







A REPLY,

ETC.



11

A REPLY . . .

TO

THE REV. DR. TURTON'S
"ROMAN CATHOLIC DOCTRINE OF THE
EUCCHARIST CONSIDERED,"

PHILALETHES CANTABRIGIENSIS,

THE BRITISH CRITIC,

AND

THE CHURCH OF ENGLAND QUARTERLY
REVIEW.

BY NICHOLAS WISEMAN, D.D.

LIBRARY ST. MARY'S COLLEGE

LONDON :

PUBLISHED BY CHARLES DOLMAN,
(NEPHEW AND SUCCESSOR TO THE LATE JOSEPH BOOKER,)

61, NEW BOND STREET.

MDCCCXXXIX.

LONDON:
C. RICHARDS, PRINTER, ST. MARTIN'S LANE.

5720

TO

HENRY R. BAGSHAWE, ESQ.

“ Quoniam mihi, fraterno excitatus affectu, *istorum* quatuor libros quos adversus unum meum scripserunt, priusquam peterem, ipse misisti; nihil convenientius putavi esse faciendum, quam ut ea quæ respondeo potissimum tu legens judices, utrum recte congruenterque responderim.”

ST. AUGUSTINE, *Ep. ad Claudium Episcopum.*



P R E F A C E.

It will, perhaps, be expected that I should account for the delay which has occurred, on my part, in publishing this Reply. Dr. Turton's book has been two years before the public; and many may, perhaps, have imagined that I was deterred, by the difficulty of the task, from proceeding forthwith to confute it. To any who should have so judged, I have only the request to make, that they will peruse the following pages, and then pronounce if they meet with any reply to the cavils of my adversary, that seems to have required either long and profound meditation, or tedious research. If he discover any such, then he may conclude that either I shrunk from the task of confutation, or have spent much time upon it. But if, on the other hand, he shall find the answers given, obvious and simple, such as must have

at once presented themselves to any one at all versed in theology, then, I trust, he will do me the justice to allow that it could not have been from any difficulties, foreseen or experienced, that I have been led to put off so long the disagreeable task of answering a work, where every argument had to be disentangled from a mass of mere personalities and language, which, to say the least, it was painful to see employed by such an opponent. To have exposed every incorrect assertion, to have unravelled every sophistry, to have laid open only a small portion of the ingenious arts resorted to by the Regius Professor of Cambridge, would have required a much larger volume than the present, and much more leisure than I am able or willing to spare. I rely upon the reader's indulgence for overlooking any faults into which the haste, wherewith this volume has, after all, been written, may have unintentionally betrayed me.

ROME,
Corpus-Christi Day, 1839.

REPLY,

&c. &c.

CHAPTER I.

ON THE STYLE AND MANNER OF DR. TURTON'S CONTROVERSY.

DURING my residence in England in 1836, I published three distinct Courses of Lectures: one of more general interest, "On the Connexion between Science and Revealed Religion," and two of a controversial character. I had no intention, at least, for that time, of giving either of these to the public: circumstances, over which I had no control, compelled me to do so. These are sufficiently stated in their respective Prefaces. One reason why I naturally desired to delay the publication of the "Lectures on the principal Doctrines and Practices of the Catholic Church," as well as those "On the Real Presence," was a fear of involving myself in controversy at such disadvantage as distance from the scene of action must necessarily cause. I was about to return to Rome, where I could not expect to see or know much of what is published in England, and where moreover the

calm of other pursuits would greatly deaden that excitement of stirring and immediate interest which so generally forms the stimulus to controversial warfare. It was, therefore, my firm resolution, when I published those Lectures, to let them take their own position, and to suffer in silence any attacks that might be directed against them. Accordingly, I allowed to pass unnoticed several pamphlets, which appeared against me, while still in England, from the pens of different writers.

“Men,” says the prince of Persian poets, “do not throw stones at a tree, on which there is no fruit;” and the activity and violence with which a controversial work is assailed, may generally be considered an adequate test of the estimate which the party opposed to its sentiments, make of its effect. If this rule be correct, I have no reason to be dissatisfied with the reception my humble lucubrations have met with. The Lectures delivered in Moorfields were soon honoured by the notice of the Rev. Mr. Pemble, of the Vicar of Blackburne, of the Rev. Mr. Hough, of the *British Critic*, of the *Protestant Journal*, and, since, of the *Congregational Magazine*. The Rev. M. O’Sullivan and others commented upon some particular points. The “Lectures on the Real Presence” have attracted the attention of the Regius Professor of Theology at Cambridge, Dr. Turton, of the *Church of England Quarterly*, which dedicated the first article of

its first Number to them; of the *British Critic*, in a distinct article from that already alluded to; and of *Philalethes Cantabrigiensis*; first in the *British Magazine*, and then in a separate book; under the disguise of which name, I understand I must respect the abilities and learning of a member of the episcopal bench.

To reply to so many opponents was certainly out of my power; I have neither time nor inclination to do so; nor, so far as I have seen of the publications enumerated, do I think a case made out why I should suspend other occupations to engage in a contest in England. The high standing, however, in their Church, of some who have thought it worth while to descend into the lists, the character they bear for theological learning, the bulk of their works, and the tone of triumph assumed in them, seemed to warrant an exception in their favour; and I have followed the suggestion of those friends who have forwarded me their works, that I should reply to their objections. As the authors of this class have chiefly attacked my "Lectures on the Eucharist," and as this work seems most to have attracted the attention of learned Protestants, I now beg the indulgence of my readers, if I enter upon a vindication of it against the objections of the four writers (whereof three are anonymous) enumerated upon my title-page. I moreover entreat them to have much patience with me, if I shall appear too prolix, or too inclined

to dwell upon minute details: for, whatever portion of the blame may have to be cast upon my unskilfulness, no small share must be laid at the door of those whose steps I unwillingly follow, and whose arts it is as necessary to expose, as it is to confute their objections.

I will premise, in the two first chapters, a few observations upon the manner in which the different attacks of my adversaries have been conducted, that so I may be at once disengaged from the most disagreeable part of the burthen imposed upon me.

It had long been my desire—one which I had warmly cherished—to see controversial discussions freed from asperity of language and acrimony of feeling, and conducted either with that calm dignity which consciousness of truth inspires, or at any rate with that simple earnestness which generally characterizes the support of scientific opinions. In delivering theological instruction, in proclaiming Catholic dogma from the pulpit, in private conferences, I had unaffectedly avoided all harsh expressions, as well as rancour of mind; and this long before I presented myself as a controversial writer before the English public. This tone I naturally preserved in the works which I published in London. With, I believe, one exception, where I was repelling a personal attack built upon a tissue of most palpable misrepresentations of my stated opinions, I avoided all personal allusions, and certainly refrained from all imputation of

unworthy motives, all insinuation of moral depravity against any one whose arguments I was called upon to combat. My sentiments upon this matter coincided with those since expressed by the *Dublin Review* in the following passage:—"It is ever our desire to treat religious subjects with becoming seriousness, and to meet all controversial antagonists in a meek, and consequently in a courteous spirit. . . . We have no desire to triumph over *the men* whose principles we are about to examine; we shall regret it if a word escape us that could reach their feelings with pain; and we shall even endeavour to harden our own against the ruffling impressions which allusions, phrases, and charges, wherein they occasionally indulge, are apt to make upon them."¹ Or, as the excellent Frederick Schlegel had before expressed it, I had thought it "not only possible, but very desirable, that theology, in its application or treatment, should ever be conformable with reason, so as not merely to avoid a pernicious confusion of words, and every sort of fanatical misunderstanding, but likewise to eschew all manner of useless contention, and uncharitable hate, to keep ever alive the spirit of love and perfect accord; and whenever this should happen to be attacked or hurt, to bring it once more into remembrance."²

Vol. iii. pp. 43, 44.

² Philosophische Vorlesungen, p. 265

If, however, I flattered myself, that conduct based upon such principles was to generate reciprocity of feeling, I have now surely reason to pronounce myself deceived. Shall I say more? I have, perhaps, received a degree of harsh language exactly proportioned to the care with which I studied to avoid its use. The *Protestant Journal*, one of my first opponents, unhesitatingly, if I remember right, charged me with hypocrisy, in assuming a character of forbearance which did not belong to my Church. And, in a more detailed review of my Lectures, of which the three first numbers were transmitted to me in Rome, I find expressions applied to me, such as display, to say the least, an excessive degree of controversial irritability. The writer *weeps* at my *wickedness*, and, after quoting a passage regarding the proofs of inspiration, comments upon it in the following terms: "There is no mistaking the *infernal* spirit of these passages, for assuredly he endeavours to remove every argument for the inspiration of the Scripture; and having attempted thus to perform the work that has for ages employed all the subtlety, and wit, and malice, of the devil to accomplish, he proposes that it should be based altogether on tradition! Thus with those who, not being yet so stultified as to receive his traditionary evidence as sufficient, have relied on other proofs, this professed minister of Christ avows his resolve to strip

them of those proofs, and transubstantiate them into infidels !”¹ And after several pages written in a spirit of equal meekness, we come to the following appropriate summary, that through the lecture in question, “there is a spirit, we cannot style it by any gentler epithet—an *infernal* spirit, which struggles with every effort of which the man was capable, to make sceptics or infidels, since he could not make them Romanists.”² I know not when spiritual wrath more closely resembled angry passion, or whether coarser weapons have been often used in beating off the profanest infidelity from its attacks on religion, than are here employed. But I should not have stooped so low as to transcribe such expressions, the contact of which might have been almost sufficient to soil the purity of truth, had it existed in the same pages, were it not that they utter in plainer language, what the principal of my present adversaries has preferred to convey by artful insinuation and inuendos.

I. The argument which provoked such unchristian language in the *Protestant Journal* was this, that in the Protestant system there is no sufficient proof of the inspiration of Scripture; and that consequently, that system, which assumes the all-sufficiency of Scripture as a basis, is void of foundation. What is there in this argument that transgresses the admitted bounds of controversial reasoning?

¹ Dec. 1836, p. 704.

² *Ibid*, p. 710.

Is it not in fact the term to which, in all such discussions, every sincere disputant desires to drive his adversary, the conviction, that is, that truth is exclusively on his own side? But because the alternative in this case *necessarily* was, "there is no medium or resting-place in Protestantism between admitting the Catholic foundation of inspiration, tradition, or renouncing that inspiration," no gentler epithet than *infernal* can be found to characterize the spirit of him who uses it! Throughout Dr. Turton's book, which I have placed first on my list, because it bears the author's name, and is most voluminous, a similar form of objection prevails. Whenever, in commenting upon any text of Scripture, I endeavour to show that a departure from a given interpretation produces contradiction, inconsequence, or any other defect not to be imagined of God's holy word, and thus prove that the interpretation, which is clear of such difficulties, must be the true one, the learned professor launches forth into declamation—calculated indeed to mislead vulgar minds, but utterly unworthy of his character—against the impiety of such reasoning, as though the very imputation were made against Holy Scripture, which the argument is intended to ward off, and into expressions of compassion or astonishment at the character of the person employing it. The following is an instance of this ingenious though not ingenuous process.

"2. With regard to the second sentence of the preceding

extract, I remark, that the consciousness of being liable to error ought to have restrained any man, when approaching that subject, from the use of such expressions as we there find. If a prize were to be awarded to that writer, who should employ the most gross and offensive terms, in describing our Lord's discourses, Dr. Wiseman's second sentence could scarcely fail to ensure success. . . . 3. On the third sentence, I shall say but little. In what way, 'teaching the doctrine of the real presence,' can avert the force of Dr. Wiseman's reproaches, more effectually than 'teaching the doctrine of faith,' does not appear. There is something quite shocking in the attempt to make a man's own interpretation—an interpretation founded on notions which have been actually shown to be incontrovertibly erroneous—the only means of removing reproaches of such a nature from our Lord's character as is displayed in his method of announcing the kingdom of heaven. 4. The fourth sentence is justly liable to similar animadversions. In affirming that '*we cannot allow* our Redeemer, if a sincere teacher, to have used such images for consoling and cheering doctrines,'—and describing him as under '*an absolute necessity* of recurring to' the language so strongly reprobated, if his intention was to inculcate the doctrine of the real presence—Dr. Wiseman manifests a style of thinking and writing in the highest degree presumptuous on the part of mortal man—with regard to his Lord and Saviour. Does he, moreover, mean to say that the doctrine of the Eucharist, as held by himself, is not 'consoling and cheering;' or does he mean to contend that the spiritual views of the discourse taken by Protestants, although 'consoling and cheering,' are not at the same time among the most grave and affecting that can be conceived? Upon that discourse, especially the latter part of it, there is impressed a character of peculiar solemnity. When our Lord spoke of

his flesh, as what he would give for the life of the world, he undoubtedly alluded to his passion; and this portion of the discourse appears to involve considerations so awful, that the writer of such comments as we are now reviewing, might justly have recoiled with alarm, at the sight of what had escaped his pen.”—(pp. 111, 112, 113.)

This extract is a fair specimen of this favourite mode of arguing followed by Dr. Turton; and as it is a common one with other Protestants of his order, I shall be pardoned for having extracted it at length, and commenting upon it. The Catholic is sure that he has an infallible authority for what he believes, and consequently does not assert opinions but truths. This is a principle which calls forth peculiar indignation from Dr. Turton at the conclusion of his work. But whoever holds it, as I, with the holy Catholic Church, sincerely do, must feel a confidence, such as perhaps a Protestant divine cannot, in conclusions which accord with the decisions of God’s Church, even where those conclusions are worked out by reasoning and research. But, in any case, it is evident that whoever so far insists upon a text, as to say that any other interpretation appears to involve contradiction or absurdity, intends only to make a *reductio ad impossibile*, as the schoolmen call it; that is to propose an only alternative which no one can for a moment chuse. In every instance where such an argument occurs, the learned Professor takes the second alternative as a direct indignity

aimed at the words or person of Christ. For instance, in pp. 175, 194, and in several other passages, some of which may be more properly noticed later, this mode of viewing an argument is made the ground for much abusive and insulting language. The following are the words of p. 194 :—
 “ Now the author has, in this place, once more indulged in the most offensive language with regard to our Lord’s conduct—supposing him not to have acted on the principles laid down in the Lectures on the Eucharist. The consequence is, that I shrink from the page that is defiled with such impropriety of language.” My only answer to this rhetorical display is simply this :—Let any unprejudiced reader, Protestant or Catholic, turn to the paragraph to which it refers, and say sincerely if he remember its having shocked his feelings, when he first read it, as being defiled with language of an offensive character regarding our Lord’s conduct.

In the controversies of the Fathers we find this form of argument often used, nor are we aware that it has ever been reprehended. For instance, St. Augustine, writing against the Donatists, makes use of these words : “ Verumtamen si alia est aqua Christi, et alia est aqua traditoris, quia non fuit traditor Christus : cur non alia sit aqua Christi, et alia sit aqua raptoris, quia nec raptor utique fuit Christus.”¹ And later he applies this strong ex-

¹ Contra. Lit. Petiliani. Lib. 2.

pression to the consequences deducible from the argument of his adversary: "Vis ut habeatur Christus mendax, tu autem verax."—"You would have Christ held a liar and yourself true." St. Jerom makes no scruple of using similar language in arguing against the Pelagians. "Accusa ergo Deum mendacii, quare dixit per Jonam, &c.;"¹ and again, against the Luciferians, he speaks of some whose application of a text from the Psalms, "crucem Christi evacuat, Dei Filium subjugat Diabolo, &c."² Surely the virtuous indignation of the Regius Professor ought to be aroused by such blasphemous ideas being even hypothetically connected with the name of Christ. For if it be so very irreverent, and so shocking to his feelings, to have it said that it is inconsistent with our Lord's character as a kind teacher to have used certain phrases in a peculiar manner, or to have acted in a certain way, it is far more repugnant to our feelings to have it said that such an argument of our adversaries makes Christ a liar, or subjects him to the evil one. Indeed, if the reader dispassionately consider such texts as 1 *John*, i. 10, and v. 10, he perhaps will not consider the form of reasoning either so modern or so disrespectful.

But neither is this a new controversial art which Dr. Turton has employed, as the following account will prove. In the *British Critic* for January,

¹ Adv. Pelagianos lib. iii. tom. i. col. 883, par. 1609.

² Adv. Lucifer, ib. col. 619.

1828,¹ we have the following passage: “In the notes to the Charge, the right reverend author (Dr. Elrington) has cited, from the class-book used at Maynooth by the students of theology, the blasphemous defence which a Roman Catholic, if in error, is directed to plead fearlessly to his Judge at the great Day of Trial. We give it here:—

‘O Lord, if that be an error which we have followed, *thou thyself hast deceived us* by thy command, that we should hear the Church *as thyself*. *Thou thyself hast deceived us* by thy apostles, by the pastors and doctors thou hast appointed in thy Church. Fearlessly we say, O Lord, if it be an error which we have followed, *thou thyself hast deceived us, and we stand excused.*’

“Human presumption cannot go beyond this, for such a declaration maintains, that it is more probable that a meaning affixed by the Church of Rome to certain disputed passages of the Scriptures is true, than that the Son of God should not have led it into error! In truth, the absurdity of the passage is equal to its impiety; for it sets up the authority of the Church, on which the meaning affixed to those passages depends for support, against the truth of Him from whom only that authority could have been received.”

Here we have precisely the same method of attack as Dr. T. pursues. The author quoted

¹ No. v. p. 8.

reasons, as I do, why, in a certain case, we should appear to be led into error by our Saviour's words, if our interpretation of them were incorrect; and this is immediately denounced, in indignant language, as blasphemous, impious, and absurd. Now compare the passage so severely reprov'd, with the following: "O Gregory! O Augustine! O Hierome! . . . O Paul! O CHRIST! *if we be deceived herein, ye are they that have deceived us. You have taught us these schisms and divisions, you have taught us these heresies.*" Is not here the same argument; only that in the Catholic theologians' writings, it is merely suggested as one which *might* be used, whereas here it is rampantly and boldly made? And whose then is this greater blasphemy, this grosser impiety? Bishop Jewell's, in his celebrated sermon at Paul's Cross!¹ Did the critic know this when he wrote his commentary on the first quotation? I doubt it. But yet farther, he was probably ignorant that the reasoning is still more ancient, as will be seen by the following passage of Richard of St. Victor: "Domine, si error est, a teipso decepti sumus. Nam ista in nobis tantis signis et prodigiis confirmata sunt et talibus, quæ non nisi per te fieri possunt."²

Dr. Turton is professor of theology, and a learned

¹ Tracts for the Times, vol. iv. p. 4.

² Ric. S. Vict. De Trinit. lib. i. c. 2, par. 1513.

man, and consequently is, or ought to be, conversant with the writings of the Fathers ; he must have been familiar with these forms of argument so frequent in them, and other divines. Has he acted justly or wisely in forgetting them, on such an occasion ?

II. There is a second characteristic in Dr. Turton's peculiar style of controversy, which cannot fail to strike an attentive reader. It is a practice of unlimited exaggeration, in reprobating whatever he does not like. His wonder, his displeasure, his grief, his horror, are ever superlative ; or rather they rise a degree higher ; for the word or sentiment, which, for the moment, is the single object of any of these feelings, is exalted above all others of the same class, and receives the honour of peerless reprobation. Where this is the case, surely a cautious reader will suspect, to say the least, the cool judgment of the writer, and be led to conclude, either that his terms of comparison are very scanty, or that a peculiar state of irritable feelings has increased, to his imagination, what a more dispassionate eye would have pronounced much less—if indeed it would have at all discerned it. The smaller the lens, the stronger its magnifying power, —and the narrower the mind, the greater its amplifying faculty on objects it dislikes. Nor does anything contract its dimensions like religious prejudice and controversial antipathies. The fol-

lowing instances will illustrate this principle of Dr. Turton's peculiar method:—

P. 30. "The fact, however, happens to be, that of all the instances of parallelism which have been imagined to exist in the New Testament, this proposed by Dr. Wiseman, is, so far as my knowledge extends, beyond expression the most wretched."

P. 31. "The design, when committed to writing, strikes me as so utterly absurd," &c.

P. 42. "I here venture to pronounce Kuinoel's conjecture to be the result of as strange an hallucination as ever took possession of any man's mind."

P. 45. "To declare without reserve, my decided opinion of the lecture which relates to Kuinoel, Rosenmüller and Bloomfield—I must say that I have seldom found so large a mass of error compressed into so small a space. No ordinary power must have been at work for such an achievement."

P. 47. "Let me also observe, that an edition of the original, or a version, or a commentary showing that Dr. Wiseman's division of the discourse, after v. 47 had been anticipated, would be a greater curiosity than can well be imagined."

P. 49. "That a more erroneous view of the general character of the multitude cannot possibly be entertained, must be acknowledged by every one."

P. 91. "There is in all this a disregard of tradition as well as of Scripture, not easy to be found in any other volume than that of Dr. Wiseman."

P. 114. "The conclusions drawn by Dr. W. from the premises contained in the first sentence of the preceding paragraph, are amongst the most rash and irreverent that are to be found in theological controversy."

P. 115. "To maintain with Dr. W. &c. . . . indicates to my mind, and I write under the sense of duty both to God and man, a determination to use language, which I verily believe is unparalleled, except among those who are labouring to throw contempt upon every thing sacred."

P. 129. "He (Dr. W.) is still farther intruding upon ground interdicted to human foot, upon which I scarcely recollect a single individual who has before had the hardihood to take his stand."

Ibid. My argument is called "a series of misrepresentations, to which in the whole range of theological literature it would not be easy to find a parallel."

P. 139. "Those cases indeed form a series of the most wretched arguments I ever recollect to have seen employed by a man of talent and information."

P. 147. "The effect of these inaccuracies, small as well as great, of Dr. Wiseman, is, an utter want of confidence in anything that is asserted—without the most vigilant inquiry into the matter."

P. 149. "Such is Dr. Wiseman's infatuation with regard to passages intended to support his hypothesis—that there is scarcely one of them which is not sufficient to overthrow it entirely."

P. 150. "Anything less to the purpose than this can scarcely be imagined. It tends, however, to prove, by another example, that, from some motive or other, Dr. W., in drawing up his lectures, must have intended never to quote correctly."

P. 154. "To suppose besides, with Dr. Wiseman, &c. . . . is not perhaps the strangest fancy that distinguishes the Lectures under review; but certainly a more absurd notion than could easily be discovered in the writings of other men."

P. 156. "There is something truly wonderful in the

recapitulation of Dr. Wiseman's achievements, which is presented in the following paragraph from his own pen."

Ibid. "After many years' attention to the inductive method of ascertaining principles, I honestly declare that Dr. Wiseman's present attempt in that way is, in my estimation, by far the most complete failure I ever witnessed."

P. 170. "The note which I am about to transcribe I deem one of the most curious specimens of exemplification to be found, even in the 'Lectures on the Eucharist.'"

P. 194. "I have already pointed out in Dr. Wiseman's volume as grievous misrepresentations as can be imagined to exist in any work whatever."

P. 312. "It is scarcely possible to conceive less to be made of a passage of Scripture . . . than has been made by Dr. Wiseman," &c.

P. 317. "The next paragraph which I shall notice, and which I really think, may, in magnitude of misrepresentation, compete with anything to be found in any volume save that of Dr. Wiseman." &c.

An author who writes in this manner runs the risk of greatly overshooting his mark. It may be possible to fix upon a work a reproach of some sort, even in a strong degree, but to persuade any reader with ordinary sense that in one volume of less than three hundred pages are accumulated every possible order and class of disreputable sentiments, feelings, and words, in the highest imaginable degree of intensity, must surely be beyond the powers of Dr. Turton's vituperation. He has drawn his bow with too little regard for its strength, and it may break in his hand. I am sure that many of his readers, and some of his

friends, will have felt regret, for his own sake, that his conclusions have not been more moderated, and his style less disfigured by hyperbole. Moreover, one cannot be but doubly suspicious of the accuracy of a critic, who carries his exaggerating propensity so far, as to throw the same superlative blame, upon those whom his adversary quotes, as upon himself. For who does not see that the learned Kuinoel must have been particularly fortunate to have hit, without previously consulting the Regius Professor, upon as "strange an hallucination as ever took possession of any man's mind," precisely in the very place where I should happen to quote him? But of this more hereafter. Farther, it must be observed, that the gentleman, who writes thus, displays a particular horror for exaggeration in any form, even the most innocent. For instance, I had observed, according to a form of speech usual both in common conversation (and these Lectures were originally orally delivered), and in every writer from Moses downwards, that Our Saviour had used an expression *twenty times*, meaning, of course, as every one not engaged in controversy would have understood, *often*.¹ This draws down a severe reproof, as an exaggera-

¹ I would recommend to Dr. Turton's perusal the chapter *De Synecdoche Speciei* in Glassius's *Philologia Sacra*, p. 1257, in Dothe's edition upon this use of numbers in Scripture. I must also observe to my readers that in its proper place I had accurately stated the number of times the phrase was used, while here the subject came in indirectly.

tion, and my imagination is said to be somewhat of a romantic cast (p. 212). What shall we say of Dr. Turton's?

III. The next incumbrance of the learned Professor's pages, I know not how to characterise by any term more appropriate than that of scurrility. For it comes within the terms of the definition given by an eminent lexicographer, as a form of speech, which "neque temporis, neque loci, neque personarum respectum habet." It is often couched in low metaphor; at one time, appearances are ridiculous, because I am like a man who has built his buttresses on the wrong side of a wall (p. 102); another time I resemble a man "rowing by himself in his own small boat" (p. 104), and on some other occasion (p. 243) the author speaks of my using *hermeneutical spectacles*. All this might have passed for wit in the pages of some Protestant reviews; it is surely not the tone to be expected on such an occasion from such a man. But the following specimens belong to a more unworthy class: for in most of them, the learned Professor allows himself the liberty of indulging in personalities that do him, I think, but little honour.

P. 98. "Dr. Wiseman, with a dexterity which cannot be too much admired, *and a disingenuousness which cannot be too severely reprobated,*" &c.

P. 106. "In truth it maketh the heart sick to think that any one—least of all a minister of Christ's religion—

should have so far forgotten his own character, as to have thus ventured, &c. To myself there is something melancholy in what appears to be too commonly the effect of a determined resolution to maintain a set of theological opinions—I mean a certain hardness of disposition, and an insensibility to the propriety or impropriety of the methods adopted for that end.”

Ibid. “ Dr. Wiseman’s opinion both *in the disrespect which it implies*, and the dangers with which it is fraught, makes a very close approximation to that which he has pronounced to be as *unhermeneutical* and absurd as *it is blasphemous*.”

P. 108. “ A notion like this, if seriously advanced, manifests such a poverty-stricken conception of the objects of our Lord’s ministration among men—*such a degrading estimate of his conduct*, as recorded by the evangelists, *that the difficulty is to reconcile its appearance with those moral feelings and religious impressions which we are anxious to attribute to the reverend lecturer*.

P. 162. “ There is something about this kind of logic, which, I suspect, is rather calculated for the climate of Italy than that of England.”

P. 163. “ Dr. Wiseman may be a very learned person, but he intruded into a province from which he will do well to retire,” &c.

P. 178. “ Dr. Wiseman takes a more enlarged view of the matter. In spite of the reasoning of Storr, &c. *he seems to care but little for St. John*,” &c.

P. 179. “ I can only question, as I have before done, *his exemption from the laws which are usually deemed binding upon human intelligence*.”

P. 188. “ The intimation that the literal meaning is that adopted by the Church of Rome—*being, as Dr. Wiseman*

well knows, not founded in fact—was thrown in merely to round the sentence and produce an impression.”

P. 191. “The learned author might have been content with delivering so absurd a sentiment in his lecture-room: he ought not to have suffered it to appear in print.”

P. 237. “In the course of this investigation, I have given an example or two of what I ventured to denominate *recklessness on the part of the learned author.*”

P. 239. “To my mind, there is something painful to think of in Dr. Wiseman’s incapacity *or disinclination* (whichever it may be) *to distinguish between a real and a corporal presence. To what an injurious extent must objects of merely materialized existence have affected his perceptions of divine things.*”

P. 242. “The correctness of that statement I all along ventured to deny, *from a feeling that he knew the notion to be untrue, and that I knew it to be mischievous.*”

P. 291. “I cannot conceive such sentiments to be avowed by any one that has thought seriously of the matter; *who has thought, I mean, for the purpose of finding the truth, and not for the mere invention of arguments in defence of an opinion.*”

P. 317. “*Supposing the author to be conscious of what he is doing, there really appears to me in all this something so reprehensible, that I will not venture to express my sentiments on the subject. I would rather leave the matter to the reader’s indignation.*”

All this, Christian reader, is from one who tells us that “strong language is quite foreign to his habits of writing!” (p. 108.) If such be Dr. Turton’s meek and gentle habits, what may we expect from one in his Church who is irritable and choleric? I certainly am not disposed to quarrel with him for

characterizing, in as strong terms as he pleases, my views or the arguments which support them; next to their convincing him, I could desire no better test of their force than his anger. But where the spirit of religion was not sufficient to check the desire to insult, its decencies might have been supposed strong enough to put limits to its exercise. And when Dr. Turton oversteps these, and by insinuations which the equitable rights of self-defence will justify me in pronouncing as false as they are mean, labours to wound my *moral* character, and by glosses and inuendoes tries to illude his readers into the conviction that I am one whose mind has been habituated to deceit, and whose feelings are familiar with insincerity, or whose heart is hardened and callous to religious sentiments—for such is the clear tendency of many passages just cited—then do I tell him plainly and boldly that “the reins and the heart” are a region beyond the search and beyond the judgment of the most learned dignitary, as of the most ignorant peasant, and reserved to One who has said, εἰς ἐστὶν ὁ νομοθέτης καὶ κριτὴς . . . σὺ δὲ τίς εἶ, ὅς κρῖνεις τὸν ἕτερον; I tell him calmly, but solemnly, that he has been guilty of presumptuous judgment of what he could not know, and of calumny in uttering it. And in conclusion I leave this portion of the cause between us to another and a juster tribunal, where that self-righteousness, which glories in its own

superior virtue, and superciliously despises others, will be sifted and exposed.

There is, however, one more passage in Dr. Turton, which I cannot forbear quoting, as an instance of the blindness which will sometimes seize men who seek for point, more than accuracy, in their writings. Ambitious, I suppose, of rivalling Denham's description of the Thames, he indulges in the following antithetic summary:—"The author is subtle, but not sagacious; he is dexterous, but not circumspect; he is learned after the manner of a controversialist, not after that of a student." (p. 322.) As in most attempts at this rhetorical form of speech, it is not perhaps easy to divine exactly what the author means by the species of learning here distinguished. I will try, however, to conjecture. I should say that a man is learned on any subject after the manner of a controversialist, when from his work it is evident that he has made no study of it, and knows nothing of it beyond what the agitation of a controversy concerning it has brought before him. Now far be it from me to put in any claim to the title of a scholar; but at any rate, I think it can hardly be boasting to say, that some evidence of *study*, and of study unconnected with the immediate subject of inquiry, may be discovered in my book. Some collections, however insignificant, there are from writers classical or oriental, who have not treated of the Eucharist—some illustrations from other parts of

Scripture, not bearing in matter, though in form, upon the texts discussed, and some pains, considering particularly the disadvantageous circumstances under which I wrote, to collate and quote Protestant divines. This, if learning at all, is, I fancy, the humble learning of a *student*. But Dr. Turton, in his reply, has contrived to write three hundred pages, from which I think it would be difficult to surmise, that ever, before he entered on the subject *as a controversialist*, he had paid the slightest attention to it. He is indeed a patient follower of my steps; a most diligent verifier of all my quotations; a most pains-taking, though extremely irritable, commentator upon all my pages; but there he most conscientiously stops. I think poor Estius is about the only Catholic author he refers to without any suggestion from me, and therefore he makes much of him, exalting him from time to time into something great; and even as to English Protestant commentators, he goes to them on the texts in dispute (and of course on no others) when it was important to him to have concurrent opinions against me. But throughout his volume, I cannot remember in him an appropriate quotation, whose discovery could be supposed independent of his controversial exercise, or any argument or reflection that seems drawn from a store of theological learning, made by previous study. He runs to his library-shelves as soon as a book is pointed out to him by his adversary; and when he does not find

it—why, he takes one like it in its place ! (as we shall see in the instances of Tittman and Faber, which, if I shall be tempted to characterize as they deserve, I must seek the epithets in Dr. Turton's pages ;) but he certainly is not the “Scriba doctus in regno cœlorum, qui profert de thesauro suo nova et vetera.” When a man calls another a coward, it is presumed that he is, or deems himself, brave ; and so when one writer sneers at another as “not learned” after a certain manner, we may suppose he lays claim himself to that character of learning which he denies him. For, as the Arabic proverb says, “the learned man knows the unlearned, because he himself has once been unlearned ; but the unlearned knows not the learned, because he has never himself been learned.” Dr. Turton is welcome, therefore, to all the self-complacency included in his sneer ; but I have no hesitation in saying—to copy, for once, his favourite form of expression,—that of all the instances I have ever met of a work exclusively controversial in its learning, his is by far the best specimen.

I now take leave of the learned Regius Professor's style, and of the graces with which he has thought proper to adorn his pages. What I have given are but specimens ; very much has been left behind, not to speak of the general tone that pervades the work. I feel a weight off my breast on having thus got through the *sickening* task of collecting

so much language unworthy of the man, his profession, his station, and his subject. Let me, in concluding, recall to his mind those golden words of the best divine his establishment ever produced : “ There will come a time when three words uttered with charity and meekness shall receive a far more blessed reward than three thousand volumes written with disdainful sharpness of wit.”¹

¹ Hooker, vol. i. p. 177, ed. Keble.

CHAPTER II.

ON THE MANNER AND STYLE OF OTHER STRICTURES ON THE
 "LECTURES ON THE EUCHARIST."

I SHALL not delay my reader much in speaking concerning the tone adopted by the other writers who have honoured my work with their notice.

Of *Philalethes Cantabrigiensis* and the *Church Quarterly* I have no desire, and perhaps no right, to complain. If they often charge me with what has no foundation in fact, it is without departure from courtesy of phrase, and they generally aim at my writings more than at my character. I hope they will have no reason to repent of this attention to the rules of Christian civility; at least, it shall be my endeavour to meet them in a corresponding spirit.

On very different grounds, I can say that with the manner in which my book and myself have been treated by the *British Critic*, I do not see that I can reasonably find fault. For, in the article which regards us, there is not a particle of misrepresentation, of discourtesy, or of bad taste, beyond what that Journal is in the habit of lavishing upon

any other antagonist, political, literary, or religious. Neither can I justly complain of having been honoured with less than a usual portion of that peculiar saturnine hilarity, which one is almost tempted to accept as wit in the pages of the *British Critic*. First, I am a “hermeneutical show-man, exhibiting to the world a brood of wonders” (p. 134); then I am “the mighty surveyor” (p. 140); a little later I am “under the influence of the hermeneutic poppy and mandragora” (p. 146); and a quarter of a page is taken up in comparing me to some one of whom the critic has somewhere read, who nailed himself up in a cellar (p. 147)! “Stupid” (p. 136), “fouly false” (p. 160), and other epithets of that class are freely applied to my opinions. But the crowning climax of the article is too excellent a specimen of the critic’s best controversial manner to be omitted. It is as follows:—

“Of the *subject* himself [I am represented as one dissected by Dr. Turton and Philalethes] we must say a word or two. He is an extremely curious specimen of a controversial divine! He, really, is the glossiest and most silken of polemics; ‘quite a jewel of a man.’ In style and manner, he frequently reminds us of nothing so much, as of an exceedingly well-powdered, well-dressed, fair-spoken, voluble, and most accomplished empiric, with the brilliant on his finger, and the cambric in his hand. And, then, he has such winning ways with him; there is so much blandness and complacency; such captivating appeals to the sense and candour of a discerning public;

so much abstinence from all provoking and ill-bred forms of speech; so much of the plausibilities of logic and induction;—that it is quite impossible to wonder at his success. Sometimes, it must be confessed, there is a good deal of sonorous pomposity; and, occasionally, there do occur some slight indications of supercilious contempt for his adversaries. But all this sort of thing is in admirable keeping with the rest. So that, taking him for all in all, we scarcely may hope to look upon his like again.”—No. XLIII. p. 161.

Concerning the writer of such a passage, I think I cannot better express myself than in the words of Cicero. “*Ludimur ab homine non tam faceto quam ad scribendi licentiam libero.*”¹ Conscious, as every man must be, of many faults in his dispositions and character, he can be in danger of no temptation, save from pride, when he sees an adversary obliged to go so far into the regions of exaggeration and mere insult to assail him. Whether the portrait here given of me resemble the original, let others judge. And whether the cause of religion will be served by such arts, whether respect will be thus gained for the doctrines supported by such methods, or whether faith should have no sisterhood with charity, but can best be upheld by outraging her,—the “greater” virtue, belongs rather to the critic’s friends than to me to decide. For my part, I fear nothing from such warfare; nor do I imagine that any sensible and

Christian mind will think worse of my Lectures because their author has been thought of sufficient importance, to be assailed at the sacrifice of social decency, and at the risk of the libeller's meed.

In the chapters that follow, I shall not often stay to notice the language in which my arguments are discussed. Sometimes this may be the case; especially where, under cover of personal abuse, an artifice lies concealed. If terms of reprobation seem called for, I trust I shall be in no danger of going beyond just bounds; for I shall content myself as much as possible, with copying the words of my learned adversaries, especially of the one who has so graciously informed us that "strong language is foreign to his habits of writing." In general, however, I shall study to guide my conduct by the golden rule of the great St. Augustine. "Ego, quando cuique vel dicendo vel scribendo respondeo, etiam contumeliosis criminationibus laccessitus, quantum mihi Dominus donat, frænatis atque coercitis vanæ indignationis aculeis, auditori lectorive consulens, non ago ut efficiar homini conviciando superior, sed errorem convincendo salubrior."¹

¹ When either by discourse or by writing, I answer any one, I bridle and keep in, as far as the Lord grants me, the excitement of vain indignation; and, seeking the profit of the hearer or reader, I strive not so much to be superior to the other in abusing, as more profitable than he in disabusing men of error." *Contra Lit. Petiliani. lib. iii. c. 1.*

CHAPTER III.

STRUCTURE OF THE SIXTH CHAPTER OF ST. JOHN.

DR. TURTON commences his attack upon my work by an examination of my opinion, that a transition takes place in Our Saviour's discourse, between the 47th and 48th verses. Nowhere does he give better proof of his controversial talent of treating secondary and unimportant points as of great magnitude, than in this lengthened commentary of nearly forty pages (from 11 to 50 T.) upon a short text of seven (40—47 W.) Not only from his diffuseness but still more from his earnestness, the reader is led to suppose, that my opinion upon this subject is something perfectly monstrous, and that its confutation will overthrow the rest of my argument. In the outset, however, the learned Doctor is guilty of, doubtless an unintentional, mis-statement, as follows :—

“The question to be considered is this is the line to be drawn immediately after or immediately before the 47th verse? or, in still different words, is the 47th verse to be connected with that which precedes or that which follows?—p. 11.

Now such was never *my* enquiry; nor could it have been of the slightest use to me to make it. Catholic divines usually place the transition at v. 51; and I proposed to place it at v. 48; there is not a word in my book to authorize Dr. Turton's assertion that whether the transition was to be immediately before or after v. 47 was a question to be discussed. But it was of some use to him to make it believed so; for otherwise, he could not have indulged in much of his voluminous commentary.

