

UNIVERSITY OF TORONTO



3 1761 00877469 7

Please
480-3
A

I

FARTHER EXAMINATION

OF

Dr. CLARKE'S Notions of

17

S P A C E;

With Some Considerations on the Possibility of

ETERNAL CREATION.

IN REPLY

To Mr. JOHN CLARKE'S *Third Defence of*
Dr. SAMUEL CLARKE'S *Demonstration &c.*

To which are added

SOME REMARKS ON Mr. JACKSON'S Exceptions
to Dr. CLARKE'S *Notions of SPACE*
Examined: in his Existence and Unity &c.

By JOSEPH CLARKE M.A.
Fellow of *Magdalen* College CAMBRIDGE

—— Turbatque Notas, & Lumina flexum
Ducit in Errorem variarum Ambage Viarum. *Ovid.*

C A M B R I D G E

Printed for CORNELIUS CROWNFIELD, and JOHN CROWNFIELD at the *Rising Sun* in *St. Paul's Church-Yard London.*
MDCCLXXXIV.



ERRATA

PAG. 20. After ARGUMENT I. *add* From the DIFFERENCE between the TOUCHING and NOT TOUCHING of two BODIES. P. 37. l. 31. *r.* suppose. P. 40. l. 34. *r.* examin'd. P. 41. l. 21. *r.* between the touching and not touching of. P. 79. l. 4. *r.* Whitencfs. P. 114. l. 25. *r.* some. P. 122. l. 32. *r.* you. P. 123. l. 19. *r.* Nutricis. P. 127. l. ult. *r.* movemur. P. 152. l. 3. *r.* Eternity.



BD
621
C53



A

FARTHER EXAMINATION &c.

INTRODUCTION.

WHEN I published Dr. *Clarke's* *Notions of SPACE Examined*, in Answer to your *two Defences* of the learned *Doctor*; I told you in the Conclusion, that, if you should afterwards produce any new Arguments, or defend the old ones with new Reasoning, you might expect a Reply: But that, if you should only repeat over and over again, what has been as often confuted, it would be only trifling, and amusing the World*.

AND since you have now in Reply, published a *Third Defence*, in which you have produced scarce any *new Arguments*, or defended the old ones with *new Reasoning* (unless Sophistry may be called Reasoning) I thought, as it required no Answer, so it would be unnecessary to trouble the Publick, who perhaps are already tired of the Controversy, with any Thing more upon the Subject.

* P. 133.

A

I there-

2 INTRODUCTION.

I therefore, Sir, intended no farther Answer, 'till I recollected what you are pleased to put me in Mind of in your first Page, *viz.* that *Sophistry may prevail with a great many Persons*; which induced me to give you a Reply.

WHEN I heard you proclaiming to the World, in your *Preface*, that you *knew, that Quibbles and wrangling upon Words were endless*; I flattered my self, that you would make use of no such wrangling Methods; but that you would throughout have kept to the strict Rules of Argument; and I could not therefore forbear wondring, to find the same Piece so full of fallacious Reasoning: But, when I recollected, that you not only knew, *Quibbles and Wrangling upon Words are endless*, but knew likewise, that *Sophistry would prevail with a great many Persons*, my wonder ceased.

I cannot find, Sir, that you have advanced any Thing new, or material, in this your *Third Defence*. Your Arguments are for the most part dressed up in a Sophistical Manner; and seem as if calculated only to perplex the Subject, to evade the Arguments used against you, and to deceive the unwary Reader by a Labyrinth of words: So that the chief Thing necessary, will be to detect Fallacy, and unravel Sophistry. As you have thought proper to put on a Mask, I hope you will excuse me, if I endeavour to pull it off, and shew your Arguments to the World in their true Light.

You are pleased in your *Preface* to favour me with some Compliments, which being only words of Form and Ceremony are to be taken as such. I shall only beg leave to observe, that, if that *little Piece, entitled Dr. Clarke's Notions of SPACE Examined*, had the good fortune to get
any

INTRODUCTION. 3

any *Character* (as you are pleased to say it did *) *amongst many learned Men at Cambridge*; I impute it not to any Thing I could say worthy their Notice, but to the Force of Truth, which is great and will prevail. And I should be unwilling to think, as you do, that mere *Sophistry* could get a *Character amongst many learned Men at Cambridge*: For, tho' *Sophistry may prevail with a great many Persons*; yet I should be loth to reflect so much on the *Learned Men of that Body*, as to reckon them in the Number.

BEFORE I enter into a particular Examination of your Book, I shall first premise a Chapter or two, concerning those main Principles, by which the Controversy must be decided.

* Preface to the Third Defence.



C H A P. I.

Concerning the different Acceptations of the Term Nothing.

THE word *Thing* is by Custom generally applied to whatever we speak about, be it either a real Existence *ad extra*, as a *Man*, a *Temple* &c. or, only an Idea, as *Whiteness*, *Extension*, *Knowledge* &c. considered in the *abstract*. But, strictly speaking, these are not *Things*, but *Ideas*: for, I think, the word *Thing* ought to be applied only to *Existences ad extra*, and not to *abstract Ideas*, *Modes*, *Properties*, or *Relations*. Abstract Ideas should be called *Ideas*, not *Things*: for otherwise they are confounded together. But, as Custom has given the Name of *Thing*, to whatever we speak about; So we may use the word according to this common Acceptation: But then we should distinguish between *Things Real*, and *Things Ideal*. We should call those *Things Real*, which have an Existence *ad extra*; and those *Ideal*, which are nowhere, but in the *Mind*.

Now, according to these two Senses of the word *Thing*, the Term *Nothing*, which is the *Negation*, must consequently have two Senses; as it is sometimes used as a Negation of *Things real* only; and, at other times, as a Negation of *Things both Real, and Ideal*.

THE Term *Nothing* is to be understood in the former Sense, when it is used concerning *abstract Ideas*; as when we say *Extension is Nothing*: for here the Term *Nothing* only denies *Extension* to be a *Thing Real*, or an Existence *ad extra*; but does not deny it to be an *Ideal Thing*, or an *abstract*

abstract Idea. We may distinguish this Sense of the Term *Nothing*, for brevity sake, by calling it *Non-Entity*.

NOTHING, in the other Sense of the Term, is a Negation, not only of all *Real Things*, but also of all *Ideal Things*, viz. all *Non-Entities*, all Properties, Modes, Accidents, Relations, in the abstract; and in short, all *Ideas* whatever; and among the rest, SPACE, the imaginary Receptacle of all Existences; in this Sense we may distinguish it, by giving it the Term of *Nihility*.

THIS is a Distinction, which is and ought to be made use of by Logicians; and I wish you had been so conversant with them as to have known this Distinction, as well as that common one of *Genus* and *Species*; which you lay so much Stress on to so little Purpose*. “Metaphysicians consider another sort of Things (says one of those Writers) “by *Abstraction*, which are neither *Beings*, nor *Modes* of Beings, nor yet are they considered as mere *Nihility*. Such are *Privations*, external *Denominations*, or *Relations*, “and all *Beings of the Mind*, [which are what I call *Ideal Things*] “for these properly neither have Existence in themselves, nor in any other Things; “neither can they strictly be said to be mere *Nothing*, or *Nihility*; since we form *Notions* about “them, and they are connected to many of our “*Ideas* †”. Here, you see, this Logician makes

* See Third Def. p. 4, 5, 6.

† Præterea quædam alia, per abstractionem, à Metaphysicis intelliguntur, quæ neque sunt *Entia*, neque modi *Entium*, neque tamen ut *merum nihil* concipiuntur. Ejusmodi sunt *Privationes*, *denominationes Externa* seu *relationes*, & *Entia Rationis* omnia. Hæc enim neque *existentiam* habent *propriam*, neque in alijs existunt, neque dici propriè possunt

the

6 Concerning the different Acceptations

the Distinction of *Non-Ens*, and *Merum Nihil*, i. e. of *Non-Entity*, and *Nibility*—*Neque sunt Entia*, says he, *neque tamen ut merum nihil concipiuntur*. They have neither *real Existence*, neither are they *mere Nibility*; i. e. as he afterwards explains himself, they are *Entia Rationis*. In this we agree with this Writer. When we say *SPACE* is *Nothing*, we mean that it is what we call *Non-Ens*, that it has not *real Existence*, or *existentiam propriam*; and, when we say *SPACE* is *Something*, we only mean, that, *neque tamen ut merum nihil concipitur*, because *notiones ejus efformamus, & Ideis variis adjunctum est*; that is, that it is an *Ideal Thing*.

AND here I would have it observed, that this Division of the Term *Nothing*, into what we call *Non-Entity* and *Nibility*, is no false and useless, but a true and necessary Division. For any one, with a little Thinking will find, that the word *Nothing* is often used in the two different Senses I have mentioned; and therefore, to avoid Confusion, the foregoing Distinction will be found necessary.

SINCE an abstract Idea has no *objective Reality*, it may certainly be said to be *Nothing*; that is, no *Thing* existing *ad extra*; but yet, since it is an *Idea*, it cannot be said to be *Nothing*, in such a Sense as shall exclude *Ideas*: and therefore, in the Term *Nothing* we make a Distinction, when it is used concerning these *Ideas*, and when it is used, as a *Negation of all Ideas* as well as *Realities*.

IT is evident, that, when we say *Whiteness* or *Knowledge* is *Nothing*; we must not be supposed

esse merum nihil; quandoquidem notiones eorum efformamus, & Ideis variis adjuncta sunt. — *Joh. Clerici, Ontologia c. 1. Sect. 2.*

to mean that Whiteness, and Knowledge, are not *Ideas*; and therefore the Term *Nothing*, does not here exclude *Ideas*; and since it does not, we should not confound it with another Sense of the word, which does exclude them; but we should remember, that when Whiteness or Knowledge is said to be *Nothing* (and the same is true of all other abstract *Ideas*) it is said to be so, in that Sense which only denies it to be a *Reality*, but at the same time admits it to be an *Idea*.

WHEN therefore we say, that Whiteness, Knowledge, Extension, or any other abstract *Ideas* are *Nothing*; we do not mean, that they are not *Ideas*; but that they are *Ideas*, which have no *real Archetype* existing without the Mind.

I would not have it imagined, that I introduce the words *Non-Entity* and *Nihility*, in order to amuse the Reader with Scholastick Terms; for (as Mr. *Locke* says of the word *Idea*) I have no fondness for any particular, Articulate Sound; nor do I think there is any Spell, or Fascination in any of them: But I use them only to express briefly the two Senses, in which the Term *Nothing* is used. In short, by *Non-Entity*, I mean a *mere Idea*, which hath no *objective Reality*: and by *Nihility*, I mean a Negation, even of those *Ideas*, as well as of *Realities*.

SINCE then the Term *Nothing*, may be understood in these two very different Senses; if we do not, in the use of it, attend to its precise Meaning, we shall run into Confusion; as you seem to have done in the Piece now before me.

THIS being observed, I shall now proceed to remark a few Things concerning Abstract *Ideas*, as far as may be of Service in the present Question.

C H A P. II.

Of Abstract Ideas.

ABSTRACT Ideas are formed by that Power of the Mind, which is called the Power of Abstracting; *i. e.* the Power of separating in *Idea*, what are inseparable in *Reality*.

By this Act of the Mind, we form our *Universal Ideas*; and rank Things into Sorts: Hence come *Genus*, and *Species*, *Substance*, *Essence*, &c.*

WE employ this Act of the mind about Properties, Modes, Relations &c. as well as Substances; and form general Ideas concerning them, “ by
 “ separating them from all other Properties &c.
 “ with which they are found in Nature, or from
 “ all particular Subjects, in which they inhere,
 “ and leaving only so much as remains in com-
 “ mon, and includes, or may be affirmed of every
 “ Property &c. of that Kind. Thus observing,
 “ that all Bodies agree in being *Extended*, as well
 “ as *Solid*; tho’ they differ never so much in *Mag-
 “ nitude* and *Figure*; we take the former of these
 “ Properties apart from the latter, as also, from
 “ any *particular* Magnitude, or Shape, and call it
 “ *Extension* in the abstract; which being thus
 “ made *general*, will comprehend all *particular
 “ Extensions* &c, †

* For the manner of acquiring these, See Mr. *Law’s* Additional Notes to his first Edition of *King’s* Origin of Evil Translated. p. 10. *Watts’s* Logic Part 1. c. 3. Sect. 3. *Locke’s* Essay on H. U. B. 2. c. xi. §. 9.

† Addit. Notes to *King-* p. 11.

By this Power, which the Mind has, of *Abstracting*, we sometimes consider a Mode or Property of any Being, (whether *Matter* or *Spirit*) without considering the Being it self, of which it is a Mode or Property; as when we consider *Exension* without considering any particular *Extended Body*, or *Thought* without any particular *Thinking Being*. This is abstracting a *Mode* from the *Substance*: but sometimes likewise we abstract even from *Modes* themselves; as when we consider the *Length* of *Body* without considering *Breadth* and *Depth*, (which Geometricians call a *Line*) or when we consider the *Length* and *Breadth*; without considering *Depth*, (which they call a *Surface*.)

THERE is a Passage in Mr. NORRIS concerning Abstraction, which will farther explain the Nature of it. "This separate Consideration where-
" in the Nature of Abstraction is made to con-
" sist, is to be understood, not of different Be-
" ings but of the Parts of the same Being; that
" is, Abstraction is not the considering one intire
" and complete Being without another (for they
" being *Numerically* at least distinct cannot be
" considered otherwise, since one Idea will not
" include them) but the considering one *Part* of
" such a Being without another,"

" BUT farther, Abstraction is not of such Parts
" neither, as are *really* and *physically* distinct, such
" as we commonly call *integral* Parts (for I sup-
" pose I should not properly be said to abstract
" in considering one Part of a human Body, or
" one Part of a Number without considering
" another; since these, tho' *Physical* Parts, are
" yet *Logical* Wholes; and so the separate Con-
" sideration of them, would be no proper Ab-
" straction)

“ fraction) but of Parts, that are *intelligibly* di-
 “ stinct, and have a *real Sameness* in the Nature of
 “ the Thing. When one of these *really Same*, but
 “ *intelligibly distinct* Parts, is considered without
 “ the other, or without that real Whole, whose
 “ intelligible Part it is; then is my Thought *ab-*
 “ *stract*; but when there is no such separate Con-
 “ sideration, but all is included together in one
 “ Idea, and considered as really it is; then is my
 “ Thought *concrete*. So that in short, Abstra-
 “ ction, as 'tis a logical Affection of Thought,
 “ is the considering one Thing without another,
 “ not *absolutely*, but in Things that are not really
 “ one without the other, nor yet really deniable
 “ one of the other. For Abstraction is as it were
 “ the drawing of a Thing away from it self. But
 “ where Things are really separate or distinct,
 “ the considering them apart is not *Abstraction*;
 “ but only a mere divided Consideration; nor
 “ would the joining them in one, be *Concretion*,
 “ but Confusion.”

“ ABSTRACTION then is the separate Consi-
 “ deration of Things *intelligibly* distinct, *really*
 “ indistinct.” *

IT may be proper to explain a Sentence or two
 in this Quotation. He says, that *Abstraction* is
 the separate Consideration of Parts that are *in-*
telligibly distinct, and have a *real Sameness* in the
Nature of the Thing. But he must not here be
 understood to mean, that these Parts which he
 says, have a *real Sameness* in the *Nature of the*
Thing, are really the *same Parts* (by *Parts*, we
 here mean *Modes*;) as for Instance, that *Exten-*

* *Morris's* Essay towards the Theory of the Ideal or
 Intelligible World. Part 2. c. 3. Sect. 7.

tion and Figure, which are Modes of Body, are really the same; i. e. that Extension is Figure, and Figure Extension: He must not, I say, be understood to mean this, when he speaks of their having a real Sameness; but, that Extension and Figure, which are intelligibly distinct, are not Things really distinct and different in the Being, from whence they are abstracted; (as a Man's Arm is from the rest of his Body) but are only the same Being, considered in different Views. And this is true: For, tho' we can abstractedly consider Figure without considering Extension, and Extension without Figure, and both of them without considering any particular Extended Figured Being, i. e. tho' they are intelligibly distinct; yet in the Nature of the Thing, i. e. in the really Extended Figured Being, Extension is not any Thing really distinct from Figure, or Figure any Thing really distinct from Extension, or either of them any Thing really distinct from the Extended Figured Being, whence they are abstracted: But they may both be said to have a real Sameness in the Nature of the Thing; because both of them, are only the same Thing considered in different Respects.

By Parts then, (i. e. Modes) intelligibly distinct, having a real Sameness in the Nature of the Thing, is meant that the Modes of any Being, tho' they may by the Mind be considered distinctly or separately; yet, are only the same Being, considered in a different Manner.

FROM what has been said concerning abstract Ideas, it is evident that they have no real Existence without the Mind correspondent to them; i. e. that there is no such real Thing *ad extra*, as Whiteness without a white Body; or Length

without a long Body &c. but that Whiteness and Length in the abstract are mere Ideas, arising from the Consideration of Body; the one with Respect to its Whiteness only; the other with Respect to its Length only; without considering any of its other Modes, or any particular Body, or any real Subject. All *abstract Ideas* then, are *Non-Entities* or mere *Entia Rationis*.

“ BUT tho’ a Non-Entity, or Not-Being, is really Nothing in it self; yet as it is introduced by some Relation to Being, it may afford Foundation for some Sort of Thoughts or Conceptions, or some relative Affections — We may also form a Sort of Idea of Non-Entities, or Not-Beings, from their Relation to Beings.”*

THUS we have an Idea and can talk of a *Shadow* and *Extension* in the *Abstract*; not that a Shadow, or Extension in the Abstract, can bear any real Relation to Beings as if they were real Existences; but these Ideas are considered relatively and with Respect to Being: A Shadow is considered, as the Representation of a Being; and is therefore thought upon, and conceived as such; it may thence be said to have relative Affections: Thus it may be said to be here, or there, to be near us, or far from us, or to be long or short, great or little &c. and Extension is considered also in a relative Manner; that is, as it may be a Mode of Being; and we call it greater, or less, or ascribe to it certain Degrees. And if we look into our Minds, we shall find, that we always tacitly refer these abstract Ideas;

* A Brief Scheme of Ontology c. 1. — Subjoined to a late Book, intitled, *Philosophical Essays on Various Subjects* by I. W.

whenever we speak or think about them, to *Somewhat*; not to any particular Being, but to some *imaginary Substratum*: For these abstract Ideas, are Ideas of pure Intellect; *i. e.* are to be understood, but cannot be imagined. A Man may *understand*, what we mean by Whiteness, or Extension in the Abstract; but *Imagination* can lay no hold of them, till the Mind supplies an *imaginary Substratum*, to support them, *pro hac vice*, such as may serve the Purpose. The Mind therefore joins the Idea of *Somewhat*, with the Idea of *one Quality only*, either Extension, Whiteness, or any other abstract Idea; and then we have an imaginary Substratum presently formed; that is, an *ideal extended Somewhat*, or an *ideal white Somewhat* *.

It is in this View, that we *affirm* Things concerning *abstract Ideas*. Hence it is, that *Extension* is said to have *Parts*, which would be Nonsense to say of Extension it self, considered as an *Idea of pure Intellect*. Hence *Distance* is said to be great or small; which we conceive, by first imagining the *SPACE*, which we consider as between, as a *Substratum of Extension*; Thence conceiving it as *extended*, (which it would be absurd to say of *Extension*) and thence considering it by *Parts*, as great, or small; long, or short. Hence likewise it is, that we say *Wisdom* is useful, that *Solidity* resists Bodies, that *Motion* is swift or slow &c.

AND we may farther observe that since *Qualities, Modes, and Accidents*, are not *Substan-*

* See this further Explained in Mr. *Law's* Notes &c. Note 16. p. 40. Edit. 1. or in Dr. *Clarke's* *Notions of Space Examined* p. 83. &c.

ces, and yet Things are affirmed of them, which can be only affirmed of *Substances*; it is sufficient to shew, that they are conceived *after the Manner* of *Substances*: That is, that altho' they are considered abstractedly from every *particular Subject*, they are yet referred to an *imaginary Substratum*.

AND as we thus form an imaginary Substratum for the *Qualities, Modes, Properties &c.* of *Body*, when considered abstractedly from all *particular Bodies*; so we do the same, with respect to the *Properties, Qualities, &c.* of *Spirit*, when considered in the *Abstract*. Thus, when we talk of *Knowledge* abstracted from every *particular knowing Man*; the Mind here supplies it with imaginary Subjects *pro hac vice*; whence we have the Idea of an intelligent *Somewhat*; which is sufficient to bring the general Idea down to a particular Subject: The same is done with Relation to *Envy, Fear, Love, Hatred, Piety, Virtue, &c.* when considered in the *Abstract*.

BUT from considering abstract Ideas in this Manner, and thence accustoming ourselves to speak of them, as *real Things*, arise Error and Dispute. Men are so used to think, conceive, and talk about them, as *Things real*, that they deceive themselves, as it were, into a Belief, that they are so: Thus, for Instance, *Nature, and Chance* have so long, and so much been talked of, that I make no Doubt, but among the more ignorant and common People, they have gained an Existence. *Fortune* has so often been said to be kind, or averse, that I am apt to believe, some imagine it as a real Being, in whose Power their Welfare is placed. Their Ideas of *Winter, and Summer, Spring, and Autumn*, are generally abstracted from the Motion of the *Earth*, (or rather from the *Sun*)
and

and are considered as *Things distinct*. *Time* and *Death* likewise, with them, have their *Existences*, but owe them only to the *abstract Ideas* of the Painter or the Statuary.

HENCE arose the numerous *Idols* of the Heathens, *Valour*, *Prudence*, *Truth*, &c.; nor were *Revenge* and *Fear*, without their Temples and their Altars.

SINCE then the customary way of considering, and speaking of Things, which is not always to be avoided, will lead us into Error; we should, when we have a Mind to be undeceived, throw off the Slavery imposed upon us by Words, and be no longer governed by Sound. We should change those Expressions which are apt to mislead us for others more exact, and which will bring us to the Knowledge of the Truth. We should consider what the *Sense* and *Meaning* of an Expression is, when stripp'd of its Disguise: This is the only way to detect these *Idola Fori*, as Lord BACON calls them, which by a Combination of Words and Names, insinuate themselves into the Mind. Men imagine that their Reason governs their Words; but sometimes Words get the better of their Reason; and have so great a Force upon the Mind, that their Philosophy lies blended with Error, and their Doctrines become useless and sophistical*.

* At *Idola Fori* omnium molestissima sunt, quæ ex fœdere verborum & nominum se insinuarunt in Intellectum. Credunt enim Homines, rationem suam verbis imperare. Sed fit etiam ut verba vim suam super Intellectum retorquant & reflectant, quod Philosophiam & Scientias reddidit sophisticas & inactivas. *Fran. Bac. de Verul. Instaur. magna. Pars Sec. Aph. LIX.*

INSTEAD then, of saying *Extension* is long or short; we should say (if we would speak strictly and philosophically) that an *extended Body* is long or short. Instead of saying, *Extension* hath *Parts*; we should say, that an *extended Body* hath *Parts*. When we say, that a Man *has Knowledge*, we mean, that a Man *knows*. When we say that he *has Piety, Charity &c.*; we mean that *he is pious, charitable &c.*

I might multiply Instances of this Kind; but these already mentioned; are sufficient to shew, that Men, by accustoming themselves to speak, and from thence sometimes to think inaccurately concerning *Ideas* formed by *Abstraction*, will be apt to run into great Mistakes: They may, nay they actually have imagined them to be *real Existences*; otherwise we should never have seen Arguments produced, to prove that *Knowledge* is *Something distinct* from the *knowing Man*; that it is *Something*, which is *in* him; or, that because we use *affirmative Expressions* concerning it, it must therefore be *Something real**. We see then, what Mistakes about abstract Ideas arise from the Force of Sound. For no sooner are the Expressions divested of their common Form, but the Ideas are divested of their Existence, and reduced to their primitive Non-Entity.

FROM what has been said, I observe as follows.

FIRST, that since there are two different Acceptations of the Term *Nothing*, which I have above explained †, it ought always to be remembered, that whenever we call *SPACE Nothing*, we call it so in the Sense of *Non-Entity*; and we shall find that most, if not all your Ob-

* See Third Def. p. 11.

† Chap. I. p. 4. &c.

jections to our calling SPACE *Nothing*, are founded upon the *Ambiguity* of that Term.

SECONDLY, from the foregoing Remarks concerning *Abstraction*, and *Abstract Ideas*, I observe, that the *Modes* of any Being, such as *Extension*, *Figure*, *Solidity*, &c. are not any Thing really *distinct*, or *different* from the *Being* of which they are said to be *Modes*; but that they are only the *Being it-self*, considered under *different Ideas*. From whence I argue; that if SPACE be the *real Extension* of any *Being*, it must be the *real extended Being*.

THIRDLY, I take Notice, that it is no solid Objection to SPACE being a mere *Abstract Idea*, that we can *think*, *conceive*, and *talk* about it, since we may do the same of all *Abstract Ideas* whatever.

FOURTHLY, I infer, that it is of no Force to argue, that SPACE must be *Something real*, because we use *affirmative Expressions* concerning it: since we may and do use such Expressions, concerning other *Abstract Ideas*.

LASTLY, I remark, that *Abstract Ideas* are sometimes looked upon as *Realities*: and that this arises from conceiving them, *after the manner of Substances*, and speaking of them as *real Things*. This customary Way of speaking is not always to be avoided. We may express ourselves in such Phrases, as Use has recommended: but then, when we enter into *Metaphysical Debates*, we must not argue from such *Phrases*, or lay so great a Stress upon *Words*, as to conclude, that the *Ideas* they are used to express, must therefore be *real Things*. If

we would in Reality be *Searchers after Truth*, we should carefully examine our *Ideas*, and strip them of the *Marks* Men use for them; otherwise, there must be endless Dispute, Wrangling, and Jargon*.

C H A P. III.

Arguments for the Reality of SPACE Examined, and Objections Answered.

HAVING premised in the foregoing Chapters, what I thought necessary, in Order to give you a general Light into the Cause of those Errors, which you have, during the Course of *Three Defences*, unhappily fallen into; proceed we next to consider distinctly what you have advanced, in *Defence* of your two First Pieces, and in *Objection* to my *Examination* of them.

BUT I must first beg the Readers Excuse, if he is not so well entertained in the following Pages, as I could wish. For I am very sensible, that it can be no Pleasure to him, any more than to me, to be employed in unravelling Sophistry, and distinguishing Ambiguities. But this is what you have made necessary, by your Manner of handling the Cause you have undertaken; and since you are got into such a Road, we are obliged to follow you in Order to bring you back. I have Reason to believe, that whoever considers this your *Third Defence* attentively, will soon be induced to imagine, that you have embarked in a

* See Locke H. U. B. 2. c. 13. §. 28.

Cause, which you now find to be indefensible; and, that you have chosen to make Use of the weak Defence of Sophistry, rather than give up what *Dr. Clarke* has advanced. Thus is the Name and Character of a *Person* thought sufficient to support the most ridiculous Hypothesis; so much Reason had I to enter my Caveat, against any Thing being brought besides rational Arguments to determine between us; and I still have Reason to desire the same: For when I see Men persisting to defend a Cause, for the Support of which they are forced to have Recourse to such low Artifices; I cannot think it either uncharitable, or unreasonable to believe; that had *Dr. Clarke* advanced that Two and Two were Six, some of his Disciples would go on in that Method of Calculation.

I would not here be thought, in the least to detract from the Character which that Author has so justly gained in the learned World: No, far be it from me. *Dr. Clarke* was a Man of very great Abilities: The World hath with Reason acknowledged him to be such: But he was still a Man, therefore not infallible: And as the learned Author of the *Remarks* upon his *Exposition of the Church-Catechism* observes, “The better he
“ has performed in some Points, the more necessary is it, to take Notice where he has de-
“ served Censure; lest Truth and Error, Good
“ and Bad so mingled should be imbibed toge-
“ ther, and one should serve to recommend and
“ ingratiate the other.” *

BUT to proceed to the Business in Hand. Since

* Remarks upon *Dr. Clarke's Exposition of the Church-Catechism* p. 2. Edit. 3.

we have so far gained our Point, as to reduce you to cavilling; all we have now to do in such Places, is to bring you out from those Refuges, and the Business is done — That my Charge against you of Sophistry is neither ill-grounded nor unjust, the following Pages will I hope sufficiently evince.

I must beg your Excuse, for not following you exactly in the Order of your Arguments and Objections: I shall take such a Method as will render the Whole more clear and obvious to the Reader. This your *Third Defence* consists of two *Vindications*, one of your *First*, the other of your *Second Defence*: I shall not consider them separately, but throw them into one, and consider them together.

A R G U M E N T I.

YOUR first Argument for the Reality of SPACE runs thus *viz.* “ Either there is no Difference
 “ between touching and not touching; or else
 “ That which is between two Walls, when they
 “ do not touch, is really *Something*. And it seems
 you cannot yet see the Fallacy of this Reasoning.
 “ This [say you] is a Disjunction, which seems
 “ to me no Way defective. Unless therefore he
 “ had proved, either that there wanted another
 “ Branch, or that there is no Difference between
 “ a Negative and an Affirmative, he has not pro-
 “ ved against me.” *

I imagined, Sir, that you would not any more have insisted on this threadbare Argument of the two Walls: But it seems you think they have as

* Third Def. p. 2,

yet received no Breach, and that they are strong enough to withstand all our Battery. You still therefore found your Reasoning upon them; and since it is your Pleasure, we must attend you: But I hope you will be convinced, that your *Disjunction* is *defective*, when you consider, that you take for granted, the Principle on which it is built. For when you argue, that “either there is no Difference between touching and not touching; or else That which is between two Bodies when they do not touch, is really Something”; I am sorry, that you either cannot, or will not see, that you suppose without any Manner of Proof, that *the Existence or non-Existence of Something between two Bodies is the Essential Difference of touching and not touching.* This is the Principle which I called in Question before, and I have yet seen no Reason to alter my Judgment; and as it is certainly not self-evident, it does not appear that your Disjunction built upon it, without any Proof, is conclusive. Every one knows that disjunctive Syllogisms are inconclusive, if the Enumeration be not compleat, or, as you allow, if any one *Branch be wanting.* Now Sir, this is the Misfortune of your Argument; there wants a Branch: For had it been compleat, it must have stood thus — *viz.* “Either the Difference of touching and not touching, does not consist in the being of *Something between* — or else there is either no Difference between touching and not touching — or, when two Bodies do not touch there must be *Something between*”. And now, perhaps, you may see that the first Branch is wanting in your Argument: which if true will prove that the two other Branches, which are the whole of your Argument,

are

are not conclusive: that is, if the *Difference* &c. does *not consist* in the *being of Something between*; then, there is no Necessity that either there must be *no Difference* between touching and not touching, or else, that when two Bodies do not touch there must be *Something between*. That it does not consist in this, and what it does consist in, shall be shewn in the proper Place. In the mean Time, since it is not self-evident that it does consist in This, you ought not to have taken it for granted; since it was incumbent upon you to have proved it, before your *Disjunction* (which depends upon the Truth of it, yet nevertheless *seems to you no Way defective*) could be of any Force. Now to take this Principle for granted, is the very same Thing, as to take for granted, that SPACE is Something real: for it is supposing, that whenever two Bodies do not touch, there must always be Something real between them; which, when there is only SPACE between them, is the very Point I deny, and is what I have taxed you with taking for granted. My Charge therefore of begging the Question stands in full Force against you.

YOU proceed — “ But he allows, that *if there was no SPACE between them, they would touch*; “ and yet nevertheless, says, that SPACE is *No-thing*.” *

AND pray where is the Absurdity of this? I allow, that when all Matter is removed from between two Bodies, and there is likewise no SPACE between them, they will touch: *and yet nevertheless* I say, that if there was SPACE between them, SPACE would be Nothing real. I am not

* Third Def. p. 2.

sensible that there is any Thing in this, which contradicts either Reason or Truth. But yet, let us see what Work you are pleased to make with it — By putting the Term *Nothing*, instead of SPACE, you would make me assert, it seems, that if there was *Something* between two Bodies they would touch. — “ If this [say you] be the “ Truth of the Case [*i. e.* if SPACE be *Nothing*] “ let us put *Nothing* for *Space* in the foregoing “ Sentence, and then see what Sense it will make. “ *If there was no Nothing between them they “ would touch*; that is, if there was *Something* be- “ tween them they would touch; but when “ there is any Thing between them, they do not “ touch: Therefore they do touch, and do not “ touch, at the same Time.” *

THIS is so pretty a jingle of Words, that 'tis Pity they are to so little Purpose. *If there was no SPACE between two Bodies (from between which all other Matter is supposed away) They would touch*: This is True. *If there was no Nothing i. e. if there was Something between two Bodies, they would touch*: This is absurd. The Truth is mine, the Absurdity is your own; and proceeds from a low Quibble upon the word *Between*.

