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Heathenism: A Scriptural Study.

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[Basel Mission.]

COMPARATIVE religion is gradually becoming a very interesting branch of our modern sciences and will have its practical issues. Many deep thinkers, not over-well grounded in the Christian religion, are ready to bring down all the religions of the world to the same level and triumphantly to show us that all the moral tenets of Christianity are nearly the same as those of the other religious systems. In dealing in this way with the religions of the world they lose sight of the main-spring of religion, the standpoint which the various systems take in regard to the connection of man with the invisible things underlying the visible things. Who can give us a better definition of religion than he who gave us the deep and pregnant definition of *πιστις* (faith) in the Epistle to the Hebrews xi., 1? "Faith" is the scriptural synonym for religion. We read: "*πιστις* is the *υποστασις*—the giving substance—(objectively and subjectively) of *ελπιζομενων* (things of hope) and *ελεγχος* (test) of unseen things (objectively and subjectively)." According to this definition of religion there are embedded in it two ideas: the one is, so to say, raising man (*ελπιζομενων υποστασις*); the other is humbling him (*ελεγχος*). This word has in the Bible always a sense of punishing, reproving (John iii., 20; Ephes. v., 11, 13). By *πιστις* man is brought into connection with the invisible world. Whether man's religion be true or false depends on the question, How the *υποστασις* is taken hold of and worked out.* See Hebrews iii., 14: *εανπερ την αρχην*

* Dr. Sheffield in his very interesting paper on the Condition and Hope of the Heathen (RECORDER, Vol. XVIII) quotes Luthardt, who says: "Consciousness of God is an essential element of our mind as consciousness of the world, or self-consciousness." Dr. Sheffield supposes by this Luthardt's opinion must be, "that the heathen who are grossly sunken in idolatry have underneath their superstitions an abiding consciousness of the true God." I can't understand how one can draw such a

της υποστασεως μεχρι τελους βεβαιαν κατασχωμεν, "if we hold fast the beginning of our confidence firm unto the end." This holding firm and working out of the υποστασις is the subjective side of religion. But religion has also its objective side. The invisible world is manifesting itself to men with things to be hoped and with laws which work on man. According to the Scripture God left the heathen to go their own way and took Abraham and his descendants out of them. On this rock God, step by step, constructed his economy of revelation, revealed himself to the Patriarchs as El Shaddai, to his people Israel as Jehovah, and in these last days he has revealed himself to mankind in his Son. But although God left the heathen in their own darkness, so to say, to lose themselves in their own works, and although the head of darkness, Satan, made use of this liberty given to the heathen of drifting away on their downward road, to bring them under his dominion, the heathen started with a working capital of their own. There were still some remnants of the original υποστασις left. It is true they were not yet partakers of the promises made to Abraham, and in this sense they were "without God in the world" (Eph. ii., 12); but they were still partakers of the covenant made with Noah. Especially in the ancient times a good store of traditions must still have taken hold on many heathen who worked on this υποστασις. Now I think that the important question: "What should be our attitude towards heathen religions?" is a very many-sided one and cannot be dealt with in such a sweeping way as many zealous missionaries are apt to do. It is our duty to search our Bible, to throw all its light on this, for us missionaries, not only interesting but also very important question. There is both darkness and light in the systems of the heathen. My purpose is to treat the dark and the bright side, subjectively and objectively and to gather all the light we get from Scripture—this "store-house of the world," as Oetinger calls our Bible.*

conclusion. To come to a knowledge of the true God depends on how man works out this consciousness of θειον (let us use θειον instead of θεος) underlying the visible things. Man must use his νους (the soul's spiritual sense), in order to νοειν by faith to bring this inborn consciousness to a developed knowledge of a personal God. But how can one deny that even fallen man has still a remainder of this inborn consciousness" (Acts xvii., 28).

*Oetinger was one of the biblical theologians of the last century, whose works are still a great blessing to Christian people, especially in the south of Germany and Switzerland. Bengel is perhaps the only one with whose name the English reader is familiar. He was the spiritual father and leader of many faithful and gifted labourers sent forth into Christ's vineyard. Oetinger, Roos, Rieger, Hahn, etc. and especially Beck in our century were bright stars. We German missionaries are mostly pupils of this school of theologians. An English clergyman, the well-known Rev. Adolph Saphir says: "There is a strong family resemblance in these south German theologians. It is their deep and solid knowledge of Scripture, as a whole, a living organism; it is the historical tone of their teaching, as distinguished from the abstract dogmatic tone which had crept into the Churches of the Reformation. It was the bright light of the

I. The Dark Side of Heathenism.

(A.) Subjectively.

Is πιστις the root of true religion, then must απιστια be the root of false religion. Soon after the fall of man began a development in the opposite direction. There was no working on the given substance (υποστασις). There was an αποστηναι (Hebr. iii., 12) opposite to υποστηναι. Paul, who got such a deep insight into the manifestations of God's grace, had also a deep insight into the darkness and corruption of the world. He gives in Rom. i., 19, 32 a concise historico-psychological sketch of the αποστηναι of the heathen, just as he in Chapters II. and III. draws a picture of the αποστηναι of the Israelites, and as he in the second Thess. ii. and I. Tim. iv. shows us an αποστηναι of the Christian world. Here it is also the not holding fast and working out the given substance (την αγαπην της αληθειας ουκ εδεξαντο.) The root is always the same; whether man be Heathen, Jew, or Christian, it is a holding down of the given truth in unrighteousness (Rom. i., 18.) The apostle shows us this falling away of the heathen in three stages.

(a.) It is at first a mixing up of the knowledge of God with nature, be it human or brute nature. By a dangerous symbolism God is, so to say, brought down to the same level with the life of creatures bound down into space and time. The specific difference between God and created things, the "αφθαρτος" in God is lost sight of. A knowing of God in his "δοξα" is not by a sound νοειν worked into the "επιγνωσις" of man (Rom. i., 21, 24).

(b.) Darkness sets in. God is by and by not only lost sight of in his supermundane glory; the truth that God is creator is also given up. This distinctive attribute of God is given to nature itself. It is the μεταλλασσειν την αληθειαν του θεου εν τω ψευδει. Nature is looked at as a θειον. It is a development beginning with a λατρευειν θεω εν ομοιωματι κτισεως (first stage) going on to a λατρευειν τη κτισει παρα τον κτισαντα (Rom. i., 25.)

(c.) The third stage is a state of a reprobate mind (αδοκιμος νους). The last remnants of the original υποστασις are thrown away (ουκ εδοκιμασεν τον θεον εχειν εν επιγνωσει. Rom. i., 28.) Humanity is plunged into a mire of immorality.

To sum up: Man, not working on υποστασις, that he may learn to fear God and walk in humility before him, becomes ματαιος (empty) and loses himself in the ματαια of this world, and is the

future, of the second advent of the Saviour and the fulfilment of God's counsel, which enabled them to take a larger, a deeper and at the same time more concrete and life-full view of Scripture." I mention this because sometimes views of the German missionaries are mistaken for the liberal views of advanced modern theologians. See the controversy about the future hope of the heathen, RECORDER, Vol. XVIII., XIX).

slave of the visible things. Instead of raising himself to be filled with the *ἐλπίζομενα* (Hehr. xi., 1) by means of the originally given *υποστάσις*, man elevates himself by means of his empty *νοῦς* (Eph. iv., 17 *ματαιότης τοῦ νοῦς*), which is, after having broken off its connection with the real invisible world, fettered by the flesh (*νοῦς τῆς σαρκός* Col. ii., 18). But certainly the apostle will not say that all the heathen individuals are specimens of this description, just as he will not say that all the Jews were and are at any time such as he gives us a picture of in Chapters II. and III., or that all the Christians of the last time will have the characteristics of the masses of anti-Christian age. It is the condition of the masses that the apostle has chiefly in view. Farther, we saw that Rom. i., 20, 32 is a description of the gradual development of heathenism. Monotheism appears not merely in prehistoric times (Enoch, Noah, etc.), there were still monotheistic remnants among the peoples of Canaan. Melchisedek, amidst a people who already worshipped idols, blessed Abraham in the name of God Most High. Oehler in his Theology of the Old Testament says (Vol. I., p. 94): "We may maintain, with great probability, that we have in El Eljon in the midst of Canaanitic forms of worship a remnant of that older and purer form of worship, which was preserved, perhaps, by a Semitic tribe dwelling among the Canaanites." Besides this there were still some traces of monotheistic remnants in Canaan (see Gen. xx., 9-11 and xxi., 22, 23).

Are there no traces of monotheistic remnants to be found among the ancestors of the Chinese?

(B.) *The Dark Side of Heathenism. Objectively.*

Man, not using his faculty of *νοεῖν* to work on the given substance (*υποστάσις*) of the real and invisible things underlying the visible world, was now open in another and objective respect. Unbelief shutting the door against the manifestations of God, opens the door of superstition. There is an "*ἐνεργεῖα πλάνης, εἰς τὸ πιστεῦσαι αὐτοὺς τὴν ψευδεῖ*" (2., Thess. ii., 11). It is always the same, whether men be Heathen, Jews, or Christians, not holding fast the "*ἀρχὴν τῆς υποστάσεως*," "they will come under the dominion of a working of error that they should believe a lie." There are still the religious forms of *προσευχὴ* and *προσφέρειν*, but prayer becomes a *βατταλογεῖν* (Math. vi., 7), sacrifices are offered up to an Elil (*οὐδεν*). But this is not all. We missionaries, according to our scriptural standpoint, know that there is a kingdom of demons, which is the dark objective side of idolatry (see 1. Cor. x.; Ephes. ii. and vi.). When the Bible speaks of the kingdom of darkness it is not the language of poetry. The Bible speaks neither the language of poetry nor of philosophy;

it speaks the real language of real life. Already in the Old Testament are given some hints in this direction. In Deut. xxxii., 17, and Psalms cvi., 37, is the meaning of "Shedim" demons (Keil and Delitsch). The New Testament shows us who is the father of all lies. It is Satan, a fallen angel with his hosts. Here is the dark background of idolatry. There is the power of a strong organization of the "prince of the power of the air." This is the great lie which fetters the pagan world; the heathen supposes his idol to be a real divine being, to whom he offers his sacrifices, but by this he does not enter into a real relation to God, but, contrary to his opinion, he enters into a real communion with the powers of darkness (1. Cor. x., 16, 21). The greater part of the objective side of heathenism is the revelation of the kingdom of darkness. Satan has usurped divine power; he, receiving the sacrifices of the heathen, fetters them by a well organized kingdom of lies. A deeper insight into the life of the heathen makes it clear that it is true that there are strong bulwarks of Satanic power in heathenism. How are the Chinese kept in fear of and in bondage to this power? (Hehr. ii., 14, 15). There is a wide chasm between the standpoint of most modern philosophers and the Bible. But the missionary, holding fast his scriptural views and examining into the real life of heathen, can see that his Bible speaks the real language of real life.

II. *Light in Heathenism.*

(A.) *Objectively.*

But is there total darkness in heathenism? Is all connection with God broken? To assert this is one-sidedness. Let us search our dear Bible, "the store house of the world." The important question is, whether the heathen, who were left to go their own way from the beginning, have lost all their working capital, the *υποστάσις* and *ελεγχος* of Hehr. xi., 1? Is this opening quite closed, through which some of the supermundane light could come in to fix some bright stars on the dark firmament of Paganism?

We read in the Old Testament (Ps. xciv., 10), "He (God) that chastiseth (marginal reading of the Rev. Version "or instructeth") the nations . . ." Hengstenberg in his Commentary on the Psalms (Vol. III., p. 161) says: "The Hebrew word 'Tazar' occurs in the sense of to 'summon,' to 'warn,' a sense which it bears more frequently than that of punishment. Gen. xx. is a parallel where the heathen Ahimelech receives a warning from God." Hengstenberg goes on to say: "that the doctrine of an influence exercised by God upon the consciences of the heathen is of rare occurrence in the Old Testament, may be explained by the very depraved condition of the heathen around the Israelites, among whom few

traces of such an influence could be seen." This may be, but I think it is with this important doctrine just as it is with other ones, the New Testament brought the full light (see John's prologue to his Gospel). I think we have good scriptural ground to say the heathen have not only brought a stock of traditions with them on their downward road, the light of the Logos is always shining into the darkness. Although the heathen were not partakers of the covenants made with the fathers of Israel, God did not leave himself without witness among them. Let us take up three passages of the New Testament, which show us something of the common manifestations to the pagan world.

(a.) Paul speaks to the heathen of Lystra (Acts. xiv.) of an "αγαθουργειν." He says: "God gave you from heaven rains and fruitful seasons, filling your hearts with food and gladness." It is the covenant of Elohim, which he made in the time of Noah, with all men and regarding all things. "The four seasons pursue their courses and all things are continually being produced." (四時行百物生). These good things, which come from the father of light, are everywhere a mighty manifestation of God's αιδιος δυναμις and θειοτης.

(b.) Besides these manifestations, which fill man's heart with joy and can help him, so to say, as a ladder to ascend to higher hopes and aspirations, there is another manifestation from heaven always going on. We read in Rom. i., 18: "The wrath of God is revealed from heaven." This heavenly voice, speaking to sinners through calamities as floods, storms, etc., makes deep impressions on the hearts of open-minded heathen.*

(c.) In the classical sermon the apostle preached in Athens he says: "God made of one every nation of men for to dwell on the face of the earth, having determined their appointed seasons and the bounds of their habitations, that they should seek God if haply they might feel after him and find him." (Acts xvii., 26, 27). God in history is also a deep-going manifestation, which rouses man's mind to a sound νοειν. The apostle says "ψηλαφω," feeling after. One who is in darkness and gets some stray rays of light, begins to feel after the way. Is there not a feeling after God going on through the history of the pagan world? The Greek strangers who wished to see Jesus in Jerusalem were true types of those "feelers after God." They were genuine descendants of their illustrious countrymen, Socrates and Plato, whose utterances, written or unwritten, were a groping in the darkness after light and truth.

* See the China Commentaries on the passage of the Analects: 迅雷. 風烈. 必變. The commentators say: "this was 敬天之怒: 記曰: 若有疾風迅雷. 甚雨. 則必變. 雖夜必興衣服冠而坐."

(B.) *The Light in Heathenism. Subjectively.*

Who can say that some of the heathen did not make some use of these manifestations of God, and that there are no traces of the working on the remnants of the υποστασις and ελεγχος, (left in the heart of man) in the pagan religious systems?

It is again the apostle of the heathen who speaks of συνειδησις, by which the heathen are a law to themselves (Rom. ii., 14, 15). "It is in the human heart, this inward workshop of man's life, that the law of God performs its proper function, for its operation (εργον) is laid there as something written once for all on the heart. The spiritual law is a sovereign power wrought into the organism of the heart, and ever busy there. This power acts as the basis of all sense of truth and uprightness and of all impulse towards them; and this by concentrating in the heart the sense and impulse of a moral reason and bringing them within one central consciousness (良知) [Mencius]. The latter not only makes them conscious but gives them an active power to bear witness to truth and justice, to express themselves in accordance therewith and to claim the same from others, so that there is developed a judicial process of thought with an accusing of unlawful things and an excusing of lawful." How truly the divine authority of conscience and its faculty of truth and justice are a primary consciousness of human nature, is shown not only in Rom. ii. but by the concurrent testimony of many sayings handed down to us from Paganism, e.g., βροτοις απασι η συνειδησις θεος, "For every mortal conscience is a God." *Conscientia mille testes*, "Conscience is worth a thousand witnesses." συνειδησις πληττει την ψυχην, "Conscience chastises the soul." Here in "conscience" is still a connecting link with the invisible world. In συνειδησις Faith has still an organic foundation in Humanity. Accordingly Christianity builds its renovation and completion of faith on this inward foundation already laid, that is to say, it commends them to every man's conscience (II. Cor. iv., 2; John vii., 17; II. Cor. v., 11; I. Tim. i., 15). How far did and do heathen work on this remnant of the υποστασις and ελεγχος? Paul says in Rom. ii., 9, 10: "Tribulation and anguish upon every soul of man that worketh evil, of the Jew first and also of the Greek; but glory and honour and peace to every man that worketh good, to the Jew first and also to the Greek." Does he here mean heathen and Jews already brought into the full light of the Christian revelation? According to the drift of this passage Paul is speaking of men apart from the Christian revelation. As far as they were true to the light they had, the future retribution will be either bliss or woe. The Jews have the light of the divine law and of the promises of the old covenant. The heathen have only the natural law worked into their hearts. Christ

says: "He that doeth the truth cometh to the light." "He that is of God." "Every one that is of the truth," etc. (John iii., 21; viii., 47; xviii., 37). Paul certainly does not mean to say that the heathen, following as well as they can the voice of their conscience, will come to eternal bliss without Christ. But is it against sound scriptural doctrine to say that everybody who is of the truth will once meet Christ, be it in this world or in the world to come? Where the Bible speaks of God's "προθεσις" there is the foundation of it "εν αγαπη." There is not a two-fold side in it as Calvin supposed it to be. Farther, for the sin against the holy spirit only there is no forgiveness, whether here or in the future. It is an unquestioned doctrine of Scripture that the provisions of grace were made for the whole world, that God *will that all men should be saved and come to the knowledge of truth* (I. Tim. ii., 4). God does not lie; He stands to His word and will certainly give everybody a chance to meet Christ. Does not I. Pet. iii., 19 and iv., 6 give us some hints that the Gospel will also come "unto the spirits in prison"?* But let us leave the question about future probation; let us see whether there are no traces of light (subjectively) of Paganism in the ancient literature. There were always heathen who were groping their way towards one or another portion of the truth. It is true that without the special revelation of God bringing men step by step to the full light manifested in Christ the best of the heathen could not find God. All the philosophers and moralists failed to re-discover the Supreme Lord, in whom the various common manifestations of the invisible world find their true unity. It was impossible to construct a religion by human force, which brought a real help into this world of sin and which could stand intact against the strongholds of Satanic power. It was also impossible to get sound, real hopes for a glorious future. There are only some stray, misty anticipations of a new order of things. Some of the ancient fathers of the Church and some of our modern orthodox theologians went too far in saying that there are Christian ideals, yea, prophecies, to be found in the pagan literature. Ritter, one who thoroughly knew the ancient philosophers, has (History of Philosophy) well shown how wrong the ideas of the theologians herein are. Also Legge says in his Commentary on the Doctrine of the Mean, treating the passage 待其人而後行

*There is always some fear with some missionaries that the belief of a future hope of the heathen will be dangerous to the missionary zeal. Gilmour, an ideal missionary, whose zeal was many miles above the level of the average missionary, "did not think that those who died without the knowledge of Christ, or without a fair chance of salvation, were finally and hopelessly lost. He believed they would have the chance of choosing between self and Christ in the other world" (see RECORDER, 1891, page 322). That was always the belief of the earnest so-called biblical Pietists of South Germany, who are the most zealous supporters of the German mission.

"that it is suggested in Confucius Sinarum Philosophus, that there may be a prophesy of the Saviour, and that the writer may have been under the influence of that spirit, by whose moving the Sibyls formerly prophesied. There is nothing in the text to justify such a thought." But God raised from time to time some men, who did a good work in using their spiritual sense (*vovs*). Confucius and his followers, with a practical turn of mind, have thrown much light upon the duties of man. Laotse, the deep thinker, the philosopher of China as Dr. Chalmers calls him (Introduction to Laotse) "soared away into regions and heights, where others could neither follow him nor see him, but he very often came back with a jewel in his bosom." We can say that there are traces that many ancient Chinese were open for all the common manifestations to the heathen Paul was speaking of. Some of them meditated on God's revelation in the works of Creation. They recognized something of the "everlasting power" (Rom. i., 20), that eternal bond of unity in the constant flux of visible things which keep rising into existence and ebbing away again. There were also always some who were open for the manifestations of God's wrath and of his direction of human history. The Chinese classics, and especially the historical records, are full of a knowledge of the Law of Retribution. Some of the ancient Chinese philosophers used to meditate on the law written into man's heart. That was a noble work of some of the Chinese thinkers to grapple with the question: "What is man's 性," which God has bestowed on man. They have brought many precious stones to light, worthy to be appreciated by us.

After all, what is our attitude towards the heathen systems? Let us not lose sight of the darkness in them. Idolatry and ancestral worship are strong bulwarks of the kingdom of darkness. But let us rejoice in whatever is found in Chinese literature and in the proverbs handed down from ancient times, which can, from a Christian standpoint, be regarded as truth. There are traces of the λογος σπερμιτικός of the light which shineth into the darkness of the heathen world.

The latest tidings from India show no abatement in the wonderful movement among the low castes and outcasts toward Christianity. Bishop Thoburn is of the opinion that 20 per cent of the Hindu population of India belong to these classes. So great are the numbers that are asking for baptism that in all the missions they find it is becoming a grave problem how they are to supply their native Christians with even the cheapest class of native preachers. The missionaries of India are beginning to study the problem of self-support for the native Churches, for it must come to that if the two hundred and eighty-four millions of India are to be evangelized. There are few missionaries in that country who do not confidently hope for so grand a consummation. Some believe that within a half a century India will be as thoroughly Christianized as England or America.

Please return to E. Y. Tuckering

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(file under 1906)

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POLICY AND METHODS FOR THE EVANGELIZATION OF KOREA

BY REV. SAMUEL A. MOFFETT, D.D., PYENG-YANG

Taking precedence of and more important than any mere policy or methods are the basal principles or convictions which underlie the work of evangelization and from which it obtains its vitality. To Dr. Herrick Johnson I shall ever be grateful for the expression "*A vivid and abiding sense of the Divine reality of the Gospel message,*" an expression which has gripped me as expressing the basal principle upon which must rest any successful policy or method for evangelization. The reality of sin, of its exceeding sinfulness and the awfulness of its punishment, the wrath of God; the reality of repentance and the absolute remission of sin to the truly penitent, the reality of the regenerating work of the Holy Spirit, of faith in Christ as the one and only way of salvation,—the supernatural, divine reality of this message vividly and abidingly grasped as a profound conviction that this Gospel is the power of God unto salvation and that God is able and willing to save any and all who come unto Him, is pre-eminently the *sine qua non* for the missionary in order to affect profoundly any people for their salvation—for evangelization.

I would place therefore—

First.—The cultivation and conservation of this *conviction*, for upon this Satan makes his chief attack, knowing full well that in so far as he weakens this conviction, in so far he has blunted the most formidable instrument in the hands of the missionary in his warfare against Satan's dominion over the world and in his evangelization of the world for his Lord and Master Jesus Christ. I am deeply convinced that our greatest need in the evangelization of Korea is unquestioning reliance upon the Gospel itself, the Word of God in its principal teachings of sin and salvation; a belief that when God ordained that by the foolishness of preaching men were to be saved. He ordained that which in His infinite wisdom He knew to be the best agency for the redemption of man; a belief that the Spirit of God does and will honor the use of the Word of God alone and that in so far as we trust in secondary agencies for reclaiming the heathen, in so far we have given up faith in the primary agency and prevent the Spirit of God from using His instrument which God ordained should be the means for the salvation of the world. What will militate most against the evangelization of Korea will be a lack of faith in the power of the Gospel itself, a belief (not acknowledged nor consciously held but nevertheless real) that there must be something used as a bait to bring people under the power of the Gospel, that secondary agencies which appeal to the natural man must be used as an attraction which will dispose favorably to a hearing of the Gospel. The danger is that there

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be a relegating of the Gospel (not avowedly or intentionally, but practically) to the secondary place,—an elimination to a large extent of the very means and the only means which the Spirit of God has given us to believe that He will use to bring souls into reconciliation with God. This will be avoided in proportion as we are possessed by the conviction and a vivid and abiding sense of the Divine reality of the Gospel message.

Second.—I would place next in order for our thought (not distinguishing as to order of importance)—the determination to make it *the one chief interest, the all absorbing task of one's life to preach this Gospel* and bring it into contact with the people in the belief that the Gospel message is the one thing of importance to every man, the one thing which he needs. Nothing should come in to prevent a close, intimate, loving contact with the people, a sympathetic entrance into their inner life, their ways of thinking, their weaknesses, prejudices, preferences, their trials and sorrows and spiritual struggles,—a real love and sympathy for them, not an abstract interest in them as so many heathen to be converted, baptized and reported upon as so much in the way of mission assets, but an unfeigned, living, personal touch and love and sympathy for individuals with a heart yearning for a transformation of their lives through a personal faith in Christ. Dominated by a sense of the supreme importance of our message to this people as the one and only reason for our being here, as the one and only thing in which we are interested or which we have which is of any real use to them, we shall in daily contact inevitably give the impression that we ourselves believe there is nought of really great import to them but the truths of sin and salvation and that practically we have no other interest and nought else of real interest, our message being the supreme concern of man, both for this life and that which is to come. This conviction deeply invrought into our very being and dominating us we will talk, eat, sleep and think the Gospel all day and every day in natural, informal contact with any one and every one until the conviction is forced upon others that we believe this to be the supreme interest of life and that our all-absorbing passion is the work of soul-saving, of soul-developing.

Third.—The conviction that the *spiritual* advantages of Christianity are pre-eminently *the* advantages, the value of the Gospel message and therefore the placing of the spiritual advantages in the forefront and the basing of all appeals upon these. There are many secondary advantages, the results of Christianity, and the temporal blessings which accrue to the Christian are often very great indeed and stand out with great prominence. These are the advantages which appeal to and receive the commendation of the statesman, the reformer, the politician, the merchant, the man of the world; but in the proclamation of the Gospel, when the material, financial, intellectual or political advantages of the spread of Christianity are placed in the forefront,

then the appeal is to the natural man, to the lower motives, and this appeal to any other motives than the highest based upon man's spiritual needs is a discarding of the most powerful agency placed in our hands, is a dropping of the use of the supernatural, and indicates a lack of faith in the spiritual and in the power of the Spirit of God to affect by spiritual truth in its appeal to man's spiritual needs his acceptance of the Gospel. The Spirit of God does not bless lack of faith but does honor and bless an unquestioning faith and reliance upon spiritual means to affect spiritual ends. With an implicit faith in the power of the appeal to man's spiritual needs—the keeping in the background of all the secondary advantages of political influence, of worldly advancement, of educational opportunities, anything which appeals most strongly to man's selfish nature, and the placing in the forefront always and everywhere the joy of reconciliation and communion with God, the relief from sin and its punishment, the assurance of the love of God and of the pardon of sin, the hope of eternal life, the comfort and peace of the believer from the indwelling of the Holy Spirit, the sympathy and help of Christ in all the trials and sorrows and struggles of life, the eventual triumph of justice and righteousness and the establishment of God's kingdom in righteousness and glory—these great uplifting, inspiring truths which are the pre-eminent and real and eternal blessings of Christianity—the keeping of these in the forefront and appealing to men to believe in Christ because of the inherent eternal need of man as a spiritual being for these blessings of fellowship with God through Jesus Christ—this is to make use of that which the Spirit of God delights to honor and which becomes the power of God unto salvation giving as the result in the hearts and minds of men a faith which rests upon no mere temporary or temporal advantage but rests solidly upon the eternal verities of spiritual truth. With a conviction born of an experience of the inestimable worth of these spiritual blessings we can hold forth of these people the spiritual joys and blessings of Christianity as far outweighing in importance and value any material prosperity, and can bring them to the same appreciation of the value of spiritual blessings, so that with Paul they will count all but loss in order to win Christ and will count as their greatest, most priceless treasure their fellowship with Christ, to retain which they will willingly endure persecution, the loss of all worldly gain or possessions, yea even life itself, and will count it all joy to suffer and to endure persecution for His sake. According to one's convictions as to the relative value of the advantages to be derived from Christianity, will be the policy he will pursue in presenting Christianity to the people, and for the real evangelization of Korea I do not think we can exaggerate the importance of this as one of the underlying, basal principles—a conviction that the spiritual advantages are pre-eminently the advantages to be placed in the forefront and upon which the appeals to men are to be based. In order to this, certain distinctions must be clearly made and kept constantly in mind.

Reformation is not redemption. Salvation from sin, not mere moral reformation, is the essence of the Gospel message. Civilization is not Christianity. Western ideas, customs and inventions are not an essential part of Christianity. In fact many Oriental ideas and customs conform more nearly to the scriptural ideas than do some of the peculiar notions and customs of the Western world and the introduction of much that is considered a part of Western civilization is a hindrance rather than a help to spiritual life. Our commission is to introduce spiritual Christianity, not Western civilization. Education is not regeneration. We are not called upon in the evangelization of Korea to provide a secular education for the heathen, but are commissioned to preach the Gospel to the heathen and to establish the Church of Jesus Christ. We might educate the heathen for centuries and yet fail to establish the church or evangelize the nation, but we cannot establish the church without having as a natural and necessary outgrowth of the church a Christian education for its own people, a powerful factor of the church in the evangelization of the nation. I quote Mr. Speer as follows: "Let us not confuse evangelization with the accessory and necessary results of evangelization which flow from it." Evangelization "plants among communities of men forces that create new social combinations. Missions are powerful to transform the face of society, because they ignore the face of society and deal with it at the heart."

Fourth.—*A strong faith, a victorious, enthusiastic faith in God and His message.* A faith in the power of the Gospel itself to carry conviction to the heart of any man and to do for the heathen all that it has done and now does for us. We need to believe and act upon the belief that it can transform character, lead to true repentance and hatred of sin, give strength to resist temptation and overcome sin, uphold in a consistent Christian life, and comfort and sustain in the midst of persecution, trial, sorrow and loss. In the face of prominent failures, in spite of keen disappointment in given cases,—one needs to grasp with a firm faith the fact that the Spirit of God can and does show His own great power in the lives of others and that through the exercise of faith these people can and do reach the same heights of spiritual attainment and enter into the same appreciation of spiritual truth which we do. Alas, too many become like those of whom a friend in another mission wrote me "some whom long years of waiting have rather—not discouraged but disciplined to expect little." Such a state of mind will not accomplish the evangelization of Korea. We need a faith which expects great things, large results, and knows that God will grant them. Faith is the evidence of things not seen, and the Spirit-filled vision can, with the eye of a buoyant, enthusiastic faith, see great results even though not yet accomplished, and can gain the victory over these feelings of depression and discouragement, and victoriously resist submission to the state of mind which expects but little. The heart is taken out of one's work,—it becomes mere routine

and drudgery, if faith has been undermined so that the note of victory is lost. I believe in enthusiasm—in enthusiastic faith. Enthusiasm may be more natural to some natures than to others, but it is a tremendous element in one's influence and has a power to communicate faith and zeal. How a real faith—a real grasp of the Gospel message and a real appreciation of the work of evangelization—can fail of enthusiasm, is a mystery. There is often far more of unbelief in our minds than we are aware of, and this unconscious and unrecognized unbelief will often explain the failure to receive a blessing and to accomplish results. "He could not do many mighty works there because of their unbelief." God delights to honor faith. He cannot work mightily in the presence of unbelief. Our own lack of faith shuts out the power of God.

Fifth.—The missionary's own spiritual life is one of the most important basal considerations or factors in evangelization. The missionary himself is the great factor in evangelization. His character, his attitude towards truth and life, determine very largely the place in evangelization which the church and those under his influence take and the influence they exert. *We need to be men who will not compromise with sin, men who will set up the Scriptural standard which God has set up and will not deviate one whit from that standard in their requirement.* Whatever the peculiar conditions in heathendom we have no authority for letting down the Divine standard on moral questions. In dealing with ourselves we should "never couple faith in the atonement of Christ with a feeling of security in the violation of a single commandment" (Chalmers) and however lenient and loving we may be in dealing with others who have fallen into sin and come short of God's law, in their discipline the failure to set up the one standard and to brand as sin anything short of that standard is to undermine the whole foundation of Christian morality and Christian character, and to build a church on no spiritual foundation, weak and powerless as a moral or spiritual force. Better far a Gideon's band of men thoroughly determined to make no compromise with sin and to strive for the highest and holiest attainments, than a whole host of nominal Christians satisfied to come short, taught that they may with impunity come short of the Divine standard—men who have committed spiritual suicide by a deliberate giving up of the law of God as the standard of Christian living. Dr. Dale writing of evangelists says: "What tells most is neither his earnestness nor his perfect certainty of the truth of the Christian Gospel, but the fact apparent to those who listen that his certainty rests on his own direct and personal knowledge of the eternal realities of which he is speaking." If God's Word is the standard by which our own life is regulated and if to us the spiritual blessings of reconciliation with God, our fellowship with Jesus Christ, the assurance of eternal life, are our chief joy and privilege and we daily experience them in our own lives, then we can go forth to present in all faith these spiritual privileges as the supreme gift of the Gospel

unto a people whose despair will be exchanged for hope, whose darkness will be dispelled by light, whose fear and misery and degradation in sin and iniquity will give way to love and joy, peace and righteousness.

I place the above *convictions* foremost as the basal principles upon which any methods of evangelization must be founded, for I believe that the deep underlying convictions of the missionary have more to do in evangelization than the mere methods adopted. In fact the missionary's convictions determine the methods and policy not in their mere external form and nomenclature but in their inner principles and their daily outworking, their essence, their spirit, their life—that which goes into and determines and is essentially the real policy and method—the vital force of them which determines their influence and results. I would therefore lay the greater emphasis upon what has already been written rather than upon the following suggested methods to be pursued in the evangelization of Korea. I shall not attempt an exhaustive enumeration of methods and I shall purposely omit some methods which are rightly and successfully used, not attempting to be either inclusive or exclusive but merely to mention a few methods adopted in our work in Northern Korea which I believe to be the most important factors in its development.

I think these factors have been.

First—The wide-spread preaching of the Gospel message in its simplicity. There should be a perfectly frank, candid, natural avowal of one's mission and a presentation of the Gospel message to all, to every one with whom one can come in contact as the most natural subject of conversation and interest, aiming to make the Gospel known over as wide an extent of territory as can possibly be covered from some strategic point as the centre of operations. If the Gospel can be made the subject of conversation among the people by the wide-spread dissemination of tracts and the extended itineration of the missionary, a great point has been gained. The methods adopted to secure this will differ largely according to the personal preferences and the disposition of the missionary. Some will adopt the formal preaching to crowds upon the street or in the market place, or the opening of street chapels, but a method better adapted to the genius of the Korean people seems to me to be the constant, daily natural and informal conversation with individuals and small groups of people, in friendly intercourse along the wayside, in the inns, on the street, in the shops, in the country village, anywhere and everywhere, with the invitation to visit you in your "sarang" for further conversation on this vital topic. The wide-spread informal dissemination of the Gospel news will result in bringing to you visitors from a wide territory, while the "sarang" work will give opportunity for hand to hand, face to face, heart to heart dealing with individuals in a personal earnest way with undisturbed, clear and pertinent presentation of the claims of the Gospel, which has

been most prolific in genuine conversions. In Korea what takes place in your "sarang" is soon heralded far and wide and often what is said to an individual there will reach a far larger audience than what is proclaimed to a crowd on the street. I would emphasize the value of seeking to reach a wide extent of territory in the initial stages. In the early stages of work the conversion of ten men from ten different sections will accomplish more than the conversion of ten men in one section only, for each one of these ten becomes the subject of conversation over a wide area and the Gospel news is thereby spread abroad to a far larger audience; instead of one group of Christians being formed, one may soon have ten places of worship each to be developed into a church.

Second.—The use of the Bible. Emphasis should be placed upon the fact that your message is not yours but the message of the living God, whose existence and the inspiration of whose word are facts to be proclaimed, not propositions to be proved. Rest your authority upon the Scriptures, the authoritative Word of God, which claims man's obedience. Get men to read it—read it to them and make it known as God's message which speaks for itself and needs no apology. Dr. Chalmers says: "We firmly believe that there is no one position of theology which can be more strongly and more philosophically sustained than the self-evidencing power of the Bible." Keep oneself in the background, one's own knowledge and wisdom and superior powers of argumentation and discourse, and keep in the forefront the Word of God, which is the supernatural agency of the Spirit of God for reaching the hearts of men with God's authoritative claim upon them. By far the most efficient means for the evangelization of men is the Bible itself, and our efforts should be to get it into the hands of men, to arouse in them a desire to read it, to constantly appeal to it as the source of our authoritative message and as containing God's own message to men for their welfare and happiness and as being of inestimable importance to them. I believe in the use of tracts, but primarily as a means of explaining the Scriptures and to lead to a study of Scriptures. To this end I should advocate the use of such tracts as "The Nevius' Catechism," "Discourse on Salvation," "The Two Friends," "The Guide to Heaven," and Mrs. Jones' most helpful primer for those who cannot yet read the Korean character. These, however, are powerful because they are a simple presentation of fundamental Scripture truths and turn the attention of the people to the Bible itself.

Third.—The Catechumenate. Particularly in the initial stages of work and for the conservation of the results of one's preaching and teaching, I look upon the public reception of catechumens as one of the most effective methods and one of far reaching influence. Just as soon as a man gives evidence of a knowledge of sin, of a desire to worship God, and of an acceptance of Christ as his Saviour from sin, he should be encouraged to make a public confession of sin, of faith in Christ, and of

his intention to lead a Christian life. The object of it is three-fold: first, it assists a man to reach a decision, and the very decision is a means of strengthening him, helping him to cut loose from his past life and ideas by holding before him a definite step to be taken; second, it is a formal recognition of his desire to be a Christian and an enrolling of him in a class for instruction so that he becomes connected with the church in a way that necessitates some provision for his systematic instruction and oversight; third, it is a means of witness bearing to others and puts him in the position of at once making known to others the fact that he has identified himself with Christianity. Reception into the catechumenate is an extension of the hand of Christian fellowship, encouraging one in his first formed intentions to renounce heathenism and accept Christ. I look upon it as more particularly valuable as an agency in the early stages of work furnishing a means of recognition and organization of first converts before the church with its baptized membership and fuller organization becomes the more prominent exponent of Christianity. The more systematic and through the Biblical instruction of the catechumenate, the more valuable will this factor prove in evangelization.

Fourth.—The infusion of an enthusiastic evangelistic spirit into the first converts and continuously into the whole church. The importance of this can scarcely be exaggerated, and it is worth our while to wisely plan to develop this and to avoid the development of the opposite spirit of service where mercenary motives develop apparent evangelistic zeal. For this reason the employment of men and women to preach in the early stages of work, and the use of much money in initiating work of any kind, is to be deprecated, for thereby people are attracted by an unintentional appeal to mercenary motives to make profession of Christianity. The inculcation and development of an overwhelming desire to make known to others the message of salvation which brings peace and joy with the sense of forgiveness and reconciliation with God, simply from an experience of the same in one's own heart, will do more than any other one thing for the wide-spread evangelization of Korea. When this spirit of voluntary, joyful, enthusiastic propagation of the truth has become characteristic of the early converts and the church, the employment of men proportionately with the development of the church will not be a hindrance but a help to evangelization. I am satisfied, however, that this spirit can be secured only through the deep convictions of the missionary, working out in his own life this same enthusiastic evangelistic spirit, so that by example rather than by exhortation he infuses this spirit into the first converts who come into closest contact with him, reading and knowing his inner real self most clearly. Real enthusiasm begets enthusiasm; conviction begets conviction. A man all on fire with and dominated by this spirit is a tremendous power, and the cumulative force of a whole church of such men is more irresistible than an avalanche. A church constantly at work seeking to convert men—peddlers carrying

books and preaching as they travel selling their wares, merchants and inn-keepers talking to customers and guests, travellers along the roads and on the ferries telling of Jesus and His salvation, women going to the fields, drawing water at the well, washing clothes at the brooks, or visiting in heathen homes, all talking of the Gospel and what it has done for them is a method of evangelization than which none is more powerful. To Yi Yeng En—now with the Lord—I ascribe the greatest influence in the development of this spirit in our Northern work. He never allowed a man to pass the examination for admission to the catechumenate or the church without impressing upon him this as his first duty and privilege as a Christian. From him came the practice of questioning the advisability of admitting to the church any one who had not first made known to his family and neighbors what great things the Lord had done for him. I do not hesitate to place this as the foremost factor in the wide-spread development of our work in Northern Korea.

Fifth.—Bible Study Training Classes. For the development of the church as the great evangelistic agency I know of nothing aside from the Sabbath services for Bible study and worship, more perfectly adapted to the conditions in Korea than the system of Bible study training classes which has already become such a great factor in our work. They are adapted to the genius of the Korean people and fit in admirably with their methods of life and study. As explanatory of these classes I quote from an article prepared by Mr. Hunt, of Pyongyang, as follows: "The education of the whole church, all its membership, young and old, literate and illiterate, is being undertaken systematically and largely by training classes in which *the* textbook is the Bible. Some of these are representative in character; the attendance coming from every part of the field; others are local, meant only for the members of a particular group. Some are attended only by men, others only by women, but in most of the country classes both men and women are taught, though in separate divisions. Sometimes these classes are taught entirely by the missionaries or by the missionary and several helpers, but more often by the helper alone. Bible study is the object of the class, but prayer, conferences and practical evangelistic effort are prominent parts of the work. . . . The Christians have learned that it is only right to put aside their occupations for several weeks each year for the special study of the Word of God. . . . This method is honoring to God's Word and teaches all the authority of God in their lives. His word, rather than that of the helper or the missionary, early becomes the Christian's rule of faith and practice. This method of education tends to bring about a mutual understanding between the rank and file, and the leaders, helpers and missionaries, so unifying the young church that it presents a solid front and is made more of a power in the midst of heathenism. The surest way to make a distinction between the church and the world is to set men to study the Bible and to preach its truths. This system is cumulative in its

results. . . . It makes of the church an army skilled in the use of God's Word. Among the many advantages of these classes is that they afford an occasion to develop qualities of true leadership. Opportunities for preliminary training and trial as well as for more careful selection are almost without end." To this I would add that the classes cannot be begun too soon, for in their essential features they are applicable alike to inquirers and catechumens, church members, leaders, helpers, evangelists, and the ministry itself, to women and children as well as to men, to the ignorant, even those unable to read as well as to the educated scholars. The whole church is made to feel the result of these classes, and from them the men go forth with an enthusiasm and an evangelistic zeal coupled with a knowledge of the Scriptures which enable them to become intelligent as well as zealous heralds of the Gospel message.

Sixth.—The development of trained helpers, evangelists and ministers. This is an integral part of evangelistic work. Here is specifically the province of mission educational work which, I believe, should be a development from within the church, a result of, and indissolubly connected with, the evangelistic work; it in turn becoming one of the powerful factors in producing a geometrically progressive advance in evangelization. It is only a perversion of educational work which is brought into an antagonistic relation to evangelistic work. Since the complete evangelization of any land will be effected only through the agency of native evangelists and pastors, the development and training of these becomes, with the establishment and growth of the church, an increasingly important phase of evangelistic work. The foreign missionary is the important agency in the initial stages of evangelization for the foundation and establishment of the church, but the native church itself must become the agency for the complete evangelization of the nation, and from the church should come the institutions and the men which are to be the permanent factors. In the development of these leaders we need to provide for the training of two classes of men. In Korea, for years to come, the bulk of the work of leading the church must be done by men who show gifts for such work but who cannot be given the thorough preparation for the ministry which is the result of a common and high school, a collegiate and seminary education. We want and must have some such men, but all experience shows that the number of such men is never equal to the demand, not even in the church at home with its elaborate system of collegiate and theological education. We must make provision for this systematic and thorough theological instruction for the training of a ministry, but we must also in the meantime and for years to come depend even more largely upon a class of men taken from among the more mature Christians who can be taken through a course of instruction less absorbing of time and not too exhaustive of the mental and physical strength of the men. Since the preparation of most of this paper there has come into my hands an article written by our beloved secretary,

Dr. F. F. Ellinwood, whose counsel and guidance have been such helpful features in the establishment and development of mission work in Korea, and who to-day, in America, rejoices with us over the results of the work of the Spirit of God in Korea these twenty years. It is particularly appropriate that I should close this paper by quoting from that article that which expresses better than I can my own convictions on this factor in evangelization as follows: "I have spoken of individual training, but each mission should at an early day make provision for a more systematic and thorough ministerial education. . . I urge this as a means to the ultimate end of evangelization. I am more and more persuaded as the years go by that the educational work on our mission fields should be directed mainly to this specific end, that the great spiritual aim, namely of the conversion of men, should uniformly and always take the lead. An excellent plan is now found in many missions of forming normal classes for Bible study to which the field workers are called for a limited time during the season less favorable for itineration. Such periods of study are valuable not only for the instruction given, but for the opportunity of gaining a spiritual uplift for both the missionary and his helpers. I would gladly see a normal department connected with our most thoroughly established missionary colleges, so that while some students gain an advanced preparation, others may be fitted for immediate work. . . . As relating to the ordinary missionary boarding-school on the one hand and the secular college on the other, there should be greater prominence given to the training of preachers and religious helpers. . . . I am not sure, but it would be better economy of our resources, always too small, to give greater comparative attention to an older class of pupils, carefully selected with reference to their intellectual ability and spiritual qualifications for evangelists. . . . I am persuaded that the great volume of our educational work should be directed toward the simple preaching of the Gospel, and to the training of men by short courses for that purpose. The hope we entertain for the ingathering of tens and hundreds of thousands in the near future depends mainly, I believe, upon the enlargement of our native ministry." Then follow these words, weighty with the spirit of exhortation to us to whom has been committed the work of the evangelization of Korea. "The Great Commission of our Lord pointed directly and in plain terms to the co-temporary work of evangelization as the great errand of the church. The disciples were not taught to spend their time in preliminary operations looking to evangelization by others after their work was done. The word was, 'Go and teach all nations.' . . . The command of Christ was primarily to those of His own age, and He gave them a large task to perform, surely. That command reiterates itself with each new generation and the mission or Board or the church at large is culpably remiss if willingly it occupies itself only with preliminary work instead of hastening to the rescue of the millions who know not the Gospel and with whom it will soon be too late."

THE EVANGELISTIC WORK OF THE KOREAN MISSION OF THE PRESBYTERIAN CHURCH (NORTH)

Being selections from a paper by Rev. S. A. Moffett, D. D., one of the founders of the Korean work, printed in the Quarterly Centennial Volume, 1909.

Extensive itineration has always characterized our Mission. It has been a Mission of itinerators always reaching out to regions not yet touched with the Gospel, establishing and visiting groups of believers in cities and villages within the territory of the central stations. . . .

The Mission and the Church have been marked pre-eminently by a fervent evangelistic spirit, a thorough belief in the Scriptures as the Word of God and in the Gospel message of Salvation from sin through Jesus Christ, and have based the appeals to men upon the great *spiritual* advantages and blessings of Christianity as pre-eminently *the* advantages which Christianity has to offer. The Evangelization of the whole country has therefore always been kept in the forefront. The methods employed have been a natural development of policies applied, as it were, experimentally, which have developed and expanded as the work grew until they became outstanding features adapted to the needs of Korea and adopted and applied from station to station. The widespread preaching of the Gospel message in its simplicity by the missionaries and the conviction on the part of the Korean Christians that those who are not doing personal work in trying to bring others to Christ do not show sufficient evidence of faith to warrant their admission to the Church, has developed a Church all on fire with evangelistic zeal, voluntarily going forth to spread the news and to win people to faith in Christ. . . .

The Bible itself has of course been pre-eminently the greatest factor in evangelization, as it is in all countries—but it has certainly occupied a rather unique position in the work in Korea, and the Korean Church derives its power, its spirituality, its great faith in prayer, its liberality, from the fact that the whole Church has been, as it were, saturated with a knowledge of the Bible. The Bible Study and Training Classes constitute the most unique and most important factor in the development of the Korean Church. In these have been laid the foundations of faith and knowledge, while in the preaching services have been developed the spirit of worship and here too the Church has received its inspiration for its spiritual activities.

These classes have gradually developed into our "BIBLE TRAINING CLASS SYSTEM." Of this system Mr. Hunt has written,—“The education of the whole Church, all its membership, young and old, literate and illiterate is being undertaken systematically, and largely by Training Classes in which *the* text book is the Bible. Some of these are representative in character, the attendance coming from every part of the field, others are local, meant only for the members of a particular group.

Some are attended only by men, others only by women, but in most of the country classes both men and women are taught, though in separate divisions. Sometimes these classes are taught entirely by the missionaries, or by the missionary and several Helpers, but more often by the Helpers alone. Bible study is the object of the class but prayer, conferences and practical evangelistic effort are prominent parts of the work.—The Christians have learned that it is only right to put aside their occupations for several weeks each year for the special study of the word of God.—This method is honoring to God's Word and teaches all the authority of God in their lives, His Word rather than that of the Helper or the missionary early becoming the Christian's rule of faith and practice. This method of education tends to bring about a natural understanding between the rank and file and the Leaders, Helpers and Missionaries, so unifying the young Church that it presents a united front and is made more of a power in the midst of heathenism. The surest way to make a distinction between the Church and the world is to set men to study the Bible and to preach its truths. This system is cumulative in its results.—It makes of the Church an army skilled in the use of God's word. Among the many advantages of these classes is that they afford an occasion to develop qualities of future leadership. Opportunities for preliminary training and trial as well as for more careful selection are almost without end . . ."

It was in one of these classes that the idea of a Missionary Society had its origin.

It was out of these classes that in 1907 grew the remarkable Revival, accounts of which have stirred the whole Church.

The Korean Church has developed as a SELF-SUPPORTING CHURCH and the Koreans have shown marked liberality and strength of Christian conviction and character in the way in which they have met the financial burdens placed upon them. They have almost wholly built their own church buildings and primary school buildings. . . .

"What is the secret of the great success of the evangelistic work in Korea?" I do not know that any one can answer that question other than to say that according to His own wise plans and purposes God has been pleased to pour forth His Spirit upon the Korean people and to call out a Church of great spiritual power in which to manifest His grace and His power to the accomplishment of what as yet is not fully revealed. I should like, however, to see this twenty-fifth anniversary impress upon our hearts and upon the heart of the Church at home the fact that the one great God-given means for the Evangelization of a people is His own Word, and that the emphasis which has been placed upon the teaching and preaching of the Word of God has brought God's own blessing upon the work in Korea. The one great commanding feature of the work in Korea has been the position, the supreme position, the perhaps almost unexampled position given to instruction in the Scriptures as the very Word of God and the power of God unto salvation to every one that believeth.

PRINCIPLES UPON WHICH THE WORK OF THE KOREAN MISSIONS HAVE BEEN CONDUCTED

From a Digest of the Presbyterian work in Korea, published in 1917, prepared by Rev. C. A. Clark D. D.

This whole Digest is written from the standpoint of the Korean Church rather than of the Presbyterian Missions. Many outside of Korea would perhaps like to know the general principles upon which the work has been carried on by the Missions. They are as follows:—

- A. Wide itineration by almost the whole missionary body women as well as men, at least in the early stages. *

This itineration work was instituted within three years of the opening of the field. It was originally partly for exploration purposes, but was found to yield such rich immediate results that it became the ordinary method of work.

By the roadside, in the market places, on the threshing floors in the villages, among the rice fields, in the homes from house to house, the missionaries went personally. Trips were from a week to two months long, and were made persistently.

With the more developed work of the present, many of the force are now tied up in institutions, and the character of the work of those who itinerate has changed somewhat, the ladies doing almost entirely Bible Class teaching, and the men having much ecclesiastical work, but the fields that are growing the fastest are where the old methods are followed most.

- B. Wide distribution of the Scriptures.

With the "Bible Societies" the missionaries have co-operated most heartily. Most of the direct management of the colporters has been in their hands, and the whole field has been worked most intensively, an effort being made to get at least a Gospel into every house in the land. Over one million one hundred thousand sales were made in 1916.

- C. Wide insistence upon Bible study.

From the beginning the strongest effort has been made to have the family altar set up in every home. Although full success has not been attained, the Koreans have come to know that that is the proper ideal.

Anyone, even a woman, can learn to read the Korean native script in a month, and the strongest emphasis has been laid upon their doing so. There has been no fixed rule on the subject, but a large number of the missionaries have refused to baptise a person under 35 years of age before they have learned, and some also refuse to baptise a husband till he teaches his wife to read.

All day Bible Classes, running from four days to a week each were held for the first time in 1891. Since then they have been held universally throughout the field. Every circuit, every church, every station has its annual or semi-annual classes. Usually those for men and for women are separate, but sometimes they are combined.

Thousands of them are held every year. In 1916 in the Northern Presbyterian Mission's field alone 1507 were held with a total enrolment of 71379. About two out of every five of the adherents of the churches attend at least one of these classes per year in addition to their ordinary church services. The Classes are all self-supporting, the people paying all of their own expenses and a small matriculation fee which pays for most of the lighting and heating. The classes vary in attendance from a dozen people in some of the single mountain churches to such as the one for men in Syenchun this year where fully 1800 were present and it required 47 Korean pastors and 6 missionaries to teach it.

As the crown of the system, come the Bible Institutes where courses in units of a month are taught, the various stations giving from one to nine months of teaching according as local station conditions require. The ideal is separate Institutes in every station, that the students may pay as they go, and grow in the situation in which they will have to live.

D. Insistence upon personal work.

From the beginning, it has been taken for granted that every man who becomes an inquirer shall at once begin to preach to his friends. He saw the missionaries doing it in their itineration, and never had any other idea. This has been one of the great glories of the Church.

E. Insistence upon self-support.

As soon as a group of inquirers gathers, it is taken for granted that they should pay the full expense of their own meetings, and also very soon that they begin to pay something to the support of the local preacher on that circuit. The churches of a given district are grouped into circuit meetings held monthly or quarterly, and each church brings to that meeting its offering for the month.

Annually as the churches grow, any part payment of the local preachers' salaries which the Missions may be carrying is regularly reduced, or the circuit is divided and two men put on so that the circuits are brought gradually but steadily to full self-support.

Ordained pastors must receive every bit of their salaries from their churches, and no church is allowed to call a pastor until it can pay his salary in full.

All church buildings are paid for by the Christians and no foreign aid given except in the stations where missionaries live. There,

because the buildings are used also for Mission purposes and must be larger than the local congregation requires, a maximum of one-third Mission aid is allowed.

F. Insistence upon self government.

When new groups start, until one or more leaders appear, a committee is usually appointed to conduct the work. These men are called "Scouts." Presently from among them, one or more unordained Deacons are selected. A little later, unordained Elders are put in charge, the Deacons thereafter having charge of the finances, and the scouts going out for new believers. Lastly come the ordained Elders, Deacons and Pastor.

In the local group and the church as a whole, it has been the ideal to anticipate every demand for more power in the Korean Church, and to give it to them before they have even asked for it.

Each itinerating missionary pastor has under his charge from 15 to 60 churches, but he cannot personally visit them more than two or three times each year. The local group leaders and the circuit unordained preachers keep him in touch by letters and reports and personal conferences with all of his work. Still he gives to them inevitably great autonomy as fast as they are able to take it.

The purpose then throughout has been to anticipate the wish for self-government upon the part of the people, and while holding themselves willing to serve, yet to put the Korean leaders forward. For the last three years, the Moderators of the General Assembly have been Koreans, and nearly all of its other officers also. That will be more and more the rule from now on.

G. Keeping before the Church its duties to the "regions beyond."

The Presbytery in 1907 opened a foreign mission enterprise in the island of Quelpart. In 1909, it opened another in Vladivostock. In 1911, another was started among the Korean students in Tokyo. In 1913, the Mission to Shantung, China was begun. East and West Manchuria were worked from 15 years or so ago. Work in Hawaii was discussed in 1905.

H. Educational work with the motive of "nurture" rather than for evangelism.

Fortunately the Missions of Korea have never lacked for children of the Church that needed to be given secular education and unfortunately their means have never been adequate even to care for all of those, but, even apart from that circumstance, it has been the conviction of the greater part of the Presbyterian missionaries that they had

no call to give a secular education to non-Christians. They have believed that they had a mission to educate in the secular branches, and teach the Bible and its doctrines to the children of the Church. When that was done, or while it was being done, if incidentally by having in their schools a few children of non-Christian homes, these children and their parents were evangelized, they were of course delighted, but the primary purpose in the educational work of the Missions has been education for nurture of the children of the Church. Non-Christians have been taken into the schools in small numbers, but the pupils have been in overwhelming numbers from Christian homes. Non-Christian teachers have never been tolerated for a moment as they would be manifestly unable to carry out the purpose of the schools. Hundreds of people have been won to Christ through the schools either directly or indirectly, but their main purpose has been for the children of the Church.

I. Medical work.

From the beginning, with but one or two exceptions, there has been none of the medical itinerating and "dispensing" such is done on some Mission fields. The ideal has been to have central plants in the stations as complete and well equipped as possible, and have the patients come there for treatment. With the possible exception of one Mission, the Presbyterian Missions have believed in large stations rather than stations with a single family each. Two clerical men and a doctor have been felt to be the minimum proper force for effective work. Within the last three years, the two-doctor-for-each-hospital principle has been adopted as a proper principle, by several of the Missions.

J. Rigid insistence upon the Bible standards.

From the beginning, the question of keeping of the Sabbath, of wine drinking, of secondary wives and all such questions have been handled very strictly not only by the missionaries, but now much more by the Korean ordained pastors. All such faults are held sufficient to debar from baptism or to call for discipline if committed by those already baptised.

At least six months probation from the time that an inquirer is enrolled is required before he takes his examination to become a catechmen. After that it is usually a year before he is baptised. Some Korean pastors will even discipline a member for tobacco smoking, Elders have been deposed from office for this single thing.

Perhaps the standard has been too high. Perhaps it has been a matter of "laying on burdens too heavy to bear." However, "by their fruits ye shall know them," and by our fruits we must be judged.

OUTSTANDING PRINCIPLES AND METHODS OF MISSIONARY WORK IN KOREA

Prepared in 1926 for a Mission History, by Rev. J.G. Holdcroft, D.D.

This chapter deals more with the past than with the present and future, and yet to deal fruitfully with the past it must have a bearing upon both the present and the future.

First, let us recall the fact that in Korea are found 40 per cent of all the churches established by the twenty-five Missions of the Presbyterian Church, U.S.A., 40 per cent of the ordained men, over 28 per cent of all communicants, over 37 per cent of the Sunday School membership, 17 per cent of the schools and 20 per cent of the pupils. Whatever be the reasons for this, the facts are significant and that this showing should be made with the use of but 7.6 per cent of funds for current expenses and with but 1.33 per cent of the money used in evangelization makes those facts still more significant.

Practically this whole work was done in Old Korea. Old Korea was marvelously receptive to spiritual truth. New Korea, however, is different from old Korea. The physical and material changes that have come about are least of all. With them has come a sharpening, at least a re-directing, of mental life which in turn affects spiritual life and attitudes. It is well then to look to our methods to see whether our tools be adapted to our task.

The church at large has heard much of Korean policy and method. These are in some important respects different from those of most Mission fields, and while they have not completely changed the method of other fields they have profoundly affected the method of several. What then are these methods and the principles that underlie them?

To speak of principles first, the very chiefest of them all is *A Great Conviction*. Paxton Hood in his life of Oliver Cromwell says that underneath Cromwell's character and deeds lay *his great thoughts of God*. and that 'unless you understand his inner depth of vital conviction you will have no comprehension of the man.' This is true of what has been accomplished in Korea: Underneath it, environing it and giving it character lies a robust, intelligent and emotion-suffused theology, the '*great thoughts of God*,' the inner and basic convictions of the men who originally moulded the Korea Mission's method and policy.

Korea was fortunate in the character of her pioneer missionaries. They were men of *conviction*, conviction that Christ was the Eternal Son of God, that He by his Godhead, His sacrificial death and victorious resurrection became the Saviour from Sin, that He is the rightful ruler of this world and of every individual life in it, and that He is to return and to receive all power and authority; conviction too that Christ suffices for all of life, this and the next, and for every phase of life. They had a conviction too that the Bible was the very Word

of God, authoritative and final. We knew these men.' Some have gone to their Lord, some are with us to this day. Speaking of them as a whole, and indeed, almost of each one individually, we know that there was no uncertainty or wavering, or evasion in regard to any of these great matters. They were men who had thought great thoughts of God, men of conviction and their convictions shaped policies and won success. The underlying facts and principles of a victorious Christianity being changeless and the greatest thing in life being simple loyalty to Jesus, the Christ, as God and Saviour we will meet with no success save as we too share these convictions fully.

However, although right and deep conviction be the basis of successful life and work it alone is not sufficient. Modern pedagogy holds that the setting up of specific purposes is one of the secrets of effective teaching. This is true of any constructive work. My study of Mission method has led me to see that there was a definitely formed ruling purpose to make not only individual life and work testify to the basic convictions held, but also to make all institutions founded testify faithfully to the now living, but once crucified, Christ. This purpose was not merely one on the part of the missionaries engaged in evangelistic work. It was definite and specific among others also and almost amounted to Paul's great resolution 'I determined to know nothing among you save Jesus Christ and Him crucified.' *That purpose has had much to do with the history of the Korea Mission.*

Sometimes conviction and purpose although present are weak, but it takes *true moral courage* actually to put first things first in all one's life and work, true moral courage, perseverance and constant vigilance. We sometimes think that we have fallen upon more perplexing days than those in which the policies of the Korea Mission were largely shaped. That however is not correct for there never was a time when there were not offered seemingly easy solutions to questions, which solutions if adopted would have ruined all our testimony. The best psychology of the human mind and spirit is in the Bible, and the supreme precept of this psychology is 'Ye must be born again.' But even though that truth is perceived, and held with real conviction and a definite purpose to make individual life and co-operative work tend to that end it takes a great deal of grace-crowned determination to work out this conviction and purpose into practicable and effective methods. Our first missionaries had this moral courage and in the face of much opposition found such methods. Shall we?

Next in order of importance among the principles of missionary work in Korea is belief in the value of *conference and discussion*. This is right because the method and policy of the Mission should be a living organism. The pioneers of this Mission were anxious that it should be. They were generously willing to listen to and consider anything put forward with sincerity and conviction. They had the knowledge of experience, but all alike, including the latest arrived new

missionary who is truly called of God possesses a measure of the Holy Spirit's guidance. He has a right to all the information that can be given, but also he has a real contribution to make to the growing organism of method and policy. This was recognized, not alone by the Mission but by the Board also, for it used to present to each new Missionary, at least to those who came to Korea, a copy of Dr. John L. Nevius' little book 'Planting and Development of Missionary Churches.' On the field also such books as Allen's 'Missionary Methods, St. Paul's or Ours,' and also his book on 'Missionary Principles' were read and discussed, and conferences on method and policy were frequently held. All this in an earnest desire to clarify principles and to correct, strengthen, and if necessary, to revise, methods of work.

These principles resulted very naturally in a very definite body of Mission methods.

The first policy inspired by these principles is that it is our first and foremost business in this country to *preach Christ just as far and as wide as possible*. Just how fully this has been the vocation of the Mission is seen by the fact that up until a very few years ago two-thirds of all the missionaries in our Mission were engaged in evangelistic work.

Yet it must never be forgotten that it was not alone by those who gave all their time to evangelistic work that this preaching was done. . . . This personal effort to lead others to Christ to do which we all have constant opportunity is the one unifying principle in all our work and like the scarlet cord bound up in the rope used by the British Navy is the sign and seal of genuineness wherever found, the sign and seal of a blood bought man. There is an ever present necessity laid upon us to allow the impulses God gave us when he called us to the foreign field free play once we are here. This impulse seems to have been so strong that it became a policy among the earlier missionaries, and no missionary ought to be content if he does not know how to lead a soul to Christ, and if he does not, as often as he has opportunity, do so.

The second method is *intensive instruction of all in the Word of God*. Not study for study's sake, or to know the Bible intellectually, but to apply it to life, that is, to create character and to give power to lives founded on Christ. As far as possible every convert should be given an opportunity for, and encouraged to, intelligent, imaginative, prolonged and reverent study of the Bible. Of course Korea was fortunate in its possession of the native script, a great boon to the ordinary Christian. But there were other things. He who put the whole church into the Sunday School must have been a genius. Then the system of local, central and station Bible classes leading to short term *Bible Institutes in every station*, so that men and women could, at convenient times and in a way that they could afford, get an education in this Book, which in itself gives a liberal education, is something

inherited by us from the past which should be handed down to the future strengthened and bettered. At the head of this system stands the Theological Seminary, or did until lately when it is drawing more and more students from the Colleges. There has always existed in Korea also a desire to add new and valuable agencies to those already in existence. Among such additions in late years are the Daily Vacation Bible School, the Week-Day Church School and summer conferences for students. By all these means the teaching of the Bible in an intelligent, believing, enthusiastic way and by right methods, has been a very greatly used method.

Not only so, but the responsibility for maintaining this teaching has been laid upon the Korean Church as well, as has also the responsibility for winning souls to Christ.

As has already been indicated one of the first methods in which the life of the Mission found expression is *medical work*. . . .

This work originally rendered its greatest service perhaps as an entering wedge. Kindly treatment at the hand of a physician leading to restored physical health could not but lessen prejudice, and induce a favorable attitude toward the Great Physician, and so not alone individuals and families were won, but church-groups were established through medical work. This characteristic has not been lost to this day especially in the smaller and weaker Stations where it is indeed a mighty factor.

Although by the establishment of government and private hospitals it is but natural that Mission hospitals should become less outstanding, nevertheless the Mission hospitals have added natural developments which still make them an indispensable part of our work. They not only alleviate and heal disease and point to Christ, but regarded as a system they are, by the development of nurses training Schools and the medical College training a body of Christian physicians and nurses who will undoubtedly eventually do as fine work for their people as do those of any land. Thus they introduce better standards of living, and by no means neglect the work which they have done from the first, namely to alleviate pain, heal sickness, point to Christ, and constantly stand as a witness that Christianity's message, while to the soul, is also a message to the whole man.

Another method of special note is *Education*. Long before the government or private organizations did much in the way of education the Mission started to build its educational institutions, until to-day it has Seminary, Colleges, High Schools and other special educational institutions. To newcomers it may seem as though a base were lacking for educational work in that the Mission has almost no primary schools. Nevertheless the Mission at one time had such schools and the Korean Church had more than it has now, and both would have been glad to have had more had it been financially possible, the Mission having more than once declared that primary and secondary education was,

in its view, of even greater importance than collegiate, so that the Mission has been cordial to all education from that given in primary schools up.

There can be no question but that in early years the prevailing policy of the Korea Mission was to educate the children *of the Church*: it did not seek to draw non-Christians into its schools, but relied rather upon the Christian testimony of its students to win other young men and women. However of late there has been some departure from this practice, two of our schools having reported that about fifty per cent of their students were non-Christian at entrance.

It behooves the Mission, therefore to face again the question, "What constitutes a Christian School?" The old principle was that it was not a Christian faculty alone, or a Christian Board of Directors, or the Bible in the curriculum, but that certainly the attitude of the students has as much to do with it, or more, than had any factor, and that in addition, there should be a definite knowledge of what kind of a school is wanted, a determination to establish and maintain that kind of a school or none, and a resolute hewing to the line to shape the school to its pattern.

Moreover we should ask "What of the final product?" Some of these young people admitted as non-Christians may be won to Christ. But it is easy in school to profess Christianity and yet be only nominal Christians. That is true even of some children from Christian homes. How much more easy for young people from non-Christian homes to go through, and finish and leave being little more than non-Christians! Almost without knowing it we have approximated conditions in many Mission schools of India and China where non-Christian students form 50, 75, even 95 per cent of the whole student body, concerning whom a recent writer in China declared, "In our particular case, of the thousands who have had years of training in our so-called Christian Schools and of the many hundreds who have gone the full length of entering into Church membership when they were in the schools, within a twelfth month after they have left the schools, scarcely any can be found who have more than a nominal connection with the Church." It is, for us then, a serious question whether, having entered the same door as these schools in India and China which admit so large a proportion of non-Christian students are we going to come out at the same point?"

No one doubts that we are in a very difficult situation educationally, but we ought not unknowingly to *drift* into a serious departure from established and pre-dominant policy and we cannot if we are to continue to make our institutions do that primary thing which ought to be required of every Christian institution, namely, to make one, even a passing stranger, think of Christ and think of Him appreciatively, before he thinks of anything else, whenever he sees that institution. *Institutions that help make the Gospel pre-eminent in the*

Religion in Communist China p. 34 f.

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AND
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RELIGION IN THE PEOPLE'S REPUBLIC OF CHINA

*A Survey of the Official Chinese Press 1964—1967*¹

by

Winfried Glüer

There is a considerable uncertainty about recent events within the People's Republic of China. The "great cultural revolution" has not yet come to an end. Its effects on the daily life of the people are still unknown to the outside world. Even less is known about the situation of the Christian church and religions in general. It has been reported that churches in the big cities are closed or used for other purposes. Some Christian leaders have come under strong attack by the new revolutionary forces. Non-Christian religions such as Buddhism, Taoism and Islam are also affected. Although the storm of the cultural revolution has already lasted longer than one year, a clear picture of the situation is not yet available. Only isolated facts have become known through travellers or other channels. The official press of the People's Republic does not touch upon the religious question at the present time.

During the preceding years, however, news on religious events was published more or less regularly by the New China News Agency. Furthermore several theoretical articles appeared in major newspapers and magazines in which the problems of religion in a socialist country were dealt with.² This has come

1. Articles were available both in the original language and in the English translation of *SCMP/SCMM*, from which quotations are taken. In some instances slight corrections were necessary. Because the original material is inaccessible to most, extensive quotations are given.
2. Peking *People's Daily* 人民日報 (abbr. *PD*); Peking *Kuang Ming Jih Pao* 光明日報 (abbr. *KM*); *Red Flag* 紅旗 (abbr. *FR*) and others.

to an end. A close analysis of this discussion and the scarce official news related to the religious situation in China is the objective of this article. Since the general course of the People's Republic in regard to religion is widely known, only some special features will be observed here. Their interpretation might further a better understanding of the present situation.

I. INTERPRETATION OF MARXIST-LENINIST CONCEPT OF RELIGION

The Definition of Religion

All articles at hand dealing with the subject of religion reveal a heavy dependence on Marxist-Leninist tradition. There appears to be little independent thought. Each position taken is based on the classical works of the communist revolution. Only slight variations of interpretation appear with different authors. The basic thought, however, shows dogmatic qualities. Again and again the same classic statements are referred to.

A definition of religion like the following one can serve as an example: "We believe that in a broad sense and as a matter of scientific definition, religion (or a religious idea), the theist idea and superstition (or religious superstition), all denote man's belief in supernatural, mystic forces. That is to say, they all exist in man's mind as ideas. These ideas are fantastic reflections of the objective world in man's mind. Their characteristic consists in reflecting the objective world in the form of supernatural, mystic forms. That is, it consists in regarding certain natural mystic forces as determinants of natural and social phenomena."³ It is emphasized here that religion does not stem from an idealist origin. It is not created immediately in the mind of man, but has an objective, material basis. It is obvious that this definition is an interpretation of the well known passage from Engel's "Anti-Dühring" on the subject of religion.⁴ Marx and Lenin are likewise quoted to a great extent.

3. *KM*, March 7, 1965; cf. *KM*, June 30, 1965.

4. "All religion, however, is nothing but the fantastic reflection in man's mind of those external forces which control their daily life, a reflection in which the terrestrial forces assume the form of supernatural forces." *K. Marx and F. Engels on Religion*, (Moscow, 1957), p. 146.

The terminology of the above example needs to be clarified. Religion is related here to "theist ideas" and to "superstition." Phenomenologically they must be differentiated. "Theism" or "theist idea" is not used in the narrow sense of the Western technical term. The Chinese original is 有神論 over against 無神論. Thus the term "theism" must be seen in a wider sense corresponding to "a-theism." The other component in the quotation is "superstition." It denotes in its narrower meaning animistic or primitive beliefs and such practices as fortune-telling, witchcraft, geomancy, physiognomy etc. The set term for these phenomena has become "feudal superstition." Hereby the social setting is to be indicated to which they are said to belong originally. After the Han and T'ang dynasties superstitious practices of this kind increased considerably. Secret societies and "professional superstition mongers" made use of them to their own advantage. "These were special products of our feudal society. We now call such things by the general term of 'feudal superstition.'"⁵

The relation of religion, theism and feudal superstition called for a lengthy debate between some writers which is most revealing. Despite the heated argument—we will analyze it later—the general meaning of these terms is accepted by all. They are the basis for all further discussion.

The Evaluation of Religion

Religion is conditioned by outside forces of the natural and social sphere. In its more developed form it is a social phenomenon, strictly belonging to class society. The ruling classes used religion to exploit the masses of the proletariat. This common line of Marxist teaching is faithfully applied to religion in China too. Marx's word on religion as opium of the people has become commonplace and is the standard from which religion is judged by all authors.

Historical interpretation consequently does not deviate from the principles of historical materialism.⁶ Religion is standardized. Its misuse by feudal or bourgeois society is exposed.

5. *KM*, June 30, 1965.

6. Works on Chinese history of religion printed before 1949 are reprinted (by use of the original plates) as late as 1962/1963. A preface was added to adjust the contents to the new social setting. Works of this kind are still on sale in China Product bookstores in Hongkong. No major publications, either reprints or new works, of a later date than 1963 are available in Hongkong.

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The view of Buddhism as presented in an article by Fan Wen-lan on the "Evils of Buddhism in the T'ang Dynasty" can be regarded as exemplary.⁷ Buddhism is said to have been promoted in order to prevent class struggle in several ways. Innumerable temples and monasteries were built by which superstition was spread and the rule of the landlords supported.⁸ Many sects were founded "to spread poison" and Buddhism took root by internal power ("the deceptive tactics of religion itself"). Furthermore the "peasants were benumbed and uprisings obstructed." The aim of such presentations is polemical. The detrimental character of religion is to be revealed. Thus the evaluation of religion is purely negative. There is no objective historical research. Such a requisite belongs to bourgeois thinking. The only objectivity accepted is the one established in the classic writings of Marxism-Leninism.

The image of Christianity correspondingly is not more than a cliché of these ideas. Church history is presented as a product of class struggle and social revolutions.⁹ Christian doctrine is characterized as superstitious and miraculous.¹⁰ The Roman Catholics are "deeply steeped in feudal tradition while the Protestant churches have discarded some of the decadent things inherited from the middle ages." This is by no means a compliment to Protestantism, where instead "some new things which appealed to the bourgeois" were added.¹¹ In fact, there

7. *PD*, Dec. 7, 1965 范文瀾 ; review of article in the magazine *New Construction* 新建設 of Oct., 1965.
8. The author repeatedly refers to source material. The interpretation is given from a strictly ideological viewpoint, e.g. Hui Neng's experience with the 5th Patriarch serves as a typical example of oppression and merciless exploitation.
9. "Religious divisions within the Christian churches occurred . . . because the ruling classes sought to cope with the requirements of different periods, notably the Reformation before and after the 16th century. This religious movement stemmed from the need to conform the interest of the emerging bourgeoisie in Europe." Canton *Yang Ch'eng Wan Pao* 羊城晚報 , Nov. 1, 1965.
10. *KM*, June 30, 1965.
11. Some doctrinal differences of the Roman Catholic and the Protestant churches are listed as mediation by priests, Mary etc. Differences in eschatology are described as follows: "The Protestants . . . believe that after death people either gain 'eternal life' or go to 'hell,' without any alternative. The Catholics believe that after death people can go to 'purgatory,' an intermediate state for 'expiatory purification' before the souls of those who die . . . go to 'heaven.'" *Yang Ch'eng Wan Pao*, Nov. 1, 1965.

is little difference between the two churches. "Religious tenets always contain a great many crude concoctions (e.g. God spent six days creating the world). Also the church demands that its members have implicit faith in these preposterous legends and no doubt of whatever kind is permitted. The church thus uses this vulgar method to deceive the people, treating them like a flock of shepherded sheep."¹²

This argumentation is neither new nor original. Similarly religion and especially Christianity is still described as the close relative of idealist philosophy. They both are "the result of the departure of ideas from reality and thus have a common cognitive origin."¹³ The article on "Religion and Idealist Philosophy"¹² is in its first part a mere repetition of the criticism first put forward in Marx's "Theses on Feuerbach" and the "German Ideology" (although not specially referred to). Religion is called "vulgar idealism" while "the bird of the same feather," idealism, is exposed as "slippery fideism." So far only the position of the nineteenth century is reproduced. From this basis a whole century of history of theology is either neglected or mutilated. Karl Barth's theology is described as "a reflection of the general crisis of world capitalism."¹⁴ Philosophy and religion are entangled in this crisis. As futile attempts at their rescue, the following five points are noted in passing at the end of the article on religion and idealist philosophy.

1) Neo-Thomists and existentialists appear hand in hand trying "to work on a 'lineal' idealist philosophy in order directly to consolidate their positions."

2) Others "propagate irrationalism, with the positive assertion that many things in this world basically cannot be proved with reason and that it is necessary for the people to reach the mystic ambit of religions through intuition or inspiration."

3) Two ways of truth are said to be presented by some, a scientific and a religious one: "on the surface . . . promoting the 'coexistence' and 'coprosperity' of religion and science."

12. 曾文經 in *PD*, March 23, 1964.

13. *Loc. cit.*

14. *RF*, Nov. 21, 1964.

4) Others are maintained "first to 'affirm' certain scientific knowledge and subsequently to declare that such knowledge is insufficient to explode the tenets of religion and, on the contrary, it can be used as proof to support religion. This is intended to serve God with the theories of Copernicus and Darwin."

5) Others are willing "to agree to all, if only God could be added to materialism."¹⁵

It is noteworthy that this is all the author is able or willing to recognize as representative Christian theology. The attempt to present correct positions is not made. They are rejected before they are even understood. There is no flexibility in this encounter with Christianity. In fact, due to this failure, there is no real encounter.

