A
FARTHER EXAMINATION
******
OF I
Dr. CLARKE'S Notions of
SPACE;
With Some Coniiderations on the Poffibility of
ETERNAL CREATION.
Ift REPLY
To Mr. JOHN CLARKE'S Third Defence of Dr. SAMUEL CLARKE'S Dtmonftration &c.
To which are added
Sorne REMARKS on Mr. JACKSON'S Excep^ tions to Dr. CLARKE'S Notions of SPA s Examined: in his Exijience- and Unity &c.
By JOSEPH CLARKE M.A.
Fellow of Magdalen College CAMBRIDGE
Turbatq'ue Notas, & Lnmina i'evmn
Ducit in Errorem variarum Ainba^e Viar ,'n.
CAMBRIDGE
Prince-.-! For CORNELIUS CR.OWNFIELD, and JOHN CP.OXV.S- FIELD attheAV,% Svn in St. /Ws' Church-Yard
E R R. A T A
PAG. 20. After ARGUMENT I. add From the DIFFE RENCE, between the TOUCHING and NOT TOUCHING of two BODIES. P. 37. 1. 31.?-. fuppofe. P. 40. 1 34. r. examin'd. P. 41. 1. 21. r. between the touching and not touching of. P. 79. 1. 4. r. Whitenefs. P. 114. 1. 29. r. fome. P. 122. 1. 32. r. you. P. 123. 1. 19. r. Nutricis. P. 127. 1. ult. r. movemur. P. 152. 1. 3. *•. Eternity.
FARTHER EXAMINATION &c,
INTRODUCTION.
WHEN I publiihed Dr. Chr&s Na tions of SPACE Examined, in Anfwer to your two Defences of the learned Dottor; I told you in the Concluflon, that, if you iliould afterwards produce any new Argu ments, or defend the old ones with new Reaion- mg, you might expert a Reply : But that, if you fhould only repeat over and over again, what has been as often confuted, it would be only tri- • fling, and amufing the World *.
AND fmce you have now in Reply, publiflied zThird Defence, in which you have produced fcarce any new Arguments, or defended the old ones With new Reafoning (unlefs Sophiftry may be called Reafoning) f thought, as it required no Anfwer, fo it would be unneceffary to trouble the Pubiick, who perhaps are already tired of the Con- trover/y, with any Thing more upon the SubjeCh
P.
I there-
a INTRODUCTION.
I therefore, Sir, intended no farther Anfwer, 'till I recollected what you are pleaied to put me in Mind of in your firft Page, viz,, that Sopkiflrj may prevail with a great many Perfow, which in duced me to give you a Reply.
WHEN I heard you proclaiming to the World, in vour Preface, that you knew^ that Quibbles and, wrangling upon Words were endlefs ; I flattered my felf, that you would make life of no fuch wrangling Methods; but that you would throughout have kept to the ftrid Rules of Argument ; and I could not therefore forbear wondring, to find the fame Piece fo full of fallacious Reafoning : But, when I recollected, that you not only knew, Quibbles and Wrangling upon Words are endlefs , but knew likewife, that Sophiflry would prevail with a great many Perfons, my wonder ceafed.
I cannot find, Sir, that you have advanced any Thing new, or material, in this your Third Defence. Your Arguments are for the moil part dreffed up in a Sophiftical Manner ; and feem as if cal culated only to perplex the Subjed, to evade the Arguments ufed againft you, and to deceive the unwary Reader by a Labyrinth of words : So that the chief Thing neceiTary, will be to deted Falla cy, and unravel Sophiftry. As you have thought proper to put on a Mask, I hope you will ex>- cufe me, if I endeavour to pull it off, and fhew your Arguments to the World in their true Light.
You are pleated in your Preface to favour me with fome Compliments, which being only- words of Form and Ceremony are to be taken as fuch. I fhall only beg leave to obferve, that, if that little Piece, entitled Dr. Clarke's Notion* oj Examined* had the good fortune to gei
anj
INTRODUCTION. 3
any Character (as you are pleafed to fay it did *) amongft many learned Men at Cambridge ; I impute it not to any Thing I could fay worthy their No tice, but to the Force of Truth, which is gres-c and will prevail. And I fliould be unwilling to think, as you do, that mere Sophiftry could gee a Cbaratier amongft many learned Aien at Cam* bridge : For, tho' Sopkiftry may prevail with a great many Perfons; yet I fliould be loth to reflect fo much on the Learned Men of that Body, as to reckon them in the Number.
BEFORE I enter into a particular Examination of your Book, I (hall firft premife a Chapter or two, concerning thofe main Principles, by whiclji the Controverfy muft be decided.
* Preface to the Third Defence.
A a
4 Concerning the different Acceptations CHAP. I.
Concerning the different Acceptations of the T'erm Nothing,
THE word Thing is by Cuftom generally applied to whatever we fpeak about, be it either a real Exiftence ad extra, as zMan, a Tem ple &c. or, only an Idea, as Whitenefs, Extenfan? Knowledge &c. confidered in the abftrafl;. But, ilrictly ipeaking, thefe are not Things, but Ideas : for, I think, the word Thing ought to be appli ed only to Existences ad extra, and not to abjtraft Ideas, Modes, Properties, or Relations. AbftracT: Ideas Ihould be called Ideas, not Things : for other- wife they are confounded together. But, as Cuftom has given the Name of Thing, to whatever \vefpcak about ; So we may ufe the word according to this common Acceptation: But then we fhould cliftin- guiih between Things Real, and Things Ideal. We fhould call thofe Things Real, which have an Ex iftence ad extra; and thofe Ideal, which are no where, but in the Mind.
Now, according to thefe two Senfes of the \vord Thing, the Term Nothing, which is the Ne gation, muft confequently have two Senfes ; as it is fometimes ufed as a Negation of Things real only ; and, at other times, as a Negation of Things both Real, and Ideal.
THE Term Nothing is to be underftood in the former Senfe, when it is ufed concerning abftra& Ideas-, as when we fay Extenfion is Nothing: for here the Term Nothing only denies Exterifion to be a Thing Real* or an Exiftence ad extra ; but does not deny it to be an Ideal Thing, or aa
djlratk
of the farm Nothing. £
Idea. We msy diflinguifli this Senfe of the Term Nothing, for brevity fake, by calling it Non- Entity.
NOTHING, in the other Senfe of the Term, is a Negation, not only of all Real Things, but alfb of all Ideal Things, viz. all Non-Entities^ all Pro perties, Modes, Accidents, Relations, in the ab» Hract ; and in fhort, all Ideas whatever ; and a- mong the reft, SPACE, the imaginary Receptacle of all Exigences ; in this Senfe we may difHnguifli it, by giving it the Term of Nihiiitj.
THIS is a Diftinclion, which is and ought to be made life of by Logicians; and 1 wifh you had been fo conversant with them as to have known this Diftin&ion, as well as that common one of Genus and Species $ which you lay fo much Strefs on to fo little Purpofe*. " Metaphyficians con- " fider another fort of Things (fays one of thofe Writers) <c by Abftraftiont which are neither Be- *c ings, nor Modes of Beings, nor' yet are they " considered as mere Nihiiitj. Such are Priva- " tions, external Denominations, or Relations, « and all Beings of the Mind^ [which are what I call Ideal Things] " for thefe properly neither have " Exigence in themfelves, nor in any otherThings ; *c neither can they ftriflly be faid to be mere JVo- <c thingy or Nihility ; fince v/e form Notions about *' them, and they are connected to many of our *< Ideas f ". Here, you fee, this Logician makes
* See Third Def. p. 4, 5, 6.
f Praeterea quaedam alia, per abftra&ionem, a Metaphy- ficis intelliguntur, quae neque iiint Entiu, ncque modi En- tium, neque tamen ut merum nibil concipiuntur. Ejufinodi funt Pri<vationes, denominationes Extern* feu relatioms, & Entia Rationis omnia. Hxc enim neque exijientiam habent neque in aljis exiilunt, neque did proprie poiTunt
the
p Concerning the different Acceptations
the Diftin^ion of Non-Ens* and Merum i.e. of Non-Entity and Nihilitj — Neque font En- na, fays he, neqae tamen tit merum nihil concipiuftr tur. They have neither real Exigence, neither are they mere Nihilitj ; i. e. as he afterwards explains himfelf, they are Entia Rationis. In this we agree with this Writer. When we fay SPACE is Nothing') we mean that it is what we call Non-Ens> that it has not real Exiflence, or exiftentiam pro^ priam ; and, when we fay SPACE is Something* we only mean, that, neque tamen tit merum nihil con*- ctpittir, becaufe notiones ejtts ejformamtis, & Jdeis variis adjuntttim eft ; that is, that it is an Ideal Thing.
AND here I would have it obferved, that this Divifion of the Term Nothing, into what we call Non-Entity and Nihility is no falfe and ufelefs, hut a true arid necelTary Divifion. For any one, with a little Thinking will. find, that the word Nothing is often ufed in the two different Senfes I have mentioned; and therefore, to avoid Confu- iion, the foregoing Diftindion will be found ne- ceffary.
SINCE an abfiraft Idea has no objective Reality, it may certainly be faid to be Nothing ; that is, no Thing exifting ad extra ; but yet, fince it is an Idea, it cannot be faid to be Nothing, in fuck a Senfe as fhali exclude Ideas: and therefore, in the Term Nothing we make a Diftinclion, when it is ufed concerning thefe Ideas, and when it is ufed, as a Negation of all Ideas as well as Realities.
IT is evident, that, when we fay Whitenefs or Knowledge is Nothing-, we muft not be fuppofed
efle merum nihil', quandoquidem notiones eorum efForma- mus, & Ideh variis adjunfta font. — Job. Clerici, Ontolq-« giac. i.SeSt. 2.
6f the Term Nothing. 7
to mean that Whitenefs, and Knowledge, are not Ideas ', and therefore the Term Nothing, does not here exclude Ideas ; and fmce it does not, we fhould not confound it with another "Senfe of the word, which does exclude them ; But we fhould remember, that when Whitenefs or Knowledge is faid to be Nothing (and the fame is true of all other abftrafl Ideas) it is faid to be fo, in that Senfe which only denies it to be 2. Reality, but at the fame time admits it to be an Idea.
WHEN therefore we fay, that Whitenefs, Know ledge, Extenfion, or any other abftrad Ideas are Nothing -, we do not mean, that they are not Ideas ; but that they are Ideas, which have no real Ar chetype exifting without the Mind.
I would not have it imagined, that I introduce the words Non-Entity and Nihility, in order to amufe the Reader with Scholaftick Terms ; for (as Mr. Locke fays of the word Idea) I have no fondnefs for any particular, Articulate Sound ; nor do I think there is any Spell, or Fafcination in any of them : But I ufe them only to exprefe briefly the two Sen&s, in which the Term Nothing is ufed. In fhort, by Non-Entity, I mean a mere Idea, which hath no abjettwe Reality : and by A7- hility, I mean a Negation, even of thofe Ideas> as well as of Realities.
SINCE then the Term Nothing, may beufider- ftood in thefe two 'very different Seafes ; if we do not, in the ufe of it, attend to its precife Mean ing, we ihall run into Confufion ; as you feem to have done in the Piece now before me.
THIS being obferved, I ihall now proceed to remark a few Things concerning Abftrad: Ideas, as far as may be of Service in the prefent Queftion,
CHAP,
8 Of Abjlraft Ideas.
C II A P. II.
Of Abftratt Ideas.
ABSTRACT Ideas are formed by that Power of the Mind, which is called the Power of Abftrading ; /. e. the Power of feparating in Idea, what are infeparable in Reality. . BY this Ad of the Mind, we form our Vniver* fal Ideas ; and rank Things into Sorts : Hence corne Genus, and Species, Subftance* EJfince, &c.* ^ WE employ this Act of the mind about Proper- ties, Modes, Relations &c. as well as Subftances; and form general Ideas concerning them, « by « feparating them from all other Properties ore. « with which they are found in Nature, or from 1 all particular Subjects, in which they inhere, ' and leaving only fo much as remains' in com- c< mon, and includes, or may be affirmed of every ' Property &c. of that .Kind. Thus obfeivin-, c that all Bodies agree in being Extended, as well c as Solid i tho' they differ never fo much in Ma^ { mttide and Figure \ we take the former of thefe" Properties apart from the latter, as alfb, from 'any Canicular Magnitude, or Shape, and call it ' Exunfion in the abftraft j which being thus « made general, will comprehend all Articular <c Extenfam &c, f
A^-F°r Jh^Tmanner'9f ^quiring thefe, See Mr. Law1, Additional Notes to his firft Edition of JST/W's Orighi ef Evil Tranflatcd. p. 10. Wattts Logic Part r \
's EfTay on H. U. B. 2. c. xi. §. o,
Addit. Notes to King- p. ii.
Of Abjlratt Ideas. g
this Power, which the Mind has, of Ab- ling, we iometimes confider a Mode or Pro perty of any Being, (whether Matter or Spirit) without confidering the Being it felf, of which it is a Mode or Property ; as when we confider Extenfion without confidering any particular £x~ tended Body, or Thought without any particular Thinking Being. This is abftrafting a Mods from the Stthfttnce : but fometimes likewife we ab- flract even from Modes themfelves; as when we confider the Length of Body without confidering Breadth and Depth, (which Geometricians call a Line) or when we confider the Length and Breadth* without confidering Depth, (which they call a Surface.)
THERE is a PafTage in Mr. N6'RRis concern ing Abftradion, which will farther explain th6 Nature of it. " This feparate Confideration where- " in the Nature of Abftradion is made to con- " fift, is to be dnderftood, not of different, Be " ings but of the Parts of the fame Being ; tha? " is, Attraction is not the confidering one intire tf and complete Being without another (for they '« being Numerically at leaf! diilmci; cannot be c< confidered otherwife, fince one kiea will not " include them) but the confidering one Part of c' fuch a Being without another,"'
" BUT farther, Abflraction r< not of fiich Pans €c neither, as are really and pl^callj diftinft, fuch f( as we commonly call integral Parts (for T iup- " pofe I fhould not properly be faid to abftraft <c in confidering one Part of a human Body, or " one Part cf a Number without confidering Cc another ; fince thefe? tho* Phyfical Parts, are c< yet Logi'cal Wholes; a^d To the feparate Con- <c fideratioft of rfrcni, would be no proper Ab« B ftraclion)
ID Of Abjlraft Ideas.
" flra&ion) but of Parts, that are intelligibly di-^ «« ftind:, and have a real Samcncfs in the Nature of " the Thing. When one of thefe really Same, but " intelligibly diftintt Parts, is confidered without ft the other, or without that real Whole, whole " intelligible Part it is ; then is my Thought ab- « flratl ; but when there is no fuch feparate Con- " fideration, but all is included together in one " Idea, and considered as really it is ; then is my * Thought concrete. So that in fhort, Abftra- " cfiion^as 'tis a logical Affection of Thought, •< is the confidenng one Thing without another* «« not Abfilntetyf but in Things that are not really cc one without the other, nor yet really deniable " one of the other. For Abftrattion is as it were " the drawing of a Thing away from it felf. But " where Things are really feparate or dirtincl:, <c the confidering them apart is not Abftrattion ; " but only a mere divided Consideration ; nor « would the joining them in one, be Concretion, ** but Confufion."
" ABSTRACTION then is the feparate Confi- Cf deration of Things intelligibly diftinct, really « indiftind." *
IT may be proper to explain a Sentence or two in this Quotation. He fays, that AbftrdRion is the feparate Confederation of Parts that are in- telligibly diQinct, and have a real Samexefi in the Nature of the Thing. But he muft not here be uoderftood to mean, that thefe Parts which he fays, have a real Samencjs in tke Nature of the Thing, are really the fame Parts (by Part?) we here mean Modes i) as for Inftance, that Ext en*
* AVrrVs EfTay towards the Theory of the Ideal- or Intelligible W«rld. Part 2. c. 3. Se£t. 7,
pon
Of 2<lbjlra5t Ideas. II
fan and Figure* which are Modes of Body* are really the fame ; *. *. that Extenfion is Figure, and Figure Extenfian : He muft not, I fay, be underftood to mean this, when he fpeaks of their having a real Samenefi* but, that Extenfion and Figure, which are intelligibly diftintt* are not Things really diftintt and different in the Being, from whence they are abflrttted, (as a Man's Arm is from the reft of his Body) but are only the fame Being* considered in different View*. And this is true : For, tho' we can abftradedly confider figure without confidering Extenfion* and Extenfion without Figure, and both of them without confidering any particular Extended Fi gured Being, i. e. tho' they are intelligibly Mr- jlintt ; yet in the Nature of the Thing, ;. e. in the really Extended Figured Being^ Exten fion is not any Thing really diftinct from Figure, or Figure any Thing really diftincl from Exten fion, or either of them any Thing really diftind from the Extended Figured Beingt whence they are abftra&ed : But they may both be faid to have a real Samenefs in the Nature of the Thing ; becaufe both of them, are only the fame Thing confidered in different Refpeds.
BY Parts then, (/. e. Modes) intelligibly diflinft* having a real Samenefs in the Nature of the Thing, is meant that the Modes of any Being, tho' they may by the Mind be conjidercd diftindly or fepa- rately ; yet, are only the fame Being* confidered in a clifferent Manner.
FROM what has been faid concerning ab- ftraft Ideas, it is evident that they have no real Exiftence without the Mind cprrefpondent to them ; *. e. that there is no fuch real Thing ad extra* as Whitenefs without a white Body 5 or Length 8 i
'1 2 Of Abjlraci Ideas.
•without a long Body &c. but that Whitenefs an4 Length in the abllraft are mere Ideas, ariiing from the Confederation of Body ; the one with Refpect to its Whitenefs only ; the other with Refpect to its Length only ; without conlldering any of its other Modes, or any particular Body> or any real Subject. All abftratt Ideas then, are Non-Entities or mere Entia Rationis.
" BUT tho* a Non-Entity, or Not-Being, is <« really Nothing in it felf ; yet as it is introduced « by fome Relation to Being, it may afford Foun- fc dation for fome Sort of Thoughts or Concep- «c tions, or fome relative Affections — We may <c alb form a Sort of Idea of Non-Entities, or «< Not-Beings, from their Relation to Beings."*
THUS we have an Idea and can talk of a Ska? dow and Eytenfion in the Jlbftratt ; not that a Shadow, or Extenfion in the Abftract, can bear any real Relation tp Beings as if they were real Exiftences ; but thefe Ideas are confidered rela tively and with Refpect to Being : A Shadow is confidered, as the Reprefentation of a Being ; and is therefore thought upon, and conceived as luch ; it may thence be faid to have relative Af fections : Thus it may be faid to be here, or there, to be near us, or far from us, or to be long or fhoj t, great or little tyc. and Exten fion is confidered alfo in a relative Manner ; that is, as it may be a Mode of Being ; and we call ic greater, or lefs, or afcribe to it certain Degrees. And if sve look into our Minds, we (hall find, that we always tacitly refer thefe abftract Ideas,
* A Brief Scheme of Ontology c. i . — Subjoined to a late Book, intitled, Philofophical E/ays en Various Subject by I. tff.
when-?
Of Abftraft Ideas. 13
"Whenever we fpeak or think about them, to Somc- ^hat ; not to any particular Being, but to loire imaginary Sub^rMnm : For thefe abftrad Ideas, are Ideas of pure Intellect ; i. e. are to be under- flood, but cannot be imagined. A Man may f*tikrjland> what we mean by Whiteneis, or Ex- ten ii on in the Abfrraft ; but Imagination can lay no hold of them, till the Mind iupplies an ima ginary Substratum, to fupport them, pro hoc vice* fuch as may ferve the Purpofe. The Mind there fore joins the Idea of Somewhat, with the Idea pf one OuMity only, either Extenfion, Whitenefs, or any other abitraci Idea; and then we have an imaginary Suoftratum prefently formed ; that is, an ideal extended Somewhat* or an ideal white Somewhat *.
IT is in this View, that we affirm Things concerning akftracl Ideas. Hence it is, that £.v- ttnfion is faid to have Parts, \vhich would be Non- fen ;e ro fay of Extenfion it fclf, confidered as an Idea of pttrg Intellect. Hence Diftance is faid to be great or fmall j which we conceive, by firft ima gining the SPACE, which we confideras between, as a Subftratutn of Extenjion ; Thence conceiving it as extended, (which it would be abfurd to fay of Extension) and thence confidering it by parts, as great, or fma.ll ; long, or ihort. Hence likewife it is, that we fay Wifdom is ufe- ful, that Solidity refits Bodies, that Motion is fwift or flow &c.
AND we may farther o:>ferve that fince Qualities, Modes, and Accidents, are not
* See this further Explained in Mr. Law's Notes &e. Note 1 6. p. 40. Edit. i. or b Dr. Clxrkis NoficKs »f . 83. &c.
ecs,
24 Of Abftratt Ideas.
ceS) and yet Things are affirmed of them, which can be only affirmed of Subftances ; it isjufficient to fhew, that they are conceived after the Manner of Subfbnces : That is, that altho* they are con- fidered abftraftedly from every particular Subjett, they are yet referred to an imaginary Subftratum.
AND as we thus form an imaginary Subftratum for the Qualities, Modes, Properties &c. of Body* when confidered abftractedly from all particular Bodies ; lo \ve do the fame, with refpe.cl: to the Properties, Qualifies, &e. of Spirit^ when confi dered in the Abfbad. Thus, when we talk of Knowledge abftracted from every particular know ing Man '9 the Mind here fupplies it with imagi nary Subjects pro hac vice ; whence we have the Idea of an intelligent Somewhat} which is fufficienc to bring the general Idea down to a particular Sub ject : The fame is done with Relation to Envy, Fear, Love, Hatred, Piety, Virtue, ore. when confidered in the j4b/tratt.
BUT from confidering abftracl; Ideas in this planner, and thence accuttoming ourfelves to fpeak of them, as real Things^ arife Error and Pifpute. Men are fo ufed to think, conceive, and taljc about them, as Things real, that they deceive themfelves, as 'it were, into a Belief, that they are fo : Thus, for Inflance, Nature, and Chance have fb long, and fo much been talked of, that J make po Doubt, but among the more ignorant and comr inon People, they have gained an. Exiftence. For tune has fo often been faid to be kind, or averfe, that I am apt to believe, fome imagine it as a real Being, in whofe Power their Welfare is pla ced. Their Ideas of Winter •> and Summer, Spring and .Autumn* are generally abftracted from the Motion of the Earthy (or rather from the Sun)
and
Of Abjiratt Ideas 15
and are confidered as Things diftintt. Time and Death likewife, with them, have their Exiftences^ but owe them only to the abftratt Ideas of the Painter or the Statuary.
HENCE arofe the numerous Idols of the Hea thens, Valour-> Prudence, Truth, &c. ; nor were Revenge and Fear, without their Temples and their Altars.
SINCE then the cuflomary way of confider* ing, and fpeaking of Things, which is not always to be avoided, will lead us inio Error; wefhould, when we have a Mind to be undeceived, throw off the Slavery impofed upon us by Words, and be no longer governed by Sound. We ihould change thofe Expreflions which are apt to miflead us for others more exaft, and which will bring us to the Knowledge of the Truth- We ihould eonfider what the Senfe and Meaning of an Ex- preffion is, when ftripp'd of its Difguife: This is the only way to detect thefe Idola Fort, as Lord BACON calls them, which by a Combination of Words and Names, infinuate themfdves into the Mind. Men imagine that their Reafon go verns their Words ; but fometimes Words get the better of their Reafon ,* and have fo great a' Force upon the Mind, that their Philofophy lies blend ed with Error, and their Dodtrines become ufe- lefs and fophiftical *.
* At Idola For! omnium mofeftiffima funt, qu^ ex fce- derc verborum & nomiuum fc infmuarunt in Intelledtum. Gredunt enlm Homines, rationem fu.un verbis impcra^c. Sed fit ctiam ut vcrba vim fuam fuper Intel Ic6lum rctor- q.uennt & refledlant, quod Philofophiam Sc Scientias red- didit fopjiilticas & ina&ivas. fran. Bat. ds Vcrul. In- ftaur. magna, Par< Ssc. Aph. LIX,
IN-
i6 Of Abjlratt IdeaL
INSTEAD then, of faying Extenfan is long of Jbort; we iliould fay (if we would ipeak finally and philofophically ) that an extended Body is long or fhort. Inftead of faying, Extcn- jlon hath Pans ; we Ihould fay, that an extended Body hath Parts. When we fay, that a Man h*s Knowledge^ we mean, that a Man knows. When \ve fay that he has Pietj> Charity &c.j we mean that he is pious, charitable &c.
I might multiply Inftances of this Kindj but thele already mentioned, are fufficient to fhew, that Men, by accuftoming themfelves to fpeak, and from thence fometimes to think inaccurately con cerning Ideas formed by Abftrattion* will be apt to run into great Mifhkes : They may, nay they ac tually have imagined them to be real Exigences j o- fherwife we ihoiild never have feen Arguments pro duced, to prove that Knowledge is Something *di- ftinft from the knowing Man ; that it is Some thing, which is in him ; or, that becaufe we ufe affirmative Expreffions concerning it, it mud there fore be Something real*. We fee then, what Miftakes about abftract Ideas arife from the Force of Sound. For no fooner are the Expref fions diverted of their common Form, but the Ideas are divefled of their Exiftence, and reduced to their primitive Non-Entity.
FROM what has been (aid, I obferve as follows.
FIRST, that fmce there are two different Ac ceptations of the Term Nothing^ which I have above explained t> it ought always to be re membered, that whenever we call SPACS No- thingy we call it fo in the Senfe of Non-Entity ; and we mall find that molt, if not all your Ob-
* Sec Third Tef. p. u. f C&ap. I P- 4
Of Abjlratt Ideas. 'ff
jedions tp our calling SPACE Nothing are found ed upon the Ambiguity of that Term.
SECONDLY, from the foregoing Remarks con cerning Abftraftion-) and Abftratt Ideas, I obferve, that the Modes of any Being, fuch as Exten/ion* Figure, Solidity, Sec. are not any Thing really di- ftintt, or different from the Being of which they are faid to be Modes ; but that they are only the Being it-felf, confidered under different Ideas. From whence I argue; that if SPACE be thereat Extension of any Being* it muft be the real ex tended Being.
THIRDLY, I take Notice, that it is no folid Objection rfo SPACE .being a mere dbftraft Idea, that we can think^ conceive, and talk^ about it, fince We may do the fame of all Abflratt Ideas what ever,.
• FOURTHLY, I infer, that it is of no Force to argue, that SPACE muft be Something real, becaufe \ve ufe affirmative ExpreJJions concerning it : iince we may and do ufe fuch ExpreiTions, concerning. Other Abftratt Ideas.
LASTLY, I remark, that Abftratt Ideas are fome- times looked upon as Realities : and that this arifes from conceiving them, after the manner of Sub- fiances, and fpeaking of them as real Things* This cuftomary Way of fpeaking is not always to be avoided. We may exprefs ourfelves in fuch Phrafes, as Ufe has recommended : but then, when we enter into Metaphyjical Debates, we mufr. not argue from fuch Phrafes, or lay fo great a Strefs upon Words, as to conclude, that the Ideas they are nfed to exprefs, muft therefore be real Things. If
C we
*8 Arguments for the Reality
we would in Reality be Searchers after Truth, we fhould carefully examine our Ideas, and {trip them of the Mark* Men ufe for them; otherwife, there mutt be endlefs Difpute, Wrangling, and Jargon *.
CHAP. IIL
Arguments for the Reality of SPACE Ex* amined, and Objections Anfwered.
HAVING premifed in the foregoing Chap ters, what I thought necefTary, in Order to? give you a general Light into the Caufe of thofe Errors, which you have, during the Courfe of Three Defences, unhappily fallen into ; proceed we next to confider distinctly what you have ad vanced, in Defence of your two Firft ..Pieces, and in Objection to my Examination of them.
BUT I muft firft beg the Readers Excufe, if lie is not fo well entertained in the following Pages, as I could wifh. For I am very fenfible, that it c'an be no Pleafure to him, any more than to me, to be employed in unravelling Sophiftry, and diftinguifhing Ambiguities. But this is what you have made neceflary, by your Manner of handling the Caufe you have undertaken; and fince you are got into fuch a Road, we are obliged to fol low you in Order to bring you back. I have ReaJbn to believe, that whoever confiders this your Third Defence attentively, will foon be in duced to imagine, that you have embarked in a'
J See Locke H. U. B. z, c. ij. §. 28,
Caufe
of SPACE Examined* i£
Caufe, which you now find to be indefenfible; and, that you have chofen to make Ufe of the weak Defence of Sophiftry, rather than give Tip what Dr. Clarke has advanced. Thus is the Name and Character of a Pcrfon thought fufficient to fupport the moiO: ridiculous Hypothecs ; fo much Reafon had I to enter my Caveat, againfl any Thing being brought befides rational Arguments to determine between us; and I ftill have Rea fon to defire the fame : For when I fee Men per- fifting to defend a Caufe, for the Support of which they are forced to have Recourfe to fuel} low Artifices; I cannot think it either uncharita ble, or unreafonable to believe; that had Dr. Clarke advanced that Two and Two were Six, fome of his Difciples would go on in that Me thod of Calculation.
I would not here be thought, in the lead to detradfrom the Character which that Author has fo juftly gained in the learned World: No, far be it from rne. Dr. Clarke was a Man of very great Abilities : The World hath with Reafon acknowledged him to be fuch : But he was ftill a Man, therefore not infallible : And as the learn ed Author of the Remark*, upon his Expofiion of the Chvrch-CatechiJfo obferves, " The better he " has performed in fome Points, the more ne- " ceflary is it, to take Notice where he has de-, « ferved Cenfure ; left Truth and Error, Good « and Bad fo mingled fhould be imbibed toge- " ther, and one ihould ferve to recommend and « ingratiate the other." *
BUT to proceed to the Bufinefs in Hand. Since
* Remarks upon Dr. Clarke* Expofition of the Chiy-clv Catechifm p. 2. Edit, 3.
C > ,vr
20 'Arguments for the Reality
we have fo far gained our Point, as to reduce you to cavilling -3 all we have now to do in fuch Places, is to bring you out from thofe Refuges,
and the Bufinefs is done That my Charge
againft you of Sophiftry is neither ill-grounded nor •unjuft, the following Pages will I hope fuf- ficiently evince.
I muft beg your Excufe, for not following you exactly in the Order of your Arguments and Objections : I fhall take fuch a Method as will render the Whole more clear and obvious to the Reader. This your Third Defence confifts of two Vindications, one of your Firfti the other of your Second Defence : I mall not confider them feparately, but throw them into one, and confider them together.
ARGUMENT I.
YOUR firfl Argument for the Reality of SPACE runs thus viz. " Either there is no Difference «c between touching and not touching , or elfe «c That which is between two Walls, when they <c do not touch, is really Something. And it feems you cannot yet fee the Fallacy of this Reafoning. « This [fay you] is a Disjunction, which feems *c to me no Way defective. Unlefs therefore he cc had proved, either that there wanted another " Branch, or that there is no Difference between " a Negative and an Affirmative, he has not pro- Cf ved againft me." *
I imagined, Sir, that you would not any more have infilled on this threadbare Argument of the two Walls : But it feems ycm think they have as
* Third Def. p. a,
of SPACE Examined. 37
yet received no Breach, add that they are ftrohg enough to withftand all our Battery. You ftifl therefore found your Reafoning upon them 5 and imce it is your Pkafure, we muft attend you • But I hope >ou will be convinced that your jpy&ffo* is derive* when you confider, that you take for granted, the Principle on which it s built. For when you argue, that « either there ( is no Difference between touching "and not ' touching ; or elfe That which is between two Bodies when they do not touch, is really Something" ; I am forry, that you either can not, or will not fee, that you fuppofe without any Manner of Proof, that the Exifiencc or non~ m/t&ct of Something between two Bodies is tic Eflential Difference of touching and not touching Tlus is the Principle which I called in Queftion before, and I have yet feen no Reafon to alter my Judgment; and as it is certainly not felf- evident, it does not appear that your Disjunction built upon it, without any Proof, is conclufive. Every one knows that disjunctive Syllogifms are mconcluflve, if the Enumeration be not compleat, or, as you allow, if any one Branch be wanting Now Sir, this is the Misfortune of your Argu ment ; there wants a Branch : For had it been compleat, it muft have flood thus- w*. « Eicner c the Difference of touching and not touching << does not co»fift in the being of Something ktow* - or elfe there is either no Difference between ' ?Uj f and n0t rouchi"g-or, when two < Bodies do not touch there muft be Something between''. And now, perhaps, you may fee that the firft Branch is wanting in your Argu ment : which if true will prove that the two other Branches, which are the whole of your Argument,
ar-.
22 r Arguments for the Reality
are not conclufive : that is, if the Difference &c\ does not conjift in the being of Something between ; then, there is no Neceffity that either there muft be no Difference between touching and not touching, or elfe, that when two Bodies do not touch there muft be Something between. That it does not confift in this, and what it does confift in, fhall be ftiewn in the proper Place. In the mean Time, fmce it is not (elf-evident that it does confift in This, you ought not to have taken it for granted ; fince it was incumbent upon you to have proved it, before your Disjunction (which de pends upon the Truth of it, yet neverthelefs feems to you no Way defective) could be of any Force. Now to take this Principle for granted, is the very fame Thing, as to take for granted, that SPACE is Something real : for it is fuppofing, that when ever two Bodies do not touch, there muft always be Something real between them ; which, when there is only SPACE between them, is the very Point I deny, and is what I have taxed you with taking for^granted. My Charge therefore of beg ging the Queftion ftands in full Force againft you.