At p. 48, the Professor thus accounts for his disproportioned attention to this portion of the subject:—

“The reader will find in the course of the next section, that Dr. Wiseman's argument, founded on his supposed division of the sixth chapter of St. John, is remarkably ingenious, and may fairly warrant great anxiety and corresponding pains, on the part of the author, to ensure its reception in the world.”

A few remarks will suffice to convince any impartial reader, how unwarranted the writer of these lines was in his assertions, calculated essentially to fix the reader's attention upon mere preliminary matter, and make him imagine that what follows is comparatively unimportant.

1. In the first place, I beg to inform my readers that the seven pages upon which Dr. Turton bestows the honour of so much attention, formed originally no part of the Lectures. I have now

before me the original draught of the arguments used, in a sermon preached in Rome in 1828, in which the reasoning now forming the subject of Dr. Turton's "next section" is essentially the same, though less developed, and yet not the slightest allusion is made to the point of division in our Saviour's discourse. The sermon was repeated, March 22, 1829, with many alterations, and in it the existence of such a division is mentioned, and it is placed, with the generality of Catholic divines, at the 51st verse. The discourse grew up into a series of Lectures, several times delivered before written; but, for the convenience of those who heard them, an analytical summary of them was drawn out, of which many copies have been made till they might be said to be dispersed over many parts of England.¹ If any one will take the trouble to consult it, he will find no allusion at all to the point of division farther than the following words: "It is evident no less, that a transition takes place to a literal eating at v. 51!" This historical sketch may be an intrusion on the public attention, and little worthy of it, but it will satisfy any reasonable mind of the great exaggeration, to say no worse, with which Dr. T. treats this enquiry. For so far from my arguments being *founded* upon *my* division of *John* vi., this was a mere result of

¹ I found a copy of it in London, not having brought my own over, at the Chapel-house in Lincoln's-Inn-Fields.

researches posterior to the drawing up in writing of those arguments, and would have probably been the subject of a note in the "Lectures," had not the length of the enquiry forbidden it. My "great anxiety and corresponding pains" will be measured by the true importance I have all along attributed to this preliminary enquiry.

2. Dr. T., in his preface, promises "incidental references" to my "Moorfield's Lectures;" — fairness would have recommended such a reference on this occasion. For, his readers would have come to a very different conclusion from himself on the importance I attach to the place of division, had they been told, that, in those Lectures, I stated the question to be "*immaterial*; it makes no difference whether we place it one verse earlier or later" (vol. ii. p. 142); that, I afterwards speak of the transition having already taken place at v. 51, where most Catholics place it; and that, at p. 140, I vaguely fixed it at "about the 50th verse." And yet nearly every one of the arguments in the larger Lectures is presented in these. How could I, therefore, be supposed to have built them upon my division of the text?

3. It is perfectly incorrect in Dr. T. to say that my arguments in the "next section" are in the least built upon my division. For not one argument is founded upon phrases occurring between vv. 48 and 51,—the only portion which I have sought to add to that commonly allotted to the

Eucharist by the Catholic divines. So that, in fact, I might have cut out every word of the seven pages in question, without any loss, except of forty pages in Dr. Turton's book.

4. In fine, the learned Professor could hardly be ignorant that the real question was, not *where* a division was to be made, but whether any was to be *anywhere* admitted. My arguments in the second and third Lectures went to prove, from the change of phraseology, that a change of topic must have taken place somewhere in our Saviour's discourse; and this was the true vital question. It was a matter of secondary interest, this being once ascertained, to find where the transition was made. Most Catholic commentators and divines placed it at v. 51, but it appeared to me, and does yet, that the structure of the passage pointed out v. 48 as the true point. The whole of this enquiry was, therefore, based upon the other, and not *vice-versá*, as my opponent would have his readers believe. For it resolves itself into this problem; "Having ascertained from our Saviour's expressions, the conduct of the Jews, &c., that a change of topic had occurred in his discourse, where is the precise point at which this may most plausibly be fixed?"

Philalethes acts more fairly, and admits a change at v. 51, though not a complete one, as I contend. However, he passes over the question as immaterial, whether it have to be placed, where he or

where I state it. He believes the Eucharist to be treated of subsequently to at least v. 51.

The *British Critic* treats this part of the controversy with his usual peculiar felicity of misapprehension. In the course of a few lines my style and title are changed several times ; now I am a "great" and indeed a "mighty surveyor," then "an artist fencing off a continuous discourse into two compartments ;" afterwards a "hermeneutic alchemist, effecting the most portentous transmutations" (pp. 139, 140). On this method of embellishing an argument I have already said enough ; I will therefore content myself with observing :—

1. That from what I have already said, the assertion of the *Critic* is sufficiently disproved that I have *laboured* to transfer the line of demarcation from v. 51 to v. 48, as to a "more convenient position" (p. 139). For I have already remarked that not one of my arguments is built upon this contested territory. (v. 48—51.)

2. That, whatever Dr. T. may have done, the *Critic* is certainly in error when he asserts that Philalethes has "swept away my thin designs and barricado of gossamer," for Philalethes entirely passes over the question of the points of division, assuming it at v. 51, and only joins issue on the completeness of the transition.¹

¹ These are his words : "Before I enter upon the consideration of this argument, I must observe, that the point here at issue between Dr. W. and myself is the *extent* of the change of

3. That the *Critic*, while he is most strenuous in denying the existence of "any line of transition" (p. 140), acknowledges that there is a gradual, imperceptible transition to the subject of the Eucharist (p. 142). This is all I desire. For the true matter of controversy is this. If a subject is treated of, in the latter part of the discourse, different from that which occupied the former, and it be the Eucharist, do the expressions used countenance the Catholic or the Protestant doctrine? This is a question independent of where the change occurs. Philalethes and the *Critic* seem both to allow that the Eucharist, which was not alluded to in the first part of the discourse, is partly at least its topic in the end. Wherefore then Dr. Turton's solicitude to combat all idea of any change?

The result of these remarks is, that, without the slightest injury to my arguments on *John* vi., I might safely waive all the inquiry which occupies Dr. T.'s forty pages, abandon what he seems to imagine I take for an important position, and meet him on their own intrinsic value. It would be seen that not one of my "favourite arguments" will be "deprived of their only support" (p. 12). Without exception, they rest upon the determination, not of

topic which takes place at v. 48, or as I think at v. 51. Dr. W. calls the change *complete*. I contend," &c.—p. 77. It is evident that this writer justly considers the question as to the point of transition unimportant, and allows that some transition does take place, three verses later.

the place of transition, but of its existence, admitted by many Protestant divines. In fact, I would here close the inquiry, and pass over, as secondary matter, the Doctor's detailed analysis of my arguments on the proposed division, were it not for another reason assigned by him for his prolixity.

He tells us that "by studying the subject, much light will be thrown upon the kind of reasoning which *may* be employed by a controversial writer in support of an hypothesis" (p. 12). This is at the outset of his investigation; at its close he thus reverts to the same subject: "Another motive, I repeat, for such an examination, is derived from the importance of ascertaining by examples, at the very outset of the inquiry, the kind of reliance which is to be placed upon the statements subsequently presented to our attention." (p. 48).

This manner of presenting the subject will not allow me to shrink from its investigation, and will, I trust, be my apology with the indulgent reader, if I lead him into details which my own view of the comparative unimportance of the inquiry would have induced me to decline. I should be tacitly admitting the consequences drawn against my accuracy and honesty, were I to decline defending the arguments I have advanced. It will however be, I trust, acknowledged that all, who thus challenged, enter into such lists, have equal rights with their challenger; and that Dr. Turton's controversial character will be placed where he tries to place

my moral character, if I convict him of the very offences which he imputes to me.

The purport of my opinion was, as I have already observed, simply this,—that a change of topic, admitted by most Catholics and many Protestants, to have taken place in our Saviour's discourse, from Faith to the Eucharist, was better placed at v. 48, than, where it usually is, at v. 51. One can hardly imagine how this could be turned into a subject of angry contest, especially as I have already shown that my arguments would be about the same, wherever the transition is to be placed. I therefore said that "I was not satisfied with the transition being placed, as it usually is, at v. 51." (p. 40). The reason of this dissatisfaction is explained in what follows, that the whole section, vv. 48—52, seemed to have all the parts of a complete discourse,—namely, a definite beginning and a symmetrical construction; both which are wanting, if we suppose the transition at v. 51. I added, what I think was not unnatural, that if such a separation from the rest of the discourse is visible in the form of the section, "we shall *not unreasonably* conclude that a new subject *may* likewise be therein treated." (p. 41). The investigation, therefore, was only preparatory, and only *plausible* deductions were proposed to be drawn from it. Three arguments were proposed for placing, not *a* transition, but "*the* transition at the 48th verse" (ib.); 1st. That this verse is preceded by what

“seemed to me” an appropriate close and summary of the foregoing discourse on faith ; 2ndly, That v. 48 presented a form occasionally used by Our Saviour in passing from one portion of a discourse to another ; 3rdly, That the entire passage, vv. 48—52, adhered together by the peculiar formation known by the name of poetical parallelism.

I ask any candid reader, were these arguments such as to call up controversial rancour, or to be discussed otherwise than in a calm tone of critical or philological disquisition ? Dr. Turton, however, thinks right to treat them with asperity, and to mix up his criticisms with much personal indignation ; how deserved the reader shall judge.

I. First, then, I asserted, in what appears to me language sufficiently devoid of presumption, “ v. 47 *seems to me* to form an appropriate close to a division of a discourse, by the emphatic asseveration *amen* prefixed to a manifest summary and epilogue of all the preceding doctrine.” (p. 41). Dr. Turton, having warned his readers that *amen* in the Douay version corresponds to *verily* in the Anglican, thus replies :—

“The word, whether single or repeated, is, when used at the beginning of a sentence, peculiar to Our Lord ; and, in that position, can scarcely ever be affirmed to be *to a certainty* designed simply to ratify what has preceded.”
—p. 13.

Now, so far was I from asserting this *to a certainty* of the passage in question, that I only said,

this “seemed to me *an appropriate* application” of the phrase. But a little farther the learned Professor attacks my views more closely. “Let us now endeavour,” he writes, “to ascertain in what manner the emphatic asseveration, ‘Verily, verily,’ is really employed by our Saviour in his discourses.” (p. 15). Two pages are then employed in collecting instances where this expression introduces discourses or sections of discourses; after which the following decided conclusion is drawn:—

“All, therefore, that we have observed in the course of our enquiry—and it is but little in comparison with what might have been adduced—leads us to the inference, that the emphatic asseveration, *Verily, verily, I say unto you*, instead of being employed in summing up and terminating what has preceded, is made use of as a means of inculcating new considerations; and of resuming, expanding, and enforcing doctrines antecedently laid down.”—p. 17.

Had Dr. T. added, “*in the passages I have just quoted*,” his assertions might stand good. But he manifestly wishes his readers to conclude that the “emphatic asseveration” is *always* so used. For otherwise he would not have drawn the conclusion that immediately follows:—

“We are thus *compelled* to decide that Dr. W.’s scheme of drawing a [*the*] line of separation between the 47th and 48th verse is overthrown by the *general analogy* of other passages, as well as by the manifest import of the whole context.”

But what if this expression is *often* used in other

circumstances, and consequently with other purposes, besides those here asserted by Dr. Turton, surely we shall not be "compelled" to make such a decision? First, then, it is sometimes used at the very beginning of a discourse, where, consequently, its power cannot be that "of resuming, expanding, and enforcing doctrines antecedently laid down." I will only refer the reader to *Matt.* xxiv. 2, xxvi. 21, and *John*, iii. 3, where Jesus had not already spoken. But I should not have thought it necessary to notice this use of the phrase in question, had not Dr. Turton been so very anxious to discover mistakes in my pages, though relating to matters of no importance.

For the more interesting point is, secondly, that this form of expression is frequently used, *as it seems to me*, to be used in *John*, vi. 47, as a conclusion to a division of a discourse, rather than as the beginning of a new one. Let the reader examine the following pages, and judge.

Matt. x. our Saviour gives his apostles minute instructions as to how they were to conduct themselves when they entered a house or city; and, after having directed them how to act in the two-fold case of their being received or rejected, closes the subject at v. 15, by saying, "*Amen, I say to you*, it shall be more tolerable for the land of Sodom and Gomorrha in the day of judgment than for that city." This is surely in close connexion with what had preceded, and is a clear conclusion. Our Lord

then recommences: "Behold I send you as sheep in the midst of wolves" (v. 16). He details the persecutions which his disciples will have to encounter from public and from domestic foes, exhorts them to fly from city to city, and adds, "*Amen, I say unto you, ye shall not finish all the cities of Israel till the Son of man come*" (v. 23). Our Saviour then presents to his apostles grounds of encouragement for the discharge of their laborious ministry in his own example, and in the certainty and immensity of their reward; and finally closes the discourse with these words: "*Amen, I say to you he shall not lose his reward*" (v. 42). I am sure that any dispassionate reader, upon perusing this chapter, will acknowledge that the emphatic asseveration in question is three times used to *conclude* a portion of a discourse, and not for the purpose of resuming or introducing. Hence the author of the "New Version of the Gospels, by a Catholic," makes a break or new paragraph after each of these conclusions, vv. 5 and 23.¹ After the first one, Griesbach likewise makes a new

¹ I may observe that Dr. Turton appeals to the circumstance of this version *not* making a break between two passages, on another occasion, as a proof that the author considered them continuous (T. p. 36.): so that I may reason that where he does make a new paragraph he must be supposed to place a new section in the discourse. What ground the learned Professor has to call the author of this version one of my *admirers* (p. 25) I am not aware. The approbation of such a distinguished man would sincerely gratify me: to be ever worthy of his admiration is far beyond my power.

paragraph, and the Anglican version thus gives the title of the chapter: "1. Christ sendeth out his twelve apostles, enabling them with power to do miracles; 5, giveth them their charge, teacheth them; 16, comforteth them against persecutions" (Ed. 1613).

Matt. xiii. 10-17. Jesus explains his reasons for teaching in parables. He commences by stating the privilege enjoyed by the apostles in hearing plainly the mysteries of the Kingdom of God. He then dwells upon the hardness of the Jews' hearts, which led him to follow with them a different course; and at v. 17 concludes this portion of his discourse by what "seems to me an appropriate close, by the emphatic asseveration *amen* prefixed to a manifest summary and epilogue of the preceding discourses;" "For, *amen I say to you*, many prophets and just men have desired to see the things that you see, and have not seen them, &c." He then proceeds to explain the parable of the sower.

Matt. xvi. 28, closes the chapter and the discourse with the same phrase. *Ib.* xxiii. 36, "Amen I say to you" introduces a summary of the preceding discourse, after which Jesus turns, in an apostrophe, to address Jerusalem, and again closes with "I say to you," &c. without the "Amen." In xxvi. 13, a similar conclusion is observable.

John viii. 51. The discourse is terminated by "*Amen, amen, I say unto you*, if any man keep

my word he shall not see death for ever." A sentence closely resembling that which I had the presumption to say *seemed to me* an appropriate close of the passage under dispute—"Amen, amen, I say unto you, he that believeth in me hath everlasting life" (*Jo.* vi. 47). Indeed, I do not think it would have been unreasonable in me to have quoted it in confirmation of this propriety.

Ib. xvii. 16. Jesus sums up what he has said regarding the washing of his disciples' feet, in these words: "Amen, amen, I say unto you, the servant is not greater than his master, &c." He then passes to another topic.

"All therefore that we have observed in the course of our inquiry—and it is but little compared with what might have been adduced—leads to the inference that the emphatic asseveration, 'Verily, verily I say unto you,' instead of being (*always*) employed as the means of inculcating new considerations, and of resuming, expanding, and enforcing doctrines antecedently laid down, is made use of (*not seldom*) as the means of summing up and terminating what has preceded. We are thus compelled to decide"¹ that Dr. Turton's argument from "the general analogy of other passages" against my thinking v. 47 an appropriate close to a section of our Lord's discourse, has no foundation in fact or truth.

¹ T. p. 17.

II. My second ground for suggesting that the transition usually placed at v. 52, might be better placed at v. 48, was this,—that immediately after what might be considered as a natural close to one section of a discourse at v. 47, there came what sometimes formed, in my humble opinion, the opening of a second division; viz. a repetition of the words which had introduced the first. Dr. Turton thinks that “there is something odd” (p. 17) in this mode of reasoning. In what this oddity consists I have laboured in vain to discover, as much as I have laboured to find out wherefore an argument of so simple a form, and stated without heat, should have called forth such ebullitions of zealous wrath as are displayed in pp. 20, 21, and 23. I must farther premise that this argument in favour of a transition is in close connexion with the first; and in my book (p. 41) is in continuation of it, beginning with “but these words,” (that is, words quoted in the preceding sentence); whereas in Dr. Turton’s attack there are about five pages of intermediate matter between the mention of the two arguments, which thus appear as reasons independent one of the other. But, in fact, their force consists in their joint consideration. It was more convenient, no doubt, for Dr. Turton to separate them widely.

The two examples which I gave of similar transitions, or of applications of similar expressions to different purposes, introduced by a repetition of

the words which had introduced the original discourse, were *John*, x. 14, compared with v. 11 and xx. 5. To both the instances Dr. Turton objects. Of the first he says that "it appears to him" that the two-fold application of the parable is quite wrong (p. 19). Though the learned Professor was so severe upon me, when I only stated what "seemed to me" a natural transition, I am not disposed to retort, but will leave him in undisturbed possession of his opinion, so long as it is unsupported by arguments. I have diligently reconsidered my proposed division of the parable, and I have not found it sufficient reason to alter my opinion, that to Dr. Turton it appears wrong. The same I say of the second parable. The distinction which I have mentioned exists, although, as is not unusual in such cases, some return may be made in the latter part to the subject of the first. But, in fact, it is in the form of an illustration, rather than of proof, that I referred to these two examples; and I am even surprised that Dr. Turton has not alleged a much more striking objection to their being applied to *John* vi., than he has done. As, however, he has not quoted it, it is unnecessary for me to do so.

The learned Regius Professor could not pass over a single point of our controversy, however remote from the main question, without artfully turning it into a subject for personal aggression, and bringing up the religious feelings of his readers

to supply the feebleness of his arguments. He is careful to do this in regard to both illustrations. It is painful to be compelled, in spite of myself, to descend to these gladiatorial contests; but the reader will not, I trust, blame *me*.

In a note upon the argument, I observed that “ I considered the latter clause of v. 15, of the first passage (*Jo.* x.), and v. 6, with the last member of v. 5, in the second (xv.), as merely incidental and parenthetic ” (p. 42). “ This truly,” exclaims Dr. T., “ seems to be a strange mode of dealing with Scripture.” . . . Then speaking of the first passage, he proceeds as follows: “ Not a single reader, I am well persuaded, will endure the idea that a sentiment so momentous in itself, and so connected with the entire passage, should be considered ‘ as merely incidental and parenthetic.’ ” This is followed by a piece of solemn declamation, in which I am charged with “ a misrepresentation obvious to a child:” and the perversion of my mind is sufficiently intimated. (p. 21.) Let Dr. Turton enjoy all the advantage of an assumed superiority of moral position. Ἔστιν ὁ ζητῶν καὶ κρίνων. But unhesitatingly I retort on him the charge of “ misrepresentation;” not such as is “ obvious to a child”—for then it could do no harm—but such as may lead the virtuous mind astray. He surely knows, or ought to know, that there is not the slightest disrespect shown to the most momentous doctrines, by representing them as “ in-

cidentally and parenthetically” treated. But he knew that by ingeniously transferring to the substance, what was obviously spoken of the form or construction, he should arouse the virtuous feelings of persons not very well versed in Scriptural knowledge, and make them at once pronounce against me. In the first place, it is not unusual, when a discourse is divided into different parts, but treating of subjects closely allied, for sentences in one to belong more strictly to the other; the division of matters not being so distinct as to prevent such recurrence to other topics. No sensible and unprejudiced commentator would object to such a supposition. To illustrate this, I will only refer the Protestant reader to Bishop Porteus’s Lectures on St. Matthew. He considers the discourse of our Saviour in chapters xxiv. and xxv., to be divided into two parts, the first of which treats of the destruction of Jerusalem, and the other of the Last Judgment. And though he allows a secondary, allusive application of the first part to the second object, yet he manifestly, through an entire lecture, and at the beginning of the next, explains the whole of chap. xxiv. as relative to the destruction of the city. When he comes to v. 36, he writes as follows:—“It is supposed by several learned commentators, that the words *that day* and *that hour*, refer to the day of judgment, which is immediately alluded to in the preceding verse, *heaven and earth shall pass away*. This conjecture is an ingenious

one, and may be true ; but if it be, this verse should be enclosed in a parenthesis, because what follows most certainly relates to the destruction of Jerusalem.”¹ So that the Bishop of London did not think it wonderful that a sentiment more properly belonging to the second part of the discourse should be “ incidentally and parenthetically ” interposed in the first : nor did he “ involuntarily begin to muse upon the motives which impel men to action, and the principles by which their conduct is directed,” (as Dr. T., in solemn phrase, says he did, p. 21), upon such an idea being suggested.

But farther, I suppose the Professor considers the declaration, 1 *Tim.* iii. 6, that the Church is “ the pillar and ground of truth ” as a very momentous one, upon which much depends. Yet he will not deny that this declaration is incidental and parenthetical : not referring to the immediate subject treated by the apostle in that place, nor necessary for its right understanding. No doubt he remembers Woide’s approbation of Cramer’s proposal to include these words, and the first part of the following verse, in a parenthesis.² Yet no one, that I am aware, has visited this temerity upon the two critics, nor thought it so awful a crime, to have proposed such a typographical

Lectures on the Gospel of St. Matthew. Lond. 1823. p. 366, (Lecture xix.)

² Notitia Codicis Alexandrini, § lxxxviii. Ed. Spohn, Lips. 1788, p. 80.

modification of the text. *Ephes.* v. 26, 27, we have another similar and very important lesson respecting the Church ; and yet it is only incidentally introduced, to illustrate the reciprocal duties of man and wife. But I shall have occasion to show that grave authorities, not to be suspected of disrespect to the word of God, consider a large portion of the discourse in *John* vi. and that part which Protestants generally propose as the key for interpreting the rest, as merely “ incidental and parenthetical.” Yet has no one ever declaimed against them, as Dr. T. thinks it right to do against me, for having entertained or expressed such an opinion.

The learned Professor is still more angry with me for proposing a conjectural alteration of the punctuation in *John* xv. 5, 6, a proposition emitted in a note, and as an opinion of my own. That the text presents difficulties no one will deny. It is as follows: “ I am the vine, ye are the branches. He who remaineth in me and I in him, he beareth *much* fruit, because without me ye can do *nothing*.” The *Codex Cantabrig.* (D) omits the οὐδέν, and so reads: ὅτι χωρὶς ἐμοῦ οὐ δύνασθε ποιῆιν. Lampe, as Dr. T. informs us, proposed to enclose in a parenthesis the words “ he that abideth in me and I in him, the same bringeth forth much fruit.” This is in reality a change of punctuation ; it is detaching a large member from the continuity of the sentence, and uniting the clause “ for without me ye can do nothing ” to the proposition preced-

ing the parenthesis, "I am the vine, ye are the branches." All this, when done by Lampe, is quite tolerable, and is quoted without any expression of feeling. But not so, when I presume to suggest a change no more violent, nor likely to bring disrespect upon the sacred text. Sacrilege could hardly be treated with greater indignation than *my* removal of a stop. Michaelis has observed, that "many obscurities of the Greek Testament have been occasioned by an improper position of the stops, and it is the duty of every commentator to remedy this inconvenience by occasional alterations, and not servilely to adhere to the present arrangement." He proceeds to suggest a great many changes of this nature. Nor does his annotator, the Bishop of Peterborough, Lady Margaret's Professor of Theology, I believe, treat these assertions, or these attempts, as rash or deserving of severe reprehension.¹ With Dr. Turton, it seems to be sufficient that a conjecture should be new, which every conjecture must at one time have been, for it to be unmercifully condemned; though Lampe's was of course new, as was Cramer's, referred to in a foregoing paragraph. For the professor enumerates the Spanish version of Cypriano de Valera, (which itself makes a change, and is not blamed), the Douay version, &c., to show that no one had made the conjecture before me. Now such erudition was surely not neces-

¹ Introduction, vol. i. p. i. p. 515.

sary, where I proposed the conjecture, not as based upon authority, but upon my own reasoning.

But Dr. Turton affects to be shocked, as though at a blasphemy, at my saying, that, as the verse now stands, the reasoning seems hardly conclusive, "he that abideth in me beareth *much* fruit, because without me ye can do *nothing*." He says he should, for his part, "be reluctant to deem it hardly conclusive from the mouth of Him who spake as one having authority."¹ (p. 23.) This is one of Dr. Turton's usual artifices to excite odium already pointed out. If, first, we are to take it for granted, that every thing was spoken by our Lord's mouth, precisely as it is pointed in the printed editions, that is, as Stephens divided the sentences, then there is, of course, an end to all criticisms upon the text. But if not, as I suppose Dr. Turton will allow to any one but myself, we are surely to make use as a ground for adjusting a reading, the greater conclusiveness of one over another word or construction.

As far as Dr. Turton's reasons, drawn from the structure of the sentence, go, I am quite willing that the reader should weigh them fairly against my proposed conjecture. I will even add a stronger objection to it, which Dr. T. has either overlooked

¹ After all, Dr. Turton supposes an ellipsis of the words *and only in that case*, and intrudes them into the text, which is a much greater conjectural liberty than I have taken. And it is after this interpolation that "he is reluctant," &c.

or undervalued. It is that the old vulgate, as presented to us by the *Codex Vercellensis* and the *Codex Veronensis*, has, v. 6, “*Si quis autem in me non manserit,*”² which, independent of all question of stops and their antiquity, will not allow, from the construction, any union with the close of v. 5. Let these and any other considerations be dispassionately urged, and let them have their full force. If before them the conjecture fall, a critical point has been settled, though the true question at issue remains untouched. Whether the real presence be taught in *John* vi., or whether the transition have to be placed at v. 48 or v. 51, or no where, will not be affected by it. No one, however, who reads Dr. Turton’s laborious commentary upon this mere critical point, will fail to see the earnestness with which he starts and pursues such secondary subjects; or its tendency to throw preliminary doubts upon my accuracy in graver matters. In my book, many readers would have overlooked this subject of such long enquiry, which occupies about a dozen lines of a note at the bottom of a page (42), but which, in Dr. Turton’s reply, is exalted into prominent possession of nearly six pages of text.

III. My third ground for considering vv. 48-52, as a continuous discourse, was the construction of the entire passage which presents a symmetrical

¹ Bianchini Evangeliarium Quadruplex. Rome, 1748. vol. i. p. cdxviii. seq.

arrangement, that will hardly allow a break at v. 51. Dr. Turton, of course, denies the whole of the proposed arrangement. His attack upon it is as feeble as it is boastful. First, "for the sake of students in divinity," he enters "his protest against the attempt to *interpret the New Testament* by the arbitrary application of versicular arrangements, so fanciful as these." (p. 28.) I beg to inform the same students in divinity, for whose welfare their professor is so deeply interested, that his protest is quite uncalled for on the present occasion. For neither here nor else where, have I applied the "versicular arrangement," fanciful or otherwise, to the interpretation of Scripture. I have sought to discover, by this arrangement, the continuity of a passage, the completeness of a section; I have not drawn any conclusion respecting its meaning. Secondly, Dr. T. selects a specimen of one form of parallelism from Dr. Jebb, in which each verse is a complete sentence, and then because mine does not give the same form, concludes that it is insufficient. Had he looked farther into Dr. Jebb, he would have found plenty of instances, where, in stichometrical compositions, verses are not complete sentences. Thirdly, Dr. Turton has "no scruple in asserting that a much better distribution of my materials might have been made." (p. 30.) As he does not condescend to communicate it, I must remain contented with the one I have proposed.

IV. I come now to the last topic of this long

section, in which two pages of my book have drawn on themselves the honour of a learned commentary of seventeen from the pen of the Regius Professor. It is prefaced, too, by these ominous words : "The design" (of my finding a parallel transition in *Matt.* xxiv.) "when committed to writing, strikes me as so utterly absurd, that the question forces itself upon the mind, how *could* a man of learning engage in such a project?" (p. 31.) The disproportion between my text and the commentary, and the energy of phrase characterising my attempt as *so utterly absurd*, would be enough to have warned the reader, had they not occurred too near the beginning of Dr. T.'s book for him to have acquired experience in his arts, that some trick of controversial sleight is about to take place, and some magnificence of display is going to be lavished upon a secondary point.

The question is briefly this : whether the transition in Our Lord's discourse, which in the next Lecture was to be proved necessary, be placed at v. 48, or v. 52 ;¹ it is plain that it consists not in

It will be important, for understanding the true bearing of this question, to which Dr. T. has given such undue prominence, to inform the reader, that it is completely independent of my own views as to *where* the transition is in *Matt.* xxiv. It is only directed to establish the fact of such faintly marked transition being found in Our Saviour's discourses. For in the analytical compendium, drawn up in 1828, before alluded to, this example from *Matt.* xxiv. is given ; though, throughout, the transition, as above stated, is placed at v. 51. The same references are given. And here I

any bold and marked step, but in an easy passage, rather discernible from the clearer expressions which follow, than from the grammatical or rhetorical form of the sentence. This obscurity may naturally be urged as an objection against admitting any such transition, and has, in fact, been repeatedly alleged. To remove this, I referred to Our Lord's discourses in *Matt.* xxiv. xxv., in which two points of resemblance are found. First, that according to many judicious commentators, with whom, in the main, I agree, the first part of the discourse refers to the destruction of Jerusalem, and the latter to the end of the world; and for this separation I referred to Bishop Porteus. Secondly, that the point where the transition takes place is indistinct, and is placed by *Protestant* commentators of repute, at a point nearly resembling either

beg to amend a typographical transposition in my work. At p. 45, is a note referring to Bishop Porteus, which should be over the page, and belongs to the second asterisk in p. 46.—Dr. Turton has taken so much pains to impeach my character for accuracy, that he might not scruple at expressing doubts, how far I may be credited when I refer to proofs not before the public. I, therefore, beg to refer the reader to my Moorfields Lectures, vol. ii. p. 142, where it will be seen that, having omitted the question of *where* the transition is to be placed, saying, that “it is immaterial,” and “makes no difference;” I yet give the discussion on *Matt.* xxiv. to illustrate the existence of transitions, cognizable from change of phraseology, subsequent to a certain point, but still scarcely discernible at their first moment, from the adaptation of the same expressions, or imagery, to different subjects.

v. 48, or v. 51 of *John* vi., namely, at xxiv. 42; where the same exhortation, as had preceded, *to watch*, is continued. Hence, I conclude, *Protestants* cannot urge a similar form of construction as an objection to a similar transition in *John*.

Any dispassionate reader would have seen, and I have no doubt did see, that this was an argument which stood completely independent of my own opinion about *Matt.* xxiv. 42, and did not involve the grounds of the opinion itself. Not so, however, Dr. Turton. He attacks the opinion itself, and at the same time is careful to fasten it upon me, shifting the entire question from its true ground, and that, as will be shown, by the strangest processes.

First, Estius, a Catholic commentator, does not place the transition at *Matt.* xxiv. 42. What then? I never referred to a single Catholic commentator upon the point; neither would it have been of the slightest value to my argument had he there placed it. I do not suppose I should have quoted him if he had. (p. 33.)

Secondly. The whole question, therefore, is respecting *Protestant* commentators. In my *Lectures on the Eucharist*, I specified only two, Kuinoel and Bloomfield. In my *Moorfields Lectures*, which the reader is aware were published from a shorthand writer's notes, (and not having been previously written, cannot be considered as so accurate in phrase), a more vague expression was used, viz.,

“It is agreed by *most modern Protestant* commentators,” (vol. ii. p. 142); and afterwards, “all the most accurate commentators, &c.,” (p. 143), meaning, of course, the *modern* ones before referred to. In candour, the exact nomination of these in the fuller Lectures should have been received as an explanation of these phrases.¹ And, in fact, I believe, that were any one called upon to specify the fullest and most complete *modern* commentators on the Gospel, he would name Kuinoel for Protestant Germany, and Bloomfield for Protestant England. When, therefore, Dr. Turton writes in these strong terms: “I here affirm, in direct opposition to Dr. Wiseman, that *those very commentators*, (with the exceptions which will be specified), have placed the point of separation after the 41st verse, and *not* after the 42nd,” (p. 33), who would not suppose that, by “*those very commentators*,” he meant those whom I had referred to? Now, those were Kuinoel and Bloomfield.

Thirdly,—Dr. Turton writes as follows: “The

¹ My words are these: “Why, *some* of the best commentators, as Kuinoel, and after him Bloomfield, place it at the 43rd verse of the 24th chapter.” (p. 46.) I conceive that the *some* are thus significantly specified. Were I to write, “Some of the best historians, as Lingard and Capefigue, believe the massacre of St. Bartholomew to have been accidental,” surely it would be a strange way of proving my assertion inaccurate, to refer to the other historians who thought otherwise. My reference to names would sufficiently explain who the historians were that I meant.

validity or invalidity of the reference to St. Matthew, as the learned author is aware, entirely depends upon *the fact*, whatever it may be, concerning these commentators. Let, therefore, the fact be ascertained." (p. 33.) How then does he proceed to ascertain it? By quoting Bengel, Tyn-dale, Scott, Campbell, Cypriano de Valera, (Spanish); the French version, and the new version by a Catholic, who do not place any transition at v. 42. Now, what has all this to do with the question, whether some Protestant modern commentators, and, more precisely, whether Kuinoel and Bloomfield, place it there? Is this ascertaining the fact as I had stated it?

IV. The learned Professor then examines the passage itself, to prove that such is the close connexion between verses 42 and 43, that no separation can be admitted between them. Be it so: for this only makes my case the stronger, if the *fact* of those commentators to whom I have referred, placing the separation between them, shall be found correct. It will show still better, what I wished to prove, that the close adherence of two verses is not considered by approved Protestant commentaries, a conclusive argument against a transition, when the change of topic is otherwise determined. What Dr. T. adds about editors and translators of the Scripture, has no connexion with our enquiry.

V. He then proceeds to enumerate a long series of commentators who place the transition at v. 42,

and takes care to sum up the paragraph by the words, not of the lectures which he professes to be confuting, but of the *Moorfields Lectures*: “So much for Dr. Wiseman’s declaration—that, ‘all the most accurate commentators,’” &c. (p. 39.) On this paragraph I have two remarks to make. First, that there is a most unworthy breach of candour, in thus transferring his attack from the work under consideration, to another; without either, by a reference or otherwise at this place, directing the reader’s attention to the stratagem, but leaving him to surmise, as probably many did, that the words quoted, were the arguments of the *Lectures on the Eucharist*. These, in fact, are the later, and avowedly the more studied performance; and any departure in them from the more popular and previous work, should, in fairness, be considered as the writer’s true opinion; and *this* should have been attacked. For, though with the explanation above given, I think the leading commentators of the continent and England, in later times, might be spoken of in popular discourses in the way they were there alluded to, yet it is evident that the more circumscribed and guarded expression of the larger work, should have been held to contain the best statement of the true question at issue. That is, if here I considered it sufficient for my argument, that *two* Protestant commentators should have maintained an opinion, the argument should not have been treated as depending upon the fact

of *a great number* maintaining, or rejecting that opinion. Yet so has Dr. T. treated it; and to borrow his phrase, “the scheme was ingenious.” It allowed him to display a great many neutral forces, as on his side; and under their cover, to execute his clever manœuvre of shifting the ground of controversy. But after this protest against the Regius Professor’s unhandsome and uncandid dealing, I ask, in the second place, what has he gained by it? He has quoted me thirteen Protestant commentators, who place the transition at v. 42, instead of at v. 43. Most heartily do I thank him for his diligence and sagacity. My object was merely to prove that Protestant commentators are not deterred from placing transitions in our Lord’s discourses by the coherence of sentences before and after; and I quoted *two* authorities. Dr. Turton has the kindness to favour me with *thirteen* instead, who, though they place the transition a verse earlier than my two, do yet precisely the same thing,—they place a transition where the expression indicates a close connexion with what precedes. He has, therefore, made my answer to the objection stronger, in the proportion of 13 to 2. For let the reader diligently examine the passage. At v. 36, our Saviour tells his apostles that the day and hour, of which he has spoken, were concealed from the very angels. He proceeds to illustrate this by the example of Noah’s contemporaries, saying, “As *they knew not* till the flood came and took them all away, so shall also

the coming of the Son of Man be." (v. 39.) Two examples follow of two men in the field, and two women at the mill (vv. 40, 41), and our Saviour thus concludes—"Watch ye, THEREFORE, because *you know not* at what hour your Lord will come." (v. 42.) It is plain that this is a conclusion strongly cohering with what had gone before; the very conjunction, *therefore*, shows this; there is an application of the instance given from the time of the Flood, where ignorance, unguarded by vigilance, led to a fatal surprise; there is a reference also to the absolute secrecy of God's decrees concerning the appointed period, of which we must be ignorant, if angels are.¹ Now it is at this verse that the thirteen commentators, quoted by Dr. Turton, propose to make a transition to the Last Judgment; so that the consequence drawn by our Lord should be the beginning of a new section. Does not this prove my assumption most convincingly, that no objection can be drawn to a transition at *John* vi. 48, from the query: "Should we not have something to indicate this transition to another subject?"

¹ The connexion of v. 42 with the preceding discourse, as a consequence to premises contained in them, is, I think, sufficiently proved by this analysis. As, however, it seems a rule with Dr. T. to deny every view which I propose of any text, I will quote St. Jerome's commentary on vv. 42, 43: "Perspicuè ostendit quare supra dixerit. De die autem illa et hora nemo scit, neque filius hominis," &c. He therefore considers these verses as closely connected with the preceding.

(*Moorf. Lect.* ii. p.142), because Protestants scruple not to admit of such transitions.

VI. Dr. Turton goes on to examine the opinions of the authors quoted by me, with an error which I will notice just now. He acknowledges my reference to Kuinoel to be correct, but not satisfied with this *fact* on which (p. 33) he had acknowledged the validity of the reference to *St. Matthew* to be based, he goes on to examine Kuinoel's reasons for his opinions; with which reasons, I have nothing to do. In the course of his enquiry into them, he comes to two curious conclusions. First, "that there is some difficulty in supposing Kuinoel not to have really meant the 42nd verse, when he wrote the 43rd." (p. 40.) I bow to Dr. Turton's superior sagacity; but when I referred to Kuinoel, or any author, to ascertain his opinion, I never made it a part of my plan to doubt his own record of it, and dive into his intentions; and, moreover, I think, that had I taken such a liberty, and said, however plausible my reasoning, that any one of his writers, who place the transition at v. 42, really meant v. 43, I should have received a severe, and, in this instance, a merited, reproof from Dr. Turton. Secondly, he thus concludes his examination of Kuinoel's opinion:—"I, here, after attentively examining the point, venture to pronounce Kuinoel's conjecture to be the result of as strange an hallucination as ever took possession of any man's mind." (p. 42.) I need hardly remind the reader again,

that I am no ways interested in the accuracy of his opinion, but only in the fact of his maintaining it.

