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CASSELL’S NATIONAL LIBRARY

“HE ADVANCEMENT
IF LEARNING

Volumes of the New Series of

CASSELL’S NATIONAL LIBRARY.

With Introductions by Professor Henry

Morley, L. F. Austin,

A. D. Innes, Sir Henry Irving, Austin Dobson, A. T. Quiller-
Couch, Tighe Hopkins, C. Lewis Hind, Neil Munro, G. K.
Chesterton, Frank Mathew, Stuart J. Reid, William Archer,

Herbert Paul, &c.

x1.—Silas Marner—George Eliot.

2.—A Sentimental Journey—L. Sterne.

3-—Richard II].—Shakespeare.

4.-—Browning’s Poems—(Selection).

5.—On Heroes and Hero Worship—
Carlyle.

6.—A Christmas Carol and the Chimes
—Charles Dickens.

7.—The Vicar of Wakefield—Gold-
smith.

8.—Macbeth—Shakespeare.

ag Net eae Diary—(Reign of Charles

)

1o.—Johnson’s Rasselas.

1r.—The Four Georges—W. M.
Thackeray.

12.—Julius Caesar—Shakespeare.

13.—Tennyson’s Poems— (Selection).

14.—The Merchant of Venice—Shake-

speare. ’ :
1s.—Edgar Allan Poe's Tales—(Selec-
tion).
16.—The Lady
Walter Scott.
17.—Emerson’s Essays—(Selection).
18.—Hamlet—Shakespeare, ;
19.—Goldsmith’s Plays.
20.—Burns’s Poems—(Selection).
2t.—Much Ado about Nothing—Shake-
speare.
22,—Bunyan’s Pilgrim’s Progress.
23.—Sheridan's Plays: ‘‘ The Rivals”
and “‘ The Schoo! for Scandal.”’
24.—Macauiay’s Lays of Ancient Rome.
25.—Nathaniel Hawthorne's Tales.
26.—Tweltth Night—Shake.peare.
27.—Horace Walpole’s Letters—(Selec-
tion).
28.—Marmion—Sir Walter Scott.
29.—The Tempest—Shakespeare.
30.—Southey’s Lite of Nelson.
31.—The Cricket on the Hearth—
Charles Dickens.
gt aera a 8 ip
33.—Steele and Addison’s Sir Roger
de Coverley.
34.—A Midsummer-Night’s. Dream—
Shakespeare.
35.—Carlyle on Uurns and Scott.
30.—Milton’s Paradise Lost—I.
37-—Milton’s Paradise Lost—II.
38.—Macaulay’s Warren Hastings.
39.—As You Like It—Shakespeare.

of the Lake —Sir

40.—Childe Harold’s Pilgrimage—Lord
Byron

41.—King Lear—Shakespeare.
42.—!sacon’s Essays.
43. —Utopia—Sir Thomas More.
44.—Romeo and Juliet—Shakespeare.
45.—Coimplete Angler—Isaac Walton.
46.—Haklyyt’s Discovery of Muscovy.
47.—Carlyle's Sartor Resartus.
48.—King John—Shakespeare.
49.—The Memorable Thoughts of
Socrates.
50.—Burleigh, &c.—Macaulay.
51.—Burke’s Thoughts on the Present
Discontents. |
52.—Tales from
Boccaccio.
53.-—Henry V.—Shakespeare.
54.—Essays and Tales—Addison.
55.-—Merry Wives of Windsor—Shake-
speare.
56.—Essays of Elia—Charles Lamb.
57-—Areopagitica— Milton.
58.—The Battle of Lite —CharlesDickens.
59.—V oyages and Travels— Marco Polo.
60.—-Grace Abounding—John Bunyan.
61.—The Winter’s Tale—Shakespeare.
62.—Hazlitt’s Essays.
63.—Henry VIII.—Shakespeare.
64.—Dryden’s Poems.
65.-—-Bacon’s Wisdom of the Ancients.
66.—Prometheus Unbound—Shelley.
67.—Burke’s Essays on the Sublime
and Beautiful.
68.—The Comedy of Errors—Shake-
speare.
69.— Wordsworth’s Poems—(Selection).
70.—-Milton’s Earlier Poems.

the Decameron—

71.—Love’s Labour’s Lost—Shakespeare, —

72.—Old Age and Friendship —Cicero.
73-—The Sorrows of Werter—Goethe.
74.—Coriolanus—Shakespeare.
75.—Banquet of Plato—Shelley.
76.—Battle of the Books—Swift.
77.—Clive—Macaulay.

78.—Henry IV., Part I.—Shakespeare.
79.—Henry IV., Part II.—Shakespeare.
80.—Steele’s Essays and Tales.

81.—The Lay ot the Last Minstrel—

Sir Walter Scott.
82.—Table Talk—Cowper.
83. Richard III.—Shakespeare.

84.—Advancement of Learning—Bacon.

“ A new form of Messrs. Cassell’s ‘ National Library,’ which is an

improvement on the old in every way, and should be a great success, —

The binding in particular is both decorative and tasteful.” —A theneum.
‘The volumes are neatly bound in cloth, clearly printed, and the’
price a mere sixpence.
British Classics, but none more handy or more adequate than these
excellent little volumes.” —A cademy.
‘A marvel of cheapness. There is nothing so good at the price
in the book market.”—Daily Mail,

CASSELL & COMPANY, LIMITED, London; Faris, New York & Melbourne.

a

here are many series of reprints of ©

mE gee

BACON’S MONUMENT,
ST. MICHAEL’S CHURCH, ST. ALBANS.

84

|} By

| FRANCIS BACON

a
a

With an Introduction by
HENRY MORLEY

CASSELL AND COMPANY, LIMITED
LONDON, PARIS, NEW YORK

AND MELBOURNE. MCMyYy
All Rights Reserved

a A EO =

INTRODUCTION.

f

4
~

“THE Tyvvoo Bookes of Francis Bacon. Of the pro-
ficience and aduancement of Learning, divine and
humane. To the King. At London. Printed for
Henrie Tomes, and are to be sould at his shop at
Graies Inne Gate in Holborne. 1605.” That was the
original title-page of the book now in the reader’s
hand—a living book that led the way to a new world of
thought. It was the book in which Bacon, early in
the reign of James the First, prepared the way for a
full setting forth of his New Organon, or instrument
of knowledge.

The Organon of Aristotle was a set of treatises in
which Aristotle had written the doctrine of proposi-
tions. Study of these treatises was a chief occupation
of young men when they passed from school to college,
and proceeded from Grammar to Logic, the second of
the Seven Sciences. Francis Bacon as a youth of
‘sixteen, at Trinity College, Cambridge, felt the
-unfruitfulness of this method of search after truth.
“He was the son of Sir Nicholas Bacon, Queen
' Elizabeth’s Lord Keeper, and was born at York House,
in the Strand, on the 22nd of January, 1561. His
‘mother was the Lord Keeper’s second wife, one of
two sisters, of whom the other married Sir William
‘Cecil, afterwards Lord Burleigh. Sir Nicholas Bacon

6 INTRODUCTION.

had six children by his former marriage, and by his
second wife two sons, Antony and Francis, of whom
Antony was about two years the elder. The family
home was at York Place, and at Gorhambury, near St.
Albans, from which town, in its ancient and its
modern style, Bacon afterwards took his titles of
Verulam and St. Albans.

Antony and Francis Bacon went together to Trinity
College, Cambridge, when Antony was fourteen years
old and Francis twelve. Francis remained at Cam-
bridge only until his sixteenth year; and Dr. Rawley,
his chaplain in after-years, reports of him that “ whilst
he was commorant in the University, about sixteen —
years of age (as his lordship hath been pleased to im-
part unto myself),he first fell into dislike of the philo-
sophy of Aristotle; not for the worthlessness of the
author, to whom he would ascribe all high attributes,
but for the unfruitfulness of the way, being a philo-
sophy (as his lordship used to say) only strong for
disputations and contentions, but barren of the pro-—
duction of works for the benefit of the life of man; in-
which mind he continued to his dying day.’ Bacon
was sent as a youth of sixteen to Paris with the ambas-
sador Sir Amyas Paulet, to begin his training for the
publie service; but his father’s death, in February,
1579, before he had completed the provision he was
making for his youngest children, obliged him to
return to London, and, at the age of eighteen, to settle
down at Gray’s Inn to the study of law as a profession.
He was admitted to the outer bar in June, 1582, and
about that time, at the age of twenty-one, wrote a

INTRODUCTION. 7

sketch of his conception of a New Organon that should
lead man to more fruitful knowledge, in a little Latin
tract, which he called “Temporis Partus Maximus ”
(‘‘ The Greatest Birth of Time”).

In November, 1584, Bacon took his seat in the House
of Commons as member for Meleombe Regis, in Dor-
setshire. In October, 1586, he sat for Taunton. He
was member afterwards for Liverpool; and he was
one of those who petitioned for the speedy exeeution
of Mary Queen of Scots. In October, 1589, he ob-
tained the reversion of the office of Clerk of the
Council in the Star Chamber, which was worth £1,600
or £2,000 a year; but for the succession to this office
he had to wait until 1608. It had not yet fallen to
him when he wrote his “Two Books of the Advauce-
ment of Learning.” In the Parliament that met in
February, 1593, Bacon sat as member for Middlesex.
He raised difficulties of procedure in the way of the
grant of a treble subsidy, by just objection to the joining
of the Lords with the Commons in a money grant, and
a desire to extend the time allowed for payment from
three years to six; it was, in fact, extended to four
years. The Queen was offended. Francis Bacon and
his brother Antony had attached themselves to the
young Earl of Essex, who was their friend and patron.
The office of Attorney-General became vacant. Essex
asked the Queen to appoint Francis Bacon. The
Queen gave the office to Sir Edward Coke, who was
already Solicitor-General, and by nine years Bacon’s
senior. The office of Solicitor-General thus became
vacant, and that was sought for Francis Bacon. The

§ INTRODUCTION.

Queen, after delay and hesitation, gave it, in November,
1595, to Serjeant Fleming. The Earl of Essex con-
soled his friend by giving him “a piece of land”—
Twickenham Park—which Bacon afterwards sold for
£1,800—equal, say, to £12,000 in present buying power.
In 1597 Bacon was returned to Parliament as member
for Ipswich, and in that year he was hoping to marry the
rich widow of Sir William Hatton, Essex helping; but
the lady married, in the next year, Sir Edward Coke. It
was in 1597 that Bacon published the First Edition of
his Essays. That wasa little book containing only ten
essays in English, with twelve “ Meditationes Sacre,”
which were essays in Latin on religious subjects.
From 1597 onward to the end of his life, Bacon’s
Essays were subject to continuous addition and
revision. The author’s Second Edition, in which the
number of the Essays was increased from ten to thirty-
eight, did not appear until November or December,
1612, seven years later than these two books on the
«Advancement of Learning; ” and the final edition ©
of the Essays, in which their number was increased _
from thirty-eight to fifty-eight, appeared only in 1625;
and Bacon died on the 9th of April, 1626. The edition
of the Essays published in 1597, under Elizabeth,
marked only the beginning of a course of thought
that afterwards flowed in one stream with his teachings
in philosophy.

In Febraary, 1601, there was the rebellion of Essex.
Francis Bacon had separated himself from his patron
after giving him advice that was disregarded. Bacon, |
now Queen’s Counsel, not only appeared against his |

INTRODUCTION. 9

old friend, but with excess of zeal, by which, perhaps,
he hoped to win back the Queen’s favour, he twice
obtruded violent attacks upon Essex when he was not
called upon to speak. On the 25th of February, 1601,
Essex was beheaded. The genius of Bacon was next
employed to justify that act by “A Declaration of
the Practices and Treasons attempted and committed
by Robert late Earle of Essex and his Complices.”
But James of Scotland, on whose behalf Hssex had
intervened, came to the throne by the death of Eliza-
beth on the 24th of March, 1603. Bacon was among the
crowd of men who were made knights by James I., and
he had to justify himself under the new order of things
by writing “ Sir Francis Bacon his Apologie in certain
Imputations concerning the late Earle of Essex.” He
was returned to the first Parliament of James I. by
Ipswich and St. Albans, and he was confirmed in his
office of King’s Counsel in August, 1604; but he was
not appointed to the office of Solicitor-General when it
became vacant in that year.

That was the position of Francis Bacon in 1605, when
he published this work, where in his First Book he

pointed out the discredits of learning from human
defects of the learned, and emptiness of many of the /

studies chosen, or the way of dealing with them. This

_ came, he said, especially by the mistaking or misplacing

of the last or furthest end of knowledge, as if there wera
sought in it “a couch whereupon to rest a searching

and restless spirit; or a terrace for a wandering and
_ variable mind to walk up and down with a fair pros-
_ pect; or a tower of state for a proud mind to raise

A*—84

~

10 INTRODUCTION.

itself upon; or a fort or commanding ground for strife
and contention; or a shop for profit or sale; and not
a rich storehouse for the glory of the Creator and the
relief of man’s estate.” The rest of the First Book
was given to an argument upon the Dignity of Learn-
ing; and the Second Book, on the Advancement of
Learning, is, as Bacon himself described it, “a general
and faithful perambulation of learning, with an in-
quiry what parts thereof lie fresh and waste, and not
improved and converted by the industry of man; to
the end that such a plot made and recorded to memory
may both minister light to any public designation and
also serve to excite voluntary endeavours.” Bacon
makes, by a sort of exhaustive aualysis, a ground-plan
of all subjects of study, as an intellectual map, helping
the right inquirer in his search for the right path.
The right path is that by which he has the best chance
of adding to the stock of knowledge in the world some-
thing worth labouring for; and the true worth is in
labour for “the glory of the Creator and the relief of
man’s estate.”

H. M.

THE
FIRST BOOK OF FRANCIS BACON;

OF THE PROFICIENCE AND

ADVANCEMENT OF LEARNING,

DIVINE AND HUMAN,

—-——-*#&«>e

To the King.

THERE were under the law, excellent King, both daily
sacrifices and freewill offerings; the one proceeding upon
ordinary observance, the other upon a devout cheerfulness: in
_ like manner there belongeth to kings from their servants both
_ tribute of duty and presents of affection. In the former of
__ these I hope I shall not live to be wanting, according to my
most humble duty and the good pleasure of your Majesty's
_ employments: for the latter, I thought it more respective to
_ make choice of some oblation which might rather refer to the
_ propriety and excellency of your individual person, than to
' the business of your crown and state.

_ Wherefore, representing your Majesty many times unto
_ my mind, and beholding you not with the inquisitive eye of
_ presumption, to discover that which the Scripture telleth me
4s inscrutable, but with the observant eye of duty and admira-
_tion, leaving aside the other parts of your virtue and fortune,
Lhave-been.touched—yea, and possessed—with. an.extreme
wonder at those. your virtues and faculties, which the pbilo-
Sophers call intellectual ; the-largeness of your. capacity, the
faithfulness of your memory, the swiftness of your apprehen-

12 THE ADVANCEMENT OF LEARNING.

original notions (which by the strangeness and darkness of this
tabernacle of the body are sequestered) again revived and
restored: such a light of Nature I have observed in your
Majesty, and such a readisiess to take flame and blaze from the
least occasion presented, or the least spark of another’s know-
ledge delivered. And as the Scripture saith of the wisest king,
‘*That his heart was as th: sands of the sea;” which, though
it be one of the largest bodies, yet it consisteth of the smallest
and finest portions; so hath God given your Majesty a com-
position of understanding admirable, being able to compass
and comprehend the greatest matters, and nevertheless to
touch and apprehend the least ; whereas it should seem an
impossibility in Nature for the same instrument to make itself
fit for great and small works. And for your gift of speech, I
call to mind what Cornelius Tacitus saith of Augustus Cesar :
Augusto profluens, et que principem deceret, eloquentia fuit.
For if we note it well, speech that is uttered with labour and
difficulty, or speech that savoureth of the affectation of art and
precepts, or speech that is framed after the imitation of some
pattern of eloquence, though never so excellent ; all this hath
somewhat servile, and holding of the subject. But your
Majesty’s manner of speech is, indeed, prince-like, flowing as
from a fountain, and yet streaming and branching itself into
Nature’s order, full of facility and felicity, imitating none, and
inimitable by any. And as in your civil estate there appeareth —
to be an emulation and contention of your Majesty’s virtue
with your fortune; a virtuous disposition with a fortunate
regiment ; a virtuous expectation (when time was) of your
greater fortune, with a prosperous possession thereof in the
due time ; a virtuous observation of the laws of mairiage, with

and perfection of your learning. For Iam well assured that
this which I shall say is no amplification at all, but a positive
and measured truth ; which is, that there hath not been since
Christ’s time any king or temporal monarch which hath been
so learned in all literature and erudition, divine and human.
For let a man seriously and diligently revolve and jeruse the
succession of the Emperors of Rome, of which Cesar the
Dictator (who lived some years before Christ) avd Marcus
Antoninus were the best learned, and so descend to the
Emperors of Grecia, or of the West, and then to the lines of

THE FIRST BOOK, 13

France, Spain, England, Scotland, daa the rest, and he shall
find this judgment is truly made. * For it seemeth much ina
king if, by the compendious extractions of other men’s wits and
labours, he can take hold of any superficial ornaments and
shows of learning, or if he countenance and prefer learning
and learned men ; but to drink, indeed, of the true fountains
of learning—nay, to have such a fountain of learning in him-
| self, in a king, and ina king born—is almost a miracle. And
the more, because there is met in your Majesty a rare conjunc-
tion, as well of divine and sacred literature as of profane and
human ; so as your Majesty standeth invested of that triplicity,
which in great veneration was ascribed to the ancient Hermes :
the power and fortune of a king, the knowledge and illumina-
tion of a priest, and the learning and universality of a philo-
sopher. This propriety inherent and individual attribute in
your Majesty deserveth to be expressed not only in the fame
and admiration of the present time, nor in the history or tradi-
tion of the ages succeeding, but also in some solid work, fixed
memorial, and immortal monument, bearing a character or
signature both of the power of a king and the difference and
- perfection of such a king.

Therefore I did conclude with myself that I could not make
unto your Majesty a better oblation than of some treatise
tending to that end, whereof the sum will consist of these two
parts: the former concerning the excellency of learning and
knowledge, and the excellency of the merit and true glory in
the augmentation and propagation thereof; the latter, what
the particular acts and works are which have been embraced
and undertaken for the advancement of learning ; and again,
what defects and undervalues I find in such particular acts: to
the end that though I cannot positively or affirmatively advise
your Majesty, or propound unto you framed particulars, yet I
may excite your princely cogitations to visit the excellent
treasure of your own mind, and thence to extract particulars
for this purpose agreeable to your magnanimity and wisdom.

I. (1) In the entrance to the former of these—to clear the
way and, as it were, to make silence, to have the true_testi-
monies concerning the.dignity.of learning to be better heard,

Le
~

_ in the errors and imperfections of learned men themselves.
f (2) I hear the former sort say that knowledge is of those

without the interruption of tacit objections—I think good to
_ deliver it from the discredits and disgraces which it hath re-
_ ceived, all from ignorance, but ignorance severally disguised ;
*} appearing sometimes in the zeal and jealousy of divines, some-
' _ times in the severity and arrogancy of politics, and sometimes

,

|

14 THE ADVANCEMENT OF LEARNING.

things which are to be accepted of with great limitation and
caution ; that the aspiring to overmuch aoe edge was the
original temptation and sin whereupon ensued the fall of man;
that knowledge hath in_it somewhat of the serpent, and,
therefore, where it entereth into a man it makes him swell 5
Scientia inflat ; that Solomon gives a censure, ‘‘That there is
no end of making books, and that much reading is weariness of
the flesh;” and again in another place, ‘That in spacious
knowledge there is much contristation, and that he that
increaseth knowledge increaseth anxiety ;” that Saint Paul
gives a caveat, ‘‘That we be not spoiled through vain philo-
sophy ;” that experience demonstrates how learned men have
been arch-heretics, how learned times have been inclined to
atheism, and how the contemplation of second causes doth
derogate from our dependence upon God, who is the first cause.

(3) To discover, then, the ignorance and error of this opinion,
and the misunderstanding in the grounds thereof, it may well
appear these men do not observe or consider that it was not
the pure knowledge of Nature and universality, a knowledge
by the light whereof man did give names unto other creatures
in Paradise as they were brought before him according unto ©
their proprieties, which gave the occasion to the fall; but it
was the proud knowledge of good and evil, with an intent in
man to give law unto himself, and to depend no more upon
God’s commandments, which was the form of the temptation.
Neither is it any quantity of knowledge, how great soever, that
can make the mind of man to swell; for nothing can fill, much
less extend the soul of man, but God and the contemplation of
God; and, therefore, Solomon, speaking of the two principal
senses of inquisition, the eye and the ear, affirmeth that the
eye is never satisfied with seeing, nor the ear with hearing ;
and if there be no fulness, then is the continent greater than
the content: so of knowledge itself and the mind of man,
whereto the senses are but reporters, he defineth likewise in
these words, placed after that calendar or ephemerides which
he maketh of the diversities of times and seasons for all actions
and purposes, and concludeth thus : “God hath made all
things beautiful, or decent, in the true return of their seasons.
Also He hath placed the world in man’s heart, yet cannot man
find out the work which God worketh from the beginning to
the end ”—declaring not obscurely that God hath framed the
mind of man as a mirror or glass, capable of the image of the
universal world, and joyful to receive the impression thereof,
as the eye joyeth to receive light ; and not only delighted in —
beholding the variety of things and vicissitude of times, but a

THE FIRST BOOK. 15

raised also to find out and discern the ordinances and decrees
which throughout all those changes are infallibly observed.
And although he doth insinuate that the supreme or summary
law of Nature (which he calleth ‘‘ the work which God worketh
from the beginning to the end”) is not possible to be found
out by man, yet that doth not derogate from the capacity of
the mind; but may be referred to the impediments, as of short-
ness of life, ill conjunction of labours, ill tradition of know-
ledge over from hand to hand, and many other inconveniences,
whereunto the condition of man is subject. For that nothing
parcel of the world is denied to man’s inquiry and invéntion,
he doth in another place rule over, when he saith, “The
spirit of man is as the lamp of God, wherewith He searcheth
the inwardness of all secrets.” If, then, such be the capacity
and receipt of the mind of man, it is manifest that there is no
danger at all in the proportion or quantity of knowledge, how
large soever, lest it should make it swell or out-compass itself ;
no, but it is merely the quality of knowledge, which, be it in
quantity more or less, if it be taken without the true correc-
tive thereof, hath in it some nature of venom or malignity,
and some effects of that venom, which is ventosity or swelling.
This corrective spice, the mixture whereof maketh knowledge
so sovereign, is charity, which the Apostle immediately addeth
to the former clause ; for so he saith, ‘‘ Knowledge bloweth
up, but charity buildeth up;” not unlike unto that which he
delivereth in another place: ‘‘If I spake,” saith he, “‘ with the
tongues of men and angels, and had not charity, it were but
as a tinkling cymbal.” Not but that it is an excellent thing to
speak with the tongues of men and angels, but because, if it
be severed from charity, and not referred to the good of men
and mankind, it hath rather a sounding and unworthy glory
than a meriting and substantial virtue. And as for that
censure of Solomon concerning the excess of writing and read-
ing books, and the anxiety of spirit which redoundeth from
knowledge, and that admonition of St. Paul, ‘‘ That we be
not seduced by vain philosophy,” let those places be rightly
understood ; and they do, indeed, excellently set forth the
true bounds and limitations whereby human knowledge is

‘confined and circumscribed, and yet without any such con-

tracting or coarctation, but that it may comprehend all the
universal nature of things; for these limitations are three:
the first, “That we do not so place our felicity in knowledge,
as we forget our mortality ;” the second, ‘‘ That we make appli-
cation of our knowledge, to give ourselves repose and content- |
ment, and not distaste or repining ;” the third, “‘ That we do

16 THE ADVANCEMENT OF LEARNING.

not presume by the contemplation of Nature to attain to the
mysteries of God.” For as touching the first of these, Solomon
doth excellently expound himself in another place of the same
book, where he saith: ‘‘I saw well that knowledge recedeth
as far from ignorance as light doth from darkness; and that
the wise man’s eyes keep watch in his head, whereas the fool
roundeth about in darkness: but withal I learned that the same
mortality involveth them both.” And for the second, certain
it is there is no vexation or anxiety of mind which resulteth
from knowledge otherwise than merely by accident; for all
knowledge and wonder (which is the seed of knowledge) is an
impression of pleasure in itself ; but when men fall to framing _
conclusions out of their knowledge, applying it to their par- ‘
ticular, and ministering to themselves thereby weak fears or
vast desires, there groweth that carefulness and trouble of
mind which is spoken of; for then knowledge is no more
Lumen siccum, whereof Heraclitus the profound said, Lwmen
siccum optima anima; but it becometh Lumen madidum,
or maceratum, being steeped and infused in the humours of
the affections. And as for the third point, it deserveth to be
a little stood upon, and not to be lightly passed over; for if
any man shall think by view and inquiry into these sensible
and material things to attain that light, whereby he may
reveal unto himself the nature or will of God, then, indeed, is
he spoiled by vain philosophy ; for the contemplation of God’s
creatures and works produceth (having regard to the works
and creatures themselves) knowledge, but having regard to God
no perfect knowledge, but wonder, which is broken knowledge.
And, therefore, it was most aptly said by one of Plato’s school,
‘‘That the sense of man carrieth a resemblance with the sun,
which (as we see) openeth and revealeth all the terrestrial
globe ; but then, again, it obscureth and concealeth the stars
and celestial globe : so doth the sense discover natural things,
but it darkeneth and shutteth up divine.” And hence it is
true that it hath proceeded, i pean _great learned men
_have been heretical, whilst they have sought to fly up to the
secrets of the Deity by the waxen. “wings.of-the-senses. And ~~
as forthe conceit that too much knowledge should incline a —
man to atheism, and that the ignorance of second causes
should make a more devout dependence upon God, which is
the first cause ; first, it is good to ask the question which Job
asked of his friends: *‘ Will you lie for God, as one man will
do for another, to gratify him?” For certain it is that God
worketh nothing i in Nature but by second causes; and if they _
would have it otherwise believed, it is mere imposture, as it —

ee ee ee ee eS

THE FIRST BOOK. 17

were in favour towards God, and nothing else but to offer to
the Author of truth the unclean sacrifice of alie. But further,
it is an assured truth, and a conclusion of experience, that a
little or superficial_knowledgeof--philosophy-may-incline_the
mind of man to atheism, but_a further proceeding therein. doth...
bring the mitid back again to religion. For in the entrance of
philosophy, Whér the’second-causesy-which are next unto the
senses, do offer themselves to the mind of man, if it dwell
and stay there it may induce some oblivion of the highest
cause; but when a man passeth on further and seeth the
dependence of causes and the works of Providence; then,

rding to the allegory of the poets, hé Will 6asily believe
that the highest link of Nature’s chain must needs be tied to
the foot of Jupiter’s. chair. To conclude, theréfore, let no man
upon a weak conceit of sobriety or an ill-applied moderation
think or maintain that a man can search too far, or be too well:
studied in the book of God’s word, or in the book of God’s
works, divinity or philosophy ; but rather let men endeavour
an endless progress or proficience in both ; only let men beware _
that they apply both to charity, and “not to swelling; to use,
and not to ostentation ; afidagain; that they do not unwisely
mingle or confound these learnings together.

II. (1) And as for the disgraces which learning receiveth
from politics, they be of this nature : that learning doth soften
1 men’s minds, “and makes them more unapt for the-honour-and

exercise of arms; that it doth mar and pervert men’s disposi-

tions for matter.of government and policy, in making then too
curious and irresolute by variety of reading, or too peremptory
or positive by strictness of rules and axioms, or too immoderate
and overweening by reason of the greatness of examples, or
too incompatible and differing from the times by reason of the
dissimilitude of examples; or at least, that it doth divert
men’s travails from action and business, and bringeth them to
a love of leisure and privateness ; and that it doth bring into
states a relaxation of discipline, whilst every man is more
ready to argue than to obey and execute. Out of this conceit
4 Cato, surnamed the Censor, one of the wisest men indeed that
4 ever lived, when Carneades the philosopher came in embassage
+ to Rome, and that the young men of Rome began to flock
about him, being allured with the sweetness and majesty of
his eloquence and learning, gave counsel in open senate that
they should give him his despatch with all speed, lest he should
infect and enchant the iainds and affections of the youth, and
_at unawares bring in an alteration of the manners and customs
of the state. Out of the same conceit or humour did Virgil,

~

| the same ages. Neither can it otherwise be: for as in man the
| ripeness Of strength of the body and mind cometh much about |
an age, save that the strength of the body cometh somewhat —

18 THE ADVANCEMENT OF LEARNING.

turning his pen to the advantage of his country and the
disadvantage of his own profession, make a kind of separation
between policy and government, and between arts and sciences,
in the verses so much renowned, attributing and challenging
the one to the Romans, and leaving and yielding the other to
the Grecians: Zu regere imperio populos, Romane, memento,
He tibi erunt artes, &c. So likewise we see that Anytus, the
accuser of Socrates, laid it as an article of charge and accusa-
tion against him, that he did, with the variety and power of
his discourses and disputations, withdraw young men from due
reverence to the Jaws and customs of their country, and that
he did profess a dangerous and pernicious science, which was
to make the worse matter seem the better, and to suppress
truth by force of eloquence and speech.

(2) But these and the like imputations have rather a coun-
tenance of gravity than any ground of justice : for experience
doth warrant that, both in persons and in times, there hath
been a meeting and concurrence in learning and arms, flourish-
ing and excelling in the same men and the same ages. For as
for men, there cannot be a better nor the like instance as of
that pair, Alexander the Great and Julius Ozsar, the Dicéators
whereof the one was Aristotle’s scholar in philosophy, and the
other was Cicero’s rival in eloquence ; or if any man had rather
call for scholars that were great generals, than generals that
were great scholars, let him take Epaminondas the Theban, or
Xenophon the Athenian ; whereof the one was the first that
sbater the power of Sparta, and the other was the first that
made way to the overthrow of the monarcby of Persia. And
this concurrence is yet more visible in times than in persons,
by how much an age is greater object than a man. For ~
both in Egypt, Assyria, Persia, Grecia, and Rome, the same ~
times that are most renowned for arms are, likewise, most —
admired for learning, so that the greatest authors and philo- |
sophers,.and the greatest captains and governors, have lived in

the more early, so in states, arms and learning, whereof the —
one correspondeth to the body, the other to the soul of man, —
have a concurrence or near sequence in times. —

(3) And for matter of policy and government, that learning —
should rather hurt, than enable thereunto, is a thing very :
improbable ; we see it is accounted an error to commit a —
natural body to empiric physicians, which commonly have a —

few pleasing receipts whereupon they are confident and advenr- —

ss

-

THE FIRST BOOK, 19

turons, but know neither the causes of diseases, nor the com-
plexions of patients, nor peril of accidents, nor the true method
of curés; we see it is a like error to rely upon advocates or

Jawyers which are only men of practice, and not grounded in’
their books, who are many times easily Surprised when matter
falleth out besides their experience, to the prejudice of the
causes they handle : so by like reason it cannot be but a matter
of doubtful consequence if states be managed by empiric states-
men, not well mingled with men grounded in learning. But
contrariwise, it is almost without instance contradictory that
ever any government was disastrous that was in the hands of
learned governors. For howsoever it hath been ordinary with
politic men to extenuate and disable learned men by the names
of pedantes ; yet in the records of time it appeareth in many
particulars that the governments of princes in minority (not-
withstanding the infinite disadvantage of that kind of state)
have nevertheless excelled the government of princes of mature
age, even for that reason which they seek to traduce, which is
that by that occasion the state hath been in the hands of
pedantes : for so was the state of Rome for the first five years,
which are so much magnified, during the minority of Nexey in
the hands or Sicnece a pedanti ; so it was again, for ten years’
space or more, during the minority of Gordianus the younger,
with great applause and contentation in the hands of Misitheus,
a pedanti : so was it before that, in the minority of Alexander
Severus, in like happiness, in hands not much unlike, by reason
of the rule of the women, who were aided by the teachers and
preceptors. Nay, let a man look into the government of the
Bishops of Rome, as by name, into the government of Pius
Quintus and Sextus Quintus in our times, who were both at
their entrance esteemed but as pedantical friars, and he shall
find that such Popes do greater things, and proceed upon truer
principles of state, than those which have ascended to the
papacy from an education and breeding in affairs of state and
courts of princes; for although men bred in learning are
perhaps to seek in points of convenience and accommodating
for the present, which the Italians call ragioni di stato, whereof
the same Pius Quintus could not hear spoken with patience,
terming them inventions against religion and the moral virtues;
yet on the other side, to recompense that, they are perfect in
those same plain grounds of religion, justice, honour, and

“moral virtue, which if they be well and watchfully pursued,

there will be seldom use of those other, no more than of physic
in a sound or well-dieted body. Neither can the experience ot

one man’s life furnish examples and precedents for the events

°0 THE ADVANCEMENT OF LEARNING.

of one man’s life. For as it happeneth sometimes that the
grandchild, or other descendant, resembleth the ancestor more
than the son; so many times occurrences of present times may
sort better with ancient examples than with those of the later
or immediate times; and lastly, the wit of one man can no
more countervail learning than one man’s means can hold way
with a common purse.

(4) And as for those particular seducements or indispositions
of the mind for policy and government, which learning is
pretended to insinuate ; if it be granted that any such thing
be, it must be remembered withal that learning ministereth in
every of them greater strength of medicine or remedy than it
offereth cause of indisposition or infirmity. For if by a secret
operation it make men perplexed and irresolute, on the other
side by plain precept it teacheth them when and upon what
ground to resolve ; yea, and how.to carry things in suspense,
without prejudice, till they-resolve. “Tfit make men positive
and regular, it teacheth them what things are in their nature
demonstrative, and what-are-conjectural, and’ as well the use

of distinétions and exceptions, a8 thé latitude of principles and
rules. If it mislead by disproportion or dissimilitude of
examples, it teacheth men the force of circumstances, the
errors of comparisons, and all the cautions of application ; so
that in all these it doth rectify more effectually than it can
pervert. And these medicines it conveyeth into men’s minds
much more forcibly by the quickness and penetration of
examples. For let a man look into the errors of Clement VILI.,
so lively described by Guicciardini, who served under him, or
into the errors of Cicero, painted out by his own pencil in his
Epistles to Atticus, and he will fly apace from being irresolute.
Let him look into the errors of Phocion, and he will beware
how he be obstinate or inflexible. Let him but read the fable
of Ixion, and it will hold him from being vaporous or imagina-
tive. Let him look into the errors of Cato IL., and he will
never be one of the Antipodes, to tread opposite to the present
world.

(5) And for the conceit that learning should dispose men to
leisure and privateness, and make men slothful : it were a
strange thing if that which accustometh the mind toa perpetung
motion and agitation should induce slothfulness, whereas, con-
trariwise,; it maybe*truly affirmed that no kind-of men love
business for itself but those that-are learned ; for other persons
love it for profit, as a hireling-that loves the work for the
wages; or for honour, as because it beareth them up in the
eyes of men, and refresheth their reputation, which otherwise

THE FIRST BOOK. 21

would wear; or because it putteth them in mind of their
fortune, and giveth them occasion to pleasure and displeasure ;
or because it exerciseth some faculty wherein they take pride,
and soentertaineth them in good-humour and pleasing conceits
towards themselves ; or because it advanceth any other their
ends. So that as it is said of untrue valours, that some men’s
valours are in the eyes of them that look on, so such men’s
industries are in the eyes of others, or, at least, in regard of
their own designments; only learned men love business as an
action according to nature, as agreeable to health of mind as
exercise is to health of body, taking pleasure in the action
itself, and not in the purchase, so that of all men they are the
most indefatigable, if it be towards any business which can
hold or detain their mind.

(6) And if any man be laborious in reading and study, and
yet idle in business and action, it groweth from some weakness
of body or softness of spirit, such as Seneca speaketh of :
Quidam tam sunt umbratiles, ut putent in turbido esse quicquid
in luce est ; and not of learning: well may it be that such a
point of a man’s nature may make him give himself to learning,
but it is not learning that breedeth any such point in his
nature.

(7) And that learning should take up too much time or
leisure : I answer, the most active or busy man that hath been
or can be, hath (no question) many vacant times of leisure
while he expecteth the tides and returns of business (except
he be either tedious and of no despatch, or lightly and un-
worthily ambitious to meddle in things that may be better
done by others), and then the question is but how those spaces
and times of leisure shall be filled and spent; whether in
pleasure or in studies ; as was well answered by Demosthenes
to his adversary A‘schines, that was a man given to pleasure,
and told him ‘‘That his orations did smell of the lamp.”
**Indeed,” said Demosthenes, ‘‘there is a great difference
between the things that you and I do by lamp-light.” So as
no man need doubt that learning will expel business, but
rather it will keep and defend the possession of the mind
against idleness and pleasure, which otherwise at unawares
may enter to the prejudice of both.

(8) Again, for that other conceit that learning should under-
mine the reverence of laws and government, it is assuredly a

mere depravation and calumny, without all shadow of truth.
For to say that a blind custom of obedience should be a surer
obligation than duty taught and understood, it is to affirm
_thata blind man may tread surer by a guide than a seeing

esnisiiees aa a Sw
eres

22 THE ADVANCEMENT OF LEARNING.
x

man can by a light. And it is without all controversy that
learning doth make the minds of men gentle, generous, man-
ageable, and pliant to government ; whereas ignorance makes
them churlish, thwart, and mutinous: and the evidence of
time doth clear this assertion, considering that the most
barbarous, rude, and unlearned times have been most subject
to tumults, seditions, and changes.

(9) And as to the judgment of Cato the Censor, he was well
punished for his blasphemy against learning, in the same kind
wherein he offended; for when he was past threescore years
- old, he was taken with an extreme desire to go to school again,
and to learn the Greek tongue, to the end to peruse the Greek
authors; which doth well demonstrate that his former censure
of the Grecian learning was rather an affected gravity, than
according to the inward sense of his own opinion. And as for
Virgil’s verses, though it pleased him to brave the world in
taking to the Romans the art of empire, and leaving to others
the arts of subjects, yet so much is manifest—that the Romans
never ascended to that height of empire till the time they had
ascended to the height of other arts. For in the time of the
two first Ceesars, which had the art of government in greatest
perfection, there lived the best poet, Virgilius Maro ; the best
historiographer, Titus Livius; the best antiquary, Marcus
Varro ; and the best or second orator, Marcus Cicero, that to
the memory of man are known. As for the accusation of
Socrates, the time must be remembered when it was pro-
secuted ; which was under the Thirty Tyrants, the most base,
bloody, and envious persons that have governed ; which revo-
lution of state was no sooner over but Socrates, whom they
had made a person criminal, was made a person heroical, and
his memory accumulate with honours divine and, human ; and
those discourses of his which were then termed corrupting of
manners, were after acknowledged for sovereign medicines
of the mind and manners, and so have been received ever
since till this day. Let this, therefore, serve for answer to
politiques, which in their humorous severity, or in their
feigned gravity, have presumed to throw imputations upon
learning ; which redargution nevertheless (save that we know
not whether our labours may extend to other ages) were not
needful for the present, in regard of the love and reverence
towards learning which the example and countenance of two
so learned princes, Queen Elizabeth and your Majesty, bein
as Castor and Pollux, lucida sidera, stars of excellent light an
most benign influence, hath wrought in all men of place and
authority in our nation.

THE FIRST BOOK. 23

‘III. (1) Now therefore we come to that third sort of dis-
eredit or diminution of credit. that groweth unto learning from
learned men themselves, which commonly cleaveth fastest: it
is either from their fortune, or from their manners, or from
the nature of their studies. For the first, it is not in their
power; and the second is accidental ; the third only is proper
to be handled: but because we are not in hand with true
measure, but with popular estimation and conceit, it is not
amiss to speak somewhat of the two former. The derogations
therefore which grow to learning from the fortune or condition
of learned men, are either in respect of scarcity of means,
or in respect of privateness of life and meanness of employ-
ments.

(2) Concerning want, and that it is the case of learned men
usually to begin with little, and not to grow rich so fast as
other men, by reason they convert not their labours chiefly to
lucre and increase, it were good to leave the commonplace in
commendation of povery to some friar to handle, to whom
much was attributed by Machiavel in this point when he
said, ‘‘ That the kingdom of the clergy had been long before at
an end, if the reputation and reverence towards the poverty of
friars had not borne out the scandal of the superfluities and
excesses of bishops and prelates.” So aman might say that
the felicity and delicacy of princes and great persons had long
since turned to rudeness and barbarism, if the poverty of
learning had not kept up civility and honour of life; but with-
out any such advantages, it is worthy the observation what a
reverent and honoured thing poverty of fortune was for some
ages in the Roman state, which nevertheless was a state with-

1 out paradoxes. For we see what Titus Livius saith in his
j introduction: Ceterum aut me amor negotii suscepti fallit

aut nulla unguam respublica nec major, nec sanctior, nec bonis
exemplis ditior fuit ; nec in quam tam sero avaritia luxuriaque
aimmigraverint ; nec ubi tantus ac tam diu paupertati ac par-
simonice honos fuerit. We see likewise, after that the state of
Rome was not itself, but did degenerate, how that person that
took’ upon him to be counsellor to Julius Czsar after his victor

“where to begin his restoration of the state, maketh it of a

'points the most summary to take away the estimation of
“wealth: Verum hec et omnia mala pariter cum honore pecunie
desinent; si neque magistratus, neque alia vulgo cupienda,
wenalia erunt. To conclude this point: as it was truly said
that Rubor est virtutis color, though sometimes it come from
Vice, so it may be fitly said that Paupertas est virtutis fortuna,

though sometimes it may proceed from misgovernment and

Y4 THE ADVANCEMENT OF LEARNING.

accident Surely Solomon hath pronounced it both in censure,
Qui festinat ad divitias non erit nsons ; and in precept, ‘ Buy
the truth, and sell it not ; and so of wisdom and knowledge ;”
judging that means were to be spent upon learning, and not
acdc to be applied to means. And as for the privateness or
obscureness (as it may be in vulgar estimation accounted) of
life of contemplative men, it is a theme so common to extol a
private life, not taxed with sensuality and sloth, in comparison
and to the disadvantage of a civil life, for safety, liberty,
pleasure, and dignity, or at least freedom from indignity, as no
man handleth it but handleth it well; such a consonancy it hath
to men’s conceits in the expressing, and to men’s consents in
the allowing. This only I will add, that learned men forgotten
in states and not living in the eyes of men, are like the images
of Cassius and Brutus in the funeral of Junia, of which, not
being represented as many others were, Tacitus saith, Ko ipso
prefulgebant, quod non visebantur.

3) And for meanness of employment, that which is most
traduced to contempt is that the government of youth is com-
monly allotted to them; which age, because it is the age of
least authority, it is transferred to the disesteeming of those
employments wherein youth is conversant, and which are con-
versant about youth. But how unjust this traducement is (if
you will reduce things from popularity of opinion to measure
of reason) may appear in that we see men are more curious
what they put into a new vessel than into a vessel seasoned ;
and what mould they lay about a young plant than about a
plant corroborate ; so as the weakest terms and times of all
things use to have the best applications and helps. And will
you hearken to the Hebrew rabbins? ‘‘ Your young men shall
see Visions, and your old men shall dream dreams:” say they,
youth is the worthier age, for that visions are nearer appari-
tions of God than dreams? And let it be noted that how-
soever the condition of life of pedantes hath been scorned upon
theatres, as the ape of tyranny ; and that the modern looseness
or negligence hath taken no due regard to the choice of school-
masters and tutors; yet the ancient wisdom of the best times
did always make a just complaint, that states were too bus
with their laws and too negligent in point of education : which
excellent part of ancient discipline hath been in some sort
revived of late times by the colleges of the Jesuits; of whom, ©
although in regard of their superstition I may say, Quo meliores, —
eo deteriores ; yet in regard of this, and some other points con-
cerning human learning and moral matters, I may say, as
Agesilaus said to his enemy Pharnabazus, Zalis quum sis,

THE FIRST BOOK. 25

utinam noster esses. And thus much touching the discredits
drawn from the fortunes of learned men.

(4) As touching the manners of learned men, it is a thing
personal and individual : and no doubt there be amongst them,
as in other professions, of all temperatures : but yet so as it is
not without truth which is said, that Abeunt studia in mores,
studies have an influence and operation upon the manners of
those that are conversant in them.

(5) But upon an attentive and indifferent review, I for my
part cannot find any disgrace to learning can proceed from the
manners of learned men; not inherent to them as they are
learned ; except it be a fault (which was the supposed fault of
Demosthenes, Cicero, Cato II., Seneca, and many more)
that because the times they read of are commonly better than
the times they live in, and the duties taught better than the
duties practised, they contend sometimes too far to bring
things to perfection, and to reduce the corruption of manners
to honesty of precepts or examples of too great height. And
yet hereof they have caveats enough in their own walks. For
Solon, when he was asked whether he had given his citizens
the best laws, answered wisely, ‘‘ Yea, of such as they would
receive :” and Plato, finding that his own heart could not agree
with the corrupt manners of his country, refused to bear place
or office, saying, ‘‘ That a man’s country was to be used as his
parents were, that is, with humble persuasions, and not with
‘| contestations.” And Cesar’s counsellor put in the same
a caveat, Non ad vetera instituta revocans que jampridem cor-
4 ruptis moribus ludibrio sunt; and Cicero noteth this error
ll 4 directly in Cato II. when he writes to his friend Atticus, Cato
Il § optime sentit, sed nocet interdum reipublice ; loquitur enim
j, | tanquam in republicd Platonis, non tanquam in face Romuli.
i 1 And the same Cicero doth excuse and expound the philoso-
- 4 phers for going too far and being too exact in their prescripts
ot | when he saith, [ste ipst preceptores virtutis et magistri videntur
et | fines officiorum paulo longius quam natura vellet protulisse, ut
yt | cum ad ultimum animo contendissemus, ibi tamen, ubi oportet,
98 | consisteremus : and yet himself might have said, Monitis sum
sy | minor ipse meis; for it was his own fault, though not in so
\jch ) extreme a degree.

_ (6) Another fault likewise much of this kind hath been in-
:0 | Cident to learned men, which is, that they have esteemed the
alee good, and honour of their countries or masters
‘before their own fortunes or safeties. For so saith Demos-
5,9 - thenes unto the Athenians: ‘“‘If it please you to note it, my
4 fi ) gounsels unto you are not such whereby I should grow great

een eee meee eaeneseme Rs

ae

26 THE ADVANCEMENT OF LEARNING.

amongst you, and you become little amongst the Grecians ;
but they be of that nature as they are sometimes not good for
me to give, but are always good for you to follow.” And so
Seneca, after he had consecrated that Quinquennium Neronis
to the eternal glory of learned governors, held on his honest

and loyal course of good and free counsel after his master grew

extremely corrupt in his government. Neither can this point
otherwise be, for learning endueth men’s minds with a true
sense of the frailty of their persons, the casualty of their
fortunes, and the dignity of their soul and vocation, so that it
is impossible for them to esteem that any greatness of their
own fortune can be a true or worthy end of their being and
ordainment, and therefore are desirous to give their account to

‘God, and so likewise to their masters under God (as kings and

the states that they serve) in these words, Ecce tibi lucre-

feci, and not Ecce mihi. lucrefect; whereas the corrupter

never caring in all tempests what becomes of the ship of
state, so they may save themselves in the cockboat of their
uwn fortune ; whereas men that feel the weight of duty and
know the limits of self-love use to make good their places and
duties, though with peril; and if they stand in seditious and —
violent alterations, it is rather the reverence which many —
times both adverse parts do give to honesty, than any versatile
advantage of their own carriage. But for this point of tender |
sense and fast obligation of duty which learning doth endue
the mind withal, howsoever fortune may tax it, and many in
the depth of their corrupt principles may despise it, yet it will
receive an open allowance, and therefore needs the less dis-
proof or excuse.
(7) Another fault incident commonly to learned men, which |
may be more properly defended than truly denied, is that
they fail sometimes in applying themselves to particular per-
sons, which want of exact application ariseth from two causes— |
the one, because the largeness of their mind can hardly confine
itself to dwell in the exquisite observation or examination of
the nature and customs of one person, for it is a speech for a
lover, and not for a wise man, Satis magnum alter altert
theatrum sumus. Nevertheless I shall yield that he that
cannot contract the sight of his mind as well as disperse and
dilate it, wanteth a great faculty. But there is a second

<<

THE FIRST BOOK. : 27

cause, which is no inability, but a rejection upon choice and
judgment. For the honest and just bounds of observation by
one person upon another extend no further but to understand
him sufficiently, whereby not to give him offence, or whereby
to be able to give him faithful counsel, or whereby to. stand
upon reasonable guard and caution in respect of a man’s self.
But to be speculative into another man to the end to know
how to work him, or wind him, or govern him, proceedeth
from a heart that is double and cloven, and not entire and
ingenuous; which as in friendship it is want of integrity, so

of the Levant, which is that subjects do forbear to gaze or fix
their eyes upon princes, is in the outward ceremony barbarous,
but the moral is good ; for men ought not, by cunning and
bent observations, to pierce and penetrate into the avearts of
kings, which the Scripture-hath-deelared-to-be inscrutable."
ere is yet another fault (with which I will conclude
this part) which is often noted in learned men, that they do
many times fail to observé decency and discretion in their
behaviour and carriage, and commit errors in small and or-
| dinary points of action, so as the vulgar sort of capacities do
make a judgment of them in greater matters by that which
they find wanting in them in smaller. But this consequence
doth oft deceive men, for which I do refer them over to
that which was said by Themistocles, arrogantly and uncivilly
being applied to himself out of his own mouth, but, being
- }applied to the general state of this question, pertinently and
justly, when, being invited to touch a lute, he said, “‘ He
could not fiddle, but he could make a small town a great
state.” So no doubt many may be well seen in the passages of
government and policy which are to seek in little and punctual
occasions. I refer them also to that which Plato said of his
7} master Socrates, whom he compared to the gallipots of apothe-
caries, which on the outside had apes and owls and antiques,
i) but contained within sovereign and precious liquors and con-
-}fections ; acknowledging that, to an external report, he was
}not without superficial levities and deformities, but was in-
}wardly replenished with excellent virtues and powers. And
so much touching the point of manners of learned men.
(9) But in the meantime I have no purpose to give allowance
s ¥6o some conditions and coursés base and unworthy, wherein
‘divers professors of learning have wronged themselves and
ab YZone too far; such as were those trencher philosophers which
i }im the later age of the Roman state were usually in the houses
of great persons, being little better than solemn parasites, of

ae. ee ee ene

towards princes or superiors is want of duty. For the custom +

28 THE ADVANCEMENT OF LEARNING,

which kind, Lucian maketh a merry description of the philo-
sopher that the great lady took to ride with her in her coach,
and would needs have him carry her little dog, which! he
doing officiously and yet uncomely, the page scoffed and said,
‘‘That he doubted the philosopher of a Stoic would turn to be
a Cynic.” But, above all the rest, the gross and palpable
flattery whereunto many not unlearned have abased and abused
their wits and pens, turning (as Du Bartas saith) Hecuba into
Helena, and Faustina into Lucretia, hath most diminished the
price and estimation of learning. Neither is the modern dedi-
cation of books and writings, as to patrons, to be commended,
for that books (such as are worthy the name of books) ought
to have no patrons but truth and reason. And the ancient
custom was to dedicate them only to private and equal friends,
or to entitle the books with their names; or if to kings and
great persons, it was to some such as the argument of the
book was fit and proper for ; but these and the like courses may
deserve rather reprehension than defence.

