

ABSTRACTION AND ILLUMINATION  
IN THE DOCTRINE OF ST. ALBERT THE GREAT

by  
LEONARD ANTHONY KENNEDY

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ABSTRACTION AND ILLUMINATION

IN THE DOCTRINE OF ST. ALBERT THE GREAT

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Abstraction and Illumination in the Doctrine of St. Albert the Great

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## THESIS

### Abstraction and Illumination in the Doctrine of St. Albert The Great

#### (Abstract)

A characteristic feature of thirteenth-century theories of knowledge was the attempt to reconcile a traditional Augustinian noetic with that found in newly-discovered Greek and Arabian works, particularly those of Aristotle and his commentators. This thesis proposes to investigate the solution offered by Albert the Great to this problem of reconciliation. Present-day students of the Universal Doctor have not sufficiently explained his theory of knowledge and shown its relationship to its Augustinian and Peripatetic sources.

In discovering Albert's doctrine, caution must be exercised in attributing personal conviction to the opinions which he expresses in his purely philosophical treatises, most of which are paraphrases of Aristotle and the Peripatetics. However, even though these philosophical works usually cannot be taken as an incontestable criterion of Albert's definitive position, nevertheless it can be shown that certain statements in them are explicitly approved by him and may be accepted without reservation as his own views.

There are two important differences between the Aristotelian abstraction theory and the Augustinian illumination theory. First, Aristotle maintained that both the sense powers and the possible intellect are receptive of the species or forms of material things, whereas Augustine taught that neither sense nor intellect is receptive in this manner, but that the human soul produces in itself both the sensible and intelligible representations of the material objects which it knows, without being acted upon by these objects. Secondly, Augustine held that man's mind must be illumined by God in order to make a true judgment, while Aristotle makes no mention of divine illumination.

Albert agreed with Aristotle that the external senses, the internal senses, and the possible intellect are receptive of the forms of material things. Yet, having asserted the receptivity of the cognitive powers, he also stressed their activity. He insisted on a curious reciprocal process whereby the internal senses must act on their objects so that these objects in turn might be able to affect them. It was also his view that the internal sense called the common sense, and the possible intellect, are more active than passive; when they are acted upon, they are merely determined or limited by the sensible or intelligible species in the manner in which a universal power is limited by particular instruments. By this emphasis on the active character of the cognitional powers Albert hoped to preserve what he thought to be the kernel of Augustinianism.

It is a contention of the present thesis that at least on the important score of the problem of the receptivity of the possible intellect Albert failed to effect an acceptable integration of the perspectives he sought to

reconcile. Averroes had convinced him that an intelligible form, being universal, could not be rendered singular by the intellect. Since a universal form or species must be exactly the same in one intellect as in another, Albert did not see how it could be individuated by the possible intellects receiving it, for such individuation would cause the universal species to differ in each intellect. As a consequence, he taught the existence of a unique intelligible species for all men. This species cannot then be received by possible intellects, since it must not in any way be made singular. Albert, therefore, seems to have held the incompatible doctrines that intelligible species are received by individual intellects and that the species are not individuated by these intellects in any manner whatsoever.

However this may be, it still remains true that Albert had committed himself to the receptivity of both sense and intellect. Here he followed Aristotle and opposed Augustine. Yet he did not think that their respective theories of abstraction and illumination were incompatible. Abstraction as conceived by Albert was intimately connected with divine illumination. He attempted to show this by his doctrine of the agent intellect and its relationship to the possible intellect.

Following Averroes (1126-1198), he carried to extreme lengths the comparison between the agent intellect and physical light. As the eye receives colours only when they are bathed in light, so the possible intellect receives intelligible forms only when they are bathed in the light of the agent intellect. The agent intellect's light exercises an effect not only on the intelligible forms but also on the possible intellect itself. This light does not merely produce intelligible species which then act on the possible intellect; the light of the agent intellect acts on the possible intellect directly. As a result, the possible intellect receives the light of its own agent intellect whenever it knows anything.

There are other considerations also to show that the agent intellect's action on the possible intellect is a direct one. In intellectual memory the intelligible species fulfils only a specificatory function. Its rôle is solely to limit the light of the agent intellect so that this light might affect the possible intellect in a determinate way. Even when no intelligible species is present, the agent intellect understands itself as acting immediately on the possible intellect, but here only indeterminately. It is in this way that Albert attempts to point the argument towards the direct action of the agent intellect on the possible intellect.

But the Universal Doctor certainly went beyond Averroes when he declared that the light of the agent intellect is the intelligible forms themselves. According to him, this intellect is a light which contains intelligibles actually but implicitly. It is too luminous to be received by the possible intellect except in an indistinct manner, and this indistinctness is removed only when the light is determined or "broken up" by means of phantasms received through the senses. But once this determination has taken place, this light can be known distinctly. Consequently, whenever any object is known, what is known is purely the light of the agent intellect.

This teaching is similar to that of Avicenna (980-1037). Avicenna had held that there is one Agent Intellect for all men, separated in being from human souls. This Agent Intellect contains all intelligibles actually and dispenses them to the possible intellects of individual men when their phantasms are properly disposed. Since Albert claimed that the agent intellect contains intelligibles actually (although implicitly), the agent intellect which he granted to each man resembles in a striking manner the unique Agent Intellect attributed by Avicenna to the whole human race.

Following the Peripatetics, especially Averroes, Albert maintained

that when all material things are known by man in this life, his agent intellect becomes the form of his possible intellect. He also added to Averroes' teaching an explanation of the manner in which this is effected. The possible intellect constantly receives the light of the agent intellect. When all intelligibles are known, the light of the agent intellect exists in its entirety in the possible intellect. But, because the agent intellect is identical with its light, the possible intellect will then be informed by the agent intellect itself.

The understanding of this doctrine of the agent intellect and its relationship to the possible intellect serves as a preface to Albert's thought concerning illumination. He admitted the existence of a two-fold illumination in man's natural knowledge, a general one and a special one. The general illumination is a natural help given by God and the angels, a help required in all knowledge gained by abstraction. The special illumination comes after knowledge by abstraction is completed, when the agent intellect has become fully the form of the possible intellect. In this latter illumination man receives from God and the angels metaphysical knowledge and a knowledge of separated substances in themselves. In this illumination it is the very content of knowledge which is received.

The Aristotelian theory of abstraction as accepted by Albert does not rule out an Augustinian theory of illumination; rather is it completed by it. Abstraction requires one type of illumination, and prepares the way for another. This important point has been missed by those historians who see in Albert a proponent of the position that all natural knowledge in this life is gained by abstraction and that man requires no special help from God in his natural knowledge. Moreover, the interpreters who admit in his works a theory of general illumination only, have overlooked the doctrine of special illumination just mentioned. They are unaware of the relationship between abstraction and illumination, through a neglect of Albert's philosophical treatises and a consequent failure to note the true nature of the agent intellect.

After outlining Albert's doctrine of abstraction and illumination and their mutual connection, this thesis seeks to relate this doctrine to Albert's view of the soul. He took from Avicenna the dual definition of the soul as the form of the body and as a substance in itself. As the form of the body it knows by means of abstraction; as a substance in itself it knows by receiving its knowledge-content from above. Hence the soul's double mode of cognition is in strict accord with its double definition. Moreover, because the soul is not essentially the form of the body for Albert, its essential mode of knowing is by illumination, and not by abstraction. Abstraction is a lower type of cognition, ordained to the higher. Its purpose is to prepare the intellect for illumination.

Albert superimposed on this twofold aspect of the soul's manner of knowing another consideration based on the distinction of the quo est and quod est of the soul considered in itself. In this distinction he found an application of the form-matter principle and he utilized this application to illustrate further the relationship of the agent intellect to the possible intellect. The agent intellect is rooted in the quo est of the soul, the possible intellect in the quod est. Since the quo est determines the quod est in the manner in which form determines matter, and since this determination is a direct one, Albert concluded once more that the agent intellect acts directly on the possible intellect in both abstraction and illumination. At first the agent intellect must make use of the senses in order to impart its light to the possible intellect a little at a time. However, when this process is completed and the agent intellect has become the form of the possible intellect, the senses are no longer necessary and the soul learns through being illumined by God. Abstraction is an inferior kind of knowledge,

necessary at first because of the difficulty the human agent intellect encounters in illumining the possible intellect.

In criticism of the Albertine noetic, it might be pointed out that it is joined to a psychology which fails to explain adequately the essential unity of human nature. For Thomas Aquinas, the human soul has a single definition. It is a substance-form, an incomplete substance which demands of its very essence that it be a form. To this single definition corresponds a single mode of knowing; all man's natural knowledge in this life is by abstraction, there being no illumination on the natural level. Albert's dualistic theory of knowledge is interdependent with a dualistic psychology.

This thesis has shown that St. Albert's answer to the problem of reconciling Aristotle and Augustine was an attempt to accept both of them and to hold doctrines of abstraction and illumination at the same time. It has also been explained that the connecting-link between these two aspects of Albert's theory of knowledge was his notion of the agent intellect, in the formulation of which he was markedly influenced by Avicenna and Averroes. However, unless one is satisfied with the Albertine psychology, it must be admitted that Albert's doctrine of abstraction and illumination was an unsuccessful attempt to reconcile Aristotle and Augustine.

GRADUATE STUDIES

Major Subject:

Mediaeval Philosophy	-Professor E. Gilson
	-Professor A. C. Pegis

Minor Subjects:

Systematic Philosophy	- The Staff in Philosophy
Psychology	- The Staff in Psychology





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## INTRODUCTION

St. Albert the Great (1207 - 1280)<sup>1</sup> pioneered the thirteenth century drive to unite the newly-recovered pagan learning with the Christian tradition. During this century, Latin translations of many works of Aristotle and his commentators became available to the Christian West for the first time. These Greco-Arabian works were not enthusiastically received by all Christians, for some saw in them only a danger to faith. To St. Albert belongs in large part the credit for fully appreciating the value of the new translations, and for realizing the true significance of what was taking place. He saw in the appearance of these works a great opportunity for the Latins, who had hitherto been ignorant of a vast store of knowledge in possession of their Moslem neighbours to the south. Now they had a chance to absorb a new world of thought.<sup>2</sup>

St. Albert wrote paraphrases of all the available works of Aristotle, introducing into them the commentaries and other works of the Arabians, especially of Avicenna (980 - 1037) and Averroes (1126 - 1198). Besides these Aristotelian paraphrases, Albert wrote extensive theological treatises in which he used the Greek and Arabian philosophers freely.

The thirteenth century knew, of course, and revered as second only to the Sacred Scriptures, the writings of



St. Augustine (354 - 430). It also knew Aristotle, at least in his logical writings, and a few other pagan philosophers. But with these new works of Aristotle, and with the writings of the Greeks and Arabians, new vistas loomed on its horizon. They were, on the whole, quite unlike the works of St. Augustine. They were based, for the most part, on reason alone. They included purely scientific works, concerned with areas of knowledge which he had never dealt with. But in some fields of enquiry they overlapped his teaching and seemed sometimes to contradict it. There was need to decide whether to accept, reject or adapt them. This task was not to take place all at once. Nor was it to be accomplished in the same manner by all thinkers. We can distinguish, for example, the varied and contrasting reactions of Siger of Brabant and the "Averroists", of St. Bonaventure and the "Augustinians", and of St. Thomas Aquinas.<sup>3</sup>

The present study is concerned in a general way with St. Albert the Great's reaction to the conflict between St. Augustine and the newly-found pagan writers, and in a particular way with one phase of the problem-- the area of knowledge. The theory of knowledge has always been an important part of philosophy, and it held a pivotal position in the thirteenth century. It has been shown that in this century, when the doctrinal synthesis of St. Augustine



was giving way to new syntheses, one of the crucial points where the new scholasticism can be marked off from the old is in the theory of knowledge.<sup>4</sup> Moreover, it is known that the Augustinian teaching on divine illumination was of central importance. It has also been established (among others by Professor Gilson) that in the history of the theory of knowledge in the thirteenth century, and in the teaching on divine illumination in particular, St. Thomas Aquinas occupies a place of special importance. Before St. Thomas there is almost unanimous agreement sustaining the Augustinian teaching on divine illumination, and after him this agreement ceases to exist.<sup>5</sup> In a celebrated article Professor Gilson shows that St. Thomas eliminated all special collaboration with an intelligence above man's in the production of human intellectual knowledge,<sup>6</sup> and that St. Thomas was very likely the first philosopher to teach that the human agent intellect is the sufficient cause of human knowledge, with no need for special divine illumination.<sup>7</sup>

Dr. Gilson's article has led to several studies developing these findings or investigating particular areas of the theory of knowledge in the thirteenth century. Jean Rohmer, for example, has demonstrated that in the Franciscan school, from Alexander of Hales (c. 1186 - 1245) to John Peckham (d. 1292), the Augustinian illumination





theory of knowledge and the Aristotelian abstraction theory made concessions to each other, with abstraction predominating at first, but illumination becoming ultimately predominant.<sup>8</sup>

In connection with the teaching of St. Albert the Great on illumination, G. de Mattos claims that Albert is quite Aristotelian in his Summa de Creaturis, one of his earliest works (before 1243),<sup>9</sup> and that almost fifteen years before St. Thomas wrote his Commentary on the Sentences, St. Albert taught that each man had his own agent intellect, and required no illumination for his natural knowledge.<sup>10</sup> De Mattos concludes that St. Albert seems to be an innovator in this regard, the real initiator of the "Thomist reform".<sup>11</sup>

R. Z. Lauer also concludes a study on St. Albert with the statements that for him "all natural knowledge in this life begins with sense experience", and that "there is no illumination on the natural level."<sup>12</sup>

U. Dähnert teaches that for St. Albert all human thinking arises from sense experience, and that in holding this view St. Albert is, like his pupil Thomas, a faithful follower of Aristotle. Dähnert makes no mention of illumination.<sup>13</sup>

Now, if St. Albert really holds that all natural intellectual knowledge in this life is gained by abstraction



from the material world, without any special help of illumination by a higher intelligence, then he, and not St. Thomas, is the first philosopher of the thirteenth century to deny the necessity for illumination.

There are writers who hold the Universal Doctor does require illumination in human knowledge.<sup>14</sup> However, none of these men has shown that St. Albert affirms this as his own conviction in his philosophical works; no one has integrated the doctrine concerning illumination in the theological treatises with that in the philosophical tractates; and no one has shown the close connection between St. Albert's teaching on illumination and that on abstraction. As a result, there has not yet been a sufficiently complete treatment of his thought in regard to illumination.

Before examining St. Albert's teaching on illumination, however, it is necessary to study what he says about abstractive knowledge. St. Augustine's theory of knowledge is usually referred to as an "illumination" theory; Aristotle's is usually called an "abstraction" theory.<sup>15</sup> The almost characteristic feature of thirteenth-century noetics is the inevitable attempt to combine or reconcile the two. Hence in any philosophy of this period they are intimately related. They are complementary aspects of knowledge, and each is fully intelligible only



in connection with the other. We therefore propose to situate St. Albert's doctrines of abstraction and illumination in relation to the teachings of Aristotle and St. Augustine. Moreover, since Aristotle was known only in conjunction with his "commentators", especially Avicenna and Averroes, we shall see how St. Albert's teaching is related to theirs.

There are two books on St. Albert's psychology which investigate his doctrine of knowledge: A. Schneider, Die Psychologie Albertus des Grossen, Nach den Quellen Dargestellt, and G. Reilly, The Psychology of St. Albert the Great Compared with that of St. Thomas. Both of these books hold that there are striking similarities in the teachings of St. Albert the Great and St. Thomas Aquinas concerning the nature of the human intellect. Schneider says:

"We conclude our undertaking on the nature of the intellect in Albert with the suggestion that Thomas has adopted his view in all the essential points, and that this has remained the prevailing view in the Dominican school. It was not Thomas but Albert who determined and established the teaching on the agent and possible intellects, as it has remained standard for the Thomistic school."<sup>16</sup>

Reilly states:

"The nature and function of this faculty (scil., the agent intellect), as stated by Albert, were fully accepted by Thomas."<sup>17</sup>



"St. Thomas, like St. Albert, attributes to the active intellect a two-fold function, namely, to abstract and to illuminate. He, too, calls it a light and uses the illustration of physical light in explaining its activity. As to the rôle of the possible intellect there is no disagreement whatsoever."<sup>18</sup>

It is not possible that St. Albert's doctrine of abstraction and illumination will differ from that of another philosopher without a corresponding difference in their teaching on the nature of the intellect. Contrary to the conclusions of Schneider and Reilly just quoted, it is the contention of the present writer that St. Albert describes the agent and possible intellects in a manner other than that of St. Thomas Aquinas, and that his doctrine of abstraction and illumination is, therefore, quite different.

There are other major works dealing with St. Albert's theory of knowledge. In Zur Erkenntnislehre von Ibn Sina und Albertus Magnus, B. Haneberg describes the divisions of the intellect and the hierarchy of intellects in the teaching of Avicenna, and compares them with the doctrines of St. Albert. Haneberg is concerned, of course, with only one aspect of St. Albert's noetic, but even so he makes a serious omission. As will appear in the course of the present study,<sup>19</sup> perhaps because he is writing at so early a date, he has failed to point





out a most profound relationship between St. Albert and Avicenna.

In Des Albertus Magnus Verhältniss zu der Erkenntnislehre der Griechen, Lateiner, Araber, und Juden, J. Bach attempts the ambitious project of relating Albert's theory of knowledge to that of all his predecessors and contemporaries. However, neither Aristotle nor St. Augustine are given special treatment, and the relation of St. Albert's thought to Augustinian illumination is not dealt with. Also, when St. Albert is contrasted with Avicenna and Averroes it is chiefly the separation of the human intellect from the human soul which is in question; this problem will be by no means the central one in our consideration.

The nature of abstraction in St. Albert has been studied by U. Dähnert in Die Erkenntnislehre des Albertus Magnus gemessen an den Stufen der "abstractio". However, Dähnert has concerned himself chiefly with the degrees of abstraction. Also, he has failed to note the true nature of the agent intellect and its action on the possible intellect.<sup>20</sup> Moreover, he has not related abstraction to illumination. It was the intention of J. Bonné in Die Erkenntnislehre Alberts des Grossen mit besonderer Berücksichtigung des arabischen Neuplatonismus, to treat the Albertine doctrine of knowledge more fully



than Dähnert, but only a very small fraction of his work is published, namely, that dealing with St. Albert's early works, the Summa de Creaturis and the Commentary on the Sentences.

None of those who have dealt with St. Albert's noetic have given a complete and true account of either abstraction or illumination or their mutual relationships. We shall therefore undertake an investigation of his doctrine of abstraction, illumination, and the connection between these two modes of knowledge. In doing this we shall also examine how his teaching is related to that of his predecessors, especially Aristotle and St. Augustine. Though we do not intend to study in full the connection of his doctrine with that of St. Thomas Aquinas, we shall not hesitate to make comparisons on specific points if this helps us in understanding the Universal Doctor more adequately.

We shall begin with the study of abstraction. We shall see the rôle which the senses, the possible intellect, and the agent intellect play in this mode of knowledge. Then we must consider whether all natural knowledge in this life is gained by abstraction. This question leads to another: is there natural illumination in this life, and, if so, what is its nature and its relationship to abstraction? Finally, we will investigate



the interconnection of St. Albert's noetic and his doctrine concerning the human soul.

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Before we study Albert's doctrines, the chronological order of his writings should be established. A philosophy has a history in the mind of its possessor. It does not come about all of a sudden, but takes hold of him slowly and by degrees. There is a development and a maturing process in his thought. When one of his writings is read it is important to know whether it belongs to his early, intermediate, or late works. If his teachings on the same topic are being compared, it is necessary to know which of these was written before the others. It is also helpful to be able to date a philosopher's treatises in relation to those of his contemporaries. This is especially true when his literary career is as long as that of St. Albert, covering forty or fifty years.

Scholars have not yet come to an agreement on the precise dates of his writings, but are able to assign each work to a certain period of his life. We shall merely adopt the generally accepted opinions of the experts in these matters.

Many writings attributed for centuries to St. Albert have been found in recent years to be spurious.



There is also the possibility that some of the writings still attributed to him, but not carefully studied, may be found unauthentic. In this study we shall use only those works whose authenticity is beyond question.

(a) The first group of writings includes the Summa de Creaturis and the Commentary on the Sentences of Peter Lombard. According to Dom Lottin, the Summa de Creaturis was composed probably before 1243, and the Sentences between 1243 and 1249.<sup>21</sup>

(b) Next come the commentaries on the works of Dionysius. There seems to be general agreement that these were written from about 1247 to 1256.<sup>22</sup>

(c) The third group of writings is made up of philosophical works, most of which are commentaries, especially on the works of Aristotle. There is a serious difference of opinion concerning the date of these writings. Mandonnet thinks that they were finished by 1244.<sup>23</sup> Pelster's opinion is that they were terminated only about 1270.<sup>24</sup> More recent authors are not in complete agreement, but they certainly tend towards Pelster's view. A. Dondaine gives evidence that these works may have been finished about 1260.<sup>25</sup> B. Geyer and H.D.Saffrey date the Commentary on the De Anima about 1257;<sup>26</sup> G. Queneau places it after 1261.<sup>27</sup> Geyer dates the De Natura et Origine Animae





between about 1258 and 1263.<sup>28</sup>

It is not difficult to discover the order in which Albert's philosophical works were composed, for he is lavish with cross-references. The chronological order of the philosophical works with which we shall be concerned, exclusive of logical treatises, is as follows: Physicorum libri VIII, De Anima, De Sensu et Sensato, De Intellectu et Intelligibili, De Natura et Origine Animae, Metaphysicorum libri XIII, De Causis et Processu Universitatis. It is difficult to date the logical commentaries. They seem to be early, yet after the Physics. The ones we are concerned with are: De Praedicabilibus, De Praedicamentis, Posterior Analytics.<sup>29</sup>

(d) The De Unitate Intellectus contra Averroem was prepared in 1256-57, but may not have been published for some years.<sup>30</sup>

(e) There are two works dating from the last years of St. Albert's life. The Summa Theologiae, which is unfinished, was written between 1270 and 1280.<sup>31</sup> The De Quindecim Problematibus was written in answer to the questions of a Dominican named Giles, probably Giles of Lessines. Authorities disagree on its precise date, but put it somewhere between 1270 and 1276.<sup>32</sup>

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Having assigned dates as exactly as possible to Albert's writings, we must next face an important problem concerning his philosophical works. The problem is to determine to what extent we can find in them his own opinions. He has often said that his personal teachings are not to be found in these works, as he is merely expounding the doctrine of the Peripatetics. For example, he says in his De Causis et Processu Universitatis:

"Let each choose what pleases him. For those things which have been said, have been determined according to the reasons of the Peripatetics; and they have not been brought forth by our own assertions, but have been besought, nay rather extorted, by the constant requests of our confreres that we explain Aristotle."<sup>33</sup>

He also says in his Commentary on Aristotle's Metaphysics:

"All these things, however, are said according to the opinion of the Peripatetics, because we are not saying anything of our own in these matters or in other matters in the field of philosophy, for we are not here attempting to explain our own doctrine in philosophy, but shall state it elsewhere."<sup>34</sup>

It would appear from statements of this kind that we cannot use his philosophical works at all for discovering his own doctrine. But there are other statements in these works which must be considered. For



example, we find in the commentary on the De Anima the following declarations:

"And because I am undertaking things which are most difficult, yet most worthy of being known, I therefore wish first of all to explain as well as I can all that Aristotle teaches, and then mention the opinions of other Peripatetics, and after this to consider Plato's opinions, and then finally to give my own opinion."<sup>35</sup>

"To these doubts, however, we wish first of all to give the response of some philosophers, and afterwards add what we think should be said of these matters."<sup>36</sup>

"However, because of the excellence of the doctrine, we wish to make an examination here in order to pass judgment on all the operations of the intellect together, as much as God will give us light in these matters. But first we wish to indicate what the Peripatetics have said concerning this question, and then our own teaching. And we shall show how it agrees with or differs from what the other Peripatetics have said."<sup>37</sup>

In these quotations we have explicit statements by Albert that he is giving his personal teaching.

We also find other statements which indicate that he is not merely repeating what others have said:

"Having carefully examined all these doctrines, we touch on what can be stated with more probability, in the natural order. And we shall now mention only those things which can be proved by philosophy alone."<sup>38</sup>



"We state that ..."<sup>39</sup>

"But I disagree with this, because  
it does not seem to me that ..."<sup>40</sup>

In these quotations St. Albert ceases to be a mere expositor and states his own opinion. There are also other texts in which he approves of what he has written in his philosophical works. For example:

"However, let us presuppose what has been already proven in our books concerning the soul; namely, that the intellect is separated from the body, and concerning its state after separation. We have already given sufficient proofs of these things in the book De Immortalitate Animae and in III De Anima."<sup>41</sup>

"And this is what can more truly be said concerning the intellect and its nature. We have disputed about this more fully in the book dealing with the perfection of the soul, which is the second part of the book De Intellectu et Intelligibili which we wrote."<sup>42</sup>

"What the separated intelligences are like has been determined by us in the eleventh book of the first philosophy (metaphysics)."<sup>43</sup>

These statements are taken from a work in which Albert was giving his own teaching, the De Unitate Intellectus. It was composed at the request of Pope Alexander IV and was incorporated in large part into St. Albert's Summa Theologiae.





We can conclude that although in his philosophical works he often merely explains what others have said, he sometimes gives his own opinion as well. To decide in particular cases whether his words represent his own teachings we must examine each statement in the light of its context. This is also the conclusion of Meersseman, who has a wide acquaintance with St. Albert's works:

"However, many things in the paraphrases, and still more in these digressions, must truly be numbered among Albert's personal convictions; these can be sifted out by an exegesis of each text."<sup>44</sup>

Consequently there are indications by which to know whether St. Albert is presenting his own teaching in his philosophical writings. One indication is his explicit statement in this effect. Another is explicit approval in his theological works of something written in a certain section of his philosophical works.

The digressions in his paraphrases are frequently sources of his own doctrine. Sometimes these digressions merely add Peripatetic doctrine which are related to the material on which he is commenting, but often they teach opinions which are not mere repetitions, and must be Albert's own. At the beginning of his Aristotelian commentaries, he says that he will frequently make digressions in order to supply whatever is not treated fully enough



by Aristotle and remains obscure for some readers. He promises to complete the teaching or bring in proofs of his own (ex nobis).<sup>45</sup>

Other fruitful sources of his own convictions are his criticisms of others. Sometimes these merely repeat criticisms made by Aristotle, or judge doctrines from an Aristotelian position. But certainly some of them must represent St. Albert's own opinion. This is especially true when he finds fault with his contemporaries.

A last help in deciding when a teaching is his own is its agreement with what he says in his theological works, even if it is not explicitly approved. If he teaches in his theological works the same doctrine as is found (perhaps in much greater detail) in his philosophical works, it is legitimate to consider this teaching in the philosophical works as having his approval.

In this thesis we will use some of St. Albert's philosophical writings. However, whenever this is done we shall first assure ourselves that in the texts used he is truly giving his own doctrine. When texts are of decisive importance, we shall prove that they represent his personal opinion.



CHAPTER I

THE ROLE OF THE SENSES IN ABSTRACTION

The first aspect of knowledge which should be investigated is the part played by sensation in abstractive knowledge. The attitude towards this mode of experience is not without its relevance for a theory of intellectual apprehension. The doctrine of sense knowledge is the first point at which the thirteenth-century philosopher had to decide between Aristotle and St. Augustine. Aristotle taught that the sense powers are passive, being acted upon by sensible things.<sup>1</sup> St. Augustine held that the sense powers are active. He said that sense knowledge is caused by material things, but that the knowing subject also contributes to this knowledge. Thus sensation is a product of the joint causality of sense and sensible.<sup>2</sup> External objects act on the senses of the body, which activity is a necessary condition for sensation. Yet these objects cannot act on the soul. The soul is not passively affected by disturbances in the sense organs. It merely pays attention to what the body undergoes, and is "not unaware" of what is taking place in the senses.<sup>3</sup> Thus sensation requires an action by sensible objects, but this action is upon the sensory organs and not upon the soul. The soul is primarily active. It is passive



only to the extent that it acts upon itself to produce sensory images out of its own substance.<sup>4</sup>

St. Albert had to say whether he agreed with Aristotle that the sense powers are acted upon by sensibles, or with St. Augustine that they are not. He preferred the doctrine of the Stagirite, holding that sense is a passive power, and that it undergoes a change which is caused by sensible objects.<sup>5</sup>

This change, however, is not brought about by these objects as they exist in their material condition. When we see coloured things, for example a stone or a horse, we do not receive these material things into our eyes. We receive only the species (species) of the colour of the stone or the horse. It is therefore by means of sensible species that material objects are able to act on the sense powers.<sup>6</sup> As Aristotle said, the senses receive sensible forms without their matter, as wax receives the shape of the signet-ring without receiving the iron or gold of which it is made.<sup>7</sup>

The notion of species is closely related to that of form. The form of a material thing, which determines its matter, is called a species in so far as it is the principle of the thing's knowability.<sup>8</sup> This species is also called an intention.<sup>9</sup> The form gives being to the matter in which it resides, whereas the species or intention





does not give being to the sense or intellect in which it resides, but is only a means by which a thing is known. It should also be pointed out that the form is only part of a material thing, whereas the species or intention is that by which the whole thing and not just the form of the thing is known.<sup>10</sup>

The sensible species itself is not the direct object of knowledge. What is known directly is the thing represented by the species. Therefore knowledge grasps things, but it grasps them by means of species.<sup>11</sup>

St. Augustine's argument for the soul's being active in sensation is based on the principle that the human mind is vastly superior to any corporeal thing. He held that even man's sensory powers are so much elevated above material things that the latter cannot make an impression on them. It is unthinkable that a body act on the soul. Hence sensations must be caused by the soul itself.<sup>12</sup>

St. Albert does not deny that the soul is superior to corporeal forms, yet he says that it can be acted upon by them. It is true in general that the agent is superior to the patient, but this need not be true in every respect. The higher can be acted upon by the lower provided there is the proper proportion between the two. If the sensible form is made spiritual, it can act on the sense power,



which then undergoes a spiritual transformation.<sup>13</sup> The sensible form, considered solely as corporeal, can act only on the sense organs. It is only because this sensible form is given a spiritual being in the soul that it is able to affect the soul itself.<sup>14</sup> Even if the sensible species represents an object in its particular, material conditions, such as shape, place, time,<sup>15</sup> position, colour, age, place of generation, and so on,<sup>16</sup> nevertheless this species does not contain the matter which exists in the object sensed, and it has a spiritual being.<sup>17</sup> Thus the sense power is acted upon by this spiritual intention or species, and not by a body.

St. Albert corrects St. Augustine by using Aristotle's doctrine of sensible species. St. Augustine maintained that the likenesses of sensible things exist in the soul when sensation takes place, but that these likenesses are not impressed on the soul; rather they are formed by it.<sup>18</sup> According to Aristotle, sensible species are impressed on the soul; this is also the teaching of Albert, who explains that they are capable of this action because of their spiritual nature.

He stresses that the transmutation which takes place in the sense powers is quite different from ordinary physical change. The substance of the sense is not changed into another substance in its being (secundum esse), but



rather the sense is changed into a sensible species in the order of intention (secundum intentionem).<sup>19</sup> This type of change is called a spiritual alteration, for what is received is not a form in its natural or physical being, but rather the intention of a form.<sup>20</sup>

In physical change, too, one form is replaced by another in the same matter. In sensation, however, the form received does not replace a previous form already possessed. In this respect sensation is the same as intellectual consideration.<sup>21</sup> When the intellect recalls actually what it knows habitually, we cannot say that an alteration takes place. Or, if we do say so, we shall have to call it a unique kind of alteration, for nothing is lost.<sup>22</sup> Sensation is thus passive in a true but very special manner. It is a passage from potentiality to act, but not from the possession of one form to the possession of a new form. It is the reception of a sensible form without the loss of a previous form. Thus it is different from physical reception.

There is no doubt about Albert's agreement with Aristotle on the point that the external senses are passive. He teaches this in the early Summa de Creaturis, and develops and emphasizes it in later Commentary on Aristotle's De Anima:



"This doctrine (scil., the passivity of the senses) must be held for a great principle, in order to destroy completely the teaching of those who say that the sensitive and intellectual powers are active, and not passive."<sup>23</sup>

Having decided that the external senses are acted upon by sensible species, there is left the question of the origin of these species. Does the sense power itself act to produce them? If so, it will be both active and passive. This problem was raised by Averroes, who said that sensible objects cannot act on the soul just as they are in their extra-mental existence, but that they must be given an intentional existence. Of themselves they possess this intentional existence only potentially, and not actually. Accordingly, some agent seems to be required in the senses to produce this intentional being, just as in intellectual knowledge an agent intellect is needed to render actually intelligible the forms which are only potentially intelligible in matter. Averroes himself does not express an opinion in this matter, but says that the problem is worthy of serious consideration, and that Aristotle has not spoken of it because it is harder to notice than in the case of the intellect.<sup>24</sup>

St. Albert deals with the question of an "agent sense" in his Commentary on the De Anima, making it clear





that he is expressing his own convictions:

"This problem (scil., whether there is an agent sense) needs great consideration, and it will be determined in the following chapter, according to our ability."<sup>25</sup>

"We, however, concentrating simply on natural arguments, consider all these opinions (scil., concerning an agent sense) to be false."<sup>26</sup>

One argument that sense has an active power is based on the belief that the eyes of certain persons can affect the air or mirrors, and even people who look at them. Also, the eyes of the basilisk are said to scatter poison, for it can kill by its glance. Now, unless the eyes were active, these things could not take place. Thus the senses have active powers.<sup>27</sup>

This reasoning, Albert says, is utterly foolish. These actions are in the eyes in so far as they are parts of the body which give off evaporations, and not in so far as they are senses. They do not at all prove that the senses can produce sensible species.<sup>28</sup>

In order that the sense power produce sensible species, it would have to leave the soul in order to act on sensible objects, like a magnet which sends out magnetic force to act on iron. But the power of sense cannot operate unless it uses a bodily spirit as its instrument.



It cannot be imagined that this bodily spirit can reach to the extremely distant object which can be seen. Therefore sense cannot be an active power which acts on sensibles.<sup>29</sup>

Having sought to rule out any doctrine which requires an agent sense or an active sense power, St. Albert must himself explain how incorporeal species are formed from corporeal things.

One theory was that this was accomplished by light, not only in sight, but in every sense. St. Augustine had said that light is the active agent in all sensations, though of course he did not hold that it could act on the soul.<sup>30</sup> This doctrine of the activity of light in all sensations was followed by St. Bonaventure.<sup>31</sup>

One reason why light was chosen as the universal agent in sensation is that light is active in vision. Now, the effect whose cause we are seeking is the same in all the senses, namely, the production of a spiritual being, the sensible species. But if the same effect is shared by many things, it must have the same cause in all of them. Hence sensible species in all the senses must be caused by one agent. Since light is active in vision, it must be active in all sensations.<sup>32</sup>

Also, it is said that light is the most "spiritual" of corporeal beings. Other corporeal beings



(fire, air, water, earth) produce bodies in their material or natural being. In sensible species, however, these bodies have a spiritual being. The only agent which can produce this effect in them is light. Light must therefore be the cause of sensible species.<sup>33</sup>

In answer to these arguments, St. Albert maintains that there cannot be one agent in all sensations, because the same effect is not produced in the different senses. Some sensible species are less spiritual than others. For instance, in touch the sensory species is less spiritual than in certain other senses, because it affects both the medium and the sense organ in a material manner. Thus the senses cannot have one agent for them all.<sup>34</sup>

Moreover, it is completely ridiculous to say that light is the cause of sensible species, for we can experience some sensations even in the dark.<sup>35</sup>

St. Albert's own position is that sensibles have in themselves the power to produce their species. This power is a property belonging to them of their very nature; it is as natural for bodies to produce their species as it is for light to shine.<sup>36</sup> Thus, in producing intentional species, corporeal forms do not do something which is above their nature.<sup>37</sup> These forms sometimes act in conjunction with the matter in which they exist, and



sometimes through themselves alone; in the latter case they act immaterially. It is not surprising that they have such a power because, looked at in themselves, they are immaterial essences.<sup>38</sup> Therefore sensible species are produced by sensible objects through an immaterial operation which is natural to them.

In our consideration of the passivity of the senses, we have been concerned so far with the external, and not the internal senses. Aristotle and St. Thomas both attribute an activity to the external senses. This activity is a type of judgment, subsequent to the reception of sensible species.<sup>39</sup> In studying St. Albert we have found no text in which he attributes activity to these external senses. The only "activity" he allows them is their very passivity, their reception of sensible species. His position will later be defended by Bartholomew of Bruges (d. 1356) about the year 1315 when this question was the subject of an interesting controversy.<sup>40</sup> St. Albert also makes no mention of the production by the external senses of an "expressed sensible species". Some later Scholastics were to teach that these were formed in all sensations, subsequent to the activation of the sense power by the sensible species impressed on it (the "impressed sensible species").<sup>41</sup>

We might suspect that after St. Albert has opposed





St. Augustine and followed Aristotle concerning the passivity of the external senses, he will oppose St. Augustine also concerning the internal senses. We shall find, however, that he is very much under the influence of St. Augustine on the question of the activity of the internal senses. He has merely erected his Augustinian defenses deeper within the soul.

One of the arguments in favour of activity in the external senses is that the senses are active because they pass judgment on their own sensibles, a judgment which must be truly active, and not passive.<sup>42</sup> Albert admits that the senses are active after they are passively informed by the sensible species, just as a person can call to mind what he has already learned.<sup>43</sup> For if the senses responded in no way to the impression of the sensible species, they would not be different from the medium of sensation, which receives the species without reacting to it vitally. This action of the senses is called their "second perfection", and is described as "sensing and judging".<sup>44</sup> Nevertheless, it is not attributed to any of the external senses, but only to an internal sense, the common sense.

The common sense is the source of the proper senses. Each of them shares the nature of "sense". But wherever we have one nature common to several things, there



must be one source which gives rise to that community. Thus the particular senses are like streams flowing from a common spring.<sup>45</sup> The common sense is one in its being or substance, but it is many in that it influences the particular senses through the instrumentality of particular organs.<sup>46</sup> That is why Albert calls it the "first sensitive power" (primum sensitivum).<sup>47</sup>

To the common sense falls the task of completing the work of the proper senses. It receives the proper sensibles from them, and also the common sensibles.<sup>48</sup> It compares the objects of the different senses to see whether or not they are joined in the same sensible object.<sup>49</sup> By it we also realize that we are sensing; for example, we are aware that we are seeing when vision takes place, and so on.<sup>50</sup> We cannot see ourselves seeing by the same sense by which we see, for then vision would be its own object, and the same sense would be both acting and acted upon, which is impossible.<sup>51</sup>

In contrast to the passivity of the external senses is the activity of the common sense, because the judgment which it passes on sensible forms is an active one.<sup>52</sup> For this reason the common sense is "formal" to the external senses, as every agent is formal to that on which it acts.<sup>53</sup>

It might be objected that the proper senses must



act on the common sense just as sensible objects act on the proper senses, for there could not be a judgment of proper sensibles by the common sense unless sensible objects reached the common sense from the proper senses. Now, that which acts on another is formal to it, and it would then appear that the common sense is not formal to the proper senses, but "material" to them.<sup>54</sup>

The answer to this difficulty is that the proper senses do not of themselves act on or move the common sense. They could not do this because the sensible forms existing in them are not sufficiently spiritual and simple. The common sense itself must give them this simplicity, acting on them somewhat as light does on colours. Its instrument in this action is one of the bodily spirits. It is not the bodily spirit itself which gives sensible forms the ability to act on the organ of the common sense, since this spirit is something corporeal. It is because it is used as the instrument of the incorporeal common sense that it is able to produce such an effect.<sup>55</sup>

This doctrine, Albert believes, is to be found in Aristotle's De Anima, where it is said that the sense is the "species" of sensibles, as the hand is the organ of organs.<sup>56</sup> The interpretation of this text is that, just as the hand acts on all the other bodily organs, so the common sense acts on all sensibles.<sup>57</sup>



By this explanation of how sensible forms act on the common sense Albert thinks that he can reconcile Aristotle and St. Augustine. He considers himself faithful to Augustine because he says that corporeal forms cannot act on the common sense without receiving this power from the common sense itself. According to Albert, when St. Augustine said that the soul produces corporeal forms in itself when sensibles produce them in the body, he merely meant that bodies cannot by themselves produce sensation, but need the active power of the soul.<sup>58</sup>

By another teaching St. Albert further reduces the degree to which the common sense is passible. This sense has in itself in advance, in potency, all the knowledge of which it is the cause. This knowledge becomes actual in it when it is informed by sensibles. But for a sensible form to inform the common sense is merely for it to limit its power.<sup>59</sup> That is, strictly speaking, the common sense does not "receive" species, but it is informed by them as a universal power is limited by a particular channel of acting. That is why some (including St. Augustine) said that the sensory power is active of its very nature, and not receptive of species.<sup>60</sup>

St. Albert therefore holds that the common sense is receptive of species only in the sense that the species





in the particular senses limit or "distinguish" its sensibility. They receive the power to act on it from the common sense itself. Thus he denies that there is an agent external sense, but admits the existence of an agent common sense, or at least gives to this sense the power of causing the sensibles in the proper senses to act on it. In this way he thinks that he can follow both Aristotle and St. Augustine.

The action by which the external senses receive the forms of sensible things separated from matter, but not from the appendages of matter, is called by St. Albert "abstraction" or "separation".<sup>61</sup> The same terms are used to designate the work of two of the internal senses, the imagination and the phantasy, both of which are acted upon by sensory forms.<sup>62</sup> The power of imagination receives sensory species from the common sense, and has the ability to preserve them when the sensible objects causing them are no longer present, which the external senses and the common sense are not able to do.<sup>63</sup> The imagination abstracts or separates sensory forms from matter and from the presence of matter, but still not from its appendages.<sup>64</sup> As the sensible form goes from the common sense to the imagination it must be acted upon to invest it with the power to affect this faculty.<sup>65</sup> This is accomplished by the animal spirit which abstracts the sensory form from



the sense organ and gives it a more spiritual being, as light does for colours, or the agent intellect for intelligibles.<sup>66</sup>

The phantasy is the source of all the internal senses; it is one in substance, but is differentiated by the work which it performs in different organs of the brain.<sup>67</sup> Its proper function is to join or separate the images which it receives from the common sense, after the objects causing these images are absent.<sup>68</sup> An animal spirit must perform a special action on the sensible form in the imagination before it can serve the phantasy.<sup>69</sup> This work produces<sup>a</sup> a higher degree of abstraction or separation in the sensory form than it has in the imagination.<sup>70</sup>

The use of the term "abstraction" to characterize the function of the sense powers is found in Avicenna's De Anima.<sup>71</sup> It was used by thirteenth-century philosophers in this connection, for example by William of Auvergne (d. 1249),<sup>72</sup> John of La Rochelle (d. 1245),<sup>73</sup> and Peter of Spain (d. 1277).<sup>74</sup> St. Thomas Aquinas also mentions "abstraction" by the senses of sensible species from material things.<sup>75</sup>

Like the common sense, the imagination and phantasy are truly acted upon by sensible forms, but must themselves give these forms the power to affect them.

Let us now summarize St. Albert's teaching



concerning the role of sense knowledge in abstraction:

- (a) The external senses are truly acted upon by sensible objects.
- (b) These objects are able to affect the sense powers by means of sensible species, which are spiritual in nature.
- (c) The transformation which they produce in the sense powers is a spiritual alteration.
- (d) There is no agent external sense.
- (e) Sensible species in the external senses are caused by sensibles themselves.
- (f) The external senses are in no way active.
- (g) The common sense, imagination, and phantasy are all passive powers.
- (h) Each of these internal senses gives its sensible species the power to actuate it.

Concerning the role of sense in abstraction, St. Albert is highly Aristotelian. He teaches that the external senses are passive powers. Though he holds that the common sense and imagination and phantasy are active, and must give sensible forms the very power they have to actuate them, nevertheless all these internal senses are truly passive, receiving sensible species derived from material things. It is true that the activity which these senses exercise makes them resemble



somewhat the sense power as described by St. Augustine, but Albert is non-Augustinian on such an essential point that he cannot be said to agree with the great Father of the Church. His attempt to follow both Aristotle and Augustine did not succeed, because it was impossible from the outset. For Aristotle the senses are receptive of sensible forms, and for Augustine they are not.<sup>76</sup> St. Albert has added to Aristotle, and has modified Augustine, but he has not reconciled their doctrines.

The term "abstraction" does not readily lend itself to a precise definition, so different and even conflicting are the many theories that have been called by this name. However, it would not be wrong to demand as a minimum requirement for a true theory of abstraction that sensible things be in some way true causes of knowledge. At the level of sense knowledge this would imply that sensible species truly act on the powers of senses. For Aristotle this is the case; for Augustine it is not. It is quite true that St. Augustine admits that sense knowledge is not innate, and that material things must be present in order to be known. But these are the occasion rather than the cause of the knowledge the soul derives from them. They do not act on the soul's sense powers. If St. Albert had followed St. Augustine, he would not have had a true theory of abstraction at all.





There is another requirement for a valid theory of abstraction. Not only the senses but the intellect as well must be receptive. Material things must be real causes not only of sense knowledge but also of intellectual knowledge. Our next task will be to see whether St. Albert teaches that the intellect is receptive of its object, and that material things cause intellectual knowledge. To conduct this investigation we shall study the possible intellect and its role in abstraction.



CHAPTER II

THE POSSIBLE INTELLECT AND ITS ROLE IN ABSTRACTION

St Albert follows Aristotle in asserting that the human intellect, like all natural things, has within it both active and potential elements. The active element is the agent intellect, which is the efficient cause of knowledge; and the potential element is the possible intellect, which receives intelligible forms.<sup>1</sup> When the possible intellect is actually informed by intelligibles it is called the speculative intellect. This is the "intellect" in the fullest sense, to which the agent and possible intellects are ordained and for which they exist.<sup>2</sup>

Since we often use the expressions "the intellect knows" or "the intellect acts", we should state at the outset that such a manner of speaking is not quite correct. It is the soul which understands, or, more properly, man himself.<sup>3</sup>

The first fact to be established concerning the function of the possible intellect is that it acquires its knowledge through sense experience. This is opposed to the position of Plato, who said that intellectual knowledge is innate. He held that men possess knowledge from the beginning of their lives but that they are so distracted by bodily delights and necessities that they



pay no attention to it. When they study they can remember what they have forgotten. Thus knowledge is not acquired but merely recalled.<sup>4</sup>

Albert's criticism of Plato is that if he were right the body and its senses would not be a help to the soul, but rather a hindrance, since they would be the cause of it forgetting what it knew. It would be strange if the soul were joined to a body which would impede it from reaching its perfection.<sup>5</sup> Therefore man's knowledge is truly acquired and not merely remembered.

The way in which knowledge is acquired is by the reception of intelligible forms.<sup>6</sup> This is St. Albert's constant teaching. In explaining it, the first difficulty to be faced is how this receptivity of the possible intellect can be reconciled with another of its properties, namely, its immateriality. The possible intellect must be immaterial because otherwise it would be the form of a body or a form which works through a bodily organ. In either case it would individuate what was in it, as any individual subject individuates the form which it contains. In this event, however, the form received in the intellect would be particular, and not universal.<sup>7</sup> But this is opposed to experience. Therefore the possible intellect cannot be the form of a body or a form which works through a bodily organ; it must be immaterial.



The difficulty stemming from its immateriality is that an immaterial thing is impassible. Now, if it is impassible, how can it be receptive?

Aristotle taught quite clearly that "the thinking part of the soul must therefore be, while impassible, capable of receiving the form of an object."<sup>8</sup> Nevertheless, he did not state how this was possible. Albert's explanation is that the possible intellect is truly receptive, but that it does not receive as material beings or bodily powers receive, and as a result it is not passible in the same manner as material beings or bodily powers are. Therefore it is correct to say that it is receptive, yet impassible.<sup>9</sup>

What makes it difficult to grasp this solution of the problem is the constant tendency to think that an intelligible form is united to the intellect as an accident is joined to its subject or a form to its matter. But an intelligible form is not related to the intellect as an accident to its subject, because an accident does not give a substantial perfection, whereas the intelligible form can be a substantial form. Nor is this relation the same as that of form to matter. First of all, form perfects matter in individuated being, but an intelligible form remains universal in the possible intellect. Secondly, whereas form perfects matter only in constituting this or





that thing in nature, the intelligible form serves as a principle of knowledge of these natural things. Otherwise the intellect would become a stone when it understood a stone.<sup>10</sup> The relation of an intelligible form to the possible intellect on which it acts is unique. It is in no way physical and has no counterpart in the material world. Its action is effected in a purely immaterial manner.<sup>11</sup>

The possible intellect is truly receptive of intelligible forms, and is their subject, but the change produced by intelligible forms in it is not a physical change, similar to changes produced in bodies. It is a passage from potency to act, but one of a special kind, one of a non-physical nature.<sup>12</sup> It differs from a physical transmutation in two ways. First, there is no loss of a previous form which must be removed to give way to its contrary. Secondly, no time is required for it to take place. In physical beings, the replacing of the old form by a new one requires a passage of time because the reception of the new form comes only at the end of a process which prepares the way for it. In the possible intellect this is not needed because there is no previous form to be removed, and hence there is only an instantaneous reception.<sup>13</sup> This is why the intellect is receptive but not physically passive.



This is true also for any sense power, if we leave its sense organ out of consideration, because when a sensible form is received in the sense power there is no removal of a previous sensible form, which must be gradually displaced.<sup>14</sup> We may then say that both intellect and sense are impassible. Yet the intellect is more impassible than the senses. The sense powers require bodily organs essentially, and these organs undergo a physical change when sensation takes place;<sup>15</sup> whereas the intellect does not operate through a bodily organ. There is also a transmutation requiring an interval of time when a universal intelligible form is abstracted from the phantasy. The form as it exists in the phantasy is singular, and only potentially universal. When it is rendered actually universal it undergoes a physical change.<sup>16</sup> This change, however, is on the part of the phantasm; there is none on the part of the possible intellect itself. Thus the possible intellect is said to be transmuted only per accidens, and not per se.<sup>17</sup> For this reason also it is more impassible than the sense powers.

We may now state that for St. Albert the intellectual knowledge which is gained by abstraction is received into the possible intellect from the outside world. In this reception, the possible intellect is actualized by intelligible forms in an immaterial manner,



and is thus both immaterial and receptive.

However, the possible intellect is not only receptive, but also active. When the intelligible form activates it, the form is not joined to it as a sensible form is united to a sense organ. It is rather joined to it as to that which it merely "determines". The possible intellect shares with the intelligible the same nature of "intellectuality", but its intellectuality is confused and indeterminate. It is determined by the universal form as potency is determined by act, or as the indeterminate is determined by the determinate.<sup>18</sup>

Accordingly the intellect is related to intelligibles as the common sense or the sense powers (apart from their sensory organs) are related to sensibles. Sensible forms are united to the sense organs as accidents to their subject. These are a special kind of accident, of course, because sensible species are not natural beings but a different kind of being, a "being of abstraction". However, the sense powers apart from their organs, and the common sense, do not receive sensible species in this way, but only as the determined receives the determinant. And in the same way the intellectuality of the possible intellect receives intelligible forms.<sup>19</sup>

In the first chapter<sup>20</sup> it was established that the common sense is distinguished by sensible forms just



as a universal power is limited by the particular channel through which it works.<sup>21</sup> The common sense was said to be more formal or active than the sensibles acting upon it because when they determine it they merely limit it, as a particular instrument limits a universal power. In the same way the possible intellect is more formal or active than the intelligible forms which determine it,<sup>22</sup> and it is even more correct to say that the intellect forms itself according to intelligible species than to say that it is the subject of these species.<sup>23</sup>

The intellect is determined by its intelligible form as by a determinant, by that which limits its intellectuality, by that which acts on it and yet is less active than it. This form is not received as an accident is received, but it is a pure determinant, that which merely limits, without giving or doing anything further.

We saw in Chapter I<sup>24</sup> that St. Albert agreed with Aristotle that the external senses are receptive, and that he opposed St. Augustine on this point. St. Albert also agrees with Aristotle that the possible intellect is receptive, but here his opposition to St. Augustine is not so pronounced. If the latter holds that sensations are formed by the soul out of its own substance, he will hold even more strongly that intellection is an active power. For him the intellect, in producing its





ideas of material things, is not acted upon by intelligible species. These ideas are formed by the soul itself; in intellection the soul is active and not receptive.<sup>25</sup> St. Albert claims that the possible intellect is truly receptive of intelligible species but that it is still somehow active even in this very reception, because the intelligibles acting on it merely determine its intellectuality, and the possible intellect can be said to be more formal or active than the intelligibles it receives. He thus opposes St. Augustine to this extent, that he insists on the possible intellect being truly receptive. But he also holds that this reception is merely the determination of an intellectuality which is more formal than what determines it. As in the case of the common sense,<sup>26</sup> he makes a concession in the direction of Augustinianism.

He does not admit any further activity of the possible intellect in the acquisition of its universal ideas, such as St. Thomas Aquinas does, for example. St. Thomas teaches that a double action is necessary for the gaining of this knowledge. First the intelligible species must actualize the possible intellect. Then the intellect, using this species as the principle of a further action, must produce an "intellectual conception" which is distinct from the intelligible species.<sup>27</sup> St. Albert nowhere mentions such an action of the possible intellect.



He states, however, that the possible intellect performs acts after its universal ideas are gained. It is active, for example, when it judges, or when it reduces a syllogism to its formal principles.<sup>28</sup> These actions are like those of the common sense which take place after sensible species have acted on the proper senses.<sup>29</sup>

Because the possible intellect is active in the two ways just mentioned, it is not quite proper to compare it to a smooth, clean, slate on which there is no writing, as Aristotle did.<sup>30</sup> It is true that this comparison helps us to realize how the intellect can be receptive and yet impassible, because when one writes on the slate there is nothing on it contrary to what is being put there, and so nothing previously existing has to be removed, as in the case of physical change.<sup>31</sup> Nevertheless this comparison is a poor one, because a slate is material to the writing placed on it, whereas the intellect is formal to the intelligibles determining it. Also, the intellect can use its intelligibles in further activities, once they are gained, but the slate cannot do this with the letters written on it.<sup>32</sup>

The same criticism is valid for the comparison between the possible intellect and prime matter. The reason why one is tempted to compare them is that each of them is able to receive all corporeal forms. But there



is a three-fold difference between them. The first difference is that the forms in prime matter are in it as in something material, whereas intelligibles are in the possible intellect as in something formal.<sup>33</sup> Secondly, intelligibles in the possible intellect are universal, whereas forms in matter are individualized by it.<sup>34</sup> Thirdly, when a form actuates matter, it uses it as an instrument of its operations. On the other hand, intelligibles in the possible intellect do not use it as their instrument, but rather the possible intellect acts on them, as we have just seen. We may therefore state that the receptive potency of matter is equivocal to that of the possible intellect, that is, these two kinds of reception are not at all alike.<sup>35</sup>

St. Albert is basically Aristotelian concerning the receptivity of the possible intellect. Despite its being "formal" to its intelligibles even in its reception of them, and despite its using them as principles of further actions, he always asserts that it is truly acted upon by them.

