacrifice, or ransom, or substitution, they may prefer that of communion or identity. (2.) Or they may interpret the death of Christ by his life, and connect the bleeding form on Mount Calvary with the image of Him who went about doing good. Or (3.) they may look inward at their own souls, and read there, inseparable from the sense of their own unworthiness, the assurance that God will not desert the work of His hands, of which assurance the death of Christ is the outward witness to them. There are other ways, also, of conceiving the redemption of man which avoid controversy, any of which is a sufficient stay of the Christian life. For the kingdom of God is not this or that statement, or definition of opinion, but righteousness, and peace, and joy in the Holy Ghost. And the cross of Christ is to be taken up and borne; not to be turned into words, or made a theme of philosophical speculation.

1. Everywhere St. Paul speaks of the Christian as one with Christ. He is united with Him, not in His death only, but in all the stages of His existence; living with Him, suffering with Him, crucified with Him, buried with Him, rising again with Him, renewed in His image, glorified together with Him; these are the expressions by which this union is denoted. There is something meant by this language which goes beyond the experience of ordinary Christians, something, perhaps, more mystical than in these latter days of the world most persons seem to be capable of feeling, yet the main thing signified is the same for all ages, the knowledge and love of Christ, by which men pass out of themselves to make their will His and His theirs, the consciousness of Him in their thoughts and actions, communion with Him, and trust in Him. Of every act of kindness or good which they do to others His life is the type; of every act of devotion or self-denial His death is the type; of every act of faith His resurrection is the type. And often they walk with Him on earth, not in a figure only, and find Him

near them, not in a figure only, in the valley of death. They experience from Him the same kind of support as from the sympathy and communion of an earthly friend. That friend is also a Divine power. In proportion as they become like Him, they are reconciled to God through Him; they pass with Him into the relationship of sons of God. There is enough here for faith to think of, without sullyng the mirror of God's justice, or overclouding His truth. We need not suppose that God ever sees us other than we really are, or attributes to us what we never did. Doctrinal statements, in which the nature of the work of Christ is most exactly defined, cannot really afford the same support as the simple conviction of His love.

Again (2.), the import of the death of Christ may be interpreted by His life. No theological speculation can throw an equal light on it. From the other side we cannot see it, but only from this. Now the life of Christ is the life of One who knew no sin, on whom the shadow of evil never passed; who went about doing good; who had not where to lay His head; whose condition was in all respects the reverse of earthly and human greatness; who also had a sort of infinite sympathy or communion with all men everywhere; whom, nevertheless, His own nation betrayed to a shameful death. It is the life of One who came to bear witness of the truth, who knew what was in man, and never spared to rebuke him, yet condemned him not; Himself without sin, yet One to whom all men would soonest have gone to confess and receive forgiveness of sin. It is the life of One who was in constant communion with God as well as man; who was the inhabitant of another world while outwardly in this. It is the life of One in whom we see balanced and united the separate gifts and graces of which we catch glimpses only in the lives of His followers. It is a life which is mysterious to us, which we forbear to praise, in the earthly sense, because it is above praise, being the most perfect image and embodiment that we can conceive of Divine goodness.

And the death of Christ is the fulfilment and consummation of His life, the greatest moral act ever done in this world, the highest ma-

nifestation of perfect love, the centre in which the rays of love converge and meet, the extremest abnegation or annihilation of self. It is the death of One who seals with His blood the witness of the truth which He came into the world to teach, which therefore confirms our faith in Him as well as animates our love. It is the death of One, who says at the last hour, "Of them that thou gavest me, I have not lost one,"—of One who, having come forth from God, and having finished the work which He came into the world to do, returns to God. It is a death in which all the separate gifts of heroes and martyrs are united in a Divine excellence,—of One who most perfectly foresaw all things that were coming upon Him—who felt all, and shrank not,—of One who, in the hour of death, set the example to His followers of praying for His enemies. It is a death which, more even than His life, is singular and mysterious, in which nevertheless we all are partakers, — in which there was the thought and consciousness of mankind to the end of time, which has also the power of drawing to itself the thoughts of men to the end of time.

Lastly, there is a true Christian feeling in many other ways of regarding the salvation of man, of which the heart is its own witness, which yet admit, still less than the preceding, of logical rule and precision. He who is conscious of his own infirmity and sinfulness, is ready to confess that he needs reconciliation with God. He has no proud thoughts : he knows that he is saved "not of himself, it is the gift of God ;" the better he is, the more he feels, in the language of Scripture, "that he is an unprofitable servant." Sometimes he imagines the Father "coming out to meet him, when he is yet a long way off," as in the parable of the Prodigal Son ; at other times the burden of sin lies heavy on him ; he seems to need more support—he can approach God only through Christ. All men are not the same ; one has more of the strength of reason in his religion ; another more of the tenderness of feeling. With some, faith partakes of the nature of a pure and spiritual morality ; there are others who have gone through the struggle of St. Paul or Luther, and attain rest only in casting all on Christ. One will



live after the pattern of the Sermon on the Mount, or the Epistle of St. James. Another finds a deep consolation and meaning in a closer union with Christ; he will "put on Christ," he will hide himself in Christ; he will experience in his own person the truth of those words of the Apostle, "I am crucified with Christ, nevertheless I live; yet not I, but Christ liveth in me." But if he have the spirit of moderation that there was in St. Paul, he will not stereotype these true, though often passing feelings, in any formula of substitution or satisfaction; still less will he draw out formulas of this sort into remote consequences. Such logical idealism is of another age; it is neither faith nor philosophy in this. Least of all will he judge others by the circumstance of their admitting or refusing to admit the expression of his individual feelings as an eternal truth. He shrinks from asserting his own righteousness; he is equally unwilling to affirm that the righteousness of Christ is imputed to him. He is looking for forgiveness of sins, not because Christ has satisfied the wrath of God, but because God can show mercy without satisfaction: he may have no right to acquittal, he dare not say, God has no right to acquit. Yet again, he is very far from imagining that the most merciful God will indiscriminately forgive; or that the weakness of human emotions, groaning out at the last hour a few accustomed phrases, is a sufficient ground of confidence and hope. He knows that the only external evidence of forgiveness is the fact, that he has ceased to do evil; no other is possible. Having Christ near as a friend and a brother, and making the Christian life his great aim, he is no longer under the dominion of a conventional theology. He will not be distracted by its phrases from communion with his fellow-men. He can never fall into that confusion of head and heart, which elevates matters of opinion into practical principles. Difficulties and doubts diminish with him, as he himself grows more like Christ, not because he forcibly suppresses them, but because they become unimportant in comparison with purity, and holiness, and love. Enough of truth for him seems to radiate from the person of the Saviour. He thinks more and more of the human nature of

Christ as the expression of the divine. He has found the way of life; — that way is not an easy way — but neither is it beset by the imaginary perplexities with which a false use of the intellect in religion has often surrounded it.

It seems to be an opinion which is gaining ground among thoughtful and religious men, that in theology, the less we define the better. Definite statements respecting the relation of Christ either to God or man are only figures of speech; they do not really pierce the clouds which “round our little life.” When we multiply words we do not multiply ideas; we are still within the circle of our own minds. No greater calamity has ever befallen the Christian Church than the determination of some uncertain things which are beyond the sphere of human knowledge. A true instinct prevents our entangling the faith of Christ with the philosophy of the day; the philosophy of past ages is a still more imperfect exponent of it. Neither is it of any avail to assume revelation or inspiration as a sort of shield, or Catholicon, under which the weak points of theology may receive protection. For what is revealed or what inspired cannot be answered “*à priori* ;” the meaning of the word Revelation, must be determined by the fact, not the fact by the word.

If our Saviour were to come again to earth, which of all the theories of atonement and sacrifice would he sanction with his authority? Perhaps none of them, yet perhaps all may be consistent with a true service of Him. The question has no answer. But it suggests the thought that we shrink from bringing controversy into His presence. The same kind of lesson may be gathered from the consideration of theological differences in the face of death. Who, as he draws near to Christ, will not feel himself drawn towards his theological opponents? At the end of life, when a man looks back calmly, he is most likely to find that he exaggerated in some things; that he mistook party spirit for a love of truth. Perhaps, he had not sufficient consideration for others, or stated the truth itself in a manner which was calculated to give offence.