(10) Not that I can tax or condemn the morigeration or
application of learned men to men in fortune. For the answer
was good that Diogenes made to one that asked him in
mockery, ‘‘How it came to pass that philosophers were the
followers of rich men, and not rich men of philosophers?”
He answered soberly, and yet sharply, ‘‘ Because the one sort
knew what they ha:l need of, and the other did not.” And of
the like nature wa. the answer which Aristippus made, when
having a petition to Dionysius, and no ear given to him, he ~
fell down at his feet, whereupon Dionysius stayed and gave —
him the hearing, and granted it ; and afterwards some person, —
tender on the behalf of philosophy, reproved Aristippus that —
he would offer the profession of philosophy such an indignity —
as for a private suit to fall at a tyrant’s feet ; but he answered,
“Tt was not his fault, but it was the fault of Dionysius, that —
had his ears in his feet.” Neither was it accounted weakness, —
but discretion, in him that would not dispute his best with ~
Adrianus Cesar, excusing himself, ‘‘That it was reason to —
yield to him that commanded thirty legions.” These and the ©
like applications, and stooping to points of necessity and con- —
venience, cannot be disallowed ; for though they may have ~
some outward baseness, yet in a judgment truly made they are ©
to be accounted submissions to the occasion and not to the ©
person, 4

IV. (1) Now I proceed to those errors and vanities which }}
have intervened amongst the studies themselves of the learned, ©
which is that which is principal and proper to the present —

THE FIRST BOOK. 99

argument; wherein my purpose is not to make a justification
of the errors, but by a censure and separation of the errors to
make a justification of that which is good and sound, and to
deliver that from the aspersion of the other. For we see that
it is the manner of men to scandalise and deprave that which
retaineth the state and virtue, by taking advantage upon that
which is corrupt and degenerate, as the heathens in the primi-
tive Church used to blemish and taint the Christians with the
faults and corruptions of heretics. But nevertheless I have no
meaning at this time to make any exact animadversion of the
errors and impediments in matters of learning, which are more
secret and remote from vulgar opinion, but only to speak unto
such as do fall under or near unto a popular observation.

(2) There be therefore chiefly three vanities in studies,
whereby learning hath been most traduced. For those things
we do esteem vain which are either false or frivolous, those
which either have no truth or no use ; and those persons we
esteem vain which are eithercredulous or curious ; and curiosity
is either in matter or words: so that in reason as well as in
experience there fall out to be these three distempers (as I
may term them) of learning—the first, fantastical learning ;
the second, contentious learning ; and the last, delicate learn-
ing; vain imaginations, vain altercations, and vain affecta-
tions ; and with the last I will begin. Martin Luther, con-
ducted, no doubt, by a higher Providence, but in discourse of
reason, finding what a province he had undertaken against the
Bishop of Rome and the degenerate traditions of the Church,
and finding his own solitude, being in nowise aided by the
opinions of his own time, was enforced to awake all antiquity,
and to call former times to his succours to make a party
against the present time. So that the ancient authors, both
in divinity and in humanity, which had long time slept in
j libraries, began generally to be read and revolved. This, by
consequence, did draw on a necessity of a more exquisite
‘travail in the languages original, wherein those authors did
‘write, for the better understanding of those authors, and the
better advantage of pressing and applying their words. And
thereof grew, again, a delight in their manner of style and
phrase, and an admiration of that kind of writing, which was
much furthered and precipitated by the enmity and opposition

—|that the propounders of those primitive but seeming new

Jopinions had against the schoolmen, who were generally of

‘the contrary part, and whose writings were altogether in a
‘differing style and form; taking liberty to coin and frame new
terms of art to express their own sense, and to avoid circuit of

30 THE ADVANCEMENT OF LEARNING.

speech, without regard to the pureness, pleasantness, and (as
I may call it) lawfulness of the phrase or word. And again,
because the great labour then was with the people (of whom
the Pharisees were wont to say, Execrabilis ista turba, que
non novit legem), for tae winning and persuading of them,
there grew of necessity in chief price and request eloquence
and variety of discourse, as the fittest and forciblest access,
into the capacity of the vulgar sort ; so that these four causes
concurring—the admiration of ancient authors, the hate of the
schoolmen, the exact study of languages, and the efficacy of
preaching—did bring in an ‘affectionate study of eloquence and
copy of speech, which then began to flourish. This grew
speedily to an excess ; for men began to hunt more after words
than matter—more after the choiceness of the phrase, and the
round and clean composition of the sentence, and the sweet
falling of the clauses, and the varying and illustration of their
works with tropes and figures, than after the weight of matter,
worth of subject, soundness of argument, life of invention, or
depth of judgment. Then grew the flowing and watery vein
of Osorius, the Portugal bishop, to be in price. Then did
Sturmius spend such infinite and curious pains upon Cicero
the Orator and Hermogenes the Rhetorician, besides his own
books of Periods and Imitation, and the like. Then did Car
of Cambridge and Ascham with their lectures and writings
almost deify Cicero and Demosthenes, and allure all young
men that were studious unto that delicate and polished kind
of learning. Then did Erasmus take occasion to make the
scoffing echo, Decem annos consumpst in legendo Cicerone ;
and the echo amswered in Greek, One, Asine. Then grew
the learning of the schoolmen to be utterly despised as bar-
barous.. In sum, the whole inclination and bent of those
times was rather towards copy than weight.

(3) Here therefore [is] the first distemper of learning, when
men study words and not matter ; whereof, though I have
represented an example of late times, yet it hath been and will
be secundum majus et minus in all time. And how is it
possible but this should have an operation to discredit learning,
even with vulgar capacities, when they see learned men’s works
like the first letter of a patent or limned book, which though
it hath large flourishes, yet it is but a letter? It seems to me
that Pygmalion’s frenzy is a good emblem or portraiture of
this vanity; for words are but the images of matter, and
except they have life of reason and invention, to fall in love
with them is all one as to fall in love with a picture.

(4) But yet notwithstanding it is a thing not hastily to be

THE FIRST BOOK. 53

condemned, to clothe and adorn the obscurity even of philo-
sophy itself with sensible and plausible elocution. For hereof
we have great examples in Xenophon, Cicero, Seneca, Plutarch,
and of Plato also in some degree ; and hereof likewise there is
great use, for surely, to the severe inquisition of truth and
the deep progress into philosophy, it is some hindrance ;
because it is too early satisfactory to the mind of man, and
quencheth the desire of further search before we come to a
just period. But then if a man be to have any use of such
knowledge in civil occasions, of conference, counsel, persua-
sion, discourse, or the like, then shall he find it prepared to
his hands in those authors which write in that manner. But
the excess of this is so justly contemptible, that as Hercules,
when he saw the image of Adonis, Venus’ minion, in a temple,
said in disdain, WV2l sacri es; so there is none of Hercules’
followers in learning—that is, the more severe and laborious
sort of inquirers into truth—but will despise those delicacies
and affectations, as indeed capable of no divineness. And thus
much of the first disease or distemper of learning.

(5) The second which followeth is in nature worse than the
former: for as substance of matter is better than beauty of
words, so contrariwise vain matter is worse than vain words:
wherein it seemeth the reprehension of St. Paul was not
only proper for those times, but prophetical for the times
following ; and not only respective to divinity, but extensive
to all knowledge: Devtta profanas vocum novitates, et oppo-
sitiones falsi nominis scientic. For he assigneth two marks
and badges of suspected and falsified science: the one, the
novelty and strangeness of terms ; the other, the strictness of

} positions, which of necessity doth induce oppositions, and so
) questions and altercations. Surely, like as many substances
/ in nature which are solid do putrify and corrupt into worms ;

so it is the property of good and sound knowledge to putrefy

j and dissolve into a number of subtle, idle, unwholesome, and
} (as I may term them) vermiculate questions, which have in-
4 deed a kind of quickness and life of spirit, but no soundness of
i} matter or goodness of quality. This kind of degenerate learn-

| ing did chiefly reign amongst the schoolmen, who having sharp
-and strong wits, and abundance of leisure, and small variety

-of reading, but their wits being shut up in the cells of a few

deuthors ( (chiefly Aristotle their dictator) as their persons were

bey up in the cells of monasteries and colleges, and knowing
ttle history, either of nature or time, did out of no great
“quantity of matter and infinite agitation of wit spin out unto

; us those laborious webs of learning which are extant in their.

32 THE ADVANCEMENT OF LEARNING

books. For the wit and mind of man, if it work upon matter,
which is the contemplation of the creatures of God, worketh
according to the stuff and is limited thereby; but if it work
upon itself, as the spider worketh his web, then it is endless,
and brings forth indeed cobwebs of learning, admirable for the
fineness of thread and work, but of no substance or profit.

(6) This same unprofitable subtility or curiosity is of two
sorts : either in the subject itself that they handle, when it is
a fruitless speculation or controversy (whereof there are no
small number both in divinity and philosophy), or in the
manner or method of handling of a knowledge, which amongst
them was this—upon every particular position or assertion to
frame objections, and to those objections, solutions ; which _
solutions were for the most part not confutations, but dis-
tinctions: whereas indeed the strength of all sciences is, as
the strength of the old man’s faggot, in the bond. For the
harmony of a science, supporting each part the other, is and
ought to be the true and brief confutation and suppression of
all the smaller sort of objections. But, on the other side, if
you take out every axiom, as the sticks of the faggot, one by
one, you may quarrel with them and bend them and break
them at your pleasure : so that, as was said of Seneca, Verborum
minutiis rerum frangit pondera, so a man may truly say of the —
schoolmen, Questionum minutiis scientiarum frangunt solidi-
tatem. For were it not better for a man in 2 fair room to set —
up one great light, or branching candlestick of lights, than to
go about with a small watch-candle into every corner? And —
such is their method, that rests not so much upon evidence of
truth proved by arguments, authorities, similitudes, examples, —
as upon particular confutations and solutions of every scruple,
cavillation, and objection; breeding for the most part one —
question as fast as it solveth another; even as in the former ~
resemblance, when you carry the light into one corner, you
darken the rest ; so that the fable and fiction of Scyllaseemeth |
to be a lively image of this kind of philosophy or knowledge ; —
which was transformed inte a comely virgin for the upper
parts ; but then Candida succinctam latrantibus inguina mon-~—
stris: so the generalities of the schoolmen are for a while good —
and proportionable ; but then when you descend into their .
distinctions and decisions, instead of a fruitful womb for the ]
use and benefit of man’s life, they end in monstrous altercations —
and barking questions. So as it is not possible but this quality |
of knowledge must fall under popular contempt, the people |
being apt to contemn truth upon occasion of controversies and |
altercations, and to think they are all out of their way which —

r

|

Ge

THE FIRST BOOK. 3S

never meet ; and when they see such digladiation about sub.
tleties, and matters of no use or moment, they easily fall upon
that judgment of Dionysius of Syracusa, Verba ista sunt senum
otiosorum.

(7) Notwithstanding, certain it is that if those schoolmen to
their great thirst of truth and unwearied travail of wit had
joined variety and universality of reading and contemplation,
they had proved excellent lights, to the great advancement of
all learning and knewledge; but as they are, they are great
undertakers indeed, and fierce with dark keeping. But as in
the inquiry of the divine truth, their pride inclined to leave
the oracle of God’s word, and to vanish in the mixture of their
own inventions ; so in the inquisition of nature, they ever left
the oracle of God’s works, and adored the deceiving and
deformed images which the unequal mirror of their own
minds, or a few received authors or principles, did represent
unto them. And thus much for the second disease of learn-

g.

(8) For the third vice or disease of learning, which con-
cerneth deceit or untruth, it is of all the rest the foulest ; as
that which doth destroy the essential form of knowledge,
which is nothing but a representation of truth: for the truth
of being and the truth of knowing are one, differing no more
than the direct beam and the beam reflected. This vice there-
Aore brancheth itself into two sorts; delight in deceiving and
aptness to be deceived ; imposture and credulity ; which, al-
though they appear to be of a diverse nature, the one seeming

| to proceed of cunning and the other of simplicity, yet cer-

‘\ tainly they do for the most part concur: for, as the verse
noteth—

‘**Percontatorem fugito, nam garrulus idem est,”

‘an inquisitive man is a prattler; so upon the like reason a
‘)credulous man is a deceiver: as we see it in fame, that he
that will easily believe rumours will as easily augment

rumours and add somewhat to them of his own; which Tacitus

"wisely noteth, when he saith, Mingunt simul creduntque: so
1) great an affinity hath fiction and belief.

(9) This facility of credit and accepting or admitting things

}weakly authorised or warranted is of two kinds according to
‘the subject: for it is either a belief of history, or, as the law-
‘Hyers speak, matter of fact ; or else of matter of art and opinion.
fi As to the former, we see the experience and inconvenience

of this error in ecclesiastical history ; which hath too easily
received and registered reports and narrations of miracles

B—S4

34 THE ADVANCEMENT OF LEARNING.

wrought by martyrs, hermits, or monks of the desert, and
other holy men, and their relics, shrines, chapels and images :
which though they had a passage for a time by the ignorance
of the people, the superstitious simplicity of some and the
politic toleration of others holding them but as divine poesies,
yet after a period of time, when the mist began to clear up,
they grew to be esteemed but as old wives’ fables, impostures
of the clergy, illusions of spirits, and badges of Antichrist, to
the great scandal and detriment of religion.

(10) So in natural history, we see there hath not been that
choice and judgment used as ought to have been; as may
appear in the writings of Plinius, Cardanus, Albertus, and
divers of the Arabians, being fraught with much fabulous
matter, a great part not only untried, but notoriously untrue,
to the great derogation of the credit of natural philosophy
with the grave and sober kind of wits : wherein the wisdom
and integrity of Aristotle is worthy to be observed, that,
having made so diligent and exquisite a history of living
creatures, hath mingled it sparingly with any vain or feigned
matter; and yet on the other side hath cast all prodigious
narrations, which he thought worthy the recording, into one
book, excellently discerning that matter of manifest truth,
such whereupon observation and rule was to be built, was not+
to be mingled or weakened with matter of doubtful credit 3

and yet again, that rarities and reports that seem uncredible ‘

are not to be suppressed or denied to the memory of men.

(11) And as for the facility of credit which is yielded to
arts and opinions, it is likewise of two kinds; either when
too much belief is attributed to the arts themselves, or to

certain authors in any art. The sciences themselves, which —
have had better intelligence and confederacy with the imagina- |

tion of man than with his reason, are three in number:
astrology, natural magic, and alchemy; of which sciences,
nevertheless, the ends or pretences are noble, For astrology
pretendeth to discover that correspondence or concatenation

which is between the superior globe and the inferior ; natural |
magic pretendeth to call and reduce natural philosophy from”
variety of speculations to the magnitude of works ; and alchemy

pretendeth to make separation of all the unlike parts of bodies

which in mixtures of natures are incorporate. But the de- |
rivations and prosecutions to these ends, both in the theories”
and in the practices, are full of error and vanity ; which the

great professors themselves have sought to veil over and con-
ceal by enigmatical writings, and referring themselves to

auricular traditions and such other devices, to save the credit’

THE FIRST BOOK. 35

of impostures. And yet surely to alchemy this right is due,
_ that it may be compared to the husbandman whereof A‘sop
makes the fable; that, when he died, told his sons that he
had left unto them gold buried underground in his vineyard ;
and they digged over all the ground, and gold they found
none ; but by reason of their stirring and digging the mould
about the roots of their vines, they had a great vintage the
year following: so assuredly the search and stir to make gold
hath brought to light a great number of good and fruitful
inventions and experiments, as well for the disclosing of nature
as for the use of man’s life.

(12) And as for the overmuch credit that hath been given
unto authors in sciences, in making them dictators, that their
words should stand, and not consuls, to give advice; the
damage is infinite that sciences have received thereby, as the
principal cause that hath kept them low at a stay without
growth or advancement. For hence it hath come, that in
arts mechanical the first deviser comes shortest, and time
addeth and perfecteth ; but in sciences the first author goeth
furthest, and time leeseth and corrupteth. So we see artillery,
sailing, printing, and the like, were grossly managed at the
first, and by time accommodated and refined ; but contrariwise,
the philosophies and sciences of Aristotle, Plato, Democritus,
Hippocrates, Euclides, Archimedes, of most vigour at the first,
and by time degenerate and imbased: whereof the reason is no
_} other, but that in the former many wits and industries have
. | contributed in one; and in the latter many wits and indus-
, | tries have been spent about the wit of some one, whom many
, ) times they have rather depraved than illustrated; for, as
}

water will not ascend higher than the level of the first spring-
, )head from whence it descendeth, so knowledge derived from

Aristotle, and exempted from liberty of examination, will not
J ‘Tise again higher than the knowledge of Aristotle. And, there-
, fore, although the position be good, Oportet discentem credere,
yet it must be coupled with this, Oportet edoctum judicare ; for
disciples do owe unto masters only a temporary belief anda sus-
I snsion of their own judgment till they be fully instructed, and
i ot an absolute resignation or perpetual captivity ; and there-
fore, to conclude this point, I will say no more, but so let great ©
authors have their due, as time, which is the author of authors,

* be not deprived of his due—which is, further and further to
na ‘Miscover truth. Thus have I gone over these three diseases
r he learning ; besides the which there are some other rather

pe ecant humours than formed diseases, which, nevertheless,
are not so secret and intrinsic, but that they fall under s

36 THE ADVANCEMENT OF LEARNING.

popular observation and traducement, and, therefore, are not
to be passed over.

V. (1) The first of these is the extreme affecting of two
extremities : the one antiquity, the other novelty ; wherein it
seemeth the children of time do take after the nature and
malice of the father. For as he devoureth his children, so one
of them seeketh to devour and suppress the other; while an-
tiquity envieth there should be new additions, and novelty
cannot be content to add but it must deface ; surely the advice
of the prophet is the true direction in this matter, State
super vias antiquas, et videte quenam sit via recta et bona et
ambulate in ea. Antiquity deserveth that reverence, that men
should make a stand thereupon and discover what is the best
way ; but when the discovery is well taken, then to make pro-
gression. And to speak truly, Antiquitas sceculi juventus
mundi. These times are the ancient times, when the world is
ancient, and not those which we account ancient ordine retro-

rado, by a computation backward from ourselves.

(2) Another error induced by the former is a distrust that
anything should be now to be found out, which the world
should have missed and passed over so long time: as if the
same objection were to be made to time that Lucian maketh
to Jupiter and other the heathen gods ; of which he wondereth
that they begot so many children in old time, and begot none —

in his time; and asketh whether they were become septua- a

genary, or whether the law Papia, made against old men’s —
marriages, had restrained them. So it seemeth men doubt ~
lest time is become past children and generation ; wherein con- —
trariwise we see commonly the levity and unconstancy of men’s
judgments, which, till a matter be done, wonder that it can —
be done; and as soon as it is done, wonder again that it was |
no sooner done : as we see in the expedition of Alexander into ~
Asia, which at first. was prejudged as a vast and impossible ~

enterprise ; and yet afterwards it pleaseth Livy to make no =|

more of it than this, Wil aliud quam bene ausus vana con- —
temnere. And the same happened to Columbus in the western ~
navigation. But in intellectual matters it is much more :
common, as may be seen in most of the propositions of Euclid ; —
which till they be demonstrate, they seem strange to our”
assent; but being demonstrate, our mind accepteth of them
by a kind of relation (as the lawyers speak), as if we had known ~
them before.

(3) Another error, that hath also some affinity with the

former, is a conceit that of former opinions or sects after —

variety and examination the best hath still prevailed and

THE FIRST BOOK. 37

suppressed the rest; so as if a man should begin the labour of a
new search, he were but like to light upon somewhat formerly
rejected, and by rejection brought into oblivion ; as if the multi-
tude, or the wisest for the multitude’s sake, were not ready
to give passage rather to that which is popular and superficial
than to that which is substantial and profound ; for the truth
is, that time seemeth to be of the nature of a river or stream,
which carrieth down to us that which is light and blown up,
and sinketh and drowneth that which is weighty and solid.

(4) Another error, of a diverse nature from all the former,
is the over-early and peremptory reduction of knowledge into
arts and methods ; from which time commonly sciences receive
small or no augmentation. But as young men, when they
knit and shape perfectly, do seldom grow to a further stature,
so knowledge, while it is in aphorisms and observations, it is
in growth ; but when it once is comprehended in exact methods,
it may, perchance, be further polished, and illustrate and
accommodated for use and practice, but it increaseth no
more in bulk and substance.

(5) Another error which doth succeed that which we last
mentioned is, that after the distribution of particular arts and
sciences, men have abandoned universality, or philosophia
prima, which cannot but cease and stop all progression. For
no perfect discovery can be made upon a flat or a level ; neither
is it possible to discover the more remote and deeper parts of
any science if you stand but upon the level of the same science,
and ascend not to a higher science.

(6) Another error hath proceeded from too great a reverence,
and a kind of adoration of the mind and understanding of man ;
by means whereof, men have withdrawn themselves too much
from the contemplation of nature, and the observations of ex-
perience, and have tumbled up and down in their own reason
and conceits. Upon these intellectualists, which are not-
withstanding commonly taken for the most sublime and divine
philosophers, Heraclitus gave a just censure, saying :—‘‘Men
sought truth in their own little worlds, and not in the great
and common world ;” for they disdain to spell, and so by
degrees to read in the volume of God’s works; and contrari-
wise by continual meditation and agitation of wit do urge and,
as it were, invocate their own spirits to divine and give oracles
unto them, whereby they are deservedly deluded.

(7) Another error that hath some connection with this latter
is, that men have used to infect their meditations, opinions,
and doctrines with some conceits which they have most
admired, or some sciences which they have most applied, and

388 THE ADVANCEMENT OF LEARNING,

given all things else a tincture according to them, utterly un-
true and improper. So hath Plato intermingled his philosophy
with theology, and Aristotle with logic; and the second school
of Plato, Proclus and the rest, with the mathematics ; for these
were the arts which had a kind of primogeniture with them
severally. So have the alchemists made a philosophy out of
a few experiments of the furnace ; and Gilbertus our country-
man hath made a philosophy out of the observations of a load-
stone. So Cicero, when reciting the several opinions of the
nature of the soul, he found a musician that held the soul was
but a harmony, saith pleasantly, Hic ab arte sua non recessit,
&c. But of these conceits Aristotle speaketh seriously and
wisely when he saith, Qui respiciunt ad pauca de facili pro-
nunciant.

(8) Another error is an impatience of doubt, and haste to
assertion without due and mature suspension of judgment.
For the two ways of contemplation are not unlike the two ways
of action commonly spoken of by the ancients : the one plain
and smooth in the beginning, and in the end impassable ; the
other rough and troublesome in the entrance, but after a while
fair and even. So it is in contemplation : if a man will begin
with certainties, he shall end in doubts; but if he will be
content to begin with doubts, he shall end in certainties.

(9) Another error is in the manner of the tradition and
delivery of knowledge, which is for the most part magistral and

eremptory, and not ingenuous and faithful; in a sort as may

e soonest believed, and not easiliest examined. It is true,
_that in compendious treatises for practice that form is not to
be disallowed ; but in the true handling of knowledge men
ought not to fall either on the one side into the vein of Velleius
the Epicurean, Wil tam metuens quam ne dubitare aliqua de re
videretur : nor, on the other side, into Socrates, his ironical
doubting of all things ; but to propound things sincerely with
more or less asseveration, as they stand in a man’s own judg-
ment proved more or less.

(10) Other errors there are in the scope that men propound
to themselves, whereunto they bend their endeavours ; for,
whereas the more constant and devote kind of professors of
any science ought to propound to themselves to make some
additions to their science, they convert their labours to aspire
to certain second prizes: as to be a profound interpreter or
commentor, to be a sharp champion or defender, to be a methodi-
cal compounder or abridger, and so the patrimony of knowledge
cometh to be sometimes improved, but seldom augmented.

(11) But the greatest error of all the rest is the mistaking or

eS ange eee ees

wget ai ata EE

THE FIRST BOOK. 39

misplacing of the last or furthest end of knowledge. For men
have entered into a desire of learning and knowledge, some-
times upon a natural curiosity and inquisitive appetite; some-
times to entertain their minds with variety and delight ;
sometimes for ornament and reputation ; and sometimes to
enable them to victory of wit and contradiction ; and most
times for lucre and profession ; and seldom sincerely to give a
true account of their gi reason to the benefit and use of

men: as if there were sought in knowle ge a couch wherétifon

est a searching and restless spirit 3 or a terrace for a
wandering and variable mind to walk up and down with a fair
prospect ; or a tower of state, for a proud mind to raise itself
upon ; or a fort or commanding ground, for strife and conten-
tion ; or a shop, for profit or sale; and not a rich storehouse
for the glory of the Creator and the relief of man’s estate.
But this is that which will indeed dignify and exalt knowledge,
if soutemblation and action may be more nearly and straitly
conjoined and united together than they have been: a con-
junction like unto that of the two highest planets, Saturn, the
planet of rest and contemplation ; and Jupiter, the planet of
civil society and action. Howbeit, I do not mean, when I
speak of use and action, that end before-mentioned of the
applying of knowledge to lucre and profession ; for I am not
ignorant how much that diverteth and interrupteth the prose-
cution and advancement of knowledge, like unto the golden
ball thrown before Atalanta, which, while she goeth aside and
stoopeth to take up, the race is hindered,

“ Declinat cursus, aurumque volubile tollit.” *

Neither is my meaning, as was spoken of Socrates, to call
philosophy down from heaven to converse upon the earth—
that is, to leave natural philosophy aside, and to apply know-
ledge only to manners and policy. But as both heaven and
earth do conspire and contribute to the use and benefit of man,
so the end ought to be, from both philosophies to separate and
reject vain speculations, and whatsoever is empty and void,
and to preserve and augment whatsoever is solid and fruitful ;

a

that knowledge may not be as a courtesan, for pleasure and. ,
vanity only, oras a bond-woman, to acquire and gain to her ~

master’s use; but as a spouse, for generation, fruit, and
comfort.
(12) Thus have I described and opened, as by a kind of

‘ ae in the race and takes the wpeeding gold. Ovid. Metam,
x. 667.

40 THE ADVANCEMENT OF LEARNING.

dissection, those peccant humours (the principal of them)
which have not only given impediment to the proficience of
learning, but have given also occasion to the traducement
thereof : wherein, if I have been too plain, it must be remem-
bered, fidelia vulnera amantis, sed dolosa oscula malignantis.
This I think I have gained, that I ought to be the better
believed-in that which I shall say pertaining to commendation ;
because I have proceeded so freely in that which concerneth
censure. And yet I have no purpose to enter into a laudative
of learning, or to make a hymn to the Muses (though I am of
opinion that it is long since their rites were duly celebrated),
but my intent is, without varnish or amplification justly to
weigh the dignity of knowledge in the balance with other
things, and to take the true value thereof by testimonies and
arguments, divine and human.

VI. (1) First, therefore, let us seek the dignity of knowledge
in the archetype or first platform, which is in the attributes
and acts of God, as far as they are revealed to man and may be
observed with sobriety ; wherein we may not seek it by the
name of learning, for all learning is knowledge acquired, and
all knowledge in God is original, and therefore we must look
for it by another name, that of wisdom or sapience, as the
Scriptures call it.

(2) It is so, then, that in the work of the creation we see a
double emanation of virtue from God ; the one referring more
properly to power, the other to wisdom ; the one expressed in
making the subsistence of the matter, and the other in
disposing the beauty of the form. This being supposed, it is
to be observed that for anything which appeareth in the
history of the creation, the confused mass and matter of
heaven and earth was made in a moment, and the order and
disposition of that chaos or mass was the work of six days;
such a note of difference it pleased God to put upon the works
of power, and the works of wisdom; wherewith concurreth,
that in the former it is not set down that God said, ‘‘Let
there be heaven and earth,” as it is set down of the works
following ; but actually, that God made heaven and earth: the
one carrying the style of a manufacture, and the other of a law,
decree, or counsel.

(3) To proceed, to that which is next in order from God, to
spirits : ‘we find, as far as credit is to be given to the celestial
hierarchy of that supposed Dionysius, the senator of Athens,
the first place or degree is given to the angels of love, which
ure termed seraphim ; the second to the angels of light, which
are termed cherubim ; and the thir, and so following places,

THE FIRST BOOK. 4]

to thrones, principalities, and the rest, which are all angels
of power and ministry; so as the angels of knowledge
and illumination: are placed before the angels of office and
domination.

(4) To descend from spirits and intellectual forms to sensible
and material forms, we read the first form that was created
was light, which hath a relation and correspondence in nature
and corporal things to knowledge in spirits and incorporal
things. ~

(5) So in the distribution of days we see the day wherein
God did rest and contemplate His own works was blessed above
all the days wherein He did effect and accomplish them.

(6) After the creation was finished, it is set down unto us
that man was placed in the garden to work therein; which
work, so appointed to him, could be no other than work of
contemplation; that is, when the end of work is but for
exercise and experiment, not for necessity ; for there being
then no reluctation of the creature, nor sweat of the brow,
man’s employment must of consequence have been matter of
delight in the experiment, and not matter of labour for the
use. Again, the first acts which man performed in Paradise
consisted of the two summary parts of knowledge; the view of
creatures, and the imposition of names. As for the knowledge
which induced the fall, it was, as was touched before, not the
_ natural knowledge of creatures, but the moral knowledge of
good and evil; wherein the supposition was, that God’s com-
mandments or prohibitions were not the originals of good and
evil, but that they had other beginnings, which man aspired
to know, to the end to make a total defection from God and
to depend wholly upon himself. .

_ (7) To pass on: in the first event or occurrence after the fall
of man, we see (as the Scriptures have infinite mysteries, not
violating at all the truth of the story or letter) an image of
the two estates, the contemplative state and the active state,
figured in the two persons of Abel and Cain, and in the two
simplest and most primitive trades of life; that of the shep-
herd (who, by reason of his leisure, rest in a place, and living
in view of heaven, is a lively image of a contemplative life),
and that of the husbandman, where we see again the favour
and election of God went to the shepherd, and not to the tiller
of the ground.

____ (8) So in the age before the flood, the holy records within
_ those few memorials which are there entered and registered

_ have vouchsafed to mention and honour the name of the

‘i inventors and authors of music and works in metal. In the

B*—84

42, THE ADVANCEMENT OF LEARNING.

age after the flood, the first great judgment of God upon the,’
ambition of man was the confusion of tongues ; whereby the}
open trade and intercourse of learning and knowledge was)
chiefly imbarred. :

(9) To descend to Moses the lawgiver, and God’s first pen:
he is adorned by the Scriptures with this addition and com-
mendation, ‘‘That he was seen in all the learning of the
Egyptians,” which nation we know was one of the most ancient
schools of the world: for so Plato brings in the Egyptian
priest saying unto Solon, “You Grecians are ever children ;
you have no knowledge of antiquity, nor antiquity of know-
ledge.” Take a view of the ceremonial law of Moses; you
shall find, besides the prefiguration of Christ, the badge or
difference of the people of God, the exercise and impression of
obedience, and other divine uses and fruits thereof, that some
of the most learned Rabbins have travailed profitably and
profoundly to observe, some of them a natural, some of them a
moral sense, or reduction of many of the ceremonies and
ordinances. As in the law of the leprosy, where it is said,
‘Tf the whiteness have overspread the flesh, the patient may
pass abroad for clean ; but if there be any whole flesh remain-
ing, he is to be shut up for unclean ;” one of them noteth a
principle of nature, that putrefaction is more contagious
before maturity than after; and another noteth a position of
moral philosophy, that men abandoned to vice do not so much
corrupt manners, as those that are half good and half evil. So
in this and very many other places in that law, there is to
be found, besides the theological sense, much aspersion of
philosophy.

(10) So likewise in that excellent book of Job, if it be
revolved with diligence, it will be found pregnant and swelling
with natural philosophy ; as for example, cosmography, and
the roundness of the world, Qui extendit aquilonem super
vacuum, et appendit terram super nihilum ; wherein the pensile-
ness of the earth, the pole of the north, and the finiteness or
convexity of heaven are manifestly touched. So again, matter
of astronomy : Spiritus gus ornavit celos, et obstetricante manu
ejus eductus est Coluber tortuosus. And in another place,
Nunquid conjungere valebis micantes stellas Pleiadas, aut
gyrum Arcturi, poteris dissipare? Where the fixing of the
stars, ever standing at equal distance, is with great elegancy
noted. Andin another place, Qui facit Arcturum, et Oriona,
et Hyadas, et interiora Austri ; where again he takes knowledge
of the depression of the southern pole, calling it the secrets of
the south, because the southern stars were in that climate

THE FIRST BOOK. ; 43

unseen. Matter of generation: Annon sicut lac mulsisti me,
et sicut caseum coagulasti me? &c. Matter of minerals : Habet
argentum venarum suarum principia ; et auro locus est in quo
conflatur, ferrum de terra tollitur, et lapis solutus calore in ces
vertitur ; and so forwards in that chapter.

(11) So likewise in the person of Solomon the king, we see
the gift or endowment of wisdom and learning, both in Solomon’s
petition and in God’s assent thereunto, preferred before all
other terrene and temporal felicity. By virtue of which grant
or donative of God Solomon became enabled not only to write
those excellent parables or aphorisms concerning divine and
moral philosophy, but also to compile a natural history of all
verdure, from the cedar upon the mountain to the moss upon
the wall (which is but a rudiment between putrefaction and an
herb), and also of all things that breathe or move. Nay, the
same Solomon the king, although he excelled in the glory of
treasure and magnificent buildings, of shipping and navigation,
of service and attendance, of fame and renown, and the like,
yet he maketh no claim to any of those glories, but only to
the glory of inquisition of truth ; for so he saith expressly,
““The glory of God is to conceal a thing, but the glory of the
king is to find it out;” as if, according to the innocent play of
children, the Divine Majesty took delight to hide His works,
to the end to have them found out ; and as if kings could not
obtain a greater honour than to be God’s playfellows in that
game ; considering the great commandment of wits and means,
whereby nothing needeth to be hidden from them.

(12) Neither did the dispensation of God vary in the times
after our Saviour came intothe world ; for our Saviour himself
did first show His power to subdue ignorance, by His conference
with the priests and doctors of the law, before He showed His
power to subdue nature by His miracles. And the coming of
the Holy Spirit was chiefly figured and expressed in the
similitude and gift of tongues, which are but vehicula scientic,

(13) So in the election of those instruments, which it pleased
God to use for the plantation of the faith, notwithstanding
that at the first He did employ persons altogether unlearned,
otherwise than by inspiration, more evidently to declare His
immediate working, and to abase all human wisdom or know-
ledge ; yet nevertheless that counsel of His was no sooner
performed, but in the next vicissitude and succession He did
_ send His divine truth into the world, waited on with other
learnings, as with servants or handmaids: for so we see St.
Paul, who was only learned amongst the Apostles, had his pen
most used in the Scriptures of the New Testament.

(
44 THE ADVANCEMENT OF LEARNING.

(14) So again we find that many of the ancient bishops and
fathers of the Church were excellently read and studied in all
the learning of the heathen; insomuch that the edict of the
Emperor Julianus (whereby it was interdicted unto Christians
to be admitted into schools, lectures, or exercises of learning)
was esteemed and accounted a more pernicious engine and
machination against the Christian Faith than were all the
sanguinary prosecutions of his predecessors; neither could
the emulation and jealousy of Gregory, the first of that name,
Bishop of Rome, ever obtain the opinion of piety or devotion ;
but contrariwise received the censure of humour, malignity,
and pusillanimity, even amongst holy men ; in that he designed
to obliterate and extinguish the memory of heathen antiquity
and authors. But contrariwise it was the Christian Church,
which, amidst the inundations of the Scythians on the one
side from the north-west, and the Saracens from the east, did
preserve in the sacred lap and bosom thereof the precious
relics even of heathen learning, which otherwise had been
extinguished, as if no such thing had ever been.

(15) And we see before our eyes, that in the age of ourselves
and our fathers, when it pleased God to call the Church of
Rome to account for their degenerate manners and ceremonies,
and sundry doctrines obnoxious and framed to uphold the
same abuses ; at one and the same time it was ordained by the
Divine Providence that there should attend withal a renova-
tion and new spring of all other knowledges. And on the
other side we see the Jesuits, who partly in themselves, and
partly by the emulation and provocation of their example,
have much quickened and strengthened the state of learning ;
we see (I say) what notable service and reparation they have
done to the Roman see.

(16) Wherefore, to conclude this part, let it be observed, that
there be two principal duties and services, besides ornament
and illustration, which philosophy and human learning do
perform to faith and religion. The one, because they are an
effectual inducement to the exaltation of the glory of God.
For as the Psalms and other Scriptures do often invite us to
consider and magnify the great and wonderful works of God,
so if we should rest only in the contemplation of the exterior
of them as they first offer themselves to our senses, we should
do a like injury unto the majesty of God, as if we should judge
or construe of the store of some excellent jeweller by that
only which is set out toward the street in his shop. The other,
because they minister a singular help and preservative against
unbelief and error. For our Saviour saith, ‘‘ You err, not

CS ee ee ee ee een ee

THE FIRST BOOK. 45

knowing the Scriptures, nor the power of God;” laying before
us two books or volumes to study, if we will be secured from
error: first the Scriptures, revealing the will of God, and then
the creatures expressing His power ; whereof the latter is a key
unto the former: not only opening our understanding to
conceive the true sense of the Scriptures by the general notions
of reason and rules of speech, but chiefly opening our belief,
in drawing us into a due meditation of the omnipotency of
God, which is chiefly signed and engraven upon His works.
Thus much therefore for divine testimony and evidence con-
cerning the true dignity and value of learning.

VII. (1) As for human proofs, it is so large a field, as in a
discourse of this nature and brevity it is fit rather to use choice
of those things which we shall produce, than to embrace the
variety of them. First, therefore, in the degrees of human
honour amongst the heathen, it was the highest to obtain to a
veneration and adoration at a God. This unto the Christians
is as the forbidden fruit. But we speak now separately of
human testimony, according to which—that which the Grecians
call apotheosis, and the Latins relatio inter divos—was the
supreme honour which man could attribute unto man, specially
when it was given, not by a formal decree or act of state (as it
was used among the Roman Emperors), but by an inward assent
and belief. Which honour, being so high, had also a degree or
middle term ; for there were reckoned above human honours,
honours heroical and divine: in the attribution and distribution
of which honours we see antiquity made this difference ; that
whereas founders and uniters of states and cities, lawgivers,
extirpers of tyrants, fathers of the people, and other eminent
persons in civil merit, were honoured but with the titles of
worthies or demigods, such as were Hercules, Theseus, Minos,
Romulus, and the like; on the other side, such as were in-
ventors and authors of new arts, endowments, and commodities
towards man’s life, were ever consecrated amongst the gods
themselves, as was Ceres, Bacchus, Mercurius, Apollo, and
others. And justly; for the merit of the former is confined
within the circle of an age or a nation, and is like fruitful
showers, which though they be profitable and good, yet serve
but for that season, and for a latitude of ground where they
fall; but the other is, indeed, like the benefits of heaven,
which are permanent and universal. The former again is
mixed with strife and perturbation, but the latter hath the
true character of Divine Presence, coming in awra lent, without
noise or agitation.

(2) Neither is certainly that other merit of learning, in

46 THE ADVANCEMENT OF LEARNING.

repressing theinconveniences which grow fromman to man, much
inferior to the former, of relieving the necessities which arise from
nature, which merit was lively set forth by the ancients in that
feigned relation of Orpheus’ theatre, where all beasts and birds
assembled, and, forgetting their several appetites—some of prey,
some of game,some of quarrel—stood all sociably together listen-
ing unto the airs and accords of the harp, the sound whereof no
sooner ceased, or was drowned by some louder noise, but every
beast returned to his own nature ; wherein is aptly described
the nature and condition of men, who are full of savage and
unreclaimed desires, of profit, of lust, of revenge ; which as
long as they give ear to precepts, to laws, to religion, sweetly
touched with eloquence and persuasion of books, of sermons, of
harangues, so long is society and peace maintained ; but if these
instruments be silent, or that sedition and tumult make them
not audible, all things dissolve into anarchy and confusion.

(3) But this appeareth more manifestly when kings themselves,
or persons of authority under them, or other governors in com-
monwealths and popular estates, are endued with learning. For
although he might be thought partial to his own profession that
said ‘‘Then should people and estates be happy when either
kings were philosophers, or philosophers kings;” yet so much
is verified by experience, that under learned princes and
governors there have been ever the best times : for howsoever
kings may have their imperfections in their passions and cus-
toms, yet, if they be illuminate by learning, they have those
notions of religion, policy, and morality, which do preserve
them and refrain them from all ruinous and peremptory errors
and excesses, whispering evermore in their ears, when coun-
sellors and servants stand mute and silent. And senators
or counsellors, likewise, which be learned, to proceed upon
more safe and substantial principles, than counsellors which
are only men of experience ; the one sort keeping dangers afar
off, whereas the other discover them not till they come near
hand, and then trust to the agility of their wit to ward or
avoid them.

(4) Which felicity of time: under learned princes (to keep still
the law of brevity, by usiug the most eminent and selected ex-
amples) doth best appear in the age which passed from the death
of Domitianus the emperor until the reign of Commodus ; com-
prehending a succession of six princes, all learned, or singular
favourers and advancers of learning, which age for temporal re-

ects was the most happy and flourishing that ever the Roman
apire (which then was a model of the world) enjoyed—a matter
revealed and prefigured unto Domitian in a dream the night

}

THE FIRST BOOK. 47

before he was slain: for he thought there was grown behind
upon his shoulders a neck and a head of gold, which came ac-
cordingly to pass in those golden times which succeeded; of
which princes we will make some commemoration ; wherein,
although the matter will be vulgar, and may be thought fitter
for a declamation than agreeable to a treatise infolded as this
is, yet, because it is pertinent to the point in hand—WNeque
semper arcum tendit Apollo—and to name them only were too
naked and cursory, I will not omit it altogether. The first was
Nerva, the excellent temper of whose government is by a glance.
in Cornelius Tacitus touched to the life : Postquam divus Nerva
res olim insociabiles miscuisset, tmperium et liberiatem. And in
token of his learning, the last act of his short reign left to
memory was a missive to his adopted son, Trajan, proceeding
upon some inward discontent at the ingratitude of the times,
comprehended in a verse of Homer’s—

“Telis, Phoebe, tuis, lacrymas ulciscere nostras.”

(5) Trajan, who succeeded, was for his person not learned ;
but if we will hearken to the speech of our Saviour, that saith,
‘He that receiveth a prophet in the name of a prophet shall
have a prophet’s reward,” he deserveth to be placed amongst the
most learned princes ; for there was not a greater admirer of
learning or benefactor of learning, a founder of famous libraries,
a perpetual advancer of learned men to office, and a familiar
converser with learned professors and preceptors who were
noted to have then most credit in court. On the other side,
how much Trajan’s virtue and government was admired and
renowned, surely no testimony of grave and faithful history
doth more lively set forth than that legend tale of Gregorius
Magnus, Bishop of Rome, who was noted for the extreme envy
he bare towards all heathen excellency ; and yet he is reported,
out of the love and estimation of Trajan’s moral virtues, to have
made unto God passionate and fervent prayers fc the delivery
of his soul out of hell, and to have obtained it, with a caveat
that he should make no more such petitions. In this prince’s
time also the persecutions against the Christians received inter-
mission upon the certificate of Plinius Secundus, a man of
excellent learning and by Trajan advanced.

(6) Adrian, his successor, was the most curious man that
lived, and the most universal inquirer: insomuch as it was
noted for an error in his mind that he desired to comprehend
all things, and not to reserve himself for the worthiest things,
falling into the like humour that was long before noted in

48 THE ADVANCEMENT OF LEARNING.

Philip of Macedon, who, when he would needs overrule and
put down an excellent musician in an argument touching music,
was well answered by him again—‘‘ God forbid, sir,” saith he,
‘‘that your fortune should be so bad as to know these things
better than I.”’ It pleased God likewise to use the curiosity of
this emperor as an inducement to the peace of His Church in
those days ; for having Christ in veneration, not as a God or
Saviour, but as a wonder or novelty, and having his picture in
his gallery matched with Apollonius (with whom in his vain
imagination he thought he had some conformity), yet it served
the turn to allay the bitter hatred of those times against the
Christian name, so as the Church had peace during his time.
And for his gevernment civil, although he did not attain to that
of Trajan’s in glory of arms or perfection of justice, yet in
deserving of the weal of the subject he did exceed him. For
Trajan erected many famous monuments and buildings, inso-
much as Constantine the Great in emulation was wont to call
him Parietaria, ‘‘ wall-flower,” because his name was upon so
many walls; but his buildings and works were more of glory
and triumph than use and necessity. But Adrian spent his
whole reign, which was peaceable, in a perambulation or survey
ef the Roman Empire, giving order and making assignation
where he went for re-edifying of cities, towns, and forts
decayed, and for cutting of rivers and streams, and for making
bridges and passages, and for policing of cities and commonalties
with new ordinances and constitutions, and granting new
franchises and incorporations ; so that his whole time was a
very restoration of all the lapses and decays of former times.

(7) Antoninus Pius, who succeeded him, was a prince ex-
cellently learned, and had the patient and subtle wit of a
schoolman, insomuch 4s in common speech (which leaves no
virtue untaxed) he was called Cymini Sector, a carver or a
divider of cummin seed, which is one of the least seeds. Such
a patience he had and settled spirit to enter into the least and
most exact differences of causes, a fruit no doubt of the exceed-
ing tranquillity and serenity of his mind, which being no ways
charged or encumbered, either with fears, remorses, or scruples,
but having been noted for a man of the purest goodness, with-
out all fiction or affectation, that hath reigned or lived, made
his mind continually present and entire. He likewise approached
a degree nearer unto Christianity, and became, as Agrippa said
unto St. Paul, ‘“‘ half a Christian,” holding their religion and
law in good opinion, and not only ceasing persecution, but
giving way to the advancement of Christians.

(8) There succeeded him the first Divi fratres, the two

THE FIRST BOOK. 49

adoptive brethren—Lucius Commodus Verus, son to Atlius
Verus, who delighted much in the softer kind of learning, and
was wont to call the poet Martial his Virgil; and Marcus
Aurelius Antoninus : whereof the latter, who obscured his col-
league and survived him long, was named the ‘“‘ Philosopher,”’
who, as he excelled all the rest in learning, so he excelled them
likewise in perfection of allroyal virtues ; insomuch as Julianus
the emperor, in his book entitled Cesares, being as a pasquil or
satire to deride all his predecessors, feigned that they were all
invited to a banquet of the gods, and Silenus the jester sat at the
nether end of the table and bestowed a scoff on everyone as
they came in; but when Marcus Philosophus came iv. Silenus
was gravelled and out of countenance, not knowing where to
carp at him, save at the last he gave a glance at his patience
towards his wife. And the virtue of this prince, continued with
that of his predecessor, made the name of Antoninus so sacred
in the world, that though it were extremely dishonoured in
Commodus, Caracalla, and Heliogabalus, who all bare the
name, yet, when Alexander Severus refused the name because
he was a stranger to the family, the Senate with one acclamation
said, Quomodo Augustus, sic eb Antoninus. In such renown
and veneration was the name of these two princes in those days,
that they would have had it as a perpetual addition in all the
emperors’ style. In this emperor’s time also the Church for the
most part was in peace ; so as in this sequence of six princes we
do see the blessed effects of learning in sovereignty, painted
forth in the greatest table of the world.

