


UNIVERSITY OF TORONTO



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THE ACADEMICS OF CICERO





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ACADEMICS OF CICERO

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PREFATORY NOTE.

THIS translation of Cicero's Academies is intended to form an adjunct to the revised issue of my edition of the Latin text with explanatory notes (Macmillan, 1885). As the appearance of the new edition was delayed far beyond the time originally fixed, copies of this translation were issued in advance (1880) partly to meet the needs of Cambridge Classical Students at that time. It also occurred to me that a trustworthy rendering of this important book might at the same time prove to have some interest and value for another class of students—those whose special study is philosophy rather than Classics, and who, while wishing to learn something of the early history of their subject, have neither the leisure nor the particular acquirements necessary to enable them to read with profit the ancient philosophical writings in the original languages. I am aware that for such students the history of ancient thought has hitherto practically closed with the name of Aristotle. But it is, I think, beginning to be felt, in Germany at least, that the vast historical importance of the post-Aristotelian systems entitles them to more attention than they have hitherto received. In any case, whatever may be thought of the later Greek speculation as a whole, the controversy presented to us in Cicero's 'Academies' is one which ought to possess an enduring interest for the

modern student of philosophy. Though the struggle between philosophic scepticism and philosophic dogmatism covered a much smaller field in ancient than it has occupied in modern times, it yet opened up to the ancients problems which are being discussed today as vigorously as they were discussed then. There is no ancient work (if we exclude the writings of Sextus Empiricus) which presents to a greater extent than the 'Academics', points of resemblance to the modern literature of philosophy.

The Introduction and Notes are intended to smooth the chief difficulties likely to stand in the way of a modern reader. Where fuller information is wanted it must be sought in the more detailed elucidations attached to my completed edition of the original text. Much of the help that is needed may be gained from any good history of philosophy—that of Zeller, or Schwegler, or Ueberweg—all of which are easily accessible to students.

In the translation accuracy has been studied rather than finish of style, though harshness has been avoided so far as was possible without resort to paraphrase. I hope it will be found that this rendering is more trustworthy than any others which have yet appeared. The question how to represent in English the ancient philosophical terms is always full of difficulty. I have explained in my notes the reasons for my modes of rendering the leading phrases.

The text from which the translation is made is that of my own edition, which differs considerably from the German texts most in use.

INTRODUCTION.

§ 1. It is of the utmost importance clearly to understand that Cicero, in his philosophical works, never professed to perform any other function but that of an *interpreter* to Roman readers of the Greek systems with which he deals. He did not even leave himself free to expound the systems in his own manner, but usually took certain Greek writings and translated pretty closely from them. So the 'Academics' consists in substance of certain passages rendered from leading Greek books which had been called forth by the Sceptical controversy. All that Cicero supplies is the framework in which the whole is set, with sundry illustrations drawn from Roman history, which are scattered here and there throughout the discussion.

§ 2. A somewhat low estimate has hitherto prevailed of Cicero's trustworthiness as an expositor of Greek doctrine. I do not hesitate to say that he has had great injustice done to him in this matter. When modern scholars have found in Cicero a philosophical statement hard to understand or patently absurd, they have usually assumed, without more ado, that he has failed to catch the meaning of the author from whom he copied. It is far safer to suppose in such cases that the difficulty existed in the original source from which he drew his information. In the majority of instances this can be distinctly proved by a comparison of Cicero's statements with those of the other ancient authorities from whom our knowledge of the Greek thinkers is derived. Cicero's very want of originality has led him to preserve all

the defects of the writers whom he translated; and the post-Aristotelian philosophers abounded in illogicalities and inconsistencies which to a modern reader seem very superficial indeed.

§ 3. The form in which the discussions are cast by Cicero is generally that of the dialogue. But the style of dialogue best known to us—that of Plato—had found no imitators among the later Greeks. The vivid dramatic interchange of question and answer was abandoned in favour of those ‘long speeches’ which Plato often condemned as unsuited for the discovery of truth. Accordingly we find the ‘Academics’ to consist of several long disquisitions delivered by the different interlocutors. Each is allowed to carry the exposition of his own views to completion without interruptions from the listeners, excepting those caused by expressions of polite admiration and encouragement.

§ 4. It has been well said that no ancient work illustrates so strikingly as the ‘Academics’ the saying ‘habent sua fata libelli’. Cicero first wrote the work in two books, entitled ‘Catulus’ and ‘Lucullus’ respectively. He then recast it and divided it into four books, addressed to Varro. By some accident these two editions, generally called the ‘Prior Academics’ and the ‘Posterior Academics’, remained in circulation together. Time has, however, preserved neither edition to us entire. Of the ‘Prior Academics’, only the latter half, i.e. the book entitled ‘Lucullus’, has come down to us; while of the ‘Posterior Academics’ we possess only a portion (though the larger portion) of the first book, along with some fragments of the remaining three, preserved by Augustine, Nonius, and others. Rather more than a quarter of the matter contained in the whole work has therefore perished.

§ 5. In the first edition the interlocutors were all leading members of the ‘Optimate’ or Senatorial party, who were already dead when Cicero wrote. The feigned date of the discussion was about 62 B.C. In the second edition the feigned date was almost the actual date of composition, that is 45 B.C. Both Varro and Atticus, who in the ‘Posterior Academics’ carry on the debate with Cicero, outlived him.

§ 6. Cicero’s object in writing the ‘Academics’ was to justify the sceptical criticism of the New Academy. The inquiry is into the

grounds of belief, and the possibility of arriving at any knowledge which may be affirmed with dogmatic certitude. For a right understanding of the 'Academics' it is necessary to state in a summary manner how these questions were handled by the Greek thinkers.

§ 7. By all or nearly all the philosophers who preceded Aristotle a sharp line was drawn between sense-knowledge and knowledge due to the operations of the reason. The former was considered dark and untrustworthy, but it was always more or less assumed that the reason was capable of purging away the imperfections of the senses and of arriving at something which might be held as certain and indubitable truth. Negative criticism was indeed to a considerable extent applied to intellectual knowledge by the Eleatic Megarian and Cynic schools, as well as by the Sophists, but the first philosopher who roundly proclaimed the doctrine that neither by the aid of the senses nor of the reason can any sure ground be won, was Pyrrho of Elis (about 360—270 B.C.). His aim in propounding this view was mainly ethical. He wished to promote virtue by shewing that no positive knowledge is attainable concerning those external objects which lead men away from the pursuit of righteousness. Pyrrho left no writings behind him and found but few professed followers in the centuries immediately succeeding his death.

§ 8. Scepticism entered on a new career in the hands of Arcesilas, president of the Academic School (lived about 315—240 B.C.). His scepticism was as undiluted as that of Pyrrho, and was summed up in the assertion that inquiry would always bring to light arguments of equal strength in favour of and against any statement that it was possible to make. In taking up this position Arcesilas professed to be merely repeating the doctrine of his predecessors in the Academic School. In theory, all men were bound to 'suspension of assent', so as to refrain from pronouncing on the truth or falsehood of phenomena. In action, phenomena were to be taken and acted on as they came, but in the full consciousness that certainty was beyond human reach.

§ 9. The Academy started afresh under Carneades (about 213—129 B.C.). He modified considerably the teaching of Arcesilas, by abandoning the assumption that equal weights of argument could be

urged on both sides of every question. His view was that if the arguments were weighed the scale would always incline in the direction of a conclusion which might be accepted as probable, and he further distinguished various degrees of probability.

§ 10. The last brilliant exponent of the principles of Carneades was Philo of Larissa, the teacher of Cicero (died about 87 B.C.). But towards the end of his life he displayed a reaction towards dogmatism, about which the information preserved is not precise enough to enable us to apprehend clearly its nature. His successor in the headship of the Academic School, Antiochus of Ascalon, whose lectures also Cicero had attended, went over wholly to the dogmatic camp. He introduced much confusion into philosophy by adopting the main tenets of Stoicism, and declaring them to be in reality true Academic teaching. The defence of dogmatism given in the 'Academics' is almost entirely drawn from writings of Antiochus, while the sceptical attack is principally taken from Clitomachus, the immediate pupil and successor of Carneades.

§ 11. The great difference between ancient and modern philosophic scepticism lies in the fact that the ancients never went the length of denying the permanence and reality of the external world. All the disputants were convinced that 'things in themselves' do exist; the only question at issue was whether the human faculties are capable of conveying accurate knowledge of the external objects. Since the notion 'nihil est in intellectu quod non prius fuerit in sensu' fully prevailed, the controversy was entirely concerned with a consideration of sense impressions. The Epicureans asserted that all sensations were in themselves true and trustworthy, though it is possible for the mind to make wrong inferences from sensation. Though this contention was much ridiculed by all the other Schools, it had been advanced by Aristotle almost in the same words. The Stoics divided sensations into two classes, the infallible and the fallible; those which truly represent a real object, and those which either proceed from no real object whatever or if they do, fail to represent it truly. Infallible sensations were known merely and solely by the conviction of their infallibility which they produced in the mind of the person who was conscious of them. The

Sceptics tried to shew that this conviction was worthless; it was always possible for a sensation to appear trustworthy without being so.

§ 12. The principles of Pyrrho received an elaborate development in the hands of Aenesidemus and the later Sceptics whose arguments are embodied in the works of Sextus Empiricus. But this portion of the history of Greek philosophy lies beyond the range of our subject.

THE ACADEMICS OF CICERO.

POSTERIOR ACADEMICS.

BOOK I.

I. WHILE my friend Atticus was staying with me lately at my house ¹ near Cumae, news was brought to us from M. Varro that he had arrived from Rome on the evening of the day before, and would have come to visit us forthwith, had he not been tired after his journey. On hearing this we considered that no obstacle should prevent us from seeing one so intimately connected with us both by the identity of our literary tastes and by the long duration of our friendship. So with all speed we hastened to visit him, and, being at a short distance from his house, we saw our friend himself coming to meet us; then we embraced him, as is the custom of friends, and after a considerable delay escorted him back to his own mansion. Here we had first a little talk, merely such as sprang ² out of my question whether he had brought any news from Rome; then Atticus said: "A truce, pray, to the subject, for we cannot help feeling pain when we put questions about it and hear the answers: rather ask him for news of himself. Indeed Varro's Muses have now been voiceless longer than was their wont; yet my belief is, not that your friend is idle, but rather that he is reticent about the work of his pen." "Far from it," said he, "I think that only a heedless man writes what he wishes to remain concealed: but I have on hand an important task, begun indeed long since, for I have planned a work dedicated to no other than my friend here" (meaning me), "one of decided importance, which I am also polishing to a high degree of finish." Then said I, "This is the ³ work, Varro, for which I have long been looking, though I did not venture to importune you about it; indeed I heard from our friend Libo, whose literary zeal you know he and I can keep no secrets of

that kind from each other—that you never interrupted the work, but were elaborating it very carefully, and never had it out of your hands. There is, however, one question which it never occurred to me to put to you before: but now when I have begun to commit to writing the doctrines which I learned in common with you, and to elucidate in a Latin work the old philosophy which sprang from Socrates, I do ask you how it is that, numerous as are your literary labours, you neglect this department, and that too though you are eminent for your acquaintance with it, while the subject and all its circumstances greatly excel all other subjects and all other pursuits.”

- 4 II. Thereupon he replied: “The course you call upon me to take is one I have often debated and much pondered. So without delay I will give you an answer, merely using the words which I find at hand, since, as I have told you, I have deliberated greatly and for a length of time on this very matter. Well, as I perceived that philosophy had been most minutely expounded in the writings of the Greeks, I judged that those of our countrymen who were possessed by an interest in it would prefer to read books in Greek rather than in our own language, supposing them to be instructed in the learning of the Greeks; while if they were repelled by Greek systems and schools, neither would they give heed to books in Latin, for these cannot be understood without instruction in Greek: thus I declined to write works which the unlearned on the one hand were unable to understand, and on the other the learned refused to read.
- 5 Again, you see—for you have studied in the same school with myself—that it is not possible for us to be like Amafinius and Rabirius, who, employing no rules of art, discuss matters which are plain to view, in the language of the people, make no definitions, no subdivisions, prove no doctrine by any appropriate argument, assume in short that the arts of rhetoric and logic have no existence. We, however, obeying as our laws the maxims of logicians and orators to boot, since our school holds the faculty that both possess to be of the nature of a virtue, are obliged, among other things, to introduce novel terms, which the learned, as I said before, will prefer to get from the Greeks, while the unlearned will not receive them either from us or from them, so that all our toil is undertaken to no purpose. Now in truth on Natural Science I could write as lucidly as Amafinius, were I a disciple of Epicurus—that is to say, of Democritus.
- 6 When once you have abolished the Causes depending upon Efficient Forces, pray, what is there of serious difficulty in prating about the casual collision of diminutive bodies—as he calls the atoms? You know the physical system of our school—as it is founded on the idea of Force

and of the Substance which Force moulds and shapes, we must needs employ Mathematics; and in what kind of language will any one be able to expound that subject, and what is the kind of reader whom he will be able to bring to a comprehension of it? Take, again, this most important branch which deals with life and conduct, with the objects of desire and the objects of aversion. They indeed frankly declare that Good is the same to a sheep and to a man, while you know well the kind and degree of refinement found in our school. If on the one 7 hand you follow Zeno, it is a serious task to bring a man to comprehend the nature of that real and uniform Good, which can never be dissociated from Morality—Good whose nature Epicurus declares he cannot so much as conjecture in the absence of pleasures which affect sense. If again we are devoted to the Old Academy—a school, as you know, which I regard with favour—what subtlety must we use to expound its system! How acutely, how profoundly too, must we argue against the Stoics! The whole pursuit of philosophy then, I, for one, make my own as far as I can, with a view both to consistency of life and to intellectual enjoyment, and I think, as Plato has it, that no greater or more excellent boon was ever bestowed by the gods on man. But those of my friends, 8 who make the pursuit a part of their lives, I despatch to Greece, that is to say, I bid them seek the Greeks, that they may rather draw their draughts from the springs, than painfully track out the little runlets. Subjects, however, which no one before my time had taught, and which students could learn from no other source, these, as far as I could—I am no great admirer of my own productions. I have brought to the knowledge of my countrymen. Such knowledge could not be got from the Greeks nor from the Latins either since the demise of our countryman L. Aelius. Still in those early writings of mine, which I imbued with a kind of mirthfulness, taking Menippus for my model—without translating him—I inserted much that was drawn from the inmost recesses of philosophy, and many statements put in logical form; thus while on the one hand the unlearned more readily comprehended these passages, because they were enticed to read them by a certain pleasantry, so on the other I have tried, in my panegyrics, and in this recent introduction to antiquities, to write for philosophers, if only I have succeeded."

III. Then said I, "What you say is true, Varro. Indeed, when 9 we were sojourning and wandering like foreigners in our own city, your books, I may say, escorted us home, and enabled us at length to perceive who we were and where we lived. You have revealed to us the age of our fatherland, its chronology, the laws of its religion and priesthoods, the plan of our home and foreign administration, the

- position of our territories and districts, the titles and descriptions of all things divine and human, with the duties and principles attaching to them, and you have shed a vast amount of light on our poets, and on Latin literature in general, and on the Latin vocabulary, while you have yourself composed picturesque and choice poems in almost every metre, and in many passages have touched upon philosophy, so far as
- 10 to arouse interest, but not sufficiently for full treatment. Yet the plea you allege is plausible: whether we look to the learned, they will prefer to read Greek, or to those who do not know Greek, they will not read Latin either. But I now ask you, do you sufficiently make good your plea? I rather assert both that those who cannot read Greek will read Latin, and that those who can will not neglect their native literature. Pray what reason is there why men acquainted with Greek literature should read Latin poets and not Latin philosophers? Is it because they take pleasure in Ennius, Pacuvius, Attius and many others who have reproduced not the language but the substance of Greek poetry? How much greater delight will they feel, if the philosophers imitate Plato, Aristotle, Theophrastus as the poets imitate Aeschylus, Sophocles, Euripides! I find that Latin orators at all events are applauded who
- 11 have imitated Hypereides or Demosthenes. For my part—I will state the facts as they are—so long as political life, office, forensic labours, and not merely an interest in the commonwealth, but also the duty to some extent of representing it, kept me entangled and fettered by a variety of business, I locked up my philosophy in my own mind, and by study, when I found opportunity, refreshed my recollection, to keep it from fading away. But now, when not only has fortune stricken me with a most grievous wound, but I have been freed from my share in the conduct of the government, I seek in philosophy a balm for my sorrow, and deem it too the worthiest amusement for my leisure. For either it is the occupation best suited to my years, or that which best accords with those achievements of mine which have earned for me applause, or again none conduces more to the education of my fellow-countrymen, or if these
- 12 statements are not exact, I perceive nothing else for me to do. My friend Brutus, who has won fame in every quarter, deals so exhaustively with philosophy in Latin writings that no one feels the need of Greek books going over the same ground, and he holds the same opinions as yourself; for he studied some time at Athens under Aristus, whose brother Antiochus you attended. For all the reasons I have given, devote yourself, I entreat you, to this department of literature also.”
- 13 IV. Thereupon he answered: “That is a point I will think over, and not without taking counsel of you. But,” said he, “what is this that I

hear concerning yourself?" "What about?" said I. "That you have deserted the Old System, and are writing about the New." "Well," said I, "is our friend Antiochus, then, to have more freedom to return to the Old School from the New, than I to pass from the Old into the New? Surely the newest doctrines are the most reformed and improved. Yet Philo, the master of Antiochus, a great man, as you yourself deem him, refuses in his books (and we often heard the same statement from himself in conversation) to allow that there are two Academies, and exposes the misconception of those who have held that view." "The fact is," said he, "as you state it, though I do not suppose you to be unacquainted with the answer which Antiochus wrote to that contention of Philo." "Say rather," said I, "that I should be delighted if you would refresh my recollection of that matter, and of the whole teaching of the Old Academy, to which I have been long a stranger, unless it troubles you." At the same time I said "let us seat ourselves, if you please." "That at least I am glad to do, for I am very weak. But let us find out whether Atticus desires that I should carry out what I perceive to be your wish." "I do desire it," said he: "what could I like better than to con again the lessons I learned from Antiochus so long ago, and at the same time to see whether they can be pretty easily stated in good Latin?" This said, we sat down in view of one another.

Then Varro thus began: "I hold that Socrates, as all are agreed, was the first whose voice charmed away philosophy from the mysterious phenomena over which nature herself has cast a veil, and with which all philosophers before his time busied themselves, and brought it face to face with social life, so as to investigate virtue and vice and the general distinction between Good and Evil, and led it to pronounce its sentence that the heavenly bodies were either far removed from the sphere of our knowledge, or had nothing to do with right living, however much the knowledge of them might be attained. This philosopher, in almost all the conversations which have been written out in picturesque and rich language by his disciples, so discourses that he lays down no dogma himself, and rebuts others who do, while he declares that he possesses no knowledge himself but this (and this it is which gives him his superiority over the rest), that men imagine themselves to know what they know not, while he merely knows one thing, viz. that he knows nothing, and it is on this account that he supposes himself to have been named the wisest of mankind by Apollo, that not to presume oneself to know what one does not know is the whole of wisdom. Making this statement consistently, and clinging to this opinion to the last, he yet devoted all his conversation to eulogizing virtue, and to urging men on to pursue

it, as we may learn from the writings of the Socratic School, and particularly of Plato. Through the influence of Plato, who was versatile and many-sided and fluent, there was founded a scheme of philosophy single and harmonious, though under the two titles of the Academic and the Peripatetic Schools, which differed in their nomenclature while they agreed in substance; for after Plato had left behind him his sister's son Speusippus as a kind of heir to his philosophy, and two other pupils whose zeal and learning were preeminent, Xenocrates of Calchedon, and Aristotle of Stagira; those who associated with Aristotle received the name of Peripatetics, because they used to discuss as they walked about in the Lyceum, while the rest, who, following Plato's custom, were wont to hold their meetings and conversations in the Academia, which is another exercise-ground, took their title from the name of that spot. But both companies, endowed out of Plato's abundance, drew up a certain definite code of doctrine, a code moreover enriched with matter to overflowing, while they abandoned the old Socratic indecision about all subjects and the practice of employing Dialectic without making any positive assertion. Thus was brought to perfection a certain artistic form of philosophy, with a regular succession of topics and a scheme of doctrine, a result Socrates was far from desiring. This scheme was at first, as I have told you, one and the same for both schools, since there was no distinction between the Peripatetics and the original Old Academy. In my opinion Aristotle was preeminent through a certain copiousness of genius, but both schools had the same source, and drew the same line between objects of desire and objects of aversion.

V. But what am I about?" cried he, "or rather am I in my right mind, when I school you in these matters? For though it is not a case of the sow schooling Minerva, as the proverb has it, yet whoever schools Minerva acts absurdly." Then said Atticus: "Pray, pray, Varro, proceed: for I am deeply in love with the literature and authors of my own people, and your views give me pleasure, when they are put in Latin, and in that style of yours." "What do you suppose *me* to think," said I, "seeing that I have already promised that I will hold up philosophy to the view of our nation?" "Let us proceed, then," said he, "since you wish it." "Well then, there had been already inherited from Plato a three fold plan for the pursuit of philosophy: the first branch dealt with Life and Conduct, the second with Nature and mysterious phenomena, the third with Dialectic and the decision between true and false statements, between correctness and incorrectness in language, between things consistent and things contradictory. Now they went back to Nature for that first portion which relates to right living and declared that

Nature must be obeyed, and that nowhere else but in Nature must be sought that Supreme Good by the standard of which all other things were judged, and they established the doctrine that the highest of all the objects of desire and the summit of things Good was found in the acquisition of all mental bodily and external advantages which are in accord with Nature. Some bodily advantages they held to reside in the whole body, others in the members, health strength and beauty in the whole, but in the members soundness of the senses, and a certain excellence pertaining to each part, for instance in the feet swiftness, strength in the hands, clearness in the voice, in the tongue moreover a lucid intonation of individual utterances. Mental advantages again they reckoned to be 20 such as were calculated to enable the minds of men to lay hold of virtue, and these they classed under two heads, that of Nature and that of Conduct. To Nature they assigned quickness to learn and memory: both of which they said were characteristics of intellect and mind. To Conduct belonged the production of inclinations, and habituation, if I may so call it; to this habituation they gave a bent, partly by incessant practice, partly by the aid of theory, and in these methods philosophy herself was included. Now in philosophy that which exists merely in outline and has not been perfected is called an 'advance,' so to speak, towards virtue: that which has been perfected is virtue, which is, I may say, the consummation of Nature and the one supreme advantage 21 of all those to which they assign a place in the minds of men. External advantages—for this was the third branch—they asserted to consist of such things as conduced to the exercise of virtue. For virtue is exhibited in dealing with advantages of mind and body and certain other advantages which are conditions required not so much by Nature, as by happiness. The individual man they declared to form in some sense a certain part of a community comprising the whole human race, and to be connected with other individuals by the link of a common humanity, as they called it. Now this is the manner in which they treat of the Supreme Good which is founded on Nature: they think the function of all other good things is either to magnify that or to maintain it, wealth for example, influence, fame, private connexion. This is their mode of introducing a tripartite scheme of things Good; (VI.) and these are the 22 three classes which the Peripatetics are commonly thought to lay down. And the common opinion is right, for the classification does belong to them: but it is careless if it implies that the Peripatetics who then bore the title were different from the Academics. This scheme was held by the two schools in common, and both considered this to be the crown of things Good, viz. to win either all or the most important of those

possessions which were highest in the order of Nature, and which were in themselves worthy objects of desire. The most important are those which have to do with the mind itself and with Virtue herself. Thus all the old Philosophy pronounced that upon virtue alone depends happiness, which was not however the greatest possible unless bodily endowments were added, and the rest, of which we spoke above as conducing to the

23 exercise of virtue. As a result of this system, a starting point for action in life was discovered, and for duty itself; this starting point lay in the maintenance of those possessions which were marked out by Nature. Hence sprang the avoidance of indolence and the neglect of pleasures: from these resulted the acceptance of toils and pains many and great for the sake of honesty and Morality, and the adoption of such objects as were in harmony with the ground-plan of nature, whence arose both friendship and justice with equity; and these were placed higher than pleasures, higher than the attainment of attendant advantages of life in large number. Such then was in their minds the outline of the theory of Conduct, and the shape and system they assigned to that branch of philosophy, which I have placed first.

24 As to Nature again—for that subject came next—they made these statements: they divided it into two spheres, the sphere of Force and the sphere of that which—so they say—yielded itself to the action of Force, and out of which formed existences were constructed. In the sphere of Force they thought Quality was comprised; in the sphere of that which was subjected to Force, the Material, if I may use the term; into both spheres however both entered; since the Material never could have had any organisation had it not been bound in by some Energy, nor could Energy have existed without some Material, seeing that nothing exists which does not of necessity exist in space. Now that which was compounded of the two they then entitled a body, and a ‘substance endowed with Quality’ so to speak: for you will certainly allow me, in dealing with unfamiliar subjects, to use occasionally novel terms, as the Greeks themselves do, who have for a long time been treating these themes.”