The error above alluded to in Dr. Turton's quotation, is, that he makes me appeal to Rosenmüller as well as Kuinoel and Bloomfield : "The learned author appeals to Kuinoel, Rosenmüller, and Bloomfield ; and his appeal shall be heard." (p. 39.) Accordingly, at p. 43, he goes on to say : "I now go on to examine the case of Rosenmüller, to whose notions Dr. W. appears to have paid great attention. The "case of Rosenmüller" is this ; that I never referred to him in my text, and only, in a note, rejected his testimony ! Such is my particular attention, which has merited nearly a couple of pages' commentary from Dr. T. It seems that whether I quote an authority in my favour, or fairly renounce and disclaim it, it is all one to Dr. T. His duty is to confute me as seriously in one case as in the other ! This is quite consistent with his avowed scheme and principle : that I must be proved wrong in everything. His conclusion is thus expressed : "It is singular that Dr. Wiseman, with all his acuteness, should have failed to perceive so glaring a discrepancy between Rosenmüller's opinion and his own." (p. 45.) As I presume, a person cannot be said to have failed in what he never attempted, and, as I never referred to this author as agreeing with myself, the reader has to thank Dr. Turton exclusively, for any pleasure that he may have derived from this exposure of my failure. It may

be an agreeable,—but is it an honest sort of controversy, where you invent for your adversary, whatever you may find it amusing to confute? “Did the misrepresentation arise from inadvertency, or from design? I know not. Happy, at all events, is the man whose cause needs not the support of the kind of criticism here used by Dr.” Turton. (p. 21.)

Kuinoel and Rosenmüller thus disposed of, Bloomfield is as unmercifully dealt with, for having been so unfortunate, as to afford me a reference. Dr. Turton “concludes that Dr. Bloomfield was not considering, when he wrote the note in that work, the *exact* point of transition!” (p. 45.) Having given his reasons for his conclusion—one of them a conjecture, and another drawn from a work subsequently published—he concludes that my “appeal to commentators in this case is, he really thinks, one of the most unfortunate on record.” (p. 45.) And not content with his usual form of superlative censure, he proceeds, as above quoted (p. 15), to speak of “the mass of errors” found in this part of my work.

The mass of errors is briefly this: first, that I did *not* refer to Rosenmüller when it was convenient for Dr. Turton that I should: secondly, that I referred to Kuinoel, and “the information was found correct” (p. 39); but though the question was one of *fact* (p. 33), Kuinoel was under a hallucination (p. 42), and must have meant differently

from what he wrote (p. 40) : thirdly, that Dr. Bloomfield, to whom I likewise referred, as agreeing with Kuinoel, is acknowledged by Dr. T. to quote that writer ; but was not considering what he wrote about. (p. 45.) After this statement, I beg to suggest that the mass of errors is in the commentary, and not in the text.

In one thing, however, I owe thanks to the learned Professor's easier access to Protestant commentators : to Kuinoel and Bloomfield (and Rosenmüller, whom he will thrust upon me), he has added Whitby, Lightfoot, and Le Clerc, as placing the transition at v. 42. If these learned writers agree in the same opinion, why must we think that Kuinoel could not have meant v. 42, but only v. 43 ? or that Bloomfield did not consider the exact point of transition, when he placed it at v. 42 ? I believe the true reason to be, that I happened to quote these two. Any reader, who has no controversial propensities to gratify, will think it probable enough that they may have asserted what the other three did.

My defence of this section, against Dr. Turton's strictures, would end here, were it not for the following additional paragraph of bold defiance : " It seems worthy of remark, that Dr. Wiseman, although in the case of *St. Matthew*, willing enough to avail himself of " the best commentators," has not mentioned a single commentator, of any age, as agreeing with him in his proposed division of our Lord's discourse in *John* vi. after v. 47. . . . Let me also

observe, that an edition of the original, or a version, or a commentary, showing that Dr. Wiseman's division of the discourse, after v. 47, had been anticipated, would be a greater curiosity than can well be imagined." (p. 47.)

The reason why I appealed to commentators about *Matt.* xxiv. has been sufficiently explained. I wished to remove or obviate an objection made by Protestants; and the authority of their own commentators was the best method. But in the establishment of my proofs, I had professed to go analytically to work, by principles and not by authority. The commentators whom I should have quoted for a transition in *John* vi. would have probably been Catholics. But what weight would have been allowed to any such? What should I have gained by alleging them? Encouraged, however, by my silence on this head, the learned Professor takes it for granted that I had no such authorities to quote, and indulges in the indirect challenge (just quoted) to me, to produce such. The exaggeration of phrase at the close of the paragraph is, to say the least, childish and unscholarlike. There would be nothing so curious beyond imagination, as the reader will just now see, and as Dr. T. ought to have known, in a division there, or, indeed, at any other verse. The reproach of not being supported in my proposed division by commentators, is repeated in another part of the book (p. 79), where I am said to have advanced it,

“without the concurrence of a single commentator, good, bad, or indifferent;” and the faithful echo of all Dr. Turton’s assertions, the *British Critic*, joins his cry to the defiance. (p. 140.) Let us see how far they are right.

Before entering on the subject, I must premise that Dr. T. seems to have got hold of one Catholic commentator, whom he is determined to make me accept as a great authority. This is Estius, whom he several times quotes, once as “a commentator of great name in the Roman Church.” (p. 32, v. p. 102.) The learned professor will allow me to set him right upon this point. The commentary of Estius upon St. Paul’s Epistles is highly esteemed by us, as one of the best upon that difficult portion of Scripture; but his commentaries upon other parts of the sacred volume are in no sort of repute. Calmet, a good testimony of Catholic opinion, made very small account of them: and Richard Simon, who devotes eight pages to the commentary on the Epistles, does not say a word upon his commentary on the rest of Scripture.¹ Were any one, versed in Catholic studies, asked what commentators on the Gospels are most in use, and most generally recommended amongst us, I think he would unhesitatingly say, Maldonatus, Cornelius à Lapide, and Calmet. The first of these is acknowledged by

¹ Histoire critique des principaux Commentateurs du Nouveau Testament. Rotterd. 1693, p. 640.

Catholics and Protestants to be a most judicious critic. “De tous les commentateurs dont nous avons parlé jusqu’à présent, il y en a peu qui aient expliqué avec tant de soin, et même avec tant de succès, le sens littéral des évangiles que Jean Maldonat, Jesuite Espagnol :” says the severe Simon.¹ Walch says that his commentary on the gospels is, “Magna cum cura et judicio compositus.”² The second is more celebrated for the copiousness than for the judiciousness of his remarks, but is still worthy of great attention. The merit of the third is sufficiently known even among Protestants. I will examine the three impartially.

Maldonatus thinks, in common with some ancient writers, that, from the beginning of his discourse, our Saviour spoke of the Eucharist, but conjointly with faith and other means of being united with him, and afterwards passed to treat more specifically of the Blessed Sacrament. Thus, he writes on v. 27 ; “Interim hoc habeamus, illic quidem (in the latter part of the discourse) de sacramento propriè agere, hîc communiter et de sacramento et de fide et de gratia, et de rebus omnibus quibus vita æterna parari potest.”³ Where therefore does he place the transition? He nowhere distinctly states it, but it seems to me probable that he places it nearly where I do. For on

¹ *Ib.* p. 618.

² *Bibliotheca Theologica*, 1765, vol. iv. p. 626.

³ Comment in iv. *Evangelistas*. Lugd. 1607, col. 1511.

v. 47 he observes, that Christ returns in it to the proposition laid down at v. 40. His words merit attention: “ Redit, ut mihi quidem videtur, ad thesim quam supra proposuerat (*in marg.* v. 40) *ut qui videt filium et credit in eum habeat vitam æternam.* Nam quæ medio intervallo dicta sunt, quasi per parentheses dixit Quam causam (of their unbelief) cum exposuisset, redit ad eandem propositionem, eamque quasi adhibito jurejurando magis affirmat.”¹ Maldonatus, therefore, does not scruple to consider “ a sentiment so momentous in itself” as that no one can come to Christ unless the Father draw him (v. 44), “ and so connected with the entire passage, as merely incidental and parenthetic.” (T. p. 20.) But he moreover considers v. 47 much in the same light as I do. I call it “ an emphatic asseveration prefixed to a manifest summary and epilogue of all the preceding doctrine” (p. 41); he considers it a return to the original proposition regarding faith, confirmed by an asseveration almost amounting to an oath. Now, after this, Maldonatus applies the discourse much more intimately to the Blessed Eucharist. Of v. 48, he only says that here is given the reason why they who believe in Christ have eternal life. But after quoting vv. 49, 50, he joins v. 48 to them, saying, “ Quod autem adjungit *Hic est panis de cælo descendens* (v. 50) seipsum intel-

¹ Col. 1534.

ligit, de quo paulo ante dixerat, *Ego sum panis vitæ*. (v. 48). And, in fact, the phrase “*this bread*,” of v. 50, cannot be disjoined from the bread mentioned in v. 48. In commenting therefore upon these three verses, Maldonatus discusses the question how those who eat manna died, and those who receive the Blessed Eucharist can be said not to die. His marginal note is: “*Quomodo verum sit eos qui manna comederunt mortuos, qui Eucharistiam autem comedunt non mori.*” Two passages may be urged against this statement of Maldonatus’s sentiments; that (col. 1535) he speaks of those “*qui sive in sacramento sive extra sacramentum, alio quocumque modo comedunt:*” and again (col. 1536), “*Credat interim lector, aut si non credit, ex illo loco discat (v. 53), utroque modo de corpore Christi agi, et in sacramento et extra sacramentum sumpto.*” I answer that Maldonatus admits, in deference to those who consider a spiritual receiving of Christ to be here meant, that this is included, but earnestly contends that from this point *more* is taught, namely, a real presence and communion. For in the place to which he refers (the commentary on v. 53), he directs his attention entirely to proving that the true Eucharist and the real presence are spoken of in the discourse, saying nothing of any other way of receiving Christ: and here he is only urging the necessity of not being content with the spiritual presence, which alone some admit, to the exclusion

of the sacramental presence.¹ This much is certain, that though at the opening of his commentary, Maldonatus seemed to imply that the entire discourse applied both to the Eucharist and to other modes of receiving Christ, yet he interprets the whole to v. 47, as applying exclusively to faith, earnestly denying that St. Augustine spoke of the Eucharist in commenting on that part (col. 1516), and saying afterwards of it (col. 1543), “*Etiam supra (v. 35 marg.) ubi de sacramento non agebatur,*” &c. Farther, that from v. 48 he applies the discourse to the Eucharist, although he may appear to *allow* its application conjointly to other ways of receiving Christ. In fine, that at v. 51 he says in the margin: “*Jam clariùs sermo de S. Eucharistia intelligitur.*” (Col. 1539.)

Maldonatus then seems to divide the matter of the discourse into three parts: from v. 26 to v. 47; of faith; from v. 48 to v. 51 of the Eucharist, but less exclusively: from v. 53 to the end, of this definitively. Allowing therefore for such differences as must pass between any two writers, I think Maldonatus may fairly join me in the class of “a greater curiosity than can well be imagined.”

On Cornelius à Lapide there is little to say; for

¹ The entire passage runs as follows: “*Alterum est quod hujus sententiæ auctores nolint hic de corpore Christi agi sumpto per Sacramentum. Quod paulo post sumus refutaturi (in marg. v. 53). Credat interim lector,*” &c.

he considers our Saviour's discourse to refer to the Eucharist throughout. Hence he applies vv. 32 and 35 to it, saying on the latter verse: "Propriè eos alit per panem Eucharistiæ de quo omnis hic Christi sermo est."¹

Much more important is the opinion of Calmet, who keeps close to the literal sense, and does not seek it out so much by the authority of earlier writers as by the connexion of the discourse. He, therefore, like most Catholic commentators, divides it here into two parts. On its opening, (v. 27) he thus writes: "Ce n'est pas le pain et la nourriture temporelle que vous devez rechercher à ma suite; mais la nourriture de l'âme. Et quelle est cette nourriture de l'âme? C'est la parole de Dieu, c'est la foi, c'est la charité, c'est Jésus Christ même."² Such is the general purport of our Lord's discourse, and v. 32 he more clearly defines the subject: "Pour montrer que lui même était le vrai pain du ciel, il prouve deux choses; la première que sa doctrine était la vraie nourriture de l'âme; que la foi était la seule voie pour arriver à Dieu: et la seconde, que réellement et véritablement il donnerait son corps et son sang pour nourriture, &c."³ The part of the discourse immediately following is then explained of faith; where

¹ Comment in iv. Evang. Antwerp, 1695, tom. ii, p. 337.

² Commentaire Littéral sur tous les Livres de l'Ancien et du Nouveau Testament. Paris, fol. 1726, tom. ii, p. 675.

³ P. 676.

then does Calmet place the transition? Just where I do. On verse 47 he thus comments: "*Qui credit in me habet vitam æternam.* Il rappelle ce qu'il a déjà dit ci-devant, v. 40, *Celui qui croit au Fils, a la vie éternelle.* Il est attiré par mon Père, *il a écouté ses instructions ; il s'est nourri du pain de vie ;* il m'a été donné par mon Père ; je ne le perdrai point, je le ressusciterai au dernier jour ; il aura la vie éternelle. Toutes vérités relatives, et liées les unes avec les autres, que le Sauveur a rebattues, et tournées en différentes manières dans tout ce discours, pour les inculquer davantage."¹ Now, I confidently ask, could Calmet have more clearly shown that he considered v. 47 in the same light as I do, as "an epilogue and summary of the preceding discourse," which he recapitulates member by member as summed up in this verse?

V. 48, "I am the bread of life,"² he makes no remark on; for it presents no difficulty, and he evidently joins it to what follows, as the sense requires. He, therefore, proceeds as follows to v. 49: "J. C. ayant déclaré aux troupes qu'il était le pain vivifiant descendu du ciel," (v. 35 and v. 48,) "a exposé jusqu'ici comment il est la nourriture des ames par la foi et par la charité dont il les anime,

¹ P. 679.

² In the Anglican version the connexion between vv. 47, 48, is made apparently stronger, by 'Ο ἄψρος being rendered "that bread," "I am that bread of life," which gives rise to a false emphasis.

et par la vérité dont il les nourrit. Il lui reste encore à expliquer une troisième manière de nous nourrir, qui renferme les deux autres c'est la manducation réelle de son corps et son sang, dans le Sacrement de son amour."¹ And from this moment forward, he treats exclusively of the blessed Eucharist. Calmet, then, anticipated my division of the discourse after v. 47 ; and must, from henceforth, be classed among "unimaginable curiosities."

Before leaving the moderns, I cannot omit the opinion of the learned Father Perrone, actual Professor of Theology in the Roman College, whose Lectures are so esteemed, as to be publishing, though yet unfinished, by the University of Louvain ; and another edition was about to be given by the lamented Dr. Möhler, at Augsburg. The volume which treats of the Eucharist, has appeared since Easter 1838. He follows the opinion of St. Cyril and Theophylact, that from the beginning, Jesus intended to speak of the Eucharist, and only introduced by way of preparation the discourse on faith. This he states, at length, in a note,² while in the text he gives the ordinary division of the discourse at v. 51 ; meaning, as is evident by what he afterwards says, the point where the Eucharist is definitely mentioned. In fact, he here says, "à v. demum 51 ad finem capitis Christum inducit

¹ P. 679.

² Prælectiones Theologicæ quas in Collegio Romano S. J. habebat Joannes Perrone è Soc. Jesu. Romæ, 1838, vol. vi. p. 162.

clarius et apertius exponentem hujus cœlestis panis naturam," &c. But afterwards, when answering the usual objections against the Catholic interpretation of the second part of the discourse, from the similarity of phraseology to that of the first, he, as near as possible, coincides with me in opinion. For he places the transition at v. 48, saying rather vaguely, "usque ad v. 48 *cum quo* desinit prior sermonis pars." That he means, though the phrase is indistinct, to place this verse in the second division, I conclude from two things: first, that he shortly afterwards says, "Præterea, quamdiu loquitur de se ut objecto fidei, sub figura cibi spiritualis hunc cibum ut à *Patre* datum exhibet, vv. 32, 33, 39, 40, 44, at à v. 48, et deinceps de eo loquitur ut à *semetipso* dando v. 52."¹ Secondly, F. Perrone avowedly adopts this answer from my *Lectures*, which he has done the honour to follow closely in his Scriptural argument on this subject, and, therefore, must be allowed to coincide with me. At the same time, the independence of his own mind, his critical acuteness, and the vast extent of his theological erudition, are a security against his having blindly copied my opinions. If, therefore, he present not an instance of my division having been *anticipated*, he presents to me a more satisfactory one of its having been adopted by a truly learned and sagacious divine.

¹ P. 162.

Whether Dr. Turton will classify the foregoing commentators among the good or bad, I do not know; and it matters but little for the argument. His defiance, or at least his blame, of me regarded either: I had not the authority of one commentator good or bad; and any that could be found to agree with me would be a

“ Rara avis in terris, nigroque simillima cygno ”

a greater curiosity than could well be imagined. I will now proceed to authorities, to which I flatter myself, that even a Protestant professor of divinity will not refuse the epithet of good. St. Augustine, in his 26th Treatise on St. John, comments on this chapter. As far as v. 47 inclusively, he applies the discourse to faith, and never once mentions the sacrament of the blessed Eucharist. He then quotes vv. 48 and 49 conjointly, and after a few lines thus comments on them: “ Nam et nos hodie accipimus visibilem cibum, sed aliud est sacramentum aliud virtus sacramenti. Quam multi de altari accipiunt et moriuntur, et accipiendo moriuntur? Unde dicit apostolus, iudicium sibi manducat et bibit. Nonne buccella Dominica venenum fuit Judæ? ” &c.¹ After continuing in this strain some time longer, he proceeds to v. 50 as follows: “ *Hic est panis qui de cælo descendit. Hunc panem significavit manna, hunc panem significavit altare Dei.* ” And so he continues verse by verse. The

¹ Tractat. xxvi. in Joan. tom. ix. p. 93, ed. Lugd. 1586.

question is not now, whether St. Augustine here taught or not the real presence. That belongs to another place ; but it will be plain to any one that reads his commentary, that, precisely as I do, he places a transition between vv. 47 and 48, from faith to the Eucharist. *He*, therefore, anticipated me.

St. John Chrysostome seems to make the same division. For he clearly interprets the first part of the discourse concerning faith, and on v. 35 he writes thus : “ *I am the bread of life*. He is going just now to speak of the mysteries,” (the Eucharist,) “ and first, he thus discourses of his divinity, *I am the bread of life*. For this is not spoken of that body, whereof, towards the end of his discourse, he says, *the bread which I will give is my flesh* : but as yet he speaks of his divinity.”¹ This holy Father, therefore, supposes that two distinct topics are to be treated of ; the first of which is not the Eucharist, but the divinity of Christ ; and he accordingly goes on explaining the chapter of faith. In the following homily, he reaches the texts in dispute. After explaining v. 46 (omitting completely v. 47), he thus proceeds : “ He calls himself *the bread of life* (v. 48), because it strengthens our life both present and future ;² and he says, *If any one shall eat of this bread he shall live for*

¹ Hom. xliv. vol. x. p. 229. Ed. 1603.

² This is an idea often applied by the Fathers to the Eucharist, that it nourishes the body and prepares it for immortality.

ever. (v. 51.) Bread he calls in this place either doctrine and salvation and faith in himself, *or else his body.* For both strengthen the soul. Observe how he declares the difference of this bread and manna, from their different ends. For, that the manna did not produce any great effects he shows, adding, *Your fathers did eat manna in the desert and are dead.* Then he subjoins the strong proof, that they had been more highly favoured than their great fathers, Moses, &c. For, having said, that they who had eaten the manna were dead, he continued : *this is the bread which hath came down from heaven, &c.*" (v. 50.)¹ St. John Chrysostome, therefore, applies to the Eucharist, or the body of Christ, the intermediate portion between vv. 47 and 51, though he allows that faith may, at the same time, be spoken of. And as he had excluded all allusion to the body of Christ in the preceding part of the discourse, he places this transition immediately after v. 47. He, therefore, belongs to the class of those who anticipated me in my division.

Having to deal with an adversary so captious as the learned Professor, I have omitted other authorities, who, I believe, place the change of topic at the same point, because this circumstance could not be proved by a short extract or two, as in the foregoing, but would require a dispassionate read-

¹ Hom. xlv. *ibid.* p. 235.

ing of the entire context. Of this class are the venerable Bede and St. Cyril of Alexandria. The former closely copies St. Augustine, and may be supposed to divide Our Lord's address where he does, though his expressions are not so clear. St. Cyril is one of those who apply parts of the first portion of the discourse to the blessed Sacrament. For he clearly expounds v. 35 of this subject, at least sufficiently for the understanding of the initiated.¹ Then he naturally applies v. 36 to faith, and continues this application to v. 47 inclusively. After reciting v. 48, the holy Doctor thus explains it: "Putting aside all disguises of phrase, he shows himself manifestly, &c."² These words imply a transition of some sort; and though, for two more chapters, his language is enigmatical, owing to the reserve observed by the Church in treating of the divine mysteries; and he seems to speak more, at first, concerning the body, or person of Christ, than of its communication through the blessed Eucharist; yet, whoever will attentively read the entire commentary, will, I think, be satisfied that, with v. 47, St. Cyril considers the topic of faith to be closed, and that of the Eucharist to recommence.

Thus much may suffice of "commentators, good or bad." Dr. Turton adds, editions of the original, or a version, to the class of curiosities, greater than can be imagined, if they agree with me in this

Lib. iii. c. 36.

² Lib. iv. c. 10.

division. I must here remark upon the fallacy of his rule for ascertaining where editors place transitions. It seems to consist in their making a break or separation in their text. To the absence of such breaks of typographical continuity he appeals, I think, on two occasions already cited, as evidences, that various editions and versions disagree with me in the collocation of transitions.

Yet, even where Calmet, Maldonatus, and others say, in their commentaries, that there is a change of topic, no intimation is given to that effect in their text, placed before or above their notes. And as more than once the learned Professor appeals to the "Version" by a Catholic, as differing from me, because he makes no separation in his text (p. 36), I would remind him that the learned author of that version has shown, in his writings, that he believes a transition to take place somewhere; and yet, in his edition, he nowhere makes a break; which would naturally lead us to the conclusion, that the absence of such separations of text affords no satisfactory argument of belief that change of topic occurs. However, no doubt Dr. Turton will stand by his own test, and allow that such divisions of text substantiate the beginnings of new sections of discourse. Now upon inspecting the sixth chapter of St. John, as published by Griesbach or Scholz, we find v. 48 separated from v. 47 by a bracket, which signifies, that with the former begins a new

lesson in the office of the Greek Church. This should be decisive, according to Dr. Turton's mode of arguing, that the ancient Greek Church believed a new division of our Saviour's discourse to commence where I have placed the transition.

Was it then becoming a sound and sober scholar to indulge in such exaggerated phrase, as he does when he characterises my suggestion on the division of *Jo. vi.* as "a greater curiosity than can well be imagined," should it be found in any older writer? As a learned man, he should not have made such a boast, unless he had first examined the most approved commentators: and he ought not surely to have omitted, in his researches, those that I have enumerated. I have been more diffuse in this chapter than I intend to be in the future: because Dr. Turton, in the section examined, has put forth all his arts to undermine the character of his adversary, literary and moral; and to raise a mist of prejudice, at the outset, between his reasonings and the truth. His misstatements have been numerous, and his arguments fallacious. In his Preface, he requests his reader, that if, in any part of his volume, "there should appear a single principle *purposefully* fallacious—a single statement *designedly* incorrect—a single argument *calculated* to mislead—a single conclusion *obviously* unwarranted by the premises—to close his book, &c." (p. vi.) But for the studied qualification in each member

of this sentence, which I have printed in italics, I would call upon the “intelligent and impartial reader,” now to take him at his word. But as I no more claim for myself, than I allow to Dr. Turton, the power to penetrate into the intentions of men, or the purposes of their hearts, still less the right to be their judge, the reader must be content to accompany me farther in my disagreeable task of self-vindication.

CHAPTER IV.

HERMENEUTICAL PRINCIPLES.

DR. TURTON, Philalethes and the *Critic*, have premised to their strictures on my arguments regarding a change of subject in *John* vi., remarks upon the principles of interpretation observed throughout my Lectures.

I. The Professor, wandering from the volume before him, attacks the introduction of these principles into the *Moorfields Lectures*, and complains, that after having conducted thirteen Discourses without mentioning them, and, indeed, according to my own statements, having till then “been content to examine Scripture by means of itself, &c.” I, afterwards, relied no longer upon so obvious a mode of proceeding. “Can anything be more manifest,” he asks, “than that the person who thus deserts his original principles of interpretation, does so because he feels, that the principles he relinquishes will not sustain the cause he has in hand?” (T. p. 54.) Such is the substance of Dr. Turton’s argument, stripped of its usual insinuations; he does not here directly attack the principles themselves.

Such remarks hardly merit a reply, because any one who will take the trouble to run over the *Moorfields Lectures*, will find that the principles employed throughout the thirteen first are substantially the same as those more prominently brought forward in the fourteenth. I would beg to refer him to the fourth Lecture, (vol. i. pp. 101, 109,) where eight pages are employed in discussing one single text of the New Testament, by the minute analysis of every phrase, so as to discover its meaning precisely by the same processes as are followed in the three last Lectures. The principles that guide them are, in fact, compendiously laid down, as much as the subject required, in p. 103, a passage which probably Dr. Turton overlooked: And so far from this method or its results having appeared alarming to Protestants, the *British Critic* in an article on those Lectures, written in a very different tone from the one on the Eucharist, seemed highly satisfied with them, and appeared to think, that the meaning of the text in question, (*Matt.* xxviii. v. 18) was placed in a clearer light, and its dogmatical import better proved than before.¹ I would also point out Lecture VIII on the Supremacy, and Lecture IX, (pp. 309 and 313, *note*) where similar forms of argument are used. From the second volume I need quote no instances; because, if the reader will look at the advertisement

¹ No. xl. p. 395, calls the remark "truly valuable and important."

prefixed to it, which, perhaps, the learned Doctor did not, he will find that, in delivery, the first Lecture on Transubstantiation, (now Lect. XIV.) was the tenth of the series ; so that all the intermediate Lectures enjoyed the advantage of the supposed new principles which were given in the introduction to that Lecture. Those, therefore, could not have been considered by me applicable only to one subject. The result is, that Dr. Turton's assertion, that I *deserted* the principles with which I set out, when I reached the Eucharist, with all its superincumbent personalities, is void of foundation. I explained them more fully when their application was to be more complicated. Nor will any Protestant, I think, deny, that the Scriptural controversy between us and him is nowhere so involved as in the question of the Eucharist.

The learned Doctor, after some pages, returns to the charge ; and after having made a long extract from my preliminary Lecture on the Eucharist, honours it with a commentary, which it is not necessary minutely to analyze. (pp. 62-64.) The following remarks may suffice in reply. 1. That the quotation made has necessarily a different character when separated from its antecedents and consequences, with the references they contain, than when in its original place. Let the reader have the patience to look at it there, and he will, I humbly believe, find it sufficiently intelligible. 2. If Dr. Turton, Philalethes, (p. 65) and even the

British Critic, (p. 135) admit that the principle laid down of the *usus loquendi* as the true criterion of the meaning, be correct in regard to words and phrases, it follows, that it is equally so of their aggregate sentences. 3. We are treating of verbal interpretation, and not of the doctrine couched under these words, and thus the Jews could be said to *understand* Our Saviour's words and not to *comprehend* them, a distinction which seems not to have been understood by Dr. Turton and the *Critic*. I will, therefore, only say, that we may *understand* perfectly the words wherein a mystery is conveyed, and thereby know what we are to believe, and yet not be able to *comprehend* the mystery, it being itself beyond the reach of reason. 4. Dr. Turton says, that, from the meaning of a word or phrase, I "glide without hesitation to the impression made by an entire address, or section of an address." (p. 62.) Now, there is not a word in the passage he quotes to warrant any such assertion. I speak entirely of the impression of words; not a syllable do I say about an entire address or section of an address. If I had, I should have laid myself open to just censure, and a charge of inconsistency. For the only application I have made of hermeneutical principles is to the *words and phrases* of *John* vi., and not to the general impression of the discourse, in which the Jews, not comprehending our Saviour, did not arrive at the idea of a sacramental, though real, eating of his flesh. Really, one who is so

severe in his censures should take more pains to be accurate in stating what his author says. 5. Another point which Dr. Turton involves in obscurity, is the observation, that, as occasionally misunderstanding takes place, we have to study not only the impression actually made, but that which the words employed were naturally calculated to make. The matter is very simple when we have other resources besides the passage under consideration, supposing it to be one, in which "for special reasons," the hearers might have been mistaken. For instance, if Protestants could show, that the expressions, "to eat Christ's flesh and to drink his blood" were such as ought, of their own nature, or from ordinary usage, to have conveyed to the Jews the idea of believing in him, and, that only their obstinacy or blindness prevented them from so understanding them, the mere fact of their understanding them otherwise would not decide the cause in our favour. And hence I had to make good this point, that, in this instance, the Jews were right in taking these phrases, as they did, in their natural sense, because our Saviour's answer to them proves it. The rest of Dr. Turton's remarks are superfluous, as they apply to my supposed assertion, that the Jews, with all their dull apprehensions of heavenly things, were the best interpreters of Christ's discourses.

II. Philaethes makes two objections against the hermeneutical rules, both of which will be

found answered in the foregoing remarks on Dr. Turton. He says, "that, to suit my purpose, the rules laid down by me for words and phrases must be extended to the continuous sense of a passage." I answer, no such thing, farther than the interpretation of the single phrases in it goes. If our Lord, in his answer to the Jews' doubts, repeats again and again the expressions "to drink his blood and eat his flesh;" if their meaning could be but one, that would not be varied by the repetition. And, therefore, if they took them once in that sense, they would arrive at the proper sense of all the phrases in the discourse.

Philalethes then proceeds to lay down another canon of interpretation, which the *British Critic* says "ought to be engraved in marble, and placed constantly before the eyes of every interpreter of Scripture." (p. 135.) It is, "that when a passage relates to a fact, falling within the cognizance of our senses, any interpretation of that passage, which contradicts their evidence, is to be rejected as false." It is not my intention here to attack this canon, because it does not belong to our present controversy, but to more general principles of Biblical interpretation. Perhaps, before closing this reply, or at any rate in my second volume, I shall have occasion to return to the subject of the evidence of our senses in such matters. At present, I will only say, "Engrave if you please this canon on marble, and place it in your schools and universities, and

see whether the Church of England or Socinianism will get most good out of it." I am sure, that many members of Philalethes' own Church will not approve it. Indeed, his very work gives evidence on the subject; as in a note at p. 136, he prints a letter, written against his principle, to the *British Magazine*, for April 1837, with his answer. It would be probably idle to add the opinions of the Oxford theologians, as Philalethes would not, I suppose, consider them of any authority.

There is another question connected with the interpretation of *John* vi., which, though not introduced into my Lectures till a much later point in the discussion, will be best treated here, as it refers to the principles of interpretation followed by Catholics. In the opening of Lecture V. (p. 157 seqq.), I observed, that the Council of Trent had declined defining this chapter to apply to the Eucharist; and I gave a succinct narrative of the controversies that occurred in the congregations preparatory to the twenty-first session upon the subject. Upon this, Philalethes comments as follows: "Really Dr. W. must entertain a very mean opinion of the understanding of his readers. He says that the Council prudently refrained from defining any thing regarding the interpretation, which refers *John* vi. to the Eucharist, because the tradition of the Church was not decided for it. The Council, on the contrary, states, as the ground of

its forbearance, that the Church having revelled in the opulence of two interpretations of the passage (directly opposed to each other, but both, on fitting occasions, serviceable against heretics), it ought not to be confined to the poverty of one. Can any thing be clearer than that the Council only refrained from defining that *John* vi. refers to the Eucharist, because it was convenient, in the controversy respecting the refusal of the cup to the laity, to deny that the passage had any such reference? either *John* vi. refers to the Eucharist or it does not; both interpretations cannot be true.”¹ (p. 147.)

Perhaps my account of the transactions of the Council was obscure, from my having consulted brevity on a matter I only incidentally touched on. The statements, however, of Philalethes are incorrect, from first to last, and the inferences drawn from them are consequently erroneous.

I. He has mistaken the conclusion for the motive. For I defy him to produce a single proof that the

¹ I do not think it necessary to insert in my text the declamation in the *Critic* upon this subject, or what he is pleased to term “*double-barrelled* theology.” In personal scurrility and petulant misrepresentation, it goes beyond even the average of the rest of the article. One sentence alone will suffice to show that the answer given, in the text, to Philalethes, is applicable also to the *Critic*: “Every person will perceive how unspeakably difficult it must always be to encounter a theology which holds it lawful to adopt one interpretation of Scripture, for the purpose of illustrating one dogma, and a directly opposite interpretation for the purpose of illustrating another dogma.” p. 130.

reason for not defining more specially the interpretation of *John* vi., was the desire to have two admissible opinions instead of one in the Church. But, on the contrary, it is expressly stated that the two were retained *in consequence* of the division of opinion among the Fathers. For Sala, bishop of Viviers, and Guerrero, Archbishop of Granada, who first opposed the definition, alleged no other reason than this.¹ And the same was assigned in the answer of the theologians to the modification of the decree proposed by Salmeron and Torres, as will be seen just now.

II. A still more grievous mistake is committed by Philalethes, when he supposes that the Council refrained from the definition, because two opposite opinions were useful against two different errors. He evidently imagines the words I quoted, “*quarum*

¹ “Giacomo Maria Sala, Vescovo di Viviers, sconsigliava che in un capitolo della dottrina s'allegasse, come facevasi assolutamente nella forma proposta, la celebre testimonianza di San Giovanni al capo sesto : e ciò per la molta diversità delle opinioni fra i Padri antichi, se ivi s'intenda il mangiamento corporale della carne di Cristo, che si fa nell' Eucaristia ; e lo spirituale, che si fa nel Battesimo e nella Giustificazione.”—Istoria del Concilio di Trento, scritta da Sforza Pallavicino, *Lib.* xvii. c. vii. *Tom.* viii. p. 36, ed. Mendrisio, 1836. “Qui oppose il Guerrero ciò che altresì alla precedente mostra di que' decreti narrammo aver opposto il Sala Vescovo di Viviers : che in quel testo di San Giovan ni *intendevasi la molti Padri* non il mangiamento e il bevimento sacramentale, ma o spirituale della carne e del sangue di Cristo : sì che non conveniva al Concilio statuir obliquamente la contraria interpretazione.” *Ibid.* c. xi. p. 57.

(interpretationum) utraque probationem ab hæreticis inde deductam impugnabat,"¹ to signify that each interpretation was useful against a different error; as though the Church said to its theologians: "When pressed on the refusal of the cup to the laity, you may deny the chapter of St. John to refer to the Eucharist at all; when proving the Real Presence, you may urge this chapter as a strong proof." Such language would be not only unprincipled, but fit to put only into fools' mouths; and I wonder how a person of Philalethes' character can have been so inconsiderate as to attribute it to such men as composed the Council of Trent. But if he had taken the pains to examine the matter, he would have found, that the *proof* or argument of Protestants, against which either interpretation of *John* vi. was opposed, is one and the same; so that the Council (or rather the divines in preparatory committee) thought that the question should be left undecided, on account of the diversity of opinions among the Fathers, especially as, by either interpretation, the argument for the use of the cup was equally refuted.

This explanation is evident, from the exposition of the Cardinal Seripandus, who answered Guerrero. In it he says, that two questions are raised concerning this chapter; the first with heretics, concerning the use of the cup; the second among

¹ Lectures, p. 159.

Catholics, as to whether it referred to sacramental or to spiritual communion : that with regard to the latter point, the present decree defined nothing : that, “ respecting the former, the decree prepared enacted, and showed how, even if St. John *there spoke of sacramental communion*, the conclusion of heretics was false regarding the necessity of the cup to salvation.”¹ From these words, it is plain that no idea was entertained of allowing two interpretations to remain, contradictory one to another, to be used by the same theologian against different opinions, (for there was no question here about one of them—the Real Presence), but it was merely insisted that whether one or the other was chosen by a divine, he was equally able to repel the argument from the chapter regarding the use of the cup. This is, in fact, the meaning of the clause “ *utcumque juxta varias Sanctorum Patrum et Doctorum inter-*

¹ “ Due liti esser intorno a quel capo di S. Giovanni : l'una con gli Eretice : Se ivi per divino comandamento, e per necessità di salute si prescriba a tutti i Fedeli la comunione sotto amendue le Specie : l'altra fra' Cattolici ; Se colà si favelli della comunione sacramentale, o della sola spirituale : Intorno alla prima rivolgersi la sentenza di quel preparato capitolo ; e mostrarvisi, come, posto eziandio che ivi si parlasse da San Giovanni della Comunione sacramentale, falsa era la conclusion degli Eretici per l'assoluta necessità del Calice alla salute : Della seconda lite nulla in quel decreto sentenziarsi, o menzionarsi.” Ibid. p. 75. Philalethes quotes Sarpi's History of the Council, which is about as reasonable as to cite Voltaire for the History of Moses, or Gibbon for that of the Church.

pretationes intelligatur." (Cap. sext. Joannis.) And this is no less clear, that the *argument* of Protestants alluded to in the Committee, (not by the Council, as Philalethes would insinuate), was simply that about the use of the cup, while the question concerning the Real Presence was not even contemplated on the occasion. Indeed the use of the singular (*probationem* and *prova* in the Italian) is quite sufficient to demonstrate this.

Now, that the Council, seeing the difference of opinion among the Fathers, should have delicately refrained from defining concerning *John* vi., seems reasonable enough : but I do not think it equally reasonable that they who are in the same predicament, should find fault with this reserve. For the Anglican Church allows its members the same latitude of interpretation, as the present chapter shows. I am, in fact, placed between two adversaries, one of whom (Philalethes) admits that *John* vi. refers to the Eucharist, while the other (Dr. Turton) as strenuously denies it ; giving to the latter part of the discourse the same meaning as to the first. Is it not somewhat strange that I should have to answer two such antagonists ? Would it not be the shortest way to leave them to settle, between themselves, this important preliminary discussion ? Surely it must seem impossible to the commonest understanding, that I can be confuted by both. If Philalethes is right in applying the latter part of *John* vi. to the Blessed Sacrament, I am right also ;

and Dr. Turton is wrong in all his efforts and manifold arguments to prove, that no transition ever takes place in the topic of our Lord's discourse. Or Dr. Turton makes good his point, and then I have erred in company with a learned divine, and, I understand, dignitary of his own Church; who must be content to share the vials of wrathful indignation and mingled scorn, outpoured upon me by the Regius Professor. On which ever side I fall, my fall is made easier by having the support of one or the other, but it seems hard that I should be expected to fall on both sides.

Before closing this chapter on the hermeneutical principles pursued in my Lectures, I must be allowed to remind the impartial reader of two or three important circumstances, of which he will not find even a hint in my opponents' volumes.

In the first place, they never think it worth while informing their readers, that the hermeneutical principles with which, one and all, they are so angry, are not, by any means, my own invention, but entirely extracted from Protestant authors. Any one perusing the strictures of my opponents, would almost infallibly conclude, that these rules were never heard of in the world before, till they made their appearance in my book,—having been there and then devised, for certain special purposes. Now, in laying them down, I have been most careful to cite my authorities, as Harris, Keil, Tittman, and Ernesti, whose *Manual of Hermeneutics*, (*In-*

stitutio Interpretis N. T.) in which every one of these principles will be found, has been translated into English; and forms, if I mistake not, part of a Theological Library, published by members of the English Church. Nay, there is not a principle there which I could not have drawn from Horne's *Introduction*, or any other work containing a treatise of hermeneutics.