(9) But for a tablet or picture of smaller volume (not pre-
suming to speak of your Majesty that liveth), in my judgment
the most excellent is that of Queen Elizabeth, your immediate
predecessor in this part of Britain ; a prince that, if Plutarch
were now alive to write lives by parallels, would trouble him, I
think, to find for her a parallel amongst women. This lady was
endued with learning in her sex singular, and rare even amongst
masculine princes—whether we speak of learning, of language,
or of science, modern or ancient, divinity or humanity—and
unto the very last year of her life she accustomed to appoint set
hours for reading, scarcely any young student in a university
more daily or more duly. As for her government, I assure my-
self (I shall not exceed if I do affirm) that this part of the island
never had forty-five years of better times, and yet not through
the calmness of the season, but through the wisdom of her
regiment. For if there be considered, of the one side, the
truth of religion established, the constant peace and security,
the good administration of justice, the temperate use of the

50 THE ADVANCEMENT OF LEARNING.

prerogative, not slackened, nor much strained ; the flourishing
state of learning, sortable to so excellent a patroness ; the con-
venient estate of wealth and means, both of crown and subject ;
the habit of obedience, and the moderation of discontents ; and
there be considered, on the other side, the differences of religion,
the troubles of neighbour countries, the ambition of Spain, and
opposition of Rome, and then that she was solitary and of her-
self ; these things, I say, considered, as I could not have chosen
an instance so recent and so proper, so I suppose I could not
have chosen one more remarkable or eminent to the purpose
now in hand, which is concerning the conjunction of learning in
the prince with felicity in the people.

(10) Neither hath learning an influence and operation only
upon civil merit and moral virtue, and the arts or temperature
of peace and peaceable government ; but likewise it hath no less
power and efficacy in enablement towards martial and military
virtue and prowess, as may be notably represented in the ex-
amples of Alexander the Great and Czesar the Dictator (men-
tioned before, but now in fit place to be resumed), of whose
virtues and acts in war there needs no note or recital, having
been the wonders of time in that kind; but of their affections
towards learning and perfections in learning it is pertinent
to say somewhat.

(11) Alexander was bred and taught under Aristotle, the
great philosopher, who dedicated divers of his books of philo-
sophy unto him ; he was attended with Callisthenes and divers
other learned persons, that followed him in camp, throughout
his journeys and conquests. What price and estimation he
had learning in doth notably appear in these three particulars :
first, in the envy he used to express that he bare towards
Achilles, in this, that he had so good a trumpet of his praises
as Homer’s verses ; secondly, in the judgment or solution ho
gave torching that precious cabinet of Darius, which was found
among his jewels (whereof question was made what thing was
worthy to be put into it, and he gave his opinion for Homer’s
works); thirdly, in his letter to Aristotle, after he had set
forth his books of nature, wherein he expostulateth with him
for publishing the secrets or mysteries of philosophy ; and gave
him to understand that himself esteemed it more to excel
other men in learning and knowledge than in power and
empire. And what use he had of learning doth appear, or
rather shine, in all his speeches and answers, being full of
science and use of science, and that in all variety.

(12) And herein again it may seem a thing scholastical, and
somewhat idle to recite things that every man knoweth ; but

THE FIRST BOOK. Si
>

yet, since the argument I handle leadeth me thereunto, I am
glad that men shall perceive I am as willing to flatter (if they
will so call it) an Alexander, or a Cesar, or an Antoninus, that
are dead many hundred years since, as any that now liveth ;
for it is the displaying of the glory of learning in sovereignty
that I propound to myself, and not a humour of declaiming
in any man’s praises. Observe, then, the speech he used of
Diogenes, and see if it tend not to the true state of one of the
greatest questions of moral philosophy : whether the enjoying
of outward things, or the contemning of them, be the greatest
happiness ; for when he saw Diogenes so perfectly contented
with so little, he said to those that mocked at his condition,
““Were I not Alexander, I would wish to be Diogenes.” But
Seneca inverteth it, and saith, ‘ Plus erat, quod hic nollet
accipere, quam quod ille posset dare.” There were more things
which Diogenes would have refused than those were which
Alexander could have given or enjoyed.

(13) Observe, again, that speech which was usual with him,
“That he felt his mortality chiefly in two things, sleep and
lust ;” and see if it were not a speech extracted out of the
depth of natural philosophy, and liker to have come out of the
mouth of Aristotle or Democritus than from Alexander.

(14) See, again, that speech of humanity and poesy, when,
upon the bleeding of his wounds, he called unto him one of his
flatterers, that was wont to ascribe to him divine honour, and
said, ‘‘Look, this is very blood; this is not such a liquor as
Homer speaketh of, which ran from Venus’ hand when it was
pierced by Diomedes.”

(15) See likewise his readiness in reprehension of logic in the
speech he used to Cassander, upon a complaint that was made
against his father Antipater ; for when Alexander happened to
say, ‘‘ Do you think these men would have come from so far to
complein except they had just cause of grief ?” and Cassander
answered, “‘ Yea, that was the matter, because they thought
they should not be disproved ;” said Alexander, laughing,
“* See the subtleties of Aristotle, to take a matter both ways,
pro et contra, &e.”

(16) But note, again, how well he could use the same art
which he reprehended to serve his own humour : when bearing
a secret grudge to Callisthenes, because he was against the
new ceremony of his adoration, feasting one night where the
same Callisthenes was at the table, it was moved by some
after supper, for entertainment sake, that Callisthenes, who
was an eloquent man, might speak of some theme or purpose
at his own choice ; which Callisthenes did, choosing the praise

52 THE ADVANCEMENT OF LEARNING.

of the Macedonian nation for his discourse, and performing the
same with so good manner as the hearers were much ravished ;
whereupon Alexander, nothing pleased, said, “It was easy to
be eloquent upon so good a subject; but,” saith he, “turn
your style, and let us hear what you can say against us;”
which Callisthenes presently undertook, and did with that
sting and life that Alexander interrupted him, and said, “‘ The
goodness of the cause made him eloquent before, and despite
made him eloquent then again.”

(17) Consider further, for tropes of rhetoric, that excellent
use of a metaphor or translation, wherewith he taxed Antipater,
who was an imperious and tyrannous governor; for when one
of Antipater’s friends commended him to Alexander for his
moderation, that he did not degenerate as his other lieutenants
did into the Persian pride, in use of purple, but kept the
ancient habit of Macedon, of black. ‘‘ True,” saith Alexander ;
“but Antipater is all purple within.” Or that other, when
Parmenio came to him in the plain of Arbela and showed him
the innumerable multitude of his enemies, specially as they
appeared by the infinite number of lights as it had been a new
firmament of stars, and thereupon advised him to assail them
by night ; whereupon he answered, ‘“ That he would not steal
the victory.”

(18) For matter of policy, weigh that significant distinction,
so much in all ages embraced, that he made between his two
friends Hephestion and Craterus, when he said, “‘ That the
one loved Alexander, and the other loved the king : ” describing
the principal difference of princes’ best servants, that some in
affection love their person, and other in duty love their crown.

(19) Weigh also that excellent taxation of an error, ordinary
with counsellors of princes, that they counsel their masters
according to the model of their own mind and fortune, and
not of their masters. When upon Darius’ great offers Parmenio
had said, ‘‘Surely I would accept these offers were I as
Alexander ;” saith Alexander, ‘‘So would I were I as
Parmenio.”

(20) Lastly, weigh that quick and acute reply which he made
when he gave so large gifts to his friends and servants, and was
asked what he did reserve for himself, and he answered,
‘‘Hope.” Weigh, I say, whether he had not cast up his
account aright, because hope must be the portion of all that
resolve upon great enterprises; for this was Czsar’s portion
when he went first into Gaul, his estate being then utterly
overthrown with largesses. And this was likewise the portion
of that noble prince, howsoever transported with ambition,

THE FIRST BOOK. 53

Henry Duke of Guise, of whom it was usually said that he
was the greatest usurer in France, because he had turned all
his estate into obligations.

(21) To conclude, therefore, as certain critics are used to
say hyperbolically, ‘‘ That if all sciences were lost they might
be found in Virgil,” so certainly this may be said truly, there
are the prints and footsteps of learning in those few speeches
which are reported of this prince, the admiration of whom,
when I consider him not as Alexander the Great, but as
Aristotle’s scholar, hath carried me too far.

(22) As for Julius Cesar, the excellency of his learning
needeth not to be argued from his education, or his company,
or his speeches ; but in a further degree doth declare itself in
his writings and works : whereof some are extant and per-
manent, and some unfortunately perished. For first, we see
there is left unto us that excellent history of his own wars,
which he entitled only a Commentary, wherein all succeeding
times have admired the solid weight of matter, and the real
passages and lively images of actions and persons, expressed in
the greatest propriety of words and perspicuity of narration
that ever was; which that it was not the effect of a natural
gift, but of learning and precept, is well witnessed by that
work of his entitled De Analogia, being a grammatical philo-
sophy, wherein he did labour to make this same Vox ad placitum
to become Vox ad licitum, and to reduce custom of speech to
congruity of speech ; and took as it were the pictures of words
from the life of reason.

(23) So we receive from him, as a monument both of his
power and learning, the then reformed computation of the
year; well expressing that he took it to be as great a glory to
himself to observe and know the law of the heavens, as to give
law to men upon the earth.

(24) So likewise in that book of his, Anti-Cato, it may easily
appear that he did aspire as well to victory of wit as victory
of war: undertaking therein a conflict against the greatest
champion with the pen that then lived, Cicero the orator.

(25) So, again, in his book of Apophthegms, which he col-
lected, we see that he esteemed it more honour to make him-
self but a pair of tables, to take the wise and pithy words of
others, than to have every word of his own to be made an
apophthegm or an oracle, as vain princes, by custom of flattery,
pretend to do. And yetif I should enumerate divers of his
speeches, as I did those of Alexander, they are truly such as
Solomon noteth, when he saith, Verba sapientum tanquam
aculei, et tanquam clavi in altum defixi; whereof I will only

54 THE ADVANCEMENT OF LEARNING.

recite three, not so delectable for elegancy, but admirable for
vigour and efficacy.

(26) As first, it is reason he be thought a master of words,
that could with one word appease a mutiny in his army, which
was thus : The Romans, when their generals did speak to their
army, did use the word Milites, but when the magistrates
spake to the people they did use the word Quirites. The
soldiers were in tumult, and seditiously prayed to be cashiered ;
not that they so meant, but by expostulation thereof to draw
Gzesar to other conditions ; wherein he being resolute not to
give way, after some silence, he began his speech, Ego Quirites,
which did admit them already cashiered—wherewith they were
so surprised, crossed, and confused, as they would not suffer
him to go on in his speech, but relinquished their demands,
and made it their suit to be again called by the name of Mzilites.

(27) The second speech was thus: Cesar did extremely
affect the name of king; and some were set on as he passed by
in popular acclamation to salute him king. Whereupon, find-
ing the ery weak and poor, he put it off thus, in a kind of jest,
as if they had mistaken hissurname: Non Rex sum, sed Cesar ;
a speech that, if it be searched, the life and fulness of it can
scarce be expressed. For, first, it was a refusal of the name,
but yet not sericus; again, it did signify an infinite confidence
and magnanimity, as if he presumed Czsar was the greater
title, as by his worthiness it is come to pass till this day. But
chiefly it was a speech of great allurement toward his own pur-
pose, as if the state did strive with him but for a name, whereof
mean families were vested; for Rex was a surname with the
Romans, as well as King is with us.

(28) The last speech which I will mention was used to
Metellus, when Czesar, after war declared, did possess himself
of the city of Rome; at which time, entering into the inner
treasury to take the money there accumulate, Metellus, being
tribune, forbade him. Whereto Cesar said, “That if he did
not desist, he would lay him dead in the place.” And

resently taking himself up, he added, “Young man, it is
hard for me to speak it than to do it —Adolescens, durius
est mihi hoc dicere quam facere.” A speech compounded of the
greatest terror and greatest clemency that could proceed out of
the mouth of man.

(29) But to return and conclude with him, it is evident him-
self knew well his own perfection in learning, and took it upon
him, as appeared when upon occasion that some spake what
a strange resolution it was in Lucius Sylla to resign his dicta-
ture, he, scoffing at him to his own advantage, answered, *‘ That

THE FIRST BOOK. 55

Sylla could not skill of letters, and therefore knew not how
to dictate.”

(30) And here it were fit to leave this point, touching the
concurrence of military virtue and learning (for what example
should come with any grace after those two of Alexander and
' Cesar ?), were it not in regard of the rareness of circumstance,
that I find in one other particular, as that which did so
suddenly pass from extreme scorn to extreme wonder: and it
is of Xenophon the philosopher, who went from Socrates’
school into Asia in the expedition of Cyrus the younger against
King Artaxerxes. This Xenophon at that time was very
young, and never had seen the wars before, neither had any
command in the army, but only followed the war as a voluntary,
for the love and conversation of Proxenus, his friend. He was
present when Falinus came in message from the great king to
the Grecians, after that Cyrus was slain in the field, and they,
a handful of men, left to themselves in the midst of the king’s
territories, cut off from their country by many navigable
rivers and many hundred miles. The message imported that
they should deliver up their arms and submit themselves to
the king’s mercy. To which message, before answer was made,
divers of the army conferred familiarly with Falinus; and
amongst the rest Xenophon happened to say, “‘ Why, Falinus,
we have now but these two things left, our arms and our
virtue ; and if we yield up our arms, how shall we make use
of our virtue?” Whereto Falinus, smiling on him, said, ‘‘If I
be not deceived, young gentleman, you are an Athenian, and I
believe you study philosophy, and it is pretty that you say ;
but you are much abused if you think your virtue can with-
stand the king’s power.” Here was the scorn; the wonder
followed: which was that this young scholar or philosopher,
after all the captains were murdered in parley by treason, con-
ducted those ten thousand foot, through the heart of all the
king’s high countries, from Babylon to Grecia in safety, in
despite of all the king’s forces, to the astonishment of the
world, and the encouragement of the Grecians in times suc-
ceeding to make invasion upon the kings of Persia, as was
after purposed by Jason the Thessalian, attempted by Agesilaus
the Spartan, and achieved by Alexander the Macedonian, all
upon the ground of the act of that young scholar.

VIII. (1) To proceed now from imperial and military virtue
to moral and private virtue ; first, itisan assured truth, which
is contained in the verses :—

“Scilicet ingenuas didicisse fideliter artes
Emollit mores nec sinit esse feros,”

56 THE ADVANCEMENT OF LEARNING.

It taketh away the wildness and barbarism and fierceness ot
men’s minds ; but indeed the accent had need be upon jfideliter ;
for a little superficial learning doth rather work a contrary
effect. It taketh away all levity, temerity, and insolency, by
copious suggestion of all doubts and difficulties, and acquaint-
ing the mind to balance reasons on both sides, and to turn back
the first offers and conceits of the mind, and to accept of
nothing but examined and tried. It taketh away vain ad-
miration of anything, which is the root of all weakness. For
all things are admired, either because they are new, or because
they are great. For novelty, no man that wadeth in learning
or contemplation throughly but will find that printed in his
heart, Wil novi super terram. Neither can any man marvel at
the play of puppets, that goeth behind the curtain, and ad-
viseth well of the motion. And for magnitude, as Alexander
the Great, after that he was used to great armies, and the
great conquests of the spacious provinces in Asia, when he
received letters out of Greece, of some fights and services there,
which were commonly for a passage or a fort, or some walled
town at the most, he said :—‘‘It seemed to him that he was
advertised of the battles of the frogs and the mice, that the
old tales went of.” So certainly, if a man meditate much
upon the universal frame of nature, the earth with men upon
it (the divineness of souls except) will not seem much other
than an ant-hill, whereas some ants carry corn, and some
carry their young, and some go empty, and all to and fro a
little heap of dust. It taketh away or mitigateth fear of
death or adverse fortune, which is one of the greatest impedi-
ments of virtue and imperfections of manners. For if a man’s
mind be deeply seasoned with the consideration of the mor-
tality and corruptible nature of things, he will easily concur
with Epictetus, who went forth one day and saw a woman
weeping for her pitcher of earth that was broken, and went
forth the next day and saw a woman weeping for her son that
was dead, and thereupon said, ‘‘ Heri vidi fragilem frangi, hodie
vidi mortalem mori.” And, therefore, Virgil did excellently
and profoundly couple the knowledge of causes and the con-
quest of all fears together, as concomitantia.

“ Felix, qui potuit rerum cognoscere causas,
Quique metus omnes, eb Inéxorabike fatum
Subjecit yedibus, strepitumque Acherontis avari.”

(2) It were too long to go over the particular remedies
which learning doth minister to all the diseases of the mind :
sometimes purging the ill humours, sometimes opening the

THE FIRST BOOK. 57

obstructions, sometimes helping digestion, sometimes increasing
appetite, sometimes healing the wounds and exulcerations
thereof, and the like ; and, therefore, I will conclude with that
which hath rationem totius—which is, that it disposeth the
constitution of the mind not to be fixed or settled in the de-
fects thereof, but still to be capable and susceptible of
growth and reformation. For the unlearned man knows not
what it is to descend into himself, or to call himself to account,
nor the pleasure of that suavissima vita, indies sentire se fieri
meliorem. The good parts he hath he will learn to show to the
full, and use them dexterously, but not much to increase them.
The faults he hath he will learn how to hide and colour them,
but not much to amend them; like an ill mower, that mows
on still, and never whets his scythe. Whereas with the
learned man it fares otherwise, that he doth ever intermix the
correction and amendment of his mind with the use and em-
ployment thereof. Nay, further, in general and in sum,
certain it is that Veritas and Bonitas differ but as the seal and
the print ; for truth prints goodness, and they be the clouds
of error which descend in the storms of passions and pertur-
bations.

(3) From moral virtue let us pass on to matter of power and
commandment, and consider whether in right reason there be
any comparable with that wherewith knowledge investeth and
crowneth man’s nature. We see the dignity of the command-
ment is according to the dignity of the commanded; to have
commandment over beasts as herdmen have, is a thing con-
temptible; to have commandment over children as school-
masters have, is a matter of small honour ; to have command-
ment over galley-slaves is a disparagement rather than an
honour. Neither is the commandment of tyrants much better,
over people which have put off the generosity of their
minds ; and, therefore, it was ever holden that honours in free
monarchies and commonwealths had a sweetness more than in
tyrannies, because the commandment extendeth more over the
wills of men, and not only over their deeds and services. And
therefore, when Virgil putteth himself forth to attribute to
Augustus Cesar the best of human honours, he doth it in these
words :—

**Victorque volentes
Per populos dat jura, viamque affectat Olympo.”

But yet the commandment of knowledge is yet higher than the
- commandment over the will; for it is a commandment over the
reason, belief, and understanding of man, which is the highest

58 THE ADVANCEMENT OF LEARNING.

rt of the mind, and giveth law to the will itself. For there
is no power on earth which setteth up a throne or chair of
estate in the spirits and souls of men, and in their cogita-
tions, imaginations, opinions, and beliefs, but knowledge and
learning. And therefore we see the detestable and extreme
pleasure that arch-heretics, and false prophets, and impostors
are transported with, when they once find in themselves that
they have a superiority in the faith and conscience of men; sc
great as if they have once tasted of it, it is seldom seen that
any torture or persecution can make them relinquish or aban-
don it. But as this is that which the author of the Revelation
calleth the depth or profoundness of Satan, so by argument of
contraries, the just and lawful sovereignty over men’s under-
standing, by force of truth rightly interpreted, is that which
approacheth nearest to the similitude of the divine rule.

(4) As for fortune and advancement, the beneficence of
learning is not so confined to give fortune only to states and
commonwealths, as it doth not likewise give fortune to par-
ticular persons. For it was well noted long ago, that Homer
hath given more men their livings, than either Sylla, or
Czesar, or Augustus ever did, notwithstanding their great lar-
gesses and donatives, and distributions of lands to so many
legions. And no doubt it is hard to say whether arms or
learning have advanced greater numbers. And in case of
sovereignty we see, that if arms or descent have carried away
the kingdom, yet learning hath carried the priesthood, which
ever hath been in some competition with empire.

(5) Again, for the pleasure and delight of knowledge and
learning, it far surpasseth all other in nature. For, shall the
pleasures of the affections so exceed the pleasure of the sense,
as much as the obtaining of desire or victory exceedeth a song
or a dinner? and must not of consequence the pleasures of the
intellect or understanding exceed the pleasures of the affec-
tions? We seein all other pleasures there is satiety, and after
they be used, their verdure departeth, which showeth well they
be but deceits of pleasure, and not pleasures ; and that it was
the novelty which pleased, and not the quality. And, therefore,
we see that voluptuous men turn friars, and ambitious princes
turn melancholy. But of knowledge there is no satiety, but
satisfaction and appetite are perpetually interchangeable ; and,
therefore, appeareth to be good in itself simply, without fallacy
or accident. Neither is that pleasure of small efficacy and
contentment to the mind of man, which the poet Lucretius
describeth elegantly :—

“Suave mari magno, turbantibus equora ventis, Sc,”

THE FIRST BOOK. 59

‘*It is a view of delight,” saith he, ‘‘to stand or walk upon
the shore side, and to see a ship tossed with tempest upon the
sea; or to be in a fortified tower, and to see two battles join
upon a plain. But it is a pleasure incomparable, for the mind.
of man to be settled, landed, and fortified in the certainty of
truth ; and from thence to descry and behold the errors, per-
turbations, labours, and wanderings up and down of other

men.

(6) Lastly, leaving the vulgar arguments, that by learning
man excelleth man in that wherein man excelleth beasts ; that
by learning man ascendeth to the heavens and their motions,
where in body he cannot come ; and the like: let us conclude
with the dignity and excellency of knowledge and learning in
that whereunto man’s nature doth most aspire, which is im-
mortality or continuance; for to this tendeth generation,
and raising of houses and families; to this tend buildings,
foundations; and monuments; to this tendeth the desire of
memory, fame, and celebration ; and in effect the strength of
all other human desires. We see then how far the monuments
of wit and learning are more durable than the monuments of
power or of the hands. For have not the verses of Homer
continued twenty-five hundred years, or more, without the
loss of a syllable or letter ; during which time infinite palaces,
temples, castles, cities, have been decayed and demolished?
It is not possible to have the true pictures or statues of Cyrus,
Alexander, Czesar, no nor of the kings or great personages of
much later years ; for the originals cannot last, and the copies
cannot but leese of the life and truth. But the images of
men’s wits and knowledges remain in books, exempted from
the wrong of time and capable of perpetual renovation.
Neither are they fitly to be called images, hecause they
generate still, and cast their seeds in the minds of others, pro-
voking and causing infinite actions and opinions in succeeding
ages. So that if the invention of the ship was thought so
noble, which carrieth riches and commodities from place to
place, and consociateth the most remote regions in participa-
tion of their fruits, how much more are letters to be magnified,
which as ships pass through the vast seas of time, and make
ages so distant to participate of the wisdom, illuminations,
and inventions, the one of the other? Nay, further, we see
some of the philosophers which were least divine, and most
immersed in the senses, and denied generally the immortality
of the soul, yet came to this point, that whatsoever motions
the spirit of man could act and perform without the organs of
the body, they thought might remain after death, which were

60 THE ADVANCEMENT OF LEARNING.

only those of the understanding and not of the affection; so
immortal and incorruptible a thing did knowledge seem unto
them to be. But we, that know by divine revelation that not
only the understanding but the affections purified, not only
the spirit but the body changed, shall be advanced to immor-
tality, do disclaim in these rudiments of the senses. But it
must be remembered, both in this last point, and so it may
likewise be needful in other places, that in probation of the
dignity of knowledge or learning, I did in the beginning
separate divine testimony from human, which method I have
pursued, and so handled them both apart.

(7) Nevertheless I do not pretend, and I know it will be
impossible for me, by any pleading of mine, to reverse the
judgment, either of A’sop’s cock, that preferred the barleycorn
before the gem; or of Midas, that being chosen judge between
Apollo, president of the Muses, and Pan, god of the flocks,
judged for plenty ; or of Paris, that judged for beauty and love
against wisdom and power ; or of Agrippina, occidat matrem,
modo imperet, that preferred empire with any condition never
so detestable ; or of Ulysses, qui vetulam pretulit immortalitati,
being a figure of those which prefer custom and habit before
all excellency, or of a number of the like popular judgments.
For these things must continue as they have been ; but so will
that also continue whereupon learning hath ever relied, and
which faileth not: Justijicata est sapientia a filiis suis.

THE SECOND BOOK. 61

THE SECOND BOOK.

To the King.

1. It might seem to have more convenience, though it come
often otherwise to pass (excellent King), that those which are
fruitful in their generations, and have in themselves the fore-
sight of immortality in their descendants, should likewise be
more careful of the good estate of future times, unto which
they know they must transmit and commend over their dearest
pledges. Queen Elizabeth was a sojourner in the world in
respect of her unmarried life, and was a blessing to her own
times ; and yet so as the impression of her good government,
besides her happy memory, is not without some effect which
doth survive her. But to your Majesty, whom God hath
already blessed with so much royal issue, worthy to continue
and represent you for ever, and whose youthful and fruitful
bed doth yet promise many the like renovations, it is proper
and agreeable to be conversant not only in the transitory parts
of good government, but in those acts also which are in their
nature permanent and perpetual. Amongst the which (if
affection do not transport me) there is not any more worthy
than the further endowment of the world with sound and
fruitful knowledge. For why should a few received authors
stand up like Hercules’ columns, beyond which there should be
no sailing or discovering, since we have so bright and benign a
star as your Majesty to conduct and prosper us? To return
therefore where we left, it remaineth to consider of what kind
those acts are which have been undertaken and performed by
kings and others for the increase and advancement of learning,
wherein I purpose to speak actively, without digressing or
dilating.

2. Let this ground therefore be laid, that all works are over
common by amplitude of reward, by soundness of direction,
and by the conjunction of labours. The first multiplieth en-
deavour, the second preventeth error, and the third supplieth
the frailty of man. But the principal of these is direction, for
claudus in via antevertit cursorem extra viam ; and Solomon
excellently setteth it down, ‘‘If the iron be not sharp, it re-
quireth more strength, but wisdom is that which prevaileth,”

62, THE ADVANCEMENT OF LEARNING.

signifying that the invention or election of the mean is more
effectual than any enforcement or accumulation of endeavours.
This I am induced to speak, for that (not derogating from the
noble intention of any that have been deservers towards the
state of learning), I do observe nevertheless that their works
and acts are rather matters of magnificence and memory than
of progression and proficience, and tend rather to augment the
mass of learning in the multitude of learned men than to
rectify or raise the sciences themselves.

3. The works or acts of merit towards learning are conversant
about three objects—the places of learning, the books of learn-
ing, and the persons of the learned. For as water, whether it
be the dew of heaven or the springs of the earth, doth scatter
and leese itself in the ground, except it be collected into
some receptacle where it may by union comfort and sustain
itself ; and for that cause the industry of man hath made and
framed springheads, conduits, cisterns, and pools, which men
have accustomed likewise to beautify and adorn with accom-
plishments of magnificence and state, as well as of use and
necessity ; so this excellent liquor of knowledge, whether it
descend from divine inspiration, or spring from human sense,
would soon perish and vanish to oblivion, if it were not pre-
served in books, traditions, conferences, and places appointed,
as universities, colleges, and schools, for the receipt and com-
forting of the same.

4, The works which concern the seats and places of learning
are four—foundations and buildings, endowments with re-
venues, endowments with franchises and privileges, institutions
and ordinances for government—all tending to quietness and

rivateness of life, and discharge of cares and troubles; much
fico the stations which Virgil prescribeth for the hiving of
bees :
‘¢ Principio sedes apibus statioque petenda,
Quo neque sit ventis aditus, &c.”’

5. The works touching books are two—first, libraries, which
are as the shrines where all the relics of the ancient saints, full
of true virtue, and that without delusion or imposture, are
preserved and reposed ; secondly, new editions of authors, with
more correct impressions, more faithful translations, more
profitable glosses, more diligent annotations, and the like.

6. The works pertaining to the persons of learned men (be+
sides the advancement and countenancing, of them in general)
are two—the reward and designation of readers in sciences
already extant and invented; and the reward and designation

THE SECOND BOOK. 63

of writers and inquirers concerning any parts of learning not
sufficiently laboured and prosecuted.

7. These are summarily the works and acts wherein the
merits of many excellent princes and other worthy personages
have been conversant. As for any particular commemora-
tions, I call to mind what Cicero said when he gave general
thanks, Difficile non aliquem, ingratum quenquam preterire.
Let,us rather, according to the Scriptures, look unto that part
of the race which is before us, than look back to that which is
already attained.

8. First, therefore, amongst so many great foundations of
colleges in Europe, I find strange that they are all dedicated
to professions, and none left free to arts and sciences at large.
For if men judge that learning should be referred to action,
they judge well; but in this they fall into the error described
in the ancient fable, in which the other parts of the body did
suppose the stomach had been idle, because it neither per-
formed the office of motion, as the limbs do, nor of sense, as
the head doth; but yet notwithstanding it is the stomach
that digesteth and distributeth to all the rest. So if any man
think philosophy and universality to be idle studies, he doth
not consider that all professions are from thence served and
supplied. And this I take to be a great cause that hath
hindered the progression of learning, because these funda-
mental knowledges have been studied but in passage. For if
you will have a tree bear more fruit than it hath used to do,
it is not anything you can do to the boughs, but it is the
stirring of the earth and putting new mould about the roots
that must work it. Neither is it to be forgotten, that this
dedicating of foundations and dotations to professory learning
hath not only had a malign aspect and influence upon the
growth of sciences, but hath also been prejudicial to states
and governments. For hence it proceedeth that princes find a
solitude in regard of able men to serve them in causes of
estate, because there is no education collegiate which is free,
where such as were so disposed might give themselves in
histories, modern languages, books of policy and civil dis-
course, and other the like enablements unto service of estate.

9. And because founders of colleges do plant, and founders
of lectures do water, it followeth well in order to speak of the
defect which is in public lectures; namely, in the smallness
and meanness of the salary or reward which in most places is

“assigned unto them, whether they be lectures of arts, or of
professions. For it is necessary to the progression of sciences
that readers be of the most able and sufficient men; as those

64 THE ADVANCEMENT OF LEARNING.

which are ordained for generating and propagating of sciences,
and not for transitory usc. This cannot be, except their con-
dition and endowment be such as may content the ablest man
to appropriate his whole labour and continue his whole age in
that function and attendance; and therefore must have a pro-
portion answerable to that mediocrity or competency of ad-
vancement, which may be expected from a profession or the
practice of a profession. So as, if you will have sciences
flourish, you must observe David’s military law, which was,
‘That those which stayed with the carriage should have equal
part with those which were in the action ;” else will the car-
riages be ill attended. So readers in sciences are indeed the
guardians of the stores and provisions of sciences, whence men
in active courses are furnished, and therefore ought to have
equal entertainment with them ; otherwise if the fathers in
sciences be of the weakest sort or be ill maintained,

“ Bt patrum invalidi referent jejunia nati.”

10. Another defect I note, wherein I shall need some al-
chemist to help me, who call upon men to sell their bocks,
and to build furnaces; quitting and forsaking Minerva and
the Muses as barren virgins, and relying upon Vulcan. But
certain it is, that unto the deep, fruitful, and operative study
of many sciences, specially natural philosophy and physic,
books be not only the instrumentals ; wherein also the bene-
ficence of men hath not been altogether wanting. For we see
spheres, globes, astrolabes, maps, and the like, have been pro-
vided as appurtenances to astronomy and cosmography, as
well as books. We see likewise that some places instituted for
physic have annexed the commodity of gardens for simples of
all sorts, and do likewise command the use of dead bodies for
anatomies. But these do respect but a fewthings. In general,
there will hardly be any main proficience in the disclosing of
nature, except there be some allowance for expenses about
experiments; whether they be experiments appertaining to
Vulcanus or Deedalus, furnace or engine, or any other kind.
And therefore as secretaries and spials of princes and states
bring in bills for intelligence, so you must allow the spials and
intelligencers of nature to bring in their bills; or else you
shall be ill advertised.

11. And if Alexander made such a liberal assignation to
Aristotle of treasure for the allowance of hunters, fowlers,
fishers, and the like, that he might compile a history of
nature, much better do they deserve it that travail in arts of |
nature.

THE SECOND BOOK. 65

12. Another defect which I note is an intermission or
neglect in those which are governors in universities, of con-
sultation, and in princes or superior persons, of visitation : to
enter into account and consideration, whether the readings,
exercises, and other customs appertaining unto learning,
anciently begun and since continued, be well instituted or no :
and thereupon to ground an amendment or reformation in
that which shall be found inconvenient. For it is one of your
Majesty’s own most wise and princely maxims, ‘‘ That in all
usages and precedents, the times be considered wherein they
first began ; which if they were weak orignorant, it derogateth
from the authority of the usage, and leaveth it for suspect.”
And therefore inasmuch as most of the usages and orders of
the universities were derived from more obscure times, it is the
more requisite they be re-examined. In this kind I will give
an instance or two, for example sake, of things that are the
most obvious and familiar. The one is a matter, which though
it be ancient and general, yet I hold to be an error 3 which is,
that scholars in universities come too soon and too unripe to
logic and rhetoric, arts fitter for graduates than children and
novices. For these two, rightly taken, are the gravest of
sciences, being the arts of arts; the one for judgment, the
other for ornament. And they be the rules and directions
how to set forth and dispose matter : and therefore for minds
empty and unfraught with matter, and which have not
gathered that which Cicero calleth sylva and supellex, stuff
and variety, to begin with those arts (as if one should learn to
weigh, or to measure, or to paint the wind) doth work but
this effect, that the wisdom of those arts, which is great and
universal, is almost made contemptible, and is degenerate into
childish sophistry and ridiculous affectation. And further,
the untimely learning of them hath drawn on by consequence
the superficial and unprofitable teaching and writing of them,
as fitteth indeed to the capacity of children. Another is a
lack I find in the exercises used in the universities, which do
make too great a divorce between invention and memory. For
their speeches are either premeditate, in verbis conceptis, where
nothing is left to invention, or merely extemporal, where little
is left to memory. Whereas in life and action there is least
use of either of these, but rather of intermixtures of premedi-
tation and invention, notes and memory. So as the exercise
fitteth not the practice, nor the image the life; and it is ever
a true rule in exercises, that they be framed as near as may be
to the life of practice; for otherwise they do pervert the
motions and faculties of the mind, and not prepare them,

o—S4

66 THE ADVANCEMENT OF LEARNING.

The truth whereof is not obscure, when scholars come to the
practices of professions, or other actions of civil life ; which
when they set into, this want is soon found by themselves,
and sooner by others. But this part, touching the amendment
of the institutions and orders of universities, I will conclude
with the clause of Czsar’s letter to Oppius and Balbes, Hoc
quemadmodum fiert possit, nonnulla mihi in mentem veniunt,
et multa reperiri possunt: de tis rebus rogo vos ut cogitationem
suscipratis.

13. Another defect which I note ascendeth a little higher
than the precedent. For as the proficience of learning con-
sisteth much in the orders and institutions of universities
in the same states and kingdoms, so it would be yet
more advanced, if there were more intelligence mutual
between the universities of Europe than now there is. We
see there be many orders and foundations, which though they
be divided under several sovereignties and territories, yet they
take themselves to have a kind of contract, fraternity, and
correspondence one with the other, insomuch as they have

rovincials and generals. And surely as nature createth

rotherhood in families, and arts mechanical contract brother-
hoods in communalties, and the anointment of God superin-
duceth a brotherhood in kings and bishops, so in like manner
there cannot but be a fraternity in learning and illumination,
relating to that paternity which is attributed to God, who is
called the Father of illuminations or lights.

14. The last defect which I will note is, that there hath
not been, or very rarely been, any public designation of writers
or inquirers concerning such parts of knowledge as may appear
not to have been already sufficiently laboured or undertaken ;
unto which point it is an inducement to enter into a view and
examination what parts of learning have been prosecuted, and
what omitted. For the opinion of plenty is amongst the

causes of want, and the great quantity of books maketh a |

show rather of superfluity than lack ; which surcharge never-
theless is not to be remedied by making no more books, but
by making more good books, which, as the serpent of Moses,
might devour the serpents of the enchanters.

15. The removing of all the defects formerly enumerate,
except the last, and of the active part also of the last (which
is the designation of writers), are opera basilica ; towards which

crossway, that may point at the way, but cannot goit. But

-the inducing part of the latter (which is the survey of learn-

ing) may be set forward by private travail. Wherefore I will 7

‘ho Seer @) we CR Oe Oe Oe Td

Pe Fe ees ee AY

THE SECOND ROOK. 67

how attempt to make a general and faithful perambulation of
learning, with an inquiry what parts thereof lie fresh and
waste, and not improved and converted by the industry of

my puryose is at this time to note only omissions and def-
ciences, and not to make any redargution of errors or incom-
plete prosecutions, For it is one thing to set forth what
ground lieth unmanured, and another thing to correct il]

perform myself, or accept from another, that duty of humanity
7 vam qui erranti comiter monstrat viam, dc. I do foresee
likewise that of those things which T shall enter and register
as deficiences and omissions, many will conceive and censure

but curiosities, and things of no great use; and others to be
of too great difficulty, and almost Impossibility to be com-
passed and effected. But for the two first, I refer myself to
the particulars. For the last, touching impossibility, T take it
those things are to be held possible which may be done by some

though not by private endeavour, But, notwithstanding, if
_ any man will take to himself rather that of Solomon, “ Dicit
- piger, Leo est in via,” than that of Virgil, “‘ Possunt quia posse
_ videntur,” T shall be content that my labours be esteemed but
_ as the better sort of wishes ; for as it asketh some knowledge
_ todemand a question not impertinent, so it requireth some
_ sense to make a wish not absurd,
I. (1) The parts of human learning have reference to the three
° ore of man’s understanding, which is the seat of learning ; |
history to his memory, poesy to his imagination, and philo-.
Sophy to his reason, Divine learning receiveth the same.
A distribution ; for the spirit of man is the same, though the

68 THE ADVANCEMENT OF LEARNING.

revelation of oracle and sense be diverse. So as theology con-
sisteth also of history of the Church; of parables, which is
divine poesy ; and of holy doctrine or precept. For as for that
part which seemeth supernumerary, which is prophecy, it is
but divine history, which hath that prerogative over human, as
the narration may be before the fact as well as after.

(2) History is natural, civil, ecclesiastical, and literary ;
whereof the first three I allow as extant, the fourth I note es
deficient. For no man hath propounded to himself the general
state of learning to be described and represented from age to
age, as many have done the works of Nature, and the state,
civil and ecclesiastical ; without which the history of the world
seemeth to me to be as the statue of Polyphemus with his eye
out, that part being wanting which doth most show the spirit
and life of the person. And yet Iam not ignorant that in
divers particular sciences, as of the jurisconsults, the mathema-
ticians, the rhetoricians, the philosophers, there are set down
some small memorials of the schools, authors, and books ; and
so likewise some barren relations touching the invention of
arts or usages. But a just story of learning, containing the
antiquities and originals of knowledges and their sects, their
inventions, their traditions, their diverse administrations and
managings, their flourishings, their oppositions, decays, de-
pressions, oblivions, removes, with the causes and occasions of
them, and all other events concerning learning, throughout
the ages of the world, I may truly affirm to be wanting; the
use and end of which work1 do not so much design for curiosity
or satisfaction of those that are the lovers of learning, but
chiefly for a more serious and grave purpose, which is this in
few words, that it will make learned men wise in the use and
administration of learning. For itis not Saint Augustine’s nor
Saint Ambrose’s works that will make so wise a divine as
ecclesiastical history thoroughly read and observed, and the
same reason is of learning.

(3) History of Nature is of three sorts; of Nuture in course,
of Nature erring or varying, and of Nature altered or wrought 3.
that is, history of creatures, history of marvels, and history of
arts. The first of these no doubt is extant, and that in good
perfection ; the two latter are handled so weakly and unprofit-
ably as I am moved to note them as deficient. For I find no
sufficient or competent collection of the works of Nature which
have a digression and deflexion from the ordinary course of
generations, productions, and motions; whether they be’
singularities of place and region, or the strange events of time
and chance, or the effects of yet unknown properties, or the

THE SECOND BOOK. 69

instances of exception to general kinds. It is true I find a
number of books of fabulous experiments and secrets, and

frivolous impostures for pleasure and strangeness; but a sub-

stantial and severe collection of the heteroclites or irregulars of
Nature, well examined and described, I find not, specially not
with due rejection of fables and popular errors. For as things
now are, if an untruth in Nature be once on foot, what by
reason of the neglect of examination, and countenance of
antiquity, and what by reason of the use of the opinion in
similitudes and ornaments of speech, it is never called down.

(4) The use of this work, honoured with a precedent in
Aristotle, is nothing less than to give contentment to the
appetite of curious and vain wits, as the manner of Mirabilaries
is to do; but for two reasons, both of great weight: the one
to correct the partiality of axioms and opinions, which are
commonly framed only upon common and familiar examples;
the other because from the wonders of Nature is the nearest
intelligence and passage towards the wonders of art, for it is no
more but by following and, as it were, hounding Nature in her
wanderings, to be able to lead her afterwards to the same place
again. Neither am I of opinion, in this history of marvels,
that superstitious narrations of sorceries, witchcrafts, dreams,
divinations, and the like, where there is an assurance and clear
evidence of the fact, be altogether excluded. For it is not yet
known in what cases and how far effects attributed to supersti-
tion do participate of natural causes; and, therefore, howso-
ever the practice of such things is to be condemned, yet from
the speculation and consideration of them light may be taken,
not only for the discerning of the offences, but for the further
disclosing of Nature. Neither ought a man to make scruple of
entering into these things for inquisition of truth, as your
Majesty hath showed in your own example, who, with the two
clear eyes of religion and natural philosophy, have looked
deeply and wisely into these shadows, and yet proved yourself
to be of the nature of the sun, which passeth through pollu-
tions and itself remains as pure as before. But thisI hold fit,
that these narrations, which have mixture with superstition,
be sorted by themselves, and not to be mingled with the narra-
tions which are merely and sincerely natural. But as for the
narrations touching the prodigies and miracles of religions,
they are either not true or not natural; and, therefore, im-
pertinent for the story of Nature.

(5) For history of Nature, wrought or mechanical, I find
some collections made of agriculture, and likewise of manual
arts; but commonly with a rejection of experiments familiar

70 THE ADVANCEMENT OF LEARNING.

and vulgar ; for itis esteemed a kind of dishonour unto learn-
ing to descend to inquiry or meditation upon matters mechanical,
except they be such as may be thought secrets, rarities, and
special subtleties ; which humour of vain and as eed

arrogancy is justly derided in Plato, where he rings in

touching beauty, Socrates, after his wandering manner of in-
ductions, put first an example of a fair virgin, and then of a
fair horse, and then of a fair pot well glazed, whereat Hippias
was offended, and said, “‘ More than for courtesy’s sake, he did
think much to dispute with any that did allege such base and
sordid instances.” Whereunto Socrates answereth, ‘‘ You have
reason, and it becomes you well, being a man so trim in ‘your
vestments,” &c., and so goeth on in an irony. But the truth
is, they be not the highest instances that give the securest
information, as may be well expressed in the tale so common
of the philosopher that, while he gazed upwards to the stars,
fell into the water; for if he had looked down he might have
seen the stars in the water, put looking aloft he could not see
the water in the stars. So it cometh often to pass that mean
and small things discover great, better than great can discover
the small; and therefore Aristotle noteth well, ‘‘ That the
nature of everything is best seen in his smallest portions.”
And for that cause he inquireth the nature of a commonwealth,
first in a family, and the simple conjugations of man and
wife, parent and child, master and servant, which are in every
cottage. Even so likewise the nature of this great city of the
world, and the ‘policy thereof, must be first sought in mean
concordances and small portions. So we see how that secret of
Nature, of the turning of iron touched with the loadstone to-
wards the north, was found out in needles of iron, not in bars
of iron.

(6) But if my judgment be of any weight, the use of history
mechanical is of all others the most radical and fundamental
towards natural philosophy ; such natural philosophy as shall
not vanish in the fume of subtle, sublime, or delectable specu-
lation, but such as shall be operative to the endowment and
benefit of man’s life. For it will not only minister and suggest
for the present many ingenious practices in all trades, by a
connection and transferring of the observations of one art to
the use of another, when the experiences of several mysteries
shall fall under the consideration of one man’s mind; but
further, it will give a more true and real illumination concern-
ing causes and axioms than is hitherto attained. For like asa

ia ee Md
a ee ee pe ee, ee ee

THE SECOND BOOK. 71

man’s disposition is never well known till he be crossed, nor
Proteus ever changed shapes till he was straitened and held
fast ; so the passages and variations of nature cannot appear
so fully in the liberty of nature as in the triais and vexations
of art.

II. (1) For civil history, it is of three kinds ; not urffitly to be
compared with the three kinds of pictures or images. For of
pictures or images we see some are unfinished, some are perfect,
and some are defaced. So of histories we may find three
kinds: memorials, perfect histories, and antiquities; for
memorials are history unfinished, or the first or rough drafts
of history; and antiquities are history defaced, or some
remnants of history which have casually escaped the shipwreck
of time.

of the naked events and actions, without the motives or
designs, the counsels, the speeches, the pretexts, the occasions,
and other passages of action. For this is the true nature of a
commentary (though Cesar, in modesty mixed with greatness,
did for his pleasure apply the name of a commentary to the
best history of the world). Registers are collections of public
acts, as decrees of council, judicial proceedings, declarations
and letters of estate, orations, and the like, without a perfect
continuance or contexture of the thread of the narration.

(3) Antiquities, or remnants of history, are, as was said,
tanquam tabula naufragii : when industrious persons, by an
exact and scrupulous diligence and observation, out of monu-
me:.ts, names, words, proverbs, traditions, private records and
evidences, fragments of stories, passages of books that concern
not story, and the like, do save and recover somewhat from

(4) In these kinds of unperfect histories I do assign no
deficience, for they are tanquam imperfecte mista ; and there-
fore any deficience in them is but their nature. Ass for the
corruptions and moths of history, which are epitomes, the use
of them deserveth to be banished, as all men of sound judg-
ment have confessed, as those that have fretted and corroded
the sound bodies of many excellent histories, and wrought
them into base and unprofitable dregs,

5) History, which may be called just and perfect history,
is of three kinds, according to the object which it propoundeth,
or pretendeth to represent: for it either representeth a time,
or a person, or an action. The first we call chronicles, the

72 THE ADVANCEMENT OF LEARNING.

second lives, and the third narrations or relations. Of these,
although the first be the most complete and absolute kind of
history, and hath most estimation and glory, yet the second
excelleth it in profit and use, and the third in verity and
sincerity. For history of times representeth the magnitude
of actions, and the public faces and deportments of persons,
and passeth over in silence the smaller passages and motions of
men and matters. But such being the workmanship of God,
as He doth hang the greatest weight upon the smallest wires,
maxima & minimis, suspendens, it comes therefore to pass, that
such histories do rather set forth the pomp of business than the
true and inward resorts thereof. But lives, if they be well
written, propounding to themselves a person to represent, in
whom actions, both greater and smaller, public and private,
have a commixture, must of necessity contain a more true,
native, and lively representation. So again narrations and
relations of actions, as the war of Peloponnesus, the expedition
of Cyrus Minor, the conspiracy of Catiline, cannot but be more
purely and exactly true than histories of times, because they
may choose an argument comprehensible within the notice and
instructions of the writer : whereas he that undertaketh the
story of a time, specially of any length, cannot but meet with
many blanks and spaces, which he must be forced to fill up out
of his own wit and conjecture.

(6) For the history of times, I mean of civil history, the
providence of God hath made the distribution. For it hath
pleased God to ordain and illustrate two exemplar states of the
world for arms, learning, moral virtue, policy, and laws; the
state of Grecia and the state of Rome ; the histories whereof
occupying the middle part of time, have more ancient to them

(7) Now to speak of the deficiences. As to the heathen
antiquities of the world ; itis in vain to note them for deficient.
Deficient they are no doubt, consisting most of fables and
fragments ; but the deficience cannot be holpen ; for antiquity
is xe fame, caput inter nubila condit, her head is muffled from
our sight. For the history of the exemplar states, it is extant
in good perfection. Not but I could wish there were @ perfect
course of history for Grecia, from Theseus to Philopeemen
(what time the affairs of Grecia drowned and extinguished in
the affairs of Rome), and for Rome from Romulus to Justinianus,
who may be truly said to be ultimus Romanorum. In which
sequences of story the text of Thucydides and Xenophon in

THE SECOND BOOK. 73

the one, and the texts of Livius, Polybius, Sallustius, Cesar,
Appianus, Tacitus, Herodianus in the other, to be kept entire,
without any diminution at all, and only to be supplied and
continued. But this isa matter of magnificence, rather to be
commended than required; and we speak now of parts of
learning supplemental, and not of supererogation.