I allowed, that *if there was no SPACE between two Bodies they would touch*: But you ought to have remembered, that I allowed this, in that particular Instance of your two Walls, from between which *all other Matter was supposed away*: For the Objection which you here raise, could only be urged against One, who should allow, that two Bodies would touch, *if there was no SPACE between them, tho' Matter should, at the*

* Third Def. p. 3.

same Time, be supposed actually filling up the intermediate Space: For it is in this Case only, that when we say, *there is no SPACE between them*, it will follow that there is Something between them.

FOR although SPACE be *Nothing*, no Space be *no Nothing*, and no *Nothing* be *Something*; yet, when I allow, that, if there be *no Space* between two Bodies, (*from whence all Matter is first supposed away*) they will touch; it will not follow, that I by this Means allow, that the two Bodies would touch, if there was *Something between* them. It will only follow, that I allow they would touch, if there was *Something where the SPACE was*: and this is true: But then the *Something* here signified by *no SPACE*, is only the *Bodies themselves* which touch, therefore is not *between* the Bodies *i. e.* the Bodies are not between themselves, which your Argument proves, if it proves any Thing. This Attempt therefore, Sir, to shew me guilty of an Absurdity, serves only to display your Skill in Sophistry, which you will excuse me for having unravelled; since it is in Order to undeceive some of those *great many Persons*, with whom it might otherwise prevail.

HAVING delivered yourself of this Quibble, you are pleased to *come to Particulars*, and cite from me the following Passage. *viz.* “Though
“ it be necessary to two Bodies *touching*, that *No-*
“ *thing* should be between them, yet it does not
“ follow that to their *not touching* it is necessary
“ that *Something* should be between them.” * This, it seems, you are surprized at, and is Something too strange for your Belief: You ask, “ If the

* Third Def. p. 3.

“ latter Part of this Sentence is true, where is
 “ the Difference between touching and not touch-
 “ ing *?” By this Question it is plain, that you
 “ have all along taken it for granted, that the
 Existence of Something between two Bodies, is
 the essential Difference of touching and not touch-
 ing. As this is the Prime Error on which you
 proceed, it will be proper to set you right, by
 shewing you wherein the Difference &c. does
 really consist.

THE Difference of touching and not touching,
 consists in the Bodies themselves being, or not
 being *distant*; i. e. in their being in a different
 Situation, or bearing a different Relation of Posi-
 tion to each other, without Respect to any Thing
 else: And this *Situation*, or *Relation of Position*,
 is not (as you would have us imagine) any real
 Affection of SPACE, nor does it arise from the
 Existence of SPACE *between*; but it has Respect
 only to the *Bodies themselves*; to them it is con-
 fined, and has nothing to do with any Thing
 else. If you ask, what is being *distant*, but hav-
 ing *Something between* them? and what is being
not distant, but having *Nothing between* them? I
 answer, that whoever consults his own Ideas, will
 soon find, that the Idea of being *distant* is not
 the Idea of *Something between*: and that the Idea
 of being *not distant*, is not the Idea of *Nothing be-
 tween*. When we have the Idea of Bodies *not distant*,
 the Idea of there being *Nothing between* them
 will perhaps follow the former Idea in the Mind,
 not as if they were Ideas of the same Thing;
 but as the latter is a Consequence of the former.
 The being of *Nothing between* them is not the

* Third Def. p. 3.

Cause or Reason why they are *not distant*: nor has it any Thing to do with the Idea of their *not being distant*: but their not being distant is the Cause or Reason, why there *can be Nothing between* them. So in the other Case; when two Bodies are distant, the being of *Something between* them is not the Cause or Reason of their being *distant*; but their being *distant*, is the Cause or Reason, why there *may be Something between* them: But then as in this Case there may *not be Something between* them; the being, or not being of Something between, is here an *Accident* only of their being distant. And therefore, although there is Nothing between two Walls which do not touch, yet it is no Consequence, that there is no Difference between touching and not touching.

YOU ask — “ Can Nothing constitute a Difference between two Somethings? according to this Author” [you say] “ it can; because he grants that there is a Difference; and says also, that *Space is sufficient to constitute that Difference*; and yet SPACE, according to him, is “ Nothing.” *

IN Answer to this, I must observe, that in speaking on this Subject of SPACE (as of all abstract Ideas) we use Terms and Expressions, which are not true in a strict Metaphysical Sense. Conceiving them after the Manner of Substances, for the Help of the Understanding, we are apt to be led into Error: and under the Disguise of Words, and common Forms of Speech, they do as it were by Artifice intrude on our Minds, as real Beings. Since then we may be deceived, and imposed on, even by ourselves; it should al-

* Third Def. p. 3.

ways be our Care to guard against it; and to distinguish between Words and Things, Appearances and Realities. Much more should it be our Care not to *argue from such Terms*; or to pretend to defend our Point by *laying a Stress on such Expressions of our Opponents*, when we are conscious at the same Time, that they do not mean them in a strict Metaphysical Sense. For there is just the same Difference, between being deceived ourselves by a Form of Words, and arguing from such Words of another Person, knowing at the same Time that he does not mean them in a strict Sense; as there is between an *Error*, and a *voluntary persisting* in it.

IT was neglecting to distinguish between *Expressions* which may be used according to the common Way of speaking, and what is *True* in a strict Metaphysical Sense, that has led you to urge, that SPACE must be Something real, because I happen'd to say that it was *sufficient to constitute a Difference*. This is the Sentence you catch Hold on, and imagine that you can prove from hence, that SPACE, even according to me, must be Something real: But my Meaning to any unprejudiced Reader, is easy and obvious.

IT is indeed, strictly and Metaphysically speaking, improper to say, that SPACE is *sufficient to constitute*, or that SPACE *is between*; But when we say that SPACE *is between* Bodies, it is from conceiving it after the Manner of a Substance, *i. e.* from conceiving *Nothing* after the Manner of *Something*; and thence affirming Something positive of it; whereas all the positive Expressions are applicable to the Bodies only. Thus it is not SPACE, which *is*, or *exists between* the Bodies; but the

Bodies are distant, and there is not any *Matter*, or any *Thing* between them.

WHEN I said therefore, that pure SPACE is sufficient to constitute the Difference; it was spoke in Compliance with the common Forms of Speech; not, that I fancied SPACE any *Thing* able, or sufficient to constitute; and the Meaning of that Sentence explained in a Strict Metaphysical Sense, is this, *viz.* that the Difference of not touching and touching of two Bodies does not consist in the Existence of *Something* between them: it is sufficient that the *Bodies* are distant. The *Bodies* themselves being distant are sufficient to constitute that Difference: which is all I meant by saying, that *pure Space*, or *pure Distance*, is sufficient to constitute the Difference; without supposing, as I there add, this pure SPACE, or pure Distance, to be any *Thing* existing between the Bodies, but a mere *Void*. It is not therefore SPACE, or Distance, or a mere *Void*, that strictly can be said to constitute; but it is the *Bodies* themselves, which being distant, are of themselves sufficient to constitute the Difference between their touching and not touching. From hence then my Meaning is clear, and it is to no Purpose for you to argue from inaccurate Expressions, unless it be to supply the Want of sound Argument, and to prop a falling Cause. Many Instances might be brought to shew, that positive Expressions do not prove, that What they are used about, is *Something* real. What is it that constitutes the Difference between a long Body, and a short one? In the common Way of speaking *Length* is said to constitute this Difference: yet it does not follow, because this positive Expression of constituting a Difference is used concerning *Length*, that therefore *Length* in
the

the *Abstract* is any *Thing real*: and the Reason is, because strictly speaking, it is not *Length*, but the *long Body* which *constitutes* the Difference. Thus in our Case, *Distance*, or SPACE may, in the common Way of speaking, be said to *constitute* the Difference; though strictly it is the Bodies themselves. I own it requires some Exactness and Care to conceive these Things aright. We are too liable to be deceived by the customary Forms of Expression; we are too apt to *realize* our abstract Ideas, which is owing to the Forwardness of the *Imagination*, in giving Assistance to the *Intellect*, for the greater Ease in conceiving, and Readiness in talking upon Subjects Abstracted and Intellectual. For measuring Distances in *Imagination*, we have Recourse to *imaginary Substrata*, as in *actual* measuring we make Use of *real* ones. Try the Case in other Ideas that are confessedly abstract, and it may assist you in understanding That before us. *Weight* is an abstract Idea; there is a Difference betwixt a Pound and an Ounce: Now what is it, that strictly speaking *constitutes* this Difference? Is it the *Idea* of *Weight*? or the *Bodies themselves* being more or less *weighty*? And thus there is a *Distance* between two Bodies: Now what is it that *constitutes* this Distance? What, but the Bodies themselves bearing such a Relation of Site to one another. And what has this to do with the Existence, or non-Existence of any Thing between? This seems to me to be the Truth of the Case, and as to your Cavils at that Expression of *Space being sufficient to constitute the Difference*, without being any Thing real; what I have said is a sufficient Answer. It is “hardly possible (as a late Writer well observes) “to speak on this Subject of “*Non-Entities*, or *Nothings*, without using the “*Terms*

“ Terms, that represent *positive Beings*, and *real Properties*.”* But an Argument founded upon mere Terms, and common Expressions, can be only used when the Disputant wants a better. I doubt not but you may find many more of my Expressions, liable to the same Cavils as This before us; and if you think this Sort of Argument will be of any Service to you, you are heartily welcome to make the best of it. Our Cause, as it requires no such Kind of arguing in its Defence, so it fears it not when used against it: It gathers Strength from such Blows, and stands the firmer for such an Opposition.

I shall now beg leave to take Notice of a Passage, which (as it appears to me) if it be not cleared up, will leave your Notions in great Obscurity. I had observed, that you “ supposed the Difference of touching, and not touching of two Bodies, to consist merely in the Existence of *Something real between them* &c. †. This you quote in your *Third Defence*, and make the following Remark upon it. “ *Something real* [say you] “ must, I think, either mean a *Substance*; and then we are agreed; for *neither of us suppose* that there must be a *Substance between the two Bodies*, when they do not touch, or that else there would be no Difference between touching and not touching &c.** ”. Here you insist that the Difference does consist in the Existence of *Something* between them: but you seem much afraid of the word *real*: you are apprehensive it may mean a *Substance*; and then it

* Philosophical Essays on Various Subjects. Ess. I. Sect. XI. p. 40.

† Dr. Clarke's Notions of SPACE Examined p. 14, 15.

** Third Def. p. 13.

seems, you would not say, that the Difference consisted in the Existence of *Something real* between them. No; if it means a Substance, “we are agreed, [say you] “for *neither of us* suppose, that there must be a “*Substance* between the two Bodies when they “do not touch.” That I do not suppose so, is indeed very true: but that *you* must either suppose so, or else, that you must suppose nothing at all between 'em, I shall make appear.

THE Force of your Remark seems to be this; you would urge, that there are some Things which are not *Substances*: and therefore, although you do not suppose there must be a Substance; yet, that you may without any Absurdity say, there is Something. But now, if so; I ask, what you call that *Something*? you will answer in your usual Language, a *Mode*. If then you say there must be *Something*, and yet do not suppose that there must be a *Substance*, and *That Something* be a *Mode*; it will follow, that you suppose there must be a *Mode* between them, and yet do not suppose that there must be a *Substance*; which is nothing less than supposing, that there may be a *Mode* between them *without a Substance*; which, I believe, even you will hardly venture to affirm: and yet, if you do not, you must contradict your self. For if there cannot be a *Mode* between them *without a Substance*; then, if there be a *Mode* at all, I presume it will follow, that it must be *with a Substance*; directly contrary to you, who say, that there must be Something between the two Bodies; (which *Something* you call a *Mode*;) and yet confess you do not *suppose that there must be a Substance*.

If therefore you will assert, that, when two Bodies do not touch, there must be *Something* between

between them; you must say that there is a *Substance*. That there must be a *Substance*, or *nothing at all*, will appear from considering, that by your granting there need not be a *Substance*, you grant that there need not be *any Thing at all*.

— For, since there cannot be a *Mode* without a *Substance*; and since you own that there need not be a *Substance*; who does not immediately see, that you own there need not be a *Mode*? (which yet, at the same time you say there must be; strange Inconsistency!) *i. e.* that there need not be either *Substance* or *Mode*: and, if there need not be either *Substance* or *Mode*, and yet *Something*; you must be so kind, as to oblige the World with the Discovery of a new Sort of *Somethings*.

“ IT is very needful [you tell us] “ to put
 “ our Author in Mind of that common and
 “ necessary Division or Distinction of Things
 “ made Use of by *Logicians*, *viz.* into *Genus*
 “ and *Species*; the not considering which, seems
 “ to be what led him into the Mistake, which
 “ runs through his whole Book.” * Your Au-
 thor is very much obliged to you for this Piece
 of Service, and I dare say, that no one will pre-
 sume to imagine, that your Memory should fail
 you, during the Course of this Work; or that
 I should be obliged to put you in Mind of this
 very same *common and necessary Distinction*: How-
 ever, if the not considering This, has led me in-
 to any Mistake, it is to be hoped that the Re-
 collection of it, will by your Assistance, be able
 to lead me out again.

* Third Def. p. 4.

“ THE Words *Thing*, *Something*, *Being*, or the like, are used [you are so kind to inform us] to signify the *Genus*, or are general and universal Terms, comprehending all Things whatsoever under them, whether they be Substances, Properties, or Relations &c. This *first Genus* comprehended under the Name *Thing*, is divided into two *Species*, viz. Substance and Property.” *

You go on with a great Deal more about *Genus* and *Species*, which is to as little Purpose, as it would be for me to repeat it. The Force of it seems to be This; that *Substance* is only one *Species* of *Things*; and therefore, that although *Space* be not a *Substance*, yet it is not improper to call it a *Thing*; because, though it comes not under that *Species* of *Things* called a *Substance*; yet it comes under another *Species* of *Things* called a *Property*.—— But you should have remembered also, Sir, that *Things* are divided into *Things Real*, and *Things Ideal*. *Things Real* are such as have a *real Existence*: *Things Ideal* are such as have no *real Existence*, but are only *Ideas* in the Mind.

OUR Dispute is, whether *Space* be any *Thing Real*; for that it is an *Ideal Thing*, I am very ready to grant. “ It is very proper [say you] “ to call *SPACE Something*, though it be no Substance &c.” † But if no *Things* besides *Substances* are *Things real*, it follows, that *SPACE* must either be a *Substance*, or no *Thing real*: Now, that no *Things* are *Things real*, but *Substances*, will easily appear. Your own Division of *Things* is into *Substance* and *Property*: If a *Property* therefore be no *Thing real*, then no *Things* but *Substances* are *Things real*: Now, a *Property* must either be con-

* Third Def. p. 4.

† Ibid. p. 6.

sidered as in the *Abstract*, or as in a *Subject*: It is plain that a Property in the *Abstract* is only an *Ideal* Thing, or has no Existence *ad extra*, and that a Property in a Subject, a Substance, or Being, is only the Substance or Being *it self*, under a particular Consideration. If therefore it be proper to call SPACE *Something*, though it be no *Substance*; it can be only in the Sense of *Something Ideal*. To what Purpose then, is this long Account of *Genus* and *Species* introduced here? For though the Word *Thing* be a *Genus*, under which are contained the two *Species*, *Substance* and *Property*; yet 'tis plain that SPACE must either be the former, *viz.* a *Substance*, or else it is no *Thing real*. What have you gained then, Sir, by insisting on the Propriety of calling SPACE a *Thing*? Since if it be not a *Substance* it may as well be no *Thing* at all; because it is then a *Thing in Ideas* only: and if you mean no more than *This*, as you can prove no more; I am very ready to agree with you, and to own, that in such a Sense, we can very properly say that SPACE is *Something*: and so we can say likewise of *Whiteness* in the *Abstract*, or any other abstract Idea whatsoever.

BUT alas! Sir, of what Service is all *This* to your Question? SPACE must not only be a *Thing*, but a *Thing real*; a *Thing* which has Existence *ad extra*, or you lose your Cause: and if it be a Property, and yet *Something real*, it must be more than a Property; it must be a Substance; otherwise, how can it be *between Walls*? can a Property be said to be there, any otherwise than as the Substance is there? can *Extension* be *between* any *Thing*? if any *Thing* is really *between*, is it not the *Extended Substance*? If SPACE be not
Some-

Something more than a Property, how can it be Infinite, Eternal &c.? can a *mere Property* be so? or must it not be the Substance, if any Thing? Nay if SPACE be not more than an abstract Property, how can it *be* at all? The Reason why I concluded that SPACE must be a Substance, if any Thing, was because I could not but take it for granted, that when you called it *Something*, you meant *Something real*; which if you do, I have shewn that I rightly concluded from your calling it *Something*, that it was a *Substance*: and if you do not mean *Something real*, then your Argument that "it may be *Something* yet not a *Substance*, is nothing to the Purpose.

BUT I may add, that the Dispute about the Propriety of calling the *Properties* or *Modes* of any particular Being *Somethings real*, when considered in any other View, than as the *Being itself* under a certain *Modification*, can be of no Service to the main Question. For you contend that *Space* is *Something*, because it is a Property of some Substance; but now supposing that Properties, considered *merely as such*, are *Somethings real*; yet this conduces nothing towards proving that SPACE is *Something real*, 'till SPACE is proved to be a *real Property* of some Being. When you have done this Sir, then, and not till then, you will have done the Business; and I shall not any longer contend, whether *Properties* are *Things real* or not. Prove SPACE to be a *real Property*, the Property, the *Extension* (as you affirm it to be) of the *Self-existent and Eternal Being*! and I will then allow it to be *Something* in what Sense you please.

IT should here be observed, that whenever I say that *Things real* must be *Substances*, I do not mean thereby, any unknown *Substratum*: This is

not the Dispute here. But by *Substance*, I mean only some Thing which has Existence *ad extra*, or some *Being*. We know not the *Substratum* of *Matter*; nay it is still a Question among Philosophers whether there be any such Thing or not: Yet we all agree, that *Matter* is a *Substance*. When I say therefore that *Things real* must be *Substances*; and that *SPACE*, if it be any *Thing real*, must be a *Substance*; by *Substance* here is only meant Something that has Existence *ad extra*, which a *Property* or *Mode*, merely as such, hath not.

I had used an Argument, the Sum of which was this *viz.* That if two Bodies which are supposed to be distant, be so increased as to touch one another; then, if the *SPACE* was Something really existing between them before, it must either now be annihilated, or removed, or else must exist between them still: That it is annihilated, or removed, you will not say; it must therefore exist between them still; so that two Bodies touch, and yet there is *SPACE* between them, *i. e.* they do touch, and do not touch at the same Time*. To this you answer, "That the *SPACE* that was between the Bodies before they touched, is now, when they do touch, neither removed from between them, nor annihilated; neither is it between the two Bodies still; but it is just where it was." † Now this to me is a very extraordinary Sentence! For, if *SPACE* was any Thing existing between the Bodies before they touched; and the Bodies have been increased in a direct Line to each other, till they touched; and this Thing which existed between them before, and was

* Dr. Clarke's Notions of *SPACE* Examined p. 8, 9.

† Third Def. p. 8.

the Reason why they did not touch, is now when they do touch, neither annihilated, nor removed; I think it necessarily follows, that it must, if it had any *real Existence*, exist between them still. To tell us, that it is *neither removed, nor annihilated, neither is it between the two Bodies still, but it is just where it was*; is the same as to say, that the *Thing*, which *existed between the Bodies* before, is now not supposed to be annihilated, and yet (tho' the Bodies are increased in a direct Line) is not removed from between them; and yet is not between them; but yet is just where it was; which seems to carry an Air of Legerdemain with it, and to be Something like telling us, that it is here; and it is not here; and yet — High pass! — it is just where it was before. But however you have been so kind as to let us into this Secret, by acquainting us, that it is *penetrated by the Increase of the Bodies* *; so that, tho' it was between 'em before, and is now neither removed nor annihilated, yet it is not between the two Bodies still, “but it is just where it was; only with this Difference, that, as it was before between the Bodies, it is now penetrated by the Increase of the Bodies †.”

To explain this, you instance as follows, “Let there be two Bodies each of them a Yard Cube, and let them be placed at a Yard Distance from each other; and let us also suppose all Matter to be taken from between them; that is, let us suppose a cubic Yard of empty SPACE between them. If these two Bodies be crowded together, so as that their two Superficies facing each other touch, and any Person should

* Third Def. p. 8.

† Ibid.

“ ask what was become of the cubic Yard of
 “ SPACE that was between them; I would an-
 “ swer, that it was neither removed, nor anni-
 “ hilated, but that it is now where the two in-
 “ ternal half cubic Yards of the Bodies are; and
 “ that, as before the Removal of the two Bodies,
 “ the SPACE was between them, that is, between
 “ the internal Superficies of each Body; it is
 “ not now between the two whole Bodies, but
 “ only between the two external half-cubic Yards,
 “ and penetrated by the two internal half-cubic
 “ Yards of the Bodies *.

To This I reply as follows.

FIRST I presume, that when you say the Space
 is penetrated by the two half-cubic Yards of the
 Bodies, you mean, that every Part of the SPACE
 (to speak in your Language) is penetrated by every
 Part of the two half-cubic Yards of the Bodies;
 or, that this cubic Yard of SPACE which was be-
 tween the Bodies is, when the Bodies touch,
 so diffused throughout the two half-cubic Yards
 of the Bodies, that wherever there is *Body*, there
 is SPACE. This, I think, must be your Meaning;
 because, if there be any Point of these two half-
 cubic Yards of Body, where there is not SPACE,
 then the SPACE cannot be *just where it was*.
 Now, if this is your Meaning, it is blending
Body and SPACE together in such a Manner, as
 to make them be One and the Same: For, if there
 is no one *Point* of the *Bodies*, where there is not
Space; and no one *Point* of the *Space*, where there
 is not *Body*; I doubt it will be difficult to di-
 stinguish One from the Other; or to tell us, whe-
 ther this cubic Yard be *Body* or *Space*; that is

* Third Def. p. 8. 9.

in plain English, you run into Confusion and Absurdity.

SECONDLY, since no Point of *Matter*, in this Instance, can be assigned, where there is not *Space*; if we take that *Point* where these Bodies touch, since that Point is *Matter*, it will follow that there is *Space* at the very Point where they touch: And I doubt you will have need of some very nice Distinction, to shew how there may be *SPACE* at the very *Point* where they touch; without shewing at the same Time, either that there is *SPACE* *between* them, or that That *Point* is *Space*. If there is *SPACE* *between* them, then the Absurdity I before charged you with follows close, *viz.* that the Bodies do touch and do not touch at the same Time: If you say, that That *Point* where they touch, is *Space*; then, since it is pretty evident that it is *Matter*, it is as evident that it must be both *Matter* and *Space*: and if so, I would desire to be informed whether it is *Space* or *Matter* which touches.

————— *Dignus Vindice Nodus.*

THE Reason why you imagine, that the *SPACE*, which was supposed to exist between the Bodies before they touched is now, when they do touch, neither annihilated nor removed, but exists just where it was, seems to me to be This; you conceive *SPACE* to be Something existing between the Bodies at first; and when they touch, you find you cannot suppose *SPACE* to be annihilated or removed, and thence you conclude, that it must be just where it was. But if you would consider what I take to be the Reason, why you cannot suppose it either annihilated or removed; That will shew you the Reason, why it does not therefore follow, that it must exist there still;
viz.

viz. Because it is not any Thing existing at all! In short, the Idea of SPACE, and of its *actual Existence*, is so fixed in your Mind, that (as you say in your *Second Defence*) you *can by no means get rid of it* * : and therefore, because the *Idea* of such actual Existence remains; you conclude that SPACE must remain, and actually *exist*, where you had an Idea of its actual Existence before, even tho' there be Matter: But if every one may conclude, that All those *Ideas* which he shall chance not to be able to *get rid of*, must therefore have *real Archetypes*; every *Creature of the Brain* may have a real Existence in Nature.

HAVING shewn the Absurdity which followed from your supposing SPACE to be *Something really existing between* the Bodies, I proceeded to observe, that “from our supposing SPACE to be
 “ Nothing but the Absence of Matter, no such
 “ Absurdities would follow; for when two Bo-
 “ dies do not touch, and there is only SPACE be-
 “ tween them, we say there is nothing between
 “ them — Let their Extremities be extended
 “ ’till they touch, and there is still, we say, no-
 “ thing between them.” †

You tell us that, if we consider this Passage, we shall see that what I before applied to you, of proving that there is no Difference between touching and not touching, may be much more justly turned upon my self**. To support this Accusation you argue as follows “If SPACE is
 “ really Nothing, then Nothing may be SPACE:
 “ I hope the Author will not deny This: If

* Second Def. p. 6.

† Dr. *Clarke's* Notions of SPACE Examined p. 10.

** See Third Def. p. 9.

“ then Nothing be SPACE, I beg leave to repeat
 “ the preceding Passage of this Author, and put
 “ the Word SPACE instead of the Word Nothing;
 “ for he allows, that all we can affirm of SPACE,
 “ we may affirm of Nothing; and therefore What
 “ we can affirm of Nothing, we may affirm of
 “ SPACE. Let us then try the Passage in that
 “ Manner, and see what it will prove. *When two*
 “ *Bodies do not touch, and there is only Nothing*
 “ *between them, we say there is SPACE between*
 “ *them. — Let their Extremities be extended*
 “ *'till they touch, and there is still, we say, SPACE*
 “ *between them.* That is, when the two Bodies
 “ do touch, there is SPACE between them; and
 “ when they do not touch, there is also SPACE
 “ between them: where therefore can the Diffe-
 “ rence be between touching, and not touching?
 “ and will it not also follow, that they do touch,
 “ and do not touch, at the same Time? *”

WHERE the Difference lies, between the touch-
 ing of two Bodies, tho' in both Cases there be
 Nothing between them, I have elsewhere shewn †.
 And it will appear presently, that you have here
 failed in your Endeavours to prove it a Con-
 sequence from What I have said, that there is
 SPACE in both Cases between them; and that
 the Bodies touch, and do not touch at the same
 Time. For pray, good Sir, from whence do you
 derive this Licence of putting one Word for ano-
 ther, just as your Fancy leads you? one would
 imagine, you thought that Words were like the
Sybil's Leaves, which might be blown about, and
 changed with every Breath. The Fallacy to be detect-
 ed lies in the latter Part of your Argument. My

* Third Def. p. 9, 10.

† See p. 25.

Expression was This *viz.* “ Let their Extremities be extended ’till they touch, and there is still we say Nothing between them.” This Sentence, changing the word *Nothing* into *Space*, you thus repeat *viz.* “ Let their Extremities be extended till they touch, and there is still, we say, SPACE between them.” Now to this Twist of Words, I answer that although when two Bodies touch, there is Nothing between them, yet it does not follow, that because *Space* is *Nothing*, therefore there must be SPACE between them: For, when it is said, that there is Nothing between two Bodies which touch; the Term *Nothing* is used in one Sense; and when SPACE is said to be *Nothing*, it is used in another. When we say that SPACE is Nothing, it is used in that Sense which excludes only Things *Real*: But when it is said, that there is Nothing between two Bodies which touch, it is to be understood in that Sense which excludes, not only all *Real* Things, but all *Ideal* Things, or all *Ideas* of any Thing as *between*. The meaning therefore of this Expression is, that there is not any Thing *Real* or *Ideal* between them; *i. e.* There is no *Real Existence* between them, neither have we that *Idea* which represents *Distance* or SPACE, as between them. The Term *Nothing*, when understood in the Sense we here use it does, you see, by being a Negation of all *Ideal*, as well as *Real* Existences, exclude SPACE, which is an *Ideal* Existence, from being, as we say, between the Bodies which touch.

It appears then, that to say *there is Nothing between two Bodies when they touch, therefore, since SPACE is Nothing, there is SPACE between them; is the same as to urge, that because SPACE is Nothing,*

thing, in that Sense which is only a Negation of Things *Real*; therefore when there is Nothing between two Bodies, in that Sense which is a Negation of all *Ideal* Things (and therefore of SPACE among the rest) as well as of all *Real* Things, there is therefore SPACE between them; which is confounding these two different Acceptations of the Term *Nothing* together, in such a manner as to destroy the Use of Language, which I suppose was designed to make Men understand one another; and is arguing in so many Words, that because there is Nothing between two Bodies in that Sense which excludes Things *both Real and Ideal*; therefore (observe the Consequence!) there is Nothing between them in that Sense which excludes *only Things Real*; i. e. because there is *not any Thing Real or Ideal* between them, therefore there is *Something Ideal* between them; there is *not Something Ideal* between them. — This is your Argument, and a curious One it is! But I believe it will hardly be thought sufficient to shew, that it follows from any Thing I had said, that there is SPACE in both Cases (*viz.* when they touch and do not touch) between the Bodies; or, that the Bodies touch, and do not touch at the same Time; but that you have been amusing your Readers, by playing upon the Ambiguity of a Word.

IF you understand the Term Nothing in this Place, in the Sense I here use it *viz.* as a Negation of Things *both Real and Ideal*; your Argument has no Manner of Force. If you understand it in that Sense in which I do not here use it, *viz.* as a Negation of Things *Real only* (which is the Sense I use it in when there is

SPACE between the Bodies) then you are not objecting to me, but to Somebody else, who, like the SPACE you are treating of, is Ideal only.

IN short, the whole Mystery of the Instance above is This: When two Bodies do not touch, and there is only SPACE between them, we say there is Nothing between them; because there is not any Thing really existing between them; yet the Bodies being *distant*, give us the Idea of Distance or SPACE as between them; but still, as Distance and SPACE, according to my Apprehension, are only *Ideas* which have no *Archetypes ad extra*; so we say, that although we have the Idea of Distance or SPACE, as between them; yet there is Nothing or *No-Thing Real* between them. Now when the Bodies do touch, we still say there is Nothing between them; but then, the Bodies not being *distant*, we have not, as we had before, the *Idea* of Distance, or of SPACE: So that in the former Case, there is Nothing between them, but then we had the *Idea* of Distance or SPACE: in the latter Case there is Nothing between them, but then we have not the *Idea* of Distance or of SPACE.—To say then that there is Nothing between two Bodies when they touch, therefore there is SPACE, or there is Distance, because SPACE and Distance are Nothing; is to say that because there is Nothing between them, therefore we must have the *Idea* of their being *distant*, because *Distance* in the *Abstract* is Nothing.

BUT you may farther consider that the Term *Nothing* consists of two Words, and that it is truly a Negation every one knows who understands English; and it is therefore also as evident, that when

when we say SPACE is *No-Thing*, we mean, that SPACE is *not a Thing*: Instead then of saying as you do, that “if SPACE is Nothing then Nothing “ is SPACE”; Let us, to render the Proposition true and intelligible, repeat it thus *viz.* “If “SPACE is not a Thing, then a Thing is not “SPACE”: Now we are got at the Truth, but it is such Truth, as utterly destroys your Argument, and lays open the Fallacy of it. For will it follow, that because SPACE is *not a Thing*, or because a *Thing is not Space*, will it therefore follow, I say, when there is *not a Thing* between two Bodies which touch, that there must be SPACE between them? No: The Reader sees your Argument depends upon its Obscurity, and when brought into the Light, its Fallacy is glaring: when stripp’d of its ambiguous Phrase, and reduced to plain Sense, every one sees that it has not the least Appearance of Force in it. When you say that, *If Nothing is Space, then if there is Nothing between two Bodies which touch, there is Space*; the Fallacy in this Sentence, may not perhaps so plainly appear; but explain it, and say that *If a Thing is not Space, then, if there is not a Thing between two Bodies which touch, there must be Space*; reduce it thus to its proper Meaning, and every one must see, that there is no Manner of Consequence, or Connection in the Proposition.