You proceed — " But he allows, that if then " was no SPACE between them, they would touchy •< and yet neverthelefs, fays, that SPACE is No- «< thing." *
AND pray where is the Abfurdity of this ? I allow, that when all Matter is removed from be tween two Bodies, and there is likewife no SPACE between them, they will ' touch : and yet never- thelefs I fay, that if there was SPACE between them, SPACE would be Nothing real. I am not
• Third Def. p, 2,
fenfible
of SPACE Examined. 23
fenfible that there is any Thing in this, which contradicts either Reafon or Truth. But yet, let us fee what Work you are pleafed to make with it — By putting the Term Nothing, inftead of SPACE) you would make me afTert, it feems, that if there was Something between two Bodies they would touch. — <c if this [fay you] be the c« Truth of the Cafe [i.e. if SPACE bz Nothing] «c let us put Nothing tor Space in the foregoing cc Sentence, and then fee what Senfeit will make. " If there was no Nothing between them they «c would touch j that is, if there was Something be- <e tween them they would touch ; but when " there is any Thing between them, they do not <f touch : Therefore they do touch, and do not " touch, at the fame Time." *
THIS is fo pretty a jingle of Words, that 'tis Pity they are to fo little Purpofe. If there was. no SPACE between two Bodies (from between which all other Matter is fkppofed away) They would touch : This is True. If there was no Nothing i. e. if there was Something bet ween two Bodies, they would touch: This is abfurd. The Truth is mine, the Abfurdicy is your own; and proceeds from a low Quibble upon the word Between.
I allowed, that if there was no SPACE between two Bodies they would touch: But you ought to have remembered, that I allowed this, in that par ticular Inftance of your two Walls, from be tween which all other Matter was fuppofed away : For the Obje&ion which you here raife, could only be urged againft One, who mould allow, that two Bodies would touch, if there -was no SPACE between them, tho' Matter fhould, at the
* Third Dcf. p. 3,
fame
24 Arguments for the Reality
fame Time, be.fuppofed * ft \iz\\y filling ^ ^ /#, termediatc Space: For it is in this ^Cafe only, that when we fay> there is no SPACE between them> it will follow that there is Something them.
FOR although* SPACE be AW%, no Space be »<? Nothing, and #0 A^//?/^ be Something ; yet, when I allow, that, if there be no Space between two Bodies, (from whence all Matter is' firft fvppojed -away} they will touch; it will not foHow, that-I'by this Means allow, that the two Bodies would touch, if there was Something be- SfaW^thWl It will only follow, that I tllow they would touch, if there was Something where* the SPACE was : and this is true : But then the' Something here fignified by no SPACE, is only the ' Bootes themfdves which touch, therefore is n6t be tween the Bodies/. e. the Bodies are nor between themfelves, which your Argument proves, if it • proves any Thing: This Attempt therefore, Sir, to fhewme guilty of an Abfurdky,- ferves only to difplay your Skill in Sophiftry, which you will excufe me for having unravelled ; fince it is m Or der to undeceive fome of thofe^r&fc many Perfons, with whom it might otherwife prev-ail.
HAVING delivered y our felf of ; this 'Quibble,
you are pleafed to come to Particutxrs; and cite*
from me the' following PafTage. viz,. « Though'
£ it be necefTary to two Bodies touching, 'that No-
' thing Hiould be between them, yet it does not
follow that to their" not touching it is neceffary ;' that Something fhould be between them." * This, it feerm, you are furprized at, and is Something too Orange for your Belief: You ask, « If the-
'* Tkird Def, p. 3.
" latter
r of SPACE Examined. zg
" latter Part of this Sentence is true, where is <c the Difference between touching and not touch- « ing* 2" By thisQueftion it is plain, that you <c have all along taken it for granted, that the Exigence of Something between two Bodies, is the efTential Difference of touching and not touch ing. As this is the Prime Error on which you proceed, it will be proper to fet you right, by Ihewing you wherein the Difference &c» does really confift.
THE Difference of touching and not touching, confifts in. the Bodies themfelves being, or not being diflant ; *. e. in their being in a different Situation, or bearing a different Relation of Pofi- tion to each other, without RefpecT: to any Thing elfe : And this Situation, or Relation of Pojition, is not (as you would have us imagine) any real Affection of SPACE, nor does it arife from the Exigence of SPACE between ; but it has Refpecl: only to the Bodies tkemfches ; to them it is con fined, and has nothing to do with any Thing elfe. If you ask, what is being diftant, but hav ing Something between them ? and what is being not diftant, but having Nothing between them? I anfwer, that whoever confults his own Ideas, will foon find, that the Idea of being diflant is not the Idea of Something between : and that the Idea of being not diftait, is not the Idea of Nothing be tween. When we have the Idea of Bodies not diftant^ the Idea of there being Nothing between them will perhaps follow the former Idea in the Mind, not as if they were Ideas of the fame Thing; but as the latter is a Confequence of the former. The being of Nothing between them is not the
* Third Def, p. 3.
D Canfc
2~6 Arguments for the Reality
Caufe or Reafon why they are not diftant: ndr has it any Thing to do with the Idea of their not being diftant : but their not being diftant is the Caule or Reafon, why there can be Nothing between them. So in the other Cafe ; when two Bodies are diftanr, the being of Something between them is not the Caufe or Reafon of their being diflant ; but their being diftant^ is the Caufe or Reafon, why there may be Something between them: But then as in this Cafe there may not be Some thing between them ; the being, or not being of Something between, is here an Accident only of their being difhnr. And therefore, although there is Nothing between two Walls which do not touch, yet it is no Confequence, that there is no Difference between touching and not touching.
You ask — "Can Nothing conftitute a Dif- " ference between two Somethings ? according to " this Author" [you fay] " it can; becaufe he <c grants that there is a Difference ; and fays alfo, €l that Space is fafficient t& conftitute that Diffe- « rence ; and yet SPACE, according to him, is « Nothing."*
IN Anfwer to this, I muft obferve, that in fpeaking on this Subject of SPACE (as of all ab- ftrad Ideas) we ufe Terms and Expreffions, which are not true in a flrid Metaphyfical Senfe. Con ceiving them after the Manner of Subfhnces, for ?he Help of the Under ftanding, we are apt to be led into Error : and under the Difguife of Words, and common Forms of Speech, they do as it were by Artifice intrude on our Minds, as real Beings. Since then we may be deceived, andrmpofed on, even by ourfelves; it ihould al-
* Third Dcf. p. 3,
ways
of SPACE Examined. 27
ways be our Care to guard againft it ; and to diftinguifh between Words and Things, Appear ances and Realities. Much more fliould it be our Care not to argue from Jifch Terms ; or tp pretend to defend our Point by laying a Strefs on fetch ExpreJJlons of our Opponents, when we are confcious at the fame Time, that they do not mean them in a ftrift Metaphyfical Senfe. For there is juft the fame Difference, between being deceived ourfelves by a Form of Words, and ar guing from fuch Words of another Perfon, know ing at the fame Time that he does not mean them in a ftrid Senfe; as there is between an Error, and a . 'voluntary perjtfting in it.
IT was neglecting to diftinguifh between Ex- trcjjions which may be ufed according to the common Way of fpeaking, and what is True in a ftri6t Metaphyfical Senfe, that has led you to urge, that SPACE muft be Something real, be- caufe I happen'd to fay that it was Efficient to conflitute a Difference. This is the Sentence you catch Hold on, and imagine that you can prove from hence, that SPACE, even according ^to me, muft be Something real : But my Meaning to any unprejudiced Reader, is eafy an4 ob vious.
IT is indeed, ftridly and Metaphyfically fpeak ing, improper to fay, that SPACE, is foment to conftitute, or that SPACE is between', But when we fay that SPACE is between Bodies, it is from conceiving it after the Manner of a Subftance, i.e. from conceiving Nothing after the Manner of Some* ttongi and thence affirming Something pofitive of it ; whereas all the pofitive Lxpreffions are appli cable to the Bodies only. Thus it is not SPACE, which is, or cxilts between the Bodies 5 but the P a
2 8 Arguments for the Reality
Bodies are diftoMt, and there is not any Matter, or any Thing between them.
^ WHEN I (aid therefore, that pure SPACE is fafficient to conftitute the Difference', it was fpoke in Compliance with the common Forms of Speech ; not, that I fancied SPACE any Thing able, or fitf- fcient to conjlitute ; and the Meaning of that Sen tence explained in a Stria Metaphyfical Senfe, is this, viz. that the Difference of not touching and touching of two Bodies does not confift in the Ejfijfatce of Something between them : it is fufficient that the Bodies are diftant. The Bodies themfdves being diftant are Sufficient to covftitute that Difference : which is all I meant by laying, that pure Space, or pure Diftance, is fufficient to conftitute the Difference'; without fuppofing, as [ there add, this pure SPACF, or pure Diftance, to be any Thing exifling between the Bodies, but a mere rbid. It is not therefore SPACE, or Di- ftauce, or a mere Void, that ftridly can be faid to conftitute ; but it is the Bodies themfdves, which being diftant, are of themfelves Efficient to con ftitute the Difference between their touching and not touching. From hence then my Meaning is clear, and it is to no Purpofe for you to argue from inaccurate Expreffious, unlefs it be to fup- piy the Want of found Argument, and to prop a falling Caufe. .Many Inftances might be brought to ihew, that pofitive Expreffions do not prove, that What they are ufed /about, is Something real. What is it that coaftitutes the Difference between a Jong Body, and a mort one ? In the common Way of fpeaking Length is faid to conftitute this Dilterence : yet it does not follow, becaufe this pofmve Expreffion of conflicting a Difference is led concerning Length, that therefore Length fa
th&
of SPACE Examined. 29
the AbflraB; is any Thing real; and the Rea- fon is, becaufe ftri&ly fpeaking, it is not Length, but the long Body which conjiittttes the Difference. Thus in our Cafe, Dtftance, or SPACE may, in the common Way of fpeaking, be faid to confttntt* the Difference; though ftric~tly it is the Bodies themfelves. I own it requires fome Fxadtnefs and Care to conceive thefe Things aright. We are too liable to be deceived by the cuftomary Forms of Expreffion ; we are too apt to realise our abftraffc Ideas, which is owing to the Forwardnefs of the Imagination, in giving Afliflance to the Intellect, for the greater Eafe in conceiving, and Readinefs in talking upon Subjects Abftrafted and Intellectual. For meafuring Difhnces in Imagination, we have Recourfe to imaginary Subftrata^ as in attual mea furing we make Ufe of real ones. Try the Cafe in other Ideas that are confeflcdly abftraft, and it may affift you in uiaderftanding That before us> Weight is an ahftra(5b Jdea; there is a Difference betwixt a Pound and an Ounce : Now what is it, that ftri&ly fpeaking conftitfttes this Difference? Is it the Idea of Weight /* or the Bodies themfelves. being more or lefs weighty ? And thus there is a Difiance between two Bodies: Now what is it that conftitfttes this Diftance S What, but the Bodies themfelves bearing fuch a Relation of Site to one another. And what has this to do with the Ex- iftence, or non-Exiftence of any Thing between 2 This feems- to me to be the Truth of the Cafe, and as to your Cavils at that Expreffion of Space being fttfficient to conflittite the Difference, without being any Thing real ; what I have faid is a fuf- fkient Anfwer. It is <c hardly poffible (as a late Writer well obferves) " to fpeak on this Subject of ^ Non-Entities, or Nothings , without ufing the
" Terms
3.0 Arguments for the Reality.
rc Terms, that reprefent pofaive Beings, and red *' Properties." * But an Argument founded up on mere Terms, and common Expreflions, can, be only ufed when the Difputant wants a^etter. I doubt not but you may find many more of my Expreflions, liable to the fame Cavils as This be fore us ; and if you think this Sort of Argument will be of any Service to you, you are heartily welcome to make the heft of it. Our Caufe, as it requires no fuch Kind of arguing in its Defence, fb it fears it not when ufed againft it : It gathers Strength from fuch Blows, and flands the firmer for fuch an Oppofition.
I fhall now beg leave to take Notice of a Paf- £jge, which (as it appears to me) if it be not cleared up, will leave your Notions in great Ob- fcurity. I had obferved, that you <e fuppofed the <c Difference of touching , and not touching of « two Bodies, to confift merely in the Exiftence cc of Something real between them &c. f. This you quote in your Third Defence, and make the following Remark upon it. " Something real [lay you] " mud, I think, either mean a Subftmce ; cc and then W2 are agreed ; for neither of m fitp- <c pofe that there muft be a Stibftance between «* the two Bodies-) when they do not touch, or *e that elfe there would be no Difference between ec touching and not touching &e. ** ". Here you infift that the Difference does confift in the Exiftence of Something between them: but you jfeem much afraid of the word real : you are ap- prehenfive it may mean a Subftance j and then it
* Philofophical EfTays on Various Subjeds. Eff. I. Se£t. XL p. 40.
f Dr. Clarkis Notions of SPACE Examined p. 14, ic. ** Third Def. p. 13.
of SPACE Examined. 31
feems, you would not fay, that the Difference con- f i fled in the Exiftence of Something real between them. No; ifit means a Subftance, " we are agreed, [fay you] " for neither o/ #J fuppofe, that there muft be a <e Subftance between the two Bodies when they " do not touch." That I do not fuppofe fo, is indeed very true : but that yon muft either fup pofe fo, or elfe, that you muft fuppofe nothing at all between 'em, I fhall make appear.
THE Force of your Remark feems to be this; you would urge, that there are fome Things which are not Sttbfiances: and therefore, although you do not fuppofe there muft be a Subftance ; yet, that you may without any Abfurdity fay, there is Something. But now, if fo ; I ask, what you call that Something? you will anfwer in your ufual Language, a A4ode. If then you fay there muft be Something^ and yet do not fuppofe that there muft be a Subftance^ and That Something be a Mode ; it will follow, that you fuppofe there muft be a Mode between them, and yet do not fuppofe that there muft be a Subftance', which is nothing lets than fuppofing, that there may be a Mode between them without a Subftance ; which, I believe, even you will hardly venture to affirm : and yet, if you do not, you muft contradict your felf. For if there cannot be a Mode be tween them without a Subftance ; then, if there be a Mode at all, I prefume it will follow, than it muft be with a Subftance; directly contrary to you, who fay, that there muft be Something between the two Bodies ; (which Something you call a Mode ;) and yet confefs you do not fappofe that there wuft be a Subftance.
IF therefore you will afiferr, that, when two Bodies do not touch, there muft be Something
between
3 2 Arguments for the Reality
between them; you muft fay that there is a fiance. That there muft be a Sttbjiancey or no thing at ally will appear from confidering, that by your granting there need not be a Stibflance^ you grant that there need not be any Thing at all.
— For, fince there cannot be a Mode without
a Subftance-, and fince you own that there need not be a Subftance ; who does not immediately fee, that you own there need not be a Mode \ (which yet, at the fame time you fay there muft be; ftrange Inconfiftency !) i.e. that there need not be either Subftance or Mode : and, if there need not be either Subftance or Mode, and yet Something; you mud be fo kind, as to oblige the World with the Difcovery of a new Sort of Somethings.
" IT is very needful [you tell us] cc to put ft our Author in Mind of that common and «c necefTary Divifion or Diuindion of Things <c made Ufe of by Logicians, viz,, into Genus <c and Species; the not confidering which, feems " to be whar led him into the Miftake, which cc runs through his whole Book." * Your Au thor is very much obliged to you for this Piece of Service, and I dare fay, that no one will pre- fume to imagine, that your Memory fhould fail you, during the Courfe of this Work ; or that I fhould be obliged to put you in Mind of this Very fame common and neccjfcrj Diftinttion : How ever, if the not confidering This, has led me in to any Miftake, it is to be hoped that the Re- colle&ion of it, will by your Affiftance, be able to lead me out again.
* Third Dcf. p. 4.
of SPACE "Examined* 33
*e THE Words Thing, Something, 'Being) or the *c like, are ufed [you are fo kind to inform us] *c to fignify the GenuS) or are genera! and uni- <c verfal Terms, comprehending all Things what- <c foever under them, whether they be Sub (lances, <c Properties, or Relations &c. This firft Genus cc comprehended under the Name Thing* is divided ** into two SpscieS) viz,. Subftance and Property." * ;You go oh with a great Deal more about Cenns and Species, which is to as little Purpofe, as it would be for me to repeat it. The Force of it feems to be This ; that Subftance is only one Species of Things ; and therefore, that although Space be not a Sub/lance, yet it is not improper to call it a Thing; becaufe, though it comes Hot under that Species of Things called a S Kb fanes ; yet it comes under another Species of Things cal led a Property.' -But you mould have remem bered alfo, Sir, that Things are divided into Things &al) and Things Ideal. Things jfa«/are fuch as have a real Exigence : Things Ideal are fuch as have no real Exiftence) but are ony Ideas in the Mind.
OUR Difpute is, whether Space be any Thing Real ) for that it is an Ideal Thing) I am very ready to grant. " It is very proper [jay you] <c to call *{ SPACE Something, though it be no Subfhnce <c &c." t But if no Things befides Sttbftances are Things real, it follows, that SPACE muft either be a Stibftaftcey or no Thing real : Now, that no .Things are Things real) but Subftances, will eafily appear. Your own Divifion of Things is into "Sttbflance and Property : If a Property therefore be tlo Thing real) then no Things but Stibftonces are Things real : Now, a Property muft either be con-
* Third Def. p. 4, f Ibid, p. 6.
JB fidered
34 Arguments for the Reality
fidered as in the ^bftraft, or as in a SiAjeft : It is plain that a Property in the sdbjtratt is only an Ideal Thing, or has no Exiftence ad extra, and that a Property in a Subject, a Subftance, or Being, is only the Subllance or Being it felf, un der a particular Confideration. If therefore it be proper to call SPACE Something* though it be no Subftance ; it can be only in the Senle of Some thing Ideal. To what Purpofe then, is this long Account of Genus and Species introduced here ? For though the Word Thing be a Genus, under which are contained the two Species, Subftance and Property, yet *tis plain that SPACE muft either be the former, viz,, a Subftance, or elfe it is no Thing real. What have you gained then, Sir, by infilling on the Propriety of calling SPACE a Thingl Since if it be not a Subftance it may as well be no Thing at all ; becaufe it is then a Thing in Idea only : and if you mean no more than This, as you can prove no more ; I am very ready to a- gree with you, and to own, that in fuch a Senfe, •we can very properly fay that SPACE is Some thing : and fo we can fay likewife of WVtteneft in the jibjlratt* or any other abftrad Idea what- foever.
BUT alas! Sir, of what Service is all This to your Queftion? SPACE muft not only be a Thing* but a Thing real; a Thing which has Exiftence ad extra, or you lofe your Caufe: and if it be a Property, and yet Something real, it muft be more than a Property ; it muft be a Subftance ; other- wife, how can it be between Walls ? can a Pro perty be faid to be there, any otherwife than as the Subftance is there? can Extenjion be between any Thing? If any Thing is really between^ is it not the Extended * Subftanw? If SPACE be not
Some*
of SPACE Examined. 3£
Something more than a Property, how can it be Infinite, Eternal &c.\ can a mere Property be fo? or muft it not be the Subftance, if any Thing I Nay if SPACE be not more than an abftrad Pro perty, how can it be at all ? The Reafon why I concluded that SPACE muft be a Subftance, if any Thing, was becaufe I could not but take it for granted, that when you called it Something* you meant Something real; which if you do, I have fliewn that I rightly concluded from your calling it Something, that it was a Subftance : and if you do not mean Something real, then your Ar gument that <e it may bs Something yet not a $#&•* " fiance, is nothing to the Purpofe.
BUT I may add, that the Difpute about the Propriety of calling the Properties or Modes of any particular Being Somethings real, when con- fidered in any other View, than as the "Being it felf under a certain Modification, can be of no Ser vice to the main Queftion. For you contend that Space is Something^ becaufe it is a Property of fome Subftance ; but now fuppofing that Pro perties, confidered merely as fuch> are Somethings real*, yet this conduces nothing towards proving that SPACE is Something real, 'till SPACE is proved to be a real Property of fome Being. When you have done this Sir, then, and not till then, you will have done the Bufinefs ; and I (hall not any lon ger contend, whether Properties are Things real or not. Prove SPACE to be a real Property, the Pro perty, the Extenfion (as you affirm it to be) of the Self-exigent and Eternal 'Being \ and I will then allow it to be Something in what Senfe you pleafe.
IT mould here be obferved, that whenever I
fay that Things real muft be St*bftahces9 I do not
xnean. thereby, any unknown Subftraww : This is
F * 09S
3$ Arguments for the Reality
not the Difpute here. v Bur only fome Thing which orfomc B*t. Ve know
, hath
not
touch, and do o at t e
of SPACE Examined. 37
die Reafon why they did not touch, is now when they do touch, neither annihilated, nor re moved ; 1 think it neceffarily follows, that it muft, if it had any real Exiflence, exift between them ftill. To tell us, that it is neither removed, nor annihilated, neither^ is it between the two Bodies , but it is jttji where it was ; is the lame as to fay, that the Thing, which exijled between the Bodies before, is now not fuppofed to be annihi lated* and yet (tho' the Bodies are increafed in a di* reel: Line) is not removed from between them ; and yet is not between them; but yet is juft where it was ; which feems to carry an Air of Legerdemain with it, and to be Something like telling us, that it is here ; and it is not here ; and yet — High pafs ! — it is juft where it was before. But however you have been fo kind as to let us into this Secrer, by acquainting us, that it is pe netrated by the Increase of the Bodies. * ; fo that, tho' it was between 'em before, and is now nei ther removed nor annihilated, yet it is not be tween the two Bodies ftill, " but it is juft where <c it was ; only with this Difference, that, as it * e was before between the Bodies, it is now pene trated by the Increafe of the Bodies f»" TO explain this, you inftance as follows, c< Let there be twp Bodies each of them a Yard Cube, « and let them be placed at a Yard Diftance from each other; and let us alfo fuppofe all Matter to be taken from between them; that is, let us fuprofe a cubic Yard of empty SPACE be tween them. If thefe two Bodies be crouded together, fo as that their two Superficies fa cing each other touch, and any Perfon fhould
$•• Third Pef. p.
3 S 'Arguments for the Reality
" ask- what was become of the cubic Yard of «c SPACE that was between them; I would an- " fwer, that it was neither removed, nor anni- " hilated, but that it is now where the two in- ** ternal half cubic Yards of the Bodies are ; and « that, as before the Removal of the two Bodies! " the SPACE was between them, that is, between « the internal Superficies of each Body ; it is *« not now between the two whole Bodies, but " only between the two external half- cubic Yards, " and penetrated by the two Jnternal half-cubic *< Yards of the Bodies*.
To This I reply as follows. FIRST I prefume, that when you fay the Space is penetrated by the two half-cubic Yards of the Bodies, you mean, that every Part of the SPAC$ (to fpeak in your Language) is penetrated by every Part of the two half-cubic Yards of the Bodies ; or, that this cubic Yard of SPACE which was be tween the Bodies is, when the Bodies touch, fo diffufed throughout the two half- cubic Yards of the Bodies, that wherever there is Body, there is SPACE. This, I think, muft be your Meaning; becaufe, if there be any Point of thefe two half- cubic Yards of Body, where there is not SPACEJ then the SPACE cannot be jnfl where it was, Now, if this is your Meaning, it is blending Body and SPACE together in fuch a Manner, as to make them be One and the Same : For, if then is no one Point of the Bodies, where there is nol Space -3 and no one Point of the Space, where then is not Body ; I doubt it will be difficult to di ftingtiim One from the Other; or to teil us, whe ther this cubic Yard be Body or Space} that is
* Third Def. p. 8, Q>
/
(
I
cf SPACE Examined. ^A
in plain Englifh, you run inJo Confufioii and Abfurdity.
SECONDLY, fince no Point of Matter, in this Inftance, can be afligaed, where there is not Space 3 if we take that Point where thefe Bodies touch, iince that Point is Matter, it will follow that there is Space at the very Point where they touch : And I doubt you will have need of fome very nice Diftin&ion, to ihew how there may be SPACE at the very Point where they touch ,• without fhewing at the fame Time, ei ther that there is SPACE between them, or that That Point is Space. If there is SPACE between them, then the Abfurdity I before charged yo'i with follows clofe, viz,, that the Bodies do touch and do not touch at the fame Time : If you fay, that That Point where they touch, is Space; then, fince it is pretty evident that it is Matter, it is as evident that it muft be both Matter and Space : and if fo, I would defire to be informed whe» ther it is Space or Matter which touches. — — Dignus Pindice Nodus.
THE Reafon why you imagine, that the SPACE, which was fuppofed to exift between the Bodies before they touched is now, when they do touch, neither annihilated nor removed, but exifts juft where it was, feems to me to be This; you con ceive SPACE to be Something exifting between the Bodies atfirft; and when they touch, you find you cannot fuppofe SPACE to be annihilated or removed, and thence you conclude, that it muft be juft where it was. But if you would confider what I take to be the Reafon, why you cannot fuppofe it either annihilated or removed ; That will fhevv you the Reafon, why it does not therefore follow, that it muft exift there ftill ;
f;
Arguments for the Reality
Becaufe it is not any Thing exi/ling at all.' In ihort, the Idea of SPACE, and of its attual ExijhncC) is fo fixed in your Mind, that (as you fay in your Second Defence) you can by no meant et rid of it * : and therefore, becaufe the Idea of uch adual Exiftence remains ; you conclude that SPACE muft remain, and actually exift* where you had an Idea of its adual Exiftence before, even tho' there be Matter : But if every one may con clude, that All thofe Ideas which he fhall chance not to be able to get rid of, muft therefore have real Archetypes j every Creature of the Brain may have a real Exiftence in Nature.
HAVING fhewn the Abfurdity which follow ed from your fuppofing SPACE to be Something really existing between the Bodies, I proceeded to obferve, that " from our fuppofing SPACE to be <c Nothing but the Abfence of Matter, no fuch <c Abfurdities would follow ; for when two Bo- cc dies do not touch, and there is only SPACE be- «e tween them, we fay there is nothing between
« them Let their Extremities be extended
" 'till they touch, and there is ftill, we fay, no- " thing between them." f
You tell us that, if we confider this PaflTage,1 we fhall fee that what I before applied to you, of proving that there is no Difference between touching and not touching, .""may be much more juftly turned upon my feff**. To lupport this Accufation you argue as follows " If SPACE is *' really Nothing, then Nothing may be SPACE. <c I hope the Author will not deny This: If
* Second Def. p. 6.
*|- Dr. Clarke's Notions of SPACE Eyamined p. 10.
** See Third Def. p. 9.
*f then
of SPACE 'Examined. 41
** then Nothing be SPACE* I beg leave to repeat *c the preceeding PafTage of this Author, and put «* the Word SPACE inftead of the Word Nothing • « for he allows, that all we can affirm of SPACE, « we may affirm of Nothing; and therefore What « we can affirm of Nothing, we may affirm of « SPACE. Let us then try the PafTage in that «« Manner, and fee what it will prove. Wuen two. " Bodies do not touch) and there is only Nothing «< between them, we fay there it SPACE between. <c them. — Let their Extremities be extended " '//// they touch* and there is ft ill, we fay, SPACE «c between them. That is, when the two Bodies " do touch, there is SPACE between them ; and « when they do not touch > there is alfo SPACE « between them : where therefore can the DifFe- <c rence be between touching, and not touching ? « and will it not alfo follow, that they do touch. *' and do not touch* at the fame Time ? * "
WHERE the Difference lies> between the touch ing of two Bodies* tho* in both Cafes there be Nothing between them, I have elfewhere fhewn f. And it will appear presently, that you have here failed in your Endeavours to prove it a Con- fequence from What I have faid, that there is SPACE in both Cafes between them ; and thac the Bodies touch, and do not touch at the fame Time. For pray, good Sir, from whence do you derive this Licence of putting one Word for ano ther, juft as your Fancy leads you ? one would imagine, you thought that Words were like the Sybil's Leaves, which might be blown about, and changed with every Breath. The Fallacy to be detect ed lies in the latter Part of your Argument. My;
* Third Def, p. 9, 10. f See p. 25.
*
4-2 Arguments for the Reality
Expreffion was This viz. " Let their Extremi- ' *' ties be extended 'till they touch, and there is '< flill we fay Nothing between them." This Sentence, changing the word Nothing into Space, you thus repeat viz. " Let their Extremities be <r extended till they touch, and there is ftill, we <c fay, SPACE between them." Now to this Twill of Words, I anfwer that although when <wo Bodies touch, there is Nothing between them, yet it does not follow, that becaufe Space is No thing, therefore there mult be SPACE between them : For, when it is faid, that there is Nothing be tween two Bod'ies which touch ; the Term'AV thing is ufed in one Senfe; and when SPACE is faid to be Nothing, it is ufed in another. When we fay that SPACE is Nothing, it is ufed in that Senfe which excludes only Things Real: But when it is faid, that there is Nothing between two Bo dies which touch, it is fo be underftood in that Senfe which excludes, not only ail Real Things, but all Ideal Things, or all Ideas of any Thing as bet-ween. The meaning therefore of this F.x- preflion is, that there is not any Thing Real or Ideal between them ,- /. e. There is no ^ Red Ex igence between them, neither have we that Idea which reprefents Diftancc or SPACE, as be tween them.. The Term Nothing, when un derftood in the Senfe we here ufe it does, you fee, by being a Negation of all Ideal, as well as Real Exigences, exclude SPACE, which is an Ideal Exiftence, from being, as we fay, between the Bodies which touch.
IT appears then, that to fay there is Nothing Wween two Bodies when they touch, therefore, face SPACE is Nothing, there is SPACE between them ; is the fame as to urge, that becaufe SPACE is No thing,
, . of SPACE Examined. 43
thin?, in that Senfe which is only a Negation.of Things ^4/5 therefore when there is Nothing between two Bodies, in that Senfe which is a Negation of all Ideal Things (and therefore ok SPA"CE among the reft) as well as of all Real Things, there is therefore SPACE between them; which is confounding thefe two different Acceptations of the Term Nothing together, in fuch a manner as to deftroy the Ufe of" Language, which I fup- pofe was defigned to make Men underftand one another ; and is arguing in fo many Words, that becaufe there is Nothing between two Bodies m that Senfe which excludes Things both Real and Ideal; therefore (obferve the Confequence !) there is Nothing between them in that Senfe which excludes only Things Real ; i. e. becaufe there is not any Thing Real 'or Ideal between them, there fore there is Something Ideal between them; there is Something Ideal between them, becaufe there is not Something Ideal between them. — This is your Argument, and a curious One it is ! But ] lieve it will hardly be thought fufficient to (hew, that it follows from any Thing I had faid, that there is SPACE in both Cafes (w*. when they touch and do not touch) between the Bodies; or, that the Bodies touch, and do not touch at the fame Time ; but that you have been amuiing your Readers, by playing upon the Ambiguity of a Word.
IF you underftand the Term Nothing in this Place, in the Senfe I here ufe it vi*. as a Ne gation of Things both Real and Ideal', your Ar gument has no Manner of Force. If you under ftand it in that Senfe in which I do not here ufe it, w*. as a Negation of Things Real only {which is the Senfe I ufe it in when there is
44 Arguments for tke Reality.
SPACE between the Bodies) then you are not objecting to me, but to Somebody elfe, who, like the SPACE you are treating of, is Ideal only.
IN ihort, the whole Myftery of the Inftance above is This : When two Bodies do not touch, and there is only SPACE between them, we fay there is Nothing between them ; becaufe there is not any Thing really exifting between them ; yet the Bodies being diftant, give us the Idea of Diftance or SPACE as between them ; but ftill, as Diftance and SPACE, according to my Apprehenfion, are only Ideas which have no Ar- chetypes ad extra ; fo we fay, that although we have the Idea of Diftance or SPACE, as between them ; yet there is Nothing or No-Thing Real be tween them, Now when the Bodies do touch, we ilill fay there is Nothing between them ; but then, the Bodies not being diftant, we have not, as we had before, the Idea of Diftance, or of SPACE : So that in the former Cafe, there is Nothing between them, but then we had the Idea of Diftance or SPACE : in the latter Cafe there is Nothing between them, but then we have not the Idea of Diftance or of SPACE.— To fay then that there is Nothing between two Bodies when they touch, therefore there is SPACE, or there is Diftance, becaufe SPACE and Diftance are No thing ; is to fay that becaufe there is Nothing be tween them, therefore we muft have the Idea of their being dtftant> becaufe Dijlance in the Abftracl is Nothing.
BUT you may farther confider that the Term Nothing confifts of two Words, and that it is truly a Negation every one knows who underftands jEngliftij and it is therefore alfo as evident, that
of SPACE Examined. 4$
when we fay SPACE is No-Thing, we mean, that .SPACE is not a Thing: Inftead then of faying as you do, that « if SPACE is Nothing then Nothing ** is SPACE *' ; Let us, to render the Propofition true and intelligible, repeat it thus viz,. « If " SPACE is not a Thing, then a Thing is not <*•• SPACE " : Now we are got at the Truth, but it is fuch Truth, as utterly deftroys your Ar gument, and lays open the Fallacy of it. For will it follow, that becaufe SPACE is not a Thingt or becaufe a Thing is not Space, will it therefore fol low, I fay, when there is not a Thing between two Bodies which touch, that there muft be SPACE between them * No : The Reader fees your Argument depends upon its Obfcurity, and when brought into the £-ight, its Fallacy is glaring : when ftripp'd of its ambiguous Phrafe, and re duced to plain Senfe, every one fees that it has not the leaft Appearance of Force in it. When you fay that, If Nothing is Space, then if there is Nothing between two Bodies which tottch> there is Space; the Fallacy in this Sentence, may not per haps fo plainly appear; but explain it, and fay that If a Thing is not Space, then, if there is not a Thing between two Bodies which touch, there mtift be Space ; reduce it thus to its proper Meaning, and every one muft fee, that there is no Manner of Confequence, or Connection in the Propofition. You fay that, « If the Words [Space and No- <c thing'] cannot be fo altered, then it is moftma- *' nifeft, that SPACE cannot poflibly be Nothing, « that is, it muft certainly be Something." * It is moft manifeft, that this PafTage is Nothing to the Purpofe. SPACE is not Nothing, in that Senfe
{.Third Def. p. io?
which
46 'Arguments for the Reality
which excludes Things both Red and Ideal, but what then ? does it follow that it cannot be No thing in that Senfe which excludes only Things Real? Is it a Confequence, that becaufe it is not No thing, in a Senfe which denies it to be any Thing Ideal, therefore it cannot be Nothing, in a Senfe which yet allows it to be a Thing Ideal? There fore when you argue, that SPACE muft be Some thing, if it be not Nothing; as we only allow it to be not Nothing^ in that Senfe of the Word, which excludes it from being any Thing either Real or Ideal; it can only be faid, that SPACE is Some thing, becaufe it is not Nv>thing in that Senfe of the Term juft mentioned: But then as Something Is diftinguifhed into Real and Ideal, it cannot be faid, that becaufe SPACE is not Nothing in that Senfe which excludes it from being any Thing either Real or Ideal, therefore it is Something Real: No; becaufe it may be, as it is, Something AsW: and therefore to fay, that SPACE mufl certainty be Something becaufe it is not Nothing, as you do in the abovecited Paffage, will do you no Ser vice; tinlefs that Argument would prove it to be Something Real ; i. e. Something which has an Ex- iftence ad extra ; which that it will not, I hope I have fufficiently mewn.
