













GENERAL HISTORY
OF THE
CHRISTIAN RELIGION AND CHURCH:

TRANSLATED FROM THE GERMAN OF
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NEW EDITION, CAREFULLY REVISED.

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"I am come to send fire on the earth."—*Words of our Lord.*

"And the fire shall try every man's work of what sort it is." "But other foundation can no man lay than that is laid, which is Christ Jesus."—*St. Paul.*

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VOLUME EIGHTH.

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ADVERTISEMENT.

THIS Volume concludes the HISTORY OF THE CHRISTIAN CHURCH as published by Neander. Since his death a posthumous volume has appeared, compiled from his papers by his pupil Dr. Schneider, and there is some probability of a further continuation. When this is determined we shall translate the remainder, and give a General Index to the whole.



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CHURCH HISTORY.

FIFTH PERIOD. FROM GREGORY THE SEVENTH TO BONIFACE THE EIGHTH. FROM THE YEAR 1073 TO THE YEAR 1294.—*Continued.*

SECTION FOURTH.

HISTORY OF DOCTRINES.

I. EVOLUTION OF DOCTRINES AND OF THEOLOGY IN THE WESTERN CHURCH.

FROM the rudeness of the eleventh century we saw a new spiritual life emerging; and here, too, the new religious awakening was accompanied with the commencement of a new creation in science. Yet these two directions of the new life, the religious and the scientific, did not always work harmoniously together, but also developed themselves independently, side by side; and sometimes, in fact,—as one or the other of them happened to predominate,—they fell into direct opposition to one another. Accordingly, we observe the sudden appearance of a certain dialectical tendency, engendered simply by the self-feeling of the awakened understanding, and not originally animated by any religious interest, which now threatened to come into conflict with the spiritual tendencies that had sprung out of the depths of the religious life. On the one side, was the predominant life of feeling and emotion; on the other, the predominant activity of the understanding and of conception. Already, towards the close of the preceding period, we noticed the strife between a freer mode of inquiry and one which chose to subject itself rather to the authority of church tradition, as it was presented to us, in

the one case, in the person of Berengar ; in the other, in that of Lanfranc. But the triumph of Lanfranc evinced already to which side the reigning spirit was inclined ; at the same time, however, the battle was not yet decided, but the contest must be often repeated ere such a decision could be arrived at as to fix a standing-point for the present times.

Although there can be no doubt that the dialectical writings of Boethius had a special influence in directing the awakened spirit of philosophical inquiry to the question respecting the objective significance of general conceptions, yet we are not to suppose that this explains everything ; for the outward occasion and point of attachment for that which develops itself from an inward principle is one thing ; and the true inward principle itself, grounded in the very nature of the process of philosophical development, is another. The most important antagonisms which, under different forms in different ages, are wont to busy the powers of thought, when awakening to freer self-activity, may be recognized in the present case, though men lost themselves in a multitude of less important collateral questions and unfruitful dialectical subtleties, before the main questions and antagonisms, lying at the bottom, could be brought into the clear light of consciousness. Under those antagonisms,—which set in movement the dialectic spirits of those times, relating to reality and non reality, to the objective or barely subjective significance of general conceptions,—were enveloped the gravest questions respecting the relation of thought to being, of the universal to the particular. It was the first breaking forth, though still concealed in the bud, and not come as yet to clear self-consciousness, of the controversy between a speculative and dogmatical, and an empirical and sceptical, tendency. It is obvious to remark, therefore, the great importance of the issue of such a contest, in determining the direction of the scientific, and especially of the theological, spirit.

As the dogmatical bent of Augustin exercised the most decided influence on the minds of the age, so the peculiar *realistic* element, which was so closely inwoven with his whole mode of thinking, had, at the same time with the latter, obtained the mastery ; and that, too, in the same form in which it appears in his writings, viz., after that partly Platonic and partly Aristotelian mode of apprehension, according to which

general conceptions (the *universalia*) were regarded as the archetypes of the divine reason (*universalia ante rem*) and as copied, struck off in the manifold diversity of phenomena—the species lying at the basis of individual beings (*universalia in re*). But a new tendency proceeded from Roscelin, a canonical priest, who, near the close of the eleventh century, founded a peculiar dialectical school at Compiègne. He maintained that all knowledge must proceed from experience, individuals only had real existence; all general conceptions were without objective significance. They were but abstractions, necessary helps of the understanding, to enable it to grasp the infinite manifoldness of things, *nomina non res*; hence the name Nominalism, to designate this school.* The sceptical tendency of nominalism may be clearly discerned in his own case, by observing the mode in which he disputes the objective reality of the conceptions, “whole and part,” when he says: “The parts must be prior to the whole;” “the whole presupposes the parts, and yet the parts really subsist only in reference to a whole.”† An internal necessity, however, would impel the minds of this age, so predominantly dogmatical in its tendency, to resist a sceptical element so strongly expressed; and this antagonism was the first which particularly occupied the dialecticians.

The university of Paris presented, in the twelfth century, for the first time, a school which gradually became a common centre for all scientific studies. Previous to this, it was only

* I will here notice how that extraordinary man, Roger Bacon, in the thirteenth century, of whom we shall have more to say hereafter, states these antagonisms: *Aliqui ponunt ea (universalia) solum in anima, aliqui extra, aliqui medio modo.* Opus Majus, p. i. c. vi. f. 28.

† These doctrines of Roscelin have become more accurately known by means of the fragments of Abelard's dialectics, published by Cousin (*Ouvrages inédits d'Abélard.* Paris, 1836). *Fuit autem, memini, magistri nostri Roscellini tam insana sententia, ut nullam rem partibus constare vellet, sed sicut solis vocibus species, ita et partes adscribebat. Si quis autem rem illam, quæ domus est, rebus aliis, pariete scilicet et fundamento constare diceret, tali ipsum argumentatione impugnabat: si res illa, quæ est paries, rei illius, quæ domus est, pars sit, cum ipsa domus nihil aliud sit, quam ipsa paries et tectum et fundamentum, profecto paries sui ipsius et cæterorum pars erit. At vero quomodo sui ipsius pars fuerit? Amplius omnis pars naturaliter prior est suo toto. Quomodo autem paries prior se et aliis dicetur, cum se nullo modo prior sit?* L. c. p. 471.

individual men of distinguished talents, teachers in the cathedral and monastic schools, who, by their power of influence on youthful minds, and by their reputation, collected around them the young men from various districts, far and near. So laboured the two representatives of the opposite dialectical tendencies, in two neighbouring cities,—one at Lisle, the other at Tournay. In the first named city, Raimbert stood at the head of the nominalist school. At Tournay, the cathedral school had become eminent and flourishing, under the care of its great master, Odo, or Udardus; and he, as a realist, was a warm opponent of the dialectician in his neighbourhood. The reputation of this scholar brought together young men here from all parts of France, Germany, and the Netherlands. When we think of the rudeness of the times, we must be surprised to learn that such influence could proceed from a man of science, not merely on the narrower circle of his scholars, but upon the city itself in which he lived. Yet so we find it described by one of Raimbert's contemporaries. "If one rambled through the streets of the city, and observed the crowds of disputants, one might imagine that the citizens had abandoned all other business, and occupied themselves with philosophy alone. Coming into the vicinity of the school, one would sometimes behold Odo walking about with his scholars, and instructing them after the manner of the peripatetics, sometimes sitting in the midst of them, and replying to the questions propounded to him. During the hours of the evening, too, he might be heard, till late into the night, disputing before the church doors, or seen pointing with his finger and explaining to his scholars the course of the stars. His scholars, who numbered two hundred, were warmly and enthusiastically attached to him."*

But this undue predominance of one mental direction, the dialectical, this one-sided occupation of the mind with mere formal matter, was attended with its mischievous effects. As well the life and soul, as the material interests of science, would suffer thereby. The new dialecticians were intent on finding for everything some new expression, without any advantage to the matter in hand. In their new-coined Latin

* See the history of the abbey at Tournay, by the abbot Herman, in D'Achery, Spicileg. T. II. f. 889.

words, men fancied they had obtained science. The ingenious advocate of the rights of empirical knowledge against the arrogant pretensions of dialectics, which swallowed up all other interest, John of Salisbury, in the last times of the twelfth century, had to complain that this one-sided logical enthusiasm caused all other studies, and all employment of time on the ancients, to be despised; that every man was for inventing a new grammar, a new logic; that, after the ancient rules had been abolished, new laws for everything were drawn from the depths of philosophy. "To call an ass or a man," says he, "by his common name, was a transgression, a thing unworthy of a philosopher. It was held to be impossible to say or to do anything according to the rules of reason, unless the terms fitness and reason were expressly introduced."* "Schools," says the same writer, "became multiplied; since no man was content to be a scholar, but each, borne onward by the approbation of his adherents, would himself be the author of some new thing."† When individuals who had been, for a season, exclusively occupied with these matters, became sensible of the idleness of such pursuits, or were brought, by the experiences of life, to a more serious tone of mind,‡ they retired from the world and became regular canonicals or monks.

Yet the change produced by such impressions was not the same in all. As it was usually the case that those who imagined they had renounced the world not seldom betrayed by their temper that they continued to be the same as before, although changed as to form, so it turned out here that, with many, the old nature soon emerged again; and hence it was

* *Solam convenientiam sive rationem loquebantur. Argumentum sonabat in ore omnium et asinum nominare vel hominem aut aliquid operum naturæ instar criminis erat et a philosopho alienum. Impossibile credebatur convenienter et ad rationis normam quicquam dicere aut facere, nisi convenientis et rationis mentio expressim esset inserta. Metalog. Lib. I. c. lii.*

† *Recentes magistri e scholis et pulli volucrum e nidis, sicut pari tempore morabantur, sic pariter avolabant.*

‡ Such cases must have occurred frequently, as John of Salisbury remarks: (*Metalog. Lib. I. c. iv.*) *Alii namque monachorum aut clericorum claustrum ingressi sunt et plerique suum correxerunt errorem, deprehendentes in se et aliis prædicantes, quia quicquid didicerant, vanitas vanitatum est et super omnia vanitas.*

easy, as John of Salisbury says, to see, lurking under the monk's cowl, the self-conceit of the philosopher.* Others renounced, with their whole soul, the pursuits which, before, they had idly followed; and, giving themselves wholly up to monkish asceticism, studied only how to make sure of salvation. The third class was composed of such as possessed a real inward call to speculation, and who, therefore, by the change of their interior life, could not be induced wholly to abandon it, inasmuch as, by so doing, they must deny the essential character of their own minds, but only took a new direction in the same, and turned it upon objects which, after that change, more particularly occupied their attention.

An example of a change of the last-mentioned kind is furnished in the above-named Odo. Already, for a period of five years, he stood at the head of the above-mentioned realistic school; and indeed, by the severe life which he himself led, and to which he held his scholars, he had made himself universally respected and revered. But the study of the Bible and of the ancient fathers of the church still lay remote from his pursuits, and he busied himself only with the philosophical writings of antiquity, so far as they were then known in the Latin language. Because he strove to imitate the pattern of the ancient philosophers, which, in those times of philosophical enthusiasm, could be the more easily represented as the highest ideal of perfection the less men derived their knowledge of antiquity from credible sources,† therefore many were inclined to attribute his severity of life to his emulation of those philosophers, rather than to the spirit of Christian asceticism.‡ On a certain time he happened to purchase of one of his scholars Augustin's work, *De libero arbitrio*, and had thrown the

* The noticeable words of John of Salisbury: Si mihi non credis, claustra ingredi, scrutare mores fratrum et inuenies ibi superbiam Moab et eam intensam valde, ut arrogantia absorbeat fortitudinem ejus. Miratur Benedictus et queritur, quod se quodammodo auctore latet lupus in pellibus agnibus. Utique tonsuram et pullam vestem a supercilio distare causatur. Et ut rectius dixerim, supercilium arguit, eo quod tonsuræ vestibusque non consonet. Ritus observationum contemnitur et sub imagine philosophantis spiritus fallacis elationis obrepit.

† We shall meet with an example of this further on, in Abelard.

‡ The above-mentioned writer of the history of St. Martin's abbey at Tours, cites it as the opinion of some: Eum hanc distinctionem non exercere causa religionis, sed potius antiquæ philosophiæ consuetudinis.

book into his library, without taking any further thought about it. Two months afterwards, however, when he was explaining to his pupils the work of Boethius, *De consolatione philosophiæ*, and in so doing was led to speak of freewill, he recollected the new addition he had lately made to his library, and ordered it to be brought to him. So strongly was he interested by it, that from thenceforth he began to expound the whole work to his scholars. Finally, in expounding the third book, he came to a passage which treats of the wretched condition of the souls absorbed in the pursuits of a worldly life, and excluded from the heavenly glory. This he thought himself bound to apply to himself and to the companions of his labours, because their science did not reach beyond the present world. He rose from his chair, and, bursting into tears, took his way to the church. The vanity of the pursuits in which he had hitherto been engaged rose clearly before his mind; four of his scholars joined him, prepared to follow him anywhere. He got himself admitted among the regular canonicals, became abbot, and afterwards archbishop of Cambray, and now applied his philosophical method to the defence of the doctrines of the church. He wrote a work on original sin, in which it is impossible not to perceive the influence of his philosophical realism. When the different positions of philosophy and theology thus came to be confounded together, theological controversies might easily grow out of the philosophical, and be carried on with even greater violence.*

This manifested itself in the way in which nominalism was suppressed at its first appearance, by a fusing together of the theological with the philosophical interest; only it might be a question whether Roscelin did not depart from the prevailing bent, not merely by his peculiar dialectical theory, but also by his theological principles, and, indeed, the entire position he took in theology, thereby creating great alarm among the followers of that bent. There was unquestionably to be detected, as we have seen, in the dialectics of Roscelin, a sceptical

* Characteristic of these times is an anecdote which occurs in the already-mentioned life of Odo. One of the young clergymen of Tournay, who was made uneasy by the controversy between the realist and the nominalist schools, between his teacher Odo and Raimbert of Lisle, applied to a deaf-mute at Tournay, who passed for a soothsayer, to know on which side lay the truth.

spirit and a sceptical tendency; and the same spirit might lead to the unsettling of everything, even in matters of Christian faith. The dangerous conclusions ascribed to Roscelin's dialectical theory by his theological opponents had their origin, no doubt, in some feeling of this sort;* but it does not appear that any such sceptical tendency actually betrayed itself in his theology. We do not perceive that he actually ascribed more to reason in comparison with faith—that he actually made the latter more dependent on the scrutiny of the former—than other theologians. He spoke, in fact, not of a *trial* of "faith" by "reason," but of a *defending* of the former by the latter. As pagans and Jews defend their religion, so, he maintained, ought Christians to defend their religion;† and, in order to this, reason should minister to faith. To this, in fact, agreed also the dialectical theologians of the common stamp, nor did it in anywise conflict with the principle of the Augustinian philosophy of religion and doctrine. To be sure, everything depended on the manner according to which the idea of defending the faith should now be determined: here there was still room for great differences of opinion. The defence of the faith, which was held forth as a pretext, might be taken advantage of as a means of entering into a bolder examination of the church doctrines. Although the opposition between Roscelin and the other theologians rested on deeper grounds, yet it was only a subordinate and single point which furnished the occasion for attacking him. As he uniformly maintained that the dialectical exposition of conceptions should be made to subserve the defence of the church doctrines, so he was desirous of showing that, without his nominalism, the

* As when in a letter, not of Abelard's writing, but published in the collection of his works (p. 334), he is accused of doubting the reality of the gospel history, on the ground that such doubt necessarily followed from his principles: "If the conceptions," whole and part, "have no reality, it follows that the testimony of the gospel narrative, 'Christ ate part of a fish roasted on the coals,' cannot be really true," l. c.: *Hic sicut pseudodialecticus, ita et pseudochristianus, cum in dialectica sua nullam rem partes habere æstimat, ita divinam paginam impudenter pervertit, ut eo loco, quo dicitur Dominus partem piscis assi comedissee, partem hujus vocis, quæ est piscis assi, non partem rei, intelligere conatur.*

† His words in Anselm's book, *De fide trinitat.* c. iii: *Pagani defendunt legem suam, Judæi defendunt legem suam, ergo et nos Christiani debemus defendere fidem nostram.*

doctrine of the Trinity and of the incarnation of the Son of God could not be rightly presented. Considering, as he did, every universal to be a mere abstraction, and particulars as alone having reality, he argued that, if only the essence of God in the Trinity was called *una res*, and the three persons not *tres res*, the latter could not be considered as anything real. Only the one God would be the *real*, all beside, a mere nominal distinction, to which nothing real corresponded; and so, therefore, with the Son would the Father and the Holy Ghost also have become man.

It was accordingly necessary to designate the three persons as three real beings (*tres res*), the same in respect of will and power.* Such a view might, not without reason, draw down upon him the reproach of tritheism. At a council assembled in 1093, at Soissons, under the presidency of the archbishop of Rheims, Roscelin's doctrine was condemned as tritheism, and his fears of the wrath of the populace towards him as a heretic induced him to a recantation. Thus driven by the power of his opponents from his native land, he sought in England a place of refuge and a field of labour. But he found himself deceived in his expectations; for, on the one hand, he encountered in the archbishop of Canterbury, the primate of the English church, the most zealous champion of realism and opponent of nominalism; while, on the other hand, by maintaining a position in no way connected with his peculiar bent, but simply relating to an interest of the church, he incurred the violent displeasure of an important party. He set up the principle anew which had been held at an earlier period by zealots of the school of Hildebrand, and controverted by others, that sons begotten in priestly marriage—which, by the sticklers of the law of celibacy in the priest, was considered, however, a concubinage—should not be admitted to any ecclesiastical office. Now, since it was the case that, until the Hildebrandian principles had worked their way into the whole church, the number of married clergy was still very great, he must necessarily, by maintaining such a principle, excite against himself the hatred of multitudes, partly of sons from such marriages

* Anselm. l. c. : Si tres personæ sunt una tantum res, et non sunt tres res, unaquæque per se separatim, sicut tres angeli aut tres animæ, ita tamen ut voluntate et potentia omnino sint idem, ergo pater et spiritus sanctus cum filio incarnatus est.

who already stood in some ecclesiastical office, partly of clergymen who lived in the bonds of wedlock, and who were desirous of handing down their office in their families. The anger of these men against him would be so much the greater, because in such a contest he could reckon on the support of a party at whose head stood the popes; for which reason the severe censors of the morals among the clergy were ever feared and hated. Thus, driven by the wrath of his enemies from England, he returned back to France, where he was destined to engage in new controversies, till at length, wearied with disputing, he withdrew from the public stage to a life of silent and quiet seclusion.

Roscelin's opponent, Anselm, is the man who exerted the most important influence on the theological and philosophical turn of the twelfth century. He was the Augustin of his age. What gives him his great importance is, that unity of spirit in which everything is of one piece,—the harmony between life and knowledge, which, in his case, nothing disturbed. Love was the inspiring soul of his thought as of his actions. He was born at Aosta, in Piedmont, in 1033. The good seed sown in his tender mind, by his pious mother Ermenberga, seems to have had a singular influence on the development of his powers. Even in childhood he occupied himself in meditation on divine things. Brought up among the mountains, he fancied that heaven was above their peaks, and that there God sat enthroned, surrounded by his court of state. A deep impression was left on his mind by a dream, in which he imagined that he ascended above the mountains to God, and was there refreshed by God's own hand with the bread of heaven. When a young man, he was induced, by the morose temper of his father towards him, to leave the paternal roof and travel to France. After having wandered about in that country for the space of nearly three years, attracted by the name of Lanfranc, he repaired to the monastery of Bec in Normandy, over which that teacher presided, and the dialectical bent which his mind here received determined from that time and for ever the course of his inquiries, and of his mode of thinking. In 1060 he became himself a monk in the monastery of Bec; and in 1063 prior of this monastery, as the immediate successor of his teacher, Lanfranc. His time was divided between the common exercises

of devotion, the imparting of spiritual counsel, superintending the education of the youth in the monastery, guiding the souls of the monks at large, correcting the ancient manuscripts which had become disfigured with errors through the ignorance of the preceding centuries,* and study and meditation on the subject-matter of the Christian faith. Great part of the night was spent by him in these occupations; only a few hours were allowed for sleep. With the station he held in the monastery were connected a multitude of little duties, unprofitable to the mind; † but the self-denial of love enabled him to accomplish all this business with conscientious fidelity; so that the time which he was desirous of devoting to his labours as an author, to study, contemplation, or prayer, had often to be spent in such employments. ‡ The man of profound speculative intellect must let himself down—no easy task for him—to the business of teaching boys to decline.§ He was an enemy to the dark rigid discipline of monks. He endeavoured to make love the inspiring principle of education. An abbot who enjoyed a high reputation for piety having once complained to him that, with all the strict severity employed in the education of boys, still nothing was brought to pass; that, after all the stripes inflicted on them, they remained incorrigible, utterly stupid, and brutish—Anselm replied to him: “A beautiful result of your training, to convert men into brutes. But tell me, if you were to plant a tree in your garden, and shut it up on all sides so that its branches could not extend in any direction, what sort of a tree would it become, in case you should, a year afterward, give it freedom again? Certainly a good-for-nothing tree, with crooked, snarly branches. And would not the whole fault be your own, who forced the tree into such unnatural confinement? || This comparison he applied to edu-

* *Libros, qui ante id temporis nimis corrupti ubique terrarum erant, corrigebat*, says Eadmer, in his life of Anselm.

† As he himself expresses it (*Lib. I. ep. 42*): *Viles et steriles, quas tamen negligere non audeam, occupationes.*

‡ *Lib. I. ep. 42*: *Non solum dictandi, sed et legendi et meditandi sive orandi opportunitatem video remotam.*

§ As he writes to a young monk (*l. c. ep. 55*): *Tu scis, quam molestum mihi semper fuerit pueris declinare.*

|| *Itaque indiscrete oppressi, pravas et spinarum more perplexas inter se cogitationes congerunt, fovent, nutriunt, tantaque ea nutriendo visuffulciunt, ut omnia, quæ illorum correctioni possent adminiculari, obstinata mente subterfugiant.*

cation after the following manner: "So would it turn out with boys treated with the same severity, irrespective of their several different peculiarities. The evil propensities, restrained by mere force, would only thrive the more in secret; and thus they would grow hardened against everything done for their improvement. Because they experience no love, no act of kindness or friendship, from you—they give you credit for nothing good, but imagine that all you do proceeds from hatred and malevolence; and because they have been educated by no one in true love, they can accost no one otherwise than with a cast-down countenance, and stolen glances.* And I would fain have you tell me," added he, with some feeling: "Why treat them with such hostility? Are they not human beings: have they not the same nature with yourselves?" He then proceeded to explain how love and severity should be united in the educating of youth. He made the abbot conscious of the evil result which must necessarily follow from his mode of training. What great effects might be brought about by love, Anselm showed by his own example. He found in the monastery a boy by the name of Osbern, who was greatly prejudiced against him, and who possessed a most obstinate temper; but by little acts of kindness, by entering wholly into his peculiar ways, by overlooking many faults when it could be done without disturbing the order of the monastery, he found means of overcoming, by the force of love, the resistance of an untoward disposition. He enchained the lad to himself, and then first began gradually to pursue with him a more earnest and strict course of discipline. As the boy grew up, a hearty friendship was formed between him and his teacher. Anselm promised himself great things, to be accomplished by his pupil, when a man, in the service of the church; but Osbern fell into a severe fit of sickness. Then Anselm sat continually at the bedside of the beloved youth, nursing him day and night, and furnishing him with every means of spiritual and bodily support. After his death, he took care that, for a year, daily masses should be offered for his soul, and from all to whom he wrote he requested prayers in behalf of his beloved Osbern.

* Cumque apud nullum fuerint in vera caritate nutriti, nullum nisi depressis superciliis, oculove obliquo valent intueri.

On the education of young men generally he bestowed the greatest care, being convinced that this period of life was best suited to the reception of divine things; that the higher impressions could then be the most easily and durably fixed. As wax, which when neither too soft nor too hard most perfectly and clearly gives back the impression of the seal, such was the relation of this age to boyhood on the one hand and more advanced age on the other.* He took great pains to excite in his young men an interest in the study of the ancient authors, only admonishing them to avoid everything in them which is obscene.†

But his love was shown no less to old age than to youth. He gave a proof of this in the deep interest he took in nursing Herewald, an old man so enfeebled by old age and disease as to be unable to move any member of his body except his tongue. He himself pressed the juice from grapes out of one hand into the other, and gave him to drink of it. After the death of the abbot Herluin, in 1078, Anselm was chosen as his successor; and in this new office also he made the spiritual interest his governing motive. He complained of many abbots who neglected the spiritual, through an undue attention to the secular, affairs of their convents, feeling it incumbent on them to see that nothing was lost of the property consecrated to God, *intrusted to their hands*, but allowing God's law to be obliterated from their hearts: for they were so earnest in being too cunning to be cheated by others, as to become adroit adepts in overreaching others themselves; they were so fearful of any useless expenditure, and of letting any-

* Videas hominem in vanitate hujus sæculi ab infantia usque ad profundam senectutem conversatum, sola terrena sapientem, et in his penitus obduratum, cum hoc age de spiritualibus, huic de subtilitate contemplationis divinæ loquere, et perspicies eum nec quid velis quidem posse videre. Nec mirum, indurata cera est. E contrario consideres puerum, ætate ac scientia tenerum, nec bonum nec malum discernere valentem, nec te quidem intelligere, de hujusmodi disserentem, nimirum mollis cera est et quasi liquens nec imaginem sigilli quoquomodo recipiens. Medius horum adolescens et juvenis est, ex teneritudine atque durtia congrue temperatus, si hunc instruxeris, ad quæ voles, informare valebis.

† See his exhortation to a young monk, to read as much as possible, and particularly of those authors which he had not been able to read with him: et præcipue de Virgilio et aliis auctoribus, quos a me non legisti, exceptis his, in quibus aliqua turpitude sonat. Lib. I. ep. 55.

thing go without good reason, that they became covetous, and allowed what they hoarded to rot without being useful to anybody.* A still wider field of action was opened to him when, in 1093, he was called to England as archbishop of Canterbury. Inasmuch as he held it to be his duty, however, to maintain the independence of the church according to the Hildebrandian principles, he became entangled by means of this high office in violent contests with the kings, William the Second, and Henry the First, which must have been extremely painful to a mind so amiable and so earnestly bent on the quiet of religious meditation. He took refuge with the pope. Urban the Second honoured in him at once the dignity of knowledge and of the office which he held in the church. Three years he spent travelling about without a settled place of abode, in France and Italy. When in the army of the Norman duke, Roger of Sicily, whom he visited at his own request during the siege of Capua, he met among others certain Saracens, who, attracted by the fame of his amiable character, came to visit him. These he entertained in a friendly manner, and won even from them the most unfeigned respect. Soon after his return, in the year 1109, he died, reconciled with all his enemies, and bestowing his blessing on all with his expiring breath.

Thus we see in him a man, whose doctrine and life were in perfect harmony with each other. While love shone eminently forth as the soul of his life, it formed also the central point of his system of faith and morals, as appears evident in that remarkable saying of his, that "if he had presented before him the hatefulness of sin on the one side, and the torments of hell on the other, and were left to take his choice between the two, he would prefer to be pure from sin, and innocent in hell, rather than to be polluted with sin and happy in heaven." Doubtless, in so saying, he was aware that he supposed what would be impossible. By this language, he simply contradicted the sensuous and fleshly externalized notions of hell

* His words: *Sunt multi prælati nostri ordinis, qui quasi solliciti, ne destruantur res Dei in manibus eorum, agunt, ut dissipetur lex Dei in cordibus eorum, nam tantum conantur esse prudentes, ne decipiantur ab aliis, ut fiant astuti, ad decipiendum alios. Adeo sunt cauti, ne fiant prodigi et quæ habent irrationabiliter perdant, ut avari fiant et quæ servant, inutiliter putrescant.* Lib. II. ep. 71.

and heaven. By the manner in which he felt himself constrained to decide in the choice between two impossible suppositions, he simply marked the necessary inner connection between sin and hell, and between holiness and heaven; he simply pointed at that which forms the peculiar ground of Christian hope in its essential inner bond of union with Christian love.* "To love others," said he, "is better than to receive proofs of love from others, for all gifts of love are of a perishable nature; but love itself is eternal, and in itself well pleasing to God."† He ever represented the disposition of love as that which alone gave their true worth to all Christian doing and suffering; so that, according to the measure of this was to be estimated the value of all good works, and of all renunciations, as he distinctly remarks in one of his letters.‡ "I have learned in the school of Christ that whoever, from true love to God and to his neighbour, gives to him that needs, were it but a cup of cold water, or an alms, shall not lose his reward. The greater the love to God, and to his neighbour, which prompts a monk to deny himself the food set before him, the greater is the alms which he gives, and the greater the reward which he reaps." On his own person, he practised the most rigid abstinence. He restricted, in every way, his sensual wants, so that his friends entertained fears for his health, and love set them on inventing many little expedients by which to compel him to relax the severity of his self-discipline.§ Even amid the splendour of the highest dignity in the English church he preserved the rigid abstinence of the monk. We know this from a remarkable and characteristic incident which at the same time evidences the force of love with which he bound others to his person. Queen Matilda of

* This idea lies at the ground of the language which he employed to explain his meaning, when the above-mentioned saying excited surprise. *Cum constet, solos malos in inferno torqueri, et solos bonos in cœlesti regno foveri, patet, nec bonos in inferno, si illuc intrarent, posse teneri debita pœna malorum. nec malos in cœlo, si forte accederent, frui valere felicitate bonorum.*

† Eadmer's Account of his life, c. v. s. 41.

‡ Lib. I. ep. 41.

§ Eadmer relates, that only when engaged, while he was eating, in the discussion on some theological subject, he would, without thinking of it, take more food than usual, and the one who sat next to him took this opportunity to slip more bread before him.

England, who clung to him with the deepest affection and reverence, as her ghostly father, was filled with great anxiety for him, when she had heard that, after long fasting, he was accustomed to take food, not from his own sense of hunger, but only by being reminded of it by his servant. She therefore wrote him a letter,* in which she begged him, in the most touching manner, for the sake of his community, to be more indulgent to himself, lest by the severity of his abstinence he should lose the strength of his voice, and thereby diminish his usefulness as a preacher, at least so far as not to be distinctly heard by those standing at a distance.† She brought up the example of Christ, who, by attending banquets as well as fasts, had sanctified eating.‡ Anselm replied to her, that although he could fast without being pained by hunger, yet he could and would, as far as it might be necessary and useful, strengthen his body by suitable nourishment.§

Severe as he was, however, towards himself, he was none the less indulgent towards others; and it gave him pain to see any one refrain from satisfying his hunger, out of any respect to himself. He looked with a friendly eye on those who ate at his own board, when they seemed to relish their food; he elevated his hand over them, and gave them his blessing, saying, "May it do you much good." He uniformly valued the spirit above the letter, and never scrupled to abate somewhat from the severity of the monastic rule, to sacrifice somewhat of the letter, whenever the spirit seemed to require it, whenever that charity which would avoid every occasion of giving pain to others, counselled him thereto. In the passage where this fact is stated by Anselm's disciple, the monk Eadmer, who wrote the account of his life, we recognize the spirit of his master, in his manner of defending this conduct against the

* Lib. III. ep. 56.

† Ne vox spiritualium ædificatrix raucescat et quæ canonum ac dulce Dei verbum decoro, quieto remissoque sermone dispensare consueverat, id tanto remissius in futurum exequatur, ut quosque aliquantisper a te remotiores audientia ipsius voce privatos fructu etiam vacuos derelinquat. Nolite igitur, bone pater et sancte, nolite tam intempestive corporis viribus inedia destitui, ne orator esse desistatis.

‡ Christus Jesus, qui dedicavit jejunium, dedicavit et esum, vadens ad convivium nuptiarum.

§ Licet sic possim sine famis molestia jejunare, satis tamen possum et volo, cum debeo, quantum expedit, corpus alimentis recreare.

censures he had drawn upon himself by such departures from the common usage, when he says that whoever enjoyed the good fortune of really understanding the life of Anselm, would consider it a thing far more deserving of praise than occasionally, for good reasons, he relaxed somewhat from the severity of his habits of life, than if he had always stiffly adhered to them, for virtuous conduct consisted in acting rationally.*

One of those recluses who had so many opportunities of scattering among the crowds that flocked to visit them the word of exhortation, had begged him to give him some instructions as to the best manner of proceeding, in order to excite the laity who visited him to contempt of earthly things and longing after the kingdom of heaven. He drew up for him the following sketch:—“My dear brother, God calls and asks you to bid for the kingdom of heaven. This kingdom of heaven is one whose blessedness and glory no mortal eye hath seen, no ear hath heard, and no heart of man can conceive. But that thou mayest gain some idea of it, take the following illustration:—Whatever any one who is thought worthy of reigning there *wills*, that, whether in heaven or on earth, *is done*; and whatever he does *not will*, is *not done*. For so great will be the love between God and those who are to be in this kingdom,—and of the latter, one towards the other,—that all will love each other as they do themselves, and God more than they do themselves. Hence, no one there will be disposed to will anything else than what God wills, and what one wills all shall will, and what one or all may will, God shall will. It will therefore be with every individual and with all, with the whole creation and with God himself, as each shall will. And thus shall all be perfect kings; for that *shall be* which each *wills*; and all will be at the same time with God as one king, as it were one man, because all shall will the same thing, and what they will shall *be*. God from heaven asks you to bid for such a good. Does any one inquire, for what price? He is answered, He who will give the kingdom of heaven, demands no earthly price; and to God, to

* Nos, qui vitæ illius modum scire meruimus, magis in eo laudandum æstimamus, quod a rigore sui propositi aliquando pro ratione descendebat, quam si continue in ipso rigidus indiscrete persisteret. Ratione siquidem agi virtutis est, vitii vero contra.

whom belongs everything that exists, no one can give what he had not. And yet God does not give so great a good for nothing, for he gives it to none who do not love it; for no one gives that which he dearly values to him that cares nothing about it. Therefore *love* and *possess*. Finally, since to reign in heaven is nothing else than to be so united by love into one will with God, all holy angels, and men, as that all at the same time possess the same power, love God more than thyself, and thou beginnest already to possess what there thou wilt have in a perfect manner. But this love cannot be a perfect one in thee, unless thou makest thy heart free from all other love; for, like a vase which, the more you fill it with water or with any other fluid, will hold so much the less oil, so the heart excludes *this* love in the same proportion as it is carried away by some other love." Anselm was of a predominantly contemplative nature, yet he devoted himself, unsparingly, to the public and outward duties to which he was called by his different fields of action.

Love formed with him the bond of union between the contemplative and the practical life. A distinguishing trait in his character was this inward placidity of mind, so well suited to religious meditation and speculation, which he never suffered to be disturbed by the multitude of cares that pressed upon him from without. In the midst of his business affairs, of his contests, and of his journeys, those speculative questions were ever thronging before his mind, which we sought to answer in the writings composed by him. What makes an important difference between Anselm and others, who passed over from simple childlike faith to speculation, is this: it was not, as in the case of others, the conflict of the flesh with the spirit, the reaction of natural reason against divine things,—not the stimulus of doubt, which incited him to speculation on the object-matter of faith. He was not seeking, by dint of thought, to find his way out from an inward schism to regain the lost certainty and repose of faith. The object-matter of Christian faith was to him immediately certain; his Christian consciousness was raised above all doubt. The experience of the heart was, to him, the surest evidence of the reality of that which faith guaranteed to him; but then, inasmuch as with his sincere and undoubting faith, he united a mind profoundly inquisitive and speculative, and the latter too asserted its

proper rights, he was convinced that that which approved itself to him as the highest matter in faith and in the experience of the heart, must also approve itself as such for thought; that there is no schism in the spirit; that that which, as the image of God, distinguishes man from the rest of creation, could not remain alien from the divine object-matter. Accordingly, he felt constrained to account to himself by a rational knowledge for that which in itself was to him the most certain of all things. Two remarkable examples* may serve to illustrate this connection in the life of his spirit. It was while he was still prior in the monastery of Bec that, awakened just before matins, from sleep, he reclined on his bed, meditating how it was to be conceived that the prophets had viewed the past and the future at once, as something present; and while, absorbed in these thoughts, he sat, with his eyes fixed on the ground, he saw, directly through the wall, the monks whose allotted business it was passing about in the church, going up to the altar, putting everything in order for the mass, lighting the candles, and at length one of them ringing the bell to awaken the rest. When, at the sound of the bell, all the monks now rose from their beds and assembled together, Anselm was filled with amazement, and saw that it was the easiest thing for God to reveal the future in the minds of the prophets, when he had enabled him to behold with his eyes, through so many thick partitions, what was going on in the church.† Now, whether we look upon this undeniably singular fact as the coincidence of a vision presented to the imagination with things that actually occurred outwardly, or as a real beholding, not confined by spatial limitations, and proceeding from some inner sensorium at the foundation of the organs of outward sense, similar to what is affirmed of the somnambulist state,—this psychological phenomenon, whatever we may think of it, manifestly furnished Anselm an analogy by which to explain

* The intimate connection between these two in Anselm is admirably described by Eadmer: *Divinis scripturis tantam fidem adhibebat, ut indissolubili firmitate cordis crederet, nihil in eis esse, quod solidæ veritatis tramitem ullo modo exiret. Quapropter (therefore this firmness of conviction was the basis of his conviction) summo studio animum ad hoc intenderat, quatenus juxta fidem suam mentis ratione mereretur percipere, quæ in ipsis sensit multa caligine tecta latere.*

† Eadmer, ii. 9.

the prophetic intuition. The idea lying at bottom is, that as, in the appearance in question, the separating interval of space was, for this intuition, annihilated, so the separating intervals of time are removed for the intuition of the prophets.

The second example is as follows: On a certain occasion, when Anselm was profoundly reflecting how everything that belongs to the doctrine concerning God, his essence and his attributes, might be summed up and comprehended in one brief argument,*—the thought haunted him everywhere, so that he could neither eat nor sleep quietly. Even his devotions, at matins and other seasons of church-worship, were thereby disturbed. Already he was on the point of repelling all these thoughts, as a temptation of Satan; but the more he struggled against them, the more importunately they thronged in upon his mind: and one night, during the celebration of vigils, his thoughts all at once became clear; his heart swelled with delight, and he immediately recorded the train of reflection which had given him this high satisfaction,—and this was the origin of his *Proslogion*. Thus were the religious and speculative bents, in his case, united together; and the works from which his mind derived all its nourishment, and which, as he continually studied them, gave the impulse to all his inquiries, were the Bible and St. Augustin.† Thus, too, in his controversy with Roscelin, the philosophical and theological interests were most closely united. Nominalism appeared to him as a mode of thinking which was utterly without power to rise above the things of sense, which did not allow reason to come round to itself,—to the consciousness of its own peculiar essence,—which, by refusing to acknowledge the reality of ideas, made all knowledge impossible. “Reason,” says he, concerning the Nominalists, “which should rule and direct over everything in man, is with them so beclouded by images of sense, that they cannot extricate themselves from their fetters, and look away from them to that which reason should contemplate alone, and purely in her own spiritual essence.”‡

* The ontological proof, hereafter to be mentioned.

† Eadmer, i. 68: *Nihil asserere, nisi quod aut canonicis aut Augustini dictis incunctanter posse defendi videret.*

‡ *De fide trinitatis, c. ii.* *Prorsus a spiritualium quæstionum disputatione sunt exsufflandi. In eorum quippe animabus ratio, quæ et princeps et judex omnino omnium debet esse, quæ sunt in homine, sic est imagi-*

The Christian ground-doctrine, of the incarnation of God, seems to him to be one incompatible with nominalism: "For," says he, "how can one who occupies this position conceive a union of God with human nature? If there are no persons at all except human persons, the conception of human nature, of humanity, is destitute of all reality."*

It is plain, we allow, from what has been said, how very much the tranquil course of religious and theological development in Anselm differed from that of Augustin, which passed through so many stormy trials; but both were led by different ways to the same result, that the right understanding of the truths of faith can proceed only from Christian consciousness,—presupposing faith and inward experience. The Augustinian principle respecting the relation of the scientific system of doctrines to faith, "*fides præcedit intellectum*," was accordingly also Anselm's, and by his means first brought over into the mediæval theology. He unfolded and defended it in his controversy with Roscelin, although the latter had, properly speaking, offered nothing against it. Anselm, like others, seized hold of the words in Isaiah vii. 9,—understood according to the translation of the Vulgate,—which had been employed from very early times as a classical proof-passage on this point. "Every Christian," says he, "must ever hold fast the same faith *without doubting*; and while he loves it, and lives according to it, seek humbly to discover, so far as he may be able, the reasons why it is so.† If he is able to understand them, let him give God thanks; if he is not able, let him bow his head in reverence, for self-confident human wisdom will sooner break its own horn than succeed in overturning this rock." He rebukes those who boldly start the highest questions respecting the faith, before they have obtained from faith the wings of the mind. Their errors he attributes directly to the inverted method which they pursued

nibus corporalibus obvoluta, ut ex eis se non possit evolvere nec ab ipsis ea, quæ ipsa sola et pura contemplari debet, valeat discernere.

* Qui non potest intelligere, aliquid esse hominem, nisi individuum, nullatenus intelliget, hominem assumptum esse a verbo, non personam, id est aliam naturam, non aliam personam esse assumptam?

† Semper eandem fidem indubitanter tenendo, amando et secundum illam vivendo, humiliter, quantum potest, quærere rationem, quomodo sit.

in their investigations; to the fact that they were for having the *intellectus* precede the *fides*. When such persons were inclined to dispute on matters of which they had no experience, Anselm said, it was as if a bat or a nocturnal owl—creatures that can see the heavens only by night—should contend respecting the beams of the sun at noonday with eagles, that gaze directly at the sun himself. “First, then, the heart must be purified by faith; the eyes must be enlightened by observing the commandments of the Lord. We must become children, in humble obedience to the divine word, before we can understand the wisdom which God has hidden from the wise and prudent and revealed unto babes. We must first renounce the flesh and live after the Spirit, before we may venture to investigate the deep things of faith; for the natural man has no perception of divine things. The more we practise, in active obedience, that which the Holy Scriptures teach us for practical living, and so nourish ourselves, the greater shall be our progress in that which gives satisfaction to the cravings of the mind after knowledge. He who believes not, will not experience; and he who has not experienced, will not understand; for, as high as actual experience is above the mere hearing of a thing, so high is *his* knowledge who has the experience of faith above his who barely knows by report. The practical is so closely connected with the theoretical, that not only can no one rise to a higher stage of knowledge without faith, and keeping the divine commandments,—but, sometimes, the very understanding bestowed is withdrawn, and faith itself destroyed, because a good conscience has been neglected.” Anselm refers here to what St. Paul says, in the first chapter of Romans, respecting such as did not like to retain God in their knowledge.

His theology pursues, therefore, the two directions: first, of defending the independence of faith, and its inviolable dignity, against a proud—or what at least seems to him a proud—spirit of dialectical speculation; and secondly, of pointing out the rational mode of apprehending and unfolding the truths of faith, and showing their agreement with divinely enlightened reason. In Anselm we find heart and reason, feelings and knowledge, the mystical and the speculative elements, beautifully united. The substance and matter of his faith was that given him by the tradition of the church. but his own subjec-

tive life of faith had developed itself in the study of the sacred writings. Since that which pertains to the church, and that which pertains to Christianity, were in his mind intimately fused together from the first; since with this spiritual bent he *read* and *lived* himself into the sacred Scriptures; he involuntarily moulded everything he derived from them into the Catholic form. To profoundness of feeling and thought he united acuteness of understanding; yet, in him, profound thought predominated above acuteness, and the religious interest was everywhere the ruling one. Accordingly, it might easily come about that into the formal argument, which, on independent examination, might fail to satisfy the demands of the logician, he would unconsciously introduce matter derived from the depths of his religious consciousness, and so fancy that he had demonstrated what he was certain of prior to all proof, and what otherwise could not by such demonstration become matter of conviction. Often must we distinguish, in his case, between the profound ideas lying at the bottom, and the faulty syllogistic form of their setting forth.

Thus, in Anselm, we see the different main directions of the spirit that actuated his times harmoniously combined; but the spiritual elements that were blended together in him became separated in the progress of the spiritual life of this period, and proceeded to antagonisms, which belong amongst the most significant appearances of the twelfth century. Controversies arose which were at first necessary, in order to conduct the unfolding process of theology to its decision. In particular, the abbot Bernard of Clairvaux, and Abelard, in the beginning of the twelfth century, appear to us as the representatives of the two main theological directions that started forth from the unity in which they had been combined in Anselm; one issuing from the life of feeling, the practico-mystical; the other, the dialectical tendency.

In the first place, as it respects Bernard, it will be necessary here to refer back to what we observed in the history of monasticism, concerning his religious position. We saw that the experience of the heart, growing out of faith, was with him the main thing; that he allowed that sort of knowledge in religion alone to be the right one which leads man back into the recesses of his own heart, and teaches him to be humble. The man whose entire life belonged to monasticism, and that

mode of intuition which lies at the bottom of it,—contemplating the matter from this point of view,—did not consider the highest aim of the Christian life as genuine Christians required that he should do,—the humanization of the divine, the ennobling of all that is human by a divine principle of life,—but a stage of Christian perfection above the purely human, a soaring upward of the contemplative spirit that leaves all that is human behind it. The highest, to his apprehension, is not that which is to be reached by the harmonious development of all the powers of man's nature; but it is the rapture of inspiration, which, overleaping all intermediate stages, antedates the intuition of the life eternal. “The greatest man,” says Bernard, “is he who, despising the use of things and of sense, —so far as human frailty may be permitted to do so, not by a slowly ascending progression, but by a sudden spring,—is sometimes wont to reach in contemplation those lofty heights.”* To this kind he reckons the account of St. Paul, how he was caught up to the third heaven.† He distinguishes three different stages or positions: “That of a practically pious life, maintained amidst the relations of civil society, where sense and the things of sense are used in a sober and orderly manner, according to the will of God; second, where one rises by a gradually progressive knowledge from the revelation of God's invisible essence in creation, to that essence itself; third and highest, where the spirit collects its energies within itself, and, so far as it is divinely sustained, divests itself of things human, to rise to the contemplation of God.‡ At this last stage the man attains immediately to that which is the aim of all aims, the experience of the divine. To the same point the other two stages also tend, but by a longer way. That which is highest cannot be taught by words, but only revealed through

* *Omnino maximus, qui spreto ipso usu rerum et sensuum, quantum quidem humanæ fragilitati fas est, non ascensoriis gradibus, sed inopinatis excessibus avolare interdum contemplando ad illa sublimia conuevit. De consideratione, Lib. V. c. i. s. 3.*

† *Excessus, non ascensus, nam raptum potius fuisse, quam ascendisse, ipse se perhibet.*

‡ *Dispensativa est consideratio, sensibus sensibilibusque rebus ordinate et socialiter utens ad promerendum Deum. Æstimativa est consideratio prudenter ac diligenter quæque scrutans ac ponderans ad vestigandum Deum. Speculativa est consideratio se in se colligens et, quantum divinitus adjuvatur, rebus humanis eximens ad contemplandum Deum.*

the Spirit. No language can explain it ; but we may by prayer and purity of heart attain to it, after we have prepared ourselves for it by a worthy life."

Again, he compares together the three different relations of the mind to the knowledge of religious truth, expressed by opinion, faith, and intellectual apprehension (*opinio, fides, intellectus*). "Intellectual apprehension" proceeds from rational knowledge; faith reposes on authority; opinion holds only to the probable. The two former are in possession of the truth, but in different ways: faith possesses the truth, but enveloped and hid under a veil; intellect possesses it unveiled and revealed. It is especially important to distinguish these three operations of the mind, and to hold them to their respective provinces; to take care that faith does not seize, as a matter of certainty, upon what belongs to bare opinion; or that opinion does not call in question the settled convictions of faith. If opinion affirms with authority, it is presumptuous; if faith companies with doubt, it is weak; if intellection attempts to force open the sealed treasure of faith, it is wanton self-will rebelling against the majesty of the divine. Faith is a sure prelibation of truth, as yet not made clear—a foretaste, growing out of the bent of the will.* The following characters or marks, therefore, are brought together in faith: the bent of the will, whereby conviction is determined; practical appropriation of the truth; living fellowship with divine things, which are still hidden from knowledge. Conviction here is not determined by outward reason, as in the case of knowledge; it proceeds from something subjective, from a bent of the disposition towards the divine; and the conviction which proceeds from this source is a sure one. Intellection is a certain and clear knowledge of the invisible. The difference, therefore, between intellection and faith is not constituted by the degree of certainty, but by the degree of clearness; that being wrapped up in faith which is unfolded to intellection.† "There is nothing we long to know more than that which we already know by faith; therefore we desire that to the certainty already given in faith, should be added the clearness of

* *Voluntaria quædam et certa prælibatio necdum propalatæ veritatis.*

† *Quod etsi non habet incertum, non magis quam intellectus, habet tamen involucrium, quod non intellectus.*

knowledge. To our blessedness nothing more will be wanting, when that which is already certain to us by faith shall also be seen by us without a veil."* It would therefore be doing Bernard injustice to assert that he altogether discarded the striving after knowledge; that he was a stranger to all such longings of the mind. The satisfaction of this need, implanted in the mind, he reckoned in fact among the things that constitute the blessedness of the eternal life; nor would he banish such a striving even from the condition of the present life, although he himself was more inclined to that contemplation which is fed from the heart. But a striving, not conscious of its proper limits, not respecting the sacred precincts of faith, violating the simplicity and humility of faith and the warmth of feeling, the striving of speculation, was hateful to him. Had speculative theology ever marched onward in the path marked out by Anselm, Bernard could easily have come to an understanding with it; and, although his own path was a different one, yet have entertained friendly feelings towards it. But the case was altered by the bold appearance of Abelard.

Peter Abelard, born 1079, at Palais, not far from Nantes in Brittany, was already in the first years of his youth seized with an enthusiasm for those dialectical studies. He was endowed with splendid natural gifts; but he was perhaps too conscious also of this fact.† A too intense feeling of self, that constantly received fresh nourishment from the brilliant recognition which his talents soon met with, was the moral failing which, from the outset to the evening of his life, he had especially to contend against, and which contributed to involve him in those strong trials that finally reacted to chastise and purify his heart. He soon fell into controversy with his teachers; for example, with that renowned dialectician, master of a realistic school, William de Champeaux of

* Nil autem malumus scire, quam quæ fide jam scimus. Nil supererit ad beatitudinem, cum, quæ jam certa sunt nobis fide, erunt æque et nuda.

† In a work written in a later period of his life, after his various misfortunes, he says of himself: Confido in ea, quæ mihi largior est, ingenii abundantia, ipso co-operante scientiarum dispensatore, non pauciora me præstiturum eloquentiæ peripateticæ munimenta, quam illi præstiterunt, quos Latinorum celebrat studiosa doctrina. *Dialectica*, ed. Cousin, p. 228.

Paris. In Melun, Corbeil, Paris, he acquired, by his proficiency in dialectics, a great name and much approbation. From the study of philosophy he was desirous of passing over to theology; although he was still far from possessing that disposition of heart without which such studies cannot be successfully prosecuted. He went to Laon to hear Anselm, then a famous teacher; but not finding himself satisfied with his teachings, soon had the boldness to stand forth as teacher himself, in rivalry with his master. Driven thence, he betook himself to Paris; and there, by his philosophical and theological lectures, he created a great sensation. From Rome, Italy, all parts of France, the Netherlands, Germany, young men flocked to hear him. His fame and plentiful income tempted him to remit more and more a proper watchfulness over himself, so that he gradually let drop the reins and abandoned himself to his pleasures.* He himself afterwards recognized, in the misfortunes which he thus brought upon himself, the means appointed by divine providence for removing the moral disorders of his life, among which he names in particular pride and luxury.† The outrageous inflictions he suffered induced him to withdraw from the world, and in the year 1119 he entered, as monk, the abbey of St. Denis, near Paris. Here he was importunately beset with petitions from many of his earlier disciples and other young clergymen, to recommence, in a new sense and spirit, and for the glory of God, those courses of lectures which he had formerly given for the purpose of gaining money and a name. The monks of St. Denis, with their licentious manners, rejoiced at any opportunity of getting rid of a severe and bitter censor, and were therefore extremely urgent that he should follow this invitation. A priory belonging to this abbey, and bordering on the province of count Theobald of Champagne, was given up to him for this object; and soon he became once more the centre of attraction for the youth, who flocked from all

* Abelard says of himself, in his *Historia calamitatum*: Cum jam me solum in mundo superesse philosophum æstimarem, nec ullam ulterius inquietationem formidarem, frena libidini cœpi laxare, qui antea vixeram continentissime. Et quo amplius in philosophia vel sacra lectione profeceram, amplius a philosophis et divinis immunditia vitæ recedebam.

† Cum igitur totus in superbia atque luxuria laborarem, utriusque morbi remedium divina mihi gratia, licet nolenti, contulit.

quarters to his lectures, so that neither rooms nor means of subsistence sufficed for their accommodation.* It is true, he still continued to busy himself here also with the explanation of ancient authors, and the resolution of dialectic questions; but the new and more serious turn which misfortune had given to his mind, induced him to direct his attention more particularly to theological subjects, which he treated according to his own peculiar dialectical method.

In compliance with the wishes of his auditors, he commenced embodying his theological doctrines in a work in which, doubtless, he intended to embrace the whole system of faith, but which did not extend beyond the doctrine of the trinity; *Theologia*, or *Introductio in Theologiam*.† From this work it appears evident that a controversy had already broken out between the dialectical and the practical church party. Abelard writes, not without a certain degree of excitement, against the antagonists of the new dialectical method. He makes it a matter of complaint that so many, who had no conception of a rational exposition of the doctrines of faith, sought to console themselves for their inaptitude by extolling in the highest terms that glowing zeal of faith, by virtue of which one believes without inquiry or examination.‡ He describes them, therefore, as the advocates of a blind belief on mere authority. He says, in opposition to such, that, in following their notions, no means would be left to refute the followers of a false religion, and to reclaim them from their errors. All idolators, too, might plant themselves on the same principle.§ If this party affirmed that the truths God

* He himself, in giving the history of his misfortune, remarks, with regard to his lectures, what certainly we have no reason to consider as exaggerated: *Ad quas tanta scholarium multitudo confluit, ut nec locus hospitibus nec terra sufficeret alimentis.*

† In his preface, he even uses the expression: *Sacræ eruditionis summa quasi divinæ scripturæ introductio.*

‡ *Nunc plurimi solatium suæ imperitiæ quærunt, ut cum ea de fide docere nituntur, quæ ut etiam intelligi possint, disserere non sufficiunt, illum maxime fidei fervorem commendent, qui ea quæ dicantur, antequam intelligat, credit, et prius his assentit ac recipit, quam quæ ipsa sint videat et, an recipienda sint, agnoscat seu pro captu suo discutiat. Lib. II. p. 1061.*

§ *Cujusque populi fides, quantamcunque astruat falsitatem, refelli non poterit. Respondere poterit, secundum nos ipsos etiam de fide ratio-*

had revealed could not be understood in the present life, this would lead to Montanism: it would follow from it that the sacred authors had been blind instruments of the Holy Spirit, and did not themselves understand what they wrote. A faith that sprung up so easily, that was not the result of examination, could never possess firmness. He appealed to the words of Sirach, xix. 4: "He who believes soon, is fickle-minded. Men who are not of easy faith require reasons that may determine them to believe either rational arguments or facts. Thus Thomas, Paul, were led to the faith by facts; and the greater the difficulty which Paul encountered in making his way to the faith, the stronger his faith proved to be after his conversion." He argued that this apostle preferred the gift of prophecy above all other gifts of the Spirit, because it enabled him to expound that which is contained in the collective matter of religious consciousness, in a way calculated to convince others; and undervalued the gift of tongues, because the former faculty was not connected with it.*

He distinguished different stages in the growth and development of faith. In the way just described, arises only the first degree of faith, religious conviction, determined by the force of rational arguments or of objective facts. This is, as yet, no such faith as has merit in the sight of God. From this is developed, by the supervention of love, a faith which, without allowing itself to be led astray by outward appearances, recognizes something as indisputably true, on account of God's word; where the love that trusts in God requires no other reason; as in the case of Abraham's faith.† But the first-mentioned faith is only a preparatory step, though not on that account to be despised. Abelard, accordingly, supposes the following process of development:—"One first inquires into the reasons, which show the truth of Christianity; thus, faith obtains its warrant. Out of this proceeds next, by the power of the Holy Spirit, the confidence of religious con-

cinandum non esse, nec a nobis alios impeti debere, unde nos ab aliis censemus impetendos non esse. Lib. II. p. 1059.

* Thus he explains the prophetari: *Ea quæ dicuntur exponere et eorum intelligentiam aperire. L. c. p. 1062.*

† *Distinguitur itaque fides talis a fide Abrahæ, qui contra spem in spem credit, nec naturæ possibilitatem, sed promittentis attendit veritatem. Lib. II. p. 1060.*

viction in reference to things unseen. Faith ever has reference to the invisible things of God. The visible and sensuous may furnish a foothold or occasion for faith, an outward vehicle, whereby that which is the object of faith manifests itself to the mind; but not the object of faith itself. Even Thomas, to whom our Lord said, 'thou believest because thou hast seen,' did not believe on that which he saw. He *saw* the sensible appearance, and he *believed* only in God, concealed under the same."*

Among the germs of a new theological development, which Abelard only failed to prosecute far enough and take advantage of, belongs this also, that, in allotting to faith its peculiar province and determining its limits, he separated from it things that concerned not the religious interest, things that to this were a matter of indifference; as, for example, the question whether Christ was a man of this or that stature, whether he had preached in this or that city:† a distinction which might have led him still farther to separate that which is properly an article of faith from that which is not such, but belongs to the same class with other historical facts; and in the sacred Scriptures themselves to separate that which is properly the word of God from that which is not such; and we may actually find, in Abelard, the indications of a freer mode of apprehending the idea of inspiration. In connection with this particular must be taken also a remark of his, in his commentary on the epistle to the Romans, that perhaps what

* If Abelard (Lib. II. p. 1061) called faith, as compared to intuition (*ipsarum rerum experientia per ipsam earum presentiam = cognitio*), simply in this relation, the *existimatio non apparentium*, an explanation which was interpreted so much to his discredit, yet he in nowise intended by this to put faith on a level with other mere fancies and opinions, or to disparage its worth. At the same time, he made it prominent that faith is the *substantia rerum non apparentium*, which, in the Sentences, soon to be more particularly described, ed. Rheinwald, c. ii. (which section on faith corresponds in all respects with the *Introduct. theol.* p. 980), he thus explains: *Fundamentum et origo, unde ad speranda aliqua perducimur, credendo scilicet primum ea esse, ut postmodum speremus. Argumentum non apparentium, hoc est probatio, quod sint aliqua non apparentia.*

† *Sunt autem plura ad Deum pertinentia, quæ credi vel non credi nostra non interest, quia sive credantur sive non credantur nullum incurrimus periculum.* (The examples are taken from the Sentences.)

the gospel has taught concerning faith, hope, and charity, might suffice for salvation."*

Lying at the basis of all Abelard's teachings is the distinction which he makes between religion in itself, that has its root in the heart,—the substance of faith in itself, and the knowledge thence derived, the development of that which is given in immediate consciousness, under the form of knowledge. Therefore he employs, in defence of the dialectic science, an argument of the same sort as the Alexandrian church-teachers had employed before him, that, although nothing is gained by that science for faith in itself, yet thereby the faculty is acquired of unfolding and vindicating scientifically the truths of faith. Two individuals may be equal as to the strength of their faith and piety; and still, on the side of Christian knowledge, one may be eminently superior to the other, because he is enabled, by his earlier scientific culture, to present the common object-matter of Christian faith in a scientific form. Piety, without scientific study, can here avail nothing. He was wont, for illustration, to compare Paul and Augustin, on the one hand, with Peter and Martin of Tours on the other. The two former have no advantage, in respect of piety, over the two latter; yet they are as distinguished from them, in point of knowledge, as we might be led to suppose they would be, from their earlier scientific education.† These remarks of Abelard are grounded on a mode of apprehending the idea of inspiration somewhat different from the one common at that time, on a habit of distinguishing the divine and the human elements in inspiration; for it follows, indeed, from this, that the different ways in which Peter and Paul present divine truth, are to be ascribed, not so much to a divine causality, as to the difference of their human individuality, and of their human education.

* Lib. I. p. 493: Sufficere saluti fortasse poterant ea, quæ evangelium de fide et spe et caritate tradiderat. Which assertion he contrived, however, to reconcile with the church doctrine, assuming that our Lord had reserved many things to be arranged and ordered by the apostles and later fathers, which, after having been once ordained, could not be disregarded without peril to salvation.

† Paulus quippe Apostolus licet non major merito quam Petrus videatur, vel confessor Augustinus quam Martinus, tanto tamen uterque altero majorem in doctrina gratiam post conversionem habuit, quanto antea majorem literarum scientia pollebat. Lib. II. p. 1053.

It is evident what a germ was herein contained of a quite different view of the Bible, of quite different principles of biblical interpretation, from any which then prevailed. Abelard, certainly, was not aware of all the wide differences here involved; but we shall see, however, that he did consciously give another shaping to the idea of inspiration.

Furthermore, he held that, in defending divine truth against those who attacked it with the weapons of worldly science, it was absolutely necessary to place one's self at their position, and to become acquainted with and apply the arts which they made use of.* We should carefully distinguish, in worldly science, that which is God's gift in it from that which arises from man's abuse of it. "Far be it from us to believe that God, who makes use of evil itself to promote good, should not also so order all the arts which are his gifts, that they too may subserve his glory, however much they may be perverted by bad men."† Upon this principle the connection between God's work and human culture should be recognized even in the church-teachers and apostles themselves.‡ When Paul says, "knowledge puffeth up," the very remark presupposes that it is something good in itself; for pride fixes upon that which, in itself considered, is good. Still, Abelard by no means felt himself bound to give a complete demonstration and a complete knowledge of the doctrine of the Trinity. He distinguishes between intellection (the *intelligere*), which corresponds to the position of faith, and cognition (the *cognoscere*), or the full intuition of the life eternal.§ And he expressly declared: "We do not promise, on this point, to teach the truth,—a task to which we hold that neither ourselves nor any other mortal is competent; but we promise

* *Alio modo non possumus, nisi has quas noverunt rationes, ex ipsorum artibus afferamus.* Lib. II. p. 1047.

† *Absit enim hoc, ut credamus Deum, qui malis quoque ipsis bene utitur, non bene etiam omnes artes, quæ ejus dona sunt, ordinare, ut hæc quoque ejus majestati deserviant, quantumcunque male his abutuntur per-versi.*

‡ *Ne a donis ejus alienæ viderentur sæculares literæ, si ad nullam eis commodam uteretur.* Lib. II. p. 1053.

§ In opposition to those who maintained that the perfect knowledge of the Trinity was reserved to the life eternal, Abelard says, l. c. p. 1061: *Profecto aliud est intelligere seu credere, aliud cognoscere seu manifestare, cognitio, that is, ipsarum rerum experientia per ipsam earum præsentium.*

to teach at least something *probable*, something which approximates near to human reason, and which stands in no contradiction with our holy faith.”*

He was as far removed as possible from that rationalist view which denies miracles: he defended the idea of the supernatural against an arrogant philosophy; and we shall hereafter be led to see the connection between his view of miracles and his doctrine concerning almighty power, and the creation and government of the world. His tendency and his principles led him only so far as to combat the supernaturalism which affirmed an absolute antagonism between the supernatural and the natural, and to demonstrate the harmonious connection between the two. From this harmonious agreement between the supernatural and the natural, showing the work of one God in original creation and in the kingdom of grace, he proceeded, as a starting-point, to justify the employment of the worldly sciences for the defence of Christianity and of its doctrines; saying of the opponents against whom he had to contend, “that they treated the matter as if God’s works of creation stood in contradiction with divine revelation and the truths of faith.” † He maintained, on the contrary, that men were bound to seek the analogies of things supernatural, by tracing out the connection of all God’s works in nature. In this view, he found a reason for the frequent use of parables in the Bible—God taking similitudes from the kingdom of nature for the representation of higher truths. ‡ Quite in accordance with this view of the connection between revelation and nature, he supposed that in history also there was no such abrupt contrariety between revelation and natural development, but sought here after intermediate links, and was disposed to find, in the natural development of reason amongst the ancients, a point of entrance for revealed truths; and this direction of thought, in

* L. c. 1047.

† Quasi sacræ fidei et divinis rationibus ipsæ naturæ rerum a Deo conditarum inimicæ videntur. Lib. II. p. 1054.

‡ In tantum vero in ipsa factura delectatus Deus, ut frequenter ipsis rerum naturis, quas creavit, se figurari magis quam verbis nostris, quæ nos confinximus aut invenimus, exprimi velit, ut magis ipsa rerum similitudine, quam verborum nostrorum gaudeat proprietate, ut ad eloquentiæ venustatem ipsis rerum naturis juxta aliquam similitudinem pro verbis scriptura malit uti, quam propriæ locutionis integritatem sequi. L. c.

which he agreed with the Alexandrian theology, would have probably led him also to similar results as it had the older Alexandrian church-teachers, if the fetters of the church doctrine had not confined him.

But if the truth was, that even the Alexandrians themselves, in this striving after a point of mediation, had allowed themselves to be deceived by apparent analogies; the same might happen still more easily with Abelard, since he knew the Greek philosophers only from the reports of others, his ignorance of the Greek language not permitting him to go back to the very sources.* While it was impossible for him to arrive at any unprejudiced view of the doctrines of the ancient philosophers, he was still less in a condition to gain any correct notions respecting their lives, and respecting antiquity generally. Having no patience with the worldly lives of many churchmen and monks of his own times, he was the more inclined to draw an idealized picture of the strictness of life maintained by the ancient philosophers, which he held up for the purpose of shaming those Christians. And in this moral perfection of the ancient philosophers he found a reason for supposing that God allowed them to attain already to the knowledge of those truths; that he, through his grace, vouchsafed to them such illumination in order to evince, by their example, how much more well-pleasing to him was a life abstracted from the world, than one devoted to its pleasures.† Abelard supposed especially that, in the idea of humility, in the recognition of God as the fountain-head of all true wisdom, a relationship might be traced between the Socratico-Platonic and the Christian positions; and that therefore what Paul says concerning the pride of worldly wisdom, could not have referred to Socrates and Plato. The whole description which Paul gives, in the first chapters of the epistle to the Romans, of the corruption of the pagan world, could, as it seemed to him, have no reference to philosophers so distinguished for their strict, abstemious lives, but must

* Abelard says, in his *Logic* (ed. Cousin, p. 205), that he had read nothing of Plato's, because his works had not been translated into Latin.

† *Oportebat quippe tunc etiam, ut in ipsis præsignaret Deus, per aliquod abundantioris gratiæ donum, quam acceptior sit ei, qui sobrie vivit et se ab illecebris hujus mundi per contemptum ejus abstrahat, quam qui voluptatibus ejus deditus, spurcitiis omnibus se immergit.* Lib. I. p. 1004.

have applied to a few cases rather than to the majority.* And it is here evident, we must allow, that, setting forth as he did the lives of the ancient philosophers after an idealized pattern, and approximating the antique standard more nearly to the Christian, he would thus be led to overlook that which is peculiar to the latter, the characterizing distinction between nature and grace, between all other human qualities and the specifically Christian. Still, he did not go so far as to maintain that those ancients could, by their moral perfection, without Christ, have ever attained to salvation. On the contrary, he declared expressly that faith in the Saviour is a means of salvation necessary for all; but he would not allow that this faith was wanting in the above-mentioned philosophy, for had not the Sibyls prophesied concerning the Redeemer, some of them even more plainly than any of the prophets? And nothing certain could be inferred from the silence of the ancients, nor was the annunciation of a Saviour to be found in the writings of every one of the prophets.†

If we inquire into the relation of Abelard's dogmatic bent, as seen in this work, to that of Anselm, we shall find that the former agrees somewhat with the latter in this principle, that "*fides præcedit intellectum.*" He saw, also, that religion had its seat in the heart; that the true knowledge of the truths of faith presupposed their reception by the heart, and that inner experience which comes from faith. But in his view of the way in which this faith arises,—in his notion of an "intellection" going before faith,—he turned from the direction of Anselm. He assumed, as his own position, that faith proceeds first from inquiry, that it works itself out of doubt by means of rational investigation. In this respect, then, he makes faith develop itself out of intellection, because one must first know why and what he believes, before he can believe; though, in another respect, he acknowledged that this intellection has its root in faith. He distinguished two different kinds of faith, and of intellection. If in Anselm's account of the relation of *ratio* to *fides*, we mark the impress of that quiet religious life which was never interrupted or disturbed by a

* Constat quippe philosophos maxime continentes vixisse atque ad continentiam tam scriptis, quam exemplis multas nobis exhortationes reliquisse.

† Lib. II. pp. 1007 et 1008.

doubt,—so in Abelard's theory, we may trace the reflection of his religious development, which had not been so harmonious or so peaceful. We see how the reaction of that element of the understanding, so strongly predominant in him,—against doctrines of faith received by tradition,—asserted its full force, and how a variety of thoughts were suggested to his mind, which might have led him entirely astray from that simple, childlike faith; and to which he must have allowed a much freer admission than would have been warranted by the standard of that childlike faith as held by the theologians of his time. His theology took schism and doubt for its point of departure, and could never wholly repudiate its origin, but always showed evidence of having been made up of conflicting and unreconciled elements.

He himself, it is true, in the account he gives of his contests, ascribes all the attacks upon his school to the jealousy of his opponents; but although this may have been true in part, yet it was assuredly saying too much. His enthusiastic pupils, who most gladly appropriated to themselves the scientific pretensions of their master, and retailed his assertions with exaggeration, must have especially contributed to provoke attacks upon him. As to the individual who was his first and his last opponent, though he misconceived Abelard's character and motives, yet he was not governed by personal passion, but by a simple interest for the cause of religion and of truth; and he was an entire stranger to the odious heresy-hunting spirit. This was Walter of Mauretania,* also called Walter a St. Victore, because he belonged to the regular clergy of that church. In intercourse with Abelard's disciples,† he had heard them repeat such assertions as these: that Abelard knew how to exhibit the mystery of the Trinity as a matter perfectly comprehensible; he could make it perfectly clear to reason how three persons were to be conceived

* Not Mauretania in North Africa, but a place called Montagne in Flanders.

† In the letters of this person, about to be referred to, there are, it is true, no exact chronological dates; still, the whole tone of the letter leads us to conclude that there had as yet been no public attacks made on Abelard; and this is confirmed by the fact that Walter of Mauretania takes notice of Abelard's theology only in the first form under which it appeared.

as subsisting in the unity of essence in God; how the Son was begotten of the Father, and the Holy Spirit proceeded from Father and Son. If he urged against them passages of Holy Scripture, from which it clearly appeared that the perfect knowledge of the divine essence was reserved to the life eternal, they replied that these passages did not refer to a perfect *knowledge* that was first to be acquired in the life eternal, but to the perfect *blessedness* of the righteous in communion with God, to the *enjoyment* of which they would then first participate.* Still, Walter was careful not to charge the master with the positions advanced by his pupils, as he was very well aware how easily a teacher may be misconceived, and how easily it may happen for pupils to ascribe to the master their own opinions, in order to give them additional authority.† He waited till he could get sight of Abelard's book, which has been mentioned; where, again, he met with many of these positions which had offended him, as uttered by his disciples; nor did he even then stand forth publicly against Abelard, but wrote him a letter, in which he explained at large his doubts, and invited him, by mutual communications in writing, to come to an understanding with him on these points, since in this way the whole matter might be investigated in the most quiet manner.‡

Walter was, to be sure, by no means a match for so practised a dialectician. It is remarkable that he brought against him the most contradictory accusations—on the one hand, that he attributed too much to knowledge; on the other, that he spoke too sceptically,—when in the preface to his work he observed, he did not promise so much to speak the truth, as to exhibit, in compliance with the requests of his pupils, his own

* D'Achery, Spicileg. T. III. f. 524: Quod istæ auctoritates non remouent ab hac vita trinitatis perfectissimam notitiam, sed perfectam delectationem de illa scientia provenientes. In the writings of Abelard himself we find, indeed, no such assertion, but only the distinction between the intellectus in this life, and the intuition of the immediately present in the life eternal.

† Solet autem frequenter fieri, quod discipuli discordent a sensu magistrorum sive per imperitiam verba eorum male exponendo sive ad ostensionem sui aliquas novitates inducendo, quas majoris auctoritatis magistris suis licet ignorantibus consueverunt adscribere.

‡ Sine ira et disceptatione, quæ animos disputantium et præsentialiter colloquentium frequenter solent commovere et menti oculum obfuscare.

opinions * Who, in discoursing of the Catholic faith, could so express himself as if he were di-coursing of a mere opinion? Who, on hearing another promise, not the truth, but only his opinions, would place any faith in what he held forth? Abelard was right, however, in warning his pupils against the delusive idea that any man could present absolute truth; he was right in distinguishing the truth of faith, in itself, from a human attempt to make it intelligible. Walter, again, in endeavouring to draw sharply the line of discrimination between the hither side and the yonder side in the knowledge of divine things, in opposition to Abelard, committed the mistake of robbing several passages in the Gospel of St. John—which refer to the connection of the hither side and the yonder side in the life of Christian faith—of their true significance, and distorting their meaning. Thus, for example, he cited against Abelard, John xvii. 3, and understood here, contrary to the connection of ideas in the evangelical writer, the eternal life as something future.† With more propriety he could appeal to 1 Corinth. xiii. 12.‡ The other party presented, in opposition to him, however, Matth. xi. 27, and John xiv. 9. In the heat of controversy, Walter was driven to refer even these passages, also, to the future life, and to adopt an arbitrary method of interpretation often resorted to in far later times; maintaining that here, as frequently in the prophetic writings, the preterite tense was substituted for the future, in order to express certainty. Yet here he did not feel sure of his ground, and therefore added: although these passages might, like John vi. 40, refer to the present life, still they treated only of a position held by faith, and the imperfect knowledge

* Non tam nos veritatem dicere promittentes, quam opinionis nostræ sensum, quem efflagitant exponentes. Page 974.

† It would undoubtedly be more common to use these passages thus, since even Abelard already referred to such a mode of apprehending them; and did not once use the good right he had to turn such passages directly in opposition to his adversaries: Quæ (which refers to the Trinity) penitus in hac vita non posse intelligi asseverant, sed hoc ipsum intelligi vitam dicunt æternam. Juxta illud Joann. xvii. 3 et iterum: Manifestabo eis meipsum. Opp. Lib. II. page 1061.

‡ His verbis aperte insinuat, se ad præsens imperfecte et obscure videre Deum, sed in futuro ad perfectam et claram Dei notitiam perventurum, et sicut a Deo est cognitus, ita in futuro se divinam essentiam nosciturum.

connected therewith, just as the promise in John xvi. 13 treated only of that which in *this* life it was necessary for the faithful to *know* in order to salvation.*

The doctrines taught by Abelard, in the book referred to and in his lectures, afforded him sufficient occasion for representing him—judged by the standard of the common theology—as a teacher of error. Owing to the want of unprejudiced reports,† it is impossible to decide how much is to be attributed, in the first open attacks against him, to a pure interest for the cause of truth, and how much to jealousy and personal passion. Different motives may have operated together. Certainly Abelard, under the existing circumstances, could expect to experience no better fate than Roscelin. At a synod held at Soissons, in the year 1121, he yielded to the power of his adversaries, and consented to cast his book with his own hands into the fire. He was for the present condemned, as a false teacher, to confinement in a monastery, where he was to do penance; but as Abelard's patron, bishop Gottfried of Chartres, who sought to bring the dispute to a peaceful termination at the council, had already, by way of consolation, assured him this mode of condemning him without a hearing would only serve to call forth in the greater number of his enthusiastic adherents a livelier sympathy for his cause, in a very few days Conon, the papal legate who had presided at that council, permitted him to return back to the abbey of St. Denis; but his restless spirit, which would never allow him to be silent where any antiquated prejudice confronted him with a lie, did not permit him to remain long here in the enjoyment of quiet. The monks, embittered towards him already on account of his lectures of reform, became still more excited by an assertion of his, which threatened greatly to injure the authority and interests of the abbey, which rested solely on the tradition that the person after whom it was named, the Areopagite converted by St. Paul, was the founder of the French church.

* Nec intelligendum est, quod sanctis in hac vita positis filius notificaverit omnia, quæ audivit a patre, ad futurum seculum pertinentia, sed potius omnia quæ sunt eis in præsentī necessaria, ut salutem consequantur.

† For what Abelard (himself a party concerned, and very violent) says, in his *Historia Calamitatum*, cannot be considered as altogether worthy of credit.

Now Abelard, in attacking this error, which had stood its ground for so many centuries,* afforded the angry monks the best opportunity for revenge; since he who would rob France of her patron saint could easily be held forth as the enemy of the empire and of the nation. He fled from the persecutions which assailed him to the territory of the count Theobald of Champagne. In the district of Troyes he built himself a hermitage of reeds and straw, which afterwards he dedicated to the Holy Spirit, the Comforter (*Paraclete*), who permitted him here to find peace after so many storms. It was absolute poverty, as he himself relates,—the want of everything necessary for the support of life, which first induced him to resume his lectures in this place. Soon, multitudes of young men of all ranks resorted to the spot to hear him. Those who had been brought up in splendour and luxury shrunk not from sharing his deprivations, and imitating his strict mode of life. With the labour of their own hands, or with their substance, they provided for their own bodily wants, and rebuilt his chapel with stone. But the enthusiasm with which his pupils, scattered in all directions, spoke of him and of his teachings, was the means of drawing upon him new persecutions. He now retired from public notice, having accepted, in the year 1128, the priory of Ruits in Brittany; but the place became very annoying to him, on account of his quarrels with the rude, undisciplined monks. In 1136 he resigned this preferment, and for a year gave lectures again in Paris. His scholars were scattered over all France; and the writings which he had published since the time of those first contests, created a great sensation; new storms were thus excited against him, and the way was now prepared for a contest of more general interest and significance than any preceding one. Let us now first cast a glance at the writings which had meanwhile been published by him, and the doctrines in them which were particularly offensive to his times, so far as the subject is not immediately connected with the history of special doctrines.

His "Introduction to Theology," which had been condemned at the council of Soissons, he sent forth, under another shape,

* In combating the error, he still did not light upon the truth; for he suffered himself to be misled by a false statement of Beda's, and to take this Dionysius for the bishop Dionysius of Corinth.

in his work* “on Christian Theology,” but without softening the harshness of those passages which, in the first edition, had given offence to many; some of them, on the contrary, were expressed still more pointedly than before. He endeavoured in this work to show more clearly the agreement between the ancient philosophy and Christianity. “In life and doctrine,” he maintained, “the old philosophers came very near to apostolical perfection, and were not far, if at all, removed from Christianity; indeed, the very terms of philosophy and Christianity were very nearly related to each other; for Christians were so called from Christ, the true wisdom, and they who truly loved Christ, might, with propriety, be called philosophers.”† “If the appeal to motives of fear and reward constituted the main difference between the Jewish position of servitude and the Christian position of grace and freedom, where love is held forth as the motive of all actions; then philosophy, which represents love to God as the highest motive, was, on this point, more nearly akin to Christianity than Judaism.”‡ If it were objected that, with those philosophers, the matter of discussion was certainly not love to God, but only love to what is good, he replied, that “this amounted to the same thing, since God is the original fountain of all good;”§ a reply, indeed, very far from satisfactorily determining anything with regard to a religious principle of action; but he affirmed that the principle of love to God was also found actually expressed in them, as the motive to all true goodness. Hence the preaching of the gospel had met with a more ready reception from the philosophers than from the Jews, for it appeared more nearly conformed to the groundwork of their principles; differing, perhaps, from what they already possessed only in the doctrine of the resurrection and

* In Martene et Durand. Thesaur. nov. anecdot. T. V.

† Cum nos a vera philosophia, hoc est sapientia Dei patris, Christiani dicamur, vere in hoc dicendi philosophi, si vere Christum diligimus. Theol. Christian. Lib. II. T. V. f. 1210.

‡ Morum et honestatis rationibus secundum caritatis libertatem, quod in gratia vocati sumus, non secundum Judaicam ex timore pœnarum et ambitione terrenorum, non (this *non* is without doubt a false reading, for it manifestly stands in contradiction with what follows), ex desiderio æternorum, nobis plurimum philosophos certum est assentire.

§ Quodsi id minus videtur esse ad meritum salvationis, quod dicitur amore virtutis et non potius amore Dei. ac si virtutem vel aliquod bonum opus habere possimus, quod non secundum ipsum Deum ac propter ipsum sit.

of the incarnation of the Son of God: for the morality of the gospel, strictly taken, was but a reformation of the law of nature (*reformatio legis naturalis*), and this moral law of nature the philosophers had followed. On the other hand, the Mosaic law occupied itself more with those ceremonial ordinances which had a typical significance, than with the moral element, and more with external than with internal righteousness; but the gospel, like philosophy, estimated the worth of all actions by the disposition of the heart. Thus Abelard, from paying no regard to the connection between the ethical and dogmatic elements in Christianity, and hence failing to give prominence to what constitutes the grand distinction between the ancient and the Christian principle in morals, was brought up at a point where he seemed compelled to place Christianity in closer relation with the Hellenic philosophy than with Judaism; and the question would naturally suggest itself, What need, then, of Christianity? Has it only the merit of having perfected philosophical morality, and introduced it into the general consciousness of mankind? This was a position which Abelard, as we shall see by comparing it with his other doctrines, was very far from taking. At the same time we must not forget, that his impatience with the rudeness of his times, made him the more inclined to extol the life of antiquity. "Would that, by the example of the heathens," says he, "the abbots of these times might at least be made ashamed of themselves, who in the very eyes of their brethren the monks, that live on a bare and scanty diet, gorge without blushing vast quantities of the most costly viands."* He contrasts the example of Plato, who banished poets from his republic, with the bishops of his time, who, on high festivals, instead of wholly spending the sacred time in giving praise to God, invited jesters, dancers, and singers of libidinous songs to their tables, entertaining themselves the whole day and night with such company, and then rewarding them with great presents at the expense of the poor.† Nay more, they

* *Erubescant ad hæc hujus temporis abbates, quibus summa religionis monasticæ cura commissa est, erubescant, inquam, et respiscant saltem gentilium exemplo commoti, quod in oculis fratrum vilia pulmentorum pabula ruminantium exquisita fercula ac multiplicia impudenter devorant, f. 1215.*

† *Quid in solennibus magnarum festivitatum diebus, quæ penitus in laudibus Dei expendi debent, joculatores, saltatores, incantatores turpium*

even profaned, with such sports, the very churches themselves.*

The ideas of Abelard, set forth already in his "Introduction," on the relation of *ratio* to *fides*, on the intellection proceeding from the interior religious life, we meet once more in this new form of his work. He declares himself strongly opposed to an aristocracy of knowledge in Christianity. He acknowledges that a right understanding of religious truths can only be obtained through the enlightening influences of the Holy Spirit, and that such influences are bestowed on none but the pure in heart. More was attained here by a religious life than by intellectual talents. Nor could it be otherwise; for, if it were, our Lord would have signified that talents were more acceptable to him than a holy life. From the religion that has its seat in the feelings, everything should proceed, and back upon the same everything should react. He supposes a mutual action and reaction between knowing and feeling: "The more we feel of God, the more we love him; and, with progress in the knowledge of him, the flame of love grows brighter." Yet he is aware of the fact that religious life and intellectual culture do not always keep pace with each other; that a man may have more in his immediate religious consciousness than he is able to express or explain; since he may be destitute of the necessary organ for this, or the requisite degree of mental cultivation: "although they who to us seem simple and ignorant, and yet possess piety so much the more fervid, want only the ability to express that knowledge which divine inspiration bestows on them."† He himself declaimed against those of his contemporaries who set up to be teachers of theology without reforming their lives, and who,

acciunt ad mensam, totam diem et noctem cum illis feriant atque sabbatizant, magnis postmodum eos remunerant præmiis, quæ de ecclesiasticis rapiunt beneficiis, de oblationibus pauperum, ut immolent certe dæmoniis?

* Parum fortassis et hoc diabolus reputat, quod extra sacra loca basilicarum gerunt, nisi etiam scenicas turpitudines in ecclesiam Dei introducat. f. 1240.

† Quo plus de Deo a nobis sentitur, plus a nobis intelligitur et cum profectu intelligentiæ caritatis accenditur flamma, licet hi qui simplices ac idiotæ nobis videntur et ideo vehementer sint ferventes nec tantum exprimere aut disserere queant, quantum iis intelligentiæ divina inspiratio confert. Lib. III. f. 1250.

while living to the flesh, pretended to a special knowledge of the divine mysteries.

Furthermore, he published, after this work, his Commentary on the Epistle to the Romans, in which the dogmatic and ethical digressions constitute what is most peculiar.* Among those doctrines of this book which excited special remark, belongs Abelard's opinion respecting disinterested love to God. He held that the love which seeks a reward, and is not exercised towards God simply for his own sake, deserved not to be called love at all. The majority of men, indeed nearly all, had fallen into so wrong a state of feeling as to be ready to avow that, if they did not hope to obtain some benefit from God, they would cease to worship and love him. But God when even he punishes ought none the less to be loved, since he would not do this unless justice required it, and so in his justice God would manifest himself as worthy of love. "Whoever seeks in God, not himself, but something else, does not in reality love *him*, but that other thing. But perhaps it will be said: although we seek our blessedness in God, yet it is a pure and sincere love; for supreme blessedness consists, indeed, in the very fact that God communicates himself to us."† To this he replies: "It is only then a pure love to God, when it has for

* In a passage of this tract (Lib. I. p. 513), he cites the first book as follows: "In theologiæ nostræ opusculo," and the passage he cites, the hint at the doctrine of the Trinity in the writings of the ancient philosophers, is actually to be found there. On the contrary (Lib. I. p. 554), he speaks of his Theology as a work which still remained to be published: "Theologiæ nostræ tractatui reservamus." But the consistency of these two statements with each other is explained by the fact that, in the last case, he is discoursing on the point how justificatio per Christum is to be understood,—a question he has not treated in his Theologia Christiana, which has come down to us. It is evident, then, that he had it in view to extend that sketch, which embraced but a small part of the doctrines of faith, to the whole sum of those doctrines, as he was accustomed to hold them forth in his lectures, of which we have a copy in his *Sententiæ*, published by Professor Rheinwald: and in this further prosecution of his theological system, then had in view, he intended to enter into the investigation of this question also. But the agitations of his life did not allow him an opportunity of executing his purpose. He also had it in view at that time to put forth a work on the subject of Ethics. Lib. II. p. 560: "Nostræ id ethicæ discussioni reservemus."

† Quoniam Deus seipso nos, non alia re est remuneraturus, et seipsum, quo nihil majus est, nobis est daturus.

its object only God as he is himself, without respect to that which he communicates to us. In this case we shall alike love him, in whatever way he may treat us or others. Such, in fact, is the true love of the wife for her husband,—of the father for his son; it will remain the same, even though they may experience nothing but detriment on account of the object of their love. O that we might have," says he, "so upright a disposition of heart towards the Lord, as to love him far more on his own account, because he is so good in himself, than on account of the benefits which he brings to us! So would our righteousness fully render to him what he claims, that, because he is supremely good, he should be supremely loved by all. Fear, and hope of reward, are but the first step in piety: 'The fear of the Lord is the *beginning* of wisdom.' But the perfection of it is pure love to God for his own sake."*

It is manifest, when we consider the doctrines of Bernard,† already explained, concerning the different stages or degrees of love, that these two men, who were so diametrically opposed to each other in their general mode of thinking, nevertheless agreed in what they regarded as moral perfection, with only this difference: that Bernard, that experienced and careful guide of souls, understood better how to distinguish the different stages of development in the religious life, and to let himself down to their necessities. Of the middle theory, attempted by Hugo a St. Victore, we shall speak hereafter.

Abelard was the first, also, among the men of the new scientific direction, to compose a particular work on morals; namely, his *Scito te ipsum*.‡ Here, however, he put forth many a bold assertion, which sometimes for good reason, sometimes without any at all, would be likely to appear offensive to the church-theologians of his time.

Like Augustin, to whose authority, moreover, he appealed, Abelard stood forth in opposition to the externalizing and isolating tendency favoured by the practice of the church, which led men, in estimating the morality of actions, to regard rather the *materiel* of the action, the *opus operatum* of good works, than the standard of the inward disposition. As already, in his Commentary on the Epistle to the Romans, we saw him point-

* Page 622, et seqq.

† Page 502.

‡ Pez, T. III. p. ii. f. 646.

ing to the pure love of God as the motive of all true goodness, so here to that outward, *quantitative* method of estimating moral actions he opposed the principle that everything depended on the intention. This principle was, to be sure, not peculiar to him; it had passed over, through the influence of the Augustinian spirit, into the theological consciousness of his times, and in it theologians of opposite tendency were agreed. Thus the mystic Richard a St. Victore observes: "A work without a good intention is like a body without life. That which appears to be good is still not good without this."* By Abelard, this generally acknowledged principle was only placed at the head, and with the consequences flowing from it, still further unfolded. "All actions," said he, "abstractedly and externally considered, are in themselves indifferent; the intention only gives them moral worth. Only when considered in connection with the intention of the agent are they capable of moral adjudication. That is the tree which yields either good fruit or bad." † This proposition he took up again in his work on Ethics, unfolding it still farther, with the important consequences which it involved. "God," he affirmed, "judges actions by the intention, not by the outward act." ‡ "Two men may do the same thing, and yet it shall be entirely different, considered in reference to the different intentions of the doers. The elect and the reprobate may perform the same works; the intention with which they perform them alone separates the one from the other." Thus he lighted upon the right way of deciding the contested question, whether there were actions indifferent (*adiaphora*); in how far all or none might be without any moral character. Nevertheless, he was, on the one hand, too much confined by the doctrines of the church, from which he by no means wished to depart,

* Quod est corpus sine vita, hoc est opus sine intentione bona. Sicut vita a corde procedit, et se per omnia membra diffundit, sic et intentio bona de consilio surgit et virtutum opera ad meriti vegetationem animare consuevit. De statu interioris hominis Tractat. I. c. vii.

† Quia opera indifferentia sunt in se, nec bona nec mala, sive remuneratione digna videantur, nisi secundum radicem intentionis, quæ est arbor bonum vel malum proferens fructum. Comment. in Roman. Lib. I. p. 522.

‡ Non quæ fiant, sed quo animo fiant, pensat Deus, nec in opere, sed in intentione meritum operantis vel laus consistit. Omnia in se indifferentia nec nisi pro intentione agentis bona vel mala dicenda sunt.

to follow out in a consistent manner all the consequences which his penetrating mind saw to be deducible from this weighty and pregnant principle; while, on the other hand, he was betrayed into false positions by pushing what was right in itself to an extreme, and was thus very apt in combating one error to fall into the opposite. He would drive a proposition, true in itself, to such lengths as could hardly fail to result in that sophistical method of treating morals which presents the whole too much on the subjective side; for, as the objective and subjective elements belong together, no action can be correctly estimated except in connection with the intention expressed by it. But neither can a right moral intention express itself except in the form of an action corresponding to the moral law; and therefore, to separate elements which should be so closely connected, could only lead to a one-sided theory, and errors directly opposed to each other in the system of morals.

Thus, for example, from the proposition above-mentioned he derives the consequence that, "as morality is only grounded in that which stands within man's power, the *intentio animi*, not in the outward act, the performance or non-performance of which depends on circumstances that do not stand under man's control, so the completed action contributes nothing towards increasing the moral worth, which lies exclusively in the intention. If we call a man's intention a good one, and his work a good one, still, we have not here two things that are good, but only one good thing in the intention."* But, in fixing his eye on this single element, he overlooks the consideration that it may depend not only on the circumstances, but also on the strength or feebleness of the "intention;" whether that intention which, in order to its actual realization, may

* Cum dicimus intentionem hominis bonam et opus illius bonum, duo quidem distinguimus, intentionem scilicet ac opus, unam tamen bonitatem intentionis. This favourite position of Abelard, which certainly was often advanced by him in his lectures, is found also in the *Dialogus* inter philosophum, Judæum et Christianum, published from the treasures of the imperial library at Vienna, by Dr. Rheinwald, in the year 1831, page 115: Non actiones vel bonæ vel malæ, nisi secundum intentionis radicem judicantur, sed omnes ex se indifferentes sunt, et si diligenter inspiciamus, nihil ad meritum conferunt, quæ nequaquam ex se bonæ sunt aut malæ, cum ipsæ videlicet tam reprobis quam electis æque convenient.

have to pass through many intermediate steps, and overcome many obstacles, really attains to its end or not.

Again, this vaguely stated proposition might be so understood as if, in estimating the morality of an action, everything depended on the subjective intention, or purpose, and not at all on the objective act; so that every man might be justified on the ground of his good intentions, although he may have failed of doing right through error. And so the intention at bottom would have to be approved in many actions bad in themselves. Accordingly, we find him proposing the following question: "How are we to judge, then, concerning those who persecuted Christ himself or the Christians, thinking that they thereby did what was acceptable to God; persons who from the position they occupied, from the degree of their knowledge, could not do otherwise, or, if they had done otherwise, would have sinned against their consciences?" His loosely conceived principle must have led him to pronounce the doings of such persons good, as proceeding from a right intention. But when he came actually to adopt this result, to which he saw himself forced by his premises, on the one hand, the door was thrown open for all manner of arbitrary judgments in morals; while on the other, he found himself involved in a dispute with regard to those principles, by which the actions of unbelievers were judged according to the standard doctrine of the church, and driven into many heretical assertions. This contradiction he was desirous of avoiding. Accordingly, he acquiesced in the judgment which, conformably to the church principles, must be pronounced on all actions of unbelievers, although by so doing he contradicted himself; and in acknowledging the condemnation of unbelievers, he took refuge, as was customary for those to do who held the doctrine of absolute predestination, in the incomprehensibility of the divine decrees. Yet in his own expressions are to be found thoughts which, had they only been still farther unfolded, would have enabled him to avoid this contradiction, not indeed with the doctrines of the church, but at least with himself, and to find a solution of that difficulty, by which solution the holiness of the moral law would be secured against all arbitrary procedures. He remarks, for instance,* "that what had been said of good in-

* L. c. xii. f. 652.

tentions, did by no means apply to everything a man might believe he did with good intention, when this intention itself was a mistaken one, when the eye of the soul was not single, so as to be able to discover clearly, and guard against error ;” and he refers the saying of Christ, respecting the eye as the light of the body, to the purity and clearness of the intention, which spreads its light over the whole life. It was only necessary, in truth, that he should have applied these thoughts to a more exact determination of the principle which he had expressed, in order to secure it against all misunderstanding and all false application. The pretended *bona intentio*, that proceeds from an error grounded in a faulty darkening of the understanding, is really, in this view, to be called no good intention at all. The good intention is only a pure and clear intention.

With this principle, that in morals all depends on the intention that governs the life, was joined, in the theory of Abelard, a view strictly connected, no doubt, with the whole history of his own moral progress, from which an essential modification of the anthropology of the church could not fail to proceed. Abelard, in truth, resembled Augustin in this respect, that he had many occasions of experiencing in his own case the might of the flesh in resistance to the spirit ; but while Augustin was inclined, when the spirit had obtained the victory in him, so much the more sharply to condemn all striving of the flesh against the spirit, Abelard, on the other hand, was determined, by the memory of his earlier experiences, to pass a milder judgment on such appearances. “ It is not the temptations of lust,” he thinks, “ that are sinful ; but the morality depends here on the fact whether the ruling bias of the will overcomes these temptations or yields to them. One man has, by nature, stronger propensities to this sin, another to that. This temptation to sin is not sin ; it serves rather for the exercise of virtue in him who victoriously sustains the contest. Sin is only when one suffers himself to be drawn by those solicitations into transgression of the divine law, into practical contempt of God. Sin, generally, is but the not doing, or not omitting to do, on God’s account what one should do or omit doing on God’s account. The true merit of virtue consists in this : that, in conflict with ourselves, we do God’s will, overcoming those hindrances in our nature, where the might of

sinful lust asserts itself.* What would there be great in obeying God's will, if our inclinations were always in harmony with the same?" From such a position it seems to follow, that the more there is in a man of that excitement to lust, if he do but combat and overcome it, the greater will be his virtue; that, generally, without some conflict of flesh with spirit no virtue can be conceived to exist, and that this susceptibility was originally planted in human nature as a thing necessary to moral development; which thoughts, prosecuted to a farther extent, would have led him to a Pelagian anthropology; from which, however, he was at the farthest remove.

Since Abelard, then, referred everything in moral judgments to the intention, and nothing to the act in itself; it presented itself to him as a necessary conclusion, that moral worth could be truly estimated by God only, to whom the intention of the heart is manifest. And hence followed the necessity of drawing sharp the line of discrimination between every human tribunal, not only civil, but ecclesiastical, and the tribunal of God; which distinction led him to many important deductions with regard to the spiritual jurisdiction of bishops, deductions that might easily involve him in controversy with the reigning system of the church.

His view of the essence of true repentance would be determined accordingly. He would allow that alone to be true repentance which proceeded from the love of God, and pain for having offended him; and on this principle he attacked with a boldness that cared for no consequences, the method of penance, as administered by the bishops and priests of his time.†

Another thing serving to illustrate the peculiar bent of Abelard is, a work of his, recently come to light;‡ which, like its fellows, must have given great offence to the church-theologians,—the book which appeared under the title "*Sic et Non*" (Yes and No). Following the same plan with the Monophysite Stephen Gobarus, of more ancient times, he

* His words: *Quid enim magnum pro Deo facimus, si nihil nostræ voluntati adversum toleramus, sed magis quod volumus, implemus.*

† See the citation on p. 8.

‡ Published by Cousin, in the collection above mentioned.

brought together the sayings of the older church-teachers on different subjects of faith and of morals, in a hundred and fifty-seven rubrics; but while, according to the common method of procedure, men endeavoured to set forth, in the ancient dogmatic tradition, only those points in which there was an agreement, Abelard, on the other hand, like that old monophysite, preferred rather to give prominence to those points where the church-teachers contradicted one another in their answers to various questions. When such contrary opinions were brought together in other cases, it was simply for the purpose of attempting to reconcile them by means of some dialectical process; but Abelard left these opposite declarations standing side by side, without any attempt at reconciliation. It was his object, it would seem, to operate against that tendency which required entire uniformity in dogmatical expression, by exhibiting to view the opposition of opinions that existed amongst the most important church-teachers themselves. He wanted to show those who were ready to fix the stigma of heresy on any dogmatical propositions that deviated from the common form, how easy it was to find offensive things even in the most highly revered teachers of the church. Perhaps not without some reference to the conduct of his adversaries towards himself, he says: "Who does not see how impertinent it is for one man to set himself up as judge over the sense and understanding of another, when it is to God alone that the hearts and thoughts of all men lie open; and when he warns us against this arrogant presumption, saying, 'Judge not, that ye be not judged'? And the apostle says: 'Judge nothing before the time, till the Lord come, who shall bring to light the hidden things of darkness, and make known the secrets of the heart.'* As if he had plainly said: 'In such matters, leave him to judge who alone knows all things, and explores the very thoughts of men.'"[†]

We have already seen, on a former page, how the remarks of Abelard, on the relation of the apostles to one another, were based on a view of inspiration that deviated from the common one,—a view that forbade him to extend the immediate suggestion of the Holy Spirit to all in like measure, and

* 1 Corinth. iv. 5.

† See the Prologue to the book "Sic et Non," p. 5, ed. Cousin.

led him to make a more distinct separation of the divine from the human. Now that which we must recognise as lying at the basis of Abelard's earlier remarks, is clearly expressed by him in the prologue to this book. "It is plain," says he, "that the prophets themselves sometimes failed of possessing the gift of prophecy, and that, from the custom of prophesying, they uttered some things when they supposed they had the spirit of prophecy which were erroneous, and the product of their own minds. And this was permitted in them, that it might serve to keep them humble, and that they might learn more clearly to distinguish between what they were by their own minds, and what they were by the Spirit of God, and understand that it was a gift of God, when the Spirit of the Infallible dwelt in them. Nor even when they possessed this Spirit did he work everything in them after the same manner, or cause them to see alike; for as he does not bestow all gifts at once on the same individual, so neither does he enlighten the soul of him whom he fills on all subjects, but reveals sometimes this, and sometimes that, and in revealing one thing hides another.* If, therefore, it is manifest that the prophets and apostles themselves were not wholly exempt from error, how can we be surprised to find that, in the voluminous writings of the church-fathers, many things have been erroneously stated.† But though many things may have been erroneously stated by them, yet such statements are not falsehoods, but errors of ignorance. It was their belief that by such statements they should best subserve the edification of others. They acted by the impulse of charity; and God looks at the intention." It was one of Abelard's favourite sayings, that

* *Constat vero, et prophetas ipsos quandoque prophetiæ gratia caruisse, et nonnulla ex usu prophetandi, cum se spiritum prophetiæ habere crederent, per spiritum suum falsa protulisse; et hoc eis ad humilitatis custodiam permissum esse, ut sic videlicet verius cognoscerent, quales per spiritum Dei et quales per suum existerent, et se eum, qui mentiri vel falli nescit, ex dono habere, cum haberent. Qui etiam eum haberent, sicut non omnia uni confert dona, ita nec de omnibus mentem ejus, quem replet, illuminat, sed modo hoc, modo illud revelat et cum unum aperit, alterum occultat.*

† *Quid itaque mirum, cum ipsos etiam prophetas et apostolos ab errore non penitus fuisse constat alienos, si in tam multiplici sanctorum patrum scriptura nonnulla propter supra positam causam erronee prolata seu scripta videantur?*

the "intention" is the "eye of the mind," to which he would add also that fine remark of Augustin, often cited by him: "*Habe caritatem et fac quicquid vis.*"

We have said already that Abelard distinguished, in the truths transmitted by the sacred writings, those properly belonging to faith, and the religious interests generally, and those having no immediate concern with these interests. So, too, in the sayings of the church-fathers, he distinguishes the errors that stand in no necessary connection with these interests from errors which affect the vital essence of the faith; and this distinction led him, perhaps, to conclude that the idea of inspiration, also in the sacred Scriptures, was not to be applied to the portion that treats of such indifferent matters. "Although God," he remarks here, "left holy men themselves to commit mistakes in things tending to no injury of the faith, yet even this is not without its benefit to those to whom all things work together for good. The church-teachers themselves were conscious of this liability, and therefore felt themselves bound to make many corrections in their own works, and by so doing have conceded also to those who come after them the right of correcting them,—or of refusing to follow them, when it was not in their power to retract or correct their own errors." At the close of this prologue, he observes that he had compiled this collection of opposite statements with a view to incite the reader to the search after the truth, and to sharpen his faculties by the labour of investigation. And here he appeals to the words of Aristotle: that "it is not easy for a man to assert anything with confidence, unless he has first repeatedly examined into the matter; and that it is not without its use to have doubted of everything."* "For doubt," he adds, "leads us to inquiry, and by inquiry we arrive at the truth,† as the very Truth himself says: 'Seek, and ye shall find.' Christ himself, when, at the age of twelve, he instead of teaching sat and inquired in the temple, would teach us by his own example that we should learn by inquiry." It is obvious in what contrariety to the repose of childlike faith, that characterizes the religious spirit of his time, the tendency expressed in these

* Aristotle's *Categories*, s. 7. ed. Bekker, I. p. 8.