There still remains an important problem concerned with the receptivity of the possible intellect, but in order to examine it we must first realize that one of the great philosophical tasks of St. Albert was to oppose the doctrine that there is only one possible intellect for all men. This teaching was propounded by the great Arabian philosopher



Averroes. When St. Albert wrote his early work, the Summa de Creaturis, he had read the commentary of Averroes on the De Anima of Aristotle, as is shown by the many references to it and the quotations from it. Indeed, his Summa de Creaturis is the first Christian treatise to make more than a passing reference to Averroes; in it he refers about eighty times to the "Commentator".<sup>36</sup>

For Averroes there is one agent intellect for all men, which is an immaterial substance separated in being from human souls. Moreover, there is only one possible intellect for all men;<sup>37</sup> and there is only one speculative intellect, which consists of all the intelligibles existing in the possible intellect.<sup>38</sup>

In his Great Commentary on Aristotle's De Anima, Averroes called the agent intellect and the possible intellect eternal substances, using the plural (substantie eterne).<sup>39</sup> This doctrine was explained differently in the Middle Commentary on the De Anima, where he said that these intellects are one same thing looked at from two points of view. He taught that they are one immaterial substance which, regarded as making forms intelligible, is called the agent intellect, and considered as receiving intelligible forms, is called the possible intellect.<sup>40</sup>

Averroes taught that there are thirty-eight or thirty-nine immaterial substances which are the unmoved





movers of the heavens.<sup>41</sup> From the lowest of these moving principles, the intelligence moving the sphere of the moon, emanates another spiritual substance, that of which the agent intellect and possible intellect are aspects.<sup>42</sup> The possible intellect, then, is the lowest in the order of separated intellects.<sup>43</sup> Like the agent intellect, it is eternal, and the speculative intellect is also eternal.<sup>44</sup>

In the Summa de Creaturis, Albert gives a reference to Averroes which indicates that he is aware of the teaching that there is only one speculative intellect for all men.<sup>45</sup> This would seem to imply, of course, that each man does not have his own possible intellect. Yet in another section of the same work he appears to say that for Averroes each man has his own agent intellect,<sup>46</sup> which would indeed be strange if he did not also have his own possible intellect. It would seem, then, that at this time (before 1243) he had not become fully aware of the meaning of Averroes' doctrine. Now, this is quite understandable, considering its novelty, and the apparent ambiguities in Averroes' teaching.<sup>47</sup> Albert also mentions in his Commentary on the Sentences (1243 - 1249) that Averroes said that there is only one speculative intellect for all men,<sup>48</sup> but he gives here a benign interpretation to the Commentator.

However, Albert was fully aware of the position



of Averroes when, in 1256, he composed his De Unitate Intellectus, which is an attempt to prove that each man has his own agent intellect and possible intellect. On the other hand, there is no evidence that at this time St. Albert thought that any Christian writers had followed the errors of the Arabian. It is only in his Summa Theologiae<sup>49</sup> and De Quindecim Problematibus that this evidence appears, and both of these works were composed after the year 1270.

St. Albert vigorously opposes Averroes' doctrine of the unicity of the possible intellect. One of his strongest arguments is that if there were one possible intellect for all men, they would all have the same knowledge. Whenever one man received knowledge, all would receive it, for they would have the same intellect.<sup>50</sup> But we know from experience that all men do not have the same knowledge, nor do they learn the same things at the same time.

Another argument is that, if man's possible intellect were outside him, the intelligible forms of his knowledge would be outside him also, and thus he could not be said to know. One cannot say that in the very act by which a form is separated from something it is also united to it. When light abstracts colours from coloured bodies, it does not join the colours to the coloured bodies, but rather



joins them to the light-bearing medium. Similarly, when the agent intellect abstracts intelligible forms from the images in the soul, it does not join them to the imagination but to the possible intellect. According to Averroes, the imagination is part of the soul, but the possible intellect is not. Therefore when intelligible forms are abstracted from the imagination they are removed from the soul, and not united to it. Accordingly the human soul understands nothing at all, and does not consider any intelligible forms. Of course, this conclusion is absurd.<sup>51</sup>

The same untenable conclusion follows from the consideration that no matter how much a man's phantasy is illumined, as long as it remains a phantasy it will never be able to receive anything except particular forms; knowledge of universal forms will always be reserved for a higher power. Now, if this higher power does not reside in the human soul, there is no way in which the soul can be said to understand.<sup>52</sup>

Furthermore, if Averroes were right a human being would be merely an animal, since his soul would have no intellectual or spiritual powers.<sup>53</sup> This would also result in the denial of the soul's immortality.<sup>54</sup> To Albert both of these teachings are false.

There are therefore three chief arguments by



which he tried to save for each man his own possible intellect. He argues that if Averroes were correct,

- (a) All men would have the same knowledge.
- (b) Man would not know intellectually at all.
- (c) Man would be merely an animal, and his soul would be mortal.

Having considered this defense of a plurality of possible intellects, we are in a position to examine a last serious problem concerning the receptivity of these intellects. This arises from the doctrine of intelligible species. As in sense knowledge, all intellectual knowledge takes place by means of species or intentions, but in sense knowledge the intention is particular, whereas in intellectual knowledge it is universal.<sup>55</sup> The difficulty which arises is that the intelligible species is universal, because it represents an object universally, and yet it exists in a particular intellect. How can it be universal and yet exist in a particular subject?

In his early work the Summa de Creaturis St. Albert has no difficulty in solving this problem. The same species can be different according as it is considered under different aspects. In so far as it is the quiddity of a thing, it is universal, and the same for all men. In so far as it is an accident of the soul,





it is individuated by the soul in which it exists, and is different for each man.<sup>56</sup>

This solution of the problem was found by St. Albert in the Metaphysics of Avicenna.<sup>57</sup> It is the same solution as that given by St. Bonaventure<sup>58</sup> and St. Thomas Aquinas.<sup>59</sup> It is also attributed by St. Albert to Alfarabi (d. 930), in the latter's Commentary on the Posterior Analytics of Aristotle.<sup>60</sup>

However, in his later works St. Albert rejects his former position and adopts a new doctrine. In his Posterior Analytics, De Anima, De Natura et Origine Animae, and De Unitate Intellectus, he explains his new teaching.

Reporting the doctrine of men such as St. Bonaventure and St. Thomas Aquinas, he states that several of the Latin philosophers say that the intentions in the possible intellect can be considered in two ways, namely, in so far as they are abstracted from things, and in so far as they have being in the intellect. Under their first aspect they are universal forms, freed from matter and its appendages. Under their second aspect, they exist in the possible intellect with an individuated being. Considered from the first point of view they are universal principles of understanding. But the intellect does not consider them at all from the second point of view, and their individuation does not prevent



universal knowledge.<sup>61</sup>

According to Albert, however, these Latins are wrong. Intellectual knowledge consists in the possession of an intelligible species in the intellect. Therefore intelligibles are understood through the being which they have in the intellect. This being, the Latins say, is an individuated being. Thus universal things would be understood universally by individual intentions. But this is incomprehensible.<sup>62</sup>

Some mistakenly say that the intelligible form in the soul is universal in relation to the thing of which it is the form, and individual in relation to the intellect in which it exists. But the form is never universal in relation to the thing from which it comes, since this thing is particular; and it is always universal in relation to the intellect, for in the intellect it is independent of space and time.<sup>63</sup>

St. Albert understands Aristotle when he says that a universal is universal in the intellect, and cannot be individuated in any way; but he can in no wise understand those who say that a universal has individual being in the intellect as in a subject.<sup>64</sup>

He changed his former position and opposed his Latin contemporaries because of arguments provided by Averroes. If the form in the possible intellect has



individual and particular being, it will be only potentially intelligible, and not actually intelligible, because every individual contains the universal in itself only potentially. Thus each intelligible, being individual, will need another intelligible in order for it to be known. This second intelligible, since it must be individual in order to exist in an individual intellect, will need a further intelligible, and so on to infinity.<sup>65</sup> Therefore universal knowledge will never be obtained.

We also know that the only reason why Avicenna, Aristotle, and Averroes said that the intellect is separated and unmixed is that the universal which it knows is separated. But for the universal to be separated it must be removed from that which would particularize or individuate it. Hence the universal can not exist in the intellect with an individuated being.<sup>66</sup>

Also, the knowledge in the mind of the teacher would be different from that generated in the mind of his pupil if each knowledge were individuated. And, if these knowledges are different, a teacher can never teach his pupil what he himself knows. The passing on of ideas would be like the production of a new flame from an old flame. The flames would be similar, but not identical. A teacher could pass on knowledge similar to his own, but not the same knowledge that he has. This



is contrary to experience, however, for we do not say that sciences are different because different people know them.<sup>67</sup> Thus universals cannot be individuated in the intellects in which they exist.

St. Albert teaches that each man has his own individual intellect, but that a universal does not exist in the intellect in so far as the intellect is individual, and hence it is not individuated by the intellect. In this way he safeguards the absolute identity of a universal when it is known by two intellects, for it is not individuated in any manner by the intellect knowing it.

We might ask, however, how he can speak of knowledge as belonging to one man rather than to another if universals are not individuated in any way by the intellect knowing them, for how can that which is not rendered proper be appropriated to one being rather than to another? His answer is that universal ideas in different intellects come from phantasms which are individuated and hence different for different men. That is, a universal existing in two intellects is not different at all in these two intellects when it is considered in itself, for it is in no wise individuated. But this universal is differentiated in these two intellects by reason of its origin, because in one intellect it comes from one phantasm, and





and in the other intellect it comes from a numerically different phantasm. And he acknowledges Averroes as the source of his solution of this problem.<sup>68</sup>

Averroes taught that there is one possible intellect for all men, and one speculative intellect, that is, one group of universals existing in the unique possible intellect.<sup>69</sup> His solution of the problem of how there can be many men with intellectual knowledge if there is only one possible intellect and only one speculative intellect is that this unique possible and speculative intellect is united to the imaginations of many men because universals are drawn from different images in different men. That is, many men can be said to have intellectual knowledge because the source of this knowledge is their individual imaginations.<sup>70</sup> This teaching is accepted by St. Albert, and he makes it clear that he is expressing his own convictions:

"Therefore I wish first of all to explain the whole teaching of Aristotle (that is, concerning the possible intellect) as well as I can, and then to introduce the opinions of the other Peripatetics. After this I want to study the opinions of Plato, and then, finally, to give my own."<sup>71</sup>

"We wish to give the answer of certain philosophers to these doubts (that is, concerning the nature of the possible intellect), and afterwards to add what we think should be said about them."<sup>72</sup>



"We shall now, however, determine the two remaining questions (that is, concerning the possible intellect) as well as we can."73

"And in this determination Averroes agrees with us."74

St. Albert accepts Averroes' teaching of the relation of universals to the imaginations of different men, and uses it to explain how men can know universals without appropriating them to their intellects. But he does not agree with Averroes that there is only one possible intellect for all men or one speculative intellect for all men. The difficulty then arises of explaining how there can be many speculative intellects if an individual possible intellect cannot individuate a universal in any way. This is not a problem for Averroes as it is for Albert. For Averroes there is only one possible intellect. It is therefore easier to explain how it can receive universals without individuating them. But if one admits a multitude of possible intellects it becomes harder to show how they receive universals without making them particular.

It should be realized at this point that there is a danger of confusing two related yet quite distinct problems. The first is concerned with the possible intellect. How can it be individuated in individual men if its knowledge is universal? That



is, if the possible intellect can know all things--and to know all things it must not be any of the individual things which it knows--how can it be individuated at all? The second problem deals with the universal, that is, not with the subject of knowledge, but with the object of knowledge. How can the universal be individuated in individual men if it is universal, and thus the same for all? Or, to put it differently, if the universal by its very nature precludes individuation, how can it be found in an individual possible intellect?

St. Albert admits that the possible intellect has universal knowledge, and that it is somehow individuated in individual men. Yet he refuses to admit that the universal itself is individuated in any manner by the intellect in which it exists. In other words, he admits that, from the point of view of the subject of knowledge, universality is not incompatible with particularity, but refuses to make this same admission from the point of view of the object of knowledge.

The problem concerned with the intellect is different from that concerned with the universal. In connection with the intellect the difficulty is how the intellect can have any nature at all. Aristotle said that the intellect, because it can know all things, must not have anything in its being, because what it contained



would prevent it from knowing universally. Thus the intellect is merely a capacity for knowing, with no nature of its own.<sup>75</sup>

St. Albert is quite aware that Aristotle's text makes it difficult to show that the intellect is a particular being. It seems that the intellect cannot have any form of its own, because if it did it could not receive that form, for the reason that nothing receives what it already has. For example, the matter of flesh does not possess all forms potentially, since it possesses one of them actually. Nothing has potentially what it actually possesses. Among natural beings only prime matter has all forms potentially. The intellect, too, possesses all forms potentially, and thus it cannot have any particular form in itself, as individuated matter has.<sup>76</sup>

Moreover, if the intellect were informed in such a way as to be a singular being, its ability to know all forms would be further prevented. Not only would it be unable to know the form it had, but it could not know forms contrary to this, for contraries can not exist in the same subject.<sup>77</sup>

As a result of these reasonings we are led to wonder how the possible intellect can have a form of its own. On the other hand, if it has no form, how can it





be a being of any kind? The answer to this problem is that the possible intellect has in itself none of the forms which it receives, yet it has a form. It is not specifically the same as any beings which it knows, but it is generically the same as they are.<sup>78</sup> The possible intellect is an incorporeal being. It has a form of its own which makes it a special type of incorporeal being, and this form is unique. It agrees only generically with all the corporeal things known by the possible intellect.<sup>79</sup> It is a being, but it is not a corporeal being, whether a body or an organic bodily power.<sup>80</sup>

The difficulty raised by Aristotle was that the possible intellect could not know all beings if it had in itself the nature of any of them. We have now solved this difficulty in so far as the knowledge of corporeal beings is concerned, because the intellect is not corporeal. The only remaining problem is to see how the possible intellect can know itself. If it can not know those things whose nature it contains in its own being, how can it know itself? St. Albert's answer begins with a distinction between the being of the possible intellect and its power. The intellect possesses its own nature in its being; but at first it knows itself only potentially. Its power to know is universal. Considered as a singular being the intellect is not universal. It is universal



not in its being, but in its power. At first this power contains no nature actually, and all natures potentially, including that of the intellect itself. Thus the singularity of the possible intellect does not limit the universality of its knowledge.<sup>81</sup>

The sun affords a good illustration of what is meant. It is numerically one being, individuated by its matter, yet its light is not determined to act on numerically one object. Rather, this light is undetermined and universal in its action, and causes life and generation in all the beings on earth.<sup>82</sup>

It is the same with the possible intellect. Each man's possible intellect is individuated in being by the soul in which it exists. But it is not individuated in its power. It is not in so far as it is an individual being that it has universals in itself, but in so far as it is universal in its power. Hence its individuation does not prevent the universality of its knowledge.

St. Albert constantly holds that the intellect is individual in being and universal in power. This, moreover, is one of the chief teachings of his De Unitate Intellectus. His doctrine in this work is that there are many possible intellects. Many of the objections to this teaching state that if the intellect is individuated in being it must be individuated in its power, and thus can



not be many in number and still able to know all things. His oft-repeated answer is a distinction between the being and the power of the intellect.<sup>83</sup>

It will be noted, however, that he has solved only half of the problem of individuation in the intellect. He has shown how the intellect can be an individual being and still have a universal power. As the one sun illumines all physical beings, so the one intellect receives all intelligible forms. But let us consider this same reception from the point of view of the universals received. Can universals be received without being individuated? It has been shown that the subject of knowledge is both individual and universal. Can it also be shown that the object of knowledge is both individual and universal?

The twenty-seventh objection in St. Albert's De Unitate Intellectus gives Averroes' reasons why a universal can not be individuated in the possible intellect, reasons which we have already seen.<sup>84</sup> In his answer to this objection, St. Albert distinguishes not the being and the extension of the universal, but rather the being and the power of the intellect. The intellect, he says, is determined as a subject, but is universal in its power, and the universal is not received in it in so far as the intellect is a determined subject, but in so far as it has a universal power.<sup>85</sup> Now, in this answer St. Albert has not sufficiently distinguished the two problems we



have mentioned. He has explained how the possible intellect is individual and universal, but he has not yet shown how the intelligible form is individual and universal.

Let us again make clear that to show how possible intellects can be many in number and yet universal in power is not to explain how a universal can be many in number in different intellects and yet remain universal. The way in which St. Albert answers this latter problem is by stating that the possible intellect receives universal forms in a unique way, without individuating them. He compares this reception to that of coloured light by a light-bearing medium. The colour is received by such a medium in a manner quite different from that by which it is received in a coloured object. In a similar way the possible intellect receives intelligible forms in a manner different from that <sup>in</sup> which matter receives them, and without individuating them.<sup>86</sup> This answer of Albert, however, is merely a declaration accompanied by an example; it is not a demonstration. We may still ask how a universal can be known if it is not appropriated to the intellect and thus rendered individual.

In another text St. Albert further complicates the situation by bringing the agent intellect into the problem. The eighth objection of the De Unitate Intellectus states that there can be only one possible intellect





because the object of the intellect is the universal, and whatever is received is received according to the nature of the receiver. If the universal exists in the intellect as universal, the intellect itself must be universal, that is, one in number for all men.<sup>87</sup>

St. Albert points out that some solve this objection in a manner different from him. They say that the intention received in the intellect can be considered in two ways. It can be looked at in relation to the possible intellect, and in this way it is particular. It can also be viewed as related to the beings of which it is the form. Under this second aspect, it is universal, and it is in this manner that the intellect grasps it. There are then many possible intellects, containing particularized intelligible species, but these species are all universal in content, though not in being.<sup>88</sup>

St. Albert's style indicates that this solution is not his own. Moreover, he has opposed it in three of his later works.<sup>89</sup> Also, he does not even mention it in the section of the Summa Theologiae which corresponds to this part of the De Unitate Intellectus.<sup>90</sup> This solution, previously his own, has been abandoned by him.

His own answer to the objection is that one intellect can penetrate another by its light, as one lamp penetrates another by its light. This explains, he says,



how a universal can be in many intellects, as in one region of intelligibles.<sup>91</sup> The comparison he uses suggests that he is speaking of the agent intellect, and saying that many agent intellects can illumine one intelligible. This supposition is strengthened when we read his words in the answer to the same objection in the Summa Theologiae:

"So much more is the spiritual light of intelligence diffusive of itself in all intelligibles, always and everywhere, without limit, measure, or number, by extending itself to intelligibles. However, it is individuated and numbered by the being which it has in those understanding."<sup>92</sup>

He has not here satisfactorily answered the question of how one universal can be in many possible intellects. He has not sufficiently differentiated the various aspects of the difficulty. He seems to shift from the question of how the universal can be in many possible intellects and yet remain universal to the question how the intellect can be many in number and yet know all things. Moreover, he seems to have moved from a consideration of the possible intellect to a discussion of the agent intellect.

The objection concerned the problem of how the same universal could exist in more than one possible intellect. St. Albert's answer is that there is one



region of intelligibles in which all possible intellects are, and where they share the same un-individuated universals. That is, all possible intellects share numerically the same universals.

Our first reaction to this answer is to wonder how an intelligible world common to many possible intellects is assimilated to each possible intellect. There is no provision for this. Albert is afraid that if there is any appropriation there will be individuation of the universal. He seems to envisage a universal, one in number, on which each possible intellect looks. This is really the destruction of a doctrine of intelligible species, for here each possible intellect knows the universal itself directly. No species is necessary. To avoid individuation of intelligible species, he has, in effect, abolished them. Or he has at least reduced them to being one in number, so that each possible intellect is informed by numerically the same intelligible species. As we have already seen,<sup>93</sup> he says that the universal in one possible intellect is numerically the same as the universal in another possible intellect, and differs from it only by reason of its origin. He therefore agrees with Averroes that an intelligible species cannot be multiplied.

We do not find in St. Albert the arguments which St. Thomas Aquinas used against Averroes. St. Thomas



pointed out that even if there were only one possible intellect it would still have to understand by means of a singular species, and thus the universal would have to be individuated in some way.<sup>94</sup>

Again, for St. Thomas the fact that an intelligible species is singular does not prevent the knowledge of universals. What prevents the knowledge of universals is not singularity, but materiality. If the form of knowledge is material, not abstracted from the conditions of matter, this form will be a similitude of a nature according as it is rendered singular by individuating principles, and the nature will not be able to be known in its universality. But if the species is abstracted from the conditions of individuating matter, it will be a similitude of the nature without these things which individuate it, and the universal nature will be known.<sup>95</sup> In either case the species of knowledge is singular, but in intellectual knowledge this singular species, because it is immaterial and unlimited by material conditions, is universal in what it represents.

St. Thomas is able to explain how the possible intellect is receptive and yet all intellects can know the same universals. St. Albert can not reconcile these two doctrines. In his De Unitate Intellectus he argues that all men cannot have one possible intellect, and uses





as a principle that what is received by many becomes many in number.<sup>96</sup> Yet he seems to deny this very principle when he holds that the same intelligible is received by many possible intellects without being many in number.

M.-M. Gorce<sup>97</sup> says that for St. Albert there is one mighty rational soul over and above each individual human intelligence. This soul individualizes itself in individual men, yet each person is able to think universals only by reason of his connection with the intellect of the universal soul. Gorce also attributes this opinion to M.-D. Roland-Gosselin,<sup>98</sup> but his attribution is incorrect, as Roland-Gosselin does not go so far as to claim that St. Albert actually taught that there is a universal intelligence.<sup>99</sup> Nor is there any justification for holding that St. Albert ever advocated such a doctrine. While it may not be wrong to claim that his tenets led logically to a conclusion of this kind, he himself did not draw this inference. The most that can be said is that there is in his doctrine an unsolved problem of great importance.<sup>100</sup>

After teaching in his earlier writings that intelligible species are individuated in some way in individual possible intellects, St. Albert later refused to admit this, and never again espoused his former doctrine. Though allowing for the individuation of



possible intellects themselves in their being, he steadfastly continued to deny any type of individuation in the intelligible species themselves. One of Averroes' strongest arguments for the unicity of the possible intellect was that a universal cannot be individuated in any way, and thus cannot exist in several possible intellects.<sup>101</sup> Far from opposing him, St. Albert agrees that a universal cannot be individuated at all. However, even though admitting his premise, Albert does not accept Averroes' deduction from it. On the contrary, he repeatedly states that each man has his own possible intellect. He affirms, too, that each possible intellect is acted upon by the universal, and receives it. Thus, though we may justly wonder how St. Albert can reconcile the actual reception of the universal by the possible intellect, with the inability of the universal to be rendered singular, there is no doubt that he does hold both of these doctrines.

The important conclusions from this chapter are the following:

(a) The possible intellect is acted upon by intelligibles.

(b) This is quite compatible with its immateriality.

(c) The possible intellect is also active, because:



- (i) being more formal than intelligibles, it is merely "determined" by them.
- (ii) after its intelligibles are gained, it can act on them, as when it judges.
- (d) Each man has his own possible intellect.
- (e) The multiplicity of possible intellects does not prevent the intellect from knowing all things.

(f) Contradicting his earlier teaching, St. Albert holds that the intelligible species is not individuated in any way by the possible intellect.

(g) He fails to answer satisfactorily the question of how the possible intellect is receptive of such a species if it does not appropriate it to itself in some manner and thus render it individual.

(h) A multiplicity of possible intellects can not be reconciled with the inability of intelligible species to be many in number. Yet St. Albert holds both of these incompatible tenets.

St. Albert agrees with both Aristotle and St. Augustine that knowledge is acquired and not innate. But he has to choose between them when deciding whether or not the intellect receives its knowledge from the material



world. As in the case of the senses, he agrees with Aristotle that the intellect is acted upon <sup>by</sup> the forms of physical things. As also in the case of the internal senses, he says that the possible intellect is active in its very reception of its species, being formal to them and merely determined by them. This departure from Aristotle's doctrine in favour of the activity of the intellect indicates a tendency towards the teaching of St. Augustine, for whom the intellect is not in any way receptive of intelligible species, but rather productive of them. Nevertheless Albert is basically Aristotelian on the question of the receptivity of the possible intellect, as he was on the question of the receptivity of both the external and the internal senses.

Had he been Augustinian on these points, he would not have had a theory of abstraction at all. There are those who hold that St. Augustine advocated a theory of abstraction, but one different from that of Aristotle.<sup>102</sup> Now, the validity of such a claim depends on one's definition of abstraction. It is true that for St. Augustine neither sense knowledge nor intellectual knowledge of material things is innate, but rather acquired from the outside world. Material objects are necessary for such knowledge, and they must act on the organs of sense. However, as already stated,<sup>103</sup>





it is legitimate to restrict the use of the term "abstraction" to apply to a knowledge in which material things are not merely occasions, but rather true causes of knowledge. For this they must act on the soul; sensible species and intelligible species must be received by the senses and the intellect respectively. Thus St. Augustine's noetic should not be said to include a doctrine of abstraction; rather it should be recognized as opposed to any abstraction theory.

It was the arguments of Averroes rather than those of Augustine which prevented Albert from developing a consistent explanation of the receptivity of the possible intellect. He was convinced that it was truly receptive; what troubled him was how this receptivity could be reconciled with the universality of intelligible species, a problem which Augustine never dealt with, though it can be a valid question even in a purely Augustinian system. Nevertheless, granted that St. Albert did not satisfactorily resolve this issue, he continued to maintain that the possible intellect is truly receptive. Hence he held a theory of abstraction.

We know that in the thirteenth century theories of abstraction were regularly thought to be compatible with theories of illumination. Some philosophers held that illumination is necessary even for abstraction to



take place. Others asserted that abstraction accounts for some natural knowledge, illumination for the rest.<sup>104</sup> We have encountered no mention by St. Albert of the existence of illumination from a source above the soul in connection with the work of the senses or the possible intellect. If, then, illumination is necessary for abstraction, or if the nature of abstraction is such that it is related to knowledge by illumination, we shall discover this in studying the agent intellect and its role in abstraction. It is to this that we now turn our attention.



CHAPTER III

THE AGENT INTELLECT AND ITS ROLE IN ABSTRACTION

An agent intellect is necessary in order to produce intelligibles in the possible intellect. In the sense powers only particular forms exist; if the possible intellect were moved by them its knowledge would be particular and not universal. Therefore a cause is required to produce universal forms.

This agent can not be a power of the sensible soul, since sensation deals only with particular forms. On the other hand, it can not be the possible intellect itself, because the possible intellect receives intelligible forms, and it can not act on them and also be acted upon by them. Accordingly, there must be an agent intellect in addition to the possible intellect.<sup>1</sup>

These intelligibles are produced by the agent intellect, but it would be a mistake to think that at any time they resided within it; it is the possible intellect alone which is the subject of intelligible forms.<sup>2</sup> Nor is the agent intellect the intelligibles themselves.<sup>3</sup> If it were, we would know all the time, for Aristotle tells us that the agent intellect is always in act. We would then have no need for our senses in order to gain knowledge.<sup>4</sup> The agent intellect is a power which makes intelligibles,



but it is not itself the intelligibles or their subject.<sup>5</sup>

The Arabians, and especially Avicenna, had held that the agent intellect is the cause of the production of intelligibles in the possible intellect, but that it is a separated substance, a wholly immaterial being, and not part of the human soul. For Avicenna there is a first intelligence which is the source of all that is. Below it are ten separated intelligences. Nine of these preside over the nine heavens. The tenth and lowest of them presides over the whole sphere of active and passive beings, moves them to acquire their forms, and gives these forms when the beings are prepared to receive them. It also gives the forms of knowledge to human intellects, and is called the Agent Intellect.<sup>6</sup>

This view, namely, that the agent intellect is separate from the soul in its being, provokes from Albert a strong rebuttal. First of all, if there is only one agent intellect for all men, separated from each soul in its being, man can be called rational only to the extent that he has a possible intellect. He is receptive of intelligibles, but is dependent on another substance for the act of intellection. Thus, he is not really intelligent.<sup>7</sup>

Another objection is that, just as in the universal order of being there is a first efficient cause of intelligible being, so in the lesser world of each individual man





there must be a first efficient cause of intelligibility. Hence each man must have his own agent intellect.<sup>8</sup>

It is unthinkable that in a form which gives to the being of which it is the form both its existence and its nature, there should be potency and not act. For every nature must have in itself both potency and act. The essential terminus of a thing is act, not potency, because all potency is ordained to act. The possible intellect, which is potential, cannot be the essential terminus of the soul. It must be completed in being by the intellect which perfects it. Nature does not terminate in the imperfect as in its natural terminus. No such thing occurs in the vegetative or sensory worlds. Indeed, in them we find an active principle inside each being. Does the rational soul alone, which is a higher kind of soul, suffer this imperfection? Does it alone have to go to another substance outside itself for its proper activity?<sup>9</sup> No, we must hold that each man has his own agent intellect, just as he has his own possible intellect.

Having established that each man has his own agent intellect, and that the function of this power is to produce universal forms, let us now investigate more precisely in what its work consists. What is involved in the production of universals?

The universals produced by the agent intellect



do not exist in external objects, since these objects as they exist outside the mind or even as they are grasped by the senses are singular. The universals reside only in the intellect.<sup>10</sup>

By this doctrine Albert was opposing any teaching which would allow that universals exist not only in the mind but also in reality;<sup>11</sup> that outside the mind there are universal forms which are separated from singular things; that such universals are the causes of singular things; and that they exist before the particular. Hence when intellectual knowledge takes place, it is not any separated forms that are known.<sup>12</sup>

Plato's name comes to Albert's mind and he recognizes that one of Plato's reasons for positing forms of this kind is that science deals with necessary and permanent things. The difficulty here, of course, is that about us we find constant change, and nothing that is necessary and fixed. In Plato's mind that which gives to the objects of intellectual knowledge their necessity cannot be in the changing, sensible things themselves.<sup>13</sup>

For Plato also the intellect itself is something permanent and necessary, and what is in it must be there according to the power and nature of the intellect, because the received is always in the receiver according to the nature of the receiver. The object of the intellect



must, therefore, be permanent and necessary. This, in Albert's mind, is a further reason why Plato insisted that the intelligibles be separated from changing sensible beings.<sup>14</sup>

In his criticism of Plato, St. Albert repeats the arguments of Aristotle. If the essences of things are eternal and incorruptible, separated from temporary and corruptible material things, without being any part of them, they cannot help us to know these things, because the principles of being and the principles of knowledge are one and the same.<sup>15</sup>

Moreover, if there were a universal existing outside the mind in such a way as to be one being, it could never be predicated of any other being, because what is appropriated to one cannot belong to many. Hence in this matter Plato's philosophy is wrong (absoue dubio inconvenientissima).<sup>16</sup>

The criticism directed against Plato is valid also against those Latins of no small authority (non mediocris auctoritatis) who agreed with him that the universal is in things in some manner. These men argued that unless it were in them it could not truly be predicated of them, and general ideas would not give a knowledge of things. Moreover, since a nature exists in its entirety in each of its singulars, and is exactly the same in them



all, it must be universal even before the intellect knows it.<sup>17</sup>

It is difficult to know which Latins Albert has in mind. According to Abelard (c. 1079 - 1142), William of Champeaux (c. 1070 - c. 1121) taught at one time that an essence is a thing simultaneously present in each and every one of its individuals, one same reality common to them all.<sup>18</sup> Another Latin closer to St. Albert taught a similar doctrine. William of Auvergne (c. 1180 - 1249) held that genera and species not only exist, but also exist in the same manner in which they are known. Sensible things exist just as the senses testify; much more should intelligible things be in reality exactly as they are known by the intellect. Now, the intellect knows them as common and eternal.<sup>19</sup> Therefore each of them is one and the same thing in all the individuals sharing in it.

Though unwilling to admit with either Plato or the Latin Platonists that universals exist as such outside the mind, Albert also refuses to admit that singular things are completely singular, as, for example, St. Thomas Aquinas does.<sup>20</sup> He considers such an admission to lead to a denial of the possibility of a knowledge of things. If there were nothing common to things of the same kind, predication would be merely a matter of words, not based on reality.<sup>21</sup> The object of intellectual knowledge would





be merely intelligible species, with nothing in the outside world corresponding to them.<sup>22</sup> He is therefore forced to admit that natures do not exist outside the mind either as universal or as fully singularized.

To see how this is possible, it should be realized that the nature or essence of a thing can be considered in more than one way. First of all, it can be considered as it is in matter. Here it is individuated in its being. Secondly, it can be regarded as a nature different from the matter in which it exists. Looked at in this manner, it can be viewed from two further aspects.

First, the essence apart from matter can be viewed in itself, considered absolutely (essentia quaedam absolute in seipsa). This is a thing existing in itself as a unity (unum quid in se existens). The being it has is called the "being of an essence" (nec habet esse nisi talis essentiae).

Besides being looked at absolutely, the essence apart from matter can be considered with its aptitude for communicability to several beings. It is apt of its very nature to give being to many individuals, even if as a matter of fact it does so to only one or to none at all. Even when it exists in an individual it has this aptitude for communicability; however, actual universality belongs to it only when it is in the intellect.<sup>23</sup>



The aptitude for universality which belongs to an individuated essence is a real property, that is, it belongs to it in its extra-mental existence, and is not merely something attributed to it because of our way of understanding it. What justifies the assertion that it has this aptitude even when in singular beings is that an essence is prior to the matter in which it exists, as act is prior to potency. This means that it must possess its own nature before it can communicate it to matter, and therefore it has the "being of an essence" before it has its particularized being. Thus it retains its aptitude for universality even when it exists in singular beings.<sup>24</sup>

The essence is the very same thing whether it is considered in itself, or as particularized in its singulars, or as universalized in the mind, but it has three different modes of being. In itself it has the being of an absolute essence, or simple being; in its singulars it has singular or material or natural being; in intellects it has universal or spiritual being.<sup>25</sup> However, even though it has three modes of being, it does not have three modes of existence; it has only two of them: singular and universal. An essence always has its proper being, but it must be either in the mind or in singulars in order to exist; it cannot exist by itself.<sup>26</sup> To say otherwise would be to agree with Plato.



Therefore St. Albert attributes to essences in the outside world (though as considered in themselves, not as individualized) an incipient or incomplete universality. They already have in themselves a being which is in itself neither fully universal nor fully singular: the being inseparably belonging to an essence in itself, no matter where it is found.

It will be noted that St. Albert's solution of the problem of universals has been taken from his philosophical treatises. Our justification for accepting the doctrine in these writings is that it is the same throughout, and in more than one place Albert endorses it as his own. In the De Praedicabilibus,<sup>27</sup> the De Intellectu et Intelligibili,<sup>28</sup> and the Commentary on Aristotle's Metaphysics,<sup>29</sup> the theory of the universal is identical, and in the De Praedicabilibus<sup>30</sup> and the De Intellectu et Intelligibili<sup>31</sup> it is approved.

St. Albert recognizes that the source of his doctrine of universals is the great Arabian philosopher, Avicenna.<sup>32</sup> Avicenna teaches in many places that an essence is something in itself (in se quoddam) no matter where it is found, whether in a singular being or in the intellect. In itself an essence (for example, a genus, say "animal") is neither singular nor universal. If it were universal in itself, there would never be a singular



animal. And if "animal" in itself were singular, there would be only one animal, and no more. "Animal", then, is just what it is, and, in itself, neither singular nor universal. If it is understood as singular or universal, it is no longer understood in itself, but also along with what happens (accidere) to it.<sup>33</sup>

An essence, Avicenna claims, does not become singular unless something is added to it to make it singular.<sup>34</sup> Nor does it become universal unless something is added to it, for the universal is more than the essence of which one affirms universality.<sup>35</sup> This can be made clearer by a consideration of Avicenna's distinction between a natural genus and a logical genus. A genus considered in itself is called a natural genus. When it is understood by the intellect there is added to it the relation (comparatio) of generality. It is when understood in this way, namely, as existing in its many particulars that it is called a logical genus.<sup>36</sup> Actual universality is thus added by the intellect to the essence, which already has it itself a communicable nature.

The position of St. Albert is the same as that of Avicenna. The object of the intellect is an essence which exists outside the mind in singular things, but before any action of the intellect this essence, considered in itself, is already non-singular, that is,





indifferent to singularity.<sup>37</sup>

"And therefore natural forms, considered in themselves, are common and universal, even those which are in singulars, although they are not common and universal according as they are in singulars."<sup>38</sup>

In this discussion of the object of the intellect St. Albert is in the Aristotelian, and not the Augustinian tradition. Aristotle had taught that the forms of things are particularized in matter and universalized in the mind.<sup>39</sup> St. Augustine was primarily concerned with the truth of human knowledge, and he did not treat ex professo of the universality of man's universal ideas. We know that for St. Augustine the material world is made up of matter which is impregnated with intelligibility by the divine ideas; but since he did not know Aristotle's works, and since he ante-dated the problem of universals as it was raised for the Latins by Boethius (c. 510 - 524/5), he found no incentive to discuss the object of the intellect as did Aristotle or St. Albert.<sup>40</sup> We may, then, conclude that when concerned with the object of the intellect St. Albert follows Aristotle, as interpreted by Avicenna.

It would seem, at first sight, that St. Albert could be forced to say that the only difference between an essence outside the mind and an essence in the mind is that, in the intellect, a declaration is made of the



fact of communicability which belongs by right to an essence even in its singular state; in effect, that the essences in singular things are already immaterial and, therefore, intelligible. However, Albert would not agree with such a deduction. It would be going beyond what he himself held if one were to push his doctrine so far as to make the universal in the thing actually intelligible though not actually understood. He requires an agent intellect in order to render intelligible the essences particularized in the outside world, because there they are only potentially intelligible.<sup>41</sup> Nevertheless, we may say that for St. Albert the agent intellect has much less to do than in a philosophy where essences are rendered completely singular in singular things, as in the philosophy of St. Thomas Aquinas.<sup>42</sup>

Having seen that the work of the agent intellect is to render universal, and, therefore, intelligible, the essences which are already, in themselves, non-singular even though existing in singular things, we can proceed to examine the relationship of the agent intellect to the possible intellect. If it acts on it, it may conceivably do so in either one of two ways. First of all, it may do it indirectly. If the agent intellect acts on the phantasms to produce a universal, and this universal acts on the possible intellect, we can say that, indirectly,



the agent intellect acts on the possible intellect, because unless it produced the universal the possible intellect would never be activated. In this indirect action the agent intellect would make intelligibles actually intelligible, but the actualization of the possible intellect would be the direct action of the intelligibles themselves.

But, secondly, the agent intellect could conceivably act on the possible intellect directly, that is, the agent intellect could act per se on the possible intellect, and not merely by rendering intelligible that which in turn acts on the possible intellect.

The chief teaching of St. Albert concerning the role of the agent intellect in abstraction is that its action on the possible intellect is a direct one. This assertion will require extensive proof. However, it concerns a doctrine of great importance, and is worthy of close attention. In showing that the agent intellect acts directly on the possible intellect we shall also demonstrate the nature of the agent intellect itself.

We shall present three proofs. The first is from the comparison of the agent intellect with light. The second is from the nature of the intellect's knowledge of itself. The third is from the manner



in which the intellectual memory functions.

(a) Proof from the comparison of the agent intellect with light.

The comparison of the agent intellect with light dates back to Aristotle.<sup>43</sup> The Peripatetics and Scholastics, following his lead, usually tried to explain the agent intellect by considering it as an intellectual light which performs in the mind what physical light does in bodies.

To understand Albert's doctrine of the relation of the agent and possible intellect, we must remember that he constantly compares the process of intellection to the physical process of illumination. The agent intellect is compared to the (colourless) light of the sun, the intelligible to the colour on which the light shines, and the possible intellect to the light-bearing medium in which the light (now coloured) shines. Light makes all colours to be actually visible and the medium to be actually illumined. So the agent intellect makes the forms in material things to be actually intelligible, and also makes the possible intellect to be in act.<sup>44</sup>

St. Albert often says that the possible intellect receives the light of the agent intellect.<sup>45</sup> He also frequently says that the possible intellect receives intelligible forms. Each of these statements, moreover,





is presumed to explain intellectual knowledge adequately. Accordingly we must investigate the relationship between the possible intellect's reception of the light of the agent intellect and its reception of intelligible forms. Are these two receptions identical? Is an intelligible form merely the light of the agent intellect? Is the agent intellect simply an intellectual light, which renders intelligibles actually intelligible, so that the content of knowledge comes solely from the intelligible itself, and thus from the outside world; or is the agent intellect a light which is the intelligibles, so that the content of knowledge can be said to come from the agent intellect itself?

To answer these questions we shall study St. Albert's comparison between knowledge and illumination. First we shall see the connection between light and colour, and then that between the agent intellect and intelligibles, and note that in Albert's mind there is a perfect correspondence in the two cases.

According to Albert, colour can affect vision only when it has a formal being (esse formale), which is given to it by light.<sup>46</sup> This formal being is also called its act and its form (actum et speciem).<sup>47</sup> Another way of expressing the same teaching is to say that light itself is the act of colour.<sup>48</sup> And when a transparent or light-



bearing body (diaphanum) is illumined by coloured light, light is the act and perfection (actus ejus et perfectio)<sup>49</sup> of this body as well. Light is thus the act of colours and also the act of a transparent body containing these colours. The proof that it is the act of the transparent body is that the light is visible in this body even if no colour is present. That is, light need not be coloured in order to be seen, since it is a colour already, if colour be taken in a very wide sense.<sup>50</sup> Since light is the act of both colour and the light-bearing body, it can also be said that colour is the act of this body.<sup>51</sup>

The question arises whether it is the light or the colour which is the object of sight when a colour is seen by means of light shining on it, for vision must have one object, and not two.<sup>53</sup> Albert's answer to this question is that vision has only one object. Colour and the light illumining it make only one visible thing, just as matter and form do not make two things, but only one. Light is as the form, and colour as the matter, and the two together form one visible object in act.<sup>54</sup> Light is the form of colour when colour is actually visible, and is seen along with the colour as one visible thing.

Another way of expressing the relation of colour to light is to say that colour is light with a certain kind of existence, or that colour is a participation



of light. As light exists in different ways in opaque or partly transparent bodies, it gives rise to different kinds of colours.<sup>55</sup> Light is even said to be the substance (hypostasis) of colour.<sup>56</sup>

St. Albert's teaching on the nature of light and colour may be summed up in the following propositions:

- (i) Light is the form of colour.
- (ii) Light is also the act of the light-bearing medium.
- (iii) Light and colour form one visible object.
- (iv) Colour is light in a certain mode of existence.

We shall now see whether all these properties of light and colour are found in knowledge, when intellection is compared to physical illumination.

The agent intellect is the formal being (esse formale) of the universal, as light is the formal being of colour.<sup>57</sup> It is the act (actus) of intelligibles, as light is the act of colours.<sup>58</sup>

Where many things are fashioned so as to be of one form, there must be one agent making them to be of one form. Now, all visible things, in so far as they are visible, have one form of visibility. So all intelligibles, in so far as they are intelligible, have one form of intelligibility. There must therefore be one agent responsible for this.<sup>59</sup> This agent is the agent intellect. It gives all intelligibles the form of intelligibility.



To understand more clearly the function of the agent intellect, however, we should realize that its work is really two-fold in character. It not only abstracts intelligible forms, that is, makes them simple and universal, but it also illumines the possible intellect. As colour must be always <sup>in</sup>light to be visible, so an intelligible species must always be in the light of the agent intellect to be universal and actually intelligible. Thus we can say that when a universal is received in the possible intellect, the possible intellect is illumined directly by the light of the agent intellect. The possible intellect is moved and formed by the intelligible forms elicited from phantasms, but it is also perfected (completus) by the light of the agent intellect.<sup>60</sup>

We find St. Albert stating expressly that the agent intellect informs the possible intellect by its light, as corporeal light informs the eye.<sup>61</sup> He means without doubt that the possible intellect receives the light of the agent intellect directly, that is, the agent intellect's light does not merely produce intelligibles, but also "accompanies" them into the possible intellect. The agent intellect, accordingly, is called the act and perfection (actus et perfectio) of the possible intellect itself.<sup>62</sup>

The possible intellect is said to receive both





the form (species) of the agent intellect and the form (species) of the intelligible. By this is meant that the possible intellect is informed by the agent intellect and by the intelligible. It would seem then that it is informed by two forms at the same time. Such, however, is not really the case, because these forms are not of the same kind, nor in the same order. But the form of the agent intellect is the act of the intelligible species, as light is the act of colour. Just as the eye receives both colour and light in one visible object, so the possible intellect receives both the intelligible and the light of the agent intellect in one intelligible object.<sup>63</sup> Thus the possible intellect receives the light of the agent intellect in all intelligibles.

The possible intellect needs a two-fold agent cause. First of all, it requires a mover, that is, an intelligible form. Secondly, it requires something to give a form to this mover. The agent intellect gives the form of intellectuality to both the intelligible and the possible intellect, as the same light makes colours actually visible and also informs the light-bearing medium in which they exist.<sup>64</sup>

Therefore the agent intellect does not merely render the intelligible capable of acting by itself on the possible intellect, but the agent intellect, by its



light, must itself act on the possible intellect, which it informs by the same act by which it informs the intelligible. The intelligible and the possible intellect thus have the same act or perfection or formal being, and this is the light of the agent intellect.<sup>65</sup>

We are now in a position to ask whether there is any difference between an intelligible and the light of the agent intellect. Many texts of St. Albert force us to the conclusion that an intelligible is only the light of the agent intellect seen in a certain way. He says that when we see colour we see the light which actualizes it, for nothing is seen unless it is incorporated in light. And, accordingly, in all intelligibles, what is understood is only the light of the agent intellect. Now, in some intelligibles this light is incorporated in sensible matter, and in some incorporated in imaginable quantity, and in some not incorporated in anything at all, but seen in itself. For we can see light (the hypostasis, the substance, of colour) as brilliant (in white), or somewhat dimmed, or almost extinguished (in black); but what is seen is always light itself. So, too, whatever intelligible we grasp, we grasp only the light of our own agent intellect.<sup>66</sup>

Albert tells us that light is the universal cause of colours, and whatever any colour has of the



nature of colour it has from light, and whatever comes from any other source is rather a privation of the nature of colour than part of its essence.<sup>67</sup> We can therefore say that light contains all colours eminently, but what happens to light when a colour is produced is that the light is reduced to one particular colour, which it contained virtually within itself all the time. Colour, then, is merely a limited or weakened light.

We find the same in intellection. The light of the agent intellect is the manifestation of the agent intellect which is proportioned to that which receives its light. Thus the agent intellect is manifested in every intelligible actually known.<sup>68</sup> St. Albert teaches in a text in the Summa de Creaturis that just as gold is true gold because it is all gold, so the agent intellect is the only thing which is truly intelligible because it consists solely of intelligible being (esse intelligibile). It is pure intelligibility.<sup>69</sup>

The agent intellect is like art, and has in itself in advance (praehabet) all intelligibles.<sup>70</sup> It is complete (perfectus) in itself, and has all perfections, and gives them to everything which is perfected in intellectual being.<sup>71</sup> It contains all the intelligibles in itself in an undivided simplicity.<sup>72</sup> In all these statements concerning the agent intellect, St. Albert



is speaking of man's intellect, and not God's. This becomes clear from an attentive reading of the context of each statement.

These proofs that the agent intellect contains intelligibles eminently, for the most part are taken from St. Albert's De Intellectu et Intelligibili, a philosophical work which could conceivably not express his own opinions.<sup>73</sup> That this work does give us St. Albert's personal convictions will be established later, when we shall be in a better position to prove this.<sup>74</sup>

We may now sum up our conclusions concerning the nature of intellection which flow from its comparison to physical illumination:

- (i) The light of the agent intellect is the form of intelligibles.
- (ii) It is also the form of the possible intellect when intellection takes place.
- (iii) The light of the agent intellect and the intelligible form one intelligible object.
- (iv) The intelligible is the light of the agent intellect in a certain mode of existence.

When these conclusions are compared with those on the nature of light and colour,<sup>75</sup> it will be seen to what lengths St. Albert has gone in likening intellectual knowledge and physical illumination.





We have now completed our first proof that for St. Albert the agent intellect act directly on the possible intellect.

(b) Proof from the nature of the intellect's knowledge of itself.

There is a second way in which we can prove that in Albert's theory of abstraction the agent intellect acts directly on the possible intellect. He is of the opinion that the agent intellect, properly speaking, does not understand itself. Neither the agent intellect nor the possible intellect understands itself with a full act of understanding, but only the intellect taken as a whole is capable of this.<sup>76</sup> Yet, improperly speaking, the agent intellect may be said to understand itself in so far as it acts in the possible intellect and understands itself as the act of this intellect.<sup>77</sup>

Aristotle says that the agent intellect is always in act.<sup>78</sup> But it does not act on itself, and we know from experience that it is not always forming intelligible species. How, then, can it be always in act?<sup>79</sup>

The answer to this difficulty is that the agent intellect always understands itself as the act of the possible intellect. This constant activation of the possible intellect, however, perfects it only in an



incomplete manner. If light were in the eye by itself, without being coloured, it would act on the eye, but would not be seen distinctly according to a determined colour. Similarly, the light of the agent intellect can shine by itself in the possible intellect, but when it does so it actuates it only in an indeterminate manner, and not in a distinct way as when it informs an intelligible species. It is in this sense that the agent intellect always understands itself as the act (at least an indistinct act) of the possible intellect.

This constant action of the agent intellect in the possible intellect is not incompatible with that of the intelligibles in the possible intellect, for the agent intellect is the act of all intelligibles, and informs the possible intellect by the same act by which intelligibles inform it, as light is the act of colour and informs the eye by the same act by which colour informs it.<sup>80</sup>

Because the agent intellect is always acting in the possible intellect, at least in an indistinct manner, the possible intellect always understands itself as the subject of either intelligibles informed by the light of the agent intellect, or of the light of the agent intellect alone.<sup>81</sup>

We can conclude from this that according to



St. Albert the agent intellect acts directly on the possible intellect.

(c) Proof from the manner in which the intellectual memory functions.

In order to find out something further concerning human cognition, and, in particular, concerning man's intellectual memory, it is interesting to examine what St. Albert says of angelic knowledge.

He teaches that the angels have both an agent and a possible intellect. It is objected against his position that there is no need for an agent intellect in their case. In man the agent intellect perfects the possible intellect by abstracting forms and placing them in the possible intellect. But the angels have the forms of their knowledge from the moment of their creation. Thus they have no use for an agent intellect.<sup>82</sup>

The answer to this objection is that even though the angelic possible intellect has its intelligibles completely at the beginning of its existence, it still requires the agent intellect for its illumination.<sup>83</sup> The agent intellect has a two-fold action. One of its functions is to abstract forms and give them intelligible being; the other is to illumine the possible intellect so that the intelligible species shine in it. In man both of these are exercised; in the angels, only the



second function takes place, because the species are already present in their possible intellect. However, even though they are present, they require the light of the agent intellect in order that they be actually known.<sup>84</sup> It is not possible for knowledge to take place without the agent intellect, even if species are possessed habitually.<sup>85</sup> That is why there can be no possible intellect without an agent intellect.<sup>86</sup>

In one respect the mode of knowledge of the angels is similar to memory in man, because it requires the use of intelligible species already possessed. In man, too, an intelligible species must always be in the light of the agent intellect in order to be actually known.<sup>87</sup> One of St. Albert's proofs for the existence of an intellectual memory is that unless the intelligible species (speculata) remain in the possible intellect the latter will not be joined to the agent intellect.<sup>88</sup> Thus the function of these species in the memory is to be a means of uniting the possible and agent intellects. Without this union there is no remembering. Since the possession of intelligible species does not suffice for memory, but the action of the agent intellect is required, it must act directly on the possible intellect.

Avicenna had maintained that the forms of knowledge are not retained in the possible intellect, but that the





possible intellect retains only an aptitude to turn again to the agent intellect when it wishes to recall knowledge previously gained. The forms of knowledge then flow once again into the possible intellect, and this is called intellectual remembering.<sup>89</sup> The same doctrine was taught by Dominic Gundissalinus.<sup>90</sup> St. Albert knew of the teaching of both of these men, but he understood Gundissalinus to hold that the agent intellect is a power of the soul,<sup>91</sup> whereas Avicenna held that it is separated in being from the soul.<sup>92</sup>

St. Albert's doctrine of intellectual memory is different from that of Avicenna in that it holds that the agent intellect is a power of the soul, and that the possible intellect can retain intelligible species. But it is similar to it in this, that it requires the possible intellect to turn to the agent intellect whenever it remembers, so that the intelligible species in the possible intellect are once again illumined by the light of the agent intellect, thus enabling the possible intellect itself to be informed by this light. As a result St. Albert's notion of memory indicates to us once again that in knowledge the agent intellect acts directly on the possible intellect.

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Now that we have established that the action of the agent intellect on the possible intellect is a direct one, we must study this action more closely. One important question to be asked is: If the agent intellect acts directly on the possible intellect, of what use are phantasms?

An argument is presented by St. Albert in the Summa de Creaturis to defend the proposition that the agent intellect is full of intelligible forms. The agent intellect, it is argued, cannot act on the possible intellect through its substance, for then it would produce in it only one thing. It must act by forms existing in itself, and in this way a variety of intelligibles can be produced. The agent intellect must, therefore, be full of intelligible forms.<sup>93</sup>

St. Albert's answer to this objection is that the agent intellect acts through its substance, and not through intelligible species existing in it. The diversity of the action of the agent intellect is not from the agent intellect, however, but from the phantasms on which it operates. Its action is determined by the phantasms, and, so determined, moves the possible intellect to act. Thus the light of the agent intellect is determined to intelligibles as physical light is determined to colours. The agent intellect can in this way cause a variety of



intelligible forms without itself containing these forms.<sup>94</sup>

What interests us in this answer is the teaching that the undifferentiated light of the agent intellect is determined by different phantasms and thus causes different intelligibles. This doctrine is attributed by St. Albert to Averroes. It is not found explicitly in the Arabian's words, but is contained implicitly in his doctrine.<sup>95</sup>

All intelligibles, as intelligible, Albert informs us, are the very same. Their intelligibility is given by the same agent intellect acting in the same way. What makes them different is that they represent different things; this difference is caused by phantasms, and not by the agent intellect.<sup>96</sup>

If it is objected that some things are more intelligible than other things, and thus must receive more intelligibility from the agent intellect, it can still be defended that the difference in their intelligibility comes from what they represent, and not from the agent intellect. For the same sun shining in the same way can have different results according as it shines on earth, mud, air or colour, and these differences can be attributed only to the different matters, and not to the sun.<sup>97</sup>

All intelligibles in the speculative intellect are one according to their form of intellectuality, and



they are many according to the different ways in which they determine the possible intellect. The universal is determined only by the relation to that of which it is the universal, and from which it is abstracted by the intellect. We may thus say that the intelligibles of the speculative intellect are one according as they are intelligibles, and many only in relation to the things of which they are the intelligibles.<sup>98</sup>

When the agent intellect informs the possible intellect, it uses intelligible forms as its instrument. The agent intellect and the intelligible are both related to the possible intellect as form to matter, but they are not equally formal. The agent intellect is more formal, since, by its light, it informs the intelligible. The intelligible is thus its instrument, and receives its act and power (actum et virtutem) from it. The agent intellect is form strictly speaking, and the intelligible is material in relation to it, though it is still formal to the possible intellect.<sup>99</sup> The agent intellect is thus able to remain a simple and undifferentiated essence in itself and yet cause distinct species in the possible intellect, through the instrumentality of intelligibles.<sup>100</sup>

The agent intellect moves the possible intellect as a universal mover, which acts in the same way in all intelligibles. But the phantasm moves the possible intellect





as a particular mover. Thus the form induced in the possible intellect is of the same nature as that contained in the phantasm, and not the form of the agent intellect itself.<sup>101</sup>

Though the light of the agent intellect originally is undifferentiated, the light in one intelligible is not the same as that in another, because if it were, the same light would be the form of things specifically different.<sup>102</sup> This means that the phantasms "break up" the light of the agent intellect. This is the purpose of phantasms in human intellectual knowledge, and the reason why they are necessary. Without them there would be no specific knowledge, but knowledge of only the agent intellect as an undifferentiated light.

It would appear from what we have discovered of the agent intellect that it is itself a "super-intelligible", which is too bright for the possible intellect, and gives a knowledge which is too concentrated, so that in order to be fully intelligible it must be "broken up". The agent intellect is a simple light which contains all intelligibles eminently, that is, actually but implicitly, in an undivided simplicity. The function of the phantasm is merely to "distinguish" this light. Consequently the content of knowledge can be said to come from the agent intellect itself.



Therefore Albert can say explicitly:

"This is what many say, and few understand, that all intelligibles flow into the soul from a separated intelligence (scil., the agent intellect) and not from the things of which the intelligibles are the quiddities and forms."<sup>103</sup>

That the separated intelligence mentioned here is the agent intellect of man, and not God's intellect, is quite clear from the context, as the chapter in question deals with the agent intellect in man. Also, the paragraph immediately preceding this text says that the agent intellect is to the possible intellect as light is to its medium.

St. Albert also claims that the possible intellect is informed by the agent intellect in its knowledge of first principles. All principles are a unity, an undistinguished simplicity, in the agent intellect's light. It is only when this light is determined and delineated (determinatur et diffinitur) by the terms of the first principles that it receives division and composition, and can thus be understood.<sup>104</sup>

In the Summa de Creaturis an objection is raised against granting possible intellects to angels. The argument is that angels have only agent intellects. The reason why man needs a possible intellect is that the light of his agent intellect is indistinct, and must be



distinguished by intelligible species which are abstracted from phantasms, and a possible intellect is needed as a subject for these species. On the other hand, the light of the angelic agent intellect is already distinct, without any need of species. Therefore the angels do not need intelligible species or possible intellects.