In the heat of the struggle, let us at least pause to imagine polemical disputes as they will appear a year, two years, three years hence; it may be, dead and gone—certainly more truly seen than in the hour of controversy. For the truths about which we are disputing cannot partake of the passing stir; they do not change even with the greater revolutions of human things. They are in eternity; and the image of them on earth is not the movement on the surface of the waters, but the depths of the silent sea. Lastly, as a measure of the value of such disputes, which above all other interests seem to have for a time the power of absorbing men's minds and rousing their passions, we may carry our thoughts onwards to the invisible world, and there behold, as in a glass, the great theological teachers of past ages, who have anathematized each other in their lives, resting together in the communion of the same Lord.



## ON PREDESTINATION AND FREE WILL.

THE difficulty of necessity and free will is not peculiar to Christianity. It enters into all religions at a certain stage of their progress; it reappears in philosophy and is a question not only of speculation but of life. Wherever man touches nature, wherever the stream of thought which flows within, meets and comes into conflict with scientific laws, reflecting on the actions of an individual in relation to his antecedents, considering the balance of human actions in many individuals; when we pass into the wider field of history, and trace the influence of circumstances on the course of events, the sequence of nations and states of society, the physical causes that lie behind all; in the region of philosophy, as we follow the order of human thoughts, and observe the seeming freedom and real limitation of ideas and systems; lastly in that higher world of which religion speaks to us, when we conceive man as a finite being, who has the witness in himself of his own dependence on God, whom theology too has made the subject of many theories of grace, new forms appear of that famous controversy which the last century discussed under the name of necessity and free will.

I shall at present pursue no further the train of reflections which are thus suggested. My first object is to clear the way for the consideration of the subject within the limits of Scripture. Some preliminary obstacles offer themselves, arising out of the opposition which the human mind everywhere admits in the statement of this question. These will be first examined. We may afterwards return to the modern aspects of the contradiction and of the reconciliation.

## § 1.

In the relations of God and man, good and evil, finite and infinite, there is much that must ever be mysterious. Nor can any one exaggerate the weakness and feebleness of the human mind in the attempt to seek for such knowledge. But although we acknowledge the feebleness of man's brain and the vastness of the subject, we should also draw a distinction between the original difficulty of our own ignorance, and the puzzles and embarrassments which false philosophy or false theology have introduced. The impotence of our faculties is not a reason for acquiescing in a metaphysical fiction. Philosophy has no right to veil herself in mystery at the point where she is lost in a confusion of words. That we know little is the real mystery; not that we are caught in dilemmas or surrounded by contradictions. These contradictions are involved in the slightest as well as in the most serious of our actions, which is a proof of their really trifling nature. They confuse the mind but not things. To trace the steps by which mere abstractions have acquired this perplexing and constraining power, though it cannot meet the original defect, yet may perhaps assist us to understand the misunderstanding, and to regard the question of predestination and free will in a simpler and more natural light.

A subject which claims to be raised above the rules and requirements of logic, must give a reason for the exemption, and must itself furnish some other test of truth to which it is ready to conform. The reason is that logic is inapplicable to the discussion of a question which begins with a contradiction in terms: it can only work out the opposite aspects or principles of such a question on one side or the other, but is inadequate to that more comprehensive conception of the subject which embraces both. We often speak of language as an imperfect instrument for the expression of thought. Logic is even more imperfect; it is wanting in the plastic and multifarious character of language, yet deceives us by the appearance of a straight rule and necessary principle. Questions respecting the

relation of God and man, necessity and free will, the finite and the infinite — perhaps every question which has two opposite poles of fact and idea — are beyond the sphere of its art. But if not logic, some other test must be found of our theories or reasonings, on these and the like metaphysical subjects. This can only be their agreement with facts, which we shall the more readily admit if the new form of expression or statement of them be a real assistance to our powers of thought and action.

The difficulties raised respecting necessity and free will, partake, for the most part, of the same nature as the old fallacies respecting motion and space, of Zeno and the Eleatics, and have their “*solvitur ambulando*” as well. This is the answer of Bishop Butler, who aims only at a practical solution. But as it is no use to say to the lame man, “rise up and walk,” without a crutch or helping hand, so it is no use to offer these practical solutions to a mind already entangled in speculative perplexities. It retorts upon you “I cannot walk: if my outward actions seem like other men’s; if I do not throw myself from a precipice, or take away the life of another under the fatal influence of the doctrine of necessity, yet the course of thought within me is different. I look upon the world with other eyes, and slowly and gradually, differences in thought must beget differences also in action.” But if the mind, which is bound by this chain, could be shown that it was a slave only to its own abstract ideas,—that it was below where it ought to be above them,—that, considering all the many minds of men as one mind, it could trace the fiction,—this world of abstractions would gradually disappear, and not merely in a Christian, but in a philosophical sense, it would receive the kingdom of Heaven as a little child, seeking rather for some new figure under which conflicting notions might be represented, than remaining in suspense between them. It may be as surprising to a future generation that the nineteenth century should have been under the influence of the illusion of necessity and free will, or that it should have proposed the law of contradiction as an ultimate test of truth, as it is to ourselves that former ages have been subjected to the fictions of essence, substance, and the like.



The notion that no idea can be composed of two contradictory conceptions, seems to arise out of the analogy of the sensible world. It would be an absurdity to suppose that an object should be white and black at the same time; that a captive should be in chains and not in chains at the same time, and so on. But there is no absurdity in supposing that the mental analysis even of a matter of fact or an outward object should involve us in contradictions. Objects, considered in their most abstract point of view, may be said to contain a positive and a negative element: everything is and is not; is in itself, and is not, in relation to other things. Our conceptions of motion, of becoming, or of beginning, in like manner involve a contradiction. The old puzzles of the Eleatics are merely an exemplification of the same difficulty. There are objections, it has been said, against a vacuum, objections against a plenum, though we need not add, with the writer who makes the remark, "Yet one of these must be true." How a new substance can be formed by chemical combination out of two other substances may seem also to involve a contradiction, *e. g.* water is and is not oxygen and hydrogen. Life, in like manner, has been defined a state in which every end is a means, and every means an end. And if we turn to any moral or political subject, we are perpetually coming across different and opposing lines of argument, and constantly in danger of passing from one sphere to another; of applying, for example, moral or theological principles to politics, and political principles to theology. Men form to themselves first one system, then many, as they term them different, but in reality opposite to each other. Just as that nebulous mass, out of which the heavens have been imagined to be formed, at last, with its circling motion, subsides into rings, and embodies the "stars moving in their courses," so also in the world of mind there are so many different orbits which never cross or touch each other, and yet which must be conceived of as the colours of the rainbow, the result of a single natural phenomenon.

It is at first sight strange that some of these contradictions should seem so trivial to us, while others assume the appearance of a high

mystery. In physics or mathematics we scarcely think of them, though speculative minds may sometimes be led by them to seek for higher expressions, or to embrace both sides of the contradiction in some conception of flux or transition, reciprocal action, process by antagonism, the Hegelian vibration of moments, or the like. In common life we acquiesce in the contradiction almost unconsciously, merely remarking on the difference of men's views, or the possibility of saying something on either side of a question. But in religion the difficulty appears of greater importance, partly from our being much more under the influence of language in theology than in subjects which we can at once bring to the test of fact and experiment, and partly also from our being more subject to our own natural constitution, which leads us to one or the other horn of the dilemma, instead of placing us between or above both. As in heathen times it was natural to think of extraordinary phenomena, such as thunder and lightning, as the work of gods rather than as arising from physical causes, so it is still to the religious mind to consider the bewilderments and entanglements which it has itself made as a proof of the unsearchableness of the Divine nature.

The immoveableness of these abstractions from within will further incline us to consider the metaphysical contradiction of necessity and free will in the only rational way; that is, "historically." To say that we have ideas of fate or freedom which are innate, is to assume what is at once disproved by a reference to history. In the East and West, in India and in Greece, in Christian as well as heathen times, whenever men have been sufficiently enlightened to form a distinct conception of a single Divine power or overruling law, the question arises, How is the individual related to this law? The first answer to this question is Pantheism; in which the individual, dropping his proper qualities, abstracts himself into an invisible being, indistinguishable from the Divine. God overpowers man; the inner life absorbs the outer; the ideal world is too much for this. The second answer, which the East has also given to this question, is Fatalism; in which, without abstraction, the individual

identifies himself, soul and body, in deed as well as thought, with the Divine will. The first is the religion of contemplation; the second, of action. Only in the last, as the world itself alters the sense of the overruling power weakens; and faith in the Divine will, as in Mahometan countries at the present day, shows itself, not in a fanatical energy, but in passive compliance and resignation.

