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
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
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A HISTORY OF DIPLOMACY
IN THE
INTERNATIONAL DEVELOPMENT
OF EUROPE

VOLUME III.

THE DIPLOMACY OF THE AGE OF ABSOLUTISM

**A HISTORY OF DIPLOMACY
IN THE INTERNATIONAL
DEVELOPMENT OF EUROPE**

BY

DAVID JAYNE HILL, LL.D.

**Volume I. *The Struggle for Universal Empire.*
Maps and Tables. pp. xxiii + 481**

**Volume II. *The Establishment of Territorial
Sovereignty.* Maps and Tables. pp. xxv
+ 663**

Volume III. *The Diplomacy of the Age of Absolutism.* Maps and Tables. pp. xxvi + 706

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P R E F A C E

WHAT has been said in the prefaces to the previous volumes of this work regarding the nature of the historic process finds ample illustration in this period, which may be fitly designated as the Age of Absolutism. Men had sought refuge from anarchy by establishing the supremacy of the State and concentrating power in the hands of a few. We behold entire nations moving *en masse* in directions not determined by their needs or their individual desires, nor yet in view of their well-being, but by the command of one man who — for reasons of his own, for which he had to give no account — acted as he saw fit. It is not an exaggeration to say, that for more than a hundred years the destinies of Europe were determined by a half dozen men in each generation; and their motives of action were largely personal.

And yet it is impossible to explain this period in terms of purely individual action. The explanation lies in the application of the prevailing theory of the State. That theory was a condition of mind, the result of past experience. How could men enjoy security and live in peace without the unity of the State, and how could the unity of the State be preserved except by submitting it to one will? Those were the questions which determined the thought and feeling of the time, and it was the thought and feeling of the time that made monarchy absolute.

It is impossible to explain the history of any nation as a linear development, a succession of events produced mechanically by their antecedents. Every great historical event is a psychological phenomenon, the result of reflection upon experience. Many influences enter into the formation of public policies, and economic conditions are frequently

subordinated to racial, traditional, sentimental, and dynastic considerations. The main causes in the historic process are dominant beliefs.

If this statement be true as regards national progress, it is more obviously so regarding international development. Here the personal note becomes predominant. All international relations are based upon the judgments and decisions of sovereigns and statesmen. These policies may be good or bad, wise or unwise, but they are essentially products of reflection. The reasons on which they are based may be dynastic or national, and may owe their origin to any of the conditions that influence human action; but the action that results from them is the outcome of the thought and feeling of the time as manifested in those who direct public policy.

Regarded from this point of view, history has a new meaning and a new value. We are no longer invited to take an interest in a succession of events without relation to the great problems of existence, or even to one another; such as the sequence of dynasties, the fatalities of battles, and mere series of dates that serve only to place occurrences in a definite chronological order. History becomes to us, instead, the explanation of progress or retrogression, as the case may be, in the attainment of purposes that affect the condition of man and society.

But if policies and the means employed for their realization constitute the true essence of history, the thought and feeling by which these policies were generated become essential to historical interpretation. There is, no doubt, a certain dramatic interest in the movement and engagement of armies in the fascinating game of war; but far greater enlightenment may be derived from the knowledge of why wars were begun, why battles were fought, and what effect they produced upon national aims and international development; and the plot-interest of diplomacy, which lies nearer to the mainsprings of action, is not less dramatic than that of military strategy.

The life of nations is as little capable of isolated develop-

ment along the lines of their own aims and purposes as the life of individuals. It is, therefore, impossible to comprehend the history of any nation without considering the influence upon it of the international environment. One of the chief problems of every people has been, and continues to be, how to maintain its existence and accomplish its national destiny in the midst of its neighbors and competitors. A great part of its activities is, in consequence, imposed upon it by the aims and policies of other nations.

The first general solution of this problem attempted in Europe was based upon the theory of the essential unity of all civilized peoples and the possibility of obtaining their submission to the moral restraint of one central authority; but the contest for the sole possession of that authority — "The Struggle for Universal Empire"—ended in the failure to solve the problem in this way.

The next solution was the formation of national dynasties, omnipotent within their respective jurisdictions, and together constituting a system of sovereign states entirely independent of one another, but formally bound by a solemn compact to respect one another's authority within the prescribed limits, resulting in "The Establishment of Territorial Sovereignty."

Such was the situation of Europe in 1648 at the conclusion of the Peace of Westphalia, which ended the Thirty Years' War. For the first time the European nations seemed to have discovered a common ground on which they could peaceably coexist. But the Treaties of Westphalia were far more the products of armed force than the voluntary recognition of any inherent rights. They were the result of a bargain between sovereign rulers, made for the sake of peace, which was rendered necessary by the exhaustion of their fighting energies.

Thus the Treaties of Westphalia, while ending imperial pretensions for the time by recognizing the absolute character of territorial sovereignty, opened a new era in the political development of Europe; but, as they were the

result so also they were the consecration of force. They imposed peace, not as a legal or moral duty, but because there was no longer profit in war. They contained solemn promises to accept and to guarantee certain definite stipulations; but, while they formed a code of honor for the sovereigns who signed them, they were in no sense based upon a recognition of the inherent rights of the State as a moral entity, or of peoples as forming the substance of the State. Still, the foundations of a European system had been laid; and, so long as the balance of forces that was expressed in the terms of the treaties continued, peace among the signatories would endure.

The task of diplomacy was to perpetuate the system thus created. The difficulty of raising money for carrying on extensive wars, the internal troubles of France, the exhaustion of Spain, the feebleness of Portugal, the commercial interests of the United Provinces, the limited resources of Sweden and of the German princes, and the substitution of the Commonwealth for the Stuart dynasty in England for a time rendered great military movements impossible; but the renewal of the struggle for preponderance was certain to occur, and it was France that was first able, through the complete triumph of the monarchy over dissentient elements and the appearance of an ambitious sovereign in the person of Louis XIV, to adopt and execute an aggressive policy.

With the reign of Louis XIV begin those vast European combinations in which were utilized all the knowledge, all the influence, and all the resources that ingenious minds could employ to obtain dynastic aggrandizement. In these great enterprises all Europe was to some extent involved, and it is only when studied from an international point of view that their full significance can be understood. In self-defence every princeling was obliged to organize a diplomatic establishment, and to enter in some capacity into the plots and counterplots in which the greater powers involved the lesser; and it is interesting to observe how, chiefly by shrewd bargaining, several of them in less than a century elevated their families to the eminence of recognized royalty.

As a result of the improved organization of diplomatic methods, no period of history is furnished with more complete documentation. Before the time of Mazarin each minister of state in France and each diplomatic agent considered the official documents in his possession as his own private property, and they were disposed of accordingly. Even the Cardinal, instead of committing his papers to public archives, bequeathed them to Colbert, who transmitted them to his son; but they were afterward in great part recovered for the archives of the Ministry of Foreign Affairs, organized in 1680, then already enriched with the papers of De Lionne, — confiscated by Louis XIV, — and also those of Pomponne. From this time forward these archives became the depository for France of all political correspondence, memoirs, and other documents, forming a vast collection of detailed information which, with other similar archives organized about the same time in other countries, enables the historian to follow the course of international events almost day by day.

The extraction of what is important to the international development of Europe from this voluminous mass of documents is a labor of such vast extent as to be beyond the capacity of any single investigator in the course of a lifetime. Happily, the task of selection and publication, so conscientiously performed by qualified scholars in all the chief countries of Europe, renders possible a general synthesis, which is undertaken in this work, with only such further occasional reference to the archives as may be necessary for filling in *lacunae* or the verification of doubtful or disputed points. To the great company of investigators whose patient toil has made possible a work of this character the author feels a deep sense of obligation, which he believes he can best express by citing their names and the titles of their publications among the authorities at the end of each chapter and in special notes wherever reference to them is likely to be specially useful to the reader.

DAVID JAYNE HILL.

PARIS,
October 1, 1913.



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CHAPTER I

THE ASCENDENCY OF FRANCE

IT was a new Europe that emerged from the fiery crucible of the Thirty Years' War. In the devastation of that terrific struggle had finally disappeared most of the mediæval ideals. Among these, that of chief importance for the future development of Europe was the venerable tradition of the moral unity of Christendom. With its disappearance went also much of the fervor of faith and zeal for principles which had imparted at least an appearance of moral purpose to the Wars of Religion.

The state of Europe after the Peace of Westphalia

From this time forward the *raison d'État* becomes the controlling motive in public action, and marks the period from the Peace of Westphalia to the Revolutionary Era as a reign of Machiavellianism. All the influences of the preceding age had tended toward the firm establishment of monarchy, and the throne had become nearly everywhere the focal point of general interest. So absolute was the authority attributed to the Crown in France, that, notwithstanding the united opposition of powerful princes and accomplished jurists, Cardinal Mazarin, although of Italian origin and acting under a queen-regent of Spanish birth, by adhering to the principle of royal supremacy as the guarantee of national unity was able to overcome the Fronde, and ultimately, in the name of the young king, to exercise the royal prerogative.

Even in England the mass of the nation never ceased to be at heart monarchical; and if for a time the dynasty was overwhelmed by the Parliament, it was on account of the resentment felt against the treachery of Charles I, and not because of opposition to the principle of royalty itself.

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There were, indeed, in parts of Europe, immediately after the Peace of Westphalia many signs of unrest and turbulence. In Russia, and to a still more marked degree in Poland, the aristocratic element was in a state of hostility to the royal authority. In Italy, the domination of the Spanish king was bitterly resented, and a revolt at Naples nearly ended in an act of independence. In the Netherlands a nominal republic, under the administration of a stadtholder, had appeared to be the best form of government for that country; but jealousy of the House of Orange had already been displayed, and its union with the House of Stuart by the marriage of William II with Mary, daughter of Charles I of England, created a strong party of opposition, which gained in influence when, on January 30, 1649, Charles I was beheaded, and England passed under the temporary rule of the Commonwealth.

In France Mazarin was for a time confronted with an opposition that threatened to disintegrate the kingdom. The Parliament of Paris refused to register the edicts for new taxes; and the discontent of members of the royal family, like the Prince of Condé, the Duke of Orléans, and the Duchess of Longueville, led to open war, and resulted in their alliance with the Spaniards; while the hostility of such able generals as Turenne, and such popular ecclesiastics as Paul de Gondi, afterwards Cardinal de Retz, menaced the very existence of the regency and even threatened the unity of France.

Yet, notwithstanding all these perils, in every European state, the throne soon became the unshaken seat of power, and nowhere was it more firmly established than in France. Sustained by all the sanctity of religion, and defended with all the ingenuity of philosophy, it became irresistible and undisputed. Service to the monarch soon proved to be the only pathway to distinction, and dynastic advantage the only active force in European politics.¹

¹ A contemporary writer says: "It is customary to respect the quality of princes, not their real merits; the wisest men have esteemed it better to obey the most vicious rather than to disturb that beautiful

I. THE DIPLOMACY OF MAZARIN

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Under these conditions, diplomacy rose to the eminence of a recognized profession. As in Italy after the decay of the Empire in the thirteenth century, so now in Europe after the Peace of Westphalia, diplomatic activity was more than ever essential to the preservation of the existing political order. As in that earlier period, but upon a far grander scale, it assumed the form of intrigue, secret negotiation, and conspiracy.

The triumph
of monarchy
in France

In the whole of Europe there existed at that time no greater master of all these arts than Giulio Mazzarini, the disciple and successor of Cardinal Richelieu. The secret of Cardinal Mazarin's power can be expressed in a simple formula,—the superiority of centrally directed influence over ill-organized and sporadic resistance. Tenacious in purpose, crafty in method, supple in activity, and unscrupulous in the use of means, he unceasingly appealed to the instinct of unity in the French nation, placing his enemies in the light of rebels and traitors to France,—a rôle which their impetuous selfishness and political ineptitude led them to play with a fidelity that confirmed his pretensions and proved fatal to their schemes.

When the devastation of civil war had once more convinced the nation that a strong central government was the only remedy for perpetual anarchy in France, on October 21, 1652, after a year's exile, young Louis XIV, under Mazarin's guidance, re-entered Paris amidst the wild enthusiasm of the people. On the following day, the King held a *lit de justice* in which he forbade the Parliament to take any further part in the affairs of state or the administration of the finances. The members were compelled to bow in mute submission, and France was

order, that excellent harmony, which God has established among men for the general good of the world, in order to maintain peace and keep consciences at rest. To promote that trust, God has surrounded the throne of kings with so much glory and majesty, with the purpose of making us understand that they are his living images," etc. — *Les seritez françoises*, Paris, 1643, p. 5.

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gradually reorganized for that proud pre-eminence in Europe which Cardinal Mazarin's diplomacy was about to confer upon it.

Sustained by the unwavering support of the Queen Regent, Anne of Austria,— to whom, if not secretly married, he stood in relations of exceptional intimacy and affection, even in exile, during the stormy period of the Fronde, this subtle Italian had been able to become the master of France through his appeal to the popular belief in the national need of the monarchy. In the person of the young king, the nation had felt, were locked up the destinies of France.

From the moment of his birth there was in Louis XIV something that appealed to the popular mind. His extraordinary vigor of will and the strength of his appetite were manifest from his earliest infancy. When he was only a few months old, Grotius, at that time ambassador of Sweden to France, wrote of him: "His frightful and precocious avidity is a bad omen for the neighboring peoples; for he is at present on his ninth nurse, whom he is rending and murdering as he has the others."

It was, in truth, a young lion that the Cardinal was training for the rule of France. The discipline imposed upon him by Mazarin was not wasted on the stronger and bolder nature of the King; and under this tuition, in which craft was grafted upon strength, a new type of sovereign was forming, destined to combine with the pride and authority of a monarch the skill and adroitness of a thoroughly schooled diplomatist.¹

The national rivalries

It was in the field of international diplomacy that the Cardinal was to find an arena for the display of his own ex-

¹ One of the pamphlets of the time, *Le Catéchisme de la Cour*, Paris, 1652, gives the *credo* of Mazarin thus: "Je crois . . . au Mazarin . . . , qui a été conçu de l'esprit de Machiavel . . ." Another pamphlet of a later date, *L'Alcoran de Louis XIV*, says the following lines had to be learned by the King: "My son, in whom do you believe? — In Nicholas Machiavelli. — Who was this Nicholas Machiavelli? — The father of politicians, and the one who has taught princes the art of reigning," etc. The relations between Louis XIV and Mazarin are discussed by Lacour-Gayet in the *Revue Historique*, LXVIII, (1898) pp. 225, 257.

traordinary powers, and the time was ripe for their active exercise.

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In establishing beyond question the supremacy of his sovereign in his own realm, Mazarin was laying the foundation of the King's future greatness. His ultimate aim was to extend the royal authority over the widest possible area of territory. Not content with maintaining their national independence, all the European states were at that time eager to expand their borders and to include within their dominions neighboring and even distant populations. Although the course of events had imposed upon Europe a state system in which theory demanded equality of rights between the members composing it, no power was willing to concede them, and the lust for aggrandizement was universal. Until the colonial question carried this rivalry beyond the ocean, as it was soon to do, the only path of expansion was the despoiling of neighbors; and this became the principal object of international politics. Spain, isolated and exhausted, was bent on the recovery of the ground lost by the independence of the United Provinces. There, in turn, the Stadtholder was ambitious to conquer a part at least of the Spanish Netherlands; while France was eager to push her borders to the Rhine, and to counterbalance Spain in Italy. While the German princes were coveting the ecclesiastical estates, the Emperor was seeking to compensate his loss of prestige by enlarging his domains in the East; Sweden was aiming to continue as the predominant power in the North and become the mistress of the Baltic; Denmark was resenting every encroachment, and preparing to oppose the preponderance of Sweden; Russia was soon to enter the field of contest with unmeasured force and keen ambitions for westward expansion; and England, under the Commonwealth, envious of the commercial supremacy which the Dutch had acquired on the ocean, was ready to overwhelm her most natural ally with her superior resources.

So long as he was crippled at home by the activities of the Fronde, Cardinal Mazarin had not been able to carry

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Mazarin's
scheme for a
Bourbon-
Stuart-Orange
coalition

on the war with Spain with his former energy, and his efforts to secure allies against his enemy were for a considerable time doomed to disappointment. Until the death of the Stadtholder William II, in 1650, the Cardinal had hoped through his influence to induce the States General of the United Provinces to annul their treaty with Spain and join with France in the conquest and partition of the Spanish Netherlands. On October 20, 1650, the project of a treaty had been prepared, by the terms of which the Stadtholder and the King of France, on May 1, 1651, were to unite in a joint attack upon the Spanish possessions, endeavor to restore the House of Stuart to the throne of England, and to form with Charles Stuart a decisive coalition against Spain; but within a month, and before William II had signed the treaty, the plan was suddenly frustrated by his death. Had the scheme succeeded, it is not impossible that William II might have added to the territory of the United Provinces a portion of the Spanish Netherlands, combined them in an independent kingdom, and secured its stability by an alliance with the Bourbon and Stuart dynasties.¹

This combination was intended by Mazarin to extinguish republicanism, which he bitterly condemned, both in England and the Netherlands, to enforce a peace upon Spain, and to obtain at one bound the preponderance of France in Europe; but its miscarriage left him without an effective ally.

In the meantime he dallied with a project to form an alliance with the Commonwealth. In August, 1652, D'Estredes was directed to sound the Protector; but Cromwell would not listen to his proposals. In the following December, however, the Cardinal decided formally to recognize the

¹ Sirtema de Grovestins, *Histoire des luttes et rivalités politiques*, I, pp. 77, 80, regards the document of October 20, 1650, as more than a "project," and considers it a "convention," intended to place William II in full possession of the sovereignty of the Netherlands. Groen van Prinsterer, on the other hand, *Archives, ou correspondance inédite de la maison d'Orange-Nassau*, IV, pp. cxix, cxxvi, absolves the Prince from this imputation.

Commonwealth, and sent Antoine de Bordeaux to London to prepare the way for more intimate relations.

If Mazarin had realized the value of an alliance with the Netherlands against Spain, the Commonwealth also did not fail to appreciate the utility of Dutch friendship. In the spring of 1651, Oliver St. John and Walter Strickland had been sent as ambassadors to the States General, to propose "a more strict and intimate alliance and union," whereby there might be a "more mutual interest of each in the other than hitherto hath been, for the good of both."

It seemed a reasonable proposition; for both governments were nominally republican and Protestant, both had struggled for religious toleration, and as maritime powers had important interests to conciliate. So long as the Stadtholder William II had lived, his family connection with the House of Stuart rendered a *rapprochement* with the Commonwealth quite impossible; but now that the House of Orange was represented only by a posthumous infant, and a republican reaction against the stadtholderate had set in, a union of the two republics no longer seemed impracticable.

It was only in appearance, however, that the interests of the two peoples were compatible. The Commonwealth was a military despotism, antimonarchical only in name, and rapidly tending toward a personal autocracy under the dictatorship of Oliver Cromwell. The Dutch Republic, on the other hand, was a loose federation of seven sovereign provinces, partly maritime and partly agricultural, in which Holland by its greater wealth and commercial supremacy enjoyed preponderance.

But the incompatibility of the two nations was deeper than the differences in their forms of government. Between the English and the Dutch had developed a sharp rivalry for the carrying trade of the world, which by the enterprise of the Dutch merchants and sailors had become almost a monopoly of the United Provinces. To this rivalry there were but two possible solutions,—a pacific union based

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Negotiations
of England
with the
Netherlands

The incompatibility of
the two
republics

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on co-operation and reciprocity on the one hand, or open war on the other.

The impediments to a union were serious. The chief of these was the unwillingness of the Netherlands to take a secondary place in the system the Commonwealth was endeavoring to create; and a military power that had just overturned the throne of England, conquered Ireland, and subdued Scotland was not likely to respect too highly the national feelings of its Dutch neighbors. The United Provinces, on the other hand, with intense sentiments of independence, were not organized for unity of action in the realm of policy.¹ A federation of separately feeble communities, bound together chiefly by fear of aggression, and divided into conflicting parties, whose decisions could be obtained only by the slow concessions of general debate and free deliberation, was not to be easily brought into submission to the will of a foreign power.

From March 30 until July 1, 1651, the English ambassadors, St. John and Strickland, had labored at The Hague to obtain an "intimate alliance and union," but in vain. Among the reasons for the approaches of the Commonwealth to the Netherlands was the wish to prevent the further machinations of the Stuarts on the continent, for which The Hague had been an active centre. During the residence of the English ambassadors in Holland, the Princess Royal of England and her brother, the Duke of York, who were living at The Hague, with great ostentation daily rode past the house occupied by the ambassadors, staring at it in a manner to excite the spirit of insult against the inmates on the part of the rabble that followed in their train. At length a warning was received by the ambassadors that the royalists were planning to murder them. Quite naturally, the expulsion of the royal refugees and of all rebels against the existing government of England from the territory of

¹ A diplomatist of the time said of the United Provinces: "C'est une imperfection dans cet état qu'il y ait tant de membres; chaque membre est une tête, et il faut que ces têtes soient en un chapeau avant qu'aucune chose se fasse!" — Thurloe, *State Papers*, III, p. 21.

the Netherlands was immediately demanded by the Commonwealth; but this proposition the Dutch negotiators would not accept. "We cannot," they replied, "banish from our soil all persons who are banished out of England. Our country is a refuge for the exiles of all nations."

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The penalty for this attitude of independence was the Navigation Act of October 9, 1651.¹ Its purpose was to inflict a crushing blow upon Holland by destroying its commercial supremacy; for, being unable to absorb its rival by diplomacy, the Commonwealth was now resolved to incapacitate it by force. The chief provisions of the act are: (1) that "no goods or commodities whatsoever of the growth, production, or manufacture of Asia, Africa, or America, . . . or of any islands belonging to them," should be brought into England, Ireland, or other possessions of the Commonwealth, in any other ships than those owned, commanded, and chiefly manned by Englishmen, under penalty of forfeiture of the ship and its cargo; (2) that no European commodities should be brought from any country in any ship not owned by the people of the Commonwealth, or the people of the country in which the merchandise was produced, under the same penalty.

The Navigation Act

Of this measure an English historian writes: "The Navigation Act, which remained substantially in force for nearly two hundred years, is the great legislative monument of the Commonwealth. It was the first manifestation of the newly awakened consciousness of the community, the act which laid the foundation of the English commercial empire. . . . By excluding the Dutch from the carrying trade of English commodities we now took into our own hands the whole work of commerce, to which our nation was henceforth mainly to devote itself. But by the same act we struck a deadly blow at the very state to which, but a few months before, we had offered almost an incorporating union. If that state in her long struggle with Spain had displayed such prodigious vitality and energy,

¹ For the text, see Reich, *Select Documents*, pp. 538, 541.

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this was because the Spaniard had never known how to strike her in her vital part. Her near neighbor, the other Protestant state, the other trading state, found out this vital part at once. The Netherlands lived by the carrying trade of the world; . . . and thus, though Dutch greatness was to last another half century, its decline commences here. The Navigation Act of 1651 is the first nail in its coffin."¹

Character of
the Anglo-
Dutch con-
flict

The severity of this attitude,—which a Dutch embassy sent to London in December, 1651, headed by the venerable Grand Pensionary of Holland, the poet Jacob Cats, was unable to mollify,—followed by the seizure of seventy Dutch vessels, soon led to open war. Admiral Tromp was directed to protect Dutch merchant ships from search and capture, and Blake was ordered to enforce the English claim to sovereignty in the narrow seas by compelling foreign vessels to salute the English flag; and thus it came to blows upon the Channel, which for a time, after first suffering a series of defeats, the Dutch admiral swept with a broom nailed to the mast-head of his ship as a symbol of his victories.

But this arrogance was soon avenged. The wealth of Holland was in her ships and cargoes, while that of England was for the most part safe on land. Every ship and cargo captured enriched the Commonwealth and weakened its victim, until the security of what remained necessitated concessions and submission.

Two things in this conflict are worthy of remark. One is that the cause of the quarrel is different from those with which we have hitherto been concerned. It is no longer the personal rivalry of Bourbon and Hapsburg, the zealous antagonism of Protestant and Catholic, nor yet the recurrent conflict of territorial sovereignty with the imperial tradition; it is a contest for primacy in commerce. The other observation is that Europe is beginning to look beyond the narrow circle of the old Empire, away from Italy and its intrigues, away from Germany with its ecclesiastical spoils

¹ Seeley, *The Growth of British Policy*, II, pp. 25, 26.

Carroll's ?
Mason's ?

and the secularizing appetities of its princes, away even from the question of national frontiers and the appropriation of passive or resistant populations. We witness the beginnings of world politics, of the struggle for sea-power, and the premonitions of colonial wars. But even in the narrower circle the spirit of interstate relations had undergone a change. For a long period ambition had masked itself behind religious sentiment and pretended virtues, but now the age of chivalry in international policy had passed away. A rude realism, based frankly on national interest, had boldly entered the arena. Only the thin textures of courtly courtesy, often too scantily, and sometimes without pretence of decency, concealed the sordid and piratical designs that mustered armies and created navies. Thitherto great wars had sprung in some manner from private or merely dynastic interests. It now became evident that the fuel for the flames of battle was not alone the passions of monarchs, but the egoism of republics also.

It was by its intelligence rather than by its force that the Dutch republic could hope, if at all, to resist its powerful antagonist, now more potent than it had ever been before both on land and sea. In one respect the Commonwealth, like the United Provinces, was dependent upon its imports for its naval strength. The materials for ships — timber, tar, and hemp — were products of the Baltic countries. To cut off the English from this supply was to sever their growing marine from its very roots. A glance at the map discloses the power possessed by Denmark to block the path of commerce between the North Sea and the Baltic by closing the Sound to its enemies and opening it only to its friends. In the rivalry for the mastery of the Baltic between Denmark and Sweden, in which Russia was soon to participate, the Danish kingdom was in need of friends, and of friends possessing power on the sea. Another fact tending to facilitate an alliance with the Dutch against the Commonwealth was that the Danish dynasty was in sympathy with the Stuarts. When, therefore, the Dutch found themselves in command of the Channel and the North Sea, their next

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The treaty of
the Dutch
with Denmark

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step was to seek an ally against the English at the Danish Court.