(8) But for modern histories, whereof there are some few
very worthy, but the greater part beneath mediocrity, leaving
the care of foreign stories to foreign states, because I will not
be curiosus in aliena republica, I cannot fail to represent to
your Majesty the unworthiness of the history of England in
the main continuance thereof, and the partiality and obliquity
of that of Scotland in the latest and largest author that
T have seen: supposing that it would be honour for your
Majesty, and a work very memorable, if this island of Great
Britain, as it is now joined in monarchy for the ages to come,
so were joined in one history for the times passed, after the
manner of the sacred history, which draweth down the story
of the ten tribes and of the two tribes as twins together. And
if it shall seem that the greatness of this work may make it
less exactly performed, there is an excellent period of a much
smaller compass of time, as to the story of England ; that is to
say, from the uniting of the Roses to the uniting of the king-
doms ; a portion of time wherein, to my understanding, there
hath been the rarest varieties that in like number of successions
of any hereditary monarchy hath been known. For it beginneth
with the mixed adeption of a crown by arms and title; an
entry by battle, an establishment by marriage ; and therefore
times answerable, like waters after a tempest, full of working
and swelling, though without extremity of storm; but well
passed through by the wisdom of the pilot, being one of the
most sufficient kings of all the number. Then followeth the
reign of a king, whose actions, howsoever conducted, had much
intermixture with the affairs of Europe, balancing and inclining
them variably ; in whose time also began that great alteration
in the state ecclesiastical, an action which seldom cometh upon
the stage. Then the reign of a minor; then an offer of a
usurpation (though it was but as febris ephemera). Then the
reign of a queen matched with a foreigner ; then of a queen
that lived solitary and unmarried, and yet her government so
masculine, as it had greater impression and operation upon the
states abroad than it any ways received from thence. And
now last, this most happy and glorious event, that this island
of Britain, divided from all the world, should be united in
itself, and that oracle of rest given ‘to Aineas, antiquam

C84

74 THE ADVANCEMENT OF LEARNING.

exquirite matrem, should now be performed and fulfilled upon
the nations of England and Scotland, being now reunited in the
ancient mother name of Britain, as a full period of all
instability and peregrinations. So that as it cometh to pass in
massive bodies, that they have certain trepidations and waver-
ings before they fix and settle, so_ it seemeth that by the
providence of God this monarchy, before it was to settle in
your majesty and your generations (in which I hope it is now
established for ever), it had these prelusive changes and
varieties.

(9) For lives, I do find strange that these times have so little
esteemed the virtues of the times, as that the writings of lives
should be no more frequent. For although there be not many
sovereign princes or absolute commanders, and that states are
most collected into monarchies, yet are there many worthy
personages that deserve better than dispersed report or barren
elogies. For herein the invention of one of the late poets is
proper, and doth well enrich the ancient fiction. For he
feigneth that at_ the end of the thread or web of every man’s
life there was a little medal containing the person’s name, and
that Time waited upon the shears, and as soon as the thread.
was cut caught the medals, and carried them to the river of
Lethe; and about the bank there were many birds flying up
and down, that would get the medals and carry them in their
beak a little while, and then let them fall into the river.
Only there were a few swans, which if they got a name would

carry it to a temple where it was consecrate. And although
many men, more mortal in their affections than in their bodies,
do esteem desire of name and memory but as a vanity and
ventosity,

“ Animi nil magnee laudis egentes ;”

which opinion cometh from that root, Non prius laudes con-
tempsimus, quam laudanda facere desivimus : yet that will not
alter Solomon’s judgment, Memoria justi cum laudibus, a
impiorum nomen putrescet: the one flourisheth, the other
either consumeth to present oblivion, or turneth to an il
odour. And therefore in that style or addition, which is and
hath been long well received and brought in use, felicis
memorice, pice memorie, bone memoria, we do acknowledge
that which Cicero saith, borrowing it from Demosthenes, that
bona fama propria possessio defunctorum ; which possession I
cannot but note that in our times it lieth much waste, and
that therein there is a deficience. ‘

(10) For narrations and relations of particular actions, there

)

THE SECOND BOOK, yt:

were also to be wished @ greater diligence therein ; for there ig
no great action but hath some good pen which attends it,

because it is an ability not common to write a Sood history,
as may well appear by the small number of them 3 yet if par-

when time should serve,

(11) There ig yet another partition of history which Cornelius
8 maketh, which is not to be orgotten, Sbeciaily with

that application which he accoupleth it¢ Withal, annajs and

Um ex dignitate populs nt repertum Sit, res illustres

annalibus, talia diurnis urbis actis mandare, So as there ig a
ind of contemplative heraldry, AS well as civil, And as

aemory, with politic discourse and observation thereupon ;
ot incorporate into the history, but Separately, and as the
ore principal in their intention ; which kind ‘of ruminated
istory I think More fit to place amongst books of Policy,

Story. For it is the true office of history to represent the
ents themselves together with the counsels, and to leave the

76 THE ADVANCEMENT OF LEARNING.
‘

observations and conclusions thereupon to the liberty and
faculty of every man’s judgment. But mixtures are things
irregular, whereof no man can define.

(18) So also is there another kind of history manifoldly
mixed, and that is history of cosmography : being compounded
of natural history, in respect of the regions themselves; of
history civil, in respect of the habitations, regiments, and
manners of the people; and the mathematics, in respect of the
climates and configurations towards the heavens: which part
of learning of all others in this latter time hath obtained most
proficience. For it may be truly affirmed to the honour of these
times, and in a virtuous emulation with antiquity, that this
great building of the world had never through-lights made in
it, till the age of us and our fathers. For although they had
knowledge of the antipodes,

**Nosque ubi primus equis Oriens afflavit anhelis,
Illic sera rubens accendit lumina Vesper,”

yet that might be by demonstration, and not in fact ; and if by
travel, it requireth the voyage but of half the globe. But to
circle the earth, as the heavenly bodies do, was not done nor
enterprised till these later times: and therefore these times
may justly bear in their word, not only plus ultra, in prece-
dence of the ancient non ultra, and tmitabile fulmen, in
precedence of the ancient non tmitabile fulmen,

““Demens qui nimbos et non imitabile fulmen,” &c.

but likewise imitabile celum ; in respect of the many memorable
voyages after the manner of heaven about the globe of the
earth.

(14) And this proficience in navigation and discoveries may
plant also an expectation of the further proficience and augmen-
tation of all sciences ; because it may seem they are ordained
by God to be coevals, that is, to meet in one age. For so the
prophet Daniel speaking of the latter times foretelleth, Plurimi
pertransibunt, et multiplex erit scientia : as if the openness and
through-passage of the world and the increase of knowledge
were appointed to be in the same ages ; as we see it is already
performed in great part: the learning of these later times not
much giving place to the former two periods or returns of
learning, the one of the Grecians, the other of the Romans.

III. (1) History ecclesiastical receiveth the same division
with history civil: but further in the propriety thereof may b
divided into the history of the Church, by a general name

THE SECOND BOOK. a7

history of prophecy; and history of providence. The first
describeth the times of the militant Church, whether it be
fluctuant, as the ark of Noah, or movable, as the ark in the
wilderness, or at rest, as the ark in the Temple? that is, the
state of the Church in persecution, in remove, and in peace.
This part I ought in no sort to note as deficient ; only I would
that the virtue and sincerity of it were according to the mass
and quantity. But I am not now in hand with censures, but
with omissions.

(2) The second, which is history of prophecy, consisteth of
two relatives—the prophecy and the accomplishment ; and,
therefore, the nature of such a work ought to be, that every
prophecy of the Scripture be sorted with the event fulfilling the
same throughout the ages of the world, both for the better con-
firmation of faith and for the better illumination of the Church
touching those parts of prophecies which are yet unfulfilled :
allowing, nevertheless, that latitude which is agreeable and
familiar unto divine prophecies, being of the nature of their
Author, with whom a thousand years are but as one day, and
therefore are not fulfilled punctually at once, but have springing
and germinant accomplishment throughout many ages, though
the height or fulness of them may refer to some one age. This
is a work which I find deficient, but is to be done with wisdom,
sobriety, and reverence, or not at all.

(3) The third, which is history of Providence, containeth that
excellent correspondence which is between God’s revealed will
and His secret will; which though it be so obscure, as for the
most part it is not legible to the natural man—no, nor many
_ times to those that behold it from the tabernacle—yet, at some
times it pleaseth God, for our better establishment and the
confuting of those which are as without God in the world, to
write it in such text and capital letters, that, as the prophet
saith, ‘‘ He thatrunneth by may read it ”—that is, mere sensual
persons, which hasten by God’s judgments, and never bend or
tix their cogitations upon them, are nevertheless in their passage
and race urged to discern it. Such are the notable events and
examples of God’s judgments, chastisements, deliverances, and
blessings ; and this is a work which has passed through the
labour of many, and therefore I cannot present as omitted.

(4) There are also other parts of learning which are ap-
pendices to history. For all the exterior proceedings of man
consist of words and deeds, whereof history doth properly re-
ceive and retain in memory the deeds ; and if words, yet but as
inducements and passages to deeds; so are there other books
and writings which are appropriate to the custody and receipt

e

78 THE ADVANCEMENT OF LEARNING.

of words only, which likewise are of three sorts—orations,
letters, and brief speeches or sayings. Orations are pleadings,
speeches of counsel, laudatives, invectives, apologies, reprehen-
sions, orations of formality or ceremony, and the like. Letters
are according to all the variety of occasions, advertisements,
advices, directions, propositions, petitions, commendatory, ex-
postulatory, satisfactory, of compliment, of pleasure, of dis-
course, and all other passages of action. And such as are
written from wise men, are of all the words of man, in my
judgment, the best; for they are more natural than orations
and public speeches, and more advised than conferences or
present speeches. So again letters of affairs from such as
manage them, or are privy to them, are of all others the best
instructions for history, and to a diligent reader the best histories
in themselves. For apophthegms, it is a great loss of that book
of Czesar’s ; for as his history, and those few letters of his which
we have, and those apophthegms which were of his own, excel
all men’s else, so I suppose would his collection of apophthegms
have done; for as for those which are collected by others, either
T have no taste in such matters or else their choice hath not
been happy. But upon these three kinds of writings I do not
insist, because I have no deficiences to propound concerning
them.

(5) Thus much therefore concerning history, which is that
part of learning which answereth to one of the cells, domiciles,
or offices of the mind of man, which is that of the memory.

IV. (1) Poesy is a part of learning in measure of words, for
the most part restrained, but in all other points extremely
licensed, and doth truly refer to the imagination ; which, being -
not tied to the laws of matter, may at pleasure join that which
nature hath severed, and sever that which nature hath joined,
and so make unlawful matches and divorces of things-—Pictori-
bus atque poetis, dc. It is taken in two senses in respect of
words or matter. In the first sense, it is but a character of
style, and belongeth to arts of speech, and is not pertinent for
the present. In the latter, it is—as hath been said—one of the
principal portions of learning, and is nothing else but feigned
history, which may be styled as well in prose as in verse.

(2) The use of this feigned history hath been to give some
shadow of satisfaction to the mind of man in those points
wherein the nature of things doth deny it, the world being in
proportion inferior to the soul; by reason whereof there is,
agreeable to the spirit of man, a more ample greatness, a more
exact gocdness, and a more absolute variety, than can be found
in the nature of things. Therefore, because the acts or events

e

THE SECOND BOOK. ; 79

of true history have not that magnitude which satisfieth the
mind of man, poesy feigneth acts and events greater and more
heroical. Because true history propoundeth the successes and
issues of actions not so agreeable to the merits of virtue and
vice, therefore poesy feigns them more just in retribution, and
more according to revealed Providence. Because true history
representeth actions and events more ordinary and less inter.
changed, therefore poesy endueth them with more rareness and
more unexpected and alternative variations. So as it appeareth
that poesy serveth and conferreth to magnanimity, morality,
and to delectation. And therefore, it was ever thought to have
some participation of divineness, because it doth raise and erect
the mind, by submitting the shows of things to the desires of
the mind ; whereas reason doth buckle and bow the mind unto
the nature of things. And we see that by these insinuations
and congruities with man’s nature and pleasure, joined also
with the agreement and consort it hath with music, it hath had
access and estimation in rude times and barbarous regions,
where other learning stood excluded.

(3) The division of poesy which is aptest in the propriety
thereof (besides those divisions which are common unto it with
history, as feigned chronicles, feigned lives, and the appendices
of history, as feigned epistles, feigned orations, and the rest) is
into poesy narrative, representative, and allusive. The narra-
tive is a mere imitation of history, with the excesses before
remembered, choosing for subjects commonly wars and love,
rarely state, and sometimes pleasure or mirth. Representative
is as a visible history, and is an image of actions asif they were
present, as history is of actions in nature as they are (that is)
past. Allusive, or parabolical, is a narration applied only to
express some special purpose or conceit ; which latter kind of
parabolical wisdom was much more in use in the ancient times,
as by the fables of A‘sop, and the brief sentences of the seven,
and the use of hieroglyphics may appear. And the cause was
(for that it was then of necessity to express any point of reason
which was more sharp or subtle than the vulgar in that manner}
because men in those times wanted both variety of examples and
subtlety of conceit. And as hieroglyphics were before letters
so parables were before arguments ; and nevertheless now an
at all times they do retain much life and vigour, because
reason cannot be so sensible nor examples so fit.

(4) But there remaineth yet another use of poesy parabolical,
opposite to that which we last mentioned ; for that tendeth to
demonstrate and illustrate that which is taught or delivered, and
this other to retire and obscure it—that is, when the secrets

80 THE ADVANCEMENT OF LEARNING.

and mysteries of religion, policy, or philosophy, are involved in
fables or parables. Of this in divine poesy we see the use is
authorised. In heathen poesy we see the exposition of fables
doth fall out sometimes with great felicity : as in the fable
that the giants being overthrown in their war against the
gods, the earth their mother in revenge thereof brought forth
Fame:
‘«Tilam terra parens, ira irritata Deorum,
Extremam, ut perhibent, Coeo Enceladoque sororem,
Progenuit.”

Expounded that when princes and monarchs have suppressed
actual and open rebels, then the malignity of people (which is
the mother of rebellion) doth bring forth libels and slanders, ~
and taxations of the states, which is of the same kind with
rebellion, but more feminine. So in the fable that the rest of
the gods having conspired to bind Jupiter, Pallas called Briareus
with his hundred hands to his aid: expounded that monarchies
need not fear any curbing of their absoluteness by mighty sub-
jects, as long as by wisdom they keep the hearts of the people,
who will be sure to come in on their side. So in the fable that
Achilles was brought up under Chiron, the centaur, who was
part a man and part a beast, expounded ingeniously but cor-
ruptly by Machiavel, that it belongeth to the education and
discipline of princes to know as well how to play the part of a
lion in violence, and the fox in guile, as of the man in virtue
and justice. Nevertheless, in many the like encounters, I do
rather think that the fable was first, and the exposition devised,
than that the moral was first, and thereupon the fable framed ;
for I find it was an ancient vanity in Chrysippus, that troubled
himself with great contention to fasten the assertions of the
Stoics upon the fictions of the ancient poets; but yet that all
the fables and fictions of the poets were but pleasure and not
figure, 1 interpose no opinion. Surely of those poets which are
now extant, even Homer himself (notwithstanding he was made
a kind of scripture by the later schools of the Grecians), yet I
should without any difficulty pronounce that his fables had no
such inwardness in his own meaning. But what they might
have upon a more original tradition is not easy to affirm, for he
was not the inventor of many of them.

(5) In this third part of learning, which is poesy, I can report
no deficience ; for being as a plant that cometh of the lust of the
earth, without a formal seed, it hath sprung up and spread
abroad more than any other kind. But to ascribe unto it that
which is due, for the expressing of affections, passions, corrup-

THE SECOND BOOK. 8]

tions, and customs, we are beholding to poets more than to the
philosophers’ works ; and for wit and eloquence, not much less
than to orators’ harangues. But it is not good to stay too
long in the theatre. Let us now pass on to the judicial place or
palace of the mind, which we are to approach and view with
more reverence and attention.

V. (1) The knowledge of man is as the waters, some de-
scending from above, and some springing from beneath: the
one informed by the light of nature, the other inspired by
divine revelation. The light of nature consisteth in the no-
tions of the mind and the reports of the senses; for as for
knowledge which man receiveth by teaching, it is cumulative
and not original, as in a water that besides his own spring-head
is fed with other springs and streams. So then, according to
these two differing illuminations or originals, knowledge is
first of all divided into divinity and philosophy.

(2) In philosophy the contemplations of man do either pene-
trate unto God, or are circumferred to nature, or are reflected
or reverted upon himself. Out of which several inquiries
there do arise three knowledges—divine philosophy, natural
philosophy, and human philosophy or humanity. For all
things are marked and stamped with this triple character—of
the power of God, the difference of nature and the use of man.
But because the distributions and partitions of knowledge are
not like several lines that meet in one angle, and so touch but
in a point, but are like branches of a tree that meet in a stem,
which hath a dimension and quantity of entireness and con-
tinuance before it come to discontinue and break itself into
arms and boughs; therefore it is good, before we enter into
the former distribution, to erect and constitute one universal
science, by the name of philosophia prima, primitive or sum-
mary philosophy, as the main and common way, before we
come where the ways part and divide themselves ; which science
whether I should report as deficient or no, I stand doubtful.
For I find a certain rhapsody of natural theology, and of divers
parts of logic; and of that part of natural philosophy which con-
cerneth the principles, and of that other part of natural philo-
sophy which concerneth the soul or spirit—all these strangely
commixed and confused; but being examined, it seemeth to
me rather a depredation of other sciences, advanced and exalted
unto some height of terms, than anything solid or substantive
of itself. Nevertheless I cannot be ignorant of the distinction
which is current, that the same things are handled but ir
several respects. As for example, that logic considereth of
many things as they are in notion, and this philosophy as they

82 THE ADVANCEMENT OF LEARNING.

are in nature—the one in appearance, the other in existence ;
but I find this difference better made than pursued. For if
they had considered quantity, similitude, diversity, and the
rest of those extern characters of things, as philosophers, and
in nature, their inquiries must of force have been of a far
other kind than they are. For doth any of them, in handling
quantity, speak of the force of union, how and how far it
multiplieth virtue? Doth any give the reason why some
things in nature are so common, and in so great mass, and
others so rare, and in so small quantity? Doth any, in hand-
ling similitude and diversity, assign the cause why iron should
not move to iron, which is more like, but move to the load-
stone, which is less like? Why in all diversities of things
there should be certain participles in nature which are almost
ambiguous to which kind they should be referred? But there
is a mere and deep silence touching the nature and operation
of those common adjuncts of things, as in nature ; and: only a
resuming and repeating of the force and use of them in speech
or argument. Therefore, because in a writing of this nature I
avoid all subtlety, my meaning touching this original or uni-
versal philosophy is thus, in a plain and gross description by
negative: “That it be a receptacle for all such profitable ob-
servations and axioms as fall not within the compass of any of
the special parts of philosophy or sciences, but are more
common and of a higher stage.”

(3) Now that there are many of that kind need not be
doubted. For example : Isnot the rule, Si inequalibus equalia
addas, omnia erunt inequalia, an axiom as well of justice as
of the mathematics? and is there not a true coincidence be-
tween commutative and distributive justice, and arithmetical
and geomcérical proportion? Is not that other rule, Que in
eodem terlio conveniunt, et inter se conveniunt, a rule taken
from the mathematics, but so potent in logic as all syllogisms
are built upon it? Is not the observation, Omnia mutantur,
nil interit, a contemplation in philosophy thus, that the quan-
tum of nature is eternal? in natural theology thus, that it
requireth the same omnipotency to make somewhat nothing,
which at the first made nothing somewhat? according to the
Scripture, Didict quod omnia opera, que fecit Deus, perse-
verent in perpetuum ; non possumuUs eis quicquam addere nec
auferre. Is not the ground, which Machiavel wisely and
largely discourseth concerning governments, that the way to
establish and preserve them is to reduce them ad principia—a
rule in religion and nature, as well as in civil administration ?
Was not the Persian magic a reduction or correspondence of

THE SECOND BOOK. 83

the principles and architectures of nature to the rules and
policy of governments? Is not the precept of a musician, to
fall from a discord or harsh accord upon a concord or sweet
accord, alike true in affection? Is not the trope of music, to
avoid or slide from the close or cadence, common with the
trope of rhetoric of deceiving expectation? Is not the delight
of the quavering upon a stop in music the same with the
playing of light upon the water ?

**Splendet tremulo sub lumine pontus,”

Are not the organs of the senses of one kind with the organs
of reflection, the eye with a glass, the ear with a cave or strait,
determined and bounded? Neither are these only similitudes,
as men of narrow observation may conceive them to be, but the
same footsteps of nature, treading or printing upon several
subjects or matters. This science therefore (as I understand
it) I may justly report as deficient ; for I see sometimes the
profounder sort of wits, in handling some particular argument,
will now and then draw a bucket of water out of this well for
their present use; but the spring-head thereof seemeth to me
not to have been visited, being of so excellent use both for the
disclosing of nature and the abridgment of art.

VI. (1) This science being therefore first placed as a common
parent like unto Berecynthia, which had so much heavenly
issue, omnes celicolas, omnes supera alta tenentes; we may
return to the former distribution of the three philosophies—-
divine, natural, and human. And as concerning divine philo-
Sophy or natural theology, it is that knowledge or rudiment of
knowledge concerning God which may be obtained by the con-
templation of His creatures; which knowledge may be truly
termed divine in respect of the object, and natural in respect
of the light. The bounds of this knowledge are, that it suf-
ficeth to convince atheism, but not to inform religion ; and
therefore there was never miracle wrought by God to convert
an atheist, because the light of nature might have led him to
confess a God; but miracles have been wrought to convert
idolaters and the superstitious, because no light of nature ex-
tendeth to declare the will and true worship of God. For as
all works do show forth the power and skill of the workman,
and not his image, so it is of the works of God, which do show
the omnipotency and wisdom of the Maker, but not His image.
And therefore therein the heathen opinion differeth from the
sacred truth: for they supposed the world to be the image of
God, and man to be an extract or compendious image of the

84, THE ADVANCEMENT OF LEARNING.

world; but the Scriptures never vouchsafe to attribute to the
world that honour, as to be the image of God, but only the
work of His hands ; neither do they speak of any other image
of God but man. Wherefore by the contemplation of nature
to induce and enforce the acknowledgment of God, and to
demonstrate His power, providence, and goodness, is an excel-
lent argument, and hath been excellently handled by divers.
But on the other side, out of the contemplation of nature, or
ground of human knowledges, to induce any verity or persua-
sion concerning the points of faith, is in my judgment not
safe; Da fidei que fidei sunt. For the heathen themselves
conclude as much in that excellent and divine fable of the
golden chain, “‘ That men and gods were not able to draw
Jupiter down to the earth ; but, contrariwise, Jupiter was able
to draw them up to heaven.” So as we ought not to attempt
to draw down or submit the mysteries of God to our reason,
but contrariwise to raise and advance our reason to the divine
truth. So asin this part of knowledge, touching divine philo-
sophy, I am so far from noting any deficience, as I rather
note an excess; whereunto I have digressed because of the
extreme prejudice which both religion and philosophy hath
received and may receive by being commixed together ; as that
which undoubtedly will make an heretical religion, and an
imaginary and fabulous philosophy.

(2) Otherwise it is of the nature of angels and spirits, which
is an appendix of theology, both divine and natural, and is
neither inscrutable nor interdicted. For although the Scrip-
ture saith, ‘‘Let no man deceive you in sublime discourse
touching the worship of angels, pressing into that he knoweth
not,” &c., yet notwithstanding if you observe well that pre-
cept, it may appear thereby that there be two things only
forbidden—adoration of them, and opinion fantastical of them,
either to extol them further than appertaineth to the degree
of a creature, or to extol a man’s knowledge of them further
than he hath ground. But the sober and grounded inquiry,
which may arise out of the passages of Holy Scriptures, or
out of the gradations of nature, is not restrained. So of de-
generate and revolted spirits, the conversing with them or the
employment of them is prohibited, much more any veneration
towards them; but the contemplation or science of their
nature, their power, their illusions, either by Scripture or
reason, is a part of spiritual wisdom. For so the apostle
saith, ‘‘ We are not ignorant of his stratagems.” And it is
no more unlawful to inquire the nature of evil spirits, than
to inquire the force of poisons in nature, or the nature of sin

THE SECOND BOOK. 85

and vice in morality. But this part touching angels and
spirits I cannot note as deficient, for many have occupied
themselves in it; I may rather challenge it, in many of the
writers thereof, as fabulous and fantastical.

VII. (1) Leaving therefore divine philosophy or natural the-
ology (not divinity’or inspired theology, which we reserve for
the last of all as the haven and sabbath of all man’s contem-
plations) we will now proceed to natural philosophy. If then
it be true that Democritus said, ‘‘ That the truth of nature
lieth hid in certain deep mines and caves;” and if it be true
likewise that the alchemists do so much inculcate, that Vulcan

86 THE ADVANCEMENT OF LEARNING.

perspicuous expressing of that I do propound, I am otherwise
zealous and affectionate to recede as little from antiquity,
either in terms or opinions, as may stand with truth and the
proficience of knowledge. And herein I cannot a little marvel
at the philosopher Aristotle, that did proceed in such a spirit
of difference and contradiction towards all antiquity ; under-
taking not only to frame new words of science at pleasure, but
to confound and extinguish all ancient wisdom ; insomuch as
he never nameth or mentioneth an ancient author or opinion,
but to confute and reprove; wherein for glory, and drawing
followers and disciples, he took the right course. For certainly
there cometh to pass, and hath place in human truth, that
which was noted and pronounced in the highest truth :—Veni
in nomine patris, nec recipitis me ; si quis venerit in nomine suo
eum recipietis. But in this divine aphorism (considering to
whom it was applied, namely, to antichrist, the highest de-
ceiver), we may discern well that the coming in a man’s own
name, without regard of antiquity or paternity, is no good
sign of truth, although it be joined with the fortune and
success of an eum recipietis. But for this excellent person
Aristotle, I will think of him that he learned that humour of
his scholar, with whom it seemeth he did emulate; the one to
conquer all opinions, as the other to conquer all nations.

erein, nevertheless, it may be, he may at some men’s
hands, that are of a bitter disposition, get a like title as his
scholar did :— :

‘* Felix terrarum predo, non utile mundo
Editus exemplum, &c.”
So,

‘* Felix doctrine prado.”

But to me, on the other side, that do desire as much as lieth
in my pen to ground a sociable intercourse between antiquity
and proficience, it seemeth best to keep way with antiquity
usque ad aras; and, therefore, to retain the ancient terms,
though I sometimes alter the uses and definitions, according
to the moderate proceeding in civil government; where, al-
though there be some alteration, yet that holdeth which
Tacitus wisely noteth, ealem magistratuum vocabula.

(3) To return, therefore, to the use and acception of the
term metaphysic as I do now understand the word; it ap-
peareth, by that which hath been already said, that I intend
paorognic, prima, summary philosophy and metaphysic, which

eretofore have been confounded as one, to be two distinct

THE SECOND BOOK. 87

things. For the one I have made as a parent or common )
ancestor to all knowledge; and the other I have now brought
in as a branch or descendant of natural science. Tt appeareth
likewise that I have assigned to summary philosophy the
common principles and axioms which are promiscuous and in-
different to several sciences ; I have assigned unto it likewise
the inquiry touching the operation or the relative and adven-
tive characters of essences, as quantity, similitude, diversity,
possibility, and the rest, with this distinction and provision ;
that they be handled as they have efficacy in nature, and not
logically. It appeareth likewise that natural theology, which
heretofore hath been handled confusedly with metaphysic, I
have enclosed and bounded by itself. It is therefore now a
question what is left remaining for metaphysic ; wherein I may
without prejudice preserve thus much of the conceit of anti-
quity, that physic should contemplate that which is inherent
in matter, and therefore transitory ; and metaphysic that
which is abstracted and fixed. And again, that physic should
handle that which supposeth in nature only a being and
moving ; and metaphysic should handle that which supposeth
further in nature a reason, understanding, and platform. But
the difference, perspicuously expressed, is most familiar and
sensible. For as we divided natural philosophy in general into
the inquiry of causes and productions of effects, so that part
which concerneth the inquiry of causes we do subdivide accord-
ing to the received and sound division of causes. The one
part, which is physic, inquireth and handleth the material and
efficient causes ; and the other, which is metaphysic, handleth

the formal and final causes.

(4) Baga Cae Te ording to the derivation, and not
according to our idiom for medicine) is situate in a middle term
or distance between natural history and metaphysic. For
natural history describeth the variety of things; physic the -
causes, but variable or respective causes ; and metaphysic the
fixed and constant causes.

“‘Limus ut hic durescit, et hee ut cera liquescit,
Uno eodemque igni.”

Fire is the cause of induration, but respective to clay ; fire is
the cause of colliquation, but respective to wax. But fire is
no constant cause either of induration or colliquation ; so then
the physical causes are but the efficient and the matter,
Physic hath three parts, whereof ¢wo respect nature united
or collected, the third ccutemplateth nature diffused or

coat

88 THE ADVANCEMENT OF LEARNING.

distributed. Nature is collected either into one entire total,
or else into the same principles or seeds. So as the first
doctrine is touching the contexture or configuration of
things, as de mundo, de universitate rerum. The second is the
doctrine concerning the principles or originals of things. The
third is the doctrine concerning all variety and particularity
of things; whether it be of the differing substances, or their
differing qualities and natures; whereof there needeth no
enumeration, this part being but as a gloss or paraphrase that
attendeth upon the text of natural history. Of these three
I cannot report any as deficient. In what truth or perfec*ion
they are handled, I make not now any judgment ; but they are
parts of knowledge not deserted by the labour of man.

(5) For metaphysic, we have assigned‘ unto it the inquiry of
formal and final causes ; which assignation, as to the former of
them, may seem to be nugatory and void, because of the
received and inveterate opinion, that the inquisition of man is
not competent to find out essential forms or true differences ;
of which opinion we will take this hold, that the inven-
tion of forms is of all other parts of knowledge the worthiest
to be sought, if it be possible to be found. As for the possi-
bility, they are ill discoverers that think there is no land, when
they can see nothing but sea. But it is manifest that Plato,
in his opinion of ideas, as one that had a wit of elevation
situate as upon a cliff, did descry that forms were the true
object of knowledge ; but lost the real fruit of his opinion, by
considering of forms as absolutely abstracted from matter, and
not confined and determined by matter; and so turning his
opinion upon theology, wherewith all his natural philosophy is
infected. But if any man shall keep a continual watchful and
severe eye upon action, operation, and the use of knowledge,
he may advise and take notice what are the forms, the dis-
closures whereof are fruitful and important to the state of
man. For as to the forms of substances (man only except,
of whom itis said, Formavit hominem de limo terre, et spiravit
in faciem ejus spiraculum vite, and not as of all other creatures,
Producant aque, producat terra), the forms of substances I say
(as they arenow by compounding and transplanting multiplied)
are so perplexed, as they are not to be inquired ; no more than
it were either possible or to purpose to seek in gross the forms
of those sounds which make words, which by composition and
transposition of letters are infinite. But, on the other side, to
inquire the form of those sounds or voices which make simple
lettersis easily comprehensible ; and being known induceth
and manifesteth the forms of all words, which consist and are

THE SECOND BOOK. 89

compounded of them. In the same manner to inquire the
form of a lion, of an oak, of gold; nay, of water, of air, is a
vain pursuit ; but to inquire the forms of sense, of voluntary
motion, of vegetation, of colours, of gravity and levity, of
density, of tenuity, of heat, of cold, and all other natures and
qualities, which, like an alphabet, are not many, and of which
the essences (upheld by matter) of all creatures do consist ;
to inquire, I say, the true forms of these, is that part of
metaphysic which we now define of. Not but that physic
doth make inquiry and take consideration of the same natures ;
but how? Only as to the material and efficient causes of them,
and not as to the forms. For example, if the cause of white-
ness in snow or froth be inquired, and it be rendered thus,
that the subtle intermixture of air and water is the cause, it is
well rendered ; but, nevertheless, is this the form of whiteness?
No; but it is the efficient, which is ever but vehiculum forme.
This part of metaphysic I do not find laboured and performed ;
whereat I marvel not ; because I hold it not possible to be in-
vented by that course of invention which hath been used ; in
regard that men (which is the root of all error) have made too
untimely a departure, and too remote a recess from particulars.

(6) But the use of this part of metaphysic, which I report as
deficient, is of the rest the most excellent in two respects : the
one, because it is the duty and virtue of all knowledge to
abridge the infinity of individual experience, as much as the
conception of truth will permit, and to remedy the complaint
of vita brevis, ars longa ; which is performed by uniting the
notions and conceptions of sciences. For knowledges are as
pyramids, whereof history is the basis. So of natural philoso-
phy, the basis is natural history ; the stage next the basis is
physic ; the stage next the vertical point is metaphysic. As
for the vertical point, opus quod operatur Deus a@ principio
usque ad finem, the summary law of nature, we know not
whether man’s inquiry can attain unto it. But these three be
the true stages of knowledge, and are to them that are depraved
no better than the giants’ hills :-—

‘Ter sunt conati imponere Pelio Ossam,
Scilicet atque Ossz frondosim involvere Olympum.”

But to those which refer all things to the glory of God, they
are as the three acclamations, Sancte, sancte, sancte/ holy in
the description or dilatation of His works; holy in the con-
nection or concatenation of them; and holy in the union of
them in a perpetual and uniform law. And, therefore, the
speculation was excellent in Parmenides and Plato, although

90 THE ADVANCEMENT OF LEARNING.

but a speculation in them, that all things by scale did ascend to
unity. So then always that knowledge is worthiest which is
charged with least multiplicity, which appeareth to be meta-
physic ; as that which considereth the simple forms or differ-
ences of things, which are few in number, and the degrees and
co-ordinations whereof make all this variety. The second.
respect, which valueth and commendeth this part of meta-
physic, is that it doth enfranchise the power of man unto the
greatest liberty and possibility of works and effects. For
physic carrieth men in narrow and restrained ways, subject to
many accidents and impediments, imitating the ordinary
flexuous courses of nature. But late undique sunt sapientibus
vie ; to sapience (which was anciently defined to be rerum di-
vinarum et humanarum scientia) there is ever a choice of means.
For physical causes give light to new invention in simili
materia. But whosoever knoweth any form, knoweth the
utmost possibility of superinducing that nature upon any
variety of matter ; and so is less restrained in operation, either
to the basis of the matter, or the condition of the efficient;
which kind of knowledge Solomon likewise, though in a more
divine sense, elegantly describeth : non arctabuntur gressus twi,
et currens non habebis offendiculum. The ways of sapience are
not much liable either to particularity or chance.

(7) The second part of metaphysic is the inquiry of final
causes, which I am moved to report not as omitted, but as mis-
placed. And yet if it were but a fault in order, I would not
speak of it ; for order is matter of illustration, but pertaineth
not to the substance of sciences. But this misplacing hath
caused a deficience, or at least a great improficience in the
sciences themselves. For the handling of final causes, mixed
with the rest in physical inquiries, hath intercepted the severe
and diligent inquiry of all real and physical causes, and given
men the occasion to stay upon these satisfactory and specious
causes, to the great arrest and prejudice of further discovery.
For this I find done not only by Plato, who ever anchoreth
upon that shore, but by Aristotle, Galen, and others which do
usually likewise fall upon these flats of discoursing causes. For
to say that ‘‘the hairs of the eyelids are for a quickset and
fence about the sight ;” or that “‘ the firmness of the skins and
hides of living creatures is to defend them from the extremities
of heat or cold;” or that ‘‘the bones are for the columns or
beams, whereupon the frames of the bodies of living creatures
are built ;” or that “‘the leaves of trees are for protecting of
the fruit ;” or that ‘‘ the clouds are for watering of the earth ;”
or that ‘“‘the solidness of the earth is for the station and

THE SECOND BOOK. 91

mansion of living creatures ;’’ and the like, is well inquired
and collected in metaphysic, but in physic they are impertinent.
Nay, they are, indeed, but remoras and hindrances to stay and
slug the ship from further sailing ; and have brought this to
pass, that the search of the physical causes hath been neglected
and passed in silence. And, therefore, the natural philosophy
of Democritus and some others, who did not suppose a mind
or reason in the frame of things, but attributed the form there-
of able to maintain itself to infinite essays or proofs of Nature,
which they term fortune, seemeth to me (as far as I can judge
by the recital and fragments which remain unto us) in par-
ticularities of physical causes more real and better inquired
than that of Aristotle and Plato; whereof both intermingled
final causes, the one as a part of theology, and the other as a
part of logic, which were the favourite studies respectively of
both those persons; not because those final causes are not
true and worthy to be inquired, being kept within their own
province, but because their excursions into the limits of physical
causes hath bred a vastness and solitude in that tract. For
otherwise, keeping their precincts and borders, men are
extremely deceived if they think there is an enmity or repug-
nancy at all between them. For the cause rendered, that
“the hairs about the eyelids are for the safeguard of the
sight,” doth not impugn the cause rendered, that ‘‘ pilosity is
incident to orifices of moisture—muscosi Fontes, &c.” Nor the
cause rendered, that ‘‘the firmness of hides is for the armour
of the body against extremities of heat or cold,” doth not
impugn the cause rendered, that ‘contraction of pores is
incident to the outwardest parts, in regard of their adjacence
to foreign or unlike bodies ;” and so of the rest, both causes
being true and compatible, the one declaring an intention, the
other a consequence only, Neither doth this call in question
or derogate from Divine Providence, but highly confirm and
exalt it. For as in civil actions he is the greater and deeper
politique that can make other men the instruments of his will
and ends, and yet never acquaint them with his purpose, so as
they shall do it and yet not know what they de, than he that
imparteth his meaning to those he employeth ; so is the wisdom
of God more admirable, when Nature intendeth one thing and
Providence draweth forth another, than if He had communicated
to particular creatures and motions the characters and im-
pressions of His Providence. And thus much for metaphysic ;
the latter part whereof I allow as extant, but wish it confined
to his proper place.
VIII. (1) Nevertheless, there remaineth yet another part of

92 THE ADVANCEMENT OF LEARNING.

natural philosophy, which is commonly made a principal part,
and holdeth rank with physic special and metaphysic, which is
mathematic; but I think it more agreeable to the nature of
things, and to the light of order, to place it as a branch of
metaphysic. For the subject of it being quantity, not quantity
indefinite, which is but a relative, and belongeth to philosophia
prima (as hath been said), but quantity determined or pro-
portionable, it appeareth to be one of the essential forms of
things, as that that is causative in Nature of a number of
effects ; insomuch as we see in the schools both of Democritus
and of Pythagoras that the one did ascribe figure to the first
seeds of things, and the other did suppose numbers to be the
principles and originals of things. And it is true also that
of all other forms (as we understand forms) it is the most
abstracted and separable from matter, and therefore most
proper to metaphysic ; which hath likewise been the cause why
it hath been better laboured and inquired than any of the
other forms, which are more immersed in matter. For it being
the nature of the mind of man (to the extreme prejudice of
knowledge) to delight in the spacious liberty of generalities, as
in a champaign region, and not in the inclosures of particularity,
the mathematics of all other knowledge were the goodliest
fields to satisfy that appetite. But for the placing of this
science, it is not much material : only we have endeavoured in
these our partitions to observe a kind of perspective, that one
part may cast light upon another.

(2) The mathematics are either pure or mixed. To the
pure mathematics are those sciences belonging which handle
quantity determinate, merely severed from any axioms of
natural philosophy; and these are two, geometry and arith-
metic, the one handling quantity continued, and the other
dissevered. Mixed hath for subject some axioms or parts of
natural philosophy, and considereth quantity determined, as
it is auxiliary and incident unto them. For many parts of
Nature can neither be invented with sufficient subtlety, nor
demonstrated with sufficient perspicuity, nor accommodated
unto use with sufficient dexterity, without the aid and inter-
vening of the mathematics, of which sort are perspective,
music, astronomy, cosmography, architecture, engineery, and
divers others. In the mathematics I can report no deficience,
except it be that men do not sufficiently understand the
excellent use of the pure mathematics, in that they do remedy
and cur¢ many defects in the wit and faculties intellectual.
For if the wit betoo dull, they sharpen it; if too wandering,
they fix it; if too inherent in the sense, they abstract it. So

THE SECOND BOOK. 93

that as tennis is a game of no use in itself, but of great use in
respect it maketh a quick eye and a body ready to put itself
into all postures, so in the mathematics that use which is
collateral and intervenient is no less worthy than that which is
principal and intended. And as for the mixed mathematics, I
may only make this prediction, that there cannot fail to be
more kinds of them as Nature grows further disclosed. Thus
much of natural science, or the part of Nature speculative.

(3) For natural prudence, or the part operative of natural
philosophy, we will divide it into three parts—experimental,
philosophical, and magical ; which three parts active have a
correspondence and analogy with the three parts speculative,
natural history, physic, and metaphysic. For many operations
have been invented, sometimes by a casual incidence and
occurrence, sometimes by a purposed experiment ; and of those
which have been found by an intentional experiment, some
have been found out by varying or extending the same experi-
ment, some by transferring and compounding divers experi-
ments the one into the other, which kind of invention an
empiric may manage. Again, by the knowledge of physical
causes there cannot fail to follow many indications and designa-
tions of new particulars, if men in their speculation will keep
one eye upor use and practice. But these are but coastings
along the shore, premendo littus iniquum ; for it seemeth to
me there can hardly be discovered any radical or fundamental
alterations and innovations in Nature, either by the fortune and
essays of experiments, or by the light and direction of physical
causes. If, therefore, we have reported metaphysic deficient,
it must follow that we do the like of natural magic, which hath
relation thereunto. For as for the natural magic whereof
now there is mention in books, containing certain credulous
and superstitious conceits and observations of sympathies and
antipathies, and hidden proprieties, and some frivolous experi-
ments, strange rather by disguisement than in themselves, it
is as far differing in truth of Nature from such a knowledge
as we require as the story of King Arthur of Britain, or Hugh
of Bourdeaux, differs from Czsar’s Commentaries in truth of
story ; for it is manifest that Cesar did greater things de vero
than those imaginary heroes were feigned to do. But he did
them not in that fabulous manner. Of this kind of learning
the fable of Ixion was a figure, who designed to enjoy Juno, the
goddess of power, and instead of her had copulation with a
cloud, of which mixture were begotten centaurs and chimeras.
So whosoever shall entertain high and vaporous imaginations,
instead of a laborious and sober inquiry of truth, shall beget

94 THE ADVANCEMENT OF LEARNING.

hopes and beliefs of strange and impossible shapes. And,
therefore, we may note in these sciences which hold so much
of imagination and belief, as this degenerate natural magic,
alchemy, astrology, and the like, that in their propositions the
description of the means is ever more monstrous than the
pretence or end. For it is a thing more probable that he that
knoweth well the natures of weight, of colour, of pliant and
fragile in respect of the hammer, of volatile and fixed in respect
of the fire, and the rest, may superinduce upon some metal
the nature and form of gold by such mechanic as longeth to
the production of the natures afore rehearsed, than that some
grains of the medicine projected should in a few moments of
time turn a sea of quicksilver or other material into gold.
So it is more probable that he that knoweth the nature of
arefaction, the nature of assimilation of nourishment to the
thing nourished, the manner of increase and clearing of spirits,
the manner of the depredations which spirits make upon the
humours and solid parts, shall by ambages of diets, bathings,
anointings, medicines, motions, and the like, prolong life, or
restore some degree of youth or vivacity, than that it can be
done with the use of a few drops or scruples of a liquor or
receipt. To conclude, therefore, the true natural magic, which
is that great liberty and latitude of operation which dependeth
upon the knowledge of forms, I may report deficient, as the
relative thereof is. To which part, if we be serious and incline
not to vanities and plausible discourse, besides the deriving
and deducing the operations themselves from metaphysic,
there are pertinent two points of much purpose, the one by
way of preparation, the other by way of caution. The first is,
that there be made a calendar, resembling an inventory of the
estate of man, containing all the inventions (being the works
or fruits of Nature or art) which are now extant, and whereof
man is already possessed ; out of which doth naturally result
a note what things are yet held impossible, or not invented,
which calendar will be the more artificial and serviceable if to
every reputed impossibility you add what thing is extant
which cometh the nearest in degree to that impossibility ; to
the end that by these optatives and potentials man’s inquiry
may be the more awake in deducing direction of works from
the speculation of causes. And secondly, that those experi-
ments be not only esteemed which have an immediate and
present use, but those principally which are of most universal
consequence for invention of other experiments, and those
which give most light to the invention of causes ; for the inven-
tion of the mariner’s needle, which giveth the direction, is of

THE SECOND BOOK. 95

no less benefit for navigation than the invention of the sails
which give the motion.

(4) Thus have I passed through natural philosophy and the
deficiences thereof ; wherein if I have differed from the ancient
and received doctrines, and thereby shall move contradiction,
for my part, as I affect not to dissent, so I purpose not to con-
tend. If it be truth,

‘Non canimus surdis, respondent omnia sylvz,’

the voice of Nature will consent, whether the voice of man do
or no. And as Alexander Borgia was wont to say of the
expedition of the French for Naples, that they came with
chalk in their hands to mark up their lodgings, and not with
weapons to fight ; so I like better that entry of truth which
cometh peaceably with chalk to mark up those minds which
are capable to lodge and harbour it, than that which cometh
with pugnacity and contention.

(5) But there remaineth a division of natural philosophy
according to the report of the inquiry, and nothing concerning
the matter or subject: and that is positive and considerative,
when the inquiry reporteth either an assertion or a doubt,
These doubts or non liquets are of two sorts, particular and
total. For the first, we see a good example thereof in
Aristotle’s Problems which deserved to have had a better con-
tinuance ; but so nevertheless as there is one point whereof
warning is to be given and taken. The registering of doubts °
hath two excellent uses: the one, that it saveth philosophy
from errors and falsehoods; when that which is not fully
appearing is not collected into assertion, whereby error might
draw error, but reserved in doubt ; the other, that the entry
of doubts are as so many suckers or sponges to draw use of
knowledge ; insomuch as that which if doubts had not preceded,
aman should never have advised, but passed it over without
note, by the suggestion and solicitation of doubts is made to be
attended and applied. But both these commodities do scarcely
countervail and inconvenience, which will intrude itself if it be
not debarred ; which is, that when a doubt is once received,
men labour rather how to keep it a doubt still, than how to
solve it, and accordingly bend their wits. Of this we see the
familiar example in lawyers and scholars, both which, if they
have once admitted a doubt, it goeth ever after authorised for
adoubt. But that use of wit and knowledge is to be allowed,
which laboureth to make doubtful things certain, and not
those which labour to make certain things doubtful. There-
fore these calendars of doubts I commend as excellent things;

96 THE ADVANCEMENT OF LEARNING.

go that there be this caution used, that when they be thoroughly
sifted and brought to resolution, they be from thenceforth
omitted, discarded, and not continued to cherish and encourage
men in doubting. To which calendar of doubts or problems I
advise be annexed another calendar, as much or more material,
which is a calendar of popular errors: I mean chiefly in
natural history, such as pass in speech and conceit, and are
nevertheless apparently detected and convicted of untruth,
that man’s knowledge be not weakened nor embased by such
dross and vanity. As for the doubts or non liquets general or
in total, I understand those differences of opinions touching
the principles of nature, and the fundamental points of the
same, which have caused the diversity of sects, schools, and
philosophies, as that of Empedocles, Pythagoras, Democritus,
Parmenides, and the rest. For although Aristotle, as though
he had been of the race of the Ottomans, thought he could not
reign except the first thing he did he killed all his brethren ;
yet to those that seek truth and not magistrality, it cannot
but seem a matter of great profit, to see before them the
several opinions touching the foundations of nature. Not for
any exact truth that can be expected in those theories ; for as
the same phenomena in astronomy are satisfied by the received
astronomy of the diurnal motion, aud the proper motions of
the planets, with their eccentrics and epicycles, and likewise
by the theory of Copernicus, who supposed the earth to move,
and the calculations are indifferently agreeable ‘to both, so the
ordinary face and view of experience is many times satisfied by
several theories and philosophies; whereas to find the real
truth requireth another manner of severity and attention.
For as Aristotle saith, that children at the first will call every
woman mother, but afterward they come to distinguish accord-
ing to truth, so experience, if it be in childhood, will call
every philosophy mother, but when it cometh to ripeness it
will discern the true mother. So as in the meantime it is
good to see the several glosses and opinions upon Nature,
whereof it may be everyone in some one point hath seen
clearer than his fellows, therefore I wish some collection to be
made painfully and understandingly de antiquis philosophits,
out of al! the possible light which remaineth to us of them:
which kind of work I find deficient. But here I must give
warning, that it be done distinctly and severedly ; the philo-
sophies of everyone throughout by themselves, and not by
titles packed and faggoted up together, as hath been done b
Plutarch. For it is the harmony of a philosophy in itself,
which giveth it light and credence; whereas if it be singled

THE SECOND BOOK. 97

and broken, it will seem more foreign and dissonant. For as
when I read in Tacitus the actions of Nero or Claudius, with
circumstances of times, inducements, and occasions, I find
them not so strange; but when I read them in Suetonius
Tranquillus, gathered into titles and bundles and not in order
of time, they seem more monstrous and incredible: so is it of
any philosophy reported entire, and dismembered by articles.
Neither do I exclude opinions of latter times to be likewise
represented in this calendar of sects of philosophy, as that of
Theophrastus Paracelsus, eloquently reduced into an harmony
by the pen of Severinus the Dane; and that of Tilesius, and
his scholar Donius, being as a pastoral philosophy, full of
sense, but of no great depth; and that of Fracastorius, who,
though he pretended not to make any new philosophy, yet did
use the absoluteness of his own sense upon the old; and that
of Gilbertus our countryman, who revived, with some altera-
tions and demonstrations, the opinions of Xenophanes; and
any other worthy to be admitted.

(6) Thus have we now dealt with two of the three beams of
man’s knowledge; that is radius directus, which is referred to
nature, 7adius refractus, which is referred to God, and cannot
report truly because of the inequality of the medium. There
resteth radius reflecus, whereby man beholdeth and con-
templateth himself.