25 VII. “We will indeed,” said Atticus, “nay more, you shall be free to adopt Greek terms whenever you please, should you find none in Latin.” “I am indeed grateful to you: but I will strive to talk Latin, unless when I use words of this kind, I mean when I speak of *philosophia*, or *rhetorica*, or *physica*, or *dialectica*, which words custom now adopts as Latin, and such is the case with many others. I have spoken then of substances endowed with Quality, meaning what the Greeks call *ποιότητας*, a term which is itself not in common use among the Greeks, but belongs

to philosophers, and the same thing happens in many instances. The terms of logicians are none of them in vogue: they use terms of their own, and the circumstance prevails in almost all arts, since either new words must be constructed to suit new matters, or words must be borrowed from other matters. And if this is what the Greeks do, who have been familiar with these subjects for so many ages, how much more readily should the licence be allowed to us, who are attempting to deal with them now for the first time?" "Indeed, Varro," I said, "I think 26 you will be actually doing a service to your fellow-countrymen if you not only enrich them with an abundance of new matters as you have done, but also of new terms." "We will venture then," said he, "to make use of new terms, with your permission, if it proves needful. These 'substances endowed with Quality' then are some of them primary, while others are derivative. The primary exist only in one form and are homogeneous: the derivative are changeable, and so to speak, heterogeneous. So air—we treat the word *æer* as Latin—and fire and water and earth are primary: the species of living creatures and of things which spring from the earth are derivative. Therefore the first are called 'first-beginnings,' and, to translate the Greek term, 'elements': of these air and fire have the function of originating motion and production, while the remaining classes have the function of receptivity and passivity, so to say. Aristotle fancied there was a certain fifth branch, which gave origin to the stars and to the intellectual faculties, being unique and unlike those four elements I have enumerated above. However, they suppose that underlying all things there is a certain 27 Material, formless and entirely destitute of that 'Quality'—for we must render the word more familiar and better worn by handling it—out of which Material all things have been formed and moulded: which Material can become receptive of all changes throughout its whole extent, and can be transformed after every fashion and in every direction, and moreover is dissolved not into nothingness, but into its own constituent parts, which are capable of being cut up and subdivided without limit, since there is in nature no least body incapable of division, while all things that move do so by the production of intervals, which again can be subdivided without limit. And because that Force to which 28 we have given the name of 'Quality' is ever in motion and changes its position hither and thither in the way described, they suppose that the Material itself through its whole extent is profoundly changed, and that those objects are produced which they call 'qualified substances,' and out of these objects, spread over the whole realm of Nature, which forms an organic whole and constitutes with all its parts an un

broken chain, the universe has been framed, beyond the limits of which universe no portion of Material exists, and no body, the parts of the universe being all things therein contained which are held together by a constitution invested with sensibility, wherein is implanted Perfect Reason, which again is everlasting, seeing that there is nothing more
 29 potent than itself which may cause its dissolution: this power they say is the soul of the universe, and is also perfect intellect and perfect wisdom: to it they give the name of God, a kind of Providence as they call it, exalted above all things which are under its sway, administering the heavenly operations chiefly, and next in order those operations on earth which concern mankind. This power moreover they now and again entitle Fate, since events cannot happen otherwise than by it ordained, being linked in what they call the destined and changeless chain of the everlasting order: sometimes too they also entitle this power Fortune, because it brings to pass many events which are unforeseen and unsuspected by us, in consequence of their mysteriousness and our blindness as to causes.

30 VIII. Next, the third branch of philosophy which was concerned with reasoning and Dialectic was handled as follows by both schools. Though the criterion of truth was, they said, dependent on our sense-impressions, it was not contained within those impressions. The intellect they determined to be the judge of facts: they pronounced it the only faculty worthy of belief, because it alone discerned those forms of existence which were homogeneous and simple and ever unchanged. These they termed *ἰδέαι*, already so named by Plato, while we may properly denote them as 'forms.' All the senses they believed to be dull
 31 and slow, and to be by no means capable of grasping those objects which appeared to fall within the domain of the senses, inasmuch as these were in some cases too small to come under the observation of sense, and in others were so fleeting and in such rapid motion that no single point of them appeared ever at a standstill, or even to retain its identity, since all objects were subject to a perpetual ebb and flow. So they
 32 denominated all this division of existences 'matter for opinion.' Knowledge they considered to reside nowhere but in the conceptions and reasonings of the mind: on this account they looked with favour on definitions of things and applied them to all matters about which they disputed. The elucidation of words also met with approval, that is to say the elucidation of the reason why each object bears its peculiar name: this they called *ἐτιμολογία*. After this, they made use of these reasons as so-called proofs and 'signs of things' for the inculcation and demonstration of any statement which they wished to have clearly

shown: wherein the tradition was established of an entire scheme of Logic, by which I mean language put into reasonable form. To this was added as a correlative, so to speak, the faculty of Rhetoric as used by orators, which enables us to unfold an uninterrupted discourse adapted to produce conviction. Such was the original system they inherited from Plato. I will now, if you wish it, set forth those changes in their system with which I have become acquainted." "Indeed we wish it," said I: "I answer for Atticus as well as myself." IX. "You are right in answering for me," said he, "for we are listening to a striking exposition of the doctrines of the Peripatetics and the Old Academy."

"Aristotle was the first who overthrew the 'forms' which I mentioned a little while ago; of which Plato was so marvellously enamoured that he declared them to contain a divine element. Theophrastus again, a man whose style is sweet and whose character is such that he bears on his front the marks of a certain uprightness and frankness, shattered in some sense by still more powerful blows the doctrines contained in the old system; for he stripped Virtue of her comeliness and enfeebled her, inasmuch as he denied that happiness depends on her alone. His pupil Strato, to be sure, though he was a man of penetrating genius, must still be entirely dissociated from that school, seeing that after he had abandoned the most indispensable portion of philosophy, that which covers the ground of Virtue and Conduct, and had thrown himself entirely into the investigation of Nature, in that very department he dissented widely from his own friends. Speusippus, however, and Xenocrates, who had been the first to take on their shoulders the system and doctrines of Plato, and after their time Polemo and Crates, with whom was Crantor, all these, gathered together in the Academic fold, carefully cherished the principles which they had received from their predecessors. Well then, Zeno and Arcesilas had both been zealous pupils of Polemo; but Zeno, being older than Arcesilas, and a refined logician, and a man of keen mental activity, tried to reform the School. This reform too, if you like, I will expound, after the manner of Antiochus." "I should certainly like it," said I, "and you see Pomponius expresses the same wish."

X. "Zeno then was by no means the man to cut the sinews of Virtue, as Theophrastus had done, but on the contrary, he was led to assign to Virtue alone all attainments which had any bearing on happiness, and to count no other thing besides as belonging to the class of things Good, and to explain Morality as constituting the sole and only Good, possessed of homogeneity, so to speak. Now although all other things were neither good nor bad, still he declared them to be partly in harmony

with and partly hostile to Nature. Interposed and midway between these same classes he counted a third class. Those things which were in harmony with Nature he taught were worthy of our choice, and were to have a certain value assigned to them, the contrary being the case with the contrary class; those things which belonged to neither class he left in the category of things indifferent, to which he attached no importance whatever. But such things as were choiceworthy [along with their opposites] were divided into those which had positive and those which had negative value. Those which had positive value he called 'preferable,' those which had negative value 'repellent.' And just as he had introduced in these respects rather verbal than substantial alterations, so between moral deeds and immoral he placed a kind of intermediate class, comprising 'appropriate action' and 'inappropriate action,' making good actions to consist of moral deeds alone, and wrong actions of wayward or immoral deeds alone, while 'appropriate actions,' whether carried out or omitted, he considered to constitute a middle class as I have stated.

38 And whereas his predecessors had maintained that the reason does not contain all that is implied by the term virtue, but merely embraces certain virtues which owe their perfection either to Nature or to habit, this philosopher made reason embrace all virtues; and whereas the old philosophers believed that those classes of virtues which I have mentioned above could be separated, Zeno argued that this could by no means be done, and that not the practice of virtue was glorious, but the mere virtuous state, in itself, and yet that no one could have virtue without putting it constantly into practice. And whereas the Old School did not eradicate emotion from the heart of a man, declaring it natural to feel pain and desire and fear, and to be excited by pleasure, but merely restricted these feelings and brought them within narrow bounds, this philosopher decided that the man

39 of wisdom is free from all these diseases, as he calls them. And whereas the ancients maintained these emotions to be due to Nature, reason having no share in them, and placed feeling in one portion of the mind, reason in another, he further refused assent to these doctrines. For he not only supposed that emotions were dependent on the will, and were embraced owing to a judgment based on fancied knowledge, but he also believed that a kind of uncontrolled incontinence was the parent of all emotions. Such or nearly such were his doctrines concerning morals.

XI. Touching natural substances he gave the following opinion; first he did not admit along with the four commonly received elements that fifth substance from which his predecessors imagined the senses and the intellect to be produced. He laid down the doctrine that fire was

very substance, which generated all individual things, among them the intellect with the senses. He moreover herein diverged from the same old philosophers, that he believed it to be impossible for any result to be produced by an incorporeal substance, (for to that category Xenocrates and the elder generation had declared mind to belong), and indeed that it was impossible either for anything which exerted force or for anything which was acted on, to be non-corporeal.

Again, he made many changes in that third branch of philosophy. 40 In this field he first of all made certain novel statements about sense-impressions themselves, which he pronounced to be compounds produced by a kind of blow aimed from without—this he called *φαντασία* and we may name it ‘appearance,’ and pray let us adhere to this word, since we shall have to make use of it repeatedly in the remainder of our discourse—well then, to these ‘appearances,’ adopted, so to speak, by the senses, he links the ‘assent’ of the mind, which he says depends on ourselves and is due to our wills. He did not attach 41 credibility to all ‘appearances,’ but only to such as brought ‘evidence,’ characteristic, so to say, of the objects from which they (the ‘appearances’) came, and such an ‘appearance,’ being discerned by virtue of its own ‘evidence’ he called ‘perceptible’—will you tolerate the term?” “Certainly we will,” said Atticus: “how else were you to translate *καταληπτόν*?” “Well then, when once the ‘appearance’ had been adopted and assented to, he designated it a ‘perception,’ [or ‘*apprehension*’] from its resemblance to things grasped by the hand; from which act of grasping he had taken the name, no one having formerly used the term in such circumstances, and he used very many other new terms, for new were the doctrines he stated. That which had been ‘apprehended’ by sense he called a sense-impression, and if it had been so ‘apprehended’ as to be incapable of being uprooted by criticism, he entitled it knowledge; if otherwise, ignorance: which was the parent of 42 fancied knowledge, and this he said was unstable and indistinguishable from the unreal and the unknown. But between knowledge and ignorance he placed that ‘perception’ of which I have spoken, and counted it neither among things moral nor among things immoral, but declared it to be alone deserving of credence. It was in consequence of this that he went so far as to place reliance on the senses, because, as I have mentioned above, he believed a ‘perception’ arrived at through the senses to be both true and trustworthy, not as supposing that the ‘perception’ seized on all the qualities of the object, but because it (the ‘perception’) did not fail to include every quality which could come within its province, and because Nature had assigned this as the canon, so to speak,

of knowledge, and the first step to an acquaintance with herself, which should lead afterwards to 'conceptions' being imprinted on the mind, which 'conceptions' enable us to find out not merely the first steps, but certain broader avenues leading to the discovery of reasoned truth. Confusion, however, and rash assertion, and ignorance, and false knowledge and conjecture, and, in a word, all that is inconsistent with a well grounded and staunch 'assent', he dissociated from virtue and wisdom. And these or nearly these are the points which constituted the whole of Zeno's disagreement with his predecessors."

- 43 XII. When he had said this, I remarked: "You have given a terse and far from abstruse account, Varro, of the Old Academic and Stoic theories: it is true, I believe, as our friend Antiochus maintained, that the latter should be regarded rather as a reform of the Old Academy than as in any sense a new system." Then Varro said: "It is now your duty, yours, who are a deserter from the theory of the ancients, and who accept the innovations of Arcesilas, to shew the nature and cause of the disruption which has been brought about, that we may see whether your
- 44 revolt proceeds upon any adequate grounds." Then said I, "From what I have heard, Arcesilas directed his attack entirely against Zeno, in no spirit of obstinacy or contentiousness, as I at least believe, but influenced by the mysteriousness of these matters which had led Socrates and even before the time of Socrates, had led Democritus, Anaxagoras, Empedocles, and almost all the men of old to admit their nescience: these declared cognition, perception, knowledge to be utterly impossible; the senses they maintained were restricted, the mind was weak, the course of life was short, and, in the words of Democritus, truth was plunged in an abyss, everything was encircled by fancies and conventions, there was no room left for truth, all things one after another were found to be overwhelmed by dark-
- 45 ness. So Arcesilas refused to admit that knowledge of anything whatever could be attained, not even of that one fact which Socrates had permitted himself to retain; to such an extent did he pronounce all things to be hid in secrecy; there was no single thing which could be discerned or comprehended: for these reasons it was not right that any man should either proclaim his knowledge, or make a positive assertion, or signify approval by 'assent,' but he should perpetually rein in and check his rashness from making any slip, for rashness then became egregious when approval was given to a fact either untrue, or unknown, nor was there anything more disgraceful than this, that 'assent' and approval should outrun knowledge and perception. He acted in accordance with this theory, and strove by speaking against the opinions

of all men, to bring round the majority to this view, that whereas equal weights of argument were always discovered on both sides of the same question, the more natural course was to withhold 'assent' from both sides. This Academy they style the New, but it appears to me to be the 46 Old, if at least we count Plato as belonging to the famous Old School, since in his books no positive statements are made, though many arguments are advanced on both sides, inquiry being made into all things, but no definite conclusion being stated: yet for all that let the School whose tenets you have explained, be called the Old, and this of mine the New; this school being continued to the time of Carneades, who was fourth in succession from Arcesilas, remained faithful to this same theory of Arcesilas. Carneades, however, had acquaintance with every branch of philosophy, and, as I learned from his pupils, and particularly Zeno the Epicurean, who admired him far beyond all other philosophers, though he disagreed with him vastly, was a man of a marvellous ability."

POSTERIOR ACADEMICS.

FRAGMENTS.

BOOK I.

"Why again does Mnesarchus vent his spleen? Why does 1 Antipater cross swords with Carneades in so many tomes?"

"...he thinking himself in thorough agreement owing to the resem- 2 blance of the terms he used."

BOOK II.

"What seems so level as the sea? Hence the poets actually style 3 it 'the level plain'."

"For those who have aspired to office somewhat late in life are with 4 difficulty allowed access to office, nor can they ever be thoroughly acceptable to the public."

"To abolish greed, to get rid of criminal courses, to exhibit one's 5 life as a model for the young to imitate."

"Well, what are the outlines of the moon? Can you say? When 6 it is waxing and waning its horns appear at one time more obtuse, at another more pointed."

- 7 "Well, is not the sea blue? But its waves when cut by the oars are tinged with purple, and (the surface of) the water is to a certain degree coloured and stained."
- 8 "But then, if we believed that, we should have no need of plummets or squares or rules."
- 9 "People who are grown up and those who are growing up have different complexions; so have sick people and healthy, sober people and drunkards."
- 10 "Whenever we plunge ourselves beneath the surface, as divers do, we either do not discern the things above us, or discern them very dimly."
- 11 "...who even think that an alabaster box full of ointment is foul-smelling."

BOOK III.

- 12 "To be perpetually crossing swords, to fight assiduously with criminals and bravoës, who would not pronounce this a course not merely unfortunate, but also foolish in the extreme?"
- 13 "And as we are now sitting by the Lucrine lake and see the tiny fish leaping..."
- 14 "To think that amid so great a diversity of living creatures man alone was endowed with a desire for instruction and knowledge!"
- 15 "...let him have some power over himself, let him claim his freedom."
- 16 "Now if those who have strayed from the right path in life were allowed to repent and correct their mistake, as those are who have taken a wrong turning on a journey, then the reform of rashness would be easier than it is."
- 17 "When the tool has been fixed in the work."
- 18 "We shall say that the clear evidence which we are bound to cling to tenaciously, is missing."
- 19 "...who used to rear large numbers of fowls with a view to profit: these on examining an egg, used to state which hen had laid it."

BOOK IV.

- 20 "Both the Stoics and their partisan Antiochus declare it untrue."
- 21 "He also, when he was hot, looked out for the road of the Old Academics, like a road under Maenian caves."
- 22 "For he is not made of stone that has been chiselled, or wood that has been planed."

"Because it appears to us at one time blue and another dun- 23
coloured, and the part which now glitters beneath the sun..."

"And I believe Clitomachus when he writes this, that a task like 24
those of Hercules has been achieved."

"...which appeared to Antiochus himself to be stupid and self- 25
contradictory."

"But he did not convince of this Anaximander his fellow country- 26
man and friend, for he laid down the unlimited..."

"[Why should God]—for this is your belief—have created such a 27
quantity of water-snakes and vipers?"

"And not as he says who declares that this world is compounded of 28
diminutive bodies, rough, hooked, and curved."

"All those matters, Varro, lie hid, being clouded and surrounded by 29
mighty darkness."

"Nor do I deny it is so.....Your school again asserts that over 30
against us on the opposite side of the earth there are men who stand
with their feet opposite to our feet."

"He is clearly, as he was described above, a Stoic who on a few 31
points gives an uncertain sound."

UNCERTAIN BOOKS.

"I at least think we are blind not only as regards wisdom, but 32
maimed and dull as regards those very objects which we think that we
partially discern."

"Of such character seem to me to be all those impressions which I 33
have supposed we ought to style 'probable' or 'resembling the truth': if
you choose to describe them by a different name, I make no opposition.
I am content that you have thoroughly admitted my statement, I mean
concerning the objects to which I apply the names; for the man of wis-
dom ought not to be a craftsman of words, but an investigator of facts."

"...that the wise man of the Academics is assigned the second place 34
by all those of the remaining schools who believe themselves to be wise
men, each thinking it needful to claim the first place for himself;
whence it might with plausibility be concluded that he was justified in
adjudging himself the first position as all the rest adjudged him the
second."

"...that they had a practice of concealing their own tenets, and 35
were not in the habit of disclosing them to any one, unless one who
had associated with them up to the time of old age."

"[Varro] a man by far the shrewdest of all, and beyond all question 36
the most learned."

PRIOR ACADEMICS.

LUCULLUS.

- 1 I. THE great ability of Lucius Lucullus and his great enthusiasm for the highest accomplishments, and the learning he had acquired, including all that became a gentleman, or was worthy of a man of noble birth, all this was divorced from the business of the capital, at the season when he might have had a specially brilliant career in the forum. After he had in very early youth joined a brother, his equal in filial devotion and energy, in avenging his father's quarrel, and had won thus a high reputation, he went out to Asia as quaestor, and there during very many years presided over the province with very extraordinary credit, then, being elected aedile in his absence, he became immediately afterwards praetor—for this was permitted to him unusually early, owing to a privilege conveyed by statute—after that he went to Africa, then returned for the consulship, which he filled in such a manner that all praised his industry and recognised his ability. Afterwards, when despatched by the senate to conduct the war against Mithridates, he surpassed not only the judgment all men had formed about his worth, but also the fame of his predecessors.
- 2 This was the more astonishing, because eminence in generalship was not much expected of one who had passed his youth in the occupations of the forum, and had peacefully spent the protracted period of his quaestorship in Asia, while Murena carried on the war in Pontus. But the almost inconceivable greatness of his ability did not require that practical training from which he had learned nothing. So after spending all the time of his journey by land and sea partly in questioning men of experience, partly in reading military history, he arrived in Asia an accomplished general, though he had set out from Rome ignorant of the military art. He possessed indeed a very marvellous memory for facts, though Hortensius had a greater memory for words, but in such measure as facts are of more avail in the conduct of affairs than words, in that measure was his memory more

splendid than the unique memory which, as historians relate, was possessed by Themistocles, whom we maintain to be by far the first of the Greeks: at least they say that he, when a certain man offered to teach him the art of memory, which was then coming for the first time into vogue, answered that he would rather learn the art of forgetting: I suppose because all the things he had heard and seen stuck fast in his recollection. To such ability Lucullus had added also that training which Themistocles had rejected. Therefore as we commit to writing those facts which we wish to place on record, so he preserved facts engraven in his mind. Consequently so great a general did he become **3** in every department of the art of war, in battles, sieges, naval engagements, and the entire equipment of, and preparation for, war, that the greatest prince since Alexander admitted that he had found him to be a greater leader than any one of those whose lives he had read. He also possessed such skill in the organisation and administration of states, and was so just, that at the present day Asia persists in maintaining the ordinances of Lucullus and in almost following out his footprints. But although the advantage to his country was great, still such a high degree of excellence and ability was detained longer than I could wish in foreign parts, far from the gaze of the forum and the senate. Furthermore, after he had returned victorious from the Mithridatic war, he triumphed three years later than he ought, owing to the trickery of his enemies. For in my consulship I almost escorted the triumphal car of the illustrious hero into the city, and I would declare how much aid I then derived in my important measures from his advice and sanction, only I should have to speak about myself, and that is not needful at the present moment. So I shall choose to withhold from him a merited eulogy, rather than to connect it with praise of myself.

II. But those achievements which in the case of Lucullus ought to **4** have been crowned with fame by his fellow-countrymen, have for the most part been made the theme of writings both in Greek and in Latin. I shared with many the knowledge of those public merits, but learned these more private accomplishments from personal acquaintance, which I enjoyed in company with a few. Lucullus indeed devoted himself with greater enthusiasm to every department of literature and particularly to philosophy than those who knew nothing of him believed, and that not merely at the beginning of his life, but during many years when he was pro quaestor as well as in time of actual war, where the pressure of military business is usually so great that a general has not much leisure left when he is actually under canvas. Finding that Antiochus the pupil of Philo was considered to be preeminent among philosophers for

ability and knowledge, he kept him in his suite when quaestor, and for many years afterwards when in command, and seeing that he possessed a memory such as I have before described, he easily learned by repeatedly hearing them those doctrines which, had he heard them only once, he could have remembered. And he took an extraordinary pleasure in the perusal of books which he heard mentioned.

5 Now I am sometimes afraid lest in my desire to extend the fame of such remarkable characters, I should even restrict it; since there are many who have absolutely no love for Greek literature, and very many who have none for philosophy, while the rest, even if they do not look with disfavour on the subject, think that the discussion of such topics is not very becoming in the foremost men of the state. For my part, after reading that M. Cato studied Greek literature in advanced age, while the memoirs of P. Africanus tell me that on the famous embassy which he undertook before his censorship, Panaetius was absolutely his only companion, I look no farther to find authority
6 for the study either of Greek literature or of philosophy. It remains for me to reply to those who do not like to have personages of such dignity forced into discussions of this kind. As though indeed the meetings of eminent men ought to be silent, or their discussions jocular, or their conversations about trivial matters! Moreover, if the eulogies which in a certain book I bestowed on philosophy were just, assuredly the treatment of it is thoroughly worthy of the best and most distinguished men, nor have we, whom the Roman people has placed in this station, anything else to look to, but that we give not to our private pursuits the time we owe to public business. And if, while I was bound to the discharge of public duties, I not merely never withheld my services from the assemblies of my countrymen, but never even penned a single syllable that was not connected with the forum, who shall blame the occupations of my leisure, if, while I have it, I not only decline to let myself grow dull and idle, but also strive to be useful to a wide circle? I believe that the fame of those is not only not reduced but is even exalted, with whose public and notorious merits we associate these also which are less familiar, and less common. Some also are found to assert that those who carry on the controversies in my books had no knowledge of the subject-matter of the discussions: these seem to me to cherish ill feeling not only against the living, but against the dead as well.

7 III. There is left one class of critics, those who do not favour the Academic system. I should be more troubled at this, if any one did favour any school of philosophy but the one of which he is himself an

adherent. We, however, seeing that it is our custom to state against all persons our opinions, cannot shew cause why others should not disagree with us: though our case at least is a simple one, for we are the men who wish to discover the truth, apart from all party spirit, and we carry on the search with extreme diligence and earnestness. For although all knowledge is cumbered about with many hindrances, and such is the cloud that covers the objects of knowledge themselves and such the feebleness of our judgments, that not without reason very ancient and very learned men have mistrusted the possibility of discovering the object of their desires, yet neither did they waver, nor will we through weariness abandon our earnest search, nor have our discussions any other purpose but this, to bring to light and so to say force to the surface something which either is true or approaches as closely as possible to the truth. Nor is there any difference between ourselves and those 8 who believe themselves to possess knowledge, excepting that they have no doubt about the essential truth of the doctrines they maintain, while we hold many theories to be probable, and can readily act upon them, though we can scarcely state them dogmatically. In this respect again we are more free and unshackled, because we retain intact our power to judge for ourselves, and are not forced by any compulsion to champion every maxim and almost every word of command which certain men have given us. For all beside ourselves are in the first place kept in bondage before they have acquired the power of judging what is best: next, at the weakest period of life, either from deference to a particular friend, or carried away by a single discourse of some person, who is the first they have listened to, they pronounce a decision on matters of which nothing is known, and whatever be the system to which the storm, so to speak, has driven them, they cling to it as though to a rock. Now as to their 9 plea that they put entire confidence in the philosopher whom they decide to have been 'the wise man,' I should admit it, if they had been qualified to make that decision when still unskilled and unlearned—since to determine who is the wise man seems to me to be the especial function of the wise man well then, granting them to have been qualified, they became so after hearing all statements, and after learning the opinions of the rest. But in point of fact they did make the decision after a single hearing of the matter, and so submitted themselves to the authority of a single person. But I know not how it is that most men choose to be in the wrong and to do violent battle for the system they have learned to love, rather than, obstinacy apart, to inquire what assertions may most consistently be made. Touching these

questions we had much inquiry and discussion on many occasions and especially once at the country house of Hortensius, close to Bauli; when Catulus had come there, and Lucullus and I myself, after we had stayed with Catulus the day before. And we had come there very early, because we had decided to take ship, if there was a fair wind, Lucullus for his house at Naples, I for mine at Pompeii. So after we had had a short conversation in the colonnade, we took seats in that place of exercise.