The danger of being cut off from the Baltic trade had caused great concern in England, and the preservation of it by alliance with the Dutch had been one of the leading motives for the proposed union.¹ That alliance having proved impossible, on February 8, 1653, a treaty was concluded in which Frederick III of Denmark agreed to close the Sound to English ships and maintain a fleet to enforce the prohibition; and in exchange for this service the United Provinces promised financial aid and the protection of their ally from any hostilities that might be incurred as a consequence of these engagements.²

The policies
of Cromwell
and De Witt

Cromwell had taken no personal part in the steps that led to the war with Holland; but, on December 16, 1653, the imperialism of the Commonwealth ended in the establishment of the Protectorate, the "Barebone's Parliament" was dissolved, and Cromwell, as Lord Protector, became the absolute head of the state. In the preceding July, John De Witt had been chosen Grand Pensionary of Holland, and entered upon that long course of public activity which was to rank him in influence with the sovereigns of Europe.

Being sincerely and first of all a Protestant, Cromwell desired to perform the task which no previous ruler of England had ever been bold enough to attempt, the formation of a great Protestant international union. To him, therefore, it seemed that the United Provinces should now accept consolidation with Great Britain, as Scotland had already done. Knowing that the Netherlands were divided into two parties, the adherents of the House of Orange and the advanced Republicans, he aimed, as he had done in Scotland, to destroy the one by his protection of the other.

¹ See the instructions printed from the MS. Order Book of the Council of State of May 9, 1651, by Geddes, *Administration of John De Witt*, p. 176, where fear is expressed that the Baltic trade might be wholly lost to the English.

² See Dumont, *Corps universel diplomatique*, Amsterdam and The Hague, 1726-1731, VI, Part II, pp. 40, 46.

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In this wish to abase the Stuart-Orange party he had a natural ally in John De Witt; but the Grand Pensionary had no intention of subjecting his country to foreign domination on the one hand, or of too much strengthening its formal unity on the other. Far better than Cromwell, he understood that too strong a pressure from without could only result in a revival of the stadtholderate in the House of Orange; whereas his own aim was to continue the loose federation of the Provinces under the leadership of Holland. There was before him, therefore, the delicate task of resisting the domination of Cromwell from without, and at the same time of preventing a popular demand for a regency in the name of the infant William III within the Netherlands. As an English historian has well said, it was "a miraculous performance on the tightrope" that was required of him; which, with consummate skill and equipoise, he executed in the presence of the wondering powers of Europe for nearly twenty years.

As an offset to the alliance of the Dutch with Denmark, in November, 1653, Bulstrode Whitelocke was sent by the Commonwealth as ambassador to Queen Christina of Sweden, for the purpose of negotiating an offensive and defensive alliance with that power. His reception by the Queen at Upsala was cordial; but both Queen Christina and her venerable Chancellor, Oxenstiern, had doubted the stability of the Commonwealth. The news of Cromwell's assumption of the protectorate, which reached Sweden on January 12, 1654, although Oxenstiern characterized it as an "election by the sword," gave great satisfaction at Upsala; for it was considered as an assurance of the permanence of the British government. When, however, Whitelocke received new credentials from Cromwell signed "Oliverius P" in analogy with the former "Carolus R," the Queen, who had already predicted that Cromwell would be "king of England in conclusion," inquired, "Is your new government by a *protector* different from what it was before as to monarchy?" Then, not satisfied with Whitelocke's answer, she added: "Why is the title 'Protector,' when the power is kingly?"

The Anglo-Swedish negotiations

CHAP. I . . . New titles, with sovereign power, proved prejudicial
 A. D. to the state of Rome."¹
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But recalling that her own ancestor, Gustavus Vasa, had risen to the throne from the ranks of the army, she was even the better prepared to negotiate not, indeed, for an offensive and defensive alliance,—which seemed to the prudent Oxenstiern an unsafe venture while England was still at war and Sweden was at peace,—but for the formation of a more effective coalition. Secretly a Catholic, and even then intending to renounce her throne, Christina could have no sympathy with Cromwell's league of Protestants; and proposed that, since the United Provinces were known to be looking anxiously for support from France,² the possible combination of that kingdom with the Netherlands and Denmark might be counterpoised by another "trinity" of powers, to be composed of Sweden, England, and Spain.³

Thus, within a decade of the Peace of Westphalia, a complete reversal of the alliances on which that settlement was founded was proposed, in which the only principle of combination was the preservation of European equilibrium, without any distinction of religion or form of government.

The triumphant peace of Cromwell

But Cromwell's negotiations did not enable him to impose his own terms upon the Netherlands. Instead of a union with that republic founded on community of religion, which he desired, he was obliged to accept a peace based on the pledge to maintain republicanism. He demanded and obtained from the Grand Pensionary a promise of the permanent exclusion of the House of Orange from office in the Netherlands, but not with the ratification of the States General. In the treaty of April 5, 1654, it is provided that whoever might hold the office of "Stadtholder" or "Captain General" should be required to accept this engagement.⁴

¹ Whitelocke's *Journal*, I, p. 274.

² For these negotiations, see Waddington, *La République des Provinces-Unies, la France et les Pays-Bas espagnols*, and Lefèvre-Pontalis, *Jean de Witt*, I, 160, 161.

³ Whitelocke's *Journal*, I, p. 275.

⁴ For the treaty, see Dumont, VI, Part II, p. 74.

In a secret declaration of May 4, 1654, however, the States of Holland solemnly pledged their word that they would not choose the Prince of Orange for any public office.¹ Little was it dreamed that the infant scion of the Houses of Stuart and Orange, whose hereditary privileges were thus denied, would one day, as William III, become not only Stadtholder of Holland but King of England.

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With great sagacity, but in the face of strenuous opposition, De Witt succeeded in preserving the Republic from self-effacement under the too powerful pressure of the Protector's mailed fist, and at the same time secured through alliance with him a new guarantee of its continued existence.² On the other hand, although Cromwell failed to obtain the "closer union," he was able to impose important concessions upon the United Provinces. Influenced by the changed conditions resulting from the peace of the Netherlands with England and Cromwell's commercial treaty with Sweden, Denmark also found it expedient to make a treaty with him, signed at Westminster, on September 15, 1654, by which Frederick III agreed to reopen the Sound to English ships, and to pay an indemnity for the seizure of vessels and cargoes; and the Netherlands, in loyal recognition of their previous treaty obligations, aided Denmark in the payments that were demanded.³

Great Britain had now become, under the guidance of Cromwell, the foremost military state in Europe, and had

¹ The divided state of the United Provinces at this time is well illustrated by the selection of the commissioners who were sent to London to negotiate peace with Cromwell. De Witt devised the plan of sending a cipher code to his friends, enjoining upon them to use it in their correspondence without the knowledge of his opponents in the commission. See Lefèvre-Pontalis, *Jean de Witt*, I, p. 181, and p. 185. For the Declaration of May 4, 1654, see Dumont, VI, Part II, pp. 85, 88.

² For the defence of De Witt from the charge of duplicity with Cromwell, see Lefèvre-Pontalis, *Jean de Witt*, I, pp. 177, 178.

³ Among the other indirect losses of the Netherlands in connection with the war was the recovery of Brasil by Portugal in 1654, the Dutch having taken it in 1640 during the war with Spain. On July 10, 1654, Cromwell made a commercial treaty with Portugal also. For the treaty of the Commonwealth with Denmark, see Dumont, VI, Part II, p. 92.

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Mazarin's
desire for an
English
alliance

established relations of amity and commerce with the three most important Protestant powers.

When in January, 1653, Mazarin had returned to Paris from exile, Guy Patin had said of him: "His Eminence is as powerful as God the Father at the commencement of the world"; but at that time the hyperbole of the French physician applied only to Mazarin's influence in the capital. In the South of France open rebellion continued, and the Spaniards were still in possession of French soil. It is not surprising, therefore, that in January, 1654, the Cardinal was ready to offer Dunkirk, if captured, to Cromwell, first with twelve hundred thousand livres, then with a much greater sum, if he would aid in the conquest of Flanders from the Spanish. On July 16, 1654, Antoine de Bordeaux was instructed to offer, if an alliance could not be obtained, as high as sixty thousand pistoles for a mere treaty of peace and commerce.

The reasons for this anxiety to obtain the friendship of Cromwell were manifold. The Commonwealth had already treated the French merchantmen with a rude hand, and when in 1652 Spain had appealed to England for aid in taking Dunkirk, Blake had even seized French ships. There was in England considerable hostility to France, wrote De Bordeaux, and would be "so long as it was governed by His Eminence, or a man of his profession, who are pillars of the Pope." In the hope of profiting by this antipathy to the Cardinal the French Protestants were instinctively turning toward Cromwell, and the rebellious Prince of Condé's agents were seeking his support. The royal family of England had sought an asylum in France and, much to the displeasure of the Protector, had received there friendly hospitality. Should Cromwell ally himself with Spain, France — isolated and surrounded with enemies — would be exposed to extreme peril. If, however, notwithstanding these adverse circumstances, Mazarin could secure the friendship of Cromwell, the mere spectacle of military co-operation between France and England would go far to intimidate Spain and end the conflict with her.

While Mazarin was thus soliciting the aid of Cromwell, the Protector was still absorbed in his great project of organizing a Protestant union, without any immediate purpose of either siding with France on the one hand or Spain on the other, or of aggressive measures against either. Yielding to his dominant religious impulse, his aim was to be the Protector of the whole Protestant world, as well as Lord Protector of England. Sincerely believing in toleration as a principle, without imposing his own faith upon others, he meant to stand for it everywhere, as he had stood for the cause of the Independents against Charles I.

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Premonitions
of a Protes-
tant league

In England there was much excited apprehension of a strong revival of the Counter-Reformation. Emissaries were sent to the Protestant cantons of Switzerland to mediate between them in the adjustment of their difficulties, with instructions to oppose the efforts of France to renew its treaty with the cantons. With equal solicitude, the Protector was ready to guard the interests of the Huguenots in France, the Waldenses in Savoy, and all imperilled Protestants everywhere. Still, beyond extensive naval preparations, which foreshadowed some great but unknown movement upon the sea, there was no sign of any definite plan of action on Cromwell's part.

A sudden change in the government of Sweden seemed for the moment to be significant for the activity of the Protestant powers. On June 6, 1654, at the castle of Upsala, Christina, Queen of Sweden, weary of her throne, voluntarily abdicated in favor of her cousin, Charles Augustus, who assumed the crown as Charles X. In this ambitious soldier and able politician Sweden seemed to have found a leader capable of realizing all the traditional hopes of that kingdom; who, in union with Cromwell, might make Protestantism preponderant in Europe. At London, the Protector had chosen the Swedish ambassador as his most intimate companion. As a contemporary writes, "He never caressed any man so much, nor sought the friendship of any so much as the King of Sweden." But Charles X had no notion of becoming a partner in Cromwell's protectorate of religion. Be-

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Negotiations
of Mazarin
with Holland
and Portugal

fore him lay Poland, feeble, divided, and an easy prey to conquest, either by Sweden on the one side or by Russia on the other. To the conquest of Poland, therefore, Charles X bent all his energies; but this soon involved him in war with Denmark and excited the apprehensions of the Emperor Ferdinand III and the Great Elector, Frederick William, Margrave of Brandenburg and Duke of Prussia, who was thus menaced with being made a vassal of Sweden in place of an almost independent holder of a great fief under the nominal suzerainty of the less potent King of Poland.¹

Although by these preoccupations of Charles X Cromwell was deprived of his support in maintaining a Protestant preponderance on the continent, the anxiety for peace in Germany enforced upon the Emperor Ferdinand III the pledge of neutrality by which he was bound not to afford assistance to the Spanish branch of the House of Hapsburg. In a very real sense, therefore, the Protector became the arbiter of Western Europe, and all the more effectually because of the difficulties that beset Mazarin's negotiations with his two other possible allies, the Dutch Republic and Portugal.

At The Hague, the French resident, Chanut, was instructed to press the Grand Pensionary to sever the offensive relations of the Republic with Spain, which had been established by the separate Peace of 1648,² and to unite in action against her. To enforce this policy upon the Hollanders, frequent seizures had been made of Dutch vessels carrying Spanish goods; and the States General had vainly striven to renew their treaties with France on the principle that the neutral flag covers the merchandise. Determined not to be thus forced into an unnecessary war with Spain, the Republic resolved, on the contrary, to meet the imperious insistence of France with increased armaments for the protection of its commerce.

¹ For the secret mission of Friesendorf, sent by Charles X in 1657 to obtain aid from England, for which possessions on the continent were offered, see Erdmannsdörffer, *Deutsche Geschichte*, I, pp. 284, 285.

² See Volume II of this work, p. 605.

The negotiations with Portugal had not proved more satisfactory to France. King John IV had resented the refusal of Mazarin,— in nominal alliance with whom he was carrying on war against Spain,— to make a formal pledge that France would insist upon the independence of Portugal when peace should finally be made. To increase the activity of King John, early in 1655 the Chevalier de Jant was sent by Mazarin to Lisbon with instructions to begin his mission by inquiring (1) how John IV proposed to indemnify Louis XIV for past expenses in the war which, it was alleged, his ambassador had promised would be repaid; and (2) in what manner he intended to execute the clause of the treaty which obliged Portugal to act “continually” against the King of Spain, and to “attack him by land and sea.”¹ The object of the mission being to bully the King of Portugal into action, De Jant did not hesitate to tell John IV to his face that he was “a prince abandoned and without resources,” and insulted him by saying that he would be “the victim of a tragedy—the reunion of Portugal with Spain—not less easy to accomplish than its dismemberment by the acclamation of Your Majesty.”

The King replied with dignity, and was firm in rejecting any new engagement with France that did not take the form of the desired league. In July, therefore, De Jant departed; but, hearing that Spain had offered a truce to Portugal, he returned to Lisbon. Confronted with the question, “Will you conclude a league, or will you not?” the envoy vacillated; then, on September 7, 1655, signed a treaty binding both signatories not to make a separate peace with Spain.

Before De Jant’s return to Paris with the treaty, however, other events had occurred which brought its ratification into question. In vain the Chevalier by citing examples from Roman history excused the fact that he had exceeded his instructions, pleading that his work was the logical

¹ See Tessier, *Le chevalier Jant*, Paris, 1877; and Saint-Aymour, *Recueil des instructions*, III, Portugal, pp. 11, 25.

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The Anglo-
French rappro-
chement

completion of the plans of Richelieu.¹ But Mazarin was resolved not to complicate the future peace with Spain by the obligation to secure his kingdom to John IV, and firmly declined to ratify the treaty.

It was upon the co-operation of Cromwell, therefore, that Mazarin was at last forced to depend for the effective ally of whom he was in quest; but to an alliance with the Protector there were serious impediments. When, in order to promote an *entente*, in February, 1654, Mazarin raised the rank of the French envoy, De Bordeaux, to that of an ambassador accredited personally to Cromwell, a question of etiquette arose not unmingled with royal sentiment. After the execution of Charles I, the Cardinal's loyalty to monarchy had not restrained him from sending a secret representative to make purchases at the sale of the late king's belongings; but he found it embarrassing to permit the King of France to address the regicide as *Mon frère*, and Cromwell refused to be called *Mon cousin*. A satisfactory compromise was found, however, in the title "*Monsieur le Protecteur*."

But this mere formality was the least of the obstacles to an understanding. Cromwell required the expulsion of the Stuart family from France, where the widow of Charles I, Henriette Marie, and her children had sought asylum; and, in addition, he demanded the protection of Protestants and the right of worship for subjects of England travelling or sojourning in France.

Upon the latter point, Mazarin was ready to make every concession. The Edict of Nantes still afforded toleration to the Huguenots, and the Cardinal was willing to guarantee in a special article the immunity and privileges of English subjects.

The expulsion of the Stuarts was a more delicate question. The elder prince, the future Charles II, offended with the sending of De Bordeaux to London, had departed from France and taken up his residence at Köln. His next

¹ Richelieu had, however, in fact also refused to guarantee the independence of Portugal.

younger brother, James, Duke of York, had become an officer in the French army, and could easily be kept out of France. But the third son of Charles I, Henry, the young Duke of Gloucester, who was then only fourteen years old, could not be exiled from France without creating a scandal. The resources of the Cardinal were, however, equal to the emergency. It furnished an occasion for reciprocity in excluding enemies of the State, and thereby an opportunity for procuring the expulsion of Condé's agents from England. It was decided, therefore, that, by a secret treaty, each government should agree to expel certain refugees from the territory of the other; and in the list figured the names of the three sons of Charles I; but, on account of his youth, the expulsion of the Duke of Gloucester was not to become effective for ten years.

The last difficulty to be encountered was the claim of the Protector to be named in the treaty as having the same rank as Louis XIV. Mazarin was for a time disconcerted by this pretension, then suggested that the Protector should first assume the title of king. This Cromwell would probably have done when the royal title was offered to him in the "Petition and Advice" by the Parliament, had it not been for the known opposition of the army.¹ In the Treaty of Westminster, concluded with France on November 3, 1655, Cromwell figures as "*Serenissimus Potentissimusque Dominus Protector Reipublicae Angliae, Scotiae, et Hiberniae.*"²

It was, after all, only to obligations of amity and commerce, not to a political alliance, that the Lord Protector pledged his country in the treaty of 1655. There was in it no mention of a league against Spain, nor was there any secret understanding upon that subject. Still, the Treaty of Westminster was a great victory for Mazarin; for it gave Louis XIV the prestige of friendship with England's powerful ruler, who was soon forced by events into a closer rela-

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The attitude
of Cromwell
toward Spain

¹ For proof that Cromwell would gladly have assumed the crown, see the famous conversation with Whitelocke, *Memorials*, III, pp. 468, 474.

² See Dumont, VI, Part II, p. 121.

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tion with France. In Spain, the most intolerant of the Catholic nations, in which the hated Inquisition was an established institution, antagonism to England, even when latent, was still inherent. But it was the exclusive pretensions of Spain to America that were most irritating to Cromwell, who saw no justice in claims extending over a great portion of two vast continents based primarily on titles of possession derived from decrees of Pope Alexander VI.¹ The Protector had complained that, in contravention of the Treaty of 1630, "the English were treated by the Spaniards as enemies wherever they were met with in America, though sailing to and from their own plantations." He had demanded, too, that English merchants in Spain might be permitted to possess and use English Bibles and other religious books. In reply the Spanish ambassador, Don Alonso de Cardenas, had declared, that to demand free sailing in the West Indies and exemption from the Inquisition in Spain was "to ask for his master's two eyes," and the demands certainly could not be granted.

Thus, peace with Spain became in Cromwell's mind impossible, and depredations on Spanish commerce and colonies, which in Queen Elizabeth's time were construed as acts for which the government was not responsible, now became its deliberate policy. Even before concluding the treaty with France, Cromwell had ordered an attack on San Domingo; which, though unsuccessful, was soon followed by the capture of Jamaica. It was only gradually, however, that he evinced a disposition to abandon his attitude of holding the balance of power; and it was not until 1657 that he was ready to seek a political alliance with France against Spain.

Secret negotiations of Mazarin with Spain

In the meantime, Mazarin had profited by his relations of amity with Cromwell to attempt direct negotiations of peace with Spain. In reality exhausted and decadent, governed by a monarch with whom temporization had become a habit, and attacked by the vigorous navy of England, Spain appeared to be already doomed to ultimate defeat.

¹ See Volume II of this work, pp. 186, 187.

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The brother of the Emperor Ferdinand III, Archduke Leopold of Austria, who since 1646 had governed the Spanish Netherlands, at once perceived the necessity of peace for Spain, and despatched Don Gaspard Bonifaz to urge it upon the Court of Madrid. On his journey, Don Gaspard visited Paris, and had a conversation with Cardinal Mazarin and the King, who informed him that they were ready to open secret negotiations of peace with Philip IV. At Madrid, the proposition was favorably received by the King and his chief minister, Don Luis de Haro; and on June 10, 1656, armed with full powers written by Louis XIV with his own hand, Hugues de Lionne, under cover of the most absolute secrecy, set out for Spain.

The negotiations at Madrid, in the midst of whose stormy scenes De Lionne evinced the poise and skill in argument that always marked his methods, were not successful; for, although each side was disposed to make concessions, De Haro demanded for the Prince of Condé the restoration not only of all his lands and titles but of all his offices in the government. To this De Lionne could not consent; and, at the end of September, after refusing a costly present from the King of Spain, he returned to France without results.¹

Defeated in his attempt to make a secret arrangement with Spain, Mazarin had, nevertheless, by his reserve during the course of these negotiations rendered Cromwell more eager than ever for a French alliance; but the revival of the war and the success of Condé against Turenne at Valenciennes now made this union far more necessary for France than for the Protector. Accordingly, on March 23, 1657, a defensive and offensive treaty was signed at Paris for a joint attack on Spain. England was to furnish six thousand soldiers and a fleet, and as her share of the spoils, was to be put in possession of Dunkirk.²

The Anglo-French alliance

It was, in truth, a war of aggression upon which the Protector had now embarked. What, then, were Cromwell's

¹ For the negotiations of De Lionne and De Haro, see Valfrey, *Hugues de Lionne, ses ambassades, etc.*, pp. 1, 63.

² For the treaty, see Dumont, VI, Part II, p. 224.

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motives? Since the loss of Calais in 1558, England had possessed no territory on the continent. In thus reversing the foreign policy of a century by asking for Dunkirk, did the Protector aim merely to prevent Charles Stuart from using Flanders as a base for attacking England; did he intend only to hold Dunkirk as a check on the future designs of France; or did he have in mind some larger enterprise against the Netherlands? It is certain that the possession of a foothold on the continent was deemed by him of great importance; for it had been a question whether to acquire Dunkirk by joining France, or Calais by joining Spain.

Cromwell's imperial conception and his death

In June, 1658, Dunkirk was captured by the French and loyally delivered to the English; but Oliver Cromwell's death on September 3 of the same year and the succession of his incapable son Richard put an end to the plans which the Protector may have entertained. It was soon afterwards declared that, contrary to the interest of England, he had made an unjust war with Spain and an impolitic league with France, thereby destroying the balance of power which England had possessed when those two countries were at war.¹ It would, perhaps, be more just to say that his intention was to establish England's maritime supremacy throughout the world, first by destroying the colonial preponderance of Spain and then by commanding the Channel on both sides, in order to hold in check both France and the Netherlands. It was, indeed, France, not England, that was to profit by his policy; not because it was ill conceived, but on account of the abrupt failure of his system through his death. That policy was, no doubt, "the deeply planned aggression of a conqueror."² It was, in substance, the imperial policy of Great Britain's later history, the germ thought of that Empire of the Sea whose development involved the overthrow of Spain, the restraint of France, and the subordination of the Netherlands. It was, however, Mazarin who was to gather the fruits of that fateful alliance,

¹ Bethell, *The World's Mistake in Oliver Cromwell*, London, 1668, p. 4.

² Seeley, *The Growth of British Policy*, II, p. 74.

and France that was to acquire in Europe that ascendancy which Cromwell would gladly have conferred upon England; but Cromwell had touched the keys of a far deeper and more lasting conception of greatness,— an empire built on trade and colonies, law and tolerance, thrift and enterprise, opening new paths upon the sea, and finally encircling the earth. With him was arrested for a time the new greatness of England; but the protection to trade, order, and religion which inspired the dictatorship of Oliver Cromwell — not, indeed, without its hardness and its hand of iron — became in time the chief problem of the race from which he sprang. In Asia, in America, and in the great continental islands of the Pacific, the war of Cromwell was to be continued for the conquest of the globe. His task ended in immediate failure, but the spirit of the Lord Protector — a conqueror in the name of righteousness, without always employing the most righteous means — has created an empire far greater than that of which he could have dreamed.

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II. THE PRETENSIONS OF LOUIS XIV

In small things as in great, it had already been made manifest that the young king of France intended to be, what by common consent he was soon to be entitled, the "*Grand Monarque*." On April 13, 1655, this youth of seventeen years, holding a *lit de justice* in his hunting costume, prohibited the assembling of the Parliament of Paris, and all deliberation upon his decrees. The famous words, "*L'état, c'est moi*," although not actually employed by him, are a faithful *résumé* of his discourse upon that occasion, and of his attitude throughout his reign. They accurately epitomize the theory of the royal office held by Mazarin, and express the central thought of the King's famous "*Mémoires*," written long afterward, for the instruction of the Dauphin. In that exposition of the royal prerogatives the doctrine is summarized in this sentence: "It is a perversion of the natural order of things to attribute resolutions to subjects and deference to the sovereign; for only the head has the right of deliberation and resolution, and the functions

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A comedy of
precedence

of the other members consist solely in executing the commandments given to them."

As, upon this theory, the sovereign has no equal within the State, he can have no superior outside of it. In international affairs this attitude was certain to provoke conflicts, for other powers were also jealous of their prerogatives. At Paris, the envoy of the United Provinces, William Boreel, resenting the confiscation of Dutch vessels by the French as a means of driving the Republic into an alliance with France against Spain, had spoken, Mazarin declared, "as no ambassador at that court before." The Cardinal was, however, eager if possible to make friends of the Netherlands; and, therefore, patiently endured the plainness of speech of the Dutch ambassador, and in April, 1657, sent De Thou to The Hague to appease the States General and secure at least their neutrality in the war with Spain. But before the ambassador had delivered the letter in which the King finally promised that the embargo against Dutch vessels should be raised, an incident occurred which narrowly missed ending in acts of violence.

De Thou had been formally instructed to expose himself to any risk rather than yield precedence to the ambassador of Spain;¹ when, on August 11, 1657, returning from a visit to the Princess Dowager in her new palace in the wood, he and the Spanish ambassador, Don Esteban de Gamarra, about six o'clock in the evening, entered one of the alleys of the Voorhout at the same time. The carriage of the French ambassador, drawn by six horses, and that of the Spaniard, drawn by two, having to pass in the narrow alley one at a time, the driver of each demanded precedence, and neither would give way to the other. Their servants were ready to tear each other from their seats; and the crowd that soon gathered, irritated with the treatment the Dutch vessels had received from France, was disposed to take the part of the ambassador of Spain. The Grand Pensionary

¹ The instruction previously given to Chanut was: "De s'exposer à toute extrémité plutôt que de céder." — Archives des Affaires Étrangères, December 10, 1653.

and several members of the States General hastened to the scene to prevent a riot; but for three hours the situation remained unchanged, and neither ambassador would permit the other to have the right of way. Finally, when the prospect was that the night would pass without any solution of the problem, the diplomatist Beverningk proposed the happy expedient of removing the barriers that confined the way, thus suffering both to depart at the same time.