The gradual emergence of the opposition is more clearly traceable in the Old Testament Scriptures or in Greek poetry or philosophy. The Israelites are distinguished from all other Eastern nations — certainly from all contemporary with their early history — by their distinct recognition of the unity and personality of God. God, who is the Creator and Lord of the whole earth, is also in a peculiar sense the God of the Jewish people whom he deals with according to his own good pleasure, which is also a law of truth and right. He is not so much the Author of good as the Author of all things, without whom nothing either good or evil can happen; not only the permitter of evil, but in a few instances, in the excess of His power, the cause of it also. With this universal attribute He combines another, “the Lord our God, who brought us out of the land of bondage.” The people have one heart and one soul with which they worship God and have dealings with Him. Only a few individuals among them, as Moses or Joshua, draw near separately to Him. In the earliest ages they do not pray each one for himself. There is a great difference in this respect between the relation of man to God which is expressed in the Psalms and in the Pentateuch. In the later Psalms, certainly, and even in some of those ascribed to David, there is an immediate personal intercourse between God and His servants. At length in the books of Job and Ecclesiastes, the human spirit begins to strive with God, and to ask not only, how can man be just before God? but also, how can God be justified to man? There was a time when the thought of this could never have entered into their minds; in which they were only, as children with a father, doing evil, and punished, and returning once more to the arms of His wisdom and goodness. The childhood of their nation passed



away, and the remembrance of what God had done for their fathers was forgotten; religion became the religion of individuals, of Simeon and Anna, of Joseph and Mary. On the one hand, there was the proud claim of those who said, "We have Abraham to our Father;" on the other hand, the regretful feeling "that God was casting off Israel," which St. Paul in the manner of the Old Testament rebukes with the words, "Who art thou, O man?" and "We are the clay, and He the potter."

We may briefly trace the progress of a parallel struggle in Grecian mythology. It presents itself, however, in another form, beginning with the Fates weaving the web of life, or the Furies pursuing the guilty, and ending in the pure abstraction of necessity or nature. Many changes of feeling may be observed between the earlier and later of these two extremes. The fate of poetry is not like that of philosophy, the chain by which the world is held together; but an ever-living power or curse—sometimes just, sometimes arbitrary,—specially punishing impiety towards the Gods or violations of nature. In Homer, it represents also a determination already fixed, or an ill irremediable by man; in one aspect it is the folly which "leaves no place for repentance." In Pindar it receives a nobler form, 'Law the king of all.' In the tragedians, it has a peculiar interest, giving a kind of measured and regular movement to the whole action of the play. The consciousness that man is not his own master, had deepened in the course of ages; there had grown up in the mind a sentiment of overruling law. It was this half-religious, half-philosophical feeling, which Greek tragedy embodied; whence it derived not only dramatic irony or contrast of the real and seeming, but also its characteristic feature—repose. The same reflective tone is observable in the "Epic" historian of the Persian war; who delights to tell, not (like a modern narrator) of the necessary connexion of causes and effects, but of effects without causes, due only to the will of Heaven. A sadder note is heard at intervals of the feebleness and nothingness of man; *πᾶν ἔστιν ἄνθρωπος συμφορῆ*. In Thucydides, (who was separated from Herodotus by an interval

of about twenty years) the sadness remains, but the religious element has vanished. Man is no longer in the toils of destiny, but he is still feeble and helpless. Fortune and human enterprise divide the empire of life.

Such conceptions of fate belong to Paganism, and have little in common with that higher idea of Divine predestination of which the New Testament speaks. The fate of Greek philosophy is different from either. The earlier schools expressed their sense of an all-pervading law in rude, mythological figures. In time this passed away, and the conceptions of chance, of nature, and necessity became matters of philosophical inquiry. By the Sophists first the question was discussed, whether man is the cause of his own actions; the mode in which they treated of the subject being to identify the good with the voluntary, and the evil with the involuntary. It is this phase of the question which is alone considered by Aristotle. In the chain of the Stoics the doctrine has arrived at a further stage, in which human action has become a part of the course of the world. How the free will of man was to be reconciled either with Divine power, or Divine foreknowledge, was a difficulty which pressed upon the Stoical philosopher equally as upon the metaphysicians of the last century; and was met by various devices, such as that of the confatalism of Chrysippus, which may be described as a sort of identity of fate and freedom, or of an action and its conditions.

Our inquiry has been thus far confined to an attempt to show, first, that the question of predestination cannot be considered according to the common rules of logic; secondly, that the contradictions which are involved in this question, are of the same kind as many other contrasts of ideas; and, thirdly, that the modern conception of necessity was the growth of ages, whether its true origin is to be sought in the Scriptures, or in the Greek philosophy, or both. If only we could throw ourselves back to a prior state of the world, and know no other modes of thought than those which existed in the infancy of the human mind, the opposition would cease to have any meaning for us; and thus the further reflection is suggested,

that if ever we become fully conscious that the words which we use respecting it are words only, it will again become unmeaning. Historically we know when it arose, and whence it came. Already we are able to consider the subject in a simpler way, whether presented to us (1.) in connexion with the statements of Scripture, or (2.) as a subject of theology and philosophy.

### § 2.

Two kinds of predestination may be distinguished in the writings of St. Paul, as well as in some parts of the Old Testament. First, the predestination of nations; secondly, of individuals. The former of these may be said to flow out of the latter, God choosing at once the patriarchs and their descendants. As the author of the Epistle to the Hebrews expresses it, "By faith Abraham offered up Isaac; and therefore sprang there of one, and him as good as dead, so many as the stars of heaven in multitude." The life of the patriarchs was the type or shadow of the history of their posterity, for evil as well as good. "Simeon and Levi are brethren; instruments of cruelty are in their habitations; Joseph is a goodly bough;" Moab and Ammon are children of whoredom; Ishmael is a wild man, and so on. There is also the feeling that whatever extraordinary thing happens in Jewish history is God's doing, not of works nor even of faith, but of grace and choice: "He took David from the sheep-folds, and set him over His people Israel." So that a double principle is discernible; first, absolute election; and, secondly, the fulfilment of the promises made to the fathers, or the visitation of their sins upon the children.

The notion of freedom is essentially connected with that of individuality. No one is truly free who has not that inner circle of thoughts and actions in which he is wholly himself and independent of the will of others. A slave, for example, may be in this sense free, even while in the service of his lord; constraint can apply only to his outwards acts, not to his inward nature. But if, in the language of Aristotle, he were a natural slave, whose life seemed to himself



defective and imperfect, who had no thoughts or feelings of his own, but only instincts and impulses, we could no more call him free than a domestic animal which attaches itself to a master. So, in that stage of society in which the state is all in all, the idea of the individual has a feeble existence. In the language of philosophy the whole is free, and the parts are determined by the whole. So the theocracy of the Old Testament seems to swallow up its members. The Jewish commonwealth is governed by God Himself; this of itself interferes with the personal relation in which He stands to the individuals who compose it. Through the law only, in the congregation, at the great feasts, through their common ancestors, the people draw near to God; they do not venture to think severally of their separate and independent connexion with Him. They stand or fall together; they go astray or return to Him as one man. It is this which makes so much of their history directly applicable to the struggle of Christian life. Religion, which to the believer in Christ is an individual principle, is with them a national one.

The idea of a chosen people passes from the Old Testament into the New. As the Jews had been predestined in the one, so it appeared to the Apostle St. Paul that the Gentiles were predestined in the other. In the Old Testament he observed two sorts of predestination; first, that more general one, in which all who were circumcised were partakers of the privilege — which was applicable to all Israelites as the children of Abraham; secondly, the more particular one, in reference to which he says, "All are not Israel who are of Israel." To the eye of faith "all Israel were saved;" and yet within Israel, there was another Israel chosen in a more special sense. The analogy of this double predestination the Apostle transfers to the Christian society. All alike were holy, even those of whom he speaks in the strongest terms of reprobation. The Church, like Israel of old, presents to the Apostle's mind the conception of a definite body, consisting of those who are sealed by baptism and have received "the first fruits of the Spirit." They are elect according to the foreknowledge or predisposition of God; sealed by

God unto the day of redemption ; a peculiar people, a royal priesthood, taken alike from Jews and Gentiles. The Apostle speaks of their election as of some external fact. The elect of God have an offence among them not even named among the Gentiles, they abuse the gifts of the Spirit, they partake in the idol's temple, they profane the body and blood of Christ. And yet, as the Israelites of old, they bear on their foreheads the mark that they are God's people, and are described as "chosen saints," "sanctified in Christ Jesus."