You say that, “If the Words [*Space and No-thing*] cannot be so altered, then it is most manifest, that SPACE cannot possibly be Nothing, “that is, it must certainly be Something.”* It is most manifest, that this Passage is Nothing to the Purpose. SPACE is not Nothing, in that Sense

* Third Def. p. 10,

which excludes Things *both Real and Ideal*, but what then? does it follow that it cannot be Nothing in that Sense which excludes *only Things Real*? Is it a Consequence, that because it is not Nothing, in a Sense which *denies* it to be any Thing *Ideal*, therefore it cannot be Nothing, in a Sense which yet *allows* it to be a Thing *Ideal*? Therefore when you argue, that SPACE must be *Something*, if it be *not Nothing*; as we only allow it to be *not Nothing*, in that Sense of the Word, which excludes it from being any Thing *either Real or Ideal*; it can only be said, that SPACE is *Something*, because it is not Nothing in that Sense of the Term just mentioned: But then as *Something* is distinguished into *Real and Ideal*, it cannot be said, that because SPACE is not Nothing in that Sense which excludes it from being any Thing *either Real or Ideal*, therefore it is *Something Real*: No; because it may be, as it is, *Something Ideal*: and therefore to say, that SPACE *must certainly be Something* because it is *not Nothing*, as you do in the abovecited Passage, will do you no Service; unless that Argument would prove it to be *Something Real*; *i. e.* *Something* which has an Existence *ad extra*; which that it will not, I hope I have sufficiently shewn.

YOU argue, that if SPACE be not Nothing, it must be *Something*; or, that I must have “found out a Thing that is between *Something* and *Nothing*, which exists, but does not really exist, which seems [say you] to be his Notion of *SPACE*.” *

To say that SPACE is *Something Ideal*, is not to find out a Thing between *Something* and No-

* See Third Def. p. 10, 11.

thing: It is only distinguishing *Things* into *Real* and *Ideal*; a Distinction which you have made necessary, by calling Modes, Relations in the *Abstract*, and all abstract Ideas, *Things*.

MY Notion of SPACE therefore is not, that it is a Thing between Something and Nothing, which exists, but does not really exist: No; but that it is a mere abstract Idea: an Idea which my Mind has formed, from considering Extension in the General: but as Extension in the General is an Idea of pure Intellect, my Imagination therefore supplies this Idea with an Imaginary Substratum, for the Help of the Understanding, as has been before explained. My Mind, by this Means, represents SPACE to me as a *Thing*: but, since this *Thing* is only my own *Idea*, and has no *objective Reality*, I therefore call it an *Ideal Thing*.

“ IF he will tell me [say you] what Sort of
 “ a Thing that is, which is neither Something
 “ nor Nothing, and can shew me the Difference
 “ between the real and not real Existence, of that
 “ which has some Existence; I shall be very ready
 “ to give up the whole Dispute.” *

IT is not so very difficult, to shew the difference, between the *real* and *not real* Existence of that, which has (according to the customary Way of speaking) some Existence. SPACE, if we would speak strictly, has no Existence at all. But as Properties, Relations, and all abstract Ideas, are in common Speech said to exist in the Mind; so SPACE is said to have an *Ideal* Existence, in Contradistinction to those Things which have an Existence *ad extra*. The Difference therefore, between the *real* and *not real* Existence, of that

* Third Def. p. 11.

which has some Existence, is this; *viz.* a Thing is said to have *real Existence*, when it exists *ad extra*; and not to have *real Existence*, and yet *some Existence*, when it exists only in the Mind.

THE Question between us is whether SPACE has *real Existence*. Now I conceive; that *real Existence* can only be applied to What exists *ad extra*. The Dispute then turns upon This *viz.* whether SPACE exists *ad extra*: Your Answer would be, I presume, that *Modes* exist *ad extra*; SPACE is a *Mode*; and therefore SPACE exists *ad extra*. To which I reply

FIRST, That *Modes* do not exist *ad extra*, under any other Consideration, than that of a *modified Substance*, and are Nothing but the *Substance*: But you grant that SPACE is not a modified Substance; and consequently, SPACE does not exist *ad extra*: *Ergo*, if *real Existence* be Existence *ad extra*, it has no *real Existence*, by your own Confession. — Secondly, supposing, but not granting, that *Modes* exist *ad extra*, considered as *Modes*; yet, till SPACE is proved to be a *Mode*, which is a Point that shall be considered in due Time, you will not have proved, that SPACE exists *ad extra*, even upon such a Supposition.

YOU proceed as follows — “ I said in my first
 “ Defence, when I asserted SPACE to be Some-
 “ thing, that *I would not be understood by Things*
 “ *to mean a Substance &c.* I doubt then, answers
 “ he, he will find it pretty difficult to be under-
 “ stood at all; for if it be a *Thing existing* and yet
 “ not a *Substance*, then it is a Thing that is nei-
 “ ther *Body* nor *Spirit &c.* I need not trouble
 “ the Reader with any more of this Page. It
 “ seems very odd, that any Person should try to
 “ exclude

“ exclude *Properties*, from coming under the *Genus* comprehended in the Word *Thing**.

It seems very odd, that you should imagine this Sort of Reasoning would do you any Service: For, in the first Place, I do not exclude *Properties* from coming under the *Genus* comprehended in the Word *Thing*: But then I say, that in the *Abstract* they come under that *Genus*, only as *Ideal Things*; and in the *Subject* are *Real Things*, in no other Sense, than as they are the *Subject it self*, under such, or such a Consideration. If therefore by *Thing* you mean a *mere Property*, or a *Property* in the *Abstract*; then I may readily grant SPACE to be a *Thing*: but then you are but just where you set out; for, since it does not follow from this Argument, that SPACE is a *Real Thing*, or that it hath Existence *ad extra*, you have been talking in vain. But if you mean that it is a *Property in some Subject*; then indeed it will be a *Real Thing*; but yet in no other Sense, than as it is the *Subject it self* under such a Consideration. The Reason therefore why I said that SPACE, if it was a *Thing*, must either be *Body* or *Spirit*, was, because I imagined you intended to prove it to be a *Real Thing*, *i. e.* to have Existence *ad extra*: And if it be a *Real Thing*; then, for the Reasons just given, my Argument was sound and conclusive; and I still repeat, that it must be either *Body* or *Spirit*: and therefore I fancy, that the Reason why you did not trouble the Reader with any more of the following Pages was, because it might have troubled you to answer them.

* Third Def. p. 11.

SECONDLY, supposing *Properties* to come under the *Genus* comprehended in the Word *Thing*, in any Sense you please; suppose 'em to be *Real Things*; yet you have done Nothing, unless you had proved that *Space* is a *Property*. When you have evinced This, I will grant *SPACE* to be a *Thing* in any Sense you shall chuse: Nay, I now grant it to be a *Thing*, if *abstract Ideas* are *Things*. But what will follow from hence? will it follow, that *SPACE* is a *real Property of any Being*, or that *SPACE* is a *Property of the Almighty*? I confess this is a *Conclusion* too abstruse for my narrow Understanding to comprehend; and, if this does not follow, what have you gained by your *Ambages Verborum*, your *Genus* and your *Species*, since you are ne'er the nearer having proved what you contend for?

You go on — “ would any one say, that because Knowledge is not a Substance, it is therefore Nothing ” — and a little farther — “ I dare say that this Author will not allow Knowledge to be either Body or Spirit, and yet it must certainly be Something. ” * To This I answer, that, if by *Something*, you mean That which has Existence, in the more true and strict Sense of the Word, *i. e.* Existence *ad extra*, then I deny Knowledge to be Some-Thing: But, if you mean by it only, *Something Ideal*, in which Sense *Whiteness*, *Extension*, and all other *abstract Ideas* are called *Somethings*, then I grant *Knowledge* to be *Something*.

You ask — “ If Knowledge is really Nothing, where is the Difference between a Wise and an Ignorant Man, when by the Supposition, there

* Third Def. p. 11, 12.

“ is Nothing more in the One than in the Other.”*
 This is fallacious: But however, to satisfy you, Sir, the Difference between a Wise and an Ignorant Man is, that the Wise Man knows, what the Ignorant Man does not: yet Knowledge and Ignorance in the *Abstract* are Nothing but *abstract Ideas*; and the Difference is, to speak properly, constituted only by the Men themselves; one of whom *Knows*, whilst the other is *Ignorant*.

IF Knowledge be Nothing, then you urge, that *by the Supposition, there is Nothing more in the One than in the Other*. When we say that *Knowledge is Nothing*, we mean, that *Knowledge considered abstractedly, is No-Thing really existing*: and therefore, it only follows, that *by the Supposition, there is No-Thing really existing, more in the One, than in the Other*: And This is true. For do you imagine, that *Knowledge is a Thing really existing within a Man*? If you do, I can't help it: But all that I understand by *Knowledge being in a Man*, is, that a Man *Knows*. Thus *Length*, considered merely as *Length*, or in the *Abstract*, is no *real Thing*: and it is as true, that *Length* is not any *real Thing existing in a long Body*, any more than it is in a short one. But does it follow, that because *Length in the abstract, is Nothing real, nor any Thing existing in a Body*, therefore there is no Difference between a long Body and a short one? The Case here is the same, as in your Instance of the Wise and the Ignorant Man; *Length and Knowledge, are not Things existing within the Body, or within the Man: Knowledge is not one Thing, and the Man another; or Length*

* Third Def. p. 11.

one Thing, and the *Body* another; But the *Man*, and the *Body*, are the only *real Things*; and *Knowledge* and *Length* are only *Ideas* formed by *Abstraction*: Tho' *Length* and *Knowledge* therefore are Nothing, nor can be properly said to exist *in* those Things which are called their Subjects; yet it does not follow, that there is no Difference between a long *Body* and a short one, a wise and an ignorant *Man*. There is Nothing, 'tis true, *in* one more than *in* the other: but then, one happens to be Long, and the other Short; one to be Wise, and the other Ignorant: Here is the Difference, which is not constituted by any *Thing within* 'em, but by *Themselves*. — I wish, Sir, you had *known* here, as well as in your Preface, that *Quibbles and Wrangling upon Words are endless*: For it no more follows, that *Knowledge* must be *Something real*, because we commonly say, that there is *Knowledge* in *Men*; than that *Difference* must be *Something real*, because we say there is *Difference* in *Men*.

BUT you proceed — “were it Nothing, we “ could truly deny every Thing of it, and then “ there could be no Difference between a Persons “ having, or not having it.” *

WHEN we say, that a *Man has Knowledge*, we mean only that he *Knows*: not, that *Knowledge* is any Thing really existing, which he actually *has*, and *possesses*, as he *has*, and *possesses* his *Estate*. We say a *Man has Knowledge*, as we say a *Man has Sobriety*; that is, that he is *Sober*; not that *Sobriety* is any Thing *of it self* distinct from the *Man*, which He can be said to *have*: No; *Sobriety* is not one Thing real, and the *Man* ano-

* Third Def. p. 12.

ther; but it is either a *mere abstract Idea*, or else the *Sober Man himself*.

BUT does it follow that, because *Sobriety* is not any Thing distinct by it self, and cannot be *had* by any Man, as He *has* his *Bottle*, therefore that there is no Difference between a Sober Man and a Drunkard? No sober Man, I am sure, can think so; and yet unless you had proved this, you have not proved what you aim at, namely, that if Knowledge be not *Something* of it self, there is no Difference between a Wise and an Ignorant Man.

BUT you tell me, "There is no Way to escape
 " this Rock without sailing between Something
 " and Nothing." * — If so, I must beg the
 favour of you, Sir, to be my Pilot! for this is a
 Course you are well acquainted with; and which
 I am afraid you must often yet Steer, before we
 have done with SPACE. But I cannot escape
 this Rock, it seems, "without imagining that
 " Knowledge may be Nothing, and yet that
 " Something may be affirmed of it &c." † This
 is the *Charibdis* to your *Scylla*; but I hope I shall
 escape 'em both. For there is no Necessity, that
 if Knowledge in the *abstract* be Nothing, there-
 fore there must either be no Difference between a
 Wise and an Ignorant Man; or else, that I must
 imagine Knowledge to be Nothing, and yet that
 Something may be affirmed of it: There is no
 Necessity for either of these, I say; for though
 Knowledge in the *abstract* is Nothing; yet a Wise
 Man differs from an Ignorant Man, in that he
Knows, whilst the Ignorant Man *does not*: and
 yet this is not to imagine that Knowledge is No-

* Third Def. p. 12.

† Ibid.

thing, and yet that Something may be affirmed of it: For I do not affirm any Thing of Knowledge as a *real Thing*; but, as we ought to do, of the *Knowing Man* only. It is not Knowledge which the *Man has in* him, that makes him differ from the Ignorant Man; but it is *He himself* which constitutes the Difference. There is no Necessity therefore, to Sail between these two Difficulties, when (to use your Words) *I can so easily go wide of them both.*

YOU Remark — “The Gentleman, I think, had
 “ no Reason to be so desirous to be told, what SPACE
 “ is, supposing it to be neither Body nor Spirit:
 “ I had often enough said in my first Defence,
 “ that it was a Property.”* Now, in my Opinion, the Gentleman had very good Reason to be so desirous of knowing, what that strange Kind of a Thing could be, which was neither *Body* nor *Spirit*, and yet was a *real Existence*: For, tho’ it is true, you had often enough *said* in your *First Defence*, that it was a *Property*; yet it happened, that you never *proved* it: And therefore, if you had *said* it ten Times oftner than you did, the Gentleman would still have had the same Reason, to have made farther Enquiries about it. Besides, had you proved it to have been a *Property*, it must then have been either *Body* or *Spirit*, or else a *Property* in the *Abstract* only; to say therefore, that SPACE is neither *Body* nor *Spirit*, *but* a *Property*, is indeed, as you say, *going wide of ’em both*; but then it is running directly upon a *Property* in the *Abstract*.

I had said that, “ Although when two Bo
 “ dies touch, and when they do not touch (i

* Third Def. p. 12.

“ all Matter be removed (from between) there is
 “ in both Cases Nothing between them; yet it
 “ does not follow, that there is no Difference be-
 “ tween touching and not touching: That they
 “ do not differ in this Respect, is very true, but
 “ they do differ in there being SPACE between
 “ them: Yet it will not follow that SPACE must
 “ be Something *really existing*.”* To this you
 reply — “ I confess I do not clearly understand
 “ this Passage: He seems to own that there is a
 “ Difference in there being or not being SPACE
 “ between the two Bodies; and yet says that it
 “ does not therefore follow that SPACE is any
 “ Thing. I should be very glad to see what
 “ the Difference is, if that which Causes the
 “ Difference be Nothing.” †

As to your *not clearly understanding this Passage*,
 it is none of my Fault: I think it is clear enough
 for any Body to understand, but those whose In-
 terest it is not to understand it. *I own that there*
is a Difference in there being or not being Space be-
tween the two Bodies; i. e. I own that there is a
Difference in there being, or not being Distance
between the two Bodies, or in the Bodies being
distant, without any Matter between them; and
yet I say, that it does not therefore follow, that Space
is any Thing; i. e. it does not therefore follow,
that Distance is any Thing. You should be very
glad to see, you say, what the Difference is, if that
which causes the Difference be Nothing: but that
which causes the Difference is not Nothing; for
it is not Space, or Distance, which causes the Dif-
ference, but the Bodies themselves.

* Dr. Clarke's Notions of SPACE Examined p. 15.

† Third Def. p. 14.

“ THE Difference [you say] between us seems
 “ now to be brought to a very narrow Compass,
 “ and is no more than This : whether it does
 “ not follow, from their being a Difference be-
 “ between touching, and not touching, as he grants
 “ there is ; that when two Bodies do not touch,
 “ there must be Something between them.” *
 It seems then, you have but just now found out
 where the Pinch of the Question lay ; and, that
 you have been all along supposing the *main Point*,
 without knowing any thing at all of the Matter :
 But I am glad you [see it at last ; for, I perceive
 you now begin to be sensible, that the Reason
 why you imagined, that when two Bodies did
 not touch, there must be Something between them,
 was, because you thought it self-evident, that
 the Difference of touching and not touching, con-
 sisted in the Existence or non-Existence of *Some-
 thing between* : but this is so far from being self-
 evident, that it is manifestly false : yet this is
 the Principle on which your whole *Demonstra-
 tion* is founded ; and 'tis to this we owe such a
 curious Chain of Reasoning.

BUT surely, Sir, now you have found out
 where the Difference lies between us, and have
 brought it to so *narrow a Compass* ; we might rea-
 sonably have expected, that you should have en-
 deavoured to give us some Proof, of what you
 had before taken for granted ; and have shewn us,
 how it followed, from there being a *Difference*
 between touching and not touching, that when
 two Bodies do not touch there must be *Something*
between 'em ; and not have left your Subject just
 where you found it : you see that the Truth of

* Third Def. p. 15.

your Argument depends upon shewing, that the Difference &c. consists in the Existence, or non-Existence of *Something between*; and yet you do not so much as offer at any Proof of it; but leave it to me to shew where the Difference lies, if it does not lie where you imagine; which is shifting off the Proof from your self. What is it to me where the Difference lies? you argue upon Supposition that it consists in the Existence or non-Existence of *Something between*: This is what therefore you ought to prove; otherwise your Argument is built upon a Principle, which does not appear to be true, and is consequently no Argument at all.

You think it sufficient to shut up all with saying, that, "If this Gentleman can any Way shew the Difference which he allows, between touching and not touching, supposing two Bodies to have Nothing between them, and yet not to touch; he will then, and not till then prove what he has spent so many Pages here in trying to do." * What I spent so many Pages in trying to do, was, I think, to shew that you *supposed the very Point to be proved*: which if I have done, I should fancy it will be but little Satisfaction to you, to number the Pages, and to reflect *how many I have spent in doing it*. Now in Order to do This, there was no Occasion for me to *shew the Difference between touching and not touching, supposing two Bodies to have Nothing between them, and yet not to touch*: but only to prove that you took it for granted, that the Difference consisted in the Existence, or non-Existence of *Something between*; and this I have done: It is your

* Third Def. p. 15.

Business therefore, to shew us, that the Difference does consist in what you have hitherto *supposed*; and *you will then, and not till then, prove what you have spent so many Pages here, in trying to do.*

BUT however, Sir, you find that I have not stood so precisely on the strict Rules of Controversy; for I have complied with your Request, and have shewn you, wherein the Difference of the touching and not touching of two Bodies consists; tho' in each Case there is supposed to be Nothing between them*.

To conclude this Argument—— I charged you with supposing the very Point to be proved in the Instance of your two Walls: You have laboured to get off; and after much Quibbling and many Doublings and Turnings confess at last, that the main Point of Dispute between us is, whether it does not follow from there being a Difference between touching and not touching; that when two Bodies do not touch there must be Something between them; that is, that the main Point of Dispute is, whether the Difference of touching and not touching, consists in the Existence or non-Existence of Something between; which you have all along taken for granted; and on which your whole Argument depends: yet, you have not offer'd at any Proof of it; even now, when you own it to be the only Difference between us: which is ending as you begun with *supposing the very Point to be proved*: I therefore repeat that Charge once more, and leave you, to get clear of it at your leisure.

AND thus I have considered every Thing which bears the Face of an Argument for the *Reality of*

* See p. 25. *et c.*

SPACE, from the Difference between two Walls touching and not touching; and have answered your Objections relating to this Point; and I hope it appears, that you have added no Reinforcement to your former Argument above the Dignity of a Sophism, or a Quibble in Language. I fear the Reader will think I have been too minute and particular, and I can only offer in Excuse, that you led me through a Path, wherein I have been obliged to follow you, as I had no other way of unravelling your Sophistry, and guarding against future Cavils.

ARGUMENT II.

That the Idea of SPACE is not the Idea of a PRIVATION.

“ THE Idea [say you] arising from a Privation is not an Idea of the mere Absence of the Thing only; for that would be an Idea of Nothing.”* The Idea arising from a Privation is not in one Sense an Idea of the *mere Absence* of the Thing; because it is always an Idea connected with the Idea of *That* whose Absence you consider: but though it be not an Idea of *mere Absence*, yet it is not therefore, as you would argue, an Idea of *Some Place* which hath *real Existence* without That Thing. It is not an Idea of a *Place*, as any Thing distinct and separate from that Body; it is only a reflection that the Body which once did bear a certain Relation

* Third Def. p. 22.

to other Bodies, does no longer bear that Relation.

You tell us, that you “have a Positive Idea of a Dog: Now suppose [you add] by any Accident, all the Dogs in the World were dead; would this Author say, that he had a Positive Idea of no Dog *?” No Sir; unless you take 'em out of the World after their Decease: for otherwise, my Idea would only be an Idea of a Parcel of dead Dogs instead of living Ones. But, if you suppose all Dogs to cease to exist; Then I affirm, that I should have the *Positive Idea* of No-Dog; which I should gain by reflecting, that Dogs did once exist, but that they now do not; *i. e.* I should reflect, that they were all dead and gone; which is a *Positive Idea*; for pray what is a *Negative Idea*? I think he who found Fault with *Negative Properties*, should have been aware of *Negative Ideas*: and I may answer you in your own Words, *viz.* *The Author should have explained what he means by a Positive Idea: are there any Ideas that are not Positive? That which is called an Idea, must be either an Idea, or not an Idea; or, is there Something between an Idea, and no Idea? as he seems to imagine Absence to be, I know not what, between an Idea, and no Idea. I confess I cannot frame to my self any Notion at all of a Negative Idea: If there are such, I shall be obliged to this Gentleman, if he will shew me what Sort of an Idea, a Negative Idea is; and make appear the Difference between that, and a Positive one †.*

THE Difference, which Mr. Locke may seem to make between *Positive* and *Privative Ideas*, is

* Third Def. p. 22.

† See Ibid. p. 18, 19.
only

only in their *Causes*, or rather *Reasons*, not in the *Ideas*, as they are in the Mind. All *Ideas* are *Positive*; tho' the *Reasons* of such *Ideas*, may sometimes be *Privations* — “Whatever (says he) “ may be the external Cause of it, when it comes “ to be taken Notice of by our discerning Fa- “ culty, it is by the Mind looked on and confi- “ dered there, to be a real *Positive Idea* in the “ Understanding, as much as any other whatso- “ ever; though perhaps the Cause of it be but “ a *Privation* in the Subject.” * The Idea there- fore of the mere Absence of a Dog, tho' the Cause be a *Privation*, is a real *Positive Idea* in the Understanding, as much as any other whatsoever: and therefore 'tis plain from Mr. Locke, that he would have said, he could have a *Positive Idea* of *No-Dog*.

You ask, “what would the Idea of the real, “ or supposed Absence of all Dogs be? I appeal “ to himself, whether it would not be an Idea “ of some Place without a Dog, where he had “ either seen, or supposed a Dog to be.” † I answer, that it would be a Reflection that such and such Things, which did once bear a Relation of Site to Dogs, no longer bear any such Relation to that Sort of Animal: it would not be an Idea of the *Place* of those Dogs as Something existing *ad extra*; but only the *abstract Idea* of that *Relation of Site*, which I had either seen, or supposed Dogs to bear to other Things.

IF I have a *Positive Idea* of no Dog, then you say, “That all Ideas whatever arising from *Privations*, must be Nothing, because they must

* Locke Hum. Understand. B. 2. c. 8. §. 1.

† Third Def. p. 22.

“ be all alike ; for an Idea of no Dog, cannot be “ different from an Idea of no Horse.” * That all Ideas whatever arising from Privations must be all alike, is what I defy you to prove: for an Idea of no Dog is just as different from the Idea of no Horse, as a Dog is from an Horse: for, otherwise we might say the very same Thing to you, upon a Supposition that the Idea of no Dog was an Idea of some really existing *Place* without a Dog; as you imagine it: for I would then ask, where is the Difference between the Idea of a Place without a Dog, and the Idea of a Place without an Horse?

“ THE Idea of the Absence of Something [you say] “ must be the Idea of Nothing &c.” † Very true! the Idea of the Absence of Something, *quatenus Absence*, is the Idea of no Thing; *i. e.* no Thing *ad extra*: but what then? is it therefore *no Idea*? yes surely it is! and a Positive one too, made by reflecting on the Thing whose Absence you consider.

You think “ it is incumbent upon this Author, since he has an Idea of Nothing, and of “ different Nothings, to tell us what Sort of an “ Idea it is; and how the Ideas of different No- “ things are distinguished amongst one another; “ and wherein they differ from other Ideas.” ** These are mere Words — when I have the Ideas of the Absence of different Things, these are not Ideas of *different Nothings*: they are only *different Ideas*, which have no *objective Realities*; and are formed from reflecting on those *different Things*, whose *Absence* I consider: These different Ideas

* Third Def. p. 22.

† Ibid. p. 23.

** Ibid.

are distinguished amongst one another, according to the different Things, whose Absence they are Ideas of.

As to our *Idea* of SPACE, I have all along said, that I think *Reflection* must be taken into the Account * : I imagine, that the *Idea* of SPACE is formed from reflecting upon *Body*, tho' we may not always take Notice of such Reflection. It is formed from conceiving *Body* away : This Conception (we having at the same time the *Idea* of the *Extension* of *Body*) leaves us the *Idea* of *Extension* in the *general*, without any particular extended Substance. This is not the *Idea* of *real Place*, as any Thing existing *ad extra*; but it is the *Idea* of the *Absence of Body*, conceived after the Manner of *Extension*. The *Idea* therefore of the *Absence of Body*, seems to me to be an *Idea* of *Reflection* : and such an *Idea* is as *positive* as any other *Idea* whatsoever, tho' it be the *Idea* of a *Privation*. The *Absence of Body* is as *positive* an *Idea*, as the *Idea* of *Body* : The *Idea* of the *Absence* of any Thing is not (as you would have us imagine) the *positive* *Idea* of a *real Place* existing *ad extra* without that Thing : It is only a *positive* *Idea* of the *Relation of Site*, which any *Body* did once bear to another, considered now without the *Real Body*. To suppose a *Body* absent from any *Place* is only supposing it to cease from bearing such a *Relation*, as it once did ; but *Relation* is *Nothing ad extra*. By daily considering *Bodies* bearing such and such *Relations* to each other, which we call *existing in Place* ; when we imagine these *Bodies* away, we apply their *Dimensions* to an imaginary *Part* of

* See Dr. *Clarke's* Notions of SPACE Examined p. 67.

SPACE: and as we before considered these *real* Dimensions to bear a Relation to other Bodies; so we conceive these *imaginary* Dimensions to do; and thence some are led to consider this *imaginary Part* of SPACE, thus clothed with *Ideal* Dimensions, to be a *Place really existing* without Body.

I shall take occasion here, to shew the Weakness of an Objection I meet with in the *Vindication* of your *Second Defence*. I had told you that, “when we suppose the Bodies away, we are apt to apply their Dimensions to that *imaginary Part* of SPACE where we considered them before existing.”* To which you answer — “what is This, but saying that Nothing exists but in Imagination? for, if Bodies exist only in some *imaginary Place*, they cannot really and truly exist at all.”† Pray Sir, who told you, that Bodies existed in *imaginary Place*? This is a mere Imagination of your own. I said that Bodies existed in an *imaginary Part* of *Space*. We deny SPACE to have *real* Parts, or to be any Thing *real*; and therefore, when we talk of the *Parts* of SPACE, those *Parts* are *Imaginary*; imaginary Substrata of imaginary Extension. I said not that Bodies existed in *imaginary Place*: No; the *Place* is *real*; *i. e.* *real Place*; For *Place* is the *Relation of Site* which one Body bears to another; and this *Relation* is *real Relation*. A Body therefore, tho’ it exists in an *imaginary Part* of SPACE yet exists in a *real Place*; that is, it bears a *Relation of Site* to other Bodies. When we suppose the Bodies away; then indeed the *Place* is *imaginary*: it is the *abstract Idea* of *Relation*, as

* Dr. Clarke’s Notions of SPACE Examined p. 131.

† Third Def. p. 92.

has been before explained. — Thus much for the Objection as it occurs in the *Vindication* of your *Second Defence*.

You say, you — “ Know of no Privation
 “ that we can have an Idea of, merely as the Ab-
 “ sence of the Thing, He instances [say you]
 “ in the Case of Darkness, which is a Privation
 “ of Light. To which I say, that no Man can
 “ have an Idea of Darkness *no where* &c.” * *Light*
 is That, by means of which we see the various
 Objects which surround us, and consider *them* as
 existing in Place; *i. e.* as bearing different Rela-
 tions of Site to each other. We are accustomed
 to refer all our *Ideas*, of *Imagination* at least, to
 Something *without* us; and to consider SPACE as
 a *common Receptacle*. Hence we refer the *Idea* of
Light to Something *without* us, as correspondent
 to that *Idea*: and as every Thing is conceived
 to exist in Place, we at length imagine *Light* as
 existing in some Place: and because *Darkness* is
 only a *Privation of Light*, we in like Manner re-
 fer the *Idea* of *Darkness* to *without*, and fancy
 it as a *Place* without *Light*. Thus we refer
Sound and *Silence* to *without*; and thence ima-
 gine *Sound* to be in *Place*, and *Silence* to be
 a *Place* without *Sound*: whereas, whoever will
 consider his own *Ideas*, and reflect a little upon
 his Manner of acquiring them, will find, that
 the *Idea* of *Darkness*, &c. is truly an *Idea* of a
mere Privation.

You take the Truth to be “ that we are so
 “ very conversant with *Place*, *Space*, &c. that,
 “ when any Thing by being taken away, cau-
 “ ses a privative *Idea*, we consider it only as

* Third Def. p. 24. &c.

“ the Absence of the Thing, without consider-
 “ ing the Place.” *

Now, Sir, I take the Truth to be this — we are used to consider Things existing *without* us, as bearing Relations to one another; and when any of these Things, by being taken away, causes a privative Idea; we, by reflecting on the Relation which we have seen or supposed it to bear to other Things, are apt to fancy such *Ideal Relation* as a *Real Place* without that Thing; whereas, it is only the *abstract Idea of Relation*.

You add — “ If we try to find out the Na-
 “ ture of such an Idea, we shall see that we can-
 “ not frame to ourselves the Idea of any Priva-
 “ tion at all, merely as a Privation.” †

IF, by *merely as a Privation*, you mean, that we cannot frame to ourselves an Idea of the Absence of any Thing, without an Idea of some *really existing Place*, from whence we suppose the Thing to be absent, then I say, we *can* frame to ourselves an Idea of the Absence of a Thing, *merely as a Privation*; because it is only framing an Idea of a Thing, ceasing to bear such or such a Relation to other Things; which is not an Idea of any *real Place*, existing *ad extra*; but only an *abstract Idea of Relation*. — If, by *merely as a Privation*, you mean, that we cannot form an Idea of the Absence of a Thing, without considering the *Thing it self*, and supposing it to cease from bearing a Relation to other Things; then I allow we cannot frame to ourselves the Idea of any Privation, *merely as a Privation*: But what then? Relation of Situation is not a *really existing Place*: it is Nothing but the Bodies them-

* Third Def. p. 25.

† Ibid.

selves bearing such Relation, and considered without the Bodies, is but an *abstract Idea*. A Place without a particular Body is the Relation of that Body considered in the *Abstract*, and is not any Thing *ad extra*: and this is, truly speaking, an Idea of a Privation, *merely as a Privation*.