Secondly, none of them have warned their readers of the protestations I made at the outset, against being compelled to have recourse to this method, to which I was driven by the departure of Protestants from the old and true rule of biblical interpretation—the authority of tradition. The following passage, if generously inserted into any of their pages, would, I think, have amply dispelled the idea they so constantly endeavour to instil that this hermeneutical system is a *Catholic* one, artfully got up by the Roman Church, for the purpose of blinding or deceiving men:—

“Before replying to this objection, I must observe, that I willingly make the two following concessions. First, I fully subscribe to the sentiment of an acute and amiable Protestant philosopher, who says, ‘Luther treated Christianity in the most capricious manner, misunderstood its spirit, and introduced a new alphabet and a new religion; namely, the holy all-availableness¹ (*Allgemeingül-*

¹ This word was, by accident, omitted in the Lectures, whereby the sense is incomplete for such as do not understand the German word.

tigheit) of the Bible : and thereby came, unfortunately, to be mixed up with the concerns of religion, another perfectly foreign and earthly science—philology—whose destructive influence cannot but be recognized from that moment.’¹ I fully agree, therefore, that this philological method of learning religion is one of the most pernicious evils we owe to the Reformation ; and that far better would it have been, had the plain and only true rule of Church authority continued in its legitimate force. But fully and cordially as I make these concessions, the state of controversy, at the present day, renders it necessary to treat these questions separately, and expedient to treat them philologically.”—*Lectures*, pp. 34-35.

¹ Novalis Schriften. 2 Th s. 195. 4 Ausgabe.

CHAPTER V.

CHANGE OF SUBJECT IN THE SIXTH CHAPTER OF ST. JOHN.

A CONSIDERABLE part of what occupies the thirteen introductory pages of Dr. Turton's section on this subject (from p. 51 to p. 64), has been answered in the preceding ; that is, all that relates to hermeneutical principles. Nearly four pages, however, of this space (from p. 55 to p. 58) are taken up with an ingenious attempt to explain my motives for placing the transition at v. 48, instead of v. 51. *My grounds* I gave in my first Lecture, already sufficiently vindicated in my third chapter. Any motives distinct from those grounds I had not ; the entire substance of those four pages is a pure and gratuitous fiction of the ingenious Professor's imagination ; the train of reasoning suggested in them never passed through my mind, and therefore I trust that a total denial of the whole statement in them will be sufficient with every reader who does not allow Dr. Turton the prerogative of knowing my intentions better than myself.

Dr. Turton of course agrees with me, that the first part of Our Lord's discourse applies to faith, though he does not admit my point of transition. But even in general agreement he is careful to pick out matter for dispute ; and accordingly, ten more pages (from p. 65 to p. 75) are occupied with a mingled strain of concession and denial. I will notice a few points, as briefly as possible.

1. I observed that, in the first part of the discourse, Our Lord never applies the term *to eat* to himself, or to the bread which he shall give. To this remark Dr. Turton (p. 69) makes three objections ; the first is general, and contains nothing to reply to. The second is, "that when Our Lord says, 'He that cometh to me *shall never hunger*,' the idea of *eating* is assuredly implied." I answer, I only stated the fact that Our Lord did not use, or rather studiously abstained from using, this word ; and surely this *fact* is best illustrated by the example of Dr. T.'s own choice : "He that *cometh to me* (not he *that eateth me*) shall never hunger ;" and, "he that believeth in me (not he that *drinketh* of me) shall never thirst." At p. 75, Dr. Turton is very severe, because, as he says, "I attempt to prove a *fact*, not by evidence, but by argument." Now what does he do here but attempt to disprove a fact in this very way ? I asserted that Christ "does not once use the expression *to eat* in this part of the discourse." This is a question of fact, and the learned Professor meets it by saying, that Our

Lord *insinuated* it! The assertion was about a *word*, the answer is about an *idea*. Dr. T. introduces another objection,—that this, my argument, is founded on my “own unwarrantable division” of the discourse; adding, that “*every one else* had previously assigned v. 50 to the preceding part of the discourse.” (p. 69.) This is only a repetition of the Professor’s ungrounded assertion disproved in Chapter III.

2. I observed that Our Lord “simply said that the Father *gave* them the true bread from heaven (v. 32), and that the bread of God *giveth life* to the world.” (W. p. 54). This is placed in conjunction with the remarks concerning Our Saviour’s avoiding the phrase *to eat*. Dr. T. magnifies it into a *third reason* given by me, and argues on it thus:—

“The meaning of this appears to be, that, as the bread was merely said to be *given*, they would not be led to infer that it was to be *eaten*. We need not look far to discover the futility of the argument now before us. When in v. 51 Our Lord said, ‘The bread that I will give is my flesh, which I will give for the life of the world,’ the Jews had no difficulty in understanding that *eating* was implied; for they immediately enquired, ‘How can this man *give* us his flesh TO EAT?’”—p. 70.

Is the Regius Professor here intending to argue against me or against himself? The great point at issue between us, is, whether or no, at a certain

point of this discourse, Our Redeemer changes his topic, so as no longer to be understood by his hearers as speaking of the same subject. One mark of the change is the introduction of the word *flesh*. Now Dr. Turton's argument, if it prove anything, proves that the introduction of this word produced upon the hearers the impression that even the verb *to give* changed its signification. For if they had all along understood it to be equivalent to *giving to eat*, and the subject had been understood by them in the same sense at the beginning as afterwards, how came they never to ask the question at a previous point of the discourse? The very understanding, therefore, of the verb *to give*, in this peculiar sense, upon the introduction of the word *flesh*, proves what I wished to show, that in the earlier part of the discourse it was supposed to bear a different meaning.

3. Passing over a long paragraph (p. 70-72), to which the Professor does not seem himself to attach much importance (p. 72), I shall close these preliminary remarks by a brief commentary upon a passage just now incidentally alluded to, which forms the close of another paragraph of nearly three pages (from p. 72 to p. 75). Dr. Turton charges me with having, at the outset of my second Lecture, professed to be showing that the phrases which occur in the first part of Our Lord's discourse *were calculated to convey* the idea of listening to the doctrines of Our Lord; and then with having con-

cluded that the Jews did so understand it. "The discourse," writes Dr. Turton, "*was calculated* to produce a certain effect on the Jews,—therefore it *did* produce that effect; on the principle, I suppose, that to point out, in any case, what ought to be the conduct of men, is only another method of ascertaining what it really was." I am not sufficiently acute to see the force of this parallelism, which, to my humble judgment, should be thus:—"On the principle, I suppose, that to use phrases calculated to convey a certain meaning, is the best security we can have that they did convey it?" Will Dr. Turton deny this principle? But let not the reader suppose that in *my* volume there exists the discrepancy between the promise and the conclusion so artfully declared by Dr. Turton. It is true, then, that I pronounced, at the outset of the Lecture, that Our Saviour's expressions were calculated to convey the idea of a figurative meaning to the Jews, and this I showed at some length. I then devoted another paragraph of a page (of which, strange to say, Dr. T., who is so minute in his strictures, takes no notice), to show how, "even if the expressions used by Our Saviour had not been so consonant with customary language, the pains which he takes to explain his words must have removed all possible obscurity." (p. 55.) It is after this paragraph that I come to the conclusion so severely censured by Dr. T. as proving a fact by an argument. In it I say, that "we are therefore

authorized to conclude, that whether we consider the ordinary meaning of the phrase, &c., *or the clear and decisive explanation which he (Christ) himself gave to them*, those who heard him *could* not possibly misunderstand this portion of his discourse." (p. 55.) Now where the parties themselves give no evidence on the subject (except so far as their making no objections is one in my favour), could we have stronger reasons for concluding that they *could* not misunderstand certain phrases, than that those phrases were common ones, and used in a manner to which they were accustomed, and were, moreover, positively explained in that sense by him who used them? Is the conclusion here beyond the premises? But then Dr. Turton (no doubt, unthinkingly) changes *could not misunderstand* into *did* understand,¹ and on this bases his censure. Yet there is a wide difference between the two: the first,—*my* inference is the natural result of the proofs, a conclusion from my argument: the second, Dr. Turton's attribution to me, would be indeed an assertion of a matter of fact, which I never made.

But Dr. Turton is quite satisfied that the Jews *did* misunderstand the entire discourse. To prove this, he refers to vv. 34, 41 and 52, thence deducing, that they only thought of obtaining a supply of food for the day. The first of the cited verses

¹ "Did produce that effect," &c. p. 73.

is too early, the last too late in the narrative to prove anything. At v. 34, our Saviour had not fully opened his discourse, which begins at v. 35; at v. 52, he had passed to other matter, and was understood correctly of giving real food. Of v. 41, I only say that I cannot find in it "the slightest intimation" of the Jews "not having a single idea in their minds, save that of obtaining a supply of food similar to that of the preceding day." (p. 74.)

At length, we come to the main question of the first portion of the Lecture—is there a transition (whether at v. 48 or v. 51) from believing in Christ to really eating his flesh? I advance six arguments in favour of such a transition; on them Dr. Turton severally comments, as does Philalethes. I will endeavour to imitate the brevity of the latter, rather than the prolixity of the former.

1. My first reason for a transition is characterized by Dr. T. as "involved in obscurity—whether because it contains something too vague for language to convey, or too absurd for the writer to have attempted to express clearly, he leaves the reader to judge." (p. 77.) The argument is simply this. Our Saviour, having seen that the use of a certain metaphor had given rise to misunderstanding, explains it literally, and for thirteen verses, continues always to use literal phrases. I do not consider it probable, that after this, he should return, without necessity, to the phrases that had been misunderstood, (as the Protestant interpretation supposes)

I might have added “ or persevered in them, after he saw a second time (v. 53) that they were again taken amiss.” I ask any reader, what great absurdity strikes him in this argument? Dr. Turton thinks, on the contrary, that it is most likely that a speaker would act just as I think it improbable that our Lord would or did, act. He thinks it “ clear to the commonest apprehension, that the explanation, previously given of such terms, is the very best warrant for recurring to them in that sense.” (p. 78.) I beg to reply, that here, at best, is only assertion against assertion; Dr. Turton’s view of probable conduct opposed to mine; whether mine be absurd or his wise, there is, at any rate, no attempt at confutation. Moreover, his is only an abstract enunciation of what he thinks might be; mine is supported by facts. It is certain that if we believe our Lord to have returned to the figurative expressions, these must have done what my hypothesis supposes, that is, revive the very objections he had so studiously removed. I do not think it suitable to his merciful character to have acted thus: Dr. T. overlooks all such conclusions. When the learned Professor adds, that to make this argument, I first divide the discourse where I please, “ without the concurrence of a single commentator, good, bad, or indifferent, and without a single reason which I ought not to have been ashamed to produce,” (p. 79) I beg to refer him, for the first of these assertions, to my third chapter, where some such

authors are quoted ; and for the second, to my first chapter, under the head *scurrility*.

2. I then repeat what I had before remarked, that in the first section of the discourse, our Lord had avoided the expression *to eat* ; and, certainly, never applied it to himself : which, afterwards, he does. Dr. T. has nothing to say about this, except to blame, of course, in no measured terms, my saying that Christ again and again applies the word to himself in the second portion, whereas he only once uses the phrase “ eateth me.” This is mere hyper-criticism ; any reader, less prejudiced, would have understood that under this abridged form, I included the application of the term to Christ’s flesh. But he goes back to the place where I say that Jeremiah and Isaiah, where they represent their doctrines as food, could not have said, “ Come and eat *me*.” (W. p. 53, T. p. 80). To this Dr. T. objects, that neither could they have said, “ He that believeth on me (*in me*) hath everlasting life.” The examples chosen, were given to show the difference between the application of the word to things and to persons. No one would admit, that because those prophets called their doctrines food, and spoke of their being eaten, they could have applied the same metaphor to their persons. We have, therefore, a warrant in those passages for the application of this figure to doctrine, as used in the first part of the discourse ; and this is what I sought in the illustration. But Dr. Turton has none for *his* applica-

tion of it to a person, whether he be the object or only the communicator of the doctrine. We were inquiring into the *use* of a certain phrase; I proved that it was used in other places, as it occurs in the first part of my discourse; the learned Professor has brought, and can bring none, to show that it ever was used in the sense he wishes it to have in the second.

But both Dr. T. and Philalethes, seem much beholden to me for another example I gave them, which they seem to think quite satisfactory for their purpose. In *Ecclesiasticus*, Wisdom is represented as saying, "Come and eat me." (W. p. 53, T. p. 82, Ph. p. 79). Dr. Turton's argument, drawn from this example, is nothing but declamation running through nearly two pages. I can only repeat what I have said in my Lectures, that Wisdom is an abstract incorporeal personage, to whom the word *to eat* could not, in any way, be literally applied. On the contrary, *flesh* is the proper object to which the action, expressed by the verb, is naturally directed. No one supposes the *flowers* and the *fruits* of Wisdom to be real; but the Jews believed and knew the flesh of Jesus to be so. And, so in fact, hearing him speak of his flesh, they understood the verb in its obvious sense. But Philalethes "cannot compliment" me "on the felicity of my observation;" that even Wisdom, in the passage alluded to, speaks of herself under the image of a vine. "If, then, Christ," he adds, "though not

an ideal person, like Wisdom, called himself, figuratively, a vine, why might not he, like Wisdom, speak figuratively of eating *him* and drinking *him*?" I answer, because *here* he is *not* speaking of himself under the allegory of a vine.

3. My third argument in favour of a transition of subject, is, that before v. 47, Christ speaks of a food given by the Father, (vv. 32, 33, 39, 40, 44,) after it, of one given by himself. (vv. 52, 53.) The difference of the giver led me to infer a difference in the gift: Philalethes seems to admit the argument, but says that the difference is accounted for by supposing Our Lord to speak, in the second section, of his passion. To make this good, it is necessary to prove that to eat Christ's flesh means to believe in his passion. Dr. Turton denies that the distinction exists, because, in v. 27, our Lord says, "Labour not for the meat which perisheth, but for that which endureth unto life everlasting, which the Son of man *will* give you." I have already remarked that our Lord's discourse properly begins at v. 35. And Jesus said to them, "I am the bread of life." To what then does the expression in v. 27 refer? I answer, to the Eucharist. This was the natural topic suggested by the miracle of the multiplied loaves, and of it Jesus designed to treat. The interruptions of the Jews, and their perverse asking of a new sign, led him to introduce (*incidentally and parenthetically*) the introductory discourse concerning faith. The

very use of the verb in the future tense seems to intimate this. For Jesus, as an object of faith, was already given to the world, and in all the passages referred to above, as in the first portion of the discourse, the present or past is used: "the Father *giveth*, the Father *hath* sent." When, afterwards he speaks of the gift that *he* shall give, he uses the future: "and the bread that *I will give* is my flesh;" precisely as in v. 27.¹

4. To the fourth reason, which is the difference of the effects attributed to the two gifts, the effect

¹ Since forming my own opinion upon this subject, I have been gratified at finding my interpretation of v. 27, and the grounds for it, confirmed by the learned F. Perrone. Lest Dr. T. should be unwarily betrayed into asserting, that this interpretation has been given by me "without the concurrence of a single commentator, good, bad, or indifferent," I will give him an extract from Perrone's note on the subject: "Omnibus perpensis longe mihi verisimilior visa est expositio S. Cyrilli Alex. et Theophylacti qui etiam secundam hujus capituli partem," (the first division of our Lord's discourse,) "referunt ad Eucharistiam, seu ad Christum fidem in se commendantem ac pollicentem Eucharistiam. Hoc aperte indicare videntur Christi verba, v. 27, 'Operamini non cibum qui perit, sed qui permanet in vitam æternam, quem Filius hominis *dabit vobis*, hunc enim Pater significavit Deus.' Ex quibus intelligimus Christum, arrepta occasione miraculi a se patratum in multiplicatione panum exhibuisse Judæis cibum longe excellentiorem, nempe Eucharistiam. Ut autem conciliaret fidem sibi hunc cibum pollicenti, patefacit necessitatem fidei in suam divinitatem. . . . Accurata perpensio hujus sermonis facile id suadebit; nam loquitur Christus in tempore futuro, v. 27 uti et v. 51." *Prælectiones Theol.* vol. vi. Rome, 1838, pp. 152-153.

of the first being faith, that of the second love ; the one coming to Christ, the second abiding in him. This distinction Dr. T. says is visionary (p. 85); Philalethes, by his concise, "be it so," seems to admit its reality. (p. 84.) But the Regius Professor does not bring anything deserving the name of an argument to prove his assertion. He barely asserts that the faith of the first part of the discourse, includes abiding in Christ, the virtue spoken of in the second part. "Be it so," for true faith leads to love, as love presupposes faith ; but not therefore are they the less distinct virtues. If one alone is constantly represented as the result of the gift bestowed by the Father, and the other as the effect of the Son's gift, this is surely reason enough to conclude that these gifts are different, notwithstanding the necessary connexion between the two virtues which form these effects. - But, says Philalethes, does this prove a real eating of Christ's flesh and blood? I refer him to my pages for the answer. The conclusion which I here draw is not the real corporal presence, but the existence of a change of topic. This he admits ; I only ask : " what institution more suited to answer this end (of nourishing divine love) than the blessed Eucharist? What could be more truly an instrument or means for our abiding in Christ, and Christ in us? (p. 61.)

5. My fifth reason would hardly delay us, were it not for the long and severe lecture read me by

the learned professor, which goes through four pages. The reason was, that if "to eat Christ" meant "to believe in him," "to eat his flesh" should signify "to believe in his flesh." At this both of my opponents are exceedingly angry; and Philalethes, who generally preserves a becoming dignity of phrase, calls it "paltry quibbling," to which I should not stoop. Both make the same argument, that according to Catholics *to eat Christ* and *to eat his flesh* mean the same thing, and consequently the two phrases may be equally equivalent in the figurative signification. (T. p. 88. Ph. p. 85.) My answer is this, that the two phrases are not by any means equal in intensity. The command to eat the flesh of Christ enforces the literal meaning of the passage much more than the simple injunction to eat Christ would have done. Nor is it right to argue similarly from the literal to the figurative sense. To eat the flesh, or body of Christ, and to eat him, are necessarily the same thing, if we speak of a real manducation. But who will assert, that *therefore* the two are equivalent in the figurative sense? If we speak of Christ's sufferings in the flesh, it is surely one, whether we say, *they crucified him*, or, *they crucified his body*, or, *they pierced his flesh*. But would it follow, that, because the Apostle says figuratively that "by sin men *crucify again* the Son of God," (*Heb.* vi. 6) we could, in like manner, say that they *crucify the body* of Christ, or nail *his flesh* to the cross? I certainly think not; nor

would the phrases be equivalent, or even allowable, on the ground that in the literal sense they are so.

But here Dr. Turton attempts to shift the question to a higher ground. Having said, that to preserve consistency, in the Protestant interpretation, we must consider the expression, "to eat the flesh of Christ" equivalent to believing in the flesh of Christ; I observe "*this* is absurd," (p. 61.) What is here meant to be characterized as absurd? Manifestly the opinion, that this phrase can have such a meaning. But Dr. Turton could not for a moment think of understanding me in that obvious sense. He assumes at once, that I mean to declare belief in the reality of Christ's flesh to be absurd! I, who have written the entire volume to prove, that that flesh is verily and literally received in the Eucharist! The absurdity of the idea, to use one of Dr. Turton's familiar forms of phrase, strikes one at first sight; for, without a belief in the reality of that flesh, I should have no foundation for my assertion of the reality of its presence, or of its manducation. However, not at all heeding such considerations, the Professor proceeds to collect testimonies from Scripture and tradition to prove what an important point of faith this belief is; and St. John and Pope Gelasius, the Mass, and the notes to the Rheims' Testament, are collected together to prove to me the impiety of pronouncing the belief in Christ's flesh absurd. This is all so much good learning thrown away, not to speak of the anger which accompanies it. Were such controversial

displays about matters of less solemn interest, there would be something almost ridiculous in this Quixotic chivalry of the Regius Professor, who is ever so zealous when he undertakes the championship of uncontested opinions, and fights the adversaries conjured up by his own imagination.

I said, therefore, and I deliberately repeat it, that to explain the words *to eat the flesh* of Christ, by to *believe in the flesh* of Christ, (not, mind, in the abstract, but as they lie in the only passages under discussion in *John* vi.) is absurd, and that for the reasons I gave in my Lectures. For it is absurd to suppose, that while the Jews saw and heard and touched Jesus actually in the body before them, while they “really sinned by believing him to be too literally only a man,” (W. p. 61)—immediately, too, after they had said, “Is not this Jesus the son of Joseph, whose father and mother we know? How then saith he, I came down from heaven?” (v. 42.) I say, that, under these circumstances, it is absurd so to interpret Christ’s words, as to suppose him inculcating again and again the necessity of believing him to be a *man*, and to have real flesh; it is absurd to suppose him (I say it with all reverence), allowing his disciples to depart on account of his hard saying, when that hard saying meant nothing more than what they really already believed,—to wit, that he had a body. And hence, when our Lord afterwards asked the twelve, if they, too, would abandon him, Peter did not reply, that they believed in his human nature which they saw,

but that "he was the Christ, the Son of God." And it was this belief in the invisible nature of Jesus, that gained his approbation, and not any acknowledgment of the truth of his corporeal and sensible existence. That afterwards, when Jesus had disappeared from the earth, heretics should have arisen that denied the truth of his humanity, I certainly required not Dr. Turton to admonish me; but what has that to do with the interpretation of *John vi.* ?¹

I wish I could end this matter here. But justice compels me to advance a heavier charge against Dr. Turton than I have hitherto done; and one which, to use his own terms, it is sickening to have to make. I have had to point out abundant instances of misrepresentation of my sentiments, and misinterpretation of my expressions. I now charge him with **FALSIFICATION** of my words. Having indulged, for several pages, in the indignant declamation answered in the last paragraphs, we have the following conclusion :

¹ I add another reason why Christ cannot be supposed to speak of belief in his flesh, because to *this* belief would not be applied those magnificent promises of eternal life, abiding in Christ, &c. ; "nor can our belief in them," (his flesh and blood) "be the source of eternal life." (W. p. 61.) Now, this, I suppose, will not be denied, for there is no question here about the *Incarnation* of our Lord, as Dr. T. insinuates. But this very sentence mentions "*our* belief in" the flesh and blood, which was surely sufficient to show the learned Professor that I could not pronounce it absurd.

“The reality of our Lord’s passion depends upon the reality of his human nature; and it is singular enough, that language, such as Dr. W. has employed, respecting a belief in *the flesh* of Christ, should have come from Rome. What renders this language the more strange is, that it was adopted after some reflection. ‘To believe *in the flesh* of Christ,’ says Dr. Wiseman, ‘is absurd; for the flesh and blood of Christ was not an object of faith to those who really sinned by believing him too literally only a man, nor can our belief in them be a source of eternal life.’ There is in all this a disregard of TRADITION as well as of SCRIPTURE, not easy to be found in any other volume than that of Dr. Wiseman.”—pp. 90-91.

The quotation included in this extract is too long to have been made without my volume being before the author; the whole is placed between inverted commas, and is comprehended in the phrase, “says Dr. Wiseman.” Any reader would, of course, take it for granted, that my *words* are here given, and I dare say would never think of suspecting one, who is so severe upon any thing he deems an inaccuracy, of misquoting them. And yet, in truth, the learned Professor has coolly changed “*this* is absurd,” into “*to believe in the flesh of Christ* is absurd!” The former was, at any rate, an ambiguous phrase; the substitution can bear no meaning but one. Coming at the close of Dr. Turton’s long declamatory argument, it seemed fully to justify it all; for it made me say precisely what it combatted so energetically. Shall I *now* desire the reader to obey Dr. Turton’s preliminary entreaty

to him ; if he meet in his volume “ a single statement calculated to mislead to close the book, and never to consider another sentence which it contains as worthy of the slightest notice” ? (p. 6.) Shall I apply to him some of those expressions—so lavished by him upon me—of wonder at the moral training of the mind in one who could stoop to such arts, or of pity for the cause which could need them ? No ; I will do neither. I will only make a request of the reader ; if Dr. Turton’s strain of indignation and exaggerated zeal have kept him up to this point of our controversy, biassed against me, I entreat him to calculate, what would my adversary’s triumph and scorn have been, had he ever detected *me* in such a practice as this ; and from henceforth, at least, to give his honest reason fair play.¹ I hasten over the paragraph, p. 91, which contains another misapprehension of my words. I say, that Protestants have brought no argument to show, that “ to *eat* the *flesh* of Christ ” can mean “ to *believe* in his *passion* : ” that is, they have never shown, that *flesh* ever signified *suffering* or death, any more than they have proved, that *to eat* signified to *believe in* when spoken of persons. Dr. T. replies, that I apply the passage to the Eucha-

¹ I need hardly say, that the *British Critic* follows Dr. T. on this point, and makes it the ground of some of its usual strain of attack. As there is nothing, however, in its argument, beyond what is answered in the text, I pass on.

rist, not then instituted, and bring no argument to show, that the phrases were so used at that time. Now, this is not the question between us, which is, whether the *words* could bear the meaning which our respective interpretations attribute to them. In the Catholic interpretation, *to eat and to drink, flesh and blood*, retain the ordinary significations they bear in every language, and have borne since the commencement of speech. We require no argument to prove that they were in use in this sense, and could be intelligible to all men in it. The application to the passion gives every one of these *words* a totally different meaning from what it usually bears: and we have a right to ask an argument in favour of the substitution. Is there any "excessive subtlety" in this argument, as Dr. Turton suggests? Does it "entail" any disastrous consequences upon me? (T. p. 91.)

Dr. Turton correctly observes, that I had stated the five arguments in favour of a change of topic, which I have thus far discussed, to be "mere *præ-ludia* to the real and decisive examination of the point which yet remains."¹ (W. p. 62; T. p. 91.)

¹ The sentence in my Lectures is, "the real, and I *trust*, decisive examination." (p. 62.) The omission of the phrase in italics certainly adds to the confidence of the proposition, and may tend to give it an air of presumption. I would not have noted such an omission in another writer. But from those who are so severe in reproving the slightest inaccuracy, even though it only affect the metre of a classical quotation, we have a right to exact more than ordinary correctness.

I own, that since I have examined my adversaries' objections to them, particularly to the third and fourth, I think they deserved a better name, and that I judged too lightly of them. However, be that as it may, Dr. Turton continues "to the sixth and final argument, then let us proceed without delay." (*Ib.*) The entire volume does not present a better specimen than we have here of the learned Professor's peculiar controversial talent, already noticed; that of dilating at great length, and treating with immense earnestness and minuteness, the secondary or accessory matter, and slurring over the main points and arguments. The five *præludia*, already discussed, occupy in my Lectures *four pages and a half*, of which, upwards of two are taken up by the fourth. Dr. Turton's remarks upon these *four pages and a half* of preliminary matter fill up *fourteen and a half*. Then comes my "real and decisive examination of the point," to which he seems so anxious "to proceed without delay." Well, this argument in my volume occupies upwards of *twenty pages*, and the reply to it in Dr. Turton's takes up *two and a half*! But this is not all. Any reader of his work would be led to suppose, that, from first to last, my volume is a tissue of inaccurate quotations, and that I am never right even in the smallest matter.¹ Now, in

¹ "Is it for one who is scarcely ever right, even by accident?" Turton, p. 292.

"It tends, however, to prove, by another example, that, from

this space, over which Dr. Turton so smoothly slides his readers, there are, at least, I should say, fifty references to authors sacred or profane. On not one of these does he offer a remark ; nor does he insinuate, that he has reason to doubt the accuracy of quotation, translation, or application. He merely says, “ In this portion of his Lecture, Dr. Wiseman certainly exhibits passages from the Old Testament, the Arabic, the Syriac, the Rabbins, the Greek and the Latin, in which, &c.” This bears the form of a grudging, unwilling, acknowledgment; it would have looked better in Dr. Turton, had he at once declared himself satisfied concerning them. Only one correction does he suggest : “ I have observed nothing in a literary point of view deserving of notice, unless it be, that the quotation from Martial should have *velint* instead of *velent*.” I am really obliged to the learned Professor for his polite suggestion, both because in another edition of my Lectures the mistake shall be rectified, and still more, because it affords me satisfactory evidence, that there must be *very* little for criticism or blame, where he can discover no more matter for the exercise of his ability in these arts. I must not, however, omit to point out to the reader another instance of Dr. Turton’s habitual inaccuracy in stating my views, in spite of his “ consciousness of

some motive or other, Dr. Wiseman, in drawing up his lectures, must have intended never to quote correctly.” p. 150.

having represented every thing fairly." (p. 6.) He asserts, that " Dr. W. holds, that in *John* vi., *love*, or *charity*, is the internal principle implied in *eating the flesh* of Christ according to his own literal sense.' (p. 93.) Now I never asserted any such thing. I said, indeed, that in the latter portion of the discourse, the *effects* attributed to eating the flesh of Christ, are such as represent love. There is a great difference between these two things; and the substitution of one for the other gives Dr. T.'s argument, at the moment (an argument otherwise not worthy of a serious answer), an air of more plausibility.

The *Church of England Quarterly* displays considerable acquaintance with the language of the East, in examining this part of my labours. The reviewer brings additional testimonies in confirmation of what I asserted regarding the phraseology of the first part of the discourse, and also acknowledges the correctness of my assertion, that " to eat the flesh of a person," signifies to calumniate or otherwise persecute him. He denies, however, the correctness of my limitation, by the particle *only*, of the phrase to this sole figurative meaning. (p. 41.) But, though evidently well conversant with the idioms necessary for such a discussion, he does not bring a single instance of any other tropical meaning being ever attached to the phrase, *to eat flesh*. I have a great many remarks to offer on the ingenious and learned illustrations of particular

expressions, either resembling this to some extent, or containing some of its words ; but the length to which this would lead me, and the fear of drawing the controversy, chiefly directed against another opponent, into minuteness of detail, hardly intelligible to ordinary readers, oblige me to content myself, for the present, with the simple remark already made. It would not, I think, be difficult to show that the writer has brought no one instance that could afford a key to the phraseology of *John vi.*, so as to explain it in the Protestant sense.

“By way of conclusion, therefore,” says Dr. Turton, after the verbal criticism upon Martial just noted, “I can now lay before the reader a few remarks upon the literal interpretation affixed by the Jews to our Lord’s phrase, of *eating his flesh*, an interpretation vindicated by Dr. W., as embodying the sense intended at the time.” (p. 94.) To compensate for the brief notice taken of my argument, Dr. Turton proposes his own views in ten pages, over which I hope I shall not long detain the reader. The Professor, therefore, takes great pains to prove that the Jews, while understanding our Saviour’s words literally, understood them differently from what Catholics do ; therefore, the latter interpret them figuratively. “In fact,” he writes, “if the phrases be interpreted of the sacrament, they *cannot but* be interpreted figuratively.” (p. 99.) This assertion I meet with the most unequivocal denial. In stating the Catholic doctrine of the Eucharist,

we use every term in precisely the same meaning as we attribute to it in *John* vi., and believe the Jews to have attributed to it; the four cardinal words *eat, drink, flesh, blood*, have, in our doctrine, the same simple, literal, usual sense, which they every day bear,—which they have, as the primary radical signification, in every dictionary,—and which the Jews, in listening to our Lord's discourse, attributed to them. By his *flesh*, we mean that sacred body which, born of Mary, was nailed to the cross, after it had been buffeted and scourged; by *blood*, we mean that very stream which, flowing from his blessed wounds on Calvary, redeemed the world; by *eating* and *drinking*, we understand the actual oral participation of these most precious and adorable gifts. Can any thing be more literal than this? Was what the Jews meant more so? Nay, was it not precisely the same? Then how can Dr. Turton say, that the Catholic doctrine of the Eucharist (for he is speaking of that which *I* hold,) “*is a figurative interpretation?*” (p. 98.)

“But,” says Dr. Turton, “the Jews understood our Lord of giving his flesh, in its natural state, cut from his body, either dead or alive; therefore I ought, according to my own principles, to interpret his words in the same manner, otherwise I depart from the strictly literal interpretation.” Such is the substance of Dr. T.'s argument; to support which, he quotes Catholic authorities, altogether needless; for what the Rheims' annotators, St.

Augustine, and the Doctor's favourite, Estius, say on the subject, I am fully prepared to admit. The question is, does a mistake about the *manner* affect the understanding of the substance of a doctrine? Let us first try the learned Professor's argument by a familiar illustration. A physician informs two patients, that he must give them, as a medicine, some drug against which nature almost instinctively revolts, as loathsome or deleterious. Both have had sufficient opportunities of knowing his kindness, his delicacy, and his experience. The same natural feelings are, in the first instance, excited in both,—surprise, and some degree of horror. The one, obeying these impulses, turns upon his physician, in anger and scorn, and asks him, how he can think of offering him such a substance, as wholesome medicine? The physician calmly, but firmly, insists that it is absolutely necessary for his recovery, and is a most sure remedy. Upon this, the refractory patient departs from him, and declines all farther assistance. The other has listened, without interruption, to the declarations of his prudent and benevolent adviser; and, upon being asked whether he shares the feelings of his companion, replies, that he has every confidence in the skill and goodness of his attendant, and, in spite of every other consideration, will remain under his care. After some time, the physician returns; the dreaded potion is concealed in an enticing, delicious form, and the patient, who has trusted his word, recovers

his health. But, will any one say that he does not *really* receive what the other abhorred and refused? Will any one say, that on account of its veiled form, the medicine is *not literally*, but *figuratively*, consumed? Still more, will any one assert that the two patients did not understand the same thing, and were both right in so understanding it: and *that*, even after it had been received in a different form from what had been anticipated? In fine, will any one deny that the obstinate patient was quite *right* in interpreting his physician's words, though he was *wrong* in not trusting him as to the manner of their verification? Now this incredulous, *unconfiding*, though understanding patient, represents exactly the Jews; the more generous and confiding one, the apostles—and, allow me to add, the Catholic. We believe, therefore, the literal sense as much as the Jews, but we know it to have been accomplished in a different manner from what they imagined, or affected to imagine.

This simple example contains, I think, the entire case: we may, however, illustrate it from Scripture. When our Blessed Saviour told the Jews that He was before Abraham, (*Jo.* viii. 58), he did not think it necessary to explain *how* this anterior existence was to be accounted for or explained. He proposed the object of faith, and left reason no alternative but to submit. Again, when he removed Nicodemus's difficulties respecting a second birth (*Jo.* iii. 5), he did not enter into any description or expla-

nation of sacramental regeneration; but, having given him the doctrine, reserved to himself its wonderful and mysterious application. To take an illustration from the *Old Testament*, when God said to the Jews in the wilderness: "In the evening you shall eat flesh, and in the morning you shall have your fill of bread," (*Exod.* xvi. 12), surely, instead of asking the question, "Can God furnish a table in the wilderness? . . . Can he also give bread?" (*Ps.* lxxvii. 19-20), they should have implicitly believed his words, and felt assured that they would be accomplished in a manner very different from what they could imagine. It would have never entered into their minds, that quails should be driven in flocks to their very tents, or that the manna, from which bread was to be made, should come from the clouds; but it was their duty to believe the substance of the promise, leaving, implicitly, the *manner* of its fulfilment to God's wisdom. But though *this* might differ from what they had preconceived, not, therefore, was the other changed, neither were they proved to have been wrong in taking the words literally. In like manner, when God, through his prophet, said to the besieged Samaritans: "to-morrow, about this time, a bushel of fine flour shall be sold for a stater. . . . in the gate of Samaria," (*4 Reg.* vii. 1), this seemed almost an absolute impossibility, in the actual circumstances of the place. The knowledge, however, of His power, who said so, ought to have overruled

every consideration : and the prophecy, or promise, ought to have been taken and believed *literally*, in spite of such apparent difficulties. But “one of the lords, upon whose hand the king leaned, answering the man of God, said : If the Lord should make flood-gates in Heaven, can that possibly be which thou sayest ?” How like the objection of the later Jews : “How can this man give us his flesh to eat ?” The prophet does not, upon this, condescend to explain *how* it shall be ; but acting precisely as our Lord did, in our discourse, insists upon simple belief in the fact literally, as he had foretold it. And, at the same time, he denounces punishment upon the incredulous nobleman, for measuring the resources of divine power by his own reason : “Thou shalt see it with thine eyes, but thou shalt not eat thereof.” Now this man had only calculated upon a direct supply of food, either, as the manna had before come down from Heaven, or by some other such physical resource : he never thought they were the provisions of the Syrian camp, that were thus to be placed at the disposal of the besieged, or that, for this purpose, God would strike a panic into the entire army, and cause it to flee. But they who lived next day to see *how* God fulfilled his promise, would, indeed, be better informed, than he who had misdoubted it, but would not, therefore, understand it otherwise than he had done. Both would have interpreted it in its literal sense, and would so far have been equally right.

This is precisely our case. The Jews and ourselves agree in the same literal explanation of our Saviour's words: we, living after the accomplishment of the promise, have the additional advantage of knowing *how* God was able to fulfil that which seemed to them so hard or even impossible.

I trust I have now answered fully Dr. Turton's cavil about my holding two contradictory opinions, that is, a literal, and, at the same time, a figurative one, (p. 100), and proved how we do not depart from the strictly literal interpretation, any more than the Jews, although we see and know that the words of Christ have been fulfilled in a different way from that in which they surmised that they could be accomplished. I need say nothing in answer to the many personalities contained in this portion of the chapter—they are but as the carvings and ornamental work upon the argument reared by the Regius Professor's ingenuity; and, therefore, I presume the intelligent reader will allow that they must fall with it. I will content myself, therefore, in conclusion, with again protesting against Dr. Turton's repeated attempts to fetter me, or any other Catholic, with the opinions of Estius, to whom he returns in p. 102, and at the same time to say, that though it may please this writer to distinguish the different possible ways of eating Christ, into four classes, these are manifestly reducible to two,—each again subdivided. The first would consist of the *literal* interpretation, and comprise his

first and third classes ; that is the sacramental or Catholic, and the carnal or Jewish interpretations. The second would represent the figurative explanations, and comprehend the spiritual or Protestant, and the cruel or metaphorical¹ interpretations.

¹ That is, in such passages as I have quoted, to prove that to eat the flesh of a person, meant to calumniate or otherwise ill-treat him.

CHAPTER VI.

JEWISH PREJUDICES AND MODE OF INTERPRETING
OUR LORD'S DISCOURSE.

I CONGRATULATE my readers upon the opening of Dr. Turton's chapter on this subject; for nearly thirty pages of it are occupied with matters so vague and declamatory, and withal so wretchedly personal, as to leave me little to do beyond referring to my first chapter, where both the form of argument used through this portion of the learned Professor's controversy, and the particular imputations it contains, have been sufficiently handled. I have, therefore, only to touch briefly upon a few leading points.