The Spanish ambassador afterwards claimed the victory, on the ground that his carriage occupied a position on the right of the thoroughfare. The French ambassador, on the contrary, maintained that he had won his point, because he had passed on without giving way to his rival.¹

But the relative importance of France among the powers of Europe was being subjected to a more convincing test in a larger field. Since 1654, when the elder son of the Emperor Ferdinand III died, the Emperor had been anxiously planning for the succession of his younger son, Leopold, to the Empire; but there was a strong disposition to end the Hapsburg succession, and Mazarin did not fail to encourage this sentiment among the electors and other German princes.

The embarrass-
ment of the
Emperor

As early as October 12, 1654, the Court of Vienna was warned of the opposition that was brewing, and informed that France favored the choice of the young Elector of Bavaria, Ferdinand Maria; and if he were not disposed to accept an election, Louis XIV might himself be a candidate.²

It was, however, the situation in the North that most seriously complicated the preparations for an election. Charles X of Sweden was at that time in the flood tide of his career of conquest, and the attitude of Frederick William, Elector of Brandenburg, later known as the "Great Elector," was, therefore, of vital consequence to the Emperor. Ferdinand III had hoped to secure a close alliance with him; but, although Count Stahremberg was sent to Berlin in

The situation
in the North

¹ The incident is reported by Lefèvre-Pontalis, *Jean de Witt*, I, p. 245; and also by Chappuzeau, *L'Europe Vivante*, II, p. 305, who claims to have been an eye-witness of the scene.

² See Pribram, *Zur Wahl Leopold*, I, p. 9 et seq.

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October, 1655, for that purpose, his mission was unfruitful. Placed in a position where neutrality was impossible, the Elector had vainly endeavored to reconcile Charles X and John Casimir, King of Poland; and was now forced either to defend his possessions against the aggressions of the Swedish king or join with him in a proposed partition of Poland, in which his share was to be inconsiderable.¹ In his perplexity he would gladly have refused the disadvantageous protectorate offered him by Charles X and ceased his negotiations with John Casimir, — which always ended in mere empty assurances, — if Ferdinand III had been willing to participate with him in a war against the Swedish conqueror; but the Emperor was not inclined to assume so great a risk. Frederick William, on the other hand, having formed an alliance with Holland for eventual resistance to the progress of Sweden,² — which had awakened the fear of the Dutch that the navigation of the Sound might be closed to them, — was eager to strengthen himself in the coming conflict by securing the Emperor's support.

On November 6, 1655, therefore, Frederick William resolved to send Georg von Bonin to Vienna to propose a defensive league and the recognition of the Elector's sovereign right to the whole of Prussia; offering upon those terms to aid the Emperor to secure for the House of Hapsburg the crown of Poland, and to recommend the election of his son Leopold as King of the Romans; but Ferdinand — who was receiving from the Poles assurances of his son's probable succession to the Polish crown after the death of John Casimir, and from the King of Sweden constant declarations of his friendship — exhibited no great concern regarding the peril of Brandenburg, and declined to support him.

Unable to obtain financial aid from Holland, unless he were actually attacked by Charles X; menaced with an invasion of his territories by the Russians who were at

¹ See Waddington, *Le Grand Electeur*, I, pp. 324, 329; and Haumant, *La guerre du Nord*, p. 62.

² For the treaty of August 6, 1655, between Brandenburg and Holland, see Dumont, VI, Part II, p. 108 et seq.

the same time engaged in war with Poland and Sweden, and abandoned by the Emperor, Frederick William felt himself reduced to extremities, when an unexpected change in the situation occurred. The Poles, inspired by religious zeal against their heretical conquerors, rose in a spirit of ardent patriotism to restore their defeated monarch, John Casimir, who triumphantly re-entered his kingdom, and the King of Sweden saw his work of conquest suddenly undone.

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In order to recover his lost position, Charles X was then ready to make concessions to Brandenburg, and proposed to the Elector the cession in fief of the Duchy of Prussia, to be held under the suzerainty of Sweden. These terms were accepted and embodied in the Treaty of Königsberg of January 17, 1656.¹ Thus the Duchy of Prussia, the ancient heritage of the Teutonic Knights, and destined to give its name to the most vigorous of the modern states of Germany, was finally detached from the Kingdom of Poland under the rule of Frederick William, who passed into temporary vassalage to the King of Sweden. Although Frederick William, as Duke of Prussia, was exempted by the treaty from seeking his investiture in person, empowered to hold his own courts, and released from annual tribute, he was obliged to open his territory to the passage of Swedish troops, and in case of war with Poland to furnish a contingent of troops to the Swedish army. In making this treaty he had not only accepted bonds which Charles X meant to tighten in the future, but he had thereby incurred the anger of Holland, the hostility of Poland, and the coolness of the Emperor.

The Treaty
of Königsberg
of 1656

Standing thus in need of a friend, Frederick William was in a position to welcome an alliance with France, and Mazarin lost no time in concluding it. The Elector had already formed secret designs for enterprises on the Rhine in which France was to participate, but these were to

The critical
position of
Brandenburg

¹ See Dumont, VI, Part II, p. 127 et seq.; for the comments, Waddington, *Le Grand Electeur*, I, pp. 342, 344; and Bosse, *Zur diplomatischen Geschichte des Königsberger Vertrages*.

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remain without execution until the conditions were more favorable in the North and East. On February 24, 1656, the King and the Elector mutually promised to protect their respective possessions and to share in any future conquests.¹ Although the French ambassador, Servien, who negotiated this treaty, objected with some indignation to the mention of the King of France and the Elector of Brandenburg in the treaty as if they were of equal dignity, Mazarin was the first to ratify the compact.

But this reaching out of tentacles on the part of Mazarin to grasp influence in Germany was directed against the Emperor and not against Sweden, with which France was in alliance; and Frederick William, now completely drawn into the vortex of the Swedish wars, derived no benefit from his French relations. By his own insistence, however, on November 20, 1656, at Labiau, the Elector obtained from Charles X a secret treaty by which the feudal relations to the Swedish crown imposed by the Treaty of Königsberg were annulled, the Duchy of Prussia was secured to himself as an absolute and sovereign prince, and a perpetual alliance promised;² but the lands conquered by Sweden from Poland so encompassed the duchy as to hold it at the mercy of Charles X. The fate of Brandenburg-Prussia, therefore, still trembled in the balance. Such was the situation in the North when, on April 2, 1657, the death of the Emperor Ferdinand III left a vacancy in the Empire.

But once more the tide was turning in favor of Poland, and the brilliant victories of Charles X were again counteracted by the patriotism of the Poles. Exhausted by the vast extent of his conquests and the immensity of the territory to be held, in May and June, 1657, the King of Sweden was obliged to retreat from Poland. But in this emergency he appealed in vain to his former vassal, for the Austrian diplomatist Franz von Lisola, who had brought about an Austro-Polish treaty on December 1, 1656, had begun the task of detaching the Elector from Sweden and reconciling

The diplo-
macy of
Lisola for
Austria

¹ See Dumont, VI, Part II, p. 30 et seq.

² See Dumont, VI, Part II, p. 148 et seq.

him with Poland. The interests of Frederick William, who dreaded the excessive power of his Swedish protector, induced him to listen to these proposals, and he soon promised not to take the offensive against Poland.¹ With the Elector of Brandenburg thus neutralized, on May 27, 1657, the new head of the House of Austria, young Leopold, already King of Hungary and Bohemia, at the instigation of Lisola, concluded at Vienna an offensive alliance with Poland;² Russia attacked the Baltic provinces of Sweden; the Danes rose in opposition to the Swedish plans of conquest; and the whole North combined to repress the ambitions of Charles X.

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Mazarin had never ceased to fear the eventual co-operation of the Austrian and Spanish branches of the Hapsburg dynasty, and the vacancy in the Empire caused by the death of Ferdinand III, without having previously secured the imperial succession to his son Leopold, seemed to offer an occasion for dealing it a decisive blow.

The vacancy
in the Empire

To win over Frederick William to an anti-Hapsburg policy, in July, 1657, Mazarin sent D'Avaugour and De Terlon to Königsberg, furnished with "realities" for the Elector and his ministers; but when these "realities" proved to be mere promises and not the solid gold expected, the temptation came to naught. The efforts of Lisola, moreover, were systematic and indefatigable; and, although the Elector took the hundred thousand crowns soon afterward brought to him from France by the mathematician De Blondel, that inept diplomatist obtained no results; and on September 19, 1657, Frederick William yielded to Lisola by signing the Treaty of Wehlau, in which the King of Poland recognized the Elector's full sovereignty in the Duchy of Prussia, and the Elector became his defensive ally.³

In the matter of the imperial election, therefore, the position of the Elector of Brandenburg rendered Berlin one of

The candidacy
of Leopold of
Austria

¹ See Pribram, *Lisolas Berichte*, p. 224.

² See Dumont, VI, Part II, p. 179 et seq.

³ See Dumont, VI, Part II, p. 191 et seq. See also the supplementary Treaty of Bromberg, of November 6, 1757.

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the principal centres of diplomatic intrigue, and conferred upon Frederick William an importance that was felt by the whole of Europe.

The difficulties in the way of securing the Hapsburg succession were fully understood at Vienna, and Prince Auersperg, one of the most accomplished ministers of Austria, did not hesitate to point out that the marriage of Leopold with Maria Theresa, the Infanta of Spain, would be a far more brilliant project than election to the Empire; while the risks of an imperial candidacy might be for the time more hopefully met by proposing some other member of the Hapsburg family.¹ The uncle of the young prince, the Archduke Leopold William, was a mature and experienced general; and his election, it was contended, might prove less objectionable to the German princes than the choice of the seventeen-year-old King of Hungary and Bohemia. Once chosen, Leopold William might afterward renounce the crown at a time more propitious for the success of his nephew, who would thus eventually be able to combine the advantages of the Spanish marriage and the prestige of the imperial honor. But young Leopold would not listen to such considerations. For him the crown of the Caesars was still the consummate glory of the world; the Spanish marriage was an uncertainty, and he firmly resolved to stake everything on maintaining the prestige which for centuries his ancestors had held in the Germanic world.²

The attitude
of Europe
towards
Leopold's
candidacy

The opposition to the election of Leopold was wide-spread and vigorous. France, Sweden, England, and a multitude of the German princes were anxious to abase still further the House of Hapsburg, and the prospect of the Emperor of Germany becoming through marriage with the Infanta the

¹ See Pribram, *Zur Wahl Leopold I*, pp. 23, 25.

² The Venetian ambassador Nani writes thus of the poverty of the court at the time of the death of Ferdinand III: "I have observed that there remained in the treasury not enough money to bury him, and it was necessary to hold a council over his body before the breath had left it to find wherewith to clothe the court in mourning." — *Die Relationen der Botschafter Venedigs über Deutschland und Oesterreich*, II, p. 14.

eventual King of Spain,— thus restoring in Europe the preponderance that had been considered so dangerous in the time of Charles V,— was regarded by these powers with a feeling of alarm. On the other hand, Pope Alexander VII and the Kings of Spain, Denmark, and Poland, who would in some degree profit by the perpetuation of the Empire in the hands of the Hapsburgs, were favorable to the choice of Leopold.

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At the death of Ferdinand III, there was only one elector, John George of Saxony, upon whose vote the House of Austria could rely. John Philip von Schönborn, Archbishop of Mainz, whose attitude as Archchancellor of the Empire was of supreme importance, had previously pledged his influence for Leopold, but he had since exhibited signs of wavering. The interests of the Archbishop of Trier were against his declaring for a Hapsburg, and the Archbishop of Köln appeared even less disposed to favor the young prince; while the Count Palatine of the Rhine was in secret alliance with France by a treaty of July 19, 1656. In Bavaria the candidacy of the young elector, Ferdinand Maria, was urged by his ambitious wife, and his adherence to the Hapsburg succession was sustained by his Austrian mother; while at Berlin, Frederick William of Brandenburg, though in alliance with France, was secretly inclined to make a bargain with the Hapsburgs.

Since 1654, Mazarin, in conjunction with Charles X of Sweden, had diligently labored with the electors to prevent the choice of Leopold; and Mazarin's agents in Germany, Wagnée and Gravel, were instructed to urge the candidacy of Ferdinand Maria. Besides the Hapsburg and Bavarian princes, only one other German was seriously considered as a candidate, — Duke William of Neuburg, — who, in addition to that duchy on the Danube, possessed the small duchies of Berg and Jülich near the Rhine; but he was so impecunious and so burdened with his family of seventeen children, that, as a contemporary said, "to maintain him as an emperor it would be necessary to take up a general collection"; and he was so much the enemy of the Elector of

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Brandenburg that Frederick William would certainly never consent to choose him as his master.

Notwithstanding all the money spent and honors promised by Mazarin in Germany, since the Duke of Bavaria preferred, as the Venetian ambassador Nani reported, "to remain a rich elector rather than become an impoverished emperor," and the electors could not unite upon the Duke of Neuburg, in the spring of 1657 the Hapsburgs appeared to be left without a rival in the field.

The candidacy
of Louis XIV

Then it was that Mazarin felt it prudent to confide to his agents his secret desire for the election of the King of France. It was no new thing for the French monarchs to aspire to the imperial honor, although no one of them had ever succeeded in obtaining it.¹ Claiming to be legitimate successors of Charles the Great, they held that the Empire belonged of right as much to them as to the Germans. Since the failure of Francis I to secure the imperial crown in 1519, the prestige of France in Germany had been much increased; and after the Peace of Westphalia it was to the King of France that many of the German princes looked for the guarantee of its observance. Moreover, the Cardinal had learned from experience in the Thirty Years' War that great obstacles could be removed by the free use of money.

In April, 1657, therefore, Gravel, the most capable of the French agents in Germany, was ordered to ascertain the disposition of the Archbishop of Mainz. On the twenty-fourth of that month, the Cardinal was informed that Boineburg, the trusted counsellor of John Philip, had declared that there were only three persons — the King of France, Leopold, and the Archduke Leopold William — to whom the crown could be offered; and early in May, Gravel wrote to Mazarin that Boineburg had twenty times repeated the words: "We shall have, if it please God, a Lewis V."²

¹ See the account of the efforts of Francis I in Volume II of this work, pp. 323, 349; and Vast, *Les tentatives de Louis XIV pour arriver à l'Empire*, in *Revue Historique*, LXV.

² Despatches of Gravel to Mazarin, April 24, and May 1, 1657, in *Archives des Affaires Étrangères*, "Allemagne," vol. 137.

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By the middle of the following June, Mazarin was convinced that it was worth while to inform the Elector of Mainz, in strict confidence, that an elector had proposed for the crown of the Empire His Majesty the King of France; that the King had reluctantly confessed his willingness, if chosen, to accept the honor; that there were many kinds of reasons for not choosing a Hapsburg prince; and that, in case it should be deemed advisable to elect the King of France, his friends would be treated with a generous hand. With this instruction was sent an undated document, evidently intended to be shown to the Archbishop, in which an ingenious appeal was made for his support.¹

This memorandum prudently begins with a mention of the Duke of Bavaria as the first, and the Duke of Neuburg as the second choice; and then proceeds to say that, if these are not available, the alternative necessarily lies between the King of France and a prince of the House of Austria. In this case, His Majesty would desire the advice of the Elector; and, although he has no ambition for the Empire, if, nevertheless, it should be deemed for the interest of the Catholic religion, for the general good of Christendom or repose of Germany, and for the advantage of the electors and other princes and states of the Empire, and that dignity should fall upon His Majesty rather than upon the King of Hungary, it would be His Highness, the Elector of Mainz, who would have all the care and fatigue of the Empire; and His Majesty, without being at any expense to the princes, would think only of employing his person, his means, and his forces to guarantee the Empire from all its enemies, and to maintain it in the grandeur and glory befitting to it.

From this document it is evident that Mazarin really desired the promotion of Louis XIV to the Empire, and that he employed what seemed the most effective available means of securing it by presenting to the Archbishop of Mainz the most potent public and private motives for furnishing his aid.

In the course of the following July, Mazarin was assured

¹ See Pribram, *Zur Wahl Leopold I*, pp. 110, 111.

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The opposi-
tion of Maza-
rin to Leopold's
election

by Gravel that the Elector of Mainz seemed "more inclined to the King of France than to any other";¹ but whether or not the Cardinal, even for a moment, was sanguine of success is by no means certain. Whatever his expectations may have been, he did not hesitate to give assurance that means should not be wanting to ensure the King's success, — for which he himself was ready, if necessary, to sacrifice his household silver. In addition, he took two energetic steps for the accomplishment of his purpose: (1) he threatened to oppose the election of a Hapsburg prince with a war of annihilation; and (2) he promoted a campaign of pamphlets in Germany against the Hapsburgs, in which were emphasized the dangers of a hereditary dynasty in the imperial office, the violations of the Peace of Westphalia already committed, the menace of the Germanic liberties by the union with Spain, and the incapacity of the German princes named as candidates to sustain the dignity of the imperial office.² One of these diatribes terminated with a glowing eulogy of the young king of France, — "noble, intelligent, and virtuous," able with the aid of his great minister to render Germany "powerful, victorious, and secure in the enjoyment of a profound peace." To enforce these arguments upon the electors, on July 10, he sent to Germany an embassy, headed by the magnificent Marshal Gramont and the experienced Hugues de Lionne, abundantly provided with funds, and furnished with instructions prepared by Servien from notes written with the hand of Mazarin himself.

The "*danse des écus*"³ is reported to have been a lively

¹ Gravel to Mazarin, July 19, 1657, Archives des Affaires Étrangères, "Allemagne," vol. 137.

² Among other documents, he distributed in Germany fictitious letters, dated from Rome, in which an Italian gentleman and a German from Frankfort are represented as proposing the King of France as the most worthy successor of Charles the Great. See Archives des Affaires Étrangères, "Allemagne," vol. 137. The texts are in French and Italian.

³ The sums expended by France to influence this election were considerable. The Elector Palatine had received 60,000 écus, and 40,000 more was promised him after the election. The price of the Elector of

one, and eager hands were ready to receive the French coins; but the candidacy of Louis XIV, if in Mazarin's mind it was ever more than an ingenious expedient to obtain the defeat of Leopold, soon ended in failure.¹

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While the astute Cardinal was engaged in the endeavor to defeat the Hapsburg aspirations, Frederick William of Brandenburg was shrewdly forecasting the probable result of the election, and preparing to reap whatever advantages it might have to offer. His agents, John Portmann and John Frederick Löben, had been sent on circular missions to sound the real intentions of the electors; and by the middle of July, 1657, he had reached the conclusion that every vote, except, perhaps that of the Count Palatine, would finally be cast for Leopold. Accordingly, he confided to Lisola his intention to support him, steadily used his influence in his behalf, and without giving a written promise took measures to obtain the highest price for his vote. As a result, on February 14, 1658, he was able to conclude with Lisola and the Austrian General Montecuccoli a treaty of alliance with Austria, in which Leopold was pledged to aid him with an army of ten thousand men in case of war with Sweden. By a secret article it was further agreed that any territory taken from Sweden in Western Pomerania should be garrisoned by the troops of Brandenburg. It was a step toward the formation of the future Kingdom of Prussia beside which the gold of France presented only a slight temptation.

The diplomacy
of the "Great
Elector"

Brandenburg was 100,000 écus, but the payments were stopped because of his attitude. The Elector of Köln was acted upon through the Counts Egon von Fürstenberg, Wilhelm receiving the bishopric of Metz with revenue of 12,000 écus, and Frans the abbey of Saint-Arnould with a revenue of 4,000. The Elector of Trier received considerable sums, and the Elector of Mainz was offered 40,000 rixtalers. So great was the demand for funds that the German bankers refused to cash the drafts; and, as in the election of 1519, some of them refused to aid in excluding a German prince. See Vast, *Revue Historique*, LXV, pp. 11, 12.

¹ Preuss, *Historische Vierteljahrschrift*, VII, 1904, in a searching criticism of Pribram, Vast, and others who have written on the subject of the candidacy of Louis XIV for the imperial crown in 1657, maintains that there was, in fact, no real candidacy.

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The election
of Leopold I

On March 19, 1658, the electors began to arrive at Frankfurt. The Archbishop of Mainz had labored assiduously for peace between France and Spain, but neither side was inclined to accept his mediation. Upon one point only were the electors disposed to act favorably to France. All had a common interest in limiting the power of the new emperor; and to this end, on May 15, Gramont and De Lionne were able to secure the adoption of a *conclusum* by which the Emperor was forbidden to furnish aid to the Spaniards against the French or their allies. The Spanish ambassador Peñaranda offered a hundred thousand crowns for the suppression of the two words "*foederatos Galliae*," but without success. Thus, the only profitable result of the mission of Gramont and De Lionne, so far as the election was concerned, was to impose upon Leopold I a capitulation which restrained his liberty of action. This the Archbishop of Mainz had repeatedly offered, but up to the last moment De Lionne had indignantly rejected it. The French case was, nevertheless, astutely handled, and Gramont, De Lionne, and Gravel did all that was possible for France; still the result accomplished by so much labor, so much gold, and so many sumptuous dinners and "*longues bueries*" can hardly be considered a signally triumphal achievement.¹ On July 18, 1658, the Austrian minister Count Isaac Volmar could boast of a more decisive victory in the election of Leopold I as Emperor.

Mazarin's dis-
simulation of
his defeat

With admirable tact, Cardinal Mazarin had prepared for this adverse result. On November 28, 1657, the birth of a male heir to the throne of Spain had been announced at Madrid. The occurrence afforded to Mazarin an occasion for writing to his ambassadors soon afterward, that the birth of the Spanish Infante Philip "might furnish an honorable pretext, since the infidelity of Mainz has reduced us to the state of not being able to do better,— to relax a little our opposition."¹ When, therefore, the final disap-

¹ Mazarin to Gramont, January 10, 1658. Archives des Affaires Étrangères, "Allemagne," vol. 140.

pointment came, the Cardinal had rendered his acquiescence in the final result so plausible, that the "*Wahlcapitulation*" enforced by the electors upon Leopold I was claimed as a decisive victory for France.¹

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The Treaties of Westphalia had left the German princes free to form alliances with one another, and even with foreign powers; and as early as March 21, 1651, they had availed themselves of this privilege by the recess of that date to provide for their common defence.² On December 15, 1654, a defensive league, composed of the Archbishops of Köln and Trier, the Duke of Neuburg, and the Bishop of Münster, had been concluded. In the course of time, the interests of peace, commerce, and political safety pointed to the wider extension and better organization of this league. In 1656, therefore, an effort was made to form an alliance with Holland; but De Witt was more interested in adjusting relations with the powers of the North to prevent the predominance of Sweden in the Baltic, and after long but fruitless negotiations, in which it was proposed that some of the Protestant princes, especially the Duke of Brandenburg and the Landgrave of Hesse-Cassel, be admitted to the league, the attempt was abandoned. The entrance of France into this combination, although taken into consideration by Mazarin as early as 1656, was not at once realized; for the Cardinal desired, as a condition of joining it, to extend the league so as to include both religious confessions, with a view of preventing its ever falling under the influence of the Emperor, — as the Catholic leagues of former times had always fallen, — in case the imperial office should continue in the House of Hapsburg. If, however, France should be successful in the imperial election, such a

The origin of
the League of
the Rhine

¹ Not unnaturally, Gramont's *Mémoires*, which has until recently been the chief source of information on this subject, tended toward an exaggeration of the French mission as a brilliant diplomatic triumph; and this is the view expressed by most writers. According to the documents cited by Pribram, *Zur Wahl* etc., pp. 135, 143, however, it is evident that Mazarin himself did not entertain this view.

² Pribram, *Beitrag zur Geschichte des Rheinbundes von 1658*, p. 6.

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The adhesion
of France to
the League of
the Rhine

confederation might be embarrassing;¹ and in no case, therefore, were Gramont and De Lionne to encourage the further development of the league, unless it could be transformed by admitting the King of Sweden, the Elector of Brandenburg, and other princes believed to be favorable to France. Thus, the policy of Mazarin had been to hold the League of the Rhine in abeyance until after the imperial election.

When, however, by the election of Leopold I another Hapsburg ascended the imperial throne, there was left to Mazarin no other resort in Germany than to enter into an alliance with the princes of the Empire, by which he might, perhaps, hold the Emperor in check. Accordingly, although he had said only a few months before, "The King cannot be content with the elevation to the empire of any prince of the House of Austria, whatever offers may be made, and whatever precautions may be proposed for bridling his power, for we cannot imagine any restraint strong enough to produce that effect";² nevertheless, having failed to prevent the election of Leopold I, and also in his plans for concluding particular treaties with the German princes — which he would have preferred to joining the League of the Rhine — Mazarin authorized the adhesion of France on August 15, 1658, at Mainz, to a treaty enlarging the earlier association, signed on the previous day at Frankfurt by ten German princes, and including the King of Sweden, but not the Elector of Brandenburg, for the maintenance of the Peace of Westphalia.³

For more than two centuries, historians were accustomed to consider the League of the Rhine as the "brilliant creation" of Mazarin. It was, in truth, of great advantage to Louis XIV in his opposition to the Hapsburgs to be associated with a strong body of German princes, and the King of

¹ See the interesting instruction to Gramont and De Lionne, British Museum, Harliana, 4531.

² Archives des Affaires Étrangères, "Allemagne," vol. 140.

³ It was not without hesitation that Mazarin reached this decision, as is shown in the Archives des Affaires Étrangères, "Allemagne," vol. 138. The treaty as signed by France is given by Vast, *Les grands traités*, I, pp. 72, 78.

France was in the future to make the most of it; but in the light of the facts now known to us the League of the Rhine must be regarded as chiefly the work of John Philip von Schönborn, Archbishop of Mainz, who wished to add new guarantees to the Treaties of Westphalia by a closer union of the German princes.

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But even from this point of view the negotiations of Gramont and De Lionne were of immense utility to France. It was presumptuous to suppose that Louis XIV could be elevated to the Empire, in which France really had no part; but it was an advantage to that kingdom to possess allies that were opposed to a Hapsburg predominance through the imperial office. In the eyes of the German princes, they had merely formed a defensive league within the Empire; and, in admitting France and Sweden to their compact, they believed they were only securing new guarantees of their own independence. In reality, however, the success of Mazarin's diplomacy was considerable; for by the capitulation of Leopold I he had obtained a solemn pledge that the German branch of the House of Austria would furnish no further aid to the Spaniards, and by union with the German princes he had made provision to enforce it.