† *Dubitando enim ad inquisitionem venimus, inquirendo veritatem percipimus.*

words must have stood. A critical direction in opposition to implicit faith, and aiming to arrive at the knowledge of the truth through doubt, was a foretoken of developments which could beat their way through only at a much later period.

We have seen before, that Abelard could not present a full exhibition of his doctrinal system in his "*Theologia Christiana*." But in his lectures he had given to his hearers his complete system of the doctrines of faith; and of these lectures many copies were in circulation, and contained matter which tended to increase the inclination to put down Abelard as a heretic. To be sure, he had a right to complain when extracts from those copies of his lectures on theology, which his opponents had contrived to get into their hands, were used in the same way as if they had been so written out by himself, although it must have been altogether a matter of uncertainty how far his hearers had rightly understood him, and faithfully taken down his remarks.*

* Concerning the propositions of Abelard which were accused of being heretical, it was said: *Hæc capitula partim in libro Theologiæ magistri Petri, partim in libro sententiarum ejusdem, partim in libro, cujus titulus est: "Scito te ipsum," reperta sunt.* But Abelard, in his apology, complained that a book, called the Sentences, was cited as his, when he had never written such a book. He attributes the false charge to ignorance or ill-will. But also Walter of Mauretania, in his work, "*Contra quatuor Galliæ Labyrinthos*," cites what, without any doubt, is the same work, of which he says that it has the title, "*Incipiunt sententiæ divinitatis*" ("*The Theological Sentences*"). Yet Walter himself was uncertain to what extent this work belonged to Abelard, since he says: *Fertur hic liber Petri Abelardi fuisse, aut ex libris ejus excerptus.* From this we may gather that the opponents of Abelard must at least have had a certain appearance of right, in making use of this book as one that came from him; but that Abelard also must have had good grounds for affirming that had he never written such a book. Now professor Rheinwald, who has done so much towards giving an account of the literary labours of Abelard, published in 1835, from manuscripts in the library of Munich, a book intituled "*Sententiæ Abelardi*." This book perfectly agrees, in many passages, with Abelard's "*Theologia Christiana*," but expresses a good deal in a more concise form; while the doctrinal system in it is carried out to the conclusion. Everything is explained, if, with Gieseler, we suppose that the *Sententiæ* were copies of Abelard's lectures on the doctrines of faith, which had been scattered abroad in different transcripts; such as had been made by his auditors according to their necessities. The transcript which Walter of Mauretania had before him, contained also the words of the address with which Abelard began his lectures: *Omnes sitientes venite ad aquas et bibite, amici, inebriamini carissimi.*

Thus the new writing published by Abelard himself, the widely dispersed copies of his lectures, and the high encomiums of his scholars scattered through all France, drew upon him once more the attention of those who believed themselves called to watch over the interests of the orthodox faith; and that, to his injury. William, once abbot of St. Thierry, now a monk in the Cistercian abbey at Signy, first stood forth to complain against him. He sent to Gottfried bishop of Chartres, and to Bernard abbot of Clairvaux, certain papers filled with invectives against Abelard, and professing to expose his heresies in a number of theses taken from his work on theology.* In an accompanying letter he expatiated on the danger which threatened the church from the writings of one who exercised the great influence of Abelard: "Abelard once more writes and teaches new doctrines. His books pass beyond the seas and over the Alps; his new opinions about the faith are disseminated through the provinces and the empire, are frequently held forth and boldly defended; so that they are said to have authority even in the *Roman curia* (scholars of his, even amongst the cardinals)." One proof of the blind zeal that governed this man, is the fact that Abelard's two tracts, the "*Scito te ipsum*," and the "*Sic et Non*," looked already suspicious on account of their, to him, "extraordinary titles;" † and because these books had not been so greatly multiplied by transcripts as the work on Theology, and he himself had never got sight of them,—he gathered from this that they shrunk from the light. ‡ Bernard had his attention directed also, from other quarters, to the erroneous doctrines spread by Abelard and his school; and several other offensive propositions were pointed out to him in Abelard's *Scito te ipsum*, and in his Commentary on the Epistle to the Romans. At first, he is said to have expostulated with Abelard in a private

See Buolæi, Hist. univers. Paris, III. f. 200. The copy published by Rheinwald appears, from what may be gathered from comparing it with Abelard's other writings, to be a faithful one, and may doubtless be used to fill up the vacancy in that exhibition of his doctrines which we have taken from works which came immediately from his own hand.

* We find this writing complete in the Bibliotheca Cisterciensis of Tissier, T. IV. f. 112, seqq.

† De quibus timeo, ne sicut monstruosi sunt nominis, sic etiam monstruosi sint dogmatis.

‡ Sicut dicunt, oderunt lucem nec etiam quæsitâ inveniuntur.

manner, and exhorted him to desist from holding forth such doctrines, and also to prevent his scholars from repeating them. But the two men differed too much from each other in the whole bent of their minds, and perhaps also were already too much excited against each other, to have it in their power to come to any mutual understanding. Personal contact would serve, therefore, only to increase the alienation already existing between them.* When Abelard was compelled to hear that he had been stigmatized as a heretic,—believing that it was in his power to defend himself against all the charges brought against his orthodoxy,—he determined to anticipate the condemnation which threatened him, and, applying to the archbishop of Sens, demanded to be heard before a synod, and to be allowed to defend himself against his accusers. Archbishop Senglier, therefore, invited the abbot Bernard to appear with Abelard at the synod, which was held in the year 1140, at Sens. Bernard was at the beginning not inclined to enter into a dispute with his rival. He did not consider himself to be a match for one who had been a practised dialectician from his youth. It was the concern of the bishops to judge with regard to doctrines; nothing more was required than simply to look at Abelard's writings, which amply sufficed to establish a complaint against him. The doctrines of faith had been fixed and settled once for all; and must not be made to depend on human disputations. † But he did not persist in declining this invitation, if indeed he was serious in declining it at all; and perhaps he might foresee that the bishops would never allow the matter to come to a dispute between him and Abelard. Many of the dialectic theologians attended this synod. It was a contest not barely between two individuals, but between two opposite directions of the theological spirit, and both parties

* In the third account of Bernard's life (c. v. s. 11), it is related that by his mild and amiable language, he had already brought Abelard to that state, that he had retired into himself, and promised, according to Bernard's opinion, to correct everything in his works. But this saying of an enthusiastic admirer cannot pass for credible testimony. The French bishops, it is true, mentioned to the pope, that Bernard had often endeavoured, *privatim*, to set Abelard right; but they by no means mention any such promise given by the latter, to which he had been unfaithful; but they report, what is in itself more credible, that he felt himself hurt by those suggestions.

were eagerly watching for the issue. Though Bernard's zeal in this affair sprung from a purely Christian interest, yet his mode of procedure seems not to have been so wholly objectionable; as, indeed, the zeal of polemical controversy but rarely knows how to preserve itself altogether pure. While his object was to procure the condemnation of Abelard at the council, he professed nothing but that charity which seeks the recovery of a brother in error; yet, under the cloak of this sacred name, he scattered seeds of hatred. In the name of Christian love he called on the people, in his sermons, to pray for Abelard's conversion; but at the same time stirred up the popular fury against him as a godless heretic, presenting him in this light before men who were incapable of understanding a single one of the complaints brought against him, and before whom he could not defend himself. With good reason, perhaps, might the youthful Berengar, who warmly stood forth as a witness and advocate in defence of his teacher Abelard, attach to such conduct the suspicion of hypocrisy, a sin which is so very apt to mix in, even when they are unconscious of it, with the polemics of *pious* men, and *not of such only*. With good reason might he tell Bernard, that Christian charity would have rather prompted him to pray for Abelard in silence.* Although the satirical account which Abelard's enthusiastic disciple has given of this council is not to be implicitly relied on, yet this much of truth doubtless lies at the bottom of it, that the assembly was one incapable of entering into a calm investigation. More partial to the general views and spirit of Bernard than to the opposite, they were easily governed by his authority. The propositions of Abelard, as stated to them by him, were soon condemned as heretical. On the next day, however, Abelard was asked whether he acknowledged that such propositions had been advanced by him; whether, acknowledging them to be his, he was ready to defend or to correct them? But as Abelard had no reason

* The words of Berengar, in his tract in defence of Abelard: *Concionabaris ad populum, ut orationem funderet ad Deum pro eo, interius autem disponebas eum proscribendum ab orbe Christiano. Quid vulgus faceret? Quid vulgus oraret, quum pro quo esset orandum nesciret? Tu vir Dei, qui miracula feceras, qui ad pedes Jesu cum Maria sedebas, purissimum sacræ orationis thus coram supernis obtutibus adolere deberes, ut reus tuus Petrus respiceret.*

to expect a calm trial from men who, without hearing what he had to say, had already pronounced sentence of condemnation on the propositions attributed to him, he did not attempt replying to these interrogatories, but appealed to the pope; most probably relying on his pupils, or on the friends of his school, amongst the cardinals. Now it was not necessary, it is true,* that all further proceedings of the council against him should be arrested by this appeal. According to the old ecclesiastical laws, and according to the principles of the Gallican church, they were not required to acknowledge as of any validity an appeal made before judgment was pronounced, from a tribunal to which the appellant himself had first applied.† They concluded, however, to follow the custom which then prevailed, and which was favoured by the Roman court, according to which appeals to Rome were to be admitted without limitation. It was necessary, in fact, to avoid everything that might tend to favour his cause at the Roman court, where Abelard was not without his friends; and therefore both parties had recourse to the pope. The council addressed him a letter, in which they complained, that not alone by students in the schools, but publicly, in all places, disputes were held upon the Trinity.‡ They besought the pope to confirm their sentence of condemnation on the propositions alleged to have been advanced by Abelard, of which, however, they sent him but a portion;§ that he would pass sentence against all who persisted in obstinately defending them; that he would condemn Abelard's writings,|| command him to be silent, and forbid him for the future either to lecture or to write.¶ The

* The council contradicts itself, in saying of Abelard, in its letter to the pope (ep. 337): *Visus diffidere et subterfugere, respondere noluit, sed quamvis libera sibi daretur audientia, tutumque locum et æquos haberet iudices,*—and yet declaring that Abelard's pretended theses had already been condemned the day before.

† To this the words refer in the letter of the council: *Licet appellatio ista minus canonica videretur.*

‡ *Cum per totam fere Galliam in civitatibus, vicis et castellis, a scholaribus non solum intra scholas, sed etiam triviatim nec a literatis et provectis tantum, sed a pueris et simplicibus aut certe stultis de sancta trinitate disputaretur.*

§ *Quædam, ut per hæc audita reliqui corpus operis facilius æstimetis.*

|| Without any accurate designation of the works intended, with the altogether arbitrary explanation: *Libros ejus perverso sine dubio dogmate respersos condemnaret.*

¶ Ep. 337.

abbot of Clairvaux himself also wrote a private letter to the pope, to which he added a list of the propositions of Abelard found to be heretical, together with a full exposition of his principal errors. He says of him, that, wishing to explain everything on grounds of reason, even that which is beyond reason, he acted as contrary to reason as he did to faith; for what was more contrary to reason, than for one to attempt with reason to go beyond reason; and what more contrary to faith, than to refuse to believe that which is unattainable by reason?* In opposition to Abelard, who applied † to that blind faith which is not the result of examination, the words of the Preacher (c. xix.), Bernard affirms, that Solomon says this, not with reference to faith in God, but with reference to men's credulity in their relations to one another; for pope Gregory the Great (H. xxvi. in Evang.) says, the faith that reposes on arguments of reason has no merit whatever; while he praises the apostles, who followed our Lord at the bidding of a word. The disciples were blamed because it was so difficult for them to believe. Zacharias was punished (Luke i.) because he required reasons for believing. He referred, moreover, to the example of faith in Mary and in Abraham. But it is evident, from the explanations already given, that Abelard also acknowledged the faith that proceeds from submission of the heart to be acceptable to God, and indispensable to true piety. It was only to the preparatory inquiry, which precedes such faith, to the way and mode of attaining to such faith, suited to certain individualities of character, and to the intellection (*intellectus*) that grew out of such faith, that the controversy related. Yet Bernard attributed the errors of Abelard to his desire of comprehending that which is above reason, and reserved to faith alone.

Moreover, he accused him of saying that faith was mere opinion, of representing it as something quite unsettled and wavering. He here took the liberty of converting his own inferences into actual positions of Abelard, for the purpose of showing that, by Abelard's doctrine, the whole foundation of Christian faith and Christian hope was left tottering. But we

* Quid enim magis contra rationem, quam ratione rationem conari transcendere? Et quid magis contra fidem, quam credere nolle, quicquid non possis ratione attingere?

† See page 29.

have already seen that, in the place referred to, Abelard is only speaking of the scientific mode of apprehending a dogma, not of the essential contents of the faith itself. Bernard, on the other hand, says: "Far be it from us to suppose that anything in our faith, or in our hope, depends on doubtful opinions or conjectures; that all does not much rather repose on a sure and settled foundation of truth, as it has been established by God's own declarations, by miracles, the birth of the Virgin, the blood of the Saviour, and the majesty of his resurrection. To this is added, finally, the internal witness of the Holy Spirit, which testifies with our spirit that we are the children of God. Who, then, can call faith an opinion, but he who has not yet received that spirit, or who has no knowledge of the gospel, or who holds it to be a fable?" He refers to the passage in Heb. xi. 1, acknowledging that Abelard also had made use of those words. The term *substance*, in this passage, he says, denotes something certain and fixed, as opposed to the unsettledness of human opinion.

Bernard wrote also to the cardinals in Rome several letters, in which he directed their attention to the dangers threatening the simplicity and purity of the faith, and complained that Abelard felt confident he had followers in the Roman court itself.

But how very far Abelard was from any intention of doing injury to the Christian faith appears evident from his own declarations, made, during the time of these disputes, to the abbess Heloise, who seems to have been disturbed by the reports concerning his erroneous doctrines. He guards himself against the eulogies of those who expressed a high estimation of his intellect, but not of his faith—who recognized in him the philosopher, but not the Christian. Christianity, the Bible, he here declares to be the matters of highest interest for him, besides which all others fall into comparative insignificance,* for to him Christ is the sole foundation of salvation. And he then proceeds to lay down a full confession of his orthodoxy.†

* Nolo sic esse philosophus, ut recalcitrem Paulo. Non sic esse Aristoteles, ut secludar a Christo, non enim aliud nomen est sub cœlo, in quo oporteat me salvum fieri.

† Abelard's disciple Berengar has cited this letter in his tract written in Abelard's defence. Opp. p. 308.

In those hopes which he had placed on his friends at Rome, Abelard found himself wholly disappointed. The influence of Bernard there was too powerful to allow any chance for the adherents of Abelard to effect anything against it; and we must admit, also, that his peculiar theological bent was not of a character suited to fall in with the reigning spirit of the church in these times. If it was not checked, if it should be allowed freely to develope itself, it would be continually coming more and more into collision with the church system. Moreover, the connection between Abelard's cause and that of Arnold of Brescia, could not fail of contributing to make the tendency which he represented appear suspicious, and fraught with danger. When he arrived at Lyons, on his way to Rome, the decision which had already been given there reached him. The pope issued two briefs to the archbishops of Rheims and of Sens, and to the abbot Bernard. In one of them he declared the propositions of Abelard, that had been sent to him, and—which really, for an ecclesiastical decision, was extremely loose and indefinite language—all his perverse doctrines, which were not specified, however, to be condemned; on himself, as a heretic, was imposed the duty of perpetual silence. Sentence of excommunication was pronounced on all his adherents. By a second writing, Innocent bestowed on the three persons above mentioned, full powers to confine Abelard and Arnold of Brescia in separate monasteries, and to burn all their writings. But the forsaken Abelard found refuge with Peter, the venerable abbot of Cluny. This person, who, above all other pious men, was distinguished for gentleness, and an open sense for every good trait in others, highly respected Abelard's zeal for science and his great talents, and could discern the marks of piety even in an individuality of character so different from his own. He was desirous of making the mental gifts and scientific attainments of the great scholar useful to his monks, while at the same time he provided, in their midst, a secure and peaceful resting-place for the evening of his unsettled and distracted life. With the assistance of the abbot of Citeaux, he effected a reconciliation between Bernard and Abelard.* He procured for him the pope's absolution, and adopted him amongst his monks at Cluny.

* Lib. IV. ep. 4.

Abelard afterwards published a Confession, which he thus begins :—“ Everything, however well said, may be perverted. I myself, though I have composed but a few treatises, and those of small extent, have not been able to escape censure; though in truth, in the things on account of which I have been violently attacked, I can (as God knows) see no fault whatsoever on my part; and if any such fault can be discovered, I have no disposition to defend it obstinately. I have perhaps, from mistake, written many things not after the right manner; but I call God to witness that, in the things for which I am accused, I have maintained nothing out of a malicious will, or out of pride. In my lectures, I have said many things before many; publicly, I have spoken what seemed to me calculated for the edification of faith or of morals; and what I have written, I have cheerfully communicated to all, that I might have them for my judges, and not for my pupils.” Many of the propositions found to be offensive, he explained in a milder sense; with regard to others, he protested against the conclusions derived from them, which he would not admit. In the history of particular dogmas, we shall compare Abelard's original teachings with the explanations presented in this apology. It is our intention to cite here only his explanation with regard to the above-presented ethical propositions. “Sins committed through ignorance amount to guilt, particularly when, from negligence, we know not that which we ought to know. I affirm that the crucifiers of Christ committed the greatest crime. I affirm that all who equally love God and their neighbour,—all who are equally good,—are equals in merit, and nothing of merit is lost in the sight of God, when a good will fails of an opportunity to execute its purposes.” It is plain, that the ethical principles before presented are here also held fast by him, only they are more cautiously expressed, and guarded against the extravagant statements to which he had given occasion. In general, we find no evidence that a change had really taken place in his mode of thinking, or that he was visited, as some asserted, with remorse, on account of the course he had pursued. The contrary rather may be gathered from a larger work (under the title *Apologia*), written in justification of himself, where he defends his doctrines, at length, against the charges of Bernard, and accuses the latter of misrepresenting and perverting them, saying of him that he thrust

himself forward as a judge on matters which he did not understand.*

How far Abelard was in spirit from yielding to his opponents—how completely, on the contrary, he triumphed over them in his own consciousness—might be gathered, moreover, from a dialogue that appeared under his name, “On the Supreme Good,”† in which a philosopher, a Jew, and a Christian are the interlocutors; for this production must have been composed after the events just described; and yet we find in it the same bold assertions respecting the relation of *fides* to *ratio*, as in the works already cited, and they are carried out with the same degree of acuteness. It may admit of a question, however, whether this production did not proceed from some one of his enthusiastic and free-spirited scholars.‡

* See the *Disputatio anonymi* against Abelard, in the *Bibliotheca Cisterciensis*, T. IV. f. 239. Here the author objects to him, quod abbatem literatissimum et, quod majus est, religiosissimum vocat inexpertum artis illius, quæ magistra est disserendi.

† *Petri Abælardi Dialogus inter philosophum, Judæum et Christianum, e codicibus bibliothecæ Cæsareæ Vindobonensis*, ed. Rheinwald. Bero-
lini, 1831.

‡ In the life prefixed to this Dialogue we find nothing which does not agree perfectly with Abelard’s mode of thinking. All the propositions scattered through his writings which have been cited, that gave offence to his opponents, were here introduced in the course of the conversation; but still, it cannot be gathered from this that he himself was the author of it: for he had ready-witted scholars, who had made his doctrines and his mode of thinking wholly their own, could present them in a talented manner, and in their youthful pride rose, still more than their master, above all regard to circumstances; as, for instance, that clergyman Pierre Berengar, the bold and witty defender of Abelard. Now it is to be remarked, that there are preserved in different libraries (See *Hist. lit. de la France*, T. XII. p. 132), two manuscript works under the name of Abelard, a dialogue of a Philosopher with a Jew, and a dialogue of a Philosopher with a Christian. If they are rightly ascribed to him, then these two separate dialogues are works distinct from the one published by Rheinwald. Perhaps the two former pieces formed the basis of the last; and if the two single dialogues came from Abelard, this may not have been the case with the dialogue which was formed out of the blending together of those two. In addition to this, we find, in the collective edition of Abelard’s works, p. 326, after several letters of Berengar, something that does not belong to those letters, the fragment of a dialogue containing Abelard’s ideas concerning the relationship betwixt the ancient philosophy and Christianity, representing the Christians as disciples of the Logos, as the genuine logicians, and Christianity as the true logic, —a dialogue between P. A. (Peter Abelard,) and P. (perhaps Peter Be-

After Abelard had laboured for a while among the monks of Cluny, his activity was arrested by an illness, and the abbot Peter, whose esteem and love for him had been increased by personal intercourse, removed him to an appropriate place for the recovery of his health, in the priory of St. Marcel, at Chalons on the Soane, where he enjoyed the benefit of careful nursing; and here he died, on the 21st of April, A.D. 1142. The abbot Peter drew up, in a letter to the abbess Heloise,* a report of his truly Christian walk during the last years of his life, and of the devout manner in which he died. He calls him the servant of Christ, the true Christian philosopher. †

An important sign of the times, an event attended with grave consequences for the next succeeding course of the development of theology, was such a termination of this controversy between the representatives of the antagonistic tendencies of spirit. At the same time, however, it should not be so understood as if the whole tendency of the dialectic, speculative theology had expired in the person of Abelard. Even Abelard's opponents themselves were by no means in favour of condemning this tendency in itself considered. Even Bernard recognized its rights; and this tendency of spirit was too closely inwoven with the very being of the times to be suppressed by magisterial denunciations. One point only was decided, that

rengar). Perhaps this dialogue may be one of the two that still remain hidden in manuscript: and this clue, if followed out, might lead us to consider Berengar as the author of the dialogue here mentioned, perhaps also of the one published under the name of Abelard. It still remains to institute a faithful comparison between the style of this dialogue and the style of Abelard and of Berengar.

* Lib. IV. ep. 21.

† He says of him: Qui singulari scientiæ magisterio toti pæne orbi terrarum notus et ubique famosus erat, in illius discipulatu, qui dixit: discite a me, quia mitis sum et humilis corde, mitis et humilis perseverans, ad ipsum, ut dignum est credere, sic transivit.—In the inscription, which he placed on his tomb:—

Gallorum Socrates, Plato maximus Hesperiarum,
Noster Aristoteles, logicis, quicunque fuerunt,
Aut per aut melior, studiorum cognitus orbi
Princeps, ingenio varius, subtilis et acer,
Omnia vi superans rationis et arte loquendi
Abælardus erat. Sed tunc magis omnia vicit
Cum Cluniacensem monachum moremque professus
Ad Christi veram transivit philosophiam.

this tendency should be checked and moderated; that the rational element should not have an undue preponderance, to the prejudice of the ecclesiastical and practical direction; that it should not be rent from its connection with the other spiritual forces that determined the character of the age. Men in whom was to be found this harmonious union of spiritual elements, stood high in the general esteem, and in intimate connection with Bernard himself, when Abelard was condemned, and their orthodoxy was disputed by no one.

Amongst these was Hugo, a canonical of the church of St. Victor at Paris. He was born at Ypres, towards the close of the eleventh century, and came, when a boy, to Halberstadt, where his uncle was archdeacon. He himself records how hard it was for him, in his boyish years, to exchange the poor little cottage in which he was born for a stately dwelling in the land of strangers.* Brought up in the abbey of Hamersleben, he was received, in the year 1118, into the foundation of regular canonicals bearing the name of St. Victor, at Paris, and contributed greatly to the high renown of this establishment. In him we see the representative of a school distinguished, in the twelfth century, for its hearty religious spirit, and its tendency to practical reform; a school which, though it united more or less the mystico-contemplative with the speculative element, yet constantly kept up the contest with the predominating dialectic tendency. Hugo entitled himself to the honour of being called the second Augustin.† If, in Abelard, we see those spiritual tendencies of his times, which had been harmoniously united by Anselm, brought into conflict with each other, we see them once more reconciled in Hugo, but with this difference, that in him the dialectical element is not so strong as it was in Anselm. In his doctrinal investigations he often has reference to, and contends against, Abelard, though without mentioning his name.‡

* In his *Eruditio didascalica*, Lib. VII. c. xx: Ego a puero exulavi et scio, quo mœrore animus arctum aliquando pauperis tugurii fundum deserat, qua libertate postea marmoreos lares et tecta laqueata despiciat.

† Qui secundus Augustinus in scientia dictus est. Thomas Cantiprat. Lib. II. c. xvi. Duaci, 1627. p. 215.

‡ The principal works of his that belong here, are the *De sacramentis fidei* and the *Summa sententiarum*. That the *Tractatus theologicus*, ascribed to Hildebert archbishop of Mans or Tours, is but a fragment from the latter work, and that the former therefore deserves no place

The empirical department of knowledge generally, and, in theology, the study of the older church-teachers and of the Bible, was by him made specially prominent in opposition to the one-sided speculative and all-innovating tendency. Thus, for example, in his Rules of Study, written for monks,* he declaims against the pride of those one-sided *à priori* methods, which, neglecting the empirical sciences, begin at once with philosophy.† “It is impossible,” he says, “to arrive at anything great, without commencing with the little. It is impossible to become a grammarian without beginning with the alphabet.” To such methods he opposes the one he had followed himself: he relates how, from his youth up, he had striven to learn everything that came within his reach.‡ His principle was, “Study everything; thou wilt afterwards see that nothing is superfluous.” He speaks against those who, if they could boast of having heard this or that great man, thought they were already something great themselves; those who talked of the Holy Scriptures as if they were so simple that it needed no teaching to understand them. He says of these, that, under the specious name of simplicity, they virtually denied the profoundness of meaning in the Holy Scriptures.§ He divides those who occupied themselves with the study of the Bible into three classes: the first, comprising such as were aiming in this way to acquire for themselves honour and riches, whose disposition was a most depraved and deplorable one; next, those who search the sacred volume for the wonderful and mysterious,|| instead of that which

among the scholastic theologians among whom he has been named, must be clear to any one who compares the two works. Dr. Liebner, the author of the fine monography on Hugo, is entitled to the praise of having, by his thorough analysis, caused this to be generally acknowledged. See *Studien und Kritiken*, Jahrg. 1831, 2tes Heft.

* *Eruditio didascalica.*

† *Lib. VI. c. iii: Scio quosdam, qui statim philosophari volunt, fabulas pseudo-apostolis relinquendas ajunt.*

‡ The object for which he enters into these details, in the third chapter of the above mentioned work, is, *ut ostendam tibi, illum incedere aptissime, qui incedit ordinate, neque ut quidam, qui, dum magnum salutum facere volunt, in præcipitium incidunt.*

§ *L. c. Lib. III. c. xiv.*

|| *Quos audire verba Dei et opera ejus discere delectat, non quia salu-
tiferi, sed quia mirabilia sunt. Scrutari arcana et inaudita cognoscere
volunt, multa scire et nihil facere.*

would tend to their salvation—who gaze with astonishment on the revelation of God's almighty power, instead of contemplating with love the revelation of his divine compassion—who are impelled only by an aimless thirst for knowledge. Of such he says, they treated God's revelations as an exhibition; and, like people going to a show, went to them for entertainment, and not to obtain nourishment for the heart. The third class embraced those whom alone he passes without censure, men who study the sacred Scriptures that they may be able to give a reason for their faith, to refute gainsayers, to instruct the ignorant, and that they may be inflamed themselves with a deeper love, the more profoundly they search into the divine mysteries. And so he always ends in speaking of theological study, with a reference to the practical purpose to be answered and the practical need to be satisfied.

Hugo appears as a strenuous advocate for the independence of the religious sphere of religious faith as a province lying above the worldly consciousness and the worldly tendencies of the soul. He uttered the profoundest remarks respecting this sacred province in the human spirit, this spot in it consecrated to the revelation of God. His ideas are as follows:—"Three eyes have been given to man: the eye of sense, for the sensible objects lying without him; another eye, whereby the soul is enabled to know itself, and what is within itself—the eye of reason; a third eye, within itself, to perceive God and divine things—the eye of contemplation." We have here important distinctions between the sensuous consciousness of the world, the rational consciousness of self, and the consciousness of God. "But, by reason of sin, the eye of contemplation is extinguished, that of reason obscured. Now, as the eye of contemplation, whereby man might come to the knowledge of God and of divine things, no longer dwells in him, therefore faith must take its place." Adopting the definition of faith in the eleventh chapter of the Epistle to the Hebrews, he remarks: "Faith is called the substance of things invisible, because that which, as yet, is not an object of open vision, is by faith, in a certain sense, made present to the soul—actually dwells in it."* Nor is there anything else whereby the things of God

* *Fides substantia illorum, quia per solam fidem subsistunt nunc in nobis.*

could be demonstrated, since they are higher than all others; nothing resembles them which could serve us as a bridge to that higher knowledge. But a credible witness is the experience of the faithful in all ages, who would not have sacrificed their all to the earnest desire after eternal life, if they had not had an experience of its reality that transcends our knowledge. In faith resides a certainty, which is more than opinion, yet falls short of absolute knowledge. Two things must meet together in faith: knowledge and feeling, or the bent of the affections (*affectus*)—objective and subjective elements. There is a conviction, then, which is determined by feeling.* Faith cannot exist, therefore, wholly without knowledge; but it is here necessary to distinguish two kinds of knowledge—a preliminary one, and a knowledge that is first evolved out of faith. Faith presupposes the *general knowledge* of the *being* of its object; but only from faith proceeds the knowledge of the *quality* of the object, which knowledge will be perfect in the heavenly world.† Hence the faith of the theologian and that of the logician stand, he says, in an inverse order to each other; for in the latter, faith proceeds first from the understanding (*intellectus*); in the former, the understanding proceeds from faith. Hence, in the latter, that is the original which in the former is the derived; and, in the former, that is the original which in the latter is the derived. In the one case, feeling is the original, and knowledge by reason the derived; in the other, knowledge on rational grounds comes first, and the feeling of conviction, of certainty, of rational satisfaction, that proceeds from and accompanies it, is the derived. “The merit of faith (*meritum fidei*) consists in the fact that our conviction is determined by the affections, when no adequate knowledge is yet present. By faith, we render ourselves worthy of knowledge, as perfect knowledge is the final reward of faith in the life eternal. To this knowledge by faith corresponds the way in which God reveals himself in creation,

* Fides in affectu habet substantiam, quia affectus ipse fides est, in cognitione habet materiam, quia de illo et ad illud, quod in cognitione est, fides est credere igitur in affectu est, quod vere creditur in cognitione est.

† Ad hoc, ut fides actu habeatur de aliquo, primum oportet scire, quod ipsum sit, secundo credere, tertia intelligere, quid ipsum sit, quod plene erit in patria.

neither entirely concealing, nor yet wholly unveiling himself. Were the former the case, there would be no guilt in unbelief; were the latter the case, there would be no merit in faith. The merit is based, in fact, on that bias of the will whereby the heart turns away from the world to God, and resigns itself to the godlike.* Inasmuch, then, as in faith knowledge and feeling (*affectus*) should meet together, their relation to each other may differ in different cases. Knowledge and feeling may both be present in equal measure, or one preponderate over the other; but the *worth* (*meritum*) of faith is determined chiefly by the degree of feeling. Hence our Lord says to the Canaanitish woman, whose knowledge was small but whose trust was great, "Woman, great is thy faith." He distinguishes among believers the following gradations. First are those who, in believing, simply follow their pious feelings, without being able to state the grounds on which they believe; next, those who are able to state the grounds which determine them to believe as they do; finally, those who, by purity of heart, begin already to have some inward taste of that which they believe,† and by purification of the mind rise to certainty. The gradual progress of the Christian life, up to this stage of it, he describes as follows:—"By the devotion that proceeds from faith, the believer's heart is purified, so that, with pure heart, he begins already to have some foretaste of that which, with faith and devotion, he longs to know. The pure heart daily makes progress through its experiences of a daily intercourse with God,‡ and it attains thereby to such a certainty as to begin already to have God present by contemplation; so that in no way, even though a whole world full of miracles should interpose, could it be drawn away again from its faith in him, and its love to him."§ We find here described such an immediate certainty of Christian consciousness as no longer needs outward support, inasmuch as it carries the evidence of

* Hence this definition of faith: *Voluntaria quædam certitudo absentium supra opinionem et infra scientiam constituta.* Misc. I. 18.

† *Puritate cordis et munda conscientia interius jam gustare incipiunt, quod fide credunt.*

‡ *Munda conscientia invisibilibus documentis et secreta et familiari visitatione de Deo suo quotidie eruditus.*

§ *Ut nulla jam ratione, ab ejus fide et dilectione, etiamsi totus mundus in miracula vertatur, avelli queat.*

the truth in itself*—a certainty superior to all proof from single miracles; whence we may infer that Hugo was far from attributing an undue importance to miracles, singly contemplated.

According as theologians placed the essence of religion in knowledge, or in the life of the heart, the affections,—a difference which here lay at the bottom, at least, though no one may have thought of accounting to himself for such opposite modes of apprehension—accordingly would they be inclined to decide the question, as to how far a knowledge of the articles of faith was requisite to salvation. They who started from the position that the essence of religion consists in knowledge, were driven by their own principle to strain the requisitions with regard to the extent of the knowledge necessary in order to salvation, to the highest point. To these Hugo would necessarily be opposed, since he placed the essence of faith in the affections. Therefore he declared that, in regard to the essence of true faith, much more depended on the degree of devotion than on the extent of knowledge: † for divine grace did not look at the amount of knowledge united with the faith, but at the degree of devotion with which that which constituted the object of faith was loved.

On this question arose a remarkable controversy, which, in a time of more cultivated and prevailing scientific reflection, when theological antagonisms could have been permitted to express themselves more fully out, and to unfold themselves with all their consequences into clearer consciousness, would have led to important oppositions in the mode of judging of doctrinal differences, and in the interpretation of the Old Testament. ‡ It was the men of excessive strictness in doc-

* He therefore describes this stage as a *per veritatem apprehendere*.

† On the other hand, speaking of the advocates of the opposite opinion, he says: *Beatificandam putant hi fidem veram in multitudine cognitionis potius, quam in magnitudine devotionis.*

‡ Hugo had already expressed his views on this point, in a letter addressed to Bernard of Clairvaux; and had requested the latter to give his own opinion on this and several other points. Bernard replies, in his *Tractatus ad Hugonem*, p. ii. opusc. 10 (according to Mabillon, c. iii), and declares his entire agreement with Hugo. It is singular, however, to observe the verbal coincidence between Bernard's remarks and Hugo's exposition, *Lib. I., De sacramentis fidei*, p. x. c. vi. As Bernard himself says: *Ad refellendum tu tanta in tua epistola posuisse videris, ut nil*

trine, the hyperorthodox, as Hugo calls them,* who, without paying any regard to the different grades of mental cultivation, required of all alike, that claimed to be called believers, the same measure and the same accuracy in the knowledge of the articles of faith, and supposed that the like was possessed also by the good men of the Old Testament, though in their case the knowledge had reference to things that could only be fulfilled in the future. The course taken by Hugo to refute this opinion evinces both the penetration and profoundness of his views, and the liberality of his mind. "From this supposition," he remarks, "it would follow that, in the times of the Old Testament, either the number of those that obtained salvation was too small, or the number of those that were specially enlightened, too great; for we must either suppose that only the few who, as prophets, were enabled by special illumination to look clearly into the future, were saved, or else we must suppose that all the pious of those times enjoyed the same special prophetic illumination. The last supposition would tend most to the honour of divine grace, but it would be contradictory to the position which the New Testament holds in relation to the Old; since it would follow from it that, instead of the New Testament possessing the advantage over the Old, of more abounding grace, the Old Testament would possess that advantage over the New. The times of the new covenant would not be distinguished, as they are declared to be, above those of the old, by the general outpouring of the Holy Ghost; on the contrary, there would be a withholding of that fullness of the Spirit that had been poured out in the times of the old covenant. Paul would have boasted, without good reason, that he had neither received the gospel of man, nor by man, but by the revelation of Jesus Christ, if such an

addendum penitus putem et pæne, quid addi possit, non inveniam, so it is the less possible to suppose that Hugo should have inserted so much important matter from Bernard's letter into his own exposition, word for word. Besides, Hugo's originality of mind renders this very improbable; but neither again is it quite conceivable that Bernard should have transcribed from Hugo's letter, word for word. It may be questioned, therefore, whether Bernard's letter may not have received additions from some other hand.

* He classes them with those, *qui quasi quadam pietate impii in Deum efficiuntur et dum ultra id, quod in veritate est, sentiunt, in ipsam veritatem offendunt.*

illumination had already before his own times been bestowed on the entire people of God. Christ himself would have had no good reason for saying, that among them that are born of women there had not risen a greater than John the Baptist. John fell once more into doubt, whether or no Jesus was the Messiah; while, on the other hand, thousands that lived under the Old Testament dispensation must, according to the supposition in question, have possessed on all points a knowledge amounting to certainty. With what propriety could Christ, on this supposition, have said to his disciples: 'Blessed are your eyes, for they see,' thus placing them so far above the enlightened men of the Old Testament (Luke x., John xv.)? By this he certainly intimates that they were to know, more clearly and more fully, those things which under the Old Testament had only been obscurely and imperfectly divined.* Nor can this be supposed to refer to the mere outward beholding of our Lord with the eye of sense, or the mere outward hearing of his word with the ear of sense; for what need of this, if they were already fully instructed in all things by the illumination of the Spirit? especially as our Lord says: 'The flesh profiteth nothing; it is the Spirit that quickeneth.' The intuition of the Spirit, then, is more than bare outward perception. Now, if the prophets and the enlightened men of the Old Testament were not all enabled alike to understand all things, but some understood more, others less, according to the measure bestowed on them by the Spirit, and that without detracting from their holiness and perfection, then how much more might the simple ones among the pious remain ignorant of the time, the form, the way, and the order in which redemption was to be accomplished, without prejudice to their salvation, if they only persevered in faith and hope to the end?" Hugo adverted to the different measure of knowledge which, without impairing the unity of faith, might exist among Christians of the same period. "How many there are," he says, "among Christian people, even at the present time, who firmly believe in a future world and an eternal life, and fervently long after it, but are still very far from being able to form the remotest conception of what it consists in.

* Ut clarius largiusque perciperent, quod vix tenuiter obscureque præsenserant.

In like manner, before the appearance of Christ, there were many that firmly believed on the Almighty God who promised them salvation, and that hoped for salvation from Him, and through this faith and this hope actually obtained salvation, although they ever remained in ignorance respecting the time, the way, and the order, in which the promised salvation would be accomplished. The very apostles themselves found it extremely difficult to understand how the sufferings of Christ were necessary to man's salvation; and therefore it was, that what Christ said to them on this subject continued for so long a time to be obscure to them. Accordingly, it is the same fundamental article of faith, virtually including in it all the rest, on the embracing of which salvation has ever depended. The matter of this faith was ever the same; it became more clearly and fully unfolded, but it never changed.* Before the law, faith was exercised in God as Creator, and salvation was expected from him; but through whom, and in what way, this salvation was to be brought about, was unknown to believers, if we except a few to whom it was made known by a special gift of illumination. Under the law, the Saviour was already promised as a person; but whether this person was to be a man, an angel, or God, was not yet revealed. Faith in God, as Creator and Redeemer, is the common ground of faith for all periods in the evolution of the kingdom of God, connected with which there may exist different measures of knowledge in different periods, and among different classes of men in the same period; still, the simple and the enlightened are bound together by the same faith."

In the controversy alluded to on a former page, concerning the nature of true love to God, Hugo endeavoured to prepare the way for a better understanding of the matter, by introducing some just and well-considered distinctions; but here, too, he stood forth as the opponent of Abelard. After having laid it down that it was only necessary to love God in order to possess him, that God is always present to love,† he goes on to say: "But, perhaps, if thou lovest and servest God with a view to receive a reward from him, thou wilt be a hireling.

* *Crevit itaque per tempora fides in omnibus, ut major esset, sed mutata non est, ut alia esset.*

† *Si amatur, habetur. Si diligitur, gustatur. Præsens est dilectioni.*

So say certain foolish men, so foolish as not even to understand themselves.* We love and serve God, say they, but we seek no reward, lest we be hirelings; we do not ask even for himself. He will give it if it pleases him; but we do not ask it. We love him with a simple, disinterested, childlike love. Listen, ye wise people! We love him, say they, but we ask not for him. We love him, that is, but we care nothing about him. I, as a man, would not desire to be so loved by you. If you so loved me as to care nothing about me, I should care nothing about your love. Consider whether that is worth offering to God which a man might rightly despise. People who talk thus, do not understand the nature of Love. What else does loving mean than a desire to have what we love? A desire to have, not something other than the object of love, but that object itself, this is disinterested love. There is no love without longing after that which is the object of the love.† Shouldst thou hold eternal life itself to be other than the supreme good, which is God, and serve him in order to obtain that, it would be no pure service, no pure love.”‡

Here we cannot forbear to remark, that this view of disinterested love to God and eternal life, holding the exact mean betwixt a fleshly Eudemonism on the one hand, and the extravagance of a mysticism leading to self-annihilation on the other, is to be found in one who, in respect to mental cultivation, certainly cannot be compared with either Abelard or Hugo, but belongs rather to the more narrow minds of his time,—Gerhoh of Reichersberg. “Though God is loved and worshipped,” says he, “yet is he not loved without reward, though he must be loved without respect to the reward.§ True love neither is empty nor yet seeks a reward, for it seeks not its own; it lets men do everything out of free will. True love is satisfied with itself; it has a reward, but it is just that which is the object of love.”|| After having declared

* *Stulti quidam et tam stulti, ut seipsos non intelligant.*

† *Qui hoc dicunt, virtutem dilectionis non intelligunt. Quid enim diligere, nisi ipsum velle habere. Non aliud ab ipso, sed ipsum, hoc est gratis. Alioquin non amares, si non desiderares.*

‡ *De sacramentis fidei, p. xiii. Lib. II. c. viii.*

§ *Non sine præmio diligitur Deus, etsi absque præmii sit intuitu diligendus.*

|| *Vacua namque vel infructuosa veracitas esse non potest nec tamen*

himself opposed to the expectations of a sensuous Eudemonism, he goes on to say: "They who know that they are to find their satisfaction and their bliss in that eternal life, in that righteousness alone after which they now hunger, need not be hired by a reward to long after it, any more than a hungry man needs to be hired to eat, or a thirsty man to drink."* Those who seek eternal instead of temporal good in eternal life, but an eternal good that resembles temporal, he calls dreamers: "For in the kingdom of heaven nothing will be found like that which they dream about,—there, God will be all in all; the only cause of joy there will be God himself;"† a remarkable evidence, certainly, of the Christian spirit that animated the thinking of this period, when a man no better cultivated than we find this Gerhoh to have been, could still write after this fashion.

We see still another besides Hugo, who contrived to unite the dialectic bent of mind with the church theology, and who composed a work in this same spirit and according to this same method, on the system of faith, and who continued at the same time to be universally respected, namely, Robert Pull, or Pullein.‡ He taught, unmolested, at the university of Oxford, where he became chancellor. Pope Eugene the Third, wishing to secure the talents and character, which had been so well tried in the service of science, for the general guidance of the church, called him to Rome, in the capacity of cardinal and chancellor of the Roman church; and the abbot Bernard, who spoke of him as his old friend, and acknowledged his merits, called upon him, when he was elevated to this dignity, to do as much in the practical service of the church as he had before done for theological culture.§

mercenaria est, quippe non quærit quæ sua sunt, sponte afficit et spontaneum facit. Verus amor seipso contentus est, habet præmium, sed quod amatur. We recognise here the verbal agreement with Bernard (see Vol. VII. p. 356), whose sayings Gerhoh doubtless had before him, or else recollected.

* Qui scientes in vita æterna solius justitiæ, quam nunc esuriunt, se deliciis fovendos et saturandos, non indigent præmiis conduci ad hanc appetendam et quærendam, sicut nullus esuriens, ut comedat, nullus sitiens, ut bibat, conducitur.

† In the above-cited Commentary on the Psalms, f. 895.

‡ His Sententiæ, in eight parts.

§ Hactenus quippe eruditioni multorum fideliter et utiliter instabas,

Somewhat later, however, the abbot Bernard fell into controversy with another representative of the dialectico-theological tendency; and, indeed, the subject was here an entirely different one. It did not involve in it an opposition of theological spirit so deeply seated as in the controversy between Bernard and Abelard, therefore the dispute did not possess the same objective interest. Even from his own point of view, Bernard needed not to see the great danger he thought he saw; nor would he have seen it, perhaps, if it had not been for various influences foreign from the matter itself. Gilbert de la Poree, archbishop of Poitiers, the person with whom this controversy broke out, was by no means to be compared, as a bold and original thinker, with Abelard. He kept himself, together with his dialectic theology, within the common limits. He followed that view of the relation of "reason" to "faith," which had prevailed since the time of Abelard; doubtless he was aware, also, of the limits of "reason,"* though the little we know of him would lead us to regard him rather as a dry dialectician, than as one possessed of the profound intellect and heart of an Anselm. Abelard, his dialectical opponent, had already, at the council of Sens, forewarned him, in the well-known words of Horace: "Nam tua res agitur, paries quum proximus ardet,"† of the danger to which he also was exposed as a representative of the same dialectical theology.

Two of his clergy, some time after this, brought a complaint against him before pope Eugene the Third as holding heretical opinions on the doctrine of the Trinity; and Bernard put himself at the head of the party opposed to him. But Bernard could not force the matter through here so easily as he had done in the controversy with Abelard. At the council of

cœlo et terra testibus, sed jam tempus faciendi Domino, ne patiaris, quod in te est, dissipari ab impiis, legem ejus. Ep. 362.

* As may be gathered from the words with which he concludes his Commentary on the first book of Boethius de trinitate; for, in explaining here the sense of Boethius, he no doubt expresses also his own opinion, that the rationum argumenta are merely subservient to the Catholicorum sententiæ sponte, id est sine rationum argumentis firmissimæ. Quod si humanæ naturæ infirmitas nequivit adscendere ultra se, ut scilicet ineffabilia ex rationum locis ostenderet, quantum intelligentiæ imbecillitas subtrahit, tantum incomprehensibilibus semper hærentis voluntatis vota supplebunt.

† Horat. Lib. I. ep. 18, v. 84.

Rheims, in 1148, where pope Eugene the Third was personally present, and heard the representations of Gilbert and his opponents, opinions were divided. Gilbert found friends among the cardinals, who were not pleased at the dependence of the pope on his old teacher, a French abbot. A confession drawn up by Bernard, in opposition to Gilbert's errors, could not obtain the authority of a confession publicly recognized by the church; and Gilbert had the advantage, at least so far as this, that he was permitted, after submitting to the pope's decision, to return home with honour to his diocese, where he ever afterwards remained unmolested,—a partial triumph of the dialectic school,—an evidence that this tendency could no longer be entirely banished. And about this time appeared an individual by whom a reconciliation was effected between the two conflicting tendencies of the church, and of speculation, in a form which came, afterwards, to be more and more generally recognized. This was Peter Lombard, of Novara, whose theological studies at the Parisian university had met the approbation of Bernard himself, and who, in the year 1159, was made bishop of Paris, soon after which, in 1160, he died. Following a method which had long been practised, but which he applied more skilfully than others, he composed a manual of doctrine, under the title of *Quatuor libri sententiarum*. By laying for his foundation a collection of sayings from the older church teachers, particularly Augustin and Gregory the Great, he met the wishes of the reigning church party; and by the great variety of questions which he propounded, by his method of arranging his whole matter according to certain general grounds of distribution, of citing opposite opinions from the fathers, which he endeavoured to reconcile by means of accurate distinctions, he presented a point of attachment for those inclined to dialectics. This method and its ingenious application; the rich store of matter reduced to a compact brevity; the sobriety and moderation of the theological spirit therein exhibited; procured for this work an ever-increasing popularity, so that it became the standard manual of the following centuries, and was adopted by the most distinguished teachers, who wrote commentaries upon it.* The school of Peter

* An able compend, strictly following, however, the original production, is the work on the Sentences, composed by a certain magister

Lombard was continued by his disciple, Peter of Poitiers,* chancellor of the university of Paris; yet even this school had still to pass through many contests, partly with the ecclesiastical and partly with the mystical tendency.

As representatives of the first-mentioned form of opposition, we may notice particularly Gerhoh of Reichersberg, and Walter of Mauretania. Gerhoh, who was so zealous in opposing abuses in the church, declared no less earnestly against those who passed over from the worldly sciences to theology, and applied a worldly sense to the judgment of divine things. Though they cited many passages from the Holy Scriptures, yet these disciples of antichrist were strangers to that spirit of truth which teaches the disciples all truth.† Walter of Mauretania, at that time prior over the foundation of the regular canonicals of St. Victor at Paris, was, indeed, as we have seen, one of Abelard's first antagonists; but he departed further, as he grew older, from that moderation which he had shown at first. When Peter of Poitiers was the only living representative of the dialectico-theological tendency of the twelfth century, Walter wrote against it a work placing together in the same category Abelard and Gilbert of Poitiers, Peter Lombard and Peter of Poitiers, little as the two latter could be associated, as men of the same spirit, with the two former. This was his work, *Contra quatuor Gallie Labyrinthos*. He maintained that the course pursued by these theologians, of applying dialectics, raising questions on every point, stating

Bandinus, otherwise unknown. (*Sententiarum libri quatuor*.) This work announces itself as a *Compendium circa res divinas*; yet professes to be by no means a mere extract from the larger work of another author, although it must have already been perceived to be so by others, as may be gathered from its title as it is cited in one manuscript in Pez: *Thesaurus anecdotorum novissimus*, T. I. Dissert. Isagog. f. xlvi. namely: "Abbreviatio de libro sacramentorum magistri Petri Parisiensis episcopi fideliter acta." But as to Peter of Lombardy, we may be certain that he was not the man to need any *such previous labour*.

* His *Libri Sententiarum*, in eight parts.

† Multi, qui cum sint animales, non percipientes ea, quæ sunt spiritus, sæcularibus literis eruditi, ab illa sapientia, quæ terrena est, animalis, diabolica, transeunt ad dijudicanda cœlestia. Possunt quidem istiusmodi homines terreni rotare verba spumantia buccis crepantibus de scripturis veritatis, sed ipse spiritus veritatis, qui docet omnem veritatem discipulos Christi, longe abest ab istis discipulis Antichristi. See the Commentary on Ps. lxxii. in the edition of Pez, f. 1479; often cited in a foregoing volume.

opposite opinions, tended to unsettle everything in religion; nothing would be left fixed and certain.* The more passionate and coarse this attack on all dialectic investigation, the less power it would have in suppressing the dialectical tendency which was so deeply rooted in the spirit of the age. Nor was the mystic Joachim equal to a contest with the dialecticians in the dogmatical province. Pope Innocent the Third, who had himself studied under the Parisian theologians, and in whose canonical decisions the scholastic form there acquired is doubtless to be recognized, pronounced in favour of Peter Lombard at the Lateran council, in the year 1215.

But the mystical bent of theology was not less deeply rooted in the very spirit of these centuries than the dialectic; nor had either power enough to overcome the other. And it greatly contributed to promote a healthy action of the spiritual life, that they should mutually act as checks on each other, mutually supply each other's defects. The dialectic theology, without some such check, would have become, through the excessive predominance of the notional conception, too far estranged from the life of the heart; and the mystic theology, by reason of the great uniformity of feelings, intuitions, and thoughts moving in a narrow circle; the excessive licence, the vague, undefined, and fluxional character of its matter, would have proved injurious to the spiritual life. It was necessary that it should be closely accompanied with a stronger tendency to the objective, a more severe and discriminating mode of thought, a richer fund of ideas.

One of Bernard's contemporaries was the German mystic, abbot Rupert of Deutz, but not to be compared with him for force and depth. He was the author of a diffuse commentary, full of arbitrary, allegorizing expositions on various books of Scripture and passages of sacred history. Another writer

* In the prologue, he calls them *uno spiritu Aristotelico afflatus*. He says of them: *Totos dies et noctes tenent, ut interrogent vel respondeant vel dent propositiones vel accipiant, assumant, affirmant atque concludant*. He says of this method: *Sicut enim rerum ita propositionum infinita conversio est, unum idemque verum est et falsum et neutrum, adhibitis mille differentiis facillime negat et probat. Si eis credis, utrum Deus annon Deus, utrum Christus homo annon homo, aliquid annon aliquid, nihil annon nihil, Christus annon Christus sit nescis*. Du Boulay. *Hist. univers. Paris, T. II. f. 402*, where he gives extracts from the four books of this work.

deserving to be mentioned here is Richard, who went from Scotland, united with the Victorines in Paris, became a disciple of Hugo, and was prior in that foundation till his death, in the year 1173. Though he had not so much to do with the movements of the dialectic theology as his teacher Hugo, yet, by his uniting a speculative element with the contemplative, we see that he was a true disciple of the latter. He would by no means prohibit reason and the intellect from attempting to explore into divine things; but he considers purification of the heart a necessary pre-requisite in order to correctness of understanding. He holds it necessary that the matter known should be a matter of the heart, something that determines the affections; that reason should be conscious of its own limits, should learn how to distinguish things relatively and absolutely supra-rational from those which it is capable of knowing out of itself; and, with Bernard, he believes in a stage of ecstatic intuition, not mediated by any process of thought, but exalted above thought. The mystic theology led man from the outward world into that inner sanctuary of the spirit which is akin to God; from the depths of self-knowledge conducted him to the heights of the knowledge of God. "The rational mind," says Richard, "finds, without doubt, in itself the most excellent mirror wherein to see God. For if God's invisible essence may be known from his works, where can we find those marks that lead to the knowledge of him more clearly stamped than in that which is his own image? Every one, therefore, who longs to see God, should cleanse the mirror of his own spirit.* Nothing," says he, "is capable of judging correctly, which does not know itself. He knows not how all the glory of the world lies under his feet, who has not learned to estimate the dignity of his own nature. If thou art not yet capable of entering into thyself, how wilt thou be capable of exploring what is within thee, and above thee."† "The truth imparted by the divine grace of knowledge," says he, "must be stamped also by our own efforts,

* De præparatione animi ad contemplationem, c. lxxii.

† Nihil recte æstimat, qui seipsum ignorat. Nescit quam sub pedibus suis omnis munda gloria jaceat, qui conditionis suæ dignitatem non pensat. Si nondum idoneus es, quomodo ad illa rimanda idoneus eris, quæ sunt intra vel supra temetipsum. De contemplatione, c. vi.

under the co-operation of divine grace upon our inclinations.* What better is the science of holiness without a good disposition, than a picture without life?"† In that which constitutes the object of faith, he distinguishes what is above reason, and aside of reason (the *supra rationem* and the *præter rationem*); but adds, that the latter holds of the relation to human, not of the relation to the divine reason.‡ "As it respects the truths of revelation, which are above reason, all evidences and analogies fall short of them, it is true; but to him who has once been conducted by revelation to faith, reasons and analogies flow in abundance from all sides, which serve for the confirmation or defence of his convictions."§ But those other truths, to which he applies the predicate *præter rationem*, seem to have all analogies and all rational grounds against them.|| He distinguishes the three following stages of religious development: that in which God is seen by faith; that in which he is known by reason; that in which he is beheld by contemplation.¶ "To the first and second stages men may ascend; but to the third they can never arrive except by ecstatic transportation of the spirit above itself.** The soul, raised above itself, beholds things too high for reason in the light of the Godhead, where the thinking reason retires back."†† This highest moment of inspiration, he considers, it is true, as a thing not to be attained by any efforts, as something which is solely the gift of God; yet he says: "None obtain so great grace without strenuous efforts, and ardent longing."‡‡ And he supposes such a connection of this loftiest

* Veritatis imago, quæ ex inspirante gratia impressa est cognitioni, per humanam industriam et co-operantem gratiam imprimatur et affectioni. De statu interioris hominis, c. xxvi.

† Scientia sanctitatis sine intentione bona quid aliud est quam imago sine vita? De eruditione hominis interioris, c. xxxviii.

‡ Quicquid enim in illa summa et divina essentia esse constiterit, summa et incommutabili ratione subsistit. De contemplatione, c. iii.

§ Fideli menti multæ undique rationes occurrunt, multa denique argumenta emergunt.

|| Tam exempla quam argumenta contradicunt. L. c.

¶ Aliter Deus videtur per fidem. aliter cognoscitur per rationem, atque aliter cernitur per contemplationem.

** Nisi per mentis excessum supra seipsos rapti nunquam pertingunt.

†† Mens enim ad illud, quod supra se, elevata et in extasi rapta, de divinitatis lumine conspicit, omnis humana ratio succumbit.

‡‡ De præparatione animi ad contemplationem, c. lxxiii et lxiv.

ecstatic moment with the whole of consciousness, that one may afterwards, by thought, reproduce the matter of such intuitions, and bring them down to the common understanding by rational arguments and illustrations (the *ἐρμηνεία* of the *γλῶσσα*).* But he declaims against certain false philosophers who appeared in these times (among whom he would doubtless include Abelard), men whose sole aim was to invent something new, and get themselves a name; whose wisdom was born and died with themselves. To show the vanity of these endeavours, he points to such examples of conversion among the disciples of this sham wisdom as have been mentioned on a former page.† “That once glorious wisdom of the world has so utterly become foolishness, that we see every day countless numbers, who once professed it, begin to deride and abhor it, desiring to know nothing save Jesus Christ, and him crucified. Behold, how many that formerly laboured in the shop of Aristotle, following a sounder conviction, learn finally to labour in the office of our Saviour.”‡

The “Meditations” of Guigo§ (the fifth prior of the Carthusians, one of Bernard’s earlier contemporaries) are especially distinguished for an ethical element of mysticism. “The more noble and mighty any creature is,” says he, among other things, “the more willingly does he subject himself to the truth; nay, his nobleness and his might depend on this very self-subjection to the truth. The way to God is easy, for a man walks in it by unburdening himself. It would be hard, were it necessary for him to take up a load. Throw off, then, every burden, by denying all else and thyself.”||

It is not to be doubted that in the great metropolis of scientific and theological education at Paris, the powerful in-

* *Id quod per excessum mens vidit multa retractatione vehementique discussione capabile seu etiam comprehensibile sibi efficit et tum rationum attestazione, tum similitudinum adaptatione ad communem intelligentiam deducit—*or in other words: *Theophaniam raptim perceptam ad communem intelligentiam paululum inclinamus. De contemplatione, c. xii.*

† Page 5.

‡ L. c. c. ii.

§ In the the *Biblioth. patr. Lugd. T. XXII.*

|| *Facile est iter ad Deum, quoniam exonerando itur. Esset autem grave, si onerando iretur. In tantum ergo te exonera, ut dimissis omnibus, te ipsum abneges.*

fluence of the Victorine school on the interior life was greatly needed, to counteract the ungodly courses pursued by the theologians, who fell in with the tendency to a dead, formal knowledge; for we hear those who were most zealously devoted to the interests of the church complaining that the lives of both teachers and pupils were in direct contradiction to a study professing to relate wholly to divine things. Jacob of Vitry, who had himself studied at Paris, depicts in the most vivid colours the loose morals of the students, by whom the more seriously disposed were hooted at with contempt; the worldly tastes, jealousies, envyings, and cupidity of the teachers, whose knowledge he likens to sounding brass and tinkling cymbals.*

In the last times of the twelfth century, Peter Cantor, a man with the spirit of a reformer and a practical, scriptural

* Jacob of Vitry, in his *Historia occidentalis*, c. vii. p. 277, seqq.: *Tunc autem amplius in clero quam in alio populo dissoluta pernitiōsa exempla multos hospites undique ad eam affluentes corrumpēbant.*—In una et eadem domo scholæ erant superius, prostibula inferius.—Si qui secundum apostolicum mandatum sobrie et juste et pie inter illos vivere voluissent, avari et miseri et hypocritæ, superstitioni confestim ab impudicis et mollibus judicabantur. Respecting the teachers of theology, he says: *Docentes et non facientes facti sunt velut æs sonans et cymbalum tinniens. Non solum autem sibi invidēbant, et scholares aliorum blanditiis attrahebant gloriam propriam quærentes, de fructu autem animarum non curantes, præbendas sibi multiplicabant et venēbantur dignitates.* We may here add the description of William of Paris: “*Adeo tepide, adeo remisse verba Dei annunciant, ut extincta in labiis eorum penitus videantur, propter quod, sicut et ipsi frigidi sunt et extincti, sic frigidos et extinctos relinquunt et utinam non faciant adhuc pejores.*” He adduces the example of a friend of his, who, to avoid becoming colder and colder under the sermons and lectures at Paris, and having every spark of his spiritual life finally extinguished (*ne tandem spirituali gelicidio extingueretur*), had fled from the spot and betaken himself to monks of fervent piety. *Vide De moribus, c. viii. T. I. f. 120.* He laments over the Parisian teachers, who exerted themselves only to increase the number of their hearers, and not to promote their spiritual improvement: “*Non de profectu eorum spirituali curant, sed de repletionē scholarum suarum nec minus turpiter quam inverecunde sonat creberime in labiis hujusmodi magistrorum: hic est clericus meus, hic inceptit sub me.*” He then remarks that many such had by their own fault lost their hearers, so as finally to be obliged to discontinue their lectures, “*Quia promissionibus et muneribus instar meretricum eos (auditores) vel emunt vel conducunt, interdum etiam precibus, et terroribus extorquent ab iis, ut ita dicam, violentia audientem.*” *L. c. c. ccxix.*

turn of mind, held a prominent place among the Victorines. He had his surname from the office which he filled in that foundation. Afterwards, from the year 1194, he was bishop of Tournay. He fought with great earnestness against secularization in the church; he saw the impossibility of effecting a renovation of church life without an improvement in theological studies. For the instruction and admonition of the young men that consecrated themselves to the service of the church, he composed his *Summa*,* a work treating for the most part of moral and ecclesiastical matters. The same Jacob of Vitry, who so vividly described the corruption of the Parisian theologians, signalizes him as a light that shone far and wide; a man who accomplished so much the greater things, as his life and his teaching were both of a piece.† He declared himself opposed to that mode of treating theology which chiefly busied itself with vain and fruitless questions, to the neglect of those matters which tended to the sanctification and benefit of the church.‡ He spoke against those who laboured, by their arbitrary interpretations, to bring the unchangeable, eternally valid commands of our Lord into harmony with their fleshly lusts; explaining away whatever was too high for them, as barely temporal and local, as a *consilium* and not a *præceptum*.§ “How is it,” he asks, “that we who hold everything in Christ’s teaching to be easy and clear, have, by

* His *Summa theologiæ*, or *Verbum abbreviatum*, published by the Benedictine Gallopin, at Bergen, A.D. 1639.

† *Morum honestate pondus et gravitatem conferens doctrinæ suæ, cœpit enim facere et docere, velut lucerna ardens et lucens, et civitas supra montem posita.* Hist. occident. c. viii. He finally resigned his bishopric, became a monk amongst the Cistercians, and died before he had closed his novitiate. Cæsarius of Heisterbach, who reports this, says of him: *Vita et exemplo multos ædificaverat.* Distinct. 12. c. xlvi. f. 353.

‡ In the above-mentioned *Verbum abbreviatum*, p. 7 *Non ergo clamandum in disputationibus theologiæ, non disputandum de frivolis, sed, ut ait Seneca, de justitia, de pietate, de frugalitate, de utraque pudicitia mentis scilicet et corporis mihi disputa. Deponamus igitur hujus declamationis acutæ concinnationes, quæstiunculas inutiles.*

§ *Qui mandata ipsa confirmata in sæculum sæculi dicit esse temporalia, localia, personalia, et præcepta consilia, addens et subtrahens, interpretans et exponens ad voluntatem et libitum suum. Qui ob hoc solum, quod mandata Dei nolunt implere opere, laborant nimis in expositione eorum.*

our explanations and allegories, departed farther from the life-giving spirit, and the plain letter of the gospel, than the Jews did from that letter which killeth?"* The unpractical direction given to theological culture was attacked also by archdeacon Peter of Blois: "What does it profit them," says he,† speaking of the theologians, "to spend their days in studies that can find their application neither at home nor in war, nor in the court nor in the cloister, nor in the senate nor in the church, nor anywhere else, save only in the schools?" He declaims, like Hugo a St. Victore and John of Salisbury, whose scholar he was, against the men who dived into purely speculative matters before they had learned anything else; ‡ against those who, in their eagerness after the latest novelty, left all that was old in utter neglect. "Of what use is it," says he, "to heap up copies of lectures, to commit to memory the *Summas*, to condemn the writings of the ancients, and to reject everything that is not to be found in the teacher's notes?"§ He declaimed against that bold speculation on divine things which would own no limits, and against the unfruitful disputes of the schools.|| The essence of faith consisted, in his opinion, in its power of grasping that which is not attainable by reason. Where reason discovers its impotence, there the might of faith, he thought, was most conspicuously manifested. It was the interest of reason to repose on faith; for the merit of faith redounded not to its own benefit, but directly to that of reason. For faith must one day cease, and make way for perfect knowledge; but reason would remain for ever constantly passing on from one stage of development to another, and would one day discover how she

* L. c. p. 211.

† Ep. 101.

‡ Quidam antequam disciplinis elementaribus imbuantur, docentur inquirere de puncto, de linea, de superficie, de quantitate animæ, de fato, de pronitate naturæ, de casu et libero arbitrio, de materia et motu, quid sit tempus, quid locus, de essentia universalium et aliis quampluribus, quæ plenioris scientiæ fundamentum et eminentiores exigunt intellectus.

§ Quæ utilitas est, schedulas evolvere, firmare verbotenus summas, et sophismatum versutias inversare, damnare scripta veterum et reprobare omnia, quæ non inveniuntur in suorum schedulis magistrorum.

|| Hodie (says he, ep. 140) varia est inter multos sententiarum contentio, factæque sunt aquæ Siloës, quæ cum silentio currebant, aquæ contradictionis, apud quas demeruerunt Moses et Aron terræ promissionis introitum.

owed it to faith, kept in this present life, that after faith had ceased she had risen to perfect knowledge.* Peter of Blois found reason to complain also of theologians, who, having spent almost their whole lives in the study of the ancients, of philosophy, or of the civil law, had become so wholly estranged from the study of the Bible as to have lost all sense† for depth in simplicity, so that the language of the Bible seemed to them childish and spiritless.

Bishop Stephen of Tournay (earlier, president of the abbey of St. Genôvese at Paris) wrote to one of the immediate successors of pope Alexander the Third a remarkable letter,‡ in which he bitterly complained of the thirst for novelty among the theologians, of the profane liberties taken in treating the mysteries of faith, of the contradictory opinions held by theological teachers; and called upon the pope to introduce greater uniformity of doctrine into the universities. "The study of sacred science with us," he writes, "has fallen into confusion, the students approving of naught but what is new, and the teachers thinking more of their reputation than of the interest of truth, continually giving out new summaries and commentaries on theology, for the purpose of attracting and deceiving their hearers;§ as if the works of the holy fathers, that have explained the sacred Scriptures in the same spirit with which the apostles and prophets wrote them, did not

* Attingit fides, quod non præsumit ratio, et, quod mirabilius est, ex rationis defectu fortius convalescit. Apprehendit fides per gratiam, quod non potuit ratio capere per seipsam, ratio succumbit, ut fides amplius mereatur, nec invidet ratio merito fidei, sed libenter et humiliter acquiescit. Quod enim fides meretur, non sibi ipsi meretur, sed potius rationi. Sane fides evacuabitur et ratio permanebit.

† Peter of Blois writes to such an one, ep. 76: In fabulis paganorum, in philosophorum studiis, tandem in jure civili dies tuos usque in senium expendisti et contra omnium diligentium te voluntatem sacram theologiæ paginam damnabiliter horruisti. The same writer had called the sermo evangelicus durus, insipidus, infantilis.

‡ Ep. 241, p. 366 in the edition of Claude Du Molinet. Paris, 1682. One of the letters which are not yet to be found in the earlier imperfect edition of Masson and in the *Bibl. patr. Lugd.*

§ Lapsa sunt apud nos in confusione officinarum sacrarum studia literarum, dum et discipuli solis novitatibus applaudunt et magistri gloriæ potius invigilant, quam doctrinæ, novas recentesque summulas et commentaria firmantia super theologica passim conscribunt, quibus auditores suos demulceant, detineant, decipiant.

suffice. Against the ecclesiastical laws disputes are publicly held on God's incomprehensible essence. Loquacious flesh and blood contend irreverently about the incarnation of the Word; the indivisible Trinity is divided and rent to pieces in the streets; so that already there are as many errors as there are teachers, as many scandals as lecture-halls, as many blasphemies as streets."* He complains, in violent language, of the licentiousness that had found its way among the faculty of liberal arts; that beardless youth set themselves up for teachers, and, with contempt of all ancient rules, and of all the books standing in cherished authority, catch those that hear them in the webs of their sophistry.† Accordingly, he entreats the pope to thrust in here the hand of reform, so that by his authority uniformity of doctrine and discipline might be restored, and that divine teachings might not be rendered contemptible by becoming vulgar, so that it might not be said in corners: Here is Christ, or there is Christ; so that the holy might not be given unto the dogs, the pearls cast before swine, for them to trample under their feet. The popes, however, were not inclined to be hurried at once, by such remonstrances of individuals, into any arbitrary interference. The spirit of the church, of which they were the organs, demanded a certain manifoldness of development.

The dialectic theology, after having triumphantly passed through the conflicts of the twelfth century, was handed over to the thirteenth, by Alanus (Alain), dignified by his age, on account of the variety of his attainments, and the diligence of his pen, with the name of universal teacher, Alanus the Great (Alanus Magnus), and surnamed Insulensis, after the place of his birth, Lille ab Insula. Here he was born, before

* Disputatur publice contra sacras constitutiones de incomprehensibili Deitate, de incarnatione verbi verbosa caro et sanguis irreverenter litigat. Individua trinitas in triviis secatur et discerpitur, ut tot jam sint errores, quot doctores, tot scandala, quot auditoria, tot blasphemix, quot plateæ.

† Quod facultates, quas liberales appellant, amissa libertate pristina in tantam servitutem dejiciantur, ut comatuli adolescentes earum magisteria impudenter usurpent, et in cathedra seniorum sedeant imberbes et qui nondum norunt esse discipuli, laborant, ut nominentur magistri. Omissis regulis artium abjectisque libris authenticis, artificio muscas tanquam ingnavium verborum et sophismatibus suis tanquam araneorum tenticulis includunt.

1128; he taught at Paris, became a Cistercian monk, and died in the year 1202.* What chiefly characterizes this schoolman is, his departure from the method of the Sententiaries, by entering into a purely rational exposition of his subject-matter. In an *Ars Catholicæ fidei*, dedicated to Pope Clement the Third, he undertook to expound, in five books, all the doctrines of faith in a connected chain of brief propositions, one of which should be clearly deducible from the other. It was designed to furnish arguments for the faith, which an acute mind could hardly resist, so that he who would not believe the prophets and the gospel, should at least be convinced by demonstration of human reason. But he added, that these arguments would by no means suffice to produce faith: for a faith that proceeded from nothing but reason would be without merit (*meritum*). "It will be our privilege and glory in heaven," says he, "to comprehend with perfect knowledge what we now see only in a glass darkly." † After the same method, he compiled also a series of brief propositions, as *Regulæ theologicæ*, which he accompanied with illustrations. ‡

In the twelfth century, traces of the influence of the Aristotelian dialectic may already be discerned; though, at first, only single logical writings of that great philosopher could have been known. But far more important became this influence, and far greater the new spring which was thereby given to dialectics and speculation in the following century, when men became better acquainted with Aristotle, partly from translations made at second hand from the Arabic, § and his metaphysical and ethical works came to be studied with great diligence. But this new direction, again, had to encounter much violent opposition; a speculative system, which near the beginning of the thirteenth century, || had become widely

* Most celebrated in his own age for his poem, called *Anticlaudianus*: also author of a *Summa de arte prædicandi*.

† The cited work published in Pez, *Thesaurus anecdotorum novissimus*, T. I. f. 476.

‡ Published by Mingarelli, in the *Anecdotorum fasciculus*. Romæ, 1756.

§ See on this point, *Recherches critiques sur l'âge et l'origine des traductions latines d'Aristote*, par M. Jourdain. Paris, 1819.

|| The doctrines of Almaric of Bena, of which we shall speak in another connection.

popular at Paris, and which was really calculated to undermine all the religious faith of the times, could not fail to appear as a dangerous symptom to those who had to watch over the doctrines of the church; and the real source of such doctrines being unknown, and wrongly attributed by some to the Aristotelian philosophy, it was natural that the latter should be looked upon with suspicion. Pope Gregory the Ninth issued, in 1228, a letter to the university of Paris, warning its teachers * against the presumptuous and false use of philosophy in matters of faith. He complained, probably not without reason, of the forced interpretations whereby it was attempted to bring the declarations of Holy Scripture into harmony with the doctrines of such philosophers as had never known the true God.† He told these teachers that, by undertaking to prove everything on philosophical grounds, they made faith superfluous.‡ In what light the arrogance of the new dialectic tendency appeared to the religious spirit of the times, is illustrated by the fable into which the history of one of the first zealous supporters of the Aristotelian philosophy, and of its application to theology, Simon of Tournay, § was converted. This individual

* Of whom he says: *Præsumptores hujusmodi doctrinam naturalem amplexantes verborum folia et non fructus auditoribus suis apponunt.*

† *Ad sensum doctrinæ philosophorum ignorantium Deum sacra eloquia extortis expositionibus, imo distortis inflectunt.*

‡ *Dum fidem conantur plus debito ratione adstruere naturali, nonne illam reddunt quodammodo inutilem et inanem?*

§ A writer belonging to the second half of the thirteenth century, Henry of Ghent, archdeacon of Tournay, who, in his work on the ecclesiastical authors of his own time, c. 24 (published by Fabricius, in his *Bibliotheca ecclesiastica*), gives the simplest account of him, refers to his writings, a *liber sententiarum suarum*, moreover, the exposition of the *quæstiones, quas in scholis suis disputatas terminavit*, an explication of the Athanasian creed,—and could say nothing worse of him than this: *Dum nimis et in hoc et in aliis scriptis suis Aristotelem sequitur, a nonnullis modernis hæreseos arguitur.* This latter fact, together perhaps with the many peculiarities of the man, and the accident he met with during his celebrated academical labours, and which put an end to them, may have given occasion to the whole of this singular legend. If some of his writings were published, we might be able to form a correct judgment of the whole matter. The copy of the very lecture with which this whole story was connected seems to be still extant, according to the report of the *History of French literature* composed by the Benedictines of S. Maur.

having passed from the study of philosophy to that of theology, and for several years given lectures on the latter subject, had, in the beginning of the thirteenth century, acquired such extraordinary celebrity, that none but the most capacious edifices could hold the crowds of his hearers. In a certain lecture, having started a variety of doubts on the doctrine of the Trinity, he deferred the resolution of them to the next day. The whole tribe of theological students flocked with eager expectation the next day, to his lecture room, when he explained all the difficulties in so satisfactory a manner that the whole assembly were struck with one sentiment of admiration. Several of them who were intimate with him, now went up and earnestly besought him, that he would dictate the lecture over again for them to copy, that all this knowledge might not be lost. Scouting such a consequence, with a burst of laughter, he exclaimed: "O my little Jesus! little Jesus! how much have I helped to establish and glorify thy doctrine! Verily, had I a mind to stand forth as its opponent I might bring still stronger arguments against it." But no sooner was this uttered than he found himself unable to speak another word; he had lost both voice and memory. He had to spend two years in learning over again the alphabet; and only with the greatest difficulty succeeded in recommitting to memory so as feebly to stammer out the Lord's prayer and the creed.*

* So states Matthew of Paris, at the year 1202 (ed. Lond. 1686, f. 173), and he adds: Hoc igitur miraculum multorum scholarium suppressit arrogantiam et jactantiam refrænavit. He appeals to the oral account of an eye-witness, who had studied in Paris, and afterwards became bishop of Durham. That which contradicts and that which agrees with this account, in Thomas Cantiprat's report of the same incident, while it testifies against the literal truth of the story, yet supports the fact lying at the foundation of it. He transfers to him that assertion respecting the three deceivers of the world, which was ascribed by others to the emperor Frederic the Second. He says that this Simon, at the close of one of his lectures, uttered a blasphemy of this sort, and as soon as he had expressed it was attacked by a fit of epilepsy, and three days afterwards fell into the condition described by Matthew of Paris, in which condition he remained till he died. He mentions also, as a characteristic trait, that Simon, whom he represents as a man of unchaste manners,—Matthew of Paris states also that he had two sons,—could at last only pronounce the names of his concubines, but not the title of the work of Boethius on the Trinity, which he before knew almost entirely by heart; see Apes, Lib. II. c. xlvi. But really, if this Simon—as would seem probable

Yet the philosophy of Aristotle, after the way had been so well prepared for its influence by the progress of events in the twelfth century, laid too strong a hold on the scientific minds to be rent away so easily. And when only the outward results were looked at, when it was observed that men of universally acknowledged piety, eminent for their zeal in behalf of the interests of faith and of the church, drew from this philosophy their weapons for the defence of the truths of faith, it could not be believed that from such a quarter any danger was to be feared. So this philosophy came at length to be patronized and protected even by the popes.

What gave Aristotle this great power of attracting the minds of men was, the combination, so peculiar to him, of dialectical acuteness with sound experimental observation, the comprehensive range of his inquiries, the fruitfulness of his logical formulas, which the great teachers of this century knew how to turn to such good purpose.

In earlier centuries we noticed, indeed, a great difference between the influences of the Platonic and of the Aristotelian philosophy. We observed that, by the latter, was called forth a one-sided direction of the understanding, which stood chiefly in a negative relation to the dogmas of the church; while the Platonic philosophy, which had more to stir the feelings, and to excite religious intuition, might be reconciled

from the chronology—was the same person with the one whom Stephen of Tournay recommended to the archbishop of Rheims, he is represented on this occasion in a very favourable light. This Stephen recommended him in connection with a controversy which he had with his bishop and the other canonicals,—and which, too, may have contributed to bring him into bad repute,—to the archbishop of Rheims: *Inde est quod magistro Simoni viro inter scholares cathedras egregio non necesse est verbosas emendicare preces aut laudum venalium coram vobis præconia erogare. Gratosum et commendabilem faciunt eum hinc auctoritas morum, hinc peritia literarum, Ep. 79. Bibl. patr. Lugd. T. XXV. f. 17.* But the testimony of this person is here certainly of peculiar weight, since he was one of the zealous advocates for the church party, and of the opponents to licentiousness of doctrine,—being inclined, indeed, to confine speculation within too narrow limits, as is plain from the letter quoted on a former page, 86. The author of the article on Simon of Tournay, in the *Hist. lit. de la France*, T. XVI. who gives a list of his works preserved in the Parisian libraries, found nothing in them which could serve either to establish or to explain the charges that had been brought against him. See l. c. p. 394.

with the church doctrines, and used for their support. But the positive element of the Christian and churchly spirit in the thirteenth century was too powerful, the mystical element was too much fused and blended with the dialectic, in all the great minds of the age, to render it possible, on the whole, for a negative tendency, in reference to the church, to be called forth by the Aristotelian philosophy. And along with the Aristotelian element was combined also, in the case of these teachers, a not less powerfully working Platonic one, which had been conveyed into them by Augustin, by the Pseudo-Dionysian writings, and by Arabic and Latin translations of the Platonists; as, in fact, the Aristotelian philosophy, even among the Arabians, whose philosophical culture spread to the Christian nations, was penetrated with elements of New Platonism.* By distinguishing the different positions of nature and of grace, of the natural and of the supernatural, they might undertake to bring the doctrines of Aristotle into harmony with those of revelation, and we shall see how this distinction was connected with their whole mode of contemplation.

The characteristic feature in the method of these men consisted in this: to start a multitude of isolated questions on all the subjects of which they treated, to state the arguments on both sides, and then sum up with a brief decision (*conclusio* or *resolutio*), in which regard was had to the arguments on both sides. This method served greatly to promote the habit of contemplating a subject on its several sides, as well as to exercise acuteness. Much that was brought forward in later times, on deistical grounds, against the doctrines of revelation is to be found already in the writings of these schoolmen among the native grounds, to which they had regard; and it is evident how carefully they had examined every objection that could be raised against their own theological position. But this method of questioning and defining was unfavourable to a coherent organic comprehension and development: it afforded abundant nourishment for a species of sophistry though it might be unconscious sophistry, which was skilful

* See the very interesting and instructive tract, *Essai sur les écoles philosophiques chez les Arabes*, par A. Schmülders. Paris, 1842, p. 95 etc.

in finding many reasons for that which was untrue, or but half true. Add to this, that the above-mentioned theologians, while they kept themselves within those limits of inquiry prescribed by the doctrines of the church, must undertake to prove everything they found contained there, though this was by no means a purposed accommodation; but the fact was, that the view of Christianity presented by the church tradition, had, after an unconscious and involuntary manner, blended itself with their whole life and mode of thinking. There were two authorities by which the minds of men were governed: in the province of natural reason, the authority of Aristotle, called pre-eminently the philosopher; in the Christian province, the authority of the church tradition. From the contrariety between these two authorities, and the results to which theologians, whose thinking was directed by the spirit of Christianity, so far as it could move with freedom at all, were led, there arose among them inconsistencies and contradictions, which, by some artifice or other, they must needs reconcile or cover over.

The most important representatives and schools of the scholastic theology proceeded from the two orders of the mendicant friars; from the order of the Franciscans, the Englishman Alexander of Hales, and the Italian Bonaventura. The history of the Franciscan order led us often to speak of the last-named individual, who entered the order in 1238, at the age of sixteen, took up its defence with enthusiasm, and finally was placed at its head as general. Bonaventura's original name, like that of his father, was John of Fidanza. He was born at Bagnarea, not far from Viterbo in Italy, about the year 1221, and lived to assist at the general council of Lyons in 1274, during the session of which he died. In him we find once more united the mystical and the dialectic theology. He distinguished himself as a writer of mystical and practical works on Christianity, and of a commentary on the *Sentences*. In the order of the Dominicans appeared Albertus Magnus and Thomas Aquinas. Albert the Great was descended from an ancient princely family, and was born at Lauingen, not far from Dillingen, in the year 1193, entered the Dominican order in 1223, and studied at Paris, Padua, and Bologna: he taught in Hildesheim, Freiburg, Regensburg, Strasburg, Paris, and Cologne. The last-mentioned city was more par-

ticularly the seat of his activity as a teacher. In 1260 he was compelled, by pope Alexander the Fourth, to accept the bishopric of Regensburg. But after he had sustained the duties of this office two years, anxious to be released from the perplexing crowd of foreign affairs which devolved on German bishops, and to return to his former quiet life, consecrated to religion and science, he obtained a dismissal from pope Urban the Fourth, and then devoted himself wholly, till the close of his life at Cologne, to his labours as a writer and teacher, though he was often called upon to transact business connected with the episcopal office within the diocese of Cologne. He is said to have been present at the general council of Lyons in 1274, and he died on the 15th of November, in the year 1280.* His great mind grasped the whole compass of human knowledge, as it existed in his time. He abounded in profound, suggestive ideas, with which he fructified the minds of his contemporaries, and far-reaching anticipations of truth. On the theological development of this century and the succeeding ones, a still more powerful influence was exerted by his great disciple Thomas Aquinas.

He was born in the year 1225 or 1227,† at the castle of Rocca Sicca, belonging to his family, not far from the city of Aquina, on the dividing line between the States of the Church and the Neapolitan territory. He was descended from a very noble family. At the age of five he was placed in the abbey of Monte Cassino to be educated, where he received the first rudiments of learning. Afterwards he repaired, for the prosecution of his studies, to the university of Naples. At this time the preachers of the mendicant orders were exercising a great power over the minds of the youth, and successfully endeavouring to win over the distinguished young men to their order; and it so happened that Thomas also was attracted by the charm of this novel appearance; and, without the knowledge of his friends, entered, in 1243, when a young man, the Dominican order. His pious mother, Theodora, was at first not displeased with this resolution of her son—she only wished to see him; but the monks, who were little accustomed

* See Echard, T. I. f. 162.

† The year of his birth is disputed, because it cannot be exactly determined whether he was forty-eight or fifty years old at the time of his death.

to pay respect to the ties and feelings of nature, felt themselves bound to prevent such an interview, fearing lest the promising young man might be taken away from them by force. But their pains to keep the son from the sight of his mother had an effect directly contrary to that which they intended. The enraged mother complained to her sons, who were serving in the army of the emperor Frederic the Second, and adjured them, as they valued her motherly blessing, to obtain her child for her once more. They went and actually succeeded in getting the young Thomas from the order, and making themselves master of his person; but no force could compel him to lay aside the dress of his order. Two years' imprisonment in a castle could not break his will. He spent these days of solitude in studying through the Bible and the works of Peter Lombard. His mother, being at length convinced that it was impossible to conquer his will, assisted, herself, in letting him down with a cord from the window, so that he could escape. Here several companions of his order stood waiting to receive him, and he was welcomed back, with great joy, by the Dominicans in Naples. Soon after this he was sent to Cologne, to pursue his studies under the guidance of the great German teacher, Albert. His taciturn disposition procured for him here the surname *bos mutus*, and nobody dreamed of what was within him. On a certain occasion, however, when he distinguished himself beyond the expectations of all, in an academical disputation, Albert the Great exclaimed, "We call him the *mute ox*, but he will turn out a teacher whose voice will be heard through the whole world." At some later period he was sent to Paris, where he obtained his academical degree. In the year 1253 he was made doctor of theology; and in the twenty years till his death, he composed his great and numerous works on subjects philosophical and theological, among which latter may be mentioned his *Summa theologiæ*, his Commentary on the Sentences, his Apologetical work against the heathens, and several of his *opuscula*. This department of his labours deserves the more to be admired because it was not the only one. He was an active teacher of youth, and his lectures were so attractive that it was hardly possible to find a hall large enough to hold the multitude of his auditors. He preached, also; and he taught, not only in Paris, but sometimes also at the university

of Naples; and was therefore occasionally interrupted in his other labours by his journey to and from Italy.* He is said to have employed three or four amanuenses, to all whom he dictated at once on different subjects. His writings show that his thoughts on divine things flowed from a full heart; he was conscious of the necessary connection subsisting between thought and feeling. Every day he was accustomed to have something read to him from a work of edification (Rufin's *Collationes patrum*); and when he was asked why he took this time for his speculative studies, he replied that he thought the excitement of devotion prepared him for soaring upwards to speculation. When the feelings are enkindled by devotion, the thoughts would more easily ascend to the highest matters.† He never began to study, to dispute, to give lectures, to write, or to dictate, without first betaking himself to prayer for divine illumination. Whenever doubts confronted him in his investigations, he left off meditating, in order to seek divine guidance in prayer.‡ In secular affairs, too, his clear, discriminating understanding is said to have shown aptitude and ability; and hence Louis the Ninth of France was in the habit of consulting him even on the affairs of government. Once, when busily engaged on his *Summa theologiæ*, he was obliged, against his will, to appear at the table of this monarch; but he took his seat there fully absorbed in his own thoughts. Suddenly striking his fists on the table, he exclaimed, "There! the Manicheans are down." Wrapped up in his speculations, he thought he had just discovered a conclusive argument against Manicheanism, and had lost all recollection of the

* The author of the Life of Thomas Aquinas (William of Thoco), says, at the 7th of March, c. iv. Unum videtur Deus in dicto doctore, dum viveret, manifestum ostendisse miraculum, ut tam modico tempore, forte in viginti annis, qui inter magisterium ejus et obitum in vita fluxerunt, bis eundo Parisios et in Italiam redeundo, tot potuerit libros per suos scriptores in scriptis redigere.

† William of Thoco cites as a reason (iii. 22): Quia frequenter contingit, quod dum intellectus superius subtilia speculatur, affectus inferius a devotione remittitur.

‡ William of Thoco finely remarks on this subject: Unde videbatur in ejus anima intellectus et affectus sicut invicem se comprehendunt, ut affectus orando mereretur ad divina ingredi, et intellectus hujus merito intueri, quæ altius intelligeret, quo affectio ardentius in id, quod luce caperet, amore flagraret.

place where he was. The prior, sitting next to him, seized his arm, and reminded him that he was at the king's table. Then Thomas came to his senses, and excused himself to the monarch; but the pious king enjoyed it, and was much edified to find that the honour of such an invitation and of such company could not divert one whose thoughts were wholly absorbed in higher things, from his meditations on divine matters. He considered it important that not one of these thoughts should be lost, and sent immediately for a scribe, to whom Thomas was obliged to dictate the whole. This great theologian died on his journey to the general council of Lyons, whither he was summoned by the pope, in 1274.

Besides these theologians of the mendicant orders, we should mention one distinguished man, who was pre-eminent alike in practical and theoretical matters,—in the practical government of the church, as a bishop, preacher, and pastor; and in science, as an apologist, dogmatician, and moral theologian. This was William of Auvergne* (born at Aurillac), who was chosen bishop of Paris in 1228, and died in the year 1248.†

One of the extraordinary men of the thirteenth century, who stood forth to resist the ruling authorities of their times, was the Englishman Roger Bacon, a man of a free spirit beyond all others, full of great ideas of reform; ideas that contained the germs of new creations, reaching farther in their consequences and results than he himself, firmly rooted as, with all his aspirations, he still was in the times in which he lived, either understood or intended. He was born near Ilchester in Somersetshire, in 1214. He was educated under the influence of that free-hearted man, so full of the spirit of reform, Robert Grosshead (Grouthead), mentioned already on a former page;‡ who, as bishop of Lincoln, and under the

* Hence known also under the name of Guilelmus Alvernus.

† His apologetical work, *De fide et legibus*, also aimed against Mohammedanism; his ethical writings, *De virtutibus, moribus, vitiis et peccatis, de tentationibus et resistentiis*; his writings on particular points of doctrine; his more comprehensive work, *De universo*; his tract, *De rhetorica divina* (on the art of correct prayer). His works were published in two folio volumes, at Paris, in 1674. His particular doctrinal and ethical writings are so wrought out as to form, together, one whole.

‡ See Vol. VII. p. 256.

name of *Robertus Lincolniensis*, held an important rank among the scholastic theologians of this period,* and whom Bacon himself was accustomed to name with peculiar reverence, as one of the great scholars of that age.† He entered, by the advice of his patron,—who at first expected much good from the orders of mendicant friars,—into the Franciscan order; but the free direction which his mind took exposed him to many persecutions in the same. For many years he languished in the confinement of a cell, until, by the interposition of powerful patrons, he obtained his freedom. He died at Oxford, in the year 1294.

In the work containing his ideas on the reform of science, the *Opus majus*,‡ which he composed by invitation of pope Clement the Fourth, to whom he dedicated it,§ he denounced dependence on authority and custom as a source of the great majority of errors, and advocated free inquiry after truth. He said that the church fathers themselves laid no claim to infallibility. They had corrected themselves, had disputed with one another; as, for example, Augustin with Jerome. Men should not feel bound by their authority, therefore, where they have erred, but imitate them in seeking a continually progressive improvement. “Had they lived to our times, they would have altered for the better many more things than they had done.”|| He cites the dispute between Paul and Peter at Antioch, to show that holy men had mutually corrected each

* It is to be lamented that we know so little of him in this respect, as nothing has been published from his greater works.

† Solum dominus Robertus, dictus Grossum Caput, novit scientias. *Opus majus*, f. 45.

‡ Ed. Jebb. Londini, 1733.

§ Which, however, is perhaps not yet completely published.

|| P. 10-17: Ne igitur nos simus causa erroris nostri et fiat magnum sapientiae impedimentum ex eo, quod vias sanctorum et sapientum non intelligimus, ut expedit, possumus auctoritate sanctorum et sapientum antiquorum considerare pia mente et animo reverenti propter veritatis dignitatem, quae omnibus antefertur, si sancti et sapientes aliqua, quae humanam imperfectionem important, protulerunt, in quibus seu affirmatis seu negatis non oportet quod nos imitemus ex fronte. Scimus quidem, quod non solum dederunt nobis consilium et licentiam hoc faciendi, sed conspicimus, quod ipsi multa posuerunt magna auctoritate, quae postea majori humilitate retractaverunt et ideo latuit in iis magna imperfectio prioribus temporibus. Quod si vixissent usque nunc, multa plura correxissent et mutassent.

other, and firmly withstood each other.* He adopted the idea of the church theocracy from the prevailing view of his times, altering it only in the essential point, that he was for having the sacred Scriptures the guiding and determining principle for everything, whether relating to knowledge or to life. All the wisdom requisite for the determination of all the relations of life and all science, were, in their principal and source, to be found in the Holy Scriptures.† There was but one perfect wisdom given by the one only God for the entire human family, which was wholly contained in the sacred Scriptures; but it was to be deduced and evolved from them by philosophy and the canonical law.‡ A reformation, according to this method, in all studies, should be introduced. The entire church would then be governed again as it was in the times of the saints; in all the affairs of the church, among princes and laymen, a universal peace would then prevail. As the church among the Jews was governed by the law of God, so must it be again among the Christians:§ in principle, at least, everything must be governed by that law. All evils, through the various ranks of society, he traced to ignorance of the Holy Scriptures, the source of faith and the rule of life. So zealous was he in favour of the general study of the Scriptures, that he would have all the laity read, and so be able to make use of them; nor should they rest satisfied with the Vulgate, which he saw needed correction, but they should study the Old and New Testaments in the original texts. By means of a universal grammar, discovered by himself, he engaged to give any man, in three days, such knowledge of the Hebrew,

* Sancti etiam ipsi mutuo suas correxerunt positiones et sibi invicem fortiter resistebant.

† Tota sapientia est ibi principaliter contenta et fontaliter, in his tract, not yet published also, addressed to pope Clement the Fourth: De laude scripturæ sacræ, from which weighty extracts have been communicated in Usserii historia dogmatica de scripturis, ed. Wharton. Londini, 1690, p. 421.

‡ Ut sicut in pugno colligitur, quod latius in palma explicatur, sic tota sapientia utilis homini continetur in sacris literis, licet non tota explicetur, sed ejus explicatio est jus canonicum et philosophia, nam utrumque jacet in visceribus sacræ scripturæ et de his exivit et super hoc fundantur omnia, quæ utiliter dicuntur in jure canonico et philosophia. L. c.

§ Quod regimen ecclesiæ, sicut per legem Dei regebatur antiquitus apud Hebræos, sic esse nunc apud Christianos.

Greek, and Latin tongues as would enable him to understand the Scriptures in each of these languages.

Considering it, as he did, a matter of so much importance that everything should be referred to the study of the Bible, he could not but lament that this was so much neglected by the theologians, and, compared with the study of the new dialectic theology, thrown wholly into the background,—that any man who, at Paris or Bologna, would give lectures on the Bible, must, in respect to time and place, give way to him who would read on the Sentences.* Theology, he said, in these schools took just the opposite course of the other faculties, for, in the other faculties, the text always went for more than the commentary, and he who rightly understood the text was considered as having a correct understanding of the whole; and yet the text, in theology, was one infinitely higher than that in any of the other faculties. It was a text brought into the world through the mouth of our Lord and of the saints, and so great, that an entire life would scarce suffice to explain it wholly.†

We may remark also, by the way, that Roger Bacon coincides with another original man of this age, Raymund Lull, in pointing out the necessity of a complete scientific education for missionaries, and particularly in insisting that missions, undertaken without any correct ideas of geography and ethnography, must necessarily prove failures; all which he explained at large.‡

As Roger Bacon suggested the necessity of an emendation

* Boulæus quotes the remarkable words from a chapter not yet published of the *Opus majus*: *De theologorum peccatis*, *Hist. univers.* Paris, T. III. f. 383. *Baccalaureus, qui legit textum, succumbit lectori sententiarum. Parisiis ille, qui legit sententias, habet principalem horam legendi secundum suam voluntatem, habet socium et cameram apud religiosos, sed qui legit bibliam, caret his et mendicat horam legendi secundum quod placet lectori sententiarum.*

† *Quod textus hic de ore Domini et sanctorum allatus mundo est, ita magnus, quod vix sufficeret aliquis lector ad perlegendum eum in tota vita sua.*

‡ *Opus majus, f. 189: Hæc cognitio locorum mundi valde necessaria est reipublicæ fidelium et conversioni infidelium, et ad obviandum infidelibus et antichristo. Qui loca mundi ignorat, nescit non solum quo vadit, sed quo tendat et ideo sive pro conversione infidelium proficiscatur aut pro aliis ecclesiæ negotiis, necesse est, ut sciat ritus et conditiones omnium nationum, quateus proposito certo locum proprium petat.*

of the extremely corrupted Vulgate, of which the manuscripts varied from each other to an astonishing extent,* so the need of this came now to be felt by all; and by the general chapter of the Dominican order, one of their own body, Hugo de St. Chere (*a Sancto Caro*), so called from his birthplace, near Vienna, a man distinguished for his knowledge of Hebrew and Chaldee, afterwards elevated to the dignity of a cardinal, was appointed to prepare an improved edition of the Vulgate.† The same schoolman composed likewise a concordance and commentary on the Bible.

In the history of systematic theology, that extraordinary man, little known as a theologian,—whom we have so often had occasion to mention on account of his many-sided activity,—Raymund Lull, holds an important place. Although, as appears evident from the history of his life, which we have given, he had not formed himself in the school of any one of the great teachers of his time, but was for the most part a self-taught man,—still, he must be regarded as one link in this connected series; and the great influence of the questions which occupied the theologians of his age is shown in his case also, in a way not to be mistaken. We have seen how intimately the speculative and practical were blended together in him; how his speculative turn entered even into his enthusiasm for the cause of missions, and his zeal as an apologist. His contests, growing out of this latter interest, with the school of Averrhoes, with the sect proceeding from that school, which affirmed the irreconcilable opposition between faith and knowledge, would naturally lead him to make the relation subsisting between these two a matter of special investigation. It is true, the enthusiasm for truth which filled his mind, the union of a fervid imagination with logical formalism, led him to form extravagant hopes of a fancied absolute method adapted to all science,—applicable also to the truths of Christianity,

* He says, in his tract already cited, *De laude scripturæ sacræ*: A viginti retro annis inter minores et Scholares, potissimum vero prædicatores, mos insolevit, quod quilibet corrigat pro sua voluntate et quilibet mutat, quod non intelligit, quod non licet facere in libris poetarum.

† The work sketched out by him in the year 1236: *Sacra biblia recognita et emendata*, id est, a scriptorum vitiis expurgata, additis ad marginem variis lectionibus codicum MSS. Hebræorum, Græcorum, et veterum Latinorum codicum, ætate Caroli magni scriptorum.

and by which these truths might be demonstrated in a convincing manner to every man. Yet his writings generally abound—far more than that formal system of science, his *Ars magna*—in deep apologetic ideas. The enthusiasm of a most fervent love to God, a zeal equally intense for the cause of faith and the interests of reason and science, expressed themselves everywhere in his works.

We perceive some progress of systematic development in the fact that the scholastic theologians of the thirteenth century, before proceeding to the treatment of particular subjects, busied themselves with preliminary inquiries respecting the idea and essence of theology itself; as to whether theology could be called a science, and in what sense; as to the relation in which its peculiar province stood to other departments of knowledge; as to the relation of faith to knowledge; as to the object-matter and the unity of theology; as to whether it was a speculative or a practical science. In their way of investigating and answering these questions, the same differences in the mode of apprehending the idea and essence of religion lie already at bottom, which became more fully and distinctly expressed in far later times. In general, they abode faithfully by the principle expressed by Augustin and Anselm, in making dogmatical knowledge proceed from the basis of Christian experience, and designating it as the special business of dogmatics scientifically to unfold and vindicate the matter received in and through faith.

This is distinctly expressed and profoundly set forth by the first of these theologians with whom we shall occupy ourselves, Alexander of Hales. “If we compare,” says he, “the way in which the relation of faith or conviction to knowledge is determined in theology with the way in which it is done in the other sciences, we shall find that the order is a reverse one. In the other sciences, conviction is brought about by the activity of reason, or mediated by thought, and scientific knowledge precedes conviction; while the reverse holds true of religious matters. It is not till we have appropriated them by faith, that we can attain to a knowledge of them conformable to reason. These things can be understood only by those who are of a pure heart; and of this purity we become possessed by keeping God’s commandments. The faith by which we come to conviction is the light of the soul: the more one is

enlightened by this light, the more will his mind's eye be sharpened by it, to account for the matters believed on rational grounds."* He distinguishes a certainty of speculation, and a certainty of experience, a certainty grounded in the intellectual agencies, and another grounded in the feelings. Of the latter kind, is the certainty of faith; and, with reference to this kind of certainty, theology is superior to the other sciences.† "Everything depends here on distinguishing one from another the different points of view, or positions occupied by the spiritual life. The same thing cannot be certain for all. The certainty of which we here speak presupposes, as a subjectively conditioned certainty, resting on inward experience, a certain stage arrived at, and position occupied by, the higher life. That which is certain to the spiritual man is by no means so to the natural man, who, as Paul says, perceives not the things of the Spirit." He distinguishes the science which aims to guide reason to the knowledge of the truth from that which aims to excite the feelings of piety.‡ "But of what use is it," he goes on to ask, "for us to seek also to know, on rational grounds, that which is already certain to us by faith? It serves, in the first place, to advance our own progress; for we must ever strive to explore more deeply into the contents of the truth we have appropriated by faith, and the grace of faith affords the mind the light for this purpose. Next, it should serve to promote the faith of the simple; for as men are incited to love God by the bestowment of temporal blessings, so they may be led by rational grounds to a higher stage of faith. Again, it may be employed as a means of conducting unbelievers to the faith. Yet this can be only a preparation; for true faith, which alone is acceptable to God, does not rest on arguments of

* In Logicis ratio creat fidem, unde argumentum est ratio rei dubiæ faciens fidem. In theologicis vero est converso, quia fides creat rationem, unde fides est argumentum faciens rationem. Fides enim, qua creditur, est lumen animarum, quo quanto quis magis illustratur, tanto magis est perspicax ad inveniendas rationes, quibus probantur credenda.