It is answered by Albert that if the agent intellect of the angel does not have something to distinguish it, distinct knowledge will not result. Accordingly angels must have possible intellects so that they might have intelligible species. If no species were present, only the undifferentiated light of the agent intellect would be known.<sup>105</sup>

What interests us in this answer is that St. Albert does not state that the object of knowledge of the angels is intelligible species, but rather he holds that what is known is really the light of the agent intellect, and the purpose of intelligible species is merely to "break up" this light in order that the possible intellect can gain knowledge.

It will be instructive at this point to compare St. Albert's doctrine of abstraction with that of Avicenna, especially concerning the part played by the agent intellect. Avicenna had held that each man has his own



possible intellect, but that there is one agent intellect for all men.<sup>106</sup> This unique agent intellect is to the possible intellects of different men as the sun is to our sense of sight. When a possible intellect considers phantasms, it is illumined by the agent intellect. The forms in the phantasms are then despoiled of their matter and its appendages and imprinted in the possible intellect.

This manner of speaking might give the impression that the forms which are impressed on the possible intellect come from the phantasms, or that the form in the phantasm, when it is immaterialized, begets its like in the possible intellect. To clear up this misunderstanding, Avicenna tells us that the consideration of the immaterialized form merely prepares the possible intellect for the reception of the corresponding form directly from the agent intellect.<sup>107</sup>

According to St. Albert, the reason why Avicenna wanted the forms of knowledge to come from the agent intellect and not from the phantasms was that a spiritual being can move the beings below it, but can not be moved by them. The intellect can move the phantasms, but the phantasms because of their materiality can not move the intellect. The intellect can not be moved by the very thing which it itself acts on. Hence the forms of knowledge must come from the intellect itself.<sup>108</sup>





St. Albert's criticism of Avicenna is that for the latter the outside world has no part in intellectual knowledge, and is not necessary for it. The body and its senses also contribute nothing to this knowledge, and are likewise unnecessary. Since the forms of knowledge are received from the agent intellect, and not from the phantasms and the outside world, man's body is superfluous.

The role of the phantasms in Avicenna's noetic remains a mystery to St. Albert. If the forms of knowledge do not come from the phantasms, how can the phantasms affect knowledge at all? Why would one not know immediately all the forms in his agent intellect? Even though the agent intellect were to illumine the phantasms, what would this have to do with knowledge, since the corresponding forms come directly from the agent intellect itself?<sup>109</sup>

The phantasms can not even be the occasions of knowledge. Since they do not affect the agent intellect in any way, how can they determine it to give<sup>now</sup> one form, and now another? There is no explanation. The agent intellect does not need the phantasms at all.<sup>110</sup>

St. Albert avoids the position of Avicenna by saying that the forms of knowledge come from the outside world. The senses and the body are necessary to produce phantasms through which the forms come to the possible intellect. Yet really these forms come just as much from



the agent intellect itself. What is the precise contribution of the outside world? The phantasms gained from it limit or determine the light of the agent intellect. This "determination" is a real function, and makes the phantasms absolutely necessary for the acquisition of intellectual knowledge, but, nevertheless, the part played by the agent intellect is much greater than if the agent intellect were to act on the possible intellect only indirectly.

St. Albert's doctrine resembles Avicenna's in this, that the agent intellect contains within itself all intelligibles. But it differs from it also, because it teaches that the agent intellect contains these intelligibles in an undivided simplicity, and not as actually distinct. Moreover, each man has his own agent intellect for St. Albert. Nevertheless the agent intellect which St. Albert attributes to the soul of each man is, as we can see, very much like the unique agent intellect which Avicenna granted to the whole human race.

Let us now attempt a summary of St. Albert's teaching concerning the agent intellect and its role in abstraction:

- (a) An agent intellect is necessary to produce intelligibles from phantasms.
- (b) Each man has his own agent intellect, for otherwise:
  - (i) Man would be lacking in intellectuality.



- (ii) Individual orders of intelligibility would lack their proper efficient cause.
- (iii) Man would be an imperfect being.
- (c) The agent intellect is necessary in order to render universal the forms of things which even in singular things are in themselves non-singular but not yet fully universal.
- (d) In his discussion of the nature of universals St. Albert is in the Aristotelian and not the Augustinian tradition, and he follows Avicenna's doctrine fully.
- (e) The agent intellect acts directly on the possible intellect. Evidence for this is furnished by:
  - (i) the comparison of the agent intellect with light,
  - (ii) the nature of the intellect's knowledge of itself,
  - (iii) the manner in which the intellectual memory functions.
- (f) In all intelligibles the possible intellect knows the light of the agent intellect.
- (g) This doctrine is taken from Averroes, but is developed much more fully than in Albert's source.



- (h) The body, with its external and internal senses, is necessary in order to enable the agent intellect to produce intelligible species.
- (i) These species merely limit or determine the light of the agent intellect to this or that intelligible being. This teaching, too, is taken from Averroes.
- (j) Intellectual knowledge is pre-contained in the agent intellect actually but implicitly.
- (k) In this teaching Albert follows Avicenna to a great extent, although he modifies the doctrine of the latter on important points.

St. Albert seems to have been using two different kinds of terminology to describe intellectual knowledge. He asserts that the agent intellect illumines sensory species in the phantasy in order to produce intelligible species which act on the possible intellect. He also teaches that for all knowledge of intelligible species the possible intellect receives the light of the agent intellect. A first reconciliation of these different descriptions of intellectual knowledge can be made by using Averroes' doctrine that the light of the agent intellect actualizes all intelligible species so that when knowledge takes place this light informs the intelligible species which in turn informs the possible intellect.





Accordingly the light of the agent intellect can be said to inform the possible intellect. This explanation borrowed from Averroes is one way of explaining how the possible intellect receives intelligible species and also receives the light of the agent intellect.

But a deeper reconciliation of these two ways of describing intellectual knowledge is that based on Avicenna's noetic. The function of the intelligible species is merely to limit or determine the light of the agent intellect, so that what is received by the possible intellect is not the light of the agent intellect in its entirety but part of this light. This explains how intellectual knowledge consists in the possible intellect receiving the light of the agent intellect. But how does it justify the assertion that the possible intellect receives intelligible species? The only explanation is that the light of the agent intellect is the intelligibles. It contains all intelligibles in an undivided simplicity, and its light is proportioned to different intelligible species when they are known. Thus to hold that the possible intellect receives the light of the agent intellect is for St. Albert equivalent to saying that it receives an intelligible species. This is the only way in which his teachings can be unified.

If we reduce the function of intelligible



species to that of merely limiting the light of the agent intellect, we have a possible explanation of why the possible intellect does not appropriate or individuate intelligible species in any way. We have considered the problem of how the possible intellect can receive intelligible forms at all if it does not render them somehow singular. As we have seen, St. Albert does not answer this question satisfactorily.<sup>111</sup> However, it is of some value to hazard a guess as to why this does not seem to have disturbed him. For Albert, intellectual knowledge consists in the reception by the possible intellect of the light of the agent intellect. Intelligible species serve the purpose of determining this light. Possibly it is because Albert's thought concentrates on the possible intellect receiving the agent intellect that he is content to leave undetermined the precise relationship of the possible intellect to the intelligible species. Perhaps it is because knowledge does not consist in the union of possible intellect and intelligible species, but in the union of possible intellect and agent intellect, that the species can remain unappropriated by the possible intellect and yet knowledge can take place. Of course this is not a demonstration, but merely an indication of a tentative solution to the difficult problem of interpreting St. Albert's thought.

We began our study of the agent intellect with



the intention of discovering whether its nature and operation indicated any relationship between abstraction and illumination. We have now laid the groundwork for investigating this relationship. To do so we shall examine more fully the action of the agent intellect on the possible intellect. This will require a long development, and therefore is reserved for the next chapter.



CHAPTER IV

MAN'S KNOWLEDGE OF SEPARATED SUBSTANCES

So far we have seen the roles of the senses, the possible intellect, and the agent intellect in abstraction. We have learned that each of these is necessary for abstraction to take place, and have noticed in particular that when the mind knows intelligible forms the possible intellect is directly informed by the light of the agent intellect. We shall now study more deeply the action of the agent intellect on the possible intellect.

A great deal can be learned about this action from an examination of St. Albert's teaching concerning man's knowledge of spiritual substances. This doctrine will enlighten us at the same time concerning another question, namely, whether abstraction is man's only mode of knowing. We thus have a two-fold purpose in this chapter. The first is to see in greater detail how the agent intellect acts on the possible intellect in abstraction. The second is to discover whether spiritual substances are known by abstraction or whether they are grasped by another avenue of knowledge. Both of these questions are answered by St. Albert in the same context, where he deals with man's cognition of





immaterial substances.

Aristotle, in his De Anima,<sup>1</sup> raised the question whether or not we can know anything immaterial: "Whether it is possible for it (the mind) while not existing separate from spatial conditions, to think anything that is separate, or not, we must consider later." Aristotle did not carry out his promise, as the editors of the English translation note.<sup>2</sup>

The problem was taken up, however, by Aristotelian commentators, whose doctrines were known by St. Albert, sometimes directly, but at least indirectly. St. Albert reviews the teachings of these men in his own Commentary on the De Anima, and after this gives his own solution to the problem. For him, to decide whether man can know substances separated from matter is to settle the problem whether man has two modes of knowing. Our intellect is joined to the magnitude of sensible things, and if it knows things separated from magnitude, it will not receive knowledge of them from phantasms, but by being joined to a separated intelligence which gives it intelligible forms.<sup>3</sup> Thus if we can know separated substances, we receive this knowledge from a separated substance above us, and not by means of abstraction from phantasms. Let us, then, examine St. Albert's outline of the doctrine of his predecessors in connection with this problem of



our knowledge of separated substances, and see his evaluation of their teachings, and his own solution. We shall consider especially the following: Alexander of Aphrodisias, Themistius, Alfarabi, Avempace, Avicenna, and Averroes.

St. Albert knew of the teachings of Alexander of Aphrodisias (fl. 198-211 A.D.) through Averroes' Commentary on the De Anima, and possibly also through Averroes' Tractatus de animae beatitudine, of which the Epistola de connexione intellectus cum homine is a part. Albert also had the Latin text of the De Intellectu attributed to Alexander. Some writings attributed to Alexander had been translated into Latin at the end of the twelfth century. The De Intellectu was translated by Gerard of Cremona (d. 1187) from an Arabic text of Ishaq ben Honein and a Greek text, and this was the translation used by Albert.<sup>4</sup>

According to Albert, Alexander taught that the possible intellect is a material and corruptible power.<sup>5</sup> He also held that the agent intellect is separated in being from the human soul. As efficient cause it leads the possible intellect from potency to act by producing intelligibles. These intelligibles are also corruptible, that is, they cease to be when the possible intellect ceases to be. When the possible intellect is fully perfected by its intelligibles the agent intellect is



joined to it no longer as the efficient cause of its knowledge, but as its form. When this happens all other separated substances can be known.<sup>6</sup>

The argument given by Alexander to show that we can know separated substances is that just as man's ability to walk improves from the time he is born until it is fully developed, so our possible intellect can be perfected until it is able to understand separated substances (res que de natura sunt intelligibiles).<sup>7</sup> This highest degree of our intellectual power is called by Alexander the acquired intellect (intellectus adeptus).<sup>8</sup>

Albert's report of Alexander states that intelligibles are acquired from phantasms by the action of the agent intellect acting as efficient cause, and that the possible intellect is thus illumined more and more by the light of the intelligibles. Finally it is sufficiently disposed so that the agent intellect is united to it as its form.<sup>9</sup>

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St. Albert also knew the doctrine of Themistius (c. 320 - 390 A.D.) through Averroes' Commentary on the De Anima. The Commentary on the De Anima by Themistius himself was not translated into Latin until just before 1270 (from the Greek, possibly by William of Moerbeke).<sup>10</sup>



Averroes, however, had this work, as he himself tells us.<sup>11</sup>

Closely associated with Themistius in the eyes of St. Albert was Theophrastus (in charge of the Lyceum 322 - 288/7 B.C.); these two men are treated as contemporaries, and are considered to have held the same doctrine.<sup>12</sup> This was Albert's own mistake, as it is not found in his source, Averroes.

According to Averroes, Themistius taught that the intellectual principle in man is a substance separated in being from the human soul, but joined to it in operation.<sup>13</sup> That Averroes considered this to be the teaching of Themistius is proved by his use of the word continuatio to describe the relation of the intellect to the soul.<sup>14</sup> This is the language which Averroes uses in his own system to speak of the relation of the unique agent and possible intellects to the phantasms of individual men. Albert speaks in many texts, however, in such a way that one cannot tell whether or not he thought that for Themistius each man has his own intellect.

Themistius and Theophrastus, Albert tells us, said that our intellect itself is immaterial, and yet can know material things. Much more, then, should it be capable of knowing immaterial things. This, Albert assures us, is only a probable argument, and not a necessary one.<sup>15</sup>

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For Alfarabi (d. 950 A.D.) the agent intellect is separated from the soul, and is one for all men.<sup>16</sup> He said that the agent intellect first causes intelligibles to be formed in the possible intellect (intellectus in potentia), thus constituting the intellect in act or the speculative intellect (intellectus in effectu). When all, or nearly all, the intelligibles are produced, the intellect (now called the intellectus adeptus or acquired intellect) is capable of receiving the forms of separated substances.<sup>17</sup>

For Alfarabi the end of man is to be united to his agent intellect, and this union brings about in him a new life.<sup>18</sup> In this new life man acts by apprehending his own essence.<sup>19</sup> His body is then no longer necessary, though he needs the senses and the imagination until his intellectus adeptus is acquired.<sup>20</sup>

St. Albert also tells us that Alfarabi was of the opinion that Aristotle, in the tenth book of his Nicomachean Ethics, answered the question he raised in his De Anima, whether man could know separated substances.<sup>21</sup> However, Aristotle does not say in his Ethics that we are joined to our agent intellect, or that we can know separated substances in themselves, but he does say that our ultimate happiness consists in contemplation, and that this is a divine life,<sup>22</sup> and the activity of the gods.<sup>23</sup> And St. Albert says that Aristotle "almost" says that we can



be joined to our agent intellect as to our form, and know separated substances.<sup>24</sup>

Albert also mentions two other philosophers, little known, who "almost" interpreted Aristotle's Ethics in this sense: Michael Ephesius and Eustratius.<sup>25</sup>

Michael lived in the late eleventh and early twelfth century, and Eustratius (c. 1050-1120) was Metropolitan of Nicaea.<sup>26</sup> The commentary of Eustratius on this part of the Ethics does not seem to be extant, but Michael says in his commentary that at the height of our intellectual perfection we are illumined by God.<sup>27</sup> He does not say, however, that our agent intellect becomes the form of our possible intellect; nor does he say that we can know separated substances.

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For Avempace (Ibn Badja, d. 1138 A.D.) the possible intellect is the phantasy, and not part of the rational soul. It is generable and corruptible with individual men. Like Alfarabi, Avempace said that the agent intellect is separated from the soul and is one for all men. He also said that man can come to know separated substances, but he added that he does this by a power different from that by which he knows material beings. For in man there are two kinds of powers. One



kind is human, and knows by means of phantasms those things which are conceived with matter (physical and mathematical beings). The other power is divine, and belongs to man because he is a vestige of a separated intelligence.<sup>28</sup>

Avempace had two arguments to show that we can know separated substances. First, the intellect abstracts from our objects of knowledge their quiddity. For the very power of intellection is the ability to abstract the forms and quiddities of the objects we know. Now, what we know intellectually is either a quiddity, or a quiddity mixed with something else, or something which has no quiddity at all. If it is a pure quiddity, it is separated from matter, and our intellect can then know things which are separated from matter. If it is a quiddity mixed with something else, our intellect will be able to free it from this admixture and finally to grasp it in itself, for this is the very nature of the intellect's power. We must admit, then, that we can finally know what is separated from all matter. Of course, if it has no quiddity, it is nothing at all. Hence we must conclude that our intellect can know that which is separated from matter. That is, whatever the intellect knows is a quiddity separated from matter, whether it is separated in itself or separated by the intellect.



The second argument leading to the conclusion that we can know separated substances is the following. When several persons know the same quiddity, the quiddity known by them is one for all. The only way in which it can be multiplied in knowledge is by being particularized in the senses and the phantasy. The universal, however, in itself, is free from matter and not individualized in any way. Thus our intellect, by knowing any universal, knows what is separated from matter.<sup>29</sup>

According to St. Albert,<sup>30</sup> Abubacher (Abou Bekr ibn Thofail, d. 1185) is associated with Avempace in holding that we can know separated substances. However, this is not stated by Averroes, who is Albert's source.

St. Albert does not explicitly criticize the two arguments of Avempace allegedly proving that we can know separated substances. St. Thomas Aquinas calls these arguments frivolous, and points out that universals are only in the mind, and cannot exist in themselves, and so cannot be separated substances.<sup>31</sup> St. Albert, however, makes this same criticism implicitly. He asks whether knowledge of the quiddities separated by our intellect from matter is the same as knowledge of separated substances.<sup>32</sup> And he tells us that if this knowledge is different, perhaps the same intellectual





power can not know both.<sup>33</sup>

St. Albert points out two difficulties in any theory which holds that we can know separated substances. One difficulty is that this type of knowledge is quite different from our knowledge of material things. The arguments of Alexander and Themistius seem to assume that the knowledge of separated substances differs only in degree from that of material beings. But these knowledges are widely different. Perhaps they are only equivocally called "knowledge". And even if they are not equivocally called "knowledge", they certainly are not called "knowledge" in exactly the same sense, and are quite different from each other. And Aristotle says that "Where objects differ in kind, the part of the soul answering to each of the two is different in kind, since it is in virtue of a certain likeness and kinship with their objects that they have the knowledge they have."<sup>34</sup> If, then, material beings and separated substances are so different in kind, they will be known by different powers. For a power and its object must have a certain affinity or proportion. Every power cannot know every object. And what evidence have we that man has a special power with which to know just separated substances?<sup>35</sup>

A second difficulty in holding that we can know separated substances is that there is no speculative



science of them, as there is of material beings. We do not know separated substances as we do material substances. We know them only slightly in so far as we can find out about them through material beings. We do not know the properties of separated substances in themselves except by knowing those properties as they are found in corporeal and mobile substances. If we can know separated substances in themselves, where is this knowledge?<sup>36</sup>

We might say that there is a natural science of separated substances, but that man has not yet found it. This might be explained by saying that man has not yet found the principles, the basic starting-points, of this science, as is true for alchemy. Or it may be that man has not yet sufficiently exercised himself in studying and developing this science. But both of these explanations are improbable, because there are so many men concerned. And if we say that only some men have this power, we are dividing men into two categories such that we make of man two different species, because to be capable of knowing separated substances is such a tremendous power that a being with this power is quite different from a being which lacks it.<sup>37</sup>

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Albert had in his possession the Sifa (The Healing) of Avicenna, the only philosophic work of his known to the Latins.<sup>38</sup> It was translated in part by Avendeath and Gundissalinus in Toledo c. 1150. The part translated included the De Anima (Liber Sextus Naturalium) and the Metaphysics, with which we are concerned.<sup>39</sup>

For Avicenna there is one agent intellect for all men, separate in being from human souls. Each man has his own possible intellect.<sup>40</sup> According to Albert, Avicenna teaches that at first our possible intellect is devoid of forms. As more and more forms are acquired, the possible intellect becomes more fully turned to the agent intellect. When at last this turning to the agent intellect is perfected, the agent intellect becomes itself the form of the possible intellect, and the possible intellect is thus enabled to know separated substances.<sup>41</sup>

Avicenna does not say exactly that the agent intellect becomes the form of the possible intellect. But he does say that our possible intellect can be joined in a special way to the agent intellect. Before learning, our aptitude to be joined to it is imperfect. After learning, it becomes complete. When we try to grasp an intelligible object we are really turning our possible intellect toward the agent intellect. In this life



it takes a long time to become ever more united to the agent intellect, but after death we can be joined to it in an intimate union and find in this union our eternal intellectual perfection.<sup>42</sup>

We cannot know separated substances in this life, because our body impedes us. We need our body, it is true, but nevertheless it is the body which holds us back from our highest perfection. And at death this impediment will be removed, and we shall be able to know separated substances.<sup>43</sup>

Albert considers Algazel (d. 1111) as the follower (insecutor)<sup>44</sup> of Avicenna, mistakenly, but with good reason. Algazel wrote a treatise called the Maqâcid (on the Intentions of the Philosophers), expounding the doctrines of previous philosophers, especially Alfarabi and Avicenna. Algazel also wrote another treatise called the Tahâfot (The Destruction of the Philosophers), refuting their errors. These two works became separated, and only the Maqâcid was known to Albert. It was translated c. 1150 by Dominicus Gundissalinus at Toledo. Hence, for Albert, Algazel was merely the echo of Avicenna.<sup>45</sup>

Thus, for Albert, Algazel taught the same doctrine as Avicenna. He said that the agent intellect is separate from the soul,<sup>46</sup> and that when the possible intellect





is perfected in its aptitude to receive knowledge from the agent intellect, after death it is eternally joined to the agent intellect, and can know without the body. This happens, however, only to those who have prepared themselves for it.<sup>47</sup>

St. Albert criticizes Avicenna and Algazel for not being more precise concerning our knowledge of separated intelligences after death. These intelligences are of many orders. To which of them does our intellect turn? If it is turned to them all, is it turned to all in the same way, or in different ways, and what is the reason for the difference? These men have not touched on these difficult questions.<sup>48</sup>

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It is chiefly from Averroes (d. 1198 A.D.) that St. Albert has taken up the problem of our knowledge of spiritual substances. Averroes has been his main source of information concerning the doctrines of his predecessors. After discussing these earlier men, St. Albert examines the teaching of the great Arabian himself.

For Averroes there is one agent intellect and one possible intellect for all men.<sup>49</sup> The agent intellect illumines the phantasms; and the forms in them, when immaterialized, are impressed on the possible



intellect.<sup>50</sup> The agent intellect can therefore produce forms in the possible intellect only when the corresponding phantasm is present. This explains why knowledge takes place only gradually in an individual man. His phantasms must first be so disposed that the universal can be drawn from them. An individual man is said to know intellectually when the separated agent intellect impresses a form from this man's phantasm on the separated possible intellect.

This teaching of Averroes explains why learning is not just remembering, even though the separated possible intellect is always possessed of all knowledge.<sup>51</sup> For, in so far as an individual man is concerned, learning is the "acquisition" of a form not previously elicited from his own senses and phantasy. Thus the senses and the body are necessary for the production of knowledge.

When we begin to learn, we can say that our possible intellect is becoming joined to our agent intellect. At first, before learning, we are joined to it only potentially. As learning progresses, we become gradually more and more united to it. At the term of our knowledge the agent intellect becomes joined to us as our form. We can then know by the action proper to the agent intellect, and we can know all that it knows.<sup>52</sup> Averroes says that we can know all beings, including separated substances; and that our knowledge is like God's.<sup>53</sup>



In this way Averroes is able to explain why knowledge is a slow process, and especially knowledge of separated substances.<sup>54</sup> He can also explain why the knowledge of separated substances is not a speculative science as other speculative sciences are, for it is a knowledge that cannot even begin without a great deal of preparation, and it comes only at the terminus of knowledge.<sup>55</sup>

For Averroes, man is different from other beings in this world in two ways. First of all, he is the instrument of the separated intellects in the highest possible manner. That is, his phantasy is used by them as a source of knowledge, and thus man can truly be said to know intellectually. Secondly, man can be joined in an even more intimate manner to the separated agent intellect, because it can finally become the form of his possible intellect and make man like God.<sup>56</sup>

It may be pointed out that in Averroes' De Anima there is no provision for personal immortality; it seems that the human soul ceases to exist at death,<sup>57</sup> and that the ultimate end of man is to know the separated substances in this life. This is different from the doctrine of Avicenna, who taught a doctrine of personal immortality, and said that we know separated substances only after death.

A recent article has shown the possibility of



personal immortality in Averroes. It points out that he does not explicitly deny it, and that in the Destructio Destructionum he holds it as a possibility, though not demonstrable. In the Destructio, too, Averroes accepts the doctrine of the resurrection of the body. It may be, then, that Averroes thinks the soul goes out of existence at death and returns at the resurrection, or that Averroes is merely trying to placate the orthodox Moslems, or that his teaching is self-contradictory.<sup>58</sup> In any case, if one had only the De Anima to judge by (as did Albert), he would judge that for Averroes there is no personal immortality, and that man's ultimate happiness is to be found only in this life, if it is found at all.<sup>59</sup>



Albert states that nearly all his Latin contemporaries hold that we can know separated substances only by means of sense knowledge, and indirectly. From phantasms we can know directly the forms of material things. However, we can also know immaterial forms. But we do not know them in the same way, that is, directly. We can know them only indirectly, and not in themselves. We can know them only as causes of certain effects presented to us directly.<sup>60</sup>

St. Albert points out that his Christian contemporaries fail to answer the question how we know separated





substances, for we certainly do finally come to know them. (Whether we come to this knowledge in this life or in the next, St. Albert does not make clear at this point, though he will presently hold that it is in this life.) If the soul can know these substances, it must have the power to do so. This power will also be different from our ordinary power of knowing, which is limited to knowledge gained from the senses.<sup>61</sup>

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Let us at this point sum up the opinions of St. Albert's forerunners concerning our knowledge of separated substances. According to Alexander of Aphrodisias, Themistius, Alfarabi, Avempace, Avicenna, and Averroes, man is capable of understanding separated substances. Avicenna, however, says that this knowledge is possible only in the next life. According to Alexander, Alfarabi, Avicenna, and Averroes, this power of knowing separated substances is acquired only after the possible intellect is perfected by intelligibles. In this state the agent intellect is said by Avicenna to be joined in a special way to the possible intellect, and Averroes says that the agent intellect becomes our form. It is also taught by Alfarabi that man can then know without the senses.

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St. Albert agrees with those who have gone before him that the possible intellect can be joined to the agent intellect as to its form, and can then know separated substances.<sup>62</sup> Our agent intellect is joined to us in three ways. First of all, it is naturally joined to us as a power of our soul. Secondly, when it illumines intelligibles, it is joined to us as efficient cause of our knowledge. Thirdly, it is joined as form to our possible intellect.<sup>63</sup>

Albert begins his solution of the problem of whether man can know separated substances by saying that he disagrees with Averroes only in a few things. This is the context of the famous remark of Albert: Nos autem dissentimus in paucis ab Averro.<sup>64</sup>

The only disagreement is this: for Albert the agent intellect and the possible intellect are powers of each human soul; for Averroes they are separated in being from the soul, and are one in number for all men.<sup>65</sup> Now, this is a very great difference in doctrine, and of course Albert elsewhere combats Averroes vigorously on this point, as we have seen.<sup>66</sup> But what Albert is concerned with here is just our knowledge of separated substances.

He perhaps can overlook Averroes' doctrine of the unicity of the possible intellect without great



disturbance because when he was writing his De Anima no Latins had thought of accepting Averroes' teaching.<sup>67</sup> If there is no practical danger from Averroes' doctrine, and some points of his teaching are quite worthy of approval, why not accept these points gladly?

Albert agrees with Alfarabi that the philosopher can hope to be joined to his agent intellect not only in so far as it is the efficient cause of the intelligibles in the possible intellect, but also in so far as it is the form of the possible intellect. When the agent intellect is the efficient cause of knowledge, it acts by itself, though it acts in the possible intellect. When it is the formal cause of the possible intellect, however, man is joined to it so closely that we can say that man himself understands and performs his properly human operation through it.<sup>68</sup>

When St. Albert says that he agrees with the teaching of Averroes, not only does he mean that he agrees that we can know separated substances, but he also means that he judges Averroes to have given the true description of how this is made possible. (In causa autem quam inducemus et modo conveniemus in toto cum Averroee.)<sup>69</sup> That is, he agrees that the agent intellect becomes the form of the possible intellect, and that this comes about by the gradual perfection of the possible intellect by



the agent intellect acting as efficient cause of intellection.

St. Albert, however, does not accept the teaching of Averroes without adding to it a further explanation of his own. Let us examine his explanation of the manner in which our agent intellect becomes the form of our possible intellect. The agent intellect makes what is potentially understood to be actually understood, and thus is the efficient cause of intellection. The objects on which the agent intellect acts are stripped of matter, and made like the agent intellect in this respect (i.e., immaterial). We saw in the last chapter that in all intelligibles the possible intellect receives the light of the agent intellect. This teaching becomes a key doctrine at this point. When the possible intellect receives more and more the light of the agent intellect, it becomes more and more like the agent intellect. It is joined more closely to the agent intellect. When the possible intellect has received all intelligibles, it has the light of the agent intellect adhering to it as its form. But, since the agent intellect is its own light, the agent intellect itself is now the form of the possible intellect. This composite of the possible intellect and the agent intellect is called by the Peripatetics the acquired intellect or divine intellect





(intellectus adeptus et divinus).<sup>70</sup>

For St. Albert, the agent intellect is simple and undivided. Intelligibles in it are in an undivided simplicity. All the intelligibles are its substance, its life, and its light.<sup>71</sup> The agent intellect in itself is a simple and undivided light. When the possible intellect receives from the agent intellect all the "broken-up" lights, the intelligibles, these once more form the complete and indivisible light which is the agent intellect. Thus, when the possible intellect is informed by all intelligibles, it is actually informed by its own agent intellect.

A man is said to receive or take up (accipit, adipiscitur) his own intellect by actualizing it. That is, the possible intellect is at first in potency to all intelligibles. When it is actualized by its intelligibles, it is "received" or "taken up". When its full potentiality is filled up, man is said to take up his own possible intellect fully.<sup>72</sup> However, St. Albert also understands the intellectus adeptus to mean the possible intellect when it has taken up not only itself, but also the light of its agent intellect.<sup>73</sup>

He agrees with all the Peripatetics that the agent intellect is more separated than the possible intellect.<sup>74</sup> Both the agent and possible intellects,



for Albert, are immaterial powers. They are separated from matter in their being and in their operation. But neither of them is separated from the soul in being. The possible intellect, however, is closer to us, metaphorically speaking. It is more "our" intellect. It is the intellect of which we are more aware. It is the intellect with which we first come consciously in contact. We gradually "take up" our possible intellect by acquiring our speculative intellect.<sup>75</sup> But we do not "take up" our agent intellect until our speculative intellect is complete and we achieve our acquired intellect, the intellectus adeptus.

St. Thomas Aquinas makes two objections against a teaching such as St. Albert's concerning the agent intellect becoming the form of the possible intellect. St. Thomas says, first of all, that no man could come to know all intelligibles in this life.<sup>76</sup> He adds that it is impossible, merely by knowing all material things, for the possible intellect to be fully united to the agent intellect. The reason for this is that the power of the agent intellect extends not only to all material forms but also to separated substances, according to the position of the men in question. Hence the possible intellect, by knowing all material things, could not be fully united to the agent intellect.<sup>77</sup> St. Albert nowhere considers



these two objections.

If he were to confront them, he might answer that it is not necessary to know every single intelligible in order to reach the intellectus adeptus, but that the knowledge of most of the intelligibles is sufficient to unite the possible intellect to the agent intellect as to its form. Perhaps he might say, too, that the possible intellect is fully united to the agent intellect by means of abstraction from material things because the power of the agent intellect does not of itself extend to immaterial things, but merely receives this light from above.

Besides the statements of St. Albert which we have just met ("We however dissent from Averroes in but a few things", "Concerning the reason we shall adduce, and the manner, we shall agree completely with Averroes", and "We accept two teachings from Alfarabi"), we have repeated assurance that in this section of his Commentary on the De Anima, St. Albert is giving his own doctrine concerning man's knowledge of separated substances. At the beginning of his treatment of intellectual knowledge, he says:



"And because I am undertaking things which are most difficult, yet most worthy of being known, I therefore wish first of all to explain as well as I can all that Aristotle teaches, and then to mention the opinions of other Peripatetics, and after this to consider Plato's opinions, and then finally to give my own opinion."<sup>78</sup>

At the beginning of his treatment of man's knowledge of spiritual substances, he says:

"However, because of the excellence of the doctrine, we wish to make an examination here in order to pass judgment on all the operations of the intellect together, as much as God will give us light in these matters. But first we wish to indicate what the Peripatetics have said concerning this question, and then our own teaching. And we shall show how it agrees with or differs from what the other Peripatetics have said."<sup>79</sup>

And, after finishing this treatise, St. Albert says:

"We have said in that question what seemed (true) to us, for it seems to us that in this life (the possible intellect) is joined to the agent intellect as to its form (continuatur cum agente formaliter), and then through the agent intellect understands separated substances, because otherwise contemplative happiness would not be reached in this life, which is contrary to what all the Peripatetics





teach, for they say that the pledge (fiducia) of contemplation is to attain to the agent intellect as form."<sup>80</sup>

Some time after writing his Commentary on the De Anima, St. Albert wrote his De Intellectu et Intelligibili, in which he completed his doctrine of the Commentary on the De Anima, as he himself tells us.<sup>81</sup>

We know from Albert's own words that in the second book of the De Intellectu et Intelligibili he is expressing his own doctrine, and not merely reporting that of others. After stating that the intellectus adeptus is acquired when a man gains all the intelligibles to which he is in potency, Albert says that he has written the truth.<sup>82</sup>

Moreover, in the De Unitate Intellectus he endorses what he had written in the earlier work in question. The De Unitate Intellectus was written by him at the request of Pope Alexander IV,<sup>83</sup> and Albert states explicitly that it represents his personal views.<sup>84</sup>

Now, before outlining his teaching concerning the nature of the intellect in this work, he says that he has proved elsewhere what he is about to say, and treated it more fully.<sup>85</sup> At the close of his exposition, he says:



"And this for certain was the understanding of Aristotle in his words about the intellect, and it alone is true, and none other ... And this is what can more truly be said about the intellect and its nature, and we have disputed more fully about this in the book concerning the perfection of the soul, which is the second part in the book 'De Intellectu et Intelligibili' which we wrote."<sup>86</sup>

This statement deals with St. Albert's doctrine of the intellectus adeptus, as is abundantly evident from its context, for he has just explicitly taught this doctrine.<sup>87</sup> We are therefore justified in using the chapters of the second book of the De Unitate Intellectus as a genuine expression of his thought.

Our intellect, Albert says in this work, is closely joined to sense and imagination. For this reason it is dark, and in relation to things completely immaterial is like a bat in relation to the light of the sun. Its vision is too weak to gaze directly upon them. Our intellect must first be exercised in studying things physical and mathematical. Only then will it be strong enough, by gaining the lights of many intelligibles, to rise to an understanding of immaterial substances (divinorum).<sup>88</sup>

The rational soul is different from a celestial intelligence. The heavenly intelligence can know the



highest intelligibles immediately. But it is necessary for the soul to rise from intelligibles which are with time and space to intelligibles which are intelligible per se. The soul goes from these intelligibles to the First Intelligible, which is the cause of all other things. Thus all intelligibles below God are helps to the knowledge of God. In so far as an intelligible "with space and time" is intelligible, it has light. Now, this light illumines the intellect. Because of this light the intellect has a greater capacity than it had before. When it is strengthened by the lower intelligibles it has gained, its power becomes proportioned to things which are intelligible in themselves, which previously it could not know.<sup>89</sup>

When man has acquired all the intelligibles from the world round about him, he has acquired the understanding proper to his nature, the intellectus adeptus.<sup>90</sup> This, however, is not the limit of his intellectual progress. The intellectus assimilativus is above the intellectus adeptus. By his intellectus assimilativus man rises as much as is possible or fitting for him to the divine intellect, the light and cause of all things. When the possible intellect has become all things in act, and has taken up the light of its agent intellect, from the light of all its intelligibles, and knowledge of



itself, it extends itself in the lights of the intelligences, gradually ascending to the simple intellect of God. The intellect thus passes from being illumined by its own agent intellect to being illumined by the light of an intelligence, and finally reaches the divine intellect.<sup>91</sup>

The higher intelligences always illumine the order subject to them, and impart their light in the proper measure to each being below them. This light, then, is always present. The human intellect thus finds it and receives it when it is prepared to do so.<sup>92</sup>

There is the possibility that someone will object that when our intellect is illumined by the intelligences above it, its own intellectual light will be made stronger and brighter, but it will not receive any distinct knowledge.<sup>93</sup> The answer to this objection is that the light of any intelligence and of God is a light which is not derived from things, but is prior to things, and includes in itself not only the general natures but also the determined natures of things, as art can include in itself not only a work in general, but, within its general idea, a particular work. Thus, when the intelligences inform us, the knowledge which they give extends to the determined natures of things.<sup>94</sup>

When the possible intellect has gained sufficient knowledge and becomes the intellectus adeptus, it no





longer needs the powers of the sensitive soul.<sup>95</sup> The soul has received bodily organs only that it might, by means of them, perfect the intellect. After this perfection has taken place, they are no longer required.<sup>96</sup>

It is important to note that St. Albert has been dealing with the perfection of the human intellect in this life. While man is still on earth his agent intellect can become the form of his possible intellect, and he can know separated substances directly. St. Albert offers as proof of this that we see the souls of happy men perfected according to the best state of wisdom. They enjoy the same divine things as God, and delight in them. The union of the possible intellect to the agent intellect as to its form is, therefore, possible, and will be found in many men here below.<sup>97</sup>

When his intellect is perfected, a man can foretell the future from the stars.<sup>98</sup> Such men can prophesy.<sup>99</sup> Sometimes the changes in exterior things obey them, as they obey the intelligences.<sup>100</sup> Now, these abilities certainly refer to the present life. Hence the intellectus adeptus can be acquired in this life.

An important text, already quoted in another connection, bears repetition, in order to show that St. Albert holds that the possible intellect is joined to the agent intellect as to its form in this life, and is



able to know separated substances. The reason which St. Albert gives for this teaching is that otherwise contemplative happiness would not be attained on earth; but this is opposed to the doctrines of all the Peripatetics, who say that the pledge of contemplative activity is to attain to the agent intellect as form.

"We have said in that question what seemed (true) to us, for it seems to us that in this life (the possible intellect) is joined to the agent intellect as to its form, and then through the agent intellect understands separated substances, because otherwise contemplative happiness would not be reached in this life, which is contrary to what all the Peripatetics teach, for they say that the pledge of contemplation is to attain to the agent intellect as form."<sup>101</sup>

And, speaking of our intellect joining itself to the light of a higher order, St. Albert affirms:

"It is the highest perfection which can happen to a man in this life, and it happens to a greater and greater degree as the soul becomes ever more receptive of the illuminations from the First Cause."<sup>102</sup>

Besides teaching that such a perfection of our intellect as had been constantly referred to is possible in this life, St. Albert also considers it as naturally attainable. To realize this, it is helpful to recall that, in the doctrine concerning our knowledge of



separated substances, St. Albert has followed the Greek and Arabian philosophers, none of whom mention that this power is other than a natural one. It seems safe to say that they consider this ability as belonging to man's nature. At any rate, St. Albert understands them to be speaking of a natural power.

In his De Unitate Intellectus, where he teaches the doctrine of the intellectus adeptus, he says that he will discuss only what can be demonstrated syllogistically, and that he will speak only "according to philosophy", and not according to Christian faith.<sup>103</sup> Also at the beginning of the De Intellectu et Intelligibili, where he treats at great length of the intellect's perfection, he says:

"We shall treat of whatever things seem to demand inquiry here, as much as we shall be able to investigate by demonstration and reason, following the footsteps of our leader."<sup>104</sup>

Since he is speaking "according to philosophy", and basing his doctrine on "demonstration and reason", he is concerned with the natural properties of the soul, which can be discovered independently of revelation. We may therefore state that St. Albert holds that it is possible for man in this life, by natural knowledge, to have his agent intellect become the form of his possible intellect, and then to be able to know separated



substances directly.

We undertook our study of man's knowledge of separated substances with two purposes in mind. We wished to investigate the manner in which the agent intellect acted on the possible intellect, and also to see whether all man's knowledge is gained by means of abstraction. We are now prepared to draw a conclusion in connection with each of these points.

The first conclusion concerns the nature of abstraction. We discovered in our last chapter that in abstraction the agent intellect acts directly on the possible intellect. The intelligible grasped by the possible intellect is in reality the light of the agent intellect. We have in the present chapter confirmed this doctrine. St. Albert has stated that the possible intellect, in receiving the intelligibles gained by abstraction from the material world, continually receives into itself the light of its agent intellect. And not only does it receive the light of the agent intellect, but it receives the agent intellect itself, for the light of the agent intellect is the agent intellect. Thus abstraction is the illumination of the possible intellect by the agent intellect, a direct illumination.

Our second conclusion is that man has in this life two natural modes of knowing. Abstraction is only





one of them. When knowledge by abstraction is completed, man is able to know by receiving by illumination from above, from the intelligences and God. This second way of knowing includes the knowledge of separated substances. When it is acquired, a man no longer has need of his external or internal senses to acquire knowledge. Man's second type of knowledge, namely, by simply turning to his agent intellect, is not at all like the first, which is knowledge by abstraction from material things. St. Albert says that these two modes of cognition are called knowledge only equivocally.<sup>105</sup>

However, knowledge by illumination is not completely unrelated to knowledge by abstraction. The latter is necessary in order that the former can come to be at all. The possible intellect is too weak to know by illumination unless it is first strengthened for this through knowing by abstraction. Abstraction and illumination are not parallel modes of knowing. Abstraction is merely the prelude to illumination, not only in the sense that it precedes it, but also in the sense that it prepares for it. And, after illumination begins, abstraction by means of the senses is no longer necessary.

St. Albert has accepted from the Greek and Arabian philosophers their teaching that man can know separated substances. He has accepted from some of them the doctrine



that this becomes possible when the agent intellect is joined in a special way to the possible intellect. But what St. Albert has contributed to these doctrines concerns the manner in which the agent intellect becomes the form of the possible intellect. It had already been stated that this process is a gradual one. Albert explains why it is gradual, and how it is ultimately terminated. He says that the agent intellect contains all the intelligibles eminently, that these are identical with its light, and that the agent intellect itself is identical with its light. This notion accounts for the way in which the agent intellect can finally become the form of the possible intellect.



CHAPTER V

ILLUMINATION

We began our thesis with the query whether St. Albert admitted the existence in this life of a natural human knowledge other than that by abstraction. In the last chapter we discovered that for him such a knowledge exists. Man is naturally able in this life to know separated substances by means of illumination from beings above himself. This doctrine, though found in St. Albert's philosophical commentaries,<sup>1</sup> expresses his personal conviction. The illumination which he teaches in these works, however, is not that usually referred to by his historians.<sup>2</sup> These men neglect the philosophical works almost entirely. They think that St. Albert's teachings in them cannot be relied upon as expressing his own views, and they concentrate on his theological treatises. Most of these writers conclude that he teaches that there is knowledge by illumination, but they fail to see the relation between the doctrines of illumination in the theological works and in the philosophical treatises. If, as we have said, his teachings on illumination in the Commentary on the De Anima and the De Intellectu et Intelligibili are his own opinions, they will not contradict what he says in his theological writings,



and it is likely that they will be similar to it or at least related to it. This similarity or relationship is what we wish to demonstrate in this chapter. First of all we shall see what St. Albert says about illumination in his theological tractates. Then we shall compare it with the teaching of the Peripatetic commentaries already studied.

There are, of course, innumerable references where Albert speaks of God illumining our mind supernaturally. There are many, too, where it cannot be decided whether he is referring to supernatural or natural illumination. All of these texts must be neglected, however, as we are concerned only with illumination on the natural level.

We shall consider the theological works in their chronological order, as follows:

Commentary on the Sentences (1243-1249)

Commentaries on Dionysius (1248-1256)

Summa Theologiae (1270-1280)

Commentary on the Sentences

The best-known text of Albert purportedly holding for the necessity of special help from God in the acquisition of natural knowledge is found here. He asks whether every truth which is known is inspired by the Holy Ghost. His reply states that four things are required in order





that the soul acquire truth. The first is a possible intellect to receive the truth. The second is an agent intellect to abstract species by its light, in order to present truth to the possible intellect. The third is an object to be known, present in itself or in an image. The fourth is the first principles of knowledge, which are used as instruments to acquire truth. Some philosophers said that these four requirements sufficed for knowledge within the scope of our intellect (ad cognitionem veri quod est sub ratione). St. Albert, however, disagrees. The light of our agent intellect, he says, does not suffice by itself to gain truth. It needs the help (applicatio) of the light of the uncreated intellect, which light is added to that of the agent intellect as the sun's light is added to that of a star. This help from above can come to the soul in two ways: first, when the light of the divine intellect is joined to the intellect's; secondly, when the light of both the divine and angelic intellects is joined to that of the agent intellect.<sup>3</sup>

His statement is based on authority. He mentions St. Augustine, who taught that God must be present in the soul as its interior master.<sup>4</sup> He refers to Dionysius, who held that human beings are led back to God by means of the angelic hierarchy.<sup>5</sup> He speaks of philosophers



who taught that an intelligence uses the soul as its instrument and imprints illuminations in it, and who said that our intellect could be joined to an intellect above it (continuatio intellectuum). This could be a reference to Alfarabi,<sup>6</sup> Avicenna,<sup>7</sup> or Averroes.<sup>8</sup> Albert mentions that one philosopher taught that even if something were known habitually it could be brought to actual knowledge only by turning to the divine light--certainly a reference to Avicenna.<sup>9</sup> It will be noticed, however, that St. Albert is more influenced by his Christian than by his Moslem sources. He asserts that even the philosophers hold this doctrine (quia etiam ipsi dixerunt).<sup>10</sup>

Professor Gilson has discovered that Christian and Arabian theories of illumination reinforced one another in the thirteenth century, especially those of St. Augustine and Avicenna. This joint influence has been called by him "Avicennizing Augustinianism".<sup>11</sup>

Professor Gilson also holds that there is an important difference in the Augustinian and the Avicennian illuminations. In the noetic of Avicenna, universal forms are given to the human possible intellect by the agent intellect which is separated in being from the human soul.<sup>12</sup> In St. Augustine's theory of knowledge, the Christian God gives to the human mind not the content of knowledge (its universal ideas), but the truth of its



judgments. The Avicennian type of illumination Professor Gilson calls "abstraction illumination" or "concept-illumination", and the Augustinian type "truth-illumination".<sup>13</sup> It is helpful to realize that there can be different kinds of illumination, and we must be careful to examine what precise manner of illumination, if any, St. Albert grants to man's natural knowledge.

In the text in the Commentary on the Sentences which we have been considering, St. Albert is speaking of natural knowledge, since he refers to knowledge in the sphere of reason (ad cognitionem veri quod est sub ratione). He holds, then, that even for natural knowledge divine help is required. He raises the question of whether grace is necessary for this act of knowing. His answer is that grace must be given, if by grace is meant any gift freely bestowed by God.

"Ad hoc ergo quaeritur, Utrum  
exigitur appositio gratiae novae,  
Dicendum quod si gratia vocatur  
quodlibet donum a Deo gratis  
datum, tunc non fit hoc sine gratia."<sup>14</sup>

It might be pointed out that it is difficult to be sure what is here meant by "grace". Does it mean a help given by God at His good pleasure, with man having no natural right to it? Or does it mean merely the divine help which is necessary for all activity, which is naturally demanded by all beings whenever they operate, and is always



given by God? For this would still be a divine gift freely given, as operation is something over and above the gift of being. In other words, is the grace Albert speaks of a supernatural or a natural grace?

In an article in his Summa de Creaturis, written a few years before the text from the Sentences just cited, St. Albert deals with the question of whether man's agent intellect is a separated intelligence. One objection to his doctrine in this article says that, according to St. Paul in his Epistle to the Corinthians, we are not sufficient to know something of ourselves as of ourselves, but that our sufficiency is from God.<sup>15</sup> In answering this objection, Albert claims that what St. Paul means is that there are certain intelligibles which are above reason, and which we do not understand unless we are illumined by the grace of God. But some intelligibles we can grasp on our own, not in the sense that we do it independently of God, but in the sense that we do it by the power of our agent intellect, which has been given to us by God.<sup>16</sup>

Thus, in the Summa de Creaturis Albert does not demand grace for some truths, namely, those which can be gained by the unaided light of our agent intellect. On the other hand, in the Commentary on the Sentences he says that all natural knowledge requires grace. Therefore,





unless he changed his mind by the time he wrote his Commentary, he is using the word "grace" in different senses. In the Summa de Creaturis he understands it to mean supernatural grace, and, in the Sentences, natural grace. That is, he teaches that some truths can be known without supernatural help from God, but that nevertheless there is required natural divine help, which can be called "grace" in the broad sense.

It is difficult to decide whether this grace is merely the ordinary help which all creatures need in order to operate, or involves something further. It would seem that the latter is the case, for Albert speaks of a light being added to the light of the agent intellect, and not merely leading the agent intellect to its own operation. Moreover, this grace sometimes includes an angelic light helping the agent intellect. Also, Albert's references to his predecessors, especially St. Augustine and Avicenna, indicate that the divine help required by man for knowledge is something quite special.

We may sum up Albert's teaching in the Sentences as follows:

- (a) Our intellect is illumined by God and the angels.
- (b) This illumination is required for all natural knowledge.
- (c) The help given to our intellect in illumination is probably a natural one.
- (d) It is more than just the general divine aid given to creatures for their operation.



### Commentaries on Dionysius

In his commentary on The Celestial Hierarchy of Dionysius, St. Albert teaches that man is naturally illumined in this life by separated substances. In commenting on St. John's text Illuminat omnem hominem venientem in hunc mundum, he says that this can be understood universally of natural illumination or particularly of illumination by grace.<sup>17</sup> This natural illumination by God could, of course, refer merely to the giving of the intellect itself.

St. Albert also says that all men are illumined by angels in their intellects to an equal extent by a natural illumination. However, only those in the state of grace (sancti) are illumined by God's free gifts, for others are rendered unfit for this by sin.<sup>18</sup> This strengthens our conclusion from the Commentary on the Sentences that St. Albert taught a doctrine of natural illumination by the angels.

### Summa Theologiae

St. Albert holds that because man's soul is made to the image of God, it is an intellectual as well as a rational substance, and its intellectual power is capable of receiving illumination made by an angel.<sup>19</sup> Now, man is the image of God in the natural powers of



his rational nature.<sup>20</sup> Since he is subject to angelic illumination by his very nature, this illumination will be natural.

An oft-quoted text in the Summa Theologiae says that our possible intellect is not able to know any object without light illumining the intellect. When it receives this light it is able to know, as an eye when illumined is able to see. When we receive natural truths (naturalia), this light is natural. When we receive truths of faith, it is gratuitous. When we grasp the objects of beatitude, it is the light of glory. All of these lights, however, are gratuitous in the sense that grace means everything superadded to nature.

"Sine lumine illustrante intellectum nullius cogniti intellectus noster possibilis perceptivus est. Per hoc enim lumen efficitur intellectus possibilis oculus ad videndum: et hoc lumen ad naturalia recipienda, naturale est: ad credenda vero, gratuitum est: ad beatificantia autem, gloria est. Totum tamen gratuitum est, secundum quod gratia dicitur omne illud quod superadditum est naturae."<sup>21</sup>

The word naturalia in this text may mean either "natural", as opposed to supernatural, or "physical", as opposed to mathematical and metaphysical. In the present case, since it is contrasted with credenda (supernatural truths of faith), it must mean "truths



naturally knowable". We may now conclude that the light by which we know natural truths is a natural light. Yet it is a grace in the sense that it is superadded to nature. Now, how can something natural be superadded to nature? St. Albert must mean that the light of our intellect is superadded to nature in the sense that operation is given over and above being. He is merely emphasizing that we need God in our intellectual operation, even for natural knowledge, just as every nature needs God not only in order to be but also in order to operate.

Further light is shed on the problem, in another part of the Summa Theologiae. St. Albert states that higher angels can illumine lower angels naturally, without grace, unless by grace is meant "something freely given", for in this sense all that the angels are and have is freely given, and therefore a grace.<sup>22</sup> This grace, he says, is not of a higher power than the angelic nature itself, considered in its natural gifts.<sup>23</sup> It would seem, then, that the "grace" required by man in natural knowledge is merely a natural help.

Having established that we know natural truths by a natural grace, St. Albert singles out one kind of natural truth for special mention and requires for it special help from God. Aristotle had said in his De Anima<sup>24</sup> that the powers of the mind are proportioned





to the realities which they grasp. St. Albert approves this doctrine. When the intellect is turned to the senses, it receives physical beings by a light which of its nature includes sensible matter. When the intellect of the mathematician is turned to an image, it receives mathematical beings by a light which of its nature does not include this or that sensible matter, since it is in all sensible matter in the same way; but it includes quantity. However, when the intellect receives divine things (divina), it receives them only in a light coming from God.

"Ad dictum Aristotelis dicendum, quod hoc necessarium est. Intellectus enim ad sensum reflexus, accipit naturalia per lumen, quod in sui ratione definitiva concipit materiam sensibilem. Mathematicus autem concipit (i.e., mathematica) reflexus ad imaginem per lumen quod in sui definitiva ratione non concipit hanc vel illam sensibilem materiam, sed in omni materia est sensibilis (sic) univoce, sicut circulus unius rationis est, sive sit in ligno, sive in ferro ... Divina autem non accipit nisi in lumine bonitatum quae sunt a primo."<sup>25</sup>

The word divina is difficult to translate. Since the general question under consideration is concerned with our knowledge of God, we might understand divina to mean "things pertaining to God". But Albert tells us in his Commentary on Aristotle's Metaphysics that



in first philosophy or metaphysics all things are called divina because God must be mentioned in their definition. For all things proceed from the first divine principles (the separated substances), where they exist as artifacts in the mind of their artificer. As artifacts are resolved into the light of the first active intellect, and are defined through it, so all things are resolved into the light of the separated substances. And the separated substances themselves are resolved into the light of God's intellect, through which they subsist and through which they are defined as through a first principle. That is why metaphysics is called the divine or theological science.<sup>26</sup>

In the text from the Summa under consideration, since divina is contrasted with naturalia and mathematica, it must mean "metaphysical objects" in general. It is quite true, of course, that metaphysics deals with God and the intelligences as its highest objects, and it is clear from the title of the article in question that St. Albert has in mind chiefly the knowledge of God, Who is the object par excellence of metaphysics. Nevertheless, first philosophy is not restricted to the knowledge of God and the intelligences.<sup>27</sup> Thus St. Albert holds that for all metaphysical knowledge our intellect requires a special light from God.



He approves a number of arguments which justify our need for special aid from God in our highest kind of natural knowledge. One proof is that no power receives what is not proportionate to itself unless something makes the power proportionate to its object. Now, God is not an intelligible proportioned to our intellect. Accordingly He cannot be known unless the intellect is raised to His level.<sup>28</sup>

Another reason is that when our intellect knows God it must have in itself something like the object known.<sup>29</sup> And St. Albert also quotes the famous passage of Psalm Thirty-five: "In Thy light we shall see Light."<sup>30</sup>

He teaches in the Commentary on the Sentences that all of man's natural knowledge requires a natural grace from God.<sup>31</sup> In the Summa Theologiae he repeats this doctrine.<sup>32</sup> Yet in the latter work he also teaches that metaphysical knowledge demands a special divine light. The divine light necessary for metaphysics is distinguished in a particular way from the intellectual light needed for physics and mathematics. It would seem that divine help is present in all natural knowledge in a common manner, and in metaphysical knowledge in a proper way also. It is not possible to decide this question definitely. However, since Albert never retracted his statement in the Sentences that all natural



knowledge requires a divine light and sometimes also an angelic light, we shall presume that his teaching on this point remains unchanged. A text in the De Intellectu et Intelligibili says that there is in the corporeal world a first agent which is the light of the sun, over which shines the light of the first agent intellect, because the sun's light would not be able to produce corporeal forms unless this higher light shone on it. It is the same in any universe, and in the soul of man there must be a similar situation in order that all things be brought to intellectual being.<sup>33</sup> This argument is used by St. Albert to prove that each man must have his own agent intellect, but it also seems to indicate that above the human agent intellect is the divine intellect, which enables it to function. This text, however, is not conclusive, and we are unable to prove definitively that St. Albert's doctrine of the Commentary on the Sentences was retained throughout his life. We shall merely assume that it was. In that case St. Albert maintains that divine help is needed for all natural knowledge, and it is required in a special way for metaphysics.