You argue, that if SPACE be not Nothing, it muft be Something ; or, that I muft have <c found «c out a Thing that is between Something snd <c Nothing, which exifts, but does not really exift, " which kerns [fay you] to be his Notion of « SPACE."*
To fay that SPACE is Something Ideal, is n< to find out a Thing between Something and N<
* See Third Dcf. p. 10, ir.
thing
of SPACE Examined. 47
|| thing : It is only diftinguifhing Things into Real and Ideal y a Diftinftion which you have made BnccefTary, by calling Modes, Relations in the^- \fttafti and all abftract Ideas, Things.
MY Notion of SPACE therefore is not, that it is a Thing between Something and Nothing, which exifts, but does not really exift : No; but that it is a mere abftrad Idea: an Idea which my Mind has formed, from confidering Extenfion in the General : but as Extenfion in the General is an Idea of pure Intellect, my Imagination therefore fupplies this Idea with an Imaginary* Subftratum, for the Help of the Underftanding, as has been before explained. My Mind, by this Means, reprefents SPACE to me as a Thing: but, lince this Thing is only my own Idea, and has no objettivc Realty, I therefore call it an Ideal Thing. " IF he will tell me [fay you] what Sort of Cf a Thing that is, which is neither Something « nor Nothing, and can fhew me the Difference «' between the real and not real Exigence, of that " which has fome Exiftence ; I ihall be very ready te to give up the whole Difpute." *
IT is not fo very difficult, to fhew the diffe rence, between the real and not real Exigence of that, which has (according to thecuftomiry Way of fpeaking) fome Exiftence. SPACE, if we would fpeak ftridly, has no Exiftence at all. But -as Properties Relations, and all abftraft Ideas are 'in common Speech faid to exift in the Mind ; fo SPACE is faid to have an Ideal Exiftence, in Contradiftinction to thofe Things which have an Exiftence *d extra. The Difference therefore,
between the real and not red Exiftence, of that
.
* Third Def, p. u,
which
48 Arguments for the Reality
which has fome Exigence, is this ; w*. a Thing is faid to have real Exiftence, when it exifts ad extra ; and not to have real Exiftence, and yet fome Exiftence, when it exifts only in the Mind.
THE Queftion between us is whether SPACE has real Exiftence. Now I conceive! that real Exiftence can only be applied to What exifts ad extra. The Difpute then turns upon This */«,. whether SPACE exifts ad extra: Your Anfwer would be, I prefume, that Modes exift ad extra j SPACE is a Mode ; and therefore SPACE exifts ad extra. To which I reply
FIRST, That Modes do not exift ad extra, un* der any other Confideration, than that of a mo* dified Stibftance$ and are Nothing but the Stibftance : But you grant that SPACE is not a modified Sub- ftance ; and confequently, SPACE does not exift ad extra: Ergo, if real Exiftence be Exiftence ad extra, it has no real Exiftewe, by your own Cort- feflion* — Secondly, fuppofing, but not granting, that Alodes exift ad extra> confidered as Modes ; yet, till SPACE is proved to be a Mode* which is a Point that ihall be confidered in due Time, you will not have proved, that SPACE exifts ad extra, even upon fuch a Suppofition.
You proceed as follows — - " I faid in my firft tf Defence, when I afTerted SPACE to be Some- cc thing, that / would not be underftood by Tkingf *c to mean a Subftance &c. I doubt then, anfwers <c he, he will find it pretty difficult to be under* <c ftood at all ; for if it be a Thing exift ing and yet <c not a Sttbftance, then it is a Thing that is nei- *c ther Body nor Spirit &c. I need not trouble tc the Reader with any more of this Page. Ic " feems very odd> that any Perfon fhould try to
" exclude
of SPACE Examined. 49
cs exclude Properties, from coming under the Ge- " nns comprehended in the Word Thing*.
IT feems very odd, that you iliould imagine this Sort of Reafoning would do you any Service : For, in the firft Place, I do not exclude Proper ties from coming under the Genus comprehended in the Word Thing : But then I fay, that in the j&ftra& they come under that Genus, only as Ide.«l Things j and in the Subjett are Real Things, in no other Senfe, than as they are the Stibjeft it felf, under fuch, or fuch a Confederation. If there fore by Thing you mean a mere Property, or a Property in the j4bflratt ; then I may readily
franc SPACE to be a Thing: but then you are ut juft where you fet out; for, fince it does not follow from this Argument, that SPACE is a Real Thing, or that it hath Exigence ad extra, you have been talking in vain. But if you mean that it is a Property in fome Snbje^ ; then indeed it will be a Real Thing ; but yet in no other Senfe, than as it is the Subjeft it Jeif under fuch a Con- fideration. The Reafon therefore why I faid that SPACE, if it was a Thing, muft either -be Body or Spirit, was, becaufe I imagined you in tended to prove it to be a Real Thing, i. e. to have Exigence ad extra: And if it be a Real Thing', then, for the Reafons juft given, my Argument was found and conclufive ; and I ftill repeat, that it muft be either Body or Spirit : and therefore I fancy, that the Reafon why you did notm>«£/£' the Reader with any more of the following Pages was, becaufe it might have troubled you to an- fwer them.
* Third Def. p. n,
-
£o Arguments for the Reality
SECONDLY, fuppoflng Properties to come under the Gentts comprehended in the Word Thing, in any Senfe you pleafe ; fuppofe 'em to be Real Things ; yet you have done Nothing, unlefs you had proved that Space is a Property. When you have evinced This, I will grant SPACE to be a Thin* in any Senfe you (hall chufe : Nay, I now grant it to be a7te£, if abjlrttl Ideas are Things. But what will follow from hence? will it follow, that SPACE is a real Property of any Vcivg, or that SP\CE is a Property of the Almighty ? I conteis this is a Conclufion too abftrufe for my narrow Underftanding to comprehend ; and, if this does not follow, what have you gained by your Am- baves Perbontm, your Genus and your Species, fince you are ne'er the nearer having proved what you contend for?
You go on — " would any one lay, that be- " caufe Knowledge is not a Subflance, it is there- « fore Nothing"" - and a little farther -" I dare « iav that this Author will not allow Knowledge « to be either Body or Spirit, and yet it muft « certainly be Something."' * To This I anfwer, that, if by Something, you mean That which has Exiftence, in the more true and ftrift Senfe of the Word, i.e. Exiftence ad extra, then I deny Knowledge to be Some-Thing : But, if you mean by it only, Something Ideal, in which Senfe Whitcnefs; Exterfon, and all other d/lr*& Idea* are called Somethings* then I grant Knowledge to be Something. .
You ask ~" If Knowledge is really Nothing, « where is the Difference between a Wife and an « Ignorant Man, when by theSuppofition, there
* Third Dcf p. n» is.
of SPACE 'Examined. £1
<* is Nothing more in the One than in the Other." * This is fallacious : But however, to fatisfy you, Sir, the Difference between a Wife and an Igno rant Man is, that the Wife Man knows, what the Ignorant Man does not : yet Knowledge and Ignorance in the Abffiratt are Nothing butabjhatt Ideas ; and the Difference re, to (peak properly, con touted only by the Men themfelves j one of whom Knows, whilft the other is Ignorant.
IF Knowledge be Nothing, then you urge, that by the Sttppo/ition, there is Nothing mere m the One than in the Other. When we fay that Knowledge is Nothing* we mean, that Know- ledge coniidered abftraftedly, is No-Thing really exifting : and therefore, it only follows, that by the Suppofition, there is NoThing really ex- ifting, more in the One, than in the Other: And This is true. For do you imagine, that Knowledge is a Thing really exifling with'w a Man ? If you do, I can't help it : But all that I underftand by Knowledge being in a Man, is, that a Man Knows. Thus Length, considered merely as Lengthy or in the Abftratt, is no real Thing : and it is as true, that Length is not any real Thing exifling in a long Body, any more than it is in a fhort one. But does it follow* that bscaufe Length in the abftratt^ is Nothing real, nor any Thing exifling in a Body, therefore there is no Difference between a long Body and a (hort one? The Cafe here is the fame, as in your Inftance -of the Wife and the Ignorant Man; Length and Knowledge, are not Things exi/iing within the Body, or within the Man : Knowledge is not one Thing, and the Man another j or Length
* Third Def. p, u.
G i pne
£2 Arguments for the Reality
one Thing, and the Body another; But the Man, and the Body, are the only real Things ; and Know ledge and Length are only Ideas formed by Abftra- chon: Tho' Length and Knowledge therefore are Nothing, nor can be properly faid to exift in thofe Things which are called their Subjects ; yet it does not follow, that there is no Difference be tween a long Body and a iliort one, a wife and an ignorant Man. There is Nothing, 'tis true, in one more than in the other : but then, one happens to be Long, and the other Short ; one to be Wife, and the other Ignorant : Here is the Difference, which is not conftituted by any
Thing within 'em, but by Themfelves. — I wifh,
Sir, you had known here, as well as in your P re face, that Quibbles and Wrangling upon Words are endlcfs : For it no more follows, that Know ledge muft be Something real> becaufe we common ly fay, that there is Knowledge in Men; than that Difference muft be Something red, becaufe we fay there is Difference in Men.
BUT you proceed — f< were it Nothing, we " could truly deny every Thing of it, and then " there could be no Difference between a Per/ons « having, or not having it." *
WHEN we fay, that a Man has Knowledge, we mean only that he Knows : not, that Knowledge is any Thing really exifting, which he actually has, and poffijfts, as he has, and pojfejfes his Eft ate. We fay a Man has Knowledge, as we fay a Man has Sobriety ; that is, that he is Sober ; not that Sobriety is any Thing of it felf di ftinft from the Man, which He can be faid to have: No; So briety is not one Thing real, and the Man ano
* Third Def. p. 12.
thcr;
of SPACE Examined. 53
ther ; but it is either a mere abftrati Idea, or elfe the Sober Man himfelf.
BUT does it follow that, becaufe Sobriety is not any Thing diftinct by it felf, and cannot be had by any Man, as He has his Bottle, therefore that there is no Difference between a Sober Man and a Drunkard ? No fober Man, I am fure, can think fo ; and yet unlefs you had proved this, you have not proved what you aim at, namely, that if Knowledge be not Something of it feif, there is no Difference between a Wiie and an Ig norant Man.
BUT you teil me, 'c There is no Way to efcape cc this Rock without failing between Something
<c and Nothing."* If fo, I muft beg the
favour of you, Sir, to be my Pilot ! for this is a Courfe you are well acquainted with ; and which
am afraid you muft often yet Steer, before we jhave done with SPACE. But I cannot efcape this Rock, it feems, <£ without imagining that cc Knowledge may be Nothing, and yet that tc Something may be affirmed of it &c" t This is the Charibdis to your Scjlla ; but I hope I fhall sfcape 'em both. For there is no Neceflity, that if Knowledge in the tbftraft be Nothing, there fore there muft either be no Difference between a Wife and an Ignorant Man ; or elfe, that I muffc imagine Knowledge to be Nothing, and yet that Something may be affirmed of it : There is no Neceility for either of thefe, I fay ; for though knowledge in the abflratt is Nothing ; yet a Wife Vlan differs from an Ignorant Man, in that he Ktaw, whilft the Ignorant Man does not : and i/et this is pot to imagine that Knowledge is No-
* Third Def. p. 12, \ Ibid,
thing
££• Arguments for the Reality
thing, and yet that Something may be affirmed of it : For I do not affirm any Thing of Know ledge as a real Thing ; but, as we ought to do, of the Knowing Man only. Jt is not Knowledge which the Man has in him, that makes him differ from the Ignorant Man j but it is He him/elf which conftitutes the Difference. There is no Neceflity therefore, to Sail between thefe two Difficulties, when (to ufe your Words) / can fe eafily go wide of them both.
You Remark — "The Gentleman, T think, had <c no R eafon to be fo defirous to be toici, what SPACI <c is, (uppoiing it to be neither Body nor Spirit : *f I hsd often enough (aid in my fir ft Defence, " thit it was a Property."* Now, in my Opi nion, the Gentleman had very good Reaion to be fo defirous of knowing, what that ftrange Kind of a Thing could be, which was neither Body nor Spirit, and yet was a real Exigence: For, tho* it is true, you had often enough faid in your JFirft Defence, that it was a Property ; yet it hap pened, that you never proved it : And therefore, if you had Jaid it ten Times oftner than you did, the Gentleman would flill have had the fame Rca- fon, to have made farther Enquiries about it. Befides, had you proved it to have been a Pro perty, it muit then have been either Body or Spirit^ or dfe a Property in the Abftratt only; to fay therefore, that SPACE is neither Body nor Spirit.. but a Property, is indeed, as you fay, going wtdt of 'em both ; but then it is running directly upor a Property in the Abffiraft.
I had faid that, " Although when two Bo <c dus touch, and when they do not touch (i
* Thirl Tef. p. 12,.
of SPACE Examined* te
*J d tj
all Matter be removed [from between) there is in both Gales Nothing between them , yet it does not follow, that there is no Difference be tween touching and not touching : That they cc do not differ in this Kefpecl", is very true, but j« they do differ in there being SPACE between them : Yet it will not follow that SPACE muft be Something really exifting" * To this you reply — " I confefs I do not clearly underftand " this Paffage : He leems to own that there is a " Difference in there being or not being SPACE «* between the two Bodies; and yet fays that it does not therefore follow that SPACE is any «c Thing. I fhould be very glad to fee what the Difference is, if that which Caufes the «.« Difference be Nothing." f
As to your not clearly under/landing this Paffage, it is none of my Fault : I think it is clear enough for any Body to underftand, but thofe whofe In- tereft it is not to underftand it. / own that there is a Difference in there being or not being Space be tween the two Bodies ; i. e. i own that there is a Difference in there being, or not being Diftame between the two Bodies, or in the Bodies being dijhinty without any Matter between them; and yet I fay, that it does not therefore follow, that Space is any Thing ; i. e. it does not therefore follow, that Diftance is any Thing. You flwuld be v&y glad to fie, you fay, what the Difference is, if that which catifcs tiie Difference bs Nothing : but that which caufes the Difference is not Nothing; for it is not Space, or Dijiance^ which caufes the Dif ference, but the Bodies thcmiclves.
* Dr. Clarke's Notions of SPACE Examined p. 15. f Third Def. p. 14.
" THE
£6 Arguments for the Reality
« THE Difference [you fay] between us feems4 cc now to be brought to a very narrow Compafs, *' and is no more than This : whether it does •c not follow, from their being a Difference be- et between touching, and not touching, as he grants <c there is ; that when two Bodies do not touch, <c there muft be Something between them." * It feems then, you have but juft now found out I where the Pinch of the Queftion lay; and, that you have been all along fuppofing the wain Pointy without knowing any thing at all of the Matter : But I am glad you [fee it at laft ; for, I perceive you now begin to be fenfible, that the Reafon why you imagined, that when two Bodies did not touch, there muft be Something between them, was, becaufe you thought it felf-evident, that the Difference of touching and not touching, con- iifted in the Exiftence or non- Exigence of Some thing between: but this is fo far from being felf- evident, that it is manifeftly falfe : yet this is the Principle on which your whole Dcmonftra- rion is founded; and 'tis to this we owe fuch a curious Chain of Reafoning.
BUT furely, Sir, now you have found out where the Difference lies between us, and have brought it to fo narrow a Compafs; we might rea- fona::ly have expected, that you fhould have en deavoured to give us fome Proof, of what you had before taken for granted ; and have fhewn us, how it followed, from there being a Difference between touching and not touching, that when two Bodies do not touch there muft be Something between 'em ; and not have left your Subject juft where you found it : you fee that the Truth of
* Third Def. p. 15,
your
of SPACE Examined, 57
your Argument depends upon fhewing, that the Difference &c. confifts in the Exigence, or non- Exiftence of Something between ; and yet you do not fo much as offer at any Pr6of of it ; but leave it to me to fhevv where' the Difference lies, if it does not lie where you imagine ; which is fhifting off the Proof from your lelf. What is it to me where the Difference lies ? you argue upon Suppofition that it conlifts in the Exigence or non-Exiftence of Something between : This is what therefore you ought to prove; otherwife your Argument is built upon a Principle, which does not appear to be true, and is confequently no Argument at all.
You think it fufficient to {hut up all with faying, that, <f If this Gentleman can any Way " fhew the Difference which he allows, between «c touching and not touching, fuppofing two « Bodies to have Nothing between them, and <c yet not to touch; he will -then, and not till «c then prove what he has fpent fo many Pages here c< in trying to do." * What I (pent fo many Pages in trying to do, was, I think, to fhev/ chat you tftfpofed the 'very Point to be proved: which if I have clone, I fhould fancy it will be but litde Satisfaction to you, to number the Pages, and to refled: how many I have /pent in doing it. Now in Order to do This, there was no Occafion for me to foew the Difference between touching and not 'touching, fappofing two Bodies to havs Nothing be tween them-, and yet not to touch : but only to prove that you took^ it for granted, that the Difference conjifted in the Exigence, or non-Exiftcnce of Some thing between ; and this I have done : It is youc
* Third Def. p. 15.
H Bufinefs
£8 Arguments for the Reality
Bufinefs therefore, to (hew us, that the Difference does confift in what you have hitherto fitppofedy and you will then, and not till then, prove what you have [pent fo nfany Pages here, in trying to do.
BUT however, Sir, you find that I have not flood fo preciiely on the drift Rules of Contro- verfy ; for I have complyed with your Requeft, and have {hewn you, wherein the Difference of the touching and not touching of two Bodies confifts; tho' in each Cafe there is fuppofed to be Nothing between them*.
To conclude this Argument— I charged you with fuppofing the very Point to be proved in the In fiance of your two Walls : You have la boured to get off; and after much Quibbling .and many Doublings and Turnings confefs at lad:, that the main Point of Difpute between us is, whe ther it does not follow from there being a Dif ference between touching and not touching; that when two Bodies do not touch there muft be Something between them ; that is, that the main Point of Difpute is, whether the Difference of touching and not touching, confifts in the Ex- iftence or non-Ex iftence of Something between; which you have all along taken for granted ; and on which your whole Argument depends : yet, you have not offer 'd at any Proof of it ,* even now, when you own it to be the only Diffe rence between us : which is ending as you be gun with foppo/tvg the very Poir.t to be proved, : I therefore repeat that Charge once more, and leave you, to get clear of it at your leifure.
AND thus I have confidered every Thing which bears the Fa;e of an Argument for the Reality of
* Sec p. 25. &c.
SPACE,
of SPACE Examined. £9
SPACE, from the Difference between two Walls touching and not touching j and have anfwered your Objections relating to this Point ; and I hope it appears, that you have added no Rein forcement to your former Argument above the Dignity of a Sophifm, or a Quibble in Language. I fear the Reader will think I have been too mi nute and particular, and I can only offer in Ex- cufe, that you led me through a Path, wherein I have been obliged to follow you, as I had no other way of unravelling your Sophiftry, and guarding againft future Cavils.
ARGUMENT II.
That the Idea of SPACE is not the Idea of a PRIVATION.
ct THE Idea [fay you] arifing from a Priva- *' tion is not an Idea of the mere Abfence of " the Thing only; for that would be an Idea of " Nothing."* The Idea arifing from a Priva tion is not in one Senfe an Idea of the mere Ahfence of the Thing ; becaufe it is always an Idea conneded with the Idea of That whofe Ab fence you confider: but though it be not an Idea of mere Abfince* yet it is not therefore, as you would argue, an fcba of Some Place which hark real Exiftence without That Thing. It is not an Idea of a Place, as any Thing diitincl: and fepa- rate from that Body ; it is only a reflection that the Body which once did bear a certain Relation
* Third Dcf. p. 22.
H * to
60 Arguments for the Reality
to other Bodies, docs no longer bear that Rela tion.
You tell us, that you " have a Pofirive Idea <c of a Dog : Now fuppofe [you add] by any <c Accident, all the Dogs in the World were " dead ; would this Author fay, that he had a <c Pofitive Idea of no Dog*?" No Sir; unlefs you take 'em out oF the World after their De- ceafe : for otherv/ife, my Idea would cnly be an Idea of a Parcel of dead Dogs inftead of living Ones. But, if you fuppole all Dogs to ceafe to exift; Then I affirm, that I fhould have the Po- fitive Idea of No-Do# ; which I fhould gain by reflecting, that Dogs did once exift, but that they now do not; i.e. i fhould reflect, that they were all dead and gone; which is a Pofitive Idea-, for pray what is a Negative Idea? I think he who found Fault with Negative Properties, mould have been aware of Negative Ideas: and I may anfwer you in your own Words, viz,. The Author fiould have explained what he means by a Pofitive Idea: are there any Ideas that are not Po/itive \ That ^hich is called an Idea^ mufl be either an Idea, or not an Idea ; or, is there Something bet-ween an Idea, and no Idea ? as he feems to imagine Abfence to be, I know not what, between an Idea, and no Idea. / confefs I cannot frame to my felf^any Notion at ail of a Negative Idea : If there are fttch, I foal bs obliged to this Gentleman, if he will foew me what Sort of an Idea, a Negattve Idea is j and makg appear the Difference between that, and A Pofttivs one f.
THE Difference, which Mr. Locke may feem to make between Poftive and Privative Ideas, is
* Third Def. p. 22. f See Ibid. p. 18, 19.
only
of SPACE Examined. 61
only in their Cattfes, or rather Reafons, not in the Ideas, as they are in the Mind. All Ideas are Pofitive ; tho' the Reafons of fuch Ideas, may fometimes be Privations . — " Whatever (fays he) " may be the external Caufe of it, when it comes (C to be taken Notice of by our difcerning Fa- " culty, it is by the Mind looked on and confi- cc dered there, to be a real Pofitive Idea in the " Undemanding, as much as any other whatfo- " ever; though perhaps the Cauie of it be but ** a Privation in the Sui jed." * The Idea there fore of the mere Abfence of a Dog, tho* the Caufe be a Privation, is a real Pofitive Idea in the Under ft an ding, as much as any other wkatjoever : and therefore 'tis plain from Mr. Locke-, ihat he would have faid, he could have a Pofitive Idea of No- Dog.
You ask, "what would the Idea of the real, " or fuppofed Abfence of all Dogs be? I appeal " to himfclf, whether it would not be an Idea " of fome Place without a Dog, where he had " either feen, or fuppofed a Dog to be." f I an- fvver, that it would be a Reflation that fuch and fuch Things, which did once bear a Relation of Site to Dogs, no longer bear any fuch Relation ro that Sort of Animal : it would not be an Idea of the Place of thofe Dogs as Something exifting ad extra ; but only the abftraft Idea of that Re lation of 'Site ', which I had either feen, or fuppofed Dogs to bear to other Things.
IF I have a Pofitive Idea of no Dog, then you fay, " That all Ideas whatever arifing from Pri- " vations, muft be Nothing, becaufe they muft
* Locke Hum. Underlhnd. B. 2. c. 8. §. I. f Third Def. p. 22.
" be
62 Arguments for the Reality
" be all alike ; for an Idea of no Dog, cannot be « different from an Idea of no Horfe." * That all Ideas whatever arifing from Privations muft be all alike, is what I defy you to prove: for an Idea of no Dog is juft as different from the Idea of no Horfe, as a Dog is from an Horfe : for, otherwife we might fay the very fame Thing to you, upon a Suppofition that the Idea of no Dog was an Idea of fome really exifting Place without a Dog ; as you imagine it : for I would then ask, where is the Difference between the Idea of a Place without a Dog, and the Idea of a Place without an Horfe ?
" THE Idea of the Abfence of Something [you fay] "muft be the Idea of Nothing ^." t Very true ! the Idea of the Abfence of Some thing, quatenus Abfence^ is the Idea of no Thing ; /". e. no Thing ad extra : but what then ? is it tkerefore no Idea? yes furely it is! and a Pofi- tive one too, made by reflecting on the Thing whofe Abfence you confider.
You think "it is incumbent upon this Au- " thor, fince he has an Idea of Nothing, and of " different Nothings, to tell us what Sort of an " Idea it is ; and how the Ideas of different No- " things are dilHnguifhcd amongft one another ; " and wherein they differ from other Ideas/' ** Thefe are mere Words — when I have the Ideas of the Abfence of different Things, thefe are not Ideas of different Nothings : they are only different Jdeas, which have no objective Realities -, and are formed from reflecting on thofe different Things^ whole Abfence I confider : Thefe different Ideas
* Third Def. p. 22. f Ibid, p, 3
** Ibid.
are
of SPACE Examined. 63
are diftinguifhed amongft one another, according to the different Things, whofe Abfence they are Ideas of.
As to our Idea of SPACE, I have all along faid, that I think Reflection muft be taken into the Account* : I imagine, that t\\z Idea of SPACE is formed from reflecting upon Body, tho' we may not always take Notice of fuch Reflection. It is formed from conceiving Body away : This Con ception (we having at the fame time the Idea of the Extenfion of Body) leaves us the Idea of Ex- tenfion in t\\z general, without any particular ex tended Subftance. This is not the Idea of red Place, as any Thing exifting ad extra; but it is the Idea of the Abfence of Body, conceived after the Manner of Extenfion. The Idea therefore of the Abfence of Body, feems to me to be an Idea of Reflection : and fuch an Idea is as pofitive as any other Idea whatfoever, tho' it be the Idea of a Privation. The Abfence of Body is as pofitive an Idea, as the Idea of Body : 7'he Idea of the Abfence of any Thing is not fas you would have us imagine) the pofitive Idea of a red Place exifting ad extra without that Thing: It is only a pofitive Idea of the Relation of She * which any Body did once bear to another, confi- dered now without the Real Body. To fuppofe a Body abfent from any Place is only fuppofing it to ceare from bearing fitch a Relation, as it once did; but Relation is Nothing ad extra. By daily confidering Bodies bearing fuch and fuch Rela tions to each other, which we call exijling in Place j when we imagine thefe Bodies away, we apply their Dimenfions to an imaginary Pan of
* See Dr. Clarkis Notions of SPACE Examined p- 67.
SPACE :
64 Arguments for tie
SPACE : and as we before confidered thefe real Dimenfions to bear a Relation to other Bodies; fo we conceive thefe imaginarj Dimensions to do; and thence ibme are led to confider this imaginary Part of SPACE, thus clothed with Ideal Dimen- fions, to be a Place really exifting without Body. I fhall take occafion here, to ihew the Weak- nefs of an O :>jeclion I meet with in the Vindica tion of your Second Defence. I had told you that, «c when we fuppofe the Bodies away, we are apt ^ to apply their Dimenfions to that imaginary Part cc of SPACE where we confidered them before «c exifting." * To which you anfwer — <« what *c is This, but faying that Nothing exifls but " in Imagination ? for, if Bodies exift only in <e fome imaginary Place, they cannot really and " truly 'exift at all." f Pray Sir, who told you, that Bodies exifted in imaginary Place? This is a mere Imagination of your own. I faid that Bo dies ex i (led in an imaginary Part of Space. We deny SPACE to have real Parts, or to be any Thing real; and therefore, when we talk of the Parts of SPACE, thofe Parts are Imaginary ; ima ginary Subftrata of imaginary Extenfion. I faid not that Bodies exifted in imaginary Place: No; the Place is real ; /'. e. real Place ; For Place is the Relation of Site which one Body bears to ano ther ; and this Relation is real Relation. A Body therefore, tho* it exifts in an imaginary Part of SPACE yet exifls in a real Place; that is, it bears a Relation of Sire to other Bodies. When we fuppofe the Bodies away ; then indeed the Place is imaginary : it is the alftraft Idea of Relation, as
* Dr. Clarkfs Notions of SPACE Examined p. 131. t Third Def. p. 92,
has
of SPACE Examined. 6£
has been before explained. Thus much for
the Objection as it occurs in the nndtittiox of your Second Defence*
You fay, you — " Know of. no Privation " that we can have an Idea of, merely as the Ab~ " fence of the Thing, He inftances [fay you] « in the Cafe of Darknefs, which is a Privation « of Light. To which I fay, that no Man can <c have an Idea of Darknefs no where &c." * Light is That, by means of which we fee the various Objects which furround us, and confider them- as exiftins in Place; i.e. as bearing different Rela tions of Site to each other. We are accuftomed to refer all our Ideas, of Imagination at ieaft, to Something without us ; and to confider SPACE as a common Receptacle. Hence we refer the Ids* of Light to Something without us, as correfpondent to that Idea: and as every Thing is conceived ro exift in Place, we at length imagine Light as exiting in fome Place : and becaufe Darkgefi ii only a Privation of Light, we in like Manner re fer the Idea of Darknefs to without, and fancy- it as a Place without Light. Thus we refer Sound and Silence to without ; and thence ima gine Sound to be in Place, and Silence to be a Place without Sound: whereas, whoever will confider his own Ideas, and reflect a little upon his Manner of acquiring them, will find, that the Idea of Darknefs, &c. is truly an Idea of a mere Privation.
You take the Truth to be «c that we are fo <c very converfanr with Place, Space, &c. that, <c when any Thing by being taken away, cau- (( fes a privative Idea, we confider it only as
* Third Dcf. p. 24. fcfV.
X « the
66 Arguments for the Reality
<c the Abfence of the Thing, without confider- <f ing the Place." *
Now, Sir, i take the Truth to be this — we are ufed to confider Things exifting without us, as bearing Relations to one another; and when any oi- thefe Things, by being taken away, cau- fes a privative Idea ; we, by reflecting on thd Relation which we have feen or fuppofed it to bear to other Things, are apt to fancy fuch Ideal Relation as a Real Place without that Thing; where as, it is only the abjiraft Idea of Relation.
You add « If we try to find out the Na-
<f cure of fuch an Idea, we fhall fee that we can- cc not frame to ourfelves the Idea of any Priva- 5C tion at all, merely as a Privation." f
IF, by merely as a Privation, you mean, that we cannot frame to ourfelves an idea of the Ab fence of any Thing, without an Idea of fome really exifting Place, from whence we fuppofe the Thing to be abfent, then I fay, we can frame to ourfelves an Idea of the Abfence of a Thing, merely as a Privation; becaufe it is only faming an Idea of a Thing, ceafing to bear fuch or fuch a Relation to other Things ; which is not an Idea of any real Place, exifriog ad extra ; but on ly an abftratt Idea of Relation. — If, by merely as a Privation, you mean, that we cannot form an Idea of the Abfence of a Thing, without con- fidcring the7l?/w it f elf, and fuppofing it to ceafe from bearing a Relation to other Things ; then I allow we cannot frame to ourfelves the Idea of any Privation, merely as a Privation : But what then ? Relation of Situation is not a really exift ing Place: it is Nothing but the Bodies thern-
* Third Def, p. 25. f Ibid.
fclves
of SPACE Examined. 6j
felves bearing fuch Relation-* and confidered with out the Bodies, is but an abftratt Idea. A Place without a particular Body is the Relation of that Both confidered in the <Abflr*%> and is not any Thing ad extra : and this is, truly fpeakmg, an. Idea of a Privation, merely as a Privation.
You obferve — "If this be true [if we can- « not frame an Idea of a Privation merely as a « Privation] then it is impoffible for us to have « any fimple Ideas from Nothing ; contrary to « what this Author offer ts page 30." *
THIS, Sir, is charging me with what is di rectly falfe in Fad ; as any one will find, who turns to the Page you cite : I there fay, that Mr. Locke " gives us a Reafon why a privative Canfe, « may in fome Cafes at leaft, produce a pofitive Idea &c" But is this averting, that we may have fimple Ideas from Nothing, in fuch a Senfe as will do you any Service \ No ; for you may remember that I told you in p. 68, that, " when « Mr. Locke fays, that Privations may be Caufe* « of Ideas in the Mind [which is what you call « having Ideas from Nothing] he does noc " mean, that Privations, which are Nothing ad a extrat may be aftftal Cattfes, but rather Reafons «« why we have Thofe Ideas." Now, who would imagine, after fuch an Explanation of what I underftood MV. Locks to mean, by faying jhac a privative Caufe may produce a pojttive Idea ; who would think, I fay, that after this, you fliould venture to affert that I faid, we might have fim ple Ideas from Nothing ? and who will not (till wonder more at this your Aflertion, when he turns to my 66th Page, where he will read (what
* Third Def. p. 25,
I % you
68 Arguments for the Reality
you ought to have remember'd) the following Words, which are in Terms directly oppofite to what you here pretend to fix upon me? The Words are Thefe - " I grant it is impoffible, ( and contradictory that we fhould have a fimple " Idea, or indeed any Idea at all from Nothing ; " or, that Nothing mould be the Canfe of a fim- <c pie, or of any Idea in us : But to have an <c Idea, or a fimple Idea of Nothing (/'. e. to have " an Idea, or a fimple Idea which has Nothing " exifting without us, correfpondent to it) is far "from impoflible." * .-Let any one compare this with what I had faid in p. 30, and judge whether you had any Reafon to think I meant, that we might have fimple Ideas from Nothing ! or whether you have not afTerted Something directly contrary to what I faid, and what you willfind im- poffible to make good.-I anfwer then to your pre sent Argument, that our Ideas of Privations, or of the Abfende of any Thing, are not Ideas from No thing : We have not the Idea of the Abfence of Body from mere Abfence (confidered in any other Senfe than as a Reafon) but from Body; that is, from reflecting on Body : yet this is an Idea of a Privation, merely as a Privation; i. e. without fup- pofing it abfent from any realty exijting Place.