† The distinction between certitudo speculativa and certitudo experitiæ, certitudo secundum intellectum and secundum affectum, quod est per modum gustus.

‡ Alius modus debet esse scientiæ, quæ habet informare affectum secundum pietatem, alius scientiæ, quæ habet informare intellectum solum ad cognoscendam veritatem.

reason, but proceeds from the immediate contact of the spirit with the highest truth manifesting itself to the spirit.* It is like the relation of those Samaritans to the woman who first pointed them to Christ, when they said to her: "Now we believe, not because of thy sayings, but because we have heard him ourselves." He affirms that theology is more a matter of temper and disposition than of systematic knowledge; it is rather wisdom than science.† He particularizes Christ and the redemption as the proper object of theology, the central point to which everything else refers.‡

With Alexander of Hales agrees Bonaventura. He distinguishes the position held by natural reason and that of reason exalted by faith, to which is imparted on that very account the gift of a higher knowledge, a knowledge not grounded in its natural powers, but communicated to it by the illumination of the divine spirit. Faith elevates the soul to a point where it harmonizes with divine truths; science to the point where it understands the matter believed. On the question, therefore, whether the truths of faith are above reason, we must carefully distinguish from one another these two positions.§ The worth of faith depends on the fact, that here conviction is not determined by arguments of reason, but by love.|| In theology, the theoretical and the practical, feeling and knowing, meet and unite together.¶ The truths of faith, though, like other truths, matters of knowledge, are distinguished from others in this respect, that, by their essence, they operate on the heart or the feelings.** Such a knowledge as this—Christ died for us—moves the heart not hardened,

* Habet rationem credendorum, non tamen ei innititur, imo acquiescit ipsi veritati per testimonium primæ veritatis. Fides inspirata ad assentiendum primæ veritati sive primo vero propter seipsum.

† Hæc scientia magis est virtutis quam artis, et sapientia magis quam scientia.

‡ Theologia: scientia de substantia divina cognoscenda per Christum in opere reparationis.

§ Credibile super rationem quantum ad scientiam acquisitam per rationem evidentem, non supra rationem elevatam per fidem et per donum scientiæ et intellectus. Fides enim elevat ad assentiendum, scientia et intellectus elevat ad ea, quæ credita sunt, intelligendum.

|| Non assentit propter rationem, sed propter amorem ejus cui assentit.

¶ Cognitio et affectus.

** Fides sic est in intellectu, ut quantum est de sui ratione, nata sit movere affectum.

to love and devotion, which cannot be said of mathematical truths.

Albert the Great also pronounces theology a practical science, because it has reference to that whereby man is to be rendered capable of attaining to his ultimate end, the bliss that consists in communion with God.* It is required as a complement to human knowledge. The light of natural reason is not sufficient for the knowledge of that which is necessary in order to our salvation; we need those truths, besides, which can be known only by supernatural light.†

All these theologians proceed on the assumption that, as man is destined for a supernatural end, transcending the limits of his nature, in which end he is to find his felicity, so he needs a supernatural means; a thought which, we allow, stands closely connected with the separation they make, in anthropology, between the natural and the supernatural, as it regards man's original state (of which more hereafter). Accordingly, Thomas Aquinas endeavours to demonstrate in this way the necessity of a supernatural revelation for mankind; which necessity he deduces from the fact that the end for which man is destined lies beyond the reach of the natural creation. The speculative spirit of Thomas Aquinas, like that of Aristotle, whose opinions he here adopts, places contemplation as the highest end and good of the spirit; but then he distinguishes the contemplation of God, mediated through the knowledge of God, by the creation from that which springs from the immediate intuition of God's essence. As all creatures are endowed with the requisite powers and means for fulfilling their destination, so also is man in respect to the end corresponding to his nature, as it is in itself. This end, therefore, reason may arrive at, by the force that resides in itself; and this was the highest end known to the ancient philosophers, beyond which they could not go; but it is by faith we

* *Finis, conjungi intellectu et affectu et substantia cum eo, quod colitur, prout est finis beatificans et ideo ista scientia proprie est affectiva id est veritatis, quæ non sequestratur a ratione boni et ideo perficit et intellectum et affectum.*

† *Ex illuminatione connaturali nobis non sufficienter innotescunt, quæ ad salutem necessaria sunt. Unde omnibus aliis traditis scientiis ista tanquam omnium perfectiva necessaria est, in qua supermundana illuminatione innotescunt ea, quæ ad salutem hominis pertinent.*

first come to the knowledge of that perfect contemplation of God which constitutes the bliss to which we shall arrive in our heavenly home. Now this highest supernatural end must have a corresponding means leading to it: that man may be led to it, not by knowledge drawn from the works of creation, but by a knowledge given immediately by divine light. But aside from the consideration of the matter which is such as can become known to man only through a supernatural revelation, even in reference to the knowledge of those truths which it is possible to reach by reason, the necessity of a revelation appears; for without this, only a few men capable of philosophical cultivation, and these only by means of a long and tedious course of mental development, could arrive at such knowledge. Moreover, the knowledge would not be so certain; it would be liable to be mixed up with many errors.* By virtue of this distinction between a supernatural and a natural end of man, he rebuts the objection often urged by those who stood on neutralistic or rationalistic grounds, against the reception of a supernatural revelation, namely, that it would be placing man below all the other creatures, to suppose him the only one not provided with all the requisite powers for attaining his ultimate end. The setting aside of this objection was provided for in the statement already made, that the end of human development reaches higher than the whole creation; and hence the necessity of corresponding instrumentality.† In accordance with these premises, he goes on to remark, that "As the other sciences proceed from principles evidenced by the light of natural reason, so theology proceeds from principles made clear by the light of faith. We ought not to be surprised that those truths should be just as strange to unbelievers as the truths of natural reason would be to us, without the light of natural reason. As, in the other sciences, it is impossible to argue

* Ad ea etiam, quæ de Deo ratione humana investigari possunt, necessarium fuit hominem instrui revelatione divina, quia veritas de Deo per rationem investigata a paucis et per longum tempus et cum admixtione multorum errorum homini proveniret.

† Illud, quod acquirit bonitatem perfectam pluribus auxiliis et motibus est nobilius eo quod imperfectam bonitatem acquirit paucioribus vel per seipsum, et hoc modo se habet homo respectu aliarum creaturarum, qui factus est ad ipsius divinæ gloriæ participationem.

from those highest principles with those who are not agreed in recognizing those principles, or with those who positively deny them; so no other means are left for convincing such as do not admit the fundamental truths themselves which are given by revelation.* Accordingly, he remarks of the attempts in the proper sense to demonstrate the Trinity by natural reasons: "That the interests of faith are thereby injured in two ways; first, the dignity of faith itself is impaired; for it has respect to things invisible, things exalted above reason, Heb. xi. 1. Next, professing to demonstrate what it is impossible to demonstrate, the doctrines of faith are exposed to the ridicule of unbelievers, if the latter are so mistaken as to suppose that our faith reposes on such arguments.

As Thomas Aquinas, on the other hand, maintained that the doctrines of revelation are above reason, and, with a moderation the more to be admired, because it proceeded from a mind so acute and profoundly speculative by nature, endeavoured to fix the boundaries of rational demonstration; so, on the other hand, he stood forth the opponent of a party who held that an irreconcilable opposition existed between faith and reason. Those who affirmed this were certainly not the advocates of an abrupt supernaturalism, but rather of a pantheistic and rationalistic infidelity, which came from Spain, having originated in the school of Averrhoes; and now, under the pretext of this irreconcilable opposition between revelation and reason, between theological and philosophical truth, was endeavouring to propagate itself. Under such an opposition might be concealed a negative tendency; negative in that it afterwards bowed to the authority of the church, holding that from the church alone could be received those higher truths which contradicted natural reason. Thomas Aquinas maintained, in opposition to this tendency, that the truths of faith could not possibly contradict the fundamental axioms recognized as necessary truths by natural reason; for if they could, then since God, the author of our nature, implanted these truths in that nature, it would follow that God contradicted himself.† Besides, our minds would be hindered, by conflict-

* Quod sicut habitus principiorum primorum non acquiritur per alias scientias, sed habetur a natura, ita etiam in hac doctrina non acquiritur habitus fidei, qui est quasi habitus principiorum.

† Principiorum autem naturaliter notorum cognitio nobis divinitus est

ing ideas, from making any progress in the knowledge of truth; a condition of being such as could not possibly proceed from God. That which is natural cannot be altered, so long as nature remains the same; but contradicting convictions cannot subsist together. Therefore, it would be impossible for a conviction to be imparted to man by God, which contradicts natural knowledge. To confirm this, he cites, with a profound sense of the spirit of the passage, Rom. x. 8. That, however, which is *above* reason, is by many wrongly held to be *contradictory* to reason. From all this it follows, that the objections brought against the truths of faith can possess only a shadow of truth: they must be sophistical. And so reason, though she cannot, it is true, demonstrate the truths of faith, which are above reason, may detect and expose the shallowness of the arguments brought against them.* As grace does not destroy nature, but completes it, so natural reason must be subservient to faith; as also the natural inclinations should be subservient to Christian love.† Here he applies the passage of Scripture which speaks of the bringing of reason into captivity to the obedience of faith, 2 Cor. x. 5. We shall, indeed, fully comprehend the truths of faith only then, when we shall have attained to the intuition of the divine essence; but reason, even here below, is doubtless competent to discover many analogies serving to illustrate them.‡ True, such analogies are insufficient to make these truths incomprehensible; still it is profitable for the human mind to exercise itself in such, however feeble, attempts, provided it does so without pretending to comprehend or to demonstrate; because no higher source of enjoyment is to be found than that of being able to know even a small portion of the highest things. This should be used for the instruction and the comfort of believers, but not for

indita, cum ipse Deus sit auctor nostræ naturæ. Hæc ergo principia etiam divina sapientia continet. Quicquid igitur principiis hujusmodi contrarium est, est divinæ sapientiæ contrarium, non igitur a Deo esse potest.

* Cum enim fides infallibili veritati innitatur, impossibile autem sit, de vero demonstrari contrarium, manifestum est, probationes quæ contra fidem inducuntur, non esse demonstrationes, sed solubilia argumenta.

† Cum gratia non tollat naturam, sed perficiat, oportet, quod naturalis ratio subserviat fidei, sicut et naturalis inclinatio voluntatis obsequitur caritati.

‡ Quod ad eam potest aliquas veras similitudines colligere.

the refutations of adversaries. Although theology takes cognizance of a great variety of apparently foreign subjects, belonging to different parts of philosophy, still, in the opinion of Thomas Aquinas, its unity as a science is not at all impaired thereby; for everything in it is bound together by virtue of *one* formal relation. It treats, it is true, of God, and at the same time of the creature, though not after the same manner; but it treats everything with a like reference to God as the principle and end of all,* and everything so far as it may be contemplated, as what God has revealed. Theology, therefore, is a certain transcript of the divine knowledge; embracing within its compass all things, as God knows all things in knowing himself.† Since Thomas entertained the same views respecting the progressive stages of religious conviction and respecting the relation of faith to knowledge with the earlier scholastic theologians, he would be likely to decide as they did on the question whether theology is a *speculative* or a *practical* science; still, he expresses himself differently, though without differing from them at bottom, in the views which he entertained. All depends on the meaning which he attaches to the word *theoretical*. Its meaning is determined, in his case, by the facts that he places the bliss of the righteous in the contemplation of God, representing everything else as means to form man for this ultimate end. "Although," says he, "theology contains much that belongs partly to speculative, partly to practical philosophy, still, it is more speculative than practical, because it occupies itself far more with divine things than with human action, and treats of the latter only with reference to the end that man may be rendered capable thereby of that perfect knowledge in which consists eternal happiness."‡

Profound discussions concerning the essence of religious conviction, concerning the idea of faith, and the process of its development, we find in William of Paris. The view of faith

* Non determinat de Deo et de creaturis æquo, sed de Deo principaliter et de creaturis secundum quod referuntur ad Deum, ut ad principium vel finem.

† Ut sic sacra doctrina sic velut quædam impressio divinæ scientiæ, quæ est una simplex omnium.

‡ Quia principaliter agit de rebus divinis, quam de actibus humanis, de quibus agit, secundum quod per eos ordinatur homo ad perfectam Dei cognitionem, in qua æterna beatitudo consistit.

common to all these theologians, that it is a determination of the "intellect," proceeding from the heart, or disposition, is explicated by him in an original and lively manner. He distinguishes *that* conviction which proceeds from objective truth through the medium of demonstration and thought, where the matter itself is so constituted as necessarily to produce acquiescence of the mind, and *that* conviction which proceeds from the subjective temper of the heart, the bent of the will, which determines man to adopt, among his convictions, even that which, in itself, may not appear credible to the natural "intellect."* Hence faith is to be denominated a virtue,—the force of a temper exercising its power over the "intellect," enabling reason to overcome the darkness pressing in upon it from without, to overcome the reaction of doubt, and shedding its own light upon that which, in itself, would appear dark, so that it becomes light and clear to the mind.† If the entire human soul is to be received into glory, and the necessary medium for its glorification in that life is grace in this, and the intellect is to share in the same glory with the other powers, then the intellect must first be clothed upon with grace in the present life, and this is the work of faith. If the human soul ought to be governed by religion, and nothing foreign from religion ought to abide in it, then the eye of the soul itself, the "intellect," should be governed by religion; but faith is, of necessity, the whole religion of the "intellect," or the first thing in it. Furthermore, man is bound to deny himself, and submit to God, as well with the bent of the "intellect" as of the "affections." But on the part of the "intellect," this act is none other than that which is denoted by the term "faith." This theologian, therefore, reckons to the essence of faith the conflict with self, and considers self-denial as the negative moment in the act by which reason submits to God. Faith, according to him, can only arise and assert itself in contest with the reactions of natural reason,

* Aliud est credere ex probabilitate sive ex evidentia ipsius crediti, aliud ex virtute credentis. De fide, c. i.

† Manifestum, quod credere improbabilia fortitudinis est atque vigoris nostri intellectus, sicut amare molesta et ignominiosa fortitudinis est et vigoris nostri affectus. Fortitudo intellectus, quæ tenebras improbabilitatis irrumpat et vincat et luminositate propria ea, quæ illa abscondere contendit lucida et aperta, hoc est credita faciat.

which will not let man receive that which does not harmonize with itself. Conflict and warfare belong to the essence of faith.* Faith is strong in proportion as conviction proceeds from its own inward energy, and requires no other supports, such as arguments of reason or miracles, which are merely crutches to uphold the weak in faith. More sublime, more noble and certain, is that knowledge which proceeds from a virtue than that which proceeds from a science; because virtue is something more inward, more deep-rooted in the very essence of the mind itself.† As religious faith is a light flowing directly from the very fountain of light, so it is a higher thing than the light, which comes through the medium and reflection of something else, as in science and in every other sort of conviction.‡ This faith (living faith) is not merely a light, by which the matter believed is revealed, but also a life which impels to the doing of that which is believed, and to the eschewing of the contrary.§ It is a life-giving ray from the fountain-source of life,—a part of that life itself which is denominated the life of faith, descending on the intellect, that head of the human soul, for the purpose of quickening, establishing, and arming it. Dead faith, if faith it may be called, he compares with those motions or spasmodic contractions, resembling life, which may sometimes be observed in the limbs of animals that are dead.||

It is evident from what has already been said concerning

* *De operationibus intellectus solum credere bellum habet, omne bellum bellica virtute seu fortitudine agendum est. Virtus, or fortitudo intellectus, manifests itself in faith. It is evident how intimately connected with his views of the nature of faith were the remarks with which this bishop endeavoured to comfort a clergyman (see Vol. VII. p. 453) who was troubled with doubts.*

† *Propter hoc virtus est certior quam ars, quia intimior et hoc utroque modo, quia magis profundans in nos, magis enim penetrat mentem et inficit virtus quam ars, et a profundioribus rerum ipsarum (that which is the most profound in the things themselves) est.*

‡ *Cum ipsa descendat a primo lumine, nobilior est atque sublimior, quam scientiæ vel credulitates, quæ a rebus per reflexionem illuminationis, quam a lumine primo recipiunt, ad intellectum nostrum accedunt.*

§ *Non solum modo lumen ad ostendendum credita, sed etiam vita, ad movendum ad illa facienda vel declinanda.*

|| *Sic et mortuo intellectu per extinctionem fide aliqui similes motus inveniuntur, non autem motus perfecti, ut ambulatio, quæ non invenitur in animali mortuo, neque volatus.*

the scientific bent of Roger Bacon, that *he* could not tolerate any schism between faith and knowledge, but would look upon Christianity,—which, in his view, should appropriate to itself all that is true in that earlier, preparatory evolution, the philosophy of antiquity,—would look upon this as the perfection of science. “All truth,” he says, “springs from the same source, from the divine light which, according to the gospel of St. John, enlightens every man that cometh into the world. Human reason is only a capacity to be filled, and knowledge can be imparted to it only by *that* reason which alone is reason *in actu*.”* He adduces the testimony of Augustin, that men know whatever they know of truth only in the eternal truth and the eternal laws.† Now, as God enlightened the souls of the philosophers in the knowledge of certain truths, so their labours are not foreign and aside from the divine wisdom.‡ The *practical* is what Bacon contemplates as the *ultimate* end to which all else must be subservient. The will or practical reason is something higher than the speculative reason; virtue and bliss are infinitely superior to mere knowledge, and far more necessary for us.§ Hence speculative philosophy stands, to moral philosophy, in the relation of a means to an end; and its end is, to prepare principles for the latter. But that which unbelievers consider as moral philosophy is, with Christian philosophers, in the proper and complete sense, theology. Philosophy respects that which is common to all things and sciences; hence it determines the number of the sciences, and the peculiar province of each; it must therefore, by the consciousness of its own inadequacy to reach the knowledge of those things which

* The distinction between the intellectus agens, *ινεργεία, ποιητικός*, and the intellectus possibilis, *δυνάμει, παθητικός*, according to Aristotle. Roger Bacon contends against that view according to which only two different spheres are thereby denoted in the human soul itself, as Aristotle certainly affirms in his work on the soul, iii. 5. See Trendelenburg on this place. He supposes, on the contrary, that, under the intellectus agens must be conceived an intellectus different from the human soul, *influens et illuminans possibilem intellectum ad cognitionem veritatis*.

† Quod non cognoscimus aliquam veritatem nisi in veritate increata et in regulis æternis.

‡ Opus majus, p. ii. c. v

§ Voluntas seu intellectus practicus nobilior quam speculativus et virtus cum felicitate excelsit in infinitum scientiam nudam et nobis est magis necessaria sine comparatione. P. iii. f. 47.

it is most necessary for man to know, come to see that there must be a science exalted above philosophy, whose peculiar nature it describes generally, though it cannot set forth its particular contents.* This higher science is the science that treats of divine things; and it can proceed only from Christianity.

Roger Bacon distinguishes this province of philosophy, perfected by Christianity, from the province of theology which concerns itself with the exposition of the truths of faith communicated by revelation. This Christian philosophy stands, according to him, in the same relation to theology in which speculative philosophy, in the ante-Christian times, stood to moral philosophy.† It adopts that which is true from the earlier speculation, and with it unites those truths, to the consciousness of which reason first attained under the light of Christianity by virtue of the impulse given to it by the same, but to the recognition of which reason may now be led of itself, though it was not competent to discover them of itself. Thus will this Christian philosophy lead to faith, while it takes nothing from the articles of faith, for the purposes of proof, but employs many common truths of reason, which any wise man would easily recognize when presented before him by another, although he would never have come to the knowledge of them if left to himself.‡ And this it must do, not only in order to the completion of philosophy, but also on account of the Christian consciousness, whose office it is to

* Quod oportet esse aliam scientiam ultra philosophiam, cujus proprietates tangit in universali, licet in particulari non possit eam assignare.

† Speculatio Christianorum præcedens legem suam debet super speculationem alterius legis addere ea, quæ valent ad legem Christi docendam et probandam, ut surgat una speculatio completa, cujus initium erit speculativa philosophorum infidelium et complementum ejus superinductum theologiæ et secundum proprietatem legis Christianæ.

‡ Philosophi infideles multa ignorant in particulari de divinis, quæ si proponerentur iis, ut probarentur per principia philosophiæ completæ, hoc est per vivacitates rationis, quæ sumunt originem a philosophia infidelium, licet complementum a fide Christi, reciperent sine contradictione, et gaudent de proposita sibi veritate, quia avidi sunt et magis studiosi quam Christiani. Also, from what is here said, we may perceive, as well as from what we have earlier remarked, that Roger Bacon must have agreed with Raymund Lull in his view of the relation of science to missions.

conduct all truth up to divine truth, so that the one may be subjected and rendered subservient to the other.*

Roger Bacon did not otherwise depart, however, in his general mode of apprehending the idea of that which properly constitutes faith, from the theologians of this century. He, too, made reason (*ratio*) proceed from the faith (*fides*) that had grown out of another process of development; though Christian philosophy, which is indebted to faith alone for its existence, may, as he supposes, be to others a preparation for faith, in order to which, however, still more than itself is required. "A great joy," says he, "we may gain for our faith, when philosophers, who follow only the decisions of reason, agree with us, and so confirm the confessions of the Christian faith; not that we are to seek after rational grounds before faith, but only after it; so that, made sure by a double confirmation, we praise God for our salvation, which we can hold fast without wavering."†

In Raymund Lull we have seen already, when contemplating his missionary labours, the zealous opponent of the doctrine, which affirmed the existence of a necessary schism between faith and knowledge. Glowing love to God imparted life to his intellect; but that love would tolerate nothing foreign beside it. It absorbed every power of the soul into itself. God, of whom he was certain, as the object of his enthusiastic love, he was desirous of having also as an object of knowledge; with the collected energy of all its powers would his great mind soar upward to him. The longing of his love aspired beyond the limits of this earthly existence, and would antedate the intuition of the internal life. "Elevate thy knowledge," says he, † "and thy love will be elevated. Heaven is not so lofty as the love of a holy man. The more thou wilt labour to rise upward, the more shalt thou rise upward."§ In a tract finished at Montpellier, in the year 1304, "On the agreement between faith and knowledge," he relates the following story,

* Propter conscientiam Christianam, quæ habet omnem veritatem ducere ad divinam, ut ei subjiçiat et famuletur. Opus majus, f. 41, seqq.

† L. c. f. 160.

‡ In the first part of his tract De centum nominibus Dei, Opp. T. VI.

§ Eleva tuum intelligere et elevabis tuum amare. Cælum non est tam altum, sicut amare sancti hominis. Quo magis laborabis ad ascendendum, eo magis ascendes.

to show what an obstacle the pretended opposition between faith and knowledge was to the spread of Christianity. Miranmolin, a certain king of Tunis, well skilled in logic and natural science, once had a dispute with a monk who, with several others, visited his country for the purpose of establishing a mission in it. This monk was well versed in morals and history, and also in the Arabic language; but he had little knowledge of logic and natural science. On the score of morals the monk showed, conclusively, that Mohanmed's doctrines were false; whereupon the prince declared that he was ready to become a Christian if the monk could prove to him the truth of the Christian doctrine. Said the latter, "The Christian doctrine is too exalted to be proved by argument: believe only, and thou shalt be saved." To this the king replied, "That is but a positive thing; in that way, I should be unwilling to exchange my own faith for another."* He was now neither Christian, Saracen, nor Jew,—and he expelled those missionaries from his kingdom.† Raymund distinguishes different degrees of the *credere* and the *intelligere*; consequently, also, different ways and manners in which one conditions the other, and in which the *intelligere* depends on the *credere* as its necessary presupposition: hence, the different sense which he gives to the commonly received proposition, "If thou believest not, thou canst not understand." In the first place, the mind cannot have an understanding of the truths of faith so long as it is thoroughly prejudiced against them; and, assuming that they involve impossibilities, will not cease from its repugnance to them. The first step in order to arrive at a certain understanding, and to attain from this point to faith, is to get free from that prejudice of hostility to the truth,—to suppose or presume for the present, that the object-matter of faith is not impossible, so that the way may be open for inquiry.‡ The mind being essentially

* De convenientia fidei et intellectus in objecto, T. III.

† Raymund heard this from the mouth of the man himself. "Et ego vidi fratrem cum suis sociis et sum locutus cum ipsis."

‡ In quantum intellectus supponit in principio, quando inquit, possibile esse, habet modum inquirendi veritatem, quam supponit, et si per credulitatem affirmat, in Deo non esse trinitatem, non potest ulterius progredi, quia non habet modum inquirendi. Vide the tract De anima rationali, p. xi. opp. T. VI. f. 51.

the same in unbelievers and believers, the former must be capable of convincing themselves of the truths of faith, if only they are so disposed; but investigation is impossible, unless it be assumed that a thing is either true or false.* Such is the action and reaction between truth and falsehood, that one is proved or destroyed with the other. He starts the query,† whether God is more an object of faith than of knowledge,‡ which he answers in the negative; and whether exaltation of knowledge is the diminution of faith,§ which, also, he answers in the negative. Knowledge and faith harmonize together, because both are acts of the mind, and the higher the mind rises in the knowledge of God, the higher it rises also in faith, and the converse.|| If it were not to be presumed that man may attain in the present life to the knowledge of the divine Trinity, of the incarnation of God, and of the other articles of faith, lest he might lose the merit of faith; then it would follow that the ultimate end of man's creation is, that he may attain to great merit and great glory, and not that God may be greatly known and loved by man; that the end, therefore, is, rather that men may be glorified than that God may be known and loved. He treats of the same subject in a disputation which he held with an anchoret on some doubtful questions in the Sentences of Peter Lombard.¶ He relates that while he was studying at Paris, looking at the wretched condition of the world, he was deeply pained; and particularly when he found that, by means of the *Ars generalis*, given him for the purpose of enlightening the darkness of this world, he had not succeeded as yet in advancing the interests of Christ's church as he wished to do. Full of these painful thoughts, he once left the city, and wandered away alone by the banks of the Seine, reflecting within himself how the evil could be remedied. There he found an anchoret, resting under the shade of a tree; one, who, after having long pursued his

* De contemplatione Dei, Vol. II. Lib. III. Distinct. 29, c. lxxiii. T. IX. f. 409. † T. IV. Quæstio 201.

‡ Magis credibilis quam intelligibilis.

§ Qu. 202: Utrum exaltatio cognitionis intellectus sit diminutio fidei.

|| Ita credere et scire habent concordantiam secundum suos actus et habitus et secundum suas potentias.

¶ Disputatio eremitæ et Raymundi super aliquibus dubiis quæstionibus sententiarum Petri Lombardi.

studies at Paris, had retired to this spot for the purpose of searching after the truth. This solitary proposed to him many doubts relative to the work on the Sentences, which he, with the help of the principles of his *Ars generalis*, promised to resolve.* Among these, was the question, whether theology is properly a science. He distinguishes, for the purpose of satisfactorily answering this question, what belongs to a thing, as to its essence and idea, and what takes place only under certain circumstances and relations.† To the mind (*intellectus*) belongs, in the former sense, only the *intelligere*; in the other sense, faith. Only when the mind is prevented, by certain hindrances, from rising to knowledge, faith takes its place, so that the mind by this means may lay hold of the truth.‡ As in the absence of an object of sensuous perception, the image of it in the fancy takes its place, so when the thinking mind is hindered from gaining a knowledge of the doctrines of faith by the necessary principles of truth,—as in the case of day labourers, women, peasants, and others, who can only hold fast to what is taught them,—the truth presents itself to the mind only in the form of faith.§ But theology is in the proper sense a science, because *intelligere* belongs in the proper sense to the essence of the “intellect,” still more than *to warm* belongs to the essence of fire; *to see* to the essence of the eye. As God is, in the highest sense, good and great, he communicates himself to the created intellect in proportion to its capacity of receiving into itself his image and perfections. If it belongs to the very essence of mind that it should know those objects, for knowing which it properly was not created, how much more should its essence be directed to the end of knowing the highest objects for which it was pre-eminently created? Raymund holds that the end for which mind was created is, to refer itself with all its powers to God: it were impossible, therefore, that any power of the mind should be able to appro-

* He says, *Ars generalis, quam mihi Deus ostendit in quodam monte.*

† *Proprie and appropriate.*

‡ *Credere est illi appropriatum, per supremum objectum, ut per fidem possit attingere illam veritatem, quam demonstrative non potest attingere propter aliquod impedimentum, quod habet ratione subjecti, aut materiale.*

§ *Restauratur veritas articulorum in credulitate intellectus, qui ipsam credit.*

prate to itself other objects than those highest, for which the mind, as to its essence, was created.* He brings up the possible objections to this position: for example, that it would follow from it that man's finite mind may comprehend the infinite. "This," says he, "would by no means follow. If we tasted a drop of sea-water, we should infer at once, from its saltness, that the water of the sea generally is salt; still, we should know this better, if we could taste *all* the water of the sea." So he supposes that the human mind, though, as he acknowledges himself, the comparison is not altogether apposite,† attains to a knowledge of the Trinity that is sufficient for it; but can attain to nothing beyond this. Such knowledge is, beyond all comparison, less in relation to the whole than the drop in relation to the sea.‡ How far he was from believing it possible to obtain an absolute knowledge of the being of God, is evident from the fact, that he supposes one great end of the striving after such a knowledge to be, that the mind might become conscious of its own limit.§ The more it strives, the more it learns to adore the incomprehensible glory of the divine essence.|| He was the less capable of admitting the possibility of an absolute knowledge of the essence of God, because he did not admit the possibility of such a knowledge even with regard to the essence of the soul itself. After having pointed out four respects in which a knowledge of the soul is possible to man, he names a fifth, in which it cannot be

* Aliud objectum illi minus principale esset illi magis appetibile, quam suum objectum magis principale, quod esset impossibile, et idem esset suo modo de voluntate, cui theologia non esset proprium objectum ad amandum et sic de memoria ad recolendum, quod est valde inconueniens.

† Licet exemplum sit grossum, cum de Deo et creatura non possimus æqualiter exemplificare.

‡ Sicut (et multo minus sine aliqua comparatione) tuus gustus non comprehendit totam aquam maris.

§ Words to God: Secunda intentio, quare tuus subditus inquitur habere cognitionem de tua honorata essentia est, ut possit captivare et terminare virtutes suæ animæ in inquisitione, quam faciet, quia intrat in inquisitionem, in qua deficiet sua cognitio et omnes suæ virtutes.

|| Quo plus anima deficit in attingendo et sciendo esse tuæ essentiæ, eo plus cognoscit excellentiam ipsius, quæ est adeo magna et adeo nobilis, quod nulla anima possit sufficere ad percipiendum et attingendum totam ipsam.

an object of human knowledge, namely the soul considered as to its intrinsic essence.*

Raymund composed a tract on the Strife between faith and the understanding. † The understanding says to faith: "You are the preparatory step by which I arrive at the right state of mind, in order to rise to the contemplation of the highest things." The "habit" of faith passes over to the understanding, ‡ and thus faith is in the understanding and the understanding in faith. While the understanding is rising by knowledge to that stage where faith already stands, faith, by believing, rises from this point to a still higher stage above the understanding. § The understanding says to faith: "As oil swims on the water, so thy place is always above mine; and the reason is, because it is thy nature to ascend, and it costs thee no labour; while I must toil incessantly, that, by knowing, I may mount a little higher." So the buoyancy of faith sets it constantly above the efforts of thought. In his principal work (*De Contemplatione*), || "On the harmony and opposition between faith and rational knowledge," ¶ he says, "Faith *stands* in lofty things, and chooses never to descend to rational grounds; while reason *soars upward* to lofty things, which she then brings down to understanding and knowledge. When faith stands in lofty things and reason soars up to her, then both are in harmony, because faith gives elevation to reason, and reason is energized and ennobled by the lofty aspiring of faith, so as to attempt to master by knowledge what faith has already reached by believing; and if reason cannot ascend to those heights which faith has attained, yet the more reason elevates itself, and puts

* Si postea inquirat, quid sit essentia animæ in se ipsa, deficit suus intellectus et sua perceptio et non potest ultra progredi per cognitionem, imo retrocedit per ignorantiam, quo plus vult inquirere istam quintam rem, quam homo non potest cognoscere in præsentī vita in rebus spiritualibus. De contemplatione in Deum, Lib. III. c. clxxvi. T. IX. f. 420.

† Disputatio fidei et intellectus, finished at Montpellier in October of the year 1303.

‡ Quod tu fides sis dispositio et præparatio, per quam ego de Deo sum dispositus ad altas res, nam in hoc quod ego per te suppono credendo, per quod possum ascendere, habituo me de te et sic tu es in me et ego in te.

§ Quando ascendo in gradum, in quo tu es, intelligendo, tu ascendis credendo in altiore gradum supra me. || Distinct. 28, c. clvi. f. 354.

¶ Concordantiæ et contrarietates inter fidem et rationem.

forth its efforts, to know those exalted things, the higher does faith mount upward. Hence, reason and faith mount upwards by help of each other ; hence, there is harmony and good-will between them, and they mutually strengthen each other. As it is the nature and property of fire to ascend higher than the other elements, so it is the nature of faith to soar higher than reason, because the activity of reason in man is compounded of sense and intellect, but the activity of faith is not a compound, but a simple thing ; it dwells above the loftiest summits of the known intelligible.* No real opposition can exist between faith and reason. Nothing false, nothing concerning which reason might show that it contradicts our ideas of divine perfection, can be an object of faith. Faith calls forth reason from potential to actual existence;† when faith, in conformity to reason, embraces the law of religion with love, and reason calls forth faith from potential to actual existence, by proving that man is bound in reason to believe those articles which by reason alone he could never come to the knowledge of. While reason confines the understanding within the limits prescribed to it by nature, because she has no means of extending them further, true faith gives freedom and largeness to the understanding, because she does not allow it to be confined to the limits within which reason has inclosed it."‡ Raymond distinguishes § potential faith, actual faith, and a third kind, which, as it proceeds from the potential and the actual, stands midway between the two. Actual faith and reason cannot be together at once in relation to the same object ; rational knowledge cannot gain entrance into the soul unless it has been evacuated and filled with knowledge by faith. || Although reason does not employ itself on the objects

* *Fides habet naturam ascendendi altius quam ratio, quia operatio rationis in homine est composita ex sensualitate et intellectualitate, sed operatio fidei non est composita, imo est res simplex et stans super extremitates intellectualitatum intellectarum.*

† *Facit venire rationem de potentia in actum.*

‡ *Sicut ratio captivat et incarcerat intellectum hominis intra terminos, intra quos est terminatus, quia non habet, cum quo eos possit ampliare et extendere, ita vera fides liberat et magnificat ipsum intellectum, quia non constringit eum intra terminos, intra quos ratio habet eum terminatum.*

§ *T. X. Distinct. 36, c. cexxxviii.*

|| *Non potest in animum intrare ratio, nisi evacuando eam fide et implendo scientia et cognitione.*

of faith when it reflects on other things, yet faith, in the third sense, still abides in the soul.* In the present life, faith must take the place of reason, because the latter, through defect arising from the body, cannot always be active; it will be otherwise in the life eternal, when reason will be wholly glorified in union with the divine essence.† False faith may acquire great power by custom and education, so that every faculty of the soul may be under its sway; but, by the force of necessary rational grounds,‡ this false faith, that has become a man's nature, may be banished from the soul, for reason possesses more power over the soul of man than custom and education.

Having thus presented the characteristic features of the general directions and tendencies of the theological spirit, we now proceed to the exposition of the several parts in detail; and first, to the doctrine concerning God, where Anselm of Canterbury is to be mentioned as the author of the ontological proof of the existence of God. As we have already remarked, generally, in speaking of him, we must, in order to understand and appreciate him rightly, carefully distinguish the ideas lying at bottom, and closely cohering with his whole philosophico-theological bent,—from the syllogistic form, under which all that sprang out of these ideas was digested and unfolded. We find already, in Augustin, those fundamental ideas which Anselm has unfolded in his work *De veritate*, and in his *Monologium*. As a defender of realism in opposition to nominalism, Anselm stood up for a higher objectivity and necessity in human thought, which he derives from the relation existing at bottom between the human spirit and the Supreme Spirit, from whom all truth proceeds. “The creaturely mind can create nothing, but only perceive that which is communicated to it by the revelation of the Supreme Mind.§

* Remanet et non privatur suo esse.

† Cap. cccxxxix: Quia anima non potest habere suas virtutes in actu, dum est in corpore sine adiutorio ipsius, propterea fides est in homine per hoc, quod ratio per defectum corporis non possit esse semper in actu, sed non erit in alio sæculo, quia impossibile erit, in eo esse fidem tam actualiter quam potentialiter, quod ratio semper erit actualiter et nunquam privabitur actualitate, imo continuo et infinite glorificabitur in tua essentia divina.

‡ Propinquiorem potentiaë rationali.

§ Lux illa, de qua micat omne verum, quod rationali menti lucet. Monolog. c. xiv.

Whatever is true and good leads upward to the primal Source of all that is true and good, whose revelation all truth and goodness is. All truth presupposes an unchangeable, necessary Being, without which there would be no truth. Without God, no truth; truth in thought presupposes truth of being.* As all other knowing and thinking presupposes the idea of God, so this idea in the human mind carries the evidence of its reality in itself. As everything else testifies of it and presupposes it, it can itself be derived from no other source than from an original revelation to the human spirit from the spirit to whom it corresponds.† The idea of God is, therefore, a necessary and undeniable one; the denial of it involves a self-contradiction. The fool may, indeed, say within himself, There is no God, but he cannot actually think there is no God (Ps. liii. 1). It is one thing to repeat over the words to one's self,—to present the thought so far as the form, the mere signs, are concerned; but it is quite another to take up the contents of the thought into one's consciousness, which is actual thought. As it is impossible that fire should really be thought water, so it is impossible that God should really be denied by thought." ‡

We must distinguish the idea of the absolute and the idea of the living God, that which is undeniable to the thinking reason and that which is so to the religious consciousness; but Anselm, having blended and confounded together the logical and religious elements, holds them inseparably united. The idea of the absolute, undeniable to the thinking reason, is with him transformed at once into the idea of the living God,

* *Omnes de veritate significationis loquuntur, veritatem vero, quæ est in rerum essentia, pauci considerant. De veritate, c. ix. Cum veritas, quæ est in rerum existentia, sit effectus summæ veritatis, ipsa quoque causa est veritatis, quæ cognitionis est, et ejus, quæ est in propositione.*

† *An non invenit anima Deum, quem invenit esse lucem et veritatem? Quomodo namque intellexit hoc, nisi videndo lucem et veritatem? Aut potuit omnino aliquid intelligere de te, nisi per lucem tuam et veritatem tuam? Proslodium, c. xiv.*

‡ *Aliter cogitatur res, cum vox eam significans cogitatur, aliter cum id ipsum, quod est res, intelligitur. Illo itaque modo potest cogitari Deus non esse, isto vero minime. Nullus quippe intelligens id quod est ignis et aqua, potest cogitare ignem esse aquam secundum rem, licet cõhpossit secundum voces. Ita igitur nemo intelligens id quod Deus est, potest cogitare quia Deus non est, licet hæc verba dicat in corde, aut eine ulla aut cum aliqua extranea significatione. Proslog. c. iv.*

undeniable to the religious consciousness. The *logical* necessity grounded in the laws of human thought, and the *real* necessity grounded in the essence,—the totality of human nature, with him, coalesce together. Again, after he had recognized the necessity, thus grounded in the essence of the mind, of presupposing the existence of God, he should for that very reason have been deterred from any attempt to prove it in the same manner as he would prove anything else. He should have been satisfied to lead back the mind into itself, into the depths of its own proper essence, in order that it might become conscious to itself of this necessity. But Anselm, who imagined that he was bound to prove, in strict syllogistic form, whatever presented itself to him as necessary truth, now seeks, from this position as a starting-point, to make out an argument by which the existence of God, and everything it is necessary to know respecting the divine attributes, should be demonstrated by one brief and summary process.* This thought did not allow him any rest, day or night; it disturbed, which grievously annoyed him, his hours of devotion. He had already begun, therefore, to look upon it as a temptation from Satan, and strove to banish the idea from his mind; but the more he strove against it the more closely it pursued him, so that he could not keep it away at all; till one night, while he was observing his vigils, the light suddenly burst upon his soul like a flash, and he was enraptured with the thought that he had discovered the long-sought argument. Thus arose his ontological proof at first, in the following form:—"God is the most perfect of beings, than whom nothing higher can be conceived; but that which has actual existence is something higher than that which is barely conceived; therefore, from the idea of such a highest being, follows also his existence. Else, he would not be that which the idea asserts: it would, in fact, be possible to conceive of something higher—namely, the most perfect essence as existing;"† a form of proof which, as such, is certainly chargeable

* Eadmer de vita Anselmi: Incidit sibi in mentem, investigare, utrum uno solo et brevi argumento probari posset, id quod de Deo creditur et prædicatur.

† Anselm, in his *Proslogium*: Convincitur insipiens, esse vel in intellectu aliquid, quo nihil majus cogitari potest, quia hoc, cum audit, intelligit, et quicquid in intelligitur, intellectu est, et certe id, quo majus

with the fallacy of a *petitio principii*. It is one in which things differing in kind—the *conception*, complete in all its characters; and *existence*, which does not belong among these characters—are confounded together. Nevertheless, faulty as this form of proof was, in a formal point of view, still, at the bottom of it lay this truth: that to the creaturely reason it is necessary to recognize an absolute being, to which it must feel bound to subject itself; just as we find it expressed in the following words of one of his prayers,—words which evidence how intimately the religious and philosophical elements were blended together in his case:—“Thou art so truthful, O Lord, my God! that non-existence cannot even be conceived of thee; and with good reason, for if any spirit could conceive anything better than thyself, the creature might rise superior to the Creator, and pass judgment on him.”

The monk Gaunilo* stood forth as Anselm's opponent; and he succeeded in detecting the fallacy in the form of the argument: “It was as if one should describe the magnificence of a lost island, and then, from the fact that I was able to conceive of such an island, infer its existence.” We must admit, however, there is a difference between the case of some contingent thing, and that of the idea of the absolute. For the rest, even Gaunilo, who distinguished himself by the dignified tone of his polemics, felt—although he did not dwell upon it—that it was necessary to distinguish, in Anselm's case, between what existed in the depths of his own immediate religious consciousness, and what he set forth in the syllogistic form. It was necessary to acknowledge that Anselm was right at bottom, and in his design, but failed only in the *form* of his argument.† Anselm defended the form of his argument against Gaunilo, in his *Liber apologeticus*. The comparison of the idea of the absolute with the image of a lost island, he could not look upon as of any force. “If that could be predicated,” says he, “of such a lost island,—which holds good

cogitari nequit, non potest esse in intellectu solo. Si enim vel in solo intellectu est, potest cogitari esse et in re, quod majus est. Si ergo id, quo majus cogitari non potest, est in solo intellectu, id ipsum, quo majus cogitari non potest, est, quo majus cogitari potest, sed certe hoc esse non potest.

* In his *Liber pro insipiente*.

† His words: Cætera libelli illius, pii ac sancti affectus intimo quodam odore fragrantia, ut nullo modo propter illa, quæ in initiis recte quidem sensa, sed minus firmiter argumentata sunt, ista sint contemnenda.

of the idea of the absolute alone, namely, that it is that than which nothing greater can be conceived,—then, beyond a doubt, existence would be implied in the conception.”*

The scholastics of the thirteenth century understood very well how to separate the false from the true in Anselm's argumentation. Alexander of Hales distinguishes, in the first place, two kinds of knowledge; knowledge in act, and knowledge in habit (*cognitio in actu et in habitu*), an idea fully unfolded in consciousness, and an idea lying at the bottom, in consciousness, as an undeveloped germ. It is in the latter, and not in the former way, that the idea of God is always present in the human mind. It is something original and undeniable to the human spirit,—that which meets and answers to the original revelation of the highest truth to the human mind.† While he supposes such a *habitus naturaliter impressus primæ veritatis* in the human mind, he presupposes also an original correlation, at bottom, of the human mind to this *prima veritas*,—an original connection between the human spirit and the Supreme, absolute Spirit. “Yet,” he remarks, “it does not follow from this fundamental relation that all men become conscious to themselves of the idea of God, and that it meets with recognition from them as an actual reality; for with regard to this knowledge in fact (*cognitio in actu*), we must distinguish two separate tendencies of the soul, according as either the higher faculty of reason is developed and active in it,—and it is directed upon that original revelation of God, hence perceives it, since the mind cannot avoid being conscious of that which is the principle of its own essence, or the lower powers only are active, as in the case of the soul that surrenders itself to earthly things when the consciousness of God is repressed in it by this predominantly worldly tendency,—and so, the fool may deny the existence of God.”‡ Again, he distinguishes, in

* *Fidens loquor, quia si quis invenerit mihi aliquid aut reipsa aut sola cogitatione existens, præter quod majus cogitari non possit, cui aptare valeat connexionem hujus meæ cogitationis, inveniam et dabo illi perditam insulam amplius non perdendam.*

† *Cognitio de Deo in habitu naturaliter nobis impressa, habitus naturaliter nobis impressus primæ veritatis in intellectu, quo potest convincere, ipsum esse et non potest ipsum ignorari ab anima rationali.*

‡ *Cognitio in actu duplex est, una est, cum movetur anima secundum partem superiorem rationis et habitum similitudinis primæ veritatis*

relation to knowledge, a common and a particular reason (*ratio communis* and a *ratio propria*),—the idea as a universal, and its particular application. So he recognizes also, in the worship of God, the idea of God, in its universal essence, lying at the ground; some error only in its application.

Thomas Aquinas says: "The knowledge of God is, in a certain general and confused way, implanted in all,* in that man is so created that he can find his happiness only in God, and the craving after happiness resides by nature in all men; yet, although the longing after the highest good can find its satisfaction only in God, many do not attain to this consciousness." He does not admit the validity of Anselm's argument from the idea to the reality.†

We see, in the history of the world, fundamental tendencies, in their incipient stages, announcing their presence by various signs,—seeking to start forth, and continually repressed again, by mightier forces ere they can succeed to push their way through, and assert themselves in opposition to these forces. Thus Christian theism, which, in the first centuries, had come off victorious in the contest with absolute dualism, had now to enter into another contest with absolute monism or pantheism. This latter theory might seek to fasten itself on Christianity at that point where it stands forth in antagonism to abstract deism and absolute dualism. Thus we discerned such an appearance already in the system of John Scotus Erigena; this century, however, was too little prepared as yet for such a speculative direction of thought, either to adopt or to understand it. It passed away at this time,

superiori parti rationis impressum eo modo, quo recolit suum principium per hoc quod videt se non esse a se et hoc etiam modo non potest ignorare, Deum esse in ratione sui principii, alia est, cum movetur anima secundum partem inferiorem rationis, quæ est ad contemplandas creaturas, et hoc modo potest ignorare, esse Deum, si per peccatum et errorem aversa a Deo obtenebratur eo modo, quo dicit Apostolus R. I. cum Deum cognovissent, non sicut Deum glorificaverunt, sed evanuerunt in cogitationibus suis, etc.

* Cognoscere Deum esse in aliquo communi sub quadam confusione est nobis naturaliter insertum.

† Dato etiam, quod quilibet intelligat, hoc nomine Deus significari id quod dicitur, scilicet illud, quo majus cogitari non potest, non tamen propter hoc sequitur, quod intelligat, id, quod significatur per nomen, esse in rerum natura, sed in apprehensione intellectus tantum.

without leaving a vestige behind. But the speculative spirit, that went over from the twelfth to the thirteenth century, had prepared the way for it, so that the work in which John Scotus had unfolded his system could acquire an influence in the thirteenth century which it was unable to exercise at the time of its first appearance. This influence was promoted by the theology of the pseudo-Dionysian writings (which were themselves among the elements whence the system of Scotus had sprung), by the writings of the new Platonicians and of the Arabian philosophers,* circulated in Latin translations, and particularly by the work *De causis*, translated from the Arabic, and circulated under the name of Aristotle,—a work which was much studied, and which acquired great authority over the minds of men in the thirteenth century.†

The production contains throughout the principles of the neo-Platonic monism, as the same was reduced to form and systematic coherence by Plotinus,—the doctrine of the absolute as the superexistent, from which issues forth the whole developing process of being, proceeding by regular gradations, the idea of creation transformed into the doctrine of a process of evolution grounded in imminent necessity.‡ Thomas Aquinas, who composed a commentary on this work, seeks to explain

* The great influence of this school has been noticed in the excellent work of Dr. Schmölders, already referred to, *Essai sur les écoles philosophiques chez les Arabes*, Paris, 1848.

† Jourdain, in the work already referred to: *Recherches critiques*, etc., p. 212, first directed attention to this source, and to the great influence of this book in the thirteenth century; though he goes to an extreme in undervaluing the undeniable influences of Scotus. Albertus Magnus took pains to expound the doctrines of this book, in his *Liber secundus de terminatione causarum primariarum*, Tractatus i., in his opp. ed. Ludg. 1651, T. V. f. 563. He ascribes the book to a certain Jew, David, who had combined Aristotelian doctrines with those of the Arabian philosopher. Thomas Aquinas, who wrote a commentary on this book (in the edition of his works, Paris, 1660, T. IV., where may be found printed also the book itself), rightly perceived that the work contained neo-Platonic, rather than Aristotelian doctrines, and held it to be a translation of some writing of Proclus.

‡ Of the highest principle, it is said that it is called spirit, indeed being the cause of spirit; but that in reality it is something far higher, and in general, nothing determinate could be predicated of it: *Non cadunt super primam causam meditatio neque sensus neque intelligentia et ipsa quidem non signatur, nisi a causa secunda, quæ est intelligentia, et non nominatur nisi per nomen causati sui primi, verumtamen per modum sublimiorem.* Opp. Thomæ, cit. T. IV. f. 481.

its propositions, which refused to accommodate themselves to his Christian theism, by presenting them under a mitigated form.* He himself did not escape wholly untouched by the influence of the ideas set forth in this tract; for, indeed, the rigid consistency of speculation conducted even him to a one-sided monism. While, then, this predominating tendency in the speculative theology of the thirteenth century was still held in check by the stronger force of the Christian principle,—and while with the majority, therefore, the Christian consciousness that governed the mode of thinking operated to prevent the full and logical evolution of these ideas, so that they must submit to be blended with a Christian theism with which they had but little affinity,—we cannot be surprised to find that there were individuals who felt impelled to express and evolve the same thoughts in a manner more consistent, and more directly at variance with the theism that governed the consciousness of their age. Such was the relation in which Almaric of Bena, and his disciple David of Dinanto, stood to the times in which they lived.†

The former was so called from his birthplace in the diocese of Chartres. In the beginning of the thirteenth century he taught at Paris. After gaining a high reputation by his lectures on dialectics, he passed over to theology, and now

* The above-cited passage, concerning the absolute, he explains as relating to the infinitude of the divine being, as compared with all determinate limited modes of existence: *Causa prima est supra ens, in quantum est ipsum esse infinitum, ens autem dicitur, quod finite participat esse, et hoc est proportionatum intellectui nostro.*

† The same ideas lie, in truth, at the foundation of the system of Scotus that are unfolded in the book, *De causis*, which book exercised a more general influence than the heretical Scotus could do. But that the work of Scotus also had a special influence on these two men, is evident from incontestable marks. Albertus Magnus, in the first part of his *Summa* (*Tract. IV. Quæst. 20, Membr. ii.*) cites the book of David of Dinanto *de tomis, hoc est de divisionibus*, which makes mention of the work of Scotus, *De divisione Naturæ*. Moreover, the propositions ascribed to Almaric, as they are cited by Martinus Polonus in his *Supputationes* to Marianus Scotus, hint at the same: *Ideas, quæ sunt in mente divina, creare et creari*,—the doctrine that, as all things proceeded from God, so all will return back to him again; that God is known only in his Theophanies; that, without the first sin, the separation of sexes would not have taken place; that Christ, after his resurrection, belonged no longer to any particular sex. The historian who cites these dogmas, says himself, too: *Qui omnes errores inveniuntur in libro, qui intitulatur Peri physeon.*

created a great sensation by many of the opinions he advanced; among which may be mentioned, in particular, the following: "As no man can be saved without believing in the sufferings and resurrection of Christ, so neither can he be saved without believing that he *himself* is a member of Christ." This, he maintained, was a necessary article of faith. Such an assertion might no doubt have been called forth by the reaction of the Christian mind, and particularly of the mystic element in it, against the churchly, theocratical point of view,—by a tendency that placed the immediate reference of the religious consciousness to Christ in opposition to its dependence on the church. Now we cannot fail to remark, it is true, in Almaric also, the antagonism of a subjectivity carried to excess against the objectivity of the church catholicism; but at bottom of it lies, not a theistic, but a pantheistic, view of the world; and only in connection with this latter can that which he meant be understood, in the sense in which he meant it. Taken in an isolated manner by itself, this proposition was susceptible of various interpretations; and, accordingly, when it was for the first time publicly advanced, it was only by virtue of the church instinct that men suspected the anti-Christian element in it, without understanding its true significance in the connection of that teacher's ideas. The Parisian university, in 1204, condemned the doctrines of Almaric, and expelled him from the professorial chair. He appealed to pope Innocent the Third, who confirmed, however, that decision. Upon this, he returned, in 1207, to Paris, and offered the recantation that had been prescribed to him; soon after which he died. It was not known, however, that he had left any school behind him. By his disciple, David of Dinanto, these doctrines were propagated, and carried to a still further length. David exerted an influence also by his writings, in which he expounded them.

We recognise here the principles of that monism, the sources of which have been pointed out; the doctrine of one being, lying at the ground of all, which being can be known only in its manifold forms of manifestation;—the whole universe only a manifestation of the divine essence. David of Dinanto* defined God as the *principium materiale omnium*

* Vide Albert. M. Summa theol. Pars i. Tractat. iv. Quest. 20. Membr. ii, ed. Ludg. T. XVII. f. 76, and Thomas Aquinas in Sen-

rerum. He distinguished three principles; the first indivisible principle, matter, the *substratum* of the corporeal world; the first indivisible out of which proceeds the soul, namely, spirit (*nus*); the first indivisible in the eternal substances (*ideas*), namely, God. Between these three, he affirmed, there can be no distinction; else we must suppose a still higher essence, from which all these three were derived, and of which they partake after different manners. No other supposition remains, then, than that these three are altogether identical,—different designations of the one divine essence, according to different relations of the same to the corporeal, the spiritual, and the ideal worlds.* Thomas Aquinas † makes a difference between the doctrine of Almaric and that of David of Dinanto. The school of the former, he said, considered God as the *principium formale* of all things; the second taught that God is the *materia prima*. According to this latter doctrine, they might consider all nature as the body of God,—God as the one subject in all. Nothing else has any true being; all things else are mere accidents, under which God, to whom alone being is to be attributed, veils himself,—*accidentia sine subjecto*. The church doctrine of the Lord's supper they explained as a symbolical clothing of this truth. The consecrating priest, they supposed, did not here first produce the body of Christ, the body of God, but he only denoted that which, without any act of his, was already present, and brought it, by his words, to the consciousness of the community. ‡ Taking this ground, they could say every true

tent. Lib. II. Distinct. 17. Quæst. i. Artic. i. ed. Venet. T. X. p. 235.

* Albertus cites the argumentation in David of Dinanto as follows: Quæro, si nus et materia prima differunt an non? Si differunt, sub aliquo communi, a quo illa differentia egreditur, differunt et illud commune per differentias formabile est in utrumque. Quod autem unum formabile est in plures, materia est vel ad minus principium materiale. Si ergo dicatur una materia esse materiæ primæ et nois, aut differunt aut non. Si differunt, oportet, quod sub aliquo communi, a quo differentia illæ exeunt, differant, et sequitur ex hoc, quod illud commune genus sit ad illa. Ex hoc videtur relinqui, quod Deus et nois et materia prima idem sunt secundum id, quod sunt, quia quæcunque sunt et nulla differentia differunt, eadem sunt.

† Summa Pars i. Quest. iii, artic. viii.

‡ From the Acta of a Parisian council of the year 1210, which have been published by Martene and Durand in the Thesaurus novus anecdo-

Christian must be conscious of the fact, that God has become man in him, even as he became man in Christ; and it is now evident, also, that the doctrine of Almaric which we first cited should be understood as taken in connection with these ideas. Although an abstract speculative system was not calculated, especially at this time, to spread among the laity, yet through the element of mysticism, which itself was hidden under a Christian guise, it was attempted, and that not without success, to diffuse these doctrines even among laymen. Books were composed for this purpose in the French language. Pantheism, with all the practical consequences that flow from it, was more boldly and abruptly expressed than perhaps the original founders of this school had intended. That distinction of the three ages which had attached itself to the doctrine of the Trinity, and which we noticed in the doctrines of the abbot Joachim, was employed by this sect, also, after their own peculiar manner. As the predominant revelation of God the Father, in the Old Testament, was followed by the revelation of the Son, by which the forms of worship under the legal dispensation were done away; so now the age of the Holy Ghost was at hand,—the incarnation of the Holy Ghost in entire humanity, the being of God under the form of the Holy Ghost after an equal measure in all the faithful; that is, the dependence of the religious consciousness upon any one individual as a person in whom God is incarnate, would cease, and the consciousness of all alike, that God exists in them, has in them assumed human nature, would come in place of it. The sacraments, under which the Son of God had been worshipped, would then be done away: religion would be made wholly independent of ceremonies, of everything positive. The members of this sect are the ones in whom the incarnation of the Holy Ghost has begun, the fore-runners of the above-described period of the Holy Spirit. Several other opinions are charged upon members of this sect, which certainly accord with their general mode of thinking; as, for example, that God had spoken in Ovid as well as in

torum, T. IV. f. 163: Deus visibilibus erat indutus instrumentis, quibus videri poterat a creaturis et accidentibus corrumpi poterat extrinsecis. *Ante* verborum prolationem visibilibus panis accidentibus subesse corpus Christi. Id, quod ibi fuerat prius formis visibilibus, prolatione verborum subesse ostenditur.

Augustin ;* that the only heaven and the only hell are in the present life; that those who possess the true knowledge no longer need faith or hope; they have attained already to the true resurrection, the true paradise, the real heaven; † that he who lives in mortal sin, has hell in himself, but it was much the same thing as having a rotten tooth in the mouth. ‡ These people opposed the worship of saints as a species of idolatry. They called the ruling church Babylon; the pope, antichrist. It is said, also, that many of them were carried along by pantheistic mysticism, by the tendency to a one-sided inwardness, into a sort of ethical *adiaphorism*, which sanctioned the worst excesses. The maxim, that a man's condition depended, not so much on outward works as on inward disposition, on love; as on the fact of his being conscious of having God within him, is said to have been pushed by many even to such consequences as the above. William of Aria, a goldsmith, stood forth as a preacher among this sect. He announced the coming of judgments on a corrupt church, and the evolution of the new period of the Holy Ghost that was now near at hand. In the year 1210, this sect was discovered; several clergymen and laymen who refused to recant were burnt at the stake. Bernard, a priest, carried his pantheistic delusion to such a length as to declare that, so far as he had being, they could not burn him, for, so far as he existed, he was God himself. One of the pernicious consequences of such phenomena was, that men were led by occasion of them to look upon every freer movement of the religious spirit with a more suspicious eye. With the writings of David of Dinanto all theological works in the French language were burnt and forbidden.

This pantheistic monism was now attacked by the most distinguished scholastic theologians. Albertus Magnus maintained, in opposition to it, that God is not the material, nor the essential, but the causative being of all existence; and the causative as the efficient, formal, and final cause, the efficient,

* Cæsar. Heisterbach, l. c. v. 22.

† In the report in Martene and Durand: *Spiritus sanctus in iis incarnatus iis omnia revelabat, et hæc revelatio nihil aliud erat quam mortuorum resurrectio. Inde semetipsos jam resuscitados asserebant, fidem et spem ab eorum cordibus excludebant, se soli scientiæ mentientes subjacere,*—with which also agrees the report of Cæsarius.

‡ The account given by Cæsarius of Heisterbach.

formative principle, and the end of all existence ; the original type to which all existence must be traced, according to which everything has been formed, and which everything is appointed to represent ; as in truth, the original type has an existence of itself, independent of the things that are formed after it, and in order to represent it.* Thomas Aquinas expresses himself after a similar manner : God is the *esse omnium effective et exemplariter*, but not *per essentiam*.

As we have an example here, showing that the foreign elements of the neo-Platonic monism, which the speculative theology of this century strove to blend into one whole with the Christian faith, would resist all such attempts, and prove rebellious to this faith itself,—so we have another example of a like incongruity in the ideas of the Aristotelian philosophy, adopted by this theology as absolute truths of reason, with which the truths of faith could not be at variance. There arose a view of the Aristotelian doctrines, growing out of the doctrines of the Arabian philosopher Averrhoës, which threatened to dissolve this league between philosophy and faith, and which, if consistently carried out, would also—like the doctrine of Almaric, that started from a neo-Platonic principle—necessarily pass over into a pantheistic mode of thinking. It was affirmed that the thinking reason is in all men identically the same, that there is but one intelligence in all. Those who set forth this as a doctrine of Aristotle, and—what in their opinion was the same thing—a doctrine that resulted with necessity from the fundamental position of bare rational knowledge or of philosophy, were well aware of the consequences—irreconcilable with the Christian faith and the doctrines of the church—which flowed from such an assertion, and represented themselves, at least, as being very far from adopting these consequences. But this subjection to the authority of faith, expressed in connection with this acknowledged opposition between reason and faith, was of such a nature as could not fail to awaken suspicions respecting the honesty of their professions, or at least respecting the seriousness and liveliness of their religious interest ; as, for example, when one occupying this ground asserted : “ By my reason I conclude, with necessity,

* Sicut paradigma, a quo fiunt, et ad quod formantur, et ad quod finiuntur, cum tamen intrinsecum sit extra facta formata et finita existens et nihil sit de esse eorum.

that mind is numerically but one ; but by my faith I firmly maintain the contrary ;”* when he expressed himself with regard to the Christian position, which was incapable of being reconciled with the above proposition, in the cold and indifferent way : “The Latins do not admit this, according to their principles, because, perhaps, *their law* stands in contradiction with it ;” where Thomas Aquinas, who cites this language, † justly takes offence, that one who pretended to be a Christian, could thus speak of Christianity as the law of a strange religion ; could designate the doctrines of faith as *positiones catholicorum*. It is obvious to remark how mischievous would be the spread of a doctrine so hostile to the fundamental grounds of Christian conviction ; how pernicious this disguised schism between subjective conviction and the doctrines of the church, this homage, altogether hypocritical, or at any rate not springing from the lively feeling of an inner necessity, to the authority of the church, must prove, when such views found currency, as they already began to do, even among laymen. ‡ These doctrines, then, Thomas Aquinas felt himself called upon to combat, not only in his general work concerning the whole body of the doctrines of faith, § but also in a small treatise, which he composed expressly on this subject. He was not satisfied with appealing to the consequences hostile to the Christian faith, which must flow from such opinions,—to the fact, that thereby the doctrines of personal immortality, and of a final retribution, would be annihilated,—but, while he strongly protested against that pretended opposition between the truths of faith and the truths of philosophy, || he endeavoured to show, also, that this

* Per rationem concludo de necessitate, quod intellectus est unus numero, firmiter tamen teneo oppositum per fidem.

† In his Opusc. ix. De unitate intellectus contra Averroistas in Vol. XIX. of the Venetian edition.

‡ See the Life of Thomas Aquinas, already referred to, c. iv. A knight, who was called upon to do penance for his crimes, gave for his reply, that if Peter obtained salvation, he also was sure of it, for there was but one and the same spirit in himself and in Peter.

§ See in Lib. II. Sentent. Dist. 17. Quæst. ii. artic. i.

|| He says, in opposition to that statement : Cum autem de necessitate concludi non possit nisi verum necessarium, cujus oppositum est falsum et impossibile, sequitur secundum ejus dictum, quod fides sit de falso et impossibili, quod etiam Deus facere non potest. Quod fidelium aures ferre non possunt.

doctrine was contrary to reason, and by no means a genuine doctrine of Aristotle.

The doctrine concerning the divine attributes gained rich accessions by the labours of these theologians. Several new investigations were evoked by Abelard. One of the charges brought against him was, that he had denied the essential omnipresence of God. Walter of Mauretania, mentioned on a former page, thought that he had heard an opinion of this sort uttered by Abelard himself.* Also, Hugo a St. Victore speaks† of certain sophists, who maintained that God was omnipresent only in virtue of his power, but not in virtue of his essence;‡ since otherwise, God would be affected by the impurity in the world. According to this statement, Abelard, like the Socinians in later times, supposed a being of God without the world,—in the sense of limitation,—so that this “without” should be understood as spatial, and, separating from one another the essence of God and his acts, reduced his omnipresence simply to the fact, that God’s agency extends to everything in the world. But if we consult Abelard’s own explanations of the matter, we see plainly that he was very far from entertaining any such views. What he says: “We cannot conceive of God’s being present *anywhere* after a spatial manner, but we must understand his omnipresence as an omnipresent agency.” He meant only to give prominence to this idea, that God is omnipresent in his agency without spatial presence, or spatial change, without departing from that immutability of his essence whichever holds the like relation to space and time;—that space presents no limitation, has no existence for him.§ But even this, which Abelard said concerning an

* His words addressed to Abelard, in D’Achery, Spicilegia, T. III. f. 525: Præterea notificare mihi, si adhuc creditis, quod Deus essentialiter non sit in mundo vel alibi. Quod, si bene meministi audivi vos fateri, quando novissime invicem contulimus de quibusdam sententiis. From which very words it is quite evident that he might easily have misunderstood Abelard.

† In his Summa Tractat. i. c. iv.

‡ Quidam calumniatores veritatis dicunt, Deum per potentiam et non per essentiam ubique esse.

§ In the Apologetical Dialogue, concerning the relation of which to Abelard’s authorship we have spoken above, and in which we, at any rate, find the correct exposition of his doctrines, it is said: Ipse, qui sic nunc quoque sine positione locali sicut ante tempora consistens, non tam in loco esse ducendus est, qui nullatenus localis est, quam in se cuncta

active omnipresence of God,—directly for the purpose of excluding all spatial representations, gave occasion to the misconception that he denied the essential omnipresence of God, and referred it simply to his agency, separated from his essence. In his *Introductio in Theologiam*,* he says: “As spirit generally is spatially present nowhere, and spatially moves itself in no direction, so this holds good pre-eminently of God, since he, by his essence, is everywhere present.† In accordance with this must those passages of sacred Scripture be understood which speak of God as coming or descending; by which, is not meant a movement in space, but a new effect, proceeding from that agency of God which is circumscribed by no space.‡ Thus, for example, when it is said that he comes to or departs from this or that individual, the reference is to the communication or withdrawal of his gifts.”§ In this way, too, he keeps clear of a misconception with regard to the incarnation of God, which arose from its being so sensuously apprehended: When God is said to come upon the Virgin, this should be understood of some peculiar relation of God’s all-pervading agency.|| By his descent upon the Virgin, nothing else was denoted than that letting down of himself whereby he entered into union with human nature.¶ That God is essentially everywhere, is a proposition referring to his power or agency

concludere loca. Qui enim ante omnia sine loco exstitit, nec sibi ipsius modum (no limits for himself) sed nobis loca fabricavit. Per potentiam suam tam intra omnia quam extra; by which is denoted that this category of space, *inner* or *outer*, cannot be applied to God’s being and action. L. c. p. 95, seqq. * Lib. III. p. 1126.

† Ubique per substantiam, ubique essentialiter, semper substantiæ præsentia in omnibus est locis.

‡ Non aliquis ejus localis accessus, sed aliquis novæ operationis effectus ostenditur.

§ Cum in quosdam venire vel a quibusdam recedere dicitur, juxta donorum suorum collationem vel subtractionem intelligitur id, non secundum localem ejus adventum vel recessum, qui ubique per præsentiam suæ substantiæ semper existens, non habet, quo moveri localiter possit.

|| Cum itaque Deus in virginem venire dicitur, secundum æquam (perhaps aliquam) efficaciam, non secundum localem accessionem intelligi debet.

¶ Quid est enim aliud, eum in virginem descendisse, ut incarnaretur, nisi ut nostram assumeret infirmitatem, se humiliasse ut hæc quidem humiliatio eius videlicet intelligatur descensus?

which is nowhere inactive, but manifests its action in all places.* As without God's preserving agency nothing could subsist even for a moment, so this very conception involves in it, that it is by the energy of his essence God exists and acts everywhere."† From these remarks, it is already quite evident that Abelard does not, by what he says concerning the divine omnipresence, as an active one, by any means exclude essential omnipresence; and he himself takes care to guard against any such interpretation, by adding: "It is common to say of a monarch, that he has a long arm, because he makes his power felt even in distant regions; he does so, however, not by his essence, but by means of his representatives."‡ Abelard thought he had hit upon an analogy by which we might form some right conception of the divine omnipresence, in the mode in which the soul is present in all parts of the body.§ Thus, also, he expressed himself in his lectures, as we may see in his so-called Sentences: || "God is everywhere present by his essence, because he everywhere acts immediately by himself, without needing the instrumentality of others. For although a king may act, by his power, through the whole extent of his dominion, yet he is not everywhere by his essence; since he cannot act at once throughout his whole empire without employing ministers and servants." It deserves to be noticed, also, that Abelard applied the idea of omnipresence to time as well as to space.¶ Hugo a Sancto Victore defends the doctrine of an essential presence of God,** perhaps in opposition to Abelard's misunderstood explication.†† He lays

* Quod tamen ubique esse per substantiam dicitur, juxta ejus potentiam vel operationem dici arbitror, ac si videlicet diceretur, ita ei cuncta loca esse presentia, ut in eis aliquid operari nunquam cesset, nec ejus potentia sit alicubi otiosa.

† Nam et ipsa loca et quicquid est in eis, nisi per ipsum conserventur, manere non possunt, et per substantiam *in eis esse* dicitur, ubi per propriæ virtutem substantiæ aliquid nunquam operari cesset vel ea ipsa servando vel aliquid in iis per seipsum ministrando.

‡ Non tamen hoc per substantiam facere sufficiunt, quod per vicarios agunt.

§ Anima per operationem vegetandi ac sentiendi singulis membris tota insit, ut singula vegetet et in singulis sentiat.

|| Cap. xix. p. 50.

¶ Omnis locus ei præsens, sic et omne tempus, in the place just quoted.

** L. c. Summa Tract. i. c. iv.

†† As in Abelard's Sentences a passage of Augustin is quoted, and also

down the trilemma: Either God is nowhere according to his essence; or, he is in some place without being everywhere; or, he is everywhere. The first and second cannot be true; only the third supposition, therefore, remains: "Though we cannot perfectly comprehend," he says, "yet we must believe, without doubting, that God is, in essence, everywhere." According to Hugo's notions, moreover, the idea of the divine omnipresence is coincident with the truth that all things subsist in dependence on God's preserving agency.* The same connection of ideas was adopted by the scholastic theologians of the thirteenth century: "God is everywhere present in space," says Thomas Aquinas,† "inasmuch as he communicates to all that is in space, being, force, and activity."‡

In treating the doctrine of the divine omnipotence, the schoolmen of the twelfth century met with similar difficulties to those with the solution of which Origen had busied himself. Two different rocks were to be avoided: they must not, under the name of omnipotence, attribute to God an infinite arbitrary will; nor, in seeking to avoid this danger, represent the divine being as dependent on a natural necessity, or derogate anything from his absolute freedom. By the prudent precaution and pious modesty of the speculations by which he endeavours to guard against both these errors, Anselm especially distinguishes himself. He says: "The freedom and will of God we must, conformably to reason, so understand as to place nothing in him that is derogatory from his dignity. The true idea of freedom regards that only which is befitting and becoming the divine excellence.§ When it is said, 'What God wills is good, and what he wills not is not good,' this is not to

Hugo declaims against such an appeal to words of Augustin, this may indicate that he actually directed his polemics against Abelard; perhaps against some of his expressions in his lectures, according to some of the copies circulated about.

* *Nec sine eo potest aliquid subsistere etiam per momentum ex omnibus, quæ fecit, quia omnia continet et penetrat et nullo continetur.*

† *Summa, p. i. Qu. viii. art. i. et ii.*

‡ *Ut dans eis esse et virtutem et operationem, quod dat esse omnibus locatis, quæ replent omnia loca.*

§ In his *Dialogue, Cur Deus homo, Lib. I. c. xii.*: *Libertatem et voluntatem Dei sic debemus rationabiliter intelligere, ut dignitati illius non videamur repugnare. Libertas enim non est nisi ad hoc, quod expedit aut quod decet.*

be so understood as if, supposing God should will anything that is bad, it would be good because he willed it; for it does not follow that, if God should lie, it would be right to lie; but rather, that a being who lied could not be God. As truly as God is God, it is impossible for us to conceive that he should will that which is bad.* An hypothetical proposition of this sort is much the same as if we should set together the two impossible things,—if water is dry, fire is water. When we talk, in the case of God, of a necessity to will that which is good, the expression is an improper one. What we denominate necessity, is nothing else than the immutability of his goodness, which he has from himself, which is not derived to him from some other quarter.† Thus he rebuts the objection that God, if he cannot do otherwise than will that which is good, deserves no thanks. It is not a natural necessity, but the immutability of his eternal, holy will, and therefore is he the more to be praised in all his goodness.‡

But Abelard's speculations could not be confined within the limits which the pious spirit of Anselm prescribed to itself. He says first:§ “We should be cautious not to admit into the idea of omnipotence anything that is grounded in deficiencies and limitations of creaturely existence;”|| and on this side he falls in with Anselm. But he adds: “We may, in a certain sense, refer everything which it lies in man's power to do, to the divine omnipotence, in so far as in him we live, move, and have our being, and he works all in all;¶ for he employs

* Non sequitur: si Deus vult mentiri, justum esse mentiri, sed potius Deum illum non esse.

† Quæ necessitas non est aliud, quam immutabilitas honestatis ejus, quam a se ipso et non ab alio habet, et idcirco improprie dicitur necessitas.

‡ Lib. II. c. x.: Recte asseritur ipse sibi dedisse justitiam et seipsum justum fecisse. Idcirco laudandus est de sua justitia, nec necessitate, sed libertate justus est, quia improprie dicitur necessitas, ubi nec coactio ulla est nec prohibitio. Quapropter quoniam Deus perfecte habet a se quicquid habet, ille maxime laudandus est de bonis, quæ habet et servat, non ulla necessitate, sed propria et æterna immutabilitate.

§ Introductio, Lib. III. p. 1109.

|| Alioquin e converso impotentiam diceremus potentiam et potentiam impotentiam.

¶ Non absurde tamen et de his omnibus, quæ efficere possumus, Deum potentem prædicabimus et omnia, quæ agimus, ejus potentiæ tribuimus, in quo vivimus, movemur et sumus, et “qui omnia operatur in omnibus.”

us as instruments to accomplish that which he wills; and it may, in a certain sense, be said, that *he* brings about that which he suffers us to bring about. But he goes still farther, and starts the question whether God could do more, other, and better than he has actually done; which he answers in the negative; though he acknowledges, indeed, how offensive this must appear to some.* The consideration seemed to him of irresistible weight, that God, who is the supreme reason, can do nothing except what is in conformity with reason; that what he does is always the best, and that by virtue of his goodness he can do no other than this.† He brings up objections to this statement, and then seeks to refute them. On this supposition, God's omnipotence would have narrower limits than man's ability; for man can do a great many things otherwise than he actually does; and he brings up the words of Christ, when he said: "If I prayed to my Father, he would send ten thousand angels." In reply to the first objection, he remarks: "That we can do many things that we ought not to do, is to be ascribed to our weakness rather than to our dignity. We should be better if we could not do that which is evil." In reply to the second objection, he says: "Most assuredly God would have done this if Christ had prayed; but that Christ should request this is the very thing that was impossible, since it was contrary to his temper." And thus, generally, he meets these and the like objections by distinguishing an hypothetical and an absolute possibility and necessity. To those who said: If God could not act differently, we should be under no obligation of gratitude to him, he replies: "It was really to be denominated nothing else than a certain necessity of his essence or of his goodness, one with his will, and no constraint."‡ "Since his goodness is so great that it moves him of himself to all good acts, he ought therefore to be the more loved and honoured on account of his own proper

* Licet hæc nostra opinio paucos aut nullos habeat assentatores et plurimum a dictis sanctorum et aliquantulum a ratione dissentire videatur.

† Cum videlicet in singulis faciendis vel dimittendis rationabilem habeat causam, cur ab ipso fiant vel dimittantur nec ipse quicquam, quia summa ratio est, contra id quod rationi congruit, aut velle aut agere queat.

‡ Hic enim quædam naturæ vel bonitatis ejus necessitas ab ejus voluntate non est separata nec coactio dicenda est, qua etiam nolens id facere cogatur.

essence, because his goodness dwells not in him in an accidental, but in an essential and immediate way ;* for should we be less thankful to a person who afforded us help in distress, if his love was so great that he could not do otherwise, but felt constrained by the force of his love to help us ?” This explanation he repeated in his *Theologia Christiana*.† “God is ever and at all times so consumed, to express ourselves after the manner of men, by his inexpressible goodness, that what he wills, he wills necessarily ; and what he does, he does necessarily ; just as everything that is grounded in the essence of God dwells in it after an eternal and necessary manner.”‡ The extreme timidity that filled the mind of Abelard, lest he should say something which might be hurtful to the religious interest, expresses itself in what he remarks, under his sense of the difficulties that pressed him : “But as it is our endeavour to preserve spotless the honour of God in all things, and to glorify him to the utmost of our ability, so let us trustfully invoke his assistance, that he who frees his chosen from their sins, would make me free from the confusion of words, and that by his grace he would deliver me from the snare of this or that expression, to the glory of his own name, so that we may not be found chargeable in his sight, either with falsehood or presumption towards him ; for it is he who tries the heart and the reins, who regards, in all, the disposition of the heart rather than the outward action, and asks not what has been done, but with what intention it was done.”§ After the same manner he touches upon this point in the published

* Cum ejus tanta sit bonitas atque optima voluntas, ut ad faciendum non invitum eum, sed spontaneum inclinet, tanto amplius ex propria natura diligendus est atque hinc glorificandus, quanto hæc bonitas ejus non ei per accidens, sed substantialiter atque incommutabiliter inest.

† L. c. Martene et Durand thesaur. anecdotor. T. V. f. 1357.

‡ Ex ipsa sua et ineffabili bonitate adeo semper, ut humano more loquar, accensus, ut quæ vult necessario velit et quæ facit, necessario faciat. Non enim carere sua potest bona voluntate, quam habet, cum sit ei naturalis et coæterna, non adventitia, sicut nostra est nobis, et omne, quod in natura est divinitatis, necessario ei atque omnibus modis inevitabiliter in est, utpote justitia, pietas, misericordia et quæcunque erga creaturas bona voluntas.

§ Ne nos mendacii vel præsumptionis in eum ab ipso arguamur, qui probator cordis et renum magis in omnibus in intentionem attendit, quam actionem, nec quæ fiant, sed quo animo fiant. T. V. f. 1358.

copies of his lectures.* He observes of those who urged similar reasons to the ones just cited, against these tenets, that they did not seem to him rightly to understand either the wisdom of God, or the declarations of Scripture, or of the church fathers. He then † notices the opinion of those who endeavoured to solve the difficulty in the doctrine of omnipotence by saying that God could do this or that if he pleased. He objects to them, that they represented God anthropopathically, as if deliberating with himself before he came to a decision. Now as this doctrine of Abelard was also fairly attacked by his opponents, he was obliged to speak of it in his apology, where he declared that he held fast everything that was essential to him, and avoided that which had given offence to many. "I believe that God can do only what is befitting him to do (which was acknowledged even by Anselm); and that he can do much that he will not do." This he might indeed have said, on his own grounds, provided the "can" were understood abstractly, concerning which he makes no further explanation here. ‡

Hugo a St. Victore controverted, in both of his works, the doctrine of Abelard, but without naming him. He declaims against those who affirmed that God was so bound by the measure and law of his own works, that he could do nothing other and nothing better than what he had done; those who set limits to God's infinite power. He describes them as men who had lost themselves in their own curious speculations, § men swollen with the conceit of their own knowledge; || and yet Abelard would doubtless have taken up into his doctrine all that Hugo said on the other side, and appropriated it as a still further determination of that doctrine. He applies here, in speaking of the divine will, a distinction which afterwards acquired great importance in the doctrinal controversies, the distinction of will in itself, as the interior action of God, *voluntas* as *beneplacitum Dei*; and that which presents itself phenomenally, as an object of the divine will, *signum bene-*

* *Sententiæ*, ed. Rheinwald, c. xx.

† Page 55.

‡ *Ea solummodo Deum posse facere credo, quæ ipsum facere convenit, et multa facere potest, quæ nunquam faciet.*

§ *De sacramentis*, Lib. I. c. xxii.: *Illi nostri scrutatores, qui defecerunt scrutantes scrutationes.*

|| *Summa Tract. i. c. xxiv.* Quosdam scientia inflatos.

placiti.* Now, if we understand the divine will in the former sense, God can do nothing and will nothing except what he wills, for his will is identical with his being and power; † but if we speak of his will in the other sense, the case is altered. All that God has created can be better than it is, if God so wills. He can make what he has created into something better; which does not suppose that it was bad before, but that he raises what he had created good to a still higher degree of perfection; not that God, so far as he himself is concerned, ought to have done better, but that it may become better through his operation, while he himself remains immutably the same. ‡ He agrees with Abelard and Anselm in extending the idea of the divine omnipotence to everything that is a positive power, and therefore excluding only that which has its ground rather in a deficiency or limitation of the creature. § But it is a remark of Hugo's, important in its connection with the theistic principle, that, as time is not commensurate with God's eternity, nor space with God's immensity, so neither are the works of God commensurate with his omnipotence. ||

The dogmatists of the thirteenth century, also, declared against Abelard's doctrine, though at the same time his name was not mentioned. Thomas Aquinas says: "As the power of God is one, not only with his essence but also with his wisdom, so it may be rightly said, that nothing is in God's power which is not grounded in the order of divine wisdom; for the divine wisdom embraces the whole extent of the divine power. Nevertheless, the order implanted in things by the

* Sicut præceptio et prohibitio signa sunt voluntatis divinæ, ita et operatio et permissio. Summa Tract. i. c. xiii. This distinction was employed already by Abelard, without his denoting it in this particular form. *Introduct. in theol. opp.* page 1111: *Velle Deus duobus modis dicitur aut secundum providentiæ suæ ordinationem aut secundum consilii adhortationem.*

† Si de ipsa Dei voluntate loquimur, quæ est hoc quod ipse, nihil potest facere, nisi quod vult et nihil potest velle, nisi quod vult, idem est enim velle quod esse, et idem etiam velle quod posse.

‡ Non ut ipse quantum ad se melius faciat sed ut, quod fecit, ipso identidem operante et in eodem perseverante melius fiat.

§ Omnia potest Deus, quæ posse potentia est.

|| Sicut æternitatem non æquat tempus, nec immensitatem locus, sic nec potentiam opus.

divine wisdom is not commensurate with that wisdom itself, so that the latter is limited to that order. If the end for which things were made stood in a commensurate relation to those things, it might be said that wisdom is confined to a certain determinate order, that this determinate order must necessarily take place, in order that this determinate end of wisdom may be attained. But the divine good is an end standing in no relation of comparison with created things.* Hence it follows that the divine goodness may manifest itself in manifold ways, in ways other than the actual ones; that it is not tied to this particular order of things; therefore we must hold absolutely, that God can do otherwise than he does." Thus he comes upon the distinction between the divine power, as it reveals itself in the order of the universe established by divine wisdom, and the divine power absolutely, which holds of everything that does not involve a contradiction, *potentia Dei ordinaria et absoluta*. We must admit he has by no means resolved all the difficulties brought up by Abelard; and the distinction he makes might be adopted and employed also by Abelard, in his own way.

In their attempts towards a rational mode of apprehending the doctrine of the Trinity, the schoolmen of this period pursued the same method with Augustin, in making the analogy between the creaturely and the supreme Spirit their starting-point. This matter was first profoundly investigated and set forth by Anselm. "We can know God," says he, "not from himself, but only after the analogy of his creatures. That will best subserve this knowledge, therefore, which presents the highest degree of resemblance to God. If everything, so far as it has being, is an image of the highest being, this must hold good in the most eminent degree of that which is highest in the whole creation; this is the rational spirit. The more, then, it endeavours to enter into itself for the purpose of coming to the knowledge of its own essence, the more will it succeed in elevating itself to the knowledge of God.† Hence this spirit may rightly be denominated a

* Sed divina bonitas est finis, impropotionabiliter excedens res creatas.

† Quid igitur apertius, quam quia mens rationalis quanto studiosius ad se discendum intendit, tanto efficacius ad illius cognitionem ascendit? Monolog. c. lxvi.

mirror to itself, in which to contemplate the image of him whom it cannot, as yet, behold face to face." Thus Anselm starts from the analogy of human consciousness, in order to mount upwards to the idea of the Trinity. "As it belongs to the essence of the creaturely spirit to come to the knowledge of itself, and thus to produce an image of itself within itself, we must conceive the same to hold true, after the highest manner, of the divine Being. The supreme Wisdom knows himself after an eternal manner, which is nothing other than the eternal Word; his most perfect image, of the same essence with himself.* As, again, everything produced by human art existed first in the idea of the producing mind; as this idea remains even when the work is destroyed, and is itself, in this respect, one with the art of the producing mind; so it is not another, but the same Word, in whom God knows himself, and by whom all things were created. This divine idea is the ground of the existence of the creatures in manifestation, and precedes them; it is unchangeable, and remains, even if the changeable creature perishes. The creatures possess, in this divine Word, a higher being than in themselves, in manifestation; they are, in so far, one with the divine Word himself.† Now, if our knowledge of things only receives into itself an image of the same, which is not adequate to that which they are essentially in themselves, it is evident that we are still less capable of comprehending that higher being of things, as they exist in the divine Word, which is represented in created being only as in an image, and that Word itself.‡ It is a relation with which nothing else can be compared, that what the supreme Mind and his eternal Word are in their essence, and in their relation to the creation, is complete by itself in each, and at the same time

* Hoc itaque modo quis neget, summam sapientiam, cum se dicendo intelligit, gignere consubstantiali sibi similitudinem suam, id est verbum suum?

† In seipsis sunt essentia mutabilis, secundum immutabilem rationem creata, in ipso vero sunt ipsa prima essentia et prima existendi veritas.

‡ Cum constat, quia omnis creata substantia tanto verius est in verbo, id est intelligentia creatoris, quam in seipsa, quanto verius existit creatrix quam creata essentia, quomodo comprehendat humana mens, cujusmodi sit illud dicere et illa scientia, quæ sic longe superior et varior est creatis substantiis, si nostra scientia tam longe superatur ab illis, quantum earum similitudo distat ab earum essentia?

in both ; and still, no plurality in the two arises therefrom. This community of being is incapable of being expressed by words.* The most suitable and befitting words by which to denote this relation, that one proceeds from the other and is yet perfectly equal to the same, are the term birth, the name Son. Here, alone, the fact is perfectly exemplified, that the act of producing requires the co-operation of nothing else, and that what is produced represents the image of the producer without any dissimilitude.† As self-knowledge presupposes the remembrance of one's self (the thought of one's self), so this memoria, from which is produced the Word, corresponds to the Father. As God knows himself, he loves himself; and as the love of God to himself presupposes in him the remembrance of himself and the knowledge of himself, so this is denoted by the procession of the Holy Ghost from both. All three pass completely into each other, constituting the one supreme Essence." By means of this concatenation of ideas, Anselm defended the doctrine of the Western church concerning the procession of the Holy Ghost from Father and Son. Being present during the time of his banishment from England, in 1098, at the council of Bari in Apulia, where the differences between the two churches came up for discussion, he was called upon to defend the Western doctrine concerning the Holy Ghost, against the Greeks; and, as his mode of stating the doctrine met with general approbation, he was commissioned by the pope to reduce it to writing.

In his doctrine of the Trinity, which drew upon him so many attacks, Abelard followed a similar method, only with a difference arising out of his different mode of contemplating the relation of faith to rational knowledge; which led him to consider that analogy as constituting proper evidence for a truth grounded in the essence of reason, although this truth might first be clearly brought up to consciousness by a super-

* *Constat igitur, quia exprimi non potest, quid duo sint, summus spiritus et verbum ejus, quamvis quibusdam singulorum proprietatibus cogantur esse duo.*

† *Nam in rebus aliis, quas parentis prolisque certum est habitudinem habere, nulla sic gignitur, ut nulla admixta dissimilitudine omnimodam similitudinem parentis exhibeat, ut omnino nullius indigens sola per se ad gignendam prolem sufficiat.*

natural revelation, which by others was represented as being only an analogy illustrating some truth communicated by supernatural revelation. He wished to show that the doctrine of the Trinity is a necessary idea of reason, without which God cannot be rightly known as the highest Good; and hence even the better class of the pagan philosophers had arrived at this knowledge. He would make it out that this doctrine only served to express, in an exhaustive manner, the idea of God as the supremely good; God as the omnipotence of the Father, as the wisdom of the Son, as the love or goodness of the Holy Ghost; and what is said of the relation of the three persons to each other corresponds to the relation of these three ideas to each other. "By the name Father is denoted that power of the divine majesty whereby God is able to bring to pass whatsoever he wills; the Word, or the Son, denotes that wisdom whereby he knows all things, and nothing remains hid from him; the Holy Ghost, the goodness or the love whereby he orders and directs all things to the best end.* It is because these three ideas contain the whole, that, in imploring the divine grace to accomplish anything by our means, we say, In the name of the Father, and of the Son, and of the Holy Ghost, testifying, by our mention of the divine power, wisdom, and goodness, that everything which God does is done in a glorious manner. As the eternal wisdom presupposes omnipotence,—is itself a certain power,—so this relation of the derived to the original is expressed by the idea of eternal generation. But there is no place for love except between two; and the symbol of procession is suited to denote the essence and action of love, which is a proceeding forth from one being to another. Love is an out-going from one's self, a communication of one's self to another; the will to enter into union, into society, with another."† In several places he says: "By the Holy Ghost

* Sicut Dei patris vocabulo divinæ majestatis potentiæ exprimitur specialiter, ita filii seu verbi appellatione sapientia Dei significatur, qua cuncta discernere valet, ut in nulla penitus decipi queat. At vero Spiritus sancti vocabulo ipsa ejus caritas, seu benignitas exprimitur, qua videlicet optime cuncta vult fieri seu disponi et eo modo singula provenire, quo melius possunt, aliis quoque bene utens et optime singula disponens et ad optimum finem quoque perducens. *Introduct. Lib. I. p. 985.*

† Nemo ad semetipsum caritatem dicitur habere, sed dilectionem in alterum extendit, ut esse caritas possit. *Procedere itaque Dei est sese*

is signified the goodness of God, whereby he dispenses life and blessing from himself; exerts his agency on his creatures."* Yet in a more recent passage, in the new revision of his Christian Theology,† he says; "The mutual love of Father and Son to each other is also denominated the Holy Ghost, and not barely God's love to his creatures; since otherwise the necessary existence of the Holy Ghost and of the Trinity would not seem so clearly evident; for as creatures have not a necessary existence, the love of God to them is not a necessary love; and so the Holy Ghost would not have a necessary existence.‡ But God is self-sufficient, unchangeable in all the goodness that belongs to his being."

As a visible illustration of the relation of the three persons to each other, he employs the comparison of a seal made of brass: "Here we have the brass material, lying at the foundation; the image of the king, engraven on the brass; the form composed of both, the seal.§ Or the impression on wax, where, in like manner, the material, the form, and that which is made up of both, may be distinguished."|| He, like earlier writers, thinks that the dispute with the Greeks might be brought to an end, if it should be said, the Holy Ghost proceeds, in the most original sense, from the Father as the unbegotten;¶ but he also proceeds from the Son, or

ad aliquam rem per affectum caritatis quodammodo extendere, ut eam videlicet diligit ac ei per amorem se conjungat. *Introduct. Lib. II. p. 1085.*

* Maxime Deus, cum nullius indiget, erga ipsum benignitatis affectu commoveri non potest, ut sibi aliud ex benignitate impendat, sed erga creaturas tantum, quæ divinæ gratiæ beneficiis indigent, non solum ut sint, sed ut bene sint. Quo itaque modo Deus a se ipso ad creaturas exire dicitur, per benignitatis affectum vel effectum, quem in creaturis habeat, dicatur. *L. c. p. 1086.*

† *Theologia christiana, Lib. IV. f. 1340.*

‡ Posset quippe esse, ut nulla creatura unquam esset, cum nulla ex necessitate sit, ac per hoc consequens videtur, ut jam nec affectus ipsius, quem videlicet erga creaturas habet, ex necessitate sit ac per hoc Spiritus ipse ex necessitate non sit, quem dicimus ipsum affectum Dei esse sive amorem.

§ Ipsum æs materia, ex qua factum est, figura ipsa imaginis regiæ forma ejus, ipsum sigillum, ex his duobus materiatum atque formatum, quibus videlicet convenientibus ipsum est compositum atque perfectum. *Introduct. Lib. II. p. 1081.*

|| *Theol. chris. Lib. IV. f. 1317. L. c.*

¶ Hoc fortasse modo si a solo patre procedere spiritum Græci intelligant, eo scilicet quod ab ipso sit quasi a summo et non existente ab alio,

through the Son, when he brings the divine ideas, received from wisdom, into actual realization. Richard a St. Victore also resorted to a comparison of the same sort with that of Abelard; though he did not lay so much stress upon it, as an *argument*, to show the necessity of the doctrine of the Trinity. He too says that although the power, wisdom, and goodness of the Father, Son, and Holy Ghost are the same; yet, in many parts of Scripture, power seems to be ascribed particularly to the Father, wisdom to the Son, and goodness to the Holy Ghost.* And to a query of the abbot Bernard, who descried something in such declarations resembling what had been so offensive to him in Abelard, he replied as follows: "I will very cheerfully tell you my opinion—What power, what wisdom, what love or goodness is, we all know. From that, then, which is manifest and known to us, we are so constituted, if I mistake not, as to frame to ourselves a conception of that which transcends the measure of human capacity; for in these three attributes is expressed a certain image of the Trinity, and a mirror, as it were, is given us, whereby we may come from the things that are made to the knowledge of the invisible essence of God."† He too, like Abelard; finds the relation of the three persons to each other answering to the relation of these three conceptions to each other.‡

Hugo a St. Victore, like Anselm, places God's image in the human spirit at the foundation; The spirit; the knowledge begotten by it out of itself, or wisdom; and the love

nulla est sententiæ controversia, sed verborum diversitas. *Introduct. Lib. II. p. 1095.*

* *Quamvis una eademque sit potentia et bonitas patris et filii et spiritus sancti, secundum quendam tamen modum loquendi in quibusdam scripturæ locis potentia patri, sapientia filio, benignitas spiritui sancto (quasi specialiter) videntur assignari. De statu interioris hominis, c. iii. f. 39.*

† In his tract *De tribus appropriatis personis in trinitate*, f. 271: In his, quæ manifesta et nobis nota sunt, erudimur (ni fallor) ad eorum notionem, quæ humanæ capacitatis modum excedunt. In his enim tribus forma quædam et imago summæ trinitatis exprimitur et quoddam nobis velut speculum proponitur, ut invisibilia Dei per ea, quæ facta sunt, intellecta conspiciantur.

‡ In hac itaque rerum trinitate sola potentia non est de reliquarum aliqua, sapientia autem est de potentia sola, bonitas vero de potentia simul et sapientia.

proceeding from both, with which it embraces its wisdom.* But in God, these are no changeable affections, as in man. Each is one with its essence; this *higher* relation is denoted by the Trinity.† Richard a St. Victore endeavours to prove that the relation of the three persons to each other is a necessary relation, thus: "The Supreme Being must have an object worthy of his love, which he loves as himself. Hence the conception of the Father as the eternal cause of his equal Son. The latter having all things in common with the former, must have omnipotence also; accordingly, the third person must derive his existence from both."‡ Alanus says briefly, adopting the language of Hermes Trismegistus: "Unity begets unity, and reflects its own ardour (love) back upon itself; thus the procession of the Holy Ghost from both is denoted as having its causative ground in the Father."§

Unedifying were the disputes which grew out of the improper transfer of opposite theories respecting universal conceptions to the doctrine of the Trinity. While Roscelin exposed himself to be called a tritheist by his nominalism, Gilbert of Poitiers, like John Philoponus, in earlier times, || drew upon

* Quoniam ex se ipsa nascitur sapientia, quæ est in ipso, et quoniam ipsa diligit sapientiam suam et ita procedit sapientia de mente et de mente et sapientia procedit amor, quo ipsa mens diligit sapientiam genitam a se.

† Quod ideo non sunt personæ, quia sunt affectiones mutabiles circa animam. Aliquando enim anima est sine notitia et amore, nec potest dici notitia hominis esse homo, vel amor hominis est homo, sed sapientia Dei Deus est, amor Dei Deus est, quia non est in Deo aliud ab ipso. Summa sent. Tract. i. c. vi. De sacramentis, Lib. I. p. iii. c. xxiii.

‡ Oportet condignum habere, ut sit, quem possit et merito debeat ut seipsum diligere. Si igitur primordiale personam veraciter constat esse summe bonam, nolle omnino non poterit, quod summa caritas exigit. Et si veraciter eam omnipotentem esse, quicquid esse voluerit, non poterit non esse. Exigente itaque caritate condignum habere volet et exigente potestate habebit quem habere placet. Ecce quod perfectio personæ unius est causa existentiae alterius. And then: Si igitur idem posse est absque dubio ambobus commune, consequens est, tertiam in trinitate personam ex ambobus et esse accepisse et existentiam habere. In his work De trinitate, Lib. V. c. vii. et viii.

§ Monas gignit monadem et in se suum reflectit ardorem.—Iste ardor ita procedit a monade id est a patre, quod ipsum non deserit, quia ejusdem est essentiae cum ipso vel in se alterum (his second self, the other altogether coequal to him) id est in filium suum reflectit ardorem, id est spiritum sanctum, sed ita procedit a patre, quod ejus auctoritate procedit a filio. See the Regulæ theologicae, p. 180, seqq. ed. Mingarelli.

|| In despite of all Dr. Baur may have said, in his Geschichte der

himself the same reproach by taking the contrary position of the Aristotelian realism. The obscure, confused, and abstruse style in which this Gilbert wrote, served to prolong the dispute, while the parties could never come to an understanding with each other. His purpose was to avoid Sabellianism, to which, as he supposed, the comparison just cited, with which it was attempted to prove or to illustrate the doctrine of the Trinity, might easily lead, if great care were not taken to keep separate things related and things different.* This danger he would avoid by distinguishing the different senses in which the name of God is used; inasmuch as we understand by it either the one divine essence, the *substantia, quæ est Deus*; the one substantial ground which is contained in the three persons; just as the one essence of the kind is contained in the individuals belonging to this kind; † the *forma constitutiva in rebus*; or, on the other hand, the persons distinguished one from the other by their personal properties, of which persons, each by itself is called God, the *substantia, quæ est Deus*. ‡ Yet Gilbert himself acknowledged the inadequacy of this transfer

Dreieinigkeitslehre, II. p. 510, where he rightly finds fault with an inaccurate expression in my St. Bernard, this comparison is an altogether correct one.

* Errant aliqui in comparationibus, imo ex comparationibus, cum aut si quid in iis est dissimile, illas omnino abjiciendas existimant, aut in his, propter quæ non sit illarum inductio, easdem usurpant, ut Sabelliani. Qui cum audiunt unius substantiæ tres esse personas, et propter eam, quæ ex illarum proprietatibus est, diversitatem aut æqualitatem aut comparationem aut coæternitatem aut processionem ostendendam, inductas similitudines legunt, scilicet vel unius animæ mentem, notitiam, amorem vel unius mentis memoriam, intelligentiam, voluntatem vel unius radii splendorem et calorem vel hujusmodi alias, putant, quod sicut unus solus est radius, de quo dicuntur calor et splendor aut una sola est mens, de qua et memoria et intelligentia et voluntas aut una sola anima, de qua et mens et notitia et amor, ita quoque unus solus subsistens sit, qui cum sit natura Deus, idem ipse personalibus proprietatibus sit pater et filius et spiritus sanctus. See the Commentary on Boëth. f. 1150, already cited on page 76.

† The *εἶδος* is contradistinguished from the individual being, from the *ἕλν*, forma et materia. See the above-cited Commentary, f. 1140.

‡ He says, concerning the Sabellians: Quos hic ipse error patenter ostendit omnino nescire hujus nominis, quod est substantia, multiplicem in naturalibus usum, videlicet non modo id, quod est, verum etiam id, quo est, hoc nomine nuncupari.—Eorum qui sunt Deus, numeratio facta est, ejus vero, quo sunt Deus repetitio. In the above-cited Commentary, f. 1150, seqq.

of creaturely relations to God, and expressed himself on this point to the effect that the conception of one common substance could not be applied to the simple essence of God in the same sense as it is applied to composite beings.* Happily these disputes, which occupied men's minds more than the object deserved,† had no further influence on the determination of the doctrine of the Trinity. A confession of faith, which the abbot Bernard opposed to the doctrine of Gilbert, could not force its way into general recognition. Abelard declared that the being of God cannot come under the categories;‡ and Peter Lombard, that the determinations of the church were designed rather to exclude from the simplicity of the divine essence what was not in it, than to place anything therein.§

The theologians of the thirteenth century followed out the ideas which had already been advanced on this doctrine in the preceding age.

Alexander of Hales says: "To the essence of the Supreme Good belongs that highest communication of himself which is denoted by the generation of the Son. As the fullest communication of nature stands in generation, so the most perfect

* Ex aliqua rationis proportione transsumptum sermonem rem ipsam, sicut est, minime posse explicare et præter rationis plenitudinem sensum mentis in eo, quod non nisi ex parte concipi potest, laborare. L. c. f. 1164.