- 10 IV. Hereupon Catulus said: "Although yesterday the subject for discussion was almost completely elucidated, so that we seem to have dealt with nearly the whole of the inquiry, yet, Lucullus, I am anxious to get those statements you promised to make to us, which you learned from the lips of Antiochus." "For my part," said Hortensius, "I have done more than I could wish, for the whole subject ought to have been kept intact for Lucullus. And yet possibly it has been kept virtually intact, for I merely stated arguments I had ready at hand, while I expect from Lucullus others more abstruse." Then he replied: "I assure you, Hortensius, that I do not feel nervous because of your expectancy, though there is nothing so unfavourable to those who wish to produce a good impression, but I am the less excited because I am not anxious about the degree of approval I shall secure for my views. I shall indeed state opinions which are neither original, nor such that, in defending them, I should not prefer to be defeated rather than to win the victory, supposing them to prove unfounded. But in very fact, as our case now stands at least, though it has been shaken by yesterday's discussion, yet I believe it to be thoroughly sound. I will plead it therefore as Antiochus used to plead it, since I am well acquainted with the subject; for I listened to him with thoughts unoccupied, and with great interest, and he spoke repeatedly on the same subject—so I shall excite greater hopes concerning myself than Hortensius did just now." When he had
- 11 thus begun, we aroused our attention to listen to him. But he said: "When I was at Alexandria as pro-quaestor, Antiochus accompanied me, and there was already at Alexandria Heraclitus of Tyre, a friend of Antiochus, who had attended the lectures of Clitomachus for many years and also those of Philo, being a man, as you must admit, held in esteem and of high repute in that school of philosophy, which after being nearly abandoned is now being called again into existence: I often listened to Antiochus when he discussed with this man, but both shewed good temper. And, I must mention, those two books of Philo, of which Catulus gave us an account yesterday, were at that time brought to Alexandria, and had then for the first time come into the hands of

Antiochus: whereupon though a man naturally good tempered in the extreme—indeed it was not possible for gentleness to exceed his—yet began to get into a passion. I was astonished: nor indeed had I ever seen him so before. But he, appealing to the recollection of Heraclitus, asked him whether the doctrines appeared to him to be those of Philo, or whether he had heard them uttered by Philo or any Academic philosopher at any time? He said he had not: yet he recognised the written style of Philo; nor in fact could there be any doubt on the matter: for there were present friends of mine, the brothers P. and C. Selius with Tetrilius Rogus, and these declared that they had heard the same doctrines from Philo's lips at Rome, and had copied those two volumes from Philo's own manuscript. Then Antiochus said not only 12 all that Catulus yesterday asserted his own father to have declared against Philo, but more besides, nor did he refrain from actually publishing against his own preceptor a book, which bears the name of Sosus. So at that period, though I listened with interest both to Heraclitus when he argued against Antiochus and to Antiochus also when he disputed against the Academics, yet I gave especially careful attention to Antiochus, wishing to learn from him his case in its entirety. Thus we invited Heraclitus to attend during a good number of days, and with him many men of learning, among whom was Aristus the brother of Antiochus and moreover Aristo and Dio, whom Antiochus held in the highest esteem next to his brother, and we spent a great deal of time in debating that single topic. But the polemic against Philo I must pass by, because a man who declares that the theories which were yesterday supported are not maintained by Academics at all, is a far from spirited opponent: since though he tells an untruth, for all that his opposition is of a very mild character. Let us turn to Arcesilas and Carneades."

V. After he had said this, he thus once more began: "In the 13 first place it always seems to me that you"—here he addressed me by name—"in quoting the old natural philosophers, take the course usually pursued by turbulent politicians, when they put forward certain famous men of old times, intending to prove them to have been democrats that they themselves may appear like them. Such persons begin with P. Valerius who was consul in the first year after the expulsion of the kings, then they tell the story of the others who while consuls carried democratic enactments concerning the right of appeal; then they come to these better known characters, C. Flaminius who when tribune of the plebs passed an agrarian law in the teeth of the senate, some years before the second Punic war, and was afterwards twice elected

consul, then L. Cassius and Q. Pompeius; and indeed these gentlemen usually place P. Africanus on the same list. They say further that two brothers of great wisdom and renown, P. Crassus and P. Scaevola, encouraged T. Gracchus in his legislation, one indeed, as history tells us, publicly, the other, as these men conjecture, more covertly. They add too C. Marius, and so far as he is concerned they tell no falsehood. When they have made an exhibition of the names of these many illustrious men, they declare that these are the men whose principles they themselves follow. In like fashion you, desiring, just as they desired to convulse the fabric of the state, so yourselves to convulse the fabric of philosophy, equally well established aforetime, thrust forward Empedocles, Anaxagoras, Democritus, Parmenides, Xenophanes, Plato too and Socrates. But neither did Saturninus (to name the enemy of my family rather than the rest) bear any resemblance to those old statesmen, nor is the chicanery of Arcesilas to be compared with the humility of Democritus. And, for all you say, those physical philosophers very seldom, when they are stopped by some difficulty, roar out like men labouring under mental excitement (though Empedocles does so to such an extent that I sometimes think him mad) that everything is mysterious, that we feel nothing, discern nothing, can find out the true nature of nothing whatever; on the contrary, nearly all are deemed (by me indeed quite all) to state certain points even too strongly, and to claim that

14 they know more than they do know. Now even if they at that time, set in the midst of novelties, faltered like new-born babes, so to speak, do we suppose that nothing has been made plain by the lapse of so many generations, by ability of the highest order and by intense enthusiasm? Is it not true that, after the most imposing philosophical systems had been founded, then just as Ti. Gracchus sprang up bent on the destruction of order, so arose Arcesilas determined to overthrow the established philosophy and to shelter himself behind the authority of those who, he said, had denied the possibility of knowledge or perception? From the number of these you must except both Plato and Socrates, the former because he left behind him a thoroughly organised school, comprising Peripatetics and Academics, who under different names agreed in doctrine, and with whom the Stoics disagreed more in the use of terms than in opinions; Socrates again, habitually disparaging himself in debate, ever assigned too much importance to those whom he desired to refute. So, his expressed opinion and his real opinion being at variance, he made free use of that self-depreciation which the Greeks call *εἰσπραξία*, and this Fannius says was a trait of Africanus, and one moreover not to be looked on as a defect, because Socrates possessed it also.

15

VI. But let us suppose, if you will have it so, that the ancients had no sure knowledge touching these matters. Has no result then been achieved owing to the fact that inquiries into the subject have been made since the time when Arcesilas, out of opposition to Zeno, as is commonly thought, because that philosopher, without making any new discoveries, merely corrected his predecessors by the alteration of their terminology, attempted to involve in obscurity the most conspicuous facts, through his desire to undermine the definitions of his opponent? His theory at first found not much favour, though he had a brilliant reputation as well for keen ability, as for a certain marvellous fascination of style, and it was supported in the time immediately succeeding by Lacydes only: afterwards, however, it received its completion from Carneades, who is fourth in succession from Arcesilas, since he was a pupil of Hegesinus, who had been a pupil of Evander, a follower of Lacydes, Lacydes having been a disciple of Arcesilas. Well, Carneades himself long held sway, for he lived ninety years, and his pupils were of exceedingly brilliant fame: of these Clitomachus possessed most application; evidence whereof is the quantity of his writings; but Aeschines was not his inferior in ability, nor Charmadas in eloquence, nor Melanthius the Rhodian in sweet quaintness. Metrodorus of Stratonice was supposed to be well acquainted with the mind of Carneades. Well, your Academic Philo devoted his attention during many years to Clitomachus. While Philo lived the Academy never lacked support. However, there were certain philosophers and those of no mean standing who thought it altogether wrong to take the course on which I am now entering, that of arguing against the Academies; they said there was indeed no sense in debating with people who professed no opinions, and they blamed Antipater the Stoic who had busied himself with that occupation, and they further said it was not needful that a definition should be given of what constituted knowledge or perception, or if we want a literal translation, that act of 'apprehension', which those persons call *κατάληψις*, and they declared that all who wished to produce a conviction that there is something of such a nature as to be capable of being 'apprehended' and perceived were acting ignorantly, because nothing could be more luminous than that *ἐνάργεια* as the Greeks term it—let us, if you please, entitle it 'conspicuousness' or 'evidence,' and let us manufacture words if we find it needful, so that our friend here—it was me he jocularly addressed—"may not think that this liberty belongs to him alone: but however—that may be, they thought no discourse could be discovered more perspicuous than that very quality of 'evidence' nor did they think that definitions should

be given of facts which were so palpable. Others again said that they would not have begun by advancing anything in defence of this 'evidence,' but they thought it right that statements should be made to refute those of the opposite side, in order to prevent people from being deluded.

- 18 Still most philosophers do not discountenance definitions even of facts which are 'evident,' and look on the subject as proper for inquiry, and the persons as worthy of being admitted to a discussion. Philo, however, while agitating certain new doctrines, because he found it hard to withstand the speeches directed against the obstinacy of the Academics, not only tells a patent lie, for which he was reproached by Catulus the elder, but, as Antiochus proved, he runs his head into the very noose of which he was afraid. This being his assertion, that there is no one thing capable of being 'apprehended'—herein we point to ἀκατάληπτον—supposing its nature to be that defined by Zeno as such an 'appearance' (for we have made this rendering of φαντασίᾳ tolerably familiar by our conversation of yesterday)—an 'appearance' then giving the form and outline of the object from which it proceeds, in such a way as would not be possible if it proceeded from any object other than that from which it actually does proceed—this definition of Zeno we maintain to be thoroughly exact: how indeed can any impression be so 'apprehended' as to give you full assurance that it has resulted in perception and knowledge, if it presents just such features as even an incorrect impression may possibly present? When Philo weakens and sweeps away this definition, he sweeps away the criterion of the unknowable and the knowable: whence it results that it is not possible to 'apprehend' anything whatever. So without knowing it, he is hurled back on the position he least desires to occupy. Therefore all our discourse against the Academy is directed by us towards the maintenance of that definition which Philo wished to overthrow. And unless we establish this definition, we admit that perception is altogether impossible.

- 19 VII. Let us begin then with the senses, whose decisions are so unclouded and so emphatic that were human nature allowed a choice, and were some god to ask of it whether it is satisfied with its senses if unimpaired and undecayed, or whether it calls for some better gift, I do not see what more it is to demand. You really must not at this part of my speech look for me to answer you concerning the bent oar or the pigeon's neck: for I am not the man to maintain that whatever object is presented to our senses possesses just such qualities as it appears to us to possess. Epicurus must see to this matter and to many

others of the kind. In my judgment, however, a high degree of truth attaches to our senses in this way, viz. if on the one hand they are sound and strong, and on the other, all the impediments are taken away which oppose and obstruct their action. Thus not only do we often desire a change in the light and in the positions of those objects which we contemplate, but we also either increase or diminish the distances, and we continue to make many experiments, until our survey itself gives us confidence in our own judgment. The same is the case with sounds, with smell and with taste, so that there is no one amongst us who in dealing with sensations of each separate class, calls for any more accurate means of judgment. If again we call in the aid of practice and method, so that the eyes dwell on a painting or the ears on musical notes, who can avoid seeing what great power the senses have? How many points are there which painters see in background and foreground, which we do not see? How many things which escape us in a piece of music, do the ears of those catch who are practised in that study? Such men tell us at the first note of the flute-player that it is the Antiope or the Andromacha, though we have not even a glimmering of the fact. It is not at all needful to talk of the senses of taste and smell, which shew power of comprehension to a certain extent, though the power is defective. What of touch, and of that touch too, which philosophers call the inner touch, either of pleasure or of pain? It is in this alone that the Cyrenaics believe the criterion of truth to reside, because truth is matter of feeling:—well, can any one say that there is no difference between a man who feels pain and one who is in a state of pleasure? Or rather would not any one likely to pronounce such an opinion be most unquestionably mad? But then whatever be the character of those perceptions which we say are made by the senses, such nature have the inferences from them, which are not said to be directly perceived by the senses, but only in a certain degree by the senses: statements like these for example: ‘that object is white, this sweet, that melodious, this fragrant, this rough.’ We now hold these judgments as ‘apprehended’ by the mind, not merely by the senses. Next in order come these statements: ‘that object is a horse, that a dog.’ Next follow the remaining links in the chain of judgments, which bind up with the others some of higher importance, these for example, which embrace what we may call a fully completed perception of their subject matter: ‘if an object is a man, it is a creature subject to death, endowed with reason.’ This is the class of judgments whereby conceptions of things are impressed upon our minds, and without these no one can either comprehend or

22 inquire or debate. Now if conceptions were untrue—you I believe, represented *εἰροιαί* by 'conceptions'—well, if these were untrue or impressed upon us by 'appearances' of such a nature as to be indistinguishable from untrue 'appearances,' in what way, pray, should we act upon conceptions? How should we see what assertions are consistent in each case and what are inconsistent? Assuredly no room is left for memory, which is more than anything else the support not only of philosophy, but of all practical pursuits in life and all arts. What memory indeed can there be of falsities? Or what does any man remember that he has not 'apprehended' and does not hold in his mind? Moreover, what art can there be which does not arise, not from one or two, but from many mental perceptions? And if you steal from us perception, how will you mark off the man who knows an art from him who does not know it? Surely we shall not declare one man an artist and another not just at random, but shall do so when we see that one man has a hold upon certain facts which he has perceived and 'apprehended,' while the other has none. And inasmuch as one class of arts is such that it discerns its subject-matter by the exercise of the mind alone, while another sets something in motion and produces some result, how can a mathematician on the one hand discern things which either have no existence or are indistinguishable from falsities, and on the other a musician complete his rhythms and wed them to poetry? The same remarks will apply to other similar arts also, whose whole function consists in production and activity. What result can possibly be produced by the aid of art, unless he who is to practise the art has perceived a number of facts?

23 VIII. The theory of the virtues, again, especially establishes the possibility of perception and 'apprehension' in many instances. In these perceptions alone we declare science to reside, and we pronounce science to be not the bare 'apprehension' of facts, but that 'apprehension' when rendered certain and unchangeable, and we so speak of Wisdom again, the art of conduct, which endows itself with stability. Now were this firmness not accompanied by any perception or knowledge, I ask to be told the source or manner of its birth. I ask, too, why the typical good man, who has determined to undergo every form of torture and to be torn to shreds by insufferable pain rather than prove a traitor to duty or truth, should have forced himself to submit to such oppressive conditions, if he possessed no fact which was 'apprehended,' perceived, known and determined? It can therefore in no way happen that any man should put so high a value on his sense of equity and good faith, as to shrink from no suffering

for the sake of maintaining it, if he has not given his assent to facts which cannot possibly be untrue. Further, how first of all is Wisdom, if she is not to know whether she is really Wisdom or not, to retain her name of Wisdom? Next, how will she venture to enter on any plan or execute it with confidence, when no certainty will exist on which she can act? Further, when she comes to doubt what is the crown and summit of things good, how can she be Wisdom, knowing no standard whereby all things may be judged? And, again, this is clear, that some fundamental principle must be determined, upon which Wisdom, when she undertakes a course of action, may proceed, and that fundamental principle must be in agreement with Nature. For otherwise 'desire'—by this word we mean *ὄρεσις*—whereby we are urged to action and desire an object which has appeared before our faculties, cannot be aroused. And the object which arouses 'desire' ought first to become apparent to us so as to secure our belief: and this is impossible, if the object which appears to us cannot possibly be distinguished from an unreality. In what manner can the mind be aroused to feel desire, if the perception of the object which becomes apparent does not shew us whether the object is agreeable to Nature or hostile? Also, if it has not dawned upon the mind what course of action is appropriate, it will never act at all, will never be urged to any undertaking, will never be aroused. But if the mind is ever to act in any case, that impression which has struck upon it must needs appear to it as a truth.

What of this objection, that, if your theories are true, reason is entirely demolished, though it is in some sense the luminary and the lamp of life? Will you for all that persist in your perversity? Why, reason brought with it the beginnings of inquiry, and carried virtue to completion, reason herself having first been strengthened by inquiry. Now inquiry is a striving after knowledge and the goal of inquiry is discovery. But no man ever discovered unrealities, nor can things which remain doubtful to the end possibly get to be discovered, but when matters which were veiled, so to speak, are laid bare, they are said to have been discovered. In this way we grasp both the starting point for inquiry and the ultimate result of the process of perception and 'apprehension.' And so a proof properly drawn up, in Greek *ἀπὸ δᾶξίς*, is thus defined: 'a reasoning which leads up from things perceived to that which was not included in the perceptions.'

IX. But if all 'appearances' had the nature assigned to them by your school, that is to say were possibly untrue so that no conception of the mind could mark off the true from the false, how could we say that any one had either given a proof of anything or discovered

anything, or what faith could we put in a formal demonstration? What will be the issue of philosophy, which is obliged to advance by the aid of reasonings? What will be the fate of Wisdom? She is bound not to mistrust herself or her own edicts, which philosophers call *δόγματα*, not one of which will it ever be possible to betray without crime. For when an edict is betrayed, the law of truth and virtue is betrayed, and from this fault often spring betrayals of friendships and commonwealths. There can be no doubt then that no edict of the wise man can be untrue, and that it is not enough that an edict should not be untrue; it must also be well grounded, firm, thoroughly ascertained and such as no reasoning can shake. Nothing having such a character can either exist or appear to exist in accordance with the principles of men who assert that those ‘appearances’ on which all edicts are founded are in no respect distinguishable

28 from other ‘appearances’ that are untrue. Hence sprang the demand which Hortensius made, that you should declare the wise man to have at least arrived at perception of this very doctrine that perception is impossible. But when Antipater made the same demand, maintaining that the person who declared perception to be impossible should consistently declare that for all that perception of this one doctrine of his is possible, although perception of other matters is not, Carneades confronted him with great shrewdness. For he maintained that so far from such a course being consistent it was actually self-contradictory in the highest degree. The man, said he, who denied that anything exists of a nature to be perceived, allowed no exception: thus it inevitably followed that the doctrine itself, no exception having been made in its favour, could by no means be ‘apprehended’ and perceived.

29 Antiochus was reputed to make a more trenchant attack on that position. Since, he said, the Academics held this doctrine—you understand by this time that I represent *δόγμα* in this way—that perception is impossible, they were bound not to waver in regard to their doctrine, as they did about all other matters, particularly as their all depended on the doctrine: for the guiding aim of all philosophy was the determination of true and false, of known and unknown: and since they adopted this purpose as their own and desired to shew which ‘appearances’ ought to be received and which rejected, assuredly they must needs have already ‘perceived’ that very doctrine from which resulted their whole criterion of true and false: furthermore the two most important topics in philosophy were the criterion of truth and the moral standard, and no person can be a man of wisdom who knows nothing either of a beginning for knowledge, or a goal for desire, so as to be

ignorant either of the point from which he means to set out or of the point which he has to reach: while to suppose that these are matters of uncertainty and not to be so sure about them as to prevent them from being shaken was, he said, vastly at variance with Wisdom. This then, he said, was a better way of demanding from them that they should at least declare that they possessed a perception of this one doctrine that perception is impossible. But as regards the inconsistency of their whole opinion, if a person who yields assent to nothing can have an opinion, let us grant, as I think we ought, that enough has been said.

X. There follows a discussion rich in matter indeed, but somewhat 30 more recondite—for it borrows a good deal from natural science—so that I fear I am bestowing on my friend who is to answer me very considerable opportunity for free and even unrestrained speech. Indeed what am I to suppose he will do in treating of hidden and mysterious subjects, when he tries to filch from us the light of day? But I might have argued with much refinement, how great is the art with which nature has manufactured, first every living creature, then man in particular, what power is possessed by the senses, in what way ‘appearances’ first strike upon us, how thereupon as a result of their impact ‘desire’ follows, next how we apply our senses to the perception of objects. The mind itself indeed, which is the source of sensations and is moreover itself sensation, has a natural power which it applies to objects by which it is affected. And so it seizes on some ‘appearances’ so as to use them immediately, while others it stores up, as it were, and from these memory springs. Other conclusions it builds up by making comparisons, from which are produced general conceptions of things, called by the Greeks sometimes *ἄντοια*, sometimes *προλήψεις*. To these when reasoning has been added, and formal demonstration, and a countless crowd of observed facts, then not only does perception of all these things come into view, but reasoning again, receiving its completion, arrives by these gradations at the goal of Wisdom. Seeing then that the mind of man is well suited to the attain- 31 ment of a knowledge of things, and also stability of life, it is especially enamoured of intellectual acquisition and that *κατάληψις*—which, as I have said, we shall term by a literal translation, ‘apprehension’—it loves not only for its intrinsic value—since nothing is sweeter to the human mind than the daylight of truth—but also on account of its utility. Hence the mind applies the senses and produces the arts, which are, as it were, a second series of senses, and the mind again so invigorates philosophy itself that it produces virtue, on which possession more than all others hangs life in its entirety. Therefore those who declare

it impossible to 'apprehend' anything strip us of all this furniture or equipment of life, or rather they actually overthrow the whole of life from its foundations, and rob the animal of the mind that animates it, so that it is not easy to speak of their rashness in terms such as the circumstances demand.

32 Nor indeed can I altogether determine the nature of their design or what it is they desire. For sometimes when we ply them with a remark to this effect, that if all the theories they put forward in discussion are true, then everything will be indeterminate, they answer: 'What then is that to us? Is the fault ours? Lay your indictment against Nature for having, as Democritus says, utterly hidden away truth in an abyss.' Others, however, display better taste, and actually protest because we charge them with declaring all things to be indeterminate, and try to shew how great is the difference between what is indeterminate and what cannot be perceived, and also to define the distinction between the two. Let us deal then with those who do draw such distinctions; the others who maintain that all matters are just as indeterminate as the question whether the number of the stars is even or odd, let us pass by, as hopeless beings, so to call them. Now our opponents are persuaded—and this is the point by which I observed you were particularly struck—that there is a sort of 'probability' which is, as it were, a likeness of the truth, and this they say they use as their canon both in active life and in inquiry and argument.

33 XI. What kind of canon of true and false is theirs, if we have no conception of true and false for the reason that these cannot be known one from the other? For if we have any such conception at all, the difference between true and false ought to be as patent as that between right and wrong. If there is no difference there is no canon, nor can one in whose judgment the modes of appearance presented by truth and falsehood are indistinguishable, possess any criterion or any sign of truth whatever. Now when they say that the only thing they abolish is the possibility that there should be any 'appearance' such that no false 'appearance' can wear the same aspect, while they yield every other point, they act in a childish fashion. For after sweeping away the means of judging about everything, they say they grant us what remains; just as if a man were to declare that though he had taken away another's eyesight, he had not deprived him of those objects which were capable of being seen. Now just as such objects are recognised solely by the eyes, so the matters of which we speak are recognised through their 'appearances,' but by the aid of a sign which is peculiar to true 'appearance' and is not a common property of true and untrue. Therefore whether

you, personally, mean to put forward, as that which you act upon, 'appearance' accompanied by probability or 'appearance' accompanied by probability and unobstructed, as Carneades would have it, or something else still, yet you will have to recur to that kind of 'appearance' with which we are now dealing. Now in that 'appearance' there will be found no criterion, 34 if the 'appearance' is to possess any marks common to it and the untrue 'appearance,' since no peculiar property can be indicated where the mark is common to the two. But if the two are to have nothing in common, I have carried my point, as I am looking for something which shall appear to me so true, that it cannot again by any possibility appear untrue. They make a like mistake when, coerced by the reproaches cast upon them by the truth, they choose to draw a distinction between 'conspicuous sensations' and perceptions and try to shew that there is something 'conspicuous,' stamped indeed as true on the mind and intellect, and yet that it cannot be perceived and 'apprehended.' How indeed are you ever to state that a thing is 'conspicuously' white, when it may happen that an object really black appears to be white? Or how shall we say that such things are either 'conspicuous' or accurately stamped upon our minds, when it is indeterminate whether our senses are affected by a reality or by empty nothingness? In this way they leave us neither colour nor substance nor reality nor proof nor senses nor any 'conspicuous sensation.' In con- 35 sequence of this it commonly happens to them that whatever statement they may have made, the question is put to them by some, 'So you have perception of this statement at all events?' But they ridicule those who put this question; since they themselves are not eager to prove that no one can dispute on any matter or make a strong assertion about it without having some sure and distinctive sign to justify the view which each person declares himself to adopt. What then is the nature of that 'probability' accepted by your school? For if each man states in positive language an opinion that has presented itself to him and almost at the first glance appears probable, what can be more worthless? But if they intend to say that after a certain survey and 36 careful reflexion they act upon the appearances presented to them, still they will find no way of escape: first because all 'appearances' which present no distinctive features are thereby indiscriminately deprived of credit; next, seeing that they declare it possible for the man of wisdom, after taking every precaution and making a most careful survey, to arrive at some result which appears like the truth and at the same time is very distant from the truth, they will never be able to put faith in themselves even if, as they are fond of saying, they in most

instances get at the truth itself or approximate to it very closely. For in order to have faith, it will be necessary for them to know some token of truth, and when they have darkened and destroyed the token what kind of truth will they suppose themselves to reach? Again, what assertion can be so ridiculous as theirs when they talk in this way? 'Here is indeed a mark or proof touching the matter in question and so I accept it on that ground, but there is a possibility that the matter indicated may be a deception or a nonentity altogether.' But enough as concerning perception. If any person shall desire to undermine the arguments advanced, truth will easily act as her own advocate though we desert her cause.