IX. (1) We come therefore now to that knowledge where-
unto the ancient oracle directeth us, which is the knowledge of
ourselves ; which deserveth the more accurate handling, by
how much it toucheth us more nearly. This knowledge, as it
is the end and term of natural philosophy in the intention of
man, so notwithstanding it is but a portion of natural philoso-
phy in the continent of Nature. And generally let this be a
rule, that all partitions of knowledges be accepted rather for
lines and veins than for sections and separations ; and that the
continuance and entireness of knowledge be preserved. For
the contrary hereof hath made particular sciences to become
barren, shallow, and erroneous, while they have not been
nourished and maintained from the common fountain. So we
see Cicero, the orator, complained of Socrates and his school,
that he was the first that separated philosophy and rhetoric ;
whereupon rhetoric became an empty and verbal art. So we
may sce that the opinion of Copernicus, touching the rotation
of the earth, which astronomy itself cannot correct, because it
is not repugnant to any of the phenomena, yet natural philoso-
phy may correct. So we see also that the science of medicine
if it be destituted and forsaken by natural philosophy, it is not

p—8&4

98 THE ADVANCEMENT OF LEARNING.

much better than an empirical practice. With this reserva-
tion, therefore, we proceed to human philosophy or humanity,
which hath two parts: the one considereth man segregate or
distributively, the other congregate or in society; so as
human philosophy is either simple and particular, or conjugate
and civil. Humanity particular consisteth of the same parts
whereof man consisteth : that is, of knowledges which respect
the body, and of knowledges that respect the mind. But
before we distribute so far, it is good to constitute. For I do
take the consideration in general, and at large, of human
nature to be fit to be emancipate and made a knowledge by
itself, not so much in regard of those delightful and elegant
discourses which have been made of the dignity of man, of his
miseries, of his state and life, and the like adjuncts of his

common and undivided nature; but chiefly in regard of the

knowledge concerning the sympathies and concordances be-
tween the mind and body, which being mixed cannot be
properly assigned to the sciences of either.

(2) This knowledge hath two branches: for as all leagues
and amities consist of mutual intelligence and mutual offices,
so this league of mind and body hath these two parts : how
the one discloseth the other, and how the one worketh upon
the other; discovery and impression. The former of these
hath begotten two arts, both of prediction or prenotion ; where-
of the one is honoured with the inquiry of Aristotle, and the
other of Hippocrates. And although they have of later time
been used to be coupled with superstitious and fantastical arts,
yet being purged and restored to their true state, they have
both of them a solid ground in Nature, and a profitable use in
life. The first is physiognomy, which discovereth the disposi-
tion of the mind by the lineaments of the body. The second
is the exposition of natural dreams, which discovereth the
state of the body by the imaginations of the mind. In the
former of these I note a deficience. For Aristotle hath very
ingeniously and diligently handled the factures of the body,
but not the gestures of the body, which are no less comprehen-
sible by art, and of greater use and advantage. For the linea-
ments of the body do disclose the disposition and inclination
of the mind in general; but the motions of the countenance
and parts do not only so, but do further disclose the present
humour and state of the mind and will. For as your majesty
saith most aptly and elegantly, ‘‘ As the tongue speaketh to

the ear so the gesture speaketh to the eye.” And, therefore, a |

number of subtle persons, whose eyes do dwell upon the faces
and fashions of men, do well know the advantage of this

|

|

THE SECOND BOOK. 99

observation, as being most part of their ability ; neither can it
be denied, but that it is a great discovery of dissimulations,
usiness.

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| and melancholy passions, and pretendeth also to exhibit
‘Medicines to exhilarate the mind, to confirm the courage, to

liations of the body, as things real, and not figurative. The
Toot and life of all which prescripts is (besides the ceremony) the

tality, or derogate from the sovereignty of the soul, he may be
taught, in easy instances, that the infant in the mother’s womb

telp. No more thana man can conclude, that because there be
%estilent airs, able suddenly to kill a man in health, therefore

100 THE ADVANCEMENT OF LEARNING.

there should be sovereign airs, able suddenly to cure a man in
sickness. Butthe inquisition of this partis of great use, though
it needeth, as Socrates said, ‘‘a Delian diver,” being difficult
and profound. But unto all this knowledge de communi vinculo,
of the concordances between the mind and the body, that part
of inquiry is most necessary which considereth of the seats
and domiciles which the several faculties of the mind do take
and occupate in the organs of the body ; which knowledge hath
been attempted, and is controverted, and deserveth to be much
better inquired. For the opinion of Plato, who placed the
understanding in the brain, animosity (which he did unfitly
call anger, having a greater mixture with pride) in the heart, and
concupiscence or sensuality in the liver, deserveth not to be
despised, but much less to be allowed. So, then, we have con-
stituted (as in our own wish and advice) the inquiry touching
human nature entire, as a just portion of knowledge to be
handled apart.

X. (1) The knowledge that concerneth man’s body is divided ©

as the good of man’s body is divided, unto which it referreth.
The good of man’s body is of four kinds—health, beauty,

strength, and pleasure: so the knowledges are medicine, or —

art of cure; art of decoration, which is called cosmetic ; art of
activity, which is called athletic; and art voluptuary, which
Tacitus truly calleth eruditus luxus. This subject of man’s body
is, of all other things in nature, most susceptible of remedy ;

but then that remedy is most susceptible of error; for the |

same subtlety of the subject doth cause large possibility and
easy failing, and therefore the inquiry ought to be the more
exact.

(2) To speak, therefore, of medicine, and to resume that we
have said, ascending a little higher: the ancient opinion that
man was microcosmus—an abstract or model of the world—hath
been fantastically strained by Paracelsus and the alchemists, as
if there were to be found in man’s body certain correspondences
and parallels, which should haverespect to all varieties of things,
as stars, planets, minerals, which are extant in the great world.
But thus much is evidently true, that of all substances which
nature hath produced, man’s body is the most extremely com-
pounded. For we see herbs and plants are nourished by earth
and water; beasts for the most part by herbs and fruits; man
by the flesh of beasts, birds, fishes, herbs, grains, fruits, water,
and the manifold alterations, dressings, and preparations of
these several bodies before they come to be his food and aliment.
Add hereunto that beasts have a more simple order of life, and
less change of affections to work upon their bodies, whereas

THE SECOND BOOK. 101

man in his mansion, sleep, exercise, passions, hath infinite
variations : and it cannot be denied but that the body of man of
all other things is of the most compounded mass. The soul,
on the other side, is the simplest of substances, as is well ex-
pressed :
‘* Purumque reliquit
Aithereum sensum atque aural simplicis ignem.”

So that it is no marvel though the soul so placed enjoy no rest,
if that principle be true, that Motus rerum est rapidus extra
locum, placidus in loco. But to the purpose. This variable
composition of man’s body hath made it as an instrument easy
to distemper ; and, therefore, the poets did well to conjoin
music and medicine in Apollo, because the office of medicine
is but to tune this curious harp of man’s body and to reduce it
toharmony. So, then, the subject being so variable hath made
the art by consequent more conjectural; and the art being con-
jectural hath made so much the more place to be left for im-
posture. For almost all other arts and sciences are judged by
acts or masterpieces, as I may term them, and not by the suc-
cesses and events. The lawyer is judged by the virtue of his
pleading, and not by the issue cf the cause; the master in the
ship is judged by the directing his course aright, and not by the
fortune of the voyage ; but the physician, and perhaps the poli-
tique, hath no particular acts demonstrative of his ability, but
is judged most by the event, which is ever but as it is taken:
for who can tell, if a patient die or recover, or if a state be pre-
served or ruined, whether it be art or accident? And therefore
many times the impostor is prized, and the man of virtue taxed.
Nay, we see [the] weakness and credulity of men is such, as
they will often prefer a mountebank or witch before a learned
physician. And therefore the poets were clear-sighted in dis-
cerning this extreme folly when they made Aisculapius and
Circe, brother and sister, both children of the sun, as in the
verses—

‘“Tpse repertorem medicine talis et artis
Fulmine Pheebigenam Stygias detrusit ad undas.”
And again-—
“* Dives inaccessos ubi Solis filia lucos,” &c.

¥or in all times, in the opinion of the multitude, witches and
old women and impostors, have had a competition with physi-
cians. And whatfolloweth? Even this, that physicians say to
themselves, as Solomon expresseth it upon a higher occasion,

102 THE ADVANCEMENT OF LEARNING.

‘Tf it befall to meas befalleth to the fools, why should I labour
to be more wise?” And thereforeI cannot much blame physi-
cians that they use commonly to intend some other art or
practice, which they fancy more than their profession ; for you
shall have of them antiquaries, poets, humanists, statesmen,
merchants, divines, and in every of these better seen than in
their profession ; and no doubt upon this ground that they find
that mediocrity and excellency in their art maketh no difference
in profit or reputation towards their fortune: for the weakness
of patients, and sweetness of life, and nature of hope, maketh
men depend upon physicians with all their defects. But, never-
theless, these things which we have spoken of are courses be-
gotten between a little occasion and a great deal of sloth and
default ; for if we will excite and awake our observation, we
shall see in familiar instances what a predominant faculty the
subtlety of spirit hath over the variety of matter or form.
Nothing more variable than faces and countenances, yet men
can bear in memory the infinite distinctions of them ; nay, a
painter, with a few shells of colours, and the benefit of his eye,
and habit of his imagination, can imitate them all that ever
have been, are, or may be, if they were brought before him.
Nothing more variable than voices, yet men can likewise dis-
cern them personally : nay, you shall have a buffon or panto-
minvus will express as many as he pleaseth. Nothing more
variable than the differing sounds of words; yet men have
found the way to reduce them to a few simple letters. So
that it is not the insufficiency or incapacity of man’s mind, but
it is the remote standing or placing thereof that breedeth these
mazes and incomprehensions ; for as the sense afar off is full of
mistaking, but is exact at hand, so is it of the understanding,
the remedy whereof is, not to quicken or strengthen the organ,
but to go nearer to the object ; and therefore there is no doubt
but if the physicians will learn and use the true approaches
and ayenues of nature, they may assume as much as the poet
saith ;
‘Et quoniam variant morbi, variabimus artes ;
Mille mali species, mille salutis erunt.”

Which that they should do, the nobleness of their art doth
deserve: well shadowed by the poets, in that they made
Aisculapius to be the son of [the] sun, the one being the
fountain of life, the other as the second stream; but infinitely
more honoured by the example of our Saviour, who made the
body of man the object of His miracles, as the soul was the
object of His doctrine. For we read not that ever He vouch-

THE SECOND BOOK. 103

safed to do any miracle about honour or money (except that
one for giving tribute to Czsar), but only about the preserving,
sustaining, and healing the body of man.

(3) Medicine is a science which hath been (as we have said)
more professed than laboured, and yet more laboured than
advanced ; the labour having been, in my judgment, rather
in circle than in progression. For I find much iteration, but
small addition. It considereth causes of diseases, with the
occasions or impulsions; the diseases themselves, with the
accidents ; and the cures, with the preservations. The de-
ficiences which I think good to note, being a few of many, and
those such as are of a more open and manifest nature, I will
enumerate and not place.

(4) The first is the discontinuance of the ancient and serious
diligence of Hippocrates, which used to set down a narrative
of the special cases of his patients, and how they proceeded,
and how they were judged by recovery or death. Therefore
having an example proper in the father of the art, I shall not
need to allege an example foreign, of the wisdom of the law-
yers, who are careful to report new cases and decisions, for
the direction of future judgments. This continuance of
medicinal history I find deficient ; which I understand neither
to be so infinite as to extend to every common case, nor so
reserved as to admit none but wonders: for many things are
new in the manner, which are not new in the kind ; and if
men will intend to observe, they shall find much worthy to
observe.

(5) In the inquiry which is made by anatomy, I find much
deficience : for they inquire of the parts, and their substances,
figures, and collocations; but they inquire not of the diversities
of the parts, the secrecies of the passages, and the seats or
nestling of the humours, nor much of the footsteps and im-
pressions of diseases. The reason of which omission I suppose
to be, because the first inquiry may be satisfied in the view of
one or a few anatomies ; but the latter, being comparative and
casual, must arise from the view of many. And as to the
diversity of parts, there is no doubt but the facture or framing
of the inward parts is as full of difference as the outward, and
in that is the cause continent of many diseases; which not
being observed, they quarrel many times with the humours,
which are not in fault; the fault being in the very frame and
mechanic of the part, which cannot be removed by medicine
alterative, but must be accommodated and palliated by diets and
medicines familiar. And for the passages and pores, it is true
which was anciently noted, that the more subtle of them

164. THE ADVANCEMENT OF LEARNING.

* appear not in anatomies, because they are shut and latent in
dead bodies, though they be open and manifest in life : which
being supposed, though the inhumanity of anatomia vivorum
was by Celsus justly reproved ; yet in regard of the great use
of this observation, the inquiry needed not by him so slightly
to have been relinquished altogether, or referred to the casual
practices of surgery ; but might have been well diverted upon
the dissection of beasts alive, which notwithstanding the dis-
similitude of their parts may sufficiently satisfy this inquiry.
And for the humours, they are commonly passed over in
anatomies as purgaments; whereas it is most necessary to
observe, what cavities, nests, and receptacles the humours do
find in the parts, with the differing kind of the humour so
lodged and received. And as for the footsteps of diseases, and
their devastations of the inward parts, impostumations, exul-
cerations, discontinuations, putrefactions, consumptions, con-
tractions, extensions, convulsions, dislocations, obstructions,
repletions, together with all preternatural substances, as
stones, carnosities, excrescences, worms, and the like; they
ought to have been exactly observed by multitude of anatomies,
and the contribution of men’s several experiences, and carefully
set down both historically according to the appearances, and
artificially with a reference to the diseases and symptoms
which resulted from them, in case where the anatomy is of a
defunct patient ; whereas now upon opening of bodies they
are passed over slightly and in silence.

(6) In the inquiry of diseases, they do abandon the cures of
many, some as in their nature incurable, and others as past
the period of cure; so that Sylla and the Triumvirs never
proscribed so many men to die, as they do by their ignorant
edicts : whereof numbers do escape with less difficulty than
they did in the Roman proscriptions. Therefore I will not
doubt to note as a deficience, that they inquire not the perfect
cures of many diseases, or extremities of diseases ; but pro-
nouncing them incurable do enact a law of neglect, and exempt
ignorance from discredit.

(7) Nay further, I esteem it the office of a physician not
only to restore health, but to mitigate pain and dolors; and
not only when such mitigation may conduce to recovery, but
when it may serve to make a fair and easy passage. For it is
no small felicity which Augustus Cesar was wont to wish to
himself, that same Huthanasia ; and which was specially noted
in the death of Antoninus Pius, whose death was after the
fashion and semblance of a kindly and pleasant sleep. So it is
written of Epicurus, that after his disease was judged desperate,

THE SECOND BOOK. 105

he drowned his stomach and senses with a large draught and
ingurgitation of wine ; whereupon the epigram was made,
Hine Stygias ebrius hausit aquas ; he was not sober enough to
taste any bitterness of the Stygian water. But the physicians
contrariwise do make a kind of scruple and religion to stay
with the patient after the disease is deplored ; whereas in my
judgment they ought both to inquire the skill, and to give the
attendances, for the facilitating and assuaging of the pains and
agonies of death.

(8) In the consideration of the cures of diseases, I find a
deficience in the receipts of propriety, respecting the particular
cures of diseases: for the physicians have frustrated the fruit
of tradition and experience by their magistralities, in adding
and taking out and changing quid pro quo in their receipts, at
their pleasures; commanding so over the medicine, as the
medicine cannot command over the disease. For except it be
treacle and mithridatum, and of late diascordium, and a few
more, they tie themselves to no receipts severely and reli-
giously. For as to the confections of sale which are in the
shops, they are for readiness and not for propriety. For they
are upon general intentions of purging, opening, comforting,
altering, and not much appropriate to particular diseases.
And this is the cause why empirics and old women are more
happy many times in their cures than learned physicians,
because they are more religious in holding their medicines.
Therefore here is the deficience which I find, that physicians
have not, partly out of their own practice, partly out of the
constant probations reported in books, and partly out of the
traditions of empirics, set down and delivered over certain
experimental medicines for the cure of particular diseases,
besides their own conjectural and magistral descriptions. For
as they were the men of the best composition in the state of
Rome, which either being consuls inclined to the people, or
being tribunes inclined to the senate; so in the matter we
now handle, they be the best physicians, which being learned
incline to the traditions of experience, or being empirics incline
to the methods of learning.

(9) In preparation of medicines I do find strange, specially
considering how mineral medicines have been extolled, and that
they are safer for tne outward than inward parts, that no man
hath sought to make an imitation by art of natural baths and
medicinable fountains: which nevertheless are confessed to
receive their virtues from minerals; and not so only, but
discerned and distinguished from what particular mineral they
receive tincture, as sulphur, vitriol, steel, or the like : which

eel:

106 THE ADVANCEMENT OF LEARNING.

nature, if it may be reduced to compositions of art, both the
variety of them will be increased, and the temper of them will
be more commanded.

(10) But lest I grow to be more particular than is agreeable
either to my intention or to proportion, I will conclude this
part with the note of one deficience more, which seemeth to me
of greatest consequence : which is, that the prescripts in use
are too compendious to attain their end; for, to my under-
standing, it is a vain and flattering opinion to think any
medicine can be so sovereign or so happy, as that the receipt
or use of it can work any great effect upon the body of man.
It were a strange speech which spoken, or spoken oft, should
reclaim a man from a vice to which he were by nature subject.
It is order, pursuit, sequence, and interchange of application,
which is mighty in nature ; which although it require more
exact knowledge in prescribing, and more precise obedience in
observing, yet is recompensed with the magnitude of effects.
And although a man would think, by the daily visitations of
the physicians, that there were a pursuance in the cure, yet
let a man look into their prescripts and ministrations, and he
shall find them but inconstancies and every day’s devices,
without any settled providence or project. Not that every
scrupulous or superstitious prescript is effectual, no more than
every straight way is the way to heaven ; but the truth of the
direction must precede severity of observance.

(11) For cosmetic, it hath parts civil, and parts effeminate :
for cleanness of body was ever esteemed to proceed from a due
reverence to God, to society, and to ourselves. As for artificial
decoration, it is well worthy of the deficiences which it hath ;
being neither fine enough to deceive, nor handsome to use, nor
wholesome to please.

(12) For athletic, I take the subject of it largely, that is to
say, for any point of ability whereunto the body of man may
be brought, whether it be of activity, or of patience ; whereof
activity hath two parts, strength and swiftness ; and patience
likewise hath two parts, hardness against wants and extremi-
ties, and endurance of pain or torment; whereof we see the
practices in tumblers, in savages, and in those that suffer
punishment. Nay, if there be any other faculty which falls
not within any of the former <livisions, as in those that dive,
that obtain a strange power of containing respiration, and the
like, I refer it to this part. Of these things the practices are
known, but the philosophy that concerneth them is not much
inquired ; the rather, I think, because they are supposed to be
obtained, either by an aptness of nature, which cannot be

THE SECOND BOOK, 107

taught, or only by continual custom, which is soon prescribed :
which though if be not true, yet I forbear to note any
deficiences ; for the Olympian games are down long since, and
the mediocrity of these things is for use; as for the excellency
of them it serveth for the most part but for mercenary
ostentation.

(13) For arts of pleasure sensual, the chief deficience in them
is of laws to repress them, For as it hath been well observed,
that the arts which flourish in times while virtue is in growth,
are military ; and while virtue is in state, are liberal 3; and
while virtue is in declination, are voluptuary : so I doubt that

and education. And thus much of that particular human °
philosophy which concerns the body, which is but the taber-
nacle of the mind.

XI. (1) For human knowledge which concerns the mind, it

by the benediction of a producat, but was immediately inspired
from God, so it is not possible that it should be (otherwise than
by accident) subject to the laws of heaven and earth, which are
the subject of hilosophy ; and therefore the true knowledge of
the nature aad state of the soul must come by the same inspira-
tion that gave the substance. Unto this part of knowledge
touching the soul there be two appendices ; which, as they have
been handled, have rather vapoured forth fables than kindled
truth: divination and fascination.

(2) Divination hath been anciently and fitly divided into
artificial and natural : whereof artificial is, when the mind
maketh a prediction by argument, concluding upon signs and

108 THE ADVANCEMENT OF LEARNING.

tokens ; natural is, when the mind hath a presention by an
internal power, without the inducement of a sign. Artificial is
of two sorts: either when the argument is coupled with a
derivation of causes, which is rational; or when it is only
grounded upon a coincidence of the effect, which is experi-
mental: whereof the latter for the most part is superstitious,
such as were the heathen observations upon the inspection of
sacrifices, the flights of birds, the swarming of bees; and such
as was the Chaldean astrology, and the like. For artificial
divination, the several kinds thereof are distributed amongst
particular knowledges. The astronomer hath his predictions,
as of conjunctions, aspects, eclipses, and the like. The
physician hath his predictions, of death, of recovery, of the
accidents and issues of diseases. The politique hath his pre-
dictions; O urbem venalem, et cito perituram, st emptorem
-invenerit! which stayed not long to be performed, in Sylla
first, and after in Cesar: so as these predictions are now
impertinent, and to be referred over. But the divination
which springeth from the internal nature of the soul is that
which we now speak of ; which hath been made to be of two
sorts, primitive and by influxion. Primitive is grounded upon
the supposition that the mind, when it is withdrawn and
collected into itself, and not ditfused into the organs of the
body, hath some extent and latitude of prenotion; which
therefore appeareth most in sleep, in ecstasies, and near death,
and more rarely in waking apprehensions ; and is induced and
furthered by those abstinences and observances which make the
mind most to consist in itself. By influxion, is grounded upop
the conceit that the mind, as a mirror or glass, should take
illumination from the foreknowledge of God and spirits : unto
which the same regiment doth likewise conduce. For the
retiring of the mind within itself is the state which is most
susceptible of divine influxions ; save that it is accompanied in
this case with a fervency and elevation (which the ancients
noted by fury), and not with a repose and quiet, as it is in the
other.

(3) Fascination is the power and act of imagination intensive
upon other bodies than the body of the imaginant, for of that
we spake in the proper place. © Wherein the school of Para-
celsus, and the disciples of pretended natural magic, have
been so intemperate, as they have exalted the power of the
imagination to be much one with the power of miracle-working
faith. Others, that draw nearer to probability, calling to
their-view the secret passages of things, and specially of the |
contagion that passeth from body to body, do conceive it

THE SECOND BOOK. 109

should likewise be agreeable to nature that there should be
some transmissions and operations from spirit to spirit without
the mediation of the senses; whence the conceits have grown
(now almost made civil) of the mastering spirit, and the force
of confidence, and the like. Incident unto this is the inquiry
how to raise and fortify the imagination ; for if the imagina-
vion fortified have power, then it is material to know how
to fortify and exalt it. And herein comes in crookedly and
dangerously a palliation of a great part of ceremonial magic.
For it may be pretended that ceremonies, characters, and
charms do work, not by any tacit or sacramental contract
with evil spirits, but serve only to strengthen the imagination
of him that useth it; as images are said by the Roman Church
to fix the cogitations and raise the devotions of them that
pray before them. But for mine own judgment, if it be
admitted that imagination hath power, and that ceremonies
fortify imagination, and that they be used sincerely and in-
tentionally for that purpose ; yet I should hold them unlawful,
as opposing to that first edict which God gave unto man, Jn
sudore vultus comedes panem tuum. For they propound those
noble effects, which God hath set forth unto man to be bought
at the price of labour, to be attained by a few easy and
slothful observances. Deficiences in these knowledges I will
report none, other than the general deficience, that it is not
known how much of them is verity, and how much vanity.

XII. (1) The knowledge which respecteth the faculties of
the mind of man is of two kinds—the one respecting his under-
standing and reason, and the other his will, appetite, and
affection ; whereof the former produceth position or decree,
the latter action or execution. It is true that the imagination
is an agent or nuncius in both provinces, both the judicial
and the ministerial, For sense sendeth over to imagination
before reason have judged, and reason sendeth over to imagina-
tion before the decree can be acted. For imagination ever
precedeth voluntary motion. Saving that this Janus of ima-
gination hath differing faces : for the face towards reason hath
the print of truth, but the face towards action hath the print
of good; which nevertheless are faces,

‘*Quales decet esse sororum.”

Neither is the imagination simply and only a messenger; but
is invested with, or at least wise usurpeth no small authority
in itself, besides the duty of the message. For it was well
said by Aristotle, ‘‘That the mind hath over the body that

.

Aa

110 THE ADVANCEMENT OF LEARNING.

commandment, which the lord hath over a bondman ; but that
reason hath over the imagination that commandment which a
magistrate hath over a free citizen,” who may come also to
rule in his turn. For we see that, in matters of faith and
religion, we raise our imagination above our reason, which is
the cause why religion sought ever access to the mind by
similitudes, types, parables, visions, dreams. And again, in all
persuasions that are wrought by eloquence, and other impres-
sions of like nature, which do paint and_ disguise the true
appearance of things, the chief recommendation unto reason
ss from the imagination. Nevertheless, because I find not any
science that doth properly or fitly pertain to the imagination,
T see no cause to alter the former division. For as for poesy,
it is rather a pleasure or play of imagination than a work or
duty thereof. And if it be a work, we speak not now of such
parts of learning as the imagination produceth, but of such
sciences as handle and consider of the imagination. No more
than we shall speak now of such knowledges as reason pro-
duceth (for that extendeth to all philosophy), but of such
knowledges as do handle and inquire of the faculty of reason :
so as poesy had his true place. As for the power of the
imagination in nature, and the manner of fortifying the same,
we have mentioned it in the doctrine De Anima, whereunto
most fitly it belongeth. And lastly, for imaginative or in-
sinuative reason, which is the subject of rhetoric, we think it
best to refer it to the arts of reason. So therefore we content
ourselves with the former division, that human philosophy,
which respecteth the faculties of the mind of man, hath two
arts, rational and moral.

(2\ The part of human philosophy which is rational is of all
knowledges, to the most wits, the least delightful, and seemeth
but a net of subtlety and spinosity. For as it was truly said,
that knowledge is pabulum animt ; 80 in the nature of men’s
appetite to this food most men are of the taste and stomach
of the Israelites in the desert, that would fain have returned
ad ollas carnium, and were weary of manna ; which, though it
were celestial, yet seemed less nutritive and comfortable. So
generally men taste well knowledges that are drenched in
flesh and blood, civil history, morality, policy, about the which
men’s affections, praises, fortunes do turn and are conversant.
But this same lumen siccum doth parch and offend most men’s
watery and soft natures. But to speak truly of things as they
are in worth, rational knowledges are the keys of all other
arts; for as Aristotle saith aptly and elegantly, “‘That the -
band is the instrument of instruments, and the mind is the

THE SECOND BOOK. 111

form of forms;” so these be truly said to be the art of
arts. Neither do they only direct, but likewise confirm and
strengthen; even as the habit of shooting doth not only enable
to shoot a nearer shoot, but also to draw a stronger bow.

(3) The arts intellectual are four in number, divided ac-
cording to the ends whereunto they are referred—for man’s
labour is to invent that which is sought or propounded ; or to
judge that which is invented; or to retain that which is
judged ; or to deliver over that which is retained. So as the
arts must be four—art of inquiry or invention ; art of examina-
tion or judgment; art of custody or memory; and art of
elocution or tradition.

XIII. (1) Invention is of two kinds much differing—the one
of arts and sciences, and the other of speech and arguments.
The former of these I do report deficient ; which seemeth to
me to be such a deficience as if, in the making of an inventory
touching the state of a defunct, it should be set down that
there is no ready money. For as money will fetch all other
commodities, so this knowledge is that which should purchase
all the rest. And like as the West Indies had never been
discovered if the use of the mariner’s needle had not been first
discovered, though the one be vast regions, and the other a
small motion ; so it cannot be found strange if sciences be no
further discovered, if the art itself of invention and discovery
hath been passed over.

(2) That this part of knowledge is wanting, to my judgment
standeth plainly confessed ; for first, logic doth not pretend to
invent sciences, or the axioms of sciences, but passeth it over
with a cuique in sua arte credendum. And Celsus acknow-
ledgeth it gravely, speaking of the empirical and dogmatical
sects of physicians, ‘‘ That medicines and cures were first found
out, and then after the reasons and causes were discoursed ;
and not the causes first found out, and by light from them the
medicines and cures discovered.” And Plato in his “ Thez-
tetus” noteth well, ‘“‘ That particulars are infinite, and the
higher generalities give no sufficient direction ; and that the
pith of all sciences, which maketh the artsman differ from the
inexpert, is in the middle propositions, which in every par-
ticular knowledge are taken from tradition and experience, ”
And therefore we see, that they which discourse of the inven-
tions and originals of things refer them rather to chance than
to art, and rather to beasts, birds, fishes, serpents, than to
men,

‘“‘ Dictamnum genetrix Cretea carpit ab Ida,
Puberibus ecaulem foliis et flore comantem

112 THE ADVANCEMENT OF LEARNING.

Purpureo ; non illa feris incognita capris
Gramina, cum tergo volucres hesere sagittee.’

So that it was no marvel (the manner of antiquity being to
consecrate inventors) that the Egyptians had so few human
idols in their temples, but almost all brute :

‘«‘ QOmnigenumque Deum monstra, et latrator Anubis,
Contra Neptunum, et Venerem, contraque Minervam, &e.”

And if you like better the tradition of the Grecians, and
ascribe the first inventions to men, yet you will rather believe
that Prometheus first stroke the flints, and marvelled at the
spark, than that when he first stroke the flints he expected
the spark; and therefore we see the West Indian Prometheus
had no intelligence with the European, because of the rareness
with them of flint, that gave the first occasion. So as it should
seem, that hitherto men are rather beholden to a wild goat
for surgery, or to a nightingale for music, or to the ibis for
some part of physic, or to the pot-lid tha’ flew open for ar-
tillery, or generally to chance or anything else than to logic
for the invention of arts and sciences. Neither is the form of
invention which Virgil describeth much other :

“Ut varias usus meditando extunderet artes
Paulatim.”

For if you observe the words well, it is no other method than
that which brute beasts are capable of, and do put in ure;
which is a perpetual intending or practising some one thing,
urged and imposed by an absolute necessity of conservation of
being. For so Cicero saith very truly, Usus uni vrei deditus et
naturam et artem sepe vincit. And therefore if it be said of
men,
“Labor omnia vincit
Improbus, et duris urgens in rebus egestas,”

it is likewise said of beasts, Quis psittaco docuit suum xatpe?
Who taught the raven in a drought to throw pebbles into a
hollow tree, where she spied water, that the water might rise
so as she might come to it? Who taught the bee to sail
through such a vast sea or air, and to find the way from a field
in a flower a great way off to her hive? Who taught the ant
to bite every grain of corn that she burieth in her hill, lest it
should take root and grow? Add then the word extundere,
which importeth the extreme difficulty, and the word paulatim,

THE SECOND BOOK. 113

which importeth the extreme slowness, and we are where we
were, even amongst the Egyptians’ gods; there being little left
to the faculty of reason, and nothing to the duty or art, for
matter of invention.

(3) Secondly, the induction which the logicians speak of,
and which seemeth familiar with Plato, whereby the principles
of sciences may be pretended to be invented, and so the middle
propositions by derivation from the principles ; their form of
induction, I say, is utterly vicious and incompetent ; wherein
their error is the fouler, because it is the duty of art to perfect
and exalt nature ; but they contrariwise have wronged, abused,
and traduced nature. For he that shall attentively observe
how the mind doth gather this excellent dew of knowledge,
like unto that which the poet speaketh of, Aérei mellis cclestia
dona, distilling and contriving it out of particulars natural and
artificial, as the flowers of the field and garden, shall find that
the mind of herself by nature doth manage and act an induction
much better than they describe it. For to conclude upon an
enumeration of particulars, without instance contradictory, is
no conclusion, but a conjecture ; for who can assure (in many
subjects) upon those particulars which appear of a side, that
there are not other on the contrary side which appear not? As
if Samuel should have rested upon those sons of Jesse which
were brought before him, and failed of David which was in the
field. And this form (to say truth), is so gross, as it had not
been possible for wits so subtle as have managed these things
to have offered it to the world, but that they hasted to their
theories and dogmaticals, and were imperious and scornful
toward particulars; which their manner was to use but as
lictores and viatores, for sergeants and whifflers, ad swmmoven-
cam turbam, to make way and make room for their opinions,
rather than in their true use and service. Certainly it is a
thing may touch a man with a religious wonder, to see how |
the footsteps of seducement are the very same in divine and
human truth ; for, as in divine truth man cannot endure to
become as a child, so in human, they reputed the attending
the inductions (whereof we speak), as if it were a second in-
fancy or childhood.

(4) Thirdly, allow some principles or axioms were rightly in
duced, yet, nevertheless, certain it is that middle propositions
cannot be deduced from them in subject of nature by syllogism
—that is, by touch and reduction of them to principles in
a middle term. It is true that in sciences popular, as morali
ties, laws, and the like, yea, and divinity (because it pleaseth
God to apply Himself to the capacity of the simplest), thas

114 THE ADVANCEMENT OF LEARNING.

form may have use; and in natural philosophy likewise, by
way of argument or satisfactory reason, Qué assensum parit,
operis effota est; but the subtlety of nature and operations
will not be enchained in those bonds. For ar, ents consist
of propositions, and propositions of words, an words are but
the current tokens or marks of popular notions of things ;
which notions, if they be grossly and variably collected out of
particulars, it is not the laborious examination either of conse-
quences of arguments, or of the truth of propositions, that can
ever correct that error, being (as the physicians speak) in the
first digestion. And, therefore, it was not without cause, that
so many excellent philosophers became sceptics and academics,
and denied any certainty of knowledge or comprehension ; and
held opinion that the knowledge of man extended ‘only to ap-
pearances and probabilities. It is true that in Socrates it was
supposed to be but a form of irony, Scientiam dissimulando
simulavit ; for he used to disable his knowledge, to the end to
enhance his knowledge; like the humour of Tiberius in his be-
ginnings, that would reign, but would not acknowledge so
much. And in the later academy, which Cicero embraced,
this opinion also of acatalepsia (I doubt) was not held sin-
cerely ; for that all those which excelled in copy of speech
seem to have chosen that sect, as that which was fittest to
give glory to their eloquence and variable discourses ; being
rather like progresses of pleasure than journeys to an end.
But assuredly many scattered in both academies did hold it in
subtlety and integrity. But here was their chief error: they
charged the deceit upon the senses; which in my judgment
(notwithstanding all their cavillations) are very sufficient to
certify and report truth, though not always immediately, yet
by comparison, by help of instrument, and by producing and
urging such things as are too subtle for the sense to some
effect comprehensible by the sense, and. other like assistance.
But they ought to have charged the deceit upon the weakness
of the intellectual powers, and upon the manner of collecting
and concluding upon the reports of the senses. This I speak,
not to disable the mind of man, but to stir it up to seek help ;
for no man, be he never 80 cunning or practised, can make a
straight line or perfect circle by steadiness of hand, which may
be easily done by help of a ruler or compass.

(5) This part of invention, concerning the invention of
sciences, I purpose (if God give me leave) hereafter to pro-
pound, having digested it into two parts: whereof the one I
term experientia literata, and the other imterpretatio nature ;
the former being but a degree and rudiment of the latter.

THE SECOND BOOK. 115

But I will not dwell too long, nor speak too great upon a
promise.

(6) The invention of speech or argument is not properly an
invention ; for to invent is to discover that we know not, and
not to recover or resummon that which we already know ;
and the use of this invention is no other but, out of the know-
ledge whereof our mind is already possessed, to draw forth or
call before us that which may be pertinent to the purpose
which we take into our consideration. So as to speak truly, it
is no invention, but a remembrance or suggestion, with an
application ; which is the cause why the schools do place it
after judgment, as subsequent and not precedent. Neverthe-
less, because we do account it a chase as well of deer in an en-
closed park as in a forest at large, and that it hath already
obtained the name, let it be called invention; so as it be
perceived and discerned, that the scope and end of this in-
vention is readiness and present use of our knowledge, and not
addition or amplification thereof.

(7) To procure this ready use of knowledge there are two
courses, preparation and suggestion. The former of these
seemeth scarcely a part of knowledge, consisting rather of
diligence than of any artificial erudition. And herein Aristotle
wittily, but hurtfully, doth deride the sophists near his time,
saying, “‘ They did as if one that professed the art of shoe-
making should not teach how to make up a shoe, but only
exhibit in a readiness a number of shoes of all fashions and
sizes.” But yet a man might reply, that if a shoemaker should
have no shoes in his shop, but only work as he is bespoken, he
should be weakly customed. But our Saviour, speaking of
divine knowledge, saith, ‘‘That the kingdom of heaven is like
a good householder, that bringeth forth both new and old
store ;” and we see the ancient writers of rhetoric do give it in
precept, that pleaders should have the places, whereof they
have most continual use, ready handled in all the variety that
may be; as that, to speak for the literal interpretation of the
law against equity, and contrary ; and to speak for presump-
tions and inferences against testimony, and contrary. And
Cicero himself, being broken unto it by great experience, de-
livereth it plainly, that whatsoever a man shall have occasion
to speak of (if he will take the pains), he may have it in effect
premeditate and handled in thesit. So that when he cometh to
a particular he shall have nothing to do, but to put to names,
and times, and places, and such other circumstances of indi-
viduals. We see likewise the exact diligence of Demosthenes;
who, in regard of the great force that the entrance and access

116 THE ADVANCEMENT OF LEARNING.

into causes hath to make a good impression, had ready framed
a number of prefaces for orations and speeches. All which
authorities and precedents may overweigh Aristotle’s opinion,
that would have us change a rich wardrobe for a pair of
shears.

(8) But the nature of the collection of this provision or pre-
paratory store, though it be common both to logic and rhetoric,
yet having made an entry of it here, where it came first to be
spoken of, I think fit to refer over the further handling of it
to rhetoric.

(9) The other part of invention, which I term suggestion,
doth assign and direct us to certain marks, or places, which
may excite our mind to return and produce such knowledge as
it hath formerly collected, to the end we may make use
thereof. Neither is this use (truly taken) only to furnish ar-
gument to dispute probably with others, but likewise to
minister unto our judgment to conclude aright within our-
selves. Neither may these places serve only to apprompt our
invention, but also to direct our inquiry. For a faculty of
wise interrogating is half a knowledge. For as Plato saith,
“¢ Whosoever seeketh, knoweth that which he seeketh for ina
general notion ; else how shall he know it when he hath found
it?” And, therefore, the larger your anticipation is, the more
direct and compendious is your search. But the same places
which will help us what to produce of that which we know
already, will also help us, if a man of experience were before
us, what questions to ask; or, if we have books and authors to
instruct us, what points to search and revolve ; so as I cannot
report that this part of invention, which is that which the
schools call topics, is deficient.

(10) Nevertheless, topics are of two sorts, general and
special. The general we have spoken to; but the par-
ticular hath been touched by some, but rejected generally
as inartificial and variable. But leaving the humour which
hath reigned too much in the schools (which is, to be vainly
subtle in a few things which are within their command, and
to reject the rest), I do receive particular topics ; that is, places
or directions of invention and inquiry in every particular
knowledge, as things of great use, being mixtures of logic with
the matter of sciences. For in these it holdeth ars inveniendi
adolescit cum inventis; for as in going of a way, we do not
only gain that part of the way which is passed, but we gain
the better sight of that part of the way which remaineth, so
every degree of proceeding in a science giveth a light to that
which followeth ; which light, if we strengthen by drawing it

THE SECOND BOOK. 117

forth into questions or places of inquiry, we do greatly advance
our pursuit.

XIV. (1) Now we pass unto the arts of judgment, which
handle the natures of proofs and demonstrations, which as to
induction hath a coincidence with invention ; for all induct»ons,
whether in good or vicious form, the same action of the mind
which inventeth, judgeth—all one as in the sense. But other-
wise it is in proof by syllogism, for the proof being not im-
mediate, but by mean, the invention of the mean is one thing,
and the judgment of the consequence is another; the one
exciting only, the other examining. Therefore, for the real
and exact form of judgment, we refer ourselves to that which
we have spoken of interpretation of Nature.

(2) For the other judgment by syllogism, as it is a thing
most agreeable to the mind of man, so it hath been vehemently
and excellently laboured. For the nature of man doth ex-
tremely covet to have somewhat in his understanding fixed
and unmovable, and as a rest and support of the mind. And,
therefore, as Aristotle endeavoureth to prove, that in all
motion there is some point quiescent; and as he elegantly
expoundeth the ancient fable of Atlas (that stood fixed, and
bare up the heaven from falling) to be meant of the poles or
axle-tree of heaven, whereupon the conversion is accomplished,
so assuredly men have a desire to have an Atlas or axle-tree
within to keep them from fluctuation, which is like to a per-
petual peril of falling. Therefore men did hasten to set down
some principles about which the variety of their disputations
might turn.

(3) So, then, this art of judgment is but the reduction of
propositions to principles in a middle term. The principles
to be agreed by all and exempted from argument; the middle
term to be elected at the liberty of every man’s invention ; the
reduction to be of two kinds, direct and inverted: the one
when the proposition is reduced to the principle, which they
term a probation ostensive ; the other, when the contradictory
of the proposition is reduced to the contradictory of the
principle, which is that which they call per incommodum, or
pressing an absurdity ; the number of middle terms to be as
the proposition standeth degrees more or less removed from
the principle.

(4) But this art hath two several methods of doctrine, the
one by way of direction, the other by way of caution: the
former frameth and setteth down a true form of consequence,
by the variations and deflections from which errors and in-
consequences may be exactly judged. Toward the composition

118 THE ADVANCEMENT OF LEARNING.

and structure of which form it is incident to handle the parts
thereof, which are propositions, and the parts of propositions,
which are simple words. And this is that part of logic which
is comprehended in the Analytics.

(5) The second method of doctrine was introduced for
expedite use and assurance sake, discovering the more subtle
forms of sophisms and illaqueations with their redargutions,
which is that which is termed elenches. For although in the
more gross sorts of fallacies it happeneth (as Seneca maketh
the comparison well) as in juggling feats, which, though we
know not how they are done, yet we know well it is not as it
seemeth to be; yct the more subtle sort of them doth not
only put a man besides his answer, but doth many times abuse
his judgment.

(6) This part concerning elenches is excellently handled by
Aristotle in precept, but more excellently by Plato in example ;
not only in the persons of the sophists, but even in Socrates
himself, who, professing to affirm nothing, but to infirm that
which was affirmed by another, hath exactly expressed all the
forms of objection, fallace, and redargution. Andalthough we
have said that the use of this doctrine is for redargution, yet it
is manifest the degenerate and corrupt use is for caption and
contradiction, which passeth for a great faculty, and no doubt
is of very great advantage, though the difference be good which
was made between orators and sophisters, that the one is as
the greyhound, which hath his advantage in the race, and the
other as the hare, which hath her advantage in the turn, so as
it is the advantage of the weaker creature.

(7) But yet further, this doctrine of elenches hath a more
ample latitude and extent than is perceived ; namely, unto
divers parts of knowledge, whereof some are laboured and
other omitted. For first, I conceive (though it may seem at
first somewhat strange) that that part which is variably re-
ferred, sometimes to logic, sometimes to metaphysic, touching
the common adjuncts of essences, is but an elenche; for the
great sophism of all sophisms being equivocation or ambiguity
of words and phrase, specially of such words as are most
general and intervene in every inquiry, it seemeth to me that
the true and fruitful use (leaving vain subtleties and specula-
tions) of the inquiry of majority, minority, priority, pos-
teriority, identity, diversity, possibility, act, totality, parts,
existence, privation, and the like, are but wise cautions against
ambiguities of speech. So, again, the distribution of things
into certain tribes, which we call categories or predicaments,

THE SECOND BOOK. 119

are but cautions against the confusion of definitions and
divisions.

(8) Secondly, there is a seducement that worketh by the
strength of the impression, and not by the subtlety of the —
illaqueation—not so much perplexing the reason, as overruling
it by power of the imagination. But this part I think more
proper to handle when I shall speak of rhetoric,

(9) But lastly, there is yet a much more important and pro-
found kind of fallacies in the mind of man, which I find not
observed or inquired at all, and think good to place here, as
that which of all others appertaineth most to rectify judgment,
the force whereof is such as it doth not dazzle or snare the
understanding in some particulars, but doth more generally
and inwardly infect and corrupt the state thereof. For the
mind of man is far from the nature of a clear and equal glass,
wherein the beams of things should reflect according to their
true incidence; nay, it is rather like an enchanted glass, full
of superstition and imposture, if it be not delivered and re-
duced. For this purpose, let us consider the false appearances
that are imposed upon us by the general nature of the mind,
beholding them in an example or two ; as first, in that instance
which is the root of all superstition, namely, that to the nature
of the wind of all men it is consonant for the affirmative or
active to affect more than the negative or privative. So that
a few times hitting or presence countervails ofttimes failing or
absence, as was well answered by Diagoras to him that showed
him in Neptune’s temple the great number of pictures of such
as had escaped shipwreck, and had paid their vows to Neptune,
saying, ‘“‘ Advise now, you that think it folly to invocate
Neptune in tempest.” “Yea, but,” saith Diagoras, ‘‘ where
are they painted that are drowned?” Let us behold it in
another instance, namely, that the spirit of man, being of an
equal and uniform substance, doth usually suppose and feign
in nature a greater equality and uniformity than is in truth.
Hence it cometh that the mathematicians cannot satisfy them-
selves except they reduce the motions of the celestial bodies to
perfect circles, rejecting spiral lines, and labouring to be dis-
charged of eccentrics. Hence it cometh that whereas there are
many things in Nature as it were monodica, sui juris, yet the
cogitations of man do feign unto them relatives, parallels, and
conjugates, whereas no such thing is; as they have feigned ax,
element of fire to keep square with earth, water, and air, and
the like. Nay, it is not credible, till it be opened, what a
number of fictions and fantasies the similitude of human
actions and arts, together with the making of man communis

120 THE ADVANCEMENT OF LEARNING.

mensura, have brought into natural philosophy ; not much
better than the heresy of the Anthropomorphites, bred in the
cells of gross and solitary monks, and the opinion of Epicurus,
answerable to the same in heathenism, who supposed the gods
- to be of human shape. And, therefore, Velleius the Epicurean
needed not to have asked why God should have adorned the
heavens with stars, as if He had been an edilis, one that should
have set forth some magnificent shows or plays. For if that
great Work-master had been of a human disposition, He
would have cast the stars into some pleasant and beautiful
works and orders like the frets in the roofs of houses; whereas
one can scarce find a posture in square, or triangle, or straight
line, amongst such an infinite number, so differing a harmony
there is between the spirit of man and the spirit of Nature.

(10) Let us consider again the false appearances imposed
upon us by every man’s own individual nature and custom in
that feigned supposition that Plato maketh of the cave ; for
certainly if a child were continued in a grot or cave under the
earth until maturity of age, and came suddenly abroad, he
would have strange and absurd imaginations. So, in like
manner, although our persons live in the view of heaven, yet
our spirits are included in the caves of our own complexions
and customs, which minister unto us infinite errors and vain
opinions if they be not recalled to examination. But hereof
we have given many examples in one of the errors, or peccant
humours, which we ran briefly over in our first book.

(11) And lastly, let us consider the false appearances that
are imposed upon us by words, which are framed and applied
according to the conceit and capacities of the vulgar sort ; and
although we think we govern our words, and prescribe it well
loquendum ut vulgus sentiendum ut sapientes, yet certain it is
that words, as a Tartar’s bow, do shoot back upon the under-
standing of the wisest, and mightily entangle and pervert the
judgment. So as it is almost necessary in all controversies
and disputations to imitate the wisdom of the mathematicians,
in setting down in the very beginning the definitions of our
words and terms, that others may know how we accept and
understand them, and whether they concur with us or no.
For it cometh to pass, for want of this, that we are sure to end
there where we ought to have begun, which is, in questions
and differences about words. To conclude, therefore, it must
be confessed that it is not possible to divorce ourselves from
these fallacies and false appearances because they are insepar-
able from our nature and condition of life; so yet, neverthe-
less, the caution of them (for all elenches, as was said, are

THE SECOND BOOK. 121

but cautions) doth extremely import the true conduct of human
judgment. The particular elenches or cautions against these
three false appearances I find altogether deficient.

(12) There remaineth one part of judgment of great excel-
lency which to mine understanding is so slightly touched, as I
may report that also deficient ; which is the application of the
differing kinds of proofs to the differing kinds of subjects.
For there being but four kinds of demonstrations, that is, by
the immediate consent of the mind or sense, by induction, by
syllogism, and by congruity, which is that which Aristotle
calleth demonstration in orb or circle, and not a notioribus,
every of these hath certain subjects in the matter of sciences,
in which respectively they have chiefest use; and certain
others, from which respectively they ought to be excluded;
and the rigour and curiosity in requiring the more severe
proofs in some things, and chiefly the facility in contenting
ourselves with the more remiss proofs in others, hath been
amongst the greatest causes of detriment and hindrance to
knowledge. The distributions and assignations of demonstra-
tions according to the analogy of sciences I note as deficient.

XV. (1) The custody or retaining of knowledge is either in
writing or memory; whereof writing hath two parts, the
nature of the character and the order of the entry. For the
art of characters, or other visible notes of words or things, it
hath nearest conjugation with grammar, and, therefore, I
refer it to the due place; for the disposition and collocation
of that knowledge which we preserve in writing, it consisteth
in a good digest of common-places, wherein I am not ignorant
of the prejudice imputed to the use of common-place books,
as causing a retardation of reading, and some sloth or relaxa-
tion of memory. But because it is but a counterfeit thing in
knowledges to be forward and pregnant, except a man be deep
and full, I hold the entry of common-places to be a matter of
great use and essence in studying, as that which assureth copy of
invention, and contracteth judgment to a strength. But this
is true, that of the methods of common-places that I have
seen, there is none of any sufficient worth, all of them carrying
merely the face of a school and not of a world; and referring
to vulgar matters and pedantical divisions, without all life or
respect to action.