1. First, in p. 28 of my *Lectures*, when explaining the principles of hermeneutics, I referred to Burke for the simple and obvious remark, that "in all bodies those who will lead, must also, in a considerable degree, follow; they must conform their propositions to the taste, the talent, and disposition of those whom they wish to conduct." This I might have said, perhaps, as well in my own

words, for there is nothing either very original or striking in it; but I naturally preferred clothing my sentiments in the expressions of a writer of such reputation. At the same time I was careful to remark, that it was by no means to be applied to our Redeemer in such a manner, as to suppose that he ever adapted his *doctrines* to the prejudices of his hearers; a rationalistic opinion which I pronounced *absurd* as it is blasphemous. At the point at which we are arrived, Dr. Turton turns back to this passage, to which reference is made in my text. (p.85.) He goes to Burke's work, and finds that the words I have extracted are in a passage treating of the revolutionary party, and, therefore, is struck with horror at my applying it to our Saviour's teaching. To calm this awful feeling, which gives occasion to a very effective display, I need only observe, that Burke introduces the words I quote as a general *axiom*, applicable to virtuous assemblies as well as to wicked ones, to virtuous as to vicious instructors. He goes on to say, "*therefore* if an assembly is viciously or feebly composed," &c. Does Dr. T. mean to insinuate, that by taking the orator's axiom, I can be reasonably charged with applying it to a similar case, when all the circumstances prove that I consider ours one clean the contrary? that whereas Burke considers the assembly to which he applies the principle one of worthless profligates, I am accused by the very Professor of giving a false character of sincerity and earnestness to the Jewish

audience of Our Saviour? that, while the leaders to whom Burke alludes are men “actuated by sinister ambition, and a lust of meretricious glory,” I ever speak of Jesus as an unflinching teacher of all his truth, one who cared not for the opposition of men, but boldly and plainly asserted the most painful doctrines?¹ But surely a scholar, like the Regius Professor, will not maintain that it is usual or just with such persons to trace every quotation of a general remark to its sources, with the idea that the citer is bound to adopt the particular application of it in the original; or that, if there it be coupled with things repulsive or unbecoming, any one has a right to associate his subject or his application with these?² And if not, surely it is a

¹ I will only refer Dr. T., or any other reader, to p. 131 of my *Lectures*, for a full confutation of all the insinuations of Dr. T., that I have formed a mean, unworthy estimate of the character of Our Lord's teaching.

² For instance if an author quote such passages as the following:

“Reddite depositum; pietas sua fœdera servet;
Fraus absit; vacuas cædis habete manus:”

or, “Justus uterque fuit; neque enim lex æquior ulla
Quam necis artifices arte perire sua;”

would any one think of taunting him with gross immorality, on account of the context which surrounds them in Ovid, and the perverse application there made of them to vicious purposes? I believe both passages have been repeatedly quoted, without any Dr. Turton considering it necessary to expose the quoter by dragging forward the context.

miserable trick of the learned gentleman to act as he has done, and try to excite indignation against a quotation, by citing passages which were neither alluded to, nor in the least connected with, the use made of the citation.

2. The next object of Dr. Turton's anger is a remark from Archbishop Whately, that "a preacher," (Dr. T. qualifies him as a *successful* preacher, I know not why,) "intent upon carrying his point, should use such precautions as are not inconsistent with it, to avoid raising unfavourable impressions in his hearers." I will not quote the Professor's commentary on this remark; because, as he tells us in the same breath, "that strong language is foreign to his habits of writing," I should have to call upon my readers for one of two conclusions, either that the learned Doctor's estimate of strong language is very different from other people's, or that his anger made him unconscious of what he was saying. I will therefore simply combat his accusation, that an application of such principles to Our Lord's teaching, is degrading and injurious to him.

I find Archbishop Newcome making no scruple of saying, that when Our Saviour commanded an incorrigible offender to be held as a heathen and a publican, he, "adapted his language to Jewish customs and ideas."¹ Who can doubt but that

¹ Observations on Our Lord's Conduct as a Divine Instructor, 3rd ed. 1823, p. 367.

some learned theologian of the English Church has been filled with sacred horror, at the impious idea, that Our Lord should have ever stooped so low as to adapt his language in this way! But Dr. Turton, after making a long extract from my *Lectures*, explains his views more at full, and I think fairly “*incidit in foveam quam fecit.*” I will therefore meet his arguments face to face.

But I must premise a remark upon another of his clever performances, in altering my words or their bearing. In the first sentence extracted by him, I say: “*Our Saviour’s object*, in his discourses to the Jews, was *to gain them over to the doctrines of Christianity*: and he therefore must be supposed to propose these doctrines in the manner most likely to gain [for them] their attention and conciliate their esteem.” I have supplied two words here, which however, I think an unprejudiced reader would have understood: at any rate, it is evident that Our Saviour’s *object* is here stated to be the conversion of the Jews to Christianity; and the gaining their esteem and attention, whether for himself or his doctrines, (*I* meant the latter) is only *supposed* to be the result of his manner in proposing his doctrines. Now see how ably Dr. Turton joins part of the first and part of the latter member of the sentence into one, and so prepares for himself a good text for his commentary. “1. If we may judge from Our Lord’s own proceeding, he must have frequently had some *other*

object besides that mentioned by Dr. Wiseman—namely, that of “gaining the attention of the Jews, and conciliating their esteem.” (p. 109.) Truly this is either solemn trifling, or it is something much worse. I have declared Our Lord’s *object*, to be “to gain the Jews over to the doctrines of Christianity.” Dr. Turton descends to a palpable falsification of my words, and then proceeds to prove that Our Lord’s object in his ministry was not to conciliate esteem! Surely it ill becomes Dr. T. to be a severe censurer of others.

Well then, the issue between us should seem to be on this point: is it degrading to Our Lord’s character, to imagine him “avoiding raising unfavourable impressions in his hearers?” I say not. When he condescended to converse with men, and for that purpose to use their speech, he voluntarily submitted himself no less to the rules whereby language and all social intercourse are necessarily regulated. When he became a teacher, he acted as every prudent, wise, and benevolent teacher would act; he *wished* his scholars and hearers to learn, and he took what was the best means of teaching them. Will Dr. Turton deny this? Sublime as may be the estimate of Our Lord’s character, which he seems to intimate he has formed, in comparison with mine, is he prepared to say that it is not based upon, or that it is at variance with, those principles which guide the intercourse of a sincere teacher with his disciples? If so, then does

the Gospel cease to be a book interpretable by rules according with any known or established laws; and then, from what source are we to derive our rules of interpretation? If not, then I ask where is the degradation of applying to Our Lord's conduct the principles which direct any benevolent and prudent man in teaching others?

But if Dr. Turton considers it so blasphemously degrading to the character of Christ's ministry, to apply such tests to it, and to imagine that he "conformed his propositions to the taste, talent, and dispositions" of his audience, St. Paul does not seem to consider such a condescension unworthy of himself, or of his master. Hear how *he* writes: "And I became to the Jews a Jew, that I might gain the Jews. To them that are under the law, as if I were under the law, (whereas myself was not under the law) that I might gain them that are under the law. To them that were without the law, as if I were without the law that I might gain them that were without the law. To the weak I became weak, that I might gain the weak. I became all things to all men, that I might save all." — 1 *Cor.* ix. 20-22. Did not St. Paul then stoop to the weaknesses of those whom he was desirous to teach and gain? and is it opprobrious and insulting to him, or his apostolic character, to say so? And yet he says twice in this very epistle: "*Estote imitatores mei, sicut et ego Christi.*" (iv. 16, xi. 1.)

Let us, however, come closer to the matter. If my assertions be so monstrous and derogatory to Our Saviour, Dr. Turton must be prepared to controvert one of these two propositions in which they are comprised. First, Our Lord was a teacher *intent upon carrying his point*; secondly, if so, he must be supposed to use the means likely to attain his object, and not such as would act quite the contrary. As to the first, Our Saviour, like every sincere person who teaches, must be desirous of convincing. *His point or object* I have already stated to have been to “gain over the Jews to the doctrines of Christianity,” to convert sinners, to convince the incredulous, to reform the negligent, to make for his Father a perfect people,—to seek, in short, and to save, what was lost of the house of Israel. Will Dr. Turton call it “a degrading estimate of his conduct,” (p. 108) to say that he was intent,—yea earnestly, deeply, with heart and soul,—intent upon accomplishing these objects? If he does, then I fling back upon him—and the entire Christian Church will approve me—the foul charges which he so unsparingly casts upon me. If then, Our Lord was far more intent upon carrying his point than ever preacher of his Gospel was, will Dr. Turton take upon himself to maintain, that he did not act in the way best suited to effect his god-like purpose, but that he studiously put obstacles in the way of the attainment of his own purpose? If he does, then once more I accuse him of the very

crime which he endeavours to fasten upon me. But in fact the learned Professor does go something like this length; for he quotes texts from the New Testament to prove my assertion false regarding Our Saviour's object. Now this object I had asserted to be the "gaining the Jews over to Christianity," and therefore one would take it for granted that his proofs are directed to show the contrary,—to wit, that Our Lord did *not* wish to convert them! But no; we must be just even to an unfair adversary, and therefore I own that Dr. T. does not attack this *my* proposition, but the one he so skilfully framed from the fragments of my sentence—viz. : that Our Lord's object was to "gain the attention of the Jews and conciliate their esteem!" And even here, what examples does the learned theologian allege?

First, *Luke* xii. 49, "I am come to cast fire upon the earth." I need not remind him that most of the Fathers, as St. Ambrose, St. Cyril, St. Jerome, St. Athanasius, St. Augustine, St. Gregory, and Origen, understand by this fire, which Jesus wished vehemently to see kindled, the light and flame of the Holy Spirit, faith, devotion, and charity; and that Tertullian, followed by one or two others, understands the hatred and persecutions which were to pursue his faithful disciples. What then does this example prove, if the interpretation of antiquity have any weight? I own I do not see. But probably Dr. Turton prefers the opinion of more mo-

dern commentators, who explain this text by the words that follow, of dissension and discord. If so, then his quotation of it, is for the same purpose, whatever that be, as his reference to the following words.

2dly. (*Ib.* v. 59, seqq.) “Think you that I am come to give peace on earth? I tell you no, but separation The father shall be divided against the son,” &c. Once more I ask, whither does this quotation tend? If it be directed to confute my assertion, that Christ was anxious to draw all to himself, and was intent upon his object of converting the Jews, then I must conclude that Dr. Turton alleges it to prove that, on the contrary, Our Lord wished to produce dissension, &c., and only a partial conversion. And this is nothing short of downright blasphemy. If, on the other hand, he considers these words as only indicating the consequences—not certainly desired, but only foreseen—of our divine Master’s teaching, and therefore cites them only to prove that he did not shrink from proposing the most disagreeable truths to his hearers: then, I ask, what assertion of mine does that confute, seeing that I have clearly asserted as much in three distinct places, and at some length, viz.: in p. 28; again, at p. 91; and, finally, at p. 131. And as Dr. T. has taken so much pains to make it believed that I have represented Christ as the “leader of a party,” (p. 110) or “a political leader,” (p. 122) because I applied to his teach-

ing a general maxim, applied by Burke to such, I will beg to quote two of my phrases: "He (Jesus) with his customary firmness and *indifference to mere popularity*, suffers them to depart." (p. 131.) "What a consistent line of conduct is here exhibited; how superior to that mere desire of having many hearers and followers, whether they believe or not, *which so often characterises popular teachers*." (Ib.)

From all this I conclude, either that Dr. T. has alleged nothing in confutation of my positions, or if he have, has incurred the charge of blasphemy against Our Lord, which he affects to make against me. Having divided a quotation from me, by numbers, into so many sentences, he proceeds, in order, to pass his censures on each, *seriatim*. All are in the same strain, and contain unqualified abuse, but no argument. I therefore pass them over; I am meeting Dr. T. as an adversary, not as a judge. I will only remark in p. 112, an apparent attempt to attribute to the word *allow*, the meaning of *permit* instead of *admit*. I say that "*we cannot allow our Redeemer*" to have used certain images, &c. By the commentary it would appear to be the Professor's desire to interpret them by the first, rather than the second of these equivalents. Surely the employment of the past tense "*to have used*" is enough to explain the word, were other considerations wanting.

In conclusion to this part of his strictures, let me observe that not an argument is brought by him to

disprove what I have said concerning the light in which eating flesh and drinking blood were viewed by the Jews; nor the improbability of Our Lord's having had recourse, without some necessity, to imagery drawn from such a source. And yet this was the true argument which he professes to attack. Such are always the controversial strategics of the Regius Professor;—most valiant is he with propositions of his own creation, most forbearing in touching his opponent's,—most doughty in attacking outworks, preliminaries and accessories, — but peculiarly cautious and delicate in closing with the real argument, or even approaching it.

I now pass over the entire space, from p. 117 to p. 130, in which Dr. Turton gives his own views of Our Lord's discourse, and the conduct of the Jews; because I have undertaken to answer his attacks upon me, but not to discuss any particular views he may choose to propose. I will only make one passing remark. At p. 49, the learned Professor charges me with having “a powerful imagination,” because I said that Our Lord's discourse “opened amidst the wonder, the admiration, and the reverence of multitudes.” Now, he seems to admit that respect at least, animated the hearers at the outset. (p. 124.) This is not much, nor, I think, will any one think it sufficient, who attends to the following considerations:—1st. That after the miracle of the loaves, the people exclaimed, “this is of a truth THE prophet (ὁ προφήτης) that is

come into the world." (*John* vi. 14.) *2dly.* That they wished to make him king, and that even by force. (v. 15.) *3dly.* That the crowds waited all night by the sea-shore, for they knew that Jesus did not embark during the night (v. 22); or, at least, assembled there early next morning. *4thly.* That they procured shipping, and crossed the sea to go to him again, upon learning that he was on the other side. (v. 24.) I ask any unprejudiced person, are these equivocal marks of "wonder, admiration, and reverence?" Could any one desire stronger? or is it a stretch of a powerful imagination to consider them such? I make these remarks, not merely in reply to the passage referred to in Dr. Turton, but in reference also to Philathes's apparent surprise at my calling Our Lord's audience, "ardent and enthusiastic hearers." (p. 108.) That they were dull of apprehension, unspiritually-minded, &c., I willingly admit—so were all the Jews; but that they were then under the influence of enthusiasm for Jesus, the fact of wishing to make him king is surely evidence, or human nature can play us sadly false:—that they were ardent, their pursuit of him across the lake, is certainly some proof.

After the long analysis of Our Lord's intercourse with the Jews at Capharnaum, which I have passed over, Dr. Turton comes to my "third and most important proof, from *John* vi. The argument is this:—The Capharnaites, having had their difficulties

about the first part of the discourse removed, upon the mention of flesh, understand our Lord to speak literally, and raise an objection. Were they right in so understanding him? We find that, when his hearers, taking his words literally, and *wrongly* so, object to them, our Saviour was accustomed to explain them; when they were *right* in so taking them, he used to repeat them. By examining his conduct on the present occasion, I proposed to ascertain whether the Jews were wrong or right in taking them literally. I gave instances in both cases, and these Dr. Turton proceeds to examine. I will therefore follow him.

I. Instances where our Lord's figurative expressions were wrongly taken in the literal sense.

1. His answer to Nicodemus. (W. p. 95; T. p. 133-138.) Dr. Turton objects the difference of the audience. Nicodemus was an upright man, seeking the truth; the multitude, in *John* vi., were of a contrary character. Be it so: but I collected every instance of our Lord's conduct, where he answered difficulties raised from misinterpretation, and from them, *collectively*, drew my rule. Whatever differences there may be between the persons (and observe, I shall just now controvert Dr. Turton's view of the Capharnaites on that occasion), let them, if you please, form extremes in a chain of graduated dispositions for learning; still, if no point can be shown where our Lord's conduct actually *did* change in his dealings with men of different

classes, this instance has a right to be brought in as one of a series, tending to establish the principles whereon Jesus universally acted. "But," says Dr. T., "I have most carefully abstained from all mention of *baptism* in my account of this conference." (p. 137.) I really was not aware of the fact, till he remarked it. I am obliged to him for it; in another edition the word shall, if possible, be introduced, though only to show that it was no particular convenience to me *not* to mention baptism.* (p. 137.) In fact, so far from my having "studiously avoided the term 'baptism'" here, upon reading the paragraph over again, I do not well see where I shall be able to introduce it. He then endeavours to explain my supposed suppression; and his argument is a curious one. In the case of Nicodemus, Christ explained the expression, literally, but erroneously, understood by the Master in Israel. As the Jews likewise understood our Lord, in *John* vi. literally, Dr. Turton says, that my "own avowed principles require, for the establishment of my own doctrine, that our Lord" should have acted similarly towards them. He adds, that "it will demand a much abler controversialist than he takes me to be, to get rid of this argument, drawn from my own premises."

¹ In a note, Dr. Turton is obliged to acknowledge that, "in other instances" I have "applied the passage to baptism." How then have I to fear the thunders of the Vatican? Dr. T. must have peculiar notions of Catholic doctrines.

(p. 138.) I am not very clear what the argument is. This was mine—in *both* cases certain phrases are taken literally; in *one* this interpretation is removed by our Lord, in the other it is not; and I conclude that the former was erroneous, and the latter correct. How do my own avowed principles require that Christ should have acted similarly in both cases, when they were exactly of opposite natures? The explanation to Nicodemus, as I have in the last chapter shown, did not reach the *manner* in which the regeneration by baptism was to be performed; it only satisfied him of its spiritual nature. That was left to be explained by its institution. The same is to be said of the Eucharist: the *manner* of receiving Christ was reserved for the institution; there being, however, no mistake as to the reality of the eating and drinking proposed in the promise, no explanation was required.

2. My second example is from *Matt.* xvi. 6. Christ said to his disciples, “Beware of the leaven of the Pharisees:” they understood his words literally of bread, and Jesus explained himself. Before replying to Dr. Turton’s objections to this example, I must notice another instance of his inexplicable perversions of my words and meaning; and, at the same time, a curious inconsistency in his own assertions. I went on to say that this instance is more remarkable, from the circumstance that our Lord, wishing subsequently (*Luke* xii. 1) “to employ *before the crowds* the same figure,”

and having observed how it had been misunderstood by the disciples, added the explanation, "Beware ye of the leaven of the Pharisees, *which is hypocrisy.*" (W. p. 97.) Upon this passage, Dr. Turton comments in the following severe words: "Now, as if there were some spell over the mind of this Learned lecturer, which left his faculties no power but to mislead—what we actually read is, that our Lord '*began to say to his disciples first of all, beware ye of the leaven of the Pharisees, which is hypocrisy.*' So that the opening of the discourse was not in the least addressed to *the crowds.* In what can such misrepresentations originate? In mere hallucinations? or in the idea that a controversial writer is released from all moral obligation to state the truth?—as if the relative duties of the writer and reader were—on the one side to practice deceit, and on the other to detect it."—(p. 140.)

I am sorry, for Dr. Turton's sake, that he should have asked these questions; for my reader will, I am sure, just now retort them upon himself. I asserted that our Saviour wished to employ these images BEFORE *the crowds*, as Dr. T. himself quotes me; and yet, "by some spell," he changes my words, and charges me with saying they were addressed "to the crowds!" Now, there is surely all the difference between the two; and as the adroit controversialist has quoted *one part* of the first verse of the chapter, to confute my *imaginary*

assertion, I will take the liberty of quoting the *whole*, to establish my *real* one. “*And when great multitudes stood about him, so that they trod upon one another*, he began to say to his disciples, Beware ye of the leaven of the Pharisees,” &c. I ask, was there any hallucination in asserting these words to have been spoken “*before the crowds?*” But this is by no means the most curious part of the matter. I beg the reader to have the patience to turn back to p. 110 of Dr. Turton’s own book, where he will find these words:—“When, for instance, he (Christ) declared *in the presence of an innumerable multitude of people*, (*Luke xii. 1*) as well as of his disciples.” Here we have this very identical verse, *Luke xii. 1*, quoted to prove that certain words were spoken *before the crowds*, which, in p. 140, is alleged to convict me of misleading, deceit, and heaven knows what, for saying exactly the same thing! If the first verse of that chapter proves for Dr. T., when it suited his purpose, that the discourse there recorded was spoken “in the presence of an innumerable multitude of people,” surely it cannot, at his convenience, prove that it was not made “*before the crowds?*” “In what can such misrepresentations originate?” &c.

Let us, however, turn away from the contemplation of such unworthy arts, rendered absolutely intolerable by the abuse that accompanies them; and now attend to the argument, such as it is, employed by the Regius Professor, against this and other ex-

amples; especially as it is much the same as that advanced by Philalethes. (p. 97.) It is, that these, and several other instances, are addressed to disciples and friends; while the discourse at Capernaum was held with cavillers and enemies. A short way back, I said that I did not admit Dr. Turton's view of the character of the assembly in *John vi.*, but that I was willing to suppose Nicodemus, who came alone by night, and the Capharnaïtes, to represent two extremes in a graduated series of dispositions to learn. I come now to examine this matter more closely. I say, therefore, *first*, that the term *disciples* of Christ must not be taken in the narrowest sense, so as to restrict it to the apostles, or even to a certain limited number of very close followers; but that the disciples of Christ were often mixed with the crowd, and formed no small portion of what was so called. St. Paul mentions as many as five hundred brethren, or disciples, (1 *Cor.* xv. 6) who believed in Christ, being assembled together after his death, when many had doubtless grown cold, or had fallen back from fear, or natural lukewarmness. We may therefore suppose, that, while Jesus was exercising his power in working signs and wonders, and publicly instructing, a much greater multitude of believers would be collected at any time together. In fact *St. Luke* speaks of "the *crowd* of his disciples," ὄχλος μαθητῶν αὐτου, (vi. 17) as well as a multitude of people. Again, when his brethren

say to him, "Go into Judea, that *thy disciples also* may see thy works which thou dost . . . if thou do these things, manifest thyself to the world." (*John* vii. 3, 4.) By disciples here could not be meant those admitted into the familiar intercourse of Jesus, but rather such of the Jews as followed him in crowds, and believed in him. It is more than probable that the multitudes whom Christ addressed, were composed of a very miscellaneous assemblage of irreverent scoffers and docile hearers, of enemies and friends, or disciples. We have a remarkable illustration of this in *John* viii., from which three of my cases are taken. Philalethes and Dr. Turton both seem to admit that these present examples, are confirmatory of our Lord's practice of correcting the misapprehension of his figurative expressions. For Philalethes says: "Of these instances I have to remark that, with the exception of the last three, (from *John* viii.) the conversations were held with his disciples, or with persons of a friendly disposition; and that these cases, consequently, are not similar to that of the Capharnaïtes, in *John* vi. The last three are taken from the same chapter, and form parts of the same discourse; they are, therefore, only to be considered as one instance. Moreover, some portion of this discourse (it is not easy to say how much) is directed to Jews who *believed* on him." (p. 97.) Dr. T., although with sufficiently bad grace, seems to admit that in "two instances adduced by me," (1 *John* viii.

33, 41) as well as in *John* vi. 33, (where the crowd was precisely the same as at v. 52) our Saviour did “convict gainsayers of their perverse interpretations of his words,” (p. 146); only, what I consider “removing misapprehension,” he believes to be “the application of the severest reproof.” (p. 147.) Now what was the construction of the crowd addressed by our Lord in *John* viii.? Philalethes and Dr. T. justly say that it contained believers, (v. 31); and the latter says “it appears as if the *unbelieving* Jews had laid hold of expressions not intended for them,” and so raised the objections in question. Dr. Turton is exceedingly severe upon anything he takes for a deviation, however slight, from the Scriptural narrative, in me, and certainly ought not to hazard theories unwarranted by it himself. The passage in *St. John* is as follows:—“Then Jesus said *to those Jews* who believed in him, if you continue in my word, you shall be my disciples indeed; and you shall know the truth, and the truth shall make you free. They answered him: We are the seed of Abraham, &c. Jesus answered *them*,” &c. (*John* viii. 31-34.) What right has the learned Professor to assume that a different set of persons here addressed our Lord from those to whom he spoke? I only notice this, to show the Doctor’s inconsistency, in taking liberties for which he would be so severe on others. But in fact, if he supposes the unbelieving Jews to have made the objections, it shows clearly that

our Lord did not give explanations merely to Nicodemus, and his own immediate followers, but to even his enemies and incredulous cavillers.

My object, however, in now referring to *John* viii., is to show, that the crowds who formed our Lord's auditory, were not always distinct from disciples, but included them; so that Dr. T. and Philalethes have no right to assume that so broad a distinction exists between the instances where disciples are more expressly mentioned, and those where the crowds are spoken of. But, *secondly*, the audience in *John* vi. was not such as my two opponents have thought fit to describe it,—an unmingled crowd of carnal, unbelieving, and captious hearers. I say, on the contrary, that it contained *many* disciples, certainly as much as the assemblage in *John* viii., who seem to be considered, on that account, entitled to explanations, withheld, according to these gentlemen, from the less deserving Capharnaites. For we read, "*Many*, therefore, *of his disciples*, hearing it said, This saying is hard, and who can hear it? But Jesus, knowing in himself that *his disciples* murmured at this," &c. . . . "After this, *many of his disciples* went back, and walked no more with him." (*John* vi. 61, 62, 67.) These disciples are manifestly not the twelve, but must be supposed to be part of the multitude; at any rate they were *many* that departed; and adding those that remained, they must have formed a considerable number of persons. There is no

reason, therefore, to make the crowd at Capharnaum of a worse character than that which took up stones to throw at Jesus, (viii. 59) to which, yet, it is allowed that he condescended to explain himself, because there were some in it who believed in him. Moreover, it is evident that the difficulties were felt and proposed, not by enemies, but by *many* disciples; and, therefore, the distinction made between our case and others, where disciples are concerned, is not very strong. For surely the *presence* of the crowd could not deprive disciples of any claim they possessed, for explanations, on the benevolence of their Master.

3. To sum up, therefore, Dr. Turton's replies to my instances illustrative of our Lord's conduct, when his figurative expressions were literally taken, which he calls "a series of the most wretched arguments he ever recollects to have seen employed by a man of talent and information," (p. 139): they are as follows:—

1. *John* iii. *Admitted*, but difference of the audience stated.
2. *Matt.* xvi. *Admitted*, with similar objection.
3. *John* iv.¹ *Admitted*, similarly.
4. *John* xi. *Admitted*, similarly.
5. *Matt.* xix. *Admitted*, similarly.
6. *John* viii. 21, *Denied*.²

¹ By a typographical error, marked xv. in my Lectures, p. 79.

² Dr. Turton argues that our Lord did not explain his words,

7 *John* viii. 33, *Admitted.*

8. *John* viii. 40, *Admitted.*

9. *John* vi. 33, *Admitted.*¹

So that really with one exception, which is answered below, Dr. Turton, notwithstanding his declamations, is compelled to admit every instance I have brought. Now, these establish similar conduct towards the crowd composed of disciples, of the indifferent, and of enemies, and towards the disciples alone. They are sufficient consequently to establish a general rule applicable to *all* cases, and certainly as a test for *John* vi., where the audience was precisely that of the four last instances. I conclude, therefore, that my case has been completely made out, and much strengthened by the impotent attempts of so learned and expert a controversialist to weaken it.

because on subsequent occasions, he used the same language, and was not understood. I have all along in my *Lectures* abstained from saying that the Jews *comprehended* our Saviour's mysterious teaching (see Lect. p. 21. and Sup. p. 84. MS.) But he removed the foolish misapprehension that he intended to kill himself, based on his saying, "whether I go you cannot come." This he did by showing his meaning to be that they could not follow him in a *spiritual* sense, because they were worldly and carnal, while he was of the other world, to which he would retire. That this doctrine should have been more fully developed later and gradually, does not prove that *here* the gross misinterpretation of Christ's words was not removed by him; which is all we require for our purpose.

¹ In enumerating *eleven* instances (p. 102) I included the two casually referred to in a note, p. 100.

II. Instances in which our Saviour's words were *rightly* taken in their literal sense, and objected against : where he repeats the words so objected to.

1. *Matt.* ix. 2, where Jesus, having declared to a paralytic that his sins were forgiven him, and fault having been found with the expression rightly understood, repeats that very expression. To this Dr. Turton objects and not very courteously. In the first place, he says, that the Jews here did not *utter* their objection, but only thought it ; and this is urged as a proof of my inaccuracy. I cannot help thinking that an unbiassed reader, who sifted arguments, rather than looked for hypercritical cavils, would have argued exactly contrary, and would have said ; “ If our Lord took pains to meet objections only mentally formed, how much more likely is he to have done it when they were actually proposed ?” Not so the Regius Professor, — he catches at every straw, while he neglects arguments. Surely when Jesus answers thoughts, as others would words, we may draw inferences in a similar manner. In *St. Matt.* xii. 25, and *St. Luke* xi. 17, we have an instance of our Redeemer's answering the *thoughts* of men, and yet the objection is mentioned as actually expressed. “ But the Pharisees hearing it *said* : this man casteth not out devils but by Beelzebub the prince of devils. And Jesus knowing *their thoughts*, said to them,” &c. Hence *St. Mark* says nothing of our Lord's words

being in answer to thoughts, but puts the objection as simply spoken. (iii. 22.) Again, it would appear that the murmuring of some disciples, at what they thought the lavish exhibition of respect to our Lord by Mary, was secret: for *St. Mark* says that they “had indignation *within themselves*, and said, why was this waste of ointment made?” (xiv. 4); and *St. Matthew* writes: “And Jesus *knowing it*, said to them; Why do you trouble this woman?” (xxvi. 10); words which indicate that their murmurs were not expressed in a manner intended to reach his ear. Again, in an instance alluded to by the learned Professor himself; when the Pharisee, at whose table Jesus sat, had *within himself* entertained a thought derogatory to his character, it is said that “Jesus *answering*, said to him.” (*Luke* vii. 39, 40.) When therefore Jesus replies to the thoughts of men in *Matt.* ix, we may consider and reason upon it, as though it had been a reply to words.

But, secondly, my learned adversary objects, that on the occasion last referred to, when similar murmurs were inwardly expressed at the very same words, “thy sins are forgiven,” (*Luke* vii. 49) our Lord did not answer or repeat his words. “And thus it appears,” observes Dr. Turton, “even according to Dr. Wiseman’s own mode of exemplification, that our Lord did *not* always stand to his words, *in the meaning intended by the learned author.*” (p. 152.) It is a pity that he should have

added the last clause, which completely spoils his argument. I do not stop to notice the unwarrantable assurance with which he determines the meaning *intended* by me : it certainly is not the meaning *expressed* by me. For if he, or the reader, would be kind enough to look at p. 109 of my *Lectures*, he would see that I have plainly declared my reason why such an example as this (if Dr. Turton's view of it be correct) can have no weight in the controversy. For, according to him, our Lord answered not at all to the objection. Now our enquiry being *how* our Saviour answered in given cases, surely no criterion is to be drawn from instances where he did not condescend to reply at all. In fact we might have divided the cases, in which difficulties were raised against our Lord's words, into *three* instead of *two* classes ; *first*, of those where he explained his words, secondly, of those where he repeated them ; and thirdly, of those where he declined giving any answer at all. In *John* vi, it is evident that our divine Saviour *did* give an answer, and therefore it cannot belong to, nor be illustrated by, passages of this third class ; —it must necessarily be placed in one of the two first, and be judged of by them. I observe this the more willingly, because Philalethes has thought this matter worthy of a jeer. (pp. 92, 94.) But I may ask, is it so clear that, in the instance proposed by the Regius Professor, our Lord acts at variance with the rule deducible from his conduct on other

occasions? I think not. For does not Dr. Turton understand the words, "thy faith has saved thee," addressed to the woman after the Jews' cavil, (if cavil it be¹) as tantamount to the foregoing words, "thy sins are forgiven thee," and as a re-assertion of our Lord's power to grant pardon?² If so, then

¹ I do not think Dr. T. will easily *prove* that these words, "Who is this that forgiveth sin also?" were spoken in the same spirit as those in *Matt.* ix, where the Jews say "this man blasphemeth," and "who can forgive sins but God alone?" (*Mark* ii. 7.) On the contrary, they bear a resemblance to the expression of wonder in *Matt.* viii. 27, "What manner of man is this, for the winds and the sea obey him?" or *Luke* iv. 36, "They talked among themselves, saying; What word is this? for with authority and power he commandeth the unclean spirits, and they go out." I by no means advance this as certain, nor even as my own opinion, but to show how Dr. T., who is so particular about what he considers bold assertions in others, is by no means scrupulous about taking for granted whatever answers his own ends. Lest he should say that this view of the Pharisees' answer has not the support "of a single commentator, good, bad, or indifferent," I beg to refer him to Cornelius à Lapidè *in loc.* who thus paraphrases the words: "Estne hic Messias? estne Deus? hic enim solus per se peccata remittit." I could add others.

² The expression is used by Christ in healing corporal infirmities, or granting the desired object of those who approached him under temporal wants, *Luke* viii. a woman touching the hem of his garment was instantly healed, (v. 44.) Jesus called her before him, and when she had declared what she had done, addressed her in the very same words as the penitent in c. vii. "ἡ πίστις σου σέσωκέ σε πορεύου εἰς εἰρήνην." (v. 48.) These words confirmed the cure operated, and declared its cause: so did they in Magdalen's case confirm her forgiveness already granted.

does our Lord here “stand to his words,” and prove that he had been rightly understood in the literal sense.”

2. *John* viii. 56. To this instance the learned Doctor objects, that in it there is not a mere repetition of the sentiment objected against, but a positive affirmation of what before had only been implied. (p. 153.) So much the better; it shows that our Lord, in answering where his words had been taken literally and yet objected against, re-asserted with greater clearness and more positively that which raised the difficulty. This is the case with *John* vi. Our Saviour *implied* that his flesh was to be our food; “and the bread which I will give is my flesh for the life of the world.” The Jews, understanding him literally, object; and then he makes a “*positive affirmation*” of his implied assertion. “Amen, amen, I say unto you, unless ye eat the flesh of the Son of Man and drink his blood,” &c.

3. *John* vi. 42. I see nothing in Dr. Turton’s observations on this instance, which has not been answered in my remarks in a former chapter, concerning the carnal manner in which the Jews understood the eating of Christ’s flesh. They here objected to his having come down from heaven, because they knew his mother and supposed father. But they were right in understanding him of a *real* descent from heaven; and *this* impression he confirms by repetition of the sentiment.

Passing, with pleasure, over two or three passages of mere declamation, I come to the ingenious critic's remarks upon two objections which I myself proposed to the rules I deduced from our Saviour's ordinary conduct. As usual, now that we have got into a by-path—into the discussion of a secondary point, the learned Professor becomes minute, lengthy, and peculiarly earnest. Every quotation is verified and discussed, with a critical detail, not vouchsafed upon any of my arguments in favour of the Catholic doctrine. This, if I mistake not, is the course usually pursued by advocates versed in the arts of making the worse appear the better cause. Upwards of twenty pages are expended upon this elaborate task : I will endeavour to be more compendious. In this, one thing will greatly assist me—my having got rid of the necessity of noticing the lamentable mass of contumelious language in which his attacks are enveloped.

1. First, then, I assert that the expression, “ this temple,” as applied to Christ's body, did not depart from the usages of language in any violent degree, because it was a figure by no means uncommon in the East, and among the Jews ; similar expressions having been employed by St. Paul, Josephus, Philo, &c. ; whereas no proof can be brought that the expressions “ to eat flesh and drink blood” were *ever* used, by any one, in the sense of “ believing in a person,” or “ in his death.” Surely this is a very great difference between the two instances. What

then does Dr. Turton? A singular spirit of complaisance comes over him, which is perfectly unaccountable. Whether a serener sky, or glad tidings, or some other exhilarating cause, lulled, for a brief space, the angry passions of his soul, I know not; but he actually goes so far as to write thus: "not having, at present, any intention to dwell upon topics at all disagreeable to Dr. Wiseman, I proceed to extract from Lardner," (to whom I had referred) "what relates to St. Paul and Josephus. It is really interesting." (p. 165.) But alas! the "present" does not last long; and the halcyon moment of calm soon gives way to the usual fretting of our controversial storm. However, with the exception of I think a supercilious criticism of a passage from Lucretius,¹ there does not seem much fault found with the accuracy of my remarks on the existence of the form of speech in question in Jewish and other writers. Willing, therefore, to improve upon this momentary glimpse of good humour, I will observe that where I say that the "Jews *ought* to have understood Christ without

¹ I quote Lucretius, *giving his very words*, as calling the *body* a temple, whereas he speaks of the *breast*, as the temple of the mind. I leave the reader to judge whether this trifle was worth a page of commentary in a work on the Eucharist (p. 167, seq.) As Dr. T. speaks of "whoever induced" me to take these lines in such a sense,—to insinuate, I suppose, that I took the passage second-hand,—I am anxious to spare him all pain on the subject, by respectfully assuring him, that I am alone responsible for the "considerable mistake," as he is pleased to call it.

difficulty," (p. 107) it would have been, perhaps, better to have said, that "they *might* have understood, had they been less disposed for mere captious cavilling." To the authors who affirm that our Lord's expression was conformable to the intelligible usages of speech, I beg to add another recent commentator, who certainly does not belong to the family of the Henkes or the Rosenmüllers, of whom Dr. Turton expresses such abundant dislike. (p. 169.) I mean Dr. Scholz of Bonn, whose words I transcribe below.¹

2. I notice the opinion of some commentators who referring these words *entirely* to the resurrection, first suppose that our Lord pointed to his body; and secondly, assert that the Jews understood our Lord's phrase, but knowingly misinterpreted it. For these commentators I referred to an Essay of Süskind in Flatt's *Magazine*, with neither of whom the Regius Professor, from the way he writes, seems to be acquainted. But even if my phrase should be considered as too general, when I mention that "*the* commentators who adopt the ordinary interpretation," instead of "*some* commentators, &c." (p. 107) still it must be plain to every reader that I do not for a moment adopt their opinion as my own. It is only in an

¹ "Dass Christus unter dem Tempel seinem Körper verstand, erhellt aus v. 21, und dieser Gebrauch des Wortes *ναός* ist durch den Sprachgebrauch gerechtfertigt."—Die vier Evangelien, Frankf. 1829, p. 359.

additional paragraph to my first reason, that I mention them. But it peculiarly suited Dr. Turton's purpose to assume, that I maintained these opinions, and he unscrupulously does it.

First, then, I speak of commentators who "refer the text *wholly* to the resurrection," whereas I afterwards give my reasons in full (p. 111), for applying the words both to this mystery, and to the destruction and rebuilding of the temple. This was surely enough to satisfy Dr. T. that I did *not* coincide with those commentators.

Secondly, in spite of this, he has the unfairness to say, that I "*make much* of the argument, that when our Lord mentioned 'this temple,' he pointed to himself." (p. 178.) If barely mentioning that commentators suppose it, be making much of a fact, then certainly he is right.¹ If not, then is this statement, to say the least, exaggerated—I might have used a severer phrase.

Thirdly, having stated that these writers maintain the Apostles to have *understood* our Lord, only they did not *believe* his words, (in what sense I will explain just now), Dr. Turton takes up two or three pages in disproving this fact, advanced, he

¹ Had I been anxious to *make much* of this supposition, I should have certainly employed other writers besides Storr, and a mere casual reference to Newcome in a note. For instance, Cornelius à Lapide says, "*Templum hoc, puta corpus meum, quod Christus hic manu ad pectus admota demonstrabat.*" — *In loc.*

writes, “with Dr. Wiseman’s approbation I presume.” (p. 172.) It is indeed an unwarrantable presumption on his part, to say so; but the innuendo was necessary, to give colour and ground to his lengthy attack upon it and me.