† It marks the character of these times* that, as we have already noticed on page 7, a reputed soothsayer was consulted about the controversy between the Nominalists and Realists; and a Parisian magister sought, in the revelation of Hildegard, a decision of the contested points handled by Gilbert. And the latter declared, appealing to the revelation imparted to her, that, in speaking of God, essence and properties cannot be separated. Everything that is declared of God denotes himself, in his essence: Quia homo hanc potestatem non habet, ut de Deo dicat, sicut de humanitate hominis et sicut de colore facti operis de manu hominis. Deus plenus est et integer et ideo non potest dividi sermone, sicut homo dividi potest. See the correspondence of Hildegard, which has been published by Martene and Durand, in the *Veterum scriptorum et monumentorum collectio amplissima*, T. II. f. 1098, ep. 66.

‡ Patet a tractatu philosophorum rerum omnium naturas in decem prædicamenta distribuentium illam summam majestatem esse exclusam omnino nec ullo modo regulas aut traditiones eorum ad illam summam atque ineffabilem celsitudinem conscendere. *Introduc. ad theol. Lib. II.* p. 1073.

§ Magis videtur horum verborum usus introductus ratione removendi atque excludendi a simplicitate deitatis, quæ ibi non sunt, quam ponendi aliqua. *Lib. II. Dist. 24.*

communication of will stands in love, we must therefore attribute both kinds of self-communication to the Supreme Good." * Albert the Great unfolds the matter thus:—"Spirit can produce only by first sketching the idea of its work within itself, an offspring of spirit exactly answering to the work. † Next is required an instrumentality, analogous to the essence of spirit, for the realization of the idea thus sketched forth. An idea of this sort must be simple, and of like essence with the highest acting principle, when this is so simple, that in it being, essence, and activity, are all one. ‡ The way in which God reveals himself in time to make his rational creatures holy, and unite them to himself, necessarily presupposes that eternal act of the self-communication of God, by virtue of which the Holy Ghost proceeds from Father and Son. Through the Holy Ghost one love is diffused through all holy souls; this is the prototype of all creaturely love, that from which all creaturely love is derived. § In itself, this is something immutable; neither increasing nor diminishing. We are the ones that increase or diminish as we become more or less assimilated to this supreme love in disposition, feeling, and action." || Thomas Aquinas also pursues the same analogy, with a view to prepare the way for understanding the doctrine of the Trinity, and he traces it out, as we shall see, in a profound manner; but he is careful at the same time to guard against the supposition as if the Trinity could thus be really demonstrated. "Only when we assume this doctrine as given do such arguments have any significance." ¶ He endeavours to show how this is so in particular cases.** But what Thomas Aquinas

* Est igitur in summo bono diffusio generationis, quam consequitur differentia gignentis et geniti, patris et filii et erit ibi diffusio per modum dilectionis, quam dicimus processionem spiritus sancti.

† Format ex se rationem operis et speciem, quæ est sicut proles ipsius intellectus, intellectui agenti similis in quantum agens est.

‡ Formans, formatum, spiritus rector formæ.

§ Una caritas diffusa per omnes animas sanctas per spiritum sanctum, ad quam sicut exemplar omnis dilectio refertur et comparatione illius et assimilatione caritas dici meretur, primum formale omnis dilectionis.

|| Quanto plus vel minus per assimilationem habitu et affectu et actu appropinquamus.

¶ Trinitate posita congruunt hujusmodi rationes.

** E. g. The infinite goodness of God reveals itself in creation. It by no means follows from this, that anything infinite proceeds from God, but it is enough that each in his own measure participates in the

thinks that he is able to make out, is this,—that if the doctrine of the Trinity, which is not to be proved *à priori*, is assumed by us as a doctrine of revelation, then the whole creation, and above all, the nature and essence of man's spirit, bear witness in favour of it. "The perfect way in which the Son and the Holy Ghost derive their essence from the Father,* is the primal ground and cause of the procession of the creatures from God. As the origin of the creation represents the perfection of the divine being only after an imperfect manner, so we are led back by it to the perfect type, which completely includes in it all the divine perfections, namely, the Son, as the original type and pattern of the way in which creatures have their existence from God; and as all creatures owe their existence to the free goodness of the divine will, so this leads us back to *one* principle, constituting the ground of every free communication of God.† This is love; the *procedere per modum amoris* in the person of the Holy Ghost; the primal form of all communication of divine love. The *processio* is, in this case, not an act passing without the divine essence, and giving birth to something different from God, but one which abides within the agent himself. The more perfect this act of spiritual procession, the more completely one and identical is that which proceeds forth with that from which it proceeds forth. ‡ Such acts of the spirit are knowing and willing, or loving (*intelligere* and *velle*). The more perfect the act of knowledge, the more completely is that which is known one with that which knows; the more perfect the love, the more completely the object of love becomes one with that which loves.§

divine goodness. Moreover, the argument that without society there is no blessedness, does not admit of being applied to a Being in himself all-sufficient. While the words ascribed to Hermes Trismegist: *monas monadem genuit et in se suum reflexit ardorem*, were by many applied to the Trinity, he, on the contrary, thinks that these words found their fulfilment in the work of creation; *nam unus Deus produxit unum mundum propter sui ipsius amorem*.

* The *processio personarum*, quæ perfecta est.

† Quod sit quasi ratio totius liberalis collationis.

‡ Id quod procedit ad intra processu intelligibili, non oportet esse diversum; imo quanto perfectius procedit, tanto magis est unum cum eo, a quo procedit.

§ Manifestum est, quod quanto aliquid intelligitur, tanto conceptio intellectualis est magis intima intelligenti et magis unum, nam intellectus secundum hoc quod actu intelligit, secundum hoc fit unum cum intel-

It is true, that *voluntas* and *intellectus* are in God one and the same; but in the order of conception, love, that comes from the will, certainly presupposes something received into the intellect, in order that it may be the object of love.* Hence, the procession of the Holy Ghost presupposes the generation of the Logos." He now seeks to show, from the same analogy, why it is that the idea of generation is applied more particularly to the Logos, and that of procession to the Holy Ghost. "The act of intelligence (*intelligere*) supposes an image of the object known, therefore corresponding to God's knowledge of himself in the generation of his Son as his perfect image. Love, on the other hand, denotes an inclination of the spirit towards another.† The Holy Ghost is the mutual love between the Father and the Son; therefore the procession from both corresponds to the being of the Holy Ghost. As the Father expresses (*knows*) within himself the essence of all the creatures through the begotten Word, inasmuch as the begotten Word represents the Father and all the creatures after a perfect manner, so he *loves* himself and all the creatures in the Holy Ghost." Thomas declares that a knowledge of the doctrine of the Trinity is necessary in order to a right understanding of the doctrine of creation. "When it is taught that God created all things by his Word, this doctrine excludes the error of those who suppose that God produced all things by a natural necessity. By the doctrine of the procession of love, it is shown that God produced the creatures not because he needed to do so, nor for any other reason urging him from without, but from love to his own goodness. But especially is this doctrine necessary in order to right views respecting the salvation of mankind, since this has been brought about by the incarnate Son, and by the gift of the Holy Ghost."

lecto.—Secundum operationem voluntatis invenitur in nobis quædam alia processio, scilicet processio amoris, secundum quam amatum est in amante, sicut per conceptionem verbi res dicta vel intellecta est in intelligente.

* Non enim est processio amoris nisi in ordine ad processionem verbi, nihil enim potest voluntate amari, nisi sit in intellectu conceptum.

† Hæc est differentia inter intellectum et voluntatem, quod intellectus sit in actu secundum suam similitudinem, voluntas autem sit in actu, non per hoc, quod aliqua similitudo voliti sit in voluntate, sed ex hoc, quod voluntas habet quandam inclinationem in rem volitam, as he afterwards says, secundum rationem impellentis et moventis in aliquid.

With this theory correspond also the views expressed by Raymund Lull. The divine principle of all existence he finds in the Father; the instrumental cause in the Son; the end, where all things find their rest, he designates as the Holy Ghost.* “Because in the Holy Ghost all things find their end and their rest, he begets no other person. The Father and Son have respect through love to one end, and the same is the Holy Ghost.† All that God knows *within* himself (in contradistinction from his knowledge of things placed without himself) is God. In so far as love within God’s essence terminates in a product, it is a person; in so far as it is not anything produced, it is his own essence. In so far as the Father knows himself as Father, he begets the Son; because the Father and Son through love contemplate each other, they beget the Holy Ghost. The divine productivity begins with the Father and terminates in the Holy Ghost.”‡ “The distinction of the divine persons,” says he, “leads us to perceive that the divine perfections are not inactive by reason of their infinite fulness; § because God is quite as much God by acting as by being, he has, by his own essence, different persons. No existence is possible without distinction.”|| Like Abelard, he considered the Trinity as an exhaustive designation of the most perfect essence.¶ In his disputes with the Mohammedans, he

* Quælibet divinarum rationum est principium per patrem in filio et per filium est medium et per spiritum sanctum est quies et finis.

† Quælibet divinarum rationum est principium per patrem in filio et per filium est medium et per spiritum sanctum est quies et finis. Id, propter quod spiritus sanctus non producit personam, est, ut appetitus cujuslibet rationis in illo habeat finem et quietem. Quia pater et filius per amorem se habent ad unum finem, ille finis est spiritus sanctus. See the section concerning the Son of God, in the liber proverbiorum.

‡ What he here says of the divine productivity, he expresses also in his proverbii, in the following enigmatical style: Deus, in quantum intelligit, se posse Deum, producit Deum et in quantum intelligit se esse Deum, non producit Deum. Quia pater et filius intelligunt, quod possint Deum, producunt Deum.

§ Distinctio divinarum personarum est, ut divinæ rationes non sint otiosæ de infinitate.

|| Quia Deus est tantum Deus per agere, quantum per existere, habet in sua essentia distinctas personas. Nulla substantia potest esse sine distinctione, sine distinctione non esset quidquam.

¶ Tua perfectio laudetur et benedicatur, quæ demonstratur in te ratione tuæ sanctæ trinitatis, quia ratione personæ patris intelligimus tuam potestatem esse perfectam, et ratione personæ filii intelligimus

frequently employed the following argument: "Without the doctrine of the Trinity, we should be driven to suppose an eternal creation; otherwise, we must detract from the idea of God's perfection. The goodness of God cannot be conceived as inoperative; but without the doctrine of the Trinity we should be compelled to represent it to ourselves as being so until the creation. To the very essence of the highest goodness belongs self-communication. This can be conceived as a perfect act only in the doctrine of the Trinity."

Thomas Aquinas acknowledges, that a beginning of creation is simply a matter of faith; that such a beginning cannot be proved by arguments; the hypothesis of an eternal creation cannot be refuted. Thereby the causality of God in relation to the world is by no means denied: since we must conceive of God's act of creation as out of time, as an act not in succession. And if it be conceived as always existing, the world is not made eternal, in the same sense as God is, because the divine being excludes all succession.*

The teleological point of view led the schoolmen to investigate the question respecting the end of the creation. Bonaventura starts the inquiry, whether the glory of God, or the good of the creature, is to be considered as this ultimate end; which question came to the knowledge of the schoolmen in its connection with the inquiry respecting the supreme good, and that in its connection with and bearing on the system of morals. Bonaventura, after having stated the reasons on both sides, determines in favour of the former. "The highest end is God's glory; for God creates all things for his own sake; not to obtain glory for himself—which would be inconsistent with his all-sufficiency—or to augment that glory, but in order to display and to communicate it; and in the manifestation of God's glory, and a participation in it, consists the highest good of his creatures. Although in creatures it would be selfish to seek their own glory, yet it is otherwise with God; for here there can be no difference between the particu-

tuam sapientiam esse perfectam et ratione personæ spiritus sancti intelligimus tuum benignum amorem esse plenum omni perfectione. Liber contemplationis in Deum, vol. I. Lib. II. Distinct. 22, c. c. T. IX. f. 219.

* Quia esse divinum est esse totum simul absque successione. S. Theol. p. i. Qu. 46, art. ii.

lar and the universal good. He is himself the highest good. If he had not respect, therefore, in all he does, to himself, what he does would not be good."

The shaping of the theology of which we are now endeavouring to give an account, certainly proceeded from an age of predominating supernaturalism, when the latter occupied and pervaded the whole spiritual atmosphere. The idea of the miracle, therefore, exercised a vast power on the minds of theologians. Since it was in fact, however, as we have shown by many examples, that the prevailing view of the miracle was not an isolating, fleshly-Jewish view of the matter, but the genuinely Christian mode of taking the miracle in connection with everything else belonging to the evolution of the divine life, so that the latter was considered the end and centre of all;* therefore, these theologians felt constrained to define the miracle, not according to the dead, mechanical view of God's relation to the world, but according to their own view of that relation,—a view which was animated, no less by a lively religious than by a profoundly speculative spirit. They must seek to point out the congruity of such an idea with their view of their creation, as a timeless act of God, with the active omnipresence of God, with a divine plan of the universe, binding together everything in organical coherence. Let us consider all this more in detail.

Abelard regarded the whole course of the world as a realization of the ideal order of the universe planned by the divine reason. By the one day, in the history of the creation, he understands: "That whole activity of God, by virtue of which he planned in his own mind the entire circle of existence, realized in the work of six days."† In the phenomenal world is manifested what was present in the divine idea; the work and the idea correspond exactly together.‡ It is this system of the ideal order of the world which is meant, when the word of God is spoken of in which he created all

* See before, Vol. VII. p. 352.

† Diem unum vocat totam illorum operum Dei consummationem, prius in mente habitam et in opere postmodum sexta die completam. *Expositio in Hexaëmeron*. l. c. Martene et Durand, T. V. f. 1372.

‡ Quasi enim de sinu quodam secreti sui singula Deus producit, dum exhibet opere, quod antea conceperat mente nec a conceptu dissidet opus, dum quod mente disponitur, opere completur.

things. It is evident from this, that there is nothing accidental, sudden, isolated; nothing that is not in conformity with reason.* Hence, the Platonic distinction between a *mundus intelligibilis* (κοσμος νοητός) and a *mundus sensibilis* (κοσμος αισθητός) seems to him to be according to truth. "If we look at this system only, which is grounded in the divine plan of the universe, there are no exceptions; everything belongs to it in like manner, as internal parts; in this regard, there is no difference between natural and supernatural." He considers, it is true, everything that takes place, as in like manner a work of God's omnipotence, as we might infer from his conception of that attribute above explained; and for this very reason, he must say, that in relation to the divine omnipotence, abstractly considered, nothing is a miracle:† but he distinguishes, in *the effects of God's omnipotence*, those which correspond to the powers and laws originally placed in the creation, whereby the latter are only called into activity, and those, to which those powers and laws would be inadequate, which evidence new powers introduced by God into the creation. This is what is meant when things are said to take place contrary to the "course of nature;" that is, the ordinary course of nature. This is what is meant by the supernatural.‡ Concerning such effects as these last, he says, that God thereby puts to shame the rules of the philosophers, because they are facts which the original laws of creation are inadequate to account for.§ "When," says Abelard, "we examine into the powers of nature, or natural causes, we by no means look at that original act of God that formed the plan of the universe, where the agency of nature is to be considered identical with the will of God; but we have regard in this case solely to the

* Cuncta Deum condidisse in verbo, hoc est in sapientia sua ostenditur, id est nihil subito, vel temere, sed omnia rationabiliter ac provide. L. c. f. 1369.

† Excellentia divinæ potentiae, quam constat ex propria natura quicquid decrevit posse.

‡ Contra naturam vel præter naturam fieri, eo quod primordialium causarum institutio ad hoc minime sufficere posset, nisi Deus præter solitum propria voluntate vim quandam rebus impertiret, ut hoc inde fieri posset. Theol. christian. L. III. f. 1133.

§ Deus philosophorum regulas in factis suis frequenter cassat, cum videlicet aliqua nova contra naturam facit sive supra naturam hoc est supra hoc, quod prima institutio rerum potest. L. c. Lib. II. f. 1074.

work of the six days, the groundwork of the constitution of the world as then given.* We speak of that original constitution of nature which was so arranged as to bring to pass all things out of itself, without a miracle."† He compares miracles, considered as effects of a new power introduced by God into the system of nature, with the original creative act of God, which first called the universe into being, when his will alone held the place of nature in all that he did.‡ By thus distinguishing from one another the ideal, divine constitution of the world, embracing at once natural and supernatural, and the ordinary course of nature corresponding to the powers and laws originally planted by God in nature, Abelard confuted that presumption of worldly wisdom, which, referring all phenomena to one law, denied the possibility of miracles. "When philosophers," says he, "call an event that takes place by miracle an impossibility, or a thing contrary to the course of nature, as, for instance, the birth from a virgin, the seeing of the blind,—they really have regard to the ordinary course of nature, or original natural causes ;§ not to the sublimity of the divine power, which is able to bring to pass all that it has determined, and to change the very nature of things, so as to bring to pass uncommon events as it pleases.|| The mistake of these philosophers is, that they confine their views to the nature of things created, and to every day experience, and pay no regard, or scarcely any, to the divine omnipotence, which

* Nullatenus nos modo, cum in aliquibus rerum effectis vim naturæ vel causas naturales requirimus, id nos facere secundum illam priorem Dei operationem in constitutione mundi, ubi sola Dei voluntas naturæ efficaciam habuit in illis tunc creandis vel disponendis, sed tantum ab illa operatione sex diebus completa. Expositio in Hexaëm. L. c. Martene et Durand, T. V. f. 1378.

† Deinceps vim naturæ pensare solemus, tunc videlicet rebus ipsis jam ita præparatis, ut ad quælibet sine miraculis facienda illa eorum constituti vel præparatio sufficeret.

‡ Unde illa, quæ per miracula fiunt, magis contra vel supra naturam, quam secundum naturam fieri fatemur, cum ad illud scilicet faciendum nequaquam illo rerum præparatio prior sufficere possit, nisi quandam vim novam rebus ipsis Deus conferret, sicut et in illis sex diebus faciebat, ubi sola ejus voluntas vim naturæ obtinebat in singulis efficiendis.

§ Ad usitatum naturæ cursum vel ad primordiales rerum causas respiciunt. *Introduct. ad theol. Lib. III. p. 1133.*

|| Quam videlicet constat ex propria natura quicquid decrevit posse et præter solitum ipsas rerum naturas quocunque voluerit modo permutare,

controls all nature, and whose will nature, properly so called, obeys.* When they call a thing, therefore, possible or impossible, conformable or contrary to nature, they do not measure that thing by the standard of the divine omnipotence."

It is plain, from what has been said, that Abelard himself, in rejecting, as we have before related, the miraculous stories of his own times, did so by no means on the ground of philosophical principles, hostile to the reception of miracles. Nor was it his opinion that miracles must necessarily be confined to a certain limited period in the history of the church. On the contrary, he declared against those who said that miracles had ceased, because the church no longer needed them for the conversion of unbelievers. "As faith without works is dead," said he, "miracles no doubt are needed, together with other means for the quickening of faith. And even if we stop with the conversion of unbelievers, as the end of miracles, there is no lack, even now, of heretics, pagans, and Jews." He ascribed the cessation of miracles to the fault of his contemporaries. It was because so very few were to be found who were worthy of such a grace; because every man desired it, not for the saving good of others, but for the gratification of his own vanity. To such extent had that faith disappeared, of which our Saviour spake, when he said, "If ye had faith like a grain of mustard-seed."

Though Abelard was attacked on many sides from the supernaturalistic position held by the majority in his times, still the endeavour to find a point of conciliation between the supernatural and the natural was common to all the great teachers of the thirteenth century. They supposed, with Abelard, things relatively rather than absolutely supernatural. To distinguish in what sense a thing might be conceived to take place, *contra* or *supra naturam*, and in what sense not,—all depended, in their opinion, upon rightly distinguishing the different conceptions of nature itself. Thus Alexander of Hales distinguishes nature as self-active, and as passive, receptive (the *potentia activa* and *susceptiva*, the *possibilitas activa* and *passiva*), nature as the material lying at the ground of all things, and nature considered as the form of manifestations.

* Omnes eorum régulas infra eam vel extra eam penitus consistere.

“As it concerns the former, nature is so constituted by the Creator of nature—who embraces all things in his plan of creation, whose works all cohere together—as to produce whatsoever can in any way be formed out of her or be wrought in her, whether it be in the ordinary course of nature or by miracles. She is so constituted, that the divine will, which all things must subserve, is accomplished in her; and in this respect there is nothing contrary to the course of nature, nothing supernatural.* But miracles are effects which suppose the creative inworking of God, to the accomplishing of which the self-activity of nature is inadequate; and so in this respect, as transcending nature, they are to be denominated supernatural, and things at variance with the form in which the self-activity of nature exhibits itself. The miracle, as a new form struck upon nature, is *contra naturam* (*præter* or *supra naturam*; as *potentia activa*, *potentia ad actum*; *contra naturam, quæ dicitur forma*.)” Accordingly, in reference to the *potentia obedientialis* or *passiva* in nature, he could say of the miracle, that the constitution for it is one hidden in nature, which is brought into activity by the divine omnipotence; and he could therefore define the miracle as an act of God, calling forth that which is hidden in nature (hidden, that is, in relation to the *potentia obedientiæ*) into activity, as a display of his almighty wisdom.†

So, too, Albertus Magnus takes the supernatural in connection with the divine constitution of the world. He sees in everything that takes place, be it natural or supernatural, the realization of the constitution of the world in the divine reason, or the eternal Word, which alike embraces all things,—the divine ideas (*rationes, quæ sunt in verbo*), in which everything that comes into being shines beforehand; in which it was predetermined what should exist, and when and after what manner it should exist. These are the *primordiales rerum causæ simpliciter*. They exist from eternity; and in these God pre-

* Nothing *contra naturam, quæ est materia primitus ordinata possibilis ad formas, quæ sunt cursu naturæ et quæ sunt cursu mirabili, potentia obedientiæ ad omnia opera divina sive mediante natura sive immediate creata est a principio.*

† *Miraculum est opus occultas naturas in actum reducens ad ostensionem sapientiæ virtuosæ. Summa, p. ii. Qu. xlii.*

figures what should come into being in the works of nature, of grace, and in the kingdom of glory, according to the ordinary course of nature, or according to the order of grace or by miracles; and nothing can ever take place except what has here been determined. He distinguishes, like Alexander of Hales, that which is grounded in the receptive, original constitution of nature, is prepared in it as to possibility, and that which may come to exist through the agency of the powers dwelling in her, her own self-activity. "If we look at the former,* there is given in every creature the capacity for everything which can be formed out of it by the will of God. And in this regard one may say, that in nature, in the original creation, was implanted this possibility, as well in relation to that which takes place according to the ordinary course of nature as in relation to miracles.† In this sense, an event may not be contradictory to nature, even though it should contradict the ordinary course of nature.‡ But if we look at the second, that which takes place according to the ordinary course of nature is grounded in the original forces of nature (*materiæ naturali insertum*), is implanted in the matter of the world; but what takes place in a miraculous manner lies hid within God's almighty power and constitution of the world, for God has from eternity arranged, in his eternal Word, whatsoever takes place, and when and how it shall take place, and with this divine arrangement nothing can interfere.§ If we understand nature in the highest sense, the *primordiales causas primæ conditionis*, and *rationes causales*, then nothing seems to take place contrary to the original nature of things (*contra naturam primo insitam rebus*); for, in the sense described, God has also implanted the *causales rationes et primordiales* of miracles in things. With these God cannot be at variance, any more than he can deny himself, deny his own

* The prima radix possibilitatis obedientiæ.

† Possibilitas tam ad consuetum naturæ, quam ad miracula in principio conditionis inserta est materiæ naturali.

‡ Not quod Deus faciat contra legem naturæ æquissimam et naturalissimam, quam ipse naturæ indidit, sed contra consuetum et nobis notum cursum naturæ.

§ Hence the distinction: Potentiæ sive rationes sive virtutes ad miracula non sunt inditæ materiæ mundi nisi per potentiam obedientiæ, per rationes autem causales in Deo sunt.

wisdom.* It is necessary, therefore, to distinguish from one another that which nature is capable of producing by the forces implanted in her, and by her own agency, and that in which she shows herself simply passive in relation to a higher inworking. Thus, God has furnished nature with everything requisite for the realization of the ends correspondent to her, but so constituted her, at the same time, that she should receive into herself still higher powers, and produce still higher effects." † He distinguishes that which takes place *contra, præter* and *supra naturam*. The first is when God, according to his secret plan of the world, the ideas in which all things were prefigured (*ex causis rationalibus in se ipso absconditis*) produces, from some object or other, a thing which had not already been prefigured and prepared in it by the seminal principle implanted within it (*quod seminaliter non inest in ipso*). *Præter naturam* is that which does not in itself, indeed, transcend the power of nature, that which has been produced from these powers bearing within themselves, by constitution and in the germ, everything that is at some time or other to appear in manifestation; ‡ but which, however, could not of itself proceed from the developing process of nature from within herself, but presupposes a certain inworking from without upon the forces hidden within her, § an impulse whereby the process of natural development is hastened, the separated forces in her are rapidly concentrated, so that something is accomplished at once, which nature could have produced only through a gradual and slow development. || *Supra naturam*, but not *contra naturam*, is that which could not come about indeed at all by natural powers, which therefore is purely supernatural, like the second; but which still,

* Sicut non potest facere contra seipsum, ita non potest facere contra rationes illas et contra opus suum sapienter dispositum.

† Quod creator nihil commodorum negavit naturæ in his, quæ sunt in natura secundum causales rationes sufficienter deducentes ad actum, quia in his passivum proportionatum est activo et e converso activum passivo. In his autem, quæ tantum obediencialiter sunt in natura et quæ secundum causales rationes pertinent ad causam superiorem, negavit commoda, quia hæc ad naturam non pertinent, sed ad causam superiorem.

‡ The causæ seminales.

§ Non modo natura ab intrinsecus generante, sed extrinsecus adhibitis motibus et fomentis.

|| Hoc quod secundum ordinem naturæ paulatim operantis produceretur, velocius et repente producitur.

however, stands so related to nature as to find first in her its completion, as, for example, the appearance of Christ.* He affirms, again, a certain analogy between the natural and supernatural, in so far as, in fact, even that whereby corrupted nature is restored, must be the same with, or sometimes similar to, that whereof the nature was originally constituted.† Thomas Aquinas unfolds this idea as follows: ‡—“If we look at the order of the world as it proceeds from the primal cause, nothing can happen contrary to this order of the world, which has its ground in God; for if God brought to pass anything at variance with it, he would act against his foreknowledge, his will, or his goodness. But if we look at the order of the world, as it is grounded in the cosmical chain of causes and effects,§ then God may bring to pass something *præter ordinem rerum*, understood according to this latter sense, because he is not tied and limited to this series of causes and effects; but, on the contrary, the order of the world thereon reposing depends on him, as it proceeds from him, not by any necessity of nature, but by his own freewill. As the *ordo naturæ* is implanted by God in things (*ordo rebus inditus*), so that which takes place *præter hunc ordinem*, is not contrary to nature.” He now raises the objection, “God would be a mutable being, if he acted contrary to the order of things established by himself.” To this he replies, “That God, in implanting a certain order in things, still reserved to himself the right of sometimes, for cause, acting otherwise. || Considered in reference to the divine omnipotence, nothing, we must allow, can be called a miracle; for, compared with this, everything is little.

“The miracle is so called only in reference to the capability

* Quod in potestate naturæ nullo modo potest esse, et tamen ad naturam se habet ut perfectio naturæ.

† Sunt ad simile in specie causæ seminales et obedientiales, et hoc ideo, quod seminales sunt ad institutionem naturæ, obedientiales autem et causales ad corruptæ naturæ restaurationem nec potest corrupta natura restaurari nisi per eadem aut similia, quibus instituta est, et ideo omne miraculum deducit ad aliquid simile naturæ. See the Summa, p. ii. Tract. viii. Quæst. xxx. seqq.

‡ Summa, Lib. I. Quæst. .cv. Artic. vi.

§ The causæ secundæ.

|| Quod Deus sic rebus certum ordinem indidit, ut tamen sibi ipsi reservaret, quod ipse aliquando aliter ex causa esset factururus. Unde, cum præter hunc ordinem agit, non mutatur.

of nature, which some event transcends.* Hence, different degrees of miraculous powers may be supposed." In his inquiry respecting the idea of the miracle, in his commentary on the Sentences,† he starts, like Albertus Magnus, with making the distinction between the *rationes causales vel obedientiales* and the *rationes seminales* in nature. And he, too, places the supernatural, not in an infringement of the former, but of the latter. Accurately understood, however, the miracle, even in relation to the latter, is not an event running counter to them, but exalted above them,—one that takes place independent of them:‡ an event exalted above them when God produces an effect which nature must ever fall short of, as the form of a glorified body; or when he produces an effect, to which nature is competent, without the mediation of natural causes, as in the changing of water into wine. But he does nothing contrary to nature; for he cannot so order it that the operative causes in nature, while still remaining the same in kind, should produce essentially different effects, any more than that a thing should be the same and different at the same time. In the second book § he distinguishes two several conceptions of the miraculous: the relatively such to a particular individual, when the natural causes which gave rise to the phenomenon are concealed from him; and the miraculous in itself, the cause of which is one *simpliciter occulta*; so that if the powers of nature had been followed, it must have taken place otherwise. || Of this kind is whatever is brought to pass immediately by the divine power, which is the most hidden of causes.¶ How miracles are comprised in the divine order of the world, and serve, along with the effects that proceed from natural causes, to reveal the divine providence, he explains again in his work *Contra gentes,*** in perfect accordance with what he teaches

* Quod nihil potest dici miraculum ex comparatione potentiae divinae, quia quodcumque factum divinae potentiae comparatum est minimum. Sed dicitur aliquid miraculum per comparationem ad facultatem naturae, quam excedit. Summa, Lib. I. Qu. cv. Art. viii.

† Distinct. 42, Qu. ii. Art. ii.

‡ Proprie loquendo tunc etiam contra eas non facit, sed praeter eas vel supra eas. § Distinct. 18, Quæst. i. Artic. iii.

|| Ita etiam, quod in re est aliqua virtus secundum rei veritatem, per quam aliter debeat contingere.

¶ Hæc proprie miracula, quasi in seipsis et simpliciter mira.

** Lib. III. c. xcix.

in the *Summa*. "There are, indeed," he says in his latter work, "many abnormal effects in nature which do not correspond with what usually takes place, while still the order of providence in nowise changes. If, then, it may be so brought about by creaturely power, that the course of nature, without any change of the divine providence, may suffer such change as to allow of phenomena deviating from what commonly appear, then, *à fortiori*, the divine power may, without any infringement on providence, sometimes bring to pass an event otherwise than as it would take place in the natural order of things. This serves especially to make it manifest that all nature is subject to God's will, and that the order of nature does not spring from a natural necessity, but from his free-will; and it can be no matter of surprise that God should effect something in nature with a view to reveal himself to the souls of men, when we consider that rational beings are the end in which all corporeal being terminates. But the end of rational beings is the knowledge of God; it can be no matter of surprise, therefore, if a change should take place in corporeal nature for the purpose of communicating to rational beings the knowledge of God." Raymund Lull refers those who refuse to admit anything supernatural to the creation of the world from nothing, as the greatest miracle.* "In nature," says he, "are many and great mysteries; and the human understanding is not competent to know and comprehend all the works of nature, for the power of nature to work according to her own course is far greater than the power of the human soul to understand the works of nature.† If, then, man finds himself so limited in the knowledge of nature, how should he be able to understand everything supernatural, especially if he is disposed to conceive what lies beyond the limits of nature as something embraced within them?" ‡ "Neither

* Valde mirum est, Domine, de hominibus discredentibus, nam quoniam negant et discredunt esse rem contra cursum naturæ, quare non respiciunt nec perpendunt esse mundi, quod est magis impossibile secundum cursum naturæ, quam sit impossibile, te esse Deum et hominem simul? nam mundus de privatione devenit in esse per tuam voluntatem et non per cursum naturæ, T. IX. f. 39.

† Adeo magna et multa sunt secreta naturæ, quod non possint omnia percipi ab homine, quoniam multo major est possibilitas, quam natura habet ad operandum secundum suum cursum.

‡ Et maxime si hoc inquirat intra terminos naturæ, intra quos non

the natural nor the supernatural," he affirms, "can be rightly understood except in their connection with each other. The understanding of the one conditions the understanding of the other."* The tendency to the supernatural he considers as the characteristic of the Christian age and position, proceeding from faith in the incarnation of God, as compared with antiquity, which leaned towards nature.†

In connection with the doctrine of miracles, we should here notice the peculiar views of Roger Bacon, who endeavours to explain certain marvels wrought by the power of man's *word*, from the potentiated natural power of mind, to which the uttered word serves as a natural organ. "Every action of man is stronger and mightier when he bends his mind therewith firmness of purpose, and confidently expects to compass what he aims at. And because the word is formed out of the thought and longing of man's heart, and man has his joy in it, and it is the most connatural instrument of the rational soul, therefore has it the power of producing the greatest effects of all that is done by man; especially when it proceeds from a sure intention, a great desire, and a strong confidence. A proof of this is, that all the miracles wrought by holy men were, from the first, performed by the power of words."‡

sunt inclusæ res, quæ non sunt secundum cursum naturæ? T. IX. f. 401.

* Opera naturæ percipiuntur per opera, quæ sunt supra naturam, et opera, quæ sunt supra naturam, percipiuntur per opera naturæ, quoniam alia sunt aliis occasio, ut percipiantur. L. c. f. 402.

† Benedictus sis, Domine, quia a tempore tuæ incarnationis plus tractant et cogitant homines in tuis operibus, quam in operibus naturæ, et per hoc significatur, quod ipsi sint plus in tempore gratiæ post tuam incarnationem, quam ante ipsam, quando philosophi plus tractabant de operibus naturæ, quam de tuis. De contemplat. in Deum, Vol. II. Lib. III. Dist. 28, c. cli. f. 349.

‡ Omnis operatio hominis est fortior et impetuosior, quando ad eam est multum sollicitus et voluntarius et fixo proposito firmat intentionem et sperat firmiter, se posse consequi, quod intendit. Quia verbum ab interioribus membris naturalibus generatur et formatur ex cogitatione et sollicitudine, et delectatur homo in eo, et propriissimum est instrumentum animæ rationalis, ideo maximam efficaciam habet inter omnia, quæ fiunt ab homine, præcipue cum ex intentione certa, desiderio magno et vehementi confidentia profertur. Cujus signum est, quod omnia fere miracula, quæ facta sunt per sanctos, a principio fiebant per virtutem verborum. Opus majus, f. 252.

When we enter into the investigations of these theologians, respecting the relation of the divine foreknowledge and predestination to creaturely freedom, we ought not to forget, that the Augustinian system swayed the religious consciousness and thinking of this age; as in fact, this ground-tendency ever constituted the most important difference, though the one of which there was the least consciousness on both sides, between the occidental and the oriental churches. Starting from the principles of Augustin, these writers were carried, by the stern consistency of monistic speculation, to the point of sacrificing the freedom of the creature, notwithstanding all their pains to rescue it. And here, too, while we see how a well-authorized practical interest was forced to give way, in speculative minds, to the stiff and rigid consistency of thought, we cannot fail to mark also the extent of mischief which arose from a confounding of the philosophical and religious points of view in theology. But the power of the ethical element within them, and their good sense, appear in this, that they attempted, at least in appearance, to maintain freedom, to remove the causality of evil from God, and to avoid everything calculated to shock the moral sensibility of mankind. Their skilful dialectics, and their custom of resorting to the arts which Augustin had already employed in such a variety of ways, stood them greatly in stead.

Anselm composed a tract on the question, How divine foreknowledge and predestination could be reconciled with freewill? He makes out an answer by resorting to distinctions, which might serve the purpose, no doubt, of guarding against many misconceptions, many extravagant and ugly positions; but which were not suited to remove the real difficulty. His doctrine is this: "Divine foreknowledge by no means excludes free self-determination. The necessary and the free, God knows beforehand, each in its own way. All depends on distinguishing the standing-point of eternity and that of development in time. As there is no contradiction in this, that, viewed from the standing point of eternity, everything is an immediate present, which in the unfolding of time is a past and a future, so it easily admits also of being reconciled, that what from the standing-point of eternity exhibits itself as immutable and necessary, should, in relation to temporal development, appear to be free and mutable, as de-

pendent on the creaturely free self-determination.* Paul, in Rom. viii. 28, employs the perfect tense,—even when speaking of an action yet future,—for the purpose of denoting, by this circumstance, that he had not in view here a temporal action, but was constrained to use this expression—by the poverty of language—to denote the immediate presence of eternity ;† since that which is once past is immutable, like the eternal.”‡ Now it is quite evident that, by this distinction of the two points of view, nothing is gained as yet for the defence of freedom. This distinction would much rather serve directly to make contingency a mere appearance, necessary in order to temporal development,—so that what is fixed in the divine plan of the world as something necessary, should be actually realized only in the form of a seeming contingency. Anselm himself cannot avoid observing the consequences which might be derived from his positions: “Must not the causes of good and evil fall back, then, on God, if he knows nothing as a mere fact (therefore, not even evil), but his foreknowledge precedes everything?” To this he answers, that “Everything positive comes from God; but evil is a negative thing. Even in evil actions, all that is positive comes from him, but not evil, which consists just in the want of that *rectitudo voluntatis*, which comes from God.”§ By these distinctions, however, when taken in connection with the positions above noticed, the acknowledgment of a freedom simply self-determining,—not determined from without, as the cause of evil,—is by no means placed clearly beyond doubt. There is something more real in the acute distinctions, by means of which Hugo a St. Victore endeavours to make the freedom in sin consistent with the acknowledgment of the divine omnipotence and providence to which all things are subjected. He says: “We must distinguish from each other the act of willing in itself, and the direction of the will to a particular

* Hoc propositum, secundum quod vocati sunt sancti, in æternitate, in qua non est præteritum vel futurum, sed tantum præsens, immutabile est, sed in ipsis hominibus ex libertate arbitrii aliquando est mutabile.

† Propter indigentiam verbi, significantis æternam præsentiam, usum esse verbis præteritæ significationis.

‡ Ad similitudinem æterni præsentis omnino immutabilia.

§ Deus facit omnes actiones et omnes motus, quia ipse facit res, a quibus et ex quibus et per quas et in quibus fiunt.

object. Willing in itself is purely the act of the man; but as soon as it directs itself to particular objects, it finds itself limited by the divine order of the world, so that it can take only the direction where the way has been left open for it by the latter. Accordingly, evil, in its manifestation, is limited by the divine order of the world; and must, like all things else, be subservient to the same.”*

Proceeding on the foundation laid in the twelfth century, the theologians of the thirteenth carried their investigations still further. Alexander of Hales, also, starts with the position that what takes place in time cannot stand to the divine knowledge in the relation of a mere datum or fact, because the temporal cannot be conceived as the cause of the eternal, nor the knowledge of God as depending on something else. In order to reconcile the divine foreknowledge with the contingency of free actions, he distinguishes that which is necessary in itself and that which is necessary in certain connections, under certain suppositions,—unconditional and conditioned necessity.† Alexander of Hales is the first of these schoolmen in whom we meet with the notion of a “fate;” and this notion from henceforth becomes a dominant one in the scholastic theology. When we look at the divine order of the world, as it exists in the divine reason, we have the idea of Providence. When we look at its manifestations, in the series of causes and effects in the phenomenal world, we are presented with the idea of “fate.”‡ Foreknowledge, in so far as it is the *exemplaris ratio* in the *arte divina*, is called *providentia*; in so far as it exhibits itself in *re vel effectu operis*, it is called *fatum*. Freewill and fate stand in no contradiction with each other; for if by fate must be understood the co-operation of all causes directed by some

* In velle et vitium est, in quantum velle ex voluntate mala, et ordo est, in quantum ad hoc vel ad hoc ex disponente est. Potest ergo voluntas mala in se corrumpi et resolvi per proprium vitium, quod ei aliunde non datur, sed non potest per velle extra se præcipitari, nisi qua ei via aperitur. God is not auctor ruendi, sed incedendi ordinator. De sacramentis fidei, Lib. I. p. v. c. xxix.

† Necessitas consequentiæ et necessitas consequentis, necessitas antecedens et necessitas consequens, necessitas absoluta et ordinis.

‡ The distinction: Dispositio, quæ est in disponente et dispositio, quæ est in re disposita. Dispositio in disponente est exemplar, dispositio in disposito est ordo deductus ab ipso exemplari et est forma exemplata in ipsa re.

higher law, then freewill is one of those causes.* By it, the operations of free, as well as of natural causes are all directed together, after a manner corresponding to their respective and proper essences. The actions of freewill are prevented only by the connection in which fate places them from overstepping the limits prescribed by Divine Providence.† God knows evil, but it is from the good; as the same art embraces the knowledge of that which agrees with its laws, and of that which violates them. So, if light could see itself and its effects, it would know that one thing is receptive of light, and another not—which is the same as darkness; by means of itself, then, it would know itself and darkness.” Alexander of Hales reckons evil as something that contributes to display the harmony of the universe: “By comparison with the evil, the good shines forth more conspicuously in its own essence.”‡ After the same manner, Albertus Magnus: “The primal ground and original type of all that is done, or can be done, whether by men or by angels, is the divine Providence.§ Fate is that orderly arrangement, originating in Providence, which is stamped on the whole series of created things, and reveals itself in the connection of natural and voluntary causes.|| Providence and fate are distinguished from each other, as type and antitype, formative cause and the form actually incorporated in things.¶ The *causæ contingentes*, as well as freewill,—the true and proximate causes of whatever takes place,—though subordinated to fate, do not lose their causality; and thus the same effects under different relations spring from providence, from fate, and from freewill. By fate, evil itself is ordered for good,—that is to say, so ordered that good must come out of it;** and evil, in relation to the

* *Ipsum liberum nostrum arbitrium est una causarum, secundum cujus ordinationem ad suos effectus currit series fati.*

† *Connexione fatali coërcentur ab evagatione limitum divinæ providentiæ sive determinatorum a divina providentia.*

‡ *Propter ipsam bonorum pulchritudinem permisit Deus mala fieri.*

§ *Prima ratio et forma exemplaris.*

|| *The dispositio exemplata a providentia, influxa et impressa rebus creatis secundum totum ordinem causarum naturalium et voluntariarum rebus inhærens et quasi impressa et incorporata rebus creatis.*

¶ *Ut exemplar et exemplatum, causa influens et forma influxa.*

** *Ipsum malum ordinem boni habet, ut scilicet bonum eliciatur ab ipso.*

whole, is evil no longer; it is taken up by the order of fate, which does not compel to evil, but subdues it to order when it has once broken in."* Albert endeavours to point out, from the analogy of nature, the connection between God's creative, preserving, and governing agency, the connection between creation and providence,—how one is already implied in the other: "As in nature, it is the same power which brings forth a formative principle in the seed, produces from the seed, and guides that which is produced, in its development,† by extending its influence to each member in particular, and at the same time communicates to the entire product a quality and character, by virtue of which each individual member is conducted onward to its proper destination, and each finds its right place in the order of the whole;‡ so in the Creator of the whole world, the power is the same by which he created the world, and by which he continues to work in each individual thing, and in the organism of the whole,—appointing to each its proper place, and guiding the development of all the individuals in the connected system, so that every individual maintains its proper position in the order of the whole.§

The rigid consistency of thought, stiffly adhering to an abstract unity of principle, and impelling to the denial of freedom, in spite of every seeming affirmation of it, is most strongly apparent in Thomas Aquinas, as every one must see who—without allowing himself to be embarrassed by isolated expressions—brings together all that he says in different places into systematic connection; we shall endeavour to gather together the main points of his doctrine under such a total intuition. "God knows all things in an eternal manner, as immediately present.|| Hence, things contingent are also

* Quæ non cogit ad malum, sed etiam ipsum factum ordinat.

† Una et eadem virtus, quæ formativa est in semine et factiva sive generativa nati, quæ efficitur regitiva ejus, quod natum est.

‡ Eo quod influit unicuique membro particulariter et toti simul talem dispositionem, per quam unumquodque ad suum ordinem deducitur et singula in toto suis nectuntur ordinibus naturalibus.

§ Ut quæquæ ordinibus suis connectantur. Only occasionaliter ex ordinatione providentiæ mala fieri est bonum et utile et universitati et facienti et patienti.

|| Ejus intuitus fertur ab æterno supra omnia, prout sunt in sua præ-sentialitate.

known by God after an infallible manner, as present ; and still, the future is a thing contingent, when taken in connection *with the causes* from which it immediately proceeds.* Although the highest cause is one that operates with necessity, yet the effect may be something contingent, on account of the proximate cause, which is one that operates contingently." He affirms that God's will works many, not all things, after a necessary manner. Now, as a reason for this proposition, it was said by many that God works partly by necessary and partly by contingent causes. But against this view he had two objections: "First, the effect of the first cause may, in relation to the second cause, be a contingent one ; if the effect of the first cause is hindered by the deficiency of the second, as the effect of the sun may be hindered by a defect in the plant. But no defect in a second cause can prevent the will of God from bringing about its effect. Next, if we stopped short with the distinction of contingent and necessary causes, it would follow from this that something might proceed from the former in opposition to the will of God, which could not be reconciled with the fact of the divine omnipotence. Hence, we must prefer to seek the reason of it in the will of God. As this is the most mighty cause, so it follows not only that everything takes place that he wills, but also in the manner that he wills. But now it is God's will that some things should take place in a necessary, and others in a contingent manner, in order to the preservation of the order of the universe.† There are, then, but two different forms ordered to this end by God himself, in which forms his will is realized."‡ Connected with this is also the fact that Thomas Aquinas, in opposition to those who supposed a *grace* conditioned on the right use of free-will, and a *predestination* conditioned on the divine foreknowledge with regard to this right use, maintained that all this is already comprised among the effects of predestination and presupposed by it.§ It was

* Et tamen sunt futura contingentia, suis causis proximis comparata.

† Ut sit ordo in rebus ad complementum universi.

‡ Non igitur propterea effectus voliti a Deo eveniunt contingentem, quia causæ proximæ sunt contingentes, sed propterea, quia Deus voluit eos contingentem evenire, contingentes causas ad eos præparavit.

§ Manifestum est, quod id quod est gratiæ est prædestinationis effectus, et hoc non potest poni ut ratio prædestinationis, cum hoc sub prædestinatione concludatur.

impossible to distinguish what proceeded from free-will and what from predestination; as it was impossible also to distinguish what proceeded from the first, and what from the second cause; for the divine providence brings forth its effects *through* the agency of second causes. "All leads back to the goodness of God; to this must be traced the reason why some are predestinated, others reprobated. The goodness of God, which in itself is simple, must manifest itself in the phenomenal world after manifold ways; because created things cannot arrive at the simplicity of the divine essence. Hence, different grades, from the highest to the lowest point of the scale, were required in order to the completion of the universe; and to preserve these manifold stages and gradations in things, God permits many things evil to happen in order that much good may not be prevented.* The human race, as a whole, may be contemplated as the universe. It was God's will to manifest his goodness to a part of mankind,—those whom he had foreordained to this end, in the form of mercy sparing them; to others, the reprobate, in the form of punitive justice. And this is the reason why he elected some and rejected others; and the ground of this difference lies only in the divine will. It is the same with nature, where, indeed, a reason can be given why God caused a part of the one original matter to take the form of fire or of water; namely, in order that a diversity might exist among natural things; but why one part of the matter exists under this form and another part under that depends upon the simple will of God,—just as it depends solely on the will of the artisan why one stone is in this and another in that part of the wall,—though his art may render a reason why in general some stones are in this, others in that particular wall.† This idea of a necessary manifoldness in the universe is generally a predominant one with him. Such a manifoldness of creatures is necessary in order that one may

* *Necesse est, quod divina bonitas, quæ in se est una et simplex, multiformiter repræsentetur in rebus, propter hoc quod res creatæ ad simplicitatem divinam attingere non possunt. Et inde est, quod ad completionem universi requiruntur diversi gradus rerum, quarum quædam altum et quædam infimum locum teneant in universo. Et ut uniformitas graduum conservetur in rebus, Deus permittit aliqua mala fieri, ne multa bona impediatur.*

† *Summa, p. i. Quæst. xxiii. Artic. v.*

supply what another lacks in manifesting the divine goodness.* Thus also evil appears to him as necessary, in order to the completion of the universe in its manifoldness. "The universe is better and more complete, if there are some beings in it capable of falling from goodness, and who sometimes do actually fall, in that God does not prevent it; because it is the part of providence not to destroy nature, but to preserve it.† It is in the very nature of things, however, that a being who is capable of falling should sometimes actually fall.‡ And since, as Augustin remarks, God is so mighty that he can make even evil subservient to good, so much good would be wanting if there were no evil.§ In evil, as action, everything positive|| leads back to the first cause; but not so in reference to evil in itself, which consists in apostasy; just as in the case of a person who limps, all that belongs to the motion proceeds from the moving power, but that which is defective, not from this, but from the defect in the bone."¶

Knowledge in God, Thomas compares with the knowledge of the artist in relation to his work. "Knowledge, as knowledge, does not imply indeed causality; but in so far as it is a knowledge belonging to the artist who forms, it stands in the relation of causality to that which is produced by his art. The knowledge of the artist first shows the end; next, the will proposes this end; then the will prescribes the action, by which the idea conceived by knowledge is to be realized. But whatever occurs in the execution, through any deviation from the idea of the artist, or from the end proposed, cannot

* *Produxit res in esse, propter suam bonitatem communicandam creaturis et per eas representandam, et quia per unam creaturam sufficienter representari non potest, produxit multas creaturas et diversas, ut quod deest uni ad representandam divinam bonitatem, suppleatur ex alia; nam bonitas, quæ in Deo est simpliciter et uniformiter, in creaturis est multipliciter et divisim, unde perfectius participat divinam bonitatem et representat eam totum universum, quam alia quæcunque creatura.* Quæst. xlvii. Artic. i.

† According to Dionysius Areopagita.

‡ *Ipsa autem natura rerum hoc habet, ut quæ deficere possunt, quandoque deficient.*

§ Quæst. xlviii. Art. ii.

|| *Id quod habet entitatis et perfectionis.*

¶ *Et similiter quicquid est entitatis et actionis in actione mala, reducit in Deum sicut in causam, sed quod est ibi defectus, non causatur a Deo, sed ex causa secunda deficiente.*

be referred to the knowledge of the artist as the cause; therefore evil, which is a deviation from the divine idea and the divine end, cannot be referred to God's knowledge as the cause.* According to this it might seem as if, in the opinion of Thomas, evil must be considered as a thing having no place in the divine idea; that it is to be ascribed, as being a deviation from that idea, to creaturely freedom; hence arises a contrariety between that idea and its manifestation. Then the redemption only would be referred back to the divine causality, as an act of God for the removal of this contrariety that had sprung out of the abuse of creaturely freedom. But if we take what Thomas here says in connection with those thoughts of his which we have just before explained, it will be evident that he cannot ascribe so much importance to creaturely freedom, to the working of second causes, as to suppose that the accomplishment of the divine ideas should actually be hindered thereby for a single moment. According to his mode of contemplation, everything must, in the last resort, certainly be referred back to the divine causality; and everything appears only as a necessary instrumentality for its going into effect in the development of time. Evil itself appears as something necessary in the connected series of these instrumentalities; only, as evil, it has no place with the rest, in the divine idea. If we consider, again, that according to the doctrine of Thomas, God's knowledge is one with his being—his essence, it follows from this, that the form in which everything is involved in the phenomenal world, necessarily corresponds to the way in which everything is ordained from eternity in that knowledge which is identical with the divine being. No room is left remaining here for creaturely freedom as true causality. Consistently carried out, such a proposition would have produced a pantheistic monism, which, however, as the antagonist of Almaric of Bena, he would avoid. We have no need, on this point, to confine ourselves barely to the commentary of Thomas, on the book *De Causis*, with regard to which it might be said that, treating the matter altogether objectively, he

* Unde patet, quod malum, quod est deviatio a forma et a fine, non causatur a scientia Dei. In Sentent. Lib. I. Distinct. 38. Quæst. i. Artic. i.

has unfolded the views of another, rather than his own. Even where he exhibits none but his own ideas, we shall still meet with such thoughts. "God," says he, "knows all things in himself;* his being is his knowing; under the form of knowledge, all effects are prefigured in the highest cause. God works in all, yet in each according to its own peculiar constitution;† hence he works in natural things so as to communicate to them the power for activity, and to determine their nature to this or that action; but he works in the free-will so as to impart to it the power to act; and, under God's agency, the free will is active;‡ but still, the determination and the end of the action stands in the power of the freewill; therefore, the control over its own actions remains to it, though not so as in the case of the first cause;" and by the limitation here introduced, the whole may again be brought round to the proposition that all must, in the end, be referred back to the *causa prima*, which works through all the instrumentalities established by itself.§

How far Thomas is from really acknowledging the freewill to be an independent causality, appears evident from the way in which he repels the objection—that, by his doctrine, freewill is annihilated. He says, God works in the freewill as the nature of it requires that he should; although, therefore, he changes the will of man to another direction, nevertheless, by his almighty power, he causes that man should freely will the change which he experiences,|| and thus all constraint is removed; for to suppose otherwise, that the man willed not the change, which is a change in his will, would involve a contradiction.¶

* Quod ipsum esse causæ agentis primæ est ejus intelligere. Unde quicumque effectus præexistunt in Deo, sicut in causa prima, necesse est, quod sint in ipso ejus intelligere et quod omnia in eo sint secundum modum intelligibilem. Nam omne, quod est in altero, est in eo secundum modum ejus in quo est. Summa, p. i. Quæst. xiv. Artic. v. God knows all things in se ipso, in quantum essentia sua continet similitudinem aliorum ab ipso. The scientia Dei non causa mali, sed boni, per quod cognoscitur malum. L. c. Artic. x.

† Ita tamen, quod in unoquoque secundum ejus conditionem.

‡ Ut virtutem agendi sibi ministret et ipso operante liberum arbitrium agat. § Sentent. Lib. I. Distinct. 25, Quæst. i. Artic. i.

|| Etiamsi voluntatem hominis in aliud mutet, nihilominus tamen hoc sua omnipotentia facit, ut illud, in quod mutatur, voluntarie velit.

¶ Sentent. Lib. I. Distinct. 25, Quæst. i. Artic. iii.

We recognize the profound and acute discernment of Raymund Lull in his mode of treating these subjects ; but in this case also it is plainly apparent that, in seeking to vindicate freedom, he is driven, in spite of himself, by the monastic tendency of his speculation, into the denial of it. He too, like Thomas Aquinas, distinguishes two different points of view in which things may be contemplated ; *first*, as they subsist after an eternal mode in God, or in the idea which is one with God ; *second*, as they manifest themselves in temporal evolution. "The world and its parts existed from eternity in the divine reason, by the idea or the ideas ; for the divine reason suffers nothing of its essence, and of the essence of its attributes, to pass without itself : * so the seal, which is impressed on wax, or the image reflected in a mirror, remains in itself the same. When God created the world, nothing that belongs to the being of the idea was transferred, in this act of creating, without himself, else this idea would be subject to change, would not remain the eternal one, which is impossible, since this idea is God himself.† But God willed, that from nothing should be created that which he had with himself from eternity, by the idea ;‡ and what he willed, his almighty power could perform. That which exists after an eternal manner, in him could not pass into the forms of quantity, time, motion.§ We must, accordingly, distinguish between created being, as such, as it unfolds itself and appears in time, and as it exists simply in and for itself, comprehended by the divine wisdom from eternity.|| And that which divine wisdom conceives, after an immediate manner, is the idea.¶ God's creative and his pre-

* Nihil extra mittente.

† Idea esset alterata, et non æterna, quod est impossibile, quum idea sit Deus.

‡ Sed divina voluntas voluit, quod de nihilo esset creatum hoc, quod ab æterno habuit per ideam.

§ Respecting time and space he explains himself in the Liber contemplationis in Deum, Vol. III. Lib. IV. Distinct. 38, c. cclxvii. T. X. f. 141. As the union of matter and form constitutes body, so potence and act constitute time. Time is the intermediate between potential and actual being ; because in God all is actus, therefore in him there is no time.

|| Ens creatum secundum hoc, quod est simpliciter per se simpliciter comprehensum ab æterno per divinam sapientiam.

¶ See Quæst. super lib. Sentent. i. Qu. xxvii. Opp. T. IV. f. 27.

serving agency are to be distinguished from each other only as immediate and mediated agencies. As all things must, alike, be referred back to God's creative powers, whether that power be exerted directly, as in the creation from nothing, or through creatures as its instruments, so creation and preservation are the same.* The intermediate instrument of God's preserving agency is the implanted *vis conservativa* residing in things, to which all other agencies coming from without are only subservient." This distinction between the immediate and the mediate agency of God, he employs for the purpose of explaining the doctrine of predestination.† "The predestinated is, in idea, God himself, since the idea and God are the same; this predestination is, therefore, infallible and immutable. But predestination, so far as it concerns a created man, is something else; and although the new-created man is not, in essence, different from the man of the idea, yet he differs from the same in so far as a created man exists under the forms of quantity, space, and time; and, in this regard, his salvation is not a necessary thing, for God works here by the way of means. He predestinated Peter through the merit of his good works, as he gives warmth by means of the sun and fire. So was it, also, with the perdition of Judas. All depends, here, upon our having regard to middle causes, so as not to impinge on the divine order and rectitude.‡ The human mind may present a thing as questionable, conceive of it as possible, which cannot be so contemplated in the divine mind, where the question falls null of itself, since it belongs to a case that cannot once be supposed, in relation to thought in God. What man conceives as possible, viewed from the position of bare abstract thought, is a thing that can find no place in the chain of actual existence."§ In his work, en-

* Et quia creatio ita est per creare creaturam, quæ conservat aliam creaturam, sicut est per creare illam creaturam conservatam, ergo sequitur quod creatio et conservatio sint idem. Qu. xxxviii.

† Vide Quæst. super lib. Sentent. i. Qu. xxxiii.

‡ Thus we must distinguish una prædestinatio, quæ est Deus, et alia prædestinatio, quæ est effectus, et in novo subjecto sustentata et creata, et hoc sine mutatione divini intellectus, qui non mutatur per suum effectum, cum suus effectus non sit novus in quantum idea, sed est novus quoad seipsum, cum ex nihil de novo sit productus.

§ Quod Deus non possit damnare Petrum, nec salvare Judam, et tale

titled *Contemplatio in Deum*,* he endeavours to show that neither predestination nor foreknowledge (*præscire*), on the part of God, carries with it any force of constraint, since this would stand in contradiction with the divine attributes of wisdom, justice, etc. “The palm-tree, by the course of nature, yields dates; the apple-tree, apples: so one man, Peter, by freewill, by his own unconstrained faculty and merit, brings forth good works; and another, William, by a nature equally unconstrained, evil works. As the cause in one case is the course of nature, in the difference of the two trees; so the cause in the other is a course of nature of another sort, in the difference of the two men. † But while nature, in the case of the two trees, *necessitates* (*constringit*) them to yield different fruits, each after its kind, there is, in the case of man, no such natural necessity constraining him to bring forth good or evil works, because here nature takes up freewill. He continually comes back upon the point, that predestination does not exclude second causes,—that it is a mistaken respect for divine wisdom which leads men to ascribe too much force to predestination. ‡ If the misunderstood-doctrine of predestination makes a man negligent in the practice of virtue and avoiding of sin, it were better that he had not meddled with it. § As one who, unknowingly, sows seeds which have lost their vitality, considers the seed productive when it is not so, and supposes that possible, therefore, which in fact is not so; || so two individuals, of whom one is predestined to salvation, the

non posse non est ens reale, sed intentionale in humano intellectu, cum Deus sicut non diligit salvare Judam et damnare Petrum, sic non intelligit damnare Petrum et salvare Judam. Quæst. xxxvi.

* Vol. III. Lib. IV. Distinct. 38. c. cclxv. T. X. f. 135.

† In anima rationali formantur diversa opera secundum formam, qua recipiuntur qualitates prædictæ, quæ formantur accidentaliter ad bona opera vel ad mala ratione accidentium separabilium, quæ eveniunt iis.

‡ Ratio, quare homo dat prædestinationi majorem vim et potestatem, quam ipsa habeat, est, quia facit honorem et reverentiam tuæ perfectæ sapientiæ imaginando, omnia, quæ fuerunt et sunt et erunt, oportere esse, sicut ab ipsa sciuntur.

§ Quo plus cognitio prædestinationis intrat in memoriam et intellectum hominis, eo plus debilitatur voluntas, eo quod prædestinatio sit nimis grave onus memoriæ et intellectui et per debilitatem voluntatis fit homo piger in faciendo bonum et evitando malum.

|| Fol. 196.

other to perdition, not knowing to what they are predestined, both believe they have everlasting happiness and perdition within their control; and, because they consider this to be possible, there is in them an unconstrained freewill. As the sower supposes that wheat will grow from the spoiled seed, while however only that becomes actual which is determined beforehand in the seed; so Peter and William arrive at the end to which they are predestined by means of what they actually do, notwithstanding they suppose that to be possible to them, *potentialiter*, which is impossible to them both *potentialiter* and *actualiter*." He is aware of the mischievous practical consequences which might be drawn from this comparison, but justifies himself by saying that interest for the truth compelled him to write thus.* "All the works done by Peter and William, and the ways in which they do the same, are predestined to them, and yet they are done by them with freewill, apart from all constraint whatsoever. In respect to men as well as nature, everything takes place according to the divine predetermination; but, in the case of a natural being, as there is no freewill, so neither can there be merit or demerit. If the predestined Peter does a bad action, and the foreknown (*præscitus*) William a good one, the good is to the human mind a mark of predestination to everlasting happiness; the evil, a mark of predestination to perdition,—while yet no change can, on this account, be supposed to have taken place in the divine councils.† Hence, then, the mistake, when the human mind undertakes to judge by these fallacious symptoms in temporal manifestations concerning predestination,‡ without having regard to the nature of the evolution in time, to the antithesis between potency and act, to the confinement of human reason, which cannot comprehend predestination after the perfect manner in which it is settled in the divine wisdom.§ Such an

* Quia istud exemplum dat periculosam significationem, id hoc, quod possit plus nocere, quam prodesse, propterea non libenter ponitur et scribitur a nobis.

† Quia in te, Domine, non est defectus, ideo salvatio et damnatio non est alterabilis in eis, sed solum in operibus ipsorum.

‡ Quando figura actualis repræsentat falsitatem, sicut speculum falso repræsentat falsam figuram.

§ Unde hæc falsa figura prædestinationis formatur ratione temporis, quod est inter actum et potentiam et ratione defectus humani intellectus

absolute knowledge of predestination would, however, destroy what essentially constitutes the great principle of human ethics, and there would be nothing more to be said about freedom of choice in the will, or about guilt and desert.* But purely human action can only be found under the condition of this uncertainty in reference to predestination, whether one is predestined to everlasting happiness or misery. Now as the husbandman, who knows that the shocks of corn are potentially in the seed-kernel, must scatter the seed according to the measure of his knowledge, notwithstanding his ignorance about the result, just so must we act in bringing forth good actions as a means of attaining to everlasting happiness; nor can uncertainty with regard to the divine decrees serve as an excuse for any man.† Suppose Peter predestined to represent to himself and will something that is good, and William something that is evil, we must say that, before they represented to themselves or willed this, both had freewill to represent to themselves and to will good and evil: their determination having been freely made, goes as freely into execution ‡—they act freely, because each of them is conscious that he can do the opposite if he chooses. Although it is decreed that this individual shall kill that other, yet he acts with entire freedom: so if he cannot accomplish his purpose, if the arrow misses the mark, this also is predetermined. Yet with such an intention, the guilt also is present, although the sensible instrument may fail of executing that intention.” But it is easy to see with how little propriety the example could be employed for the purpose which Lull had in view, of proving that predestination generally had not the force of constraint, and did not destroy freedom of the will; for predestination certainly refers not barely to the outward action, but also to the inward deter-

qui non potest ita perfecte percipere prædestinationem, sicut tua sapientia eam scit. f. 143.

* Si noster intellectus ita bene id, quod homini est prædestinatum, sciret sicut tua sapientia, non fieret homini falsa figura in prædestinatione, neque haberet homo liberam voluntatem, nec obligationem nec meritum in suis operibus.

† Et non excusat eum ignorantia, quam habet de salvatione vel damnatione, quam scit tua gloriosa essentia divina; c. cclxviii. f. 145.

‡ Voluntas venit libere ad potentiam motivam, quin sit constricta per prædestinationem.

mination of the will.* For the rest, he expresses the conviction that, in this doctrine, the discursive development falls very far short of the intuition.† And so he concludes this whole exposition with the apology, *quod noster intellectus ipsam melius intelligat, quam noster sensualitas potuerit scribere.*

From theology we now pass to anthropology, and shall consider the farther prosecution of the doctrine concerning man's primeval state, concerning the fall, and its consequences.

In anthropology we must trace forward the threads of development from the earlier periods into the present age, in order to have a right understanding of its history. Important in their consequences, in this regard, were the opposite views that arose during the Pelagian controversies, which related, not barely to the present condition of human nature, to the acknowledgment or denial of its need of redemption, but also to the relation of human nature and of the creative spirit, in itself considered, to God; the acknowledgment or denial of a moral autonomy of human nature. Augustin had applied the distinction of natural and supernatural, not merely to the condition of fallen man, but also to man in his primeval state; he had proceeded on the supposition that man, from the beginning, needed communion with God, in order to attain to the realization of that likeness to God for which his nature was destined, and hence he made use of the term *gratia*, in this sense, even in relation to the primeval state of man. Accordingly, this view passed over into the theology of the present period.

Anselm controverts‡ the Pelagian definition of freewill, as being the faculty of choice between good and evil. "The capability of choosing the last could not possibly, as he thought, be one of the necessary characters of this conception; for such a definition must, though differences might occur in its application, admit of being applied, in a certain degree, to all

* *Quia motiva intellectualis est prior sensuali, est meritum in intellectuali, et licet sensualis non occidat Joannem, intellectualis jam est in peccato et culpa, eo quod, quia prædestinatio eam constringat, se obligat ad peccatum per liberam voluntatem, quia, si prædestinatio eam obligaret et constringeret, tunc eam obligaret ad nolendum occidere Joannem eo quod sit prædestinatum Gulielmo, non occidere eum, f. 147.*

† *Quia ista res in verbo et in scriptura non potest ita bene manifestari, sicut est in intellectu, f. 136.*

‡ In his dialogue, *De libero arbitrio.*

objects to which the thing denoted by this conception is to be attributed. But this character would not apply to those to whom we must ascribe freedom in the highest sense, namely, God, and the spirits of the blessed. And the farther a being is advanced in his moral development, the farther removed must he be from the possibility of choosing evil. A character which diminishes freedom when added, and increases it when absent, cannot then possibly form a necessary character or mark of this conception."* Accordingly, Anselm reduces the *formal* conception of freedom to a *material*, the *negative* to a *positive element*. Sin, in his opinion, supposes an original freedom, as the faculty of self-determination in a being who is good; but here enters in still another peculiar character connected with the point mentioned above, the application of the conception *gratia* to the primeval state of man. In order to repel, from the beginning, an autonomy of human nature, he defines freewill as a faculty to preserve the bent of the will, *once received*, to that which is good *for its own sake*, laying an emphasis on the phrase, *once received*.† The phrase, "for its own sake," is also an important clause considered from this point of view, that the love of goodness on its own account gives to morality its true significance. The same definition may, according to this doctrine, be applied also to the angels. These too were created in the state of grace, and it depended solely on their freewill to persevere in communion with God, and preserve what had been bestowed on them by grace. But the sin of Satan consisted in an arrogated autonomy, in the fact that he did not acquiesce in God's appointed order, but was for obtaining likeness to God *by his own will*.‡ By withstanding this temptation, the good angels attained to that state which Satan aspired to reach in a disorderly manner, and perseverance in the goodness originally communicated to them was their reward. This perseverance was made conditional on their "merit." § Robert Pullein acknowledges also the

* Potestas peccandi, quæ addita voluntati, minuit ejus libertatem, et si dematur, auget nec libertas est nec pars libertatis. In his dialogue, De libero arbitrio, c. i.

† Ad servandam acceptam rectitudinem voluntatis propter seipsam.

‡ Plus aliquid, quam acceperat, inordinate volendo voluit inordinate similis esse Deo. See the tract, De casu Diaboli.

§ Anselm himself avows his ignorance with regard to this higher

necessity of a *gratia co-operans* in the first man, without which he had no power to do anything good.* We find more exactly determined in his writings, what Anselm had left still vague and indefinite. "The angels," he teaches, "stood originally on the foundation of faith; it was made to depend upon the fact of their perseverance in good, whether they should attain to the intuition of God, and thereby to immutability in goodness."† We shall not fail to see, when we come to look more closely into the systematic connection of the doctrines of these theologians, that a twofold application of the term *gratia* lay at the bottom, in the case of them all. The rational creature is equally dependent on God with all the other creatures; his universal co-operation is indispensable, without which even the powers originally implanted in the creatures could not continue to exist and operate. But from this is to be distinguished a new communication of God to his rational creatures, supervening to the original powers, and made conditional on the employment of them,—a communication which they need in order to reach their ultimate destination. This distinction, already lying at bottom in the previous dogmatic systems, would therefore, when once clearly brought out, be generally recognized. It was so brought out by Hugo a St. Victore. He distinguishes grace, for instance, in the wider sense, as denoting the universal divine influence (*concursum*) on which all creaturely action constantly depends, —without which the powers originally bestowed on rational creatures cannot operate,—and grace, in the more restricted sense, as something supervening to those original powers of nature through a new divine communication, whereby they are exalted. This distinction having been once clearly expressed, the question next arose, For what, in man's primitive state, did grace, in the wider sense, suffice; and for what did he

stage that Satan would have attained to by his *selfwill*; and which *they* obtain by *humble submission* to the divine will. The words of the master: *Quid illud fuerit non video, sed quicquid fuerit, sufficit scire, quia fuit aliquid, ad quod crescere potuerunt, quod non acceperunt, quando creati sunt, ut ad illud suo merito proficerent, c. vi.*

* *Primus homo hac vi floruit, pronus velle bona et quæ voluerit nullo obnitente relinquens infecta, talis ex creationis natura, ita tamen, ut nihil queat absque co-operante gratia, p. ii. c. iv.*

† *Lib. II. c. v.*

need grace, in the more restricted sense? Hugo answered: * "The former sufficed to keep man from falling, with his freewill, from the position where he was placed by the original constitution of his nature; but to actual righteousness, the actual accomplishment of good works and progress therein, he could not attain without some new supervening grace. † Before sin, man was able by his freewill, with the assistance of that common grace, to avoid evil; but he needed *gratia co-operans*, in order to perform anything positively good. But after the fall, he needed not only *gratia co-operans*, but also *gratia operans*." Peter Lombard attributes to the first man a freewill wholly uncorrupt, and all the natural powers of the soul in their full purity and vigour. ‡ This freewill wills that which is good, but after a feeble manner, until the help of divine grace supervenes, by which first the *efficaciter velle* is imparted to it. Peter of Poitiers § makes the image of God refer to those spiritual powers bestowed on man at creation, by the right use of which he might have attained to the realization of likeness to God; but in order to this it was necessary, in his opinion, that the *bona gratuita* should supervene to the *bonis naturalibus*. || Man was created for likeness to God, inasmuch as his spiritual nature was so constituted as to render him capable of receiving those higher goods, and of forming himself to the virtues proceeding therefrom. ¶ He distinguishes in the primeval state two conditions, one before and the other after the bestowment of grace. **

This distinction of natural and supernatural, applied to

* Summa Sentent. tract iii. c. vii.

† Sine apposita gratia.

‡ Lib. II. Distinct. xxiv.: Libertas arbitrii ab omni labe et corruptela immunis atque voluntatis rectitudo et omnium naturalium potentiarum animæ sinceritas atque vivacitas.

§ P. ii. c. ix. Sentent.

|| Also, the mystical theologian, abbot Rupert of Deutz (Tuitiensis), bears testimony to this distinction, which was still further prosecuted by the speculative theologians, as one grounded in the universal consciousness of the church, since he remarks: Cum creasset Deus ad imaginem suam hominem, cepit illum informare ad *similitudinem* suam. Non enim creando, sed *informando* perducit Deus hominem ad similitudinem suam. De victoria verbi Dei, Lib. II. c. vii.

¶ Ad habilitatem suscipiendi bona gratuita, quia factus est aptus suscipere virtutes, non tamen statim habuit.

** Duo status, unus, in quo non habuit gratiam, qua posset proficere, et alius, qui habuit gratiam, qua potuit proficere.

man's original state, was attended, indeed, with the advantage that the supernaturalistic element in the system of faith and opposition to Pelagianism were thus made to rest on deeper grounds; but it might also be attended with a disadvantage in furnishing encouragement and the occasion for a separation of the divine and human, altogether at variance with the essence of christianity; as if the truly human could subsist wholly separate from all union with God, and the divine, the supernatural, first supervened from without, as something that did not belong to the actualization of the essence of human nature; under which supposition, redemption could not be apprehended in its right relation to human nature, as the restoration of that nature. This mistake had an important influence also on the systems of morals; for it led men to apprehend the divine, not as the ennobling of the human, and the actualization of all that which was originally implanted in man's nature, but as the superhuman. A false direction in ethics, which, as we have already been led to remark, had been transmitted from earlier centuries, was thereby kept up, and this false tendency might in turn contribute to promote the view in question. If we consider the mighty influence of Aristotle, in whose ethics this separating of the purely human and the divine—which is characteristic of the ancient morals generally—strongly predominates, it will be quite apparent to us that this influence, also, would operate powerfully in the same way. We have preferred to notice this connection beforehand, and in this place, that we may be able to refer back to it in the particular expositions which are to follow

The abbot Peter de la Celle, afterwards bishop of Chartres, felt it to be his duty, already, to enter a firm and decided protest against the view of which we have been speaking.* He expressed his surprise that he must be compelled to hear, what he never could have dreamed of himself, that likeness to God was an accidental gift, when it must assuredly be known to be a quality truly essential. It appears to him that the true essence of human nature cannot be conceived at all separate from the divine life.† Should it be said, this likeness is something contingent because it may be lost, it would follow for

* Lib. III. ep. iv.

† Quid igitur? Itane summa illa beatitudo et gloria sæculorum accidentalis erit, ut possit adesse et abesse præter subjecti corruptionem?

the same reason, that life itself is something contingent to us.*

This separating of the purely human and the divine lies at bottom of the view of man's primeval state, in Alexander of Hales.† In man's original state he looks upon the purely human (the *pura naturalia*) as the first; the divine he considers as something superinduced, at a later period, for the ennobling of the purely human. In other words, that man was created at first in a pure state of nature left to itself (*in puris naturalibus*), he declares to be the view most conformable to reason. He distinguishes two stages of development: "It served to glorify the divine majesty that nature should appear, first, in its development out of itself; and that the higher formation (*informatio*) by grace should then be communicated to it, in order that man might be led to the sense of what grace is, as a gift of God; might be taught to distinguish such effects as proceed from this, the supernatural, from the barely natural. There is a manifestation of divine wisdom in the way in which man is conducted along, through various stages of development towards perfection. The goodness of God shines forth in this, that in communicating himself to man he imparts to him not only single operations of grace, but also the capacity, in a certain sense, of independent co-operation—the divine life considered as something independent, and animating the individuality of character. The theologians of the thirteenth century, in their conception of grace, make the important distinction between isolated effects of the divine, the supernatural, isolated notions of the higher life, particular higher gifts, and the divine life as a principle ennobling the whole individuality of character; that from which a new character proceeds,—the individual wholly interpenetrated with a divine life,—the distinction between a *gratia gratis data*, and a *gratum faciens*,—such grace as first renders the man well-pleasing to God. This perfect communication of God was to be made conditional on the right use of nature. It is a universal law that, in nature, a certain preparation and

* Vera quoque virtus, vera bonitas, vera justitia, imo ipsa veritas est Deus. Sine his igitur si fuerit anima, moritur, et dicis esse accidentalibus dona?

† P. i. Quæst. xcvi.

receptivity for the communication of grace is required.* Hence, grace was not created in man, but kept in store until, by the use of reason, he had become in a certain sense fitted for the reception of the same.† Merit, in the strict sense of the word, as that on the ground of which something may be claimed as a due, *a meritum de condigno*, could certainly find no place here; as must be evident, indeed, from the incommensurate relation between things divine and natural; but doubtless, there might be *a meritum de congruo* (*congruit, id quod congruit*), a θεῖον πρέπον, in perfect accordance with the laws of the moral order of the world, a merit constituting the condition under which God has found it befitting to bestow his grace. So here the principle already appears, that the bestowment of grace is always conditioned on the use made of it by freewill. Pure nature stood as yet in no opposition to the divine, the latter was simply *wanting* to the perfection of nature; nature was *informis negative* not *privative*. The divine found still a clear place for its action; it had as yet no opposition to overcome. Nothing was needed as yet but a *gratia informans*; no *gratia reformans*. Now as it respects the exact relation subsisting between the state of *pura naturalia* and that of *gratia*, Alexander of Hales by no means limits this first state of man to his ethical position. The purely human is to him by no means the merely moral part of man's nature: for he assumes the relation to God as one implanted originally in human nature. This relation, grounded in the very essence of the creature, as such, must reveal itself in man as simply conscious of himself. Accordingly, love to God, as the creature's highest good, was necessarily present in the state of pure nature. But he distinguishes from this purely *human* virtue a *superhuman* one. In the purely human, according to him, something selfish still seems to inhere, which could only be removed by a higher principle. From the above-mentioned love to God as the creature's highest good, belonging to the pure state of nature, Alexander distinguishes a still higher position of love, standing in contradiction with the natural inclinations, which impels a man to

* Deus secundum legem communem requirit aliquam præparationem et dispositionem ex parte naturæ ad hoc, ut infundat alicui gratiam.

† Deus liberalis salvo ordine sapientiæ et justitiæ.

do, for God's sake, that to which the natural inclinations are adverse; or to shun that which is the object of natural love; as that love to God which leads men to love their enemies and to despise all earthly goods. This is the supernatural disposition of "charity." Here again that *ethical* direction is the principle lying at bottom, which proposes not the appropriation of the earthly in subservience to the divine, but the utter renunciation of the earthly, as the highest problem; a view which stands closely connected with the above-mentioned false separation of the divine and human.

According to the teachings of this theology, all communication of God to man is conditioned on a certain preparation on man's part, a certain "merit;" but now it is inseparably connected with the above view of the relation of the human to the divine, that eternal happiness must be regarded as something far transcending the *pura naturalia*, as well as everything barely creaturely, so that no proportionality can exist between them. In the condition of *pura naturalia*, therefore, no "merit," by which man could have made himself worthy of that happiness, was possible. It required a supernatural mediation, in order that man might be fitted for that supernatural eternal life.* To the supernatural divine, nothing corresponds but the supernatural divine. A proportionality can exist only between a supernatural divine life bestowed on man already in the present life, and eternal blessedness.†

Bonaventura defines the place assigned to man as the image of God in the creation in accordance with his doctrine already explained concerning the end of the creation.‡ God created all things for his own glory; as the greatest light for his own self-manifestation; as supreme goodness for his own self-communication. But there can be no perfect revelation without some one to understand it,—no perfect communication of goodness without some one capable of enjoying it. Since this capacity of understanding and enjoyment belongs only to the rational creatures, the irrational creation stands in no

* *Ipsius gratuite bonitatis influentia, per quam creatori ipsi creatura grata existat, gratia gratum faciens.*

† *Impossibile, quod homo merendo ad illud summum bonum ascendat, nisi per aliquod adiutorium, quod sit ultra naturam.*

‡ *Lib. II. Distinct. 16. Quæst. i.*

immediate, but only in an indirect relation to God, and that, through the medium of the rational creature.* But rational creatures, being created to praise and to know God, and to appropriate other things for the use of a will in submission to God, are therefore created to stand in an immediate relation to God (*nata est ordinari in Deum immediate*). By virtue of this immediate relation to God, they are capable of communion with God, and God can hold communion with them (*ideo capax ejus est vel e converso*). Therefore they are destined to become like him; and they carry within them, from the beginning, the light of God's countenance.† Because the rational creature is in a certain sense all things, and is so created as to embrace within himself the images of all things, as to receive all things into himself intellectually, therefore may it be said, that as the universe represents God in a sensuous, so the rational creature represents him in an intellectual totality.‡ Bonaventura also adopts the above-mentioned distinction between the image of God and likeness to God. The former he refers more particularly to intellectual qualities;§ the latter, to the heart or feelings, the bent of the will, from which proceeds love to God, the means above all others whereby man becomes like him.|| The "intellect" should therefore be governed by the "affections." He recognizes, it is true, in the original pure nature, an aptitude for blessedness;¶ but he supposes that in order to an *actual* receptivity for it, a supernatural medium is required, a supernatural faculty must be bestowed on man.** The distinction here explained of a twofold meaning of grace (*gratia*), the inworking of God by means of the natural chain of causes

* Non habent ipsæ creaturæ irrationales immediate ad Deum ordinari, sed mediante creatura rationali.

† Propter hoc fert in se a sua origine lumen vultus divini.

‡ Quia rationalis creatura et intellectus quodam modo est omnia, et omnia nata sunt ibi scribi et imprimi omniumque similitudines depingi, ideo, sicut totum universum repræsentat Deum in quadam totalitate sensibili, sic creatura rationalis eum repræsentat in quadam totalitate spiritali, nata alia in se spiritualiter continere.

§ Virtus cognitiva, potentia cognoscendi.

|| Virtus affectiva, potentia diligendi, qualitas in qua principaliter assimilatur anima Deo, est in voluntate sive affectione.

¶ The aptitudo.

** The dispositio sufficiens et propinqua, sufficiens ordo ad actum, *Distinct. 19, Artic. iii. Quæst. i.*

and effects, and the supernatural operation by which nature is provided with new and higher powers,* of a two-fold love to God, that grounded in the natural relation of the creature to God as the highest good and end of the creation, and a supernatural love required as the means to the supernatural end,†—this distinction also passed over to the great teachers of the following age.

But what constitutes the peculiar feature of the doctrine of Thomas, as compared with that of Alexander of Hales, and forms an important moment, on account of its bearing on the gradually-developed difference in the theology of the two monkish orders, is, that the former did not suppose in man's original state two conditions, or positions, separated from each other in the order of time, the first, that of the *pura naturalia*, left to itself, the second, that where "grace" was bestowed on man, in consideration of his faithful employment of the *pura naturalia*; but taught that both the pure moral nature and the supernatural state of grace were, from the first, harmoniously united, and must co-operate together, in order to produce original righteousness (*originalis justitia*); so that no other distinction could be applied here than a distinction in thought.‡ This difference immediately brought along with it other differences in the doctrine concerning the relation of freewill to grace. In his *Summa*,§ Thomas thinks he can thus prove the doctrine of a concreated state of grace. Belonging to the state of original purity, or uprightness, in which man was created,|| was the harmony subsisting in man's entire nature;

* As Thomas Aquinas expresses himself, the *divinum adjutorium, sine quo nec lapis in esse conservaretur nec deorsum tenderet, similiter etiam nec humana natura sine eo vel consistere potest vel rectum motum voluntatis habere*, and the *donum naturalibus superadditum*.

† In the words of Thomas, the principle: *Nulla creatura rationalis potest habere motum voluntatis ordinatum ad illam beatitudinem, nisi mota a supernaturali agente, i. e. auxilium gratiæ*. The distinction between the naturaliter diligere Deum, in quantum est principium naturalis esse and the conversio ad Deum, in quantum est beatificans per suæ essentiæ visionem.

‡ As he himself describes it in *Lib. II., Sententiar. Distinct. 29. Quæst. i. Art. ii: Secundum ordinem naturæ status in naturalibus puris ad statum ejus in gratia comparatur et non secundum ordinem temporis*.

§ *P. i. Qu. xcv. Art. i.*

|| *The rectitudo primi status, according to the preacher, Eccles. vii. 29.*

the body obeyed the soul; the lower powers of the soul, reason; and the latter was obedient to God. Now this harmonious relation between reason and God is the ground of all other harmony in human nature; but this harmony between the higher and lower powers was disturbed by sin, it was not a condition, therefore, grounded in the essence of human nature as such. Arguing from the effect to the cause, then, we may conclude that this harmonious relation between reason and God proceeded from grace bestowed on man. In his commentary on the Sentences * he also explains himself, it is true, after precisely the same manner, on the conflict between the two views above mentioned, but in such way as to avoid all decisive expression of an opinion; remarking that here, as in all matters depending on the will of God, nothing could be decided with perfect assurance.† He lays it down as the most probable opinion (*probabilius*), that man was created in the state of pure nature, and as his powers could not remain inactive, he, from the first moment of his creation, turned to God, and attained to grace.‡ Among the objections to this supposition, Thomas cites the passage, which also in later times had been cited to prove that a foundation or aptitude (*Anlage*) for sin existed in the first man, 1 Corinth. xv. 46;§ in reply to which he remarks, that this passage refers to the constitution of the body, not to that of the soul.||

Augustin, having already explained to himself the influence and effects of the first sin according to his philosophical system of Realism, was followed in this by the representatives of the same philosophical sect, in the twelfth century. It is the doctrine of Anselm of Canterbury, that as entire human nature was only expressed and contained, as yet, in this first exemplar, entire humanity, therefore, became corrupt in him,

* In Lib. II. Dist. 29. Qu. i. Art. ii.

† Quæ harum opinionum verior sit, multum efficaci ratione probari non potest, sicut nec aliquid eorum, quæ ex voluntate Dei sola pendent.

‡ Cum homo creatus fuerit in naturalibus integris, quæ otiosa esse non poterant, in primo instanti creationis ad Deum conversus, gratiam consecutus.

§ Sed vivificatio spiritus est per gratiam, ergo hoc est proprium Christi, quod fuerit factus in gratia.

|| Non ergo in verbis Apostoli habetur, quod Adam non fuit spiritualis secundum animam, sed quod non fuit spiritualis secundum corpus.

and the corruption passed from him to his posterity, just as his moral character, if he had remained obedient to the divine will, would have been transmitted to all.* He therefore distinguishes *peccatum naturale* from *peccatum personale*,—the former being so called,—not as though it were grounded in the essence of the nature, but because it goes with it on account of the corruption of that nature.† This connection of ideas is exhibited with remarkable distinctness in the work which Odo of Tournay, the person whose change from a philosopher to a theologian we have described on a former page, has written on this doctrine.‡

In the Anthropology of Abelard we find the same unsettled conflict between contending elements which is so apparent everywhere in his theology, the conflict between the subjective bent of his mind, as it had developed itself out of the man, and the force of the church doctrine pressing upon him from without. What he has thrown out here and there on this doctrine in his works on theology,§ in his *Scito te ipsum*, and in his commentary on the Epistle to the Romans, certainly cannot be joined together in a logically coherent system; and he himself was compelled to resort to far-fetched expedients, which could not possibly satisfy any thinking mind, in order to avoid contradictions which he could not conceal from himself. In his literal understanding of the facts related in Genesis, he agreed with Augustin and Pelagius; in the isolated, empirical, and abstract views of the understanding which he followed, we see the spirit of Pelagius, rather than that of Augustin. Considered from this point of view, it could not appear so very grave a fault to him, that the first man, inexperienced in moral conflicts, by giving way to the enticements of sensual appetite, which in itself considered was an innocent thing, should be betrayed into transgression of the divine law, on the first trial to which he was exposed. And the more inclined he was to think lightly of the intrinsic importance of this act, the more abhorrent was it to his reason

* Humana natura, quæ sic erat in Adam tota, ut nihil de illa extra illum esset.

† Quoniam propter ejus corruptionem cum illa assumitur.

‡ De peccato originali libri tres.

§ In a copy of the lectures published by Prof. Rheinwald this doctrine is not touched at all.

to derive from it so great and general a consequence as that all men must thereby be liable to condemnation.* When he went on the principle, that a violation of the divine law, such at least as had been owing to an inculpable ignorance, could not be imputed as sin; when he considered the opposition between reason and sense as belonging necessarily to the organism of human nature, and conflict as something required, in order to the realization of virtue; it is easy to see that from these premises followed conclusions which must lead to an entirely different view of man's original state, and of the first sin, from that held by Augustin and the church. Hence, too, he was inclined to interpret the passage in Romans v. 12 (the *in quo*, which, following the authority of Augustin, theologians were accustomed to explain as relating to a transfer of Adam's guilt to all his posterity), a meaning simply that the punishment of Adam's sin had passed upon all; † in defending which interpretation, he maintained that the term sin was used metonymically, the punishment of sin only being intended by it. ‡ But on the other hand, he remained bound under the fetters of the church system. He could not cast off the theory, that all continued subject to those punishments that had passed upon them from Adam; and, indeed, in order to free himself from it, it would have been necessary for him to assume an entirely different position towards the church doctrine of his time, and to make a far more thorough and resolute application of the thoughts which he had expressed. But resolved, as he was, to hold fast on the above determinations of the church doctrine, while at the same time he refused to acknowledge the common doctrine concerning original guilt and original sin, § it could not be otherwise than that, from his own point of view (which could not allow him to acknowledge the mysterious connection between the development of the entire race and original sin), God must appear

* *Unum delictum nec magnum aliorum comparatione in ep. ad Roman. Lib. II. p. 588. Quantum sit crudele et summæ bonitati Dei incongruum, qui salvare magis quam perdere animas desiderat, ut pro peccato parentis filium damnet, quem pro ejus minime justitia salvaret.*

† *Pœnam peccati incurrerunt in ep. ad Roman. Lib. II. p. 586.*

‡ *L. c. p. 591.*

§ Accordingly he says, that the assertion, the children sinned in Adam, is to be understood in an improper sense; as when we say in the improper sense, that a tyrant still lives in his children. *L. c. p. 597.*

only so much the more as a being who acted arbitrarily and unjustly. Thus he was driven from rationalism to the most abrupt supernaturalism, falling back, as the last resort, upon the unlimited will of the Creator, who may dispose of his creatures according to his own pleasure. He thinks that those who are punished without any guilt of their own, can no more complain than the brutes, which God has appointed for the service of man, can enter into judgment with him. He goes to the extreme of making the distinction of right and wrong to depend on the divine will;* a representation which, it is evident, directly contradicts his doctrine of God's omnipotence, explained on a former page. But he turns about again, and attempts to justify, though in a very unsatisfactory manner, the goodness of God in proceeding after this manner. Children which suffer solely on account of the first sin, which remain excluded from baptism, would only be punished in the mildest way, in a degree suited to their condition, in not being suffered ever to attain to the intuition of God. And God would so order events, that those children only would be subjected to this lot, and die unbaptized, which, had they lived longer, would, by their offences and crimes, have brought upon themselves a severer punishment; so that, in comparison with this latter, the lot which they actually meet with is rather a mitigation of their doom. Abelard says that, by suspending so severe a punishment, on account of so trifling a sin, over a posterity not guilty on their own account, God designed to express his abhorrence of all sin;† thus could he unite a way of thinking which was in many respects altogether rationalistic with a subjugation of reason under the yoke of a blind and implicit faith. For the rest, those peculiar opinions of his on the subject of original sin belonged, as we see from

* Hac ratione profiteor, quoquomodo Deus creaturam suam tractare velit, nullius injuriæ potest argui. Nec malum aliquomodo potest dici, quod juxta ejus voluntatem fiat. Non enim aliter bonum a malo discernere possumus, nisi quod ejus est consentaneum voluntati et in placito ejus consistit. Lib. II. p. 595.

† Voluit etiam ostendere in prima et fortasse modica primorum parentum transgressione, quam ita in posteris, nihil adhuc merentibus, vindicat, quantum omnem abhorret iniquitatem et quantum pœnam maioribus culpis et frequentioribus reservet, si hoc semel commissum in unius pomi reparabilis esu ita in posteris punire non differat. Lib. II. p. 596.

Bernard's tract against him, with the other censurable things which his adversaries found in his writings. He was obliged, therefore, to take notice of them in his Apology; but his explanations on these points are extremely indefinite, and by no means contain an unreserved confirmation of the church doctrine, since he gives no further account of the propagation of sin and punishment from Adam, than by saying that his sin was the origin and cause of all the other sins that followed;* and it is very apparent from the manner in which he expresses himself concerning sins of ignorance, that he was extremely reluctant to allow that the divine imputation would be extended to any other sins of ignorance than those of culpable ignorance; for what other reason had he for adding the qualifying word "especially."†

After the separation of goodness of nature and of grace, *bona naturalia* and *gratuitu*, in man's original state, had become more clearly expressed, the explication of the doctrine of original sin would be determined accordingly. Thus, Peter Lombard teaches, that man was not deprived of natural goodness, but this goodness was corrupted; for, had the former been the case, no possibility of reformation would have been left; but supernatural goodness was wholly removed from him.‡

Thomas Aquinas declares, it is true, against Traducianism; at the same time, however, he says all the descendants of Adam are to be considered as one man, by reason of the community of nature received from the father of the race. Original sin he calls a disorderly condition (*inordinata dispositio*), which originated in the dissolution of that harmony, in which consisted the essence of original righteousness, the disorder of nature (*languor naturæ*). Negatively, it is the deprivation of original righteousness; positively, the disorderly relation of the parts of the soul to each other (*inordinata dispositio partium animæ*).

In the doctrine concerning Christ, the question was first started in the twelfth century, whether we should conceive of his sinlessness as a *posse non peccare* or a *non posse peccare*, the

* Ex Adam, in quo omnes peccaverunt, tam culpam quam pœnam nos contaxisse assero.

† See above, p. 197.

‡ Naturalia bona non detracta, sed corrupta, gratuita detracta.

former having been the opinion of Theodore of Mopsuestia ; the latter, that of Augustin. Anselm* says, "Christ could have sinned had he willed to, but he could not will to sin ; such a will would have stood in contradiction with his holiness. There was a moral necessity in the nature of the God-man, which does not exclude freedom." In Abelard we may observe also, on this point, the same twofold bent which has just before been alluded to. The rational element made him inclined to illustrate the union of God with humanity in Christ by an analogy long before used, *that* union with God which was vouchsafed to holy enlightened men and prophets. What was a transient and fragmentary thing in their case, they being sometimes filled, at others forsaken, by the Spirit of God ; † this was an entire and constant union in the case of Christ alone, like the union betwixt soul and body. As all motions of the body proceed from the soul, so the soul of Christ could impart no other motions to his body than those inspired in it by his word. ‡ Accordingly, it was an important point with him to give prominence to the purely human element in Christ, so as to keep clear of all Docetic illusions. He supposes that as freewill, and therefore the capability of sinning or not sinning, belong to the essence of human nature, so we may venture to ascribe to the man in Christ also, abstractedly considered (*in abstracto*), only the *posse non peccare*. By a *non posse peccare* we should destroy the essence of virtue, which is grounded in freewill. § In so far, then, as we contemplate this man as subsisting, independently for himself, we must also suppose in him the possibility of sinning ; but it is quite another thing, when we conceive of the man as one

* Cur Deus homo, Lib. II. c. x.

† Which perfectly accords with his doctrine of inspiration, as explained on a former page. ‡ Sententiæ, c. xxiv.

§ Si simpliciter dicitur, hominem illum, qui unitus est, nullo modo peccare posse, potest quilibet ambigere. Si enim peccare non potest, quod meritum habet, cavendo peccatum, quod nullatenus incurrere potest? Christus libero videtur privatus arbitrio et necessitate potius quam voluntate peccatum cavere.—Quis etiam neget hominem illum, qui Deo unitus est, etiam sine illa unione, sicut cæteros homines in sua natura consistere posse? Alioquin minoris valetudinis esse videretur, si per se ipse subsistere non posset, non [here, beyond doubt, there is some mistake in the reading, it should read nam] et magis accidentis, quam substantiæ naturam habere. Ep. ad Roman. Lib. I. p. 538 et 539

united with God, and when we speak of Christ as of one in whom deity and humanity are united, we can predicate of him absolutely the impossibility of sinning. In opposition to some exaggerated statements of eminent ancient fathers, he affirms that what is related concerning the conflicts of Christ in view of death, the feeling of sadness, his human weakness, is to be understood in the proper sense. Even the authority of Augustin could not shake his conviction on this point. "Let Augustin say what he will," he remarks, "we affirm that as Christ took on him true humanity, so too he had the real defects of human weakness."* Hugo a St. Victore and Peter Lombard, on the other hand, seek to reconcile the opposite declarations of the church-fathers by distinguishing from one another the different kinds of weakness, the purely human, the natural, and those connected with sin. Hugo a St. Victore says: "There is a moderated fear, which dwells in every man and is without sin, like hunger and thirst;" he means that connected with the natural instinct of self-preservation, the shrinking of the natural feelings from death. "This we may suppose to have been in Christ." Peter Lombard distinguishes from a passion, by which the mind may be affected in an extraordinary manner and drawn away from the right course, another which cannot draw it away from the contemplation of God, and from that which is right. The former he calls *propassio*, the latter *passio*—a distinction which might have proved of some importance in morals.

The arriving at a distinct conception of the way in which the salvation of mankind was wrought out by Christ, was a matter on which little attention had thus far been bestowed, in comparison with the investigations on other subjects belonging to the system of faith. Though the whole of that which from this period onward was, for the first time, more sharply defined in the explication of conceptions, admits of being already pointed out, in its germ and principle, in the foundation of Christian consciousness, as it is presented to us in the declarations of the early church-teachers, yet everything was as yet quite indistinct and fluxive, as it is wont to be where the lan-

* Dicit Augustinus voluntatem suam, nos vero dicimus, quia, sicut veram humanitatem assumpsit, ita humanæ infirmitatis veros defectus habuerit. Sentent. c. xxv.

guage of feeling predominates. Things connected in the feelings were not as separated and held apart in conception; and as the second period furnished in this respect nothing that was peculiarly new, we have scarcely touched upon this subject in tracing the development of doctrines in it. The twelfth century constitutes an epoch in the history of this doctrine; and on this account we shall state in connection with what is here to be mentioned some things that belong to an earlier century. As the scholastic theology attached itself generally to Augustin, and we find in him the germinal ideas out of which it proceeded, so it may be shown that this holds good also with respect to the doctrine in question. On the subject of reconciliation, Augustin is on his guard against an anthropathical misconception that might easily arise, if one were not careful to separate the idea lying at bottom, the objective reality, from the symbolical form of expression. "We must not so conceive," says he,* "the reconciliation of man, as if God required blood in order to forgive men; but we should understand it in the sense that God loved men before the creation of the world, and his love was the very cause of his sending his Son into the world; not as though God now first began to love those whom he before hated, as an enemy becomes reconciled with his enemy, but we are reconciled with him who already loved us, with him whose enemies *we* were by transgression." † Thus, Augustin perceives in this idea of reconciliation a subjective element, and yet at the same time its foundation in something possessing objective reality. He was also the first to consider the question respecting the necessity of a redemption in precisely this form. He started the query, whether any other way would have been possible; and, considered from the point of view of the divine omnipotence, he believed the answer must be in the affirmative. But no other way, he supposed, would have been so well adapted for man's recovery from his wretched condition; and this conclusion he derived, not from the intrinsic nature of the case, not

* De trinitate, Lib. XIII. c. xi. s. 15.

† Quod ergo reconciliati sumus Deo per mortem filii ejus non sic audiatur, ut jam inciperet amare quos oderat, sicut reconciliatur inimicus inimico, ut deinde sint amici, sed jam nos diligenti reconciliati sumus, cum quo propter peccata inimicitiam habebamus. In Joann. Tract. ex. s. 6.

from the laws of the moral government of the world, but from the subjective influences thereby to be produced, from the relation of this method to the affections, to the religious need implanted in man's heart; for nothing was so directly calculated to awaken its hopes, as the way in which God here manifested his love, which could be done by no act so effectually as by his entering into union with human nature." *

Anselm of Canterbury was the first who sought to demonstrate the necessity of the work of redemption wrought precisely in this way by the incarnation of God and the sufferings of the God-man, on rational grounds.† It is evident, from his remarks, that at that period not only theologians, but also simple laymen (a proof of the more general habit of reflection on religious subjects), employed their thoughts a good deal on the question, why God might not have forgiven men by a simple act of his will; why he might not have wrought out the redemption of mankind by some angel or man.‡ With the more profound apprehensions of the nature of sin is connected, in Anselm's mind, a more profound apprehension of the idea of punishment and of the divine justice; a fact which becomes particularly manifest when we compare him with those who, as the older Alexandrians, resolve the idea of punitive justice into that of disciplinary love, and apprehend punishment simply as a means, and not according to its true conception and essence. "The honour due to God"—from this point he starts—"consists in this, that the creaturely will should submit itself to the divine will. Only *such* a creaturely will performs works acceptable to God, if it can act; and if it cannot do so, it is acceptable to God in itself." Now, since in every sin God is deprived of this honour, which is his due,§ all sin is therefore sin against God—it is impossible that the matter of it should here make any difference. Now punishment and sin appear to him to be necessary correlative ideas. Punishment is required in order to exhibit sin in the moral government of the world in its objective

* De trinitate, Lib. XIII. c. x. s. 13.

† See the two books composed in the form of dialogues: *Cur Deus homo* and *De conceptu virginali et originali peccato*.

‡ In the book, *Cur Deus homo*, Lib. I. c. i: *De quæstione non solum literati, sed etiam illiterati multi quærent ac rationem ejus desiderant*.

§ In every sin Deo non reddere debitum.

significance, to mark a standing distinction in the sight of God between that which is sin and not sin.* The punishment of sin is necessary in order that its due place may be assigned to it in the moral government of God.† He endeavours to show that all conception of punishment, even in civil relations, goes back to the conception of punishment grounded in the essence of divine justice.‡ “Rather should the universe fall in ruins than that the least thing should be done against the will of God. A substitute for the punishment required by the law can only be a satisfaction furnished therefor, when something is afforded for indemnification which outweighs the offence;§ as, for example, when one man has wounded another, it is not a sufficient reparation to see that the wound is healed, but there must also be added a satisfaction for the pain endured. Man, being impure, was unfit to enter into the community of the holy and blessed. As blessedness is that full satisfaction which excludes every want, so it is due to none but him who possesses pure righteousness.”|| Anselm now seeks to show that no man was in a condition to afford that satisfaction for sin required by the moral government of the world. The way in which he does this evidences the purity and severity of his standard of morals, and proves how far he was from holding to an ascetical work-holiness. For the purpose of laying open the insufficiency of all good works, he represents the other party as saying, “Do I not honour God when, in the fear and love of God, and contrition of heart, I renounce all earthly enjoyments, in abstinence and labour deny myself the comforts of this life, and am ready to communicate to all men, to forgive, to obey God in all things?” And he answers; “Even if a man refrained wholly from sin, he would in all this be only doing his duty; but at present he is not capable even of that, and his inability is still no excuse, since this very inability is his fault. Now, as sin proceeded from one man, so must satisfaction for all proceed also from one. Such a being

* Si peccatum dimittitur impunitum, similiter erit apud Deum peccanti et non peccanti.