YOU observe — “If this be true [if we cannot frame an Idea of a Privation merely as a Privation] then it is impossible for us to have any simple Ideas from Nothing; *contrary to what this Author asserts page 30.*” *

THIS, Sir, is charging me with what is directly false in Fact; as any one will find, who turns to the Page you cite: I there say, that Mr. *Locke* “gives us a Reason why a *privative Cause*, may in some Cases at least, produce a *positive Idea* &c.” But is this asserting, that we may have simple Ideas from Nothing, in such a Sense as will do you any Service? No; for you may remember that I told you in p. 68, that, “when Mr. *Locke* says, that Privations may be *Causes* of Ideas in the Mind [which is what you call having Ideas from Nothing] he does not mean, that Privations, which are Nothing *ad extra*, may be *actual Causes*, but rather *Reasons* why we have Those Ideas.” Now, who would imagine, after such an Explanation of what I understood Mr. *Locke* to mean, by saying that a *privative Cause* may produce a *positive Idea*; who would think, I say, that after this, you should venture to assert that I said, we might have simple Ideas from Nothing? and who will not still wonder more at this your Assertion, when he turns to my 66th Page, where he will read (what

* Third Def. p. 25.

you ought to have remember'd) the following Words, which are *in Terms* directly opposite to what you here pretend to fix upon me? The Words are These — “ I grant it is impossible, “ and contradictory that we should have a *simple* “ *Idea*, or indeed *any Idea* at all *from* Nothing ; “ or, that Nothing should be the *Cause* of a sim- “ ple, or of any *Idea* in us : But to have an “ *Idea*, or a *simple Idea of* Nothing (*i. e.* to have “ an *Idea*, or a *simple Idea* which has Nothing “ existing without us, correspondent to it) is far “ from impossible.” * — Let any one compare this with what I had said in p. 30, and judge whether you had any Reason to think I meant, that we might have *simple Ideas from* Nothing ! or whether you have not asserted Something directly contrary to what I said, and what you will find impossible to make good.—I answer then to your present Argument, that our Ideas of Privations, or of the Absence of any Thing, are not Ideas *from* Nothing : We have not the Idea of the Absence of Body *from* mere *Absence* (considered in any other Sense than as a Reason) but *from* Body ; that is, from reflecting on Body : yet this is an Idea of a Privation, *merely as a Privation ; i. e.* without supposing it absent from any *really existing Place*.

* Dr. Clarke's Notions of SPACE, Examined p. 66, 67.

A R G U M E N T III.

*That SPACE is not, like WHITENESS, an
ABSTRACT IDEA.*

THE Substance of what you say in Defence of this Point, is This — “ An abstract Idea
“ is an Idea of a Quality of Body, which we
“ may conceive without any *particular Body*, but
“ yet *not without any Body at all*: Thus, tho’ we
“ can have the Idea of Whiteness, without any
“ particular white Body, yet we cannot have the
“ Idea of Whiteness without *any Body at all*:
“ But we can have an Idea of SPACE, *without*
“ *any Body, or material Substance at all*. The
“ Difference therefore between *Whiteness* and *Space*
“ is plain: and consequently *Space* is not like
“ *Whiteness*, or an *abstract Idea*.” * This I be-
lieve you will acknowledge to be your Argument
in its full Force: But I am apt to think, if you
would impartially consider, that you would find,
there is not this Difference between *Whiteness* and
SPACE.

IT is very true, we cannot have the Idea of
Whiteness *without any Body at all*: but then, this
Body may be only an *Imaginary Substratum*, form-
ed by the Mind, for the help of the Under-
standing. It is an Idea of *Somewhat*, with
one Quality only, namely *Whiteness*; that is,
an *Ideal white Somewhat*, and that’s all. Nor
is the Case different in SPACE: for we cannot
have, as you would urge, an Idea of SPACE,

* See Third Def. p. 17, 18.

without any Body or material Substance at all: The Mind is always ready with an imaginary Substratum upon the Occasion. We can indeed have the Idea of SPACE, without considering it as the Extension of any particular Body; but not without considering it, as Somewhat with the Idea of one Quality only, namely Extension. Thus you see, or at least may see, that Whiteness and Space exactly agree in that, wherein you imagined them to differ. The Idea of Whiteness is an Ideal white Somewhat: and the Idea of SPACE is an Ideal extended Somewhat: We can no more therefore have the Idea of SPACE without any Body or material Substance at all, i. e. without an extended Somewhat, than we can have an Idea of Whiteness without any Body at all, i. e. without a white Somewhat; unless Spirit can be extended like Matter.

“ Let any Person try [say you] whether he
 “ can frame to himself an Idea of a white No-
 “ thing.”* And, in return I say, Let any Per-
 son try, whether he can frame to himself an Idea
 of an *Extended Nothing*: I believe he will find
 one, full as easy as the other.

IN the Instance of your two Bodies, you talk
 of a *cubic Yard of Space* between them; whereby
 it is most evident, that you yourself cannot speak
 of SPACE, but your Mind presently suggests to
 you a material Substratum, for your Thoughts to
 rest on; and that you cannot have the Idea of SPACE,
without any Body or material Substance at all. To ar-
 gue therefore, that you can, and yet to talk of *cubic*

* Third Def. p. 17.

Yards of Space, is to argue, that you can have an Idea, which 'tis plain you cannot; and is consequently arguing against your own Ideas; unless you would talk of *cubic Yards of Spirit*, and *cubic Yards of the Divine Substance*. For, however harsh and absurd these Expressions may appear, they must be your own: For, if SPACE be the real Extension of the Self-existent Being, and you measure that Extension by cubic Yards; 'tis Nothing less than saying, what I have mentioned. If you deny your Meaning to be this; and own, that cubic Yards are only *material Measures*; then since you apply them to SPACE, it appears, that when you have the Idea of SPACE, you consider it either as a Real, or Ideal extended material Something: and if you cannot have the Idea of SPACE, without the Ideas of such material Measures (as it appears you cannot, by your general Expressions concerning it) then, I think, we may with Reason conclude, that you cannot have, what you would persuade us that you can, *viz.* the Idea of SPACE, *without any Body or material Substance at all.*

YOU appeal to me — “Let him say in the fore-mentioned Instance of two Bodies that are distant from each other, without having any Matter between them, whether he has not an Idea of SPACE between the two Bodies.” *

I answer, yes; allowing for the Impropriety of saying, that any Thing *ideal can be* between. But altho', Sir, there be no Matter between the Bodies, and I have the Idea of SPACE; yet, I have not the *Idea of SPACE, without any material Substance at all*, as you would from hence infer; but

* Third Def. p. 18.

my Idea, is an imaginary material Substratum, *i. e.* an ideal extended Somewhat. For till *Spirit* is proved to be *extended*, Extension is only applicable to *Matter*.

“ Let him also say [you continue] whether he
“ can possibly have any Idea of *Whiteness* between
“ them, whilst there is no *Matter* there.” *

I Reply, yes; as well as I can of *SPACE*: for it is only forming an imaginary Substratum in my Mind; and then I have an Idea of *Whiteness* between them, or an Ideal white Somewhat, as much as I have of *SPACE*, or an Ideal extended Somewhat.

YOU had said, that “ *Whiteness* is only owing
“ to a particular Texture of Parts upon the Surface
“ of the white Body &c. But the Extension of,
“ or the *SPACE* in which any Body exists, nei-
“ ther is, nor can possibly be owing to any Tex-
“ ture of Parts or Difference of Surface; since,
“ were *Matter* either square or round, or any o-
“ ther Shape whatever, it must necessarily be
“ extended; that is, must exist in some Part of
“ *SPACE*.” †

THIS, I thought, was “ little to our Purpose:
“ For, of what Significancy in the present Di-
“ spute is it, whether the Ideas of Extension and
“ *Whiteness* be excited in the same Manner or
“ not ? ” **

BUT you now tell us, that your Meaning is not what it seemed to be; for, that “ the Difference was not supposed to consist in any different
“ Excitement, but in the one’s being distinct and

* Third Def. p. 18.

† First Def. p. 3.

** Dr. *Clarke’s* Notions of *SPACE*, Examined p. 19.

“ *sepa-*

“ separate from Body, and in the other’s being
 “ necessarily joined with it.” *

LET This be your Meaning, yet I must own, Sir, I cannot see any Force in this Argument. *Whiteness* is an Idea owing to a particular Texture of Parts, but *Extension* is not; *Whiteness* is not necessarily join’d with Body in general, as *Extension* is, but only to particular Bodies: and what then? can we not have the Idea of *Extension* in the *Abstract*, as we have an Idea of *Whiteness* in the *Abstract*? what, tho’ one is joined with all Bodies, and the other not? does that hinder us from justly illustrating our *abstract* Idea of *Extension* by the *abstract* Idea of *Whiteness*? *Whiteness* considered without a white Body is an *abstract* Idea, which can have no Subsistence of it self: So is *pure Extension*: in this they agree; and this is all the agreement between them, that Mr. Law, I believe, ever intended.

THO’ *Whiteness* is not a Quality of all Bodies, yet it is considered as a Quality of *Body*: and the Idea of this Quality in *general*, or in the *Abstract*, without any particular Body, I think, may be very well used to illustrate the Idea of *Extension* in *general*, or in the *Abstract*, without any particular Body. — If you think otherwise, we can’t help it: The Cause by no means depends upon this; so that your Objection is but trifling at best; for I imagine, you would hardly make it an Argument, even supposing Mr. Law’s Instance to be improper, which he uses to illustrate his Notion of SPACE, therefore that his *Notion* of SPACE was *wrong*: For, would it follow that his *Notion* of SPACE, as *Extension* in the *Abstract*, is

* Third Def. p. 18.

wrong; because *Whiteness*, which in the *Abstract* is the Instance he makes use of, is not, like *Extension*, a Quality or Mode of Body in general? No surely! But however, the Question to be asked here is only this; whether or no, because *Whiteness* does not agree with *Extension*, in being a Quality of all Bodies; it therefore follows, that *Whiteness* in the *Abstract* does not agree with *Extension* in the *Abstract*, in being an *abstract Idea* which can have no Subsistence of it self? for, as I observed before, this was all the Agreement Mr. *Law* supposed between them: If they do agree in this, Mr. *Law* has properly used the Instance; and you have been talking to no Purpose. There is no Occasion therefore, to take any further Notice of what you say upon this, in the *Vindication* of your *Second Defence* p. 81.

BUT there is an Objection which you make in Relation to my Reasoning, which I must not forget to remark upon. It had been said that SPACE is *Extension* considered *abstractedly*; as *Whiteness* without a *white Body*. Upon which you observe very gravely; that “This Gentleman’s Reasoning will prove *Whiteness* to be SPACE.”* I dare say the Reader must be big with Expectation of what this Mountain will bring forth! — It is This — “If *Whiteness* be Nothing, and SPACE “also be Nothing, *Whiteness* is SPACE; it being as impossible, that two Things should be “a Third, without being one another; as that “two Things should be equal to a Third, without being equal to one another.”† To what Purpose, Sir, have you been so conversant with Logicians, if it was only to make use of their

* Third Def. p. 16.

† Ibid.

Sophistry? Of what Service was it to you, to know that *Quibbles and Wrangling upon Words are endless**, if you still take that endless Path.

THE Term *Nothing* is here a Negation of all real Things: To say then, that, if *Whiteness* be No-Thing real, and SPACE be No-Thing real, then *Whiteness* is SPACE; is just the same as to argue, that, if all *abstract Ideas* are no Realities, then all *abstract Ideas* must be the same.

You will allow, that *white* and *black* in the *Abstract* are Nothing, *i. e.* no Realities: Now, if *white* is No-Thing, and *black* is No-Thing, then according to your Way of drawing Consequences, *white* is *black*. — Whether a Man, who would endeavour to prove that *white* is *black*, is not to be deem'd past Confutation, let the Reader judge! Mr. *Locke* observes that “there were Philosophers found, who had Learning and *Subtlety* enough to prove, that *Snow was black*, *i. e.* to prove, that *white* was *black*; whereby they had the Advantage to destroy the Instruments and Means of Discourse, Conversation, Instruction, and Society.” † — We see that Sect of Philosophers is not entirely extinct!

BUT give me leave to observe, that if this Sort of Argument be conclusive, your own Reasoning will prove, what perhaps you are not aware of, that SPACE is DURATION, and that DURATION is SPACE.—I said, that *Whiteness* is *Nothing*, and SPACE is *Nothing*; from whence you couclude, that *Whiteness* is SPACE: Now, you say that SPACE is *Something*, and DURATION is *Something*; and I fancy, you by this time perceive, that (to argue as you do) If SPACE be *Something*, and DURATION also be

* Preface to the Third Defence.

† *Locke* Hum. Understand. B. 3. c. x. §. 10.—Edit. 9.

Something; SPACE IS DURATION; "it being as impossible, that two Things should be a Third, without being one another; as, that two Things should be equal to a Third, without being equal to one another." — If the Argument is conclusive in one Place, I apprehend that it has the same Force here: Answer this, and you answer your own!

THO' it may be true, that when two *Things* are a third *Thing*, they must be one another; yet, when the *third Thing* happens to be *no Thing*, it must be false; which is manifestly the Case in your Argument; where the three *Things* are *Whiteness*, *Space*, and *Nothing*. Now, I presume, this general Term *Nothing* is not a *Thing*, but only a Negation of the two former Ideas to be *Things* real. The third Term in my Argument concerning DURATION and SPACE, *viz.* *Something*, has, of the two, a better Pretence to be a *Thing*; as *Something* is more like a *Thing*, than *Nothing*: and consequently, if your Argument is good, mine is better. But the Truth is, the third Term in both, *viz.* the Terms *Nothing* and *Something* are neither of 'em to be considered as *Things*, but as mere *general Terms*: For, if your Way of Reasoning was true, and general Terms were thus to be understood, as *Things*; we might prove any two Things whatever to be the same: for it is but affirming two *Species* of their *Genus*; and then, if your Rule be true, they are the same. It might therefore have been of Service to you, to have remember'd here *that common and necessary Division, or Distinction of Genus and Species, or of General and Special Terms.* — But how short are our Memories, when our Necessities require it!

FURTHER

FURTHER, the third Term in your Argument being *Negative*, makes it still worse. For, if two *Ideas* must be the *same*, because they are each no *Thing*, *i. e.* no *Thing real*; it is but denying any two Terms of a Third, and they will be the same: Thus because a *Stone* is *no-Animal*, and a *Tree* is *no-Animal*, a *Stone* must be a *Tree*: for, if *no-Animal* be taken for a *Thing* (which I think it may be, as well as *No-Thing*) then your Rule does the Business presently.

BUT I cannot avoid telling you, that your Rule in general is delusive. It is indeed impossible that two Things should be a Third, or agree with a Third *in all Respects*, without being one another: but, it is not impossible, that two Things may be, or agree with a Third, in *some Respects*, without being one another.

Two Things cannot be equal to a Third, without being equal to one another; but then it only means, that they cannot be equal to a Third, without being equal to one another, *in that Respect, in which they are equal to the Third*. So it is impossible, that two Things should be, or agree with, a Third, without being, or agreeing with one another, *in that Respect, in which they are, or agree with, the Third*: but it does not follow, that because two Things agree with a Third *in one Respect*, therefore they must agree with each other *in all Respects*; any more than it follows, that, because two Things are equal to a Third *in one Respect*, therefore they must be equal to one another *in all Respects*.

WE may thus consider the Terms *Whiteness* and *SPACE*, agreeing with the third Term *No-thing*, as it is a *Negation of real Things*; and *Whiteness* and *SPACE*, may be said for that Reason, to
agree

agree with one another, *in that Respect*; *i. e.* as they are neither of them *real Things*: but, it does not follow, that because they both agree with the Term *Nothing in that Respect*, therefore they must agree with each other *in all Respects*, and become both the same Ideas. But, Sir, you ought to have remember'd that Rule in Logick, that, *from two Negative Premises Nothing can be concluded*, and that, *when two Ideas disagree to a Third, we cannot infer that they either agree or disagree with each other**, unless in their mutual *disagreeing* with the *Third*. — This is the Case here. SPACE is *no-Thing*, and *Whiteness* is *no-Thing*: Both these Propositions are *Negative*: And these *two Ideas*, SPACE and *Whiteness*, *disagree to a Third Idea*, *viz. Thing*, and therefore, by the foregoing Rule, we cannot infer that they *agree with each other*, unless in their mutual *disagreeing* with the *Third Idea*: Consequently, we cannot infer (as you do) that if SPACE is *no Thing*, and *Whiteness* is *no Thing*, then *Whiteness* is *SPACE*: all that we can infer is, that neither *Whiteness* nor *SPACE* are *Things real*, *i. e.* that those *two Ideas*, have no *objective Realities*. — I am sorry I am obliged to take Notice, that you deviate from the common and known Rules of Syllogizing.

BUT since you have found out such an acute Way of Reasoning, I wonder you gave your self so much needless Trouble, in proving SPACE to be a *Property*; when you might so soon have done it by the foregoing Method: For, if SPACE be *Something*, and a *Property* be *Something*; then you know that, according to you, *Space* is a *Property*: How clear the Reasoning! How evident the

* See *Watts's Logick* Part 3. c. 2. Sect. 2. Rule 6.

Consequence! and you might by the same Argument, have proved it to be an *Elephant*, or any other Creature you had a Mind to.

IN short, when we say that *Whiteness* and *Space* are *Nothing*; we mean that the *Ideas*, *Whiteness* and *SPACE*, have no *objective Realities*. But is it sound Reasoning to say, that, if the *Idea* of *Whiteness* has no objective Reality, and the *Idea* of *Space* has no objective Reality, then the *Idea* of *Space* is the *Idea* of *Whiteness*? If it be, your Argument is valid: and you may by the same Method prove all abstract Ideas to be the same.

THE Reader will readily excuse me, from troubling him any longer upon such an Argument: It seems calculated rather for those Schools, where Sophistry is at least allowable: Where Persons sometimes stand obliged, and therefore determined to defend that Side of a Question, which at the same Time they know to be wrong; and are, for that Reason, to support a bad Cause, forced to have recourse to Art and Wile: But this, believe me! will never do from the Press, where the Public are to be Judges of the Dispute: Where both Parties are supposed to be in Earnest, to believe themselves in the Right; and where the Learned, in that view, are to determine. The Arts of Sophistry are here to be disdained, at once the Supports and Signs of a weak Cause! and whoever sees these in a *Second*, or *Third Defence*, will perhaps be induced to conclude, that the Author is resolved to *defend*, tho' by such Methods, whatever he has once asserted.

WE are not disputing here for the Sake of disputing only, or to shew our Talents, but to weigh the Merits of the Cause: For it is but of small Importance to the World, who is the better

better Disputant; You, or I. But how irreconcilable is it, to hear any one professing, that he *has no Pursuit here, after any Thing but Truth*; and yet to see him thus rambling after it, through the Labyrinth of Error, and taking that Road, which is designed on purpose to lead Men astray? If this be to *pursue Truth*, I doubt you may pursue it long enough, before you overtake it.

ARGUMENT IV.

From SPACE having PROPERTIES.

I took Notice, that the Translator of Archbishop King's *Origin of Evil*, "used the Expression of SPACE *having some Properties*, for Instance *Penetrability*, or a *Capacity* of receiving Body; but uses it in such a Manner, as plainly shews he never meant, nor ever thought SPACE to be endued with any positive Property."* Here you tell me that "the Author should have explained what he means by a positive Property: are there any Properties that are not positive? †" No Sir; There are no *Properties* which are not *positive*: Those which you apply to SPACE are not *positive*; and therefore they are *no Properties*. The very Reason of my using the Expression of *positive Properties*, was to distinguish *true Properties* from *fictitious* ones; *Properties* from *no Properties*. You called the *receiving all Body*, a *Property* of SPACE; and would conclude that SPACE must be Something, because

* Dr. Clarke's *Notions of SPACE*, Examined p. 23.

† Third Def. p. 18.

it has *such Properties*: "That SPACE has the *Pro-*
 " *perty* [said you] or the Capacity of *receiving*
 " *all Body* &c. no Person was ever so absurd as to
 " deny."* To this I answered, that the Trans-
 flator did deny it. He does indeed call Penetra-
 bility or a Capacity of receiving Body by the
 Name of *Property*; (not in his own Name as we
 shall see presently) but he speaks in such a Man-
 ner, as evidently shews he never imagined it to
 be a *Property*; or that SPACE was endued with
 any *Property*; but that it was a mere *Negation*.
 That this is truly Mr. *Law's* Meaning is plain
 from his own Words; which, if you had turned
 over to the next Leaf, you would have seen in
 my Quotation from him; where he explains him-
 self by telling you, that to argue from *such Pro-*
erties, is the same as "to assign absolute *Negations*,
 " and such as by the same Way of Reasoning may
 " be applied to *Nothing*, and then call them
 " *positive Properties.*" † And in the very next
 Sentence he calls them *pretended Properties*, and
supposed Properties. From whence it is plain, that
 when he uses the Expression of SPACE *having*
Properties, he uses it only as an Argument which
 the Gentlemen on your Side of the Question bring;
 and the Tenor of his Discourse shews that he
 does not think SPACE has any *Properties*; that
 what you assign as a *Property*, and argue from as
 such, is no *true Property*, but a *pretended*, and a
 falsely *supposed* one; is *Nothing positive*, but a mere
Negation: and the Expression of a *positive Pro-*
erty, you see, he makes Use of only in Opposi-

* First Def. p. 4.

† Translation of ABp. *King*. Note 5. Ed. 1.—N. 3. Ed. 2.

— Dr. *Clarke's* Notions of SPACE, Examined p. 24, 25.

tion to a mere Negation. This is what he meant: and instead of saying in Answer to my 23^d Page, *The Author should have explained what he means by a positive Property*; you might have turned to p. 27, where you would have found that I only meant to oppose *positive Properties* to *no Properties*: not as if we believed any such Things as *Negative Properties*, as we were only distinguishing between *Properties* and *Negations*; a Distinction which your perplexed Manner of treating the Subject gave me occasion to insist upon.

By calling mere Negations *Properties*, you make the Distinction of *positive Properties* necessary; and then ask, *if there are any Properties that are not positive?* as if we believed any such Things as *negative Properties*; when we are only arguing against you, and shewing, since what you call *Properties* are mere *Negations*, *i. e.* are not *positive*, that they are *no Properties at all*.

Mr. Law argued — “To say that SPACE
“ must have Existence because it has some Proper-
“ ties, for Instance Penetrability, or a Capacity
“ of receiving Body, seems to me the same as to
“ urge, that *Darkness* must be Something, because
“ it has the Power or Property of receiving *Light*
“ &c.”* To this Passage and my Explanation
of it, you object “These are the Translator’s
“ own Words: But this Gentleman tells us, that
“ he did not mean either that SPACE was [*had*
“ you should have said for that was my Word]
“ a Capacity; or that *Darkness* was a Capacity;
“ but only, *that they were Suppositions alike ridicu-*
“ *lous*. If this was really the Translator’s Mean-

* Translation of ABp. King’s *Origin of Evil* N. 5.
Edit. 1. ——— N. 3. Edit. 2.

ing, to what Purpose did he say, in the Man-
 ner he did, that it did not from thence follow,
 that they must exist, or be Something &c.*
 The Error which you here run into proceeds, I
 find, from your mistaking the Sense of the Tran-
 slator. You imagine that the Words, *because it*
has some Properties, for Instance Penetrability, or a
Capacity of receiving Body — and *Because it has*
the Power of receiving Light, are Sentences spoken
 by the Translator, as if he allowed SPACE to have
 a Property of receiving Body, and *Darkness* of
 receiving Light; and that he would argue from
 thence, that it did not follow, supposing them to
 have these Properties, that they had Existence.
 But This, if I understand that Gentleman, was
 not his Meaning: But that those Sentences above
 in *Italics*, were spoken as the absurd Reasons which
 some Persons give, in order to prove the real Ex-
 istence of SPACE, and *Darkness*. The Translator's
 Meaning therefore is evidently This; "to say
 "SPACE must have Existence, and to give this
 "Reason for it viz. because it has some Proper-
 "ties, for Instance Penetrability, or a Capacity
 "of receiving Body, seems to me the same as to
 "urge, that *Darkness* must be Something, and to
 "give this Reason for it, viz. because it has the
 "Power of receiving Light: whereas neither of
 "them have any Properties; and those which
 "are assigned them are mere Negations." — This
 I understand to be all the Translator meant, a
 Meaning right and true: and justly did he urge
 it against Those, who pretend to prove the real
 Existence of SPACE, by such Sort of Arguments
 as he here shews the Weakness of. *Darkness* has

* Third Def. p. 19.

as good a Pretension to real Existence as SPACE; since *receiving Light* may as well be called a *Property* of *Darkness*, as *receiving Body* be called a *Property* of SPACE; but the Truth is, neither of them are *Properties* but mere *Negations*.

THIS Instance of *Darkness* puts me in Mind of a pleasant Objection made to my last Piece, by one who is in the Way of Thinking with the Anti-Gravitarian Mr. H———n; and is consequently one of those deep-penetrating Gentlemen, who can see Things in Scripture which never were there; and find out Mysteries which nobody can understand. He was greatly offended, that I had denied the Existence of *Darkness*; This, it seems, he looked upon as a strange Kind of Assertion, nothing less than a Denial of Scripture; for he remember'd *Moses* had told him, that *Darkness* was upon the Face of the Deep. And if he had remember'd *Gen. 1. 6. and 7.* he would, no Doubt, have brought that Text to prove that *Space* was Created on the Second Day; which would have been both as good Sense, and as good Divinity as That of some considerable Writers, who make SPACE a Consequence of God's Existence. But these Gentlemen are to be left to the uninterrupted Enjoyment of their own Speculations; whose Notions seem to be too sublimated, for Heads that are (as a certain Writer expresses it) less exalted in the Clouds, and Understandings more terrestrial than their own.

BUT I return — “There seems [you say] to be no Occasion to take Notice of all our Author has said in the 27th and 28th Pages.” These are the very Pages, Sir, where you might have seen what I meant by a positive Property: To say therefore, that *The Author should have explain'd*

explain'd what he means by a positive Property; and presently afterwards to tell us, that *There seems to be no Occasion to take Notice of all our Author has said in those very Pages*, where the Author has explained what you wanted to know; plainly shews, that you industriously avoided to understand the Author's Meaning.

BUT it is proper the Reader should be told what these Pages contain, which you think there is *no Occasion to take Notice of*. You had said that, "whatever is endued with Properties must actually exist; that SPACE has the Property or Capacity of receiving all Body &c. no Person was ever so absurd as to deny." * Now, Sir, the Design of these 27th and 28th Pages was, in Answer to you, to shew, that *Space was endued with no Property, Attribute &c. that receiving Body was no positive Property; that is, was truly no Property at all, but an absolute Negation: That the Property which is applied to SPACE, of receiving Body, is Nothing but a Property in Body to exist, where no Body existed before &c.*

INSTEAD of answering This, as you ought to have done, you pass it off with saying, "There seems to be no Occasion to take Notice of all our Author has said in the 27th and 28th Pages: for, tho' he may deny SPACE to have any Attribute or Property, yet he has himself affirmed Something of it, to wit, that it is sufficient to constitute a Difference between Things; and therefore he cannot deny it to be Something." †

Now was it not incumbent on you to have defended what you had asserted, against the Ob-

* First Def. p. 4.

† Third Def. p. 20.

jections I there advanced? Had not you affirmed, that SPACE had the *Property* or the Capacity of receiving all Body? and did not I object that this was no *Property*, but a mere *Negation*, which might as well be applied to *Nothing*, as to SPACE? did not you say that no Person was ever so absurd as to deny, that SPACE had such a *Property* as you mentioned? and did not I tell you in these Pages, that I deny'd it? Surely then you ought here to have offered at some Proof that SPACE was endued with a *Property*: Should you not have endeavoured to confirm what you had before asserted, namely that receiving Body was a *Property*, and a *Property* of SPACE? I believe the Reader will think you should: For, not to take Notice of these Objections and Arguments, is to give up the Point concerning SPACE having the *Property* of receiving Body; at least, while those Arguments remain unanswered, they stand firm against you, and support the Cause I defend. Nay it is most plain, that you do give up the Point, or pass it over at least, of SPACE having the *Property* of receiving Body; for you urge, *Tho' he may deny Space to have any Attribute or Property, yet he has himself affirm'd Something of it &c.* — Is not this passing over your former Argument for the Existence of SPACE, and putting the Controversy upon another Foot? But to drop your former Argument of SPACE *having the Property of receiving Body*, and to lay a Stress upon mere *Words*, shews only that you are forced to fluctuate from one Argument to another; and that not being able to keep your self above Water, by the Justice of your Cause, or the Force of Reason; you are willing to lay Hold of any little Twig, to keep your self from Sinking.

BUT

BUT tho' you will not take Notice of all I have said in those forementioned Pages, yet you are pleas'd to make some Remarks upon them; viz. "The Difference between a positive and a negative Property, which he lays so much Stress on, I before own'd I did not understand; for they seem, each of them, from the Nature of our Language, capable of being put one for another." * What I meant by a positive Property, I think you might easily see: If you did not, I have again explained it. The only Question is, whether *receiving Body* can be called a Property at all? I think it cannot: and that this Property which is applied to SPACE, is only a Property in *Body* to exist where no *Body* existed before: The Property is in *Body*, not in *Space*. This I objected to you, but you have thought fit to give no further Answer. You argue indeed, that positive Properties, and negative Properties are capable of being put one for another: You Instance — "Body is endued with a positive Property of excluding other Bodies; but it is a negative Expression to say, that it is not capable, or has not a Capacity of receiving other Bodies into its Place." † But this, at most proves only, that a Property of *Body* may be changed to a *negative Expression* concerning *Body*, and yet *Body* be still endued with a Property: but it does not prove, that because the Property of *Body* to exist where no *Body* existed before, may be represented in a *negative Expression* concerning SPACE; therefore SPACE must be endued with a Property; yet, unless you had proved this, your Instance is wide of the Point.

* Third Def. p. 27.

† *Ibid.* p. 28.

YOUR next Attempt is to prove, that either SPACE must be really Something; or else, that I talk downright Contradictions and Nonsense, as you are pleased to express it; which I suppose was designed as a Specimen of your Endeavours, to treat the Author of Dr. Clarke's Notions &c. with all the Civility you could*. But you begin — “It is, he says, a Property of one Body to exclude another. I ask then from whence? His Answer I suppose will be, from the same Place, from that Place in which the other exists.” † True! but my Meaning in such an Answer would be—*from bearing the same Relation; from bearing that Relation of Site to other Bodies, which the excluding Body bears.*

YOU advance — “I ask again, what is Place? Why, I suppose he will say, a Part of SPACE.”** But I see no Reason you have to suppose so; when I have so often denied SPACE to have Parts; and have so frequently told you, that by Place, I mean only the Relation of Site which one Body bears to another. But taking this for granted, you go on most triumphantly in the following Strain. — “What then is SPACE? Here I know he will answer, Nothing. If therefore SPACE be Nothing; Place, which is only a Part of Nothing, must be Nothing too.” †† But, if Place be not a Part of SPACE (which is what you hang this fine String of Arguments upon, as that which you suppose would be my Answer) but only the Relation of Bodies to each other; then, you know, it does not follow, that if SPACE

* See Preface to Third Defence.

† Third Def. p. 21.

** Ibid.

†† Ibid.

is Nothing, Place must be a *Part of Nothing*; which is your own *Nonsense*. — The latter Part of your Sentence indeed happens to be true notwithstanding, *viz. that Place is Nothing*: For Relation, or Place in the *Abstract*, is most certainly Nothing; that is, no-Thing existing *ad extra*, but an *Idea* only: for what is *Relation*, considered abstractedly from *Things related*? Well, but if Place is Nothing, let us hear what Sort of a Conclusion you draw: It is this — “So that when
 “ one Body has the Property of excluding ano-
 “ ther, it has the Property of excluding it from
 “ Nothing, or from No-where; that is, it has
 “ the Property of excluding it, and it has not,
 “ at the same Time.” * One Body has the Property of excluding another from that Place where it exists; not from a *Part of Nothing*; but *from bearing the same Relation which it self does to other Bodies, at the same Time*. But tho’ Relation in the *Abstract* be *Nothing*; does it therefore follow, that one Body must have a Property of excluding another Body from *Nothing*, in such a Sense as to signify, that it has the Property of excluding it from *No-where*, or, *of not excluding it at all*? Whoever says it does, confounds Words and Ideas together in such a Manner, as should render him beneath our Notice. The remaining Part of your Argument which extends beyond the Bottom of this your 21st Page is of the same Sort with the former: it proceeds upon the same *Supposition*, that I should answer; *Place is a Part of Space*: But I would have you look over this Part of your Argument again; remembering as you go along, that I should not make the Answer which you

* Third Def: p. 21.

suppose; and observing that *Place* is not a Part of SPACE; that it is not any Thing distinct and separate from the Bodies; but is only the Relation which they bear one to another.