Again, the Apostle argues respecting Israel itself, "Hath God cast off his people whom he foreknew?" or rather, whom He before appointed. They are in the position of their fathers when they sinned against him. If we read their history we shall see, that what happened to them in old times is happening to them now ; and yet in the Old Testament as well as the New the overruling design was not their condemnation but their salvation—"God concluded all under sin that He might have mercy upon all." They stumbled and rose again then ; they will stumble and rise again now. Their predestination from the beginning is a proof that they cannot be finally cast off ; beloved as they have been for their father's sakes, and the children of so many promises. There is a providence which, in spite of all contrary appearance, in spite of the acceptance of the Gentiles, or rather so much the more in consequence of it, makes all things work together for good to the chosen people.

In this alternation of hopes and fears, in which hope finally prevails over fear, the Apostle speaks in the strongest language of the right of God to do what He will with his own ; if any doctrine could be established by particular passages of Scripture, Calvinism would rest immoveable on the ninth chapter of the Romans. It seemed to him no more unjust that God should reject than that He should accept the Israelites ; if, at that present time He cut them short in righteousness, and narrowed the circle of election, He had done the same with the patriarchs. He had said of old, "Jacob have I loved, and Esau have I hated:" and this preference, as the Apostle observes, was shown before either could have committed actual sin.

In the same spirit He says to Moses, "I will have mercy on whom I will have mercy, and I will have compassion on whom I will have compassion." And to Pharaoh, "For this cause have I raised thee up." Human nature, it is true, rebels at this, and says, "Why does He yet find fault?" To which the Apostle only replies, "Shall the thing formed say unto him that formed it, Why hast thou made me thus? Hath not the potter power over the clay?" Some of the expressions which have become the most objectionable watchwords of predestinarian theology, such as "vessels of wrath and vessels of mercy," are in fact taken from the same passage in the Epistle to the Romans. •

It is answered by the opponents of Calvinism, that the Apostle is here speaking not of individual but of national predestination. From the teaching of the Old Testament respecting the election of the Jewish people we can infer nothing respecting the Divine economy about persons. To which in turn it may be replied, that if we admit the principle that the free choice of nations is not inconsistent with Divine justice, we cannot refuse to admit the free choice of persons also. A little more or a little less of the doctrine cannot make it more or less reconcilable with the perfect justice of God. Nor can we argue that the election of nations is a part of the Old Testament dispensation, which has no place in the New; because the Apostle speaks of election according to the purpose of God as a principle which was at that time being manifested in the acceptance of the Gentiles.

Yet the distinction is a sound one if stated a little differently, that is to say, if we consider that the predestination of Christians is only the continuance of the Old Testament in the New. It is the feeling of a religious Israelite respecting his race; this the Apostle enlarges to comprehend the Gentiles. As the temporal Israel becomes the spiritual Israel, the chosen people are transfigured into the elect. Why this is so is only a part of the more general question, "why the New Testament was given through the Old?" It was natural it should be so given; humanly speaking, it could not have been otherwise. The Gospel would have been unmeaning, if it had been



“tossed into the world” separated from all human antecedents; if the heaven of its clearness had been beyond the breath of every human feeling. Neither is there any more untruthfulness in St. Paul’s requiring us to recognise the goodness of God in the election of some and the rejection of others, than in humility or any act of devotion. The untruth lies not in the devout feeling, but in the logical statement. When we humble ourselves before God, we may know, as a matter of common sense, that we are not worse than others; but this, however true (“Father, I thank thee I am not as other men”), is not the temper in which we kneel before Him. So in these passages, St. Paul is speaking, not from a general consideration of the Divine nature, but with the heart and feelings of an Israelite. Could the question have been brought before him in another form,—could he have been asked whether God, according to His own pleasure, chose out individual souls, so that some could not fail of being saved while others were necessarily lost,—could he have been asked whether Christ died for all or for the chosen few,—whether, in short, God was sincere in his offer of salvation,—can we doubt that to such suggestions he would have replied in his own words, “God forbid! for how shall God judge the world?”

It has been said that the great error in the treatment of this subject consists in taking chap. ix. separated from chaps. x. xi. We may say more generally, in taking parts of Scripture without the whole, or in interpreting either apart from history and experience. In considering the question of predestination, we must not forget that at least one-half of Scripture tells not of what God does, but of what man ought to do; not of grace and pardon only, but of holiness. If, in speaking of election, St. Paul seems at times to use language which implies the irrespective election of the Jews as a nation; yet, on the other hand, what immediately follows shows us that conditions were understood throughout, and that, although we may not challenge the right of God to do what He would with His own, yet that in all His dealings with them the dispensation was but the effect of

their conduct. And although the Apostle is speaking chiefly of national predestination, with respect to which the election of God is asserted by him in the most unconditional terms; yet, as if he were already anticipating the application of his doctrine to the individual, he speaks of human causes for the rejection of Israel; "because they sought not righteousness by the way of faith;" "because they stumble at the rock of offence." God accepted and rejected Israel of His own good pleasure; and yet it was by their own fault. How are we to reconcile these conflicting statements? They do not need reconciliation; they are but the two opposite expressions of a religious mind, which says at one moment, "Let me try to do right," and at another, "God alone can make me do right." The two feelings may involve a logical contradiction, and yet exist together in fact and in the religious experience of mankind.

In the Old Testament the only election of individuals is that of the great leaders or chiefs, who are identified with the nation. But in the New Testament, where religion has become a personal and individual matter, it follows that election must also be of persons. The Jewish nation knew, or seemed to know, one fact, that they were the chosen people. They saw, also, eminent men raised up by the hand of God to be the deliverers of His servants. It is not in this "historical" way that the Christian becomes conscious of his individual election. From within, not from without, he is made aware of the purpose of God respecting himself. Living in close and intimate union with God, having the mind of the Spirit and knowing the things of the Spirit, he begins to consider with St. Paul, "When it pleased God, who separated me from my mother's womb, to reveal His Son in me." His whole life seems a sort of miracle to him; supernatural, and beyond other men's in the gifts of grace which he has received. If he asks himself, "Whence was this to me?" he finds no other answer but that God gave them "because He had a favour unto him." He recalls the hour of his conversion, when, in a moment, he was changed from darkness to light, and from the power of Satan unto God. Or, perhaps, the dealings of

God with him have been insensible, yet not the less real; like a child, he cannot remember the time when he first began to trust the love of his parent. How can he separate himself from that love or refuse to believe that He who began the good work will also accomplish it unto the end? At which step in the ladder of God's mercy will he stop? "Whom He did foreknow, them He did predestinate; whom He did predestinate, them He also called; whom He called, them He justified; whom He justified, them He also glorified."

A religious mind feels the difference between saying, "God chose me; I cannot tell why; not for any good that I have done; and I am persuaded that He will keep me unto the end;" and saying, "God chooses men quite irrespective of their actions, and predestines them to eternal salvation;" and yet more, if we add the other half of the doctrine, "God refuses men quite irrespective of their actions, and they become reprobates, predestined to everlasting damnation." Could we be willing to return to that stage of the doctrine which St. Paul taught, without comparing contradictory statements or drawing out logical conclusions,—could we be content to rest our belief, as some of the greatest, even of Calvinistic divines have done, on fact and experience, theology would be no longer at variance with morality.

"Work out your own salvation with fear and trembling; for it is God that worketh in you both to do and to will of His good pleasure," is the language of Scripture, adjusting the opposite aspects of this question. The Arminian would say, "Work out your own salvation;" the Calvinist, "God worketh in you both to do and to will of His good pleasure." However contradictory it may sound, the Scripture unites both; work out your own salvation with fear and trembling; for it is God that worketh in you both to will and to do of His good pleasure.



## § 3.

I. We have been considering the question thus far within the limits of Scripture. But it has also a wider range. The primary relations of the will of man to the will of God are independent of the Christian revelation. Natural religion, that is to say, the Greek seeking after wisdom, the Indian wandering in the expanse of his own dreamlike consciousness, the Jew repeating to himself that he is Abraham's seed; each in their several ways at different stages of the world's history have asked the question, "How is the freedom of the human will consistent with the infinity and omnipotence of God?" These attributes admit of a further analysis into the power of God and the knowledge of God. And hence arises a second form of the enquiry, "How is the freedom of the human will reconcilable with Divine omniscience or foreknowledge?" To which the Christian system adds a third question, "How is the freedom of the human will reconcilable with that more immediate presence of God in the soul which is termed by theologians Divine grace?"

1. God is everywhere; man is nowhere. Infinity exists continuously in every point of time; it fills every particle of space. Or rather, these very ideas of time and space are figures of speech, for they have a "here" and a "there," a future and a past—which no effort of human imagination can transcend. But in God there is no future and no past, neither "here nor there;" He is all and in all. Where, then, is room for man? in what open place is he permitted to live and move and have his being?