† Nihil aliud, quam recte ordinare peccatum.

‡ Deum vero non decet aliquid inordinatum in suo regno dimittere.

§ Pro contumelia illata plus reddere, quam abstulit.

|| Quemadmodum beatitudo sufficientia est, in qua est nulla indigentia, ita nulli convenit, nisi in quo pura est justitia.

must have something exalted above the whole creation which he can freely offer to God, if the satisfaction is to be complete. He must have been God, therefore; but the satisfaction should be furnished by a man, because otherwise it could not be given for men; he must therefore have been a God-man, whose life as such, as infinitely exalted above the whole creation, possessed an infinite value. He voluntarily surrendered himself to a death to which he was not subject on account of sin."

Noticeable, withal, is the way in which Anselm distinguishes and separates the ethical significance of the death of Christ from the doctrinal, and contemplates the death of Christ, in the first-mentioned point of view, as a result brought about by his whole activity in his vocation. "We should be careful to distinguish," says he, "what Christ did because obedience to God required it, and what he endured as a lot brought upon him by the obedience which he showed, while at the same time it was not necessary in order to the showing of that obedience. His perfect obedience to God he manifested in continuing steadfastly true to righteousness, and the natural consequence was, that the Jews plotted against him the death to which he freely offered himself.* Thus it clearly appears how the satisfying power of Christ's death by no means involves in it that he sought death, or that God required the death of an innocent person." Christ's victory over Satan in the severest temptations, Anselm contrasts with the sin of our first parents, who so easily gave way to the impulses of appetite. God owed him a recompense for this; but being all-sufficient in himself, no such recompense could be given him, Christ could only transfer it to others. His life and his death contain infinitely more than is requisite to give satisfaction for all the sins in the world. It is clear from this exposition that Anselm's doctrine of satisfaction certainly included in it the idea of a *satisfactio activa*, the idea of perfect obedience, which was required in order to satisfaction for sin, and which Christ alone was able to afford. To the significance of Christ's offering in the sight of God, necessarily belonged also the

* Ipse sponte sustinuit mortem, non per obedientiam deserendi vitam, sed propter obedientiam servandi justitiam, in qua tam fortiter perseveravit, ut inde mortem incurreret.

moral worth of the same.* Far from Anselm, however, was the idea of a passive obedience, the idea of a satisfaction by suffering, of an expiation by assuming the punishment for mankind; for the satisfaction which Christ afforded by what he did was certainly, according to Anselm's doctrine, to be the restoration of God's honour, violated by sin, and by just this satisfaction afforded to God for mankind was the remission of punishment to be made possible. How far from him was that idea of a *satisfactio passiva*, appears evident also from the circumstance, that he does not seek at all to give prominence to the unhappiness of Christ in his passion, but rather to show that, amidst all his sufferings, he still was not unhappy. "In like manner," says he, "as happiness is not promoted by any agreeable thing which happens to one contrary to his wishes, so it is not to be called unhappiness when one, after wise deliberation, not forced by any necessity, but with freewill, undertakes something disagreeable." Another reason which he considers a valid one, why the God-man alone should be the redeemer of mankind, is, that man could not otherwise have attained to the possession of his dignity, but would have been made dependent upon a creature.

Another characteristic in Anselm is, that he seems fully aware how the fact will not pass into any conception. "Many other considerations," says he, "conspire to show that this was very befitting, which may be more easily and clearly seen in the life of Christ and his works, than by mere arguments of reason."† "Who can fully explain how necessary and conformable to divine wisdom it was, that our Saviour should live as a teacher among men, at the same time proving his doctrines by his conduct, and presenting himself as an example to mankind. But how could he have exhibited himself as a pattern to weak mortals, that under suffering and death they should not swerve from righteousness, if he had not endured all this himself?"

It may be gathered from Anselm's representations, that this particular doctrine occupied in a special manner the thoughts of theologians and laymen in this age; and that the older

* Vita ista tantum amabilis, quantum est bona.

† Sunt et alia multa, cur valde convenit, quæ facilius et clarius in ejus vita et operibus, quam sola ratione monstrari possunt.

view, containing truth in a mythical form, as, for example, that, in purchasing the redemption of man, Satan should have his due, could not be satisfactory to the acute dialectics of these theologians ; and it served to call forth the scepticism which was now aimed against the whole doctrine of satisfaction. We here come to see the difference between Anselm, whose investigations proceeded from a childlike faith and a profound sense of Christian truth, and Abelard, who began with doubt, but was restrained by the power of the religious faith of his times ; while Anselm, deeply sensible to the power of the work of redemption, and doubting the solidity of the foundation on which it was placed by the older writers, sought to place it on a deeper one, corresponding to his own sense of Christian truth, Abelard carried his scepticism still farther. Together with the older theory, that a redemption so wrought out was necessary in itself, he rejected every other way of accounting for it, although he recognized, in the mission of Christ and his passion, a manifestation of the love of God with which no other could be compared. Of Anselm's deductions he seems to have known nothing ; but had it been known to him, it is hardly to be supposed that a man so prevailingly bent on trying everything by the standard of the abstract understanding, would have been pleased with it.

In his commentary on the Epistle to the Romans,* Abelard commences, in the first place, with refuting the above-mentioned older view of the necessity of such a redemption from the power of Satan. "Why might not God," says he, "by an act of his will alone, forgive men their sins, and deliver them from the power of Satan? What need was there, in order to this, of the sufferings of Christ? Christ had in fact already, before his passion, forgiven many their sins. It is not to be ascribed to any human merits, but only to the divine grace, that the Son of God assumed a human nature in union with himself, and exalted this to a perfectly sinless life ; and why might not God, by virtue of the same grace, forgive the rest of mankind their sins? Why should not he, who showed so great favour to man, as to take him into this union with himself, have shown him the inferior favour of granting him the forgiveness of sins?" We see that while to Anselm, sin, in its relation to

* Page 552.

the moral government of the world, appeared something so monstrous as absolutely to require a satisfaction, Abelard was not deeply impressed with any such feelings. In particular, he was not inclined, as we have already observed, to think lightly of the first sin. "How could God," he says, "become reconciled with man through the death of his Son, when this death could not happen without involving the sin of so many who crucified him, which sin was certainly far greater than the first sin, which consisted in the partaking of a forbidden apple? If God was so angry on account of that first sin, how could he be appeased in the case of so many far greater sins?*" How unjust and cruel were it, that God should have required the blood of an innocent person as the price of pardoning so many guilty ones."† Abelard, in thus utterly denying the necessity of a satisfaction to be furnished by Christ, looked, on the other hand, upon the incarnation and passion of the Son of God, as simply a manifestation of divine love, and referred everything to the subjective impression wrought upon the minds of men by this love; for which he may have found a warrant in the notion of justification according to the common, subjective mode of apprehending it; and this theory accords, moreover, with the significance which the conception love has in Abelard's system of morality. The justification and reconciliation with God, brought about through Christ's blood, he explains, in the passage alluded to, as follows: "The amazing grace shown us by God, who gave his own Son to become man and suffer for us, must enkindle in us such love in return, as to make us ready to endure all suffering for his sake." Justification consists, then, in this view, in the true righteousness

* Quomodo nos reconciliari Deo per mortem filii sui dicit Apostolus, qui tanto amplius adversus hominem irasci debuit, quanto amplius homines in crucifigendo filium suum deliquerunt, quam in transgrediendo primum ejus in paradiso præceptum, unius pomi gustu? Quo enim amplius multiplicata sunt per homines peccata, irasci Deum hominibus amplius justum fuerat. Quodsi tantum fuerat illud Adæ peccatum, ut expiari non posset, nisi per mortem Christi, quam expiationem habebit ipsum homicidium, quod in Christum commissum est, tot et tanta scelera, in ipsum vel in suos commissa?

† Quam crudele et iniquum videtur, ut sanguinem innocentis in pretium aliquod quis requisierit, aut ullo modo ei placuerit, innocentem interfici, nedum Deus tam acceptam filii sui mortem habuerit, ut per ipsam universo reconciliatus sit mundo?

begotten by this love becoming an active principle in the human soul. "Every person becomes more just, that is, more full of love to God, after the sufferings of Christ than before them, because every one is more inflamed with love by benefits bestowed than by those hoped for." * After the same subjective manner he apprehends, also, the idea of redemption. "Redemption is that greatest love enkindled in us by Christ's passion,—a love which not only delivers us from the bondage of sin, but also acquires for us the true freedom of God's children, where love instead of fear becomes the ruling affection." † To enkindle the flame of a love prepared to make any sacrifice, Abelard often declares to be the highest purpose of the work of Christ. It is a favourite thought of his, that the fire which Christ came to enkindle on earth, was the love shed abroad by the Holy Ghost. ‡ "Because the entire life of Christ, with his miracles, was directed, till his glorification, to the great end of enlightening and instructing, and of exciting to love by instruction and manifestation of the love of God, for this reason it was particularly the Wisdom of God that must assume human nature." § Accordingly, it ever continued to be the firm persuasion of Abelard, that the incarnation and passion of the Son of God was to serve the purpose of enkindling love in the human heart by the display of the greatest love of God. On this point he expressed himself in the most emphatic terms, in his lectures. || He here explains the term "ransom," as one used in the way of comparison. ¶ "God," said he, "might have done it in many other ways, but in no way so befitting." Conformably to his doctrine of omnipotence, this was the best way; hence, too, the one which

* Justior, i. e. amplius Deum diligens quisque sit post passionem Christi quam ante, quia amplius in amore accenditur completis beneficiis quam speratis.

† So he explains Rom. iii. 25, propter remissionem (ἀρῆσιν) ut per hanc justitiam, i. e. caritatem remissionem peccatorum assequamur, p. 549.

‡ Cum ignis ipse amor dicatur, de quo veritas: ignem veni, inquit, mittere in terram, id est caritatem prædicare atque plantare, potius quam timorem, qui frigori comparatur. Theol. christian. Lib. I. f. 1166; and in the Introductio, Lib. II. p. 1084, he explains the above words of Christ by saying: amore potius quam timore corda terrena implere.

§ Theol. christian. Lib. IV. f. 1308.

|| In the Sentences, c. xxiii.

¶ Translative pretium nuncupatur.

must actually be chosen.* Afterwards, when objections were brought against this view, he conformed himself, in his Apology, to the expressions of the church and of the Bible, without more exactly defining in what way he understood them. He designated, as the end of the incarnation, that Christ delivered us from the bondage of sin and from the yoke of Satan, and by his death opened for us the way to the eternal, heavenly life.

Now it was *these* peculiar doctrines of Abelard, thus unfolded, which Bernard particularly attacked, in his letter of complaint addressed to pope Innocent the Second. He charged against him that, in taking ground against that older representation of the victory of Christ over Satan, he had, with presumptuous arrogance, set his own opinion above the judgment of all the ancient church teachers; † and yet a church teacher of no less consideration than Anselm had already as strenuously contended against that old representation. He accused Abelard of not acknowledging Christ as Redeemer; of saying nothing more of him than that he instructs men, by his words and example; and that he had, by his sufferings and death, exhibited before them the most perfect example of love; and the great matter of offence to his own Christian feelings was, that Christ should be considered merely as a teacher and pattern of living. "Then," "exclaims he, † "Christ taught righteousness, but did not bestow it; he exhibited love, but did not infuse it."

* What he says, in the passage of the Sentences marked in the preceding note, doubtless has reference to this: Possibilitas tamen ista ad quid referatur, satis superque determinatum esse arbitror.

† In his letter, *De erroribus Abælardi*, c. v. he cites such language as this from Abelard: sciendum est quod omnes doctores nostri post Apostolos in hoc conveniunt, and then, sed ut nobis videtur; and he remarks beforehand, that he cites it as he had read it in Abelard's Exposition of the Epistle to the Romans, and in his book of the sentences. But neither in that book, nor in the lectures published by Prof. Rheinwald, is any such passage to be found. In the Sentences, c. xxiii. Abelard, in mentioning the above noticed opinion, simply says: quidam dicunt; and afterwards, ego vero e contra dico et ratione irrefragabili probo. As appears evident, this language is milder, and, at the same time more decided and abrupt, than that quoted by Bernard. Perhaps Bernard's quotation is taken from some other lecture. For the rest, the language quoted coincides, in other respects, very nearly with what we find in the Exposition of the Epistle to the Romans.

‡ Cap. vii.

But the truth is, Abelard did not deny the communication of divine life by Christ. "According to Abelard's doctrine," says Bernard, "Christ would have benefited those only who could copy his life, and be inflamed with love in return for his own. But how is it with children, in whom nothing of this sort can take place?" And we must allow that here Abelard would have been unable, from his own point of view, to give any satisfactory reply; but yet, independently of this, he had asserted, although it is difficult to see how he came to ascribe this significance to the sufferings of Christ, that it was only by the sacrifice of Christ the way to the kingdom of heaven had been opened for all.* In relation to the question thrown out by Abelard, whether God could not have redeemed men by his simple will, Bernard replies:† "Who denies that other ways of redeeming, justifying, and delivering us, were possible to the Almighty; but this can make out nothing against the efficacy of the way and method which, among many, he has actually chosen." He then adduces a reason for the choice of *this* method, which Abelard, too, might have allowed from his own point of view. "Perhaps that way and method is the best, by means of which we, in this land of forgetfulness, have most strongly and vividly brought to our remembrance our own fall, through the many and great sufferings of our Saviour." But then he adds, that the inexhaustible depth of this mystery, how it answers to the divine wisdom, what it effects for the glorying of God and the salvation of man, it is beyond any man's power to explore; and instead of indulging in nice speculations, he chose to appeal to inward experience. "Although we cannot fathom the holy will of God, yet we can feel the effect of the work; we can be sensible of its benefit.‡ Why did he accomplish that by his blood which he might have accomplished by a word? Ask himself. It is vouchsafed me to know that the *fact is so*, but not the *wherefore*. Shall the creature say to the Creator, Why hast thou formed me thus?" In allusion to the scruple which Abelard expressed about admitting that God required the blood of an innocent person, &c., Bernard answers: "It was not the *death*

* See ep. ad Rom. Lib. II. p. 563.

† Cap. viii.

‡ Si non licet perscrutari divinæ sacramentum voluntatis, licet tamen sentire effectum operis, fructum utilitatis percipere.

of Christ, *in itself*, but the will of him who freely offered himself, that was acceptable to God; and because this precious death, procuring the downfall of sin, could only be brought about by sin, so God had no pleasure in the sin, but used it for good. God did not require the death of his Son, but accepted it when offered; he did not thirst for blood, but for man's salvation." Bernard concludes with this remark: "Three things here meet together, the humility of self-renunciation; the manifestation of love, even to the death of the cross; the mystery of redemption, whereby he overcame death. The two former parts are nothing without the third. The examples of humility and love are something great, but have no firm foundation without the redemption." The copying of the humility of Christ, love to him, is nothing in his view without union with him, which first confers the power for all, and which gives eternal life. Bernard, too, gives prominence to *that end* of Christ's passion which Abelard represents as the sole end, and expresses himself in an altogether similar manner with the latter. He brings up the question, "Could not the Creator have redeemed his creature without those conflicts of trial?" And he answers, "No doubt he could have done so, but he chose to accomplish man's redemption in this way, in order to excite him to greater love and gratitude by the sacrifice he made for him."* The divine and typical, in the life of Christ, is also made a matter of prominent importance by Bernard. "How fair thou appearest to me," says he, "even in my own form, Lord Jesus! not solely on account of the divine miracle, but also on account of the truth, meekness, and righteousness. Blessed is he who narrowly observeth thee, so as thou walkedst as a man among men, and, according to his ability, striveth thus to be thine imitator."† We have already seen, on a former page, how he made the chief end of the appearance of the Word in the flesh to consist in this, that the love of man might gradually emancipate itself from the things of sense to those which are purely spiritual; might

* In Cantica Canticorum, Sermo xi. s. 7.

† Quam formosum et in mea forma te agnosco, Domine Jesu! non ob divina tantum, quibus effulges miracula, sed et propter veritatem, et mansuetudinem et justitiam. Beatus, qui te in his hominem inter homines conversantem diligenter observans, seipsum præbet pro viribus imitatorum tui. In Cantica C. S. xxv. s. 9.

elevate itself from the appearance of the divine, which lowered itself down to man in the form of the sensible life, to the divine as it is in itself.

Robert of Pullein, also, approaches nearer to Abelard than to Anselm, when he says that God might, indeed, have redeemed men in some other way, but that he chose this particular way in order to exhibit to us, in the greatness of the ransom, the greatness of his love and of our sins.*

As it respects Peter Lombard, it is to be noticed that, adopting as his own the words of Augustin, cited a few pages back, he is on his guard against the same anthropopathic misconception of the idea of reconciliation which Augustin thought it so important to avoid. "We must not so conceive," says he, "of the reconciliation of man with God, brought about by Christ, as if God then, for the first time, began to love those who were before objects of his hatred, as an enemy is reconciled to his enemy. God did not first begin to love us when he became reconciled with us through the blood of his Son; but he loved us before the world was, and before we were. We were, only on account of sin, at enmity with him, who ceased not to love us even when we were his enemies. We were at enmity with him as sin and righteousness are at enmity." From Anselm's explication he has adopted nothing. He allows himself to be determined only by the declarations of the old church teachers, collated together, and follows, here, the evidence of authorities, rather than dialectical explication. He denominates Christ the only perfect and entirely valid sacrifice for mankind. He contrasts his self-renunciation and humility with the pride by which the first man fell. In respect of the passion, he supposes a *satisfactio vicaria*, which we do not find in Anselm. That ancient doctrine of the justice due to Satan once more emerges in him. Yet, on the other hand, he explains the *justificatio per Christi sanguinem* to mean that men are justified, that is, made just, by the return of love which the revelation of God's love enkindles in their hearts. And to the question, Whether God could have brought about man's redemption in any other way, he answers, that some other way was, indeed, possible to God;

* Ut quantitate pretii quantitatem nobis sui innotesceret amoris et nostri peccati.

but no other was so well fitted to raise up the souls of men, and deliver them from despondency, as that God should show them such love, and consider them worthy of such amazing condescension. Neither do we meet with any trace of Anselm's explication in pope Innocent the Third. Like Peter Lombard, he gives peculiar prominence to the impression which the manifestation of God's love, in the redemptive sufferings of Christ, must make, and the example of humility which he gave, as contrasted with the pride of man.* He is probably the first who represented the work of redemption expressly as a reconciliation between the divine mercy and justice. "God's justice," says he, "required an adequate punishment for all; his mercy could not permit this; hence the adjustment that God took upon himself the punishment for all, and bestowed the gift of salvation upon all through himself."† But the doctrine above-mentioned, of the justice experienced by Satan, is to be met with also in him.

Thomas Aquinas adopts Anselm's doctrine of satisfaction, together with all the other points thus far developed in his representation of it. Like Anselm, he places the satisfaction furnished by Christ over against the punishments which mankind must have suffered for sin. The satisfaction consisted in this, that Christ offered something of infinite worth, something exalted above the whole creation, to God. In suffering from love and obedience, Christ offered to God something greater than was required as a satisfaction for the entire sins of mankind, first, by reason of the greatness of the love with which he suffered; then by virtue of the dignity of his life, which as the life of the God-man possessed an infinite worth; and, thirdly, on account of the greatness of his sufferings. Hence, the "passion of Christ" is not only "sufficient," but also "superabundant" for the sins of all mankind. In connection with this satisfaction, Thomas now mentions also the punishment borne by Christ for mankind: "Christ must take upon himself, as he says, that punishment which is the termination of all other, which virtually contains all other in itself, that is,

* Ut per mortem suam genus humanum redimeret, quatenus inimicos ad caritatem accenderet, superbos ad humilitatem reduceret.

† Modum invenit, per quem utrique satisfecerit tam misericordiæ quam justitiæ, judicavit igitur, ut assumeret in se pœnam pro omnibus et donaret per se gloriam universis. Sermo i. fol. vi. ed. Colon. 1575.

death.* But besides the deliverance of man from sin by the satisfaction furnished for him, many other things come in, in addition, which make this way in which the redemption of man was accomplished especially suited to bring man to perceive how much God loves him, and thus to call forth the love in which salvation is grounded; and next, to operate as an example of humility and of every virtue." In his apologetical work, he lays special stress on the consideration that the union of God with human nature was to serve the purpose of imparting to men the firmest assurance that they could attain to supreme blessedness, to immediate fellowship with God, when the wide distance between God and man must have otherwise been to them a cause of despondency. Hence, from that time onward, the longing after blessedness had become vastly stronger among men, and all worship of the creature had been destroyed.

William of Paris, in following the explication of Anselm,† has prosecuted it still farther, in a way peculiar to himself. He begins with the principle: "It is the case with spiritual and bodily distempers, that they can only be cured by their opposites,‡ and the satisfaction must also be the opposite of the transgression, and commensurate with it, or still beyond it. In the first sin, and every following one, three things go together,—pride, disobedience, and cupidity. Now as in the first sin of man, who was for making himself independent of God, and arrogating to himself equality with God, was exhibited the climax of all this, so the remedy and satisfaction for this could only be again the extreme contrary;—that God himself, the all-sufficient, the Lord of all, should humble himself, subject himself, to the obedience which man was bound to render, and assume his poverty. This alone could be an adequate remedy and an adequate satisfaction, which God as man only could furnish. When, through the love of God, this adequate satisfaction was given, the divine mercy might, without injury to justice, bestow on man the forgiveness of

* *Illam pœnam, ad quam omnes ordinantur, et quæ continet in se virtute omnes pœnas, quamvis non actu. In Lib. III. Sent. Distinct. 20. Quæst. i. Artic. iii.*

† In his book *De causis, cur Deus homo.*

‡ *L. c. c. v: Quod contraria contrariis curantur tam in spiritualibus, quam in corporalibus.*

sin, and deliver him from his wretchedness; and thus the antagonism between these two divine attributes was reconciled.* Furthermore," he says, "by love man must be led back to fellowship with God; but nothing is so well suited to excite love as love, the manifestation of love, which enkindles love in return.† By nothing, however, could God so show his love as by entering himself into union with human nature, taking upon himself its suffering by giving up his life for his enemies, which is ever the highest proof of love. The chief end of man, as all true philosophers must own, is divine life, the deification in which the glory of man consists. Accordingly, God must become man by participating in human nature, in order that man might become God by a corresponding participation in the divine nature."‡

A peculiar mode of contemplating the import and aim of the work of redemption, and one which had not appeared since the time of the systems of the Gnostics and of the Antiochian school, was first brought up again by the schoolmen of the thirteenth century; namely, the view of it as a work necessary to the perfection of the whole universe. This view was connected, in their case, with the investigation of the question whether the incarnation of God must have taken place even if man had not sinned. For inasmuch as by this union of God with the creature the universe is raised to that highest point of perfection to which it could not have otherwise attained, it seemed to them it might be said that this union must have taken place even if there had been no sin. In relation to this question, as to all the rest, the arguments were duly weighed on both sides; and Bonaventura, for instance, brings as a reason on the negative side that, as the incarnation of God was a fact which far surpassed in dignity the work of creation, so it cannot be considered as anything that had a place in the original plan of that work, but a deviation to the opposite of that which should have been, must necessarily precede, in order to

* *Misericordia et veritas obviaverunt sibi, justitia et pax osculatæ sunt. Dum enim altera per viam exigentiæ satisfactionis, altera autem per viam omnimodæ remissionis incederet, obviam altera alteri nunquam venisset, nisi altitudo divini consilii ambas in uno illo beneficio sociasset.*

† *Quia amor amore convenientius accenditur, sicut ignis igne, decuit Deum amorem nostrum amore suo accendere.*

‡ *Quid mirum est, Deum esse factum hominem, participatione humanæ naturæ, ut homo etiam fieret Deus, congruenti sibi participatione deitatis?*

furnish the occasion for an adjustment of so extraordinary a nature.* After having stated the arguments on both sides, he remarks: "Which side has the best, is known only to him who became incarnate for us. It is difficult to decide between two suppositions which may both pass as conformable to the Catholic faith." He distinguishes between the interest of reason and that of piety. That view appears to him most agreeable to the former, according to which the perfection of the universe, the completion of God's work, required his incarnation; and that view most agreeable to the latter, according to which God is not made dependent on the perfection of the universe; but this fact is contemplated as a work of God's free love for the extirpation of sin, while at the same time it most nearly accords with the sacred Scriptures." To this view likewise Thomas Aquinas most strongly inclines. As the sacred Scriptures uniformly consider the incarnation of God as a necessary remedy against sin, so it is safest to rest satisfied with this view. To the perfection of the universe the natural reference and respect of the creation to God, as the end of all, is sufficient. That personal union of the creature with the Creator transcends the limits of nature, exceeds any perfection which lies within her capacity.† There is nothing to forbid the supposition that human nature after the introduction of sin might rise to a higher exaltation,—for God makes evil subservient to good. Thomas Aquinas was assuredly prevented by his moral feelings from becoming clearly conscious to himself that according to his own principles, as already set forth, he must have considered evil as something necessary, in the evolving process of the universe, though he carefully seeks to guard against every such theory by abundant precautions. The supposition, however, that this doctrine virtually lies at bottom in his mind, clearly harmonizes with the fact just stated, that he makes the elevation of the creature above the original capabilities of his nature to depend on the introduction of sin.‡

* *Quia incarnatio Dei est superexcedentis dignatis excessus oppositorum, per ipsum corrigendorum et restaurandorum.*

† *Ad perfectionem universi sufficit, quod naturali modo creatura ordinetur in Deum, sicut in finem. Hoc autem excedit limites perfectionis naturæ, ut creatura uniatur Deo in persona.*

‡ *V. Summæ, p. iii. Quæst. i. Artic. iii.*

The scruples by which his predecessors were deterred from recognizing the necessity of the incarnation of the Son of God in order to the perfection of the universe, are taken notice of by Raymund Lull : "It is, in itself considered, true," he says, "that the incarnation of God can be attributed to no other cause than God's freewill. The creation is a work of God's free love. But this being once supposed, God's assumption of human nature is necessary ; for otherwise God would not fulfil the obligations due to himself and his perfections.* Upon the introduction of sin, the same was necessary in order that the end for which the world was created might not be defeated, but be realized notwithstanding that disturbance."†

As it regards the subjective appropriation of the work of redemption, that view still continued to be the prevailing one in the Western church which Augustin had set forth in opposition to Pelagianism, that by *justification* must be understood the inward work of making just,—the sanctification grounded in the fellowship of divine life with Christ,—the subjective in contradistinction from the objective work. And we shall see how this subjective tendency in the mode of contemplating the order of salvation contributed, little as it might seem so at first glance, to keep the religious consciousness in a state of dependence on the tutelage and mediation of the church and the whole churchly theocratic system ; as, indeed, the same tendency generally had the most important consequences on the whole process of the development of Christian life in the Middle Ages.‡

In exhibiting the order of salvation, Bernard distinguished himself in a remarkable manner from the other church-teachers of his time. The experience which he had gained in the history of his own mental conflicts, and in the spiritual guidance of others, led him doubtless to the conviction that, amid the changing mood of subjective feelings, nothing could afford certain repose but an objective ground of trust ; but confidence in Christ as Saviour, and in the grace of redemption. This direction we see him constantly following ; though, in

* *Alias Deus non solveret debitum sibi ipsi et suis dignitatibus.*

† *Ut satisfaceret illi fini, ad quem mundus fuit creatus.*

‡ See above, page 422.

the use of the term *justification*, he seems sometimes to waver between the objective and subjective sides. The reference to the objective comes out plainly and distinctly in a passage of his sermons on the Song of Solomon,* where, after citing Psalm xxxi. 2, and Rom. iii. 23, he remarks: "No one is without sin. Sufficient for all justification to me is the faith that he is gracious to me against whom I have sinned. All that he has decreed not to impute against me, is as if it had never been.† Not to sin, is God's righteousness; God's forgiveness, the righteousness of man." Deserving of notice is also the way in which Bernard seeks to illustrate the doctrine of justification thus understood, by distinguishing between that which is gradual in the process of evolution in time, and that which is timeless in the divine intuition. "The heavenly birth," says he, "is the eternal predestination, by virtue of which God loved his chosen and made them accepted in his beloved Son, in that they appear to him, in the Holy One, as conformed to his own image. They stand before the presence of the Father as those who have not sinned; at least, the fact that they have, here vanishes before God's eternal intuition, whose love covers the multitude of sins."‡ And in another sermon he says:§ "Christ is not only called righteous, but righteousness itself, and justifying righteousness. Thou art as mighty in justifying as thou art rich in forgiving. Whosoever, therefore, is contrite for sin, hungers and thirsts after righteousness, let him believe on him who justifies the ungodly,—and justified by faith alone, he shall have peace with God."|| Manifestly, he distinguishes here *justification*

* Sermo xxiii. in Cantica Canticorum, s. 15.

† Omne, quod mihi ipse non imputare decreverit, sic est quasi non fuerit.

‡ Generatio cœlestis æterna prædestinatio est, qua electos suos Deus dilexit et gratificavit in dilecto filio suo ante mundi constitutionem, sic in sancto apparentes sibi, ut viderent veritatem suam et gloriam suam, quo ejus forent consortes hæreditatis, cujus et apparerent conformes imaginis. Hos ergo adventi quasi nunquam peccasse, quoniam et si qua deliquisse videntur in tempore, non apparent in æternitate, quia caritas patris ipsorum coöperit multitudinem peccatorum.

§ Sermo xxii. s. 8.

|| Quamobrem quisquis pro peccatis compunctus esurit et sitit justitiam, credat in te, qui justificas impium, et solum justificatus per fidem, pacem habebit ad Deum.

from sanctification, and derives the latter from the former, as in fact is particularly evident from what follows, where he says: "Whosoever, then, justified from sin, longs and strives after the holiness without which no man can see God, let him hear him who says, 'Be ye holy, for I am holy.'"* In another passage, however, the two modes of apprehending the notion of justification are confounded together by him, where he says: "Fear goes before, that justification may follow after. Perhaps then we are called in fear, justified through love. The just man finally lives by faith, but, without doubt, by that which works by love."† He here derives salvation from the eternal counsels of predestination. He considers as the means for the actualization of that which is contained in them, at least in those of mature age, to be calling with justification. The man, being filled with love, becomes conscious of his justification.‡ The love that proceeds from faith is to him the source of justification.§ By virtue of the inherent connection in which faith and love represent themselves to him, he embraces together in his notion of justification the objective and subjective parts of it in thus expressing himself: "Beloved, we love; loving, we deserve to be loved still more. The Holy Ghost is bestowed on those alone who believe on the Crucified, and faith is powerless unless it works by love; but love is a gift of the Holy Ghost. Who is just, besides him who returns his own love to God, who first loved him?—which is never done but when the Spirit reveals to the man, through faith, the eternal counsel of God respecting his future salvation; which revelation is certainly nothing else than the infusion of the grace of the Spirit. By this the man is fitted, in that the works of the flesh are mortified, for that kingdom which flesh and blood cannot inherit,—in that he receives at one and the same time, in one Spirit, the consciousness of being loved by God, and the power to love him in return, so that he may not be loved in vain."||

* Qui ergo justificati a peccatis, sectari desiderant sanctimoniam.

† Ep. cvii. s. 4.

‡ Sentit se justificari, cum amore perfunditur.

§ Amor Dei, is duntaxat, qui interim ex fide est, ex quo et nostra fit justificatio.

|| Quæ sane revelatio non est aliud, quam infusio gratiæ spiritualis, per quam, dum facta carnis mortificantur, homo ad regnum præparatur,

The whole systematic theology of these centuries we see interpenetrated and quickened, however, by that which Augustin had represented as the principle of living Christianity as contradistinguished from Pelagianism. Very far were these theologians from substituting any form of legality, or work-holiness, in place of living Christianity. The *externalization* of Christianity, which appeared to us in the misgrowths of the churchly life, found no point to fix upon in what they here represented as the principle, though it might do so in the supervening effects. All gave prominence to the idea of a true fellowship of life with Christ, acquired by faith, as absolutely requisite to salvation. They considered it important to distinguish the dead faith, that knew no such fellowship, from the living faith, that works by love. Thus Anselm of Canterbury * describes dead faith as one to which the object of faith is wholly outward,—living faith, as one to which the object is within, †—faith in God, as a faith whereby one enters into a participation of the divine nature. ‡ He calls faith something dead when it does not work and live by love. § The faith which was accompanied by its corresponding love, could not be inactive when an opportunity presented itself for it to work. Faith is active by reason of the life that resides within it, without which it could effect nothing. Operative faith is called a living faith, because it has in it the life of love; inoperative faith a dead faith, because that life of love is wanting to it with which it could not have been inactive." So also Peter Lombard distinguishes the three acts, *credere in Deum* or *Christum*, *credere Deum*, and *credere Deo*. Faith, in the two last respects, is the bare considering a thing as true, without inward life; the first is that living faith whereby man enters into fellowship with God, is incorporated into the community with him and his members. || With this faith is necessarily connected love. This alone is, according to him,

quod caro et sanguis non possident, simul accipiens in uno spiritu et unde se præsumat amatum et unde redamet, ne gratis amatus sit.

* Monolog. c. lxxv.

† Mortua fides credit tantum id, quod credi debet, viva fides credit in id.

‡ In Deum credendo tendere in suam essentiam.

§ Nisi dilectione valeat et vivat.

|| Credendo in Deum ire, ei adhærere et ejus membris incorporari.

justifying faith (*fides justificans*), that is, faith that makes just or holy. Love is the work of this faith, and the latter the ground of the entire Christian life. Following the Aristotelian distinctions, he denominates that dead faith the yet unorganised matter which must first be actuated by the sealing impress of the form. It is formless, *informis, qualitas mentis informis*. Love is this form, which must be impressed upon it. The faith animated by love, the *fides formata*, is a virtue, and the source of all other Christian virtues.

On this foundation proceeded also the schoolmen of the thirteenth century; and new, profound explications of the progressive development of Christian life were added by them.

Dead faith, like all gifts which are not connected with the all-inspiring temper of love,—all isolated gifts, as the gifts of miracles, prophecy, are distinguished by Thomas Aquinas, as *gratia gratis data*,* from that grace which alone fits man for attaining salvation, which transports him into a disposition of heart acceptable to God, begets in him faith that works by love, from that divine element as the animating principle of the whole life, the *gratia gratum faciens*. Thomas reckons it to the essence of faith that the object should not be sufficiently known to the mind to produce conviction by the mind itself, so that the bent of the will must give the turn whereby it inclines to one side rather than to the other.† When this is accompanied with doubt and anxiety lest the opposite may be true, it is called opinion; but when the certainty is present without any such doubt, it is called faith.‡ Accordingly, he defines faith as an act of the mind assenting to divine truth according to the direction of the will moved by divine grace, or by virtue of the impulse given it by such a will.§ Now, inasmuch as the will gives the impulse, and this receives its determination, its particular character, from the end to which it is directed; so it is love by which the will is united with its

* Compare above, page 189.

† Intellectus assentit alicui, non quia sufficienter moveatur ab objecto proprio, sed per quamdam electionem voluntarie declinans in unam partem magis quam in aliam. Summa, Lib. II. p. ii. Quæst. i. Art. iv.

‡ Si quidem hoc sit cum dubitatione et formidine alterius partis, erit opinio. Si autem sit cum certitudine absque tali formidine, erit fides.

§ Actus intellectus assentientis veritati divinæ ex imperio voluntatis a Deo motæ per gratiam.

end, the supreme good. Hence, charity is here the animating principle, the *forma fidei*, whereby the mind enters into a true union with the object of its knowledge. It was now a contested point; *how* the transition was made from the *fides informis* to the *fides formata*; whether, when the latter entered the soul, the former retreated from it, or the groundwork of the latter remained and was only raised to a higher power. Thomas asserts the latter. The *habitus*, that is to say, remains the same, inasmuch as it is a capacity of the soul; but by love is denoted the bent of the will, in which the essence of faith, as such, does not consist, for faith is indeed first an *act* of the intellect. Where imperfection belongs to the conception of the object described as imperfect, there the imperfect must make way for the perfect; but it is otherwise where the imperfect belongs only to the accidental, and therefore the object remains the same, though it loses an accidental predicate, while an imperfect thing grows into a more perfect one, as the boy ever continues to be the same person when he grows up to manhood. Raymund Lull says: "Faith is always something communicated to man by God, that by faith he may rise upward to divine truth, which he never yet could do by means of knowledge. Being a divine gift, this faith is *fides formata*.* Its defect is only subjective, arises accidentally in the Christian still beset with sin, in so far as he is estranged by sin from the end for which he was created.† Accordingly, the *informitas* is a privation ‡ accidentally cleaving to the divine reality, and therefore from the same fundamental essence of the *fides informis* would arise a *fides formata*, from its being made free from the privation by surpervening grace."§

Justification is made by Thomas to consist in the infusion of grace. In this, all is given at once; only in thought, different operations are to be considered separately from one another, and amongst these is to be found a certain relation, according

* Tale esse datum dicitur ens positivum, et est esse formatum, cum Deus non det esse difformatum.

† Sed Christianus existens in peccato difformat ipsum per accidens, in quantum se deviat a fine per peccatum, ad quem finem est creatus.

‡ Fides informis quoad hominem peccatorem, non tamen informis quoad se ipsam, cum habet formam sibi coessentialiam datam a Deo.

§ Quæstt. super libb. Sentent. L. III. Qu. cxiii. et cxiv. T. IV. f. 98, seq.

to which they condition each other. Thus the first is the infusion of grace; the second, the movement of the freewill towards God; next, opposition to sin; then forgiveness of sin. With conversion to God is given abhorrence of sin, as ungodly. The love of God to man is the cause of the peace with God imparted to the man. The love is something eternal and immutable; but the operation of it takes place in time. This operation taking place in the inner being of the man is grace, by which he who by sin is excluded from eternal life is made worthy of it; therefore forgiveness of sin cannot be conceived without the infusion of grace. As the love of God consists not only in the inward act of the divine will, but also in a certain operation of grace which accompanies it, so, too, the fact that God does not impute to the man his sins, carries along with it a certain operation in him to whom God does not impute sin.

From this view of "justification," certain consequences affecting the peculiar order of salvation according to this scheme now resulted, important in their influence on Christian life and the guidance of souls. As the salvation of man was made to depend on this interior subjective working of divine grace, and on the presence of a divine life brought about thereby, as this alone was to constitute the sure mark of adoption into the number of the elect; so the question now arose, which could hardly be answered in a way calculated to promote tranquillity of soul, how is one to be certain of his salvation? No other course was left here but to appeal to inward experience, to the feelings, which in the various moods of mind, affected by so many different influences, and the conflicts continually springing up afresh in such as were actually engaged in the progress of sanctification, could be but an uncertain and unsteady criterion, as all in fact acknowledged, and supposed that no infallible mark could be proposed.

Thus Alexander of Hales, proceeding on the assumption, that neither the cause nor the operation of grace fell within the province of human knowledge, concludes from this fact, that no other means remained to man of ascertaining whether or no he was in a state of grace except the experience of his own feelings.* There is no infallible knowledge. It rests

* *Scientia affectus, per experientiam rei in affectu.*

solely on three marks; light, peace, and joy in the inner man. And he supposes that this very uncertainty is a fact the most salutary in its influence on the progress of the Christian life, and one which has been so ordered by God on this very account. God has not thought proper to leave us in entire uncertainty on this point, nor yet to give us perfect knowledge. If man should have no experience of the blessed effects of communion with God, he would have nothing to stimulate him to the love of God; but if a perfect certainty of his being in a state of grace were bestowed on him, he would easily fall into pride. So also Thomas Aquinas reckons to the stage of faith the absence of any such certainty with regard to the state of grace,* for the same reasons that are assigned by Alexander of Hales; because the principle and the operative cause of grace, in God himself, who cannot be an object of immediate intuition in the present life, and hence there can be no certain knowledge of his presence or his non-presence in the human soul.† For this reason, one can only infer from certain marks, that he is in a state of grace;‡ he can infer this in so far as he is conscious of having his delight in God, of despising earthly things, and in so far as he knows himself to be guilty of no mortal sin.§ The only exception relates to those cases where individuals have been favoured with the assurance of their being in a state of grace by an express and extraordinary revelation, that so the joy of assurance may already begin with them in the present life, and they themselves may accomplish noble works with the greater confidence and the greater power, and patiently endure the evils of the present life.||

What Thomas here says respecting the beneficial influence of the certainty obtained by means of such supernatural

* Nullus certitudinaliter potest scire se habere caritatem, sed potest ex aliquibus signis probabilibus conjicere. In Lib. I. Sentent. Distinct. 17. Quæst. i. Artic. iv. ed. Venet. T. IX. p. 223.

† Principium gratiæ et objectum ejus est ipse Deus, qui propter sui excellentiam est nobis ignotus et ideo ejus præsentia in nobis et absentia per certitudinem cognosci non potest. Summæ, p. ii. Lib. I. Quæst. cxii. Art. v. T. XXI. p. 633.

‡ Cognoscere conjecturaliter per aliqua signa.

§ In quantum percipit, se delectari in Deo et contemnere res mundanas et in quantum homo non est conscius sibi alicujus peccati mortalis.

|| He refers to this the passage 2 Cor. xii. 9, which is inapplicable.

revelation in particular cases, is, however, bottomed on the consciousness of the prejudicial influence of the want of such a certainty. The uncertainty must often act as a check on the true cheerfulness of the Christian life, and would impel men to take refuge from the conflicts of the world in the monastic life, and to seek by self-tortures or work-holiness to obtain assurance of the salvation for which they were anxious. This uncertainty led to tormenting reflections on the state of the heart, in which anxious souls wasted themselves away. Men were filled with distress on account of the absence of certain *marks* of the state of grace, which they believed they did not possess, and so *laboured* with anxious self-tormenting pains to produce such feelings within them. The striving after certainty with regard to the salvation of their own souls, to be obtained by certain excitements of feeling, supernatural revelations, visions and other evidences of this sort, gave birth to fanatical tendencies. And, on the other side, that uncertainty served to bring the Christian life more and more into a state of dependence on the tutelage of the priesthood and of the church, and all the necessary instrumentalities for attaining to the state of grace; as, in fact, the communication of justifying grace (*gratia justificans*) was made dependent on the sacraments, and it was an important determination for the church system of doctrine, that the sacraments should be considered in a certain sense a cause of this grace.* We see how important

* This very thing was said to be that which distinguished the sacraments of the New Testament from those of the Old. The latter merely significabant fidem per quam justificantur homines, the former actually confer such a *gratia justificans*. It was considered important to hold fast to the objective sanctifying power, which was transferred to the consecrated elements and objectively resided in them, to hold that they communicated *gratia justificans ex opere operato*; which, to be sure, was said to denote simply a purely objective operation, was by no means a mere mechanical thing, standing in no relation with the state of the heart. Though these theologians, in accordance with that externalization of the conception of humility, sought an exercise of humility for men who had fallen by pride, in requiring them to humble themselves before these outward things, so as by their means to receive grace, yet they always took pains to define the sense in which the sacraments are the cause of grace with great exactness, and to guard by various distinctions against the error of ascribing too much to them. Thomas Aquinas says, the *causa principalis gratiæ* is God; the sacraments are only the *causa instrumentalis*. But many were actually driven by the effort just alluded

this shaping of the order of salvation must prove for the whole form of Christian life in the middle ages, and the church theocratical system.

As it regards the power still remaining to freewill in a corrupt nature, and the relation of the freewill to the work of conversion or to justification in the sense described, we plainly discern, in the mode after which the theologians of the twelfth century from the beginning onwards explained themselves on this point, the mighty influence of the Augustinian system; but although determined thereby in their main direction, they were yet led, by their moral interest, and by the dialectical weariness which stood connected therewith, to be desirous of avoiding the appearance as if they actually denied freewill, and glorified grace and predestination at the expense of it. The logic of Augustin and the older moderate defenders of this system had already set them the example in this respect. Here properly belongs Anselm's Dialogue on the freewill, and his treatise on the harmony between foreknowledge, predestination, grace, and freewill. His ideas are as follows: No capacity of a created being is, in and of itself considered, in a condition to pass by itself into action. There must first supervene, in order to this, many influences from without. Still, whether this takes place or not, the capacity as such remains the same. Thus, for example, though the eye requires the influence of the sunlight, in order to see, yet it may be said, that even in the dark it still retains the faculty of sight. So stands the case with regard to the relation of the capacity for goodness to the depraved will, although this capacity is never exerted except by those whose depraved wills have been drawn by the irresistible power of grace. Robert Pullein expresses himself wholly as if he ascribed to man the free power of self-determination, by virtue of which he may

to, to ascribe to the sacraments less than the spirit of the church and its doctrine required. Thomas Aquinas cites the opinion of some, whom he controverts: *Quod sacramenta non sint causa gratiæ aliquid operando, sed quia Deus sacramentis adumbrat in animo gratiam operantem, quod sacramenta non causant gratiam, nisi per quod concomitant virtutem divinam sacramentis assistentem.* The matter was illustrated by the case of a king, who had determined to make a distribution of money, and laid it down as one of the conditions, that none should receive any portion of the gift except such as brought with them a certain leaden token as a countersign.

surrender himself to grace, or unite himself with it. "As often as grace offers itself to any one," says he, "the individual either acts in co-operation with that grace, or, rejecting it, still goes on to sin. The first cause of all goodness is grace; but the free will has also a part to perform, though a subordinate one (as *causa secundaria*). Freewill also has some merit; namely, this, that it ceases to resist the divine will." Afterwards, however, he explains himself in a way that perfectly accords with the Augustinian scheme. Thus: "If efficacious grace (*gratia efficax*) is but imparted to man, it draws, though without violence, the freewill with such force, that it follows without resistance, as if impelled by an inner necessity." "Although," says he, "grace reclaims the wandering, yet it draws them with their own freewill. It does not constrain them contrary to their will. It is so mighty that it transforms even the will of the most obdurate, without any difficulty and any violence, to each stage of conversion, whenever it pleases." The same held good also of the other systematic theologians of the twelfth century; but we must make special mention of the mystical writers of this century. Their mild practical bent led them to give special prominence to the doctrine of the free will, and to represent it as standing in harmony with grace; but yet it may be questioned if they really supposed a free will conditioning grace. Here Bernard's tract, *De gratia et libero arbitrio*, takes an important place. The occasion of his writing it was furnished him by a promise he had given to draw up a confession of faith. He recognized, in all the good that was in him, the work of prevenient grace. He hoped by that to make still further progress in holiness, and to be carried onward to perfection.* This appeared to one who heard it an extravagant eulogium of grace at the expense of human merit and human activity. Bernard felt himself called upon, therefore, to give an account of the manner in which he conceived grace and freewill to be related to each other. He acknowledged that there is in man an inalienable somewhat, a freedom subjected to no necessity and to no constraint, the faculty of self-determination, the freedom of nature as contradistinguished from the freedom of grace. Freedom, in this latter sense, is

* Quod scilicet ab ipsa me in bono et præventum agnoscerem et provehi sentirem et sperarem perficiendum.

the freedom from sin as a state, *material* freedom ; in the other sense, it is *formal* freedom. That formal freedom it is whereby man is distinguished from natural beings. Unless this faculty of freedom always remained with him, there could be no place for moral imputation, no question about either merit or guilt. As the salvation of man proceeds from the operation of grace, so the latter can produce its operation only in the free will.* No one obtains salvation against his will. The whole work of the free will, its entire merit, rests upon this, that it consents to the grace that awakens it.† Which, however, is not to be so understood as if this consent originated in itself ; since, according to the declaration of St. Paul, we are not able of ourselves to think anything as we ought, which is still less than consent. Grace prevents us, by inspiring us with good thoughts, which it does without any aid from us. In transforming our perverse wills it unites itself with them, so that they consent with it. From God comes the beginning of our salvation, neither through us nor with us.‡ However many our gracious Father, who wills that all men should be saved, seems to draw to his salvation, still, he will hold none worthy of salvation save such as approve themselves to him as willing. The constraining influences of God on man§ aim at this very thing, that he should be stimulated to voluntary consent, so that when God changes his will from evil to good, God does not deprive that will of freedom, but transforms it.” Now, if we compare all this with what Bernard says concerning the relation of free-will to grace, we can make his determinations with respect to the former harmonize with his declarations concerning the latter, only by supposing that, like Augustin, he leaned upon the assertion that the free will is subjected to no constraint, and no natural necessity ; that the form of rational self-determination was ever present, but as one always determined by the almighty influence of grace. On the ground of such a formal, abstract notion of freedom he might say that this

* Tolle liberum arbitrium et non erit, quod salvetur, tolle gratiam, non erit unde salvetur.

† Quod consentit.

‡ A Deo sine dubio nostræ fit salutis exordium, nec per nos utique nec nobiscum.

§ Hoc quippe intendit, cum terret aut percutit, ut faciat voluntarios, non salvet invitos.

freedom continued to exist in connection with all moral unfreedom, is the same in evil actions and good; and, consequently, we must weigh moreover the fact, that he ever supposed the participation of all in original sin grounded in a hidden chain of evolution, so that therefore that supervening sinfulness from which man could be freed only by a grace bestowed on him without any help of his own, was still not able to prevent imputation, nor to remove the guilt of the free will.* In like manner, Richard a S. Victore could unite Augustin's doctrine of prevenient grace, drawing the will, with the strongest expressions with regard to freewill.† "How," says he, "is the will of man not truly free, who can be deprived of his freedom by no constraint; for no creature has power to do it, and it does not become the Creator to do it. But how should the Creator himself be able to do this; he who can do nothing except that which is worthy of him?"‡ He in fact will not admit that this will can be denominated a captive will; because it involves a contradiction to call him free, and at the same time a captive; unless by that term is meant simply his weakness, the being deprived of the original capability.§ But concerning grace, he says also, that it often presented itself to the negligent and careless of its own accord, and was often suddenly and unexpectedly snatched away from our many and earnest efforts. Yet he ascribes to the free will an ability to consent to the evil or the good, to consent to divine grace or not.|| It can win grace again, but only through grace.¶ As it cannot regain by itself those who are once lost, so it cannot without other help secure those who have been gratuitously (therefore by the operation of grace)

* Where he is discoursing of the freedom that is the condition of imputation, he adds, c. ii. s. 5: *Excepto sane per omnia originali peccato, quod aliam constat habere rationem.*—c. xii. s. 38: *Quo non solum non consentiens, verum plerumque et nesciens alia ratione constringitur, necdum renatus baptisate.*

† *De statu interioris hominis, p. i. tract. i. c. xxiii.*

‡ *Quomodo arbitrium hominis vere liberum non est, quod sua libertate nulla vi, nulla potestate privari potest, nam hoc nec creatura valet, nec creatorem decet. Sed quomodo vel creator hoc potest, qui nihil quod non decet facere potest?*

§ *Nihil aliud quam infirmum et nativæ possibilitatis virtute privatum.*

|| *Potest consentire vel non consentire aspirationi divinæ. De statu interioris hominis, p. i., tract. i., c. xiii.*

¶ *Gratiam, sed gratis, recuperare potest.*

regained. Grace may with justice be at any time withdrawn from it, because it is never to be found without fault.*

But, in the thirteenth century, we mark two tendencies in the mode of apprehending this doctrine divaricating from each other. One in the order of Franciscan monks, of which Alexander of Hales appears first as the representative, really departs so far from the rigid Augustinian system as to suppose a grace conditioned in its operations on the free recipiency of the man; the other, led by the logical consistency of its principles even beyond Augustin himself, as we have seen in the principles already lying at bottom in Albert the Great, and still further developed and more clearly expressed by Thomas Aquinas. Alexander of Hales says: "All men are found to be alike corrupt. No one can make himself fit for heaven. God wills according to his highest love to save men, to communicate to them himself; but it is presupposed that there is a recipiency, so far as this is grounded in the moral powers still remaining to man. The light shines everywhere; but its rays do not find everywhere a material susceptible of illumination. No one can render himself sufficiently susceptible for the reception of grace, unless God himself makes him fit for it by his own inward operation; but if he only does what it depends on himself to do, the divine grace ensues by which he is prepared for the reception of grace."† He makes use of the following comparison: As when a rich man distributes alms, and two persons are present equally poor; but one stretches out his arm to receive the alms and afterwards receives it, but the other neglects to do so and receives nothing. Thomas Aquinas also starts from the maxim of the Aristotelian philosophy which prevailed in all the schools, that every action, in order to its being accomplished, presupposed a susceptible material prepared for it beforehand.‡ According to his doctrine, therefore, a certain susceptibility was required on the part of man in order to the operation of grace. But it appears evident, from the chain of the doctrine of Thomas Aquinas, already unfolded, that he could not allow so very

* Sicut non potest per se semel amissam recuperare, sic quidem gratis recuperatam non potest nisi ex aliena tutela custodire. L. c. c. xxii.

† Quod nullus potest sufficienter se disponere ad salutem, sed si faciat, quod in se est, consequitur dispositio divini adjutorii.

‡ Nulla forma nisi in materia sic disposita.

much to depend on creaturely self-determination. Although he presupposes such a necessary susceptibility for the operations of grace, yet he traces even this preparation again to God, to the assistance of God moving the mind to goodness.* Whatsoever in man renders him a fit subject for salvation, is all comprehended under the effect of predestination; †—every necessary instrumentality for carrying out the decree of predestination.

The above-mentioned preparation for a divine communication to the rational creature by means of a recipiency on his part, by means of that which he might be able to do at his own position with the moral power still left to him, was called a *meritum de congruo*. ‡ It was the condition ordained of God under which he had decreed to bestow his gifts, in distinction from a merit in the proper sense; concerning which distinction, in its reference to man's original state, we have already spoken. § Yet it is easy to gather, from what has been said, the difference that prevailed in the mode of applying this idea, when Alexander of Hales actually placed such a condition in the free will. Thomas Aquinas referred all to the divine causality operating in a certain order of sequence by virtue of the form of development in time.

When the distinguished theologians of this period embraced together, under the name of theology, doctrines of faith and morals. in their works treating of the whole province of theology united both these objects together, this was not a mere outward combination, but really an inward one, founded

* Ex auxilio moventis animum ad bonum.

† Quicquid est in homine, ordinans ipsum in salutem, comprehenditur totum sub effectu prædestinationis.

‡ According to Thomas Aquinas, videtur congruum, ut homini operanti secundum suam virtutem Deus recompenset secundum excellentiam suæ virtutis. This is so arranged in the divine economy, just as in nature each thing working after its own peculiar manner, attains to the end for which God has designed it. In the case of the rational creature, however, this takes place by means of self-determination, by the free-will, and hence is called a *merit*. Here there is always congruitas propter quendam æqualitatem proportionis. The *adequate relation*, meritum condignum, quod æquatur mercedi, is quite another thing. Such a relation can never exist between creaturely acts and supernatural communication, but only between the supernatural itself, that which proceeds from the grace of the Holy Spirit, in so far as the latter is the principle, and the communication of eternal life.

in the intrinsic connection in their own minds of the doctrinal with the ethical element, as we may gather, in fact, from their anthropology, as it has already been explained by us, namely, their doctrine concerning *grace* and *justification* and *faith* in its complete form (*fides formata*), the actuating principle of the Christian life. As the principal work here, we must consider the *Summa* of Thomas Aquinas, which, in this theological discipline, furnished vastly greater stores than were furnished either by those who preceded or came after him. A particular *Summa* on morals,* composed by Nicholas Perardus (Pérault), archbishop of Lyons, in the thirteenth century, is not to be compared with this in respect of originality and profoundness. The ethical writings of William of Paris, whom we have had occasion to mention so often, e. g. his book *De virtutibus*, is of more importance; and the works of Raymund Lull are rich in ethical matter, particularly his work on the Contemplation of God.

But also in the ethical parts of these systems, two elements occur together; that which proceeded from their unbiassed Christian consciousness, and their free thoughts as actuated by that consciousness, and that which they must adopt from the church tradition, in which they themselves, with their intellects, were involved. From this circumstance contradictions might arise, of which they themselves were not conscious. Again, the influence of Aristotle, esteemed by them the philosopher *par eminence*, would necessarily show itself, on this particular side, as of the highest importance with them, as his masterly ability in evolving conceptions and in sound observation shines pre-eminently forth in him as a moralist; and so many things were to be met with in his ethical works, which might be appropriated even by such as stood on Christian grounds, at least with certain modifications demanded by the Christian principle; for every sound position of an earlier development ought certainly to be adopted, and first brought to its full import and significance by Christianity. But the Aristotelian system of morals had its root entirely, it must be owned, in the distinctive ground occupied by the antique world, though soaring in occasional flashes of thought above that inferior position, and containing vaticinations of a loftier one destined

* *Summa de virtutibus et vitiis.*

at some future time to be the inheritance of mankind. Many of his principal ethical ideas are necessarily connected throughout with that which in the mode of life and thought in antiquity constituted an antagonism to Christianity. In order, therefore, to a right application of Aristotle's ethical ideas in the Christian system of morals, an exact and sharply defined line of demarkation was required between the fundamental positions occupied by the ancient world and by pure Christianity, a sifting apart of that which was related and that which was opposed in the two different positions; of that which could only be adduced as antagonistic to the properly Christian view, for the purpose of rendering the latter more distinct and clear, and of that which, after being modified by the Christian principle, might be appropriated. But in order to this was required a species of criticism proceeding from the intelligent examination of the facts of history, which was by no means given to the profound and acute perceptions of these men. They were liable to be easily misled by their admiration and reverence of the great master, to allow undue importance to his conceptual distinctions, whether it was that they distorted these notions themselves, by laying into them something more or other than they meant, or that, in applying them to the Christian province, they injured and troubled that province itself. The latter would be more likely to happen in those cases where an occasion for it was already furnished in a troubling of the Christian consciousness that had arisen at some earlier period, where already, in the church tradition, the antagonisms of the ancient world, overcome by primitive Christianity, had been again introduced by the false Catholic element. And what we have said with regard to the influence of the Aristotelian principles, will have to be applied also to the influence of the Neo-Platonic, inasmuch as the grand position of the antique world expresses itself in both in certain aspects.

Most assuredly we meet in these theologians with an important line of demarkation, which might seem to denote the same thing with a distinct separation of the different positions held by the ancient world and Christianity,—the distinction, namely, between the moral virtues recognized already in the ante-Christian period, that is, the cardinal virtues, and the theological virtues. The former stand connected with the fitness of the moral nature in itself, the purely human as

such; the latter, with the higher fitness superinduced upon man's nature by a supernatural divine principle,—the ennobling of the purely human by a divine life. By the general conception virtue, Thomas Aquinas understands the capacity or fitness required in a rational being as a means of answering the end for which he is destined. But here he distinguishes a twofold point of view, and a corresponding twofold end and twofold instrumentality required in order to reach it; the happiness answering to the nature of the creaturely reason, and implied in its essence, to which man may attain* by the powers implanted in his nature, the highest end of reason left to itself and not enlightened by revelation, and the end of a blessedness transcending the nature of the creaturely reason, consisting in the supernatural fellowship with God, which proceeds only from some new communication grounded in a free determination of the divine will. In order to the attaining to this there was required, therefore, a new instrumentality in accordance with it, in the new powers communicated to human nature by grace, a certain participation of the divine nature by the human.† Thomas, moreover, perceived, being in this respect a predecessor of Schleiermacher, that the precise number of the four cardinal virtues was not a mere accidental and arbitrary thing. He sought to point out the necessity of this numerical division as requisite in order to a perfect realization of the dominion of reason in the life of humanity. As all virtue has respect to rational good (*bonum rationis*), this rational good, in order to hold out a light to action, must be given as an object of knowledge. Thus we are presented with that which went under the name of *prudence*. Next, arises the requisition to manifest in the world, to exhibit in action, the *ordo rationis* received in the form of knowledge.‡ Inasmuch as this is done in our intercourse with others,§ it is called *justice*. Then, in order to the actual realization of all this, it is necessary that the passions resisting the *ordo rationis* should

* *Beatitudo proportionata humanæ naturæ, ad quam homo pervenire potest per principia suæ naturæ.*

† *Beatitudo naturam humanam excedens, ad quam homo sola divina virtute pervenire potest secundum quandam divinitatis participationem.*

‡ *Ordo rationis circa aliquid ponitur.*

§ *Ordo rationis circa operationem.*

be subjected to it, that this *ordo* should be preserved and defended against their encroachments. And this must be done in a twofold manner, having respect to the twofold description of passions;* those that incite men to do that which is contrary to reason; those that hinder them from doing what reason requires.† To counteract the first kind of passions, that power of reason is required whereby such passions are restrained, that is, *temperance*. In respect to the second, man must be firm in that which reason requires: this is the work of *fortitude*.

Now, as Thomas endeavours to demonstrate the necessity of the cardinal virtues as the means of actually realizing the appropriate end of reason, so he applies the same to the relation to that supernatural end, and the instrumentality of the theological virtues necessary in order to attain it. Here, as also in the case of the virtues suited and assigned to the position of pure reason, the different powers of the mind, the intellectual and voluntary faculties must be called into requisition. The intellect appropriates to itself the revealed truths which man must know in order to attain to that end by *faith*. The will must direct itself towards that end, as an attainable one; this is done by *hope*.‡ And again, the will must, by a certain spiritual union, become assimilated with that towards which it directs itself as the end to be reached;§ this is *love*.

But how much soever truth may lie at bottom of this distinction of the two points of view, and the capacities of mind having respect to them, still we meet here with the same separation between the natural and the supernatural, the human and the divine, hindering the apprehension and application of the Christian principle, which lay at bottom of the severance of the *pura naturalia* and the *dona supernaturalia, superaddita*, in man's primeval state. The whole would have assumed a quite different arrangement, in case it had been perceived that the destination grounded in pure nature as such, the original *ordo rationis*, is precisely that the actual realiza-

* *Passiones impellentes ad aliquid rationi contrarium.*

† *The passiones retrahentes ab eo, quod ratio dictat.*

‡ *Voluntas, quæ ordinatur in illum finem, sicut in id, quod possibile est consequi.*

§ *Quantum ad unionem spiritalem, per quam quodammodo transformatur in illum finem.*

tion of which had been interrupted by sin, and should be brought about by the redemption and the divine principle of life founded thereon; that the very thing which lay in the essence of the cardinal virtues could only attain, in connection with the supervening principle in the theological virtues, its true significance and application. Thus the view of Christianity as a restoration of the truly human, as an ennobling of the human by the divine, would have presented itself; as most assuredly expressions pointing to this same thing occur in these theologians, which were duly repressed, again, by other influences, and could not be carried through and applied in a consistent manner; expressions implying that by grace nature is not destroyed, but potentiated and ennobled.

The doctrine of the seven spiritual gifts, though the number seven and its designation was borrowed accidentally from the text, Isa. xi. 2, according to the Vulgate, might doubtless be employed for the purpose of passing over from the antique view of the cardinal virtues to the Christianly-modified view. Thomas considers these gifts as the medium, serving to the end, that the work of the Holy Spirit may go on in the soul by means of the theological virtues, that the soul may be brought into entire harmony with the relation to God, with the dominion of the Holy Spirit. He compares the above-named spiritual gifts, in this respect, with the moral virtues, so called in the more limited sense, as the means to make everything that resists subject to the order of reason (*ordo rationis*). Accordingly, these gifts were to operate in such manner as to subject everything to that higher order of the Holy Spirit, and he considered them as the very means whereby the natural should be freed from the defects cleaving to it, and advanced in its evolution.*

The same point of view we find, likewise, in William of Paris, but carried out after a profound and original manner. He distinguishes—which is nothing peculiar to him, but, as an imitation of the Aristotelian method of division, common to him with others—the natural virtues, those founded in natural capacity (virtues of temperament), those acquired by exercise (*virtutes consuetudinales, acquisitæ*), and those derived from the divine principle of life, from grace, ennobled virtues. The

*. Per has virtutes, quæ dicuntur dona Spiritus Sancti, illa naturalia reformantur atque adjuvantur.

natural virtues he compares with the natural members of the body ; the acquired, with the substitutes, helps, and supports framed by art for maimed or enfeebled limbs. These helps supplied by art cannot, however, answer the end of, or restore the powers of, nature. The same holds true of that which moral effort and practice can effect in relation to a nature depraved and enfeebled by sin. It is only by grace that true virtue is bestowed on man ; it is only by this, that those wings are given to the mind with which it soars upwards to the divine. William of Paris vigorously attacks, as Pelagian, the assertion that, between that which is natural and that which is bestowed by grace, the difference is one of degree, and not of kind. But he also starts from that distinction between the *pura naturalia* and the *donis gratiæ*. He also distinguishes the relation of uncorrupted nature to its commensurate world, and its exaltation above itself ; the super-earthly direction communicated to it, the necessary intermediation in order to the supernatural blessedness by grace.*

From that view of the relation between the cardinal virtues and the theological virtues which we have described, the result is not that all the cardinal virtues must co-operate in order to shape the world by the principle of the theological virtues, to use and appropriate it for the kingdom of God ; the divine principle attacking and appropriating to introduce both in connection with each other into the world, which it is destined to control ; but something appears as the highest work and end of the theological virtues, which reaches beyond the province of those subordinate virtues, in relation to which they appear simply as preparatory and initiatory, viz. the desecularizing and dehumanizing of the individual that devotes himself wholly to God by the contemplation of the spirit soaring upwards to him as its sole object. Thus that Aristotelian view of the moral element as of the barely human, in opposition to the superhuman, the divine, taking occasion from many erroneous tendencies that had long prevailed in the church life, may have found entrance. Thus might that op-

* Sicut naturales *veræ* virtutes (not at present in the state of corruption) animam tenent, custodiunt et conservant in statu suo et rectitudine naturali, sic istæ sublimes et nobiles virtutes eam rapiunt et elevant a se ipsa, hoc est, a naturalibus suis et, supra se velut suspensam, in spiritualibus et æternis eam tenent. De virtutibus, f. 137. seqq.

position between divine and human virtue, ἀρετὴ πολιτικὴ, which had been overcome by the Christian principle, he once more adopted from Aristotle and the Neo-Platonists; and important were the consequences which resulted from that cause. Thus that division of the virtues was imitated from Plotinus,* which is so wholly incongruous with the Christian principle of the theocratical appropriation of the world, so favourable to the one-sided ascetic, and unfavourable to the appropriating tendency,—the division of them, namely,† into the exemplary (*exemplares*), the purifying (*purgatoriae*), and the political. These political virtues, destined to shape the life, appear as the subordinate ones.‡ The middle place is given to the *virtutes purgatoriae*, since by purifying the soul they render it capable of rising from the human to the divine, and of surrendering itself wholly to the latter after the completion of the purifying process.

Starting from this distinction of a purifying virtue, Thomas places *prudence* in the contempt of all worldly things and a mind bent solely on God; *temperance*, in withdrawing as much as possible from the objects of sense; *fortitude*, in not allowing the soul to be terrified when it withdraws itself from all objects of sense, and turns to the contemplation of things heavenly alone; *justice*, in the surrender of the soul to precisely this order. The highest stage, then, where this purification has arrived at its completion, must belong to the virtue of a soul wholly absorbed in contemplation, perfectly purified, which is the virtue of the blessed, or of the most perfect in this life.

In strict accordance, moreover, with these views, Thomas describes it as the work of temperance, considered in the light of the *ordo rationis*, that the body should be made suitable for becoming an organ of reason; while, however, he reckons to the essence of temperance, in the supernatural sense, as it is wrought in man by the operation of grace, the *temperantia infusa*, this additional element, that fastings and abstinence must be required.§

* See his Book of the Virtues. Ennead. i. lib. ii.

† In the Dialogue, cited on a former page, inter philosophum, Judæum et Christianum. published by Prof. Rheinwald, p. 67, where, too, Plotinus is expressly quoted.

‡ Secundum quas homo recte se habet in rebus humanis gerendis, according to Thomas Aquinas.

§ In sumptione ciborum ratione humana modus statuitur, ut non noceat

From the combination of these different elements in the ethical system of Thomas, many apparently gross contradictions may be explained. We might think that the answer to the question, whether there is any class of actions morally indifferent or permissible, not coming under the province of duty, must determine the decision of another, namely, whether there is a condition of moral perfection above law, or transcending the province of duty and obligation. We might suppose that, from the denial of a void space for actions indifferent or permitted, from the assertion that duty must embrace the whole of life, must also follow the denial of such a higher condition; but we find these modes of contemplation in Thomas placed in a different relation to one another.

He has investigated the question about indifferent actions (*adiaphora*) with great acuteness, in a distinct section; and maintains that if we contemplate actions in their true and real connection, we shall find that nothing is indifferent, because every action is either one corresponding or not corresponding to the order of reason (*ordo rationis*), and nothing can be conceived as holding a middle place. He at the same time explains whence it is that the appearance has arisen of a class of actions indifferent. It is because there are actions which, considered in general, without any more exact specifications, appear as if indifferent; which same actions, if considered in a particular case, in a more exactly determined connection, must be declared to be bad or good.* Indifferent actions are, in his view, those which as yet want those marks by means of which a moral judgment of them would be possible, those which are not as yet sufficiently defined, so that they may be taken into the series of moral actions.† “Thus,” he says, “eating and sleeping are things in themselves indifferent, yet both are subservient to virtue with those who use the body generally as an organ of reason.” At the same time, Thomas

valetudini corporis nec impediat rationis actum. Secundum autem regulam legis divinæ requiritur, quod homo castiget corpus suum et in servitum redigat per abstinentiam cibi et potus et aliorum hujusmodi.^a

* Contiugit quandoque, aliquem actum esse indifferentem secundum speciem, qui tamen est bonus vel malus in individuo consideratus.

† Indifferens quasi extra genus moralium actionum existens.

^a Prima secundæ, Quæst. lxxiii., Artic. iv. T. xxi. p. 311.

had adopted into his system the doctrine, which had long obtained in the church tradition, of a higher perfection, consisting in the observance of the *consilia evangelica*. And this doctrine was, in his case, by no means at variance with the principle just explained by us, since he supposed a mode of life transcending the province of purely human actions, wholly renouncing the world, and devoted solely to the contemplation of God. And this agrees perfectly with that division of the virtues which we have already noticed.

The *præcepta* relate, according to his doctrine, to that which is *necessary* in order to arrive at eternal felicity. The *consilia*, to that whereby one may better and more easily attain to the same end. "Man," says he, "stands midway between the things of this world and spiritual good; so that the more he devotes himself to the latter, the more he withdraws from the former. Whoever, then, places his supreme good in the things of this world, becomes wholly estranged from spiritual good; and to such a bent of disposition, the precepts stand opposed. But in order to attain to the above-mentioned end, it is not required that one should wholly cast aside the things of this world; as one who uses the things of this world may attain to everlasting life, provided only he does not make them his supreme end. Still, it will be easier for him, if he renounces the things of this world *entirely*." It is manifest how this whole distinction of a twofold renunciation of the world in the observance of the *præcepta* and of the *consilia*, rests precisely on the circumstance that the real connection between the negative and positive sides of the Christian principle, between virtue combating and virtue appropriating the world, between the Christian renunciation and the Christian appropriation of the world, is not recognized, on the not perceiving that the requisition, rightly understood, of the precepts which relate to the total renunciation of the world with the total appropriation of it for the kingdom of God, excludes room for anything higher. And it may easily be shown, too, how the same fundamental mistake betrays itself in the separating the negative and positive elements in the more exact determination of the three *consilia evangelica*,*

* As Thomas says, in the total renunciation of the three things wherein sin reveals itself,—the lust of the eyes, the lust of the flesh, and the pride of life, to which the three *consilia* relate.

—the total renunciation of earthly goods separated from the appropriation of them; the total suppression of the sexual instinct, instead of the control over it in the appropriation of a form of moral society necessary for the manifestation of the kingdom of God; the total, barely negative denial of one's own will, whereby, in contrariety to its native dignity, it is made the blind tool of another creaturely will, instead of the positive appropriation of it as an organ for the divine will of a reason that shows itself to be enlightened. Not recognizing that the condition of Christian freedom stands only in the essence of that love which freely fulfils the precepts from an impulse within, Thomas places this condition in a self-will exalted above law. He accounts, among the marks distinguishing the Old and New Testament points of view, that in the latter, as the law of liberty, counsels are added to commands which require unconditional obedience,—counsels, the following of which is left entirely to free choice.*

And not barely in reference to the three *consilia* above described, but also in reference to other departments of action coming under the cognizance of the *præcepta*, Thomas distinguishes a perfection reaching beyond mere conformity to the law of duty. He distinguishes that which, in itself considered, is a *consilium*, from that which is such only under certain circumstances and in certain relations; † as, for example, when one gives alms, does good to his enemies where he is under no obligations to do so, forgives injuries which he might retaliate. But here he was met by the precept so clearly expressed in the sermon on the mount; still, he contrives to evade the difficulty, by erroneously applying here a rule correct enough in itself, that, in the sermon on the mount, we must distinguish the reference to the temper of the heart, and to the individual action. He says that the love to our enemies required in the sermon on the mount is, indeed, a *precept* in reference to the *præparatio animi*, and something necessary to salvation; but that the action in particular cases, where no particular necessity existed, belonged to a *consilium particulare*.

* Quod præceptum importat necessitatem, consilium in optione ponitur ejus, cui datur. Et ideo convenienter in lege nova, quæ est lex libertatis, supra præcepta addita consilia, non autem in veteri lege, quæ erat lex servitutis. † Consilium simpliciter and consilium secundum quid.

How Thomas allowed himself to be misled, by the influence of the Aristotelian ethics, into the mistake of adopting ideas which belong altogether to the ancient world, and stand properly in contradiction with Christian morals, and how he laboured to get rid of this contradiction, is especially illustrated by one example. The antique notion of magnanimity (*μεγαλοψυχία*), finely explicated by Aristotle, belongs in truth wholly to the heathen morality, is necessarily connected with the ethical self-sufficiency, the self-feeling, of antiquity; and stands in contradiction with the essence of Christian humility. But Thomas, who appropriates this notion under the name *magnanimitas*, takes the greatest pains to reconcile this contrariety. Attaching himself to Aristotle, he describes this virtue as one which holds great honours within the bounds of reason;* and he then endeavours to show that the self-feeling, the sense of one's own dignity, which belongs to the nature of magnanimity, is not incompatible with the essence of humility. He maintains that the contradiction between these two virtues was only in appearance.† It was only needful in the case of these two virtues to distinguish their different relations.‡ Magnanimity allows man to exalt himself in consideration of the gifts he has received from God.§ Humility leads man to think lowly of himself in view of his own defects;|| but humility does not in fact relate merely to the sense of one's own defects, but to the sense of the absolute dependence of all creaturely beings, the nothingness of everything, as referred simply to itself, and not contemplated as a gift received from God. Now this, undoubtedly, instead of excluding from, includes in itself, that feeling of elevation which is grounded in the consciousness of fellowship with God, denoted by the expression *ἐν κυρίῳ καυχᾶσθαι*; but still, this is quite another thing from the sense of one's own greatness and dignity, implied in the *μεγαλοψυχία*. Then, again, the contempt of others, springing from this state of mind, is

* Quæ modum rationis ponit circa magnos honores.

† Quia in contraria tendere videntur.

‡ Quia procedunt secundum diversas considerationes.

§ Facit, quod homo se magis dignificet secundum considerationem donorum, quæ possidet e Deo.

|| Facit, quod homo seipsum vilipendat secundum considerationem proprii defectus.

said to refer to them only so far as they are destitute of God's gifts.* Humility, on the other hand, should honour and highly esteem others, so far as it perceives in them any of these gifts of God; but really, this recognition of each man in the condition where God has placed him, excludes the above-mentioned contempt. While Aristotle reckons it as belonging to the essence of *μεγαλοψυχία*, that it should not willingly receive benefits from others, because this would be at variance with that self-feeling, would be self-humiliating, Thomas endeavours even here to set aside that which is foreign from the Christian point of view, by explaining it in the sense that to this virtue it does not seem desirable to receive benefits without repaying them with others still greater, which, in fact, he says, belongs to the perfection of gratitude, in which, as in all other virtues, the magnanimous spirit will be pre-eminent.

We must acknowledge then, it is true, that Thomas does not here distinguish with sufficient precision the antique and Christian points of view; that he knows not how to take the notion of Aristotle in connection with the former of these points of view, and according to its own proper essence; that he does violence to it, and endeavours to blend together conflicting elements. But we must also acknowledge the freedom of spirit with which, from his own ascetical point of view, he was able to discern some truth at bottom capable of being united with the essence of humility, in that notion of magnanimity, though he did not draw with sufficient clearness and precision the line of demarkation which separated it from the antechristian notion; from that which belonged exclusively to the antique point of view. If he had held fast simply to the truth at bottom, much that is so one-sided in his ascetical view of the matter would have been overcome.

We should mention, moreover, in reference to the controversies with Abelard, that the disputed question then brought up about the relation of the intention to actions, in judging of their moral character, was answered by this great teacher, Thomas Aquinas, with great clearness, and so as to avoid the opposite errors on both sides: "It is undoubtedly the case," says Thomas, "that the moral character of an action depends on the disposition, the end, which the will

* Deficiunt a donis Dei.

proposes. The action, by itself considered, can add nothing ; in that, the will simply goes into effect. But the question arises, Is the will strong enough to produce the act, to pass into fulfilment? When one will proposes to do something good or bad, but desists from its purpose on account of obstacles in the way ; while another continues acting till it has accomplished the object proposed, the latter will is manifestly a persevering one, in the good or bad sense ;* and by this is to be estimated the *degree* of goodness or badness, the *intensity* of the good or bad will. That only is a perfect will which acts when an opportunity is presented.† But then, if the failure of execution proceeds solely from the want of opportunity, if the execution depends on outward conditions which do not stand within the man's control, the failure in such cases certainly is not to be attributed to the will."‡

II.—THE GREEK CHURCH AND ITS RELATION TO THE LATIN.

In comparison with the fulness of life, manifesting itself under such a diversity of forms, and moving in such various directions, in the church of the West, the Greek church presents a melancholy spectacle of stiff and torpid uniformity. While the ecclesiastical monarchy of the West could lead onward the mental development of the nations to the age of majority, could permit and promote freedom and variety within certain limits,—the brute force of Byzantine despotism, on the other hand, stifled and checked every free movement. To all which the Greek church had in common with the Latin, the animating spirit was still wanting. Thus we have seen how the monasticism of the Western church carried within itself a principle of reaction against its own corruptions, and hence new forms of regeneration were continually springing out of it. In the Greek church the monastic life stood, it is true, in equally high estimation as in the Latin,

* Manifestum, quod hujusmodi voluntas est diuturnior in bono vel malo.

† Non est perfecta voluntas, nisi talis, quæ opportunitate data operetur.

‡ Defectus perfectionis, quæ est ex actu exteriori, est simpliciter involuntarius.

and was enabled to exercise a great influence; but it was very far from being the case that this influence was so extensive and penetrating as in the Latin church; or that so much good, along with the evil, proceeded from it. Monasticism here remained motionless in the old petrified forms. It was far less practical than in the Western church; and yet, it was not less overpowered by worldliness,—but without reproducing again out of itself so powerful an opposition to the worldly spirit.

In the twelfth century appeared every form of self-castigation among the Greek monks. Some passed their lives on high trees (*δενδροῖται*); others on pillars, either in the open air or in close dwellings erected on lofty scaffoldings;* others in subterranean caves or catacombs; others encased themselves in iron coats of mail.† But more frequent than the extravagant self-mortification proceeding from the earnestness of a mistaken piety and a misdirected striving after Christian perfection, was the mock-holiness which affected severity of living merely as a mask and outside show, for the purpose of winning high veneration and bountiful gifts from the multitude. Such were those monks whom Eustathius describes as all factitious from head to foot.‡ They contrived by various impostures to make their monasteries famous for miracles,—till the fraud was detected, when the wonders ceased;§ or by pretended visions, to invest themselves with an air of sanctity,|| so as to attract the multitude, and open a profitable source of gain; but what especially contributed to the corruption of the monastic life, and its mischievous influence, was the vast numbers from the lowest classes, workmen¶ and beggars, who withdrew to

* *στυλῖται* and *κιονῖται*.

† Vide Eustath. ed. Tafel. p. 27, the different classes of monks: *τοὺς ἡγιασμένους τῶ θεῷ ἀσκητὰς, τοὺς τῆς ἐρήμου, τοὺς στυλῖτας, τοὺς χῶστους, τοὺς ἔγκλιιστους*. Eustathius of Thessalonica names (p. 189) the different classes of monks at that time: *οἱ γυμνῖται, οἱ χαμεῦναι καὶ ἀνιπτόποδες, οἱ ῥυπῶντες, οἱ σιγῶντες, σπηλαρῶται, σιδηρούμενοι, δενδροῖται, κιονῖται, the στυλῖται*, who were distinguished from the Kionites, by the fact that they were shut up out of sight, *ὡς ἔγκλιιστοι*.

‡ *πεπλασμένους ὄλους ἐκ ποδῶν ἕως κεφαλῆς*. His tract *περὶ ὑπεκρίσεως*, p. 94.

§ See Eustath. p. 230.

|| Ap. eundem, p. 243.

¶ See e. g. Eustathius on the improvement of the monastic life, p.

the monasteries for the sole purpose of gaining a subsistence without toil,—or culprits, who fled to them to escape the punishment of their crimes.* Hence, among the monks were to be found the rudest and most ignorant people,—enemies to all science and culture; and the rich libraries of the monasteries went fast to destruction. It was in vain to inquire after ancient books; these had long since been among the missing.† If a man of literary attainments proposed to join the monks, he became for that very reason an unwelcome suspected guest, and every possible obstacle was thrown in his way.‡ This sort of people, after having secluded themselves for a while, appeared publicly again in another shape. The air of sanctity which they affected enabled them to gain more than others by their bargains and sales, and to grow richer by agriculture and cattle breeding.§ With a view to counteract the worldly traffic and cupidity of the monks, the emperor Manuel Comnenus allowed the newly founded monasteries to own no property, but directed that they should be furnished with all that was needful for their subsistence from the imperial treasury; and he renewed a decree of the emperor Phocas against multiplying the landed estates of the monasteries.|| Eustathius extols also the prudence of this emperor, in appointing secular officers for the great monasteries, to superintend the management of their revenues, so as to relieve the monks from business foreign to their vocation.¶

Under the Comnenes, a fresh zeal was awakened for literary studies in the Greek empire. The chief direction of them was intrusted to a college of twelve learned men under a president; ** which college, moreover, was to have the first voice in the deciding of controversies of doctrine, an authority which we must allow would be likely to prove extremely cramping.

251: γράμματα οὐκ οἶδασιν, ἐξ ἐργαστηρίων οἱ πλείους ἤκοντες καὶ ἄλλως δὲ χειρονάκτες ὄντες.

* Ap. eund. p. 223.

† Ap. eund. p. 249 ff.

‡ Ap. eund. p. 244.

§ Ap. eund. p. 229.

|| See Nicetas Choniat. history of the emperor Manuel Comnenus (Lib. VII. c. iii. p. 370., ed. Bekker), which historian also confesses that the worldliness of the monks called for these restrictions.

¶ On the improvement of the monastic life, s. 124, p. 244.

** Duodecim electi didascali, qui studiis Græcorum de more solent præesse. See the Dialogue of Anselm, of Havelberg, in D'Achery Spicileg. T. I. f. 171

But though many remains of ancient learning were preserved, and individual theologians appeared who distinguished themselves by their erudition, yet the fresh, living spirit was always wanting, which alone can give a spring to scientific development. They never went beyond the compiling together and handing down of traditional lore; and artificial ornaments deformed even the better productions of those times.

Among the learned theologians of the twelfth century, we may mention Nicetas, bishop of Chonae,* in Phrygia, eminent as a doctrinal and polemical writer, and belonging also among the Byzantine historians; the monk Euthymius Zigabenus, who, with Theophylact, mentioned in the preceding period, is to be reckoned among the most distinguished exegetical writers of this period; and Nicholas, bishop of Methone, in Messènia.† All, however, were eclipsed by an individual comparatively unknown until in these recent times,‡ but who was no less distinguished for his extensive learning than for a noble spirit of reform flowing from truly Christian motives. This was Eustathius, archbishop of Thessalonica, author of the famous commentary on Homer, one of those pure characters so rarely to be met with among the Greeks,—a man who well knew the failings of his nation and his times, while he was more exempt from them than any of his contemporaries. In his remarkable work on hypocrisy, he mentions falsehood and empty pretence, which he hated above all things, as being the sins by which public and private life among all ranks of society was then polluted. Great were the services he rendered to his fellow-citizens under the bad administration of the empire in the minority of Alexius the Second, subsequent to the year 1180. When Thessalonica was conquered by the army of king William the Second, of Sicily, and the city given up to the fury of soldiers excited, in addition to other bad passions, by fanaticism, Eustathius, who shrunk from no danger or toil,

* The city anciently called Colosse.

† See respecting these men, and the doctrinal history of the Greek church in the twelfth century, the essay of Dr. Ullmann, in the *Studien und Kritiken*. Year 1833. 3tes. Heft.

‡ By the meritorious labours of Prof. Tafel in Tübingen, who we confidently hope will succeed in clearing up many of the obscure points in the life of this remarkable man. May his essay on the chronology of Eustathius's writings soon appear.

appeared as a protecting angel in the midst of his people. It was his courage and awe-commanding person alone which could procure for the unfortunate any alleviation of their sufferings. His powerful word protected his fellow-citizens, when threatened with heavy oppressions by the arbitrary power at Constantinople, against the extortion of the tax-gatherers.* Yet he had a great deal to suffer from the ingratitude of his community, who could not endure the freedom with which he rebuked iniquity.† He was banished by partisans; and afterwards, when the people learned from experience how much they had lost in their bishop, recalled with greater affection than ever.‡

He appears to us as the Chrysostom of his times, in contending against its superstition, mock-holiness, and indecorous frivolity. His fast-sermons, especially, bear witness of the zeal with which he waged this contest. In the lightness with which marriages were contracted, and matrimonial relations generally regarded, he found special cause of complaint. It seems that many affected a certain pretentious, shallow-kind of free-thinking, to which they retreated as a cover from the pungent sermons or moral oversight of the more worthy ecclesiastics. They drew a line of distinction between the church, for which they professed the greatest zeal, and the clergy in their personal capacity. "God is all sufficient in himself," said they, "he needs nothing which is upon earth."§ The opposition to

* These meritorious acts of Eustathius in behalf of the city of Thessalonica are extolled by Nicetas, bishop of Athens, in his *Monodia* on Eustathius, published, with several other records abounding in important matter relating to the history of these times, by Prof. Tafel, in the Appendix to his *Dissertatio Geographica de Thessalonica ejusque agro*, Berolini, 1839, p. 382. He represents the widowed city Thessalonica complaining: πάντως φορολόγοις ἐκκείσομαι πάντως δασμολόγοις βρωθήσομαι, ὡς ἐποίησεν καὶ ἀγαθὴ θῆρα καὶ τοῖς ἀνθρωποφάγοις τούτοις θηροῖν ἐκδοσὸς οὐκέτι γὰρ ἐπαγρυνήσει μοι ἐκείνος ὁ μέγας ἐμὸς ποιμὴν καὶ μυρίοις διεγρηγορῶς ὄμμασιν, p. 387. It is to be lamented that this Greek eulogium is so full of rhetorical declamation as to leave but little room for facts.

† Ep. xix. ad Thessalonicenses.

‡ Michael Nicetas says, in a letter to Eustathius; μᾶλλον μὲν οὖν νῦν οἱ ποθοῦντες πλεον τῶ πόθῳ κάμνουσι, παρόσον τῇ ἀποστάσει μανθάνουσιν, οἷον ἔχοντες ἀγαθὸν ἐλάτθανον ἑαυτοῦς. See Tafel's *Dissertation on Thessalonica*, above referred to, p. 354.

§ As he says, φιλοσοφούντες, ὡς ἀπροσδιέες μὲν πάντων τῶν ἐπὶ γῆς (τοῖ

superstition may perhaps have called forth infidelity. So we might infer from a remark of Eustathius on the indulgence shown to atheists living among Christians.* While he adopted the dominant church mode of thinking, which indeed bore him along with it, Eustathius still sought to transform and renovate all, beginning back from the spirit and disposition. Accordingly, he makes the *consilia evangelica* his point of departure, recognizing monachism as the summit of Christian perfection; and, misapprehending the words of Christ, contrasts the mild and easy yoke of the ordinary Christian life with the heavy yoke which the monks had to bear. Thus, in exhorting laymen to Christian virtue, by comparing their case with that of the monks, he says: "These latter voluntarily endure the oftentimes heavy yoke of the Lord which is laid on them. Take then upon yourselves, as he himself bids you, the light and easy yoke, and ye shall, even as they, be blessed, albeit in a way corresponding to your stage of perfection."† But he was profoundly sensible also of the corruption which beset the monachism of his times, as we have shown in the preceding remarks. Monachism was, in his opinion, designed as a means for the religious and moral education of the people; and the monasteries should be seats also of literary culture. He called upon the stylites to avail themselves of the general reverence in which they were held, at a time when men of all ranks and

Ἐῖον, without doubt omitted) ἐπὶ γῆς δὲ καὶ οἱ ἐκκλησιαστικοὶ καὶ τὰ κατ' αὐτούς.

* He employs the climax: Jews, bad Christians, and τὸ μείζον τὰ τῶν ἀθίων φύλα. Fast-sermon, xi. p. 66. The interpretation of this passage is, to be sure, a matter of dispute. Tafel, in the prolegomena to the Dissertation above noticed, p. 17, is disposed to understand by atheists, Mohammedans; in favour of which it might be said that atheists, if any such existed, would not have dared, however, so openly to avow themselves as such. Still, though Eustathius did not concede that the Mohammedans worshipped the same God with Christians and Jews, the true God, when from his own point of view he could call them idolators, yet it is difficult to conceive that he should have called them directly atheists, unless perhaps he considered himself entitled to do so, by a rhetorical exaggeration, on account of this antithesis to Christians and Jews who worshipped the true God.

† Orat. ii. in Ps. xlviii. s. xiv. p. 10: αἵρουσιν ἰβελούσιοι ἐκείνοι τὸν τοῦ κυρίου ζυγόν, ἔστιν οὐ βαρὺν, αὐτοῖς ἐπικείμενον' ἐπὶ ὁμοίῳ φέρτω ἄρατε ὑμεῖς τὸν, ὡς αὐτὸς ἐκείνος ἔφη, ἑλαφρὸν καὶ χρηστὸν. καὶ οὕτω κατ' ἐκείνους, ἀναλόγως μέντοι, εὐλογηθήσεσθε καὶ αὐτοί.

degrees of education, husbands and wives from all quarters, flocked to them, to take advantage of the opportunity thus afforded of imparting to them such knowledge and advice on the matters of salvation as each might require. "With these," says he, in an admonitory discourse addressed to a stylite in Thessalonica,* "the stylite will hold intercourse in the right, to say all in a word, in the apostolical way; for he becomes all things to all men, that he may win all for the glory of God. And," putting him on his guard against opposite errors, "he will neither improperly flatter, lest he falsify the truth, nor will he be violent against all, lest he be accused of unseasonable freedom. For all the gifts which may be presented to him, he will be only a channel by which they are communicated to others, to the poor." He complains of those monks, who boasted of knowing no other trinity than devotion in the church, in the cell, and at the table; and those who were not aware that this was not enough for the genuine monk in order to perfection of virtue, but that he also stood greatly in need of knowledge—"And that, not only of things divine," says he, "but also of history and various other kinds of culture, by means of which he may be useful to those who approach him."† At all times, however, he declared strongly against the over-valuation of externals; as elsewhere, so also in monachism. Thus, for instance, to a stylite, girt with iron, he says,‡ "I desire to see on thee also the armour and other panoply of the great Paul. The outward iron avails nothing towards making him who wears it invulnerable, if he throws aside that apostolical armour. Nay, without that, it serves only to draw down the man's spirit to the earth, and to impede its flight upward. Such iron is in itself neither salutary nor hurtful; but it may be either. It has sometimes become the one and sometimes the other, according to the bent of the will." Love he declares to be, for all Christians alike, the central point of the Christian life. "Only obtain this, and the whole troop of the other virtues will follow in its train. As it is in the beginning of all good, it will call forth all good in you. Pronounce but the word love, and you have named at once all goodness. If love

* xxii. s. 66, p. 193.

† On the improvement of the monastic life, s. 146, p. 250.

‡ xxii. p. 186.

enters the soul, the whole band of the other virtues enters along with it; but if she be excluded, the soul is manifestly left naked of all good.* “Not so much depends on the frequent bowing of the knee,” says he, in one of his sermons, † “but a great deal upon what is signified by that outward sign, prostration of the spirit, humility of heart before God To stand erect was not less acceptable to God than to bow the knee; nay, it was more in harmony with nature, more consonant with activity.” ‡ To persons who complained that they wanted the gift of tears, he says, they should not feel pained about that. Charity shown to the poor would fully supply its place.§

The rage for dogmatizing among the Greek emperors had, from the earliest times, been the cause of many checks and disorders in the Greek church; and the same thing proved true under Manuel Comnenus, who reigned from 1143 to 1180. The historian Nicetas Choniates was doubtless right in saying the Roman emperors were not satisfied to rule, and to deal with freemen as with slaves; but they took it quite amiss if they were not also recognized as wise and infallible dogmatists, as lawgivers, called to decide on matters human and divine. || The Byzantine spirit, which tolerated the emperors in this, characteristically expresses itself in these words of the historian Johannes Cinnamos: “To speculate on God’s essence is a thing allowable to none but teachers, the most considerable of the priests, *and perhaps also to the emperors on account of their dignity.*” ¶ It is characteristic of the Byzantine emperors, that they took it amiss when the epithet “holy” was not applied to them as the anointed of God.**

* xi. s. 7, p. 62: αὕτη, ὅσα καὶ ἀρχὴν, ἀπάσαν ἀγαθοπραξίαν ἐν ὑμῖν ἐκφανεῖ· οὐκ ἔφθη τις ἀγάπην εἰπεῖν καὶ συνεξεφωνήθη αὐτῇ ζύμπαν καλόν· ἀγάπης παρεισδυμένης εἰς ψυχὴν, συνεισέρχεται καὶ λοιπὸς ἅπας ὄμιλος ἀρετῶν· εἰ δὲ αὐτῇ ἐκίθην ἐκκίκλεισται, δῆλον, ὅτι ἔρημος ἡ ψυχὴ ἐκίειν παντὸς ἀγαθοῦ.

† ii. on Ps. xlviii. p. 11.

‡ καὶ φυσικώτερον ἅμα καὶ ἐνεργέστερον καὶ πρακτικώτερον.

§ S. 14, p. 10.

|| The remark of this historian, in speaking of Manuel Comnenus, Lib. VII. c. v.

¶ Lib. VI. c. ii.

** τὸ ἅγιον, ὃ σύνθετος ἔχειν ὡς χρυσθέντας μύρω τοὺς βασιλεῖς. Pachymeres de Michaële Paleologo, Lib. VI. c. xxxi. p. 507.

That tendency, which had called forth the fanatical attachment to the word *θεοτοκός* in the Greek church, continued still to be active there ; and it ever found a welcome admission among emperors, who, in proportion as they neglected to form and prove their lives by the teachings of Christ, seemed the more to imagine that they could honour him by zeal for such empty formulæ. Thus, for example, the emperor Manuel Comnenus stirred up a violent controversy about the following formula : The incarnate God, in the sacrifice of Christ, was at once the offerer and the victim.* This formula,† to which the emperor had taken a fancy, must be adopted by all. A synod, convened at Constantinople, drove the matter through ; ‡ and many of the bishops who resisted it were deposed from their seats. At a subsequent period he was led back again to his favourite thought by one who had acquired great authority as a man of learning and a dialectician, and had often been employed on embassies to the West. This was Demetrius. He had accused the Occidentals of error, because they taught that the Son of God was inferior to the Father, and yet equal to him. But Manuel took part with the Occidentals, maintaining that most assuredly this might be said of the God-man, in virtue of the twofold relation in which he must be considered ; § and, in evidence, he cited Christ's word, " My Father is greater than I ! " which he said as God-man, as one in two natures. And thus the controversy turned upon the interpretation of these words. It is a melancholy sign of deadness in the Greek church, that the controversy on the question whether these words should be referred to Christ according to his divine or according to his human nature, or to both at the same time, was waged as long and as vehemently as if the salvation of souls were depending on this point : || and not merely bishops, but statesmen and courtiers,

* τὸν σισαρκωμῖνον Θεὸν προσφέρειν τε ὁμοῦ καὶ προσφέρεισθαι. Nicet. Choniat. Manuel Comnen. Lib. VII. c. v.

† The opponent of it was the Diaconus Soterich. See his explication of the form published in a programme by Prof. Tafel, A.D. 1832, p. 10.

‡ The transactions of the same synod in the programme just mentioned of Prof. Tafel, p. 18.

§ The first beginning of the dispute is recorded by Johannes Cinnamos, Lib. VI. c. ii.

|| See Nicet. Choniat. Lib. VII. c. v. p. 276, seqq.

and finally laymen of all ranks, took sides in the dispute ; and the scenes were renewed which were witnessed in the fourth century.* The emperor required that *his* explanation of these words, according to which they referred to the entire God-man, in virtue of his human nature, should be adopted by all. Those who would not submit to this, drew upon themselves his displeasure, and at last he forced the matter through at an *endemic synod* (σύννοδος ἐνδημοῦσα) held under his own presidency at Constantinople in 1166, before which he caused to be laid many extracts from the church-fathers, and in the transactions of which he himself took an active part.† The bishops who would not receive this doctrine were threatened with deposition ; persons of the higher ranks, with the loss of their dignities and the confiscation of their goods ; the rest with banishment from the residential city. The emperor is even said ‡ to have issued an edict in confirmation of these decrees, denouncing the punishment of death on those who dared oppose them ; and a stone tablet which contained these determinations was set up in the church of St. Sophia.

Towards the end of the reign of Manuel another controversy was stirred up by him in the Greek church, to which, also, an undue importance was ascribed. The church-books at Constantinople contained the form of an oath, couched in very unsuitable language, we admit, for those who came over from Mohammedanism to the Christian faith — “Anathema to Mohammed’s God, of whom he says that he neither begat nor was begotten ;” § but perhaps this formula had never as

* The general interest taken in this controversy is noticed in the introduction to the Acts of the Council held on this subject at Constantinople, under Manuel Comnenus : ταῦτα εἶχον καὶ λεωφόροι καὶ στενωποὶ καὶ οἶκοι περιλαλούμενα. Maji Scriptorum veterum nova collectio, T. IV. p. 4, Romæ, 1831.

† See the above-mentioned Acts of the same.

‡ According to the account of Nicetas.

§ See Nicetas de Comneno, Lib. VII. c. vi. The words added, καὶ ὅτι ὀλόσφυρος ἐστὶ, are attended with difficulty. It was even at that time confessed, as Nicetas shows, that it could not be exactly understood what was meant : ἄλλως δὲ μὴ συνίεναι ἀκριβῶς ὁποῖόν τε ἐστὶ τὸ ὀλόσφυρον. The last word denotes that which is solid, firm, or wrought of such materials, and made of one piece ; thus Pliny, Hist. Nat. Lib. XXXIII. c. xxvi. employs the word holosphyratos, to signify a statue of this sort cast in metal. Perhaps the allusion is to the stone in the Kaaba at

yet given that scandal to any one which the emperor thought proper to discover in it. He believed that it contained a blasphemy, for by it the anathema was pronounced on God himself; and in the breasts of Mohammedans who came over to Christianity, it would excite scruples against the Christian faith. He proposed, therefore, at an endemic synod convened under the presidency of Theodosius, bishop of Constantinople, the abrogation of this formula; but he was unable, on this occasion, to carry this point. It was maintained against him, that the God of Mohammed was plainly not the true God. He was not to be balked, however, by failing of his object here. With the assistance of some of his court-clergy,* he drew up a wordy edict against the above-mentioned form of oath. But this met again with violent opposition from the patriarch and the bishops, which excited great indignation in the emperor. Determined to carry his point at any cost, he summoned the patriarch, with a synod, to his palace in Scutari, to which he had retired on account of his health. When they arrived, the emperor's secretary handed them an edict of the emperor against the formula, which he required them to sign, and an extremely violent document, in which he declared he should be ungrateful to the King of kings, to whom he was bound by so many obligations, if he suffered him to lie under the anathema; and following a common practice of the Byzantine emperors, he threatened that he would apply to the pope, expecting to frighten the bishops to compliance. He said he would assemble a larger synod, and call in the pope's assistance. At this juncture, the venerable Eustathius stood forth, holding it to be his duty, as a shepherd, to declare firmly against the imperial edict. "He could not," he said, "look upon the God of that Mohammed, from whom so much mischief had come, as the true God." When this was reported to the emperor, he fell into a paroxysm of anger. He demanded that Eustathius should be impeached. Either he who had dared to injure the Lord's anointed must be punished, or it must be proved against himself that he had never worshipped

Mecca, which the Mahommedans were accused of worshipping. Vide Hottinger, Hist. oriental. p. 156.

* As Nicetas says: ὑπουργοῖς εἰς τοῦτο χρησάμενος, οὓς ἤπει τῶν ἐκ τῆς βασιλείου αὐλῆς τὸν καιρὸν κολακεύοντας.

the true God, and, in that case, he would willingly allow himself to be converted. It was with the greatest difficulty that the patriarch could appease the emperor; and after much negotiation a middle course was finally agreed upon, and it was determined that, in place of the anathema against the God of Mohammed, should be substituted the certainly more judicious form—"Against Mohammed and his doctrine, and everything connected therewith." *

In respect to the relation of the Greek church to the Latin, the after-effects of these schisms which had made their appearance at an earlier period still continued to be experienced. The systematic evolution of the system of faith of the Roman church, by scholasticism, and the perfected form of papal absolutism, could only serve to define more sharply the line of division between the two churches, and to make the difference still more radical. While they on the side of the Roman church, in their consciousness of possessing the only true tradition, and an authority founded on divine right, and destined to judge and decide over all, supposed they could look down on the Greek church with a feeling of superiority; they of the Greek church, priding themselves on a traditional literary culture, which, to be sure, must fade to insignificance when compared with the new mental achievements of the West, were still inclined to despise the Latins as barbarians. The crusades brought Greeks and Latins into closer connection and more living contact with each other; but these were frequently but sources of controversy and distrust, and served rather to widen than to narrow the distance between the two parties. As we have already remarked on a former page, † the disputed question prevailing between the two churches, concerning the doctrine of the Holy Ghost, was brought up anew for discussion at the beginning of these undertakings, in 1098, before a council held by pope Urban the Second, at Bari. Anselm of Canterbury stood forth as advocate of the Latin church-doctrine, and the anathema on that of the Greek church was here renewed.