The utility to
France of Mas-
arin's policy
in Germany

The primary aim of the Cardinal in continuing the war with Spain had been the acquisition of the Spanish Netherlands. This, he had long maintained, "would furnish to Paris an inexpugnable bulwark, and render it truly the heart of France by placing it in the least vulnerable part of the kingdom."

The relations
of France and
Spain

The decisive battle of the Dunes, on June 14, 1658, rendered the realization of this project more probable than it had ever been before; for the exhaustion of Spain—at war with England and Portugal as well as with France—was evident.

The military leaders were eager to push their victory to a conclusion; but Mazarin was influenced by another consideration,—the marriage of the King and the succession to the throne. Already Louis XIV had displayed his passion for the Cardinal's attractive niece, Maria Mancini, and it was with difficulty that the royal lover was dissuaded

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by his minister from a marriage which that statesman knew would be injurious to the dynastic interests of the monarchy and ultimately, perhaps, disastrous to himself. It had long been the desire of the Queen Mother that Louis XIV should marry her niece, the Infanta of Spain. To please Anne of Austria, therefore, and to end a situation which the inclinations of the King were rendering dangerous to the State, Mazarin resolved to force the hand of the King of Spain.

The royal
comedy at
Lyons

The idea of the Spanish marriage had been first suggested during the Congress of Westphalia, and the Spanish plenipotentiaries had employed it as a means of promoting a separate peace with the United Provinces, which were naturally opposed to it. The union of Louis XIV and Maria Theresa, it was insinuated, might involve a French claim to the Spanish Netherlands as a marriage portion. If this were granted, France, as possessor of all the Spanish rights in the Netherlands, would become a dangerous neighbor.

In his secret mission to Madrid in 1656, De Lionne had proposed the marriage as the most practicable basis of a peace; but Don Luis de Haro had steadily declined to consider it, for Spain did not have the Salic law, and as there was at that time no male heir to the Spanish throne, it was possible that the kingdom might thus pass by marriage into the practical possession of a French prince.¹

To force the hand of Philip IV, Mazarin now pretended to favor the marriage of Louis XIV to the Princess Margaret of Savoy. The arrangements for the betrothal were appointed to take place at Lyons; and on October 26, 1658, the French Court, accompanied by Cardinal Mazarin, with an enormous suite of ladies and gentlemen, set out upon an intentionally protracted journey to that city.

¹ Ten years before, on January 20, 1646, Mazarin had distinctly formed the project of obtaining for France the entire succession of Spain, and had written: "The Infanta being married to His Majesty, we could aspire to the kingdoms of Spain, whatever renunciation might be required to be made." — Mignet, *Négociations relatives à la succession d'Espagne sous Louis XIV*, I, p. 33.

The Duchess Dowager Christine and the Princess Margaret having arrived some weeks previously, on November 24 the interviews and festivities began.

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Louis XIV appears to have been charmed with the young princess, who responded to his gallantry, when suddenly there fell upon her an unexpected blow. The journey of the French Court, studiously retarded for the purpose, had awakened lively emotions in Spain, and the Spanish ambassador, Antonio Pimentel, was sent post haste to Lyons. The ruse of Mazarin proved entirely successful. The ambassador offered the hand of the Infanta in marriage, the Princess of Savoy was sent home laden with costly gifts, and the negotiations between France and Spain were resumed at Paris.

From February until June, 1659, Pimentel struggled with Mazarin, as De Lionné had previously struggled at Madrid with Don Luis de Haro, for honorable terms of peace. The difficulties were very great. Not until May 7, was a suspension of arms concluded; and then against the opposition of Turenne, who regarded the Spanish Netherlands as an easy prey to France.

The preliminary treaty of Paris

The chief obstacle to an agreement was the future of Condé. At Paris, he was regarded as a traitor deserving of death. At Madrid, the honor of the King of Spain was pledged to see him restored to his possessions and offices in France. For a time no solution of the problem seemed possible, for Philip IV insisted that he should not be treated "as a criminal," and Mazarin retorted that it was not for the King of Spain "to lay down the law for a king who would not receive it."

After long and trying discussions, Pimentel was obliged to yield to the firmness of the Cardinal. Condé was required to offer complete submission, sacrifice all his public charges, and accept nothing but the restitution of his possessions. But the treaty signed by Pimentel at Paris, on June 4, 1659, was not definitive, and only served as a scaffolding for the final treaty. At Madrid, where the agents of Condé were active, a storm of denunciation was

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Negotiations
in the Isle of
Pheasants

showered upon the head of the unhappy ambassador, who was even declared deserving of decapitation for having thus betrayed the honor of his master. Still, in the hope that further negotiations between the chief ministers might smooth away the difficulties, toward the end of June the ratification of the treaty was sent to Paris.

Peace being thus rendered practically certain, the Cardinal deemed it opportune before his departure for his final negotiations with Don Luis de Haro at the Franco-Spanish frontier, to dispel the illusions of the Duchess of Savoy regarding the marriage of her daughter. This he did by ungraciously insinuating that the Duchess had been guilty of intrigues with Spain, against which she energetically protested; but, fearing lest the interests of Savoy might suffer if she offered reproaches, she humbly besought the favor of the King without complaining of Mazarin's conduct, and was rewarded by the restitution to the Duke of Savoy of the castle of Vercelli.

In the middle of the Bidassoa, on a little neutralized island known as the Isle of Pheasants, the two ministers were to meet for the completion of the peace. There, from August 13 to November 7, 1659, twenty-four conferences were held by Cardinal Mazarin and Don Luis de Haro in the pavilion, constructed for the purpose. The programme of procedure was carefully arranged in advance, but it was modified to suit the views of the two negotiators, to whose personal skill in treating with each other the interests of both kingdoms were now intrusted.

The future of Condé continued to be the central problem. De Haro obstinately insisted on the restoration of his rank and offices. Mazarin was firm in demanding his absolute submission to the King as a condition of pardon. It was finally agreed that the office of "*Grand Maître de France*" should be exercised by his son, the Duke of Enghien; and that the Prince of Condé, having made known to Cardinal Mazarin his sorrow for his hostility, his request for grace, and his promise of obedience for the future, should be pardoned and restored to the free possession of all his goods,

honors, and privileges as a prince of the blood, with the government of Burgundy and Bresse.

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In view of the possibility of the death of the Infante Philip, the Court of Spain insisted upon an absolute renunciation of the rights of Maria Theresa to the Spanish throne. This, it was recalled, had been required of Anne of Austria upon her marriage to Louis XIII. In reply, Don Luis was reminded that that princess had received a wedding portion of five hundred thousand écus. It was agreed, therefore, that the renunciation should be made and the dowry given; but the impoverished condition of Spain made it necessary that this should be only promised, not immediately paid. The occasion was thus presented for De Lionne to make the ingenious stipulation — destined to afford an apparent justification of future pretensions to the crown of Spain — that the renunciation of rights to the throne should be conditional upon the payment of the wedding portion within the period named in the treaty.

The last difficulty was the delimitation of the Netherlands frontier. The extensive restitutions to Spain did not meet the expectation of the French generals who had made such large conquests in the Netherlands, but Mazarin had designs for the future. On the side of the Pyrenees, however, France reached its "natural limit" through the cession by Spain of Roussillon and Cerdagne. The French conquests in Catalonia and Italy were abandoned by France to Spain, Dunkirk was confirmed to England, and Jülich assured to the Duke of Neuburg. Portugal was offered French mediation; but left, unaided, to fight for her own independence.

On November 7, 1659, the last conference was held in the Isle of Pheasants and the peace was signed.¹ While the Peace of the Pyrenees is generally regarded as the greatest monument to the diplomacy of Mazarin, he has been reproached for frustrating by it the French conquest of the Spanish Netherlands, which seemed so imminent.

The Peace of
the Pyrenees

Amidst the Cardinal's labors to conclude the treaty, fresh

¹ The best text of the treaty, with admirable introduction and comments, is found in Vast, *Les grands traités*, I, pp. 93, 107.

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efforts had been necessary to induce his young monarch to forget the charms of Maria Mancini and consent to accept the Infanta. Only the most resolute determination on the part of Mazarin in urging the *raison d'État* finally prevailed over the King's infatuation. It was not, however, until the Cardinal threatened to retire from his service and abandon the country, that Louis XIV decided to give up the fair Italian for the peace of France.¹ When, in June, 1660, the marriage had been solemnized and the royal pair proceeded on their journey to Paris, the nation could not repress its joy at having so glorious a monarch, and the progress of the King and Queen through France resembled a march of triumph.

The Peace of the Pyrenees not only marks the victory of Mazarin over the civil dissensions which attended his advent to power but of the theory of government he had striven to impose on France. The King was greeted at his capital as a "young god," the rightful repository of omnipotence in his realm, who could do no wrong.

The crisis in
the North

One of the articles of the Peace of the Pyrenees provided for the joint efforts of France and Spain to secure the pacification of the North, where the war between Sweden and the coalition of Austria, Poland, Denmark, and Brandenburg had reached a crisis.

In the winter of 1658, by wonderful marches over the ice, Charles X had almost without resistance crossed the Little and the Great Belt and threatened Copenhagen. Denmark was thus at the mercy of the conqueror, who by the Peace of Roskilde of February 26, 1658, obtained the cession of Scania, the island of Bornholm, and the Norwegian provinces of Badhus and Trondhjem; the transfer of four thousand soldiers to Sweden; the renunciation of all anti-Swedish alliances; the exclusion of all hostile war-ships from passing through the Sound and the Belts; the exemption of Swedish vessels from tolls; and the restoration to his estates of the traitor Korfits Ulfeld. But the peace had proved only transitory. After friendly intercourse between

¹ See Valfrey, *Huques de Lionne*, pp. 280, 285.

Charles X and Frederick III at the castle of Frederiksborg, celebrated with sumptuous banquets, the King of Sweden made fresh demands. When these were reluctantly conceded, the conqueror, still unsatisfied, resolved to renew his attack and efface Denmark from the map of Europe.¹

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"I will die in my own nest," was the answer of Frederick III to those who counselled flight from his kingdom; and his people, animated by his example, prepared for the defence of their capital. But all Europe was now interested in the struggle. The United Provinces were filled with anxiety at the thought of the annihilation of their ally and the control of the Sound by Sweden. The States General promptly sent to the Baltic a powerful fleet, and a naval combat followed in which Dutch heroism reached its climax, with the result that provisions and reinforcements were furnished to Copenhagen, and Charles X was compelled to raise the siege. In the ceded territories, the Danes rose to recover their nationality; the Swedish possessions in Prussia were invaded by a force of Poles, Austrians, and Brandenburgers under Frederick William and Montecuccoli; another army under Czarniecki swept over Holstein and drove the Swedish troops from Jutland; and by January, 1659, Charles X was struggling to maintain his foothold in the Danish islands. Exposed to the vengeance of the coalition of the North, the future fate of the recent conqueror had suddenly become an object of solicitude to France and England.

The rescue of
Denmark

Either the unlimited preponderance or the total defeat of the King of Sweden was seen to involve a danger for the

The interven-
tion of France
and England

¹ The Chevalier de Terlon, French ambassador to Sweden, thus reports in his *Mémoires* the intentions of Charles X confided to himself: "I shall destroy Copenhagen; . . . then I shall transfer the privileges of that city to Malmö, or to Landskrona in Scania, and make my residence in that province, which will become the centre of the State. After that, I shall render myself absolute master of the Baltic, and for that purpose I shall have a fleet of a hundred war-ships. . . . The conquest of Norway will follow that of Denmark. . . . Finally, I wish to go to Italy with a powerful army and navy, like a second Alaric, to place the city of Rome once more under the power of the Goths."

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system of equilibrium in Europe. The successful establishment of the Baltic empire he was aiming to create implied the extinction of Denmark, the absorption of Poland, the exclusion of Russia from the Baltic, the subordination of Austria, the appropriation of Brandenburg and other German territories, and the prohibition of commerce with the North except on such terms as Sweden might be disposed to dictate. The ruin of the Swedish state, on the other hand, would involve the preponderance of Austria in the Empire, the probable development of Brandenburg in Northern Germany, and the undisputed control of the Sound by Denmark. For France and England, therefore, the integrity of Sweden was of supreme importance; and, as the Netherlands had opposed the extinction of Denmark, so now those powers were anxious to prevent the entire defeat of Sweden.

Accordingly, in January, 1659, an agreement had been made between France and the Protector, Richard Cromwell, for the purpose of securing peace in the North. In pursuance of this object, on May 21, 1659, was signed at The Hague by France, England, and the Netherlands a compact, known as the "First Hague Concert," to endeavor by their mediation to terminate the war between Denmark and Sweden on the terms contained in the Treaty of Roskilde. On the twenty-fourth of the following July, was signed the "Second Hague Concert," by which England and the Netherlands agreed to employ their fleets, then in the Baltic, to compel a peace upon the basis already indicated within a fortnight; but Mazarin, who knew the obstinacy of his ally and was unwilling to use force against him, refused to accede to this proposal.

Before the mediation at The Hague had reached any decisive result, however, the victory of the coalition of the North over the small Swedish army in Denmark on November 24, 1659, at Nyborg, broke the power of Charles X; who, after endeavoring to renew the war by offering the United Provinces a portion of the spoils, on February 13, 1660, suddenly died, worn out with his exertions.

Before the death of Charles X — who was succeeded by

his four-year-old son, Charles XI, under a regency — a congress had been arranged to assemble in the monastery of Oliva near Danzig. There, in January, 1660, the plenipotentiaries of the Emperor, Sweden, Poland, and Brandenburg met for the purpose of negotiating a peace. In the course of the negotiations, representatives of Holland, Denmark, and Courland arrived at the Congress, but took only a secondary place. The mediation of the French ambassador to Poland, Antoine de Lumbres, was accepted by all except the Emperor, who refused to recognize the French.¹ The *éclat* of the occasion may be judged by the fact that weeks were required to arrange the ceremonial, and even the delegation of Brandenburg contained sixty-five persons, with thirty-five horses.²

On May 3, 1660, was signed the Peace of Oliva, in which the King of Poland, John Casimir, renounced his hereditary claims to the Swedish crown; Livonia was assigned to Sweden, and the quarrel between that kingdom and Poland was thus ended.³ The most significant provision of the peace for the future of Europe, however, was the confirmation of the Duchy of Prussia to the Elector of Brandenburg in full sovereignty; for Frederick William was thus permanently rendered a figure of consequence beyond the limits of the Germanic world, and in his person a Hohenzollern entered the family of recognized sovereign rulers. His temporary conquests in Swedish Pomerania he was obliged to relinquish; but he had won his place — more by astute diplomacy than by war — among the great founders of modern Europe.

¹ Diplomatic relations between Austria and France had not existed since 1648, and Leopold I had not notified Louis XIV of his election to the Empire. Referring to the Emperor, whom he could not recognize until duly notified, Louis XIV always used the expression, "*La Cour de Vienne.*" See Sorel, *Recueil des instructions*, I, Autriche, pp. 41, 64.

² A list of the plenipotentiaries and a full account of the proceedings may be found in Waddington, *Le Grand Electeur*, I, pp. 464, 478.

³ For the treaty, see Dumont, VI, Part II, p. 303 et seq.; for the negotiations, Friese, *Ueber den äusseren Gang der Verhandlungen beim Frieden von Oliva.*

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The pacifica-
tion of the
North com-
pleted

Abandoned by his allies, who had concluded the Peace of Oliva without safeguarding the interests of Denmark, Frederick III was disposed to restore the integrity of his kingdom by continuing war with Sweden; but the United Provinces, fearful of the consequences of further war, made a treaty with Sweden and employed their fleet to impose peace upon Denmark by immobilizing the Danish army. On June 6, 1660, a peace was signed at Copenhagen, whereby Trondhjem and Bornholm were recovered; but the rich provinces of Scania were lost. Denmark retained, however, the right to admit foreign fleets to the Baltic and to collect the Sound tolls as before; but the ships of Sweden were to be allowed free passage.¹

Only one other step was necessary to complete the pacification of the North. On July 1, 1661, was concluded the Treaty of Kardis, by which the Czar Alexis restored to Sweden all the places he had taken in Livonia, and granted to the Swedes the privilege of free commerce with Russia and the right of worship according to their creed.²

The achieve-
ments and
death of
Mazarin

Like the League of the Rhine, the pacification of the North has figured in French history as one of the trophies of Mazarin's diplomacy. That it was so in a certain sense cannot be denied, but the success of his mediation was dependent almost entirely upon the decisive action of the Netherlands, the exhaustion of Sweden, the desire of Poland for repose, the weariness of the Emperor with the whole enterprise, and the willingness of the Great Elector to accept full sovereignty in his Prussian duchy.

One fact is, however, incontestable,— upon his death on March 9, 1661, Mazarin left France the first power in Europe. That supremacy was not the result of any single triumph, but of a multitude of successful applications of one line of policy,— the exaltation of the French monarchy by consolidation within the State, and the persistent extension of the influence of France in every part of Europe in pursuance of the plans of Richelieu. In the struggle for position,

¹ For the treaty, see Dumont, VI, Part II, p. 319 et seq.

² For the treaty, see Dumont, VI, Part II, p. 363 et seq.

the death of Oliver Cromwell had ended the temporary ascendancy of England; the division of the Hapsburg power had reduced both Austria and Spain to a secondary rank; and Sweden, though still a great kingdom, had failed to establish her empire on the Baltic. The United Provinces by their vigorous diplomacy, supported by their naval and commercial prestige, had acquired a prominence never before possessed by so small a country; but France, ruled by a sovereign who was completely master in his own realm, had attained a primacy which no other power could dispute. Mazarin had failed in his ambition to place upon the head of his young king the diadem of the Caesars, but he had succeeded in making him far more potent in reality than the Emperor who wore it.

III. THE DESIGNS OF FRANCE UPON THE NETHERLANDS

The cruel trials which civil war had inflicted upon France had powerfully promoted that deference for the royal prerogatives upon which the rule of Cardinal Mazarin reposed; and, under his inspiration, the "*culte du roi*" had become for France almost what the apotheosis of the Roman emperors had been for the Empire in the days of the "*Pax Romana*." "The seat of Your Majesty represents the throne of the living God," Omer Talon had declared in the *lit de justice* when the regency of Anne of Austria was proclaimed. "This company regards you as the living image of divinity," the scrupulous Lamoignon had said to Louis XIV in the presence of the Parliament of Paris. A short time afterwards, Bossuet, in a subtle argument drawn from the Holy Scriptures, was to write: "The royal throne is not the throne of a man, but the throne of God himself. . . . The prince should render to no one an account for what he does. . . . Without that absolute authority, he can neither accomplish what is good nor repress that which is evil." ¹

The personal
government
of Louis XIV

A king by divine right, in his own belief and in that of his people, Louis XIV naturally became the incarnation

¹ Bossuet, *Politique tirée des propres paroles de l'Écriture-Sainte*, 1709.

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of the pride, the power, and the imperial aspirations of the French nation. For him and for his people, Versailles was like a second Rome; whence he was divinely ordained to extend the power of France, and diffuse its riper civilization throughout the world.

Of this high responsibility the King had a clear conception. "It is by toil that a sovereign rules, and it is for this that he reigns," he afterwards wrote; and history has accorded to him the praise he coveted of "doing conscientiously the business of a king." With unlimited confidence in his own powers, with which the tuition of Mazarin had inspired him, he resolved to gather into his own hands the entire administration of the state, to improve its organization, and to be his own prime minister.

The foreign
service of
France

Immediately after the death of Cardinal Mazarin, at seven o'clock in the morning, a council was assembled, and the King said to the Chancellor, the venerable Pierre Séguier: "I have called you with my ministers and secretaries of state, to inform you that until the present I have been pleased to leave the direction of my affairs to the Cardinal; it is now time that I govern myself. You will aid me with your counsels, when I shall ask for them." Then, turning to De Lionne, "You are assured of my affection; I am content with your services. You, Brienne, will act in concert with him in foreign affairs, and you will send to my ambassadors all that he shall authorize on my part, without a new order from me. The face of things has changed. I shall have other principles in the government of my estate, in the regulation of my finances, and in foreign negotiations than those of the late Cardinal. You know my wishes; it is for you now, gentlemen, to execute them."

The royal
instructions

Not even his most trusted minister was permitted to form a policy or instruct an ambassador without the direction of the King. After his line of action had been ascertained by conversation, the formal written instructions to ambassadors were usually prepared by the chief of the department; but these documents were always read aloud to the King, and were often annotated and revised by him with

his own hand. Many of them have been recently published; and they are, in general, models of clear, direct, and systematic style and method.¹ They contain elaborate analyses of the political conditions of the time and indicate not only the aims and policy of France, but those of other countries which were to be frustrated or promoted according to the interests of the monarchy. Supplemented by the correspondence addressed to ambassadors already at their posts, they not only reveal the motives of the French Court, but disclose the whole mechanism of European politics as seen from the French point of view.

But Louis XIV was not content with these merely formal expositions of his political system, or that the foreign representatives of France should be the best informed in Europe. Every ambassador, before his departure for his post, was called into the presence of the King and impressed with the real aim and significance of his mission by a few words from the monarch's own lips. He was thus sent forth as an apostle of French prestige rather than as a mere public functionary; and the foreign service of France, which Richelieu and Mazarin had raised to the dignity of a profession, under the personal rule of Louis XIV acquired almost the character of a priesthood.

Chosen chiefly from a class of men likely to prove personally loyal to the King, and rarely from the ranks of ecclesiastics,—whose dual relations rendered their devotion less certain,—the diplomatic agents of Louis XIV were followed and directed in the field with incessant oversight. To secure strict obedience to the King's orders, every ambassador was closely watched. Everything coming under his observation affecting the political, military, or commercial interests of France he was expected to report. By this means, the monarch became the best informed person in Europe. He was familiar with all the parties and factions of every country, and all the intrigues of every court were known to

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The French
diplomats

¹ See *Recueil des Instructions données aux Ambassadeurs et Ministres de France depuis les Traités de Westphalie jusqu'à la Révolution Française.*

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him. Even the characters, the weaknesses, and the dispositions of his fellow sovereigns and of their ministers were of interest to him; for they were all considered useful items of knowledge in suggesting the means by which his ends might be accomplished.

Under the exacting administration of the King, the labors of the diplomatic agents of France, as shown by the existing archives, were often enormous. Every ambassador was expected to be well informed of the state of affairs in every European country. For this purpose a lively correspondence was kept up by the ambassadors with one another. As many of these communications were sent in cipher, diplomacy became a serious industry. The long distances to be traversed, the slowness of communication, and the frequent necessity of prompt action often rendered imperative on the part of ambassadors a bold initiative, and the responsibility was great. The expenses of representation were sometimes immense. Journeys lasting weeks and months, with extensive trains of servants and baggage, were necessary incidents of diplomatic life. Frequently the sovereign to whom an ambassador was accredited had to be followed on long marches, and even on the field of battle. Thus Charles X was accompanied across the belts of the Baltic on the ice by the French ambassador, and Colbert de Croissy at a later time had an audience of Charles XII in the trenches while bullets were flying through the air.

For all this service and exposure, the ambassador received but meagre pay, usually much in arrears. Feuquières had thirty horses and eighty persons to maintain on an income of thirty-six thousand livres. It was not unusual for an ambassador to pawn or sell his silver, and even ruin his private fortune, in order to sustain the dignity of his king. And yet the ambassadors of France handled for their sovereign vast sums of money, bribing and pensioning ministers and princes, and sometimes even kings. The chief rewards for so much sacrifice and responsibility were usually a word of praise from the monarch, the order of St. Louis, or a post of increased honor and importance.

The missionary zeal of the French diplomatists is the more necessary to comprehend because it was through the machinery of this system that the King of France was to complete his ascendancy in Europe, and because its organization was soon to be imitated by every European country. Other monarchs were not wanting in able diplomatists, who in devotion and intelligence were equal to the French. No more skilful or more loyal service could be imagined than that of Franz von Lisola to the House of Austria, and Spain was served with equal fidelity by Esteban de Gamarra and many others; but in the perfection of its organization the diplomatic service of France was without an equal. Another advantage was the central position of Paris. The distance which separated Madrid from Vienna, and both from the field of influence and expansion of France on and near the Rhine, gave to the French the benefit of more swift intelligence and more rapid action. At London, Portugal could be secretly aided in its struggle with Spain almost without suspicion; and The Hague, only a short journey from Paris, had become the chief centre of diplomacy, while from these points it usually required three weeks for a courier to reach Madrid, and two months for an exchange of notes. When to this it is added that Louis XIV never failed promptly and energetically to sustain his representatives, while Spain and Austria were lethargic in action and even divided in counsel, it is easy to comprehend the superior effectiveness of French diplomacy.

But there was still another reason for the growing ascendancy of France. All her rivals were passing through a period of transition and confusion.

In March, 1660, General Monk had reorganized the British Parliament; on April 14, Charles Stuart had issued the conciliatory Declaration of Breda; and on May 25, he had landed at Dover, amidst the applause of a nation weary of military rule and always monarchical at heart. But Charles II had not returned to England as a friend of France, nor was the French alliance made by Cromwell popular with his subjects. One of the first steps of the new king was a

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Advantages of
the French
diplomacy

The interna-
tional influence
of the Stuart
restoration

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notice to the French ambassador, De Bordeaux, to quit the country; and he left England on July 7, 1660. It was toward Spain that English sentiment was at that time turning, not only for commercial reasons, but because it was judicious for two weak nations in the presence of a stronger to unite in resisting its aggressive policy. The return of Dunkirk to Spain and a Spanish marriage for Charles II were seriously discussed in the summer of 1660; but it was soon made to appear that it was for the interest of the Crown in its struggle with the nation to possess a powerful rather than a feeble ally, and the militant diplomacy of Louis XIV soon turned the tide in favor of France. Thus England, against its will, was soon condemned by Charles II to assume the position of a mere satellite in the system of French preponderance.