God is the cause of all things; without Him nothing is made that is made. He is in history, in nature, in the heart of man. The world itself is the work of His power; the least particulars of human life are ordained by Him. "Are not two sparrows sold for one farthing, and yet your heavenly Father feedeth them;" and "the hairs of your head are all numbered." Is there any point at which

this Divine causality can stop? at which the empire of law ceases? at which the human will is set free?

The answer is the fact; not the fact of consciousness as it is sometimes termed, that we are free agents, which it is impossible to see or verify; but the visible tangible fact that we have a place in the order of nature, and walk about on the earth, and are ourselves causes drawing effects after them. Does any advocate of freedom mean more than this? Or any believer in necessity less? No one can deny of himself the restrictions which he observes to be true of others; nor can any one doubt that there exists in others the same consciousness of freedom and responsibility which he has himself. But if so, all these things are as they were before; we need not differ about the unseen foundation whether of necessity or free will, spirit or body, mind or matter, upon which the edifice of human life is to be reared. Just as the theory of the ideality of matter leaves the world where it was—they do not build houses in the air who imagine Bishop Berkeley to have dissolved the solid elements into sensations of the mind—so the doctrine of necessity or predestination leaves morality and religion unassailed, unless it intrude itself as a motive on the sphere of human action.

It is remarkable that the belief in predestination, both in modern and in ancient times, among Mahometans as well as Christians, has been the animating principle of nations and bodies of men, equally, perhaps more than of individuals. It is characteristic of certain countries, and has often arisen from sympathy in a common cause. Yet it cannot be said to have been without a personal influence also. It has led to a view of religion in which man has been too much depressed to form a true conception of God Himself. For it is not to be supposed that the lower we sink human nature in the scale of being, the higher we raise the Author of being; worthy notions of God imply worthy notions of man also.

“God is infinite.” But in what sense? Am I to conceive a space without limit, such as I behold in the immeasurable ether, and apply this viewless form to the thought of the Almighty? Any one will admit that here would be a figure of speech. Yet few of us free our

notions of infinity from the imagery of place. It is this association which gives them their positive, exclusive character. But conceive of infinity as mere negation, denying of God the limits which are imposed upon finite beings, meaning only that God is not a man or comprehensible by man, without any suggestion of universal space, and the exclusiveness disappears; there is room for the creature side by side with the Creator. Or again, press the idea of the infinite to its utmost extent, till it is alone in the universe, or rather is the universe itself, in this heaven of abstraction, nevertheless, a cloud begins to appear; a limitation casts its shadow over the formless void. Infinite is finite because it is infinite. That is to say, because infinity includes all things, it is incapable of creating what is external to itself. Deny infinity in this sense, and the being to whom it is attributed receives a new power; God is greater by being finite than by being infinite. Proceeding in the same train of thought, we may observe that the word finite is the symbol, to our own minds as to the Greek, of strength and reality and truth. It cannot be these which we intend to deny of the Divine Being. Lastly, when we have freed our minds from associations of place and from those other solemn associations which naturally occur to us from its application to the Almighty, are we sure that we intend anything more by the "Infinite" than mere vacancy, the "indefinite," the word "not?"

It is useful to point out the ambiguities and perplexities of such terms. Logic is not to puzzle us with inferences about words which she clothes in mystery; at any rate, before moving a step she should explain their meaning. She must admit that the infinite overreaches itself in denying the existence of the finite, and that there are some "limitations," such as the impossibility of evil or falsehood, which are of the essence of the Divine nature. She must enquire whether it be conceivable to reach a further infinite, in which the opposition to the finite is denied, which may be a worthier image of the Divine Being. She must acknowledge that negative ideas, while they have often a kind of solemnity and mystery, are the shallowest and most trifling of all our ideas.



So far the will may be free unless we persist in an idea of the Divine which logic and not reason erroneously requires, and which is the negative not only of freedom but of all other existence but its own. More serious consequences may seem to flow from the attribute of omnipotence. For if God is the Author of all things, must it not be as a mode of Divine operation that man acts? We can get no further than a doctrine of emanation or derivation. Again, we are caught unwittingly in the toils of an "illogical" logic. For why should we assume that because God is omnipotent He cannot make beings independent of Himself? A figure of speech is not generally a good argument; but in this instance it is a sufficient one, what is needed being not an answer but only an image or mode of conception. (For in theology and philosophy it constantly happens that while logic is working out antinomies, language fails to supply an expression of the intermediate truth.) The carpenter makes a chair, which exists detached from its maker; the mechanician constructs a watch, which is wound up and goes by the action of a spring or lever; he can frame yet more complex instruments, in which power is treasured up for other men to use. The greater the skill of the artificer the more perfect and independent the work. Shall we say of God only that He is unable to separate His creations from Himself? That man can produce works of imagination which live for ages after he is committed to the dust; nay, that in the way of nature he can bring into existence another being endowed with life and consciousness to perpetuate His name? But that God cannot remove a little space to contemplate His works? He must needs be present in all their movements, according to the antiquated error of natural philosophers, "that no body can act where it is not."

(2.) Yet although the freedom of the will may be consistent with the infinity and omnipotence of God, when rightly understood and separated from logical consequences, it may be thought to be really interfered with by the Divine omniscience. "God knows all things; our thoughts are His before they are our own; what I am doing at this moment was certainly foreseen by Him; what He certainly foresaw

yesterday, or a thousand years ago, or from everlasting, how can I avoid doing at this time? To-day He sees the future course of my life. Can I make or unmake what is already within the circle of His knowledge? The imperfect judgment of my fellow-creatures gives me no inquietude—they may condemn me, and I may reverse their opinion. But the fact that the unerring judgment of God has foreseen my doom renders me alike indifferent to good and evil.”

What shall we say to this? First, that the distinction between Divine and human judgments is only partially true. For as God sees with absolute unerringness, so a wise man who is acquainted with the character and circumstances of others may foretell and assure their future life with a great degree of certainty. He may perceive intuitively their strength and weakness, and prophesy their success or failure. Now, here it is observable, that the fact of our knowing the probable course of action which another will pursue has nothing to do with the action itself. It does not exercise the smallest constraint on him; it does not produce the slightest feeling of constraint. Imagine ourselves acquainted with the habits of some animal; as we open the door of the enclosure in which it is kept, we know that it will run up to or away from us; it will show signs of pleasure or irritation. No one supposes that its actions, whatever they are, depend on our knowledge of them. Let us take another example, which is at the other end of the scale of freedom and intelligence. Conceive a veteran statesman casting his eye over the map of Europe, and foretelling the parts which nations or individuals would take in some coming struggle, who thinks the events when they come to pass are the consequences of the prediction? Every one is able to distinguish the causes of the events from the knowledge which foretells them.

There are degrees in human knowledge or foreknowledge proceeding from the lowest probability, through increasing certainty, up to absolute demonstration. But as faint presumptions do not affect the future, nor great probability, so neither does scientific demonstration. Many natural laws cannot be known more certainly

than they are ; but we do not therefore confuse the fact with our knowledge of the fact. The time of the rising of the sun, or of the ebb and flow of the tide, are foretold and acted upon without the least hesitation. Yet no one has imagined that these or any other natural phenomena are affected by our previous calculations about them.

Why, then, should we impose on ourselves the illusion that the unerring certainty of Divine knowledge is a limit or shackle on human actions ? The foreknowledge which we possess ourselves in no way produces the facts which we foresee ; the circumstance that we foresee them in distant time has no more to do with them than if we saw them in distant space. So, once more, we return from the dominion of ideas and trains of speculative consequences to rest in experience. God sits upon the circle of the heavens, present, past, and future in a figure open before Him, and sees the inhabitants of the earth like grasshoppers, coming and going, to and fro, doing or not doing their appointed work : His knowledge of them is not the cause of their actions. So might we ourselves look down upon some wide prospect without disturbing the peaceful toils of the villagers who are beneath. They do not slacken or hasten their business because we are looking at them. In like manner God may look upon mankind without thereby interfering with the human will or influencing in any degree the actions of men.

(3.) But the difficulty with which Christianity surrounds, or rather seems to surround us, winds yet closer ; it rests also on the Christian consciousness. The doctrine of grace may be expressed in the language of St. Paul : “ I can do nothing as of myself, but my sufficiency is of God : ” that which is truly self, which is peculiarly self, is yet in another point of view not self but God. He who has sought most earnestly to fulfil the will of God refers his efforts to something beyond himself ; he is humble and simple, seeming to fear that he will lose the good that he has, when he makes it his own.