(2) For the other principal part of the custody of knowledge,
which is memory, I find that faculty in my judgment weakly
inquired of. An art there is extant of it; but it seemeth to
me that there are better precepts than that art, and better
practices of that art than those received. It is certain the art

122 THE ADVANCEMENT OF LEARNING.

(as it is) may be raised to points of ostentation prodigious; but
in use (as is now managed) it is barren, not burdensome, nor
dangerous to natural memory, as is imagined, but barren,
that is, not dexterous to be applied to the serious use of busi-
ness and occasions. And, therefore, I make no more estimation
of repeating a great number of names or words upon once hear-
ing, or the pouring forth of a number of verses or rhymes
extempore, or the making of a satirical simile of everything, or
the turning of everything to a jest, or the falsifying or contra-
dicting of everything by cavil, or the like (whereof in the
faculties of the mind there is great copy, and such as by
device and practice may be exalted to an extreme degree of
wonder), than I do of the tricks of tumblers, funambuloes,
baladines; the one being the same in the mind that the other
is in the body, matters of strangeness without worthiness.

(3) This art of memory is but built upon two intentions ;
the one prenotion, the other emblem. Prenotion dischargeth
the indefinite seeking of that we would remember, and directeth
us to seek in a narrow compass, that is, somewhat that hath
congruity with our place of memory. Emblem reduceth con-
ceits intellectual to images sensible, which strike the memory
more ; out of which axioms may be drawn much better prac-
tice than that in use; and besides which axioms, there are
divers more touching help of memory not inferior to them.
But I did in the beginning distinguish, not to report those
things deficient, which are but only ill managed. —

XVI. (1) There remaineth the fourth kind of rational know-
ledge, which is transitive, concerning the expressing or trans-
ferring our knowledge to others, which I will term by the
general name of tradition or delivery. Tradition hath three
parts: the first concerning the organ of tradition ; the second
concerning the method of tradition ; and the third concerning
the illustration of tradition.

(2) For the organ of tradition, it is either speech or writing ;
for Aristotle saith well, ‘‘ Words are the images of cogitations,
and letters are the images of words.” But yet it is not of
necessity that cogitations be expressed by the medium of
words. For whatsoever is capable of sufficient differences,
and those perceptible by the sense, is in nature competent to
express cogitations. And, therefore, we see in the commerce
of barbarous people that understand not one another’s lan-
guage, and in the practice of divers that are dumb and deaf,
that men’s minds are expressed in gestures, though not exactly,
yet to serve the turn. And we understand further, that it is
the use of China and the kingdoms of the High Levant to

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write in characters real, which express neither letters nor
words in gross, but things or notions ; insomuch as countries
and provinces which understand not one another’s language

extend ; and, therefore, they have a vast multitude of charac-
ters, as many, I Suppose, as radical words.

(3) These notes of cogitations are of two sorts: the one
when the note hath some similitude or congruity with the
notion; the other ad placitum, having force only by contract
or acceptation, Of the former sort are hieroglyphics and
gestures. For as to hieroglyphics (things of ancient use and
embraced chiefly by the Egyptians, one of the most ancient

the nobility and grandees. Ad placitum, are the characters
real before mentioned, and words : although some have been
willing by curious inquiry, or rather by apt feigning, to have
derived imposition of names from reason and intendment ; a
speculation elegant, and, by reason it searcheth into antiquity,

(4) Concerning speech and words, the consideration of them
hath produced the Science of grammar. For man still striveth
to reintegrate himself in those benedictions, from which by

12-4. THE ADVANCEMENT OF LEARNING.

foreign tongue more; but most in such foreign tongues as
have ceased to be vulgar tongues, and are turned only to
learned tongues. The duty of it is of two natures: the
one popular, which is for the speedy and perfect attaining
languages, as well for intercourse of speech as for under-
standing of authors; the other philosophical, examining the
power and nature of words, as they are the footsteps and
prints of reason: which kind of analogy between words and
reason is handled sparsim, brokenly though not entirely ;
and, therefore, I cannot report it deficient, though I think
it very worthy to be reduced into a science by itself.

(5) Unto grammar also belongeth, as an appendix, the con-
sideration of the accidents of words; which are measure,
sound, and elevation or accent, and the sweetness and harsh-
ness of them: whence hath issued some curious observations
in rhetoric, but chiefly poesy, as we consider it, in respect
of the verse and not of the argument. Wherein though men
in learned tongues do tie themselves to the ancient measures,
yet in modern languages it seemeth to me as free to make new
measures of verses as of dances ; fora dance is a measured pace,
as a verse is a measured speech. In these things the sense is
better judge than the art:

“*Coene fercula nostre
Mallem convivis quam placuisse cocis.”

And of the servile expressing antiquity in an unlike and an
unfit subject, it is well said, ‘‘ Quod tempore antiquum videtur,
id incongruitate est maxime novum.”

(6) For ciphers, they are commonly in letters or alphabets,
but may be in words. The kinds of ciphers (besides the simple
ciphers, with changes, and intermixtures of nulls and non-
significants) are many, according to the nature or rule of the
infolding, wheel-ciphers, key-ciphers, doubles, &c. But the
virtues of them, whereby they are to be preferred, are three ;
that they be not laborious to write and read; that they be
impossible to decipher ; and, in some cases, that they be with-
out suspicion. The highest degree whereof is to write omnia
per omnia; which is undoubtedly possible, with a propor-
tion quintuple at most of the writing infolding to the writing
infolded, and no other restraint whatsoever. This art of
ciphering hath for relative an art of deciphering, by supposi-
tion unprofitable, but, as things are, of great use. For suppose
that ciphers were well managed, there be multitudes of them
which exclude the decipherer. But in regard of the rawness
and unskilfulness of the hands through which they pass,

THE SECOND BOOK. 125

the greatest matters are many times carried in the weakest
ciphers.

(7) In the enumeration of these private and retired arts it
may be thought I seek to make a great muster-roll of sciences,
naming them for show and .ostentation, and to little other
purpose. But let those, which are skilful in them, judge
whether I bring them in only for appearance, or whether in
that which I speak of them (though in few words) there be not
some seed of proficience. And this must be remembered, that
as there be many of great account in their countries and
provinces, which, when they come up to the seat of the estate,
are but of mean rank and scarcely regarded ; so these arts,
being here placed with the principal and supreme sciences,
seem petty things: yet to such as have chosen them to
spend their labours and studies in them, they seem great
matters.

XVII. (1) For the method of tradition, I see it hath moved
a controversy in our time. But as in civil business, if there be
a meeting, and men fall at words, there is commonly an end of
the matter for that time, and no proceeding at all; so in
learning, where there is much controversy, there is many
times little inquiry. For this part of knowledge of method
seemeth to me so weakly inquired as I shall report it deficient.

(2) Method hath been placed, and that not amiss, in logic,
as a part of judgment. For as the doctrine of syllogisms
comprehendeth the rules of judgment upon that which is
invented, so the doctrine of method containeth the rules of
judgment upon that which is to be delivered ; for judgment
precedeth delivery, as it followeth invention. Neither is the
method or the nature of the tradition material only to the use
of knowledge, but likewise to the progression of knowledge:
for since the labour and life of one man cannot attain to
perfection of knowledge, the wisdom of the tradition is that
which inspireth the felicity of continuance and proceeding.
And therefore the most real diversity of method is of method
referred to use, and method referred to progression: where-
of the one may be termed magistral, and the other of pro-
bation.

(3) The latter whereof seemeth to be via deserta et inter-
clusa. For as knowledges are now delivered, there is a kind
of contract of error between the deliverer and the receiver.
For he that delivereth knowledge desireth to deliver it in such
form as may be best believed, and not as may be best
examined ; and he that receiveth knowledge desireth rather
present satisfaction than expectant inquiry ; and so rather nes

126 THE ADVANCEMENT OF LEARNING.

$o doubt, than not to err: glory making the author not to lay
open his weakness, and sloth making the disciple not to know
his strength.

(4) But knowledge that is delivered as a thread to be spun
on ought to be delivered and intimated, if it were possible, in
the same method wherein it was invented : and so is it possible
of knowledge induced. But in this same anticipated and

revented knowledge, wo man knoweth how he came to the

nowledge which he hath obtained. But yet, nevertheless,
secundum majus et minus, a man may revisit and descend unto
the foundations of his knowledge and consent; and so trans-
plant it into another, as it grew in his own mind. For it is in
knowledges as it is in plants : if you mean to use the plant, it
is no matter for the roots—but if you mean to remove it to
grow, then it is more assured to rest upon roots than slips : so
the delivery of knowledges (as it is now used) is as of fair
bodies of trees without the roots ; good for the carpenter, but
not for the planter. But if you will have sciences grow, it is
less matter for the shaft or body of the tree, so you look well
to the taking up of the roots. Of which kind of delivery the
method of the mathematics, in that subject, hath some
shadow : but generally I see it neither put in use nor put in
inquisition, and therefore note it for deficient.

(5) Another diversity of method there is, which hath some
affinity with the former, used in some cases by the discretion of
the ancients, but disgraced since by the impostures of many
vain persons, who have made it as a false light for their
counterfeit merchandises ; and that is enigmatical and dis-
closed. The pretence whereof is, to remove the vulgar
capacities from being admitted to the secrets of knowledges,
and to reserve them to selected auditors, or wits of such sharp-
ness as can pierce the veil.

(6) Another diversity of method, whereof the consequence is
great, is the delivery of knowledge in aphorisms, or in methods ;
wherein we may observe that it hath been too much taken into
custom, out of a few axioms or observations upon any subject,
to make a solemn and formal art, filling it with some discourses,
and illustrating it with examples, and digesting it into a
sensible method. But the writing in aphorisms hath many
excellent virtues, whereto the writing in method doth not
approach,

(7) For first, it trieth the writer, whether he be superficial
or solid: for aphorisms, except they should be ridiculous,
cannot be made but of the pith and heart of sciences; for
discourse of illustration is cut off; recitals of examples are cut

THE SECOND BOOK. 127

off ; discourse of connection and order is cut off ; descriptions
of practice are cut off. So there remaineth nothing to fill the
aphorisms but some good quantity of observation; and there-
fore no man can suffice, nor in reason will attempt, to
write aphorisms, but he that is sound and grounded, But in
methods,
“‘Tantum series juncturaque pollet,
Tantum de medio sumptis accedit honoris,”

as a man shall make a great show of an art, which, if it were
disjointed, would come to little. Secondly, methods are more
fit to win consent or belief, but less fit to point to action; for
they carry a kind of demonstration in orb or circle, one part
illuminating another, and therefore satisfy. But particulars
being dispersed do best agree with dispersed directions. And
lastly, aphorisms, representing a knowledge broken, do invite
men to inquire further; whereas methods, carrying the show
of a total, do secure men, as if they were at furthest.

(8) Another diversity of method, which is likewise of great
weight, is the handling of knowledge by assertions and their
proofs, or by questions and their determinations. The latter
kind whereof, if it be immoderately followed, is as prejudicial

not leave some important piece enemy at his back. In like
manner, the use of confutation in the delivery of sciences
ought to be very sparing; and to serve to remove strong pre-
occupations and prejudgments, and not to minister and excite
disputations and doubts.

(9) Another diversity of method is, according to the subject
or matter which is handled. For there is a great difference in
delivery of the mathematics, which are the most abstracted of
knowledges, and policy, which is the most immersed. And
howsoever contention hath been moved, touching a uniformity
of method in multiformity of matter, yet we see how that
opinion, besides the weakness of it, hath been of ill desert
towards learning, as that which taketh the way to reduce
learning to certain empty and barren generalities 3 being but
the very husks and shells of sciences, all the kernel eing
forced out and expulsed with the:torture and press of: the
method. And, therefore, as I did allow well of particular
topics for invention, so I do allow likewise of particular methods
of tradition.

128 THE ADVANCEMENT OF LEARNING.

(10) Another diversity of judgment in the delivery and
teaching of knowledge is, according unto the light and pre-
suppositions of that which is delivered. For that knowledge
which is new, and foreign from opinions received, is to be
delivered in another form than that that is agreeable and
familiar ; and therefore Aristotle, when he thinks to tax
Democritus, doth in truth commend him, where he saith, ‘‘ If
we shall indeed dispute, and not follow after similitudes,” &c.
For those whose conceits are seated in popular opinions need
only but to prove or dispute ; but those whose conceits are
beyond popular opinions, have a double labour ; the one to
make themselves conceived, and the other to prove and
demonstrate. So that it is of necessity with them to have
recourse to similitudes and translations to express themselves.
And therefore in the infancy of learning, and in rude times,
when those conceits which are now trivial were then new, the _
world was full of parables and similitudes ; for else would men
either have passed over without mark, or else rejected for
paradoxes that which was offered, before they had understood
or judged. So in divine learning, we see how frequent para-
bles and tropes are, for it is a rule, that whatsoever science
is not consonant to presuppositions must pray in aid of
similitudes.

(11) There be also other diversities of methods vulgar and
received : as that of resolution or analysis, of constitution or
systasis, of concealment or cryptic, &c., which I do allow well
of, though I have stood upon those which are least handled
and observed. All which I have remembered to this purpose,
because I would erect and constitute one general inquiry
(which seems to me deficient) touching the wisdom of tradition.

(12) But unto this part of knowledge, concerning method,
doth further belong not only the architecture of the whole
frame of a work, but also the several beams and columns
thereof ; not as to their stuff, but as to their quantity and
figure. And therefore method considereth not only the dis-
position of the argument or subject, but likewise the pro-
positions : not as to their truth or matter, but as to their limita-
tion and manner. For herein Ramus merited better a great
deal in reviving the good rules of propositions—Ka6éAov mperor,
kata navrés, &c.—than he did in introducing the canker of
epitomes ; and yet (as it is the condition of human things that,
according to the ancient fables, ‘‘the most precious things have
the most pernicious keepers ”) it was so, that the attempt of the
one made him fall upon the other. For he had need be well
conducted that should design to make axioms convertible, if he

THE SECOND BOOK. 129

make them not withal circular, and non-promovent, or incurring
into themselves; but yet the intention was excellent.

(13) The other considerations of method, concerning pro-
positions, are chiefly touching the utmost propositions, which
limit the dimensions of sciences : for every knowledge may be
fitly said, besides the profundity (which is the truth and sub-
stance of it, that makes it solid), to have a longitude and a
latitude ; accounting the latitude towards other sciences, and
the longitude towards action; that is, from the greatest
generality to the most particular precept. The one giveth
rule how far one knowledge ought to intermeddle within the
province of another, which is the rule they call Ka6avré ; the
other giveth rule unto what degree of particularity a know ledge
should descend : which latter I find passed over in silence, being
in my judgment the more material. For certainty there must
be somewhat left to practice ; but how much is worthy the in-
quiry? We see remote and superficial generalities do but offer
knowledge to scorn of practical men ; and are no more aiding
to practice than an Ortelius’ universal map is to direct the way
between London and York. The better sort of rules have been
not unfitly compared to glasses of steel unpolished, where a
may see the images of things, but first they must be filed :
the rules will help if they be laboured and polished by pr a
But how crystalline they may be made at the first, and how far
forth they may be polished aforehand, is the question, the in-
quiry wheregf seemeth to me deficient.

(14) There hath been also laboured and put in practice a
method, which is not a lawful method, but a method of im-
posture : which is, to deliver knowledges in such manner as
men may speedily come to make a show of learning, who have
it not. Such was the travail of Raymundus Lullius in making
that art which bears his name; not unlike to some books of
typocosmy, which have been made since ; being nothing but a
mass of words of all arts, to give men countenance, that those
which use the terms might be thought to understand the art ;
which collections are much like a fripper’s or broker’s shop,
that hath ends of everything, but nothing of worth.

XVIII. (1) Now we descend to that part which concerneth
the illustration of tradition, comprehended in that science
which we call rhetoric, or art of eloquence, a science excellent,
and excellently well laboured. For although in true value it is
inferior to wisdom (as it is said by God to Moses, when he dis-
abled himself for want of this faculty, ‘‘ Aaron shall be thy
speaker, and thou shalt be to him as God”), yet with people
it is the more mighty; for so Solomon saith, Sapiens corde

E—8&4

as

130 THE ADVANCEMENT OF LEARNING.

appellabitur prudens, sed dulcis eloquio majora reperiet, signify-
ing that profoundess of wisdom will help a man to a name or
admiration, but that it is eloquence that prevaileth in an active
life. And as to the labouring of it, the emulation of Aristotle
with the rhetoricians of his time, and the experience of Cicero,
hath made them in their works of rhetoric exceed themselves.
Again, the excellency of examples of eloquence in the orations
of Demosthenes and Cicero, added to the perfection of the
precepts of eloquence, hath doubled the progression in this
art; and therefore the deficiences which I shall note will
rather be in some collections, which may as handmaids attend
the art, than in the rules or use of the art itself,

2, Notwithstanding, to stir the earth a little about the roo uss
of this science, as we have done of the rest, the duty and office
of rhetoric is to apply reason to imagination for the better
moving of the will. For we see reason is disturbed in the
administration thereof by three means—by illaqueation or
sophism, which pertains to logic; by imagination or impres-
sion, which pertains to rhetoric ; and by passion or affection,
which pertains to morality. And as in negotiation with
others, men are wrought by cunning, by importunity, and by
vehemency ; so in this negotiation within ourselves, men are
undermined by inconsequences, solicited and importuned by
impressions or observations, and transported by passions.
Neither is the nature of man so unfortunately built, as that
those powers and arts should have force to disturb reason, and
not to establish and advance it. For the end of logic is to
teach a form of argument to secure reason, and not to entrap
it; the end of morality is to procure the affections to’ obey
reason, and not to invade it; the end of rhetoric is to fill the
imagination to second reason, and not to oppress it ; for these
abuses of arts come in but ex obliquo, for caution.

(3) And therefore it was great injustice in Plato, though
springing out of a just hatred to the rhetoricians of his time,
to esteem of rhetoric but as a voluptuary art, resembling it to
cookery, that did mar wholesome meats, and help unwhole-
some by variety of sauces to the pleasure of the taste. For
we see that speech is much more conversant in adorning that
which is good than in colouring that which is evil; for there is
no man but speaketh more honestly than he can do or think ;
and it was excellently noted by Thucydides, in Cleon, that be-
cause he used to hold on the bad side in causes of estate, there-
fore he was ever inveighing against eloquence and good. speech,
knowing that no man can speak fair of courses sordid and base.
And therefore, as Plato said elegantly, ‘‘ That virtue, if she

THE SECOND BOOK. 131

could be seen, would move great love and affection; ” go seeing
that she cannot be showed to the sense by corporal shape, the
next degree is to show her to the imagination in lively repre-
sentation ; for to show her to reason only in subtlety of argu-
ment was a, thing ever derided in Chrysippus and many of the
Stoics, who thought to thrust virtue upon men by sharp dis-
putations and conclusions, which have no sympathy with the
will of man,

(4) Again, if the affections in themselves were pliant and
obedient to reason, it were true there should be no great
use of persuasions and insinuations to the will, more than of
naked proposition and proofs; but in regard of the continual
mutinies and seditions of the affections—

‘* Video meliora, proboque,
Deteriora Sequor,”

reason would become captive and servile, if eloquence of per-
suasions did not practise and win the imagination from the
affections’ part, and contract a confederacy between the reason
and imagination against the affections 3 for the affections them-
Selves carry ever an appetite to good, as reason doth. The
difference is, that the affection beholdeth merely the present y
reason beholdeth the future and sum of time. And, therefore,
the present filling the imagination more, reason ig commonly
vanquished ; but after that force of eloquence and persuasion

etween logic on the one side, and moral or civil knowledge on
the other, as participating of both ; for the proofs and demon-
Strations of logic are toward all men indifferent and the same,
but the proofs and persuasions of rhetoric ought to differ ac-

{ ** Orpheus in sylvis, inter delphinas Arion,”

Which application in perfection of idea ought to extend so far,

132 THE ADVANCEMENT OF LEARNING.

that if a man should speak of the same thing to several persons,
he should speak to them all respectively and several ways ;
though this politic part of eloquence in private speech it is easy
for the greatest orators to want: whilst, by the observing their
well-graced forms of speech, they leese the volubility of applica-
tion; and therefore it shall not be amiss to recommend this to
better inquiry, not being curious whether we place it here or in
that part which concerneth policy.

(6) Now therefore will I descend to the deficiences, which, as
I said, are but attendances ; and first, I do not find the wisdom
and diligence of Aristotle well pursued, who began to make
a collection of the popular signs and colours of good and evil,
both simple and comparative, which are as the sophisms of
rhetoric (as I touched before). For example—

“ Sophisma.
Quod laudatur, bonum ; quod vituperatur, malum.

Redargutio.
Laudat venales qui vult extrudere merces.”

Malum est, malum est (inquit emptor) : sed cum recesserit, tum
gloriabitur ! The defects in the labour of Aristotle are three—
one, that there be but a few of many; another, that there
elenches are not annexed ; and the third, that he conceived but
a part of the use of them : for their use is not only in probation,
but much more in impression, For many forms are equal in
signification. which are differing in impression, as the difference
is great in the piercing of that which is sharp and that which is
flat, though the strength of the percussion be the same. For
there is no man but will be a little more raised by hearing it
said, ‘*‘ Your enemies Will be glad of this ”—

“ Hoe Ithacus velit, et magno mercentur Atride.”

than by hearing it said only, “‘ This is evil for you.”

(7) Secondly, I do resume also that which I mentioned
before, touching provision OF preparatory store for the furni-
ture of speech and readiness of invention, which appeareth
to be of two sorts: the one in resemblance to a shop of pieces
unmade up, the other to a shop of things ready made up}
both to be applied to that which is frequent and most in
request. The former of these I will call antitheta, and the
latter formule.

(8) Antitheta are theses argued pro et contra, wherein men
may be more large and laborious; but (in such as are able to

paaeiipagtiensiapilicatdem samara

= rear capa
ee

THE SECOND BOOK. 133

do it) to avoid prolixity of entry, I wish the seeds of the
several arguments to be cast up into some brief and acute
sentences, not to be cited, but to be as skeins or bottoms of
thread, to be unwinded at large when they come to be used ;
supplying authorities and examples by reference.

“Pro verbis legis,
Non est interpretatio, sed divinatio, que recedit a litera:
Cum receditur a litera, judex transit in legislatorem.

Pro sententia legis.
Ex omnibus verbis est eliciendus sensus qui interpretatur singula,”

(9) Formule are but decent and apt passages or conveyances
of speech, which may serve indifferently for differing sub-
jects ; as of preface, conclusion, ¢gression, transition, excusa-
tion, &e. For as in buildings there is great pleasure and use
in the well casting of the staircases, entries, doors, windows,
and the like; so in speech, the conveyances and passages are
of special ornament and effect.

“A conclusion in a deliberative.

So may we redeem the faults passed, and prevent the inconveniences
future.”

XIX. (1) There remain two appendices touching the tradi-
tion of knowledge, the one critical, the other pedantical.
For all knowledge is either delivered by teachers, or attained
by men’s proper endeavours: and therefore as the principal
part of tradition of knowledge concerneth chiefly writing of
books, so the relative part thereof concerneth reading of
books ;_ whereunto appertain incidently these considerations.
The first is concerning the true correction and edition of
authors ; wherein nevertheless rash diligence hath done great
prejudice. For these critics have often presumed that that
which they understand not is false set down: as the priest
that, where he found it written of St. Paul Demissus est per
sportam, mended his book, and made it Demissus est per
portam ; because sporta was a hard word, and out of his
xeading : and surely their errors, though they be not so palp-
able and ridiculous, yet are of the same kind. And therefore,
as it hath been wisely noted, the most corrected copies are
commonly the least correct.

The second is concerning the exposition and explication of
authors, which resteth in annotations and commentaries :

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184 THE ADVANCEMENT OF LEARNING

wherein it is over usual to blanch the obscure places and
discourse upon the plain.

The third is concerning the times, which in many cases give
great light to true interpretations.

The fourth is concerning some brief censure and judgment
of the authors; that men thereby may make some election
unto themselves what books to read.

And the fifth is concerning the syntax and disposition of
studies; that men may know in what order or pursuit to

(2) For pedantical knowledge, it containeth that difference
of tradition which is proper for youth ; whereunto appertain

refrain them.

Secondly, the consideration where to begin with the easiest,
and sv proceed to the more difficult; and in what courses
to press the more difficult, and then to turn them to the
more easy; for it is one method to practise swimming
with bladders, and another to practise dancing with heavy
shoes.

A third is the application of learning according unto the
propriety of the wits ; for there is no defect in the faculties
intellectual, but seemeth to have a proper cure contained in
some studies: as, for example, if a child be bird-witted, that
is, hath not the faculty of attention, the mathematics giveth a
remedy thereunto ; for in them, if the wit be caught away
but a moment, one is new to begin. And as sciences have a
propriety towards faculties for cure and help, so faculties or
powers have a sympathy towards sciences for excellency or
speedy profiting: and therefore it is an inquiry of great
wisdom, what kinds of wits and natures are most apt and
proper for what sciences.

Fourthly, the ordering of exercises is matter of great conse-
quence to hurt or help: for, as is well observed by Cicero,
men in exercising their faculties, if they be not well advised,
do exercise their faults and get ill habits as well as good ; so
as there is a great judgment to be had in the continuance
and intermission of exercises. It were too long to particularise
a number of other considerations of this nature, things but of
mean appearance, but of singular efficacy. For as the wrong-
ing or cherishing of seeds or young plants is that that is most
important to their thriving, and as it was noted that the first
six kings being in truth as tutors of the state of Rome in

THE SECOND BOOK. 135

the infancy thereof was the principal cause of the immense
greatness of that state which followed, so the culture and
manurance of minds in youth hath such a forcible (though
unseen) operation, as hardly any length of time or contention
of labour can countervail it afterwards. And it is not amiss
to observe also how small and mean faculties gotten by educa-
tion, yet when they fall into great men or great matters, do
work great and important effects : whereof we see a notable
example in Tacitus of two stage players, Percennius and
Vibulenus, who by their faculty of playing put the Pannonian
armies into an extreme tumult and combustion. For there
arising a mutiny amongst them upon the death of Augustus
Cesar, Blesus the lieutenant had committed some of the
mutineers, which were suddenly rescued ; whereupon Vibu-
lenus got to be heard speak, which he did in this manner :-—
‘‘ These poor innocent wretches appointed to cruel death, you
have restored to behold the light ; but who shall restore my
brother to me, or life unto my brother, that was sent hither
in message from the legions of Germany, to treat of the
common cause? and he hath murdered him this last night
by some of his fencers and ruffians, that he hath about him
for his executioners upon soldiers. Answer, Blesus, what is
done with his body? The mortales+ enemies do not deny
burial. When I have performed my last duties to the corpse
with kisses, with tears, command me to be slain besides him ;
so that these my fellows, for our good meaning and our true
hearts to the legions, may have leave to bury us.” With
which speech he put the army into an infinite fury and
uproar: whereas truth was he had no brother, neither was
there any such matter; but he played it merely as if he had
been upon the stage,

(3) But to return: we are now comie to a period of rational
knowledges; wherein if I have made the divisions other than
those that are received, yet would I not be thought to disallow
all those divisions which I do not use. For there is a double
necessity imposed upon me of altering the divisions. The
one, because it differeth in end and purpose, to sort together
those things which are next in nature, and those things which
are next in use. For if a secretary of estate should sort his
papers, it is like in his study or general cabinet he would sort
together things of a nature, as treaties, instructions, &e. But
in his boxes or particular cabinet he would sort together those
that he were like to use together, though of several natures.
So in this general cabinet of knowledge it was necessary for
me to follow the divisions of the nature of things; whereas if

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136 THE ADVANCEMENT OF LEARNING.

myself had been to handle any particular knowledge, I would
have respected the divisions fittest for use. The other, be-
cause the bringing in of the deficiences did by consequence
alter the partitions of the rest. For let the knowledge extant
(for demonstration sake) be fifteen. Let the knowledge with
the deficiences be twenty; the parts of fifteen are not the
parts of twenty ; for the parts of fifteen are three and five ;
the parts of twenty are two, four, five, and ten. So as these
things are without contradiction, and could not otherwise be.

XX. (1) We proceed now to that knowledge which con-
sidereth of the appetite and will of man: whereof Solomon
saith, Ante omnia, fili, custodi cor tuum: nam inde procedunt
actiones vite. In the handling of this science, those which
have written seem to me to have done as if a man, that
professed to teach to write, did only exhibit fair copies of
alphabets and letters joined, without giving any precepts or
directions for the carriage of the hand and framing of the
letters. So have they made good and fair exemplars and
copies, carrying the draughts and portraitures of good, virtue,
duty, felicity ; propounding them well described as the true
objects and scopes of man’s will and desires. But how to
attain these excellent marks, and how to frame and subdue
the will of man to become true and conformable to these
pursuits, they pass it over altogether, or slightly and un-
profitably. For it is not the disputing that moral virtues are
in the mind of man by habit and not by nature, or the dis-
tinguishing that generous spirits are won by doctrines and
persuasions, and the vulgar sort by reward and punishment,
and the like scattered glances and touches, that can excuse the
absence of this part.

(2) The reason of this omission I suppose to be that hidden
rock whereupon both this and many other barks of knowledge
have been cast away ; which is, that men have despised to be
conversant in ordinary and common matters, the judicious
direction whereof nevertheless is the wisest doctrine (for life
consisteth not in novelties nor subtleties), but contrariwise
they have compounded sciences chiefly of a certain resplendent
or lustrous mass of matter, chosen to give glory either to the
subtlety of disputations, or to the eloquence of discourses.
But Seneca giveth an excellent check to eloquence, Nocet illis
eloquentia, quibus non rerum cupiditatem facit, sed sui. Doc-
trine should be such as should make men in love with the
lesson, and not with the teacher; being directed to the au-
ditor’s benefit, and not to the author’s commendation. And
therefore those are of the right kind which may be concluded

THE SECOND BOOK. 137

as Demosthenes concludes his counsel, Que si feceritis, non
oratorem dumtaxat in preesentia laudabitis, sed vosmetipsos etiam
non ita multo post statu rerum vestraram meliore.

(3) Neither needed men of so excellent parts to have de-
spaired of a fortune, which the poet Virgil promised himself,
and indeed obtained, who got as much glory of eloquence, wit,
and learning in the expressing of the observations of husbandry,
as of the heroical acts of Eneas:

‘Nec sum animi dubius, verbis ea vincere magnum
Quam sit, et angustis his addere rebus honorem,”

And surely, if the purpose be in good earnest, no+ to write at
leisure that which men may read at leisure, but really to in-
struct and suborn action and active life, these Georgics of the
mind, concerning the husbandry and tillage thereof,) are no
less worthy than the heroical descriptions of virtue, duty, and
felicity. Wherefore the main and primitive division of moral
knowledge seemeth to be into the exemplar or platform of
good, and the regiment or culture of the mind: the one de-
scribing the nature of good, the other prescribing rules how to
subdue, apply, and accommodate the will of man thereunto.

(4) The doctrine touching the platform or nature of good
considereth it either simple or compared ; either the kinds of
good, or the degrees of good; in the latter whereof those
infinite disputations which were touching the supreme degree
thereof, which they term felicity, beatitude, or the highest
good, the doctrines concerning which were as the heathen
divinity, are by the Christian faith discharged. And as
Aristotle saith, ‘‘That young men may be happy, but not
otherwise but by hope;” so we must all acknowledge our
minority, and embrace the felicity which is by hope of the
future world.

(5) Freed therefore and delivered from this doctrine of the
philosopher’s heaven, whereby they feigned a higher elevation
of man’s nature than was (for we see in what height of style
Seneca writeth, Vere magnum, habere fragilitatem hominis,
securitatem Dei), we may with more sobriety and truth receive
the rest of their inquiries and labours. Wherein for the nature
of good positive or simple, they have set it down excellently
' in describing the forms of virtue and duty, with their situations
and postures; in distributing them into their kinds, parts,
provinces, actions, and administrations, and the like: nay
further, they have commended them to man’s nature and
spirit with great quickness of argunient and beauty of

E*—84

138 THE ADVANCEMENT OF LEARNING.

persuasions ; yea, and fortified and entrenched them (as much
as discourse can do) against corrupt and popular opinions.
Again, for the degrees and comparative nature of good, they
have also excellently handled it in their triplicity of good, in
the comparisons between a contemplative and an active life, in
the distinction between virtue with reluctation and virtue
secured, in their encounters between honesty and profit, in
their balancing of virtue with virtue, and the like ; so as this
part deserveth to be reported for excellently laboured.

(6) Notwithstanding, if before they had come to the popular
and received notions of virtue and vice, pleasure and pain, and
the rest, they had stayed a little longer upon the inquiry con-
cerning the roots of good and evil, and the strings of those
roots, they had given, in my opinion, a great light to that
which followed; and specially if they had consulted with
nature, they had made their doctrines less prolix and more
profound : which being by them in part omitted and in part
handled with much confusion, we will endeavour to resume
and open in a more clear manner.

(7) There is formed in everything a double nature of good—
the one, as everything is a total or substantive in itself; the
other, as it is a part or member of a greater body ; whereof
the latter is in degree the greater and the worthier, because it
tendeth to the conservation of a more general form. ‘There-
fore we see the iron in particular sympathy moveth to the
loadstone ; but yet if it exceed a certain quantity, it forsaketh
the affection to the loadstone, and like a good patriot moveth
to the earth, which is the region and country of massy bodies ;
so may we go forward, and see that water and massy bodies
move to the centre of the earth; but rather than to suffer a
divulsion in the continuance of nature, they will move upwards
from the centre of the earth, forsaking their duty to the earth
in regard of their duty to the world. This double nature of
good, and the comparative thereof, is much more engraven
upon man, if he degenerate not, unto whom the conservation
of duty to the public ought to be much more precious than the
conservation of life and being; according to that memorable
speech of Pompeius Magnus, when being in commission of pur-
veyance for a famine at Rome, and being dissuaded with great
vehemency and instance by his friends about him, that he
should not hazard himself to sea in an extremity of weather,
he said only to them, Wecesse est ut eam, non ut vivam. But
it may be truly affirmed that there was never any philosophy,
religion, or other discipline, which did so lainly and highly
exalt the good which is communicative, and depress the good

THE SECOND BOOK. 139

which is private and particular, as the Holy Faith; well de-
claring that it was the same God that gave the Christian law
to men, who gave those laws of nature to inanimate creatures
that we spake of before ; for we read that the elected saints of
God have wished themselves anathematised and razed out of
the book of life, in an ecstasy of charity and infinite feeling of
communion.

(8) This being set down and strongly planted, doth judge
and determine most of the controversies wherein moral philo-
sophy is conversant. For first, it decideth the question
touching the preferment of the contemplative or active life,
and decideth it against Aristotle. For all the reasons which
he bringeth for the contemplative | are private, and respecting
the pleasure and dignity of a man’s self (in which respects no
question the contemplative life hath the pre-eminence), not
much unlike to that comparison which Pythagoras made for
the gracing and magnifying of philosophy and contemplation,
who being asked what he was, answered, ‘‘ That if Hiero were
ever at the Olympian games, he knew the manner, that some
came to try their fortune for the prizes, and some came as
merchants to utter their commodities, and some came to make
good cheer and meet their friends, and some came to look on ;
and that he was one of them that came to look on.” But men
must know, that in this theatre of man’s life it is reserved only
for God and angels to be lookers on. Neither could the like
question ever have been received in the Church, notwith-
standing their Pretiosa in oculis Domini mors sanctorwm ejus,
by which place they would exalt their civil death and regular
professions, but upon this defence, that the monastical life is
not simple contemplative, but performeth the duty either of
incessant prayers and supplications, which hath been truly
esteemed as an office in the Church, or else of writing or taking
instructions for writing concerning the law of God, as Moses
did when he abode so long in the mount. And so we see
Enoch, the seventh from Adam, who was the first contem-
plative and walked with God, yet did also endow the Church
with prophecy, which Saint Jude citeth. But for contempla-
tion which should be finished in itself, without casting beams
upon society, assuredly divinity knoweth it not.

(9) It decideth also the controversies between Zeno and
Socrates, and their schools and successions, on the one side,
who placed felicity in virtue simply or attended, the actions
_and exercises whereof do chiefly embrace and concern society ;
and on the other side, the Cyrenaics and Epicureans, who
placed it in pleasure, and made virtue (as it is used in some

140 THE ADVANCEMENT OF LEARNING.

comedies of errors, wherein the mistress and the maid change
habits) to be but as a servant, without which pleasure cannot
be served and attended; and the reformed school of the
Epicureans, which placed it in serenity of mind and freedom
from perturbation; as if they would have deposed Jupiter
again, and restored Saturn and the first age, when there was
no summer nor winter, spring nor autumn, but all after one
air and season; and Herillus, which placed felicity in ex-
tinguishment of the disputes of the mind, making no fixed
nature of good and evil, esteeming things according to the
clearness of the desires, or the reluctation; which opinion
was revived in the heresy of the Anabaptists, measuring things
according to the motions of the spirit, and the constancy or
wavering of belief; all which are manifest to tend to private
repose and contentment, and not to point of society.

(10) It censureth also the philosophy of Epictetus, which
presupposeth that felicity must be placed in those things which
are in our power, lest we be liable to fortune and disturbance ;
as if it were not a thing much more happy to fail in good and
virtuous ends for the public, than to obtain all that we can
wish to ourselves in our proper fortune: as Consalvo said to
his soldiers, showing them Naples, and protesting he had
rather die one foot forwards, than to have his life secured for
long by one foot of retreat. Whereunto the wisdom of that
heavenly leader hath signed, who hath affirmed that ‘‘a good
conscience is a continual feast ;” showing plainly that the
conscience of good intentions, howsoever succeeding, is a more
continual joy to nature than all the provision which can be ©
made for security and repose.

(11) It censureth likewise that abuse of philosophy which
grew general about the time of Epictetus, in converting it into
an occupation or profession ; as if the purpose had been, not to
resist and extinguish perturbations, but to fly and avoid the
causes of them, and to shape a particular kind and course of
life to that end; introducing such a health of mind, as was
that health of body of which Aristotle speaketh of Herodicus,
who did nothing all his life long but intend his health;
whereas if men refer themselves to duties of society, as that
health of body is best which is ablest to endure all alterations
and extremities, so likewise that health of mind is most proper
which can go through the greatest temptations and perturba-
tions. So as Diogenes’ opinion is to be accepted, who com-
mended not them which abstained, but them which sustained,
and could refrain their mind in preécipitio, and could give unto
the mind (as is used in horsemanship) the shortest stop or turn,

THE SECOND BOOK. i 141

(12) Lastly, it censureth the tenderness and want of appli-
cation in some of the most ancient and reverend philosophers
and philosophical men, that did retire too easily from civil
business, for avoiding of indignities and perturbations ; whereas
the resolution of men truly moral ought to be such as the same
Consalvo said the honour of a soldier should be, e teld crassiore,
and not so fine as that everything should catch in it and
endanger it.

XXI. (1) To resume private or particular good, it falleth
into the division of good active and passive ; for this difference
of good (not unlike to that which amongst the Romans was
expressed in the familiar or household terms of promus and
condus) is formed also in all things, and is best disclosed in the
two several appetites in creatures; the one to preserve or
continue themselves, and the other to dilate or multiply them-
selves, whereof the latter seemeth to be the worthier ; for in
nature the heavens, which are the more worthy, are the agent,
and the earth, which is the less worthy, is the patient. In the
pleasures of living creatures, that of generation is greater than
that of food. In divine doctrine, beatius est dare quam acci-
pere. And in life, there is no man’s spirit so soft, but es-
teemeth the effecting of somewhat that he hath fixed in his
desire, more than sensuality, which priority of the active good
is much upheld by the consideration of our estate to be
mortal and exposed to fortune. For if we might have a per-
petuity and certainty in our pleasures, the state of them would
advance their price. But when we see it is but magni esti-
mamus mori tardius, and ne glorieris de crastino, nescis partum
diei, it maketh us to desire to have somewhat secured and
exempted from time, which are only our deeds and works ; as
it is said, Opera eorum sequuntur eos. The pre-eminence like-
wise of this active good is upheld by the affection which is
natural in man towards variety and proceeding, which in the
pleasures of the sense, which is the principal part of passive
good, can have no great latitude. Cogita quamdiu eadem
feceris ; cibus, somnus, ludus per hune circulum curritur ;
mori velle non tantum fortis, aut miser, aut prudens, sed etiam
fastidiosus potest. But in enterprises, pursuits, and purposes
of life, there is much variety ; whereof men are sensible with
pleasure in their inceptions, progressions, recoils, reintegra-
tions, approaches and attainings to their ends. So as it was
well said, Vita sine proposito languida et vaga est. Neither
hath this active good an identity with the good of society,
though in some cases it hath an incidence into it. For al-
though it do many times bring forth acts of beneficence, yet it

142 THE ADVANCEMENT OF LEARNING.

is with a respect private to a man’s own power, glory, ampli-
fication, continuance; as appeareth plainly, when it findeth
a contrary subject. For that gigantine state of mind which
possesseth the troublers of the world, such as was Lucius Sylla
and infinite other in smaller model, who would have all men
happy or unhappy as they were their friends or enemies, and
would give form to the world, according to their own humours
(which is the true theomachy), pretendeth and aspireth to
active good, though it recedeth furthest from good of society,
which we have determined to be the greater.

(2) To resume passive good, it receiveth a subdivision of
conservative and perfective. For let us take a brief review
of that which we have said: we have spoken first of the good
of society, the intention whereof embraceth the form of human
nature, whereof we are members and portions, and not our
own proper and individual form; we have spoken of active
good, and supposed it as a part of private and particular good.
And rightly, for there is impressed upon all things a triple
desire or appetite proceeding from love to themselves: one of
preserving and continuing their form; another of advancing
and perfecting their form ; and a third of multiplying and
extending their form upon other things : whereof the multi-
plying, or signature of it upon other things, is that which we
handled by the name of active good. So as there remaineth
the conserving of it, and perfecting or raising of it, which
latter is the highest degree of passive good. For to preserve in
state is the less, to preserve with advancement is the greater.
So in man,

“ Igneus est ollis vigor, et celestis origo.”

His approach or assumption to divine or angelical nature is
the perfection of his form; the error or false imitation of
which good is that which is the tempest of human life ; while
man, upon the instinct of an advancement, formal and es-
sential, is carried to seek an advancement local. For as those
which are sick, and find no remedy, do tumble up and down
and change place, as if by a remove local they could obtain a
remove internal, so is it with men in ambition, when failing
of the mean to exalt their nature, they are in a perpetual
estuation to exalt their place. So then passive good is, as
was said, either conservative or perfective.

(3) To resume the good of conservation or comfort, which
consisteth in the fruition of that which is agreeable to our
natures ; it seemeth to be most pure and natural of pleasures,
but yet the softest and lowest. And this also receiveth a

THE SECOND BOOK. 143

difference, which hath neither been well judged of, nor well
inquired ; for the good of fruition or contentment is placed
either in the sincereness of the fruition, or in the quickness
and vigour of it; the one superinduced by equality, the other
by vicissitude ; the one having less mixture of evil, the other
more impression of good. Whether of these is the greater
good is a question controverted; but whether man’s nature
may not be capable of both is a question not inquired.

(4) The former question being debated between Socrates and a
sophist, Socrates placing felicity in an equal and constant peace
of mind, and the sophist in much desiring and much enjoying,
they fell from argument to ill words : the sophist saying that
Socrates’ felicity was the felicity of a block or stone; and
Socrates saying that the sophist’s felicity was the felicity of
one that had the itch, who did nothing but itch and scratch.
And both these opinions do not want their supports. For the
opinion of Socrates is much upheld by the general consent
even of the epicures themselves, that virtue beareth a great
part in felicity ; and if so, certain it is, that virtue hath more
use in clearing perturbations then in compassing desires. The
sophist’s opinion is much favoured by the assertion we last
spake of, that good of advancement is greater than good of
simple preservation ; because every obtaining a desire hath a
show of advancement, as motion though in a circle hath a
show of progression.

(5) But the second question, decided the true way, maketh
the former superfluous. For can it be doubted, but that there
are some who take more pleasure in enjoying pleasures than some
other, and yet, nevertheless, are less troubled with the loss or
leaving of them? So as this same, Von uti ut non appetas,
non appetere ut non metuas, sunt animi pusilli et diffidentis.
And it seemeth to me that most of the doctrines of the philo-
sophers are more fearful and cautionary than the nature of
things requireth. So have they increased the fear of death in
offering to cure it. For when they would have a man’s whole
life to be but a discipline or preparation to die, they must needs
make men think that it is a terrible enemy, against whom
there is no end of preparing. Better saith the poet :—

“* Qui finem vite extremum inter munera ponat
Nature.”
So have they sought to make men’s minds too uniform and

harmonical, by not breaking them sufficiently to contrary
motions ; the reasons whereof I suppose to be, because they

144 THE ADVANCEMENT OF LEARNING.

themselves were men dedicated to a private, free, and un-
applied course of life. For as we see, upon the lute or like
instrument, a ground, though it be sweet and have show of
many changes, yet breaketh not the hand to such strange and
hard stops and passages, as a set song or voluntary; much
after the same manner was the diversity between a philo-
sophical and civil life. And, therefore, men are to imitate the
wisdom of jewellers : who, if there be a grain, or a cloud, or an
ice which may be ground forth without taking too much of the
stone, they help it; but if it should lessen and abate the stone
too much, they will not meddle with it : so ought men so to
procure serenity as they destroy not magnanimity.

(6) Having therefore deduced the good of man which is
private and particular, as far as seemeth fit, we will now re-
turn to that good of man which respecteth and beholdeth
society, which we may term duty ; because the term of duty is
more proper to a mind well framed and disposed towards
others, as the term of virtue is applied to a mind well formed
and composed in itself; though neither can a man understand
virtue without some relation to society, nor duty without an
inward disposition. This part may seem at first to pertain to
science civil and politic ; but not if it be well observed. For
it concerneth the regiment and government of every man over
himself, and not over others. And as in architecture the di-
rection of framing the posts, beams, and other parts of build-
ing, is not the same with the manner of joining them and
erecting the building ; and in mechanicals, the direction how
to frame an instrument or engine is not the same with the
manner of setting it on work and employing it; and yet,
nevertheless, in expressing of the one you incidently express
the aptness towards the other ; so the doctrine of conjugation
of men in society differeth from that of their conformity
thereunto.

(7) This part of duty is subdivided into two parts: the
common duty of every man, as a man or member of astate;
the other, the respective or special duty of every man in
his profession, vocation, and place. The first of these is ex-
tant and well laboured, as hath been said. The second like-
wise I may report rather dispersed than deficient; which
manner of dispersed writing in this kind of argument I ac-
knowledge to be best. For who can take upon him to write
of the proper duty, virtue, challenge, and right of every
several vocation, profession, and place? For although some-
times a looker on may see more than a gamester, and there be
a proverb more arrogant than sound, ‘‘ That the vale best dis-

THE SECOND BOOK, 145

covereth the hill ;” yet there is small doubt but that men can
write best and most really and materially in their own profes-
sions ; and that the writing of speculative men of active matter
for the most part doth seem to men of experience, as Phormio’s
argument of the wars seemed to Hannibal, to be but dreams
and dotage. Only there is one vice which accompanieth them
that write in their own professions, that they magnify them
in excess. But generally it were to be wished (as that which
would make learning indeed solid and fruitful) that active men
would or could become writers.

(8) In which kind I cannot but mention, honoris causa, your
Majesty’s excellent book touching the duty of a king; a work
richly compounded of divinity, morality, and policy, with
great aspersion of all other arts; and being in mine opinion
one of the most sound and healthful writings that I have read :
not distempered in the heat of invention, nor in the coldness
of negligence ; not sick of dizziness, as those are who leese them-
selves in their order, nor of convulsions, as those which cramp
in matters impertinent ; not savouring of perfumes and paint-
ings, as those do who seek to please the reader more than
nature beareth ; and chiefly well disposed in the spirits thereof,
being agreeable to truth and apt for action ; and far removed
from that natural infirmity, whereunto I noted those that
write in their own professions to be subject—which is, that
they exalt it above measure. For your Majesty hath truly
described, not a king of Assyria or Persia in their extern glory,
but a Moses or a David, pastors of their people. Neither can
Tever leese out of my remembrance what I heard your Majesty
in the same sacred spirit of government deliver in a great cause
of judicature, which was, ‘*‘ That kings ruled by their laws, as
God did by the laws of nature ; and ought as rarely to put in
use their supreme prerogative as God doth His power of
working miracles.” And yet notwithstanding in your book of
a free monarchy, you do well give men to understand, that
you know the plenitude of the power and right of a king, as
well as the circle of his office and duty. Thus have I pre-
sumed to allege this excellent writing of your Majesty, as a
prime or eminent example of tractates concerning special and
respective duties ; wherein I should have said as much, if it
had been written a thousand yearssince. Neither am I moved
with certain courtly decencies, which esteem it flattery to praise
in presence. No, it is flattery to praise in absence—that is,
when either the virtue is absent, or the occasion is absent; and
so the praise is not natural, but forced, either in truth or in
time. But let Cicero be read in his oration pro Marcello,

146 THE ADVANCEMENT OF LEARNING.

which is nothing but an excellent table of Czesar’s virtue, and
made to his face ; besides the example of many other excellent
persons, wiser a great deal than such observers; and we will
never doubt, upon a full occasion, to give just praises to present
or absent.