The interpretation of Christianity as an exponent of imperialism has been known for years already. It shall not be reproduced here except for a few comments that were made on current events within Christianity. A review of the trends in Protestant theology during the more recent period was given under the title, "How Protestant Theology of the West serves U.S. Imperialism."¹⁶ Here the theology of the years after 1950 is characterized as "nuclear blackmail theology" by which people were to be threatened and to be driven into despair with the objective to make them surrender to a completely reactionary world outlook. The ecumenical conference of New Delhi in 1961 especially aroused the suspicion of the author. It was held under the control of U.S. imperialism. Particularly the representation of Professor Sittler of Chicago, "this imperialist element," on the cosmic Christ revealed "the intention of U.S. imperialism in requiring the theologians of the West to coin a set of new theological systems to meet its counterrevolutionary global strategy."¹⁷ The Vatican II Council has come under similar charges: "In modern times both the Roman Catholic and Protestant churches are exploited by Western capitalist countries . . . what merits the attention of the patriotic faithful and others in our country is that through the instigation of

15. *PD*, March 23, 1964.

16. *RF*, No. 21/22, Nov. 21, 1964.

17. *Loc. cit.*

U.S. imperialism in recent years, these two camps of 'international religious organizations' have clamored for religious 'reforms' and a movement of 'international religious unity' . . . it is obvious that in using the two major camps of the Christian church to sabotage domestic revolutionary movements and extending aggression abroad, U.S. imperialism is plotting for new and far reaching intrigues."¹⁸ Christian theology is thus said to have concrete political aims. Varying theological interpretations due to the dialogue within the church itself and to different situations and historical moments are declared to be arbitrary: "In the past, the Christian theory emphasized the so-called 'uniqueness of Christ' and 'world-transcendence' to negate the world. Now they once again emphasize Jesus Christ's 'descent into the world as an incarnation of the divine' . . . to give the impression that Jesus Christ has a hand to play in all human affairs, so as to publicize the need for Christian followers to permeate into all spheres of social life to carry out reactionary political activities . . . To the imperialist theologians God or Jesus Christ can be sent for or sent away in this way . . . obviously the Bible is like a grocery store or a rubbish dump from which the theologians produce the kinds of ware imperialism wants. To meet the need of any imperialist policy, the theologians can pick from this rubbish dump some junk, whitewash it and make it up into 'absolute, eternal truth' for use as Christian faith to deceive people."¹⁹

The language of these articles is clear. Whether it is Buddhism, Taoism, Confucianism or Christianity, religion is regarded as opium of the people and must, therefore, be rooted out. Where religion does not correspond to the image of the classical writings, it is even more under suspicion and will be attacked forcibly as the above examples have shown.

The articles referred to were published in the People's Republic's leading newspapers and magazines. They were meant to be read in China and to be used as directives for the Chinese people to the correct attitude in religious matters. This leads us to the question of how far it is possible at all to practise religion in a society determined to exterminate the last vestige of religion.

18. Canton, *Yang Ch'eng Wan Pao*, Nov. 1, 1965.

19. *RF*, Nov. 21, 1964.

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II. THE PROBLEM OF FREEDOM OF RELIGION

The constitution of the People's Republic of China guarantees freedom of religion. On the other hand, it is the aim of the atheist state to abolish religion. The tension between both aspects can be felt in all articles on the religious question. Freedom of religion is usually defined in paradoxical form: "In our country the people have the freedom of religious belief and legitimately religious activities are permitted. But we must also actively, dynamically and patiently carry out atheistic propaganda."²⁰ This statement of 1963 is subscribed to also in the later articles. Religious freedom is not unlimited. The dividing line is clearly marked. Only "legitimate religious activities" are permitted. As long as religion does not interfere with the state and the new social order it will enjoy freedom. But, in any case, the restriction is emphasized strongly, because the actual interest of the state naturally lies here and not in the protection of religion. A quotation from Liu Shao-ch'i, who at that time was still unchallenged, illustrates this accentuation: "Safeguarding the freedom of worship and safeguarding the freedom of counterrevolutionary activity are two things which absolutely must not be confused with each other. Our constitution and all laws, similarly, will never give any facility to those elements who carry out counterrevolutionary activities while wearing the cloak of religion."²¹ And yet it is declared policy in the earlier years as well as up to the time of the last article in our hands that "proper" religion must not be dealt with by force. This is advocated by Mao Tse-tung, who admits that it is relatively easy to break the power of the reactionary classes with the state, the power of clan chiefs and *patres familias* and the husbands' power over the women. Yet the fourth power, "the divine power of the system of Gods and spirits," must be broken too. Doing away with it "will be a more difficult and prolonged job . . . Leaving the last (i.e. religion) untouched, . . . we shall not be completely fulfilling our revolutionary mission."²² Religion may exist at present, but it is expected to disappear before communism in its perfect

20. *PD*, Aug. 15, 1963.

21. Quoted from *PD*, Aug. 8, 1963.

22. *PD*, Aug. 15, 1963; cf. Mao Tse-tung, "Investigation into the Peasant Movement in Honan," *Selected Works of Mao Tse-tung*, Vol. I (Bombay, 1955), p. 45.

form will be introduced. Within these limits freedom of religion is granted.

The Debate on Freedom of Religion

So far our survey has not revealed anything which could not be known in principle or which would differ much from the policy toward religion in other countries ruled according to Marxist-Leninist principles. Considering the circumstances, it must be admitted that a fair chance is offered to any follower of religion.²³ However, so clear the legal position appears in the above definition of a narrow margin for religious freedom, so wide a range for differing understandings is left. All depends, in fact, on the interpretation of what is to be regarded as "legitimate" or "proper" religious activity. This will be defined not by those who practise religion but by the state which is aiming at the extinction of religion. When this aim is radically pursued, the question must arise as to whether religion can be "legitimate" at all.

The question, however, has not been raised in this form. Up to now the passage in the constitution on freedom of religion has not been revoked, but there are strong indications that religious activities have been curbed in the cultural revolution by means other than by "actively, dynamically and patiently carried out atheistic propaganda." (See note No. 20).

It is not surprising that the tension underlying the very definition of religious freedom has called for a lengthy and vivid debate during the years preceding the cultural revolution. This debate was held in public in the leading newspapers and magazines. We have access to eleven articles which were published between 1963 and 1965. Some further contributions to the debate are not available. The contestants are Ya Hanchang 牙含章 who advocates a less radical line, and two authors

23. Cf. Chou En-lai speaking to Chinese Christians in 1950: "So we are going to go on letting you teach, trying to convert people . . . After all we both believe that truth will prevail; we think your beliefs untrue and false, therefore, if we are right, the people will reject them and your church will decay. If you are right, then the people will believe you; but as we are sure that you are wrong, we are prepared for that risk." Quoted from *China Notes*, July, 1966.

who jointly produced and signed their contributions to the dispute: Yu Hsiang 游驤 and Liu Chün-wang 劉俊望. All these articles are centered around the problem of freedom of religion although this is not always clear from their topic or line of thought.

Much space is devoted to the definition of religion, especially to the clarification of the relation between "religion," "theism" and "feudal superstition." To some this problem has appeared to be "childish,"²⁴ but, in fact, the answer to this question is of high importance and has decisive consequences. The debate itself is rather complicated and verbose. Only a close analysis will elaborate the actual position and show that the gulf between the disputants is deeper than it would appear at first glance. The authors on both sides are faithful Marxists and prove this by lengthy quotations from Marx, Engels and Lenin and even by excommunicating each other because of their differing interpretations.

The position of Ya Han-chang²⁵ is most interesting because it presents a solution to the religious problem in which the authority of the Marxist classics is not merely reiterated, but thoughtfully applied to the Chinese situation which obviously differs from the situation in nineteenth century Europe. Thus Ya defines the relation of religion, theism and superstition in the following way: religion, theism and superstition have their similarities in so far as all religion and theist ideas are based on superstitious beliefs instead of recognizing the natural and social realities. However not all theist ideas or superstitious activities can be called religion. Ya denies that "feudal superstition" is to be regarded as religion. He differentiates between the highly developed religions (such as Buddhism, Taoism, Islam and Christianity) on the one hand, and theist, primitive superstition on the other hand. In the case of China the term "religion" does not apply to both although the

24. Cf. *China Notes*, Oct., 1965, p. 6. The same issue also gives extracts from most of the articles.

25. *PD*, Aug. 8, 1963; *New Construction*, Feb., 1964; *Shanghai Wen Hui Pao*, Sept. 11, 1964; *Ibid.*, Dec. 10, 1964; *KM*, June 30, 1965. Among these the concluding article is the most important one because it gives a comprehensive clarification of the author's opinion.

bourgeois history of religion has identified both the higher religions and primitive superstition as "religion."

This is proved by references to Engels and Lenin, mainly by the latter's definition of "spontaneous religion" in the early stage of mankind, when the idea of gods and the soul were born—by pressure from natural and social forces—which led to the invention of rites and worship, sacrifices and other activities. After this stage "man-made religion" arrived which was misused in class struggle for suppression and exploitation. While the authors of the Marxist classics mainly encountered Christianity in their evaluation of religion, it must be seen that in China the situation is far more complicated because organized, man-made religions (Buddhism, Taoism and Confucianism—the latter without strictly religious qualities) existed side by side with spontaneous theism and activities like fortunetelling, geomancy etc. The superstitious activities were intermingled at times with religious practices but in themselves, Ya contends, they lack religious qualities. While Lenin spoke of "spontaneous religion" Ya modifies this term as far as China is concerned and denies the religious character in spontaneous superstition. He tries to prove this from an historical point of view and from an assessment of the present situation.²⁶ It is not the intention of Ya to give an unbiased historical interpretation of religion in China. His real motive is revealed in the following statements: "In our country especially it is extremely harmful to speak of theist 'religion' . . . If we admit that the theist idea and religion are the same thing and that all theist ideas are religion then we must necessarily admit that all those who believe in 'spirits' and 'fate' are 'religious believers.' In this way many who are not religious believers will be counted as such, and this will greatly magnify the forces of religion in our country. This is obviously disadvantageous to our struggle against religion and superstition and to class struggle in the

26. ". . . among the broad masses of our people there have been in history and are still at present, many who do not follow any religion, and yet they believe in 'spirits' and 'fate.'" *KM*, June 30, 1965.

Ya's concept of religion is particular as it seems to presuppose mainly external organization. In this regard it was rightly challenged by his adversaries (*KM*, March 7, 1965). But apart from the aspect of external organization, it is debatable how far certain beliefs and practices in China constitute religion in the full sense.

sphere of religion and superstition." Ya goes on to confirm that "sorcerers, priests, soothsayers, geomancers etc. still exist openly or covertly in large numbers."²⁷ He does not fear, however, the large numbers of people as a religious force. For him it is necessary instead to have the hands free for the suppression of superstitions. Thus his elaborate definition of feudal superstition has a most real and practical origin: "If we admit that feudal superstition is also 'religion,' then we shall also have to admit that the Party's policy of freedom of religious belief also applies to all forms of feudal superstition . . . repressive measures cannot be taken against them and . . . those who practise them should be allowed to enjoy 'freedom of religious belief.' Such a theory is obviously . . . disadvantageous to our struggle against feudal superstition."²⁸

At this place we have come to the core of the debate, the problem of religious freedom. It is covered up in the debate itself by a lengthy and complicated argumentation. Even here only few indications are given in which way freedom of religious belief is understood by Ya. For him feudal superstition is incompatible with the socialist state. It must, therefore, be destroyed. Freedom of religion cannot be granted to practisers of feudal superstition. From this we can gather that Ya sees "freedom," which the organized religions enjoy, in a positive way. This can be confirmed by a remarkable statement from one of his early essays where he says that religion can legitimately continue to exist when it is not exploited politically. This he applies to the situation in China after 1949: "After the nationwide liberation, the condition of religions serving as a tool for the ruling class in ruling the people, and for imperialism in aggression against our country has basically changed."²⁹ Although he cautions against a possible revival of these forces, Ya, in principle, can conceive of religious practise to which freedom legitimately might be granted, at least for the tran-

27. *KM*, June 30, 1965.

28. *Loc. cit*

29. *PD*, Aug. 8, 1965; Yu and Liu denounce Ya for his view that Marx's verdict on the opium of the people "is applicable only to class society and refers only to the harmful role of religion in class struggle." *KM*, March 7, 1965. Besides this particular interpretation of Marx, Ya also refers to Lenin's "spontaneous religion" in support of his assertion of religious practice which does not underlie the rules of class struggle.

sitional period from socialism to communism. Freedom of religious belief is defined here in more positive terms than in many other interpretations (including the ones of his counterparts).

Of course Ya also advocates the extinction of religion, otherwise he would not be a Marxist. But from his position we now will understand the emphasis in his directive: "In conducting propaganda on atheism or opposing superstition³⁰ we must absolutely not interfere with others' worship or tamper with the proper religious activities of the believers. On the other hand, the believers and theists, for their part must not interfere with our conducting education in atheism or our opposing religious superstitions. Only this is the correct attitude."³¹ The before-mentioned tension in the definition of religious freedom is not eliminated here. But the recommendation of long-term, systematic, positive education in atheism among the broad masses, under the correct leadership of the Party, corresponds with the positive assertion of this freedom. Ya Han-chang is strictly opposed to the use of administrative orders or coercive means against religion and with this attitude he is quite in line with Lenin and Mao Tse-tung.³²

The position taken by Yu Hsiang and Liu Chün-wang³³ is by far more radical. For them "the problem of religion is an important socio-political problem."³⁴ Religion can never be a private affair. It is not confined to the realm of individual thinking. It is rather "one of the many aspects of social ideology."³⁵ Ya is said to neglect the ideological character of religion as in fact his emphasis on external organization in the definition of religion would suggest. When he affirms, as we have seen, that religion cleansed from its counterrevolutionary and imperialist misuse might rightfully exist until the com-

30. Here in the wide sense of superstition, not feudal superstition.

31. *Loc. cit.*

32. *The Works of Lenin*, "Socialism and Religion," Vol. X, p. 64; Mao Tse-tung, *On the Correct Handling of Contradictions among the People* (Peking: Foreign Language Press, 1957).

33. *New Construction*, Sept., 1963; Review in *KM*, Oct. 17, 1963; *RF*, Feb. 26, 1964; *KM*, March 21, 1964; *Shanghai Wen Hui Pao*, April 21, 1964; *Ibid.* May 5, 1964; *KM*, March 7/8, 1965.

34. *RF*, Feb. 26, 1964.

35. *KM*, March 7, 1965.

unist society will be fully introduced, he overlooks that the material and social components always are constitutive factors of religion. The main charge brought against Ya's view of religion is, therefore, that his outlook is "idealistic." Religion vanishes into a mere idea. "He negates the material, objective sources which has produced religion as an ideology He has departed from the principle that existence determines consciousness He merely looks at external phenomena of certain religions as the common, immanent essence of all religions thereby substituting metaphysics for materialistic dialectics and subjective idealism for dialective materialism and historical materialism."³⁶ According to Yu and Liu one cannot operate in the important question of religion with "pure ideology" (i.e. idealistic thinking) and separate religion from the reality of social conditions — and that means specifically: one cannot regard religion apart from class struggle.

Religion basically is ideology. It can therefore not be assigned to a neutral position but must by its very nature be related to the proletarian revolution. The two co-authors deny forcibly that "the problem of extinction of religion and the theist idea is first of all one of changing man's world outlook" as Ya would advocate. Instead they accuse him of basically ignoring "the decisive role of the proletarian struggle and the struggle for production in promoting the extinction of religion."³⁷

Yu and Liu do not have much concern for history of religion, religious phenomenology and their like. As hard-core ideologists they represent the doctrine in its strictest consequences.³⁸ Thus the differentiation of religion, theist idea and superstition is not important to them. They concede that phenomenologically differences exist, but with regard to the solution of the religious problem these three are basically the same, namely, ideological deviations which must be dealt with at all costs. We can bypass

36. *Loc. cit.*

37. *Loc. cit.*

38. Ya's accusation that their way of thinking is "bourgeois" (*KM*, June 30, 1965) is certainly not correct. He might be nearer to the truth, when he hints that they are ignorant of the subject of religious history (cf. their misunderstanding of the religious situation of the West at the time of Marx). On the other hand, they do not care for such details in their rigid campaign of interpreting the Marxist principles.

their elaborate defense of the identity of religion, theism and superstition, as we already pointed out the basic motive behind their argumentation. More important now is the question of what understanding of freedom of religion this rigid interpretation allows for.

Freedom of religion is not denied by Yu and Liu. The two co-authors subscribe to the principles laid down in the constitution. Freedom, however, is interpreted here much more narrowly than by Ya. The emphasis in the concession of freedom lies on the negative side where the limitations of freedom are defined.³⁹ Religion must necessarily be eliminated. Nevertheless, for the transitional period from socialism to communism it is recognized that there are religious believers. Certain concessions must be given to them without abandoning the main aim, the final destruction of religion. This freedom is a period of grace only, not really to the benefit of the believers, but of the state. For "religious followers constitute a social force. The majority are working people. When they are united with, we can develop their positive role in the revolution and construction."⁴⁰ This was written in 1964 in the theoretical Party magazine *Red Flag*. The same article gives more indications of how in Yu and Liu's understanding religion and class struggle are to be linked up.

With reference to Mao Tse-tung's speech, "On the Correct Handling of Contradictions among the People,"⁴¹ two kinds of social contradictions are pointed out which must be seen when dealing with religion. The first is the contradiction between classes. "The reactionary classes exploit religion to preserve their class interests, and come into contradiction with the masses of the people."⁴² While Ya is of the opinion that basically this exploitation belongs to the past, at least as far as religion in China is concerned, Yu and Liu state grimly

39. "People who believe in religion have the freedom in carrying out proper religious activities, but because of carrying out such activities, they definitely cannot undermine the interests of the state, the society and the collective and the other civic rights; and much less can they use religion to carry out counterrevolutionary and illegal activities." *RF*, Feb. 26, 1964.

40. *Loc. cit.*

41. *Op. cit.*

42. *RF*, Feb. 26, 1964.

(1964): "Contradictions of this nature continue to exist during the period of the socialist revolution and they are principally expressed in the fact that the imperialists and the remnant reactionary forces in this country, not content with their defeat, continue to exploit religion to carry out all kinds of sabotage activities, in the futile attempt to overthrow the proletarian dictatorship, and to realize their restoration."⁴³ As religion is inherently connected with ideology, its very existence means a continuous threat to the forces of the revolution. For this reason there can be no concession. Class struggle must continue until the death of religion is achieved.⁴⁴

The second social contradiction falls outside the range of class struggle. It is a social contradiction within one class: "Religious adherents among the working class believe in religion and come into contradiction with the other working people . . ." Contradictions of this kind "are the reflection, within the inner rank of the working people, of the contradiction between religion and the Marxist-Leninist world outlook, the contradiction between theism and atheism."⁴⁵

While the class enemy must be exposed and destroyed without concessions, the encounter with religion within the working class must take place in a different way. On the principle of "divide and conquer," even positive cooperation with religious adherents will be possible. The construction of a "patriotic united front" is imperative. "Differences in ideological belief among people do not exclude cooperation on a given political foundation In China, generally speaking, religious circles possess patriotism to varying extents, and a portion of these people also have a definite amount of progressive democratic demands. Accordingly it is also possible to unite with them under the patriotic front."⁴⁶ But this is only a political alliance. Among its objectives is the continuation of class struggle (especially within religion itself), furthermore positively the construction of the new society. This social contradiction within the working class must be handled carefully

43. *Loc. cit.*

44. *KM*, March 7/8, 1965.

45. *RF*, Feb. 26, 1964.

46. *Loc. cit.*

because a political alliance "does not in the least imply that it can adopt a neutral attitude toward religion, that it can 'coexist peacefully' with religion in the realm of ideology, and that it can remain unconcerned with the bondage imposed on the masses by religion."⁴⁶ These are the principles on which "freedom of religion" is based. It is a time of indulgence, but not an indulgence of a quiet, peaceful existence but of continued struggle, even when the followers of religion positively support the construction of the new society. At the same time the state will be at work to destroy the basis that enables the existence of religion: "The Party must practise the principle of both, uniting with them (i.e. the patriotic religious circles) and struggling with them, continuously pushing them to carry out political and ideological reform, gradually making them rid themselves of the political influences of domestic and foreign reactionaries, and helping them to catch up with the development of the general situation."⁴⁷ While there might be a political alliance and cooperation, at the same time the ideological struggle will continue.

The last quotation speaks of "gradual" liberation from the bonds of religion. In fact, Yu and Liu emphasize throughout all their writings that this is a long process in which no simple and brutal methods should be used, nor should administrative order be applied. This resembles the advice of Ya, but in fact the stand of Yu and Liu is quite different. In spite of the similarity, they assault Ya because he "practically regards atheistic propaganda as the primary and even only way to promote extinction of religion."⁴⁸ They rather want to work in various fields in an overall ideological warfare against religion with intensified atheist propaganda, "so as to release the masses from the shackles of religious superstition step by step."⁴⁹ They are aware of the long period that this struggle will continue, but they are by no means prepared to wait until religion will vanish by its own. Therefore, "religion must unavoidably be weakened. This is the general trend However, even under the condition of the proletariat holding state power the weakening of religion is not a vertical drop. In the

47. *Loc cit.*

48. *KM*, March 7, 1965.

49. *KM*, March 8, 1965.

general decline trend, there must be undulations. . . ."⁵⁰ Wave after wave of assault will finally cause the death of religion. Certainly their understanding of freedom of religion is very radical. The freedom they respect is not more than a freedom to die.

In this regard all religious activities, whether "religion, theism or feudal superstition" are the same: "We treat the superstitious beliefs of the masses in ghosts, spirits, fate and so forth on the same principle as we do the beliefs of the Roman Catholics or the Protestants in God, of the Moslems in Allah, of the Buddhists in Buddha and of the Taoists in fairies and genii."⁵¹ They blame Ya for exempting the organized religions from the struggle and for only being concerned with the struggle against feudal superstition. Pressed by Ya, they concede that "freedom of religion" cannot be applied to feudal superstition.⁵² Yet this does not mean any basic difference in the treatment of religion and feudal superstition.⁵³ Ya's interpretation of freedom of religion is unacceptable to them. It leaves too much room to the organized religions: "His vigorous insistence that religion, the theist idea and superstition are not the same, objectively plays the role of beautifying religion to the detriment of the struggle against religion."⁵⁴

We have shown before that the debate on the relation of religion, theism and feudal superstition is basically a debate on the freedom of religion. From the last quotations a wide rift between both positions should be manifest. In the debate itself it is covered up by intricate clauses. However the positions are clear: Ya advocates the destruction of feudal superstition, while the organized religions enjoy freedom of belief, which is not narrowed radically, although it is seen also in the framework of Marxist-Leninist ideology. Yu and Liu, on the other hand, promote an all-out ideological struggle against religion which

50. *RF*, Feb. 26, 1964.

51. *KM*, March 8, 1965.

52. *Loc. cit.*; This is not at all consistent with their definition of religion.

53. "In this regard we should not specially tighten our grip on the masses because they believe in the kitchen God or the door God. Nor should we relax our grip because they believe in God, Buddha or genii." *KM*, March 8, 1965.

54. *Loc. cit.*

consists in all its forms of nothing but superstition, incompatible with the communist society under construction, and, in fact, already unbearable for the socialist society in the transitional stage. Its extinction, therefore, must be speeded up, admittedly not by administrative orders or direct use of force. But the question arises as to how far this belligerent attitude is from an even more radical and active attitude towards religion.⁵⁵

III. ATHEIST PROPAGANDA

We have several examples of atheist propaganda at hand which appeared in the official newspapers and magazines. The evaluation of Buddhism and Christianity has already been touched upon.⁵⁶ Here we are interested in this propaganda in so far only as it possibly indicates a general trend toward a more lenient direction or a more radical one.

A popular way of atheist education through the medium of the press is through the column called "Letters to the Editor" in which letters of readers are printed and answered. It is not always clear how far such correspondence is genuine. In any case the questions dealt with are considered to be of importance to the public. In these columns of different papers letters of young people have frequently been printed expressing the impatience of youths with their parents who still practise religion (all being concerned with "feudal superstition"). As an example of an uncompromising attitude of the young, the following quotation may be given: "Some said, 'We are all good youths of the Mao Tse-tung era. We shall struggle against

55. Cf. the essay on "The Question of Breaking down Religion and Superstitions" by Chou Chien-jen 周建人. He comes to the following conclusion: "From the point of view of ideology, superstition must be broken down . . . We cannot wait for it to destroy itself . . ." *KM*, April 2, 1964.

56. Typical for the "historical" presentation on religion is the sudden change to the present tense in the article on "Evils of Buddhism in the T'ang Dynasty." After it was said that under the Emperor T'ang T'ai Tsung 唐太宗 Buddhism enjoyed many privileges and thus took root by virtue of its internal power, a sudden application to the present situation follows: "Nevertheless, one could only say that religion could be possibly wiped out, but would not disappear by itself. Therefore, the vestige of religious poison must be seriously fought in various respects and eliminated completely." *PD*, Dec. 7, 1965.

feudal superstitious thoughts. We must not give way.' I share this view I feel that slow persuasion shows lack of a firm proletarian stand and is an act of bowing to feudal superstitious thoughts. I am a member of the communist Youth League. I don't care who he may be, if he has incorrect thoughts. I will struggle firmly against him and correct him immediately. I will make no exception even for my own parents. I will not wait for them to change gradually."⁵⁷ This example is one of many. It shows the radical attitude especially of the young generation. Usually this attitude is confirmed to be right: "You should be a promoter in the movement to break down the old and establish the new. You should constantly talk to your relatives and people around you about atheism and science. As for your mother, you must tirelessly work on her, making her see the harm done by old ideas and old customs and rid her mind of the concept of 'gods and spirits.'"⁵⁸ But besides the voices advocating uncompromising opposition to religious practises, cautioning voices are also to be heard: Differences are to be made between relatively harmless practises and outright reactionary activities. In general, one should be patient.⁵⁹ The last letter of this kind dates from January, 1966, i.e. several months before the cultural revolution began. It still cautions against hasty, brutal action: "Nor should we try to solve problems summarily because the masses are not conscious. If we do so we will only arouse their antipathy and will fail to attain the objective of eliminating superstition. We hope that you will do away with superstition in the rural areas in such a spirit."⁶⁰

Although in the above examples only feudal superstition is mentioned expressly, yet a general attitude towards religion as a whole which definitely belongs to the "old" can be ascertained. There is an unchallenged agreement on the necessity of doing away with these forms of religion. As to the methods, however, we find that two different positions are being taken. One promotes immediate and thorough action and is even less cautious than that expressed in the articles of Yu and Liu. The

57. *Chung Kwo Ch'ing Nien*, "News Letter Box," No. 8, April 16, 1965.

58. *Canton Nan Fang Jih Pao*, Feb. 8, 1965.

59. *Chung Kwo Ch'ing Nien* "News Letter Box," April 8, 1965.

60. *Loc. cit.*, No. 1, Jan. 1, 1966.

other is trying to hold back in order to work gradually and patiently. Both exponents were represented in the press until news about religious topics disappeared early in 1966.

IV. NEWS ON RELIGIOUS EVENTS

Religious news items are published mainly in the New China News Agency English language issue. This means that these news releases are meant for the outside world. Most of these items can serve as examples of "proper" religious activity and of the "united patriotic front" mentioned before. The visits of foreign religious delegations (Islam or Buddhist) are announced,⁶¹ or a report is made on the expedition of a Chinese delegation to friendly countries.⁶² News of this kind has been frequent in recent years.⁶³ In June, 1964 there was even a report of the inauguration of a new pagoda for a tooth of Buddha which was rebuilt from 1958 to 1963!⁶⁴ Since this time, however, no more reports of this kind have been made. Instead some statements of religious leaders on political questions have been published.⁶⁵

While in 1965 more than ten news items appeared, in 1966 we find only four.⁶⁶ The political intention behind most of these news items is clear. In 1967 we have only one short note

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61. May 4, 1965; Japanese Buddhists in East China.
 62. April 12, 1966; Chinese Islamic delegation to Iraq, Kuwait, Sudan and Pakistan.
 63. Nineteen Buddhist items and one Islamic item in Nov., 1963; Eleven Buddhist items in June/July, 1964.
 64. June 25, 1964. In this connection it was made clear that imperialist troops had destroyed the old pagoda in 1900.
 65. Feb. 11, 1965: "Patriotic Chinese Catholics Condemn U.S. War Provocations." (Apart from this, the last news on Christianity was issued on Christmas eve, 1964, "Chinese Christians Observe Christmas Eve.").
 66. April 1, 1966: Sinkiang Moslems celebrate the Corban Festival at which occasion factories closed for three days. A special expression of thanks to Chairman Mao Tse-tung was given. April 2, 1966: A short note on the Corban in Peking. April 12, 1966: A Chinese delegation leaves for Islamic countries. There is obviously a relation with the two preceding items on Islamic events. June 16, 1966: A ceremony was held in Peking at the 1100th anniversary of a T'ang Dynasty monk, the founder of a Ch'en Buddhist sect. At this occasion foreign guests, mainly Japanese, were present.

on the Corban festival held in Peking.⁶⁷ This note is significant for it is the only official mention of religion after the cultural revolution which so far we can register from the main papers.

V. CONCLUDING REMARKS

This survey has dealt with three different occurrences of religion in the People's Republic's official press. The first and most important one consists of editorials and articles in which the question of religion is discussed from a Marxist-Leninist viewpoint. A heated debate had arisen which revealed the existence of different opinions. The debate was closed in the summer of 1965. After this no more theoretical articles appeared on this subject. Articles falling into the range of atheist education and propaganda were brought forward at the same time, the last of them being published early in 1966. News items which belong really to a different category because they were published in English for the outside world were found frequently in early years. Their numbers decreased steadily and reached a minimum in 1966. From the beginning of the "great cultural revolution" silence has covered the wide field of religion except for one short item of news in 1967.

On the other hand, sporadic reports reaching us indirectly indicate that there is no quiet for religion in China. On the contrary, religion seems to be deeply affected by the course of the cultural revolution. The question arises as to how these events can be interpreted. Is the only interpretation left to us an *argumentum e silentio*, or is it possible to link the present occurrences with some of the ideas discussed in the press during recent years?

Why has the subject of religion been avoided since the summer of 1966? Is it because the press has been preoccupied with more important aspects of the great revolution? This can hardly be the case, because religion certainly belongs to the four remnant "powers" of old times which should be abandoned. Or is religion regarded as already wiped out and therefore there is no need anymore to touch upon this subject?

67. March 22, 1967.

In relation to these questions an interpretation offers itself which probably will come near to the "official" standpoint, especially since it can be related to a statement of Mao Tse-tung in one of his early writings. This statement is quoted several times in the material at hand,⁶⁸ and played an influential part in the time preceding the cultural revolution. Its function then, however, was to restrain radical elements from hurried action. In his "Investigation into the Peasant Movement in Honan" of 1927 Mao Tse-tung says that the idols have been erected by the farmers and will be destroyed by them in due time voluntarily.⁶⁹ It is not right for others to act prematurely, i.e. before the people have reached the state of consciousness in which they will rid themselves of religion. The right attitude to be taken is described by a word from Mencius: "Draw (the bow) to the full without letting (the arrow) go and be on the alert."⁷⁰ The phrase refers to the art of teaching archery. One draws the bow to the full, but in a state of alertness holds back the arrow until the right time for shooting has come. The restraining function of this statement against inconsiderate actions has already been pointed out. Is the movement of the new wave of revolution in which the old is broken down and the new established the implementation of the hope that the masses themselves will destroy the idols? Yet, even though it seems that indeed the masses of the young have acted in this way or are in the process of doing so, it would not be a voluntary revolution on the part of the whole population of which in 1965 it was still admitted, as we have seen, that the numbers of religious adherents were not small. Thus this explanation would imply a radical change of policy from restraint to the sudden use of force.

A more realistic interpretation is possible on the grounds of the analyzed publications. This, in fact, does not involve a sudden change of policy, but a consistent development in the attitude towards religion. The debate on freedom of religion has revealed two contradicting opinions, the tension of which could be traced throughout the examples of atheist popular

68. *PD*, Aug. 15, 1963; *RF*, April 26, 1964; *Chung Kwo Ch'ing Nien*, "News Letter Box," April 16, 1965; etc.

69. *Op. cit.* p. 49.

70. 引而不發躍如也 *Mencius*, Book VII, 42; cf. *PD*, Aug. 15, 1963.


education. There are early indications that the radical party represented by Yu and Liu were gaining ground. Already in 1964 these two authors were called upon to present their case in the magazine, *Red Flag*, the theoretical mouthpiece of the Party. Although opposition was still voiced thereafter by their counterpart, Ya, and others, who warned against overheated action, the advocates of a radical ideological warfare and sweeping action have been advancing. Their ranks range from the more careful theoretical ideologists to the openly aggressive columnists of atheist education and propaganda, and include the extreme young people who are not willing to wait any longer for the abolition of the old. The two parties existed side by side, though in more or less open hostility, until in the summer of 1966 the revolutionary forces, which were long before prepared by continual atheist education, were released. The editorials and articles on the religious question reveal that the recent events do not mean a sudden change of policy towards religion, but in fact are the consequent execution of directives which were already effectively represented in the years before 1966 by an influential group of ideologists.

The debate on the problem of religion in a socialist country has so far ended in silence. Its final outcome is yet to be awaited.

SPECIAL REPORT

**Set loose on
colonial Asia by the
Russian Revolution**

The Marxist Evangelists



At the third world congress of the Comintern, in late 1922, Asian revolutionaries group with Western colleagues. M. N. Roy is fourth from left, standing. To his left is Tan Malaka. Seated, extreme left, is Ho Chi Minh. Beside Ho are Japanese Communists Eizo Kondo, Sen Katayama and Manabu.

On November 7 Russia celebrated the 50th anniversary of the Bolshevik Revolution. The burning message of the Revolution was spread over the globe in the 50 intervening years.

Here, in a special report, The Asia Magazine looks at the Asians who were chosen to carry the Bolshevik message to this continent, and at the Revolution's impact on colonial and post-colonial Asia.

ONE OF THE FIRST acts of the Russian Bolsheviks — after the Revolution of November 7, 1917 — was to set the chimes on the bell-tower of the Kremlin palace in Moscow so that its gigantic bells played the *Internationale* instead of the old Tsarist anthem. Standing in the great square beneath the Kremlin one day in the early spring of 1920, a young Indian Communist named M. N. Roy, on his first visit to the "Holy Land," felt awed by the echoing bells that rang out the

"anthem of the revolutionary proletariat." Roy was in Moscow for the second congress of the Third, or Communist, International. The Comintern had been founded in March of the preceding year, to be the general staff of the world revolution. For Lenin and his comrades, to whom Tsarist Russia had fallen like some overripe fruit, pursuit of the world revolution was partly idealism, partly survival. Not only did they fear for the survival of their Bolshevik state in a capital-

ist Europe. As visionary internationalists, animated by the thought (in Roy's words) of "marching to battle for the liberation of the downtrodden of the world," they expected the Bolshevik triumph in Russia to be only the ground swell of a flood tide of revolution that would sweep away the old order everywhere. As the great bells of the Kremlin chimed their rousing message, thrice each day, to all the "wretched of the earth," so did the professional revolutionaries of the

Comintern spread the burning message of Marx and Lenin to all the corners of the globe.

Colonial Asia soon became a focus of this evangelist effort. For the revolutionary flood tide that Lenin and his Bolsheviks expected to flow through Europe did not materialize. Not only were Bolshevik-type revolts in Central and Eastern Europe suppressed with brutal efficiency. Reaction rose in fascism — first in Italy and then in

continued

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the French, the Dutch,
the British and the
Americans.

Toynbee on
The Imperialists

Toynbee

Communism's second front was India, Roy the apostle chosen to lead the campaign

EVANGELISTS *continued*

Germany. With the tide of revolution in Europe plainly at its ebb, the Soviet leaders turned more and more to the East for support in their war against the West.

The task of the Comintern was, in Lenin's words, "to carry the revolutionary conflagration into Europe" through revolutions in the imperialist colonies of Asia — on which the prosperity of the European ruling classes depended. Marx himself had hoped that the Asian revolution would be the spark of powder that would blow to bits the entire European industrial system. The Soviet diplomat Chicherin told Roy that "the second front of the world revolution must be opened in India."

M. N. Roy and the other Marxist evangelists who brought to Asia the gospel of the Bolshevik Revolution were a unique group of men. Fired by the fervour of a religion for materialists, they regarded themselves as the ministers of an international brotherhood. Sacred vessels of abstract virtue, they gave their whole lives over to the service of Revolution.

What kind of men were they — M. N. Roy, the Indian; Tan Malaka, the Indonesian; Ho Chi Minh, the Vietnamese; Mao Tse-tung the Chinese; Hendricus Josephus Franciscus Marie Sneevliet, alias Maring, the Dutchman; Eizo Kondo, the Japanese; or Crisanto Evangelista, the Filipino?

Evangelista, a frail intellectual who led the Philippine Communists, was a printer and labour leader. Maring was an engineer. Mao was an assistant librarian at Peking University. M. N. Roy was the son of a priestly family of Bengal. Ho Chi Minh was variously photographer's assistant, sailor, pastry-cook. But the true profession of every one of them was that of revolutionary — and all too often prison or exile was their habitat.

Ho Chi Minh wryly celebrated the little dilemmas of captivity in a notebook of verses he wrote, in the manner of the T'ang dynasty poets, while a prisoner in 1942:

THE WATER RATION

Each of us has a ration of half a basin of water

For washing or brewing tea, as each may choose:

If you want to wash your face, then you must go without brewing tea:

If you want a drink of tea, then you have to go without washing your face.

Roy lived in exile for over 15 years, wandering through America and Europe. Tan Malaka, like Ho, dodged the police of several countries. He was imprisoned in the Philippines and Singapore, as well as in his native Indonesia. And Mao wandered the Chinese hinterland for two decades.

The Comintern evangelists counted as their homelands not the separate states of their accidental birth, but the entire world of the proletariat. So Maring worked with equal devotion in China, as in Indonesia and the Netherlands. Ho Chi Minh helped found the French Communist Party. Roy set up the Communist Party of Mexico — the first one outside the Soviet Union; and Tan Malaka organized the Party in the Philippines. The Comintern considered nationalism the narrow and ephemeral ideology of the middle class — and in the end this fatal mistake proved the Comintern's undoing.

But this was to be years ahead, into the turbulent future. In communism's evangelistic period in Asia, the optimism of its ministers often was inversely proportional to its chances of attracting followers. Uprooted intellectuals from societies torn between tradition and change, they represented one extreme of the Asian reaction to the impact of the West. The other extreme lay in nativistic movements that looked back to ancient religions and folk traditions. Often enough the two extremes touched at flash-points, as *Sarekat Islam*, the conservative Islamic Indonesian movement sparked off the Indonesian Party, or as the rebellious peasants of Central Luzon followed first the religious fanatics called *colorum*

and then the Communist *Huks*. But the Comintern evangelists were above all Westernized intellectuals who embraced and sought to apply to their societies the Western heresy that is Marxism.

To Marx's strictures against exploitative capitalism of nineteenth-century Europe, Lenin had added both a theory of imperialism and a master-plan for the seizure of state power. His theory of imperialism traced how Western finance capitalism depended for its profits on the exportation of surplus capital to the colonial countries. These profits not only enabled a rentier and monopolist class of European imperialists to live in idle splendour; it also enabled these plutocrats to corrupt the opportunistic upper ranks of the European working class. This theory neatly explained not only why the European revolution the Bolsheviks were breathlessly awaiting was so long in coming. It also showed the Bolsheviks where the true contest lay: not between social classes but between imperialist states and their colonies — in short, between East and West. This facile theory still underlies Soviet Communist foreign policy in our time.

The essence of Leninism is of course its technique for capturing state power through a tightly-organized, rigidly disciplined party — working openly where it could, clandestinely where it must. The members of such a party make up a closely-knit elite of true believers devoted to the masses in the abstract, and animated by a self-confidence derived from an unshakable faith in the infallibility — and the inevitable triumph — of their cause. As time went on, the classical Marxist content of Asian communism began to matter less and less, and its Leninist system of organization to matter more and more.

Marxist theory had in fact undergone several sea-changes even before it reached Asian shores. For instance, classical Marxism taught that pre-capitalist societies — like those of old Russia and the new countries of Asia — must go through a capitalist, democratic revolution before they could undergo a proletarian, socialist revolution. The Bolshevik revolution itself short-circuited this dialectical transition. In the 1920s, Comintern theoreticians of colonial Asia anguished about how to fit the Marxist theories to societies that defy analysis and classification. What, for instance, should Communist parties do in

countries that have no proletariat, or exploited urban workers? The answer to this was relatively simple. "In Asia you have the exploitation of the peoples by mercantile capitalism, and semi-feudal relations in agriculture. You can build an organization of toilers, even in backward countries, on this basis."

The problem of how to deal with

Asian nationalism — obviously a growing force — was much more difficult. Roy distinguished two distinct revolutionary movements in the colonial countries. One was the "bourgeois-democratic nationalist movement, with its program of political independence under the bourgeois order." The other was "the mass struggle of the poor and

ignorant peasants and workers for their liberation from various forms of exploitation."

Roy wanted the Communist movement in Asia kept free from contamination by middle-class nationalism. His thesis, "revolution from below," would mobilize the mass of workers and poor peasants

continued



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EVANGELISTS *continued*

under the Red flag, in almost total disregard of the parallel revolution of the middle-class nationalists. In contrast, Lenin, the master pragmatist, advocated a "revolution from

above," under which the Comintern would be prepared to cooperate or even ally with the "bourgeois-democratic nationalist movement" while retaining its independent character. Lenin's view prevailed, but this dilemma plagues Asian parties until now; as witness the recent travails

of the Indonesian party (PKI).

Lenin devised a "minimum program," which Communist parties would espouse during the "popular-front" era of struggle for power, and a "maximum program" of socialization which they would follow after the straight-forward contest

For communism's evangelists the Promised Land turned sour a long time ago

against the imperialist power was won. This, together with the tactical flexibility built into the Leninist organization, gave Communist parties a tremendous advantage over their more orthodox political rivals.

Yet, armed though they were with the fervour of Marxism and the conspiratorial apparatus of Leninism, the first Comintern ventures in Asia met only harsh failures. Not only were the colonial and national police remarkably efficient; the sparks failed to catch fire among the docile peasants and the disorganized urban workers among whom the Comintern evangelists worked. In Japan, in Korea, in the Philippines, in Indo-china, in Indonesia, Communist parties were suppressed and their leaders killed, imprisoned or exiled.

Neither did the rigid discipline that the Comintern extracted from the national parties help — especially after Stalin's policy of "building socialism in one country" veritably submerged the Comintern and the international Communist movement into a foreign-policy appendage of the Soviet state. Men like M. N. Roy and Tan Malaka early on broke with the Comintern in favour of national communism. Dogmatic theorizings by academics far away from the arena plunged the parties into needless troubles, as in their opposition, dictated by the Comintern, to Asian religious — particularly pan-Islamic — movements. Eventually the leadership of the Asian revolution passed on to the liberal intellectuals and national capitalists, who in India, Burma, the Philippines and Indonesia were able to harness the enthusiasm of both middle class and peasant masses in the cause of nationalism.

Where the Communists won, as in Mainland China and in Vietnam, they did so at the end of protracted civil conflicts in an atmosphere of World War. In North Korea, Communists rode on the coattails of Red armies, as other parties had done in Eastern Europe. In Indonesia, Malaya, the Philippines and India, up-



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risings failed. In Indonesia, specially, the Communists have thrice risen since the Bolshevik Revolution — and have each time failed, at great cost in lives.

The defeat of the mass-organization that D. N. Aidit built on the ruins of the Madiun rebellion has willy-nilly restored the Indonesian party to its traditional Leninist form. While the Asian parties remain Leninist in form, the classic technique of the seizure of power has subtly evolved into "Maoism," which is the concept of protracted war from a power base not of urban workers but of peasants, with revolution flowing from bases in the countryside to overwhelm the cities, instead of the other way around.

Their adaptation to Asian nationalism, the consciousness of their leaders of the value of native traditions and the emotive appeal of religious-traditional slogans — all these have made Asian parties a great deal different from what they were in the fervent days of the Comintern. The Soviet Union also has long ago ceased to be the mecca of world communism. Not only must it contest that claim with Mainland China. It must also content itself with having not much more than a fraternal influence upon the often strong-willed national parties. The Soviet leaders belatedly recognized this other change when Khrushchev at the famous 20th Party Congress in 1956 remarked that "each Communist and Workers' Party has its own concrete, practical tasks, which arise from the diversity of conditions in different countries"

For the evangelists of the Comintern, the Promised Land turned sour long ago. Tan Malaka was shot by Indonesian troops in April, 1949. Maring was killed by the Nazis in Europe during World War II. Crisanto Evangelista by the Japanese in 1942. M. N. Roy, expelled from the Comintern, continued to tune in to Moscow shortwave during the war, listening for the bell-towers that each day rang out the *Internationale*. One day, he relates in his *Memoirs*, the broadcast did not come through. And when Roy heard the bells again, they played, instead of the proletarian hymn, the new Russian national anthem. "A period of history was over," Roy mused. "I began to lose my faith in the liberating significance of the Russian Revolution."

But of course by then Asian

Communism had separated itself from its beginnings and had taken up a life of its own, both as an ideology and as a conspiratorial technique. Today the Asian parties are embedded in national societies in varying degrees — moving, and stirring reaction, in many different

ways. In some countries they, along with the other parties in the radical spectrum, play a gadfly role in national society. In others, they plot stillborn conspiracies. In a few Asian states, as in Vietnam and China, they are triumphant parties. In most, they remain as the seeds the

Marxist evangelists sowed, waiting for the right soil, the right climate. Taken all in all, the map of Asia has changed considerably since the Bolshevik Revolution burst upon the world 50 years ago, giving body to the revolutionary visions of men in many lands. ■

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MISCELLANY

RELIGIOUS
RAZZLE-
DAZZLE

A SPECTACULAR CROSS between an Olympic Games and a revivalist gathering, these are scenes from Sokagakkai's October Culture Festival, held at Tokyo's National Stadium. Sokagakkai is Japan's rapidly expanding socio-religious sect with transcendental goals. Since 1962 the festival has been an annual event and this year it attracted 75,000 spectators. The entertainment — gymnastics, folk dances, intricate collages which spelt out world peace in 11 languages — was provided by thousands of young men and women drawn from among the 6,230,000 families which make up Sokagakkai's membership. The Culture Festival is part of Sokagakkai's avowed objective to build globally a "Third Civilization" founded on the philosophy of Shiki-shin Funi — oneness of matter and mind.





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
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The Bold, Abstract Beauty of Kim Joo's Batiks




Singapore street scenes such as this are among Seah's favourite subjects.



Age-old dye and wax medium is shown to advantage in this painting on Dyak women.

SINGAPORE ARTIST Seah Kim Joo, noted an *Asia Magazine* report on March 15, 1964, was an Asian to watch. At the time Seah, fresh out of the Nanyang Academy of Fine Arts, had just completed his first series of one-man shows and was attracting attention with bold, imaginative oils, watercolours and woodcuts. Seah, TAM reported, was an "artist on the move." Today the 28-year-old painter has arrived. Abandoning his oils and watercolours, he has settled on the glowing beauty of batik as his medium and has become the only artist in Singapore and Malaysia to command international attention for semi-abstracts created in this age-old method. His works have been displayed in most Asian capitals and many hang in private collections in the region as well as in the U.S., Britain, Australia, Canada and Europe. But success has only served as a spur for Seah's versatile talent. This fall he shipped some 60 works off for exhibitions in the United States and Europe, and recently completed a globe-circling tour which is expected to yield a whole new crop of batik abstracts reflecting the grace and beauty of our world as seen through the eyes of this talented young Malaysian artist.




Joy of Living is the title of this glowing work.

1974

Problems of Communism

SEPTEMBER-OCTOBER 1974



People's China: A Symposium

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Mark Gayn
Edward E. Rice
Juergen Domes
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Cover photo: A member of the model Tachai Production Brigade in Shansi Province, People's Republic of China. A 1973 photo by Vincent Mentzel via Nancy Palmer.

Photo opposite: Chinese of different generations look on as a squad of people's militia awaits its turn to drill in Peking's Tien An Men Square in 1958. Photo by H. Cartier-Bresson for Magnum.

People's China: 25 Years



EDITORS' NOTE: October 1 of this year marks the 25th anniversary of the founding of the People's Republic of China. With the experience of a quarter of a century to go on, it now seems both possible and appropriate to reflect on the continuities and changes in China under Communist rule. To what extent has Chinese society undergone fundamental alterations over the last 25 years, and to what extent have traditional institutions, behavior, and modes of thinking persisted, whether in their old guises or in new incarnations? What impact has Communist power had on any changes that have occurred? That is, to what degree has the regime managed to shape society according to its own vision, and to what degree has it found itself a prisoner of larger historical forces?

Assessing the continuities and changes is no mean task. Not only can analysts disagree about the amount of change observable, but they can also differ on how to approach such an evaluation. For example, they may adopt a variety of standards against which to measure the continuities and changes—a distillation of the essence of Chinese culture across the ages, China at the fall of the Manchu Empire in 1911, China in the 1930's prior to Japanese invasion, China on the eve of the Communist takeover in 1949, etc. They may likewise choose to look at the broad spectrum of Chinese life or to focus on a specific segment of it.

The following symposium reflects our belief that truth emerges from a contention of viewpoints and that no single approach to the subject enjoys a monopoly on insights. Our participants reach diverse conclusions and arrive at them by different paths and from different perspectives. But we hope that their contributions, taken together, will afford heightened understanding of present-day Chinese reality.

"Fu-chiang" and Red Fervor

By Lucien Bianco

The "unchanging China" of old has changed a great deal over the last 25 years—but then, so too have even the least progressive of the underdeveloped countries. Among major trends in China today, one of the most important and most fraught with consequences is the rapid decrease in the death rate—yet this is a phenomenon common to the whole underdeveloped world and one which would have taken place in China (if at a slower pace) even if the former regime had survived. Obviously, the assessment of two-and-a-half decades of Communist rule cannot be made simply by describing Chinese developments in terms of planetary trends which Peking is either anticipating or trailing. Yet with respect to all aspects of change in China, it is necessary to raise what to Maoists is a sacrilegious issue, embodied in two questions: What in the Chinese Communist course represents the traditional quest for *fu-chiang* (wealth and power), a goal obstinately pursued for over a century first by officials of the Ch'ing dynasty and later by Chiang Kai-shek? Conversely, what accomplishments of the Communist regime are clearly of a different order?

Our initial postulate is that, to date, the most obvious success of the Chinese Communists lies in their having progressed, with much greater efficiency, along the course pursued by their predecessors. While perhaps unpleasant to Maoist ears, such praise is, in fact, less paradoxical than it may seem. Certainly, it was an agreement with the Communists on the primacy of the goals of national greatness and on "progress" in a broad sense—from economic development to the struggle against flies, epidemics,

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bound feet, and countless other effects of backwardness and tradition—that brought over to the regime, or to the Communist movement before establishment of the regime, so many Chinese intellectuals otherwise unconvinced by Marxist ideology and doubtful about the methods of the latest claimants to the "Mandate of Heaven."

Nowhere are the changes and accomplishments of the present regime more obvious than in the realm of foreign policy, and nowhere have the gains more clearly contributed to *fu-chiang*. The revolution has enabled this venerable nation, humiliated by a century of "unequal treaties" and imperialist encroachments, to regain its dignity. The break with Moscow climaxed the recapture of China's independence, a process which was perhaps less obvious during the first decade of the regime. Once one accepts the logic of *fu-chiang*, there is nothing surprising in the Chinese *volte-face* from condemnations of Soviet-American collusion to negotiations with Washington. The same may be said for China's support of Pakistan against the Bangladesh liberation movement; its diplomatic relations with Pinochet's Chile; the flowers sent by the Chinese government to the Spanish Embassy following the assassination of Admiral Carrero Blanco (Peking in an earlier day would have called it an "execution"); or the warm welcome extended in the Chinese capital to the United Kingdom's former Prime Minister, the Conservative Edward Heath.

Ultimately, only the spreading of the Chinese revolution and the Chinese "model" of development can be dissociated from the quest for *fu-chiang*. More diffuse and extensive than the earlier propagation of Confucianism and Chinese civilization in the narrow corner of the globe surrounding the Middle Kingdom, this proselytizing process (and with it the propagation of the Thought of Mao Tse-tung) is

also much more perishable. It will doubtless survive for a while until it is eventually repudiated by reality. Once the torch of revolution ignites another huge country—say an Indonesia, a Brazil, or an India—attention will be diverted from China, making it possible to view the Chinese revolutionary experience in clearer perspective, as just another variant of the Soviet experience. In a sense this will be to Peking's benefit, for stripping China of the trappings of a unique revolutionary model will leave in bold relief the strength and considerable weight in international affairs of a populous and industrious subcontinent, rich in raw materials and natural resources.

When turning from the external to the internal political sphere, one again discovers important continuity (preserving the authoritarian and paternal power of the past) but also considerable change. From the *fu-chiang* perspective, the change represents progress. The authoritarian power today has a much firmer hold on the governed than in the imperial age: it reaches to the village level, its initiatives and directives are felt almost everywhere, and centralization is more effective. Measured in particular against the last century of Chinese history—which was marked by the fall of a dynasty, the chaos of an interregnum, and incomplete and abortive efforts to restore unity—the gains are obvious. The rule of law and order has been restored in a unified China. Centralization, order, and security are not, of course, invulnerable, as was amply demonstrated by the Cultural Revolution; yet the regime's survival of this ordeal is proof of its strength. The one potential weakness in the political sphere may lie in the excessive concentration of power in the hands of a regime that is essentially oligarchic. As in Russia, the real political debate is played out among cliques of very limited size. One of them, or a coalition of factions, has the capacity to initiate a sudden drastic shift of course, whether or not its implementation causes social malaise.

The foregoing assessment makes short shrift of the claims of "originality" for the Chinese revolution so often trumpeted by Mao, his propagandists, and his exegetes. But we have not yet gotten to the heart of the matter—which lies in the question of relations between the rulers and the ruled or, as the Communists say, between the party and the masses. The flood of proclamations, directives, and debates originated on this topic by Peking represents something more than a simple propaganda operation.



China on the world stage: Teng Hsiao-p'ing, Deputy Premier of the State Council of the People's Republic of China, and Huang Hua, PRC Ambassador to the United Nations, confer with Kurt Waldheim, UN Secretary-General, in New York on April 9, 1974.

—T. Chen/United Nations via Keystone.

They suggest a fundamental and growing concern, felt perhaps most acutely by Mao himself, over a problem (or "contradiction") stemming from application of the political principle of "democratic centralism." This anxiety has generated apparently sincere endeavors to give the "masses" a "say," to encourage their initiative, to develop their creativity by giving them a feeling of participating in decisions and their execution, and not solely in production. In this respect, in terms of both insights and intentions, there has certainly been novelty and originality in the Maoist course, reflecting a departure from the Chinese bureaucratic tradition (both under the Empire and under the Republic) as well as from Bolshevik and Stalinist practice. Such innovation dates back beyond the "mass line" of the Yen-an period to the need of the first Chinese soviets to gain and retain the support of the rural masses in order to survive.

On the whole, efforts in this regard somehow succeeded (with periodic rectifications dictated by a careful listening to the needs and daily concerns of the masses) in the Central Soviet Area of Kiangsi-Fukien and then in the "Liberated Areas" of Northwest China, but they have proved much less satisfactory in the country as a whole since the mid-1950's. The explanation for this is not essentially a matter of geographic scale: the record for the first five years of the People's Republic of China seems less negative than the overall picture of Communist

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rule for a quarter of a century. The short-term objectives of the new rulers could still be in harmony with the wishes of the rural masses at a time when the property of landlords and rich peasants was being confiscated and divided among the other villagers.

Since the acceleration of agrarian collectivization in 1955, there has been no lack of periodic rectifications (in fact, the masses wish they had been less frequent). As before, those rectification efforts to which the regime resorted out of necessity (and which, owing to circumstances, were dictated by a "listening" to the masses) more or less succeeded in the sense of achieving short-term goals, even though they also entailed undesired aftereffects. Most other so-called "rectifications" failed. A power with no rival, no longer confronted with the risk of being overthrown as soon as it ceased listening to the masses (as would have been the case with the fragile rural bases of the 1930's and 1940's), was freed of all restraints against arbitrary decisions and exploitation of the agricultural producers.

This is not to suggest that a revolutionary power must obediently trail behind the masses. Certainly, the latter are likely to discover too late the need for birth control, they are not spontaneously ready to toil in order to finance "primitive accumulation" of capital, they will not free themselves from the grasp of superstition without further education.

What is suggested here is that Maoist education has not been very successful, and—more to the point—that this is not surprising considering the conditions under which it has been attempted. Reversing the terms is not enough. Sending officials, young graduates, and other privileged urban dwellers to the countryside to "learn" from the villagers will not alone transform the reality—a Communist society marked above all by a dreary, classic lack of political life (which is only highlighted by the superabundance of slogans) and by a gap between the rulers and the ruled which works to the special disadvantage of the rural masses.

Besides defaulting on a crucial point (who will educate the Great Teacher?), pedagogy does not



China's steel capital Anshan (in Northeast China)—an important contributor to the nation's drive for industrial and national power.

—Miao Ming/China Photo Service via Eastfoto.

compensate for the deficiencies in the dialogue between party and people. Despite the concerns and initiative which constitute the originality of Maoism—which is wholly in the realm of theory—the masses in the final analysis still lack the means of expressing themselves. What Mao wishes for, what he has sometimes attempted, is moving but not convincing (somewhat like Lenin's belated discovery of some of the dangers inherent in the system he established). The contradiction inherent in the expression "*directing the spontaneity of the masses*" has not been resolved, or rather it has been resolved in favor of the first of the two terms.

From the outset, in Juichin and then in Yenan, the problem was not a matter of finding the solution to this theoretical contradiction but of realizing a fragile, if sophisticated, empirical compromise. Cumulatively, the rectification campaigns, the Cultural Revolution, and countless other measures and movements since 1949 have certainly rendered the position of those who direct the masses, the Communist cadres, a great deal less secure and comfortable than that of their counterparts in the Soviet Union and Eastern Europe (assuredly, the fact that this more precarious status has involved purges usually not accompanied by physical liquidation represents another "plus" for the Chinese approach). But it should be recognized, on the one hand, that the effectiveness of the myriad of movements and campaigns is wearing thin, as eloquently confirmed by the disproportion between the drastic character of the Cultural Revolution and its meager results in terms of forcing cadres to heed the masses. On the other hand, and this is the major point, the masses themselves stand to gain little from these periodic campaigns, which attack everything but the people's inferior conditions and the subjugation they endure. They desire most of all, or so it seems, to be delivered from the agitation or periodic nightmare of these campaigns.

It is certainly risky to speak of the longings or aspirations of the masses, for the people are silent. The silence of unorganized masses, capable of expressing dissatisfaction (if not demands) only by passivity and petty thievery, as during the Great Leap—this is what reminds one of the Soviet precedent. In fact, both regimes have much in common despite the violent accusations leveled by Mao against the "degenerate revisionists" in Moscow. There is the same monopoly of power in the hands, not of the party, but of a few cliques at the top, which dictate their law to the party. There is the

same depoliticization of those who are ruled (and of most of the party members themselves, who are reduced to the role of implementers). To the extent that there are differences in the two systems, they lie mainly in the social sphere—in China for example, inequality is less pronounced and the privileges of the cadres are more limited and ambiguous (a subject to which we will return shortly).

As far as the political sphere is concerned, Mao's innovations are a mark of failure, of a malfunctioning of the system. Mao's worries are more than justified. His quasi-cures (even when they entail an upheaval as chancy as the Cultural Revolution) are inoperative. The logic of the system prevails over the reformist velleities of a chief who is more sensitive and adept at reading the signs than are his fraternal enemies to the north. Maoism does not resolve the contradictions of Leninism; it is content to expose them when others would hide them. It constitutes, not a viable substitute for Leninism, but a reflection of the guilty conscience of the "revolutionary" bureaucrats.

Having looked at the power expressed in China's international relations and guaranteed by her internal order, let us now examine the Communist regime's quest for wealth—*i.e.*, the course of economic development or "socialist construction," and the demographic constraints involved. In this sphere, too, the changes are spectacular, even if less fundamental and less decisive than is often claimed. China now has a modern industrial sector, much broader than in the Kuomintang era, furnishing a solid base for future development. Agriculture passed the "take-off" point in the 1960's and, in the most advanced areas, seems to be freeing itself from the uncertainties of climate. The annual growth of China's gross national product, while quite uneven, has nevertheless come close to—if not reached—an average of 4 percent,¹ higher than that of most other underdeveloped countries.

If the standard of living is not much higher than in 1936 (the last "normal" year before the Japanese invasion and the civil war), it is more equally distributed—now, moreover, among 800 million persons as against some 500 million on the eve of the Sino-Japanese war. Population growth, which has

¹ See Dwight H. Perkins, "Looking Inside China: An Economic Reappraisal," *Problems of Communism* (Washington, DC), May-June 1973, p. 5.

absorbed at least half of the gains in production, has itself been accelerated by the spread of hygiene and medical care. The much larger cohorts which are reaching or will soon reach the age of reproduction will, for a time, limit the effects of a birth control program which was slow in getting started but now appears to be gaining good ground. The next 10 or 15 years are likely to constitute a most critical phase because of the conjunction of the fragile emergence of the economy from its initial development stage and the threat of a population explosion not yet forcefully contained. Common in the Third World, this combination is the more fearsome in China because of the masses involved, which give it spectacular dimensions. One can only hope that the economic progress already achieved, as well as a resolute and egalitarian policy on the part of government, will spare "People's China" from the famine which plagues other, less crowded states.

By comparison with other areas of the world threatened with starvation, the PRC, in its policies of economic development and birth control, seems to be headed in the right direction. The leaders appear to have learned the lessons of past failures, which were sometimes costly and not always unavoidable. If objectives as fundamental as the production of chemical fertilizers or the lowering of the birth rate did not initially get the priority which they are now accorded, this was certainly the result of a deep-rooted dogmatism carried over from the past. From the pro-natalist professions of faith of Sun Yat-sen and Chiang Kai-shek to those of Mao Tse-tung in September 1949,² or to the abrupt stand *Jen-min Jih-pao* took in 1952 denouncing the "hyprocrisy" of birth control as a "means of killing off the Chinese people without shedding blood,"³ one can trace through the regimes of this country a continuous chauvinistic line whose rash certitudes may have served the capture of power, but not its exercise.

In the case of chemical fertilizer production, the initial neglect was due not so much to any indirect

² Mao stated: "Even if China's population multiplies many times, she is fully capable of finding a solution—the solution is production. The absurd argument of Western bourgeois economists like Malthus—that increases in food cannot keep pace with increases in population—was not only thoroughly refuted in theory by Marxists long ago but has also been completely exploded by the realities in the Soviet Union and the Liberated Areas of China after their liberation." See "The Bankruptcy of the Idealist Conception of History," Sept. 16, 1949, tr. in Mao Tse-tung, *Selected Works*, International Publishers, New York, Vol. 5, p. 453.

³ (Peking), April 25, 1952.

impact of anti-imperialistic attitudes as to the Mao regime's undue attention to the then available revolutionary model, namely the Stalinist strategy of development. The selective priority accorded to, and applied within, heavy industry held back whole sectors of the same heavy industry, including the production of nitrate fertilizer, the servant of a neglected agriculture. An excess of nationalist passion and too much humility in adopting an imported model—far from being contradictory, these two passions complemented and compensated for one another. The corrections made over the last 16 or 17 years in the once-servile imitation of the foreign experience have not so far, to say the least, been paralleled by a moderation of China's intolerant nationalism. The probable reason is that the initial effects of the corrections have been too unconvincing or uneven to permit Chinese national pride, so long humiliated, to unbend.

The important point, in any case, is that the Chinese did not stubbornly pursue an unsuitable policy, even though renunciation of it led initially to failure and disaster. But the failure (the first major birth-control campaign, in 1957) and the disaster (the Great Leap of 1957-58) clearly signified that a break with the past, while necessary, was not enough; it could at best—and only if it was absolute—represent a preliminary step. In breaking spectacularly with the previous development strategy, the Great Leap still amounted to no more than a half-hearted emancipation from the underlying commitment to the priority development of industry, which continued to receive the lion's share of state investment. As for the anti-natalist efforts of 1957, they only enabled the leadership to realize the true magnitude of the cultural and economic obstacles facing the diffusion of contraceptive practices and techniques.

The succession of policies which have been tested and/or implemented in the economic and demographic spheres during the last 15 years have amounted to a series of corrections applied to the initial corrections of 1957-58. The current product of these multiple modifications—i.e., the economic and demographic strategy pursued without major interruption since the end of the Cultural Revolution—is, by comparison with the Great Leap and the 1957 anti-natalist campaign, not only more cautious and sophisticated but also better suited to Chinese conditions.

Careful retouchings or laborious modifications inspired, indeed imposed, by failure and difficulties

—these have brought us far from the real beginnings and radical originality claimed for Maoism. When we look at the innovations most frequently cited to illustrate that originality (which is real but hardly radical), the pertinent test ultimately comes down to how long they have lasted, *i.e.*, their viability. Unlike such still-born novelties as close sowing, deep planting, and the small backyard iron-smelting furnaces of the Great Leap era, there are diverse and successful practices and institutions like bare-foot doctors, delayed marriage, an accelerated school curriculum geared toward practical work, and an industrial decentralization that increases in the countryside the supply of simple equipment requiring little capital and many hands—all of which represent ingenious responses to scarcity. Cheap and designed above all for the rural masses, most of these measures reflect an egalitarian ideology, but that is not the main point. They are sensible recipes that are neither antitheses nor substitutes but rather ideologically-tinged complements to the more classical means of achieving progress recommended by the drab “experts.” Despite the endless criticism directed at the latter, the two streams had to unite. Thus, with the exception of the scarlet revolution of 1966-67 (the Great Proletarian Cultural Revolution), it is a rather mixed, colorless alloy which seems to have been able to stand the test of time for some 15 years. From Liu Shao-ch’i to Chou En-lai, and from a Teng Hsiao-p’ing indifferent to the “color of the cat”⁴ to Teng Hsiao-p’ing today, this blend has permitted both the economic recovery of 1962-65 and the progress of the last decade in agriculture.

It was, after all, only after the rural sector finally garnered the huge modern investments long denied it—*i.e.*, chemical fertilizers, irrigation, mechanization, and seed selection—that Chinese agriculture took off decisively. To this day, modern agriculture has only really taken hold in the most developed regions (the deltas, plains, and valleys of the East, the Southeast, and the Center), which have enjoyed a privileged status in this technological transformation. This could only be accomplished by sacrificing egalitarian distribution of investments and, even more, by foregoing a distribution (of Maoist inspira-

⁴ During the dark years following the failure of the Great Leap, Teng had justified a policy which relied on private, individual incentives in the following words: “No matter whether the cat is black or white so long as it catches the mouse.” See Joint Publication Research Service, *Reports* (Washington, DC), No. 41,450, June 19, 1967, quoting a statement reportedly made by Teng in 1962.



Chinese peasants provide the power for a simple irrigation mechanism in this scene photographed in August 1972 near Shaoshan, the birthplace of Mao Tse-tung.

—Carlo Leidl/Black Star.

tion) which would have favored the underdeveloped zones of the interior. Today, Chinese agriculture combines a modern sector of relatively high and stable yields and comprising about one-fifth of the cultivated lands in the country and a traditional sector growing at a pace which is slower than that of the population—slower and less regular, for in this China, agriculture is still subject to the vagaries of climate.⁵

⁵ See Benedict Stavis, “China’s Green Revolution,” mimeographed, Cornell University, Ithaca, N.Y.

How then is one, in the final analysis, to characterize the contribution of Maoist recipes to the growth of production? Heavily reliant upon technology, these prescriptions cannot be dissociated from expertise, specialization, and inequality.

This has not prevented the leaders of a self-professed "social" revolution, who have already abolished the most crying inequalities inherited from the past, from combating the inequalities introduced by economic development; quite the contrary. At the same time, the fact that this revolution sees itself as "social" in nature does not prevent it from being first and foremost "national." Thus, the balance sheet in matters of social change (as in the sphere of economic policies) is more ambiguous than it is in the areas of national and state power.

The most notable social transformation remains that brought about by the land reform undertaken in the first years of the regime: the abolition of tenancy and the confiscation and redistribution of the land and goods of the landlords abruptly terminated the secular domination of that element of Chinese society. From the viewpoint of the majority of peasants (who constitute between three-fourths and four-fifths of all Chinese), the subsequent collectivization greatly compromised the benefits of that ephemeral emancipation. In effect, it took away from them with one hand what had just been given them by the other and, through the imposition of compulsory deliveries at low prices, virtually turned them into tenant farmers of the state. Inasmuch as, before 1949, there were not only tenant farmers but also small private cultivators (as well as a quite common intermediate category of those who owned fields too small to assure the family's subsistence and had to secure the indispensable complement by cultivating land rented from a landlord), conditions had indeed been equalized, but by leveling them downward. The private plots which were left at the disposal of each member of the agricultural cooperatives—and later of the people's communes—came to be cherished every bit as much as the family fields of yesteryear, which the peasants had always taken great pains to cling to. Only the plots were tinier than most of the microfarms of the pre-Liberation era, and whereas under the old regime farmers had the feeling (if largely illusory) that work, thrift, and luck (*i.e.*, the absence of natural or human catastrophe) would enable them to keep and—who knows?—even enlarge their holdings, members of the cooperatives

and communes have learned from experience that the destiny of their private plots (their size and even their very existence) depends entirely on the caprice of a power almost as difficult to influence as the former village despot with his strawmen.

And yet this power is very sensitive to the inequalities still afflicting the rural population and very concerned about reducing them. Some of its representatives, in view of the immensity of the task, may well be tempted to resign themselves to such continuing inequalities. But they must reckon with the relentless injunctions of Mao himself, whose concern with abolishing the "three great differences" (or inequalities)—between city and countryside, between worker and peasant, and between intellectual work and manual labor—imposes itself on any person wielding a bit of authority. To tell the truth, the periodic directives that Mao has inspired to this end have thus far concerned mainly peripheral, albeit important, sectors, *e.g.*, education and public health. They have not yet been aimed at making the rewards for agricultural work a little more commensurate with the wealth that it creates. The income and purchasing power of the members of the rural communes remain much lower than those of the privileged minority, which includes urban workers. "Primitive accumulation" of capital is financed to a large measure by the labor of the peasants, who to boot have practically no hope of seeing their children escape the curse of the land.

This last is true because the urban sector already creates too few jobs to provide employment for every urban citizen. Such pressures alone would seem to justify sending graduates of urban educational institutions to the countryside. But in addition, it is the shrewd calculation—or vision—of the planners to have these potential urban unemployed devote their talents, their competence, and their faith to transforming the existence and work of the villagers. The trouble is that talents and competence are not always equal to the task; that the faith imparted and nurtured, probably to excess, by propaganda is seldom great enough to enable a transplanted urban youth to tolerate the desolate backwardness of the village; and finally that the rustics thus "assisted" grumble at receiving a reinforcement they did not ask for—another mouth to feed in return for a pair of weak and clumsy arms.

There is no irony, no implicit criticism, intended here—both would be unjust and inappropriate. That a policy which makes virtue out of necessity has, in its initial phase, created more problems than it

has solved does not negate its underlying principle. So far as application of the policy is concerned, one can identify some of the preconditions—not yet realized—for the success of the undertaking: for example, it is necessary that the faith of the young “volunteers” headed for the interior not be undermined by the feeling that they were sent as a result of an arbitrary decision or an act of fate, or worse, as a punishment. In any case—like most of the measures aimed at narrowing the gap between town and countryside, or at least preventing it from widening at the same rapid and disorderly pace as in the Third World—this policy is, in its conception, one of the very few which seems capable of going beyond the scope of *fu-chiang* without contradicting its legitimate requirements.

Without going into a lengthy analysis of the problems of the privileged few who do not work on the land, we should note that the quest for equality touches them too. Alongside the peasants, the other pillar of Chinese society today is not, or is not yet, the proletariat, although its size is growing with the progress of industrialization; rather, it is the heterogeneous universe of the cadres, who are the heirs of the scholar-mandarins of the past. China’s “New Class” is not only more deeply rooted in national tradition than its European or Soviet counterparts; it is also less privileged and up till now has had to lead a more laborious—or less parasitic—existence in order to earn more niggardly and precarious advantages. Not only between different levels of workers but also between workers and technicians or engineers within the same enterprise, wage differentials are much less pronounced than in the USSR, where they are only now being reduced and where the living standards of kolkhoz members are just beginning to rise toward the level enjoyed by urban dwellers. The leaders of the PRC have shown themselves less inclined to live with levels of inequality that are already less flagrant than those prevailing in Soviet society.

So much for the power of the nation and of the state and the problems of the economy and soci-

ety; thus far we have left ideology aside. But here, too, one can discern strong elements of continuity. Kowtowing, for example, is still *de rigueur*: Confucianism continues to be denounced, but they have forgotten to abolish the rituals. This is to say that the new orthodoxy is an extension of the ancient one even while going against it. Both have imposed a ubiquitous cultural conformism. In truth, the present orthodoxy is even more omnipresent than that of the past, but it is likely to prove that much more transitory. There is nothing surprising in the fact that they are still criticizing Confucius a quarter of a century after the Liberation. It will still be necessary to continue the de-Confucianization of China long after the task of de-Maoization has been completed.

Even before de-Maoization has been officially promoted, it has already made its way into the hearts and minds of many Chinese. The contemporaries of the current *Pi Lin Pi Kung* (Criticize Lin Piao, Criticize Confucius) campaign appear more cynical than those of the Cultural Revolution. The vicissitudes of that earlier upheaval and its epilogue in 1971 (which culminated in the disappearance and disgrace of Lin Piao) can hardly have failed to swell the ranks of the skeptics.

It is possible that many Chinese remain bound to their leaders by a tacit contract whereby they offer their obedience in exchange for the leaders’ assurances of national greatness and of an irreducible minimum standard of living. But this passivity does not, perhaps, exclude a growing impatience, not with authority *per se*, but with its caprices or what are perceived as such—the repeated campaigns and “movements” (*yun-tung*), whose efficacy is in any case constantly diminishing. If this lesson is learned, we may suppose that the regime will itself increasingly refrain from periodic actions that jeopardize order, continuity, and routine. There would then remain little on the agenda for the bureaucratic heirs of the octogenarian Prophet other than the traditional pursuit of *fu-chiang* and the unequal distribution of its dividends among the different classes of a society consolidating its hierarchical structure.

A View from the Village

By Mark Gayn

The opening item in the *Selected Works of Mao Tse-tung*, as issued in 1951 and since, is an "Analysis of the Classes in Chinese Society." First published in 1926 in *Chung-kuo Nung-jen*, then the organ of the Central Committee of the Kuomintang, it is a curious work—naive, untidy, and decidedly un-Marxist. What is not widely known is that nearly a half-century ago it provoked the first published Soviet criticism of Mao.

The criticism came from a leading aide of Mikhail Borodin, head of the Soviet advisory group in Canton in the mid-1920's. The mission, which at one point numbered three-score members, included a high-powered peasant section headed by M. Volin, a noted Soviet historian and Sinologist. In September 1926, the advisory group's mimeographed house organ *Canton* carried a review of Mao's work by "V-n"—as Volin signed himself.¹

Mao's essay divided Chinese society into five major classes—big, middle, and petty capitalists, semi-proletariat, and proletariat—and further broke each of these down into smaller categories. Among the latter was the "unemployed proletariat," which Mao defined as consisting mainly of yesterday's peasants and artisans who had become bandits, along with soldiers, beggars, and prostitutes. Most of them, he added, are "organized in secret societies and, being courageous and determined, may under certain circumstances become a considerable force in the revolution." Mao put the total population of China as of that time at 400 million, and on the basis of his own analysis he estimated that "we have 395 million friends, one million undoubted enemies,

and four million undecided persons, who may be our friends or foes. But even if they all became enemies of the revolution, they would still—together with the big capitalists—form a front of only five millions, which of course could never withstand 395 million people."

"V-n" was less than kind to this still obscure leader of China's infant Communist party. One of Mao's defects, he noted, was carelessness with figures, for the 1922 postal census put China's population at 456 millions. Worse was Mao's "more than just arbitrary" division of Chinese society into his various categories: Mao treated this society as if it were a developed capitalist system. Actually, according to "V-n," it was still burdened with remnants of semi-feudalism, a characteristic reflected in the class structure.

When the essay reappeared in Mao's *Selected Works* in 1951, it bore signs of extensive surgery. Gone were the dubious statistics that had troubled Volin. Gone were some of the subgroups, including the brigands and prostitutes. Passages had been deleted and others inserted. The Central Committee's editorial group responsible for the revisions insisted that the 1926 essay had really been intended to combat the two wicked "deviations" that then afflicted the party: the "rightist deviation" of the party's first leader, Chen Tu-hsiu, and the "leftist deviation" of Chang Kuo-t'ao. This explanation was at best dubious, for in its original form the essay made no reference to either Chen or Chang.

Today, on rereading the original, one is struck by two things. The first is that the essay paid only

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¹ *Canton*, originally titled *Bolshevik in Canton*, was published in an edition of 100. Information on it, and on Volin, is available in V. V. Vishniakova-Akimova's memoir, *Dva goda v vosstavshem Kitae, 1925-27* (Two Years in Revolutionary China, 1925-27), Moscow, Nauka, 1965. Volin's article has been reproduced and analyzed by one of the leading Soviet Sinologists of today, Lev Deliusin, in *Voprosi filosofii* (Moscow), No. 6, 1969, pp. 128-29.

the most cursory lip service to standard Marxist—or even Comintern—doctrine. There was, to be sure, mention of the industrial worker as the main motive force of revolution, but it was hardly more than casual. Indeed, it seems quite clear that Mao was looking at Chinese society from the vantage point of the village. His proletariat appeared to consist mainly of the poor and dispossessed members of the peasantry; most of his capitalists were landlords.