- 37 XII. Now that we understand pretty well the principles which have just been expounded, we shall next, as regards 'assent' and approval, which the Greeks call *συγκατάθεσις*, make a statement in few words, not that the subject is not an extensive one, but our foundation was already laid a little while since. For when we were unfolding the powers that the senses possess, we at the same time revealed the fact that many things are 'apprehended' and perceived by the senses, which cannot take place without 'assent.' Next, inasmuch as the chief difference between an inanimate thing and an animated being is this, that the animated being acts, since we cannot imagine an animated being without activity, we must either deprive such a being of sensation or allow to it that power of giving 'assent' which the freedom of our wills
- 38 permits to us. But indeed the soul that animates is in some sense wrenched away from those to whom these philosophers are determined not to allow either sensation or assent. Now just as a scale in a balance dips of necessity when the weights are placed on it, so the mind yields to things 'conspicuous.' For as no animated being can help desiring an object which clearly seems agreeable to Nature—the Greeks call such an object *οἰκείον*—so it cannot avoid giving its 'assent' to a 'conspicuous' phenomenon which has been offered to its view. Yet if the doctrines we have put forward in discussion are true, it is out of place to say a single word about 'assent,' since he who perceives anything 'assents' at once. But these consequences again follow, that without 'assent' neither memory nor conceptions of things nor arts can exist, and what is most important, the freedom of the will, cannot exist in him who means to give his 'assent' to nothing.
- 39 What then becomes of virtue if nothing depends on our own wills? It is particularly ridiculous that while faults are within men's control, and no one commits sins without assenting to them, yet the same should not hold good in the case of virtue, whose whole stability and

strength is derived from those impressions to which she has given assent and sanction, and speaking generally it is inevitable that before we act some appearance should present itself to us and that our assent should be given to the appearance which has so presented itself. Therefore he who sweeps away either 'appearance' or 'assent,' sweeps away all activity out of life.

XIII. Now let us look to the arguments usually advanced in ⁴⁰ opposition by these philosophers. But first you have an opportunity of understanding the basis, so to speak, of their entire theory. They put together, then, first of all, a certain system relating to what we call 'appearances,' and determine their nature and classes, and when dealing with these classes they define at as great length as do the Stoics the properties of that class which can be perceived and 'apprehended.' Next they set forth those two propositions which almost, they say, comprise within them the whole problem now before us: when certain 'appearances' present such an aspect that other appearances also may possibly present the same aspect, without any difference between them, then it is not possible for one division of these appearances to be perceived while another division is not perceived: now appearances are indifferent, not only when they are in all respects essentially alike, but also when they cannot be in practice distinguished. After laying down these propositions, they put their whole case in the compass of a single formal demonstration. This demonstration is thus drawn up: 'Of appearances some are true, some deceptive, and what is deceptive is not capable of being perceived: any true appearance however which has presented itself is in every case such that a deceptive appearance may present itself having the same aspect.' Again: 'As regards appearances which wear such an aspect as to be indifferent, it cannot possibly happen that some of them are capable of being perceived, while others are not. There is therefore no appearance which is capable of being perceived.' Of the assumptions which they make in order to arrive ⁴¹ at the conclusion which they desire, they suppose that two are granted them, nor indeed does any one oppose them. These are as follows: 'deceptive appearances cannot be perceived,' and the second 'indifferent appearances cannot be partly capable of being perceived, partly not so capable': the rest of their assumptions however they support by extensive and varied discourse, and these are also two, one 'of appearances some are true, some deceptive,' the second 'every appearance which truly represents its source has the same form that another may have which does not truly represent its source.' These two conten- ⁴² tions they do not skim lightly over but so enlarge upon as to display

no mean degree of accuracy and carefulness; for they divide their subject into sections of considerable importance: first the senses, then the inferences drawn from the senses and from general experience, which they desire to have enveloped in darkness. Then they come to the chapter, in which they shew how it is impossible to gain perception of anything by reasoning or by hypotheses either. These general topics they cut up into still smaller parts. For just as you saw them deal yesterday with the senses so they deal with the other topics, and in the case of each of the subjects which they distribute into very small fragments, they attempt to prove that side by side with all true 'appearances' there are deceptive 'appearances' which are interchangeable with the true, and that since this is the nature of 'appearances', they cannot be 'apprehended.'

- 43 XIV. This minute accuracy I pronounce to be thoroughly worthy of philosophy but most alien to the principles of those who thus argue. Definitions and subdivisions and discourse which avails itself of the light which these processes throw, points of resemblance again and points of contrast, and the fine and subtle distinctions drawn between them, all these are for men who are confident that the opinions they champion are true and stable and sure, and not for men who cry aloud that their opinions are not a whit more true than false. Now what would they do, if after they have given a definition of something some one were to ask them whether their definition may be applied to another thing, any you please? If they say it can, what reason could they bring to shew it to be a true definition? If they say it cannot, they would have to admit that inasmuch as even this true definition of theirs cannot be applied to the wrong object, the object which is explained by the definition is capable of being perceived: which is a conclusion they by no means desire. The same remarks may
- 44 be made upon every division of their argument. For if they mean to say that they have a clear view of the matters about which they are going to argue, and are not obstructed by any interchangeability of 'appearances,' they will admit that they do apprehend these matters. But if they intend to deny that the true 'appearances' can be separated from the deceptive, how will they be able to advance a step farther? They will be met again as they have been met already. Why, no proof can be drawn up without the assumptions which are made in order to frame it being so accepted that no untrue assumptions could possibly be identical with them. So if reasoning which is based upon and proceeds upon facts 'apprehended' and perceived is to prove this conclusion, that it is not possible to 'apprehend' anything, what more

self-contradictory process could be found? And whereas the very essence of careful discourse is to promise that it will reveal something which is not plain, and the more readily to attain that end will avail itself of the senses and of 'conspicuous appearances', what must we think of the discourse of men who are decided in their minds that all these matters do not so much exist as seem to exist? They are very well caught in their own net when they adopt as consistent these two propositions which so violently contradict one another: first that there are certain deceptive 'appearances', in deciding upon which fact they make it clear that there are certain true 'appearances'; then in the same breath that deceptive 'appearances' and true are indifferent. But you had framed your first assumption on the supposition that they were different: so your later assumption is not in harmony with your earlier nor your earlier with your later.

But let us go a step farther and so plead our case as not to 45 appear to have flattered our own side, and let us so exhaust all the statements of our opponents, as to leave nothing overlooked. First then, that 'conspicuousness' of which we have spoken is sufficiently powerful to shew us things which exist, exactly in their own nature, as they are. But yet to help us to keep a stronger and more secure hold on 'conspicuous appearances' we need a considerable degree either of skill or watchfulness, to prevent us from being driven by a certain sleight of hand, so to speak, and by certain sophistries to relax our hold upon things which are in their own nature full of light. Now Epicurus, who was anxious to obviate those fallacies which we believe to throw into confusion the knowledge of the truth, and declared that it was for the man of wisdom to disconnect conjecture from 'conspicuousness', did no service, since he in no way abolished the fallacy due to conjecture.

XV. On this account, seeing that two causes are at work against 46 'conspicuous' and 'evident appearances', we must provide the same number of resources to meet them. The first cause at work is that men do not chain down and apply their minds to the observation of those 'appearances' which are 'conspicuous', so as to recognise the intensity of the light which plays around them: the second is that, overreached and tricked by deceptive and sophistical questionings, some, finding themselves unable to unravel them, revolt from the truth. We ought, then, to have ready prepared the answer which may be made in defence of 'conspicuousness', concerning which we have already spoken, and to be fore-armed, so that we may go out to meet these men's questionings and expose their sophistries: and this next in order I have determined

- 47 to do. I will explain then each class of the proofs they bring, for even these persons usually talk in an orderly manner. First they try to shew that it is possible for much to seem to exist, which has absolutely no existence, since our minds are falsely affected by things which have no existence just in the same way as they are by things which have existence. Now, say they, seeing that you declare certain 'appearances' to be sent to us by a god—for example those which are presented to us in sleep and those which are made known to us by oracles, auspices and entrails—for they say that all these matters are believed in by the Stoics against whom they argue—they ask then how a god can give probability to false 'appearances' and cannot give it to 'appearances' which very closely resemble others that are true? Or if he can give it to these, why not to 'appearances' which though with great difficulty can yet be distinguished from the true? And if to these why not to those which
- 48 are indistinguishable? Next, seeing that the mind is affected of its own motion, as is made plain by the things we picture to ourselves in imagination and the visions which sometimes appear either to sleepers or to madmen, it is likely that the mind is also so affected as not merely to fail to distinguish whether those 'appearances' are true or untrue, but so as to find absolutely no difference between true and untrue: even as were any persons to shake or grow pale either spontaneously through some internal movement of the mind or on meeting with some alarming thing obtruded upon them from without, there would be no possibility of distinguishing between the trembling and the paleness in the two cases, nor of finding a difference between the spontaneous and the induced affection. Finally if there are no deceptive 'appearances' which are attended by probability, another method applies. But if there are, why should they not be such as to be not readily distinguished from the true? Why not to such a degree that no difference can be traced? The more so as you yourselves state that the man of wisdom during madness refrains entirely from rendering his assent, because the 'appearances' presented to him shew no distinctive stamp.
- 49 XVI. In reference to all these kinds of false 'appearances' Antiochus advanced many arguments and the discussion on this one head lasted a whole day. I suppose I must not imitate him but must give merely a summary. And in the first place I must find fault with this, that our opponents make use of a most sophistical kind of argument, a kind which commonly meets with very little approval in philosophy, I mean when very small and gradual additions or diminutions take place. The class bears the name 'sorites,' because they prove by it that a heap results from the addition of a single grain. Truly a

faulx and sophistical style: 'This is the way you take your successive steps: if an 'appearance' has been brought before a sleeper by a god, of such a sort that it is probable, why not of such a sort as to be extremely like a true 'appearance'? Then why not such as to be not easily distinguished from the true? Next why not such as not to be distinguished at all from the true? Finally, such that there is no difference traceable between the one and the other? If you get so far as this because I yield to you each point as you go along, the error will be mine, but if you advance thither unaided, yours. Why, who will ever allow you that a god either has unlimited power or would use it in that way if he had it? How is it that you take it for granted that if one thing can be like another it follows that the two can with difficulty be distinguished? then that they are not distinguished? finally that they are the same? For inst. not, if wolves are like dogs you will say at last that the two classes are identical. And further some things not moral are like things moral, and things not good are like things good, and things far from artistic are like things artistic: why do we hesitate then to declare that there is no difference between these classes of things? Do we not see how irreconcilable they are? There is indeed nothing which can possibly be removed from its own class into another class. But if the result were demonstrated, that there is no difference between 'appearances' of various classes, we should find some which belonged both to their own proper class and to a class not their own. How can that happen? There is one method of keeping off false 'appearances', whether they are shadowed forth by imagination, which we admit to be a common occurrence, or in sleep, or through the influence of wine or of madness. For we shall declare that all such 'appearances' lack 'conspicuousness' which we are bound to cling to tenaciously. Who is there that, when he pictures something to himself and sketches it in his imagination, does not, when once he has collected himself and recalled his thoughts, understand the difference between 'conspicuous' and unsubstantial phenomena? The same principles apply to dreams. Surely you do not think that Ennius after he had taken a walk with his neighbour Servius Galba said: 'I appeared to myself to be walking with Galba'? But when he dreamed, this is how he told of it: 'the poet Homer appeared at my side.' And again in his Epicharmus: 'for I appeared to dream that I was dead.' So whenever we have awakened we make light of such 'appearances' nor do we place them on the same level as the business we have transacted in the forum.

XVII. But, say they, so long as the appearances last, the forms of things in dreams are the same as those of the things we see 52

when awake. To begin with, there is a difference between them: but let us waive that point. Now what we say is that sleepers and wakers have not equal degrees of power or soundness either as regards intellect or as regards sensation. Nor do drunken men carry out their actions with the same decision as sober men: they hesitate, they waver, they check themselves sometimes and very feebly acquiesce in the appearances that present themselves, and when they have slept off their drunkenness they comprehend how worthless the appearances were. The same trait is natural to men of unsound mind also—when they are at the beginning of their madness they think and say that something appears to them which has no real existence, and again when the severity of their disease lessens, their thoughts and utterances are such as those of Alcmaeon: ‘But I find my mind

53 accords not with the visions my eyes see.’ But, say our opponents, the man of wisdom restrains himself in madness, lest he should accept falsities for truths. So he will at many other seasons, if perchance some oppression or dulness weighs on his senses or the ‘appearances’ are unusually dim, or he is prevented by the shortness of the time from thoroughly examining them. Yet the doctrine that the man of wisdom sometimes refuses his ‘assent’ is entirely detrimental to your theories, since if there were no difference between ‘appearances’ he would either withhold it constantly or would never do so at all. But this whole class of arguments clearly exhibits the frivolity of speech characteristic of those who are eager to bring about general disorder. We ask for the verdict given by character, consistency, solidity and wisdom: we have to put up with instances of dreamers, lunatics and drunkards. Are we aware how inconsistent is our talk concerning this entire class of arguments? If we were, we should not quote men overpowered by wine or sleep or bereft of their intellect, in such a ridiculous manner as to say at one moment that there is a difference between ‘appearances’ as presented to men awake and sober and of sound mind and to men in a different condition, and again at an-

54 other moment that there is no such difference. Are they not aware of this either, that they are making all things indeterminable, a result they do not desire?—by things indeterminable I mean what the Greeks call *ἀδύνατα*. Now if things were so constituted that it made no difference whether ‘appearances’ present themselves to any one as they do to a madman or as they do to a man of sound mind, who could possibly feel certain about his own soundness of mind? Now to wish to arrive at this conclusion shews no slight madness. Further, they hunt out with childish delight resemblances either between twins or

between the impressions made by signet rings. Now who among us does not admit that there are resemblances between things, seeing that they are manifest in very many quarters? But if the fact that many things are like many others suffices for the destruction of knowledge, why are you not satisfied with it, particularly as we make you a present of it? And why do you prefer to maintain a proposition which the natural order of the world does not admit—I mean that each thing should not preserve its identity in its own class, and that there should be any confusion, based on the absence of all differences, between two or more phenomena? For example be it granted that eggs are extremely like eggs and bees like bees: why then do you carry on the fight: or what do you want with the twins? It is admitted that they resemble one another, and you might have remained satisfied with the admission: you however want them to be identical and not merely alike: and that cannot by any possibility happen. Then you flee to the natural philosophers, who are especial marks 55 for ridicule in the Academy, yet you like the rest will no longer keep your hands off them and you say Democritus declares that there are countless worlds and some of them not merely so like one another, but so thoroughly and completely copies of one another in all respects, that they absolutely do not differ in the least, and that the same is true of men. Then you ask us to grant you that, if one world is so similar to another as to preclude the least distinction being drawn between them, so in this world of ours too one thing is so much a copy of another that all distinctions and differences are absent. Why indeed, you will say, should it be that in this world of ours, great as it is, a second Catulus cannot be produced, though out of all those atoms whence Democritus declares the universe to be constructed countless copies of Q. Lutatius Catulus not only may be formed but are in existence in the other worlds, which are countless in number?

XVIII. In the first place then you summon me before the bar of 56 Democritus, with whom I do not agree or rather whom I set at nought because of the doctrine which is stated in clear language by more cultivated natural philosophers, that each individual thing has its own peculiar marks. Now assume that those Servilii of old, who were twins, were as much alike as they are said to have been; you surely do not pronounce them to have been identical? They were not recognised out of doors, but they were at home: not by those of other households, but by those of their own. Do we not commonly see it come about that after we supposed we could never know certain persons one from the other, when once we have the advantage of experience we find it so easy to know

them one from the other that they do not appear to us to be in the
 57 least degree alike? At this point you may carry on the contest if you
 like, I will not strike back: nay, I will go so far as to admit that the
 very man of wisdom himself, with whom our whole conversation is
 concerned, so often as things that are alike come across him, which he
 has not got marked off from one another, will refrain from 'assent' and
 will never acquiesce in any 'appearance', unless it possess such a nature
 as a deceptive 'appearance' cannot possibly possess. But just as he has
 certain rules applicable to all other matters, which enable him to draw
 the line between the true and the deceptive, so he must bring experi-
 ence to bear on those instances of similarity. Even as the mother
 knows her twins one from another by practising her eyesight, so you
 will know them if you once grow accustomed to them. Do you not
 observe how proverbial is the resemblance which eggs bear one to
 another? Yet we have understood that at Delos when its prosperity
 was at its height many persons were in the habit of rearing fowls for
 profit: when these people had glanced at an egg they commonly de-
 58 clared which hen had laid it. Nor is this fact (the resemblance of
 eggs) detrimental to us, since we are content not to be able to tell the
 eggs one from another: yet none the more for that is it right for us to
 assent to the statement that one egg is identical with another, implying
 that there is absolutely no difference between the two, for I have a
 guiding principle which leads me to adjudge certain 'appearances' to
 be true which present such features as cannot belong to 'appearances'
 that are deceptive: from this principle I am not free to depart a
 finger's breadth, as the saying is, lest I should produce general dis-
 order. Not merely the theory of truth and untruth, but their natural
 features as well will be destroyed, if there is to be no difference
 traceable between them: thus the statement becomes ridiculous which
 you are sometimes fond of making, that when 'appearances' are
 imprinted in our minds you do not mean to deny a distinction be-
 tween the imprints themselves, but only between certain kinds and
 classes of them. As though we do not decide about appearances with
 reference to their class! And these will be deprived of credit when
 once the mark which distinguishes truth from falsehood has been
 59 swept away. Another contention of your school is extremely ridi-
 culous, that you act upon probable 'appearances' if you find your-
 selves unobstructed by any circumstance. To begin with, how can you
 help being obstructed, seeing that the deceptive 'appearances' are not
 separable from the true? Next, what test of truth have we, seeing that
 your test is linked with falsehood? Hence arose inevitably $\epsilon\pi\omicron\lambda\eta$, or

'suspension of assent', in the practice of which Arcesilas, if the judgments of some concerning Carneades are true, was the more consistent of the two. For if perception is impossible, as both held it to be, there must be an end of 'assent'. What indeed is so nugatory as to acquiesce in something which is not known? Now we heard just yesterday that Carneades used sometimes to drift away so far as to say that the man of wisdom will give a groundless judgment, which means that he will commit a sin. Moreover, I am not so sure of the possibility of perception (a point I have already discussed at too great length) as I am that the man of wisdom has no fancied knowledge, I mean never yields 'assent' to any matter which is either fallacious or unknown. There remains the assertion of our opponents that arguments ought 60 to be urged against and in defence of all views, for the purpose of discovering the truth. I want then to see what truth they have discovered. It is not our custom, says one, to shew it. Pray what are these mysteries of yours? Or why do you conceal the opinion of your school, as though it were something that disgraced you? In order, says one, that our pupils may be guided by reason rather than by authority. How would it be if they were guided by both? Surely that is not a worse plan? There is one doctrine, however, which they do not conceal, namely, that perception is impossible. Now has authority no baneful influence in the case of this doctrine? I believe its influence is baneful in the extreme. Pray who would have attached himself to theories so plainly and 'conspicuously' preposterous and untrue, but that Arcesilas had such rich acquirements and such a power of eloquence, which Carneades possessed in a much higher degree still?

XIX. These are, approximately, the doctrines Antiochus urged not 61 only on that occasion at Alexandria, but with much greater emphasis many years later when he was in Syria with me a short time before his death. But now I have established my case, as you are my dear friend"—here he addressed me by name—"and are my junior by a good many years, I will not refrain from rebuking you. Do you now after pronouncing so high an encomium on philosophy and after driving our friend Hortensius from his opposing opinion, intend to enrol yourself as a disciple of that philosophy which commingles truth with untruth, strips us of our means of judging, robs us of our power of approval, and deprives us of all our senses? Even the Cimmerians, though some divinity, or Nature perhaps, or the position of the spot they inhabited, had cut off from them all view of the sun, still had fires at hand, of whose light they might avail themselves, but the school of philosophers which you follow, after they have spread around us such thick darkness, have not left us even so much as a

single spark whereby we might spy out anything: and were we to become their pupils we should be bound with such shackles as to be
 62 unable to turn ourselves about. If they have destroyed 'assent' they have destroyed all mental activity and all exertion in practical affairs: now I say that this destruction is not only not right but not possible. Take care that you do not find yourself to be just the man of all others who is least free to support such a theory. Do you, after discovering and dragging to light a most secret conspiracy and declaring on oath that you had 'learned all about it', as I too might have done, for you had acquainted me with it, do you I say mean to affirm that there is nothing which admits of being known, 'apprehended' and perceived? Take precautions, I pray you, again and again, that you may not by your own action also disparage the prestige of your most splendid achievements." When he had said this, he stopped. Now Hortensius in great wonderment, which he had betrayed constantly while Lucullus was speaking, to such an extent that he actually often lifted up his hands, which is not surprising, for never, I believe, was a more careful speech directed against the Academy—Hortensius then whether in jest or in earnest—for I could not entirely make him out—began to urge me to abandon my opinions. Then Catulus said to me: "If you have been shaken by the discourse of Lucullus, which was delivered so as to shew great resources of memory, great carefulness, and great fluency, I hold my tongue and do not think that it is for me to prevent you from changing your opinions if it seems good to you so to do. But there is one thing I should not be inclined to advise, that you should be influenced by his authority. For", said he with a smile, "he almost went so far just now as to warn you to be on your guard lest some unprincipled tribune of the plebs, and you understand how great the number of these will always be, should catch you and put the question to you at a public meeting, in what way you were consistent with yourself, since you maintained on the one hand a denial that any certainty can be arrived at, and on the other hand declared that you had 'learned all about it.' See to it, I entreat you, that this threat does not alarm you. As to the principles themselves, I should prefer you to hold different views from those of our friend. But should you yield your ground, I shall not be greatly surprised, since I recall the fact that Antiochus himself, though he had believed one set of doctrines for a number of years, abandoned his opinions as soon as it seemed good to him to do so." When Catulus had thus spoken, all eyes were turned on me.

64 XX. Then, not less excited than I usually am when I have a very important case, I began a speech somewhat after this fashion. "In regard

to the matter at issue, Catulus, the discourse of Lucullus has impressed me, as a discourse well might coming from a man of learning and rich acquirements and great readiness, one too who neglects no argument which can be urged in favour of his case, yet he has not made me distrust my power of replying to him. Authority so great as his was certainly likely to impress me had you not balanced it by your own, no whit inferior to his. I will approach my task then, after first saying a few words touching my own reputation. If it was in any spirit of 65
vain glory or contentiousness that I became an adherent of this philosophy rather than the others, then I think that not only my folly, but my character and disposition deserve reproof. Indeed, if in trivial matters obstinacy is censured and trickery is actually repressed, am I likely to desire either to contend, for the mere love of fighting, about the general conditions and the purpose of life in its entirety, or to delude not only others but myself as well? Therefore, did I not think it out of place in a debate of this kind to do what is sometimes done in political discussions, I would swear by Jove and by my family gods that I burn with a passion for the discovery of truth and do believe the doctrine I state. Pray, how can I help having an ardent desire to 66
discover truth, seeing that I am delighted with the discovery of anything that resembles the truth? But as I judge it to be the noblest occupation to gaze on the truth, so it is the greatest dishonour to accept falsities for truths. Nor yet am I the man never to accept a falsity, never to yield my 'assent', never to fancy I know, but our inquiries relate to the man of wisdom. For my part, I am myself a great holder of fancied knowledge for I am by no means a man of wisdom, and I guide my reflections not by the tiny Cynosure 'wherein the Phoenicians trust as their guide by night over the deep,' as Aratus says, and so steer a straighter course because they keep in view the star 'which revolves in an inner orbit, or a small circle,' but I guide myself by Helice and the very brilliant stars of the Bear, I mean by reasonings which present a broader aspect, and are not polished to extreme refinement. So I wander about and fetch a wider compass. But the inquiry concerns not myself, as I have said, but the man of wisdom. Now whenever those 'appearances' have made a vigorous attack on my mind or my senses, I admit them and sometimes even yield them my assent, though I have no perception of them, for perception I believe to be an impossibility. I am not a man of wisdom, so I give way to 'appearances' and cannot stand my ground. Arcesilas, however, in agreement with Zeno, thinks this the highest function of the wise man, to watch lest he should be taken captive, to see that he is not deceived.