BUT I cannot forbear remarking, that instead of replying to what I objected, concerning SPACE *being endued with Properties*; or giving an Answer to what I observed with Respect to *those Properties* (which you attribute to SPACE) *being no Properties at all*; instead of answering these, as I had Reason to expect you should, you pass 'em over; and only select a particular Passage, where you first *suppose* me to say Something which may serve your Purpose; and then proceed to argue from such a *Supposition*. Thus, instead of answering what I *do* say, you *suppose* me to say Things which I *do not* say, and answer them very ingeniously. You dress up a Man of Straw, and when you have attacked, and most manfully defeated him, you imagine you have confuted my Opinion: Which puts me in mind of a Passage I have somewhere met with, where a Disputant of this Kind is compared to the Hero of a certain famous Romance, who fancied he saw Monsters in every Passenger he met upon the Road; and by this Means (never seeing any Thing in its true Light, or calling any Thing by its right Name) was perpetually fighting with Phantoms of his own raising.

A R G U M E N T V.

From SPACE having PARTS.

“SPACE [say you] is one, uniform, continued Thing, yet it has nevertheless assignable Parts; and may have Things predicated of some of them, different from Those which may be predicated of others.”* That is, SPACE is *one, uniform, continued* Thing; and yet is nevertheless composed of *many, different, assignable Parts*: Query therefore, whether That which is composed of *many, different, assignable Parts*, can be *one uniform* Thing? If it can, then it is incumbent upon you to explain what you mean by *one uniform Thing*.

BUT I attend to your Illustration — “Thus I can say that the Part of SPACE which this World exists in, is different from that Part, in which the Sun exists.”† But to *say* is one Thing, and to *prove* is another: For the Difference you assign, is not any Difference in your *Parts of SPACE*; but is only telling us, that the Sun, and this World are distant: But does their being distant, make any *Difference* in the *Parts of SPACE*? or, does it prove that SPACE *has Parts* at all? What you call two *assignable Parts of SPACE*, are only two *assignable Bodies*, namely this Globe, and the Sun. If they are the *Parts of SPACE* which differ; then they would differ as much, if the Sun and this World did not exist as you suppose them now to do: and therefore, upon a Supposition

* Third Def. p. 25.

† Ibid. p. 25, 26.

that neither this World, nor the Sun did exist, I desire you would shew the *Difference* of these two *Parts* of SPACE: If you cannot; then it is plain the *Difference* is not in any such *Parts*, but in Something else.

THIS is like an Argument which occurs in a very late Author*; and which by Reason of its marvellous Force, I beg Leave to take Notice of! “If SPACE [says he] is Nothing, and therefore hath no Existence, there could be no such Thing as *here* or *there*; for *here* and *there* are certainly Affections of Something &c.” † True! but they are not Affections of SPACE; but of *those Things* which are said to exist in SPACE. It is not SPACE, or any *Part* of it, that is *here* or *there*; but the *Things* which exist are *here* or *there*; that is, they bear such or such Relation of Situation to other Things. That *here* and *there* are Affections of *Something*, by no Means proves SPACE to be *Something*; unless *here* and *there* were proved to be Affections of SPACE; which this Author should have done; or else he leaves his Argument—just as he found it.

I MAY take Notice that Mr. *Locke* has observed that WHERE and WHEN are *Questions belonging to finite Existences*; ** and as the Advocates for the Reality of SPACE contend likewise for its *Infinity*, they must acknowledge that according to Mr. *Locke*’s Opinion WHERE is not applicable to SPACE.

THE Book where the forementioned Argument appears, is a late Piece, to which the Anonymous

* An Essay concerning Rational Notions &c. ———
Anonymous. † P. 187.

** *Locke* Hum. Understand. B. 2, c. 15, §. 8.—Edit. 9.
Author

Author has prefixed the Title of *An Essay concerning rational Notions &c.* Towards the end of Prop. VIII he professes to say *Somewhat concerning Space.* He tells us that “the Opinion or
 “Conceit of Some that SPACE is nothing at all,
 “is a wild and extravagant Notion: for *Nothing*
 “hath no Manner of Existence, which we are
 “sure from continual Experience SPACE has.”*
 It would have been kind in this Author, if he had informed us what *Manner of Existence* SPACE has: and I should be glad to know what *Experience* he has had of SPACE, that makes him so *sure* it has Existence. “*Nothing* [he says] hath no
 “Manner of Existence, which we are sure from
 “continual Experience SPACE has:” that is, if we ask him why SPACE is *Something*? he answers — because it has *Existence, i. e.* because it is *Something*. If we ask how he knows that it has *Existence*? why, he knows it, because *he’s sure of it*: That is, SPACE is *Something*, because *he’s sure of it*; which is an Argument of such Force, that I shall not attempt to answer it. This Author seems to me, not to know what the Gentlemen on our Side the Question have said; or to see the Difficulties and Objections which oppose this *Rational Notion* of his: For if he had, he could never have thought it sufficient to say, that the *Conceit* of Some, that SPACE is Nothing, *is a wild and extravagant Notion*; or to think he had done the Business, by adding a trite Objection or two, which had more than once been answered. He is mistaken if he thinks his Arguments are new; or that the Question may be treated in such a *wild*

* Essay concerning Rational Notions p. 186.

and extravagant Manner, as he has done. — But enough of this Author and his *Notions*.

YOU quote from me the following Passage *viz.*
 “ If it [SPACE] has Parts, it must be divisible;
 “ for the very Notion of Parts implies Discerpi-
 “ bility: to say that any Thing has Parts, and
 “ yet that those Parts are inseparable, seems to be
 “ near a Contradiction. I think the Ideas of
 “ Extension, and indivisibility, are incompati-
 “ ble.” * You answer — “ This is a bare Affir-
 “ tion, and without any Colour of Proof &c.” †
 If the very Notion of *Parts*, implies *Discerpibility*, then there was no Occasion to give any other Proof: and whether it did not imply it, I thought sufficient in this Place to leave with the Reader. But in my Answer to your *Second Defence*, I had given you a Proof of it: But you have not thought proper in either of these Places, to make any Answer to it. Instead therefore of saying that I had here given a *bare assertion without any Colour of Proof*; you should have considered the *Proof* which you might have found by turning over a few Pages; and either have answered it, or given up the Point. Your taking Notice that I have not *here* produced a Proof, is no doubt designed to make the Reader believe, that I had produced no Proof of it *at all*; and since I had given a Proof of it in p. 126, to take no Notice of *That* is a mere Evasion.

YOU say — “ It is true indeed, that whatever
 “ is not extended, supposing an unextended Sub-
 “ stance possible to be, such a Substance would
 “ be indivisible: but it does not follow, that

* Dr. Clarke's *Notions of SPACE*, Examined p. 31.

† Third Def. p. 26.

“ what is extended, must be divisible: I am sure
 “ it is plainly otherwise in the Case of SPACE.” *
 — I am sure *this is a bare Assertion, and without
 any Colour of Proof.* I ask, what is the Reason
 that an *unextended* Substance would be *indivisible*?
 Is it not, because it has *no Parts*? and if this be
 the Reason, does it not imply that if it *had Parts*
 it would be *divisible*? I doubt you will find it
 difficult to avoid this Consequence.

WHATEVER is extended, *has Parts*; This, I
 presume, will be allowed me: The Question then
 is, whether that which *has Parts*, must not have
divisible Parts? And here we ought, I think, to
 argue according to the common, and received
 Meaning of the Words *Extension*, and *having Parts*;
 or else you should have told us what you mean
 by those Expressions. Every Man, who makes
 Use of Terms where Doubts may arise about their
 Signification, is obliged either to explain his Mean-
 ing, or to use them according to that which is
 the common, and received one; *i. e.* He is obliged
 either to give us his own *peculiar* Sense, or else
 to talk according to *common* Sense.—Now, I sup-
 pose every one understands, that to *have Parts* is
 to be *compounded* of *Parts*; and to be *compound-
 ed of Parts* is to *consist of Parts joined together*;
 and *Parts* that are *join'd together*, may be supposed
asunder; *i. e.* may be *divisible*. — In the Idea then
 of *Parts*, is plainly implied *Divisibility*: If every
 Thing then which is *extended* has *Parts*, then
 every Thing which is extended has *divisible* Parts;
 and that every Thing which is *extended* has *Parts*,
 I fancy you will hardly deny: Whatever there-
 fore is *extended*, must be *divisible*.

* Third Def. p. 26.

I ARGUED to this Purpose in my last Piece; to prove the very same Thing, namely that what is *extended* is *divisible*: but you have thought proper, as I just now observed, not to attempt any Answer to it, as I desire the Reader to remark by consulting Dr. *Clarke's Notions of SPACE examined* p. 125, 126. and this your *Third Defence* p. 89, 90: and therefore since you repeat the same Assertion, namely, that what is *extended* need not be *divisible*, without taking any Notice of the Answer before made to it, I have a Right to repeat here that Answer; which, if it had any Force before, must have the same Force still.

You say in the Page before mentioned *, that you “suppose I endeavour to maintain the Notion of the Soul’s being an unextended Substance.” I must confess that at present it is my Opinion; and though it may be difficult to us in this present State, to conceive an *unextended Substance*; which I imagine proceeds from our being conversant with none but *extended Substances*; yet, unless I could conceive, that an *Immaterial Substance* could be *divisible*, or that *Extension* does not imply *Divisibility*, I must still retain the Notion, that the Soul is not extended—That it must be *divisible*, if *extended* was the Argument I there urged, by shewing that *Extension* implied *Divisibility*: This Argument, I say, you make no Reply to: but instead of it you tell us, that an *Immaterial Substance* may be divisible, for what you know †: and in another Place, you say that—“A Spirit may be, for all this Gentleman can shew to the contrary, an extended

* Third Def. p. 90

† See Third Def. p. 90.

“divisible Substance.”* I must observe therefore, that your Conduct looks as if you saw the Difficulties attending *Indivisible Extension*: and therefore, instead of saying any Thing against my Argument brought in Answer to your *Second Defence*, to confute that Notion; or producing any Thing against it *here*, except a certain Instance of an *extended indivisible Thing*, which I shall take further Notice of presently; you chuse to argue that, for *what You know an immaterial Substance may be divisible*; and therefore, that my Argument to prove it *not extended, because it would then be divisible*, required no Answer. This, Sir, may seem a plausible Way of evading a Defence of *indivisible Extension*, when we argue that a *Spirit* must be *divisible*, if *extended*: But since you have thought proper to maintain the Notion of *indivisible Extension* in other Parts of your Book; you ought to have answered the Argument which I produced against it: But you have not done it, and therefore till you do, you have not answered me, nor defended your self.— To tell us, as you do here, that you are *sure it is plainly otherwise in the Case of Space* †, is a downright begging the Question: for we are *here* disputing (which surely you forget) whether SPACE, if it *has Parts*, must not be *divisible*; and it is therefore arguing, like the Anonymous Author just now remarked upon, that *it is so, because you are sure of it*; which the Reader, if he pleases, is to take for a Proof.

But although you will not attempt to defend *Indivisible Extension*, by answering my Arguments; yet you will endeavour, you say, “to give the

* Third Def. p. 28.

† Ibid. p. 26.

“ Author an Idea of an extended indivisible
 “ Thing; or at least shew him, that the two Ideas
 “ of Extension and Indivisibility are not in-
 “ compatible.” * — And now let the Reader pre-
 pare for a very curious Invention! It is this —
 “ Let us suppose a Yard Cube of Matter free
 “ from all Pores, so that it should be perfectly
 “ solid: Suppose this Matter surrounded with
 “ Something, that should hinder its being sepa-
 “ rated into any Parts whatever; that is, should
 “ hinder the Body from taking more Room.” †
 — I cannot think, Sir, but you must smile at
 your self, when you produced this extraordinary
 Instance, this Quintessence of Proof. — “ It is
 “ plain, you say, that this Matter is extended,
 “ and it cannot be divided &c.” ** It is very
 plain indeed, Sir, that this Matter cannot be
 actually divided, so long as it is *surrounded with
 Something that shall hinder it*; that is, it cannot
 be divided, when it cannot be divided. But
 you assign an *external accidental* Impediment: You
*suppose this Matter surrounded with Something, that
 should hinder its being separated into any Parts what-
 ever*: A notable Instance indeed, of an *extended
 indivisible Thing!* and if you had supposed this
 Thing locked up in a Chest, it might have pro-
 ved full as much. It is like binding Something
 over a Man’s Eyes; and then producing him,
 as an Instance of one who hath Eyes, and yet
 cannot see. Do you really flatter your self, you
 have shewn by this Instance, that what is ex-
 tended may be, *in its own Nature*, indivisible?

* Third Def. p. 26.

† Ibid. p. 27,

** Ibid.

THIS is what you must explain to me; or else you are fighting with the Wind. My Assertion was this, that *the Ideas of Extension, and Indivisibility, were incompatible*: Now, it is evident I must mean, that what was *extended*, must, *as such, and in its own Nature*, be *divisible*; not, that what is *extended*, cannot by *accidental Impediments* be secured from *actual Division*. To what Purpose then have you been talking about a Piece of *Matter, surrounded with Something that should hinder it from being separated*? You might as well have told us, of a Piece of Matter at the Bottom of the Sea, which no Body can come at; or that Matter is not, *as Matter*, divisible in *infinitum*, because I cannot cleave a Grain of Sand with a common Hatchet. You seem not to know the Distinction, of a Thing being indivisible, *as it is that Thing, or in its own Nature*; and being *accidentally* so: The extended Piece of Matter which you mention, is still, *in its own Nature*, and *as it is extended*, divisible, let it be surrounded with a Rock of Adamant: Such an accidental Impediment may hinder it from being *actually divided*; but does not alter the *Nature of Extension*, or of the *Thing extended*: It still retains the *Nature of Divisibility*, notwithstanding it cannot, in your Instance, be *actually divided*. You have therefore failed, Sir, in your Endeavours to shew me by this Instance, *that the two Ideas of Extension, and Indivisibility, are not incompatible*: They seem to me to be as incompatible as ever: And let any one try, whether or no, in the Instance you mention, he can have an Idea of that Piece of Matter being *extended*; without having at the same Time, the Idea of its being, *in its own Nature*, divisible: If he cannot, you have been labouring in vain.

“ IF we suppose this solid Matter to be infinite, it will be a tolerable Representation [you say] of the Indivisibility, and Extension of “ SPACE.”* In Answer to this, I must observe

FIRST, that *If we suppose this solid Matter to be infinite, i. e. positively, and metaphysically infinite; by which we mean perfect, or, to which Nothing can be added; if we suppose this solid Matter, I say, to be infinite, in this Sense; we suppose, what seems to me to be an Impossibility and a Contradiction. For, as it consists of Parts, it must be considered as Quantity, or Number; which in their very Nature include perpetual Increasableness or Addibility; and must therefore, in their very Nature, be incapable of this positive, or metaphysical Infinity. And to suppose this solid Matter to be infinite in the other Sense; viz. negatively infinite, which is the only Infinity that can be applied to Quantity, is nothing more than to suppose, that the Mind of Man has a Faculty of going on in infinitum; and enlarging this Matter in his Mind, without being able to stop any where: but this Sense of Infinity will not here serve your Turn; and the other, as I have observed, is a Contradiction.*

SECONDLY, I answer, that I cannot conceive any *extended Being without Parts; nor consequently either Infinite, or indivisible: I cannot conceive it to be positively infinite for the Reasons above given: and I cannot conceive it to be indivisible; because I can never think of Parts, but immediately my mind answers, Divisibility: and*

* Third Def. p. 27.

therefore, till you can produce a Proof, that the very Notion of *Parts* does not imply *Divisibility*; or, that a Thing may be *extended*, without having *Parts*; I shall never be able to consider an *extended Being*, under any Circumstances whatsoever, without, at the same Time, considering it as *Divisible*.

THIRDLY — The supposed *positive Infinity* of this solid Matter, is assigned as a Reason for its being *indivisible*, though it be *extended*: and as this Instance is brought as a Representation of the *Indivisibility*, and *Extension* of SPACE; so I presume, that the *positive Infinity* of SPACE is assigned as the Reason, for its being *indivisible*, notwithstanding it is *extended*: If so, I must beg Leave to inform you, that the *positive Infinity* of SPACE, must never be alledged to me, as a Proof of its being *indivisible*; or as a Proof of any Thing at all about it; because I deny it to be any Thing *positively infinite*, as well as to be *extended*. You must not therefore go on quite so fast with me; but prove first, that SPACE is *real Extension*, and that it is *positively infinite*; and then, but not before, you may boldly assign *such Infinity* for a Proof, where it will be of any Service to you. But at present, Sir, we are but just where we set out: For if you tell me *Space is extended, and has Parts*; I answer, *It is then divisible*: If you urge, that *it is positively infinite*; I reply, you have not *proved it*. I deny it to be *real Extension*; but if it was, I deny that there can be any *real Extension positively infinite*, or That to which nothing can be added: And you must prove that there can, before you assign the *Infinity* of *real Extension*, as a Proof that *real Extension* may be *indivisible*.

INFINITY (i. e. *positive* Infinity or *Perfectness*) and *Extension* are in my Ideas, as incompatible, as *Extension*, and *Indivisibility*; and will to me remain so, until I can find out a *Number*, to which nothing can be *added*, and clear up all the Absurdities of an *infinite Series*.

THE Ideas then of *Extension* and *Indivisibility*, which you have been endeavouring to reconcile, will, I believe, appear as incompatible as ever, to those who thought them so before. You have hitherto failed in producing any Proof; and therefore, if you think it worth your While, you must try once again, to invent another Instance of an *extended indivisible Thing*; but I dare say, you will find none comparable to the former.

YOU remark that — “the Difference [between
 “SPACE, and your infinite extended Matter] is
 “only this, that to separate the Parts of SPACE,
 “is both to crowd those Parts into one another,
 “and to leave SPACE between; but to separate
 “the Parts of the Matter, is only to crowd the
 “Parts into one another; both which we see,
 “from the Nature of each of them, is impossi-
 “ble.”* If we could by an impossible Suppo-
 sition imagine Matter *infinitely extended*, yet, there seems to me to be no Occasion, to crowd the Parts into one another, in order to its separation: for let Matter be supposed to be extended *ad Infinitum*; yet, whilst you and I consider it as consisting of Parts; instead of being at the Trouble of *crowding the Parts into one another*; we need only suppose one single Part to be *annihilated*, and the Business is done: And this, by the Way, suggests to me an Absurdity, which follows upon supposing that

* Third Def. p. 27.

Matter can be *positively infinite*: For, if when we have imagined (as far as we can imagine) Matter to be *infinite*, in the Sense above mentioned; if, I say, we can after this, suppose an Inch of it to be annihilated; then it must either still remain *infinite*, and then *one Infinite* will be *bigger* by an Inch, than *another*; or else, the Addition of an Inch, would make that *infinite*, which was *finite* before; both which Suppositions are alike absurd. — As to the other Part of your Remark, *viz.* that “to separate the Parts of SPACE, is to leave SPACE between”; I must observe, that it is indeed very true, that we cannot separate the Parts of SPACE; but not because it is to *crowd those Parts into one another, and to leave SPACE between*; but because SPACE *has not any Parts* to be separated: and when you try to separate the supposed Parts, the Reason why you still must always leave SPACE, is only this, *viz. Take Nothing from Nothing, and there remains Nothing.*

I HAD said, that “a Spirit is *indivisible*, and “for that very Reason, *not extended*; for it is “very manifest that an *indivisible Being* cannot admit of a *divisible Quality*, which *Extension* is &c.” * Upon this you exclaim — “Where has our Author proved Extension to be a divisible Quality? “and if he has not proved it, I must take the “Liberty to say, that it is not.” † I reply, that I had proved it in the 126, and 127th Pages: and therefore, instead of *taking the Liberty* of saying, that *it is not*; and asking, *where I had proved it to be so*; it would have looked much

* Dr. Clarke's Notions of SPACE, Examined p. 31.

† Third Def. p. 28.

fairer, if you had turned to the forementioned Pages, and had *taken the Liberty to answer* them.

BUT you proceed—“A Spirit, he says, is indivisible, and for that Reason not extended. If he means by Spirit an Immaterial Substance, then I say, that it may be queried whether it is indivisible, or no, and still the Argument against Matter’s thinking be equally conclusive &c.”* I must observe here, that you artfully turn off the Point of *indivisible Extension*: we are disputing, whether or no That which is *extended*, must not be *divisible*; I asserted that it must; and then added, “I know the Reply to this is ready, *viz.* Is not a Spirit extended, and is it not indivisible? I answer; that a Spirit is indivisible, and for that very Reason, not extended: For it is very manifest, that an indivisible Being cannot admit of a divisible Quality, which Extension is; any more than a divisible Being can admit of an indivisible Quality; which is the Reason, that no System of Matter can be intelligent.” †

Now, instead of defending your Notion, that what is *extended* may be *indivisible* (which is the Point in Hand) you take Occasion to drop That, and proceed to tell us, *that it may be Queried, whether an immaterial Substance is indivisible or no; and and still the Argument against Matter’s thinking, be equally conclusive.* Now supposing this Passage to be as true, as it appears to me to be false; it is dropping, I say, your Notion of *indivisible Extension*: For to Query, whether an Immaterial Substance may not be *divisible, as well as extended*;

* Third Def. p. 28.

† Dr. Clarke’s Notions of SPACE Examined p. 31.

at a Time when I am arguing that That, or any other Thing, *must be divisible, if extended*; is rather admitting, that the *Ideas of Extension and Indivisibility* are incompatible, than arguing against it. According to my Apprehension, it would have been more to your Purpose in this Place to have still insisted upon it, that an immaterial Substance was *extended*, and yet *indivisible*: here would have been an Assertion at least (which is very often all the Proof you will condescend to give us in other Points) of *indivisible Extension*. But the Truth is, you seem conscious of the Absurdities of that Notion; and are therefore willing to wave the Point: And, as you had maintained in other Places, that the *Soul is extended*; and as I had urged that it must then be *divisible*; you here chuse to *Query*, whether an immaterial Substance may not be *divisible*; rather than put it on the other Foot, namely, that a Thing may be *extended*, and yet *indivisible*; lest if you should be unable to make that good, your Notion of *extended Spirit* should be utterly confuted. — But let us consider this Notion of *divisible Spirit*.

I MUST first observe, that you seem to have changed your Opinion, with Respect to this Point. It is not long since you believed, that immaterial Beings *must necessarily be indiscerpible* (as the Reader may see, by turning to p. 43, 44. of your *First Defence*) and that *as evidently as the known Properties of Matter prove it to be certainly a discerpible Substance*; *so evidently, the known and confessed Properties of immaterial Beings prove them to be indiscerpible*: But notwithstanding you there believed them to be *indiscerpible*; and tell us, that they are *proved to be so, from their known and confessed Properties*;

erties; yet now, it seems, that an immaterial Substance may, for what you know, be divisible.

You will perhaps answer, that your Notions are now consistent with what they were before; for that when you talked of the *Indivisibility* of *immaterial Substances*; you meant, as you in your *Third Defence* express your self, that they were *indivisible*, as *thinking Substances*; but that, as *immaterial Substances*, they might be *divisible*: This might seem a plausible Way of reconciling your Sentiments, were it not for another Passage which occurs in your *First Defence*; where you say, that “according to the Supposition of the Soul’s being so extended, as to consist of more than one Point, yet these Points would be a *Continuum*, they could not be separable, any more than every Point of the Deity is.”* Now, by this Passage it is plain, that you then thought, that an *immaterial Substance* could not be *separable at all*: For that which cannot be separable, any more than every Point of the Deity is, cannot be separable in any Sense whatsoever.—But besides, Sir, the Purport of your Argument shews you meant, that an immaterial Being was indivisible, in all Senses: For the Passage which you quote from Dr. Clarke † is brought to confirm what you had before said; namely, that though a *Spirit* be extended, yet there is no Necessity that it must be extended in the same Manner as *Matter* is; which you suppose to be Dr. *Cudworth’s* Meaning; who “seems [you say] to confound the two Ideas of Indivisibility and Non-Extension together, as if they were the same Thing, when they are certainly as wide and distinct from one another,

* First Def. p. 42.

† Ibid. p. 43, 44

“ as any two Ideas possibly can be. That they
 “ are so, is very plain, from the Consideration
 “ of the Nature of SPACE, which no-Body
 “ can be so absurd, as to say is not extended,
 “ and yet must allow, that it is indivisible and in-
 “ separable.” * — It is evident from hence, that
 your Meaning was, to maintain the Notion, that
 the Soul might be *extended*, and yet *indivisible*;
 for that *Extension* did not imply *Divisibility*: But
 if you had only meant, that the Soul might be
indivisible as a *thinking* Substance, and *divisible* as an
immaterial Substance; then your whole Argument
 will be Nothing at all to the Purpose. For to say
 that any *extended* Being is *indivisible* as a *thinking*
 Substance, tho’ it may be *divisible* as an *imma-*
terial Substance, is no Proof or Reason, that what
 is *extended*, may be *indivisible*: For if it be divisi-
 ble in any Consideration whatever, it is simply *divi-*
sible: And consequently you would leave the No-
 tion of *indivisible Extension*, by such an Argument,
 just where you found it. — It is plain therefore
 from the foregoing Observations, that the Author
 of the *First* Defence, and the Author of the
Third Defence, tho’ the same Person, yet widely
 differ in their Sentiments.

Now I cannot assign any other Reason you
 could have, for admitting here, what you had de-
 nied before; but, that you was sensible of what
 Doctor *Clarke* confesses, in the Passage you have
 cited from him †; *viz.* that, “ How far such
 “ *Indiscernibility* can be reconciled, and be consist-
 “ ent with some kind of *Expansion* — is another
 “ Question of considerable Difficulty.” And
 finding this *considerable Difficulty* hanging heavy

* First Def. p. 42.

† Ibid. p. 43. 44.

over you; and that you would be reduced to this Dilemma; either to give up the *Extension*, or the *Indivisibility* of *Spirit*; you chose to *Query* the *latter*. You will not say that it is divisible; lest you should be forced, one time or other, to contradict your self: Nor will you say, that it is *not* divisible; lest you should not then be able to maintain its *Extension*: and therefore you find out a Medium, and tell us, that it *may be queried whether it is indivisible or no*, and still the Argument against *Matter's thinking* would be equally conclusive*.

THIS you assert; whether you have made it good, comes now to be examined: And I beg Leave to say, you are so far from it, that I will shew you have by your own Arguments which you have brought to support it, proved the direct contrary.

THAT this may appear, I shall produce what you admit to be the Argument used by *All Authors* who have argued against *Matter's Thinking*; and I shall shew, that if *Spirit* be *divisible*, in the Manner you here assert it to be, the same Argument will equally prove against a *Spirit's Thinking*: If I do this; then I shall hereby shew, that you prove (because it will follow) from your own Arguments, that, *if a Spirit be divisible, the Argument against Matter's Thinking, will not be equally conclusive*.

“ ALL Authors [you say] that were for con-
 “ futing the Notion of Matter's Capacity of
 “ thinking, always endeavoured to prove the Im-
 “ possibility of it, from its having so many *di-*
 “ *stinct Percipients* in it; that is [you continue]

* Third Def. p. 28.

“ because it *consisted* of an infinite Number of *distinct whole Substances*.”* These are your own Words: And a little before, you tell us, that a *Spirit* may, by *Division*, become “several immaterial Substances.” †—Now, from hence will I shew, that a *Spirit*, according to your Notion of it, must *consist* of several *distinct whole Substances* (as you are pleased to call ’em) *several distinct Percipients*; from whence it will appear, that the Argument, which you allow to be conclusive against *Matter’s Thinking*, (*viz.* its having so many *distinct Percipients* in it) will be equally conclusive against *Spirits Thinking*.

IF a *Spirit* may be *divided*, and by such *Division* become *several immaterial Substances*; as you grant it may; then it is obvious, that a *Spirit* must *consist* of *several immaterial Substances*: For otherwise you must say, that a *Spirit* may be *divided* into those Things, of which it does not *consist*; and that the *Whole* does not consist of its *Parts*. Now, if a *Spirit* consists of *several Substances*, it must, as well as *Matter*, consist of several, *distinct, whole Substances*; unless you have found out a *Distinction* of *whole Substances*, and *not whole Substances*; if you have pray acquaint us, what Sort of *Substances* Those are, which are not *whole Substances*! According to the little Knowledge I have of Things, That which is not an *whole Substance*, can be *no Substance at all*, in whatever Sense the Word *Substance* be understood: For, to talk of an *Half-Substance*, would, I presume, be thought no better Sense, than to talk of an *Half-Being*, or an *Half-Property*; which would be dividing *Beings, Properties &c.* into

* Third Def. p. 29.

† Ibid. p. 28.

whole Beings, and half Beings, whole Properties, and half Properties — a Division, to which my Metaphysics have never yet carried me!

Now since that which consists of *distinct whole Substances*, must consist of so many *distinct Percipients* (as you allow; by making the *having distinct Percipients*, and the *consisting of distinct whole Substances* to signify the same *) it follows, that a *Spirit* consists of several *distinct Percipients*.

SINCE then you admit that *All Authors who were for confuting the Notion of Matter's Capacity of thinking, always endeavoured to prove the Impossibility of it, from its having so many distinct Percipients in it; that is, because it consisted of an infinite Number of distinct whole Substances*: And since I have shewn from your own Notions of a *Spirit's* Division, that a *Spirit* must, according to you, *consist of several distinct whole Substances, and therefore of several distinct Percipients, as well as Matter*; the natural Conclusion is, either that it is impossible for a *Spirit* to *think*; or else that the Argument against *Matter's* Thinking is by no Means conclusive.

I MUST therefore farther observe, that if the Argument against *Matter's* Thinking be conclusive then, since upon Supposition that a *Spirit* is *divisible*, it would *not be* conclusive; as I hope I have proved; it follows, that a *Spirit* cannot be *divisible*, as you assert it *may be for what you know*. I cannot therefore but wish, Sir, that you had either known more, or asserted less.

* See Third Def. p. 29. Your Words are these
 "its *having* so many *distinct Percipients* in it; that
 "because it *consisted* of an infinite Number of *distinct whole*
 "Substances."

You argue much to the same Purpose, in the *Vindication* of your *Second Defence* *. What therefore I have said here, is a sufficient Answer to both. — But, since in this last mentioned Place, you tell us that “the Soul is a *Continuum*, or “*one, uniform* Thing †;” it is incumbent upon you, to explain your Meaning; and reconcile it to your Notion, that the Soul “may be *divisible*, “for what you know,” which you assert a few Lines above it. You say indeed, that it may be *divisible*, as an *immaterial* Substance, but *indivisible*, as a *thinking* Substance **; but this will be of no Service to you in the present Case: For if it be *divisible* into *several* immaterial *Substances*, as you assert it may, for what you know; and is yet *one, uniform* Thing, which you likewise assert; you must either reconcile these Notions; or we must conclude, that you are irreconcilably inconsistent.

I SHALL conclude this Point with observing briefly, that the Reason which has induced Men to imagine that Spirits are extended, seems to me to be This. They suppose that no Properties can subsist but in some *Substratum*; that is, in Something different, and distinct from all its essential and constituent Properties; Something, in which all these Qualities, Properties &c. are *stuck*, and by which they are supported. They suppose therefore, that *Thinking*, and *Willing* &c. must have such a *Substratum*. Now, being conversant with material Objects, and considering them as having a *Substratum*, and finding them all to be extended; hence they have associated their two Ideas of

* Third Def. p. 90.

† See Ibid.

** See Ibid.

a *Substratum*, and *Extension* together; in such a Manner, as whenever they think of a *Substratum*, they always conceive it extended: And from hence considering Spirits to have a *Substratum*, and always joining the *Idea* of Extension to every *Substratum*, they conceive *Spirits* to be *extended*. — But I pass on to another Argument.

ARGUMENT VI.

From BODY being extended INTO SPACE.

YOU argue, that if a Body be extended into SPACE, and SPACE be Nothing; “then is the
 “ Body extended into Nothing. what therefore
 “ is the Difference between being extended into
 “ Nothing [into no where] and not being ex-
 “ tended at all*? I am obliged to repeat, that when I say SPACE is *Nothing*, I mean that SPACE is *not a Thing*, that it is not a *real Existent*: Is it then any Consequence, that what is not extended into a *real Existent*, must not be *extended* at all? But your Mistake lies in imagining that what is extended into *Nothing*, must be extended *no where*; for *Somewhere*, or *some Place* is not a *Thing*, unless in the Sense that *Relations* are *Things*; viz *Ideal Things*. Place is a Relation of Site, which one Body bears to another; and when we say that a Body is extended into a *Place*, we mean that the Part of the Body which is the Increase, bears a certain Relation to other Bodies, which before it did not. A Body may therefore be extended in-

* Third Def. p. 30.

to no-Thing; and yet be extended *Somewhere*; i. e. not extended into *Nowhere*.