The same point of view was apparent in Mao's famous "Report on an Investigation of the Peasant Movement in Hunan." Tucked away in the original 1927 version of the report was this telltale sentence: "To give credits where they are due, if we allot ten points to the accomplishments of the democratic revolution, then the achievements of the urban dwellers and the military units rate only three points, while the remaining seven points should go to the peasants, in their rural revolution."² Not surprisingly, this sentence, too, was deleted from the editions of Mao's works published in 1951 and later. Presumably these excisions were made because it was essential to affirm Mao's loyalty to Marx and Lenin, and to establish his claim to be a true political heir to these two great men. But while Mao beyond doubt borrowed heavily from both and adapted their ideas—or what he took to be their ideas—to the reality he knew, he also borrowed heavily from many other sources, ranging from Adam Smith to the celebrated 18th-century Chinese novel *Dream of the Red Chamber*, adapting or modifying what he found useful and discarding what he found irrelevant. But if he was constant in anything, it was in placing the village at the center of his world.

Roughly two decades after the appearance of these very early writings of Mao, I had a number of interviews with the Chinese leader at the Communists' Yen-an base in February 1947. Rereading my notes of these encounters, I find in them no record of any reference by Mao to Karl Marx. Mao did have the works of Marx and Engels, of Lenin and Plekhanov, in the rickety bookcase that stood in his sparsely-furnished hillside cave, but these men and their ideas remained unmentioned in our conversations.

² As translated in Conrad Brandt, Benjamin Schwartz and John K. Fairbank, *A Documentary History of Chinese Communism*, Cambridge, Mass., Harvard University Press, 1952. The authors apparently translated the essay from the 1944 edition of Mao's works, published in Shantung.

Mao saw his movement not as a by-product of the Western revolutionary tradition but as a lineal successor to the peasant upheavals that had rocked China through 2,000 years. He was thoroughly immersed in this long record of social violence; he knew both its heroes and its villains, as well as the errors which had doomed all the peasant revolts of the past. Without boastfulness but as if it was quite natural and obvious, he placed himself alongside these rebels of Chinese history, to whom he saw himself as spiritual kin. A certain peasant leader, Mao explained, failed because he allowed himself to be corrupted by the enemy; another, because he had no consistent strategy, sound organization, or appealing political doctrine. Where their revolutions failed, Mao insisted, his would succeed because it had a political philosophy, a disciplined and vigorous political party, and tested leadership.



Mao during a tour of Communist-held rural areas in Yen-an around 1948.

—Magnum.

People's China: A View from the Village

It was also clear from these conversations in Yen-an that Mao idealized the peasants who had followed him through his 22 years of bitter and bloody struggle. He pictured the rural villager as the foremost repository of revolutionary virtues—of a spirit of self-denial and a sense of discipline, of integrity, loyalty, steadfastness, and courage. At least in my mind, there was no doubt that Mao saw in many of his peasant soldiers a reincarnation of the heroes of the Chinese classics he had devoured as a youth—including even highwaymen. (Indeed, three bandit units and their chieftains had been incorporated into the small force assembled by Mao in the Ching-kang Mountains of Kiangsi Province in the late 1920's.) Quite obviously, in Mao's eyes the peasants were the real heroes of the Communists' long struggle, the most skillful guerrillas, the toughest and most enduring fighters, the truest revolutionaries.

The village continued to be Mao's spiritual habitat—and one of his main preoccupations—even after the Communists assumed central power in Peking in 1949. His entire view of China was colored by the belief that the backwardness of the countryside and its 550-600 million peasants was the greatest brake on China's progress and development as a major power. He feared the widening of the gap between the primitive village and the modern, comfortable, increasingly soft and corrupt city. He distrusted the intellectuals and the bureaucrats, for they were urban creatures who looked down on the peasants or ignored them. During my visit to Yen-an in 1947, I stood in the room in the Central Committee building where, back in 1942, Mao had sharply lectured to the intellectuals drawn to this barren corner of the northwest by their idealism. He exhorted them to stop dabbling in abstract art, dissonant music, and literature that went over the heads of the Shensi peasant. Almost a third of a century later, Mao's attitude toward, and his treatment of, the intellectuals remain unchanged.

The Cultural Revolution of 1966-68 was a many-faceted affair. Above all, it was a titanic intraparty struggle for power, but among its key facets was a series of momentous debates centering on the issue of the relative importance of the urban and rural segments of the population in China's national development. Enough is known to suggest that one of these debates saw grouped loosely on one side some powerful urban party leaders who believed that China could advance to greatness only by creating an intellectual elite with high academic qualifications, by giving authority to the technocrats and managers,

and by stressing use of material incentives. On the other side was Mao, who insisted that the key to China's advance lay in bringing the millions of rural villagers out of the 17th century into the 20th.

It is noteworthy that the full fury of the Cultural Revolution was turned on the cities, while the countryside was spared. Equally significant is the fact that, as by-products of the upheaval, the transfer of urban cadres to the country became institutionalized through the creation of the "May 7th Schools"; the transplantation of urban "young intellectuals" to the villages was greatly stepped up; and the rural health services were vastly expanded not only by the addition of a million "barefoot doctors" but also by the assignment of thousands of trained physicians and medical students—and even of entire medical schools—to the villages for periods of six months or more. It was not only a great internal migration; it was also, at least in part, a massive transfusion of urban literacy and skills into the veins of rural China, with a potential long-range impact that can hardly be measured at the moment.

It could be argued that in his almost obsessive emphasis on the village Mao was running against the tide of history, and that by dispersing the intellectual elite he was actually retarding China's progress. It can hardly be denied that the economic and technological gap between China and, say, Japan continued to widen with each year that these policies were prolonged. But on the other hand, Mao could argue persuasively that China's overall progress would continue to be slow so long as the countryside remained backward. Of what worth are an intellectual elite and a sophisticated industry, he could ask, if in much of China's vast interior not even bullocks and donkeys but human beings still pull ploughs?

The People's Republic is now 25 years old, and it seems a good time to ask what Mao has achieved in the countryside and how durable those achievements are likely to be.

Perhaps the most significant achievement has been the creation in the countryside, as in the towns, of a more equitable system of social justice. For all the occasional remaining disparities, there are probably few, if any, societies more egalitarian than China's today. There are no concentrations of wealth in urban or rural China, no conspicuous consumption—and no ragged women and children begging in the streets as they once did by the thousands in every major city. In one rural commune after another, I



Terraced fields constructed from barren hills by the model Tachai Production Brigade of Shansi Province, shown in September 1970.

—EUPRA.

was told of the existence of a social welfare fund, amounting to about five percent of total communal income, to help the aged, widows with large families, and the chronically ill, as well as to finance the local public health service. This welfare concept is almost unique in Asia (except for the Soviet Asiatic republics). In the past, the only social insurance in the Chinese countryside was provided by the family, and it was too bad if a family was too poor to provide for its own members in case of illness or misfortune. The new system is far more equitable and therefore likely to endure.

Another achievement has been the growth in the countryside of a new sense of national solidarity and pride. Like the urban Chinese, the peasants have been given an injection of nationalism. True, this has been tinged now and then with xenophobia; true, too, for many rural inhabitants China still does not extend beyond the commune limits. But for a very large proportion of the rural population—especially the young, who enjoyed a remarkable degree of mobility during the Cultural Revolution—Han nationalism has become a powerful emotional force that may help to ensure national cohesion in the crises of tomorrow. To countless Chinese, Mao has given the opportunity and the urge to discover their own land and take pride in its accomplishments.

Mao's third major achievement in the rural areas has been the creation of an effective, honest, and tough-minded rural administration. While the leader-

ship in Peking has grown infirm with age, in the countryside there has been great fluidity, making for constant renewal with younger blood. I have visited upwards of 20 communes in North, Central, and South China in the course of five trips to the People's Republic since 1965. In all these communes, authority rested in the hands of professional party cadres, mostly in their thirties and usually assigned by the county party apparatus. They were articulate, dedicated, and well-versed in agricultural matters, but they were even better-versed in the techniques of governing, of social organization and indoctrination. Never did I see any signs of an easy camaraderie between these professional administrators and the ordinary tillers of the soil; nor was there much evidence of that rural democracy which seems to have beguiled so many visitors to China. The peasants did have their fleeting moment of glory in 1966-68 when, in each commune and production brigade, a few officials—with county sanction—were exposed to public criticism and even abuse. But that time is gone. In a typical commune in Kwangtung Province, the chairman and the party secretary told me that they performed 40 days of manual labor in the fields annually ("as Chairman Mao has instructed"), but this did not seem to have altered their governors-to-governed relationship with the peasants. Nor did it diminish the fact that the rank-and-file members of the commune had no say in choosing these administrators.

But whether those who run the communes are chosen democratically or not, the fact remains that the present rural administration of China is an effective tool of social, political, and economic management, and one that is constantly being watched by the party network for signs of corruption and inefficiency—or of excessive abrasiveness. Mao put a great deal of thought and care into the shaping of this apparatus, for he saw it destined to play a crucial role in the realization of his vision of a new and revitalized China. In this vast country, with its burgeoning population and relatively meager natural wealth, he looked upon manpower as a vital resource which must be exploited to the fullest if China was to achieve its development goals. To do this, the rural masses had to be mobilized and motivated, and this in turn required a vigorous and capable rural administration quickly responsive to Peking's command.

Such an administration is now functioning, and the results in the countryside have been impressive. From Inner Mongolia on the north to Kwangtung on the south, and as far west as Shensi, I have seen many striking examples of what well-directed manpower could achieve. There was, for instance, a reservoir—virtually an inland sea—which 20,000 workers, toiling in one-month shifts, had shoveled out of a barren valley in Shansi. When I saw it, the reservoir already had a hydroelectric plant that powered irrigation pumps for many miles around. The reservoir was richly stocked with fish, and for the first time the peasant youths in the area were learning to swim. The whole pattern of life in the region had changed, better crops were being raised, the homes had electric lighting, and incomes were rising. After Mao dies, this nationwide system of reservoirs and irrigation canals, of small power stations providing energy for village workshops, and of flood-control dikes, will remain as a memorial to him—a memorial as impressive as the Great Wall, and far more useful.

Finally, Mao has accomplished much in ensuring that the countryside can produce enough foodstuffs to feed both the rural and urban populations. Illustrative of how this was achieved was the experience of the Tom Tong Commune in Kwangtung Province. The details were supplied to me in the office of one of the commune's production brigades by the brigade chairman, who was also its party secretary. A silent witness to the conversation was a large gilded bust of Mao. The chairman told me that before 1949 the rice paddies (then known fatalistically as "de-

pendent on heaven" fields) in the area had produced 1,800 catties³ per acre. By 1960, the yield had risen to nearly 4,300 catties; by 1969, to nearly 5,000; and by 1975 the brigade chairman expected the figure to soar to 12,000 catties. This had been accomplished by rigorously mobilizing the commune's 33,000 people to construct 150 water-control projects, including large reservoirs with seven hydroelectric stations; by building roads and storage sheds; by initiating a seed-selection program; and by imposing tight administrative controls.

Thanks to the water-control projects, the commune was able to deal with floods and droughts reasonably well. And even though annual incomes were still pathetically low by Western standards (120 yuan, or roughly \$56 at the 1972 exchange rate, per working person, with 60 percent paid in grain, salt, and cooking oil), there were such evidences of relative well-being as 150 bicycles and 40 sewing machines in a brigade with 304 households. Most important, the amount of grain delivered to the state had been rising steadily.

But these four achievements—the creation of a more equitable pattern of social justice, the establishment of an honest and capable rural administration, the more effective use of rural manpower, and the attainment of self-sufficiency in food—are not the sum total of Mao's imprint on rural China. The peasant's psyche has been affected, no less than that of the city dweller, by Mao's moralistic preachments. New patterns of behavior based on integrity, subordination of the interests of the individual to the public weal, self-reliance, and discipline have begun to take hold. I was told of occasional crime in the countryside, but there is clearly less of it than one would find in any other country on the Asian mainland. Selfishness may still persist, but it must be concealed, for its exposure before the public eye is a cruel experience.

There are deep moral flaws in any totalitarian society, and Mao's is as totalitarian as they come. (For example, my conversations with "rusted youths" and with people in the "May 7th Schools" produced an image of utter official indifference to the individual's right to some private life of his own.) But no Asian country honors the ten commandments—as rewritten by Mao—quite as much as China, and this new morality may well survive its creator.

³ One catty equals approximately 1½ pounds.

Mao has for years been striving to assure that the changes he has wrought will survive him—as the saying went during the Cultural Revolution—“for a hundred, a thousand, nay, ten thousand years.” He has changed political heirs and stirred up fearsome political upheavals to prevent detours from the path he charted. He has had hundreds of millions memorize his essays on “Serving the People” and “The Foolish Old Man Who Moved the Mountains” in order to deepen the new morality, and he has humbled the bureaucrats to check arrogance. At 81, his mind is not as active as it once was, but it still searches restlessly for ways to perpetuate his ideas lest his revolution fail like the peasant uprisings of the past.

The big difficulty for Mao—or for the outsider seeking to assess the impact of Mao’s achievements—lies in the complexity of China’s rural society. The peasants are torn between traditional attitudes and ethics and the new morality of Mao. They may chant anti-Confucian slogans in public, but their domestic regimen is, perhaps unknowingly, still influenced by the old sage’s teachings. There are conflicts between poor peasants and the less poor over the allocation of private plots and of work points; between the old and the young; between the peasants and the urban interlopers—the students and cadres—thrust upon them; between the peasants and the rural administrators. The village is not yet a world of pure and profound harmony, but one of continuing if often hidden tensions.

Indeed, there have been numerous indications that discontent continues to plague the society, however more equitable the social order today than it was before 1949. During the Cultural Revolution, when political controls broke down in many areas, there were instances in which peasants divided grain crops among themselves, leaving little for the commune reserves, appropriated communal pigs and chickens, or chopped down commune forests. A more recent hint of strains has been the issuance

of strict directives to the communes to take better care of the resettled “young intellectuals,” to provide them with more grain and better housing. In some of the communes I visited, the attitude was that the youths had been sent in to be “reeducated through manual labor”—and the labor they were put to was truly of the most strenuous or demeaning kind. Instead of welcoming them as literates whose skills the villages badly needed, the peasants seemed to resent the newcomers as extra mouths to feed. The result has been that hundreds of thousands of resettled youths—one estimate puts the number at 400,000⁴—have fled from the countryside to the cities; and thousands of others have been fleeing to Hong Kong in the face of all the perils of Chinese shore patrols and China Sea sharks.⁵ The latter refugees have been telling tales of rural scarcity and discontent.

What, then, of the future? If the transfer of power after Mao’s death proves reasonably smooth, if central authority remains firm and the rural administration continues to function without disruption, then the villages are likely to go on for many years along the paths charted by Mao. If, on the other hand, another upheaval comparable to that of 1966-68 occurs, some of the Maoist implantations in the countryside may be eroded. Still, I am convinced that so profound has been Mao’s imprint on rural China—on its modes of living and producing and on the way it is governed—that the effects will continue to be felt for many generations after he has passed away.

⁴ A senior Western diplomat in Peking gave this estimate in a conversation with the author.

⁵ A news item in *The New York Times*, reprinted in the *Toronto Globe & Mail*, Aug. 10, 1974, reported that 2,833 illegal Chinese immigrants reached Hong Kong in the first six months of this year. It added: “The Immigration Department, which operates on the theory that the police statistics should generally be multiplied by three, estimated that 8,230 people escaped in the first half of the year.”

A Radical Break with the Past

By Edward E. Rice

The restoration of territorial unity to mainland China by the Chinese Communist Party (CCP) in 1949 rounded out a recurrent historical cycle and verified once again a saying of the ancients. They had observed that the empire when united tended ever to divide, and when divided strove ever to unite. However, the revolution that has reached its zenith under the Communists is the only one in China since the revolution of Shih Huang Ti (221-210 B.C.) that has changed the system of government and altered the configuration of society.

It was Shih Huang Ti's revolution that created the centralized empire, and it has been the post-1911 revolution, now presided over by the Communists,¹ that has overthrown it and entered China upon a new era. By depriving the aristocracy of their hereditary lands and transporting them from the regions in which they had exercised power, Shih Huang Ti dealt feudalism a blow from which it was never to recover. The redistribution of agricultural lands, carried out shortly after the establishment of the present Communist government and accompanied by the killing of several million people, similarly destroyed the landed gentry, a class analogous to the aristocracy of feudal China.

Shih Huang Ti ordered the burning of the Confucian classics and the burying alive of Confucian scholars because they advocated a return to the governing principles of the feudal past, whereas he ruled his Ch'in empire in accordance with the principles of the rival Legalist school of political philosophers.² The results of his efforts to exorcise Con-

fucianism proved impermanent, perhaps because Confucianism reflected the basic ways of Chinese society too accurately to be rooted out under his short-lived dynasty. Since the early years of this century, those Chinese who have advocated basic changes in their society have attacked Confucianism as an obstacle to progress, and even today in China, Confucius is the target of a campaign of criticism said to have been launched by Chairman Mao himself. In this campaign, Shih Huang Ti—long held in disrepute for the ruthlessness of his rule—is being represented as a progressive and admirable figure.

The Ch'in created a powerful state by means of a high degree of organization under a bureaucracy which imposed severe discipline on behalf of an absolutist emperor. Mao Tse-tung and his fellow leaders, ruling through a similarly powerful bureaucracy (except during the aberrant period of the Cultural Revolution), have been committed to the goal of transforming China into a strong, modern, socialist country. China is, in other words, to be restored to greatness through modern development carried out in accordance with the socialist principles of Marxism-Leninism. It is this adherence to Marxism, with its implied commitment to an eventual

¹ The collapse of the Manchu dynasty in 1911 marked the beginning of a complex struggle during which parliamentary rule from Peking and Chinese unity were early victims. In this struggle, the principal contenders were militarist organizations—Sun Yat-sen's Kuomintang and the emergent Chinese Communist Party, with which Sun allied the Kuomintang early in 1924. The back of warlord power was broken by the Northern Expedition of the Soviet-trained and -equipped Kuomintang armies, launched in 1925 under the command of Chiang Kai-shek. With the initiation of his anti-Communist purge in 1927, a new civil war broke out. Its first phase ended in 1936, when the two parties again entered into collaboration to resist Japan, and its second phase, which commenced after Japan's defeat in 1945, ended with the Communist triumph in 1949.

² Unlike the Confucianists, who viewed the moral example of rulers as the central factor determining the tone and behavior of society as a whole, the Legalists stressed the importance of a fixed body of laws, to be firmly administered by a highly organized state bureaucracy.

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transition from socialism to communism, which gives the present regime its most distinctive features.

In the China of Shih Huang Ti's era, the new bureaucrats supplanted the feudal lords as links between local societies and the sovereign. With the founding of the People's Republic of China, the gentry's similar role was assumed by the cadres of the new regime. As Communist parties have done elsewhere, the Chinese Communist Party set up complex organizational structures which permeated all of society. Through these structures, the party proceeded to mobilize the masses to play an active and continuous role in the pursuit of its multitudinous objectives. While the party leadership regarded ideological indoctrination of the people themselves as one of the most important of these objectives, it believed that even before this indoctrination had been accomplished, popular participation in mass campaigns would lead to commitment to the party's aims, and hence to the Communist regime.

Shih Huang Ti had employed large bodies of people for the construction of trunk roads and of the Great Wall, and successor regimes, both dynastic and republican, had recurrently mobilized them for a variety of public works. However, the traditional relationship between the populace and its rulers was well summed up in the old Chinese saying: "Heaven is high, and the emperor is far away." With the coming of the party and its cadres, that saying lost all relevance.

If the most noteworthy of the changes brought about by Communist rule has been popular involvement and participation, the most striking aspect of its operational method has been reliance upon campaigns. As one cadre explained shortly after the establishment of the new government, these mass movements were to follow one another endlessly, like waves beating upon the shore.³ His prediction has been fulfilled by the history of Chinese Communist rule, which may be divided into chapters, each devoted to a movement and the period in which that movement constituted the dominant element.

The Ch'in rulers, after depriving the feudal lords of the land, turned its ownership over to the peasants who had been cultivating it. The mass movement conducted against the landlords shortly after the founding of the present Peking government had as one of its immediate aims an analogous goal—the redistribution among peasant households of the

³ Based upon a personal interview with a refugee, who recounted the cadre's statement to explain his own decision to leave China.



A drawing of Shih Huang Ti (259-210 B.C.), founder of the powerful Ch'in Dynasty, who is currently being viewed by the Chinese Communists as a "progressive" figure in China's history.

—China Pictorial (Peking), No. 6, 1974, p. 30.

fields being seized from landlord proprietors. However, unlike the peasants of the earlier era, the peasants of the Communist period were not destined to keep their newly acquired land long enough to become accustomed to its ownership. By participating in the killing of the landlords and the burning of old title deeds, they burned their bridges to the past. When Communist cadres launched the next great campaign affecting land tenure, the peasants proved unable either to protect their new acquisitions or to retain their old holdings.

Sun Yat-sen, the prophet of China's republican revolution, once complained that the Chinese people were like a loose tray of sand. While it is true that Chinese society in his day lacked a unifying cement, individual Chinese did not then or traditionally re-

semble loose grains of sand. Rather, the individual was at the center of a web of mutually supportive relationships. Immediately surrounding him was the extended family—usually consisting either of a single household or of several households in close proximity—with its own hierarchical arrangement of authority. Individuals were also typically linked by a variety of organizational and other relationships—e.g., relationships based on common local origins, shared schooling experiences, involvement in the same occupation, as well as on friendships, sometimes solidified by an oath of brotherhood or by acceptance of an important favor. This family-centered society reflected Confucian precepts, which assumed that society would be in harmony as long as its sets of personal relationships, beginning with those of the family and culminating with those between the ruler and his ministers, were properly ordered and maintained.

A society so organized, however, is one in which authority is diffused and not readily susceptible to concentration; moreover, giving precedence to personal relationships tends to undercut loyalty to large and hence impersonal organizations. In theory, if much less so in practice, the Chinese Communist Party is such an organization, and so are many of the enterprises required for economic modernization. Viewed against this background, Sun Yat-sen's observation had an element of validity which his Communist successors were bound to recognize.

Nonkinship bodies—such as the neighborhood *pao chia* (mutual security) organizations set up under the previous Kuomintang government, the secret societies, and the pro-Kuomintang unions—were early casualties of the party's determination to reorder society within a pervasive organizational structure of its own. Because kinship is unalterable, the married state basic, and personal feelings sometimes hidden, it could not deal similarly with these, and the problems arising from them have surfaced at every level, including that of the party's top leadership. Indeed, it is at that level that the cadres show the most obvious evidence of having been imperfectly remolded—despite the fact that virtually none of them has been spared the often traumatic experience of group criticism and compulsory self-criticism.

The party has approached the task of transferring loyalties to itself through new marriage laws, ideological indoctrination, and group pressures—all designed to lessen the authority that family members traditionally have exercised over one another.

It has also taken a variety of steps—some of them intended primarily to serve other ends—which reduce the functional scope of the family and tend to unravel family ties. At the cadre and professional levels, job assignments in widely separated places have in many cases kept spouses apart for long periods. The families of the growing class of industrial workers have become less closely knit as a consequence of the entry of women into the urban work force—a development encouraged through pay scales which make outside employment of both spouses desirable if not necessary, through restrictions on the housing space assigned each family, and through the provision of enterprise mess halls and day nurseries to help free wives of household responsibilities. In addition, there has been a great increase in the availability of schooling, which takes children from the home and exposes them to a system of education in which virtually every course of study inculcates the desired values. Finally, upon leaving school, millions of youths are sent off to take up new lives as farm workers in the countryside or as pioneers in border areas.

In the countryside, the initial land reform was followed by a movement to form agricultural cooperatives in which the peasants would pool their lands, and by the consolidation of the peasants' small fields into the larger ones of the cooperatives. Collective ownership was accompanied by collective farming, which was carried on by peasants organized into teams and brigades. In 1958, there ensued an effort to carry out the communization of the agricultural sector, applying to it the techniques of large-scale organization and division of labor that are features of modern industry. Agricultural communization proved to be a disastrous failure, as did the concurrent Great Leap Forward in the industrial sector. Both were abandoned, and the government adopted a development policy of "taking agriculture as the base," under which agriculture would benefit from inputs of fertilizer, pesticides, and other elements supplied by industry "as the leading factor."

The communes were preserved in modified form as multipurpose government organizations in rural areas, with important responsibilities in the field of agriculture. However, the peasants were left to till the lands they knew, as members of work teams and brigades composed largely of neighbors with whom they were acquainted; the communal mess halls were abandoned; and peasant families were again

allowed small private plots on which to raise produce for their own use and for sale. Thus, the relationships of the three-quarters of China's people who live in the countryside—to each other and to the land they till—have been substantially altered but not changed beyond all recognition.

The failures of the Great Leap and the initial communes, coupled with the withdrawal of Soviet aid at about the same time, forced Mao Tse-tung to recognize that the goal of making China a strong, modern country could not be attained within the span of a few years and would have to be pursued through "self-reliance." This meant that the regime could invest each year in development only that portion of the gross national product left over after the basic needs of the populace and the requirements of national defense and government administration had been met.

China's estrangement from the Soviet Union, leading Peking to invest in the development and production of its own nuclear weapons, unquestionably diverted substantial resources from productive uses, but population growth perhaps more than



A block-card display flashes Mao's image during a mass demonstration of calisthenics in Peking Stadium in 1967.

—Nicholas Turner/Empire News via Black Star.

any other factor has limited the annual surpluses available for development. Although the Chinese Communists are followers of Marxism, with its labor theories of value and anti-Malthusian bias, they now implicitly recognize that the fecundity of their people is an obstacle to development. They are, at any rate, pursuing a multifaceted and pervasive program aimed at fertility control. This program, which runs so directly counter to the traditional Chinese emphasis on having progeny, is proving more successful in cities, where conditions of housing and employment tend to discourage large families, than in the relatively conservative countryside.

A contradiction developed, during the first 15 years of Communist rule, between Mao Tse-tung, the charismatic leader, and the ranking cadres who managed the country's bureaucracies. He was ever in a hurry, and he insisted on pursuing objectives through huge and disorderly campaigns conducted in the loose style of his guerrilla years. This approach ran counter to the orderly procedures and step-by-step methods congenial to all large organizations. The industrial depression and widespread hunger that followed upon the failures of the Great Leap and communes gave Mao's critics the upper hand. Thereafter, Mao came to view their efforts to thwart his will as an attempt to put him on the shelf. In his eyes, the policies of his opponents represented a revisionism which would make China "change color," and the higher-ranking leaders were threatening to become a new class of "red capitalist" exploiters. Mao's answer was to involve the populace in another great campaign, with a purge of the party's "capitalist roaders" as its main task and the solution of problems of world outlook as its basic purpose. Although the party structure was destroyed during this so-called Cultural Revolution and then reconstructed under Mao's aegis after it had waned, that revolution did not achieve its basic aim, and the new leadership has failed to prove cohesive.

The contradictions within the party are paralleled by contradictions within Mao himself, who is prone to sudden reversals of course. He puts high value on both voluntarism and discipline, and these qualities can be reconciled only through ideological conversion. As he sees it, when all have internalized the Thought of Mao Tse-tung, everyone will enjoy the freedom that he has defined as the recognition of necessity.

The life of the mind is bound to be constricted

under any totalitarian government, but it undoubtedly tends to become more constricted when the regime in question is both afflicted by disunity and prone to sudden shifts of line, as that of China has been. Those most obviously affected by the contradictions within the leadership have been the intellectuals. Kuo Mo-jo affords the country's most eminent example of this class: at the outbreak of the Cultural Revolution he felt impelled to declare that everything he had ever written deserved only to be burned. Today, five years after the Cultural Revolution, those scholars who once wrote favorably on Confucius are similarly denouncing the views that they expressed earlier. Though Mao urges his people to criticize their leaders, it is hardly surprising that there are no Chinese Solzhenitsyns.

To some extent, of course, the entire population has felt the impact of Mao's determination to exorcise all ways of thought not in keeping with his own. This determination has been evidenced, for example, by the suppression—since the Cultural Revolution—of the traditional Chinese theater, with its more than a thousand operas, to which the whole populace had

been addicted. The traditional theater has been replaced by repetitive renditions of the handful of reformed operas prepared under the direction of Mao's wife, Chiang Ch'ing.

During the past quarter of a century, great changes have taken place in China: the building of a modern industrial sector; the reshaping of the rural society, with accompanying agricultural improvement; and the creation of nationwide systems for the collection and distribution of the produce of a vast land. Today, 800 million Chinese are better fed than the 400 millions of a quarter of a century ago, they benefit from greatly improved and extended systems of public health and medical care, and they ordinarily enjoy physical security of person. The society in which they live has a strong spirit of egalitarianism, and they can take pride in the newly-won respect in which their country is held. These are accomplishments which could undoubtedly have been achieved, possibly at less cost, under a somewhat different regime, but they could not have been achieved under one which did not provide a framework of strong and effective government.

The Pattern of Politics

By Juergen Domes

The founding of the People's Republic of China (PRC) in 1949 clearly constituted a benchmark in Chinese history. During the last quarter of a century, China has undergone major social and economic development and has transformed her position in the world political arena. At the same time, the political system that emerged in 1949 has by no means remained static. Indeed, the changes

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in China's socioeconomic and international status have been accompanied by remarkable changes in her political system.

These last alterations have greatly affected the course of political events in the country—especially during the crises connected with the Great Leap Forward, the Cultural Revolution, and the purge of Lin Piao. As a consequence, they have been described at length by many Western observers of the Chinese scene, but few efforts have thus far been made to evaluate them in a systematic way. Therefore, it seems appropriate—now that we have been scrutinizing Communist China for 25 years—to try to formulate some conclusions about elements of continuity and change in politics within the Chinese Communist Party (CCP) and in Communist rule more generally.

In approaching this task, we must first recognize that the concept of a stable, personal (*i.e.*, Maoist) dictatorship does not afford an accurate picture of politics in the PRC. During the last three years, students of China, like those of the Soviet Union during the early 1960's, have more and more come to appreciate the deficiencies of such a concept. As a substitute, some analysts, of whom Richard Thornton was among the earliest,¹ have suggested that Chinese politics be looked at as a process of conflict and compromise—or, as the present author labels it, an *allocative process*. That is, conflict and compromise have been the rule in the policymaking process, and an easily-arrived-at consensus the exception, throughout the 25 years that the Communists have been in power in China.

Such an approach seems to have considerable merit, for political conflict has indeed been evident in China over the years. While every ideologically-based, single-party system strives to present a monolithic front to the outside world (*e.g.*, Lenin included a provision in the statutes of the Communist Party of the Soviet Union prohibiting the formation of factions), several signals have indicated the existence of intraparty disputes. The first of these has been terminological divergence. Whenever a conflict over policy has occurred—whether it eventually resulted in a change of policy or not—contradictions have tended to appear in the media's employment of terminology related to the area of concern. Among the specific illustrations one might cite are the differing organizations to which the term "people's communes" was applied in the late 1950's, the varied meanings attached to the need to educate "millions of revolutionary successors" in 1963-64 and again since 1973, and the changing character of the features extolled in the campaign to "emulate the example of Tachai in agriculture" in the 1970's. The dispute over development strategies in the late 1950's and the early 1960's, the dispute over rural policies that seems to have figured in a major way in the Lin Piao crisis of 1971, and the wide-ranging dispute that has dominated Chinese domestic politics since the Tenth Party Congress in August 1973 all surfaced initially in the media's inconsistent use of central ideological and political terms.

A second signal of conflict has been the removal of prominent dissenters from influential positions in the state-administrative and party *apparats*. Such

removals have been carried out fairly frequently. Perhaps the most dramatic instance involved Marshal P'eng Te-huai, the Minister of Defense, in 1959. He had taken positions against the Great Leap Forward and the central leadership's growing hostility toward the USSR.

The expulsion of individual dissenters from the party has constituted a third signal of conflict. Since more drastic in nature, it has occurred less often than removal from influential positions. One of the prime examples is the treatment of Kao Kang and Jao Shu-shih in 1954-55. These two major party figures deviated from the center's opinions with respect to development planning and possibly with respect to future relations between China and the Soviet Union as well. Their expulsions, which to some extent paralleled the expulsions of Leon Trotsky and Grigori Zinoviev from the CPSU in 1927 and 1932, respectively, provided the leaders of the central civilian party machine with increased leverage over regional administrative and military leaders.

A fourth signal of intraparty conflict has been the emergence of an open rift. The Cultural Revolution affords the only genuine illustration of this kind of signal. During the Cultural Revolution, Mao Tse-tung—relying, first, on more or less spontaneously organized bands of students and, later, on the military—launched an all-out attack on the civilian party apparatus, which he deemed an impediment to the realization of his revolutionary vision.

If we apply the allocative process concept to intraparty politics in China, then, we can discern qualitatively different stages in the history of Chinese political conflicts in terms of the types of groups which have been involved in these disputes and the manner in which decisions have been reached in conflictual situations. To clarify this judgment, perhaps it would be well to begin by looking at general prototypes.

At the outset, let us note that any discussion of groups involved in Chinese political conflicts must take into account both political platforms and personal status. A number of outside observers have tended to analyze disputes within the Chinese Communist Party as essentially power conflicts. At the same time, the Chinese leaders and some of their foreign admirers have tried to portray such disputes as springing from a basic clash "between two lines"—a clash in which questions of personal power have been only marginally relevant, if at all. In

¹ "The Structure of Communist Politics," *World Politics* (Princeton, N.J.), July 1972, pp. 498-517.

actuality, however, all major disputes within the Chinese leadership have entailed conflict over both personal power and policy. One cannot separate the issues of policy disputes from the individual persons who hold divergent views, for the rivals engage in contests for positions of power which will enable them to enact the policies and strategies they advocate.

From this perspective, one can identify two kinds of groups in the Chinese case. These are: (1) coalitions formed on the basis of individual issues; (2) coalitions with comprehensive platforms. Those in the first category have taken shape when ties and affiliations within a divided leadership have remained in flux and mostly rooted in issues; the second have emerged during periods when continuous factionalism has produced relatively coherent circles which have programs and compete for overall control of the country.

(This categorization, it should be underscored, stems from the author's assessment that functional groups *per se* are not highly useful frames of reference. There is scant evidence that such groups have, in point of fact, acted as cohesive units in intra-party conflicts. Rather, in some instances certain functional groups have joined with other functional groups to form a political coalition; in others—e.g., the Cultural Revolution—individual functional groups have split as a result of decisions which transcended functional interests. Thus, it seems more worthwhile to couch the analysis in terms of coalitions than in terms of functional groups.)

Since the foregoing are prototypes, they have, of course, rarely existed in pure form. Indeed, the first type of coalition has quite often developed through a series of intermediate stages into one of the second type. The dynamics of this process were quite clear during the period preceding the Cultural Revolution and at the time when the Lin Piao crisis was building up in 1970-71. In these two cases, opinion groups in consecutive issue-based disputes became increasingly identical—that is, there was a growing similarity of views among a number of loosely-organized circles and functional groups with respect to several different areas of policy conflict. Finally, these groups, by agreement and compromise, managed to put together what approximated coherent platforms.

With regard to the way in which decisions have been arrived at in conditions of conflict, one can discern two prototypical procedures. They are (1) majority construction and (2) majority formation.

Under the first procedure, Mao Tse-tung, the party leader, has from time to time fashioned coalitions of functional and opinion groups willing to follow his initiatives and constituting a majority. Good examples would be the coalitions he brought together to support the institution of the Great Leap Forward in the winter of 1957-58 and the launching of the attack on the civilian party machine in the early stages of the Cultural Revolution. Under the second procedure, groups have combined to form a majority in the decision-making organs without the active participation of Chairman Mao or even against his will. Prime illustrations would include the coalitions that formed to force the introduction of the policy of readjustment in 1961 after the failures of the Great Leap Forward in 1959-60 and the adoption in 1970-71 of a number of measures that undermined Lin Piao's position.

These abstractions will become more meaningful if we attempt to place them more coherently in concrete historical context. As A. Doak Barnett has pointed out in a recent study of major problems and future perspectives for the PRC,² there was a fairly wide-ranging consensus among the Chinese leaders about policies and strategies at the time of the founding of the PRC in 1949, but this consensus dissipated as the leadership had to face ever more important practical issues. Especially since 1957, perhaps the most critical turning point in Chinese politics to date, the dissension has grown increasingly severe.

However diverse the specific issues upon which people differed may have been, the differences appear to have revolved essentially around one fundamental issue—namely, the proper approach to economic and social development. In pushing through the Great Leap Forward in 1958, Mao and his supporters opted for a concept of development keynoted by mass mobilization and harsh austerity. Elements in the leadership opposed this concept from the very beginning, and when its implementation in the Great Leap brought on a major economic crisis, a majority of the party leadership coalesced and devised, more by improvisation than by clear-cut design, the alternative concept of "readjustment" in order to overcome the Great Leap's unfavorable effects on society and the political system. This latter concept found embodiment in a number of pragmatic measures aimed at political relaxation

² *Uncertain Passage: China's Transition to the Post-Mao Era*, Washington, DC, The Brookings Institution, 1974.

and economic development based on material incentives.

Over the years, Mao and his close associates have from time to time sought to reimpose their concept and ensure its enshrinement as official policy. Their efforts have thus far spawned two major political crises—the Cultural Revolution and the conflict that ultimately culminated in Lin Piao's demise in September 1971 (Mao having by then split with Lin). In the first of these crises, the major organizational instrument they employed was a host of student groups formed outside the regular channels of the party *apparatus*. These bodies encouraged mass demonstrations and open factional struggles. The undertaking failed largely because the groups of discontented youths generated factional fights which could be controlled only by invoking severe disciplinary action by the People's Liberation Army. During the second crisis, the organizational instrument was intended to be the PLA, through which Mao and Lin Piao sought to carry out a total militarization of Chinese society. This effort collapsed after it became evident that a majority of the regional military leaders would not act in accordance with the designs of Mao, Lin Piao, and Lin's supporters in the central military machine, and after Mao began to perceive Lin's attempts to build up the PLA's role in society as a challenge to himself.

We may also at the moment be witnessing a third attempt along these lines, for aspects of the current anti-Confucian campaign seem to point in this direction. If such is the case, the organizational instrument would appear to be urban worker bodies, and there are signs that the endeavor could entail some degree of mass involvement and open factional strife, just as the Cultural Revolution did. But should the present turmoil become a major effort to turn the clock back to 1958, the chances for its success look fairly dim, for urban workers in general tend to value their personal standard of living more than they do the creation of a "new society" with "new men."

The foregoing analysis, it should be observed, may lay undue stress on the element of continuity through cyclical change in Chinese politics. We gain a somewhat different impression from an examination of features of Chinese politics during the identifiable broad stages of Communist rule over the last two and a half decades.

In this connection, we ought to note first that



At the height of the Cultural Revolution in the summer of 1967 competing mobs clashed in Shanghai and even resisted efforts of the People's Liberation Army to restore order. The slogan on the overturned truck in the foreground reads: "Learn from the Chinese Liberation Army."

—London Daily Express/Pictorial Parade.

countries whose political systems draw their legitimacy from a revolutionary process have by and large undergone transitions from charismatic rule to institutionalized rule. Thus, the USSR has passed through three stages in the development of its political system. After a period of charismatic rule under Lenin, it went through a comparatively long period of transitional rule characterized mainly by Josef Stalin's personal despotism. Not until the early 1960's did it finally reach the stage of institutionalized rule.

In China, we can find parallels to each of the initial two stages. Mao dominated the Chinese political scene until his attempt to integrate critical

intellectuals into the system failed in the "hundred flowers" campaign of 1957 and his ensuing approach to the development of Chinese society through mass mobilization ran into difficulties toward the end of 1958. Since the end of 1958, China seems to have entered a stage of transitional rule marked by Mao's increasingly obvious retreat into the role of legitimator and by a growing frequency and intensity of intraparty conflicts. In this respect, the Chinese system in the second stage might best be described as a transitional crisis system, for it lacks the elements of personal despotism. During the early part of this stage—between 1959 and late 1965—there was a breakdown in the consensus on issues within the leadership circle, although a consensus on procedures still prevailed, with controversial issues being temporarily solved in plenary meetings of the Central Committee or in "working conferences" of the leading cadres. But the consensus on procedures also broke down in September 1965 when Mao Tse-tung refused to abide by a majority decision of an enlarged meeting of the Politburo's Standing Committee not to launch a new rectification campaign against intellectual critics.³ While this consensus on procedures was seemingly restored after the Cultural Revolution, the Lin Piao crisis of 1971 cast some doubts on the durability of that consensus. Although it is highly questionable whether Lin really attempted to carry out a coup against Mao, it is safe to conclude that Lin's political demise did not result from any regular procedure.

The characteristics of politics in China during these two phases have by no means been the same. During the period of charismatic rule, Mao, the party leader, occupied a dominant position, and the party—as a political unit, not as a bureaucratic machine—exercised undisputed control over all other pillars of the political system. Intraparty conflicts during this stage became manifest largely in terminological divergences and removal of dissenters from office, with an exceptional expulsion. The conflicts were carried on by coalitions united by issues, and decisions were taken through majority construction by the party leader.

While some continuities with the past have been evident during the stage of transitional rule, the

³ *Hung Ch'i* (Peking), Nos. 7 and 9, 1967. See also Franz Michael, "Moscow and the Current Chinese Crisis," *Current History* (Philadelphia), September 1967, p. 147; and Philip Bridgham, "Mao's Cultural Revolution: Origin and Development," *The China Quarterly* (London), January-March 1967, p. 16.

changes have overshadowed them. This stage has been characterized by political competition between minorities and majorities within the different pillars of the political system. To some extent, such intraparty conflict has manifested itself in traditional ways, but there have been far more removals and expulsions in this stage, as well as one open rift—the Cultural Revolution. More important, the conflict has reflected both disputes over individual policy issues and disputes over alternative platforms. Thus, in contrast to the USSR's earlier transitional system, in which the combination of Stalin's personal despotism and his paranoid perception of opinion groups as already factional and hence not to be tolerated, prevented the development of factionalism, China's transitional crisis system has to date rested on an interplay between the formation of opinion groups and their transformation into factions. Decisions have been reached by both majority construction and majority formation, but since Mao, the charismatic leader, has increasingly retreated to—or been forced into—the role of a legitimator, majority formation has more and more become the norm. The fading away of the charismatic leader, however, has not resulted in a strengthening of the institutions of the political system. Rather, it has produced continuous questioning and even a diffusion of political initiative. At certain periods, to be sure, the leadership has acted decisively, but constant policy changes of a major nature have raised doubts about the long-range reliability of this appearance of decisiveness.

The fact that Communist rule in China has not yet reached the institutionalized stage distinguishes the current Chinese political system from that of the USSR, and this distinction is exceedingly significant. Institutionalized rule promotes competition between various *apparats*, but this competition is resolved by repeated compromise. In this sense, institutionalized rule conforms to Graham Allison's "bureaucratic politics model."⁴ Under such a political system, intraparty conflict inevitably leads largely to terminological divergences and removals from positions of responsibility, with only an occasional expulsion from the party, for in a political framework which requires a balancing of bureaucratic elements, the minority which suffers defeat from a compromise worked out on one controversial matter may consti-

⁴ *Essence of Decision: Explaining the Cuban Missile Crises*, Boston, Little, Brown and Co., 1971.

tute essential allies for at least some elements of the victorious majority in the resolution of another matter. Hence, that minority cannot with impunity be expelled from the party and certainly cannot be liquidated physically. Under such a system, too, functional groups and historical loyalties loom more important than opinion groups, and decision-making is normally carried out by majority construction. Disputes over issues and competing platforms also tend to disappear, with conflict concentrating on the specific institutional interests or concerns of the competing *apparats*.

A major question with respect to the future, of course, is whether China will make the transition to institutional rule as the Soviet Union has. Mao's version of the theory of permanent revolution and the events of the Cultural Revolution attest to the existence on the Chinese domestic scene of strong impediments to this kind of evolution. Nevertheless, such a development seems likely for two reasons:

(1) The next generation of Chinese leaders appears destined to come mostly from the bureaucracies of the civilian party, the governmental administration, the PLA, and the official mass organizations. (2) Successive attempts since 1958 to base national development strategy on extensive mass mobilization have yielded decreasingly effective results. In short, the new generation of leaders, because of the impact of their own bureaucratic working experiences, will have a natural inclination toward institutionalization of the political system, and they will have before them concrete evidence of the inadequacies of a development strategy with mass mobilization at its heart.

It should be emphasized, however, that we are talking here about a generational succession, not the personal succession to Mao. Until the generational succession takes place, Chinese politics will in all probability continue to exhibit more flux than continuity.

Shrinking Political Life

By L. La Dany

Twenty-five years is not a long period in Chinese history. But during the past 25 years, China has been exposed to shock treatment after shock treatment (called political campaigns), and the whole Chinese way of life has undergone radical change. Fundamentally this change has consisted of adapting Chinese society to a political and economic system taken from the Soviet Union. This system has remained, despite the rift with Moscow. An almighty party apparatus now rules the country; the land has been collectivized; political control dominates the field of culture; security agencies keep dossiers on every individual; foreigners—though in periods of relaxation they are treated more politely than in Russia—are looked upon with suspicion.

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Nothing, however, would be more false than to think that China, having adopted the Russian model, has lived in peace ever since. The past 25 years in China have been a catena of stormy events, and of recurrent change.

A rereading of the Chinese press of 20, or even 10, years ago, recalls a China unbelievably remote from the China we see today. Twenty years ago, in 1954, elections had been held; the first People's Congress, China's parliament, had been convoked; a state constitution had been promulgated; laws were regulating the functions of the courts. The lynching of landlords and the radio-broadcasting of public executions were already things of the past; it seemed that a period of legality was being ushered in. The legality was Soviet legality. The laws and the Constitution itself were modeled on Soviet legislation. In retrospect, those days now seem to have been days of freedom. Even the advisability of sanctioning legal counsel was being discussed.

People's China: Shrinking Political Life

In the 1950's, the People's Congress met, and the newspapers published the speeches of the delegates *in extenso*, all, as might have been expected, expressing full agreement with government policy, but also airing grievances—not very different from present practice in Taiwan. In the 1960's, reports on the People's Congresses lost vigor, and only one or two major reports were printed. A marked decline in the importance of the Congress was visible to all.

A parliament under a Communist regime has, as all know, little power and can hardly be called a legislative body. Yet, in the second half of the 1960's and first years of the 1970's, the convocation of even such a parliament met insurmountable difficulties. The last session of the People's Congress was held in December 1964-January 1965. When the turbulent years of the Cultural Revolution had ended, the solemn New Year's editorial for 1971 announced the convocation of the Congress for that year.¹ That year and the following years have passed. In August 1973, Chou En-lai announced that the Congress



Chinese officials accused of leading anti-revolutionary groups are fitted with dunce caps and paraded in shame through a Peking street by Red Guards on January 26, 1967.

—Wide World.

would be held in "the immediate future."² No Congress was held in "the immediate future."

The whole tone of political life has changed with the years. Until 1957, the classic Communist formula was observed: decisions were taken in the inner circles of the Communist Party and implemented later by the government. In those days, there were some nonparty members in both the central and the regional governments—the People's Committees as the latter were called.

After 1957, though the People's Committees continued to exist, all decisions of major importance were published in the name of the regional party committees, not of the regional governments. In Peking, the central government was still functioning, but the major posts in the Cabinet were filled by Politburo members.

The cause of this change is to be found in disappointment with the nonparty members. When they were asked in 1957 to express their views about the system and the ruling party, they—one must say—overfulfilled the target. A great number of the critics were labeled "rightists," and a new sort of labor camp, with undefined sentences, was set up. (The first type had been organized soon after the establishment of the People's Republic.)

Direct rule by the party has always been considered an anomaly. During the years before 1966, *i.e.*, before the Cultural Revolution, there were even rare articles suggesting that the party organizations should not be entangled in daily administration.

The Cultural Revolution did not solve this problem. Indeed, it boldly wiped out of existence not only the People's Committees but also the whole Communist Party apparatus—except that within the army. Only a skeleton of the supreme party organization remained.

Very recently, in this present year 1974, voices have again been heard, both in the *People's Daily (Jen-min Jih-pao)* and in provincial news media, demanding a more important role for the regional Revolutionary Committees which have taken the place of the People's Committees. But months have passed since these views were expressed, and major provincial conferences, dealing not only with political matters but also with agriculture and industry, are still being convoked by the provincial party committees.

¹ Joint New Year's editorial, published in *Jen-min Jih-pao*, *Hung Ch'i*, and *Chieh-fang Chün Pao* (all Peking), Jan. 1, 1971.—Ed.

² This announcement was made by Chou in his report to the Tenth CCP Congress, Aug. 24, 1973. See *Peking Review*, Sept. 7, 1973, p. 25.—Ed.

However, cohesion within the Communist Party itself leaves much to be desired. Far behind are the days when, in 1956—soon after the iconoclast 20th Congress of the Communist Party of the USSR—Peking published a document, “On the Historical Experience of the Dictatorship of the Proletariat.”³ This document recalled that the Communist Party in China also had had its internal troubles—before Mao took over power. The tone of the document was one of self-confident belief in the unshakable unity and cohesion of the CCP.

Today the official doctrine is very different. The history of the last 25 years is being described in terms of four struggles within the party, struggles leading, first, to the purge of Kao Kang (1954); second, to the purge of the Minister of Defense, P’eng Te-huai (1959); third, to the purge of a President of the Republic, Liu Shao-ch’i; fourth, to the revolt of Mao’s successor-designate, Lin Piao. The prevailing doctrine turns this succession of untoward incidents into a necessary law: the class struggle necessarily penetrates the party itself. An ominous monition is being repeated constantly—it was used at the Tenth Party Congress last year—“Follow Marxism and not revisionism; be united and do not split the ranks; walk along the great bright road and do not engage in conspiratory treachery.”⁴

Such a doctrine creates a feeling of insecurity and suspicion. The Tenth Party Congress quoted another saying of Mao: “Great disorder across the land leads to great order; every seven or eight years, therefore, monsters and demons will jump up spontaneously.”

China has truly had 25 turbulent years, and political rule has become ever more secretive. First the nonparty members were eliminated from the rule of the country. Then troubles started within the party itself, and these troubles have not ended. Consequently, the Tenth Party Congress was held in secret—very different from the Eighth Congress of 1956, which met with great publicity and in the presence of representatives of foreign Communist parties.

The inner-party strife has affected the whole social texture of the nation. The most grievously exposed are those in jobs related to ideology. A list

of jobs known to be “dangerous occupations” could be drawn up—teaching, writing, journalism, and the like.

Not least dangerous is the job of a Marxist theoretician. The official party history of Hu Ch’iao-mu has disappeared.⁵ The works of Feng Ting, the popularizer of Marxism whose books appeared in millions of copies before the Cultural Revolution, have been condemned, and the young who read them have had to confess that they had been infected by the “poison.”

Where are the supreme Marxist philosophers, the group of Marxist writers of the Yen-an days? The Cultural Revolution made a grand sweep of them. The only survivor, Ch’en Po-ta, who for over 30 years had been the official interpreter of the Thoughts of Mao, has since been swallowed up as the first visible victim of the purge of Lin Piao.

Novels and theatrical pieces that had been lauded on their first appearance—none were published without official approval—were blacklisted as soon as the political wind had changed. The Chinese Literature Department of Fudan University, Shanghai, produced a booklet explaining classic terms in colloquial language. This book was published in 1973. In 1974, the wind changed, and the authors had to confess their enormity: they had translated Confucian terms improperly. Confucius is of course at the center of attention today, and nothing good is being said about him. Those who years ago interpreted him as a good, “progressive” writer—an interpretation well accepted a decade ago—are now repenting their rashness.

Inner-party friction and the incessant “class struggle,” which means struggle against political adversaries, has roughened the whole style of life. Old polite forms of speech are no longer in use, and the exquisite manners of the past are frowned upon. The dehumanization of human relations reaches its peak in the famous doctrine, first pronounced in 1942 in Yen-an, that there is no human nature but only class nature. This doctrine was not invented by Mao; it is part of the Marxist heritage. In China it was rarely mentioned in the 1950’s. Since the Cultural Revolution—which changed the whole political tone in China—this anti-humanist aspect of Mao’s Thoughts has become a principal element of political doctrine. It is normal now for a man who has fallen

³ This document was published in *Jen-min Jih-pao*, April 5, 1956.—Ed.

⁴ For the official English-language versions of the principal published documents of the Tenth CCP Congress, see *Peking Review*, Sept. 7, 1973.—Ed.

⁵ This history was published in Peking in 1951 under the title, *Chung-kuo kung-ch’an-tang te san-shih-nien* (Thirty Years of the Communist Party of China). An official English-language version appeared in 1952.—Ed.

from power to be accused of having professed the wrong doctrine on human nature and defended "liberty, equality, fraternity." This happened to Liu Shao-ch'i, to Ch'en Po-ta, and to Lin Piao.

The anti-humanist doctrine has become a political institution, a means of cutting off from the political body of the nation those considered politically unreliable. They are called "landlords, kulaks, counter-revolutionaries, bad elements, and rightists." They are ejected from the political community and have to labor in the worst material conditions, in factories or in villages or in camps. Ever since the late 1950's, when foreign investigators began to write about forced labor in China, the Chinese press has avoided the term "forced labor," but it has had a great deal to say about the internal enemies, about the "five bad elements." Many evil things are being said nowadays about Lin Piao; one of the worst is that he intended to liberate the "five bad elements."

The same anti-humanist trend is manifest in the attacks now being made on Confucius. The attacks say that Confucius promoted education for all; that

he demanded uniform justice and kindness for all. Confucius apparently knew nothing about class struggle. But no, the condemnations of Confucius also say that the system he put forward, like every political system, defended one class to oppress another—a restatement of the old Leninist tenet about the state, the organ of the dictatorship of the proletariat.

This may seem to be a somber account of the political life of China. Some may be mesmerized by certain sayings of Mao's about "serving the people" and the "line of the masses" (though the "masses" excludes, even semantically, human individuals) and by the cordial reception China has been offering of late to foreign visitors. But a close look at political life, hard facts, and official statements shows a different picture.

It is quite true that the working-out of an imposed political doctrine need not totally or permanently affect a nation's life. How much and how deeply the experience of 25 years, a short period in Chinese history, has affected the nation, only time can tell.

The Economy—Same Path, New Pace

By Audrey Donnithorne

The year 1949 was certainly a dividing line in Chinese history. However, it may be debated whether it was as sharp a dividing line as sometimes claimed, whether by supporters or opponents of the Communist government which in that year was proclaimed in Peking. This brief study will probe the question in relation to some economic policies. It will also examine another type of continuity, the extent to which certain recurrent patterns and problems, which can be traced far back in Chinese history and tradition, are still emerging.

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In the mid-1930's, the modernization of the Chinese economy was proceeding apace, and the future seemed assured. Foreign observers remarked on the way that Chinese-owned concerns were becoming prominent in spheres previously controlled by foreign interests. The British Commercial Counsellor, early in 1937, wrote:

... that Chinese private interests can adapt themselves to modern economic needs is shown by the growth of a number of enterprises, such as Chinese insurance companies, the flour industry, the Chinese cotton industry, the electrical industry and many others . . .; the outstanding feature . . . is the increasing, justified confidence which the Chinese themselves as well as the world at large have in the future of this country, a confidence based on the

remarkable growth of stability achieved in recent years and the improved political, financial and economic conduct of affairs—government and private.¹

It may in fact have been this very air of hopefulness, the consciousness of the growing strength of China, that prompted the Japanese attack in July 1937 as a preemptive strike before China became any stronger.

Most of this growth in the consumer goods manufacturing industries took place in Shanghai, Tientsin, and other coastal cities. The development of North-east China—at that time known as Manchuria—into the country's major center of heavy industry occurred under the Japanese, who occupied that region in 1931. While their economic program was aimed primarily at making Manchuria a useful source of raw materials and an industrial base ancillary to Japan, it laid the foundation and set the direction for the great development that has taken place there since 1949. The three provinces of the Northeast (as they now are) were developed as one region and still retain that character—e.g., in their unified power grid. Much more than the other "great administrative regions" that were set up in China in the wake of the Communist victory in 1949 and that have disappeared and been reconstituted and disappeared again since, the Northeast is an operative supraprovincial region, bearing the imprint of its development by the Japanese.

Thus, the Communist drive to industrialize China was a continuation of an existing trend. This trend had been interrupted over much of China by the war, and in Manchuria by the Soviet despoliation. The new Communist government during the First Five-Year Plan period (1953-57) pushed forward the process of industrialization at a greater speed than before, but the difference was in the speed of development, not in its direction.

The economic nationalism evinced by the Communists was, again, nothing new, but a carrying out further and more effectively of tendencies stretching back for a century. From the 19th century onward, Chinese businesses had been growing important in lines at one time monopolized by foreigners. In many sectors, they were by 1937 showing

an increasing ability to compete successfully and, had the process continued undisturbed, might in the course of time have largely replaced the foreign concerns. As it was, political events hastened the process. These events, however, were primarily the Sino-Japanese war and its aftermath rather than the Communist victory.

The disappearance of foreign economic enterprise from China was substantially completed before 1949. The Sino-Japanese war, on which was superimposed the war between Japan and the Western allies, dealt an almost fatal blow to the greater part of the Western economic stake in the country, while Western victory in 1945 led to the confiscation of Japanese assets in China, including Manchuria. Between 1945 and 1949, the Nationalist government discriminated against foreign firms in matters such as import licenses and also banned foreign shipping from China's inland waterways and coastal services. By 1949, only a few remnants were left of a century's economic operations and investment by foreigners in China. These remnants were liquidated within a few years by the new regime, which thereafter maintained stringent limitations on foreign economic activities in the country. No foreign firms have been allowed to set up offices in China, make equity investments, or even, since the last Soviet loans (which ceased in 1956 and were repaid by the end of 1965),² give credit to China except by way of commercial loans. Here again, the Communists have gone further than any previous Chinese government, but along trends already established.

This was also the case in respect to the role of the state in the economy. The government of China has always taken a prominent part in the country's economic life, as has occurred in other "hydraulic societies."³ In the 19th century, the first modern industrial enterprises in Chinese hands were set up by the government, or at least under the auspices of officials. "Official supervision and merchant management" (*kuan-tu shang-pan*) was the approved formula, but much of the initiative and entrepreneurship came from the official side. The China Merchants' Steam Navigation Company, which began operations in 1873, was perhaps the foremost example of this type of mixed enterprise. After many

¹ United Kingdom, Department of Overseas Trade, *Report on Economic and Commercial Conditions in China: April 1935-March 1937*, by Sir Louis Beale, Commercial Counsellor in Shanghai, London, H.M.S.O., 1937, p. 3.

² Tsai Cheng, "Our Country Is Now a Socialist Country Without Internal or External Debts," in *Peking Review* (Peking), May 23, 1969, p. 16.

³ The concept of "hydraulic societies" was put forward by Karl A. Wittfogel in his *Oriental Despotism: A Comparative Study of Total Power*, New Haven, Conn., Yale University Press, 1957.



An electric power works on the waterfront of Shanghai, a major port city and center of light industry.

—Scheler/Stern via Black Star.

vicissitudes and varying degrees of government control, the CMSN Co. was reorganized in 1933 as a completely state-owned enterprise.

In many other sectors of the economy, including railways, civil aviation, banking, manufacturing industry, and trade, Chinese government-owned enterprises were important long before 1949. Even in agriculture, state initiative was to be found. In 1915, government tea plantations were opened in Anhwei. However, like so many of the attempts to modernize China's economy in the 19th and early 20th century, this venture collapsed because it depended on the drive and support of one man, in this case the then Minister of Agriculture.⁴ In the 1930's and especially after the outbreak of the Sino-Japanese war, official corporations were set up for internal and foreign trade. Then, on the defeat of Japan in 1945, it was the Chinese Nationalist government which became the legal owner of the confiscated Japanese assets, including the large heavy industry, mining, and railway developments in Manchuria as well as many light industrial undertakings in Shanghai and other east-coast cities.

⁴G. C. Allen and A. Donnithorne, *Western Enterprise in Far Eastern Economic Development: China and Japan*, London, Allen & Unwin, 1954, p. 57.

On the eve of the Communist victory in 1949, state-owned industry accounted for a substantial part of China's industrial output. It included all the petroleum and non-ferrous metal concerns, almost all the iron and steel undertakings, and most of the electricity-generating capacity. From this base, in the course of the next seven years, the new government went on to take over the remaining private businesses of any size and turn them into either state-owned or joint state-private enterprises.

In agriculture, the Communists made a much more radical break with the past than was the case with industry. In the early years, the elements of continuity were strong. Land reform had long been part of Kuomintang policy: "land to the tiller" was a slogan propounded by Sun Yat Sen. The early mutual-aid teams built on the foundation of traditional practices of mutual help among the peasants.

However, the formation of agricultural producer cooperatives and, even more, of communes represented much more of a new departure.⁵ The landlords and rich peasant classes have, at least to appearances, been swept away. How far appearances match fact is of course a matter of conjecture. Pos-

⁵ Some agricultural cooperatives had, of course, been formed prior to 1949 in areas already ruled by the Communists.

sibly it may be hazarded that while the landlords have gone, the rich peasants are more persistent. In some instances, indeed, the new cadre may be but an old kulak in another guise.

The commune, although officially a collective unit and not a state organ, can more realistically be regarded as the lowest level of state administration in the countryside. It represents a new development in that previously the apparatus of government scarcely penetrated below the *hsien* (county). In this direction, therefore, the creation of the communes represents a significant new step.

Allusion has already been made to the dependence on individuals that characterized many of the first Chinese modern economic undertakings. The difficulty in creating and perpetuating large impersonal organizations in economic life seriously hampered the country even as late as the Nationalist era. This was partly due to the Chinese preference for what has been described as "the *conscious particularization* of economic relationships, the attempt to develop a multiplicity of ties between individuals associated by economic transactions,"⁶ a manner of conduct which assists the smooth running of small concerns but hampers the establishment of large undertakings that must be impersonal. In the 1930's in China, this weakness was beginning to be overcome as the growth of banks and other sizable businesses witnessed. Outside China, the Overseas Chinese Banking Corporation, established in Singapore in 1932 through the amalgamation of three existing banks, grew into an efficient, influential body with widespread branches.

The process of attempting to reconcile the demands of large modern economic organizations on the one hand and instinctive Chinese ways of doing things on the other has certainly been carried much further since 1949, both on the mainland and also in Taiwan, in Hong Kong, and among the Overseas Chinese. It would be interesting to compare the different lines this development has taken in differing political and social circumstances. That it has run into difficulties in China can be seen from the constant complaints about bureaucracy and bureaucratic rigidity: there is an inevitable tendency to lean over too far in this direction when seeking to avoid the "conscious particularization" of economic relations which has been traditional.

⁶ See introduction to W. W. Willmott, Ed., *Economic Organization in Chinese Society*, Stanford, Calif., Stanford University Press, 1972, p. 5. [Willmott's italics.]

In the topics so far discussed—the drives toward economic modernity, especially industrialization, and toward economic nationalism, an increase in the role of the state and of state-owned enterprises, and the growth of large impersonal economic undertakings—the emphasis has been primarily on the continuities and discontinuities in developments that have been occurring in China over the last century or so. Two topics now to be discussed—first, the fiscal relations between the provinces and the central government since 1949 and, second, the procurement of grain for the needs of the state in the same period—are but the latest installments of stories running through many centuries of China's history.

In any huge country such as China, alternations between relative centralization and relative decentralization are likely to take place. In the economic sphere, a perennial problem has been the division of revenue between the central government and the provincial authorities. The absence of a clear assignment of revenues to each level of the state apparatus was responsible for much administrative weakness before the Nationalist Revolution of 1911. The Nationalist solution was to reserve customs duties and salt and commodity taxes for the central government and to hand over the land tax (predecessor of the present agricultural tax) to the provinces, but placing it back, as we have seen, in central hands in the course of the war. However, during much of the Nationalist period, because of internal and external warfare, collection of revenue often fell into chaos.

After 1949, the Communist government initially attempted an extreme centralization of finances but soon had to accede to what became a reverse movement. In 1956, an article in the journal *Ts'ai-cheng* complained that no clear dividing line had been drawn between central and local items of expenditure, thus leading to attempts to shift responsibility for payments between administrative levels.⁷ The administrative decentralization measures of 1957-58, preparatory to the Second Five-Year Plan period, took account of this criticism. Specific revenues, under three headings, were allotted to the provinces, with variations according to the wealth of the par-

⁷ See Ch'en Hsüeh, "Further Strengthen Local Responsibility for Financial Management," *Ts'ai-cheng* (Peking), No. 1, Oct. 5, 1956, p. 11.



Rice weights being tallied on an abacus by officials of a commune near Nanking after the 1965 harvest.

—Paolo Koch/Rapho Guillumette.

ticular province concerned.⁸ This may have proved administratively complicated, because in 1959 a more streamlined approach was adopted. A centrally-approved figure for a province's budgetary expenditure was to be compared with the sum the province was responsible for raising as revenue—and this was to be all the revenue from its area except for customs duties and the profits of enterprises under direct central control, both of which were to go to the central treasury. On the basis of this comparison between approved provincial revenue and expenditure, deficits would be met by subsidies from the center, while if a province was shown to be in surplus, a proportion of the surplus had to be transmitted to the center.

No regulations, as far as we know, have been published since 1959 on this subject. From the scraps of information on national financial matters, it is not possible to speak with precision or certainty about the present position. However, the system of financial transfers between the provinces and the center would seem still to be much as described.

The distinction between surplus and deficit provinces and the financial transfers arising from this

distinction long predate the Communist era. In some past periods—in the early years of this century, for example—not only did the richer provinces make financial transfers to the center, but there were also direct interprovincial transfers from richer to poorer provinces. As these transfers were however made on the orders of Peking, they were not essentially different from transfers by provinces to the center.

Under the Communist government, no reference has ever come to our attention of one province making a lateral revenue transfer directly to another. Instead, the surplus provinces are supposed to make their transfers vertically to the center, which then, in turn, subsidizes the deficit provinces. If the system is ever short-circuited by lateral transfers (e.g., between provinces in the same military region), no mention is made of such transactions.

The central government of China has from ancient times sought to procure regular supplies of grain for its use. The original needs to be met by such grain supplies were to feed the court and its retainers as well as the army, and to accumulate reserves under central control. The lower levels of the state, likewise, needed to secure grain for local purposes. Originally the grain had been obtained by levying the land tax in kind. This practice largely, but not entirely, lapsed in the 15th century, when land tax came to be commuted to cash. Certain payments of grain tribute, however, continued.

In 1941, spurred by the wartime inflation, the Kuomintang government revived the practice of levying land tax in kind. The Communists continued this practice, although regulations issued in 1956 permitted cash payments in certain circumstances.⁹ Such a commutation to cash may be widespread. At least, a production brigade cadre told the author in 1973 that his unit had paid agricultural tax in cash since 1956, and he thought this practice was common.

The great change that has come about in relation to grain procurement is that now the responsibilities of the state, at all levels of administration, for supplying grain have greatly increased. The state has in fact a virtual monopoly of the task of supplying grain both to the towns and to non-grain-producing rural inhabitants. Hence, the proportion of the country's grain it needs to procure has risen greatly and (at a rough estimate) may now be around 25-30 percent of China's total grain output; in addi-

⁸ On the subject of fiscal relations between the central government and the provinces, see A. Donnithorne, *China's Economic System*, New York, Praeger, 1967, pp. 393-400.

⁹ See *ibid.* Chap. 13, for details and sources on state procurement of grain.

tion there are imports of grain currently amounting to more than 6 million tons a year. In order to obtain such a large proportion of the grain crop, the government supplements tax levies by compulsory sales to the state at prices set by the state. Free market sales of grain have been forbidden or strictly limited.

In seeking to determine the links which keep the vast land of China together, recourse may still be had to Chi Ch'ao-ting's concept of the "key economic area" that he employed to discuss the China of Ch'in Shih Huang Ti (221-210 BC), which "was not bound together by economic ties like those in a modern state, but was held together by military and bureaucratic domination through the instrumentality of the control of the Key Economic Area."¹⁰ While Chi contrasts this with a modern state, in

¹⁰ Chi Ch'ao-ting, *Key Economic Areas in Chinese History*, 2nd ed., Clifton, N.J., Augustus M. Kelley, 1969, pp. xii-xlii.

China much of the ancient political characteristics survive. At the present day, Shanghai, the Northeast, and Kwangtung may be considered the key economic area. Shanghai's importance lies in its being the country's largest industrial center and the source of a considerable proportion of China's total exports and in the fact that revenue transfers from Shanghai form the biggest single contribution to the central government's coffers. The Northeast is the greatest center of heavy industry in China and contains the Taching oilfield, source of probably more than half the country's oil. Kwangtung's significance consists in its foreign exchange earnings from trade with Hong Kong and in its links with the outside world. Chou En-lai's skill has so far kept these three areas, especially Shanghai and the Northeastern provinces, closely enough linked with Peking for the central government to be able to draw on their resources. While admiring the ability with which the age-old drama of Peking and the provinces is currently being enacted, we can realize that, whatever else may change in China, this play will go on.

Continuities in Change

By Krishna P. Gupta

On the ground of conventional social science, the problem of continuity and change in China is a game that one can play from either side.

From the side of continuity, one can establish identities: between imperial absolutism and Communist state control, between Han chauvinism and Communist China's forced assimilation of minorities, between Confucian meritocracy and Maoist achievement orientation, between traditional Sinocentrism and Peking's current struggle against "barbarian" superpowers. In establishing these identities, one

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can easily ignore intracultural variations, evolutionary growth, the impact of the West, and the consequences of China's explicit acceptance of Marxism-Leninism.

From the side of change, one can demonstrate a series of transformations: from Confucian harmony to Marxist class struggle, from mandarin elitism to Mao's mass line, from filial piety to youthful rebellion, from clan parochialism to party loyalty. In establishing this switchover, one can conveniently assume that internal beliefs can faithfully be deduced from external protestations, and institutional reality from normative texts.

In between, one can play safe by suggesting that Mao is recreating, selectively utilizing, or manipulating components of tradition to modernize his society, and that modern China is part Confucian, part Communist. Such a suggestion can be made—in fact, it

has been made quite often—without establishing any logical criteria for systemic transmutation, adaptation, or rejection of tradition.

In each of these frameworks, China is implicitly conceived as a congeries of beliefs and behavior patterns from which one can choose dominant or secondary value-orientations, or aspects of "Great" or "Little" traditions, to use or abuse at will. Such an *ad hoc* and segmental approach, however, seriously obscures the conceptualization of China as an integrated, *total*, evolutionary social-political system. Without establishing this totality, one cannot really deal with the problem of continuity and change.

Once this totality is established, a conventional sector-by-sector analysis of persistence and transformation becomes meaningless, because the problem of determining continuity and change then becomes one of defining relevant levels of generalization for each and every sector. At the highest level of abstraction, nothing would seem to have changed in China in the last three thousand years. At the lowest level of concretization, even the first and second decades of the last 25 years would appear vastly different. Between these two levels, one can chart the entire course of evolution for each historical stage.

For the present Communist phase, an adequate framework to assess continuity and change would require analysis at the following levels, listed in ascending order of specificity: (a) an abstraction of the Chinese system, delinked from the Confucian ideology and imperial state; (b) historically institutionalized patterns of change, with special emphasis on developments prior to the impact of the West; (c) the nature of the Western impact and the attendant change within tradition; (d) the process of accepting Marxist-Leninist categories, with attention to aspects of internalization, selective emphases, and tension areas.

Mao's modern China is to be visualized at all these levels simultaneously. At level "a" nothing has changed. At levels "b" and "c" changes have been incremental. At level "d" everything has changed. In what follows, I have chosen certain key themes to illustrate briefly the interpenetration of these levels during the last 25 years.

In this framework, level "a" is broadly ahistorical and can be described only in terms of highest-order, culturally immanent thought categories. Such a description can be meaningful only in a cross-cul-

tural context: the Chineseness of the Chinese system can be abstracted only in comparison with non-Chinese systems. As an illustration, one can take the Western, Indian, and Chinese cultures and contrast their variable modes of perceiving and analyzing reality. In the Western culture, reality is *split* between the sacred and secular spheres, and the crucial tension has been between subservience and autonomy. In the Indian culture, reality is *hierarchized* into higher and lower forms, and the crucial tension has been between divine self-realization and human, ritual propriety. In the Chinese case, reality is *ordered* between "inner" and "outer" realms, and the crucial tension has been between personal cultivation and institutional reform. The central problem in each culture has thus been historically unique, leading to radically different evolutionary patterns.

Proceeding from the dichotomy of inner and outer realms, the Chinese have evolved an ideal of horizontal unity: between matter and principle, between essence and function, between virtue and vocation. At the apex, the ruler combines sagemess with kingliness; at the intermediate level, the elites combine morality with statecraft; at the lower levels, the masses combine ideological conformity with efficient role performance. There is no ethic of individual goal attainment as such; the self becomes meaningful only in the context of virtues displayed in one's relations with others. Such an ideal fosters very distinct conceptions of political authority and social interaction. While the former becomes primarily a trust for the welfare of people, the latter gains relevance mainly in terms of reciprocal obligations. Any failure, accordingly, is invariably interpreted as a function of personal deficiency, not of structural shortcomings. Appropriate changes are supposed to occur only when men's minds are changed.

This model is faithfully duplicated in modern China. Mao combines in his person images of sublime saint and ruthless strategist; his cadres are supposed to be both red and expert, his masses both fighters against revisionism and agents of production. At each level, there is an emphasis on denying personal gain. Privileges are supposed to be exercised only in serving society. People are expected to help each other through voluntary renunciation of personal wealth and power. All deviations from this norm are attributed to defective types of mentality such as individualism, subjectivism, sectarianism, departmentalism, or "mountaintopism." Even capitalism is attacked less as a mode of production than as an evil instinct. In order to change men and



An early 20th-century photo of the traditional examination booths in which scholars trained in Confucian virtues were tested for admission into the administrative bureaucracy of imperial China.

—Photoreporters.

institutions, there is constant exhortation to imbibe Mao's ethic of sacrifice and commitment. External material circumstances, notwithstanding China's professed Marxism-Leninism, play only a secondary role in diagnosing and resolving crisis situations. The watchword is "revolution in the superstructure."

This model, however, is essentially a theoretical ideal-type. At level "b," the model can be further articulated in terms of its actual institutionalization in China. At this level, Mao's communism involves a continuation of certain historic trends which first crystallized as early as the Western Han dynasty (202 B.C.—9 A.D.). This development was neither isomorphic with textual Confucianism, nor was it ever significantly influenced by alien ideas such as Buddhism, or by alien rulers like the Mongols and Manchus. In its totality, it revealed a complex function-and-situation-specific adaptation of Confucian moralistics, Legalist authoritarianism, and Taoist esthetics and anarchism.¹

This adaptation produced a culturally unique pattern of systemic deviance and reformist protest. Throughout China's history, rulers, elites, and masses have tended to deviate from the idealized norm in a very specific direction, and this deviance has gen-

erated very specific types of protest. The deviance of the rulers took the form of willful distortion of the sage-king equation. To create an image of virtuous reign, they invariably tried to vilify the previous dynasty, promote their own cult, and spread an illusion of consensual rule. In this process, they went on strengthening their unilateral control over the masses—by the massive use of indoctrinational education, by organizing people into mutual-supervision and collective-responsibility groups, by systematic spying on officials, by meting out exemplary rewards and punishments, and by transferring government functions from the cabinet to the inner court. The deviance of the elites took the form of institutionalized misuse of their privileged positions. Instead of service to society, self-seeking corruption, bureaucratism, and scholasticism became their standard rules of behavior. Finally, the deviance of

¹ China's own historians have posited Confucianism and Legalism as two antithetical systems. However, in actual practice, while Confucianism generally provided the inner ideal of social harmony with its detailed rules of propriety, Legalism provided the outer framework of statecraft with its own code of rewards and punishments. In between, Taoism expressed itself either through China's artistic sensibilities or in the nonconformist visions of Chinese rebels. Together, these subsystems constituted an integrated whole; they never acted as exclusive or parallel "philosophies" (much less "religions") in the narrow Western sense.

the masses manifested itself in a fatalistic acceptance of this tyranny. Although theoretically guarantors of the emperor's mandate to rule, they generally served their superiors with almost uncritical obedience.

Occasionally, protests against such deviance occurred from within. And here again, the pattern was quite fixed. Reformist rulers adopted a variety of measures to protect the people: measures to purify the bureaucracy by linking status and achievement, to vocationalize education by including technical subjects in the civil service examinations, to reform the economy by creating state monopolies and redistributing land. The reformist elites sought to translate their "knowledge" into "action" to rectify imperial absolutism and administrative mismanagement. The reformist masses protested against an insensitive establishment, often nurturing in this process a mystique of military exploits, peasant rebellions, and utopian reconstruction.

Both these patterns of protest and deviance have been recreated in modern China. Mao's very coming to power has all the ingredients of a protest scenario: the loss by the Kuomintang of its mandate to rule, the military exploits of a man of peasant origins, rebellion by the masses, and the victory of a just cause. Mao's actual socialist program—from the elimination of landlords and capitalists to the creation of agricultural cooperatives and communes, the linking of theory and practice in education, and the making of a responsive bureaucracy—has also been part of the main reformist trend of China's evolutionary development. Similarly, his communism has only extended the orthogenetic processes of China's systemic deviance. The accent is still on orthodoxy, although the substantive content of the orthodoxy has been completely altered. To perpetuate it, all the time-tested techniques—indoctrination through education, mutual surveillance, criticism and self-criticism, publicization of model heroes—are extensively utilized. Even what used to be extrasystemic rebellion is harnessed today to propagate intrasystemic Maoist values. Together with this,

modern China's officials and masses have also reasserted their age-old deviant behavior patterns. Mao's cadres, despite all the thought-cleansing campaigns, are still frequently blamed for being arrogant, bureaucratic, and corrupt. Mao's so-called politicized masses have likewise displayed a remarkable degree of conventional fatalism in uncritically accepting the regime's fluctuating targets of love and hate.