The affair of
D'Estrades
and De
Watteville

An incident connected with this transition is too significant of the temper of the time to be passed over without notice. In August, 1661, the contention of France and Spain over the question of precedence induced Charles II to exclude all foreign ministers from the public escort of the Venetian embassy then arriving at London. Louis XIV was incensed with his cousin for denying to his ambassador, the Count D'Estrades, the precedence claimed by him over the Spanish ambassador, De Watteville, who thus seemed to be placed on an equality with his French colleague; and D'Estrades was not only rebuked for submitting to the order, but instructed to seize the first occasion to repair the indignity to his master. Accordingly, on October 10, at the entry of the Swedish ambassador, Count Brahe, into London, the carriages of the two rivals were sent to join the procession, when a bloody encounter occurred between their servants, the hamstrings of the horses attached to the carriage of Count D'Estrades were cut, several of his servants were killed and others wounded, and the Spaniards, aided by the populace, alone secured a place in the escort.¹

¹ According to De Martens' account, *Causes célèbres*, I, p. 353, the number of armed people on the side of Spain was 2,000. The French side was sustained by 500, so that the conflict took the form of a pitched battle.

Charles II escaped the wrath of the King of France by immediately expressing his regrets and chastising his own subjects who were connected with the affair, but the indignation of Louis XIV toward Spain was unbounded. On the day after the news reached him at Fontainebleau, the Spanish ambassador, Count Fuensaldafia, was ordered to leave France immediately; the Marquis de la Fuente, who was then on his way to supersede him, was warned not to continue his journey; the Marquis de Caracena, a former governor of the Spanish Netherlands, who had been accorded permission to pass through France, was ordered not to appear on French soil; and the Baron du Vouldy was despatched to Madrid to inform the French ambassador to Spain, La Feuillade, Archbishop of Embrun, of the incident and to demand instant reparation for the insult.

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The time was an especially trying one for the Spanish Court; for on November 1 the Infante Philip Prosper died, and the attitude of Louis XIV on the question of succession was a matter of deep concern. After a long discussion with Don Luis de Haro, it was agreed that De Watteville's letter of recall should be placed in the hands of Du Vouldy, accompanied with an order to appear at Madrid and give an account of his conduct; and at the same time a letter of credence was sent for the new Spanish minister, La Fuente, who at his first audience was to pledge the King's word that the Spanish ambassadors would henceforth abstain from demanding precedence in England.

Concession of
precedence to
France by
Spain

But Louis XIV was not satisfied with these concessions. He sent M. de Nantia to express to Philip IV his condolence on the death of the Infante, but charged him to direct the French ambassador at Madrid to demand not only that the King of Spain should include his declaration in the text of the new letter of credence sent for La Fuente, or express it in some equally public and unquestionable form, but also that the renunciation of precedence in favor of France, which had been confined to England, should be extended to all other countries.

During the controversy, Don Luis de Haro died, and

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the Infante Charles — the future Charles II of Spain — was born. It was not, therefore, until January 6, 1662, that, after much difficulty, the final modifications were accorded. On March 24, La Fuente, in the presence of the papal nuncio and all the ambassadors, was received by the King of France in solemn audience and read a declaration expressing the regrets of His Most Catholic Majesty.¹ Then, after La Fuente had withdrawn, the King addressed the other envoys in these words: "You have heard the declaration which the ambassador of Spain has made to me. I pray you to write to your masters, in order that they may know that the Catholic King has given orders to all his ambassadors to yield precedence to mine upon all occasions."²

The aims of
Louis XIV
in Europe

At Court there was an organized conspiracy to plunge the young king into an abyss of sensuous pleasure, in the hope that, by the influence of mistresses and preoccupation in amusements, others might rule in his place. For a time the illusion prevailed that these intrigues would prove successful. The King was entertained with ballets, fêtes, hunting parties, and theatrical representations, in which Molière's own troupe presented the plays of that master. But in the midst of all this frivolity Louis XIV never for a moment neglected his *métier de roi*, and De Lionne was required to write despatches in the presence of the King, article by article, which His Majesty corrected when his minister did not exactly express his thought.

Exposed to no danger from any of his neighbors, the policy of Louis XIV in foreign affairs was, from the moment of Cardinal Mazarin's death, clear, comprehensive, and aggressive. "Immoderately desirous of glory and of establish-

¹ The text may be found in Dumont, VI, Part II, p. 405. In order to perpetuate the memory of that event, says De Martens, Louis XIV caused a medal to be engraved on which he was represented on the steps of his throne and the Spanish ambassador in the posture of making an apology in the presence of the papal nuncio and other ministers. The legend on its face was: *Jus praecedendi assertum*; the reverse, *Hispanorum accusatio coram XXX Legatis principum*.

² The best account is found in *Recueil des Instructions*, XI, Espagne, pp. 164, 170.

ing his reputation in the world," as Jean Baptiste Colbert has described him, he entertained no illusions, and perfectly understood what he wished to accomplish. Mazarin had extended France to the Pyrenees. Louis XIV wished to extend it to the Rhine and the Alps. Thus would be realized those "natural limits" which had belonged to ancient Gaul. Beyond this hovered indistinctly the future succession to the throne of Spain. Even the crown of the Empire was not yet excluded from his dreams; for, as we shall have occasion to observe, he was repeatedly recurring to plans for the gratification of this ambition. The first step to the realization of this vast programme of French expansion was, however, the possession of the Netherlands; and it was toward this end that all his energies were directed.

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With a broader knowledge of the complex relations of the European powers than any sovereign had ever yet possessed, Louis XIV comprehended that his diplomacy must be secret, systematic, and all-pervasive. Spain and Austria were not only to be kept apart, but both were to be rendered powerless in order that the territories West of the Rhine, partly Spanish and partly Imperial, might be left without defence.

The secret aid
of Portugal
by France

In order to weaken Spain, it was desirable that Portugal should be sustained. Many years afterward, in his "Mémoires" the King thus described his evasion of his treaty obligations not to aid that kingdom in its war with Spain: "I saw that the Portuguese, if they were deprived of my assistance, would not be able to resist alone the forces of the House of Austria. I did not doubt that the Spaniards, having vanquished that domestic foe, would more easily undertake to oppose the establishments I was mediating for the good of my state; and yet I had a scruple about aiding Portugal openly, on account of the Treaty of the Pyrenees. The most natural expedient for relieving myself of that embarrassment was to place the King of England in a position to permit that, in his name, I should give to Portugal all the assistance necessary."

In pursuance of this expedient, La Bastide de la Croix

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was secretly sent to London to promote the marriage of Charles II with Catherine, the Infanta of Portugal. Under the pretext of buying lead in England for the roofs of the royal palace, La Bastide carried letters of credit for five hundred thousand livres, and Edward Hyde, the first Earl of Clarendon, Prime Minister and Lord Chancellor of Charles II, was won for France. Notwithstanding the lively opposition of the Spanish ambassador, on June 23, 1661, the marriage was arranged, and the King of England promised to furnish Portugal with three thousand men and eight frigates for the war with Spain. By a secret contract, Louis XIV bore the whole expense; and Portugal was thus enabled to continue its resistance to Spain.¹

The activities
of Louis XIV
against the
Emperor

With the King of England thus actually in the service of France, and the King of Spain intimidated by the arrogance of his haughty son-in-law, who now disavowed the validity of the renunciation of the right of succession to the Spanish throne on the part of Maria Theresa, there was no monarch in Europe who could contest the primacy of this young sovereign, still in his twenty-fourth year. Racine did not greatly exaggerate when in the dedication of his "Alexandre," employing the words used of the great Macedonian in the Scriptures, he exalted Louis XIV as a prince "before whom all the people of the earth are silent."

Beside the superb independence of the King of France, the Emperor Leopold I seemed the victim of a perpetual conspiracy against his imperial pretensions. Gravel had labored incessantly to extend the League of the Rhine and fortify French influence in Germany. Through his efforts the French party constantly grew in numbers and strength of organization; while the Austrian party, at first the stronger, gradually became enfeebled.² The principal aims of Louis XIV in his opposition to Leopold I were to dissolve the Austro-Polish alliance, dictate the Polish succession, win

¹ In 1662, Charles II sold Dunkirk to France for £200,000, quite against the popular will in England.

² On the state of the two parties in Germany in 1660, see Pagès, *Le Grand Electeur et Louis XIV*, p. 35 et seq.

over the adhesion of the Elector of Brandenburg, and confirm the predominance of Sweden in the North; thus stripping the Emperor of all external support, and leaving him impotent in international affairs.

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The question of the Polish succession offered a *point d'appui* for the influence of France. The Queen, Louise Marie, who has been described as the "veritable King of Poland," was weary of the Austrian alliance, and eager to secure the crown to the Duke of Enghien, son of the Great Condé, who was to marry her niece and become the successor of her childless husband, John Casimir. Until the Peace of the Pyrenees, Mazarin had opposed this idea; but, after the reconciliation of Condé, the project had been seriously entertained, and Louis XIV now joined his influence with that of the Polish queen to promote the election of the French prince.

In this contest, in which the ingenuity of the French minister, De Lumbres, was opposed by the astuteness and perspicacity of Lisola, the Elector of Brandenburg was the secret opponent of both; for Frederick William perceived in the success of France the triumph of a power in alliance with his enemies, and was opposed to any increase of prestige for the House of Austria. The truth is, Frederick William himself — as is now clearly proved — secretly aspired to the kingship of Poland; and with such ardor that he was even willing if necessary to abandon rights which he had acquired for Brandenburg, in order to obtain it.¹

Entirely ignorant of the Elector's ambition in respect to Poland, Louis XIV, needing his support in the execution of his own designs, attempted to bring him into the circle of his alliances, first by the mediation of Abraham Wicquefort, — half diplomatist and half adventurer, and author of the famous work "The Ambassador," who had passed from the service of Brandenburg into the Bastille as a prisoner of Louis XIV, and from the Bastille into the secret service of France, — and afterward by the more formal negotiations

¹ See Waddington, *Le Grand Electeur*, II, p. 84.

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Negotiations
and alliance
of France with
the Elector of
Brandenburg

of De Lesseins, who in November, 1661, was sent to Berlin to enroll Frederick William among the allies of France.

The attitude of the Elector, whose chief desire was to maintain his own independence and to incur no obligations, was expressed in his declaration that he was "neither Austrian nor Spanish, neither French nor Swedish; but purely and solely German." The instructions of De Lesseins reviewed the former relations of France and Brandenburg, asserted that the interests of both in the Empire were the same, emphasized the danger to the Elector of an Austrian king of Poland, who would covet Prussia, promised security to Frederick William if a French prince were chosen, and in exchange for this demanded two things,—adhesion to the League of the Rhine, and a loyal support of the candidature of the Duke of Enghien.¹

The reception of the French envoy was apparently cordial; but Frederick William, as usual, was coy and wary. The health of the King, the Queen, and the new-born Dauphin was drunk at the Elector's table, and all the cannon in Berlin were fired in salute; but the designs of France were too evident; and, in February, 1662, the negotiations were suspended, then resumed, and in April — after an illusory revival of hopes — terminated by the departure of Lesseins.

It was now the Elector's turn to seek the protection of France. Sweden was rumored to be entering into the plans of France and the Queen of Poland; reports of a bargain with the Duke of Neuburg, — the rival and enemy of Frederick William, — by which France was to give him rewards in Poland in exchange for the duchies of Jülich and Berg, reached the ears of the Elector; and, menaced by these intrigues, he began to tremble for the security of Prussia and of his Rhenish possessions. In November, his agent, Kappeler von Blumenthal, was sent as special ambassador to Stockholm and Paris; but little was accomplished in Sweden, and nothing in France. It was Louis XIV who was now dictating the terms of alliances; and, in the midst of universal dissimulation, Frederick William, although unequalled as

¹ For the instructions, see *Recueil*, XVI, Prusse, p. 69 et seq.

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a subtle and astute dissembler, was disquieted with the fear that he might have no refuge but "slavery to France;" to which, as he alleged, he would prefer the "protection of the Turks!" The desperate battle of intrigue, temporization, and equivocation ended, however, in a nominal alliance between Louis XIV and Frederick William. The Elector entered the League of the Rhine; but he was not pledged to promote the designs of France in Poland, or to renounce his relations with Austria. Based neither upon common interests nor mutual confidence, the treaty was almost as ambiguous as the negotiations had been insincere; yet it was, in appearance at least, a triumph for the diplomacy of France, and a new symptom of French predominance in Europe.¹

The negotiations with the Elector of Brandenburg had not remained a secret, and John George II of Saxony had been much perturbed in mind by the progress of French influence in Germany. Originally a loyal friend of Austria, his ardor for the Hapsburgs had been cooled by the refusal of the Emperor to marry his daughter; and, not wishing to be isolated, he was disposed to secure his interests by an *entente* with Louis XIV. Accordingly, one of his chamberlains, Kaspar von Clengel, who was hostile to Austria, in January, 1664, was secretly sent to Paris to seek a subvention and to promise in return that Saxony would aid no one who resisted the interests of France.

The alliance of
France with
Saxony

At Paris, Clengel did not hesitate to reveal the enfeebled position of his master,— whose possession of the electorate was threatened by family quarrels, and whose independence of action was hampered by the rivalries of his ministers,— frankly admitting the need of money to operate a *coup d'État* by which the authority of the Elector might be regained. Having, in truth, nothing of value to offer, he was naturally accorded nothing in return. In February, the probable adhesion of the Elector of Brandenburg to the

¹ For the negotiations, see the elaborate account in Pagès, *Le Grand Electeur et Louis XIV*; for the treaty, dated March 6, 1664, see Dumont, VI, Part II, p. 129 et seq.

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League of the Rhine became known at Paris, and John George II grew alarmed at his own exposed position. When, soon, afterward, he gave an audience to Gravel in the presence of his ministers, he clasped the French envoy warmly by the hand and whispered in his ear: "I beg you to recommend me to the good graces of the King your master, I will have more to say on the subject one of these days."

To De Lionne and Gravel it was amusing to negotiate with such an easy prey, who seemed satisfied with the pleasure of feeling himself able to conclude a treaty with so powerful a protector. Practically without negotiations, on April 6, 1664, the Treaty of Regensburg, drawn up by Gravel "in terms not disadvantageous for the Elector," as he blandly promised the Saxon plenipotentiary, was signed between Louis XIV and John George II.¹ The Elector was bound to aid the King against anyone who should attempt to oppose him "in the enjoyment of his rights" in the Empire; and the King agreed to protect the Elector in the possession of his electorate. The secret articles were more explicit. Louis XIV would supply the Electoral Prince with an "annual gratification," the amount of which was left to "the generosity of His Majesty;" and, in return, John George II would vote in the assemblies of the Empire "conformably to the good intentions of the King!"² If Louis XIV should become a candidate for the imperial throne, the Elector of Saxony was thus pledged to vote for him.

The embroglio
of Louis XIV
and Pope
Alexander VII

There remained in Europe only two powers whose opposition the King of France had cause to dread, — the Pope and Holland. The one he hoped to conciliate; the other he intended first to beguile and isolate, then finally to crush. Pope Alexander VII — that Fabio Chigi who as papal nuncio had aided in mediating the Peace of Westphalia — had bitterly hated Cardinal Mazarin, who had opposed

¹ For the details, see Auerbach, *La diplomatie française et la cour de Saxe*, pp. 117, 148; for the treaty, Dumont, VI, Part III, p. 7 et seq.

² The secret articles have been published by Vast in the *Revue Historique*, LXV, pp. 20, 21.

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his election, resented his protection of the recalcitrant Cardinal de Retz, and described the Pope as possessing neither "knowledge nor solid virtues," with a "head filled with false maxims touching the affairs of the world and the interests of Christian princes." The pretensions of Louis XIV and the adulations of France towards the King, which threatened to subordinate the papal authority to the *culte du roi*, had excited in Alexander VII an almost equally intense animosity. From the beginning of his independent rule, the King of France had endeavored to propitiate the Pope; but the Spanish and imperial influences were strong at Rome, and although there was a French party among the cardinals, up to the arrival of the Duke of Créqui as ambassador of France in June, 1662, no progress toward a reconciliation had been made.

This bellicose diplomatist, described by a contemporary as a "proud man whose face did not belie his character," . . . who "needed to humanize himself," . . . and "who became more disdainful after he was clothed with the quality of ambassador," was ill adapted for a work of peace. His audiences of the Pope were mutually unsatisfactory, and the tension between the ambassador and the papal court was strained. In these circumstances on the evening of August 20, the Farnese Palace, in which the French embassy was lodged, was made the object of a violent attack by Corsican soldiers of the papal guard. The outrage originated from a quarrel between the Corsicans and domestics belonging to the embassy, in which innocent persons were killed and wounded, leading to a terrific battle in the streets, and ending in an assault upon the carriage of the Duchess of Créqui, the death of one of her pages by a musket shot, the exposure of her life amidst a shower of bullets, and a siege of the palace itself so furious as for a time to prevent her approach and to imperil the safety of the ambassador.¹

The recriminations growing out of this occurrence not only for the time put an end to all hope of an *entente* between

The pressure of
Louis XIV
upon the Pope

¹ The incident is exhaustively related by Moty, *L'ambassade du duc de Créqui*.

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France and the Holy See, but excited Europe with the dread of a conflict that might change the whole course of European politics. The Duke of Créqui proceeded to fortify his palace like a fortress, with the intention, he alleged, of preventing such insults in the future. The papal court, on the other hand, complained that the arrogance of the French and their preparations for resistance were responsible for the occurrence. The French charged the officials of Rome with complicity in the assault, and characterized it as a "papal conspiracy." Finally, after various attempts to adjust the matter, further negotiations became impossible, and the ambassador left Rome, which hastened to put itself in a state of defence against the indignation of the King of France.

The wrath of Louis XIV was equal to the papal expectation. The King wrote bitterly to the Pope of the "aversion" which the Holy See had for his person and his crown, to the cardinals of the "consequences" which the affair might entail, and to his *chargé d'affaires* of the "amends" he would require. In the draft of his letter to the Pope, he wrote on the margin that it was needless for the copyist to insert the usual closing formula, "*Je prie Dieu de Vous tenir en sa sainte garde.*" The nuncio at Paris was dismissed and at once conducted to the frontier, without being allowed to see his confessor or hear mass before his departure. When the Venetian and the Spanish ambassadors protested to the ministers against such rigorous treatment of the representative of the Holy See, they were informed that the orders given to the soldiers did not concern foreign envoys.

But Louis XIV did not confine himself to mere diplomatic reprisals. Refusing all mediation, and demanding that reparation should be made to him only through the Duke of Créqui, in whose person he had been wronged, he gave meaning to his attitude by immediately occupying Avignon and the County of Venaissin. On July 26, 1663, the County was declared by the Parliament of Provence united with France. As the Pope did not show himself

sufficiently humble, the King ostentatiously began preparations for the invasion of Italy, and by the commencement of 1664, French troops were quartered at Parma and Modena. In February the negotiations were resumed with a more lively interest, and on the twelfth of that month was signed the Treaty of Pisa, in which Pope Alexander VII agreed to require of his ministers "to show to the ambassador of His Majesty the respect which is due to him who represents the person of so great a king, the eldest son of the Church," to exclude forever the Corsican race from the pontifical service in every ecclesiastical state, and to erect at Rome an expiatory pyramid as a memorial of his humiliation. In return, Louis XIV consented to evacuate Italy, and to restore to the Holy See Avignon and the County of Venaisin, but the pontifical garrison of Avignon was to be suppressed.¹ The Duke of Créqui returned to Rome, and the appearance of friendly relations was resumed; but, in truth, the reconciliation was illusory. Alexander VII had vainly endeavored to form a coalition against France, and had yielded only to *force majeure*. He could forgive the triumphant monarch neither his pretensions nor his victory, and it was discerned that, under the guise of a faithful son, the King of France was for the Holy See a formidable rival and a dangerous foe.

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It was not enough for Louis XIV to subordinate England and Spain, to frustrate the Emperor's designs in Germany, and to humiliate the Pope; his real plans were constructive rather than competitive, and all his vast international machinery, all his insistence upon primacy in rank were intended to support the material expansion and predominance of France. To extend his territories to the Rhine by the annexation and incorporation of the Netherlands, Franche-Comté, Lorraine, and Alsace; and to raise France, thus augmented, to the height of a great industrial, commercial, and colonial power, thereby making it the richest and most dominant of civilized states,—such was the ambition of the King. Before his vision opened a great world of develop-

The new poli-
tics of France

¹ For the treaty, see Dumont, VI, Part III, p. 1 et seq.

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ment such as had never entered into the thoughts of Richelieu or Mazarin. Child of a new age, and heir of a reconstituted France, Louis XIV dreamed, indeed, of the Empire and of the Spanish succession, as any one of his ambitious predecessors might have dreamed; but, unlike them, he realized the value and significance of the economic elements of national greatness. He was the first of the French kings to found his state upon the principles of political economy. His army, his navy, his finances, and his internal administration were all reorganized with this end in view. With this purpose also, under the inspiration of his great minister, Jean Baptiste Colbert, and in imitation of the Dutch, in 1664, he founded the East and West India Companies, and began that quest of colonial empire which was to give a new direction to the course of history.¹

The progress
of the United
Netherlands

It was the Dutch Republic that had thus far best represented the new forces which were to shape the future of the world. Like Venice in the mediæval period, the United Provinces, as the result of their commercial enterprise, had developed a vast colonial system, and their population had become the most prosperous then existing.

Within the confederation, Holland, representing the maritime power and the chief wealth of the Republic, controlled its administration, and dictated its foreign policy. Two parties continued to exist within the State. The adherents of the House of Orange desired the restoration of the stadtholderate, and through it a revival of military strength, which, with the aid of England, it was believed, would guarantee the integrity of the country against the designs of France. The republicans, who were strongest in Holland, and particularly in Amsterdam, found their chief interest in the prosecution of trade, in which England was their rival, and feared the effect of a strong central and military authority upon their commerce and their liberties.

The system
of John De
Witt

Under the leadership of the Grand Pensionary, John De Witt, the republicans were still in power; but, forced by his

¹ See Sottas, *Histoire de la Compagnie Royale des Indes orientales*, Paris, 1905, p. 5.

position to negotiate with the States General as well as with foreign potentates, he had cause to realize the relative weakness of a form of government in which so many "High Mightinesses" had to be consulted.¹ All the sovereigns of Europe courted the favor of Holland, but only for the purpose of profiting by its resources in the advancement of their schemes; and to maintain with any one of them a relation of close friendship without provoking a counterbalancing enmity, required the utmost skill.

Amidst dangers that arose almost as much from the choice of friends as from the designs of enemies, De Witt sought to preserve good relations with all, to substitute intelligence for force, and by a dexterous counterpoise of all the powers to obtain for the Republic peace, security, and prosperity. In an age when glory and dominion were almost universal passions, and war was the chief argument of rulers, he was charged with the task of preserving the independence of a state in which trade, industry, science, and literature were regarded as the normal pursuits of mankind. To foster them, Holland had become the chief emporium of Europe, the asylum of religious and intellectual liberty, and the only country where a free press, exempt from official oversight and censure, sent forth in various languages books and gazettes, elsewhere prohibited, which found their way by mysterious avenues to every European country.

If in governmental theory De Witt was an idealist in an age of political realism, in his diplomatic negotiations he was not less astute than the most expert of his antagonists. In the life and death struggle of Spain with France he was forced to choose between them. At the time when Dunkirk was sold to France, the Spanish ambassador, Gamarra, pointed out that it was far better for Holland that this stronghold should return to Spain, which was less able to use it against the interests of the Republic; but at that time the ambitious designs of Louis XIV were not as ap-

The rivalry of
Spain and
France for the
Dutch alliance

¹ For the manner in which De Witt manipulated, — and sometimes deceived, — the States General, see Lefèvre-Pontalis, *Jean de Witt*, I, pp. 329, 330.

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parent as they afterward became, and the favorable treaty of alliance, commerce, and navigation made by Holland with France on April 17, 1662, seemed a sufficient compensation for the sanction of the bargain which France had then made with England regarding Dunkirk.

To win Holland away from this alliance, Gamarra offered to place the Grand Pensionary in the council of finance for the Spanish Netherlands, by which he would be in possession of the secret plans of Spain; but De Witt declined this proposition. At that time he was disposed to solve the problem of the Netherlands by allowing France to annex a portion of the Spanish provinces, the Republic taking also a certain portion, on condition that a federal republic, like that of the Swiss Cantons, be formed of the remainder as a barrier between that kingdom and the United Provinces; but this project, which had been first suggested by Richelieu, was invested with peculiar difficulties.¹ On the one hand, the King of France hesitated to limit in this manner his field of future expansion; and, on the other, the merchants of Amsterdam were resolved not to tolerate the revival of Antwerp. At the same time, Gamarra, who was not ignorant of the plans for the total expulsion of Spain from the Netherlands, on five separate occasions urged upon the Grand Pensionary a close league with Spain as the only expedient for resisting the designs of France.

The idea of a
barrier state

The anxiety of De Witt for the future of the Spanish Netherlands was increased by the reports of the contemplated marriage of the Emperor Leopold I with Margaret, the second Spanish Infanta, to whom, it was feared, the Spanish Netherlands might be given as a dowry, whereby the old Hapsburg union would be restored and both France and the United Provinces exposed to a revival of the old danger.² If such a restoration of Hapsburg power were realized, even if the United Provinces were not recovered by Spain, the

¹ See Mignet, *Négociations relatives à la succession d'Espagne sous Louis XIV*, I, p. 199 et seq.

² The marriage contract had been signed at Madrid on December 18, 1663. See Dumont, VI, Part II, p. 283 et seq.

stadtholderate might be restored and the republican party doomed to extinction.

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As the case presented itself to his mind, there was no possible chance of preserving the Dutch Republic by an alliance with Spain. In March, 1664, he described that power as a "skeleton whose parts are attached, not with nerves, but with wires, so that no confidence can be placed in its friendship or its ability to succor." His estimate of the aid that might be obtained from the Emperor, or from the princes of the Empire, so largely under the influence of France, was equally low. While, therefore, he clearly saw that danger to the Republic might come from France, he believed that there was no way to avert it except to yield to Louis XIV a part of what he claimed. This, with great ingenuity, he attempted to do; but it had not fully dawned upon him how insatiable the King of France would be. Determined to share his prey with no one, Louis XIV was from first to last negotiating with De Witt only to prevent his forming a league with Spain; and, if for a time he seemed to favor the idea of partition and the erection of a barrier state, it was with the purpose of first weakening the power of Spanish resistance, in order that his triumph might be the easier when he should advance his claims to the Spanish crown. These were already in process of elaboration, and it was because Holland would not formally acknowledge his pretended rights of inheritance that in April, 1664, he suddenly broke off the negotiations, and left the Republic to be weakened by its war with England.¹

If England had envied the prosperity of the Dutch in the time of Cromwell, there was additional reason for doing so in the time of Charles II. Dutch commerce had again revived and the Dutch colonies were flourishing. In addition, Charles II was hostile to the Republic as such, both on account of its treatment of the House of Orange and its attitude toward himself in the time of Cromwell. No pains were taken on his part, therefore, to prevent insults to the Dutch

The Anglo-Dutch war of 1664

¹ For these negotiations, see Legrelle, *La diplomatie française et la succession d'Espagne*, I, pp. 67, 100.