We may summarize the teachings of the Summa Theologiae so far studied, in the following points:

- (a) Illumination by God is needed for all our natural knowledge.
- (b) This illumination is a natural help.





- (c) A special illumination is required for metaphysical knowledge.
- (d) This is necessary because the most intelligible objects are so far above our intellect.

There is a neglected article in St. Albert's Summa Theologiae which is of decisive importance for our understanding of the nature of illumination. It deals with the question: "How the angel is understood by man."

An objection states that man can know by his intellect only those things which are previously in phantasms. An angel, however, does not produce phantasms unless it assumes a body. It seems, therefore, that man cannot know an angel by intellectual cognition.<sup>34</sup>

This objection, Albert answers, is founded on a false premise, namely, that man cannot know intellectually what does not exist first of all in phantasms. If this premise were true, the human intellect would never know divine things (divina), and those things which are purely intellectual, such as the first principles of substance and being. It is true, however, that man does not know physical or mathematical objects intellectually except from phantasms. When Aristotle deals with the question of man's knowledge of separated substances, he says that our intellect receives the understanding of divine things not from phantasms, but in as much as the (possible) intellect is elevated in the light of the agent intellect



into the likeness of the divine light, where it becomes the intellect which Avicenna calls the intellectus sanctus et divinus.

"Illud fundatur super quoddam falsum, scilicet quod homo non habet intellectum, qui ex phantasmate non oritur: secundum hoc enim intellectus hominis numquam acciperet divina, et ea quae pure intellectualia sunt, sicut prima substantiae et entis principia. Sed verum est, quod naturalium et mathematicorum non habet intellectum, nisi ex phantasmate. Unde etiam Aristoteles in III de Anima hanc eandem quaestionem movens, dicit, quod intellectum divinorum accipit intellectus non ex phantasmate, sed in quantum elevatur in lumine agentis intellectus ad speciem luminis divini, quod in puro splendore intelligentiae consistit: quem intellectum Avicenna vocat sanctum et divinum."

"Intellectus hominis non sic est conjunctus continuo et tempori, quin elevari possit ad lumen intelligentiae purum et clarum: et in illo potest cognitionem accipere intellectualium, quia sic non reflectitur ad sensum."<sup>35</sup>

In this text, St. Albert states that man has two ways of knowing intellectually. Physical and mathematical objects are known by one kind of knowledge, that proceeding from phantasms. Metaphysical notions, on the other hand, are gained in a quite different manner. They are not perceived by the intellect reflecting on phantasms. They are known when man's possible intellect is informed by



his agent intellect. We have now arrived at the doctrine St. Albert taught in his Commentary on the De Anima and in his De Intellectu et Intelligibili, which we studied in detail in our last chapter. St. Albert holds in his Summa Theologiae, as in the philosophical works mentioned, that man's agent intellect can so act on his possible intellect as to enable it to rise to an understanding of separated substances.

A few clarifications are necessary in connection with the first of the two quotations just given. St. Albert attributes to Aristotle the teaching that our intellect can know divine things. Albert here refers to his long treatment in the Commentary on the De Anima which is concerned with man's knowledge of separated substances. As we have seen, he there said that Aristotle "almost said" that man can know separated substances directly in this life.<sup>36</sup> Some Peripatetics actually said that man had such a capacity,<sup>37</sup> and Albert here attributes to Aristotle the view of many members of his school.

St. Albert does not say explicitly in the above quotation that our agent intellect can become the form of our possible intellect. But this is found implicitly in his words. For he says that the agent intellect elevates the (possible) intellect and enables it to know separated



substances, and he attributes this doctrine also to Avicenna. Now we have seen that, according to St. Albert, Avicenna said that the agent intellect can become the form of the possible intellect, and then the possible intellect can know separated substances.<sup>38</sup> And, in his De Intellectu et Intelligibili, Albert says that the intellectus sanctus of Avicenna comes into being when the agent intellect becomes the form of the possible intellect.<sup>39a</sup> Therefore St. Albert is restating his own doctrine of the Commentary on the De Anima and the De Intellectu et Intelligibili that man has two modes of knowing. By the lower (abstraction) he grasps physical and mathematical objects. By the higher (illumination) he receives knowledge directly from God and the intelligences. The lower kind of knowledge prepares the intellect for the higher, as the possible intellect gradually receives its own agent intellect and makes itself capable of knowledge by illumination.<sup>39b</sup>

Hence he declares that man knows divina, et eae quae pure intellectualia sunt, sicut prima substantiae et entis principia by a knowledge not arising from phantasms. It is important for us to understand what the objects of this special kind of knowledge are. First of all, the intellect knows things which are purely intellectual, such as the first principles of substance and being. These are the objects of metaphysics. In his Commentary on





Aristotle's Metaphysics, Albert states that metaphysics studies being and its "parts" and principles,<sup>40</sup> and also the principles of substance.<sup>41</sup> Moreover, in his De Unitate Intellectus he holds that the human soul gains physical knowledge by turning to the common sense, mathematical knowledge by turning to the imagination, and metaphysical knowledge from the light of the agent intellect (secundum lucem agentis).<sup>42</sup> Thus metaphysics is not known by abstraction from phantasms.

There is also another class of objects which is grasped by knowledge not arising from phantasms: divina. These divine objects are contrasted with metaphysical objects in general. Therefore they are the separated substances themselves. In the article from which the text being considered is taken, St. Albert is concerned with man's knowledge of angels. He holds that the angels and God can be known by a knowledge not gained by abstraction from phantasms.

It is important to realize that St. Albert is concerned with truths naturally knowable. He mentions two kinds of knowledge, namely, metaphysics and a direct knowledge of separated substances. Concerning metaphysics, we know that it is a natural science.<sup>43</sup> Moreover, in his De Unitate Intellectus, he teaches that it is gained other than by abstraction, and the De Unitate Intellectus



is concerned only with truths naturally knowable.<sup>44</sup> Concerning the direct knowledge of separate substances, he refers in this connection to the intellectus sanctus of the philosopher Avicenna. This intellect is dealt with by Albert in his philosophical works, which discuss only natural knowledge.<sup>45</sup> Since it is this intellect which enables man to know separated substances directly, such knowledge is natural knowledge.

Our conclusions from the whole of the Summa Theologiae are the following:

- (a) Illumination by God is needed for all natural knowledge.
  - (b) This illumination is a natural help.
  - (c) A special illumination is required for metaphysical knowledge.
  - (d) St. Albert repeats the teaching of his Commentary on the De Anima that we are naturally capable of knowing immaterial substances other than by abstraction from phantasms.
  - (e) Both metaphysical knowledge in general and the direct knowledge of separated substances in particular, are naturally attainable.
  - (f) Since all natural knowledge requires only a natural grace,<sup>46</sup> the help required for metaphysics and a direct knowledge of separated substances is a natural one.
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Now that we have studied the teaching on illumination in St. Albert's theological works, we shall examine its relationship to the doctrine of the philosophical tractates. In doing this it should be kept in mind that the Commentary on the De Anima and the De Intellectu et Intelligibili were composed after the Commentary on the Sentences and the Commentaries on Dionysius, but before the Summa Theologiae. By considering these works in their chronological order we can judge whether Albert's thought progressed over the years.

There is a development in his teaching concerning the type of illumination which is needed for certain knowledges. In the Commentary on the Sentences illumination was said to be necessary in general for all natural knowledge. In the Commentary on the De Anima and the De Intellectu et Intelligibili it was required for knowledge of a particular kind, namely, a grasp of separated substances in themselves, and certain other extraordinary natural knowledge accompanying it.<sup>47</sup>

Of course, there need be no contradiction between these two teachings. It is theoretically possible for St. Albert to have taught in the Sentences that all knowledge requires a general illumination, and to have said later in his philosophical commentaries that some knowledge also demands a special illumination, without this later addition



being a departure from his earlier thought. However, this does not seem to be the case. In the Sentences he speaks of "our intellect which receives all its knowledge from the phantasm".<sup>48</sup> In another early work, the Summa de Creaturis, when speaking of our knowledge of separated substances, he says that man by his natural powers cannot know anything unless it is somehow in sense knowledge.<sup>49</sup> He states that nothing is naturally in the apprehension of the rational soul which is not abstracted from the apprehension of the sensible soul.<sup>50</sup> In the same work it is objected that we cannot know angels at all because they are not sensible.<sup>51</sup> In reply, Albert holds that angels can be known through their sensible works or through some sensible objects on which they act.<sup>52</sup>

Thus in his early works he teaches that all natural knowledge requires divine help, but he holds that we have no knowledge except through phantasms. It is only later that he says that we can gain knowledge other than by abstraction. In the Commentary on the De Anima and the De Intellectu et Intelligibili he states that we can know separated substances by illumination.<sup>53</sup> He repeats this teaching in the Summa Theologiae, and adds that all metaphysical knowledge is acquired from above.<sup>54</sup> Assuming that he has not abandoned the doctrine that all natural knowledge needs divine illumination, we may say





that in his later works he requires in addition a special illumination in the case of metaphysics and the direct knowledge of separated substances.

By holding that special illumination is necessary not only for a knowledge of separated substances, but also for metaphysics, the Summa Theologiae may actually be adding to St. Albert's teaching in the Aristotelian commentaries. On the other hand, it may merely be making more explicit what he had already held.

A second progression in Albert's works concerns the mode of illumination, that is, it deals with the question of whether the divine help merely strengthens the intellect or gives knowledge directly, or does both of these. In the Commentary on the Sentences he says that the divine light (and sometimes an angelic light also) is added to the light of the agent intellect in order to enable it to gain truth.<sup>55</sup> The added light may merely strengthen the power of the agent intellect, or it may give extra illumination on the object from which abstraction is made, but in either of these cases it would not give knowledge directly to the intellect. It is quite possible that in this general illumination required for all natural knowledge, no knowledge-content is given from above. However, there is not sufficient information to allow us to settle the question definitely.



In any case, the philosophical writings are clearer. In the Commentary on the De Anima, St. Albert asserts that if the human intellect can know separated substances it does not know them by means of phantasms, but by being joined to a separated intelligence which gives it intelligible forms.<sup>56</sup> In the De Intellectu et Intelligibili he states that when the human intellect applies to any one of the higher intellects, from the light of this intellect there flow into the human intellect the forms and species of the higher order (a lumine istius influunt in ipsum formae et species sui ordinis), and a certain knowledge of this order is brought about in the soul in proportion to its ability to receive it.<sup>57</sup> St. Albert also says that the light of God or any intelligence informs the intellect, enabling it to know the determined natures of things.<sup>58</sup> Therefore this illumination gives the content of knowledge.

The doctrine of the Summa Theologiae at first sight appears to be quite different from that of the philosophical works. In this Summa St. Albert makes it clear that the divine light does not make the object of knowledge more knowable, but helps and disposes the intellect which knows (conferens cognoscenti, coadjuvans et disponens intellectum). It also makes the intellect like God in some way.<sup>59</sup> No doubt the reason why St. Albert



refuses to the added light the office of making the object more knowable is that the object is already highly intelligible. In fact, it is too intelligible for the human mind. Indeed, the objects of metaphysics are most intelligible in themselves, it is just that our mind is too weak to grasp them without help.

It is objected that corporeal things which are visible in themselves are seen without further illumination, and that therefore in intellectual knowledge things which are intelligible by themselves should be understood without further illumination.<sup>60</sup> St. Albert answers that the help given to the intellect does not serve as a means of making the object more knowable, but merely helps and disposes the intellect to understand. Certainly what is intelligible in itself is known directly and without a medium, but the intellect must first be strengthened.<sup>61</sup>

From these statements it might seem that, since in illumination as described in the Summa Theologiae no mention is made of knowledge-content being given, there is a contradiction between this and the teaching of the Commentary on the De Anima and the De Intellectu et Intelligibili. However, there is not necessarily a contradiction. In the Summa Theologiae St. Albert stresses the notion that our intellect is weak and needs special help to know things above itself. The things above it



are fully intelligible, but the human intellect is not capable by itself of understanding them. There is thus no need of a light to render these objects more intelligible.

In the Commentary on the De Anima and the De Intellectu et Intelligibili, St. Albert likewise insists on the weakness of our intellect in knowing objects above itself. And he does not say that a light is necessary to render these objects more knowable. He merely says that the intelligences give us knowledge. This knowledge is that which the intelligences themselves possess, though we can grasp it only imperfectly. That is, the light from above does not render objects above us more knowable in themselves. It simply gives us knowledge of them. Perhaps a parallel may be found in that illumination which is above the natural order, where angels can give both the light by which knowledge is accomplished, and the species of the objects known.<sup>62</sup>

We may therefore state that in man's higher mode of knowing his intellect is strengthened in power, and knowledge-content is also given by the intelligences and God. St. Albert says in his De Intellectu et Intelligibili that once our intellectus adeptus is attained, and the intellect is sufficiently fortified, it receives knowledge (informatur) from separated substances.





This knowledge is always present, but the intellect cannot find it unless it is prepared.<sup>63</sup> Thus the objects of knowledge in this illumination do not need to be illumined; only the intellect need be disposed. Accordingly, the strengthening of the intellect and the giving of knowledge are both required. There is no opposition in these two aspects of illumination. In the Summa Theologiae Albert emphasizes the intellect's need to be strengthened. In the De Intellectu et Intelligibili he mentions also that, after this, knowledge is given through illumination by the very fact that the intellect is capable of receiving it.

We could not decide whether or not the illumination taught in the Sentences gave a knowledge-content,<sup>64</sup> that is, whether it was a truth-illumination or a concept-illumination or a third type of illumination.<sup>65</sup> However, we may state definitely that the illumination advocated in St. Albert's later works gives knowledge to the soul. It is a concept-illumination.

A third development which we must single out in connection with illumination is one concerning man's two modes of knowing. In the Summa de Creaturis we find the teaching that man has two ways of knowing. One of them is by means of intelligible species such as the angels have. This mode, however, is used only after death. During life the soul knows by abstracting from phantasms.<sup>66</sup>



The intelligible species of the knowledge after death exist in the soul from the moment of its creation.<sup>67</sup>

The reason why they cannot be used during life is that movements concerned with the body are stronger than other movements in the soul, and exclude them.<sup>68</sup>

It is evident that this teaching is held by Albert in the Summa de Creaturis solely to show how the soul can be immortal, even if separable from the body. For it is his answer to the argument that that which cannot operate without the body cannot exist without the body.<sup>69</sup> St. Albert says that after death the possible intellect is activated by the agent intellect and the forms in the separated intelligences, and hence is not inoperative. As the philosophers say, the soul after death is turned to the First Mover, in which it finds its beatitude.<sup>70</sup>

St. Albert thus holds in this early work that man has two different ways of knowing, but that the higher mode comes into exercise only at death. We find the same teaching in the Commentary on the Sentences. We have two modes of knowledge, one by abstraction from phantasms, the other in the light of our agent intellect alone, without using phantasms.<sup>71</sup> The latter way of knowing is not exercised until death, however, because "the great frequency of sensibles and phantasms blinds the eye of



the intellect".<sup>72</sup> For example, we could know the virtue of charity in our souls, were it not for the tumult of concupiscence and phantasms in our hearts.<sup>73</sup>

We should note two points in connection with this early teaching of Albert. First, though he does not expressly say so, it is evident that our higher mode of knowledge, as well as the lower, is a natural one, for St. Albert in many places says that the human soul is naturally immortal. It must therefore be able to act after death. The second point to note is that there is no connection between Albert's teaching on illumination in his Commentary on the Sentences and his doctrine related to man's two avenues of knowledge.

In the Commentary on the Ninth Letter of Dionysius St. Albert still teaches that we can know in two ways, but he attributes both of these ways to us in the present life. There are two parts of the soul, he says. One of these knows immaterial things (accipit ipsa simplicia secundum se). The other receives knowledge from phantasms. This second kind of cognition is more connatural to the soul according to its nature, and it is this manner of knowing which we exercise more frequently. By the first part of the soul, however, we reach the intelligences. When we receive knowledge of divine things (divina) directly, without sense knowledge being used (sine symbolis),



we relate this spiritual knowledge to the sensibles we are used to, and which are connatural to our mind, in order to look on the divina more clearly.

"In anima sunt duae partes quaedam quae accipit ipsa simplicia secundum se, ut intellectus simplex: quaedam vero quae accipit a phantasmatis, et ista est magis connaturalis animae secundum naturam ejus, et in actu ejus frequentius scimus, quia accipimus scientias ex sensibilibus: sed secundum primam partem attingit intelligentias: nihilominus quamvis divina sine symbolis accepta sint, ut melius ea possimus inspicere, reducimus ad sensibilia consueta nobis et connaturalia cognitioni nostrae."<sup>74</sup>

St Albert certainly holds in this commentary on the letter of Dionysius that man in this life has two ways of acquiring knowledge. One is by abstraction from phantasms. The other must therefore be by illumination from above, for no other possibility is mentioned.

That St. Albert is concerned with natural knowledge would appear from the fact that the two modes of knowledge correspond to two "parts" of the soul. On the other hand, when he speaks of divina in his Dionysian commentaries he seems to be dealing with supernaturally revealed truths, at least primarily.

It is held in the Mariale Super Missus Est that man can know naturally in this life by a mode of knowledge





which does not operate through the senses.<sup>75</sup> This work has for a long time been attributed to St. Albert, but in recent years its authenticity has been questioned.<sup>76</sup> For this reason we shall not offer it as evidence.

In both the philosophical treatises and the Summa Theologiae St. Albert teaches that man's highest mode of knowing can be exercised in this life. Furthermore, it is identified with knowledge by illumination. Man can know naturally in two ways. The lower way is by abstraction from phantasms. The higher, which is exercised only in metaphysical knowledge and in the direct knowledge of separated substances, is by illumination from separated substances above the soul. St. Albert thus ends by identifying with illumination man's second way of knowing in this life. As he has modified gradually his doctrine of illumination, he has also changed his teaching concerning man's two avenues of intellectual knowledge. Finally he has solved both problems by allowing man to know in this life in two ways, which are abstraction and illumination.

Let us summarize our findings about the progress in St. Albert's teaching on illumination throughout all his treatises:



- (a) At first illumination was claimed to be necessary in general for all natural knowledge. Later a special illumination was required for the knowledge of separated substances. This special illumination was finally demanded for metaphysical knowledge as well.
- (b) It is not clear whether or not the illumination taught in Albert's early writings was a concept-illumination. However, that described in the later works is certainly a concept-illumination, although it also strengthens the intellect.
- (c) Beginning with a doctrine of two distinct modes of natural knowledge, one used in this life and one in the next, St. Albert changed his doctrine to allow for both types being exercised on earth, and identified these two ways of knowledge with abstraction and illumination.

We have noticed in this development of St. Albert's views the preponderant part played by the Peripatetics. This has not been shown by Albert's historians. Most of them have seen that in his theological works there is a doctrine of illumination, but many do not even mention the philosophical works, for example, M. Browne<sup>77</sup> and



G. de Mattos.<sup>78</sup> Others have merely mentioned that illumination is taught in Albert's De Intellectu et Intelligibili, for example, A. Schneider,<sup>79</sup> B. Geyer,<sup>80</sup> G. Manser<sup>81</sup> and R. Miller.<sup>82</sup> But none of these has developed the thought of the philosophical tractates, shown that it represents Albert's own conviction, and integrated it with that of the theological treatises. As a result, the notion of illumination in St. Albert has not been treated adequately up to the present time.

Mention should be made of another author, A.-M. Ethier, who denies that God illumines us in the natural order in the noetic of St. Albert. He says that there is no teaching of divine illumination in the De Intellectu et Intelligibili. He is inclined to think that the grace required for abstraction in the Comentary on the Sentences<sup>83</sup> is merely the divine help needed by any creature for its operation. He is of the opinion that in the Summa Theologiae<sup>84</sup> there is taught no illumination in the sense of specification, that is, the actual giving of knowledge.<sup>85</sup> We have already opposed each of these three views, and will not here repeat our criticism of them.

Miss R. Z. Lauer also denies that there is any theory of natural intellectual illumination in St. Albert's works,<sup>86</sup> but her arguments are too weak to merit detailed refutation.



G. de Mattos holds that St. Albert denies the existence of divine illumination in his Summa de Creaturis.<sup>87</sup> Fr. de Mattos bases his proof on the text:

"... quaedam autem rationabilia intelligimus a nobis, sed non quasi ex nobis, sed ex virtute intellectus agentis, quae data est nobis a Deo."<sup>88</sup>

However, this text does not state that man receives no divine help in his natural knowledge. It is the answer to an objection concerned with whether there is one agent intellect for all men. It merely indicates that each man possesses his own agent intellect. We admit that the passage is difficult to interpret, but certainly it is not at all clear that it denies the existence of divine illumination.

One author, J. Bonné, thinks that St. Albert has not quite rid himself of St. Augustine's illuminationism, but has abandoned it to such an extent that he is quite close to Aristotle, and has paved the way sufficiently for St. Thomas to interpret St. Augustine in an Aristotelian sense.

"By his teaching on abstraction, through which he has given an essentially new meaning to Augustine, Albert has laid the groundwork for the consistent interpretation of the Father of the Church in an Aristotelian





sense by Thomas Aquinas. Albert himself has not changed the illumination theory of Augustine so consistently into Aristotelianism, but has remained at the half-way mark."<sup>89</sup>

In the light of our findings, this statement cannot be justified. While it is true that St. Albert accepts an Aristotelian doctrine of abstraction, it is also true that it does not eliminate a theory of illumination. On the other hand, it exists side by side with it. These two teachings are equally acceptable to Albert. They complement each other. Abstraction does not rule out illumination. In fact, it is ordained to it and completed by it.

We have now seen that St. Albert taught a true theory of abstraction and also a doctrine of illumination. We have examined to some extent the relationship between these different ways of knowing. However, in order to fully appreciate their mutual connections it will be necessary to see how these two modes of cognition are dependent on St. Albert's view of the nature of man.



CHAPTER VI

KNOWLEDGE AND THE SOUL

Having investigated in detail St. Albert's doctrine of abstraction and illumination, it remains to explain the close connection between his notions of knowledge and of the soul. His teaching that there are two types of human intellectual knowledge is in full accord with his tenet that the human soul has a double definition. Furthermore, his doctrines of abstraction and illumination, and the nature of the agent and possible intellects, are related to his notion of the composition of the soul.

It would be beyond the scope of our subject to give a full treatment of his teaching on the nature of the soul. We shall limit our remarks to what is necessary for our present purpose. To begin with, we shall study his double definition of the soul, and then see how it is related to his doctrine of knowledge.

Aristotle defined the soul as the first act of a physical, organic body, which has life potentially.<sup>1</sup> Albert asks in his Summa Theologiae whether this definition is a good one.<sup>2</sup> In reply, he does not simply accept or reject it; he accepts it only after making an important distinction. He states that Aristotle has defined the



soul in so far as it is the form of an animated body, in which body it effects vital operations throughout the whole and in each part, but that Aristotle has not defined the soul as it is in itself.<sup>3</sup>

The source of this distinction is the De Anima of Avicenna, as Albert himself tells us. According to Avicenna, the soul has a double definition. It can be defined in two different ways, just as a sailor can be defined in two different ways. We can consider a sailor in himself, as a craftsman who rules the ship through the practical knowledge he has acquired in his mind; or we can consider him as actually carrying out the task of sailing the ship, by working with the sails, the mast, and the oars. In the same way, we can consider the soul in itself, and define it in so far as it is separable from the body;<sup>4</sup> or we can consider it as carrying out vital operations in the body and the bodily organs.<sup>5</sup>

This distinction between the soul as a substance in itself and as form of the body led Nemesius (Bishop of Emessa, fl. c. 400) to pose a dilemma concerning the soul. If one admits with Plato that the soul is a substance which is separable from the body, how can one explain the close union of soul and body? Even if one says that the soul is a substance which is specially fitted for ruling the body, how can the soul be a substance in itself and



also the form of a body? On the other hand, if one says with Aristotle that the soul is the perfection of the body, how can one hold for the immortality of the soul, for a bodily form cannot exist without its body? One must then deny either that the soul is the form of the body, or that it is immortal.<sup>6</sup>

St. Albert solves this dilemma by saying that he agrees with both Plato and Aristotle, but from different points of view. When the soul is considered as the form of the body, Aristotle is right; when the soul is considered in itself, Plato is right. Thus Albert is not forced to decide against either Aristotle or Plato. He agrees with both.<sup>7</sup>

Albert defines the soul in relation to the body in this way: the soul is the first act of a physical, organic body, which has life potentially. What is his definition of the soul in itself? In itself the soul is defined as a substance which is fitted for ruling the body, and which is separable from it.<sup>8</sup> But when Albert says that the soul is separable from the body, he does not mean that the conjunction of soul and body is accidental. For him, it is a substantial property of the soul to be the act of the body. This means, first of all, that the soul is the substantial, and not an accidental form of the body. It means, secondly, that





the soul as a substance is naturally inclined to the body as the act of the body. This is the difference between a human soul and an angel. An angel is not inclined to be united to a body as its form, but the soul is so inclined.<sup>9</sup> Even after death the soul retains its substantial desire for the body, and cannot be perfectly happy without the body.<sup>10</sup>

Albert also says that the soul is substantially and essentially outside the body.<sup>11</sup> By this he does not mean to deny that the soul is the form of the body, or that the soul has a substantial inclination for the body. Rather, he means to affirm that the soul is separable from the body, and does not cease to exist when the body does.<sup>12</sup> Nevertheless, he does teach that the human soul is essentially separated from the body,<sup>13</sup> and this indicates a pronounced tendency in his thought to stress the substantiality of the soul in itself, apart from the body.

The problem arises, of course, of how the soul can be a substance in itself and yet also be the substantial form of a body, for it would appear that if a being is a substance by itself it cannot be united to something else to compose with it one substance. It would seem that the union of one substance with something else could bring about only an accidental and not



a substantial union.

However, he insists that the soul is not only a substance in itself, but also a substance of such nature that it can be the substantial form of matter, and, with matter, make up one substance.<sup>14</sup> He believes that he has sufficiently accounted for the immortality of the human soul and also for the substantial unity of man. One searches his works in vain for a deeper solution of this problem. We must therefore admit that he has not satisfactorily shown how the human soul can be both a substance and a form.<sup>15</sup> It will be the work of St. Thomas Aquinas to do so.<sup>16</sup>

We must make more precise what Albert means when he calls the human soul a substance (substantia), hoc aliquid,<sup>17</sup> and a supposit or subject complete in itself (suppositum et subjectum in se perfectum).<sup>18</sup> The meaning of these terms is clarified in a text in the Commentary on the Sentences. A natural thing (res naturae), he says, is a being which is composed either of matter and form or quod est and quo est.<sup>19</sup> This natural thing is an individual member of a species, and is called hoc aliquid. It is called a supposit (suppositum) when it is considered as related to the specific nature which it individualizes and renders incommunicable. It is called a subject (subjectum) when it is considered in relation to accidents



which may exist in it. This subject is also called a substance (substantia) or hypostasis (ὑπόστασις). An individual (individuum) is a substance which actually has individuating accidents.<sup>20</sup>

When he calls the soul a substance, hoc aliquid, a supposit, or a subject, he means, then, that it is a res naturae, that is, a being which exists in its own right, which is fully capable of existing. It is not just an accident, or a part of an existing thing, such as a species;<sup>21</sup> it is a complete substance.<sup>22</sup> It is true that for him every hoc aliquid is composed of either matter and form or quod est and quo est, but this is not involved in the very notion of hoc aliquid. Hoc aliquid in its very notion means that which is fully equipped by itself to exist in reality. He thus holds that the soul is a complete substance even when separated from the body.

This same conclusion can be arrived at by examining another text from a question where he is considering the simplicity of the angels. He affirms that an angel must be composite, since it is a supposit and hoc aliquid. To be a supposit is to be a member of a certain species or genus. This implies being determined to be an individual thing (signatum hoc aliquid). Hoc aliquid, therefore, means a particular being fully equipped to exist. Of



course, from the very fact that every particular being of this kind is formed of a nature, of itself common, which exists in a subject particularizing it, every hoc aliquid is, for him, composite.<sup>23</sup>

We may point out that the reason why he defines the soul as a substance in itself and hoc aliquid is to ensure its immortality, since, if the soul is to exist after its separation from the body, it must be capable of existence by itself. This requires, for Albert, that it be a substance and hoc aliquid.<sup>24</sup>

In order to appreciate more fully the import of his doctrine of the soul, it will be helpful to compare it with that of St. Thomas Aquinas. It is not our intention hereto treat fully, or even adequately, St. Thomas' doctrine of the soul, but merely to contrast some of his teachings with those of St. Albert, in order to make Albert's position stand out more clearly.

St. Thomas begins his Quaestio Disputata de Anima by asking whether the human soul can be a form and a substance (hoc aliquid).<sup>25</sup> His conclusion is that the soul is both a form and hoc aliquid (only in one sense, however, as will be explained presently).<sup>26</sup> But the fact that St. Thomas can say that the soul is a form and hoc aliquid does not mean that he gives the soul a double definition. Rather, the soul is already completely defined when it is called a form, because it is not fully hoc aliquid.





Hoc aliquid, according to St. Thomas, is an individual in the genus of substance, that is, an individual substance.<sup>27</sup> Hoc aliquid can be understood either as any subsisting individual, or as any subsisting individual which is complete in the nature of some species. (To subsist means for something to exist in itself, and not to exist in another.)<sup>28</sup> For example, an accident is not hoc aliquid at all, for it does not exist in itself. Nor is a material form (a form which has existence only in matter) hoc aliquid, because it does not exist in itself. But a part of a substance, for example, a hand, can be said to be hoc aliquid in one sense, since it exists in itself. However, in another sense it cannot be called hoc aliquid, as it is not a complete substance; it is only part of a substance. The human soul, too, is hoc aliquid in one sense, and not in another. It is hoc aliquid in the sense that it exists in itself, and is not an accident or a material form. But it is not hoc aliquid in the sense that it is a complete substance, for it is only part of human nature. Only soul and body together can be called hoc aliquid in the sense of a complete substance.<sup>29</sup>

For St. Thomas, then, the human soul is not a complete substance in itself. True, it can exist by itself, but by itself it is incomplete as a nature. Without the body it cannot perform the operations proper to human



nature. For man's function is to gain knowledge by his intellect. This knowledge is immaterial, but is acquired only from material things, which are grasped by the senses of the body. Hence the soul by itself cannot perform the work for which it was intended.<sup>30</sup> Accordingly, St. Thomas can say that for the soul to be separated from the body is a feature of its existence which is over and above the exigencies of its nature (praeter rationem suae naturae).<sup>31</sup>

In St. Thomas' doctrine, the soul separated from the body has a complete act of existing (esse completum), for it can exist without the body. But the separated soul does not have a complete nature (speciem completam). The soul, when united to the body, communicates to it its own act of existing, so that the whole composite has the same act of existing. It is only when the soul is joined to its body that a complete nature exists.<sup>32</sup>

St. Thomas states that when the soul is separated from the body it is still by nature a form, even if it is not actually perfecting matter.<sup>33</sup> For the human soul is the lowest of intelligent beings, and is in potency to its intellectual knowledge. It needs its sensory powers in order to acquire its intellectual perfection, because it learns only from material things. Hence, since the senses of their very nature require bodily organs, the human soul of its very nature requires to be united to the body.<sup>34</sup>



The human soul thus requires its body from the very fact that it is the kind of intellectual being that it is. The soul as intellectual requires a body.<sup>35</sup>

The human soul, therefore, for St. Thomas, does not have two definitions. It is true that it is both a form and a substance. But it is one and the same thing for the soul to be a form and for it to be a substance. The soul is a form because it is the type of substance that it is. When separated from its matter, the soul is still a form, though it does not actually vivify matter.<sup>36</sup> It is also a substance, but an incomplete substance, since it cannot do the work it was intended by nature to do. The soul must inform matter in order to perform its natural operations; only the composite of soul and body is a complete substance.<sup>37</sup> Thus the soul as a substance is defined in the same manner as the soul as a form. The soul has only one definition. It is a substance-form.

This conception of the soul is very different from that of St. Albert. Perhaps the best way to summarize their opposition is to say that for St. Thomas the soul is essentially the form of the body,<sup>38</sup> while for St. Albert it is essentially separable from it.<sup>39</sup>

We have now sketched St. Albert's doctrine of the soul and compared it briefly with that of St. Thomas



Aquinas. Our purpose in doing this was to relate St. Albert's conception of the soul to his teaching concerning knowledge. Since operation follows being, the operation of intellection will be in accord with the nature of the substance performing it. Whether the soul in itself is a complete or an incomplete substance, and whether or not it is essentially the form of the body, will affect its powers of cognition; and, if it has one definition, it will know in a different manner than if it has two definitions.

In St. Thomas's psychology, for example, the soul has one definition. It is an incomplete substance, and it is essentially joined to the body as its form. Corresponding to the one definition of the soul is its one way of knowing. St. Thomas teaches that all natural knowledge in this life is by abstraction from phantasms.<sup>40</sup> He reduces the divine help necessary for natural knowledge to God's gift of man's intellectual light.<sup>41</sup> On the natural level there is only abstraction in St. Thomas's noetic. Any special divine illumination is eliminated.<sup>42</sup> This is perfectly in keeping with his definition of the soul.

In St. Albert's psychology the soul has two definitions. On the one hand, it is a substance complete in itself, essentially separated from the body. On the





other hand, it is the form of the body. To its two-fold mode of being corresponds a two-fold mode of knowing. As the form of the body it has a manner of knowing which is related to the body. It knows in this way by means of abstraction. As a substance complete in itself, separated from the body, it is like the separated substances, and can know as they do, without the body.<sup>43</sup> This kind of cognition, as we have demonstrated in our last chapter, is by illumination from God and the intelligences.

The soul has two avenues of natural knowledge in this life, abstraction and illumination. These two types of intellectual knowledge spring from the soul's double being, which merits for it a double definition. Thus is established the relationship in St. Albert's thought between the nature of the soul and the nature of knowledge.

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A further aspect of this relationship can be developed in connection with immortality. It is because the soul can exist without the body that St. Albert defines it as a substance complete in itself.<sup>44</sup> It is partly because the soul can operate without the body after death that he grants it a way of knowing without the body.<sup>45</sup>



He sees that in order to be immortal the soul needs not only to exist but also to operate without dependence on the body. Now, the second of these conditions can be realized only in the intellectus adeptus. Following the philosophers, he places the root of the soul's immortality (radix immortalitatis) in the intellectus adeptus.<sup>46</sup>

Alfarabi's De Intellectu et Intelligibili is given special mention by St. Albert in this connection.<sup>47</sup> This work does not use the term radix immortalitatis, though Albert often uses the expression when speaking of Alfarabi's doctrine. The De Intellectu et Intelligibili of Alfarabi says that when the intellect is perfected (intellectus adeptus) man comes close to the separated agent intellect, which is his ultimate end. Here he exercises another kind of activity in a new life, where he does not need his body in order to exist or any bodily power in order to operate.<sup>48</sup> The phrase radix immortalitatis is from the Book of Wisdom, which says: "To know thy (God's) justice and power is the root of immortality."<sup>49</sup> St. Albert understands the Book of Wisdom to mean that immortality is not just an unending existence, but the unending knowledge of divinity. For this reason he equates this scriptural teaching with that of Alfarabi, because for St. Albert the intellectus adeptus makes it



possible for the soul not only to know forever, but also to know separated substances above man.<sup>50</sup> Thus he can say that it is by the intellectus adeptus that the immortality of the human soul is truly proven.<sup>51</sup>

In his early works, as we have seen,<sup>52</sup> he provided for knowledge after death by means of intelligible species infused in the soul from the beginning of its existence. He later changed his teaching, however, and held that only by the intellectus adeptus, gained in this life, is the soul able to know naturally in the next life. The soul's ability to exercise the mode of knowledge which belongs to it in itself is an ability which must be acquired through using the mode of knowledge belonging to the soul in conjunction with the body. Only in this way can the soul become truly immortal. Thus, St. Albert's doctrine of man's two modes of knowledge is closely connected with his notion of the soul's immortality.

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If we wish to be more precise as to why man has two different modes of knowing, and how these are related to one another, we must study the nature of the soul's composition, dealing not so much with the soul



as related to the body, as with the intrinsic parts of the soul itself. We have just seen that the human soul is hoc aliquid, that is, a substance in itself, fully capable of existing alone. In showing that it is hoc aliquid, we also noted that it is a composite substance, not a simple one, and that it has a real composition of component parts.<sup>53</sup>

In the thirteenth century, many theologians taught that human souls were composed of matter and form. This matter, of course, was a "spiritual" matter, different in many ways from the matter of earthly bodies and even of heavenly bodies. This doctrine was the common teaching of the Franciscans, with the exception of John of Rupella.<sup>54</sup> It was taught also by some Dominicans.<sup>55</sup> St. Albert, however, opposes it from the very beginning of his career. For him there is no "spiritual" matter in the human soul.<sup>56</sup>

In his early work, the Summa de Creaturis, he states that the angel and the human soul are not composed of matter and form. They are composed only of quod est and quo est. The quo est is the angelic or human nature, and the quod est is the supposit of this general nature, which individuates it.<sup>57</sup>

In another early work, the Commentary on the Sentences, he identifies this composition of quod est and quo est with that of quod est and esse, and says that





it occurs in all spiritual beings,<sup>58</sup> that is, in angels and human souls. In the same work he describes this composition in spiritual substances as that of potency and act.<sup>59</sup> He also gives his reason for not calling quod est matter. Earthly bodies are able to take on new substantial forms, and heavenly bodies are subject only to local movement. This difference in the potentiality of their matters led Aristotle to say that the matters themselves were different.<sup>60</sup> Now, in spiritual beings (angels and human souls) the potential part is not subject to either local motion or change of form. Its potentiality, then, is altogether different from that of either earthly or heavenly matter. The soul passes from ignorance to knowledge, but this is not, properly speaking, a motion or mutation. Therefore there is no matter at all in an angel or a human soul.<sup>61</sup> Only if matter be taken in a very large and improper sense can the potential part of every substance be called material, for the philosophers have called matter only that potency which is under some privation, that is, which is in potency to forms other than it actually possesses, and therefore mutable. Albert is willing to say that an angel is composed of matter and form only if any kind of foundation (fundamentum) can be termed "matter".<sup>62</sup> This would apply also to the soul.

However, in his later works he refuses to call



the potential element in the human soul matter. One reason is that this would entail the possibility of the soul being eduuced from matter.<sup>63</sup> Since the soul is created immediately by God, he does not think that an eduction of this sort is possible.<sup>64</sup>

But his chief reason for denying that there is matter in the soul is that if there is any matter whatsoever in it, it cannot know all things. If it is material it will receive only those things which are proportioned to its matter, as the senses do.<sup>65</sup> St. Albert thinks that this argument holds even if spiritual matter is attributed to the soul, because, if the intellect is individuated in being by spiritual matter, this matter is limited in some way by being made proper to an individual intellect. It is then able to receive only those things proportioned to its own nature. Nor can we say that this matter is of such a nature that all things are proportioned to it, for, since it is different from other matters, it must be limited in some way, having something proper to itself, to distinguish it from all other individuating matters. There will then be many other things not proportioned to the composition of the intellectual soul, and the intellect will not be able to know them.<sup>66</sup>

Albert is convinced that if the soul is material, even by reason of spiritual matter, it cannot know all



things.<sup>67</sup> - He affirms that no form, however noble it may be, can completely take away from its matter the mode of reception proper to matter, which is to receive things according to being (secundum esse), that is, to receive things in so far as they are individual existing beings.<sup>68</sup> It is meaningless to say that there is matter in the intellect, and then to deny in this "matter" all the properties which belong to "matter" as generally understood.<sup>69</sup> Therefore he denies the existence of any kind of matter in the soul.

To deny that there is matter in the soul, however, immediately raises two difficult problems, namely, how the soul is different from God, and how there can be many souls.

God alone is absolutely simple, without any composition.<sup>70</sup> If the soul can exist by itself, it must be composite, or else it would be God, which is absurd. This is the most basic reason why St. Albert holds that the human soul is composite.

His second reason for maintaining an essential composition in the soul is also a compelling one. Souls must be distinguished from one another in some way, if there are many of them. They must then be distinguished by their form or by their matter. Now, souls are not distinguished by their form, for they are essentially



the same kind of form. On the other hand, if there is no matter in the soul, it would seem that soul cannot be distinguished at all.<sup>71</sup> This is the very argument by which Averroes and Abubacher attempt to show that there can be only one human intellectual soul and only one human intellect. And, according to Albert, it is the strongest argument (potissima rationum) they have.<sup>72</sup>

St. Albert, having denied any matter whatsoever in the soul, must be able to explain how souls are individuated in being, and thus are able to be many in number.<sup>73</sup> His way of doing this is to introduce the doctrine of quod est and quo est as substantial principles of the soul. This composition is not the same as that of matter and form, even spiritual matter and form. Yet it is sufficient to show how the soul is composite, and thus not God; and also sufficient to make the soul hoc aliquid, an individual substance, and so able to be many in number.

In his De Unitate Intellectus, written against Averroes and others who denied multitude in rational souls, St. Albert makes constant use of his theory of quod est and quo est. One of his principal arguments in this work is that the soul is immaterial and yet composite. He lists thirty objections which are advanced to prove there is only one human intellect. Of these, nearly half (the 2nd, 3rd, 7th, 10th, 16th, 18th, 21st, 22nd, 23rd,





24th, 25th, 26th, 28th, and 30th objections)<sup>74</sup> follow the line of reasoning that there can be no matter in the soul, and thus the soul cannot be many in number. He agrees that the soul is immaterial, but says that it is also many in number by reason of its composition of quod est and quo est.

Let us recapitulate. There is no matter of any kind in the human soul, because its knowledge is universal. The soul is composed of quod est and quo est (or esse) as substantial principles. These are, respectively, the supposit and the common nature which it individuates. The soul must be composite if it is to be distinguished from God, and also if it is to be many in number.

St. Albert tells us, moreover, that this composition in the soul is one of potency and act,<sup>75</sup> and it is this teaching, stemming from Avicenna, which he exploits particularly.

Avicenna taught that only the first, necessary being is completely free of potentiality or possibility in itself.<sup>76</sup> The separated intelligences, on the other hand, have possibility in themselves, for it is possible for them to be or not to be. These intelligences are composed of necessity and possibility. The necessity which is in them comes to them from the first principle,



the necessary being. This necessity is what makes an intelligence to be an intelligence and to understand itself and the first being. The possibility in the intelligences belongs to them in themselves. It is this possibility which individuates their necessity. It is thus the possibility in the intelligences which makes them able to be many in number.<sup>77</sup>

This doctrine which Avicenna teaches concerning the intelligences is applied by Albert to both angels and human souls. An angel, Albert asserts, has its quod est, or potentiality, because it comes from nothing; and it has its esse, or act, from God.<sup>78</sup> Of course its potentiality is never without its act.<sup>79</sup>

The human soul, too, is an intellectual substance as are the angels, and is potential in itself, as they are. But it receives from God its actuality, or as Albert calls it, following Avicenna, the necessity of its being (sui esse necessitatem), which actualizes the possibility of the soul and makes the soul exist.<sup>80</sup>

St. Albert also uses terms borrowed from the Liber de Causis in order to express his thought. Though he knew in his later works that this book was not written by Aristotle, he considered it to be of Aristotelian inspiration.<sup>81</sup> The soul is said to stand because of the first cause, and to be fixed in being by the first



cause. It is also said to depend on the first cause.<sup>82</sup>

He thus identifies that by which the soul receives the necessity of its being (Avicenna) with that by which it stands in being, is fixed in being, or depends on the first cause (Liber de Causis), and further identifies this with the soul's actuality. Moreover, this actuality is identified with the soul's quo est or esse. Similarly, he identifies that in the soul which receives the necessity of its being, its standing in being, its fixity in being, and its dependence on God, with the soul's potentiality, its possibility in itself. And this potentiality is further identified with the soul's quod est.

When reading some of his statements, one wonders whether the whole soul comes from God, or only the soul's quo est or actuality, because he says that the soul receives its esse from God, and that the soul's quod est belongs to the soul in itself. His teaching, however, is that the whole soul comes from God. But the quod est is merely the foundation of the quo est; it is the quo est which gives being to the possibility of the quod est. The quod est merely gives the quo est the possibility of existing.<sup>83</sup> It is because the quod est in itself is nothing but potentiality (ex nihilo et nihil est) and because the whole being of a thing (totum esse suum), in so far as the thing is actual, comes from God, that



he speaks as if only the quo est or actuality came from God.<sup>84</sup>

Having identified the quod est and the quo est of the soul with its potency and actuality, he goes further. He divides the intellectual powers of the soul according to the division of the soul's essential components. The soul, in so far as it depends on God, is not in potency at all. It is pure act (actus purus). For this reason the intellect which flows from it in so far as it is actual, is the agent intellect (intellectus agens universaliter). On the other hand, the soul considered in itself is in potency. Thus the intellectual power of the soul is also potential, and there is a possible intellect in the soul.<sup>85</sup>

This was the teaching of St. Albert throughout his life. Even in his early work, the Summa de Creaturis, he says that the agent intellect flows from the quo est or the act of the soul, and the possible intellect from its quod est or potency.<sup>86</sup>

He occasionally speaks of the soul as if it were composed not of act and potency, from which the agent and possible intellects emanate, but as if it were composed directly of an agent intellect and a possible intellect.<sup>87</sup> This is not his usual way of speaking, however, and it is quite certain that for him these





intellects are powers of the soul, and not its substantial parts.

We may wonder, nevertheless, why he correlates the substantial division of the soul (act and potency) with the division of its powers (agent intellect and possible intellect). This seems to be done in part because of its fittingness. If the soul has both act and potency in its substance (we have already seen the necessity of this), and if the soul also has an active intellectual power and a passive intellectual power, what is more appropriate than that the agent intellect should flow from the soul's act, and the possible intellect from its potency?

No doubt he is also following Averroes.

Averroes said that a separated substance (intelligibile esse) is divided into components of act and potency, which are similar to form and matter. Otherwise there could not be many separated substances, since only God (prima forma) is completely free from potentiality. Now, this doctrine is used in order to show what kind of being the possible intellect (intellectus materialis) is. Averroes thus implicitly related the possible intellect to the soul's potentiality.<sup>88</sup>

A hint of this teaching can also be found in the Summa de Bono (c. 1230) of Philip the Chancellor, which



says that the angelic intelligence receives according to its quod est, and is active according to its quo est.<sup>89</sup> The Summa Theologica attributed to Alexander of Hales, which teaches that the soul is composed of form and spiritual matter,<sup>90</sup> also says that the agent intellect belongs to the soul by reason of its form, and the possible intellect by reason of its matter.<sup>91</sup>

Let us now sum up St. Albert's teaching. The soul's actuality (quo est) is received by its potentiality (quod est) and thus made capable of individuation. The actuality is from God in a special way. It is responsible for the whole being of the soul. St. Albert has followed the lead of Averroes, and possibly has also been influenced by Philip the Chancellor and Alexander of Hales, in deriving the agent intellect from the soul's actuality, and the possible intellect from its potentiality.

What we now wish to show is that St. Albert, by conceiving the agent intellect as flowing from the soul's actuality, and the possible intellect as flowing from the soul's pure potentiality, has envisaged the nature of abstraction in a manner peculiar to himself, and has at the same time given the soul a title to illumination. We wish to point out that the nature of the soul's composition in his teaching is intimately connected with his doctrines of abstraction and illumination and



their mutual relationship.

The human soul is made in the image of God. But it is God's similitude not in its material powers, but in its immaterial ones, which do not operate through bodily organs, since God is immaterial.<sup>92</sup> But the soul, in its immaterial or rational part, is composite. And St. Albert tells us further that it is not the rational part as a whole which is like God, but rather the agent intellect alone. The agent intellect belongs to the soul in so far as the soul shares in God's intellectual nature. Through the agent intellect the soul is turned to God by a sharing of His light. The possible intellect, on the other hand, flows from the soul not in so far as it is like God, but in so far as it is joined to the body.<sup>93</sup>

This does not mean that the possible intellect is a bodily power. It is not. It is an incorporeal power. It belongs to the soul only because the soul is immaterial.<sup>94</sup> But nevertheless the soul would not have it unless it were the form of the body.

We might well ask ourselves how it is that the possible intellect exists only because the soul is the form of a body, and yet the possible intellect flows from the soul because the soul is possible in itself. For the soul, like every intellectual substance, is possible in itself, without any relation to the body.



It would seem, then, that Albert is inconsistent.

Such, however, is not the case. He says that angels have possible intellects in so far as they have intellects which are the subjects of their intelligible forms, but that these possible intellects are quite different from human possible intellects, as they are at no time in potency to their knowledge, having it from the instant of their creation.<sup>95</sup> The angels thus have possible intellects flowing from their quod est, without any relation to a body. Now, man also has a possible intellect which flows from his soul's quod est, but the possible intellect of the human soul is without its intelligibles because the soul is the form of the body. That is, man has a possible intellect from the very fact that his soul is possible in itself, but he has the kind of possible intellect that he has because his soul informs a body.<sup>96</sup>

What interests us more particularly in St. Albert's teaching, however, is the nature of the agent intellect. It is the agent intellect alone which makes the soul an image of God. No doubt the reason why this is so is that God has only an agent intellect, and no possible intellect, not even as the subject of intelligibles. God understands all things in Himself, seeing them in so far as He makes them, for He is the exemplar of all things.<sup>97</sup>





We might wonder how God can understand without a possible intellect as a subject of His intelligibles. The only explanation given by St. Albert is in his Commentary on the Liber de Causis. All that is required for knowledge, he says, is that an intelligible species be in the light of a knower. It is not necessary that the species be received in a possible intellect. For knowledge is perfected not by the power of the possible intellect as possible, but by the power of the agent intellect. And in God the species of all things are contained as in a first principle which effects all things. Thus God knows all things without having a possible intellect.<sup>98</sup>

As a consequence, it would seem that angels and men need a possible intellect because their intellectual light is not constitutive of things and thus does not contain things according to determinate species. For the perfection of their knowledge there must be a possible intellect to hold intelligible species. We know from Chapter III<sup>99</sup> that knowledge does not consist merely in the possible intellect considering an intelligible species. It is the direct light of the agent intellect alone which accounts for intelligibility. The functions of the intelligible species and the possible intellect are important, but secondary, and result rather from the



limitation of our intellectual power than from its perfection. Thus it is only in our agent intellect that we resemble God.

There are two important teachings which flow from the fact that our agent intellect makes us like God. The first is that the agent intellect contains its knowledge at the beginning of its existence. It has all intelligibles in an undivided simplicity. It is true that they are not known explicitly, but only implicitly. Nevertheless they are actually contained in the light of the agent intellect. It is this fact which accounts for the direct action of the agent intellect on the possible intellect in abstraction.<sup>100</sup>

The direct action of the agent intellect on the possible intellect also follows from other doctrines of Albert. He pictures the soul's quo est and agent intellect as descending from God, and being received in something other than themselves. The soul, in so far as it comes from God, is pure act. And the agent intellect, proceeding from the soul considered in this respect, is also pure act. That which receives the soul's quo est is its quod est, which is pure potency in itself.<sup>101</sup>

It will be noticed that St. Albert almost identifies the agent intellect with the soul's quo est. The soul, he says, is a reflection (resultatio) of the light of a separated intelligence (God). It is composed of the form



of light and that which receives this form and makes it capable of being an existing thing. From the light received there flows the agent intellect. From that which receives this light flows the possible intellect.<sup>102</sup> Now, in speaking of the soul's quo est as light, St. Albert seems to be making little distinction between it and the agent intellect. And a consequence of this is that he conceives the relation of the agent intellect to the possible intellect as identical with that of the soul's quo est to its quod est.<sup>103</sup>

The quo est is human nature itself. The quod est merely guarantees creaturality and makes multitude possible. The quo est gives the rational nature. In return for being individuated, it confers rationality. The quod est is rational only by participation in the quo est.

But the relationship of the agent intellect to the possible intellect is patterned on that of the quo est to the quod est. If, then, the quo est directly actualizes the quod est, so does the agent intellect directly actualize the possible intellect. The light from God penetrates the soul's possibility.<sup>104</sup> As the soul's quod est merely participates in the rationality of the quo est, so the possible intellect merely participates in the intellectuality of the agent intellect.

It is because the agent intellect contains all



intelligibles in its light that it can act directly on the possible intellect. For if its light were merely the efficient cause of intelligibles the agent intellect would not act on the possible intellect as the soul's quo est acts on its quod est. It is therefore quite in keeping with his doctrine of the composition of the soul, and the division of intellects according to the soul's components, that St. Albert teaches that the agent intellect contains its intelligibles actually.

The second important teaching which flows from the fact that the agent intellect makes the soul like God, is that the soul is capable of being illumined from above. Of its very nature it is receptive of illumination from God (perceptiva illuminationum quae sunt a primo).<sup>105</sup> The human intellect is the first image of the light of God which is joined to space and time. Thus it is a similitude of all things which are made by the light of God. It becomes the receptacle of some of these in so far as it is in space and time, and of others in so far as it is an image of God.<sup>106</sup> The agent intellect flows from the soul according as it is of the same intellectual nature as God, and is turned to God by a sharing of His light.<sup>107</sup>

We have shown in Chapter V <sup>108</sup> that the soul is illumined in the natural order in this life. What we did





not mention, however, is the fact that illumination does not concern only the possible intellect. We know already that it terminates in the possible intellect, because it gives knowledge-content,<sup>109</sup> and the agent intellect is never the subject of intelligibles. However, illumination must be mediated by the agent intellect. It comes to the soul by reason of the agent intellect, and not by reason of the possible intellect.<sup>110</sup> We have seen that metaphysical knowledge is gained by illumination.<sup>111</sup> Now, this knowledge is derived from the agent intellect.<sup>112</sup> Moreover, in divine illumination God's intellect is joined to the agent intellect as one light is joined to another light of a lower order, giving intelligible species to the possible intellect according as the divine light is joined more intimately to the agent intellect.<sup>113</sup>

When the intellectus adeptus is reached, St. Albert states, a man can give to himself and others knowledge like God's.<sup>114</sup> If a man gives it to himself, it must be through his agent intellect giving it to his possible intellect.

The illumination which comes to the soul after death is also mediated by the agent intellect. The soul turns to the agent intellect as to its form, and through the agent intellect understands immaterial substances.<sup>115</sup>

The soul is naturally entitled to illumination



because it is like the angels, being itself a separated substance.<sup>116</sup> However, there is a major difference between the soul and an angel, for man is not entitled to illumination at the beginning of his knowledge, as the angel is, but only at the end. Man must prepare himself by abstraction so that illumination can take place. The angel has an agent intellect and a possible intellect,<sup>117</sup> but the agent intellect fills the possible intellect immediately. The agent intellect is the form of the possible intellect from the beginning of the angel's existence. An angel always has its intellectus adeptus.<sup>118</sup>

It is only when man acquires his intellectus adeptus that he becomes like the angel and capable of illumination.<sup>119</sup> Before this, he knows only by abstraction from phantasms.<sup>120</sup> The penetration of the possible intellect by the agent intellect requires some time. This is due to the refractoriness of the possible intellect, which is not capable of receiving the agent intellect all at once, as in the angels. For this reason the human intellect needs a body and senses, so that the light of the agent intellect might be received gradually through the breaking-up of the agent's light by the help of phantasms. The possible intellect finds the agent intellect in all intelligibles, and after a long period



of study it receives the whole of the agent intellect as its form. The agent then floods the possible intellect with its light (this light is the agent intellect itself) and the soul is made capable of illumination.<sup>121</sup>

In this way we see how St. Albert's doctrine of the soul as the image of God through its agent intellect involves the direct action of the agent intellect on the possible intellect in abstraction, and also the natural right of the soul to illumination.

We may also note that in both of these modes of knowledge there is a unity in the function of the agent intellect. First of all, its work in abstraction is ordained to its work in illumination. Since the soul is not essentially joined to the body, it is not essential to the soul to receive knowledge from phantasms.<sup>122</sup> Therefore the primary and essential function of the agent intellect is to receive knowledge from above, and not to perform the work of abstraction. It is only because the possibility of the soul prevents it at first from exercising its fundamental operation that it performs a lower one. The whole raison d'être of this lower activity is to make possible a higher mode of knowing, for which the agent intellect is finally intended. This ordination of the agent intellect's task in abstraction to its task in illumination manifests the unity of its



operations.