Fourthly, when I used the word *believe*, I explained it by “that is to say, that they did not *comprehend how they were to be verified*.” Maldonatus thus explains the verb “to believe,” as here employed by *St. John*: “*Crede hoc significat intelligere, aut intelligendo credere, aut re intellecta, magis firmiter, credere quod ante obscurius, incertiusque credebatur*.” This is much the same sense which I applied to it; though, be it remembered, only in recording the opinion of commentators who believed our Lord’s words to have been of themselves intelligible.¹

Fifthly. In a note, I quoted a passage from Storr, to prove, not any opinion of my own, but the fact, that some commentators asserted our Lord to have pointed to himself. Now this passage, in Dr. Turton’s view of it, contains an absurdity, namely, that the Jews were so stupid as to overlook the gesture whereby our Lord defined the meaning of his ambiguous phrase. The learned Professor, with his usual good-manners, attributes the sentiment to

¹ To establish this beyond a doubt, I refer the reader to p. 105 of my *Lectures*, where giving my own exposition of the passage, I say: “the *Apostles themselves*, as appears from the very text, *did not understand* it until after the resurrection.

me, hardly intimating that it is a quotation, which fully proves what I cited it for, and expatiates on it, in a strain bordering upon coarseness. But the reader must be, by this time, pretty callous to this his favourite weapon. Yet, in spite of the learned critic's severity, allow me to ask him, does not every author, who maintains that our Saviour pointed to his body, and yet was misunderstood by the Jews,—Grotius, Newcome, Lampe, Cornelius, &c., necessarily suppose the Jews to have overlooked, or neglected, this indication of his meaning ?¹ And if so, is it really so good a joke, and one worthy of the Regius Professor's dignity, to jeer and scoff at Storr's having asserted this ? But be it noted that even here he could not be content to make a fair statement. The extract speaks of *John's* having understood ; but Dr. Turton transfers the understanding to the Jews : “ there is something in the idea of *the Jews, having correctly understood* our Lord's expression in consequence of a sign—which they were at the same time ‘ such stupid people’ as to overlook, &c.” Now, the whole wit or point of this bitter passage will unfortunately be lost to the reader, if he will look at the quotation, as given, immediately before these words, by Dr. Turton

I may add the concurrent opinion of a very recent commentator : “ Die Juden haben die durch Gesticulation und Nachdruck (*diesen Tempel*) von Jesu herausgehobene deiktische Beziehung nicht verstanden.” — Meyer, *Kritisch exegetischer Kommentar über das N. T.* 2 Th. 2 Abth. Götting. 1834, p. 43.

himself. “ *So observant an auditor as John* may have noticed, that Jesus at the *τουτου* (v. 19) pointed to his own body, *which may have been overlooked by such stupid people as the adversaries of Jesus were.* (W. p. 108, T. p. 170.) You see, impartial reader, that it is a very different person who is said to have noticed the sign, and so understood our Saviour’s words, from those who were such stupid people,—the former was the beloved *John*, the latter the enemies of Jesus. But our ingenious controversialist makes no scruple, for the sake of a jibe, to confound them !

Such, then, are the numerous false assertions, resulting from attributing to me what I quoted as other people’s sentiments. Let me only observe, that the moment he wishes to deny the correctness of my assertion that certain commentators maintain an opinion, he flings at once aside, besides those referred to in the Essay cited by me, Rosenmüller, Kuinoel, and those mentioned by them, as of no value. Yet he is glad enough to avail himself of their aid, whenever it suits *his* purpose. Nor had a word been said by me about the value of the commentators I alluded to, *as theologians*, under which character alone, I imagine had Dr. Turton ventured to speak disparagingly of those two, he might have been right. As critical and philological commentators they certainly rank most high ; and in a question mainly involving these qualities, it is a little too arbitrary in him to say he has not

found *one* commentator holding a certain opinion; with the supercilious remark, “ Kuinoel and Rosenmüller are, of course, out of the question.”

3. Having shown that our Saviour's words were conformable to the usage of speech, which those in *John* vi. were not, if Protestantly interpreted, I proceed to point out other discrepancies between the two passages. The first is that the one contains a prophecy, the other a doctrine. Dr. Turton urges that *John* vi., if it allude to the Eucharist, is also a prophecy. Perhaps he meant a *promise*, which it certainly is; one may *prophecy* a miraculous work where others' acts are requisite, but he *promises* a gift which he himself intends to bestow. It depends entirely upon his own good-will; he is already aware of his intentions, and therefore, it is no prophetic foresight that is required for him to speak of it. But the destruction of the temple of Christ's body by the Jews, and its subsequent resurrection, was not in the nature of a gift, but of a miraculous *event*, dependent upon contingent circumstances. The sixth chapter, too, contains *commands* which are very different from a prophecy. Dr. Turton, however, is very anxious to fix upon me the charge of holding two contradictory opinions; to wit, first, that the expressions used by our Lord were such as ought to have been easily understood, and secondly, that being a prophecy, they were necessarily obscure. Truly, any one trying to learn my sentiments through his

pages, will suppose I act as he says ; but not so, I think, any one who peruses my own work. The question now is, why the expressions (whether in themselves intelligible or not) *having been understood*, were not explained? And the answer is, because being of a prophetic character, their explanation was necessarily to come in the fulfilment ; and so the event proved. Here is surely no contradiction, however slight. I need not notice the exaggeration, that I have laboured to shew that “ the expression ‘ destroy this temple ’ was so clear that explanation was altogether superfluous.” (p. 173.) I never make any such assertion.

4. Dr. Turton’s next objection I have elsewhere sufficiently answered. It refers to the distinction I have already made between the cases where our Lord did not answer at all, and where he did. This he calls a “ paltry subterfuge,” and twice appeals to any member of the Roman Catholic Church “ whether it is not.” (p. 176, seq.) I cheerfully accept his appeal. According to Dr. Turton, then, that our Lord “ frequently left the Jews to their misconceptions is certain. Whether he did so by an indignant silence—or by an indignant re-assertion of his statement—may have depended upon circumstances, &c.” In order to point out the difference between the two methods, and to show at the same time, the exact discrepancy between *John* vi., and the case now under dispute, let us suppose that instead of our Lord’s having dropped

the conversation at the Jews' objection, he had proceeded, in that particularising strain observable in his answer to the objection in *John* vi.; would it have made no difference? Without levity, let us imagine him to have answered their objection; "Six and forty years was this temple in building, and wilt thou raise it up in three days?" in something like the following language: "Amen, amen, I say unto you, pull down the stones of this temple and pluck up the foundation thereof, and I will replace them all. He that shall see me restore its stones and lay down its foundations once more, shall have abundant proof of my authority. For the stones shall indeed be set in order, and the foundations shall indeed be put in their place, &c." If our Lord, thus specifying the parts of the material temple, as he did his body and blood in *John* vi., had replied to the Jewish difficulty, I ask would there have been no difference of grounds for the interpretation of his first words, from what there is when he preserves an absolute silence?

Would not any one, Catholic or Protestant, allow that such a reply would have materially altered the case? and farther I ask, supposing the Evangelist had not expressly told us that he spoke of his body, should we not have concluded from such an answer, that the Jews must necessarily have understood our Lord of the material temple; and that his reply would have naturally led them to conclude that they were right in so understanding him?

And this is precisely the difference between *John* ii. and *John* vi. ; that in one case our Lord does not answer at all, and in the other he does ; and answers in a way to which the imaginary answer just given is parallel. If then the case of *John* ii. would have been materially modified by such a reply, it must be a totally different one from that of *John* vi. ; and it is no “paltry subterfuge” to say that the absence of an answer makes the difference. Nay, again I ask, if those supposed words had been spoken, and tended to lead the Jews into the belief that they were right in taking our Saviour’s words literally, when he was all the time speaking figuratively, could we not say that such words would *mislead* the Jews? Yet such is the hypothesis, made by me *per impossibile*, as the schoolmen say, at which Dr. Turton affects such indignation.

5. But, says my learned opponent, I have precluded myself from this answer, because, in laying down my canons, or rules, drawn from our Lord’s conduct, I engaged to “collect and examine *all* passages where the hearers of our Saviour *erroneously* take his figurative expressions in their literal sense,” &c. He then ingeniously says : “In other words his avowed design was *to prove* that our Lord ‘constantly answered,’ and he subsequently ventures to inform us that he ‘examined only’ the cases in which our Lord *did* answer.” (p. 177.) I never said anything of the sort : the

question was concerning the manner in which our Saviour answered ; and this, as I have repeatedly remarked, can only result from those passages in which an answer is recorded. Were our dispute one of words, and had mere captiousness to decide religious controversy, Dr. Turton might be permitted to write in this manner. Or had I laid down a conclusion such as he states, in my *Lectures*, and then, upon the case of *John* ii. being objected by an adversary, had said that my intention was only to refer to examples where answers had been given, he might, with a show of plausibility, have retorted that I had swerved from my original standing. But where, in the same volume and chapter, nay, within the same half-a-dozen pages, I myself adduce the example, and so answer it, it is plain that I had the case, and its grounds of exception, in my mind, when I wrote the rule or conclusion ; and, consequently, cannot be suspected, by any impartial or equitable man,—that is, by any one who will not make a personal matter of a great theological inquiry,—of having run off my ground, or varied my principles.

6. When I state my own idea of the interpretation of the words in question, namely, that it is one of those passages which have a twofold meaning, and say that my view of the subject differs from that of several modern commentators whom I mention, Dr. Turton, in quoting my sentiments, adds this innuendo : “ He seems to care but little

for *St. John* ;” (p. 178) ; and again : “ Having supported the literal meaning of our Lord’s phrase, in opposition to *St. John*.” (p. 180.) Now let me ask any reader the following questions:—First: Does maintaining a twofold meaning of a passage, exclude one of those meaning? Secondly: Is there a word in *St. John* to prove that the literal meaning may not be held conjointly with the mystical one? Thirdly: Is then the holding it thus conjointly, “ supporting it in opposition to *St. John* ?” When he has answered these questions in the only manner in which an upright mind can, I beg to put another to him. Fourthly, then, Would it be too hard to characterise Dr. Turton’s insinuation as unworthy of his station? I have only to do two things fully to vindicate myself against it. The first is to quote my own words:—“ Finally, did our Lord speak *altogether* of his resurrection, *so as to exclude all allusion to rebuilding the temple which stood before him* ? I must confess I cannot read the passage without being convinced that *he spoke of both* ?” (p. 110.) More than a page follows, in which this matter is developed. Secondly, I have to show that such an opinion is by no means new, nor is there anything in it that may not safely be held. Dr. Turton characterises the two opinions in this manner: “ As Dr. Wiseman has not produced his authority for holding opinions thus opposed to each other, I can only question, as I have done before, his exemption from the laws which are

usually deemed binding upon human intelligence.” (p. 179.) St. Paul (*Heb.* i. 5) expressly applies to our Lord the words, “I will be to him a Father, and he shall be to me a Son.” These words we read in the second book of *Kings*, (or *Samuel*) vii. 14. The passage runs thus: “*He shall build a house to my name, and I will establish the throne of his kingdom for ever. I will be to him a father, and he shall be to me a son; and if he commit any iniquity, I will correct him with the rod of men.*” I ask, would it require any “exemption from the laws which are usually deemed binding upon human intelligence,” or would it be in “opposition to St. Paul,” to support the literal application of this declaration to Solomon, conjointly with the mystical one to Him whose type Solomon was? How then can it deserve these harsh qualifications, to speak similarly, concerning another passage of Scripture? But the learned Professor apparently wants my “authority” for holding this twofold interpretation. He did not choose here, as he has done on other occasions, to look out for authorities, or he would not have had great difficulty in finding them. I will give him one: the judicious Maldonatus. Rupert, he informs us, proposes the question, Why Christ here used this figure of a temple in preference to others, but does not give a satisfactory reply. This he himself offers in the following terms:—“*Agebatur de templo, de quo ementes et vendentes ejecerat: interrogatus fuerat qua id*

auctoritate faceret, respondet se id facere jure suo, quod Dominus esset templi: *Dominum autem se esse præbet, quia si illud everterent, tribus diebus excitabit illud, Dominus enim cujusque rei est, qui de ea potest facere quod libet.* Itaque indicat illud ipsum fuisse corpus suum, *eademque facilitate*, cum dissolutum fuerit, refectionum Quibus omnibus rebus ostendit se esse Deum, ac proinde sicut corporis sui, *ita etiam templi illius de quo agebatur Dominum esse*, quia Patris sui templum erat." (in v. 19.) I am not therefore singular in this twofold interpretation; nor will any one of sound mind and sound heart second the insulting accusations into which Dr. Turton's extreme anxiety to blame has thoughtlessly hurried him.

7. I therefore pass over, as merely another instance of blind precipitancy, his charge of my supporting my assertions by the words of the false witnesses against our Saviour. He himself is obliged to acknowledge that I put the correctness of their attribution of *one single word* (*χειροποίητον*) upon mere hypothetical grounds, and draw from it a conditional conclusion. Now the Scripture does not say that their testimony was false in the use of this very word—which one would imagine was necessary for Dr. Turton's argument; and certainly in the use of the other words they are not so inaccurate. It was the deduction of blasphemy against the temple, rather than the in-

correctness of the words alleged, which evidently formed the false testimony of the suborned witnesses.

A second case which I cited, as an objection to the rules I had deduced from our Lord's conduct, was his conversation with the Samaritan woman; where she seems to understand literally his expressions about water, and yet he does not explain them. To obviate this objection I observed; 1st, that our Lord, as in the former instance, gave no answer at all—a reply the validity of which is, I trust, by this time, sufficiently established; 2ndly, that “according to the best commentators, the woman in v. 15 received our Lord's words with irony and levity, and did not so much solicit an explanation, as ridicule his words.” (p. 112.) On this Dr. Turton thus comments: “*How it is possible for any one to attribute to her the least tendency to irony or levity, in making such a request, is to me inexplicable.* Yet, according to Dr. Wiseman, this is done by the best commentators.” Then follow Lampe's and Kuinoel's opinions. (Why is not he here out “of the question?”) Later, this view is called a “strange construction.” (pp. 181, 182.) It is really a pity that, in drawing up my *Lectures*, I should not have quoted commentators oftener, indeed that I should have purposely refrained from doing so, except where *philological* authorities were required. Had I done so, I should have spared Dr. Turton's readers the perusal of much bold

assertion, and himself some exposure of ignorance. For it happens that generally, nay, I think in every instance, where he has assailed me about commentators being against me, I have found the first I have laid my hand upon agreeing with the views I had taken. It is inexplicable, then, to Dr. Turton, how *any one* can attribute the *slightest* tendency to irony or levity to the Samaritan woman; though he, with the same breath, quotes Lampe, asserting "*sarcasticum* quid subesse videtur."¹ Does not *sarcasm* include "the *least* tendency to irony or levity?" Is it inexplicable, then, how any one can admit this in the woman's questions?" But let Dr. Turton listen to the following, from a commentator of his own Church, compared to whom all its modern ones are pigmies: "Verba quæ tractamus (v. 9) videntur esse verba feminæ (the common opinion of the Fathers) potius quam evangelistæ: *eaque ab illa prolata scommatice, et cum sarcasmo. Tunc Judæus a me Samaritissa petis aquam? Cum vero Salvator ulterius aquam celebraret quam habuit dandam tum femina, summa cum irrisione; (v. 15) O des mihi, inquit,*

¹ "Lampe hints that there *may have been* something *slightly* sarcastic in her manner." (Dr. T. p. 181.) Compare this account of Lampe's sentiments with his words in the text, and then with what he says of my manner of referring to Dr. Lardner, p. 167 of his book; and then judge of the learned Professor's justice or consistency—also of his accuracy.

hanc aquam, ut molestiam non amplius patiar huc veniendi haustum. Nam verba *irrisorie* prolata longe aptius concipias quam supplicatorie." Such is the opinion of Dr. Lightfoot.¹ The Regius Professor says, "That the commentators who take this view of the matter are the best, I should be sorry to believe, *as I am but little acquainted with their labours.*" (p. 181.) Are we to conclude that the Regius Professor of Theology at Cambridge, makes it almost a boast to be "but little acquainted "with commentators" of Dr. Lightfoot's class? And having thus given him a Protestant commentator of note, I may be allowed to quote the best Catholic one to whom I have already so often referred. Maldonatus proposes a twofold explanation of the Samaritan's words; one of which is, that *she understood* the true import of our Saviour's words, but did not believe them, and asked the question in v. 15 in a scoffing strain. "Utrumque mihi probabile videtur, et mulierem intellexisse Christum de aqua spirituali loqui, tamen non credidisse quæ dicebat, *irridendoque* respondisse, Domine da mihi hanc aquam." (in v. 15.) I may add that many of the Fathers suppose the woman to have understood our Lord in the true and spiritual sense.

Before concluding this section, I beg to add that

¹ Horæ Biblicæ in Evang. Joannis, Op. tom. ii. *Rotterd.* 1686, p. 615.

it would be easy to confirm every view I have taken of our Redeemer's conference with the Samaritan woman, from the commentaries of the Fathers, particularly St. Cyril, who proposes our Lord's conduct as a perfect model of the method which should be followed, in teaching in the Church,—of gradually unfolding truth,—and accommodating ourselves to the capacity of our hearers.

CHAPTER VII.

OUR LORD'S ANSWER TO THE JEWS, AND HIS CONDUCT
TO HIS DISCIPLES.

THE chapter on which I now enter, is by far the most rhetorical in all Dr. Turton's work. It abounds in lengthy and vague declamation, in irrelevant discussion, in misstatements, (I hope unintentional,) and, above all, in his usual ornaments of exaggeration and abuse, beyond all the preceding. There is one encouragement, however, upon entering it,—it is his last on *John* vi. Both for the reader's sake and for my own, I rejoice at the thought;—one more stage, and we shall be at the end of this portion of our wearisome journey. There are in this chapter rich materials for any one, who, if in my situation, would think it proper to avail himself of his right of recrimination; for I find on reperusal, that the gleanings of passages which might have found a place in my first chapter, are beyond the harvest I there gathered. But let this pass. On one or two expressions I may feel myself called to comment; the mass—and it is great—I leave to

the good sense and good taste of the impartial reader.

The first part of this chapter professes to examine my analysis of our Saviour's reply to the Jews. I will briefly comment upon the few points which I think deserve it.

1. I compare the command in *John* vi., to eat the flesh of the Son of Man, and its promises and threats, with the precept, and its consequences, concerning baptism, in *Mark* xvi. 16. Dr. Turton seems grievously scandalized at my saying, that in this latter passage the Sacrament of Baptism is *inculcated*, (p. 187) whereas, he says, it is there instituted; and of course, he imagines some deep design to lurk in the phrase. But, if the reader will please to look at the passage of *St. Mark*, he will find that it does not contain the institution of baptism, for which he must go to *Matt.* xxviii. 19, but only the consequences of neglecting or receiving it. This is *inculcating* surely, and not instituting. Farther, my learned Commentator remarks, that "in the baptismal commission, great stress is laid upon the internal principle of the recipient—upon faith — 'he that believeth and is baptized'—'he that believeth not,'—in accordance with the tenor of the New Testament; whereas the words in *St. John*, in their literal sense, convey no intimation of any internal principle whatever; eternal life being made to depend upon the gross, material eating and drinking." (p. 188.) I will not remark upon the

grossness of this way of speaking of an interpretation which is not only allowed in his own Church, but is held by many of its best divines. These interpret our Lord's discourse of the Eucharist and of a Real Presence, and meet this very objection, which attacks them as well as me. For the answers to it I refer the reader to p. 138 of my *Lectures*. I will here only ask one or two questions. *First*, does Dr. Turton mean to assert that faith is the only internal disposition that need accompany baptism to ensure salvation? If he does, then he excludes charity, the observance of the commandments, &c. If he does not, then I conclude that important and essential internal dispositions are omitted, when precepts are enjoined with a promise or a threat. Why not in the Eucharist? *Secondly*, when he refers the whole of the discourse in *John* vi. to faith, and annexes to this the promise of eternal life, does he mean to teach that mere faith will secure this reward? If not, as I hope,—then are the conditions of the act or habit to which he applies our Saviour's words, omitted in his theory, as much as in our doctrine. He has still to understand “he who believeth properly, with a lively faith, a faith working by charity, &c.”

But before leaving this matter, one or two reflections present themselves to my mind. One is, what does Dr. Turton think of infant baptism? If this great stress is to be laid on faith in “*the recipient*” of baptism, as an “*internal principle*,”

how does he justify pædo-baptism? Does his Church lay such great stress upon this principle, as to make it indispensable in the recipient of baptism? Another is, what does he say of the practice in the ancient Church of administering the Eucharist to infants? Or of its administration to "the dying and insensible?"¹ Did not that Church attach some importance to what he is pleased to call "the gross and material eating and drinking?"

2. The Regius Professor "has so much opinion of the common-sense actually existing in the world, that he will not suppose the possibility of any person's asserting his belief, that even one of our Lord's hearers at the time . . . either had or could have, the most distant idea of the Sacrament of the Eucharist, &c." (p. 189.) If this prove any thing, it must be a crime against common-sense to believe, not that Transubstantiation or the Real Presence, but that the Eucharist is at all spoken of in this chapter. This is indeed a slashing argument, which I call *Philalethes*, and the numerous divines who believe it to be there taught, to help me in bearing the reproach of. Allow me still to pursue my interrogatory form. Was belief in Christ's passion understood by any of the hearers, or was faith in it the intelligible deduction they can be supposed to

¹ See Dr. Pusey's "Tract on Baptism," in the "Tracts for the Times," or the vindication of it, prefixed to the fourth volume of the Tracts, p. xx.

have drawn from his words? But of this more hereafter. Furthermore, whatever the learned critic says of the precept being impossible, because the Sacrament was not yet instituted, will apply as well to the *precept* in the conference with Nicodemus, for certainly baptism was not then instituted: "Unless a man be born again of water and the Holy Ghost, he cannot enter into the kingdom of God;" "Except ye eat the flesh of the Son of Man, &c. you shall not have life in you." The two were equally prospective precepts, to come into operation when the respective institutions to which they referred should be appointed. In the same way did Moses give laws, which could not come into operation till the Lord should have chosen his dwelling-place in the midst of Israel, in the promised land.

3. We come now to a curious specimen of "the learning of a controversialist," so cleverly distinguished by the learned Professor from that of "a student." In my second *Lecture*, I quoted a passage from Tittmann, on which Dr. Turton made no remark; but now that he is commenting on my fourth, he returns to it, and discusses it at some length, and certainly in a singular manner. Did I copy the learned critic's style, I ought to insinuate, that no doubt he found it convenient to make this translocation. But no matter, Tittmann says, that certain writers explaining *John* vi., appeal to the *usus loquendi* of profane authors, who apply the

words *to eat* and *drink* to doctrine; that it is true that Greek and Latin writers do employ them in this manner, but “that they so used the phrases, *to eat the flesh* and *drink the blood* of any one, cannot be proved by a single example.” (W. p. 77; T. p. 191.) Now observe the curious,—shall I add the candid—commentary? “The learned Tittmann, we see writes absolutely,—I mean without the condition ‘if not speaking of the real presence,’—that our Lord’s forms of expression were ‘unheard of.’ Tittmann, therefore, is cited to prove that which he does *not* prove.” Tittmann was cited to prove (that is, was cited as acknowledging) that the application of the phrases *to eat flesh* and *drink blood*, to admitting or approving of doctrines, could not be supported by the *usus loquendi*; and this against a special, unproved, assertion of Townsend’s. Does not his assertion say this? Does he not speak *solely* of *that* application? And is not that application the Protestant one? How then is he cited to prove what he does not prove? Did I ever say that he maintained the *Catholic* interpretation to be either supported or combated by the *usus loquendi*? And farther, does Dr. Turton think that he would have denied these phrases ever to signify to participate orally of the constituents of a body—flesh and blood? If I should “have acted more prudently, if I had kept this authority for my own private edification, instead of divulging it for the public advantage,” (p.

190) what shall we say of the Regius Professor's either blundering or unfair comment? But this is not the most curious part of this extraordinary proceeding. I quoted the *Meletemata Sacra*—I suppose the learned Professor was unacquainted with the work; so, like a good controversialist—certainly not like a good scholar—he goes to another work of Tittmann's, and from that attempts to confute me. This is his commentary on *St. John*. Now in this, Tittmann, being a Protestant, interprets our Lord's discourse Protestantly, and says, "apud nostros," that is, among German Protestants, there is no doubt that no reference is here intended to the Blessed Sacrament. But how I ask does this opinion of Tittmann's invalidate his statement that it is not by the *usus loquendi* that this interpretation is attained, which is all that I quoted him for. Suppose that the learned German admits *other* ways of arriving at an explanation of phrases, this does not prove my allegation of him false, when I cited him to contradict Mr. Townsend's assertion, that the Protestant interpretation *is* based on the *usus loquendi*. The words from the *Meletemata Sacra* are as clear as those from the commentary; nor will any quotation from the latter obscure or invalidate the former.

4. To the next argument, that in the figurative interpretation no sensible distinction can be drawn between eating the flesh and drinking the blood of Christ, Dr. Turton has little to say, except, with an

instance of exaggeration which I did not insert in my first chapter, "of all the arguments which Dr. Wiseman has employed, this has surprised me the most." (p. 194.) I presume, from this surprise, that it was new to Dr. Turton. If so, he must be slenderly read in controversy.

5. His comment on my fourth argument is a masterpiece. It treats of the word ἀληθῶς, *truly* or *indeed*: "For my flesh is meat *indeed*, &c." Upon which word I premised this remark, "I own that the word ἀληθῶς is spoken, not merely of identity of things, but also of their qualities; so that Christ calls himself the true vine, when he only spoke in parables: and the Greek version of *Isaiah* has the same word in the same sense, ἀληθῶς χορτος ὁ λαός." (p. 121.) One would have supposed that such a declaration would have cut short all philological discussion; but no: five pages are taken up with the meaning of the different words, ἀληθῆς,¹ ἀληθινός, and ἀληθῶς. I am tempted to leave him in exclu-

¹ To have an excuse for the long discussion about the two adjectives, Dr. Turton says, that I "appear to prefer the adjective." (p. 195.) My preference is couched in this passing remark: "*It may be worth while to remark, that the best manuscripts, several versions, and fathers, read ἀληθῆς, &c. Whichsoever we adopt,*" &c. Really, was it worth Dr. Turton's while to take the trouble of misstating such a trifle? It is no less remarkable that my sentence, quoted in the text, allowing this use of the Greek word, is never alluded to by Dr. T., so that *his* readers could naturally suppose that I had overlooked, or carefully suppressed, all mention of it.

sive possession of the field; but I think it right to expose his fallacies in even irrelevant arguments. He quotes then two examples of the adverb ἀληθῶς, in which the word applies to moral qualities, and not to sensible realities. One is *John* i. 47, where Nathanael is called “an Israelite *indeed*,” which doubtless signified—and I will not contest it—that the individual in question “possessed qualities which rendered him worthy of his lineage.” The second is *John* viii. 31: “If you continue in my word, you shall be my disciples *indeed*.” To these two examples the learned Professor adds this sweeping conclusion: “Under such circumstances and to such purposes is the word ἀληθῶς employed: and I have not been able to discover a single instance of an adverse character.” (p. 199.) Let me refresh the learned Doctor’s memory: Ἀληθῶς Θεοῦ υἱὸς εἶ, “*Truly* thou art the son of God,” (*Matt.* xiv. 33.) Ἀληθῶς Θεοῦ υἱὸς ἦν οὗτος. *Truly* this was the son of God.” (xxvii. 53: *Mark* xv. 39.) By these words, then, we are not to understand that Christ was revealed and declared to *be* really the Son of God, but only the “possessor of qualities which rendered him worthy” of being considered such! he was pronounced the Son of God only as Nathanael was pronounced an Israelite! “Can any one imagine that our Lord adverted to the unblemished descent of Nathanael from the ancient patriarch?” asks Dr. Turton triumphantly—shall I imitate this sentence, so as to make it applicable to the other passage,

and to our divine Saviour's filiation? No: I will leave the Socinian to do it. Let the learned Professor, however, take to himself shame for such inconsiderate boldness of assertion, in hopes of gaining an advantage over his opponent.

With the exception of his prolonged philological disquisition, he answers my argument in a very brief style: "Two great fallacies, which pervade the disquisition of *John* vi., annihilate the force of his argument. The first fallacy is—that the literal interpretation of the Jews is the same as Dr. Wiseman's interpretation." (p. 195.) On this subject I have already said enough, and, I am sorry to say, shall be obliged later to say more. "The second" [fallacy is] "that our Lord then intended to correct the misapprehension of his meaning." Truly this is "as strange a hallucination" as is to be found in Dr. Turton's, or any one else's book. It is a fallacy of no mean order. Just now I had to defend, at great length, my assertion, that our Lord *did not* here correct any misapprehension, but that he stood to his words, and that, consequently, *there was* no misapprehension; and now it is boldly propounded, that I am guilty of a fallacy in supposing that our Lord *did* correct a misapprehension! Moreover, my two alleged fallacies contradict and neutralize each other: how can my argument assume, first, that the Jews believed what I do; and secondly, that Christ corrected their misapprehension? Had *I* proposed such an argument, Dr.

Turton might have reasonably addressed me in the words of St. Augustine: "Vere tu ipse obdormisti, cum scrutando talia defecisti."

6. I pass over his remarks on my fifth argument, because I find nothing in them that deserves a reply. They contain mere hypotheses and questions, without anything approaching to even the shadow of proof. Neither shall I detain the reader upon the two following pages (202, 203) where he gives his 'opinion [of v. 59 (or 58) which did not enter into my analysis. "I have, in fact," he writes, "now to demand belief when I affirm, that Dr. Wiseman, while professing to give an analysis of our Lord's reply, which extends from v. 53 to v. 58, has actually passed over the 58th verse; although of the utmost importance towards the right understanding of the discourse, without the slightest notice." (p. 303.) This is followed by a lamentation over my "unhappy condition," as "truth in religion must have become as nothing" to me; with other such language, to which by this time I have become pretty callous. But "I have to demand belief" for another more extraordinary fact; it is, that Dr. Turton should have taken no notice of my having passed over another verse, the 57th, (I follow the notation of the Vulgate) and also over the whole of the 58th, excepting the phrase "eateth me." Was there any more "dishonesty and disingenuousness"—these are his gentle applications to me—in stopping at v. 58, than in "passing over v.

57? Or does not this show, that I never undertook to give a minute analysis of our Lord's answer, but only to comment on such phrases as presented me an additional argument? Any one reading my analysis, would, I think, have come to this conclusion. Any one, I mean, except a professed opponent. What I might have been tempted to call "dishonesty and disingenuousness" in the former, I can only consider "the blindness of prejudice" (Dr. T. p. 241) in the latter.

We come now to the second part of the chapter, that which treats of our Saviour's conduct to the disciples. There is nothing in the two first pages (204, 205) to detain us. I proceed, therefore, to the new explanation given by Dr. Turton, of our Lord's answer to the murmurs of the Jews; "Doth this scandalize you? What if you shall see the Son of Man ascend up where he was before? It is the spirit," &c. v. 62, 63, 64. Before examining the learned Professor's view of this text, I beg the impartial reader to recall to mind the manner in which my censorer treated my proposed division of our Lord's discourse at v. 48: it appeared to be quite enough to condemn it, that I quoted no preceding commentator as holding it, (though I have since shown I could have adduced plenty); and this was harped on again and again, and I was pronounced most rash, and I know not what, for presuming to advance what the learned Professor considered a new opinion. Moreover, I was careful

always to propose it *as* an opinion, as what “seemed to me,” &c. Yet in spite of all, no mercy was shown me. Now the rule generally is, that with the same measure wherewith we mete, we should expect ourselves to be meted unto. I know of nothing that gives the Regius Professor of Cambridge a single privilege in biblical disquisition,—unless it be what his superior attainments, so boldly assumed in his volume, may procure—him beyond what I may claim. If then, it be sufficient to condemn my interpretations, that other commentators have not given them, the same circumstance must be equally fatal to his ; if I am to be visited with unsparing indignation,—nay almost held up to execration, if I venture to propose anything as my opinion,—surely Dr. Turton will not be allowed to insult the reason of every one who does not instantly bow to his dogmatic award. But I consent to waive my privilege of equality : I shall be more than content, if the reader will only put by a tithe of the scorn, the pity, and the anger which the learned Professor poured upon me, and have it ready to apply them—not to him but—to his opinion, if it shall turn out to deserve it.

Dr. Turton’s theory, then, is that our Lord’s answer above rehearsed, does not apply to the murmurs immediately preceding : “This saying is hard, and who can hear it ?” but partly to the difficulties raised in vv. 41, 42, when the Jews murmured at the sentiment, that Jesus had come down from heaven, and partly to those in v. 53, (or 52) Dr.

Turton has an indubitable right to propose this, or any other explanation, however extravagant; but he surely has no right to treat all that do not implicitly adopt it, as devoid of intellect. Yet no sooner has he propounded this his theory, than he writes as follows: "I will not suppose, till compelled to do so, that *any rational person*, who has seen these passages thus brought together," (that is vv. 41, 42, and 62-64) "can doubt of the reference which they respectively have to each other." And after a few lines: "If I mistake not, I have now proved, as distinctly as any thing of the kind can be proved, that our Lord's first observations refer to the two points which had been most offensive to his hearers." (p. 207.) Happy they who can be satisfied with such proofs! For my part I must renounce my claim to be considered by Dr. Turton a "rational person," if to be accorded only on the specified terms. I appeal to the common-sense of any reader, who has already perused, and will again peruse, the entire discourse, whether he can persuade himself that, after twenty verses, an answer is given to a difficulty then answered, and after which two interruptions by objections had occurred, and the Evangelist had interposed an historical verse. (v. 60.) I appeal to the words of our Saviour himself. The disciples say *Σκληρός ἐστὶν ὍΥΤΟΣ ὁ λόγος*. "THIS saying is hard." Then the Evangelist continues. *Εἰδὼς δὲ ὁ Ἰησοῦς . . . ὅτι γογγύζουσι περὶ ΤΟῦΤΟΥ . . . ἔειπεν αὐτοῖς ΤῸΥΤΟ*

ὁμᾶς σκανδαλίζει ; “ But Jesus seeing that they murmured about THIS, said to them : Does THIS scandalize you ? ” Will any one, calmly reading this, for a moment allow that the pronoun *this* refers to something twenty verses removed, not to speak of the intervening interruptions ? And, is not the plain construction of the passage which refers the answer to the proposition immediately preceding, enough to overthrow any mere specious similarity between the purport of two texts so far removed, however they may be “ brought together ” on the pages of Dr. Turton’s book ? Farther, I appeal to the historical context. The objections which the Professor supposes to be here answered, were made by the Jews during the discourse : the answer was given to the disciples, upon *their* observing “ this saying is hard. ” It is *after* the teaching in the synagogue ; nor is there any evidence that it was *immediately* after. I appeal to editions and versions which make a break here, either before or after v. 59, (Greek) and consequently suppose a complete separation. (The reader will remember the stress laid upon these breaks, as demonstrative of this point, when Dr. T. attacked my division at v. 48.) I have opened *three*—the nearest at hand—and they all present a new paragraph. These are the “ New Version of the Four Gospels by a Catholic,” (p. 359) ; Dr. Campbell’s “ Four Gospels ” (vol. ii. p. 225, Lond. 1825 ;) and Griesbach, who makes an interval of a line, indicative of a new sec-

tion. (p. 438, ed. Lond. 1818.) In fine I appeal “to the best commentators.” I will not be so rash as to assert that Dr. Turton has made this interpretation without “the authority of a single commentator, good, bad, or indifferent;”—I can only say, that I have looked into a good many Catholic and Protestant, and find not a hint of such an application of our Lord’s words. I have no hesitation in saying, that, upon these grounds, this their new adaptation is as devoid of foundation in substance, as it is of scholarlike reserve in the manner of its propounding.¹

1. Passing over the pretended illustrations of this crude and untenable theory, let us proceed to Dr. Turton’s objections to my interpretation of the words “flesh” and “spirit,” in the celebrated passage, “It is the spirit that quickeneth, the flesh profiteth nothing.” I will not notice the usual preliminary flourishes, such as that Dr. Turton “could not

¹ Philalethes also is of opinion that our Lord’s answer refers to vv. 41, 42, and 52. He gives it, however, as his opinion, and does not intimate that he will not suppose any rational person to hold a contrary one. I have remarked several other coincidences between my two principal opponents, in peculiar views; which I should imagine must arise from the one having adopted them from the other; though I am not sufficiently acquainted with the chronology of their respective publications, to pronounce accurately on the subject, or on their respective claims to originality. Another instance occurs in p. 96, where Philalethes, in a note, charges me with inaccuracy for asserting that Christ spoke *before* the crowds, that which he spoke *to* the disciples. See above, p. 153.

beforehand have thought it possible for human credulity to believe "my explanation," (p. 211), and come to the substance at once. This takes me to p. 213 : where my learned opponent opens upon me with the following ominous terms : "The next objection" (to the Protestant, *popular* interpretation of those words) "furnishes us with a noble specimen of Dr. Wiseman's ambidexterous management of hermeneutical principles." This management consists in the following form of argument. Till this point I have understood by "flesh" our Lord's sacred, real flesh, because coupled with the idea of *eating*, with the mention of his *blood* and of *drinking it*. My hermeneutical principles oblige me to consider the acknowledged or established use of words : and I find that whenever *flesh* and *blood* are thus united together, they signify the constituents of a body ; for whenever *eat* and *drink* are applied to them (except in one established metaphor not here admissible) they are literally applied. Afterwards I find "flesh" no longer so united with "blood," but *contrasted* with "spirit;" and *the same* principles compel me to examine the signification it bears, whenever it is so contrasted ; and I find that the only signification it does bear under such circumstances, is that of "the corrupted dispositions and weak thoughts of human nature." To prove this I give a long passage from the Epistle to the *Romans* (viii. 1-9), in which the very same sentiment is expressed as in the text of *St. John* ; and I referred to many other passages. This pro-

ceeding seems to me sufficiently consistent—it is an application throughout of a single principle: to Dr. Turton it is ambidexterous.

But now, he charges me with hereby “fabricating an interpretation of the verse.” (p. 213.) I should think most readers will consider this, as equivalent to asserting, that I have been the first to propose this interpretation. And this from the writer who *fabricated* such a one as we saw just now! But while Dr. Turton charged me with this fabrication, he actually had open before him, in my volume, references to the commentaries of Kuinoel and Bloomfield, besides the concurrent testimony of Mr. Horne, who expressly refers to *John* vi., as of many other philological writers. Now, why, I ask, does Dr. Turton mention only these “philological works”? Is it because, had he mentioned my referring to commentators, it would have hurt his accusation against me, that I had “fabricated” the interpretation? I know not, but the suppression is “curious.”

2. Dr. Turton then proceeds: “My object will now be, to show how much more judiciously he would have acted, if he had adhered to the interpretation of the 63rd verse, to be found in Roman Catholic writers of great repute, *instead of devising an interpretation for himself.*” (p. 214.)

“Ecce iterum Crispinus.”

The reader has no doubt conjectured that Estius is once more to be brought forward. “Estius, as the reader is already aware,” continues Dr. T., “was of

opinion that the Jews erroneously interpreted the eating of the flesh in the grossest possible way.”

Now I do not wish to repeat what I have said about Estius, and the exaggerated character given him by the learned Professor, who in matters of Catholic exegetics seems truly a man of one book, and of the preposterous use made of him, as though his opinions were to bind Catholics, like the decrees of a general council. I will therefore make some additional remarks on this matter. *First*, should not the reader be satisfied with the evidence I gave before, of the very second-rate character attributed by Catholics to Estius's commentary on the difficult passages of Scripture, I beg he will peruse the following judgment of Dupin, who pronounces the highest, and merited, encomiums on the commentary on *St. Paul's Epistles*: “Les annotations d'Estius sur les lieux difficiles de l'Écriture . . . ne sont pas si travaillées que ses commentaires sur les Epîtres de S. Paul : et il semble s'être plus appliqué à rechercher les pensées morales pour servir d'instruction, qu'à expliquer à fond les difficultés de l'Écriture sainte.”¹ Such is the commentator “of great repute” to whom the learned Professor seems to think Catholics are bound to submit their judgment.