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flag and violence to the Dutch colonies on the part of his naval officers, which the Dutch admiral Ruyter was ordered to resent; and thus, without a declaration of war, the conflict broke out once more, first in Africa, then in America, and the King's brother, the Duke of York, assumed command at sea.

At the moment of the Stuart restoration, De Witt had seen that the English monarchy must be propitiated, and had attempted to conciliate Charles II. On September 29, 1660, therefore, the act of exclusion against the House of Orange had been revoked by the States General, on the ground that it had been forcibly exacted by Cromwell; but the concession had proved unavailing. Charles II was not only disposed to maintain the rights of his nephew, the future William III, he was determined to abase the power of Holland. He especially needed at that time the influence and support at home which only a foreign war could evoke, and at the moment there was no foe to face with whom battle would create so much enthusiasm as the Dutch. Accordingly, in April, 1664, a fleet of four war vessels was sent to New Amsterdam, and in September that city and the Hudson river were surrendered to the English before war had been formally declared. In December, Parliament voted large subsidies to drive Dutch commerce from the ocean, and for the first time Charles II discovered the secret of how to obtain money from a reluctant people.

French mediation and the Peace of Breda

Bound by the Treaty of 1662 to aid the Republic in resisting this aggression, Louis XIV nevertheless complained because Van Beuningen, who had negotiated the treaty, was sent to Paris to press its execution. Unable to deny his obligation, he pleaded his right to four months' preparation before offering active aid; and endeavored to evade the demand for immediate support by claiming that he had promised assistance only in case the States General were attacked "in Europe." In order, however, to prevent the United Provinces from falling under the power of England or seeking an alliance with Spain, he finally decided, after permitting the Republic to be weakened, to propose mediation.

But it was not to his interposition that the Republic owed its salvation. While negotiations for peace were dragging on unsuccessfully, in July, 1667, a Dutch fleet under Ruyter entered the mouth of the unprotected Thames and sailed up the Medway, capturing the "Royal Charles," burning the dockyards where new ships were building at Chatham, and blockaded London for several weeks. As a consequence, the Peace of Breda, signed on July 31, 1667, closed the war, leaving each belligerent in possession of what had been taken before May 20 of that year.¹

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Surinam thus fell to the Dutch, and New Amsterdam to the English, who renamed it in honor of the Duke of York. The Navigation Act was not annulled, but it was so modified as to permit Dutch vessels to convey to England the commerce of the Rhine. To De Witt the victory gave a new lease of power, but the net was already gathering about his feet. For England the chief gains of the war were the elimination of Holland as a rival in North America, and the establishment of a closer territorial bond between the colonies of New England and Virginia; but the mismanagement of the war had the further consequence of causing the downfall of the Clarendon ministry and the beginning of the reaction against Charles II.

The death of Philip IV of Spain on September 17, 1665, had furnished the occasion for an action long contemplated by the King of France. From the beginning, he had considered the renunciation of the Spanish crown on behalf of Maria Theresa an invalid act; and had never ceased his efforts to obtain from the King of Spain an acknowledgment of that view.² By his last will and testament, dated three days before his death, Philip IV had bequeathed the Spanish monarchy and all its possessions, in case the child Charles II — who was born November 6, 1661, three days

The theory of
"dissolution"

¹ See Dumont, VII, Part II, p. 44 et seq.

² Since August, 1661, these negotiations were pursued at Madrid by Feuillade. See his instructions, *Recueil*, Espagne, XI, p. 161. An excellent digest of the negotiations is given by Vast, *Les grands traités*, II, pp. 1, 10.

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after the death of Philip Prosper — should die without heirs, to his second daughter, Margaret, affianced to the Emperor Leopold I.¹ In this document the renunciation of Maria Theresa's claims was not only declared to be valid, but the incompatibility of a union of the two crowns of France and Spain was declared to be a "fundamental law."

Notwithstanding the terms of this testament, Louis XIV had no thought of abandoning the ultimate claims of the Queen of France to the throne of Spain. On the contrary, he was not even willing to await the death of the infant king before asserting a part of the claims in her behalf. Franche-Comté, Luxemburg, Hainault, Cambrai, Aire, and Saint-Omer he demanded immediately, on the ground of a local custom of certain Spanish provinces, particularly of Brabant, by which a daughter of a first marriage was preferred to a son by a second marriage in the inheritance of real estate. The territories just named, it was pretended, had thus "devolved" upon Maria Theresa before her marriage. They could not, therefore, belong to Charles II, who was born afterwards. Such was the *droit de dévolution* by which the King of France claimed in the name of his queen immediate possession of the lands in question.

The Spanish juriconsults argued that the custom referred only to private property, and could not be applied as a doctrine of public law to the inheritance of political rights; and, further, that it was opposed to the Pragmatic Sanction of the Emperor Charles V, which made the Netherlands indivisible.²

But Louis XIV was not disposed to listen to objections. He caused a manifesto to be prepared and printed in Latin, French, and Spanish, in which his juriconsults attempted to prove the illegality of the renunciation imposed on the Queen of France, and to set forth her rights. The renunciation was claimed to be invalid (1) because it is contrary to

¹ See Mignet, *Négociations*, etc., I, p. 382.

² For the arguments of the Spanish and Imperialist juriconsults, see Lonchay, *La rivalité de la France et de l'Espagne aux Pays-Bas*, pp. 226, 227.

natural and civil law, and rests only on a decretal of Pope Boniface VIII having no application to sovereign kingdoms; (2) the King of Spain in reality gave nothing to his daughter, for even the five hundred thousand écus promised and not paid were only a legitimate inheritance from her mother, who had brought that sum to her husband; (3) the renunciation did not apply to future successors, and by the death of her mother and her brother, Maria Theresa was, at the moment of her marriage, heiress by full right; (4) the renunciation of a minor is not valid; and (5) a king cannot change the order of succession without consultation with the councils established in his states, which Philip IV had not done.¹ The rights of the Queen were then fully recited, with the reasons for demanding their execution in each case.²

As Spain would neither admit the invalidity of the renun- The isolation
of Spain ciation nor the right of "*dévolution*," Louis XIV resolved to assert his claims by force of arms. Only a few dexterous strokes were necessary to complete the isolation of Spain and render her an easy victim. The first was a new offensive and defensive treaty with Portugal, signed on March 31, 1667, with the intention of keeping Spain occupied in the Iberian peninsula while the French army invaded Flanders.³ The second was the master stroke of securing the non-intervention of the Emperor.

As early as 1664, the idea was suggested that the best solution of the Spanish succession, when the male line became extinct, would be to divide the heritage of Spain between France and Austria. The Archbishops of Mainz and Köln had favored such a solution as a possible means of ending the rivalry between the Emperor and the King of France; thus securing the peace of Europe, and rendering

¹ Don Luis de Haro, who had negotiated the treaty for Spain, was obliged to admit that such a renunciation did not set aside the Spanish constitution, which recognized the right of females to the throne.

² The *Traité des droits de la reine* is a volume of 270 quarto pages printed in 1667. Replies were published by Lisola, *Bouquier d'État et de Justice*, and Ramos del Mansaño, *Respuesta de España*. For the literature, see Vast, *Les grands traités*, II, p. 4, note.

³ For the treaty, see Dumont, VII, Part I, p. 27 et seq.

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Catholicism once more predominant by the fraternal union of these two sovereigns.

After unsuccessful attempts by the two archbishops to interest the Court of Vienna in this scheme, the idea was taken up by De Lionne and with the approbation of Louis XIV intrusted to the skilful hands of the French ambassador, the Chevalier de Grémonville.¹

After long negotiations with Prince Auersperg, — who was ambitious to possess the red hat of a cardinal, — Grémonville succeeded not only in winning over the minister to the plan of partition, but obtained from him concessions that were no doubt surprising to the ambassador himself.

The transaction was conducted with such secrecy that false instructions were employed to deceive the officers of the great seal of France; and Grémonville's interviews with Auersperg were held at night, the ambassador visiting him on foot to prevent suspicions by his own servants. At these midnight meetings these two men, each striving to outdo the other, divided between France and Austria the whole heritage of Spain. Throughout this extraordinary comedy, the "red hat" for "the cardinal of peace" was from time to time shaken when Grémonville was not satisfied with the course of the negotiations; and, at one of the heated points of the controversy it was suggested that it was not worth while "to quarrel about such a little matter as the Kingdom of Naples," whichever way it went! Finally, at two o'clock in the morning, on January 20, 1668, the secret treaty was signed; in which it was agreed that, if Charles II of Spain died without children, Leopold I was to have Spain, Milan, and most of the Spanish colonies; while France was to take all that Spain yet possessed in the Netherlands, with Franche-Comté, Navarre, Naples, Sicily, and the Philippines.²

¹ An objection first raised at Vienna to the idea of partition was that the marriage of Leopold I and the Spanish Infanta Margaret had not yet been celebrated. The marriage having taken place on April 25, 1666, this objection was now removed.

² Details of the negotiation are given by Legrelle, *La diplomatie française et la succession d'Espagne*, I, pp. 101, 148; and Mignet

By this astonishing compact, the monarch who had the best reason to dispute the pretensions of Louis XIV was made a clandestine partner with him in the project of dismembering the heritage of Spain. While all Europe was being thus bound to the chariot wheels of Louis XIV or mystified by his sophisms,¹ and sovereigns and statesmen were reading the famous "Traité des Droits de la Reine," without a declaration of war, in June, 1667, the King of France had silently occupied with his troops the cities of Flanders, which were almost defenceless, in order to execute his plan of immediate expropriation.

While Gravel was quieting apprehensions among the Germans at Regensburg, and Count d'Estrades was allaying irritation at The Hague, the Marquis de Ruvigny was despatched to London to prevent opposition in England. Although the English Parliament was suspicious of the designs of France, and the prime minister, the Earl of Arlington, was inclined toward a Spanish alliance, Louis XIV was hopeful of gaining the ear of Charles II by promises of money and the prospect of securing some colonies from Spain.

In Holland, De Witt had become alarmed at the pretensions of France, and the Dutch ambassador Van Beuningen was instructed to demand of the King how far he intended to carry his plans of annexation. The answer did not allay the feeling of uneasiness, and for the first time De Witt fully

Négociations, etc., II, pp. 342, 441. The treaty, being secret, was not published until recent times, but was seen by Voltaire, who says of it: "Leopold had no sooner signed it than he repented of his act. He demanded at least that no other court should know of its existence; that a double copy be not made according to custom; and that the unique instrument be enclosed in a metal casket, of which the Emperor should possess one key and the King the other." — *Sidcle de Louis XIV*, p. 141. The precautions mentioned were not in reality carried out, but the existence of the treaty was first publicly revealed by Torcy in his *Mémoires*, I, p. 36, published in 1756.

¹ For the details of the diplomatic web woven by De Lionne under the direction of Louis XIV between 1662 and 1667, by which all Europe seemed to be arrayed against Spain, see Vast, *Les grands traités*, II, pp. 5, 6.

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realized the peril to which the Republic might in the future be exposed.

But the danger foreshadowed by the dominance of France had already begun to be felt in other quarters. The Elector of Brandenburg had long been alarmed by the French influence in Poland, and in order to hold him to his alliance Louis XIV had been obliged to promise new concessions. Sweden, already disturbed on account of the attitude of Louis XIV regarding the throne of Poland, had shown signs of jealousy because of the protection France was offering to Denmark, and began to realize that the King was becoming too powerful in the Empire.

In January, 1666, the Marquis de Pomponne had been sent to Stockholm to strengthen the relaxing bonds of the Swedish alliance, and especially to prevent the possibility of the partition of Poland by the Emperor, Russia, and the Elector of Brandenburg after the death of John Casimir.¹ But De Pomponne had not been successful in this mission; and as early as August, 1667, that ambassador had announced to Louis XIV the possible formation of a general league against France in which Sweden might take a part. At The Hague, the Swedish ambassador, Count Dohna, suggested that, in concert with Holland and England, Sweden might agree to a joint mediation, and thus enforce a reconciliation of Louis XIV with Spain.

Thus was sounded the first note of the Triple Alliance of Holland, England, and Sweden; which, with the help of Sir William Temple, whom Arlington sent to The Hague on special mission in December, 1667, in co-operation with De Witt and Count Dohna, soon took effective form. On January 23, 1668, England and Holland agreed to unite in a coalition, to which Sweden adhered in the following May, for the purpose of enforcing upon Spain the conditions demanded by Louis XIV, and thereby arresting his am-

¹ This appears to be the first clear indication of what the fate of Poland was finally to be. See Mignet, *Négociations*, etc. II, p. 303 et seq.

bitious designs.¹ At the same time, Spain was relieved of the war with Portugal; which, through the mediation of England, received from Spain on February 13, 1668, the recognition of its independence.² On April 15, at Saint-Germain-en-Laye, the Triple Alliance laid down the conditions which it was proposed to enforce as the basis of peace; and, on May 2, the Treaty of Aix-la-Chapelle was signed, in which Spain agreed to recognize all the conquests thus far made by France, and Louis XIV consented to restore Franche-Comté, which had been occupied in the previous February, together with Cambray, Aire, and Saint-Omer. Thus ended the "*War of Dévolution*."³ But the intervention of the Triple Alliance had aroused in Louis XIV a resentment for which Holland was to pay a heavy penalty.

Ostensibly, the purpose of the Triple Alliance was to enforce upon Spain the acceptance of the demands made by the King of France, and thus terminate the war; but, in reality, it was intended to present a permanent barrier to further pretensions by Louis XIV. The whole significance of the coalition lay in the secret articles, and especially the third; which was to the effect that, if the "*Roi Très Chrétien*" had intentions that could induce him to refuse to sign the treaty of peace when the Spaniards consented to cede to him the places taken by him in the last campaign, or their equivalent, or rejected the guarantees to be required of him, then the three powers were bound to unite with the King of Spain in enforcing these conditions upon the King of France.

The Treaty of Aix-la-Chapelle imposed no restriction upon the will of Louis XIV, but simply required that he should loyally execute what he himself had already proposed.⁴ But this was a serious cause of offence to him. Having secured by the Treaty of Aix-la-Chapelle all that

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The resentment of Louis XIV toward Holland

¹ For the treaty, see Dumont, VII, Part II, p. 66 et seq.

² For the treaty, see Dumont, VII, Part II, p. 70 et seq.

³ For the treaty, see Vast, *Les grands traités*, II, pp. 14, 22.

⁴ See the Memorandum of November 18, 1667, in Dumont, VII, Part II, p. 69.

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he had at the time demanded, and having obtained through his secret treaty of January 20, 1668, with the Emperor an agreement to his eventual possession of the entire Spanish Netherlands, he had really obtained in principle all he could hope to gain from Spain by continuation of the war. He, therefore, resolved to conceal his indignation, dissolve the coalition, and in time wreak his vengeance upon the chief offender, the Dutch Republic.¹

The exposed
position of
Holland

But the attitude of Holland was hardly less resented in other quarters. Spain felt deeply wounded by the exactions imposed upon her, and the Papacy was incidentally aggrieved. The new pope, Clement IX, had been anxious to restore the international influence of the Holy See by acting as mediator at Aix-la-Chapelle, and for this distinction all the resources of Rome had been brought into action; but it was a Dutch burgomaster, Van Beuningen, who had really settled the essential conditions of the peace, and at Aix-la-Chapelle the only rôle left for the papal nuncio was to be, as Voltaire has expressed it, "a phantom of an arbitrator among phantoms of plenipotentiaries." The treaty there ratified with so much solemnity had been already written at Saint-Germain.

Deliberately and sagaciously, Louis XIV now planned the total annihilation of the Republic. The first step was to be its complete isolation. The task was not difficult, for Spain, forced to make a disadvantageous peace, was much enfeebled, the Emperor and many of the chief princes of the

¹ In a memorandum found by Rousset in the archives of the War Department at Paris we have these words from the King himself regarding the Hollanders: "J'avoue que leur insolence me piqua au vif, au risque de ce qui pourrait arriver de mes conquêtes, de tourner toutes mes forces contre cette altièrre et ingrate nation. Mais ayant appelé la prudence à mon secours et considéré que je n'avais ni le nombre des troupes, ni la qualité des alliés requis pour une pareille entreprise, je dissimulai, je conclus la paix à des conditions honorables, *résolu de remettre la punition de cette perfidie à un autre temps.*" — Rousset, *Histoire de Louvois*, I, p. 233. Louis XIV was especially irritated by a medal struck in Holland representing Van Beuningen as Joshua arresting the sun (Louis XIV) in his course.

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Empire were already in league with France, and only England and Sweden were in alliance with Holland. With prompt insight Louis XIV perceived that the Triple Alliance was in reality a mere rope of sand. The Stuarts needed his support, and the English people could be made to feel hostile to the Dutch by reviving the quarrels of the past. Sir William Temple's diplomacy might not receive the sustained approval necessary to make it of permanent importance; for the memory of past defeats, joined with the prospect of obtaining spoils from the Dutch commerce and colonies, could be made to counteract it, and with the desertion of England the coalition would be practically dissolved.

To the Machiavellian mind of Charles II the overthrow of the Dutch Republic appeared a profitable scheme, and he easily yielded to the influence of the King of France. In September, 1670, Temple was recalled from The Hague, to find a cold reception at the English Court. Colbert de Croissy, who had been sent to London in 1668, had quietly done his work; the King was fully committed to the designs of Louis XIV against Holland; Arlington found it to his interest to give way; and the negotiator of the Triple Alliance retired to the tranquillity of private life, writing soon afterward to Wicquefort that the fruits of his garden seemed to him "to have the quality of preserving themselves better than the fruits of his embassies."

The secret
Treaty of
Dover

While De Witt was unmindful of the plot that was forming, Lisola, who had been sent as Imperial ambassador at The Hague, tried to induce the Emperor to join the Triple Alliance; and that inconstant sovereign — of whom Grémonville once said that he was "like a clock that always needed winding" — wrote to Charles II offering his adhesion.¹ He applied too late. The King of England had already made a new compact with Louis XIV, and declined

¹ The Emperor's decision to enter the Triple Alliance was brought about by the counsels of Lisola, the urgency of Malagon, Spanish ambassador at Vienna, and the purchased assent of Auersperg and Lobkowitz. See Legrelle, *La diplomatie française*, etc., pp. 178, 180.

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to admit the Emperor to a coalition which he had in fact deserted. The conspiracy which De Croissy had begun had been completed by the Princess Henriette of Orléans. Charles II had received his sister at Dover; and, on June 1, 1670, Arlington and De Croissy had signed a secret treaty of offensive alliance against Holland.

By the secret Treaty of Dover, Charles II was to receive two million livres to be employed in defending his royal authority and making England Catholic; and in return he was to furnish six thousand soldiers and fifty vessels of war for an attack upon the United Provinces. When the country was conquered England was promised Walcheren, the mouths of the Scheldt, and the island of Cadsandt, as her share of the spoils.¹ Arlington was offered eight thousand crowns for his complicity, which the King authorized him to accept.

The Triple Alliance being thus secretly disrupted, it only remained to dissolve it openly. After the Dutch Republic had been completely isolated, the united forces of France and England were to attack it by land and sea.

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¹ The Treaty of Dover, being secret, was not known to Dumont, and therefore does not appear in his collection of treaties. The text may be found in Mignet, *Négociations*, etc., III, p. 187. To give it effect and follow it up with advantage to France, a beautiful Breton girl, Louise de Kéroualle, maid of honor to the Princess Henriette, having pleased the fancy of Charles II, was sent to England, where she became the King's mistress and under the title of the Duchess of Portsmouth exercised a powerful influence over his foreign policy. See Forneron, *Louise de Kéroualle*, Paris, 1886.

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CHAPTER II

THE PERIL AND THE RESCUE OF THE DUTCH REPUBLIC

The Nether-
lands in 1670

ALTHOUGH a century of civil liberty had produced in the United Provinces a social organization more modern both in form and spirit than any other then existing in Europe, the peril to which the Republic was exposed was, perhaps chiefly for that reason, extremely great. Compelled by its military weakness and its geographic situation to depend upon foreign alliances for the maintenance of its independence, it was as a consequence obliged to incur the enmity of those from whose friendship it was alienated by its relations with other powers. Possessing valuable ports, an extensive mercantile marine, rich colonies, and great accumulated wealth, the United Provinces — and especially Holland — were naturally objects of envy to their less favored neighbors, and presented particularly attractive spoils to the eyes of France.

The form of government being neither monarchical nor democratic but in effect a federal oligarchy, the rulers of the country were fettered by the organization of the State, which required a constant reference to local decisions.

Notwithstanding this embarrassment, John De Witt, by his patriotism, probity, and sagacity, had for nearly twenty years maintained and promoted the prestige of the Republic. He had, in truth, acquired an influence far in excess of the material resources of his country, and the day of reckoning was now at hand. The triumph of the Triple Alliance in the Treaty of Aix-la-Chapelle had been celebrated by striking a memorial medal symbolical of liberty united with power, and bearing the inscription in Latin: "After having reconciled kings, re-established liberty on the sea, caused peace to reign on earth by the force of arms, and

conferred upon Europe a stable repose, the States of the United Provinces caused this medal to be made in 1668."

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It was a presumptuous boast. Relying too much upon the support of other powers, and fearing the restoration of the House of Orange through the army, the Grand Pensionary had discouraged the strengthening and organization of the land forces, while building up the navy in the belief that the chief danger to Holland was the commercial rivalry of England.

De Witt was not blind to the ambitions of Louis XIV; but, so far as the Netherlands were concerned, he expected to defeat them by the skill of his diplomacy. His success at Aix-la-Chapelle led him to regard Holland as the arbiter of Europe, able to protect itself on every side by balancing the powers against one another. He had failed to foresee that the day would come when his circle of alliances would be broken; and the Republic, completely isolated, would have to preserve its existence by its own force. That hour had arrived, but the Grand Pensionary was unable to meet its requirements. They demanded a different policy and a stronger hand.

I. THE APPEAL TO THE HOUSE OF ORANGE

The Grand Pensionary had the merit of faith in his policy, and negotiated desperately until the foe had crossed the frontier. A full treasury, the result of wise fiscal administration, gave him the advantage of abundant ready money. The diplomatic agents of the Republic were provided for with a munificence which excited the envy even of the ambassadors of France. Count d'Estrades wrote, that he would be happy to be treated as well as the Dutch ambassadors, who were well supplied at the expense of the States, while he was obliged to expend far more than he received.

The diplomatic efforts
of De Witt

No opportunity was neglected to make diplomatic representation effective through the agents chosen to serve the interests of the Republic. There was no court of im-

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portance where they were not present. They were received with the pomp and consideration accorded to the representatives of sovereign monarchs, held their heads high, and their success was often remarkable. The Sultan guaranteed to the Dutch ships free navigation in the Mediterranean, where they were menaced by the corsairs of Tunis and Algiers. Denmark and Sweden were long rivals for good relations with the Republic. The Swiss were heavily subventioned by Louis XIV; but Colbert's economies led to the mission of François de Bonstetten to The Hague to propose the employment of Swiss mercenaries; to which De Witt was favorably inclined by the probability that they would not be subservient to the House of Orange.

The Grand Pensionary had never placed much reliance upon aid from Germany. The only German princes whose assistance might possibly be counted upon were the Duke of Brunswick-Lüneburg and the Elector of Brandenburg, with whom alliances had been made in 1666; but De Witt had always regarded Frederick William with suspicion and dislike because of his connection with the House of Orange-Nassau.

The relations of the Republic with the Scandinavian states were extremely uncertain. The members of the Triple Alliance had guaranteed to Spain the protection of the Spanish Netherlands; and, in return, Spain had agreed, with the guarantee of England and the United Provinces, to pay to Sweden four hundred and eighty thousand écus for the maintenance of the army.¹ When England abandoned the coalition Sweden clamored for the fulfilment of the agreement; but, since one of the guarantors of the subsidy had withdrawn, the Republic threw the burden entirely upon Spain, which was not prepared to offer payment.

The illusions
of De Witt

De Witt never ceased to entertain the hope that, by some fortunate combination of circumstances, it would be possible to transform the Spanish Netherlands into an independent state; thus conceding to France the security of

¹ For the treaty of May 7, 1669, see Dumont, VII, Part I, p. 107.

her frontier, and at the same time erecting a barrier between France and the United Provinces. Such an arrangement would, if acceded to, have rendered possible a continuation of the traditional relations of friendship between France and the United Provinces, and thereby have given repose to Europe. To facilitate this result, De Witt was ready to permit France to profit by the partition of the other Spanish possessions upon the death of the King of Spain; but Louis XIV, feeling confident of finally obtaining all that was assured to him by the secret treaty of partition with the Emperor, had resolved to crush the power of Holland, and thus leave all his aspirations unopposed. Acting in conformity with this idea, in February, 1670, he resolved to discontinue all negotiations with De Witt and to treat the States General as a negligible quantity.

From this time forward, the Grand Pensionary had no other recourse than to seek the grace of the King of France; which he did by sending Admiral Van Obdam in the following April on a special mission, to assure the King of the "continued affection of the Republic"; but the ambassador was received with cold politeness, and reconciliation was found to be impossible.

The dispossession of Charles IV, Duke of Lorraine, and the appropriation of his duchy by the King of France in August, 1670, without a declaration of war, might have opened the eyes of De Witt to the danger that threatened Holland; but, unintimidated, the States General took up the cause of the Duke so far as to inquire what reasons the King had for his action, and proposed that the duchy might be restored to the legitimate heir. Without directly discussing the subject, Louis XIV accused the Duke of having negotiated with the Grand Pensionary for the protection of his estates, with the intention of placing his forces at the disposal of Spain. When afterward the Emperor sent Count Gottlieb von Windischgrätz to the King of France to remind him that Lorraine was a constituent part of the Empire, the imperial ambassador was told by the King, "That duchy

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belongs to me, and no one today has a better right to it than I."¹

Notwithstanding all these premonitions, it was not until December, 1670, when the Grand Pensionary was informed by the Dutch ambassador to France that he had learned through private sources of the conclusion of the secret alliance of France and England, that he began to realize the real intentions of Louis XIV.