(9) But to return ; there belongeth further to the handling
of this part, touching the duties of professions and vocations,
a relative or opposite, touching the frauds, cautels, impostures,
and vices of every profession, which hath been likewise handled ;
but how? rather in a satire and cynically, than seriously and
wisely ; for men have rather sought by wit to deride and
traduce much of that which is good in professions, than with
judgment to discover and sever that which is corrupt. For,
as Solomon saith, he that cometh to seek after knowledge with
a mind to scorn and censure shall be sure to find matter
for his humour, but no matter for his instruction: Querenti
derisori. scientiam ipsa se abscondit ; sed studioso fit obviam.
Butthe managing of this argument with integrity and truth,
which I note as deficient, seemeth to me to be one of the best
fortifications for honesty and virtue that can be planted. For,
as the fable goeth of the basilisk—that if he see you first, you
die for it; but if you see him first, he dieth—so is it with
deceits and evil arts, which, if they be first espied they leese
their life; but if they prevent, they endanger. So that we
are much beholden to Machiavel and others, that write what
men do, and not what they ought todo. For it is not possible
to join serpentine wisdom with the columbine innocency, ex-
cept men know exactly all the conditions of the serpent; his
baseness and going upon his belly, his volubility and lubricity,
his envy and sting, and the rest—that is, all forms and natures
of evil. For without this, virtue lieth open and unfenced.
Nay, an honest man can do no good upon those that are
wicked, to reclaim them, without the help of the knowledge of
evil. For men of corrupted minds presuppose that honesty
groweth out of simplicity of manners, and believing of
preachers, schoolmasters, and men’s exterior language. So as,
except you can make them perceive that you know the utmost
reaches of their own corrupt opinions, they despise all morality.
Non recipit stultus verba prudentia, nisi ea dixeris que, versan-
tur in corde eus.

(10) Unto this part, touching respective duty, Goth also
appertain the duties between husband and wife, parent and
child, master and servant. So likewise the laws of friendship
and gratitude, the civil bond of companies, colleges, and politic
bodies, of neighbourhood, and all other proportionate duties ;

THE SECOND BOOK. 147

not as they are parts of government and society, but as to the
framing of the mind of particular persons.

(11) The knowledge concerning good respecting society doth
handle it also, not simply alone, but comparatively ; where-
unto belongeth the weighing of duties between person and
person, case and case, particular and public. As we see in the
proceeding of Lucius Brutus against his own sons, which was
so much extolled, yet what was said ?

‘“*Infelix, utcunque ferent ea fata minores.”

So the case was doubtful, and had opinion on both sides. Again,
we see when M. Brutus and Cassius invited to a supper certain
whose opinions they meant to feel, whether they were fit to
be made their associates, and cast forth the question touching
the killing of a tyrant being a usurper, they were divided in
opinion ; some holding that servitude was the extreme of evils,
and others that tyranny was better than a civil war: and a
number of the like cases there are of comparative duty.
Amongst which that of all others is the most frequent, where
the question is of a great deal of good to ensue of a small in-
justice. Which Jason of Thessalia determined against the
truth : Aliqua sunt injuste facienda, ut multa juste jiert possint.
But the reply is good: Auctorem presentis justitie habes,
sponsorem future non habes. Men must pursue things which
_ are just in present, and leave the future to the Divine Pro-

vidence. So then we pass on from this general part touching
the exemplar and description of good.

XXII, (1) Now, therefore, that we have spoken of this fruit
of life, it remaineth to speak of the husbandry that belongeth
thereunto, without which part the former seemeth to be no
better than a fair image or statue, which is beautiful to
contemplate, but is without life and motion ; ; Wwhereunto
Aristotle himself subscribeth in these words : Necesse est sctlicet
de virtute dicere, et quid sit, et ex quibus gignatur. Inutile
enim fere fuerit virtutem quidem nosse, acquirende autem gus
modos et vias ignorare. Non enim de virtute tantum, qua specie
sit, querendum est, sed et quomodo sui copiam faciat : utrumque
enim volumus, eb rem tpsam N08se, et ejus compotes fiert: hoc
autem ex voto non succedet, nisi sciamus et ex quibus et quomodo.
In such full words and with such iteration doth he inculcate
this part. So saith Cicero in great commendation of Cato the
second, that he had applied himself to philosophy, Won ita
disputandi causa, sed ita vivendi. And although the neglect of
our times, wherein few men do hold any consultations touching

148 THE ADVANCEMENT OF LEARNING.

the reformation of their life (as Seneca excellently saith,
De partibus vite quisque deliberat, de summa nemo), may make
this part seem superfluous ; yet I must conclude with that
aphorism of Hippocrates, Qui gravi morbo correpti dolores non
sentiunt, tis mens cegrotat. They need medicine, not only to
assuage the disease, but to awake the sense. And if it be said
that the cure of men’s minds belongeth to sacred divinity, it is
most true; but yet moral philosophy may be preferred unto
her as a wise servant and humble handmaid. Foras the Psalm
saith, ‘‘That the eyes of the handmaid look perpetually to-
wards the mistress,” and yet no doubt many things are left to
the discretion of the handmaid to discern of the mistress’ will ;
s0 ought moral philosophy to give a constant attention to the
doctrines of divinity, and yet so as it may yield of herself
(within due limits) many sound and profitable directions.

(2) This part, therefore, because of the excellency thereof, I
cannot but find exceeding strange that it is not reduced to
written inquiry; the rather, becatise it consisteth of much
matter, wherein both speech and action is often conversant ;
and such wherein the common talk of men (which is rare, but
yet cometh sometimes to pass) is wiser than their books. It is
reasonable, therefore, that we propound it in the more par-
ticularity, both for the worthiness, and because we may acquit
ourselves for reporting it deficient, which seemeth almost in-
credible, and is otherwise conceived and presupposed by those
themselves that have written. We will, therefore, enumerate
some heads or points thereof, that it may appear the better
what it is, and whether it be extant.

(3) First, therefore, in this, as in all things which are practical,
we ought to cast up our account, what is in our power, and
what not; for the one may be dealt with by way of alteration,
but the other by way of application only. The husbandman
cannot command neither the nature of the earth nor the
seasons of the weather ; no more can the physician the consti-
tution of the patient nor the variety of accidents. So in the
culture and cure of the mind of man, two things are without
our command: points of Nature, and points of fortune. For
to the basis of the one, and the conditions of the other, our
work is limited and tied. In these things, therefore, it is left
unto us to proceed by application :—

“‘ Vincenda est omnis fortuna ferendo:”
and so likewise,

“‘ Vincenda est omnis Natura ferendo,”

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But when that we speak of suffering, we do not speak of a dull
and neglected suffering, but of a wise and industrious suffering,
which draweth and contriveth use and advantage out of that
which seemeth adverse and contrary ; which is that properly
which we call accommodating or applying. Now the wisdom
of application resteth principally in the exact and distinct
knowledge of the precedent state or disposition, unto which we
do apply; for we cannot fit a garment except we first take
measure of the body.

(4) So, then, the first article of this knowledge is to set down
sound and true distributions and descriptions of the several
characters and tempers of men’s natures and dispositions,
specially having regard to those differences which are most
radical in being the fountains and causes of the rest, or most
frequent in concurrence or commixture; wherein it is not
the handling of a few of them in passage, the better to describe
the mediocrities of virtues, that can satisfy this intention. For
if it deserve to be considered, that there are minds which are
proportioned to great matters, and others to small (which
Aristotle handleth, or ought to have handled, by the name of
magnanimity), doth it not deserve as well to be considered
that there are minds proportioned to intend many matters,
and others to few? So that some can divide themselves:
others can perchance do exactly well, but it must be but in
few things at once ; and so there cometh to be a narrowness of
mind, as well as a pusillanimity. And again, that some minds
are proportioned to that which may be dispatched at once, or
within a short return of time ; others to that which begins afar
off, and is to be won with length of pursuit :—

** Jam tum tenditque fovetque.”

So that there may be fitly said to be a longanimity, which is
commonly also ascribed to God as a magnanimity. So further
deserved it to be considered by Aristotle, ‘‘ That there is a
disposition in conversation (supposing it in things which do in
no sort touch or concern a man’s self) to soothe and please,
and a disposition contrary to contradict and cross;” and
deserveth it not much better to be considered, ‘‘ That there is
a disposition, not in conversation or talk, but in matter of more
serious nature (and supposing it still in things merely in-
different), to take pleasure in the good of another; and a dis-
position contrariwise, to take distaste at the good of another ? ”
which is that properly which we call good nature or ill nature,
benignity or malignity ; and, therefore, I cannot sufficiently

150 THE ADVANCEMENT OF LEARNING.

marvel that this part of knowledge, touching the several
characters of natures and dispositions, should be omitted both
in morality and policy, considering it is of so great ministry
and suppeditation to them both. A man shall find in the
traditions of astrology some pretty and apt divisions of men’s
natures, according to the predominances of the planets: lovers
of quiet, lovers of action, lovers of victory, lovers of honour,
lovers of pleasure, lovers of arts, lovers of change, and so forth.
A man shall find in the wisest sort of these relations which the
Italians make touching conclaves, the natures of the several
cardinals handsomely and lively painted forth. A man shall
meet with in every day’s conference the denominations of
sensitive, dry, formal, real, humorous, certain, huomo di prima
impressione, huomo dt ultima impressione, and the like; and
yet, nevertheless, this kind of observations wandereth in words,
but is not fixed in inquiry. For the distinctions are found
(many of them), but we conclude no precepts upon them :
wherein our fault is the greater, because both history, poesy,
and daily experience are as goodly fields where these observa-
tions grow; whereof we make a few posies to hold in our
hands, but no man bringeth them to the confectionary that
receipts might be made of them for use of life.

(5) Of much like kind are those impressions of Nature,
which are imposed upon the mind by the sex, by the age, by
the region, by health and sickness, by beauty and deformity,
and the like, which are inherent and not extern; and again,
those which are caused by extern fortune, as sovereignty,
nobility, obscure birth, riches, want, magistracy, privateness,
prosperity, adversity, constant fortune, variable fortune, rising
per saltum, per gradus, and the like. And, therefore, we see
that Plautus maketh it a wonder to see an old man beneficent,
benignitas hujus ut adolescentuli est. Saint Paul concludeth
that severity of discipline was to be used to the Cretans,
increpa eos dure, upon the disposition of their country, Cretenses
semper mendaces, malee bestice, ventres pigri. Sallust noteth
that it is usual with kings to desire contradictories : Sed
plerumque regia voluntates, ut vehementes sunt, sic mobiles,
sepeque ipse sibi adverse. Tacitus observeth how rarely raising
of the fortune mendeth the disposition : solus Vespasianus
mutatus in melius. Pindarus maketh an observation, that
great and sudden fortune for the most part defeateth men
qui magnam felicitatem concoquere non possunt. So the Psalm
showeth it is more easy to keep a measure in the enjoying of
fortune, than in the increase of fortune ; Divitie si afiuant,
nolite cor apponere. These observations and the like I deny

THE SECOND BOOK. 151

first to know the divers complexions and constitutions 3
secondly, the diseases ; and lastly, the cures: so in medicining
of the mind, after knowledge of the divers characters of men’s
natures, it followeth in order to know the diseases and in-
firmities of the mind, which are no other than the perturba-
tions and distempers of the affections. For as the ancient
politiques in popular estates were wont to compare the people
to the sea, and the orators to the winds ; because as the sea

and trouble it; so the people would be peaceable and tractable
if the seditious orators did not set them in working and

findeth place for them, and handleth them well for the
quantity ; but where their true place is he pretermitteth
them. For it is not his disputations about pleasure and pain
that can satisfy this inquiry, no more than he that should
generally handle the nature of light can be said to handle the
nature of colours ; for pleasure and pain are to the particular
affections as light is to particular colours. Better travails, I
suppose, had the Stoics taken in this argument, as far as I can
gather by that which we have at second hand. But yet it is
like it was after their manner, rather in subtlety of definitions
(which in a subject of this nature are but curiosities), than in
active and ample descriptions and observations. So likewise I
find some particular writings of an elegant nature, touching
some of the affections : ag of anger, of comfort upon adverse
accidents, of tenderness of countenance, and other. But the
poets and writers of histories are the best doctorz of this

152 THE ADVANCEMENT OF LEARNING.

knowledge; where we may find painted forth, with great life,
how affections are kindled and incited ; and how pacified and
refrained; and how again contained from act and further
degree ; how they disclose themselves ; how they work ; how
they vary ; how they gather and fortify; how they are en-
wrapped one within another; and how they do fight and
encounter one with another; and other the like particularities.
Amongst the which this last is of special use in moral and
civil matters; how, I say, to set affection against affection,
and to master one by another; even as we used to hunt beast
with beast, and fly bird with bird, which otherwise percase we
could not so easily recover: upon which foundation is erected
that excellent use of premium and pena, whereby civil states
consist: employing the predominant affections of fear and
hope, for the suppressing and bridling the rest. For as in the
government of states it is sometimes necessary to bridle one
faction with another, so it is in the government within.

(7) Now come we to those points which are within our own
command, and have force and operation upon the mind, to
affect the will and appetite, and to alter manners: wherein
they ought to have handled custom, exercise, habit, education,
example, imitation, emulation, company, friends, praise,
reproof, exhortation, fame, laws, books, studies : these as they
have determinate use in moralities, from these the mind
suffereth, and of these are such receipts and regiments com-
pounded and described, as may serve to recover or preserve
the health and good estate of the mind, as far as pertaineth to
human medicine: of which number we will insist upon some
one or two, as an example of the rest, because it were too long
to prosecute all; and therefore we do resume custom and
habit to speak of.

(8) The opinion of Aristotle seemeth to me a negligent
opinion, that of those things which consist by Nature, nothing
can be changed by custom ; using for example, that if a stone
be thrown ten thousand times up it will not learn to ascend ;
and that by often seeing or hearing we do not learn to see or
hear the better. For though this principle be true in things
wherein Nature is peremptory (the reason whereof we cannot
now stand to discuss), yet it is otherwise in things wherein
Nature admitteth a latitude. For he might see that a strait
glove will come more easily ou with use ; and that a wand will
by use bend otherwise than it grew; and that by use of the
voice we speak louder and stronger ; and that by use of
enduring heat or cold we endure it the better, and the like :
which latter sort have a nearer resemblance unto that subject

THE SECOND BOOK. 153

of manners he handleth, than those instances which he allegeth.
But allowing his conclusion, that virtues and vices consist in
habit, he ought so much the more to have taught the manner
of superinducing that habit: for there be many precepts
of the wise ordering the exercises of the mind, as there is
of ordering the exercises of the body, whereof we will recite
a few.

(9) The first shall be, that we beware we take not at the
first either too high a strain or too weak: for if too high, in a
diffident nature you discourage, in a confident nature you
breed an opinion of facility, and so a sloth; and in all natures
you breed a further expectation than can hold out, and so an
insatisfaction in the end: if too weak, of the other side, you
may not look to perform and overcome any great task.

(10) Another precept is to practise all things chiefly at two
several times, the one when the mind is best disposed, the
other when it is worst disposed ; that by the one you may gain
a great step, by the other you may work out the knots and
stonds of the mind, and make the middle times the more easy
and pleasant.

(11) Another precept is that which Aristotle mentioneti by
the way, which is to bear ever towards the contrary extreme
of that whereunto we are by nature inclined; like unto the
rowing against the stream, or making a wand straight by
bending him contrary to his natural crookednesss.

(12) Another precept is that the mind is brought to any-
thing better, and with more sweetness and happiness, if that
whereunto you pretend be not first in the intention, but
tanquam aliud agendo, because of the natural hatred of the
mind against necessity and constraint. Many other axioms
there are touching the managing of exercise and custom,
which being so conducted doth prove indeed another nature ;
but, being governed by chance, doth commonly prove but
an ape of Nature, and bringeth forth that which is lame and
counterfeit.

(13) So if we should handle books and studies, and what
influence and operation they have upon manners, are there not
divers precepts of great caution and direction appertaining
thereunto? Did not one of the fathers in great indignation
call poesy vinum demonum, because it increaseth temptations,
perturbations, and vain opinions? Is not the opinion of
Aristotle worthy to be regarded, wherein he saith, ‘‘ That
young men are no fit auditors of moral philosophy, because
_ they are not settled from the boiling heat of their affections,
nor attempered with time and experience”? And doth it not

154. THE ADVANCEMENT OF LEARNING.

hereof come, that those excellent books and discourses of the
ancient writers (whereby they have persuaded unto virtue
most effectually, by representing her in state and majesty, and
gefeaee opinions against virtue in their parasites’ coats fit to

e scorned and derided), are of so little effect towards honesty
of life, because they are not read and revolved by men in their
mature and settled years, but confined almost to boys and
beginners? But is it not true also, that much less young men
are fit auditors of matters of policy, till they have been
thoroughly seasoned in religion and morality ; lest their judg-
ments be corrupted, and made apt to think that there are no
true differences of things, but according to utility and fortune,
as the verse describes it, Prosperum et felix scelus virtus
vocatur; and again, Ille crucem pretium sceleris tulit, hic
diadema : which the poets do speak satirically and in indig-
nation on virtue’s behalf ; but books of policy do speak it
seriously and positively; for so it pleaseth Machiavel to say,
“‘T hat if Ozesar had been overthrown, he would have been
more odious than ever was Catiline ; ” as if there had been no
difference, but in fortune, between a very fury of lust and
blood, and the most excellent spirit (his ambition reserved) of
the world? Again, is there not a caution likewise to be given
of the doctrines of moralities themselves (some kinds of them),
lest they make men too precise, arrogant, incompatible ; as
Cicero saith of Cato, In Marco Catone hec bona que videmus
divina et egregia, tpsius scitote esse propria ; que nonnunquam
requirimus ea sunt omnia non a natura, sed a magistro? Many
other axioms and advices there are touching those proprieties
and effects. which studies do infuse and instil into manners.
And so, likewise, is there touching the use of all those other
points, of company, fame, laws, and the rest, which we recited
in the beginning in the doctrine of morality.

(14) But there is a kind of culture of the mind that seemeth
yet more accurate and elaborate than the rest, and is built
upon this ground; that the minds of all men are at some
times in a state more perfect, and at other times in a state
more depraved. ‘The purpose, therefore, of this practice is to
fix and cherish the good hours of the mind, and to obliterate
and take forth the evil. The fixing of the good hath been
practised by two means, vows or constant resolutions, and
observances or exercises ; which are not +o be regarded so much
in themselves, as because they keep the mind in continual
obedience. The obliteration of the evil hath been practised by
two means, some kind of redemption or expiation of that
which is past, and an inception or account de novo for the

THE SECOND BOOK. 155

time to come. But this part seemeth sacred and religious,
and justly ; for all good moral philosophy (as was said) is but
a handmaid to religion. :

(15) Wherefore we will conclude with that last point, which
is of all other means the most compendious and summary, and

such as may be in a reasonable sort within his compass to attain,
For if these two things be supposed, that a man set before him
honest and good ends, and again, that he be resolute, constant,
and true unto them 3 it will follow that he shall mould himself
into all virtue at once. And this indeed is like the work of
nature ; whereas the other course is like the work of the hand,
For as when a carver makes an image, he shapes only that part
whereupon he worketh 3 as if he be upon the face, that part
which shall be the body is but a rude stone still, till such times
as he comes to it. But contrariwise when nature makes a
flower or living creature, she formeth rudiments of all the
parts at one time. So in obtaining virtue by habit, while a
man practiseth temperance, he doth not profit much to forti-

sage towards those ends doth commend unto him, he is invested
of a precedent disposition to conform himself thereunto. Which
state of mind Aristotle doth excellently express himself, that
it ought not to be called virtuous, but divine. His words are
these: Immanitati autem consentaneum est opponere eam, que
supra humanitatem est, heroicam sive divinam virtutem ; anda
little after, Yam ut Sere neque vitium neque virtus est, sic neque

prayers to the gods, but that they would continue as good lords
to them as Trajan had been ;” as if he had not been only an
imitation of divine nature, but a pattern of it. But these be

conduct men unto, by imprinting upon their souls charity,
which is excellently called the bond of perfection, because it
comprehendeth and fastencth all virtues together. And as it ig
elegantly said by Menander of vain love, which is but a false
imitation of divine love, Amor melior Sophista levo ad humanam
vitam—that love teacheth a man to carry himself better than

156 THE ADVANCEMENT OF LEARNING,

the sophist or preceptor ; which he calleth left-handed, because,
with all his rules and preceptions, he cannot form a man so
dexterously, nor with that facility to prize himself and govern
himself, as love can do: so certainly, if a man’s mind be truly
inflamed with charity, it doth work him suddenly into greater
perfection than all the doctrine of morality can do, which is
but a sophist in comparison of the other. Nay, further, as
Xenophon observed truly, that all other affections, though
they raise the mind, yet they do it by distorting and uncome-
liness of ecstasies or excesses; but only love doth exalt the
mind, and nevertheless at the same instant doth settle and
compose it: so in all other excellences, though they advance
nature, yet they are subject to excess. Only charity admitteth
no excess. For so we see, aspiring to be like God in power, the
angels transgressed and fell ; Ascendam, et ero similis altissimo :
by aspiring to be like God in knowledge, man transgressed and
fell; Hritis sicut Dit, scientes tbonum etmalum : but by aspiring
to a similitude of God in goodness or love, neither man nor
angel ever transgressed, or shall transgress. For unto that
imitation we are called: Diligite inimicos vestros, benefacite eis
qui oderunt vos, et orate pro persequentibus et calumniantibus vos,
ut sitis filii Patris vestri qui in celis est, qui solem suum orirt
facit super bonos et malos, et pluit super justos et injustos. So in
the first platform of the divine nature itself, the heathen re-
ligion speaketh thus, Optimus Maximus: and the sacred Scrip-
tures thus, Misericordia ejus super omnia opera ejus.

(16) Wherefore I do conclude this part of moral knowledge,
concerning the culture and regiment of the mind; wherein
if any man, considering the parts thereof which I have enu-
merated, do judge that my labour is but to collect into an art
or science that which hath been pretermitted by others, as
matter of common sense and experience, he judgeth well. But
as Philocrates sported with Demosthenes, ‘‘ You may not marvel
(Athenians) that Demosthenes and I do differ; for he drinketh
water, and I drink wine;” and like as we read of an ancient
parable of the two gates of sleep—

“Sunt geminz somni porte: quarum altera fertur
Cornea, qua veris facilis datur exitus umbris :
Altera candenti perfecta nitens elephanto,

Sed falsa ad ccelum mittunt insomnia manes:”

so if we put on sobriety and attention, we shall find it a sure
maxim in knowledge, that the more pleasant liquor (“‘ of
wine ”) is the more vaporous, and the braver gate (‘‘ of ivory ”)
sendeth forth the falser dreams,

THE SECOND BOOK. 157

(17) But we have now concluded that general part of human
philosophy, which contemplateth man segregate, and as he con-
sisteth of body and spirit. Wherein we may further note, that
there seemeth to be a relation or conformity between the good
of the mind and the good of the body. For as we divided the
good of the body into health, beauty, strength, and pleasure,
so the good of the mind, inquired in rational and moral know-
ledges, tendeth to this, to make the mind sound, and without
perturbation ; beautiful, and graced with decency ; and strong
and agile for all duties of life. These three, as in the body, so
in the mind, seldom meet, and commonly sever. For it is easy
to observe, that many have strength of wit and courage, but
have neither health from perturbations, nor any beauty or
decency in their doings; some again have an elegancy and
fineness of carriage which have neither soundness of honesty
nor substance of sufficiency ; and some again have honest and
reformed minds, that can neither become themselves nor
manage business; and sometimes two of them meet, and
rarely all three. As for pleasure, we have likewise determined
that the mind ought not to be reduced to stupid, but to retain
pleasure ; confined rather in the subject of it, than in the
strength and vigour of it.

XXIII. (1) Civil knowledge is conversant about a subject
which of all others is most immersed in matter, and hardliest
reduced to axiom. Nevertheless, as Cato the Censor said,
“That the Romans were like sheep, for that a man were better
drive a flock of them, than one of them; for in a flock, if you
could get but some few go right, the rest would follow:” so in
that respect moral philosophy is more difficile than policy.
Again, moral philosophy propoundeth to itself the framing of
internal goodness ; but civil knowledge requireth only an ex-
ternal goodness ; for that as to society sufficeth. And therefore
it cometh oft to pass that there be evil times in good govern-
ments: for so we find in the Holy story, when the kings were
good, yet it is added, Sed adhuc populus non direxerat cor suum
ad Dominum Deum patrum suorum. Again, states, as great
engines, move slowly, and are notso soon put outof frame : for
as in Egypt the seven good years sustained the seven bad, so
- governments for a time well grounded do bear out errors follow-
ing ; but the resolution of particular persons is more suddenly
subverted. These respects do somewhat qualify the extreme
difficulty of civil knowledge.

(2) This knowledge hath three parts, according to the three
summary actions of society ; which are conversation, negotia-
tion, and government. For man seeketh in society comfort,

158 THE ADVANCEMENT OF LEARNING.

use, and protection; and they be three wisdoms of divers
natures which do often sever—wisdom of the behaviour, wisdom
- of business, and wisdom of state.

(3) The wisdom of conversation ought not to be over much
affected, but much less despised ; for it hath not only an honour
in itself, but an influence also into business and government.
The poet saith, Wee vultu destrue verba tuo: a man may destroy
the force of his words with his countenance ; so may he of his
deeds, saith Cicero, recommending to his brother affability and
easy access; IVil interest habere ostium apertum, vultum clausum :
it is nothing won to admit men with an open door, and to re-
ceive them with a shut and reserved countenance. So we see
Atticus, before the first interview between Cesar and Cicero,
the war depending, did seriously advise Cicero touching the
composing and ordering of his countenance and gesture. And
if the government of the countenance be of such effect, much
more is that of the speech, and other carriage appertaining to
conversation; the true model whereof seemeth to me well ex-
pressed by Livy, though not meant for this purpose: We aut
arrogans videar, aut obnoxius ; quorum alterum est alien
libertatis obliti, alterum suc : the sum of behaviour is to retain
a man’s own dignity, without intruding upon the liberty of
others. On the other side, if behaviour and outward carriage
be intended too much, first it may pass into affectation, and
then Quid deformius quam scenam in vitam transferre—to act a
man’s life? But although it proceed not to that extreme, yet
it consumeth time, and employeth the mind too much. And
therefore as we use to advise young students from company
keeping, by saying, Amici fures temporis: so certainly the in-
tending of the discretion of behaviour is a gr2at thief of medita-
tion. Again, such as are accomplished in that form of urbanity
please themselves in it, and seldom aspire to higher virtue ;
whereas those that have defect in it do seek comeliness by
reputation ; for where reputation is, almost everything be-
cometh; but where that is not, it must be supplied by puntos
and compliments. Again, there is no greater impediment of
action than an over-curious observance of decency, and the
guide of decency, which is time and season. For as Solomon
saith, Qué respicit ad ventos, non seminat ; et qui respicit ad
nubes, non metet : aman must make his opportunity, as oft as
find it. To conclude, behaviour seemeth to me as a garment of
the mind, and to have the conditions of a garment. For it
ought to be made in fashion ; it ought not to be too curious ; it
ought to be shaped so as to set forth any good making of the
mind and hide any deformity; and above all, it ought not to

THE SECOND BOOK. 159

be too strait or restrained for exercise or motion. But this part
of civil knowledge hath been elegantly handled, and therefore I
cannot report it for deficient.

(4) The wisdom touching negotiation or business hath not
been hitherto collected into writing, to the great derogation

scattered advertisements, that have no proportion to the
magnitude of this subject. For if books were written of this
as the other, I doubt not but learned men with mean ex-
perience would far excel men of long experience without
learning, and outshoot them in their own bow.

we see is laboured and in some part reduced. Of this wisdom
it seemeth some of the ancient Romans in the saddest and
wisest times were professors ; for Cicero reporteth, that it was
then in use for senators that had name and opinion for
general wise men, as Coruncanius, Curius, Lelius, and many

_ others, to walk at certain hours in the Place, and to give

‘audience to those that would use their advice; and that the

_ particular citizens would resort unto them, and consult with
_ them of the marriage of a daughter, or of the employing of a

written by the ancients), although it concerned a, particular

action then on foot, yet the substance thereof consisteth of
_ Many wise and politic axioms, which contain not a temporary,
_ but a perpetual direction in the case of popular elections. But.

160 THE ADVANCEMENT OF LEARNING.

chiefly we may see in those aphorisms which have place
amongst divine writings, composed by Solomon the king, of
whom the Scriptures testify that his heart was as the sands
of the sea, encompassing the world and all worldly matters,
we see, I say, not a few profound and excellent cautions,
precepts, positions, extending to much variety of occasions ;
whereupon we will stay a while, offering to consideration some
number of examples.

(6) Sed et cunctis sermonibus qui dicuntur ne accommodes
aurem tuam, ne forte audias servum tuum maledicentem tibi.
Here is commended the provident stay of inquiry of that which

we would be loth to find: as it was judged great wisdom in |

Pompeius Magnus that he burned Sertorius’ papers unperused.

Vir sapiens, si cum stulto contenderit, sive irascatur, sive |

rideat, non inveniet requiem. Here is described the great
disadvantage which a wise man hath in undertaking a lighter
person than himself; which is such an engagement as,
whether a man turn the matter to jest, or turn it to heat,
or le he change copy, he can no ways quit himself
well of it.

Qui delicate a pueritia nutrit servum suum, postea sentiet
eum contumacem. Here is signified, that if a man begin too |
high a pitch in his favours, it doth commonly end in unkind- |

ness and unthankfulness.

Vidisti virum velocem in opere suo? coram regibus stabit,
nec erit inter ignobiles. Here is observed, that of all virtues
for rising to honour, quickness of despatch is the best; for
superiors many times love not to have those they employ too
deep or too sudicient, but ready and diligent.

Vidi cunctos viventes qui ambulant sub sole, cum adolescente —

secundo qui consurgit pro eo. Here is expressed that whick
was noted by Sylla first, and after him by Tiberius. Plures
adorant solem orientem quam occidentem vel meridianum.

Si spiritus potestatem habentis ascendertt super te, locum
tuum ne demiseris ; quia curatio faciet cessare peccata maxima,
Here caution is given, that upon displeasure, retiring is of all
courses the unfittest ; for a man leaveth things at worst, and
depriveth himself of means to make them better.

Erat civitas parva, et pauct in ea viri: venit contra eam
rec magnus, et vallavit eam, instruxitque munitiones per
gyrum, et perfecta est obsidio ; inventusque est in ea vir pauper

et sapiens, et liberavit eam per sapientiam suam; et nullus

deinceps recordatus est hominis illius pauperis. Here the
corruption of states is set forth, that esteem not virtue or
merit longer than they have use of it.

—

ET GES SE ES

THE SECOND BOOK. 161

Mollis responsio frangit iram. Here is noted that silence
or rough answer exasperateth ; but an answer present and
temperate pacifieth.

Iter pigrorum quasi sepes spinarum. Here is lively re-
presented how laborious sloth proveth in the end; for when
things are deferred till the last instant, and nothing prepared
beforehand, every step findeth a briar or impediment, which
catcheth or stoppeth.

Melior est finis orationis quam principium. Here is taxed
the vanity of formal speakers, that study more about prefaces
and inducements, than upon the conclusions and issues of
speech.

Qui cognoscit in judicio faciem, non bene facit ; iste et pro
buccella panis deseret veritatem. Here is noted, that a judge
were better be a briber than a respecter of persons; for a
corrupt judge offendeth not so lightly as a facile.

Vir pauper calumnians pauperes similis est imbri vehementi,
in quo paratur fames. Here is expressed the extremity of
necessitous extortions, figured in the ancient fable of the full
and the hungry horseleech.

Fons turbatus pede, et vena corrupta, est justus cadens coram
impio. Here is noted, that one judicial and exemplar iniquity
in the face of the world doth trouble the fountains of justice
more than many particular injuries passed over by con-
nivance.

Qui subtrahit aliquid a patre et a matre, et dicit hoc non
esse peccatum, particeps est homicidii. Here is noted that,
whereas men in wronging their best friends use to extenuate
their fault, as if they might presume or be bold upen them,
it doth contrariwise indeed aggravate their fault, and turneth
it from injury to impiety.

Noli esse amicus homini iracundo, nec ambulato cum homine
furioso. Here caution is given, that in the election of our
friends we do principally avoid those which are impatient,
as those that will espouse us to many factions and quarrels.

Qut conturbat domum suam, possidebit ventum. Here is
noted, that in domestical separations and breaches men do
promise to themselves quieting of their mind and content-
ment; but still they are deceived of their expectation, and it
turneth to wind.

Filius sapiens letificat patrem : jilius vero stultus mestitia
est matri suc. Here is distinguished, that fathers have most
comfort of the good proof of their sons; but mothers have

_ most discomfort of their ill proof, because women have little
_ discerning of virtue, but of fortune.

¥F—S8 4

162 THE ADVANCEMENT OF LEARNING.

Qu celat delictum, querit amicitiam ; sed qui altero sermone
repetit, separat foderatos. Here caution is given, that recon-
cilement is better managed by an amnesty, and passing over
that which is past, than by apologies and excuses.

In omni opere bono erit abundantia ; ubi autem verba sunt
plurima, ibe frequenter egestas. Here is noted, that words and
discourse aboundeth most where there is idleness and want.

Primus in sua causa justus : sed venit altera pars, et inquiret
in eum. Here is observed, that in all causes the first tale
possesseth much ; in sort, that the prejudice thereby wrought
will be hardly removed, except some abuse or falsity in the
information be detected.

Verba bilinguis quasi simplicia, et ipsa perveniunt ad m-
teriora ventris. Here is distinguished, that flattery and in-
sinuation, which seemeth set and artificial, sinketh not far;
put that entereth deep which hath show of nature, liberty, and
simplicity.

Qui erudit derisorem, ypse sibt injuriam facit ; et qui arguit
impium, sibi maculam generat. Here caution is given how we
tender reprehension to arrogant and scornful natures, whose
manner is to esteem it for contumely, and accordingly to
return it.

Da sapienti occasionem, et addetur ei sapientia. Here is
distinguished the wisdom brought into habit, and that which |
is but verbal and swimming only in conceit ; for the one upon
the occasion presented is quickened and redoubled, the other
is amazed and confused.

» Quomodo in aquis resplendent vultus prospicientium, sic corda}
hominum manifesta sunt prudentibus. Here the mind of a}
wise man is compared to a glass, wherein the images of |
diversity of natures and customs are represented ; from which}
representation proceedeth that application,

“Qui sapit, innumeris moribus aptus erit.”
?

(7) Thus have I stayed somewhat longer upon these sen-
tences politic of Solomon than is agreeable to the proportior
of an example ; led with a desire to give authority to this
part of knowledge, which I noted as deficient, by so excellent
a precedent ; and have also attended them with brief obser
vations, such as to my understanding offer no violence to thi
sense, though I know they may be applied to a more divin:
use: but it is allowed, even in divinity, that some inter
tations, yea, and some writings, have more of the eagle thal)
others; but taking them as instructions for life, they migh

THE SECOND BOOK. 163

have received large discourse, if I would have broken them
and illustrated them by deducements and examples.

(8) Neither was this in use only with the Hebrews, but it
is generally to be found in the wisdom of the more ancient
times ; that as men found out any observation that they
thought was good for life, they would gather it and express it
in parable or aphorism or fable. But for fables, they were
vicegerents and supplies where examples failed: now that the
times abound with history, the aim is better when the mark
is alive. And therefore the form of writing which of all
others is fittest for this variable argument of negotiation and
occasions is that which Machiavel chose wisely and aptly for
government ; namely, discourse upon histories or examples,
For knowledge drawn freshly and in our view out of particu-
lars, knoweth the way best to particulars again. And it hath
much greater life for practice when the discourse attendeth
upon the example, than when the example attendeth upon
the discourse. For this is no point of order, as it seemeth at
first, but of substance. For when the example is the ground,
being set down in a history at large, it is set down with all
circumstances, which may sometimes control the discourse
thereupon made, and sometimes supply it, as a very pattern
for action ; whereas the examples alleged for the discourse’s
sake are cited succinctly, and without particularity, and carry
a servile aspect towards the discourse which they are brought
in to make good.

(9) But this difference is not amiss to be remembered, that
as history of times is the best ground for discourse of govern-
ment, such as Machiavel handleth, so histories of lives is the
most popular for discourse of business, because it is more
conversant in private actions. Nay, there is a ground of
discourse for this purpose fitter than them both, which is dis-
course upon letters, such as are wise and weighty, as many
are of Cicero ad Atticum, and others. For letters have a
great and more particular representation of business than
either chronicles or lives. Thus have we spoken both of the
matter and form of this part of civil knowledge, touching

_ negotiation, which we note to be deficient,

(10) But yet there is another part of this part, which
differeth as much from that whereof we have spoken as sapere
and stbi sapere, the one moving as it were to the circumference,
_ the other to the centre. For there is a wisdom of counsel,
_ and again there is a wisdom of pressing a man’s own fortune ;
and they do sometimes meet, and often sever. For many are
Wise in their own ways that are weak for government or

164 THE ADVANCEMENT OF LEARNING.

counsel ; like ants, which is a wise creature for itself, but
very hurtful for the garden. This wisdom the Romans did
take much knowledge of : Nam pol sapiens (saith the comical
poet) jfingit fortunam sibi; and it grew to an adage, Faber
quisque fortune propric ; and Livy attributed it to Cato the
first, Jn hoc viro tanta vis animi et ingentt inerat, ut quocunque
loco natus esset sibi ipse fortunam facturus videretur.

(11) This conceit or position, if it be too much declared and
professed, hath been thought a thing impolitic and unlucky,
as was observed in Timotheus the Athenian, who, having done
many great services to the state in his government, and
giving an account thereof to the people as the manner was,
did conclude every particular with this clause, ‘‘ And in this
fortune had no part.” And it came so to pass, that he never
prospered in anything he took in hand afterwards. For this is
too high and too arrogant, savouring of that which Ezekiel
saith of Pharaoh, Dicis, Fluvius est meus et ego fect memet
ipsum ; or of that which another prophet speaketh, that men
offer sacrifices to their nets and snares; and that which the
poet expresseth,

‘ Dextra mihi Deus, et telum quod missile libro,
Nunc adsint !”

For these confidences were ever unhallowed, and unblessed ;
and, therefore, those that were great politiques indeed ever
ascribed their successes to their felicity and not to their skill
or virtue. For so Sylla surnamed himself Felix, not Magnus.
So Cesar said to the master of the ship, Casarem portas et
fortunam eus.

(12) But yet, nevertheless, these positions, Faber quisque
fortune sue: Sapiens dominabitur astris: Invia virtuti nulla
est via, and the like, being taken and used as spurs to industry,
and not as stirrups to insolency, rather for resolution than for
the presumption or outward declaration, have been ever
thought sound and good; and are no question imprinted
in the greatest minds, who are so sensible of this opinion
as they can scarce contain it within. As we see in Augustus |
Cesar (who was rather diverse from his uncle than inferior
in virtue), how when ke died he desired his friends about
him to give him a plaudite, as if he were conscious to him- |
self that he had played his part well upon the stage. This
part of knowledge we do report also as deficient; not but ©
that it is practised too much, but it hath not been reduced to —
writing. And, therefore, lest it should seem to any that it

THE SECOND BOOK, 165

is not comprehensible by axiom, it is requisite, as we did in
the former, that we set down some heads or passages of it.

(13) Wherein it may appear at the first a new and unwonted
argument to teach men how to raise and make their fortune ;
a doctrine wherein every man perchance will be ready to yield
himself a disciple, till he see the difficulty: for fortune layeth
as heavy impositions as virtue; and it is as hard and severe a
thing to be a true politique, as to be truly moral. But the
handling hereof concerneth learning greatly, both in honour
and in substance. In honour, because pragmatical men may
not go away with an opinion that learning is like a lark, that
can mount and sing, and please herself, and nothing else ;
but may know that she holdeth as well of the hawk, that can
soar aloft, and can also descend and strike upon the prey. In
substance, because it is the perfect law of inquiry of truth,
that nothing be in the globe of matter, which should not be
likewise in the globe of crystal or form; that is, that there be
not anything in being and action which should not be drawn
and collected into contemplation and doctrine. Neither doth
learning admire or esteem of this architecture of fortune
otherwise than as of an inferior work, for no man’s fortune
can be an end worthy of his being, and many times the
worthiest men do abandon their fortune willingly for better
respects: but nevertheless fortune as an organ of virtue and
merit deserveth the consideration.

(14) First, therefore, the precept which I conceive to be
most summary towards the prevailing in fortune, is to obtain
that window which Momus did require; who seeing in the
frame of man’s heart such angles and recesses, found fault
there was not a window to look into them; that is, to procure
good informations of particulars touching persons, their
natures, their desires and ends, their customs and fashions,
their helps and advantages, and whereby they chiefly stand,
so again their weaknesses and disadvantages, and where they
lie most open and obnoxious, their friends, factions, depend-
ences; and again their opposites, enviers, competitors, their
moods and times, Sola virt molles aditus et tempora noras ;
their principles, rules, and observations, and the like: and
this not only of persons but of actions; what are on foot from
time to time, and how they are conducted, favoured, opposed,
and how they import, and the like. For the knowledge of
present actions is not only material in itself, but without it
also the knowledge of persons is very erroneous: for men
change with the actions; and whilst they are in pursuit they
are one, and when they return to their nature they are

166 THE ADVANCEMENT OF LEARNING.

another. These informations of particulars, touching persons
and actions, are as the minor propositions in every active
syllogism ; for no excellency of observations (which are as
the major propositions) can suffice to ground a conclusion,
if there be error and mistaking in the minors.

(15) That this knowledge is possible, Solomon is our surety,
who saith, Consilium in corde viri tanquam aqua profunda ;
sed vir prudens exhauriet jllud. And although the knowledge
itself falleth not under precept because it is of individuals, yet
the instructions for the obtaining of it may.

(16) We will begin, therefore, with this precept, according
to the ancient opinion, that the sinews of wisdom are slowness
of belief and distrust ; that more trust be given to countenances
and deeds than to words; and in words rather to sudden pas-
sages and surprised ‘words than to fset and purposed words.
Neither let that be feared which is said, Fronti nulla fides,
which is meant of a general outward behaviour, and not of the
private and subtle motions and labours of the countenance
and gesture; which, as Q. Cicero elegantly saith, is Anim
janua, ‘‘the gate of the mind.” None more close than Tiberius,
and yet Tacitus saith of Gallus, Etenim vultu offensionem con-
jectaverat. So again, noting the differing character and manner
of his commending Germanicus and Drusus in the Senate, he
saith, touching his fashion wherein he carried his speech of
Germanicus, thus: Magis im speciem adornatis verbis, quam ut
penitus sentire crederetur ; but of Drusus thus: Paucioribus sed
intentior, et fida oratione ; and in another place, speaking of
his character of speech when he did anything that was gracious
and popular, he saith, ‘‘That in other things he was velut eluc-
tantium verborum ;” but then again, solutius loguebatur quando
subveniret. So that there is no such artificer of dissimulation,
nor no such commanded countenance (vultus jussus), that can
sever from a feigned tale some of these fashions, either a more
slight and careless fashion, or more set and formal, or more
tedious and wandering, or coming from a man more drily and
hardly.

(17) Neither are deeds such assured pledges as that they
may be trusted without a judicious consideration of their mag-
nitude and nature: Fraus sibi im parvis fidem prestruit Ww
majore emolumento fallat ; and the Italian thinketh himself
upon the point to be bought and sold, when he is better used
than he was wont to be without manifest cause. For small
favours, they do but lull men to sleep, both as to caution and
as to industry; and are, as Demosthenes calleth them, A//-
menta socordie. Soagain we see how false the nature of some

AE EE AE TPS

THE SECOND BOOK, 167

deeds are, in that particular which Mutianus practised upon
Antonius Primus, upon that hollow and unfaithful reconcile-
ment which was made between them; whereupon Mutianus
advanced many of the friends of Antonius, Simul amicis ejus
prefecturas et tribunatus largitur : wherein, under pretence to
strengthen him, he did desolate him, and won from him his
dependents.

18) As for words, though they be like waters to physicians,
full of flattery and uncertainty, yet they are not to be despised,
specially with the advantage of passion and affection. For so
we see Tiberius, upon a stinging and incensing speech of
Agrippina, came a step forth of his dissimulation when he
said, “You are hurt because you do not reign;” of which
Tacitus saith, Audita hec raram occulti pectoris vocem elicuere :
correptamque Greco versu admonuit, ideo ledi quia non
regnaret. And, therefore, the poet doth elegantly call pas-
sions tortures that urge men to confess their secrets :—

**Vino tortus et ira.”

And experience showeth there are few men so true to them-
selves and so settled but that, sometimes upon heat, sometimes
upon bravery, sometimes upon kindness, sometimes upon
trouble of mind and weakness, they open themselves ; specially
if they be put to it with a counter-dissimulation, according to
the proverb of Spain, Di mentira, y sacar as verdad: “Tell a
lie and find a truth.”

(19) As for the knowing of men which is at second hand from
reports : men’s weaknesses and faults are best known from
their enemies, their virtues and abilities from their friends,
their customs and times from their servants, their conceits
and opinions from their familiar friends, with whom they dis-
course most. General fame is light, and the opinions conceived
by superiors or equals are deceitful; for to such men are more
masked: Verior fama e domesticis emanat.

(20) But the soundest disclosing and expounding of men is
by their natures and ends, wherein the weakest sort of men
are best interpreted by their natures, and the wisest by their
ends. For it was both pleasantly and wisely said (though I
think very untruly) by a nuncio of the Pope, returning from a
certain nation where he served as lidger ; whose opinion being
asked touching the appointment of one to go in his place, he
wished that in any case they did not send one that was too
wise ; because no very wise man would ever imagine what they
in that country were like todo. And certainly it is an error

168 THE ADVANCEMENT OF LEARNING.

frequent for men to shoot over, and to suppose deeper ends
and more compass reaches than are: the Italian proverb being
elegant, and for the most part true :—

“‘Di danari, di senno, e di fede,
C’é ne manco che non credi.”’

‘There is commonly less money, less wisdom, and less good
faith than men do account upon.”

(21) But princes, upon a far other reason, are best inter-
preted by their natures, and private persons by their ends.
For princes being at the top of human desires, they have for
the most part no particular ends whereto they aspire, by dis-
tance from which a man might take measure and scale of the
rest of their actions and desires; which is one of the causes
that maketh their hearts more inscrutable. Neither is it
sufficient to inform ourselves in men’s ends and natures of the
variety of them only, but also of the predominancy, what
humour reigneth most, and what end is principally sought.
For so we see, when Tigellinus saw himself outstripped by
Petronius Turpilianus in Nero’s humours of pleasures, metus
ejus rimatur, he wrought upon Nero’s fears, whereby he broke
the other’s neck.

(22) But to all this part of inquiry the most compendious way
resteth in three things ; the first, to have general acquaintance
and inwardness with those which have general acquaintance and
look most into the world ; and specially according to the diver-
sity of business, and the diversity of persons, to have privacy
and conversation with some one friend at least which is perfect
and well-intelligenced in every several kind. The second is
to keep a good mediocrity in liberty of speech and secrecy ; in
most things liberty ; secrecy where it importeth; for liberty
of speech inviteth and provoketh liberty to be used again, and
so bringeth much to a man’s knowledge ; and secrecy on the
other side induceth trust and inwardness. The last is the
reducing of a man’s self to this watchful and serene habit, as to
make account and purpose, in every conference and action, as
well to observe as to act. For as Epictetus would have a
philosopher in every particular action to say to himself, Ht hoe
volo, et etiam institutum servare ; 80 a politic man in every-
thing should say to himself, Ht hoc volo, ac etiam aliquid
addiscere. I have stayed the longer upon this precept of ob-
taining good information because it is a main part by itself,
which answereth to all the rest. But, above all things,
caution must be taken that men have a good stay and hold

THE SECOND BOOK. 169

of themselves, and that this much knowing do not draw on
much meddling ; for nothing is more unfortunate than light and
rash intermeddling in many matters. So that this variety of
knowledge tendeth in conclusion but only to this, to make a
better and freer choice of those actions which may concern us,
and to conduct them with the less error and the more dexterity.

(23) The second precept concerning this knowledge is, for
men to take good information touching their own person, and
well to understand themselves; knowing that, as St. James
saith, though men look oft in a glass, yet they do suddenly
forget themselves ; wherein as the divine glass is the Word of
God, so the politic glass is the state of the world, or times
wherein we live, in the which we are to behold ourselves.

(24) For men ought to take an impartial view of their own
abilities and virtues; and again of their wants and impedi-
ments; accounting these with the most, and those other with
the least ; and from this view and examination to frame the
considerations following.

(25) First, to consider how the constitution of their nature
sorteth with the general state of the times ; which if they find
agreeable and fit, then in all things to give themselves more
scope and liberty ; but if differing and dissonant, then in the
whole course of their life to be more close retired, and reserved ;
as we see in Tiberius, who was never seen at a play, and came
not into the senate in twelve of his last years; whereas
Augustus Cesar lived ever in men’s eyes, which Tacitus ob-
serveth, alia Tiberio morum via.

(26) Secondly, to consider how their nature sorteth with pro-
fessions and courses of life, and accordingly to make election,
if they be free ; and, if engaged, to make the departure at the
first opportunity ; as we see was done by Duke Valentine, that
was designed by his father to a sacerdotal profession, but
quitted it soon after in regard of his parts and inclination ;
being such, nevertheless, as a man cannot tell well whether
they were worse for a prince or for a priest.

(27) Thirdly, to consider how they sort with those whom
they are like to have competitors and concurrents ; and to take
that course wherein there is most solitude, and themselves like
to be most eminent ; as Cesar Julius did, who at first was an
orator or pleader ; but when he saw the excellency of Cicero,
Hortensius, Catulus, and others for eloquence, and saw there
was no man of reputation for the wars but Pompeius, upon
whom the state was forced to rely, he forsook his course begun
towards a civil and popular greatness, and transferred his de-
signs to a martial greatness.

r*—84

170 THE ADVANCEMENT OF LEARNING.

(28) Fourthly, in the choice of their friends and dependents,
to proceed according to the composition of their own nature ;
as we may see in Cesar, all whose friends and followers were
men active and effectual, but not solemn, or of reputation.