In all these spheres, changes in China have been orthogenetically cumulative. At level "c" one can indicate areas where changes have been heterogenetically cumulative. The crucial variable at this level would be China's encounter with the West. The precise significance of this encounter does not lie in the so-called Western impact. Sociologically, the "modernizing" role of the Christian missions and treaty ports, or even of Westernizers who advocated individualism and liberalism for China, is not at all relevant. The more important changes were produced not through the impact and presumed internalization of such alien ideas but in the process of reacting to these ideas through a fixed cultural prism. This reaction was inevitable, necessary, and fatal, and Mao's China is still suffering from its consequences.

The first consequence of this reaction was a forced rearticulation of the traditional world view to accommodate the new un-Confucian universe. Confronted with hostile Western superiority, China's elites were driven to conclude that the world was made up of a weak but virtuous China and powerful but barbarian Western nations; that the only way to restore order was to make these barbarians fight one another; that this could be done only by resorting to temporary peace and friendship but actually planning for war and defense. With minor variations, this analysis was shared by leading intellectuals—such as Wei Yuan, Hsu Chi-yu, and Feng Kuei-fen²—of 19th-century China. Mao's current paranoid distrust of superpowers, his delusions of China's innocence and purity, his constant attempt to exacerbate Soviet-American contradictions, and his global united-front tactics are all derived from this world view.

The second consequence of China's encounter with the West was an uneasy translation of the intracultural tension between personal cultivation and institutional reform into a tension between the Chinese and the Western. This created, first, a split be-

² Wei Yuan (1794-1856) was the most important historian of mid-19th-century China, known for his compilation of China's first "Illustrated Gazetteer of the Maritime Countries." Hsu Chi-yu (1795-1873), an eminent "specialist on the barbarian problems," was author of "A Brief Description of the Ocean Circuit."

Feng Kuei-fen (1809-1874) was the famous scholar-official who pioneered in advocating "self-strengthening" for China by combining Chinese essence with Western practical science. Together, these individuals were leading representative-types of China's pre-modern intellectual response to the West.

tween the traditionalists and eclectics. When eclecticism was absorbed by the traditionalists, this split was reformulated—most forcefully during the “Hundred Days” of 1898³—between the conservatives and reformers *within* Confucianism. When the conservatives themselves became reformers in the first decade of the 20th century, this conflict in turn evolved into a new split between constitutionalists and revolutionaries—a split which subsequently carried over into the contradictory orientations of the Kuomintang and the Chinese Communist Party. After the Communists gained power in 1949, it assumed still another form in the intraparty struggle between the bourgeoisism of Liu Shao-ch’i and Lin Piao and Mao’s proletarianism. In all these contrived reincarnations, something of the original tension survived each time, but it progressively took on the appearance of a superficial Chinese-Western dichotomy. This superficiality is most forcefully exposed in the current anti-Confucian campaign in China. Outwardly, it is a struggle between Confucian restorationists and Marxist revolutionaries; inwardly, it once again resurrects the conventional dilemma between personal cultivation and institutional reform.

The third consequence of the encounter with the West was an ultranationalistic reevaluation of China’s tradition to meet the Western ideological challenge on *Western* terms. This led first to a defensive reinterpretation of Confucianism, but later to its gradual abandonment when defense no longer seemed necessary. The crucial figures in this transition were the late-19th-century reformer K’ang Yu-wei, Sun Yat-sen, and Mao. K’ang transformed a past-oriented cyclical tradition into a future-oriented linear philosophy of progress. His utopia visualized one-world government, full equality between the sexes and generations, and complete public ownership of agriculture, industry, and commerce. This projection, however, still remained within the confines of Confucianism. With Sun, the father of the Kuomintang, these confines were broken and expanded to borrow selectively from the external socialist *and* capitalist experiences. His three principles of nationalism, de-

³ The “Hundred Days” (June 11 to September 21, 1898) have become famous in China’s history for the sweeping reforms introduced in this period in nearly every sphere of Chinese life: education, industry, agriculture, the army, and communications. While the earlier proponents of such reforms had often based their appeals on adapting *Western* techniques for self-strengthening, the reformers in this period for the first time sought to justify this massive modernization in the name of Confucius himself. Their conservative critics, however, lost no time in exposing this “hypocrisy.”

mocracy, and people’s livelihood retained the spirit of tradition but repudiated its form. Mao represented the next step in this repudiation. Although still favoring critical inheritance of China’s cultural legacy, he unabashedly accepted a completely alien source for legitimizing changes within tradition. It is apparently from this alien source that China is currently deriving its concepts of linear progress, emancipation of peasants, women, and youth, and formation of cooperatives and communes. In effect, none of this is radically different from K’ang’s thoroughly traditional solution. But the vocabulary has completely changed.

This brings us to level “d,” where sharp discontinuities have already occurred between China’s past and present. It was perhaps inevitable. Vocabulary cannot be dissociated ultimately from its contextual ethos. Once Mao and his protagonists ac-



China’s new mandarins, members of the party and government cadres. Since 1966, such cadres have been subjected to periodic retraining and exposure to manual labor at “May 7 Cadre Schools” like this one in Shanghai.

—Vincent Mentzel/Nancy Palmer.

People's China: Continuities in Change

cepted a new vocabulary, they were inevitably led to accept a whole new frame of reference. At this point, one can analyze the role of Marxism-Leninism in China.

This role cannot be satisfactorily analyzed in terms of China's presumed creation of a brand new socialist society. Notwithstanding Maoist propaganda, China is still not a socialist utopia. The Chinese economy still displays yawning wage differentials; there is still acute status consciousness in all spheres of social interaction; women are still looked down upon by their male comrades; villagers still believe in gods and ghosts; cases of theft, graft, nepotism, rape, and blackmarketing still persist. Yet, what denotes a distinct break from the past is China's avowed commitment to apply Marxism-Leninism in solving these problems. It is not important to find out whether this commitment signifies a disintegration or an enrichment of orthodox Marxism-Leninism. In either case, there are areas where the orientation of this commitment seems decidedly anti-traditional and pro-Marxist-Leninist.

Two of these areas are particularly relevant for understanding developments in China during the last 25 years. One is Mao's acceptance of the centrality of class contradictions; the other is his belief in the dictatorship of the proletariat. Both these ideas, despite their specific adaptation to the Chinese context, have violently militated against China's tradition of harmony and elitism; both have been uppermost in Mao's revolutionary vision of transforming China; both have so far persisted despite repeated setbacks in the actual process of institutionalization.

The first idea has led to the projection of antagonistic conflicts into the interpretation of China's past and present. History is rewritten to depict continuous warfare between the gentry and peasantry. Modern Chinese society is also diagnosed in terms of a life-and-death struggle between bourgeoisie and proletariat. Any idea of class conciliation has become totally suspect, often leading to bizarre ideological rectification campaigns. In 1951, an immensely popular movie, "The Life of Wu Hsun," was fiercely criticized because it sought to glorify a nonproletarian beggar by showing that he saved all his money to educate poor children. In 1965, Wu Han's famous play, "The Dismissal of Hai Jui," was attacked because it portrayed an official who, contrary to his class nature, returned previously confiscated land to peasants. Early this year, an opera, "Three Visits to Taofeng," was widely condemned because it indirectly preached forgiveness by telling of a produc-

tion brigade that apologized for having dishonestly sold a sick horse. Such examples can be easily multiplied. Often these attacks have been euphemistic—attacking abstract ideas in order to attack concrete personalities—but they still show Mao's persistent efforts to upgrade conflict as an irrevocable mechanism for all self-understanding and social change in China.

The second idea, setting up a dictatorship of the proletariat, has been pursued with similar tenacity. Mao's concept of the "proletariat" and "proletarianism" embraces two components: a *class* of workers, peasants, and soldiers; and an *ideology* of sacrifice and commitment. In the former sense, proletarians as a class have been given ascendant status—by a bias which favors them in admissions to higher education and in appointments; by economic planning which gives them opportunity for joint ownership and management; by a revolutionary art and literature which places them in the forefront of esthetic expression. In the latter sense, proletarianism as an ideology has been turned into a generic virtue which everybody should assimilate—officials and bureaucrats should "go down" to perform periodic manual labor; students should voluntarily rusticate themselves to settle in the countryside; workers should refuse material incentives; peasants should deemphasize private plots and sideline production. In none of this has China really succeeded, but it has managed to keep the ideal alive. The struggle is still going on.

It is difficult to say how this struggle will develop in the future. All the available evidence suggests that Mao's Marxism, like Buddhism once before, has failed in institutionalizing its blatantly unorthodox features. But, again like Buddhism, it has succeeded in providing a transitional focus for meeting a crisis situation. Once this crisis is over, China is likely to return to its pre-Marxist evolutionary pattern. Two events already provide an indication of this drift: the Sino-Soviet dispute and the current anti-Confucian campaign. The first has moved China away from imitating an alien Marxist model: the Chinese are no longer duplicating Soviet ideas and institutions in their society. The second has brought China nearer to the traditional categories of discourse: the Chinese are once again talking in terms reminiscent of the struggles between Confucianists and Legalists. In essence, this implies neither a denial of Marxism nor an affirmation of tradition. But it does indicate that even as China moves away from the Confucian tradition, it is moving away from Marxism as well.

Sino-Soviet Rivalry in Southeast Asia

By Dick Wilson

Students of Chinese literature are probably familiar with the great novel *Romance of the Three Kingdoms*, set in the 3rd century A.D., when a trilateral competition for predominance in the vast Chinese Empire set the ground rules for what nowadays would be called a tripolar political system. Interestingly enough, a leading Chinese-language newspaper in Southeast Asia, the *Nanyang Siang Pau* of Malaysia and Singapore, has been describing the current phase of three-cornered rivalry between the United States, the Soviet Union, and China in the Southeast Asian region as a "new *Romance of the Three Kingdoms* era."¹ One rule of the game that remains valid, the newspaper asserts, is that whichever two of the three rivals should first begin to fight each other "would automatically weaken both their positions *vis-à-vis* the third, which would reap all the benefit from their struggle." No one power, therefore, can entertain the ambition to "unify" the region under its own aegis; all that the three can aspire to is to maintain the balance among themselves and allow Southeast Asia to be a buffer zone in which no one is predominant.

This description still applies basically to the present state of international rivalry in Southeast Asia, but the general curtailment of US commitments in Asia has tended to sharpen competition between the other two members of the triangle. Before the Sino-US détente was set in motion in 1971, the superiority of American over either Russian or Chinese power in Southeast Asia assured Moscow of US help in keeping China out. Since the Nixon-Chou communiqué of February 1972, how-

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ever, the Kremlin has felt obliged—as evidenced by Soviet Deputy Foreign Minister Nikolai Firubin's tour of the area in early 1974—to step up its efforts to win friends and influence in Southeast Asia in order to make it as difficult as possible for the Chinese to take advantage of the lifting of US containment or to mend their fences with the Southeast Asian countries after the setbacks caused by Peking's Cultural Revolution diplomacy. Both Peking and Moscow now issue strident charge-sheets accusing each other of bullying, cheating, and sabotaging Southeast Asia. Still, their respective actions, as distinct from their harsh words, are not those of all-out antagonists each of whom seeks wholly to exclude the other from the region. Both sides evidently appreciate that there is room for both, that neither can be excluded, and—though this may be considered more controversial—that in the long run China has the better chance of establishing a superior margin of influence in the area; so the clash is one of pinpricks rather than death blows. This article will explore the current dimensions of the rivalry, the factors that favor the one or the other power in waging it, and its likely shape in the future.

New Opportunities

At the outset, it should be noted that détente with the United States has created new and welcome openings in the region for both Moscow and Peking. Before 1970 or so, the pro-Western Southeast Asian governments were infinitely more suspicious of détente than any of their Western "allies." Yet President Ferdinand E. Marcos of the Philippines indicated recently that he was undertaking an "opening to the East" in foreign policy, although he declared

¹ See, e.g., issue of Oct. 19, 1970.

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that this in no way diminished his intent to suppress Communist insurgency at home. "It is crucial to the survival of the republic that this threat be dealt with fully," he stated, but he went on to say: "Our posture abroad is necessarily different. Were it demonstrated that some of these countries were helping the dissidents' cause, there can be no question of relations. But this is not generally so."² The result of this policy shift has been an influx of eager Polish, Russian, and Chinese sportsmen, traders, and diplomats into the hitherto out-of-bounds Philippines.

Malaysia has moved further in the same direction. Having already lived for some time with a Soviet diplomatic presence, Prime Minister Tun Abdul Razak has now beaten the well-trodden path to the Forbidden City of Peking and become the first post-détente Southeast Asian prime minister to institute diplomatic relations with the People's Republic. This followed about two and a half years of negotiations with Peking based on premises worthy of a Gaullist or Kennedian diplomacy. Razak's sophisticated explanation of these premises to his Commonwealth colleagues at the end of 1971 is worth examining in some detail. Recognizing that China, having long been excluded from the mainstream of international affairs, was unwilling to accept the existing international order and seeking to upset it, he noted that China's immediate neighbors in Southeast Asia were the first to feel the impact of these policies, and that a constant barrage of radio broadcasts from China, under the name of *Suara Revolusi Malaya* or Voice of Malayan Revolution, was not only making virulent propaganda attacks on the Malaysian government but also disseminating detailed instructions to subversive elements within the country. Such Chinese interference in Malaysia's internal affairs would not be tolerated, Razak declared, and Malaysia had the right "to call on the assistance of anyone wishing to assist us." But for its part, he emphasized,

Malaysia accepts the fact that China has a right to play her part in international forums and to have an interest in the affairs of Asia. Our support for China's membership to the United Nations and, in particular, our proposal for the neutralization of Southeast Asia are clear manifestations of this belief. . . .

. . . we wait to see China's response, whether she for her part recognizes and respects our independence and integrity and our legitimate interests in Southeast Asia. . . .

² *Bangkok Post*, Oct. 22, 1973.

Of course, the accumulation of years of bitterness, frustrations, and fear cannot be overcome overnight. We will require much patience. We will need to move step by step, feeling our way carefully in a matter which, so far as the countries of Southeast Asia are concerned, involves our very survival.³

Prime Minister Razak's statement has been quoted at some length because it destroys the myth that the Southeast Asian countries are conglomerations of inarticulate backwoodsmen incapable of determining their own interests beyond the immediate short term. Many of the region's governments are, in fact, quite sophisticated enough to be capable of playing off Moscow against Peking (and either against Washington), as the two rival Communist powers are now discovering.

Thus, there have been indications of a realization on the part of Southeast Asian leaders that a Soviet presence in the area may be a useful counterweight to a possible Chinese attempt to gain regional predominance. Again, this view has been best expressed by a Malaysian government minister, Ghazali bin Shafie, who is Razak's chief international troubleshooter. Of the four big powers active in Southeast Asia, he told a Singapore conference at the end of 1973, "perhaps the Soviet Union is the one that appears to be moving . . . with a design and a purpose." Shafie then went on to say:

It would seem that any Soviet initiative that is designed or even only such as to appear to further the Soviet cause in the Sino-Soviet dispute is not likely to gain the support of countries in the region. This factor is unfortunate because the Soviet Union has much to contribute to the development of the region.⁴

The Soviet Response

Soviet efforts to capitalize on the shift in Southeast Asian attitudes have been steady if unspectacular. A Soviet parliamentary delegation toured Malaysia in March 1974, going to Kota Bharu as well as Kuala Lumpur. Its success can be gauged by the fact that the Peking-backed Voice of Malayan Revolution violently denounced the delegation's leader for allegedly having declared that "the reac-

³ *The Straits Times* (Kuala Lumpur), Jan. 16, 1971.

⁴ *Malaysian Digest* (Kuala Lumpur), Oct. 31, 1973, p. 10.



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tionary system adopted by the Razak clique was correct" and that "Soviet revisionism and the Razak clique held identical views on issues of peace, freedom, and independence."⁵ The Russians also made a big hit with Philippine President Marcos by welcoming his First Lady to Moscow after Peking had rebuffed her approaches for a similar visit to the People's Republic. Even Indonesian President Suharto's icy hostility toward the Communist powers was broken, if not entirely melted, by Firyubin's visit early this year, which marked the highest-level meeting between representatives of the two governments since the abortive Communist coup in mid-1965. Firyubin obligingly submitted to a lecture about the evils of naval expansion in the Indian Ocean and expressed Moscow's "respect" for Indonesian's claims to a 12-mile offshore territorial limit and application of the "archipelago principle"⁶—a principle also strenuously advocated by the Philippines. Predictably, however, Firyubin failed to win Suharto's backing for the Asian collective security system that the Kremlin has been pressing as a solution to the region's defense problems. "We do not want to reject the idea," Indonesian Foreign Minister Adam Malik said afterwards, "but it is still not clear to us."⁷

The only Soviet shot which has misfired dramatically was the curious attempt to build a grandiose monument in Penang to commemorate the Russian sailors drowned when the Imperial cruiser *Zhemchug* was sunk in the harbor by the Germans in 1914. In September 1973, a Soviet cargo ship unloaded 12 tons of Polish granite under the supervision of the Soviet military attaché stationed in Malaysia, Colonel Nikolai Belousov, who casually explained to the surprised citizens of Penang that the simple headstone to the sailors in the city's Western Road Cemetery would now be replaced by a tasteful replica of the *Zhemchug*. Local observers indignantly noted that the French, who had also had a ship sunk by the same German raider, had quietly flown the remains of their sailors home some years ago, and the Malaysian government proceeded to "stonewall" the Soviet diplomacy of gravestones.⁸

⁵ British Broadcasting Company, *Summary of World Broadcasts, Far East* (henceforth BBC, SWB/FE), 4573/A2/1-2, April 10, 1974.

⁶ The "archipelago principle," which has not yet gained the approval of the now recessed UN Law of the Sea Conference in Caracas, would entitle archipelagic nations to measure their territorial waters from a baseline joining their islands instead of merely from each island's separate coastline.

⁷ *The Straits Times* (Kuala Lumpur), March 8 and 11, 1974.

⁸ See *Daily Telegraph* (London), Dec. 27, 1973.



Madame Imelda Marcos, wife of Philippine President Ferdinand E. Marcos, talks with Soviet Foreign Minister Andrei A. Gromyko during her March 1972 visit to Moscow.

—V. Kunov/TASS via Sovfoto.

In the economic field also, the Russians have taken advantage of the atmosphere of détente. Trade agreements were signed with Thailand in 1970 and with Indonesia in 1974. A Soviet mission to Manila in September 1973 proposed a trade pact, though without immediate result. Another Soviet delegation that visited the Philippines in March 1974 was received in audience by President Marcos and engaged in discussions concerning plans for a joint shipping line. Soviet shipping has already been actively utilizing port facilities at Singapore for many years, with approximately 600 Russian ships entering the harbor each year and a dozen or more undertaking repairs at the Keppel shipyard there.

In the sphere of aid, Malaysia appears to be a major target of Soviet attention. It is the site of the newest Soviet aid project in Southeast Asia outside of Indochina: the Tembeling hydroelectric station in Pahang state, for which surveying began last year. One of the Russian experts acting as an adviser on this project is Anatoli Erofeev, a "graduate" of the Aswan High Dam project in Egypt. At the end of 1973, another Russian was hired by the Malaysian shipping firm Syarikat Angkatan Laut (owned by ethnic Malays rather than Chinese Malaysians) to serve as its chief consultant. *Pravda* commented at the time that Malaysian-Soviet relations were "entering a new stage characterized by more extensive

cooperation."⁹ The Russians currently buy about a quarter of Malaysia's rubber output, and the Polish, Hungarian, and Bulgarian governments broached various joint ventures with Malaysia during 1973.

On the other side of the ledger, Moscow has as yet made no headway toward reviving its pre-1965 aid projects in Indonesia, although some Russian technicians have been readmitted to the country since 1971.¹⁰ (Soviet and East European investments in civilian and military assistance to Indonesia prior to the 1965 attempted Communist coup aggregated about \$1.5 billion—an outlay largely wasted.)

Peking's Response

Meanwhile, China has been equally active in moving to take advantage of the increased disposition of her Southeast Asian neighbors to better their relations with Peking in the wake of Sino-US détente. The significance of the 1972 Nixon-Chou communiqué was quickly grasped by Southeast Asian leaders. "China and the United States," said Indonesian Foreign Minister Malik, "will continue to have special interests in Southeast Asia. Despite their recent declaration [about noninvolvement in the region], we cannot expect them to forget these [interests] altogether, but we can hope that their activities in this area will be limited. We hope China will reduce her support for national liberation movements."¹¹

Malaysia has been in the forefront of the Southeast Asian nations with which Peking has sought improved relations. Following upon Prime Minister Razak's announcement of a new posture of conciliation toward China in late 1971, the PRC joined with Malaysia in initiating a series of reciprocal visits by Chinese and Malaysian sports teams, medical experts, traders, and others which eventually culminated earlier this year in the formal establishment of diplomatic relations between the two governments. The PRC also appeared to be moving in the same direction vis-à-vis the Philippines as Peking played host in early 1972 to President Marcos' brother-in-law, Governor Benjamin Romualdes, and Senator Salvador Laurel—and has belatedly (just before this article went to press) invited Madame Imelda Marcos to the Chinese capital.

Since the Nixon visit, the Chinese have likewise

displayed a friendlier attitude toward Thailand, welcoming a succession of high-level Thai emissaries to Peking. These moves began with a visit by a police general and the Deputy Director of Economic Affairs, who attached themselves to a Thai table-tennis team invited to tour the PRC, and culminated in visits to Peking earlier this year by Thailand's Deputy Foreign Minister Chartichai Choonhavan and Defense Minister Marshal Dawee Chullasap. The Deputy Foreign Minister's mission—which was an official one, without any sporting cover—was reportedly for the purpose of negotiating a deal with the PRC for the supply of Chinese petroleum products to Thailand at favorable prices—a prize which Peking has also dangled before other Southeast Asian governments.¹²

Chinese trade initiatives in Southeast Asia, it should be noted, have often seemed intended to further political rather than economic objectives. China has all along been trading overtly with Malaysia, Singapore, Burma, and Indochina, and even though her trade with the other Southeast Asian countries has been subject to restrictions, these restrictions have been evaded by Hong Kong and Singapore merchants acting as middlemen. Hence, Peking's offers of official commercial relations appeared to have relatively minor economic importance and to be aimed more at paving the way for full political relations. This was readily apparent from a statement made by Chou En-lai to a visiting trade delegation from the Philippines in 1973 that "trade relations between the two countries can be immediately expanded and further developed into diplomatic relations in the near future."¹³ Peking has followed up this move during the current year by sending Wang Ting-yao, Chairman of the China Council for the Promotion of International Trade to Manila to conduct further talks.

In seeking to expand their official trade relationships in Southeast Asia, the Chinese have apparently benefited from a reputation for fair play and for being more aboveboard than Western capitalist corporations. At the height of the euphoria among Southeast Asian Chinese over the Nixon visit to Peking, Michael Chen, Executive Secretary of the ruling Alliance Party of Malaysia and certainly no Communist, told a gathering of the Selangor Laundry Association that the Chinese, unlike the Ameri-

⁹ Quoted in *The Straits Times* (Kuala Lumpur), Sept. 7, 1973.

¹⁰ *The New York Times*, March 21, 1973.

¹¹ *The Straits Times* (Singapore), May 20, 1972.

¹² *Asia Research Bulletin* (Singapore), Vol. 3, No. 8, Jan. 31, 1974, p. 2404.

¹³ *The Japan Times* (Tokyo), May 16, 1973.

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cans or the Japanese, would not seek to acquire ownership of Malaysian enterprises or to manipulate the international rubber market. "Only China," he was reported as saying, "could help free Malaysia from economic control of other countries, because China traded on a barter basis," buying as much as she sold to another country.¹⁴

This suggests that the Sino-Soviet contest for friends and influence in Southeast Asia is not one in which all the advantages lie on one side or the other. There are important factors favoring each of the parties, and it is these elements which must be weighed if one is to speculate intelligently about the outcome. There are two factors in particular which appear to have worked to Moscow's advantage and which the Chinese have consequently been compelled to expend a great deal of diplomatic energy to try to minimize. These are Peking's twin associations, in Southeast Asian eyes, (1) with local national liberation movements, and (2) with the region's local populations of Chinese ethnic origin. Let us consider first how China's close identification with Southeast Asian revolutionary movements has affected the terms of Sino-Soviet competition.

Chinese Revolutionism

That Southeast Asian government leaders, particularly those with military connections, see Peking as closely linked with national liberation or insurgency movements in the area can hardly be contested. In Indonesia, President Suharto has called it a "proven" fact that China "lent its support" to the abortive 1965 leftist coup d'état—an action which constituted "interference in the [country's] internal affairs"; and Admiral Sudomo, the naval Chief-of-Staff, has also claimed to have evidence of Chinese arms being smuggled into Indonesia for rebel use.¹⁵ Similarly, in the Philippines, President Marcos reportedly suspects China of being behind the supply of weapons to the New People's Army insurgents on the coast of northern Luzon,¹⁶ although the absence of any great publicity about it suggests that the quantities of arms and other supplies delivered to insurgent groups probably have not been consequential. Outside the "bamboo buffer" zone of Indochina and Burma, Chinese patronage of insurgency has

generally tended to emphasize the intangibles of diplomacy and propaganda rather than such concrete support as supplies of goods and cash; still, Southeast Asians see Peking as morally committed to support its co-ideologists in the area in one way or another. "While China seems to have matured as a power vis-à-vis the great powers," a Singapore diplomat observed, "it nevertheless continues to serve as a source of inspiration for revolutionary Communist forces in our region."¹⁸

It is equally clear that the Soviet Union has sought to make maximum capital of this widespread unease over China's sincerity in dealing with the established Southeast Asian governments. Thus, the Soviet English-language news weekly *New Times* warned that the Peking leaders, "by forcing their adventurist tactics on some detachments of the Communist and national liberation movement in Southeast Asia and trying to use them as an instrument to establish China's domination in Asian countries," are "dooming these forces to defeat." The journal explicitly cited the Philippines, Malaysia, and Indonesia as cases in point.¹⁹

On the face of things, it might seem incongruous that one Communist power has succeeded in gaining an advantage in dealing with established Southeast Asian regimes by pointing to the ties of the other with local radical movements. To understand why this is true, it is necessary to probe more deeply into the specific situations that exist in the ten Southeast Asian states.

Some may find it surprising that the Chinese have greater influence than the Russians on the local Communist movements in all but four cases: the ruling North Vietnamese Communists, the Communist Provisional Revolutionary Government in South Vietnam, and the leftist camps in Laos and Cambodia, all of which prefer to steer a cautious middle course between the two rival patrons of the Communist world in Peking and Moscow. North Vietnam is the only country in Asia where an extremely strong and self-confident Communist regime has ruled—on China's very border—even longer than the Chinese Communists themselves have held power in Peking. It is quite natural that such a seasoned and unchallenged Communist government has tried as far as possible—and will continue to try—to hew to a "neutralist" stance vis-à-vis the two

¹⁴ *The China Press* (Kuala Lumpur), Jan. 24, 1972.

¹⁵ *Le Monde* (Paris), Nov. 10, 1972.

¹⁶ *The Straits Times* (Singapore), May 20, 1972.

¹⁷ *The Asian* (Hong Kong), July 30, 1972.

¹⁸ Quoted in Lau Telk Soon, Ed., *New Directions in the International Relations of Southeast Asia*, Singapore, 1973, p. 25.

¹⁹ No. 23, June 9, 1970, p. 15.

centers of Communist power. And it is Hanoi which, in turn, calls the tune for the Communist revolutionaries in South Vietnam, Laos, and Cambodia, all of whom are dependent on the support of the North Vietnamese.

But while the revolutionary forces in Laos and Cambodia look primarily to Hanoi rather than to either Peking or Moscow, there are nevertheless some potentialities for Sino-Soviet rivalry in both these cases. In the case of Laos, the greater advantages in such competition would clearly seem to lie with China since the two countries directly border on each other and China has a substantial presence along the Chinese-built road leading south from the border toward Thailand. In Cambodia, developments since the ouster of Prince Sihanouk by Lon Nol in March 1970 have given rise to an extremely complex situation in which the Chinese initially gained an edge but have recently come under increasing challenge from the Russians in an intense struggle for influence. This situation merits somewhat closer examination.

When the pro-Western Lon Nol regime first seized power in Phnom Penh, it was the Chinese who responded first, by providing Prince Sihanouk, in spite of his open rejection of communism, with facilities in Peking as a head-of-state in exile. Moscow reacted



A delegation of party and government officials from N. Vietnam arrives in Peking on June 4, 1973, for a "friendly official" visit. In the foreground, Chinese Premier Chou En-lai greets Le Duan, First Secretary of the Central Committee of the Vietnam Workers' Party; directly behind Le Duan is Pham Van Dong, Premier of the Democratic Republic of Vietnam.

—China Pictorial (Peking), No. 8, 1973, p. 2.

more slowly and only began phasing out its diplomatic presence in Phnom Penh after Prince Sihanouk, taking issue with Castro at the nonaligned summit in Algiers in September 1973 over the Cuban leader's praise of the Soviet Union as the best friend of the nonaligned world, declared that "we fully respect the Soviet Union, but one thing we cannot understand is why Moscow maintains diplomatic relations with the clique of traitors under Lon Nol, with whom we are fighting."²⁰ This blunt criticism prompted the Kremlin to try to patch up its awkward position in Cambodia; nonetheless, the Khmer Rouge has continued to lean heavily toward China, as was graphically demonstrated in May 1974 when a delegation from the rebel Cambodian regime, headed by Deputy Premier Khieu Samphan, made an official tour of eleven countries under overt Chinese auspices. If this was not enough, the 1974 May Day message disseminated by the Khmer Rouge news agency AKI expressed appreciation for the active support given to the revolutionary cause in Cambodia by "the working class and other laboring people of Vietnam, Laos, China, Korea, Albania, Cuba, Romania, Yugoslavia, Algeria, Mauritania and other countries, and by friendly people in Africa, Latin America, Europe, and other areas of the world, including the American working class," but conspicuously omitted any mention of support from the Soviet Union.²¹

In the meantime, however, there has been such a pronounced upsurge of Soviet interest in the Cambodian situation that official circles in Thailand have nervously begun to speculate that Moscow may be preparing to take control in Cambodia and turn the port of Kompong Som (formerly Sihanoukville) into a Soviet base which could be used to blockade the Gulf of Thailand. "The Russians and the Chinese," a leading Thai commentator declared a year ago, "have already begun their struggle for influence" in Cambodia.

*With the American role there minimized, Cambodia has become the testing ground of Sino-Soviet conflict for dominance over Southeast Asia, and the winner will be able to exert authority in the region.*²²

Turning to the other countries of Southeast Asia, one finds that there is only one in which Chinese

²⁰ As quoted in *Bangkok Post*, Sept. 8, 1973.

²¹ As reported by New China News Agency (henceforth NCNA), May 1, 1974.

²² *Bangkok Post*, Sept. 2, 1973.

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influence over the local Communist movement today faces at least a potential but genuine Soviet challenge—namely, Indonesia, where the Maoist brand of Marxist populism from the outset faced an uphill battle against the more orthodox and static Marxism preached in Moscow. The Indonesian Communist Party, or PKI, seems still to be split between a pro-Chinese and a pro-Soviet wing. The former is represented by Jusuf Adjitorop, so far as is known the sole survivor of the pre-1965 party Politburo, who now lives in Peking, ostensibly as a delegate of the PKI Central Committee. The pro-Soviet wing, or so-called Marxist-Leninist group, currently appears to be leaderless, with its cadres largely incapacitated by detention in the camps of Buru and other parts of Indonesia. Moscow, however, scored some points in 1971 by flying out supplies of food, clothing, and medicine for these cadres, placing the Indonesian authorities in the awkward position of rejecting what superficially appeared to be a humanitarian act. Regardless of the division in the party, the rigorous policy of suppression followed by the Suharto government since 1965 makes it difficult to assess the overall Communist position in Indonesia today. There are probably only a few thousand Communists operating at present, and their activities appear to be uncoordinated. Meanwhile, the competition between Peking and Moscow for their allegiance continues—but outside Indonesia rather than within.²³

In all the remaining Southeast Asian countries, the Chinese are really unchallenged in their hold on the confidence and outlook of the actively insurgent Communists. In Burma, the "White Flag" Communists are the only viable Marxist group left on the scene, and they look exclusively to Peking for their support. The Russians, having seen their own "Red Flag" protégés disappear, have been happy to woo the established government of President Ne Win: in November 1973, Soviet party chief Brezhnev sent a message to the leaders of the ruling Burmese party wishing them "big success in achieving the most important political and socioeconomic goals put forward by its [the Burmese party's] Second Congress."²⁴ The Chinese, on the other hand, at a time when they have been soft-pedaling armed insurgency against established bourgeois governments in almost every other theater, have been openly supporting aggressive anti-government actions by the

White Flags. One factor behind this exceptional Chinese policy may have been that Peking wished to assure itself of White Flag help in curbing the reported infiltration of Chinese Nationalist intelligence agents from Taiwan into the Thai-Burmese-Laotian border area, although adequate documentation of these reports is lacking.²⁵ In any case, Peking's apparent judgment that exceptionally strong support of the Burmese rebels is necessary in spite of China's equal desire to maintain as good relations as possible with the Ne Win government was underscored by the appearance at the May Day festivities in Peking this year of Ba Thein Tin, Vice-President of the Burmese CP Central Committee.

The situation in the Philippines is in many respects analogous to that in Burma. Although there formerly were elements in the Philippine Communist Party who leaned toward Moscow, the Manila government claims that these have all been apprehended, but it acknowledges that the pro-Peking groups have been more successful in remaining at large. This is simply another way of saying that it is Peking whose influence predominates over the still active Communist movement in the country.

Chinese influence likewise holds sway over the Malaysian Communist Party, which is led by and largely composed of Malaysian Chinese and has had a close relationship with Peking all along. (The party's sphere of operations, it should be noted, also includes Singapore.) After returning from his trip to Peking in June of this year, Prime Minister Razak stated that he had received "categorical assurances" from Mao Tse-tung, Premier Chou En-lai, and other Chinese leaders "that they regard the remnant terrorists in our country as our internal problem that is for us to deal with as we think best."²⁶ China, however, has continued to provide the Malayan insurgents with facilities for broadcasting in Malay, although these broadcasts were somewhat subdued during the Razak visit. They again resumed their customary incendiary tone after his departure, and the only difference is that Chinese official radio broadcasts have not picked them up as frequently as

²³ See Arnold Brackman in *The Straits Times* (Singapore), July 17, 1971.

²⁴ *Soviet News* (London), Nov. 6, 1973.

²⁵ This situation developed during 1972-73, when Nationalist agents who had formerly carried on underground activities in China's southern coastal provinces reportedly shifted their operations to the so-called "golden triangle" in the Thai-Burmese-Laotian border region with the acquiescence of the then Thai government. Their activities evidently prompted the Chinese authorities in Yunnan Province to pursue hostile elements across the Burmese border with the help of the White Flags, causing heightened tension between Peking and Rangoon.

²⁶ BBC, *SWB/FE*, 4616/A3/5, June 5, 1974.

before or quoted their denunciations of the Malaysian government with quite the same fervor.

The clandestine Communist Party in Thailand is very small and has little influence, but like the Malaysian party it is largely composed of Thais of Chinese ethnic origin and looks to Peking for ideological guidance and support.²⁷ It is believed to provide direction to local insurgent groups operating in remote border areas of the country. Although there were reports of Soviet efforts to infiltrate the local labor unions earlier this year, this has been denied by a leading Thai trade unionist.²⁸

The overall picture that emerges from this Southeast Asian *tour d'horizon* is one that reveals the Chinese to be much more closely identified than the Russians with the radical and insurrectionary movements in the region, and it is this identification—in the minds of the local leaderships—that has afforded the Russians a major advantage in pressing their own efforts to strengthen relations with the established Southeast Asian governments. This situation obviously poses a difficult problem for Peking. As the *Bangkok Post* editorialized late last year (December 19), "with India a staunch Soviet ally, China cannot afford to have itself further encircled along its soft underbelly by any dominating Russian influence in Southeast Asia." But if the Chinese are to undercut the Russians, they must themselves develop normal relations with the region's established governments—which would involve curtailing their ties with the insurrectionary movements. To quote from a Malaysian newspaper editorial,

*China wishes to neutralize the Soviet Union, which it sees as pursuing a policy of containing China reminiscent of America's Dullesian policies of the 1950's and 1960's . . . [but] it must know that subversion will drive the states of Southeast Asia into the arms of its enemies. . . .*²⁹

For the Chinese, however, it is not that easy simply to cut off relations with their ideological followers in Southeast Asia. For one thing, their ties with the Maoist-oriented insurrectionary groups are too long-standing and intimate to be lightly cast aside. As the *London Times* recently observed (April 1, 1974):

²⁷ US Department of State, *World Strength of the Communist Party Organizations* (1973 Edition), Washington DC, US Government Printing Office, 1973, p. 96.

²⁸ *Bangkok Post*, April 2, 1974.

²⁹ *The Straits Times* (Kuala Lumpur), as quoted in *New Nation* (Singapore), May 23, 1972.

Unfortunately the close Chinese links with these parties were formed in the days when the Sino-Soviet dispute had each side competing for the allegiance of all other [Marxist] parties, and how can parties won over to Maoism ever be formally forsaken while the founder of their faith still rules in Peking?

The result of this dilemma is that Peking is currently attempting to perform a delicate tightrope-walking act. On the one hand, it is seeking to persuade the established Southeast Asian governments that it will not try to subvert their efforts to deal as they see fit with the insurrectionary movements and that they therefore have nothing to fear from normalizing relations with China. On the other hand, it is seeking to retain at least enough of its ties with the radical Communist movements to satisfy its own ideological conscience and to prevent them from shifting their allegiance to the Soviet side. Clearly, one reason why the Razak government of Malaysia finally established diplomatic relations with Peking—and why other non-Communist Southeast Asian governments may be leaning in the same direction—is that these governments believe that the guerrilla movements will be undercut if they see their Chinese patrons associating on cordial terms with the very regimes those movements are fighting against. Peking's thorny task is to go far enough to encourage this idea among the Southeast Asian governments, but not so far as to thoroughly alienate the radical movements that look to China for guidance. The very difficulty of this task suggests that the Russians may well continue to enjoy an advantage over their Chinese rivals in the contest for influence in Southeast Asia for some time to come.

The Overseas Chinese Liability

The second issue which the Soviet Union has successfully exploited in carrying on its competition with China has been the role and position of the Overseas Chinese in the region. In 1973, for example, Moscow published a book by Mikhail Andreev entitled *Overseas Chinese Bourgeoisie—Peking's Tool in Southeast Asia*. It elaborated the thesis that China was exploiting the region through the millions of Chinese capitalists living there.

In reaction to such maneuvering, China has re-emphasized the policy that it followed during the Bandung period in the mid-1950's—namely, en-

couraging Overseas Chinese in the region to take up local nationality and abandon any allegiance they might have to China. Peking officials in 1972 told a Philippine journalist, Antonio Zumel of the *Manila Daily Bulletin*, that ex-Chinese "who have adopted other citizenships are expected to owe allegiance to their countries and to contribute to the well-being of their countrymen."³⁰ During Malaysian Prime Minister Razak's 1974 visit to Peking, Premier Chou and his colleagues spelled out their new policy on this matter in more detail. The joint communiqué of the two prime ministers on May 31 stated:

... the Chinese Government considers anyone of Chinese origin who has taken up of his own will or acquired Malaysian nationality as automatically forfeiting Chinese nationality. As for residents who retain Chinese nationality of their own will, the Chinese Government, acting in accordance with its consistent policy, will enjoin them to abide by the law of the Government of Malaysia, respect the customs and habits of the people there, and live in unity with them, and their proper rights and interests will be protected by the Government of China and respected by the government of Malaysia."

The responses of the Southeast Asian countries to China's reassurances have varied somewhat. Razak told his enthusiastic countrymen after his return to Kuala Lumpur that the Chinese government had agreed to "far-reaching and historic commitments" with regard to the Overseas Chinese. Peking, he said, believed that their destiny was with the countries and peoples among whom they had lived for so long—that they should "integrate themselves into the countries of their residence and . . . should form an integral part of the local society and not consider themselves separate from it."³² However, an official Indonesian radio commentary warned that "observers believe that Chinese support of Communists in Malaysia will be quietly continued, while the abolition of the dual nationality of Chinese residents will be on paper only. . . ." ³³ Earlier, Indonesian Foreign Minister Adam Malik had discussed this question with Chinese Foreign Minister Chi Peng-fei at the Paris conference on Vietnam at the beginning of 1973, and he had told Chi that "Indonesia would need time to educate its Chinese popu-

lation to be loyal to Indonesia and not have their orientation toward Peking." According to Malik, Chi "agreed with this."³⁴

This question of nationality and status is obviously of compelling importance to the governments of at least three countries. Indonesia has about 275,000 Chinese who lack local citizenship and therefore owe some residual obligation to the Chinese government; the Philippines, a similar number; and Malaysia, some 220,000. Malaysia's new diplomatic relations with China will thus be closely watched for their impact on such Chinese.

As in the case of the local Communist parties, it should be underscored, there is a factor which compels Peking to proceed cautiously in dealing with the Overseas Chinese question. This is the presence of an alternative patron. If Peking were to abandon the Southeast Asian Chinese to their fate completely, it would invite the Taiwan authorities to assert a stronger influence over them by parading themselves as better protectors.

However, Taiwan's expulsion from the United Nations in 1971 and its visible loss of diplomatic status throughout the world have tended to diminish the force of this argument. Indeed, Peking has not hesitated to have its missions to the region boycott the local Chinese and actually to assist the local governments in promoting *bumiputra* (non-Chinese, i.e., Malay or Indonesian) interests at the expense of the local Chinese even when it comes to trade with China. The sight of Chinese visitors from Peking coming to Malaysia, speaking Malay, wearing Malay dress, dancing Malay dances, and conspicuously not calling on the local Chinese community has stirred conflicting emotions in Malaysian Chinese hearts over these past two years. Nonetheless, the ambivalent loyalties of the Overseas Chinese still constitute a definite obstacle to Peking's wooing of the Southeast Asian governments and hence an advantage for the Russians.

Soviet Vulnerabilities

As noted at the outset, the Soviet Union also suffers from some liabilities that work to China's advantage. On at least two general international issues close to the hearts of Southeast Asian governments, Peking has won esteem by lending support to the positions of these governments, while the

³⁰ As quoted in *The Straits Times* (Singapore), March 30, 1972.

³¹ NCNA, May 31, 1974.

³² BBC, *SWB/FE*, 4616/A3/5, June 5, 1974.

³³ *Ibid.*

³⁴ *The Japan Times*, April 27, 1973.



The Russian cruiser Aleksandr Suvorov photographed 10 miles off Singapore on its way from the South China Sea to the Malacca Strait and the Indian Ocean on January 15, 1971.

—UPI.

USSR has felt obliged to take stances which have cast it in the villain's role. These issues have been (1) the law of the sea and (2) freedom from super-power pressures.

With regard to the first, the central controversy has involved the extent of local territorial waters. In 1972, Malaysia and Indonesia jointly declared that the Strait of Malacca did not constitute international waters—a stand which immediately stirred the wrath of the US, the USSR, Britain, Japan, and other maritime powers. China, however, spoke up loudly on their behalf. At the now recessed Conference on the Law of the Sea in Caracas this past summer, the Chinese even sought to don the mantle of champion of the Southeast Asian states on this issue. China also emerged at the conference as upholder of the "archipelago principle"—a principle which Indonesia and the Philippines have asserted as a means of maximizing their control over their interinsular waters. (It is worth pointing out here that gratefulness for such support from Peking against the two super-powers probably has had much to do with Indonesia's recent backing of China's claims to the Parcel Islands in the South China Sea.)

While the Soviet Union has belatedly tempered its insistence on preserving international waters to the greatest extent possible, it has not retreated enough to undo the damage caused by its earlier stance, and the Chinese have done their utmost to exploit the situation. Two recent articles in the Chinese party daily *Jen-min Jih-pao* setting out the "crimes" of the "social imperialists" in Southeast Asia afford good illustrations. One attacked Admiral Sergei Georgievich Gorshkov, the USSR's Vice-Minister of Defense and Commander-in-Chief of the Navy, and his book, *The Navy in Times of War and Peace*, for advocating

an expansionist and bullying role for the Soviet Navy in Eastern waters.³⁵ The other, in the course of a general catalog of Soviet efforts to dominate Southeast Asia, accused "the Soviet revisionists" of sending "their 'trawlers' to run amuck in Indonesia's territorial waters" around "the Portuguese-occupied part of Timor Island" in disregard of "Indonesia's sovereignty over her territorial waters"; it went on:

What warrants particular attention is that in recent years the Soviet revisionists have loudly trumpeted "internationalization" of the Malacca Strait. Such domineering acts in utter disregard of international law and in wanton violation of other countries' sovereignty over their territorial waters have invoked strong opposition from the Malaysian and Indonesian Governments.

It is no accident that the Soviet revisionists harbor aggressive designs on the ports of Southeast Asian countries and the Malacca Strait. . . .

. . . Their smug calculation is to secure for their Vladivostok-based Pacific Fleet free passage via the Sea of Japan through the Malacca Strait into the Indian Ocean and then to link this up with the Red Sea, Mediterranean, and Black Sea Fleets in an attempt to establish hegemony in these vast waters.³⁶

While this last charge has a ring of propagandistic excess, it cannot be dismissed as utter fantasy. Certainly, some Southeast Asian leaders accept the possibility that it might be true. Last year, for example, Prime Minister Lee Kuan Yew of Singapore pub-

³⁵ Article by Kung Ping and Chen Hua, *Jen-min Jih-pao* (Peking), May 9, 1974.

³⁶ Article by Hsiang Tung, *ibid.*, March 19, 1974.

Sino-Soviet Rivalry in Southeast Asia

licly proposed in Tokyo that a joint naval task force comprising American, Japanese, Australian, and West European fleets be formed to counter the growing Soviet naval presence in Southeast Asia.³⁷

As for the issue of freedom from superpower pressures, the controversy has revolved around proposals for the neutralization of Southeast Asia. A number of Southeast Asian governments have recently demonstrated interest in such proposals. Perhaps the most dramatic manifestation of this interest has been the Kuala Lumpur Declaration of November 1971 by the Association of Southeast Asian Nations (ASEAN—composed of Indonesia, the Philippines, Singapore, and Thailand). This declaration proclaimed Southeast Asia a zone of peace, freedom, and neutrality. It followed a Malaysian campaign to secure international neutralization of the region under big-power guarantee (a goal which, though influential during the 1970-73 period, has now been abandoned).

The attraction of neutralization for Southeast Asian governments lies in the hope that it would prevent possible superpower intervention in support of efforts by minority areas to secede and constitute themselves as independent states. Because of the infancy of Southeast Asian countries as modern nation-states and their central authorities' consequent lack of full administrative control over outer provinces or islands where different religions, languages, and racial origins prevail, secessionist movements are quite common in the region. While in the postwar years both superpowers have succumbed to the temptation of helping secessionists against governments unfriendly or cool toward themselves, the most recent and most glaring example has been the Soviet role in the Indo-Pakistani war that led to the creation of Bangladesh. To the Indonesians in particular, the Soviet performance in this case provided a warning of what might happen if Soviet arms were allowed into their own region.

Neither the Soviet Union nor China has been terribly enthusiastic about the idea of neutralizing the region, but Peking has appeared less unsympathetic than Moscow. For instance, Chinese authorities told Philippine Senator Salvador Laurel in April 1972 that China would respect Southeast Asian neutrality

after all the region's military links with the US had been severed, and Thai officials received the same message in June 1973.³⁸ Earlier in 1973, a New Zealand government minister reported after an official visit to China that the Chinese were ready to give a "hands-off" guarantee and to accept neutralization in the long run because they did not want to see any part of Asia tied to a grouping which could be directed against them.³⁹ (Southeast Asian leaders, of course, recognize, as Premier Lee Kuan Yew observed in May 1973, that China "would first need to develop a blue-water fleet" to render itself an actual, "meaningful" guarantor of regional neutrality.⁴⁰)

Despite arguments by Southeast Asians such as Zain Azraai (Razak's adviser on the issue) that neutralization of the region would benefit the USSR by giving "the imprint of legitimacy to her role in the region" and effecting "the withdrawal of the United States without its being replaced by China,"⁴¹ the Russians have remained essentially hostile to the idea. To be sure, Moscow has over the years softened the language with which it refers to the notion in order to reduce Peking's ability to capitalize on the Soviet attitude. For example, *Izvestia* at the beginning maintained that the ASEAN neutralization scheme "lacked consequence," but by the time of



Malaysian Prime Minister Tun Abdul Razak meets with Soviet President N. V. Podgorny on October 3, 1972, during an official visit to the USSR.

—V. Mastiukov/TASS via Sovfoto.

³⁷ *The Straits Times* (Kuala Lumpur), May 28, 1973.

³⁸ *Bangkok Post*, April 20, 1972; *Asia Research Bulletin*, Vol. 3, No. 2, July 1973, p. 1910.

³⁹ *Canberra Times*, April 5, 1973.

⁴⁰ *The Straits Times* (Kuala Lumpur), May 28, 1973.

⁴¹ In Lau Teik Soon, *op. cit.*, p. 132.

Razak's visit to the USSR in the summer of 1972, it had become something for Premier Kosygin to "respect" and for *Pravda* to describe as "an idea that cannot be underestimated."⁴² Yet the Russians have continued to push for the acceptance of their own proposal for an Asian collective security system, first advanced in 1969.

To Southeast Asians, this Soviet proposal carries with it distinct anti-Chinese overtones—overtones in no way removed by A. E. Nesterenko's assurance at the 1973 ECAFE conference in Tokyo that "in our view the People's Republic of China would be a full-fledged member of such a system."⁴³ Consequently, no Southeast Asian leaders have endorsed it. President Suharto of Indonesia, for instance, dismissed it with the remark that "we want ASEAN to strengthen regional independence and avoid having this area become a regional cockpit."⁴⁴ Prime Minister Razak of Malaysia rejected it on the ground that "to bring the big countries in Asia into such a scheme will be to bring in problems which we small nations may find difficult to resolve."⁴⁵

No one in Southeast Asia, however, believes that the USSR will abandon its collective security scheme in favor of regional neutralization. Hence, the Chinese can gleefully point to the Soviet posture as confirmation of Moscow's selfish intentions.

The Future

Let us turn now to a brief consideration of the probable course of Sino-Soviet rivalry in Southeast Asia in the years immediately ahead. To begin with, we must recognize that geography and culture will inevitably be major influences on the respective abilities of the two rival Communist suitors for Southeast Asia's hand to achieve their ends. From these standpoints, China possesses distinct advantages. It is so close to Southeast Asia that it cannot be wished away; so it must be satisfactorily accommodated. And its history as a font of Asian culture means that it can elicit responses from the region which the Soviet Union (and the United States for that matter) cannot. Indeed, it benefits politically from every degree of alienation from the Western world that a Southeast Asian experiences.

⁴² See *Izvestia* (Moscow), Jan. 2, 1972; *Soviet News* (London), Oct. 3, 1972; and *Pravda* (Moscow), Aug. 31, 1972.

⁴³ *The Japan Times*, April 14, 1973.

⁴⁴ *The New York Times*, March 18, 1973.

⁴⁵ *The Straits Times* (Kuala Lumpur), Oct. 6, 1972.

To at least a limited extent, it is true, some Southeast Asians can—and in all likelihood will—deem it "safer to deal with the remote superpower" than with nearby China,⁴⁶ but doing so is a luxury available only to the offshore states, not to the states with land borders abutting on or near Chinese territory. And that is a vital distinction to be made in attempting to peer ahead into the future. Southeast Asia's landward and seaward halves probably will move on different tracks in the years ahead—one concentrating on establishing the best possible *modus vivendi* with China, the other emphasizing its freedom from all external powers equally. Professor Alejandro M. Fernandez, of the University of the Philippines, goes even a step further in his assessment of the shape of things to come; he argues that the 1972 Shanghai communiqué of President Nixon and Premier Chou in effect sealed continental Southeast Asia's fate as a sphere of Chinese influence.⁴⁷

In the long run, therefore, the new *Romance of the Three Kingdoms* will in all likelihood have two subtheaters—a Soviet-Chinese one in Indochina, Burma, and Thailand, and a Soviet-American one in Malaysia, Singapore, Indonesia, and the Philippines. But the crystallization of these subtheaters may not take place for another decade. Pending this development, the entire region will remain open to a three-cornered battle, with the odds that China will emerge from such a competition better off than the Soviet Union.

Even if such a struggle continues throughout the region as a whole, however, one can perhaps expect Moscow to concentrate its effort in those portions of Southeast Asia closest to China's borders because it is there that the competition with China is strongest, and also because the Russians cannot anticipate even tacit American support in these areas. Moreover, the Kremlin seemingly has greater opportunities and cause for interest in these areas. While it burned its fingers once in Indonesia (as the result of its close identification with Sukarno and the Indonesian Communist Party) and can boast of only limited achievements after so many years of effort in Malaysia and the Philippines, it enjoys a long-standing presence and a good chance of making things awkward for China in Thailand and Burma, and in Indochina it will never forsake the struggle for the conscience of world communism.

⁴⁶ *The Asian*, July 30, 1972. The comment referred specifically to the Philippines.

⁴⁷ In Lau Teik Soon, *op. cit.*, p. 31.

Books

Khrushchev Remembers-- But Also Forgets

By Foy D. Kohler

NIKITA S. KHRUSHCHEV: *Khrushchev Remembers. The Last Testament.* Tr. and ed. by Strobe Talbott. Introductions by Edward Crankshaw and Jerrold Schechter. Boston, Little, Brown & Co., 1974.

I CAME TO KNOW Nikita Khrushchev and his family well during nearly six of the ten years of his rule—from July 1959, when I accompanied then Vice-President Richard Nixon to the Soviet Union and participated in many hours of talk between them; through Khrushchev's visit to the United States in September of that year, when my wife and I, along with the Henry Cabot Lodge and others, escorted him, his wife, and party on a two-week trip around the United States; and until he was ousted by a conspiracy of his associates on October 15, 1964, after I had been US Ambassador in Moscow for more than two years. I have either heard or read practically every word he ever said in public and talked with him personally, both officially and informally, on countless occasions.

In my own book, *Understanding the Russians*,¹ I wrote:

To me he came to be the embodiment of the almost untranslatable Russian adjective khitryi. It is usually applied, not without a certain respect and appreciation, to the Russian peasant. According to the dictionary it means sly, cunning, artful, intricate or wily. But it really means more than this; it also means unscrupulous, smart, clever, quick-witted. Roll all these adjectives into one and you have the khitryi Khrushchev—a bootlicker or a bully as circumstances required, a demagogue and opportunist always.

He also had, just to complicate his character, a colossal inferiority complex—because of his origins, because he was not an Old Bolshevik, and just because he was a Russian—and, typically, this inferiority complex was more often than not manifested in assertions of superiority. He had an inexhaustible store of Russian proverbs and folk tales and an unrivaled vocabulary of the unprintable, earthy expressions in which the Russian language is so rich.

Khrushchev had certainly read less of Marx and Lenin—though probably not of Stalin—than I, and yet he was a kind of “true believer” as Eric Hoffer uses the

term. I used to think that he must say to himself every night before he went to bed that the system which had enabled him—a poor shepherd boy—to mount to the throne of the Czars had to be right.

In international affairs, Khrushchev was a dangerous man with appalling areas of prejudice and ignorance and a tendency to act recklessly and impulsively. Internally, he had done more than his share of Stalin's dirty work of cruel, ruthless oppression and bloody purges. And yet he somehow remained a common man with a common touch, and when he came to power, he was the first ruler in Russian history actively to seek popularity. One could detect in conversation with him that he was not unaware—indeed, even seemed to take satisfaction in the fact—that some of his acts would inevitably influence the evolution of Russian society toward greater humanism.

I FIND NO essential differences between this picture of the colorful and ebullient little commissar I knew and the self-portrait that emerges from his own words in the two volumes of *Khrushchev*

¹ New York, Harper & Row, 1970.

Remembers, the first published in 1970² and the second, *The Last Testament*, just this summer. For, however unreliable they are as history, these fascinating and readable memoirs are extraordinarily revealing as to the character, attitudes, and general outlook of Khrushchev and his Kremlin associates.

When the first volume appeared, there was much controversy about its authenticity. Before the second volume was published, Time, Inc., had laid the doubts to rest by having its 180 hours of tape recordings verified as the real Khrushchev by voice-print analysis. I never shared the doubts, because even the first excerpts published in *Life* magazine were recognizably Khrushchev, both in style and tone and in self-serving content. After October 15, 1964, as he himself said in the opening paragraph of the first volume, he "lived like a hermit on the outskirts of Moscow," surrounded by "those who guard me from others—and who guard others from me." In the Soviet Union, he immediately became, to use Orwell's famous term, an "unperson."

He knew this, of course. He knew that he was never even mentioned in the Soviet press or on the radio or television, and he knew that the history books were all being revised to eradicate his memory. Anyone who was acquainted with the man comprehends that he was under tremendous mental compulsion to justify himself, to find a way somehow to recapture the place in Russian history to which he considered himself entitled.

Thus, Khrushchev started to make his own version of the rec-

ord on dictated tapes—a process which, as he frequently remarks, also relieved the boredom of his forced retirement. He would certainly have been encouraged in this effort by his family and especially by his son-in-law, Aleksei Adzhubei, former editor of *Izvestiia*, who was also smarting from having been removed from that important post and given a second-level editorial job after his father-in-law's ouster. Naturally, this activity could not be hidden from the secret police, who provided the staff for Khrushchev's household and who would hardly have failed to make copies of the tapes. Awareness of this fact and related concern for the future safety and well-being of his family probably account for some of the more glaring omissions in the memoirs. There is little about the internal political struggle following Stalin's death—less, for example, about the ouster and execution of Beria than was known from Khrushchev himself while he was in power, and no real details on his victory over his rivals of the "anti-party group" in 1957. Neither is there an account of the slick conspiracy of his colleagues leading to Khrushchev's own ou-

ter in 1964. None of his successors is directly attacked, and criticisms of their policies are ambiguous and indirect. Whenever Khrushchev seems about to let himself go in discussing living Soviet personalities, there are mysterious gaps in the tapes which make the reader wonder if those which reached the West were not in fact screened in advance by police or even political authorities. While military policies are discussed in broad terms, no secrets are revealed. There are no figures on defense costs, no accounts of Politburo debates, no identifications of key personnel in the Soviet military-industrial complex.

The memoirs are also replete with historical and chronological errors (most of which are ably set straight in footnotes by editor-translator Strobe Talbott). Some of these, of course, simply reflect the vagaries of the mind of an old man trying to set down his recollections without access to official archives or even to his personal records. Others are clearly deliberate, to serve Khrushchev's self-justifying purposes. As Edward Crankshaw observes in his introduction:

Reviewers in This Issue

FOY D. KOHLER—Career Ambassador of the United States, who served as Ambassador to the USSR, 1963-67, and as Deputy Undersecretary of State, 1967-68; currently Professor at the Center for Advanced International Studies, University of Miami; author of books and articles on US-Soviet relations and co-author of a forthcoming study on Soviet global strategy and the Middle East.

NORTON S. GINSBERG—Dean of the Academic Program and Senior Fellow,

Center for the Study of Democratic Institutions (Santa Barbara, Calif.); author of *Atlas of Economic Development*, 1961, and numerous works on the human geography of Asia.

KENNETH LIEBERTHAL—Assistant Swarthmore College (Swarthmore, Pa.); author of *Research Guide to Central Party and Government Meetings in China, 1949-1974*, forthcoming in spring 1975.

² Boston, Little, Brown & Co., 1970.

Book Reviews

In the days of his supremacy, his speech was filled with evasions, distortions, deliberate omissions, contradictions, downright lies. How could he be expected to change in old age?

The first volume of *Khrushchev Remembers* dealt largely with Khrushchev's early years and his life with Stalin, adding many pithy anecdotes but not really going far beyond his famous "secret speech" of 1956 in substance. The relatively shorter section on "The World Outside" in that volume featured his defense of his reconciliation with Tito, of his suppression of the Hungarian uprising of 1956, and of his surreptitious placement in and then withdrawal of missiles from Cuba.

The second volume, subtitled *The Last Testament*, is also a mixed bag—though the editors have done an excellent job of giving logical structure to what must have been an incoherent, confused mass of raw material.

Of the book's 500 pages, 150 are devoted to the domestic scene during Khrushchev's reign. His pungent commentary darts from subject to subject, touching—*inter alia*—on his relations with scientists (he distrusted Piotr Kapitsa for refusing military work but regretted having refused to let him travel abroad, partly because "Stalin was still belching inside me"); the regime view of writers and artists ("We were scared, really scared. We were afraid the thaw might unleash a flood"); housing ("It was painful for me to remember that as a worker under capitalism I'd had much better living conditions"); agriculture ("The Virgin Lands campaign showed us how mighty our Party could be if it only had the trust of the people").

The next 150 pages, devoted to relations with other Communist states, are characterized by blandly arrogant acceptance of Moscow's natural right to control the East European states and a viciously critical appraisal of Mao, reflecting the Russians' ingrained distrust of and antipathy toward their "yellow-beak" neighbors.

THE FINAL 250 pages deal with relations with the outer world, occasionally duplicating but mainly supplementing and elaborating on the material in the first volume. An almost paranoid suspicion of the United States runs throughout. Thus, when Stalin let Beria goad him into making territorial demands on Turkey, he succeeded only in "frightening the Turks right into the open arms of the Americans." The "so-called 'scientific expedition' . . . in search of Noah's Ark" which the US organized "at about that time . . . didn't fool anyone. . . . It was a border action directed against Soviet Armenia and our oil fields in Azerbaidzhan." Next door, "the Shah repeatedly denied there were any American bases in Iran, but we didn't believe him." Still farther east, "it was clear the Americans were penetrating Afghanistan with the obvious intent of setting up a military base there." Sukarno's troubles in West Irian arose "probably at the instigation of Dutch and American agents." Khrushchev was even worried that an American submarine might sink his ship en route to the UN meeting in New York in 1960. And so on—sort of the obverse of the American Communist-under-every-bed syndrome.

In Khrushchev's version, the cold war started with Churchill's "Iron Curtain" speech at Fulton, Missouri, on March 6, 1946—not

with Stalin's famous "back to orthodoxy" speech the previous month (February 9, 1946), nor with the USSR's attempt to hang on in Iran, or its demands on Turkey, or its occupation of Eastern Europe, or its takeover of Czechoslovakia. The United States had grown rich and fat in World War II and wanted to keep the Soviet Union impoverished. UNRRA provided only food, not the machinery the USSR needed to rebuild its industries. In all this, the "arsonist and militarist" Churchill was in league with Truman, "an aggressive man and a fool," aided by "that political half-wit Mr. Acheson." When Adenauer came to Moscow in 1955, his "initial bargaining terms were wholly unacceptable—to create a single capitalist German state allied with the West would have meant for us to retreat to the borders of Poland. . . . Once you start retreating, it's difficult to stop." However, the man usually attacked as the greatest of the Western cold warriors comes out very well. "Dulles was a worthy and interesting adversary," Khrushchev says, "who forced us either to lay down our arms or marshal some good reasons to continue the struggle. It always kept us on our toes to match wits with him [and] he had the common sense never to overstep that 'brink' he was always talking about." Even Nixon, though always considered "hostile to the Soviet Union, . . . showed genuine human courtesy when he tried to see me after my retirement."

Khrushchev professes puzzlement at receiving an invitation "out of the blue" to visit the United States in 1959. This claim comes as the only real surprise in the book to those of us who counseled President Eisenhower to issue the invitation, for our pur-

pose of defusing Khrushchev's ultimatum on Berlin seemed so transparent that we were almost ashamed of the maneuver. The Big Four foreign ministers had been meeting for several months in Geneva, getting nowhere and about to break up in a complete impasse. Clearly, something new had to be done to get Khrushchev off the hook of his public commitment to move against the Western position in Berlin. In fact, the exercise produced a short breathing spell, when Khrushchev agreed at Camp David (the US presidential retreat in Maryland) to suspend his deadline. Strangely enough, Khrushchev does not even mention Berlin once in the long chapter covering his visit to the United States and his talks with President Eisenhower.

Political shortcomings aside, Khrushchev's account of his feelings about and reactions to the trip to America are engrossing and revealing reading. His admission that he was "curious to have a look"; his anxiety to be received "with maximum honors"; his initial suspicion that Camp David might be some sort of quarantine "leper colony"; his concerns about his own adequacy to face this "important test"; his discovery that capitalists looked like ordinary people without "the pigs' snouts our artists always gave them"; his obvious awe in the presence of President Eisenhower—these and a hundred other impressions are recounted with engaging earthiness.

Khrushchev adds little to the public record of the U-2 incident, except his admission that "these flights had been going on for years," thus in effect confirming that the elaborate cat-and-mouse game he mounted after the American craft was shot down on May

1, 1960, was a deliberate ploy designed for his own purposes. His main purpose comes out in his account of the abortive Paris summit meeting only two weeks later. Having recklessly renewed his threats to act unilaterally on Berlin, he was again in a dangerous situation "without much hope that the [Paris] negotiations would produce a meaningful agreement." By his own account, he decided only on the flight to Paris that the answer to his problem was to break up the summit.

I saw that the only way out was to present the United States with an ultimatum: the Americans would have to apologize officially for sending their spy plane into the USSR, and the President of the United States would have to retract what he said about America's "right" to conduct reconnaissance over our territory. . . . We knew they [the Americans] couldn't swallow the bitter pill we were trying to force down their throats . . . this meant that the four-power negotiations were over before they began.

Indeed, promptly after the Paris spectacle, he again publicly postponed any action on Berlin—this time until after the upcoming US elections.

Although he has some kind words for President Kennedy—here, as recurrently, his somewhat resentful respect for capitalist "millionaires" comes out—Khrushchev makes no bones about the hard line he took with the young President at Vienna: "The difference in our class positions had prevented us from coming to an agreement. . . . I felt bad about his disappointment."

Khrushchev is equally frank about the immediate sequel to the

Vienna meeting: "We decided the time had come to lance the blister of West Berlin." He becomes vague, however, about the consequences of the operation. As American military preparations and personnel moves posed "a counterthreat of their own," Khrushchev came up with the idea of the Berlin Wall; he calls it "border control" and takes full credit personally. He talks of the ensuing military standoff in Berlin, as a result of which, he says, "the West had been forced to recognize the establishment of border control and the separation of capitalist West Berlin from socialist East Berlin." "We didn't quite achieve the same sort of moral victory that a peace treaty would have represented," Khrushchev admits, "but we probably received more material gains without a peace treaty [which would have] meant concessions on our part." The remaining doubt, Khrushchev says, was "about the ability of the Germans to control their own borders . . . to shoot a fellow German." The Kremlin was soon relieved to find that the "border troops of the GDR were well grounded in the teachings of Marxism-Leninism. They understood their class obligations as well as their military duty."

Khrushchev indicates that the Cuban missile crisis was a subject much on his mind by dealing with it *in extenso* in both volumes of the memoirs; and indeed, his handling of the matter was probably one of the major reasons for his ouster. Throughout, he vehemently combats the Western thesis (and my own) that he sought surreptitiously to place MRBMs and IRBMs in Cuba to redress the Soviet ICBM gap disclosed during the Berlin confrontation, insisting that these weapons were solely intended "to maintain the inde-

pendence" of Cuba. "I'm not saying we had any documentary proof that the Americans were preparing a second invasion," he says in *The Last Testament*, but then he hastens to add: "We didn't need documentary proof. We knew the class affiliation, the class blindness of the United States, and that was enough to make us expect the worst." Khrushchev does reveal, however, that he met strong resistance from Castro when he broached the idea. "When Castro and I talked about the problem," he says, "we argued and argued. Our arguments were very heated. But, in the end, Fidel agreed with me." He goes on to say that Castro later reaffirmed that agreement and justified the Soviet action. Naturally, he concludes that forcing the Americans to pledge not to invade Cuba was one of the great "victories we won on the diplomatic front."

I SHOULD LIKE to see these memoirs read by all thinking Americans, perhaps particularly by those who are specialists in Soviet affairs but have not had the actual experience of living in the Soviet Union and negotiating with Russian officials.

For cumulatively Khrushchev's revelations of his own beliefs and feelings, his prejudices, hates, fears, and hopes provide a needed antidote to the persistent American tendency to ascribe to Soviet leaders attitudes, values, and interests closely parallel to our own and to project into Soviet affairs a mirror-image of ourselves and our own concepts. Khrushchev's ruminations certainly make it clear that the considerations determining Soviet policies and actions are not the product of conditions and practices similar to our own but are the product of an environment, a view of the world, and a decision-

making process entirely different from ours

In any event, I think the reader of *Khrushchev Remembers* must in turn remember that these self-serving, self-justifying recollections of a garrulous old man who felt very sorry for himself are not objective history. Nearly a century and a half ago, the great French observer and writer, the Marquis de Custine, quoted an eminent Russian as saying:

God makes only the future, while the Czar remakes the past! . . . Russian despotism not only counts ideas and sentiments for nothing; it wages war on fact and triumphs in the battle. . . .

I would say, then, that what we have in *Khrushchev Remembers* is another fascinating chapter in the long annals of Russian history—Russian history, Russian style.

Counting China's People

By Norton S. Ginsburg

LEO A. ORLEANS: *Every Fifth Child: The Population of China*. Stanford, Calif., Stanford University Press, 1972.

H. YUAN TIEN: *China's Population Struggle: Demographic Decisions of the People's Republic, 1949-69*. Columbus, The Ohio State University Press, 1973.

THESE TWO BOOKS should be welcomed by all students of China as well as those interested in the course of China's develop-

ment, even though they seem to raise more questions than they answer. Before we attempt to deal with some of these questions, however, perhaps it would be well to describe the books briefly, review their contents, make some comparisons between them, and evaluate them for the nonspecialist reader.

The Orleans book contains an immense amount of information. After finishing it, the reader can be quite confident that he knows

as much about the population of China as anyone but a specialist in the subject would want to know. Of its six chapters, the first deals with the historical record of population fluctuation and growth, describing in some detail the characteristics of the 1953 census-registration and assessing its utility and value. The second reviews certain key characteristics of China's population and provides information about its apparent evolution since 1953 and its likely

development in the future. A third devotes special attention to the urban population, upon which the long-term future of the country may most heavily depend. The fourth analyzes the distribution of that population and the recent patterns of internal migration. The fifth discusses, at somewhat excessive length, the roughly six percent of the national population that is not Han Chinese. By far the most interesting chapter, at least to the general reader, is the sixth and final one, in which the author ruminates about what the existing data mean and how the demographic variables seem related to other aspects of the Chinese socioeconomic system. A number of tables help to array the available information in concise form, and several maps (the sources for which are by and large not identified) are useful not only in describing certain population patterns but also in relating them to other elements in China's complex social geography.

Orleans is frank and precise about the quality of the existing data and therefore about the constraints involved in generalizing from them. He acknowledges that the 1953 census-registration is of limited value, but he argues quite properly that it is simply the best source of information there is. He recognizes, too, the enormous variation among estimates of the present population. For 1975, for example, he himself projects a population of 818 million; however, he notes that the United Nations has forecast a population of 826 million, whereas the United States Bureau of the Census predicts a figure of 962 million. He realizes the policy implications of this difference of nearly 145 million between the lowest and the highest estimates; more impor-

tant, he submits that the information available to foreigners probably is of the same general order of reliability as that available to the Chinese themselves. Indeed, he is sympathetic to the difficulties inherent not only in counting noses, but even more in dealing with highly complex demographic variables in a country so huge and still so backward.

The Tien book contains much less specific information than the Orleans volume, but it was not intended to describe what is known about the population of China. Its purpose was to cast light on the policies, and the variations in them over time, that have either directly or indirectly affected China's population under communism. An initial chapter discusses what is involved in a "population policy." In it, the author clearly accepts Alva Myrdal's trenchant observation that "a population policy can be nothing less than the social policy at large."¹ Later chapters deal with trends related to rural and urban populations, with the urban population in its own right, with migration and pioneer settlement, with the perception and control of population numbers (two separate chapters), and with comparative social transformation in the broad and changing population patterns. Heavy emphasis is placed on the Chinese press, and the text is larded with extensive quotations (too many, one might argue) from Chinese newspapers, as translated, for example, in the *Survey of the China Mainland Press* put out by the US Consulate-General in Hongkong. Since more of this kind of material is available for the years prior to the beginning of

the Cultural Revolution in mid-1966 than for later years—indeed, the great bulk of it dates from before the Great Leap Forward in 1958—most of the quotations stem from the earlier rather than the more recent periods of Communist rule. The conclusion is inescapable that more is known about China's population in the 1950's than is known about the population in the 1960's. (In fact, this conclusion applies to a large extent to all areas of knowledge about China since 1949.) The "conceptual map" of the present is shot with major blanks which continue to plague understanding and analysis.

Of the two volumes, the one by Orleans is by far the more useful. The book by Tien is less specifically focused, although it nonetheless remains a unique assessment of the Chinese leadership's policies with respect to population, such as these policies have been. In content, the two volumes overlap. Both authors agree that China is a society undergoing major transformation and that the demographic characteristics of the country will depend on the nature of this transformation. Moreover, both imply—though they are not as explicit in this case—that the type and degree of social transformation will vary, perhaps substantially, as the demographic complex becomes less and less a "black box."

HAVING EXPLORED the nature of the two books under review, let us now turn to a consideration of some of the issues they pose. Prior to the Communist consolidation of power in 1950, China had known no extended period of internal peace for more than 40 years, and both the land and the people had been mismanaged for generations

¹ *Nation and Family*, Cambridge, Mass., MIT Press, 1968, p. 2.

before that. Environmental sanitation in the modern sense was virtually unknown outside the few larger cities under strong foreign influence and/or management. The country was highly fragmented because of a host of factors: several foreign powers had administered extraterritorial enclaves at some places in China before World War II; the railway network was skeletal and disconnected; the system of internal waterways had been disrupted by neglect and maladministration; coastal shipping had deteriorated over a period of at least a century; and there was no effective central administrative authority to make and implement national policy, except perhaps in Manchuria. Death rates and birth rates were as high as anywhere in the world, and population numbers were kept under control by the apocalyptic "horsemen" who periodically ravaged the hinterland and cast their pall even over the great cities.

It would be reasonable to assume that any central government able to enforce its control over most of the country would—even apart from ideology—be able to assuage many of these grievances and their consequences. And this, indeed, is what has been happening in China for a quarter of a century. Railroads have been reconstructed and extended; environmental sanitation has been improved; water conservancy has been pursued; inland waterways have been reconstituted; administration at regional and local levels, as well as at the national level, has been stabilized. It is a tribute to the Chinese people, and probably also to their new leaders, that so many improvements of this sort took place within the short span of just a few years. The im-

mediate consequences were a falling-off of death rates, rapid increases in general population numbers, even more rapid growth of the urban population, and substantial increases in both agricultural and industrial production.

All the foregoing took place pretty much on the old territorial base, on a resource endowment reasonably well defined, and on a settlement pattern inherited from earlier times. Another regime might well have simply "gone along" with these more or less "natural" trends in development, but the Peking regime is *sui generis*. It has sought not merely to develop China and to provide a modicum of security and well-being for its vast population but, much more, to transform it—and to transform it according to the perception of "what ought to be" suggested by its dominant ideology.

For a time, Russian influence on planning decisions was strong, especially in the years immediately after the period of rehabilitation in 1949-52. Industry was to be the leading sector during the period of the First Five-Year Plan (1953-57), and that meant that the prevailing urban-industrial pattern was to be retained and strengthened, as indeed it was. However, the Soviet model also suggested the need to develop new industries near the sites of freshly discovered major resources if these happened to lie outside the already heavily populated and structured ecumene. Thus, the steel industrial complex at Pao'ou, for example, came into being. Similarly, emphasis was placed on large public works, the creation of which was directed from the center. Agriculture was not neglected—far from it—as land reform was followed by the several stages of

collectivization that culminated in the communes, but it was assumed that agriculture would more or less take care of itself as general conditions were stabilized and improved.

The Great Leap Forward of 1958 signaled a major shift away from the Soviet model, although in concrete terms it was hardly successful. The new policy that it represented was one in which agriculture became first a partner of the industrialization effort and later the basis for a new development strategy. That strategy was, in part, a consequence of factors not under the control of the ruling elite. The sudden withdrawal of Soviet aid in July 1960 necessitated a shift from certain kinds of large-scale industrial projects, as well as from huge public works which drew heavily on scarce national resources, particularly skilled manpower.

As the Soviet Union was transformed from a "big brother in socialism" to a "rival in socialism" and even an enemy, the colonization and development of China's outlying territories, previously comparatively neglected, also assumed greater importance. At the same time, the necessity for the decentralization of many agriculture-related economic functions became an opportunity for furthering social transformation, for developing a Chinese New Man—literate, motivated, capable of making decisions in concert with his colleagues, and self-reliant though not independent—who would provide a vast nationwide reservoir of semi-skilled labor. In the field of water conservancy, for example, the process of decentralization brought a shift of emphasis from the national project to the local, and environmental sanitation problems were to be at-

tacked where they mattered most—that is, where most of the people lived, in the countryside.

At first, the communes were conceived as vast agro-industrial complexes. In due course, however, it became clear that application of that concept diverted rural manpower away from what it could do best—that is, produce more food for the growing population and more producers' goods for agricultural enterprise. It became apparent, too, that rural industries could only do so much and that a modern, predominantly urban system of national industrial production had to be developed along with the more localized, land-based system. Hence, there was a partial return to what has been described in other contexts as a "dual economy" in which the rural-based and the urban-based sectors were conceived of as equal and complementary. Thus the somewhat elliptical slogan: "Agriculture as the foundation; industry as the leading sector!"