The prepara-
tions of Wil-
liam of Orange

The adherents of the House of Orange had long been hostile to the Grand Pensionary and the policies he represented. The "Perpetual Edict" of January 12, 1668, which prohibited the revival of the stadtholderate in the province of Holland, had been bitterly resented by the believers in a strong central government, who recalled with pride and gratitude the splendid services rendered by the Orange princes in the early days of the Republic. It was not unnatural for those who had been excluded from office in the State by the republican oligarchy to wish for the overthrow of the existing *régime* and the restoration of the princely family to the position of which it had been, as many felt, unjustly deprived. Some of the provinces had retained the stadtholderate after Holland had rejected it. Friesland and Groningen were firm in their loyalty to the past; and Zeeland, as a rival of Holland for leadership in the federation, was ready to utilize the latent sentiment for the House of Orange throughout the country.

While these influences were indirectly acting against the existing form of administration, they were specially concentrated against John De Witt, who had gathered into his own hands the chief direction of affairs, and had become practically the ruler of the country.

In addition to the personal animosity felt toward the Grand Pensionary, there was a lively interest in the person of the young prince, — the posthumous son of the last stadtholder, William II, — left motherless at the age of ten by the death of the Princess Mary, sister of Charles II, King of England. As a child, his misfortunes had taken a strong

¹ Mignet, *Négociations*, etc., III, pp. 494, 498.

hold on popular sympathies; and as he approached manhood his person, his talents, and his known aspirations appealed with equal strength to the imagination of the people. Uniting in himself the lineage of the House of Orange and the blood of the House of Stuart, what might he not yet become to the little country in which he stood out as a unique personality? Cromwell, who had persecuted him in his infancy, had not been insensible to the possibilities of his future; and had said of him to the Dutch ambassador Beverningk, "This William, born of the daughter of the dead king, will grow with increasing greatness!"

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Physically delicate, yet endowed with a restless energy of body as well as of mind, the young prince was conscious of his royal origin and almost consumed with ambition. Grave, retiring, sober, and industrious, fond of open-air exercise, and full of courage, in spite of fears regarding his health which followed him all his life, he was clearly born for action, and rejoiced in combat. Without pretending to great intellectual attainments, he was at the age of twenty well versed in current politics and an excellent linguist, speaking Dutch, French, English, and German, with a fair knowledge of Spanish, Italian, and Latin. Under the stern discipline of De Witt he had learned that intelligence is often more than a match for power. He knew how to fix his aim, keep his own counsel, and bide his time for action.

It was to the Dutch rather than to the English side of his ancestry that the Prince looked for the principles and the inspiration by which he intended to shape his life. A Protestant in religion and a liberal in politics, he was yet a royalist at heart; believing in the royal prerogatives as essential to the unity and efficiency of the State, and in royal responsibility as necessary to its peace and prosperity. D'Estrades' judgment of him, formed when he was yet a youth, was that his ancestors, William the Silent, Maurice, and Frederick Henry, would live and act again through him.

In 1668, at the age of eighteen, William of Orange resolved to reclaim the heritage of his ancestors. Excluded from this hope in Holland by the "Perpetual Edict," he

The ambition
of the Prince

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decided to vindicate his claims in Zeeland, where eight years before he had been declared by the States "First Noble."

Eluding the watchful Grand Pensionary and profiting by the absence of his tutor, he proceeded to Breda, and from there to Berg-op-Zoom, where a waiting yacht transported him to Zeeland; and, having previously announced his coming, on September 23, he arrived at Middleburg, where the States of Zeeland were in session. Amidst the plaudits of the populace he rode on horseback to the ancient palace of the House of Orange, where a deputation of the States came to offer their felicitations. On the following day he was received in the hall of the States of Zeeland, and delivered an address, which he terminated by saying that he intended to walk in the footsteps of his ancestors, "to whom no sacrifice had been too great for the preservation of liberty and the reformed religion."

The cabal against De Witt, promoted by influential former associates, marched apace with the growing concentration of public attention upon the Prince of Orange, in whom the Grand Pensionary now discovered earlier than he had expected a popular pretender to power; and when the Princess Dowager resolved immediately to proclaim the majority of the Prince, and thus prepare him at once for a public career, it became evident that a new political force had entered upon the scene.

In the midst of the increasing signs of meditated aggression from without, indications multiplied of a revolution brewing within the Republic. De Witt was suddenly called upon to give an account of certain secret funds which had been confided to his discretion. Suspicions were aroused that his policy was too subservient to the interests of France, and that he was in secret relations with the King, whose attitude was menacing. The States General became more difficult to control; and while he acted with moderation toward those who opposed him, he considered it necessary to take effective measures against the procedure of the Prince.

Fearing that the "First Noble" of Zeeland might soon

be elected stadtholder of that province, if steps were not taken to prevent it, the Grand Pensionary induced the States of Holland to charge their representatives in the States General to urge the adoption of an instruction to the Council of State excluding all provincial stadtholders from membership in that body. Friesland and Groningen opposed this step, as an encroachment upon their constitutional right to make a free choice of their representatives; but the States of Holland replied, that they would not permit any stadtholder to sit in the Council without the previous consent of the confederate provinces.

Thus excluded by the preponderating power of Holland from sitting as a stadtholder, it was still possible for his supporters to offer the Prince a seat in the Council without possessing the title which he claimed; but to this — although it was advised by his uncle, Charles II, and urged by the Princess Dowager — the proud youth objected that it was a disparagement of his dignity to enter the Council at the price of renouncing the right to all civil and military offices, which the statutes required of him. Finally, however, seeing the force of the remark, that, “in order to mount a horse, it is necessary first to place a foot in the stirrup,” he consented to pursue this course.

The impediments thrown in the way of William’s advancement, while no doubt resulting from honest convictions on the part of De Witt, caused the Grand Pensionary’s conduct to seem equivocal, and greatly increased the opposition of the Orangist party.

The embarrassments of the Prince

Finally, a change in the feelings of the deputies of Amsterdam, inspired partly by their suspicions of De Witt, caused a marked transition in the States of Holland in favor of the Prince. De Witt was obliged to accept a compromise; and on May 31, 1670, William was solemnly conducted before the States General of the Republic, took the oath of office, and received his commission as a member of the Great Council with the right to cast a vote.

He had placed his foot in the stirrup by which he was finally to mount to power. De Witt was one of the first to

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recognize the fact; and soon afterward, wrote: "I fear, to my regret, we have laid the first stone of an edifice which threatens our liberty."

Presently, communications to the Council began to be addressed to "*His Highness and the Council*," — the form used in the time of the stadtholders. Not long afterward, taking advantage of a temporary absence of the Grand Pensionary, the adherents of the Prince supported his claim to a place in the States General, on the ground that his commission, which contained the identical formula used in that of his father, permitted him to sit in that body. Six provinces sustained this contention, but the deputies of Holland opposed it; and De Witt, hastening to the scene, denounced the attempt as an "impertinence."

Foreign ad-
vances to the
Prince

It was not unnatural for the partisans of the House of Orange to believe that the blood relationship existing between the Prince and Charles II of England would enable the Prince to effect a reconciliation between that monarch and the United Provinces, obtain the King's mediation with Louis XIV, and procure at the same time the overthrow of De Witt and the establishment of the Prince in the stadtholderate.

Pleased with the growing disunion of the political parties in Holland, Louis XIV offered to the Prince the assurance of his friendship, and congratulated him upon the success he had already achieved and the prospect of "another still greater," — "the establishment of the same authority as his fathers had possessed in the State."

Charles II also manifested a sudden interest in the fortunes of his nephew, and invited him to visit England. De Witt, solicitous regarding the possible consequences of such a journey, strongly opposed it; but, having been emancipated from his tutelage, the Prince disregarded this opposition; and, in the autumn of 1670, attended by a numerous suite, accepted the invitation.

Cordially welcomed by Charles II, who in the hope of winning his confidence flattered him with lavish entertainments and conferred upon him the Order of the Garter, he

was also honored with an address by the Lord Mayor and aldermen of London, and received the degree of Doctor of Laws at Oxford. But the phlegmatic nature of the Prince did not respond to the seductions of his uncle. Serious and reserved in his manners, he took little pleasure in the diversions offered to him;—an attitude which won him the respect of sober Englishmen, who were critical of the levity of the King.

The impression made upon Charles II was not favorable. He found the Prince, as Colbert de Croissy wrote to his sovereign, "too Dutch and too Protestant" for the encouragement of his hopes. The information led Louis XIV to dissuade Charles II from taking the young man into his confidence, on the ground that his extreme youth might lead him to indiscretion, and he thought his true sentiments were too uncertain to be trusted.

It was prudent of Charles II not to reveal to his visitor the terms of the secret treaty of Dover, in which he had joined in a conspiracy to subjugate and partition the country of William the Silent.

De Witt, who had suspected the existence of this conspiracy without knowing its terms, had kept up his courage in the belief that the English Parliament — which was not unfriendly to the Dutch, and had lately voted for an increase of armaments with the object of restraining the designs of Louis XIV — would remain loyal to the Triple Alliance, whatever might be the engagements of Charles II with the King of France. Unfortunately for the Republic, but most conveniently for the secret schemes of the King, it was easy to find a cause of offence in the too frequent indulgence on the part of Holland in the spirit of boastfulness.

In 1667 the Dutch had successfully bombarded Chatham; and, in continued celebration of this heroic action, they had printed books, painted pictures, and struck medals designed to perpetuate the memory of this victory over the English. At Dordrecht there had been hung in the town-hall a painting representing Cornelius De Witt, — commissioner of the Dutch fleet, and brother of the Grand Pensionary — crowned

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England openly
arrayed against
Holland

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by victory in the presence of the English ships burnt at Chatham; and the "Royal Charles," which had been captured from the English, was anchored at the mouth of the Maas as a permanent public exhibition. The Grand Pensionary, when complaint was made of these alleged insults, did all in his power to offer satisfaction; but Charles II, seeking a quarrel, made the most of them in arousing hostile sentiment in England.

The secret treaty of Dover, which was in reality directed quite as much against the English Protestants as against the Dutch, had been negotiated with the knowledge and connivance of Catholics only. Gradually, however, the Protestant advisers of the King were skilfully drawn into the plan of a war with Holland; and on December 10, 1670, while the Prince of Orange was still in England, was signed the Treaty of Whitehall, by which it was pledged that England and France should together attack the Republic.¹

The completion of Louis XIV's circle of alliances

The circle of Louis XIV's diplomatic activities for the isolation of Holland was now rapidly rounding to its close. On December 31, 1669, he had procured from the Elector of Brandenburg a secret alliance for four hundred thousand thalers, to be paid in ten annual instalments, together with a promise of money for his troops in case they should be called upon, and the prospect of sovereignty in portions of Gelderland, if France should acquire the Spanish Netherlands either by war or diplomacy.² On February 17, 1670, a treaty of alliance was signed at Munich with the Elector of Bavaria; who for five hundred thousand florins promised to prevent the Reichstag from supporting the Emperor, and to help elect Louis XIV, if the imperial office became vacant.³

¹ For the treaty, see Saint-Prest, *Histoire des traités de paix*, I, p. 284 et seq.

² The treaty was signed on January 4, 1670. It remained secret until the nineteenth century, and was first printed in full by Moerner, *Kurbrandenburgs Staatsverträge*, Berlin, 1867, pp. 335, 337. For digest and comments, see Waddington, *Le Grand Électeur*, II, pp. 211, 213.

³ The text is printed by Legrelle, *La diplomatie française*, etc., I, p. 230. In a second treaty, of November 28, Louis XIV agrees, in case

The Elector of Köln, by a treaty of July 11, 1671, promised neutrality, and gave permission to the French army to pass through his territories.¹ The Duke of Brunswick-Lüneburg and the Bishops of Münster, Osnabrück, and Paderborn were soon added to the list of allies, with the privilege of using their possessions for a base in making the attack on the United Provinces.

Thus, one after another, Louis XIV had drawn into his system of paid alliances some of the most powerful princes of the Empire. On November 1, 1671, the Emperor himself, compelled by his poverty and menaced with the prospect of French aid being offered to the Turks and his own Hungarian rebels if he refused, upon the understanding that the war with Holland would be carried on entirely outside of Germany, signed with the King of France a treaty of alliance and mutual surety.²

There remained only Sweden to be added to the list. Early in 1671, Pomponne had been sent to Stockholm to give the final *coup de grâce* to the Triple Alliance. Before the end of November, the Chancellor, Magnus de la Gardie, under the pressure of Sweden's financial needs and the dim prospect of obtaining money from Spain, had yielded to the ambassador's seductions; and, although Pomponne was recalled to succeed De Lionne, — who had died in September, — in the direction of the foreign affairs of France, his successor, Honoré Courtin, on April 14, 1672, concluded the treaty with Sweden. By its terms, France promised an annual subsidy of six hundred thousand crowns in exchange for the services of sixteen thousand Swedish soldiers to prevent the sending of aid to Holland from Germany.³

On January 4, 1672, in response to the pleadings of the Dutch ambassador, Peter De Groot, against a rupture be-

The double
declaration of
war against
Holland

Leopold I should die without leaving male offspring, to furnish the Elector with means for the conquest of Bohemia.

¹ For the treaty, see Saint-Prest, *Histoire des traités de paix*, I, pp. 470, 472.

² For the treaty, see Dumont, VII, Part I, p. 154 et seq.

³ For the treaty, see Dumont, VII, Part II, p. 171 et seq.

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tween France and the Republic, Louis XIV coolly informed him that, having begun his armaments, he would complete them, and would then take the course dictated by his "glory and his interests." Two days later, he terminated a despatch to the States General with the words: "We shall augment our armament by land and by sea, . . . and we shall make the use of it which we judge suitable to our dignity, of which we owe account to no one."¹

Following close upon this announcement, Charles II sent a message to the States General by a special envoy, "the most overbearing of diplomatists," George Downing, demanding for the English Crown recognition of the sovereignty of the seas.² On March 29, 1672, war with Holland was publicly declared at London,³ and on April 6 at Versailles. An army of one hundred and fifty thousand men commanded by Condé, Turenne, and Luxembourg was sent to invade the United Provinces; while fifty English and thirty French war-vessels combined to destroy the commerce and capture the ships of the Republic. In June the army had

¹ A few clear-sighted thinkers had already begun to realize the peril to which the power and ambition of Louis XIV were now exposing Europe and to wonder how it might be averted. Among these the philosopher Leibnitz was the foremost. He sought by a carefully drawn plan to divert the King's attention from his designs upon the Netherlands to the conquest of Egypt and the control of the Mediterranean, which he represented as a vastly more profitable and magnificent enterprise. Both the Elector of Mainz and Frederick William of Brandenburg used such influence as they could in favor of a diversion that would absorb the energies of the French monarch in a distant part of the world. This scheme, however, which later appealed so powerfully to the imagination of Bonaparte, did not beguile the practical intelligence of the Grand Monarch, who preferred at the same time to gratify his vengeance and pursue his political interests in a nearer field. For the text of the *Consilium Aegypticum*, see Testa, *Recueil des traités*, etc., I, p. 525.

² Downing's instructions were, *not* to obtain satisfaction, but so to embroil the relations with the Republic that the English would wish to sustain the war. See the despatch of Colbert de Croissy, of November 5, 1671, cited by Sirtema de Grovestina, *Guillaume III et Louis XIV*, II, p. 289.

³ The English ships had, however, already attacked the Dutch commerce without a declaration of war.

crossed the Rhine and taken possession of Wesel, Emmerich, and other places. Holland seemed doomed to certain subjugation.

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Thus, within less than a quarter of a century, the Treaties of Westphalia, which all the signatories were solemnly bound to defend, were completely set at nought, and a great part of Europe was in collusion with the King of France in forcing upon a friendly nation a war of conquest.

The motives
of Louis XIV

What were the motives that led to such a wanton exhibition of power? Louis XIV has himself given us the answer. He informs us, "I had resolved to place this people in a position where they could not oppose my designs."¹

What then were his designs? The ultimate object was to secure unopposed possession of the heritage of Spain. A more immediate purpose was to destroy Dutch rivalry to French commerce on the sea. The keys to both these enterprises were to be sought at The Hague. The Dutch Republic had opposed, and already partially frustrated, the King's designs. It had created the Triple Alliance for the purpose of preserving to Spain the Spanish Netherlands, and it had thus far maintained its own supremacy over the French on the sea. It would, if permitted to live and prosper, hold the balance of power in Western Europe, and thus at every point endanger the success of the King's ulterior plans of expansion. Therefore, *Batavia delenda est*.

Five months before the declaration of war, Louvois wrote to the Prince of Condé, "The effective means of accomplishing the conquest of the Spanish Netherlands is to abase the Hollanders; and, if possible, to destroy them."²

For this violation of sovereign rights, Louis XIV could plead neither the urgency of his people nor the exigency of his state. While the French nation might rejoice in the glory of their monarch and the extension of the monarchy, they had no just *casus belli* against the Republic, and none was alleged. Although the Hollanders were successful competi-

¹ Unpublished memoir of Louis XIV cited by Rousset, *Histoire de Louvois*, I, p. 323, from the Archives du Dépôt de la Guerre.

² See Mignet, *Négociations*, etc., III, p. 665.

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tors in commerce, they had deprived the French of none of their rights.¹ From every point of view, the war was a personal one, prompted by a spirit of vengeance and executed by all means that were available. Almost a fourth of the French army was made up of mercenary troops, twenty thousand Swiss and about twelve thousand adventurers gathered from England, Germany, and Italy, — professional fighting men, ready to serve the one who paid them best.

Nor were the aims upon which Louis XIV was bending his energies the real interests of France. In December, 1671, De Witt offered to yield to the King of France all the concessions he had demanded; but, suddenly, as if seeking to raise impassable barriers to peace, Louis XIV proposed the restoration of Catholicism in Holland, with the obligation to furnish the population with Catholic churches and to pay the priests from the public funds. Not content with the offer of Nymwegen, Gelderland, and the island of Bommel as the price of peace, he required that the Hollanders should recognize their perpetual vassalage to him by sending annually to Versailles a gold medal attesting their dependence upon him!

The Republic
in extremis

To defend their country, there was, indeed, one last resort, — to open the sluices and convert it into a lake. When Grémonville, the French ambassador at Vienna, heard of this intention, he could not pardon the use of such an obstacle to the power of his royal master, and said to the Emperor's ministers: "If they can only use such an unfaithful element as water, it would seem that they must presently submit to the yoke; but the obstinate rage of that rabble shows that they evidently see God intends to punish them; and, in place of humbling themselves, they become the more churlish, and prefer to ruin and destroy their country, and expose themselves to be drowned, rather than to submit to such a glorious and triumphant conqueror!"

¹ In the long list of reasons for Louis XIV's hostility to the Dutch given by Legrelle, *La diplomatie française*, I, pp. 201, 208, there is no instance mentioned of violated right.

The "glorious and triumphant conqueror" took a different view, and afterward wrote in his memoir on the Dutch war: "The resolution to put the country under water was indeed rather violent; but what will one not do to escape foreign domination?"

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Inundation could arrest the progress of a French army, but it could not save the Republic.

The search for
aid against
France

But whence could succor for the Republic be expected, since Louis XIV held a great part of Europe in his pay, or subject to the fear of his hostility? The States General knocked at every door for assistance, but in vain. The appeal to Denmark met with an apparently favorable response, and ten thousand men were at one time promised, but their arrival was indefinitely postponed. The Protestant cantons of Switzerland were inclined to assist the Republic, and the Catholic cantons were urged to do so by Spain; but, to reach the seat of war, it was necessary to pass through the states of the Empire, and the Imperial Diet was not disposed to offend the King of France, the Swiss were themselves not prepared to forego the subsidies they were already receiving from him, and the effort ended merely in an order to the Swiss officers in the French army not to take an active part in the campaign against the United Provinces. The Prince of Condé made short work of this decision by surrounding the Swiss contingent with other troops and menacing them with death if they did not obey.

It was necessary, therefore, finally to turn to Spain; but no great activity could be expected in that quarter. After urgent negotiations, however, on December 17, 1671, the Republic had succeeded in inducing the Queen-Regent to join in a "declaration" for mutual defence;¹ but, even if better disposed, the financial condition of Spain was not such as to render its support decisive in a war with France.

There remained the hope that the Emperor, with the support of some of the princes of the Empire, seeing the perilous condition in which Europe was placed by the ambitions of Louis XIV, would absolve himself from his treaty

The attitude
of the
Emperor

¹ For the declaration, see Dumont, VII, Part I, p. 155.

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engagements with him, and come to the rescue of the Republic.

The Treaty of November 1, 1671, had in reality been extorted from Leopold I more by intimidation than through any positive advantage to be gained from it for Austria or the Empire. Its third article had expressly provided for the case of war with Holland; and Louis XIV had frankly informed the Emperor that he intended "to deprive the Hollanders once for all of the power to oppose his designs."¹ It had been stipulated that the interests of the Empire were not to be affected, and that hostilities were not to be carried on within its limits. But there were always at Vienna suspicions of the ulterior intentions of Louis XIV. In truth, the greed and duplicity of Louis XIV in plotting the dismemberment of Spain during the life-time of the King had rendered Leopold I suspicious of all his acts.

Unhappily for the Emperor, there were two influences which alternated in obtaining ascendancy over his wavering will: that of Lisola, an honest man, who was determined to defeat the schemes of Louis XIV; and that of Prince Auersperg, Leopold's Chief Minister of State, who never ceased longing for the hat of a cardinal and hoped to profit by French favor in obtaining it. Between them was the venal courtier, Prince Lobkowitz, eager to obtain preferment by any means. With such counsellors to bend his pliant will; with two camps of princely interests in the Empire, one favorable to the Emperor and the other in league with France; and deriving all his real strength from his resources as an Austrian, Bohemian, and Hungarian monarch, the head of the Germanic body found constancy a virtue difficult of cultivation. As Prince Lobkowitz is reported to have said of him, Leopold I was "like a statue which one carries where one wishes, and replaces at pleasure."

Before the negotiation of the Treaty of November 1, 1671, Prince Auersperg, accused at Rome of being the creature of France, had not only been refused the coveted red

¹ See Legrelle, *La diplomatie française*, etc., I, p. 164.

hat but had been exiled to his estates in Styria; and Prince Lobkowitz had come to power as first minister. "Seeking to make his pot boil," as he himself expressed it, he did not hesitate openly to ask for gratuities from France.

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Realizing the great value of the Treaty of Aix-la-Chapelle for the further security of Spain, the Spanish ambassador, Malagon, had urged upon the Emperor the duty of becoming one of its guarantors; and in the autumn of 1670 Lisola, joining his efforts with those of the ambassador of Spain, had obtained from Leopold I a promise to oppose France, if Louis XIV made an attack on the United Provinces. But Grémonville, who was aware of this proceeding, had by Louis XIV's instructions, informed the Emperor that if, in violation of his engagements with the King of France, he undertook to aid those who were against him, the King would reserve to himself a like liberty to take advantage wherever he could.

The Austro-French rivalry at Vienna

To balance the menace conveyed in this message, Spain had no counterweight to offer. Leopold I had not forgotten that, in 1666, before negotiating the treaty of partition, Louis XIV had aided the Hungarian rebels. It was well known that the King was in secret correspondence with the Hungarian magnate, Count Zrinyi, who had already proved a dangerous foe; and it was certain that Louis XIV would repay interference in Holland with new incitement to rebellion in Hungary.

Caring nothing for the Dutch Republic, Leopold I, under the influence of Grémonville's skilful diplomacy, had decided to leave it to the tender mercies of the King, reserving the right to intervene in behalf of the Empire, in case its interests were impaired.

Exposed to the recurring assaults of the Turks upon his Eastern dominions, and embarrassed by the rebellious spirit of his Hungarian subjects, whom he was persecuting on account of their religion, the Emperor's position was always critical. The Ottoman pressure upon Europe engaged his constant attention to the eastward, and compelled him to bear the brunt of invasions which, though inter-

The Emperor's perils in the East

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mittent, were often serious. The German princes, who had practically won their autonomy by the Treaties of Westphalia, were able to combine among themselves for their own protection, and responded with hesitation to calls for aid in repelling dangers to the Empire so distant as Ottoman inroads into Hungary; but both as King of Hungary and as head of the Germanic body, it was the duty of the Emperor to defend the frontiers of Christendom.

In 1656, under the energetic Sultan, Mohammed IV, a long period of Turkish lethargy had come to an end; and, fired by a new spirit of conquest, the Turks were making a desperate struggle to secure predominance in the Mediterranean, and to extend their rule on the Danube, which they already controlled as far North as Buda.

The Venetians, single-handed, had long valiantly defended their possessions; and, after the Peace of Aix-la-Chapelle, had besought from France the aid which the Emperor was unable to afford them. Pope Clement IX had called earnestly for a general crusade; but with the decline of the faith that had once inspired it the crusading spirit had passed away, and there were only feeble responses. As the "*Roi Très Chrétien*" and the eldest son of the Church, it was especially the duty of Louis XIV to obey the summons of the Pope; but the King, engrossed with his schemes of conquest, offered no assistance, and merely permitted French officers to fight against the Turks on condition that they did not fly the French flag.

The secret of the indifference of the King of France to the defence of Christendom is to be found in his private relations with the Sultan. Following the example of Francis I, he had negotiated treaties of amity with him, partly to hold the Emperor in check, and partly to advance the commercial interests of France in the Orient and the Mediterranean; and, although the commerce of France had sometimes suffered from the corsairs of Tunis and Algiers, it was no part of his policy to offend the Sultan.

The experience of the Emperor had taught him that opposition to the will of Louis XIV was liable at any time to

involve him in hostilities on the side where he was most exposed. Even as an ally Louis XIV had proved to be a source of danger. When, in 1663, Pope Alexander VII had ordered a crusade against the Infidel, who was invading Hungary, the "*Roi Très Chrétien*" had manifested to the world his devotion to the Church by sending some troops with those of the German princes; but had taken pains to inform the Sultan by a special envoy that he had done this only in fulfilment of his obligations as a member of the League of the Rhine, and not as the King of France!