Secondly, I am continually reproached by Dr. Turton with maintaining, contrary to Estius (ac-

¹ Nouvelle Bibliothèque des Auteurs Ecclésiastiques. Tome xviii. p. 46. *Amst.* 1711.

cording to his interpretation of the matter), that we take the words of *John* vi., literally, as the Jews did, and so contending that as to the matter, the Jews were right and so are we. (p. 94-104.) To this point he returns again and again, and constantly denies the correctness of my assertion, that we adopt the literal meaning as the hearers of our Lord's discourse did. Nor has very gentle language been applied to me for my assertion. I have, I trust, sufficiently vindicated it; but by way of change, I wish to oppose another writer—for one of whose works Dr. Turton seems to have a great and well-merited esteem—so as to show that I am by no means singular in my opinion that we, as well as the Jews, understand our Redeemer literally. “But is it then so very evident that the Jews did not mistake the meaning of our Saviour on this occasion? That they understood him to speak of a real eating of his flesh, and of a real drinking of his blood, I acknowledge: and that the Bishop of Durham understands him to speak of a figurative eating, and a figurative drinking, I cannot deny. Their opinions are evidently contradictory I have, therefore, considered the subject with no small degree of attention; *and the more I have considered it, the more reason I have seen to believe that the Jews were in the right.* I do not mean to say that they may not have formed erroneous conclusions in their own minds, *as to the manner* in which the manducation of our Saviour's body was to be effected; *but in as much as they*

*understood him to speak of a real eating and a real drinking, so far I contend that they understood his real meaning."*¹ It is evident, then, that Dr. Lingard, whose words these are, differs from Dr. Turton's oracular authority, Estius, as understood by him, and that he expresses exactly the same views as I have been so severely chid for, respecting the relation between the Jewish and the Catholic interpretation of our Lord's expressions in *John* vi. Nor have I the least hesitation in preferring the opinion of our learned divine to that of Estius. But why is the latter such a peculiar favourite of Dr. Turton's? I can find no reason, except that he appears to lend him an argument on this matter. Certainly he is not indebted, for this preference, to his reputation among us.²

¹ A Collection of Tracts on several subjects. By the Rev. John Lingard, D.D. p. 225, *Lond.* 1826.

² We have in p. 215 an interesting specimen of the controversial spirit. Estius, most unfortunately for all Dr. Turton's argument from him, says at last: that it is not the *corporal* eating of our Lord's body, but the carnal only that is excluded. Whereupon Dr. T. remarks: "I cannot compliment Estius on the accuracy of his logic in introducing the word *corporal* in the last sentence; *but with Estius I have no controversy.*" Does this signify, that the truth or falsehood of a proposition goes for nothing, so long as you are not engaged in contention with the person who utters it, or that the same belief may be passed over in Estius with the mere refusal of a compliment to his logic, which shall be made the theme of gross insinuations and abuse, against me, because with me the learned Professor *has* a controversy? Shall I say that to one who acts thus, "truth in religion must have become as nothing, the support of an opinion everything"?

Thirdly, Dr. Turton, having before accused me of fabricating my interpretation of the text under discussion, now clearly charges me with “devising an interpretation for myself.” I do not exactly know by what epithet compatible with courtesy, one would characterize an assertion, thus made by an acute and learned man, with the proofs of its falsehood under his eyes. I gave two Protestant commentators’ authority for my interpretation, which was thus at once deprived of all pretence to originality. Does Dr. Turton think that I had no right to follow Protestant expositors, when “directly opposed to leading writers of my own communion,” (p. 216), meaning, of course, Estius and the Rheims annotators? To remove all his scruples—if he have any—on this head, I will once more take up the judicious Maldonatus, whose opinion is far preferable to Dr. Turton’s favourites. I find him write as follows: “*Multi graves auctores ita videntur exposuisse, quasi caro non pro vera carne, sed pro carnali hominis ingenio; et spiritus non pro spiritu vero, sed pro spirituali et a Deo per fidem illuminato homine sumatur.*” So that I must be supposed to have “fabricated” and “devised for myself” an interpretation which “many grave authors” had held before the year 1578. Maldonatus then proceeds to give us the reasons why he for a long time held this opinion himself, and

(T. p. 203.) Once more, I am inclined to solve the difficulty by a more charitable agent—“the blindness of prejudice.”

why he subsequently abandoned it : “ *Diu mihi hæc placuit interpretatio, nec omnino modo displicet.*” The first reason in favour of it, is, “ because Tertulian (*De Resurrectione Car.*) and St. Cyprian (*De Cæna Domini*) so interpret it : and St. Chrysostome expressly prefers it to all others.” Only reflect on my presumption in *fabricating* an interpretation which these Fathers had held above a thousand years ago ! think of my boldness in preferring the opinion of these lights of the Church to that of such “ leading men ” as Estius ! The second reason is, that it agrees better than any other with the circumstances and context. This Maldonatus shows at length : for an answer, therefore, to the Professor’s assertion that my interpretation “ frees the address from connexion with the preceding discourse,” (p. 211) I refer the reader to the old commentator. The third reason is precisely the one I gave : “ because we observe in the sacred Scriptures, that *whenever ‘ flesh ’ and ‘ spirit ’ are opposed to each other, ‘ flesh ’ is not taken in the sense of flesh, but for man, or the disposition or carnal nature of man, and ‘ spirit ’ is not put for spirit, but for spiritual disposition and nature of man. Innumerable examples could be set down.*” He then refers to several of those given in my *Lectures*. The fourth reason is characteristic of those times, and, if not good as an argument, contains the statement of a fact which Dr. Turton’s mode of dealing may seem to verify at the present day. It is, that he found this interpretation peculiarly dis-

agreeable to Protestants: “ Et quia hæc sententia maxime displicebat hæreticis, maxime mihi placebat.” His ground for abandoning this interpretation is thus given: “ Video tamen *nonnullis* postea Catholicis displicuisse, quibus *etsi nihil me eorum rationes movent*, pertinaciter repugnare nolo.” He then answers their objections. After this he proceeds to give certain reasons why the interpretation “ pleased him less than before,” (“ minus quam solebat hæc placet interpretatio ”) he adopts that of SS. Augustine and Cyril, with a slight emendation.¹ From this statement it is evident, that the interpretation, which I am charged with having devised for myself, is nearly as old as the Church,—has been held by many grave authors,—and has been fully defended by a learned commentator, who, if he abandoned it, yielded rather to authority, than to his own judgment, and clung to it, even after, with affection. After this, I cannot imagine that it will add to the Regius Theological Professor’s reputation, either for research in his own branch of science, or for accuracy in the application of terms, to see that he attributes to me the “ fabrication ” or “ devising ” of this interpretation. At the same time, it will not diminish, I am sure, any fame, he may have acquired by his work, for great powers of wondering, exaggerating, and using superlatives, to read the following

¹ Tom. ii. pp. 650, seqq. ed. *Brix*. 1598. I will add that the learned F. Perrone adopts the same signification of these words, referring to my list of texts. *Sup. cit.* p. 168.

judgment upon this interpretation, which he thought *mine*, but which Tertullian, St. Cyprian and St. Chrysostome must share the blame of with me. "Now with regard to this explanation of the 63rd verse, I shall only remark that, if I were desired to produce from commentators on Scripture what I considered the worst interpretation—the most inapplicable to the text attempted to be illustrated—I should despair of finding anything more unfortunate than what has now been proposed by the learned author." (p. 214.) I should weaken the force and energy of this declaration by a single remark.

In the following pages (216-220), I find nothing worthy of detaining the reader. Indeed it seems as if all the learned Professor's powers had been exhausted in the two last displays, in framing his own interpretation of one verse, and exposing my "fabrication" of that of another. After this, the chapter becomes uninteresting beyond measure, filled with long, irrelevant disquisitions, that bear but little upon anything in my *Lectures*. These discussions are carried on in a more subdued tone: the Professor condescends to use such terms as, "I suppose," (p. 218), "I apprehend," (p. 219), "such appears to me," (*ib.*) &c. So long as he is thus proposing his opinions, I have no desire to molest him in his possession of them: but it cannot be expected of me to submit to *these*, without better grounds than his word, after the specimens we

have had of the process of reasoning whereby he has attained others. I cannot, however, pass over two passages, without some expression of my feelings. The first is in p. 216, where Dr. Turton says, "he has now shown, and could still show to an extent which would probably surprise even Dr. Wiseman, how little unanimity there really is, in a Church calling itself infallible." I feel duly grateful to the learned Professor for his readiness to instruct me in this matter; but he will pardon me if I add, that I have found no reason, in his present work, to conclude that he is so much better informed than myself, on the doctrines or history of my own religion. I beg also, with becoming respect, to remark, that after what I have already found in Dr. Turton, nothing I am sure which he might say would "surprise" me. The second passage is of a similar character. "I strongly suspect that the learned author has yet much to learn—much that easily may be learned—with regard both to those purposes" (of our Lord's mission,) "and the means by which they really were accomplished." (p. 220.) The truth of this sentence I fully acknowledge,—with entire renunciation, too, of the epithet courteously applied to me, though somewhat at variance with the context that surrounds it. That I have yet much to study and much to learn, in the deep mysteries of love and graciousness involved in the descent of the Eternal Word on earth, and his conversation among men, I

willingly and with humility allow. If Dr. Turton only “strongly suspects” this of me, I beg to assure him that I am certain of it. From day to day I hope to become wiser in these momentous subjects of meditation : and for my learned opponent’s credit, as a Christian and a theologian, I trust he did not mean, in this passage, to put himself in contrast with me, or expect the reader to conclude, that he did *not* suspect *himself* to have much to learn on these incomprehensible manifestations of love unlimited.

We come now to our Saviour’s conduct to the disciples, in allowing them to depart. I had asserted it to be impossible to believe that Jesus would have thus “cast away his disciples for ever,” when an explanation in two words would have saved them. To this Dr. Turton makes two objections. First, “we are not justified in affirming that those disciples *were* ‘cast away for ever.’ Their minds might in process of time, be brought into a more hopeful state.” (p. 220.) And yet the Evangelist says of them that “after this . . . they walked *no more* with Jesus.” (v. 67.) Shall we say of Dr. Turton that “he seems to care but little for St. John”? (T. p. 178.) His second objection is only the assumption of the truth of his own private conjectural views of the causes of dissatisfaction in the Jews, as detailed in his three preceding paragraphs. He now takes it for granted, that what he there “supposed,” and “apprehended,” and

what "seemed to him," ought to be admitted as certain by others, and as a sufficient reply to every objection.

The next topic is our Saviour's treatment of the Apostles. Dr. Turton gives my remarks on the subject, which, on re-perusal, appear to me sufficiently simple and intelligible: but he occupies several pages in perplexing them; and I think any reader must have an extremely clear head, who gets, unpuzzled, through his lengthy commentary. Dr. Turton has, certainly, the art of procuring obscurity, without the Horatian condition of brevity. To my statement of our Lord's conduct towards the Apostles, he applies the epithet "odd." The oddity seems to be this; that the Apostles understood our Lord, and that, rightly, of a real eating and drinking of his flesh and blood, and yet saw that in this there was a mystery which they could not comprehend. Does the reader see any thing so very "odd" in this combination? Yet I own that, after reading it, as it is attempted to be presented in Dr. Turton's pages, the epithet does not seem inappropriate. When he asks, how it came, if there was a mystery—which I presume Protestants allow as much as we—that the Apostles were not informed of it? (p. 222.) I answer that there could be no necessity of informing them of that whereof they were already aware. Once more (p. 224) Dr. Turton seems at a loss to account how "any Roman Catholic" can have identified

the Catholic and Jewish interpretation, “in opposition to the declared sentiments of SO MANY EMINENT writers of his own Church.” (p. 224.) *So many!* to wit, Estius and the Rheims annotator, of whose opinion there is much to say. Is this the language of sobriety and truth? In concluding this topic, Dr. Turton favours us with a quotation from Virgil, considered by him as descriptive at once of Æneas and the Sybil’s journey to the infernal regions, and of our wanderings, in company, through the thorny paths of this controversy. I know not which part he assigns to each of us. But, I think, the oracular tone of his decisions, the great excitement and display of ungentle emotions, with which they are uttered; — the mixture of horror and perplexity with which my opinions are always announced—“*horrendas canit ambages*”—and, still more, his art of involving the truest and simplest propositions in obscurity—“*obscuris vera involvens*”—may well entitle him to the more lofty attributes of Sybilline inspiration. As for myself, I can see nothing to give me any resemblance to the Trojan hero, during this our journey, unless it be too great earnestness in attacking many shadows of arguments, without substance, which have opposed my advance.

“*Et ni docta comes tenues sine corpore vitas
Admoneat volitare cava sub imagine formæ
Irruat, et frustra ferro diverberet umbras.*”

After this classical display, Estius is once more

evoked from his slumbers on the library shelves, to prove that our Lord often left matters in obscurity. As I have never denied this, and as, to use Dr. Turton's words, "with Estius I have no controversy," I will suppress the various remarks which present themselves to me, and pass on to a very brief notice of our next contested position.

The learned professor, for I know not what reason, now turns back, to take up an argument that occurred some ten pages before the point which he had now reached in his observations on me. In answer to the objection that *John* vi. could not apply to the Eucharist, because this divine sacrament was not then instituted, I replied, with many divines, both Catholic and Protestant, that neither had baptism been instituted when our Lord inculcated its necessity to Nicodemus. To this Dr. Turton replies, by endeavouring to prove, at considerable length, that there were important differences between the two; and at length, after six pages, comes to this conclusion: "The discourse in the sixth chapter of *St. John*,' says Dr. W., 'stands in the same relation to the institution of the Eucharist, as the conference with Nicodemus does to the institution of baptism.' This, indeed, is easily said: but will not easily be believed by any one who has perused the preceding observations on the conference and discourse." (p. 233.) I know not whether Philalethes Cantabrigiensis had the advantage of perusing those observations,

or no, before the publication of his *Letters*; but his sentiments on this subject are expressed in the following words: "Dr. W. says, *in my opinion correctly*, that this conversation" [with Nicodemus] "stands in the same relation to the institution of baptism, as the discourse in *John* vi. to the institution of the Eucharist. Christ, in the two cases, referred to the respective rites by anticipation." (p. 110.) This concession on the one side, would, I think, be sufficient to dispense me, on the other, from all necessity of examining Dr. Turton's lengthy exposition of his views concerning the purport and character of the conference with Nicodemus. I will add, however, one or two remarks.

Dr. Turton considers the command, to be born again, as a necessary condition for entering the religion of Christ, as practicable when our Lord intimated it to Nicodemus. Some Catholic writers, I know, suppose baptism to have been already instituted; and look upon our Lord's words, in *Matt.* xxviii. 19, as only the promulgation of the law. But these authors are, I think, few; and Dr. Turton, at least, cannot avail himself of their opinion. For, when I alluded to *Mark* xvi. 16, a text, forming, most probably, part of the same discourse as that in *Matt.* xxviii., as *inculcating* baptism, he was very severe on me, for speaking so of "Our Lord's formal *institution* of baptism for the Gentiles." (p. 187.) Now, if by the clause "for the Gentiles," it is meant to be implied that there was

a different *institution* of baptism for the Gentiles from that which was *made* for the Jews, then I say that the Regius Professor of Theology contradicts both the apostle, who tells us, there is “one Lord, one faith, ONE BAPTISM;” (*Ephes.* iv. 5), as well as the Nicene creed, appointed to be read in his own Church, “I acknowledge *one* baptism.” Certainly, in the early Church, it would have been deemed heretical to have distinguished the institution of a distinct baptism for the Jews and for the Gentiles. If, however, by “institution,” Dr. Turton means the promulgation or extension to the Gentiles of a rite already instituted, with what justice could he blame me for applying to this the word “*inculcated*,” and intimate that I had studiedly suppressed the word “instituted?” (p. 187.) Indeed, it is curious how here, as in other instances, Dr. Turton makes texts cut both ways, and teach contradictory doctrines, as it suits him best to give me an answer. It would appear, then, according to him, that our Lord, in his conference with Nicodemus, alluded not so much to the sacrament of baptism, but, “first, to the baptism of John; secondly, to that which he was himself about to administer by his disciples; and through those two baptisms, to the final baptism to be administered by his apostles, when they should no longer have his personal assistance.” (p. 233.) I do not hesitate to pronounce this crude theological theory, totally averse to the doctrine of all antiquity.

Nothing can be more marked than the line drawn by the ancient fathers between the baptism of John and that in the name of the Holy Trinity; nor was it ever imagined that the words, "Unless a man be born again," &c. referred to the former. Nay, it seems to me that if Dr. Turton, in his eagerness to press for an advantage, should be inclined to overlook the unanimous sentiments of the ancient Church (which he may read in any good theologian), he will still find his theory go very far towards undermining the doctrine of his own. For, if by the being "born again," or "regeneration," inculcated in *John* ii., was meant nothing more than was conferred by the baptism of John, which certainly forgave not original sin, which was no "being buried together with Christ;" (*Rom.* vi. 4; *Coloss.* ii. 12), and which was not one of faith, but simply of penance (*Luke* iii. 4), conferred upon man before our Lord was manifested to the world, the Zuinglians and Socinians will not be far amiss in their views concerning this rite. Moreover, John carefully distinguishes his own baptism from our Lord's: "I, indeed, baptize you in water unto penance he shall baptize you in the Holy Ghost and fire." (*Matt.* iii. 11.) This is still more strongly observed in *John* i. 33. *John* disclaims, therefore, baptism "in the Holy Ghost," his being in water *only*. Now the baptism which is "referred to," in the conference with Nicodemus, is "of water *and the Spirit*." I know not, therefore, how any

one could consider the baptism of *John* to be referred to, in these words, unless he totally disregarded the doctrine of Scripture as well as of tradition. Yet so does the learned Professor act, not only in the passage above quoted, but in p. 231, where he writes, "My belief, then, is, that when our Lord spoke of being 'born of water and the spirit,' he not only alluded, by anticipation, to the sacrament of baptism thenceforth to be instituted . . . but to the sacred rite so well known to the people of Jerusalem." (p. 231.) To sum up, in a few words: upon the answer to Nicodemus, are founded the necessity of baptism, its regenerative virtue, its forgiveness of original sin, and its bestowing of the sanctifying grace of the Holy Spirit: such, at least, is the reasoning of the fathers. Now, according to Dr. Turton, these words alluded to the baptism of John, as well as to the sacrament afterwards instituted; therefore, we must conclude that the baptism of John had all these prerogatives. But the baptism of John was not instituted by Christ; and, therefore, we must suppose the sacramental energy to have preceded Christ's institution,—to have existed independently of him,—a doctrine clearly repugnant to that of the Anglican Church on the nature of a sacrament. I would recommend to Dr. Turton's consideration, what Dr. Pusey has written concerning the unanimous interpretation of *John* iii. 5, by the ancient Church, and the danger of introducing into theology any new system concern-

ing it.¹ To me, certainly, the inclusion of *John's* baptism in the doctrine of the verse, seems not only erroneous, but fatal to all sound doctrine concerning baptism.

Before dismissing the subject of Nicodemus's interview with Jesus, I will say a few words on Philalethes's remarks. Admitting, as we have seen, its parallel character to *John* vi., he repeats the objection, before met, against applying it to the explanation of the latter chapter, that Nicodemus was a person sincerely desirous of instruction, "while the Capharnaites were exactly the contrary. (p. 111.) When answering this difficulty above (p. 145), I waived all enquiry on this supposed difference, expressing myself willing to consider Nicodemus as one extreme in a series, and the Capharnaites as the other. Neither do I intend now to take up any other view. I only wish to observe, that reference to the commentaries of the fathers, would enable me to maintain a different view of Nicodemus's character, from what both the professor and Philalethes have studied to represent it. It would be easy to show that several of them considered Nicodemus as better, indeed, than the majority of the Pharisees, yet still, as not only imbued with their prejudices, but as exhibiting no small degree of their obstinacy. Hence, St. Chrysostome intimates

¹ "Tracts for the Times," vol. iii. "Scriptural Views of Baptism," pref. p. v.

that our Lord's gentleness and kindness were displayed, in attributing his objections to stupidity rather than to malice.¹

After having endeavoured to show, at the expense of the doctrine of baptism, that the discourse in *John* vi. can receive no illustration from *John* iii., Dr. Turton goes on gravely to assert, that to the application of the discourse to belief in Christ's passion, there does not exist a like difficulty,—of that passion's being a subsequent event. Our Lord *prophetically* alluded to it; and, from that moment, all were to have, or lose, everlasting life, according as they eat or eat not the flesh of the Son of man by faith in his death. Dr. Turton considers it an insuperable objection to the Eucharist's being here alluded to, that he does not think "that even one of our Lord's hearers at the time—whether his disciples or the people at large—either had or could have the most distant idea of the sacrament of the Eucharist." (p. 189.) I think any one will smile at seeing the same divine assuming, instead, a belief in the passion and death of the Messiah, as the object of the command, with the penalty of eternal death, if not observed. It is evident, from Dr. Turton's own showing, that the apostles could not be brought to understand that our Lord, whom they believed to be the Messiah,

¹ "Ὅρα πῶς οὐδαμοῦ πονηρίαν κατηγορεῖ τοῦ ἀνδρός. Hom. xxvi. in Joan. Oper. tom. viii. p. 151. Ven. 1741.

would die,¹ how much less the crowd. Nor is this all. "When our Lord spoke of his flesh," says Dr. Turton "he, doubtless, prophetically alluded, *as he frequently had done* on other occasions, to his passion." (p. 234.) I call for proofs of this gratuitous and incorrect assertion, that Jesus "*had* frequently alluded to his passion." Dr. Turton cannot bring a single instance of such allusions—most certainly not *frequent* instances—anterior to the discourse in *John* vi. I do not think he can possibly reconcile, with the evangelical chronology, his bold and random assertion. *John* viii. was, probably, the very first time when his death was alluded to; and we see the tremendous effects of the announcement. Yet this point is taken for granted, in a manner that would escape the attention of most readers, though it forms the foundation of the entire theory, that, supposing our Lord to inculcate belief in his passion, no objection can be made, on the score that the command applied to something not yet existing, nor intelligible to the hearers. Even, if the words "to eat flesh" and "drink blood," could have been on any occasion intelligible in the Protestant sense, they surely could not be so here, where the death of the individual, to whom they were to be referred, could

¹ See p. 209 and p. 145, where it suited the learned gentleman to maintain that the apostles, and much more the crowd, could not be brought to understand allusions to our Lord's death.

not even enter into the imagination of his audience. If, then, the Eucharist could not be the subject of our Saviour's discourse, and its precept, just as little could faith in his passion.

I have only one more point to touch on,—a joint attack from Dr. Turton and Philalathes. It is where I censure an assertion of Dr. Hampden's, that the sixth chapter of *St. John* proves a *real*, but not a *corporal* presence. My arguments were drawn entirely from the terms of the chapter. If any presence be proved by it, it is that which is pointed out by telling us, that the flesh and blood of Christ are there. These are the constituents of his body, nor do I see how the contemptuous epithet of "quibbling" can be justly applied by Philalathes to the argument, that the presence of a person's body constituted a corporal presence; and that the moment such a presence is denied to be proved by the words *flesh* and *blood*, no other *real* presence can be. To the arguments themselves, neither of my opponents think it useful to reply; they fasten on the conclusion, general in its form, but manifestly connected with the enquiry; viz. where in Scripture is this distinction drawn? They answer, by referring to *Matt. xviii. 20*, where Christ says, that where two or three are gathered together in his name, there is he in the midst of them. Do these gentlemen then mean to say that Christ is present in this manner in the Eucharist? or that no other species of presence is implied by our

Lord's saying, that his flesh and blood, or his body is there? When the Apostles were assembled together, after his resurrection, he was certainly there in the midst of them, by virtue of that promise; but had it been told to Thomas "the body of Christ, or his flesh and blood, have been amongst us," he certainly would not have ever understood that they meant nothing more than the spiritual presence promised in *St. Matthew*. It is, therefore, truly mere "quibbling" to meet an argument, entirely referring to passages where a body and its constituents are clearly mentioned, by passages where not the remotest allusion is made to such objects.

Dr. Turton concludes this chapter, with a disquisition about the Council of Trent, a point already sufficiently discussed in my fourth chapter. I there, it is true, overlooked Dr. Turton's arguments on the subject, from their not being in their natural place,—his next section. Still, I see nothing necessary to add to what I have already written on the subject.

CHAPTER VIII.

THE WORDS OF INSTITUTION—MAY THEY BE INTERPRETED
FIGURATIVELY?

To this portion of his labours Dr. Turton pre-mises a note, to the effect that his remarks on *John* vi. having been prolonged beyond his original design, he will endeavour proportionably to compress his account of the *Lectures on the Words of Institution*. As my remarks must necessarily be guided by the line and form which he takes, I hope I can promise the reader a similar brevity.

After some preliminary remarks, the Professor thus declares the doctrine opposed to mine—the Catholic: “The Protestant holds that the words [of Institution] are to be taken figuratively; so that what was before simply *bread*, became *the symbol* of the body of Christ.” (p. 259.) I suppose we are to consider this sentence as containing the proposition to be maintained by Dr. Turton, in opposition to my assertion of Transubstantiation, and as including, under the title of “Protestant,” the Anglican Church. If this be the

case, I think he will have many to contradict him besides myself. For he places in opposition to the Catholic doctrine this Protestant belief, that, by the words of consecration or institution, what was before bread becomes nothing more than a symbol of our Saviour's body. Mr. Newman thus writes against Dr. Faussett:—"Three questions offer themselves for consideration; first, whether there is a Real Presence of Christ in this Holy Sacrament; next, what it is; and, thirdly, where. On the first of these I shall not use many words; because, on the one hand, the Real Presence is expressly recognized by the Catechisms and Homilies," &c. He then refers to different passages in the Church Formularies and Homilies, especially one where it is said, that "in the supper of the Lord there is no bare ceremony, *no bare sign*, no untrue figure *of a thing absent*," &c.; from which he thus concludes:—"These passages seem to *determine* that the body and blood of Christ are not absent, but present, in the Lord's Supper; and if Christ's body be there, His soul is there, and His divine nature. He is there whole and entire."¹ Such is the doctrine maintained by a theologian of the sister university; and I believe it is well known

¹ "A Letter to the Rev. Godfrey Faussett, D.D.," 2nd ed. p. 49. I need not advert to the express rejection, by the author of this letter, and his friends the writers of the "Tracts for the Times," of the title "Protestant" applied to the Church of England.

that he generally expresses the sentiments of a considerable body of clergy and laity, professing to be members of the Anglican Church. It is not for me to decide whether Oxford or Cambridge have the superior right to declare the doctrine of this Church; but it is certain that the expressions employed by Mr. Newman are as completely contradicted by Dr. Turton's declaration of the Protestant doctrine of the Eucharist, as the Catholic one is. The entire course of objections made to my reasoning, by the Regius Professor, in the chapter on which I am entering, does not impugn the Catholic doctrine in that part wherein it differs from that proposed by Mr. Newman, but in that respect wherein the two agree. All his arguments are directed to prove that the words of institution are to be figuratively interpreted, in the same manner as "I am the vine," "The Rock was Christ." Such an interpretation at once completely shuts out all idea of any Real Presence. If then I have deserved the strong feelings which Dr. Turton's criticisms on me display, and must tend to excite, I bear them in common with a large and respectable portion of his own Church.

Dr. Turton enumerates the texts which I extracted from Dr. Adam Clarke, as proving, in his opinion, that the words of institution *may* be figuratively explained. I took his list, because I had seen it copied by other Protestant writers; I suppose on account of its completeness. The first

class of these texts consists in such passages as these:—"The seven good kine are seven years;" "The field is the world." On these, and such others, Dr. Turton agrees with me that they must be interpreted figuratively, because two objects, each having a separate existence, are declared identical. He then goes on to say, that in the example "these are the two covenants." (*Gal.* iv. 24.) We know not what *these* refers to, till we examine the context, and discover that they are Agar and Sarah. This argument is put, to show a similarity of case with "*This* is my body." But Dr. Turton did not think it necessary to advise his readers—and therefore I take the liberty of doing it instead—that such similarity only exists in the deceitfulness of an imperfect translation. For, as I was careful to observe in p. 181 of my *Lectures*—a passage to which Dr. T. never alludes—in the Greek text we have *αὗται*, "these *persons*," or "they." We are not for a moment left in the dark. It is not true that we "know not, till we have ascertained to what the word 'these' refers, whether a literal or a spiritual interpretation is required." (p. 262.) In the first place, it is not true that we have to depend upon our ascertaining the reference of this pronoun, for learning whether or no a figurative interpretation is to be given, unless St. Paul's word, given before he uses the pronoun, is to go for nothing. For thus he writes: *ἅτινα ἐστὶν ἈΛΛΗΓΟΡΟΥΜΕΝΑ· αὗται γὰρ εἰσὶν δύο διαθήκαι.* St. Paul, then,

does not leave us to any investigation, but himself tells us which meaning we are to adopt. Secondly, it is not true that we have to ascertain to what the pronoun *αῦται* refers, because it can refer only to the two women previously mentioned. Thus is Dr. Turton's attempt to find a form of indefinite expression similar to "This is my body," where we take the word *to be* figuratively, based upon two fallacies, and a concealment of the original text, which would at once have detected them. Had I made such assertions, and such an argument, I am pretty sure he would not have scrupled to tell me that I ought to have been ashamed of them. He fails, then, completely in establishing similarity of phrase in any one instance, with the words under discussion.

"But," says Dr. Turton, "for the more easy management of the passages discussed, I suppose them to be alleged as *parallel passages*," (p. 203), which, I conclude, he means to deny them to be. Then, in reason's name, what are they? When other passages are adduced to illustrate any one phrase, I always supposed they were alleged as parallel passages. One of the authors to whom I referred for the instances in question (p. 170), expressly calls them *parallel passages*; so that, at any rate, Dr. Turton's blame should fall upon his own brethren, not upon me,—as though I had been the first to give them that name. But Dr. Turton afterwards prefers calling them *similar passages*;

such at least being the name he gives them. Very well; let us turn off the established name which gives him so much offence, and adopt his. What does he gain? I find Ernesti, whom I hope he has not, in his hatred of all hermeneutics, completely reprobated, commonly call parallel passages by the more classical term *loca similia*: and I find, that it is under this name, that he lays down his rule, that similarity of words suffices not, but that similarity of things is requisite, in passages brought together for the purpose of mutual illustration.

But before coming to closer quarters on this point, I am met by a formidable objection, put forward with great pomp and circumstance by the learned theologian. I say that I can bring "some thousands of passages" [in the Bible] "where the verb 'to be' is taken literally." (p. 170.) This is called "magnificent language," and Dr. Turton says that, where I write *thousands*, he is ready to understand *scores*; which he thinks a very reasonable reduction in my writings, and he therefore wonders whether I was "made poor by my very abundance—absolutely bewildered by variety." (p. 265.) He thinks half a score of instances would have been an ornament to my volume. Yet "not a single instance has been produced." (p. 266.) I am truly grateful for the kindness with which he proposes such a reduction of my numbers; but I beg, in return, to assure him that I have no desire to avail myself of it. The verb "to be" occurs in

the vulgate at least five thousand five hundred times; and, making every possible allowance, I imagine Dr. Turton will admit that five thousand of those times, at least, it is used in the substantive signification—that is in the sense which it bears in every grammar, and in the second verse of Genesis and the last of the Apocalypse. It was not necessary, therefore, for me to prove that the verb “to be” is ever used in Scripture in the signification which Catholics give it in the sentence, “this *is* my Body.” I had no need of parallel passages. But the Protestant, who insists that “to be” is not here to be taken in the sense of the five thousand passages in question, (I have calculated the number) must bring other passages to justify his deviation. The *onus probandi*, Dr. Turton ought to have understood, was not upon me. When, therefore, I said that I could bring thousands of passages wherein the verb in question had this substantive signification, I only did so to show the necessity under which Protestants were, of bringing *some* at least to justify their departure from it here. I certainly never suspected, I should have fallen in with a critic, who would either have cut down the thousands of instances of this verb’s natural use, to scores, or who would have thought it incumbent on me to allege some, in order to justify my adherence to this ordinary use of it in any instance. Hooker says, “I hold it for a most infallible rule in expositions of sacred Scripture, that

where a literal construction will stand, the farthest from the letter is commonly the worst.”¹ If so, it becomes the duty of those who wish to go, as Dr. Turton does, the farthest from the letter, to prove that *this* will not stand.

This little rub being removed out of our way,—and the ruffling of the learned Professor’s temper, which it caused, with it, I trust, calmed,—let us proceed to the matter in hand. I maintain, therefore, that the passages in the first class, above described, could not be produced as similar—or parallel—or in other words, as illustrative of “this is my body,” because the circumstances or context in all those, referred them to the interpretation or explanation of figurative ideas, such as parables, dreams, allegories, or the like. This, Dr. Turton calls “preposterous,” as equivalent to a desire that first you should “prove your point—and then have recourse to arguments.” (p. 267.) I expect the Protestant, according to him, first to prove *aliunde* that the words of Institution must be interpreted figuratively, and then to show that they belong to the same class as the alleged passages. I am sorry that Dr. Turton should have so completely misapprehended my meaning. I cannot help thinking that if he had kept himself cooler, he would have seen it better. I appeal from him in anger, on the present occasion, to himself cooled down in p. 274.

¹ Book v. cl. lix. vol. ii. p. 336. ed. *Keble*.

There he writes as follows: "The first chapter of *St. John* suggests another proof of the necessity of duly *considering the circumstances of the case*, before we explain the phraseology of Scripture in its most rigorously literal sense:" he will allow me to add, "or in a metaphorical one." They are precisely "the circumstances of the case," in the passages alleged to explain in the words of Institution, that I wish him to consider: and I am sure he will find them totally different from the circumstances of the case to be illustrated, though all these instances mutually agree. Is not this enough to exclude them from all right to be here employed? Now, such is the rule I quoted for parallel passages, from various authors. But I remember, too, how on another occasion, as far back as p. 128 of his book, he thus wrote: "I was led to lay this statement before the reader, because I wished to show the importance of *taking situations and circumstances* fairly into account, before we venture to decide positively, or write confidently, on the meaning of passages of Scripture." Now this is precisely all I want. But Dr. Turton has now forgot all these excellent principles, and insists merely upon words; being quite satisfied that because "to be" means "to represent," whenever dreams, allegories, or parables, are explained, therefore it may mean the same when a sacrament is instituted! Is this consistent?

But he presses his argument more home, and I

am ready to meet the thrust, though it be prepared as “ a sharp sword.” “ Fain would I hope,” so he writes, “ that it” (the next argument) “ is unique even in the writings of this learned theologian. I might give it in fewer words ; but that there may be no erroneous impression, I shall merely transcribe what I find.” (p. 267.) I am compelled to say, that either Dr. Turton’s ignorance of our divines and controvertists is very great, or his hopes of my argument being unique are very misplaced. For I should hardly think there is a single Catholic writer on the Eucharist who does not employ it. For the argument is, that in every one of the instances alleged by Protestants, the writer from whom it is drawn is careful to tell us that he is relating, or giving the interpretation of a symbolical expression ; whereas nothing similar occurs in the institution of the Eucharist. Dr. Turton thus comments on the remark : “ And of what use would have been the reference, unless the contexts *had* manifested the true import of the passages ? What would Dr. Wiseman have said, if passages had been quoted of which it was uncertain whether the meaning was literal or figurative ?” (p. 268.) I answer they would have left the matter doubtful ;—they would have approximated, however, to an argument, and not, like the present instances, have merely proved the inability of our adversaries to bring a single parallel example. These have served only to demonstrate, that in no case is the verb “ to be” used figuratively, without ample warning and inti-

mation being given in the context to that effect. This warrants us to demand proof of similar notice in the words of Institution, before we allow them to be wrested from their literal signification.

But let us now examine Dr. Turton's argument; and, however painful the process, I must do it in the person of a Socinian. Dr. Turton, doubtless, believes the title of "God" to be bestowed, in its literal import, upon our Lord Christ Jesus. Suppose, then, the follower of Socinus to step forward and assert, as has been done, that this term *may* be taken improperly, and figuratively, because it is so applied in other passages of Holy Writ. In proof, let us suppose him to allege such passages as the following: (*Exod.* vii. 1), "Behold I have appointed thee the God of Pharaoh;" (*Ps.* lxxxi. 6), "I have said, ye are Gods, and all of you sons of the Most High." Would any one consider it an "unique" argument, were the learned Professor to reply, that these texts were not to the purpose, because the very context pointed out that the title of God was given in an improper sense? inasmuch as in them both, there are expressions that indicate this; for the very idea of being *appointed* a God, and that, to *one* man, is repugnant to all idea of true Deity: and the next verse of the psalm intimates, that those who are called Gods shall die, which is no less incompatible with God's nature: whereas, in the application of the term to Jesus, for instance, in *John* xx. 28, there is nothing in the context to suggest such a modified, figurative in-

terpretation. I ask, if, apart from any other reply that might be made, this would be thought an improper argument to use? would it be a “miserable sophistry?” (T. p. 268.) Then, if such a reply were made, would not the Socinian have the advantage of Dr. Turton’s censures of my similar “unique” argument, and say: “The objection,” he might say with him (to our interpretation, from similar passages, of the word ‘God,’) “here is, that reference is made to passages, which are proved by their contexts to require a figurative interpretation? And of what use would have been the reference, unless the contexts *had* manifested the true import of the passages? What would Dr. [Turton] have said, if passages had been quoted, of which it was uncertain whether the meaning was literal or figurative?” The fact is—and it is only wonderful how it should have escaped the learned Professor—that I have done what every sound interpreter must do; refused to classify a passage with others, which have clear indications, in their contexts, of a specific and peculiar meaning, which indications are completely wanting in the passage under review. It is no more than he would himself do in the case just cited. After this exposure, I do not think that the concluding sentence of his paragraph (in which he charges me with doing, in that argument, what he should have hoped the meanest and most illiterate of my brethren, who had common-sense, would have had the virtue to shrink from with disdain,)

can be better answered than in the words of St. Augustine : “ Et hæc non vides non aliqua esse documenta, sed vana convitia ?”¹

Dr. Turton then proceeds to notice my argument, drawn from the phrase “ the Word was God :” where I have shown that every thing depends upon the literal interpretation of the word “ was,” which might be eluded, as well as the words of Institution, by the application of the passages adduced by Protestants. I think I put the answer on its right grounds, when I said that it would be sufficient reply to show, that, in *John* i. 1, there was no intimation that a figurative meaning was intended, which there was in the other cases. I think any Protestant would, unhesitatingly, answer so. Dr. Turton prefers leaving this vantage ground, for fear I might here share it, and founding his answer to the Socinian upon the more difficult and complicated ground of metaphysical theology. He forgets that he is assuming, as the basis of his answer, what his supposed adversary would deny. He says that the literal meaning of “ this is my body,” “ manifestly implies that which cannot be.” The Socinian will say that the strict meaning of “ the Word was God,” implies no less manifestly that which cannot be. “ This,” he says, “ is one of Dr. Wiseman’s best arguments ; although,” he courteously adds, “ I think he must have been well aware

¹ Adv. lit. Petil. lib. ii.

of its fallacy." (p.270.) I cannot forbear answering him in the words of Adeodatus, in the Conference of Carthage: "Agimus tibi gratias quod *semper* facis injuriam."