The second way in which this unity can be shown is by noticing that in both abstraction and illumination the agent intellect acts directly on the possible intellect; this has been established for both of these modes of cognition. Since the agent intellect acts directly on the possible intellect in abstraction, it is well fitted to do so in illumination also. For St. Thomas Aquinas the function of the agent intellect is to make intelligibles in act by the abstraction of species from material conditions.<sup>123</sup> According to him it has this sole operation; it is not concerned with gaining knowledge naturally by illumination, for there is no illumination in this life on the natural level.<sup>124</sup> However, for St. Albert the agent intellect is responsible not only for abstraction but also for illumination. It is therefore different in kind from that envisaged by St. Thomas. It is not just that it has an extra function to perform. Its two functions are closely connected, and both stem from the one nature of the agent intellect. The agent intellect described by St. Albert is not the one described by St. Thomas to which another power is added. Rather, it is wholly unlike it. According to St. Thomas, the function of the agent intellect is to act directly on phantasms, educating intelligible forms. It acts only indirectly





on the possible intellect.<sup>125</sup> It is difficult to see how the agent intellect described by St. Albert could work in this way and still act on the possible intellect directly in illumination from above. If its function were merely to make sensible things actually intelligible, it could not account for illumination after man had passed the stage of knowledge by abstraction. On the other hand, if the agent intellect acts directly on the possible intellect in abstraction, as is actually the case for Albert, it is eminently fitted to do so in illumination also.

St. Albert's conception of the soul's actuality as an image of the divine light, containing intelligibles actually, open to further divine illumination, and suffusing itself into its individuating receptacle, accounts for the nature of abstraction that we have described, and also explains how abstraction gives way to illumination.

The conclusions which can be drawn from this chapter are the following:

(a) For St. Albert the human soul has two definitions. It is a substance complete in itself, not essentially joined to the body. It is also the form of its body. Accordingly, it has two modes of knowing. As a substance complete in itself it knows by illumination from God



and the angels. As the form of its body it knows by abstraction.

(b) The nature of abstraction and illumination accords well with the requirements for the soul's immortality.

(c) The soul is composed of quo est and quod est. The quo est gives rise to the agent intellect, which makes the soul an image of God. The agent intellect, because it makes man like God, of its very nature is a light containing intelligibles actually and implicitly. It acts on the possible intellect in abstraction as the soul's quo est acts on its quod est, that is, directly. Because the agent intellect makes the soul like God, it also makes it capable of divine illumination. In this illumination the agent intellect also acts directly on the possible intellect. Illumination cannot take place at the beginning of life, but requires knowledge by abstraction in order to prepare the soul for the reception of knowledge from above. These two ways of knowing are related to each other, since abstraction is ordained to illumination, and in both of these the agent intellect acts directly on the possible intellect. Thus the nature of the soul's quo est and quod est on the one hand, and its knowledge on the other, are interdependent.



(d) St. Albert's teaching concerning abstraction and illumination is closely related to his doctrines of the double definition of the soul, its immortality, and its substantial composition.



### CONCLUSION

In the mid-thirteenth century the meeting of Aristotle and St. Augustine led to a variety of blendings of their philosophical doctrines. We have studied the theory of knowledge evolved by a pioneer in the task of reconciling these great thinkers. We have seen that to a great extent he remained an Augustinian. Of course at this time no follower of St. Augustine was unaffected by what Aristotle had said. Consequently, there are many Aristotelian elements in St. Albert's noetic. These elements have modified his theory of knowledge, but they have by no means purged it of all typically Augustinian notions. This applies especially to two questions: whether the soul is passive in gaining its knowledge, and whether there is divine illumination.

For St. Augustine the human soul needs the outside world in order to gain knowledge of material things.<sup>1</sup> Nevertheless, sensation is an action performed by the soul alone; the soul does not receive the forms of sensible things. According to Aristotle, on the other hand, the sense powers do receive these forms.

St. Albert teaches that all the external and internal senses are receptive of the forms of material things. He denies that there is an agent sense, and





holds that sensibles themselves are the agents in sensation, through a spiritual activity of which they are capable. However, he adds that the internal senses (the common sense, imagination, and phantasy) give their objects the power to act on them. Thus, on the question of sensation, St. Albert safeguards the basic Aristotelian doctrine of the passivity of sense, but makes allowance to some extent for St. Augustine's teaching (that sensation is an active power of the soul) by requiring that the internal senses must themselves make it possible for their objects to act on them.<sup>2</sup>

As to what concerns the possible intellect, St. Augustine holds that in intellectual knowledge, as well as in sensation, the soul is purely active, and not passive or receptive. For Aristotle, on the other hand, the intellect receives intelligible forms from the material world; it is receptive of intelligibles and in this reception it is not active.

St. Albert agrees with Aristotle that man has a possible intellect, which is truly acted upon by intelligibles. Yet a tendency to reconcile Aristotle with St. Augustine can be found in Albert's holding that the possible intellect is more formal than the intelligibles acting upon it. What takes place in knowledge is that the intellectuality of the possible intellect is merely



"determined" by the intelligibles; that is, the intellect forms itself to the intelligibles. Thus in its reception of intelligibles the possible intellect is passive but also active.<sup>3</sup>

In dealing with the object of the intellect, St. Albert is in the Aristotelian, and not the Augustinian tradition. However, he follows Avicenna rather than Aristotle proper. He regards the material world as not far removed from being actually intelligible. The forms in singular things are not fully singularized. They exist as singular, but, even in the state of singularity, they are non-singular as considered in themselves. Nevertheless, he does require an agent intellect for the work of making these forms universal or actually intelligible.<sup>4</sup>

However, the agent intellect which is required is pictured as quite different in nature from that described by Aristotle. The light of this agent intellect contains its intelligibles actually but implicitly. They exist in it in an undivided simplicity. This light is determined or limited by a sensible form in the phantasy. When it is thus limited, it becomes a certain intelligible, and what the possible intellect receives is the very light of the agent intellect.

In one respect, this agent intellect is very much like the intellectual power described in the noetic



of St. Augustine. Assuming that the divine illumination (which Augustine requires for true knowledge) does not give the content of our knowledge but only its truth,<sup>5</sup> we must hold that for St. Augustine the soul produces its concepts from inside itself,<sup>6</sup> because it is not acted upon by beings below it. That is, for St. Augustine man's universal ideas are contained virtually within his intellect from its beginning, and they are actualized after the senses put the intellect in contact with material things. Similarly, St. Albert teaches that sense knowledge plays a real and important role in the formation of universal ideas, yet knowledge may truly be said to come from the agent intellect itself.<sup>7</sup>

Though St. Albert is closer to St. Augustine than to Aristotle in his doctrine of the agent intellect, he also resembles Avicenna.<sup>8</sup> Dr. Gilson has pointed out that the teaching of Avicenna in connection with illumination reinforced that of St. Augustine.<sup>9</sup> He has also shown that Avicenna's doctrine of the soul facilitated the acceptance of St. Augustine's teaching.<sup>10</sup> We have now discovered that Avicenna's theory of the agent intellect and St. Augustine's explanation of intellectual knowledge both influenced St. Albert in his doctrine of the agent intellect.

On the whole question of abstraction, St. Albert



is Aristotelian in insisting upon the receptivity of both senses and intellect. He tends in an Augustinian direction in so far as he teaches that the internal senses are active in acquiring sensible forms, that the (possible) intellect is active as well as receptive in acquiring intelligibles, and that the (agent) intellect pre-contains intelligible forms.

There is a teaching in which Albert parts company with Aristotle completely and joins Augustine: divine illumination. He holds that all natural knowledge requires divine illumination, which is a special, but natural, help of God (and sometimes of the angels also). Over and above this illumination, a more special, but still natural, help is required for metaphysics and for the knowledge of separated substances in themselves. In this more special illumination, the intellect is strengthened and knowledge is infused.

Man can know naturally in two ways, by abstraction and by illumination. By abstraction he gains knowledge from material things. Even for abstraction, however, a certain kind of illumination is required. But there is another mode of knowledge other than abstraction (we have just called it "a more special illumination") by which man acquires the science of metaphysics and the knowledge of separated substances. Abstraction is a means whereby





the soul is strengthened so that it can come to know by this illumination.<sup>11</sup>

We may conclude that St. Thomas Aquinas still remains unchallenged as the first thirteenth-century author to hold that the agent intellect is the sufficient cause of its knowledge, requiring no special divine illumination for its natural operation. They<sup>12</sup> are in error who hold that St. Albert teaches that all natural knowledge comes from sense experience, or that no divine illumination is needed for natural knowledge in this life. Though a theory of abstraction is adopted by Albert, it is not accepted as an explanation for all knowledge. Indeed, it itself requires one kind of illumination, and prepares for another.

Contrary to the statements of A. Schneider and G. Reilly,<sup>13</sup> the agent intellect and the possible intellect are described differently by St. Albert and St. Thomas. For St. Albert the agent intellect acts directly on the possible intellect. This means that it must contain its intelligibles in advance. It also means that, in the eyes of St. Albert, the possible intellect must be such as to receive the agent intellect ultimately as its form. Now, these doctrines are opposed to what St. Thomas holds concerning the human intellect.

This direct action of the agent intellect on



the possible intellect in abstraction is also related to the agent intellect's essential function, which is to receive knowledge by illumination from God and the intelligences. For in both abstraction and illumination the action of the agent intellect on the possible intellect is a direct one. Moreover, it is because the agent intellect acts directly on the possible intellect in abstraction that it can become its form, which is a necessary prerequisite in order that illumination can take place.<sup>14</sup>

St. Albert's teaching on knowledge is closely related to his doctrine of the soul. The soul's two definitions correspond to its two ways of knowing. As a substance complete in itself, it knows by illumination; as the form of its body it knows by abstraction. It is because the soul is not essentially the form of the body that its essential mode of knowing is by illumination, and not by abstraction. Abstraction is a lower kind of cognition, ordained to the higher. Its purpose is to prepare the intellect for illumination.

It is because the soul is composite, and because its intellectual components are subdivided according to its substantial parts, that the agent intellect acts directly on the possible intellect, as the soul's actual component directly actuates its potential component.



This similarity between the relation of the soul's component parts and the relation of the two intellects is also the reason why the soul is an image of God only in its agent intellect. And because the agent intellect makes the soul an image of God, this intellect is a light which contains intelligibles actually, though implicitly. It is also because the agent intellect makes the soul an image of God, that the soul is capable of receiving divine illumination.

Thus St. Albert's teaching concerning man's knowledge is in accord with his doctrines of the double definition and the substantial composition of the soul.<sup>15</sup>

We have mentioned that St. Albert has not been able to answer the question of how the soul can be both a substance in itself and also the substantial form of the body.<sup>16</sup> The answer to this problem as furnished by St. Thomas Aquinas<sup>17</sup> involves giving the soul one definition and not two, as was done by St. Albert. Since Albert's doctrine of the intellect and his teaching on abstraction and illumination are intimately tied up with his explanation of the nature of the soul, they must be discarded if the latter is not accepted.

The Augustinian type of illumination, truth-illumination,<sup>18</sup> is not incompatible with a theory of abstraction. But the Avicennian type, concept-illumination,<sup>19</sup>



can be reconciled with a theory of abstraction only by changing Aristotle's teaching. One way of reconciling them is that of Avicenna himself, but this entails denying that the forms of material things act on the intellect, which is equivalent to a denial of a true theory of abstraction.<sup>20</sup> Another way of reconciliation was attempted by St. Albert. He attributed to man two different modes of knowing. Though he tried to unify these two types of knowledge as much as possible, nevertheless he was not successful, but remained content with a noetic which rested ultimately on a psychology in which the human soul required two definitions.

St. Thomas refused to try to accommodate abstraction to illumination. In denying the existence of illumination on the natural level he safeguarded the unity of man, whose soul is a substance-form with a single definition. St. Albert, on the other hand, in trying to preserve the teaching of both Aristotle and Augustine (an "Avicennized" Augustine), sacrificed the unity of man, whose soul is defined as both a substance and a form.

We might briefly summarize our conclusions as follows:

- (a) St. Albert is basically Aristotelian concerning the receptivity of the senses and the intellect in knowledge by abstraction.





- (b) Certain reservations which he makes in this doctrine show that he retains Augustinian tendencies.
- (c) He is strongly influenced by Avicenna concerning the object of the intellect in abstraction.
- (d) The teaching of St. Augustine and of Avicenna have helped to form his doctrine of the agent intellect.
- (e) The agent intellect acts directly on the possible intellect in abstraction. This teaching is closely connected with St. Albert's doctrine of divine illumination.
- (f) St. Albert teaches that all natural knowledge requires illumination, and that further illumination is required for certain kinds of natural knowledge.
- (g) The way in which St. Albert envisages the soul is in harmony with his teaching on both abstraction and illumination. As a result, his theory of knowledge stands or falls with his doctrine of the soul.



NOTES



NOTES TO THE INTRODUCTION

- 1 Some still place his date of birth in 1193. Cf. P. Mandonnet, "La date de naissance d'Albert le Grand", Revue Thomiste, 36 (1931), 233-256. Also A. Dondaine, Secrétaires de Saint Thomas, p. 187.
- 2 Cf. E. Gilson, History of Christian Philosophy in the Middle Ages, pp. 277-279.
- 3 For example, cf. F. Van Steenberghen, Aristotle in the West, Louvain, 1955.
- 4 Cf. E. Gilson, "Pourquoi saint Thomas a critiqué saint Augustin", AHDL, (1926-1927), 5.
- 5 "Avant saint Thomas d'Aquin, l'accord est à peu près unanime pour soutenir la doctrine augustinienne de l'illumination divine; après saint Thomas d'Aquin, cet accord cesse d'exister." Ibid.
- 6 "Ceci dit, il apparaît avec évidence qu'en éliminant radicalement toute collaboration spéciale d'un agent séparé à la production de l'intelligible dans l'âme humaine, saint Thomas éliminait, en même temps que l'Intelligence agent d'Avicenne, un aspect important du Dieu illuminateur de saint Augustin." Ibid., p. 120.
- 7 "Nous n'avons en effet pas rencontré d'autre philosophe, avant lui, pour enseigner que l'intellect agent créé soit la raison suffisante de la connaissance humaine, toute illumination divine spéciale étant écartée." Ibid., pp. 120-121.
- 8 "L'illumination augustinienne et l'abstraction aristotélicienne nous ont paru se faire des concessions mutuelles, dans lesquelles l'abstraction semble d'abord l'emporter sur l'illumination pour lui céder ensuite le pas." J. Rohmer, "La théorie de l'abstraction dans l'école franciscaine d'Alexandre de Halcs à Jean Peckam", AHDL, 3(1928), 105.



- 9 "Dans la Summa de creaturis et le Commentaire des Sentences Albert de Cologne présente une théorie de l'abstraction qui est d'esprit nettement aristotélien." G. de Mattos, "L'intellect agent personnel dans les premiers écrits d'Albert le Grand et de Thomas d'Aquin", RNSP, 43 (1940-1945), 147.
- 10 "Près de quinze ans avant le Commentaire de saint Thomas, saint Albert, dans la Summa de Creaturis, professe la théorie de l'intellect agent personnel et rejette toute illumination pour la connaissance naturelle." Ibid., p. 161.
- 11 "Saint Albert apparaît comme le grand novateur, l'initiateur de la 'réforme thomiste'." Ibid., p. 161.
- 12 R. Z. Lauer, "St. Albert and the Theory of Abstraction", The Thomist, XVII (1954), 83.
- 13 "Aus Aristoteles' Ansicht von dem Nichtvorhandsein einer Wissenschaft bei Fehlen eines Sinnes ergibt sich für Albert ganz in Sinne seines Lehrers, dass all unser Denken aus der Sinneswahrnehmung entspringt. In dem Festhalten an diesen Sätzen zeigt sich der gelehrte Dominikaner des 13. Jahrhunderts gleich seinem grossen Schuler Thomas als Anhänger des Philosophen von Stagaira." U. Dähnert, Die Erkenntnislehre des Albertus Magnus ..., p. 26. The same teaching may be found in G. Reilly, The Psychology of St. Albert the Great Compared with that of St. Thomas, pp. 49, 57.
- 14 Cf. infra, pp. 181-182.
- 15 Aristotle himself uses the term abstractio (ἀγαύουσις) only in relation to mathematical knowledge. Since, however, natural philosophy and the first philosophy grasp their objects as removed from matter, they can be said to use abstraction. The use of the term for





this purpose, nevertheless, is post-Aristotelian. For an excellent explanation of this, cf. J. Owens, The Doctrine of Being in the Aristotelian Metaphysics, pp. 239-240. Also M.-D. Philippe, "Abstraction, Addition, Séparation, dans la philosophie d'Aristote", Revue Thomiste, 48 (1948), 461-479.

- 16 "Unsere Untersuchung über das Wesen des Intellektes bei Albert schliessen wir mit dem Hinweis, dass Thomas seine Auffassung in allen wesentlichen Punkten übernahm und sie in der Dominikanerschule die herrschende geblieben ist. Nicht Thomas ist es also gewesen, der die Lehre vom tätigen und möglichen Intellekt festgestellt und begründet hat, wie sie für die Thomistenschule massgebend geblieben ist, sondern Albert." A. Schneider, Die Psychologie Alberts des Grossen..., p. 233.
- 17 G. Reilly, The Psychology of St. Albert the Great..., p. 44.
- 18 Ibid., p. 57.
- 19 Cf. infra, pp. 106-109.
- 20 Cf. infra, pp. 85-100.
- 21 O. Lottin, "Problèmes concernant la 'Summa de Creaturis' et le Commentaire des Sentences de S. Albert le Grand", RTAM, 17 (1950), 319-328.
- 22 Cf. especially H.-F. Dondaine, "Date du Commentaire de la hiérarchie céleste de saint Albert le Grand", RTAM, 20 (1953), 315-322.
- 23 P. Mandonnet, "Albert le Grand et la 'Philosophia Pauperum'", RMSP, 36 (1934), 230-262.



- 24 F. Pelster, "Um die Datierung von Alberts des Grossen Aristotelesparaphrase", Philosophisches Jahrbuch, 48 (1935), 443-461.  
F. Pelster, "Beiträge zur Aristotelesbenutzung Alberts des Grossen", Philosophisches Jahrbuch, 1933, pp. 450-463; 1934, pp. 55-64.
- 25 A. Dondaine, Secrétaires de Saint Thomas, pp. 185-198.
- 26 B. Geyer, "Die von Albertus Magnus in 'De Anima' benutzte Aristotelesübersetzung und die Datierung dieser Schrift", RTAM, 72 (1955), 322-326.  
H. D. Saffrey, "Une brillante conjecture de Saint Albert...", Revue des Sciences Philosophiques et Théologiques, 40 (1956), 263.
- 27 G. Queneau, "Origine de la sentence 'Intellectus speculativus extensione fit practicus' et date du Commentaire du 'De Anima' de S. Albert le Grand", RTAM, 21 (1954), 307-312.
- 28 Alberti...Liber de Natura et Origine Animae, ed. B. Geyer, p. ix.
- 29 Cf. F. Pelster, "Um die Datierung von Alberts des Grossen Aristotelesparaphrase", Philosophisches Jahrbuch, 48 (1935), 443-461.
- 30 P. G. Meersseman, Introductio in Opera Omnia B. Alberti Magni, D.P., p. 49.
- 31 Ibid., p. 112.
- 32 Cf. P. Mandonnet, Siger de Brabant, Part I, pp. 105-106. And F. Van Steenberghen, "Le 'De Quindecim Problematibus' d'Albert le Grand", Mélanges Auguste Pelzer, pp. 417-418, 438-439.



- 33 "Eligat ergo unusquisque quod sibi placuerit: ea enim quae dicta sunt non assertionibus nostris inducta, sed assiduis postulationibus sociorum, ut Aristotelem explanemus, potius extorta quam impetrata." St. Albert, De Causis et Processu Universitatis, II, 5, 24; X, 619.
- 34 "Haec autem omnia dicta sunt secundum opinionem Peripateticorum: quia nec in his nec in aliis in hac via philosophiae dicimus aliquid ex proprio: quia propriam intentionem quam in philosophia habemus, non hic suscepimus explanare, sed alibi dicitur." St. Albert, Metaphysics, XI, 1, 9; VI, 598. Statements similar to this are given in G. Meersseman, Introductio in Opera Omnia B. Alberti Magni, O.P., p. 7. These latter, however, are not from the works with which we are concerned.
- 35 "Et quia adipiscor res difficillimas et cognitione dignissimas, ideo volo primo totam Aristotelis scientiam pro nostris viribus explanare, et tunc aliorum Peripateticorum inducere opiniones, et post hoc de Platonis opinionibus videre, et tunc demum nostram ponere opinionem." St. Albert, De Anima, III, 2, 1; V, 330.
- 36 "His autem dubiis primo volumus (volumus?) aptare responsionem Philosophorum quorundam, et postea adungere quod nobis videtur dicendum de his." Ibid., III, 2, 3; V, 335.
- 37 "Nos autem propter doctrinae bonitatem, quantum Deus in his donare dignabitur, hic volumus per-  
scrutari, ut omnes simul determinemus operationes intellectus: sed volumus primo ostendere dicta Peripateticorum in hac quaestione, et postea scientiam nostram: et ostendemus in quo convenit, et in quo differt a dictis aliorum Peripateticorum." Ibid., III, 3, 6; V, 378.
- 38 "Omnibus diligenter excussis, tangamus id quod secundum naturam probabilius dici potest, et non faciemus modo aliquam mentionem nisi tantum de his quae per philosophiam tantum possunt probari." St. Albert, De Nat. et Orig. An., II, 13; IX, 425.



- 39 "Nos ponimus quod..." Ibid., II, 16; IX, 432.
- 40 "Sed dissentio in hoc quod non videtur mihi sua potentia esse materiae potentia." St. Albert, De Anima, III, 3, 12; V, 350.
- 41 "Quaecumque autem jam probata sunt in libris nostris de Anima, quod intellectus separatur a corpore, et de statu ejusdem post separationem, subjaceant. De his autem jam in libro de immortalitate animae sufficientes posuimus probationes, et in III de Anima." St. Albert, De Unit. Int., cap. 1; IX, 437.
- 42 "Et hoc est quod verius de intellectu dici potest, et natura ipsius: et disputavimus de hoc latius in libro de perfectione animae, cui secundus est in libro de Intellectu et intelligibili quem scripsimus." St. Albert, ibid., cap. 7; IX, 469.
- 43 "Qualiter autem sint intelligentiae separatae, determinatum est a nobis in XI primae philosophiae." Ibid.
- 44 "Attamen multa in paraphrasi, et adhuc magis in istis digressionibus realiter ad ipsam intimam Alberti convictionem pertinere debent; haec autem discerni possent per exogesim uniuscujusque loci." P. G. Meersseman, Introductio in Opera Omnia B. Alberti Magni, O.F.M., p. 8.  
The same opinion is voiced by A. Schneider in Die Psychologie Alberts des Grossen..., pp. 4-8, 294-308.
- 45 "Et praeter hoc digressiones faciemus, declarantes dubia subeuntia, et suppletas quaecumque minus dicta in sententia Philosophi obscuritatem quibusdam attulerunt...ubicumque autem in titulo praesignatur, quod digressio fit, ibi additum est ex nobis ad suppletionem vel probationem inductum." St. Albert, Physics, I, 1, 1; III, 1-2.





NOTES TO CHAPTER I

- 1 Cf. Aristotle, De Anima, II, 4, 415b24;  
II, 5, 416b33-417a8.
- 2 "Unde liquido tenendum est quod omnis res quamcumque cognoscimus, congenerat in nobis notitiam sui. Ab utroque enim notitia paritur, a cognoscente et cognito." St. Augustine, De Trinitate, XI, 8, 14; PL 42, 970.
- 3 "Et ne longum faciam, videtur mihi anima cum sentit in corpore, non ab illo alicuid pati, sed in ejus passionibus attentius agere, et has actiones sive faciles propter convenientiam, sive difficiles propter inconvenientiam, non eam latere: et hoc totum est quod sentire dicitur." St. Augustine, De Musica, VI, 5, 10; PL 32, 1169.
- 4 "Dat enim (scil., anima) eis (scil., corporum imaginibus) formandis quiddam substantiae suae." St. Augustine, De Trinitate, X, 5, 7; PL 42, 977.  
"Cum autem ab eisdem suis operationibus alicuid patitur (scil., anima), a seipsa patitur, non a corpore." St. Augustine, De Musica, VI, 5, 12; PL 32, 1169-1170.  
For a full treatment of sensation in St. Augustine, cf. E. Gilson, Introduction à l'Etude de S. Augustin, pp. 71-86.
- 5 "Omnis potentia quae fit in actu per susceptionem formae alicujus agentis in ipsam, est passiva: sensus est potentia hujusmodi: ergo sensus est potentia passiva." St. Albert, Sum. de Creat., P. II, q. 34, a.1; XXXV, 294.  
"Sensus nihil transmutat, sed potius transmutatur ab objecto." Ibid.
- 6 "Omnis sensus est susceptivum specierum sine materia." Ibid., a. 3, sol.; XXXV, 303.  
"Et hoc etiam probatur per rationem: materia enim coloris res colorata est, non lapis, vel equus; quae res non recipiuntur in oculo, licet species coloris equi vel lapidis in oculo recipiantur. Et similiter est in aliis sensibus." Ibid., arg. 2; XXXV, 301.



- 7 "Hoc enim dicit Philosophus in II de Anima circa finem, et dat simile: sicut cera recipit figuram annuli sine materia annuli, quae est ferrum, vel aurum." Ibid., arg. 1; XXXV, 301.  
Cf. Aristotle, De Anima, II, 12; 424a17-20.
- 8 "Nomina autem formae varia sunt...Forma autem dicitur, eo quod distinguit et informat informitatem materiae. Et species secundum quod est dans esse et cognitionem rei." St. Albert, Physics, I, 3, 17; III, 89.  
"Species enim aut sumitur ut in logicis, aut sicut in naturalibus, aut sicut in spirituablius...Si autem secundo modo: tunc species est forma dans esse et rationem...Si tertio modo: tunc Filius esset ratio secundum quam formaliter cognosceret Pater." St. Albert, I Sent., d. 31, a. 6, obj. 3; XXVI, 107.  
"Sensus est species sensibilium: species autem est forma: ergo in sensu est forma sensibilium." St. Albert, Sum. de Creat., P. II, q. 45, a. 2; XXXV, 413.
- 9 "Et voco intentionem speciem quae principium est cognitionis sensibilis." Ibid., q. 34, a. 2, quaest.; XXXV, 298.  
The word sensibilis is used here because St. Albert is concerned only with sensible knowledge at this point. The word intentio is used in Averroes, De Anima, II, 121, 29. Forma and intentio are found in Avicenna, De Anima, IV, 1; f. 17vb.
- 10 "Adhuc autem notandum est, quod differunt forma rei et intentio rei: forma enim est proprie quae informando dat esse actu materiae, et composito ex materia et forma. Intentio autem vocatur id per quod significatur res individualiter sive universaliter, secundum diversos gradus abstractionis: et haec non dat (esse?) alicui, nec sensui quando est in ipso, nec etiam intellectui quando est in ipso, sed signum facit de re et notitiam: et ideo intentio non est pars rei sicut forma, sed potius est species totius notitiae rei: et ideo intentio quia abstrahitur de tota re, significatio totius de re praedicatur." St. Albert, De Anima, II, 3, 4; V, 238.  
"Et anima secundum sensum efficitur idem cum sensibilibus...eo modo quo eadem actu dicuntur, quorum idem est actus, licet esse sit differens." Ibid., III, 3, 12; V, 388-389.



- 11 "Si proprie loquamur, species intelligibilis non est materia considerationis circa quam est consideratio, sed potius res cuius est illa species: sicut etiam in visu species visibilis non est materia circa quam est visus, sed potius res visa." St. Albert, Sum. de Creat., P. II, c. 57, a. 1, ad obj. 1; XXXV, 489.
- 12 "Quia vero spiritus omnis omni est corpore sine dubitatione praestantior, sequitur ut non loci positione, sed naturae dignitate praestantior sit natura spiritualis isto corporeo caelo, etiam illa ubi rerum corporalium exprimuntur imagines... Nec sane putandum est facere aliquid corpus in spiritu, tanquam spiritus corpori facienti, materiae vice subdatur... Tamen eandem ejus imaginem non corpus in spiritu, sed ipse spiritus in seipso facit celeritate mirabili." St. Augustine, De Genesi ad litteram, XII, 16, 32-33; PL 34, 466-467. Cf. also De Musica, VI, 5, 8; PL 32, 1167-1168.
- 13 "Et sic communicantiam habent forma sensibilis agens et sensus patiens, in eo quod sicut sensus spiritualiter patitur, ita etiam forma sensibilis spiritualiter agit in ipsam... Nec oportet aliquo modo illud fore verum, quod licet agens sit honorabilius patiente, quod hoc agens propter hoc sit honorabilius hoc patiente." St. Albert, De Anima, II, 3, 6; V, 243-244.
- 14 "Quod autem dicunt inferius et materiale non debere agere in superius et formale, frivolum est: quia sensibilia non agunt in animam, sed potius in organa corporum: et in illa possunt agere. Organa autem sunt animata, et ita provenit motus sensibilibus usque ad animam." Ibid., II, 3, 1; V, 232.  
"Licet primum agens sit corpus, tamen proximum est intentio spiritualis ab anima apprehensa." St. Albert, IV Sent., d. 44, a. 35, ad 1; XXX, 590.
- 15 "Aliud est singulare secundum esse naturae, et aliud intentio singularis in anima. Singulare secundum esse quod habet in natura, est a materia: sed intentio singularis in anima est ab appendiciis materiae." St. Albert, Sum de Creat., P. II, q. 34, a. 3, ad 1; XXXV, 303.



- "... ab omnibus quae accidunt formae secundum quod est materia individuata, sicut est figura, et ubi, et quando, et caetera hujusmodi." St. Albert, De Anima, II, 3, 4; V, 235.
- 16 "Dico appendicias materiae conditiones et proprietates quas habet subjectum formae quod est in tali vel tali materia: verbi gratia, talis membrorum situs, vel talis color faciei, vel talis aetas, vel talis figura capitis, vel talis locus generationis." Ibid., II, 3, 4; V, 237.
- 17 "Cum sensus sunt partes animae, et organa sensuum sunt animata, non possunt eis inesse formae illae, nisi secundum esse spirituale." St. Albert, Physics, VII, 1,4; III, 494.
- 18 For the nature of sensible species in St. Augustine, cf. O. F. Knapke, The Scholastic Theory of the Species Sensibilis, pp. 14-25.
- 19 "Sensus autem dicitur potentia passiva, non quod recipiat formam quae transmutat substantiam suam in substantiam secundum esse, sed potius transmutatur in speciem sensibilem secundum intentionem." St. Albert, Sum. de Creat., P. II, q. 34, a. 1, sol.; XXXV, 295.
- 20 "Quod autem alterans agit dupliciter, scilicet corporaliter et spiritualiter...Spiritualiter autem agit, quando immutat per intentionem suae formae potius quam per formam, sicut alterantur sensus in partibus animae passivis perceptivis." St. Albert, Physics, VII, 1, 4; III, 493. The same doctrine is found in Roger Bacon, Quaestionem Supra Libros Octo Physicorum Aristotelis, in Opera hactenus inedita..., XIII, 352.
- 21 "Cum igitur generatum est complete sentiens, tunc jam habet habitum perficientem sensum prima perfectione, quae est sicut scientia, quae est primus actus in intellectu: sentire autem secundum actum qui est secunda perfectio, quod est quando recipitur species sensibilis in sensu, est sicut considerare se habet ad scientiam." St. Albert, De Anima, II, 3, 3; V, 235. Cf. Aristotle, De Anima, II, 5; 417b10-19.





- 22 "Habens enim scientiam, et secundum scientiam illam sic speculans et operans, aut in veritate non est alterari, aut si alteratio dicitur, dicitur alterum genus esse alterationis, in eo quod nihil in eo abjicitur vel generatur." Ibid., II, 3, 2; V, 234.
- 23 "Haec autem doctrina tenenda est pro principio magno, ad destruendam totam sententiam eorum qui dicunt sensitivas et intellectivas virtutes esse activas, et non passivas." Ibid., II, 3, 1; V, 232.  
Cf. Sum. de Creat., P. II, q. 34, a. 1; XXXV, 295.
- 24 "Et potest aliquis dicere quod sensibilia non movent sensus illo modo quo existunt extra animam; movent enim sensus secundum quod sunt intentiones, cum in materia non sint intentiones in actu, sed in potentia... Sed Aristoteles tacuit hoc in sensu, quia latet, et apparet in intellectu. Et tu debes hoc considerare, quoniam indiget perscrutatione." Averroes, De Anima, II, 60, 40-44 and 55-57.
- 25 "Haec autem dubitatio magna indiget consideratione, et in sequenti capitulo secundum facultatem nostram determinabitur." St. Albert, De Anima, II, 3, 3; V, 236.
- 26 "Nos autem simpliciter naturalibus insistentes haec omnia falsa reputamus." Ibid., II, 3, 6; V, 242.
- 27 "Adhuc autem indicunt quarto loco experimenta: quia vident oculos menstruarum inficere aerem et specula, et aliquando oculos etiam intuentium eas: et oculos basiliscus spargere venenum, eo quod, ut dicunt, visu interficit serpens qui basiliscus vocatur: hoc autem, ut dicunt, non fit nisi agendo in aerem et in objectum: et ita dicunt sensum esse potentiam activam." Ibid., II, 3, 1; V, 232.  
The eyes of fascination are mentioned by Avicenna, De Anima, IV, 4; f. 20vb.
- 28 "Quod autem inducunt ultimo, est omnino stultum: quia talis actio non est oculi in quantum est sensus in ipso, sed potius prout est pars corporis evaporantis." St. Albert, De Anima, II, 3, 1; V, 232.



- 29 "Quod enim dicunt virtutem sensibilem egredi et supponere se sensibus, propter universalem ordinem quem habet ad ipsam, intelligi non potest nisi sicut egreditur virtus a magnete ad ferrum... Sed hoc falsum est, quia virtus illa non ingreditur nisi in suo vehiculo quod est spiritus: multoties autem spiritus non possent extendi usque ad sensibile quod multum distat aliquando, et praecipue in visu et odoratu quorundam animalium." Ibid., II, 3, 6; V, 243.
- 30 Cf. De Genesi ad litteram, III, 5, 7; PL XXXIV, 282. Cf. also XII, 16, 32; PL XXXIV, 466.
- 31 Cf. De Reductione Artium in Theologiam, 3; ed. Quaracchi, V, 320. Also In II Sent., d. 13, a. 2, q. 2, sed contra 2; II, 319.
- 32 "Fuerunt autem quidam modernorum magnae auctoritatis qui haec concesserunt propter praeinductam rationem, asserentes quod omne sensibile quod invenitur in omnibus sensibus, est unum in eo quod est intentionale et spirituale et non materiale: unum autem in multis participatum necesse est ab uno causari: hoc autem non casu illud movet ad aliud vel aliud: oportet igitur aliquem esse motorem qui movet ad hoc esse in omnibus sensibus...Cum movens in omnibus sensibus debeat esse unum et idem, et vident lumen esse motivum in sensu visus, dicunt ipsum oportere esse motivum in omnibus sensibus." St. Albert, De Anima, II, 3, 6; V, 240-241.
- 33 "Quinta autem est quae et praecipua est cui innituntur: quia vident sensibilibus esse materiale causari a qualitatibus elementorum: et ideo nullam esse qualitatem elementi, quae agat in ipso intentionem spirituales." Ibid.; V, 241. Cf. St. Augustine, De Gen. ad litt., XII, 16, 32; PL XXXIV, 466: "Cum illud quod subtilissimum in corpore, et ob hoc animae vicinius quam caetera, id est lux..."



- 34 "Dicimus enim nullo modo fore necessarium unam esse causam multitudinis quae est in multis, quae secundum unam rationem non est in eis, sed secundum rationes aequivocas: esse autem intentionale et spirituale non una ratione est in sensibus: quia unum est multo spiritualius alio, quia unum afficit et medium et organum secundum esse materiale agens in ipsum, sicut est in objectis tactus." St. Albert, De Anima, II, 3, 6; V, 242.
- 35 "Opinio autem quae dicit hoc esse lumen omnino ridiculosa est: quia qui dicit lumen esse in tenebris, indiget sensu." Ibid.; V, 243.
- 36 "Et si quaeritur quid conferat ei hoc esse? videtur mihi stulta quaestio, quia nos superius ostendimus omnem virtutem activam esse per se perfectam ad agendum, sine aliquo motivo extrinseco: et ideo dico quod forma sensati per seipsam generat se in medio sensus secundum esse sensibile, cujus necessaria demonstratio est, quod ab omnibus Philosophis et ab ipsa veritate vincitur, per se sensibile esse, quod in secundo modo dicendi per essentiam suam est causa sui esse sensibilis: et ideo frustra quaeritur, quid conferat ei illud? sicut si quaeritur, quid conferat luci lucere secundum actum?" Ibid., II, 3, 6; V, 242.
- "Secundus modus dicendi per se" is to predicate of a subject an accident which is included in its definition. Cf. St. Albert, Posterior Analytics, I, 2, 9; II, 40-43.
- 37 "Forma autem corporalis per se agens, nihil supra se confert quando confert esse intentionale." St. Albert, De Anima, II, 3, 6; V, 243.
- 38 "Forma quae est in re, aliquando agit per qualitates materiae in qua est: et tunc agit materialiter. Aliquando autem agit per se solam: et tunc agit immaterialiter: quia et ipsa est essentia immaterialis per seipsam, et non indiget in ista secunda actione nisi se sola. In prima autem indiget alia quam seipsa." Ibid.
- "Forma in eo quod forma sic multiplicat se." Ibid.; V, 244. Cf. also Sum. de Creat., P. II, q. 45, a. 2, ad obj. 1; XXXV, 414.



- 39 For the activity of the external senses in St. Thomas, cf. G. Picard, "Essai sur la connaissance sensible d'après les scolastiques", Archives de Philosophie, IV (1926), cahier 1, pp. 71-86. For Aristotle, cf. J. de Tonquedec, La Critique de la Connaissance, pp. 479-484.
- 40 Cf. S. MacClintock, Perversity and Error, pp. 10-50.
- 41 For the doctrine of expressed sensible species, cf. G. Picard, "Essai sur la Connaissance Sensible d'après les Scolastiques", Archives de Philosophie, vol. IV. (1926), cahier I, pp. 1-70.
- 42 "Tertium autem est, quia vident sensum iudicare de sensibili, et non decipi in ipso. Iudicare autem certa actio quaedam est perfectissima: et cum illa sit sensus, dicunt sensum potentiam esse activam." St. Albert, De Anima, II, 3, 1; V, 232.
- 43 "Quod autem dicunt de iudicio sensuum, dicendum quod nulla virtus est adeo passiva, quin per formam sui activi existentem in ipsa possit agere: et sic est de sensu, qui efficitur in actu per formam sensibilis in ipso existentem; et ideo tunc agere potest, sicut sciens potest considerare." Ibid.
- 44 "Sed tunc quaeritur: quia si odorare est etiam pati aliquid a specie, tunc una ratione patitur medium, quod est corpus inanimatum, et sensus a specie sensibili... Et ad hoc dicimus, quod odorare non est absolute pati aliquid a sensibili percepto, sed potius odorare est sentire et iudicare odorem, quod est secunda sensus perfectio: et non est tantum pati, sed operari aliquid: et hoc modo sensibile ad operationem sensus non agit in id quod est inanimatum." Ibid., II, 4, 2; V, 295.
- 45 "Dicamus igitur quod in omni natura quae pluribus communis est, oportet esse unum fontem ex quo illa communitas oriatur: sensibilis autem cognitio est communicata quinque sensibus: et ideo oportet esse





unum fontem ex quo omnis sensus oriatur, et ad quem omnis motus sensibilium referatur sicut ad ultimum finem: et hic fons vocatur sensus communis." Ibid., II, 4, 7; V, 302.

"Et ipsi particulares sensus sunt sicut rivi ex communi fonte derivati." Ibid., II, 4, 8; V, 306.

- 46 "Dicimus...(scil., sensum communem) esse unum in substantia et forma sensibilitatis, sed distinctum per hoc quod influit particularibus organis particulares sensus, et prout dirigit sensum huic vel illi proprio organo." Ibid., II, 4, 11; V, 311.  
Cf. also Sum. de Creat., P. II, q. 35, a. 2; XXXV, 310-314.
- 47 Cf. St. Albert, De Anima, III, 3, 12; V, 389.  
Also De Sensu et Sensato, III, 5; IX, 89-90.  
In this teaching about the common sense, St. Albert follows Avicenna, De Anima, IV, 1; f. 17rb-va.  
And especially Algazel in his Physica (no longer extant), quoted by Albert in Sum. de Creat., P. II, q. 35, a. 2: "Sensus communis est sensus a quo omnes proprii derivantur, ad quem omnis impressio eorum renuntiat, in quo omnes conjunguntur, et sic sunt quasi suggerentes ipsum." XXXV, 310.
- 48 "Proprium sensibile accipitur a sensu proprio per se et primo, commune autem per posterius: commune vero accipitur a sensu communi per se et primo, et a sensu proprio per posterius." St. Albert, Sum. de Creat., P. II, q. 35, a. 1, ad 2; XXXV, 310.  
St. Albert follows Aristotle concerning the common sensibles.  
Cf. ibid., a. 4, sol.; XXXV, 316. Also Aristotle, De Anima, II, 6; 418a18-19.
- 49 "Nullus sensus proprius potest discernere idem et diversum inter sensata per compositionem et divisionem: et idcirco oportet nos ponere sensum communem." St. Albert, Sum. de Creat., P. II, q. 35, a. 1; XXXV, 306. This is from Aristotle, De Anima, III, 1, 425a27-32; and III, 2, 426b17-29.



- 50 "In quantum autem communis est, habet duo sine quibus sensibilis cognitio non perficitur, quorum unum est iudicium sensibilis operationis, sicut nos apprehendimus videre quando videmus, et audire quando audimus, et sic de aliis." St. Albert, De Anima, II, 4, 7; V, 307.  
This goes beyond Aristotle. Cf. his De Anima, III, 2; 425b10-25.
- 51 "Si autem daretur quod est idem visus quo videmus colorem, et quo videmus nos videre colorem, tunc visus erit suiipsius sicut objecti: et cum objectum sit agens, sensus patiens, sequeretur eundem sensum esse agens et patiens, quod iterum est impossibile." St. Albert, De Anima, II, 4, 8; V, 305.  
Cf. also Sum. de Creat., P. II, q. 36, a. 1; XXXV, 319.
- 52 "Et hoc modo nihil prohibet quando idem sit activum et passivum: agere enim quoddam est iudicare et componendo et dividendo, et hoc est communis sensus, qui est formalis: recipere autem et habere formes sensibiles est pati, et hoc est sensuum particularium." St. Albert, De Anima, II, 4, 8; V, 306.  
In all this doctrine of the common sense, St. Albert goes beyond Aristotle. Cf. Aristotle, De Anima, III, 2, 425b11-23 and 426b3-28.
- 53 "Omne movens formale est ad id quod movetur ab ipso." St. Albert, De Anima, II, 4, 12; V, 312.  
"Activum quod est formale, non perficitur eodem quo perficitur passivum quod est recipiens et tenens." Ibid., II, 4, 7; V, 303.
- 54 "Forsitan autem objiciet aliquis contra ea quae dicta sunt, dicens quod omne movens formale est ad id quod movetur ab ipso: movet autem sensus proprius communem eo modo quo ipse movetur a sensibili: non enim esset iudicium sensorum priorum in sensu communi dicente ea altera esse vel eadem, nisi ad ipsum transirent a sensu proprio cui prius occurrunt. Videtur igitur sensus communis esse materialior quam proprius." St. Albert, De Anima, II, 4, 12; V, 312.



- 55 "Et quod dicitur, quod sensus proprii movent ipsum, falsum est omnino: oportet enim quod sensibile proprium spiritualius et simplicius fiat in sensu communi quam in proprio: et hanc majorem simplicitatem non dat ei sensus proprius, sed potius communis. In ipso enim est spiritus lucidus, qui est vehiculum et instrumentum ipsius: et ille prout est instrumentum sensus communis, confert ei majorem simplicitatem, sicut lux coloribus: et in tali actu et forma facta sensibilia propria pertingunt ad organum sensus communis: et tunc judicat de eis. Nec potest dici quod alicuid corporeum omnino conferat eis agere in organum sensus communis: eo quod formae corporales sunt ipsa sensata, non separatae ab appendiciis materiae: et ideo corporale agens, quod tamen est instrumentum ejus quod est incorporeum, habet quod dat eis agere in organum sensus communis, quod formalius est quam organa sensuum priorum." Ibid., V, 312-313.
- 56 De Anima, III, 1, 432a1-2.  
The text Albert used had species sensibilium. That of St. Thomas had forma sensibilium. See his Commentarium in de Anima, III, lect. 13.
- 57 "Manus enim non est organum uni officio tantum, sed juvat quodlibet organum ad officium suum...et ita est sensus potentia species sensibilium...quoniam sicut necesse est quod manus sit formalior organis, ita necesse est quod primum sensitivum sit formalius quam sensibilia." St. Albert, De Anima, III, 3, 12; V, 389.
- 58 "Et hoc est quod intendit dicere Augustinus, qui dicit quod corporales formae non movent animam, sed potius talibus formis factis in corpore, anima luce sua facit eas in ipsa." Ibid., II, 4, 12; V, 313. Averroes says that the common sense is formal in regard to the proper senses. See his De Anima, III, 36, 571-577.
- 59 "Talis autem forma (scil., sensus communis) una simplex praehabens potestate ea quorum ipsa est causa, et habet ea actu quando distinguitur ab aliquo illorum." St. Albert, De Anima, II, 4, 12; V, 313.



- 60 "Hac etiam de causa dixerunt quidam virtutem sensibilem per se esse activam, et nullius speciei esse receptivam: quia non recte recipit eas, sed una species quae est habitus potentiae sensitivae, distinguitur ad sensibilia quae sunt in organis, sicut distinguitur virtus universalis ad particulare in quod agit, et circa quod operatur." Ibid.
- 61 "Dicimus igitur quod omne apprehendere est accipere formam apprehensi, non secundum esse quod habet in eo quod apprehenditur, sed secundum quod est intentio ipsius et species, sub qua aliqua sensibilis vel intelligibilis notitia apprehensi habetur. Haec autem apprehensio, ut universaliter loquendo, quatuor habet gradus. Quorum primus et infimus est, quod abstrahitur et separatur forma a materia, sed non ab ejus potentia nec ab ejus appendiciis: et hoc facit vis apprehensiva de foris, quae est sensus." Ibid., II, 3, 4; V, 237.
- 62 Cf. infra, n. 70.
- 63 "Sensus enim recipit, et non tenet nisi re praesente: sed imaginatio retinet accepta a sensibus. Dicitur autem recipere a sensu communi, quia ab illo recipit proxime." St. Albert, Sum. de Creat., P. II, q. 37, a. 1, ad 1; XXXV, 325.
- 64 "Secundus autem gradus est, quod separetur a materia, et a praesentia materiae, sed non ab appendiciis materiae, sive conditionibus materiae: et hanc apprehensionem facit imaginativa potentia, quae etiam singularibus non praesentibus retinet formas sensibilibum, sed non denudat eas a materiae appendiciis... Secundum autem hos gradus abstractionis sive separationis distinguentur inferius vires apprehensivae." St. Albert, De Anima, II, 3, 4; V, 237-238. Cf. also Sum. de Creat., P. II, q. 55, a. 6; XXXV, 475.
- 65 "Imaginatium majoris est abstractionis quam sensatum: ergo videtur, quod non agatur ab illo." St. Albert, Sum. de Creat., P. II, q. 37, a. 4, obj. 4; XXXV, 328.





- 66 "Ad illud quod quaeritur, a quo fiat (scil., imaginatum) in actu, Dicendum, quod a spiritu animali qui abstrahit ipsum ab organis sensuum, et confert ei esse spirituale, sicut lumen facit actu colores, et intellectus agens facit actu universale." Ibid., ad 4; XXXV, 329.
- 67 "Propter quod et ipsae potentiae (scil., the internal senses) non penitus sunt eadem: sed, sicut superius diximus de sensu communi, videtur tota formalitas sensibilis virtutis esse phantasia: et hoc materialiter differentiam habet secundum quod inchoat ab organo unius motus ejus, vel ab organo alterius: et hoc modo videntur omnes istae vires animae sensibilis esse interiores in una essentialitate communi et substantia, differentes autem secundum esse materiale in diversis partibus cerebri, in quo organizantur istae potentiae: quae omnes sunt organicae." St. Albert, De Anima, III, 1, 3; V, 318.
- 68 "Sensus enim communis discernit componendo sensata propria inter se, et propria cum communibus, et hoc re praesente...Phantasia autem discernit componendo et dividendo imagines quae sunt in anima re non praesente." St. Albert, Sum. de Creat., P. II, q. 37, a. 1, ad 1; XXXV, 325.  
"Phantasia est motus a quolibet sensu secundum actum factus, sed non immediate. Immediate enim fit ista motus a sensu communi." Ibid., q. 38, a. 1, ad 6; XXXV, 331.
- 69 "Major subtiliatio spiritus animalis exigitur ad operandum imaginationes apprehensas ut ex eis eliciatur verum vel falsum, quam ad recipiendum imagines tantum: et ideo quia phantasia facit talem comparisonem, oportet quod ipsa habeat spiritum similem illi spiritui qui est in media cellula, qui subtilissimus est." Ibid., a. 3, ad 2; XXXV, 333.
- 70 "Oportet igitur phantasiam secundum aliquid esse differentem ab imaginatione et aestimativa: licet enim omnes istae potentiae passivae animae sint et patiantur a formis individui, quae sunt principia cognitionis sensibilis, quae formae eadem esse videntur, tamen motus passionis non est idem, sed est secundum differentem gradum abstractionis." St. Albert, De Anima, III, 1, 3; V, 318.



- 71 Avicenna, De Anima, II, 2; f. 6vb-7ra.
- 72 William of Auvergne, De Anima, cap. VII, pars 7; in Opera Omnia, II, 213.
- 73 John of La Rochelle, Summa de Anima, P. II, cap. 35; ed. Domenichelli, p. 286.
- 74 Peter of Spain, Scientia Libri de Anima, tr. 6, cap. 4; ed. Alonso, p. 210.
- 75 St. Thomas, Sum. Theol., I, 42, 2, obj. 1.
- 76 Cf. supra, pp. 18-19.



NOTES TO CHAPTER II

- 1 "Dicit enim Aristoteles in III de Anima: Quoniam autem sint in omni natura quaedam, quorum aliquid est tamquam materia, et in unoquoque genere, hoc autem est potentia illa, alterum autem est causa et efficiens quidem est, et omnia facit ut ars ad naturam sustinuit, necesse et in anima has differentias esse: et hujus quidem quaedam differentia est intellectus quo omnia fiunt, ille vero quo est omnia facere." St. Albert, Sum. de Creat., P. II, q. 55, a. 1, sed contra 1; XXXV, 454.  
The text in Aristotle is De Anima, III, 5; 430a10-16.
- 2 "Supra dictae divisiones (scil., intellectuum) sunt analogi, quod medium est inter univocum et aequivocum: sunt enim illae partes ordinatae ad unum, scilicet ad intellectum speculativum, et agens ordinatur ad ipsam ut efficiens, possibilis vero ut recipiens." St. Albert, Sum. de Creat., P. II, q. 54, a. 1, sol.; XXXV, 451.  
"Cum igitur intellectus speculativus nihil aliud sit quam possibilis existens sub forma intelligibili." Ibid.; 450.
- 3 "Melius est non dicere animam misereri, aut discere, aut intelligere, sed hominem per animam. Et similiter intellectus non est intelligere, sed animae per intellectum." Ibid., q. 56, a. 6; 476.
- 4 "Dixit (scil., Plato) non esse universale collectum ex pluribus memoriis et experimentis, sed omnium scientias ex intellectu, sed non considerare animam ea quae sunt in ipsa, eo quod occupatione corporis et delectatione abstrahitur, ne convertat oculum ad ea quae semper sunt in ea: per studium autem nihil fieri de scientia in homine, sed potius reordinari animam ad contuendum ea quae sunt in ea ut reminiscatur eorum quae delectatione carnis et occupatione sensibilibus oblivioni tradiderat." St. Albert, De Anima, III, 2, 10; V, 346-347.  
For this doctrine in Plato, cf. his Meno, 86; and Phaedo, 73-74.



We know that Albert did not have a direct knowledge of very much of Plato's works. He had the translation of the Timaeus made by Chalcidius in the third or fourth century A.D. He knew the Phaedo and the Meno and the Phaedrus in their substance, but indirectly. Cf. L. Gaul, "Alberts des Grossen Verhältnis zu Plato", Beitrage, XII, 1 (1913), 29-30. Only half the Timaeus was translated (to 53C). The Phaedo and the Meno had been translated, however, by Henricus Aristippus in Sicily, c. 1156. Cf. R. Klibansky, The Continuity of the Platonic Tradition, pp. 27-29.

- 5 "Adhuc autem secundum istam scientiam sensus et phantasiae non erunt nisi impedimenta scientiae: et tunc est mirum quod anima eligeret tale corpus, quod eam a perfectione impediret." St. Albert, De Anima, III, 2, 10; V, 347.
- 6 "Intellectus autem possibilis sicut recipiens et subjectum intelligibilium." St. Albert, Sum. de Creat., P. II, q. 56, a. 6; XXXV, 476.
- 7 "Averrois (sic) quidem est ista: quoniam si intellectus possibilis non esset separatus a materia et appendiciis materiae, tunc esset aut forma corporis, aut forma operans organice in corpore: et quocumque modo diceretur, sequitur quod id quod foret in ipso, individuaretur per ipsum, sicut quaelibet forma individuatur per suum subjectum individuum: et sic universale non esset in ipso, sed particulare." St. Albert, De Anima, III, 2, 3; V, 334.  
From Averroes, De Anima, III, 5, 32-44.
- 8 Aristotle, De Anima, III, 4; 429a15.
- 9 "Intellectus non est simpliciter potentia passiva intelligibilium, sed quodammodo est potentia: est enim potentia receptiva tantum, et non proprie passiva." St. Albert, De Anima, III, 2, 17; V, 361.





- 10 "Intelligibile cum intellectu possibili non fit unum sicut subjectum et accidens sunt unum, quia accidens non est perfectio subjecti: nec etiam est unum sicut materia et forma sunt unum, quia forma non perficit materiam nisi secundum esse et distincta et divisa: universale autem est indistinctum et indivisum, et non perficit esse, set potius est principium cognitionis eorum quae sunt: alioquin oporteret nos dicere quod intellectus esset lapis quando intelligit lapidem...et in hac scientia convenit nobiscum Averroes in commento de Anima, et sic universale comparatur intellectui: ideo speculativus intellectus ex subjecto quod est intellectus possibilis, non habet aliquam transmutationem nec passionem veram." Ibid.; III, 2, 17; V, 352. This solution is from Averroes, De Anima, III, 5, 419-423.
- 11 "Anima rationalis (scil., secundum intellectum possibilem)...non movetur aliqua specie motus physici, licet ibi sit transmutatio secundum species intelligibiles." St. Albert, Sum. de Creat., P. II, q. 55, a. 4, p. 1, ad 4; XXXV, 470.
- 12 "Possibilis intellectus est potentia passiva, si passio large sumatur ad physicam et non physicam... Possibilis enim intellectus transmutatur ex alio quod est intellectus agens, et sua transmutatio est exitus de potentia intelligendi ad actum intelligendi." Ibid., a. 56, a. 1 sol.; XXXV, 478.
- 13 "Potentia enim materiae quae una est contrariorum, est subjectum et causa receptionis et transmutationis: propter duo enim est subjectum transmutationis, et propter unum tantum est ipsa subjectum receptionis: quia enim contrarium inest sibi, oportet hoc abjici per transmutationem: et quia inchoatio formae inest ei ante perfectionem secundum actum, oportet illam inchoationem procedere ad actum per transmutationem quae est forma post formam: et eo quod continue fluit potentia ejus in actum. His enim duabus de causis oportet ipsam materiam prius tempore subijci transmutationi quam receptioni. Receptioni enim subijcitur per id quod receptio est finis transmutationis: et ideo receptio est in indivisibili temporis, et transmutatio in tempore." St. Albert, De Anima, III, 2, 17; V, 362.