As these shifts in percepts and policies took place, various demographic consequences followed. The growth of cities, already hampered by the depression that followed the withdrawal of the Russians and the food shortages associated with the Great Leap Forward, was deliberately slowed. In fact, large numbers of urban-dwellers, chiefly younger people but including some recent migrants to the cities, were moved to the rural areas. No one knows just how many persons were involved in this internal migration, but it must have been a large number, even if smaller than the regime has claimed. At the same time, an improved registration system made it increasingly difficult for peasants to move to the cities or to become "urbanized" once

they arrived there. Many industries were established in smaller towns away from the larger cities—often at costs which, in strictly economic terms, would have been unacceptable elsewhere. But in spite of these measures, the "urban" proportion of the population probably increased from 13 percent in 1953 to perhaps 17 percent in 1970. Much of that growth took place in cities near the agricultural frontiers, as in the Northeast and in Sinkiang, but the data are unclear as to how significant this actually was in comparison with the growth of the larger, well-established urban centers, which were likewise growing rapidly.

If one takes India, for example, as a standard, the upsurge in urban population has seemingly been much better controlled in China, but it is an open question

whether, in the longer run, the Chinese policy will prove effective or not. Such examples as one can discover elsewhere suggest that modernization (however defined) leads to ever more rapid urban growth, and the evidences of such a tendency in China are already seen in the expansion of the populations of such great cities as Shanghai, Tientsin, Peking, Shenyang, Wuhan, and Canton. Rapid urban growth also tends to be associated with even more rapid declines in the birth rate. In China, the birth rate remains high but has been declining—at commendable rates—to what Orleans estimates to have been about 32 per thousand as of 1970. At the same time, death rates have continued to fall, apparently even more precipitously, to an estimated 17 per thousand in 1970. But then, of course, nobody really knows.

CORRECTIONS

Following are corrections of errors that have appeared in the last two issues of *Problems of Communism*:

1. In Charles Gati's article, "The Kádár Mystique" (May-June), the reference on p. 32, col. 1, line 9, to the total membership of the Hungarian party Politburo should read 12, not 13. In the table on the same page, the first name of Gáspár should be Sándor, not Zoltán.
2. In John C. Campbell's article, "Soviet Strategy in the Balkans" (July-August), footnotes 5 and 6, respectively on pages 6 and 7, are transposed.
3. In Trond Gilberg's article, "Ceausescu's Romania" (July-August), p. 36, col. 2, lines 17-21, Miron Constantinescu, not Ion Gheorghe Maurer, should have been identified as deceased. The reference to Maurer on p. 38, col. 1, line 2 from bottom, should read "prior to his retirement in March 1974," not "prior to his death in July 1974."
4. In Nicholas C. Pano's article, "The Albanian Cultural Revolution" (July-August), the credits for photos on pages 53 and 56 are switched. The photo on page 53 is from Eastfoto and that on page 56 from *Shqipëria Socialiste Marshon* (Socialist Albania on the March), Tirana, Naim Frashëri, 1969, p. 27.
5. In Hansjakob Stehle's book review, "Two Polish Leaders" (July-August), p. 65, lines 13-17, the reference to the death of Wladislaw Gomulka is believed to be inaccurate.

The Editors accept responsibility for and regret these errors.

Book Reviews

TO THE EXTENT that there has been a "population policy" in China, its broad outlines have changed as other developmental policies have taken shape and have themselves been modified. During the first few years of the Communist regime, people were seen only as a "good." Every mouth to feed was another pair of hands to produce; and more hands were clearly needed even in the rural areas—not only at planting and harvest times but also during the off-season, when mountains were being moved and rivers diverted for productive purposes. Then, spasmodically but unmistakably, a policy of population control to achieve lower birth rates became an important factor—one which Orleans regards as fundamental and Tien only somewhat less so. Contraceptive devices have become widely available during the last decade and especially during the last few years, as the quality of rural medical services has improved. A trend toward late marriages in combination with a puritanical dedication to work has also left its mark.

Thus, China has clearly passed the point where the rate of population increase has begun to decline. But then, according to Donald Bogue,² this probably is true of India, too, despite the vastly different conditions in the

² As stated in an unpublished paper entitled "Family Planning in India: Present Status and Problems," prepared for the Indian Centenary Seminar, Family Planning in India, October 23-29, 1972, p. 4.

two countries. Indeed, as one projects population trends for the whole world into the future, it appears probable that the proportions of the world's population accounted for by China and even India will continue to decline, while the proportions of Spanish- and Arabic-speaking peoples will increase.

If, as some claim, a new type of "demographic revolution" is in the making in China—one which, unlike that which has taken place in the West, will not depend upon extremely rapid urbanization—the evidence is far from clear as to how it will occur, or indeed whether it will occur at all.

It is puzzling to persons other than demographers why there are so many uncertainties about China's population and why a census, properly conceived, cannot be taken there. Orleans painstakingly examines these questions in his study, but the reasons he cites could apply just as well to India, which has nevertheless been able to conduct reasonably satisfactory censuses since independence, even though it is often thought of as a model of what a developing country should *not* be. The cause cannot be lack of the requisite machinery since no one questions the administrative regimentation that exists in the People's Republic, despite the disruptions of the Cultural Revolution. Can it be merely that the Chinese leadership simply does not care very much? Tien suggests otherwise, but the mystery remains.

Surely, an effective long-range agricultural policy must depend on adequate demographic information. Thus far, Chinese agriculture seems to have been able to provide the Chinese people with food and fibers at levels which have been at least a little higher than those required for bare subsistence. Of course, China, in its capacity as the only large and poor country in the middle latitudes (as contrasted with the tropics) has profited from the advances in modern scientific agriculture associated with Japan's several "green revolutions" at home and in Taiwan. Moreover, the ubiquitous small-scale mechanization that Mao insists is essential to the further development of agriculture—involving the utilization of pumps, threshers, compost and fodder grinders, etc.—is not only labor-saving but also more productive than tractors or aerial sowing, for example. Still, how long can this state of affairs go on?

Slowly, the curve of Chinese population growth appears to be assuming the S-shape to which all poor countries aspire.³ The astonishing question for which there appear to be no answers are: when, why, and how? Surely, this is the Chinese puzzle of all Chinese puzzles, and Messrs. Orleans and Tien can help us only a little in trying to solve it.

³ Such a curve reflects a period of slow growth, then a period of extremely rapid growth, and finally a period in which the growth rate tapers off.

Social Stratification: A Cross-Cultural Analysis

By Kenneth Lieberthal

STUART R. SCHRAM, Ed.: *Authority, Participation, and Cultural Change in China*. London, Cambridge University Press, 1973.

MURRAY YANOWITCH and WESLEY A. FISHER, Eds.: *Social Stratification and Mobility in the USSR*. New York, International Arts and Sciences Press, 1973.

BORIS MEISSNER, Ed.: *Social Change in the Soviet Union*. London, University of Notre Dame Press, 1972.

L. G. CHURCHWARD: *The Soviet Intelligentsia*. London, Routledge & Kegan Paul, 1973.

FIFTEEN YEARS ago conventional wisdom dictated the importance of studying the Soviet Union in order to understand the Chinese revolution. Because of the Sino-Soviet dispute and China's avowed departure from the Soviet model, that wisdom has unfortunately been abandoned. The present essay-review is intended to serve as a reminder of the methodological and analytical lessons that China specialists can derive from the Soviet experience.

Despite the very substantial differences in the development and stratification policies adopted by these two countries, the Soviet Union's experiences provide the most appropriate reservoir of data

available for analysis of the probable successes and difficulties in the massive social programs the Chinese have undertaken. No Western country has undergone a prolonged period of development during which the political authorities controlled the economy and consciously utilized their political and economic leverage to reshape the very thought of the people and the contours of the society they ruled. Even among Communist countries, only the Soviet Union has combined a very strong political system with collectivized and socialized means of production and a strongly-held, socially-oriented ideology over a sufficient period of time to present some solid evidence of the potential capacity of rulers with these resources to effect the social changes they desire. It is this that makes the recent development of sociological inquiry in the USSR so exciting for analysts of China, as well as intriguing in its own right.

OF THE FOUR BOOKS under review, those edited respectively by Stuart R. Schram and by Murray Yanowitch and Wesley A. Fisher provide the most solid basis for comparative analysis of this sort. The bulk of the Yanowitch-Fisher volume consists of the editors' translations of recent works by

Soviet sociologists, grouped into sections on new developments in Soviet social stratification theory, empirical results, and social mobility. These are bracketed by an editors' introduction on the development of Soviet studies on stratification and mobility and a concluding commentary on Soviet social stratification research written by Seymour Martin Lipset.

The Schram volume is a collection of essays by European scholars that do more than speak to the questions of "authority, participation, and cultural change in China" suggested by the title. Schram uses his 100-page introduction (more than one-third of the book) to place the Cultural Revolution in perspective through a brilliant analysis of themes in Chinese politics since the 1920's, focusing particularly on Mao's own role. This essay alone makes the book valuable. The other six contributions are on more functionally specific topics (levels of economic decision-making, education, rural industry and the internal transfer of technology, etc.), and their quality varies greatly. Taken as a group, however, they specify clearly the Maoist departure from the Soviet model of development and the related Chinese initiatives to forge a more egalitarian society.

The remaining volumes are less useful for the purposes of cross-

cultural analysis and therefore will be touched on only briefly here. The volume edited by Boris Meissner is dominated by his own 150-page essay on "Social Change in Bolshevik Russia" and also includes contributions on pre-1917 Russian society and on post-1917 social, educational, and economic policies. The book was originally published in German in 1966; the 1972 translation is interesting but in fact adds little to what other scholars (e.g., Alex Inkeles, Frank Parkin, Robert Feldmesser, David Lane, and the contributors to Cyril Black's *Transformation of Russian Society*) have provided in works already available. The book does, however, serve the useful purpose of reminding readers that it was only some 15 to 25 years after the Bolshevik Revolution that the decisions were made which ensured a markedly stratified social system in the USSR.

L. G. Churchward's *The Soviet Intelligentsia* is a rather narrow study of a crucial group in Soviet society. The author defines the intelligentsia as those people with a tertiary education, and he focuses his inquiry almost exclusively on the 1960's and 1970's. The study provides some useful data on institutions of the intelligentsia (the Soviet Academy of Sciences, research institutes, etc.), on the social composition and life styles of intellectuals, and on their relationships with the party apparatus. On the minus side, Churchward tends toward description rather than analysis, and rather dry description at that. The concluding chapters examining the types of interaction between intellectuals and the political au-

¹ Cambridge, Mass., Harvard University Press, 1960.

thorities probably provide the most interesting reading in what is on the whole an informative but not very exciting book.

WITH RESPECT TO the main focus of this essay, cross-cultural analysis is always methodologically hazardous, especially when one is dealing with data such as those in the Yanowitch-Fisher volume, where the authors do not relate in detail how their surveys were conducted and analyzed, and when one is comparing cultural traditions as diverse as those of China and Russia. With this caution in mind, what significant lessons does recent Soviet sociological research seem to hold for China?

First and perhaps foremost, the growing literature on Soviet sociology as exemplified by the Yanowitch-Fisher work underscores the extremely unsatisfactory nature of the Chinese data base for vigorous sociological inquiry. In essence, this data problem reflects the fact that part of any social stratification inquiry is concerned with attitudes (e.g., group identity) and preferences (e.g., ranking of career choices)—both of which must be determined through interviews and questionnaires. If the Chinese are undertaking this type of research, they are not making the results known publicly. Other physical indicators, such as income differentials, housing perquisites, and welfare benefits, also provide important information for analysis of social stratification. Here again, however, the Chinese data are grossly inadequate.

Indeed, one cannot help reading the Schram volume (which is of higher quality than many works on China) without being struck by the degree to which the analysts take affirmative statements by the

Chinese as solid evidence that programs are in fact being carried out effectively. Thus, for instance, John Gardner and Wilt Idema assert in their article on current educational policy that educational "aid to relatively affluent districts has been discontinued or reduced, but it has been reallocated to the poorer and remote rural areas" (p. 266) without citing evidence to bolster this contention and without indicating the scope and priorities of the transfer (if it in fact is taking place). An essay by Jon Sigurdson, which provides a detailed analysis of the Chinese plan for building up local industry and gradually integrating it with the national economy, uses data consisting primarily of qualitative (not quantitative) statements in the Chinese media combined with observations the author made while traveling in China in 1971. These data suggest that current investment patterns promote provincial or "regional" (an ambiguous term in Chinese) equality at the possible cost of increasing interprovincial and interregional disparities (pp. 215 and 231); however, the statistics to test the suggestion are unavailable.² (One might note in passing that the Soviet data presented by Yanowitch and Fisher show continuing, marked regional inequalities in income, career prospects, and attitudes—see, e.g., p. 81.) Indeed, with the exception of Andrew Watson's concluding essay on the family, interpersonal relations, and daily life, all the contributions to the Schram volume depict a rather rosy current situation in China largely on the assump-

² Such statistics are available for the 1950's and are currently being analyzed by Nicholas Lardy at the University of Michigan. No adequate statistics are available for the past 14 years.

tion that the Chinese programs mentioned in the media are in fact being carried out effectively in the various localities.

The Soviet data also sensitize the analyst to the degree to which highly aggregated categories are employed in most analyses of Chinese stratification patterns. In almost every sphere, the Soviet scholars have found group identities and lines of stratification more complex and finely gradated than the literature on China recognizes. For instance, one Soviet study found that there were at least nine large groups among Leningrad machine-building personnel that differed significantly in their socioeconomic characteristics (pp. 65-66). These gradations were found through empirical inquiry and probably fairly accurately reflect the real socioeconomic stratification within this Leningrad industry. These and similar findings throughout the book should give pause to China specialists who find themselves forced by their data to speak collectively of groups such as "workers," "technical specialists," "poor and lower middle peasants," "students," and, of course, "reds" and "experts." Such categorizing may well in fact aggregate out of existence the most meaningful cleavages in China in terms of the personal life experiences of the average Chinese.

Curiously, recent analyses of the Soviet Union, including the three Soviet-related books under review here, tend either to ignore or to play down the important question of the social and political considerations that leaders take into account when making economic decisions. The Schram volume and many other works on China earn a plus for pointing out the significance of such considera-

tions in the Chinese context. Again, however, the problem is that data are rarely available for realistic analysis of the strengths and weaknesses of the various options in the minds of the leaders and of the affected constituents.

The occasional exception to this statement only serves to prove the rule. To cite an instance that has come to the reviewer's attention, the Red Guards in the city of Tientsin during the Cultural Revolution released a body of documents relating to an earlier decision about whether Tientsin's capitalists should continue to receive interest on capital that had been socialized in 1955-56 beyond the seven-year expiration date (1962) originally set for payment of such interest.³ The problem arose in the wake of the disaster of the Great Leap Forward, at a time when the Communist leadership was anxious to win over the capitalists so that they would contribute their skills to improving the ominous economic situation.

The Tientsin materials consist of a series of reports providing the results of empirical investigations and of the deliberations of the authorities. These reports divide the capitalists into three groups, according to how much capital they put into the joint state-private enterprises formed in 1955-56. From 1956 to 1962, all capitalists received a 5 percent fixed annual interest on this capital, and many also earned high salaries in their jobs. The opinions of the various groups concerned as to whether interest payments should be abolished in 1962 or extended were briefly as follows:

³ The documents are translated in *Selections from China Mainland Magazines* (published in Hong Kong by the United States Consulate General), No. 619, June 10, 1968, pp. 1-79.

Large investors: counted on the interest payments for about 50 percent of current income and did not want to give them up; feared political isolation, however, if all smaller investors renounced their payments.

Medium investors: counted on interest payments for about 10 percent of current income; split over the question of renouncing further payments.

Small investors: counted on interest payments for only 2 percent of their current income; figured that by renouncing interest payments they would rid themselves of the "capitalist" label, thereby qualifying for workers' welfare benefits that would exceed their former interest payments; almost all, therefore, favored giving up the interest payments.

One opinion group in the Tientsin party: permit all who want to renounce interest payments to do so and allow all others to retain them (the small investors formed the large majority of Tientsin's capitalists); stress the need to reduce tensions with the former bourgeoisie and enlist their help in economic development.

Second (and eventually predominant) opinion group in the Tientsin party organs: retain fixed interest payments for most investors (including many who want to renounce them) so as to (1) maintain a clear dividing line between the bourgeoisie and the workers, (2) continue to provide material incentives to enlist the cooperation of the bourgeoisie, (3) retain a visible excuse for maintaining a political program aimed at transforming the bourgeoisie, and (4) make a better impression among Overseas Chinese with ties to native capitalists.⁴

⁴ *Ibid.*, pp. 25-26 and 28-42.

This brief list provides some sense of the complexity and close interrelationship of political, economic, and social considerations in such decision-making in a socialist country like China. The key elements that divided opinion on this issue—and probably most other matters of a similar nature in China—were more subtle than the public media indicated and more complex than most Western analyses could account for. The Soviet data now becoming available, although lacking specific reference to policymaking desiderata, at least serve as a vivid reminder of the great complexity of the socioeconomic situation hidden behind the oversimplified, ideologically-defined social categories mentioned in the public media. They also point up the types of difficulties that the Chinese can expect to encounter in trying to mold their society and their populace into a historically unique pattern of development.

THE MOST SALIENT phenomenon that emerges from the pages of Yanowitch and Fisher is the intractable nature of inequality resulting from differences in intellectual background and attainment under socialism.

Specifically, Soviet sociologists are finding that even in the 1960's and 1970's family background provides the single most important determinant of the occupational values of Soviet citizens. They are learning, moreover, that this characteristic has proved strongest among the intellectuals, where the countervailing attitudes conveyed to the children through a range of formal channels (schools, mass media, etc.) evidently have only a marginal impact (p. 224). In addition, continuing cognitive differentials in the nature, complexity, and

importance of various jobs are providing an ongoing source of inequality of fundamental importance (p. 102). Only better education, then, allows a person to move from one type of position to a qualitatively better job (p. 80). However, "cultural" (highly correlated with family) background determines the degree to which people will avail themselves of the educational opportunities afforded them. Thus the circle is complete, and the intellectuals maintain their positions through a number of generations.

A study of collective farms in the Kalinin Region, Krasnodar Territory, and the Tatar ASSR shows the ramifications of this syndrome. Here analysts found that increasing the degree of latitude of collective farms in decision-making did not make the collective farmers themselves feel that they participated more meaningfully in the affairs of the farms. Rather, the study concluded, "since a large proportion of the collective farmers do not have any skill whatsoever, nor enough education, all of the constantly expanding rights of collective farms are first of all personified in the managerial personnel and specialists . . ." (p. 112). Thus, increasing the latitude in decision-making in effect puts more power into the hands of the more educated personnel at the local level, for only they have the interest, competence, and confidence necessary to exercise fully these newly-available options.

This finding in the Soviet situation should caution analysts against equating decentralization of decision-making in Chinese agriculture with greater egalitarianism within the communes. Indeed, it seems possible that over the long run it will be China's

rusticated students who will increasingly monopolize the key decision-making posts in the communes.

In fact, the attempts at decentralization in all spheres of economic decision-making in China may, if the Soviet data can validly be applied to China, simply accentuate differentials within basic-level units, given the low level of mass education in China. Jack Gray's conclusion in the Schram volume that Mao's policies produce a type of socialism that is based on "popular power" may, therefore, overlook a critical element of differentiation among the populace (p. 157). And Mao's stress on the importance of mass education, along with his fears concerning the continuing "elite" culture of the intellectuals passed on through the family, seem fully justified, judging by the Soviet research. The same research also tends to support Mao's belief that this problem will persist for decades, perhaps for centuries, even under the conditions of socialist society.


To sum up, the findings of Soviet sociological inquiry obviously cannot be mechanically applied to China. Given the new research now being carried out in the USSR, however, Soviet writings are again becoming important for understanding the internal dynamics of the People's Republic of China. Recent Soviet research, as exemplified in the Yanowitch and Fisher volume, should sensitize China specialists to the methodological pitfalls inherent in analyzing the results of contemporary Chinese programs. And a careful look at the Soviet data can suggest some of the more intractable problems that the Chinese may face in their search for a socially equitable polity.



COMMUNIST PLOTTINGS IN THE FAR EAST



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COMMUNIST PLOTTINGS IN THE
FAR EAST

CHINA INCIDENT SERIES—No. 5



COMMUNIST PLOTTINGS IN THE FAR EAST

I. THE COMINTERN'S POLICY OF SOVIETIZING EAST ASIA

Immediately after the opening of the Sixth Congress of the Comintern in Moscow in the summer of 1928, the Soviet Union, "the birthplace of Communism," launched its first five-year plan of economic development of the country. Under the slogan "Overtake and Outstrip the Capitalistic Nations," the Stalin Government undertook to realize its ambitious project for the development of heavy industries. Giving the world the impression of eliminating hunger and destitution of the masses in time of need, the Stalin régime enforced severe and oppressive measures, and blindly pushed its plans forward.

For several years since 1928, Soviet Russia was so busily absorbed in its internal affairs that it had no reserve energy to show interest in its fundamental mission of "Sovietizing the world." Under these circumstances there was no alternative for it but to follow a peaceful foreign policy of international collaboration which has come to be known as "Litvinov Diplomacy." This is attested to by the fact that the Seventh Congress of the Comintern, originally scheduled to be held in 1930 (two years after the Sixth Congress), was postponed until July 25, 1935.

After completing the First Five-Year Plan, the Stalin régime moderated its extreme policy and launched its Second Five-Year Plan. Owing to this moderation and to bumper

crops obtained yearly following the execution of the Second Five-Year Plan, it was able to extricate itself from the critical situation prevailing at the time. The Soviet Government has now abandoned its former policy of establishing a sound national economic structure in European Russia and is feverishly engaged in replenishing its already formidable military force and in exploiting the vast natural resources of its Far Eastern territory.

At the Seventh Comintern Congress, Soviet Russia not only reaffirmed that it had no intention whatsoever of abandoning its attempt to Sovietize the world but, believing that conflict between the capitalistic and socialistic worlds was unavoidable, made clear its attitude to embark upon an active campaign for the realization of this ambition. Emboldened by the Soviet attitude, the Congress, to the indignation and perturbation of the Powers which had hitherto taken a peaceful attitude towards the Soviet foreign policy of "international collaboration," adopted a resolution in favor of making renewed efforts to bring about a world proletariat revolution. This resolution drew forth vigorous protests from the United States, Italy, Latvia and Japan.

Analysing the present international political situation, the Seventh Comintern Congress emphasized :

The world economic crisis and the collapse of capitalism have produced a disturbing effect on all international relations. The intense competition in the world markets, which have become extremely inactive due to the world economic depression, has changed to a severe economic war. The beginning of the repartitioning of the world is now an established fact.¹

The Congress recognized the necessity of organizing a definite united front for the destruction of both Fascist and

¹ Resolution passed by the Seventh Congress on August 20 on the basis of a report submitted by Delegate Erkoli.

imperialistic influences, and passed the following resolution.²

All the members of the Comintern are under obligation to give positive support to the oppressed people of colonies and quasi-colonies waging a war for racial emancipation, especially to the Chinese Red Army's struggle with Japan and other imperialistic countries and the Kuomintang.

The Chinese Communist Party, in particular, should endeavor to extend the front of the racial emancipation war of the Chinese and to concentrate in it all the racial power available for resisting the encroachment of Japan and other imperialistic countries upon China.

At the same time, as to the tactics to be employed in the struggle against imperialism, the Comintern passed a resolution in which it emphasized the necessity of bringing the movement of the weaker races under the protection of the Soviet Union. From the above resolutions the Comintern's Far Eastern policy and tactics may be generally understood.

Since the Communist activities in Europe have recently received a set-back owing to vigorous opposition put up against Soviet Russia by the European Fascist countries, the Comintern is now directing its spearhead of attack on countries in the Far East, whose defensive strength is rather weak. The marked expansion of the sphere of Communist influence in East Asia, the strengthening of the Soviet Far Eastern Army, and the Red advance in China are facilitating the materialization of the Comintern's scheme to Bolshevize the whole of East Asia. The important mission which the Comintern is carrying out, needs therefore to be watched closely.

² Resolution passed by the Seventh Congress on the basis of a report submitted by Delegate Erkoli.

II. CHINESE COMMUNISTIC ACTIVITIES AND RECENT MOVEMENTS OF THE RED ARMY

The Establishment and Organization of the Chinese Communist Party

It is needless to say that the Comintern has always been seeking an opportunity to bring as much territory in the Far East as possible under its control. For twenty years since the Russian Revolution of 1917, Japan has mustered her national strength to prevent the spread of Red influence and to maintain peace in the Far East. As a result those regions under virtual Japanese influence have been saved from the death grip of the Comintern. However, in China, whose national structure is extremely weak, the Comintern has been able to continue its activities either openly or secretly, through the medium of the Chinese Communist Party, which will be treated in the following paragraphs.

The Chinese Communist Party was established in Shanghai in 1920 soon after the arrival in China of Vertinsky who was despatched by the Comintern to formulate a policy for the propagation of Communist ideas in the Far Eastern regions. Since 1923 it has functioned as a branch of the Comintern. At the time of its formation it was nothing more than a meeting of a small group of men with similar ideals, but it was not long before it grew into a powerful organization. Its membership increased at an amazing rate and, during the period from 1925 to 1927, when the Party was at the height of its power, the number of members was said to have exceeded five hundred thousand. The acquisition of so many members at that time was due, however, to the open adoption of Sun Yat-sen's three great policies for the execution of the National

Revolution, namely, accord between China and the Soviet Union, the acceptance of Communism, and assistance to the peasants and workmen.

After the "Purification" coups d'état of April 1927 (executed by Chiang Kai-shek in Shanghai on April 12 and by Li Chi-shen in Canton on April 15), the Party gradually lost its influence until finally it was compelled to become an illegal organization resorting to underground tactics. But by the outbreak of such extraordinary incidents as the Canton Commune of December 1927, and the establishment of the Changsha Soviet in August 1930, it proved that it had by no means vanished into oblivion and that its latent power was not a negligible factor in Chinese politics. The Red Army and the Soviet district which were formed early in 1928 repulsed the five general drives of the National Army under Chiang Kai-shek and, in 1931, even went so far as to establish at Juichin, in Kiangsi Province, a proletarian regime called the Provisional Government of the Chinese Republic. The large-scale anti-Communist campaign, which had exhausted the greater part of the annual military expenditures of the Nanking Government, finally resulted in the expulsion of the main forces of the Red Army out of Juichin in 1934, but this abandonment of Juichin by the Reds is said to have been due to strategic reasons. The fact that without engaging in any pitched battle with the Nanking Army and consequently without suffering any serious losses in their fighting strength, the Red troops succeeded in moving westward in a vast contingent, made one forecast the future recovery of the Communist Army.

Concerning the Communist movement in China "The Report of the League Commission on the Sino-Japanese Dispute" (1929) mentions a few characteristic points and


indicates the fact that the Chinese Communist Party, as a strong adversary of the Nanking Government, has complicated relationship with the Nanking régime.

Communism in China not only means, as in most countries other than the U.S.S.R., either a political doctrine held by certain members of existing parties, or the organization of a special party to compete for power with other political parties. It has become an actual rival of the National Government. It possesses its own law, army and government and its own territorial sphere of action. For this state of affairs there is no parallel in any other country. Moreover, in China the disturbances created by the communist war is made more serious by the fact that the country is going through a critical period of internal reconstruction, still further complicated during the last eleven months by an external crisis of exceptional gravity. The National Government seems to be determined to regain the control of the districts under the communist influence, and to pursue in these districts, once their recovery is achieved, a policy of economic rehabilitation.

The Chinese Communist Party owed its birth to some ten leftist students and scholars who initiated the Chinese proletariat movement. The success of the Communists in growing into a powerful organization in control of a vast territory,³ despite the fact that economically, China was in a state of infancy, was due, in a measure, to the peculiar social conditions prevailing in the country at that time. Even given such social conditions, however, the phenomenal success of the Reds could not have been achieved without the spiritual and material assistance rendered by the Comintern which succeeded in winning over the support of

³ In a report submitted to the 17th Congress of the Soviet Communist Party, held in February, 1934, Dmitry Manuilsky stated that the Chinese Communist Party ranked next to the Soviet Communist Party, and its membership had increased by 120,000 to 416,000 during the past one year. Its sphere of influence extended over an area covering 700,000 square kilometers, while the regular Red Army numbered 350,000, and the partisans, 600,000.

MAP OF RED INFLUENCE
IN
THE FAR EAST



the Chinese people under the pretext of waging warfare against the foreign capitalists. Behind the activities of the Communist Party and the Red Army of China, which comprised a powerful influence against the National Government, however, could be discerned the plans of Soviet Russia working through the Comintern. Needless to say, the significance of this fact and the decisive role played by the Soviet Union in the Red advance in China cannot be over-estimated.

Recent Movements of the Red Army

As previously mentioned, the Chinese Communist Party established the Provisional Government of the Chinese Soviet Republic at Juichin in November, 1931, and, with the aid of its powerful Red Army, became a big threat to the Nanking Government. However, it was unable to withstand both the repeated large-scale campaigns conducted by Chiang Kai-shek's Central Army and the economic blockade of its territory, and was finally forced to abandon Juichin on November 10, 1934.

The main forces of the Red Army under Chu Teh and Mao Tse-tung, which numbered about fifty thousand, following their evacuation of Juichin, gradually moved westward to the frontier of Hunan, then marched through the provinces of Kweichow and Yunnan, and entered the northwestern part of Szechwan in June, 1935. There they succeeded in uniting with Hsu Hsiang-chien's powerful Fourth Red Army comprising 50,000 men, which had been active in the northeastern part of Szechwan Province. Its political commissioner, Chang Kuo-tao, was one of the leaders of the Chinese Communist Party. For eight months after their withdrawal from the Soviet capital, the Red forces

marched westward in a zigzag course for six to ten thousand kilometers, which is truly an astonishing feat in military history.

The following month, namely in July, the combined Red forces commenced their march northward to the frontier districts of Kansu and Chinghai. But in August, this Red Army, owing to a divergence of opinion among the leaders as to the course to be followed in future, split up. Mao Tse-tung, who advocated the northward march in order to establish a new Soviet district in close cooperation with the Soviets, proceeded northeastward and entered Kansu Province, while Chang Kuo-tao, who favored a southward advance, marched towards the Yaan region with the majority of the troops of Chu Teh and Hsu Hsiang-chien.

The troops which followed Mao Tse-tung to Kansu numbered twenty thousand and comprised the pick of the Red Army. From Kansu they advanced to Shensi Province, picking up associates wherever they could during their march. In the winter of 1935 they united with the divisions under Liu Tsu-tan and Hsu Hai-tung, which had been active in that province, and extended the sphere of influence of the Shensi Soviet Government. The Red troops under Hsu and Liu had their base in the north of Shensi Province for a long time and, after their union with Mao Tse-tung's troops, were able to adopt active measures in their movements.

At the beginning of 1935, the combined Communist troops advanced into Shansi Province and broke through the strong defences of Yen Hsi-shan's army. By February 1936, they had brought the greater part of Shansi under their control. They, however, withdrew to Shensi and

Diagram of the Organization of the Chinese Red Army





Diagram of the Organization of the Chinese Communist Party



Kansu when several divisions of the Central Army launched a large-scale campaign against them in September, 1936. The main forces of the Red troops have since then been operating in Ninghsia and Suiyuan Provinces.

Meanwhile, after separating from Mao Tse-tung, the main troops under Chu Teh and Hsu Hsiang-chien returned to Szechwan Province and roamed about in the district west of Chengtu up to the end of 1935. At the beginning of 1936 they entered Sikang Province and, in June, the same year, united with the forces under Hsiao Ko and Ho Lung, which had been active in the northern part of Yunnan Province and the southern part of Szechwan. The leaders of the combined army held a conference at Kantzu, in the north of Sikang Province, in the latter part of July, and decided to return to Kansu Province and to re-unite with Mao Tse-tung's troops. The meeting also decided to send the troops under Hsiao Ko and Ho Lung to Mongolia via Chinghai. The following month the vanguard of Chu Teh's troops commenced its march to Kansu.

After separating for some time, the above forces advanced into Shensi Province at the beginning of 1937 and assembled in the districts around Fushih (Yenan). With these regions as their base of operations, these Red forces, numbering seventy thousand, operated in Shansi and Suiyuan. When the Sino-Japanese Incident broke out, a portion of the Red troops, comprised of 20,000 men, was organized into the National Revolutionary First Route Army and is now fighting against the Japanese troops.

After the fall of Juichin, the seat of the Provisional Government of the Chinese Soviet Republic, the Chinese Communist Party changed its headquarters from one place to another. Finally in February, 1935, the Party's head-

quarters was reestablished in Shanghai, but owing to the growing intensity of the anti-Communist campaign conducted by the Kuomintang and the Blue Shirt Society, which resulted in the arrest of many of its members, the Party's influence declined for a time.

Under these circumstances the Communist Party abandoned its policy of devoting all its efforts to the establishment of Soviet districts, and adopted a policy of acquiring the support of the masses in the cities, namely, that of the intelligentsia, of the small propertied classes and of the laborers. They offered to unite with any organizations or parties, including the Kuomintang, for the purpose of organizing a united front against imperialism and Japan.

III. INTENSIFICATION OF RED MANOEUVRES IN THE FAR EAST AND THE CHINA INCIDENT

The Significance of the Red-Nanking Rapprochement After the Sian Incident

On the occasion of its westward advance in the fall of 1933, the Chinese Communist Party issued a statement in which it advocated the formation of a unified anti-Japanese front of the masses, military forces and politicians for the purpose of entering into an armed struggle with Japan. This was followed by a manifesto entitled "Anti-Imperialism and Anti-Japanese National Salvation," issued on August 1, 1935, in which it clearly indicated its intention to adopt the new policy. This change in the Communist Party's policy was a memorable one and has produced no small effect upon the Far Eastern situation.

The principal object of the manifesto in question was immediate anti-Japanese resistance and the elimination of

dangers to the Chinese race. For the realization of this aim, it called upon the people, the political factions, organizations and armies to discard past differences of opinion and enmity, and advocated (1) the establishment of an All China National Defence Government in cooperation with Soviet Russia and anti-Japanese régimes in the northeastern districts, and (2) the organization of the Chinese confederate Anti-Japanese Army, to be composed of the Red Army, the Northeastern People's Revolutionary Army and volunteer troops.

Believing that only an anti-Japanese popular front on a most extensive scale can subdue Japanese imperialism, the Central Political Bureau of the Chinese Communist Party, on the basis of resolutions passed by the Seventh Comintern Congress, issued on December 25, 1935, the following manifesto concerning the materialization of the new policy and the formation of the Anti-Imperialistic National Defence Government and the Confederate Anti-Japanese Army :

In order to make efforts for the immediate establishment of a National Defence Government and a Confederate Anti-Japanese Army and to incorporate the undivided support of the general masses, at the same time strengthening their fighting power, the Chinese Communist Party shall actively form popular organizations, armed forces and anti-imperialistic and anti-Japanese organizations, and shall unite the political and military factions. These shall be supported by the Soviet Communist Army. Furthermore, in order to place the anti-Japanese unified front on a wide and strong basis, the "Soviet Industrial and Agricultural Republic" shall be changed into the "Soviet People's Republic," and to unite all classes in the struggle against imperialism and Japan, the policies hitherto pursued in the Soviet districts shall be changed."

In relation to the manifesto cited above, another state-

ment which must not be overlooked in view of the fact that it voices the Communist Party's readiness to come to terms with Chiang Kai-shek, was issued on August 1, simultaneously with the manifesto.

The Chinese Communist Party and the Red Army have time and again announced their readiness to reach a military accord with Nanking's Central Army for the purpose of conducting a joint military campaign against Japan. If Chiang Kai-shek should suspend his military operations against the Communist Army and direct his campaign against the Japanese, the Chinese Communist Party is prepared to form a joint front with him and his army to fight Japan.

Meanwhile, the Comintern, taking advantage of the change in the Chinese Communist Party's policy, plotted to bring China and Japan to a clash in anticipation that, by stirring up animosity against Japan among the Chinese people, on the one hand, and by assisting Chiang Kai-shek to strengthen Nanking's resistance against Japan, on the other, the Island Empire would reach the end of its endurance and cross the Rubicon. Needless to say, these Comintern's manoeuvres were based on the Soviet's Far Eastern policy aiming at the prevention of a possible clash between Japan and Russia so that the latter's armament expansion program might be smoothly executed in order to be fully prepared to overpower Japan, and also at the complete Sovietization of China.

The Sian coup d'état executed by Chang Hsueh-liang in December, 1936, strongly reflected the trend of the anti-Japanese popular front movement. The amazing fact that Chiang Kai-shek was released on condition that the Nanking régime join hands with the Soviet Union, accept Communism and oppose Japan, cannot be readily understood without taking into account the manoeuvres of the conspir-

ing undersurface elements. As expected, later events conclusively revealed that the Sian coup was machinated by the Comintern which skilfully manipulated the former Mukden warlord and Yang Hu-cheng, commander of the Sian Army, through the agency of Wang Ming, Chinese representative of the Comintern in Moscow, and Chou En-lai, chief adviser of the Chinese Communist Party. The Sian incident afforded an opportunity to bring the Chiang régime under complete Red control, and consequently shattered every hope of compromise with Japan.

The markedly intensified anti-Japanese activities in China recently are one manifestation of the workings of the Red popular front and constitute a special phase of the world popular front movement. In consequence, the various countries of the world must fully realize the danger of the Comintern's special tactics which seek first of all to crush its immediate enemy, Japan, who is the sole barrier against the Communist menace in the Far East. After this is accomplished, the Comintern plans to prepare for a war to attain world supremacy and communization.

Needless to say, with the equipment of the Soviet Army being strengthened to a phenomenal degree⁴ for the protection of Red activities in the Far East, centering around China, and the situation today developing to a point where the violent resolutions of the Seventh Comintern Congress in favor of an open challenge to Japan are in process of materialization, the Japanese Empire, which has hitherto been fighting a lone struggle for the peace of East Asia against the Communist menace, cannot by any means ignore these alarming developments.

⁴ Foot note on the following page.

The Communist Plot to Usurp Nanking's Power is Bared by the China Incident

As expected, the next stage in the rapprochement between the Nanking Government and the Chinese Communist Party was the Sovietization of the Nanking Government. On July 8, the day after the outbreak of the current China Incident, the Central Committee of the Chinese Communist Party issued an anti-Japanese manifesto throughout the country urging "the decisive defeat of the enemy, the participation of the entire armies of China in the hostilities, the extermination of traitors, and collaboration between the Nanking Government and the Chinese Communist Party."

⁴ The growth of the Far Eastern Soviet Forces in recent year is shown in the following table.

	Full military strength	Divi- sions of sharp shooters	Cavalry divisions	Air- planes	Tanks	Sub- marines
1927 (Year before commencement of 1st Five-Year Plan)	—	4	1	—	—	—
Sino-Soviet clash of 1929	—	—	—	—	—	—
1931 (Outbreak of Manchurian Incident)	70,000	4	1	150	40	—
1933 (Commencement of 2nd Five-Year Plan)	170,000- 180,000	9	1.5	350	300	5-6
1934	240,000	11	3	650	650	20
1935	250,000	12	3	750	650	30-40
1936 (Conclusion of Japan-Germany Anti Comintern Pact)	300,000	15	4.5	over 1,000	900	40-50
1937	320,000	16	4.5	1,200	1,200 (including 180 heavy bombers)	70

In conjunction with this manifesto Chiang Kai-shek issued at Lushan on July 17, a statement, in the form of an interview, in which he announced his firm determination not to come to any form of compromise with Japan and to put up thorough-going resistance against Japan. His statement concluded with words to the following effect :

The Nanking Government has already decided its policy and attitude with regard to the Lukowkiao Incident. We are aware that conclusive sacrifice alone will be our lot when our country goes to war and that we do not expect the slightest good fortune. In the event of an outbreak of hostilities it is the duty of every part of the country regardless of whether it be the north or the south, and of every man to defend the country.

As may be clearly seen from the above statements, the policies of the Nanking Government and the Chinese Communist Party are fundamentally the same. An article published by the Communist leader, Mao Tse-tung, on July 23 declared that these statements have far-reaching historical significance, giving the impression that he was boasting of the victory of the Chinese Communist Party.

Since then all the policies of the Nanking Government have been subject to the control of the Communist Party, and many Communists and leaders of the popular front, who were imprisoned, have been released and are hailed as the first-line heroes in the anti-Japanese movement. The principal figures among those released are the veteran Communist leader, Chen Tu-hsiu, who was instrumental in the establishment of the Chinese Communist Party, Shen Tiao-ju, Wang Tsao-shih, Li Kung-pu, Sha Chien-li, Chang Nai-chi, Tsou Tao-to and Li Liang of the popular front faction, who are known as the seven heroes of anti-Japanism, Noulens, secretary of the Eastern Bureau of the

Comintern and chief of the Chinese Department of the Secretariat of the Pan Pacific Laborers' Union, who had been confined to life imprisonment. It is reported that the warrant for the arrest of Kuo Mo-jo, the well-known Chinese revolutionary scholar, has been cancelled, and he is now taking an active part in the anti-Japanese movement.

On August 21, China concluded a non-aggression pact with Soviet Russia. The Nanking Foreign Ministry, in an official statement issued on August 29, characterized the pact as simply a pledge made between China and Russia not to take any aggressive action against each other or to give assistance to a possible aggressor against either of the parties concerned, and as a condemnation outlawing resort to war as a means of settling international disputes. Lauding its conclusion, the statement added that, by virtue of its simple nature and noble ideals, the accord would not fail to become an important instrument subsidiary to the treaties concluded in the past for promotion of world peace.

However, any one who understands the real state of affairs in the Far East, can readily perceive the unreasonableness and irresponsibility of the Chinese explanation inasmuch as at a time when Japan announced at home and abroad that the fundamental motive which had prompted her to open hostilities against China was to prevent the Communists from controlling that country, the conclusion of such a treaty of amity with Red Russia and the wide opening of China to Communist influence can be construed as none other than a blunt challenge to Japan. If the spirit of other peace treaties really aims at the attainment of peace, China's contention that the Soviet-Chinese Non-Aggression Pact, which has produced no material results other than making a clash between Japan and China inevitable, will

become an important instrument subsidiary to the treaties concluded in the past for promotion of world peace, amounts to nothing but a meaningless theory. The despatch sent out by *Kokutsu* (Manchoukuo News Agency) on September 24, 1937, from Shanghai that Nanking and Moscow had drafted the following mutual assistance pact, together with the non-aggression pact, gives tangible proof of the dubiousness of the above conception :

1. China and the Soviet Union will establish a joint anti-Japanese secret defence committee, with headquarters in Ulanbator, Outer Mongolia.

2. Nanking and Moscow will cooperate in every way to attain as fully as possible the following objectives :

(a) International trouble will be created in either Europe or the Far East in order to render useless the Japan-Germany Anti-Comintern Agreement.

(b) The two countries will strive to scatter as much as possible the Japanese forces, through action on the Soviet-Manchoukuo border, the Manchoukuo-Outer Mongolian border, and the North, Central and South China fronts.

(c) The Comintern will work to disturb thought in Japan.

(d) Guided by the Comintern, secret tactics will be resorted to to undermine the Japanese military operations.


(e) To attain these objectives, the Soviets will take charge of operations in North China and along the Manchoukuo borders. Central and South China, with Shanghai as the center, will be under Chinese control.

3. The Soviet Union will supply China with volunteer soldiers and technical advisers, as well as arms and ammunition in case of need. This will be done on the following lines :

(a) China will deposit half of what it owes the Soviet Union in the State Bank of the U.S.S.R. to pay for the arms and ammunition it receives.

(b) China will pay fixed sums to the soldiers and technical advisers supplied by the Soviets. The Soviet Union will insure their lives in the "gosstrah" (Soviet State Insurance Bureau).

Chart Showing Network of Communist Ties
Closely Binding Moscow and Nanking.



(c) The first series shipment of munitions will be delivered to the Chinese between the end of September and the first of December. It will be transported via Outer Mongolia and Sinkiang.

(d) The first series shipment will consist of 362 airplanes of various types, 100 anti-aircraft guns, 200 pieces of field artillery, 120,000 shells, 150,000 rifles, 60,000,000 rounds of ammunition, 100 tanks, 1,500 anti-aircraft machine-guns, 2,500 motor cars and cycles, 5,000 horses and 2,000 carts.

4. In exchange for Soviet assistance, China promises to carry out the following undertakings:

(a) The Comintern will be given full freedom of action in China.

(b) China will grant to Moscow full freedom of political and economic activity in Outer Mongolia.

(c) Nanking gives Moscow the right to build a railway connecting Outer Mongolia, Sinkiang and China Proper. China will later make other concessions in North China.

(d) If and when the anti-Japanese movement ends in success, China will drive out, with Soviet assistance, all other foreign political influences now active in China.

With the Comintern having already succeeded in leading the Nanking Government to a decisive battle with Japan, the next thing which may happen is the downfall of the Nanking régime and the establishment of a Sovietized China. So long as China does not awaken to the actual state of affairs in the Far East and continues to pursue her anti-Japanese policy, she will not only be inviting her own destruction but allowing the Comintern parasite to eat into the heart of East Asia. One cannot afford to overlook the network of Communist ties (shown in the previous page) closely binding Moscow and Nanking.

Other than terror and massacre resulting from the militant rule of autocrats, what freedom, what equality, what justice can be found in the regions under Red control?

The twenty years of Communist government in Soviet Russia has produced merely a sordid mechanized society and a huge army, for the creation of which as many as seven million forced laborers were overtaxed even to the point of death. As the sole stabilizing force in the Far East, it is not by mere chance that the Japanese Empire, which has a national structure based on an unbroken rule for 2,600 years, staked its national destiny in a holy war against the advance of Red imperialism for the sake of moral cooperation and progress of the various races in East Asia. It is only Japan that can save China from being engulfed by the onrushing tide of Communism.

December, 1937





1938

CHINA: Search for Community, Raymond L. and Rhea M. Whitehead, Friendship Press, New York, 1978.

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CHRIST AND COMMUNITY IN NEW CHINA

Donald MacInnis' personal statement about the future of Christianity in China, which concluded the previous chapter, brings us into this chapter's subject. How are we, as Christians, to respond to the vast, complex, and controversial questions which China raises for us? How can we put the China event into a framework which makes sense for us in the church? What have we learned to help us in our search for community?

In order to approach these questions we have brought together here a number of different Christian views on China. We will first quote the words of Chinese Christian K. H. Ting and his wife Siu-mei. He is president of Nanking Theological College, and she teaches at Nanking University. Questions were put to them by a delegation including Eugene L. Stockwell which visited Nanking in 1976; Dr. Stockwell prepared the text of the conversation reproduced below.

The Tings make three points especially important in the context of this book. First, they do not expect the churches in China to play an active role in international ecumenical study and conferences. This fact means that the task of seeking the significance of China's experience for our search for community will fall to Christians outside China. Second, they point out the relationship between missions and Western power as a reason for Chinese people's loss of interest in Christianity. Another reason for church decline is that many of the physical and spiritual needs which led

people into the church have been met in the new political situation. It is not because of pressure from the government but because of these other historical and social factors that few people are attracted to Christianity, according to the Tings. Thirdly, the Tings feel that God is working in socialist China, and that for 2,000 years Christians have been able to appreciate good things that happen outside the church.

Following the Ting interview we outline some of the responses of Christians outside China to the China experience.

A CHINESE CHRISTIAN VIEW OF CHINA

Question: What is the place of Christianity in this society?

K.H. Ting: That question cannot be isolated from a previous question: What has been the place of Christianity in the past? The main influx of Protestant and Roman Catholic missionaries was in the 19th and 20th centuries. Individual missionaries may be quite innocent, but the missionary movement was part of a system. Missionaries were tools of imperialist aggression. We have strong views on this point. We do not think the missionary movement contributed to the liberation of the Chinese people. Indeed, it worked against our revolution in many ways. Christianity has never been a popular religion in China, even though there were more missionaries here than anywhere else. The number of converts was very small. Even today Chinese Christians have to live down that past association. Christianity has always been something foreign to China. It was not rejected before liberation because of military support from imperialist states. After liberation this situation was different. The Chinese people were angry with missionaries and churches. Many buildings had been built with money paid as indemnity for missionary lawsuits. Missionaries called in gunboats to enforce certain policies, and Chinese officers would get money from ordinary people—and that money was used to build churches. When you see a church you see something holy, but to many Chinese a church is a reminder of the imperialist past. . . .

Question: What is the role of the Religious Affairs Bureau in Peking?

K.H. Ting: Through it we are exempted from paying taxes on land. When some students wanted to study in the seminary, the Bureau would help see to it that they would not have other work. No indication was given as to study content.

In the past Nanking Seminary was like colleges in the US, but Chinese society has changed tremendously. Our Christian groups are very small. They are scattered. There are few Christian groups that still have paid

clergy. We cannot afford to maintain salaried ministers. With the new esteem in which labor is held, many of our ministers have wanted to identify themselves with the workers around them. They feel they do not want to be full-time ministers. Our Protestant Christianity is declergyized, deinstitutionalized. We do not have denominations. Ours is a postdenominational Christianity. Christians meet informally in homes or in any room they can borrow. They do not use church buildings. Part of the reason is finance—we cannot maintain them. Nanking once had 35 church buildings for 500 Protestants; they were attracted here because Nanking was Cheng Kai-shek's capital. We saw no point in maintaining these buildings; especially since the Cultural Revolution, Chinese Christians have not wanted to use them.

Given this situation, it is unthinkable to maintain a five-year course for students to educate them in an ivory tower to be a new elite. Christians will not support them anyway. I wonder if we would be able to get worthy young people in socialist China. We have some short-term training courses as experiments. We want to know what sort of theological education would be consonant with the new China. A certain amount of theological education can be sent to where the people are.

There is a constant decrease in the number of Christians. The Chinese have never been very religious. In the past, people went into religion mainly because of suffering. They wanted to get medical help, education, support. This drew them into the churches. Another reason for people to be religious in those days was the disharmony among families. In the new China the life of the people has improved a great deal. No one needs to worry about starvation, medical help, etc. That part of the Christian church's attraction no longer exists. Human relationships have not entirely changed, but they do not seem to bring about great pessimism and frustration. Given the imperialist background, it is understandable that the number of believers would decline. There have been new converts, but the number is not large.

Question: Would you agree that Christianity will die out in China when today's Christians die?

K.H. Ting: I would not be too surprised if that were to be the case, but I think that there are bound to be people, if in small numbers, who with all their political enthusiasm will still believe that it is Christian faith and teaching that will give them answers about ultimate questions. A Christianity which has divested itself of harmful background things can satisfy the needs of these people. But such people will be few. I do not foresee

the evangelization of all or even half of China. Protestants are about one-tenth of 1 percent of the population.

This has nothing to do with the Communist Party's policy on religion. The right to hold religious beliefs is to be respected. The party thinks that religion itself is bad, but building up socialist China is a task for all people who can be united in it—and is more important than struggling against religious faith. In the united front we say that we are to seek our common ground—opposition to imperialism and feudalism, for example. This is more important than maintaining our differences, as for instance over the question whether there is a God. The Chinese Communists are very anxious that Christians be within the united front.

We returned to China in 1951. People in Europe were very concerned about our coming back. They felt I would be killed or put in a concentration camp. I am still alive, and I do not believe that there is any such camp. We do not need it. I have been engaged in religious work all these years. I believe in the honesty of the Communists concerning the policy of religious freedom. But not everything needs to be kept intact as it was 27 years ago.

Question: What about the relationship between Chinese Christians and Christians in other Third World countries?

K.H. Ting: Some Christians think about this, others do not. In the West sometimes it is said that Chinese Christians are not permitted to come into contact with any foreign visitors except those who are approved by the regime. . . .

Some Chinese Christians are angry about these matters. Others think that in principle there is no objection [to meeting with foreign Christians] and that such contact may be beneficial.

But I think we must not expend much time and energy in maintaining international contacts, or in going to many meetings abroad. Our situation in China is entirely different from that in other places. For example, we are not interested in women's ordination . . . because we have discarded ordination entirely. We think many of these international gatherings are becoming places where the Soviet Union and the US contend with each other. The World Council of Churches is such a place. The US and the USSR cooperate when the goals are common; they contend when their goals differ.

Question: Do not First and Third World Christians need to be more aware of the Chinese Christian experience? How do we learn from you?

K.H. Ting: An analogy is the protective tariff. We are trying to make Christianity Chinese. We cannot afford to be inundated by Western or African things. We must raise our barriers. Later we can lower our tariff. . . .

Question: What is the place of the Holy Spirit here? Has it left the church because the church did such a bad job? Is it working in disguise through Marxism in China? Do Chinese get along well without dealing with the ultimate questions?

Siu-Mei Ting: As Chinese Christians we do not see Christianity and socialist China as opposed to each other. It is God working, whether in his name or not. We do not pose the question this way.

K.H. Ting: This question does not need to be raised with China only. For 2,000 years the Christian church has faced the question of how to account for things that are good and beautiful which are found outside the churches. Very few Christians would say that all these things are done by the devil in the garb of an angel. Christians have always appreciated good things that have appeared outside the churches, in science and in art. What is happening in China is only one of these things, on a larger scale. Christianity is not something political and socialism is not something theological, though outside there are discussions about the theological implications of the new China. China has not posed a new theological problem for the church. . . .

Question: What is happening to worshiping groups of Christians? What about Bible study?

K.H. Ting: Christianity in China is more and more a world view in the minds of those who still hold to the truth of the Bible. It is mainly a world view, not an institution. We have done away with institutions and church buildings. There is a very informal relation among Christians. They meet very informally, not even on Sunday mornings because factories are open on Sundays. Mostly Christians meet in the evenings, not necessarily every week, maybe once every two or three weeks, as they decide. They just meet as Christians. There is no ritual. They share their convictions or insights after studying the Bible or after certain experiences. The Quakers would feel at home. We do study the Bible. Our meetings are very simple, just meetings. . . .

The implications of the Chinese experience for our understanding of community life and Christian mission appear differently to different people. Somewhat arbitrarily we divide these responses into our four

groups. These groupings are not mutually exclusive, and the same person may fit into more than one.

First, the "Visible Church" approach affirms the primary and present role of the Christian community in China in achieving or assuring fullness of life. Verbal evangelism is therefore given high priority. Second, the "Lord of History" approach finds God's saving grace mediated through non-Christian as well as Christian persons and events and even sees signs of salvation in Mao's China. Third, the "Values" approach emphasizes the Christian dimension of Mao's values. Fourth, the "Mirror" approach seeks to re-define mission theology in light of China's experience and sees China as counterfoil, a positive but alien experience, through which we can see ourselves more clearly. We shall now look more closely at each of these four types and give examples of each.

THE "VISIBLE CHURCH" APPROACH

Those who take this path affirm the need for verbal evangelization of the people of China. Most significant for them are not stories of the changes brought about in China through the people's struggle to overcome oppression but stories of continued church activity in China. Some are content to leave the task of evangelism to Christians in China. Others see the need to mount a new "mission offensive" in China, although they might be split over the question of whether this should be a Western undertaking or a Third World Christian responsibility or an exclusive prerogative of overseas Chinese Christians. Others caution patience but still look to an eventual effort to incorporate more of the Chinese people into the church. This view often goes hand in hand with a negative assessment of revolutionary culture in China but not necessarily.

A pamphlet by Jonathan Chao, "The Spirit of God at Work in China," presents one variation of this approach.

In the recent (1975) Chinese Christian Students Summer Conference. . . I was asked to conduct a workshop on "Our Tasks Today for the Future Evangelization of China." Part of the workshop was an interview with two young people who came out of China recently. . . .

Q: When did you leave Mainland China?

A: I left China in July 1973.

Q: Are there Christians in your village?

A: Yes, there are, but only six families.

Q: How about your neighboring villages?

A: . . . In another village . . . there are many Christians. In fact, it has the largest number of Christians in our whole country. About 30 percent are Christians. . . .

Q: How did it happen that an entire production brigade turned Christian?

A: In that particular production brigade there were two or three families who were unusually zealous for the Lord. They were really willing to put themselves wholly unto prayer for the salvation of the entire production brigade. They helped everyone who needed help. Non-Christians in that village were exceedingly moved. They felt that it was great to be Christians. So they, too, believed in the Lord. Another important reason is that wherever Christians are active, the devil is also extremely active. At one time there were many in that village who were possessed by demons. Not a few were mentally sick, too. So all the Christians prayed for them, and they were healed, and the demons were expelled. . . .

Q: Do Communist cadres know about your Christian meetings?

A: Sometimes they do. In some instances it is quite marvelous. For example, in our neighboring village the mother of the secretary of the production battalion is a Christian, so there was nothing that he could do. . . .

This report reveals at least three ways by which the Spirit of God is working in China in bringing His people under the name of Jesus: (1) Healing the sick by His power, (2) expelling demons by His Spirit, and (3) using the Chinese family system for evangelism. . . .

Chao's emphasis is on bringing Chinese people into the visible church, bringing them "under the name of Jesus."

A similar concern for the visible church is expressed by Father Domenico Grasso, S.J., in a book edited by Michael Chu, *New China: A Catholic Response*. Father Grasso opposes two statements which suggested that God's primary action might possibly be outside traditional church and mission structures. One was Hosea Williams' question, "Is it possible that God has become so disgusted with the 'believers' that he has decided to turn the moral future of mankind over to nonbelievers?" The other was an ex-China missionary's comment that "our mandate has been withdrawn," and "the end of the missionary era was the will of God." Writes Father Grasso:

We cannot, however, accept these opinions because they are contrary to the Bible which is the word of God for us. The word of truth entrusted to the Church must, with Christ's help, resound to the ends of the earth (Acts 1:8) and until the end of the world (Matt. 28:16-20). No. Humanity's religious future remains entrusted to the Church no matter how imperfect its members may be. God did not turn to nonbelievers; he has not taken back the mandate conferred on the apostles and their successors, the college of Bishops united to the Pope. The missionary era is not over and will not be over so long as there are people to be evangelized including those living in the New China.

In this vein, Protestant theologian Charles West writes:

Evangelism must be a dimension of our Christian responsibility for China. Despite all our personal and social sins . . . we are called to make known the ways of the judge and redeemer of the world to all peoples. If there is not an evangelistic quality in our entire relation to other people and cultures we are not really being serious about the God in whom we claim to believe. Unless we care about, pray for, and support however we can the church in China in its mission, we are not really trying to respond to God's purposes there.

A common factor which holds these views together is the phrase *extra ecclesium nulla salus* or "outside the church no salvation." True, some in this camp may hold that a preliminary or partial or limited salvation may be possible in non-Christian contexts, but the visible church is necessary for the fullness of salvation, and this requirement is the most important factor to consider when viewing any situation, including China.

THE "LORD OF HISTORY" APPROACH

The second type of response falls loosely under the label "Lord of History," emphasizing God's action beyond the church. Most of those who take this path see the possibility of significant saving works of God being manifested in non-Christian, even anti-religious contexts. This group ranges from the pragmatic to the radical, that is, from those who simply observe things in China which seem to be of God and therefore to be affirmed to those who make this perception of God's action outside the church the grounds for quite new thinking.

A former Canadian missionary to China, E. H. Johnson, who made return visits in the 1970's, reflected on the accomplishments of the new government, then on Christian response:

For Christians, what is happening to the people of China—a fourth of the human family—is profoundly important. We believe God created all, and is concerned to save all.

I can't imagine, though, anything more counter-productive and showing less faith in the Holy Spirit than blasting in the Gospel from the Philippines or Bible smuggling, as some suggest. These are part of the devious ways in which the West established its domination in the past. . . .

I suggest these guidelines:

1. Don't mount a missionary team ready to flood into China when the doors are open. The doors may never again be open to certain kinds of foreign missions.
2. Wait until the Church in China reaches out a hand for help. Its big-

gest problem is not the government but the question of how Christians express themselves in relation to the new society.

3. Listen to the lessons China has for the church. Try to understand its radical transformation of political, ideological, social and religious structures.
4. Prepare men and women now in Chinese language and knowledge of contemporary China to be ready for whatever the future calls for.

Another former missionary, Earl Willmott, goes further in suggesting the possibility of faith even for an atheist. Willmott writes:

The heroic old peasant who led his production brigade to turn their rockstrewn valley into terraced fields told of his own emancipation and said, "But if a person thinks only of his own emancipation and happiness, he may perhaps slide down the wrong road." I realized I had not heard a Chinese speak of seeking happiness. Perhaps a life of devoted serving has no need to seek personal goals.

Is not all this like Jesus' teaching? In their dedication to act "for the good of the people," are the Chinese people not committed to "doing the will of God"—though with no knowledge of the name of "God"? Consider Jesus' parable of the two sons. When the father asked them to go and work in the fields, the first said "no" but he went; the second said, "I go," but did not. Jesus asked, "Which did the will of his father?" In 1950 in Chengtu I heard two Chinese pastors preach on this parable; both suggested that Christians were so often like the second son, while the leaders of the revolution, who say "no" to God, were like the first.

And that raises a question. Is it not possible to have faith in God and yet not believe in the idea of God? We might reflect on this quotation from the French Marxist, Roger Garaudy: "What gives meaning, beauty and value to life, is for the Marxist as for the Christian, to give oneself without any limit to what the world, through our sacrifice, can become." Somehow I cannot help thinking they have been more successful in China than in the Christian church in the West in bringing people into this life-giving experience.

In the examples given above the authors, former China missionaries, have seen something positive in China and are grappling with the question of how to respond. Theologian C.S. Song takes up this whole issue of "salvation outside the church." The unwillingness of Western Christians to see "saving value" in non-Christian cultures is felt to be a subtle way of maintaining a Western imperialist stand. China causes trauma because it challenges the very notion of Western superiority and in doing so forces us to look at our Christian roots in a new way. "What does it mean," asks

C.S. Song, "when atheistic Communist regimes . . . act as liberators from poverty, starvation, social injustices, and human indignity?" It means that we have to see the life of the church differently. "An understanding of Christian mission in terms of evangelizing and converting the pagans and bringing them into the fold of the church is irrelevant in the context of modern China," concludes Song. The prophet Isaiah saw Cyrus, a Persian, as an agent of salvation. "Unless we, like Isaiah . . . begin to see those alien to our faith as making a contribution to the development of human community, as agents of God, our reading of history will be one-sided. . . ." Many would see Mao Tse-tung in a role analogous to that of Cyrus.

Francis Sullivan, Jesuit writer, comments on the view of C.S. Song and others whom, he says, give a secular definition of salvation—seeing it as "liberation," "humanization," or "freedom to be human." Sullivan feels that this approach, which refuses to center salvation in the institutional church, may be truer to a Christian understanding of God. By rejecting a church-centered idea of salvation they opt for what is really a more God-centered one, writes Sullivan. God is given a more central role in salvation history because God's acts of salvation are found not only in "sacred" contexts but in every process of genuine liberation and humanization, even in China, where God's very existence is denied. Sullivan says that this concept of salvation is sound as long as salvation is seen as an ongoing process and not a final accomplished fact in some social movement. God's saving action, he says, can be recognized "in every event of human history whereby people are saved and freed from any of the various forms of bondage and oppression to which 'the sin of the world' has subjected them."

Father Sullivan sees salvation as broader and more inclusive than just salvation of the soul. The liberation of humanity from sinful structures of oppression and exploitation is truly a work of salvation. "As Israel came gradually to understand that Yahweh was not just a tribal god, but the God of all nations and people, so also we have to understand that Christ . . . is Lord not just over the 'Christian' nations, but over all peoples, whether they know him as Lord or not."

Another Catholic writer, Joachim Pillai, is also in the "Lord of History" group. Pillai writes:

It is true that the central aspect of freedom, as freedom for God, . . . is absent in Mao's vision of liberation. But even here I would say that this dimension is not explicitly denied. . . . Just as God is not unambiguously present in the Christian political and ecclesiastical systems, so too He is not totally absent in the Communist phenomenon, if we know how to read between the lines and discern the presence of God at points of tension and liberation in society. Christ is really present there where men, women, and children are struggling to be human.

The "Lord of History" approach, we can see from these several authors, tries to move away from a narrow view of God which confines divine power to the visible church or equates it with Western culture. It sees the power of God at work in the world in many diverse ways and does not limit salvation to the Christian community.

THE CHRISTIAN AFFIRMATION OF MAOIST VALUES

The third response focuses on the "Christian" quality of Mao's values. It does not give a direct answer to the question of the visible church, although authors in this group may deal with that question in other contexts.

The essence of this response is the affirmation that the experience of the people in China today, their way of living and interacting, is in some way "Christian," aside from any considerations about religious adherence or belief.

Perhaps the most forthright expression of the Christian quality of Maoist values is in the writings of British Christian and scientist Joseph Needham:

China is, I think, further on the way to the true society of mankind, the Kingdom of God if you like, than our own. . . . We don't know what back-slidings and failures will occur, but on the whole, I think they are more advanced.

You will naturally ask about the situation of the Christian churches. They are exceedingly weak. . . . I don't believe there has been any great number of Christian martyrs. I am much more inclined to think that many Christians have felt that their aims were being implemented by revolutionary Chinese communism and that they ought to join up with it. . . .

And so one comes to the great paradox that, as I see it, in China they are implementing the second great commandment far better than has been done by Christendom at any period, while at the same time rejecting altogether the first one. . . . I think China is the only truly Christian country in the world in the present day, in spite of its absolute rejection of all religion.

Carman St. J. Hunter has also pondered the Christian significance of Chinese values and writes of her encounter with China:

Not only are values—such as friendship; co-operation; self-sacrifice; rigid honesty; full participation of women; moral persuasion as the means of social control; the breaking down of differences in the treatment and status of citizens; productive labour; trust in the intuition of the masses to embrace the good when the issues are understood—all proclaimed verbally, but they are also internalized as part of a total system of education. . . .

If values are criteria for interpersonal and communal life, beneath them lie the social and religious myths which provide their substance. Every society develops a way, or ways, of understanding and responding to deep existential forces—the mystery and deepest meaning at the centre of being; the inevitable experience of anguish and ecstasy; the tragic dimension in life. Myths develop from the history and experience of a people. They are an expression of how participant peoples see truth, but they are not truth itself. . . .

In China the Long March is not only an actual historical event, it is also basic to the dominant myth of the present society. It stands for the transforming journey from the old society to the new. It represents the long struggle against all the afflictions of humanity and holds the promise of final victory not only for the Chinese but for all the hopeless of the earth.

Those whose lives reflect the spirit of self-sacrifice and service to the people are revered by the masses and their story told over and over. Salvation is won through suffering. Death is given meaning within the movement of the whole people toward the new future. The Cultural Revolution, with its recognition of the growing dangers of elitism, is symbolic of a process that Christians might describe as recognition of sin, repentance, confession, forgiveness and exaltation through reconversion to the ideals of revolution.

The "Christian" value-system of Maoist China is also perceptible in the comments of Wu Yi-fang, about changes since the revolution. The following is taken from a report written by Eugene Stockwell of the National Council of Churches.

Later in the morning four of us had a chance to talk with 83-year-old Wu Yi-fang, a distinguished and articulate woman who years ago, before 1949, was President of Ginling Women's College, a Christian university in Nanking. Over the years she gradually became impressed with the way the new government really helped people, beyond mere social service. She slowly became convinced of the rightness of Mao's thought, helped with provincial educational policies, and eventually became an enthusiastic supporter of the government. In time she gave up her Christian faith as well. Here we were talking to a very Christ-like woman, a beautiful person, who avowedly had given up her Christian faith. Two quotations stick with me. She is deeply impressed with the way neighbors help each other in the new society neighborhoods. The Chinese phrase is: "If there is difficulty in one place, then help comes from eight sides." The other comment related to Chairman Mao and Premier Chou En-tai, both of whom Mme. Wu admires greatly. She has concluded, admiring these men as well as the present new Chairman Hua, that "the basic qualification of a person is unselfishness." That is not too bad a Christian statement, for an ex-Christian non-Christian! One cannot help but recall the phrase, "By their fruits you shall know them."

William Small, a Canadian missionary in China from 1941 to 1952 who returned for a visit in 1973, reported on how he continued to find in China a learning experience for himself as a Christian.

While those concerned with Christian values cannot take exception to the high moral principles espoused (in China) and, indeed, must be supportive of the objective promoted, the question of the means of bringing about desired change is clearly important and of concern. Though there was insistence on adherence to ultimate goals and at times excesses must have prevailed in dealing with subversive groups, persuasion was known to be the major instrument used in promoting the concept of the desired new man and the new society.

China's many problems are far from resolution, but the pervasive atmosphere of self-confidence and enthusiasm, of discipline and dedication, of overriding collective purpose and cooperation, of constructive criticism and self-criticism suggest that this nation is on an historic mission. The short period last summer (1973) provided another significant learning experience and left me wondering how an avowedly atheistic regime could strongly emphasize so many humane qualities supporting the dignity and equality of man, and how our own society, with a large percentage of the population professing Christians and with the wide-spread influence of Christian institutions, was lacking in so many of the above-noted characteristics.

Raymond Fung, a Chinese Christian in Hong Kong, wrote after visiting China:

There is a lot of interest in learning English. A taxi driver checked with me his pronunciation of "zoo" and "memorial" in order to "better serve the people." A cadre showed me the English translation of "Quotations from Chairman Mao," asking me point-blank whether the translation was in any way as good as the original. . . . I went over a quotation and suggested that the phrase "we must endeavor" could be replaced by "we must strive. . . ." The Communist seemed pleased. He took down the word and pronounced slowly in English, "We must strive to serve the people."

Eventually, the trip was over. Near Sheung Shui in the British sector, beside the railway line, I saw a cross on a church wall. And then I suddenly came to realize that the cross can never make sense to my seven hundred million fellow Chinese unless we who claim to be Christians also can say honestly, "We must strive to serve the people." Or, cross or no cross, there is no audience.

Those who find worthy Christian values in China are often led to a searching attitude about how Christian faith influences society in the West. In 1976 a group of coal miners from Nova Scotia, a miner's chorus called "Men of the Deeps," toured China. They had the chance to see the life of

their counterparts, Chinese coal miners. They affirmed that "Chinese culture and values today resemble nothing so much as a religious society without God." One of the miners, an active Catholic layman, felt that "China was, in effect, practicing Christian principles with a seriousness that few Christians can match." In a late night conversation on a homeward bound bus after the China trip he said to a friend:

You know what bothers me? We're supposed to be a Christian society, and they're supposed to be an atheist society. But what kept coming to me again and again, and I couldn't get away from it, was this: I kept on feeling that, more than ours, their society was pleasing to God.

Many people then, coming from a variety of backgrounds, have felt that values in China seem more "Christian" than those in the West. What one does with such an observation is another problem. A British Christian leader, Simon Barrington Ward, feels that values are not the whole question:

Too much talk about Mao's Christian values misses the point. Christian faith is not ultimately about values, which are still part of the Law. It is about grace. It is about the fact that healing of our contradictions and the reconciling of our oppositions must continually well up among us out of a love from beyond ourselves, out of . . . cross and resurrection. We are all indebted to the great stimulus of Mao's China. But perhaps it is in the as yet tiny but growing traces of a new, free, and practical Christianity (in China) . . . that we must discern the final clue of the meaning of the quest for true human fulfillment.

What Ward is doing here takes us back to the first group—the "visible church" approach, since he finds the "final clue" to human fulfillment in the small Christian communities in China. Others who are impressed by Christian values in China might move toward the "Lord of History" approach, giving less emphasis to the institutional church. Danish theologian Johannes Aagaard's view, for example, is quite different from Ward's:

Salvation today—in China? No need of the question mark. The Kingdom of God—in China? How can it be questioned? But the church and missions in China? That is quite another matter, not unimportant, but not *that* important. A Norwegian old missionary lady once said, "Mao has done much good for China, and China is more important for God than the church in China." This is a true insight. God saves the world, and the church is meant to be an instrument of that salvation. But if it has become a bad instrument, it will be cast away. As an instrument it has no value in itself. And God can find new instruments of His salvation. That is not only so in China.

CHINA AS A MIRROR FOR REFLECTING ON CHRISTIAN LIFE AND MISSION

Another response to China is that which takes the Chinese experience as an occasion for thinking anew about theology and Christian life. Of course writers referred to in this category may also reflect on values, God in history, and the visible Church. What is of interest here is those persons, or those passages, which take such reflection as the central motif. China challenges many areas of our thinking about the mission of the church and the style of the Christian community life. This challenge may, in fact, be the most important aspect of our study of China.

Raymond Fung suggests that the experience of China may provide some new insights on mission thinking of importance to other parts of the world. The new approach, he suggests, would put primary emphasis on the missionary as a learner. The missionary would not be the expert who comes with "authority" but rather a learner who comes to be with those considered to be culturally equal. The People's Republic of China is culturally equal with the West. Foreigners, including Christians, should be prepared to learn and to relate as equals.

Eugene Stockwell after visiting China found that the experience raised many questions about community life of the church here in North America. He lists six questions which forced themselves upon him as he reflected as a Christian on what he witnessed in China:

1. What does the People's Republic of China teach us about the meaning of participatory democracy?

Though it is true that the Chinese government is authoritarian and directed from above, it is impressive to note the many ways in which the Chinese people, particularly at the local and community levels, determine their own destiny and participate in decision making about matters closest to them. Neighborhood committees, self criticism groups, study gatherings and all sorts of local organizations provide persons with what seem to be almost too many opportunities to think through their own activities and determine their day to day tasks. The concept of "democratic centralism" as applied to production goals for communes and factories means that production targets initiated by central economic planning are eventually received at local commune and factory levels for ample discussion, amendment, alternative suggestions and potential new directions. Thus, peasants and workers participate actively in many of the detailed plans that most immediately affect their work life. As we compare this reality with what occurs in the West I cannot help but wonder whether employees on large

farms or in large industries in the West have really as much to say about their work and future as the Chinese do.

2. How does the People's Republic of China challenge our concepts of justice?

As we traveled in China, we from the United States tended to ask one wrong question: "What is your salary?" Often skilled Chinese professionals, such as surgeons or teachers, would respond with a blank look wondering why this question was asked. If the basic motivation for work is to "Serve The People" then the matter of monetary reward for the service is quite secondary. What in fact happens in China is that people are paid financially for their services within certain minimum and maximum ranges, none of which are high by U.S. standards, for the fundamental criteria is justice for all so that no one should starve and no one should be rich at the expense of others. The result is a fundamental justice which extends to pay scales but also to many other areas of life where it is expected that no person or family will have greater rewards than others. This is not to suggest that perfect justice has been achieved in China but it is to say that in principle and in intention Chinese society places the concept of justice at the heart of its system. One could wish that in Western societies some such commitment to justice might be as evident.

3. How does the People's Republic of China challenge our views of freedom?

One of the recurring questions as we traveled through China was: "What does freedom mean?" We could see that the Chinese are often assigned tasks that they may or may not want. Freedom to travel from one area of the country to the other or outside of the country is strictly controlled. It is said there is considerable freedom of thought but as one views "cultural performances" one sometimes wonders whether artistic freedom is real. On the other hand, indiscriminate license is barred so that people do not have the "freedom" to kill themselves with drugs or to starve or to be degraded by others. Freedom is seen not simply in individualistic terms but is seen in terms of the dignity of the whole community and nation. Freedom also means lack of subservience to foreign governments and the ability to stand as an equal in the world community.

4. In what ways does the People's Republic of China help us to understand the nature of what is "political"?

In the West we tend to separate politics out from much of the rest of our life whereas in China all of life is seen to be intentionally related to political decisions that affect the total community. If one is concerned for the whole community or for the improvement of that community it is unavoidable that political activity be at the heart of change or improvement. The Chinese social system suggests to Westerners that we be more realistic about our political options and responsibilities. It also suggests to Western observers who consider themselves to be Christian that there is no possibility of separating out a religious faith from the choices of political options because if faith is concerned with the whole person and the community it must deal with the political choices the person and community must make.

5. How does the People's Republic of China press us to understand the ways God works in history?

It is not easy to determine exactly how God works in the history of any nation. I believe that during the last quarter century God has not been absent or far from the Chinese people. I believe that the vast social improvements in China are the work of the Holy Spirit and even among those who call themselves atheists and would not acknowledge the Holy Spirit. Also, a part of God's work in China may be to challenge us in the West to relook at our own social system where injustice or repression is institutionalized or condoned.

6. As we look at the People's Republic of China, are we not pressed to ask new and profound questions about ourselves and our society? If so, how do we begin to ask appropriate questions about ourselves and our society?

We do not have to use the Chinese society as a model for the West and, indeed, the Chinese warned against a description of their society as a "model." However, there are large questions raised for us as we compare our social institutions and systems with those of the Chinese. One question, for instance: Are our nations and societies of the West deeply committed to justice and fairness for all, the abolition of drugs and other factors which destroy human life, the abolition of hunger and the search for human dignity for every person. Because nearly a quarter of the human race has been able to institutionalize some of these commitments in daily life and community organization, it would seem that the rest of the human race could move toward similar commitments even though all the theo-

logical baggage and political system of the PRC are not swallowed whole. May it not be that in the West we could begin to address the fundamental human and humane questions the Chinese society has been wrestling with in recent years so that priority in our efforts might be given to the improvement of the lot of people on a just basis rather than to such matters as nuclear defense, the arms race, and protection of opportunities for the privileged to maintain their privileges and so on?

These questions also require us to look at Chinese history again in the light of the biblical message. The re-telling of the story of the Good Samaritan, by Jonas Jonson, gives a new perspective on the Chinese experience:

A country, a culture, was on its way through the centuries. It fell in with robbers, who stripped it, beat it, and left it at the roadside half dead. The robbers were many: graft and corruption, war lords and generalissimos, foreign powers, Western merchants and missionaries. And China was helpless. A priest passed by: a Christian or a Buddhist or a representative of any other established religion, too concerned with religion to be willing to get his hands dirty with social reform and politics, not to speak of the violence required to put China on its feet.