Nothing is indeed more irreconcilable with the conception we have formed of the wise man's seriousness, than blundering, carelessness, and rashness. What need then for me to talk about the stability of the wise man? And you too, Lucullus, admit that he holds no fancied knowledge. Now since you accept this statement—I am dealing with the last of your statements first, but will soon get back to the proper order—bethink yourself first of all, what weight the following argument possesses.

67 XXI. If the wise man is ever to yield assent, he will also sometimes yield it improperly: but he never will yield it improperly: therefore he never will yield his assent on any occasion. Arcesilas used to accept this argument, since he strongly maintained the first and the second premiss: Carneades sometimes granted as the second premiss, that the wise man does sometimes yield his assent. So it followed that he also 'opines,' a conclusion which you refuse to accept, and rightly so, as I think. Now the first premiss, that the wise man, were he to assent, would also 'opine,' is declared untrue both by the Stoics and by their partisan Antiochus; for, say they, he can mark off deceptive 'appearances' from true, and 'appearances' which can lead to perception from those
68 which cannot. Yet we in the first place, even if there are objects which can be perceived, still think the mere habit of rendering assent dangerous and treacherous. Therefore since it is admitted to be so wrong to assent to anything which is either untrue or uncertain, it is better to withhold 'assent' altogether, lest a rash advance should lead to a headlong fall. For falsehoods lie so close to truths, and 'appearances' which cannot be perceived to those which can—granting for the moment that there are such: we will look to that matter by and by—that the man of wisdom ought not to trust himself on such hazardous ground. Now if I assume on my own account that perception is impossible, and take over from you the admission, which you offer me, that the wise man does not 'opine', this result will follow, that the wise man will check his 'assent' in all cases, so that you will have to consider whether you prefer to adopt that conclusion or this, that the wise man will 'opine'. Neither of them, you will say. Let us strive then to shew that perception is impossible: in fact the whole dispute turns on that.

69 XXII. But first a few words with Antiochus, who not only studied these very doctrines I am maintaining in the School of Philo so long that he was allowed to have studied there longer than any other pupil, but also wrote most ably on these themes, and then again attacked them with vigour not greater than he had often before displayed in their defence. However able he may have been, and he was able, still his authority is diminished by his instability. I ask what the day was that

dawned on him and revealed to him that token of truth and falsehood, whose existence he had persistently and for so many years denied? Did he think out some new theory? His doctrines are those of the Stoics. Was he dissatisfied with his former views? Why did he not betake himself to some other school, and best of all to the Stoics? He dissented on grounds peculiar to that school. Well, was he not content with Mnesarchus, with Dardanus? These were at that time the leaders of the Stoic school at Athens. He never separated himself from Philo until he began to find pupils of his own. How was it that the Old Academy was suddenly resuscitated? He seems to have wished to preserve the respectability of the title, though he was in revolt against the doctrines, because some declared that he was acting with an eye to his own reputation and was hoping that his followers would be called Antiocheans. My opinion rather is that he found himself powerless to withstand the combined attack of all the philosophers. In fact on all other matters they have some points of agreement: the doctrine in question is the one Academic doctrine which no philosopher of the other schools admits. Thus he retreated and like those, who find the sun intolerable under the New Exchange, so he, finding himself too hot, took refuge under the shadow of the Old Academics, as the others do beneath the Maenian caves. If we turn to the test he applied at the time when he held perception to be impossible, demanding which of the two opinions Dionysius the philosopher of Heraclia had 'apprehended' by the aid of that infallible token which you say ought to accompany 'assent', whether the doctrine to which he had clung for many years and which he had taken on trust from his master Zeno, that Morality was the only Good, or the doctrine he had actively championed afterwards, that Morality was an empty phrase and that Pleasure was the Supreme Good; we find that in desiring to shew from Dionysius' change of opinion that there is no copy of the truth imprinted in our minds so as to render it impossible that the copy may be untrue, Antiochus was careful to allow the rest an opportunity of deriving from himself the same proof he had obtained from Dionysius. But I shall have more to say to him on another occasion; now I turn to the arguments you advanced, Lucullus, in reply to these.

XXIII. And in the first place let us see what is the character of the assertion you made at the outset; that we talked of ancient philosophers just as rebels were wont to use the names of certain illustrious men who had still been to some extent democrats. The rebels, in undertaking actions that are far from respectable, are anxious to be thought to resemble respectable statesmen. We however say that

we hold views which you yourselves allow to have found favour with very famous philosophers. Anaxagoras declared snow to be in reality black. Would you tolerate me if I were to declare it so too? No, nor would you if I even had a doubt about the matter. But who is Anaxagoras? Is he a sophist—this is the title given to the men who used to pursue philosophy for vain glory or for lucre? He was
73 a man of the highest reputation for seriousness and ability. What need to speak of Democritus? Whom can we compare with him not only for greatness of talent but for greatness of soul, inasmuch as he dared to write this preface: ‘this I have to say about all things that are.’ His promise has no exception. What can there be beyond ‘all things that are’? Who does not place this philosopher above Cleanthes, Chrysippus and the others of later times? These appear to me fifth-rate when compared with him. Now he does not say what we do, for we do not deny that something of the nature of truth exists, but we do deny that it can be perceived; he roundly denies that truth exists: the senses, he says, are attended, not by dimness, but by thick darkness; this is the way he speaks of them. He who admired him more than all others, Metrodorus the Chian, at the beginning of his book about Nature says: ‘I say we do not know whether we know anything or whether we know nothing, nor do we either know or not know anything about the very statement
74 just made, nor generally whether anything exists or nothing.’ You think Empedocles is mad: but to me he appears to pour forth utterances most worthy of the subjects concerning which he speaks. Surely then he does not put out our eyes or rob us of our senses, if he decides that they have very little power of pronouncing judgment on objects which come within their scope. Parmenides and Xenophanes, in verses far from good indeed, but still in their verses such as they are chide in almost angry strain the assumption of those who though it is impossible for anything to be known, dare to assert that they do know. You said further that Socrates and Plato must be separated from the rest. Why? Are there any I can speak about more confidently than these? I seem to myself to have lived in their company: so many dialogues have been written at length which place it beyond question that Socrates held knowledge to be impossible. He made only one exception ‘that he knew himself to know nothing,’—no other. What need to speak of Plato? He surely would not have followed up the consequences of this doctrine in so many volumes, had he not accepted it. There was no reason for him to persist in using the irony of the other philoso-

pher, especially as it was continual. XXIV. Do I now appear to you, not merely to use the names of famous men, like Saturninus, but to take as my models none but brilliant, none but renowned philosophers? But yet I had at hand men you dislike, though insignificant men, Stilpo, Diodorus and Alexinus, who use certain complicated and keen-edged σοφίσματα; for this is the name borne by deceptive arguments of the minor sort. But what need for me to summon them together, when I find at hand Chrysippus who is supposed to be the pillar of the Stoic porch? How much did he urge against the senses, how much against everything that is accepted in the course of experience? But, say they, he refuted himself. I think he did not, but let us suppose, if you like, that he did. Surely he would not have got together so many examples of phenomena, which he said deceived us by their great probability, did he not see that it is no easy matter to withstand them. What do you think of the Cyrenaics, a school of philosophers by no means without repute? These declare that there is nothing coming from without which can lead to perception: that they have perception only of those facts which they feel by an inner contact, pain for example or pleasure, and that they do not know what colour or sound anything has, but only that their own constitution is affected in a certain way. 75

We have said enough about authorities. However, you some time since put the question to me whether I did not suppose that after the time of those old philosophers, through the lapse of so many generations, truth might possibly have been discovered, when so many minds and so much enthusiasm were engaged in the search. What *has* been discovered I shall examine a little later, and you shall yourself be the judge. But that Arcesilas did not do battle with Zeno from mere love of opposition, but desired to discover the truth, becomes clear from the following considerations. No one among his predecessors had ever, I will not say elaborated, but even uttered the theory, that it is possible for a man to avoid 'opining', and that this is not only possible but indispensable for the man of wisdom. The principle was in the eyes of Arcesilas both true and right and befitting the character of the wise man. He asked Zeno, it may be, what would happen if it was neither possible for the wise man to have perception nor becoming for him to 'opine.' He, I suppose, answered that he would not 'opine', since there was something capable of being perceived. What was that something? An 'appearance', I suppose. What kind of 77

- 'appearance' then? He then, I imagine, defined it thus; 'an appearance which is an imprint or stamp or picture caused by a real object, representing that object as it is.' After this the question was put whether this was the case even if a true 'appearance' took the very form which possibly a deceptive one might assume. Here I think Zeno shrewdly saw that there was no 'appearance' which could be perceived, if an 'appearance' proceeding from a reality were such that one proceeding from a nonentity might be of just the same form. Arcesilas agreed that the addition had been properly made to the definition, since perception of the untrue was not possible, nor yet of the true if it had the same form that the false might perchance assume. He then threw his whole strength into discussions intended to enable him to prove that there is no 'appearance' thrown off by a real object with such a form that there may not exist
- 78 another 'appearance' just like it but proceeding from a falsity. This is the only point which has remained in dispute till now. For the other statement, that the wise man would assent to nothing, was not essential to this discussion, since it was open to him, without perceiving anything, nevertheless to 'opine', a position which Carneades is said to have sanctioned, though I, putting more faith in Clitomachus than in Philo or Metrodorus, think that he rather supported the position for argument's sake than gave it his sanction. But let us pass that by. Indubitably when 'opining' and perception have both been swept away, the refusal of 'assent' in every case is the consequence, so that if I demonstrate perception to be impossible, you must admit that the wise man will never yield his 'assent.'
- 79 XXV. What then is there that admits of being perceived if even the senses do not give us true information? You, Lucullus, defend them by resort to a commonplace: though to cut you off from the opportunity of doing so, I had purposely made such a long speech against the senses, at a stage of my argument where it was not needed. You further say you are not disturbed by the broken oar, or by the pigeon's neck. I first ask why? For I observe that in the case of the oar there exists nothing of the kind that appears, and that in the case of the pigeon several colours appear, though not more than one exists. In the next place did our statement contain nothing more than this? All those arguments are intact, your case is overthrown; yet my friend says his senses tell him truth. Well then, you always have at hand an authority ready to plead the case at great hazard to himself, for Epicurus stakes the issue on the declaration, that if an act of sense ever once conveyed false information during the whole of life, sense is in

no case to be trusted. This is candour, to rely on your own witnesses 80
 and to stand to your perverse view! So Timagoras the Epicurean says
 that it never happened to him, after applying pressure to his eye, to
 see two tiny flames proceeding from a lamp: the falsehood was the
 fault of the inference, and not of the eyes. As though the question
 were what really is, and not what seems to be! Let us permit this
 philosopher to be like his elders: but you, who declare that some
 'appearances' presented to the senses are true, while others are de-
 ceptive, how do you mark them off one from the other? A truce,
 I pray, to commonplace arguments; we have a store of those at
 home. You say to me, 'if some god were to put this question to
 you: supposing your senses to be healthy and unimpaired, there is
 nothing else, is there, that you crave?—what would you answer?'
 I only wish he would put it. He would hear what a bad sub-
 ject he had found in us. For granting that our eyes see truly, how
 far do we see? From where I stand, I see the villa of Catulus at
 Cumæ, but that at Pompeii I cannot discern, nor is there any obstacle
 interposed, but the eyesight can be strained no further. What a
 splendid view! Puteoli we see, but our friend C. Avianius, who is
 perhaps taking a walk in the colonnade of Neptune, we do not see.
 But that person, whoever he was, who is often quoted in lectures, used 81
 to see an object distant eighteen hundred stadia, and some birds see
 further still. I should therefore boldly answer the god your friends
 imagine that I am entirely dissatisfied with the eyes I have. He will
 say that my sight is sharper than that of those fishes perhaps which
 we cannot see though they are at this moment beneath our eyes, and
 which cannot see us from below. Therefore just as the water obstructs
 their vision, so the thick air obstructs ours. But, say our opponents,
 we crave nothing more. Well, do you suppose that the mole has a
 craving for the light? Nor should I so much find fault with the god,
 because my vision is contracted, as because it is incorrect. Do you
 see that vessel? It appears to us to be at anchor; while to those on
 board the vessel, this house seems to be in motion. Search out the
 reason why it seems so: yet however completely you may have dis-
 covered it, and very likely you may not succeed, nevertheless you will
 not have shewn that you have on your side a true witness, but merely
 that he gives false evidence not without a reason. XXVI. Why talk of 82
 the vessel? Why, I saw that you thought nothing of the oar. Perhaps
 you want things on a larger scale. What can there be larger than the sun?
 Mathematicians maintain it to be more than eighteen times larger than
 the earth. How tiny it seems to us! In my eyes about a foot broad.

Epicurus thinks that it may be even less than it seems to be, but not much: nor does he think it is much greater, or it may be just the size it seems to be, so that our eyes belie us either not at all, or not much. What then becomes of that word 'once'? But let us part company with this credulous man, who thinks the senses never belie us: who thinks so even now, when yonder sun, which is whirled along with such mighty impetus that the greatness of its velocity cannot be even
83 imagined, still appears to us to be at rest. But, to bring the dispute into small compass, pray see within what narrow bounds the issue lies. There are four leading propositions which prove that there is nothing which can be known, perceived, and 'apprehended', and this is the doctrine with which our whole investigation is occupied. Of these propositions the first is that there is a kind of deceptive 'appearance', the second that such an 'appearance' cannot be perceived, the third that when no difference is traceable between a number of 'appearances' it cannot happen that some of them should be capable of being perceived, while others are not so capable, the fourth that there is no truthful 'appearance' resulting from an act of sensation, which has not side by side with it another indistinguishable from it, yet which cannot be perceived. Of these four propositions, all allow the second and third. The first Epicurus does not grant; you, with whom we have
84 to do, allow this too. The whole battle is over the fourth. A man then who was looking at P. Servilius Geminus, if he supposed himself to be looking at Quintus, came across an 'appearance' of such a nature that it could not be perceived, because there was no sign marking off the true 'appearance' from the untrue: and when once this test was removed, what infallible sign was he to use in recognising C. Cotta who was twice consul with a Geminus? You say that in the whole realm of Nature no resemblance so great as this exists. You carry on the fight, it is true, but with a compliant opponent. Suppose that there exists no such resemblance: assuredly it may *seem* to exist. It will therefore impose upon our sense, and if one resemblance imposes on us, everything will be thrown into uncertainty. For when once that criterion is destroyed, by the aid of which the recognition ought to be made, even if the man upon whom your eyes rest proves to be the very man he seems to you to be, still you will not decide on the strength of such a sign as you say ought to be present, a sign such that there cannot possibly exist any false sign wearing the same aspect.
85 Now therefore that it is possible for P. Geminus to appear to you as Quintus, what certainty have you such as prevents Cotta from appearing to you a different man, seeing that there is something which

appears to you to be what it is not? You say that all things belong to their own particular class, and that no one thing has the same characteristics as another. It is a Stoic notion and not very easy to believe, that there is not a hair which is in all respects just what another hair is, nor grain either. These statements can be exposed, but I do not care to enter on the battle. Indeed it matters not with regard to the present question whether an impression of a thing is in every respect identical with another, or cannot be in practice distinguished from that other, even though the two be not identical. But if the resemblance between men cannot be so great as we allege, cannot that between statues be so either? Tell me, could not Lysippus with the same brass, the same tempering, the same graving tool and the other implements the same, produce a hundred Alexanders of the same pattern? By what mental conception then would you distinguish between them? Again, if I make 86 a hundred impressions with this ring, all on wax of the same description, will it be possible that there should be any characteristic to help you to recognise each? Or, will you have to look out for some ring-maker, since you have succeeded in finding your Delian fowl-breeder, able to acquire knowledge of each egg? XXVII. But you call in the aid of art to give further support to the senses. A painter sees things we do not see, and as soon as the flute-player has sounded a note, the music is recognised by the expert. Well, do you not think that it is a strong point against you, if without the aid of difficult arts, with which few make acquaintance, and of our nation very few indeed, we cannot have the use either of eyes or ears? Now for your fine speech about the immense art which nature had shewn in 'manufacturing' our senses and intellect and the whole constitution of man! What 87 reason is there here why I should not recoil from the rashness of 'opining'? Can you any longer maintain the notion that there is some power possessed of foresight and wisdom, save the mark! which has moulded, or to use your own term, which has 'manufactured' man? What is the nature of that 'manufacture'? Where was it carried out? When? Why? How? You handle those topics cleverly, and discuss them tastefully too. My last word is this, hold these opinions if you like, only do not state them dogmatically. But I shall speak of natural philosophy presently, and just for this reason, to save you from seeming to have told a falsehood, when you said a little earlier in your speech that I should do so. But to pass to subjects which are more open to the light, I will at once launch forth those arguments whole and entire with which many tomes have been filled, not by our school alone, but by Chrysippus also: and it is a common complaint for the

Stoics to make about him, that while he eagerly raked up everything that told against the senses and 'conspicuousness', and against common experience, and reasoning too, he shewed less power when he tried to
 88 reply to himself, and so furnished Carneades with weapons. The matters I mean are of the kind to which you devoted such minute treatment. You said more than once that the impressions of sleepers, drunken men, and lunatics were feebler than those of men awake, sober, and of sound mind. In what respect? Because, you said, Ennius, on awaking, did not say he had seen Homer, but that he had seemed to see, while Alcmaeon cried, 'But my thoughts are far from agreeing.' And you said the same of drunken men. Just as though any one denied that a man on awaking thinks his visions dreams, or that one whose madness has calmed down, supposes the 'appearances' which came before him during his madness not to have been true. But that is not the point: the question is, what aspect the 'appearances' had at the time when they did come before him. Unless indeed we choose to suppose that Ennius, merely because he dreamed it, did not hear that whole speech beginning 'What filial reverence in my soul' as clearly as he would have heard it had he been awake. When he roused, indeed, he was able to regard those impressions as dreams, as they really were, but while asleep he accepted them as fully as if he were awake. Again, does not Iliona in her slumber so firmly believe her son to have called out 'Mother, I summon thee,' that she believed it still when aroused? Else, whence those words 'Hither, stay, wait, listen: tell me o'er thy tale again'? Does she seem to put less trust in her impressions than waking people usually do?

89 XXVIII. Why talk of madmen? Pray, Catulus, what was Tuditanus, your connexion, like? Does any one, however sound in mind, feel so sure about what he sees as that man did about his visions? What of him who cried 'I see thee, I see thee; live, Ulysses, while thou may'st'? Did he not actually twice cry aloud that he saw, though he assuredly did not see? Again, when Hercules, in Euripides, pierced with his arrows his own children, thinking them the children of Eurystheus, and began to kill his wife, and tried to slay his father also, was he not just as strongly affected by false as he would have been by true impressions? Once more, does not your Alcmaeon himself who declares that 'his thoughts agree not with his eyes' shout again when his madness grew intense, 'whence springs this fire?' and in his next speech 'they come, they come; they're here, they're here; 'tis me they seek.' Again, when he appeals to the maid for protection: 'Bring me succour, banish from me the plague, this power armed with fire that

tortures me. Girt with lurid serpents they stalk onwards, and encircle me with their flaming torches.' Do you doubt that he believes himself to see this sight? And so with the rest: 'Apollo never-shorn bends his golden bow, as he leans o'er the moon; Diana launches her brand on the left.' How could he possibly, were these real facts, have a stronger belief than he had, merely because they seemed so? For it is now clear that 'the thoughts agree with the eyes'. Now all these examples are quoted to prove what is as sure as anything can be, that so far as the acquiescence of the mind is concerned, there is no difference between true 'appearances' and false. You do no good by pitting against those delusions the deliberate recollection either of the madmen or of the dreamers themselves, since the question is not what sort of recollection those people commonly retain who have roused themselves from sleep, or those who have recovered from madness, but what kind of 'appearances' were present either to madmen or dreamers at the time when they were affected. But now I leave the subject of the senses.

What is there that is capable of being perceived by the aid of reasoning? You say logic has been discovered and is a sort of arbitress and judge of truth and falsehood. What truth and what falsehood? Concerned with what subjects? Will the logician decide what is true or false in mathematics or in literature or in music? But his knowledge is not of that sort. In philosophy then. What has he to do with the size of the sun? What acquirement of his enables him to determine the nature of the Supreme Good? What then will he decide? What conjunctive proposition, what disjunctive proposition is true, what statements are ambiguous, what consequences follow upon each fact, and what are inconsistent with it? If he decides these and the like questions, he decides about his own affairs. But he promised more. Verily if we look to the other numerous and important matters which philosophy embraces, it is not enough merely to decide these questions. But as you set so high a value on that art, see that its whole development be not to your harm: for it at its first setting out gaily instructs us in the first principles of utterance and the interpretation of dubious statements, and the theory of proof, then gets to the soritæ with their tiny additions, which surely form treacherous and perilous ground, and which you lately declared to constitute a faulty style of argument. XXIX. What of that? Is the blame for their faultiness to be laid on us? The nature of the universe has permitted us no knowledge of limits such as would enable us to determine in any case how far to go. Nor is it so with the heap of corn alone, whence comes the name, but there is no matter whatever, concerning which, if questions with

gradual increase are put to us (e.g. whether a man is rich or poor, famous or unknown, whether a number of things are many or few, large or small, long or short, broad or narrow), we know how much addition or

93 diminution must be made before we can give a definite answer. But, say they, the soritae are defective. Destroy them, then, if you can, lest they cause you trouble. They certainly will, unless you take precautions. The precautions have been taken, says one, since Chrysippus thinks it right when graduated questions are put, such as 'are three things few or many?' that some time before getting to the 'many' one should keep quiet, or as these people phrase it, ἡσυχάζειν. For all I care, says Carneades, you may not merely keep quiet, but may even snore. But what do you gain? There is some one at your elbow, bent on rousing you from your sleep and putting questions to you as before. 'If to the number at which you refused to answer, I make an addition of one, will that be many?' You will go on again as far as you think fit. Why say more? You indeed confess that you cannot state in your answer what number is the last of the 'few' or the first of the 'many.' And this kind of confusion is so widespread that I see no limits it may not

94 reach. That does me no damage, quoth our arguer, for like a crafty driver I will pull up my horses before I come to the limit, and all the more if the spot to which the horses are rushing be a precipice. In this way, says he, I pull myself up in good time, and cease to answer a sophistical questioner. If you are clear about the matter and yet do not answer, you are supercilious; if you are not clear, you too yourself have no perception. If you refuse because the subject is difficult, I allow your refusal. But you say you do not advance so far as the difficult parts. You stop then while there is plenty of light. If you only do so to avoid speaking, you will achieve nothing. What, pray, does it matter to the man who wants to entrap you, whether he gets you into his net while you are silent or while you are talking? But if as far as nine, for instance, you answer without hesitation that the numbers are 'few,' and stop at the tenth thing, you actually withhold your assent in a case free from doubt and very clear. This same course you do not permit me to take in a case which is difficult. So your art brings you no aid in contending with the soritae, for it does not shew those who carry on the process of increase or diminution where either the beginning is or the

95 end. What of the fact that the same art ends by destroying what it had before produced, like Penelope unravelling her web? Is that your fault or ours? No doubt the first principle of dialectic is, that every proposition—they call it ἀξίωμα, which is almost 'deliverance'—is either true or false. Well then, is the following proposition true or false? If

you say you are a liar and therein tell the truth, are you a liar or do you tell the truth? These fallacies, of course you say, are insoluble, a statement which is more invidious than ours when we allege that things have not been 'apprehended' and not perceived. XXX. But I pass this by. If, however, these sophisms do not admit of solution, and no test of them is near being discovered, which will enable you to answer the question whether the statements are true or false, I do ask what becomes of your definition: 'a proposition is such that it is either true or false'? I will add, that when once certain assumptions have been made, some statements must be allowed as resulting from these assumptions, while others must be rejected as belonging to a class opposed to them. What judgment do you pronounce on the form of the following argument? 'If you say it is now daylight and you say the truth, it is daylight; you do say that it is now daylight and you do say the truth, therefore it is daylight.' You and your school undoubtedly think the style valid and allow that the argument has been very properly constructed. So in your teaching you impart it to your pupils as the simplest method of composing an argument. You will therefore either allow the validity of any argument constructed in the same way, or else your art is nought. Consider then whether you will allow the validity of this proof: 'if you say you are a liar and tell the truth, you are a liar; now you do say you are a liar and you do tell the truth; a liar therefore you are.' How can you help accepting this, when you have accepted the former proof which belongs to the same class? These are knots tied by Chrysippus which even he never untied. What indeed was he to do in face of an inference like this: 'if it is daylight, it is daylight: it is daylight however; daylight therefore it is'? Of course he would admit it. Indeed the very method of the compound statement compels you, when you have admitted the former member, to admit the latter. In what respect then is it different from this other inference: 'if you are a liar, you are a liar: but you are a liar, therefore you are a liar'? This you say you can neither accept nor reject. How can you any more accept or reject the former? If art, reasoning, method, and the cogency of the argument are worth anything, there is as much of these in the one as in the other. But this is what these men come to at last: they require us to make exceptions of these insoluble fallacies. I advise them to go before some tribune: they will never get me to allow them their exception. Nay more, inasmuch as Epicurus who flouts and ridicules dialectic altogether cannot be got by them to admit the truth of the proposition we shall put thus: 'either Hermarchus will be alive to-morrow or not alive,' though dialecticians lay down that every disjunctive proposition of the form

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‘either yea or nay,’ is not merely a truth but a necessity, see how heedful that philosopher is whom these reasoners usually regard as dull. ‘For,’ says he, ‘if I allow one of the alternatives to be inevitable, Hermarchus will inevitably be either alive or not alive to-morrow; now there is in the constitution of things no such necessity.’ With this philosopher then the dialecticians, by whom I mean Antiochus and the Stoics, must fight their battle, since he turns dialectic entirely upside down. Indeed if a disjunctive proposition composed of two contradictory statements (now by contradictory statements I mean when one asserts and the other denies)—if such a disjunctive proposition may be deceptive,
 98 then there is none which can be true. But what quarrel have they with me, who merely follow their teaching? When he had met with some difficulty like this, Carneades used thus to jest: ‘if my inference is sound, I have you in my power; if faulty, Diogenes shall return me the mina.’ From that Stoic philosopher he had learned dialectic, and this was the fee paid to dialecticians. I follow the methods Antiochus taught me, and I cannot discover how I am to pronounce on the one hand that the proposition ‘if it is daylight, it is daylight,’ is true, on the ground that my instructors declare every proposition, wherein a statement is linked with a repetition of itself, to be true, and yet on the other hand to refrain from pronouncing that the proposition ‘if you are a liar, you are a liar,’ is composed in just the same way as the other. Either then the one proposition is as true as the other, or if mine is not, I will not accept yours either.