"Talis autem potentia receptiva soli convenit intellectui possibili, ita quod non sensui: quoniam quaedam materiales dispositiones ad sensibile recipiendum praecedunt in sensu, sicut calor vel frigus, vel hujusmodi aliquid: in intellectu autem omnino nihil praecedit: sed purae receptibilitati acquiritur receptum secundum actum." Ibid.

- 14 "Et videmus quod id quod est sic agens in actu ipsum sensibile, nihil patitur omnino, etiam quando recipitur a sensu, non abjicitur aliquid a sensu nec progreditur de forma in formam fluendo, quemadmodum forma generata in materia." Ibid., III, 3, 2; V, 373.
- 15 "Non tota est (scil., anima) locus: quia sensibilis quae est virtus, cum corpore transmutatur: et hoc non est loci. Similiter ipsa est subjectum formae: et hoc iterum loco non convenit." Ibid., III, 2, 15; V, 356.
- 16 "Sed ad hoc nos dicimus, quod intellectus speculativus qui est forma speculativa in intellectu possibili, in duplici est potentia, quarum una est secundum comparationem ejus quod intelligitur ad particulare in quo ipsum non est nisi in potentia: quia particulare non nisi secundum potentiam habet in se universale, et secundum exitum illius potentiae ad actum habet vices et tempus intellectus et transmutationem, et quoad hoc est passibilis. Alio autem modo in potentia est secundum comparationem ad intellectum possibilem." Ibid., III, 2, 12; V, 351.
- 17 "Secundum intellectum non essentialiter sed per accidens transmutatur (scil., anima) ex speciebus, sicut diximus supra: et hoc est secundum id quod extra intellectum est, et hoc est phantasma a quo elicitur universale, et non secundum ipsum intellectum possibilem." Ibid., III, 2, 15; V, 356.



- 18 "Quando sub luce istius intellectus (scil., agentis) unitur universale intellectui possibili, non unitur ei sicut organo sicut fit in formis sensibilibus, sed unitur ei sicut determinato: quia habitus connaturalis intellectui possibili qui est ipsa intellectualitas, qua possibilis intellectus vocatur et est natura intellectualis, ejusdem naturae est cum intelligibilibus in quantum sunt intelligibilia: sed sua intellectualitas est confusa et indeterminata: determinatur autem sicut potentia per actum, et sicut perficitur indeterminatum per determinatum." Ibid., III, 2, 12; V, 351-352.
- 19 "Et ex isto intelligitur, quod vere dictum est, quod sicut se habet sensus ad sensibilia, ita intellectus ad intelligibilia, non quidem quoad organum sensus, quia organum unitur formae sensibili sicut subjectum accidenti, si tamen vere accidens dici debet intentio sensibilis quae est in organo, quoniam secundum veritatem non est ens, sed est aliquid entis non secundum esse entis naturae, sed secundum esse abstractionis, sicut patet ex supra determinatis: sed est similitudo inter sensum comparatum ad sensibilia et intellectum comparatum ad intelligibilia quoad ipsam virtutem sine organo consideratam et ad sensibilia comparatam: superius enim diximus quod prima et principalis forma sensitiva quae est sensus communis, comparatur ad ista sicut determinata ad ipsa: et sic est comparatio intellectualitatis possibilis ad universalis sicut ad quae determinatur ejus formalis intellectualitas." Ibid.; V, 352.
- 20 Cf. supra, pp. 31-32.
- 21 "Una species quae est habitus potentiae sensitivae, distinguitur ad sensibilia quae sunt in organis, sicut distinguitur virtus universalis ad particulare in quod agit, et circa quod operatur." St. Albert, De Anima, II, 4, 12; V, 313.
- 22 "Forma sensus communis indeterminata, formalior est determinantibus ipsum, et est una secundum formam et plures secundum materiam." Ibid., III, 2, 12; V, 352.



"Formae intelligibiles sunt in intellectu possibili sicut in magis formali per ipsas determinato."

Ibid., III, 2, 13; V, 353-354.

"Sed est (scil., intellectus possibilis) subjectum formale sicut commune et indeterminatum subjectum determinantis ipsum: et ideo diximus superius quod forma intellectus non operatur aliquid in intellectu nisi determinatione." Ibid., III, 2, 15; V, 358.

For the meaning of "formalis", cf. supra, Chap. I, n. 53.

23 "Quia speciebus non subicitur (scil., intellectus possibilis) sicut subjectum earum, sed potius formare se habet ad ipsas." St. Albert, De Anima, III, 2, 15; V, 357.

24 Cf. supra, pp. 18-19.

25 For a valuable discussion of this point, cf. E. Gilson, Introduction à l'Etude de S. Augustin, p. 101. Also R. Jolivet, "La doctrine Augustinienne de l'illumination", Mélanges Augustiniens, pp. 132-133.

26 Cf. supra, pp. 31-32.

27 "Intelligens autem in intelligendo ad quatuor potest habere ordinem: scilicet ad rem quae intelligitur, ad speciem intelligibilem, qua fit intellectus in actu, ad suum intelligere, et ad conceptionem intellectus. Quae quidem conceptio a tribus praedictis differt... Differt autem a specie intelligibili: nam species intelligibilis, qua fit intellectus in actu, consideratur ut principium actionis intellectus: cum omne agens agat secundum quod est in actu: actu autem fit per aliquam formam, quam oportet esse actionis principium. Differt autem ab actione intellectus: quia praedicta conceptio consideratur ut terminus actionis, et quasi quoddam per ipsam constitutum... Dicitur autem ab intellectu per suum actum." St. Thomas, De Potentia, q. 8, a. 1, resp.





- 28 "Et ideo diximus superius quod forma intellectus non operatur alicui in intellectu nisi determinatione, sed potius e contrario intellectus operatur circa formam intellectam discretionem et iudicium et resolutionem et alias multas operationes." St. Albert, De Anima, III, 2, 15; V, 358.  
"Ars resolvendi et iudicandi secundum rationem resolutionis est ante artem inveniendi. Nec potest esse nisi duplex resolutio, scilicet rei conclusae in principia et causas per quas concluditur, et syllogismi collecti jam et constituti in principia formalia." St. Albert, rior Analytics, I, 1, 1; I, 460.
- 29 "In sensibilibus agunt objecta, et non ipsi sensus: quamvis enim sensus iudicent sensata, tamen hoc iudicium non est nisi sensuum existentium in actu, sicut etiam intellectus possibilis ens in actu iudicat de intelligibili." St. Albert, Sum de Creat., P. II, q. 55, a. 4, part. 2, ad 3; XXXV, 472.
- 30 Aristotle, De Anima, III, 4, 430a1-2.
- 31 "Et illius exemplar est, quod tamen non per omnia simile est, tabula rasa et planata et polita, in qua scriptura nec secundum actum est, nec contrarium scripturae, nec inchoatio scripturae per dispositionem mediam inter actum et potentiam, quae per motum educatur in actum: sed tantum est sufficienter praeparata ad recipiendam scripturam, et ideo recipit eam sine motu." St. Albert, De Anima, III, 2, 17; V, 362.
- 32 "Quia supra diximus quod ipse (scil., intellectus possibilis) est quodammodo formalis ad ea (scil., intelligibilia), quod non tabula circa scripturam est: et est operativus circa intelligibilia, quod iterum tabula minus facit circa scripturam: tamen tabula exemplum convenientius est quod in rebus corporalibus poterat inveniri ad incorporearum rerum potentiam demonstrandam." St. Albert, Ibid.



- 33 "Formae intelligibiles sunt in intellectu possibili sicut in magis formali per ipsas determinato: Formae autem sunt in materia prima sicut in materiali in quo subsistere habent." Ibid., III, 2, 13; V, 353-354.  
"Diximus enim supra impassibilem esse sensum a formis sensibilibus, eo quod est circa ipsas sicut forma una terminata ad ea sicut ad quinque materialia: et similiter est intellectus circa intelligibilia: formale autem non est passibile a materiali." Ibid., III, 2, 15; V, 357.
- 34 "Formae universalis simplices sunt comparatae ad intellectum possibilem: formae autem divisae secundum esse particulare et hic et nunc existentes sunt comparatae ad materiam." Ibid., III, 2, 13; V, 354.
- 35 "Formae quae sunt in intellectu possibili, sunt in eo non individuatae, eo quod non omnino uniuntur sibi sicut subjecto, nec sicut materiae: et ideo intellectus possibilis non obligatur alicui earum, sicut materia et instrumentum in quo et per quod formas (formae?) suas exercent operationes, sed remanet liber potens operari circa eas: materia autem formas quas recipit, sicut subjectum recipit, et ideo dividitur in partes per formas, et efficitur per partes obligata cuilibet formae, et illa exercet operationes suas in ea sicut instrumento et subjecto. Si autem ista subtilius considerantur, satis patet aequivoce dici potentiam passivam de materia et intellectu possibili." Ibid.
- 36 Cf. R. deVaux, "La première Entrée d'Averroes chez les Latins", Rev. des Sciences Philos. et Théol., 22 (1933), 231-241.
- 37 "Quoniam, quia opinati sumus ex hoc sermone quod intellectus materialis est unicus omnibus hominibus." Averroes, De Anima, III, 5, 575-576.



- 38 "Quaestio autem secunda, dicens quomodo intellectus materialis est unus in numero in omnibus individuis hominum, non generabilis neque corruptibilis, et intellecta existentia in eo in actu (et est intellectus speculativus)...Et ex hoc modo possumus dicere quod intellectus speculativus est unus in omnibus." Ibid., III, 5, 424-427, 594-596.  
For the meaning of "speculative intellect", cf. supra, p. 37.
- 39 "Et fuit necesse attribuere has duas actiones anime in nobis, scilicet recipere intellectum et facere eum, quamvis agens et recipiens sint substantie eterne, propter hoc quia hee due actiones reducta sunt ad nostram voluntatem, scilicet abstrahere intellecta et intelligere ea." Averroes, De Anima III, 18, 71-76. Cf. also III, 4, 54-58; III, 5, 556-574.
- 40 "En tant qu'il (scil., l'intellect) fait les formes intelligibles on l'appelle actif, et en tant qu'il les reçoit, on l'appelle passif; mais ce n'est qu'une seule et même chose." Averroes, Middle Commentary on the De Anima, selection in S. Munk, Mélanges de Philosophie Juive et Arabe, p. 447. Cf. the same conclusion in B. H. Zedler, "Averroes on the Possible Intellect", Proceedings of the American Catholic Philosophical Association, 1951, pp. 170-171.
- 41 Cf. E. Gilson, History of Christian Philosophy in the Middle Ages, p. 222, with the references given there.
- 42 Die Metaphysik des Averroes, trans. M. Horten, p. 194, ll. 7-17.
- 43 "Et ideo opinandum est secundum Aristotelem quod ultimus intellectus abstractorum in ordine est iste intellectus materialis." Averroes, De Anima, III, 19, 62-64.



- 44 "Et ideo opinandum est, quod iam apparuit nobis ex sermone Aristotelis, quod in anima sunt due partes intellectus, quarum una est recipiens...alia autem agens...et quod hec due partes sunt non generabiles neque corruptibiles." Ibid., III, 5, 556-563.  
"Hec enim intellecta sunt unica secundum recipiens, et multa secundum intentionem receptam. Secundum igitur modum secundum quem sunt unica necessario sunt eterna." Ibid., III, 5, 581-585.
- 45 St. Albert, S. de Creat., P. II, q. 57, a. 3, obj. 1; XXXV, 492.
- 46 Ibid., q. 55, sol.; XXXV, 466.
- 47 Cf. R. Miller, "An Aspect of Averroes' Influence on St. Albert", Mediaeval Studies, 16 (1954), 59-64. Roger Bacon made the same mistake. Cf. his Quaestiones Supra Libros Prime Philosophie Aristotelis, in Opera hactenus inedita..., X, 298-299. This was written probably between 1240 and 1246.
- 48 St. Albert, In I Sent., d. 37, a. 28, obj. 12; XXVI, 272.
- 49 St. Albert, Sum. Theol., P. II, q. 77, m. 3; XXXIII, 75.
- 50 "Inconueniens autem quod illi conantur evadere, minus evadunt, scilicet qualiter uno intellectu existente in omnibus, non omnes accipiunt scientiam uno solo scientiam accipiente." St. Albert, De Anima, III, 2, 7; V, 343.
- 51 "Est autem hic error omnino absurdus et pessimus et facile improbabilis. Quod enim statim ex hoc sequitur error, est quod intellecta omnia semper sint extra nos: vires autem animae nostrae secundum dictum errorem sunt a quibus lumine intellectus fit universalis abstractio et separatio. Non est autem intelligibile quod ejusdem formae ab eodem fiat





separatio, et per abstrahens ad idem conjunctio, sicut in exemplo quod ponit, est manifestum. Lumen enim abstrahens colores a coloratis corporibus non conjungit eos abstrahendo coloratis, sed potius perspicuo in quo secundum esse spirituale salvantur. Igitur intellecta ab imaginibus animae abstracta, similiter alicui alii conjungetur extra animam et animae potentias: non autem fit unquam intellectus ab aliqua anima vel intelligentia per hoc quod est extra ipsam: ergo anima hominis nihil omnino intelligit, neque considerat de formis intelligibilibus: quod cuilibet patet esse absurdum." St. Albert, De Nat. et Orig. An., II, 4; IX, 406.

- 52 "Quantumcumque illuminatur phantasia in homine, quamdiu phantasia est, nunquam habebit facultatem aliam receptionis nisi particularis formae: et facultas receptionis universalis semper erit in natura altioris facultatis: et si illa natura non est de animae partibus, non erit in anima facultas aliquid intelligendi vel considerandi ex illis." Ibid.
- 53 "Sequitur quod homo non generat hominem, sed animal imperfectum." St. Albert, De Unit. Int., cap. 5, arg. 23; IX, 459.
- 54 "Igitur nihil penitus de anima hominis remanet: igitur pereunte corpore perit anima, quod alibi a nobis improbatum est." Ibid., arg. 33; IX, 461.
- 55 "Nihil enim omnino intelligi potest, nisi per suam universalem et formalem intentionem." St. Albert, De Anima, III, 2, 17; V, 363.
- 56 "Species autem consideratur duobus modis, scilicet ut ratio rei, et ut accidens animae. Et ut ratio rei est apud omnes idem: ut accidens vero animae individuatur in omnibus animabus." St. Albert, Sum. de Creat., P. II, q. 57, a. 3, ad 1; XXXV, 493. The same doctrine is found in I Sent., d. 37, a. 27, sol.; XXVI, 273.



- 57 "Haec autem forma quamvis respectu individuorum sit universalis, tamen respectu animae singularis in qua imprimitur est individua." Avicenna, Metaphysics, V, 1, ad finem; f. 87E.
- 58 St. Bonaventure, In II Sent., d. 18, a. 2, q. 1, ad 4, Quaracchi ed., II, 447.
- 59 St. Thomas, De Unitate Intellectus, no 112.
- 60 St. Albert, Posterior Analytics, I, 1, 3; II, 9. This work of Alfarabi is not extant in Latin. Cf. D. Salmon, "The Mediaeval Latin Translations of Alfarabi's Works", New Scholasticism, XIII (1939), 258.
- 61 "Dicunt enim (scil., plurimi Latinorum Philosophorum) quod intentiones quae sunt in intellectu possibili, dupliciter considerantur, scilicet prout sunt abstractae, et prout habet esse in abstrahendo. Et primo quidem modo sunt formae universales liberatae a materia et appendiciis materiae. Secundo autem modo habent esse individuatum in intellectu possibili. Et primo quidem modo esse universalis principia intelligendi: secundo autem modo non convertitur ad ea intellectus: et ideo non impedit scientiam talis individuatio formarum." St. Albert, De Anima, III, 2, 11; V, 348.
- 62 "Est igitur intelligere intelligibilis speciem in intellectu habere: per esse ergo quod intelligibilia habent in intellectu, intelliguntur: hoc autem est esse individuum, ut dicunt: ergo per intentionem individuum res universales intelliguntur vel universaliter: et hoc intelligi non potest." Ibid.; V, 348-349.
- 63 "Propter quod mentiuntur omnino qui dicunt, quod forma quae est in anima, duplicem habet comparationem: unam quidem ad rem cuius est forma, et sic dicunt ipsam esse universalem: et aliam ad intellectum, et sic dicunt individuum esse per intellectum in quo est: forma enim ex comparatione quam habet ad



rem, numquam est universalis: et ex comparatione ad intellectum in quo est, semper est universalis: eo quod in eo ubique est et semper." St. Albert, De Nat. et Orig. An., I, 7; IX, 304.

- 64 "Et haec omnia dicit Aristoteles in diversis locis, et sunt vera: et ideo opinio sua est, quod universale est universale per hoc quod in intellectu est, nec aliquo modo potest individuari in ipso. Dicat tamen quilibet quod vult, quod ego non praejudicio alicui, sed dico quod dictum Aristotelis intelligo: dictum autem illorum qui dicunt universale per esse in intellectu sicut in subjecto, nullo modo possum intelligere." St. Albert, Posterior Analytics, I, 1, 3; II, 10.  
Aristotle has not dealt with this problem. Perhaps Albert is thinking of such passages as his Metaphysics, III, 6, 1003a12-14.
- 65 "Adhuc autem objicit Averroes: quia si forma in intellectu possibili habet esse individuum et particulare, cum omne individuum in se potentia claudat universale, erit illud potentia intelligibile et non actu: et sic intelligibile unius erit aliud intelligibile, et de esse illius iterum quaereretur, et ibi hoc in infinitum." St. Albert, De Anima, III, 2, 11; V, 349.  
From Averroes, De Anima, III, 5, 713-717.
- 66 "Amplius autem ex superius demonstratis constat per rationem Avicennae et Aristotelis et Averrois, quod nulla necessitas est quod intellectus ponitur separatus et immixtus, nisi quia universale cui subjicitur in tali est separatione: ergo omnino falsum est quod per esse individuum universale sit in ipso." St. Albert, De Anima, III, 2, 11; V, 349.  
The reference is to Avicenna, De Anima, V, 2, f. 23rb; and Averroes, De Anima, III, 5, 32-44.
- 67 "Adhuc autem secundum haec, scientia quae est in anima Doctoris non eadem efficitur in discipulo, sed generatur alia, sicut si ignis generaretur ab igne, quod est absurdum, cum scientiae non differant



nisi per subjecta de quibus sunt: scientia autem Doctoris et scientia discipuli semper sunt de subjecto eodem." St. Albert, De Anima, III, 2, 11; V, 347.

From Averroes, De Anima, III, 5, 718-721.

- 68 "Licet enim intellectus meus sit individuus et separatus ab intellectu tuo, tamen secundus quod est individuus, non habet universale in ipso, et ideo non individuatur id quod est in intellectu...Sic igitur universale ut universale est ubique et semper idem omnino et idem in animabus omnium non recipiens individuationem ab anima: non tamen scientia unius est scientia alterius, vel speculatum ab uno est speculatum ab altero: quoniam speculatio perficitur ex motu phantasmatis. Similiter autem scientia ex universalibus est quae fiunt ex multis memoriis et experienciis quae non sunt eadem omnium. Et hoc est quod supra diximus, quod speculativi intellectus sunt unus in eo quod speculativi intellectus sunt, sed sunt multi secundum quod illorum vel illorum sunt, et hac in determinatione convenit nobiscum Averroes." St. Albert, De Anima, III, 2, 13; V, 353.
- 69 Cf. supra, p. 47.
- 70 Averroes, De Anima, III, 5, 424-653.
- 71 "Ideo volo primo totam Aristotelis scientiam pro nostris viribus explanare, et tunc aliorum Peripateticorum inducere opiniones, et post hoc de Platonis opinionibus videre, et tunc demum nostram ponere opinionem." St. Albert, De Anima, III, 2, 1; V, 330.
- 72 "His autem dubiis primo volumus aptare responsionem Philosophorum quorundam, et postea adungere quod nobis videtur dicendum de his." Ibid., III, 2, 3; V, 335.
- 73 "Nunc autem duas quaestiones quae remanent, quantum possumus determinemus." Ibid., III, 2, 13; V, 353.
- 74 Cf. supra, n. 68.





- 75 "Therefore, since everything is a possible object of thought, mind, in order, as Anaxagoras says, to dominate, that is, to know, must be pure from all admixture; for the co-presence of what is alien to its nature is a hindrance and a block: it follows that it, too, like the sensitive part, can have no nature of its own, other than that of having a certain capacity. Thus that in the soul which is called mind (by mind I mean that whereby the soul thinks and judges) is, before it thinks, not actually any real thing." Aristotle, De Anima, III, 4, 429a18-23.
- 76 "Verbi gratia, materia enim carnis non potentia habet omnes formas, sed tantum potentia materiae primae quae non habet formam alicuam: nihil enim est potentia id quod jam habet: haec autem materia potentia habet formam: et ideo non est potentia forma illa nec aliqua formarum quae est de intellectu suae formae habitae: et illius exemplum est, quod materia Socratis nec potentia est animal, nec animatum, nec corpus, nec substantia: quia omnia illa jam actu habet...Intellectus autem potentia suscipit omnes species: ergo actu nullam habet: ergo non est hoc aliquid sicut haec materia." St. Albert, De Anima, III, 2, 1; V, 330.
- 77 "Si enim esset aliqua forma informatus ad hoc quod esset hoc aliquid, tunc hoc ipsum prohiberet, nec appareret ei in cognoscendo alienum et contrarium ab ipsa forma, et impediret omnis rei cognitionem quae obicitur ei: quia contrarium et diversum ab illa forma recipi in eo non posset, eo quod nec contraria nec disparata possunt esse in eodem." Ibid., III, 2, 2; V, 331.
- 78 "Id enim quod est receptivum alicujus, non habet illud quod natum est recipere in specie, licet possit habere formam in genere cum his quae recipit convenientem." Ibid.
- 79 "Non est inconveniens intellectum possibilem habere quidam alicuam formam, qua efficitur unum de entibus mundi in genere naturae incorporeae, licet nullam habeat formam eorum quae intelliguntur ab ipso: eo quod illa forma qua determinatur in ens in genere naturae incorporeae, cum intellectis ab ipsa convenit in genere, et differt specie ab eis omnibus." Ibid.



- 80 "Intellectus possibilis...nulla est formarum quae recipiuntur in ipso, quae sunt aut formae corporum, aut formae quae licet non sint corporum, tamen sunt organicae in corpore." Ibid.; V, 332.  
"Per hoc quod est intellectus, determinatur in ens quoddam in corporeae naturae: per hoc autem quod est possibilis respectu omnium, oportet quod privetur omnium formis quae potentia sunt in ipso." Ibid.  
"Sic intellectus est hoc aliquid, licet non sit aliquid intelligibile, nisi quando intelligit seipsum." Ibid., III, 2, 13; V, 353.  
This is from Averroes, De Anima, III, 4, 90-96.
- 81 "Est (scil., intellectus possibilis) ens distinctum a quolibet alio ente et numeratum. Hoc etiam modo non est in potentia ad se intelligendum nisi per accidens: quia licet sibi praesens sit secundum quod est natura, non tamen est sibi semper praesens secundum quod est intelligibile...His duobus diversis modis nihil prohibet intellectum respectu suiipsius esse in actu et in potentia." St. Albert, De Unit. Int., cap. 7, ad 28; IX, 473.
- 82 "Sol enim unus est numero per materiam suam, et tamen lux sua non est determinata ad unum numero eorum aliquid quae agit: est enim solis virtus indeterminata et universalis in agendo vitam in omnibus et generationem." St. Albert, De Anima, III, 2, 12; V, 350.
- 83 Cf. St. Albert, De Unit. Int., cap. 7, ad 4, 6, 9, 17, 19, 20, 27, 28, 29; IX, 466-473.
- 84 Cf. supra, pp. 53-55.
- 85 "Si enim concedere velimus, quod receptio universalis in intellectu possibili est receptio universalis secundum esse universalis et rationem, dicemus quod illa receptio est loci et speciei potius quam materiae: et quod nihil prohibet intellectum esse universalem in ambitu potentiae localis et speciae, et determinatum esse secundum esse subjecti: et si reciperetur universale in ipso receptione subjecti, tunc procederet objectio." St. Albert, De Unit. Int., cap. 7, ad 27; IX, 472.



- 86 "Si enim consideremus esse visibilium in perspicuo, non est esse coloris aliquid aliud nisi esse lucis cum intentione coloris...Et ideo in perspicuo non est sicut in subjecto, quia non colorat ipsum, sed est in ipso perspicuo sicut in loco in quo salvatur secundum esse spirituale...ita nec intelligibile particulatur per possibile (possibilem) quo minus sit universale." Ibid.  
Cf. also De Int. et Int., II, 1, 7; IX, 488.
- 87 "Id quod est in alicuo, est in eo secundum potestatem ejus in quo est...Nec est aliquid quod recipiat universale ut universale, nisi intellectus...Ergo intellectus est universale (sic) ubique et semper. Quod autem ubique est et semper, unum et indistinctum est apud omnes." St. Albert, De Unit. Int., cap. 4, obj. 8; IX, 44.
- 88 "Tamen quidam solvunt hoc aliter: quia dicunt quod intentio recepta in intellectu potest considerari dupliciter, videlicet ut recepta, et ut comparata ad ea quorum est esse et forma: et primo modo est particularis, et secundo modo est universalis, et hoc modo judicatur ab intellectu: et hoc est quod dicitur, quod universale est dum intelligitur." Ibid., cap. 7, ad 8; IX, 467.
- 89 Cf. supra, pp. 52-55.
- 90 St. Albert, Sum. Theol., P. II, q. 77, m. 3, ad 8; XXXIII, 96.
- 91 "Et hoc modo nihil prohibet unum universale esse in multis intellectibus, sicut in una intelligibilium regione, et sicut in uno intelligibilium loco." St. Albert, De Unit. Int., cap. 7, ad 8; IX, 467.
- 92 "Ita multo magis lumen spirituale intelligentiae diffusivum est sui in omnia intelligibilia ubique et semper sine limite, sine mensura, sine numero, per extensionem sui quam habet ad intelligibilia: est tamen distinctum et numeratum per esse quod habet in intelligentibus." St. Albert, Sum. Theol., P. II, q. 77, m. 3, ad 8; XXXIII, 96.



- 93 Cf. supra, pp. 55-56.
- 94 "Nec refert, quantum ad hoc, utrum sit unus intellectus vel plures; quia si etiam esset unus tantum, oporteret ipsum esse aliquem quandam, et speciem per quam intelligit esse aliquam quandam." St. Thomas, Sum. Theol., I, 76, 2, ad 3.
- 95 "Dicendum quod individuatio intelligentis, aut speciei per quem intelligit, non excludit intelligentiam universalium...Sed materialitas cognoscentis et speciei per quam cognoscitur, universalis cognitionem impedit...Si ergo forma per quam fit cognitio, sit materialis, non abstracta a conditionibus materiae, erit similitudo naturae speciei aut generis, secundum quod est distincta et multiplicata per principia individuantia: et ita non poterit cognosci natura rei in sua communitate. Si vero species sit abstracta a conditionibus materiae individualis, erit similitudo naturae absque iis quae ipsam distinguunt et multiplicant; et ita cognoscetur universale." Ibid.
- 96 "Si autem dicat aliquis, quod substantia intellectualis ita est in omnibus, quod in nullo per se: hoc ridiculum est, quia de rebus naturalibus nihil est in omnibus, nisi quod est in quocunque eorum." St. Albert, De Unit. Int., cap. 5, arg. 24; IX, 459.
- 97 "L'interprétation orthodoxe la plus légitime qui puisse être donnée sur ce point de la pensée d'Albert est celle-ci: il est impressionné très fortement par l'argumentation d'Averroès fondée sur l'universalité de l'intelligible. Il pense maintenir l'individualité de chaque homme pensant, ayant son intelligence unie à l'âme-forme de son corps, par le simple jeu des virtualités multiples d'une grande âme raisonnable unique; en sorte que si l'intelligence s'individualise, ce ne peut être comme individuelle qu'elle pense l'éternel." M.-M. Gorce, L'Essor de la Pensée au Moyen Age, pp. 138-139.
- 98 Cf. Ibid., p. 139.





- 99 Cf. M.-D. Roland-Gosselin, Le "De Ente et Essentia"  
de S. Thomas D'Acuin, pp. 97-98.
- 100 This is also the opinion of U. Dähnert. Cf. his  
Die Erkenntnislehre des Albertus Magnus ..., p. 82.
- 101 Averroes, De Anima, III, 5, 703-728.
- 102 B. Xiberta, "De abstractione apud S. Augustinum",  
Acta Hebdomadae Augustinianae-Thomisticae,  
pp. 317-336. For other reference, cf. E. Gilson,  
Introduction à l'étude de S. Augustin, pp. 113-125.
- 103 Cf. supra, pp. 35-36.
- 104 J. Rohmer, "La théorie de l'abstraction dans  
l'école franciscaine...", AHDL, 3 (1928), 105-184.



NOTES TO CHAPTER III

- 1 "In sensu et phantasia non est nisi particulare et singulare: si ergo non esset movens intellectum possibilem nisi phantasia, non moveretur intellectus possibilis nisi secundum particularem: et ita intellectus possibilis non differret a viribus animae sensibilis: ergo necesse est intellectum agentem ponere, qui agit universale ex particulari. Item, Universale est in particulari potentia, non actu: ergo si debeat educi in actum, necesse est, quod hoc fiat ab aliquo agente, quod agens non potest esse de viribus animae sensibilis. Aut ergo hoc est idem cum intellectu possibili, aut non. Si non, habetur propositum, scilicet quod necesse est ponere intellectum universaliter agentem universalia de particularibus. Si sic, tunc idem erit recipiens universale et faciens ipsum, et idem erit movens et motum: quae omnia impossibilia sunt." St. Albert, Sum. de Creat., P. II, q. 55, a. 1, sed contra 7-8; XXXV, 455.
- 2 "Agens secundum quod agens non potest esse subiectum." Ibid., P. I, q. 24, a. 1: XXXIV, 474.
- 3 "Et nulli eorum consentimus dicentes intellectum agentem non esse habitum vel speciem accidentalem aliquam." Ibid., P. II, q. 55, a. 2, sol.; XXXV, 459.
- 4 "Cum igitur intellectus agens semper sit in actu, ut dicit Aristoteles, oporteret quod omnia simplicia semper essent actu in anima: et sic nullum eorum acciperetur a sensibus, quod est falsum." Ibid., quaest.; XXXV, 458. The reference to Aristotle in his De Anima, III, 4; 430a18.
- 5 "Intellectus agens secundum diffinitionem est potentia et principium activum intelligibilium." St. Albert, S. de Creat., P. II, q. 55, a. 5, sol.; XXXV, 473.



- 6 "Item, Avicenna in undecimo suae metaphysicae ponit duplicem ordinem intelligentiarum separatarum. Quaedam enim est intelligentia prima, quae est motor universitatis et principium primum totius esse. Secundae autem intelligentiae sunt in decem ordinibus, ut ipse dicit, quarum prima movet coelum uniforme quod est primum mobile, secunda movet sphaeram stellarum fixarum, et tertia sphaeram Saturni, et quarta sphaeram Jovis, quinta sphaeram Martis, sexta sphaeram Solis, septima sphaeram Veneris, octava sphaeram Mercurii, nona sphaeram Lunae. De decima vero sic dicit: 'Decima est intelligentia a qua fluit super nostras animas, et haec est intelligentia mundi terreni, et vocamus eam intelligentiam agentem'." Ibid., a. 3, obj. 6; XXXV, 467. Cf. also St. Albert, De Anima, III, 2, 8; V, 343. For the doctrine in Avicenna, cf. his Metaphysics, IX, 3; f. 104r BF.
- 7 "Facile autem istud refellitur: quoniam secundum hoc homo diffiniri non potest intellectuali et rationali, cum nihil sit de essentia sua." St. Albert, De Anima, III, 2, 8; V, 343.
- 8 "Oportet ergo quod in hoc ordine universi recurratur ad unum agens primum quod est primum agens esse intelligibile: non enim solum in universitate omnium recurritur ad primum, sed in quolibet ordine uno necesse est esse primum in quo est status illius ordinis...et per istam rationis necessitatem arguuntur falsitates illorum qui in anima dicunt nullum esse intellectum agentem." St. Albert, De Int. et Int., II, 1, 3; IX, 507.
- 9 "Non videmus in aliquibus formis esse et rationem conferentibus his quorum formae sunt, potentiam esse sine actu, sed in omnibus intra naturam ipsarum rerum has esse differentias, sicut et in libro tertio de Anima diximus: potentia enim non est finis et terminus essentialis rei, sed actus: quomodo ergo potest esse potens omnia fieri intellectus terminus et finis essentialis animae sine eo intellectu quo est anima facere



intellecta, mirabile enim satis videtur, quod natura stet in imperfecto sicut in ultimo et esse (esse et?) naturali termino. Amplius neque in vegetativo neque in sensitivo videmus hujusmodi imperfectionem...et ideo irrationabile videtur si anima rationalis hanc patiatur sola imperfectionem, sic quod ad aliam quandam substantiam extra eam existentem, eam intelligendo, oporteat eam converti." St. Albert, De Nat. et Orig. An., II, 10; IX, 420-421.

- 10 "Amplius autem universale aut est in rebus, aut est in sensu, aut in intellectu, aut omnino nihil. Constat autem quod non sit in sensu. Cum autem nihil sit in rebus nisi secundum quod est singulare et proprium uniuersae rei, constat quod universale non sit in rebus. Oportet igitur quod sit in intellectu." St. Albert, De Int. et Int., I, 2, 1; IX, 490.
- 11 "Universale autem quod est objectum intellectus, aliquando esse habet in anima, et aliquando esse extra animam. Est enim universale, ut dicitur (scil., a Platone) incorruptibile, aliquando in re existens, aliquando in anima, aliquando in utroque: et hoc non est inconueniens, quoniam est ubique et semper." St. Albert, De Anima, III, 2, 10; V, 346. This teaching is based on such passages as Aristotle, Metaphysics, I, 6; 987b4-13 and I, 9; 991b1-3.
- 12 "Dicit enim (scil., Plato) quod omnis forma per hoc quod est causa, est ante rem cuius est causa, non solum secundum rationem, sed etiam secundum esse formale: et secundum hoc praehabet omnia in se quibus multiplicantur postea secundum esse: et haec forma sic existens est objectum ipsius intellectus quando intelligitur." St. Albert, De Anima, III, 2, 10; V, 346.
- 13 "Hujus autem causa est, quoniam scientia est ex necessariis. In rebus autem mutabilibus nihil est permanens necessarium. Oportet igitur quod necessarium per quod est scientia ipsorum, sit extra res ipsas." Ibid. This reason is given by Aristotle. Cf. Metaphysics, I, 6; 987b4-7.





- 14 "Adhuc autem intellectus est quoddam permanens et necessarium: quod autem est in ipso, est in eo secundum potestatem et naturam illius in quo est: quia hoc generaliter est verum de omni eo quod est in aliquo, quod scilicet semper est in eo in quo est secundum potestatem ejus in quo est, et non secundum naturam et potestatem ejus quod inest: oportet igitur quod id quod est in intellectu, sit permanens et necessarium. Istis igitur de causis et similibus posuit Plato intellectum separatum, et universale sic separatum." St. Albert, De Anima, III, 2, 10; V, 346. This argument I have not found in Plato or his commentators. For Albert's knowledge of Plato, cf. Chap. II, n. 4.
- 15 "Si esse et essentiae rerum perpetuae et incorruptibiles sunt tales, ut dixit, tunc illae nihil omnino sunt de esse rerum naturaliter existentium, neque res cognoscuntur nisi per principia quae sunt de esse ipsorum: igitur per universalia praexistentia et praehabentia esse rerum nulla res cognoscitur: et sic inutiles sunt ad scientias rerum." St. Albert, De Int. et Int., I, 2, 5; IX, 496. This argument is from Aristotle, Metaphysics, I, 9; 991a11-14.
- 16 "Adhuc autem et secundum hoc false universale praedicaretur de pluribus unum existens: quia secundum quod appropriatum est, non convenit pluribus: primum autem est nihil de esse rerum: et ideo ipsum praedicari de re aliqua non potest. Propter quod absque dubio inconvenientissima est philosophia Platonis in hac parte." St. Albert, De Int. et Int., I, 2, 5; IX, 496. The argument is from Aristotle, Metaphysics, VI, 13; 1038b9-14.
- 17 "Sed quidam non mediocris auctoritatis viri inter Latinos quibus ista sententia (scil., sententia Aristotelis, quod universale nihil est rei) non placuit, asserunt universale secundum aliquid esse in rebus. Si enim in re non esset, de re vere non praedicaretur, praecipue cum haec sit natura universalis, quod in cuolibet suorum particularium est totum... Amplius autem nihil est verius in rebus, quam id quod est totum



et unum in multis, et de multis: non enim amittit rationem essendi in rebus per hoc quod est in multis...oportet ergo quod universale sit vere in rebus, cum ipsum sit unum in multis et de multis." St. Albert, De Int. et Int., I, 2, 2; IX, 493.

- 18 "Erat autem (scil., Guillelmus) in ea sententia de communitate universalium, ut eandem essentialiter rem totam simul singulis suis inesse astrueret individuis; quorum quidem nulla esset in essentia diversitas, sed sola multitudine accidentium varietas." Peter Abelard, Historia Calamitatum, cap. II; II, 17<sup>a</sup>, 119.
- 19 "Quare necesse est formas communes, scilicet genera, et species, et alia hujusmodi convenientia, esse, et non solum modo, sed etiam esse sicut intelliguntur...Si ergo ita se habent res in esse suo, res, inquam sensibiles, quemadmodum testificatur de eis sensus, multo fortius necesse est res intelligibiles ita se habere, sicut de eis testificatur intellectus. Testificatur autem esse communes, sempiternas, et seorsum a generatione." William of Auvergne, De Universo, II, 4; in Opera Omnia. ?
- 20 "In socrate non invenitur communitas aliqua, sed quidcuid est in eo individuatum est." St. Thomas, De Ente et Essentia; ed. C. Boyer, p. 28.
- 21 "Si autem (scil., universale) habet (scil., esse) in anima apprehendente, tunc relatio universalis ad multa, non est nisi in anima, et non in re, et sic praedicatur nomine, et non re." St. Albert, De Praedicabilibus, II, 5; I, 31.
- 22 "Ergo universalialia sunt res extra intellectum. Si enim essent in intellectu tantum, essent rerum intentiones, et non res ipsae." Ibid., II, 3; I, 22.



23 "Nos autem in ista difficultate mediam viam ambulantes, dicimus essentiam unicuiusque rei dupliciter esse considerandam. Uno modo videlicet prout est natura diversa a natura materiae, sive ejus in quo est quodcumque sit illud. Et alio modo prout est in materia, sive in eo in quo est individuata per hoc quod est in ipso. Et primo quidem modo adhuc dupliciter consideratur. Uno quidem modo prout est essentia quaedam absoluta in seipsa, et sic vocatur essentia, et est unum quid in se existens, nec habet esse nisi talis essentiae, et sic est una sola. Alio modo ut ei convenit communicabilitas secundum aptitudinem: et hoc accidit ei ex hoc quod est essentia apta dare multis esse, etiamsi nunquam det illud, et sic proprie vocatur universale: omnis enim essentia communicabilis multis, universale est, etiamsi actu nunquam dat esse nisi uni soli, sicut sol... Per hanc igitur aptitudinem universale est in re extra, sed secundum actum existendi in multis non est nisi in intellectu." St. Albert, De Int. et Int., I, 2, 2; IX, 493. Cf. R. Miller, The Notion of the Agent Intellect in Saint Albert the Great, pp. 126-141.

The expression esse essentiae used by St. Albert will become a technical expression only some years later. Cf. E. Gilson, History of Christian Philosophy in the Middle Ages, p. 450.

24 "Sed forte quaeret aliquis ex his quae determinata sunt, occasionem accipiens: quia talis consideratio formae in se et in materia non videtur esse rei, sed rationis... Sed ad hoc dicendum est, quod absque dubio, sicut in Metaphysicis determinatur, actus est ante potentiam, et non secundum rationem tantam sive in modo intelligendi, sed ipsa substantia et diffinitione, sicut causa est ante causatum, et habet esse causae et essentiae, sicut diximus, licet non habeat esse nisi in natura particulari." St. Albert, De Int. et Int., I, 2, 3; IX, 494. Cf. Aristotle, Metaphysics, VIII, 8; 1050a3-b5.



- 25 "Et ideo una et eadem est essentia in se et in anima et in singulari: sed in anima secundum esse spirituale, in singulari secundum esse materiale et naturale, in se autem in esse simplici." St. Albert, De Predicabilibus, II, 6; I, 35.
- 26 "Forma enim non est nisi individu vel universalis." St. Albert, De Mat. et Orig. An., I, 7; IX, 394.  
"Universale in genere non habet nisi duplex esse, separatum videlicet, et participatum in hoc alicuid." St. Albert, Metaphysics, V, 6, 6; VI, 362.
- 27 I, 2, 3; I, 24-25. And IX, 3; I, 147-148.
- 28 I, 2, 2-5; IX, 492-497.
- 29 V, 6, 5-7; VI, 361-365.
- 30 "Nos autem quantum sufficit praesenti intentioni ista solventes, dicimus quod..." St. Albert, De Praedicabilibus, I, 2, 3; I, 24.  
"Ea quae secundo inducta sunt, puto de necessitate concludere." Ibid., I, 26.
- 31 "Nos autem in ista difficultate median viam ambulantes, dicimus..." St. Albert, De Int. et Int., I, 2, 2; IX, 493.  
"Et quia longum est omnibus talibus immorari, videtur nobis sine praeiudicio melioris sententiae dicendum, quod haec opinio falsitati obnoxia est." Ibid., I, 2, 4; IX, 495.
- 32 Cf. St. Albert, Metaphysics, V, 6, 5; VI, 362.  
Historians also attribute to Gilbert of la Porrée (1076-1154) the teaching that essences are found in their particulars in a state of indetermination with respect to individuality. Cf. E. Gilson, History of Christian Philosophy in the Middle Ages, pp. 140-144, 154-155. And A. Forest, "Le réalisme de Gilbert de la Porrée...", RNSP, 36 (1934), 101-110.





- 33 "Ponamus autem in hoc exemplum generis, dicentes quod animal est in se quoddam, et idem est utrum sit sensibile, aut sit intellectum in anima. In se autem esse hujus nec est universale, nec est singulare. Si enim in se esset universale ita quod animalitas, ex hoc quod est animalitas, esset universalis, oporteret nullum animal esse singulare, sed omne animal esset universale. Si autem animal ex hoc quod est animal esset singulare, impossibile esset esse plus quam unum singulare, sed ipsum singulare cui debet animalitas, et esset impossibile aliud singulare esse animale. Animal autem in se est quoddam intellectum in mente quod sit animal, et secundum hoc quod intelligitur esse animal, non est nisi animal tantum. Si autem praeter hoc intelligitur esse universale, aut singulare, aut aliquid aliud, jam intelligitur praeter hoc quiddam, scilicet id quod est animal, quod accidit animalitati." Avicenna, Logica, P. III, f. 9r4.
- 34 "Animalitas enim non fit singularis designata, nisi quia adjungitur ei aliquid quod facit illam." Ibid., f. 9r9.
- 35 "Universale et hoc quod est universale est quoddam, et ex hoc quod est quoddam cui accidit universalitas, est quoddam aliud." Avicenna, Metaphysica, V, 1; f. 86vA.
- 36 "Et generalitas vocatur genus logicum... Naturale autem genus est animal secundum quod est animal, quod est aptum ad hoc ut ei quod intelligitur de illo ponatur comparatio generalitatis." Avicenna, Logica, P. III, f. 9rB.  
For other texts of Avicenna, cf. E. Gilson, "Avicenna et le point de départ de Duns Scot", AHDL, 2(1927), 129-132.
- 37 "Quod enim est in individuo, non semper est in eo per modum esse individui." St. Albert, De Praedicabilibus, II, 3; I, 25.
- 38 "Et ideo secundum se acceptae (scil., formae naturales) sunt communes et universales etiam



quae sunt in singularibus, quamvis non secundum quod sunt in singularibus habeant id."

Ibid., II, 3; I, 26.

Cf. also: "Universale autem quod dicunt esse in re, est eadem forma participata a multis actu vel potentia: et haec quidem dicitur universalis, eo quod de se semper est communicabilis et propagabilis in multa ex uno." St. Albert, Metaphysics, V, 6, 5; VI, 362.

"Est autem hic quoddam advertendum valde notabile: ex quo enim una et simplex est natura quae secundum se necue est in intellectu, neque in rebus, haec pro certo quantum est de se est una ubique et semper." Ibid., V, 6, 7; VI, 365.

- 39 The necessary texts will be found in S. Mansion, Le Jugement d'Existence chez Aristote, pp. 94-107.
- 40 For an excellent treatment of this aspect of St. Augustine's philosophy, cf. E. Gilson, Introduction à l'étude de S. Augustin, pp. 114-119.
- 41 Cf. supra, p. 74.
- 42 Cf. supra, p. 79.
- 43 Aristotle, De Anima, III, 5; 430a13-17.
- 44 "Sicut ergo colore (read lumine) eodem agente colores omnes fiunt in effectu, et facti in effectu, faciunt in effectu perspicuum et visum: ita formae rerum uno lumine agentis fiunt in effectu, et factae in effectu, faciunt in effectu possibilem intellectum." St. Albert, De Int. et Int., II, 1, 6; IX, 512.  
Cf. Averroes, De Anima, III, 5, 688-691: "Immo debes scire quod respectus intellectus agentis ad istum intellectum (scil., possibilem) est respectus lucis ad diaffonum, et respectus formarum materialium ad ipsum est respectus coloris ad diaffonum."



- 45 "Et ideo in omnibus (scil., intelligibilibus) accipit continue intellectus possibilis lumen agentis." St. Albert, De Anima, III, 3, 11; V, 386.
- 46 "Esse autem formale coloris est esse coloris quo est actu in potentia activa immutandi visum secundum actum: et hoc esse color visus habet a luce." St. Albert, Sum. de Creat., P. II, q. 21, a. 1; XXXV, 182-183.  
Cf. also St. Albert, De Anima, II, 3, 7; V, 246.
- 47 "Color est visibilis non omni modo, sed in ratione formali, hoc est, per actum luminis, qui dat ei actum et speciem secundum quod potest agere in visum." St. Albert, Sum. de Creat., P. II, q. 21, a. 3, part. 1, sol.; XXXV, 188.
- 48 Cf. infra, n. 51.
- 49 "Lumen est receptus habitus in natura diaphani, et lumen est actus ejus et perfectio ejus secundum quod est diaphanum." St. Albert, De Anima, II, 3, 8; V, 248.
- 50 "Lumen secundum se acceptum non est color, nisi large sumpto colore." St. Albert, De Sensu et Sensato, II, 2; IX, 46.
- 51 "Cum igitur constet actum colorum esse lumen, et cum lumen sit in perspicuo sicut actus in propria sua potentia, oportet quod prima potentia subjecta colori sit aliquod perspicuum." Ibid., II, 1; IX, 39.
- 53 "Unus actus numero non habet nisi tantum unum objectum: visio autem est unus actus numero: ergo terminatur tantum ad colorem, vel ad lumen, et non ad utrumque simul." St. Albert, Sum. de Creat., P. II, q. 21, a. 3, part. 3; XXXV, 197.



- 54 "Dicendum ad primum, quod visus secundum actum non est nisi unius visibilis: color enim secundum actum cum lumine quo agit, unum visibile est: sicut materia et forma non faciunt duo, sed unum: et ideo cum lumen illud sit ut forma, color autem ut materia, erit ex illis duobus unum visibile secundum actum: et ideo visus non est nisi unius visibilis." Ibid., sol.; XXIV, 200.  
This is from Averroes, De Anima, III, 36, 565-566.
- 55 "Lumen est color perspicui secundum actum facti, quando color accipitur: quia lumen secundum veritatem est actus colorum in eo quod colores sunt: et ideo est natura formalis eorum, et cum propria potentia in qua habet fieri hic actus, fit perspicuum necesse est quod omnis color sit participatio luminis in tali vel tali perspicuo." St. Albert, De Sensu et Sensato, II, 1; IX, 39.  
"Non oportet dicere quod aliquid sit color praeter esse quoddam luminis in perspicuo terminato... Et sic ex esse luminis in diversis in perspicuo erit accipere coloris naturam et omnem colorum diversitatem." Ibid., II, 2; IX, 47.
- 56 "Lumen est hypostasis colorum secundum esse formale quod est esse simpliciter colorum, sicut supra diximus. Hanc igitur veram putamus esse sententiam de luce et lumine."  
St. Albert, De Anima, II, 3, 12; V, 255-256.  
This is a common mediaeval doctrine. Cf. Avicenna, De Anima, III, 3; f. 11rb. Also St. Thomas, In I Sent., d. 17, q. 1, a. 1, corp.; and In II De Anima, lect. 14.  
For a complete treatment of St. Thomas' teaching, cf. J. P. Ledvina, A Philosophy and Psychology of Sensation, with Special Reference to Vision, pp. 58-72.  
St. Albert attributes to Jacob Alkindi (d. 873) the teaching that light is the species and hypostasis of colours. Cf. Sum. Theol., P. II, q. 77, m. 3, obj. 5; XXXIII, 76. This doctrine, however, is not found in Alkindi's published works. Cf. A. Nagy, "Die philosophischen Aphanlungen des Ja'qub ben Ishaq al-Kindi", Beitrage, II, 5 (1897), 1-64.





- "Quando dicitur, color est motivus visus secundum actum lucidi, et hoc esse substantiam ejus, erit hoc intellectum de eo quod est vera substantia coloris secundum esse formale: et secundum hoc esse, non est actu color nisi in lumine." St. Albert, De Anima, II, 3, 7; V, 247.
- "Color per suam essentiam movet. Per substantiam dico quae est in eo formalis et essentialis; secundum illam enim non est in tenebris nisi in potentia tantum." Ibid.
- 57 "Aristoteles loquitur ibi de intellectu agente prout ipse est formale esse universalis, sicut lumen formale esse est coloris. Omne enim universale suum esse formale habet ab intellectu agente." St. Albert, Sum. de Creat., P. II, c. 55, a. 3, ad 2; XXXV, 466.
- 58 "Intellectus agens...per hoc idem quod aliud intelligit active, est intelligibilia (sic) in quibus intelligit se ut actum ipsorum." Ibid., a. 6, ad q. 1; XXXV, 476.  
Cf. Averroes, De Anima, III, 5, 691-697.
- 59 "Similiter est in omnibus: plura enim ad speciem unam formata, necesse est quod habeant agens unicum quod formet ea ad speciem illam: est autem omnium intelligibilium secundum quod intelligibilia sunt, sicut est etiam omnium visibilium secundum quod visibilia sunt, species una qua visibilia sunt: oportet igitur quod ipsorum sit agens unum ad speciem illam formandam in eis." St. Albert, De Anima, III, 2, 18; V, 364.
- 60 "Ex his autem facile adverti potest, quod duo sunt opera agentis, quorum unum est abstrahere formas intelligibiles, quod nihil aliud est nisi facere eas simplices et universales. Secundum est illuminare possibilem intellectum, sicut lumen se habet ad diaphanum, quod oportet quod species universalis quamdiu est universalis, semper sit in lumine agentis: et ideo quando recipitur in possibili intellectu, oportet quod in lumine



agentis recipiatur: et ideo oportet possibilem illuminari lumine intellectus agentis. Similiter autem possibilis dupliciter habet comparationem: comparatur enim ad agentem sicut completus lumine suo, et comparatur ad formas ex phantasias elicitas sicut motus et formatus ab eis." Ibid., III, 2, 19; V, 366.

- 61 "Ideo et anima convertens se supra se, accipit intellectum terminum (terminatum?), quod est informatio agentis qua informat possibilem luce sua, sicut oculus informatur per lucem corpoream, ut videat. Et hunc intellectum quidam vocant formalem, et aliquando improprie locuentes vocant eum speculativum." St. Albert, De Unit. Int., cap. 6; IX, 464.
- 62 "Ita etiam est de formis imaginatis et in sensitivis acceptis a lumine intellectus agentis. Et ideo non accipiuntur ab intellectu possibili, nisi separatae sint ab eadem luce quae est actus et perfectio possibilis." Ibid.  
"Lux agentis quae est actus possibilis, est actus intelligibilis." Ibid., cap. 7, ad 27; IX, 472.  
"Lumen quod est actus intellectus agentis, est forma et intellectus possibilis et ejus quod intelligitur." St. Albert, De Int. et Int., II, 1, 5; IX, 510.
- 63 "Ad id quod juxta hoc quaeritur, scilicet utrum sit potentia ad duas species simul? Dicendum, quod suscipit speciem agentis, et speciem intelligibilis. Sed illae duae species non sunt nisi actus unius. Species enim agentis est actus speciei intelligibilis, sicut lux est actus coloris." St. Albert, Sum. de Creat., P. II, q. 57, a. 4, ad quaest.; XXXV, 495.  
This doctrine is from Averroes, De Anima, III, 36, 559-566 and 591-594.
- 64 "Et ideo (scil., intellectus possibilis) indiget agente duplici, scilicet quod conferat formam moventi, et movente: intellectus enim agens confert formam intellectualitatis et intelligibili et possibili intellectui, sicut unum lumen et perficit diaphanum et facit actu esse colorem." St. Albert, De Anima, III, 2, 17; V, 362.



- 65 "Quia idem est actus intelligibilis cui est actus possibilis intellectus." St. Albert, De Unit. Int., cap. 6; IX, 464.
- 66 "Et sicut in colore viso videtur lumen quod de potentia coloris facit actu colorem, eo quod nihil aliud agit in visum nisi illud sit terminatum, et quasi sit luce incorporatum: ita in quolibet eo quod intelligitur de omnibus intelligibilibus, non intelligitur nisi lumen intellectus agentis, licet in aliquo intelligatur incorporatum in materia sensibili, et in aliquo intelligatur incorporatum in quantitate imaginabili, et in aliquo intelligatur clarum in esse simplici intellectuali: sicut lumen quod est colorum hypostasis, et in aliquo videtur candens, sicut in albo, et in aliquo submersum, et in aliquo fere extinctum, sicut in nigro. Patet igitur ex dictis, quod intellectus possibilis in actu efficitur per lumen intellectus agentis, et quod in omni eo quod intelligit, hoc intelligit." St. Albert, De Int. et Int., II, 1, 5; IX, 511.
- 67 "Amplius autem in lumine quod est universalis causa colorum...quidquid aliquis color de natura habet coloris, ab ipso habet, et si quid aliud est in ipso, potius est de privatione naturae coloris quam mereatur dici coloris essentia." Ibid., I, 1, 4; IX, 482.
- 68 "Amplius cum lumen illud (scil., intellectus agentis) sit manifestatio intellectus agentis facti secundum proportionem ejus quod recipit lumen, patet quod intellectus agens manifestatur in quolibet intellectu secundum actum facto." Ibid., II, 1, 5; IX, 511.
- 69 "Et est verum quod est ab entitate et forma rei... sicut diximus verum aurum: et sic intellectus separatus est solum quod vere intelligibile est et circa verum, quod nihil habet praeter esse intelligibile." St. Albert, Sum. de Creat., P. II, q. 55, a. 5, ad quaest. 2, ad obj.; XXXV, 474. That intellectus separatus means the agent intellect is clear from the objection itself, and the answer to the quaest.



- 70 "Hic autem intellectus agens comparatus arti, et est comparatio quae essentialiter convenit ei secundum quod praehabet in seipso omnia intellecta." St. Albert, De Int. et Int., II, 1, 3; IX, 508.
- 71 "Ex his constat intellectum agentem esse perfectum, et supra perfectum, perfectiones omnes habentem et largientem omni ei quod secundum esse intellectuale perficitur." Ibid.
- 72 "...et quod indivisae sunt intelligentiae in ipso (scil., in intellectu agente), et quod omnes in ipso sunt sua substantia et vita ex (et?) lux sua." Ibid.; IX, 507.  
Intelligentia has here the meaning of "intelligible". For this meaning cf. Sum. de Creat., P. II, q. 60; XXXV, 517.
- 73 Cf. supra, pp. 13-17.
- 74 Cf. infra, pp. 140-141.
- 75 Cf. supra, p. 90.
- 76 "Sed utrum intellectus agens intelligat se hoc modo quod flectatur supra se, vel non, multi diversimode determinant. Nobis autem videtur quod sic, improprie tamen, eo quod non attribuimus aliquem intellectum perfectum intellectui possibili vel agenti per se, sed bene concedimus animam intellectivam intelligere se." St. Albert, Sum. de Creat., P. II, q. 55, a. 6, ad quaest. 1; XXXV, 476.
- 77 Cf. infra, n. 80.
- 78 Aristotle, De Anima, III, 5; 430a18.