A Levite, another religious professional, also passed by on the other side. Was he one of those well-meaning and informed people who see the need but have no means of changing the situation? Was he proceeding to Jericho to ask others to come and help, like all those pleading with Western countries to assist China? Was he a Confucian, more concerned with the preservation of the moral and social position of the elite than with the plight of the downtrodden, the poor and the exploited?

Finally the Samaritan arrived on the scene, one who was despised by the political and religious authorities, an outcast with no respectability. In Chinese eyes, he could be no other than Mao Tse-tung and the Chinese Communist Party. The wounds made by the imperialist robbers were healed, national dignity was restored, and armed protection was given. Here was the neighbour, the comrade, who was willing to go down into the ditch and lift the robbed and wounded from below. Here was the one deserving the love of the people and setting the example for a life style and a political programme.

Perhaps from the Wisdom Literature of the Hebrew scriptures we can discover some wisdom on China and Christian consciousness. Mission theologian Kaiharine Hockin, who was born in China and served there as a missionary, thinks so. The following section is her reflection on Ecclesiastes, China, and the Christian community.

Kohcleth, the Preacher, writes in Ecclesiastes that God has made everything "beautiful" in its own time. He reflects on the appropriateness of different human activities in varied situations:

"For everything there is a season, and a time for every matter under heaven;

- a time to be born and a time to die;
- a time to plant, and a time to pluck up what is planted;
- a time to kill and a time to heal;
- a time to break down and a time to build up. . . ."

(Eccles. 3:1ff)

Popular folk thought and song make these words familiar. It is interesting that this Wisdom writer, who lived about three centuries before the Christian era, was doing for his day the reflection on life which is so modish in our own day as the "Action/Reflection Life-style." The biblical wisdom, frozen by posterity into tight, compact, almost quaint proverbs, when seen in this more dynamic context does bring us insights which are missed when these writings are seen simply as collected precepts.

All this relates specifically to North American Christian understanding of China today. The great years of Western missionary expansion assumed that the "Christian nations" had the responsibility to carry the gospel throughout the world. There was a particular urgency since without this agency there would be vast geographical areas where Christ would never be known. The agents of mission were generally people of white skin and of some variety of European heritage—from the "Christian civilizations."

By mid-twentieth century, when the People's Republic of China started on her new course under the administration of the Chinese Communist Party, the missionary enterprise had been forced to discover themes such as "Mission in Six Continents" and "Partnership in Mission." We of the West are still struggling with the implications of this reality. Our "managerial attitudes" make it difficult for us to relax enough to be, in truth, partners and sharing comrades in a witness which (in Ecclesiastes' sense) is *timely*, having the deep appropriateness summoned by God's beautiful creation!

And how does China relate to these themes? When the Korean War hastened the withdrawal of Western personnel from China, we spoke of this door "closing" to Christian witness. A book written at the time was "The Lost Churches of China." They were lost to us, the old friends. We thought they were lost to God as well. After all, were we not His servants and messengers?

In 1951 the North American churches researched the "Lessons from China." On the whole, the learnings of that study were personal and individual, not structural. Missionaries failed as people to recognize the values of other cultures. There was the failure, too, to shed paternalistic attitudes and privileged standards of living. The entanglement of mission policy with the expansion of colonialism was recognized and regretted. The analysis went only part way, though, in recognizing how this affected the credibility of the Western missionary enterprise.

The *Chinese Christian*, as one analyst of that time pointed out, was often attracted to the egalitarian policies of the new government because of his or her Christian conscience. This led to a division between foreign missionary and national colleagues. We struggled to understand how significant segments of the Christian community under Communist rule could affirm their civil loyalty. To North American Christians, Communist rule seemed to demand Christian protest. We saw a nation ruled by leaders who denied the reality of Deity. *Chinese Christians* saw the work of a government on behalf of the disadvantaged.

We were challenged to shift grounds in the quest for understanding. "How can we perceive the signs of the times, and what God is doing in China as the sovereign ruler of human history?" The ground of consideration became the whole China scene, rather than the narrower focus on our daughter church.

One Christian visitor to China was particularly interested in trying to meet Christians and to visit church buildings, with a one-track flow of questions and requests. Finally the tour guide, who had been trying to let the visitor know about the achievements of the Chinese people in many areas of their life, responded with a bit of exasperation, "Are you only interested in this tiny minority of believers in our country? Have you no concern for anything but a group in which you people have an old vested interest?" We assumed the world existed for the strengthening of the church. Now it is necessary to realize that the church exists for the world. We must reflect on the relationship of the Chinese experience to God's purposes for human life.

To look at the panorama and quality of a people's life in order to learn from it is different from seeing only the potentialities for conversion and saving of souls. As the canvas stretches more widely we gain a new awareness of salvation activity to which we were previously blind. From the noted scientist Joseph Needham to the Cape Breton coal miners came the recognition that ordinary Chinese society has achieved more neighborly concern and interpersonal justice than most other nations of the world

today. Such impressions and opinions may not be accepted easily. They have to be taken seriously, however, if one is concerned with faithfulness in mission. For we, who are committed to the effort to achieve a world which is really "beautiful" in God's eyes, must be challenged by any situation which can be appraised so positively.

It becomes clear that God and the ever-creative moving Spirit can find expression through a nation with which Western Christians have lost connection. Surprisingly perhaps, God's mission does go forward and without us as leading participants. (Can you not hear a compassionate and amused chuckle from somewhere in the heavenly places, as a divine parent sees some beloved but blinkered children begin to grow up in the family of humanity?) Does this not help us to discover new dimensions of that Mission, particularly where managerial attitudes are quite clearly impossible? Surely this points to a greater mutuality as we Western Christians discover appropriate and timely roles in the interrelated globe of the late seventies and eighties.

The message of wholeness which the gospel brings to the world is now carried in part by the achievements of a land which has picked up the practical service ideals expressed through Christian schools, hospitals and institutions. These have been woven into the fabric of the expressed goals of a whole society "in the service of the people." These goals, far from achieved, remain the basis of practice to such a measure that the "China model" is taken seriously by many Third World nations today, which is, in turn, a challenge to us.

The message to us from many quarters today is, "You are part of our problem, not of its solution!" In the developmental debates regarding food, trade, aid or exchange, this conclusion is repeatedly affirmed. A creative and timely activity for the corporate structures of mission in the West today might be a profound and honest analysis of our history in mission. There was offered a great measure of obedience to God and there were achievements and productivity to the praise of God's name. We have also made mistakes and fumbled badly. When these errors are examined, accepted and forgiven, we might be enabled to participate in the mission of the future much more effectively.

It is easy to be burdened with guilt. This leads to hopelessness and anger. But guilt transcended by a confessional stance before God, and by seeking peace with our fellows, is liberating. It leads to greater freedom and obedience and also to a new quality of relationship with those from whom we are now alienated and estranged. If the Chinese experience could take us, under God, in this direction, we might indeed discover that there

is a time and season for all things under heaven, and that God's appropriate time makes all things beautiful.

SOME QUESTIONS ON CHINA FOR CHRISTIANS IN SEARCH OF COMMUNITY

Readers may want to consider the following questions as they study life in China.

Are there signs of God's saving grace in Maoist China? We have looked at various aspects of life in China that have impressed people like the Lings, who lived there nine years, as well as visitors on brief tours. Insofar as wholesome community life is being fostered in China it seems to be consistent with a Christian understanding of our life together. If this sense of community in China is not of God, then what is its source? If it is, what does that lead us to in our thinking about God's action in the world?

Should Christians sacrifice self for the sake of community? The Chinese model, that of self-giving in order to serve the people, may not be lived fully by many people in China, but it is the ideal. How do we respond to that ideal as Christians? Do we agree with it or reject it? Why? Are our cultural values ("Take care of Number One") consistent with our Christian values? Which are closer to values in China?

How do we respond to Chinese Marxist atheism? Does the atheism of China need to be more of a barrier than differences we have with other non-Christians? As Christians, are we closer to the atheist who acts justly or to one who believes in God while treating people miserably?

Should Christians from the West seek to evangelize China? There might be a "time to keep silence," as is suggested in Ecclesiastes; silence in which to reflect on the past and on the future. Is it possible that our own mistakes of the past have created a time in which honest evangelism is impossible? Probably anything we say now about Christianity will be misunderstood in China. Would mounting some kind of Christian onslaught, a new mission campaign for China, simply delay the time when any meaningful communication can take place?

Where is there fullness of salvation? If we look at our own community life, or that of China, we can see that fullness of salvation cannot be claimed by any society. We are involved in continuing search and struggle. But if completeness is absent in both China and our own society, might it not be useful to have a dialogue about what each of us is discovering in our search? Maybe China is not ready for such dialogue with Christians—but are we Christians ready for dialogue with Chinese Marxists?

Where should Christians search for a new understanding of community? China does not have the answers for our questions. Rather, China's experience raises questions which lead us back to the biblical roots of our own faith. If we are able to see how God acts beyond the church, if we are humble enough to see that we do not have a monopoly on goodness, if we can open our minds to a very different experience like that of China, if we can hear the biblical message which comes to us as members of communities as well as individuals, then perhaps we are on our way to finding the community for which we search.

MEETING WITH PROTESTANT LEADERS IN CHINA

By Peter K. H. Lee

Earlier this year several Chinese Protestant ministers in Hong Kong were wondering if the day would ever come when they could go into the People's Republic of China explicitly as a clerical or Christian group. In the mean time someone did seriously look into the possibility; he even personally travelled to Guangzhou to talk to government people about it. Prompted by a sense of encouragement he brought back, the ministers sent in an application just as a trial. Before they knew it, the application was approved, all the way from top-level government authority in Beijing, and it took them a while to accept the news to be true.

Very quickly the visitors' list was enlarged. Some joined in as they might have signed up for any sightseeing tour. Others really wanted to meet Christian people, except that a few withdrew for fear of any "political" implications. The figure finally settled at twenty-two, of whom fifteen were ordained ministers and the others lay persons. It was a mixed group, in terms of denominational background as well as social outlook.

I was among those who joined the tour recognizing its historic significance. For it was the first time that Chinese Protestant ministers from Hong Kong *as a group* were to be admitted to the People's Republic of China. It was also the first time since the closing of the churches during the Cultural Revolution, and even sometime before that, that Christian leaders in China would publicly receive a group of fellow-Chinese clergymen from abroad.

The group of twenty-two left Hong Kong for Guangzhou by train on March 21. From there we went to Hangzhou, Shanghai, Nanjing and finally Beijing, sometimes by air, sometimes by rail. Sixteen days afterwards, on April 6, we took the train from Guangzhou to return to Hong Kong.

On our last evening together in Beijing, coming to the close of a journey in which all along we felt free in talking about religion, I thought we were going to have an evaluation as a group, but there was no final sharing of

impressions and observations. Instead fear was expressed by some members that they might be inconvenienced if someone in the group should make a careless remark when asked to report on the trip, and the time was spent on getting all the participants to agree that no one was to speak for the whole group. Some would not even want their names mentioned in public.

I have had no such uneasy feeling at all. But I abide by the agreement not to implicate anyone. In this write-up I speak for myself only and take responsibility for what I have to say, and I believe I have something interesting or worthwhile to share with others who are concerned about Christianity in China today.

Guangzhou

When our train arrived at the Guangzhou Railway Station, we were met by at least ten persons who at one time were pastors or lay Christian workers. We were somewhat taken by surprise, for communication between the Hong Kong churches and the churches in China had been cut off for almost two decades. We later learned that the China Travel Service had already efficiently made all contacts for us with Christian representatives in each place. Besides the China Travel Service guides, a staff member of the Three-Self Patriotic Movement Committee, Mr. Shen De-rong, was sent to accompany us all through the trip.

All the hearts instantly glowed with warmth upon meeting one another. The older ones in our group actually recognized some of the greeters. Even though others among the Hong Kong visitors met the Guangzhou Christian people for the first time, yet it was like seeing long-lost cousins again. When one found out that the other originally belonged to the same denomination or came from the same village, the sense of personal ties was heightened even more.

The next morning a tea party was arranged for the visitors. More people came. The scene at the railway station was repeated except that this time the gathering was larger and lasted longer.

We soon learned that most of the ones who came to see us have held positions in the provincial or municipal committees of the China Christian Three-Self Patriotic Movement which came into being in the early 1950's and which since then has been the officially recognized spokesmen for Protestantism in China. One by one those who spoke condemned the Gang of Four for a great deal of destruction and suffering, in which Christians had

their share, and they said that not until now did they dare to come out openly as Christians. Indeed they barely got together again as a group in Guangdong Province to consider what to do next.

In the afternoon we went to the airport to board the airplane for Hangzhou, and the hosts again came to see us off. The plane was delayed for an hour, and waiting in the humid weather I talked with two of the Guangzhou pastors at some length. I asked them what hope they had. They said that they would like to see one or two churches re-open for service. But they had a good deal of practical matters to attend to in the mean time. Many of the churches have been used as warehouses, while a few have been converted into school buildings or even residential dwellings. It is a complicated procedure to claim the church buildings back. In fact the Three-Self Committee in Guangzhou had yet to decide which church or churches should be re-opened first. Now, the churches are entitled to rental income, even to reimbursements of accrued rents. The Three-Self Movement Committee is given the responsibility to sort out all these practical matters, with the help of the Religious Affairs Bureau. The pastors gave the impression that they are not worried about financial resources. When someone among our group naively asked if the churches in Hong Kong could help in the way of giving money, one of the Guangzhou pastors shook his head and said, "No, I am afraid not; after all, one of the "three-selves" is "self-support".*

Finally walking towards the plane, I waved back to our hosts who were waving good-bye to us, and I talked to one next to me, "Our Guangzhou friends have lots of practical problems in their hands, just like the Hong Kong pastors. May be it's the Cantonese pragmatic trait."

Hangzhou

A small group of Protestant leaders came to meet us at the airport in Hangzhou. All the same, we appreciated their cordiality. It was already rather late at night, and we all retired to our hotel rooms without much further ado.

*The other two selves are self-government and self-propagation. A Three-Self Movement began in the 1920's. The present Three-Self Patriotic Movement also emphasizes the same three selves but adds the word "Patriotic" owing to historical circumstances in the 1950's. At one time the word "Reform" was used instead of "Patriotic."

The China Travel Service and our Christian hosts had already arranged to have us spend the following day sightseeing. Certainly we were all eager to see the famous West Lake. It was the very beginning of spring. Not only the weather but the scenery could not have been more delightful. Every scene is a masterpiece of exquisite landscaping in a natural setting of extraordinary beauty. The city of Hangzhou is pleasant and the people are gentle.

Several pastors accompanied us on the sightseeing tour, and travelling or walking in a leisurely pace I inquired of them about Christian activities in their city. I learned that Hangzhou never had a large Christian constituency. Congregations were few in number even before the Communist Revolution, and cooperation among the Protestant churches was never problematic.

Our Christian hosts in Hangzhou were surprised to find out that some of the younger ones among the Hong Kong visitors knew hardly anything about the Three-Self Patriotic Movement. So at a tea house Pastor Cai Wen-hou, who is the Chairman of the Three-Self Committee for Zhejiang Province, spoke informally to several gathered around him on the necessity of Chinese Christians after 1949 to take into serious account certain realities, especially revolutionary political change in their country and financial dependence on America which was at that time at odds with China.

The next day we went for more sightseeing, including a visit to the Ling-yin Buddhist Temple. The temple, which is of historical interest, has been recently refurbished and is now a popular tourist site, for the Chinese themselves as well as anybody else. One of the monks, who now wore the usual grey uniform, gave us explanations. A cadre from the Religious Affairs Bureau, who was with us all through our sightseeing tours in Hangzhou, explained that it is part of the job of his bureau to see that a temple like this opened if the religious organization concerned really thinks there is a need for it. "But in this case," I said, "it's not just the religious use but the historical value or even tourist attraction that makes the government decide to open the temple to the public, isn't it?" The cadre replied, "Yes, yes."

The cadre, who was very friendly, said that he was new on the job. In fact, most of the people in the Religious Affairs Bureau are new, since the whole bureau was closed during the Cultural Revolution, with some of the higher officials even persecuted by the Gang of Four. "The country is in a new day now," the cadre observed.

It was Sunday the following morning. The Christian hosts in Hangzhou arranged for a joint worship service with the Hong Kong visitors. It had

been thought that a church which was used as a warehouse would be ready to be re-opened by then, and that the joint worship service would be most appropriate for the occasion. But the work of removing the goods from the church was more involved than had been anticipated, and instead the service was held in a conference room of the People's Political Consultative Council. Needless to say, that was an extraordinary occasion. For a decade and a half the Hangzhou Christian leaders had not held a public worship service, and now this time it took place in a government building and fellow-Christians from Hong Kong participated in it! Pastor Cai and Pastor Niu Zhi-fang, formerly of the Sheng Kung Hui, led in prayers, while the leader from the Hong Kong visiting group preached. A quartet formed from the Hong Kong visitors sang an anthem.

Following the service a group discussion was held. One question had to do with evangelism in China today. The answer given was that mass evangelism in public places is not appropriate, not because it is against any laws but it may lead to a public disturbance in case heated argument with atheists ensues. Person-to-person evangelism is certainly possible. At this point one of the persons who met us for the first time that morning spoke. A man probably in his early forties, he received a full theological education in the 1950's and has been a foreman in a warehouse. He said that both he and a woman present in the room, who was a parish worker before and is now a factory worker, have been recently elected "model workers" in their respective factories. They are known to be Christians, and the fact that they are well regarded by their fellow-workers for their performance in productive labor is something of a testimony they give as Christians.

In the afternoon we all went to see the church, the Gu-Lou Church, which was supposed to be ready for service. When we were inside the building we saw that the last packages were ready to be moved away. The cadre from the Religious Affairs Bureau was explaining that it was not easy to locate places to move the goods to. Pastor Cai then commented, "Once you located the places, it didn't take you too much time to transfer the goods." He then turned to me and said, "The Religious Affairs Bureau has done its best and is very helpful." The next thing to be done was refurbishing and repainting. It is really a well-built church. I could see that it would make a good sanctuary.

Leaving the church, a fellow-pastor from Hong Kong and I could not but notice that it is well situated in a pleasant residential neighborhood, and we both said that if it has any good news to preach at all it should have

no difficulty in drawing people to come. A place like Hangzhou does not have the great many distractions which a city like Hong Kong has. It is true that the present China is built on a thoroughly secular ideology. But the remarkable thing is that, at this moment at least, freedom of religion is guaranteed, if only within the premises of a church. Supposing the people who go to worship do have their vision re-affirmed and renewed, they then go back to the world to work with the vision burning in their heart and mind. What's wrong with that? I shook the hand of Pastor Sun Shi-pei walking close by me, and said how thrilled I was about the prospect of the church where he would have a part in ministering.

When we were back in the hotel having dinner, one of my companions from Hong Kong thought that I was naive both about the pressure which the government would apply on the church and about the willingness of the people to follow the leadership of the Three-Self Patriotic Movement, which, in his judgement, has betrayed the Gospel. I may have been naive indeed, I thought; yet how could my friend had been so sure himself? I have acquainted myself with the Three-Self Movement and have followed events in China as much as, if not more than, most of my Hong Kong confreres; still I do not feel that I know enough to make definite judgements.

In the bus leaving for the airport, the elderly and frail Pastor Niu bade farewell to us on behalf of the Hangzhou Christians. His voice quivered with emotion as he said, "Words could not express the joy you have brought to us these few days." I said to myself, "Shouldn't the experience with fellow-Chinese Christians in Hangzhou have touched our hearts rather than hardened them so as to make us remain cynical and distrustful?"

As I took leave of scenic Hangzhou I once again rejoiced in the spring in the air. Someone else said that he heard from the weather report that a cloudy day was to follow. But that did not keep me from going to Shanghai with keen anticipation.

Shanghai

Actually it was not so much Shanghai the city as the Christian leadership there that I was eager to see. For I knew that Shanghai once had a large number of churches and has been the headquarters of the Three-Self Patriotic Movement.

In a style worthy of the largest city in China, the Protestant leaders gave us a reception in a first-class hotel. It was the largest group of Christian

people so far to greet us, out-numbering our visiting group of twenty-two for sure.

Among the hosts were people who were active in the Three-Self Patriotic Movement from the very beginning, and some are on the Standing Committee still. What were names found in documents I used to read in my study now became flesh and blood right before my eyes.

The reception began with tea, presided by Mr. Luo Guan-zhong, formerly Associate General Secretary of the Shanghai YMCA. A Pastor Sun gave a brief resume on Protestant Christianity in China from the beginning of the Three-Self Patriotic Movement in 1950 to the complete stop of all public religious activities with the onslaught of the Cultural Revolution in 1966. He went on to speak on what lay ahead, under four headings: (1) preparation for the resumption of the work of the Three-Self Patriotic Movement; (2) re-opening churches for worship (in Shanghai, possibly the International Church to start with); (3) dealing with matters of livelihood (e.g. recompense for wages deducted from pastors, restoring the names of those under persecution, finding living accommodations for Christian workers, etc.); and (4) participation in the "Four Modernizations" of China (e.g. encouragement of Christian people to continue to participate in productive labor and translating valuable foreign publications into Chinese).

Afterwards, the chairman of the meeting meant to have a discussion. A question from the audience triggered off impassioned speeches from Li Shou-pao and Jiang Wen-han, both formerly of the National Committee of the YMCA, defending the course taken by the Three-Self Movement. The message came through loud and clear that, from where they stood, anti-imperialist and patriotic stands were necessary conditions for the survival of the Church in China. One of them said that it was a political decision the Three-Self people had to make, putting a heavy accent on the word "political". After the two speeches, other people from Shanghai were eager to speak but time allowed for only two more speakers. These two, along with the previous two, seemed to be pleading to the Hong Kong visitors, "Please understand the circumstances we were in".

As I listened, I could not help feeling that even the documents of the Three-Self Movement I had read rather carefully did not equip me to adequately understand the Chinese Christians when they found themselves in dramatically different circumstances. At the same time, on this my first visit, I could not possibly know all there was to know about the People's Republic of China. I was not prepared to make conclusive pronouncements on the Three-Self Movement, either in the past or in the present. It is true

that I did not like the accusation practices about which I read and I thought that the persistent linking of the Missionary Movement in China with American imperialism was overdone. Now, from the outside we have at most a partial view of what the Chinese Christians were faced with. I kept saying to myself, "What would I have done had I been in their shoes?" Because I did not feel that I knew their circumstances well enough, I did not know how I could have done, and therefore I was not in a position to judge.

It is obvious that Hong Kong and China are worlds apart. Whereas China has already laid Western imperialism to rest, Hong Kong is still under the shadow of colonialism. Whereas Chinese life is highly politicized, the Hong Kong people do not even have the concept of citizenship. Indeed many Hong Kong Christians feel uneasy about the very mention of the word "politics". Apart from the historical circumstances they are in, they still live in a theological world which was molded by missionaries of an earlier era.

In the mean time the tea hour concluded. All the people then moved about freely to greet one another. I got to meet and talk with more people whose names I had come across before. I again noticed that denominational ties meant something to the Chinese, at least as a matter of sentimentality, if not doctrines. Thus when a Baptist met a Baptist, or a Methodist met a Methodist, invariably the conversation lingered longer and each asked the other about mutual acquaintances. One of the Shanghai pastors did remind us that as of 1957 most churches in China held united worship services, while allowance was made for diversity in certain religious practices like baptism. I asked if in future denominations would be allowed to flourish again, and his response was that that would be unlikely although diverse church traditions might co-exist as long as unity is not undermined.

A banquet followed. At my dinner table the subject at one point turned to what are often called "house-churches." I asked some assiduous questions and I listened to answers carefully as the subject is often talked about by Christians elsewhere who claim to have special interest in Christians in China. More than one person said that there is nothing exceptional about worship in the homes of Christians as such. That has always been a normal part of congregational life. But in recent years in China, a hard demarcation has been drawn between what is considered to be official Christianity, as represented by the Three-Self Movement, and those who do not go along with it. I know too well that this is the picture which many

Hong Kong Chinese Christians as well as some Western missionaries have of Christianity in China today. The Three-Self people I talked to at first declined to have much to say about those Christians who want to have nothing to do with them. By and by from two or three of the Shanghai Christians at my table I got the hint that, granted there are those so-called house-churches, one should not make sweeping generalizations about them. Some of the groups, like the followers of Wang Ming-tao, have a kind of theological orientation which separates faith and the world sharply. There was a leader in one of the groups who had questionable moral conduct. Still other gatherings may be led by people who are theologically untrained. There may well be truly pious Christians who gather for worship in the homes. But why must they be ipso facto against the Three-Self Movement just because they meet in private houses? As a matter of fact some of the pastors who are active in the Three-Self Movement have conducted worship either at their homes or at the homes of devout Christians. However, during the Cultural Revolution it would have been impossible to have even a small gathering of people worshipping at one's home. Even now some members of the same household may not agree to have worship in the premises for fear of incrimination from those who are against Christianity. In a word, concluded my Shanghainese friends at the dinner table, even if there are people who have house-worship, it is better to be related to the church when it is free to hold public worship services. While I may have been shown one side of the picture, I have at least learned not to make any sweeping generalizations about house churches — and the Three-Self Patriotic Movement, for that matter; — and I do not like to see factionalism sharpened among Christians in China.

On the following day we went sightseeing. The visit to the industrial exhibition was educational. There we saw China's great concern for industrialization, but not being a student in the field I was not able to tell specifically how successful China is or what her problems are exactly. We also went to one of the "youth palaces." I was very much impressed by the community spirit which prevailed there and I appreciated the spontaneity and talents of the young people who pursued recreational and creative activities.

On our third day in Shanghai we were originally scheduled to visit communes but the majority voted to go to Souzhou instead. I would have preferred to see communes, but I had no regret about the visit to Souzhou after all. I did enjoy the gardens, which once belonged to the privileged few or corrupt officials, but which are now open to the masses.

Our several days in Shanghai had overcast skies but there were sunny intervals. I can say the same thing about my superficial, general impressions of China so far. Poverty still lingers on and the whole issue of human freedom has yet to be cleared up. But there are bright spots in the horizon, like the impulse of national construction for the common good and the possibility of fuller human development.

Concerning the future of Christianity in China, while spring is here, one who is from outside is not altogether sure how well the Church has weathered the stormy seasons in the past, or whether some erosion has already set in. It is too early to say that one clearly sees bright days ahead with the promise of bountiful harvest.

Nanjing

It rained off and on in Nanjing when we were there. We visited the Sun Yat-sen Memorial as well as the Zhang Jiang (Yangtze River) Bridge of Nanjing in the rain, but the rain did not dampen our enthusiasm. I liked the architecture of the Sun Yat-sen Memorial and enjoyed climbing the long flight of steps. The very sight of Zhang Jiang meant something special to me as a Chinese. The grandeur of the bridge gave me a sense of wonderment. The story of the construction of the project, involving several thousand regular workers and many times more volunteer workers, all united by a sense of national purpose, moved me deeply.

In the evening we were honored at a banquet given by the United Front Department of Jiangsu Province. The master of ceremony was a Christian layman, Comrade Han Wen-zhao, who is on the Chinese People's Political Consultative Conference (CPPCC) at the provincial level. He began by asking one of the clergymen to say grace for the whole gathering. Cadres from the United Front Department as well as Christian people in Nanjing together just about equalled the visitors in number.

I sat next to Comrade Han, and I had the occasion to ask him questions about the United Front and the CPPCC. The United Front is an organization within the Communist Party. It has the dual function of uniting diverse elements in the nation and of promoting consultation. The common target or the national goal varies with time. Right now of course the supreme pre-occupation of the nation is the "Four Modernizations". The CPPCC is in the government structure all the way from the township to the national level. The Conference has within it diverse elements in the nation, including ethnic minorities, religious organizations, occupational groups, and yes, political

parties other than the Communist Party. I was surprised to hear that there are a fairly large number of political parties represented at the CPPCC, but naturally the Communist Party plays a dominant role. I did not ask Comrade Han whether "dominating" would not be a more accurate word than "dominant".

With Mr. or Comrade Shen, the secretary from the Three-Self Movement who was with us all through the trip, I also talked about the United Front and the People's Political Consultative Conference. He reiterated many of the things which Comrade Han had said. I gathered that having Christian representatives on a consultative council is better than having none at all. I promised myself that thenceforth I will follow more closely than ever before the working of the whole system of the people's political consultation at all levels. If I was not mistaken, the idea of the "United Front" and the provision for People's Political Consultative Conference, in which Christians along with other representative groups are included, are special features which Soviet Russia, for one, does not have.

I know that the name "United Front", the very idea of political participation in a communist state, and even the title "Comrade" have negative connotations in most church circles in Hong Kong. Now that I was in China, I certainly did not find everything abhorrent. One must be fair in one's judgment and this should hold true of Christians from outside in their criticism of Christianity in China today.

The next morning it was my turn to lead in devotion. For all through the trip our visiting group had a brief period of devotion every morning. We always managed to find a place in the hotel for that particular purpose, and we felt completely at ease about our devotional activity though in a communist country. On that particular morning I chose for my scriptural reading Acts 10. In my meditation I particularly called attention to the touching words which Peter said to Cornelius, when the latter fell down at the former's feet, "Stand up, I too am a man." I suggested that on our visit to China we sensed something of what it means to meet people as fellow-human beings, and fellow-Chinese, as well as fellow-Christians, no less! I thought that we were showing real cordiality toward one another but for certain preconceived suspicions and theological biases on our parts. Peter, too, showed hesitancy in meeting the Gentile Cornelius, and it was not until the third time he saw a vision that he felt more at ease about meeting Cornelius.

We were like Peter in our hesitancy to trust Christian leaders in a non-Christian or even anti-Christian country. Some of us did finally look at them

straight in the eyes. But would we be able to say as Peter did, "Truly I perceive that God shows no partiality, but in every nation any one who fears him and does what is right is acceptable to him"? I supposed it would depend on the people with whom we come face to face, but I suggested that it would also depend on us!

In the afternoon we were received by the Nanjing Christian leaders many of whom were connected with the former Nanking Theological Seminary. With the presence of a number of theological minds, the meeting that afternoon was bound to have a heavier theological accent.

Ding Guangxun (K.H. Ting) was there and spoke first. He said something about Christianity being deinstitutionalized and declericalized in China today. The theme was familiar to me, yet it was the first time some members of our group heard of it and found it intriguing. Now, what was interesting to me was that those from Hong Kong who were predisposed toward favoring the house-churches and against people in the Chinese Protestant "Establishment," like Bishop Ding, did not realize that he is all in favor of the "scattered" Christian community rather than the large "gathered" church. He was not enthusiastic about getting busy to open up many churches and building up large congregations; he was more interested in the intimate type of Christian fellowship.

Some years ago my attention had been drawn to the name of K. H. Ting when I came across an address he gave on "Christian Theism".* The address was given in 1957 when he was President of Nanking Theological Seminary. It was a quiet but authentic affirmation of faith made against the atheistic background of communism. While he thought that certain positive things could be said about communism, he remained unwaveringly a theist. He did not think that the New China has taken care of the sinful nature of man just because it has brought about a more just social environment. He appealed to his listeners to turn to Jesus Christ for the forgiveness of sin. I know that the fundamentalist preacher Wang Ming-tao was vehemently opposed to Ding along with others whom he called modernists.** Wang's opinion has had a large influence on the conservative Chinese Christians' view of Ding and the Three-Self Movement. But on reading Ding's address on theism and his other writings, one would be grossly unfair if one should call him a betrayer of Jesus Christ.

*Translated and printed in *Documents of the Three-Self Movement* (New York: National Council of the Churches of Christ in the U.S.A., 1963), pp. 156-167.

**See "We, Because of Faith," *ibid.*, pp. 99-113.

In Nanjing this time, Bishop Ding mentioned a recent paper prepared by his colleague Pastor Chen Ze-min on a historical survey of theism. Chen is the Director of the Research Institute on Religion, which succeeds the Nanking Theological Seminary. The Research Institute is now part of Nanjing University. The paper on theism was received with considerable interest by some non-Christian students, according to Ding.

Pastor Chen then told of the intellectual struggles he went through. He said that all worthwhile theological thinking is the result of vigorous struggle. In his case, his first struggle involved the contention of fundamentalism with modernism. His second struggle occurred at the time of the Communist Revolution when he realized the inadequacy of liberal theology. He went through a third struggle when Christians, along with many others, were under great strain during the Cultural Revolution. As I listened, what interested me was not so much the contents of his theological thought resulting from struggle in each instance, as the sincerity of his struggle in his own soul to achieve integrity of faith in the face of social reality.

A woman parish worker also told of the dramatic change in her theological view from an individualistic kind of spiritual emphasis to a recognition of God's activity in the world. It was not an easy shift from one position to another; rather it was accompanied by painful inner strain, if only to be followed by joy and release. At every turn she was tempted to be self-satisfied or to give up the uniqueness of the Christian Gospel, but apparently each time she came through all right.

I myself was quite thrilled by the discussions in Nanjing that afternoon. I sensed a dynamic quality in the people's struggle to find truth. If there is to be genuine Chinese theology it must go through this kind of searching.

If the rain did not dampen my enthusiasm for visits to places in Nanjing, it did nothing to distract me from my great interest in meeting the Christian friends in that city. Is it not true that a certain amount of rain is good for the soil? So may it be that the kind of theological rethinking that is going on in Nanjing is like rain watering the parched field of Chinese theology.

We took the night train from Nanjing to Beijing. On the train I had long talks with Mr. Shen, who has been accompanying us since we started in Guangzhou. I shared with him my consciousness of dilemma in the meeting of the Hong Kong Christians and the Christian leaders in China. On the one hand the two groups had an instinctive feeling of kinship between them, and the Hong Kong visitors sincerely appreciated the cordiality accorded them by

their hosts. On the other hand a wide historical, ideological and theological gulf separated guests and hosts, and I wondered how the gulf could be bridged.

I also remarked to Mr. Shen that I was disappointed at not seeing Catholic representatives. I gathered that between Protestants and Catholics in China there are barriers to break down. Apparently the radical changes inaugurated by Vatican II have eluded Christians in China.

I did not speak to Mr. Shen about it, but privately I was deeply distressed by the chasm, imagined or real, separating the officially recognized Three-Self Movement and those Christian activities which go their own ways. Is this inevitable? To an extent I can see that some of the Three-Self people went to excesses. But I could not condemn the movement wholesale. From my personal contact this time I cannot believe that all of the people who are willing to let themselves be grouped under the name of the Three-Self Patriotic Movement have betrayed the Gospel. Earnestly I hope that whatever breach there may have been among the Chinese Christians will be healed. I feel very strongly that those from the outside must not make the breach harder to overcome. If we do, we are doing the Christian cause a great disservice.

Beijing

Our train arrived in Beijing at 6:30 a.m. A group of Christian people were already there to meet us. It was a rather cold morning. We appreciated all the more the trouble they took to come to welcome us so early on a chilly morning.

That was Sunday morning, and we had already been told that we would worship in the only Protestant chapel that has remained open for service on Sunday during the last several years mainly for the benefit of foreigners. So the first thing we did after breakfast in the hotel was to go to church.

The chapel is in a building that was used to house the Bible Society. Besides the visiting group from Hong Kong, a Tanzanian family and a few Americans and Europeans came to worship. Probably ten or fifteen Chinese who are pastors or women Christian workers were there too. The service was in Chinese but there was a printed English order of worship, together with the hymns. No sermon was preached, the reason given being that a sermon would have to be delivered in a foreign language in order to suit the foreigners. It was a holy communion service, administered by the Rev. Yin Chi-chang,

originally of the Church of Christ in China, and I did have a vivid sense of communion during the worship.

In the afternoon a tea was given for the visiting Hong Kong group in the same building. The hosts who spoke first are elderly and humble. Someone asked them what the future would hold for the Church now that the Gang of Four, who admittedly were responsible for so much trouble, have tumbled. They did not have much to say. One of their number then wanted to know more about Christianity in Hong Kong. Two or three Hong Kong pastors spoke about the churches' success in attracting young people. Someone who had experience in the United States told of the large number of Bible study groups springing up among Chinese students (from Hong Kong and other parts of South East Asia), indicating the hunger of the young minds for the Word of God. The reports made the Beijing people envious, for they had difficulty in reaching youth. At this point I came in to say that, while one should rejoice in the response of young people to spiritual needs, I was not sure that those who guide them help them face reality squarely. For instance, the Chinese students in North America as well as in Hong Kong have to grapple with the problem of Chinese identity, but I am afraid that their Bible study leaders and pastors are not helping them think through what in the light of biblical teachings it means to be a Chinese Christian in dispersion in the twentieth century. The churches in Hong Kong may have some youth in them, but they are mostly students of Christian schools which are part and parcel of a pyramidal social structure, and these students are most likely headed for the upper strata of the pyramid. As to the greater masses of young people who work in the factories, Christianity is beyond their pale because the churches are so middle class-oriented!

At refreshment time I got to talk to Zhao Fu-san, who is the Deputy Director of the Research Institute on World Religions under the Chinese Academy of Social Sciences. Certainly he was one of the persons I was anxious to meet. I asked him if his research institute is confined to a Marxian approach to religion, as the Director, Ren Ziyu, said in an article which I translated and published in the English *Ching Feng*.^{*} Zhao replied that other approaches are permissible. He then reported that at the conference on religious studies held in Kunming earlier this year, an ambitious program was outlined. I was greatly interested in his comments. If the studies show that religion is a stubborn fact in human life, that would make Marxism in China less of a closed metaphysical system.

^{*}No. 3, Vol. XX, 1977.

Zhao, who was ordained in Sheng Kung Hui, also said something which struck me and two or three others. He said that all Christians did suffer because of their religious identity under the Gang of Four, and that their suffering together with others had given them a greater sense of solidarity with the Chinese people. This is an important turn of events for Chinese Christians, besides their success in getting rid of the bad name of "foreign religion" and in identifying themselves with socialistic reconstruction of China. He was, of course, speaking as one who is involved in the Three-Self Patriotic Movement. Now, those who are critical of the movement have rarely bothered to suggest that the ones connected with it did suffer on account of their religious affiliation.

Before the gathering broke up, a pastor from Hong Kong led in prayer, Zhao Fu-san read from the Bible, and the whole group sang "Blessed be the tie that binds." Several of the pastors in Beijing were seen cleaning their wettish eye-glasses at the conclusion of the hymn.

The following three days were devoted to sight-seeing. Walking along the Great Wall, the men felt that they could now be counted as "hou han" (meaning "good fellows", after the saying, "Unless we go to the Great Wall, we are not good fellows.") The Palace and the gardens overwhelmed us by their grandeur, but it was good to see that they are now opened to the masses. The immense Tienanmen Square and the massive new public buildings surrounding it told us that China has gone through a dramatic political revolution.

Had we had double the time, we still could not have seen all that we wanted to see in Beijing. In the vast canvas, what is the Church but a few dots of paint? Especially if the church people are only absorbed in their internal petty affairs, or are squabbling, or are speaking a message which is totally unrelated to contemporary reality, why bother with the Church at all?

As I was feeling how insignificant the Church can be in an immense country which has gone through a revolution with still many things unsettled, we, a group of church people from Hong Kong, found ourselves as honoured guests of the Director of the Religious Affairs Bureau. After telling the audience that he himself underwent persecution because of his work in the Bureau, he reiterated the present government's determination to implement the policy of religious freedom as provided in the Constitution. While there

is the freedom of disbelief as well as the freedom to propagate atheism, the freedom within the precincts of a religious institution is safeguarded. In the mean time members of recognized religious bodies have the right to be represented in the people's consultative organs as well as the privilege to participate in the up-building of the nation. Someone whispered in my ears, "I've heard that before." I thought to myself, "Even if only a part of what the top man in charge of religious affairs said can be realized, that is better than keeping Christians out of the public altogether. Especially if there is the possibility that God works in history, even outside the walls of an established institutional church, the presence of faithful Christians where decisions in the arena of history are made is exactly what is called for to make a witness.

On the day before Qing Ming Festival, a bright sunny day, we were in Tienanmen Square and already there were throngs of people, including school children, gathering in front of the Monument of the Revolutionary Heros, bringing wreathes or paying respects to their heros, especially Zhou En-lai. It was an impressive scene. We left Beijing the next morning, Qing Ming Festival. The sky was less clear than the previous day, and there were a few rumblings in the distance. On the way to the airport we again passed by Tienanmen Square where great crowds of people were gathered, and the one sitting next to me in the bus asked if dramatic incidents would occur on that day. I said that I would not be surprised or disturbed if there were demonstrations. After all China has not had everything settled nicely.

Back to Hong Kong

When we returned to Hong Kong we did read about tension in Tienanmen square on Qing Ming day, but I was not particularly shocked.

Another experience on the same day affected me personally more. When we arrived in the Kowloon Railway Station, one of the persons who greeted us told us that the day after we left for China an extreme rightist newspaper headlined the news that a group of clergymen went to Beijing in a "sacred pilgrimage" (*chao-sheng*) and warned the Taiwan government about these men (publishing the names of ten of those who went in.) Some members in our group panicked. Screamed one of them: "Who could have leaked out the name list?" Another one said, "Probably one of the pastors who were present at the briefing session but who did not really mean to go." I said to myself, "I thought that many Christians in Hong Kong had been told that only the Three-Self people in China would meddle in politics and even kowtow to political authority, and that only those people would stoop so low as

to betray fellow-Christians!" The incident showed me that the encounter with Christians in China is also an occasion for the Christians in Hong Kong to examine themselves.

Then just when I began to write this report I received in the mail a newsletter from an American Missionary stationed in Hong Kong which has an item on our visit to China. The newsletter says that "The visiting pastors concluded as a result of their visit, that the Three-Self Movement was not the real Church The future of the Christian Church in China does not lie with the Three-Self Movement. It lies with the innumerable groups of believers meeting informally." I was furious. I know as a matter of fact that the visiting pastors did not come to a group conclusion about Christians in China one way or another. I was angry at the purported report because whoever said those words, either one person in the visiting group or one who edited it, was too presumptuous in making judgement on others, and made what breach there is among Chinese Christians even harder to heal. I was angry because a foreigner with his own predilections made the whole group of Chinese clergymen from Hong Kong appear to betray not only the hospitality they received in China but the moments of cordiality which they shared with their fellow-Chinese Christians. I am sure that overseas Chinese Christians can do much to help Christians in China, and I appeal to Westerners not to impose their own preoccupations, or they deserve to be called imperialists once again!

Strangely enough, these two negative lessons only serve to enhance the positive meanings of my historic visit to China where I, along with twenty-one others from Hong Kong, had the opportunity to meet with Christian leaders for the first time. I hope that this is only the beginning of greater things to come.

THE REAWAKENING OF THE CHURCH IN CHINA

By Andrew K. H. Hsiao

FOREWORD

After 30 years of merciless oppression, fiery trials and dead silence, the Christian Church in the mainland of China has finally shown signs of life. Though the sign of life is as delicate as the sigh of a patient just recovering from a coma, it has nevertheless brought much hope to the worrying relatives surrounding the sick-bed. This is one of the most encouraging impressions I got during my recent three-week visit to mainland China.

I entered Guangzhou from Hongkong on the 25th of June this year and returned from Guangzhou to Hongkong on the 16th of July. In those three weeks not only did I go to Hunan to visit my 82-year-old mother and my seven brothers and sisters and their relatives after 31 years of separation, but I also toured places like Beijing, Shanghai and Nanjing.

I will not forget the affection and kindness of my relatives and friends, nor can I forget the beauty and grandeur of my fatherland, and least of all can I forget the fact that the seed of the Gospel, after 30 years of burial, begins to show signs of life again.

Wherever I went I tried my best to visit the surviving church members and leaders and to visit some of the churches that have been closed or are being used for other purposes. Because the main task of this trip, besides visiting my relatives, was as representative of the Lutheran World Federation, of which I am a vice-president, and the Association of Theological Schools in South East Asia, which I serve as chairman, to bring greetings to members of related churches and to visit leaders involved in religious studies and theological education and to get to know better the present situation and future development of churches in China.

Of the 40 or so church members I contacted, about two-thirds belonged

to the former Lutheran churches in Hunan and Henan provinces. These included four pastors, one Bible woman and one church executive. Most of the other one-third are church leaders in the Beijing, Shanghai and Nanjing areas and included, besides the pastors of the Protestant church in Beijing (the only Protestant church presently open in China), the leaders of the Christian Three-Self Patriotic Movement Committees in Shanghai and Nanjing as well as the internationally-known Rev. Zhao Fusan, deputy director of the Research Institute of World Religions at the Academy of Social Science, Beijing, as well as Bishop Ding Guangxun, the vice-chancellor of Nanjing University and director of the University's Institute of Religious Studies. It should be noted that both Zhao and Ding as well as Luo Guanzong, chairman of the Shanghai Three-Self Committee, attended the Chinese People's Political Consultative Conference in Beijing recently. (CPPCC)

I do not know how much time I spent with the various people mentioned above, sharing spiritual experiences or discussing religious issues, but I do remember that I had two conferences with Zhao which totalled up to 7 hours, and my meetings with Ding came close to 9 hours — both of which interviews included dinners. The subjects discussed were wide-ranging but mainly concentrated on the following four matters:

1. The past and present of the Chinese Communists' religious policies;
2. The present and future of the mainland church;
3. The needs and forms of future theological education; and
4. The responsibilities and contributions by Christians outside mainland China.

Generally speaking all the discussions were carried out in a very open, sincere and calm atmosphere. There were exceptions of course. When discussing the religious policy of the Chinese Communists, some persons uncontrollably repeated the communist line. Others, when questioned on the future of the Chinese Church, were evasive and began to 'shadow box' instead of speaking to the point. Still others, when reminded of the suffering because of their faith, were overcome by emotion and broke into tears. In the interest of free and natural conversation I did not use a tape-recorder or even take notes. Following the interviews I would note down the important items. Thus if there are mistakes in quoting, I must assume the responsibility.

PART I: The Past and Present Religious Policies of the Chinese Communists

I asked the church leaders who recently attended the CPPCC, "Is there any change in the Chinese Communist religious policy?" They replied, "The policy of the Chinese Communists is freedom of religion. The policy itself has not changed. If there is any change it lies in the implementation of the policy." They believe the government will be more faithful from now on in carrying out the policy. They cited the recent reopening of the Religious Affairs Bureau as one evidence. At a dinner party I had opportunity to meet the director of the Religious Affairs Bureau, Xiao Xianfa. He too stressed that from now on the government will carry out the established religious policies more faithfully than in the past.

However their answers did not satisfy me. I pointed out that in the 1954 Constitution there was simply a clause on freedom of religion. Then in 1975 in addition to the statement on the freedom of belief as well as the freedom to have no religious faith, there was added "the right to proclaim atheism." This unfair addition was apparently added because of the influence of the Gang of Four. I raised the question, "Why should it not be deleted?" Bishop Ding informed me that at the CPPCC the sub-committee on religion had held a detailed discussion on this matter, and that with the exception of a very few persons who expressed different ideas, all agreed that this sentence be deleted from the present Constitution or that they return to the wording of the 1954 Constitution. This proposal was presented by the religious sub-committee to related departments for further study. Dr. Ding feels that the chances for its adoption are good. Not only was it supported by religious people, but others too expressed support.

The Criminal Code which was recently proclaimed also shows that the Chinese Communists are paying more attention to religious liberty. Article 147 in the Criminal Code states that government workers who interfere with or disturb regular religious practices, if serious enough, are subject to arrest and imprisonment up to two years. A number of Christians expressed the opinion that if the communists can truly implement this law then the actions of the early '50's and during the Cultural Revolution, such as confiscating Bibles, forceful occupation of churches, obstruction of worship, etc. would not be repeated.

Why are the Chinese Communists now more serious about their religious policy than before? Naturally it is not because the communists have changed

their attitude toward religion itself, but rather they have discovered that respect for religious freedom is a necessary step toward socialist democracy and order. As one church leader remarked: "Our government now knows that the freedom of religion is the right of people that cannot be suppressed by force."

There are still people who express doubt about the determination on the part of the Chinese Communists in implementing the policy of religious freedom, while others express openly that the government is not active enough in assisting the churches to get back their church buildings. Many church leaders believe however that the more friendly attitude shown toward religion, on the part of the government gives hope for a reawakening of the Chinese Church.

PART II: The Present and the Future of the Mainland Church

In the last 30 years the mainland Church experienced two unprecedented deadly blows. One, in the beginning of the 50's and the other during the last part of the 60's, right after the Cultural Revolution began. During the first blow the old church structure entirely dissolved under various pressures. The church cut off all its overseas connections. The vast majority of churches were closed and most of the church workers changed occupation and members were dispersed. For the existence and reform of the church a political organization was formed by church leaders, the Christian Three-Self Patriotic Movement Committee which took over the leadership of the church. Up to the middle of the 60's the churches continued to maintain a limited amount of work. In some of the major cities a few churches' property was used under contract. Retired church workers and church workers doing other work received salaries from the government like all others. But when the Cultural Revolution started the church which was already decimated broke down entirely under the onslaught of forces carrying out the slogan: Down with the Four Olds. In the years that followed, in the land of 900 million people no church could be found open for public worship by Chinese Christians.

This is not to say that Christian faith disappeared entirely from the hearts of the Chinese, nor can it be said that the blood and sweat shed by Chinese and foreigners in spreading the Gospel for over 100 years in China had been in vain. It does say, however, that the Chinese church has been transformed from a 'visible' to an 'invisible' church, from an institutional

to non-institutional church (Bishop Ding calls it the 'de-institutionalized' church), from a 'public' to a 'household' church, from a church of the lips to a church in the heart. In my conversations not only did I discover that many people still hold fast to the Christian faith, but that in some places, as the southeastern coastal area of China, there still exist many household churches. One elderly Christian reminded me with tears, "Here are still 7,000 who have not bowed their knees to Baal."

Since the Chinese Communists are taking more active measures in supporting religious freedom, many Christians are once again showing courage in returning to the churches. In 1972, in order to meet the needs of diplomats and tourists in Beijing. The Da Mi Shi Church was opened. Attendance has been between 10-12 persons, all but the three Chinese pastors and their wives being foreigners. Beginning on Easter this year, however, the situation has substantially changed. There has been a rapid increase in attendance so that the 70-seat chapel has been full to capacity on Sundays. According to one of the pastors, the Rev. Gan, people are also coming on Thursdays for Bible study, consultation and prayer. Many participants join together in tear-filled prayer. On the date of my visit there, I prayed, holding hands with Pastor Gan and others in the church; it was an inspiring and moving experience.

In order to meet the need for places for worship by Christians the church leaders in Beijing, Shanghai and Nanjing are making the locating of church buildings a priority task. The government in various places has expressed its willingness to assist in returning church buildings in keeping with the religious policy, but by the end of June there had been no report of any church having been officially opened. Since church buildings have been taken over by schools, factories, government offices, etc. it is not easy to ask them to leave when there is no other place for them under the acute housing shortage.

To meet the new development of the church, the leaders of the Three-Self Movement are planning to call a nationwide meeting later this year or next year to establish a national church body. I asked the leaders in Shanghai what name will be used for the church, what kind of church order (episcopal, presbyterian, etc.) and what form of sacraments (immersion, sprinkling, etc.). They said no decision had been made as of yet, but certainly it will be an indigenous and non-denominational church.

The lack of Bibles is another problem faced by Christians in China. After the two blows in the 50's and 60's, the Bible has become a rare and precious item in China. A limited number of hand-copied Bibles were produced to meet the needs of individual devotions and family meetings. An elderly pastor related to me bitterly that he regretted that he, in following the orders by the authorities, had handed over 700 Bibles and theological books which he had collected during his lifetime, with the result that he himself has gone without a Bible since that time. In various places I visited I was asked: Have you brought any Bibles? Since I flew into Guangzhou by air I had a limited weight allowance and so brought along only 10 Bibles and hymnals. These were quickly taken by friends and relatives along the way.

In order to meet the shortage of Bibles and in order that the language of Scripture will be understood more easily by the readers in the mainland both in terms of content and the form of the script, the co-workers at the Nanjing Seminary started several years ago the work of revision and reprinting the Bible. Dr Ding stressed that the revision of the Bible must be true to the original text and must maintain the advantages expressed in the 1919 Chinese Union Version. But in order for the mainland readers to grasp the ideas more readily they will need to follow the style of the leading newspapers as well as to print the text in simplified script and in horizontal lines.

Bishop Ding told me that he hopes that the manuscript for the New Testament will be finished next year and that it will be published and distributed by the Commercial Press and that paper will be supplied by the government. He also said that to meet the market demand there will be two editions. One edition will use Bible paper and be high-priced; the other using newsprint will be low-priced. Although I could see that the work on the Bible revision was going ahead apace, the requirements of typesetting, proof-reading, printing, etc. all take much time. Hence I feel that the Christians in China will still need to get Bibles from outside for at least two or three years.

Before going to mainland China I was told that among the Christians on the mainland there were two groups — those associated with the Christian Three-Self Patriotic Movement and those belonging to the 'household churches'. I was told there exists a gap between them. As one who is used to such terms as 'ecumenical' and 'evangelical', I was not surprised to hear such terms. But I cannot but be concerned that this alleged antagonism may prove harmful for the reawakening of the very weak Chinese Church. The Chinese Church needs different kinds of people. She needs those who live behind

closed doors, praying and reading their Bibles. She also needs those who publish Bibles and build churches. Bishop Ding believes that both the 'household churches' and the more visible churches will both exist in the future. And with a smile he said to me, "I will attend both."

PART III: The Need and Form of Theological Education in the Future

In talking about the development of the Chinese Church we cannot leave out theological education (TE). Will there be need for TE in the Chinese Church in the future? What kind of TE will be needed? I asked more than ten church leaders these two questions. Half of them worked formerly as seminary teachers. To the first question they all gave a definite and positive answer. But to the second, the answers were not the same.

Some older pastors said to me that church leadership training is needed, but that it is not very urgent, since for the foreseeable future the Chinese Church will not need very many pastors. And at present there are still quite a few pastors available and able to serve.

Some other pastors stressed that the most effective form of leadership training is the traditional apprentice system where an old monk teaches a young monk. Thus young people who are dedicated to the church would study and work under the direction of an experienced pastor.

The two ideas mentioned above apparently are not supported by other leaders, particularly those with higher academic training. They express doubt whether the older pastors, whose seminary training dates back thirty to fifty years, are qualified to train young pastors to meet the situation and needs of China today.

Both Zhao Fusan and Ding Guangxun emphasized that although what the Chinese Church needs may not be a Western type of theological education, yet it will not be a formless and unstructured program. They admit that at present there is no clear or comprehensive plan, however, they believe that future TE will meet the special situation of the Chinese Church both as to its form and content.

In my discussion with Zhao and Ding we talked about three possible forms: One is similar to what we have heard, namely, 'intensive training' which offers maximum training in the shortest possible time, i.e., the con-

densing of the regular four-year theological course so that students can acquire the basic theological knowledge and preaching skills in one or two years. Another form is similar to Theological Education by Extension (TEE) or like the extension courses carried on by some Hongkong seminaries for voluntary church workers. China is vast and has an enormous population. Hence it cannot depend upon a few professional preachers but must rely on the work of many lay leaders. These two kinds of training will be carried out by the national church that is to be formed.

The third form of theological education will be to provide theological studies on a higher level. This will be the responsibility of the Religious Study Institute at Nanjing University. This newly established Institute is the successor to the former Nanjing Theological Seminary. It is different from the one in Beijing at which Zhao Fusan serves as deputy director, namely, the Research Institute on World Religions. Though the Nanjing Institute is not limited to the study of Christianity, it deals basically with the Christian faith and all of the staff are Christians. Ding calls it "a Christian body in a secular institution." It is only proper that this institution be engaged in the leadership training of the Chinese Church. The Beijing Institute is however a secular research program in social science. It is said that of the 80 staff members in the World Religion Institute only one or two are Christians besides Zhao. But Zhao noted happily that he often has opportunity to provide information on Christianity to other researchers.

The Nanjing Institute has already started recruiting its first students. Although they are not confined to Christians, Ding hopes and believes the great majority will be Christians. Admission is on university graduate level. The period of study is for two years — close to our Master of Divinity standard. However, in line with other graduate schools in mainland China, there is no plan at present for the granting of degrees.

I had the opportunity to visit this Institute and to meet its staff. Because the buildings of the Nanjing Seminary are still being occupied by others, the staff members are crowded into a small three-storey building in which the Christian Three-Self Patriotic Movement Committee also has its offices. Most of the staff are involved with translation, writing and research. Besides continuing on the revision of the Chinese translation of the Bible, the Institute has completed the manuscript of "Western Religious Idioms," which will be published by the Commercial Press. Most of the idioms relate

to the Christian faith. I purposely picked out one term – Sunday School – and made some comments. Three members of the staff recently took part in an international conference on the Taiping Rebellion and had presented papers. Professor Chen Zemin of the Institute this spring gave a lecture on Christian theism in a lecture series at the Nanjing University. The Institute is also organizing the books from the former seminary library. Though the books are not many and are rather old – pre-Cultural Revolution – it was nevertheless a joy to see that they had escaped total destruction.

In talking about the theological books, I feel obliged to mention something else that made me happy. When I visited the famous Jade Buddha Temple in Shanghai, which has recently been reopened, I learned that the temple escaped destruction by the Red Guards by reason of the personal order of Zhou Enlai. Not only did the two jade buddhas, imported from Burma in 1882, escape damage, but so also the 7,240 volumes of the Classical Buddhist Sutras, edited in 1735, had been kept intact. The Lutheran Theological Seminary in Hongkong at one time intended to secure a photocopy set of these books, but both the lack of funds as well as space in the library precluded carrying out the plan. The curator at the temple told me that the Chinese Buddhist Association was now considering holding lectures on Buddhism in the temple as part of their leadership training program.

As a theological educator I cannot but be concerned about TE problems. The development of TE in the mainland of China will greatly influence or even determine the future of the Church in the mainland as a whole. If the church desires good TE, then it is necessary to meet certain conditions: good students, qualified faculty, up-to-date library, and a free study environment. It is clear that in the foreseeable future the Chinese Church in the mainland will not find it easy to provide such a satisfactory situation.

PART IV: The Responsibilities and Contributions by Christians Outside of Mainland China

On returning to Hongkong I have been asked by several people: Has the door for the Gospel been opened? When can we enter China to preach? Without a doubt this is the question that people who love the people in mainland China are most concerned with. Yet according to the present situation in mainland China even the most optimistic answer we can give will be a disappointment to many.

If you are thinking of organizing a mission board to send a large number of missionaries to China, you will be disappointed. If you would like to hold a large evangelistic campaign, say in Shanghai, similar to what Billy Graham is doing in many places, you will be disappointed. If you plan to stand at the street corners to sell Bibles or pass out Gospel tracts, you will be disappointed. "Freedom of religion" in China is still only words in the Constitution, and as such it is not yet understood by many and accepted by even less except for a few higher-placed persons. Although this statement has appeared in the Chinese Constitution for 25 years, it has not been actually carried into practice. Just as one old pastor said to me: The policy of the government is one thing, the implementation of it is another. And besides, as was mentioned before, there is the right to propagate atheism, but there is no right to propagate theism. This policy on atheism has no doubt been carried out 100 per cent. During my visit to the Guangzhou City Museum I discovered that many anti-Christian pictures are posted there. I thought, if the churches posted anti-atheism pictures in public places or even just in the churches, what would be the result?

This is not to say that we cannot offer any assistance to the Chinese Church which is reawakening, or that we should take no responsibility. On the contrary, as I once told Bishop Ding quite bluntly: "The preaching of the Gospel to mainland China is not only the responsibility of Christians in China, but also of every Christian, especially every Chinese Christian in the world. The Christians in Hongkong have as great a responsibility in this mission as you have and have as much a right to do so as you do."

But we must understand the true condition in China and the actual situation of the church there so that we will not make unwarranted demands of the Chinese Church nor draft unrealistic plans. In these three weeks I discovered that in the past few years some people have distorted the image of China, either deliberately or unintentionally. Some described the mainland as 'hell'; other pictured it as 'heaven'. The result was that people hardly knew whether to weep or laugh at the thought of China. But what really put me between tears and laughter was the peals of laughter I heard from a respected church leader when he reflected on the description by certain China experts of China's "New Man". If I understood him aright, he laughed because he felt that the western China experts were far too naive. He laughed because the description of the "New Man" under the Chinese Communists came just at the time when China was undergoing its most unprincipled period, the Cultural Revolution, when throughout the land there was 'no law and no heaven'. He

laughed because in the face of political fantasies these people had forgotten the biblical truth that only in Christ can there be a "New Man". If the Chinese had become "New Men" as by these western experts, then the Kingdom of God would already have come to China. What more would we need to do?

Though the 30 years of Communist control have brought many changes to China, it has not changed the spiritual condition of China's people. They need the Gospel as much as others do. During these recent days I have kept reminding myself that my beloved fatherland is still the largest mission field in the world.

What then can we do? I asked this question of Zhao Fusan, Ding Guangxun and others. In answer to this question they all seemed to be unusually careful, possibly because they themselves are not quite sure about the answer. Besides thinking of the needs of the church, they will have to consider other factors such as government policy, reaction of the people or the effect on the Three-Self Movement principles. They did emphasize that any help from outside should not hurt the principles of self-support, self-administration, or self-propagation which have been stressed by the Chinese Church for many years.

In talking about concrete actions, Zhao mentioned especially the supply of information. The church in the mainland has been virtually cut off from churches overseas for 30 years. It is now time to resume contacts. He especially hoped that he might get news about the Chinese churches in Hongkong, Taiwan and Southeast Asia. I asked him if the *Taiwan Christian Tribune* were sent to him would this cause problems. He said he did not think so.

Like Bishop Ding, Zhao also mentioned the urgent need for theological books for purposes of research and introduction to China. He hoped that more Christian Classics could be introduced to Chinese readers. Ding also expressed hope that he might get more new theological books to enrich their library. In his study I saw several boxes of books that had just arrived from abroad.

But pastors and laymen in general indicated that at present the most needed books were Bibles and hymnals as well as cassettes of religious music. There were also people who asked me for books and cassettes for the study of English and German. Several relatives and friends in Chongqing and Beijing who listen to the Good Companion Gospel Radio broadcasts, do so mainly

to learn English or to hear good religious music. One friend even asked me to contact the Good Companion station in the hopes that they would work harder to enrich and upgrade their music programs in order to attract more listeners.

All those I met expressed the hope that more Christians would visit China, stressing that this kind of visit is the most effective way to promote mutual understanding. "We need to understand what other Christians are doing; we also hope other Christians will understand our situation," they said. Visits by other Christians to China will not only promote mutual understanding but will bring untold comfort and encouragement to Chinese Christians who have suffered so much, assuring them that they are not forgotten or alone. During my three-week visit to China I not only had opportunity for meetings on several occasions to pray and sing hymns with relatives and friends, but I also had opportunities during mealtimes and while travelling to talk about Christianity with those who have never heard the Gospel clearly before. Their responses were usually beyond my expectation.

Not only ought overseas Christians to take the opportunity to visit China, but overseas churches should invite church leaders from China to come out and lecture, speak and attend meetings so they will have a chance to learn to know about the churches in the world and to share their own experiences. Bishop Ding stated that going abroad is all right but he has many practical problems to solve. One of them is time. People who are asked to go abroad are usually very busy people and so it is not easy for them to find the time to get away from all that there is to do in China today. But Ding said he would consider carefully any genuine invitation. For a fact Rev. Zhao paid a visit to the States in April and Bishop Ding is to go to the States and Canada in August this year. Ding graciously accepted the invitation I extended him on behalf of ATSSSEA to attend a meeting next year.

CONCLUSION

Thirty years! And finally we see the Church in mainland China showing sign of new life. No matter how delicate the signs of life may be, we should feel really happy and treasure it for the glory of God, and for the spiritual need of 900 million Chinese. We must support this church which is reawakening, by our actions as well as in our prayers so that it will grow free and firm.

Truly we should not forget to pray for the Chinese Church. When I asked an elderly Christian what she needed most, she answered that it was prayer. "What I need most from you is that you pray daily for me." This is the most important message I believe that the Christians in China want me to bring to your Christians all over the world!

FURTHER MEETING WITH PROTESTANT LEADERS IN CHINA

By Deng Zhaoming

Chongqing, Wuhan and Nanjing have been known as the furnaces of China. This summer I found out for myself that the whole Changjiang valley is indeed a long fire belt. People on both banks of the big river were sweating, many with a fan in the hand in a faint effort to fend off the scorching sun and the suffocating heat. In the evening, as soon as the sun set, stools, couches and straw mattresses were moved out from the houses into the shaded areas on the pavements. Pretty soon, not only the pavements, but also the side streets, and even many of the thoroughfares were occupied by those who enjoyed the cool. Their houses were left behind empty and dark. A most spectacular scene to be seen was perhaps the People's Square in Nanchang, a place comparable to Tiananmen Square in size. There people kept coming from all directions at dusk. The evening I was there, the huge place was completely filled shortly after 8 p.m. It was so crowded that the ice-cream vendors had to squeeze through the multitudes. It was truly a *people's square*.

Out in the open, people were in a leisurely and carefree mood. Families gathered together after day-long work; old friends came together for some casual chats; lovers wallowed in their own small worlds; games of bridge or Chinese chess were played under the light of street lamps. It was the time for social contact.

In a care-free mood too I went to meet some Christian leaders in Hangzhou, Shanghai and Nanjing in late July and early August. There I was cordially received as a fellow-Christian (Peter Lee had written to them about my coming). Talks were casual and frank. I had the feeling of simply going back to my own people. And I sensed that in spite of the heat of the summer people in the Christian communities began to resume activities.

In Hangzhou I went straight to the home of Pastor Cai Wenhao. He was not there. So I took the trolley car again to his office in the Provincial Political Consultative Conference. There he was busy looking for veteran translators

who might help the four modernizations by translating foreign scientific information into Chinese. Upon seeing me, he quickly arranged a time for me to meet other Christian leaders of the city, namely, pastors Niu Zhifang, Sun Xipei and Deng Fucun.

I was told that the Gulou Church was still not yet ready for service. But the government had promised to get it repaired as early as possible, and the church was on the waiting list for repair and repainting work. The church also needs some long benches. I later went to see the church by myself. I found it was emptied of all goods all right (it had been used as a warehouse) and saw that it needed renovation.

Pastor Niu said that they were thinking of having Sun and Deng to serve as pastors at the Gulou Church on a part-time basis, for both of them were still working in factories. Pastor Niu estimated that there were about 2000 Christians in Hangzhou alone and the church could at most accommodate 400 people at a time. They were quite confident that once the church is re-opened to the public, it will be fully used and two part-time pastors may not be enough to serve the people.

Their optimism is not unfounded. For in Ningbo, according to Pastor Cai, when the church there was reopened in April, it drew immediately 200 people to come for worship. The next Sunday, there were 400 and the third Sunday 700. It seemed that some Christians were hesitant at first. They wanted to know who would be ministering in the church. They also wanted to know whether the church was again preaching politics. But once they came to church, they found their old acquaintances. (The Ningbo church now has eight retired pastors coming out to serve.). I learned that the Three-Self Patriotic Movement had made a point that the church is a place for worshipping God. Not only the Hangzhou Christian leaders, but also Mr. Shen Derong, of the Shanghai Three-Self Movement, stressed strongly that within the church only the gospel message would be preached and to be sure, a message based on the interpretation of the Bible. They all seemed to regret that in the past there had been too much politicization in the Three-Self churches. (Since September, three churches in Shanghai and one church in Guangzhou have been re-opened. All of them are filled with worshippers.)

"You call yourself 'patriotic', then how do you justify your name?" I asked Mr. Shen. "Well, I don't mean we don't talk about politics," he answered. "That we'll do in places like the Political Consultative Conference, and politics now means mainly the four modernizations which I think all

of us would try our best to help realize."

Yet Shen, Niu and others, on separate occasions, spoke about the positive role which the religious representatives might play in public affairs. They had particular reference to the petition which Ding Guangxun and other religious representatives made at the Second Session of the Fifth People's Congress to remove the clause, "freedom to propagate atheism," from the Constitution. The Christian people I talked to entertained high hope that the petition might be finally accepted. Niu was also enthusiastic when he called attention to the provision in the new criminal code which provides for protection of a citizen against any restraint on enjoying and exercising the right to freedom of religion.

Pastor Deng Fucun, a man probably in his 40's, is an example of how a Christian can contribute in nation-building by working hard as a model worker in his factory. (Peter Lee in his earlier trip had heard him "testify" after the worship service in Hangzhou.) He too agreed that the church should not simply pick up political slogans from the daily newspapers. He believes that the Christian faith is something more than Marxism-Leninism. I personally felt that with their work experience in the factory as well as their pastoral concern, both Deng and Sun would have fine qualifications to be ministers. Deng was not yet decided whether he should keep his factory job or give it up to do full-time pastoral work.

If the church in China now goes back to the old liturgy, i.e., Bible teaching, hymn singing and prayers, would there still be any difference between the 'official' church and the 'silent' church, a difference which some Christians outside China seem to make much of? Pastor Deng remarked: "There might be brothers and sisters who still do not understand what we are doing. Yet they are welcome to come and see for themselves. I believe sooner or later they too will understand and come to worship with us together. It is a matter of time."

On the question of Bible and hymnal, the church leaders seemed to insist on the principle of self-reliance. Pastor Cai thought the *Hymns of Universal Praise* was too bulky for the Chinese congregation. They would rather use an abridged version of 108 hymns.

Due to the lack of both personnel and time, however, the Nanjing Religious Institute could for the time being only prepare a revision of the

Chinese Bible. To explain why they had to do their own Bible translation, Mr. Chen Zemin of the Institute had this to say: "You know it is not the use of the simplified characters alone. All through these years the usage of the language here has become quite different from that in Hong Kong." Mr. Chen was just getting ready to go to Beijing, from thence he would leave for the U.S.A. to attend the Conference on Religion and Peace in Princeton. But he was gracious to talk with me as he was packing, and the hour I spent with him was invaluable.

Besides the revision of the Bible, the staff of the Institute have already completed the manuscript of *Western Religious Idioms* which will be published by the Commercial Press next year. They are also translating a 3-volume *History of Christian Thought* by the Cuban theologian Gonzales. They will then go on to translate some of the Christian classics.

As to the question of accepting research fellows in the Institute, Mr. Chen said there were seven applicants this fall. But the examination results showed that their religious knowledge was very insufficient. The Institute thus decided not to take in any students this year.

From a visitor's point of view, there seems to be a communication gap not only between Protestants and Catholics in China, but even among Protestants of the Three-Self Movement. For this reason there was a strong desire to re-convene the national congress of the Three-Self Movement. Mr. Shen said this would take place in about half a year. In the mean time, the various provincial Three-Self Committees would be preoccupied in internal affairs, such as replenishing committee members, taking back church property, inviting retired pastors to come out again, preparing to re-open churches, etc.

No doubt, the church is in China and is there to stay. The only question is: Would it turn out to be just one of the ordinary churches as in the rest of the world or would it emerge as a really prophetic one?

On my way to Lushan I had one whole morning to wander around in Jiujiang. An old pagoda attracted my eyes, so I found my way there. It was an old monastery. The front gate had recently been renovated. Yet a sign stood at the entrance: strictly no visitors. I was about to turn away. Then I discovered someone sitting just inside the entrance. He was an old man, writing something. As I drew closer to him, I saw him copying the *Hua-yen sutra*

(avatamsa). This was a beautifully bound book. And as the situation should be, his calligraphy too matched beautifully with the old book. I was tempted immediately to strike up a conversation with him. Yes, he was a former monk. He had studied Buddhism. Only recently was he called back from his work unit to serve temporarily as the door-keeper of this monastery under reparation. It was called the Nengren Si.

All at once, I seemed to know this monastery. Was there not a famous Beijing opera piece called "The Lady who Stormed the Nengren Si?" Telling the monk that I too was a religious person, I asked his permission to let me go inside. He nodded. As I entered, I found the front court being encroached upon by some houses. The pagoda was in a bad shape, with grass and small trees growing everywhere. What remained in the monastery were two big halls. The rear one was under renovation. The front one was still occupied by tenants.

I turned back to the door-keeper cum monk. "What will this place be used for when repaired?" I asked him. "It will be used as a museum", he answered. "Will you be the curator?" "I guess so. I'm still working for my work points."

To be sure, temples and mosques have been repaired and reopened in many cities already. A couple of months ago visitors would still have doubts about the genuineness of those who came to burn their incense. Now it has become superfluous to raise the question. Religious practices have come back to the people in the open. Certainly this holds true for Christian churches.

But still a question haunts me. Could the re-opened church escape the fate of being a museum piece? That is, would the church belong to the past only, invoking some loving memories perhaps, or would it be something of the future which leads people to new horizons? Any religion in China, including the 'official' and 'silent' churches, I am afraid, will go to the museum if it does not take into account Marxism-Leninism and Mao Zedong Thought as the theoretical basis for the reality of present day China and then wrestle with it like Jacob. It is human to try to forget something which has hurt. But escapism in whatever form can hardly represent the true faith.

RELIGIOUS POLICY AND THEOLOGICAL REORIENTATION IN CHINA

K. H. Ting

It is a great pleasure for me to be in Toronto again and a special pleasure to meet with you. I feel very much at home in this hall which I remember well.

The religious policy of new China, which is the announced subject of my talk, is not anything hard to understand. I'll try to deal with it briefly so that, if you don't mind, I would devote some time to reporting something of the theological reconstruction or transformation that many of us Christians in China have been going through in the last thirty years.

The People's Republic of China is under the leadership of the Chinese Communist Party and the communist view on religion is clear to us. They don't have a high opinion of religion. They think that religion is a bad thing, essentially a reflection of people's suffering and hopelessness. It may be a protest of some sort against injustice, but it is a very weak one at that. It is largely an opiate to numb the sense of pain. They think that in a few hundred years, when humanity has entered the stage of communism, when people reach a very high understanding of things, i.e., a high consciousness, and when there are plenty of things materially to satisfy our needs, then religion will have reached its stage of withering away. This in general is their conception of religion which is probably familiar to you.

I think we have good reasons to welcome this frank and open attitude. When it is all put on the table, as it were, you know exactly where they stand. All through history, powers that have wanted to make use of religion have put on a mask of religiosity. They pretend to support religion and make religious oaths to show that they are sincerely for religion. The Chinese communists' frankly anti-religious posture makes it hardly possible for them to exploit religion for their own purposes and this is something we like.

Now the communists' understanding of religion and their policy on religion are two different entities. We shouldn't get the two confused. To

take the view that religion will one day, perhaps a few hundred years later, wither away is not the same thing as to think it is possible and desirable to suppress religion today. That really is not a very difficult thing for us to understand. We are all agreed that every human being will die some day, but we don't thereby want to kill him or her off today. The communists believe that religion will wither away when circumstances are ripe. But, today, they want above all to unite as many of the people in China as possible in the work of building up socialism. There is enough common ground for us to work together, and the communists are the first people in China to know that the task of building up socialism is so gigantic that no group or party can monopolize it. They like to see that the majority of the Chinese people would join together in a united front; and in order that religious people could be mobilized to take part in the united front, it is important for religious faiths to be respected. This is the basis of the policy for religious freedom in the People's Republic of China. In this united front, we emphasize our common ground. The prosperity of our fatherland is a common ground. It represents the desire of over 95% of our population. The building up of a better life for our people is again a common ground on which over 95% of our population would be agreed. In this united front we emphasize political unity and maintain or keep our differences. We can be different in many ways. There are 55 or 56 minority nationalities, each different from the others. We have different ideologies; the religious people have many different faiths of our own. These differences cannot be settled today. Today we have to proceed with our work of building socialism, and ideological, theological and religious specialities can only be respected. This is the principle of the united front. The Chinese communists believe that religious people can be good citizens and so can very well be a part of the united front. As to differences, they have to be tolerated and respected.

Thus, we Chinese Christians do find the religious policy of the Chinese Communist Party reasonable and supportable. It is diametrically opposed to the outlawing of religion as practised under the ultra-leftist line of the "Gang of Four".

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Now religious freedom is not everything to the churches because they cannot rely on religious freedom for their existence. For the churches to exist, we need many more things than religious freedom. We must be convinced ourselves and able to convince others that Christianity has a message which is important enough for people to listen to. Hence, all the theological reconstruction and transformation that we have been going through in the last thirty years.

"We have entered a new and unique stage of history"

I think it is quite warranted for me to say that the Chinese Christians constitute that part of the world's Christian population which has entered a new and unique stage of history, the stage of doing away with exploitative systems and of building up socialism in a country which is poor and which has hitherto been semi-colonial and semi-feudalistic. Our response to this transition may be just as momentous and significant as the Reformation during the transition from European feudalism to capitalism. Therefore, to Christians the world over who take to heart seriously the fate of Christianity in the future world, ours may be considered a sort of laboratory whose experiments they cannot afford to miss. This is so not because ours is a big strong church, but simply because history is such that it is we who have been put in that exciting situation.

There are roughly three million Roman Catholics and 700,000 Protestants, Anglicans and Orthodox in China. Before the liberation, there were side by side strong strains of evangelicalism, neo-orthodoxy and the social gospel within Protestantism. It may be helpful to those of you who are younger to know something of the international theological-political orientation of those days, because Chinese theology then was to a very large extent an appendage of that orientation.

When in 1951 I went back to China from Europe, I went there from a theological milieu that had also very much invaded the Chinese scene. I think the following two quotations are very representative of the political-theological thinking of those days. Here is a statement given by Dr. John C. Bennett in a study pamphlet on the Responsible Society, published by the World Council of Churches Study Department in

November 1949. He said (let me add it is not important that he said it, because the statement was reflective of something that was being said by many.): "The conviction most widely held among the member churches of the World Council of Churches is that Communism as a movement which has its base in the Soviet Union, and through Communist parties is seeking to extend its power throughout the world should be resisted both politically and spiritually, and the churches in the countries associated with 'western democracy' should give moral support to their governments in their efforts to check the extension of communist power ... The whole ecumenical community, whatsoever differences there may be among its members about policies in particular nations, should recognize that it has a responsibility to do what is possible to prevent the world from coming under Communist domination."