BUT I had said that “when the Body is extended into a Void, that Void becomes full, which is all the Mystery.”* — To this you answer — “If all the Mystery is, that Nothing becomes full; I beg this Author to tell me the Difference between the Fulness of Nothing, and no Fulness at all &c.”† To say that a Void becomes full, is only saying that there is *real Extension*, whereas before there was not: and that when there is real Extension, there is not a Void. But to talk, as you do, of the *Fulness of Nothing*, or the Fulness of a Void, is confounding Words; and amounts to the same as talking of a *full Void*, or a *full Nothing*. It is making the Void one *Thing*, and *Fulness* another; whereas, where *Body* is, there is no *Void*. If you would please therefore, to ask your Question in intelligible English, you should say “what is the Difference between a Void becoming full (which was my Expression) and no fulness at all?” and then I answer; there is just the same Difference, as there is between a Void and no Void, Body and no Body, *real Extension* and *Ideal Extension*.

* Dr. Clarke's Notions of SPACE, Examined p. 34.

† Third Def. p. 31.

ARGUMENT VII.

From the DISTANCE and PLACE of BODIES.

YOU had said, that “If there was no Distance existing really, it would unavoidably follow, that the Sun and Moon existed both in the same individual Place.” * To which I answer’d that “Distance is the imaginary Length of SPACE, considered between any two Beings &c.” † You now reply — “what is This but allowing the Consequence I mentioned? For, if the Distance of the Sun from the Moon be only imaginary, it cannot be real; therefore the Sun and Moon are really in the same Place, though they are in our Imagination at a Distance,” **

I SAID, that *Distance is the imaginary Length of Space*; upon which you reply; *If the Distance of the Sun from the Moon, be only imaginary, it cannot be real*: But pray Sir, who said that the *Distance was imaginary*? The *Distance is real*, i. e. *real Distance*; or the *Bodies are really distant*: But yet, when Distance is considered as *a Length of Space*, it is *imaginary Length*: that is, it is not the Length of any *really existing Thing*. And here likewise may be answered what you offer in the *Vindication* of your *Second Defence*; where, because I had said, that “when we speak of Things being distant, we mean it of some Relation, or

* First Def. p. 32.

† Dr. Clarke’s *Notions of SPACE*, Examined p. 37.

** Third Def. p. 32.

“ Accident in the Things themselves;” * — You reply — “ That is, in plain English, the Distance that is between two Bodies, is not *between* them, “ but *in* them.” † From whence you take Occasion to play upon the Words *in*, and *internal* Relation, for fifteen Lines together. — It is sufficient therefore to tell you, that the Relation is neither *in* them, nor *between* them: And that when I spoke of Distance, as a Relation *in* Bodies; I meant no more, than a Relation *of* Bodies, or a Relation which Bodies bear to each other.

THE Sun and Moon are not only distant in *Imagination*; but *really* so: For it does not follow, that because *Distance* is *imaginary Length*, therefore it must be *imaginary Distance*; or that because *Distance* is no *Thing*, therefore it must be no *Distance*; any more than that because *Virtue* and *Vice* are no *Things* (*i. e.* no *real Existents*) therefore that there is no *Virtue* or *Vice* in the World, or that Men cannot be said to be either *Virtuous* or *Vicious*. And thus I conclude, that *Distance* is no *real Thing*, is only a Relation of Bodies, yet not an *imaginary* Relation (which would be the same as no Relation) but that it is *really* predicable of Bodies, or that Bodies [the Sun and Moon for Instance] may be said to be *really distant*, and therefore do not exist in the same Place, tho’ *Distance* be no *really existing Thing*.

BUT it is endless to dispute about Words: and a Person who is resolved to do it, may go on wrangling for ever. And This may be an Excuse for omitting several *little* Objections of this Sort, which run through your Performance. To fol-

* Dr. Clarke’s Notions of SPACE, Examined p. 113,

† Third Def. p. 80

low you minutely in every Step you have taken, might perhaps take away all Room for future Cavils, and leave you nothing to say; but as I am sensible, it could afford but very little Entertainment, or Improvement to the Reader, I may very well be excused.

YOU take Notice of an Expression of Mr. *Locke*, viz. *beyond the Universe*; from whence you would prove SPACE to be *Something real*. You argue that — “To say beyond the Phænomena of Nature, means either that there is Something beyond them; or else there is no Difference between *Finity* and *Infinity*; because we can in both Cases say, there is nothing *beyond* them.”* Let us consider what is meant by BEYOND, for herein lies the Fallacy. Could we suppose the Phænomena of Nature infinite, in a positive Sense, we could not say *beyond* them, but why? not merely because there could be no *Thing existing* beyond them; but because there could be no *beyond*. Now if the Phænomena of Nature be finite, it is proper and true to say *beyond* them, because there *may be* Something existing beyond them, or because there is *beyond*. *Space* and *beyond* are here the same: And if you can prove *beyond* to be a *Thing*, a *Being*, a *Property of God*; then, and not before, will this Expression of Mr. *Locke* prove SPACE to be *Something*. — In short, to say *beyond the Phænomena of Nature* does not mean that there is any *Thing existing* beyond them; but only, that the Phænomena of Nature are finite.

THE Sum of what you say farther on this Head is This; viz. That “our Idea of the absolute Place of any Thing, is an Idea of its

* Third Def. p. 35.

“Existence in some Part of the Universe”: and, that “there can be no relative Place without an absolute Place:” and, that “if Distance be Nothing, there can neither be any relative, or absolute Place.”* My Answer to which is This—If by *Existence in some Part* of the Universe, you mean Existence in some *really existing* Part of SPACE; this is supposing that SPACE is Something *really existing*, which is the Question: And it will remain to be shewn, that Bodies cannot exist in a *relative* Place, without existing in an *absolute* one, in such a Sense of *absolute Place*: that is, it will remain for you to shew, that Bodies cannot bear a Relation of Site to each other, unless SPACE be a real Existent. If you say that a Body cannot exist at all, unless it has some absolute Place; and by *absolute Place* you mean as above; then you must shew, that a Body cannot exist, unless SPACE be really existing too. By a Body’s *existence in Space*, I understand nothing more than *extended Existence*: And it is no Consequence, that if SPACE be not a real Existent, an extended Being cannot exist. A Body indeed cannot be extended, unless there be a *Void*, or a *possibility* of its being extended: But then it must be proved, that this *Possibility* is a *real Thing*. we must, ’tis true, presuppose SPACE to the Existence of every Thing which is to exist in it; but this is only to presuppose a *Possibility* of their *Existence*: The *Presupposition* of SPACE does not prove its *real Existence*.

WHEN we say that a Body exists in *absolute Place*; the Meaning is, that we consider its Existence *abstractedly* from the *Relation* which it bears

* Third Def. p. 35, 36,

to other Bodies: And then, what we call the *absolute Place* of that Body, is only its *mere Existence*. This I take to be the true Meaning of *absolute Place*: And then indeed there can be no *relative Place* without an *absolute Place*; that is, Bodies cannot bear Relation of Situation to other Bodies, unless they *exist*; or, they cannot exist in *Place* (for, properly speaking, there is no *Place* by *relative*) if they do not exist at all. But This, I apprehend, is no Proof of the *real Existence* of SPACE.

ARGUMENT VIII.

From the IMPOSSIBILITY of ANNIHILATING SPACE.

DR. CLARKE argued, that SPACE could not, even in Thought, be *annihilated*; that it would *remain*, even after it was supposed to be *annihilated*: and from hence the learned Doctor would prove SPACE to be NECESSARILY EXISTING.* In *Defence* of this Argument you urged — “To suppose SPACE away, certainly amounts to the forementioned Absurdity [*i. e.* that it remains, even after it is taken away, or supposed to be annihilated] “for the Idea of it necessarily rushes into our Minds; and we cannot but suppose it to exist, even after we have tried to suppose it annihilated.” † In this Argument I could see no Force; and in answer to it, I observed, that if it should be admitted, that the *Idea* of

* See Dr. CLARKE'S *Answer to the sixth Letter*.

† First Def. p. 47.

SPACE, after all Endeavours to suppose SPACE *away*, would still *rush into our Minds*; yet, it would not from thence follow, that SPACE must have *real Existence*, much less *necessary* or *self Existence* — that *Ideas* may rush into our Minds, which have nothing *ad extra* correspondent to them—that it seemed evident to me, that the very Reason why SPACE *i. e.* the *Idea* of SPACE, after all Endeavours to the contrary, does still rush into the Mind, is because SPACE is *mere Nothing*; and to suppose NOTHING *away*, or to endeavour, even in Thought to *annihilate* NOTHING, is a Contradiction; because in the *Idea* of *Annihilation*, we always presuppose the *Existence* of *Something*; and when we endeavour to imagine NOTHING *annihilated*, *Nothing* will remain; for to annihilate *Nothing*, is to turn *Nothing* into *Nothing*, and therefore the *first Idea*, after all our Suppositions, still recurs, and consequently, if this be an Argument for the NECESSARY EXISTENCE of SPACE, it is full as good for the NECESSARY EXISTENCE of NOTHING.

BUT you are pleased in Reply, to ask the following Questions — *viz.* “ If after all Things, by
 “ which I now mean all created Substances, and
 “ their Properties, are supposed to be annihilated,
 “ this Author has an *Idea* of *Nothing*, which
 “ rushes into his Mind, whether he will or no;
 “ I ask, *First*, what Sort of an *Idea* it is? *Secondly*,
 “ whether it be an *Idea* of *Nothing*, nowhere,
 “ or *Somewhere &c.*” * To your first Question I answer, that it is an *Idea* arising necessarily from the Supposition which you make: It is an *Idea* of *Reflection*. I had before an *Idea* of These Sub-

* Third Def. p. 37.

stances, that is, of their *Existence*: I now consider their Existence to *cease*; and what is my *Idea* then, but an *Idea* of the Negation of all created Existences? and if I ask my self what remains? will not my Mind immediately answer, *Nothing*? (for the Supreme Being is out of the Question) and if, after This, I endeavour to annihilate, or to suppose NOTHING *away*, and again consult my *Ideas*; shall I not find, that I have the same *Idea* I had before? To your second Question I answer, that it is neither an *Idea* of Nothing *Nowhere*, nor *Somewhere*; unless in such a Sense, as *Ideas* may be said to be *Somewhere*. It is a *mere Idea* arising from imagining the Existence of all created Substances to cease. The remaining Part of this your 37th Page, is only ringing Changes upon the Words *Nothing Somewhere*, and *Nothing Nowhere*, and therefore I shall leave you to entertain your self with the Music.

THIS Argument, urged by Dr. Clarke for the necessary Existence of SPACE, *viz.* that it cannot be annihilated, is as it seems, a favourite one with Those Gentlemen on his Side the Question. I must own, I have often wondered, that the learned Doctor could think there was so much Force in this Argument as he seems to do; till I chanced to meet with the following Passage in Mr. WHISTON'S *Historical Memoirs*; where he relates a Circumstance of Dr. CLARKE'S Life, which he says was communicated to him from the Doctor's own Mouth. — "One of his [Dr. CLARKE'S] Parents asked him, when he was *very young*, whether God could do every Thing? He answered, yes. He was asked again, whether God could do one particular Thing, could tell a Lie? He answered, no. And he understood

“ stood the Question to suppose, that this was
 “ the only Thing, that God could not do :
 “ Nor durst he say, *so young was he then*, he
 “ thought there was any Thing else which God
 “ could not do : While yet, he well remember’d,
 “ he had even then, a clear Conviction in his
 “ own Mind, that there was one other Thing
 “ which God could not do ; *viz.* that he could
 “ not *annihilate* that SPACE which was in the
 “ Room wherein they were. Which Impossi-
 “ bility now appears even in Sir ISAAC NEW-
 “ TON’S own Philosophy.” *

FROM this *Memoir*, I am not at all surpris’d
 that Dr. CLARKE believed SPACE to have *real*
Existence ; or to find the *Impossibility of its being*
annihilated, alledged in his Writings, as a Proof
 of its *necessary Existence*. Mr. WHISTON has set
 the Matter in its true Light. It appears, that the
 Notion of SPACE being Something really existing
ad extra, and the Impossibility of its Annihilation,
 were *natural* to him ; Notions which he had
 when he was *very young* : And it is well known,
 that whatever is strongly imbibed at such an Age,
 too often remains with us all our Lives after. If
 the Idea of a *Phantom*, in our infant Years makes
 any strong Impression upon our tender Minds ;
 we find it ever after very hard, if not impossible
 to get rid of it ; it almost necessarily *rustles* into
 our Minds, after all our Endeavours to the con-
 trary.

DR. CLARKE’S Principle, that SPACE cannot
 be annihilated is, I think, a very true one : But
 then the Question is, whether it cannot be anni-

* Mr. WHISTON’S *Historical Memoirs of the Life of*
 Dr. SAMUEL CLARKE p. 15. Edit. 2.

Q

hilated;

hilated, because it is *necessarily existing*; or whether, because it is *Nothing*? you assert the former, and I the latter; it is therefore incumbent upon you to prove your Affirmative. As I apprehend, the *Impossibility of Annihilation* can be no Proof of the *necessary Existence* of any Thing, unless that Thing be first proved to *exist*: For otherwise, the *Impossibility of Annihilation* will prove the *necessary Existence* of *Nothing*. Your Argument begins at the wrong End: You first *suppose* SPACE to have *real existence*; and then finding you cannot suppose it *annihilated*, you conclude that it must be *necessarily existing*. But it should first be put out of all Doubt, that SPACE has *real Existence*; and then indeed, if it cannot be supposed to be annihilated, it will follow that it is *necessarily existing*: Whereas, in this Argument, its *real Existence* is taken for granted; and then you endeavour to prove its *necessary Existence*, by an Argument which will, as I have observed, equally prove the *necessary Existence* of *Nothing*.

YOU tell me the “actual remaining of SPACE follows from the Impossibility of getting rid of the Idea of its real Existence, that is, from the Contradiction implied in supposing it not to exist.”* I must take the Liberty, Sir, to inform you, that the *actual Existence* of SPACE *ad extra*, by no means follows from your not being able to *get rid of* the *Idea* of its actual Existence, or from your imagining (without shewing) that there is a Contradiction implied in supposing it not to exist. What if you could not *get rid of* the *Idea* of a *Castle in the Air*? — must there be *really* such a *Thing*? If then, after all the Reason-

* Third Def. p. 80.

ing that has been used to convince you, all the Arguments that have been urged, you still find, that you can by no means *get rid of* this troublesome Idea; it is your Misfortune: But you must not endeavour to persuade us, that because you *cannot help thinking* that SPACE is a *real Existent*, therefore it must really be so — A Man that should have the Jaundice from his Birth, would by no means perhaps be able to get rid of the Idea of every Thing he saw being yellow: But I suppose, he would be thought to have a worse Distemper, should he endeavour to persuade all Mankind, that *therefore* they really were so.

To conclude this Point. It appears, that Dr. CLARKE received into his Mind this *Notion* of the *necessary Existence* of SPACE, when he was *very young*. It was one of the earliest of all his Thoughts: He seems as it were *cum lacte Nutricis errorem suxisse* * And it is no strange Thing, that Men should become zealous Votaries to those Opinions, which they have entertain'd in their Minds from their very Infancy — and *a propos* in this Place, are the Words of Mr. LOCKE; “ It is easy to imagine, how by these Means
“ it comes to pass, that Men *worship* the *Idols* that
“ have been set up in their Minds; grow fond
“ of the Notions they have been long acquaint-
“ ed with there; and *stamp the Characters of DI-*
“ VINITY upon *Absurdities and Errors.*” †

* Cicer.

† Essay on Hum. Understand. B. 1. c. 3. §. 26.—Edit. 9.

ARGUMENT IX.

*That SPACE is a MODE or PROPERTY
of GOD.*

IN Defence of Dr. CLARKE, you say that
 “ in proving SPACE to be Something from its
 “ Qualities, he did not consider it strictly as a
 “ Property, but as its own *Substratum*.” * — The
 Meaning of this you explain, by what you call
 a parallel Instance; “ A Capacity, you say, of di-
 “ stinguishing betwixt Right and Wrong, Truth
 “ and Falshood, are Qualities accompanying
 “ Knowledge; if therefore we see these distin-
 “ guishing Qualities in any Being, should we
 “ not immediately apply Knowledge to this Be-
 “ ing, and conclude that it was a Property of
 “ this Being? So likewise, in the Case before
 “ us: If we perceive that Something is pene-
 “ trable, extended, &c. and that no Being could
 “ be so, except SPACE was Something; will it
 “ not most evidently follow, that SPACE is Some-
 “ thing? and if it be a Property, that it is a
 “ Property of that Being?” † You here imagine,
 that the *Capacity of distinguishing betwixt right and
 wrong &c.* is Something *distinct* from Knowledge; whereas it is Knowledge it self: And therefore, if we see this *distinguishing Quality* in any Being, we should undoubtedly apply Knowledge to it, and conclude that it is a Property of this Being: why? — Because this *distinguishing Quality* is Knowledge; and therefore this is only saying, that if we see

Third Def. p 38.

† Ibid. p. 39.

Knowledge in any Being, we should conclude that Knowledge is a Property of this Being — But the Case before us is widely different. Penetrability and Extension are no Properties of God. And tho' Immobility, Indiscernibility, and Infinity are, yet this will not prove SPACE to be a Property of him, as a Capacity of distinguishing between Right and Wrong, Truth and Falshood, will prove Knowledge to be a Property of that Being, in whom we find such a Capacity: And for this plain Reason; viz. because such a Capacity is Knowledge: but Immobility, Indiscernibility, and Infinity are not SPACE; your parallel Instance is therefore not parallel in the least.

As to Penetrability, I told you — “To say
 “ that Penetrability is a Property of the Infinite
 “ Being, i. e. of God, is saying that the Infinite
 “ Being, i. e. God is penetrable; which is so ap-
 “ parently blasphemous, that it cannot by any one
 “ be allowed to be a Property of him.” * Now
 let us hear what Reply you make to this. It is
 an Answer drawn from the Sacred Writings, and
 usher'd in with all the Pomp of Words — “God
 “ forbid! it greatly behoves this Author, to con-
 “ sider upon whom this Accusation of Blasphemy
 “ will fall: For if by a Being's being penetrable,
 “ can only be meant that such a Being may have
 “ other Beings in it (and whether it can possi-
 “ bly mean any thing else I appeal to all the
 “ World;) then let him remember whose the
 “ following Words are, *in him we live and move,*
 “ *and have our Being.*” † — I well remember,
 Sir, whose Words they are: But I must beg Leave

* Dr. Clarke's Notions of SPACE Examined p. 46.

† Third Def. p. 40.

to observe, that they are no Proof of what you contend for.

LITTLE, I believe, did St. PAUL ever imagine, that he should be called upon as a Witness in such a Cause! little did he think, that his Words would be produced to prove, that we live and move *in* the *Essence* of God; and, that as we are *in* SPACE we are *in* God; *i. e.* that SPACE is GOD! St. PAUL was speaking to the Men of ATHENS, and endeavouring to abolish the Worship of *Idols*; and he would hardly have set up another in their Room. No; SPACE was an Idol, unknown to those Times! an Idol, reserved to these latter Ages, and for the Discovery of some modern Englishmen! But I must confess, Sir, you are not the only Person who has quoted these Words of St. PAUL to the same Purpose, and understood them in such a Sense: For the *Learned* Dr. CLARKE has done the same. Mr. LEIBNITZ calls it a *strange Expression*, to say that what is in SPACE, is *in* God's *Immensity* *. To which the *Learned* Doctor replies, *This strange Doctrine is the express Assertion of St. Paul. Acts XVII. 27, 28.*

I MUST own, it is to me Something strange, that either the *Learned* Dr. CLARKE, or any Body else should ever understand these Words in the Manner you do. Had you not been contented to be your own *Commentator*, you would have found this Passage explained in a very different Manner by the most *Learned* Interpreters †. But

* *Leibnitz's* Fifth Paper §. 44.

† Dr. WHITBY's Explanation is this; *viz.* "For in
" (or *by*) him we live, and move, and have our Being."
Dr. HAMMOND's Paraphrase upon the Place is, — "For
" our Life, Motion, and Subsistence is wholly *through*
" him." The *Learned* GROTIUS remarks that it is an
what

what is sufficient to put St. PAUL's Meaning past all Doubt, is the *Context*. When he has said, that *in him we live, and move, and have our Being*; he immediately adds, *as certain also of your own Poets have said, for we are also his Offspring*, τῷ γὰρ καὶ γένος ἐσμεν. From whence it is plain, that by these Words, *in him we live, and move, and have our Being*, St. PAUL means the same, as he does by, *we are also his Offspring*; because he mentions this saying from ARATUS, as importing the same Doctrine which he was teaching. Whatever then is the Meaning of *we are his Offspring*, the same must be intended by *in him we live, and move, and have our Being*. Now the true Import of the Former is plainly this *viz.* that God is the common *Parent* of Mankind, the *Protector* and *Preserver* of us all: That we derive our *Being from him*; and owe the *Continuance* of it *to him*: That it is wholly *through* him, or *through his Power, and Protection*, that we have our *Life, Motion, and Subsistence*; which must therefore likewise be the true Meaning of those Words of St. PAUL, *In him we live, and move, and have our Being*. It appears then

Hebraism, and understands *in ipso*, to signify the same as *per ipsum*. His whole Note runs thus *viz.* “Eit Hebraismus. “*In ipso*, id est, *per ipsum*, ipsius Beneficio. *Per ipsum existimus*: ipse nobis *Vitam* Homini congruentem, & *Motus* “tali vitæ respondentes dedit.” — And if you will enquire farther; you may find that the Preposition 'Εν is render'd by *Per*, as well as *In*; and 'Εν αὐτῷ in this Place is, you see, render'd by the Learned; *Per ipsum*; i. e. *per ipsius Omnipotentiam, & Patrocinium*; *through*, or *by Means of* him, or his *Power* and *Protection*. And agreeable to this, you will find that the *Arabick Version* actually has it, not *in Ipso*, but *Per ipsum* — “*siquidem per ipsum vivimus, movemur, & existimus.*” WALTON *Polyg.*

that

that St. PAUL, in the Passage you have cited from him to prove it, meant not (as you do) that God is *penetrable*, or that he may have other Beings in him. — To charge the Apostle with teaching such Doctrine, must proceed, either from Ignorance of his plain Meaning, or from a gross Misrepresentation of it.

You object to the Instance, which I brought to shew your Argument (*viz.* that SPACE is the Property of the infinite Being) fallacious. My Instance was this *viz.* “ God is Omniscient; he “ could not be Omniscient, unless there were “ Things for him to know: But does it from “ hence follow, that these knowable Things are “ Properties of God? * ” This you think is not a parallel Case: And therefore reduce it to such an one, as you think may be of Service to you. “ The Argument [say you] should have stood “ thus, and then let the Author judge whether “ it be conclusive, or no. An Impossibility of “ ever being deceived belongs to God; but with- “ out *Omniscience*, this Impossibility of ever being “ deceived could not belong to God; therefore “ God is omniscient.” † But this Argument is no more parallel, than you imagine mine to be. It is very plain, that *it would not be impossible* for God to be *deceived*, if *Omniscience* was *not* a Property of him: And therefore, since it *is* impossible for God to be deceived; it necessarily follows, that *Omniscience* is a *Property* of him. But is it so evident, that God cannot be *Omnipresent*, if *Space* be not a *Property* of him? This wants Proof; for as yet we have seen Nothing but bare Af-

* Dr. Clarke's Notions of SPACE, Examined p. 47.

† Third Def. p. 41.

fections, — An *Impossibility of ever being deceived* is *Omniscience*; but *Omnipresence* is not SPACE: This shews, that your Case is *by no means parallel*.

YOU say, “If we consider it, we shall find
“that it is impossible for a Being, to which SPACE
“does not belong as a Property, to be indiscer-
“pible.” * — I presume you will hardly say, that
SPACE is a Property of any *finite Spirit*: And if
not, then it is *impossible* for any finite Spirit to be
indiscerpible. You have here, Sir, advanced in Know-
ledge; for you have written but six Leaves, since
you was so uncertain in this Matter, as to say
only, that an immaterial Substance *may* be dis-
cernible, *for all that you know* †: But now it seems,
It is impossible for any finite immaterial Substance
to be indiscerpible. Yet, what is Something strange,
we shall find, if we look farther, that you have
lost all this wonderful Knowledge again, and are
reduced to your former Uncertainty: For, in
the *Vindication* of your *Second Defence*, you tell us
again, that an immaterial Substance *may, for what
you know*, be divisible **. — But let us hear your
Reason why it is impossible for a Being to which
SPACE does not belong as a Property, to be in-
discerpible: It is this; you say, that “as SPACE
“is a necessarily existent Property, there must
“be some Substance to which it belongs; and
“that Substance must be Self-existent, and there-
“fore superior to all other Substances, and con-
“sequently indiscerpible.” ††

IN the first Place, we deny SPACE to be a *ne-
cessarily existing Property*: And, in the next Place,

* Third Def. p. 41.

† Ibid. p. 29.

** Ibid. p. 90.

†† Ibid. p. 41.

tho' it be true, that *If SPACE* be a necessarily existing Property, there must be some Substance to which it belongs, and that Substance must be *Self-existent*; yet it does not appear, that there *cannot* be a *Self-existent* Substance, unless *SPACE* be a necessarily existing Property. You go on to shew that *SPACE* may be a *Property*, and yet *have Properties*; and that *Properties* may *inhere in one another*. In order to this, you tell the Reader that what I say upon this Point, "is only raising a
 " Dispute about the Words, Figure and Shape;
 " but which-ever of them is the Genus [say you]
 " is nothing to our Purpose: Figure, or Shape,
 " let him take which he pleases for the Genus,
 " in its general Meaning, is a Property of Finite-
 " nefs, or of all finite Substances."* — What I said was not *merely raising a Dispute about the Words Figure and Shape*: My Observation, that *Shape* may be said to be the *General* of all *Figure*, as well as *Figure* to be the *General* of all *Shape*, was to shew that *Shape* and *Figure* were only two different Words for the same Thing: That they could not therefore be said to be *Modes* of each other. *Shape* or *Figure* must be consider'd either in the *Abstract* or *Concrete*; in the former Sense it is a *mere Idea*, and therefore can have no *Properties* ascribed to it. In the latter, it has *Existence* in *Body* only, and therefore different *Modes* of it will in a strict Sense be only different *Modifications* of *Body*, or *Body* existing under *different Shapes*. To say that particular *Shapes* are *Modes* of *Figure* is talking of *figured Figure*: and to tell us, that " *Roundness* is not a *Quality* of *Body*,
 " because it cannot be applied to *all Bodies*†" is

* Third Def. p. 42.

† Ibid.

trifling: And I might as well tell you again, that it is not a Mode of *Figure*, for the same Reason: For I would have you recollect, whether it can be applied to *all Figures*.

A R G U M E N T X.

The two DEMONSTRATIONS of the REAL EXISTENCE of SPACE.

“SPACE is either *absolutely Nothing*, or a *mere Idea*, or a *Relation* between one Thing and another; or it is *Body*, or some *Substance*, or the *Property* of some Substance. But it is neither *Nothing*, nor a *mere Idea*, nor a *Relation*, nor *Body*, nor any *Substance*; therefore it must be a *Property* of some Substance.”* This is Dr. CLARKE’S famous *Demonstration* (as ’tis called) of the real Existence of SPACE, which you had produced in your *First Defence* †. And this *Demonstration* you likewise endeavoured to support, by other *Media* of your *own*, for the Benefit of Those who might not see the Force of the Doctor’s. Upon these I offered some Remarks **. You have since endeavoured to vindicate the Doctor, and your self, from the Difficulties I had raised against you; but I meet with little or nothing, but what has been already obviated; and therefore I should want the Reader’s Excuse, were I to re-examine them minutely, and particularly. But least you should think what you have urged to

* Dr. CLARKE’S 5th Reply to Mr. LEIBNITZ.

† First Def. p. 59.

** Dr. Clarke’s Notions of SPACE, Examined.

be unanswerable, were I to pass them by without Notice, I shall make a few Strictures upon them.

FIRST, SPACE ('tis said) is not absolutely Nothing, in Proof of which you offer these three Things.

1. "It has Quantity, because it has Length, " which is Quantity" * — that is, Quantity is Quantity, SPACE has Quantity, therefore SPACE has Quantity. Wonderfully edifying This! But I must put you in Mind, that I deny SPACE to have *Length which is Quantity*. You say "it is " plain that it has Length, for otherwise all Bodies would be equal and alike." † If this Argument has any Force, it lies too deep for me to fathom it; and till it is brought to Light, I shall only say, that I never yet heard of any other Reason, for Bodies not being equal in Length, but that one was longer than another. The Difference is only in the Bodies themselves.

2. *It has Dimensions*. All the Proof you bring of This is, that "Dimensions are only Lengths " every way, or Length, Breadth, and Depth." ** This Argument must therefore stand, or fall with the Former, for unless you can prove SPACE to have *Length*, it will hardly appear to have *Breadth*, or *Depth*.

3. *It has Properties* — This you tell us, "has " been sufficiently shewn, and is unquestionable." †† But those Arguments by which you think you have *sufficiently shewn* SPACE to have Properties, are *sufficiently answer'd* in their Place. You add these Words *viz.* "unless This, or some other " Author can shew the Impossibility of Properties

* Third Def. p. 45.

† Ibid.

** Ibid. p. 46.

†† Ibid.

“ inhering in one another.” * But herein, Sir, you are greatly mistaken! for it is by no means incumbent on us here to shew, that Properties cannot inhere in one another: No; 'tis your Business to prove that SPACE has Properties, in order to prove its Existence. We don't argue that SPACE is a *Property*, and therefore cannot *have Properties*: No; we deny SPACE to be a *Property*; and only urge that Properties cannot inhere in Properties, to shew your Inconsistency, who, at the same Time that you say it is a *Property*, contend for its *having Properties*.

BUT my Principles, it seems, *tend towards Atheism* †; and why? because you assert that I suppose SPACE to be a '*Property of Body*' **. But what Reason you could have for this I know not, when I neither affirm'd, nor intimated any Thing like it. You ought, Sir, to have laid the Passage before the Reader, in which you pretend that I make such a Supposition: But the Case is, *there is no such Passage* as will support your Charge, and if the Reader will give himself the Trouble to turn to p. 53. of *Dr. Clarke's Notions of SPACE examined*, against which Page, it seems, the Accusation lies, he will soon be convinced that what you say is without Foundation. To suppose SPACE a *Property of Body*, would be a Supposition absolutely inconsistent with my constant Description of SPACE, as *mere Nothing*, or an *Idea only*, or the *Absence* of Body; and few, I believe, will imagine, that I should suppose the *Absence* of Body to be a *Property* of Body — The Reason therefore

* Third Def. p. 46.

† Ibid.

** Ibid.

of this Assertion of yours, is what you are still to account for.

SECONDLY, "SPACE [says Dr. Clarke] is not a mere Idea; for no Idea of SPACE can possibly be framed greater than finite, yet Reason shews that it must be infinite." * To which I answer.

SPACE may be considered, either as a *Void*, a mere *Negation of Body*; or as the *Idea of Extension*. All the *Infinity* which can be applied to it under the former Consideration is such as may be applied to *Nothing*. It may be said to have *no Bounds* or *Limits*, not because it is a Being *really* extended *in infinitum*; but because it is *no Being at all*; and therefore has not *Reality*, or *Existence*, so as to be *capable of having* Bounds. The *Infinity* which is attributed to SPACE under the latter Consideration *viz.* as the *Idea of Extension*, is only the Impossibility of setting Bounds to that Faculty, which the Mind has of enlarging the *Idea of Extension*. Such *Infinity* is only a mere roving *Idea*, an indefinite Increasableness †. To imagine this to be a true *positive* Infinity, and to attribute it to a *really existent Being* is all over Contradiction, and Absurdity; 'tis supposing it to be *positively infinite*, and yet continually capable of being *increased*, i. e. infinite and finite at the same Time: or else 'tis to find out a *Number* so great as to admit of no *Addition*; which is what has been always looked upon to be the greatest Absurdity possible in

* Third Def. p. 47.