Among the succeeding transactions between the two churches, one particularly deserving notice was a conference held under

* Ἀνάθεμα τῷ Μωάμετ καὶ πασῇ τῇ αὐτοῦ διδαχῇ καὶ διαδοχῇ.

† Page 146.

the Greek emperor John Comnenus the Second, between Anselm of Havelberg,* a bishop eminently distinguished for weight of character, intellectual ability, and education, and the archbishop Nechites (doubtless Nicetas) of Nicomedia, who superintended the direction of studies already noticed, at Constantinople, in 1146, on the question in dispute between the two churches, and the means of settling them. When Anselm, at a subsequent period, was residing at the court of pope Eugene the Third, he drew up, at the request of that pope, a full account of that conference.† We may take it for granted, indeed, that we are not presented here with a set of minutes drawn up with diplomatical accuracy; still, we have every reason to presume that the mode in which the Greek prelate managed his cause in this conference, has, in all essential respects, been truly represented by Anselm. He represents him as saying many pointed and striking things against the Latin church, such as he, assuredly, could not have invented at his own point of view, and would not have put into the mouth of his opponent.

In respect to the contested point in the doctrine of the Holy Ghost, Nicetas appealed, as the Greeks were ever wont to do, to the passage in the gospel of St. John, and to the inviolable authority of the Nicene creed. Anselm replied conformably with the doctrine of the church, as it had been settled since the time of Vincentius of Lerins. He presented, on the other side, the progressive evolution of that doctrine, under the guidance of the Holy Spirit, actuating the church, by virtue of which the doctrine, contained as to its germ in the sacred Scriptures, had been more exactly defined and explicated, and what it contained in spirit, reduced to the form of more precise conceptions; just as the work of one universal council is completed in the gradual development of Christian doctrine by another and later. All this is the work of the same Spirit, promised by Christ to his disciples and to his church; of whom he says that he would teach many things which the apostles, at that time, could not understand. Even

* See, respecting him, A. F. Riedel's Essay, in the *Allgemeinen Archiv für die Geschichtskunde des preussischen Staates* von L. von Ledebur, Vol. VIII. f. 97; and by Dr. Spieker, in *Illgen's Zeitschrift für historische Theologie*, Vol. II. f. 1840.

† In D'Achery Spicileg. T. I.

the doctrine of the Trinity, as explained by the council of Nice, the doctrine of the divinity of the Holy Ghost, cannot be pointed out as a doctrine expressed, in so many words, in the Bible.* Anselm alleged, in behalf of the well-grounded authority of the Roman church, that all heresies had found their birth-place in the Greek church; while in the former the pure doctrine had ever been preserved, free from alloy, amid all the disputes proceeding from that other quarter. To this Nicetas replied,† “If the heresies had sprung up in the Greek church, still, they were subdued there; and they could only contribute to the clearer evolution and stronger confirmation of the faith.” And he endeavours to point out, here, a substantial advantage of the Greek church over the Latin, tracing it to the predominating scientific culture which had distinguished the Greek church from the beginning. “Perhaps the very reason why so many heresies had not sprung up among the Romans was, that there had not been among them so many learned and acute investigators of the sacred Scriptures. If that conceit of knowledge by which the Greek heretics had been misled, deserved censure, still, the ignorance of the Latins, who affirmed neither one thing nor another about the faith, but only followed the lead of others in unlearned simplicity, deserved not to be praised.‡ It must be ascribed either to blamable negligence in examining into the faith, or to singular inactivity of mind and dullness of apprehension, or to hindrances growing out of the heavy load of secular business.”§ He applies to the Latins, in this regard, the words in 1 Tim. i. 7, and to the Greeks what Aristotle says of the usefulness of doubt as a passage-way to truth.|| Earnestly does Nicetas protest against the intimation that the Greek church might be compelled to adopt what the pope, without a council held in concurrence with the Greeks,

* Lib. II. c. xxii. seqq.

† Lib. III. c. xi.

‡ Lib. III. c. xi: Sicut hæreticorum, qui apud nos fuerunt, vana sapientia, qua seducti sunt, culpanda est, ita nimirum [which, without doubt, should read *minime*, as irony here would be out of place] laudanda est Romana imperitia, qua ipsi nec hoc nec illud de fide dixerunt, sed alios inde dicentes et docentes simplicitate quasi minus docta audierunt.

§ Quod contigisse videtur vel ex nimia negligentia investigandæ fidei vel ex grossa tarditate hebetis ingenii vel ex occupatione ac mole sæcularis impedimenti.

|| See the passage cited from Abelard, above, p. 193.

might, on his own self-assumed authority, prescribe. "If the pope, seated on the high throne of his glory, will fulminate against us, and hurl down his mandates upon us from his lofty station; if, not with our concurrence, but arbitrarily, and according to his own good pleasure, he will judge us, nay, order us; what fraternal or what paternal relation can subsist long or such terms? Who would patiently endure this? If we could, we might justly be called, and should be in fact, slaves, and not sons of the church."* He then goes on to say that, if such authority belongs to the pope, then all study of the Scriptures, and of the sciences, all Greek intellect and Greek learning, were superfluous. The pope alone would be bishop, teacher, and pastor; he alone would have to be responsible to God for all, whom God had committed to his charge alone. The apostolic creed did not teach men to acknowledge a Roman church in especial, but one common, catholic, apostolic church.†

Though Nicetas defended the use of ordinary bread in the celebration of the Lord's supper, a custom which had always been handed down in the Greek church, yet he estimates the importance of this disputed point with Christian moderation.‡ He says that he himself, in case no other bread was to be had, would have no hesitation in using unleavened bread in the mass. "Since, however," he adds, "the number of the narrow-minded far exceeds that of persons well instructed in the faith, and the undistinguishing multitude easily take offence, it was worthy of all pains, that both Latins and Greeks should be induced to join, heart and hand, in bringing about, in some suitable place and at some suitable time, a general council, at which the use of leavened or unleavened bread, by all at the same time, should be adopted; or, if such an agreement could not be arrived at without giving scandal to one of the two parties, yet all should agree in this, that neither party should

* Si Romanus pontifex in excelso throno gloriæ suæ residens nobis tonare et quasi projicere mandata sua de sublimi voluerit, et non nostro consilio, sed proprio arbitrio pro beneplacito suo de nobis et de ecclesiis nostris judicare, imo imperare voluerit, quæ fraternitas seu etiam quæ paternitas hæc esse poterit? Quis hoc unquam æquo animo sustinere queat? Tunc nempe veri servi et non filii ecclesiæ recte dici possemus et esse.

† Lib. III. c. viii.

‡ Lib. c. c. xviii.

condemn the other, and this difference should no longer turn to the injury of holy charity. "Mutual condemnation," says he, "is a far greater sin than this diversity of custom, which was in itself a matter of indifference." Both finally agreed on this point, that a general council, consisting of Latins and Greeks, for the purpose of bringing about a reunion of the two churches, was a thing greatly to be desired.

But the irritable state of feeling between the two parties, heightened by the crusades and the consequences following in their train, and the arrogant pretences of the popes, who would not lower their tone, put the assembling of such a council out of the question; and even if it could have been held, it must, for the same reasons, have failed of coming to any beneficial results. When afterwards, in the twelfth century, several provinces of the East were conquered by the crusaders, when finally, in 1204, a Western empire was founded at Constantinople, the Latins behaved towards the Greeks in so unchristian, despotic, and cruel a manner, that the hate of the latter was thereby roused to a higher intensity, and the impression endured for a long time afterwards. Every violent measure was resorted to for the purpose of subjecting all to the church of Rome, and of suppressing everything peculiar to the Greeks. The monks, especially, were treated with great harshness. Many Greeks died as martyrs at the stake, for the liberties of their church, and the honest convictions of their minds.*

Though by these events the Greeks must have become still more alienated from the Roman church, and the transactions on the island of Cyprus and at Constantinople had left an indelible impression on the minds of the Greek clergy, yet a new political interest came into play, which made the Greek

* See the report of an unknown Greek, particularly, concerning the cruelties perpetrated on the island of Cyprus, in the work of Leo Allatius, a Greek who had gone over to the Roman church: *De ecclesiæ occidentalis atque orientalis perpetua consensione*, Lib II. c. xiii. p. 694. To this learned man such proceedings of the Romish church seem perfectly regular, and he very naïvely remarks: *Opus erat, effrænes propriæque fidei rebelles et veritatis oppugnatores non exilio, sed ferro et igne in saniolem mentem reducere. Hæretici proscribendi sunt, exterminandi sunt, puniendi sunt et pertinaces occidendi, cremandi. Ita leges sanciant, ita observavit antiquitas, nec alius mos est recentioris ecclesiæ tum Græcæ tum Latinæ.*

emperors, who had taken up their residence at Nice, more desirous than ever of the union of the two churches. The emperor John Ducas Vatazes hoped, by the mediation of the pope, that he should be able to recover what had been rent from the empire by the arms of the Latins; and for this reason invited and favoured negotiations for union. The patriarch Germanus of Constantinople, but who also resided at Nice, sent two letters to pope Gregory the Ninth, and to the cardinals, which certainly betray no evidence in him of a man who could have been induced by any political considerations to bow before the papacy.* The patriarch begins with saying that he regarded Christ as the only true corner-stone, on which the whole church was founded: "Whoever believes on thee, as this corner-stone," he exclaims,—addressing Christ, and probably alluding already to the exclusive pretensions of the church of Rome,—“shall in nowise come to shame, nor find himself torn from the foundation of his hope. This truth none can gainsay but a disciple of the father of lies.” As Christ proclaims peace to those who are nigh, and to those who are afar off, as by his death on the cross he had brought together all, from the utmost bounds of the earth, into a fellowship of piety, so it was his own cause to bring back those who had fallen apart to the unity of faith. He then urgently calls upon the pope to make every effort for the restoration of church-fellowship between Greeks and Latins. He defends the Greeks against the objections made to their orthodoxy; against the complaints that they were the authors of the schism: “Many persons of high dignity and power,” says he, “would listen to you were they not afraid of unjust oppressions, wanton extortions, or indecorous servitude.” Only one thing was wanting to the Greeks, the blood and crown of martyrdom: “What I say, and why I say it,” he then exclaims, “the famous island of Cyprus can tell, which has

* These two letters, published by Matthew of Paris, at the year 1237, f. 386. Nothing but the bias of party-interest could ever lead one to hold that these letters are a fabrication, on the ground of the violent passages in them directed against the popes: Gregory's answer shows that many passages of that sort must have been in the letter to which he is replying; besides, what took place subsequently, during the negotiations at Constantinople, testifies to the existence of such a tone of feeling as is expressed in these letters.

furnished new martyrs. Was that a pretty business, most holy pope, successor of the apostle Peter? Did Peter, the gentle and humble disciple of Christ, prescribe that?" And he held up to the pope the doctrine set forth in the first epistle of Peter; while to the Greeks he applies what the same apostle says of the faith that is tried by the fire of sufferings. He concludes with again entreating the pope that he would spare no pains in bringing about the great word of restoring unity to the church, as he himself would not be hindered by any bodily weakness, any infirmity of old age, from doing all that lay within his power. He said: "He was well aware that both parties maintained the error was not with them, which each would of course say of itself; but both parties should look into the mirror of the sacred Scriptures, and of the writings left behind them by the old church teachers, and thereby examine themselves." The same spirit also expressed itself in the letter written by the patriarch to the cardinals: "Let us all," said he to them, "be of the same mind. Let not one of us say: I am of Paul; another, I am of Apollos; another, I am of Cephas; another, I am of Christ; but let us all call ourselves of Christ, as we are all called Christians." Here, too, the rending of the unity of the church was attributed to the extortions and oppressive measures of the church of Rome: "From being a mother, she had turned into a step-mother; unmindful of the words of our Lord, that he who humbleth himself shall be exalted, she trampled most under foot those who humbled themselves the most before her." The pope hereupon sent two Dominicans and two Franciscans to Constantinople, as delegates to treat concerning peace,—with two letters to the patriarch, in which he took notice of the reproaches thrown out in the above cited letters, but also passed by many things, perhaps purposely, in silence. He allowed that the patriarch was right, in saying that Christ is the chief corner-stone and first foundation of the church; but reminded him that the apostles were the secondary foundations (*secundaria fundamenta*), among whom the first and most important was the apostle Peter, of whose primacy he was careful to remind him. The envoys, on their arrival at Constantinople, in 1233, were received with great marks of honour; but the negotiations, in which the Greeks betrayed the irritated state of their feelings at the wrongs they had suffered, led to no

favourable results. The legates declared that the Roman church would not depart an *iota* from their faith and symbol; the Greeks must confess to the faith that the Holy Ghost proceeds from the Son as well as from the Father; and they must set forth this in their sermons before the people, and condemn and burn their books written against this doctrine. On the other hand, however, the pope would not force them to recite the creed with that addition. Neither should the use of unleavened bread, in the Lord's supper, be pressed on the Greeks; only they should firmly believe and preach to others that the body of Christ could be made of unleavened as well as leavened bread, and all the books composed against that usage of the Roman church they should condemn and burn. These last declarations were received by the emperor, and by the bishops, with great indignation; and so the negotiations were broken up.*

If the restoration of fraternal communion between the two great portions of the church, which together were designed to form one whole, might itself be an object of longing desire to all who were not blinded by national hate or narrow-minded fanaticism, much more must the great evils which sprang out of the schism, and continued to be propagated and to spring up afresh from age to age, call forth in the unprejudiced the wish for a reunion, and impel them to cast about for the means of securing so great an object. And when such persons inquired into the points of dispute which had come into discussion between the two parties, these, most assuredly, would appear to them as of little or no importance in their relation to the interests of the Christian faith; for the far graver doctrinal opposition betwixt the two churches had in fact remained an unconscious one, never expressed in any public confession. In the controverted point which was considered of the most weight,—the doctrine concerning the Holy Ghost,—an easy method of accommodation readily presented itself, that of resorting to a comparison of the older church-teachers. Accordingly, a pious and learned man of these times, standing in high veneration among the Greeks, the abbot and priest Nicephorus Blemmydes, devoted himself to the business of

* See the account of the papal legates in Rainaldi, A.D. 1233, s. 5 et seq.

writing for the peace of the church,* which he was induced to do by a purely Christian interest, separate from all those other considerations, which, under these circumstances, are so apt to mingle in.

He was one of the few who did not cringe before the Byzantine despotism, as we may see from the following example:—The emperor John Ducas kept up an illicit intercourse with Marcesina, a lady of the court, with whose beauty he had become enamoured. He treated her as a second wife, and required nearly the same honours to be paid to her as to an empress. The pious monk whom we have mentioned was the only one who fearlessly expressed himself; both in writing and conversation, against this scandal offered to a Christian people; and once, when she proposed visiting the church connected with the monastery of Blemmydes, and to partake of the communion there, he caused the church-doors to be shut in her face. Accustomed to receive homage from all, she was the more exasperated at receiving this treatment from a monk, and urged the emperor, over whom in other matters her influence was unbounded, to revenge her insulted pride. The worthy monk, foreseeing the vengeance that must overtake him, issued a circular letter,† giving an account of what he had done, explaining the reasons which had led him to do so, and expressing the noble temper which governed him.‡ “Though by this sudden and unexpected appearance,” says he, “we were taken by surprise, yet we did not for a moment hesitate to drive away from the common prayer and song of the faithful, the adulteress, who, in an unheard-of manner, insults the laws of Christ, and makes the insult a public one, and to banish with all our power the unholy from holy places; not without fear, indeed, owing to the weakness of the flesh, but overcoming the fear of man by the fear of the Lord, so that we would rather die than act contrary to his laws. Though many,” he wrote, “might think differently from himself, yet he could not follow them in that which is wrong. He should

* See two treatises relating to this subject, in Leo Allatius *Græcia orthodoxa*, T. I.

† *Ἐπιστολὴ καθολικωτέρᾳ.*

‡ Of Marcesina he says: ὅτι ἡ ἀρχοντίσσα ἡ Μαρκεσίνα, ἡ ἐξοχῶς ἱεραμένη τῷ βασιλεῖ καὶ διὰ τοῦτο πάντων ὑπερτεροῦσα καὶ αὐτῆς τῆς Αὐγούστης πρωτεύουσα τυραννικῶς εἰσέφρησεν, etc.

stand ready even to renounce the fathers, that he might be only a disciple of Christ, and to keep himself wholly in his footsteps and laws. Whoever was not so minded could not be Christ's disciples." And he concluded with these words: "Thus thinking, we dared not present the holy bread to the impure and shameless, and to cast the pearls of the liturgy before one who wallows in the mire of adultery. Therefore will we suffer in the Lord whatever may betide us." *

But the emperor, restrained by the voice of his conscience, did not venture to attempt anything against the pious man who was in earnest for the honour of the divine law.† Under the emperor Theodore Lascaris the Second, the dignity of patriarch of Constantinople was offered to this Blemmydes, but he preferred the quiet of his monastery. ‡

The above-mentioned reasons which led the emperors residing in Nice to wish for the union of the churches, was removed, it is true, when, in 1261, Michael Paleologus, by his crimes, had risen to the imperial dignity,—and by crimes sought to maintain himself in it,—reconquered Constantinople, and restored the ancient empire; but, on the other hand, the political motives inducing him to seek the restoration of a good understanding with the pope, became the stronger. He stood in fear of the armies of the West, which were again threatening the Greek empire, and hoped, through means of the pope, to be able to avert this danger. He was ready himself to make any sacrifice for this object, and felt assured, not without reason, that the papacy, even though submitted to, must always remain a powerless thing to the Greek church, and the subjection be merely one of form and appearance. But he could not so easily succeed in making the heads of the clergy and of the monks feel the force of these considerations, and share these convictions with himself. Great as was the power of the rude Byzantine despotism over the minds of its subjects, still it was opposed on this side by a formidable check, which brute force could not so easily remove; and there subsisted already in the Greek church a schism, for

* Vide Leo Allat. de ecclesiæ occidentalis atque orientalis perpetua consens., Lib. II. c. xiv. p. 718.

† See the historical work of Nicephorus Gregoras, Lib. II. c. vii.

‡ L. c. Lib. III. c. i.

which this emperor was accountable, and which might easily be followed up by another, still more radical, to increase the confusion.

When, under the reign of Theodore Lascaris the Second, Nicephorus Blemmydes declined the patriarchal dignity offered to him, another pious monk, Arsenius, was induced to accept it, though he was afterwards constrained to lament that he had not followed the example of the first-named individual. That emperor left behind him, at his death, a son six years old, over whom he appointed the patriarch guardian; and the latter felt himself sacredly bound to watch over the young heir of the empire till he could enter upon the government. It being out of his power to prevent Michael Paleologus from usurping the supreme authority, he crowned him; yet only on the express condition that he bound himself, by a solemn oath, to hold the government no longer than to the majority of John Lascaris, and then to resign in his favour. But that usurper refused to be bound by his oath; and the more effectually to exclude from the throne the regular successor of the late emperor, and to secure himself against all danger from his plots, he caused John Lascaris, who was now a child about ten years old, to be deprived of his eyesight. The patriarch Arsenius immediately excommunicated him; and the emperor, though he might silence the upbraidings of his own conscience at the commission of so great a crime, and forget the judgment of a holy God, yet dreaded the tribunal of the church. The absolution of the church was, to him, the same as the forgiveness of sin. A stranger to all true fear of God, the despot humbled himself before the tribunal of the church. Submitting to the penance imposed on him, he expected thus to gain over the patriarch so as to induce him to remove the ban and grant him absolution; thus would he make the matter up with his own conscience and the judgment of God. But he could not bend the mind of the pious patriarch. The only course that remained, therefore, was to get rid of him. A synod, called together at Constantinople, was the instrument employed to subvert him, and he cheerfully retired once more to the seclusion and quiet of the cloister. A bishop of Adrianople, Germanus, who was friendly to the emperor, was appointed his successor. Still, a large party remained devoted to Arsenius, and refused to recognise any other as patriarch. Germanus

found himself assailed by reproaches on all sides, and resigned his office. Joseph, an aged and unlettered monk, wholly ignorant of the world, finally assumed the patriarchal dignity. In the midst of a large convocation of bishops, the emperor, after the celebration of the mass, prostrated himself at the foot of the altar, and declared himself guilty of two sins, perjury, and depriving the son of his predecessor of his eyesight. Then the patriarch first stood up and gave the emperor, while prostrate on the ground, a written certificate of the forgiveness of his sins; and the bishops, one after the other, in the order of their rank, read to him this form of absolution. The emperor, after partaking of the communion, departed, joyful, as if the burden had been removed from his conscience, and he were now made sure of the grace of God himself;* nor did he forget how much he was indebted for the peace of his soul to the patriarch Joseph. The new patriarch, however, was but the more detested by the party of Arsenius; and the schism betwixt the Arsenians and the followers of Joseph penetrated into the midst of families.†

Although the attempt to effect a union between the two churches would unavoidably create new divisions in the Greek church, already rent by these parties, still, the dread of the storm which threatened him from the West caused the emperor to overlook all other difficulties. The motives which influenced Michael Paleologus were sustained and reinforced by the fact that, in 1271,‡ an individual, who on his return from the East had taken pains accurately to inform himself of the emperor's situation, who took a lively interest in the renewal of the crusades, and considered the reconciliation of the Greeks and Latins a very important means to that end, Gregory the Tenth, was elected pope. It was the determination of this pope to make it his special business at the general council, which was to assemble in 1274, to set on foot a new crusade, and consequently to bring up the subject of the union. When the Roman embassy for peace, in which John

* The words of the historian Nicephorus Gregoras, Lib. IV. c. viii.: *καὶ οὕτως ἀπὴν χαίρων ὁ βασιλεὺς, ὁμοῦ τῇ τοιαύτῃ συγχωρήσει καὶ θεὸν αὐτὸν εὐμενῆ καὶ ἴλιων αὐτῶ καταστῆναι οἰόμενος.* George Pachymeres's history of this emperor's reign, Lib. IV. c. xxv.

† Pachymeres's History, Lib. IV. c. xxviii.

‡ See Vol. VII. p. 260.

Parastron, a man of Greek descent, especially distinguished himself by his zeal for the cause, arrived at Constantinople, the emperor exerted himself to the utmost to hasten the business to a conclusion. He described to the clergy the threatening danger which might thus be averted; he appealed to the negotiations already mentioned, under the emperor Johannes Ducas, when the Latins were by no means accused of impiety on account of their doctrine of the Holy Ghost, and it was by no means required that their addition to this doctrine should be expunged from all other writings, but only from the creed; he represented to them that the Latins and Greeks agreed as nearly together on the most important matters of faith, as if the difference between them was only a difference of language. There needed to be no scruples about admitting the name of the pope into the ecclesiastical books (*διπτυχά*), and of mentioning him in the public prayers of the church, since the same thing was done in the case of bishops of far inferior dignity, as a mark of church-fellowship. Why should there be any hesitation about calling the pope brother and first brother, when even the rich man in torments did not hesitate to call Abraham father, from whom he was separated by that great gulf which indicated an opposition of temper. Even though the right of appeals to the pope were sanctioned, still, owing to the wide separation by sea, the thing could not easily be carried out in practice.* The patriarch Joseph, who was otherwise inclined to compliance, and whom the emperor was disposed to indulge out of gratitude for the absolution he had obtained from him, offered here the most determined resistance, being fully under the influence of the common sentiment which prevailed in the Greek church. Not having sufficient confidence in his own learning, he requested his archivarius (*χαρτοφύλαξ*) Johannes Beccus, †

* See the report of George Pachymeres, who himself took a part in these proceedings, in his history of this emperor, Lib. V. c. xii.

† The two historians, Nicephorus Gregoras and Pachymeres, do not entirely agree with each other in their judgment about the learning of Beccus. The former says (Lib. V. c. ii. p. 129, in the latest collection): in the knowledge of Hellenic literature, others had gone before him; but in the *δόξεις δογμάτων ἐκκλησιαστικῶν*, all appeared as children in comparison with him. The other remarks, that he busied himself so much with Hellenic literature that he could not make himself so well acquainted with the ecclesiastical. Vide Lib. V. p. 381.

a man of high authority on account of his knowledge in church literature, and his rhetorical gifts, after the Byzantine standard, that he would give a public expression of his judgment on these matters. Fear held him back. But when the patriarch bade him speak on penalty of the ban, he at length surmounted his fears, and in direct terms declared the Latins to be heretics. This was of great weight on the side of the party whom he led. The concentrated fury of the emperor now fell upon him; he was thrown with his whole family into prison, and the emperor, who considered it a matter of the greatest consequence to gain his voice, employed this treatment as a means also of bending his will and inducing him to alter his tone. For the purpose of gaining him over, extracts from the older church-teachers were laid before him in his dungeon. He desired to read the excerpted passages in their connection, and the emperor readily consented. He was permitted to leave his prison, so as to be able to consult himself all the books he thought necessary. One might be disposed to think, from the way in which the change in Beccus's opinions was brought about, that it was merely a hypocritical pretence. Yet his later behaviour, the fidelity with which he adhered, under every change of circumstances, to the principles once expressed by him, evidence that he was not one of those whose views are determined by extraneous considerations. And the writings subsequently composed by him in defence of the union, speak the language of conviction, and lead us to infer how the change must have been brought about in him, though we might be inclined to suppose that the outward circumstances also exercised an unconscious influence. His first violent declaration might have proceeded from the passion which he shared in common with the other zealots of the Greek church, before he had made any exact inquiry into the contested points. Now he had leisure and quiet to think over the great evils which had been wrought by the schism and the violent opposition of the two parties, to weigh more exactly the points of dispute, and to compare them with the far more

Perhaps he excelled in the so called gifts of discourse and dialectics, but had little knowledge of Greek literature or ecclesiastical either. If he was no great proficient in ecclesiastical learning, the change of his views on matters of ecclesiastical controversy may be more easily explained without disadvantage to his character.

important articles in which both the churches were agreed. The compromise already proposed by many, in the most important point of dispute, the doctrine concerning the Holy Spirit, appeared to him a plain and obvious one. In particular, the writings of the venerable Nicephorus Blemmydes, writings prompted by a sincere regard for the peace of the church, but which he had never before read, seem to have produced a great effect on his mind. Thus, from being the most zealous opponent, he became by degrees the warmest supporter of the union; and in him the emperor found the most important instrument for promoting his designs, an instrument which he needed so much the more, as it was now vain to expect that he should be able to gain over the patriarch Joseph, who had bound himself by an oath. Without listening to the contradiction of the zealots for the ancient doctrine and freedom of the Greek church, Michael Paleologus was determined to push the matter through. A respectable embassy, charged with valuable presents, was sent to Rome, and so the work of union was consummated, at the council of Lyons, in 1274, after the manner prescribed by the pope. A confession answering to the faith of the church of Rome, which had respect also to the doctrine concerning the Holy Ghost, was accepted and read in the name of the Greek church; but to the latter was conceded the right of retaining their symbol without alteration, as well as other peculiar usages, which obtained before the schism. The primacy of the church of Rome was admitted by the Greeks. The emperor had entered into an agreement with the peace-loving patriarch Joseph, that the latter should quietly resign his patriarchate, if the work of union should be consummated at Rome. This was now done; and he hailed it as a welcome event which enabled him once more to retire to the cloister. Beccus was appointed patriarch; and Joseph, being forced against his will to stand at the head of the opponents of the union, though he himself and his former archivarius cherished the same feelings towards each other as ever, Beccus was made by that party the brunt of the most violent attacks. And the measures to which the emperor resorted in order to force a recognition of the union, and punish its opponents, who might easily be represented to him as guilty of high treason, would only serve to exasperate that party and stir up their hatred against Beccus, who was

certainly a great sufferer in consequence of these proceedings. Banishment from the country, imprisonment, confiscation of goods, the scourge, the cutting off of ears and noses, and putting out of eyes, these were the means which the emperor employed against the enemies of the seeming peace which he had brought about. The fanatical opponents of the union detested its advocates still more, if possible, than they did the Latins themselves. Their fanaticism manifested itself by their sedulously avoiding all intercourse with the other party, by which they imagined they should be polluted. Beccus had resolved, at first, to take no notice of the calumnious attacks made against himself, for he feared that the public excitement would only be increased; but he found it impossible to resist the impulse to defend a cause which he considered just against accusations which appeared to him sophistical and columnious. He felt constrained to defend the Latins against that fanatical hate which would load them with every heresy, and allow the agreement in the essentials of faith to be utterly forgotten. He showed how the schism had been originally brought about by outward occasions and personal animosities. He endeavoured to expose the groundlessness of the accusations of Photius and other old polemics.* He exerted himself withal to produce a spirit of greater moderation; but in the present excited state of feelings his controversial writings could only serve to pour fresh oil on the flames, and to furnish new occasions for branding him as a heretic. The mania of these disputes once more penetrated into families. Laymen became zealous for differences about which they understood nothing at all, as if the very being of the Christian faith depended thereon. Those melancholy spectacles of the fourth century were repeated, when disputes on such matters were carried on in bake-shops and public baths,—a comparison made by Beccus himself, who tells us that children, women, day-labourers, peasants, people understanding nothing about the matter, raised a great clamour and outcry against every man who dared say a word in favour of the peace of the church.† He

* See the controversial writings of Beccus in the above-mentioned collection of Leo Allatius.

† γυναῖκες καὶ παῖδες καὶ ἄνδρες τῶν ὅλων οὐδὲν γεωργικοῦ ἢ ἄλλου τινὸς βαναύσου βίου πλέον εἰδότεων μεγάλου ἐγκλήματος κρίνουσι, τοὺς μικρὸν γούν τι τολμῶντας ὑπογρύζαι πρὸς τὴν τῆς ἐκκλησιαστικῆς εἰρήνης συναίνεσιν.

then cites a statement of Gregory, of Nyssa, about the Arian controversies.* “The same thing,” he says, “I see happening now-a-days almost everywhere. Boys going to school, women at the spinning-wheel, peasants, and day-labourers of all sorts, are more intent and interested, than they are upon any business under their hands, in passing judgment on those who say that the Holy Ghost proceeds from the Son.” And at the same time that he was thus attacked by the opponents of the emperor, he must run the risk of incurring that despot’s displeasure by the greater nobleness of his own character. He availed himself both of the relation in which he stood to him as patriarch, and of the favour which he had won as promoter of the union, to intercede in behalf of many of the wretched victims of power. Violent altercations not seldom arose between him and the emperor, but he was often able to carry his point, and many owed to him their deliverance. Yet occasionally he failed; and the boldness with which he then spoke brought down upon him, for the moment, the monarch’s displeasure. Thus it happened, that the emperor on a certain occasion refused to grant the patriarch, in spite of his repeated remonstrances, the pardon of an unfortunate individual. When Michael afterwards came to a great festival of saints, Beccus renewed his remonstrances, but with no better success than before. Then he held back the hand from which the emperor was about to receive the holy supper, declaring that he would not offer it to him in that unforgiving mood to his own condemnation. All the entreaties of the emperor were in vain. Ashamed and angry, he left the church. Beccus withdrew from the patriarchal palace to a monastery, and the emperor was forced to recal him again from his retirement. Such scenes were ever and anon repeated. In the fourth year of his patriarchal dignity, it so happened that Beccus failed once more in his intercessions in behalf of an unfortunate person. Afterwards, on meeting the latter, he called God to witness that he had done all that lay in his power to save him. This was so interpreted by Beccus’s enemies as if he had pronounced a curse on the emperor. It is said that he was impeached for high treason. He gladly resigned the patri-

* See the second discourse of Beccus, respecting his unjust deposition, in Leo Allat. *Græcia orthodoxa*, T. II. p. 52 seqq.

archal office, and retired to the monastery. But as envoys from Rome arrived just at that time, to look after the state of the union in the Greek church, the emperor was obliged once more to invoke the assistance of Beccus, in order to make the embassy believe in a peace which was only a seeming one.* As by this union only new divisions were excited in the Greek church, the thing fell more and more into neglect on both sides. The emperor saw that he had not obtained his object, which was to keep the war away from Sicily through the mediation of Rome, and became himself more lukewarm. In Rome, too, it was understood that nothing had been gained by the seeming union; and the papal court was no longer influenced in its conduct towards the Greeks by this idle play.—In 1281, pope Martin the Fourth actually went so far as to pronounce the ban on the emperor, and Michael, who was governed entirely by political motives, on seeing that all his plans were frustrated, would gladly have retraced all his steps, if he could have done so under any plausible pretext.

But when, in the year 1282, Andronicus succeeded his father Michael in the government, the hatred conceived by the Greek people towards that union which had been forced upon them, a hatred hitherto suppressed, broke out for that very reason with the greater violence. The new emperor, who had never been a friend to the union, followed with good will the reigning tendency of spirit; and far from being disposed, like his father, to domineer over the conscience, he desired above all things to put an end to the divisions. The fanaticism of the excited multitude prevented him from observing the funeral obsequies of his father according to the usual ecclesiastical forms. Joseph was now regarded as the regular patriarch, and he was favoured also by the emperor. Beccus, who had to be protected from the popular fury, voluntarily retired to a monastery. A dignity which had caused so many painful hours, and involved him in so many uncomfortable disputes,† he probably laid down without regret, though he afterwards felt himself compelled to complain of

* The full account of the particulars is in Pachymeres, Lib. VI. c. xiv.

† Pachymeres says of him: τῆς τοῦ πατριάρχου τιμῆς ἐπικύρωσις ἔχων, ὡς πολλάκις καὶ λέγων καὶ πρώττων ἔδειξεν.

the party which had put him down by arbitrary will, and to defend his good cause against the fanatics who accused him of heresy. The patriarch Joseph, now reduced by severe illness and old age to the borders of the grave, and who could not therefore be inclined either to resume such an office, or to place himself at the head of a party, was obliged, by those who pretended to act in his name and under his authority, to consent to be borne on his sick-bed into the patriarch's palace.* Under the patriarch's name, whose gentle temper was altogether averse to the odious practice of branding men as heretics, as well as to all other extravagant proceedings, such acts were perpetrated by the fanatical monks and clergy as he would have utterly disapproved of, but which the feeble state of his body prevented him from publicly disclaiming. All who had in any way had anything to do with the union were regarded as cut off from the fellowship of the church; and according to the part which they had taken in that measure, ecclesiastical penalties, more or less grave, in the shape of pecuniary mulcts, were imposed on them, as a condition of their readmission to church-fellowship. The walls of the churches, the sacred utensils, were looked upon as polluted, and subjected to various ceremonies of purification. But Beccus especially, though he had voluntarily withdrawn himself from the public stage of action, was made the object of hatred and persecution. It was laid to his charge that he had forcibly obtruded himself into the place of the still living, regular patriarch. He was held up to scorn as the enemy of the Greek nation and church. From his conciliatory essays men pretended to deduce a large list of heresies; and in this church, to which a theology like the scholastic theology of the Latins was foreign even to the more moderate class, such attempts to reconcile the contrary views in the mode of ap-

* Beccus, agreeing with the historian Pachymeres, says, in the first discourse relating to his unjust deposition, c. iii. of this change: *ἔρχε μὲν ἡμῶς ἡ μονὴ, ἣ φέροντες δεδάκαμεν ἑαυτοὺς, ἐκείνον δὲ ἡ κλίνη, οὐ γὰρ ὁ θρόνος, ὅτι μηδ' ἐκαθίσθη, ἀλλ' ἐτέθη ἐπὶ τὸν θρόνον.* And he adds, that he did not say this in the way of reproaching the man, but only to expose the wickedness of his enemies, who were determined, at all hazards, to depose him. Against the man, in himself considered, not a word of reproach could be cast: *τίς γὰρ ὁ μῶμος, ἀνθρώπων ἑγγύς ὄντα θανάτου ἀναισθητεῖν.*

prehending the doctrine of the Holy Ghost, as Beccus had made by means of the dialectical formula respecting the procession of the Holy Ghost from the Father through the Son, seemed offensive. It appeared to them a profane and impertinent speculation on matters which must only be adored in silence.* He proceeded by writings and by discourses to defend his orthodoxy, and the course of conduct he had pursued. He ever sought to show that he had given up nothing appertaining to orthodoxy, but had only allowed himself, for the sake of the peace of the church, after the example of the older church teachers, to adopt an *οικονομία*, a conception, to be sure, which theologians in the Greek church were in the habit of using in a very indefinite sense, even at the expense of strict veracity. The party of the zealots required that he should acknowledge his guilt, confess the legality of his deposition, furnish a written recantation, and beg forgiveness of the patriarch. When he had been forced against his will to appear before a synod at Constantinople, and had there boldly defended himself, he at length consented to give way for the moment, to resign the patriarchal and priestly offices, to subscribe a confession of faith which had been laid before him, and to beg forgiveness of the patriarch Joseph, who was entirely ignorant of all these proceedings.† By this, the clamours of his enemies were for the present appeased; but only a short time elapsed before he was banished to Brussa. While here also, he took an active and zealous part in the disputes which were ever springing up afresh. Before a synod assembled in the presence of the emperor, he disputed with his opponents on the doctrine of the Holy Ghost; the boldness and violence with which he spoke in public drew down upon him the displeasure of the emperor, who had but one wish, which was to reconcile all the parties with each other. He was banished to a castle on the bay of Astacene in Bithynia, and here narrowly watched; he at first suffered from want, till the emperor became again more mildly disposed towards him. In this confinement, in which also he did not cease

* The moderate Pachymeres, who defends Beccus on many points, concurs with this way of thinking: τὰ περὶ Θεοῦ σιωπῆ μᾶλλον ἔχειν τε καὶ σιμᾶν ἢ λόγοις συνιστᾶν καὶ δεικνύειν πέφυκεν. The History of Andronicus, Lib. I. c. viii. T. II. p. 27.

† Pachymeres, Lib. I. p. 34.

writing in defence of his cause, he spent fourteen years, and died there in 1298.

After the death of the emperor Michael, and the reinstatement of the old patriarch Joseph, the party of the Arsenians, which had ever continued to propagate itself in secret, once more emerged from obscurity. They were as zealous against Joseph as the other party were against Beccus; and the same fanaticism as the followers of the patriarch Joseph had shown in avoiding all intercourse with the unionists, the Arsenians manifested in refusing fellowship with the so-called Josephites. They wanted to have a church by themselves at Constantinople. No one was pure enough for them, because they looked upon all as polluted by the worship performed by the Josephites. At length a magnificent church, that of All-saints, occurred to them, which for a long time had been shut up and not used, and which therefore they might suppose themselves entitled to regard as perfectly pure; and from the peace-loving emperor, who hoped to win this important party by mildness, they managed to obtain this church for their assemblies. The greater the concessions made to them, the higher rose their demands and their wishes. Toleration did not satisfy them, they wanted to be masters; they were convinced that the justice of their cause would be made manifest by a judgment of God, a miracle; they even succeeded in prevailing on the emperor to enter into their foolish proposals. He was concerned for nothing but the peace of the church, which was also a matter of political importance. This, deceiving himself, he hoped he should be able to secure, at all events, whether God by a miracle decided in favour of the Arsenians,—in which case the party of the Josephites would be compelled to acknowledge their rights,—or the miracle did not take place, when the Arsenians, undeceived, would be obliged to yield. He ordered, therefore, that the bones of John of Damascus should be given them for this purpose; that a writing in attestation of their cause should be laid on these bones, and that by the mediation of the saint a miracle might be wrought for their party. Already the Arsenians proceeded to prepare themselves by fasting, prayer, and vigils for this judgment of God; when the emperor, whether of his own impulse or by the influence of others, was induced to alter his determination. Perhaps he feared the political consequences, for easily might

political movements attach themselves to the tendency of the Arsenian faction, as the victory of the cause of Arsenius might be regarded as a decision against the legality of the reign of Michael Paleologus, and consequently of his successor. He directed that the trial should be forbidden, and that the Arsenians should be told that men ought not to wish to have things decided according to their own notions, but should follow the ways of divine wisdom, as they were made known in the government of the world. Now it was obvious that no miracle had been wrought for a long period of time. They had ceased ever since Christianity began to be more widely spread. The writings of the fathers were sufficient to furnish the knowledge of God's will, even as Christ himself assured the rich man, who required the resurrection of one from the dead, that Moses and the prophets were sufficient.

In vain did the emperor hope that after the death of the patriarch Joseph, in 1283, to whom the Arsenians were so hostile, both parties might be reconciled by means of the new patriarch Georgias—the Arsenians would only follow the decision by a judgment of God. As God is the same now as in ancient times, said they, so will he also ever manifest himself by miracles, provided only we doubt not.* And the emperor finally yielded to them, in order to secure the wished-for peace. A great fire was to be kindled, and a writing composed according to their principles, by each of the parties, was to be cast into it. The party whose writing remained uninjured should be held to be right; and even should both writings be consumed, this should be regarded as a token whereby God signified his will that they should conclude a peace with each other. The emperor directed that a large vase of silver should be manufactured for the purpose. The great Sabbath before Easter, a day held especially sacred, was chosen for the holding of this judgment of God. Before a numerous and gorgeous assembly, at the head of which stood the emperor himself, the fire was lighted, the two documents were thrown into it, and, as was to be expected, soon were both burnt to ashes.† Now, even the Arsenians declared themselves ready to acknowledge the patriarch, and to unite again with the rest of the church.

* Pachymeres, Lib. I. p. 60.

† Pachymeres says: τὸ πῦρ ἐκ ἡγνόου τῆν ἑαυτοῦ δύναμιν.

The emperor, who thought he had accomplished a great thing, led them full of joy, late in the evening, in rough weather, amid ice and snow, to the patriarch, who gave them his blessing. Yet the joy soon proved to be idle. This was only an effect of the first transient impression of events; on the next morning all had become cool again. Thus every attempt at union proved abortive, and the more so in proportion to the pains taken to bring the thing about by outward measures.

III. SECTS WHICH STOOD FORTH IN OPPOSITION TO THE HIERARCHY.

We have seen, in the preceding periods, how the reactions of the sects which had sprung up from the intermingling of the Oriental theosophy with Christianity, still continued to propagate themselves amid all the persecutions in the Greek church, and to emerge again from obscurity under continually new forms. The inward corruption of the Greek church, and the unsatisfied religious need of the laity, furnished a good occasion for these reactions. The political and ecclesiastical despotism which sought to suppress, served rather to promote them. If mysticism sprung up here and there, within the retreats of the monastic life, it might, by its very opposition to this prevailing worldliness, be the more easily led into an anti-churchlike direction, or to blend itself with other mystical directions, already possessed of an heretical colouring. The Paulicians had now established themselves in fixed settlements, beyond the limits of the Greek empire, and might spread back again to the spots whence they came, as we know they had a great zeal for making proselytes. Their bravery procured them admittance among the hiring troops of the hard-pressed Greek empire, and here they enjoyed a new opportunity for diffusing abroad their doctrines. In the preceding periods we saw the sect of the Euchites, who were essentially distinguished by a peculiar modification of Dualism from the Paulicians, making their appearance under a monk-like shape, and we observed their efforts to get introduced among the Slavic population. From this centre they now spread back again into the Greek empire, for the sect of the Bogomiles, concerning whom we are now to speak, betray, beyond the

possibility of a doubt, by an affinity of doctrines, their origin from that quarter; and the express testimonies of contemporary writers with regard to their Bulgarian extraction, as well as their manifestly Slavic name, confirm the same thing; whether that name was, according to the interpretation of the Greeks, derived from the circumstances that, in their prayers, they were heard frequently calling on God for mercy,* or whether the Slavic signification of the word Bogumil, one beloved of God,† is the fundamental one, so that this name, denoting a pious community, may be considered analogous to the “friends of God,” in Germany. What is said by themselves goes to show that they sprung up out of the midst of ecclesiastics or monks of the Greek church.

The Bogomiles, like the Euchites of the eleventh century, have nothing in common with the older Gnostics. We hear not a word from them concerning a doctrine of Æons, or concerning an original evil principle; but they busied themselves with a higher doctrine of spirits. The name Satanael,‡ and the figure of God as the ancient of days,§ might seem to point to Jewish elements, which had exercised an influence on the authors of the sect. Perhaps on this point, also, the language of the Bogomiles themselves should be taken into consideration, who, in allegorically expounding the account of the star of the wise men, called Jerusalem the Catholic church,

* “Bog milui,” Lord, have mercy. See the 23d chapter of the Panoplia of Euthymius Zigabenus, published by Dr. Gieseler, 1842, in the Greek original: *Βὸγ ἢ τῶν Βουλγάρων γλαῦσσα καλεῖ τὸν Θεὸν, μίλουι δὲ τὸ ἐλίησον· εἶη δ' ἂν Βογόμιλος κατ' αὐτοὺς ὁ τοῦ Θεοῦ τὸν ἕλιον ἐπισπώμενος.* Thus this name would be analogous to that of the Euchites, Messalians.

† See the remarks of Gieseler on the above-cited words of Euthymius. Euthymius cites, from the Bogomiles: *παρὰ τῶν ἀρχιερέων καὶ τῶν ἄλλων γραμματέων καὶ διδασκάλων μαθεῖν αὐτοὺς, ὅτι ὁ Χριστὸς ἐν Βηθλέεμ γεννᾶται* (their communities), *ἀφ' ἡμῶν γὰρ γενέσθαι τοὺς πρώτους διδασκάλους αὐτῶν.* Comp. what is said by the Euchites, in a preceding volume. Yet in the passages there cited, from the dialogue of Michael Psellus, *περὶ ἐνεργείας δαιμόνων*, p. 2, ed. Boissonade, 1838, by the *ἱερὸν κόμμα* is to be understood, not the Catholic clerus, but the Catholic church generally, as opposed to the *πονηρὸν κόμμα* of the heretics.

‡ Like Sammael, among the Jews.

§ The words of Euthymius: *Λέγουσιν, οὐκ ὄναρ μόνον πολλάκις ἀλλὰ καὶ ὕπαρ βλέπειν τὸν πατέρα ὡς γέροντα βαθυγένειον*, ed. Gieseler, p. 33. How they represented God, also, under a human shape: *ἀνθρωποσώσωπον ὑπολαμβάνουσι*, p. 7.

the star of the Mosaic law, which had first guided them to the Catholic church, where they learned from the priests and lawyers that Christ was born in Bethlehem, that is, that the true Christ was to be found in that community which, by a reaction of reform, had itself gone forth from the Catholic church.* Satanael they regarded as the first-born son of the supreme God, in which they agreed with the Euchites, and with one particular view of the Parsic dualism,—who sat at the right hand of God, armed with divine power, and holding the second place after him. To each of the higher spirits God had committed a particular department of administration, while Satanael was placed over all as his universal vicegerent. Thus he was tempted to become proud, and, intoxicated with the sense of his power and dignity, was for making himself independent of the supreme God, and founding an empire of his own. He endeavoured, also, to lead away from their allegiance the angels to whom God had entrusted the management of the different portions of the world; and he succeeded with a part of them. The Bogomiles believed they found Satanael described in the unjust steward of the parable, and they expended much labour in expounding the several points in the parable in accordance with this notion.† Satanael now called together the angels who had apostatized with him,‡ and invited them to join him in laying the groundwork of a new creation, independent of the supreme God, a new heaven and a new earth; for the Father had not yet deprived

* See the excerpt, from Euthymius, published by Gieseler, p. 35.

† These doctrines are all found again in the conversation betwixt Christ and the apostle John, published under the name of this apostle, which apocryphal writing was published from the archives of the Inquisitorial tribunal at Carcassone, by the Dominican Jean Benoist, in his *Histoire des Albigeois*, T. I.; and last by Thilo, in the first volume of his *Cod. apocryph. Novi Testamenti*, p. 885. The same doctrine concerning the apostasy of Satanael occasioned by pride, concerning the arts which he employed to seduce the angels placed as vicegerents over the different parts of the world, as well as the comparison between Satanael and the unjust steward, is there carried out in all its particulars,—a certain proof that the above document is to be traced, directly or indirectly, to the Bogomiles. In fact, this apocryphal writing is said to have been brought, by an heretical bishop, from Bulgaria to France.

‡ According to the above-mentioned Pseudo-Johannean gospel, it was a third part of the angels.

him of his divine form, he had not as yet lost the El, but still possessed creative power. He let himself down, therefore, with his apostate companions, into chaos, and here laid the foundations of this new empire; with his angels he created man, and gave him a body formed out of the earth.* To animate this being, he meant to give him a portion of his own spirit, but he was unable to carry the work to its completion; therefore he had recourse to the supreme God, beseeching him to have pity on his own image, and binding himself to share with him in the possession of man. He promised that, by the race proceeding from man, the places of those angels should be made good who had fallen from God in heaven.† So the supreme God took pity on this image, and communicated to it a portion of his own spirit, and so man became a living soul. But now, when Adam and Eve, who had been created with him, became radiant with splendour, in virtue of the divine life that had been communicated to them, Satanael, seized with envy, resolved to defeat the destination of mankind to enter into those vacant places of the higher spiritual world. For this purpose he seduced Eve, intending by intercourse with her to bring forth a posterity which should overpower and extinguish the posterity of Adam. Thus Cain was begotten, the representative of the evil principle in humanity; while Abel, the offspring of Adam and Eve, was the representative of the good principle. Satanael ruled in the world he had created. He had power to lead astray the majority of mankind, so that but few attained to their ultimate destination. It was he who represented himself to the Jews as the supreme God. He employed Moses as his instrument, giving him the law, which in fact the apostle Paul describes as begetting sin; he bestowed on Moses the power of working miracles. Many thousands were thus brought to ruin by the tyranny of Satanael. Then the good God had pity on the higher nature in humanity which had proceeded from himself and was akin to his own, in that humanity which had become so estranged from its desti-

* In the account of the creation of man (anthropogony), the above-mentioned apocryphal gospel differed entirely from the doctrine of the Bogomiles, as the latter is represented by Euthymius.

† We recognize here, something common to the Bogomiles with the church theology; for it was a very commonly-spread doctrine, that the elect among men were to take the place of the fallen angels.

nation by the crafty plots of Satanael. He determined to rescue men from the dominion of Satanael, and to deprive the latter of his power. For this purpose, in the 5500th year after the creation of the world, he caused to emanate from himself a spirit who was called the Son of God, Logos, the archangel Michael, exalted above all the angels, the angel of the great council, Isa. ix. 6, who was to overthrow the empire of Satanael and occupy his place. This being he sent down into the world in an ethereal body, which resembled an earthly body only in its outward appearance. He made use of Mary simply as a channel of introduction. She found the divine child already in its swaddling-clothes in the manger, without knowing how it came there. Of course, all that was sensible here, was merely in appearance. Satanael, who held Jesus to be nothing more than a man, and saw his kingdom among the Jews drawn into apostasy and endangered by him, plotted his death. But Jesus baffled him; in reality, he could not be affected by any sensuous sufferings. He who, though supposed to be dead, was exalted above all suffering, appeared on the third day in the full vigour of life; when, laying aside the veil of his seeming earthly body, he showed himself to Satanael in his true heavenly form. The latter was forced to acknowledge his supremacy, and, being deprived by Christ of his divine power, was obliged to give up the name El, and remain nothing but Satan.* Christ then ascended to the right hand of God, to be the second after him, and to occupy the place of

* It is manifest, from a comparison of Euthymius with himself, that he has represented the matter erroneously, when he says, earlier (p. 13, l. c.), the good God deprived Satanael of the Eli, in punishment for his cohabiting with Eve. What he himself says (p. 17) contradicts this, and is, without doubt, the correct statement, namely, that this was first brought about by Christ. So the accounts given by Euthymius generally, may not always be quite accurate. So it may not be an altogether faithful representation of the Bogomilian doctrine, when Euthymius (p. 17) says that, according to the same, Satanael is not only deprived by Christ of his El, but also thrust down to hell; for this contradicts what Euthymius himself observes (p. 27), where he says the Bogomiles taught that, as Satanael once had the temple of Jerusalem for his seat, so, after its destruction, he chose for this same purpose the temple of St. Sophia at Constantinople. But if so, then, though Satan was no longer Satanael, yet he still continued to exercise a certain power over the unredeemed. Euthymius perhaps failed here, as in other cases, to separate things which were altogether distinct in the doctrine of the Bogomiles.

the ruined Satanael.* When Christ was now removed from the earth, and taken up into heaven, God caused a second power, the Holy Ghost, to emanate from himself, who took the place of the now risen and exalted Christ, by his influences on individual souls and the community of the faithful.† It may be noticed as a characteristic peculiarity, that the Holy Spirit was represented by the Bogomiles under the form of a beardless youth, doubtless a symbol of his all-renovating power. They regarded it as the final end of all things, that when Christ and the Holy Ghost should have finished their whole work, all the consequences of the apostasy from God would be removed, and the redeemed souls would attain to their final destination. Then God would receive back into himself those powers which had emanated from him, and all things would return to their original unity.‡ Accordingly, the Bogomilian

* Euthymius doubtless falls into the mistake again, of not sufficiently separating things which were distinct, when he attributes to the Bogomiles the doctrine that Christ, after his ascension to heaven, relinquished his independent existence, and again sunk back into the one essence of the Father. *Εἶτα εἰσελθεῖν, ὅθεν ἐξῆλθε, καὶ ἀναλυθῆναι πάλιν εἰς τὸν πατέρα*, p. 17. In fact, the two assertions contradict each other, that Christ, at his exaltation to the right hand of God, assumed a rank next to the Father, and at the same time sunk back into the essence of God, from which he had emanated, One of these statements evidently excludes the other. The only way to clear up the contradiction is, to suppose that what is here represented as taking place at the same moment, is really distributed into different moments, the sitting at the right hand of God taking place directly after Christ's resurrection and ascension to heaven, while his return into the essence of God was not to take place till after the completion of the whole work of redemption, and the total destruction of Satanael's kingdom.

† Euthymius may possibly be under a mistake from the same cause, namely from failing to distinguish different moments, when he represents it as the doctrine of the Bogomiles, that the Son of God and the Holy Spirit had both emanated from God at the same time. Vide s. 3. That God *τριπρόσωπος ἀπὸ τοῦ πεντακισχιλίστου πεντακοσίστου ἔτους*, namely, since the birth of Christ; see s. 23. *τὸν πατέρα μὲν ὡς γέγοντα βαθυγένειον, τὸν δὲ υἱὸν ὡς ὑψηλότερον ἄνδρα, τὸ δὲ πνεῦμα τὸ ἅγιον ὡς λειοπρόσωπον νεανίαν.*

‡ *Τὸν υἱὸν καὶ τὸ πνεῦμα τὸ ἅγιον εἰς τὸν πατέρα πάλιν, ἀφ' οὗ προῆλθον, ἀναλυθῆναι καὶ τριπρόσωπον αὐτὸν ἀπὸ τοῦ πεντακισχιλίστου ἔτους ἄχρι καὶ τριάκοντα καὶ τριῶν ἔτων χρηματίσαντα πάλιν γενέσθαι μονοπρόσωπον.* Here, again, it is easy to see that Euthymius has confounded things different in kind; for it cannot be a correct representation of the Bogomilian doctrine with regard to Christ to say that, after finishing his work on earth he sunk back into the divine essence; still less can it be so with regard

view of the Trinity is most nearly akin to the Sabellian ; and from this point of view they might say, conforming to the faith of the church, that they believed in the Father, Son, and Holy Ghost.*

They rejected the church baptism, as a mere baptism with water, following here the anti-judaizing Gnostics ; and as the apocryphal gospel of John faithfully represents on this point the doctrine of the Bogomiles, there can be no doubt that they looked upon John the Baptist as a servant of the Jewish God Satanael, and the water-baptism, therefore, which proceeded from him as opposed to Christian baptism. The only Christian baptism was a baptism of the Spirit, to be imparted simply by calling upon the Holy Ghost, with the laying on of hands. There were two modes of initiation into their sect : after the individual who wished to be received into their community had first prepared himself for it by the confession of sins, fasting, and prayer, he was introduced into their assembly, when the presiding officer laid the gospel of John on his head, and they invoked upon him the Holy Ghost, and repeated the Lord's prayer. A season of probation was then assigned to him, during which he must lead a life of the strictest abstinence. If men and women bore testimony that he had faithfully observed this season of probation, he was once more introduced into their assembly, placed with his face towards the east, and the gospel of John again laid on his head. The men and women of the assembly again touched his head with their hands, and sung together a hymn of thanksgiving that he had proved himself worthy to become a member of their community.

As they rejected outward baptism, so they seem also to have rejected altogether the outward celebration of the Lord's supper ; † probably understanding the Lord's supper spiritually

to the Holy Spirit, whose agency was to begin at the very point of time when Christ ascended to heaven. We are perfectly warranted, therefore, to represent the theory otherwise, so as to make it consistent with itself.

* Euthym. s. 2: Τὰς τρεῖς ταύτας κλήσεις τῷ πατρὶ προσάπτουσι καὶ ἀνθρωποπρόσωπον τοῦτων ὑπολαμβάνουσι, παρ' ἑκατέραν μηνίγγα ἀκτῖνα ἐκλάμποντα, τὴν μὲν υἱοῦ, τὴν δὲ πνεύματος.

† If we find among those Catharists, who in various respects were related to the Bogomiles in their doctrines, something like an outward

and symbolically of the communion with Christ, as the bread of life that came down from heaven; to which also they applied the petition for our daily bread in the Lord's prayer, as signifying a participation in the new fellowship of life, founded by Christ; and by this petition the original unity of the spiritual world—in virtue of which all called upon God as their common father, but which had been broken up by Satanael—was restored. The Lord's prayer was the symbol of this unity restored.* We should notice, in this connection, that the Bogomiles, consistently with their Docetism, could recognize no other than a spiritual communion with Christ. The sacrifice of the mass, according to the dominant church, they interpreted as an offering to evil spirits residing within the church.

From what has been said, it is manifest into what opposition with the dominant church the Bogomiles would be driven by their mystical element. They contended against the worship of the Virgin Mary, of the saints, and of images. The true *θεοτοκός*, said they, is the soul of the real believer, of the Bogomile, which carries the Logos in itself; and while it leads others to the divine life, produces that life out of itself. In the

celebration of the Lord's supper, yet we cannot with safety argue back from this circumstance to the tenets held by the latter, for there were still many points in which the two sects differed from each other.

* We must endeavour, as far as the case admits of it, to make out the real opinion of the Bogomiles, from the obscure account by Euthymius, compared with a passage in the apocryphal gospel of John. Euthymius's words are: "Ἄρτον τῆς κοινωνίας ὀνομάζουσι τὴν προσευχὴν τοῦ πατρὸς ἡμῶν, τὸν ἄρτον γὰρ φησὶ τὸν ἐπιούσιον, ποτήριον δὲ κοινωνίας ὁμοίως τὴν λεγομένην ἐν τῷ εὐαγγελίῳ διαθήκην, τοῦτο γὰρ φησὶ τὸ ποτήριον ἢ καινὴ διαθήκη μυστικὸν δὲ δεῖπνον τὴν ἀμφοτέρων τούτων μετέληψιν. He says himself, that Bogomiles, when asked in what sense they understood these words, replied that they did not know themselves; whether it was that the individuals of whom he inquired belonged to the more ignorant class, or that they did not wish to disclose the esoteric sense of the doctrine. From the apocryphal gospel, the words of Christ belong here: *Quia ego sum panis vitæ descendens de septimo cælo et qui manducant carnem meam et bibunt sanguinem meum, isti filii Dei vocabuntur.* And to the question, what it meant to eat his flesh and drink his blood, Christ answers, *Ante ruinam diaboli cum omni militia sua a gloria patris in oratione orando sic glorificabant patrem in orationibus dicendo: pater noster, qui es in cælis, et ita omnia cantica eorum ascendebant ante sedem patris. Et cum cecidissent, postea non possunt glorificare Deum in oratione ista.*

Iconoclasts, they recognized kindred spirits. It was only the patriarchs and emperors of this party whom they regarded as Christians. The image worshippers, on the other hand, they called idolaters. They honoured especially Constantine Copronymus, a fact easily explained from popular rumours concerning him. But this circumstance affords grounds for important conclusions with regard to the origin of this sect. We find evidence here, that this sect had sprung up neither in a foreign country, nor at this particular point of time; else, how could they have known so much about this emperor, or how should they concern themselves about him one way or the other?

When, however, the representatives of the Catholic church appealed to miracles wrought by the relics of saints, it never occurred to the uncritical minds of the Bogomiles to call these miracles in question. They resorted to another mode of confutation. As it was their doctrine that every man is attended by a good or evil spirit; they said, the evil spirits connected with those advocates of error in their lifetime, wrought these miracles after their death, with a view to seduce the simple and lead them to worship the unholy as holy. Nor could they tolerate that reverence from the cross which was permitted even by Iconoclasts. This we might infer, indeed, from their views of Christ's passion. And when men told them of the power of the cross over the demoniacal world, they either replied that evil spirits hailed the symbol with joy, as typifying the instrument which they would have employed for the death of the Redeemer, or that they only practised dissimulation in order to lead men into error. The churches they scorned, as seats of evil spirits; for the Most High, who has heaven for his habitation, dwells not in temples made with hands. According to their own principles, they might, for the purpose of escaping persecution, pretend to join in the church worship. They looked upon it all as the work of evil spirits; and then they supposed a certain dominion over the world was allowed by the Father to Satanael, until the termination of the seventh æon (the seven thousandth year). The Bogomiles, like one class of the Euchites, noticed by us in the preceding periods, believed they ought occasionally to enter into some agreement with Satanael and his powers, so long as his empire still sub-

sisted. They appealed, in proof of this, to the words ascribed to Christ in one of their apocryphal gospels: "Reverence not the evil spirits for the purpose of obtaining anything from them, but that they may not injure you."* "Therefore," said they, "we are bound to reverence the evil spirits dwelling in the temples, lest they be wrought against those who omit to do so, and involve them in ruin (namely, by stirring up persecutions against them)."[†] They cited also another apocryphal saying of Christ: "Save yourselves with craft,"[‡] the maxim by which they sought to justify the various arts of dissimulation resorted to by them for the salvation of their lives. The words of Christ, in Matt. xxiii. 3, they explained as follows: "We should affect to do everything which the hierarchy prescribes; but not really follow their works." The fact also that Christ spoke to the multitude in parables, was one to which they gave their own peculiar interpretation.

Since the Bogomiles regarded the body as a prison-house, wherein the soul, which is related to God, has been confined, death appeared to them the means of release for such faithful ones as had become partakers of the divine life here below. "These," said they, "do not die, but they are transported over, as it were, in a sleep, putting off this earthly coil of the flesh without pain, and putting on the imperishable and divine clothing of Christ."[§]

As it regards the canon of the Bogomiles, Euthymius reports that they rejected the historical books of the Old Testament, and received the Psalms and prophets, and all the writings of the New Testament; but whether he has correctly represented their opinion on this point may well be doubted. Certainly they did not attribute to the other books the same authority as to the gospel of John, which in fact always appears as the

* Τιμᾶτε τὰ δαιμόνια, οὐχ' ἵνα ὠφελήθητε παρ' αὐτῶν, ἀλλ' ἵνα μὴ βλάψωσιν ὑμᾶς.

† The relationship of the Euchites and Bogomiles with the so-called Syrian devil-worshippers, Jezidaners, can hardly be mistaken; whether it was that the latter sprung from the former, or that both had a common origin.

‡ Τρόπῳ σωθῆτε.

§ Τοὺς τοιούτους μὴ ἀποθνήσκειν, ἀλλὰ μεβίστασθαι, κατὰπερ ἐν ὕπνῳ, τὸ πηλινὸν τούτῳ καὶ σαρκινὸν περιβόλαιον ἀπόνως ἐκδυομένους καὶ τὴν ἄφθαρτον καὶ θεϊκὴν τοῦ Χριστοῦ στολὴν ἐνδύομένους.

principal book with them. Very probably they might, in conversation with the friends of the church, to whose views they wished to accommodate themselves, have appealed to these Scriptures, where they thought they could interpret them in favour of their own doctrines, without allowing them on that account the authority of a rule of faith. It may be, too, that, like the Manichæans, they distinguished in these Scriptures parts that were true from others which they considered false. It is plain, that they could not, according to their doctrine, receive the whole, unless they allowed themselves in the most forced interpretations. It would be even so with the gospel of John, which so directly contradicts their representation of John the Baptist; and it may justly be questioned, whether their gospel was really the genuine gospel of John. The history of Christ's infancy they explained as a symbolical clothing of higher facts, or as a myth. They asserted also, that the gospels had been falsified by the church teaching; and they named Chrysostom * in particular, as one of these falsifiers. Owing to the theosophic bent, they were set against all scientific culture. The grammarians, with whom they would have nothing to do, were to them the same as the scribes of the New Testament, whom they put in one class with the Pharisees.

While the Bogomiles looked upon the dominant church as a church apostate from Christ, and ruled by Satanael, they represented themselves as the true Christians, citizens of Christ.†

As they supposed they might resort to every species of accommodation and dissimulation, as they generally succeeded by their rigid and monk-like life in commanding a certain degree of respect, and, before they began to divulge their peculiar doctrine, cited from the Bible a great deal that was applicable to Christian life and opposed to the doctrines of the church, they found no difficulty in getting hearers among the laity and clergy in Constantinople, and in the towns and villages of the country.‡ Adherents of this sect were to be

* Vide s. 21.

† Χριστιανοί, Χριστοπολίται. See the little tract of Euthymius against the Bogomiles, published in J. Tollii Itinerar. Italic. p. 112: *χριστιανούς ἑαυτοὺς ὀνομάζοντες οἱ μισόχριστοι* and *χριστοπολίτας*, p. 122.

‡ In Anathem. xii. (J. Tollii insignia Itinerar. Ital.), it is said, that

found in the greatest families connected with the court.* The emperor, Alexius Comnenus, on hearing of this, resolved to spare no pains in ferreting out the doctrines which were held so secretly, and in bringing their heads and teachers to punishment. Information having been obtained, by torture, from certain members of the sect who had been arrested, that an old man, known as a monk, and named Basilius, stood at their head, the emperor caused him to be brought, in a covert manner—as it was pretended—to the palace, where he treated him with great honour, invited him to sit at his own table, and professed a wish to be instructed in their doctrines, with a view of joining the sect. Basilius, though at first mistrustful, at length fell into the trap, and set forth all the doctrines of the sect to the emperor, his imagined disciple; but behind a curtain sat one charged with the business of taking down minutes of the whole conversation. When the thing had been carried far enough, the curtain was raised, and, to his consternation, Basilius saw the notables of the spiritual and secular orders, the former, under the presidency of the patriarch Nicholas, assembled before him. The copy of what he had said to the emperor was shown him, and he confessed that these were his doctrines, and declared himself ready to suffer the loss of all things for them. Upon this, he was led away to prison, and many of all ranks were arrested as Bogomiles. Of these, some confessed that they had joined the sect, others denied it. To separate the innocent from the guilty, the emperor resorted to a trick, in which very probably he may have been outwitted by many of his victims. He directed that all who had been arrested should appear on a public place, before a grand and numerous assembly, in the centre of which sat the emperor himself, elevated on a throne. Two great fires were kindled; by one of these was erected a cross, by the other none. The emperor now declared that, as he was unable to distinguish the innocent from the guilty, he would cause them all to be put to

those who joined the Bogomiles from the lay order, did not hesitate to partake of the church communion, and that the priests, who had secretly joined this sect, continued to celebrate mass as before, p. 122: Euthymius says, in the tract on the sect of the Bogomiles, published by J. Tolle, p. 112: 'Εν πάση πολει καὶ χώρα καὶ ἐπαρχία ἐπιπολάζει τὰ νῦν.

* 'Ενεβόθουνε τὸ κακὸν καὶ εἰς οἰκίας μεγίστας καὶ πολλοῦ πλήθους ἤψατο τὸ δεινόν. Anna Comnena Alexias, Lib. XV. f. 387, ed. Venet.

death. Those who wished to die as believers should pass to the fire with the cross, and pay their homage to the latter. A division having thus been made among the condemned, the emperor directed both parties to be conducted back to their places. Those whom by this test he supposed he had ascertained to be orthodox, he dismissed with a few words of admonition; the others he sent back to their prison. The emperor and the patriarch expended a great deal of labour in gradually instructing these latter, which, however, did not succeed except with a few, who were therefore pardoned. The rest were condemned to perpetual imprisonment. Basilius alone, who would listen to no persuasions, being the leader of the sect, was condemned to die at the stake (A.D. 1119). It is said that he proceeded to the place of his execution at first in a triumphant confidence of faith, singing the thirtieth psalm;* but when he came nearer, and beheld the curling volume of flames, he could no longer suppress the feelings of nature. Claspings together his hands, he held them before his face; but in the end he held fast to his confession.

The Bogomiles were already too widely spread in the Greek empire, to be rooted out by such measures as these. Among laymen, ecclesiastics, and monks, many might continue to go on and propagate themselves in secret. The writings of a venerated monk, Constantinos Chrysomalos, are said to have contributed greatly to the diffusion of these doctrines, but it was not till after his death that attention was directed to the threatening danger from this quarter; and a synod assembled under the emperor Emanuel Comnenus, in 1140, at Constantinople, pronounced sentence of condemnation on him and his followers. Yet it may be questioned, whether the name Bogomiles was not here employed for the purpose of stigmatizing as heretics those who had no connection with them, but attacked from some other point of view the prevailing worldliness of the dominant church; persons who had nothing in common with the Bogomiles, except a certain fervent mystical tendency, which was not to be satisfied by the common church theology. Perhaps a certain connection may have subsisted

* It may be doubted whether his words, and the lively hope therein expressed, have not been understood too grossly, when he is represented as expecting that the flames would not hurt him, but angels would snatch him from the midst of them.

between this mystical tendency and the Bogomiles; yet we have no good reason for supposing that this tendency itself had sprung out of Bogomilian principles.

It is manifest, from what has been communicated to us from the writings of this monk, that there existed a secret society, which was supposed to have the power of imparting a higher spiritual life than could be attained by the sacraments of the church, and in connection with which there were many rites and ceremonies of initiation. The transformation of man by a new divine life, making him capable of the intuition of divine things, was set over against a dead Scripture learning, and the mechanical forms of the church; an antagonism constantly occurring under various forms, in the mystical theology of all ages. We find great use made here of the ideas of St. Paul, a circumstance not wont to distinguish the mysticism of the Greek church, which possessed less affinity with the Pauline spirit; neither do any indications of it appear among the Bogomiles. Since the subjective element, the progressive development of a divine life beginning with a change of nature (*ἀναστοιχειώσις*), was considered the main thing, without which no man could be in the true sense a Christian, this led to the rejection of infant baptism. "Those who had been baptized in childhood, without previous instruction, were not Christian, it was said, though they were called so. Though they might live in the practice of many virtues, yet these were nothing better than single good actions among the heathen." It was understood by this party that the characteristic thing in the condition of a Christian, did not consist in insulated virtues, but in the main direction and bent of the whole life. "All singing and praying, all participation in the outward rites of the church, all study of the Scriptures, is dead and nugatory, separate from this inward change, whereby man is delivered from the power of the evil principle. Though one should know every word of Scripture by heart, and in the pride of that knowledge which puffeth up, pretend to teach others, still, it profits nothing, unless accompanied with this higher instruction in spiritual things; this transformation, this new shaping of the condition of the soul.*

* *Εἰ μὴ κατηχηθέντες αὐθις ἀναστοιχειώσις (ὅτι μεταστοιχειώσις) τύχῃσι καὶ μορφώσις τῶν ψυχικῶν αὐτῶν ἕξιν.* °

In his polemical attacks on holiness of works, Chrysomalos follows the apostle Paul. "To the obtaining of that grace of inward transformation," says he, "man's own doings can contribute nothing; it is obtained by faith alone. It is by this alone that a man becomes capable of any real virtue. Though such as have not attained to that higher position may insist upon it that they bring forth good actions for God's sake, still, they really act from a sort of instinct rather than from rational consciousness."* We here meet with the doctrine which often occurs among the mystics, that all purely human agency must sink to nothing, and God alone produce the entire work in the soul which he fills. Hence, all which the man does himself appears tainted with sin. "It profits Christians nothing to live in the practice of all the virtues, and to shun all the vices, though they do it for God's sake, if they have not obtained a spiritual feeling of the indwelling of the Divine Spirit, producing within them by nature and without constraint that which is good, and making them quite invincible to the temptations of evil.† He who is not conscious that God himself accomplishes his own will in him through Christ, labours in vain.‡ Those true Christians who have arrived at the maturity of Christian manhood stand no longer under the law; by virtue of God's agency within them, they fulfil the law to the utmost."

Contempt for all civil authority was one charge brought against the followers of this doctrine; but a seditious turn could hardly be united with a mysticism of this sort. The charge probably grew out of the spiritual self-conceit with which they affected to look down upon all the high dignities in the secular and ecclesiastical orders as belonging to a much lower sphere of spiritual understanding than their own. Perhaps they only inveighed against those extravagant titles which, after the oriental fashion, were in those times bestowed on the great, and declared them to be idolatrous and unworthy

* Δαίμοσι γὰρ ἰοικέται τοὺς ταῦτα κατορθοῦντας καὶ ὁμολογοῦντας μὲν διὰ τῶν Θεῶν κατορθοῦν, ἀλόγως δὲ ταῦτα ποιοῦντας.

† εἰ μὴ νοεράν αἰσθήσῃ τοῦ Θεοῦ πνεύματος δέχονται, φυσικῶς τε καὶ ἀνωδύνως ἐν αὐτοῖς ἐνεργοῦντος τὸ ἀγαθὸν καὶ ἀκινήτους πάντη ποιοῦντος πρὸς τὸ κακόν.

‡ ὅστις οὐ νοερᾶ αἰσθήσει νοερῶς αἰσθάνεται ποιοῦντος ἐν αὐτῷ τοῦ Θεοῦ τὸ θέλημα αὐτοῦ διὰ Ἰησοῦ Χριστοῦ, εἰς κενὸν κοπιᾷ.

of Christians. So at least we might gather from many of their expressions.*

They are said to have maintained that no man is a Christian who is not conscious of having within him two souls, one subject to sin, and one superior to all evil, sinless.† If this is a correct representation of their doctrine, it must be understood in the sense that, first, by the new birth, man has a soul without sin; and, by means of it, is in a condition to resist the soul burdened with sin. We can hardly suppose, however, that on the basis of this mysticism, such an antagonism between the godlike and ungodlike principles would be considered as having been first called forth by Christianity. More probably the doctrine, in this particular aspect of it, has not been correctly represented; and perhaps the opinion was this, that, from the very first, there are in every man two souls; a higher nature, which St. Paul designates as the inner man,—a nature superior to all contact with sin, but which, through the predominance of the ungodly principle, is prevented from passing into action: this is first made active by becoming united with its original source through the redemption, is thus freed from the yoke of the foreign nature; and so the man attains to freedom from sin. With the laying on of hands, unction, and various mystic rites, the consecration was consummated by the spiritual superiors of the society on those who longed after this *ἀναστοιχειώσεις*.‡

That reaction against the corrupt church proceeding from a spirit of reform, which it was ever found impossible to suppress, was doubtless propagated in a secret manner; and in the beginning of the reign of the emperor Emmanuel Comnenus. a certain monk appears at Constantinople, by the name of Niphon, who stood at the head of this more widely spread

* ὅσα πρὸς ἀτιμίαν ἀρχῆς ἀπάσης καὶ περὶ Φρόνησιν (ἐγράφησαν) τῷ Σατανᾷ προσκυνοῦν ἀποφλυαρήσαντι τοὺς ὅποιω δὴ ποτε ἄρχοντι τιμὴν ἢ προσκύνησιν ἀπονέμοντας.

† ὡς πᾶς χριστιανὸς δύο ἔχει ψυχὰς, τὴν μὲν αὐτῶν ἀναμάρτητον, τὴν δὲ ἁμαρτητικὴν.

‡ As it is called, διὰ τῆς τελειουργήσεως, καὶ τῆς τῶν χειρῶν ἐπιθέσεως τῶν ἐπιστημόνων οἰκονόμων τῆς μυστικῆς ταύτης χάριτος—διὰ τῆς εἰσαγομένης κατηχήσεώς τε καὶ μυσίας μύρων τε κρίσεως ἀναστοιχειωθέντες. The presidents ἐπισκευάσται. See the excerpts from the acts of that Synod, in Leonis Allatii de ecclesiæ occidentalis atque orientalis perpetua consensione. Colon. 1648. Lib. II. c. xi. p. 646.

movement. By his pious and strict life he had won universal reverence. He is described as being a man unversed in the ancient literature, but so much the more familiar with the Holy Scriptures.* That one who was governed by a predominant practical and biblical tendency, who from his childhood had occupied himself chiefly with the study of the Bible, should allow himself to be carried away by the doctrines of the Bogomiles, is in itself hardly probable; but it is more easy to conceive that such an one might be impelled, by his opposition to a dead and formal orthodoxy, and the hierarchy connected therewith, to a mystical theology. We must also admit it to be possible, that a school for the propagation of Bogomilian ideas had formed itself among the monks, and that Niphon may from the first have been educated in this school. This Niphon seems to have exercised an extensive influence. He maintained a close correspondence, particularly with the bishops of Cappadocia, and there was a peculiar spirit which seems to have animated these bishops. Some clue to the matter was got hold of, and, under the presidency of the patriarch Michael of Constantinople, several *endemic synods* were held there in opposition to these tendencies.† Men were disposed to trace in them the diffusion of Bogomilian principles; but the only thing that could point to such principles is what was said of this party, that they did not regard the God of the Old Testament as the true God.‡ But considering the slight respect which was paid to truth among the Greeks of this period, we may doubt whether such a declaration is altogether worthy of credit; and even if it were, such a doctrine may just as well be traced to other sources as to the sect of the Bogomiles. When those bishops were accused of rebaptizing such as had received infant baptism, on the ground that they regarded this transaction as invalid, having been performed by vicious men; this certainly is inconsistent with

* The historian of this time, John Cinnamos, says of him: παιδείας μὲν τῆς ἐγκυκλίου καὶ μαθημάτων οὐδὲ μέχρι πείρας ἔλθων, τοῖς ἰεροῖς δὲ λογίοις ἐκ παιδῶν ἑαυτὸν ἐπιδοῦς. Lib. II. p. 64, ed. Meineke.

† See the excerpts from the acts in the above cited work of Leo Allatius, Lib. II. c. xii. p. 671.

‡ Thus, in the copy of the transactions with Niphon, it is said of him, that he pronounced the anathema on the God of the Hebrews. Leo Allat. l. c. p. 682; and John Cinnamos says of him, l. c. p. 64: τὸν Ἑβραίων ἀπροσεπιόντο θεόν.

the principles of the Bogomiles, who allowed no validity to water-baptism in any way. Various other circumstances indicate a tendency which was seeking to restore primitive Christianity, striving to oppose superstition. Without needing to resort to the hypothesis of any Bogomilian element, we may on *this ground* alone satisfactorily account for it, that they would sanction no other adoration of the cross, except that which was paid to a cross bearing the inscription "Jesus Christ, the Son of God," consequently referring immediately to *Christ himself*; that they declared those miracles said to be wrought by the bare *sign of the cross* a work of the devil, and that they steadfastly opposed all images of saints. The monk Niphon was condemned to perpetual confinement in a monastery; but the patriarch Cosmas, Michael's successor, restored him to liberty, and he stood high in the estimation of that prelate, insomuch that he made him his confidant and table-companion. The friendship of such a man would lead us to judge favourably of Niphon's character; for all the accounts agree in describing Cosmas as a person of great piety and worth, of a strict life, self-denying love, and a benevolence which gave away everything, to the very raiment which he wore. Similarity of disposition, and a like dissatisfaction with the corrupt state of the Greek church, may perhaps have made Cosmas the friend and protector of Niphon. The only fault that could be found with him was, that his excessive simplicity made him the dupe of that monk.* But men could easily avail themselves of the orthodox zeal of the emperor Manuel Comnenus to ruin the monk Niphon; and perhaps the whole was a mere plot contrived for the downfall of Cosmas, who, as patriarch of Constantinople, would be to many an object of envy.† As Cosmas would not abandon Niphon, after the latter had been condemned by an *endemic synod*, but persisted in declaring that he was a holy man, the sentence of deposition was passed upon himself. He

* As John Cinnamos says of him: ἀνθρωπος, πλὴν τοῦ ἀφελοῦς ὡς οἶμαι τὰ ἄλλα πάντα πιστευτικῶς ἀγαθός.

† According to the account of the historian Nicetas Choniates, Lib. II. p. 106, ed. Bekker, the connection with Niphon was only a pretext; and what had prejudiced the emperor against him was, a suspicion of political intrigue, which the enemies of Cosmas had contrived to excite against him—a suspicion of intrigue with his brother Isancios.

signified to the synod his abhorrence of the corrupt church, saying that he was like Lot in the midst of Sodom.*

We have already mentioned that the Greek emperor John Zimisces had assigned Philippolis, a city of Thrace, as a seat for the Paulicians. This city was, in the twelfth century, a place of rendezvous for sects hostile to the church, till the emperor Alexius Comnenus was led by his wars into these districts. He disputed for several days in succession, from morning to evening, with the leaders of these sects, and they brought against him many passages from the Bible. A large number declared themselves convinced, and submitted to baptism; they might calculate on receiving marks of distinction from the emperor. Such as would not be converted he summoned to Constantinople, and gave them a 'dwelling-place in the neighbourhood of the imperial palace. He there continued to labour with them. As a rival to the heretical colony at Philippolis, he founded a city called after himself, Alexiopolis, in which converted Paulicians and other converted heretics were to settle.† But it certainly admits of a doubt whether many of these conversions were sincere, and whether the emperor did not, in spite of himself, contribute, by the founding of such a pretended orthodox colony; to the spread of the heresies in those very regions, whereby the way was prepared for the transportation of these tendencies into the Western church.

We saw, in fact, already, during the preceding period, how the sects that originated in the East had, amidst the confusions of these centuries, diffused themselves into almost every part of Europe before they were discovered. By the manifestations just described as occurring in the Oriental church itself, and by the lively intercourse between the East and the West, this diffusion of heretical opinions would be still more promoted. There were a set of men who, in the periods of which we speak, went under the name of *Catharists*. The sects which may be traced up to them appear scattered in different countries, under different names, which may serve, partly, to indicate their original extraction, partly to mark the ways of their latter dispersion, and partly to hint the causes which procured them an introduction. The most current name is

* Leo Allat. l. c. p. 686.

† See book xiv. of Alexias, near the close.

that of Catharists, which indicates their Greek origin, and which they applied to themselves because, as they pretended, they were the only true church. This name should not be confounded with *Gazzari*—which indicates an origin from *Gazzarei*, the peninsula of Crimea—as the name *Bulgari*, *Bugri*, indicates an origin from Bulgaria; *Slavoni*, an origin from the midst of the Slavic tribes; *Publicani*, perhaps a mutilation of the name Paulicians, indicates their spread in South France and in Provence, which was called *Novempopulonia*, with allusion to the nickname publicans, *paterenes*, indicating their connection with that insurrection against the clergy which was provoked by the Hildebrandian principle of reformation itself.* The name *Tesserants*, weavers, marks the spread of these sects among the weavers in South France, a class of artisans which in all times seem peculiarly disposed to be carried away by mystical tendencies. Many things in the doctrines and institutions of these sects carry so fresh an Oriental impress, akin to the Gnostic, on their very front, that the fact is to be explained only on the supposition of their fresh Oriental origin. At the same time it is evident, from what we find reported concerning their doctrines, that they did not rest content with the bare mechanical tradition of what had come to them from the East; but that the principles and doctrines received from abroad were elaborated and wrought over by them in an independent manner. Men who were capable of this must have been found among them, like Johannes de Lugio, for example, who, in the thirteenth century, is mentioned as an original teacher and author among them. The scientific spirit of the Western church exercised a power over this originally Oriental tendency, by the influence of which many peculiar modifications were introduced. Notwithstanding the agreement in certain general principles, the Dualism, and the doctrine of emanation, we still discover oppositions and diversities in their doctrine; where the question arises, whether they are to be accounted for from an original difference in the Oriental systems at bottom, from which these sects were derived, or from modifications of a peculiar kind, introduced by the later Occidental schools.

As it regards the most important difference, the question admits of a very easy decision. This main difference consists

* See Vol. VII. p. 127.

in the following particulars:—That one party among the Catharists started from an absolute Dualism, assumed the existence of two ground-principles, one opposed to the other, and of two creations corresponding to these principles; while the other party admitted only a relative Dualism, and regarded the evil principle as a spirit fallen from God, who became the author of a revolution in the universe.* In the last party we cannot fail to perceive a relationship with the Bogomiles, and their derivation from this sect—a derivation confirmed also by the apocryphal gospel under the name of the apostle John, which their bishop Nazarius brought along with him from Bulgaria. Now the matter admits, it is true, of being so represented as if the derivation from the Bogomiles was common to the entire sect of Catharists, and as if this view of Dualism was the original one amongst them, while absolute Dualism is to be considered as a later modification introduced in the West. But notwithstanding all the affinity between the systems of the Catharists which sprung out of these two tendencies, still, that fundamental difference is too essential a one, it appears in a form too clearly bearing the impress of its primitive Oriental origin to favour the supposition of such an origin. We might with greater propriety trace many of the affinities in the two classes of Catharists to a later commingling of the sects together, brought about by their common hostility to the dominant church-system, and to the monistic principle of dogmatism, in which union their doctrines mutually exerted an influence upon, or passed over into, each other. We may feel ourselves warranted, therefore, to assume the existence of another sect from the East, different from the Euchites or the Bogomiles, as the source whence to derive the other principal party of the Catharists. In this case we might first, with contemporary writers, consider Manichæanism as this source, from which the above-mentioned more abrupt Dualistic tendency is to be derived; but the marks of Manichæanism are by no means indisputable.† Their doctrine concerning creation, concerning

* This is not only apparent from the work, which may be regarded as being the most important source of our knowledge of the doctrines of the Catharists, the work of the dominican Moneta, *Adversus Catharos et Valdenses*, published by Ricchini, but all the accounts agree in fixing upon it as the main distinction.

† The abbot Ecbert of Schönau cites, indeed, in his first sermon

the origin of man, concerning Christ, is by no means a Manichæan one, and we are led much more naturally to think of the Paulicians and other sects related to Gnosticism; though they distinguished themselves from the Paulicians, who, consistent to their original tendency, admitted no opposition of esoterics and exoterics within their body, by the fact that such a distinction actually existed among them.

To speak first of the party which started from an absolute Dualism. They supposed two principles, then, subsisting from all eternity, and two creations corresponding to these principles. The good God they regarded as the primal source of a world of imperishable existence related to himself; while they were of the opinion that all perishable existence, as being null, untrue, could only be traced and referred to the evil principle. With this they united, however, the doctrine of a correspondence of the lower and higher worlds. Everything existing here below, as visible and perishable, they taught, has its correspondent, though under a form adapted to that higher region of existence in the upper world; a view which reminds one of the Manichæan doctrine of the pure elements, but which not less finds its analogy in the Gnostic opposition between an original and a representative world. In

against the Catharists (Bibl. patr. Lugd. T. XXIII. f. 602), a fact which undoubtedly, if well established, would go far to indicate an origin from Manichæanism, namely, that this party celebrated the Manichæan festival *Bema* (see vol. i. sect. ii.); but that the unknown festival of the Catharists was the Manichæan *Bema* is a mere conjecture, refuted by what the writer himself states: for his informers, who had once been members of the Catharist sect, told him that this festival, which they called *Malilosa*, took place in autumn. But Mani's festival of the martyrs happened in the month of March. Again, Ecbert cites, it is true (l. c. f. 103), the declarations of Catharists themselves to prove their derivation from Manichæanism, to wit, that they accused Augustin of divulging their mysteries. But neither from this circumstance could so much be inferred. The Catharists, it is probable, had simply allowed themselves to fall into the mistake of their adversaries, when they looked upon the Manichæans, combated by Augustin, as their forerunners. Besides, in pointing out the age and originality of their doctrines, they might be very willing to adopt the view which assigned them such predecessors; and because the hypothesis pleased them, they might notice only the resembling points, and overlook the rest; and as they rejected the church, and all her authorities, they would be likely to rejoice at any chance of criminating Augustin as a traitor to the truth.

defence of their Dualism, they appealed to many passages of the Old and New Testaments; all that is said concerning the opposition between flesh and spirit, world and God, being interpreted by them in this sense. They insisted especially on the passage in John viii. 44, where, as they would have it, the devil is described as one who had never, from the first, stood in truth and goodness.* Like their opponents, who regarded Aristotle as the irrefragable authority for all rational truth, they too appealed confidently to his authority as favouring their views.† In the processes of nature, these Dualists did not believe it was possible to recognize the self-revealing God; its unconsciously working, destructive powers, making no difference between good and evil, seemed to them—and this was a point on which both classes of Catharists agreed—to bear testimony of an opposite principle. “How can the fire,” said they, “or the water which destroys the dwellings of the poor, of the holy, proceed from the good creation?”‡ The evil principle, Satan, they taught, seized with envy of the good, had exalted himself to the heaven of the latter, and led a third part of the heavenly souls§ into apostasy. Those heavenly souls they regarded as middle beings between a higher and a lower class. To each soul corresponds a related spirit, of which it is the organ, by which it suffers itself to be determined and guided; and each soul also had an organ subordinate to it, a heavenly body, wholly dependent on it, as itself was on that higher spirit. || Those spirits were the same as the angels. We may, perhaps, recognize here the *Syzygia* of the Gnostical doctrine. By their apostasy, these heavenly souls forsook the harmonious connection with that higher world. Hurlled with Satan from heaven, they were separated from the spirits belonging with them, and from those heavenly bodies which remained behind in heaven, and Satan succeeded to bind them fast in the corporeal world. So it is those fallen heavenly beings, which in their banishment are ever reappearing under the veil of some human body, in which

* In veritate non stetit, ergo non fuit in ea, ergo fuit semper spiritus mendax, ergo non fuit a bono creatore.

† They appealed to the Aristotelian maxim: Contrariorum contraria sunt principia. See Moneta, Lib. I. c. iv. s. 1, f. 44.

‡ L. c. f. 124 et 126.

§ To which they applied Rev. xii. 4.

|| Moneta, f. 105.

Satan has confined them. This, probably, has some connection with their doctrine of metempsychosis.* On this basis they combated creatianism. They referred to Sirach xviii. 1,† and particularly to the word “*simul*,” to prove that no new creations took place, and to Deut. xviii. 1; for—so they argued—if the people to whom Moses spake was the same with those who should hear Christ, then they were not a new people who were born in the time of Christ, but the same that lived already in the time of Moses, which also serves to prove that they held to a metempsychosis.‡ But among these heavenly souls they distinguished different classes, according as they belonged to different princes of heaven. The highest class was composed of those who were described as the spiritual Israel, at whose head stood the highest spirit living in the intuition of God, the ἀνὴρ ὁρῶν τὸν Θεόν as they understood the name Israel, the ὁρατικὸν, θεραπευτικὸν γένος. In that name they believed they found a proof of their doctrine; for it certainly referred to such as had seen God. But when, and where? Here below it cannot have been; therefore, in an earlier, heavenly existence. The Alexandrian, Gnostic ideas are too plain here to be mistaken.§ Matth. xv. 24 might thus be reconciled, they supposed, with John x. 16. It was especially to save that highest race of souls, the lost sheep of the house of the heavenly prince Israel, that Christ came; but at the same time to redeem also the souls belonging to other princes of heaven, which are the heathen. || These Catharists are said to have denied the freedom of the will: they made it an argument against the doctrine of a free will, determining itself by choice between good and evil, that no such will can be sup-

* This doctrine of the fallen souls might already be found among them at the time of the abbot Bernard, when little was known about the secret doctrines of the sect; for this is reported by the abbot Ecbert of Schönau: Novam et hactenus inauditam insaniam de iis compertam habemus, quam manifeste confessi sunt quidam eorum, cum examinarentur a clero in civitate Colonia. Dicebant enim, animas humanas non aliud esse, nisi illos apostatas spiritus, qui in principio mundi de regno cœlorum ejecti sunt. L. c. f. 602.

† According to the Vulgate: Quod Deus creavit omnia simul.

‡ Moneta, f. 72.

§ See the passage of Philo, Vol. I. p. 48, and the passage cited from the prayer of Joseph, p. 61.

|| Moneta, Lib. I. c. iv. s. 1. f. 44, seqq.

posed in the case of God. They appealed to the text in the ninth chapter of the epistle to the Romans, employed by others also, in proof of the doctrine of unconditional predestination.* It may be questioned, however, whether their opinion on this point has been correctly represented; for it does not exactly accord with their doctrine of the fall, of repentance, and of the purifying process of fallen souls. Perhaps they only objected to the doctrine which derived evil generally from the creaturely free will, as they were obliged to do by their Dualism; or to a Theodicy, which referred everything in the progressive development of the earthly life to the free will; while they, on the contrary, believed it must proceed from an original difference of nature, or from the conditions of an earlier existence.† They regarded Christ as the highest spirit after God, yet differing from him in essence, and subordinate to him; as they supposed, again, a like subordination between the Son of God and the Holy Ghost. They referred here to those passages of the Old and New Testament which had always been quoted in support of the doctrine of subordination; among others, to Proverbs, viii. 22, where they had the reading ἐκτίσατο, not ἐκτίησατο,‡ which again indicates their connection with the older Oriental sects. But if it were inferred from this use of the passages cited, that they considered Christ as merely a creature, this would certainly be wrong, since they were undoubtedly in favour of a doctrine of emanation. The Son of God, then, was sent down—so they taught—to overthrow the kingdom of Satan, to release the fallen souls from the bonds of the corporeal world and of Satan, and to bring them back to the community of heaven, to restore them to their original condition. The Son of God united himself to a spirit, soul, and body, in that heavenly world, and so descended, with the annunciation of the angel, into Mary, and again went forth from her.§ Herself, however, they regarded as a higher spirit, who appeared on earth for the purpose of becoming the instrument or channel for the appearance of the Son of God in humanity. They taught, like the Valentinians, that the heavenly body of Christ was,

* L. c. Lib. I. c. v. f. 64.

† As in the texts concerning Jacob and Esau, in the Epistle to the Romans, ch. ix.

‡ Moneta, f. 235.

§ Moneta, f. 5 et 232: per aurem intravit, and per aurem exivit.

by a special act of divine power, so modified that it seemed like an earthly one, and could be perceived by the senses. Yet they must explain all sensuous acts and affections, to which Christ subjected himself, as unreal, mere appearances. They maintained, likewise, that all the accounts of the miracles wrought by Christ were to be understood only in a spiritual sense, as symbols of the spiritual miracles wrought by him.* In proof that these accounts should be so understood, they appealed to the words of St. Paul: "The letter killeth, the spirit maketh alive." In a dialogue, written probably in the thirteenth century, between a member of this party and an orthodox man,† the Catharist, in reply to the question, Why do you work no such miracles as are adduced in the Catholic church, in testimony of its truth and divinity? says, "We perform a miracle when we convert a man to God; then we drive out from him the evil spirits, his sins. We exorcise the poisonous serpents when we drive out these evil spirits; we speak in other tongues when we set before our hearers truths never before heard. A covering is still over your souls who believe that Christ and the apostles wrought visible miracles. The letter killeth, the spirit maketh alive. Spiritually we must understand it, and not suppose that Christ called the soul of Lazarus back again to his body, but that he awakened the sinner, one spiritually dead, and passed already, through sin, to putrefaction, by converting him to the faith. So will it happen to you, also, if you will but understand, spiritually, all that is said of the miracles of Christ and of the apostles."‡ The denial of miracles did by no means proceed, in the case of this party of Catharists, from an original tendency of opposition to the supernatural principle; but it grew out of their spiritual Dualism, which led them to regard the sensible world as a work of the evil principle; to disparage, uniformly, the things of sense, and to set little value on deliverance from bodily evils. A kind of miracle, quite different from corporeal ones, must be wrought by the representative of the good principle. It belonged to an organ of the evil principle, from which this sensible world proceeds, to perform visible miracles.

* L. c. Lib I. c. ix. f. 99 et 222.

† *Disputatio inter Catholicum et Paterinum*, published by Martene and Durand, in the *Thesaur. nov. anecdotor.* T. V

‡ L. c. f. 1750.

We may rather look upon these Catharists as the representatives of an ultra supernaturalistic direction, when, instead of contemplating phenomena in the natural connection of cause and effect, we find them representing the powers of the higher world of spirits as everywhere coming into play. While they made the Virgin Mary an angel, sent down to the world on a particular errand,* a party among them declared the apostle John, whom they especially revered, to be an angel, who, as Christ said of him that he should remain till he came, was still upon earth.† Yet that spiritualizing Docetism might pass over to a rationalistic tendency, setting lightly by or wholly discarding the historical Christ. We find, accordingly, a party among the Albigenses in South France, who taught that the Christ who was born in the earthly and visible Bethlehem, and crucified in Jerusalem, belonged to the evil principle, and they did not hesitate to blaspheme him. The Christ of the good principle they would recognize only as an ideal one, a Christ that never ate nor drank, that never took a real body, that existed in this world only in a spiritual manner, in the person of the apostle Paul;‡ so that the apostle Paul was here exalted above the historical Christ, as his doctrine also was recognized as the genuine spiritual Christianity, the historical appearance of the ideal Christ having first taken place in him. We will not deny that, as this account proceeds from the fiercest enemies of the sect, we might be tempted to consider the whole report as a manufactured conclusion, or a pure invention of heresy-hating spite; but as a representation like this is entirely foreign from the spirit of these times, it is not very probable that a story of this sort would be invented. We find mentioned, again, a party of Catharists under the name *Ordibarii*, who taught that a Trinity first began to exist at the birth of Christ. The man Jesus became Son of God by his reception of the Word announced to him, and he was the son of Mary, not in the corporeal but in a spiritual

* According to Martene and Durand, T. V. f. 1722, Mary was an archangel.

† The opinion of the Slaves, according to Moneta, l. c. f. 233

‡ See the Chronicle of Bal Cernay, belonging to the thirteenth century, in Du Chesne, *Scriptores Hist. Franc.* T. V. c. ii.: Bonus enim Christus nunquam comedit vel bibit nec veram carnem assumsit nec unquam fuit in hoc mundo nisi spiritualiter in corpore Pauli.

sense, being born of her in a spiritual manner, by the annunciation of the Word;* and when, by the preaching of Jesus, others were attracted, the Holy Ghost began to exist.†

We shall say nothing in this place on the doctrine of baptism as held by this party, as it is our intention to omit, here, what both parties have in common with each other. We simply notice that, according to their doctrine, repentance must have respect not only to all single sins, but first of all to that common sin of the souls that fell from God, which preceded their existence in time. This is the consciousness of the apostasy from God, of the inward estrangement from him, and pain on account of this inner aversion to God, as constituting the only foundation of true penitence. As the Gnostics supposed that, by virtue of the new birth, every soul is reunited to its corresponding male half, the higher spirit of the *pleroma*, so the Catharists party of which we are speaking supposed, in this case, a restoration of the relation between the soul and its corresponding *spirit*, from which it had been separated by the apostasy. From this spirit they distinguished the Paraclete, promised by Christ, the *Consolator*, into fellowship with whom one should enter by the spiritual baptism, which they called therefore, the *consolamentum*. They held that there were many such higher spirits, ministering to the vigour of the higher life. But from all these they distinguished the Holy Spirit, pre-eminently so to be called, as being exalted above all others, and whom they designated as the *Spiritus principalis*. They held to a threefold judgment; first, the expulsion of the apostate souls from heaven; second that which began with the appearance of Christ; third and last, when Christ shall raise his redeemed to that higher condition which is designed for them.‡ This they regarded as the final consummation, when the souls shall be reunited with the spirits and with the higher organs they had left behind them in heaven.§ This was their resurrection.

As we find among this party of Catharists many elements of

* Quod primo tunc Deus pater habuerit filium, quando Jesus suscepit verbum, et dicunt ipsum esse filium virginis, non carnaliter ex ea, sed spiritualiter per prædicationem ejus genitum.

† Quando prædicavit Jesus et attraxit alios, tunc primo accessit tertia persona. Rainer contra Waldenses, c. vi.; Bibl. patr. Ludg. T. XXV. f. 266.

‡ F. 381.

§ F. 353.

Alexandrian Judaism, so it is possible that these Catharists were, from the first, disposed to admit the authority of the Old Testament, according to the distinction laid down by the Alexandrian Jews, of a literal and a spiritual sense. It is possible, also, that it was not until a later period they were led, in disputing with their adversaries, whom they wished to confute on their own grounds, to admit the authority of the prophets.* Another noticeable fact, which also intimates their connection with a Jewish theology, is, that they set great value upon the apocryphal book called the Ascension of Isaiah (*ἀνάβασις τοῦ Ἡσαΐα*) where, in fact, may be found the germs of many of their doctrines; as, for example, the doctrine concerning the heavenly garment of souls, the doctrine of Docetism.†

The second class of Catharists did not hold to an evil principle existing from eternity; but, on the contrary, derived all evil and imperfection from the apostasy of a higher spirit. He, they taught, had been made ruler, by the Almighty, over many other spirits, as the case is represented in the unjust steward of the parable, the symbol, in their opinion, of this higher fact. Seized with the desire of casting off the shackles of dependence in which he was held, and of setting up an independent kingdom of his own, he persuaded the stars of heaven, that is, many of the angels, a third part of them, to apostatize with him, promising them that they should be relieved from the heavy burdens and cares of their allotted employments.‡ Out of chaos, which God created as the first

* As Moneta says (f. 218), they rejected, at first, all but Isaiah.

† L. c. f. 218: Cujus—of Isaiah—dicunt esse quendam libellum, in quo habetur, quod spiritus Esaiaë raptus a corpore usque ad septimum cælum ductus est, in quo vidit et audivit quædam arcana, quibus vehementissime inuitantur, with which we may compare the anathema attributed to the Bogomiles (in J. Tolle, *Insigne, &c.*, p. 116): *Κατὰ τὴν βδίλυραν ψευδοπίγραφον παρ' αὐτοῖς τοῦ Ἡσαΐα ὄρασιν.* Dr. Engelhardt has already noticed the fact that the Bogomiles made use of that book, and has referred to the above-quoted passage in J. Tolle. The old Latin version of the book, published by Engelhardt, proves also, that it was known and circulated in the Middle Ages. See Engelhardt's *Kirchen-geschichtliche Abhandlungen*, s. 27. Erlangen, 1832.