(29) Fifthly, to take special heed how they guide themselves
by examples, in thinking they can do as they see others do ;
whereas perhaps their natures and carriages are far differing.
In which error it seemeth Pompey was, of whom Cicero saith
that he was wont often to say, Sylla potuit, ego non potero?
Wherein he was much abused, the natures and proceedings of
himself and his example being the unlikest_in the world ; the
one being fierce, violent, and pressing the fact ; the other
solemn, and full of majesty and circumstance, and therefore
the less effectual. .

But this precept touching the politic knowledge of ourselves
hath many other branches, whereupon we cannot insist.

(30) Next to the well understanding and discerning of a man’s
self, there followeth the well opening and revealing a man’s
self; wherein we see nothing more usual than for the more
able man to make the less show. For there is a great advan-
tage in the well setting forth of a man’s virtues, fortunes,
merits ; and again, in the artificial covering of a man’s weak-
nesses, defects, disgraces ; staying upon the one, sliding from
the other ; cherishing the one by circumstances, gracing the
other by exposition, and the like. Wherein we see what
Tacitus saith of Mutianus, who was the greatest politique of
his time, Omnium que dixerat feceratque arte quadam_ 0s-
tentator, which requireth indeed some art, lest it turn tedious
and arrogant; but yet so, as ostentation (though it be to the
first degree of vanity) seemeth to me rather a vice in manners
than in policy ; for as it is said, Audacter calumniare, semper
aliquid heret ; so, except it be in a ridiculous degree of de-
formity, Audacter te vendita, semper aliquid heret. For it
will stick with the more ignorant and inferior sort of men,
though men of wisdom and rank do smile at it and despise it ;
and yet the authority won with many doth countervail the
disdain of a few. But if it be carried with decency and
government, as with a natural, pleasant, and ingenious
fashion; or at times when it is mixed with some peril and
unsafety (as in military persons) ; or at times when others are
most envied; or with easy and careless passage to it and from
it, without dwelling too long, or being too serious ; or with an
equal freedom of taxing a man’s self, as well as gracing him-
self ; or by occasion of repelling or putting down others’ injury
or insolency ; it doth greatly add to reputation: and surely

THE SECOND BOOK. bee We |

not a few solid natures, that want this ventosity and cannot
sail in the height of the winds, are not without some prejudice
and disadvantage by their moderation.

(31) But for these flourishes and enhancements of virtue,
as they are not perchance unnecessary, so it is at least neces-
sary that virtue be not disvalued and embased under the just
price, which is done in three manners—by offering and ob-
truding a man’s self, wherein men think he is rewarded when
he is accepted ; by doing too much, which will not give that
which is well done leave to settle, and in the end induceth
satiety ; and by finding too soon the fruit of a man’s virtue, in
commendation, applause, honour, favour; wherein if a man be
pleased with a little, let him hear what is truly said: Cave ne
insuetus rebus majoribus videaris, si heec te res parva sicuti Magna
delectat.

(32) But the covering of defects is of no less importance
than the valuing of good parts; which may be done likewise
in three manners—by caution, by colour, and by confidence.
Caution is when men do ingeniously and discreetly avoid to be
put into those things for which they are not proper ; whereas
contrariwise bold and unquiet spirits will thrust themselves
into matters without difference, and so publish and proclaim
all their wants. Colour is when men make a way for them-
. Selves to have a construction made of their faults or wants, as

proceeding from a better cause or intended for some other
purpose. For of the one it is well said, |

“Seepe latet vitium proximitate boni,”

and therefore whatsoever want a man hath, he must see that
he pretend the virtue that shadoweth it ; as if he be dull, he
must affect gravity ; if a coward, mildness ; and so the rest.
For the second, a man must frame some probable cause why he
should not do his best, and why he should dissemble his
abilities ; and for that purpose must use to dissemble those
abilities which are notorious in him, to give colour that his
true wants are but industries and dissimulations. For con-
fidence, it is the last but the surest remedy—namely, to
depress and seem to despise whatsoever a man cannot attai 3
observing the good principle of the merchants, who endeavour
to raise the price of their own commodities, and to beat down
the price of others. But there is a confidence that passeth this
other, which is to face out a man’s own defects, in seeming to
conceive that he is best in those things wherein he is failing ;
and, to help that again, to seem on the other side that he hath

172 THE ADVANCEMENT OF LEARNING.

least opinion of himself in those things wherein he is best :
like as we shall see it commonly in poets, that if they show
their verses, and you except to any, they will say, ‘*‘ That that
line cost them more labour than any of the rest ;” and pre-
sently will seem to disable and suspect rather some other line,
which they know well enough to be the best in the number.
But above all, in this righting and helping of a man’s self in
his own carriage, he must take heed he show not himself dis-
mantled and exposed to scorn and injury, by too much dulce-
ness, goodness, and facility of nature; but show some sparkles
of liberty, spirit, and edge. Which kind of fortified carriage,
with a ready rescussing of a man’s self from scorns, is some-
times of necessity imposed upon men by somewhat in their
person or fortune; but it ever succeedeth with good
felicity.

(33) Another precept of this knowledge is by all possible
endeavour to frame the mind to be pliant and obedient to
occasion; for nothing hindereth men’s fortunes so much as
this : Idem manebat, neque idem deccbat—men are where they
were, when occasions turn : and therefore to Cato, whom Livy
maketh such an architect of fortune, he addeth that he had
versatile ingenium. And thereof it cometh that these grave
solemn wits, which must be like themselves and cannot make
departures, have more dignity than felicity. But in some it is
nature to be somewhat vicious and enwrapped, and not easy to
turn. In some it is a conceit that is almost a nature, which is,
that men can hardly make themselves believe that they ought
to change their course, when they have found good by it in
former experience. For Machiavel noted wisely how Fabius
Maximus would haye been temporising still, according to his
old bias, when the nature of the war was altered and required
hot pursuit. In some other it is want of point and penetra-
tion in their judgment, that they do not discern when things
have a period, but come in too late after the occasion; as
Demosthenes compareth the people of Athens to country
fellows, when they play in a fence school, that if they have a
blow, then they remove their weapon to that ward, and not
before. In some other it is a lothness to lose labours passed,
and a conceit that they can bring about occasions to their
ply ; and yet in the end, when they see no other remedy, then
they come to it with disadvantage; as Tarquinius, that gave
for the third part of Sibylla’s books the treble price, when he
might at first have had all three for the simple. But from
whatsvever root or cause this restiveness of mind proceedeth,
it isa thing most prejudicial ; and nothing is more politic than

THE SECOND BOOK. 173

to make the wheels of our mind concentric and voluble with
the wheels of fortune.

(34) Another precept of this knowledge, which hath some
affinity with that we last spoke of, but with difference, is that
which is well expressed, Fatis accede deisque, that men do not
only turn with the occasions, but also run with the occasions,
and not strain their credit or strength to over-hard or extreme
points ; but choose in their actions that which is most passable :
for this will preserve men from foil, not occupy them too
much about one matter, win opinion of moderation, please the
most, and make a show of a perpetual felicity in all they under-
take : which cannot but mightily increase reputation.

(35) Another part of this knowledge seemeth to have some
repugnancy with the former two, but not as I understand it;
and it is that which Demosthenes uttereth in high terms: Et
quemadmodum receptum est, ut exercitum ducat imperator, sic
et a cordatis viris res ipse ducende ; ut que ipsis videntur, ea
gerantur, et non ipsi eventus persequi cogantur. For if we
observe we shall find two differing kinds of sufficiency in
managing of business: some can make use of occasions aptly
and dexterously, but plot little; some can urge and pursue
their own plots well, but cannot accommodate nor take in;
either of which is very imperfect without the other.

(36) Another part of this knowledge is the observing a good
mediocrity in the declaring or not declaring a man’s self: for
although depth of secrecy, and making way (qualis est via
navis in mari, which the French calleth sourdes menées, when
men set things in work without opening themselves at all), be
sometimes both prosperous and admirable ; yet many times
dissimulatio errores parit, qui dissimulatorem ipsum illaqueant.
And therefore we see the greatest politiques have in a natural
and free manner professed their desires, rather than been
reserved and disguised in them. For so we see that Lucius
Sylla made a kind of profession, ‘“‘ that he wished all men
happy or unhappy, as they stood his friends or enemies.” So
Cesar, when he went first into Gaul, made no scruple to
profess ‘‘that he had rather be first in a village than second
at Rome.” So again, as soon as he had begun the war, we see
what Cicero saith of him, Alter (meaning of Czesar) non recusat,
sed quodammodo postulat, ut (ut est) sic appelletur tyrannus.
So we may see in a letter of Cicero to Atticus, that Augustus
Cesar, in his very entrance into affairs, when he was a darling
of the senate, yet in his harangues to the people would swear,
Ita purentis honores consequi liceat (which was no less than the
tyranny), save that, to help it, he would stretch forth his

174 THE ADVANCEMENT OF LEARNING.

hand towards a statue of Czsar’s that was erected in the place :
and men laughed and wondered, and said, ‘‘Is it possible? POF,
“Did you ever hear the like?” and yet thought he meant no
hurt; he did it so handsomely and ingenuously. And all
these were prosperous: whereas Pompey, who tended. to the
same ends, but in a more dark and dissembling manner, as
Tacitus saith of him, Occultior non melior, wherein Sallust
concurreth, Ore probo, animo inverecundo, made it his design,
by infinite secret engines, to cast the state into an absolute
anarchy and confusion, that the state might cast itself into his
arms for necessity and protection, and so the sovereign power
be put upon him, and he never seen in it: and when he had
brought it (as he thought) to that point when he was chosen
consul alone, as never any was, yet he could make no great
matter of it, because men understood him not; but was fain
in the end to go the beaten track of getting arms into his
hands, by colour of the doubt of Czsar’s designs : so tedious,
casual, and unfortunate are these deep dissimulations : whereof
it seemeth Tacitus made this judgment, that they were a
cunning of an inferior form in regard of true policy ; attri-
buting the one to Augustus, the other to Tiberius ; where,
speaking of Livia, he saith, Ht ewm artibus mariti simulatione
filia bene composita : for surely the continual habit of dissimu-
lation is but a weak and sluggish cunning, and not greatly
politic.

(37) Another precept of this architecture of fortune is to
accustom our minds to judge of the proportion or value of
things, as they conduce and are material to our particular
ends ; and that to do substantially and not superficially. For
we shall find the logical part (as I may term it) of some men’s
minds good, but the mathematical part erroneous ; that is,
they can well judge of consequences, but not of proportions
and comparison, preferring things of show and sense before
things of substance and effect. So some fall in love with
access to princes, others with popular fame and applause,
supposing they are things of great purchase, when in many
cases they are but matters of envy, peril, and impediment. So
some measure things according to the labour and difficulty or
assiduity which are spent about them ; and think, if they be
ever moving, that they must needs advance and proceed ; as
Ovsar saith in a despising manner of Cato the second, when he
describeth how laborious and indefatigable he was to no great
purpose, Hac omnia magno studio agebat. So in most things
men are ready to abuse themselves in thinking the greatest
means to be best, when it should be the fittest.

THE SECOND BOOK. 175

(38) As for the true marshalling of men’s pursuits towards
their fortune, as they are more or less material, I hold them to
stand thus. First the amendment of their own minds. For
the removal of the impediments of the mind will sooner clear
the passages of fortune than the obtaining fortune will remove
the impediments of the mind. In the second place I set down
wealth and means; which I know most men would have
placed first, because of the general use which it beareth towards
all variety of occasions. But that opinion I may condemn
with like reason as Machiavel doth that other, that moneys
were the sinews of the wars; whereas (saith he) the true
sinews of the wars are the sinews of men’s arms, that is, a
valiant, populous, and military nation: and he voucheth aptly
the authority of Solon, who, when Croesus showed him his
treasury of gold, said to him, that if another came that had
better iron, he would be master of his gold. In like manner it
may be truly affirmed that it is not moneys that are the
sinews of fortune, but it is the sinews and steel of men’s minds,
wit, courage, audacity, resolution, temper, industry, and the
like. In the third place I set down reputation, because of the
peremptory tides and currents it hath ; which, if they be not
taken in their due time, are seldom recovered, it being extreme
hard to play an after-game of reputation. And lastly I place
honour, which is more easily won by any of the other three,
much more by all, than any of them can be purchased by
honour. To conclude this precept, as there is order and
priority in matter, so is there in time, the preposterous placing
whereof is one of the commonest errors: while men fly to
their ends when they should intend their beginnings, and
do not take things in order of time as they come on, but
marshal them according to greatness and not according to
instance ; not observing the good precept, Quod nunc instat
agamus.

(39) Another precept of this knowledge is not to embrace
any matters which do occupy too great a quantity of time, but
to have that sounding in a man’s ears, Sed fugit interea Fugit
irreparabile tempus : and that is the cause why those which
take their course of rising by professions of burden, as lawyers,
orators, painful divines, and the like, are not commonly so
politic for their own fortune, otherwise than in their ordinary
way, because they want time to learn particulars, to wat
occasions, and to devise plots.

(40) Another precept of this knowledge is to imitate nature,
which doth nothing in vain ; which surely a man may do if he
do well interlace his business, and bend not his mind too much

176 THE ADVANCEMENT OF LEARNING.

upon that which he principally intendeth. For a man ought
in every particular action so to carry the motions of his mind,
and so to have one thing under another, as if he eannot have
that he seeketh in the best degree, yet to have it in a second,
or so ina third; and if he can have no part of that which he
purposed, yet to turn the use of it to somewhat else; and if
he cannot make anything of it for the present, yet to
make it as a seed of somewhat in time to come; and if
he can contrive no effect or substance from it, yet to win some
good opinion by it, or the like. So that he should exact an
account of himself of every action, to reap somewhat, and not
to stand amazed and confused if he fail of that he chiefly
meant: for nothing is more impolitic than to mind actions
wholly one by one. For he that doth so loseth intinite
occasions which intervene, and are many times more proper
and propitious for somewhat that he shall need afterwards,
than for that which he urgeth for the present ; and therefore
men must be perfect in that rule, Hac oportet facére, et illa
non omittere.

(41) Another precept of this knowledge is, not to engage a
man’s self peremptorily in anything, though it seem not liable
to accident ; but ever to have a window to fly out at, or a
way to retire: following the wisdom in the ancient fable of
the two frogs, which consulted when their plash was dry
whither they should go; and the one moved to go down into
a pit, because it was not likely the water would dry there ;
but the other answered, ‘‘ True, but if it do, how shall we get
out again?”

(42) Another precept of this knowledge is that ancient pre-
cept of Bias, construed not to any point of perfidiousness, but
only to caution and moderation, Ht ama tanquam inimicus
futurus et odi tanquam amaturus. For it utterly betrayeth
all utility for men to embark themselves too far into un-
fortunate friendships, troublesome spleens, and childish and
humorous envies or emulations.

(43) But I continue this beyond the measure of an example;
led, because I would not have such knowledges, which I note
as deficient, to be thought things imaginative or in the air, or
an observation or two much made of, but things of bulk and
mass, whereof an end is more hardly made thatia beginning. It
must be likewise conceived, that in these points which I men-
tion and set down, they are far from complete tractates of
them, but only as small pieces for patterns. And lastly, no
man I suppose will think that I mean fortunes are not ob-
tained without all this ado; for I know they come tumbling

‘ THE SECOND BOOK. BY ee

into some men’s laps; and a number obtain good fortunes by
diligence in a plain way, little intermeddling, and keeping
themselves from gross errors.

(44) But as Cicero, when he setteth down an idea of a
perfect orator, doth not mean that every pleader should be
such ; and so likewise, when a prince or a courtier hath been
described by such as have handled those subjects, the mould
hath used to be made according to the perfection of the art,
and not according to common practice: so I understand it,
that it ought to be done in the description of a politic man, I
mean politic for his own fortune.

(45) But it must be remembered all this while, that the
precepts which we have set down are of that kind which may
be counted and called Bone Artes. As for evil arts, if a man
would set down for himself that principle of Machiavel, ‘‘ That
a man seek not to attain virtue itself, but the appearance only
thereof ; because the credit of virtue is a help, but the use of
it is cumber:” or that other of his principles, ‘‘That he pre-
suppose that men are not fitly to be wrought otherwise but
by fear; and therefore that he seek to have every man ob-
noxious, low, and in straits,” which the Italians call seminar
spine, to sow thorns : or that other principle, contained in the
verse which Cicero citeth, Cadant amici, dummodo inimici
intercidant, as the triumvirs, which sold every one to other
the lives of their friends for the deaths of their enemies: or
that other protestation of L. Catilina, to set on fire and trouble
states, to the end to fish in droumy waters, and to unwrap
their fortunes, Lgo st quid in fortunis meis excitatum sit in-
cendium, id non aqua sed ruina restinguam: or that other
principle of Lysander, ‘‘ That children are to be deceived with
comfits, and men with oaths:” and the like evil and corrupt
positions, whereof (as in all things) there are more in number
than of the good : certainly with these dispensations from the
laws of charity and integrity, the pressing of a man’s fortune
may be more hasty and compendious. But it is in life as it
is in ways, the shortest way is commonly the foulest, and
surely the fairer way is not much about.

(46) But men, if they be in their own power, and do bear and
sustain themselves, and be not carried away with a whirlwind
or tempest of ambition, ought in the pursuit of their own
fortune to set before their eyes not only that general map of
the world, ‘‘ That all things are vanity and vexation of spirit,”
but many other more particular cards and directions: chiefly
that, that being without well-being is a curse, and the greater
being the greater curse; and that alJl virtue is most rewarded

178 THE ADVANCEMENT OF LEARNING.

and all wickedness most punished in itself : according as the
poet saith excellently :

“ Que vobis, que digna, viri, pro laudibus istis
Premia posse rear solvi? pulcherrima primum
Dii moresque dabunt vestri.”

And go of the contrary. And secondly they ought to look up
to the Eternal Providence and Divine Judgment, which often
subverteth the wisdom of evil plots and imaginations, according
to that scripture, “‘He hath conceived mischief, and shall
bring forth a vain thing.” And although men should refrain
themselves from injury and evil arts, yet this incessant and
Sabbathless pursuit of a man’s fortune leaveth not tribute
which we owe to God of our time; who (we see) demandeth a
tenth of our substance, and a seventh, which is more strict, of
our time: and it is to small purpose to have an erected face
towards heaven, and a perpetual grovelling spirit upon earth,
eating dust as doth the serpent, Atque afigit humo divine
particulam aura. And if any man flatter himself that he will
employ his fortune well, though he should obtain it ill, as
was said concerning Augustus Cesar, and after of Septimius
Severus, ‘‘That either they should never have been born, or
else they should never have died,” they did so much mischief
in the pursuit and ascent of their greatness, and so much good
when they were established ; yet these compensations and
satisfactions are good to be used, but never good to be purposed.
And lastly, it is not amiss for men, in their race towards their
fortune, to cool themselves a little with that conceit which is
elegantly expressed by the Emperor Charles V., in his instruc-
tions to the king his son, “‘ That fortune hath somewhat of the
nature of a woman, that if she be too much wooed she is the
farther off.” But this last is but a remedy for those whose
tastes are corrupted: let men rather build upon that founda-
tion which is as a corner-stone of divinity and philosophy,
wherein they join close, namely that same Primum querite.
For divinity saith, Primum querite regnum Dei, ct ista omnia
adjicientur vobis : and philosophy saith, Primum querite bona
anim; cetera aut aderunt, aut non oberunt. And although
the human foundation hath somewhat of the sands, as we see
in M. Brutus, when he broke forth into that speech,

“Te colui (Virtus) ut rem ; ast tu nomen inane es ;”

yet the divine foundation 1s upon the rock. But this may
serve for a taste of that knowledge which I noted as deficient.

THE SECOND BOOK. 179

(47) Concerning government, it is a part of knowledge secret
and retired in both these respects in which things are deemed
secret ; for some things are secret because they are hard to
know, and some because they are not fit to utter. We see all]
governments are obscure and invisible:

‘*Totamque infusa per artus
Mens agitat molem, et magno se corpore miscet.”

Such is the description of governments. We see the govern:
ment of God over the world is hidden, insomuch as it seemeth
to participate of much irregularity and confusion. The govern-
ment of the soul in moving the body is inward and profound,
and the passages thereof hardly to be reduced to demonstration.
Again, the wisdom of antiquity (the shadows whereof are in
the poets) in the description of torments and pains, next unto
the crime of rebellion, which was the giants’ offence, doth
detest the offence of futility, as in Sisyphus and Tantalus.
But this was meant of particulars: nevertheless even unto the
general rules and discourses of policy and government there is
due a reverent and reserved handling.

(48) But contrariwise in the governors towards the governed,
all things ought as far as the frailty of man permitteth to be
manifest and revealed. For so it is expressed in the Scriptures
touching the government of God, that this globe, which seemeth
to us a dark and shady body, is in the view of God as crystal :
Et in conspectu sedis tanquam mare vitreum simile crystallo,
So unto princes and states, and specially towards wise scnates
and councils, the natures and dispositions of the people, their
conditions and necessities, their factions and combinations,
their animosities and discontents, ought to be, in regard of the
variety of their intelligences, the wisdom of their observations,
and the height of their station where they keep sentinel, in
great part clear and transparent. Wherefore, considering that
I write to a king that is a master of this science, and is so well
assisted, I think it decent to pass over this part in silence, as
willing to obtain the certificate which one of the ancient philo-
sophers aspired unto; who being silent, when others contended
to make demonstration of their abilities by speech, desired it
might be certified for his part, ‘‘'That there was one that knew
how to hold his peace.”

(49) Notwithstanding, for the more public part of govern-
ment, which is laws, I think good to note only one deficiency ;
which is, that all those which have written of laws have written
either as philosophers or as lawyers, and none as statesmen.
As for the philosophers, they make imaginary laws for imaginary

180 THE ADVANCEMENT OF LEARNING.

commonwealths, and their discourses are as the stars, which
give little light because they are so high. For the lawyers,
they write according to the states where they live what is re-
ceived law, and not what ought to be law; for the wisdom
of a law-maker is one, and of a lawyer is another. For there
are in nature certain fountains of justice whence all civil laws
are derived but as streams; and like as waters do take tinctures
and tastes from the soils through which they run, so do civil
laws vary according to the regions and governments where they
are planted, though they proceed from the same fountains.
Again, the wisdom of a law-maker consisteth not only in a
.platform of justice, but in the application thereof ; taking intc
consideration by what means laws may be made certain, and
what are the causes and remedies of the doubtfulness and un-
certainty of law ; by what means laws may be made apt and
easy to be executed, and what are the impediments and reme-
dies in the execution of laws; what influence laws touching
private right of mewm and tuum have into the public state, and
how they may be made apt and agreeable ; how laws are to be
penned and delivered, whether in texts or in Acts, brief or
large, with preambles or without ; how they are to be pruned
and reformed from time to time, and what is the best means to
keep them from being too vast in volume, or too full of multi-
plicity and crossness; how they are to be expounded, when
upon causes emergent and judicially discussed, and when upon
responses and conferences touching general points or questions ;
how they are to be pressed, rigorously or tenderly ; how they
are to be mitigated by equity and good conscience, and whether
discretion and strict law are to be mingled in the same courts,
or kept apart in several courts ; again, how the practice, pro-
fession, and erudition of law is to be censured and governed ;
and many other points touching the administration and (as I
may term it) animation of laws. Upon which I insist the less,
because I purpose (if God give me leave), having begun a work
of this nature in aphorisms, to propound it hereafter, noting it
in the meantime for deficient.

(50) And for your Majesty’s laws of England, I could say
much of their dignity, and somewhat of their defect ; but they
cannot but excel the civil laws in fitness for the government,
for the civil law was non hos quesitum munus in usus ; it was
not made for the countries which it governeth. Hereof I cease
to speak because I will not intermingle matter of action with
matter of general learning.

XXIV. Thus have I concluded this portion of learning
touching civil knowledge ; and with civil knowledge have con:

THE SECOND BOOK. 181

cluded human philosophy; and with human _ philosophy,
philosophy in general. And being now at some pause, looking
back into that I have passed through, this writing seemeth to
me (si nunquam fallit imago), as far as a man can judge of his
own work, not much better than that noise or sound which
musicians make while they are in tuning their instruments,
which is nothing pleasant to hear, but yet is a cause why the
music is sweeter afterwards. So have I been content to tune
the instruments of the Muses, that they may play that have
better hands. And surely, when I set before me the condition
of these times, in which learning hath made her third visita-
tion or circuit in all the qualities thereof; as the excellency
and vivacity of the wits of this age ; the noble helps and lights
which we have by the travails of ancient writers; the art of
printing, which communicateth books to men of all fortunes ;
the openness of the world by navigation, which hath disclosed
multitudes of experiments, and a mass of natural history ; the
leisure wherewith these times abound, not employing men so
generally in civil business, as the states of Grecia did, in
respect of their popularity, and the state of Rome, in respect
of the greatness of their monarchy ; the present disposition of
these times at this instant to peace; the consumption of all
that ever can be said in controversies of religion, which have
so much diverted men from other sciences; the perfection of
your Majesty’s learning, which as a phoenix may call whole
volleys of wits to follow you; and the inseparable propriety
of time, which is ever more and more to disclose truth;
cannot but be raised to this persuasion, that this third period of
time will far surpass that of the Grecian and Roman learning ;
only if men will know their own strength and their own weak-
ness both ; and take, one from the other, light of invention,
and not fire of contradiction ; and esteem of the inquisition of
truth as of an enterprise, and not as of a quality or ornament;
and employ wit and magnificence to things of worth and ex-
cellency, and not to things vulgar and of popular estimation.
As for my labours, if any man shall please himself or others in
the reprehension of them, they shall make that ancient and
patient request, Verbera, sed audi: let men reprehend them,
so they observe and weigh them. For the appeal is lawful
(though it may be it shall not be needful) from the first cogita-
tions of men to their second, and from the nearer times to the
times further off. Now let us come to that learning, which
both the former times were not so blessed as to know, sacred
and inspired divinity, the Sabbath and port of all men’s labours
and peregrinatious.,

182 THE ADVANCEMENT OF LEARNING.

XXV. (1) The prerogative of God extendeth as well to the
reason as to the will of man: so that as we are to obey His law,
though we find a reluctation in our will, so we are to believe
His word, though we find a reluctation in our reason. For if
we believe only that which is agreeable to our sense we give
consent to the matter, and not to the author ; which is no more
than we would do towards a suspected and discredited witness ;
but that faith which was accounted to Abraham for righteous-
ness was of such a point as whereat Sarah laughed, who therein
was an image of natural reason.

(2) Howbeit (if we will truly consider of it) more worthy it
is to believe than to know as we now know. For in knowledge
man’s mind suffereth from sense: but in belief it suffereth
from spirit, such one as it holdeth for more authorised than
itself and so suffereth from the worthier agent. Otherwise it
is of the state of man glorified ; for then faith shall cease, and
we shall know as we are known.

(3) Wherefore we conclude that sacred theology (which in
our idiom we call divinity) is grounded only upon the word
and oracle of God, and not upon the light of nature: for it is
written, Celi enarrant gloriam Dei; but it is not written,
Celi enarrant voluntatem Dei: but of that it is said, Ad legem
et testimonium: si non fecerint secundum verbum istud, &c.
This holdeth not only in those points of faith which concern
the great mysteries of the Deity, of the creation, of the re-
demption, but likewise those which concern the law moral,
truly interpreted: ‘‘Love your enemies: do good to them
that hate you; be like to your heavenly Father, that suf-
fereth His rain to fall upon the just and unjust.” To this it
ought to be applauded, ec vox hominem sonat : it is a voice
beyond the light of nature. So we see the heathen poets,
when they fall upon a libertine passion, do still expostulate
with laws and moralities, as if they were opposite and malig-
nant to nature: Et quod natura remittit, invida jura negant.
So said Dendamis the Indian unto Alexander’s messengers,
that he had heard somewhat of Pythagoras, and some other
of the wise men of Grecia, and that he held them for excellent
men : but that they had a fault, which was that they had in
too great reverence and veneration a thing they called law and
manners. So it must be confessed that a great part of the
law moral is of that perfection whereunto the light of nature
cannot aspire : how then is it that man is said to have, by the
light and law of nature, some notions and conceits of virtue
and vice, justice and wrong, good and evil? Thus. because
the light of nature is used in two several senses: the one, that

THE SECOND BOOK. 183

which springeth from reason, sense, induction, argument, ac-
cording to the laws of heaven and earth; the other, that
which is imprinted upon the spirit of man by an inward
instinct, according to the law of conscience, which is a
sparkle of the purity of his first estate: in which latter
sense only he is participant of some light and discerning
touching the perfection of the moral law ; but how? suffi-
cient to check the vice but not to inform the duty. So
then the doctrine of religion, as well moral as mystical,
is not to be attained but by inspiration and revelation from
God.

(4) The use notwithstanding of reason in spiritual things,
and the latitude thereof, is very great and general: for it is
not for nothing that the apostle calleth religion ‘‘ our reason-
able service of God ;” insomuch as the very ceremonies and
figures of the old law were full of reason and signification,
much more than the ceremonies of idolatry and magic, that
are full of non-significants and surd characters. But most
specially the Christian faith, as in all things so in this,
deserveth to be highly magnified ; holding and preserving
the golden mediocrity in this point between the law of the
heathen and the law of Mahomet, which have .embraced
the two extremes. For the religion of the heathen had no
constant belief or confession, but left all to the liberty of
argument ; and the religion of Mahomet on the other side
interdicteth argument altogether: the one having the very
face of error, and the other of imposture ; whereas the Faith
doth both admit and reject disputation with difference,

(5) The use of human reason in religion is of two sorts:
the former, in the conception and apprehension of the
mysteries of God to us revealed; the other, in the inferring
and deriving of doctrine and direction thereupon. The former
extendeth to the mysteries themselves ; but how? by way of
illustration, and not by way of argument. The latter con-
sisteth indeed of probation and argument. In the former we
see God vouchsafeth to descend to our capacity, in the expres-
sing of His mysteries in sort as may be sensible unto us; and
doth graft His revelations and holy doctrine upon the notions
of our reason, and applieth His inspirations to open our under-
standing, as the form of the key to the ward of the lock. For
the latter there is allowed us a use of reason and argument,
secondary and respective, although not original and absolute.
For after the articles and principles of religion are placed and
exempted from examination of reason, it is then permitted
unto us to make derivations and inferences from and according

184, THE ADVANCEMENT OF LEARNING,

to the analogy of them, for our better direction. In nature
this holdeth not; for both the principles are examinable by
induction, though not by a medium or syllogism ; and besides,
those principles or first positions have no discordance with
that reason which draweth down and deduceth the inferior
positions. But yet it holdeth not in religion alone, but in
many knowledges, both of greater and smaller nature, namely,
wherein there are not only posita but placita; for in such
there can be no use of absolute reason. We sce it familiarly
in games of wit, as chess, or the like. The draughts and first
laws of the game are positive, but how? merely ad placitum,
and not examinable by reason; but then how to direct our
play thereupon with best advantage to win the game is
artificial and rational. So in human laws there be many
grounds and maxims which are placita juris, positive upon
authority, and not upon reason, and therefore not to be
disputed: but what is most just, not absolutely but relatively,
and according to those maxims, that affordeth a long field of
disputation. Such therefore is that secondary reason, which
a place in divinity, which is grounded upon the placets
of God.

(6) Here therefore I note this deficiency, that there hath
not been, to my understanding, sufficiently inquired and
handled the true limits and use of reason in spiritual things,
as a kind of divine dialectic: which for that it is not done,
it seemeth to me a thing usual, by pretext of true conceiving
that which is revealed, to search and mine into that which is
not revealed; and by pretext of enucleating inferences and
contradictories, to examine that which is positive. The one
sort falling into the error of Nicodemus, demanding to have
things made more sensible than it pleaseth God to reveal
them, Quomodo possit homo nasct cum sit senex? The other
sort into the error of the disciples, which were scandalised at
a show of contradiction, Quid est hoc quod dicit nobis ? Modi-
cumet non videbitis me; et iterum, modicum, et videbitis me, &e.

(7) Upon this I have insisted the more, in regard of the
great and blessed use thereof ; for this point well laboured
and defined of would in my judgment be an opiate to stay and
bridle not only the vanity of curious speculations, wherewith
the schools labour, but the fury of controversies, wherewith
the Church laboureth. For it cannot but open men’s eyes to
see that many controversies do merely pertain to that which
is either not revealed or positive; and that many others do
grow upon weak and obscure inferences or derivations : which
letter sort, if men would revive the blessed style of that great

THE SECOND BOOK. 185

doctor of the Gentiles, would be carried thus, ego, non
dominus ; and again, secundum consilium meum, in opinions
and counsels, and not in positions and oppositions. But men
are now over-ready to usurp the style, non ego, sed dominus ;
and not so only, but to bind it with the thunder and de-
nunciation of curses and anathemas, to the terror of those
which have not sufficiently learned out of Solomon that ‘‘ The
causeless curse shall not come.” .

(8) Divinity hath two principal parts: the matter informed
or revealed, and the nature of the information or revelation;
and with the latter we will begin, because it hath most co-
herence with that which we have now last handled. The
nature of the information consisteth of three branches: the
limits of the information, the sufficiency of the information,
and the acquiring or obtaining the information. Unto the
limits of the information belong these considerations : how far
forth particular persons continue to be inspired ; how far forth
the Church is inspired; and how far forth reason may be
used ; the last point whereof I have noted as deficient. Unto
the sufficiency of the information belong two considerations :
what points of religion are fundamental, and what perfective,
being matter of further building and perfection upon one and
the same foundation ; and again, how the gradations of light
according to the dispensation of times are material to the
sufficiency of belief.

(9) Here again I may rather give it in advice than note it
as deficient, that the points fundamental, and the points of
further perfection only, ought to be with piety and wisdom
distinguished ; a subject tending to much like end as that I
noted before; for as that other were likely to abate the
number of controversies, so this is likely to abate the heat
of many of them. We see Moses when he saw the Israelite
and the Egyptian fight, he did not say, ‘‘ Why strive you?”
but drew his sword and slew the Egyptian ; but when he saw
the two Israelites fight, he said, ‘‘ You are brethren, why strive
you?” Ifthe point of doctrine be an Egyptian, it must be
slain by the sword of the Spirit, and not reconciled; but if it
be an Israelite, though in the wrong, then, ‘“‘ Why strive you?”
We see of the fundamental points, our Saviour penneth the
league thus, ‘‘He that is not with us is against us;”’ but of
points not fundamental, thus, “‘ He that is not against us is with
us.”’ So we see the coat of our Saviour was entire without seam,
and so is the doctrine of the Scriptures in itself; but the garment
of the Church was of divers colours and yet not divided. We
see the chaff may and ought to be severed from the corn in

186 THE ADVANCEMENT OF LEARNING.

the ear, but the tares may not be pulled up from the corn in
the field. So as it is a thing of great use well to define what,
and of what latitude, those points are which do make men
mere aliens and disincorporate from the Church of God.

(10) For the obtaining of the information, it resteth upon
the true and sound interpretation of the Scriptures, which are
the fountains of the water of life. The interpretations of the
Scriptures are of two sorts : methodical, and solute or at large.
For this divine water, which excelleth so much that of J acob’s
well, is drawn forth much in the same kind as natural water
useth to be out of wells and fountains ; either it is first forced
up into a cistern, and from thence fetched and derived for use ;
or else it is drawn and received in buckets and vessels imme-
diately where it springeth. The former sort whereof, though
it seem to be the more ready, yet in my judgment is more
subject to corrupt. This is that method which hath exhibited
unto us the scholastical divinity ; whereby divinity hath been
reduced into an art, as into a cistern, and the streams of doc-
trine or positions fetched and derived from thence.

(11) In this men have sought three things, a summary brevity,
a compacted strength, and a complete perfection ; whereof the
two first they fail to find, and the last they ought not to seek.
For as to brevity, we see in all summary methods, while men
purpose to abridge, they give cause to dilate. For the sum or
abridgment by contraction becometh obscure ; the obscurity
requireth exposition, and the exposition is deduced into large
commentaries, or into commonplaces and titles, which grow to
be more vast than the original writings, whence the sum was
at first extracted. So we see the volumes of the schoolmen are
greater much than the first writings of the fathers, whence the
master of the sentences made hissum or collection. So in like
manner the volumes of the modern doctors of the civil law
exceed those of the ancient jurisconsults, of which Tribonian
compiled the digest. So as this course of sums and commen-
taries is that which doth infallibly make the body of sciences
more immense in quantity, and more base in substance.

(12) And for strength, it is true that knowledges reduced
into exact methods have a show of strength, in that each part
seemeth to support and sustain the other; but this is more
satisfactory than substantial, like unto buildings which stand
by architecture and compaction, which are more subject to
ruin than those that are built more strong in their several
parts, though less compacted, But it is plain that the more
you recede from your grounds, the weaker do you conclude ;
and as in nature, the more you remeve yourself from par-

THE SECOND BOOK. 187

ticulars, the greater peril of error you do incur; so much more
in divinity, the more you recede from the Scriptures by in-
ferences and consequences, the more weak and dilute are your
positions.

(13) And as for perfection or completeness in divinity, it is
not to be sought, which makes this course of artificial divinity
the more suspect. For he that will reduce a knowledge into
an art will make it round and uniform; but in divinity many
things must be left abrupt, and concluded with this: O alti-
tudo sapientie et scientie Dei! quam incomprehensibilia sunt
judicia gus, et non investigabiles vie ejus. So again the apostle
saith, Ex parte scimus : and to have the form of a total, where
there is but matter for a part, cannot be without supplies by
supposition and presumption. And therefore I conclude that
the true use of these sums and methods hath place in institu-
tions or introductions preparatory unto knowledge; but in
them, or by deducement from them, to handle the main body
and substance of a knowledge is in all sciences prejudicial, and
in divinity dangerous. °

(14) As to the interpretation of the Scriptures solute and at
large, there have been divers kinds introduced and devised ;
some of them rather curious and unsafe than sober and war-
ranted. Notwithstanding, thus much must be confessed, that
the Scriptures, being given by inspiration and not by human
reason, do differ from all other books in the Author, which by
consequence doth draw on some difference to be used by the
expositor. For the Inditer of them did know four things which
no man attains to know; which are—the mysteries of the
kingdom of/ glory, the perfection of the laws of nature, the
secrets of the heart of man, and the future succession of all
ages. For as to the first it is said, ‘“‘ He that presseth into the
light shall be oppressed of the glory.” And again, “‘No man
shall see My face and live.” To the second, ‘‘When He pre-
pared the heavens I was present, when by law and compass He
enclosed the deep.” To the third, ‘‘ Neither was it needful that
any should bear witness to Him of man, for He knew well
what was in man.” And to the last, “From the beginning are
known to the Lord all His works.”

(15) From the former two of these have been drawn certain
senses and expositions of Scriptures, which had need be con-
tained within the bounds of sobriety—the one anagogical, and
the other philosophical. But as to the former, man is not to
prevent his time: Videmus nunc per speculum in ceenigmate,
tunc autem facie ad faciem ; wherein nevertheless there seemeth
to be a liberty granted, as far forth as the polishing of this

188 THE ADVANCEMENT OF LEARNING.

glass, or some moderate explication of this enigma. But te
press too far into it cannot but cause a dissolution and over-
throw of the spirit of man. For in the body there are three
degrees of that we receive into it—aliment, medicine, and
poison ; whereof aliment is that which the nature of man can
perfectly alter and overcome ; medicine is that which is partly
converted by nature, and partly converteth nature ; and poison
‘s that which worketh wholly upon nature, without that
nature can in any part work upon it. So in the mind, what-
soever knowledge reason cannot at all work upon and convert
is a mere intoxication, and endangereth a dissolution of the
mind and understanding.

(16) But for the latter, it hath been extremely set on foot of
late time by the school of Paracelsus, and some others, that
have pretended to find the truth of all natural philosophy in
the Scriptures ; scandalising and traducing all other philosophy
as heathenish and profane. But there is no such enmity be-
tween God’s Word and His works; neither do they give
honour to the Scriptures, as they suppose, but much embase
them. For to seek heaven and earth in the Word of God,
whereof it is said, ‘‘Heaven and earth shall pass, but My word
shall not pass,” is to seek temporary things amongst eternal :
and as to seek divinity in philosophy is to seek the living amongst
the dead, so to seek philosophy in divinity is to seek the dead
amongst the living: neither are the pots or lavers whose place
was in the outward part of the temple, tobe sought in the holiest
place of all, where the ark of the testimony was seated. And
again, the scope or purpose of the Spirit of God is not to ex-
press matters of nature in the Scriptures, otherwise than in
passage, and for application to man’s capacity and to matters
moral or divine. And it is a true rule, Auctoris aliud agentis
parva auctoritas. For it were a strange conclusion, if a man
should use a similitude for ornament or illustration sake, bor-
rowed from nature or history according to vulgar conceit, as of
a basilisk, a unicorn, a centaur, a Briareus, a hydra, or the like,
that therefore he must needs be thought to affirm the matter
thereof positively to be true. To conclude therefore these two
interpretations, the one by reduction or enigmatical, the other
philosophical or physical, which have been received and pur-
sued in imitation of the rabbins and cabalists, are to be confined
with a noli altum sapere, sed time.

(17) But the two latter points, known to God and unknown
to man, touching the secrets of the heart and the successions of
time, doth make a just and sound difference between the manner
of the exposition of the Scriptures and all other books. For it

THE SECOND BOOK. 189

is an excellent observation which hath been made upon the an-
swers of our Saviour Christ to many of the questions which
were propounded to Him, how that they are impertinent to the
state of the question demanded: the reason whereof is. because
not being like man, which knows man’s thoughts by his words,
but knowing man’s thoughts immediately, He never answered
their words, but their thoughts. Much in the like manner it is
with the Scriptures, which being written to the thoughts of
men, and to the succession of all ages, with a foresight of
all heresies, contradictions, differing estates of the Church, yea,
and particularly of the elect, are not to be interpreted only ac-
cording to the latitude of the proper sense of the place, and re-
spectively towards that present occasion whereupon the words
were uttered, or in precise congruity or contexture with the
words before or after, or in contemplation of the principal
scope of the place ; but have in themselves, not only totally or
collectively, but distributively in clauses and words, infinite
springs and streams of doctrine to water the Church in every
part. And therefore as the literal sense is, as it were, the main
stream or river, so the moral sense chiefly, and sometimes the
allegorical or typical, are they whereof the Church hath most
use ; not that 1 wish men to be bold in allegories, or indulgent
or light in allusions: but that I do much condemn that inter-
pretation of the Scripture which is only after the manner as
men use to interpret a profane book.

(18) In this part touching the exposition of the Scriptures, I
can report no deficiency ; but by way of remembrance this I
will add. In perusing books of divinity I find many books of
controversies, and many of commonplaces and treatises, a mass
of positive divinity, as it is made an art : a number of sermons
and. lectures, and many prolix commentaries upon the Scrip-
tures, with harmonies and concordances. But that form of
writing in divinity which in my judgment is of all others most
rich and precious is positive divinity, collected upon particular
texts of Scriptures in brief observations ; not dilated into com-
monplaces, not chasing after controversies, not reduced into
method of art; a thing abounding in sermons, which will
vanish, but defective in books which will remain, and a thing
wherein this age excelleth. For I am persuaded, and I may
speak it with an absit invidia verbo, and nowise in derogation
of antiquity, but as in a good emulation between the vine and
the olive, that if the choice and best of those observations upon
texts of Scriptures which have been made dispersedly in sermons
within this your Majesty’s Island of Brittany by the space
of these forty years and more (leaving out the largeness of

190 THE ADVANCEMENT OF LEARNING.

exhortations and applications thereupon) had been set down
in a continuance, it had been the best work in divinity which
had been written since the Apostles’ times.

(19) The matter informed by divinity is of two kinds : matter
of belief and truth of opinion, and matter of service and adora-
tion; which is also judged and directed by the former—the
one being as the internal soul of religion, and the other as the
external body thereof. And, therefore, the heathen religion
was not only a worship of idols, but the whole religion was an
idol in itself ; for it had no soul; that is, no certainty of belief
or confession : a8 a man may well think, considering the chief
doctors of their church were the poets; and the reason was
because the heathen gods were no jealous gods, but were glad
to be admitted into part, as they had reason. Neither did
they respect the pureness of heart, so they might have external
honour and rites.

(20) But out of these two do result and issue four main
branches, of divinity : faith, manners, liturgy, and government.
Faith containeth the doctrine of the nature of God, of the
attributes of God, and of the works of God. The nature of
God consisteth of three persons in unity of Godhead. The
attributes of God are either common to the Deity, or respec-
tive to the persons. The works of God summary are two, that
of the creation and that of the redemption ; and both these
works, as in total they appertain to the unity of the Godhead,
so in their parts they refer to the three persons: that of the
creation, in the mass of the matter, to the Father ; in the dis-
position of the form, to the Son; and in the continuance and
conservation of the being, to the Holy Spirit. So that of the
redemption, in the election and counsel, to the Father ; in the
whole act and consummation, to the Son; and in the applica-
tion, to the Holy Spirit; for by the Holy Ghost was Christ
conceived in flesh, and by the Holy Ghost are the elect re-
generate in spirit. This work likewise we consider either
effectually, in the elect; or privately, in the reprobate; or
according to appearance, in the visible Church.

(21) For manners, the doctrine thereof is contained in the
law, which discloseth sin. The law itself is divided, according
to the edition thereof, into the law of nature, the law moral,
and the law positive ; and according to the style, into nega-
tive and affirmative, prohibitions and commandments. Sin, in
the matter and subject thereof, is divided according to the
commandments ; in the form thereof it referreth to the three
persons in Deity: sins of infirmity against the Father, whose
more special attribute is power ; sins of ignorance against the

THE SECOND BOOK. 191

Son, whose attribute is wisdom ; and sins of malice against the
Holy Ghost, whose attribute is grace or love. In the motions
of it, it either moveth to the right hand or to the left 3 either
to blind devotion or to profane and libertine transgression ;
either in imposing restraint where God granteth liberty, or in
taking liberty where God imposeth restraint. In the degrees
and progress of it, it divideth itself into thought, word, or act.
And in this part I commend much the deducing of the law of
God to cases of conscience; for that I take indeed to be a
breaking, and not exhibiting whole of the bread of life. But
that which quickeneth both these doctrines of faith and
manners is the elevation and consent of the heart ; where-
unto appertain books of exhortation, holy meditation, Christian
resolution, and the like.

(22) For the liturgy or service, it consisteth of the reciprocal
acts between God and man; which, on the part of God, are
the preaching of the word, and the sacraments, which are seals
to the covenant, or as the visible word ; and onthe part of man,
invocation of the name of God ; and under the law, sacrifices ;
which were as visible prayers or confessions: but now the
adoration being in spiritu et veritate, there remaineth only
vitult labiorum ; although the use of holy vows of thankful-
ness and retribution may be accounted also as sealed petitions.

(23) And for the government of the Church, it consisteth of
the patrimony of the Church, the franchises of the Church,
and the offices-and jurisdictions of the Church, and the Jaws
of the Church directing the whole ; all which have two con-
siderations, the one in themselves, the other how they stand
compatible and agreeable to the civil estate.

(24) This matter of divinity is handled either in form of in-
struction of truth, or in form of confutation of falsehood.
The declinations from religion, besides the privative, which is
atheism and the branches thereof, are three—heresies, idolatry,
and witchcraft: heresies, when we serve the true God with
a false worship ; idolatry, when we worship false gods, sup-
posing them to be true; and witchcraft, when we adore false
gods, knowing them to be wicked and false, For so your
Majesty doth excellently well observe, that witchcraft is the
height of idolatry. And yet we see though these be true
degrees, Samuel teacheth us that they are all of a nature,
when there is once a receding from the Word of God ; for so
he saith, Quasi peccatum ariolandi est repugnare, et quasi scelus
tdololatrice nolle acquiescere.

(25) These things I have passed over so briefly because I
can report no deficiency concerning them: for I can find no

192 THE ADVANCEMENT OF LEARNING.

space or ground that lieth vacant and unsown in the matter of
divinity, so diligent have men been either in sowing of good
seed, or in sowing of tares.

Thus have I made as it were a small globe of the intellectual
world, as truly and faithfully as I could discover; with a note
and description of those parts which seem to me not constantly
occupate, or not well converted by the labour of man. In
which, if I have in any point receded from that which is com-
monly received, it hath been with a purpose of proceeding in
melius, and not in aliud ; a mind of amendment and pro-
ficiency, and not of change and difference. For I could not
be true and constant to the argument I handle if I were not
willing to go beyond others ; but yet not more willing than to
have others go beyond me again : which may the better appear
by this, that I have propounded my opinions naked and un-
armed, not seeking to preoccupate the liberty of men’s judg-
ments by confutations. For in anything which is well set
down, Iam in good hope that if the first reading move an
objection, the second reading will make an answer. And in
those things wherein I have erred, Iam sure I have not pre-
judiced the right by litigious arguments ; which certainly have
this contrary effect and operation, that they add authority to
error, and destroy the authority of that which is well invented.
For question is an honour and preferment to falsehood, as on
the other side it is a repulse to truth. But the errors I claim
and challenge to myself as mine own. The good, if any be, is
due tanquam adeps sacrificii, to be incensed to the honour,
first of the Divine Majesty, and next of your Majesty, to whom
on earth I am most bounden.

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