† To this Purpose speaks Mr. LOCKE. "Our Idea of *Infinity*, even when applied to *Expansion*, and *Duration*, seems to be Nothing but the *Infinity* of *Number*." — Essay on H. U. B. 2. c. 16. §. 8.

Philosophy; too great for any one to maintain, till Mr. JACKSON, in a late Piece, thought fit to oblige the World with the Discovery *

BUT it is said, that we *cannot but* conceive SPACE to be infinite; that the Mind is not only *capable of enlarging* its Idea of Extension *in infinitum*, but that *it cannot but enlarge it in infinitum* †. I reply, this must either mean in *Reason*, or in *Imagination*; in *Reason* we cannot but enlarge our *Idea* of Extension without Bounds, for otherwise our *Faculty* of enlarging must be bounded; but in *Imagination*, what *Idea* we have of SPACE or Extension, is necessarily finite and limited. We can think of a Yard, or Mile in length, or of the Diameter of the *Orbis Magnus*; which will be having an *Idea* of a determinate Length, *i. e.* in the Language of these Gentlemen, of a determinate Quantity of SPACE.

IN the *Vindication* of your *Second Defence* p. 82. you say, “were SPACE not truly, and positively infinite, there must be a Possibility of stopping Somewhere, when we add finite SPACES together.”—To this I reply, that the Reason why we cannot stop, in adding finite SPACES together (*i. e.* why we cannot stop if we try to go on, for otherwise we may stop) is because there are no Limits to our Faculty of Numbering, and therefore the Faculty of Numbering being boundless is the Reason, not only why we *can* go numbering on, or *can* enlarge our Idea of Extension in infinitum; but why we *cannot but* do it, if we endeavour at it. But this no more proves SPACE

* See *The Existence and Unity of God proved from his Nature and Attributes* — p. 87.

† See *Existence and Unity* &c. p. 86.

to be any Thing positively infinite *ad extra*, than it proves *Number* to be so. All the Truth then that I can find in this Proposition of Dr. Clarke's (*viz.* no Idea of SPACE can possibly be framed greater than finite, yet Reason shews it must be infinite) is This. *viz.* That our *Idea* of SPACE as *Extension* being an Idea of *Imagination*, such an Idea must be *finite*; yet *Reason* shews that we can repeat *these Ideas*, without ever finding any *Limits*, or *Bounds* to our *Faculty* of *Repeating*.

MR. JACKSON observes, that "we find we cannot but add *in infinitum*, not to the *Ideas* formed in the *Imagination*, there is soon an End of them, but to the *Ideatum's* or *Things Themselves*." * But I think he might have known, that we deny there are any *Ideata* or *Things themselves* in the Case. What he calls the *Ideatum*, in the Case of SPACE, is what we call a *Void*, or *mere Nothing*; and why there is no End to SPACE under that Consideration, requires no great Sagacity to account. SPACE, consider'd as a *Void*, or a *Negation of Body*, has no End or Limits, in the same Sense as *Nothing* has no End: And considered as the *Idea of Extension*, has no End or Limits, in the Sense that *Number* has no End.

BUT you charge me with *supposing Matter to be infinitely expanded*, i. e. as you explain it, that *Matter may be made infinite* †. And from hence you argue, that "if SPACE be a Possibility of the Existence of Matter (as we allow) SPACE must be infinite." ** But you should have been careful here to have distinguished between

* Existence and Unity &c. p. 83.

† Third Def. p. 47

** Ibid. p. 47, 48.

positive Infinity, and such an *Indefiniteness* (improperly called *Infinity*) as is predicable of Quantity. I allow Matter may be infinitely expanded in the latter Sense; *i. e.* a Quantity may be supposed greater than any given (for I have not as yet found out the *last Number*.) But to suppose it capable of positive Infinity, is to suppose that nothing can be added to it, that 'tis boundless and unmeasurable, that 'tis more than either Imagination or Number (without the help of Mr. JACKSON'S Numeration Table) can possibly reach to. And if any one will maintain such Absurdities, I assure him, he shall have no Controversy with me.

YOU proceed next to argue for the *real Existence* of SPACE, from the Difference betwixt *That* and *Duration*. Your whole Argument is *petitio Principii*. Because we can talk of *certain Ideas* and make *Propositions* about them, therefore you would argue that they are *real Entities*: Because we can predicate Things of *Virtue*, which cannot be predicated of *Vice*, therefore, according to you, they must be *real Entia*. SPACE or Extension has Respect to the *Bulk* of a Body; DURATION has not, (which is the true Meaning of the notable Difference you have found between SPACE and DURATION *viz.* "that the bigger any Body is, " the greater Part of SPACE it requires for its " Existence, whereas in DURATION, it takes up " the same Part of it, whether it be great or " small.)" * This Difference I acknowledge to be between SPACE and DURATION; but it is only a Difference of *Ideas*. SPACE and DURATION are two *different Ideas*, applied to *Body* in

* First Def. p. 61.

two different Respects, the one as to its *Extension*, the other as to its mere *Existence* consider'd as *continuing*. But this does not prove that SPACE and DURATION are any *real Things* differing in Themselves: It proves only that they are *different Ideas*; and not that either, or both of them must have an *objective Reality*.

THE other Part of the Doctor's Disjunction we are both agreed in *viz.* that SPACE is neither a *Relation*, nor *Body* nor some *Substance*. But in the Sequel, you carp at some of my Expressions, and endeavour to support your Arguments, by a supposed Defect, or Inconsistency in mine. Thus you observe:

1. "HE calls SPACE Nothing, and yet allows " it to have a Relation to Something. Can No- " thing have a Relation to Something?" * Can you really think that this deserves an Answer? Has not *Anatomy* a *Relation* to the *Human Body*, and *Botany* to *Plants*; and yet will you say that *Anatomy*, and *Botany* are *real Entia*? or thus; the *Quantity* of *Gold* has *Relation* to its *Bulk*, which the *Quality* has not; is *Quantity* therefore a *real Entity*? — Please, Sir, but to turn to my *First Chapter* concerning the different Senses of the Term *Nothing*; and I believe it will help you out of all your Difficulties.

2. You observe " that I seem throughout my " Reply, to imagine we can have an Idea of No- " thing, from the Absence of Something." † I answer — we have an Idea of SPACE *from*, or *by Reason* of the Absence of Body: *i. e.* We have first an *Idea* of *Body* from *Sensation*; and then supposing *Body away*, we have an *Idea* of SPACE:

* Third Def. p. 51.

† Ibid. p. 52.

By reflecting on what it is for *Body* to occupy *Space*, or to be endued with *Solidity*, or *Impenetrability*, we perceive what is the *Reverse* of This, or what *Extension* is *without Solidity*.

3. YOU call upon me to explain what I mean by an *Idea of Nothing* * ; which I do, by explaining the Term *Nothing*, which is equivocal. If by *Nothing*, be meant a Negation of all *Things both Real and Ideal*, then an *Idea of Nothing* is *no Idea*; but if it means a Negation only of real Existencies *ad extra* (in which Sense I have always applied it to SPACE) then an *Idea of Nothing* will be an *Idea without an objective Reality*; and such may be the *Idea of SPACE*, for any Thing you have said.

4. YOU say that — “as he thinks that simple Ideas may be Ideas of Nothings, he should find out some new Way to prove, that Things exist without us &c.” †

BUT I apprehend the old one to be still very sufficient: Tho’ I think ’tis pretty plain, that you make no Use of it. Your Way is to argue from *Ideas* to *Things*; whereas Mr. LOCKE is of Opinion, that “the having the Idea of any Thing in our Mind, no more proves the Existence of that Thing, than the Picture of a Man evidences his being in the World, or the Visions of a Dream make thereby a true History.” ** The Case is, we are not so to depend upon our Perceptions (be they Simple or Complex) as to conclude immediately, that every one of them must necessarily have Objects *ad extra* correspondent to them. We must examine them by

* Third Def. p. 52.

† Ibid.

** Essay on H. U. B. 4. c. xi. §. 1.

those Ways which we are furnish'd with, by Reason, Experience, Attention, &c. and I am persuaded, that none of These will ever bear Testimony to the real Existence of SPACE.

BUT you "grant that the Idea of SPACE is " first got from *Body*, that is, the Idea of the " *Space or Extension of Body &c.*"* Pray Sir what do you mean by the *Space of Body*? You are here fallen into the very Hypothesis you was so lately fixing upon me; and if therefore to make SPACE a *Property of Body*, be tending towards *Atheism*, I hope you will remember whole Principles they are: And will likewise find out some new Distinction, to reconcile the two Hypotheses, of SPACE being a Property of God, as well as a Property of Body — You see, Sir, I do not think it sufficient to tell the Reader, that *our Author supposes* SPACE the Property of Body at the Top, or Bottom of a Page; but I fairly produce the Passage, against which my Exceptions lie; that any one may judge, whether I tax you falsely or not: To do otherwise, is an Art to which I can never prevail with my self to descend.

I HAD said that " we have no Idea, no Notion " at all of the Substance of which SPACE is said " to be a Mode *viz.* of the Self-existent Substance: " — how then can SPACE be affirm'd to be a " Mode of him."† In answer to This, you would shew that my Argument proves too much. You endeavour to make it follow from my Principles, that we cannot know any of the Properties or Attributes of God. The Sum of your Objection may be thus comprisd *viz.* " He af-

* Third Def. p. 53.

† Dr. Clarke's Notions of SPACE, Examined p. 74.
" firms

“ firms [say you] that we cannot tell whether
 “ a particular Property can be applied to any Sub-
 “ stance, unless we have some Idea, some Notion
 “ of that Thing which we call the Substance.
 “ He says likewise, that we have no Idea, no No-
 “ tion at all of the Self-existent Substance: How
 “ then can he prove *Omniscience*, *Omnipotence*, and
 “ *Eternity*, to be Properties of God; since with-
 “ out knowing his *Substance* (which he says we
 “ know nothing of) we cannot tell whether they
 “ belong to him or no.” And then you con-
 “ clude, as before, with flinging out your Charge
 “ of *Atheism*: “I should be loth [say you] to en-
 “ certain Principles whose natural Consequences
 “ lead so near *Atheism*, as these seem to do.”*—
 To this I answer, that there is no Necessity of
 knowing the *Substance* of God, in order to a Proof
 of such Attributes as relate not at all to the *Mo-
 dus* of the Divine Existence. The *Existence* it self
 is one Thing, and the *Modus* of that Existence
 quite another; a Person may know the *former*, and
 yet be wholly ignorant of the *latter*. We prove
 the *Existence* of God *a posteriori*, or by ascending
 from *Effect* to *Cause*; and from thence we deduce
Omniscience, *Omnipotence* &c. Attributes which we
 may, and do know to belong to God, tho’ under
 an entire Ignorance of the *Divine Substance*, or
 of the *Modus* of his *Existence*. Nor when we call
 him Omnipotent, or Omniscient, do we at all
 define his *Substance*, any more than we define the
Substance of a King, by calling him Wise or Power-
 ful. But how widely different is the Point with
 Respect to SPACE, which you call his *real Exten-
 sion*: For in Order to know that *Extension* is a Pro-

* Third Def. p. 58.

perty of God, it is not sufficient to know that he *exists*; but a Knowledge is required likewise of the *Modus* of his Existence, because *Extension* relates to the *Modus of Existence*: And therefore, since we know nothing at all of the *Modus* of God's Existence (which is what I meant by saying that we have no Idea, no Notion at all of the *Substance* of which SPACE is affirmed to be a *Mode*) How can any one presume to affirm, that SPACE is a *Property of the Deity*? But you pretend to be clear in Subjects the most dark and mysterious, and to comprehend, what all Writers whether Divines or Philosophers, have allowed to be Incomprehensible. The Divine Substance is better known to you, than what you are daily and hourly conversant with: For you ask "will any one presume to say that he *knows not as much* of the " SELF-EXISTENT SUBSTANCE as he does of " MATTER?" * — Such Presumption deserves Rebuke rather than an Answer; I shall only observe with Relation to the Point in Hand, that to know that God exists, or to know those Properties only which we prove must belong to God, as being the *First Cause*, is not sufficient to let us into the Knowledge, whether SPACE be a Property of him or no, for the Reasons before given; unless SPACE be a Property of him, as being the *First Cause*; and if it be, then there cannot be a *First Cause*, that is a *God*, without SPACE being a Property of him. But if there cannot, then, if the Proof should fail that SPACE is the Property of God, or a Property at all; it will follow, that it cannot be proved there is a God — were I disposed therefore, I might retort upon you with

* Third Def. p. 58.

the utmost Justice the Charge of *entertaining Principles whose natural Consequences lead so near Atheism*: But I am sensible that every serious Debate should be carried on with Calmness, and that calling our Adversary an *Atheist* at every turn can be only to supply the Defect of Argument, and fill up the Vacancies of Reason; a Charge as trite as it is despicable: Nor could some of the most Learned and Religious escape the Censure, when they have fallen into the Hands of malicious and calumniating Adversaries*.

I AM far from suspecting either you, or the Person in whose Defence you are writing, to believe any of those ill Consequences to Religion, which seem to me to follow from your Doctrine. You contend that SPACE is the *real Extension of the Divine Substance*; now according to my Metaphysics, this is to *Deify SPACE*, and make it *God himself*. For I can think of *Modes* in no other Way than these, either as *abstract general Ideas* (in which Sense they have no Existence *ad extra*) or as the *modified Substance it self*. Thus *Extension* is either *in Abstracto*, or *in Concreto*; *in Abstracto* 'tis a *mere Idea*, and *in Concreto* 'tis *Body it self*: And I could never see any Foundation

* Jac Frid. REIMMANNI &c. *Historia Uniuersalis Atheismi* &c. — *Hildesie apud Ludolphum Schroeder*—1725— This Author shews that GROTIUS^a, CUDWORTH^b, LOCKE^c, nay even the learned Dr. CLARKE himself have not been always free from this Accusation. — His Words are these — “SAMUEL CLARCK S. B. D. Rector Ecclesie “ S. Jacobi Westmonasteriensis & Serenissimæ Regine a “ Sacris Ordinariis, Vir in Philosophia & Mathesi exerci- “ tatifimus, Arianismi semet ipsum fecit reum, & Atheismi “ Infamia ab aliis notatus est.” — Sect. 3. c. 8. §. 11.

^a Sect. 3. c. IX. §. 2. — ^b Sect. 3. c. 8. §. 12. — ^c Sect. 3. c. 8. §. 9.

for that Distinction of Sir ISAAC NEWTON* and Dr. CLARKE † betwixt *Immensitas* and *Immensum*. If SPACE be *Immensitas Dei*, if it be, as the Doctor calls it, τὸ *Immensi*; it must be *Deus ipse*, the τὸ *Immensum*. I suppose it would be thought a too fine-spun Distinction, if I should say that the *Deity* of the Supreme Being is not the *Divine Being himself*; because the Divine Being is *Deus*, not *Deitas*. You see what your Arguments when examined will prove, if they prove any Thing: And does it not betray a secret Doubt, a conscious Mistrust in Men, that they are wrong in a Point which yet they strenuously defend; when they wrap up their Arguments in mysterious Expressions, and hang as it were a Veil over their Reasoning? If your own Sentiments are not what your Arguments, if true, would prove; it may be necessary for you to explain the following Passage in your *First Defence* viz. “ It may not appear so proper to say that He “ [God] is *co-extended*, or *co-expanded* with every Point of the boundless Immensity: For “ it is *He, his Existence*, that *constitutes* every Point “ of this Immensity, IT IS HE ALONE THAT “ IS IMMENSE, and even *Space it self* is not *infinite* independent of him.”** — These are your Words, which I shall leave the Reader to make his own Remarks upon.

As to the Notion of *God* being *extended*; that, it seems, is thought a very defensible Hypothesis. To me it appears big with Absurdities. In my Answer to your *Second Defence*, I remarked that

* See his Princ. Math. Schol. Gen.

† Dr. CLARKE's 5th Reply to LEIBNITZ.

** First Def. p. 57.

“to suppose God extended is a very gross Notion.”* But in your *Vindication* of that *Defence*, you tell me that, “if we put any other Word for Extension that has the *same Meaning*, as Expansion suppose, the Grossness immediately vanishes.”† But I beg of you Sir, put me not off with empty Sounds! If *Expansion* has the *same Meaning* (which you here admit) as *Extension*; then the *Meaning* is as *gross* as ever. I confess *Expansion* is a much prettier Kind of Word than *Extension*; and a Poet would undoubtedly chuse it: But Poetry is not always Truth, any more than Rhime is Reason. The Sound will not alter the Sense. *Expanded God*, tho’ a *smoother Expression*, is yet as *gross a Notion*, as *Extended God*, You may call Matter *expanded* if you please, instead of *extended*: But if you do, I believe every one, not excepting your self, would still have the same *Idea* of *Matter* they had before.

I SHALL next proceed to the Point of *Eternal Creation*.

* Dr. Clarke’s *Notions of SPACE Examined* p. 128.

† Third Def. p. 91.

C H A P. IV.

Of ETERNAL CREATION.

LET us now proceed to enquire how the Controversy stands between us, in Relation to the Possibility of an ETERNAL CREATION.

THAT a Being may have *existed from Eternity*, without *Beginning*, and yet have been *created by Another*, has always seemed to me to be an Hypothesis which carries its own Confutation with it, and is nothing less than a Contradiction in Terms. But what is there, which Some will not advance? and when advanced by Some, that Others will not defend? — I shall endeavour to reduce the Dispute to as narrow a Compass as I can. What we have to say, may be distributed under the three following Heads.

1. THE Nature of *Creation*.
2. OF *Cause* and *Effect*.
3. OF *Eternity*.

I. FROM the Nature of *Creation*, I argued that God could not make an *Eternal Creature*, because it implied a Contradiction: For That which is created, begun to exist, and therefore, to make an *Eternal Creature* is causing That to exist *without Beginning*, Which yet, by being *created*, is supposed to *have a Beginning*. To this you answer by “denying that *Creation* implies a *Beginning of Existence* *” that is, by denying That to be the true Sense of *Creation*, which all Writers, *Logical* and *Metaphysical*, have ever understood it in.

* Third Def. p. 66.

“ Creation (says one of them) is the *Production* of
 “ Something *out of Nothing*, therefore That which
 “ is *created* cannot be *eternal*: For there must
 “ have been *Nothing* before there could be a *Crea-*
 “ *ture.*” * And in another Place, “ a *creating Cause*
 “ is that which *produces an Effect out of Nothing.*” †
 In this Sense likewise Mr. LOCKE understands
Creation: “ When the Thing (says he) is wholly
 “ *made new*, so that no Part thereof *did ever exist*
 “ *before*; as when a new Particle of Matter doth
 “ *begin to exist, in rerum Natura*, which had be-
 “ fore *no Being*,—this we call *Creation.*” ** And
 indeed, if this be not the Meaning of *Creation*, I
 would desire to know the Difference between
Creation and *Conservation* ††? It would be endless
 to mention All who have understood *Creation* in
 this Sense: It would be more proper for you to
 mention *One* who ever understood it in any other.
 Since then every *Creature* must have had a *Begin-*
ning of Existence, it is evident that no *Creature*
 could have existed from *Eternity*, or co-eval with
 his *Creator*. And indeed it appears to be such an
 Absurdity, that one would wonder how any Man
 can maintain it: A *despised* and *absurd* Tenet, as

* *Creatio est Productio Rei ex Nihilo, ergo quod crea-*
tur non potest esse æternum: oportet enim nihil fuisse,
antequam crearetur. — Burgerf. Institut. Metaphys. Lib. 2.
c. X. N^o. VII.

† *Causa Creans est quæ producit effectum ex nihilo.*
Ibid. L. I. c. 26. N^o. IV.

** *Essay on H. U. — B. 2. c. 26. §. 2.*

†† *Causa procreans* dicitur, quæ Rem efficit, quæ antea
 non erat: *Conservans*, quæ efficit Rei existentis *Durationem.*
Burgerf. Instit. Met. L. I. c. 26. N^o. II.

MR. WHISTON, in his Reply to Lord NOTTINGHAM, justly stiles it*.

I SAID that, “whatever was *created*, did once “*not exist.*” † This [say you] “is true only in “a certain Sense, that whatever was *created in Time*, “did once *not exist*; but That which was *from “Eternity*, whether it was *created* or not, *did never not exist.*” ** But this is only begging the Question *viz.* That what is *created*, may yet be *from Eternity*; and asserting that *Creation* does not imply a *Beginning of Existence*, and therefore it requires no further Answer.

YOU object — “If God had exerted this Power “from Eternity, and yet the Effect was not from “Eternity, it is evident that there must be a “whole Eternity pass’d between the Exertion of “the Power, and the Effect consequent upon that “Exertion; because the Effect has a Beginning, “and the Exertion of the Power has none.” †† I answer: If by the *Exertion of the Power*, you mean the *mere Act of the Will*, then I say, that

* “Nor do I quite despair of seeing such shrewd and “cunning *Athanasians*, as Dr. *W.* driven to this *last Eva- “sion*, and of hearing them broach This other great *Atha- “nasian* Mystery, how *despised* and *absurd* an one soever, “that any *Creature* whatsoever may be strictly speaking, “in Point of *Duration*, *coeternal* with its *Creator.*” — *Whiston’s* Reply to Lord *Nottingham.* p. 30. — But it is proper that the *Remark* upon this Passage should be here added — “Mr. *Whiston* justly calls it a *despised* and *absurd* Tenet: “only he happen’d to have his Thoughts a little wan- “dering, when he call’d it an *Athanasian* Mystery, instead “of calling it an *Arian* one. For I never heard of any “one *Athanasian* but what despised and rejected it. — *Waterland’s* Second Defence &c. QUERY XV. p. 363.

† Dr. *Clarke’s* Notions of SPACE Examined p. 93.

** Third Def. p. 70.

†† Ibid. p. 69.

the *Exertion of the Power* might have been *from Eternity*, and yet the *Effect* would not have *existed from Eternity*. But then say you “there must
 “ be a whole Eternity pass’d between the Exer-
 “ tion of the Power, and the Effect consequent
 “ upon that Exertion.” This Confusion arises from
 considering the *Eternity* of God, as *Something really*
flowing successively; whereas your Difficulty would
 soon vanish, if you would conceive it in that
 Sense, which seems to me to be the only true one;
 and that is, “*uniform, invariable Existence*: or
 “*simple Existence*, joined with *Necessity*: by
 “ which last Word we only understand an *Im-*
 “*possibility of having ever begun, or of ever*
 “*ceasing.*” * And if this be the true Meaning
 of God’s *eternal Existence*, then the *Eternity* of his
Power of Willing must be consider’d in the same
 Light *viz.* as an *Impossibility* of its having be-
 gun, or of ceasing: And then to say that God
will’d This, or That Thing *from Eternity*, will
 signify no more, than that such a Thing was the
invariable Will of God. Let us suppose then the
 Existence of his Creatures to be the *invariable*
 Will of God: Yet, as these are *external Effects* of
 this *Will*, they must *begin to exist*: And then in
 this Way of considering it, the *Eternity* which
 you conceive *Prior* to their *Existence*, and to be
 Something *actually past* between the *Act of the Will*,
 and the *Existence of the Effect*, is only the *simple*
Existence of the Deity.

If by *Exertion of the Power*, be meant the
 same as the *actual Production* of the Creature (as
 indeed, to speak properly, it ought to be: For the
Effect should be considered in the *Exertion of the*

* Transf. of ABp. King’s Orig. of Evil — Remark [XC.]
 Ed. 1. [R. C.] p. 66. Ed. 2.

Power; because the *Power* is not, strictly speaking, *actually exerted*, till the *Creature* is produced) then I deny that the *Power* could be *actually exerted from Eternity*: For in this Sense, the *Exertion* of the *Power* has a *Beginning*, namely with the Existence of the *Creature*.

BUT then you “desire to know the Difference “ between having a *Power* from Eternity, without being able to exert it from Eternity, and not having that *Power* from Eternity at all.” * I answer here (as before) that if by *exerting the Power from Eternity*, be meant the *simple Act of the Will*, then God could exert this *Power* from Eternity. If the *Effect* be taken into the *Idea* of the *Exertion of the Power*, then indeed he could not exert the *Power* from Eternity; but then there will still be a wide Difference, between not being able to *exert the Power from Eternity*, in this Sense, and *not having the Power from Eternity at all*. For to suppose the *Power* of creating *actually exerted* from Eternity in *such a Sense* is, as has been shewn, to suppose a Contradiction: And therefore, since God cannot work Contradictions, the *Power* of creating cannot be *actually exerted* by him from Eternity *i. e.* he cannot produce an *eternal Creature*. But yet tho’ he cannot make an *eternal Creature*, he has nevertheless the *eternal Power* of Creating: Though he cannot exert the *Action* of *eternal Creation*, yet still he has an *eternal Power* of exerting the *Action* of Creation: The *Power* is *eternal*, or *invariable*, but the *Action*, the *Creation* must be in *Time*, or must *begin*. And surely it is not difficult, to see the Difference between having an *eternal Power* (tho’ the *actual Exertion*,

* Third Def. p. 69, 70.

or *Effect* of this Power would be in *Time*) and not having the *Power* from Eternity at all.

I ARGUED that “the very Supposition that “God had a Power from Eternity to *create*, or “bring any Thing *into* Being, implies that What “he had a Power to *create*, or bring *into* Being, “must be once *out* of Being.” * “That is [say “you] in other Words, The very Supposition “that God had a *Power* from Eternity to *create*, “implies that he could not exert that Power from “Eternity *i. e.* he had not that Power from E- “ternity.” † — I answer: *Power* is one Thing, The *Exertion* of the Power is another. The *Exertion* of the Power is (strictly) the *actual Creation*, and *Creation* implies a *Beginning of Existence*: Therefore the Supposition that God had a Power from Eternity to *create*, is that he had the Power from Eternity of *giving Beginning to what was not*; *Ergo* the very Supposition that he had a Power to *create*, implies that What he had Power to *create* was not from Eternity. The very Power of *doing* supposes the Thing *not done*; because if the Thing be *done*, it cannot be said, that it is in the Power of any Being to *do* it: For to have a Power of *doing* that which is *already done*, is a Contradiction. Thus if any *created* Beings *always* existed, it cannot be said, that it was ever in the Power of any Being to *cause* them to exist: For they were never *in Potentia*, but always *in Actu*. The *voluntary Power* of *doing* must be *Previous* to the *Thing done*: And therefore God might *from Eternity* have the Power of *doing* what, in the Nature of the Thing, could not be *actual'y done from*

* Dr. Clarke's Notions of SPACE Examined p. 121.

† Third Def. p. 83.

Eternity. But it does not follow, because the *actual Exertion* of the Power, *i. e.* the *Thing created* was not from Eternity, therefore God had not the *Power* from Eternity of *creating*. The *Power* of *creating* he had from Eternity, but the *Thing created* must begin to exist. But it seems you can see no Difference in that Distinction, which I made between a *Power from Eternity* of *creating*, and a *Power of creating from Eternity*. I argued thus “that God had in himself a *Power* “*from all Eternity* of *creating* whatsoever, and “*whenever* he pleased, is most undoubtedly true: “But that he had a *Power of creating Beings from* “*all Eternity*, *i. e.* that he had a *Power to create* “*eternal Beings*, is undoubtedly false.”* To this you answer “I beg leave to observe here, that “This is undoubtedly inconsistent with his own “*Notion*; for if God could create *whenever* “he pleased, he could create *from all Eternity*, be- “cause he could certainly please from all Eternity, “otherwise he had not free Will from all Eter- “nity.”† To which I reply.

FIRST, God could not *create from all Eternity* *i. e.* he could not make an *eternal Creature*, because it is a Contradiction; yet he had a *Power from Eternity* of *creating whenever*, that is, at what *Time* soever he pleased: But *creating in Time* is not *creating from Eternity*, therefore I am undoubtedly consistent.

SECONDLY. God had always the *Power of creating*, and could create *whenever* he pleased; but yet he could not *create* a Being, which should nevertheless *exist from Eternity*; because *Creation* is an *Action*, and has Relation to an *external Effect*,

* Dr. Clarke's Notions of SPACE Examined p. 91.

† Third Def. p. 67.

and therefore must be *in Time*; and although God was always free to exert this Power of creating, yet he could not exert it so as that this *voluntary Exertion* (in which I include the *Effect*) should be without *Beginning*. “ The supposing an Action
 “ (says a late judicious Writer) such as the effect-
 “ ing of Matter must be, destroys the Idea of
 “ *Eternity* in the *Thing effected* by that Action.
 “ Every Action must have a *Beginning* and an
 “ *End*, these are included in the Conception of
 “ Action; for if it were without a *Beginning*,
 “ the Thing is not yet begun; and what was
 “ never begun cannot be now ended, as the Pro-
 “ duction of Matter is. The denying *these Li-*
 “ *mits* to Action, amounts still to an absolute
 “ Negation of it. And to say Matter was pro-
 “ duced without Action, is as much as to say,
 “ it was effected without Agency or Efficiency.
 “ — Tho’ it be certain that the *Agent* is eternal,
 “ it will never follow that any *particular Act* is
 “ eternal. It is the Nature of any particular Act
 “ to be circumscrib’d and temporary, that is, in
 “ other Words to be limited both *before* and *be-*
 “ *hind*, which is a Condition inconsistent with E-
 “ ternity.”* — In short there may be an *eternal*
Power, yet not an *eternal Action*. For as the *A-*
gent is *eternal*, the *Power* must be so too, because
Power is one of his *essential Attributes*, and there-
 fore that Being whose Attribute it is, cannot be
 supposed to exist without it. But then the *actual*
Exertion of this *Power* relates to Something *ex-*
ternal, the *actual Exertion* of the *Power* of creating,

* Enquiry into the Nature of the Human Soul —
 Sect. VIII. No. XIII. p. 357.

consider'd as the actual *Creation*, must have a Beginning.

2. FROM the Nature of *Cause* and *Effect*, I argue that an *eternal Creation* is impossible. *Causes* may be considered, either as *Voluntary*, or *Necessary*. The *Cause* which we are here concern'd with is a *voluntary Cause*: For it is admitted, that God is the *voluntary Cause* of thote Things which he has *created*, that is, that he did not create them *necessarily*, but out of his own *free Will* and *Pleasure*: that they did not flow from him as *Light* from the Sun, but that they were the *Effects* of a *free Agent* *. If then the *Existence* of a *voluntary Cause* must be *prior* to the *Existence* of the *Effect*, then it is plain, that the *Effect* could not *exist from Eternity*, or *coeval* with the *Existence* of the *voluntary Cause*. There is indeed a *Sense*, in which an *Effect* may be said to be *coeval* with its *voluntary Cause* viz. as No Thing is strictly speaking a *Cause*, till it produces an *Effect*. Thus if I put a *Body* into *Motion*, I am not properly a *Mover* till the other *Body* is *moved*; or, a *Father* is not a *Father*, till he has a *Son*. The *Cause* and *Effect*, in this *Sense*, may perhaps be allowed to be *coeval*, consider'd *merely* as *Cause* and *Effect*: For this is a *Relation* which equally depends upon *both*, and cannot subsist in *one alone*: The *Effect* is not an *Effect*, before it be *caused*, nor can the *Cause* be strictly a *Cause*, till it produces an *Effect*. But this will be of no *Service* to you in the present *Question*, nor prove that a *Creature* may *exist coeval* with its *Creator*: For in the forementioned *Sense*, every *Effect* must be *coeval* with its *voluntary Cause*: Every Thing

* See *Third Def.* p. 74.

which

which God has created, or will create, must be *coeval* with him consider'd merely as *Creator* of those Things. If God should create a Being to Day, this Being would be *coeval* with God consider'd merely as the *Cause* of it, for he was not the *Cause* or *Creator* of this Being, till the Being was *produced*. But this I say makes nothing for you in the present Debate: For the Question here is, not whether an *Effect* may be *coeval* with its *Cause*, consider'd merely as *Cause* and *Effect*, but whether the *Existence* of the *Thing effected* can be *coeval* with the *Existence* of the *voluntary Agent*, which *produced* it, not consider'd in the *relative* Sense of *Cause*, but in the *absolute* Sense of *Being*: If it cannot, then the *Existence* of a *Creature* cannot be *coeval* with the *Existence* of its *Creator*, and consequently no *Creature* could *exist from Eternity* i. e. there could not be an *Eternal Creation*.