‡ Vide Moneta, f. 111. The hundred measures in the parable of the unjust steward, they explained as referring to the obligation of repeating a hundred prayers, which the Catharists of those times may have

matter of all being, he proposed to construct a world of his own. Matter, as these Catharists taught,* proceeded from God; the form given to it, from Satan. They allowed, therefore, that God created all things visible potentially.† Adam was an angel, sent by the Almighty to watch Satan, and observe how he proceeded in forming his world. Satan got possession of him, and bound him within the prison of an earthly body. Thus they interpreted the parable of the good Samaritan, Luke x., which also symbolically represented their whole theory. Adam, veiled in a shining robe of light, leaves the heavenly Jerusalem; he is attacked, while on his way, by the fallen spirits in league with Satan, who rob him of his light and throw him into the dark prison of the body. These spirits invested themselves with the robe of light which they took away from man. They are the sun, moon, and stars; for these Catharists, following an ancient notion, looked upon these bodies as intelligences, and intelligences which had fallen. The sidereal kingdom was, to them, a kingdom of evil. So, too, following another ancient notion, they recognized in the sun the male, and in the moon the female principle.‡ Regarding all marriage as defiling, they attributed to sun and moon a monthly cohabitation, which they considered the cause of the dew that falls to the earth. Their method of explaining the parable in Matt. xviii. furnishes another illustration of their circle of ideas. The servant with whom God reckons is, according to their interpretation, Satan; his wife, wisdom; his sons, the angels subjected to and in league with him. God, moved with compassion towards him, did not deprive him of those higher powers of intelligence (wisdom) with which he had been furnished, his subjects and his goods: so also the Bogomiles taught, that God allowed Satanael to retain his creative power; for Satan had promised that if God would have patience with him, and let him alone, he would produce men enough to make good the whole number of apostate angels. God therefore gave him liberty for six days, to make whatever he pleased of the corporeal world he had formed; which means, the six thousand years of the world, over which Satan presides.

understood literally, though it was originally meant otherwise,—works done to the glory of God being thereby understood.

* L. c. f. 118.

† L. c. f. 220.

‡ Moneta, f. 110.

Eve was another angel, whom Satan succeeded to confine in an earthly body, to prepare the way for an intercourse of sexes, whereby the spirit might be brought into entire dependence on sense, and made subservient to his own purposes. From the intercourse of Satan with Eve, Cain was born.* The sin of Adam, the eating of the forbidden fruit, consisted in his allowing himself to be enticed into sexual intercourse with Eve; and thus Abel was born.

From the one heavenly soul of Adam, then, all other souls were supposed to be derived. *Traducianism*, at that time indeed generally rejected, was by them defended as the only correct theory; and *creatianism* combated. "If one soul," said they, "is not begotten of another, as the body of the body, the soul belongs not to the human kind, and so Christ is not a redeemer of souls.† When it is said of Christ, that he came to save the lost, it could not be understood of new-created souls, which were not yet lost. The doctrine of original sin could not be maintained; it could not be said, that all men sinned in Adam, if they sprang from him only by bodily descent."‡ In opposition to creatianism, they asserted "that, according to this view, a new divine creation must take place in the case of every illegitimate offspring of adultery.§ From the same it would follow that God, knowingly and purposely, creates more souls for destruction than for salvation. The great diversity of mental endowments, some being wise, others foolish, would, according to that doctrine, have to be ascribed immediately to God. Would God distribute his gifts so differently?|| Why should finely-created souls be immersed in these impure vessels, by which they themselves become impure? for, to this contact it would be necessary, according to creatianism, to ascribe the communication of depravity."¶

According to the doctrine of this party, Satan is the God of the Old Testament. It was he who revealed himself to Abraham, and caused the flood to destroy mankind. God interfered

* According to Moneta's account, these Catharists supposed that by Satan's succeeding to seduce Adam to cohabit with Eve, Cain was born; yet it would seem probable, when we look at the doctrine of the Bogomiles, that this was a misconception. This is confirmed, moreover, by the language of the Catharists themselves, when Moneta says: "Ut dicunt volentes hoc habere per illud Joann. i. 30, quod Cain ex maligno erat."

† Moneta, f. 129.

‡ L. c. f. 132.

§ Ibid.

|| L. c. f. 135.

¶ L. c. f. 288.

for the preservation of the race; from God proceeded the salvation of Noah. Moses and the prophets were, according to these Catharists, servants of Satan; yet they supposed, like the earlier Gnostics,* that the prophets were transported by a higher spirit, and sometimes consciously prophesied of Christ;† but they unquestionably spoke with consciousness, and understood themselves, when, under the impulse of evil spirits, they predicted war, pestilence, the captivity of the people.‡ Like Marcion, they sought to point out the opposition between the Old and New Testaments; and appealed especially to the opposition between the sermon on the mount and the Mosaic law. The Mosaic law forbade only perjury; the law of Christ, oaths generally. The Mosaic law threatened death to the guilty; the law of Christ forbade the shedding even of innocent blood. They said of the members of the dominant church, that they had sunk back upon the foundation of the Mosaic law.§ The Catharists, on the other hand, were for restoring the strict observance of the law of Christ. They condemned war, and punishment by death, and would allow no other testimony than a simple yea or nay.

With the prophets they rejected, also, John the Baptist, of whom they said that he was sent by Satan to prevent the baptism of Christ, to set up the baptism of water, in opposition to the spiritual baptism of Christ; but they owned, as in the case of the prophets, that he had sometimes, under the influence of the Holy Spirit, borne witness of Christ, without being conscious of what he said. They traced the contradictory language of the Baptist, therefore, to the circumstance that he spoke, sometimes, under the impulse of the Holy Spirit, and sometimes by his own.|| In proof of the correctness of their views of John the Baptist, they deemed it sufficient to ask, How else came it about, that John did not personally attach himself to Christ, and become his disciple?¶ They appealed to Christ's own words, as bearing witness that John (Matt. xi. 6) took offence at his labours.**

* See what is said respecting their notion of inspiration, in my Church History, Vol. I. sect. 2.

† Si aliquando aliquid boni dixerunt de Christo, coacti a Spiritu Sancto dixerunt. L. c. f. 111.

‡ L. c. f. 218.

§ Vos Romani idem dicitis. Moneta, f. 199.

|| L. c. f. 228.

¶ L. c. f. 230.

** L. c. f. 229.

In the system of subordination on the subject of the Trinity, they agreed with the other party; except with the difference that they had no scruples in calling Christ and the Holy Spirit God; also, concerning the person of Christ they taught, like the Bogomiles, that he brought with him from the celestial regions a higher ethereal body. Mary contributed nothing to the production of his human body; but only served as the channel through which he passed; as proof of that higher character of the body of Christ, they referred to his walking upon the water, to his passing through the multitude without any one being able to lay hold on him. In proof of the assertion that Mary was not really the mother of Jesus, they referred to the circumstance that Jesus called her woman, John ii. 3; and to the texts Matt. xii. 17; Luke xi. 27. They maintained, that the communication of the Holy Spirit took place only after the resurrection of Christ; but in this, the Catharists also of the other party agreed with them.*

The doctrine of the resurrection of the body they could not admit, for the body having sprung from the evil principle, appeared to them the prison of the soul; and they were obliged to give another interpretation to the passages of the New Testament referring to this point.† The text Phil. iii. 20 was referred to the church, as being the body of humility; for they understood the word here as denoting this ethical conception.‡ They represented, as the final end of all things, the destruction of the creation produced by Satan, and the return of all things to the original chaos. To this chaos, wicked spirits and men should be banished;§ this they regarded as hell.|| Then the stars shall be deprived of that light which they had stolen, and the redeemed souls should resume it, since this was the original raiment of the heavenly man.

A point in which both parties of the Catharists agreed, was opposition to the traditional and externalizing element of the

* L. c. f. 271.

† A well-known individual of this party, in the thirteenth century, Desiderius, explained all such passages as relating to the spiritual animation of the body as the organ of the sanctified soul: Quod spiritus sanctus vivificat corpus exterius, quod ab Apostolo dicitur mortale et mortuum ad serviendum rationi, non ad resurgendum. L. c. f. 357.

‡ L. c. f. 362.

§ L. c. f. 382.

|| We see the analogy here with the Manichæan doctrine.

dominant church. They were for separating the primitive apostolical truth from later additions; but deeply entangled as they were in their own singular notions, it was quite beyond their power to find any correct criterion by which to effect such a separation. Thus they contended not only against infant baptism, with arguments always readily presenting themselves against the institution as apostolical, but also against water-baptism generally, which Catharists of the second class looked upon as a rite introduced by Satan, through his organ John the Baptist, to the end that he might suppress the true baptism of the Spirit. When it was objected to them that Christ had suffered himself to be baptized by John, they replied: it had been done on the part of Christ by way of accommodation to a prevailing custom, and to avoid giving offence;* others said, in order that, by occasion of it, the hitherto hidden Christ might be revealed. The church, moreover, had for a time used water-baptism, because men were accustomed to that rite,† or because it would invite them, by this symbol of water-baptism, to the baptism of the spirit. They affirmed, that in the sacred Scriptures, baptism was a term often employed to express repentance or the preaching of the divine word.‡ The baptism of the Spirit, true baptism, should be performed by the imposition of hands in connection with prayer, which they designated by the term *consolamentum*. In evidence of the power and significance of this act, they referred to the apostles Peter and John, who were sent to Samaria for the purpose of communicating, by the imposition of hands, the Holy Ghost to those who had received water-baptism. When it was objected to them that it was in contradiction with their own principles, according to which all sensible things proceeded from the evil principle, to attribute so much importance to a sensible act, and represent it as the instrument of an inward operation of divine grace, they replied: The Holy Spirit is communicated, not by the visible but by an invisible hand; the invisible hand is contained under the visible.

* Moneta, f. 279.

† L. c. f. 291.

‡ Moneta, f. 288. And the Catharist in the above-cited dialogue in Martene and Durand (Tom. V. f. 1726), says: *Concedo, quod baptizaba Jesus et discipuli ejus in aqua, id est in prædicatione et spiritu sancto, sed non in aqua corporali.* And he then appeals to the fact, that John himself had alluded to the baptism of the Holy Spirit (John vii.): *ex his collige, quod per aquam intelligitur prædicatio spiritus sancti.*

St. Paul distinguishes an inner and an outer man; and so likewise there must be an inner and an outer hand.* This consolamentum seems to have been twofold; the rite of initiation, whereby one was received into the communion of the sect, adopted among the number of the believers (*credentes*); and that whereby he was received into the circle of the fully initiated, into the number of the *perfects*. This latter act was doubtless so called by them in the stricter sense, since it was only by means of it that the new birth and the impartation of the Holy Spirit were effected; as we may gather from the fact that the perfects were distinguished by the epithet *Consolati*.† Answering to this consolamentum, in the stricter sense, was the rite likewise so called, whereby he who had hitherto belonged only to the number of the *credentes* was, in the hour of death, received into the more limited circle of the sect, so as to be in a condition to enter, immediately after death, into the heavenly world.‡ The consolamentum of adoption into the number of believers was performed, according to a description of the rite drawn up in the twelfth century, after the following manner: “They assembled in a room, dark and closed in on all sides, but illuminated by a large number of lights affixed to the walls. Then the new candidate was placed in the centre, where the presiding officer of the sect laid a book (probably the gospel of St. John) on his head, and gave him the imposition of hands, at the same time reciting the Lord’s prayer.”§ As it regards the Lord’s supper, they were of opinion that Christ, with the words “This is,” pointed to his own body; or they explained the words of the institution in a symbolical sense. “This is,” was equivalent to—this signifies. They referred, in proof, to those paragraphs of the New Testament where the thing itself is mentioned in place of that which it may serve to represent; as, for example, in 1 Corinth. x. 4.|| They referred to the fact, that Christ himself says: “My flesh profiteth nothing; my words are

* Moneta, f. 126.

† Perfecti, qui consolati vocantur in Lombardia. Rainer contra Catharos, c. vi. Bibl. patr. Ludg. T. XXV. f. 266.

‡ Rainer. c. vi. f. 272.

§ Ecbert, sermon. contra Catharos, c. viii. f. 615. Here, too, it is impossible to mistake the affinity of the Catharists with the Bogomiles.

|| Moneta, f. 296.

spirit and life," that is, are to be spiritually understood. His *words*, by which he communicates *himself*, are his true body. Moreover, they said, in partaking of the means of nourishment, in communion with Christ as his members, the bread and wine were converted into the body and blood of the Lord. This was to be represented in their love-feasts, at which the presiding officer of the sect imparted the blessing by reciting the Lord's prayer.* They combated the doctrine of the sacrament of penance, of the necessity of a satisfaction for sins committed after baptism; according to their own doctrine, the consolamentum was a substitute for all other penance. When the members of the sect came to the bishop for the purpose of confessing their sins, they prostrated themselves before him, after the manner of the East. Each person said, "Have mercy upon us, O Lord! I never must die, but inherit thee on high, that I may have a good end." The bishop then bestowed on each, with the imposition of his hands, the consolamentum, thrice repeating, "And that thou mayest be a good man."† Many Catharists appealed to the fact that Christ, the great High Priest, enjoined no works of satisfaction on the woman caught in adultery.‡ Contending against the externalization of religion in the dominant church, they said: God dwells not in houses made with hands. It is not the house of stone, but the good man and the good woman, and the community of such, that constitute the church.§ Prayer in the church is no better than prayer in the closet. It is better to clothe the poor than to decorate the walls of a church. Yet we are not to suppose that this sect held on in the true direction to an interior vital Christianity. On the contrary, they united with their mystical element another species of

* Ecbert, l. c. f. 602: Se solos in mensis suis corpus Domini facere dicunt, verba sancta dicunt esse panem, quia cibus animæ sunt verba evangelica. Ebrardus contra Catharos, c. viii. Bibl. patr. Ludg. T. XXIV. f. 1547 See the dialogue betwixt the Catholic and the Catharist in Martene and Durand, T. V. f. 1730.

† The German words, "Und werdest ein gut Mann," are so given by Rainer, c. vi. Bibl. patr. Ludg. T. XXV. f. 272.

‡ Moneta, f. 306: Quidam garruli objiciunt dicentes, quod Christus summus sacerdos et pontifex secundum ordinem Melchisedek nulla satisfactionis opera injunxit mulieri in adulterio deprehensæ.

§ Ebrard. Bibl. patr. Ludg. T. XXIV. f. 1537. Rainer, c. v. Bibl. patr. Ludg. T. XXV. f. 266.

externalization. To the *consolamentum* was ascribed a magical efficacy — the fellowship of heaven was made as dependent upon it as it was in the dominant church on the priestly acts. We recognize the same tendency of the times in those cases where laymen of the Catholic church eagerly put on, at the very hour of death, the monkish cowl, in order to make sure of salvation, and in those cases where others were eager to obtain, in the very hour of death, the *consolamentum* by the Catharists, and to be buried among them.* If men elsewhere sought to make themselves more certain of the forgiveness of their sins by bequests to the clergy and to the churches, bequests to the communities of the Catharists were made on precisely the same principle.† We may believe, therefore, that as the former suffered themselves to be misled, by trusting in the outward things of the church, into a false security, so the same effect was produced on the latter by reliance on the *consolamentum* in the hour of death.‡ In fact, the externalization in the Catharistic doctrine of the *consolamentum*, which stood them in place of all the sacraments, may have been pushed farther than it was in the church-doctrine of the sacraments. While the necessity of the *consolamentum* was unconditionally asserted, for instance, by the Catharists, the

* In the Chronicle of Puy Lorent, the following anecdote is related. Bishop William of Alby, in South France, received a message in the night from Pierre de Beres, a knight notorious for robbery, and other crimes, who was a kinsman of his, requesting him to come to his castle, some hours distant, the knight being very sick and near to death, and wishing to speak with him on certain affairs before he left the world. When the business was finished for which the bishop had been summoned, the latter asked the knight where he wished to be buried, naming several consecrated places. The knight replied, he needed give himself no trouble about that matter, for he had already made up his mind on the subject. When the bishop pressed him further, he declared that it was his wish to be conveyed to a community of the Catharists. The bishop now assured him that this would not be allowed; but, said the knight, "Better give yourself no trouble about it; for if I could not do otherwise, I would crawl to them on all fours." See the *Chronicon magistri Gulielmi de Podio Laurentii*, c. iii. in Du Chesne, *Scriptores Hist. Franc.* T. V. f. 668.

† See the words of Moneta, f. 393: *Nonne tua synagoga legata recipit mortuorum? Nonne aliquoties cum aliquis moritur, recepta manuum impositione a te, legat ecclesiæ tuæ tantum vel tantum et alii totidem aut plus vel minus.* Which is also confirmed by other evidence.

‡ As is shown in the above-stated example.

votum might serve, on the contrary, according to the doctrines of the church, as a substitute for the sacraments, when they were unavoidably omitted.* In the case of such a sect, limited to itself, this principle of externalization, having once gained a foothold, would be the more likely to be pushed to an extreme, as those manifold tendencies of the religious spirit in different directions were here absent, which, acting as a check on each other, preserved the Catholic church from too stiff a uniformity and too downright one-sidedness. It is quite evident, also, how little capable the Catharists were of understanding their own straightness and confinement, by comparing it with the manifold diversity which distinguished the Catholic church of this period, when we find them proceeding on the principle, that there is but one uniform way of salvation which was to be found in their own sect alone, and hence regarding that manifoldness as a reproach to the church, as a proof that she did not know the one only way of salvation.†

Although the Catharists, in opposing the authority of church tradition,‡ the hierarchy, the worship of saints and images,

* Hence Moneta, from this starting-point, combats, in connection with the church mode of thinking, the externalization which was carried to such extremes. See Moneta, f. 304, col. 2, where he cites against it the example of the thief on the cross.

† Quod unica est via ad salvationem secundum Christum, Joann. xiv. 6, cum ergo via ecclesiæ Romanæ multiplex sit, alia enim est via monachorum, alia clericorum regularium, et alia clericorum aliorum, alia fratrum prædicatorum, alia minorum, ecclesia Romana non est de via salutis. Moneta, Lib. V. c. i. f. 396. So likewise Ebrard. contra Catharos, c. xix: Dicunt unam tantum salutis esse viam, ad quam ipsi præ cæteris devenerunt. Nesciunt enim, quod plures viæ ad unam deveniunt viam. Bibl. patr. Ludg. T. XXIV. f. 1563.

‡ Rainer says, particularly, they did not receive the writings of the fathers; but the four evangelists having written, as they said, in a saving way, because they had written upon the heart, these they received—sed tantum moraliter exponunt; an expression too general, correctly applying only to those spiritualizing Catharists. The other four, say they, had written unprofitably, because they only wrote on the lifeless parchment, namely, Jerome, Augustin, Ambrose, and Bernard. The writings of these fathers they despised, and said of them that they were damned. It deserves to be noticed, however, that they are said to have made an exception here of St. Bernard, eo quod ipse conversus ab errore suo sit et salvatus. What may have led them to make this exception? The kindred mystic element, or the way in which he protected the Catharists from the bloodthirsty rage of the populace? See Rainer, contra Catharos, c. vi.; Bibl. patr. T. XXV. f. 267.

the value of pilgrimages, are precursors of the Protestant principle, still it is evident, from what has been said, that in other respects they are the farthest possible removed from it; and among these may be mentioned the great importance they gave to works as a condition of salvation. Their opponents combated them on this very point, and set up faith and grace in opposition to the merit of works. It is from this point of view that Eberhard of Schönau, in attacking them, gives the priority to faith; because, where there is faith, works will invariably follow of themselves, while with works faith is not necessarily given.*

From the principles of the Catharists proceeded a rigidly ascetic system of morality, to the observance of which, however, none but the perfects were obligated. Those principles required abstinence from meat, eggs, and cheese; from everything that is the product of the sexual intercourse of animals. Perhaps only by a part it was held unlawful to kill animals, or certain species of animals.† This probably stood in some connection with their doctrine of metempsychosis. They condemned marriage, so far as connected with sexual intercourse; for, according to the doctrine of one party of the Catharists, this is the very means whereby the heavenly souls are continually confined anew in the corporeal world, while, according to the other, this intercourse was the capital sin into which Adam suffered himself to be beguiled by the evil spirit. The words of Christ, "What God has joined together let no man put asunder," the more Dualistic Catharists explained of the spiritual marriage, between Christ and the church;‡ and accordingly they permitted only a spiritual marriage without sexual intercourse.

To the Esoterics and Exoterics in this sect correspond the two classes of *perfecti*, or *boni homines*, who were called Catharists in the stricter sense, and the *credentes*. According to the testimony of Rainerio Sacconi, who wrote against the

* In operibus solummodo confidentes, fidem prætermittunt, cum fides operibus potius sit præponenda. He appeals to the fact that to the question (John vi.): Quid faciemus, ut operemur opera Dei? Christ answered, Hoc est opus Dei, ut credatis in eum, quem misit ille. Ecce, quod credere hic appellat operari, omnis enim, qui credit, operatur, sed non omnis, qui operatur, credit, fides enim præcellit operibus. Ebrard. contra Catharos, c. xvi. Bibl. patr. Ludg. T. XXIV. f. 1558.

† Rainer, c. vi. T. XXV. f. 268.

‡ Moneta, f. 341.

Catharists in the first half of the thirteenth century, there were countless numbers, in all quarters of the world, who belonged to the second class; but only four thousand of both sexes belonging to the class of the "perfect." A numerical statement of this sort, relating to a sect that propagated itself in secret, is of course a matter of uncertainty; still, the statement becomes more probable when we are informed that he himself had been for seventeen years a member of the sect.* He refers, moreover, to a census repeatedly taken among themselves; and notwithstanding opposite parties existed among them, such a census might very well have been made; for, in spite of these differences, they still mutually acknowledged one another as belonging to the same community.† The *perfects* stood in the same kind of relation to the entire sect as the *elect* in the sect of the Manichæans. They represented themselves as being persons who in utter poverty, amidst constant persecutions, wandering about without a settled home, truly copied the life of Christ and of the apostles, while the walk of the worldly-minded clergy was in direct contradiction to that life.‡ From the number of these perfects, as in the case of the Manichæans, were chosen the presiding officers of the sect; first, a bishop; then under him a *filius major* and a *filius minor*; finally, a deacon.§ It deserves to be noticed, that several were destined from their childhood to the office of bishop, and educated for this purpose, who received for their food no other milk than the milk of almonds, and no flesh but fish, and who were obliged to observe the rigid diet of the perfects.|| But an opposition of this sort, so entirely at variance with the essence of the Christian life, could only be injurious in its influence on that life, so that the higher the requisitions made on the strict living of the *perfects*, the greater would be the disposition to overlook the failings of the *credentes*. Yet how shall we

* Rainer, f. 267.

† Omnes ecclesiæ Catharorum recipiunt se invicem, licet diversas habeant opiniones et contrarias. L. c. f. 271.

‡ See e. g. the letter of the provost Everwin of Steinfeld, giving a report to abbot Bernard of Clairvaux, of the Catharists, discovered in the region of Cologne, in the 3rd vol. of Mabillon's *Analecta*, in the octavo ed.

§ Rainer, f. 269.

|| Nutrientes cum lacte amygdalino et pecudis, in Rainer, f. 272, should read, without doubt, et non pecudis.

reconcile it with the above statement that, according to the testimony of the first opponents themselves, it was their blameless and strict mode of life that distinguished the Catharists generally; that they abstained from cursing and swearing, and a simple yea or nay was a substitute with them for the strongest attestations. It may be, that it was not till after the sect had become more widely spread, and acquired a proselyting spirit, that this opposition between the moral life of the perfects and of the believers became more prominent, and the standard of conduct required of the latter was lowered down. But it may be, too, that those who were no better than the great mass of the dominant church, did not belong to the believers among the Catharists, but to the Catechumens, the *auditores*; that the opponents of the Catharists, who noticed only the distinction between the perfects and the believers, failed duly to distinguish the Catechumens from the latter, and many things which might be true of the Catechumens came to be transferred to the believers.* And so it may have been these auditors, who put off the *consolamentum* which they were bound to receive, till the hour of death, in the expectation that they might then pass over, purified from all their sins, into the higher world. It is plain, at least from the report of the proceedings of the inquisition at Toulouse, † published by Philip of Limborch, which contains the trial of several men and women belonging to the sect of the Catharists, that such persons entered into an agreement ‡ with the presiding officer of the same, in virtue of which they were to be received into the sect by the *consolamentum*, that so being delivered from all their sins they might pass at once into paradise.§ This is explained to mean that they were then first

* The provost Everwin of Steinfeld, in the above-mentioned letter, distinguishes the following three classes: *Prius per manus impositionem de numero eorum, quos auditores vocant, recipiunt quemlibet inter credentes et sic licebit eum interesse orationibus eorum, usquedum satis probatum eum faciunt electum.*

† In the Appendix to his *Historia Inquisitionis*. Amstelodami, 1692.

‡ Called *La convenensa*.

§ In the above-mentioned protocol, f. 29: *Fecit pactum hæreticis, quod ipsi vocant la convenensa, quod peteret hæreticos, in infirmitate sua, ut reciperent eam et salvarent animam ipsius et si evaderet, quod servaret et teneret vitam et sectam ipsorum et observantias.* F. 111, the words of a leader of this sect: *Quod in ipso erat salvatio et si aliquis in fine suo reciperet ab ipso ordinationem, salvabatur, et ibat in paradisum.*

received into the sect.* The presiding officers of the Catharists were called to visit the sick, for the purpose of performing some rite upon them, whereby they were to be incorporated into the sect, and so made partakers of salvation; † that is, without doubt, to bestow on them the consolamentum. Cases occurred where persons who, in sickness, had been led by the fear of death to resolve on getting themselves received into the sect, and to whom the presiding officer had already been called for this purpose, fell back from their purpose on finding themselves getting better. ‡ It is true, Rainer so represents the matter as if those who were already believers would, when near their end, in order to secure salvation, make over all their property, and wholly devote themselves to the sect. § However this may be, we must conceive the matter in the sense of the Catharists, which was as follows: whether one belonged before his death to the class of Catechumens or of believers, it was only by resolving on and binding himself to that renunciation of the world which was required of the *perfects*, that he could hope to enter into the kingdom of heaven: for what the Manichæans said of their *elect*, the same was said by the Catharists of their *perfects*, that to belong to their number was a necessary transition-point to reunion with heaven. || Such began, therefore, even in their sickness, a strictly ascetic life. They must bind themselves to drink nothing but water, especially to abstain from milk, and not to allow any woman to come too near them. ¶ If one who had received the consolamentum, allowed

* The occurring expression: *hæreticari*, f. 22, the *convenensa pactum*, quod reciperetur in fine per eos ad sectam ipsorum.

† F. 20: Ut facerent aliquid, per quod salvaretur in ordine ipsorum.

‡ F. 15 to one called, ad hæreticandum quemdam infirmum, sed non fuit hæreticatus, quia invaluit, and other like cases.

§ *Credentibus ipsorum nullam dant spem salutis, nisi ad ipsorum sectam relictis omnibus convertantur et saltém in extremo vitæ articulo manus impositionem ab ipsis accipiant. Dicunt enim, omnia peccata per manus impositionem ab ipsis factam relaxari et spiritum sanctum infundi. Bibl. patr. Ludg. T. XXV. f. 272.*

|| Thus, in that protocol of the Inquisition at Toulouse (f. 152), it is said of a person who was for going over to the Catharists, that he betook himself to such an one, ut addisceret vitam et sectam dicti hæretici et quod volebat et proponebat esse et fieri hæreticus perfectus seu vestitus, sicut ille erat, qui vocant se bonos homines.

¶ Of such an one, f. 29: Quod non daret aliquem cibum cum pingue-

himself afterwards to eat anything forbidden, he must be comforted over again, which was the *reconsolatio*.* We recognize the gloomy ascetic spirit of downright Dualism,† the genuinely oriental spirit, reminding us of the self-annihilation of the Hindoo, in the case of those who, after having finally received the consolamentum, resigned themselves to death by starvation, which was called the *endura*, hoping thus to pass the more certainly to, or to secure a higher place in, the kingdom of light; or in other ways sought an imaginary martyrdom,‡ men and women taking their places together in a bath, and either opening each other's veins, or poisoning themselves with the juice of the wild cucumber.§ It is true, the fury with which the Catharists were persecuted in the thirteenth century may have contributed to promote among them this fanatical seeking after death; and we meet with examples which show that they inflicted death on themselves in these ways, to avoid falling victims to the inquisitions.||

dine nisi aquam ad bibendum; and f. 104, of a little daughter, who, as being hæreticata, had bound herself to drink no milk.

* L. c. f. 59: Iterum reconsolatus, quia peccaverat comedendo.

† Probably these things were done only by the Catharist who espoused the doctrine of absolute Dualism; the doctrines which occur in the protocol of the Inquisition at Toulouse, point throughout to *this* party.

‡ Ponere se in endura et facere bonum finem. In the above protocol, f. 138.

§ Such cases occurred in various forms in the Toulouse protocol: Of a woman, it is said: In sua ultima ægritudine compos mentis existens in sectam recepta fuit, consolamentum per impositionem manuum petens, et recipiens ab iisdem, et legatum ipsis fecit, et ipsamet persolvit iisdem, et sic recepta per hæreticos in abstinentia, quam ipsi vocant enduram, multis diebus perdurans sectam ipsorum servando, se fecit tanquam hæreticam more ipsorum adorari, mortemque corporalem sibi accelerans, sanguinem minuendo, balneum frequentando potumque letiferum ex succo cucumerum silvestrium, immisso in eo vitro fracto, quo frangerentur ejus viscera, in fine. L. c. f. 33. A juice prepared from the seeds of a wild gourd (wild cucumber) called by the ancients elaterium, used in certain quantities as a medicine, a cathartic, was in larger doses fatal: "Copiosius necat," says Pliny, Hist. Natur. Lib. XX. c. iii. The declaration so often occurring in the protocol of Toulouse serves to confirm what Rainer reports, though all he says is not to be regarded as literally true. He states that the Catharists left it at the option of the sick whether they would belong to the martyrs or to the confessors. He who chose the first was strangled; he who chose the second, was left to die of hunger. T. XXV. f. 272.

|| Instrumentum ferrerum, quod dicta Gulielma fecerat emi, cum quo

But still, there is not the least warrant for asserting that this sickly hatred of life, which has its ground in the whole Dualism and orientalism of this sect, was only and for the first time called forth by the persecutions.

The Catharists were zealous in disseminating their principles everywhere; they were careful to improve every favourable circumstance for this purpose, and seized upon every occurrence which could serve as means to it. Among the favourable circumstances belonged, especially, the contests between emperors and popes; the schisms between state and church, whereby the introduction and spread of their tenets were particularly favoured. This was the case, for example, during the disputes between the Hohenstaufen emperors and the popes, in Italy and the countries on the Rhine.* When a country was laid under the interdict, the dissatisfaction and the religious necessities of the laity gave them better opportunity than they usually enjoyed to enlarge their sect.† Humbert de Romanis, in exhorting the companions of his order to a more zealous discharge of their predicatorial duties, in a work already mentioned by us, could hold up for their imitation the example of the heretics, who at the peril of their lives travelled about from village to village and from house to house.‡ As merchants, they frequented fairs and markets, and converted the intercourse of trade into a means of finding opportunities and occasions for introducing their doctrines among the multitudes who flocked together at these places.§

perforaretur in latere subito, si venirent nuncii inquisitorum. In the above-mentioned protocol, f. 76

* Thus in the quarrel betwixt Alexander the Third and Frederic the First: see Thomas Cantipraten. Apes, Lib. I. c. v. p. 23, the contested imperial election between Philip and Otho under Innocent the Third; see Cæsar. Heisterbac. Distinct. 5. c. xxi. f. 138.

† See Thomas Cantipraten. l. c.

‡ Hæretici cum periculo corporis non cessant per domos et villas discurrere, ut pervertant animas. De eruditione prædicatorum, lib. v. c. xxxi. Bibl. patr. Ludg. T. XXV. f. 447.

§ See a letter of pope Innocent the Third to French bishops, warning them against certain Catharists: Qui tempore prædecessoris tui, cum essent hæretici, a villa fugere prædicta sub mercationis obtentu nunc adeunt loca suspecta et per tres aut quatuor menses commorantes ibidem, cum redeunt secum adducunt, sani dogmatis perversores.—An eye-witness says of the Catharists in Italy: Multos mercatores hac intentione mittunt ad nundinas, ut pervertant divites laicos commensales et hospites,

They also sent young men of their community to the then metropolis of all scientific culture at Paris, for the purpose of learning there the dialectical arts, which they were to apply in refuting the doctrines of the church, and in defending their own; and to seek occasions of exerting an influence on the academical youth.* Among their believers were many tradesmen, who had accumulated handsome fortunes.† These had it in their power to bestow largely on the members of their party, and to show hospitality to all the brethren coming from a distance. The feature that so much distinguished the first Christian communities, seemed to have revived again in this party, more closely bound together, as they were, by the persecutions. The above-mentioned Humbert, general of the Dominicans, holds them up likewise to the Catholics as patterns for imitation, in respect to the zeal with which they made collections for their indigent brethren in the faith.‡

cum quibus loquendi familiariter indulgetur facultas ut multipliciter negociantes, aliorum pecunias hinc sibi lucrentur, inde animas nihilominus thesaurizent Antichristo. See the letter of Yves of Narbonne, in Matthew of Paris, f. 538. This report is an important source of information respecting the occupations followed by the Catharists. The above Yves was an ecclesiastic of Narbonne, who had been accused of heresy before the papal legate, and fear induced him, though conscious, as he says, of no guilt, to abscond. As a man persecuted by the church on account of heresy, he everywhere met with a very hospitable reception in the communities of the Catharists in Italy, though as a man whose sole aim in living was gratifying his lusts, he availed himself of this hospitality only to enjoy himself at their expense, without sharing their convictions. He drew up a report of what came under his notice while living among the Catharists, for bishop Gerald of Bourdeaux, in the above-cited letter.

* Thus in the above-cited letter, it is said: Quod ex omnibus fere civitatibus Lombardiæ et quibusdam Thusciæ Parisios dociles transmississent scholares, quosdam Logicis cavillationibus, alios etiam Theologicis dissertationibus insudantes, ad adstruendos ipsorum errores et professionem apostolicæ fidei confutandam.

† When they boasted of following the apostles in evangelical poverty, which, to be sure, could hold good only of the "perfect," this was objected to them; as, for example, by Moneta: Nusquam invenitur in novo testamento, quod apostoli essent negotiatores, et quod pergerent ad nundinas causa negotiationis terrenæ (where, however, as we have seen, they had another object in view) et quod anhelarent pecuniam cumulandam, sicut vos facitis, quomodo ergo illorum viam tenetis? Lib. V. c. i. f. 396.

‡ Tanta est hæreticis cura de auditoribus suis, quod non cessant dis-

Their adversaries expatiate on the ample support which every one that professed their peculiar principles found among them, as a means by which attachment to those principles was especially promoted.* As in the first ages of Christianity, every Christian who brought with him a letter of recommendation from his community was certain of meeting a hospitable reception from his brethren in the faith, so any one belonging to the sect of the Catharists, when recommended by one of their communities, might expect to meet with a kind reception everywhere among the Catharists. Let him travel in Italy, or in South France, he was sure of finding everywhere whatever he needed, in abundance; † a custom, to be sure, liable to be abused by impostors. ‡ In particular, the perfects, when on their travels, were received into the houses of all believers with great demonstrations of respect. The inmates thrice bowed the knee to receive their blessing. The members of the sect in the whole place speedily assembled at the house where they were entertained; and perhaps others also, who were not liable to be suspected as informers, were invited in, to hear them preach and expound the Scriptures.§ Commencing with the inculcation of practical truths, against which no one could have a word to object, with making known and explaining the New Testament which was withheld from the laity, the Catharist preachers prepared the way for pointing

currere et congregare eleemosynas, ut de ipsis sustentent credentes suos pauperes et alliciant alios socios suos ad credendum. Lib. I. c. xli. f. 452.

* *Si pauper fueris et mendicus, moram cum illis facias, statim exies opulentus, quippe a diluculo ad crepusculum in mundanis operosi mercatoris, manus non permittunt otari. Ebrard. c. xxii. T. XXIV. f. 1566.*

† It seems that the houses of the Catharists could be distinguished by certain marks known to individuals of the sect, and concealed from all others. It is reported of the Catharist Punzilovo, presently to be mentioned, that in returning from Rimini, he remarked to some one, that the Catharists had many houses there; and on being asked, how he knew, he replied: *Ego bene cognosco eas, quia habent aliqua signa, per quæ cognosco eas.* These marks, however, he would not discover to any one. See the acts relating to this Punzilovo in Muratori, *Antiquitates Italicæ mediæ ævi*, T. V. ed. fol. 131.

‡ As in the case of the above-mentioned Yves, who says of his reception amongst the Catharists at Cremona: *Nobilissima Paterinorum bibi vina, radiolas et ceratia et alia illecebrosa comedens, deceptores decipiens.*

§ As often occurs in the protocol of the Inquisition at Toulouse.

out the contradictions between the doctrines of the New Testament and those of the church; and after having gradually shaken the confidence of their audience in the latter, they began to set forth their own opinions among hearers whose confidence they had gained for themselves. In South France, they took in the daughters of indigent noblemen, and educated them for nothing. These were thus won over to their doctrines, and by their means these doctrines might be disseminated and spread in families.* When the defenders of the church doctrine spoke of the miracles of ancient and modern times as testimonies to the truth of these doctrines, the Catharists pronounced such miracles to be frauds, or works of sorcery, performed by the evil principle for the advancement of his own kingdom.† To convince the people that it was all a trick, many of the Catharists feigned themselves sick, or possessed of devils, and pretended to seek relief at the hand of some famous and venerated worker of miracles; and if the latter happened to be taken in by them, they afterwards discovered to the astounded multitude the true course of the thing, exclaiming, "Here you have a living example! As it was all a trick in this case, so will it be in every other in which you may allow yourselves to be duped."‡ They spread abroad reports of miraculous cures which had been wrought in filthy spots, or where the bones of some culprit or heretic had been buried. They contrived—which was no difficult thing in those times—to bring it about that vast crowds of people would flock to these spots. Then they discovered the trick, thus seeking to stagger the people in their faith, or to involve them in controversy with their clergy, when these sought to abate the evil.§ Catharists who appeared in mean apparel,

* Humbert, *Lib. II. c. xlvi. f. 480*: *In partibus Albigensium nobiles pauperes tradebant filias suas hæreticis ad sustentandas eas et erudiendas et sic fiebant hæreticæ.* To counteract this influence, the Dominicans determined to erect a convent on the spot, particularly for the education of the daughters of the nobility.

† See the work of Lucas Tudensis (bishop Lucas of Tuy) *adversus Albigenses, Lib. I. Bibl. patr. Ludg. T. XXV. f. 195.*

‡ Thus they endeavoured to counteract the influence of the Dominican Peter of Verona, a zealous persecutor of heretics, who had great power with the people, and who fell in this contest, A.D. 1252. See his life, *Mens. April. T. III. c. ii. s. 18, f. 691.*

§ An example of this sort is related by Lucas Tudensis, *Lib. III.*

with pallid countenances, who wore the marks of self-mortification on their persons, might, before they were recognized as heretics, become highly venerated among the people, and artfully avail themselves of this circumstance to gain the credit also of being miracle-workers ; so that it must have been very difficult for the clergy to counteract their influence.*

Near the close of the thirteenth century, a man who had contributed much to the spread of this sect in Italy, came very near being canonized. Armano Punzilovo was a rich and respectable citizen of Ferrara, descended from a family of Catharists, and had himself been received among the *consolati*, or *perfects*. He stood in close connection with their communities in the different cities of Italy ; frequently entertained them, and held meetings with them in his house. He had been suspected by the Inquisition, but he contrived to deceive them ; for he hypocritically bore his part in the Catholic worship, and regularly confessed, with all apparent devoutness, to his Catholic guides. Through a long life he had won universal respect for his piety, his strict morality, and benevolence, when in 1269 he died, and multitudes soon flocked to his tomb, since he was regarded as a saint. Many reports were spread abroad of the wonderful cures performed there, which are to be explained in the same way as other like appearances of this period ; perhaps, too, the sly hand of the artful Catharists may have occasionally intermeddled here. For a series of years miracles were made out and received, falling in no respect behind the protocols of the miracles wrought by other saints, which had secured their canonization ; and the proposition was made even at Rome to canonize Punzilovo. But in the course of the proceedings for this purpose, remarks of his on careful inquiry gradually came

c. viii : Quod callide fecerant, quibusdam detegentes hæretici deridebant fidem Catholicam et simili artificio fieri miracula in ecclesia coram sanctorum corporibus affirmabant. Then, how the ecclesiastics and monks, who at first encouraged the devotion of the people, and built a house there for the devout, afterwards stood forth in opposition to it, instabant fratres minores et clerici, ne populi vota sacrilega in loco sordido immundis ossibus exhiberent, et magis accendebantur animi laïcorum ad cultum diabolicum peragendum et fratres prædicatores et minores ac clericos universos, quia erant contrarii suis operibus, hæreticos conclamabant.

* Examples in Cæsarius of Heisterbach, *Distinct.* 5. c. xix. f. 138, and x. c. xii. f. 270.

to light, which increased the suspicions against him to certainty, and the result of the whole finally was, that in 1301, instead of being declared a saint, he was condemned as an heresiarch, and his body disinterred and removed.*

The most absurd reports of unnatural excesses, and other abominations, said to be committed in the secret assemblies of the sect, were spread among the multitude; accusations similar to those brought against the primitive Christians, afterwards against the Jews, and such as are ever wont to be repeated against all opponents of a dominant religion. The fanatical multitude exercised a speedy justice, hurrying away such people at once to the stake. So it happened at the beginning of this period, in the countries on the Rhine and in France. The people, in such cases, sought to anticipate the orderly investigations of the clergy, fearing they would be too gentle.† The abbot Bernard of Clairvaux protested against these tumultuary proceedings of the multitude: "We praise the zeal," says he, "but we do not advise to such hasty action; for faith must come from conviction, must not be forced;‡ although we admit it were better that false teachers should be restrained by the power of the sword than that they should be allowed to mislead multitudes into their error, yet only by the sword of the magistrate, which God has ordained for this purpose."§ And in another sermon he says: "They should be captured, not with arms, but with arguments, by which their errors would be exposed and refuted; and they themselves reconciled, if possible, with the Catholic church, would be led back to the true faith; for such is the will of him who wills that all men should be saved and come to the knowledge of the truth. It should be the great aim of one skilled in church doctrine, whenever he is called to conduct disputes with a heretic, so to convince the errorist that he may be converted, never forgetting the words of the apostle James (v. 20). But if such an one will not be convinced," says he, "it were

* See the remarkable transactions in Muratori, *Antiquitates Italicæ mediæ ævi*, T. V. folio edition.

† An example of this sort is given by the abbot Guibert Novigent., in the third book of his life, c. xiv.; *Fidelis interim populus clericalem verens molliem*, &c.

‡ *Fides suadenda est, non imponenda.*

§ In *Cantica Canticorum*, Sermo. lxvi. s. 12, T. I. f. 1499.

better to drive him away, or even to place him in custody, than to leave the whole vineyard to be laid waste by his means.”*

Hildegard,† who was zealous in her opposition to these people, as a race by whom the whole country was polluted, who looked upon them as instruments for the punishment of a corrupt clergy,‡ declared that they ought to be deprived of their goods, and driven far away from the church, but that they ought not to be killed,—for even in them the image of God must be respected.§ The last person who declared against punishing the Catharists with death was the pious Peter Cantor. He cites the example of pope Eugene the Third and of archbishop Samson, at the council of Rheims, in 1148. A Manichæan, who was brought to confess his errors, had, by the decision of the council, not been killed nor corporeally punished; but that others might not be misled by him, and that he himself might, if possible, be brought to repentance, he was confined in a cell, and there maintained on a meagre diet till he died.||

When the Catharists were asked by the bishops concerning their doctrines, they were fond of giving indefinite and evasive answers, and begged not to be too closely pressed.¶ They could get along by tacitly understanding the articles of faith in another sense,** as was actually done in the case of the

* Ex hoc jam melius, ut quidem ego arbitror, effugatur aut etiam religatur, quam sinitur vineas demoliri. In Cantica Canticorum, Sermo. lxiv. s. 8. f. 1486.

† See Vol. VII. p. 300.

‡ Without doubt, the picture of these people, as they then appeared, hovered before her imagination, when she writes: Populus iste a diabolo seductus et missus pallida facie veniet et velut in omni sanctitate se componet et majoribus secularibus principibus se conjunget. Letter to the Clergy in Cologne, p. 166. Epistolæ Hildegardis, Colon. 1566.

§ Quoniam forma Dei sunt. In the Epistola ad Moguntinenses, p. 138.

|| Verbum Abbreviatum, p. 200.

¶ As in that trial referred to by Guibert, when, after they had explained themselves generally on the subject of baptism, and they were urged to speak out more distinctly, they answered: Propter Deum ne nos adeo profunde scrutari velit.

** Rainer says: Index cautus sit circa tales, quia sicut anguilla, quanto fortius stringitur, tanto facilius elabitur, sic in omni responsione hæreticorum invenies duplicitatem. L. c. T. XXV. f. 274.

articles relating to the Trinity, to Mary as the mother of God, to the miracles of Christ, to the future resurrection, and to baptism.* It is worthy of notice, that the same people who did not hesitate to deceive their judges by ambiguous explanations, or some sort of mental reserve, yet understanding, as they did, the prohibitions of the sermon on the mount literally, felt the most anxious scruples against taking an oath. The perfects might be known by the fact, that they either utterly refused to confirm any statement by an oath, or else endeavoured to appease their consciences by pretending that they did not swear from their souls, but only mechanically repeated

* When the Catharists were examined before the council at Lombes (Lumbariense), in South France, A.D. 1165, they stuck to the principle, in their first answers to the bishops, of acknowledging no doctrine save what could be proved from the New Testament: and, in relation to particular doctrines, gave indefinite and evasive answers. When, e. g., they were asked about infant baptism, they declared they would say nothing further, but only answer from the gospels and the epistles. When asked about the body and blood of our Lord in the eucharist, they answered at first, as they might properly do, from their own point of view, that whosoever partook of it worthily was blessed; and whosoever did so unworthily rendered himself liable to damnation. And then they added that it could be consecrated by any good man, whether clergyman or layman, which doubtless referred to their doctrine of the daily love-feast, before explained by us. They would answer no further questions, on the ground that they would not be forced to give an account of their faith. Concerning marriage, which they certainly condemned, they gave an ambiguous explanation. When asked what they thought of penance and confession, they answered: "For the sick it was enough, if they confessed their sins when they pleased to do so. As to the duty of those in health, they had nothing further to say, since James spoke only of the sick." To the question whether, in addition to contrition of heart and oral confession, a church satisfaction was also required, they answered, James speaks only of confession; nor did they wish to be better than the apostles, and add something of their own, as the bishops did. When, upon this, the condemning sentence was passed upon them and their doctrines, by the bishops, they turned to the assembled multitude and said: "Listen, ye good people, to our faith which we confess. But we confess propter dilectionem et gratiam vestri." Which, to be sure, was ambiguous, as if they expressed themselves as they did only to avoid giving offence to the multitude, who were incapable of understanding the pure truth. Which ambiguity was perhaps remarked by a bishop, who therefore objected to them: "Vos non dicitis, quod propter gratiam Domini dicitis atque dicitis propter gratiam populi," and they then recited a confession in perfect accordance with the orthodox faith, and which contained many things, therefore, which they could not honourably say.

a form of words after the dictation of another person.* When, at the council of Lombez, the Catharists had laid down a confession for the multitude altogether consonant with orthodoxy, and they were required to confirm it by oath, they declared they would not swear in any case, because it was contrary to the gospels, and to the writings of the apostles. We have already observed how easily any man who, from conscientious regard to the words of Christ, declined taking an oath, might fall under the suspicion of being a Catharist. As it was now thought that no confidence could be placed in their assertions, and as judgments of God, notwithstanding that influential voices had pronounced against them,† had not, down to the thirteenth century, been forbidden by any general law of the church,‡—resort was had, in such doubtful cases, to judgments of God, as a means of arriving at certainty respecting the guilt or innocence of suspected persons.§ Thus individuals who, on no sufficient grounds, had incurred the suspicion of heresy, might, by the uncertain decision of such a judgment of God, be made to suffer, although innocent. The excellent Peter Cantor, that warm opponent of judgments of God, as an institution directly at variance with the spirit of Christianity and of the church,|| vigorously attacks the arbitrary will and tyranny over conscience which characterized the proceedings against the Catharists. “The pagans,” says he, “used to grant a Christian, who would not give in, or who had not himself confessed, a respite of thirty days to decide whether he would or would not offer to the idols; but from him who was convinced, or who confessed, and then denied the name of Christ, it was only required that he should

* As Rainer says, T. XXV. c. ix. f. 274: *Ut formet sibi conscientiam, quod non sit jurans, sed tantum recitator juramenti judicis.*

† Yves of Chartres opposed them, because he looked upon them as a mode of tempting God, and as forbidden by the church laws. Epp. 74 and 205.

‡ First, the Lateran council of the year 1215 forbade the clergy at least from taking any part in judgments of God, and severed them from all connection with the church: *Nec quisquam purgationi aquæ ferventis vel frigidæ seu ferri candentis ritum cujuslibet benedictionis aut consecrationis impendat.*

§ The *judicium aquæ frigidæ* in the above-mentioned case in Guibert Novigentens. *De vita sua*, Lib. III. c. 16.

|| See *Verbum Abbreviatum*, p. 200.

offer to the gods. Whether he did so from the heart was not made a matter of examination. Why does the church now presume to search men's hearts by a judgment out of her province? or why should not the legal respite be granted to the Catharists? Why are they burnt at once?" He states that honourable matrons, who would not abandon themselves to the pleasures of their priests, had been accused by them as Catharists, and condemned by a powerful lord, whom he describes as a weak zealot for the faith; while from rich Catharists they were satisfied with extorting money.* Yet sometimes human sympathy would triumph over fanaticism, and the Catharists found comfort from many who accused the church of cruelty.†

The Catharists could show conclusively that persecuting false teachers was directly contrary to the essence of Christianity. They referred, for example, to the parable of the wheat and the tares, to show that man should not forestall the divine judgment, and anticipate the divine process of separation, by a violent interference of human will.‡ William of Paris, who speaks of this as a doctrine sprung up in his own times from the pit of hell, and contrary to divine law and divine justice,§ says against it: "Certainly it was not Christ's intention that the tares should be spared, but only the wheat. He could not mean that the tares should be spared at the expense of the wheat, or that they should be spared when they could not be without injury to the wheat. Wherever, then, the ungodly increase to the injury of God's people, they must be extirpated, and that by death, if it cannot be effected otherwise. Now it is true that they who, at present,

* *Loculis divitum Catharorum emunctis et abire permissorum.* The same person cites the example of a female recluse who had fallen into bad repute with the people by familiar intercourse with the Catharists, so that none were willing to bring her food. By the advice of her confessor, to whom she protested her innocence, she resolved to subject herself to the ordeal of the hot iron; but it turned out twice to her disadvantage. *Verbum Abbreviatum*, p. 200

† Thus Humbert de Romanis, in his Rules for the preachers of his order, thinks some regard should be had to such expressions and objections (ii. 62, f. 555, l. c.): *Sunt multi, qui quadam falsa pietate moventur circa illos et judicant ecclesiam de nimia credulitate.*

‡ See Moneta, *Lib. V. c. xiii. f. 519.*

§ *De legibus, c. i. f. 26.*

belong to the tares, may be converted into wheat, but this is a matter of uncertainty; but that by their means the wheat is turned into tares, is a matter of perfect certainty, for the simple and ignorant are led astray with incredible facility by the sly craft of the heretics. A few tares may easily choke a large field of wheat. It is a very rare and a very difficult thing to convert a heretic, but it is a very easy and common thing to subvert the faithful." *

The intrepidity and calmness with which Catharists faced an excruciating death might well create an impression in their favour on those who were not altogether hardened by fanaticism. Their enemies had no other way of accounting for it, but by ascribing it to the power of Satan. A bishop of the Catharists, named Arnold, marched firmly, with several of his believers, to the stake, simply asking that he might first have a morsel of bread and a basin of water, doubtless for the purpose of distributing the holy supper according to their own mode. When the fire seized them, he laid his hands on them, in the midst of the flames, and said, "Be of good comfort, my brethren; to-day we shall be with St. Lawrence." A comely maiden, who had been condemned to die with them, exciting compassion, was pulled from the flames. She was promised that, if she would renounce the sect, she should either be sent to a monastery or provided with a husband. She seemed at first to consent; but when Arnold was now dead, she asked, "Where lies the seducer?" and, pressing her hands to her face, she threw herself upon the body, and died in the flames. †

The persecutions furthered the spread of the Catharists, who often held their meetings in obscure retreats, catacombs, and subterranean caves. ‡ During the quarrel of pope Gregory the Ninth with the emperor Frederic the Second, and the absence of the former from Rome, the Catharists were enabled to spread their opinions, not only among laymen, but also the clergy; so that, as was ascertained by inquiries set on foot in 1231, many priests even were affected with the heresy, and the sharpest measures had to be employed in order to stay it. Whoever had any knowledge of the existence of heretics, in

* *Difficilem admodum et raram videmus hæreticorum conversionem, facillimam autem et crebram fidelium subversionem.*

† See Cæsar. Heisterbac. Dist. 5. c. xix. f. 138.

‡ L. c. Dist. 5. c. xxii. f. 142.

any place, or of their secret meetings, and did not give notice of it, should be excommunicated. Every layman was strictly forbidden, on penalty of the ban, to dispute publicly or privately on the faith.* Such was their boldness that, in open defiance of the church, they proceeded to elect a pope for themselves, to act as supreme head over their scattered communities. Such a pope appears in South France, Nequinta. He held, in 1167, a church-assembly at Toulouse, to which crowds of men and women flocked to receive from their pope the consolamentum. Many bishops of the party came there also with their clergy.† Nine bishops were installed, and received ordination from the pope by the consolamentum.‡ As disputes existed among the bishops respecting the boundaries of their dioceses, a committee was appointed for the purpose of determining these boundaries.§ Still later, about A.D. 1223, the sect chose themselves a pope in their original seat, in Bulgaria: his name was Bartholomew, and he imitated, in all respects, the pope of Rome. Delegates of the sect visited him from all quarters, for the purpose of consulting him on disputed matters. He began his epistles as follows:—*Bartholomæus, servus servorum, sanctæ fidei N. N. salutem.* By invitation from a bishop of the sect, whom he had appointed his vicar in Carcassonne, he made a villa in that district his residence.||

Among the sects of Oriental origin belongs, perhaps, besides those already mentioned, the Pasagii, or Pasagini. It is manifest, from the agreement of the two accounts respecting this sect, which appeared in Italy towards and after the close of the twelfth century,¶ that it sprung out of a mixture of

* Raynaldi Annales, f. 1231. N. 13, &c.

† Episcopi cum consilio suo, as is said.

‡ Accordingly it is said of such an one: *Acceptit consolamentum et ordinem episcopi, ut esset episcopus ecclesiæ Tholosanæ.*

§ *Divisores ecclesiarum.* The acts of this council, in the *Histoire des Ducs, Marquis, et Comte de Narbonne, par le Sieur Besse.* Paris, 1660. p. 483.

|| Matthew of Paris, at the year 1223, in the above-cited edition, f. 267, mentions, as a document in evidence of what is here said, a letter of the papal legate to the archbishop of Rouen.

¶ Of Bonacursus: *De vita hæreticorum in the Spicileg. of D'Achery, T. I. f. 212, and of a G. of Bergamo, in Muratori, Antiq. Ital. medii ævi, T. V. f. 151.*

Judaism and Christianity. To the confession of Christ they united the literal observance of the Mosaic law, except sacrifices, which ceased of course after the destruction of the temple. They revived, also, subordinationism in the doctrine of the Trinity. Christ they regarded only as first among the creatures of God, probably the one by whose instrumentality he formed all other creatures. We may now ask to what source shall we look for the origin of this mixture? * As multitudes of Jews were scattered in all directions, and these, though oppressed and persecuted in various ways, yet oftentimes arose by means of their wealth to great influence, creating friends by their money among the great and mighty by whom they were protected; and as we may elsewhere observe many indications of an influence exerted by Jews upon the convictions of those Christians with whom they frequently associated; † it is not inconceivable that some such influence of habitual intercourse with Jews may have given rise to a sect blending Judaism with Christianity, and which may thus have had a purely domestic origin in the West itself. Lucas, bishop of Tuy, looked upon it as an adroit contrivance of the heretics, that they submitted to circumcision, pretended to be Jews, under this mask promulgated their opinions, and so easily found protection and a hearing from the patrons and friends of the Jews. ‡ But what can be more improbable than that men who were not themselves Jews, especially that Catharists, the class of heretics evidently here meant, those enemies of Judaism, should subject themselves to that detested rite of

* Over which Lucas Tudensis laments, Lib. III. c. iii.: *Audiunt sæculi princeps et iudices urbium doctrinam hæresium a Judæis, quos familiares sibi annumerant et amicos. Si aliquis, ductus zelo legis Dei, aliquem horum exasperavit, punitur quasi qui tangit pupillam oculi iudicis civitatis.*

† See the above-cited examples, where we were speaking of the abbot Guibert and the fall of pope Nicholas the Third, of the year 1288, in which he alleges, which admits of being easily explained from the kind of conversions that not only many Jews who had embraced Christianity had turned back again to Judaism, *verum etiam quam plurimi Christiani, veritatem catholicæ fidei abnegantes, se damnabiliter ad Judaicum ritum transtulerunt.*

‡ *Hæretici quadam excogitata malitia plerumque circumciduntur et sub specie Judæorum quasi gratia disputandi ad Christianos veniunt et hæreticas quæstiones proponunt. Liberior tanquam Judæi hæreses seminant, qui primo verbum hæresis dicere non audebant. Lib. III. c. iii.*

circumcision, instituted, according to their opinion, by the evil principle,—should pretend to be Jews in order to secure such outward objects, for the securing of which this was by no means the best source; for if, on the one hand, they might, under this mask, more easily find protection and a hearing from some, yet on the other hand they would disgust still greater numbers, over whom, by other means, they might have succeeded in exerting an influence. The matter of fact, which must be separated from the subjective reflections of the reporter, we should be inclined to regard as simply this: that there was an heretical tendency, leaning to the side of Judaism, which leaning, however, was strongly supposed to be hypocritically put on for the purpose of compassing certain ends. The name of this sect reminds one of the word *pasagium* (passage), which signifies a tour, and was very commonly employed to denote pilgrimages to the East, to the holy sepulchre,—crusades. May not this word, then, be regarded as an index pointing to the origin of the sect as one that came from the East, intimating that it grew out of the intercourse with Palestine? May we not suppose that from very ancient times a party of Judaizing Christians had survived, of which this sect must be regarded as an offshoot? The way in which they expressed themselves concerning Christ, as being the firstborn of creation, would point also, more directly, at the connection of their doctrine with some older Jewish theology, than at that later purely Western origin.

The impulse given by oriental Dualism had contributed, it is true, in a great measure, to call forth a reaction of the Christian consciousness, longing after liberty, against the churchly theocratic system; yet this was not the only cause by which such appearances were produced. That secularization of the church, that confusion of Jewish and Christian elements in its forms and doctrines, could not fail, of itself, to arouse the opposition of a Christian consciousness, repelling this foreign matter; an opposition which was not to be kept under by any force, but which must continually break forth with increasing strength, till, with the fulness of time, it reached its triumph in the Reformation. As the progressive development of the church, proceeding on the foundation of faith in Christ as the only Saviour, pressed onwards to the Reformation, many kindred appearances would precede it.

Those sects of oriental origin were but transient appearances, leaving behind them no after-effects of their own particular form. What continued to operate longer than themselves, was the opposition they set at work; which, however, cast aside the oriental and Dualistic element, and started on other principles. Of the Catharists we afterwards meet with no further traces; but that reaction of the Christian consciousness, of which we spoke, was continually exhibiting itself in other forms, till it obtained a more durable shape in the sect of the Waldenses. Various influences co-operated to produce such reactions. We saw how the reforming bent of the Hildebrandian epoch invited the laity to rise against a corrupt clergy. The pope himself took the lead in a movement of popular reform; and we saw how, after the first impulse had been given, it might lead farther than was intended. The name *Patarenes*, which, signifying in the first place a union of the people against the corrupt clergy, passed over into an appellation of the Catharists, may serve as an illustration. Thus arose separatist tendencies. The laity would have nothing to do with the corrupt clergy. Such people, they thought, were unfitted to perform any sacramental act. From these beginnings it was easy to proceed further, to declare the sacraments of the corrupt church, generally, null and void. In laymen would be awakened the consciousness of the universal priesthood, and they would soon consider themselves capable of administering the sacraments to one another.* There needed but a man of some power over the minds of others, and of an enterprising spirit, to furnish a centre for the revolutionary movement, and, by the intermingling of savage passion and fanaticism, the most violent scenes might have been witnessed. Thus that wild demagogue Tanchelm, of whom, to be sure, we know nothing except from the reports of embittered opponents,† placed himself at the head

* Thus bishop Yves of Chartres must maintain the necessary recognition of a special priesthood against such as supposed *quascunque personas, etiam sacrum ordinem non habentes, verba dominica proferentes, sacramenta altaris et cætera ecclesiastica sacramenta posse conficere et salubriter accipientibus ministrare.* Ep. 63. ed. Paris, 1610.

† See Norbert's life, c. xiii. Jun. T. I. f. 843, and the letter of the church of Utrecht to the bishop Frederic of Cologne, first published by Sebastian Tengnagel, Cologne, f. 845. What gave him acceptance in Antwerp was, the bad management of the church; for it is stated, in

of a separatistic popular movement of this kind in Flanders. As he undertook to visit Rome, we may certainly infer that he was not following out any wholly anti-churchly direction, but was hoping, in consideration of his zeal against the unchaste clergy, to find some support in the Hildebrandian system at Rome. In addition to all this, came the ideas put into circulation by the disputes about investiture, those ideas which, in opposition to the earthly glory of the church, favoured the copying after the apostolical life in evangelical poverty, which sometimes allied themselves with existing customs in various forms of the monastic life, sometimes rose in resistance to the church herself. Thus we find in many districts, indications of societies of the so-called apostolicals, who were for bringing back the apostolical simplicity of the church, and whom we must take care to distinguish from the Catharists, with which sect, owing to many points of resemblance, they might easily be confounded.

When the provost Everwin of Steinfeld drew up his report to abbot Bernard of Clairvaux, of the sects in the territory of Cologne, he expressly distinguished from the Catharists another party, which probably, although agreeing with them in opposing the Catholic church, yet differed from them by their more biblical tendency, by combating Dualism, Gnosticism, &c., and it was just the disputes between those two anti-church parties which had drawn upon them the attention of their common opponent.* The worldly and corrupt church, they taught, had lost the power of administering the sacraments; the successors of Peter had forfeited their title to the spiritual authority conferred upon them, because they had not followed him in a life consecrated to God. Baptism in the church was the only rite they would still acknowledge, and they acknowledged this because, whoever might administer the rite, it was still Christ that baptized. As then they did not substitute the consolamentum in the place of baptism, they

the above life, that the whole large diocese was governed by a priest, who gave himself but little concern about the flock, and was scorned by the people, on account of his unlawful intercourse with his niece.

* Everwin, after having described the Catharists, says: *Sunt item alii hæretici quidam in terra nostra, omnino ab istis discordantes, per quorum mutuam discordiam et contentionem utrique nobis sunt detecti.* Mabillon, *Analecta*, T. III. p. 456.

were by this circumstance alone sufficiently distinguished from the Catharists. Yet infant baptism they opposed as a non-apostolic institution; so, too, they were very far from rejecting, with the Catharists, the institution of marriage, which they recognized as a holy estate instituted by God; but they reckoned it to the sacredness of marriage that it should only be contracted between parties who had never been married before, as being an indissoluble connection. What God hath joined together, no man should put asunder. They rejected the intercession of saints, denied the necessity of fasting and of ecclesiastical satisfactions for sins. Neither the sinner nor the righteous man needed it; for if the sinner did but sigh after God, his sins would be forgiven him. They would recognize no ordinance but such as had proceeded from the institution of Christ and the apostles; all else they declared to be superstition. They combated the doctrine of purgatory, maintaining that when souls departed from this life, their everlasting destiny was already decided; hence they were opposed to all prayers and other works for the repose of departed souls.

Neither do we perceive, in another sect which made its appearance about this time in the department of Perigueux,* in South France, the least signs of any peculiarity of the Catharists; though we see other peculiarities still more fanatical. They were for following the apostles in a total renunciation of all earthly goods. They abstained from meat, and drank very little wine. Opposition to the mass, which was common to all the anti-churchly tendencies, seems to have been carried by them to the extreme of rejecting the Lord's supper altogether. They combated all veneration of the cross and of the images of Christ as idolatry. The frequent bowing of the knee, a custom which we find ascribed to them, would not warrant the inference that they were a branch of the Catharists, but should be regarded, probably, as simply a mark of the Pietistic element. One of their doxologies is cited, which shows that, contrary to the Dualism of the Catharists, they acknowledged God as the creator of all things. As they adopted that idea of evangelical poverty which was grounded in the religious spirit of the times, as much truth

* Petragorium.

lay at the bottom of their attacks on the dominant church, and as they often appealed to Scripture, they might find acceptance with many; and it is reported that not only people of rank left their possessions and joined them, but also clergymen, priests, monks, and nuns, were among their adherents.* And it is mentioned as a characteristic fact, that the rudest and most unlettered peasant who joined their sect, would in less than eight days gain so much knowledge of the Scriptures, that he could not be foiled in argument by any man. They were accused of practising necromancy.

Sometimes such tendencies proceeded from the midst of the people, without being connected with any individual of note. Although some individual may have given the first impulse, yet afterwards he retired into the general mass. Sometimes it was individuals who constituted from the beginning the central point of such a reformatory movement. While some stood forth who had been awakened within the body of the clergy, and, seized with indignation at the depraved members of their order, felt themselves impelled to travel about as preachers of repentance in the sense of the church, there were others, in whose case the awakening seems rather to have proceeded from the spirit which breathed on them from the Bible than from the general spirit of the church, and whose labours as reformatory preachers of repentance were chiefly guided and determined by that circumstance. These latter were not only zealous against practical corruptions, but, as they had been led by their study of the Bible to perceive an element foreign to Bible Christianity in the church as it then was, many things false in its doctrines and its rites, felt themselves impelled to attack the corrupt church herself on this particular side, and to stand forth not barely as reformers of life, but also of doctrine. Frequently, however, the prudence of such men did not come up to the measure of their zeal. In combating one error, they often fell into the opposite extreme, and in what they attacked as false, they had no skill to discern the particle of truth at the bottom. They went too far on the side of negation; and to their polemics against the unauthenticated mysteries of church doctrine, a one-sided negative and subjective tendency might easily attach itself.

* See the report of the monk Heribert, in Mabillon, l. c. p. 467.

One of the first among these reformers was the priest Peter of Bruis, who appeared, near the close of the twelfth or in the beginning of the thirteenth century, in South France.* It is certain that he rejected the authority of the church and of the great teachers, to whom it was customary to appeal, and would recognize nothing as obligatory on faith but what could be proved from the Bible. But it may be questioned whether he attributed this authority to the whole Bible; whether he did not make a difference between the Old and New Testament; whether he attributed equal authority even to the entire New Testament; whether he did not make a difference in this respect between the gospels and the epistles; whether he ascribed an altogether decisive force to anything except that which Christ had taught with his own words. The last is repeatedly laid to his charge; and if he refused to acknowledge the celebration of the Holy supper as valid for all times of the church, and denied the significance of the redemptive sufferings of Christ, the charge might seem to be well grounded. The biblical Protestant element would in this case have passed over into a rationalistic, critical one. Still, what is said on this point is too uncertain and fluctuating to afford any ground for a safe conclusion; and so the venerable abbot Peter of Cluny, with a reservation of judgment which does him honour, declines expressing any opinion here lest he might bring a false charge upon the man after his death.† He was an opponent of infant baptism, since he regarded personal faith as a necessary condition for true baptism, and denied the benefit in this case of another's faith. As he could not allow, according to this, any validity whatever to infant baptism, he must consequently rebaptize, or

* We can very nearly calculate the time, if we put together the two facts, that he laboured during a period of twenty years, and that Abelard, in his Introduction to Theology, written before the year 1121, speaks of him as a person deceased. See Opp. p. 1066.

† The words are in his letter in refutation of the Petrobrusians: *Videndum est, utrum hi, qui tantis orbis terrarum magistris non credunt, saltem Christo, prophetis vel apostolis adquiescant. Hoc ideo dico, quoniam nec ipsi Christo vel prophetis aut apostolis ipsique majestati veteris ac novi testamenti vos ex toto credere fama vulgavit. Sed quia fallaci rumorum monstro non facile assensum præbere debeo, maxime cum quidam vos totum divinum canonem abjecisse affirmant, alii quædam ex ipso vos suscepiisse contendant, culpæ vos de incertis nolo.*

bestow true baptism, for the first time, on those who joined his party. The followers of Peter of Bruis refused to be called Anabaptists, a name given to them for the reason just mentioned: because the only baptism, they said, which they could regard as the true one, was a baptism united with knowledge and faith, by which man is cleansed from his sins.* The mass, the pretension of the priests that they could produce Christ's body and repeat his sacrifice, Peter of Bruis looked upon as the grand means for upholding and promoting the dominion of the priesthood; this doctrine, therefore, he vehemently attacked, but his vehemence carried him so far that he was willing to dispense with the celebration of the eucharist altogether. Language like this was spoken, if not by himself, at least by one of his adherents: "O ye people, do not believe those false guides, the bishops and priests; for they deceive you: as in so many other things, so also in the service of the altar, when they falsely pretend that they make the body of Christ, and present it to you for the salvation of your souls, they pronounce an absolute falsehood; for the body of Christ was made but once by Christ himself before his passion at the last supper, and was given but once, at that time, to his disciples." It is difficult to understand exactly what is meant by this language. The simplest view would be to suppose that he meant to say, Christ had observed this supper but once, as a parting meal, and it was not to be repeated at all; but if we hold closely to the words, they actually express that Christ did then distribute his body to his disciples in the proper sense. We must in this case suppose that Peter of Bruis believed it necessary to follow here the literal meaning of the words, in which this fact seemed to him to be expressed, and was satisfied, if he only needed not concede to the church, that she still continued to exercise this power of producing the body of Christ; yet it may be questioned, whether these words really present the exact opinion of the man. His zeal against the veneration paid to the cross, led him to say, that the instrument with which Christ was so

* Nos vero, said they, tempus congruum fidei expectamus, et hominem, postquam Deum suum agnoscere et in eum credere paratus est, non, ut nobis imponitis, rebaptizamus, sed baptizamus, quia nunquam baptizatus dicendus est, qui baptismo, quo peccata lavantur, lotus non est.

cruelly put to death, was so far from deserving reverence that it should rather be abused and destroyed in every way to avenge his sufferings and death. To what outbreak of rude passion, doing outrage to the religious feelings of others, a negative fanaticism of this sort was capable of leading men, is illustrated by a remarkable example. On one Good-Friday, the Petrobrusians got together a great multitude of people, collected all the crosses which they could lay hold of, and made a large bonfire of them, at which, in contempt of the church laws, they cooked meat, which was distributed to all present. It may be doubted, accordingly, whether Peter of Bruis recognized the significance which Christ's redemptive sufferings possess for the Christian consciousness; whether the very fact that this was a thing so foreign to his mind sufficiently accounts for the violence of his language, or whether the heat of polemical opposition may not have led him to say what he would not have said in a calmer mood of mind. His zeal against the externalizing spirit of the dominant church prevented him from allowing that respect which is due to the necessary connection between the internal and the external in man's religious nature. He required the destruction of churches especially consecrated to the worship of God. "God may be worshipped just as well in the shop and on the market-place, as in the church. God hears wherever he is called upon, and listens to the worthy suppliant, whether he prays before an altar or in a stall." On the same principle, church psalmody was rejected. "God is mocked by such service; he to whom pious feeling is alone acceptable, is neither brought near by loud vociferation nor soothed by musical melodies." He rejected prayer, offerings, alms for the departed, maintaining "that all depends on a man's conduct during his life on earth; this decides his destiny. Nothing that is done for him after he is dead can be of any use to him." For twenty years, Peter of Bruis had laboured as a preacher in South France, when seized by an infuriated mob at St. Gilles, in Languedoc, he was hurried away to the stake. But as his doctrines still continued after his death to have an influence in many districts, particularly around Gascoigne,—a fact which the venerable abbot Peter was forced to learn while on a tour in those parts,—the latter composed a book in refutation of them, which he sent to the bishops of the

region, inviting them at the same time to use their personal influence in suppressing the heresy. "It was their business," he wrote them, "by preaching, to drive the sect from those spots where they flattered themselves they had found a hiding-place, and, if necessary, to call in to their aid the weapons of the laity; but as it became Christian charity to labour more for their conversion than for their extirpation, authorities should be brought before them, and arguments of reason employed, so as to force these people, if they avowed themselves Christians, to bow to authority, and, if they wished to be considered men, to bow to reason."*

When Peter the Venerable deemed it necessary to call upon the bishops of South France to suppress the Petrobrusians, another man had already started up, as Peter himself testifies, who agreed, if not in every particular doctrine, yet in his reformatory bent, with Peter of Bruis; an individual by whose means the anti-church tendency which had proceeded from the latter was revived after his death, and received a new impulse. Henry, a monk of Cluny, and a deacon, came from Switzerland. Whether it was by an impulse of his own, that, disgusted with the common pursuits of the world, and touched with higher aspirations, he retired to the monastery, or whether he was presented to it by his parents in his infancy, is not known; but certain it is, that the quiet of the contemplative life did not satisfy this ardent young man. He felt himself impelled to seek a life of practical activity. He had derived his knowledge of the truths of faith from the New Testament more than from the writings of the fathers and of the theologians of his time. The ideal of the apostolic labours stimulated him to imitation. His heart was inflamed with a glowing zeal of charity to look after the religious needs of the people, either totally neglected or else led astray by a worthless clergy. As a preacher of repentance he sallied forth, which at that time was no unusual thing, in the dress of a monk, and barefoot. According to the custom of such itinerant preachers of repentance, he took up his residence in the houses of the citizens or countrymen to whom he preached, and was contented with any fare that was set before him.† So

* Ut, si Christiani permanere volunt, auctoritati, si homines, rationi cedere compellantur.

† What Bernard (ep. 241) says to his disadvantage, bears no impress

far as we know, he first appeared as a preacher of repentance in the city of Lausanne.* From thence he betook himself to France. Persons like-minded joined him; and an apostolical society was formed under his direction. His companions went before him, bearing, as a symbol of the preacher of repentance the banner of the cross, inviting men to follow the cross of Christ,—a fact which plainly shows, that, in his estimation of this sacred emblem, he was far from agreeing with Peter of Bruis. At first, he only preached repentance, denouncing that sham Christianity which did not prove its genuineness by the fruits of good living, and warning against the prevalent vices. This led him next to warn men against their false guides, the worthless clergy, whose example and teaching did more to promote wickedness than to put a stop to it. He contrasted the clergy as they actually were with what they ought to be; he attacked their vices, particularly their unchastity. He was a zealot for the observance of the laws of celibacy, and appeared in this respect, like other monks, a promoter of the Hildebrandian reformation. It was probably his practical, restless activity, and the opposition which he met with on the part of the higher clergy, which led him to proceed further, and, as he traced the cause of the corruption to a deviation from the primitive apostolical teaching, to attack errors in doctrine. He must have possessed extraordinary power as a speaker, and this power was backed up by his strict mode of living. Many men and women were awakened by him to repentance, brought to confess their sins, and to renounce them. It was said, a heart of stone must have melted under his preaching. The people were struck under such conviction by his sermons, which seemed to lay open to them their inmost hearts, that they

whatever of a report founded on facts, but seems much rather like the false conclusions of a polemical sophistry set forth as facts, which might be sustained perhaps by false rumours easily set afloat against one stigmatized as a heretic. Owing to the disgrace in which he had involved himself by his wicked life, being forced to leave his native country, he wandered about without a home. To obtain a livelihood, being a *literatus*, he resorted to preaching, and made a trade of it. What he could obtain more than was necessary for his own support from the simple-minded, he squandered away in gambling, or things still worse. The only reliable fact out of all this is what has been stated in the text.

* See the above-cited report of Bernard.

attributed to him a sort of prophetic gift, by virtue of which he could look into the very souls of men.

On Ash-Wednesday of the year 1116, two of Henry's spiritual society arrived with the banner of the cross at the city of Mans: they came to inquire whether their master might visit the city as a preacher of repentance during the season of Lent. The people, who had already heard so much of him, were now anxiously expecting the time when he would make his personal appearance. The bishop of the city at that time, Hildebert, a pupil of Berengar of Tours, one of the more discreet and pious bishops, received the two messengers in a very friendly manner, and as Henry was not known as yet to be guilty of any heresy, as only his mighty influence on the people was everywhere extolled, the bishop rejoiced at the opportunity of securing a preacher like him for his people during the Lent; and being then about to start on a journey to Rome, he gave directions to his archdeacon that he should allow Henry to preach without molestation. The latter soon won the same great influence here as he had done everywhere else. Among the clergy themselves there was a division. The higher clergy were prejudiced against him on account of his method of proceeding; the younger clergy of the lower class, who were less tied to the church-system, and had nothing to fear from Henry's invectives, could not resist the impression of his discourses, and the seed of the doctrines which he scattered among them continued to spring up for a long time after him. They became his adherents, and prepared a stage for him, on which he could be heard by the entire people. One effect of his preaching soon began to manifest itself. He chained the people to himself, and filled them with contempt and hatred towards the higher clergy. They would have nothing to do with him. The divine service celebrated by them was no longer attended. They found themselves exposed to the insults and gibes of the populace, and had to apply for protection to the civil arm. Though it scarcely admits of a doubt that if Henry, had he known better how to curb his passions, might with a little foresight and wisdom have easily prevented these effects; yet we must own that, as we have only a report of the facts on one side from an individual belonging to the clerical party, and a passionate opponent of

Hénry,* it is impossible to decide how much the preacher was to blame, and how far the fault lay also on the side of his opponents. Suffice it to say, that the clerus of the city, by virtue of the full powers residing in them, issued a letter to Henry, upbraiding him for his abuse of the confidence reposed in him, and for his ingratitude, and accusing him as the author of the division between the clergy and the community, an instigator of sedition and propagator of heresies. On penalty of the ban on himself and all his adherents, he was forbidden to preach in any part of the diocese. Henry refused to receive the letter when offered to him, not recognizing the tribunal which had passed the judgment. A clergyman read the letter publicly before all, and at each several sentence Henry shook his head, and exclaimed, "Thou liest!" Probably he did not find the reasons sufficient to sustain the several charges brought against him. The definitive sentence issued against him by the clerus served, however, to promote rather than to diminish his influence with the multitude; the clergy had far more cause to be afraid of him than he to be afraid of them. With the people he was everything; they were ready to be directed and determined in all their movements by him; and among those who followed him as their spiritual guide in all things, seem to have belonged not only the people of the lower class, but also substantial citizens, for any amount of gold and silver was at his command, and had he been governed by impure motives he might easily have made himself rich; but the only use he made of the money which was at his disposal, was to realize his ideas of a Christian commonwealth.† If we are surprised to see Henry ruling over the whole life of the people, and shaping their domestic and civil relations according to his own ideas, we must consider the immense influence of the theocratic prin-

* The *Gesta Hildeberti* in the *Actis episcoporum Cenomanensium*, published in Mabillon, *Analecta vet.* T. III. p. 312, octavo edition.

† The words of a party-report can establish nothing against the purity of Henry's course of proceeding; for one cannot but feel that its author was reluctant to say anything good of him, and could not forbear suspecting his good qualities, and charging him with bad ones, though they were rather taken for granted than proved. *Tanta auri, tanta argenti affluentia, si vellet, redundaret, ut opes omnium solus videretur possidere. Licet plane multa reciperet, tamen parcebat cupiditati, ne nimis ambitiosus videretur.*

inciple in those times, and remember that what the popes were on the large scale, such were those who, in still smaller circles, appeared as the oracles of God, namely, powerful preachers of repentance and curers of souls. Now, in this light, it was quite possible for such also to be regarded as stood forth as opponents of the churchly theocratical system. We see Henry deporting himself like other men who have already been mentioned,—Robert of Arbrissel, Fulco, Berthold,—save that his principles are peculiar to himself. In common with them, too, he laboured particularly against the sin of unchastity, and sought to improve the marriage relation. Women who led an unchaste life should, as a penance for themselves and a terror to others, be exposed to the disgrace of having their clothes and their hair publicly burnt before the eyes of all: they must bind themselves under oath to renounce unchastity and extravagance in dress. The life of celibacy he regarded as a custom which promoted immorality among the laity; he took pains, on the contrary, to encourage marriages between young men and maidens. Marriage was to be an indissoluble connection formed by God, through the inner fellowship of dispositions; selfishness should have no hand in forming such unions for a whole life; there should be no bargaining in marriage. The fact that a man chose his wife for the sake of some outward advantages, he regarded as the cause of nearly all unhappy marriages. This practice he wished utterly to abolish, and proposed that no money or goods should be obtained by marriage.* Wherever he supposed God had drawn souls together, he did not allow himself to be deterred by any of the hindrances defined by the laws of the church from sanctioning their union, which was so construed by his enemies as if he was ready to approve of any sort of incest.† It seems that, on the principle of removing every cause of arbitrary distinctions among men, he got free-born young men to take wives from the class of bond-women, and then used the money placed at his command to provide the latter with decent raiment.‡ Henry's virulent antagonist, from whom we have

* The words of that report are: *Nec quilibet amplius aurum, argentum, possessiones, sponsalia cum uxore sumeret, nec illi dotem conferret.*

† Thus in the report, the doctrine is attributed to him: *Nec curarent, sive caste seu inceste connubium sortirentur.*

‡ *Ejus admonitu multi juvenum ducebant venales mulieres, quibus*

the account of his labours in Mans, brings up against him the unhappy issue of the marriages which were formed by his arrangement. This certainly would be an argument to show his want of a knowledge of mankind, or his want of wisdom and prudence, but no argument against the purity of his motives. As with a view to promote practical Christianity, Henry attacked every opinion which might serve to nourish a false confidence, so he seems to have been led by this interest to attack various customs, which could not be directly proved from the Sacred Scriptures as corruptions of primitive Christianity; such, for example, as the worship of saints and infant baptism.* But it may be doubted whether at this particular time he had as yet so distinctly evolved the points of his opposition to the doctrines of the church. Though even then he was accused of error in doctrine, yet heresies of so striking a character were not expressly alleged against him. But we must allow that the tendency which would inevitably lead him to such results may be clearly discerned in what his opponents say of him; for they charge that he held only to the historical sense and letter of the prophets, and therefore set up a perverse doctrine.† From which language it may be inferred that he acknowledged no doctrine which could not be expressly pointed out as contained in so many words in the Bible; that he was an opponent of all allegorizing interpretation.

When Hildebert returned from his journey to Rome, he found the tone of feeling in his community strangely altered. He was no longer received with the usual demonstrations of joy, and the usual veneration. His episcopal blessing was treated with contempt. Henry was everything to the people. "We have a father," exclaimed the people, "a priest, an intercessor, still more exalted in authority, more honourable in life, more eminent in knowledge. The clergy abhor him as a godless man, because they are afraid he will attack with the weapons of the Sacred Scriptures their vices, their inconti-

ipse pannos pretio quatuor solidorum emebat, quo nuditatem suam tantummodo supertegerent.

* Vide Bernard, ep. 241; and Hildebert, ep. 23.

† *Aurem suam tantum historię et literę prophetarum accommodans dogmatizabat perversum dogma. Acta Cenomanens. p. 341.*

nence, and their false doctrines.”* By an imperious, violent mode of procedure, bishop Hildebert would only have increased Henry’s influence, and alienated the popular feeling still more from himself; by wisdom and love, gentleness and forbearance, he could effect more. Henry himself he was determined not to put down by force. He had an interview with him, which, as we might presume, would not be a satisfactory one. In the theology and liturgy of the church Henry could exhibit but little proficiency; in the knowledge of the New Testament he might perhaps have sustained a better examination.† Bishop Hildebert simply directed Henry to leave his diocese and betake himself to some other field. Would the bishop have pursued so gentle a course with him if it could have been proved that he was really guilty of the clandestine vices which were whispered against him amongst his enemies? Would not the placing him on his trial for such offences, and suspending over him the punishment affixed to them by the church-laws, have been the most direct and certain means of undeceiving the people who revered him as a saint? But the mild measures pursued by the bishop towards the clergy who had gone over to Henry, and whom he endeavoured to win back from him by degrees, and recover to a more church-like mode of thinking, may justly claim our respect.‡ In the disputes against saint-worship, which Hildebert was under the necessity of defending, we certainly recognize also, though Henry’s name is not mentioned in this connection, a reaction of the ideas which he had disseminated. The opponents of saint-worship appealed to concessions of bishop Hildebert himself. How they could do so may easily be explained, if we call to mind the prevailing bent of the man; for we have already spoken of him as the representative of a more spiritual Chris-

* *Verentes, quod eorum scelera denudaret prophético spiritu, et hæresim suam et corporis incontinentiam privilegio condemnaret literarum.* These words are of some importance as indicating the character of Henry’s labours in Mans. We see from them that he was zealous for strict celibacy in priests: attacked first their life, then their doctrine; held up against them the doctrines of the Bible.

† The writer of the *Actis Cenomanensibus*, represents him as an altogether ignorant man, thus contradicting himself. Hildebert says of him, ep. 24: *Huic et habitu religionem et verbis literaturam simulanti.* He may have been well versed in the New Testament and yet otherwise unlearned.

‡ See ep. 24.

tianity, the opponent of a worship of mere ceremonies.* We may conjecture that they had in view those declarations of Hildebert, in which he protested against certain excrescences of superstition, and exhorted men to copy the living walk of the saints. The genuinely Christian element lying at bottom of the church doctrine and practice, in this respect, he knew very well how to insist upon and use against those who denied that the saints had any concern with that which is done on earth.† “Without controversy,” says he, “love stands pre-eminent above all the other virtues. On love hang the law and the prophets; all else must pass away, but charity never ceaseth. Charity is not confined to the measure with which God and our neighbour are loved in this present life, but it becomes more perfect in the life to come, the more perfectly both our neighbour is known in God, and God is known in himself.” He refers to this more perfect love existing among the saints for the purpose of intimating their sympathy in the concerns of their contending brethren on earth.

Henry now turned his face to the South, and made his appearance in Provence. He came into those districts where Peter of Bruis had laboured before him. There he put himself at the head of the anti-churchly tendency, which he seems to have shaped into a more systematic doctrinal form.‡ Here he joined himself to a number of like-minded individuals. When Peter of Cluny’s letter, mentioned on a former page, had stirred up the zeal of the bishops of that district to contend against the encroaching anti-churchly tendency, the archbishop of Arles succeeded in securing the person of Henry, and took him along with him, in 1134, to the council of Pisa, held under the presidency of Pope Innocent the Second. This council declared him a heretic, and condemned him to confinement in a cell.§ Subsequently, however, he was set at liberty, when he betook himself again to South France, to the districts

* See Vol. VII. p. 425.

† See ep. 23.

‡ He himself, as Peter Cluny states, was the author of a tract directed against the church doctrine, in which still more of an heretical character occurred than in the above-cited propositions of the Petrobrusians. Peter the Venerable says, in the above-cited letter (opp. f. 1119), concerning the relation of Henry to Peter of Bruis: *Hæres nequitiae ejus Henricus cum nescio quibus* (it seems, then, there were several), *doctrinam diabolicam non quidem emendavit, sed immutavit et sicut nuper in tomo, qui ab ore ejus exceptus dicebatur, scriptum vidi, non quinque tantum, sed plura capitula edidit.*

§ *Acta Cenomanensia*, p. 342.

of Toulouse and Alby, a principal seat of anti-churchly tendencies, where also the great lords, who were striving to make themselves independent, favoured those tendencies from hatred to the dominion of the clergy. Among the lower class and the nobles Henry found great acceptance; and, after he had laboured for ten years in those regions, Bernard of Clairvaux, in writing to a nobleman, and inviting him to put down the heretics, could say, "The churches are without flocks, the flocks without priests, the priests are nowhere treated with due reverence, the churches are levelled down to synagogues, the sacraments are not esteemed holy, the festivals are no longer celebrated." * When Bernard says, in the words just quoted, that the communities are without priests, he means the priests had gone over to the Henricians; for so he complains in a sermon, † where he speaks of the rapid spread of this sect: ‡ "Women forsake their husbands, and husbands their wives, and run over to this sect. Clergymen and priests desert their communities and churches; and they have been found sitting with long beards (to mark the *habitus apostolicus*) among weavers." § As this party made such rapid advances, pope Eugene the Third, who was then residing in France, deemed it necessary to resort to other still more energetic measures for its suppression. With this in view, he sent to those districts the cardinal bishop Alberic of Ostia, who took with him the abbot Bernard. If the legate, in all the pomp of his office, was scoffed at, Bernard, on the other hand, whose very appearance refuted the charge that the whole church had become secular, and the clergy and monks sunk in luxury, made quite a different impression, and his great power over the minds of men was manifested also in the present case. Some said he even wrought miracles, and it may be that he appealed to them himself. || Probably, however, he did not

* Ep. 241.

† In *Cantica Canticorum*, Sermo. lxxv. s. 5.

‡ In these *Sermones*, he does not, to be sure, treat merely or particularly of the Henricians, but also and especially of the Catharists. The allusion is doubtless to the Henricians, when from those who wholly rejected marriage, he distinguished those who required marriage between young men and maidens, as a connection which was only once to be formed for the whole life. Sermo. lxxvi. s. 4.

§ *Clerici et sacerdotes populis ecclesiisque relictis intonsi et barbati quod eos inter textores et texitras plerumque inventi sunt.* Sermo. lxxv. s. 5.

|| See Vol. VII. p. 356.

find it quite so easy to manage these sectaries as his enthusiastic admirers, who have given us the account of his life, would represent. A writer belonging to these very districts relates that Bernard once came to a strong-hold, constituting one of the principal seats of the sect, and commenced preaching against it, when the leaders of the sect left the church and were followed by the whole congregation. Bernard hurried after them into the street, and continued his sermon in the open air ; but the sectaries were so noisy, citing against him passages from the sacred Scriptures, that he was obliged to stop.* The bishops afterwards succeeded in once more apprehending Henry, and the archbishop Samson, of Rheims, brought him before the council held in that city in 1148. On the information of the archbishop, who disapproved of capital and corporeal punishments against heretics, he was simply condemned to imprisonment during life, with a meagre diet, that he might be brought to repentance.†

On observing the remarkable affinity of spirit and of principles between the Apostolicals in Cologne and Perigueux, the Petrobrusians and the Henricians, we might be led to suppose that this agreement must have been owing to a common external descent. But the question immediately occurs whether we should be justified in so doing ; for when certain ideas and tendencies have once become incorporated in the process in which the spirit of a determinate period is developing itself, and prevail therein, they are wont to diffuse themselves abroad without any external cause, as through an atmosphere, and we see them breaking to view in one place and another without being able to trace the whole to any single point. It is manifest, at any rate, that Peter of Bruis and Henry made their

* When he left this castle without having accomplished his object, he is said to have exclaimed, with his characteristic assurance, which sometimes gave him the appearance of a prophet, alluding to the name of this castle, *Viride folium* : “ *Viride folium, desiccet te Deus.*” Which curse people believed was fulfilled. See the *Chronica Guil. Pod. Laurent.* in *Du Chesne*, T. V. f. 667.

† If this story were found only in the *Chronicle of Alberic* (pp. 315, 317), we might regard it as not sufficiently well vouched : for this chronicler classes Henry with the crazy enthusiast Eudo, and other opponents of the dominant church. But he names his authority, which is perfectly trustworthy, the *Verbum Abbreviatum* of Peter Cantor, where we actually find the passage cited above (p. 326), where this Henry is undoubtedly meant.

appearance quite independently of each other, and so it may have happened also with other individuals and entire communities; nothing therefore would be gained, even if the prelates succeeded in silencing the individual representatives and organs of such general tendencies to reform. These tendencies, especially in South France, had acquired too much strength to be suppressed by the destruction of the individual organs. The corruption of the clergy had, even in places where the church-system of doctrine was still held fast, excited great dissatisfaction and violent complaints, as appears evident from the songs of the Troubadours, who came from these districts, where this tone of feeling is not to be mistaken.* In such a tone of feeling a thorough and radical spirit of reformation, going back from the corruption of the church in life, to the corruption in the doctrine, and aiming at the renovation of everything, as well in doctrine as in practice, after the pattern of the apostolic church, must have found its true element. The sect of the *Waldenses*, presently to be mentioned, which, free from the disturbing and fanatical elements hitherto seen intermingling with reformatory antagonisms, survived as the purest offspring of the reaction of a purified Christian consciousness all the earlier appearances of its kind, and propagated itself in spite of every form of persecution through the succeeding centuries, presents itself accordingly; not merely as the work of an individual man, excited to it by external occasions, but as a single link in the chain of reactions, running through this whole period of reactions of the Christian consciousness, against the churchly theocratic system of the Middle Ages—one form of the manifestation of that idea of following

* See the examples of vehemence and boldness with which the Troubadours attacked the ambition and cupidity of the Roman court and of the clergy, and pointed their satire against the whole subject of indulgences, in Raynouard, *Choix des poésies originales des Troubadours*, T. II. Paris 1817, in the Introductory Essay, p. 61. It is said of the church, that, yielding to the cupidity by which she suffered herself to be governed, she sold pardons for all kinds of iniquity at a paltry price; of the priests, that they were eager to grasp wealth with both hands, whatever wretchedness it might occasion; that they sometimes used prayer and sometimes the sharp edge of the sword, as a means of persecution,—deluding some with God, others with the devil; of Rome, that she despised God and the saints; that craft and treachery of all kinds leagued together, and lurked there.

the apostles in evangelical poverty, which had its ground in the religious consciousness of the period, a product from the laboratory of the Christian mind in these districts. It was quite a mistake to think of deriving this sect from an outward connection with manifestations of some such reaction of the reforming spirit subsequent to the time of Claudius of Turin, and that too in districts whither this sect, which arose in another quarter, was certainly first transplanted at a later period. But it was not without some foundation of truth that the Waldenses of this period asserted the high antiquity of their sect, and maintained that from the time of the secularization of the church—that is, as they believed, from the time of Constantine's gift to the Roman bishop Silvester—such an opposition as finally broke forth in them, had been existing all along.* We recognize this spirit, which gave birth to the Waldensian sect, in a writing on the antichrist in the Romance language, which certainly belongs to the twelfth century,† though the date assigned in the manuscript (1120) is of uncertain authority, and the question whether this document proceeded from the Waldenses, or is of an older origin, cannot now be decided. The idea set forth in this production bears witness of the circumstances of the times in which it was produced. By the antichrist, is here understood the whole antichristlike principle, concealing itself under the guise of Christianity, which principle had from the time of the apostles been continually unfolding itself, till finally in this period, as was shown in the particular manifestations of churchly corruption, it had reached its climax. “Although antichrist,” it is here said, “was already born in the times of the apostles, yet because he was only in the stage of infancy, he was still without his interior and exterior members.‡ It was more easy, therefore, to recognize and destroy him, since he was rustic and gross, and had been formed a

* See Pilichdorf contra Waldenses, c. i. Bibl. patr. Ludg. T. XXV. f. 278: Coram simplicibus mentiuntur, sectam eorum durasse a temporibus Silvestri papæ, quando videlicet ecclesia cœpit habere proprias possessiones. It is remarkable that Rainer, who points to the true historical origin of the sect, still reckons among the reasons why this sect was more mischievous than any other, its longer duration: Aliqui enim dicunt, quod duraverit a tempore Silvestri, aliqui a tempore apostolorum.

† Published in Paul Perrin's *Histoire des Vaudois*, Lib. III.

‡ Al temp de li apostol ia sia zo que l'Antechrist era ia conceopu, ma, car essent enfant, mancava de li debit membre interiors et exteriors.

mute.* But since that time he has grown up to his members, and attained to the complete age of manhood. We are not, therefore, to expect antichrist as one that is yet to come; so far from that, he is already old; his power and authority have begun already to diminish, for already the Lord slays this godless beast by the spirit of his mouth, by many men of good disposition,† sending forth a power which is opposed to his, and to that of those who are fond of him." We see, then, that this book was composed at a time when several antagonists of the church-system had already made their appearance in these districts, when their doctrines had met with acceptance from the people, and it already seemed that the hierarchy must give way to a purer and freer progress of evangelical truth. This is precisely the time of which we speak.

All the accounts which go back to the origin of the sect agree in this, that it started with a rich citizen of Lyons, by the name of Peter Waldus (Pierre de Vaux).‡ At a certain time, when he happened to be attending an assembly of respectable citizens in Lyons, one of the number suddenly expired. This incident, reminding him of the lot which might at any time be his own, left on him so powerful an impression that he resolved to abandon all other concerns, and to occupy himself solely with the concerns of religion. He felt an earnest desire to obtain, from the original fountain itself, a more exact knowledge of the doctrines of salvation,

* Enaima rostic et grossier, el era fait mut.

† Car el es fait de Dio ja veil et que el descreis ia : car la soa potesta et authorita es amerma et que lo Seignor Jesus occi aquest felon per lo Sperit de la soa bocca en molti home de bona volunta.

‡ This, Rainer, with other contemporaries, says (c. v.). Particularly weighty is the testimony of the Dominican Stephen de Borbone, or de Bella Villa, in his book *De septem donis Spiritus sancti*; from which book, hidden among the manuscripts of the library of the Sorbonne, D'Argentre has communicated a passage which belongs here, in the *Collectio judiciorum de novis erroribus*, T. I. f. 85. This person was himself a resident at Lyons in the year 1223, and two years later composed this work. He had his accounts from several persons who had associated with the founders of the Waldensian sect, and particularly with that ecclesiastic Ydros, whom Peter Waldus employed as a writer. If Pilichdorf (c. i.) derives the surname of Peter Waldus, or Waldenses, from his native place, and says that another man from Lyons, by the name of Jolin, was associated with him, this does not essentially disagree with the other accounts.

than what he could derive from the passages of Holy Scripture cited by the preachers. For this reason he gave to two ecclesiastics, one Stephen de Ansa, a man of some learning, the other Bernard Ydros, who was a practised writer, a certain sum of money, on condition they would prepare for him a translation of the gospels and other portions of the Bible into the Romance language, which one was to dictate, the other write down.* He procured to be drawn up, also, by the same persons, a collection of sayings of the church fathers, on matters of faith and practice,—so-called *Sententie*. These writings he read with great diligence, and so the religious direction he had received from the incident above mentioned was more and more confirmed, and he was now seized with an earnest desire to follow the apostles in evangelical poverty. He distributed all his property amongst the poor, and proposed to found a spiritual society of Apostolics, a society for the spread of evangelical truth, in knowledge and life, among the neglected people, in city and country. He employed for this purpose multiplied copies of his Romance version of the Scriptures, which, by degrees, was extended to the whole Bible. He and his companions laboured with great zeal, and certainly without any thought, at first, of separating themselves from the church, but simply aiming at a spiritual society, like many others in the service of the church; with this difference, that while other founders of such societies were animated with a zeal for the church, and its laws possessed for them all the force of truth drawn directly from the Word of God, Peter Waldus, on the other hand, was influenced more by the truth derived immediately from the Scriptures; though this was still mixed up, in his case, with the church-doctrines of those times, and heterogeneous elements were, at first, blended together. Practical religion was the great thing with him. He entered into no conscious opposition with the doctrines of the church, and it was impossible to descry anything heretical in this society. The ecclesiastical authorities might have adopted such a society, and taken the direction of it into their own hands.† But an influential union

* The above-named Stephen de Borbone was personally acquainted with both these ecclesiastics.