* Dr. Clarke's Notions of SPACE, Examined p. 66, 67.
ARCU-
of SPACE Examined. 69
ARGUMENT III.
Tibat SPACE is not, like WHITENESS, an ABSTRACT IDEA.
THE Subftance of what you fay in Defence of this Point, is This — « An abftrad Idea " is an Idea of a Quality of Body, which we " may conceive without any particular Body, but *£ yet not without any Body at all : Thus, tho' we cc can have the Idea of Whitenefs, without any '<c particular white Body, yet we cannot have the " Idea of Whitenefs without any Body at all: " But we can have an Idea of SPACE, 'without " any Body, or material Subftance at all. The " Difference therefore between Whitenefs and Space *<> is plain : and confequently Space is not like «< Waitenefs, or an abftratt Idea" * This I be lieve you will acknowledge to be your Argument inks full Force: But I am apt to think, if you would impartially confider, that you would find, there is not this Difference between Whitenefs and SPACE.
IT is very true, we cannot have the Idea of Whitenefs without any Body at all: but then, this Body may be only an Imaginary Sttbflratum, form ed by the Mind, for the help of the Under- flanding. It is an Idea of Somewhat, with \one Quality only, namely Whitenefs:, that is, an Ideal white Somewhat y and that's all. Nor is the Cafe different in SPACE : for we cannot have, as you would urge, an Idea of SPACE,
* Sec Third Def. p. 17, 18,
With-
>;o Arguments for the Reality
without any Body or material Subftance at all: The Mind is always ready with an imaginary Suhflra* turn upon the Occafion. We can indeed have the Idea of SPACE, without confidering it as the Extenfion of any -particular Body ; but not with out confidering ir, as Somewhat with the Idea of one Quality only, namely Extenfion. Thus you fee, or at leaft may fee, that Whitenefs and Space exadly agree in that, wherein you imagin ed them to differ. The Idea of Whitenefs is an Ideal 'white Somewhat : and the Idea of SPACE is an Ideal extended Somewhat : We can no more therefore have the Idea of SPACE without any Body or material Subftance at all, /'. e. without an extended Somewhat, than we can have an Idea of Whitcnefs without any Body at all /. e. without a white Somewhat ; unlefs Spirit can be extended like Matter.
Cf Let any Perfon try [fay you] whether he w can frame to himfelf an Idea of a white No- <* thing.' '* And, in return I fay, Let any Per fon try, whether he can frame to himfelf an Idea of an Extended Nothing : I believe he will find one, full as eafy as the other.
IN the Inftance of your two Bodies, you talk of a cubic Yard of Space between them ; whereby it is mod evident, that you yourfelf cannot fpeak of SPACE, but your Mind prefently fuggefts to you a material Subftratum, for your Thoughts to reft on ; and thatyou cannot have the Idea of SPACE, without any Body or material Subftance at all. To ar gue therefore, that you can, and yet to talk of cubic
* Third D:£ p, 17.
Tardt
of SPACE Examined. ji
Tards of Space, is to argue, that you can have an Idea, which 'tis plain you cannot ; and is confe- quently arguing againft your own Ideas; unlefs you would talk of cubic Tards of Spirit, and cubic Yards of the Divine Subftance. For, however har (h and abfurd thele Expreflions may appear, they muft be your own: For, if SPACE be the real £xten- fion of the Self-exiftent Being, and you meafure that Extension by cubic Yards; 'tis Nothing lefs then faying, what I have mentioned. If you deny your Meaning to be this ; and own, that cubic Yards are only material Meafures ; then fmce you apply them to SPACE, it appears, that when you have the Idea of SPACE, you confider ic either as a Real, or Ideal extended material Some what: and if you cannot have the Idea of SPACE, without the Ideas of fuch material Meafures fas ic appears you cannot, by your general Expreflions concerning it) then, I think, we may with Rea- fon conclude, that you cannot have, what you would perfuade us that you can, viz,, the Idea of SPACE, without any Body or material Subftance at all.
You appeal to me — "Let him fay in the fore- «c mentioned Inftance of two Bodies that are di- <e ftant from each other, without having any Mat- <c ter between them, whether he has not an Idea cc of SPACE between the two Bodies." *
I anfwer, yes ; allowing for the Impropriety of faying, that any Thing ideal can be between. But altho', Sir, there be no Matter between the Bo dies, and I have the Idea of SPACE; yet, I have not the Idea of SPACE, without any material Sub- fiance at ail, as you would from hence infer ; but
* Third Def. p. 184
my
^2 ' Arguments for the Reality
my Idea, is an imaginary material Subftratum, *. e. an ideal extended Somewhat. For till Spirit is proved to be extended, Extenfion is only applica ble to Matter.
cc Let him alfo fay [you continue] whether he cc can poffibly have any Idea of frhitenefs between <c them, whilft there is no Matter there." *
I Reply, yes; as well as I can of SPACE : for it is only forming an imaginary Subftratum in my Mind; and then I have an Idea of Whitenefs between them, or an Ideal white Somewhat, as much as I have of SPACE, or an Ideal extended Somewhat.
You had (aid, that fc Whitenefs is only owing ec to a particular Texture of Parts upon the Surface cc of the white Body &c. But the Extension of, « or the SPACE in which sny Body exifts, nei- cc ther is, nor can poffibly be owing to any Tex- (f ture of Parts or Difference of Surface ; fince, cc were Matter either fquare or round, or sny o- cc ther Shape whatever, it mult neceflariiy be ff extended; that is, mult exift in fome Part of « SPACE."!
THIS, I thought, was cc little to our Purpofe: <c For, of what Significancy in the prefent Di- fc fpute is it, whether the Ideas of Extcniion and cc Whitenefs be excited in the fame Manner or " not ? " **
BUT you now tell us, that your Meaning is not* what it feemed to be; for, that "theDifFe- <<r rencewasnot fuppofeci to confift in any different Cf Excitement, but in the one's being diftinft and
* Third Dcf. p. 1 8. f Firit Dcf. p. 3.
* Dr. Clarke's Notions of SPA.CE, Examined p. 19.
" fepa-
of SPACE Examined. 73
« feparate from Body, and in the other's being " necefTarily joined with it."
LET This be your Meaning, yet I muft own, Sir, I cannot fee any Foice in this Argument. Wbitenejs is an Idea owing to a particular Tex ture of Parts, but Extenfwn is not ; Wkitenep is not necelTarily join'd with Body in general, as Extenfion is, but only to particular Bodies : and what then ? can we not have the Idea of Exten- fan in the jflftrdl, as we have an Idea of White- nefs in the ufbftraft .? what, tho' one is joined with all Bodies, and the other not .? does that hinder us from juftly illuftrating our abftraft Idea of Ex- tenfion by the abftratt Idea of Whitenefs? White- nefs confidered without a white Body is an a&- ftract Idea, which can have no Subfiftence of it felf: So is pure Extenfani in this they agree; and this is all the agreement between them, that Mr. Law, I believe, ever intended.
THO* Whitenefs is not a Quality of all Bo dies, yet it is confidered as a Quality of Body : and the Idea of this Quality in general* or in the jlbftratt, without any particular Body, I think, may be very well uied to illuftrate the Idea of Extenfion in general, or in the ; >4&/?r*#, without any particular Body. -~ If you think otherwife, we can't help it : The Caufe by no means depends upon this 3 fo that your Objection is but trifling at beft ; for I imagine, you would hardly make ic an Argument, even fuppofmg Mr. Law's Inftance to be improper, which he ules to illuftrate his Notion of SPACE, therefore that his Notion of SPACE was -wrong: For, would it follow that his Notion of SPACE, as Extenfan in the Abjlratt, is
* Third Def. p. 18.
74 Arguments for the Reality
wrong ; becaufe Wnitemft* which in the Abflraft is the Initance he makes ufe of, is not, like Ex* ten/ton, a Quality or Mode of Body in general ? No furely ! But however, the Queftio'n to' be asked here is only this ; whether or no, becaufe Whitencfi does not agree with Extcnjton^ in being a Quality of all Bodies ; it therefore follows, that fFhitcttefs in the dbftrdft does not agree with Ex- tenjion in the ^Abflracl^ in being an abflracl Idea which can have no Subfiflence of it fclf ? for, as I obferved before, this was all the Agreement Mr. Law fuppofed between them : If they do agree in this, Mr. Law has properly ufed the Inftance , and you have been talking to no Purpofe. There is no Occafion therefore, to take any further Notice of what you fay upon this, in the Vindication of your Second Defence p. 81.
BUT there is an Objection which you make in Relation to my Reafoning, which I muft not forget to remark upon. It had been faid that SPACE is Ext en/ion considered abftraftctily \ as White- nefs without a white Body. Upon which you ob- ferve very gravely; that i£ This Gentleman's Rea- " foning will prove Whitenefs to be SPACE." * I dare fay the Reader muft be big with Expecta tion of what this Mountain will bring forth ! — It is This — cl If Whitenefs be Nothing, and SPACE <c alfo be Nothing, Whitenefs is SPACE ; it be- *' ing as impoilible, that two Things mould be " a Third, without being one another; as that Cr two Things fliould be equal to a Third, with- c< out being equal to one another."! To whaC Purpofe, Sir, have you been fo converfant with Logicians, if it was only to make ufe of their
f Third Def. p. 16. f Ibid.
Sophiftry?
of SPACE Examined. 'y$
Sophiftry ? Of what Service was it to you, to know that Quibbles find Wrangling upon Words arc endlefs*, if you ftill take that endlefs Path.
THE Term Nothing is here a Negation of all real Things: To fay then, that, if Whitenefs be No-2^K»f real) and SPACE be No-7%*»g real) then Whitenefs is SPACE, is juft the fame as to ar gue, that, if all abflracl Ideas are no Realities, then ail abflract Ideas muft be the fame.
You will allow, that white and black^ in the j4bftraft are Nothing, *. e. no Realities : Now, if white is No-Thing, and black^ is No-Thing, then according to your Way of drawing Confequences, white is black. -* — ^ Whether a Man, who would endeavour to prove that white is black^ is not to |DC deem'd paft Confutation, Jet the Reader judge! Mr. Locke obferves that cc there were Philofopher$ <e found, who had Learning and Subtlety enough c* to prove, that Snow was blac^ /• e. to prove, cc that white was blac^ whereby they had the <c Advantage to deftroy the laftrurnents and «' Means of Difcourfe, Converfation, Inftrudion,
« and Society." t We fee that Sed of Phi-
lofophers is not entirely extinct !
BUT give me leave to obferve, that if this Sort of Argument be conclufive, your own Reafoning will prove, what perhaps you are not aware of? that SPACE is DURATION, and that DURATION is SPACE. — I faid, that Whitenefs is Nothing, and SPACE is Nothing; from whence youcouclude, that Whitenefs is SPACE : Now, you fay that SPACE is Something^ and DURATION is Something ; and I fancy, you by this time perceive,, that (to argue as you do) If SPACE be Something^ and DURATION alfo b§
* Preface to the Third Defence. f Locke Hum. Underiknd. B. 3. c. x. §. 10.— Edit. 9. K z Some-
Arguments for the Reality
Something ; SPACE is DURATION ; Cf it being as im- <c pofTibie, that two Things ihould be a Third, «c without being one another; as, that two Things 4C fhould be equal to a Third, without being e- <c qual to one another." — If the Argument is conclusive in one Place, I apprehend that it has the fame Force here : Anfwer this, and you an- fwer your own !
THO* it may be true, that when two Things are a third Thing) they muft be one another ; yet, when the third Thing happens to be no Thing, it muft be falie ; which is manifeftly the Cafe in your Argument; where the three Things zvzJ$rhite- ne/Sy Space, and Nothing. Now,, I prefume, this general Term Nothing is not a Thing, but only a Negation of the two former Ideas to be Things real. The third Term in my Argument concern ing DURATION and SPACE, viz,. Something, has, of the two, a better Pretence to be a Thing ; as Something is more like a Thing, than Nothing: and confequently, if your Argument is good, mine is better. But the Truth is, the third Term in both, viz*, the Terms Nothing and Something are neither of 'em to be confidered as Things, but as mere general Terms : For, if your Way of Rea- foning was true, and general Terms were thus to be underftaod, as Things; we might prove any two Things whatever to be the fame : for it is but affirming two Species of their Genus ; and then, if your Rule be true, they are the fame. It might therefore have been of Service to you, to have remember* d here that common and neceffary Divifon, or Biflinftion of Genus and Species, or of General and Special Terms. — But how (hort are our Memories, when our Neceffities require it !
FURTHER,'
of SPACE Examined. 77
FURTHER, the third Term in your Argument be ing Negative, makes it ftill worfe. For, if two Ideas muft be the fame, becauie they are each no Tfanfy i.e. no Thing real', it is but denying any two Terms of a Third, and they will be the fame^: Thus becaufe a Stone is no- Animal, and a Tree is no- Animal* a Stone muft be a Tree: for, if no- Animal be taken for a Thing (which I think it may be, as well as No-Thing) then your Rule does the Bufinefs prefently.
BUT I cannot avoid telling you, that your Rule in general is deluiive. It is indeed impofli- ble that two Things fhould be a Third, or agree with a Third in all Refpetts, without being one another : but, it is not impoffible, that two Things may be, or agree with a Third, in fome Refpetts, without being one another.
Two Things cannot be equal to a Third, with out being equal to one another; but then it on ly means, that they cannot be equal to a Third, without being equal to one another, in that Refpeft, in which they are equal to the Third. So it is im- poflible, that two Things ftiould be, or agree with, a Third, without being, or agreeing with one another, in that Refpett, in which they are, or agree with, the Third: but it does not follow, that be caufe two Things agree with a Third in one Re~ fpett, therefore they muft agree with each other 'in all Re/petts ; atiy more than it follows, that, becaufe two Things are equal to a Third in one Refpett, therefore they muft be equal to one ano ther in all Rejpeffs.
WE may thus cohfider the Terms Wmtenefs and SPACE, agreeing with the third Term No thing, as it is a Negation of real Things; and White* nefi and SPACE, may be laid for that Reafon, to
agree
yZ Arguments for the Reality
agree with one another, in that Rejpett ; i.e. as they are neither of them real Things : but, it does not follow, that becaufe they both agree with the Term Nothing in that Rejpett, therefore they muft agree with each other in all Refpetts, and be come both the fame Ideas. But, Sir, you ought to have remember'd that Rule in Logick, that, from two Negative Premifes Nothing can be con- eluded* and that, when two Ideas difagree to a Third* we cannot infer that they either agree or difagree with each other*, unlefs in their mutual difagreeing with the Third. - This is the Cafe here. SPACE is »o-7v&w, and Whitenefs is no-Thing : Both thefe Propofitions are Negative : And thefe two Ideas, SPACE and PFhitenefi, difagree tc a Third Idea, viz* Thing, and therefore, by the foregoing Rule, we cannot infer that they agree with each other, unlefs in their mutual difagreeing with the Third Idea : Confequently, we cannot infer (as you do) that if SPACE is no Thing, and Whitenefs is no Thing, then Whitenefs is SPACE: all that we can infer is, that neither Whitenefs nor SPACE are Things real, /. e. that thofe two Ideas, have no
Mefftoc Realities 1 am forry lam obliged to
rake Notice, that you deviate from the common and known Rules of Syllogizing.
BUT fince you have found out fuch an acute Way ofReafoning, I wonder you gave your felf fo much needlefs Trouble, in proving SPACE to be a Property, when you might fo foon have done it by the foregoing Method: For, if SPACE be Something, and a Property be Something ; then you fcnow that, according to you, Space is a Property: How clear the Rcafoning ! How evident the
* See Watt?* Logick Part 3 . c. 2. Se£t. 2. Rule 6.
of SPACE Examined. 79
Confequence ! and you might by the fame Argu ment, have proved it to be an Elephant, or any other Creature you had a Mind to.
IN fhort, when we fay that Wbiteneft and Space are Nothing; we mean that the/^j, White- nefs and SPACE, have no objective Realities. But is it lound Reafoning to fay, that, if the Idea of tfhitenefs has no obje&ive Reality, and the Idea of Space has no objective Reality, then the Idea, of Space is the Idea of Whitenefs? If it be, your Argument is valid : and you may by the fame Method prove all abftrad Ideas to be the fame.
THE Reader will readily excufe me, from troubling him any longer upon fuch an Argument : It feems calculated rather for thofe Schools, where Sophiflry is at leaft allowable : Where Perfons Ibmetimes fhnd obliged, and therefore determined to defend that Side of a Queftion, which at the fame Time they know to be wrong ; and are, for that Reafon, to fupport a bad Caufe, forced to have recourfe to Art and Wile: But this, believe me ! will never do from the Prefs, where the Pub lic are to be Judges of the Difpute : Where both Parties are fuppofed to be in Earned:, to believe chemfelves in the Right ; and where the Learned, in that view, are to determine. The Arts of So- phiftry are here to be difdained, at once the Sup ports and Signs of a weak Caufe ! and whoever fees thefe in a Second, or Third Defence, will per haps be induced to conclude, that the Author is refolved to defend, tho' by fuch Methods, what ever he has once afTerted.
WE are not difputing here for the Sake of difputing only, or to fhew our Talents, but to weigh the Merits of the Caufe : For it is but of imall Importance to the World, who is the
better
8o Arguments for the Reality
better Difputant; You, or I. But how irrecon cilable is it, to hear any one profeffing, that he has no Ptirfuit here, after any Thing but Truth; and yet to fee him thus rambling after it, through the Labyrinth of Error, and taking that Road, which is defigned on purpofe to lead Men aftray ? If this be to purfue Truth> I doubt you may purfue it long enough, before you overtake it.
ARGUMENT IV. From SPACE having PROPERTIES.
I took Notice, that the Tranilator of Arch- Bifhop Kings Origin of Evil, " ufed the Ex- " preilion of SPACE having fome Properties, for *c Inftance Penetrability^ or a Capacity of receiving «c Body ; but ufes it in fuch a Manner, as plairi- *c ly ihews he never meant, nor ever thought cc SPACE to be endued with any pofitive Pro- *c perty."* Here you tell me that "the Author cc ihould have explained what he means by a po- <f iitive Property : are there any Properties that <c are not pofitive ?f" No Sir; There are no Properties which are not pofaive: Thofe which you apply to SPACE are not pofitive ; and there fore they are no Properties. The very Reafon of my ufing the Expreffion of positive Properties, was to diftinguifli true Properties from fftitious ones ; Properties from no Properties. You called the re ceiving all Body, a Property of SPACE ; and would conclude that SPACE, mufl be Something, becaufe
,
* Dr. Clarke's, Notions of SPACE, Examined p. 23. f Third Def. p. 18.
it
bf SPACE Examined. 81
' it has fitch Proper ties : " That SPACE has the Pro" " pertj [faid you] or the Capacity of receiving " all Body &c. no Perfon was ever fo abfurd as to «e deny."* To this I anfwered, that the Trari- flator did deny it. He does indeed call Penetra bility or a Capacity of receiving Body by the Name of Property ; (not In his own Name as we mall fee prefently) but he fpeaks in fuch a Man ner, as evidently mews he never imagined it to be a Property ; or that SPACE was endued with any Property ; but that it was a mere Negation* That this is truly Mr. Lav's Meaning is plain from his own Words ; which, if you had turned over to the next Leaf, you would have feen in my Quotation from him ; where he explains him- felf by telling you, that to argue from fuch Pro perties, is the fame as et to aflign abfolute Negations, " and fuch as by the fame Way of Reafoning may " be applied to Nothing, and then call them «c po/ttive Properties.'1 f And in the very nexc Sentence he calls them pretended Properties, and fuppofed Properties. From whence it is plain, that when he ufes the Exprefiion of SPACE having Properties) he ufes it only as an Argument which the Gentlemen on your Side of the Qpcdion bring; and the Tenor of his Di-courfe ihews that he does not think SPACE has any Properties ; thac what you aflign as a Property, and argue from as fuch, is no true Property, but a pretended, and a falfly fitppo/ed one i is Nothing pofitive, but a mere Negation : and the Lxpreffion of a pojitive Pro perty, you fee, he makes Uie of only in OppoG-
* Firft Def. p. 4.
f TranflLition of ABp. King. Note 5. Ed. i .— N. 3- Ed. 2. — Dr, Clarkis Notions of SPACE, Examined p. 24, 2£.
L lion
tion to a mere Negation* This is what he Stieant i and inftead of laying in Anfwer to my 13^ Page* fix Author foottld have explained what he means by a qoptive Property j you might have turned to pi 2,7, where you would have found that I only meant to oppofe po/itive Properties to nv Properties : not as if wfc believed any fuch Things as Nega* ttoe Properties, as we were only diftinguilhing be tween Properties and Negations; a Diftin&ion which your perplexed Manner of treating the Subject gave me occafion to infift upon*
BY calling mere Negations Properties > you make the Diftindion of foptivc Properties neceflary ; and then ask, if there are any Properties that art mt pvfaive* as if we believed any fuch Things as negative Properties} when we are only arguing againft you, and fhewing, fince what you call Properties are mere Negations, i, e. are not pojitwct that they are m Properties at all.
Mr. Law argued - - "To fay that Si>ACfe " muft have Exigence becaufe it has fome Proper- *c tiesj for Inftance Penetrabilityj or a Capacity «c of receiving Body, feems to me the fame as to *e urge* that J>ark»ejs muft be Something, becaufe *< it has the Power or Property of receiving Light «c &c."* To this Paflage and my Explanation of it, you objed " Thefe are the Tranflator's «« own Words: But this Gentleman tells us^ that *6 he did not rriean either that SPACE Was [had *< you mould have faid for that was my Word! «€ a Capacity; or that Darknefs Was a Capacity t " but only, that they wens Supposition* alike 5s km. If this was really the Tranflator's
* Tranflatioft of ABp. Kings Oriefo of Evil: N. -. Mt,
ef SPACE Examine^ 83
«c ing, to what Purpofe did he fay, in the Man" « ner he did, that it did not from thence follow, c< that they muft exift, or be Something^."* The Error which you here run into proceeds, I find, from your miftaking the Senfe of the Tran- flator. You imagine that the Words, becaufe it has fome Properties •> for Inflance Penetrability, or a Capacity of receiving Body — and Because it has the Power of receiving Light* are Sentences fpoken by the Tranflator, as if he allowed SPACE ta have a Property of receiving Body, and Dark^eft of receiving Light ; and that he would argue from thence, that it did not follow, fuppoftng them to have thefe Properties, that they had Exiftence* Bus This, if I underftand that Gentleman, was not his Meaning : But that thofe Sentences above in Mies* were fpoken as the abfurd Reafons which fome Perfons give, in order to prove the real Ex- iftence of SPACE, andDart&sjs* The Tranflator*s Meaning therefore is evidently This j " to. fay <« SPACE snuft have Exiftence, and to give tbi$ « Reafon for it viz. becaufe it has fome Proper- <* ties, for Inftance Penetrability, or a Capacity ** of receiving Body, feems to me the fame as to « urge, that Darknefs rnuft be Something, and t®. « give this Reafon fir it-, viz, becaufe it has the <c Power of receiving Light \ whereas neither of <{ them have any Properties j and thofe which « are affigned them are mere Negations/' — This I underftand to be all the Tranflator meant, a Meaning right and true s and |ufUy did he urge it againft Thofe, who pretend to prove the real Exifenc^ of SPACE? by fuch Sort of Arguments is he ter§ (hews ths Weaknefs of,
* Third Ekf. f. i9u
&f Arguments for the Reality
as good a Pretenfion to real Exiftence as SPACE; imce receiving Light may as well be called a Pro- fen -j of Dar/tnefs, as receiving Body be called a 7V0- /w^ofSpAciij but the Truth is, neither of them are Properties but mere Negations.
THIS Inftance of Darknefs puts me in Mind of a plcafant Objection made to my laft Piece, by one who is in the Way of Thinking with the
Anti-Gravitarian Mr. // n ; and is confe-
quently one of thofe deep- penetrating Gentlemen, •who can fee Things in Scripture which never were there ; and find out Myileries which no- Body can underftand. He was greatly offended, that I had denied the Exiftence o£D#rk&efi ', This, it feems, he looked upon as a flranqe Kind of Afr fertion, nothing lefs than a Denial of Scripture ; for he remember'd Mofes had told him, that Dark? nefs was upon the Face of the Deep. And if he had remea ber'd Gen. i. 6. and 7. he would, no Doubt, have brought that Text to prove that Space was Created on the Second Day ; which would have been both as good Senfe, and as good Divinity as That of fome confiderable Writers, who make SPACE a Conference of God's Exiftence. But thefe Gentlemen are to be left to the unin terrupted Enjoyment of their own Speculations ; whofe Notions feem to be too fublimated, for Heads that are (as a certain Writer exprefTes it) lefs exalted in the Clouds, and Under/landings more terreftrial than their own.
BUT I return — fc There feems [you fay] to " be no Occafion to take Notice of' all our ^Au- " thor has fa-id in the 2jth and i^th Pages.'* Thefe are the very Pages, Sir, where you might pave feen what I meant by a pofitive Property : .To fay therefore, that fhe 4utkor jhoald have
'
of SPACE Examined. 85
explain *d what he means by a pofitive Property ; and prefently afterwards to tell us, that There feems to be no Occajion to take Notice of ail our Author has fad in thofe very Pages, where the Author has explained what you wanted to know ; plainly fhews, that you induftrioufly avoided to under- fhnd the Author's Meaning.
BUT it is proper the Reader fhould be told what thele Pages contain, which you think there is no Ocwjion to take Notice of. You had faid that, " whatever is endued with Properties muft adual- *' ly exift j that SPACE has the Property or Ca- " pacity of receiving all Body &c. no Perfon " was e'ver fo abfurd as to deny." * Now, Sir, the Defign of thefe 2jth and z%th Pages was, in Anfwer to you, to mew, that Space was endued with no Property^ Attribute &c. that receiving Body was no pofaive Property ; that is, was truly no Pro perty at all) but an abfolute Negation : That the Property -which is applied to SPACE, of receiving Body, is Nothing but a Property in Body to exift-> where no Body exijied before &c.
INSTEAD of anfwering This, as you ought to have done, you pafs it off with faying, £< There " feems to be no Occafion to take Notice of all <e our Author has faid in the ijth and z8th Pages : ic for, tho' he may deny SPACE to have any At- " tribute or Property, yet he has himfeli affirmed " Something of it, to wit, that it is fufficient to ^ conftitute a Difference between Things ; and <f therefore he cannot deny it to be Something." f
Now was it not incumbent on you to have defended what you had aiferted, againft the Ob-
f Firft Def. p. 4. f Third Def. p. so,
jeclions
fit* the
I there advanced \ Had not you affirmed^ SPACF- had the Property or the Capacity of Deceiving all Body ? and did not- 1 ohjeft that this, was no Property, but a mere Negation, which might 3, well be applied to Nothing, as to SPACED dkt not you fay that no Perfon was ever fo abfurd & to deny, that SPACE had fuch a. Property as )?ou: menrioned ? and did not I tell you in thefe f ages,, that / deny.'d it \ Surely then you ought fere to have offered at iome Proof that SPACE was e#aued with a Property : Should you not have (tuckavoured, to- confirm what you had, before af-- ferred*. namely that receiving Body was & Proper* ty> md 2 Property- of SPACE \ \ believe the Reader think you fliould: For, not to take Notice of theft Objedions and Arguments,, is to,give up. ^ie Point concerning SPACE having the Property Q£ receiving Body ;. at leaft, while "thofe ArguV, ifien-ts rernam unanfwered, they ftandfom, againft- 5jou,. and fupport the Caufe I defend. Nay it k *npit plain, that you do give up the- Point^ OE- pafs it over at leaft, of SPACE having the Pro- gerty of receiving Body ; for you urge, TV fe ^47- aery. Space- to hav$ any Attribm ^ Prwerty* yt he has. himftlf affirm* d Something of it &C*!— is. Sot this paiEng over your former Argument ibc t4ie ;Exi (fence of SPACE, and putting the €ontro^ j(erfy upon another Foot i But to- drop youe- Argument of SPAGB bwfw tfa Proves* y, and to lay a. Strefi upon^^i only that you are forced; ta flue* from one Argument ta another j and tha^ ©t being, able ta keep your £ej£ above Water*, the Juftijce of your Caufc *b^ the force of
'
n; you are willing to, lay HoU of aay
kee '
tho* you will not take Notice of all If faid in thofe forementioned i;ages, yet ydia. pleas'd to make fome Remarks upon themi; « The Difference between a pofitive snd a
c negative Property, which he lays fo much Strds *c on> I before own'd I did not unckrftand 3 " for they feem> each of them, from the Nature
s of our Language, capable of being put ont for " another." * What I meant by a pofitive Pro perty, I think you might eafily fee: If you dil not, I have again explained it* The only Que-- ftion is, whether receiving Body can be called & Property at all ? I think it cannot : and that this Property which is applied to SpA'CEi is only a Property in Body to exift where no Body efcifh ed before : The Property is in ^^y, not in Space.** This I objeded to you> but you have thought fit to give no further Anfwer. You argu€ indeed, that pofitive Properties^ and negative Properties are capable of being put one for ano ther : You Inftance **. " Body is endued with & Ki pofitive Property of excluding t>t4ier Sadies $ *' but it is a negative £5cpreffion to fay* that it <c is not capable^ or has not a Capacity of Ve^ *€ ceiving other Bodies into its Place." t But this^ at moft proves only-, that a Property -of Body ma'y be changed to a toegative Exprejfi&n concerning Bodj^ and yet Body be Ml endued with a Property 'c but it does not prove* that becaufe the Property of Body to exift where no Body exifled before*, imay be reprefented in a negative Expcffiov cerning SPACE 5 therefore SPACE mull, be with a Property \ yet, unlefs you had proved your Inftance is wide of the Point,
* Third Def j>, 29, f (bid, p, 20-,
88 Arguments for the Reality
YOUR next Attempt is to prove, that either' SPACE muft be really Something; or elfe, that I tilk downright Contradiction* and Ntnfenfe^ as you are pleafed to exprefs it ; which I fuppofe was defigned as a Specimen of your Endeavours, to treat the Author of Dr. Clarke's Notions &c. with all the Civility you could*. But you begin— "It " is, he fays, a Property of one Body to exclude " another. I ask then fiom whence? His Anfwer cc I fuppofe will be, from the fame Place, from cc that Place in which the other exifts." f True ! but my Meaning in fuch an Anfwer would be— from bearing the fame Relation ; from bearing that Relation of Site to other Bodies, which the excluding Body bears.
You advance — ct I ask again, what is Place ? " Why, I fuppofe he will fay, a Part of SPACE."** But I fee no Reafon you have to fuppofe fo> when I have fo often denied SPACE to haw Parts; and have fo frequently told you, that by Place , I mean only the Relation of Site which one Bo dy bears to another. But taking this for granted, you go on mod triumphantly in the following Strain. — "What then is SPACE ? Here I know cc he will anfwer, Nothing. If therefore SPACE cc be Nothing ; Place, which is only a Part of " Nothing, muft be Nothing too." ft But, if Place be not a Part of SPACE (which is what you hang this fine String of Arguments upon, as that which you fappofe would be my Anfwer) but only the Relation of Bodies to each other ; then, you know, it does not follow, thatifSpA£J
* Sec Preface to Third Defence.
f Third Dcf. p. 21. ** Ibid.
ft Ibid.
is
bf SPACE Examined.
is Nothing, Place mud be a Part of Nothing; which is your own Nonfenje. — The latter Part of your Sentence indeed happens to be true not- withftanding, viz*, that Place is Nothing : For Re lation, or Place in the Abflratty is moft certainly Nothing ; that is, no-Thing exifting ad extra* but an Idea only : for what is Relation, confider- ed abftraftedly from Things related? Well, but if Place is Nothing, let us hear what Sort of a Con- clufion you draw: It is this— "So that when " one Body has the Property of excluding ano- " ther, it has the Property of excluding it from " Nothing, or from No-where; that is, it has " the Property of excluding it, and it has not, « at the iame Time." * One Body has the Pro perty of excluding another from that Place wnere it exifts; not from a Part of Nothing; but from hearing the fame Relation which it (elf does to other 'Bodies, at the fame Time. But tho' Relation in the jlbfiratt be Nothing ; does it therefore follow, that one Body mutt have a Property of excluding another Body from Nothing, in luch a Senfe as to fignify, that it has the Property of excluding it from No-wkere> or, of not excluding it at all ? Whoever fays it does, confounds Words and Ideas together in fu.ch a Manner, as fhould render him beneath our Notice. The remaining Par; of your Argument which extends beyond the Bottom of this your 2 iy? Page is of the fame Sort with the former : it proceeds upon the fame Suppo/inon, that 1 mould anfwer, Place is a Part of Space: But I would have yotf look over this Part of your Argument again ; remembring as you go along,
*hat I fhould not make the Anfwer which
i-
* third Dcf,-p; *i.-
go Arguments for the Reality
fttppofe ; and obferving that Place is not a Part of SPACE ; that it is not any Thing diftinft and feparate from the Bodies; but is only the Relation which they bear one to another.