- 79 "Cum enim non semper faciat intellectus agens, videtur quod non semper intelligat. Similiter sequitur, quod non intelligat se, quia non agit in se, quod est contra multos dicentes, quod intellectus agens intelligit se semper." St. Albert, Sum. de Creat., P. II, q. 55, a. 6, quaest. 1; XXXV, 475.
- 80 "Dicimus quod sic, eodem modo quo improprie dicimus intellectum agentem intelligere se: hoc enim est intelligere se ut actum possibilis: suum enim intelligere est suum esse, cum semper sit in actu: et hoc est quod sit actus possibilis, sed ille actus non perficit possibilem nisi secundum quid: sicut si lumen per se solum esset in oculo sine colore, tunc esset immutatus oculus ab actu colorum, sed non esset distincta immutatio ad aliquam speciem coloris determinatam. Similiter quando non solum lumen agentis est in possibili, tunc possibilis est in actu indistincto secundum aliquam speciem intelligibilem, et intellectus agens intelligit se ut talem actum semper: et iste motus non excludit motum intelligibilem, eo quod intellectus agens secundum illum sit actus omnium intelligibilem: sicut etiam motus luminis non excludit motum coloris in oculo, eo quod sit actus ejus." Ibid.; 476.  
"Semper (scil., intellectus agens) intelligit se ut actum intelligibilem vel intellectus possibilis, ut supra ostendimus per simile in lumine et coloribus." Ibid.
- 81 "Ut subjectum intelligit se intellectus possibilis: et hoc semper: quia intellectus agens semper est actus intelligibilem, et intellectus possibilis, vel utrorumque." Ibid., ad obj. 1; XXXV, 477.  
The same doctrine is found in I Sent., d. 3, a. 29, ad 3; XXV, 130-131.
- 82 "Agens est qui perficit possibilem, abstrahendo formas et ponendo in ipso: cum igitur forma a principio creationis sit posita in ipso, videtur quod numquam indiget (scil., angelus) agente." St. Albert, II Sent., d. 3, a. 6, obj. 4; XXVII, 70.



- 83 "Dicitur etiam possibilis quod est subjectum in quo fundantur species cognoscibilium, et sic habet possibilem perfectum a principio suae creationis, et agentem illustrantem super possibilem." Ibid., ad 4; 71.
- 84 "Duplex est actio intellectus agentis: unus in abstrahendo intelligibilia, et dando eis esse intelligibilium secundum speciem intelligentis: alter est illustratio intellectus possibilis ut resplendeant in ipso species intelligibilium: sed utrumque istorum est in homine. Secundum alterum autem istorum actuum est in Angelis, qui est illustrare intellectum possibilem, ut actu resplendeat in ipso, quod tamen jam in fuit sibi secundum actum concreatum." St. Albert, Sum. Theol., P. II, q. 14, m. 3, a. 2, part. 1, ad 1; XXXII, 180.
- 85 "Agens (scil., intellectus) aliter est in eis (scil., in angelis), quam in homine: in homine enim...distinctam facit cognitionem de cognoscibilibus, et in universali sicut illa universalis sunt: in Angelo...distinctam facit cognitionem et universalis et singularis." Ibid., a. 1, ad obj.; 174.
- 86 "Ergo in Angelis est intellectus possibilis: et ille numquam potest esse sine agente." Ibid., obj. 4; 171. This objection is approved.
- 87 "Oportet quod species universalis semper sit in lumine agentis." St. Albert, De Anima, III, 2, 19; V, 366.
- 88 "Cum medium conjunctionis possibilis ad agentem sint speculata, oportet ipsa manere, aut extrema dividantur." Ibid., III, 3, 11; V, 388.
- 89 Cf. Avicenna, De Anima, V, 6; f. 26rb-va.



- 90 Gundissalinus, De Anima, cap. X: ed. J. Muckle, Mediaeval Studies, II (1940), 94-95.
- 91 St. Albert, Sum de Creat., P. II, q. 55, a. 3, ad 13; XXXV, 467.
- 92 Cf. supra, p. 75.
- 93 "Intellectus agens aut agit in possibilem actione suae substantiae, aut alicujus formae existentis in ipso. Si primo modo, cum sua substantia sit eodem modo se habens et una, non faceret in possibili actionem nisi uno modo se habentem ut unam: quod maxime falsum est, cum sint multa intelligibilia secundum quae intellectus possibilis efficitur in actu. Si secundo modo, tunc intellectus agens habebit species et formas omnium intelligibilium." St. Albert, Sum. de Creat., P. II, q. 55, a. 3, obj. 14; XXXV, 463.
- 94 "Ad aliud dicendum, quod intellectus agens agit per suam substantiam, et non per aliquam speciem intelligibilium quam habeat apud se. Ad aliud autem quod contra objicitur, dicendum quod diversitas actionis intellectus agentis non est ex intellectu agente, sed ex phantasmate: et hoc est quod Averroes in commento super tertium de Anima dicit: 'Manifestum est, quoniam quando omnia speculativa fuerunt in nobis existentia in potentia, tunc et agens continuatur nobis in potentia, quia non continuatur nobis nisi per illa: et cum fuerint existentia in nobis in actu, tunc et ipse continuatur nobis in actu: actio enim intellectus agentis determinatur ad phantasma, et sic determinata movet intellectum possibilem et educit eum in actu: sicut actio luminis determinatur ad colores, et sic determinata visum educit in actum.'" Ibid., ad 14; 467-468. The quotation from Averroes should end at in actu, as in Averroes, De Anima, III, 36, 599-603.
- "In intellectu naturali est lux intellectus agentis qui facit actu possibilem, non tamen determinate perficit et movet ipsum ad hoc intelligibile, vel illud: sed postea determinatur per intellectum hominis, vel Angeli, vel alterius." St. Albert, I Sent., d. 1, a. 15, ad quaest.; XXV, 37.



- 95 Cf. Averroes, De Anima, III, 36, 552-566 and 591-598.
- 96 "Ad aliud dicendum, quod omnia intelligibilia in quantum intelligibilia sunt eodem modo: et illo modo agit in illis intellectus agens, ut determinabitur in sequenti quaestione. Quod autem intelligibilia sunt diversa, hoc est in quantum sunt diversorum intelligibilia: et hoc non habent ab intellectu agente." St. Albert, Sum de Creat., P. II, q. 55, a. 5, ad obj. 2; XXXV, 473.  
"Sic omne intelligibile est unum specie agentis intellectus." Ibid., q. 58, a. 1, ad quaest. 1; XXXV, 503.
- 97 "Ad aliud dicendum, quod quaedam esse magis intelligibilia et quaedam minus non est ab intellectu agente: haec enim propositio falsa est: Omnis diversitas formarum fit a faciente. Quaedam enim facta sunt secundum potestatem rei factae et non facientis, sicut patet in actione solis in terram et lutum et aerem et colorem." Ibid., q. 55, a. 5, ad obj. 3; XXXV, 473.
- 98 "Et similiter est intellectus speculativus: omnes enim unum sunt secundum formam intellectualitatis, et multi sunt secundum determinantia: quia universale non determinatur nisi secundum comparisonem ad id cuius est universale, et a quo abstrahitur per intellectum...Speculativi sunt unum secundum quod intellectus sunt et non multiplicantur nisi secundum comparisonem ad ea quorum sunt intellectus." St. Albert, De Anima, III, 2, 15; V, 352. Speculativi and intellectus both mean "intelligibles".
- 99 "Solus possibilis intellectus est non quidem materia, sed ut materia quaedam: ad ipsum autem unitur agens sicut lumen ad diaphanum, et speculativus unitur et comparatur ad possibilem sicut instrumentum: comparatur autem ad agentem sicut minus formale recipiens actum et virtutem a magis formali: quandocumque enim duc comparantur ad unum sicut ad materiam, unum illorum est forma simpliciter, et alterum est quasi instrumentum et imperfectum: propter hoc est deductus in rationem alicujus materialis." Ibid., III, 3, 11; V, 387.





- 100 "Quia cum agens sit una et simplex essentia, non potest esse causa distinctarum specierum in speculando: et ideo speculativus est ut instrumentum ejus ad distinguendum intellectum possibilem." Ibid.
- 101 "Similiter est de intellectu possibili: illum enim movet intellectus agens ut agens universale, quod uno modo agit respectu omnium intelligibilium: phantasmata autem movet ut agens particulare: et ideo forma inducta in intellectu possibili, non univocatur intellectui agenti, sed naturae phantasmatis." St. Albert, Sum de Creat., P. II, q. 55, a. 2, ad 4; XXXV, 460.
- 102 "Lux intelligentiae in uno intelligibili non est eadem cum ea quae est in alio intelligibili: quia aliter eadem esset species diversorum genere et specie." St. Albert, Sum. Theol., P. II, q. 77, m. 3, ad 5; XXXIII, 95.
- 103 "Et hoc est quod multi dicunt, et pauci intelligunt, quod omnia intelligibilia fluunt in animam ab intelligentia separata et non a rebus, quarum ipsa intellecta sunt quidditates et formae." St. Albert, De Nat. et Orig. An., I, 7; IX, 394.
- 104 "Sic autem informatur intellectus possibilis apud se habens intellectum principiorum ex lumine illo, quo omnia quidem principia unum sunt et simpliciter, secundum quod pendent ex uno lumine intellectus: divisionem tamen habet et compositionem et intellectionem secundum quod lumen id determinatur et diffinitur ad terminos dignitatum." St. Albert, De Unit. Int., cap. 6; IX, 464.
- 105 "Propter hoc dicunt alii, quod in Angelis non est nisi intellectus agens: sed differt ab intellectu humano: quia in hominibus lumen intellectus agentis est indistinctum: et propter hoc dicitur, quod in hominibus est intellectus agens sicut lux: quia sicut lux habet lumen indistinctum, et distinguitur ad colores quos abstrahit, ita intellectus agens in homine habet lumen indistinctum, et distinguitur secundum species quas abstrahit a phantasmatibus: in Angelis autem est distinctus sine



speciebus. Sed hoc nihil est: quia idem eodem modo se habens non facit nisi idem. Si igitur intellectus in Angelis est eodem modo se habens, cum nihil adveniat ei, non facit intelligere nisi unum, scilicet seipsum." St. Albert, Sum. de Creat., P. I, c. 24, a. 1, sed Contra; XXXIV, 474-475. I have not been able to identify the alii.

106 Cf. supra, p. 75.

107 "Sed causa dandi formam intelligibilem non est nisi intelligentia in effectu, penes quam sunt principia formarum intelligibilium abstractarum. Cuius comparatio ad animas nostras est sicut comparatio solis ad visus nostros, quia sicut sol videtur per se in effectu, et videtur luce ipsius in effectu quod non videbatur in effectu, sic est dispositio huius intelligentiae quantum ad nostras animas. Virtus enim rationalis cum considerat singula quae sunt in imaginatione, et illuminatur luce intelligentiae agentis in nos, quam praediximus, fiunt nuda a materia et ab eius perditis et imprimuntur in anima rationali, non quasi ipsa de imaginatione mutetur ad intellectum nostrum, neque quia intentio pendens ex multis, cum ipsa in se sit considerata nuda, per se faciat similem sibi, sed quia ex consideratione eorum aptatur anima ut emanet in eam ab intelligentia agente abstractio. Cogitationes enim et considerationes motus sunt aptantes animam ad recipiendum emanationem... Sic anima rationalis cum coniungitur formis aliquo modo coniunctionis aptatur ad hoc ut contingant in ea ex luce intelligentiae agentis ipsae formae nudaae ab omni permixtione." Avicenna, De Anima, V, 5-6; f. 25rb-va.

108 "Intelligentiae non sunt nisi ut moveant subjecta sibi, et non ut moveantur ab ipsis: et ideo dicunt (scil., Avicenna et Algazel) quod intellectus moveri non potest a phantasmate, sed ipsemet habet formas et dat eas sicut intelligentiae separatae. Sic igitur absolvunt omnia quae sunt inducta." St. Albert, De Anima, III, 2, 8; V, 343. I have not found this reasoning in the works of Avicenna or Algazel.



- 109 "Intellectus agens habet habitum formae: ergo in agendo nihil recipit a phantasmate: ergo sine phantasmate erit in eadem actione: et sic sequeretur primum inconveniens, quod semper erimus aequaliter scientes." St. Albert, Sum. de Creat., P. II, q. 55, a. 3, sed contra 7; XXXV, 465-466.
- 110 "Si intellectus agens est intelligentia habens formas, ut dicunt, aut easdem quas habet, ponit in intellectu possibili, aut alias. Si easdem, tunc species quae sunt in anima, non abstrahuntur a rebus extra, et sic a sensibus in nullo juvatur intellectus possibilis." Ibid., sed contra 6; 465.
- 111 Cf. supra, pp. 51-69.



NOTES TO CHAPTER IV

- 1 III, 7; 431b18-19.
- 2 The Works of Aristotle, ed. W. D. Ross, III, 431b,n.3.
- 3 "Sed est questio de nostro intellectu qui conjunctus est magnitudini sensibilium, sicut dictum est, eo quod non accipit nisi formas abstractas a magnitudine, utrum nunquam contingat ipsum intelligere aliquod sic separatorum a magnitudine vel non? Si enim contingit ipsum intelligere separata, tunc non semper accipitur a phantasmatis et a magnitudine, sed jungitur intelligentiae separatae, danti sibi formas intelligibiles." St. Albert, De Anima, III, 3, 6; V, 378.
- 4 Cf. G. Théry, Autour du Décret de 1210: II.--Alexandra d'Aphrodise, pp. 82-83. Théry thinks the De Intellectu is really by Alexander. Cf. ibid., pp. 20-21. Moraux gives arguments to show it is not. Cf. P. Moraux, Alexandre d'Aphrodise, Exégète de la Noétique d'Aristote, esp. pp. 132-142. Averroes himself points to an inconsistency between the De Intellectu and Alexander's De Anima. Cf. Averroes, De Anima, III, 36, 81-179. But Moraux's is not the common opinion.
- 5 "Dixit enim intellectum possibilem esse generabilem cum corpore hominis et corruptibilem, eo quod esset forma et virtus in corpore." St. Albert, De Anima, III, 3, 6; V, 378. This teaching of Alexander is found in Averroes, De Anima, III, 36, 88-90. It is also found in Alexander's De Intellectu. Cf. the Latin text in G. Théry, op. cit., pp. 80-81. Zeller holds that this teaching is given as the doctrine of Aristocles. Cf. P. Moraux, op. cit., pp. 143-149. The Latin text, however (p. 78), has it as the doctrine of Alexander. And Averroes quotes this very text as the doctrine of Alexander. Cf. Averroes, De Anima, III, 5, 220-227. It can also be pointed out that Alexander in his rebuttal of Aristocles, does not oppose this teaching. Cf. the Latin text, p. 82.





- 6 "In hac autem aptitudine facit formas primo intellectus agens, qui secundum istum est intelligentia separata et non pars animae existens, et quamdiu tantum facit esse in actu educendo eam de potentia ad actum, non coniungitur intellectui possibili nisi sicut efficiens, et facit sic inesse intellectum speculativum, quem etiam dicit generabilem et corruptibilem in nobis, quando perficitur ad plenum intellectus possibilis, et habet intellectum speculativum, tunc demum coniungitur et intellectus agens sicut forma: et hunc quidem nunquam intelligit intellectus possibilis, sed cum post omnia intellecta coniungitur ut forma, tunc nos per ipsum intelligimus omnia alia separata, et habemus scientiam ipsorum." St. Albert, De Anima, III, 3, 6; V, 378-379. Albert takes all this from Averroes, De Anima, III, 36, 128-169. According to Averroes, Alexander said the agent intellect finally became our form, and through it we knew separated substances. Alexander, in the De Intellectu, says we can know separated substances, but does not say explicitly that the agent intellect becomes the form of the possible intellect. Cf. the Latin text, p. 79: "Sed hic est aliquid per se intelligibile quod de natura sua est sic; et intellectus etiam qui est in potentia cum perficitur et augetur intelligit illud; quia sicut potentia ambulandi que est in homine quando nascitur exit ad effectum cum processerit in tempore et cum perficitur id per quod fit ambulatio. Sic et intellectus qui est in potentia cum perficitur, intelligit res que de natura sunt intelligibiles."
- 7 Cf. supra, n. 6.
- 8 Cf. G. Théry, op. cit., p. 80.
- 9 "Redit ergo dictum istius hominis ad hoc quod ex phantasmatis acceptus continuatur et unitur nobis intellectus speculativus, et multo lumine speculatorum, quod lumen largitur ejus intellectus agens ut agens, et disponitur continue melius et melius intellectus possibilis. Et sic continue speculando tandem unitur ei ut forma." St. Albert, De Anima, III, 3, 6; V, 379. This analogy with light comes from Albert himself. It is not found in Alexander or Averroes.



- 10 M. Grabmann, Mittelalterliche lateinische Übersetzungen von Schriften der Aristoteles Kommentatoren..., pp. 63-64.
- 11 Averroes, De Anima, III, 36, 31-32.
- 12 Cf. St. Albert, De Anima, III, 2, 5; V, 337-339. And III, 3, 7; V, 380-381.
- 13 Averroes, De Anima, III, 5, 57-62.
- 14 Ibid., III, 20, 269-272; III, 20, 278-282; III, 36, 257-262.
- 15 "Et hujus unicum rationem assignant (scil., Themistius et Theophrastus), quae a majori est ducta, et est ratio topica probabilis uno modo et non necessaria: dicunt enim quod minus videtur, quod intellectus compositus ex duobus separatis sit de intelligibili concipiente materiam, quam de intelligibili quod est simile sibi: et est tamen de intelligibili conjuncto cum magnitudine: ergo multo magis est de intelligibili separato." St. Albert, De Anima, III, 3, 7; V, 381. This is taken from Averroes, De Anima, III, 36, 235-257.
- 16 Cf. the Latin text of Alfarabi, De Intellectu et Intellecto, ll. 230-235, 293-306. This text can be found in E. Gilson, "Les sources gréco-arabes de l'augustinisme avicennisant", AHDL, 4 (1929), 115-126. Albert no doubt had this twelfth-century translation.
- 17 "Solvebant autem istam quaestionem sicut et Alfarabius et post eum Alubachel, quod intellectus agens est natura hominis et est separatus: et ideo quando per intelligibilia perficeret operationem suam, quae est creare et facere intellectum speculationis: et tunc quasi liberatus intelligit per seipsum ea quae sunt separata." St. Albert, De Anima, III, 3, 8; V, 381.



"Et ille forme non possunt intelligi perfecte nisi postquam acquisita fuerint intellecta omnia intellecta in effectu aut plura ex eis et ut intellectus adeptus acquiratur et tunc fiet ille forme intellecte et fient quasi forme intellectui secundum quod est intellectus adeptus." Alfarabi, De Intellectu et Intellecto, ll. 202-207.

Averroes says that Alfarabi says this in his De Intellectu et Intelligibili and contradicts it in his Nichomachia. Cf. Averroes, De Anima, III, 36, 180-187.

- 18 Alfarabi, De Intellectu et Intellecto, ll. 307-312.
- 19 Ibid., ll. 312-314.
- 20 Ibid., ll. 314-325.
- 21 "Si autem obscure potest haberi de libris ejus, tunc, sicut dixit Alfarabius, inchoatum habetur ab eo solum, ubi ut videtur hoc esse quod dicit de felicitate contemplativa." St. Albert, De Anima, III, 3, 6; V, 378. For the reference to Aristotle's De Anima, cf. supra, p. 116.
- 22 Aristotle, Nichomachean Ethics, X, 7; 1177b26-1178a6.
- 23 Ibid., X, 8; 1178b7-23.
- 24 "Tunc adhaeret intellectus agens possibili sicut forma...et tunc homo perfectus est ad operandum opus illud quod est opus suum in quantum est homo... etiam hoc est perfecte per ipsum contemplari et intelligere separata; et iste modus et ista conjunctionis operatio concordat cum Aristotele in X Ethicae suae, ubi fere dicit ista." St. Albert, De Anima, III, 3, 11; V, 387.
- 25 "Et praecipue concordat cum Eustratio et Michaelae Ephesio, qui fere in hunc sensum exponunt Aristotelem ibidem." Ibid.



- 26 F. Ueberwe, Grundriss der Geschichte der Philosophie, II, 285.
- 27 "Eustratii et Michaelis et Anonyma in Ethica Nicomachea Commentaria", ed. G. Heylbut, Commentaria in Aristotelem Graeca, vol. 20, p. 591, ll. 2ff. It may be that Albert thought that Eustratius and Michael both wrote the whole commentary.
- 28 "Avepace autem cui tota vita sua solitus fuit solvere istam quaestionem, posuit intellectum materialem esse corruptibilem et generabilem, et non esse animae rationalis partem: quia dixit et hunc esse phantasiam... intellectus agens est natura hominis et est separatus: et ideo quando per intelligibilia perficeret operationem suam, quae est creare et facere intellectum speculationis: et tunc quasi liberatus intelligit per seipsum ea quae sunt separata. Avepace autem post hos veniens, addidit quod homo secundum intellectum habet duas vires: unam humanam quam habet in quantum colligatur phantasmatibus, alteram autem divinam quam habet secundum quod est vestigium intelligentiae separatae. Per humanam intelligit concepta cum materia, per divinam autem separata." St. Albert, De Anima, III, 3, 8; V, 381. Averroes had many works of Avepace, but it is unlikely that Albert had any of them. Cf. E. Gilson, History of Christian Philosophy in the Middle Ages, p. 217. Averroes says that for Avepace there is one agent intellect for all men (De Anima, III, 5, 729-754; III, 36, 337-345), that the possible intellect is the imagination, which is corruptible (III, 5, 299-303; III, 5, 549-555; III, 36, 414-416), that Avepace, following Alfarabi, said we could know separated substances (III, 36, 185-187; III, 36, 331-334), and that we had two modes of knowing (III, 36, 426-436).
- 29 "Supponunt enim primo, quod omnis quidditas suppositi et singularis cum potentia est potentia separabilis ab ipso... et quaerunt quod sit speculativum, aut compositum ex quidditate et alio, aut est simpliciter quidditas, aut non est habens quidditatem, ita quod sit privatio pura. Et si dicatur quod est compositum ex quidditate et quodam alio, tunc cum ab omni





composito intellectus sit aptus separare quidditatem intellectus, separat ab intellectu illo quidditatem illam: et de illa quidditate erit eadem quaestio: et ibi hoc in infinitum: et quia infinitum fugit omnia intellectus, standum est in primo intellectu, et dicendum est quod illa est quidditas pura. Si autem dat quod non esset quidditas, sed esset privatio pura, non est pura: tunc nihil esset intellectum speculativum, nulla etiam esset scientia speculativa omnino: quod falsum est. Remanet ergo quod sit separata et absoluta quidditas...Supponit enim quod intellectus equi in quantum est equus sive per simplicem quidditatem ipsius non est plures intellectus, sed unicus...Si ergo efficitur plures intellectus, oportet quod aliquid sit causa pluralitatis: hoc autem non est nisi quod dividitur et differre facit quidditatem secundum esse et numerum: et hoc non est nisi forma corporalis et individualis in phantasia vel in sensu." St. Albert, De Anima, III, 3, 8; V, 382. Albert attributes the first of these two arguments to Avempace and Abubacher, and both of them to Alfarabi. Averroes, however, Albert's source, gives both to Avempace only. Cf. Averroes, De Anima, III, 36, 322-369.

- 30 St. Albert, De Anima, III, 3, 8; V, 381. Albert also says that Avempace came after Abubacher, though we know that he died fifty years before him.
- 31 St. Thomas, Contra Gentiles, III, 41.
- 32 "Et hoc fere idem est ac si dicatur...quod idem est intelligens quidditates quas a materia separatas habet, et quidditates separatorum." St. Albert, De Anima, III, 3, 8; V, 382.
- 33 "Sed unicuique potest de facili patere, quod haec ratio non valet, nisi nos concedamus quod unicuique (univocae?) sunt quidditates separatorum per se, et quidditates eorum quae separantur ab intellectu a materia in qua sunt. Si enim hoc esset verum, tunc ejus virtutis esset comprehendere utrosque. Si autem aequivoce, tunc nihil valet ratio inducta." Ibid., III, 3, 8; V, 382.



- 34 Aristotle, Nic. Eth., VIII, 1; 1139a9-12.
- 35 "Et si dicatur neque esse aequivoce, neque penitus univoce, tunc oportet etiam virtutem intellectivam variari, supposito hoc quod dixit Aristoteles in VIII Ethicorum, quod omnis cognitio est in anima secundum congruentiam cognoscentis et cogniti, nisi hoc esset verum, tunc qualibet virtus acciperet quodcumque: et sic intellectus acciperet sensibile et alicujus (aliquis?) sensus intelligibile, quod omnino esse non potest." St. Albert, De Anima, III, 3, 8; V, 382-383. This is from Averroes, De Anima, III, 36, 400-411.
- 36 "Adhuc relinquitur quaestio secundum istos, quare de separatis secundum se non sunt scientiae speculativae, sicut sunt de conjunctis? Si enim utrumque est in potestate nostri intellectus, tunc speculabimur de separatis per separata sicut speculamur de conjunctis. Hoc autem non est verum: quoniam si quid parum aliquando speculamur de separatis, hoc facimus per conjuncta cum materia, sicut per motus accipimus motorem: et nescimus speculari passiones substantiae ipsius, nisi quae relatae sunt ad motum et ad corpora." St. Albert, De Anima, III, 3, 8; V, 383.
- 37 "Si enim est aliqua hujus causa ista, quia habemus intellectum connaturalem nobis ad talia speculanda, tunc oportet quod omnes deficiamus in scientia speculativa separatorum: aut propterea quod principia illius scientias non sunt inventa, sicut deficiamus in alchimia: aut propter hoc quod non sumus exercitati sufficienter: et utrumque eorum est improbable, quia talis defectus esset generalis apud omnes homines. Si autem diceret aliquis, quod aliqui habent et aliqui non habent potentiam hujus speculativi, tunc nos quia non habemus hujusmodi potentiam, aequivoce diceremur homines ad eos qui habent hujusmodi potentiam. Constat enim summam hominis potentiam esse perfectionem in contemplatione separatorum." Ibid. This is from Averroes, De Anima, III, 36, 420-425 and 437-459.



- 38 Cf. D. Salmon, "Algazel et les Latins", AHDL, 10 (1935-36), 117.
- 39 Cf. H. Bédoret, "Les premières versions tolédanes de philosophie. Œuvres d'Avicenne", RNSP, 41 (1938), 374-400. Cf. also M.-T. d'Alverny, "L'introduction d'Avicenne en Occident", La Revue du Cairo, XXVII, 141 (1951), 130-139.
- 40 Cf. supra, p. 75.
- 41 "Et cum quaelibet illarum formarum intellectualitatis accipit ab agente, oportet quod possibilis in qualibet convertatur ad agentem: et cum perfecta fuerit conversio ejus ad agentem, tunc conjungitur intellectui agenti ut formae: et tunc per ipsum intelligit separata." St. Albert, De Anima, III, 3, 9; V, 383.
- 42 "Aptitudo autem quae praecedit discere est imperfecta; postquam autem discitur est integra. Cum enim transit in mente eius qui discit id quod cohaeret cum intellectu inquisito, et convertit se anima ad inspiciendum, ipsa autem inspectio est conversio animae ad principium dans intellectum. Cum enim anima coniungitur intelligentiae, emanat ab ea virtus intellectus simplicis, quam sequitur emanatio ordinandi... Dum autem anima humana generaliter est in corpore, non potest recipere subito intelligentiam... Cum autem anima liberabitur a corpore et ab accidentibus corporis, tunc poterit coniungi intelli gentiae agenti, et tunc inveniet in ea pulchritudinem intelligibilem et delectationem perennem." Avicenna, De Anima, V, 6; f. 26va.
- 43 "Quod autem intellectus non potest formare ea quae sunt in ultimo intelligibilitatis, et abstractionis a materia, hoc non habet ex aliquo quod sit in essentia illarum rerum, nec aliquo quod sit in natura intellectus, sed ex hoc quod anima impedita est in corpore et ex corpore, et quod in multis eget corpore. Sed corpus elongat eam a dignioribus suis perfectionibus... Sed cum aufertur de nostra anima ipsa aggravatio et impedimentum, tunc intelligentia animae de his est melior quam habet anima, et quae est purior et delectabilior." Ibid., V, 5; f. 25va.



"Sua perfectio animae rationalis est ut fiat saeculum intelligibile et describatur in ea forma totius, et ordo intellectus in toto, et bonitas fluens in esse, et ut incipiens a principio totius procedat ad substantias excellentiores spirituales absolute." Avicenna, Metaphysics, IX, 7; 107rA.  
"Puto hoc esse, scilicet ut anima hominis imaginet principia separata verissime." Ibid.

44 St. Albert, De Anima, III, 3, 9; IX, 383.

45 Cf. D. Salman, "Algazel et les Latins", AHDL, (1935-36), 103-127, esp. 103-106. The chief part of the Maqâsid which interests us is the Metaphysics.

46 Algazel's Metaphysics, ed. J. Muckle, pp. 121, 124, 184.

47 Ibid., pp. 185-189.

48 "Amplius cum intelligentiae separatae sint multorum ordinum, ut dicunt Avicenna et Algazel, debuissent determinare ad quam illarum convertitur post mortem: etiam si convertitur ad omnes, utrum eodem modo, vel diverso, et quae sit causa diversitatis? hoc quidem enim determinare secundum istam opinionem est necessarium, non autem leve." St. Albert, De Nat. et Orig. An., II, 10; IX, 421.

49 Cf. supra, p. 47.

50 Averroes, De Anima, III, 5, 556-562.

51 Ibid., 605-623.

52 Ibid., III, 36, 578-639. Esp. 607-609, 611-616, 636-639:  
"Et manifestum est quod <sup>cum</sup> iste motus complebitur, quod statim iste intellectus (scil., agens) copulabitur nobiscum omnibus modis...Et cum ita sit, necesse est ut homo intelligat per intellectum sibi proprium omnia





entia, et ut agat actionem sibi propriam in omnibus entibus, sicut intelligit per intellectum qui est in habitu, quando fuerit continuatus cum formis ymaginabilibus, omnia entia intellectione propria... Cum efficietur forma nobis in actu... tunc intelligemus per illum omnia que intelligimus, et agemus per illum actionem sibi propriam."

- 53 "Et secundum hunc modum verificabitur opinio Alexandri in hoc quod dicit quod intelligere res abstractas fiet per continuationem istius intellectus nobiscum." Ibid., 623-625. Also cf. III, 5, 678-683.  
"Homo igitur secundum hunc modum, ut dicit Themistius, assimilatur Deo in hoc quod est omnia entia quoquo modo, et sciens ea quoquo modo." Ibid., III, 36, 617-619.
- 54 Ibid., 191-206; 630-639.
- 55 Ibid., 640-644.
- 56 Ibid., 656-664.
- 57 Ibid., III, 33, 74-82.
- 58 B. Zedler, "Averroes and Immortality", New Scholasticism, XXVIII (1954), 436-453.
- 59 St. Albert so understood Averroes. Cf. his De Nat. et Orig. An., II, 9; IX, 418.
- 60 "Separata autem sunt in anima per hoc quod abstrahuntur a phantasmate, quod est eorum per accidens: cum enim acceperimus in sensu motum, cognoscimus motorem per hoc quod circa motum profundatur anima et ratiocinatur de motore et substantia ipsius. Est autem duplex scientia ex phantasmate: quaedam enim est ex phantasmate, ita quod ipsa forma intellecta est forma habens esse in particulari: quaedam autem



sic, quod forma intellecta non est secundum esse in particulari, sed in sensibili manifestantur opera ejus: et per opera sicut per effectum venit in causam per intellectum: et sic cognoscimus separata. Haec est via quam fere sequuntur omnes moderni Latini." St. Albert, De Anima, III, 3, 10; V, 384-385. St. Thomas teaches in many places that we cannot know separated substances directly in this life. For example, cf. his Sum. Theol., I, 88, 1.

- 61 "Amplius sit, quod quocumque modo anima veniat in conjunctione substantiarum separatarum, semper hoc verum est quod in fine cognoscit illas substantias: oportet quod ergo per aliquid habeat virtutem cognoscendi eas: constat quod per intellectum conjunctum cum continuo et tempore non habet virtutem tales substantias cognoscendi: ergo habebit hanc virtutem per aliquem alium intellectum: et tunc remanet quaestio ut prius, et quid sit ille, et qualiter copuletur cum anima?" St. Albert, De Anima, III, 3, 10; V, 385.
- 62 "Nobis videtur quod in hac vita continuatur (scil., intellectus possibilis) cum agente formaliter, et tunc per agentem intelligit separata." Ibid., III, 3, 12; V, 390.
- 63 "Colligitur enim ex his, quod intellectus agens tribus modis jungitur nobis, licet in se et secundum essentiam suam sit separatus: a natura enim jungitur ut potentia et virtus quaedam animae, sed faciendo intellecta speculata jungitur ut efficiens: et ex his duabus conjunctionibus non est homo perfectus ut operetur opus divinum: tandem jungitur ut forma." Ibid., III, 3, 11; V, 387.
- 64 Ibid.; V, 385.
- 65 "Nos autem in dictis istis nihil mutamus nisi hoc quod etiam Aristoteles mutasse videtur, quoniam dixit quod in omni natura in qua est patiens, est etiam agens: et ita oportet in anima esse has differentias: per hoc enim videtur nobis: nec de



hoc dubitamus, quia intellectus agens sit pars et potentia animae. Sed tunc dicentes eum esse partem, erit quidem animae semper conjunctus sicut pars." Ibid.; 385-386.

66 Cf. supra, pp. 46-51.

67 "L'averroïsme latin hérétique relève d'une situation doctrinale déjà fort évoluée, dont on ne trouve pas de traces avant 1265." D. H. Salman, "Jean de la Rochelle et les débuts de l'averroïsme latin", AHDL, 16 (1947-48), 133.  
Cf. also F. Van Steenberghen, Aristote en Occident, p. 490. Also D. H. Salman, "Note sur la première influence d'Averroès", RNSP, 40 (1937), 204. Also D. H. Salman, "Albert le Grand et l'averroïsme latin", Rev. des Sciences Philos. et Théol., 23 (1935), 38-64.

68 "Sic igitur patet quod intellectus agens est forma possibilis: et sunt isti duo unum sicut compositum." St. Albert, De Anima, III, 2, 19; V, 367.  
"Et his duobus suppositis accipimus alia duo ab Alfarabio... Id autem quod dicit in X Ethicae, est quod fiducia philosophantis est non conjungi agenti intellectum ut efficienti, sed etiam sicut formae: et explanat hoc, dicens quod intellectus agens cum agit et creat intellectum in nobis, est efficiens conjunctus nobis tantum: eo quod tunc agit operatione sibi substantiali per quam diffinitur, et agit sine nobis coagentibus, licet agat in nobis intellecta quae facit: sed intelligere nostrum opus per intellectum nobis conjunctum. Et si fiducia philosophantis felix est conjungi intellectum sicut formae, tunc conjungetur ei ita quod ipsum intelligat homo felix in actu felicitatis: forma enim est per quam operatur hoc opus quod nostrum est in quantum homines sumus." Ibid., III, 3, 11; V, 386.  
Albert refers explicitly to Alfarabi's commentary on Aristotle's Nicomachean Ethics. No manuscript of this commentary has been found. Cf. D. Salmon, "The Mediaeval Latin Translations of Alfarabi's Works", New Scholasticism, XIII (1939), 246-248.  
This reference to Alfarabi could possibly, however, be taken from Averroes, De Anima, III, 36, 655-664.



- 69 St. Albert, De Anima, III, 3, 11; V, 386.
- 70 "Et haec omnia fiunt intellectu agente influente eis intellectualitatem, et faciendo haec intellecta esse intellecta secundum actum intellectus agens conjungitur nobis ut efficiens: et quia in omnibus his influit intellectualitatem et denudationem, sunt omnia sibi similia in hoc quod separata sunt et nuda: et ideo in omnibus his accipit continue intellectus possibilis lumen agentis, et efficitur sibi similior de die in diem: et hoc vocatur a Philosophis moveri ad continuitatem et conjunctionem cum agente intellectu: et sic cum acceperit omnia intellecta, habet lumen agentis in formam sibi adhaerentem: et cum ipse sit lumen suum, eo quod lumen suum essentia sua est, et non extra ipsum, tunc adhaeret intellectus agens possibili sicut forma: et hoc compositum vocatur a Peripateticis intellectus adeptus et divinus." Ibid.; 386-387.
- 71 "Et haec veteres Philosophi intenderunt, cum dixerunt quod (scil., intellectus agens) sit simplex, et quod essentialiter agit, et quod indivisae sint intelligentiae in ipso, et quod omnes in ipso sunt sua substantia et vita ex (et?) lux sua." St. Albert, De Int. et Int., II, 1, 3; IX, 507. For "intelligible" as the translation of intelligentia, cf. Sum. de Creat., II, 60; XXXV, 517.
- 72 "Intellectus possibilis unus et indivisus secundum potentiam existens, potentia est omnia intelligibilia: non ergo accipitur nisi per hoc quod efficiuntur ipsa intelligibilia in effectu, et totus adeptus et acceptus, quando in effectu positus est omnium intelligibilium (ad?) cuae ipse est in potentia: et sic adipiscitur homo suum proprium intellectum." St. Albert, De Int. et Int., II, 1, 8; IX, 515. This terminology is from Alfarabi. Cf. Alfarabi, De Intellectu et Intellecto, ll. 202-206, in AHDL, 4(1929), 120-121.
- 73 Cf. infra, n. 91.
- 74 "Convenimus enim cum omnibus Peripateticis, quod intellectus agens magis est separatus quam possibilis." St. Albert, De Anima, III, 3, 11; V, 386.





- 75 For the meaning of "speculative intellect", see supra, p. 37.
- 76 "Intelligere autem omnia quae dicuntur ab eis intelligibilia speculata, vel est impossibile alicui homini, vel adeo rarum quod nulli unquam homini hoc accidit in statu hujus vitae, nisi Christo qui fuit Deus et homo." St. Thomas, Quaes. Disp. de Anima, a. 16, resp.
- 77 "Tertio quia, dato quod secundum modum praedictum uniretur nobis substantia intellectus agentis, tamen ipsi non ponunt quod intellectus agens totaliter uniatur nobis secundum unum intelligibile vel duo, sed secundum omnia intellecta speculata. Sed omnia intellecta speculata deficiunt a virtute intellectus agentis: quia multo plus est intelligere substantias separatas, quam intelligere omnia materialia. Unde manifestum est quod etiam intellectis omnibus materialibus, non sic uniretur intellectus agens nobis, ut possemus intelligere per eum substantias separatas." St. Thomas, Sum. Theol., I, 88, 1, c.
- 78 Cf. supra, Introduction, n. 35.
- 79 Cf. supra, Introduction, n. 37.
- 80 "Et nos diximus in illa questione quod nobis videbatur: quoniam nobis videtur quod in hac vita continuatur cum agente formaliter, et tunc per agentem intelligit separata, quia aliter felicitas contemplativa non attingeretur ab homine in hac vita: et hoc est contra omnes peripateticos, qui dicunt quod fiducia contemplativa est ut formam attingere intellectum agentem." St. Albert, De Anima, III, 3, 12; V, 390.
- 81 "Determinantes autem de intellectu et intelligibili, supponemus quaecumque in libro nostro tertio de Anima convenienter determinata sunt." St. Albert, De Int. et Int., I, 1, 1; IX, 478.



- 82 "Demonstratio autem dicti vera est, quae nunc est inducta." Ibid., II, 1, 8; IX, 515.
- 83 St. Albert, Sum. Theol., P. II, q. 77, m. 3, ad finem; XXXIII, 100.
- 84 "...breviter naturam intellectus explanantes, et nostram de eo opinionem ponentes: quia nos haec quae hic dicimus, alibi probavimus, et prolixè tradidimus." St. Albert, De Unit. Int., cap. 6; IX, 462.
- 85 Ibid.
- 86 " Et/<sup>iste</sup> pro certo fuit intellectus Aristotelis in verbis suis de intellectu, et solus iste est verus et nullus alius...Et hoc est quod verius de intellectu dici potest, et natura ipsius: et disputavimus de hoc latius in libro de perfectione animae, qui secundus est in libro de intellectu et intelligibili quem scripsimus." Ibid.; 464.
- 87 Ibid.
- 88 "Et sicut diximus, quod intellectus noster plus conjungitur imaginationi et sensui quam intellectui primo agenti, ideo obscurus est, et ad ea quae sunt separatae penitus rationis, habet se sicut oculus vespertilionis ad lumen solis: et ideo prius est imbuendus in physicis, et deinde mathematicis, ut sic confortatus multis luminibus multorum intelligibilium, consurgat ad intellectum divinatorum." St. Albert, De Int. et Int., II, 1, 6; IX, 513.
- 89 "Dicimus quod anima rationalis differt ab intelligentia caelesti, eo quod per intelligibilia, quae sunt cum tempore et continuo, venire habet ad intelligibile, quod secundum esse et essentiam per se est intelligibile, et si est ordo in illis per se intelligibilibus,



habet devenire ad primum intelligibile, quod est causa omnium aliorum...omnia intelligibilia adminiculantia sunt ad primum intelligibile... Id enim quod est cum continuo et tempore, lumen habet ex parte, qua est intelligibile, et illud lumen illuminat intellectum, et sub ipso lumine duplicis illius intelligibilis efficitur intellectus amplioris capacitatis, quam ante fuit...Et ideo licet per seipsum intellectus noster se habeat ad ea quae sunt per se intelligibilia sunt sicut oculi vespertilionis ad lumen solis, tamen cum his luminibus efficitur fortioris luminis, ita quod iam proportionatur facultas eius his quae per se sunt intelligibilia." St. Albert, De Nat. et Orig. An., II, 13; ed. B. Geyer, p. 38.

- 90 "Adeptus igitur intellectus est, quando per studium aliquis verum et proprium suum adipiscitur intellectum, quasi totius laboris utilitatem et fructum." St. Albert, De Int. et Int., II, 1, 8; IX, 514.
- "Intellectus possibilis unus et indivisus secundum potentiam existens, potentia est omnia intelligibilia: non ergo accipitur nisi per hoc quod efficiuntur ipsa intelligibilia in effectu, et totus adeptus et acceptus, quando in effectu positus est omnium intelligibilium (ad?) quae ipse est in potentia: et sic adipiscitur homo suum proprium intellectum." Ibid.; 515.
- 91 "Est autem intellectus assimilativus, in quo homo quantum possibile sive fas est proportionabiliter surgit ad intellectum divinum, qui est lumen et causa omnium. Fit autem hoc cum per omnia in effectu factus intellectus perfecte adeptus est seipsum et lumen agentis, et ex omnium luminibus et notitia sui extendit se in luminibus intelligentiarum ascendens gradatim ad intellectum simplicem divinum: devenit ergo ex lumine sui agentis in lumen intelligentiae, et ex illo extendit se ad intellectum Dei." Ibid., II, 1, 9; IX, 516.
- The term intellectus assimilativus is found in Avicenna, De Anima, I, 5; f. 5vb.
- "Anima igitur humana concipiendo lumen cui applicatur intellectus agens in ipse illustratus, applicatur lumen (lumini?) intelligentiarum, et amplius clarescit in illo...In illo autem lumine confortatus consurgit intellectus in lumen divinum quod nomen



non habet et inenarrabile est: quia proprio nomine non innotescit: sed ut recipitur, innotescit."  
St. Albert, De Int. et Int., II, 1, 9; IX, 517.

- 92 "Forma mundi ambit et illuminat totam materiam ordinis sibi subjecti, et unicuique proportionaliter lumen suum ubique praesens impartitur...Intellectus igitur extendens se invenit lumen ubique praesens, et informatur et imbuitur illo et clarificatur ad pulchritudinem coelestem." Ibid., II, 1, 11; 519.
- 93 "Adhuc autem si detur, quod superius miscetur luminibus, cum haec lumina sint formae mundi, non videtur ex his luminibus aliquid distinctum in ipso fieri et determinatum: et ideo licet clarioris efficiatur intellectus, non tamen ex hoc aliquam accipit notitiam determinatam." Ibid.
- 94 "Solutio est, quod illud lumen cujuscumque sit intelligentiae, sive etiam sit divinum, est lumen activum et formativum omnium eorum quae sunt ordinis inferioris: et ideo semper extendit se ad rerum naturas determinatas, sicut lumen artis se extendit ad materiam. Propter quod etiam quando informat intellectum, extendit eum ad rerum naturas determinatas." Ibid.; 519-520.
- 95 "Cum autem jam (scil., intellectus possibilis) habet scientiam, vocatur intellectus adeptus: et tunc non indiget amplius virtutibus sensibilis animae."  
St. Albert, De Anima, III, 2, 19; V, 367.
- 96 "Substantia autem habens esse divinum et operationem, non indiget aliquo: ergo anima sic reducta de sensibilibus et materia corporum, non indiget, eo quod materialia et instrumentalia organa non accipit secundum naturam nisi ad hoc ut ad esse divinum reduceretur...Quod autem diximus eam indigere sensibilibus et corpore, intelligendum est de indigentia relata ad intellectus perfectionem."  
St. Albert, De Int. et Int., II, 1, 12; IX, 520-521.





The doctrine that we do not need phantasms for the recall of knowledge once acquired is found in Alfarabi, Avicenna, and Algazel. For Alfarabi, cf. supra, n. 20. For Avicenna, cf. his De Anima, V, 3; f. 24ra. For Algazel, cf. Algazel's Metaphysics, ed. J. Muckle, p. 185.

- 97 "Et si forte diceretur, quod haec conjunctio secunda (scil., possibilis intellectus ad agentem ut ad formam) est impossibilis, refellitur hoc per hoc quod nos videmus animas feliciam sicut quando perficiuntur animae eorum secundum optimum statum sapientiae, quando videlicet sapiunt divina quae sapit Deus, et habent delectationem in his: per effectum igitur probatur quod haec conjunctio erit hic in multis, et est possibilis." St. Albert, De Anima, III, 3, 11; V, 386.
- 98 "Peritissimus efficitur astrorum, et prognosticationum quae sunt in astris." St. Albert, De Int. et Int., II, 1, 9; IX, 517.
- 99 "...a quibusdam prophetizare putantur." Ibid.  
"Et multi viri illustres in hoc lumine ordinem rerum naturarum percipiunt in ordine istius luminis, et praedicunt." Ibid., II, 1, 11; 520.  
"Quando autem adeptus quasi totus est perfectio (sic) luminis agentis, ita quod per se facit intellecta, tunc ille proximus est ad cognoscendum futura ex praesentibus. Etiam illi frequenter efficiuntur prophetae." St. Albert, De Anima, III, 3, 11; V, 388.
- 100 "Ideo alicquando obediunt eis transmutationes exteriorum, sicut obediunt formis mundi: et hi sunt de quibus, sicut Philosophi dicunt, quod operantur mirabilia in conversionibus hominum et naturarum." St. Albert, De Int. et Int., II, 1, 11; IX, 519.
- 101 Cf. supra, n. 80.
- 102 "Est summa perfectio quae in hac vita contingere potest homini. Contingit autem plus et plus secundum quod anima est perceptiva illuminationum, quae sunt a prima causa plus et plus." St. Albert, De Int. et Int., II, 1, 10; IX, 518.



- 103 "Et ideo quaecumque dicit lex nostra, non (nos?) omnino praeterimus, tantum ea accipientes quae per syllogismum accipiunt demonstrationem." St. Albert, De Unit. Int., cap. 1; IX, 437.  
"Nihil secundum legem nostram dicemus, sed omnia secundum philosophiam." Ibid., cap. 6; 452.
- 104 "Quaecumque vero hic inquirenda esse videntur, quantum per demonstrationem et rationem investigare poterimus, tractabimus, sequentes principis nostri vestigia." St. Albert, De Int. et Int., I, 1, 1; IX, 478.
- 105 "Intelligere post habitum scientiae secundum solam conversionem ad agentem, est aequivocum ad intelligendum accipiendo scientiam per experimentum et memoriam." St. Albert, De Anima, III, 2, 19; V, 367.



NOTES FOR CHAPTER V

- 1 Cf. supra, pp. 13-17.
- 2 Cf. infra, pp. 181-182.
- 3 "Dicimus quod in anima ad hoc quod accipiat scientiam veritatis exiguntur quatuor: intellectus possibilis qui paratus sit recipere: et secundo, intellectus agens cujus lumine fiat abstractio specierum in quibus est veritas, vel verum illud: et tertio, res objecta per imaginem, vel seipsam, de qua est veritas illa: et quarto, principia et dignitates quae sunt quasi quaedam instrumenta...Unde quidam Philosophi dixerunt, quod ista sufficerent ad cognitionem veri quod est sub ratione. Sed aliter dicendum, scilicet, quod lux intellectus agentis non sufficit per se, nisi per applicationem lucis intellectus increati, sicut applicatur radius solis ad radium stellae. Et hoc contingit dupliciter, scilicet, secundum lumen duplicatum tantum, vel etiam triplicatum: duplicatum ut si fiat conjunctio ad lumen intellectus increati, et illud lumen est interior magister. Quandoque autem fit ad conjunctionem intellectus angelici et divini." St. Albert, I Sent., d. 2, a. 5, sol.; XXV, 59-60.  
There is a similar text ibid., d. 47, a. 19, sol.; XXVI, 462.
- 4 St. Augustine, De Magistro, XII, 38; PL, 32, col. 1216.
- 5 Dionysius, De Divinis Nominibus, IV, 2; PG, 3, 696.
- 6 Cf. supra, pp. 120-121.
- 7 Cf. supra, pp. 126-127.
- 8 Cf. supra, pp. 128-130.



- 9 St. Albert, I Sent., d. 2, a. 5; XXV, 60.  
For Avicenna, cf. his De Anima, V, 6; f. 26rb-va.
- 10 St. Albert, I. Sent., d. 2, a. 5, sol.; XXV, 60.
- 11 E. Gilson, "Pourquod Saint Thomas a critique' Saint Augustin", AHDL, 1 (1926-27), 5-127.  
Also "Les sources gréco-arabes de l'augustinisme avicennisant", AHDL, 4 (1929), 5-149.
- 12 Cf. supra, pp. 106-107.
- 13 E. Gilson, Introduction à l'étude de Saint Augustin, pp. 117-119. Also "Les Sources Gréco-Arabes de l'Augustinisme Avicennisant", AHDL, 4(1929), 107.  
Cf. also references to opposed opinions in E. Gilson, Introduction à l'étude de Saint Augustin, pp. 113-125.
- 14 St. Albert, I Sent., d. 2, a. 5; XXV, 60.
- 15 "Idem videtur dicere Apostolus ad Corinthios, ubi dicit, quod non sumus sufficientes aliquid cognoscere a nobis quasi ex nobis, sed quod sufficientia nostra a Deo est." St. Albert, Sum. de Creat., P. II, q. 55, art. 3, obj. 22; XXXV, 464.  
For St. Paul, cf. II Cor., 3, 5.
- 16 "Ad aliud dicendum, quod vis in hoc est quod Apostolus dicit, quod non sufficientes sumus aliquid cogitare a nobis quasi ex nobis: ex hoc innuit, quod quaedam intelligibilia non intelligimus, nisi gratia Dei illuminante, sicut ea quae sunt supra rationem: quaedam autem rationabilia intelligimus a nobis, sed non quasi ex nobis, sed ex virtute intellectus agentis, quae data est nobis a Deo." St. Albert, Sum. de Creat., P. II, q. 55, art. 3, ad 22; XXXV, 469.
- 17 "Et hoc potest intelligi universaliter de illuminatione naturali, vel particulariter de illuminatione per gratiam." St. Albert, De Coelesti Hierarchia, I, 1; XIV, 11. Cf. St. John, I, 9.





- 18 "Illuminatione naturali omnes aequaliter illuminantur per Angelos secundum intellectum, sed secundum gratuita soli sancti, quia alii efficiuntur indispositi per peccatum." St. Albert, De Coelesti Hierarchia, IX, 6; XIV, 283.
- 19 "Quia anima hominis ad imaginem Dei facta est, et est substantia rationalis et intellectualis, analogiam habet perspicacitatis intelligentiae ad illuminationem factam per Angelum." St. Albert, Sum. Theol., P, II, q. 40, m. 2, a. 2, ad 2; XXXII, 496.
- 20 "Imago proprie est in naturalibus potentiis rationalis animae." Ibid., q. 71, ad qu. 3, ad obj. 1; XXXIII, 31.
- 21 Ibid., P. I, c. 16, m. 3, a. 3, sol.; XXXI, 110-111.
- 22 "Nisi gratia dicatur gratis data, sicut totum quod sunt et quod habent, gratia est." Ibid., P. II, q. 26, m. 3, ad qu. 1; XXXII, 292.
- 23 "Sed haec gratia non est altioris virtutis, quam ipsa natura in datis naturalibus considerata." Ibid.
- 24 Aristotle, De Anima, III, 4; 429b21-22.
- 25 St. Albert, Sum. Theol., P. I, q. 16, m. 3, a. 3, ad 5; XXXI, 111. The word "bonitatum" is from Liber de Causis, prop. 18; cf. ed. O. Bardenhewer, p. 180.
- 26 "Ita in prima philosophia omnia dicuntur divina, eo quod in diffinitione eorum cadit Deus: quia sicut inferius late prosequemur, omnia alia exeunt a primis principiis divinis, et in ipsis sunt sicut artificiata in mente artificis: et sicut artificiata resolvuntur ad lumen intellectus primi activi, et per ipsum diffiniuntur, ita omnia resolvuntur ad lumen separatarum substantiarum:



et ipsae separatae substantiae resolvuntur ad lumen intellectus Dei, per quod subsistunt et per ipsum sicut per primum principium diffiniuntur. Et haec est causa, quod divina et theologica dicitur haec sapientia." St. Albert, Metaphysics, VI, 1, 3; VI, 386.

27 Ibid., IV, 1, 2; VI, 205-206.

28 "Nulla potentia receptiva recipit illud quod improportionabile est sibi, nisi per aliquod illi proportionetur. Intelligibile quod Deus est, improportionatum est intellectui nostro. Ergo non recipitur ab ipso nisi per aliquod quod intellectum nostrum intelligibili facit proportionabilem." St. Albert, Sum. Theol., P. I, q. 16, m. 3, a. 3, obj. 3; XXXI, 110.  
This objection is granted by Albert.

29 "Si ergo intellectus cognoscendo concipiat Deum, videtur quod in omni cognitione divina necessarium sit aliquod simile cognito." Ibid., obj. 4.  
St. Albert grants this objection too.

30 "In lumine tuo videbimus lumen." Psalms, 35, 10.

31 Cf. supra, pp. 154-156.

32 Cf. supra, pp. 158-159.

33 "Per hunc ergo mundum quo universitas corporalium habet unum primum agens in his quae faciunt et fiunt usque ad ultimum factum, quod est lux solis, super quam irradiat lux agentis primi intellectus: et nisi irradiaret super ipsum, lux solis non esset effectiva formarum corporalium. Ita est in quolibet universo: oportet etiam ita in anima hominis esse secundum multitudinem et universitatem intellectualis esse quod fit in ipsa et in intellectu ipsius." St. Albert, De Int. et Int., II, 1, 3; IX, 507.



- 34 "Homo enim intellectum non habet cui ex phantasmate non oritur: Angelus autem nisi assumpto corpore phantasmata non facit: ergo videtur, quod homo non possit habere intellectum de ipso, sive intellectualem cognitionem." St. Albert, Sum. Theol., P. II, q. 14, m. 3, a. 2, part. 4, obj. 1; XXXII, 195.
- 35 Cf. ibid., ad 1; 196.
- 36 Cf. supra, pp. 120-121.
- 37 Cf. supra, p. 132.
- 38 Cf. supra, p. 126.
- 39a "Secundi autem quasi per se aut ex parva doctrina nati sunt intelligere omnia: quia agentem non habent tamquam potentiam animae, vel quasi efficientem per abstractionem intelligibilia in anima, sed habent eum quasi pro forma...et haec vocatur intellectus sanctus sive mundus ab Avicenna." St. Albert, De Int. et Int., I, 3, 3; IX, 501.
- 39b Cf. supra, pp. 147-148.  
For further confirmation, cf. St. Albert, De Quindecim Problematibus, in P. Mandonnet, Siger de Brabant..., Part II, p. 33:  
"In anima sunt lumina intelligentiarum adepta et possessa ab illustratione intelligibilium... Quanto magis avertitur (scil., intellectus hominis) ab inferiori virtute qua se habet ad organa, tanto magis intellectum suum proprium adipiscitur, acquirit et possidet...In hac autem adeptione nobilissima omnes Peripatetici radicem dixerunt immortalitatis."  
For the meaning of radicem immortalitatis, cf. infra, p. 197.
- 40 St. Albert, Comm. on Metaphysics, I, 1, 3; VI, 6.
- 41 Cf. ibid., III, 3, 4; VI, 179.