Another statement was given by Bishop Dibelius of Berlin and published in the Ecumenical Review of July 1956: "Perhaps the ecumenical movement is the prelude to a general theological or non-theological mobilization of all the Christian churches against the materialistic ideology of the East."

These two statements probably can give us some idea of the political-theological atmosphere of those days. There was also a lot of talk about the utter depravity of man and the diabolical nature of human collectivities.

Before I left Geneva for China in 1951, I was invited by Dr. Kraemer to go to his study to have a heart-to-heart talk for the last time. I remember very well the last statement he said to me as he held my hand. He said: "Always put a question mark to whatever a communist says and does." So I went home to liberated China with this question mark in my mind.

"All schools of theological thought were found to be on the side of political reaction."

In new China, when Christians were faced with the tremendous political reality of the People's Liberation Movement and of the new People's Republic, I found that all our isms somehow were forced to come out into the open in political terms. Aside from a small number of western missionaries and Chinese church leaders who could see something positive in the people's movement for liberation and wanted to identify

This address was delivered to the faculty and students of the Toronto School of Theology at Emmanuel College in October, 1979.

themselves somehow with the people's struggle for liberation, I must say all schools of theological thought were found to be on the side of political reaction. Christians were made to pray for Chiang Kai-Shek, the model Methodist, and when the People's Liberation Army was about to cross the Yangtze River, prayers were offered in churches that God would perform a miracle so that the soldiers would drown in the river. Christians were sent to preach on the streets wearing special clothes to make themselves noticeable, warning people of the imminent second coming of Jesus Christ to destroy the world. Within that political setup, to destroy the world meant really to destroy the People's Liberation Movement. We found that all the strong doses on original sin, on the fallen state of the world, on the meaninglessness and absurdity of history, on the complete separation and antithesis of grace and nature, on the so-called pride in human works and on justification by faith could very easily be turned into a sort of ammonitism which in the name of faith gave blessing to any sort of political stance required by the Kuomintang and U.S. policy. After the liberation of Shanghai, there were Kuomintang bombers that went from the islands near Shanghai to bomb the city. A man supposed to be the leader of a very devout evangelical group organized a band of people to give signals to the bombers from the ground. This man is treated in some circles in North America as a martyr because

"Prayers were offered that God would perform a miracle and the soldiers would drown."

he was put in jail for this and other crimes. But we in China haven't thought of him as a martyr or someone who had to suffer persecution because of his Christian faith. We have thought of him as a collaborator with the Kuomintang and someone who has committed very serious crimes against the People's State.

The rank-and-file Christians in China are mostly members of the working classes. They didn't have much to lose in the liberation but a lot to gain. They found that the People's Liberation Army was a very disciplined army, entirely different from what they were told. So naturally they were unwilling to follow their reactionary church leaders. The Social Gospellers were not so reactionary politically. Some of them were good

exposers of the darkness of the moribund society, but they could advance no programme for change except a few reformist measures which really prettified the Kuomintang status quo and they didn't seem to be able to offer any message that could hold the Christians together.

As to the Roman Catholics, orders came from the Vatican that they should do nothing to support the war effort of the People's Republic in its assistance to North Korea. At a time when there was a very high upsurge of patriotic feelings in our country, the sacrament was denied to those who took part in patriotic activities. Roman Catholic parents were not allowed to let their children wear red scarves, which were a symbol of the popular young people's group, the Pioneers. Even the buying of citizen's national bonds was condemned as a sin. So, many Roman Catholic priests who were patriotic felt a strong pressure on their conscience. Many dioceses were being run by western bishops who had to leave under those circumstances. But Rome refused to appoint new bishops for these dioceses. So, in 1958, the Roman Catholic Church in China began to elect and consecrate its own bishops. There are forty or fifty bishops of this kind that have been consecrated without the approval of Rome. I don't know if Rome would take such a stiff attitude today, but I am talking about the 1950's. The conflict was very severe.

So it became very clear to us in those days how political theology really was. I myself began to apply the Kraemer question mark not just to the communists but to many others too.

However, Chinese Christians felt that there is something in Jesus Christ that makes us unwilling to depart from Him. "Thou has the word of eternal life, to whom shall we go?" That seems to be the thought that existed in the minds of many Chinese Christians. In spite of all the political reaction that had appeared in the name of Christian faith, we felt there is something in Christian faith that speaks to us about things more ultimate than what the newspapers were talking about, and that speaking we need to hear. We were greatly humbled by the revolutionaries in China, but we felt that the gospel does give us some assurance of things not seen, but real to us nevertheless, no matter how vaguely we could express it. So that's the beginning of our theological struggle, a struggle to keep the Christian faith, but also one against its being used

as an obstacle to social change or made a tool of political reaction. It was sort of knitting our theology, or reknitting it in our new environment.

Now to be very brief, there have emerged mainly two theological approaches. The first type still makes theological thinking revolve mostly around the axis of belief and unbelief. The world is still essentially evil and Christ is still somebody extrinsic to this world. Yet, necessary adjustment is made so as to be possible to affirm something of what is happening in new China.

A colleague of ours in the Nanking Theological College was a good representative of this kind of adjustment. He used to talk a lot about the imminent coming of Jesus Christ, denying any value in what was being done by man on this earth. But he began to realize that what the Chinese people were doing in new China was something that he, as a Chinese and as a Christian, wanted to affirm. What could he do about it? He did some partial adjustment. He began to tell us a story about a carpenter who was an ardent believer in the immediate second coming of Jesus Christ. Somebody asked this carpenter: "How can you reconcile your belief in his imminent coming with the fact that you try to do so well in your carpentry? Since Jesus Christ will be coming tomorrow, why do you still have to make strong and durable desks and chairs?" He answered, "I want to prepare my soul so that I could meet Jesus Christ tonight or tomorrow, but I must work with my two hands as a carpenter to produce furniture that would be good for use for a hundred years or even five hundred years." This story represented his attempt to arrive at some sort of reconciliation between his premillenarian faith in the imminent return of Jesus Christ and his desire to affirm what human beings in China were doing. Later he took a further step by becoming a post-millenarian and taught that Jesus Christ would return to this earth only after one thousand years of peace and prosperity. Friends rather welcomed that change because, although it wasn't very satisfactory theologically, he allowed a space of one thousand years for Christians to affirm what is happening in new China. The efforts he made deserve our sympathy but, as you see, this sort of adjustment is necessarily temporary, partial and reformist.

"Creation is not an act completed in the past, but a continuing evolution."

Many other Christians began to engage in more fundamental theological reconstruction. We began to think much more about how large the area of God's concern and God's care is. We shift away from the belief - unbelief antithesis to a greater appreciation of what God is doing in history. God is not an infinite being extrinsic to our human world or apart from human life and history. He is a living, immanent, ever-working God. Creation is not an act completed in the past, in six days or in six thousand years, but a continuing evolution. And the end purpose of creation is the emergence in the universe of a truly free humanity in the image of God. When we say "in the image of God", we especially have in mind God himself in his nature of being a community. (Trinity)

"We are magnifying his glory and confirming his claims."

That is, this new humanity will freely and on its own accord choose to live in community with each other and with God, and then that humanity will be like God; and that is the consummation of history. Creation is an act of God, but it is very much an educative evolutionary process. This world is God's, not Satan's. Christ is not an intruder into the world alien to God, but is the first fruit of all creation. He is unique, but also akin to us organically because he himself is the perfection of that which all of us possess as our birthright as human beings, as sons of God. He is unique not because he stands against or stands in contrast with the world process, but as an exemplification of the fullness with which he reveals the nature and the potentiality of the world. Although we say he came down from heaven, we do so with the same kind of mental reservation or lack of it when we talk about the rising or the setting of the sun. And we seem to feel that there is a pre-given engracement of all people through the incarnation of the Son of God. He unites himself to every man and woman in some fashion and, therefore, you will find Chinese Christians not only talking about the Redeemer Christ, but more now about the Cosmic Christ, the Incarnational Christ, Christ as the crown and fulfillment of the whole creative process, the clue to the meaning of creation, the One whom we find very much talked about in the New Testament, especially in the Fourth Gospel, in Colossians and in Ephesians. And in this way we think that many contemporary thoughts and

K.H. Ting
in Toronto



Photo: R. Brian Ruitan

movements are not in contrast with the divine revelation or destructive of divine revelation, but rather means of illuminating that revelation. They are not adversaries to but glimpses and fore-shadows of the way of Christ. In looking at reality this way, we think we are not diminishing the unique significance of the Christ, but are magnifying his glory and confirming his claims.

We are deeply impressed by the fact that Christ showed very meagre interest in specially sacred doings. We are impressed by His profound interest in the most ordinary doings of secular life. He was interested in lilies and birds, in the sowers and the seeds, in women and children, in a father with two sons, in the fishermen, in baking of bread by the housewife, in the merchant seeking pearls. He didn't aim at turning us away from the natural order and from the world, but using them to enable us to discover in them manifestations of the truth about God.

Now a world which can be used so often to teach us about God cannot be an entirely fallen one. If there is a total disparity between man and Christ, then incarnation would not be possible. We think that to say that man has fallen is really to say that he is not at present in his proper state, the state to which he ought to belong, the state for which he is made. And this verse in Romans Chapter 5 has become very real to us in China: "For if by the offense of the one man all dies, much more did the grace of God and the gracious

gift of the one man Jesus Christ abound for us." We like to emphasize "much more". In other words, we are born not only in original sin but in original grace as well. It is inconceivable that the incarnation of the Son of God should make less of an impact on humanity than the fall of Adam. Too often, we have made original sin universal but have particularized or narrowed redemption and divine grace as though Adam had succeeded in carving his name deeper on humanity than had Christ. We surely think that our human solidarity with Christ is more universal, more decisive, and more efficacious than is our solidarity with Adam.

These probably tell you some of the changes that have happened in our minds. We think that what humanity does in history is not going to be simply and totally destroyed or negated at the end of history. Our work will be received, sublimated, transfigured and perfected. In this way we see the worth of what our Chinese people are suffering and striving for.

In this light we see that the dominant pre-liberation Chinese theology was a reflection of our alienation from our own people. Revolving itself around the axis of belief and unbelief it was very useful to bring about enmity between Christians and the revolutionaries who are mostly non-believers. Today, after thirty years, it has shifted to a more appreciative language of practice. We have to abandon certain conceptual frameworks in which we have felt secure for many years. But as Kierkegaard said, "It is good once in a while to feel oneself in the hands of God and not always and eternally slinking around the familiar nooks and corners of a town where one always knows a way out." That seems to be the experience to many Chinese Christians as we discover the immanence of the transcendent God in history, in nature, in the people's movements and in the collectivities in which we find ourselves. After all, the God who is worthy of our worship and praise is not so small as to be concerned only with a few million Chinese who profess to believe in him. God's love and care is for the whole of humanity and the whole of the Chinese people. He does not mind terribly much if many, for good reasons, do not recognize his existence. We know to believe that God is loving and at the same time almighty is difficult anyway, if one is serious about one's belief. But I think liberation in China, with all the material and cultural elevation it has brought to our people, does make it more possible for our people to ponder on such a God. We hope we are

able gradually to be an instrument of introducing this God to our people.

"Our movement is aimed at making the Churches in China just as Chinese as churches in Canada are Canadian."

Another very important area of re-thinking is in connection with the church. As you know, the Chinese churches were imported from the west and, therefore, it was something western in the eyes of our Chinese people. As far as we Christians ourselves were concerned, we were more or less proud of it. But after the liberation we came to realize that, although many missionaries went to China with the intention of helping and evangelizing China, the missionary movement happened in a stage of history when the west was penetrating China economically, politically and militarily and this movement could not but have a de-nationalizing effect. We want to live down that part of history so that we can be a suitable instrument for bearing the Christian witness. Our movement to promote self-government, self-support and self-nurture is exactly aimed at overcoming that effect and making the churches in China just as Chinese as churches in Canada are Canadian and those in U.S.A. are American.

Another change is that our churches are much more de-institutionalized than yours. I don't mean that we thought about it and decided to de-institutionalize, then proceeded with it. But as we look back, we think that in institutional Christianity, faith is very often replaced by a search for security. Institutional Christianity tends to exist for itself. Perpetuation of itself requires it to unite with the powers that be and become a part of the status quo. It binds men to the dead past. Its investments and bonds are a symbol of the identification with the social order which it is supposed to question. Institutional Christianity seems to us to sacralize the cultural, social and political structures of domination. Therefore, Christianity in its institutional expressions is often the very denial of the gospel it affirms. It gets in the way of man's vital communion with Jesus of Nazareth and with each other. Prophetic voices do arise in the church here and there, now and then, but only in spite of itself. So de-institutionalization seems to Chinese Christians to be something valuable. It came to many of us as an

experience of loss. It was difficult and painful when we had to part company with our universities, colleges, hospitals and orphanages. Something felt to be important to us seemed to die. And yet, through this death, a Christian finds that he is living more intensely, not less so. It is actually an authentic working out of the things that is most important to us as Christians from the very start. And religion as the legitimation of the status quo becomes somehow a catalyst for social change. That is cause for rejoicing.

Now ours is a very small and weak church, of course, and we do feel that international contacts can be a great help to us. We would like to have more of them. But we like to see that international contacts should not mean the undoing of our experiments and the dismantling of the laboratory.

I see that I have spoken much longer than I ought to so I'll stop right away. Thank you very much.

CANADA CHINA PROGRAMME DIRECTOR RESIGNS

Staff
April 10, 1980

Raymond Whitehead, Director of the Canada China Programme since 1976, has submitted his resignation to the Programme Executive. His resignation is to become effective as of July 1, 1980. At that time he will begin his new responsibilities as Director of the Doctor of Ministry Programme at the Toronto School of Theology, in Toronto.

After his resignation becomes effective, Dr. Whitehead will continue to be involved with the China Programme on a volunteer basis. In his letter of resignation, he said: "Although I am leaving the directorship of the China Programme, I will continue to participate in it. I expect the Programme to play a central role in my life. The last year of the seventies was exciting, with the visit of K. H. Ting, the Fort Qu'Appelle Conference, and the chance to meet in the U.S.A. such visitors from China as Zhao Fusan and Wu Yifang. China itself is going through dramatic developments with many imponderables in the present situation. My change in career will open new doors and close others, but my commitment to China remains firm."

PRESS RELEASE JUST BEFORE DEPARTURE FROM TAIWAN:

We have come to Taiwan as a delegation representing two worldwide Christian religious bodies, the World Alliance of Reformed Churches and the World Council of Churches. The WARC is a family of churches stemming from the Genevan reformation of the sixteenth century. It is composed of 145 member churches with more than 70 million members. The WCC is a fellowship of churches including, in addition to the Reformed Church mentioned above, Lutheran and other Protestant churches, Anglican churches, Pentecostal churches and Eastern Orthodox churches. It cooperates closely with the Roman Catholic Church. There are 297 churches in the Council whose membership exceeds 400 million. Our delegation is made up of Propst Uwe Hollem, Deputy Bishop of the Evangelical Church in Berlin-Brandenburg (West Berlin), Dr. Edmund Perret, General Secretary of the WARC, and Dr. William P. Thompson, Stated Clerk of the United Presbyterian Church, USA.

We have come at this time because of the arrest on April 24, 1980, of Dr. C. M. Kao, General Secretary of the Presbyterian Church in Taiwan. Dr. Kao is well-known throughout the Christian world as a committed pastor who follows in his daily life the teachings of our Lord and Saviour Jesus Christ that His disciples should minister to those in need. He is known to be a man of integrity who has served the Presbyterian Church in Taiwan with vigor and foresight.

We would first address the officers, pastors and people of the

Presbyterian Church in Taiwan:

Your church is a longtime member of the WARC and has recently activated its membership in the WCC. We have followed with keen interest the life of your church. We have applauded your inventive, evangelistic outreach, your devotion to a life of Christian discipline and your courageous witness to the implications of the Gospel of our Lord to the situation in which you have been called to minister.

We assure you of the solidarity of the brothers and sisters in Christ in all parts of the world at this time. You may be confident of their continuing concern and prayer in the days ahead.

We would also address the people of Taiwan and the authorities of the government of the Republic of China:

We regret that we are unable, despite repeated efforts to meet with any government official on this visit. Had we been able to do so, we would have assured them that we came with the firm determination that we shall not interfere with the internal affairs of this nation; however, we are obligated as members of world organizations to express the perception which we have observed beyond the boundaries of this island regarding recent events here.

We regret that we must report that to Christian observers in other parts of the world it appears that when the Presbyterian Church in Taiwan began to articulate the relevance of the

Christian gospel to their daily life in this society, that church and its leaders became the objects of persecution. Freedom of religion means more than simply the freedom to worship. It means freedom to live out the implications of one's faith as well.

We have seen encouraging evidence of the nurturing of diverse groups in this society in the past. We urge that such steps be advanced for we are convinced from our own experience in quite different situations that a nation is most secure which receives the voluntary support of free citizens who are able to express that support with courage and enthusiasm.

Uwe Hollem

Edmund Perret

Willim P. Thompson

OWT

5/16/80



**Sargent Shriver and
Richard A. McCormick, S.J.**

The China Trip



When we left for China no one in our 18-member delegation knew what to expect. When we returned everyone knew the unexpected had surpassed the planned.

Some members of our group may have thought they knew what was going to happen, since each had been given a detailed itinerary. Some had prepared speeches for audiences they expected to address. The leader of our party had assured and reassured everyone that everything would work out according to schedule. But, like most other leaders, past and present, he was proceeding on intuition and faith as well as on facts and circumstantial evidence. He was himself uncertain how we would be received, and by whom; what audiences we would address; what questions we could ask, and what responses if any we would receive.

Before we departed no one anticipated that *nothing* in the travel brochures, *nothing* in the physical, environmental reality of China, or *nothing* in the books we had read about China, would even be mentioned at our dinner together back in Washington, when each of us was called upon to describe "that *one* most unforgettable experience" of our journey from the U.S.A. to Japan, to Hong Kong and to China. Neither did our independent, objective scholars mention the universities or medical schools, nor the discussions with political leaders, diplomats, lawyers or students. Instead, they all recalled as most

significant the human, affective, nonacademic experiences. An adequate explanation for these surprising responses probably doesn't exist, but a few rather simple observations might help.

Our scholars learned about the tortures, banishments and humiliations inflicted upon their academic counterparts over the last 20 years in China, from the lips of professors who had actually undergone the banishments, trials and tribulations. Personal stories about the national assault upon learning and on the learned by the "know-nothings" of the Cultural Revolution would have shocked, if not traumatized, the most dedicated enthusiast of Chairman Mao. The effect of this assault penetrates more deeply perhaps, to academics like the members of our delegation. They could easily see themselves in the faces of their fellow, albeit Chinese, professors.

Reading about re-education programs is one thing. Meeting and talking for hours with distinguished professors who had been ridiculed and made to grovel simply because they were professors brought the reality to life.

How could the Catholic priests in our group not fail to be stirred by their meetings and lengthy conversations with Chinese priests, fellow followers of Christ, who had been imprisoned and tortured for 25 years—condemned, some of them, to five consecutive years of solitary imprisonment?

How could Protestant ministers experience, without being touched to their very depths, the first open Sunday church service in Shanghai in 13 years, when the congregation began singing Christian hymns as tears of joy ran openly down their cheeks at the chance once again to worship God.

How could anyone—atheist, secularist or religionist—ever forget a gifted pianist's performance as he tried to play Chopin, Vivaldi and Schubert (with fingers which had been broken by the Red Guards with the intent that he never play again) on a battered old piano, while bats, entering through giant holes in the theatre's ceiling, swooped over the stage and orchestra?

Every day we saw evidence of the despoliation and ignorance which had ravaged China. But even more frequently, each day our spirits were touched and elevated by the tenderness, the hospitality, the courage, and the will to rise above hardship and poverty. One billion Chinese displayed, better than books or television or billboard advertising, the indomitable qualities of human nature and the classic qualities of Chinese civilization which have seen and survived numerous attempts by foreigners at subjugation.

Many subjects were discussed in the course of our meetings with the faculty members of the Academy of the Social Sciences in Beijing, and with administrators and professors in

universities, medical schools, scientific centers and elsewhere. Religion in China was one of these, and we were told repeatedly how "it did not count for much." Yet whenever it came up in discussions, the opposite seemed to be the case as interest immediately sharpened.

Our group visited the Catholic cathedral in Beijing (now under the jurisdiction of the "Patriotic Catholic" Bishop) with the intention of celebrating Mass there. After numerous put-offs, we were eventually treated to tea and an hour's discussion of religious affairs in China. As was explained to us, there is so-called freedom of religion (practice or worship) in

China, but not the freedom to *propagate* one's faith.

The heart of our stay in Beijing (which included visits to the Great Wall, the Ming Tombs, an exhibition game by the Washington Bullets, an interview with Vice Premier Yao Ilin, a discussion/reception with Ambassador Leonard Woodcock, and a discussion with the former president of the Chinese Medical Association) was August 27th and 28th. On these two days the Chinese made their presentations and we held our seminars with the National Academy of Social Sciences (described in further detail elsewhere in this issue).

The seminar was opened with a welcome by Vice President Huan Xiang, with a return address by Sargent Shriver. Richard McCormick explained the nature, purpose and activities of the Kennedy Institute. The Chinese members of the National Academy (which is the equivalent in China of cabinet level in this country) then presented a series of topical discussions including: ethical problems in a socialist society (Professor Li Ji, Deputy Director of the Institute of Philosophy); population problems and ethics (Professor Fei Xiaotong, Chairman of the Chinese Sociology Association); law and ethics (Professor Rui Mo, Deputy Director of the Institute of Law); and religious thought in China (Professor Zhao Fusan, Deputy Director of the Institute of World Religion). Professor Zhao Fusan made one of the most



courageous statements we heard. When asked about the inequality involved in the lack of freedom to propagate anything but atheism, he stated simply: "I feel unequal."

The next day the Kennedy Institute made its presentation. Dr. Conrad Taeuber discussed "Ethics and Population," Dr. John Collins Harvey "Ethics and Medicine," and Dr. H. Tristram Engelhardt "Ethics and Research." Later in the day shorter presentations were made on law, economics, and health by Professors Patricia King, Thomas Beauchamp, and Ruth Faden, which completed the dialogue. One of the highlights of these two days was Hans Küng's lecture on "Science and Religion" in which he argued that the God-question must be viewed as an open question—not a closed one as official Chinese policy would present it. Küng stated pointedly that both religion and revolution can be opiates to the people.

These two days deserve at least a footnote in the history of the People's Republic. It was the first time in thirty years that ethics and religion had been discussed at a public forum by an outside group, at a seminar approved or at least tolerated by the Chinese government. Whatever the results, that in itself is a breakthrough. Furthermore, the Chinese seem to want to continue the contact. And so do we. We have already invited Professor Zhao Fusan to join us for a sabbatical as a Kennedy Institute research scholar. These initial over-



Beijing University.

tures were strengthened socially during two banquets hosted successively by the Academy of Social Sciences and the Kennedy Institute. Repeated *Mao Tais*, a wicked rice liquor used traditionally in Chinese toasts, intensified a cordiality and good will that we found abundant in China.

The Chinese segment of the trip concluded with a visit to Qo Fu (Confucius' birthplace) and three days in Shanghai, where conversations with medical and legal experts reinforced what we had been learning all along: that Marxist-Leninist analyses lead to a distinct set of problems, attitudes, and practices in the professions.

Scholars who spend two weeks in China do not thereby become experts on China, but they do form some instant, even if corrigible impressions. The other articles in this issue of the *Kennedy Institute Quarterly Report* describe some of the personal impressions from a variety of perspectives.

Certainly the contact between the Kennedy Institute of Ethics and The Chinese Academy of Social Sciences will not be restricted to the events described herein. On Saturday, the 10th of November, Vice President of the Academy of Social Sciences, Huan Xiang, visited the scholars of the Kennedy Institute of Ethics in Washington. In a happy reunion atmosphere it was agreed that plans would be made for a joint seminar between the two Institutes in Washington in 1980.

Four possible subjects were suggested for consideration at this seminar. These topics will be developed in a preliminary way by scholars at the Kennedy Institute and then submitted to their counterparts in the Academy of Social Sciences for review, criticism and discussion. One subject will be chosen for the joint seminar and a mutually agreeable date selected, so that the "Opening to the Far East" which was inaugurated in the waning months of the Summer of '79 will be remembered as the beginning of a long and fruitful scholarly relationship between East and West. In these days and years ahead the twain will meet.

Dr. Tristram Engelhardt

Bioethical Issues in Contemporary China

On October 26, 1963, Chou Yang delivered an address to the Department of Philosophy and Social Sciences of the Chinese Academy of Sciences, "The Fighting Task Confronting Workers in Philosophy and the Social Sciences." There he argued that "Philosophy and the social sciences constitute an important front in the ideological struggle.¹ This view of the role of philosophy and therefore of ethics and bioethics, which is integral to a Marxist-Leninist society, framed all of the discussions we had in the People's Republic of China. A philosophical interchange within an orthodox Marxist-Leninist framework proceeds quite differently from philosophical and ethical discussions in the West. Where we view philosophy, *inter alia*, as a rational attempt to clarify ideas, and as a good worth pursuing in its own right, philosophy in the People's Republic remains always at least implicitly the handmaiden of political and economic policies. These differences were recognized by our hosts. One might indeed say that our hosts were cordially attendant to the problems of doing philosophy across such conceptual gulfs.

It is important that one not underestimate the expanse of the gulf involved. It is not merely a difference in tradition, as between an analytic philosopher and a phenomenologist, or between a Christian philosopher and an atheist philosopher. In all of those cases philosophy and more particularly bioethics, can be viewed as having an independent intellectual integrity and purpose of its own, one that cannot be reduced without loss of meaning to other intellectual concerns. In our discussions, however, philosophical concerns, including bioethical concerns, were persistently recast in terms of economic forces and the role of particular ideas for particular classes. The extent of this gulf was, I believe, in many cases appreciated better by our hosts than by us. In any event, the gulf itself added a special interest to the exchange. It showed the special problems involved in, and benefits derivable from, serious cultural exchange with an intellectual community that has come to view the significance of ideas in a fashion quite different from the West. One should remark here that for many reasons these differences are more starkly drawn between the West and the PRC than between the West and philosophical communities in the Soviet bloc. However, the force of this contrast is altered by not only a greater political openness, but I believe a greater cordiality and intrinsic interest on the part of the scholars in the People's Republic.

Because of this different context for philosophical reflection, the study of

ethics is not undertaken as a primarily intellectual enterprise, but much more as a project of moral training or of the development of a proper conscience. Our interlocutors were, therefore, often puzzled at our persistent search for basic conceptual presuppositions and our attempt to analyse various bioethical views. Though our hosts could see that a particular bioethical issue existed, it rarely presented itself to them as a quandary or problem. There was not a tradition of ethical controversy or moral pluralism to draw upon for the analysis of bioethical issues. As a consequence, particular moral stances or resolutions of issues were for the most part simply taken for granted. The enterprise of the ethicist was seen as that of fortifying or developing the accepted position. Our interlocutors were thus at times puzzled that we on the one hand could accept a particular moral viewpoint, and yet see merit in subjecting it to vigorous analytical appraisal.

Because of this view of philosophical discussion in the intellectual life of the PRC, there was an absence of bioethical reflection, as we would understand it. In a real sense there is no bioethics in the PRC as a scholarly subdiscipline, though there surely are bioethical issues. Moreover, those bioethical issues appear in quite a different mode in a society where ethics is not primarily a means of negotiating moral intuition by an appeal to reason rather than force, than in a society where ethics serves as a logical pluralism, as with us.

Rights to and in Health Care

Health services are provided out of the resources of communes and factories for their members. Usually one-half of the costs of the care of the children of factory and commune workers is supported as well. Health care is often delivered in a fashion which we would consider to be spartan, and which would reflect well upon the circumstances of call-in, in our major charity hospitals. Put in perspective, the medical accomplishments of China are impressive. As the PRC emphasized, its major focus has been upon preventive medicine. One need think only of their astonishing success in controlling *Schistosoma japonicum*. In this context rights to health care have been appreciated as a commitment to the major goal of providing adequate health care to nearly a billion people. Rights to health care have been understood in terms of interest in this goal and have not been seen as a fundamental or irreducible right (e.g., though health care is provided cheaply, non-factory and non-commune workers must pay for their care). Moreover, the sense of the basic amenities of health care are quite different from ours. For example, at an operation we witnessed, little care was taken to avoid a scar on the neck of a 30-year-old woman. The proposal of greater interest in achieving greater cosmetic success was dismissed with some puzzlement.

Issues of consent and of the provision of full information are addressed in a

social milieu in which little active dissent from policy decisions exists. Thus on the one hand, patients are given complete information concerning the risks and benefits of the surgical medical procedures to which they are to be subjected. On the other hand, the notion that an individual would refuse a "needed" operation was often dismissed with amazement. Generally, consent is acquired through enlisting peer pressure, and these pressures tend to be fairly effective. For example, relatives of potential organ donors are often repeatedly brought to see a potential recipient in order to acquire their consent for the use of the organs. Yet despite these measures, we heard that certain operative procedures were frequently declined to the consternation of those involved in providing

care. In short, the occasion exists for the development of bioethical reflections, were there to be an accepting intellectual milieu.

One of the impediments to such reflection is the lack of interest in applied philosophy, an absence similar to that which prevailed among American philosophers until at least ten years ago. This, combined with the non-analytic, "pragmatic" approach on the part of the medical profession, makes the pursuit of scholarly bioethical reflection somewhat difficult. For example, in a group of physicians and philosophers, we failed to convince any that there was a bioethical issue involved in removing organs for transplantation from dying patients. There was neither a sense of an ethical issue



Dr. Engelhardt, Dr. Harvey, and Father McCormick with Dr. Xi-Wu, at Shantung Medical College, Jinan, examining electron-micrographs in electron microscopy room.



at stake with respect to the transfer of organs at that point, nor recognition that a conceptual issue existed with regard to when individuals indeed die.

In summary, one finds individuals strongly committed to humanitarian goals, but without an interest in or tradition of actually analyzing them. In discussing the treatment of deformed infants, we were repeatedly told that resources were invested as far as possible in their care. Physicians in the PRC took this to be an obligation of revolutionary humanitarianism. They were concerned that the life of all persons should be succored, even when the lives supported are not productive. However, there was no interest in analyzing the bases of that viewpoint, or of determining how a revolutionary humanitarian ethic should come to terms with problem cases. Physicians, for example, stated that in the case of some deformed infants, life was worse than death, and that therefore those should not be treated. How such cases were to be recognized, however was left unexamined.

Care for the Mentally Retarded

Concern to provide medical and educational care for the mentally retarded was expressed both at the level of communes and in the Academy of Medicine. Within the limited resources available in a developing nation, there appears to be a sincere commitment to provide

support and care. Those who are not severely impaired were, as far as possible, treated within local communities (e.g., within the parent's commune). Those with more serious difficulties were sent to major cities with specialized facilities. However, given the exigencies of contemporary China and the administrative chaos that ensued during the Cultural Revolution, there does not appear to be a well developed general policy. Still, within those constraints, there appears to be a commitment on the basis of "Revolutionary Humanitarianism" to provide health services for all persons in China independently of considerations of their potential future contributions. This respect for life was focused only on humans *ex utero*. The notion of the possible use of amniocentesis and selective abortion was considered to be morally unproblematic. In general one found a positive humanitarian position that had not been subjected to any critical reflection or analysis of its possible internal contradictions and limiting cases.

Reproductive Ethics

The People's Republic of China combines a puritanical view of human sexuality with widespread contraceptive education (e.g., detailed billboards on the street explain contraception) and an aggressive abortion policy. On the one hand, sexuality as a social or pleasurable element of life is little discussed. Premarital and extramarital sex is vigorously suppressed through the

use of communal social pressures. On the other hand, the same peer pressures are used to support active discussion of, and use of, contraception. In addition, individuals who have more than two children meet with strong social pressures and economic sanctions if they do not acquire an abortion for subsequent pregnancies. Population control has in fact become a moral goal in view of the limited resources available in the People's Republic. Reproduction in excess of two children is thus seen as a form of assault upon the common resources of the citizenry and meets with general disapproval. The People's Republic has achieved as a result, in the larger cities at least, a rather widespread commitment to a contraceptive ethos in order to secure a minimum decent standard of living for all its citizens. Towards these ends, the use of contraception and abortion are seen to be morally unproblematic.

The Family

In all bioethical discussions, the family retains a vigorous central role. In all difficult medical procedures it appears that the family is consulted. In fact, often family consent substitutes for the consent of the individual involved. In short, the family is seen as an intact moral entity and is treated as such. In fact, the economic and social sanctions against families having more than two children reflects this basic commitment. In punishing such families (e.g., denying further rations for extra children, and denying



Canton roofs.

payment for education and health care benefits), the State continues to view the family as a morally responsible entity. As a consequence, an analysis of bioethical issues in the People's Republic is forced to attend to the family in a way that would not be necessary in the West.

Future Exchange: Working Through Ideologies

These very sharp differences between the state of scholarship in bioethics in the People's Republic versus that of the West make exchange on these points interesting for both sides. For the People's Republic the increased use of intrusive medical procedures will undoubtedly press health professionals and philosophers to reflect on problematic areas such as patient consent and upon definitions of death. On the other hand, the People's Republic of China offers the West an occasion to reflect and learn about a consent society's approach to modern bioethical issues, an approach value within a different conceptual context and with special commitments to the family and to population control. Such an exchange would surely be beneficial to both parties. □

1. Chou Yang, "The Fighting Task Confronting Workers in Philosophy and the Social Sciences: Speech at the Fourth Enlarged Session of the Committee of the Department of Philosophy and Social Sciences of the Chinese Academy of Sciences Held on October 26, 1963." Peking: Foreign Languages Press, 1963, p. 1.

Dr. Conrad Taeuber

The People

"Between 900 million and a billion," was the answer given by the Vice Premier when he was asked about the numbers of people in his country. On second thought, he said "958,000,000". That was the figure which had been published officially, omitting the population of Taiwan. The official estimate was as of the end of 1978—by the time the Kennedy Institute delegation spoke with him, the total may well have climbed to 965 million.

The release of "official" figures on the country's population is in itself a unique development. Until recently analysts outside China have been dependent on scattered information in making their assessment of population trends in that country. The new figure falls within the range of estimates made in Washington and New York, which were as low as 921 million and as high as one billion.

Whatever the final digit in such numbers may be, it is clear that China is by all odds the most populous country in the world, including nearly a quarter of the world's people.

The same official reports state that during 1978 the total population increased by 1.2%, or about 11 million. It is planned to reduce the

increase to one percent in 1979, and to 0.5% by 1985. The target is to have no growth by the end of the century, with births just equalling deaths. Immigration or emigration are relatively unimportant in these totals. One report stated that some 250,000 refugees have entered the People's Republic of China, primarily across the land borders. Large as that number may seem in the United States, one can readily agree with the Chinese observer who expressed the view that the refugees presented a humanitarian rather than a demographic problem.

The publication of demographic statistics has not been a high priority activity for the government. The local registration system is considered an adequate basis for such statistics as are needed. In a country as large as China, with limited communication and transportation facilities in much of the area, it should not be surprising that national and regional statistics are largely lacking, at least so far as publication is concerned. Analysts may argue whether the birth rate is as low as 16.5 or as high as 26.6 per thousand of the population. (The birth rate in the United States is currently about 15 per thousand.) The rate in China is low in comparison with similar rates in other less developed countries. Moreover there are strong indications that the birth rate has dropped by about one third in the years since the early nineteen fifties. Very few of the less developed countries have had such a rapid decline in their birth rates.



Death rates have also been cut rather rapidly—in 1970-75 they were only about half as high as they had been twenty years earlier. Whether the death rate is as low as 6.0 or as high as 9.6 per thousand of the population may be difficult to establish, but it is clear that the People's Republic of China has made substantial gains in the reduction of deaths, especially those due to infectious diseases. Compulsory immunization of all school children, coupled with universal compulsory education, undoubtedly has played an important role in this achievement. However, the infant mortality rate is still more than three times that of the United States, and is susceptible to further reductions.

“The target is to have no growth by the end of the century, with births just equalling deaths.”

China, like industrially less developed countries generally, has a very low percentage of its people in the older age groups. However, with the improvements in health and reduction of mortality among children and young adults, the causes of death common among older people will become of increasing concern.

Visitors to China very quickly become aware of the campaign by the government to curtail births. Window

displays of contraceptives and posters advocating small families make it evident that the climate has changed from one of antagonism to the idea of restricting fertility to the active promotion of programs toward that end.

Shortly before the group's arrival in China, the *People's Daily* had carried an article by Chen Muhua, Vice Premier of the People's Republic of China and the Head of the Planned Birth Leadership Group in the State Council (effectively the Cabinet). In this article she argued that under a socialist system the production of goods, i.e., the development of the national economy, must follow the principle of proportionality. Planned development in the production of material goods and the planned reproduction of the population itself must be in harmony. The planned control of population growth is not a product of subjective decisions but is determined and demanded by the socialist system of production. Controlling population growth is considered essential to the realization of the four modernizations: agriculture, industry, science and technology, and national defense. The superiority of the socialist planned economy provides the possibility for mankind to regulate its own reproduction and to coordinate population growth with the increase in the production of material goods. For a long time there was an inadequate understanding and inadequate research into the principles of a planned economy.

The article further points out that rapid growth is not beneficial to an accelerated rate of capital accumulation; it hinders the speed of raising the level of scientific and cultural standards; and it is not beneficial to the improvement of levels of living.

The author points with pride to a decline in the annual rate of growth from 2.3 percent in 1971 to 1.2 percent of 1978. She calls for a substantial reduction of the number of third and higher order births and the promotion of the one child family as the ideal. The action program called for includes: strengthening the leadership of the party by including planned birth work in the daily agenda at all levels of party committees; a thorough investigation into “forbidden” areas of population theories, and the creation of a public opinion in favor of controlling population growth; the enactment of laws and enforcement through economic means, chiefly rewards; the training of medical personnel and the production and distribution of contraceptives; and the establishment of strong planned birth offices. Contraceptives and medical care are free throughout the country.

As one moves about the country one is made aware of the efforts to popularize the notion of a one child family. The talk seems to say that a one child family is the desirable norm, two children are tolerable, but no good citizen would have more. Leaders of commune and production

brigades and other people in leadership positions whom we encountered knew that that was the doctrine. Vice Premier Muhua had pointed out in her article that about one third of the 17.4 million births were third or higher order births. As an immediate goal she called for the reduction of the number of such births by one half.

There was much talk about a new family law which was being discussed in draft form, and was being reviewed with provincial officials. One proposal receiving some publicity was that economic incentives would be offered to couples which stop with one child, for example, a money bonus monthly, or an increase in the size of the private plot, giving that family the housing space which is normally allotted to a family of four persons. In April 1979 a law embodying such provisions was in effect in Sichuan Province. Threats of a cut in wages for having a third child, reduced rations, and the elimination of free schooling and care have also been discussed.

One observes that in a matter such as family planning, the central government lays down policies which are communicated to all levels of government but that implementation is left to the local authorities who may be given quotas, yet left free to implement specific measures. There is also a significant reliance on "peer pressure." In a commune one may be told that each production brigade and team has its own leading group on family planning. Broadcasts and

special commune meetings carry the message. A woman who has had her first child will be visited by female cadres who will offer to accompany her to the hospital to have an IUD fitted, and who will return in six months time to make sure that it is still in place. In another commune, the local authorities are keeping track of the birth control measures used by



the 3,000 married women of child-bearing age. In a housing project it was stated that priority is given to newly married couples but only if they have waited until the bride is 25 years old. Marriage at a younger age would relegate the couple's application for housing to the bottom of the list. Premarital sex is severely condemned and one is repeatedly told that it simply does not occur.

At one university there is a women's faculty group which meets periodically to discuss matters of common interest. If one of the members should become pregnant in violation of the accepted norm of family size, she would be "reasoned" with and every effort would be made to "have her do something about it."

According to Chinese law, adult children are responsible for the care of their aged parents. There is no nationwide Social Security system to provide for the care of the elderly. Such provisions are the responsibility of agricultural communes, industrial production brigades, or other enterprises. A common statement is that some 80% of the population live in rural areas and that it is precisely these areas in which tradition and personal economic calculations favor the continuance of large family patterns. One is frequently told that the policy favoring the small family may work in the cities and industrial enterprises, but that it will be very difficult to make it prevail in the rural areas.

One can not spend even a few days in the major urban areas without being impressed by the sheer numbers of people. The streets are filled with people at all hours of the day and wherever one turns one encounters masses of people. Even in the rural areas one seldom sees an individual working alone, but usually there are a number of persons, both men and women, who are carrying out their tasks.

The government reports that the population in 1953 was 582 million persons, not including the population of Taiwan. Twenty-five years later an "official" estimate gives the total as 958 million. Even if birth rates are further reduced rapidly, continued growth of that population is indicated by the large number of women in the early childbearing ages. Recent reports by the Bureau of Census give "low" projections of 1.2 billion by the year 2000. The "medium" projection, which is generally preferred by the analysts, would be some 200 million higher. Neither variant uses birth rates as low as those proposed by Chen Muhua when she looks for zero population growth by the year 2000. But even if that should be achieved, the population of the country would be greater by

the end of the century than it is now. Questions of food supply, housing, levels of living, and living space will continue to be critical.

According to official statistics food supplies have increased as population has increased, and it would appear to the casual observer that in areas we visited food supplies are adequate. However, there are reports that in some of the more remote areas there are food shortages and even famine conditions. As this is written there is a news dispatch from China which reports that a total of 8,500 students were admitted to postgraduate work, of some 600,000 who had applied. The numbers reflect not only on the large numbers of persons of college age, but also on the continuing effects of the cultural revolution

which sharply restricted the training of scholars and research workers.

Chen Muhua spoke of "forbidden" areas of research. These were particularly noticeable in the social sciences, including demography. Although population growth and the control of that growth are receiving high level attention within the government, there is very little of what we would classify as demographic research. At the Academy of the Social Sciences we learned that none of the Institutes is devoted to the study of Demography. An inquiry about this lack elicited the response that such an Institute is to be set up in 1980. A number of research institutes are reported from some universities in the country, but it appears that they are primarily concerned with a study of Marxist-Leninist-Maoist thoughts on population.

The lack of demographic data is matched by a lack of research in that field. No one can speak with confidence of current population size or of trends. One can only speculate on the problems which must face a large and growing population, given the constraints under which any governmental program must work. The oft-repeated slogan: "Let a thousand flowers bloom and a thousand schools of thought contend" comes after a long period during which such diversity was extremely restricted. There is understandable



Canton bicycles.

Beijing University.



hesitation on the part of intellectuals who were victims of the excesses of the cultural revolution to expose themselves to similar troubles. The Rector of Beijing University was removed from his position in 1960 because he advocated reductions in the rate of growth of the population and stated that stern and administratively effective measures might need to be applied if persuasion failed to lead to the needed results. In June 1979 he was officially informed that the criticisms of his theories had been erroneous and that actual events have validated the correctness of his theory of controlled fertility. Accordingly the Party "wants to institute a thorough rehabilitation and restore your reputation." Plans are underway for a population census in 1981. It may be that later visitors to China will find more reliable data and analyses of demographic developments than can be found in 1979. □

Dr. James Childress

Reflections on Socialist Ethics

Our delegation was, we were told, the first North American group to meet with the Chinese Academy of Social Sciences since the Liberation. In our two-day session with members of the Institute of Philosophy, the Institute of World Religion, and the Institute of Law, all under the Chinese Academy of Social Sciences, we had an opportunity to explore the meaning of socialist ethics in China. Elsewhere, for example, at Beijing University and at Fudan University in Shanghai, we also met with philosophers and other scholars. I shall offer some impressions of socialist ethics as viewed by philosophers and other scholars in China. It is impossible to say much about morality in China, i.e., how people actually live, on the basis of our brief visit. But it may be useful to see how some Chinese scholars view morality and ethics in a socialist society. I shall concentrate on papers given by Professor Li Ji, Deputy Director of the Institute of Philosophy, and Professor Rui Mo, Deputy Director of the Institute of Law. Professor Li Ji discussed "Ethics and Moral Problems in Socialist Society," while Professor Rui Mo discussed "Law and Ethics." I shall also draw on some observations offered by other Chinese philosophers and social scientists as well as by physicians, scientists, and judges.

Let me make a few preliminary observations. First, we had our most fruitful discussions when we focused on concrete problems such as population control and when we avoided jargon such as "deontology" (which bewildered one translator in Beijing). Second, in China ethics is part of philosophy which, in turn, is part of social science. Social science in China deals with problems in connection with social phenomena, and the Chinese Academy of Social Sciences, with a staff of 1,500, is very much aware of the needs of the state. The autonomy of the enterprise of philosophy or ethics is not a major issue. Third, we wondered whether philosophers concentrating on ethics examine certain problems that interest moral philosophers and theologians in the United States. War, for example, is not considered a problem for ethics; it comes under the division of historical materialism.

While many political leaders, scientists, and physicians appeared to be pragmatic, most philosophers uncritically reiterated Marxist-Leninist-Maoist ideology without attention to Western revisionism of Marxism. For example, the philosophers insisted that the substructure—economic relations and production—determines what happens in the superstructure, which includes both law and ethics. Moral conceptions are reflections of the means of production. There is no abstract morality or law, only the morality or law of a particular class or society.

How are law and ethics as parts of the superstructure distinguished? According to Professor Rui Mo, one major distinction is that law involves coercion while morality depends on public opinion. Law is an expression of the will of the ruling class, while ethics is a set of normative principles expressed by individuals and groups in judgments and actions.

Both law and morality originate in the substructure. When they have the same origin, i.e., emerge out of the same class interests, they converge. Divergence and conflict result when they express different class interests. Some feudal and bourgeois views may persist alongside proletarian views. According to Professor Rui Mo, confusion about right and wrong was widespread during the rule of the Gang of Four.

When production is collectivist and state-owned, the ethic should be socialist. In a socialist ethic, according to Professor Li Ji, the emphasis shifts from the personal to the social, from the partial to the whole, and from the immediate to the remote. The aim is to serve the people wholeheartedly. Professor Li Ji, who is finishing a book on socialist ethics, offered two examples of serving the people wholeheartedly. First is the example of Comrade Lei Feng, apparently widely known and appreciated in China. Chairman Mao said, "Learn from Comrade Lei Feng." Born in 1939, Lei Feng was a poor orphan who joined the army and became a member of the Communist Party,



Construction workers.

serving the people in numerous ways prior to his death at age 22 in an accident. He was selfless, not only fulfilling his assigned roles but serving in other ways such as collecting manure for the commune. He wrote in his diary:

I want to be a man who is useful to the people and nation. If this is what you call a 'fool' then I'm willing to be a 'fool.' The revolution needs such 'fools' and so does socialist construction. I only have one heart and it is turned towards the Party, toward socialism and communism.

Professor Li Ji's second example was a woman who was fatally burned while trying to prevent a factory from being destroyed by fire.

Professor Li Ji's presentation provoked a lively discussion, both during the session and later. Because her two examples have counterparts in other traditions, which stress both saintly and heroic actions, we wanted to determine what is distinctive about socialist ethics. Without denying that such examples can be found elsewhere, Professor Li Ji responded by saying that sacrifice, or selflessness, is more common in socialist ethics. It might be difficult to establish her claim empirically, but acceptance of service of the people as a goal, as a moral requirement, appears to be widespread and deep in the People's Republic of China. At any rate, moral discourse appears to be relatively untouched by themes of individuality, self-expression

and self-fulfillment that mark much moral discourse in the United States. One questioner wondered whether the examples represent a value system that emphasizes the material over the personal (e.g., the woman lost her life trying to save the factory). Professor Li Ji refused to say that production is more important than people, for, she insisted, the factory's loss would have affected a lot of people.

Philosophers in the West frequently distinguish ordinary social duties—what we expect of everyone—from supererogatory actions that transcend our duties and conform to ideals. The latter merit praise, often because they

involve some sacrifice of the individual agent's own interests. Within socialist ethics, the example of Lei Feng represents an ideal and praiseworthy style of life. It expresses the strong sense of obligation to the society in socialist ethics, but it is not clear how many of his actions are deemed *obligatory*. There may be many different ways to discharge the obligation to the society. In some respects, the emphasis in Chinese socialist ethics is on virtue. It captures the spirit and attitude of the new man, appropriate to the socialist society, without specifying obligatory acts.

In areas of applied ethics, we tried to determine how physicians and philosophers handle some problems that trouble us such as reproductive freedom and refusal of treatment. Regarding many of our problems, we were assured: "There is no problem like that in China. It doesn't happen in China." Moral problems or dilemmas do not exist out there in the world, but are created by moral principles and values. In the absence of pluralism, some problems and dilemmas simply do not arise. In response to a question about the most pressing "moral problems" or "controversies" in medicine and health care in China, Dr. Huang, Director of the Academy of Medicine, did not identify a single problem. For example, when we asked how decisions are made about the treatment or non-treatment of defective newborns, he insisted that after Mao all are treated.

When disagreements about moral matters emerge in China, "persuasion" is used. We frequently encountered the term "persuasion." For example, if a patient disagrees with his physician and family and wants to refuse medical treatment, he will be "persuaded" to accept the treatment. (Such disagreement was held to be very rare). Likewise if a woman is pregnant with her third child, she will be "persuaded" to have an abortion. We wondered just how much was packed into the term "persuasion," particularly whether it included what we would call "undue influence," "manipulation," and even "coercion." For example,



A commune kitchen.



Dr. Taeuber and Dr. Faden observing students in lab room.

Chinese physicians reported that it is not easy to "persuade" families to donate a deceased relative's kidneys and other organs for transplantation; families want to bury or to burn the body as a whole. As part of the process of persuasion, the family is asked to see the patient who would receive the organ. Such a request would probably be viewed as coercive in the United States.

Different interpretations of persuasion and coercion reflect different conceptions of the relations between individuals and the society. In a dominant strand of western thought, we tend to think of individuals as independent bearers of rights; out of charity they may choose not to stand on these rights. In Chinese socialism, individuals and the society are interdependent, and the dominant moral tone is to serve the people whole-heartedly. We are concerned about protecting the individual's autonomy over against the community, health care professionals, etc., while Chinese socialism stresses the virtue and obligation of service to the community. Some of these themes are in obvious continuity with the traditional Chinese thought. For example, as Victor Li has pointed out, there is no Chinese word for "privacy," so important for autonomy in our individualistic society. □

Dr. John C. Harvey

Medicine in China

The delegation from the Kennedy Institute of Ethics was afforded the opportunity to observe and to examine superficially some aspects of medical research, teaching and care in the People's Republic of China (PRC). This report is a subjective one and necessarily anecdotal. It is based on the perceptions and conclusions drawn by the author. It is not objective, neither is it based on a well thought out study rigorously pursued. Thus it may well be open to errors both in fact and conclusions; the former because translation of conversations was in some places very difficult (the interpreters were not, strictly speaking, trained medical interpreters), and the latter because visits were often brief, and questioning and pursuit of ideas were limited by time constraints. Daily schedules were full; activity was vigorous. Fatigue blurred clear thinking and good notetaking. At the time, my own notes seemed complete; going over them now reveals many lacunae.

During the course of the work-study tour as guests of the Chinese Academy of Social Sciences, we observed several medical facilities in different parts of the country. Among those we visited were a commune hospital outside

of Canton; the Capital Hospital (formerly the Peking Union Medical College Hospital) and the China Institute of Medical Research (housed in one of the laboratory buildings of the former Peking Union Medical College) in Beijing (Peking); the Shantung Province Medical College which contains schools of Medicine, Dentistry, Pharmacy, and Nursing (housed in the former Christian College, Cheeloo (Qilu), founded by Henry Luce's father) in Jinan, as well as a production team's clinic in a commune on the outskirts of Jinan; and, finally, the Hua Shau Hospital (an affiliated teaching hospital of the Shanghai Medical College) in Shanghai. A conversation was arranged in Beijing with Dr. Huang Chia-ssu, Director of the Academy of Medicine and President of the China Academy of Medicine. In addition to those facilities personally visited, the group met with several professors of medicine and of psychiatry in other medical schools and hospitals in Beijing and Shanghai.

All of the physicians, medical scientists, students, and health care workers with whom we talked were very open, reasonably frank in their discussions, and very courteous. All members of the delegation were received most warmly by them. No question was considered unimportant and all were answered as completely and as honestly as the respondents could under existing circumstances. In these conversations a good exchange of ideas ensued.

Many of the remarks made by the leaders of groups at the time of introductions contained perfunctory statements paying tribute to the Marxist-Leninist-Socialism espoused by Chairman Mao and describing the benefits brought to the peasants, workers, and soldiers of China by the Liberation. Difficulties, frustrations, and adverse conditions in medicine were uniformly attributed to the Gang of Four. Medicine, it was emphasized, is participatory in the overall national priorities of the Four Modernizations, it being within the third area, which is science and technology.

One gets the impression that within the last twelve months very rapid strides have occurred in the opening up of the thought and expression of ideas, albeit always consistent with Marxist-Leninist Socialism. Comparisons of experiences and observations of other American physicians and health care workers who have visited the PRC in previous years confirm this impression.

The isolation of the PRC and lack of intercourse with the outside world precludes our understanding the dreadful and really terrifying effect that the Red Guard's Cultural Revolution, led by the notorious Gang of Four, had upon the intellectual life of the country between the years 1966-76. One gets the impression that chaos reigned. All education, including medical education, came almost to a standstill. All intellectuals were suspect. Most were relieved of



Kennedy Institute delegation observing acupuncture operation.

their duties at the universities and hospitals and sent to the countryside for "re-education" about the practical problems of the country's peasant and worker population. Some scholars continued to receive their full pay, although they had no teaching or research duties. Such individuals were sometimes physically abused and subjected to humiliation and embarrassment. Many of these intellectuals were in the older age group and certainly suffered physically and emotionally, yet superficially none appear now to hold resentment, or at least none express it, nor do they seek retribution. During this period, those students who were allowed to pursue education, including medical education, were admitted to studies on the basis of political merit rather than academic merit.

The Cultural Revolution did great physical damage as well. Libraries were burned, buildings ravaged, records destroyed, laboratory equipment damaged or destroyed. To an outsider, it appears that madness reigned. Now rebuilding is taking place.

In 1977 the Cultural Revolution was abandoned. In 1978 a national science conference was held and a science development plan for the next 5-7 years was adopted, with the conclusion that eight key areas were to be developed. In medicine, genetic engineering and population control received top priority.

One of the older Chinese physicians who had been educated in the United States before World War II said: "It is as if Chinese medicine went to sleep for twenty years and like Rip Van Winkle is just awakening." Consequently schools of medicine are being reorganized, libraries restocked, laboratories re-equipped, manuals rewritten. Scholars are hungry for exchanges with scholars of the West to learn of the progress in medicine over the last twenty years.

Nowhere did I see much of medical records. Medical libraries were for the most part inadequate and were lacking copies of journals for the last two decades. Copies of textbooks in existence were editions published in the 1950's and were in the language of whatever western country had vested influence in the particular geographic area before liberation,



Thyroid acupuncture patient applauding the Kennedy Institute delegation immediately after her operation.

e.g., Beijing, English; Jinan, German; Shanghai, French.

Laboratory equipment was for the most part outmoded or nonexistent if the facility had been the object of the Red Guard destruction in the misguided and tragic conception of "purification and re-education, elimination of bourgeois influence, and elimination of internal contradiction." The medical school in Jinan has been reequipped. In one research laboratory excellent modern electronmicroscopes (German) were in use and in another was the most up to date equipment for tissue culture. In the two laboratories visited in the Institute of Medical Science in Beijing, on the other hand, there was precious little: a few tables, some chipped but

usable chemical glassware, old monocular microscopes, and an early model of an isotope counter. This area had received, however, the direct expression of Red Guard wrath.

In a laboratory exercise some of us saw in the Medical School in Jinan, the equipment reminded me of a pathology student lab in America of the 1940's. All scopes were monocular; the sectioning microtomes were older models. The manuals had been written by the instructor who had been rehabilitated only 18 months ago. The students were very hardworking, disciplined, extremely polite, and very deferential to the teacher. The ambience reminded me of a German university. Indeed, though this school was housed in a former Christian College, built by Americans, the Shantung Province had been a German sphere of influence up until World War I, and then it had been influenced by the Japanese. Interestingly, Japanese medical pedagogy has, for the most part, been based on the German model.

The Anatomy Department of the Provincial Medical College in Jinan was the only place where actual research was observed. It was first rate. One team was studying endometrial changes during the menstrual cycle, utilizing electronmicroscopic techniques. Another group was studying, by cytogenetic techniques, the X chromosome. Another group was attempting gene mapping in birth defects. In the tissue culture

laboratory sperm development and the effect of inhibitory chemical substances upon the same was being studied. All the scientific investigators said the research was directed and in accord with that area assigned by the Ministry of Health in Beijing, as had been set earlier at the National Science Conference and within the goals of the Four Modernizations. No free individual personal research was being done nor would it be allowed, I deduced. All the scientists were well aware of the goals set by the aforementioned scientific congress. Efforts are now directed primarily at population control and genetic engineering, they all said, conforming to the national goals.

The Teaching Hospital in Jinan was "closed for lunch for patients" and could not be visited. Conversation with surgeons conducting clinical research in renal transplantation led me to believe that this area has little priority and has not been pursued vigorously. The clinical investigators had just set up a tissue typing laboratory; they were unconcerned about the definition of death and ethical problems in transplantation. They did say the reluctance of the Chinese to cause any violation of integrity of the human body after death (a Confucian concept of integrity and wholeness persisting in this officially atheistic country) resulted in kidney supplies coming only from criminals suffering capital punishment. The legal scholars among us (who had been unable to get any information on capital punishment previously

since they had been told in another setting that such punishment did not exist because crime was so low) were delighted to get this vicarious bit of information. The clinical investigators quickly said that they had only done seven renal transplants in the past two years.

In Shanghai we were told that excellent results were obtained from the pioneering studies done on microsurgical suturing techniques of vessels and nerves. Pioneering work has also been done in bone grafting, which has resulted in superb results in the auto-implantation of severed limbs. We did not observe any of these operations on patients first hand. However, at the Shanghai Trade Palace, we had the opportunity to observe medical equipment, prosthetic devices and operating instruments which are being manufactured in the PRC. These examples on display were very advanced, particularly the artificial joints for knees, elbows and fingers. The guide did say this equipment was for export and not for home consumption.

At the Hua Shau Hospital in Shanghai we observed the removal of a thyroid nodule under acupuncture anesthesia. The operating room was bare of any modern equipment except for a hy-frocater for coagulation and an electrical generator used to administer acupuncture anesthesia. The manual skills exhibited by the surgeons were great. The anesthesia was effective. The patient waved before and after the procedure to the group in the

observation booth. I had the opportunity to interview the patient through the interpreter immediately after the procedure. She said she felt no pain, only a sensation of "pins and needles" in her neck. The acupuncture needles were inserted into the interdigital spaces of the left hand between the thumb and index finger and the index and middle fingers. A micro-current was run through these needles.

As the acupuncture anesthesiologist spoke no English, translation was difficult and the principles of acupuncture did not emerge clearly. The physician, trained in traditional Chinese medicine, said acupuncture has an effect upon the nerves, the fluids of the body between the nerves, and on the "meridians." The meridians could not be further explained as to whether these were anatomical structures capable of dissection, physiological phenomenon, or biochemical (endorphin?) substances.

Clearly acupuncture is effective in some types of operations. The anesthesiologist reported that in the Chinese experience, acupuncture was most effective for operations above the diaphragm but not as effective in abdominal or pelvic procedures, in mentally ill patients, or in comatose patients. Clearly it is not acclaimed as a universal anesthesia, but obviously it is effective. In my opinion it should be studied thoroughly and adopted when practical and useful. I was very impressed that the patient was awake and able to

cooperate when the surgeon was identifying the recurrent laryngeal nerve, always vulnerable to damage in any thyroid operation. The patient, while under acupuncture, could cough at the command of the surgeon!

In this operation, which was done very skillfully with a minimum of bleeding, a drain was left in place. This must have been to facilitate postoperative wound damage and it meant to me that the incidence of postoperative wound infection was high. Indeed it seemed everywhere we went in any medical facility, concern for antisepsis was minimal. We were taken through the main



Acupuncture chart.

corridor of the operating theater in the Hua Shau Hospital having merely changed our shoes and put gowns over our clothes. In the communal hospital, visitors walked in and out at will through the small and ill-kempt room used for minor surgery. In all the hospitals and clinics, the buildings were in need of repair and the equipment was old and outmoded by Western standards. These deficiencies were readily acknowledged. The increased incidence of postoperative wound infection was also readily acknowledged.

Overall my impression is that basic medical research is just now beginning again. The individuals who had held posts of responsibility and who had been previously trained to conduct research are now being placed back

in the appropriate setting to begin again. Laboratories are being equipped and scholarship is being encouraged. Exchanges with the West are encouraged. Medical education too has had a renaissance. Students are now being admitted to medical school on academic merit. Medical education has been reconstituted and is vigorous, demanding, and taught in the Western methodologies, though traditional Chinese herbal medicine is also being fostered.

Health care is extensive and spread throughout the populace. It is varying in effectiveness and in excellence. On the whole it appears to be below western standards, though some developments, particularly reimplantation, appear to be far ahead of the West.

The practicing physician is a servant of the clients for whom he provides care. The clients make the policies and the physician carries out the medical aspects, unfettered professionally, but under the general social and behavioral norms set by the group. The physician scholar (leader, professor, research scientist) is very much respected and has a few more material benefits and emoluments than other health care professionals.

Modern drugs in use in the West were evident in the pharmacies of all hospitals. Traditional herbal medicine was also practiced in all hospitals and clinics. The herbal doctors claimed great effectiveness of traditional medicines and potions. It seems that investigation of these products would be a worthwhile research project for pharmacologists to find the active substances and to identify them. The claims of some of the herbal physicians seem extravagant to a western scientific investigator. There are no reports of data to be examined; double blind studies are not carried out. Yet such studies would be in violation of Confucian ethical principles as, "If something is good for a person, it cannot be denied." It will be interesting to see how such Confucian ethical principles will be incorporated into the development of modern medicine within the national priorities of the Four Modernizations. The prospects are certainly exciting for the 1980's.



Pathology lab class in Shantung Medical College, Jinan.

William F. Ryan, S.J.

The Catholic Church in China

"My friends, religion is no big thing in China today!"

This self-assured caution stated categorically by our Chinese guide as we emerged from our visit to the old Catholic Cathedral in Beijing remains uppermost in my mind as I jot down for you my impressions on the present state and possible future of Catholicism in China. Our Chinese hosts were frank. If there is some thaw in their hardline treatment of believers it does not stem from a new-found interest in religion, but rather from the keen desire of its new leaders to win the cooperation of all Chinese—and even of friendly foreigners—to work together strenuously to achieve their primary goal of “modernization.” To this end they are willing to guarantee in their constitution “the freedom to believe in religion.” There is, however, an explicit guarantee only to propagate atheism. Vice Premier Yao Ilin assured us that the right to propagate belief was included implicitly but this was not the understanding of the Catholic priests we met.

What I write here about the Catholic Church in China is not the result of scholarly study but only of impressions gathered during our short visit

to China from meetings and discussions with perhaps a hundred people. These included both Chinese and foreigners, political leaders, scholars, guides, interpreters, foreign press personnel, believers and atheists, priests and members of the Catholic Patriotic Church. It also included visits with other Catholics who reject this church as a government agency, and finally Chinese Jesuits who have been and/or who are still confined to labor camps. This is my brief synthesis of what I heard and saw.

Before the revolution in 1949, it was estimated that China had three million Catholics. At that time many left for Taiwan and elsewhere. When in 1957 the revolutionary government insisted that the new, independent Catholic Patriotic Church break all ties with Rome, and its action was condemned by Pope Pius XII, still more Catholics, including all foreign missionaries, exited or disappeared—not a few via prison. Their crime was, like many others, “high treason.” They were judged to be against the revolution and/or to be in the service of a foreign power.

Present estimates of Catholics in China today range from a conservative one-and-a-half to a wildly optimistic five million, with little hard evidence to substantiate these apparent guesses. The only Catholics highly visible to the visitor are those found in the Beijing Patriotic Church whose leaders claim three to six thousand members, but not more than 250-300 attend Mass on any given Sunday.

Even though priests of the Patriotic Church assured us that all Chinese Catholics now belong to their independent Church, all others questioned admitted that the Patriotic Church contains only a small minority of Catholics. I was, in fact, able to meet several members of this invisible church, who had worked, visited, or been in prison or labor camps in different regions of China. All agreed that in many places—especially in more rural and mountainous villages—the Church carries on clandestinely with varying degrees of vitality, sometimes with the help of priests, but more often under lay leadership which is at times supported by religious sisters.

Though there are no full-time priests and though all its priests are now aged, children continue to be baptized and brought up in the Catholic faith. Home Masses and prayer services are not uncommon. The consecrated wine is often kept reserved in private homes so that people can *communicate*. In fact, baptism and private Masses are not unknown even in prison and labor camps where sisters have in the past successfully smuggled in the hosts and wine. Local cadres (leaders) are now becoming more tolerant of clandestine religious practice provided, as everywhere else, that economic production quotas are met. Indeed, some observers claim that there are still remote Catholic villages that have been little touched by either Mao or the cultural revolution—but this assertion is contested by others.

Whatever the present sum total of these active, invisible Catholics, it is clear that the Patriotic Church has not gained many members among them. In fact, many of them, especially priests, have endured long years of prison rather than join it. To be specific, Bishop Ignatius Kung still languishes in Shanghai's central prison. Personally, I met three Chinese Jesuits who had served sentences of fifteen years on charges of "high treason" and are still confined to labor camps nine years later. They are three of thirty-six Jesuits we know to be still in labor camps and these thirty-six represent only a third of the Chinese Jesuits who disappeared from sight at the time of the revolution.



Imperial Palace, Beijing.

Fr. Richard McCormick and I visited Fr. Vincent Chu, the only Jesuit who has been totally "rehabilitated," that is, restored to citizenship. He has been given an I.D. card and ration coupons and is, therefore, free to live and work outside of prison and the labor camps where he spent twenty-three years. In the coming months as the religious thaw continues I am sure that other Christian groups will be able gradually to complete the story of what happened to their members during and since the revolution of 1949 as well as during the more recent cultural revolution. Until now, few if any foreigners have been allowed to visit many more remote regions of China.

What are the future prospects for Christianity, and, in particular, for the Catholic Church in China? In recent months we have several examples of government officials urging priests and ministers to get back to their task of reorganizing and/or rebuilding their community of believers. This has been advocated on the grounds that a Chinese citizen has a right under the constitution to believe and to practice that belief if he/she chooses—a quite unusual initiative for an atheistic government. The Patriotic Church especially in the more central cities has been the first beneficiary of this new benevolence, but I heard of Catholic churches in more remote areas being transformed from sawmills and warehouses back into churches, with little apparent concern whether the available priest was "patriotic" or not.

For the Catholic Church the deep split between "patriotic" and "Roman" Catholics becomes immediately acute, and is crystallized in the recent nomination of Michael Fu Tieshan as bishop of Beijing without any reference having been made to Pope John Paul II. Any discussion with "patriotic" priests quickly reveals that for them, as for the government, the root of the problem is the Vatican's continued recognition of Taiwan, even though the Pope has presently no official delegate there. Moreover, the bishops of Taiwan continue to be officially identified as the "Chinese Catholic Bishops' Conference" and to argue strenuously, as does their government, that any dialogue with China's present regime is "a fatal dialogue."

These "patriotic" priests believe that if the Vatican could reach an agreement with Beijing the possibility of reconciliation among Chinese Catholics would be greatly enhanced. They were encouraged by the Pope's recent call for reconciliation, and the new bishop-elect, who is a validly ordained priest, seems in no hurry to be consecrated. An easy reconciliation with the new bishop-elect and other leaders of the Patriotic Church would seem, at least at first sight, a great scandal that would render useless all the long years of suffering of many Chinese Catholics. However, it would, nevertheless, offer the government a chance to "rehabilitate" many priests who now remain unjustly and ambiguously without citizens' rights in labor camps, unable to exercise

their priesthood publicly. In the post-Vatican II era, China could now have its own truly national and indigenous Catholic Church and no longer have to continue the evident contradiction of championing independence from Rome while clinging tenaciously to the Latin Mass and ritual. Even aside from the anguishing issue of Taiwan, such reconciliation will require heroic virtue and trust not only on the part of Chinese "who have suffered for their faith," but also of those who despise the present leadership of the Patriotic Church. One very hopeful sign of reconciliation was that the Jesuits whom I met from the labor camps were neither bitter nor judgmental concerning these "patriotic" priests.

However urgent this challenge of reconciliation and "rehabilitation" is for the Catholic Church in China, it seems to pale in importance in the face of more long run considerations concerning the future of Christianity in China. Active Christians presently represent less than one-half of one percent of the population. Even allowing for ten million Muslims and millions more "lingering" Buddhists, modern China is, in fact, the most secular of states, for whom belief in God is not a threat but only a superstition for the old and a curiosity for the young. If indeed Christianity's mission is truly universal, then we must still be very early in our human history, since more than a quarter of humankind remain almost totally untouched by revealed Christianity. If evangelization is to have



An old temple, surrounded by a cornfield.

any success in the future, then its carriers must give compelling and credible witness to the Gospel's clear bias in favor of the poor, and that human advancement and social justice are integral to this message. In the immediate future the Chinese will open their doors and their hearts only to those people who are as preoccupied as they are with overcoming the poverty of their masses.

Fortunately for all of us, their solid progress towards building a more sharing society of people—whose basic moral premise is to serve the people wholeheartedly—may be preparing more fertile ground for the basic Gospel message of serving our neighbor than is found in our own individualistic, consumer society. Who

knows what the spirit of the Lord is preparing in China quite independently of Christian church structures. We must be as ready to learn as to teach. At the very least, as Fr. Hans Küng suggested in his paper read before the Chinese National Academy of Social Sciences, their own unique socialist experience will undoubtedly help shape our evolving concept of God in the next millennium because He is after all primarily "the God of the poor." Only such long thoughts as these will help us meet the incisive challenge of our Chinese guide, "My friends, religion is no big thing in China today!"

Rev. Hans Küng

Nine Theses on Religion and Science

Pope John Paul II, in a recent announcement to the College of Cardinals, stated that increased attention should be devoted to the problems involved in the coexistence of science and religion in the modern world.

The relationship between science and religion has long been a concern of the Kennedy Institute, and has been addressed in several of Georgetown University's Rose F. Kennedy Lecture Series. In the spring of 1978, Rev. Hans Küng delivered a series of lectures on the meaning of Christianity in the modern world. Rev. Küng's keynote address "Nine Theses on Religion and Science," presented to the Chinese Academy of the Social Sciences, is therefore a timely contribution as it marks the first opening of a dialogue on religion and science between Chinese and western scholars in over 30 years.

I am extremely grateful to the Academy of Social Sciences for this very extraordinary opportunity to participate in this discussion, the first discussion in the last thirty years on "Religion and Science" in China between believing Western Christian and atheist scholars. It is a difficult task. But I have to give you information rather than to try to convert you, information as to how educated people in the West, among them many scientists, presently understand this relationship. This is, of course, an extremely complex question which has a long, long history. I have done scholarly research on the modern period of this history with all of its difficulties, the result of which is this book of over 800 pages: *Existiert Gott? Antwort auf die Gottesfrage der Neuzeit* (Munich, Piper Verlag, 1978; English translation; *Does God exist? A Response to the Problem of God in Modern Times*, Doubleday/Collins 1980). The book also contains an extended analysis of the thought of Hegel, Feuerbach and Marx. I have inscribed a copy for the Institute of World Religions in Beijing.

Today I would like to propose, in a very simplified manner, a few theses

for discussion, nine to be exact, because I understand that for the Chinese nine is a perfect number. I shall not speak from a specifically Christian viewpoint, but rather from a viewpoint which could also be shared by a number of people, including, for example, those Chinese who come from a traditional Confucian or Islamic background.

A. CLARIFICATION OF CONCEPTS

1. We have to make a distinction between religion and superstition.

Religion claims absolute authority for nothing which is relative, conditioned, human, but only for the Absolute itself, which from time immemorial we have called God. I mean that hidden, absolutely ultimate, absolutely primary reality which not only Jews and Christians worship, but which also Muslims worship as Allah, which also Hindus seek in Brahma and Buddhists in the Absolute, and, of course, traditional Chinese in heaven or in the Tao. Religion is certainly one of the most important factors in the history of your great country; it is a social and political factor not only in Tibet but also elsewhere.

Superstition claims absolute authority for (and blind obedience to) something which is relative and not absolute; it worships either material things or a human person or a human organization. In this respect, all personality cults, for example, manifest themselves as a kind of superstition.

The *consequence* is that not all superstitions are religions; there are also other superstitions, even very modern ones. Nor are all religions superstitions, but any religion can become a superstition whenever it makes non-essential things absolute.

2. The God of the old world-view is obsolete. The God (or the Ultimate) of the new world-view is an open question.

If God existed, how would he have to be conceived of against the background of modern science? First of all we must make two *negative* demarcations. God must not be thought of as a "supreme being" dwelling in a literal or spatial sense "above" the world, in a "higher world." It is especially this naive, anthropomorphic idea of God as a supermundane being above the clouds in a physical heaven which has prevented scientists from reflecting seriously on the question of God.

But neither may God be conceived of as an objectified, hypostasized "Opposite" existing in a metaphysical sense "outside" the world in an extramundane beyond, in a world "behind" our world, withdrawn from the concrete life of world and man. This rationalistic-deistic idea of a God as an extramundane being beyond the stars, in the metaphysical heaven, can no longer be an impediment to raising the question of God for serious discussion even among scientists.

The *positive* answer, one on which many great thinkers in the West (Hegel) and East (many Chinese) can agree, is the following. God is not the world and the world is not God, but God is *in* this world and this world is *in* God. To think of God in this way presupposes not any dualistic, but a uniform understanding of reality. God is not to be thought of merely as a part of reality, a (supreme) infinite alongside finite things. Instead he must be thought of—to paraphrase it in some of the great classical formulas—as the infinite *in* the finite, the unconditioned *in* the conditioned, the absolute *in* the relative, transcendence *in* immanence. God, then, is the here and hereafter, all-embracing and all-permeating, most real reality in the heart of things, in man, in the history of humanity, in the cosmos. Hence he is to be understood as the simultaneously close and distant, worldly and unworldly God, a God who does not make freedom of man impossible, does not restrict it, does not play it down, but makes it possible, sustains and perfects it.

All this means certainly that the question of the God of the *ancient world-view* is *obsolete*: God as a miracle-working helper in need, as a stop-gap, who is always invoked when we cannot get further with our human science or technology or cannot cope with our personal life. But the question of the God of the *new world-view* described is not obsolete.

B. SELF-CRITICISM OF THE CHURCH AND THEOLOGY

3. God was rejected in modern times because the churches and theology opposed science.

The Life of Galileo by Bertold Brecht was the second foreign play to be performed in Beijing, with great success, after the decline of the "Gang of Four." We have to agree that the condemnation of Galileo and, later on, the opposition to Darwin's theory of evolution have been colossal errors on the part of the church. This opposition has poisoned the relations between religion and science right up to the present day. It was claimed that it was a question of defending the faith in God, but in fact what was defended was the Gracco-Medieval world-view and the authority of the church in questions of science and life and, in the final analysis, quite simply a blind obedience to the ecclesiastical system. (I may add here in parentheses that a similar colossal error was the condemnation of the Chinese rites and the Chinese translation of "God" by "T'ien" and "Shang-ti.")

A great new synthesis—as in the high Middle Ages—between faith in God and the new sciences would have been possible and was in fact expected by the leading scientists and philosophers of modern times: by Galileo himself and by Descartes, Pascal, Copernicus, Kepler, Newton, Boyle. But the opportunity was missed and, for many, science replaced religion, and

became itself a quasi-religion. Today, however, more and more people in the West realize that science and technology cannot resolve all the questions of life and society, that science and technology cannot replace ethics and religion.

4. God was rejected in modern times because the churches and theology opposed democracy.

This morning I heard the word "democracy" a number of times, and rightly so. Now unfortunately, the history of Europe, even up to the beginning of this century, makes it abundantly clear that secular and spiritual rulers, throne and altar, state constitution and church constitution, provided one another with mutual support. The heretic was also an enemy of the state; the political opponent also counted as a heretic. As in the field of science, so too in the field of politics a continual strategy of defense and withdrawal was practiced.

Belief in God was opposed because it was used by princes ruling by God's grace as a means of preventing the diffusion of the "light of reason," liberty, equality and fraternity, and of keeping the people in tutelage and servitude.

After churches and clergy had come to be the main support of the unsocial, corrupt and bankrupt *Ancien Regime*, the cry of the Jacobins, "Priests to the lamp posts!" and the public deposing of God in the cathedral of

Notre Dame in Paris in 1792 were scarcely surprising. For the first time in world history, in France but later also in Germany, atheism had become a political program. This was a bourgeois-liberal atheism which then developed into a real power in world politics after the Russian and the Chinese revolutions through the communist movement.

There can be no doubt that Christian churches in Russia and China committed errors very similar to those of the church in Western Europe. The often unconscious alliance of many foreign missionaries with colonialist and imperialist forces seriously diminished the undeniably positive contributions of missionaries (since the time of Matteo Ricci) to Chinese education and social welfare.

The blunt condemnation of communism as atheism, the excommunication of all communist party members and other disciplinary measures taken, especially in China, by Pope Pius XII, were serious mistakes which have only been partially corrected by Pope John XXIII, the Second Vatican Council and the World of Council Churches.

But it is precisely recent developments which demonstrate two points:

1. The opposition of the church and theology to democracy has been changed; a more constructive relationship of the believers of all religions to socialist systems is now possible.