BUT I cannot forbear remarking, that in- flead of replying to what I objected, concern ing SPACE being endued with Properties ; or giving an Anfwer to what I obferved with Refped to thofe Properties (which you attribute to SPACE) being no Properties at all', inftead of anfwering thefe, as I had Reafon to expect you fhould, you pafs 'em over; and only feled a particular PafTage, where you firft fuppoje me to fay Some thing which may ferve your Purpofe ; and then proceed to argue from fuch a Sappofition. Thus, inftead of anfwering what I do fay, you fappoje. me to fay Things which I do not fay, and anfwer them very ingenioufly. You drefs up a Man of Straw, and when you have attacked, and tnoft manfully defeated him, you imagine you have confuted my Opinion : Which puts me in mind of a PafTage I have fomewhere met -with, where a Difputant of this Kind is com pared to the Hero of a certain famous Ro mance, who fancied he faw Monfrers in every Paflenger he met upon the Road; and by this Means (never feeing any Thing in its true Light, or calling any Thing by its right Name) was perpetually fighting with Phantoms of his own railing.
of S p A c E Examined. g t
ARGUMENT V. From SPACE having PARTS.
" SPACE [fay you] is one, uniform, conti- " nued Thing, yet it has neverthelefs affignable c' Parts; and may have Things predicated of fome cc of them, different from Thofe which may be €C predicated of others." * That is, SPACE is one, uniform, continued Thing ; and yet is never thelefs composed of many^ different) affignable Parts : Query therefore, whether That which is compo- fed of many, different, affignable Parts, can be one uniform Thing ? If it can, rhen it is incumbent upon you to explain what you mean by one uni form Thing.
BUT I attend to your Illuftration — <c Thus I <c can fay that the Part of SPACE which this cc World exifts in, is different from that Parr, in " which the Sun exi!ls." t But to fay is one Thing, and to frove is another : For the Diffe rence you affign, is not any Difference in your Parts of SPACE ; but is only telling us that the Sun, and this World are diltant : But does their being diftant, make any Difference in the Parts of SPACE ? or, does it prove that SPACE has Parts ac all \ What you call two affignable Parts of SPACE, are only two affignable Eidies, namely this Globe, and the Sun. If they are the Parts of SPACE which differ; then they would differ as much, if the Sun and this World did not exift as you fuppofe them now to do : and therefore, upon a Supposition
* Third Def, p. 25. f Ibid. p. 25, 26.
M z that
gz Arguments for tfo Reality
that neither this World, nor the Sun did exift, I pefire you would fhew the Difference of thefe two Pans of SPACE : If you cannot; then it is plain the Difference is not in any fuch Parts, but in Something elfe.
THIS is like an Argument which occurs in a yery late Author*; and which by Reafon of its marvellous Force, I beg Leave to take Notice of ! '<• If SPACE [fays he] is Nothing, and therefore " hath no Exiftence, there could be no fuch Thing «f as here or there ; for here and there are certainly «£ Affedions of Something &c." f True ! but they are not Affections of SPACE ; but of thoft Things which are faid to exift in SPACE. It is not SPACE, pr any Part of It, that is here or there*, but the Things which exift are here or there; that is, they bear fuch or fuch Relation of Situation to other Things. That here and there arc Affec tions of Something, by no Means proves SPACE to be Something ; unlefs here nnd there were pro ved to be Affections of SPAC^ ; which this Au thor fhould have done ; or elfe he leaves his Ar gument — juft as he found it.
I MAY take Notice that Mr. Locke has ob- fcrved that WHERE and WHEN are Qttcftions be longing to finite Exigences; ** and as the Advocates for the Reality of SPACE contend likewife for its Infinity, they muft acknowledge that accord? ing to Mr. Locks 's Opinion WHERE is not appli cable to SPACE.
THE Book where the forementioned Argument appears, is a late Piece, to which the Anonymous
* An Effay concerning Rational Notions &c. •• Anonymous. f P. 187.
?* l,9fke Hum. Underiland. B. 2, c.J5- §. 8.— Edit. 9.
Authoy
of SPACE Examined. 93
Author has prefixed the Title of An Eflay con cerning rational Notions &c. Towards the end of Prop. VIII he profeffes to fay Somewhat con cerning Space. He tells us that « the Opinion or «c Conceit of Some that SPACE is nothing at all, " is a wild and extravagant Notion : for Nothing *< hath no Manner of Exiftence, which we are «c fure from continual Experience SPACE has." * Jt would have been kind in this Author, if he had informed us what Manner of Exiftence SPACB has : and I fhould be glad to know what Expe rience he has had of SPACE, that makes him fofttre it has Exiftence. f£ Nothing [he fays] hath no <c Manner of Exiftence, which we are fure from « continual Experience SPACE has : " that is, if we ask him why SPACE is Something* lie anfwers — becaufe it has Exiftence , i. e. becaufe it is Some thing. If we ask how he knows that it has Ex iftence ? why, he knows it, becaufe he's fure of it: That is, SPACE is Something, becaufe he's fure of It ; which is an Argument of fuch Force, that I lhall not attempt to anfwer it. This Author feems to me, not to know what the Gentlemen on our Side the Queftion have faid; or to fee the Diffi culties and Objections which oppofe this Rational Notion of his : For if he had, he could never have thought it fufficient to fay, that the Conceit of Some, that SPACE is Nothing, is a wild and extravagant Notion ; or tp think he had done the Bufine's, by adding a trice Objection or two, which had more than once been anfwered. He js miftaken if he thinks his Arguments are new ; or that the Queftion may be treated in fuch a wild
* Eflay concerning Rational Notions p. 186.
94 Arguments for the Reality
and extravagant Manner, as he has done. — But enough of this Author and his Notions.
You quote from me tha following Paflage viz,.
€C If it [SPACE] has Para, it muft bedivifible;
<c for the very Notion of Parts implies Difcerpi-
" bility : to fay that any Thing has Parts, and
*c yet that thofe Parts are infeparable, feems to be
<c near a Contradiction. I think the Ideas of
<c Extenfion, and indivifibility, are incompati-
" ble." * You anfwer — " This is a bare AiTer-
" tion, and without any Colour of Proof &c" f
If the very Notion of Parts, implies Difcerpibilitj,
then there was no Occafion to give any other
Proof: and whether it did not imply it, I thought
fufficknt in this Place to leave with the Reader.
But in my Anfwer to your Second Defence, I had
given you a Proof of it : But you have not
thought proper in either of thefe Places, to make
any Anfwer to it. Inftead therefore of faying
that I had here given a bare aflertion without any
Colour of Proofs you ftiould have confidered the
Prcof which you might have found by turning
over a few Pages ; and either have anfwered it,
or given up the Point. Your taking Notice that
I have not here produced a Proof, is no doubt
defigned to make the Reader believe, that I had
produced no Proof of it at all, and fince I had
given a Proof of it in p. 126", to take no Notice
of That is a mere Evafion.
You fay— "It is true indeed, that whatever " is not extended, fuppofing an unextended Sub- " fiance poffible to be, fuch a Subftance would *< be indivisible : but it does not follow, that
* Dr. Clarke s Notions of SPACE, Examined p. 31. f Third Dcf. p. 26,
€C what
of SPACE Examined. 95
cc what is extended, muft be divifible : I am fure <c it is plainly otherwifein the Cafe of SPACE/'* — I am fure this is a hare j4flertiony and without my Colour of Proof. I ask, what is the Reafon
that an unextended Subftance would be indivifible? Is it nor, becaufe it has no Parts ? and if this be the Reafon, does it not imply that if it had Parts it would be divifible ? I doubt you will find it difficult to avoid this Confequence.
WHATEVER is extended, has Parts; This, I prefume, will be allowed me : The Queftion then is, whether that which has Partsy muft not have divifible Parts ? And here we ought, I think, to argue according to the common, and received Meaning of the Words Extenfion, and having Parts ; or elfe you fhould have told us what you mean by thofe Expreflions. Every Man, who makes Ufe of Terms where Doubts may arife about their Signification, is obliged either to explain his Mean ing, or to ufe them according to that which is the common, and received one ; i.e. He is obliged either to give us his own peculiar Senfe, or elfe to talk according to common Senfe.— -Now, I flip- pofe every one underftands, that to have Parts is to be compounded of Parts; and to be compound ed of Parts is to confifi of Parts joined together * and Parts that are joind together, may be fuppofed ajunder; i. e. may be divifible. — In the Idea then of Parts, is plainly implied Divifibilitj : If every Thing then which is extended has Parts, then every Thing which is extended has divifible Parts ; and that every Thing which is extendedhis Parts, I fancy won will hardly deny: Whatever there fore is extended, muft be divifible.
* Third Def. p. 26.
§6 Arguments for the Reality
I ARGUED to this Purpofe in my laft Pieces to prove the very fame Thing, namely that what is extended is divijible: but you have thought pro per, as I jufl now obferved, not to attempt any Anfwer to it, as I defire the Reader to remark' by confulting Dr. Clarke's Notions of SPACE ex amined p. 125, 126. and this your Third Defence p. 89, 90 : and therefore fince you repeat the fame Aflertion, namely, that what is extended need not be divi/ibie^ without taking any Notice of the Anfwer before made to it, I have a Right to repeat here that Anfwer; which, if it had any Force be fore, muft have the fame Force flill.
You fay in the Page before mentioned *, that you cc fuppoie I endeavour to maintain the No- rc tion of the Soul's being an unextended Sub- *c fiance.'* I muft confefs that at prefent it is: my Opinion ; and though it may be difficult to us in this prefent State, to conceive an unextend- ed Subflance ; which I imagine proceeds from our being converfant with none but extended Sub- fiances ; yet, unlefs I could conceive, that an Immaterial Stibftance could be divijible, or that Ex-
tenfion '.-oes- not imply Divtfibilitj, I mufl flill re tain the Notion, that the Soul is not extended —
That k muft be divifible, if extended MJM the Ar gument I there urged, by (hewing that Extenjion implied Divifibility : This Argument, I fay, yoft make no Reply to : but inftead of it you tell ti^, that an Immaterial Subflance may be divifible, for -what you kgow f : and in another Place, you fay that - <f A Spirit may be, for all this Gen- <c tkman Can (hew to the contrary, an extended
* Third Dcf. p. 90
t See Third Def. p. 90.
of SPACE Examined*
*c divifible Subftance." * I muft obferve there fore, that your Conduct looks as if you faw the Difficulties attending Indivifible Extent/ton : and therefore, inftead of faying any Thing againft my Argument brought in Anfwer to your Second Defence, to confute that Notion j or producing any Thing againft it here, except a certain Inftance of an extended, indivijible Thing, which I ihall take further Notice of prefently ; you chufe to argue that, for "what Ton know an immaterial Sttbjtance way be divijible ; and therefore, that my Argu ment to prove it not extended, becaufe it would then be divijible, required no Anfwer. This, Sir, may feem a plaufible Way of evading a Defence of indivijible Extenjion, when we argue that a Spirit muft be divifible, if extended: But fince you have thought proper to maintain the Notion of indi- •vifible Extenjion in other Parts of your Book ; you ought to have anfwered the Argument which J produced againft it : But you have not done it, ,snd therefore till you do, you have not anfwer- :ed me> nor defended your fel£— . To tell us, as you do here> that you are fare it is plainly other* wife in the Cafe of Spaced, is a downright begging the Queftion : for we are here difputing (which furely you forget) whether SPACE, if i: has Parts, •muft not be divifible; and it is therefore arguing, like the Anonymous Author juit now remarked upon, that it is fo, becaufe you are fare of it , which the Reader, if he pleafes, is to take for a Proof.
BUT although you will not attempt to defend Indivifible Extenjion, by anfwering my Arguments ; yet you will endeavour, you fay, ts to give the
* Third Deff p. 28. f Ibid. p. 26.
N <c Au-
98 Arguments for the Reality
" Author an Idea of an extended indivifiblc *' Thing; or at leaft ihew him, that the two Ideas fc of Extenfion and Indivifibility are not in- t( compatible.*' * — And *now let the Reader pre pare for a very curious Invention ! It is this — *f Let us fuppofe a Yard Cube of Matter free " from all Pores, fo that it ftiould be perfectly ce folid : Suppofe this Matter furrounded with " Something, that fhould hinder its being fepa- <c rated into any Parts whatever ; that is, fhould " hinder the Body from taking more Room." f — I cannot think, Sir, but you muft fmile at your felf, when you produced this extraordinary Inftance, this QuintefTence of Proof. — - « It is <c plain, you fay, that this Matter is extended, <e and it cannot be divided $-£."** It is very plain indeed, Sir, that this Matter cannot be actually divided, fo long as it is furrounded with Something that JbalL hinder it ; that is, it cannot be divided, when it cannot be divided. But you affign an external accidental Impediment : You faffoje this Alatter furrotinded with Something, that Jhotild hinder its being feparated into any Parts what ever : A notable Inftancc indeed, of an extended indivifible Thing ! and if you had fuppoied this Thing locked up in a Cheft, it might have pro ved full as much. It is like binding Something over a Man's Eyes ; and then producing him, as an Inftance of one who hath Eyes, and yet cannot fee. Do you really flatter your felf, you have fhewn by this Inftance, that what is ex tended may be, in its own Nature, indivifible?
* Third Def. p. 26. f Ibid. p. 27,
** Ibid,
THIS
cf SPACE Examined. 9^
THIS is what you muft explain to me; or elfe you are fighting with the Wind. My Af- fertion was this, that the Ideas of Extenfan, and Indivifibility, were incompatible : Now, it is evident I muft mean, that what was extended, muft, as fuck, and in its own Nature* be divijible ; not, that what is extended, cannot by accidental Impediment* be fecured from attual Divifion. To what Pur- pofe then have you been talking about a Piece of Matter-) furrounded with Something that jhould hinder it from being feparated ? You might as well have told us, of a Piece of Matter at the Bottom of the Sea, which no Body can come at j or that Matter is not, as Matter, divifible in infinitum% becaufe I cannot cleave a Grain of Sand with a common Hatchet, You feem not to know the Diftin&ion, of a Thing being indivifible, as it is that Thing, or in its own Nature ; and being acci dentally fb : The extended Piece of Matter which you mention, is ftill, in its own Nature, and as it is extended, divifible, let it be furrounded with a Rock of Adamant : Such an accidental Impedi ment may hinder it from being attually divided; but does • not alter the Nature of Extenjton, or of the Thing extended: It ftill retains the Nature of j)wipbilityi notwithftanding it cannot, in your In- ftance, be attually divided. You have therefore failed, Sir, in your Endeavours to mew me by this Inftance, that the two Ideas of Ext en/ion, and Indivifibility, are not incompatible : They feem to me to be as incompatible as ever : And let any one try, whether or no, in the Inftance you men tion, he can have an Idea of that Piece of Matter being extended-, without having at the fame Time, the Idea of its being, in its own Nature, divifible ; Jf h$ cannot, you have been labouring in vain.
N * I?
Arguments for the Reality
" IF we fuppofe this folid Matter tfo be infi- c' nite, it will be a tolerable Reprefentation [you " fay] of the Jndivifibility, and Extenflon of *« SPACE."* In Anfwer to this, I muft ob- ferve
FIRST, that If ivc fuppofe this folid Matter to be Infinite, i. t.pofoivelyy and metaphyfcally infinite ; by \vhich we mean perfeft, or, to which Nothing can \->zadded-y if we fuppofe this folid j Matter, I fay, to be infinite, in this Senfe ; we fuppofe, what feems to me to be an Impoffibility and a Contradiction. For, as it confifts of Parts, it muft be confidered as Quantity , or Number \ which in their very Na ture include perpetual Increafablenefs or *dddibility $ and muft therefore, in their very Nature, be in capable of this po/itivt) or metaphjfaal Infinity* And to fuppofe this folid Matter to be infinite in the other Senfe; -z//^. negatively infinite, which is the only Infinity that can be applied to Quan-* tity, is nothing more than to fuppofe^ that the Mind of Man has a Faculty of going on in infi- nitum y and enlarging this Matter in his Mind, without being able to flop any where : but this Senfe of Infinity will not here ferve your Turn ; and the other, as I have obferved, is a Contra* diftion.
SECONDLY, I anfwer, that I cannot conceive any extended Being without Parts ; nor confequent- ly either Infinite, or indivijible : I cannot con* ceive it to be pofitwely infinite for the Reafons above given: and I cannot conceive it to be indi: "jifeble ; becaufe I can never think of Parts, but immediately my mind anfwers* pivifibilitj : and
* Third Dsf. p. 57,
there**
of SPACE Examined. Jot
therefore, till you can produce a Proof, that the very Notion of Parti does not imply Divifibility ; or, that a Thing may be extended, without having Parts-,1 lhall never be able to coniider an extended 'Being, under any Circumftances whatfoever, with out, at the fame Time, confidering it as Divifible.
THIRDLY — The fuppofed pofitive Infinity of this folid Matter, is affigned as a Reafon for its being indivifible, though it be extended: and as this Inftance is brought as a Reprefen ration of the Indtvi/ibilityy and Extcnfion of SPACE; fo I prefume, that the pojttive Infinity of SPACE is affigned as the Reafon, for its being indivifible* notwithftanding it is extended: If fo, I muft beg Leave to inform you, that the pofitive Infinity of SPACE, muft never be alledged to me, as a Proof of its being indivifiblei or as a Proof of any Thing at all about it ; becaufe I deny it to be any Thing pojitrvely infinite, as well as to be tx- tended. You muft not therefore go on quite fb faft with me ; but prove firft, that SPACE is real Extenfon, and that it is pojttive ly infinite ; and then, but not before, you may boldly affign Jkch Infi~ nity for a Proof, where it will be of any Service to you. But at prefent, Sir, we are but juft where we fet out ! For if you tell me Space is extended, And has Parts; I anfwer, It is then divi/ible: If you urge, that it is poptively infinite; I reply, you have not proved it. I deny it to be real Exten- Jion ; but if it was, I deny that there can be any real Extenfion po/itively infinite, or That to which nothing can be added : And you muft prove that there can, before you affign the Infinity of real Extcnfion, as a Proof tha; real Exttnfon may be
f 02 'Arguments for the Reality
INFINITY (i.e. fofitive Infinity or Perfettnefs) and Extenjton are in my Ideas, as incompatible, as Extcnjiony and Indivijibilitj ; and will to me re main fo, until I can find out a Number, to which nothing can be added, and clear up all the Abfur- dities of an infinite Series.
THE Ideas then of Extenjion and Indivijibilitjy which you have been endeavouring to reconcile, will, I believe, appear as incompatible as ever, to thofe who thought them fo before. You have hitherto failed in producing any Proof; and there fore, if you think it worth your While, you muft try once again, to invent another Inftance of an extended indivifible Thing ; but I dare fay, you will find none comparable to the former.
You remark that — (< the Difference [between <•« SPACE, and your infinite extended Matter] is «< only this, that to feparate the Parts of SPACE, « is both to croud thofe Parts into one another, " and to leave SPACE between ; but to feparate «' the Parts of the Matter, is only to croud the " Parts into one another ; both which we fee, *6 from the Nature of each of them, is impoili- *c ble." * If we could by an impoffible Suppo- iition imagine Matter infinitely extended^ yet, there ieems ,to me to be no Occaiion, to croud tbe Pans into one another, in order to its feparation : for let Matter be fuppofed to be extended ad Infinitum*, yet, whilft you and I confider it as confining of Parts ; in (read of being at the Trouble of cronding ths Parts into one another ; we need only fuppoie one fingle Part to be annihilate^ and the Bufinefs is done: And this, by the Way, fuggefh to me an Abfurdity, which follows upon fuppofing thac
* Third Def. p. 27,
Matter
of SPACE Examined. loj
Matter can be po/itivelj infinite : For, if when we have imagined (as far as we can imagine) Matter to be infinite, in the Senfe above mentioned!; if, I fay, we can after this, fuppofe an Inch of it to be an- nilated; then it muft either ftill remain infimtt3 and then one Infinite will be bigger by an Inch, than another ; or elfe, the Addition of an Inch, would make that infinite, which w as finite before; both which Suppofitions are alike abfurd. — As to the other Part of your Remark, viz,, that " to *• feparate the Parts of SPACE, is to leave SPACE <c between" ; I muft obferve, that it is indeed very true, that we cannot feparate the Parts of SPACE ; but not becaufe it is to croud thofe Parts into one another ', And to leave SPACE between ; but becaufe SPACE has not any Parts to be feparated: and when you try to feparate the fuppofed Parts, the Reafon why you ftill muft always leave SPACE, is only this, viz*. Take Nothing from Nothing and there remains Nothing.
I HAD faid, that ° a Spirit is indivifible, and «c for that very Reafon, not extended ; for it is rc very manifeft that an indivifible ~Being cannot ad mit of a divijibie Quality, which Extenjion is C-TT." * Upon this you exclaim — " Where has our Au- " thor proved Extenfion to be a divifible Quality? *c and if he has not proved it, I muft take the «« Liberty to fay, that it is not." t I reply, that I had proved it in the 126", and izyr/j Pa ges : and therefore, inftead of taking the Liberty of faying, that it is not; and asking," where I had f roved it to be fi\ it would have looked much
* Dr. darkis Notions of SPACE, Examined p. 31, f Third Def. p. 28.
fairer.
IO4 Arguments for the Reality
fairer, if you had turned to the forementioned Pages, and had taken the Liberty to anfiver them.
BUT you proceed— <c A Spirit, he fays, is in* «e divifible, and for that Reafon not extended* «c If he means by Spirit an Immaterial Subftance* " then I fay, that it may be queried whether it <c is indivifible, or no, and frill the Argument cc againft Matter's thinking be equally conclufive « &c." * I muft obferve here, that you artfully turn off the Point of indivifible Extenfan : we are difputing, whether or no That which is extended, muft not be divijible ; I afferted that it muft 5 and then added, " I know the Reply to this is ready, « -y/^. Is not a Spirit extended, and is it not in* «c divifible .? I anfwer ; that a Spirit is indivifible* ec and for that very Reafon, not extended : For " it is very manifeft, that an indivifible Being *c cannot admit of a divifible Quality, 'which Ex- <c tenfion is; any more than a divifible Being <c can admit of an indivifible Quality j which is <« the Reafon, that no Syftem of Matter can be <c intelligent." t
Now, inftead of defending your Notion, that what is extended may be indivijible (which is the Point in Hand) you take Occafion to drop Thar, and proceed to tell us, that it way be Queried, whe ther an immaterial Sub fiance is indivijible or no, and and ft ill the Argument agalnfl Matter's thinking* be eqttalij conclttjive. Now fuppofing this PafTage to be as true, as it appears to me to be falfe ; it is dropping, I fay, your Notion of indivijible Exten* fan : For to Query, whether an Immaterial Sub- ftance may not be divifible, as well as extended ;
* Third Def p. 28,
•j- Dr. Cfar&s Notions of SPA c 3? Examined p. 31.
at
bf SPACE tLxamined.
at a Time when I am arguing that That, or any other Thing, mttft be atotfitfir, if extended ; is rather 'admitting, that the Ideas of Extenfion and Indivijibility are incompatible, than arguing again ft it. According to my Apprehenfion, it would have been more to your Purpofe in this Place to have ftill infifled upon it, that an immaterial Subfhnce was extended, and yet indivifible : here Would have been an AfTertion at lead (which is very often all the Proof you will condefcend to give us in other Points) of indivtfible Extenjion. But the Truth is, you feem confcious of the Ab- furdities of that Notion ; and are therefore will ing to wave the Point : And, as you had main tained in other Places, that the Soul is extended ; and as I had urged that it muft then be diuifible -> you here chufe to Ottery, whether an immaterial Sub (lance may not be divifible ; rather than put it on the other Foot, namely, that a Thing may be extended-, and yet indivifible^ left if you fhould be unable to make that good, your Notion of ex tended Spirit mould be utterly confuted. — But le: us confider this. Notion of divifible Spirit.
I MUST firft obferve, that you icem to have
changed your Opinion, with Refpefit to this Poinr.
It is not long fince you believed, that immaterial
Beings muft neceflarily be indifcerpible (as the Reader
may fee, by turning to p. 43544- of your Fir ft
Defence} and that as evidently as the knoivn- Proper-*
ties of Matter prove it to be certainly a difcerpible
Subftance ; Jo evidently t the kgoivn and cohfefled Pro-
\ perties of immaterial Beings prove them to be indi-
| Jcerpible : But notwirhftanding you there believed
I them to be indifcerpible ; and tell us, that they ate
; f roved to be fo, from their %02y#and confeftd Prg<*
Q par fit* \
Id6 Arguments for the Reality
ferties\ yet now, it feems, that an immaterial Sub- fiance may, for what you know, be divifible.
You will perhaps anfwer, that your Notions are now confident with what they were before; for that when you talked of the Indiviftbility of immaterial Sttbftances; you meant, as you in your Third Defence exprefs your felf, that they were ivdtvifiblC) as thinking Sitbftances ; but that, as im material SubftanceS) they might be divijible: This might feem a plaufible Way of reconciling your Sentiments, were it not for another Paffage which occurs in your Fir ft Defence ; where you fay, that <c according to the Suppofition of the Soul's be- " ing fo extended, as to conftft of more than one e< Point, yet thefe Points would be a Continuumy cc they could not be feparable, any more than eve- «c ry Point of the Deity is." * Now, by this PafTage it is plain, that you then thought, that an immaterial Subftance could not be fcparable (ft all : For that which cannot be feparable, any more than every Point of the Deity isy cannot be fepara ble in any Senfe whatfeever.—B\it befides, Sir, the Purport of your Argument fhews you meant, that an immaterial l>eing was indivifible, in all Senfes : For the PafTage which you quote from !Dr. Clarke t is brought to confirm what you (had before f&id ; namely, that though a Spirit be ex- tendedy yet there is no Neceffity that it muft be extended in the fame Manner as.4^/o"is; which you fuppofe to be Dr. Cudworttis Meaning; who cc feems [you fay] to confound the two Ideas of ', Indivihbility and Non-Extenfion together, as " if they were the fame Thing, when they are *c certainly as wide and diflin^t from one another?
* Firft Dcf. p. 42. f Ibid. jr. 43, 44
« as
of SPACE Examined.
" as any two Ideas poflibly can be. That they *c are fo, is very plain, from the Confideration " of the Nature of SPACE , which no-Body " can be fo abfurd, as to fay is not extended, <c and yet muft allow, that it is indivifible and in- <c feparable." * — It is evident from hence, that your Meaning was, to maintain the Notion, that the Soul might be extended, and yet indivijible ; for that Extenjion did not imply Divijibility : But if you had only meant, that the Soul might be indivifible as a thinking Subftance, and divifible as an immaterial Subftance; then your whole Argument will be Nothing at all to the Purpofe. For to fay that any extended Being is indtvifble as a thinking Subftance, tho' it may be divifible as an immate rial Subftance, is no Proof or Reafon, that what is extended, may be indivijible .: For if it be divifi- ble in any Confideration -whatever, it is Jimply divi fible : And confequently you would leave the No tion of indivijible Extenjion, by fuch an Argument, juft where you found it. — It is plain therefore from the foregoing Obfervations, that the Author of the Firfl Defence, and the Author of the Third Defence, tho' the fame Perfon, yet widely differ in their Sentiments.
Now I cannot affign any other Reafon you could have, for admitting here, what you had de nied before; but, that you was fenfible of what Doctor Clarke confefTes, in the Paffage you have cited from him t ; vk» that, " How far fuch <£ Indifcerpibility can be reconciled, and be confift- « ent with fome kind of Expanfion — is another «{ Queftion of confiderable Difficulty." And finding this wnfidtfable Difficulty hanging heavy
* Firft Def, p. 42. f Ibid. p. 43, 44.
Q a over
*o8 Arguments for the Reality
over you ; and that you would be reduced to this Dilemma ; either to give up the Extenjion, or the Indiuijibility of Spirit ; you chofe to Query the latter. You will not fay that it is diviftble; left you fhould be forced, one time or other, to contradict your (elf: Nor will you fay, that it is not divifible ; left you fhould not then be able to maintain its Extenfion : and therefore you find out a Medium, and tell us, that it may he queried wheth. r it i s indivifible or no, and ftill the Argument again ft Matter's thinking would be equally coa- clufive *.
THIS you affert; whether you have made it good, comes now to be examined : And I beg Leave to fay, you are fo far from it, that I will ihevv you have by your own Arguments which you have brought to fupport it, proved the di- red contrary.
THAT this may appear, J fliali produce what you admit to be the Argument ufed by All .Aiir floors who have argued againft Matter's Thinking ; and I ill all fhew, that if Spirit be divifible, in the Manner you here afTert it tq be, the fame Argument will equally prove againft a Spirit* s Thinking: If I do this; then I fliali hereby (hew, that you prove (becaufe it will follow) from your own Arguments, that, // a Spirit be divijible, th$ Argument •' tgainft Matter's Thixkivg* will not be c- qud'.y conclufi've.
" ALL Authors [you fay] that were for con- *' futing the Notion of Matter's Capacity of i£ thinking, always endeavoured to prove the Im-* c< poiTibiliry of ir, from its having fo many di*, *c Jhxcl Percipients in it | that is [yo^ co^tinue]
f Third Def. p, 28
I'fees
of SPACE Examined. 109
« becaufe it conjifted, of an infinite Number of 4&- « ftintt whole Sttbft antes. "* Thefe are your own Words : And a little before, you tell us, that a Spirit may, by Divifon, become <c feveral imma- " terial Subftances." f— Now, from hence will I ftiew, that a Spirit, according to your Notion of it, muft confift of feveral diftincl whole Sttbftances (as you are pleafed to call 'em) fever -at diftincl Percipients ; from whence it will appear, that the Argument, which you allow to be conclufive a- gainft Matter's Thinking^ (viz,, its having fo many diftinft Percipients in it) will be equally conclufive againft Spirits Thinking.
IF a Spirit may be divided, and by fuch Di- vifion become feveral immaterial Subftances ; as you | grant it may; then it is obvious, that a Spirit muft conjtft of fever at immaterial Subftances : For otherwife you muft fay, that a Spirit may be di vided into thofe Things, of which it does not conjifl ; and that the Whole does not confift of its Parts. Now, if a Spirit confifts of feveral Sub- fiances, it muft, as well as Matter, confift of fe veral, diftintt) whole Subflances ; unlefs you have jfound out a Diftinftion of whole Subftances, and fyot whole Subftances ; if you have pray acquaint ius, what Sort of Subftances Thofe are, which are faot whole Subftances ! According to the little Knowledge I have of Things, That which is ot an whole Subftance, can be no Subflance at all> ' \ whatever Senfe the Word Subftance be under- ood : For, to talk of an Half -Subftance^ would, prefume, be thought no better Senfe, than to ilk of an Half-Being, or an Half-Property ; which rould be dividing Beings, Properties &c. into
? Third Def, p. 29, f Ibid. p. 28.
no Arguments for the Reality
whole Eeings, and half Beings, whole Properties, and half Properties — a Divifioi^ to which my Meta- phyfics have never yet carried me !
Now fince that which confifts of diflintt whole Subflances, muft confift of fo many diftintt Perci pients (as ybu allow ; by making the having di- ftm ft Percipients, and the conjifling of diftintt whole Subflances to fignify the fame *) it follows, that a Spirit confifts of feveral diftinft Percipient*.
SINCE then you admit that Ail Authors wbc were for confuting the Notion of Matter's Capacity of thinking, always endeavoured to prove the ImpoJ> jibility of tf, from in having fo many diftinft Per cipients in it j that is, becaufe it confifled of an in fnite Number of diftind: whole Subflances : An jfince I have fhewn from your own Notions c a Spirit's Divifion, that a Spirit mutt, according t you, conjift of feveral dlflinc~l whole Subflances, an therefore of feveral diflinft Percipients, as well Matter; the natural Conclufion is, either that it impoffible for a Spirit to thinkj or elfe that tl: Argument againft Matter 's Thinking is by n Means conclufive.
I MUST therefore farther obferve, that if t Argument againft Matter's Thinking be conclufiv then, fince upon Supposition that a Spirit is dw fible, it would not be conclufive ; as I hope I ha proved ; it follows, that a Spirit cannot be d fible, as you aflert it may be for what you k$ I cannot therefore but wifh, Sir, that you had ther known more, or afferted lefs.
* See Third Def. p. 29. Your Words are thefe ** its having fo many diftinft Percipient [s in it ; thai becaufe it cwfijled of an infinite Number of diflinff tu
To
of SPACE Examined. n\
You argue much to the fame Purpofe, in the Vindication of your Second Defence *. What there fore I have faid here, is a fufficient Anfwer to both. — But, fince in this laft mentioned Place> you tell us that " the Soul is a Continuum* or *c one, uniform Thing t ; " it is incumbent upon you, to explain your Meaning; and reconcile it to your Notion, that the Soul cc may be divifible* *' for what you know/* which you aflert a few- Lines above it. You fay indeed, that it may be divifibk) as an immaterial Subftance, but indwifi~ ble> as a thinking Subftance ** ; but this will be of no Service to you in the prefent Cafe : For if it be divijible into Jeveral immaterial Stances* as you aflert it may, for what you know ; and is yet oney uniform Thing, which you likewife aflert ; you muft either reconcile thefe Notions ; or we muft conclude, that you are irreconcileably inconfiftent.
I SHALL conclude this Point with obferving briefly, that the Reafon which has induced Men to imagine that Spirits are extended, feems to me to be This. They fuppofe that no Properties can fubfift but in fome Subftratum ; that is, in Something different, and diftind from all its ef- fential and constituent Properties ; Something, in which all thefe Qualities, Properties &c. are ftuck^ and by which they are fupported. They fuppofe therefore, that Tftwi^ofg, andJ$7/w| &c. muft have fuch a Subftratum. Now, being convesfant with material Objects, and confidering them as having a Subilratum, and finding them all to be extend ed j hence they have afibciated their two Ideas of
* Third Def. p. 90. f See Ibid.
** See Ibid,
H2 Arguments for the Reality
a S*bftr*tum* and Extenjion together ; in fucn a Manner, as whenever they think of a Stibftratum, they always conceive it extended : And from hence confidering Spirits to have a Subftratttm, and al ways joining the Idea of Extenfion to every Sub- ftratum, they conceive Spirits to be extended. — *— But I pafs on to another Argument.
ARGUMENT VI.
From BODY being extended INTO SPACE.