† As was exemplified in that society of Raymund Palmaris. See Vol. VII. p. 411.

of laymen, associated for the purpose of preaching to the people; a union which had sprung up, independently of the clerus, from among the laity, and made the sacred Scriptures themselves the source of religious doctrine, might, however, appear to be something contrary to ecclesiastical order, and excite the jealousy and the suspicion of the clerus. This society, though not conscious as yet of any opposition with the Catholic element, was, from the first, distinguished from other such societies by the fact that this element exercised no particular power over the feelings and imagination, but retired out of sight before a sober, practical, biblical element of the religion of the heart. Those who were governed by the church spirit, certainly felt some such difference. The archbishop of Lyons was for suppressing the whole by an authoritative decision. He forbade Peter Waldus and his companions to expound the Scriptures and to preach; but they did not think they ought, in obedience to this magisterial decree, to desist from a calling which they were conscious was from God. Declaring that they were bound to obey God rather than man, they persevered in the work which they had begun. Even yet, however, they entertained no thought of forming a sect separate from and standing forth hostile to the church. One other means remained, by which they might be enabled to unite the continuance of their spiritual activity with obedience to the church, namely, by applying to the pope himself. This they undertook to do. They sent delegates from their body to pope Alexander the Third, transmitting to him a copy of their Romance version of the Bible, and soliciting his approbation, as well of that as of their spiritual society.* The matter was discussed before the Lateran council, then assembled, in the year 1170. Interesting is the account which the Franciscan monk, Walter Mapes of England, who was present at this council, has given of the Wal-

* We owe these statements to an eye-witness, the English Franciscan Walter Mapes (Mapeus), who, in his work *De nugis curialium*, to be found among the manuscripts of the Bodleian library at Oxford, has given an account of this embassy of the Waldenses, and of his conversation with two of the number. This part of the above-named work has been published by archbishop Usher (Usserius), in his work, *De christianarum ecclesiarum in occidentis præsertim partibus continua successione et statu*. Londini, 1687, f. 112.

denses, from his personal observation. "They have no settled place of abode. They go about barefoot, two by two, in woollen garments, possessing nothing, but, like the apostles, having all things in common; following, naked, him who had not where to lay his head." A commission was appointed to institute an exact examination of the case. The above Franciscan was a member of it. He says that he took pains to enter with them into an investigation of their religious knowledge and of their orthodoxy. They appeared to him an uneducated, ignorant people; and he was surprised that the council had thought it worth while to have anything to do with such people. He conversed with two, who seemed to be regarded as leaders; but the examination which he held with them did not relate to their knowledge of the Christian religion, but to their knowledge of the scholastic terminology of the church, in which, as we may well suppose, these pious, unlearned laymen were but poorly versed. He asked them, first, whether they believed on God the Father, the Son, and the Holy Ghost? to which they could, with perfect propriety, reply in the affirmative. He then asked them, if they also believed on the mother of Christ? The poor people, who knew nothing about the common distinction, in the doctrinal language of the schools, between *credere aliquid* and *in aliquid*, and supposed that they were simply called upon to explain whether they were infected or not with the heretical opinions concerning Mary, answered this question also in the affirmative, which was followed with a general shout of laughter. Yet this Walter Mapes, who thought himself entitled to regard the Waldenses with so much contempt, must have known how much good might have been effected by the enthusiastic zeal which would have flowed from the reaction of such a principle as exhibited itself in the Waldenses; for he says of them: "They began at present in the humblest manner, because they had not as yet gained any firm footing; but had we suffered them to gain admittance, we should have been driven out ourselves."* The pope refused the Waldenses the wished-for permission, and forbade them to preach or expound the Scriptures. It now became

* Humillimo nunc incipiunt modo, quia pedem inferre nequeunt, quos si admiserimus, expellemur.

necessary for them to decide whether they should obey, and desist from their work, or stand forth in open opposition to the church. Among the sects on whom, at this Lateran council, the sentence of condemnation was pronounced, the adherents of Peter Waldus do not occur. It was necessary, indeed, to wait and see what course they themselves would take after this papal prohibition. But being sure of their cause as being from God, no papal authority could induce them to give it up; and they must necessarily appear, therefore, as declared enemies of the church, as in fact they were considered, under the above-named pope's successor, Lucius the Third. Without any doubt it was those Waldenses who were condemned, in 1183, by the last-named pope, together with other heretics, under the name of persons *qui se humiliatos vel pauperes de Lugduno falso nomine mentiuntur*. Certainly this is a surname which the Waldenses applied to themselves, as followers of the apostolical poverty; as from their wooden shoes,* which they also considered to be a mark of the apostolical dress,† they were called *Subôtiers, insabbatati*. But though they were, at first, for following the apostles in coarseness of dress, according to the common notions of their times, yet afterwards, by their continual study of the New Testament, they would be led to a purer knowledge and a freer direction in regard to all such matters; for one of their opponents says afterwards of them, that their dress was neither expensive nor yet altogether mean. They rapidly spread themselves from South France to Italy, where they appear under the name of the *Pauperes de Lombardia*; the Piedmontese mountains, those districts in which Claudius of Turin had formerly laboured, soon furnished them a permanent home, where they continued to propagate themselves in the midst of persecutions.‡ We have before§ seen how already, under Innocent the Third, they found an entrance into the districts

* Such wooden shoes were called *sabôts*.

† Ebrard, c. xxv.: *Etiam sabbatenses a sabbatata potius quam Christiani a Christo se volunt appellari.*

‡ The records of the archives of Turin are said to testify of this. See the tract, *Frà Dolcino*, and the *Patarnes of Julius Krone*, Leips. 1844, p. 22, note. There is cited here a command already issued, by the emperor Otho the Fourth, against *hæreticos Valdenses, qui in Taurinensi diocesi zizania seminant.*

§ See Vol. VII. p. 445.

on the Rhine ; how societies of laymen, in which men zealously studied and sought edification from the Bible, afford indications of the influence of the Waldenses. Though it was imagined that the sect had been totally exterminated in this quarter, yet a remnant of it may have been saved, which continued to propagate itself in secret. In the year 1231 a multitude of heretics suddenly appear in the districts on the Rhine and other countries of Germany ; and the persecution against them continued raging for three years. At Triers were to be found three schools of the heretics. There seem to have been various sects, it is true ; but the spread of German versions of the Bible, and the doctrine of the universal priesthood, are certainly marks which indicate the Waldenses.* As according to what we have already said,† the entrance which the Catharists found into these districts was facilitated by the contests between the popes and the Hohenstaufens, the same was undoubtedly the case also with the Waldenses.

When Innocent the Fourth was venting his fury against the Hohenstaufen family, and suspending ban and interdict over those who stood faithful to that house, heretics spread, as a contemporary writer reports, at Halle in Suabia. They rang the tocsin, and collected together the lords and nobles from the surrounding country, and preached, publicly, that the pope and all ecclesiastics of the higher and lower classes were heretics and traitors to the people. They had no power to bind and to loose, and could administer no sacraments, as they lived in every species of vice. Neither pope nor bishop could lay an interdict on a people. Men should not allow themselves to be deprived of the blessing of divine worship by their arbitrary will. They denounced the Franciscans and Dominicans, as people who had brought the church to ruin by

* See the report of a contemporary, in the *Memorabilia* of the archbishop of Triers (*Gesta Trevirorum*, ed. Augustæ Trevirorum, 1836, Vol. I. c. civ. p. 319): *Et plures erant sectæ et multi earum instructi erant scripturis sanctis, quas habebant in theutonicam translatas; and among their doctrines: indifferentes corpus Domini a viro et muliere, ordinato et non ordinato, in scutella et calice et ubique locorum posse confici dicebant.*

† Page 320

† The abbot Albert of Stade in his *Chronicle*, at the year 1248, ed. Helmstad. 1587, p. 220.

their false preaching, and who led vicious lives. As there was no one to speak the truth, and to give force to the right faith by a right course of living; God, who, when others kept silent, was able to raise up preachers from the very stones, had called them, they said, to proclaim the truth. "We preach to you," they exclaimed, "no lying indulgence, such as the pope and the bishops have invented, but we preach that which God alone and our community are able to bestow."* They called upon the people to pray, not for the pope, whose life was so wicked that he deserved not to be mentioned, but for the emperor Frederick, and his son Conrad the Fourth; for these were honest men. Yet there is nothing in the facts here stated which would lead us to think particularly of the Waldenses. The noisy demonstration seems more like the manner of other sects than the Waldenses. Neither does what these people held concerning the forgiveness of sins, which one could receive by their "order" alone, in case their representations are correctly reported, answer to the principles of the Waldenses; nor the fact that, for the time being, they allowed a value to be attached to masses for departed souls, for the purpose of stirring up the people against the interdict.† If we are not to suppose here some community or other of Apostolics, called forth by opposition to the worldliness of the church, we might perhaps suppose Catharists, whose crafty management, which was not always in strict accordance with the principle of veracity, perhaps here betrays itself. It was, moreover, in conformity with their policy, to draw the people to them at first by opposition, and to let nothing be known, at the outset, concerning their doctrine.

As the origin of the Waldenses is to be traced to the reading of the Bible, they always remained true to this direction. A great knowledge of the Bible distinguished men and women among them; and this circumstance, contrasted with the ignorance of the Scriptures among the clergy, contributed to their spread. Rainer reckons among the means which served to promote the sect, the translation of the Old and New Testa-

* *Indulgentiam, quam damus vobis, non damus fictam vel compositam ab apostolico vel episcopis, sed de solo Deo et ordine nostro.*

† Thus they are reported to have said: *Ut missas audirent super animam ipsorum et sacramento ecclesiæ libere perciperent, quia ipsis perceptis mundificarentur.*

ments into the spoken language of the country. The same writer mentions in this connection, that he had seen an illiterate peasant who had learned by heart the book of Job, and several others who had committed the entire New Testament.* He says: "Among all the sects that have hitherto existed, there has been none more pernicious to the church than the sect of the Leonists (Waldenses of Lyons), because it is the most universally spread, for there is hardly a country where they are not to be found. Next, because, while other sects repel their hearers by the blasphemous character of their doctrines, the Leonists maintained a great show of piety; because they led a pious life before the eyes of men, were quite orthodox in their doctrine concerning God, and adopted all the articles of the apostolic creed. They only abused the church of Rome, and the clergy, in doing which they found ready hearers among the people." † The same writer represents the heretics, by whom doubtless he means more particularly the Waldenses, as saying, "With us, men and women teach, and he who is but a scholar of seven days already teaches others. Among the Catholics, a teacher is rarely to be met with who can repeat from memory, letter for letter, three chapters of the Bible; but with us, a man or woman is rarely to be found who cannot repeat the entire New Testament in the vernacular language." ‡ Ignorant priests in South France would invite, therefore, the Waldenses to dispute with other sects, whom they found it difficult to manage themselves on account of their ignorance of the Scriptures.§ And Rainer, where speaking of these sects generally he seems to have the Waldenses chiefly in his eye, thus describes their mode of living: || "They are orderly and modest in their manners; their dress is neither expensive nor mean; they eschew oaths, falsehood, and fraud; they engage in no sort of traffic; || they live on what they earn by the

* Rainer, c. iii.

† Cui multitudo laïcorum facilis est ad credendum. L. c. civ.

‡ L. c. c. viii.

§ So says William of Puy Laurent, in the prologue to his work above referred to, in Du Chesne, T. V. f. 666: Illi Waldenses contra alios acutissime disputabant, unde et in eorum odium alii admittebantur a sacerdotibus idiotis. These words may indeed be understood to mean that the ignorant priests had called in the assistance of other sects to conduct the dispute with the Waldenses, whom they found it very difficult to refute.

|| c. vii.

labour of their hands from day to day. Even shoemakers are teachers among them.* They amass no wealth,† but are contented with the bare necessities of life. They are also chaste," where he adds, "especially the Waldenses. They are never found hanging about wine-shops; they attend no balls nor other vanities; they govern their passions; they are always at work; and on this account learn, or teach and pray, but little."‡ Afterwards, to be sure, this writer mentions also, as a characteristic of this sect, that they hypocritically confessed and took part in the mass. This, as is evident from what has been remarked above,§ may apply perhaps to the Catharists, but hardly to the Waldenses. Though in general they supported themselves by manual labour rather than by trade, and scattered themselves more among the people than among the nobles, yet a number of them dealt in jewels and ornaments of dress as a means of obtaining access to the families of the great. When they had disposed of rings and trinkets, and were asked if they had nothing more to sell, they answered, "Yes, we have jewels still more precious than any you have seen; we would be glad to show you these also, if you would promise not to betray us to the clergy." On being assured that they should be safe, they said: "We have a precious stone, so brilliant, that by its light a man may see God; another, which radiates such a fire as to enkindle the love of God in the heart of its possessor;"—and so they went on. The precious stones which they meant were passages of the Holy Scriptures in their various applications. ||

Pope Innocent the Third seems to have been aware of the mistake committed by his predecessor in compelling the Waldenses to break away, contrary to their own original intention, from the church, and he sought to correct it. He was for converting the Waldenses from an heretical society into a church society of *pauperes Catholici*. Some ecclesiastics of

* Which could not be said of the Catharists, as is evident from what is cited above, p. 321.

† Neither can this apply to the Catharists. See above, p. 321.

‡ The last could not, of course, be a matter of outward observation for others.

§ P. 359.

|| See c. viii. That the particular passages here cited should be the angel's salutation to Mary with the annunciation of our Saviour's nativity, and the 13th chapter of John relating to the washing of the disciples' feet, points to the Waldenses rather than to the Catharists.

South France, who had belonged to the Waldenses, took the lead in an enterprise of this sort, particularly a certain Durand de Osca. They first went to Rome, where they submitted to the pope a confession of faith containing everything belonging in general to orthodoxy, and opposed in particular to the anti-churchly tendencies and opinions of the Waldenses. The pope confirmed the new society of *pauperes Catholici*, formed of Waldenses who had returned back to the church. The ecclesiastics and better educated were to busy themselves with preaching, exposition of the Bible, religious instruction, and combating the sects; but all the laity, who were not qualified to exhort the people and combat the sects, should occupy houses by themselves, where they were to live in a pious and orderly manner. This spiritual society, so remodelled, should endeavour to bring about a reunion of all the Waldenses with the church. As the Waldenses held it unchristian to shed blood and to swear, and the presiding officers of the new spiritual society begged the pope that those who were disposed to join them should be released from all obligation of complying with customs of this sort, the pope granted, at their request, that all such as joined them should not be liable to be called upon for military service against Christians, nor to take an oath in civil processes; adding, indeed, the important clause, so far as this rule could be observed in a healthful manner without injury or offence to others, and, especially, with the permission of the secular lords.* In Italy and Spain, also, the zeal of these representatives of the church-tendency among the Waldenses seemed to meet with acceptance. The pope gladly lent a hand in promoting its more general spread, and he was inclined to grant to those who came over to it, when they had once become reconciled to the church, various marks of favour; but he insisted on unconditional submission, and refused to enter into any conditional engagements. There were a hundred Waldenses in Milan who declared themselves ready to come back to the church on condition that a certain piece of property, on which they had erected a house for their meeting, which had been demolished by the archbishop, should be restored to them for the purpose of rebuilding on it another edifice for similar purposes; but this the pope did not think

* See Innocent, epp. Lib. XI. ep. 198.

proper to grant, because the fellowship of the church must not be sought after from motives of temporal interest, but solely to advance the interests of the soul. Yet, at the same time, Innocent issued a brief to the archbishop of Milan,* inviting him to receive those Waldenses—if they were disposed to be reconciled with God and the church for the sake of their own salvation—with due tenderness into the bosom of the church; and then if, according to the wisdom which God had given him, it appeared consistent as well with the honour as with the well-being of the church so to do, he might grant them this or some other place where they might meet in the fear of God, for the purpose of exhorting each other and their friends, so far as this could be done without any grievous scandal to others.† But in the bishops generally, who perhaps might have cause for not placing full confidence in this conversion of the Waldenses, the pope found no inclination to second his own milder views; and he had to complain that the bishops of the diocese of Tarraco sought evasion, with a view to put off the readmission of them into the fellowship of the church; and in a letter to those bishops,‡ bidding them to delay the thing no longer, he assured them it could not be his will that, by their *harshness*, any who seemed to be drawn by the divine grace should be repelled from the boundless mercy of God.§ In Catalonia this spiritual society of *pauperes Catholici* maintained itself for some time: at its head stood the above-named Durand of Osca, who had written some tracts against the Waldenses. But though at an earlier period, before the principle lying at bottom of the tendency of the Waldenses had been fully developed, such measures for their reunion with the dominant church might have been successful, it was now too late; and even that society is said to have gradually fallen into decay. || When a bishop of South France asked a highly

* L. c. Lib. XII. ep. 17.

† Et si demum secundum datam vobis a Deo prudentiam tam ecclesiasticæ honestati quam eorum saluti videritis expedire, pratum prædictum seu alium locum idoneum, in quo ad exhortandum se ipsos et amicos eorum cum timore Domini valeant convenire, concedatis eisdem sine gravi scandalo aliorum, quoniam aliter est cum conversis quam cum per-versis agendum. Lib. XII. ep. 17.

‡ Lib. XIII. ep. 78.

§ Nolentes, sicut etiam nec velle debemus, ut qui trahi gratia divina creduntur, per duritiam vestram ab infinita Dei misericordia repellantur.

|| See the Chronicle of William Puy of Laurent, c. viii., where it is

respected knight of this district, why they did not expel the Waldenses from their province, he answered, "We cannot do it, for we have grown up with them, and have kinsmen among them; besides, we see them living in all honesty." *

The Waldenses went on the principle that the sacred Scriptures, independent of every other authority explained from themselves, are to be recognized as the only source of the knowledge of the Christian faith, and that whatever could not be derived from them ought to be rejected. They must of course, then, when expelled from the church, since they were freed from the restraint of all other considerations, be led to a knowledge of Christian doctrine which would every day become purer, and to a rejection of the statutes at variance therewith, which would every day become more complete. Thus, for example, it is certain that they combated all those doctrines which had grown out of a confusion of the Old and New Testament points of view; as, for instance, that of a necessary special priesthood,—all that was connected with the church theocracy, the doctrine of the seven sacraments, of the sacrifice of the mass, of transubstantiation, of the worship of saints, of purgatory, and its associate dogma, that of indulgences. This is shown by the writings composed in these times † against the Waldenses, and by the minutes of trials published by Philip of Limborch. ‡ They revived the consciousness of the universal Christian priesthood; hence, laymen among them heard confessions, gave absolution, bestowed baptism, and the Lord's supper. § By this doctrine of the universal priesthood was not

said of them: *Hi in quadam parte Catalauniæ annis pluribus sic vixerunt, sed paulatim postea defecerunt.* * L. c.

† See, e. g., the above-cited tract of Pilichdorf, from the twentieth chapter onward.

‡ See the above-cited work on the History of the Inquisition. Thus, e. g. f. 201: *Dicti Valdenses credunt, quod in præsentī vita solum sit pœnitentia et sit purgatorium pro peccatis et quando anima recedit a corpore, vadit ad paradisum vel ad infernum et non faciunt orationes nec alia suffragia pro defunctis, quia dicunt, quod illi, qui sunt in paradiso, non indigent et illis, qui sunt in inferno, non prodessent.*

§ In the above protocol of the Inquisition (f. 251), a married countryman is mentioned, who used common bread in consecrating and distributing the Lord's supper. Many peculiar and dark things are said touching the wine which they used. The consecrated bread was preserved, and a portion of it eaten daily. It is said of one who died while a member of this sect: *Quod credebat et asserebat, se habere potestatem*

excluded, however, the idea of certain ecclesiastical offices which subsisted among them, and which had been arranged at a very early period, to say the least, in their body.* Starting from the literal understanding of the Bible, they condemned absolutely the oath, all shedding of blood, military service, and the punishment of death.† As they found unconditional truth enjoined in the sermon on the mount, they are said to have considered every utterance of a falsehood a mortal sin. ‡ The spirit of a truly evangelical bent expresses itself also in the confessions composed in the Romance language, which bear the very impress of those times when the Waldenses arose. Among these belong the tract on antichrist, already noticed. Everything is, according to this document, a work of antichrist, by which men are led from relying on Christ alone, to place their trust in external things; which ascribes renewal by the Holy Ghost to a dead, outward faith, and to the baptism of infants on the ground of such faith.§ This might lead us to infer, though not with absolute certainty, that the author of the tract was an opponent of infant baptism. It was also described as a work of antichrist, that he built the whole fabric of religion and holiness in the people upon his mass, and worked up in it a tissue of various Jewish, pagan, and Christian ceremonies.|| It is said that antichrist covers up his wickedness under some few words of Christ, under the writings of the ancients

a Domino, celebrandi missam et consecrandi verum corpus Christi de materia panis communis fermentati et verum sanguinem de vino cum oleo et sale commixtis in scipho ligneo cum pede, quem ad hoc loco calicis secum habebat, quamvis esset laicus uxoratus, laborator et agricola. He celebrated the mass at home on Sundays and festivals, et de prædicto pane ac poculo communicabat singulis diebus cujuslibet hebdomadis, quando sibi vacabat, de peccis panis sic per eum consecratis, quas in pixide conservabat, sumendo de mane pro communione diebus singulis.

* F. 290. At the commencement of the fourteenth century occurs a Majoralis of the Waldensian sect.

† See f. 201 and 207, and other passages. If, as is here said, they appealed to the passage, "Judge not, that ye be not judged;" they must, of course, have condemned all civil trials.

‡ See Alan. c. Valdenses, Lib. II. p. 206.

§ Que el attribuis la reformation del Sanct Sperit a la fe morta de fora et bapteia li enfant en aquella fe.

|| La quarta obra de l'Antechrist es laqual ensemp bastic et edifique tota religion et sanctita del poble en la soa messa et ensemp ha teissut varias cæremonias en un Judaicas et de li Gentil et de li Christian.

and the councils, which the servants of antichrist observe just so far as they may without danger of any interference with their wicked lives and their sinful pleasures.* The author reckons among the things that serve to conceal antichrist, the partly hypocritical, partly truly pious life, of many in the church; for the elect of God, who choose and practise goodness, being in the church of antichrist, were captives in Babylon, and serve as the gold with which antichrist covers his vanity. The people in whose name this tract was composed, deemed themselves bound to renounce antichrist inwardly and outwardly;† they had a fellowship and unity of good-will, and of a sincere disposition among one another, since they proposed to themselves the pure and simple end of pleasing the Lord and attaining to salvation. They declared themselves to be resolved, with the Lord's help, to embrace, so far as their minds were capable of bearing it, the truth of Christ and of his bride, small as their knowledge of it might be. If to any man more knowledge of the truth was given, then, they more humbly desired to be taught by him, and to be corrected of their mistakes. Forgiveness of sins is bestowed by that fulness of authority which is in God, through the mediation of Christ, and men obtain it by faith, hope, penitence, love; by obedience to the word.‡ Among the means employed by antichrist to cover his wickedness they reckoned the miracles now and then performed, noticing the fact that St. Paul enumerates, among the signs of antichrist, lying wonders.§

A second beautiful monument of this Christian spirit is the sketch of Christian doctrine entitled the Noble Lesson.|| We have no just grounds for scepticism with regard to the date which this production attributes to itself, and this date places it in the early days of the Waldenses; for it is observed that

* Los quals illi gardan, entant quant non destruo la mala vita et volupta de lor.

† Nos fazen departiment exterior et interior de luy.

‡ Car illi es en Dio autoritativament et en Christ ministerialment, per se, per speranza, per penitentia, per carita, per obedientia de parola en l'home participativamente.

§ See Lib. III. p. 271.

|| La nobla *Leyczon*, noble leçon, first published by Léger, in his *Histoire des Vaudois*;—a more complete reprint in the *Choix des poésies originales des Troubadours*, par Raynouard. T. II. p. 76.

but eleven centuries had elapsed since it was said, that we live in the last times,—whether the passages in the epistle of St. Paul, of which mention is made in the immediate context, or in the Apocalypse are intended. The chronological determination agrees with the times in either case, unless we suppose a calculation to the letter. In the Noble Lesson the following contrast is drawn between the old law and the new. The old, curses the body that brings forth no fruit; the new, recommends the life of virginity:* the old, forbids perjury alone; the new, swearing in general †—it bids us say simply yea and nay. The prohibition of all shedding of blood is also cited. The apostles are represented as patterns of spiritual, voluntary poverty; ‡ they were contented with food and raiment: they find, however, but very few followers after them. After the times of the apostles there were some teachers, it is said, who showed the way of Christ our Saviour; but at present, also, there are a few who earnestly desire to show the way of Christ, but they are so persecuted that it is hardly in their power to do so: they were especially persecuted by the false shepherds. If an individual is still to be found who neither curses, swears, lies, commits adultery, murders, possesses himself of another's goods, nor revenges himself on his enemies, they say he is a Waldensian, and deserves to be punished.§ Against the priestly power of the keys, it is said, the popes (since the times of Silvester), the cardinals, bishops, and abbots, all put together, have not even power to forgive a single mortal sin: God alone can forgive sins. It belongs to the shepherd, simply, to preach to the people, to pray for them, to exhort the people to repentance and a sincere confession of their sins; to fast, give alms, and pray with fervent hearts—for by these means the souls of bad Christians who have sinned may attain to salvation. || The doctrines of the Waldenses, thus expressed, perfectly harmonize with what we have said concerning the origin of this sect, as one which is to be traced

* La ley velha maudi lo ventre, que fruc non a porta,
Ma la novella conselha, gardan vergeneta.

† La ley velha deffent solament perjurar,
Ma la novella di al pos tot non jurar.

‡ Poverta spiritual. Que volhan esser paure per propria volunta.

§ Qu'es Vaudes e degne de punir.

|| Car per aquestas cosas troba l'arma salvament,
De nos caytio Crestians, lical haven pecca.

to the idea of the evangelical poverty ; and we perceive how the evangelical spirit in it gradually attained a freer development.*

It was in the order of the Franciscans we saw the idea of evangelical poverty first introduced into the hierarchy ; but we also saw † how the popes, by their participation in the disputes within this order, in which they sided with the milder party among the Franciscans, became involved in a contest with the *zelantes* and *spirituales*, and how it thus came about that the idea of evangelical poverty, raised to importance by this party, took another direction, was set up against the worldliness of a church corrupted by the superfluity of earthly goods, and by means of this antagonism many others might be called forth, which from the point of view occupied by this party could not fail to appear heretical. Added to this was the influence of those prophetic ideas, of which we spoke in the first section, and which, propagated ever since the middle of the twelfth century, had been continually shaping themselves out into greater distinctness ; particularly those ideas in the peculiar form in which they are presented by the abbot Joachim, whose profound thoughts and intuitions operated in various ways to stimulate and fructify inquiry. The ex-

* Maitland, in his work entitled *Facts and Documents illustrative of the history, doctrine, and rites of the ancient Albigenses and Waldenses*, London, 1832, p. 115, has very properly directed attention to the criticism necessary to be employed in the use of the ancient confessions of the Waldenses ; but he has certainly carried his doubts too far. One mark of spuriousness cited by him, the divisions of the Bible into chapters, first introduced after the middle of the thirteenth century (yet it is already to be met with in William of Paris), may no doubt excite suspicions against the statement that the above-cited tract concerning anti-christ originated in the twelfth century, if this division was to be found in the original form of that document ; but the whole character of the document, as well as that of the last named Noble Leçon, harmonizes with this period of time. As it regards the style and language, respecting which I am not qualified to judge, I must rely here on the judgment of that competent critic, Raynouard. Maitland supposes, it is true, the antique form of the language is no proof of its genuineness. Whoever was interested, he thinks, to forge such documents, might also take pains to imitate the language. But what interest could a later Waldensian be supposed to have, in forging two documents like these, in which there are still many things which do not agree with the doctrines of the Waldenses according to their later form ?

† See Vol. VII. p. 404.

position of the Apocalypse opened a wide field of imaginative conjecture to minds deeply conscious of the corruption of the church in their times, and piercing with a spirit of divination into the future. As the signs of the times, which are presented in that production of Joachim as tokens of the last great conflict, were, in the important epochs of new evolutions of the kingdom of God repeated in manifold * forms, and exalted to a still higher significance, so the opinion, which indeed contained something of truth, that this final judgment was hinted at by signs corresponding to the predictions of the Apocalypse, might the more easily obtain credence. The abbot Joachim had given the impulse to that kind of speculation by which men were led to trace in certain correspondences, in which one step prefigured that which was to follow, the progressive fulfilment of the prophetic element in the unfolding thread of historical facts. The ideas of the evangelical poverty and of the age of the Holy Spirit were in these intuitions combined together; there were, however, different spiritual tendencies, agreeing only in their opposition to the existing church form, which seized and appropriated these ideas after different ways; sometimes, as we saw in the sect of Almaric of Bena, a mystical pantheism, which would exchange Christian theism, and the dependence of the religious consciousness on a Saviour of the world for the self-deification of mind, representing Christianity as being only a subordinate form of religion which the mind, when arrived at the age of manhood, should slough off; sometimes a tendency, which, conscious that Christianity is itself the absolute religion, strove after a freer and more perfect development of the same, whereby it was to break through all human ordinances:

As the strict Franciscans entertained a special reverence for the abbot Joachim, who had foretold their order and the regeneration of the church, of which they were to be the instrument, and occupied themselves a good deal with the

* There is much truth in the remark which Hamann made in a letter to Herder, relative to the New Testament prophecies of the last times, where he says of the Apocalypse: "I accordingly did not consider the book as entirely fulfilled, but, like Judaism itself, as partly a standing, partly a progressive fulfilment. The actual fulfilment of the book is but a type of a higher fulfilment." See Hamann's writings, edited by F. Roth. Vol. VI. p. 111.

explanation of his writings, the interpretation and application of the current ideas in the same, so a great deal was said among them about a new everlasting gospel. The idea of such a gospel belonged really among the characteristic and peculiar notions of Joachim; and we have seen how by this expression, borrowed from the 14th chapter of the Apocalypse (v. 6), he had understood, following the view of Origen, a new spiritual apprehension of Christianity, as opposed to the sensuous Catholic point of view, and answering to the age of the Holy Spirit. A great sensation was now created by a commentary on the eternal gospel, which after the middle of the thirteenth century, the Franciscan Gerhard,* who, by his zeal for Joachim's doctrines, involved himself in many persecutions and incurred an eighteen years' imprisonment,† published under the title of "*Introductorius in evangelium æternum.*" Many vague notions were entertained about the eternal gospel of the Franciscans, arising from superficial views, or a superficial understanding of Joachim's writings, and the offspring of mere rumour, or the heresy-hunting spirit. Men spoke of the eternal gospel as of a book composed under this title and circulated among the Franciscans.‡ Occa-

* Assuredly this person was not, as he was afterwards said to be (see the Directorium inquisitionis of the Dominican Nicholas Eymericus, 272), a friend and kindred spirit to that same John of Parma, who, on account of his severity as a reformer, and his zeal for the doctrines of Joachim, suffered much persecution, was deposed from his office as a general of his order, had Bonaventura for his successor; the author of this book, as may be gathered from a statement of the acts of that process preserved in the library of the Sorbonne at Paris, by a member of the papal commission, composed of three cardinals appointed to examine that work, was Hugo of St. Chers (see above, p. 101). See the work already cited relative to the writers of the Dominican order, by Quetif and Echard, T. I. f. 202: *Processus in librum evangelii æterni.*

† See, respecting him, Wadding. *Annals of the Franciscan order*, T. IV. at the year 1256.

‡ So said that violent enemy of the mendicant monks, of whom we have before spoken, in the second section, William of St. Amour. In his sermon, preached on St. James' and St. Philip's days in the above-cited edition of his works, p. 500, where he is describing the dangers which belonged to the signs of the last times, and without doubt had the Franciscans in his mind, he says: *De istis periculis jam habemus quædam Parisiis, scilicet librum illum, qui vocatur evangelium æternum. Et nos vidimus non modicam partem illius libri et audivi, quod ubicunque est, tantum vel plus contineat ille liber quam tota biblia, which*

sionally, also, this eternal gospel was confounded perhaps with the above-mentioned *Introductorius*. In reality, there was no book existing under this title of the *Eternal Gospel*; but all that is said about it relates simply to the writings of Joachim.* The opponents of the Franciscan order objected to the preachers of the eternal gospel, that, according to their opinion, Christianity was but a transient thing, and a new, more perfect religion, the absolute form, destined to endure for ever, would succeed it. William of St. Amour says: † “For the past fifty-five years some have been striving to substitute in place of the gospel of Christ another gospel, which is said to be a more perfect one, which they called the gospel of the Holy Spirit, or the eternal gospel. ‡ These doctrines, concerning a new eternal gospel, which was to be

might certainly be said with propriety of the compass and extent of Joachim's writings.

* See the learned and profound essay on this subject by Dr. Engelhardt, in his *Kirchengeschichtlichen Abhandlungen*, Erlangen, 1832, p. 4. et f. This may be very distinctly gathered from the statement in the above-cited acts of the process on the *Introductorius in evangelium æternum*, l. c. Quetif et Echard, f. 202, for here it is expressly stated: *Quod liber concordiarum vel concordia veritatis appellaretur primus liber evangelii æterni et quod liber iste, qui dicitur Apocalypsis nova, appellaretur secundus liber ejusdem evangelii, similiter, quod liber, qui dicitur Psalterium decem chordarum, sit tertius liber ejusdem evangelii.* Here we plainly recognize the titles of the three works of Joachim mentioned above, in a note on p. 221. With this agree also the following words of Thomas Aquinas: *Hoc autem evangelium, de quo loquuntur (William of St Amour and his party), est quoddam introductorium in libro[s] Joachim compositum, quod est ab ecclesia reprobatum, vel etiam ipsa doctrina Joachim, per quam, ut dicunt, evangelium Christi mutatur.* See *opusculum xvi. contra impugnantes religionem* (the opponents of the mendicant orders). *Opp. ed. Venet. T. XIX. p. 415.*

† *De periculis novissimorum temporum*, p. 38.

‡ I cannot acquiesce in the conjecture of Dr. Engelhardt, that William of St. Amour here had in mind the doctrine of Almaric of Bena, but believe that he always had in view the doctrines of Joachim, which had spread in the Franciscan order, or doctrines associated with Joachim's ideas, as appears evident, when, after the words above cited, he adds: *Quod (evangelio æterno) adveniente evacuabitur, ut dicunt, evangelium Christi, ut parati sumus ostendere in illo evangelio maledicto.* Here he assuredly means the same thing which in the place first cited from his sermons is called the gospel; and had he meant Almaric, who was condemned as a heretic, there was certainly no reason why he should omit to mention his name.

preached in the times of the antichrist, had already, in the year 1254,—where perhaps he refers to the appearance of the above-mentioned *Introductorius*,—been set forth at the very seat of theological studies in Paris. Whence it is manifest that the antichristian doctrine would even now be preached from the pulpits, if there were not still something that *withholdeth* (2 Thessal. ii. 6), namely, the power of the pope and of the bishops. It is said in that accursed book, which they called the eternal gospel, which had already been made known in the church, that the eternal gospel is as much superior to the gospel of Christ, as the sun is to the moon in brightness, the kernel to the shell in value. "The kingdom of the church, or the gospel of Christ, was to last only till the year 1260." In a sermon which we have already noticed,* he points out the following as doctrines of the eternal gospel: that the sacrament of the church is nothing; that a new law of life was to be given, and a new constitution of the church introduced; and he labours to show that, on the contrary, the form of the hierarchy, under which the church then subsisted, was one resting on the divine order, and altogether necessary and immutable.

These charges from the mouth of a passionate opponent cannot certainly be regarded as evidence that a doctrine like that of Almaric, concerning a new religion of the perfect, close at hand, was even then taught among the strict Franciscans. It is easy to see, by referring back to the account given on a former page, of the doctrines of Joachim, how St. Amour might be led to suppose that he found all this in Joachim's writings, which surely he had read but superficially, and for the very reason that they were so highly esteemed among the Franciscans, with hostile feelings, as well as an entirely opposite bent of mind. And since the existing form of the church constitution seemed to him in exact accordance with the essence of Christianity, he could not fail, indeed, where Joachim predicted some new form of the manifestation of Christianity, in which it was to cast aside its present confined envelope, to see therein announced some new antichristian gospel. Taking everything together which the opponents cite from the "Introductory to the eternal gospel," it

* L. c. p. 500.

may well be doubted whether, even in this book, any such doctrine, implying the destruction of Christianity, was set forth. The whole matter of this work also seems to have consisted in an explication of the fundamental ideas of the abbot Joachim, and in the application of them to the genuine Franciscan order. The condemnation of the "Introductory," by pope Alexander the Fourth, could not put a stop, however, to the circulation of these ideas. They still continued to be cherished among the party of the more rigid Franciscans, and a remarkable individual, who sprung up in the midst of that body, gave them a new impulse.

This was John Peter de Oliva of Provence, who from his twelfth year had been educated in the Franciscan order.* He was governed from the first by that eccentric tendency of religious feeling and imagination which had gone forth from Francis; as was seen, for example, in his extravagant eulogiums of the Virgin Mary, which, indeed, were found to be offensive even in his own order;† but with this he united a profound, speculative intellect. A mixture of profound ideas and fantastic, whimsical assertions might naturally be expected, therefore, in his writings.‡ Zealous for the primitive severity of the Franciscan rule, he inveighed against all deviations from it; and the same spirit led him also to attack the worldly life, the luxury and pomp of the clergy. By so doing he created many enemies, who eagerly laid hold of every occasion presented by his many singular, bold remarks, to suggest suspicions with regard to his orthodoxy.§ Besides his doctrine of evangelical poverty, various metaphysical, dogmatic statements were hazarded by him, which gave offence. Among these was the opinion that Christ when struck by the spear in his side was not yet dead.|| After an assembly of the Franciscan order, convened in the year 1282, had ordered an

* See Wadding. *Annales*, 1289. N. 29.

† In Wadding. l. c. N. 28.

‡ We have to lament that nothing has as yet been published from the writings of this remarkable man. We know nothing of him except from the articles declared heretical, which had been extracted from his Commentary on the Apocalypse, by a papal commission under John the Twenty-Second. In Baluz. *Miscellan.* i. f. 213.

§ Wadding. *Annales*, at the year 1282. N. 2.

|| L. c. at the year 1297. N. 37, &c.

investigation of his doctrines, and of their spread, he submitted, in the year following, to the recantation prescribed to him,* and at a convention of the order held at Paris, in 1292, he gave them entire satisfaction by the explanations which he laid before them. His opponents were no match for him in dialectics. He died at the age of fifty, in 1297. Before his death he laid down a confession, in which he unconditionally submitted to the decisions of the church of Rome. Yet he reserved to himself the liberty of refusing to follow any human determination claiming to decide that anything belonged to the essence of the faith, unless it were the decision of the pope, or of a general council; except in so far as he was enforced to adopt it by reason, or the authority of the Holy Scriptures, or the essence of the Catholic faith itself. He held it, moreover, to be a salutary thing that opposite opinions should be set forth and defended, provided it were done without obstinacy,—for so, the truth would be more accurately investigated, the minds of disputants more exercised, and men more certainly led to an understanding of the doctrines of faith.†

Oliva distinguished seven ages of the church: The first, its foundation by the apostles; the second, its preservation by the sufferings of the martyrs; the third, the evolution and defence of the faith in the contests with heretics; the fourth, the period of the anchorites living in strict self-mortification, who poured a bright light on the church by their example; the fifth, the period of the common life of monks and clerks, some of whom practised greater severity, others accommodated themselves to the ordinary mode of living; the sixth, the renewal of the evangelical and the extirpation of the antichristian life, with which is connected the final conversion of the Jews and pagans, or at once the reconstruction of the primitive church; the seventh age is, in its relation to this earthly life, a sort of sabbath; a peaceful and miraculous participation in future blessedness, as if the heavenly Jerusalem had descended upon earth;—but in its relation to the future life, it is the general resurrection, the glorification of the saints, and the end of all things. This distinction of a twofold design of the great

* L. c. at the year 1283. N. 7.

† Wadding. Annales, at the year 1297. N. 34.

epochs in the evolution of the kingdom of God, according to their point of departure and their point of termination, belongs among the peculiar features in the intuitions of Oliva. Thus, he says of the first period, that in one sense it may be supposed to begin with the preaching of Christ; in another, with the outpouring of the Holy Spirit. The second age began, in the proper sense, with Nero's persecution; but in a certain sense with the stoning of Stephen, or the passion of Christ. The sixth age began, in one sense, with the time of St. Francis, but more perfectly with the judgments executed on a corrupt church. He distinguishes, furthermore, a threefold manifestation of Christ in the history of the world: the first and last, visible; the middle one not sensible, but spiritual. The first, for the redemption of the world, and the founding of the church; the second, to renew the latter to the spirit of the evangelical life, and carry forward the church, already founded, to perfection; the third, for judgment, for the glorification of the elect, and for the general consummation. Although this spiritual advent of Christ must be referred to the *whole* process of development of the church, and also to the glorification of the saints, yet it may, in a certain sense, be pre-eminently attributed to the sixth period, whose characteristics are founded on this very interior activity of the spirit of Christ.* He supposes a progressive evolution of the antichristian and the Christian principles, both proceeding side by side, to the last decisive struggle; so that each successive period takes up into itself all the good and evil of the preceding one, and hence all the good and evil of all earlier periods must be concentrated in the last time of the spiritual revelation of Christ, and of the manifestation of antichrist. "Just as the virtue of the root and of the stalk," says he, "lives again in the branches and the fruit, so whatever disturbs the healthy development of life also transmits itself.† And as the whole virtue and force of the earlier times, therefore, strives towards the great end, of producing the sixth and the seventh period, so all the opposite evil of the earlier times will ally itself with the malice of antichrist, and of the others,

* Licet autem secundus adventus sit in toto decursu ecclesiæ et etiam in glorificatione sanctorum, nihilominus recte et congrue per quamdam antonomasiam appropriatur tempori sexto.

† Sicut virtus radicis et stipitis redivivit in ramo et fructu, sic et infectio utriusque.

by whom the elect of the sixth and seventh periods are to be tempted.* The sixth period will, therefore, be distinctly and prominently marked above all the preceding ones, as the goal to which everything presses,—the commencement of a new age of the world, whereby the old world will be done away, just as by the appearance of Christ the Old Testament, and the old life of mankind, were done away.† As by Christ's first appearance an end was put to the old synagogue and a new church was erected, so by his spiritual advent all old things will be taken out of the way, and the church re-created, as it were, into an entirely new one. As the spiritual revelation of Christ goes through all the ages of the church, but must be pre-eminently ascribed to that sixth age, the same is to be said also of the agency of the Holy Spirit; and precisely by this fact the third age of the world, beginning with the sixth period of the church, is distinguished as the age of the Holy Spirit from the two earlier, the time of the Old Testament and the Christian period which has thus far elapsed.‡

It is manifest, from this collation of passages, how far Oliva was from favouring the theory which taught that Christianity itself was to be annulled by this new revelation of the Holy Ghost. He looks upon the whole as only a progressive, organic evolution of Christianity itself, through different *stadia*, starting from that which Christ has done once for all. The aim of the entire evolution is nothing other than the complete exhibition of the image of Christ, according to life and knowledge, in humanity; which coincides with the true realization of the image of God, and of man's destined dominion over the world. So, too, the sixth day, on which man was created in the image of God, corresponds to the sixth period, in which the mass of the Jews and pagans will be restored to the image of God by Christianity.§

* Sicut tota virtus priorum temporum intendit generationem sexti et septimi status, sic tota malitia iis opposita coöperabitur malitiæ anti-christi et reliquorum exercentium electos sexti et septimi status.

† Initium novi seculi, evacuans quoddam vetus seculum, sicut status Christi evacuavit vetus testamentum et vetustatem humani generis.

‡ Tertius status mundi sub sexto statu ecclesiæ inchoandus et spiritui sancto per quandam antonomasiam appropriandus.

§ Bestiæ sexto die formatae, post quas formatus est homo ad imaginem Dei, quia post has convertetur Israël cum reliquiis gentium et apparebit Christiformis vita et imago Christi.

And here we should not fail to notice that, as Oliva did not possess a correct view of the apostolical church, nor a clear consciousness of the distinction between the Catholic point of view and primitive Christianity, so his view of the great end towards which the church in its progressive advancement is striving must of course be affected thereby. Complete estrangement from the world, as contradistinguished from the hitherto prevailing absorption in the world; the religion of intuition and feeling, as opposed to the hitherto conceptual theology; pure passivity, in the surrendry of one's self to the godlike, as opposed to the hitherto prevailing self-activity of the intellect in the dialectical theology,—this, as it appeared to him, would form the distinguishing characteristic of that glorious period: “As it was the striving of the fathers in the first age of the world before Christ,” says he, “to proclaim the great works of the Lord from the creation of the world, and as the children of God, in the second age of the world, from Christ onwards, laboured to explore the hidden wisdom, so nothing else remains for the third age, but that we should sing God's praise,—while we magnify his great power and his manifold wisdom and goodness, which are clearly revealed in his works, and in the word of the Sacred Scriptures; for while, in the first age of the world, God the Father manifested himself as the terrible God, and a being to be feared; in the second age of the world, the Son manifested himself as a teacher and revealer, the Word of divine wisdom; he will reveal himself in the third age, of the Holy Ghost, as the flame of divine love and the fulness of all spiritual joy,—so that all the wisdom of the incarnate Word, and all the power of the Father, will not merely be known, but also felt and experienced.”* To this he applies the promise, given by Christ, of the Holy Spirit, which should lead to all truth, and glorify him;—which, therefore, he applies also, in a pre-eminent sense, to this sixth period: “As, in the first times, the world was converted to Christ by extraordinary and countless miracles, so it is behooving that it should, in the last times, again be converted by a peculiar light of divine wisdom,

* Non solum simplici intelligentia, sed etiam gustativa et palpativa experientia videbitur omnis veritas sapientiæ verbi Dei incarnati et potentia Dei patris.

and of the understanding of the Scriptures; especially, since the condition of this period is to be of so elevated a character as to admit of the reception and contemplation of the divine light itself."* This sixth period, then, stands prominent, indeed, above all the other and earlier ones, by the plenitude of grace and familiar tokens of Christ's love; yet it has the more reason to humble itself, because what distinguishes it consists much rather in passivity, or receiving, than in activity, or giving; much rather in that blessedness, which is a reward, than in that pains-taking service, which might pass for a desert. As the glory which was intended for the synagogue and its priests, had they believed in Christ, was transferred to the primitive church and its shepherds; so also the glory intended for the church of the fifth period will, on account of its apostasy, be transferred to the elect of the sixth period. The precursor of the new period of genuine life, which consists in following Christ in evangelical poverty, is St. Francis; he who first exhibited, in this respect, the perfect image of Christ, who must resemble Christ therefore in all respects, and hence must bear also the prints of his wounds.† When David was anointed, and the spirit of the Lord came upon him, Saul was left more than ever to himself, and the evil spirit took possession of him; so when the Spirit of God was evidently transferred to the evangelical paupers (the genuine, strict Franciscans), and they were called and consecrated by him to the office of preaching, many began to be stirred with a diabolical spirit against them, while they sunk deeper and deeper themselves into simony, cupidity, luxury, and worldly pomp. The *extensive* increase of the church should be conditioned on its *intensive* power,—from the interior glory of the church, in the period of the Holy Ghost, should proceed also its external enlargement. They who exhibited the perfect image of Christ in evangelical poverty, should be employed as the instruments for the extension of God's kingdom through the whole world."

* Sicut primo tempore conversus est mundus ad Christum per stupendas, et innumerabiles virtutes miraculorum, sic decet, quod in finali tempore convertatur iterum orbis per præclara et superadmiranda et superabundantia lumina sapientiæ Dei et scripturarum suarum, et maxime quia oportet statum illius temporis elevari et intrare ad ipsa lumina suscipienda et contemplanda.

† See Vol. VII. p. 383.

“But as, in the apostolic times, the preaching of the gospel found more acceptance among the heathen than among the Jews; so, too, the new evangelical missionaries would find greater success among the Greeks, Saracens, Tartars, and finally the Jews, than in the fleshly church of the Latins.” The Babylon of Revelation is uniformly represented by Oliva as the corrupt church of Rome, hurrying to the judgment; and he describes her corruption in the plainest terms. “She is Babylon, the great whore, because wickedness thrives and spreads in her, not only intensively but extensively; so that the good in her are like a few grains of gold in a vast sandheap; and as the Jews in Babylon were captives, and grievously oppressed, so will the spirit of the righteous, in this period, be oppressed and afflicted beyond endurance, by the countless host of a fleshly church, which they are enforced to serve against their will. The Babylon which stood in heathendom, made all men drunk with her idolatries; so that Babylon, which is the fleshly church, has made herself and all the people in subjection to her drunk, and led them astray by her shameful carnalities, simony, and worldly pomp. And as, previous to her fall, her malice and her power grievously oppressed the spirit of the elect, and hindered the conversion of the world, so will her overthrow be to the saints as a release from their captivity.” “The seat of corruption,” he says, “is more especially in the fleshly clergy, who hold the high places of Babylon; there it exists to a far greater extent than in the communities under them.”*

Oliva agrees with the abbot Joachim, also, in that he describes the period of the Holy Ghost as being, at the same time, the Johannean period. To him, also, John stands as the representative of the contemplative bent, and of the new evangelical mode of life, the prototype of the *ordo evangelicus*. So he expounds Rev. x. 10, in the sense that, by the new evangelical order, the work first commenced by the apostles shall be completed, and the mass of the pagans and Jews converted to Christianity.† The twelve gates of the kingdom of

* In quo bestialis vita singulariter regnat et sedet sicut in sua principali sede et longe plus quam in laicis et plebibus sibi subjectis.

† Ut per ipsum Joannem designatur in communi ordo evangelicus et contemplativus, scitur ex ipsa intelligentia libri, quod per istum ordinem debet hoc impleri.

God, mentioned in Rev. xxi. 12, he applies more particularly to the great teachers of this last period, by whose means the kingdom of God was to be extended among the pagans and Jews;* for, as it belonged more properly to the apostles to build, under Christ, the foundation of the whole church and of the Christian faith, so it belongs more properly to these to stand as the open gates—as those by whom the Christian wisdom is opened and explained;† for as a tree, so long as it subsists only in its root, cannot as yet unfold its whole peculiar nature, and let every part of it be seen, which can only be done when, in its branches, leaves, blossoms, and fruit, it has reached its complete development,—so the tree, or building of the church and of the divine wisdom, which shines forth in its different parts after manifold ways, neither could nor should unfold itself from the beginning, as it can and must do in its perfection.‡ As the course of development marked by the Old, supposes a gradual progression, so does the process of the development of Christian wisdom, on the foundation of the New Testament.” §

It is plain that, notwithstanding the wild and singular notions which are mixed in with his more profound ideas, we may reckon Oliva as belonging, with the abbot Joachim, among the prophetic men who bore within them the germs of great spiritual developments in the future, though intermingled with a chaotic mass of heterogeneous elements. His ideas

* Licet per Apostolos et per alios Sanctos secundi generalis status intraverit multitudo populorum ad Christum tanquam per portas civitatis Dei, nihilominus magis appropriate competit hoc principalibus doctoribus tertii generalis status.

† Sicut enim Apostolis magis competit esse cum Christo fundamenta totius ecclesiæ et fidei Christianæ, sic istis plus competit, esse portas apertas et apertores seu explicatores sapientiæ Christianæ.

‡ Sicut arbor, dum est in sola radice, non potest sic tota omnibus explicari seu explicite monstrari, sicut quando est in ramis et foliis et fructibus consummata, sic arbor seu fabrica ecclesiæ et divinæ providentiæ ac sapientiæ in ejus partibus diversimode refulgentis et participatæ non sic potuit nec debuit ab initio explicari sicut in sua consummatione poterit et debet.

§ Sicut ab initio mundi usque ad Christum crevit successive illuminatio populi Dei et explicatio ordinis et processus totius veteris testamenti et providentiæ Dei in fabricatione et gubernatione, sic est et de illuminationibus et explicationibus Christianæ sapientiæ in statu novi testamenti.

relative to the process of the development of revelation and of the church were incapable of being shaped out and applied, except by the calm, scientific insight of a distant futurity. In his own times, however, it was the imaginative element in the writings of Oliva, and that part of them which touched on the favourite ideas of the strict Franciscans and other zealous defendants of an evangelical poverty, such as were found among the people called Beghards,* which promoted their circulation. The magisterial decree of the superiors of his order, against Oliva's writings,† could not hinder their influence. We shall perceive the after-workings of them in the succeeding periods.

Among those in whom the power of those ideas expressed by the abbot Joachim, and which filled the spiritual atmosphere, is plainly seen, we shall notice, in this connection, the Italian *Apostolicals*. Though the history of this party reaches into the following period, yet we think it proper to take up the whole matter in the present connection, because their commencement belongs in this period, and their history is very closely inwoven with those kindred manifestations which we have been contemplating in this section. We shall first have to consider these Italian Apostolicals as one of the many forms of manifestation of that idea, which we saw springing up under so many different shapes, from Arnold of Brescia and onwards. Their first founder was Gerhard Segarelli of Parma.‡ Born in the village of Alzano, in the province of Parma,§ he had settled down in that city, where he pursued some sort of a trade. Disgusted with the common pursuits of the world, and awakened to an earnest desire after a more serious and hearty Christian life, he felt impelled, like so many other pious men

* See Vol. VII. p. 419.

† See Wadding. *Annales*, at the year 1297. N. 35.

‡ The history of his life was more fully given in the Chronicle composed by the Franciscan Salimbenus de Adam, belonging to this time. This has not been published; but extracts from it, which relate to the history of Segarelli, are said to have been communicated by the Italian jurist Francesco Pegna, in his remarks on the *Directorium Inquisitionis* of Nicholas Eymericus, f. 271, ed. Venet. 1595. I follow, here, the quotations of Mosheim; for, in the Roman edition of 1585, lying before me, I do not find this piece.

§ The Chronicle of Parma, published by Muratori, in the 9th vol. of the *Scriptores rerum Italicarum*, p. 826.

of his times, to follow the pattern of the apostles in a total renunciation of earthly interest. Hoping to find such an apostolical community in the Franciscan order, he expressed a desire to enter this order; but his reception into it was for some cause or other delayed. While pursuing his daily practice of abandoning himself to devotional meditations before a picture in the Franciscan church, representing the apostles in the coarse garments and slippers usually assigned to them in this period,* he became more and more fixed in the resolution to found an apostolical community, which should labour for nothing else but for the conversion of men. That form of the apostolical community which he found in the Franciscan order no longer satisfied him: it was a freer union which his mind demanded—a union not held together by any vow, rule, or law, but a union of brethren actuated solely by the free spirit of love. So, in the year 1260, suiting his dress to the style in which the apostles were represented, he went forth as a preacher of repentance, and gradually a number of others joined him. As he and his companions were in the habit of commencing their sermons with the Ave Maria, the recitation of the Apostles' creed, and the Lord's prayer, and as the substance of their discourses was altogether practical,—as they entered into no discussions of the church-doctrines, perhaps were not conscious of any opposition to them,—they went on for a long time unmolested, for the appearance of such itinerant preachers of repentance was nothing extraordinary; and, moreover, the political disturbances which then agitated Italy, diverted public attention from such singularities. Thus it was in the power of this society of apostolical brethren to propagate themselves for twenty years, and also to extend themselves beyond the limits of Italy. At length, however, the rapid increase of the sect excited the suspicion of the bishop of Parma, and he had Gerhard arrested and confined. Yet he could find nothing in him that was heretical, but looked upon him, as he might well do, from the many singularities in his conduct, as a crazy fanatic, not deserving of punishment, but

* In the extracts from Salimben's Chronicle: *Super coopertorium lampadis depicti erant apostoli circumcirca cum soleis in pedibus et cum mantellis circa scapulas involuti, sicut traditio pictorum ab antiquis accepit,—ubi iste contemplatur.*

needed only to be watched ;* and he bestowed every attention upon him in his palace, till, growing tired of him, he set him at liberty in 1286. He banished him, however, from the city of Parma and from the entire diocese. Yet pope Honorius the Fourth, in the same year, found it necessary to issue a bull, addressed to all bishops, and calling upon them to suppress all those spiritual societies existing without papal confirmation, whose members went about begging, to the great peril of their own souls, and the grievous scandal of many in different countries of the world. True, it must already have been perceived that such modes of life were employed by numbers for the dissemination of heretical doctrines,† yet no indication is to be found in the papal document that any such society had, on the whole, drawn upon itself the suspicion of an heretical tendency. On the contrary, it is presupposed that they were, on the whole, devoted to the Catholic church ; it was simply required of them that, in order to preclude the dangers to which they exposed themselves and others, they must, if they wished to continue such a mode of life, attach themselves to some existing order of mendicant friars. Neither is it clear that the ordinance was directed against Segarelli's society in particular, which is not indicated in any way. There were, in fact, a number of such communities, which had arisen among the laity in different countries ; and so the pope renewed the ordinance which Gregory the Tenth, in the twenty-third canon of the council of Lyons, in 1274, had issued against communities of "mendicants," not standing under papal confirmation ; but then, if the ordinance was not expressly directed against *this* spiritual society, it could not fail to have a very serious effect on its prosperity : the inquisitorial measures of the church authorities would, by virtue of it, be called forth

* When, afterwards, the heretical tendency of the Apostolicals came to light, men would, of course, no longer be satisfied with this mild declaration. We must interpret in the sense that the heretic, who resorted to every species of falsehood and deceit to gain his end, feigned madness for the purpose of escaping deserved punishment, as Salimbeno says: *Amentiam finxit ideoque carcere eductus*. But such cunning and dissimulation were certainly altogether inconsistent with the natural disposition of this man.

† As it is said: *Cum nonnulli pravitatis hæreticæ vitio laborantes sub hujusmodi habitu asserantur inventi*.

against all such combinations.* This freer reaction of the Christian spirit, extending under so many various forms among the laity, could not thus be suppressed. Pope Nicholas the Fourth was obliged, four years later, in 1290, to issue another circular letter against the Apostolicals, couched in terms similar to the first,† which shows how little had been effected by the first.‡ The Italian Apostolicals, who refused to abandon

* At the council of Würzburg, A. D. 1287, the 34th canon was enacted against it: *Leccatores sive reprobatos apostolos in eorum reprobata regula remanere vetantes omnino volumus, quod nullus clericus, nulla sæcularis persona intuitu religionis eorum ac insolito habitu eos de cætero recipiat aut eis alimenta ministret.* It cannot, however, as Mosheim supposes, be certainly proved, from this ordinance, that the Apostolicals, originating with Segarelli, had already spread as far as Germany; for as such communities everywhere abounded in the twelfth and thirteenth centuries, and particularly in Germany, and as it is simply the mark common to all such societies which is here mentioned, so there is nothing to warrant us to fix upon the Segarellian community rather than any other. At the council of Chichester, in 1289, the thirty-eighth canon was passed against such as, professing themselves members of some apostolical society, preached, heard confessions, and pretending that they were in want of books of a sacramental chalice, or of some other church-utensil, collected money and deceived the people: *Quidam non veri fratres, nec veraciter quidem de ordine Apostolorum existentes Apostolorum habitum et tonsuram portantes, in plerisque ecclesiis et aliis locis nostræ diœcesis prædicationis et audiendi confessionem officium præsumptuose exercuerunt et aliquoties eorum prædicationem ad quæstum pecuniarum et aliud lucrum turpe florido colore subventionis ad calicem vel librum vel aliud ornamentum ecclesiasticum, quos eos egere asserunt, converterunt, &c.* See Wilkins, *Concil. Brit. T. II. f. 172.* Mosheim acknowledges that marks here occur which cannot apply to the Segarellian apostolicals. Why ought we not, then, to refer this ordinance of the German, as well as that of the English council, to all such societies of Apostolicals, or Beghards, among whom, as among the proper monks, there were men of very different religious and moral characters, without any particular reference to the Italian Apostolicals? When these are described in the first passage, as *leccatores* (voluptuaries), this designation may have been deserved by many who used the pretended apostolical mode of life only as a hypocritical mask, and wrongly applied to others by the heresy-hating spirit.

† As we may conclude from the report of Nicholas Eymericus, l. c. f. 288, ed. Rom. 1585.

‡ The author of the *Additamentum ad historiam Dolcini*, in Muratori's *Scriptores rerum Italicarum*, T. IX. f. 448, who wrote in the year 1316, says the contrary, it is true, of the effect of that first papal document. *Post prædictas literas apostolicas dicta secta perniciosa cœpit dejici paulatim et a fidelibus evitari;* but what he himself reports, in the sequel, sufficiently proves that we are not to regard the effect as having been

their vocation, which they believed to be from God, were only driven thereby to a more violent opposition to the papacy and the dominant church. They stood forth against it as a worldly and corrupt church, and began to describe it as the Babylon of the Apocalypse. They were now persecuted as opponents of the church, and heretics. Many died at the stake: Segarelli himself, having ventured to show himself once more within the diocese of Parma, was, in 1294, thrown into prison. By consenting to make a recantation of the erroneous doctrines imputed to him, he escaped the stake, but was condemned to perpetual confinement.* The inquisitors, however, managed to find out that they had been deceived by him, and that he was still given to the same erroneous doctrines as before, and so he was condemned, as one who had relapsed into heresy, to the stake, and died in the year 1300.

With the death of their first founder this sect was by no means broken up. It was connected with a spiritual excitement growing out of the prevailing temper of those times, in which the individual Segarelli, a man of no great force of personal character, was of subordinate importance; and there stood already at the head of the Apostolical community a man altogether superior to Segarelli, in mind, education, and practical efficiency, who had joined him at some earlier period. This was Dolcino,† the natural son of a priest,

very great; and a limitation indeed is implied in the word paulatim. But when the author says that the sect could not be wholly suppressed, quia longe lateque in diversis mundi partibus se diffuderat, the question arises whether he was not under another mistake, in identifying with the sect of Segarelli all the different branches of the Apostolicals which had started from the same idea with that sect, but outwardly had no sort of connection with it.

* Addit. ad hist. Dolcini, l. c. f. 450, and Chronicon Parmense, l. c. f. 826.

† The principal sources are, the *Historia Dolcini* and the *Addimenta ad historiam Dolcini* in Muratori's *Scriptores rerum Italicarum*, T. IX. I learn from the work of Julius Krone: "Frà Dolcino and the Patarenes," that Christofora Baggiolini, professor at Vercelli, in a work entitled *Dolcino e i Patareni notizie storiche*, Novara, 1838, has published, from the archives of Vercelli, some new documents on Dolcino's history, which frequently contradict those published by Muratori. Respecting the value of these new documents, as bearing on the right apprehension of Dolcino, I cannot decide, because I have never seen them; but however disputable some things may be in the history

in a village belonging to the diocese of Novara;* he was destined for the spiritual order, and educated with a view to it. He obtained the requisite literary qualifications, and distinguished himself by the quickness of his parts and the rapid development of his intellectual powers, as well as by the winning kindness of his natural disposition.† If we could trust a story from a good source, though not wholly free from all liability to suspicion,‡ Dolcino did not from his youth

of Dolcino, yet at any rate the comparison of the appearance of this man with kindred appearances, in which connection we have endeavoured to seize it, presents, on the whole, a picture of decided and well-marked outlines.

* According to the sources early published, Trontano, in the upper Ossola-Thal; according to the documents in Baggiolini, Prato, in the diocese of Vercelli, between Grignasco and Romagnano, the work of Krone, p. 27.

† We are indebted for these statements to Benvenuto of Imola, who, in the fourteenth century, wrote a commentary on the *Divina Commedia* of Dante, from which Muratori has published extracts in his *Antiquitates Italicae medii ævi*, T. I. folio edition. This Benvenuto had his information from the mouth of the nephew of a physician, Raynald de Bergamo, who was Dolcino's physician. He says of him: *Erat acutissimi ingenii iste Dulcinus, ita quod in brevi factus est optimus scholaris; quum esset parvæ staturæ, facie lætus, omnibus gratus.* L. c. f. 1122.

‡ It is the source just cited. The particular circumstances in the story may have served to give it currency: *Surripuit furto sacerdoti præfato certam pecuniæ summam, quia nimis fidebat ei. Ideo, ut sæpe accidit, sacerdos imputabat hoc furtum cuidam familiari suo, cui nomen erat Patras. Qui moleste ferens injustam infamiam, clandestine Dulcinum captum compulit terrore privatæ torturæ ad confessionem furti et iratus juste volebat ducere Dulcinum ad publicum supplicium. Sed sacerdos prohibuit, ne fieret irregularis. Dulcinus autem territus secessit inscio sacerdote et contulit se ad ultrema Italiæ ad civitatem Tridenti.* But we know how easily rumours arise to the disadvantage of persons decried as heretics, and how especially inclined men ever are to trace the origin of their heretical tendencies to wicked motives. Now of Dolcino's early boyhood and youth nothing had been heard but what was good. But on the presupposition that the heretic must have been a bad man from the beginning, all his good qualities could only be pretended: wickedness must have been concealed under the mask of virtue, and would some time or other make itself manifest. (Thus Benvenuto, reporting what was good of him, adds: *sed non diu occultavit pravitatem, quæ latebat sub egregia indole.*) If, perhaps, when a young man animated with a zeal for reform, he betook himself to Tyrol, for the purpose of winning over to his views the simple mountaineers, then this first step of his heretical career must be directly traced to something bad. He wanted to escape deserved punishment, and as he afterwards introduced the

upward maintain a character quite pure from all stain. He is said to have purloined a sum of money from the ecclesiastic who managed his education, and who reposed the utmost confidence in him; and to escape the threatened punishment, when he was compelled to confess his guilt, he fled to the districts of Trent, in the Tyrol. If this account is strictly true; if Dolcino, on the contrary, full already of his reformatory ideas, suggested to him, perhaps, by the representation of the apostolical life in his Latin New Testament, as contrasted with the corruption of the clergy of his times, did not betake himself to the districts of the Tyrol for the sake of spreading these ideas more easily and safely, we are left without the means of reconciling the Dolcino who was capable of committing the crime above mentioned with the Dolcino who appears in the character of a reformer and Apostolical. It remains in fact a psychological enigma,—how there should have arisen in the mind of one who robbed his benefactor of money to gratify his lusts an enthusiasm for the ideal of an apostolical community of goods; how such an one could have been carried away by zeal against the corruption of the worldly-minded clergy. This is a self-contradiction, which must render the whole story suspicious to us.* Only two suppositions remain to solve this contradiction: either that a great change had transpired in the religious and moral life of Dolcino, and to this was to be traced the opposition he manifested against the corruption of the church of his times, or that there was some intrinsic connection between his want of respect for another's property in his early youth, and the tendency which later in life caused him to appear as a zealot for the community of goods,—certainly a very improbable supposition.

apostolical community of goods, so it naturally occurred to represent his first transgression as one in which he was led to disregard the rights of property. Accidental circumstances may have furnished the occasion for such a setting forth of the story. I would only hint a possible doubt, not decide.

* Against its credibility is the fact, also, that these writers, belonging to a place and period which breathed nothing but hostility to Dolcino, of whom they are eager to say everything bad, still mention nothing of this sort, which they gladly would have done if it had been true, for the purpose of showing that the hidden root of his heresy was covetousness.

But however this may have been, the districts of Tyrol were the first field of Dolcino's activity as a reformer; and here he might easily have come in contact with anti-churchly tendencies which had been spread there ever since the time of Arnold of Brescia. Here he appeared at first as a zealot against the corruption of the clergy, living in pomp and luxury; and as he himself went in coarse apparel, like the so-called Beghards, Humiliates, so he was for setting up a society in opposition to the clergy, composed of those who were willing to make a total renunciation of the world, and live without any property whatever.* Driven from this place by persecutions, he betook himself to those districts where the apostolical society of Segarelli was established, joined it, and, after the death of Segarelli, became the leader of the party. He travelled about Italy, seeking opportunities to extend his sect, but, everywhere dogged by the Inquisitors, he was obliged to flee from city to city. Thrice he fell into the hands of the Inquisition, but so managed his part as to deceive the judges, and gain his liberty.† According to the original principles of the Apostolicals, all Christ's commands should be observed to the letter; and so every attestation was to be a simple yea or nay.‡ But the strictness of these principles must in this case have yielded, or the interpretation of them accommodated itself to the force of circumstances. As Dolcino denied the competency of that ecclesiastical tribunal, or the right of any mere human authority to call others to an account for their religious convictions, so he seems to have considered it allowable to deceive by an oath those judges who arrogated to themselves a lordship over the conscience which did not belong to them. The verbal answer might be given in one way, the convictions of the heart held in another. So long as a man could save his life by such prevarication, the end would

* So says Benvenuto: *Ibi in montibus illis inter gentes rudes et credulas cœpit fundare novam sectam in habitu fratricelli sine ordine, prædicans se verum Dei apostolum et quod omnia debebant communicari in caritate.*

† He confessed this at his last trial. See the *Historia Dolcini* in Muratori, T. IX. f. 436.

‡ See in the protocol of the Inquisition at Toulouse, published by Philip of Limborch, f. 361, the declaration of an Apostolical with regard to oaths. He says to the inquisitor: *Quod caveret sibi, quod non peccaret, faciendo ipsum jurare, quia in evangelio Deus prohibuerat jurare.*

sanctify the means,*—a principle which Dolcino undoubtedly applied in other cases where the circumstances seemed to require it.

At length he retired to Dalmatia, a safer spot. From thence he issued a circular letter to the brethren scattered through all countries, and directed also to Christians generally. He claimed for himself a divine mission, having respect not barely to a particular community, but to entire Christendom; to announce to all the judgment impending over the corrupt church, to present before all the pattern of the resuscitated apostolical life, since the entire purified church was to pass over into this apostolical brotherly community. This letter began with the confession of his orthodoxy, which his opponents pronounced a mere pretence. He then described the nature of the new Christian community, by which the perfection of the apostolic life was to be restored, a union without the outward vow of obedience, preserved only by the inward bond of love.† This fellowship, he declares, had been specially sent and chosen in these last days of the world, by God the Father, for the salvation of souls. He, the brother Dolcino, as he styled himself, had been specially called and chosen by God, with revelations communicated to him respecting present and future events, which furnished a key for the understanding of the Old and New Testament. He calls Gerhard Segarelli the founder of this last reformation of the Christian life, and himself the divinely commissioned leader of the new spiritual community, to qualify him for which office the understanding of the prophecies in the Bible had been revealed to him.‡ He presented his intuitions of the onward movement of the church, of her increasing conflicts till the appearance of antichrist, and of her triumph, for which the way was to be prepared by the Apostolicals. He expressed himself throughout in the tone of a prophet. Anticipating, he said, the impending judgments of God, he had hidden himself, and fled from the presence of

* See the *Additamentum* in Muratori, f. 457. N. 20.

† *Congregationem suam spiritualem esse et propriam in proprio modo vivendi apostolico et proprio nomine cum paupertate propria et sine vinculo obedientiæ exterioris, sed cum interiori tantum.*

‡ *Gerardum inceptorum istius vitæ novissimæ reformatæ, et rectorem alium, scilicet seipsum, a Deo missum super congregationem prædictam cum intelligentia ad aperiendas prophetias.*

his persecutors, as his predecessors had done, till God's appointed time, when all his adversaries were to be destroyed, and he and his would come forth and preach openly.* All their persecutors, all the prelates of the church, were in a short time to be exterminated; those that remained would be converted, and adopt the apostolical mode of living. The Apostolicals would then gain the preponderance in all matters. He subsequently wrote a second and third letter of the same general import.†

Many things in the circumstances of the times,—the appearance of a pope possessed of a spirit so much akin to that of the Apostolicals, and who stood in so strong a contrast with his predecessors, as Celestin the Fifth; the secular drift and policy of Boniface the Eighth, his contests and final humiliation, might appear as a confirmation of Dolcino's predictions. Where the issue plainly contradicted them, he still might not allow himself to be nonplused, and would only have to give them a different interpretation.

Dolcino had determined to await the final crisis in Dalmatia, where he had founded a small community; but by the invitation of a wealthy landowner of his native country, Milano Sola, in the valley of Sessia, near Campertolio, in the province of Novara, he was induced, in the year 1304, to take refuge in that place, and from thence he extended his sect amongst men and women. Numbers flocked to him from all quarters. The attempts to waylay him led him to flee for security, with a band of adherents, amounting to two thousand men and women, to an inaccessible mountain; but here, though safe from other enemies, they were exposed to perish by famine. As none would willingly supply them with the means of subsistence, they took the liberty to obtain it by force from the surrounding country. The Apostolicals, who accused the dominant church of apostasy from the doctrine of Christ on account of the persecutions which they practised, who condemned all shedding of blood as unchristian, and were for committing everything to the judgment of God, were forced by necessity to depart from their own principles. Dolcino once more let down his

* *Usque ad tempus præfinitum, in quo ipse et sui publice apparebunt et publice prædicabunt, omnibus suis adversariis exterminatis.*

† From the first two extracts in the *Additamentis ad historiam Dolcini*.

theory to the exigencies of practice. The Apostolicals looked upon their relation to the adherents of the dominant church as one of open war. The end of self-preservation must again sanction the means. In the year 1305 a crusade was proclaimed against Dolcino. With consummate skill he directed for two years the measures of defence against a superior force, and was able to inspire his friends with an enthusiastic courage, which surmounted every difficulty till the year 1307, when the remnant of the famished Apostolicals, after fighting with desperate bravery, surrendered to the superior force of their enemies.* One of the captives was Dolcino, who, under the most cruel tortures which fanaticism and a thirst for vengeance could devise, manifested a steady calmness, which filled even his enemies with astonishment, though we can hardly doubt that it was rather the stoicism of the intoxicated enthusiast, than the calm submission of the sober, genuinely Christian martyr, with his eye fixed in the full consciousness of human weakness on the image of his suffering Master.

In Dolcino we see the climax of that ascetical view of Christian charity,† according to which it should manifest itself, not in the appropriation of all earthly means for the advancement of God's kingdom, but in the renunciation of every earthly advantage; not in the conciliation and subordi-

* It is foreign from our purpose to enter farther into the account of this remarkable war. We refer on this point to the more full investigation and description in the above-mentioned work of Krone.

† Krone (p. 35), following the documents published by Baggiolini, gives a peculiar account of Dolcino's doctrines, according to which they would resemble those of the later Beghards. But we must have these documents before us, in order to form any decided judgment with regard to their credibility. We do not venture, therefore, as yet, to follow this new view of the matter, but hold to the documents made known to us by Muratori, which, to be sure, do not contain a full representation of the doctrines of Dolcino, and indeed presuppose a great deal that is wanting. It is very true, the Spanish author, Alvarus Pelagius, who began to write his work, *De planctu ecclesiæ*, at Avignon, when papal pœnitentiary, A. D. 1330, says, Lib. II. f. 172, ed. 1517: *Caput istius sectæ spiritus libertatis istis temporibus fuit Dulchinus Lombardus qui fuit combustus cum quadam sua meretrice in Lombardia prope Vercellensem civitatem*; but even he does not sufficiently distinguish the different kinds of Apostolicals, Beghards, and brothers of the free spirit.

nation of the inequalities of condition flowing out of human relations, and necessary to the various development of man's nature, but in the total abnegation of those differences. In opposition to the worldliness of the church, he proposed an entire estrangement from the world by a fraternal association of love, in which all should be united together under a voluntary bond, independent of constraint and law, and with the repudiation of all property and all inequalities of condition. Connected with this view of love in the form of entire estrangement from the world, was his view of marriage, which he would have separated from all sensuous affections, substituting a purely spiritual fellowship between husband and wife in the place of marriage, reviving the ascetical fanaticism of the *Syneisactæ*. Such was the spiritual union in which he lived himself with the sister Margaret, whom, in the introduction to his letters, he called "the beloved above all others," (*præ cæteris sibi dilectissima*.) It was the most dangerous error in this fanatical drift. Sense thus despised, under the false persuasion of a superiority of the spirit over the flesh, would easily find occasions to manifest itself, and in a worse way than before. This principle was to be carried to the point, that all mankind should come to live together in perfect innocence as brothers and sisters, and this fellowship of love, renouncing every earthly feeling, was to form the transition-point to the end of all things and the fulfilment of the kingdom of Christ.

Dolcino distinguished four stages and divisions in the progress of the kingdom of God on the earth. First, the stage of the Old Testament, where, as all depended on the multiplication of the human race, everything was arranged with reference to this end. As at this stage corruption spread wider and wider, Christ with the apostles and their successors appeared, to heal the infirmities incident to the earlier condition. Humility, patience, poverty, chastity, were opposed to the corruption of the preceding stage. The unmarried life was now preferred before marriage; the renunciation of all possessions to the possession of earthly goods. This second stage lasted till the time of Constantine or pope Silvester, and the latter generations gradually departed from the perfection of the preceding ones, till the third period appeared, when

the multitudes of the heathen were converted in increasing numbers to Christianity. To train them by degrees for Christianity, and to show them how the things of earth should be used in the love of God and our neighbour, the church had now to assume earthly possessions and riches. She must make use of secular power, and rule in order to educate and guide the rude people. Hence, then, a departure was required from the original condition of apostolical poverty.* But when men grew cold in the love of God and their neighbours, when they departed from the example of Silvester, and from the right use of earthly goods, the stricter rule of Benedict appeared as a reaction.† For a time virtuous ecclesiastics and monks were to be found side by side; both forms of living were good, each in its place; save that in the case of the ecclesiastics, or the majority of them, the goodness went on diminishing, while in the case of the monks it went on increasing; the clerical life gradually lost its influence, and monachism continually gained the preponderance.‡ But when, again, both ecclesiastics and monks had almost entirely lost the love of God and their neighbours, and departed from their primitive mode of life, then, as a reaction against this state of things, came the renunciation of all earthly possessions and of all temporal lordship, in the rules of Francis and Dominick § Still, even this reformation did not afford an adequate counterpoise to the extensive spread of corruption among the monks

* Dum sic convertebantur et non refrigerabantur in amore Dei et proximi, melius fuit sancto Silvestro papæ et aliis successoribus suis possessiones terrenas et divitias suscipere et habere, quam paupertas apostolica et melius fuit regere populum, quam non regere, ad tenendum ipsum sic et conservandum.

† Quando incœperunt populi refrigerari a caritate Dei et proximi et declinare a modo vivendi sancti Silvestri, tunc melior fuit modus vivendi beati Benedicti, quam aliquis alius, quia in terrenis fuit strictior et a temporali dominio magis separatus.

‡ Et tamen ita bonus erat tunc modus bonorum clericorum, qui tunc erant, sicut monachorum, nisi quod modus clericorum bonorum secundum majorem partem numeri eorum erat in diminuendo et monachorum erat in multiplicando.

§ Quando clerici et monachi quasi ex toto a caritate Dei et proximi refrigerati fuerunt et declinaverunt a priori statu suo, tunc melior fuit modus vivendi sancti Francisci et sancti Dominici et magis strictus in possidendo res terrenas et in dominio temporali magis quam modus vivendi beati Benedicti et monachorum.

and ecclesiastics. All prelates, ecclesiastics, and monks waxed colder and colder in the love of God and of their neighbours ; departed farther and farther from the way of life among their predecessors. For the purpose, then, of checking this tide of corruption, the life of the Apostolical brethren was instituted by a divine call ; and this is the fourth and last stage of the Christian life, which is to continue till the final judgment ; the last defence against the encroaching torrent of worldliness. In like manner, Dolcino marked out the different periods of the church. The first, when the church was a holy and humble one ; the second, from Silvester and onwards, when the church was honoured and rich, but still persevered, however, in righteousness ; the third, as she now is, rich and honoured, but at the same time apostate from God, full of avarice, luxury, and pride ;* the fourth corresponds to the first, as being the restoration of the Apostolical perfection.

The mode of life among the Apostolical brethren differs from that of the mendicant orders of monks in two respects : First, the latter have monasteries, to which they carry what they have gained by begging. The Apostolical brethren have no houses, and take nothing with them, hoard nothing up ; they live from hand to mouth, on the pittance bestowed on them at the moment by the charity of the pious.† Secondly, the Apostolicals, in distinction from the other orders of monks, do not bind themselves to their mode of life by any outward

* *Tertius status fuit et est modo dives, avarus, fornicarius, honorabilis et superbus.* The word *fornicarius* may be understood in the proper or the improper apocalyptic sense. Here very probably in the latter, as Dolcino really taught (see Muratori, f. 456): *ecclesia Romana est illa meretrix, quæ a fide Christi apostavit, and the Apostolical Peter de Lugio styled the corrupt church Babylon, and the great whore of the Apocalypse.* In the protocol published by Philip of Limborch, l. c. f. 361.

† *Nos nec domos habemus nec etiam mendicata portare debemus,* says Dolcino. The Apostolical Peter de Lugio, from Spain, *Petrus Lucensis*, distinguished the perfect and imperfect poverty: the *perfecta paupertas, quam tenuerunt Apostoli et omnes illi, qui sequuntur et imitantur eos, videlicet nihil habere, nec in proprio nec in communi.* Item est *paupertas imperfecta, sicut est religiosorum viventium secundum regulam sancti Augustini et sancti Benedicti, qui habent possessiones et divitias in communi et tales religiosi non sunt perfecti in paupertate, quia habent domos ad manendum et in communi necessaria ad comedendum et bibendum.* See the Inquisitional sentence-book of Philip of Limborch, f. 360.

and formal vows;* they are not bound by any outward rule of obedience to a particular class of superiors, but, with them, all the members are held together by the free spirit of love; no other bond exists but the inner one of the Holy Spirit. Thus Dolcino set up against the legal condition that of gospel liberty. Though the Apostolicals recognized men called of God as the founders and guides of their society, yet they were not subject to them by an outward vow of obedience. The monkish virtue of obedience must wholly cease, according to the principles of the Apostolicals, who admitted no form of obedience whatever, but that of free obedience to God. Dolcino, in his letters to the different communities of the Apostolicals, describes them as brethren mutually subordinate, and bound to each other by ties of affection, without the bond of outward obedience.† As Dolcino uniformly opposed the inward power and desecularization of religion, to its externalization and conformity to the world, in the corrupt church, so he undervalued the importance attached to consecrated places of worship. “A church,” he is reported to have said, “is no better for prayer to God, than a stable or a sty.‡ Christ may be worshipped as well, or even better, in groves than in churches.” It is clear that the above principle and tendency must have led him to depart in a great many other ways from the church doctrine, than his unsettled life and prevailing practical bent allowed him liberty to express with consciousness; unless it be the fault of the records which we follow, that we have but a very imperfect knowledge of Dolcino’s principles in their logical coherence.

Dolcino taught, again, that the church of Rome, by reason of her apostasy, and of the prevailing vices among ecclesiastics and monks, had lost all the authority conferred on her in the person of the apostle Peter. This was transferred to the community which restored the apostolical life, and was to be a refuge for all truly Christian people. The Apostolical Peter, of Lugio, made a distinction betwixt the spiritual and the carnal church (*ecclesia spiritualis et carnalis*). The

* One of the principles of Dolcino in Muratori (T. IX. f. 457.): Quod perfectior vita est vivere sine voto, quam cum voto.

† Omnes invicem sine vinculo exterioris obedientiæ, sed interioris tantum subjecti et uniti.

‡ Muratori, T. IX. f. 457

former consists of those who live in perfect poverty and humility, and in spiritual obedience to God; but the second, of those who live in fleshly lusts, riches, and honour, in the pomp and glory of the world, like the prelates of the church of Rome.

If the representation given by opponents of Dolcino's doctrine is correct, he announced that after the corrupt church had been deprived of her wealth by some king whom God would choose as the instrument of the judgments to be brought upon her, and reduced back to apostolical poverty, the Roman pope and the incorrigible prelates were to be slain, and a new holy pope, the worthy successor of Peter, to be chosen by God himself, and this was to be Dolcino, should he be then living.* Unquestionably, it follows from the supposition that the apostolical brethren represent the restored apostolical church, to which is transferred all the plenitude of the Holy Ghost that distinguished the apostolic age, to which passes over the entire authority bestowed on Peter; from this supposition it unquestionably follows that their divinely commissioned leader must hold the first place; that, namely, which was before occupied by the pope, yet with the modification growing out of the nature of *free* obedience, of the brotherly community, the universal outpouring of the Holy Spirit.

It is manifest from Dolcino's doctrine, as thus set forth, that Joachim's idea of the period of the Holy Ghost harmonizes with it; though none of the older contemporary sources ascribe to him this idea.† According to Dolcino's doctrine,

* The latter is stated, however, only, in the *Historia Dolcini* in Muratori. According to the *Additamentis*, which are more accurate in their representation of Dolcino's doctrine, Dolcino distinguishes himself from this pope; and the supposition that he declared himself to be this pope, may have been nothing more than a false conclusion of his enemies.

† Notices of heretics of a later time in the French language, which are to be found in the libraries of Avignon and Marseilles, attribute to Dolcino that whole doctrine about the three ages, or periods; but these surely are no credible sources of information, since we find Dolcino confounded in them with the *Fratricelli* of the fourteenth century. I am indebted for this account to the kind communications of M. G. Heine of this city, one of my dear young theologians, who has for some years consecrated his means and talents to literary investigations, particularly in the libraries of Spain, from which a rich harvest may be expected in due

also, the last period might be called a time of the Holy Ghost, inasmuch as the distinguishing characteristic of this period was to be the free inspiration by the Holy Spirit, in the Apostolical brethren and sisters, of a life no longer depending, as before, on outward means and ordinances, but purely producing itself from within outwards.

We may also mention as a thing deserving of notice, that the great poet, Dante, a contemporary, compares Dolcino with Mohammed. He composed his work after Dolcino's death; but he transports himself back to the time when the heresiarch was besieged in those inaccessible mountains, covered with snow and ice, where starvation appeared the only method of forcing him to submission. He represents Mohammed, therefore, as telling Dante that he might warn brother Dolcino to look out, and provide himself well with the means of subsistence, for otherwise he would soon be compelled to yield, and come down to Mohammed in hell.* The question is, What led Dante to bring these two personages together? No doubt, because he looked upon him as a false prophet, determined to assert his pretended divine mission with the sword, and had heard of the doctrine of a community of wives, which was imputed to Dolcino by his opponents, and the like. But a certain truth lies at bottom of this comparison, different as these individuals were in other respects. In both we find a true element of religious enthusiasm, though perverted by the intermingling of natural feelings not controlled, and an imagination not held in curb by the divine life; both had a partial view of truth in one of its aspects, as opposed to prevailing errors. In the case of Mohammed, enthusiasm for the faith in one Almighty God stood abruptly opposed to polytheism; in the case of Dolcino, enthusiasm for a religious community, estranged from the world, stood abruptly opposed to a worldly church. Both meant, at first, to labour simply as prophets—

time. The same friend has also sent me a *historia Dolcini* transcribed by him, which, however, is not different from the one already published by Muratori.

* The words in the 28th canto of the *Inferno*, v. 55.

Or di a Fra Dolcin dunque, che s' armi.
 Tu che forse vedrai il sole in breve,
 S'egli non vuol qui tosto seguarmi
 Sì di vivanda, che stretta di neve
 Non rechi la vittoria al Noarese,
 Ch' altrimenti acquistar non saria lieve.

simply by the word—but afterwards fell into the mistake as appealing to the sword in defence of truth. In the case of Mohammed, success hurried him on to further steps; in that of Dolcino, it was necessity: yet in Mohammed, this course of proceeding was certainly grounded in his whole religious mode of thinking, which was an incarnation of Judaism. In Dolcino, it was adopted in contradiction to the principles originally laid down by him: yet as he was bent on realizing at once, in the form of an outward community, overlooking, with enthusiastic love, the great gulf betwixt his purpose and its accomplishment, an idea which Christianity would realize by moral spirit and temper in the very process of that historical development which proceeds in conformity with nature, so by this externalization and secularization of a thing that was only to be seized ideally and spiritually, he was hurried along farther and farther in the same course of secular action.

Ideas which have once acquired in a period a certain domination, are wont to lay hold of manifestations proceeding from some entirely different quarter, merely furnishing them a point of attachment; and to stamp their signature upon fanatical tendencies, which happen to meet and mingle with them, assuming in the same some strange, fantastic shape. Thus we may instance, as illustrating the power which the idea of the age of the Holy Ghost exerted on the minds of men in the thirteenth century, a sect otherwise unimportant, which sprung up in the last times of this century in Milan.

In the year 1281 a rich widow, of noble rank, died in Milan, Wilhelma, or Wilhelmina, said to have been a Bohemian princess. Having spent in that city the last twenty or thirty years of her life, she secured the love and respect of many by her piety, and especially by her active charities. A circle of men and women, who had placed themselves under her guidance, and were advised and helped by her in their necessities, had become strongly attached to her. She was revered as a saint, insomuch that the sick applied to her for healing. Already in her lifetime she began to be made an object of extravagant, fanatical veneration, though such demonstrations were never sanctioned by herself, but repelled with abhorrence; but this veneration was not to be suppressed in that way; on the contrary, it increased so much the more after her death.

A citizen of Milan, Andrew Samarita, who seems to have united in himself the characters of impostor and fanatic, undertook to work upon this feeling. The body of Wilhelmina, which had been already buried, was disinterred. Having first been bathed in water and wine, it was enwrapped in costly purple robes, fringed with silver and gold. To the water in which the body had been washed the bewildered enthusiasts ascribed a miraculous virtue; over the recent grave of Wilhelmina they erected a magnificent altar, and pilgrims flocked in great numbers to the spot. It was not enough to honour Wilhelmina as a saint: the veneration exceeded all bounds; the spirit of dissatisfaction and opposition with the dominant church was doubtless connected with it. In Wilhelmina, it was pretended, the Holy Spirit had become incarnate. After the worship of the incarnation of the Divine Word in Christ, was to follow the worship of the Holy Spirit incarnate in Wilhelmina. A new age of the Holy Ghost was to begin. The ancient hierarchy, at whose head stood the vicar of Christ, was to cease; a new female hierarchy, corresponding to the incarnation of the Holy Spirit in a woman, at whose head stood a vicar of Wilhelmina, as the incarnate Holy Spirit, was to take its place. For the present, this place was filled by the nun Mayfreda of Tirovano. In the year 1300 this sect was put down by force, and those who stood at the head of it perished at the stake.*

Since then, as appears evident from the facts above presented, the church had now to engage in a violent contest with tendencies of spirit struggling in opposition to her, continually multiplying and continually spreading,—a contest such as had never occurred before,—she must be driven (in case she would concede nothing to religious needs manifesting themselves with such power, but was determined to maintain her position against all opposition) to employ every means at her command for the purpose of suppressing an insurrection which could not be put down by spiritual might alone. Those principles of ecclesiastical law, on the ground of which all violent measures against heresies could be justified, had, indeed, long

* See the extracts from the trial preserved in the Ambrosian library in the literary tour to Italy, of the Bohemian historiographer, Franz Palacky. Prague, 1838, p. 72, and on.

since been shaped out on the foundation laid by Augustin, and the systematic theologians of the thirteenth century needed, in the present case, only to build further on the same foundation; but the bishops were too busily occupied with other concerns to ferret out, in all quarters, the sects which, with so much zeal and so much prudence, sought to spread themselves in the communities; and in many districts, where the anti-churchly spirit had already become too powerful, they were no longer regarded in the communities with the requisite respect. This was especially the case in South France, in Languedoc, in the territory of the counts of Toulouse; districts where also, at a later period, Protestantism gained a wide spread, and sought to maintain itself in a sanguinary struggle,—where the opponents of the dominant church found protection from mighty lords, and the localities of a mountainous region afforded them safe retreats. The clergy and the church service had here, ever since the last times of the twelfth century, been treated with contempt and ridicule. A characteristic proof of this was the colloquial phrase used in these districts to express a supreme feeling of disgust: “I would rather be a chaplain than that.” By mere chance, the sects scattered in South France* received the common name of Albigenses, from one of the districts, where the agents of the church who came to combat them, found them mostly to abound,†—the district around the town of Alba, or Alby; and

* The man who during the crusades against the Albigenses wrote in verse in the Provençal language the history of this war, published by Fauriel, in the *Collection des documens inédits sur l'histoire de France*, Paris, 1837, says, that the sects were thickly spread throughout the whole province of Alby, Carcassonne, Laurac, in a great part of the province of Beziers as far as Bourdeaux: — — — la eretgia | Era tant fort monteia cui domini Dieus maldia | Que trastotz Albeges (absolutely all,—the appended adverb *tras* gives a superlative signification to the adjective *tous*), avia en sa bailia | Carcasses, Lauragues, tot la major partia | De Beziers tro a Bordel si col cami tenia (as far as the way goes), A motz de lor crezens e de lor companhia (many of their faith and of their party). In the above-mentioned poem, v. 30, et seq.

† In the *Histoire générale de Languedoc*, published by the Maurins, an important work in reference to the history of these struggles (T. III., A. D. 1737), it is asserted, in connection with that inquiry concerning the origin of the name Albigeois, which first threw more light on this subject (note xiii. f. 553), that the heretics were by no means particularly spread over this district, and that it was not this which had occa-

by this common name they were known from the commencement of the thirteenth century.* Under this general denomination parties of different tenets were comprehended together, but the Catharists seem to have constituted a predominant element among the people thus designated. Innocent the Third, a pope accustomed to act in all cases with vigour, well understood that extraordinary measures were needed to suppress the heretical tendencies so rapidly advancing, which threatened wholly to sever the connection betwixt these districts and the church of Rome. As the bishops, who were even here looked upon with contempt, had shown themselves too weak or too inactive, he chose for his instruments the monks,—an order in which the most faithful, zealous, and active organs of the hierarchy were ever to be found, and in whose hands was already placed an exorbitant power independent of the bishops,—the germ of the future inquisitions. At the very commencement of his papal reign, in 1198, he sent to South France two Cistercians, Rainer and Guido, whom he recommended to the bishops and magistrates of those districts, calling upon them to sustain them in their labours in all possible ways. These monks, on whom the pope conferred unlimited powers to proceed against the heretics, were to endeavour to convince them, by argument, of their errors, and, if they did not succeed in this way, to pronounce the ban upon them. The nobles and magistrates should then expel the obstinate from the country, having first confiscated their goods; and if they ventured to come back again, they were to be visited with still severer punishments. The same punishments were suspended over all who dared to harbour the heretics as over the heretics themselves. These papal delegates were authorised to employ ban and interdict for the purpose of enforcing obedience to the appointed measures; but to those who, in the case of so great a danger threatening the

sioned the more general use of that name: but the above-cited words of the Provençal poet prove the contrary.

* The words in the dedication, addressed to the pope, in the so-often cited Chronicle of the monk Peter of Vaux-Sernai: *Unde sciunt, qui lecturi sunt, quia in pluribus hujus operis locis Tolosani et aliarum civitatum et castrorum hæretici et defensores eorum generaliter Albigenes vocantur, eo quod aliæ nationes hæreticos Provinciales Albigenes consueverint appellare.*

church, contended against the heretics with fidelity and devotion, employing the power of the sword bestowed on them by God for the preservation of the faith, the pope promised the same indulgence which was granted to pilgrims to the tomb of St. Peter, or to St. Jago di Compostella. It is curious to observe the strange medley, not uncommon indeed, nor new to this age of juridical, ethical, and religious ideas, in the way in which the pope proceeds to justify the severity of these measures for suppressing the heretics, when he says that these sects sought to rob men, not of their earthly goods, but of the spiritual life; for he who deprives a man of faith, robs him of his life, since the just man lives by his faith.* But we have seen on a former page † how bishop Diego of Osma, in Spain, and Dominick, joined themselves to these men, and endeavoured to introduce a more spiritual mode of dealing with the heretics. Several colloquies were held on the disputed points with the leading men of the heretical communities; but it was impossible that these transactions, where the two parties proceeded on such opposite principles, should lead to any favourable result; and then, the heretics were found fault with because they would not so easily allow themselves to be converted. In a religious conference of this sort, which was held in 1207, at Montreal, near Carcassonne, betwixt the above-mentioned Spanish bishop, Dominick, and a pastor of the so-called Albigenses, Arnold Hot, ‡ the latter defended the three following theses: That the church of Rome is not the bride of Christ, not the holy church, but the Babylon of the

* *Nec volumus ipsos ægre ferre aliquatenus, si eos ad id exequendum tam districte compelli præcipimus, cum ad nil amplius intendamus, uti severitatis iudicio, quam ad extirpandos hæreticos, qui non nobis substantiam temporalem, sed spiritualem vitam surripere moliuntur; nam qui fidem adimit, vitam furatur, justus enim ex fide vivit. See the letter of Innocent to the archbishop of Aix (Aquæ), and the bishops of his diocese, Lib. I. ep. 93.*

† See Vol. VII. p. 372.

‡ The protocol of this religious conference was composed in the Catalonian tongue. An extract from it was first published by Nicole Vignier, in his *Histoire de l'Eglise*, and from this book, which has not fallen under my eye, archbishop Usher has transcribed it in his work, *De christianarum ecclesiarum in occidentis præsertim partibus ab apostolicis temporibus ad nostram usque ætatem continua successione et statu*, f. 157, Londini. 1687.

Apocalypse, drunk with the blood of saints and martyrs; that her doctrine is a doctrine of Satan, her constitution not a holy one, founded by Christ; that the mass, in the way in which it was at present celebrated, did not originate from Christ and the apostles. But as nothing could be effected by sermons* and disputation, and it was believed that nothing could be found in the heretics but incorrigible obstinacy in their rebellion against the church, it was deemed necessary to resort to more compulsory measures. The assassination of one of the papal delegates, added afterwards to the first, the monk Peter of Castlenau (*Pierre de Château neuf, Petrus & Castro novo*), in 1208,†—which the pope attributed to count Raymund of Toulouse, whom he had excommunicated, though he was afterwards compelled to acknowledge the groundlessness of this accusation;—this melancholy event furnished the signal for a thirty years' bloody war, in which the worst outrages of fanaticism and cupidity were practised against the inhabitants of these districts,‡—the famous crusade against the Albigenses. The principle that every heretic, or protector of heretics, should lose his land, and that this should fall into the hands of others, furnished an encouragement and pretext for every species of cupidity. The pope himself was compelled to see worldly interests and motives giving direction to

* The above-mentioned Provençal poet, who has given the history of the war with the Albigenses, says, sermons were, to the heretics, not worth a rotten apple. No prezan lo prezio (the preaching) una poma porria. See l. c. v. 52.

† Pope Innocent the Third says (Lib. XI. ep. 26.) that, when dying, he prayed to God to forgive his murderers. Also the above-mentioned Provençal poet, stating that one of the equerries of the count of Toulouse had murdered Peter of Castelnau, says that the latter, in the presence of all, prayed God to forgive that person his sin.

El preguet domni deu vezent tota la jant,
Quels perdo sos pecatz a cel felo sarjant.—See v. 90.

‡ The above Provençal poet reports that the besiegers of the town of Chasseneuil, when they saw themselves compelled to raise the siege, first condemned many heretics to the stake, and cast many beautiful heretic females into the flames, who, though urgently importuned, would not consent to be converted.

E cela ost jutgero mot eretge arder
E mota bela eretga ins en lo foc giter,
Car convertir non volon tan nols podon prier.—See v. 322.

the movement he had excited, and could no longer control.* A remark worthy of notice was uttered by a certain count Roger de Foix. During the negotiations for peace, in the year 1228, he declared the pope had no business to meddle in the concerns of his religion, for that was a matter in which each man must enjoy his liberty: "This liberty," he said, "his father had always recommended to him, assuring him that, with it, and a mind resolved to maintain it, he might look on calmly though the very vault of heaven gave way and broke over his head, for he had nothing to fear."† After the land had been laid waste for thirty years, the blood of thousands had been spilt, and a general submission had thus, in the year 1229, been finally brought about by force, the maintenance of the faith was still by no means secured for the future. The sects destroyed by fire and sword sprang up afresh out of the same needs of the spirit from which they had sprung up at the beginning. It required the unceasing vigilance of spiritual despotism to prevent the renewal of those anti-churchly tendencies.

At a council of Toulouse, held in 1229, it was ordered, after the precedent of measures appointed already at the Lateran council, c. iii. in 1215, that a permanent Inquisition should be established against the heretics. 1. The bishops were to appoint in all the communities, in city and country, a priest, and with him two or three, or if necessary several laymen, of good standing and character, and bind them by oath carefully and faithfully to ferret out the heretics, to search suspected houses, subterranean chambers, and other hiding-places, all which should be destroyed; to lodge as speedily as possible with the archbishop, bishop, or the lord or magistrate of the province, an information against detected heretics, their patrons and concealers, after first taking every precautionary measure to prevent their escape, in order that they might be brought to condign punishment, c. xii. In every commune all males from the age of fourteen and upward, and females from the age of twelve, should abjure all doctrines in hostility to the

* See a letter of Innocent the Third to his legates, in which he declares against the unjust proceedings of the count of Toulouse. L. XV. ep. 102.

† See Paul Perrin, *Histoire des Albigeois*, Genève, 1568, p. 141, from a manuscript account of the life of this count.

church of Rome, also swear that they would preserve the Catholic faith, which the church of Rome holds and preaches, and persecute and conscientiously make known all heretics, according to their ability. That this oath might be taken by every individual, the names of all the men and women in each parish should be recorded; and if any person should be absent at the time of the taking of this oath, and did not take it within fourteen days after his return, he should be put down as suspected of heresy. This oath should be renewed once in every two years. manifold disadvantages should, in civil life, be connected with the fact that a man was even suspected of heresy; but every man was so suspected whom public rumour accused of that crime.

Though, according to the church-constitution up to this time, it belonged to the bishops to administer and direct all such measures, yet, for the reasons already mentioned, the practice was adopted, by pope Gregory the Ninth, in 1232-33, after the example set by Innocent the Third, of selecting for this purpose monks, who might proceed independently of the bishops, and particularly from that order which had derived its origin from the contests with the heretics, the order of the Dominicans. Thus were formed those tribunals which obtained special jurisdiction over cases of transgression coming within the spiritual province, the *inquisitores hæreticæ pravitatis*. The church hypocritically deprecated the appearance of having anything to do with the shedding of blood, but used the secular power as its executioner, the blind tool of its cruel fanaticism. The convicts, excommunicated by the spiritual tribunal, were handed over to the secular power, which put them to the stake. The arbitrary violence of these tribunals, instituted first in Toulouse and Carcassonne, and in Spain, might light also upon such as in any way fell under the suspicion of the zealots for orthodoxy, or of the hierarchy, or against whom their enemies might seek, in the charge of heresy, a means of revenge.

When such a power against heresy first began to be formed, it was the priest Conrad of Marburg who was charged with the execution of it in Germany; a man in whose hands such power must have been especially dangerous, on account of his inexorable severity and his credulity, at a time when, after the

year 1230, the sects were uninterruptedly spreading in the countries about the Rhine. Conrad's example showed how ruinous those measures appointed by Innocent the Third and Gregory the Ninth against the heretics and those suspected of heresy might prove, not to the heretics alone, but to persons who in this respect were altogether innocent. No man was safe before the terrific power of Conrad; he exercised it, unscrupulously, against the highest as well as the humblest individuals. A man once accused of heresy could save his life only by declaring himself guilty, and confirming all that had ever been said by the most extravagant rumours concerning the assemblies of the heretics, and subjecting himself to penance; but he who would not confess was held to be guilty, and burnt. These accusations were employed as means of revenge.* The archbishop of Mentz and the Dominican Bernard held it necessary, afterwards, to draw up a report to the old credulous pope, Gregory the Ninth, concerning the arbitrary use which Conrad the priest made of the power intrusted to him, and the disorders thus created in Germany.† His credulous fanaticism also brought war and devastation over another district of Germany. That branch of Friesland which dwelt in the territory of Oldenburg, the Stedingers, had been involved, by their inflexible love of liberty, in violent contests with the nobles and with the clergy, the archbishop of Bremen in particular. The rebellion against the hierarchy arose here, not from a religious but from a political element; but this furnished occasion for drawing the matter within the religious province. Conrad of Marburg could believe the most extravagant things of the Stedingers, and make them believed by the pope. After the crusade against the Albigenses followed that against the Stedingers. The pope surrendered the poor people victims to their enemies; but when, after their subjection, the church became reconciled with them, the accusation of heresy which had been brought against them—the groundlessness of which must probably have been well known—was no longer men-

* See the description in the *Gestis Trevirorum*, i. c. civ., and c. cv., f. 317.

† See Extracts therefrom in the *Chronicon of Alberic*, A. D. 1233, in the *Accessiones historicæ of Leibnitz*, T. II. p. 543.

tioned. Conrad of Marburg at length fell himself a victim to his own ferocity ; the vengeance of a mighty lord, whom he had without cause stigmatized as a heretic, overtook him, and he was murdered in 1233. These unfortunate events had however a beneficial effect, in that they operated as a warning and terrifying example for Germany, which kept the tribunal of the Inquisition at a distance from that country.



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
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
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
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