XXXI. But, to put away from us all those edged tools, and all those intricate forms of discussion, and to exhibit our true character, when once I have elucidated the entire doctrine of Carneades your Antiochean theories will topple down, all of them. But I am not going to put any statement in such a way as to lead any one to fancy it my own invention: I shall borrow from Clitomachus, who lived with Carneades till old age, a man not only shrewd, like a Carthaginian, but very enthusiastic and painstaking. There are four books of his about the suspension of ‘assent.’ The argument I am about to give is taken from the first.
 99 Carneades holds that there are two classifications of ‘appearances’, one involving the distinction that there are some ‘appearances’ which can be perceived and others which cannot, while the other involves the notion that some ‘appearances’ are probable, some not probable. So all the objections against the senses and against ‘conspicuousness’ bear upon the former division; against the latter no objections ought to be brought; so this is the doctrine of Carneades, that there was no ‘appearance’ of such a character as to lead to perception, but many such as to lead to

acceptance. Moreover, it would be unnatural, were there no such thing as probability, and the consequence is to turn life upside down, as you, Lucullus, warned us. Thus there are many 'appearances' for the senses to accept, provided we hold fast the fact that among these 'appearances' there is none of such a character, that there may not be also a deceptive 'appearance' bearing the same character and in no respect differing from it. Thus, whenever any 'appearance' befalls, whose aspect gives it probability, assuming that nothing presents itself to us which is adverse to the probability, the wise man will avail himself of it and so will keep in a straight course his whole scheme of life. Indeed the wise man you so often introduce acts, as well as others, on many probabilities which he has not 'apprehended' or perceived or approved, but which resemble the truth: and did he not accept these his whole life would be destroyed. Well then, in going on board a ship does your wise man hold in his mind the fact thoroughly 'apprehended' and perceived that he will have a favourable voyage? How can he? But if, we will suppose, he were to set out hence for Puteoli, in a sound vessel, with a good captain, in such a calm sea as this, it would appear to him that he is likely to arrive there in safety. He will therefore base his plans for action and inaction on 'appearances' of this kind and he will be readier to admit that snow is white than Anaxagoras was, who not only denied that it is so in fact, but also because he knew that water, from which snow was congealed, was black, denied that the snow even appeared to him white. And whatever phenomenon so comes in contact with him, that the 'appearance' it presents is probable, and its probability entirely unobstructed, he will be influenced by it. Indeed he is not chiselled out of stone or planed out of wood; he has a body, he has a mind, he is affected through his mind, and through his senses, so that many 'appearances' seem to him to be true, though for all that he does not find anywhere that palpable and characteristic mark which belongs to perception: and he believes the wise man does not render 'assent', just because some deceptive 'appearance' may spring up presenting the same form as any particular true 'appearance.' Nor do we argue against the senses in any other way than the Stoics, who aver that there are many false 'appearances' which are really far different from what they appear to the senses to be. XXXII. If it be true that only a single false 'appearance' comes before the senses, there is some one ready to declare that the senses cannot possibly perceive anything. So without a word from us, a single line of Epicurus and another of your own destroy 'perception' and 'apprehension.' What is the line of Epicurus? 'If any appearance of sense is false, then perception is impossible.'

What is yours? 'There are false appearances of sense.' What follows? Without a word of mine, the inference speaks for itself: 'perception is impossible.' I do not give in to Epicurus, says some one. Contend then with him, for he disagrees with you wholly: do not contend with me, for I agree with you at least in this, that some deceptions attend our senses. Yet nothing astonishes me so much as to hear such assertions made, and especially by Antiochus, who was thoroughly well acquainted with the principles I enuntiated a little while ago. For though any man should, to please himself, blame us because we deny that we can perceive anything, certainly the blame is to us of small account: still because we say that certain probabilities do exist, you do not find the statement sufficient. Be it insufficient: certainly we are bound to seek refuge from the reproaches which you, Lucullus, have especially cast upon us: 'Do you see nothing then? Do you hear nothing? Is nothing 'conspicuous' to you?' A little while ago I made it clear on the authority of Clitomachus how Carneades spoke on these topics. Hear how the same ideas are announced by Clitomachus in the book which he dedicated to C. Lucilius the poet, after he had addressed another treatise on the same subject to L. Censorinus, the same who was consul with M' Manilius. He wrote then almost in these words: I know them well, because the book contains the first principles and almost the simplest lessons in the very subject with which we are dealing—however, the passage runs thus: 'The Academics believe there are such differences between things that some of them seem probable, while others do not: that however is no reason why you should say that some can be perceived, while others cannot, because many falsities are probable, while nothing false can be perceived and known.' Therefore he says those go grievously astray who allege that the Academy steals from us our senses, since this school has never alleged that either colour or taste or sound has no existence, but has merely maintained this, that these sensations do not comprise within them each its peculiar sign of truth and infallibility which is found nowhere else. After setting this forth, he adds that there are two modes in which the wise man is stated to withhold his 'assent': in one way, when it is intended that he yields 'assent' to nothing whatever, in the other when he merely refrains from giving an answer such as implies that he absolutely sanctions anything or refuses to sanction it, so that he gives neither an absolute 'yes' nor an absolute 'no.' This being so, he holds one of these modes as a dogma, never giving his absolute 'assent', while the other form he carries out in practice, so that following the lead of probability, wherever it is present or absent, he can answer

(qualified) 'yes' or (qualified) 'no.' Moreover, as it is his belief that the man who refrains from assenting on all occasions, is nevertheless aroused and enters on action, he allows 'appearances', of such a nature as to impel us to activity: also such as enable us to return either a negative or a positive answer when questioned, merely acting upon the appearance which has presented itself, so long as we do so without (absolute) 'assent'; and yet he says not all such 'appearances' are accepted, but only those which are attended by no adverse circumstance. If we do not secure your approval for these doctrines let 105 them be false if you like, assuredly they are not odious. For we are not filching away the daylight, but merely declare that the 'appearances' you say are perceived and 'apprehended', are accepted by us if they are only probable.

XXXIII. So therefore now we have introduced and established probability, and required it to be without hindrances, or restrictions, free and not complicated by any circumstances, you surely see, Lucullus, that your advocacy of 'conspicuousness' is overcome. Our wise man of whom I am speaking will look out with the same eyes as the wise man of your school upon sky earth and sea, and with the same senses will take cognisance of the other objects which fall within the province of each sense. The sea yonder, which now seems purple beneath the freshening western breeze, will seem so also to the wise man of our school, and yet he will not absolutely accept the 'appearance', because we ourselves thought the sea blue just now and gray in the dawn, and because at this moment where it shines beneath the sun, it whitens and quivers and is unlike the portion close by, so that even if you were able to give a reason why it should prove so, still you would not be able to maintain that the 'appearance' presented to the eyes was true. Whence springs memory if we perceive nothing? 106 That was a question you put. Well, cannot we remember 'appearances' unless we have completely 'apprehended' them? What, did Polyænus, who is said to have been a great mathematician, the same who afterwards believed, in agreement with Epicurus, that geometry was entirely false, did he really forget the knowledge he once possessed? But then what is false cannot be perceived, as you yourselves hold. If then memory is of facts perceived and 'apprehended', what each man remembers he holds after perceiving and 'apprehending' it. No falsehood can be 'apprehended', and yet Siron remembers all the dogmas of Epicurus. As things stand, then, all these dogmas are true. This may be so for all I care; but you must either admit it to be so, which you are far from desiring to do, or you ought to give up memory

to me, and allow that there is room for it, even if 'apprehension' and
 107 'perception' have no existence. What will become of the arts? Which
 arts? Those which themselves admit that they rely on hypothesis more
 than on knowledge, or those which act merely upon 'appearances', and
 do not employ that system of yours to enable them to distinguish truth
 from falsehood?

But there are still two shining lights, which are the especial sup-
 ports of your case. For, first, you say it is not possible that a man
 should decline to assent in every case, and that so much at all events
 is 'conspicuous.' Seeing that Panaetius, in my opinion at least
 nearly the greatest of the Stoics, declares that he has doubts on a
 subject which all Stoics excepting himself think to be as clear as
 possible, namely the truth of augury, auspices, oracles, dreams, and
 prophecies, and refrains from assenting to them: why should the wise
 man not be able to do in dealing with other subjects what this philo-
 sopher is allowed to do even when treating of topics which his
 teachers have held to be perfectly clear? Or is there any assertion
 which when it is maintained he is free either to reject or to accept, but
 not free to doubt? Or are you to use such freedom as often as you
 please, when you come across *sortiæ*, and is our wise man not to be
 free to stop in the same way when he deals with the other matters,
 and that though he can act upon a close and unobstructed resemblance
 108 to the truth without yielding his 'assent'? The second point is that
 you assert it to be impossible that one who sanctions nothing by ren-
 dering his 'assent', should shew activity of any kind. Now, to begin
 with, it ought to be clearly seen in what 'assent' actually consists, for
 the Stoics say that the sensations themselves are forms of 'assent', and
 that since desire attends them, activity follows on them; but all this is
 swept away if the truth of 'appearances' is abolished. XXXIV. On
 both sides of this question a great deal has been both spoken and
 written, but in a short space the whole discussion may be completed.
 For my part, though I regard it as the highest form of activity to battle
 against 'appearances', to make a stand against hasty judgments, to
 check the perils of 'assent', and, though I believe Clitomachus when
 he writes that an almost Herculean task was achieved by Carneades in
 that he expelled from our minds 'assent' or rather hasty judgment and
 rashness, as it were some savage and cruel monster, yet for all that
 I still ask (for I wish now to leave that portion of my defence) what will
 obstruct the activity of one who acts on probabilities, if he finds no
 109 obstacle in the way? He will be obstructed, some one says, by the
 very fact that he will decide the impossibility of perceiving even that

impression which he accepts. You too will be obstructed by the same hindrance, in making a voyage, in agriculture, in marriage, in rearing children, and on very many occasions, in which you will find nothing but probability for your guide.

And yet you recur to that well worn and often rejected argument, pleading it not like Antipater, but as you say 'more trenchantly.' In fact you say Antipater was censured, because he asserted that consistency required a man who asseverated that nothing could be 'apprehended', to declare at least that his asseveration itself could be 'apprehended', a position which seemed to Antiochus stupid and inherently contradictory. For it cannot fittingly be said that nothing can be 'apprehended', if it be said that something can be 'apprehended.' He thinks Carneades should rather have been pressed in this way, viz. to admit this very dogma, that the wise man must believe perception to be impossible, to constitute an example of perception, inasmuch as no dogma of the wise man can escape being thoroughly 'apprehended', perceived and known. Just as if the wise man had arrived at no other dogma, or cannot conduct his life without dogmas altogether? Why, just as he holds his other opinions as 110 probabilities, without perceiving them, so he holds this, that perception is impossible. For if he possessed in this case a sign leading to knowledge, he would use it in all other cases. As he possesses no such sign, he avails himself of probabilities. So he is not afraid of being supposed to produce general disorder and to render everything indeterminable. For if questioned about duty and many other subjects in which he has had experience and practice, he would not declare his ignorance as he would if asked to say whether the number of the stars is even or odd. For in things indeterminable there lies no probability, and where there is probability the wise man will never be at a loss what to do or what to answer. Nor did you, Lucullus, overlook that criticism of Antiochus, 111—and that is not astonishing since it is particularly famous—which Antiochus often asserted to have caused Philo very great trouble. He said that in making one assumption, that there did exist false 'appearances', and again another that these do not differ from the true 'appearances', Philo did not observe that he had allowed the former assumption for this very reason, that there did seem to be some difference between 'appearances', a difference which was abolished by the second assumption, whereby he denies that true 'appearances' differ from false; whereas nothing could be more inconsistent. That would be correct, if we did abolish truth altogether. We do not do that, for we discern truths as much as falsehoods. But there is an aspect of things leading us to acceptance: we find no mark leading to perception

- 112 XXXV. Yet even now I seem to myself to plead my case somewhat narrowly. When there is a wide field over which our discourse may range, why do we drive it into such narrow passes, and into the Stoic jungle? Why, if I had to do with a Peripatetic who alleged that anything could be perceived, which was an 'appearance' proceeding from a real object, without bringing in that important appendix, 'having a form which it could not have if it proceeded from a deceptive object', I should deal directly with so direct a man, and should not greatly dispute the matter, and even if, on my declaring that there is nothing which can be 'apprehended', he were to maintain that the wise man sometimes 'opines', I should not offer resistance, particularly as Carneades himself maintained no strong opposition to that doctrine; but now what can I do? I ask what it is that can be 'apprehended.' I get an answer not from an Aristotle nor from a Theophrastus nor yet from a Xenocrates or a Polemo, but from one far inferior to them: 'a true appearance of such a form as a false appearance could not take.' I find nothing corresponding to the definition. So of course I am to give my sanction to something of which I know nothing, which means that I am to 'opine.' This is a course permitted to me by the Peripatetics and the Old Academy; you and your friends forbid it, and Antiochus above all, who powerfully influences me, either because I loved the man, as he did me, or because this is my opinion of him, that he was the most cultivated and the shrewdest of all the philosophers contemporary with us. First, I ask him how it is that he belongs to that form of the Academy, of which he declares himself a disciple? To pass by other points, what philosopher either of the old Academy or the Peripatetic school ever maintained the two doctrines we are discussing, either that the only thing which could be perceived was a true impression of such a form as a false one could not exhibit, or that the wise man never decides on insufficient grounds? Assuredly no one. Neither of these theories met with much support before Zeno's time. Yet I believe both of them to be true nor do I say so merely to serve the occasion, but that is the view I entirely accept.
- 114 XXXVI. One thing I find intolerable. While you interdict me from giving my sanction to what is unknown, and allege that to do so is most disgraceful and shews excessive recklessness, are you to take so much upon yourself as to set forth a scheme of wisdom, unfold the constitution of the universe, mould character, settle the boundaries of good and evil, plan out all duties, deter-

mine the course of life on which I am to enter, moreover promise to impart to me a critical test and a method applicable to debate and to processes of thought? Are you likely to secure me from slipping at any point, from ever judging hastily, while I try to master those countless topics? What school, pray, is that to which you are trying to transfer me, if you succeed in divorcing me from the one I now follow? I am afraid you will shew something of conceit, if you say it is your own. But you must needs say so. Nor is that so with you only, but every man wants to carry off people to his own school. Well, suppose I stand my ground against the Peripatetics, who assert that there is a kinship between them and the orators, and that illustrious men whom they have educated have often governed states, suppose I stave off the Epicureans, so many of whom are my intimate friends, who are such kind men and so affectionate to one another, what am I to do with Diodotus the Stoic, to whose teaching I have listened since I was a boy, who has associated with me so many years, who now lives in my house, for whom I feel both admiration and esteem, who sets at nought your Antiochean doctrines? 'Our doctrines', you will say, 'are alone true.' Alone undoubtedly, if true: for there cannot be several systems of truth at variance. Are we then immodest, who are anxious to take no false step, or are they rather conceited in convincing themselves that they alone possess all knowledge? 'It is not myself', says some one, 'but the wise man whom I declare to possess knowledge.' Excellent: you mean of course, to possess knowledge of the contents of your system. Well, to begin with, what sort of admission is this, that wisdom is being expounded by one who is not a wise man? But let us put ourselves out of sight, and talk of the wise man, with whom, as I have often said already, our whole investigation is concerned.

Wisdom then has been divided into three parts as well by yourselves as by most others. First then, if you like, let us examine the researches that have been made in natural philosophy: but there is one question I must put before we begin. Is there any one who is puffed up by so serious a misconception as to have brought himself to believe that he has firm knowledge of that subject? My question refers not to those theories which depend on hypothesis, which are tossed in this way and in that in the course of discussions, and which bring with them no convincing cogency. Let the mathematicians give heed, who boast that they do not induce, but compel conviction, and who bring you and your friends to accept all their propositions. Of these propositions my question concerns not those funda-

mental definitions of the mathematicians without the admission of which they cannot advance one finger's breadth: that a point is that which has no magnitude, a superficies, and so to speak, a collection of external points, is that in which no thickness whatever can be found: that a line is without breadth. When I have once admitted these propositions to be true, if I were to require the wise man to take an oath, and that not until Archimedes, under his very eyes, goes through all the calculations, which prove that the sun is many times greater than the earth, do you suppose he would swear it? If he did so he would shew disrespect to the sun himself, whom he

117 believes to be a god. But if the wise man is not likely to pin his faith to mathematical calculations which, as you yourselves declare, add a cogent force to demonstration, verily he will be very far from trusting the proofs proposed by philosophers, or if he is likely to trust them, I ask what school will he prefer? We may expound to him all the schemes of natural philosophy; but the task is a long one; however, I demand to know what teacher he is to follow. Imagine now that some man is on the road to become a wise man, but is not so yet, what doctrine and what system will he choose before all the others? Though any system he chooses, he will choose while he is not yet a wise man. But suppose him to be a being of superhuman ability, to what single natural philosopher will he give his approval in preference to all others? Nor can he approve more than one. I am not pressing vague problems; let us look only at this, what leader he is to follow in treating of the first elements of things, out of which the universe is constructed, since there is extreme disagreement between great men.

118 XXXVII. Thales first of all, the one man of the seven, to whom the other six are stated to have yielded the palm, declared that the universe was composed of water. But he did not induce Anaximander, his fellow countryman and companion, to believe this, since this thinker said that there was a formless substance out of which all things sprang. Afterwards his pupil Anaximenes assumed the air to be formless, but the things which were created from it to be endued with form: its products were earth, water, fire, and then the universe from these. Anaxagoras postulated an indefinite store of material substance, but said minute portions of it with certain resemblances among them were first in chaos, and were then brought into order by the divine intellect. Xenophanes at a still earlier time asserted that the universe was one, and that it was not subject to change, and that it was identical with God, without origin and eternal, of a globular form: Parmenides talked of fire as setting in motion the earth, which receives

from it her shape: Leucippus assumed a plenum and a vacuum; Democritus resembled him in this, but shewed greater fertility in other respects; Empedocles adopted the well-known and familiar four elements; Heraclitus, fire; Melissus a substance which was formless and unchangeable and existed from all eternity to all eternity. Plato gives his opinion that out of a material substance which admits of all modifications the universe has been constructed to last for ever. The Pythagoreans have made up their minds that the universe begins with numbers, and with the first principles of mathematics. From among these your wise man will choose some one philosopher, I suppose, as his leader; the rest, numerous and great as they are, will leave his tribunal rejected and convicted. To whatever doctrine again he gives his sanction, this he will hold because he has 'apprehended' it as thoroughly by mental effort as the 'appearances' he 'apprehends' by means of his senses, nor will he give a stronger 'assent' to the statement that the sun is now shining, than he will render, seeing he is a Stoic, to the theory that this universe is instinct with wisdom and possesses intellect, which has 'manufactured' both its own constitution and that of the universe, and sways, impels and governs all things. He will be convinced also that the sun, moon, all stars, the earth, the sea are gods, because a certain living intelligence penetrates and permeates them all, and yet that there will come a time for this universal order to perish amid a conflagration. Suppose all this true—you see surely by this time that I confess there is such a thing as truth—yet I say it is not 'apprehended' and perceived. XXXVIII. As soon as your Stoic wise man has dictated to you those doctrines syllable by syllable, Aristotle will come forward, and while he pours from his lips a golden stream of eloquence will declare that the great man is beside himself, since the universe is without origin, because there was no possibility of a beginning for so resplendent a work, needing a novel design to be devised, and that it is on all sides so symmetrical that no force can stir up a movement or a change sufficiently great, no length of years in the long lapse of time can come to pass vast enough to make the present order fall asunder and pass away. You will be forced to scorn this opinion, and to defend the other as you would your own life and reputation, though you do not even allow me to doubt. To pass over the light-mindedness of those who make rash assertions, how precious is the mere freedom which saves me from the compulsion to which you are subject! I ask why God—since he constructed everything in the interest of men—so you believe—should have created so large a quantity of water-stakes and adlets, and why he should

have scattered so many deadly and pestiferous things over land and sea? You say that the world could not have been constructed with such finish and accuracy without some divine activity. You indeed bring the divine majesty down to the perfecting of bees and ants, so that there seems to have been among the gods some Myrmecides, who
 121 was a 'manufacturer' of tiny works. You say nothing can happen apart from God. See then, here is Strato of Lampsacus who cuts across your path to give your God a discharge from a really mighty task; and indeed seeing that the priests of the gods have an exemption, how much more just is it that the gods themselves should have it! This philosopher says he does not require the assistance of the gods for 'manufacturing' the world. He proves that every existing thing has been produced by natural operations, though not after the fashion of one who should say that this world is compacted of rough and smooth and hooked and bent bodies with void interspersed. All this he pronounces a dream of Democritus, who therein aspires, but does not prove. Strato himself however goes through the parts of the universe one by one, and demonstrates that everything which exists or is coming into existence is being produced or has been produced by the masses and movements of natural objects. Verily he emancipates the god from a mighty task and me from a mighty dread. Who indeed, when he reflects that he is watched over by God, can help trembling day and night before the divine will, and, if any ill fortune befalls him—and whom does it not befall?—fearing that it may have come upon him deservedly? Yet I give no 'assent' either to Strato or to you. Now this opinion, now that appears to me the more plausible.