You argue, that if a Body be extended into SPACE, and SPACE be Nothing ; « then is the cc Body extended into Nothing, what therefore " is the Difference between being extended into " Nothing [into no where] and not being ex- « tended at all * ? I am obliged to repeat, that when I fay SPACE is Nothing* I mean that SPACE is not a Thing, that it is not a real Exiflent : Is it then any Confequence, that whar is not extend ed into a real Exiflent* muft not be ext 'ended at all? But your Miftake lies in imagining that what is extended into Nothing, muft be extended no where ; for Somewhere* or Jome Place is not a Thing* unlefs in the Senfe that Relations are Things ; viz Ideal Things. Place is a Relation of Site, which one Body bears to another ; and when we fay that a Body is extended into a Place, we mean that the Part of the Body which is the Increafe, bears a certain Relation to other Bodies, which before it did not. A Body may therefore be extended in-
* Third Def p. 30.
to
of SPACE Examined, 113
to no-Thing -3 and yet be extended Somewhere ; i. e. not extended into Nowhere.
BUT I had faid that " when" the Body is ex- " tended into a Void, that Void becomes full, " which is all the Myftery." * — To this you anfwer-" If all the Myftery is, that Nothing be- " comes full ; I beg this Author to tell me the " Difference between the Fulnefs of Nothing, *c and no Fulnefs at all &c." f To fay that a Void becomes full, is only faying that ther£ is real Extenfon, whereas before there was not : and that when there is real Extenfion, there is not a Void. But to talk, as you do, of the Ftilncfs of Nothing* or the Fulnefs of a Void, is confounding Words; and amounts to the fame as talking of a full Void, or a full Nothing. It is making the Void one Thing* and Fulnefs another ; whereas, where Body is, there is no Void. If you would pieafe therefore, to ask your Queftion in intelligi ble Englifh, you mould fay " what is the Dif- «e ference between a Void becoming full (which " was my Expreffion) and no fulnefs at all ? "" and then I anfwer ;' there is juft the fame Diffe rence, as there is between a Void and no Void, Body and no Body, real Extenfion and I final Extenfion.
* Dr. Clarkis Notions of SPACE, Examined p, 34, f Third Def. p. 31,
ARGU-
114 Arguments for the 'Reality
ARGUMENT VII.
From the DISTANCE and £LACE of BODIES.
You had faid, that u If there was no Diftance c£ exifting really, it would unavoidably follow, " that the Sun and Moon exifted both in the « fame individual Place/' * To which I anfwer'd that " Diftance is the imaginary Length of SPACE, " confidered between any two Beings &c. " t You now reply — fc what is This but allowing « the Confequence I mentioned ? For, if the " Diftance of the Sun from the Moon be only <c imaginary, it cannot be real; therefore the Sun «c and Moon are really in the fame Place, though sc they are in our Imagination at a Diftance," **
I SAID, that Diftance is the imaginary Length of Space ; upon which you reply ; If the Diftance of the Snn from the Moon, be only imaginary, it cannot be real : But pray Sir, who faid that the Diftance was imaginary ? The Diftance is real, \. e. real Diftance', or the Bodies are really diftant : But yet, when Diftance is coniidered as a Length of Space, it is imaginary Length: that is, it is not the Length of any really exifting 7"hing. And here likewife may be anlwered what you offer in the Vindication 'of your Second Lefence ; where, becaufe I had (aid, that " when we fpeak of Things «« being diftant, we mean ic of fone Relation, or
* FirR Def. p. 32.
"f- Dr. Clarke's Notions of SPACE, Examined p. 57.
** Third Def. p. 3 2.
" Acci-
cf S p A c E Examined. i i £
" Accident in the Things themfelves;" * — You reply—" That is, in plain Englifh, the Diftance " that is between two Bodies, is not between them, *' but in them.1' f From whence you take Occa- cafion to play upon the Words in, and internal Relation, jfor fifteen Lines together. — It is fuffi- cient therefore to tell you, that the Relation is neither in them, nor between them : And that when I fpoke of Diftance, as a Relation in Bo dies , I meant no more, than a Relation of Bodies, or a Relation which Bodies bear to each other.
THE Sun and Moon are not only diftant in Imagination -y but really fb : For it does not follow, that becaufe Diftance is imaginary Length, therefore it muft be imaginary Diftance ; or that becaufe Di ftance is no Thing, therefore it muft be no Di» fiance ; any more- than that becaufe Virtue and Vice are no Things (/'. e. no real Exiftents) there fore that there is no Virtue or Vice in the World, or that Men cannot be faid to be either Virtuous or Vitious. And thus I conclude, that Diftance is no real Thing, is only a Relation of Bodies, yet not an imaginary Relation (which would be the fame as no Relation) but that it is really predica- ble of Bodies, or that Bodies [the Sun and Moon for Inftance] may be faid to be really diftant^ and therefore do not exift in the fame Place, tho? Diftance be no really exift ing Tlaing.
BUT it is endlefs to difpute about Words 2 and a Perfon who is refolved to do it, may go on wrangling for ever. And This may be an Excufe for omitting feveral little Objections of this Sort, which run through your Performance* To fok
* Dr. Clarkis Notions of SPACE, Examined p. 113, f Third Def. p. 80
P *
Si 6 Arguments for the 'Reality
low you minutely in every Step you have takers might perhaps take away all Room for future Cavils, and leave you nothing to fay ; but as I am fenfible, it could afford but very little Enter tainment, or improvement to the Reader, I may very well be excufed.
You take Notice of an Expreffion of Mr. Locke* viz. beyond the ZJmverfej from whence you would prove SPACE to be Something real. You argue that — " To fay beyond the Phjenomena of Na- " ture, means either that there is Something be- cc yond them ; or elfe there is no Difference be- " tween Finity and Infinity ; becaufe we can in «' both Cafes fay, there is nothing beyond them.'* * Let us conficier what is meant by BEYOND, for herein lies the Fallacy. Could we fuppofe the fhaenomena of Nature infinite, in a pofitive Senfe, we could not fay beyond them, but why ? not merely becaufe there could be no Thing exifting be yond them j but becaufe there could be no beyond. Now if the Phenomena of Nature be finite, it is proper and true to fay beyond them, becaufe there may be Something exifting beyond them, or becaufe there is beyond. Space and CoWare here the fame : And if you can prove beyond to be a "Thing, a fiebsg) a Property of God ; then, and not before, will this Expreflion of Mr. Locks prove SPACE to be Something. — In fhort, to fay beyond the Phenomena of Nature does not mean that there is any Thing exifting beyond them ; but only, that the Phenomena of Nature are finite.
THE Sum of what you fay farther on this Head is This ; viz,. That " our Idea of the ab- «f folute Place of any Thing, is an Idea pf its
* Thi?d Def. p. 35.
"Ex-
of S p A c E Examined, 117
*£ Exigence in fome Pare of the Univerfe " : and, that " there can be no relative Place without <c an abfolute Place:" and, that " if Diftance be " Nothing, there can neither be any relative, or *c abfolute Place.'** My Anfwer to which is This— If by Exiftence in fome Pan of the Uni verfe, you mean Exiftence in fome really exifting Part of SPACE ; this is fuppofmg that SPACE is Something really exifting) which is the Queftion : And it will remain to be (hewn, that Bodies can not exiil: in a relative Place, without exifting in an abfolute one, in fuch a Senfe of abjblttte Place : that is, it will remain for you to fhew, that Bo dies cannot bear a Relation of Site to each other, unlefs SPACE be a real Exiftent. If you fay that a Body cannot exift at all, tmlefs it has fome abfolute Place ; and by abfolute Place you mean as above ; then you mutt fhew, that a Body can not exift, unlefs SPACE be really exifting too. By a Body's cxiftcncc in Space> I underftand no thing more than extended Exiftence : And it is no Confequence, that if SPACE be not a real Ex iftent, an extended Being cannot exift. A Body indeed cannot be extended, unlefs there be a Void* or a fojpbility of its being extended : But then it irmft be proved, that this PoJJibility is a real Thing, we mud, 'tis true, prefuppofe SPACE to the Ex iftence of every Thing which is to exift in it ; but this is only to prefuppofe a PoJJibility of their Exiftence: The Prefitppojition of SPACE does not prove its real Exiflence.
WHEN we fay that a Body exifts in abfolute Place ; the Meaning is, that we confider its Ex iftence abftraffiedl] from the Relation which it bears
* Third Def. p. 35, 36,
n8 Arguments for the Reality
to other Bodies : And then, what we call the *£- felttte Place of that Body, is only its mere Exifl- ence. This I take to be the true Meaning of ah- folttte Place: And then indeed there can be no relative Place without an abfolutc Place ; that is> Bodies cannot bear Relation of Situation to other Bodies, unlefs they exifl ; or, they cannot exift in Place (for, properly fpeaking, there is .3 Place by relative) if they do nor exift at all. But This, I apprehend, is no Proof of the real Ex- iftence of SPACE.
ARGUMENT VIII.
From the IMPOSSIBILITY of ANNIHI LATING SPACE.
DR. CLARKE argued, that SPACE could not, even in Thought, be annihilated; that it would remain, even after it was fuppofed to be annihi lated : and from hence the learned Doctor would prove SPACE to be NECESSARILY EXISTING.* Jn Defence of this Argument you urged — fC To <c fuppofe SPACE away, certainly amounts to the <c forementioned Abfurdity [/. e. that it remains, even after it is taken away, or fuppofed to be an nihilated] " for the Idea of it neceffarily rufhes <c into our Minds ; and we cannot but fuppofe c< it to exifi, even after we have tried to fuppofe " it annihilated." t In this Argument I could fee no Force ; and in anfwer to it, I obferved, that if it fhould be admitted, that the Idea of
* See Dr. CLARKE'S Anfwer to the Jtxtb Letter. f Firil Def. p. 47,
SPACED
of SPACE Examined. 119
SPACE, after all Endeavours to fuppofe SPACE awaj, would (till rttfb into our Minds \ yet, it would not from thence follow, that SPACE mud have real Exiftence, much lefs necejfarj or Je If Ex* iftence — that Ideas may ru(h into our Minds, which have nothing ad extra correfpondent to them — that it feemed evident to me, that the very Reafon why SPACE i. e. the Idea of SPACE, af ter all Endeavours to the contrary, does (till rufh into the Mind, is becaufe SPACE is mere No thing; and to fuppofe NOTHING away* or to endeavour, even in Thought to annihilate NO THING, is a Contradiction ; becaufe in the Idea of Annihilation, we always prefuppofe the Exift- €nce of Something ; and when we endeavour to imagine NOTHING annihilated^ Nothing will re main ; for to annihilate Nothing-, is to turn No- thing into Nothing, and therefore the frfl Idecy after all our Suppofitions, ftill recurs, and confe- quently, if this be an Argument for the NECES SARY EXISTENCE of SPACE, it is full as good for the NECESSARY EXISTENCE of NOTHING. BUT you are pleafed in Reply, to ask the fol lowing Queftions — viz,. cc If after all Things, by «c which I now mean all created Subftances, and «' their Properties, are fuppofed to be annihilated, «c this Author has an Idea of Nothing^ which " rulhes into his Mind, whether he will or no ; « I ask, Firfly what Sort of an Idea it is? Secondly cc whether it be an Idea of Nothing, nowhere, " or Somewhere &c.ft * To your firft QuefKon I anfwer, that it is an Idea arifing necefTai i]y from the Supped tion which you make : It i of Reflection. I had before an Ids* of Thefe Sub-
* Third Def. p. 37.
fiances,
I2O Arguments for the Reality
fiances, that is, of their Exiftence : I now confi- der their Exiftence to ceafe ; and what is my Idea then, but an Idea of the Negation of all created Exiftences ? and if I ask iny felf what remains? will not my Mind immediately anfwer, Nothing £ (for the Supreme Being is out of the Queftion) and if, after This, I endeavour to annihilate, or to fuppofe NOTHING awajy and again confuk my Ideas ; (hall I not find, that I have the fame Idea I had before? To your fecond Queftion I anfwer, that it is neither an Idea of Nothing No- where, nor Somewhere ; unlefs in fuch a Senfe, as Ideas may be faid to be Somewhere. It is a mere Idea arifing from imagining the Exiftence of all created Subftances to ceafe. The remaining Part of this your $jth Page, is only ringing Changes upon the Words Nothing Somewhere, and Nothing Nowhere, and therefore I ihall leave you to enter tain your felf with the Mufic.
THIS Argument, urged by Dr. Clarke for the necefTary Exiftence of SPACE, viz*, that it cannot be annihilated, is as it feems, a favourite one with Thofe Gentlemen on his Side the Que ftion. I muft own, I have often wondered, that the learned Doctor could think there was fo much Force in this Argument as he feems to do; till I chanced to meet with the following Paffage in Mr. WHISTON'S Hiftorical Memoirs; where he relates a Circumftance of Dr. CLARKE'S Life, which he fays was communicated to him from the Doctor's own Mouth. — " One of his [Dr. " CLARKE'S] Parents asked him, when he was <f very young, whether God could do every Thing? " He anfwered] yes. He was asked again, whe- « ther God could do one particular Thing, could " tell a Lie ? He anfwered, no. And he under-
« ftood
of SPACE Examined,
" flood the Queftion to fuppofe, that this was c the only Thing, that God could nor do :
*4 Nor durft be fay, Jo young wat he then, he ' thought there was any Thing elfe which God
Cc could not do : While yet, he well remember'd,
<c he had even then, a clear Conviction in his Cc own Mind, that there was one other Thing " which God could not do ; z/«,. that he could " not annihilate that SPACE which was in the 'c Room wherein they were. Which Impoffi. Cf biliry now appears even in Sir ISAAC NEW- « TON'S own Philofophy." *
FROM this Memoir, I am not at all furprifed that Dr. CLARKE believed SPACE to have real Exiflence j or to find the ImpoJJibility of its beinv annihilated, alledged in his Writings, as a Proof of its nece/ary Exigence. Mr. WHISTON has fee the Matter in its true Light. It appears that the Notion of SPACE being Something really exiftino- ad extra, and the Impoffibility of its Annihilation, were natural to him 5 Notions which he had when he was very young: And it is well known, that whatever is ftrongly imbibed at fuch an A^e, too often remains with us all our Lives after. If the Idea of a Phantom, in our infant Years makes any ftrong Impreffion upon our tender Minds • we find it ever after very hard* if not impoffible to get rid of it; it almoft neceflarily r*J1:es into otir Minds, after all onr Endeavours to the con trary.
> DR. CLARKE'S Principle,- that SPACE cannot be annihilated is, I think, a very true one: But then the Qiieflion is, whether it cannot be anni-
* Mr. V/HISTON'S Eijlorical Memoirs 'of tie Life of (Dr. SAMUEL CLARKE p. 15. Edit, 2,
P. hilated,
*a2 Arguments for the Reality
liilated, becaufe it is neceflarily cxifting\ or whe ther, becaufe it is Nothing ? you aiTert the former, and I the latter ; it is therefore incumbent upon you to prove your Affirmative. As I apprehend, the ImpoJJibtlitj of Annihilation can be no Proof of the neceffitrj Exiftence of any Thing, unlefs thac Thing be firft proved to cxift : For otherwife, the ImpoffibilitJ of Annihilation will prove the ne- ceffarj Exijlcnce of Nothing. Your Argument be gins at the wrong End : You fir ft fuppofc SPACE to have real exigence ; and then finding you can not fuppofe it annihilated, \ou conclude that it nm ft be necejfarily exifting. But it fliould firft be put out of all Doubt, that SPACL has real Ex- iftence-, and then indeed, if it cannot be fuppofed to be annihilated, it will follow that it is nccej- farilj exlfting: Whereas, in this Argument, its teal Exiftence is taken for granted; and then you endeavour to prove its necejfary Exiftence, by an Argument which will, as I have obferved, equal ly prove the ncctfary Exiftence of Nothing.^
You tell me 'the "actual remaining of SPACE « follows from the Impoflibility of getting rid « of the Idea of its real Exiftence, that is, from « the Contradiction implied in fuppofing it not <>< to exift." * I muft take the Liberty, Sir, to inform you, that the actual Exiftence of SPACE ad extra, by no means follows from your not be- inq able to get rid of the Idea of its actual Exift ence, or from your imagining (without ihewing) that there is a Contradiction implied in fuppofing it not to exift. What if yon could not get rid of the Idea of a Caflle in the 4ir? ~ muft there be really fuch a Thing \ If then, after all the lieafon-
* Tliird Dcf. p. 80,
ing
of SPACE Examined.
ing that has been ufed to convince you, all the Arguments that have been urged, you ftill find, that you can by no means get rid of this trouble- fome Idea ; it is your Misfortune : But you muft not endeavour to perfuade us, that becaufe you cannot help thinking that SPACE is a real Exijient,
therefore it mult really be fo A Man that
fhould have the Jaundice from his Birth, would by no means perhaps be able to get rid of the Idea of every Thing he faw being yellow : But I fuppofe, he would be thought to have a worfe Diftemper, fhould he endeavour to perfuade all Mankind, that therefore they really were fo.
To conclude this Point. Ic appears, that Dr. CLARKE received into his Mind this Notion of the neceffary Exiftence of SPACE, when he was very joung. It was one of the earlieft of all his Thoughts: He feems as it were cum laEte Nutri- els errorem faxiffe * And it is no ftrarge Thing, that Men fhoiild become zealous Vota ries to thole Opinions, which they have entertain'd in their Minds from their very Infancy — and a propos in this Place, are the Words of Mr. LOCKE; <f It is eafy to imagine, how by thefe Means <c it comes to pafs, that Men worjbip the Idols that " have been fet up in their Minds ; grow fond <c of the Notions they have been long acquaint*- ce ed with there ; and ft amp the Characters ofDi- <fi VINITY upon Absurdities and Errors" t
* Cicer.
| Eflay on Hum. Underihnd. B. i. c. 3, f. 26.— Edit. 9.
Q z
'124 Arguments for the Reality
ARGUMENT IX.
That SPACE is a MODE or PROPERTY of GOD.
IN Defence of Dr. CLARKE, you fay that <c in proving SPACE to be Something from its " Qualities, he did not colder it ftri&ly as a «f Property, but as its own Subfiatum." * — The Meaning of this you explain, by what you call a parallel Inftance ; « A Capacity, you fay, of di- «< flinguiftiing betwixt Right and Wrong, Truth «< and Falfhood, are Qualifies accompanying « Knowledge ; if therefore we fee thefe diftin- <£ guifhing Qualities in any Being, fhould we ** not immediately apply Knowledge to this Be- <c ing, and conclude that it was a Property of << this Being ? So likewife, in the Cafe before *c us : If we perceive that Something is pene- <c trable, extended, &c. and that no Being could f< be fo, except SPACE was Something j will it <* not molt evidently follow, that SPACE is Some- « thing 2 and if it be a Property, that it is a ' Property of that Being ? " f You here imagine, that the Capacity of difiingmjhing betwixt right and wrong £c. is Something diftintt from Knowledge ; whereas it is Knowledge it felf: And therefore, if we fee this diftingmjhing Quality in any Being, we Ihould undoubtedly apply Knowledge to it, and conclude that ir is a Property of this Being: why? — Becaufe this diftifiguijhmg Quality is Knowledge j and therefore this is only faying, that if we fee
Third Def. p 3g. | |bid. p. 39.
of SPACE Examined. 125
Knowledge in any Being, we fhould conclude that Knowleage is a Property of this Being — But the Caie before us is widely different. Penetrability and Extenfan are no Properties of God. And tho' Immobility, Indifcerpibility, and Infinity are, yet this will not prove SPACE to be a Property of him, as a Capacity of diftinguifoing between Right and Wrong, Truth and Faljhood, will prove Know ledge to be a Property of that Being, in whom we find fuch a Capacity: And for this plain Real on j viz,, becaufe fuch a Capacity is Knowledge : but Immobility, IndifcerpibiUty, and Infinity are not SPACE; your parallel Inftance is therefore not pa rallel in the leaft.
As to Penetrability, I told you — "To fay *' that Penetrability is a Property of the Infinite « Being, /. e. of God, is faying that the Infinite : Being, i.e. God impenetrable; which is fo ap- *f parently blafphemous, that it cannot by any on* <c be allowed to be a Property of him.".* Now- let us hear what Reply you make to this. It is an Anfwer drawn from the Sacred Writings, and ufher'd in with all the Pomp of Words — " God f< forbid ! it greatly behoves this Author, to con- «c fider upon whom this Accufation of Bkfphemy « will fall : For if by a Being's being penetrable, «c can only be meant that fuch a Being may have " other Beings in it (and whether it can poffi- « bly mean any thing elfe I appeal to all the *c World ; ) then let him remember whofe the 4C following Words are, in him -we live and move*
*' and have our Being"}- I well remember,
Sir, whofe Words they are : But I mud beg Leave
* Dr. Clarke's Notions of SPACE Examined p, 46. f Third Def. p. <J.Q.
to
126 Arguments for the Reality
to obferve, that they are no Proof of what you contend for.
LITTLF, I believe, did St. PAUL ever imagine, that he fhould be called upon as a VVitnefs in fuch. a Caufc i little did he think, that his Words would be produced to prove, that we live and move in the E fence of God:, and, that as we are in SPACE we are in God; i.e. that SPACE is GOD ! St. PAUL was fpeaking to the Men of ATHENS, and endeavouring to abolifli the Worfhip of Idols ; and he would hardly have fet up another in their Room. No ; SPACE was an Idol, unknown to thofe Times ! an Idol, referved to theie latter Ages, and for the Difcovery of fome modern En- glimmen ! But I mull confefs, Sir, you are not the only Perfon who has quoted theie Words of St. PAUL to the fame Purpofe, and underftood them in fuch a Senfe : For the Learned Dr. CLARKE has done the fame. Mr. LEIBNITZ calls it zftrange Exprejllon, to fay that what is in SPACE, is in God's Immenjtty *. To which the Learned Doctor replies, This flrange Dotlrine is the exprejs j4ffertion of St. Paul. Ads XVII. 27, 28.
I MUST own, it is to me Something ftrange, that either the Learned Dr. CLARKE, or any Bo dy elfe fhould ever underftand thefe Words in the Manner you do. Had you not been content ed to be your own Commentator^ you would have found this PafTage explained in a very different Manner by the moft Learned Interpreters f. Bun
* Leibnitz's Fifth Paper §. 44.
-j- Dr. WHITBY'S Explanation is this; vix. "For in " (or £y) him we live, and move, and hive our Being." Dr. HAMMOND'S Paraphrafe upon the Place is, — " For " our Life, Motion, and Subfiftcnce is wholly through ? him." The Learned GROTIUS remarks that it is an
what
of SPACE Examined. 127
what is fufficient to put St. PAUL'S Meaning pad all Doubt, is the Context. When he has laid, that in him ive live, find move, and have our Being ; he immediately adds, as certain alfo of your oivn Poet shave faid, for we are alfo his Offspring, rS yap xj ye- vs$ tv/LLtv. From whence it is plain, that by thefe Words, in him we live, and move, and have ottr Being, St. PAUL means the fame, as he does by, we are alfo his Offspring ', becaufe he mentions this faying from ARATUS, as importing the fame Do- drine which he was teaching. Whatever then is the Meaning of we are his Offspring, the fame muft be intended by in him we live, and move, and have our Being. Now the true Import of the Former is plainly this viz,, that God is the common Pa rent of Mankind, the Protestor and Preferver of us all : That we derive our Being from him ; and owe the Continuance of it to him: That it is wholly through him, or through his Power, and Protection, that we have our Life, Motion, and Subfiftencc ; which muft therefore likewife be the true Mean ing of thofe Words of St. PAUL, In him welive^ and move, and have our Being. It appears then
Hebraifm, and underftands in ipfo, to fignify the fame as per ipfum. His whole Note runs thus eviz. " Eit Hebraifmus. *' In ipfo, id eft, per ipfum, ipfius Beneficio. Per ipfum cx- " iftimus : ipfe nobis Vitam Homini congruentem, £ Motus <( tali vitae refpondentes dedit." — And if you will enquire farther ; you may find that the Prepofition '£» is rendered by Per, as well as In ; and '£» ocurt/ in this Place is, you lee, render'd by the Learned; Per ipfum ; i.e. per iplius Omnipotentiam, & Patrocinium ; through, or by Means of him, or his Power and Protection. And agreeable to this, you will find that the Arabick Verfion actually has it, not in Ipfo, but Per ipfum — " fiquidem per ipfum vivimus, mo- " vanus, & exiftimus." WALTQN Polyg*
that
Arguments for the Reality
that St. PAUL, in the Paffage you have cited from' him to prove it, meant not (as you do) that God is penetrable, or that he may have other Beings in him. -. To charge the Apoftle with teaching fuch Doctrine, mult proceed, either from Igno rance of his plain Meaning, or from a grofs Mif- repreientation of it.
You object to the Inftance, which I brought to ihew your Argument (vi<,. that SPACE is the Property of the infinite Being) fallacious. My Inftance was this w*. « God is Omnifcient ; he « could not be Omnifcient, unlefs there were <f Things for him to know : But does it from " hence follow, that thefe knowable Things are " Properties of God ? * " This you think is not a parallel Cafe: And therefore reduce it to fuch an one, as you think may be of Service to you. <f The Argument [fay you] fhould have flood <c thus, and then let the Author judge whether " it be conclufive, or no. An ImpoCTihiliry of «• ever being deceived belongs to God ; but with- cc out Omniscience^ this Impoffibility of ever being " deceived could not belong to God; therefore " God is omnifcient." f But this Argument is no more parallel, than you imagine mine to be. It is very plain, that it would not be impojjible for God to be deceived, if Omniscience was not a Pro perty of him: Arid therefore, fince it is impoflible for God to be deceived; it necelTarily follows, that Omniscience is a Property of him. But is it fo evident, that God cannot be Omniprefent^ if Space be TUX * Property of him? This wants Proof; for as yet we have feen Nothing but bare Af-
Dr. Clarkis Notions of SPACE, Examined p. 47. f Third Def. p. 41.
fertions
of SPACE Examined. 129
ferrions, — An Impoffibitity of ever being deceived is Omnifcience ; but Omniprcfence is not SPACE ; This fhews, that your Cafe is by no means pa rallel.
You fay, "If we confider it, we fhall find " that it is impoffible for a Being, to which SPACE " do?s not belong as a Property, to be indifcerp- " ible." * ~ I prefume you will hardly fay, that SPACE is a Property of any finite Spirit : And if not, then it is inpojjible for any finite Spirit to i:e indifierpible. You have here, Sir, advanced in Know ledge ; for you have written bur fix Leaves, fince you was fo uncertain in this Matter, as to fay only, that an immaterial Subir.ar.ee may be dit- cerpible* for ail that you knoiv f: Bur now it (ecms, It is impojjlble for any finite immaterial Suhibnce to be indijcerpible. Yet, what is Something ftrange, we ih ail find, if we look farther, that you have loft all this wonderful Knowledge again, and are reduced to your former Uncertainty : For, in the Vindication of your Second Defence^ you tell us again, that an immaterial Subftance may, for what you know, be divifible ¥J|C. — But let us hear your Realon why it is irnpoilible fora Being to which SPACE does not belong as a Property, to be in- difcennble : It is this; you fay, that f£as SPACE (< is a neceffarily exiftent Properry, there mud " be fome Subftance to which it belongs; and " that Subftance muft be Self-exiilvu, and there- "<c fore fuperior to all other Subftances, and con- «c lequenriy indifcerpible.'* ft
IN the fir ft Place, we deny SPACE to be a »o txifting Property : And, in the next Place,
Third Def. p. 41, f Ibid. p. 29.
Ibid. p. 90, ft Ibid, p, 41,
R tho'
130 Arguments for the Reality
tho* it be true, that // SPACE be a neceflarily ex- iftin"- Property, there muii be iotne Subftance to whidi it belongs, and that Subftance muft be&ff- cxijlent ; yet it does not appear, that there <**«<* be * S-lf-exiftent Subftance, unlefs SPACE he a neceffarily exifting Property. You go on ro (hew that SPACE may be a Property, and yet have Pro perties , and that />r^r//« may «d*r« in one ano ther. In order to this, you tell ihe Reader^ that what I fay upon this Point, "• is only railing a " Dilute about the Word-,, Figure and Shape ; « bur whichever of them is the Genus [fay you] « is nothinc to our Purpofe: Figure, or Shape, « let him take which he pleafes ibr the Genus, << in its general Meaning, is a Property of Fimte- " nets, or of all finite Subflances." -What . laid was nor merely rat/in* * Dilute tbout the Words •piture and Shye : My Obfervation, that Shape may be (aid to be the General of all ri^re, as well as Ft"ftre to he the General of all Shape, was to iliew nd Figure were only two different
that^ and Figure were ony two Words for the fame Thing : That they could not there fore be laid to be Modes of each other. Shape or Figure mud be confider'd either in die siktlraft or ^Concrete ; irf the former Scnfc it is a wre Idea, and therefore can have no Properties ascribed to it. In the latter, it has Exiftence m Body only, and therefore different Modes of it will in a'ftrid Sen'e be only different Modifca* lions of fad], or Body exifting under differe^ Shapes, To iay that particular Shapes are Modes of Fhure is talking of fared Figure: and to tell us, that " Rottndnefs is "not a Quality of Body, *« becaufe it cannot be applied io all Bodies 1 " is
* Third Def. p. 42. t Ibid-
trifling :
of SPACE Examined. 131
trifling : And I might as well tell you again, that it is not a Mode of Figure, for the hrne Rea- ion : For I would have you recoiled, whether it can be applied to all Figures,
ARGUMENT X.
*Tbe two DEMONSTRATIONS of the REAL EXISTENCE of SPACE.
" SPACE is either abfoltttelj Nothing, or a mere <c Idsay or a Relation between one Thing and ano- " ther ; or it is Body* or fome Suhjiance, or the <c Property of fome Subftance. But it is neither <c Nothing, nor a mere Idea, nor a Relation, nor Cf Body, nor any Subftance ; therefore it muft be a " Property of iome Sub'hnce." * This is Dr. CLARKE'S famous Demonftration (a? 'tis called) of the real Exigence of SPACE, which you had produced in your Firft Defence}. And this De- monflration you likewife endeavoured to fupporr, by other A4edia of your oivn, for the Benefit of Thofe who might not fee the Force of the Doctor's. Upon thefe I offered fbme Remarks **. You have fince endeavoured to vindicate the Doctor, and your felf, from the Difficulties I had raifed sgainfl you ; but { meet with little or nothing, but what has been already obviated; and therefore I fhould want the Reader's Excufe, were I to re- examine them minutely, and particularly. But leaft you ihould think what you have urged to
* Dr. CLARKE'S $fb Reply to Mr. LEJENITZ.
f Finl Dcf. p. 59.
** Dr. Clarke* Notions of SPACE, Examined.
R^ t:
1 32 Arguments for the Reality
be unanfwerable, were I to pafs them by without Notice, i Pnall make a few Strictures upon them, FIRST, SPACH ('tr, (aid) is not absolutely No- thing, in Proof of which you offer thefe three Things.
1. '• ft has Quantity, becaufe it has Length, <c which is Quantity " * — that is, Quantity is Quantify, SPACE has Quantity, therefore SPACE has Quantity. Wonderfully edifying This ! But I mu ft put you in Mind, that I deny SPACE to have Length which is Quantity. You fay "it is " plain that it has Length, for otherwile all Bo- <c dies would be equal and alike." f If this Ar gument has any Force, it lies too deep for me to fathom it ; and till it is brought to Li^ht, I iliall only fay, that I never yet heard of any other Reafon, for Bodies not being equal in Length, but that one was longer than another. The Dif ference is only in the Bodies themfelves.
2. // has Dimenfions. All the Proof you bring of This is, that ft Dimeniions are only Lengths <c every way, or Length, Breadth, and Depth. " ** This Argument mu.it therefore ihnd, or fall with the Former, for tinlefs you can prove SPACE to have Length, it will hardly appear to have Breadih> or Depth*
5. It has Properties — This you tell us, "has <c been fufficiently fhewn, and is unqueftionable."tt But thofe Arguments by which you think you SPACH to have Proerties,
are fujjicientlj avfiverd in their Place. You add thefe Words 'viz,. cc unlefs This, or fome other " Author can ftiew the Impoffibility of Properties
« Third Dcf. p. 45. f Ibid
** Ibid. P. 46. ff Ibid.
" in-
of SPACE Examined. 13 ^
« inhering in one another/' * But herein, Sir, you are greatly miilaken 1 for it is by no means in cumbent on us here to ihew, that Properties can not inhere in one another : No ; 'tis your Bufi- ne;s to prove that SPACE has Properties in order to prove us Exigence. We don't argue that SPACE is a Property, and therefore cannot have Properties • No; we deny SPACE to be a Property; and on ly urge that Properties cannot inhere in Proper ties, to (hew your Inconfiftency, who, at the fame 1 ime that you fay it is a Property, contend for its having Properties.
BUT my Principles, it Teems, tend towards A- t ; and why ? becaufe you affert that I fup- pofe SPACE to be ^Property of Body **. But what Rearon you could have for this I know not, when I neither affirm'd, nor intimated any Thino- like it. You ought, Sir, to have laid the PalT^e before the Reader, in which you pretend that I make: fuch a Suppofition : But the Cafe is, there u no Jkch Pajfrn as will fupport your Charge, and if the Reader will give himfelf the Trouble to turn to p. 53. of Dr. Claris Notions of SPACE examined, againft which Page, itfeems, the Accu- fation lies, he will foon be convinced that what you fay is without Foundation. To fuppofc SPACE a Property of Body, would DC a Suppofition aMb- lutely mconfiltent with my conllant Defcriprion of SPACE, as mere Nothing* or an Idea only, or tne Abjcnce of Body ,• snd few, I believe, will "ima gine, that I ftiould fuppofe the Abfencc of Body to be a Property of Body -The Reafon therefo/c
f Third Def. p. 46. f Ibid,
** Ibid.
of
134 Arguments for the Reality
of this Aflcrtion of yours, is what you are dill to account for.