To all those Arguments which I urged against you, founded upon the Supposition that the *Existence* of a *voluntary Cause* must be *prior* to the *Existence* of the *Effect*, you only answer by calling upon me to prove it †. But that it must be so, is so very evident, that I believe there are Few, who will think it *requires* any Proof. However I shall endeavour to give you one.

It is admitted, that God is the *voluntary Cause* of those Beings which are supposed to be created from Eternity. *Ex Hypothesi* then, God could *choose* whether he would have created these Beings or not; therefore it was in his Power *not* to have created them; from whence it follows, that there

† See *Third Def.* p. 68, 70, 71.

must be a Time *pre-supposed* to their Existence: For *after* they are created, it is not in the Power of God *not to have* created them: If therefore it was ever in his Power *not to have* created them, it must be *before they existed*, and consequently there was a Time when they did *not exist*: For to suppose that those Things *might not* have been, which *always actually were*, or that there *was a Time* when these Beings *might not* have been created, and yet that there *never was a Time* when they were *not actually in Being*, appears to be a manifest Contradiction. — Again, I would ask, whether these *Creatures*, which you suppose never to have been *out of Being*, might have been created any way *different* from what they were? If you say, no; you limit Omnipotence, and in Effect overturn the Supposition of God's being their *Creator* in any proper Sense, or the *voluntary Cause* of their *Production*. But if you answer in the Affirmative, then there must have been a Time when they were *not in Being*: For if God could have created them in any *Manner different* from what he did create them, it follows, that there was a Time when their *Modus of Existence* was *contingent*: But as nothing can *exist* before it exists in *some Manner*, so that whose *Modus of Existence* was *contingent*, must be *contingent* as to its *Existence* also: For if the *Modus* of it was *contingent*, and the *Existence* not so, then it must have once *existed* without any *Modus of Existence* i. e. it must have *existed*, and *not have existed* at the same Time. Whatever then was *contingent* as to the *Modus* of its Existence, was *contingent* likewise with Respect to *Existence it self*; and that whose *Existence* was *contingent* i. e. which *might or might*

might not have existed, could not have existed from Eternity*.

You grant that—“God is a free active Being; and therefore it depended upon his own good-Will and Pleasure, whether *any Effects at all*, or *at any Time*, should proceed from his Power.”† Now this is in Consequence granting the Question. For That which *existed from Eternity* could not depend upon the *Pleasure* of any *other Being*, whether it should *have existed or not*, because it *always actually did exist*. If it depended upon the *Will* of God, whether *any Effects at all*, or *at any Time* should proceed from his Power, is it not a necessary Conclusion, that there must have been a Time when there *were not any Effects at all*. Does it not plainly suppose a *prior Time* for God to chuse?

I HAD argued, that whatever *existed from Eternity* would be *necessarily-existing*, and therefore, if *created Beings* might have been *Eternal*, there might have been *necessarily-existing Creatures*, which I looked upon as an Absurdity**. In answer you say, that I have “not yet shewn, that what was

* It is certain that *some other Being* determined the *Manner* of Matter's Existence at first, and therefore the *Existence it self*, or gave it Existence, since Existence without a Manner is impossible. Now let a Man answer it to his own Understanding, if when Matter *got Existence*, that doth not plainly imply that it *had it not before it got it*. And if it ever was without Existence, whether its Existence can be *Eternal*. It appears to me, that to say, an Effect may be *Eternal*, is the same as to say, a Thing which had a Beginning may want a Commencement. —

Enquiry into the Nature of the Human Soul. Sect. VIII. No. XIV. p. 357.

† Third Def. p. 74.

** See Dr. Clarke's Notions of SPACE, Examined p. 94.
“ from

“ from Eternity, must therefore be necessarily existing.” * If the Proof which I have already given be not sufficient, take the following *viz.* Whatever *always existed* did never *not exist*, and That which did *never not exist* was *never* under a Possibility of *not having existed*, therefore what *existed from Eternity* must be *necessarily existing*. If you say that what did *never not exist* may be under a Possibility of *not having existed*; I ask, *When* was it under such a Possibility? and by that Time you have furnished out an Answer to this Question, you may perhaps see the Absurdity of your Supposition.

UPON the whole — Your Errors upon this Head arise from not distinguishing between *willing* and *acting*, or between *determining* to create, and *actually creating*. God’s Will, Pleasure, Determination, or Choice are *eternal* as his Existence (because he is immutable) for they are not the same as *Action*, but follow necessarily from his being endued with such or such Attributes; but the *actual Execution* of his Will must, from the Nature of the Thing, be in *Time*: *Acts* flowing from *Choice* must be *subsequent* to such Choice; and consequently God must have the Power, before it could be exerted. This I take to be little less than Demonstration, and therefore is not to be encounter’d with Difficulties, which must necessarily attend our Endeavours to explain the *Manner* of the Divine Existence. You may go on objecting that he must, according to This, have existed a *whole Eternity*, without being able to exert his Power; yet this will have no Force, when the Arguments are clear and convincing,

* Third Def. p. 70.

that he could not *create* but *in Time*. The Difficulty you throw in the Way, arises from our want of knowing the *Manner* of the Divine Existence; or I should rather say, that your Difficulties are owing to your conceiving his Existence in a *wrong* Manner, and talking about it in improper Language. You are considering the Divine Existence in the Way of *successive Duration*; you are speaking of a *whole Eternity*; whereas 'tis evident that *Succession* cannot possibly be applied to God, nor *whole* to Eternity, *Whole* and *Part* being only Relations of *finite Existences**. But we shall see the Absurdity of This still more evidently by attending, as I proposed,

3. To the *Nature* of ETERNITY; which evinces beyond all Question the Impossibility of Eternal Creation. I had said enough upon this Head in my last Piece † to have convinced any attentive and unprejudiced Reader. Every Argument against an *Infinite Series* will prove as strongly against an *Eternal Creation*. For every *created Being* is *changeable*, and must therefore exist *per Modum successionis*: But *Succession* implies *Beginning*; therefore a *Creature* cannot be *eternal*. Here the *minor Proposition* only is (I think) what you will call in Question; and this has been so fully proved by Dr. CUDWORTH**, Dr. BENTLEY††, and Mr. LAW*†, in their Arguments against an

* See Mr. LOCKE's Essay on Hum. Understand. B. 1. c. 4. §. 6. — Edit. 9.

† See Dr. Clarke's Notions of SPACE, Examined p. 88. &c.

** Intell. Syst. p 643. — & 843.

†† Boyle's Lect. Sermon. 3.

*† Translation of ABp. King's Origin of Exil. Note 18.
Infinite

Infinite Series; that it must be needless to add any Thing more to what They have said. But let us see what you have offer'd in Objection.

You had advanced in your *First Defence*, what I call'd a *Riddle*, but as you don't like that Term; let it be call'd an *Absurdity*, a Word which suits it better. It stands thus: "There is a Time to come which never will be present": and "there is a Time now actually past which never was present." * This you defend, by urging that there is no Absurdity in saying that all *future* Time is *to come*; and that all Time that *has been*, is *past*; for *to come*, means no more than *future*.† Be it so: What is *future* then, is *to come*; and what is *not future*, is *not to come*. But then, what *never will be present*, is *not future*, and consequently *not to come*. Again—all Time; say you, that *has been*, is *past*; right! But what *has not been*, is *not past*. Now that which *never was present*, never *has been*; and therefore is *not actually past*. A little lower you have given an Instance by way of Illustration *viz.* "suppose, a Man to move from any given Point directly forward, and to move on infinitely; it is plain that there will be SPACE for him to go through for ever; and the SPACE which he is to go through, will be before him; and as SPACE is Infinite, there will be SPACE which he never will arrive at." ** Now what SPACE is *That*

p. 45. Ed. 1. — N. 10. p. 46. Ed. 2. *Remarks* referr'd to in Note 18. [X b] Edit. 1. — *Remarks* refer'd to in Note 10. [R. b] Edit. 2. N. 5. p. 13. Edit. 1. — N. 3. p. 16. Edit. 2.

* First Def. p. 27.

† Third Def. p. 75.

** Ibid.

which

which the Man *will never arrive at*? I presume it is the *End*: I ask then, again, what is the Reason that he will *never arrive at the End* of SPACE? I know not any Thing you can say, but that it is, because there *is no End* for him to arrive at. To say then, that there *is SPACE* which he never will arrive at, and by That SPACE to mean the *End*; is saying that there *is an End* which he will *never arrive at*: and since at the same Time you suppose, that the Reason why he *will not arrive at the End* is, because *there is no End*; it is plainly saying, that there *is an End*, and *no End* at the same Time. By saying that *there is SPACE which never will be arrived at*, you mean the same as you do when you say, that *there is a Time to come, which never will be present*. By the SPACE which *never will be arrived at*, and by the Time which *never will be present*, you mean the *End* of SPACE, and the *End* of DURATION: But as you suppose both SPACE and DURATION to have *no Ends*, it is evidently absurd to talk of their *Ends*, or of their being *to come*.

“ *To come*, [say you] with Respect to TIME
 “ or DURATION, means only the same as *before*, in
 “ a Motion through SPACE; and *past*, with Re-
 “ spect to TIME or DURATION, may be taken in
 “ the same Sense as *behind*, in a Motion through
 “ SPACE, supposing a Person to have moved from
 “ Infinity in SPACE.”* But remember, Sir, that
 if DURATION be supposed never to have *begun*,
 and never to *end*; then neither a *Beginning*, nor
 an *End*, can be said to be *behind* or *before*, or any
 where else, any more than to be *to come*, or to be
past. So if SPACE be allowed to have neither Be-

* Third Def. p. 75.

ginning nor *End*; no *End* or *Beginning* can be said to be *behind*, or *before* the Man in Motion.

THE Learned Dr. BENTLEY, in shewing that to suppose *infinite Generations of Men already past* is a Contradiction, began with observing, that “whatsoever is now past, was once actually present.”* This Argument you charge with equally proving “against the Existence of the Deity from all Eternity”; and your Reason for it is This; *viz.* “Because, if there is not a *Time*, or a *Part* of Duration *past* which never was present, then there was a *Beginning of the Existence of God.*”† Now, Sir, the Difficulty returns upon your self: For I beg Leave to affirm, that not Dr. BENTLEY’S, but YOUR Arguments will prove against the *eternal Existence* of the Deity. For you say “there is a *Time* now actually *past*, which never was present.” But if so, then *That Time* could not be present to the *Existence of the Deity*; consequently the *Existence of the Deity* was not present to *that Time*; therefore *there was a Time*, to which the *Existence of the Deity* was not present; i. e. *There was a Time* when God did not exist. This Argument is conclusive, and the Consequences unavoidable by Those, who imagine the *Eternity of God* to be an *Infinite Series of successive Duration*: Nay, the Notions of these Gentlemen will still appear more absurd, if we consider, that they suppose this *Succession of Time* to be the *Flowing of God’s Existence*: For if it be, and there be likewise a *Time* now actually *past* which never was present; then it follows, that there is a *Period of God’s Existence* now actually *past*, which never

* Boyle’s Lect. Serm. 3.

† First Def. p. 27.

was present; that is, God's Existence was not present to every Period of his Existence *i. e.* he did exist, and did not exist at the same Time. —

You see into what inextricable Difficulties, and Absurdities your Notions will precipitate you! and when you have endeavour'd to disperse these Clouds, you will perhaps have Light enough to discern, that *Succession* cannot be applied to the Deity.

BUT this Objection, and that which you bring against Dr. BENTLEY's Arguments, affect those, and those only, who suppose the *Eternity* of God made up of *successive Parts*; and you should have remember'd, that this is what we constantly deny. 'Tis a Difficulty which lies, and will for ever lie, against your Manner of conceiving the Divine Eternity; and such a Difficulty, as I am persuaded not all the Wit of Man can get over. *Eternity*, and *Succession* appear to me to be *Ideas* quite as *incompatible*, as *Infinity* and *Finiteness*: *Successive Eternity* is just as good Sense as *red Sound*, or *loud Colour*. 'Tis in the very Nature of *Time* to admit of a constant *Increase*, and therefore it can never arrive at *Compleatness*, or a *real positive Infinity*, and consequently it can never be applied to God, whose *Existence* is *perfect*, whose *Continuance* is *stable* and *permanent*, without *Beginning* or *End*, without Possibility of receiving any *Addition* or *Increase*, "comprehending in the *Stability* " and *immutable Perfection* of his own Being, his " *Yesterday*, and *to Day*, and *for ever*." * "The " *Duration* of every Thing (says the very Learned and Judicious Dr. CUDWORTH) " *must* of " *Necessity* be agreeable to its Nature; and there-

* CUDWORTH Intellect. Syst. p. 644.

“ fore, as That whose *imperfect Nature* is ever
 “ *flowing* like a River, and consists in *continual*
 “ *Motion* and *Changes* one after another, must needs
 “ have accordingly a *successive* and *flowing Dura-*
 “ *tion*, sliding perpetually from *present* into *past*,
 “ and always posting on towards the *Future*, ex-
 “ pecting Something of its self, which is not yet
 “ in Being, but to come: So must That, whose
 “ perfect Nature, is *essentially Immutable*, and al-
 “ ways the *same*, and *necessarily existent*, have a
 “ *permanent Duration*; never losing any Thing of
 “ it self once present as sliding away from it;
 “ nor yet running forward to meet Something of
 “ it self before, which is not yet in Being: and
 “ it is as contradictory for it, ever to have begun,
 “ as ever to cease to be.” *

I SHALL quote one Passage more from a
 very Learned Writer, which by the Way,
 had you read, might have hinder'd you from
 making that Objection to his Arguments, that
 they equally proved against the Existence of
 the Deity from all Eternity. After he has shewn
 by those Arguments, the Impossibility of succes-
 sive Duration being actually, and *positively Infinite*;
 or that infinite Successions should be already gone
 and past; He well, and judiciously observes,
 “ Neither can these Difficulties be applied to the
 “ eternal Duration of God Almighty. For tho'
 “ we cannot comprehend Eternity and Infinity:
 “ yet we understand what they are not. And
 “ Something, we are sure, must have existed from
 “ all Eternity; because all Things could not e-
 “ merge and start out of Nothing. So that if
 “ this pre-existent Eternity is not compatible with

* CUDWORTH *Intellect. Syst.* p. 645.

“ a successive Duration, as we clearly and distinct-
 “ ly perceive that it is not; then it remains that
 “ some Being, though infinitely above our finite
 “ Comprehensions, must have an identical, inva-
 “ riable Continuance from all Eternity; which
 “ Being is no other than God. For as his Na-
 “ ture is perfect and immutable without the *least*
 “ *Shadow of Change*; so his eternal Duration is
 “ permanent and indivisible, not measurable by
 “ Time and Motion, nor to be compared by Num-
 “ ber of successive Moments. *One Day with the*
 “ *Lord is as a Thousand Years, and a Thousand Years*
 “ *as one Day.*” *

THERE remains one Argument more to be taken
 Notice of. You endeavour to prove, not only
 that it was *possible* for God to *create from Eternity*,
 but that it is *probable* he *actually did* so. Your Ar-
 gument is This. “ Since God always acts upon
 “ some Ground or Reason, from thence it follows,
 “ that he had some Reason for Creation, other-
 “ wise he never would have created at all. If
 “ then he had any Reason, that Reason certainly
 “ was the same from all Eternity, that it was at
 “ any particular Time: For Instance, suppose
 “ Goodness was the Ground of his Creation, it
 “ follows that if it was good at any particular
 “ Time, it was equally so from all Eternity. For
 “ as he himself is, and always was immutable, and
 “ invariable, every Thing was the same with Re-
 “ spect to him from Eternity; and before the
 “ Existence of any Thing but himself there can
 “ be no external Cause to determine it either ways.
 “ It is therefore very probable, that as it was al-
 “ ways good in him to create, that he always did

* Dr. Bentley's Boyle's Lect. Serm. 3.

“ create, and did therefore never exist alone.” * This Argument must be resolved into the following Principle *viz.* That *whatever God created, 'tis probable he created from all Eternity*; for “ what-
 “ ever it was good for God to create in Time,
 “ it was equally good from all Eternity.” But if this be admitted, then it will follow, that it is probable that he actually created the *World*, and all Things in it *from all Eternity*, and therefore, that, not only *Angels* and *Men*, but that *every other Species of Creatures*, every *Planet* with *all its Inhabitants* were *eternal*. It likewise follows from your Principle, that God *cannot ever hereafter create any new Species of Beings*; because, whatever it is good for him to create in Time, it was equally good from all Eternity, and therefore it is probable, according to you, that he *cannot create any Beings but what he created from Eternity*. — If your Principles were pursued in all their Consequences, I know not where they would stop: But if these already mentioned, shall be thought extravagant, the Argument from which they are deduced must be thought so too.

I HAVE NOW, Sir, gone through your *Third Defence*, and have answer'd your several Arguments, and Objections. I am afraid the Reader will think I have been too particular, in taking Notice of some Quibbles, which, in Reality, deserve no Answer: but as *Sophistry may prevail with a great many Persons*, I thought it might not be wholly unnecessary to detect it. With Relation to *SPACE*, it appears, that you have descended to the lowest Shifts in order to support your Hypothesis; and in Respect to the *Possibility* of an *ETERNAL CREA-*

* First Def. p. 56.

TION, you have been forced to deny the Truth of two Maxims, as self-evident, and universal as any in Philosophy *viz.* that *Creation implies a Beginning of Existence*: and that the *Existence of a voluntary Efficient must be prior to the Existence of the Effect it produces*. I shall now, Sir, take Leave of you for the Present, hoping, if you shall hereafter think proper, to oblige the World with any more *Defences*, and me with any more *Answers*, that you will take a Method different from what you have hitherto done; and endeavour (if you can) to support your Cause, by Rational, and Philosophical Arguments.



REMARKS

R E M A R K S

O N

Mr. JACKSON'S

E X C E P T I O N S

T O

Dr. Clarke's Notions of SPACE Examined.

MR. JACKSON, at the end of a Piece not long since by him Published, entitled *The Existence and Unity of God &c.* has thought proper to add, as he calls it, a *Short Consideration of Dr. Clarke's Notions of SPACE Examined*; which *Short Consideration*, he tells us, he thinks to be a *sufficient Reply*. The whole is flighty and superficial; and the Author takes great Care always to speak with *most Assurance*, where his *Reasoning* seems to be the weakest: As if a *Declamatory Style* was to supply the *Defect of Proof*, and the Reader was to be put off with *Words*, instead of *Arguments*, I find scarce any Thing in it but what has been already obviated, and had not the foregoing Papers been preparing for the Press, I should not have thought it worth my Time to have taken any Notice of it: But I shall now fling out a few brief Remarks upon what he has said.

THIS

THIS Gentleman opens his Performance with wisely observing that "This Author's Notion of SPACE, is, that it is a *mere Nothing*, a *mere Negation* and *Absence* of Things; yet he perpetually talks of it as a *real Existent*." * And what then? We are under a Necessity of so doing, from the very Nature of Language. We talk of *abstract Ideas*, as if they were *real Beings*, just as the Poets talked of *Fortune* as a *Goddeſs*, of *Virtues*, *Vices*, *Diseases* &c. as if they were *real Persons*. And if he will turn to my *Second Chapter* p. 14. &c. he may receive farther Information.

I SAID that "the bigger any Body is, the *more* SPACE it requires for its Existence, is true — The larger any Body is, the *more* SPACE we say it requires for its Existence." † These Sentences Mr. JACKSON quotes from me, and then observes that "These Inconsistencies and Contradictions are the necessary Consequence of denying the *Existence* of SPACE." ** The Contradiction here meant, I suppose, is that I should talk of *more* SPACE, and yet call SPACE *Nothing*: But this Gentleman should not have left out the Sentence which immediately follows one of those he has quoted: For that would have shewn him the true Meaning of the Expression. The Sentence runs thus *viz.*, "The larger any Body is the *more* SPACE we say it requires for its Existence: *that is, in plain English, the larger any Body is the more or th. farther it must be extended.*" †† In this I see neither Inconsistency, nor Contradiction,

* Existence and Unity &c. p. 145.

† Dr. Clarke's Notions of SPACE Examined p. 61, 62.

** Existence and Unity p. 148.

†† Dr. Clarke's Notions of SPACE, Examined p. 62.

any more than there is, in affirming some Bodies to be heavier than others, and denying *Weight* to be any thing more than an *abstract Idea*.

“THE Idea of Absence [says he] is not the Idea of *Quantity*, or *Extension*, as the Idea of *SPACE* evidently is.” * I answer, the Idea of *SPACE* is *Ideal Extension*, and so is the Idea of the *Absence of Body*; and *Ideal Extension* is *Ideal Quantity*. He observes, that “we have the *same Idea* of *SPACE*, or *Extension*; when *Matter* is present, as when it is absent, and even as existing *in* and *between* the Parts of solid *Matter*.” † To this I reply, that we have the *Idea* of *Extension* when *Matter* is present, but not of *SPACE*; and therefore it is not, as this Author imagines, the *same Idea* of *Extension* when *Matter* is present, as when it is absent: For in the former Case, it is *real Extension*, our *Idea* has a real Archetype; but in the latter Case, it is only *Ideal Extension* i. e. *SPACE*. But what does this Author mean by *SPACE* existing *between* the Parts of solid *Matter*? For if there is *SPACE* *between* the Parts of solid *Matter*, which I presume he will allow to touch, and two Bodies do not touch when there is *SPACE* between them; I may ask, where is the Difference between touching and not touching?

“THE next Thing (says Mr. JACKSON) to be taken Notice of, is a Piece of Reasoning, which this Gentleman seems to value himself upon.” ** He then quotes a Passage from me, where I endeavour to shew, that the Reason why the *Idea* of *SPACE*, when all *Matter* is supposed

* Existence and Unity p. 148.

† Ibid.

** Ibid. p. 149.

to be annihilated, still *rushes* into the Mind is, because SPACE is *Nothing*. But pray how came this Author to imagine, that I valued my self upon this Reasoning? If he means that I think it a Piece of Reasoning which he cannot confute, he is much in the Right of it. All the value that I know in it is, that (as it seems to me) it is true, and Truth is valuable every where. But Mr. JACKSON thus remarks upon it *viz.* "I am sorry I cannot help thinking, that all this fine Reasoning is *arrant Nonsense*." * — To which I have nothing more to say, than that I am sorry this Gentleman, above all Men, should not remember that *Calumny* is no *Conviction* †.

"CAN any Thing [says he] be more absurd, than to talk of a *mere Nothing* rushing into our Minds, and forcing its Idea upon us whether we will or no." ** It does not rush into our Minds whether we will or no, in one Sense, that is, we may chuse whether we will think at all about it; but when we do think of it, and try to suppose it annihilated, then it is that the *same Idea* still rushes into our Minds: And let any one try if he can, even in Thought, ANNIHILATE *Nothing*. — By *Nothing* rushing into our Minds, I only meant, that when we supposed every Thing *annihilated*, we could not help having an *Idea*, that *Nothing* would remain: And therefore it would be *Nonsense* to talk of any farther Annihilation.

I HAD remarked, that we could say the same of *Nothing* as of SPACE — "Let him say (then

* Existence and Unity p. 149.

† The Title of a *calumniating* Book written by Mr. JACKSON.

** Existence and Unity p. 150.

“ says Mr. JACKSON) and be consistent, that
 “ Nothing, a mere Nothing is necessarily Existent,
 “ Eternal, Infinite, Immoveable, Incomprehensible,
 “ comprehends all Matter, and all finite Things;
 “ that in Nothing we live, move, and have our Be-
 “ ing &c.”* To all which I still answer, that we
 may full as well talk thus of Nothing, as of SPACE:
 One is as proper as the other, that is, they are
 both Nonfense alike.

HE takes Notice that my Expression viz. “ God
 “ is Omniscient; he could not be Omniscient unless
 “ there were Things for him to know, is very rash
 “ and inconsiderate; as if the Omniscience of God,
 “ who made all Things, depended on the Exist-
 “ ence of Things for him to know.” † This
 Charge of Rashness, and Inconsiderateness, pro-
 ceeds from his not understanding my Meaning;
 I meant no more, than that if there were not
 certain Truths, such certain Truths would not be
 Objects of God’s Omniscience: Thus, if Virtue
 was not different from Vice, and Vice from Virtue;
 then, that Vice is not Virtue and that Virtue is not
 Vice, would be no Part of God’s Omniscience.
 And therefore he may be pleased to read what he
 objects against over again.

I HAD urged, that “ to say any Thing which
 “ is Infinite, has Quantity, and Dimensions, is not
 “ far from saying, it is Finite, and Infinite at the
 “ same time.”** To this he replies. “ Infinite
 “ SPACE is as real Quantity, as finite SPACE is;
 “ and an infinite Body is as real Body, and has real
 “ Quantity, as well as finite Body. Infinite Quan-
 “ tity, and Dimensions are, and cannot but be

* Existence and Unity &c. p. 152. † Ibid. p. 153.

** Dr. Clarke’s Notions of SPACE Examined p. 54.

“existent: Nothing is plainer.*” If calling a Thing plain will make it so, then all is plain enough: But he that knows an *Infinite Series* to be *absurd*, will plainly see the Absurdity of an *infinite Body*, *infinite Dimensions*, *infinite Quantity* &c.

HE tells us that to say SPACE is an *imaginary Substratum of imaginary Extension*, “is a Definition as full of *mere Imagination* as one shall meet with.” † I suppose the Author imagines this to be Wit: It may be so; 'tis certainly no Argument. It is not I, but Mr. JACKSON who is deceived by his *Imagination*. I *imagine* SPACE to exist, and believe its *Existence* to be *imaginary*; Mr. JACKSON imagines it likewise to exist, and believes its *Existence* to be *real*. 'Tis plain then which of us is the fuller of *Imagination*.

“BEFORE [says he] SPACE was Nothing but the Absence of Matter; and what has Absence to do with Extension, or Substratum either? Now it has got a Substratum (though an *imaginary* one) to make it look like *real* SPACE.” ** — I answer no; but to make it look like what it is, an *imaginary Substance*.

HE proceeds—“But if SPACE is only an *imaginary Substratum of an imaginary Extension*, how comes it that, as he owns and supposes,—the Idea of its *Existence* rushes into his Mind, whether he will or no. — How comes his *Imagination* to have gotten so much the better of his *Reason* &c.—” †† This is another of our Author's Flowers of Rhetorick; but how-

* Existence and Unity &c. p. 153.

† Ibid. p. 154.

** Ibid.

†† Ibid.

ever it may perhaps be thought more proper to say, that his Imagination has got the better of his Reason, who takes Things for *real* which are *imaginary*.

HE asks—“What greater Difficulty is there in
“ supposing the material World to have existed
“ *from Eternity*, than there is in supposing it to
“ *exist to Eternity?*” * The Difference lies here.
For the World to have existed *ab aeterno*, implies
the Absurdity of an *Infinite Series*; but to exist
in aeternum, is only to exist (after it has once ex-
isted) without ceasing, which is no other than a
Negative Infinity.

“It can never be proved [says he] that a
“ Cause must necessarily be prior to the Effect,
“ in Respect of Time.” † — If not, then *Cause*
and *Effect* mean Something else than what they
did among ancient *Logicians*, by whom this was
allowed as an Axiom.

“ARISTOTLE &c. (continues he) who sup-
“ posed the World *Eternal*, supposed it notwith-
“ standing, to be produced by God, as the Ori-
“ ginal Cause and Former of it.” ** But Mr.
JACKSON should have remember'd that *Aristotle*
did not consider the World as a proper *Effect* of
the Divine Power, but as a *necessary Emanation*
from him.

SPEAKING of the Ideas of *Extension* and *Indi-
visibility* being incompatible, “Having Parts [said I]
“ — is *consisting* of Parts joined together, and Parts
“ that are joined together, I should fancy might

* Existence and Unity p. 156.

† Ibid.

** Ibid.

“ be supposed *asunder*, i. e. might be divisible.” *
 To this Mr. JACKSON replies, “ The Author
 “ here seems diffident of his Answer being to
 “ the Purpose, saying first, whatever has Parts,
 “ *must* have *divisible* Parts, then in Conclusion,
 “ that being *joined together*, he *fancies* they *might*
 “ be supposed *asunder*.” † — This was a Remark
 too curious for me to pass over: But the whole
 State of the Matter is, that my *Diffidence* hap-
 pen'd to be *Ironical*, and Mr. JACKSON could
 not see it.

HE next endeavours to shew how *Parts* do not
 imply *Divisibility*, even in Respect of *Matter*.
 “ Suppose [says he] God to have created the
 “ *least* Body or Piece of Matter, which he can
 “ create, or which is the *least* possible to exist,
 “ which is probably true of the solid Parts of
 “ some Body: I ask then, has this Body, or
 “ Piece of Matter, *Extension* and *Parts*, or not?
 “ He will say, it has *Extension* and *Parts*; and
 “ yet to suppose the *Parts divisible* is an express
 “ Contradiction, because then the Body will be
 “ *less* when divided, than it was before, though
 “ it was, before it was divided, the *least* possible
 “ for God to create, or exist.” **

I NEED give no other Answer to This, than
 that the *Supposition* is one of the greatest Absurdi-
 ties in Philosophy. 'Tis to suppose that there
 may be a *least Particle of Matter*, or one *infinitely*
small, that is, of no magnitude; that it is *extend-*
ed, and has *Parts*, and yet is of no *Quantity*.

* Dr. Clarke's Notions of SPACE, Examined p. 125,
 126.

† Existence and Unity p. 158.

** Ibid.

Does not he know, that Matter (like all other Quantity) is divisible *in infinitum*, and consequently that a *least Particle* is Nonsense? — God can't create a *least Particle* of Matter, because he can't work *Contradictions*; So all is foreign. — But it is pleasant enough to see, how these Gentlemen are put to it, to give us an Instance of an *extended indivisible Thing*. Mr. CLARKE and Mr. JACKSON have both endeavour'd at it, and very curious ones have they presented us with. One tells us of a Piece of Matter, surrounded with Something that hinders it from being divided, *ergo* it is indivisible: The other informs us of the *least Particle of Matter*: A Discovery which no one could make, but he that could find out the *last Number*.

I SHALL take Notice but of one Thing more, and that is that Mr. JACKSON every where speaks as if he thought (what I always imagin'd was a necessary-Consequence of these Gentlemens Opinions) that SPACE is the very Substance of GOD. For he tells us in one Place, that “ the Idea of
 “ SPACE is not the Idea of a mere Nothing, *un-*
 “ *less* the Idea of the infinite Presence and *Exist-*
 “ *ence of God* is the Idea of a mere Nothing.” *
 In another Place he observes, that *whoever denies the Existence of SPACE supposes the Existence of God to be the Existence of Nothing* †. What is this less than deifying SPACE, and making it God himself? But not content with This, he still plunges deeper, for he not only believes SPACE to be the *Extension of God* but the *Extension of Matter* too. For he acquaints us that “ the internal Quan-
 “ tity of SPACE pervading the Bodies, and pos-

* Existence and Unity p. 151.

† See Ibid. p. 150.

“felt by them, *is their true Extension.*”* Mr. CLARKE indeed talks of the *Space of Body*, from whence I *imagin'd* he thought SPACE to be a Property of Body; But this Gentleman speaks out, at least his own Sentiments, and tells us that it is the *true Extension of Body*; and He likewise holds it to be the *true Extension of God*. — If then the *true Extension of Matter*, be the *true Extension of God* ——— I leave the Reader to draw the necessary Consequence.

* Existence and Unity p. 68.



F I N I S.

17
I have the honor to acknowledge the receipt of your letter of the 10th inst. in relation to the above mentioned matter. I have the honor to inform you that the same has been forwarded to the proper authorities for their consideration. I am, Sir, very respectfully,
Your obedient servant,
J. M. W.

W. M. W.

0





BINDING

MAY 12 1969

BD Clarke, Joseph
621 A farther examination of
C53 Dr. Clarke's notions of space

PLEASE DO NOT REMOVE
CARDS OR SLIPS FROM THIS POCKET

UNIVERSITY OF TORONTO LIBRARY