122 XXXIX. All those matters lie hid in secrecy, Lucullus, being shrouded and encompassed by thick darkness, so that no sharpness of the human mind can suffice to cleave a way to the sky, or descend into the depths of the earth. We know nothing of our own bodies: as to the situation of each organ, and the functions of each part we are quite in the dark. So physicians, whose interest it was to possess this knowledge, have opened up the body to bring the parts to view. And yet the Empirics say that this does not give them any better knowledge of the organs, because it may be that when disclosed and uncovered they undergo a change. But can we at all dissect, open up, and cut into the component parts of Nature, so as to see whether the earth has deep foundations and is upreared on roots so to speak of its own, or
 123 whether it hangs in mid air? Xenophanes says that there are inhabitants in the moon and that it is another earth containing many cities

and mountains. This seems monstrous, yet neither could he who made the statement swear that it is true, nor I that it is false. Your friends again allege that directly opposite to us on the farther side of the earth are people who stand with feet over against our feet, and these men you call antipodes: why then are you more angry with me, who am not treating the theory contemptuously, than with those who, when they listen to you, think you out of your mind? Hicetas the Syracusan, as Theophrastus says, believes that sky, sun, moon, stars, and in fine all heavenly bodies are at a standstill, and that no body in the universe except the earth is in motion; and that as this turns and revolves round its axis with vast velocity, all the phenomena come into view which would be produced if the earth were at rest and the heavens in motion. And this is what some persons believe Plato to say in the *Timæus*, though in rather difficult language. What opinion have you, Epicurus? Tell us. Do you think the sun is so big? 'I? No, nor is it twice the size.' He ridicules you and you in turn mock at him. Socrates then is safe from such ridicule, Aristo the Chian too, who thinks that about those subjects nothing can be known. But I return to the mind and the body. Have we any sufficient knowledge of the structure of the sinews, or of the veins? Do we understand what the mind is, or where it is, or in fine whether there is such a thing, or whether, as Dicaearchus believed, it has no existence at all? If it has, do we know whether it has three divisions as Plato held, the reasonable, the passionate, the appetitive, or is homogeneous and single? If homogeneous, whether it is fire or breath or blood, or, as Xenocrates thought, a number with no substance—a thing whose nature is scarcely conceivable—and, whatever it is, whether it is a perishable thing or immortal? Much indeed is alleged on both sides of these questions. Your wise man believes that one view of these problems is established, while ours cannot even decide which view seems to him most probable: the weight of the opposite reasonings strikes him in most cases as being so exactly even. XL. But if you behave to me with more modesty and attack me, not because I do not give my sanction to *your* theses, but because I give it to none, I will do violence to my inclinations and choose out a leader to whom I may render my assent.' Whom shall I prefer? Whom? Democritus: for I have always been, as you know, a partisan of the nobility. I shall be overwhelmed at once by the reproaches of every man among you. 'Are you the man to suppose either the existence of void, though all space is so completely filled, that any body which is to be set in motion only yields to pressure, and wherever one body has yielded, another at once fills its place? Or the existence of atoms, such

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that whatever is composed of them is exceedingly unlike them? Or the possibility of any splendid result being achieved in the absence of some intellect? And whereas in our one world this order is found to be so marvellous, would you believe that there exist innumerable worlds above, below, on the right and on the left, in front and behind, some unlike this, some exactly like it, and that just as we are at this moment close to Bauli and are looking towards Puteoli, so there are countless persons in exactly similar spots with our names, our honours, our achievements, our minds, our shapes, our ages, discussing the very same subject? And that if just now or possibly when we sleep something appears to our mental vision, phantoms from without burst in upon our minds through the body? Pray do not adopt that system, and do not give your sanction to arbitrary doctrines. To have no
 126 opinion is better than to hold opinions so perverted.' The question therefore is no longer whether I am to sanction *some* system by assenting to it: beware lest your demand that I should sanction *your* system be not merely conceited but actually immodest, particularly as your opinions do not seem to me so much as plausible. Indeed I believe that the divination which you accept is a deception, and I reject the existence of that Fate, in whose chain you say all things are held. Nor do I reckon that this world of ours was built up by divine wisdom, and yet it may possibly be so. XII. But why am I held up to odium? Will you permit me to be ignorant where I am ignorant? Or are the Stoics to be free to dispute among themselves, and is no one to be free to dispute with them? Zeno and almost all the other Stoics believe the higher air to be the supreme God, endued with that intellect whereby the universe is governed. Cleanthes who is a Stoic, so to say, of the noblest extraction, supposes the sun to be our ruler, and to be at the head of affairs. So we are forced by the disagreement of our wise men to remain in the dark about our ruler, inasmuch as we are ignorant whether we are servants of the sun or of the empyrean. As to the size of the sun now—since crowned with rays he seems to keep his eye upon me, and warns me to make frequent mention of himself—his magnitude then you report as though you had measured him with a rod; I say that I put no confidence in this measurement of yours, but treat you like incompetent surveyors. Is there any doubt therefore which of
 127 us two is, to put the matter mildly, the more modest? Yet I do not think that those investigations of the natural philosophers ought to be banished. The contemplation of and reflexion upon Nature is in some sense the natural food of our hearts and minds. We rise, we seem to be uplifted, we look down on human things, and when we ponder over

the exalted and heavenly existences we think this earth of ours puny and insignificant, and hold it in light esteem. The mere exploration of matters at once so vast and so mysterious inspires us with pleasure. Further, if anything has come to view which seems to reflect the truth, the mind is overwhelmed by a most civilising feeling of delight. The 128 wise man, therefore, whether of your school or of ours, will make researches, but yours will yield 'assent', will believe, will dogmatise; ours will dread to give a rash judgment, and will think he is fortunate, if in matters of that kind he finds anything that looks like truth.

Let us pass now to the conceptions of things good and bad: but I have a small statement to make first. These people do not appear to me to reflect, when they state so emphatically their physical theories, that they are losing their hold on the weighty testimony of such facts as appear to be set in more brilliant light. Indeed they do not grant a stronger 'assent' or acceptance to the fact that the sun is now shining than to the fancy that when the crow croaks, he is either enjoining or interdicting some action, and they will not assert a whit more strongly that yon statue, if they measure it, is six feet high, than that the sun, which they cannot measure, is more than eighteen times greater than the earth. Hence arises this argument: if the size of the sun cannot be perceived, he who accepts all other facts on the same conditions as the sun's magnitude, has no perception of those facts. But the sun's magnitude cannot be perceived. He then who accepts it, as though he perceived it, perceives no fact whatever. They may answer that it *is* possible to perceive the size of the sun. I shall not resist them, provided always that they declare all other matters to be perceived and 'apprehended' after the same fashion. Nor indeed can they assert that one thing is 'apprehended' in a greater or less degree than another, since one and the same definition of 'apprehension' applies to all cases.

XIII. But this is what I began to say: what certitude do we 129 possess concerning things good and bad? Of course standards must be established for the determination of the Supreme Good and the Supreme Evil: is there then any subject where the disagreement among the leading men is greater? I say nothing of theories which appear now to have been abandoned, that of Herillus for instance, who makes the Supreme Good consist in intellectual acquirements and in knowledge. You see how widely he departed from Zeno's system (though he was his pupil) and how little from that of Plato. The Megarian school was famous, and its founder, as I see from written authorities, was Xenophanes, whom I named a little while ago:

after him came Parmenides and Zeno, and so from them the school of philosophers was entitled Eleatic. Later came Euclides of Megara, a pupil of Socrates from whom the same thinkers were called Megarian, I mean those who declared that the only Good was that which was indivisible and ever like itself and the same. These too resembled Plato much. From Menedemus the Eretrian school took its title, because he came from Eretria, and this school made all Good consist of intellect and intellectual keenness, whereby the truth was discerned. The Eleans held like opinions, but they were, I think, developed with greater copiousness and brilliance. If we disregard these, and look on them as long since cast aside, there are others on whom we assuredly ought not to look down so loftily, among them Aristo, who after having been a disciple of Zeno, accepted in their spirit doctrines which his master held in the letter, that there is no Good but Virtue and no Evil but Virtue's opposite: he held that the importance which Zeno attached to intermediate objects had no existence. His Supreme Good is, not to be influenced in one direction or the other, when you deal with these intermediate objects, and this he himself calls *ἀδιαφορία*. Pyrrho again said that the wise man is actually insensible to these objects, and this state is entitled *ἀπάθεια*. To put aside these doctrines then, numerous as they are, let us glance at those which were for a long time and strongly maintained. Some were minded that Pleasure was the true standard: the founder of this school was Aristippus, who had been a disciple of Socrates, from whom descended the Cyrenaics. Afterwards came Epicurus, whose system is now better known, though he is not in harmony with the Cyrenaics on the question of Pleasure itself. Callipho again pronounced Pleasure combined with Morality to be the standard; Hieronymus freedom from disturbance; Diodorus this freedom combined with Morality: both of these last were Peripatetics. To live a moral life in the enjoyment of those things to which a man is first attracted by Nature, was not only approved by the Old Academy, as is clear from the writings of Polemo, whom Antiochus to a great extent follows, but Aristotle and his followers in our day seem to come very close to that position. Carneades too brought forward the idea, not that he believed in it, but merely to make opposition to the Stoics, that the Supreme Good consisted in the enjoyment of those things which were the earliest that Nature had commended to us. Zeno, the founder and leader of the Stoics, laid down for his ethical end the life of Morality, having for its starting point this commendation of Nature.

XLIII. Next it is evident that opposed to all those con- 132
 ceptions of the Supreme Good which I have described, there are
 conceptions of the Supreme Evil. I now leave with you the ques-
 tion whom I am to take for my leader: only let no one give me
 such an ignorant and ludicrous answer as this: 'any one you please:
 only some one.' No more unreflecting advice could be given.
 Suppose I am eager to join the Stoics. Shall I be allowed to do
 so—I will not say by Aristotle, who in my judgment holds almost
 an unique position in philosophy—but by Antiochus himself? Yet he
 though called an Academic was indeed a most genuine Stoic, had
 he made a very few changes. So the matter will still remain un-
 decided, since we may suppose the wise man to set himself up
 either for a Stoic or for a member of the Old Academy. He can-
 not be both, because there is a suit between the two schools, con-
 cerning not merely their boundary-marks, but their whole territories.
 In fact the entire scheme of life is bound up with the definition of
 the Supreme Good, and those who are at discord on this matter are
 at discord about the whole plan of life. Therefore the wise man
 cannot belong to both schools but must belong to one of them, seeing
 that they disagree so widely. If the wise man is a follower of Polemo,
 the Stoic is in sin, since he sanctions a false system—a thing which
 you and your friends say is more than anything else at variance
 with the character of the wise man. If on the other hand the
 truth is with Zeno, we must bring the same charge against the
 Old Academics and Peripatetics. Is our friend then to give his
 sanction to neither school? If he is to render it, I ask, which of 133
 the two possesses more wisdom? Again, when Antiochus disagrees
 in certain matters with his beloved Stoics, does he not make it
 clear that the wise man cannot give his 'assent' to those matters?
 The Stoics hold that all sins are of equal importance. But An-
 tiochus thoroughly abhors this doctrine. Leave me time, pray, to
 reflect which of the two opinions I am to adopt. 'Make an end
 of the matter,' some one says; 'come to some decision at last.' How
 can I do so in face of the fact that many arguments are urged on
 both sides of the question which seem to me both clever and of
 equal weight? Am I not to take precautions against committing a
 crime? You said it was a crime, Lucullus, to be a traitor to a dogma.
 I therefore check myself from assenting to an unknown doctrine:
 and here we have a dogma which you and I hold equally. See, now 134
 there comes a still more serious disagreement. Zeno supposes that
 happiness flows solely from Virtue. What thinks Antiochus? 'Yes.'

says he, 'happiness, but not the greatest happiness.' He was a god, who thought that Virtue was complete in itself, while the other is a frail mortal, who thinks there are many other things which a man finds in part precious and in part even necessary. But I am afraid the former gives Virtue too high a place for human nature, and the more so as Theophrastus discourses on this at length with eloquence and fluency. Yet I fear that the latter is scarcely consistent, because though he says there are some evils which affect our persons and our fortunes, he still pronounces that a man who is surrounded by all these evils will be happy, if he only is a wise man. I am divided; now this theory seems more plausible, now that, and yet unless one or the other be true, I think Virtue is entirely overthrown. But yet such are their disagreements.

- 135 XLIV. Well, can we accept as truths those doctrines concerning which they are at one? For instance, that the mind of the wise man is never influenced by desire or elated by pleasure. Come then, let us admit these doctrines to be plausible: can we say the same of the others, that he never feels fear or pain? Is the wise man not to fear, lest his country should be effaced? Is he not to feel pain though his country has been effaced? It is a hard saying, but Zeno cannot avoid it, for he thinks the category of things good contains nothing but what is moral, while you, Antiochus, are far from so thinking, for you believe there are many good things besides Virtue, and also many evil things besides Vice, whose approach the wise man dreads, and whose arrival causes him pain. But I ask, when were these dogmas promulgated by the Old Academy, forbidding the mind of the wise man to be disturbed or ruffled? Those old philosophers believed in the theory of the mean, and were persuaded that in every excitement there were certain bounds marked out by Nature. We have all of us read the treatise of Crantor, of the Old Academy, concerning grief. It is of no great size, but a golden little book, and should be learned off word for word, as Panaetius counselled Tubero. Now the old school declared that those forms of excitement were attributed to our minds by Nature for a purpose: fear with a view to foresight, compassion and grief to generate mercy, anger itself they said was the whetstone of courage, as they put it, whether rightly or other-
- 136 wise we shall see on another occasion. How the spirit of severity you display forced itself upon the Old Academy I know not. There are other theories I cannot tolerate, not that I absolutely disbelieve them, for the Stoic marvels, which they call *παράδοξα*, are most of

them Socratic; but I ask, where has Xenocrates or Aristotle touched upon them? For their two systems you try to make out to be identical. Were they the men ever to say that only wise men are kings, only wise men are wealthy, only wise men are handsome? That all property everywhere belongs to the wise man? That no one is consul or praetor or general, or possibly even constable except the wise man? In short, that none other has the citizenship, none other is free? That all non-wise men are aliens, exiles, slaves and madmen? Finally, that the enactments of Lycurgus, Solon and our Twelve Tables are not laws at all? That there are no cities or commonwealths, but those which consist of wise men? These theses, Lucullus, if you give your sanction to your dear friend Antiochus, you must defend, as your bulwarks: I can accept them within fair limits, just so far as pleases me. 137

XLV. I have read in Clitomachus that when Carneades and the Stoic Diogenes were waiting on the senate in the Capitol, A. Albinus, who was then praetor, with P. Scipio and M. Marcellus as consuls, the same man who held the consulship with your grandfather, Lucullus, an admittedly learned man, as is proved by his memoirs, written in Greek, said to Carneades jocularly: 'I, Carneades, do not appear to you to be a praetor [because I am not a wise man], nor do you think this capital a city, nor that it has a body of burgesses.' Then said Carneades: 'It is this Stoic who does not think you a praetor.' Aristotle or Xenocrates, whose teaching Antiochus insisted that he followed, would have had no doubt that he was a praetor and Rome a city and that a body of burgesses dwelt in it. But this philosopher of ours is, as I said before, quite a Stoic, though on a very few points he gives an uncertain sound. Again when I feel alarmed lest I should glide into hasty judgment, and adopt and approve something unknown, a result you are far from wishing, what advice do you give? Chrysippus avers that there are only three views which can be maintained concerning the Supreme Good: he cuts down and reduces the number of opinions: either, he says, Morality is the ethical end, or Pleasure, or the two combined: for those who say the Supreme Good is freedom from all disturbance, are simply shunning the odious term Pleasure, though they hover about in its neighbourhood, and so also do those who combine the same end with Morality, nor do those act very differently who add to Morality the primary advantages of life: so he leaves three opinions which he thinks may plausibly be maintained. Be it so—though I do not 138 139

easily tear myself away from the ethical standards of Polemo, of the Peripatetics, and of Antiochus, nor do I as yet find anything possessed of more probability—however, I see how enticingly Pleasure flatters our senses. I find myself drifting into agreement with Epicurus or Aristippus. Virtue summons me away or rather plucks me back with her hand: she declares that those inclinations are of the beasts that perish, while man she associates with God. I can take up an intermediate position, and since Aristippus regards the body alone, as though we had no mind, and since Zeno embraces the mind alone as though we were destitute of body, I can join Calpho, whose view Carneades used to champion with such earnestness, that he was even thought to believe it, though Clitomachus insisted that he never could understand what Carneades did believe. But if I chose to adopt that view of the ethical end, would not Truth herself and Reason, in all her seriousness and uprightness, haunt my visions? ‘Do you, though the business of Morality is to set Pleasure at nought, couple Morality and Pleasure, like one who should join man
 140 and beast?’ XLVI. A single pair then is left to fight out the battle, Pleasure matched against Morality. Now Chrysippus, so far as I see, made no long dispute about the question. If you follow the one, many things are ruined, particularly all community of interest with the human race, affection, friendship, justice and the other virtues, no one of which can exist, unless it is disinterested, seeing that Virtue which is driven to the performance of duty as though by a certain reward, is not really Virtue, but a deceptive copy and pretence of Virtue. Hear on the other side those who say they cannot even attach a meaning to the term Morality, unless indeed we mean to give the title of ‘moral’ to anything which dazzles the crowd, that the source of all things good lies in the body, that this is Nature’s plummet, her rule, her axiom, and that he who de-
 141 parts from it will never find any aim in life. Do you suppose I am not impressed when I hear this and innumerable other arguments? I am impressed as much as you are, Lucullus, and you must not think me less human than yourself. The only difference is that you, when thoroughly impressed, agree, assent and sanction, and insist that your ‘truth’ is infallible, thoroughly ‘apprehended’, perceived, determined, grounded and established, and from it you cannot be driven or made to swerve by any reasoning: while I believe there is no truth of such a nature that, if I gave my assent to it, I should not often find myself assenting to what is untrue, seeing that truths are divided from falsehoods by no line of demarcation,

particularly as the criteria presented by your art of dialectic are worthless.

I pass now to the third part of philosophy. Protagoras has 142
 one standard of judgment, thinking that what appears true to each individual is true for him: the Cyrenaics have another, for they think that there is no standard but that supplied by the inner disturbances: Epicurus has another, for he bases the standard entirely on the senses, and on primary conceptions and on Pleasure. Plato again insisted that the whole standard of truth and truth herself were far removed from fancied knowledge and from the senses, belonging wholly to reflexion and the intellect. Does Antiochus 143
 adopt any of these views? Indeed he follows not even his own intellectual ancestors. In what respects does he follow Xenocrates, who has written works on logic which are both numerous and highly esteemed, or the great Aristotle, who assuredly carries both subtlety and refinement to the highest pitch? He never departs a foot's breadth from Chrysippus. XLVII. Why then have we the name of being Academics? Do we use for improper purposes that famous title? Or rather why are we urged to join those who are at variance one with another? What a battle there is about the very question, which dialecticians expound in their elementary lessons, viz. how we are to decide whether a compound proposition of this form: 'if it is day, the sun shines,' is true or false! Diodorus has one view, Philo another, Chrysippus another. Why, on how many topics is Chrysippus at variance with his own instructor Cleanthes? Again do not two philosophers, who are actually in the first rank among dialecticians, Antipater and Archidemus, men full of fancies, disagree on very many subjects? Why then, Lucullus, do you 144
 summon me before a prejudiced public and almost before a civic assembly, nay, more, direct all places of business to be closed, as turbulent tribunes are wont to do? What design, pray, have you, in complaining that we destroy all crafts, unless to rouse the crafts men? Though if they assemble from all quarters it will be easy for us to excite them against your own party. I shall first bring forward all those odious charges, in which you declare all who are present at the assembly to be outlaws slaves and madmen; then I shall pass to the doctrines which concern not the crowd but you personally, who are here before me. Zeno denies, Antiochus denies that you have any knowledge of anything. 'How so?' you will say, 'for we maintain that even he who is no wise man 'apprehends' many things.' Yes, but you declare that no one but the wise man has *knowledge* 145

- of any subject. And Zeno illustrated this by the action of his hand. For shewing his hand open to view with the fingers stretched out, 'an appearance,' said he, 'is like this.' Then, closing his fingers slightly, 'assent is like this.' Next, entirely pressing together his fingers and doubling his fist, he declared this position to resemble the mental act of 'apprehension.' And from this resemblance he assigned to the mental act the name *κατάληψις*, which had not been so applied before. Again when he had brought up his left hand and had tightly and powerfully closed it over the other fist, he asserted that *knowledge* resembled that position, and that no one was able to attain to knowledge but the wise man. Still they themselves do not usually tell us who the wise men are. So at this moment, Catulus,
- 146 that we are in your mansion. Are these statements less odious than the others? Yet they are not so choice: the others show more refinement. But just as you declared that all the crafts were cast down if there was nothing that could be 'apprehended', and refused to grant me that probability was strong enough to support the arts, so now in turn I retort that art without knowledge cannot exist. Now do you think that Zeuxis or Phidias or Polyclitus would endure this theory, that they possessed no knowledge though their skill was so immense? If, however, any one had demonstrated to them the meaning the word *knowledge* was intended to convey, they would have ceased to be angry: nor would they be vexed with us, on learning that the thing we destroyed had no existence, while we left untouched something that was all they wanted. This principle too is approved by the carefulness of our forefathers who, to begin with, required every one to swear 'to the best of his belief', and next to be liable to punishment 'if he knowingly deceived', on the ground that much ignorance was present in life, finally that any one who was giving evidence should declare that he 'believed' the things of which he had been actually eye-witness, and that the judges should announce the facts they had ascertained according to oath, not as having taken place, but as 'seeming' to them to have taken place.
- 147 XLVIII. However, since not only is the skipper beckoning but the western breeze itself is whispering to us that it is time to set sail, Lucullus, and since I have said enough, I must conclude my speech. This I say however, let us hereafter when we investigate such matters, prefer to discourse about the wide disagreements between the foremost men, the mysteries of nature, and the aberrations of

so many philosophers, who are so vastly at discord concerning good things and their opposites, that the overthrow of so many and so famous schools is inevitable, since there can be one truth and no more, rather than about the falsehoods told us by our eyes and the other senses, and about the sorites and the pseudomenos, meshes which the Stoics have woven to their own ruin." Then said Lucullus: 148 "I am not sorry that we have held this conference. Often again when we meet and particularly in our houses at Tusculum, we shall investigate anew such points as we please." "Excellent," said I, "but what thinks Catulus? What thinks Hortensius?" Then said Catulus: "What do I think? I drift once more to my father's view, which he declared was that of Carneades, so as to suppose that nothing can be perceived, while judging that the wise man will give his 'assent' to something he has not perceived, that is to say will 'opine', but in such manner that he is clearly conscious of 'opining', and knows that there is nothing which can be 'apprehended' and perceived: so while I accept your $\epsilon\pi\omicron\lambda\eta$ in the abstract, I do strongly assent to that other doctrine that perception is impossible." "I understand your view," said I, "and do not very greatly object to it. But pray what is your decision, Hortensius?" Then he answered with a laugh, "You must cast off." "You are on my side," said I, "for 'casting off things' is peculiarly the design of the Academy." So our conversation finished and Catulus stayed behind: we went down to our yachts.

NOTES.

POSTERIOR ACADEMICS.

§ 1. "M. Varro." The great 'polymath', who had promised to dedicate to Cicero his important work 'De Lingua Latina.' Throughout this proemium Cicero labours to convey the impression that he and Varro were very intimate friends, whereas their relations were always cold, distant and polite. Varro was a follower of the Stoicised Academicism of Antiochus. It is often wrongly stated that he was a Stoic.

§ 2. "News from Rome." It will be remembered that these words were written in the year before that of Caesar's death.

§ 3. "Libo." A member of the aristocratic party. His sister Scribonia married Augustus Caesar.

§ 4. The elaborate apology offered (in §§ 4—12) for writing in Latin upon philosophy recurs in the introduction to the 'Lucullus,' and is repeated at the outset of nearly every one of Cicero's philosophical works. The frequent recurrence of the apology as well as its elaborateness shews how strong was the prejudice which Cicero sought to combat.

§ 5. "Amatinius and Rabirius." These writers (with whom a third named Catus is often classed) had translated some of the Epicurean literature out of Greek into Latin, and their works, although Cicero pronounces them contemptible, had won an extraordinary popularity. The disregard of the Epicureans both for style and for all abstruse argument was notorious.

§ 6. "Causes depending on Efficient Forces." It was a stock charge against the Atomists that they neglected one half of Natural Science, considering Matter to the exclusion of Force.

"What is the kind of reader etc.?" The answer implied is 'not such vulgar persons as those to whom Amatinius appeals.'

§ 7. "Old Academy." The name by which Antiochus dignified his jumble of Stoic and Academic doctrine.

§ 8. "L. Aelius." This is L. Aelius Stilo or Praeconinus, a Roman knight of Lanuvium, who was the first great Latin grammarian, the teacher of Varro and other distinguished Romans. He was also a great antiquarian.

"Menippus." A Cynic philosopher of the second century B.C. who wrote satires in Greek, which were imitated by Varro. Of Varro's 'Menippean Satires' a considerable number of fragments is still extant. The philosophical utterances to which allusion is made in the text were for the most part merely what we should call moral reflexions, or ethical common-places.

"For philosophers." The reading taken is *philosophis*.

§ 9. "Its chronology." Varro was the author of the commonly accepted era for the foundation of Rome.

§ 11. "A most grievous wound." The death of Cicero's only daughter Tullia in 46 B.C., which drove him to seek consolation in incessant literary activity.

§ 12. "Brutus." The murderer of Caesar.

§ 13. "That you have deserted the Old System." The 'Academica' was the first book in which Cicero distinctly imitated any work written by a follower of the New Academy. Varro was therefore unaware that his friend accepted the Carneadean dialectic.

§ 18. "There was no distinction between the Peripatetics and the original Old Academy." It was only possible for Antiochus to support this opinion by a complete perversion of historical facts. His assertion was no doubt mainly based on the resemblances in Ethical doctrine between the two schools, but even then it must have been a hard task for him to gloss over the difficulties that were in the way. In his view, and in the view of nearly all the later Greeks, Ethics were of supreme importance; a small amount of agreement in this field would seem to outweigh a large amount of disagreement in the fields of Dialectic and Physics.

§ 19. "A three-fold plan." The division of philosophy into Ethics, Logic and Physics runs through the whole of the later Greek thought, though Cicero's assertion that it was invented by Plato is a mistake. It was first used by Plato's pupil Xenocrates.

"Nature." The conception of Nature is not prominent in the Ethical systems of Plato and Aristotle. It was first conspicuously put

forward by the Academic Polemo, and by Zeno was made the ground-work of his doctrine; after his time the idea was wrought into the texture of every system. The Ethical scheme adopted by Antiochus was the later form of Peripatetic teaching, in which the doctrines of Aristotle had been to a certain extent transformed by the influence of Stoicism.

§ 20. "Is called an 'advance'." The term is the Greek *προκοπή*, used in the Stoic and Peripatetic systems of those who have their faces set towards righteousness, though they have not yet earned the right to be called virtuous.

§ 21. "Conditions required by happiness." That is to say, the greatest happiness possible; see the end of § 22.

"A common humanity." The idea of a common brotherhood of mankind was first developed by the Stoics; there is hardly any trace of it in Plato or Aristotle. The conception then became part of Peripateticism in its later days.

§ 24. The physical system adopted by Antiochus was mainly Stoic, but the Stoic system was largely built upon Aristotle and the 'Timæus' of Plato. The notion of a *prima materia*, a formless material substance underlying all organised bodies, first definitely appears in the 'Timæus,' though there Matter is very much identified with Space—a view of which we have a trace below in the words 'seeing that nothing exists which does not of necessity exist in Space.' The general view here given is however Stoic.