- 42 "Et ideo habet tres theorias: quoniam theoria sua secundum lucem agentis est philosophia prima, secundum autem conversionem ad imaginationem habet theoriam mathematicam, et secundum conversionem ad sensum communem habet theoriam physicam." St. Albert, De Unit. Int., cap. 6; IX, 463.
- 43 St. Albert, Comm. on Meta., XI, 3, 7; VI, 687.
- 44 Cf. supra, p. 146.
- 45 Cf. supra, pp. 145-146.
- 46 Cf. supra, pp. 151-156, 158-159.
- 47 Cf. supra, pp. 133, 144.
- 48 "Intellectus noster omnem scientiam accipiens ex phantasmate." St. Albert, II Sent., d. 8, a. 10, ad quaest.; XXVII, 186.
- 49 "Nullam habemus scientiam secundum naturam de eo quod nullo modo est in sensu." St. Albert, Sum. de Creat., P. II, q. 58, ad 7; XXXV, 502-503.
- 50 "Nihil enim secundum naturam est in apprehensione rationalis animae, quod non abstrahatur ab apprehensione animae sensibilis." St. Albert, Sum. de Creat., P. I, q. 69, a. 3, part. 3 and quaest. 1<sup>a</sup>; XXXIV, 702.
- 51 Cf. ibid., q. 19, a. 1, obj. 4; XXXIV, 454.
- 52 Cf. ibid., ad 4; 455.
- 53 Cf. supra, pp. 133, 140-141.





- 54 Cf. supra, pp. 159-169.
- 55 Cf. supra, pp. 151-154.
- 56 "Si enim contingit ipsum (scil., intellectum nostrum) intelligere separata, tunc non semper accipitur a phantasmatis et a magnitudine, sed conjungitur intelligentiae separatae, danti sibi formas intelligibiles." St. Albert, De Anima, III, 3, 6; V, 378.
- 57 "Hic autem hoc notandum, quod cuicumque superiorum intellectuum intellectus applicatur humanus, qui est una de formis mundi, a lumine istius influunt in ipsum formae et species sui ordinis: et ideo quaedam notitia illius ordinis efficitur in ipso per analogiam cujus potest illa recipere." St. Albert, De Int. et Int., II, 1, 9; IX, 517.
- 58 "Propter quod etiam quando (illud lumen cujuscumque sit intelligentiae, sive etiam sit divinum) informat intellectum, extendit eum ad rerum naturas determinatas." Ibid., II, 1, 11; IX, 519-520.
- 59 "Hoc tamen lumen disponit intellectum, et nihil confert intelligibili in cognitione divina." St. Albert, Sum. Theol., P. I, q. 16, m. 3, a. 3, ad 5; XXXI, 111.  
"Hoc autem lumen sic descendens, non est aliquid conferens cognitio (read cognito) ut cognoscibile sit, sed est conferens cognoscenti ut cognoscere possit, et assimilatio est quaedam cognoscentis et cogniti." Ibid., sol.  
"Non est (scil., lumen divinum) nisi medium coadjuvans et disponens intellectum ad intelligendum." Ibid., ad obj.
- 60 "In corporalibus per se visibilia sine omni alio illuminante videntur. Ergo in intellectualibus similiter est, quod per se intelligibilia seipsis intelliguntur." Ibid., in cont.; 110.



- 61 "Tale medium non obstat, nec interstat: quia non est nisi medium coadjuvans et disponens intellectum ad intelligendum. Unde non impedit, quin intelligibilia per se et primo per se et sine medio intelligantur." Ibid., ad obj.; 111.
- 62 "Angeli in intellectum possunt imprimere lumen sub quo fit cognitio, et ipsa cognoscibilia secundum species suas." St. Albert, Sum. de Creat., P. I, q. 34, a. 2, sol.; XXXIV, 523b.  
The same doctrine is found in Sum. Theol., P. II, q. 27, m. 3, sol.; XXXII, 302. And in De Mystica Theologia, I, 6; XIV, 835.
- 63 "Intellectus igitur extendens se invenit lumen ubique praesens, et informatur et imbuitur illo et clarificatur ad pulchritudinem coelestem." St. Albert, De Int. et Int., II, 1, 11; IX, 519.
- 64 Cf. supra, p. 172.
- 65 Cf. supra, pp. 153-154.
- 66 "Dicendum quod intellectus duobus modis intelligit, scilicet per formas intelligentiarum separatarum; et hunc modum accipit ipse ab intelligentia prima, et utitur ipso post mortem. Alio modo intelligit a phantasmate abstrahendo universale: et hoc modo utitur in corpore." St. Albert, Sum. de Creat., P. II, q. 56, a. 4, ad 1; XXXIV, 483.  
The "forms of the separated intelligences" are their intelligible species. Cf. ibid., a. 5, ad 1; 486.
- 67 "Et concedimus, quod illae formae concreatae sunt animae rationali." Ibid., a. 5, sol.; 486.
- 68 "Quod sitem anima non agat per formas illas, hoc est, quia fortiores motus in comparatione ad corpus excludunt alios qui sunt debiliores." Ibid., ad obj.



- 69 "Cujus nulla operatio est sine corpore, secundum nullum principium illarum operationum potest esse sine corpore." Ibid., q. 61, a. 2, sed cont. 3; 530.
- 70 "Potentia intellectus possibilis post mortem complebitur ab intellectu agente, et a formis quae sunt in intelligentiis separatis: et ideo non erit supervacua. Dicunt enim philosophi, quod anima post mortem convertitur ad motorem primum: et hic est finis prosperitatis ejus." Ibid., q. 56, a. 4, ad 4; 484.
- 71 "Sine praejudicio loquendo puto hic esse distinguendum in intellectu: est enim aliquis intellectus in nobis accipiens ex phantasmate... Est autem alius intellectus non accipiens ex phantasmate, sed in lumine agentis intellectus tantum... Primus autem modus est quasi generalis nobis dum sumus in via. Secundus autem magis erit in actu post viam." St. Albert, I Sent., d. 27, a. 4, sol.; XXV, 472.  
This is found also in IV Sent., d. 50, a. 7, obj. 2; XXX, 694.
- 72 "Omnia illa procedunt quae in contrarium objiciuntur secundum primum modum intellectus, et secundum potestatem ejus quod noscitur: et non secundum intellectum phantasticum, et secundum potestatem intelligentis in via in quo magna frequentia sensibilibus et phantasmatum obcaecat oculum intellectus secundum primum modum considerati." St. Albert, I Sent., d. 27, a. 4, ad 5; XXV, 473.
- 73 "Licet charitas manifesta sit de se, non tamen nobis ita manifestatur propter tumultum concupiscentiae et phantasmatum in cordibus nostris." Ibid., a. 5, sol.; XXV, 473.  
A similar doctrine is found in Roger Bacon, Quaestiones Supra Librum de Causis, in Opera hactenus inedita ..., XII, 73-76.
- 74 St. Albert, Comm. in Epist. IX Dionysii, sec. 10; XIV, 1001. Simplicia secundum se are those things which are separated from matter in their being, and not just in the way in which they are understood.



Cf.: "In inferioribus sumenda sunt simplicia secundum modum intelligendi eorum, quae secundum esse composita sunt, et dependent a materia (sicut essentiae rerum naturalium)... Sed Deus et secundum intellectum simplex est, et secundum esse absolutum non dependens ab aliquo." St. Albert, De Mystica Theologia, I, 1; XIV, 819.

- 75 St. Albert, Mariale...super...Iesus Est..., c. 45; XXXVII, 153-157.
- 76 B. Korošak, Mariologia S. Alberti Magni..., p. 14. Also J.-A. Robilliard and F.-M. de Contenson, "Bulletin d'histoire des doctrines médiévales", Rev. de Sciences Phil. et Théol., 39 (1955), 455-457.
- 77 M. Browne, "Circa intellectum et eius illuminationem apud S. Albertum Magnum", Angelicum, IX (1932), 196-198.
- 78 G. de Mattos, "L'intellect agent personnel dans les premiers écrits d'Albert le Grand et de Thomas d'Aquin", RNSP, 43 (1940), 150-151.
- 79 A. Schneider, Die Psychologie Alberts des Grossen..., pp. 345-348.
- 80 B. Geyer, "De aristotelismo B. Alberti Magni", Atti della Settimana Albertina, pp. 78-79.
- 81 G. Manser, "Albert der Grosse als Neuerer auf philosophischen Gebiete", Divus Thomas, Jahrbuch für Philosophie und spekulative Theologie: Albertus-Magnus Festschrift, Fribourg, 1932; p. 35.
- 82 R. Miller, The Notion of the Agent Intellect in Saint Albert the Great, pp. 143-177.
- 83 Cf. text supra, p. 154.





- 84 Cf. text supra, p. 160.
- 85 A.-M. Ethier, "Les parties potentielles de l'intellect chez S. Albert le Grand", Études et Recherches, Publiées par le Collège Dominicain d'Ottawa, III (1938), 87-89.
- 86 R. Z. Lauer, "St. Albert and the Theory of Abstraction", The Thomist, XVII (1954), p. 83.
- 87 G. de Mattos, "L'intellect agent personnel dans les premiers écrits d'Albert le Grand et de Thomas d'Aquin", RNSP, 43 (1940), 150-152, 161.
- 88 St. Albert, Sum de Creat., P. II, q. 55, a. 3, ad 22; XXXV, 469.
- 89 "Albert hat durch seine Lehre von der Abstraktion, durch die er Augustinus im wesentlichen umdeutete, die Grundlagen gelegt für die konsequente Interpretation des Kirchenvaters im aristotelischen Sinne durch Thomas von Aquin. Albert selber hat die Illuminationstheorie Augustins nicht so konsequent in den Aristotelismus umgemodelt, er ist auf halbem Wege stehen geblieben." J. Bonnè, Die Erkenntnislehre Alberts des Grossen..., p. 61.



NOTES TO CHAPTER VI

- 1 Cf. Aristotle, De Anima, II, 1; 412a28.
- 2 St. Albert, Sum. Theol., P. II, q. 69, m. 2, a. 2; XXXIII, 13.
- 3 "Dicendum, quod definitio Aristotelis inducta, dicit quid est anima secundum quod anima est forma et species et substantia animati corporis, in quo secundum totum et secundum partes operatur operationes vitae, et non est data de anima secundum quod est in seipsa." Ibid.; XXXIII, 15.
- 4 "Alia definitio est, quae datur de anima secundum se, et secundum quod separabilis est a corpore." Ibid.; XXXIII, 16.
- 5 "Avicenna in VI de Naturalibus, dicit, quod sicut nauta duplicem habet definitionem: unam secundum quam consideratur in seipso, secundum quam dicitur artifex arte regens navim: aliam secundum quam operationes nauticas operatur instrumentis navis, artemone scilicet, malo, velo, remis: ita anima duplicem debet habere definitionem: unam secundum quod operatur opera vitae in corpore et in organis ejus. Et secundum hoc definitur ab Aristotele secundum quod est endelechia." Ibid.; XXXIII, 15-16.  
For the double definition of the soul in Avicenna, cf. his De Anima, I, 1; f. lrb.  
For a full treatment of Albert's Avicennian definition of the soul, cf. E. Gilson, "L'âme raisonnable chez Albert le Grand", AHDL, 14(1943-45), 13-22. Also A. C. Pegis, St. Thomas and the Problem of the Soul in the Thirteenth Century, pp. 88-110.
- 6 "Adhuc, addit Gregorius Nyssenus, quod ad hoc deducti sumus, quod dicamus cum Platone, quod anima sit substantia, et hoc aliquid, corpori regendo accommodata, et quod separabilis sit a corpore: vel cum Aristotele dicamus, quod est endelechia sive perfectio corporis: et cogemur dicere, quod



nullum esse habeat sine corpore." St. Albert, Sum. Theol., P. II, q. 69, m. 2, a. 2, obj. 2; XXXIII, 13-14.

The expression hoc alioid will be explained presently. The text of Nemesius can be found in Gregori Nysseni (Nemesii Emeseni) Peri Phuseos Anthropou..., chap. II; ed. C. Burkhard, p. 15. This work was thought to be by Gregory of Nyssa until the sixteenth century. Cf. F. Van Steenberghen, Aristote en Occident, p. 62.

- 7 "Animam considerando secundum se, consentiemus Platoni: considerando autem eam secundum formam animationis quam dat corpori, consentiemus Aristoteli." St. Albert, Sum. Theol., P. II, q. 69, m. 2, a. 2, ad 2; XXXIII, 16.
- 8 Cf. supra, n. 6.
- 9 "Substantialis differentia animae et Angeli est in hoc quod anima inclinatur ad corpus ut actus, Angelus autem non. Et ideo substantiale dicimus animae esse, quod sit actus corporis." St. Albert, S. de Creat., P. II, q. 4, sol.; XXXV, 34.
- 10 "Etiam anima separata, propter hoc quod secundum esse unibilis est corpori, affectum et intentionem retinet ad corpus, in tantum quod etiam a contemplatione retrahatur." St. Albert, Sum. Theol., P. II, q. 9, sol.; XXXII, 141.
- 11 "Haec enim (scilicet, anima humana) per substantiam et essentiam est extra corpus et distincta ab ipso." Ibid., q. 69, ad 4; XXXIII, 16.
- 12 "Anima enim rationalis secundum seipsam et secundum totum affectum unibilis est corpori...Et hoc non est per potentias tantum, ut quidam dixerunt, sed per essentiam suam, sic enim nisi essentialis forma esset hominis, homo non esset homo...Non est tantum actus corporis, sed etiam suppositum et



subjectum in se perfectum, utens corpore, et regens corpus. Propter hoc separatur post mortem." Ibid., q. 9, sol.; XXXII, 140-41. For the Augustinian sources of this definition of the soul, cf. St. Augustine, De moribus ecclesiae, I, 27, 52; PL, 32, 1332; and De quantitate animae, XIII, 22; PL, 32, 1048.

- 13 "Omne essentialiter separatum a corpore, et quod non communicat corpore per se sed per alium, manet separatum a corpore: anima autem rationalis sic separata est." St. Albert, De Anima, III, 3, 13; V, 390. Cf. also ibid., II, 1, 4; V, 198. "Secundum se enim semper separata est (anima), licet ad tempus regendo corpori a creatore sit accommodata." St. Albert, Sum. Theol., P. II, q. 73, m. 2; XXXIII, 56.
- 14 "Anima rationalis non tantum est substantia per se ens, nec tantum actus, sed substantia et actus: sed si esset substantia per se ens tantum, non esset unibilis alteri per constitutionem unius per substantiam." St. Albert, S. de Creat., P. II, c. 4, a. 5, ad 4; XXXV, 53. Cf. also St. Albert, De Unitate Intellectus, cap. 7, ad 2; IX, 469.
- 15 Cf. A. C. Pegis, "St. Albert the Great and the Problem of the Soul as Form and Substance", chap. III of St. Thomas and the Problem of the Soul in the Thirteenth Century.
- 16 Cf. infra, pp. 192-194. Also A. C. Pegis, St. Thomas and the Problem of the Soul in the Thirteenth Century, pp. 168-187.
- 17 Cf. supra, n. 6. "Dicendum, quod anima et maxime hominis, quae arte et providentia regit corpus ut nauta navim, composita est et hoc aliquid." St. Albert, Sum. Theol., P. II, q. 70, sol.; ed. Jammy, t. 18, p. 350.
- 18 Cf. supra, n. 12.





- 19 These terms are explained infra, pp. 198-204.
- 20 "Et rem naturae intelligimus compositum ex materia et forma, vel quod est et quo est, in natura et sub natura communi, et hoc est hoc aliquid in natura. Suppositum autem addit rei naturae respectum ad naturam communem, cui supponitur ut incommunicabile. Subjectum autem, ut dicit Philosophus, est ens in se completum, occasio alteri existendi in eo: et hoc habet respectum ad accidens, licet non sit in intellectu sui nominis habitus accidentis: et hoc vocatur ab Aristotele substantia, et a Graecis ὑποστάσις. Individuum autem est habens accidentia individu-antia." St. Albert, In I Sent., d. 26, a. 4, sol.; XXVI, 8.
- 21 "Species autem non est hoc aliquid." St. Albert, In II Sent., d. 1, art. 4, obj. 4; XXVII, 13.
- 22 "Bene concedo quod hoc aliquid dicit substantiam." Ibid., ad 1; XXVII, 13.
- 23 "Dicendum, quod Angelus substantia composita est, et est suppositum, et hoc aliquid. Suppositum autem et hoc aliquid in ratione sui habent, quod sint compositum ad minus ex quod est et quo est: omne enim suppositum alicui substat communi, scilicet naturae, quo est in genere vel specie illius naturae: et omne quod substat, res naturae determinata est in illa natura ad hoc quod est signatum hoc aliquid. Et per hoc patet, quod in ratione suppositi est, quod compositum sit." St. Albert, Sum. Theol., P. II, q. 13, m. 1, sol.; XXXII, 160.
- "Hoc aliquid, quod est compositum individuum substantiae." St. Albert, De Anima, II, 1, 1; V, 192.
- 24 Cf. n. 6 and n. 12.
- "Dicendum, quod anima et maxime hominis, quae arte et providentia regit corpus ut nauta navim, composita est et hoc aliquid. Et nisi ita dicatur, dicit Gregorius, quod sequitur quod corpore destructo destruitur anima." St. Albert, Sum. Theol., P. II, q. 70, sol.; ed. Jammy, t. 18, p. 350.



- 25 St. Thomas, C. D. de Anima, art 1.
- 26 Ibid., resp.
- 27 "Respondeo dicendum, quod hoc aliquid proprie dicitur individuum in genere substantiae." Ibid.
- 28 "Illa enim subsistere dicimus, quae non in alio, sed in se existunt." St. Thomas, Sum. Theol., I, 29, 2, c.
- 29 "Dicendum quod hoc aliquid potest accipi dupliciter: uno modo, pro quocumque subsistente; alio modo, pro subsistente completo in natura alicuius speciei. Primo modo, excludit inhaerentiam accidentis et formae materialis; secundo modo, excludit etiam imperfectionem partis. Unde manus posset dici hoc aliquid primo modo, sed non secundo modo. Sic igitur, cum anima humana sit pars speciei humanae, potest dici hoc aliquid primo modo, quasi subsistens, sed non secundo modo; sic enim compositum ex anima et corpore dicitur hoc aliquid." Ibid., I, 75, 2, ad 1.
- 30 "In quantum enim habet operationem materialia transcendentem, esse suum est supra corpus elevatum, non dependens ex ipso; in quantum vero immaterialem cognitionem ex materiali est nata acquirere, manifesta est quod complementum suae speciei esse non potest absque corporis unione. Non enim aliquid est completum in specie, nisi habeat ea quae requiruntur ad propriam operationem ipsius speciei." St. Thomas, C. D. de Anima, art 1, resp.
- 31 "Sed (scilicet, animam) esse separatam a corpore est praeter rationem suae naturae." St. Thomas, Sum. Theol., I, 89, 1, c.
- 32 "Ad primum ergo dicendum, quod licet anima habeat esse completum, non tamen sequitur quod corpus ei accidentaliter uniatur; tum quia illud idem esse quod est animae, communicat corpori, ut sit unum esse totius compositi; tum etiam quia etsi possit per se subsistere, non tamen habet speciem completam;



sed corpus advenit ei ad completionem speciei."  
St. Thomas, Q. D. de Anima, art 1, ad 1.

- 33 "Corrupto corpore non perit ab anima natura secundum quam competit ei ut sit forma; licet non perficiat materiam actu, ut sit forma." Ibid., ad 10.
- 34 "Unde quanto aliqua substantia immaterialis fuerit primo agenti propinquior, tanto in sua natura simplici perfectiore habet bonitatem suam, et minus indiget inhaerentibus formis ad sui completionem; et hoc quidem gradatim producit usque ad animam humanam, quae in eis tenet ultimum gradum, sicut materia prima in genere rerum sensibilium; unde in sui natura non habet perfectiones intelligibiles, sed est in potentia ad intelligibilia, sicut materia prima ad formas sensibiles; unde ad propriam operationem indiget ut fiat in actu formarum intelligibilium, acquirendo eas per sensitivas potentias a rebus exterioribus; et cum operatio sensus sit per organum corporale, ex ipsa conditione suae naturae competit ei quod corpori uniatur, et quod sit pars speciei humanae; non habens in se speciem completam." Ibid., art 7, resp.
- 35 "Et ideo ad hoc unitur corpori, ut sic operetur secundum naturam suam." St. Thomas, Sum. Theol., I, 89, 1, c.
- 36 Cf. supra, nn. 31, 33.
- 37 Cf. supra, n. 29.
- 38 "Per essentiam suam (anima) forma corporis est, non per aliquid superadditum." St. Thomas, Q. D. de Veritate, q. 16, a. 1, ad 13.  
"Quantvis anima secundum suam essentiam sit corporis forma." St. Thomas, Sum. Theol., I, 76, 1, ad 4.  
For an excellent treatment of St. Thomas' doctrine of the soul, cf. A. C. Pegis, "St. Thomas and the Unity of Man", Progress in Philosophy, pp. 153-173.



- 39 Cf. supra, nn. 11 and 13.
- 40 "Intellectus autem noster possibilis, secundum statum praesentis vitae, est natus informari similitudinibus rerum materialium a phantasmatibus abstractis."  
St. Thomas, Sum. Theol., I, 88, 1, ad 2.  
Cf. also Q. D. de Veritate, X, 8, arg. 5 and ad 11.
- 41 St. Thomas, Sum. Theol., I, 84, 5.  
Cf. also Q. D. de Veritate, VIII, 7, ad 13.
- 42 For the basic treatment of illumination in St. Thomas, cf. E. Gilson, "Pourquoi Saint Thomas a critiqué Saint Augustin", AHDL, 1(1926-27), esp. 111-127.
- 43 "Quod autem anima duplicem habet modum intelligendi, est propter duplicem dispositionem ipsius: sicut enim supra habitum est, ipsa est una in substantia habens quasdam vires affixas corpori, et quasdam non affixas: et propter hoc habent unum modum intelligendi per comparisonem ad corpus, alium autem per comparisonem ad substantias separatas, quibus ipsa est similis per hoc quod est substantia perpetua et incorruptibilis et inseparabilis."  
St. Albert, Sum de Creat., P. II, q. 56, a. 5, ad obj.; XXIV, 486.
- "Anima est immortalis et separabilis a corpore, et intelligere est opus ejus proprium, quod habet etiam non in communicatione ad corpus sicut et Angelus. Est autem aliud intelligere quod non convenit ei nisi communicando corpori, sicut nec texere, nec aedificare: et hoc est quod habet per reflexionem intellectus ad sensum et ad sensibile, a quo abstrahit: et hoc non est animae intellectualis secundum se, sed secundum insitam sibi potentiam sensibilitatis." St. Albert, Sum. Theol., P. II, c. 77, m. 5, ad 1; XXXIII, 105.
- 44 Cf. supra, n. 12.
- 45 Cf. supra, pp. 176-180.





46 "Ulterius etiam sequitur ex hoc, cum talis actus (scil., anima humana) nec secundum esse, nec secundum agere, nec secundum recipere sive pati dependeat ad aliquid corruptibile, quod ipse sit incorruptibilis et secundum esse et secundum agere et secundum pati: in his enim naturam sequitur intelligentiae et non alicujus actus naturalis vel corporalis. Et super hanc rationem omnes Philosophi sustentati fuerunt: et ideo omnes concorditer, ut dicit Alpharabius, radicem immortalitatis animae posuerunt in intellectu adepto: quia ille nec secundum esse, nec secundum operari, nec secundum pati sive recipere, dependentiam habet ad aliquid corporalium vel corruptibilium." St. Albert, Sum. Theol., P. II, c. 73, m. 2; XXXIII, 55.

47 "Et ideo, sicut dicit Alpharabius in libro de Intellectu et intelligibili, omnes Philosophi in intellectu adepto ponebant radicem immortalitatis animae." Ibid., c. 77, a. 5, sol.; 105.

48 "Ipsa (scil., intelligencia agens) enim est que ponit eas formas in materiis et deinde studet approximare eas separacioni paulatim quousque accquiratur intellectus. Et sic substantia anime hominis uel homo cum eo per quod substanciatur, fit propincius ad intelligenciam agentem et hic est finis ultimus, et uita alia, scilicet quia ad ultimum acquiritur homini quiddem per quod substanciatur et accquiritur perfeccio eius ultima, quod est ut agat in alteram aliam accionem per quam substancietur, et hec est intencio de uita alia. Quamvis eius accio non fiat in alio quod sit extra suam essenciam, ipsam enim agere nichil aliud est quam inuenire suam essenciam. Igitur sua essencia et sua accio et suum agere est unum et idem et tunc ad suam existentiam non indigebit ut corpus sit sibi materia, nec ad alicuam suarum accionum indigebit adiuuari uirtute animali que est in eius corpore, nec indigebit in ea instrumento corporali omnino." Alpharabi, De Intellectu et Intellecto; ed. E. Gilson, AHDL, 4(1929), pp. 123-124, ll. 304-318.  
The phrase quousque accquiratur intellectus refers to the intellectus adeptus.



- 49 Wisdom, XV, 3.
- 50 "Sola autem illa est quae cor elevat, et elevatum purificat, et in aeterna fundat immortalitate. Sapient. XV, 3: Nosse te, consummata justitia est: et scire justitiam tuam et virtutem tuam, radix est immortalitatis. Hinc est quod dicit Alpharabius in libro de Intellectu et intelligibili, quod omnes Philosophi in intellectu adepto divino radicem posuerunt immortalitatis animae." St. Albert, Sum. Theol., P. I, prol.; XXXI, 2.  
Cf. also supra, pp. 142-143.
- 51 "Substantia autem habens esse divinum et operationem, non indiget aliquo: ergo anima sic reducta de sensibilibus et materia corporum, non indiget, eo quod materialia et instrumentalia organa non accepit secundum naturam nisi ad hoc ut ad esse divinum reduceretur: stat igitur substantiata et formata in esse divino in esse perfecta: et hoc vocaverunt Philosophi caducum alterius et immortalis vitae, per quam vere probatur animae humanae immortalitas." St. Albert, De Intellectu et Intelligibili, II, 1, 12; IX, 520.
- 52 Cf. supra, pp. 176-177.
- 53 Cf. supra, pp. 189-191.
- 54 For example, cf. Alexander of Hales (?), Summa Theologica, I-II, Inq. II, tr. II, q. unica, n. 106 (Quaracchi, II, 135); St. Bonaventure, In II Sent., Lib. II, d. 3, p. 1, a. 1, q. 1 (Quaracchi, II, 91); Roger Bacon, Liber Primus Communium Naturalium, Pars IV, dist. 3, c. 4, in Opera hactenus inedita..., III, 291.
- 55 Cf. Dom. O. Lottin, "La composition hylémorphique des substances spirituelles. Les débuts de la controverse", RNSP, 34 (1932), 21-41.



- 56 "Consentio in hanc partem, quod anima sit composita ex principiis essentialibus quae sunt quod est et esse, sed non ex materia et forma: licet hoc quidam dicere videantur." St. Albert, In I Sent., d. 8, a. 25, sol.; XXV, 257.
- 57 "In quibusdam autem non est talis compositio (of matter and form), sed ex quo est et quod est...et haec compositio est in incorruptilibus et in ingenerabilibus....Et hoc praecipue verum est in spiritualibus substantiis, in quibus non est accipere compositionem nisi suppositi et naturae cujus est suppositum illud." St. Albert, S. de Creat., p. I, q. 2, a. 5; XXXIV, 334.  
Also cf. Sum. Theol., P. II, q. 15, m. 2, sol.; XXXII, 206.  
Also cf. n. 23.
- 58 "Compositio corporum prima est ex materia et forma, sed non spiritualium, sed potius ex quo est et quod est, sive ex quod est et esse." St. Albert, In I Sent., d. 8, a. 25, ad 5; XXV, 258.  
St. Albert's doctrine is borrowed in part from Boethius (c. 480-524/5) and Gilbert of la Porrée (1076-1154).  
For the meaning of quod est and esse in Boethius, and quod est and quo est in Gilbert of la Porrée, cf. E. Gilson, History of Christian Philosophy in the Middle Ages, pp. 104-5, 142-4.  
For fuller treatments of quod est and quo est in St. Albert, cf. M.-D. Roland-Gosselin, Le "De Ente et Essentia" de S. Thomas d'Acquin, pp. 172-184.  
Also E. Kleineidam, Das Problem der hylomorphen Zusammensetzung der geistigen Substanzen im 13. Jahrhundert behandelt bis Thomas von Acquin, pp. 51-57.  
Also A. C. Pegis, St. Thomas and the problem of the soul in the thirteenth century, pp. 109-116.  
Also E. Lottin, Psychologie et Morale aux XII<sup>e</sup> et XIII<sup>e</sup> Siècles, Tome I, pp. 444-7.  
Also E. Gilson, "L'âme raisonnable chez Albert le Grand" AHDL, 14(1943-45), 37-50.



- 59 "Unde dico non solum esse hoc aliquid, quod est ex materia et forma, sed quod est ex potentia et actu." St. Albert, In II Sent., d. 1, a. 4, sol.; XXVII, 14.
- 60 "Et ideo dicit Philosophus quod generabilium et incorruptibilium non est materia una, nec genus unum: cum tamen utrorumque sit materia et genus, sed non unius rationis. Quia potentia ad situm sive ubi, et potentia ad formam non est unius rationis: sicut nec motus ad ubi, et motus ad formam." Ibid.
- 61 "Spiritualium autem quae sunt hoc aliquid, nulla est materia meo iudicio: sed in ipsis est quod est, et quo est: quorum neutrum numquam separatur ab altero, ut quod est dicat hoc aliquid quod vere est in natura, quo est dicat principium intelligendi et subsistendi ipsum in tali esse: et hujus nulla est potentia ad motum vel mutationem, nisi aequivoce cum aliis quae moventur et mutantur: quia scitum est apud sapientes, quod illo modo per scientiam et ignorantiam non sunt proprie motus et mutationes." Ibid.; 14-15.
- 62 "Ubi non est potentia ad motum, non dico esse materiam nisi materia valde large et improprie sumatur: quoniam mihi videtur, quod Philosophi non loquantur de materia nisi ipsa sit sub aliqua privatione. Bene tamen dico, quod si fundamentum vocetur, quod tunc est ex materia et forma." Ibid., d. 3, a. 4, sol.; 68.  
"Ergo materia est incorruptibilis per se: ergo quod corrumpitur in materia, est privatio, et ipsa manet incorrupta: et cum materia acquirit formam aliam, acquirit tunc privationem ad formam aliam: et haec est causa corruptionis in ipsa: et sic semper materia propter mixtionem sui cum privatione, transmutabilis est secundum formas." St. Albert, Physics, I, 3, 18; III, 90.





- 63 "Decima via est probationis qua dicunt, quod omnis forma quae per esse distinguitur et multiplicatur in materia, potentia est in materia, et per mutationem vel motum educitur de ipsa." St. Albert, De Unitate Intellectus, cap. 4, obj. 10; IX, 444.
- 64 Cf. St. Albert, Sum. Theol., P. II, q. 72, m. 2.
- 65 "Et alibi nos jam probavimus, quia si daretur esse ex materia, non acciperet nisi illa cum quibus in materia habet communicationem, sicut facit oculus." St. Albert, De Unitate Intellectus, cap. 4, obj. 2; IX, 442. This argument is from Aristotle, De Anima, III, 4; 429a24-26.
- 66 "Nec stare potest, quod dicatur duplex esse materia: una spiritualis, et altera corporalis, et quod ad materiam spiritualem individuetur intellectus: quia illa materia spiritualis non efficitur propria intellectus nisi per aliqua appropriantia eam: et tunc redit idem quod prius, quod scilicet suae complexioni non proportionatum non cognoscet intellectus. Nec potest dici, quod omnia proportionata sint tali compositioni: quia nullum est proprium nisi per ea quae non conveniunt alii. Multa igitur alia erunt suae propriae compositioni non proportionata, et hoc non cognosceret intellectus." St. Albert, De Int. et Int., I, 7; IX, 488.
- 67 "Quia procul dubio si quis dicat intellectum esse ex materia, non poterit evadere inconvenientia illa omnia quae concludit inducta objectio, et multa alia quae de facili possunt concludi." St. Albert, De Unitate Intellectus, cap. 7, ad 2; IX, 465.
- 68 "Nulla forma quantumcumque sit nobilis, tollit a materia modum receptionis materiae in toto. Modus autem receptionis est recipere secundum esse." Ibid., cap. 4, obj. 2; IX, 442.



- 69 "Quia nihil est dare intellectui materiam, et negare ab eo omnes materiae proprietates." Ibid., cap. 7, ad 2; IX, 465.
- 70 Cf. St. Albert, Sum Theol., P. II, q. 70, m. 1, ad obj.
- 71 "Omne quod distinguitur ab alio, aut distinguitur per materiam, aut per formam...Scimus autem, quod intellectus unius animae ab intellectu alterius animae non distinguitur per aliquam formam, quae sit differentia essentialis; aut igitur distinguitur per materiam, aut est idem ipsi." St. Albert, De Unitate Intellectus, cap. 4, obj. 2; IX, 442.
- 72 "Et haec potissima rationum est, quare Abubacher et Averroes et multi alii intellectum universalem esse posuerunt, nec appropriabilem nobis nisi per imaginationem et sensum." St. Albert, De Int. et Int., I, 7; IX, 488.  
Cf. Averroes, De Anima, III, 5, 432-434: "Si enim posuerimus quod iste intellectus materialis est numeratus per numerationem individuorum hominum, continget ut sit aliquid hoc, aut corpus aut virtus in corpore."  
For a complete argument by Averroes, cf. his Destructio Destructionum Philosophiae Algazelis, Venetiis apud Juntas, 1573; Vol. IX, f. 20r-21r, from "Ponere autem" to "...cum corporibus". For an English translation, cf. Averroes' Tahafut Al-Tahafut; vol. 1, pp. 15-16. This work of Averroes, however, was not translated into Latin until 1328. Cf. B. Zedler, "Averroes and Immortality", New Scholasticism, XXVIII (1954), 452.
- 73 "E contra autem si quis neget omnino ab intellectu potentiam materiae, et ponit intellectum agentem, cum non sit in quo fundetur intellectus agens, ponit intellectum agentem nihil esse secundum esse ratum in natura." St. Albert, De Unit. Int., cap. 7, ad 2; IX, 465.
- 74 Ibid., cap. 4; IX, 442-452.



- 75 Cf. supra, n. 59.
- 76 "Nihil est quod omnino sit expoliatum ab omni eo quod est in potentia et possibilitate respectu suiipsius nisi necesse esse." Avicenna, Metaphysica, I, 8; f. 74ra.
- 77 "Intelligentiis enim separatis non potest esse aliqua multitudo nisi quemadmodum dicam, quoniam causatum per se est possibile esse in seipso. Propter primum autem est necessarium esse; sed necessitas sui esse est secundum quod est intelligentia et intelligit seipsum et intelligit primum necessario, unde oportet ut sit in eo multitudo ex hoc quod intelligit se, quod est possibile esse quantum in se et ex hoc quod intelligit necessitatem sui esse a primo quod est intellectum per se." Ibid., IX, 4; f. 104rb.
- 78 "Angelus enim eo quod est hoc aliquid, in se habet diversa: habet enim quod est ex hoc, quod est habet (omit habet?) ex nihilo ens: esse autem habet a primo principio influente sibi esse." St. Albert, Sum. Theol., P. II, q. 6, m. 1; XXXII, 120.
- 79 "Ipsum posse (scil., in angelis) numquam fuit sine esse." St. Albert, In II Sent., d. 3, a. 4; XXVII, 69.
- 80 "Et cum ipsa (scil., anima) sit in potentia secundum seipsam, sicut et aliae substantiae intellectuales... omnis enim intellectualis natura in seipsa considerata non est nisi in potentia, et similiter omne causatum in se non est nisi in potentia: sed quod est a causa prima, est in actu, et accipit sui esse necessitatem." St. Albert, De Unit. Int., cap. 6; IX, 463.  
Similar Avicennian language is used by Robert Grosseteste in his Tractatus de Anima. Cf. the text in Beitrag, IX (1912), 247.
- 81 Cf. St. Albert, De Causis et Processu Universitatis, II, 1, 1; X, 433, 435.



- 82 "Omnium enim Peripateticorum est ista sententia, quod substantia intellectualis quam Arabes Philosophi vocat intelligentiam, est substantia stans et in esse fixa per causam primam, et ab ipsa habet in suo esse necessitatem." St. Albert, De Unit. Int., cap. 6; IX, 463.
- "Cum autem per hoc quod (scil., anima) pendet ad causam primam...Et sic per omne deveniens ad causam primam unde dependet secundum esse suae necessitatis." Ibid.; IX, 463-4.  
Cf. the Liber de Causis, prop. 18-19, ed. O. Bardenhewer, Freiburg i. B., 1882; pp. 180-181.
- 83 "Materiam et quod est producit Deus ut fundamentum in quo fundatur esse, quia sic facit ad finem universi: et producit formam et quo est, ut dantem esse et terminantem potentiam materiae sive ejus quod est." St. Albert, Sum. Theol., P. II, q. 3, m. 3, a. 2; XXXII, 33-4.
- 84 "Sicut enim dicit Avicenna, secundum id quod est, (scil., omne creatum) ex nihilo et nihil est: ex se enim nihil habet esse, sed totum esse suum recipit a causa quae facit debere esse in omnibus." Ibid.; XXXII, 35.
- 85 "Cum autem per hoc quod pendet (anima) ad causam primam, nullo modo fit in potentia, sed actus purus, secundum hoc est in ea intellectus agens universaliter: et cum ipsa sit in potentia secundum seipsam, sicut et aliae substantiae intellectuales, secundum hoc est in ea intellectus possibilis." St. Albert, De Unit. Int., cap. 6; IX, 463.
- 86 "Intellectus agens est pars animae fluens ab eo quo est, sive actu: possibilis autem pars animae est fluens ab eo quod est, sive potentia." St. Albert, Sum. de Creat., P. II, q. 55, a. 4, part. 1, sol.; XXXV, 470.
- 87 "E Contra autem si quis neget omnino ab intellectu potentiam materiae, et ponit intellectum agentem, cum non sit in quo fundetur intellectus agens,





ponit intellectum agentem nihil esse secundum esse ratum in natura. Et ideo Aristoteles in tertio de Anima probat duo de intellectu possibili... Per secundum autem habetur, quod sit subjectum quoddam in genere substantiae. Et hoc modo accipiendum intellectum fundat et intellectum agentem." St. Albert, De Unit. Int., cap. 7, ad 2; IX, 465-6.

- 88 "Tertia autem questio (et est quomodo intellectus materialis est alicuod ens, et non est alicua formarum materialium neque etiam prima materia) sic dissolvitur. Opinandum est enim quod iste est quartum genus esse. Quemadmodum enim sensibile esse dividitur in formam et materiam, sic intelligibile esse oportet dividi in consimilia hiis duobus, scilicet in alicuod simile forme et in aliquo simile materie. Et hoc necesse est in omni intelligentia abstracta que intelligit aliud; et si non, non esset multitudo in formis abstractis. Et iam declaratum est in Prima Philosophia quod nulla est forma liberata a potentia simpliciter, nisi prima forma." Averroes, De Anima, III, 5, 654-665.
- 89 "Intelligentia est binarius eius quod est et quo est, sive potentie receptive et potentie active ... Non secundum idem est (angelica intelligentia) agens et recipiens; recipiens est id quod est, agens secundum id quo est." Philip the Chancellor, Summa de Bono, selections in Dom. O. Lottin, Psychologie et Morale aux XII<sup>e</sup> et XIII<sup>e</sup> Siècles, Tome, I, p. 435.
- 90 Cf. supra, n. 54.
- 91 "Ad quod potest dici quod intellectus agens et intellectus possibilis sunt duae differentiae in anima rationali, quarum, una, scilicet intellectus agens, est ex parte formae ipsius animae, secundum quod est spiritus, altera vero, scilicet, possibilis, est ex parte suae materiae, qua est potentiae ens respectu cognoscibilium quae fiunt in ea." Alex. Of Hales, Sum. Theol., Inq. IV, Tr. I, Sect. II, Q. III, Tit. I, m. 2, c. 2, a. 2, sol.; ed. Quaracchi, II, 452.



For the authenticity of this work (parts of which date from 1245), cf. ed. Guaracchi, IV, pp. lix-lxxx, cccxxxix-ccclxx.

- 92 "Dicimus igitur in nostra anima partem esse intellectualem, et ipsam quae dicitur anima rationalis, dicimus esse substantiam, ex qua emanant potentiae, quarum quaedam sunt separatae, ita quod non sunt corporeae virtutes, neque virtutes in corpore: quaedam autem emanant ex ipsa, quae sunt virtutes operantes in corpore. Et illae quae non sunt virtutes in corpore, sunt in ea ex similitudine sua ad causam primam per quam est, et per quam stat esse ipsius. St. Albert, De Unitate Intellectus, cap. 6; IX, 462-3.  
The word "stat" comes from the Liber de Causis, proposition 15; ed O. Bardenhewer, p. 177.
- "Et ideo illud (Primum Principium) aliquando generat ad imaginem et similitudinem suam creando ex nihilo: et tunc creatum est anima rationalis: cuius causa est, quod nihil factum ex materia corporali, potest esse ad imaginem et similitudinem creantis." St. Albert, Sum. Theol., P. II, q. 72, m. 3, ad 5; XXXVIII, 39.
- 93 "Ex hujus (scil., intellectualis animae) enim assimilatione causae primae habet intellectum universaliter agentem." De Int. et Int., I, 1, 6; IX, 486.
- "Cum autem per quod pendet (scil., anima) ad causam primam, nullo modo fit in potentia, sed actus purus, secundum hoc est in ea intellectus agens universaliter." De Unit. Int., cap. 6; IX, 463.
- "Sunt tamen in anima, sicut dictum est, intellectus agens qui est lux, ut dicit Aristoteles in III de Anima, eo quod ille est imago et similitudo quaedam luminis primae causae sive Dei..." St. Albert, Sum. Theol., P. II, q. 93, m. 2, sol.; XXXVIII, 212.
- "Si vero dicatur divina particula esse ea quae ex luce divina in imaginem intellectualitatis divinae constituitur...Hoc quidem modo dicendo divinam particulam, intellectus agentis divina particula est et non quidem per substantiam et naturam divinam, sed secundum participationem proprietatis et virtutis." St. Albert, Comm. on Aristotle's Ethics, I, 7, 5; VII, 114.



- 94 "Et ideo manifeste errant qui dicunt quod ista duo (scil., intellectus agens et intellectus possibilis) secundum idem sint in anima: sed differunt in hoc quod eadem forma secundum quod est separata, sit agens: et secundum quod est incorporata, sit patiens: quoniam nos ostendimus supra quod anima non habet intellectum possibilem nisi in quantum est separata." St. Albert, De Anima, III, 2, 18; V, 365.
- 95 "Habet etiam (angeli) possibilem intellectum, non secundum rationem potentiae de qua potentia educitur in actum per universale acceptum de phantasmate, sicut contingit in homine, cujus intellectus possibilis conjunctus est continuo et tempori, sed habet eum secundum quod est subjectum intelligibilem." St. Albert, Sum. Theol., P. II, q. 14, m. 3, a.1, sol.; XXXII, 173.  
The same doctrine is found in Alexander of Hales, Summa Theologica, Inq. IV, tr. 1, sect. II, q. 3, tit. 1, m. 2, c. 2, a. 2, ad 2; ed. Quaracchi, II, 452.  
Also in St. Bonaventure, In II Sent., d. 3, p. 2, a. 2, q. 1, resp.; ed. Quaracchi, II, 119.
- 96 "Ex hoc tamen quod haec natura appropriatur corpori organico physico, natura sua intellectualis parum mergitur, et ideo habet intellectum possibilem accipientem ab imaginatione et sensu." St. Albert, De Int. et Int., I, 1, 6; IX, 486.
- 97 "Hoc necessario concludit quoad intellectum possibilem. In Deo autem nullum talem ponimus, sed universaliter agentem: et ideo seipso intelligit: ipse enim intelligit ut agens, et in se intelligit ut est species exemplaris omnium rerum." St. Albert, I Sent., d. 36, a. 3, ad 8; XXVI, 211.
- 98 "Perficitur autem scientia ex hoc quod scientia est in sciente secundum speciem. Cum igitur species in lumine agentis primi adsit primo scienti et primo intellectivo, constat quod primum est sciens, per hoc quod species scibilem sunt in lumine intellectus ipsius. Si autem aliquis dicat quod species



contentae vel comprehensae in scientifico, non perficiunt scientiam nisi comprehendantur in ipso sicut in subjecto: hoc penitus absurdum est: quia per hoc quod in intellectu possibili comprehenduntur species, non perficitur scientia, et virtute possibilis intellectus secundum quod possibilis est, sive secundum id quod est, sed potius secundum quod actus intellectus agentis est in ipso... Ergo species in intellectu agente, habet scientiam. In illo enim est sicut in principio constitutivo, et sicut in actu efficientis et constituentis. Cum ergo omnis species sicut in primo constitutivo et effectivo sit in lumine intellectus universaliter agentis, constat quod primus intellectus universaliter agens scit, et habet scientiam omnium." St. Albert, Liber de Causis, I, 2, 3; X, 391.

- 99 Cf. supra, pp. 98-99.
- 100 Cf. supra, Chap. III.
- 101 "Cum autem per hoc quod pendet ad causam primam, nullo modo fit in potentia, sed actus purus, secundum hoc est in ea intellectus agens universaliter: et cum ipsa sit in potentia secundum seipsam, sicut et aliae substantiae intellectuales, secundum hoc est in ea intellectus possibilis: omnis enim intellectualis natura in seipsa considerata non est nisi in potentia, et similiter omne causatum in se non est nisi in potentia: sed quod est a causa prima, est in actu, et accipit sui esse necessitatem." St. Albert, De Unit. Int., cap. 6; IX, 463.
- 102 "Cum enim anima sit resultatio cuaedam lucis intelligentiae separatae, erunt in ipsa duo necessaria, quorum unum est forma lucis, et alterum est id in quo lux recipitur et stat ut fiat ens aliquod mundi: et ab hoc esse animae fluunt duae virtutes, quarum una est intellectus agens, qui causatur a luce recepta: et alius est intellectus possibilis, qui causatur ab eo in quo lux recipitur." St. Albert, De Anima, III, 2, 18; V, 365.





- 103 "Agens principiatur in anima ab eo quo est: possibilis autem ab eo quod substat illi in anima rationali: unde sicut intellectus (actio?) quo est qui est esse animae rationalis, non est nisi in substanti, ita actio intellectus agentis non est nisi in possibili." St. Albert, Sum. de Creat., P. II, q. 55, a. 6, sol.; XXXV, 475-476.
- 104 "Omnis intellectualis natura necessitatem habens a prima causa, et possibilitatem a seipsa, potest converti supra seipsam: et in conversione illa lux quae est a causa prima, penetrat possibilitatem quam habet in seipsa." St. Albert, De Unit. Int., cap. 6; IX, 463-464.
- 105 "Anima enim rationalis in quantum tertium creatum est a prima causa, et Angelus in quantum secundum est, ex sui natura, hoc est, secundum id quod sunt, perceptiva sunt illuminationum quae sunt a primo." St. Albert, Sum. Theol., P. I, q. 15, m. 1, a. 2, part. 1, subpart. 2, ad 4; XXXI, 95.
- 106 "Prima imago lucis primae causae quae conjuncta est continuo et tempori, est intellectus humanus: et ideo necesse est quod sit similitudo quaedam omnium quae fiunt per lumen primae causae, et ambiens omnia illa, et fit quorundam receptaculum per hoc quod est imago causae primae, et quorundam secundum quod est cum continuo et tempore." St. Albert, De Int. et Int., II, 1, 8; IX, 515.
- 107 "Id quod fluit ab ea (scil., ab anima) secundum quod ipsa est naturae intellectualis primae, conversa ad primam causam per lucis suae participationem, est in ea sicut lux, et est intellectus agens." St. Albert, De Unit. Int., cap. 6; IX, 463.
- 108 Cf. supra, pp. 150-184.
- 109 Cf. supra, pp. 172-176.



- 110 Cf. supra, n. 107.
- 111 Cf. supra, pp. 159-168.
- 112 "Quoniam theoria sua (scil., animae) secundum lucem agentis est philosophia prima." St. Albert, De Unit. Int., cap. 6; IX, 463.  
"Intellectum divinatorum accipit intellectus non ex phantasmate, sed in quantum elevatur in lumine agentis ad speciem luminis divini." St. Albert, Sum. Theol., P. II, q. 14, m. 3, a. 2, part. 4, ad 1; XXXII, 196.
- 113 "Oportet enim scire, quod lumen causae primae generaliter loquendo, sui quatuor habet manifestationes... Tertius autem est, quo manifestatur in lumine agentis universaliter in ordine minoris mundi. Illi enim conjungitur, non sicut lumen tenebris vel privationi vel potentiae, sed potius sicut lumen lumini inferioris ordinis: et secundum quod plus conjungitur et limpidius ea ponens in intellectum possibile: et haec est irradiatio de qua multum locuti sunt Philosophi." St. Albert, De Int. et Int., II, 1, 9; IX, 516.  
"Anima igitur humana concipiendo lumen cui applicatur intellectus agens..." Ibid.; 517.  
"Et iste intellectus adeptus (est stramentum) ad intellectum assimilativum, cui per gradus applicationis luminis inferioris ad lumen superius ascendit usque ad lumen intellectus divini." Ibid.  
The same doctrine is found in the Sum. Theol., P. II, q. 14, m. 3, a. 1, obj. 5 and ad 5; XXXII, 171 and 174.
- 114 "Mirabilis autem et optimus est iste status intellectus adepti: sic per eum enim homo fit similis quodammodo Deo, eo quod potest operari sic divina et largiri sibi et aliis intellectus divinos." St. Albert, De Anima, III, 3, 11; V, 387.  
That in illumination knowledge comes to the possible intellect through the agent intellect is also taught by Alexander of Hales, Summa Theologica,



Lib. II, Pars I, inc. 4, tr. 1, sect. 2, q. 3, tit. 1, mem. 3, art. 2, ad 1; ed. Quaracchi, II, 452. Also by Peter of Spain, Scientia Libri de Anima, tr. X, cap. 5; ed. Alonso, p. 437. Roger Bacon also refers to "exempla sibi innata" when speaking of the agent intellect, in Quaestiones Supra Undecim Prime Philosophie Aristotelis, in Opera hactenus inedita..., VII, 110.

- 115 "Licet autem hoc sufficienter probatum sit animam non destrui morte corporis, sed post mortem nobilius esse accipere: quoniam tunc tota converti habet ad intellectum agentem sicut ad formam, et per eum intelligere separata a materia, quod est summum felicitatis ejus." St. Albert, De Anima, III, 3, 13; V, 392.  
"Et ideo etiam quando talis est in toto separatus intellectus, cui est conversio intellectus possibilis ad agentem, qui totum intelligere suum habet intra seipsum, tunc non reminiscimur." Ibid., III, 2, 19; V, 366-367.  
"Possumus igitur dicere, quod sic separatus intellectus qui habet jam intelligibilia et non convertitur nisi ad agentem et ad seipsum, est tantum quod est vere." Ibid.; 367.
- 116 "Mirabilis autem (est anima) secundum quod ipsa est in aliqua sui parte de numero substantiarum separatarum." St. Albert, Sum. de Creat., P, II, c. 1, a. 1, ad 4; XXXV, 6.
- 117 St. Albert, Sum. Theol., P. II, q. 14, m. 3, a. 1, sol.; XXXII, 173.
- 118 "Dicitur etiam (scil., intellectus) adeptus per species habituum concreatorum, qui scilicet perfectus est, et stans in perfectione sua per habitus omnium scibilium concretos: et sic Angeli habent adeptum intellectum: ergo studio non indigent, nec doctrina." St. Albert, Sum Theol., P. II, q. 14, m. 3, a. 1, ad quest. 2; XXXII, 175.
- 119 "Et hoc non impedit, quin rationabilia possunt esse intellectuality per participationem et intellectum adeptum sive possessum." St. Albert, ibid., P. I, q. 15, m. 1, a. 2, part. 1, subpart. 2; XXXI, 95.



- 120 "Omnis nostra scientia oritur ex sensibus." St. Albert, De Anima, III, 2, 19; V, 367.  
"Ante adeptum intellectum, est acceptio scientiae ex phantasmatibus." Ibid.; III, 3, 13; 389.
- 121 Cf. supra, pp. 133-149.
- 122 "Non alteratur anima rationalis per mixtionem corporis, nisi in quantum accipit a phantasmate: et hoc est per accidens." St. Albert, S. de Creat., P. II, q. 61, a. 2, ad 4; XXXV, 531.
- 123 "Oportebat igitur ponere aliquam virtutem ex parte intellectus, quae faceret intelligibilia in actu, per abstractionem specierum a conditionibus materialibus." St. Thomas, Sum. Theol., I, 79, 3, resp.
- 124 "Intellectus autem noster possibilis, secundum statum praesentis vitae, est natus informari similitudinibus rerum materialium a phantasmatibus abstractis." Ibid., I, 88, 1, ad 2.  
Cf. also ibid., I, 84, 4-6.  
Cf. also supra, Chap. I, n. 7.
- 125 "Et si quis recte consideret, intellectus agens, secundum ea quae Philosophus de ipso tradit, non est activum respectu intellectus possibilis directe; sed magis respectu phantasmatum, quae facit intelligibilia actu, per quae intellectus possibilis reducitur in actum." St. Thomas, Q. D. de Anima, a. 18, ad 11.





NOTES TO THE CONCLUSION

- 1 "Mens ergo ipsa sicut corporearum rerum notitias per sensus corporis colligit; sic incorporearum per semetipsam." St. Augustine, De Trinitate, IX, 3, 3; PL, 42, 963.
- 2 Cf. supra, Chap. I.
- 3 Cf. supra, Chap. II.
- 4 Cf. supra, pp. 76-85.
- 5 Cf. supra, pp. 153-154.
- 6 Cf. supra, pp. 43-44.
- 7 Cf. supra, pp. 85-114.
- 8 Cf. supra, pp. 106-109.
- 9 Cf. supra, p. 153.
- 10 E. Gilson, "L'âme raisonnable chez Albert le Grand", AHDL, 14 (1943-1945), pp. 24, 64.
- 11 Cf. supra, chap. V.
- 12 Cf. supra, pp. 4-5.
- 13 Cf. supra, pp. 6-7.
- 14 Cf. supra, pp. 115-149, 218-220.
- 15 Cf. supra, chap. VI.



- 16 Cf. supra, pp. 188-189.
- 17 Cf. supra, pp. 191-194.
- 18 Cf. supra, pp. 153-154.
- 19 Cf. supra, ibid.
- 20 Cf. supra, pp. 70-72, 106-107.



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The following are the principal abbreviations used in the notes:

AHDL	Archives d'Histoire Doctrinale et Littéraire du Moyen Age.
Beitrag	Beitrag zur Geschichte der Philosophie des Mittelalters (Münster).
De Int. et Int.	De Intellectu et Intelligibili.
De Nat. et Orig. An.	De Natura et Origine Animae.
De Unit. Int.	De Unitate Intellectus contra Averroem.
PG	Migne, Patrologiae cursus completus, Series Graeca, 162 vols. (Paris, 1857-1866).
PL	Migne, Patrologiae cursus completus, Series Latina, 221 vols. (Paris, 1844-1864).
Q. D.	Quaestio Disputata.
RTAM	Recherches de théologie ancienne et médiévale.
RNSP	Revue Néo-Scholastique de Philosophie.
Sent.	Commentarium in Libros Sententiarum Petri Lombardi.
Sum. de Creat.	Summa de Creaturis.
Sum. Theol.	Summa Theologiae.

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