2. Recent developments also pose questions to the socialist countries which have forbidden the propagation of belief in God, just as in earlier times Christian and other countries have forbidden the propagation of atheism.

Maybe—and I hope it is not presumptuous to make such a suggestion—a fifth modernization of China will be necessary, not only the modernization of agriculture, industry, science and technology and defense, but also the modernization of ideology, of thought.

C. EVALUATION OF THE CLASSICAL CRITICISM OF RELIGION

5. It is regrettable that so many false battles have been fought in modern times between science and belief in God, between theology and atheism.

No thinking person today can dispute the fact that the critique of religion by Feuerbach and Marx was largely justified. Feuerbach was absolutely right in thinking that religion—like all human faith, hope and love—contains an element of projection. But this is not to say by any means that Feuerbach proved that religion is merely a projection. It can also be a relationship to a wholly different reality. Marx too was absolutely right in suggesting that religion can be an opium, a means of social appeasement and temporary consolation, of repression—and it often was such. It can be such, but it need

not be. It can also be the means of comprehensive enlightenment and social liberation.

6. Thus both the strength and the weakness of the psychological argument for atheism are clearly seen.

God is said to be a pure projection of man's wishes. Is he really a projection? It must certainly be admitted that belief in God can be psychologically explained. But there is no question of a simple choice between psychology and not psychology. From the psychological viewpoint, belief in God always displays the structure and substance of a projection and is always open to the suspicion of being merely a projection. But the fact that it is a projection by no means decides whether the object to which it is related exists or does not exist. A real God can always correspond to the wish for God. And why should I not be allowed to wish that death is not the end of everything, that my life has a meaning, that there is meaning in the history of humanity, in a word, that God exists? If a German child thinks his father might still be alive in a Russian concentration camp, this might be wishful thinking, but it can also be true.

7. Both the strength and the weakness of the often repeated argument, based on the philosophy of history, that religion has come to an end, are also clearly seen.

The strength of the argument lies in the indisputable, all embracing secu-

larization process of modern times. But does this in itself mean the end of religion? Nietzsche's prognosis of the death of God has turned out to be a wrong prognosis. On the contrary, we see: Instead of the "abolition" of religion by atheistic humanism, as announced in Feuerbach's projection theory, there is now (despite all secularization) in many places a new humanism both theoretical and practical which is fostered by believers in God. The atheistic-humanistic belief in human nature and in human progress is itself now suspected of being a projection.

Instead of religion "withering away" with the advent of atheistic socialism, as proclaimed in Marx's opium theory, there is now (despite all violent suppression, e.g. under the "Gang of Four") a new religious awakening in many places, even in the socialist countries. The atheistic-materialist belief in the rise of a socialist society seems to countless people today, e.g. in the Soviet Union, to be *itself* a form of consolation serving the vested interests of a new class of cadres; the revolution can also become the opium of the people.

Instead of atheistic science leading to a "breakdown" of religion, as prophesied by Freud's illusion theory, there is now (despite all hostility to religion in certain sectors of science) a new understanding of ethics and religion. The atheistic-scientific belief in the solution of all problems by rational science *itself* now seems to many to amount to an illusion.

D. POINTS OF PROSPECT

8. I must put it briefly: that God exists can be accepted neither on the basis of a rational proof, nor on the basis of an irrational feeling, but only on the basis of a reasonable trust (rooted in reality itself).

That is to say, I can reasonably commit myself to and rely on the fact that the reality which we can experience, which we see, hear, measure, weigh, calculate, manipulate, does not explain itself. It is not the ultimate and primal reality. No, this reality of world and man is substantiated and embraced by a primal ground, radical support and final purpose. Belief in God then is a matter of *trust*. The ambivalence of the whole reality of world and man forces a decision on us. We are expected to decide, without intellectual restraint, but also without rational proof. Belief in God is a venture which cannot be proved rationally from the outset and from outside, but whose reasonableness and meaningfulness dawn on the person from within in the very process of deciding (inner reasonableness) against a last meaninglessness, insignificance, nothingness of human life and human history. Faith has reasons which reason itself does not know: it is a *reasonable trust*.

9. Nobody should be forced physically or morally to accept a certain religion or a certain ideology.

There has not always been freedom for *atheists*; atheists must be allowed freedom of thought, speech and propagation also in *Christian* countries. There has not always been freedom for believers; believers must be allowed freedom of thought, speech and propagation also in *socialist* countries. This full freedom would help many believers (Christians, Moslems, Jews, Buddhists, Confucianists) to overcome their discomfort in socialist societies.

Obviously the answer to the question of God is in no way an answer to all the urgent economic, political and social questions of the day. The question of God can, however, have a deeply positive effect from below, as it were, on these questions, namely by bringing basic convictions, basic attitudes, basic values to bear on them. There is not only a dependence of ideas upon the economic base, but there is also a dependence of the economic development upon ideas. This can become a negative influence, but there can also be a positive influence as has been proved by many believers in west and east who are fighting for social justice, liberation and peace. With this basis, believers have a foundation for the answer to why love is better than hate, peace is better than war, freedom is better than servitude, and non-violence is better than violence.

In recent times we have gone through so many forms of superstition, so many kinds of blind faith in allegedly supreme values like nation, people,

race, class, science, progress. People have always believed in some kind of God—if not in the true God, then in some kind of idol. But after so many crises, surprisingly much has been clarified and many difficulties against belief in God have been cleared up. It is not necessary to be against belief in God just because we are for heliocentrism and evolution, for democracy and science, for liberalism or socialism. On the contrary, and let me state this clearly, we can be for true liberty, equality and fraternity, for humanity and social justice, for humane democracy and controlled scientific progress, just because we believe in God. This, I think, is a new situation, very different from that of Feuerbach, Marx and Engels. □

Dr. Paul Lauby

Religion in Chinese Academia

Our visit to China came at a time of unusual excitement and activity as the Chinese people rapidly move away from the devastating cultural revolution into a new era of modernization and nation building.

This new dynamism was particularly evident on the university campuses we visited. Administrators and scholars are making strenuous efforts to catch up after a fifteen year loss of productive research and teaching. During the Cultural Revolution the university was a favorite target for the radical Maoists. They believed that the powerful intellectual elite had to be humbled in the interests of social equalitarianism. Professors, especially those educated abroad, suffered harrassment, humiliation and at times imprisonment. Many scholars were sent to the countryside to work in the communcs or were hindered in other ways in their academic pursuits. The universities were turned over to revolutionary committees made up of workers, peasants and soldiers. Academic standards suffered, untrained faculty were hired, and students were admitted largely on the basis of political loyalty rather than intellectual capacity.

Now the universities have been returned to the scholars. Rigorous entrance examinations have been reinstated. Attempts are being made to upgrade the poorly trained instructors and to provide opportunities for older faculty to catch up with developments in their fields. Libraries severely out of date need to be strengthened and facilities and equipment restored and expanded.

I was particularly interested in observing the place of religion and religious studies in the current academic community. In prerevolutionary China the Christian church had made a significant contribution as a pioneer in higher education. In the early 1900's western missionary educators established sixteen Christian colleges and universities, thirteen of them Protestant and three Catholic. Despite their so-called elitism and western oriented curricula, these schools provided high quality liberal education and produced many effective Chinese leaders.

Our group had the opportunity to visit the campuses of two of these former Christian universities, Yenching (Yenjing) in Beijing and Cheeloo (Qilu) in Jinan. We were entertained by the Vice President of Beijing University and a faculty group in the former President's home on the Yenching campus. The lovely old Yenching buildings, of traditional Chinese design, are now part of the University of Beijing and are fully utilized. The former Cheeloo campus houses one of China's finest medical

colleges created out of a merger of the Cheeloo Christian Medical College and a provincial medical school.

In Shanghai I had the pleasure of visiting the campus of St. John's University, a former Anglican institution, now accommodating a law college and a school of nursing and medical technology. Reports indicate that the other Christian college campuses are being used in like fashion.

There is evidence that many professors of the Christian colleges continued to teach in the government universities following the revolution. We met a few of them still in active service. It is gratifying to realize that the Christian contribution to Chinese higher education lives on through the use of the old campuses, the service of Christian professors and the influence of the alumni, some of whom occupy places of unusual responsibility.



Cheeloo University, Jinan, Shantung Province.



However, it is even more exciting to witness the place of religion in the current university system. Religion appears to be widely accepted as a necessary and important academic discipline. There is common agreement that religion is an essential component of traditional cultures and that it remains a vital part of many modern societies. Chinese scholars recognize that an adequate understanding of world history and culture requires a knowledge of religion as a significant phenomenon. Thus we discovered that one of the

important institutes in the new Academy of the Social Sciences is devoted to the study of world religions. The Institute of Religion has a staff of fifty research scholars, Christian, Buddhist, Moslem and atheist. There are ambitious plans for a much larger staff who will be capable of studying all aspects of religion using accepted scientific methods. The Institute hopes to build a strong religion section of the Academy's library as a national resource for students of religion.

We had helpful conversations with the deputy director of the Institute, Professor Zhao Fusan, a respected scholar and committed Christian. He articulated convincingly the importance of a strong Christian presence in the Institute.

We also had the opportunity to visit with Dr. K. H. Ting, who was an Anglican Bishop in pre-revolutionary days and who has served for the past thirty years as President of the Nanking Theological Seminary, a united Protestant institution. The seminary and its faculty remained intact during the Cultural Revolution, although students were not allowed to enroll. The faculty occupied its time in pursuing valuable research which it now may be allowed to publish. The biblical scholars are completing a new Chinese translation of the Bible which the government has promised to publish in the near future.

In January the Nanking Seminary became a Center for Religious Studies in the University of Nanking. Bishop Ting was appointed director of the Center and, to symbolize its importance, was also made a vice president of the university. The seminary faculty has become the center's staff and future plans call for the employment of Buddhist and Moslem scholars. The faculty already is offering religion courses to university students. The Bible as literature and Christian history are being taught in the first term of the 1979-80 academic year.

Much of the valuable seminary library was destroyed by the Red Guards, but the faculty was able to safeguard some 3,000 volumes which now form the nucleus for the university's religion collection.

Dr. Ting stressed the importance of Christian scholars fully participating in the life of the university and the opportunity they have to influence academic decisions. There is hope that fruitful religion-Marxist dialogues might be possible along with the freedom to examine all of the salient world-views.

Currently in the United States and Canada there is much talk in church circles about the possibility of a new Christian mission to China. I came away from China seriously questioning this new enthusiasm. We found evidence in China that the Christian church is very much alive and that with the new-found religious freedom, it may emerge as a significant religious force despite its comparatively tiny membership. However, Chinese Christianity seems to have altered its prerevolutionary image as a foreign religion dominated by western missionaries and to have established itself as an indigenous movement, firmly rooted in Chinese soil. There appears to be a strong feeling of self-confidence and a reluctance to re-establish close ecclesiastical ties with the West. Certainly there is no clamor for the return of the missionaries, and in any event, it is doubtful that the government would allow it.

Clearly the North American churches and mission agencies must seriously consider in what ways they can be of genuine service to the Chinese people and how they can foster understanding and friendship in the 1980's. Perhaps one effective mode of service might be the support of the Chinese higher education enterprise. The Chinese government faces the impossible task of providing quality higher education to millions of eager Chinese young people, and there is evidence that it would welcome the help of people of good will in other countries. Our conversations with Chinese educators

indicate an openness to explore ways in which Christian agencies might become helpfully involved. For example, we were given to understand that competent Christian scholars will be welcome in China, that fellowships to enable Chinese faculty members to study abroad would be appreciated, and that help in building stronger library collections would be a valued contribution. It will also be important to find ways of enabling Chinese scholars to share their knowledge and insights with North Americans, particularly in the church-related colleges in the United States.



Dr. Ruth Faden

Social Science in China

Among the most frequent questions I've been asked since returning from China have been, "What are Chinese psychologists doing?" I have no simple answers to these questions. Although the Kennedy Institute delegation was invited to the People's Republic as the official guest of the Chinese Academy of the Social Sciences, we met very few Chinese social scientists.

Now on the surface this may seem a bit odd. So let me attempt an explanation. The Chinese use the term "social science" very broadly to include disciplines addressing all questions of social phenomenon and human behavior. Thus, the Chinese Academy of the Social Sciences (CASS) includes many disciplines which we would be inclined to classify as humanities. For example, there are within CASS two institutes of philosophy, three institutes of literature, and one institute each of world religion, archeology, and journalism. Closer to what we might call social science are their three history institutes, four economic institutes, three institutes of international problems and world affairs, and their institutes of law, national minorities and "social science information." Notice that there are no

administrative units within CASS that correspond to what many would consider the classic social sciences of sociology, anthropology, and social psychology. When we raised this confusing omission with the Vice President of CASS, we were told that an institute of sociology is now being established under the direction of Professor Fei Xiaotong.

In subsequent discussions with CASS colleagues, we were to be referred again and again to Professor Fei. Whenever any issue relating to demography, program evaluation, normative structures, cultural values or behavioral predispositions was raised, we were told the issue fell in Professor Fei's area. It soon became

apparent to us that Professor Fei is the preeminent social scientist at CASS. It was also readily apparent that Professor Fei deserved his preeminent status, and that he would be treated with respect and deference as a senior social scientist in any academic community. But in all, we met only one Professor Fei—and that was disturbing.

What accounts for this state of affairs? In many respects, the status of the social sciences is not much different from the current status of other scientific and scholarly activities. Throughout our trip we were constantly reminded of the high cost to Chinese progress of the recent activities of the Gang of Four and the earlier Cultural Revolution. We were



Sargent Shriver and Dr. Reich presenting the Encyclopedia of Bioethics to a representative of Beijing University, at the Kennedy Institute's farewell banquet.

repeatedly told about the long term disruption of universities, the persecution of scholars, and the eventual painful recognition by the Chinese that the extreme idealism or repression (depending upon your point of view) of this period had resulted in the loss of one, and in some cases two, generations of trained scientists and scholars.

While it is certainly true that the period encompassing the Cultural Revolution and the fall of the Gang of Four negatively affected the entire academic community, difficulties with the social sciences actually precede this period. In the early days of the People's Republic most social science was outlawed as bourgeois and useless. This position was analogous to the view taken towards social sciences during several periods in the history of the Soviet Union. Thus, I did not expect to find many young social scientists in the People's Republic. My hope was that with the fall of the Gang of Four and the opening of the Academy of the Social Sciences in 1977, social scientists such as Professor Fei (now in their sixties and seventies and trained before the revolution) would have gotten the first crop of "graduate students" underway. This process is apparently now beginning.

It is my understanding that Professor Fei has asked for American assistance in teaching the first set of courses in social science methodology to CASS staff members. It may be that it will

not be possible for the Chinese to train new social scientists in any large numbers. In addition to the problems inherent in their thirty years of isolation from mainstream social science, it is not clear how many older qualified social scientists exist. Remember, these would have to be people who had survived the traumas involved in university disruptions and forced relocation to the countryside. I have, of course, no first hand knowledge of the number of social scientists resident throughout the university system in China. At the several universities we did visit, I do not recall being introduced to any social scientists. I did have a chance to speak with a Chinese speaking American anthropologist who was a visiting Professor at a provincial university regarding her impressions of the status of social science in China. Although her contacts were substantially wider than mine, she had not yet found a community of practicing Chinese social scientists and she herself had not been asked to teach anthropology in China.

This brings me to a most important question: What exactly is the commitment of the Chinese to reestablishing the social sciences? Certainly, the establishment of an institute of sociology and the obvious high regard paid Professor Fei is suggestive that the Chinese, at least at the moment, are seriously interested in promoting the social sciences.

What direction this new Chinese social science will take is unclear. There is

some fear that social science will be encouraged only to the extent that its research can be used to justify and support government policies. At the moment, there seems to be no interest in establishing an institute of anthropology. Social psychology, I am told, will fall under Professor Fei's institute of sociology. An institute of psychology exists in the Academy of Science, but it is dominated by experimental and physiological psychologists.

Whatever form this new Chinese social science will take, whether it conforms with our notions of an independent scientific enterprise or not, it seems clear that its development ought to be strongly encouraged and assisted by western social scientists. After a visit to China, it is impossible not to be impressed with the tremendous successes that the Chinese have achieved in meeting the basic needs of their overwhelming population. At the same time, I was also clearly impressed by what appears to be a fairly dramatic change in policy towards the recognition of failures and the tremendous problems and challenges yet to be faced. These problems include: population control, development of new social services, and the assimilation of cultural minorities. These are exactly the kinds of problems that could benefit from social science theory and research. The Chinese are asking for help. Active exchange of scholars and the training of young Chinese in the social sciences in western countries would be a good beginning.

Yao Ilin Greet the Visiting Delegation of The Kennedy Institute

姚依林会见美国肯尼迪学会访华团

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新华社北京八月二十八日电 姚依林副总理今天下午会见了美国肯尼迪学会访华团。肯尼迪学会由美国前总统肯尼迪家族建立于乔治顿大学。访华团成员有科学家、医生、律师、神学家、哲学家、教育家和政治家。团长萨金特·施赖弗是肯尼迪学会的最高顾问。会见时，姚副总理就中国的人口问题、宗教政策、民主制度、医疗卫生和中美贸易等问题，同访华团进行了友好的交谈。

Peking, Xin Hua, Agency, August 28, 1979—This afternoon, Vice Premier Yao Ilin greeted the Kennedy Institute delegation from America. The Kennedy Institute, founded by the family of the late President Kennedy, is located at Georgetown University. The delegation, which is touring China, consists of scientists, physicians, lawyers, theologians,

philosophers, educators and statesmen. Their leader is Sargent Shriver, the head consultant for the Kennedy Institute. Upon greeting the delegation, Vice Premier Yao discussed in a friendly manner the Chinese population issue, religious questions and policies, the democratic system, medical practices, and Sino-American trade relations.

The People's Daily

Vice Premier Yao Ilin with The Kennedy Institute Delegation in the Great Hall of the People, Beijing, August 27, 1979



Front Row (left to right): Dr. Julia Ching; Dr. John C. Harvey; Deputy Minister of Education, Huang Yinbai; The Hon. Sargent Shriver; Vice Premier Yao Ilin; William Alford, J.D.; Deputy Director of the China Travel Service, Ye Daiheng; Dr. Warren Reich; Deputy Director of the Institute of World Religions and representing CASS, Zhao Fusan.


Middle Row (left to right): China Travel Service Guide; Professor Patricia King; Dr. Conrad Taeuber; Dr. H. Tristram Engelhardt; Rev. William F. Ryan, S.J.; Mr. Edmund Meuwissen; Rev. Hans Küng; Agnes Williams, J.D.; Dr. James Childress; China Travel Service Guide.

Back Row (left to right): China Travel Service Guide; Dr. Roy Branson; Mr. Peter Robinson; Rev. Richard A. McCormick, S.J.; Dr. Paul Lauby; China Travel Service Guide; Dr. Ruth Faden; China Travel Service Guide; China Travel Service Guide.

Snapshots of China



Imperial Palace, Beijing.



William Alford, J.D.

Democracy Wall

My most poignant experience in China came at Democracy Wall. I had gone there early one morning with Roy Branson and John Collins Harvey to read wall posters. As we walked along the wall examining the posters, our attention was suddenly drawn to a crowd of 50 gathered around a large poster which was composed of a number of bed sheets sewn together and tied between two trees near the Wall.

In carefully drawn characters, supplemented by photographs and drawings, the poster told the sad story of a Chinese peasant from a western border region some 3,500 miles from Beijing whose wife had been beaten to death in her home three years earlier by politically radical police under the influence of the Gang of Four. As we stood there talking in hushed tones about the poster, it became apparent that its author's eyes were fixed on us, three foreigners. At first I was not sure what to do but finally, at Roy's urging, I went over to the author and told him that I was quite moved by the awful chain of events described in his poster.

The author looked at me with very heavy, sad eyes and then began to pour out in increasingly emotional terms an account of how he had sought—to no avail—to have the grave injustice he had suffered righted. First, he had gone through the proper



channels in his province. When that failed, he had come to Beijing where he had gone first to the Great Hall of the People, then to the Headquarters of the Communist Party, then to other government offices, and finally to the compound in which Deng and other leaders lived. None of these had provided him with the redress he sought.

With tears welling in his eyes, he told me that he now believed his injustice would not be righted but that he had come to Democracy Wall, in any event, to let the world know his story. He was not worried about the police doing anything to him, he continued, because after what he had been through, there was no remaining harm they could do to him.

With that, he stopped and stared at me. At a total loss for words, as there was nothing we could do to help this man, I asked Roy and John what they would want to say to him. John told me that, given his own religious convictions, he would tell him that he would pray for him. I translated John's message and added that although we could do nothing to help him directly, I would do what I could to retell his story in the hope that it would engender further support abroad for the movement in China toward a more democratic society. With that he thanked me, I touched him on the shoulder, and we left.

Dr. Tristram Engelhardt

Qo Fu, Birthplace of Confucius

My trip through China was marked by many moving experiences. The most intrusive experience occurred at Qo Fu standing in the precincts of the temple of Confucius. The temple grounds contain a number of large inscribed stones which were overturned and broken by Red Guards

during the Cultural Revolution and the reign of the Gang of Four. I understand the pain of our hosts when they spoke of that period. But the impression was more general. I was reminded as well of the destruction of temples and of art in the latter days of the Roman Empire, when philosophers were at times killed in the streets. It struck me how fragile our hold is on civilization, of how easily an established culture can collapse into barbarism, and that this problem is not one unique to China, but marks the human condition.



Noodles set in the sun to dry.



Mushrooms anyone?



Sargent Shriver buying mushrooms.

Dr. Conrad Taeuber

Population Theory Yesterday and Today

An event that occurred about a month before our arrival illustrates the current efforts to undo the excesses of earlier periods. Professor Ma Yinzhu, an economist, was President of Beijing University. In June, 1957, he published a "New Population Theory," arguing that population growth in China needed to be controlled. He called for efforts to persuade the masses that fertility regulation was important and that early marriage was harmful. He stated also that stern and effective administrative measures may need to be invoked if the efforts at persuasion were not adequate. It was his position that the State should have the power to intervene in reproduction and to control population. He was denounced in press and other public statements, and in 1960 was removed from his post as President of Beijing University.

On June 5, 1979, *The People's Daily* referred to Professor Ma's "New Population Theory"—the first public mention since 1960. On July 10, it called for his rehabilitation and this call echoed in other newspapers. In mid-July, the Vice Minister of the United Front of the Central Committee of the Chinese Communist Party called on Professor Ma at his home in Beijing and stated: "Today I have

been instructed by the Party to convey to you that the two criticisms of your new population theory before 1958 and after 1959 had both been erroneous. Practice [actual events] has validated the correctness of your new population theory of controlled fertility. The Party wants to institute a thorough rehabilitation and restore your reputation."





The egg market.



Father McCormick and Peter Robinson playing with children in an elementary school in Shanghai.



The Great Wall attracts tourists from everywhere, including Wesley Unsel of the Washington Bullets.

Dr. Julia Ching

Moral Values in Today's China

Dr. Julia Ching chose the topic of "Moral Values in Today's China" because of the importance of the subject in itself, as well as within the context of the aims and purposes of the Kennedy Institute of Ethics, Georgetown University. Dr. Ching based her judgments and conclusions on information and observations gathered and made not only during the group tour of the Kennedy Institute of Ethics in China, but also during her other preceding visits in the country, July/August 1978, February 1979, and July 1979. In sum, Dr. Ching spent roughly one month in the country in 1978, another month in summer 1979, with about 10 days in winter 1979. Twice she travelled as an individual and twice with a group.

The Images: Traditional and Modern

Traditional China called herself, and was known by her nearest neighbors, as the Land of Virtue (*li-yi zhi bang*). Her high ethical standards were evident in the Confucian classics, and knowledge of them was spread by Jesuit and other missionaries to Europe in the seventeenth and eighteenth centuries. As a result such great philosophers as Leibniz, Wolff, and Voltaire all became ardent Sinophiles. This does not mean that the images necessarily conformed well to the realities. As is now known, China's European admirers frequently projected into her the image of accomplished virtues, even though the Classics merely extolled and encouraged the practice of these virtues. This image was the result of wishful thinking, of the desire to discover a realized, moral Utopia.

Nevertheless, morality *was* at the core of Chinese philosophy, which, in turn, constituted the basis of traditional China's educational program. Such virtues as filial piety, fraternal respect, courtesy and hospitality were highly

esteemed and carefully upheld—by the family as well as the state. Indeed, the rigidity of the social structure in the early 20th century in which a fossilized form of Confucian ideology was imbedded, led eventually to a movement calling for the overthrow of old values, the introduction of Western ideas, and eventually, to the establishment of the Chinese Communist Party in an endeavor to save Chinese society from Western imperialism as well as from what was considered China's feudal past.

During the Great Proletarian Cultural Revolution, which lasted for roughly a decade from 1966 on, China was once more virtually closed to outsiders. Yet she projected, by her propaganda, the image of a Land of New Virtue, where the Chairman's ethical appeals—especially his dictum, "Serve the People"—were almost universally, and even lovingly, carried out. Once more the West envisaged in this seldom visited country a land where the *right* kind of socialism, especially socialist ethics, triumphed—a land not only without drug addicts and prostitutes, but also where high and low collaborated in living a code of puritanical ethics covering every aspect of life: love (never public, never abused), marriage, work (always willingly and joyfully done), and even entertainment (only "revolutionary" ones).

But the image would not outlast by long the Cultural Revolution. Until

last summer it was not openly criticized, but during this past summer visitors heard an outpouring of stories recalling painful and shocking experiences of the 1966-76 decade, confirming information gathered by professional Chinawatchers. Instead of a reign of virtue, the years witnessed a long nightmare. The young missed schooling; the more mature were forbidden to do work for which they were trained; books were burnt; scholars sent to feed pigs. Indeed, violence and sporadic chaos were the order of the day. Many houses were ransacked, people were tortured—sometimes to their deaths. Over 100,000 cases of miscarriages of justice have been recorded for that period, while one could only hazard guesses for the number of suicides. The so-called puritanical morality was only a farce, as burglaries and rapes went frequently unpunished.

I have not set out the traditional/modern, images/realities contrasts in order to suggest any proportional correlation. Nor do I wish to exaggerate the moral havoc created by the Cultural Revolution—which many in China openly describe as a near-fatal blow to Chinese culture. I wish rather to examine the post-Cultural Revolution rhetoric of ethics, presuming that the virtues extolled today will reflect the moral values now considered important. And I also wish to ascertain, so far as possible, how people *live* these virtues. Of course, my several visits to China remain brief when considered against the vastness of this subject. But I hope

all the same to throw some light upon this question.

What the visitor now finds: the Real China?

Today's visitors are no longer treated to boring, official propaganda comparing the accomplishments of the Communist regime with the evils of the feudal past. Rather, those who care are able to meet and converse with local Chinese much more informally and casually, although socialist ideology has not given way. In formal lectures, one still hears expositions of socialist morality and the revolutionary heroism it produces. We heard tales of heroic self-sacrifice in efforts to save state property such as factories, which also represent the fruit of the labor of proletariat masses. If the casual listener finds reflections of Western, Christian heroism, let him pause and beware: the accent was on the saving of material property—even though human lives *were* also saved, on the side. The big characters representing the dictum, "Serve the People," remain ubiquitous, even if it is no longer vaunted in conversation. Foreign visitors who are overwhelmed by the devotion of the Travel Service are also overcome by exaggerated efforts to make their tours comfortable—while local Chinese are pushed aside to make way for the tour bus. On the other hand, the *quality* of service offered even in the best of China's hotels compares very poorly with that known in the outside world: rooms are only superficially

swept, if at all, and dining orders not well attended. Much, of course, could be attributed to the lack of proper training for service personnel. But the occasional overseas Chinese who undertakes to tackle personally the red tape involved in the purchase of an air or rail ticket usually lines up with a crowd of local people pushing one another in their attempts to cope with a discourteous travel staff officiously asking for documents. The proverbial Chinese "love of labor" becomes suspect in light of newspaper revelations of the low work morale prevalent in the country's factories and productive units and the difficulty of developing an effective, proper bonus system. And what of the traditional virtues—of family devotion, respect for elders, courtesy and hospitality—those extolled in the Classics, those practised certainly by a great number of people, regardless of whether they were "class virtues" (shown only to one's own social class) or not?

Here and there, the occasional visitor sees evidence of a touching witness to the durability of traditional family virtues: the young respecting, helping and even serving the aged. Nearly everywhere one is impressed by the solidarity of the family system, certain attacks upon it notwithstanding. But there are also immense problems under the surface. China's young senses itself "equal" to the older generation. Many had been brutalized by what they had seen or even done during the Cultural Revolution. They are less willing to

act passively according to parental advice. What is more, and what is obvious to all is that the young hardly ever mutter thanks or express regrets orally. Yet their demands are many. Overseas Chinese are asked by young relatives who hardly know their elders, to bring in pocket calculators, tape-recorders, television sets. Parents and elders are far quicker to offer gestures of hospitality and service.

The Anti-Confucius Campaign (1972-74) is of course over. It is now criticized as an effort to overthrow Premier Chou En-Lai by associating him with the moral philosopher Confucius, as well as Confucius' admired Duke of Chou. Older people, including the country's higher cadres are once more referring to Confucius' *Analects*, as well as other works, and are even quoting from them to illustrate a point. Confucius' birth-place in Shantung is once more open to the public (since April, 1979), and our group was privileged to visit there. Confucius himself is now said to have made some mistakes, but to have also made contributions to the social order and culture. While he is no longer considered a sage, neither is he a mere villain. He has become a human being, prone to both merits and demerits, as indeed has the deceased Chairman himself.

Has Christianity a Place?

For many Westerners, especially Christians, the question emerges as to how Christianity has fared during the past few decades and what place it

may now have in Chinese society. If the Cultural Revolution has created a kind of "moral vacuum" in today's China, is there perhaps a desire for and openness to Western religious and moral values? In my opinion, I find it difficult to respond affirmatively. I should say there is intellectual curiosity about Christianity, as perhaps about all religions now that these are no longer, intellectually speaking, "forbidden fruits." There is recognition also that the technologically advanced West still harbors many people who are believing Christians. There is also sincere effort, so it seems, by the government to allow more freedom of religion at least for those adhering to the Patriotic Churches (Catholic and Protestant). The government has stated its willingness to guarantee a constitutional right to freedom of religious belief. But the educated people, whether they be convinced Marxists or disillusioned experimental Utopians, usually declare themselves materialists and atheists with some respect for "the preternatural." Christianity is still alive among those who have always been Christians, including those who nominally gave up their faiths during the Cultural Revolution. But the majority of educated Chinese seem too disillusioned with the cult of the Chairman, who became semi-divinized during his lifetime to desire any more cult. Politics still sound too much like religion and dogma. People who have passed through the Great Crucible (of the Cultural Revolution) are not asking many "eternal" questions about

life and death and the meaning of each. They are more eager to improve the quality of their lives here and now.

Conclusion

There are definite "generation gaps" in Chinese society, gaps that are perhaps deeper than in the West. In the cities we visited, children appeared to be attending schools normally. But there is ostensibly a "lost generation" (those aged twenty-five years and under) who missed much of their schooling during the Cultural Revolution. There are also the middle-aged, (forty or above), many of whom actively worked for the advent of a utopian society only to emerge disillusioned and chastened, themselves the victims of power struggles. The elders who were the young patriots and revolutionaries of the decade of China's war with Japan and the ensuing civil struggle remain, being far removed from younger generations in many ways.

I find that the older generation has preserved much more of the traditional sense of morality, of courtesy, and of family devotion. They have suffered much and remain the most self-sacrificing. The middle-aged appear often cynical, but eager for their own advancement. They know little of traditional moral values, but desire the benefits arising from the family system, which are often material benefits overseas relatives might bring. The young appear the most morally deprived, and while

less cynical, they have fewer ideals for which to live. While older generations experimented with revolutionary idealism, and were themselves exploited and persecuted for it, the young have no such background. The old are quite vocal about the faults of the young, such as their lack of courtesy (quite real), their propensity for conflict and confrontation rather than filial consideration, and their downright dishonesty. (Yet who could be counted to tell the truth when *everyone* has been required to cry political slogans which changed with the political weather?)

The above account has perhaps overdrawn certain contrasts, but this was done in order to delineate more clearly the moral contours of a society in rapid political change. There is much that is good and beautiful in China and human relationships remain warm, vital, and important. In contrast to the West, which many Chinese consider decadent, there is as yet no *evident* drug or sex problems. In spite of a low living standard and poor housing, they appear disciplined and tolerant. People are clean (although few houses have baths), and they keep their city streets and country roads free of rubbish. The children are happy and often generous, as witnessed by us when a child offered his apple to one of our delegation.

While China has real problems in the economic as well as the moral order, it is my belief that China possesses the solutions to these problems.

Among the assets of her people is their openness to the true and good. As China becomes more and more a part of the one world, we may hope that she will grow to fulfilment, morally as well as otherwise. China will yet have much to teach the rest of the world. □



Dr. Roy Branson

Chinese Protestantism

Christians, particularly Protestants, are buoyant about the future of the Church in the People's Republic of China. In Beijing, the Kennedy Institute of Ethics' delegation met prominent and long-time leaders of the Three-Self Movement, the official Protestant church recognized by the government. (The three "self's," which emphasize the indigenous, non-imperialist nature of official Protestantism in China are self-government, self-support, and self-propagation.) In Shanghai, contacts were also made with unofficial but actual leaders of Protestants who continue to identify themselves as members of particular denominations. As freedom increases so does debate among Protestants about the nature and role of the Church in contemporary China.

Bishop Ting is a quintessential leader of the Three-Self Movement. Members of our delegation met with him two days before he flew to Princeton University where he gave widely reported speeches concerning the state of Christianity in the People's Republic of China. Ting, who was consecrated an Anglican Bishop and served on the staff of the World Council of Churches, returned to



Leaving the gothic sanctuary.

China after the Liberation and became head of the Protestant Seminary in Nanking. His description of the increasing centralization of seminary education coincided with other accounts we heard, of the general consolidation of Protestant institutions after 1951. Those accounts helped us to understand why the present, freer environment is so exhilarating.

From 1951 to 1957 the government insisted that the leaders of the Three-Self Movement be acceptable to it, but some denominational identity persisted as it does within the National Council of Churches. There was even maintenance of separate church buildings. From the time of Mao's Great Leap Forward in 1957, until 1966, the Three-Self Movement was molded into a more organically unified Protestant Church, with common worship services and assignment of state-paid clergy without reference to denominational affiliation. The many Protestant seminaries in China were reduced to four, one in each geographic part of the country. Finally, the only seminary faculty that remained was Bishop Ting's in Nanking. The last class graduated from the seminary in 1966. In 1966 the Cultural Revolution began and even leaders of the Three-Self Movement were thrown into prisons or banished to hard labor in remote areas. The Nanking Seminary managed to retain a faculty devoted to translating the Bible, but it still has not admitted any new students. The Three-Self Movement has recently begun to re-emerge in local areas,

but when we were in Beijing it still had not had a national meeting. Even those who would certainly be present did not know when such a meeting would take place or who would be invited.

One of the leaders of the Three-Self Movement who was banished during the Cultural Revolution and who has been rehabilitated made the only public criticism of present official policy that we heard during our two weeks in China. Zhao Fusan was ordained by the Anglican Church and now is the Deputy Director of the Institute of World Religions within the Academy of Social Sciences. He was prominent throughout the formal academic meetings of the Kennedy Institute with the Academy. He translated for other

speakers, delivered his own lecture on the history of Chinese religion, and accompanied the Kennedy Institute delegation to the Great Hall of the People to see Vice Premier Yao Ilin.

From Ting and Zhao we learned concretely how the government is serious about allowing more religious freedom. The government has approved the allocation of enough paper to publish thousands of copies of the Bible. In Fukien Province, south of Shanghai, entire brigades within a commune (about 7,000 people comprise a brigade) have declared themselves to be Christians. Since the time of liberation, Christians in the countryside have enjoyed greater liberty than those in the cities, including the



The first Christian public worship service held in Shanghai in thirteen years.

The Three-Self's:

- Self-Government
- Self-Support
- Self-Propagation

opportunity in certain areas of conducting worship services. Freedom has also begun to return to urban areas. In Beijing one Protestant Church had already been opened, although at the time we were there it was the only one in all of China.

While Bishop Ting and Professor Zhao Fusan are very hopeful about the future, other conversations and experiences in Beijing highlighted persistent problems for Christianity in China. During Vice Premier Yao Ilin's hour-long meeting with our delegation, he was asked why the new constitution of the People's Republic of China, promulgated in 1978, does not grant equal freedom to atheism and theism. We knew that during a meeting of the National People's Consultative Congress, comprised primarily of individuals not belonging to the Communist Party, government leaders had been challenged on that specific point. Vice Premier Yao replied that the government understands that freedom of belief in either atheism or in God implies freedom to propagate that belief. However, in China theists remain uneasy that the government's current interpretation has not yet been embedded in the wording of the constitution.

Another aspect of the challenge facing Christianity was dramatized for me by another conversation in a very different setting. One evening I left the delegation to walk two or three miles away from the Beijing Hotel down various commercial streets and to poke into restaurants, bakeries and



groceries. A young night crew at a small typewriter repair shop detained me for about an hour. One of the machinists in his twenties studied English at night. With the help of his two Chinese-English dictionaries, we struggled phrase by phrase through a couple of sentences at a time. Periodically he paused to translate our conversation for the five other workers who had gathered around. Finally, I asked him if he heard of any Christians in Beijing. "Christmas? Christmas?" he kept repeating. Once I had clarified the word Christian, he said, "I know only a man on the radio from Hong Kong who said he was a Christian. He

had a friendly voice." He went on to explain in a matter-of-fact manner that Beijing had never had many Christians. "The south had more." He translated my question for the other workers, but none knew or had heard of any Christians in Beijing. I later found that the Protestant Church in Beijing was a few blocks away, within easy walking distance. Weekly attendance there was reported to be about forty people.

The virtual invisibility of Christianity away from the coastal cities and southern countryside was underscored by Ambassador Woodcock in his conversations at the American Embassy with the Kennedy Institute delegation. He suggested that in addition to the government's commitment to constitutional guarantees of freedom of religious belief, the leadership may be allowing increased religious liberty because it has observed the minimal success Christianity historically enjoyed in Japan and China. They may have concluded that a few thousand freely worshipping Christians would pose a minimal threat to one billion Chinese.

Another disturbing fact is that Christianity, particularly Protestantism, continues to be identified with Western culture. When I asked Zhao Fusan what contribution the tiny Christian community could make to the future of Chinese society, he pointed out that Christianity is the most important religion in the West. Chinese Christians can therefore help their countrymen to understand a

significant aspect of Western culture. Ambassador Woodcock recalled another remark that revealed a similar perception. At a diplomatic reception a high Chinese official noted that "It's interesting, isn't it, that the West, which is so advanced technologically, has been deeply influenced by Christianity." If the identification between Christianity and Western culture persists, Christianity will continue to be hostage to shifts in the political and diplomatic relations between China and the West.

Greater freedom allows another basic dilemma to reappear. Will the government form and sponsor a single Protestant Church, or will Protestants identify church buildings with particular denominations, choose their own pastors, and support them with their offerings? Zhao Fusan anticipated that when the national Three-Self Movement is reorganized the result

will not be a unified Church, analogous to the United Church of Canada or the Church of South India. Differing patterns of ordination and liturgy could probably not be merged. A closer analogy would be the National Council of Churches. However, cooperation would be essential in the use of church buildings. The government would simply not allow each Protestant denomination to convert a different church building from its present use as an office or workshop to use for a weekly worship service.

Events during our visit to Shanghai drew us into both the excitement and perplexity experienced by Protestants in China. Taking a taxi to his one room apartment, I visited Pastor Xu Hua, the President of the China Division of Seventh Day Adventists at the time of liberation.

During 19 of the last 25 years (1954-1979), Pastor Xu Hua has been either in jail or under house detention. I saw him only three months after his final house arrest was terminated in May, 1979. Since then he has been free to visit with Chinese and overseas church members. An indication of a changed official attitude toward him and his family is the fact that a new edition of a Chinese encyclopedia will include an article about Pastor Xu Hua's grandfather. After working as a business agent for foreign companies, his grandfather established his own shipping company which sent the first ships flying the Chinese flag into European ports such as Liverpool and Southampton. The Sunday morning that I saw Pastor Xu Hua happened to be his 74th birthday, but far from reflecting on the past with its painful prison experiences, Pastor Xu Hua was exhilarated by the future opportunities for Christians in China.

He was clear that Chinese must be the leaders of Christianity within the People's Republic of China. Neither foreigners nor overseas Chinese can determine policy or provide funds for Christians within China. On the other hand, Christians inside China should be allowed to identify with particular traditions. Cooperation of the various Protestant groups under the umbrella of a Three-Self Movement recognized by the government would be less of a problem if it were similar to the early years of the Three-Self Movement when denominational identities were not wholly obliterated. Adventists,



More Memorial Church.

he felt, would be happy to share church buildings and cooperate in many joint projects. But Seventh-Day Adventists should certainly not be forced to meet on the same day as other Protestants. Pastor Xu Hua was encouraged by reports that in different communes two production teams (each team usually consisting of 400-600 members) identified themselves as Seventh-Day Adventist Christians and insisted that they would not perform routine labor on Saturday. Each commune agreed as long as the Adventist team continued to exceed its production quota.

Without question we gained our most dramatic and moving impression of Christianity in China from attending, September 2, what was the first Christian public worship service held in Shanghai in thirteen years. Sunday morning, Pastor Xu Hua volunteered in our conversation in his apartment that invitations had been distributed to a thanksgiving church service that would be held within two hours. Dr. Paul Lauby had heard in Beijing of this service, but the official government guides that met our delegation when it arrived the previous Saturday night denied that any such service was planned. I quickly returned to the hotel and found Dr. Paul Lauby. Our taxi driver had no trouble finding the crowd entering More Memorial Church, which had originally been built by a Methodist congregation and subsequently occupied by a school.



More than 1000 people attended the thanksgiving service.

Although we did not have invitations, Dr. Lauby and I were still warmly welcomed into the gothic sanctuary. As we were gently hurried down the right aisle, Dr. Lauby and I could see that we were the only non-Chinese in attendance. We quickly discovered that over a thousand people had more than filled the main floor and balcony. An extra wooden bench was placed next to one of the already filled pews by a middle-aged man who insisted on sitting behind a pillar so that I could see the platform. Behind me a young man who spoke a little English identified the four men in their seventies sitting on the platform. He indicated the denomination with which each participant had been affiliated: the Methodist minister offered the welcome and benediction, the Presbyterian pastor read the scriptural lesson, the clergyman from The Little Flock (an indigenous Chinese Church) gave the pastoral prayer, and a Baptist pastor preached the sermon.

On the left of the platform a man in his late twenties played an ancient upright piano. The congregation was predominantly over 55 years of age, but many young married couples were also in attendance. As in any church around the world, teenagers and young adults had found their way to the balcony. To my left, above the balcony, were three large gothic windows. Rocks had smashed huge holes through each of them.

For the congregation the most fervent part of the service was the opening prayer. To my right, my benchmate swayed, his head tilted back, weeping, occasionally joining others in responding aloud. I still remained the sympathetic observer. But when the congregation swept into "Holy, Holy, Holy" and "Joyful, Joyful, We Adore Thee," I became a fellow worshiper, sharing the congregation's emotion and tears. It was easy to believe in that moment that even if

the Christian minority played an obscure role in public events, Christianity could never be eradicated from the fabric of Chinese life.

According to a later translation of his recorded remarks, the Baptist preacher gave a rather traditional sermon, including the admonition that God's unconditioned love should be demonstrated in not just religious exercises, but everyday life. It was announced that the next week a former Presbyterian Church would be opened. Others would follow, until five Protestant churches would be reopened in Shanghai. After the congregation sang "Love Divine," and heard the closing prayer, the congregation began chatting excitedly to one another. They had attended Shanghai's first public Christian worship service in thirteen years.

Before I could leave I felt a tap on my right shoulder. The man who had been translating asked me what group I was with. When I told him, he said, "Oh yes, the Kennedy Institute met for a long conversation with Vice Premier Yao Ilin in Beijing." I turned completely around and asked carefully how he knew about our meeting that had take place just a few days before. He fumbled for a moment. I finally suggested that "Maybe you read about it in the *People's Daily*?" He quickly smiled and agreed. When I asked him his name he gave it and said, "I am the Vice Chairman of the Shanghai Three-Self Movement."



Grilling chicken on the street.

By the time I reached the front steps of the church I could see that scores of pedestrians and as many cyclists had stopped to silently watch this large, talkative group spilling on to a busy, downtown thoroughfare. I wondered if some bystanders did not even know that the building being emptied was originally a church. As I approached the wall enclosing the church yard, my gaze stopped at a young man in the crowd peering through the front gate. He was wearing the green cap and red star of a soldier in the People's Liberation Army.

The church service had epitomized both the hope and uncertainty of not only the Christian community, but many parts of contemporary Chinese

society. Leadership is being provided by older men whose memories are the fragile membrane connecting pre-liberation traditions to the present. Foreigners are treated as friends, but there is the unchallenged assumption that the Chinese will operate their own institutions. Hope, bordering on euphoria, at the enjoyment of greater freedom is interrupted by sharp reminders that the exercise of that freedom remains carefully scrutinized. A tension between unity based on national identity and diversity founded on historic loyalties remains unresolved.

Zhao Fusan had said in Beijing that "The People's Republic of China has entered its Protestant era." He was using Paul Tillich's famous phrase to epitomize China's recent political life, such as its increased appreciation of individual initiative and greater acceptance of dissent. If the church demonstrates how groups within Chinese society can exercise some independence it may be that Zhao Fusan's *bon mot* will have expressed a profound truth. In contemporary China, as it did previously in the West, Christianity may make its greatest contribution to public life simply by being itself: an institution loyal to a reality it believes transcends the claims of any particular government. Freedom of religion has, in the past, accompanied the emergence of diverse, autonomous groups. Historians may later agree that during this period, by beginning to allow institutional pluralism, China did indeed enter its Protestant era.

Wm. Alford, Pat King and Agnes Williams

Law, Lawyers and Legal Education in PRC

The Kennedy Institute's delegation to China was fortunate to arrive at a time when the Chinese were once again focusing on law after what was, in effect, a hiatus of two decades' duration. China's concern with the development of greater legal protections is now in an incipient stage, and still falls far short of what we in the West would expect of a society based on the rule of law. Our group was able to learn from meetings with judges, legal educators and others that the Chinese, of late, have made considerable strides toward such a society. The very fact that we were able to partake of such meetings in itself represents a clear advance from a year ago when the Chinese expressed great reluctance about allowing visiting Americans (including co-author Alford) to meet with legal officials and scholars.

The most extensive legal discussions in which the group engaged came during an afternoon-long session with two Shanghai municipal court judges, devoted chiefly to questions of criminal law and procedure, and in the course of meetings with Professor Rui Mo and other scholars affiliated

with the Chinese Academy of Social Sciences in Beijing. In addition, individual group members were able to glean further useful information through discussions with a range of individuals. These people include: Vice Premier Yao Ilin; the leaders of a commune on the outskirts of Canton; a professor of law at Beijing University; a professor of international relations at Fudan University in Shanghai; the author of a wall poster at Democracy Wall in Beijing; Professor Jerome A. Cohen, the Director of Harvard Law School's East Asian Legal Studies Center (who was in Beijing at the same time with American scholars of tax law, leading a seminar for Chinese officials), and others. Through these discussions we were able to supplement our understanding of the following developments in Chinese law and legal education.

The Resurgence of Legality

Although law was never accorded as central a position in either traditional or modern Chinese society as has been the case in Anglo-American culture, during the first decade of the People's Republic, the Chinese did attempt to establish a new socialist legal order based in large measure upon the Russian model. By the late 1950's, however, law began to come under fire as being a socially divisive force, and lawyers as being reactionary, elitist elements. After a brief respite in the early 1960's, law and lawyers were subjected to even stronger attacks, first during the Cultural Revolution and then in the heyday of the Gang of Four. During this period, which commenced in 1965 and lasted for more than a dozen years, law schools were closed, bar associations disbanded, and many



A popular food vendor, Canton.

laws and legal procedures abrogated or ignored.

With the ascendance of Deng Xiaoping, law has over the course of the past two years again become a proper subject for concern—indeed, more so than had ever previously been the case. Some observers have speculated that the present leadership's recent interest in law is explicable largely as a reaction to the arbitrary and lawless manner in which many of them were treated during the Cultural Revolution and Gang of Four periods. Others attribute it, at least in part, to the influence of the West, as expressed both by foreign businessmen who have pushed for codified commercial law and by foreign leaders eager to promote the growth of civil liberties in China (including Senator Edward M. Kennedy, who during his visit with Professor Cohen to China in December of 1977, stressed to the leadership the importance of further developing China's criminal law and procedure).

Whatever the impetus, during the past year-and-a-half the Chinese have promulgated a new Constitution, a new criminal code, a new law of criminal procedure, a joint venture code for foreign companies hoping to engage in partnerships with them on Chinese soil, and a number of environmental laws. Moreover, work is presently underway on new copyright and patent codes, new commercial and corporate laws, revisions to the existing tax and labor laws, and further additions to the environmental laws.

And, as will be discussed below, legal education and lawyer's groups have again sprung up.

The Criminal Laws

The new substantive and procedural criminal laws hold greater promise of protecting the individual than have previous codes. However, many people with whom we spoke indicated that they wished to withhold judgment on the laws—which take effect on January 1, 1980—until they have been in operation for a while.

One issue *not* resolved by the new laws is that of whether an accused should be considered innocent or guilty until acquitted or convicted. The judges with whom we met informed us that in the early years of the People's Republic, innocence had been presumed, but that in the late 1950's, this had been attacked as a "rightist idea" and abandoned. Now, the issue is again the subject of extensive and often heated debate—so much so that the drafters of the new laws have left it unanswered. The personal view of the judges we met was that a judge should presume neither innocence nor guilt but should act "neutrally."

Interestingly, a number of elements of the new criminal law are reminiscent of Imperial Chinese legal codes as are a number of present-day administrative regulations. To take but a brief example, the new code, like the Ch'ing Dynasty Code of a century ago, makes falsely accusing another of

having committed a crime and forcing another to commit suicide major crimes.

Legal Education

After having been stifled for a dozen years, legal education has again surfaced at four universities. The prestigious law department of Beijing University currently numbers more than 20 faculty members and 200 students (none, to date, from the U.S.). Among the subjects taught are criminal law, criminal procedure, family law, labor law, Chinese legal history, and Western law and legal history. Surprisingly, notwithstanding China's increasing involvement with foreign businessmen, the law faculty has few offerings in the area of international trade. The instruction of China's future commercial negotiators is instead left largely to the government itself and to foreign institutions—including Harvard Law School and Hong Kong University—to which a handful of officials with legal responsibilities have recently been sent.

In a departure from both the Confucian and Communist past, the Chinese are now also striving to inculcate at least a minimal awareness of the law among the populace through the publication of legal periodicals and the inclusion of general features on law in major newspaper and on radio and television. Foreigners (including co-author Alford) were able to purchase and read such periodicals.



The Legal Profession

The resurgence of the legal profession has been even slower than that of the law itself or of legal education—due most likely to the fact that even when functioning at its smoothest, the Chinese legal system has far less need for lawyers or legally trained judicial officials than most Western systems. Even before the Cultural Revolution shut down legal education, many “legal workers” engaged in prosecutorial, defense, or judicial activity had little or no formal legal training—as was the case with one of the judges we met who, prior to entering the judiciary at age 23, had been a laborer and party cadre.

Within the past half year, China’s lawyers have regrouped. Bar associations have been revived in Beijing and other major cities. And, if the new criminal law truly is followed, there will be far greater need for skilled legal workers than is now the case. The judges with whom we spoke in Shanghai indicated that they presently are trying only two or three cases a month—a small number when one considers that that city of more than 10,000,000 has fewer than 100 municipal judges. Nonetheless, the promise is such that students at Beijing University are now avidly looking forward to active careers in the law—a thought hardly imaginable a few years ago. □

Dr. Tom Beauchamp

Bioethics in Japan and Hong Kong

In travelling to and from the People's Republic of China, the Kennedy Institute delegation met with health care professionals in Japan and Hong Kong. Dr. Beauchamp reports here on those activities.

It is no doubt a difficult question how “Hong Kong Chinese,” as they refer to themselves, are to be distinguished culturally, politically, and in other ways from the Chinese in the PRC. However, when it comes to distinguishing their involvement in medicine and problems in bioethics, the proverbial difference between East and West is everywhere manifest. It would perhaps be an oversimplification to say that Chinese in the PRC have no bioethical problems, though other articles in this *Quarterly Report* will, I predict, bear out this broad claim. By contrast, the Hong Kong Chinese have virtually the same approach to medicine and the same bioethical problems to which we are accustomed in the United States. This is the case I shall try to make in this brief article.

The members of the Kennedy Institute delegation were invited to see both Hong Kong University and also the Chinese University of Hong Kong. Hong Kong University is a British legacy, and still functions largely on the British model. The Chinese University of Hong Kong is staffed largely with Chinese professors and administrators. One might think this historical and cultural difference would count substantially toward divergent points of view being taken by these two universities. However, we did not find this particular thesis to be borne out. The differences that count are always between Hong Kong and China, not between the British and the Chinese located in Hong Kong.

Consider first our visit to the Chinese University of Hong Kong. We met there with a largely nonmedical set of faculty members, and had some briefings on the health system in Hong Kong and on traditional Chinese philosophy. The briefings tended to show that administrative arrangements for health care, as well as health planning, are substantially similar to those found in the United States. We were given the impression that even though the scope of health care for certain segments of the lower class may be more restricted than in the United States, those from the lower class can expect immediate admission to a hospital bed for no more than \$5 per day. We were told that in Hong Kong they are somewhat behind in the treatment of some kinds of diseases—mental disease was specifically men-



tioned in the visit to the Chinese University—but on the whole they see themselves as similarly advanced as western countries; and, from what we could tell, this seems to be so.

One noticeable way in which they lag behind is in the gathering of statistics. We learned right away that it is difficult to understand how the problem of abortion is handled in Hong Kong. They tend to treat problems of abortion under the category of either therapeutic abortion or septic abortion, but in response to queries about the number of such abortions performed each year, we were told that those statistics are only now being gathered for the first time.

We actually learned more about bioethics in Hong Kong from our discussions at Hong Kong University than from our discussions at the Chinese University of Hong Kong. At the Chinese University we were placed largely in an interdisciplinary setting which led to a discussion of many extraneous topics. When we went to Hong Kong University, we were greeted in a session chaired by the head of the Department of Community Medicine. It was clear from the start that his faculty was interested in whatever we were interested in, and the course of the discussion was naturally bioethical in character. Indeed, the only request made in advance of the discussion itself by the head of the Department of Community Medicine, was "What *fields* of medical ethics are we going to cover?" The person to whom this question was put,

Sargent Shriver, did not answer the question directly. Instead, he turned the question over to Warren Reich, who presented the faculty with a copy of the *Encyclopedia of Bioethics*. The subtle implication, I suppose, was that the field of discussion was to be open to every item catalogued in that *Encyclopedia*.

We then went on to discover that the four professors from the medical school who were meeting with us did in fact know somewhere between a little bit and a lot about virtually all of these bioethical topics. Moreover, the answers they gave were answers we are generally used to hearing in the West. We quizzed them especially closely about the ways in which they handle problems of informed consent in doing research in Hong Kong. We were told that the consent of all subjects involved in a research protocol had to be obtained, and that they had modeled their procedures for receiving consent and their consent forms on those currently being used in the United States. We learned, similarly, that many of their ethical concerns about consent paralleled our own. For example, they had been worried about how much the subjects they were using in experiments actually comprehended the information provided. Their "volunteers," as they call them, had come from a poorer segment of the population, and it was questionable how well they understood their participation in the research. We were told that they now use subjects at a "higher level" who are fully capable of understand-

ing their participation in the research, and who are even quite interested in such participation and actually follow the course of the research to its conclusion. They also indicated that they contacted subjects after a period of a year or so in order to let them know what happened in the research as well as to solicit further consent if they were still involved in the research project. They also were well aware of some of the subtleties of bioethical problems about consent, such as the special difficulties posed by randomized clinical trials. They indicated that they had faced up those problems, and had decided to inform patients prior to their participation that they were involved in a randomized trial.

There were also indications that the Hong Kong University faculty not only had thought through the same problems, but had thought them through to a greater extent in some quarters than have we. For example, we discussed their institutional review board as a mechanism for approving research protocols. Not surprisingly, the system that they use is similar to our own. Somewhat surprisingly, they decided to think through their use of *animal* subjects at the same time they were establishing mechanisms for protecting *human* subjects. While they did not make the claim that the same protections were in order for animals as for humans, they gave every indication that they have far better conceived and attempted to handle the problem of protecting research animals through review committees than have we. That

the review for animals paralleled the lines of the review of human subjects is especially interesting.

These findings contrast sharply with our findings in the PRC. There we found either little understanding of or little concern with what we consider to be the primary problems of bioethics. From time to time a particular individual with whom we were speaking would indicate an awareness of or an interest in a particular bioethical problem—for example, we occasionally found people explicitly interested in problems of the allocation of scarce medical resources. However, the constant impression that we received within the PRC was that there was very little understanding of what we were asking, and even less of an awareness that bioethical problems constitute serious social problems. Perhaps we should not be surprised about this reaction, given the present structure of the government and of scientific and scholarly activities in the PRC. After all, there has been continual disruption and upheaval there and moral problems such as those in bioethics have simply had to take second place. It would, however, be a mistake to suppose that these problems have been given second place because the Chinese themselves are not concerned with such problems due to their own peculiar ethical and religious history. What we found in Hong Kong, I believe, is that the Chinese there are concerned with virtually exactly the same set of problems that concern us and are at least as well on their way to resolving those problems as are we. □

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Dr. Warren Reich

The Beijing Symposium on Ethics and Values in the Contemporary World

"Historically significant" and "an important beginning" are appropriate terms for describing the Beijing Symposium on Values and Ideologies in Science, Medicine, Technology, and Law. The highlight of the Kennedy Institute delegation's trip to the People's Republic of China, this conference was hosted by the Chinese Academy of the Social Sciences in Beijing, August 27-28, 1979.

The Chinese Academy of the Social Sciences, which was established only in 1977, is without an American counterpart. Similar to our National Institutes of Health in its structure, the Academy is made up of twenty-four institutes. While the research staff of the entire Academy exceeds 1500 people (including many graduate students), there appear to be only a few well trained senior level scholars in some of the institutes, and these usually double as professors at universities.

We found a remarkably open attitude among our Chinese colleagues during the Beijing conference. It was apparent that their openness was due partly to official policy. For the Chinese are now extremely eager—in contrast with the isolationist and anti-intellectual attitudes manifested during the Cultural Revolution—to explain their positions to the world and to learn from foreign colleagues systematically in the coming years. □

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THE MEANING OF THE CHINESE EXPERIENCE AND OUR RESPONSE

By Charles C. West

There are various ways of answering the question: How should we respond to the recent events in China? All of them have their place. Careful and constructively critical analysis is called for, so that we may understand what is really happening to human beings and not just what this or that ideology explains. A response of eager and expectant hope is also appropriate, anticipating what God will be doing next with and for one-quarter of the people on earth who bear his image and for whom his saving promise in Christ is meant. Enthusiasm and joy are also called for, when old friends and family meet after years of separation, when talk flows freely and honestly from person to person after a long interruption -- all in a society where great progress has been made toward economic equality and a spirit of public service.

This morning, however, I would like to put all of these responses in another context by asking the question: How do we rightly pray for China? To put it another way: How do we place our relationship with the people of China in a context where God becomes one of the actors in that relationship? We sometimes assume too quickly that we are capable humanly of understanding and helping each other. In the world of politics, ideological discourse, and even in the church, we find ourselves explaining others in our terms, setting conditions for their relation with us, picking and choosing friends and colleagues by whether they conform to our expectations. Perhaps we cannot totally transcend this, but we ought at least to try. How then do we speak and listen to God with our fellow believers in China? Let me explore the answer under three categories of prayer.

1980

1. Thanksgiving and Praise

All worship begins with praise to God. Even when we cannot see the ways of his working, it is an act of faith to place ourselves and our world with confidence in his hands. But in China today we have a clear and special reason to rejoice and give thanks. For all the past thirty years, and most wonderfully during the past fifteen, God has not been left without witnesses in China. He has preserved and deepened his church in the knowledge of his presence and promise in Jesus Christ. The Spirit has been at work, even when no open witness or public worship has been possible. Communities of Christian believers have held together and strengthened each other even when they could have no knowledge of fellow Christians in other parts of China doing the same. I propose we start by thanking God for the church of Jesus Christ in China, in all its variety, in its different (sometimes even opposing) expressions, despite its isolation and through its suffering and its faith.

It is not a matter of course that the church survives in any particular place or time. The powerful church of northern Africa--the church of Cyprian and Augustine--was wiped out by the Muslim invasion. Whole areas of western Asia, once Christian, have been left without witness to the faith until modern times. Twice before in China--by the Nestorians in the Tang Dynasty, and by the Roman Catholics led by John of Montecorvino during the Yuan--Christianity had been planted in China and had disappeared. The awful lesson which the leaders of China's Three Self Movement have been impressing upon us was evident in all these cases. When the Christian church and its mission are identified with the power of another culture and society--Roman, Turkic, Mongol, or Euro-American--and the Gospel does not penetrate the heart and culture of a people, then Christian faith does not survive the next tidal wave of political and social power to engulf that people.

We are well aware of the role which foreign power played in the Christian mission to China during the nineteenth and twentieth centuries. Despite the sincere motives of our missionary forebears and colleagues--and who is to say that the motives of Montecorvino and the Tang Nestorians were not just as sincere?--, the sin of imperialism could easily have destroyed the church.

By the grace of God this did not happen. During the last two years we have seen miraculous evidence that deep in the heart and soul of Chinese people themselves the Triune God has been at work, that there has been worship, faithfulness, love, witness, all along, and that now when it is permitted the people pour out to worship God together in public. The skeptics have all been confounded: the conservatives who argued that Three Self and house-church Christians would not trust one another, and that a church existed only under persecution; leaders of the Three Self Movement themselves, who expressed doubts to foreign visitors only two years ago that the church in China would revive and grow; and the Marxist ideologues, who looked forward to the withering away of the church along with all religion. Instead of all that, we find Christians surging out of their seclusion, finding each other across all the barriers which a century of foreign influence and thirty years of recent history had created between them.

One could illustrate this with hundreds of incidents, which many of you have read or personally experienced. Let me focus our thanksgiving, however, by quoting just one such story. It is told by Roy Branson, a Seventh Day Adventist who traveled with the Kennedy Institute team to China last fall. He learned just two hours beforehand from Adventist pastor Xu Hua of the thanksgiving church service to be held in the More Memorial Church in Shanghai, and with Paul Lauby attended it.

Although we did not have invitations, Dr. Lauby and I were still warmly welcomed into the gothic sanctuary. As we were gently hurried down the right aisle, Dr. Lauby and I could see that we were the only non-Chinese in attendance. We quickly discovered that over a thousand people had more than filled the main floor and balcony. An extra wooden bench was placed next to one of the already filled pews by a middle-aged man who insisted on sitting behind a pillar so that I could see the platform. Behind me a young man who spoke a little English identified the four men in their seventies sitting on the platform. He indicated the denomination with which each participant had been affiliated: the Methodist minister offered the welcome and benediction, the Presbyterian pastor read the scriptural lesson, the clergyman from The Little Flock (an indigenous Chinese church) gave the pastoral prayer, and a Baptist pastor preached the sermon.

On the left of the platform a man in his late twenties played an ancient upright piano. The congregation was predominantly over 55 years of age, but many young married couples were also in attendance. As in any church around the world, teenagers and young adults had found their way to the balcony. To my left, above the balcony, were three large gothic windows. Rocks had smashed huge holes through each of them.

For the congregation the most fervent part of the service was the opening prayer. To my right, my benchmate swayed, his head tilted back, weeping, occasionally joining others in responding aloud. I still remained the sympathetic observer. But when the congregation swept into "Holy, Holy, Holy" and "Joyful, Joyful, We Adore Thee," I became a fellow worshiper, sharing the congregation's emotion and tears. It was easy to believe in that moment that even if the Christian minority played an obscure role in public events, Christianity could never be eradicated from the fabric of Chinese life.

According to a later translation of his recorded remarks, the Baptist preacher gave a rather traditional sermon, including the admonition that God's unconditioned love should be demonstrated in not just religious exercises, but everyday life. It was announced that the next week a former Presbyterian Church would be opened. Others would follow, until five Protestant churches would be reopened in Shanghai. After the congregation sang "Love Divine," and heard the closing prayer, the congregation began chatting excitedly to one another. They had attended Shanghai's first public Christian worship service in thirteen years.

Methodist, Presbyterian, Baptist, Adventist, and Little Flock. Leaders from the Three Self Movement, and people from all kinds of house churches in other communities. Old people and young people. All of these gathered to praise God and rejoice in each other's fellowship, looking forward to a new and open life by the Christians in China. Thank God.

This having been said, let me venture two further definitions of our thanksgiving.

First, it is thanksgiving for the whole church of Jesus Christ in China in all its expressions and in all its parts. God does not allow us to pick and choose, to include this group and exclude that. What determines our prayers is not our human judgment, whether Chinese or foreign, of the past performance or present attitudes of Christians. It is rather the judgment which God in Jesus Christ has passed on all of us, and the grace by which he is building his Kingdom as he forgives and guides those who confess his name.

Let us then give thanks for those who organized and led the Three Self Movement through the years of its varying fortunes to its present position as agent and advocate of the church's revival: for Y. T. Wu, for K. H. Ting, for Kiang Wen Han, for Chao Fu San, and for many others whom we are only now getting to know. Let us give thanks for the leaders of the church in China who brought it into the present period and who have suffered such varying fates during the past generation: for T. C. Chao, for Y. Y. Tsu, for Robin Chen, for H.H. Tsui, for Luther Shao, for T.H. Sun, and many, many others. Let us give thanks for those pietist groups with whose theology most of us differ and whose exclusiveness has been such a problem for us, but who also have weathered pressure and persecution and borne their witness: for the Little Flock and the Jesus Family; for Wang Ming Tao; for Watchman Ni; and for all the groups, charismatic or otherwise, who over the past generation have called on the name of Christ out of this tradition. Let us thank God for martyrs of the church, those who suffered in the fifties and those who suffered more recently under the Cultural Revolution and the Gang of Four. Let us thank God for all the Christians who kept the prayers and the fellowship of the Christian community going over these many years, and who now emerge with an amazing display of unity to continue Christ's work in China,

Second, to give thanks to God for the witness of the church is also to give thanks through and with that church for his work in Chinese society as a whole. This defines both the scope and the context of our prayer. Many things have happened in socialist China of the past generation for which we ought quite simply to praise God. A period of peace and order has followed decades of chaos and civil war. A unified and independent country has stood up to throw off the dividing and exploiting influences of foreign imperialism. A greater economic security and equality has replaced intolerable contrasts of poverty and wealth. And now we see a new opening of Chinese society to religious pluralism, ideological moderation, and more open dialogue among different points of view. Different groups of western Christians have in the past few years made contrasting mistakes in their attitude toward all this. Both have been based on the same error: to imagine that one could interpret events in China from some European, American, or other Asian point of view, then pick and choose among the Christian witnesses in China itself to determine the content of one's prayers. On the one side there have been those whose praise to God for the human progress of the People's Republic of China has treated the church there as simply irrelevant. On the other side, there have been those who have given thanks only for the witness of an allegedly persecuted church in a society supposedly beyond the reach of divine Providence and grace.

In contrast to both of these, I am suggesting that the way we give thanks to God for the world in China must be guided by an openness to his Word in Scripture and a sensitive listening to the whole experience of our Chinese fellow Christians. The art we need to learn is to give thanks to God for his work, beyond the social ideologies and political powers which suggest other standards and objects for our gratitude.

2. Confession

This leads us to the other movements of prayer--confession and intercession. First, what have we to confess which will guide our repentance in the service of God's mission in our relation to China? I would like to put this in the present rather than the past tense, for two reasons. First, to recite continually the litany of our past involvement in the sins of imperialism, cultural pride, and social insensitivity when new realities call us, is an expression of disbelief in the Resurrection, as if Peter had gone right on weeping bitterly through the day of Pentecost. It is also divisive because there are those who still would justify the past on the one hand, or who would misuse the past to define our sins according to their standards rather than God's on the other.

Second, to dwell on repentance for sins in a now long past era can be a form of escapism. We are now involved with Chinese and all other Christians in the mission to this world. It is our present response to that mission which we need to examine.

This having been said, let me suggest five points of self-examination appropriate especially to us American Christians as we repentantly prepare for present and future relations with China and with the church there.

(a) We have not finished coping with the way in which the exercise of human power may distort the mission of God. This is an old, even an ancient, problem, but it is still with us. We can be grateful that the leaders of the Three Self Movement are alert and firm in preventing any foreign domination from coming into the life of the church in China. We can be grateful that the government of the People's Republic is equally firm about the influence of any foreign power in its society as a whole. But there is an element of earthly power in all relationships. The object of this power may be beneficent and humane--the strengthening of health care services, the improvement of university

scholarship, the cultivation of trade, or the strengthening of mutual security, for example--but these powers are still secular and human, not divine. As we relate ourselves to China with their help and under their auspices, Jesus' advice to his disciples on their first missionary journey to be as wise as serpents and as harmless as doves is still appropriate. We need to ask ourselves the question, With what powers are we now involved? How can we be wise about them, in order that through the harmlessness of our witness we may undermine the harm they may do because of the element of human sin in even the most creditable projects?

Specifically this means a repentant self-examination about the way we seek both to evangelize and serve. A recent Hong Kong Chinese visitor to the church in China was right in emphasizing that the task of evangelism is given to the whole church for the whole world. Therefore one must not exclude the participation of foreigners in the proclaiming of the Gospel in any country, whether that country be China or America. When the open letter of the Three Self Movement condemns foreign "evangelism," I take it they are not opposing this fundamental calling but rather the mixture of evangelism with an element of foreign power, even though that power be only a few dollars or the kilowatts of a radio station. We need constantly to be examining ourselves to discern the difference between the power of the Spirit and the power of a human activity. Similarly, with regard to service, we need to watch this mixture. It would be far too easy for American Christian institutions to get into China under the auspices of various secular projects, with the blessing of the governments both of the People's Republic of China and the United States of America, only then to become the servants of those powers rather than of God. We cannot disentangle ourselves from human power, but we can and we must repent of it and bear witness to the way God subjects it in Christ to himself.

(b) We are still learning how to treat China--and indeed many other countries--not as an object of investigation and analysis but as a society of people with whom we are bound by mutual ties. There is still too much of the spirit of "research" which the Three Self Movement's open letter condemned, among us. China-watching and analysis continues to be important. Such a big and complex country cannot be understood from one point of view or by one group of interpreters. But there is an understanding whose purpose is to control an object, and there is another understanding whose goal is to deepen relationships. At this point too we need constant self-examination and repentance.

(c) We are still beset by our tendency to divide the forces at work in China into the good and the bad, to idealize the one and to demonize the other. We do it in both conservative and liberal forms. The bad Communists versus the persecuted church, on the one side, is matched by the bad reactionaries versus the progressive forces of the people's socialism, on the other. Events of the last two years have exploded all these simplistic categories. It is we who now must learn to repent of our tendency to label whole classes of people who differ ideologically from ourselves and to explain them by those labels. In God's world there are no simply evil forces, nor any without sin. There is no person or group for whom he does not have something in mind or who is beyond the power of his reconciliation.

(d) We continually, almost instinctively, tend to reduce the promise of God for the world to some form of human achievement, experience, or system. Here in another way our human absolutes take the place of confidence in his redeeming grace. The test of God's saving goodness is not a human experience of being healed by faith, speaking with tongues, or being born again. It is not the new spirit and social achievements of the People's Republic of China.

It is not the new openness and pluralism which have followed the defeat of the Gang of Four. It is not the growth of the church in China, nor would it be the successful Christianization of the entire country. These are all human achievements. As human, they may be blessed by God. They must also be judged and redeemed by him. When we forget this--as we so often do--we have no Gospel for the people when human achievements fail.

(e) We are not careful enough in discerning signs of the Kingdom of God in human affairs. We have not been careful enough to do so in our intercession for China. I refer here to an attitude which is hard to learn: that of discerning how divine grace transforms human actions and by blessing them makes them something which they could not be in themselves, seeing them in a way that they could not understand by themselves. We have been and we still are tempted to be much too simple in our judgment of the realities of China. We need to learn more subtly how God is praised by sinful people, Christian or non-Christian, Chinese or American, in ways that transform their actions and their self-understanding.

3. Intercession

This leads us to the third dimension of prayer. In the tradition of the church it has become the most critical and the most difficult. How does one rightly pray for someone else? One cannot do so without bringing the whole scope of one's human understanding to bear upon the prayer. It is real human beings in their whole social context for whom we ask God's guidance and help. How then does one avoid distorting the prayer with one's own ideas and evaluations of other people? In Nazi Germany during the war, the Confessing Church prayed regularly for lists of pastors and church members who were imprisoned for their faith. But Dietrich Bonhoeffer was not on that list. In the judgment of the church of that time, he was suffering for a political action

which was not deemed to be a Christian witness. For years there were in the Roman Catholic Church two programs for the Week of Prayer for Christian Unity-- one prepared by the Abbé Couturier of France, in which Protestant and Orthodox could join, and another which prayed for the conversion of Protestants and of Orthodox along with Jews, secularists, and adherents of other religions. How does one properly pray for and with the church in China?

I suggest a basic principle in response to this question, and three particular expressions of it. Intercessory prayer is a three-way relationship-- between the God who reveals himself to us in Christ, the persons or groups for whom we pray, and ourselves who offer the prayer. The whole relationship is controlled by God and not by us or them. It is to the biblical story that we must first go for guidance and correction of our relationships with each other. It is from there that the meaning and direction of the social context in which we are all involved today is illuminated. Intercessory prayer depends first on listening to God the Spirit interpreting Scripture, and letting that Word give shape to our hopes and concerns for others today. In this context I suggest that our prayers for China, and presumably the prayers of our Chinese fellow-believers for us, involve a threefold discernment.

(a) Discernment of the dialogical relation with those for whom we pray. This discernment is not simple. Chinese culture and society remain today profoundly different from our own. We have had long experience in misunderstanding one another. Even in our attempts to understand, we have tended to impose our categories of Christian experience, of political witness, of social progress, freedom and justice in trying to understand and evaluate their human situation. Or, in our efforts to compensate for these distortions we have often simply accepted their categories--of nationhood, of social revolution, and of the common good--without penetrating to the human realities behind them.

We should not assume too quickly that even yet we are, in human terms, in true dialogue with one another.

Furthermore, we face the problem of relating to different people with different experiences in ways that respect their integrity, seek their justice, and relate them to a judging and reconciling God. Our effort to intercede at the same time for the people of Taiwan and the people of China is an obvious example. But also within China itself we are only beginning to re-establish the variety of relationships which should inform our prayers.

In all of this the human task of intercessory prayer is to listen and respond to the others for whom we pray. This means listening not only to what is said but to the context in which it is said and to the dialogue that takes place through relationships of which words are only one part. It means being sensitive to the divine-human drama that involves us both with Christ as we inform and give ourselves to each other. Intercession needs a growing matrix of human relations of this kind.

(b) Intercession involves on the human level a disciplined effort on our part to understand the Marx-Lenin-Maoist ideology and reality of Chinese society, just as it involves on their part a new effort to understand the forces and ideas of the society in which we live. Thank God Karl Marx at one point was wrong. For Christians at least, social existence does not wholly determine consciousness. But neither is it irrelevant to the self-understanding of Christians in different societies, or to God's purposes for them. Part of our intercession is to relate that reality to God. This means an inner participation in the struggle of the Chinese people for social development in the context of equality in socialist community. It means a discriminating understanding of the place and limits of human freedom in a socialist society. It means a discreet engagement with Marxist ideology, including its Chinese form. I say discreet, because it is Chinese Christians and not we who must live with

that ideology every day. I say engagement, because we in the non-Chinese world are not without experience in Marxist societies and critical appreciation of some Marxist insights. Finally, this involves raising the question with God about his purpose for a society dominated by a Marxist ideology. We have been promised in Scripture that every tongue will confess that Jesus Christ is Lord to the glory of God the Father, and that the principalities and powers of this world will be subjected to him. In the light of this, what may we hope for the conversion not only of Marxists but of Marxism, and what does this mean for the witness of the Christian community throughout the world including China? This is a question the answer to which we must seek together, and a hope for which we must learn to pray in union with one another.

(c) Our intercession for the church in China finally involves a continually deepening discernment of ourselves in the light of their witness. We are praying not simply for them but for the whole church ecumenical in its mission to the world. This whole includes ourselves. God is redefining the church in America through its relation with the church in China and elsewhere in the world. A proper intercession involves continuing reflection on the question of our gifts, our ministry, and our mission. It involves being redefined as a church in America by the Holy Spirit through the ministry of Chinese Christians to us. This has social dimensions. It casts a special light on the whole structure of the political and economic witness of American churches. We are now in dialogue with Chinese Christians among others concerning the way we exercise this. It has ecclesiological dimensions. What does the emerging reality of a Chinese church, as we pray expectantly for it, say to us in our divided institutional Christianity which so uncritically reflects the culture in which it is set? It has profoundly communal and personal dimensions. Who can place him- or herself by prayer within the context of our Chinese Christian brothers and sisters without hearing the

call to a more sacrificing, a more disciplined, and a more hopeful Christian life also here at home?

We belong together in this three-way dialogue. If we are faithful to it, all our earthly absolutes and all our self-defenses on both sides will crumble before a transforming relationship which will prophesy to both worlds in which we live. This is what happens when we take prayer seriously.