§ 26. "A certain fifth branch." This fifth element was first assumed by the Pythagoreans. It is called by Aristotle the 'ethereal' body, and although material just as much as the other four elements, is not, like them, subject to change or decay. The derivation from it of the intellect has usually been considered a serious blunder on the part of Cicero or his authority Antiochus, but Aristotle's language about the matter is so contradictory and wavering that even in modern times scholars have been found to maintain, from a consideration of passages in his works, that he intended to lay down the doctrine we have in the text. In other passages, however, Aristotle seems to have guarded himself carefully against assuming a material origin for mind.

§ 27. "All things that move etc." This is directed against the Epicureans, who held that without the assumption of a vacuum motion would be entirely impossible.

§ 28. "A constitution invested with sensibility." In this section we have almost undisguised Stoicism. To the Stoics the whole Universe

was a sentient being, to which they gave the names God, Reason and the other titles which we have here.

§ 30. "These they termed *ἰδέαι*." The ideal theory of Plato entirely ceased to be taught in the Academic School after the criticism passed by Aristotle. It was in large measure unintelligible to Cicero and his contemporaries.

§ 31. This section is composed of reminiscences from those dialogues of Plato which, like the 'Theætetus' and 'Sophistes,' discuss the Heraclitean theory of a perpetual flux in things.

§ 32. "The elucidation of words." With the Stoics, from whom this passage ultimately comes, etymology was one branch of the science of proof. The most astounding derivations were by Chrysippus and others advanced with all seriousness as valid arguments.

§ 33. "Aristotle." The criticism of the Platonic 'Ideas' is contained in the twelfth book of his 'Metaphysics' (of which an analysis appears in Grote's Aristotle) and the first book of his 'Nicomachean Ethics.'

It will be observed that Aristotle, Theophrastus, and Strato, the three great lights of the Peripatetic School, are represented as being at variance with the supposed harmonious old Academico-Peripatetic system, and two of them are described as having gone astray in Ethical doctrine. For Strato see n. on 2, § 121.

§ 34. "Cherished the principles they had received." This is far from being true as it stands. Speusippus and Xenocrates largely developed the Pythagorean element in Plato's teaching, while Polemo's Ethical conceptions contained the germs of Stoicism.

§ 37. "*Along with their opposites.*" These words (omitted by Cicero) are necessary to the sense.

"Appropriate action." It is important to select for rendering the word 'officium' *καθήκον* (as used by the Stoics) some phrase which shall not imply moral obligation. The 'officium' is an action which has nothing to do with the idea of virtue; the word 'duty,' commonly used to represent it, is therefore wholly unsuitable.

§ 38. The term 'virtue.' It must be remembered that the words *ἀρετή*, *uirtus*, have a much wider sense than the corresponding English word; they are used, not merely of moral, but of intellectual and even of bodily excellences.

§ 39. The Stoics considered even abstract notions such as 'virtue' to be actually corporeal substances.

§ 40. 'Appearance.' The most recent German translator of the 'Academics' (Kirchmann) takes credit for putting in place of 'Erscheinung' by which his predecessors had rendered 'uisum' the word 'Wahrnehmung.' But this term which like our 'perception' implies the activity of the mind when it becomes cognisant of the information conveyed by the senses, is unsuited to the numerous passages in the text where the 'uisum' is spoken of as something which strikes upon the senses from without. Kirchmann himself is led at least once (note 102) into serious error by his translation. I have therefore retained in all cases the word 'appearance.' The same ambiguities attend the word 'uisum' which are found in Locke's uses of 'idea' and other similar expressions. Sometimes 'uisum' means a copy or picture supposed to be thrown off by an external object and to penetrate through the senses to the mind; sometimes the state of mind produced by such a copy or picture; sometimes even the object of which the mind supposes itself to be conscious. Another source of confusion is that 'uisum' is sometimes used to render *καταληπτικὴ φαντασία*, *i.e.* an 'appearance' of the infallible class, and sometimes to render *φαντασία* merely, *i.e.* an 'appearance' which may be deceptive.

§ 41. "Being discerned by virtue of its own 'evidence'." The word 'evidence' is thus used by Berkeley, Descartes and others to denote that conviction of their trustworthiness which attends upon certain of our ideas or impressions, while it is absent from others.

"*Apprehension.*" The Greek word *κατάληψις*, translated by 'comprehensio,' keeps before the mind, more vividly than any English word which can be selected to represent it, the metaphor of an act of seizure or grasping. (Cf. *Begriff*, *begriffen*.) 'Perceptio,' which I have translated by the corresponding English word throughout, is simply another rendering of *κατάληψις*.

"He entitled it knowledge." The Stoics often spoke of a single (infallible) perception as '*a* knowledge' meaning thereby that it was one of the elementary units out of which knowledge was constructed.

§ 42. "Not as supposing that the 'perception' seized on all the qualities of the object." That is to say, the object may have qualities which our faculties do not enable us to apprehend, and of which we could only become cognisant by having conferred on us some new sense in addition to the senses we already possess.

"Conceptions." Cf. n. on 2, § 30.

"He dissociated from virtue and wisdom." In the Stoic system the ideal wise man, who alone possesses any share of virtue and wisdom, is intellectually as well as morally infallible.

PRIOR ACADEMICS.

BOOK II. (LUCULLUS).

§ 3. "The greatest prince since Alexander." That is to say, Mithridates himself. The account of Lucullus' early life here given contains some inaccuracies, which have led some commentators (but without sufficient warrant) to conclude the whole prooemium to be spurious.

§ 6. "A certain book." This is the lost dialogue entitled 'Hortensius,' founded on a similar work by Aristotle, and setting forth the advantages to be derived from a study of philosophy.

"Some are found to assert etc." The assertion was a fact, and was admitted by Cicero himself in his letters to Atticus. He declared that Lucullus, Catulus and Hortensius could never even have dreamed of the doctrines he had put into their mouths, and it was this consideration which led him to agree to Atticus' proposal that he should recast the whole work and dedicate it to Varro. In this prooemium Cicero has made a deliberate attempt to mislead his readers about the amount of culture possessed by Lucullus.

§ 8. "Every maxim and almost every word of command." Reading 'praecepta a quibusdam et quasi imperata.'

§ 12. "The polemic against Philo." In the later form of his teaching Philo seems to have contended that the Academics had been misunderstood when it was supposed that they declared sure knowledge to be unattainable. At the same time he maintained that the Stoic definition of an infallible perception (*καταληπτική φαντασία*) was a delusion. What he put in the place of it we are not told.

§ 13. L. Cassius Longinus Ravilla, when tribune of the plebs in 137 B. C., carried a ballot bill.

"Q. Pompeius." Consul in 141 B. C.; the senate decided to deliver him up to the Numantines because he had concluded with them a convention which it was not to the advantage of the Roman people to ratify. His democratic friends succeeded in securing his safety.

"P. Crassus." His original name was Scaevola, but he had been adopted into the family of the Crassi. Kirchmann strangely identifies him with the triumvir who perished at Carrhae in 53 B. C.

§ 15. "Socrates again, etc." This was the stock explanation given by the dogmatists of Socrates' *prima facie* Scepticism. It was, they said, only apparent, and entirely due to his use of irony.

§ 16. "Clitomachus. — A Carthaginian by birth. On the death of Carneades in 129 B.C. he succeeded him in the presidency of the Academic School. As Carneades left no writings behind him, the works of Clitomachus constituted the chief source from which a knowledge of his system could be gained.

§ 19. "The bent oar...the pigeon's neck." Cf. n. on 2, § 79.

§ 20. "The inner touch." The Cyrenaics maintained that in sensation all that men were conscious of was an internal modification of the mind (*παθος*); the sensation could convey no information about the external object which was supposed to cause it, though the existence of an external cause was not denied.

§ 21. This section presents a good deal of difficulty. We seem to have three grades of mental judgment upon the facts supplied by sensation: (1) when the attention of the mind is directed towards some one quality in an object; (2) when an object as a whole is referred to the class to which it belongs; (3) when an object is referred to its class and then certain circumstances previously known to pertain to the class are affirmed of it. In the Greek sources preserved to us I can find nothing corresponding to this section.

§ 22. "What memory can there be of falsities?" This argument is based on the assumption (familiar to readers of Plato's 'Sophist') that falsity is identical with non-existence. A memory stored with falsities is a memory stored with nonentities. Cicero answers the argument in § 106.

§ 23. "The theory of the virtues etc." The moral virtues, it must be remembered, are forms of science in the Stoic system, which Antiochus followed in the passage here imitated.

§ 24. The argument in this section assumes the Stoic theory — set forth in the third book of the 'De Finibus' — that the earliest impulses of desire in young creatures are aroused by objects which tend to preserve their natural constitution, and the earliest impulses of aversion by those objects which have the opposite character. Starting from these impulses men may ultimately arrive at virtue. If the very existence of the objects is matter of doubt, as the Academics assert, then how is action possible? Thus the first steps towards virtue can never be taken.

§§ 27 — 29. The question in dispute is evidently begged throughout these sections. There is no essential difference between Antipater's mode of dealing with the Sceptics and that of Antiochus; both of them assume the very point at issue, *viz.* that it is the function of

philosophy to discover some indestructible truth. Sextus Empiricus indicates a hundred times over that the assertion of uncertainty covers *all* possible utterances, even those in which the assertion itself is made.

§ 30. When the Stoics use the terms strictly (which is not by any means always the case) *προλήψεις* denote such elementary generalisations from experience as all men must make, *ἐννοιαί* such generalisations as require the operation of the trained reason.

§ 33. “‘Appearance’ accompanied by probability and unobstructed.” According to Carneades it often happened that in making a perception the mind was drawn away from the particular object of which it desired to take cognisance, by the presence of some other object or objects which obtruded themselves on the mind, and prevented it from getting a clear view of the particular object it desired to examine. To a perception which was not obstructed in this manner he ascribed a higher degree of probability than to one which was impeded. A third degree of probability is mentioned in § 36, which arises when the mind has had time thoroughly to explore the circumstances which attend upon the appearances presented by the object, and has after that survey declared the appearances to be probably trustworthy.

§ 34. “A distinction between ‘conspicuous sensations’ and perceptions.” It is not known who drew this distinction; it was possibly one of Philo’s devices to cover his return to dogmatism. The term *ἐναργής* (translated by the word ‘conspicuous’) thus receives a signification different from that which the Stoics gave it, and implies something less than the absolute infallibility which every *ἐναργής φαντασία* possessed for them.

§§ 37, 38, 39. These sections practically repeat the argument of §§ 23, 24, 25. In § 38 it at first sight seems as though ‘assent’ were declared to be an involuntary act, though in § 37 (and also in I. § 38) the opposite was stated. The doctrine in § 38 is only intended to apply to the entirely healthy reason of the ideally wise man.

§ 40. “They define at as great length as do the Stoics etc.” The proceeding was perfectly legitimate. The Sceptics said to the Dogmatists: ‘give us the most accurate definition you can of a perception which you say may be accepted as true; we will then shew that there is nothing in existence which satisfies the requirements of your definitions.’ In this section and the sections which follow the terms ‘perceive,’ ‘perception’ are used in their strict dogmatic sense, implying that the result of a ‘perception’ is something which is irrefragably true. Throughout these sections the *uísium* or ‘appearance’

is regarded as something which presents itself to the mind from without, and is weighed by the mind and then accepted or rejected according to the clearness or want of clearness which it exhibits. Kirchmann has got into confusion by regarding 'uisum' as a state or modification of the mind resulting from the external appearance.

§ 42. "Side by side with true appearances there are deceptive appearances." It must be remembered that 'deceptive appearances' are of two kinds: (1) those which are caused by objects which are actually existent, but are misconceived by the person who becomes cognisant of them, and so are supposed by him to be caused by quite different objects; (2) those which have no reality behind them whatever, being mere visions created by the mind itself.

§ 44 end. The contention of the Sceptics is misrepresented. They did not deny that the distinction between true and false *existat*, but that it can *become known to us* as a certainty.

§ 47. The general drift of the argument is this: if a god can make us believe in what is a mere vision or phantom, can he not cause us to mistake two 'appearances' both thrown off by real objects, the one for the other? The argument is *a fortiori*.

§ 49. The 'sorites' takes its name from *σωρός*, a heap. In the earliest form of the fallacy the sophist asked his opponent, 'does one grain make a heap?' The latter answered 'no.' He was then asked 'do two, three, four... n grains make a heap?' He answered 'no' up to n grains; then at $(n + 1)$ grains was obliged to answer 'yes.' The difference between $(n - 1)$ and n grains, therefore, that is one grain, does make a heap. As Cicero points out in § 91 the fallacy is capable of being used in connexion with every term which has a relative meaning. The fallacious 'sorites' must be clearly distinguished from the chain-inference which sometimes bears that name; an argument of the form 'all A is B; all B is C; all C is D; all D is E, therefore all A is E.'

§ 50. In this section Lucullus chooses to confuse, for his own purposes, indistinguishable resemblance with absolute identity, as he also does in § 54 and again later on. In the argument about all things belonging to a definite class he again obviously begs the question at issue.

§ 53. "Again at another moment that there is no such difference." The Sceptics never denied the difference in vividness between the impressions of the two classes of men; what they did deny was that

the difference could be affirmed to lie in the absolute certainty of the one set of impressions and the absolute uncertainty of the other set; at the utmost, they said, different degrees of *probability* could be traced.

§ 58. "Only between certain kinds and classes of them." The sense of this very difficult passage (to which I can find no parallel in the Greek sources) seems to be that the Sceptics, while not denying that the mind does distinguish between individual impressions, did refuse to allow that they could be divided off into two classes, the true and the untrue, as the Dogmatists contended.

§ 59. "That the man of wisdom will give a groundless judgment." In the context of this passage there is a good deal of playing upon words. To 'opine' is not in the eyes of the Sceptic essentially different from acting upon probabilities, as may be seen from § 146 where the view of Carneades is again mentioned. In the eyes of a Dogmatist, to 'opine' would be to assume as certain an uncertain impression.

§ 60. "These mysteries." There is no ground for saying that the Academics had an esoteric form of doctrine based upon Dogmatic principles. It is an assertion which often meets us in the later Greek writers, but is an invention of the Dogmatic teachers, who could not imagine how any thinkers could rest contented with the principles which Arcesilas and Carneades ostensibly professed.

§ 62. "That you had 'learned all about it'." In speaking of the Catilinarian conspiracy in the Senate, Cicero had used the word 'comperisse,' which was picked up by the public and turned into a cant expression of the day.

§ 66. "The man of wisdom." Each one of the later Greek schools had its ideally wise man in whom the principles of the School were embodied, but who was never to be encountered in actual life.

§ 70. "Maenian caves." These were wooden galleries projecting from the houses, and named from their inventor Maenius. When fire broke out, they served to carry it from street to street, and so were over and over again placed under the ban of the law. In spite of that they still continued to be constructed till the fourth century (Amm. Marc. 27, 9, 10).

§ 71. "Dionysius." Called the 'pervert'; he was induced to give up Stoicism and to embrace Epicureanism by a severe attack of pain, which proved to him that pain was really an evil.

§§ 72, 73, 74. A very unfair use is here made of the utterances of the pre-Socratic philosophers concerning the untrustworthiness of the

knowledge derived from the senses. They never doubted that it was possible by the aid of reasoning to rise to some knowledge which could be stated in a dogmatic form. Democritus for example declared that 'in very truth' the atoms and the void existed. The position of Socrates is also misrepresented. What Plato in his 'Apology' makes him say is not that he knows himself to know nothing, but that he never supposes himself to know what he does not know.

§ 75. "Stilpo, Diodorus and Alexinus." These were of the Megarian school, and all famous for their logical subtlety. Stilpo lived about 380 - 300 B.C., Diodorus and Alexinus about the beginning of the third century B.C. Alexinus was a bitter opponent of Zeno, the founder of the Stoic school. For an account of these philosophers see Zeller, *Socrates and the Socratic Schools*.

"Chrysiippus." The second founder of Stoicism, who lived about 280 - 205 B.C. Cicero in the text alludes to a well known saying "Had there been no Chrysiippus, there had been no Porch."

§ 77. "An imprint or stamp." The Stoics, it should be observed, spoke of the mind being stamped or impressed by an appearance coming from without, much in the same way as Locke, and the metaphor involved them in very similar difficulties.

§ 78. "Metrodorus." This is Metrodorus of Stratonice, mentioned in § 16, not Metrodorus of Chios, referred to in § 73.

§ 79. The doctrine of Epicurus (which had been stated before him in almost the same words by Aristotle, and was afterwards insisted on by Kant) did not advance much the case of the Dogmatists. If sensation is an instrument the use of which is admitted to be attended on some occasions by inaccurate results, it matters little whether the blame be laid on the instrument or on the person who uses it. The phenomenon of changing colour in the pigeon's feathers is due to what is now called diffraction. All the examples given here of misleading sensations are, with many others, elaborately discussed and classified by Sextus Empiricus.

§ 82. "Eighteen times greater than the earth." This was evidently a popularly accepted measure of the sun, though I have not been able to trace its source. The measure probably is of diameter against diameter, not circumference against circumference; certainly not of solid contents against solid contents, a mode of comparison which we do not find much used by the ancients. Hipparchus determined the diameter of the earth to be 37 that of the moon, and the diameter of the sun to be 5½ times that of the earth (Montucla, *Histoire des sciences*,

Mathématiques,' Paris, 1758; Vol. 1. p. 272). Aristarchus said that the diameter of the sun when compared with that of the earth was found to bear to it a larger proportion than 19 to 3, and a smaller proportion than 43 to 6. Posidonius the Stoic made the *circumference* of the earth = 240,000 stadia, and the *diameter* of the sun = 3,000,000 stadia. The absurd assertion of Epicurus that the sun's diameter is probably about a foot's breadth is actually defended by Lucretius.

§ 85. "It is a Stoic notion etc." In many modern books written in defence of the Darwinian hypothesis statements almost exactly similar to this are found.

§ 87. Carneades is said to have thus parodied the saying about Chrysippus quoted in n. on § 75: "If Chrysippus had not existed, I should have been nothing."

§ 90. "The question is not what sort of recollection etc." The drift of the argument has been misunderstood by Kirchmann and others. When the Dogmatists were pressed to say what ground they had for declaring their senses to be trustworthy in some cases and not in others, they appealed to the *conviction* felt by them that certain impressions were true and certain others false. The answer here given is that dreamers and madmen have this *conviction* quite as strongly. The fact therefore that a man has this *conviction* of the truth of an impression can prove nothing. The arguments in the context here greatly resemble some used in Plato's 'Theætetus', p. 158.

§ 92. The fallacy of the Sorites consists in the determination to treat relative, and therefore necessarily indefinite, expressions as though they ought all to be capable of having a very definite sense forced upon them. The whole of the ancient philosophy shewed great weakness in dealing with relative terms. Much confusion arises from this cause in the works of Plato, and even in those of Aristotle.

§ 95. The 'Pseudomenos' appears in many forms. One well-known form is as follows: "Epimenides says the Cretans are liars; Epimenides is a Cretan; is he therefore a liar or a truth-teller?" The fallacy rests on a confusion between lying with regard to a particular fact and lying as a permanent characteristic.

§ 97. "I advise them to go before a tribune." The reference is to the system of conducting lawsuits by *formulae*. The *formula* was an order issued by the praetor (who determined the law applicable to the case) directing the iudex (who tried the facts) to pronounce for the plaintiff if certain facts were proved, and for the

defendant if they were not proved. But sometimes the order was more complicated: the iudex was to pronounce for the plaintiff if certain facts were proved, *unless certain other facts were proved*. This limiting clause was called an *exceptio*. If the praetor wrongfully refused to insert the *exceptio* in the *formula*, the plebeian tribunes could in certain circumstances on being appealed to force him to do so. Hence the allusion in the text (which Kirchmann and others altogether misunderstand).

The proposition denied by Epicurus is nowadays called "the Law of Excluded Middle." His purpose was to save the freedom of the will: he thought that if he admitted the proposition he would make such a concession to the doctrine of necessity that it would be difficult to set limits to it.

§ 98. The Stoics seem to have declined to have anything to say to any proposition which was even remotely connected with the 'pseudomenos'; they therefore laid themselves open to the retort in the text that they accepted and refused to accept arguments of exactly the same form.

"The entire theory of Carneades." It is commonly, but erroneously, stated (e.g. by Zeller) that both Pyrrho and Arcesilas put forward a doctrine of probability and that Carneades did no more than expand it. What the earlier philosophers did say was that we must act on phenomena as we find them; the moment we begin to argue about their actual truth or falsehood we find it impossible to decide the question either way. This is something widely different from that careful testing and exploration of phenomena which Carneades enjoined.

§ 100. All the ancients conceived colour as something actually present in an object, whether the object be in light or in darkness, whether it be seen or unseen. Hence Anaxagoras could not imagine that congelation should change the colour of water, and as he saw that the larger the mass of water, the more nearly its colour approached to black, he decided that the real natural colour of water and therefore of snow also must be black.

§ 104. There are two ways in which the answers 'yes' and 'no' may be understood; they may be taken to imply entire certainty, or only probability. In order to make the meaning of Cicero quite clear, I have introduced the words 'absolute' and 'relative.'

§ 107. Panaetius (pupil of the Antipater mentioned in § 100) lived about 185-112 B.C. He was the intimate friend of the younger Scipio and of Laelius, in whose company he passed a large portion of his life.

He toned down the extravagances of Stoicism to a great extent, and enabled it to become a useful creed for the Roman statesmen and lawyers.

§ 111. "We discern truths as much as falsehoods." Only they must be probable truths and probable falsehoods, not absolutely certain truths or absolutely certain falsehoods.

§ 119. "There will come a time for this universal order to perish." According to the Stoics, however, matter is eternal; although the existing order will perish it will be created anew by the Universal God out of his own substance.

"Since the universe is without origin." Aristotle repeatedly claims credit for having been the first to maintain that the universe has existed from all eternity and will continue to exist to all eternity. At first sight this claim seems to contradict the statements we have in § 118 about Xenophanes and Melissus. In a recent pamphlet Zeller maintains that Aristotle was the first to assert that *the present order* of the universe has always existed and will always continue to exist.

§ 120. Myrmecides was an ivory carver, who made a four-horse chariot which a fly covered with its wings, and a ship which the wings of a bee were large enough to conceal.

§ 121. Strato, a pupil of Theophrastus, presided over the Peripatetic school about 288–270 B.C. Strato seems not altogether to have banished the term God from his system, but he identified God with the forces of Nature, so that Seneca declared Strato's God to have a body but no soul.

§ 122. "The Empirics." At the outset of Celsus' work a very clear account is given of the history of the chief medical sects, the Dogmatics, the Empirics and the Methodics (the last sect probably did not arise till after Cicero's time). The Dogmatics were theorists; the Empirics were practical observers of the signs of sickness and health. Yet these practical men altogether objected to anatomy, from which they thought nothing was to be learnt. Their objection was probably due in part to a revulsion from the vivisection which the Dogmatics had practised upon human criminals.

§ 123. Hicetas was a Pythagorean, probably contemporary with Socrates and Plato. It is not certain that Cicero understood what Theophrastus said of this theory; cf. Lewis, *Astronomy of the Ancients*, p. 127 sq. Aristotle supposed Plato to lay down, not a motion of the earth in an orbit round some centre, but a motion round its own axis. Most modern scholars think the inference not justified.

§ 124. Democritus, a Peripatetic, one of the immediate pupils of Aristotle, held that the soul is a mere function of the body and will die with it.

Xenocrates developed greatly the Pythagorean doctrine of numbers, which Plato is said to have to a great extent adopted and taught at the end of his life.

§ 125. "A partisan of the nobility." These words do not imply that Democritus was of aristocratic birth, but merely that he held a conspicuous position among philosophers and might therefore be regarded as having a sort of patent of philosophical nobility. Cf. what is said of Cleanthes in § 126.

§ 129. "The Megarian School etc." Cicero, or rather his authority, here considers the Eleatic School and the Megarian (founded by Euclides the pupil of Socrates) to form practically one and the same School. The Eleates did not connect their 'One' with Ethics, as did the Megarians.

§ 130. Aristo the Chian (a pupil of Zeno the founder of Stoicism) maintained that the wise man must remain absolutely and entirely indifferent to all things but virtue and vice.

§ 134. "He was a god." That is, any one who can remain absolutely content with virtue alone must be more than human.

§ 137. Cicero (or perhaps more probably some copiers of the MS. of this work) has evidently spoiled the story about Carneades Albinus must have jested with the Academic philosopher on his asserting all things to be uncertain: "you do not think that what we fancy we see here is a city," i.e. it may be nothing at all, or something very different from what it appears to be. Carneades then turned the jest by saying: "It is the Stoic who thinks this is no city," i.e. because it is not inhabited by wise men. As our text gives the story, it is made to appear as though Albinus had made a mere stupid blunder, mistaking Stoic tenets for Academic.

§ 143. The Philo here mentioned was a Megarian and is not to be confounded with Philo of Larissa, the Academic.

§ 148. "To cast off." There is a pun on two meanings of *Zōōōō* (1) to weigh anchor, (2) to sweep away, abolish, destroy, in which latter sense the word has been frequently used throughout the 'Academics'.

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