This is the mind of Christ which is formally expressed in theology



by theories of grace. Theories of grace have commonly started from the transgression of Adam and the corruption of human nature in his posterity. Into the origin of sin it is not necessary for us to enquire ; we may limit ourselves to the fact. All men are very far gone from original righteousness, they can only return to God by His grace preventing them ; that is to say, anticipating and co-operating with the motions of their will. (1.) God wills that some should be saved, whom He elects without reference to their deserts ; (2.) God wills that some should be saved, and implants in them the mind of salvation ; (3.) God calls all men, but chooses some out of those whom He calls ; (4.) God chooses all alike, and shows no preference to any ; (5.) God calls all men, even in the heathen world, and some hear His voice, not knowing whom they obey. Such are the possible gradations of the question of election. In the first of them grace is a specific quality distinct from holiness or moral virtue ; in the second it is identical with holiness and moral virtue, according to a narrow conception of them which denies their existence in those who have not received a Divine call ; in the third an attempt is made to reconcile justice to all men with favour to some ; in the fourth the justice of God extends equally to all Christian men ; in the fifth we pass the boundaries of the Christian world and expression is given to the thought of the Apostle, "Of a truth I perceive that God is no respecter of persons, but that in every nation he that feareth God is accepted of Him."

All these theories of grace affect at various points the freedom of the will, the first seeming wholly to deny it, while all the others attempt some real or apparent reconciliation of morality and religion. The fourth and fifth meet the difficulties arising out of our ideas of the justice of God, but fall into others derived from experience and fact. Can we say that all Christians, nominal and real, nay, that the most degraded persons among the heathen, are equally the subjects of Divine grace ? Then grace is something unintelligible ; it is a word only, to which there is no corresponding idea. Again, how upon any of these theories is grace distinguishable from the better

consciousness of the individual himself? Can any one pretend to say where grace ends and the movement of the will begins? Did any one ever recognise in himself those lines of demarcation of which theology sometimes speaks?

These are difficulties in which we are involved by "oppositions of knowledge falsely so called." The answer to them is simple—a return to fact and nature. When, instead of reading our own hearts, we seek, in accordance with a preconceived theory, to determine the proportions of the divine and human—to distinguish grace and virtue, the word of God and man—we know not where we are, the difficulty becomes insuperable, we have involved ourselves in artificial meshes, and are bound hand and foot. But when we look by the light of conscience and Scripture on the facts of human nature, the difficulty of itself disappears. No one doubts that he is capable of choosing between good and evil, and that in making this choice he may be supported, if he will, by a power more than earthly. The movement of that Divine power is not independent of the movement of his own will, but coincident and identical with it. Grace and virtue, conscience and the Spirit of God, are not different from each other, but in harmony. If no man can do what is right without the aid of the Spirit, then every one who does what is right has the aid of the Spirit.

Part of the difficulty originates in the fact that the Scripture regards Christian truth from a Divine aspect, "God working in you," while ordinary language, even among religious men in modern times, deals rather with human states or feelings. Philosophy has a third way of speaking which is different from either. Two or more sets of words and ideas are used which gradually acquire a seemingly distinct meaning; at last comes the question—in what relation they stand to one another? The Epistles speak of grace and faith at the same time that heathen moralists told of virtue and wisdom, and the two streams of language have flowed on without uniting even at our own day. The question arises, first, whether grace is anything more than the objective name of faith and love; and again, whether

these two latter are capable of being distinguished from virtue and truth? Is that which St. Paul called faith absolutely different from that which Seneca termed virtue or morality? Is not virtue, *πρὸς θεόν*, faith? Is faith anything without virtue? But if so, they are not opposed at all, or opposed only as part and whole. Christianity is not the negative of the religions of nature or the heathen; it includes and purifies them.

Instead, then, of arranging in a sort of theological diagram the relations of the human will to Divine grace, we deny the possibility of separating them. In various degrees, in many ways, more or less consciously in different cases, the Spirit of God is working in the soul of man. It is an erroneous mode of speaking, according to which the free agency of man is represented as in conflict with the Divine will. For the freedom of man in the higher sense is the grace of God; and in the lower sense (of mere choice) is not inconsistent with it. The real opposition is not between freedom and predestination, which are imperfect and in some degree misleading expressions of the same truth, but between good and evil.

II. Passing out of the sphere of religion, we have now to examine the question of free agency within the narrower limits of the mind itself. It will confirm the line of argument hitherto taken, if it be found that here too we are subject to the illusions of language and the oppositions of logic.

(1.) Every effect has a cause; every cause an effect. The drop of rain, the ray of light does not descend at random on the earth. In the natural world though we are far from understanding all the causes of phenomena, we are certain from that part which we know, of their existence in that part which we do not know. In the human mind we perceive the action of many physical causes; we are therefore led to infer, that only our ignorance of physiology prevents our perceiving the absolute interdependence of body and soul. So indissolubly are cause and effect bound together, that there is a mental impossibility in conceiving them apart. Where, then in the endless chain of causes and effect can the human will be



inserted, or how is the insertion of the will, as one cause out of many, consistent with the absolute freedom which we ascribe to it ?

The author of the "Critic of pure Reason" is willing to accept such a statement as has been just made, and yet believes himself to have found out of time and space, independent of the laws of cause and effect, a transcendental freedom. Our separate acts are determined by previous causes ; our whole life is a continuous "effect," yet in spite of this mechanical sequence, freedom is the overruling law which gives the form to human action. It is not necessary to analyse the steps by which Kant arrived at this paradoxical conclusion. Only by adjusting the glass so as to exclude from the sight everything but the perplexities of previous philosophers, can we conceive how a great intellect could have been led to imagine the idea of a freedom from which the notion of time is abstracted, of which nevertheless we are conscious in time. For what is that freedom which does not apply to our individual acts, hardly even to our lives as a whole, like a point which has neither length nor breadth, wanting both continuity and succession ?

Scepticism proceeds by a different path in reference to our ideas of cause and effect ; it challenges their validity, it denies the necessity of the connection, or even doubts the ideas themselves. There was a time when the world was startled out of its propriety at this verbal puzzle, and half believed itself a sceptic. Now we know that no innovation in the use of words or in forms of thought can make any impression on solid facts. Nature and religion, and human life remain the same, even to one who entirely renounces the common conceptions of cause and effect.

The sceptic of the last century, instead of attempting to invalidate the connection of fact which we express by the terms cause and effect, should rather have attacked language as "unequal to the subtlety of nature." Facts must be described in some way, and therefore words must be used, but always in philosophy with a latent consciousness of their inadequacy and imperfection. The very phrase, "cause and effect," has a direct influence in disguising from us the

complexity of causes and effects. It is too abstract to answer to anything in the concrete. It tends to isolate in idea some one antecedent or condition from all the rest. And the relation which we deem invariable is really a most various one. Its apparent necessity is only the necessity of relative terms. Every cause has an effect, in the same sense that every father has a son. But while in the latter case the relation is always the same, the manifold application of the terms, cause and effect, to the most different phenomena has led to an ambiguity in their use. Our first impression is, that a cause is one thing and an effect another, but soon we find them doubling up, or melting into one. The circulation of the blood is not the cause of life, in the same sense that a blow with the hammer may be the cause of death ; nor is virtue the cause of happiness, in precisely the same sense that the circulation of the blood is the cause of life. Everywhere, as we ascend in the scale of creation, from mechanics to chemistry, from chemistry to physiology and human action, the relative notion is more difficult and subtle, the cause becoming inextricably involved with the effect, and the effect with the cause, "every means being an end, and every end a means."

Hence, no one who examines our ideas of cause and effect will believe that they impose any limit on the will; they are an imperfect mode in which the mind imagines the sequence of nature or moral actions ; being no generalization from experience, but a play of words only. The chain which we are wearing is loose, and, when shaken will drop off. External circumstances are not the cause of which the will is the effect ; neither is the will the cause of which circumstances are the effect. But the phenomenon intended to be described by the words " cause and effect " is itself the will, whose motions are analysed in language borrowed from physical nature.

The same explanation applies to another formula : " the strongest motive." The will of every man is said to be only determined by the strongest motive : what is this but another imaginary analysis of the will itself ? For the motive is a part of the will, and the strongest motive is nothing more than the motive which I choose. Nor is it

true as a fact that we are always thus determined. For the greater proportion of human actions have no distinct motives ; the mind does not stand like the schoolmen's ass, pondering between opposite alternatives. Mind and will, and the sequence of cause and effect, and the force of motives, are different ways of speaking of the same mental phenomena.