SECONDLY, "SPACE [fays Dr. Clarke] is not " a mere Idea; for no Idea of SPACE can poili- fC bly be framed greater than finite, yet Reafon <f mews that it muft be infinite."* To which J anfwer.
SPACE may be confidered, either as a Void, a mere Negation of Body ; or as the Idea of Ext en/ion. All \he Infinity which can be applied to it under the former Confederation is inch as may be ap plied to Nothing. -It may be faicl to have no Bounds or Limits, not becaufe it is a Being really extend ed in infinitum* but becaufe it is no Being at all; and therefore has not Reality, or Exifience, fo as to be capable of having Bounds. The Infinity which is attributed to SPACE under the latrer Confide- ration viz,, as the Idea of Extenfon, is only the Impoflibility of fetting Bounds to that Faculty, which the Mind has of enlarging the Idea of Ex- ten/ton. Such Infinity is only a mere roving Idea, an indefinite Increafablenefs f. To imagine this to be a true pojitive Infinity, and to attribute it to a really exigent Being is all over Contradiction, and Abfurdiry; 'tis fuppofing it to \xpojitively in finite, and yet continually capable of being mcrea/ed* _ i.e. infinite and finite at the fame Time: oreife 'tis to find out a Number fo great as to admir of no ^Addition-, which is what has been always look* e.d upon to be the greateil Abfurdity poilible in
* Third Def. p. 47.
f To this Purpofe {peaks Mr. LOCKE. " Our Idea of (C Infinity even wlren applied to EF pan/ion, and Duration, f( fcems "to be Nothing but the Infinity of Number" — on H. U. B. 2. c. 16. §. 8.
of SPACE "Examined^ 135
Philofophy ; too great for any one to maintain, till Mr. JACKSON, in a late Piece, thought fit to obi ge the World with the Difcovery *
BUT it is laid, that we cannot but conceive SpACh to be infinite; that the Mind is not on ly capable of enlarging its Idea of Extenfion in in- pmtumy but that it cannot but enlarge it in infini* tu;n-\. I reply, this muft either mean in Reofon^ or in Imagination ; in Redjon we cannot but enlarge our Id a of Extenfion without Bounds, for other- wife our Faculty of enlarging muft be bounded ; but in Imagination^ what Idea we have of SPACE or Exunjion, is necefTarily finite and limited. We can think of a Yard, or Mile in length, or of the Diameter of the Orbis Magnus \ which will be having an Idea of a determinate Length, /. e. in the Language of thefe Gentlemen, of a determinate Quantity of SPACE.
IN the Vindication of your Second Defence p. 82. you fay, " were SPACE not truly, and pofi- " tively infinite, there muft be a Poffibility of •c flopping Somewhere, when we add finite SPA- <£ CES together."— To this I reply, that the Rea- fon why we cannot flop, in adding finite SPACES together (/. e. why we cannot ftop if we try to go on, for otherwife we may flop) is becaufe there are no Limits to our Faculty of Numbering, and therefore the Faculty of Numbering being bound - lefs is the Reafon, not only why we can go num bering on, or can enlarge our Idea of Extenfion in infinitum; but why we cannot but do it, if we t endeavour at ir. But this no more proves SPACE
* Sc-c Th? Exigence ami Unity of God proved from his Nature and Attributes — p. 87.
f See Exigence and Unity &c. p. 86,
to
136 Arguments for the Reality
to be any Thing pofitively infinite ad extra, than it proves Number to be fo. Ail the Truth then that I can find in this Proportion of Dr. Clarke's (viz,, no Idea of SPACE can poflibly he framed greater than finite, yet Reafon (hews it mutt be infinite) is This. viz,. That our Idea, of SPACE as Extenfon being an Idea of Imagination, fuch an Idea mud bz finite, yet Reafon fhews that we can repeat thefe Ideas, without ever finding any Limits* or Bounds to our faculty of Repeating.
MR. JACKSON obierves, that " we find we y" cannot but add in infinitum-> not to the Ideas " formed in the Imagination, there is foon an <l End of them, but to the Ideaturas or Thiws " Themjews." * But I think he might have known, that we deny there are xny Ideata or Things themfches in the Cafe. What he calls the Ideatum, in the Cafe of SPACE, is what we call a fold, or mere Nothing ; and why there is no End to SPACE under that Confideration, requires no great Sagacity to account. SPACE, confider'das a Foidy or a Negation of Body, has no End or Li mits, in the fame Senfe as Nothing has no End : And coniidered as the Idea of Extenfon, has no End or Limits, in the Senfe that Number has no End.
BUT you charge me with fuppojinr Matter to be infinitely expanded, i. c. as you explain it, that Matter may be made infinite f. And from hence you argue, that « if SPACE be a Poffibility of " the Exigence of Matter (as we allow) SPACE " muft be infinite." ** But you (hould have been careful here to have diiHnguiPaed between
* Exigence and Unity bV. p. 83.
f Third Dcf. p. 47 ** iSid. p. 47, 4g.
fofoive
if SPACE Examined.
fofiiw Infinity, and fuch an Indefinitenefs (impro per y called Infinity) as is predicate of Quantity I allow Matter may be infinitely expanded in the senfe; i.e. a Quantity may be fuppofed greater than .any given (for I have not as yet found out the laft Number.) But to fuppofe it capable of pofitive Infinity, is to fuppofe that no thing can be. added to it, that 'tis boundlefs and unmeafurable, that 'tis more than either Imagina tion or Number (without the help of Mr. [ACK- s.°*'s. Numeration Table) can poffibly reach to. Arid if any one will maintain fuch Abfurdities, I aflurc him, he fhall have no Controverfy with me.
You proceed next to argue for the real Exifl- tnce of SPACE, from the Difference betwixt That and Duration. Your whole Argument is petith Pnncipii. Becaufe we can talk of certain Ideas and make Proportions about them, therefore you would argue that they are real Entities : Becaufe we can predicate Things o£ Krtve, which cannot be pre dicated of ric€, therefore, according to you, they ftiuft be real Entia. SPACE or Extenfion has Re- fjteft to the flrft of a Body ; DURATION has nor, (which is the true Meaning of the notable Difference you have found between SPACE and DURATION viz,. «• that the bigger any Body is, < the greater Part of SPACE it requires for its Exiftence, whereas in DURATION, it takes up c the fame Part of it, whether it be great or «' imall.)"* This Difference I acknpwledge ^o be between SPACE and DURATION ; but it is only a Difference of Ideas. SPACE and DURA- I TION are two dffirem Ideas, applied to Body in
* Firlt Dcf, p. 6r,
two
Arguments for the Reality
two different Refpects, the one as to its Ex- tenfion, the other as to its mere Exigence con- fider^d as continuing. But this does not prove that SPACE and DURATION are any real Things differing in Themfelves : It proves only that they are different Ideas ; and not that either, or both of them muft have an objective Reality.
THE other Part of the DoclorS Disjunction we are both agreed in viz,, that SPACE is neither a Relation, nor Body nor fome Sub fiance. But in the Sequel, you carp at fome of my Expreflions, and endeavour to fuoport your Arguments, by a fuppofed Defect, or Inconfiftency in mine. Thus you obferve :
1. tc HE calls SPACE Nothing, and yet allows <c it to have a Relation to Something. Can No- " thing have a Relation to Something ? " * Can you really think that this deferves an Anfwer ? Has not Anatomj a Relation to the Unman Bodyy and Botany to Plants ; and yet will you fay that Anatomy ) and Botany are real Entia ? or thus ; the Quantity of Gold has Relation to its J$tdk^> which the Quality has not ; is Quantity therefore a real Entity ? — Pleafe, Sir, but to turn to my Fir ft Chapter concerning the different Senfes of the Term Nothing ; and I believe it will help you out of all your Difficulties.
2. You obferve £f that I feem throughout my €£ Reply, to imagine we can have an Idea of No- <f thing, from the Ai; fence of Something." f I anfwer -— we have an Idea of SPACE from, or by Reafon of the Abfence of Body : /'. e. We have firft an Idea of Body from S nfation ; snd then fuppolmg Body awaj, \vehave an Idea of SPACE:
* Third Def. p. Ji. f Ibid. p. 52,
of SPACE Examined. I 3 9
By refle&ing on what it is for Body to occupy Space, or to be endued with Solidity, or Impenetra bility, we perceive what is the Reverfe of This, or what Extenfion is without Solidity.
3. You call upon me to explain what I mean by an Idea of Nothing * ; which 1 do, by explain ing the Term Nothing, which is equivocal. If by Nothing, be meant a Negation of all Things both Real and Ideal, then an Idea of Nothing is no Idea; but if it means a Negation only of real Exiften- cies ad extra (in which Scnfe I have always ap plied it to SPACE) then an Idea of Nothing will be an Idea without an objective Reality ; and fuch may be the Idea of SPACE, for any Thing you have faid.
4. You fay that — cc as he thinks that ilmple cc Ideas may be Ideas of Nothings, he fhould find " out fome new Way to prove, that Things exift " without us &c." t
BUT I apprehend the old one to be (till very fufficient : Tho' I think 'tis pretty plain, that you make no Ufe of it. Your Way is to argue from Ideas to Things-, whereas Mr. LOCKE is of Opinion, that " the having the Idea of any Thing « in our Mind, no more proves the Existence of <c that Thing, than the Picture of a Man evi- cc denccs his being in the World, or the Vifions ec of a Dream make thereby a true Hiftory." ** The Cafe is, we are not fo to depend upon our Perceptions (be they Simple or Complex) as to conclude immediately, that every one of them mud: neceffarily have Objects ad extra corref- pondent to them. We muft examine them by;
* Third Def. p. 52. f Ibid,
f* May en H. U. B. 4. c. xi. §. i.
S z thofs
T.A.O Arguments for the Reality
thofe Ways which we are furnifti'd with, by Reafon, Experience, Attention,^, and I am per- fuaded, that none of Thefe will ever bear Tefti- mony to the real Exigence of SPACE.
BUT you "grant that the Idea of SPACE is c firft got from Body, that is, the Idea of the " Space or Extenjton of Body &c."* Pray Sir what do you mean by the Space of Body ? You are here fallen into the very Hypothec's you was fo lately fixing upon me; arid if therefore to make SPACE a Property of Bodj, be tending towards A- theijm, I hope you will remember whole Princi ples they are: And will likewife find our fome new Diftindion, to reconcile the two Hyporhe- fes, of SPACE being a Property of God, as well as a Property of Body -You fee, Sir, I do not think it fufficient to tell the Reader, that our Au thor fuppofa SPACE the Property of Body at the Top, or Bottom of a Page ; but I fairly produce the PafTage, againft which my Exceptions lie ; that any one may judge, whether I tax you falfly or not : To do otherwife, is an Art to which I can never prevail with my felf to defcend.
I HAD faidthat "we have no Idea, no Notion c at all of the Subftance of which SPACE is /aid c to be a Mode viz,, of the Self-exiftent Subftance : •—how then can SPACE be affirm'd to be a
Mode of him." f In anfwer to This, you would fliew that my Argument proves too much. You endeavour to make it follow from my Prin ciples, that we cannot know any of the Proper ties or Attributes of God. The Sum of your )bjedion may be thus comprifed w*f " He afT
* Third Def. p. 53.
r Br, Clark's Notions of SPACE, Examined p. 74.
" firm?
of SPACE Examined. 141
?c firms [fay you] that we cannot tell whether ;*' a particular Property can be applied to any Sub- I*' ftance, unlefs we have fome Idea, fome Notion >< of that Thing which we call the Subftance. " He lays likewife, that we have no Idea, no No- " tion at all of the Self-exiftent Subflance : How *' then can he prove Omnifcience, Omnipotence, and <c Eternity i to be Properties of God ; fince with- *c out knowing his Sttbflance (which he fays we fc know nothing of) we cannot tell whether they <c belong to him or no." And then you con clude, as before, with flinging out your Charge of ^4iheifm: "I fhould be loth [fay you] to en- <c tertain Principles whofe natural Confequences " lead fo near Atheifm, as thefe feem to do."*-- To this I anfwer, that there is no NeceiTicy of knowing the Subflance of God, in order to a Proof of fiich Attributes as relate not at ail to the Mo- dm of the Divine Exiftence. The Exigence it felf is one Thing, and the Alodus of that Exiftence quite another; a Perfon may know the former, and yet be wholly ignorant of the latter. We prove the Exiftence of God a pofleriori, or by afcending from Ejfett to Cattfi ; and from thence we deduce Qmnifcience, Omnipotence &c. Attributes which we pay, and do know to belong to God, tho* under an entire Ignorance of the Divine Stibftance, or of the Modus of his Exiftence. Nor when we call him Omnipotent, or Omnifcient, do we at all define his Subftance, any more than we define the Subpance of a King, by calling him Wife or Power ful. But how widely different is the Point with RefpecT: to SPACE, which you call his real Extcn- fon: For in Order to know that Extenjion is a Pro-
* Third Dcf. p. 58.
perry
j 42 Arguments for the Reality
perty of God, it is not diffident to know that he ixifls ', but a Knowledge is required hkewife of the Modus of his Exiftence, becau'e Exterfon relates to the Modus of Exigence: And therefore, fmce we know nothing at all of the Modus of God s Exiftence (which is what I meant by faying that we have no Idea, no Notion at all of the Suhftancc of which SPACE is affirmed to be a Mode) How can any one prefume to affirm, that SPACE is a Property of the Deity ? But you pretend to be clear in Subjeds the moft dark and my -enous, and to comprehend, what all Writers whether Divines or Philofophers, have allowed to be Incomprehen- fible. The Divine Subftance is be-ter known to you. than what you are daily and hourly con- verfant with: For you ask " will any one pe- « fume to fay that he knows not as much of the « SELF-EXISTENT SUBSTANCE as he does of *< MATTER?"* — Such Preemption deferves Rebuke rather than, an Anfwer ; 1 foall only ob- ferve with Relation to the Point in Hand, that to know that God cxilts, or to know thole Proper ties only which we p'ove muft belong to God, as being the Firfl Caufa is not fufficient to let us into the Knowledge, whether SPACE be a Pro perty of him or no, for the Reafons before given; (inlets SPACE be a Property of him, as being the Firft Caufe ; and if it be, then there cannot be a Firft Caufc, that is a God, without SPACE being a Property of him. But if there cannot, then, if the Proof ihould fail that SPACE is the Proper ty of God, or a Property ar all ; it will follow, that it cannot be proved there is a God -were I difpofed therefore, I might retort upon you witii
* Third Def. p. 58.
of SPACE Examined. 143
the utmoft JufHce the Charge of entertaining Prin ciples n>hofe natural Confeqttences leadfo near Atkeifm: » But I am fenfible that every ferious Debate fhould • be carried on with C almnefs, and that calling our Adverfary an Atheifl at every turn can be only to fupply the Defect of Argument, and fill up the Vacancies of Reafon ; a Charge as trite as it is defpicable : Nor could fome of the moil Learned and Religious efcape the Cenfure, when they have fallen into the Hands of malicious and calumniating Adverfaries *.
I AM far from fufpeding either you, or the Perfon in whofe Defence yoa are writing, to be lieve any of thofe ill Confequences to Religion, which feern to me to follow from your Doctrine. You contend that SPACE is the red Extenfion of the Divine Sttbftance ; now according to my Me- taphyfics, this is to Deify SPACE, and make it God himfelf. For I can think of Modes in no o- ther Way than thefe, either as ab ft ratt general Ideas (in which Senfe they have no Exigence ad extra) or as the modified Subftance it felf. Thus Ext en- fan is either in Ab/hafto, or in. Concrete ; in Ab- ftraolo 'tis a mere Idea, and in Concreto 'tis Body it felf : And I could never fee any Foundation
* Jac Frid. REIMMANNI £c. Hiftoria Uniuerfali? A- iheifmi &c. — Hildeji& apud Ludotphum Scbroeder — 1725 — This Author fliews that GROTIUSU, CUDWORTHD, LOCKE c, nay even the learned Dr. CLARKE himfelf have not been always free from this Accufation. --- His Words are thefe _ " SAMUEL CLARCK S. B. D. Reftor Ecclefiae " S. Jacobi Weftmonafterienfis & Sereniffimre Regime a " Sacris Ordinariis, Vir in Philofophia & Mathefi exerci- " tatiffimus, Arianifmi femet ipfum fecit reum, & Atheifmi " Infamia ab aliis not at us eft" — Sedl. 3. c. 8. §. n.
3.c.
344 Arguments for the Reality
for that Diftinftion of Sir ISAAC NEWTON.* and Dr. CLARKE f betwixt Immen/itas and 1m- wenfitm. If SPACE be Immenfaas Dei, if it be, as the Doclor calls it, rS lmmenfi\ it muft Be Pens ipfi, the TO Immcnfum. I fuppofe it would be thought a too fine-fpun Diftin&ion, if I fhould fay that the Deity of the Supreme Being is not the Divine Being himjelfi becaufe the Divine Be ing is DetiS) not Deltas. You fee what your Ar guments when examined will prove, if they prove any Thing : And does it not betray a fecret Doubt, a confcious Miftruft in Men, that they are svrong in a Point which yet they ftrenuoufly defend ; when they wrap up their Arguments in myilerious Expreffions, and hang as it were a Veil over their Reafoning ? If your own Sentiments- are not what your Arguments, if true, would prove; it may be neceflary for you to explain the following Paffage in your Firft Defence viz,. «' It may ^not appear fo proper to fay that He <c [God] is co-extended, or co-expanded with e- *' very Point of the botmdlefs Immenfity : For <e it is Hey his Exiftence, that ccnftittties every Point Cf of this Immenfity, IT is HE ALONE THAT «f is IMIVIENSE, and even Space it felf is not in- " finite independent of him." ^^ — Thefe are your Words, which I {hall leave the Reader to make liis own Remarks upon.
As to the Notion of God being extended', thatr it feems^ is thought a very defenfible Hypothefisl To me it appears big with Absurdities. In my Anfwer to your Second Defence, I remarked that
* Sec his Princ. Muh. Schol. Gen.
f Dr. CLARKE'S $tb Reply to LEIBNITZ.
;a* Firil Dcf. p. 57.
<c tO
of SPACE Examined.
" to fuppofe God extended is a very grofs No- <c tion." * But in your Vindication of that De fence, you tell me that, " if we put any other 44 Word for Extenfion that has the fame Mean- " ing, as Expanfion fuppofe, the GroiTnefs imme- <c diately vanifhes." f But I beg of you Sir, put me not off with empty Sounds ! If Expanfan has the fame Cleaning (which you here admit; as Extenjton ; then the Meaning is as grojs as ever. I conftfs Expanfon is a much prettier Kind of Word than Extenfan ; and a Poet would undoubt edly chufe it : But Poetry is not always Truth, any more than Rhime is Reafon. The Sound will not alter the Senfe. Exyanded> Gody tho* a fmoother Exprejflon, is yet as grojs a Notion, as Extended God, You may call Matter expanded if you pleafe, inftead of extended: But if you do, I believe every one, not excepting your felf, would ftill have the fame Idea of Matter they had before.
I SHALL next proceed to the Point of Eternal Creation.
* Dr. Clarke's Notions of SPACE Examined p. 128. f Third Def. p. 91.
CHAP,
146 Of ETERNAL CREATION,
CHAP. IV.
Of ETERNAL CREATION.
LE T us now proceed to enquire how the Con- troverfy {lands between us, in Relation to the Poffibility of an ETERNAL CREATION.
THAT a Being may have exifted from Eternity, without Beginning, and yet have been created by Another f has always Teemed to me to be an Hypo- thefis which carries its own Confutation with it, and is nothing lefs than a Contradiction in Terms. But what is there, which Some will not advance? 2nd when advanced by Some, that Others will not defend ? — I fliall endeavour to reduce the Difpute to as narrow a Compafs as I can. What we have to fay, may be diftributed under the three follow ing Heads.
1. THE Nature of Creation.
2. OF Caufe and Effeft.
3. OF Eternity.
i. FROM the Nature of Creation, I argued that God could not make an Eternal Creature, becaufe it implied a Contradiction : For That which is created, begun to exift, and therefore, to make an Eternal Creature is caulingThat to exift without Beginning^ Which yet, by being created, is fuppofed to have a Beginning. To this you anfwer by " de- <e nying that Creation implies a Beginning of Ex* *fi iftence*" that is, by denying That to be the true Senfe of Creation^ which all Writers, Logical and AJetapkytfealy have ever underftood it in.
5 Third Def. p. 66,
" Crca-
Of ETERNAL CREATION. 147
c Creation (fays one of them) is the Production of " Something out of Nothing, therefore That which cc is created cannot be eternal: For there nuift *' have been Nothing before there could be a Crea- " rwv." * And in another Place, ci a creating Caufi tc is that which produces an £$?$ «w/ of Nothing" | In this Senfe likewife Mr. LOCKE underftands Creation: " When the Thing (fays he) is wholly " made new, fo that no Parr thereof did ever exift " before \ as when a new Particle of Matter doth u begin to exift, in rerwn Natura^ which had bc- <c fore no #«'#£,— this we call Creation." ** And indeed, if this be not the Meaning of Creation, I would defire to know the Difference between Creation and Confers ation\\ ? Ic would be endlefs to mention All who have underflood Creation in this Senfe : It would be more proper for you to mention 0;;^who ever under/food it in any other. Since then every Creature muft have had a Begin ning of Exigence, it is evident that no Creature could have exifted from Eternity, or co-eval with his Creator. And indeed it appears to be fuch an Ablurdity, that one would wonder how any Man can maintain it : A dcjpifcd and abfurd Tenet, as
* Creitio eft Produftio Rei ex Nihilo, ergo quod crea-
tur non poteil ciTe icternum : oportet enim ninil fuifie,
antequam cre.iretur, — Burgerf. Injlitut. Mctapbyf. Lib. 2. c. X. Nk VII.
f Caufa Creans eft quze producit eftcclam ex nihilo- Ibid. L. i. c. 26. NJ. IV.
** Eiiay Ox^i H. U. B. 2. c. 26. §. 2,
-\-\- Caufa procreans dicitur, qace Rein efficit, quae antea non erat : Confer<vans9 quss efficit Rei exiftentis Darationem, EtiiZerf. In/lit. Met, L, I. c. 26. N". IL
T z Mr,
148 Of ETERNAL CREATION.
Mr. WHISTON, in his Reply to Lord NOT TINGHAM, juftly ftiles it*.
I SAID that tc whatever was created, did once <c not exifl" f This [fay you] " is true only in cc a certain Senfe, that whatever was created in Time, <f did once not cxifly but That which was from " Eternity, whether it was created or not, did m- «• ver not exift" ** But this is only begging the Queftion viz.. That what is created, may yet be from Eternity ; and aflerting that Creation does DO: imply a Beoinninv of Exiftence, and therefore it
• r J r i • r
requires no further Aniwer.
You object— ct If God had exerted this Power Cc from Eternity, and yet the EfFecl: was not from 16 Eternity, it is evident that there muft be a " whole Eternity pafs'd between the Exertion of <c the Power, and the Effed confequent upon that " Exertion; becaufe the EfFed has a Beginning, " and the Exertion of the Power has none." ft I anfwer : Jf by the Exertion of the Power, you mean the mere Att of the Will, then I fay, that
* " Nor do I quite defpair of feeing fuch fhrewd and cunning dtbanapaits, as Dr. W, driven to this loft E<va- fan, and of hearing them broach This other great Atba- nafian Myftery, how defpifed and abfurd an one foever, that any Creature whatsoever may be ftridly fpeaking, in Point of Duration, coeternal with its Creator" — Wbiftoits Reply to Lord Nottingham, p. 30.— -But it is proper that the Remark upon this Paffiige fhould be here added —
* Mr. Whifton ]\\ft\j calls it a defpifed and as fur d Tenet : ' only he happen'd to have his Thoughts a little \van- ' dering, when he cali'd it an Athanafian Myftery, inftead
* of calling it an Art an one. For I never heard of any f one Athanajian but what defpifed and rejected it. —
Waterlanfs Second Defence &c. QUERY XV. p. 363.
*f Dr. Clarke's Notions of SPACE Examined p. 93. ?* Third Def. p. 70. ff Ibid. p. 69.
the
Of ETERNAL CREATION. 149
the Exertion of the Power might have been from Eternity ) and yet the Ejfetl would not have exift- ed from Eternity. But then fay you Cf there mud <c be a whole Eternity pafs'd between the Exer- <c tion of the Power, and the Effed: confequent c< upon that Exertion." This Confufion arifes from confidering the Eternity of God, as Something really flowing fucceffively ; whereas your Difficulty would foon vaniili, if you would conceive it in than Scnfe, which feems to me to be the only true one ; and that is, <f uniform^ invariable Exiftence : or " Jlmple Exiftence , joined with Necejjity : by " which laft Word we only underrtand an Im- cc pojfibility of having ever begun , or of ever <e ceafing" * And if this be the true Meaning of God's eternal Exiftence^ then the Eternity of his Power of Willing muft be confider'd in the fame Light viz,, as an Impoflioiliry of its having be gun, or of ceafing : And then to fay that God wiWd This, or That Thing from Eternity will iignify no more, than that fuch a Thing was the invariable Will of God. Let us fuppofe then the Exiftence of his Creatures to be the invariable Will of God : Yet, as thefe are external Effefts of this Wdl-t they mud begin to exift : And then in this Way of considering it, the Eternity which you conceive Prior to their Exiftence^ and to be Something actually paft between the Aft of the Wilt, and the Exiftence of the Effeff, is only the pmfle Exiftence of the Deity.
IF by Exertion of the Power , be meant the fame as the aft ft at Production of the Creature (as indeed, to fpeak properly, it ought to be : For the Effect fhould be confidered in the Exertion of the
* Tranf of ABp. Kinfs Orig. of Evil - Remark [XC.l Ed, i. [R. C.]p. 66. Ed. 2.
• -Power,
Of ETERNAL CREATION.
Power ; becaufe the Power is not, ftrictly fpeak- ing, alluallj exerted,, till the Creature is produced) then I deny that the Power' could be attually ex erted from Eternity : For in this Senfe, the Exer tion of the Power has a Beginning, namely with the Exigence of the Creature.
BUT then you " delire to know the Difference " between having a Power from Eternity, with- " out being able to exert it from Eternity, and not having that Power from Eternity at all." * I anfwer here (as before) that if by exerting the Power from Eternity, be meant t\\Q Jtmple *dcl of the Will, then God could exert this Power from EternN ty. If the Effeft be taken into the Idea of the Exer~ tion of the Power) then indeed he could not exert the Power from Eternity ; but then there will Hill be a wide Difference, between not being a- ble to exert the Power from Eternity, in this Senfe, and not having the Power from Eternity at all. For to fuppofe the Power of creating attually exerted from Eternity mfuch a Senfe is, as has been {hewn, to fuppofe a Contradiction : And therefore, fince God cannot work Contradictions, the Power of creating cannot be attually exerted by him from Eternity /. e. he cannot produce an eternal Crea~ tare. But yet tho' he cannot make an eternal Creature, he has neverthelefs the eternal Power of Creating: Though he cannot exert the Aclion of eternal Creation? yet flill he has an eternal Power of exerting the Action of Creation : The Power is eternal, or invariable, but the ^Aciion^ the Crea tion muft be in Time, or muft begin. And fu re ly it is not difficult, to fee the Difference between having an eternal Power (tho' the aftaal Exertion,
* Third Dcf. p. 69, 70.
or
Of ETERNAL CREATION. 151
or Effect of this Power would be in Time) and not having the Power from Eternity at all.
I ARGUED that « the very Suppofition that God had a Power from Eternity to create* or c bring any Thing into Being, implies that What he had a Power to create, or bring into Bein^, ' muft be once out of Being." * « That is [faV ' you] in other Words The very Suppofinon ( that God had a Power from Eternity to create, c implies that he could not exert that Power from c Eternity /. e. he had not that Power from E- " ternity." f _ I aniwer : Power is one Thing, The Exertion of the Power is another. The Ex ertion of the Power is (ftridly) the aitn.il Crea tion, and Creation implies a 'Beginning of Exiftence : Therefore the Suppofition that God had a Power from Eternity to create, is that he had the Power from Eternity <£ giving Beginning to what was not; Ergo the very Suppofition that he had a Power to create, implies that What he had Power to create was not from Eternity. The very Power of do- *»£ fuppofes the Thing not done-, becaufe if the Thing be done, it cannot be faid, that it is in the Power of any Being to do it : For to have a Pow er of doing that which is already done, is a Con tradiction. Thus if any created Beings always ex- ifted, it cannot be faid, that it was ever in the Power of any Being to caufe them to ex if! : For they were never in Potentia> but always in Atlu. The voluntary Power rf doing miifi be Previous to the ning done: And therefore God might from Eternity have the Power of doing what, in the Na ture of the Thing, could not be actuaTy done from
* Dr. Clarke's Notion? of SPACE Examined p. 121. t Third Def. p. 83.
Eternity.
TS2 Of ETERNAL CREATION.
Eternity. But it does not follow, becaufe tfee actual Exertion of the Power, /'. e. the Thing created was not from Eternity, therefore God had not the Power from Lternity of creating. The Power of creating he had from Eternity, but the Thing created mud begin to exift. But it feems you can fee no Difference in that Diftindion, which I made between a Power from Eternity of creating, and a Power of creating from Eternity. I ar gued thus " that God had in himfelf a Power " from all Eternity of creating whatfoever, and <c whenfoever he pleafed, is moft undoubtedly true : " But that he had a Power of creating Beings from " all Eternity, i. e. that he had a Power to create <c eternal Beings, is undoubtedly falfe." * To this you anfwer " I beg leave to obferve here, that " This is undoubtedly inconfiftent with his own *« Notion ; for if God could create wkenfoever " he pleafed, he could create from all Eternity, be- " cauie he could certainly pleafe from all Eternity, <c otherwife he had not free Will from all Erer- " nity." t To which I reply.
FIRST, God could not create from all Eternity i. e. he could not make an ct.rnal Creature, becaufe it is^a Con trad id ion ; yet he had a Power from Eternity of creating wkenfocwr, that is, ar whan Time foever he pleafed : But creating in Time is not creating from Eternity, therefore I am undoubt edly confident.
SECONDLY. God had always the Power of creating, and could create whenfoever he pleafed ; but yet he could not create a Being, which fhould neverthelefs cxifi from Eternity ; becaufe Creation is an Attion, and has Relation to an external Effttk,
* Dr. Clarke's Notions of SPACE Examined p. 91. f Third Def. p. 67,
and
Of ETERNAL CREATION.
and therefore muft be in Time} and although God was always free to exert this Power of creating, yet he could not exert it fo as that this 'voluntary Exertion (in which I include the Lffett) fhould be without Beginning. « The fuppofing an Adion c (fays a late judicious Writer) fuch as theeffed- c mg of Matter muft be, deftroys the Idea of < Eternity in the Thing effected by that Adion. c Every Adion muft have a Beginning and an c Endy thefe are included in the Conception of c Adion ; for if it were without a Beginning, f the Thing is not yet begun ; and what was c never begun cannot be now ended, as the Pro- ' dudion of Matter is. The denying theje Li- c mits to Adion, amounts ftill ro an abfolute ' Negation of it. And to fay Matter was pro- c duced without Adion, is as much as to fay, c it was efFeded without Agency or Efficiency! c -. Tho- it be certain that 'the 4gent is eternal^ c it will never follow that any particular Att is " eternal. It is the Nature of any particular Ad • to be circumfcrib'd and temporary, that is, in «' other Words to be limited both before and be- c kind, which is a Condition inconfiftent with E- < ternity/»f-In Ihort there may be an eternal Power, yet not an eternal jlttion. For as the <A- gent is eternal, the Power muft be fo too, becaufe Power is one of his e/ential Attribute^ and there fore that Being whose Attribute it IF, cannot be fuppofed to exift without it. But then the aftttal Exertion of this Power relates to Somerhing ex- theattttal Exertion of the Power of creating
Soul —
con*
154 Qf ETERNAL CREATION.
confider'd as the adual Creation, muft have a Be ginning.
i. FROM the Nature of Caufe and Effeft, I ar gue that an eternal Creation is impoiTible. Caufes may be confidered, either as Voluntary, or Necef- farj* The Caufe which we are here concern'd with is a voluntary Caufe : For it is admitted, that God is the voluntary Caufe of thole Things which he has created, that is, that he did not create them necejfarily, but out of his Ovvn free Wdl and Pleafure: that they did not flow from him as Light from the Sun, but that they were the Effects of a free Agent *. If then the Exigence of a voluntary Caufe muft be prior to the Exiflence of the Ejfeft, then it is plain, that the Effett could not exifl from Eternity ^ or coeval with the Exiftence of the voluntary Laufe. There is indeed a Senfe, in which an Effeft may be faid to be coeval V7\th involuntary Caufe viz. as No Thing is ftridly fpeaking a Caufe, till it produces an Effett. Thus if I put a Body into Motion, I am not properly a Mover till the other Body is moved y or, a Father is not a Father^ till he has a Son. The Caufe and Effett* in this Scnfe, may perhaps be allowed to be coeval, confider'd merely as Caufe and Effeft : For this is a Relation which equally depends upon bothy and cannot fubfifl in one alone : The Effed is not an EJfeft, before it be cattfcd, nor can the Caufe be ftriclly a Caufey till it pro duces an Ejfeft. But this will be of no Service to you in the prefent Quefrion, nor prove that a Creature may exift coeval with its Creator : For in the forementioned Senfe, every Effect mud be coeval with its voluntary Caufe : livery Thing
* See Tbirj Dcf. p. 74.
which
Of ETERNAL CREATION,
which God has created, or will create, mud be coeval with him confider'd merely as Creator of thoie Things. If God mould create a Being to Day, this Being would be coeval with GocUon- fider'd merely as the Cattfi of it, for he was not the Cauje or Creator of this Being, till the Being was produced. But this I fay makes nothing for you in the prefent Debate: For the Queftion here is, not whether an Effeft may be coeval with its Cattfe, confider'd merely as Cattfe and Effect, but whether the Exiftence of the Thing effctted can be coeval with the Exlflence of the voluntary dvent, which produced it, not confider'd in the relative Senfe of Cauje, but in the abfolute Senfe of Being: If it cannot, then the Exiftence of a Creature can* not be coeval with the Exiftence of its Creator, and confequently no Creature could exift from Eternity i. e. there could not be an Eternal Creation.