Dr. Turton proceeds to examine the use I made of a passage from Mr. Faber, where that experienced controversialist compares the words "The rock was Christ" with "This is my Body." His manner of proceeding is curiously consistent. He seems anxious to throw doubt upon the accuracy of my quotations,—by stating, first, in the text, that Mr. F. "appears to have written as follows," and then, in a note, that he takes the passage as I have given it; for, "on looking over the second edition" [of Faber] "not *very* carefully—he did not meet the passage; but it may, nevertheless, be there!" (p. 270.) Is this, I ask, scholar-like,—or is it the learning of a controversialist? I quote a book, giving edition and page,—Dr. Turton takes *another* edition of the book—looks over it not *very* carefully—does not find the passage (as well he might not, upon seeking for it negligently, where it was not said to be), — and insinuates that it *may* be there; — but, that of course, my minute reference to the place might be almost counterbalanced by his careless ramble over another edition! Such is the accuracy of the learned Professor, such are the arts to which he can actually descend, to carry a point! On his vindication of Mr. Faber, I will only make a brief remark or two. First, he

says, "I do not suppose that Mr. F. adduced the two passages as *parallel*, according to the meaning which Dr. Wiseman would attach to that word: so that, with respect to Mr. F., the remarks do not seem very appropriate." (p. 271.) This is a common form of argument with Dr. Turton. Not only does he almost assume, from one book to decide concerning another, as in the case just noted, and in that of Tittmann, but he appears to have a secret for penetrating the intentions of men's minds. We are here to conclude my observations to be inappropriate, because Dr. Turton does not *suppose* Mr. Faber to have meant the words as *I* take them. It was in this manner that, on a former occasion,¹ Kuinoel's and Bloomfield's intentions, penetrated by the sagacious eye of the Regius Professor, were made to annul the clear words of their texts. It is thus, that repeatedly my intentions have been unravelled with as authoritative a precision and boldness, as though he had been in my study, and in my confidence, while I was writing my *Lectures*, and these supposed motives made to set aside my clearest words. It is thus, in fine, that the Scripture is made to yield its most hidden secrets to the magical key of my learned adversary; he analyzes all the mental difficulties of the Jewish

¹ "There is some difficulty in supposing Kuinoel not to have really meant the 42nd verse, when he wrote the 43d." (p. 40.) "I conclude that Dr. Bloomfield was not considering, when he wrote the note, *the exact* point of transition." (p. 45.)

crowd, reduces to heads their stifled murmurs, and then pronounces any man devoid of reason, who is not convinced of the falsehood of the plain Catholic interpretation of our Lord's words, after perusing *his* dogmatical "suppositions" and "apprehensions." Now I have before claimed, and still do claim, perfect equality with Dr. Turton, in all matters not dependent on our respective personal qualities—on which I presume not to contend with him—and I allow him no more independence of "the laws usually deemed binding upon human intelligence," than he allows me. I give no more weight, I attach no more importance, to his suppositions of any body's intentions—be they Mr. Faber's, or the Jewish crowd's—than he would afford to mine: and that I am sure is very little. St. Augustine has very strongly described the difficulty he had in keeping patience with those, who, instead of calling on him for proofs of his interpretations, boldly substituted their own, and expected implicit credence for them, as though they had been better able to penetrate into the minds of the inspired writers.¹ Once for all, I am willing to examine

1 "Si mihi diceret; 'unde scis hoc sensisse Mosen, quod de his ejus verbis loquaris,' æquo animo ferre deberem. Quum vero dicit, 'non hoc ille sensit quod tu dicis, sed quod ego dico;—O vita pauperum, Deus meus, plue mihi mitigationes in cor, ut patienter tales feram, qui non mihi hoc dicunt, quia divini sunt, sed quia superbi sunt, neque noverunt Mosis sententiam, sed amant suam, non quia vera est, sed quia sua est.'—Conf., lib. xii.

any arguments which Dr. Turton, or any other critic, may bring ;—on his suppositions or conjectures, I beg to address to him the words of Æneas to the Sybil (our prototypes, the reader will remember)—

“ ——— *Foliis tantum ne carmina manda
Ne turbata volent rapidis ludibria ventis.*”

Secondly, he assumes the entire question, when, to make the similarity between the words of Christ and St. Paul apparent, he writes the former thus ; “ This [bread] is my body.”¹ I would respectfully suggest the omission of the word in brackets in another edition. It would really be only fair. I see, at the end of Dr. Turton’s book, an advertisement of another work by him, “ preparing for the press,” intituled, “ A Dissertation on the use of *Supplementary Words* in versions of Scripture, more especially the English version.” I know not the exact purport of the volume ; but I presume it is to vindicate the employment of such words. But

¹ See, however, Dr. Lingard’s excellent remarks upon the difference of the expressions “ this is my body” and “ that rock was Christ.” St. Paul, as he observes, is speaking of the *spiritual* rock that followed the Israelites in the desert, which was not an emblem of Christ, but Christ himself. This explanation removes the text entirely from all right to stand with the others, as “ was” then retains its natural signification. Compare, also, his observations on the difference between the words of Institution and the phrases, “ I am *the* door,” not “ I am *this* door.” Ubi supr. p. 219, seq.

truly, such “supplementary words” as the one intercalated in the preceding text, however great may be their “use,” go, I trust, beyond the permission which he will accord to Scriptural interpreters, especially such as deprecate all hermeneutical rules. And, being upon this subject of “supplementary words,” I will anticipate my remarks on p. 279, to observe that “these supplementary words,” when used, not in the text of Scripture, but in quotation for a particular purpose, take portentously the semblance of emphatic marks. I beg the reader to peruse the following passage: “Independently of the foregoing observations, let the reader just look at one of the accounts of the institution, that of *St. Matthew*, for instance; ‘And, as they were eating, Jesus took bread, and blessed *it* and brake *it*, and gave *it* to the disciples, and said, Take, eat, this is my body;’—and then let him consider, whether he can possibly imagine any one seriously maintaining that the word ‘this,’ had not a determinate reference to *the bread* which had been taken, and blessed and broken, and given to the disciples.” Here, certainly, the supplementary words help the argument of appeal. For they appear to make the connexion between “this” and “the bread” more clear; and the unwary reader steps from one “*it*” to another, scarcely conscious that the italics, in this instance, serve not to fix his attention particularly on the words printed in them, but to warn him that they are

totally wanting in the original, and are only “supplementary words.” I suppose the learned theologian, in his treatise, will not forget to speak of the controversial “use” of “supplementary words.” But, to return. Dr. Turton, having had his attention directed to the first chapter of *St. John*, asks why the expressions of v. 14 are not to be explained strictly literally? and why, when we read “the Word was made flesh,” we do not understand that the Word was changed into flesh? He answers, because such is incredible; as if, to unassisted reason, the assumption of a “corruptible body,”¹ by the Divine nature, were not equally incredible! Sound theology will, I am sure, reject such a criterion for the interpretation of the passage. The words themselves cannot guide us,² and it is only the analogy of Scripture doctrine, and still more the traditional and living authority of the Church, that could ever have drawn from this text the definite and clear explanation of the Athanasian creed; “*unus autem non conversione divinitatis in car-*

¹ This is Dr. Turton’s phrase. I should have hesitated, before I would have applied this epithet to His body, who was not to be suffered “to see corruption.”

² Ὁ λόγος σὰρξ ἘΓΕΝΕΤΟ. In *Matt.* iv. 3, this verb has the signification of “being changed into.” Ἴνα οἱ λίθοι ἄροισι ΓΕΝΩΝΤΑΙ, “that the stones *become* loaves.” This is an instance of the inapplicability of mere *verbal* resemblances to interpret phrases, such as Protestants allege to prove that the words of Institution *may* be taken figuratively.

nem, sed assumptione humanitatis in Deum." I think the learned Professor perillously rash, when he introduces the comparative credibility between the two doctrines of conversion and assumption, as the touchstone, whereby we are induced to take the one, while we reject the other.

After another, and a desultory disquisition about *Matt.* xi. 13-15, Dr. Turton discovers that I do not allow the pronoun "this" to be equivalent to "this bread." He "fancied" that this equivalence was admitted "on all hands." (p. 276.) Once more I must regret the learned Professor's want of acquaintance with our standard divines, in any one of whom he would have found this matter treated, and the same opinion maintained, which shocks him so much in me, that the pronoun "this" receives its determination from the word "body," at the end of the sentence.¹ To illustrate the possibility of such an explanation, let us suppose, by way of hypothesis, that our Lord had said, "This is—not bread but—my body." To what would "this" have referred? Certainly not to the bread, which would involve a contradiction,—but to the

¹ This *ignorance* is the more surprising, as, after a few pages, the learned Professor refers to Bellarmine, who has a long disquisition to prove that *τὸ αὐτὸ* cannot refer to the bread, but can only refer to the *σῶμα*. How skilful is a controversial eye in picking out exactly what suits the present purpose, and completely overlooking, in nearly the same page, whatever it would be inconvenient to know!

“body.” Its true signification would have remained suspended till the close of the sentence. The same is to be said of those passages, where the object signified is mentioned at the end of the sentence. One of these Dr. Turton himself gives, p. 283 :— “ *This* is the work of God, that ye believe,” &c. The meaning of “this” is here suspended, till it be determined at the close of the period.

But, says Dr. Turton, if we look at the formula of Institution of the Cup, we shall find this to be incorrect. For in *it*, the “this” is not left indefinite till the close of the sentence. For St. Luke and St. Paul express the words by “This CUP is the New Testament in my blood.” “So far,” he continues, “is it from being true, that the ‘THIS’ ‘represents nothing,’ Dr. Wiseman, with all his zeal for literal interpretation, will not deny that *the cup* really means the wine contained in the cup.” (p. 278.) I am much obliged to Dr. Turton for having brought forward this argument, which gives me an opportunity, while confuting it, of supplying an important omission in my *Lectures*. I say that “this cup” no more signifies “the *wine* in this cup,” than “this” means “this bread.” It signifies indefinitely, “what is in this cup ;” and that is determined afterwards to be our Saviour’s blood, and not wine. This is not a matter of conjecture, but of demonstration. The words in *St. Luke*, to which the Professor appeals, are as follows : ΤΟΥΤΟ ΤΟ ΠΟΤΗΡΙΟΝ ἡ καινὴ διαθήκη, ἐν τῷ αἵματί μου, ΤΟ ὕπερ

ὑμῶν ἐκχυρομένον. “THIS CUP is the New Testament in my blood, WHICH [CUP] is shed *for you*.” The Greek construction will allow no reference of the TO, WHICH, except to the cup: “BLOOD” being in the dative, and the relative in the nominative. I suppose Dr. Turton will not deny this. In like manner, “which is *shed for you*,” cannot refer to “the wine contained” in *any* cup, but to the blood of Christ, our Redeemer; “which is *shed for many*,” says *St. Matthew*, “for the remission of sins.” In the English version of *St. Luke*, the “which” seems to refer immediately to “in my blood,” which precedes it, but the Greek leaves us no alternative.¹ What in the other Evangelists is attributed to the blood of Christ, is, by *St. Luke*, attributed to the contents of the cup. I, therefore, leave Dr. Turton his choice of two alternatives, either to maintain that the “wine contained in *a* cup” was shed for our redemption, or to withdraw his assertion that τοῦτο τὸ ποτήριον means—whatever my zeal for literal interpretation—“the wine contained in the cup.”

In addition to these remarks, I will observe that the Vulgate, a version to which I am sure the Re-

† The “Version by a Catholic,” has very accurately rendered the words thus:—“This cup is the new covenant IN MY BLOOD; the (cup) poured out for you.” (p. 314.) The Latin version, “Interprete Leopoldo Sebastiani Romano,” Lond. 1817, transposes the words, so as to point out the true construction: “Hic calix qui pro vobis effunditur, novum.”

gius Professor will be willing to pay due respect, has, in one instance, "*Hoc* est corpus meum," and in the other "*hic* est enim sanguis meus." (*Matt.* xxvi. 28.) "*Hic*" cannot be made to refer to "calix," otherwise the "*hoc*" ought similarly to be masculine, to refer to "panis." But, in both instances, the demonstrative pronoun is made to agree with the determining noun at the end of the sentence. This observation will serve to show that, whatever may be Dr. Horsley's reasoning about the reference of the neuter *τοῦτο* to *ἄρτος*, (*Philaethes*, p. 133,) the early interpreters did not so understand it. For if they used the neuter in one case, why did they not in the other?

Dr. Turton, again, in p. 280, returns to the example of "these are the two covenants," which I think I have sufficiently answered. Neither do I see anything to detain me in the following pages, where he discusses the other classes of texts alleged by Protestants, because, although he differs from me, of course, on many points, he does not seem to attach much importance to them as means of proof. The glorious example, so mysteriously manifested to Zwingle, "It is the Lord's passover," is made very little of: it is pronounced "not sufficiently clear to afford illustration for other cases." Yet I beg the reader to remember, that this reformer was rejoiced at the discovery of this text, because he felt the objection to the common ones, that they treated of parables. (*W.* p. 188.)

Dr. Turton now has recourse to Bellarmine, and quotes him, saying, that it is not altogether improbable that the proofs of transubstantiation, from Scripture, are not sufficient to prove it without the declaration of the Church. Fortunately, he gives Bellarmine's own words. Now, the learned divine says only that it may be doubted whether the proofs be such as to *compel* us to this belief, *solely* because such a man as Scotus thought so. At the same time, Bellarmine considers them himself sufficient. "Etsi Scriptura . . . videatur nobis tam clara, ut possit *cogere* hominem non protervum." He therefore only hesitates upon seeing *one*, not obstinate, think the contrary. Suppose that any one, seeing that the texts in favour of our Lord's divinity are not considered conclusive by some divines, (and, I think, Protestant ones,) were to give this as a reason for not positively declaring them sufficient, without the sanction which the doctrine has received from tradition, could this be retorted with any show of justice against such as did maintain that dogma from Scripture? or could it be said that even those divines acknowledged the weakness of the Scriptural proofs? This reserve, upon such motives, would do honour to their delicacy, but would be no argument of their hesitating to believe the strength of their proofs. But in regard to Bellarmine and Scotus, I must farther remark, that the question treated by them is *not* the Real Presence at all, but its *mode*, whether by

transubstantiation, or by companation, or some other means. Bellarmine does not hesitate, or express a shadow of doubt, respecting the absolute sufficiency of his Scriptural proofs in favour of the *corporal* presence, which is what Dr. Turton impugns, and of which the learned Jesuit had treated at full length in his first and second books on the Eucharist. It is in his third book that he discusses the *manner* in which our Lord's body is present; that he answers Kemnitius's objections from Scotus, which apply solely to this *manner*. For Scotus says, in the first objection, that God could, by his power, have caused the body of Christ to co-exist in the Eucharist *with* the bread. To which Bellarmine replies, that this is a scholastic question, that may be maintained by any Catholic. Then comes the second one, that Scotus did not think transubstantiation (as distinct from other possible *modes* of the Real Presence) could be proved without Church authority. Such is the connexion of the arguments, that any one reading the entire treatise, cannot fail to see that it has no bearing upon our question. *I* have considered transubstantiation as a corollary of the corporal presence, and have confined my arguments to the latter. Scotus is speaking entirely of the former, as a specific *mode*. But a few pages later, we have this matter again brought forward by Dr. T., with important changes. We have it said (p. 290) that "Duns Scotus *could not discover*, as Dr. Wiseman can, that the *Real*

Presence in the Eucharist may be deduced from Scripture. Bellarmine *was aware* that learned and able enquirers may *have reason* not to be convinced by the proofs usually alleged for the same doctrine. The Schoolman and the Cardinal¹ had really studied the subject.” This is quite beyond *my* powers of praise. The *mode* of Christ’s presence is cleverly transformed into the Real Presence itself. Bellarmine’s modest reserve, in not considering his arguments *for that mode* finally conclusive, *only* because Scotus thought otherwise, is exaggerated into his being aware that learned and able inquirers “may *have reason* not to be convinced!”

But this is only the first step in the learned Professor’s course of ingenious amplification. For, a few pages later (p.298) he takes still fuller advantage of any oblivion which may have crept over the mind of his readers, concerning the words of Bellarmine, and of all the ignorance in which they have been kept respecting their true import and subject, and writes as follows : “ Bellarmine, as we have seen—and some of the ablest defenders of the Roman Catholic faith,—have allowed that the language of Scripture, according to the ordinary rules of interpretation, is not of itself sufficient to esta-

¹ Bellarmine was not a Cardinal, but a Jesuit, when he wrote his “Controversies.” I take this opportunity of thanking Dr. T. for his correcting my mistake of Doctor, for Bishop Sherlock (p. 237.)

blish the doctrine of Transubstantiation, mentioning that, for that purpose, recourse must be had to the authority of the (so-called) infallible Church." It argues no small controversial ability to have worked this positive and decisive result out of the former assertion, and it will be instructive, in many ways, to see the various substitutions, and exaggerations whereby one has grown out of the other. First, besides Bellarmine, "we have seen some of the ablest defenders of the Catholic faith." Who are these? Scotus alone was mentioned, who lived some hundreds of years before the Reformation, and that the reader may have more to justify the Doctor's words than he himself has given him, I will inform him, that Kemnitius mentions *two* others with Scotus: Andradius and Cameracensis. Probably hardly one of my readers has ever heard of them before. Yet these, at most, must represent some of the ablest defenders of the "Catholic faith!" Secondly, all about "the ordinary rules of interpretation" is a present from Dr. Turton to Bellarmine's text. Thirdly, the "merito dubitari potest" is changed into a positive admission of the insufficiency of Scriptural proof. Fourthly, Bellarmine is made to maintain that which he never does either maintain or say. After this let Dr. Turton talk as he pleases of my "romantic imagination," my "magnifying faculty," my "hermeneutical spectacles," and so forth. The reader will, I trust, only gently remind him of the parable of the mote in his neighbour's, and the beam in his own eye.

CHAPTER IX.

MUST THE WORDS OF INSTITUTION BE UNDERSTOOD
FIGURATIVELY?

IN pursuing Dr. Turton's ingenious arts of making the most of a passage of Bellarmine, I have passed over the boundary of the chapter on which I was engaged, and followed him into another. In it the learned author does not much attempt to criticise or blame my expressions, nor even much to discuss my argument; but justly estimating that the *onus probandi* lies with his side, gives his reasons for taking figuratively the words of Institution. This important matter may be considered under two points of view, either with reference to the impression those words made on the apostles, or to the sense which considerations more properly affecting *us* suggest. Here both Dr. Turton and Philalethes (the *British Critic* I have long since cast aside, as their mere echo) pursue a similar train of argument. I will therefore give the words of both, and then reply.

“ The conversion of bread into flesh, and of wine into blood, must be as astonishing an event as the turning of water into wine :

what account of the change do we find in the Gospels? No account whatever: *not a trace of a miracle can be discovered*. We read of bread and wine: we read of words spoken, but the senses of those present, *by which alone* the bread and wine could be known to be really such *before* the words were spoken, attested the same truth *after* the words were spoken. A like difference exists between every instance of a miracle related in the Gospels, and the case in question. The changes specified as miraculous, invariably struck the senses; the supposed change in the Eucharist was in contradiction to the senses."—*Turton*, p. 293.

"We have just seen that, accustomed as the apostles were, to attribute the mighty works they witnessed, to our Lord's miraculous power, *they would habitually judge of that power by its visible effects*. *When they perceived no change, they would never suppose that the power had been in operation*.—p. 296.

"Let us consider some of the instances of the exercise of miraculous powers recorded in Scripture . . . a withered limb is restored to vigour, a dead man is restored to life, &c. . . . In all these instances the senses of the disciples were cognizant of the miracle," &c.—*Philalethes*, p. 125.

Do these theologians mean to say that our Lord so completely constituted the senses of his disciples judges of his miraculous works, as that even his word alone, conveyed through that *sense* through which faith comes,¹ was not to have weight without their concurrent testimony? Could he reserve to himself no one case in which their faith might have been tried, upon his word alone, without their confirmatory evidence? Could not Jesus have cured an internal, hidden complaint—as a pulmonary or hepatic affection, which exhibited no outward symp-

¹ "Fides ex auditu, auditus autem per verbum Dei." — *Rom.* x. 17.

toms, and would not the apostles, upon his simple word “ Be thou made whole,” have believed the invisible cure to have been wrought ? Nay, when we are told that he healed “ all manner of sickness and every infirmity,” (*Matt.* iv. 23), and that “ virtue went forth from him and healed all,” (*Luke* vi. 19), who will doubt but that among these were many internal maladies, of which the apostles could have no knowledge from their senses, and of the cure of which—if intermittent in their sensible effects,—probably the patients themselves could not pronounce till some time after. Yet doubtless the disciples would at once have taken it, on our Lord’s declaration, that a cure had been wrought.

But, these gentlemen will say, the question is not an abstract or hypothetical one, of what our Lord might have chosen to say, but of what, from the Gospel, we know that he actually did say, “ The apostles would habitually judge of that power, by its visible effects.” Let us see if this be the case ; that is, whether the apostles were not often placed in a situation where they must have believed a miracle to have been wrought, upon their Divine Master’s word, without evidence of the senses. In *Luke* viii., we have it recorded how a woman, suffering under obstinate hæmorrhage, touched the hem of our Lord’s garment, and was instantly healed. Our Lord said : “ Somebody hath touched me, for I know that virtue hath gone out from me.” (v. 46.) This was the salutary energy which “ healed *all*.”

Now I ask, upon the apostles hearing this declaration from the Son of God, did they suspend their judgment upon the existence of a miraculous cure, till they had farther evidence? And when that only farther evidence was brought, to wit, the bare *word* of the woman, can we suppose that it added a tittle to the certainty they had derived from the word of truth itself? Again, when Jesus said to the importunate Canaanitish woman: "Be it done as thou wilt," (*Matt.* xv. 28), or when he said to the Centurion: "Go, and as thou hast believed, so be it done to thee;" (*viii.* 13), does any one imagine that the apostles believed not that the miracle had been effectually wrought, upon the word of Jesus, but waited to be convinced by the testimony of their senses, that the daughter of the one, and the servant of the other, both absent, had duly recovered?—In like manner, when the ruler asked him to come and heal his son, (*John* iv. 47), he was at a considerable distance from the place, as appears from v. 52. Yet when Jesus said to him; "Go thy way, thy son liveth," the Gospel tells us, that "the man believed the word which Jesus said to him." (v. 50.) These examples are sufficient to prove the incorrectness of my two critics' assumption, that the apostles were habitually accustomed to judge, whether the miraculous power had been exerted, by the evidence of their senses. They had, on the contrary, been accustomed to take the word of Jesus for a miracle, without their testimony.

Still, they will urge, in all these instances the senses *could* have acted; and if brought to the enquiry, would have confirmed the words of our Lord. Hence Dr. Turton takes the question farther back, and with some precautionary phrases, makes this argument: "Christianity was, by Divine appointment, founded on miracles, that is on events, of the truth of which the senses of men were the judges." (p. 300.) Therefore, it is not to be imagined, that anything should be proposed for our belief, relating to objects of sense, which is in contradiction to the senses. This argument is treated at some length, but its pith is here. Let us examine it.

The question, then, is: can the Eucharist be called a *miracle* in the ordinary signification of the word? Dr. Turton considers and treats it as such; and here lies his error. "A miracle," he says, speaking of it, "attested by no change, must not only have been contrary to all their experience," (even in the case of internal complaints?) "*but to all their perceptions of the reasons for which miracles were wrought.*" (p. 296.) This is considering the Eucharist in the same light as the restoring of a withered limb, or the raising of a paralytic. Now all these things were wrought, not so much for their own sake, as in evidence of God's power, and our Lord's mission. They were performed to bring men to faith; like tongues they were "a sign to unbelievers," and not to believers." (1 *Cor.* xiv. 22.) If Christ had not done, among the Jews,

the works that no other man had done, they would not have had sin. (*John* xv. 24.) “Unless ye see signs and wonders, ye believe not,” (iv. 48), he said to them on another occasion. Now was the Eucharist proposed in this way? On the contrary, is it not for believers exclusively? the last seal and pledge of favour, to complete perfect believers? And is it to be brought down to the certainly lower level of wonderful works performed to convince men incredulous, obdurate, unyielding, of some truth, apart from the works themselves? If it be not, then I ask, is it to be subjected to, and tried by, the same laws as these? Of course the evidence of the senses may be the proper criterion, where the certainty of the change has to be believed, on grounds *anterior* to faith, because intended to lead to faith. But of what *could* the Eucharist be intended as an *evidence*? Of the *love* of God, if you please, but not of his power. This indeed it displays to the believing soul, but to none other. What ulterior truth is to be deduced from the Eucharist, as was to be deduced from the healing of the withered hand? In fact, this adorable Sacrament cannot be called a *miracle*, in the usual acceptation of the phrase; it is a *mystery*, itself the term and object of faith, and in no wise intended for its evidence. Under this name it was known in the ancient Church, as “the tremendous mysteries,” veiled from the view of the faithful, con-

cealed from the knowledge of the catechumens, screened by every solemn engagement from the surmises of the heathens. That the Eucharist *contains* in it, the greatest, the sublimest miracle, I willingly admit : that it *is* a miracle, in the sense of Dr. Turton, no Catholic will, I think, allow. The miraculous change in it is by implication and consequence,—it is the condition of every mystery to be miraculous, that is, transcendent to human perceptions ; but its essence is not the miracle, it was not something “ wrought ” — as Dr. Turton expresses himself, it was not a sign, a wonder. Again, those instances of miracles, which I quoted to show the habitual readiness of the apostles to believe anything our Lord told them, without allowing considerations of his power to interfere, were single, transient acts, intended to produce an effect upon those who witnessed or heard of them ; whereas the Eucharist was in the way of a permanent institution, to remain for ever in the Church. In short, the simple difference above rehearsed,—that miracles were for evidence of some truth deducible ; while the Eucharist could not be considered by any one an evidence of any other truth ; that the former were intended for the conviction, this for the consolation of men ; those for unbelievers, and this exclusively for the faithful ;—is sufficient for us to refuse any classification of this Sacrament with the healing of limbs, or the cleansing of lepers.

But then, Dr. Turton will not hear of our consi-

dering it a mystery such as the Trinity or Incarnation. As, however, his argument on this subject is confined to the former of these two mysteries, which does not regard objects cognizable by the senses, I will rather say a few words upon the latter. Let us look upon the incarnation of our Lord, not in that point of view which regards the ineffable union between the eternal word of God and the human nature, but as respects the formation and assumption of this nature in the virginal womb of Mary. I approach the subject with all due reverence, and say that, conception was a thing subject to the test of experience, from the commencement of the human race till that hour ; and, as much as human testimony could assure the apostles that whenever the senses experienced the accidents of bread—to use the school-terms—the substance was there too ; so much did that undeviating testimony assert, that whenever a new human body was formed, it was formed by the efficacy of certain invariable laws. Yet, upon the simple declaration of an angel of God, that what was born in Mary was through the Holy Ghost, we set aside the entire experience of all ages, regarding, mind, a physical law, of which experience was the legitimate test, on every other occasion. We presume not to scrutinize into what portion of the usual laws was suspended, and what allowed to remain in operation ; we take the simple declaration, and we believe in all its necessary results. Now this suspension of the ordinary laws of constituted

nature, this contradiction to the sole test or basis of these laws—for we call those the laws of nature which every observation, every experiment, proves to have uniformly directed her operations,—was surely miraculous to the highest degree: but who would call it no more than a *miracle*, of the same class as the rising of a paralytic from his bed, given like this in evidence, or to be discussed upon the same principle, of investigation and proof, apart from the divine revelation? The fact is, this is a *mystery*, part of the mystery of the Incarnation,—it is itself an object of faith, and, as such, withdrawn from the sphere of all philosophical scrutiny.

We have, thus, here, an instance, not of that abstract character which the Triune existence of God presents, and which serves as an excuse to Dr. Turton for escaping from this subject, (p. 303), and then joining the Incarnation to it, as though of the same nature, denying any parity between the Eucharist, treated by him as a miracle wrought, and the deep mysteries of religion.¹ From this example, too, we may learn how all mysteries are not necessarily of

¹ St. Thomas, with his usual acuteness and accuracy, properly considers the Blessed Sacrament as a mystery, though containing the most marvellous miracles. He asks the question: “Cur in Symbolo Fidei non sit hoc *mysterium* insertum?” He says in reply, that it is implicitly contained in our expression of belief in God’s omnipotence: “Dicendum, quod in Sacramento Eucharistiæ *miraculose* Corpus Christi continetur; et sic concluditur sub omnipotentia.”—Opusc. v. c. 7.

exactly the same character"; some belonging to a sphere transcendently elevated above all principles of human research ; others seemingly within their compass, yet not allowed to be tested by them, because a Divine word suspends or sets aside their action, reserving all credence for the authority thus conveyed through one of the avenues of truth—the hearing. It is not, therefore, sufficient to say that the Eucharist cannot belong to the first class, to deny its separation from matters cognizable by human reasoning : it may partake of the more mixed nature of mysteries of the second class, where things heavenly come in contact with things earthly, which in fact is the case in all sacramental action. Again, if Dr. Turton says that the words " this is my body" contain not a sufficiently clear declaration, nor are sufficiently undisputed for us to deduce from them the interposition of a Divine power, which puts in abeyance the exercise of ordinary tests, then I beg to reply that just so much will a rationalist say in regard to the words of the angel, from which we deduce the virginal conception of Mary. Finally I will observe, that, thus considering the learned Regius Professor's principles of the value of the senses and of human reason in deciding mysteries, there does not seem to be much difficulty in getting from them to such rationalistic ideas. For, if here he considers the senses, as much entitled to use their ordinary right in judgment, where a sacrament is

instituted for the faithful, as where a miracle is given in evidence to unbelievers, so in another place he admits the right of reason to decide what is incredible and what not, in the most sublime mysteries, (p. 272), and to settle, according to the line of such credibility, their exact terms ; so that we are to understand by the Word's becoming Flesh, that It assumed the human nature, because another interpretation gives us a sense *incredible*. Now, put these two principles together : admit first, that wherever the Divine operations come in contact with material nature and its laws, no expressions, however clear, can set aside the judgment of the senses, but those must be figuratively interpreted rather than the testimony of these be set aside : admit, secondly, that in mysteries transcending human intelligence, there are degrees of credibility whereof reason is cognizant, to the extent of thereby deciding the *mode* of such mysteries,—and I have no hesitation in saying that you open the door, wide, and easy, to any degree of rationalistic theology. I do not think Strauss could ask for more. And, if this be the theology taught from the royal chair of Cambridge, to those pupils whom its occupant is so solicitous to preserve from the awful dangers of a Biblical parallelism, (p. 27), I can only say that the Church of England must look to the other University, where better principles are held on such important matters, for security against the tide of

infidelity, which has overspread Protestant Germany.¹

In p. 306, he draws an argument for the Eucharist's being only bread, that the participles "broken" and "given" can apply only to this. I beg to call his attention to the addition "FOR you." Again, we have the repetition of the old arguments about "this," signifying "this bread," and "this cup," for which I refer to the old answers.

Dr. Turton's next chapter is of two pages. It is headed, "Objections to a literal Interpretation." It reminds me only of the chapter mentioned, I think, by Dr. Johnson, as the shortest ever written. It is that, in a "Natural History of Iceland," entitled, "On Snakes," and consisting of the words: "In Iceland there are no snakes." And so here, the whole chapter might have been summed up in similar words, "There *are* no objections to a literal interpretation." I will, however, take this opportunity of stating, that if, as the *Church of England Quarterly* insinuates, there are expressions in my strictures on Mr. Horne and Dr. Lee, which go beyond the proprieties of controversial warfare, I sincerely regret it, and shall be most happy, in another edition, to modify what I have said, in such a way as, without abating the force of any

¹ I beg to correct a typographical error in my *Lectures*, p. 218, where, in an extract from Leibnitz, instead of "give *no* satisfaction, read "give *me* satisfaction."

thing necessary for self-exculpation, may not appear personal, or directed to give pain. I wrote under the consciousness that I had been most completely and most strangely misrepresented, though I am willing to believe unintentionally; nor were expressions wanting, in those two gentlemen's comments on me, that insinuated charges highly derogatory, if true, to my character. Still, I am willing to overlook these circumstances, and withdraw any expression offensive to them, in the hope that, thereby, I may forward what I so earnestly desire; the stripping controversy of those false aids which it is supposed to derive from personal aggressions, and declamatory periods.

CHAPTER X.

ST. PAUL'S DOCTRINE OF THE EUCHARIST.—CONCLUSION.

WE come, at length, to Dr. Turton's scanty notice of this last Scriptural argument advanced by Catholics. After having quoted my remarks upon 1 *Cor.* x. 16, he writes, that "it is scarcely possible to conceive less to be made of a passage of Scripture," than I have made of this. (p. 312.) I am thankful for the observation; because experience has taught me its value in the contrary sense. The same I say of his complaint of the darkness with which my meaning is insinuated. I will not enter upon any argument on this text, for a reason which Dr. Turton thought it right to omit, though given in my *Lectures*;—it is, that there this text is cursorily and lightly mentioned, and said to be noticed "chiefly for the sake of some remarks to be subsequently made." (W. p. 260.) In fact, no stress is there laid upon it, but it is afterwards considered, in connexion with other passages, to show the consistency of expression, in all the passages alleged by Catholics in favour of their doctrine. Dr. Turton, according to his usual practice, makes the most of it, and gives us two pages of comment on it.

We thus come to the more important passage (in 1 *Cor.* xi. 26-29), where the unworthy use of the divine mysteries is reprov'd. First (p. 315), I am charged with great irreverence in my manner of speaking of the Protestant doctrine, and am accused of "the most grievous insensibility to holy things." The learned Professor hopes I may live long enough to lament my conduct, and then cannot prevail on his zeal to withhold from the public a passage of Scripture, which, if it have any meaning in this place, seems to insinuate his charitable conviction, that Tyburn would be the proper place for confuting what I have said. I only beg of him to remember, that he here assumes for granted, that which I *would* go (as many glorious martyrs have gone before me), to that place of blood, rather than acknowledge,—that the Protestant Lord's Supper is "an ordinance instituted by our Lord, in so striking a manner." (p. 316.) On the contrary, I hold it "a contempt" of his true ordinance, and a sad and fatal perversion of his magnificent sacrament of love. And, if Dr. Turton's threats have to fall upon those who have "counted the blood of the covenant an unholy thing," or who have contemptuously treated the Son of God, it will not be upon those who believe that He, in the fulness of his love and mercifulness, has made that blood the daily oblation of his Church, and the banquet of his faithful, and who humbly take his words in their simplest and most literal sense.

Dr. Turton next finds a contradiction in two of my arguments, which may be compendiously stated thus: First, if the Protestant doctrine of the Eucharist be true, St. Paul must be supposed to have applied, to eating, unworthily, a morsel of bread, commemorative of Christ's body, words descriptive of the greatest crime possible against his real person. Secondly, in thus applying *figuratively* such expressions, he would not have so strongly expressed the *true* crime committed against the emblems, as if he had employed words strictly applicable to it. Is this contradiction? is it an argument against which "one's moral nature revolts?" (p. 317.) It is as though one said, that a judge should not, in charging upon a case of manslaughter, treat it as he would do one of murder, on the ground that, by acting so, he would use expressions inapplicable to the case; and these having, consequently, to be improperly explained, would conceal the true character of the guilt of the *real* transgression.

Dr. Turton's next attack is upon a paragraph, which, he "really thinks, may, in magnitude of misrepresentation, compete with anything to be found in any volume except" mine. (p. 317.) It is where I say that St. Paul characterizes the conduct of the profane Corinthians in terms inapplicable to the Eucharist, on any other hypothesis than that of the Real Presence. The learned author takes great pains to show that the behaviour described is incredible in men who believed our Lord's body to be present. It is not necessary

that I should send an answer from Rome to this objection: Oxford has already done it, and, I think, done it well. I take the liberty of referring Dr. Turton to Mr. Newman's "Letter to Dr. Faussett," pp. 76, seq. (2nd ed.) where he will find it solidly proved that no argument can be drawn against the Real Presence, from the profanation of the Corinthians.

Anxious to bring this Reply to a conclusion, I shall only notice the last answer in the learned Professor's book, where he insists upon the insufficiency of instances brought by me, to reconcile the sacred elements' being called "bread," and "the cup" after the consecration, with the Catholic system. I will here notice that "bread" is a generic name, constantly equivalent to *food*, as the disquisition on *John* vi. sufficiently proved. "This bread," therefore, can very well signify "this food." On the other hand, the other sacred element is never called "this wine," (wine never being used in the same general sense,) but "the cup." I have given several examples of things being called, after a change in them, by the name of what they were before the change took place. The examples Dr. Turton does not consider sufficient, because their circumstances are all different. Certainly they are, in some respects; but not in the essential one. They are all examples of acknowledged changes, where the substances are *occasionally* called by their former appellations. When, however, the learned Professor objects that *St. Paul* has not:

“explained himself, nor given any just occasion for that kind of explanation” (p. 327) which Catholics give to their use of the same figure of speech in the Canon of the Mass, he forgets that *St. Paul* had, two verses before, given us the words of institution, and, in the very passage, calls the elements “the body and blood of the Lord; and that he does the same in the preceding chapter. If Dr. Turton thinks that all these plain declarations are counterbalanced by the use of the terms “bread” and “cup”—the first, generic of food, and the second, of drink—which *may* be applied to the Eucharistic elements after consecration, as they are by Catholics; then I say that he *does* act like the adversaries of other doctrines, mentioned in my *Lectures*, who catch up a straggling phrase that can be brought into accordance with the body of doctrine on the subject, and make it the ground of distorting to a metaphorical signification, many words and expressions, which are never known to be so used, and which the tenor of the context warrants us in taking literally.

Dr. Turton has added to his work a “Conclusion,” which is somewhat in the character of the old dramatic conclusion: “Vos autem plaudite.” He tells us, “that now, at the conclusion of his work,” he “seems as if he had not quite failed in exposing misrepresentations, and had really done something towards ascertaining truth.” (p. 333.) Sorry should I be to disturb the self-complacency with which the Regius Professor thus reviews his

labours. Nor do I much think it would be in my power to do so. I will therefore turn to the reader who has impartially perused both sides of this controversy. I here bring it to a close, and I do not think I can do so better, than in the words of St. Augustine, who seems to me to have admirably described, in the following passage, a controversialist of Dr. Turton's character: "Non plane laudandus, quod cetera similiter invicta [besides the arguments he omits] quæ tamen putavit posse obscurari, verborum nebulis operire conatus est, et quod me facit causam, cum defecisset in causa; de me quoque ipso nihil dicens, nisi quod aut omnino falsum esset, aut culpandum non esset, aut ad me jam non pertineret. Sed interea vos, quos inter me et illum iudices posui, sapitisne inter verum et falsum discernere? inter inflatum et solidum, inter turbidum et tranquillum, inter divina prædicta et humana præsumpta, inter probationes et criminationes, inter documenta et figmenta, inter causæ actionem, et causæ aversionem? Si sapitis, et bene et recte."¹

To any reader who has discernment enough to make the distinction of opposite qualities here enumerated—be he Catholic, or be he Protestant—I cheerfully commit judgment upon Dr. Turton's work.

¹ Cont. Lit. Petil. Don. Lib. iii.

THE END.