So readily are we deceived by language, so easily do we fall under the power of imaginary reasonings. The author of the "Novum Organum" has put men upon their guard against the illusions of words in the study of the natural sciences. It is true that many distinctions may be drawn between the knowledge of nature, the facts of which are for the most part visible and tangible, and morality and religion, which run up into the unseen. But is it therefore to be supposed that language, which is the source of half the exploded fallacies of chemistry and physiology, is an adequate or exact expression of moral and spiritual truths? It is probable that its analysis of human nature is really as erring and inaccurate as its description of physical phenomena, though the error may be more difficult of detection. Those "inexact natures" or substances of which Bacon speaks exist in moral philosophy as in physics ; their names are not heat, moisture, form, matter and the like, but necessity, free will, predestination, grace, motive, cause, which rest upon nothing and yet become the foundation-stones of many systems. Logic, too, has its parallels, and conjugates, and differences of kind, which in life and reality are only differences of degree, and remote inferences lending an apparent weight to the principle on which they really drag, which spread themselves over every field of thought and are hardly corrected by their inconsistency with the commonest facts.

III. Difficulties of this class belong to the last generation rather than to the present ; they are seldom discussed now by philosophical writers. Philosophy in our own age is occupied in another way. Her foundation is experience, which alone she interrogates respecting the limits of human action. How far is man a free agent ? is the question still before us. But it is to be considered from without



rather than from within, as it appears to others or ourselves in the case of others, and not with reference to our internal consciousness of our own actions.

The conclusions of philosophers would have met with more favour at the hands of preachers and moralists, had they confined themselves to the fact. Indeed, they would have been irresistible, like the conclusions of natural science, for who can resist evidence that any one may verify for himself? But the taint of language has clung to them; the imperfect expression of manifest truths has greatly hindered the general acceptance of them even among the most educated. It was not understood that those who spoke of necessity meant nothing which was really inconsistent with free will; when they assumed a power of calculating human actions, it was not perceived that all of us are every day guilty of this imaginary impiety. The words, character, habit, force of circumstances, temperament and constitution imply all that is really involved in the idea that human action is subject to uniform laws. Neither is it to be denied that expressions have been used equally repugnant to fact and morality; instead of regularity, and order, and law, which convey a beneficent idea, necessity has been set up as a constraining power tending to destroy, if not really destroying, the accountability of man. History, too, has received an impress of fatalism, which has doubtless affected our estimate of the good and evil of the agents who have been regarded as not really responsible for actions which the march of events forced upon them.

According to a common way of considering this subject, the domain of necessity is extending every day, and liberty is already confined to a small territory not yet reclaimed by scientific enquiry. Mind and body are in closer contact; there is increasing evidence of the interdependence of the mental and nervous powers. It is probable, or rather certain, that every act of the mind has a cause and effect in the body, that every act of the body has a cause and effect in the mind. Given the circumstances, parentage, education, temperament of each individual; we may calculate, with an approximation to accuracy, his probable course of life. Persons are

engaged every day in making such observations ; and whatever uncertainty there may be in the determination of the future of any single individual, this uncertainty is eliminated when the enquiry is extended to many individuals or to a whole class. We have as good data for supposing that a fixed proportion of a million persons in a country will commit murder or theft as that a fixed proportion will die without reaching a particular age and of this or that disease under given circumstances. And it so happens that we have the power of testing this order or uniformity in the most trifling of human actions. Nor can we doubt that were it worth while to make an abstract of human life, arranging under heads the least minutiae of action, all that we say and do would be found to conform to numerical laws.

So, again, history, is passing into the domain of philosophy. Nations, like individuals, are moulded by circumstances; in their first rise, and ever after in their course, they are dependent on country and climate, like plants or animals, embodying the qualities which have dropped upon them from surrounding influences in national temperament; in their later stages seeming to react upon these causes, and coming under a new kind of law, as the earth discloses its hidden treasures, or the genius of man calls forth into life and action the powers which are dormant in matter. Nature, which is, in other words, the aggregate of all these causes, stamps nations and societies, and creates in them a mind, that is to say, ideas of order, of religion, of conquest, which they maintain, often unimpaired by the changes in their physical condition. She infuses among the mass a few great intellects, according to some law unknown to us, to "instrument this lower world." Here is a new power which is partially separated from the former, and yet combines with it in national existence, like body and soul in the existence of man. Partly isolated from their age and nation, partly also identified with them, it is a curious observation respecting great men that while they seem to have more play and freedom than others, in themselves they are often more enthralled, being haunted with the sense of a destiny which controls them. The "heirs of all the ages" who have subjected nature to

the dominion of science are also nature's subjects; the conquerors who have poured over the earth, have only continued some wave or tendency in the history of the times which preceded them. From the thin vapour which first floated, as some believe, in the azure vault, up to that miracle of complexity which we call man, and again from man the individual to the whole human race, with its languages and religions, and other national characteristics, and backwards to the beginning of human history, in the works of mind too as well as in the material universe, there is not always development, but order, and uniformity, and law.

It is a matter of some importance in what way this connexion or order of nature is to be expressed. For although words cannot alter facts, the right use of them greatly affects the readiness with which facts are admitted or received. Now the world may be variously imagined as a vast machine, as an animal or living being, as a body endowed with a rational or divine soul. All these figures of speech, and the associations to which they give rise, have an insensible influence on our ideas. The representation of the world as a machine is a more favourite one, in modern times, than the representation of it as a living being; and with mechanism is associated the notion of necessity. Yet the machine is, after all, a mere barren unity, which gives no conception of the endless fertility of natural or of moral life. So, again, when we speak of a "soul of the world," there is no real resemblance to a human soul; there is no centre in which this mundane life or soul has its seat, no individuality such as characterises the soul of man. But the use of the word invariably recalls thoughts of Pantheism :

*"deum namque ire per omnes terrasque tractusque maris, cœlumque profundum."*

So the term "law" carries with it an association, partly of compulsion, partly of that narrower and more circumscribed notion of law, in which it is applied to chemistry or mechanics. So again the word "necessity" itself always has a suggestion of external force.

All such language has a degree of error, because it introduces



some analogy which belongs to another sphere of thought. But when, laying aside language, we consider facts only, no appearance of external compulsion arises, whether in nature, or in history, or in life. The lowest, and therefore the simplest idea, that we are capable of forming of physical necessity, is of the stone falling to the ground. No one imagines human action to be necessary in any such sense as this. If this be our idea of necessity, the meaning of the term must be enlarged when it is applied to man. If any one speaks of human action as the result of necessary laws, to avoid misunderstanding, we may ask at the outset of the controversy, "In what degree necessary?" And this brings us to an idea which is perhaps the readiest solution of the apparent perplexity—that of degrees of necessity. For, although it is true, that to the eye of a superior or divine being the actions of men would seem to be the subject of laws quite as much as the falling stone, yet these laws are of a far higher or more delicate sort; we may figure them to ourselves truly, as allowing human nature play and room within certain limits, as regulating only and not constraining the freedom of its movements.

How degrees of necessity are possible may be illustrated as follows: The strongest or narrowest necessity which we ever see in experience is that of some very simple mechanical fact, such as is furnished by the law of attraction. A greater necessity than this is only an abstraction; as, for example, the necessity by which two and two make four, or the three angles of a triangle equal two right angles. But any relation between objects which are seen is of a much feebler and less absolute kind; the strongest which we have ever observed is that of a smaller body to a larger. The physiology even of plants opens to our minds freer and nobler ideas of law. The tree with its fibres and sap, drawing its nourishment from many sources, light, air, moisture, earth, is a complex structure: rooted to one particular spot, no one would think of ascribing to it free agency, yet as little should we think of binding it fast in the chains of a merely mechanical necessity. Animal life partaking with man of locomotion is often termed free; its sphere is narrowed only by instinct; indeed

the highest grade of irrational being can hardly be said, in point of freedom, to differ from the lowest type of the human species. And in man himself are many degrees of necessity or freedom, from the child who is subject to its instincts, or the drunkard who is the slave of his passions, up to the philosopher comprehending at a glance the wonders of heaven and earth, the freeman "whom the truth makes free," or the Christian devoting himself to God, whose freedom is "obedience to a law;" that law being "the law of the Spirit of life," as the Apostle expresses it; respecting which, nevertheless, according to another mode of speaking (so various is language on this subject), "necessity is laid upon him." And between these two extremes are many half freedoms, or imperfect necessities: one man is under the influence of habit, another of prejudice, a third is the creature of some superior will; of a fourth it is said, that it was "impossible for him to act otherwise;" a fifth does by effort what to another is spontaneous; while in the case of all, allowance is made for education, temperament, and the like.