To all thofe Arguments which I urged again ft you, founded upon the Supposition that the Ex iftence of a voluntary Caufe muft be -prior to the Exiftence of the Effect, you only anfwer by cal ling upon me to prove it f. But that it muft be fo, is fo very evident, that I believe there are Few, who will think it requires any Proof. However [ lhall endeavour to give you one.
IT is admitted, that God is! the voluntary Caufe of thofe Beings which are fuppofed to be created from Eternity. Ex Hypotheji then, God could cbttfe whether he would have created thefe Beings or not; therefore it was in his Power not to have created them , from whence it follows, that there
f See Third Dcf. p. 68, 70, ;j.
V a mull
156 Of ETERNAL CREATION.
mud be a Time pre-fuppofed to their Exiftence: For after they arc created, it is not in the Power of God not to have created them : If therefore it was ever in his Power not to have created them, it muft be before they exifted^ and confe- quently there was a Time when they did notex- ift : For to fuppofe that thole Things might not have been, which always actually were> or that there was a Time when thefe Beings might not have been created, ana yet that there never was a Tims when they were not aftually in Being, appears to be a manifeft Contradiction. — Again, I would ask, whether thefe Creatures^ which you fuppofe never to have been out of Being, might have been created any way different ftom what uhsy were ? If you fay, no ; you limit Omnipotence, and in Effect overturn the Suppofition of God's being their 'Creator in any proper Senfe, or tht voluntary Caufe of their Production. But if you anfwer in the Affirmative, then there muft have been a Time when they were not in Being : For if God could have created them in any Manner different from what he did create them, it follows, that there was a Time when their Modus of Exiftence was con- lixgent: But as nothing can exifl before it exifts in jome Manner •, fo that whofe Modus of Exiftence was contingent i muft be contingent as to its Exiftence alfo: For if the Modus of it was contingent, and the Exiftence not fo, then it muft have once exifled without any Modus of Exigence i. e. it rauft^ have exifted, and not have exifted at the fame Time. Whatever then was contingent as to the Modus of its Exigence, was contingent like- wife with Refpedt to Exiftence it fe/f; and that whofe Exiftence was contingent i. e. which might or
Of ETERNAL CREATION. 157
wight not have exifted, could not have cxiftcd from
Eternity *.
You grant that-" God is a free aftive Being; <e and therefore it depended upon his own good- : Will and Pleafure, whether any Effects at all, " or at any Time, mould proceed from his Pow- V er."f Now this is in Confequence granting the Queftion. For That which exifted from £- ternity could not depend upon thePlea/ttre of any other Being, whether it mould have exifted or not, becaufe it always actually did exift. If it depended upon the Will of God, whether any Effetts at all* or at any Time flionld proceed from his Power, is it not a neceffary .Concluiion, that there mutt I have been a Time when there were not any Effdh at all. Does it not plainly fuppofe a prior Time for God to chufe ?
I HAD argued, that whatever exifted from Eter- nity would be neccffarily-ex$ing, and therefore, if created Beings might have been Eternal, there mi^ht have been neceflarily-exifling Creatures, which I looked upon as an Abfurdity**. In anfwer you fay, that I have <c not yet ihewn, that what was
* It is certain that fame other Being determined the Manner of Matter's Exigence at firft, and therefore the Ex igence it felf, or gave it Exigence, fmce Exigence with- -tout a Manner is impoffible. Now let a Man anfwer it to nis own Underilanding, if xvhen Matter got Exigence, that doth not plainly imply that it had it not before it %of it. And if it ever was without Exiftence, whether its Exiil- f encc can be Eternal. It appears to me, that to fay, an I EffeCl may be Eternal, is the fame as to fay, a Thing
Which had a Beginning may want a Commencement ,
Enquiry Into the Nature of the Human Soul. Sect. VIII N'. XIV. p. 357.
t Third Def. p. 74.
** See Dr, Clarke's Notions of SPACE, Examined p. 94.
tc from
158 Of ETERNAL CREATION.
" from Eternity, muft therefore be neceflarily e<- exifting." * If the Proof which I have already given be not fufficient, take the following viz.. Whatever always exified did never not exift , and That which did never not exift was never under a Poftibility of not having exifted, therefore vv hat ex ift cd from Eternity muft be neceffarily exifting. If you fay that what did never not exift may be un der a Pollibiliry of not having exifted •> I ask, When was it under fu h a Poflibility \ and by that Time you have furnillied out an An'wer to this Qiie- flion, you may perhaps lee the A:;furdity of your Suppolition.
UPON the whole — Your Errors upon this Head arife from not diftinguifliing between willing and aftingi or betv/een determining to create, ana aclttally creating. God's Will, Pleafure, Deter mination, or Choice a-e eternal as his Exiftence (becaufe he is immutable) for rh*y are not the lame as Aftion> but follow neceflarily from his be ing endued with fuch or fuch Attributes ; but the affttal Execution of his Will muft, from the Nature of the Thing, be in Time: Afts flowing from Choice muft be fubfequcnt to fuch Choice ; and confeqnently God muft have the Power, be fore it coi^d be exerted. This I take to be lit tle lef* than Demonfiration, and therefore is not to be encounter'd with Difficulties, which muft necefTarily attend our Endeavours to explain the Manner of the Divine Exift ence. You may go on objecting that he muft, according to This, have exifted a ivMe Eternity, without being able to exert his Power; yet this will have no Force, when the Arguments are clear and convincing,
* Third Def. p. 70.
that
Of ETERNAL CREATION. 159
that he could not create but in Time, The Diffi culty you throw in the Way, arifes from our want of knowing the Manner of the Divine Ex- iftence ; or I mould rather fay, that your Diffi culties are owing to your conceiving his Exig ence in a -wrong Manner, and talking about it in improper Language. You are confidering the Di vine Exigence in the Way of fucceffiw Duration ; you are fpeaking of a whole Eternity ; whereas 'tis evident that Succeffion cannot poffibly be applied to God, nor whole to Eternity, Whole and Part being only Relations of fnite Exigences*. But we lhall lee the Abiurdity of This ftill more evi dently by attending, as I pronofed,
3. To the Nature of ETERNITY; which e- vmces beyond all Quertion the Impoffibility of Eternal Creation. I had /aid enough upon this Head in my laft Piece f to have convinced any at tentive and unprejudiced Reader. Every Argument againft an Infinite Series will prove as ftrongly againft an Eternal Creation. For every created Be ing is changeable, and muft therefore ex i ft per Mo- dum fitcceffionh : But Succeffion implies Beginning ; therefore a Creature cannot be eternal. Here die minor Proportion only is (I think) what you will call in Queflion ; and this has been fo fully proved by Dr. CUDWORTH **, Dr. BENTLEY ft. and Mr. LAW *t» in their Arguments againft aa
* See Air. LOCKE'S Eflay on Hum. Underitand. B i c. 4. §. 6. — Edit. 9.
f See Dr. Clarke* s Notions of SPACE, Examined r. S8. &c.
** Intcll. Syft. p. 643. — & 8-13. -}f Boyle's Left. Serin. 3.
*f Tranfl.uion of ABp, Kin^s Origin of Exil. Note 18.
Infinite
i6o Of ETERNAL CREATION,
Infinite Series ; that it muft be needlefs to add any Thing more to what They have faid. But let us fee what you have offer'd in Objection.
You had advanced in your Fir ft Defence, what I call'd a Riddle^ but as you don't like that Term, let it be call'd an jfkjurditj, a Word which flats it better. It (lands thus : <c There is a Time t6 *c come which never will be prefent" : and <c there <c is a Time now actually paft which never was <c prefent. " * This you defend, by urging that <c there is no Abfurdity in faying that all future " Time is to come ; and that all Time that has cc been, is paft ; for to come^ means no more than « future'' f Be it fo : What is future then, is to come ; and what is not future ', is not to come. But then, what never will be prefent, is not future, and confequently not to come. Again — all Time, fay you, that has been, is paft; right ! .But what has not been, is not paft. Now that which never was prefent, never has been ; and therefore is not attuallj paft. A little lower you have given an In- ftance by way of llluftration viz,. a fuppofe, a( «c Man to move from any given Point dirt&Iy <c forward, and to move on infinitely ; it is plain <c that there will be SPACE for him to go through " for ever; and the SPACE which he is to go ct through, will be before him; and as SPACE is" « Infinite, there will be SPACE which he never <c will arrive at." ** Now what SPACE is That
p. 45. Ed. i. — N. 10. p. 46. Ed. ?,. Remarks referred to in Note 18. [X fc] Edit. i. — Rema.ks refer'd to in Note 10. [R. l~\ Edit. 2. N. 5. p. 13. Edit. i. — N. 3. p. 16.
Edit. 2.
* Firft Def. p. 27.
t Third Def. p. 75. ** Ibid.
\vhiclr
Of ETERNAL CREATION. 161
which the Man will never arrive at ? I prefume ic is the End: I ask then, again, what is the Reafon that he will never arrive at the End of SPACE ? I know not any Thing you can fay, but that it is, becaufe there is no End for him to arrive at. To /ay then, that there // SPACE which he never will arrive at, and by That SPACE to mean the End i is fay ing that there is an End which he will never arrive at : and fince at the fame Time you fuppofe, that the Reafon why he will not arrive at the End is, becaufe there is no End ; it is plain ly faying, that there is an End, and no End at the fame Time. By faying that there is SPACE which neper -will be, arrived at, you mean the fame as you do when you fay, that there is a Time to come> -which never will be prefent. By the SPACE which never will be arrived at, and by the Time which never will be prefcnt, you mean the End of SPACE, and the End of DURATION : Bur as you fuppofe both SPACE and DURATION to have no Ends, it is evidently abfurd to talk of their Ends, or of their being to come.
" To come^ [lay you] with Refpedl to TIME rc or DURATION, means only the fame as before, in " a Motion through SPACE; and pafl, with Re- " fped to TIME or DURATION, may be taken in " the fame Senfe as behind, in a Motion through <c SPACE, fuppofing a Perfon to have moved from " Infinity in SPACE." * But remember, Sir, thac if DURATION be fuppofed never to have begun, and never to end; then neither a Beginning, nor an End, can be faid to be behind or before, or any where elfe, any more than to be to come, or to be faji. So if SPACE be allowed to have neither Zfr-
* Third Def. p. 75.
X
162 Of ETERNAL CREATION*
ginning nor End \ no End or 'Beginning can be (aid to be behind, or before the Man in Motion.
THE Learned Dr. BENTLEY, in fhewing that to fuppofe infinite Generations of Aden already pafl is a Contradiction, began with obferving, that " whatfoever is now paft, was once actually pre- ec fent." * This Argument you charge with e- qually proving " againft the Exiftence of the Dei- cc ty from all Eternity " ; and your Reafon for it is This ; viz,. ft Becaufe, if there is not a Time> " or a Part of Duration paft which never was «' prefent^ then there was a Beginning of the Exifl- " ence of God" f Now, Sir, the Difficulty re turns upon your felf : For I beg Leave tp affirm, that not Dr. BENTLEY'S, but YOUR Arguments will prove againft the eternal Exiflence of the Deity. For you fay te there is a Time now actually paft9 " which never was prefent." Butiffo, then That Time could not be prefent to the Exiflence of the Deity ; confequently the Exiflence of the Deity was not prefent to that Time ; therefore there was a Time, to which the Exiflence of the Deity was not pre- fent ; i. e. There was a Time when God did not exifl. This Argument is conclufive, and the Con- fequences unavoidable by Thofe, who imagine the Eternity of God to be an Infinite Series of fftccejflv& Duration : Nay, the Notions of thefe Gentlemen will ftill appear moreabfurd, if we confider, that they fuppofe this Sttccejflon of Time to be the Flow ing of God's Exigence : For if it be, and there be likewife a Time now actually paft which never was prefent ; then it follows, that there is a Period of God's Exiflence now actually pafl, which never
* Boyle's Left Sernl. 3, f Firft Def. p. 27.
Of ETERNAL CREATION. 165
was prefect ; that is, God's Exigence was not pre- fent to every Period of his Exigence /. e. he did
exift, and did not exift at the fame Time.
You fee into what inextricable Difficulties, and Abfurdities your Notions will precipirate you ! and when you have endeavour'd to difperfe thele Clouds, you will perhaps have Light enough to difcern, that Succeffion cannot be applied to the Deity.
BUT this Objection, and that which you bring again ft Dr. BENTLEY'S Arguments, affecl: thole, and thofe only, who fuppofe the Eternity of God made up of fuccejfive Parts ; and you fliould have remember'd, that this is what we conftantly deny. 'Tis a Difficulty which lies, and will for ever lie, againft your Manner of conceiving the Di vine Eternity ; and fuch a Difficulty, as I am periuaded not all the Wit of Man can get over. Eternity^ and SttcceJJion appear to me to be Ideas quite as incompatible? as Infinity and Finitenefi: Sue- cejjive Eternity is juft as good Senfe as red Sound, or loud Colour. 'Tis in the very Nature of Time to admit of a conftant Increase, and therefore ic can never arrive at Compleaineff, or a real po/itive Infinity •, and confequently it can never be applied to God, whole Exiftence is perfect, whofe Conti nuance is ft able and permanent, without 'Beginning or Endy without Poflibility of receiving any Ad dition or Increase, "comprehending in the Stability lc and immutable Perfection of his own Being, l.is f< Yefterday, and to Day, and for ever.'' * '" The " Duration- of every Thing ({ays the very Learn ed and Judicious Dr. CUDWORTH) " mu/l of K NeceiFity be agreeable to its Nature , and there-*
* CUDWORTH lutellcil. Syd. p^ 644,
X i ' ««
164 Of ETERNAL CREATION.
« fore, as That whofe imperfett Nature is ever " flowing like a River, and confifts in continual (c Motion and Changes one after another, mult needs Cc have accordingly a fuccejjive and flowing Dura- ec tiofty fliding perpetually from prejent into paflt cc and always polling on towards the Future*) ex- <£ peding Something of its felf, which is nor yet et in Being, but to come: So muft That, whofe *c perfect Nature, is eflentially Immutable, and al- *c ways the fame, and neccffarilj exijlent, have a <c permanent Duration; never lofing any Thing of <t it felf once prefent as 'fliding away from it; <c nor yet running forward to meet Something of <c it felf before, which is not yet in Being : and ^ it is as contradictious for it,- ever to have begun, " as ever to ceafe to be." *
I SHALL quote one Paffage more from a very Learned Writer, \vhich by the Way, had you read, might have hinder'd you from making that Objection to his Arguments, that they equally proved againft the Exigence of the Deity from all Eternity. After he has fhewn by thofe Arguments, the Impoflibility of fuccef- five Duration being actually, and fofttively Infinite i or that infinite Succeffions fhould be already gone and paft ; He well, and judicioufly obferves, <c Neither can thefe Difficulties be applied to the <e eternal Duration of God Almighty, For tho* <c we cannot comprehend Eternity and Infinity : « yet we underfland what they are not. And <£ Something, wearefure, muft have exifted from <c all Eternity ; becaufe all Things could not e- <c merge and ftart out of Nothing. So that if ?' this pre-exiftent Eternity is not compatible with
* CUDWORTH Intelled. Syft. p. 645.
^
Of ETERNAL CREATION. 165
" a fucceflive Duration, as we clearly and diftindl-
ly perceive that it is not; then it remains that
" fome Being, though infinitely above our finite
c Comprehenfions, muft have an identical, inva-
c riable Continuance from all Eternity; wnich
" Being is no other than God. For as his Na-
c ture is perfecl: and immutable without the leaft
" Shadow of Change; fo his eternal Deration is
" permanent and indivifible, nor meafurable by
« Time and Motion, nor to be compared by Nuin-
<c ber of fucceflive Moments. One Day with the
<c Lord is as aTkottfand Tears, and aTi-Joufand Tear*
*s as one Day"*
THERE remains one Argument more to be taken Notice of. You endeavour to prove, not only that it was pojjlble for God to create }rom Eternity* but that it is probable he actually did fo. Your Ar gument is This. " Since God always ads upon « fome Ground or Reafon, from thence it follows, " that he had fome Reafon for Creation, orher- " wife he never would have created at all. If « then he had any Reafon, that Reafon certainly cc was the fame from all Eternity, that it was at « any particular Time: For Jnflance, fuppofe " Goodnefs was the Ground of his Creation, it <e follows that if it was good at any particular " Time, it was equally fo from all Eternity. For <e as he himfelf is, and always was immutable, and «c invariable, every Thing was the fame with Re- <c fpeft to him from Eternity; and before the « Exiftence of any Thing but himfelf there can " be no external Caufe to determine it either ways. « It is therefore very probable, that as it was a!- « ways good in him to create, that he always did
* Dr. Bentlefs Boyle's Left. Scrm. 3.
" create
i66 Of ETERNAL CREATION.
<c create, and did therefore never exifr. alone." * This Argument muft be refolved into the follow ing Principle viz,. That whatever God created, 'tis probable he created from all Eternity; for " what- <c ever it was good for God to create in Time, «c it was equally good from all Eternity." But if this be admitted, then it will follow, that it is probable that he actually created the World, and all Things in it from all Eternity, and therefore, that, not only Angels and A/Jen> but that every other Species of Creature^ every Planet with ail its Inha bitants were eternal. It likewife follows from your Principle, that God cannot ever hereafter create any view Species of Beings ; becaufe, whatever it is good for him to create in Time, it was equally good from all Eternity, and therefore it is probable, ac cording to you, that he cannot create any Beings but what t.e created from Eternity. If your Princi ples were purfued in all their Confequences, I know not where they would flop : But if thefe already mentioned, Aiall be thought extravagant, the Ar gument from which they are deduced muft be thought fo too.
I HAVE now, Sir, gone through your Third Defence, and have anlwer'd your feveral .Arguments, and Objections. I .am afFraid the Reader will think I have been too particular, in taking Notice oi: fome Quibbles, which, in Reality, deferve no Anlvver : but as Sophiftry may prevail with a great many Perfons, I thought it might not be wholly unncceflary to detect it. With Relation to SPACE, it appears, that you have defcended to the lowed: Shifts in order to fupport your Hypothefis ; and in Refpect to the Pqfffcilitj of an ETERNAL CREA-
* F;rft Dcf. p. 56,
TIONj
Of ETERNAL CREATION. 167
TION, you have been forced to deny the Truth of two Maxims, as felf-evident, and univerfal as any in Philofophy vi*,. that Creation implies a Be- ginning of Exijience : and that the Exijience of a vo luntary Efficient mnft be prior to the Exijience of the Ejfett it produces. I fhall now, Sir, take Leave of you for the Prefent, homing, if you fli all here after think proper, to oblige the World with any more Defences, and me with any more Anfoers, that you will take a Method different from what you have hitherto done ; and endeavour (if you can) to fupport your Caufe, by Rational, and Philofophical Arguments.
REMARKS
i68
REMARKS
O N
Mr. JACK SON's
EXCEPTIONS :
T O
Dr. Clarke's Notions of SPACE Examined.
MR. [ACKSON> at the end of a Piece not long fince by him Publifhed, entitled The Exiflence and Unity of God &c. has thought proper to add, as he calls it, a Short Con- Jtderation of Dr. Clarke's Notions of SPACE Ex amined ; which Short Confederation, he tells us, he thinks to be a Sufficient Reply. The whole is flight* and fuperficial ; and the Author takes great Care always to fpeak with moft jiffurancC) where his Reafoning feems to be the weakeft : As if a De clamatory Style was to fupply the Defeft of Proof * and the Reader was to be put off with Words, in- ftead of Arguments*) I find fcarce any Thing in it but what has been already obviated, and had not the foregoing Papers been preparing for the Prefs, I fhould not have thought it worth my Time to have taken any Notice of it : But I fhall now fiing out a few brief Remarks upon what he has
^ . +** . - - ~ L. _^ ^_ .
faid.
THIS
REMARKS &c. 169
THIS Gentleman opens his Performance with \vifely obferving that "This Author's Notion of *c SPACE, is, that it is a mere Nothing, z mere Nc- " gation and Absence of Things ; yet lie perpetu- " ally ralks of it as a real Exiftent." J And what then ? We are under a Neceflity of fo doing, trom the very Nature of Language. We talk of *b$ra& Idea;, as if they were real Beings, ju/t a* the Poets talked of Fortune as a GW%/," of Virtues, Pices* Difeafes & . as if they were real Ferfons. And if he will turn to my Second Chapter p. 14. &c. fa may receive farther Information,
[ SAID that " the bigger any Body i^ the more
" SPACE it requires for its Exigence, is true ,
*c The larger any Body is, the more SPACE we " fay it requires for its Exigence." f Thde Sen tences Mr. JA :XSON quotes from me, and then obferves that <c Thefe Inconfiftencies and Contra- <c diftions are tnc necelfary Confequence of deny- " ing the Exlfle»cs of SPACE," *** The Contra- didion here meanr, I iuppofe, is that I ihould talk of more SPACE, and yet call SPACE Nothing? But this Gentleman inould not have left cut the Sentence which immediately follows one of thofe he has quoted • For tL it v/ould have lliewn him the true Meaning of the Expreflion, The Sentence runs thus -z/^, ^ The larger any Body is the more' " SPACE we-i&y it requires for its Exiftencc :• <f that is, in plain Engfijb, the larger any Body is the " more or tk farther i extended" ff Jn
this I fee neither IiKonfiflency, nor Ccntraciclion,
* Exigence anJ Unity &c. p. 145. f Dr, Clarke's Notions of SPACE Examinee! p, 61, 62. ** Exigence and Unity p. 148. . f| Dr. C/flr&'i Notions of SPACE, Examined p. 62,
REMARKS
any more than there is, in affirming Tome Bodies to be heavier than others, and denying Wekkt to be any thing more than m ah jlr aft Idea.
« THE^ Idea of Ab'ence [fays he] is not the
of Quantity, or Extension, as the Idea of
PACE evidently is." * I anfweY, the Idea of
JPACP, is Ideal Exterfon, 3fid fo is the Idea of the
**&Jaxe of Body, and Ideal Extcnfanis Ideal Qu*n-
tie bblerves, that "we have the fimc 7^'
SPACE, or Extender,, when Matter is pre-
nr, as when it is abfenty. artd'even as exiftinp-
«c /» and. between the Parts of foli'd Matter." f
JTo thiv I reply, that we have the /feof Extw-
: when Matter is prcjcnt, but* not of SPACF ;
I therefore it is nor, as this Author Imagines, the jame Idea of Extenjion when Matter is prefent* as when it is abfent: For in the former Cafe, it rs real Extenfion, our Idea has a real Archetype - but in the latter Cafe, it is only Ideal Extenflon\.L SPACE, Bur what does this Author mean by SPACE exiftingfoW«« the Parts of iolid Matter"? For if there is SPACE between the Parts of folid Matter, which I prefume he will allow to touch, and two Bodies do not touch when there is SPACE between them; I may ask, where is the Difference between touching and not touching ?
" THR next Thing (fays Mr. J!CKSON) tO: e taKen Notice of, is a Piece of Reafonine,
vluch this Gentleman feems to value himHf " upon/' He then quotes a PafTage from m\ ; where I endeavour to fhew, that the Reafon why the Idea of SPACE, when all Matter is fuppofed
* Exigence and Unity p. 148
t IHd.
** Ibid. p. ,49.
: '
Mr. JACKSON QV.
to be annihilated, ftill rafhes into the Mind i<? becaufe SPACE is Nothing. But pray how came this Author to imagine, that I valued my feJf 6p6n this Reafomng ? If he means that I think it a_ Piece of Reafoning which he cannot confute, he is much in the Right of it. All the value . Know m it is, that (as it feems to me) ir is true, and Truth is valuable every where. But Mr. JACKSON thus remarks upon it viz. '"I am ' ferry I cannot help thinking, that all this fine " Reafonmg is arrant Nonfinjc." * —To which I have nothing more to fay, than that I am forry this Gentleman, above all Men, iliould not remem ber that Calumny is no Convitiion f .
" CAN any Thing [fays he] be more abfurd, than to talk of a mere Nothing ruihino into " our Minds, and forcing its .Idea upon us whe- ' ther we will or no." ** It does not rum in to our Minds whether we will or no, in one Senfe, that is, we may chufe whether we will think at all about it; but when we do think of it, and try to fuppofe it annihilated then it is that the ftme Idea ftill rufhes into our Minds : And let any one try if he can, even in Thought, ANNI HILATE Nothing. -Ky Nothing milling into our Minds, I only meant, that when we fuppofed e- very Thing annihilated, we could not help having an Idea, that Nothing would remain : And there fore it would be Nonfenfe to talk of any farther Annihilation.
1 HAD remarked, that we could fay the fame of Nothing as of SPACE - « Let him fay (then * Exiftcnce and Unity p. 149.
f The Title of a calumniating Book written by M5r. JACKSON.
f* Exigence and Unity p. 150,
Y z « fays
172 REMARKS on
" fays Mr. JACKSON) and be confident, that " Nothing, a mere Nothing is ntteffarttj Exiftent,
Eternal^ Infinite, Immoveable^ Incomprehensible^ €< comprehend'- all Matter > and all finite Things ; cc that in Nothing we live, wove, and have our Bc- " ing*;c."* To all which I ftillanfwer, that we may full as well *alk thus of Nothing^ as of SPACE : One is as proper as the other, that is, they are both Nonfenfe alike.
HE takes Notice that my Expreffion viz. " God *< is Qmniftient ; he could not be Omnijcient unlefs «' there were Things for him to know, is very ra Hi *e and inconfiderate; as if the Omnilcience of God, *( who made all Things, depended on the Exift- <c ence of Things for him to know." f This Charge of Railinefs, and Inronfideratcnefs, pro ceed^ from hi? not under/landing my Meaning; J meant no more, than that if th^re were not certain Truths^ (uch certain Truths would not be Objects of God's Omnifcience : Thus, if f^trttto was not diffTcnt from Vice^ and Ficefrom Virtue ; then, that Vice is nor Virtue and that Virtue is not y would be no Part of God's Omnifcience. therefore he may be pleafed to read what he objects sgainfl over again.
I HAD urged, that " to fay any Thing which <c is Infinite'^ has Quantity, and Dimen/ions, is not. <e far from faying, it is Finite, and Infinite at the €c fame time/* ** To this he replies. " Infinite *c SPACE is as real Quantity > as finite SPACE is; r< and an infinite Body is as real JWy, and has real *c Quantity) as well as finite Body. Infinite Quan-> Jc tity, and Dirnenfions arc, and cannot but be
* Exiftence and Unity fcfr. p. 152. f Ibid. p. 153! ^* Dr, Clarki$ Notions of SPAC^ Examined p. 54.
" ex-
Mr. J A c K'S o N Gfc. 173
<c exiftent : Nothing is plainer.*" If calling ft Thing plain will make it fo, then all is plain enough: But he that knows an Infinite Series to be abfttrdy will plainly fee the Abfurdity of an infinite Body, infinite Dimenjions^ infinite Quantity &c.
HE tells us that to fay SPACE is an imaginary Stibftratum of imaginary Extenjion^ "is a Definition c< as full of mere Imagination as one fhall meet " with/' f I fuppofe the Author imagines this to be Wit : It may be fo; 'tis certainly no Ar gument. It is not I, but Mr. JACKSON who is deceived by his Imagination. I imagine SPACE to exift, and believe its Exiftence to be imaginary ; Mr. [ACKSON imagines it likewife to exiit, and believes its Exigence to be real. JTis plain then which of us is the fuller of Imagination.
" BEFORE [fays he] SPACH was Nothing but " the Abfence of Matter ; and what has Abfence « to do with Extenfion, or Subftratum either £ « Now it has got a Subftratum (though an ima- *' ginary one) to make it look like real SPACE." ** —I anfwer no ; but to make it look like whac it is, an imaginary Subftance.
HE proceeds — 4'* But if SPACE is only an ima- *« ginary Subftratttm of an imaginary Extenjton, how <c comes it that, as he owns and fuppoies, — . the <e Idea of its Exigence rulhes into his Mind,
•c whether he v/ill or no.- How comes his
*c Imagination to have gotten fo much the better «< of his Reafon £c. — " ft This is another of our Author's Flowers of Rhetorick , but how*
* Exigence and Unity &V. p. 153. •f Ibid. p. 154. ** Ibid. ft Ibic
on
174 REMARKS
ever it may perhaps be thought more proper to' lay, that his Imagination has got the better of! his Reafon, who takes Things "for real which are imaginary.
HE asks-" What greafer Difficulty is therein tf fuppofing the matt-rial World to have exift'ed « from Eternity than there is in fuppoiin^ it to < exift to Eternity ? " * The Difference lie*? here,' For the World to have exifted ab £tcrno, implies the Abfurdity of an Infinite Series ; but to exift fa aternum, is only to exift (after it has once ex ifted) without ceafing, which is no other than a Negative Infinity.
" IT can never be proved [fays he] that a «* Caufe muft neceffarily be prior to the EfFed, <c in RefpeA of Time." f - If not, then Caufe and Effeft mean Something elfe than what they did among antient Logicians, by whom this was allowed a? an Axiom.
" ARISTOTLE &c. Tcontinues he) who fup,
c poled the World Eternal, fuppofed it notwith-
c ftanding, to be produced by God, as the Ori-
«c ginal Cau'e and Former of it." ^^ But Mr.
JACKSON fhould have remember'd that dfiflotlc
did not confider the World as a proper Efeft of
the Divine Power, but as a neceffarj Emanation
from him.
SPEAKING of the Ideas of Extenfan and 7W/-
vifebiiity being incompatible, "Having Parts [laid I]
-is confijting of Parts joined together, and Parts
« that are joined together, I Ihould fancy might
* Exiftence and Unity p. 156. f Ibid.. <** Ibid.
^ be
Mr, JACKSON &c. 175
" be fuppolcd afunder, i. e. might be divifible." * To this Mr. JACKSON replies, " The Author " here feems diffident of his Anfwer being to " the Purpofe, faying firft, whatever has Parts, " #?#/2'have divifible Parts, then in Conclusion, " that being joined together, he fancies they might- " be fuppofed a f under/' f — This was a Remark too curious for me to pafs over s But the whole Scare of the Matter is? that my Diffidence hap- pen'd to be Ironical, and Mr. JACKSON could not fee it.
HE next endeavours to mew how Pans do not imply Divifibility, even in Refpect of Matter. " Supnofe [fays he] God to have created the *c haft Body or Piece of Matter, which he can <c create, or which is the leafl poffible to exift, ct which is probably true of the folid Parts of cf fome Body : I ask then, has this Body, or a piece of Matter, Extenfion and Parts, or not S <c He will fay, it has Extenfan and Parts ; and <c yet to fuppofe the Parts divifible is an exprefs cc Contradiction, hecaufe then the Body will be " lefs when divided, than it was before, though " it was, before it was divided, the leaft poffible " for God to create, or exift." * *
I NEED give no other Anfwer to This, than that the Sup f opt ion is one of the greateft Abfurdi- ties in Philofophy. JTis to fuppole that there may be a leafl Particle of Alatter, or one infinitely fmall, that is, of no magnitude ; that it is extend ed, and lias Parts, and yet is of no Quantity .
:* Dr. Clarke s Notions of SPACE, Examined p. 12;, 126.
f Exiftence and Unity p. 158, ** Ibid.
Does
176 REMARKS on
Does not he know, that Matter (like all other Quantity) is divifible in infinitum^ and confequent- ly that a leaft Panicle is Nonienfc ? - God c;an't create ileaft Particle of Matter, becaufe hp bn*c work Contradictions; So all is foreign. — But it is pleafant enough to fee, how thefe Gentlemen are put to it, to give us an Inftance of an extended in- divifible Tking. Mr, CLARKE 2nd Mr. JACKSON have both endeavour'd at it, and very curious ones have they prefented us with. One tells us of a Piece of Matter, furrounded with Something that hinders it from being divided, ergo it is indivifible: The other informs us of the le aft Particle of Matter : A Difcovery which no one could make* but he that could find out the loft Number.
I SHALL take Notice but of one Thing more* and that is that Mr. JACKSON every where fpeaks as if he thought (what I always imagin'd was a neceffary -Confequence of thefe Centlemens Opi nions) that SPACE is the very Subftanceof GOD. For he tells us in one Place, that " the Idea of <c SPACE is not the Idea of a mere Nothing, »»- " lefs the Idea of the infinite Pretence and Exift- <c ence of God is the Idea of a mere Nothing." * In another Place he • obferves, that whoever denies the Exiftencs of SPACE feffpofes the Exiftence of God to be the Exiftence of Nothing t- What is this lefs than deifying SPACE, and making it God himfelf ? But not content with This, he ilill plunges deeper, for he not only believes SPACE to be the Extenjion of Godbut the Extsnfion of Matter too. For he acquaints us that "the internal Quan- 4C tity of SPACE pervading the Bodies> and pof-
Exiftence and Unity p. KI. t S^.e Ibid. p. 150.
left
-
»• >...
Mr. J A c K s o N . 177
" feft by them, is their true Extenfan,"* Mr CLARKE mdeed talks of the Space of Body, from whence I im*gi»'d he thought SPACE to be a Property of Body ; But this Gentleman freaks pur, at lea:} his own Sentiments, and tells us that it is the true Extwfioa of Body . and He ,ikewif
holds it to be the true Exten/io» of God. If
then t^true Extenfion of Matter, be the true Ex-
ttofion of God- x le3ve the Reader to
the neceflary Confequence.
' Exiftence and Unity p. 68.
I N I S,
I
BINDING MAY 1 2 1989
Clarke, Joseph
621 A farther examination of C53 Dr. Clarke1 s notions of space
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