The idea of necessity has already begun to expand; it is no longer the negative of freedom, they almost touch. For freedom, too, is subject to limitation; the freedom of the human will is not the freedom of the infinite, but of the finite. It does not pretend to escape from the conditions of human life. No man in his senses imagines that he can fly into the air, or walk through the earth; he does not fancy that his limbs will move with the expedition of thought. He is aware that he has a less, or it may be a greater, power than others. He learns from experience to take his own measure. But this limited or measured freedom is another form of enlarged necessity. Beginning with an imaginary freedom, we may reduce it within the bounds of experience; beginning with an abstract necessity, we may accommodate it to the facts of human life.

Attention has been lately called to the phenomena (already noticed) of the uniformity of human actions. The observation of this uniformity has caused a sort of momentary disturbance in the moral ideas of some persons, who seem unable to get rid of the

illusion, that nature compels a certain number of individuals to act in a particular way, for the sake of keeping up the average. Their error is, that they confuse the law, which is only the expression of the fact, with the cause; it is as though they affirmed the universal to necessitate the particular. The same uniformity appears equally in matters of chance. Ten thousand throws of the dice, "ceteris paribus," will give about the same number of twos, threes, sixes: what compulsion was there here? So ten thousand human lives will give a nearly equal number of forgeries, thefts, or other extraordinary actions. Neither is there compulsion here; it is the simple fact. It may be said, Why is the number uniform? In the first place, it is *not* uniform, that is to say, it is in our power to alter the proportions of crime by altering its circumstances. And this change of circumstances is not separable from the act of the legislator or private individual by which it may be accomplished, which is in turn suggested by other circumstances. The will or the intellect of man still holds its place as the centre of a moving world. But, secondly, the imaginary power of this uniform number affects no one in particular; it is not required that A, B, C, should commit a crime, or transmit an undirected letter, to enable us to fill up a tabular statement. The fact exhibited in the tabular statement is the result of all the movements of all the wills of the ten thousand persons who are made the subject of analysis.

It is possible to conceive great variations in such tables; it is possible, that is, to imagine, without any change of circumstances, a thousand persons executed in France during one year for political offences, and none the next. But the world in which this phenomenon was observed would be a very different sort of world from that in which we live. It would be a world in which "nations, like individuals, went mad;" in which there was no habit, no custom; almost, we may say, no social or political life. Men must be no longer different, and so compensating one another by their excellencies and deficiencies, but all in the same extreme; as if the waves of the sea in a storm instead of returning to their level were to remain



on high. The mere statement of such a speculation is enough to prove its absurdity. And, perhaps, no better way could be found of disabusing the mind of the objections which appear to be entertained to the fact of the uniformity of human actions, than a distinct effort to imagine the disorder of the world which would arise out of the opposite principle.

But the advocate of free will, may again return to the charge, with an appeal to consciousness. "Your freedom," he will say, "is but half freedom, but I have that within which assures me of an absolute freedom, without which I should be deprived of what I call responsibility." No man has seen facts of consciousness, and therefore it is at any rate fair that before they are received they shall be subjected to analysis. We may look at an outward object which is called a table; no one would in this case demand an examination into the human faculties before he admitted the existence of the table. But inward facts are of another sort; that they really exist, may admit of doubt; that they exist in the particular form attributed to them, or in any particular form, is a matter very difficult to prove. Nothing is easier than to insinuate a mere opinion, under the disguise of a fact of consciousness.

Consciousness tells, or seems to tell, of an absolute freedom; and this is supposed to be a sufficient witness of the existence of such a freedom. But does consciousness tell also of the conditions under which this freedom can be exercised? Does it remind us that we are finite beings? Does it present to one his bodily, to another his mental constitution? Is it identical with self-knowledge? No one imagines this. To what then is it the witness? To a dim and unreal notion of freedom, which is as different from the actual fact as dreaming is from acting. No doubt, the human mind has or seems to have a boundless power, as of thinking so also of willing. But this imaginary power, going as it does far beyond experience, varying too in youth and age, greatest often in idea when it is really least, cannot be adduced as a witness for what is inconsistent with experience.

The question, How is it possible for us to be finite beings, and yet to possess this consciousness of freedom which has no limit? may be partly answered by another question: How is it possible for us to acquire any ideas which transcend experience? The answer is, only, that the mind has the power of forming such ideas; it can conceive a beauty, goodness, truth, which has no existence on earth. The conception, however, is subject to this law, that the greater the idealisation the less the individuality. In like manner that imperfect freedom which we enjoy as finite beings is magnified by us into an absolute idea of freedom, which seems to be infinite because it drops out of sight the limits with which nature in fact everywhere surrounds us; and also because it is the abstraction of self, of which we can never be deprived, and which we conceive to be acting still when all the conditions of action are removed.

Freedom is absolute in another sense, as the correlative of obligation. Men entertain some one, some another, idea of right, but all are bound to act according to that idea. The standard may be relative to their own circumstances, but the duty is absolute; and the power is also absolute of refusing the evil and choosing the good, under any possible contingency. It is a matter (not only of consciousness but) of fact, that we have such a power, quite as much as the facts of statistics, to which it is sometimes opposed, or rather, to speak more correctly, is one of them. And when we make abstraction of this power, that is, when we think of it by itself, there arises also the conception of an absolute freedom.

So singularly is human nature constituted, looking from without on the actions of men as they are, witnessing inwardly to a higher law. "You ought to do so; you have the power to do so," is consistent with the fact, that in practice you fail to do so. It may be possible for us to unite both these aspects of human nature, yet experience seems to show that we commonly look first at one and then at the other. The inward vision tells us the law of duty and the will of God; the outward contemplation of ourselves

and others shows the trials to which we are most subject. Any transposition of these two points of view is fatal to morality. For the proud man to say, "I inherited pride from my ancestors;" or for the licentious man to say, "It is in the blood," for the weak man to say, "I am weak, and will not strive;" for any to find the excuses of their vices in their physical temperament or external circumstances, is the corruption of their nature.

Yet this external aspect of human affairs has a moral use. It is a duty to look at the consequences of actions, as well as at actions themselves; the knowledge of our own temperament, or strength, or health, is a part also of the knowledge of self. We have need of the wise man's warning, about "age which will not be defied" in our moral any more than in our physical constitution. In youth, also, there are many things outward and indifferent, which cannot but exercise a moral influence on after life. Often opportunities of virtue have to be made, as well as virtuous efforts; there are forms of evil, too, against which we struggle in vain by mere exertions of the will. He who trusts only to a moral or religious impulse, is apt to have aspirations, which never realise themselves in action. His moral nature may be compared to a spirit without a body, fluttering about in the world, but unable to comprehend or grasp any good.

Yet more, in dealing with classes of men, we seem to find that we have greater power to shape their circumstances than immediately to affect their wills. The voice of the preacher passes into the air; the members of his congregation are like persons "beholding their natural face in a glass;" they go their way, forgetting their own likeness. And often the result of a long life of ministerial work has been the conversion of two or three individuals. The power which is exerted in such a case may be compared to the unaided use of the hand, while mechanical appliances are neglected. Or to turn to another field of labour, in which the direct influence of Christianity has been hitherto small, may not the reason why the result of missions is often disappointing be found in the circumstance, that we



have done little to improve the political or industrial state of those among whom our missionaries are sent? We have thought of the souls of men, and of the Spirit of God influencing them, in too naked a way; instead of attending to the complexity of human nature, and the manner in which God has ever revealed himself in the history of mankind.

The great lesson, which Christians have to learn in the present day, is to know the world as it is; that is to say, to know themselves as they are; human life as it is; nature as it is; history as it is. Such knowledge is also a power, to fulfil the will of God and to contribute to the happiness of man. It is a resting-place in speculation, and a new beginning in practice. Such knowledge is the true reconciliation of the opposition of necessity and free will. Not that spurious reconciliation which places necessity in one sphere of thought, freedom in another; nor that pride of freedom which is ready to take up arms against plain facts; nor yet that demonstration of necessity in which logic, equally careless of facts, has bound fast the intellect of man. The whole question when freed from the illusions of language, is resolvable into experience. Imagination cannot conquer for us more than that degree of freedom which we truly have; the tyranny of science cannot impose upon us any law or limit to which we are not really subject; theology cannot alter the real relations of God and man. The facts of human nature and of Christianity remain the same, whether we describe them by the word "necessity" or "freedom," in the phraseology of Lord Bacon and Locke, or in that of Calvin and Augustine.

THE END.

70  
LONDON:  
PRINTED BY SPOTTISWOODE AND CO.  
NEW-STREET SQUARE.









6. 75 6