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But it was not from the East alone that the Emperor feared new dangers. Louis XIV was now once more in close alliance with Sweden. The long foreign wars had drained that kingdom of its manhood to an extent that left it with increased territories but weakened force. Nevertheless, although it was no longer the formidable power that it had been during the reign of Gustavus Adolphus, it was still able to furnish a hardy soldiery; and the financial needs of the country made it possible for its participation in any profitable military venture to be bought. It appeared quite practicable, therefore, for the King of France to continue to neutralize through his subsidies to Sweden any effective intervention of the Emperor in the affairs of Holland by threatening him with a Swedish invasion.

The isolation
of the Em-
peror in the
North

To balance these restraints upon his action, the Emperor had no ally in the North upon whom he could depend for immediate support. Since the Peace of Oliva, France had shown a constant interest in maintaining the pacification of the North, with the purpose of leaving Sweden free to use its forces in promoting the French designs. During the wars between Sweden and Poland, the Emperor, on the other hand, had supported the latter; and it was natural that he should expect in return the friendship of the Poles. But even without the constant efforts of French diplomacy to alienate Poland from the Emperor, no great amount of effective support could be looked for from that country, whose great geographical extent exposed it to the peril of becoming a prey to the rapacity of its neighbors, while its defective

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political organization and the rivalries of its nobles seriously impaired its powers of self-defence. The mutual hostilities of the nobles had rendered it difficult even to select any Pole as King of Poland, and before every election had caused the creation of conflicting parties as numerous as the foreign interests they were created to subserve. An influential French party had been formed to secure the crown upon the death of John Casimir for someone acceptable to France; and, although in 1669 Michael Koributh ~~Wiesnowski~~, a native Pole, had been elected King, and was friendly to the Emperor, a strong French faction continued to exist, and it was not to be expected that any material aid could be obtained by the Emperor from Poland.

Russia, which was beginning to be regarded as a factor in European politics, and was eager to obtain a foothold upon the Baltic, — from which it had been excluded by the Peace of Kardis, — was the only power in the North that would be able to render important aid to Leopold I. For the time, however, the active interest of Russia lay in the direction of subjugating the wild tribes of the Volga and extending its dominions to the Black Sea.

The Emperor's
alarm for the
Empire

Thus, on every side, Leopold I seemed powerless, even if disposed, to intervene for the rescue of the Dutch Republic. All Europe seemed to have fallen under the spell of the Grand Monarch. But the more this fact was contemplated the more it became evident that there were causes of alarm in the projects of Louis XIV. Had he not already dispossessed the Duke of Lorraine, a member of the Empire? Had he not pursued a policy of constant intrusion into the affairs of the Empire itself, claiming to be the defender of the Germanic liberties in allying himself with the princes for the purpose of rendering them independent of the Emperor? And now came the report that he was intending to cause himself to be elected "King of the Romans," in order to be promoted to the imperial office at the next election; and, in confirmation of this suspicion, it was rumored from Paris that the King had already prepared jewelled ornaments — particularly a sword decorated with precious

stones at a cost of three hundred thousand livres — for that occasion; which was taken to signify “that His Majesty had other designs than those upon Holland.”

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True or false, these speculations were diligently used against him. Lisola, the implacable enemy of Louis XIV, had neglected no opportunity to magnify the dangers with which he believed Germany to be threatened. His insistence that after subduing the United Provinces the insatiable ambition of the victorious monarch would lead him on, not only to appropriate the entire Spanish heritage, but to make himself master of the Rhine and to lay down the law to the Electoral College of the Empire, could not fail to make a deep impression upon the Emperor. His only remedy against complete isolation and final humiliation in the Empire itself, Lisola contended, was an alliance with Spain for the preservation of the Dutch Republic.

These importunities did not fail to bear fruit in preparing the way for a new order of things. Leopold I, usually undecided, and always timid, was finally so far convinced by Lisola's arguments as cautiously to inquire into the dispositions of the German princes regarding the attack on the Republic.

The change of
feeling in
Germany

Among the electors, three were in general inclined to sustain the Emperor: the Archbishop of Trier, the Elector of Saxony, and the Count Palatine; while two — the Archbishop of Köln and the Duke of Bavaria — were in complete dependence upon the King of France. The Archbishop of Mainz was a member of the League of the Rhine, but he did not wish to render Louis XIV in any sense master in Germany. His aim was merely to use his influence as a means of assuring the autonomy of the German princes and maintaining the Treaties of Westphalia. Since 1668, he had witnessed with anxiety the growth of Louis XIV's preponderance in Europe, and had striven to counteract it by forming an independent defensive league composed solely of German princes;¹ and he did not hesitate to in-

¹ See Dumont, VII, Part I, p. 210 et seq. The date October 10, 1672, should be January 10, 1672.

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form the Marquis de Feuquières that his master was running the risk of making himself suspected throughout Europe of designs that would eventually, if he did not cease his conquests, array it against him.

Although Frederick William of Brandenburg was still in alliance with Louis XIV by the Treaty of 1669, together with the Archbishop of Mainz he had become disquieted by the military preparations of his ally.

The position of the Elector of Brandenburg in Germany was unique. He had for a long time withstood the seductions of France and held aloof from the League of the Rhine, where he knew his accession would at any time be welcome, until it suited his convenience to enter it as a caution to the Emperor. Of all the German princes, Frederick William was the one who had a clearly outlined forward policy of his own; and his flexible mind did not hesitate to make any changes in his foreign relations which the success of this policy seemed to demand. Keenly alive to the interests of Brandenburg, he was also a stalwart Protestant and intensely German. As an uncle of the Prince of Orange, it was to be expected that he would have some interest in the fate of Holland; and it was in fact the Elector of Brandenburg who was to turn the tide in Germany.

The position
and policy of
the Elector of
Brandenburg

When in January, 1672, the Dutch envoy, Baron Van Amerongen, arrived in Berlin, he found much sympathy with his cause among the officers of the Brandenburg army, but only one of the Elector's ministers was in favor of intervention. All the others were firm for the French alliance, in which they had a personal interest; for, as the French ambassador, Saint-Géran, reported, the French écus were very acceptable at Berlin.

In the midst of opposing counsels, Frederick William at first manifested little sympathy for the Republic. He detested its form of government, personally disliked De Witt, was irritated by the arrogance of these proud republicans, whom he despised as a race of merchants and money-changers, and bitterly resented the occupation of his duchy of Cleve by Dutch garrisons to secure the payment of a

local debt. But, on the other hand, the Hollanders were his co-religionists, and the Great Elector was sincerely religious; they were also of Teutonic blood, and above all they were at this moment the protagonists of the Germanic liberties. What might happen to him, and to his growing power in Germany, if the King of France became omnipotent? His stake was great in the destinies of the Rhine; for there were situated, in close proximity to the United Provinces, some of his richest possessions.

A glance at the map of Europe as it was in 1672 reveals the nature of the Great Elector's solicitude. His territories, which were scattered from the Duchy of Prussia on the Baltic to the Duchies of Cleve and Mark on the Rhine, spanned a distance greater than the entire width of Germany. He could travel from the Vistula to the Maas almost on his own lands, without passing more than a night or two out of his own jurisdiction. To bind these scattered possessions together, and to give them unity and security, required of Brandenburg an expansive policy which would be impossible of execution without great military force and sagacious statesmanship. Frederick William had resolved to create in Germany, by connecting and enlarging these fragments of a future kingdom, a state powerful enough to maintain its own independence and to play a large rôle in the politics of Europe.

The time was now approaching when Frederick William must make a decision. In the spring of 1672 it was no longer a question whether the Elector should keep his engagements with France. The Triple Alliance, which in 1669 appeared able to protect the Republic from harm, and therefore permitted Brandenburg to drive a good bargain without really endangering the existence of the United Provinces, had disappeared; Louis XIV had associated both England and Sweden with his plans; and a Protestant state was in immediate danger of being removed from the map. In these circumstances active aid to France was not to be seriously considered by the Elector of Brandenburg. Counsels were still divided, but the parties had shifted their

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The hesitation
of Brandenburg

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grounds, and the Elector was face to face with two alternatives, — intervention or neutrality. The loss of the promised subsidies from France, the exposure of the Rhenish provinces to the vengeance of Louis XIV, the sacrifice of a share in the spoils of the apparently doomed Republic, — these were serious considerations for a little state like Brandenburg. The voice of the *raison d'État* was clearly for neutrality at least. But, on the other hand, the thought of the total effacement of the asylum of Protestantism, where he himself had passed his youth, for the advantages to be gained by the Electorate moved the Elector's personal feelings to their depths.

It was fortunate, perhaps, for his mission that the Dutch envoy, Amerongen, belonged to the Orangist party and represented the States General, with which he corresponded directly and not with De Witt. He had come to Brandenburg to seek "twelve or sixteen thousand men for the protection of the Republic," for whose services proportional subsidies would be paid.

Saint-Géran was there to thwart him, insisting that the war was inevitable; that opposition to the King of France would be unavailing; and that the prudent course for the Elector would be to continue the alliance, for which he would be well paid; and, if active aid from him were not needed, he should at least remain neutral.

During the months of February and March, the diplomatic duel had been hard fought, but without result. Although Amerongen spent sixteen hundred florins in presents when the Elector's new son was born, and had the honor of representing the States General as godfather at the baptism, — to which Saint-Géran was not even invited, — the States General were so blind to their interests and maintained such a lofty tone in their negotiations, that in spite of his cordial reception and the evident good will of the Elector, he was unable to obtain an alliance. With Denmark neutral, Sweden under bonds to France, and England actually hostile, it seemed as if the Protestant world had abandoned Holland to its fate.

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Too prudent to undertake single-handed a campaign for the United Provinces with such enormous odds against him, Frederick William had, nevertheless, the perspicacity to realize the danger to Germany that would result from the destruction of the Republic; and, during his negotiations with Amerongen and Saint-Géran, he was in active correspondence with the German princes, whom he openly warned of the consequences of their indifference. To the Archbishop of Mainz he sent a special envoy, to persuade him of the impending danger; but John Philip von Schönborn was not inclined to intervene so long as the Empire was not attacked, and expressed his reliance on his new protective league, which he invited Frederick William to join.

The alliance
of Brandenburg
and the United
Provinces

On every side the Elector met with indifference or indecision; but, on April 13, alone and unsupported, he resolved to accept the terms offered by the States General and form an alliance with the Republic.¹ On May 6, 1672, the treaty was signed, in which the Elector agreed to provide an army of twenty thousand men for the defence of the United Provinces in case they were invaded; for which the States General were to pay five hundred and fifty thousand florins and half the expenses of maintenance. The troops were to be ready in two months, and to march toward Westphalia under the command of the Elector himself, if his health permitted him to conduct the army.²

It was a bold step for Frederick William to take, and at once raised Brandenburg to a position of importance in European politics. In the middle of May the Elector opened active negotiations at Vienna to procure the support of Leopold I; and, as the result of persistent efforts, on June 23, 1672, a treaty of alliance was obtained from the Emperor for the maintenance of the Peace of Westphalia, the protection of the Empire, and the defence of the treaties of

¹ It is rare for a diplomatist to attribute his success to another than himself; but Amerongen wrote to one of his friends: "Here is the work of the Saviour, and it is a miracle in the eyes of men!"

² For the treaty, see Dumont, VII, Part I, p. 194 et seq.

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the Pyrenees and of Aix-la-Chapelle. The Emperor and the Elector were each to furnish twelve thousand men, to execute this agreement; and the Elector undertook the task of soliciting the adhesion of Denmark and the Dukes of Brunswick and Hesse-Cassel.

The dismay at
the invasion of
the Republic

There was great rejoicing at Berlin, but it was soon dampened by the news from Holland. At the time when the treaty with the Emperor was signed, the army of Louis XIV had already crossed the Rhine, and was advancing almost without resistance into the territories of the Republic.

"The King is perfectly happy," wrote Madame de Sévigné on June 13, "that he will have only to say what he wishes in Europe, without taking the trouble to go to the head of his army. They will be happy to give it to him. I assure you, he will pass the Yssel as easily as the Seine. The joy of the courtesans is a good augury. Terror is preparing an easy submission everywhere."

The power and vengeance of the invader were soon to be felt by the unfortunate Amerongen. After the occupation of Utrecht by the French army, Louis XIV demanded his recall as a subject of that province; but this ardent patriot dared to remain at Berlin, where his presence was still necessary to the complete success of his cause. As a consequence, he was condemned to make a heavy contribution to the invader's war chest. Being unable to pay it, his estates were seized, his house and gardens destroyed, and he was left so impoverished that his children were almost without bread. With heroic devotion, and at the risk of his life, he remained at his post and continued his activity.

The party in power in the United Provinces had been so absorbed in defending their liberties against the House of Orange that they had neglected the defence of the country against the real enemy, who was now within their gates. In order to prevent the army from rallying round Prince William and proclaiming him stadtholder, many of the troops had been disbanded, the chief military posts were in the hands of mere civilians, and the feeble garrisons

of the cities approached by the French army had opened their gates almost without resistance. But, as the people became convinced of their peril and of the designs of the invader, religious zeal kindled their patriotism, all the memories of their glorious past mingled with their fear and humiliation, and the old cry of "*Oranje boven!*" soon began to be heard upon the streets.

Encouraged by the prospect of deliverance, De Witt, who had attempted to reopen negotiations with Louis XIV and Charles II, now sent a commission to ask for conditions of peace. Pomponne and Louvois inquired what terms they had to offer; to which the commissioners modestly replied that, out of respect to the King of France, they had come to seek rather than to propose conditions. They were then informed that, until they came with full powers to conclude a peace, the King refused to negotiate with them; adding that, if the States General wished to avoid "complete ruin," they should hasten to end the war.

While the States General were deliberating upon what course they would pursue, in the night of June 21 three armed assassins made an attempt on the life of the Grand Pensionary, who received in his struggle with his assailants such serious wounds that he was thereafter incapable of attending to public business.¹ Four days afterward his brother, Cornelius De Witt, who had been recalled from the fleet, also narrowly escaped assassination.

It was evident that the revolution which had been preparing was now at hand. Rumors had been set afloat that the Prince of Orange was dead; and the excited populace, misled by these reports, were ready to wreak their vengeance on those who had opposed him.

On June 27, De Groot carried to the camp of Louis XIV at Zeist an offer of ten million livres and the cession of all the principal places of the "Generality," — a broad band of territory situated half in Brabant and half in Flanders, and constituting a province belonging to the Republic as a

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Negotiations
for peace and
assault on the
De Witts

¹ The account of this attack is fully given by Lefèvre-Pontalis, *Jean de Witt*, II, pp. 395, 400.

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whole, much as the "*Reichsland*" now belongs to the German Empire, — if the King would make peace; but Louis would not listen to it. The offer involved the surrender of all that the United Provinces had conquered in their long wars with Spain, and would have left them powerless before him in the future; but Louvois would not hear of it, and the King resolved to bring the Republic to a still deeper humiliation.

The Prince of
Orange chosen
Stadtholder

The day for the triumph of the Orange party had arrived. To the masses of the people, it appeared that the country was on the verge of destruction because of the need of a strong hand and a military policy. The inundations had only checked the advance of the invader, and the promised help from abroad had not arrived and might never come. The Prince had already, under the most difficult circumstances, displayed his qualities in the field; and his friends were pointing to him as the foreordained saviour of the Republic.

The first general demonstration of the popular feeling was in the village of Ter Veere, in Zeeland, where the Prince of Orange had estates. The inhabitants demanded of the Council that he be proclaimed stadtholder; and the authorities, intimidated by their fury, were forced to yield.

The movement spread like a conflagration. At Dordrecht, the home of the De Witts, the deputies to the States General had favored peace, and it was believed that they were ready to negotiate the capitulation of the town. The presence of the Prince was demanded; and, after excuses that he was too much occupied at the front, he came. His conduct was modest and irreproachable. He argued against their wish to make him stadtholder that he had taken an oath to respect the "Perpetual Edict." The pastors of the place solemnly undertook to absolve him from this obligation, and to this he finally yielded.

The only attempt at resistance came from Cornelius De Witt. The crowd forced its way into his house and delegates surrounded his bed, imploring him to sign the act of the local authorities. A tragic scene ensued. After long

resistance, subdued by the tears and pleadings of his wife, he finally signed the act of Revocation of the Edict; but, to show that he did so only by order of the authorities, he added his title as "Pensionary of Dordrecht"; which his wife, in her fear for his life, secretly erased.

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The example of Dordrecht was the tocsin of the revolution. On July 3, 1672, the States of Holland abrogated the "Perpetual Edict"; on July 4, under the title of William III, the Prince of Orange was proclaimed "Stadtholder, Captain, and Admiral General of Holland;" and, on July 8, the States General took the same action for the United Provinces, bestowing upon the Prince these titles and their prerogatives for life.

II. THE COALITION OF THE HAGUE

In the midst of the commotion that placed the Prince of Orange at the head of the United Provinces, De Groot returned to The Hague from the camp of Louis XIV bearing the King's conditions of peace. They were so onerous as to involve the complete vassalage of the provinces, and the excitement was intense. The word "treason" had been already whispered, and it was proposed to associate Van Beuningen with De Groot in the subsequent negotiations; but, peremptorily refusing to participate in this mission, Van Beuningen, on July 7, — the day before the Prince was chosen stadtholder by the States General, — in an eloquent address before that body, denounced the continuation of negotiations, pointed out their unfavorable effect upon the activity of the allies, and terminated his discourse with a peroration which contained the whole programme of action of the Orangist party.

The rupture
of negotia-
tions with
France

As seen by the adherents of the House of Orange, the woes and humiliation of the Republic were the results of the policies pursued by the republican oligarchy under the direction of John De Witt. A change of attitude would rescue the country. The King and the Parliament of England, it was alleged, had a high regard for the Prince of

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Orange. For his sake and in his interest, they would cease their attack on the Republic; and the King of England would mediate a peace with the King of France. The occasion, Van Beuningen concluded, called for a stout resistance and the conduct of all further negotiations by the Prince of Orange.

This discourse made a deep impression; and, on the following day, having elevated the Prince to the high position of his ancestors, it was decided to ask his opinion regarding the conditions of peace. Without hesitation William III expressed his conviction that the conditions were impossible, and that the independence of the Republic could still be maintained without such humiliating sacrifices. The States General thereupon decided to name a colleague to accompany De Groot upon his return to the French camp, with the reply that the "insupportable hardness" of the terms of peace made it impossible to accept them; but De Groot, convinced that his usefulness was at an end, and alarmed by the fear of assassination, — which he had narrowly escaped at Rotterdam, — decided to abandon his mission.

Negotiations
with the King
of England

It was a heavy responsibility for a young man of twenty-two to advise the continuation of resistance, but the Prince was firm in his resolution. Feeling the great importance of detaching the King of England from his alliance with Louis XIV, he had, upon his own authority, privately sent a trusted friend, Gabriel Sylvius, to open negotiations with Charles II.¹ Far from being discouraged by the indisposition of his uncle to change his attitude, the Prince despatched a second emissary, Frederick Reede, to renew the appeal; but Charles II took no action, except to send to The Hague a commission, composed of Lord Halifax, a member of his privy council, the Duke of Buckingham, and Arlington; at the same time informing Louis XIV that the object of this embassy was merely "to delude the

¹ For further details concerning Sylvius and his mission, see Siccamo, *Sir Gabriel de Sylvius*, in the *Revue d'Histoire Diplomatique*, XV, 1901, p. 109 et seq.

public with the hope of peace" and prevent the acquisition of support by Holland. His commissioners were, however, secretly instructed to sound the intentions of the Prince, and ascertain if he was disposed to become an accomplice with the two Kings in the humiliation of the United Provinces.

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Assured of pacific intentions by the Duke of Buckingham, the States General appointed a committee — of which Van Beuningen, Beverningk, and two others were members — to negotiate with the commissioners under the direction of the Prince, with instructions to cede no territories; but to make, if possible, an advantageous use of money.

Having received the commissioners in his camp at Bodegrave, the Prince was asked what conditions of peace they could communicate to Louis XIV; but, instead of transmitting his resolute reply, which they evidently thought useless, they embraced the opportunity, on July 16, to make a new treaty with the King of France. In this convention it was stipulated that, in addition to all the concessions demanded through De Groot or contained in the previous treaty between France and England, peace should not be made by either power without the consent of the other; the Dutch flag must be lowered in presence of the English, even on the coasts of Holland and Zeeland; a million pounds sterling must be paid to England as a war indemnity; Surinam must be ceded to England; and a premium of ten thousand pounds sterling must be paid for the right to catch herring on the English coasts.¹

The sixth article of the treaty provided that "the sovereignty of what remained of the United Provinces after the parts detached by the two Kings and their allies," should be accorded to the Prince of Orange; "or at least the perpetuity of the stadtholderate in his family."

This last-named provision profoundly touched the honor of the Prince, for it was of a nature to compromise him fatally in the eyes of his people. He, therefore, hastened to lay the treaty, which had been sent to him, before the States General.

¹ For the treaty, see Dumont, VII, Part I, p. 208 et seq.

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He emphasized its ruinous consequences for the state, and declared: "To sign it, is to be lost; even to discuss it is dangerous; but if the majority of this assembly decides otherwise, there remains only one course for the friends of Protestantism and liberty; that is, to withdraw to the East India colonies, and there create a new country, where their consciences and their persons will have shelter from tyranny and despotism."¹

He then pointed out that the cause of the Republic was the cause of all Europe, and that the English Parliament would soon perceive the pernicious consequences of an alliance with the King of France and the attempt to ruin the Republic, and would upon its next convocation put an end to that policy. The arrival of the German troops on the Rhine would, he declared, be the signal for a change in the situation, and the retreat of the enemy.

The hopes
and uncer-
tainties of the
Dutch Re-
public

The Prince had rightly interpreted the spirit and the faith of his people. The new terms of peace imposed by the Anglo-French alliance were, on July 21, tersely but firmly rejected by the States General. The announcement, together with the proposed conditions themselves, placarded throughout Holland, inspired the whole population with new courage and resolution.

On July 13, Baron Van Amerongen, accompanied by General von Pöllnitz, governor of Berlin, after a journey of two weeks, had arrived at The Hague. They reported the ardent activity of Frederick William, who had everywhere urged support from the German princes, and was preparing to lead his troops to the rescue. The news, no doubt, greatly influenced the hopes and determination of William III in circumstances that were extremely disheartening. The visitors found the province of Holland inundated with water by the act of its inhabitants, who were confined within the cities as if they were besieged. Everywhere else, except in the islands of Zeeland and parts of Friesland and Groningen, the French troops were already in

¹ Siretma de Grovestins, *Guillaume III et Louis XIV*, II, p. 382.

possession of the country; but the people were full of hope, and the authority of the stadtholder was incontestable.

At Berlin, Louis XIV, indefatigable in his efforts to maintain the isolation of the Republic, was again endeavoring through his new envoy, Count de la Vauguyon, to discourage the Elector from rendering assistance to the Republic and to win him over to a policy of neutrality. In order to elude his insistence, Frederick William professed that he was interested only in the maintenance of the Treaties of Westphalia, and in the safety of his duchy of Cleve, already occupied by the French troops. The French diplomatist was not deceived; but took pains to inform himself regarding the condition and activities of the Elector's army up to the moment of its westward march, when he took his departure from Berlin without having accomplished the purpose of his mission.

On July 25, 1672, through the efforts of Lisola, a treaty of alliance was signed at The Hague between the Republic and the Emperor;¹ but, like so many of the engagements of Leopold I, it was devoid of sincerity. Grémonville was assured by Lobkowitz that it was merely a diplomatic diversion, and, like the Austrian treaty with Brandenburg, not to be taken seriously. He had explained the engagements with the Elector by saying, that for the good of the Empire Frederick William had to be treated like a "wild horse that needed to be harnessed with a tamer one." If, he now stated, the King of France could only see the secret instructions given to Montecuccoli, who commanded the Austrian troops, he would realize that the treaty with the Republic was only a sham.²

Having repudiated with indignation the personal offers made to him by the Kings of France and England, William III — notwithstanding the endeavors of the commissioners of Charles II as they passed through Brussels to induce Spain to desert the Republic — persisted in his determina-

Efforts of
William III
to detach
England from
France

¹ For the treaty, see Dumont, VII, Part I, p. 208.

² See Waddington, *Le Grand Electeur*, II, p. 270.

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tion to detach the King of England from the alliance with France.

A private letter from Charles II, dated July 28, — only three days after the signature of the new Anglo-French convention, — fully justified high hopes on the part of the Prince; but he was yet to learn that the pretended friendship of that Machiavellian monarch was intended only to win his confidence and bring him into complicity with the enemy.¹

William III has been accused of exceeding his powers in his private correspondence with Charles II, and even of aiming to obtain for himself hereditary royal rights in the United Provinces, under the protection of England and France;² but the evidence for the truth of this accusation is not convincing.³ The conduct of the Prince is a sufficient proof of its unfairness. Instead of yielding to the solicitations of Charles II to aid in obtaining from the Republic the concessions demanded, — which would have meant the virtual dismemberment of the United Provinces, — he declined to be a traitor to his country; energetically continued his measures for defence; and awaited the assembling of the English Parliament, to which he now looked for the means of forcing the King to terminate the alliance with France. But Charles II also foresaw this possibility; and to prevent it prorogued the Parliament — which was to meet on October 30, 1672 — until the month of February in the following year.

The conflict
of parties in
Holland

In the midst of external dangers to the Republic that threatened to destroy its existence, the strife of parties now assumed a tragic intensity which added greatly to its perils. The adherents of the Orangist party believed that the salvation of the country depended upon the unqualified restoration of the power and prerogatives formerly enjoyed by the stadtholders, the exclusion of the existing republican administration from all public authority, and the appoint-

¹ See Bésnage, *Annales des Provinces-Unies*, II, p. 331.

² See Lefèvre-Pontalis, *Jean de Witt*, II, p. 437.

³ These accusations rest entirely on the alleged correspondence published by Costerus, which is believed to be apocryphal.

ment of new public officials by the Prince. The party of De Witt, on the other hand, regarded the centralization of power in the hands of William III and the transfer of authority from themselves to him and his subordinates as a violation of the republican constitution of the country, and full of danger to the liberties of the people, which the representative and federal theory of the government was intended to preserve.

Since they felt themselves too weak in a military sense to overwhelm and expel the invader, the republicans were anxious to make peace; for only upon that condition could they expect to continue in power. The Orangists, on the other hand, found it to their interest to continue the war as long as possible; for its evils could be urged as a constant ground of reproach to those who were alleged to have occasioned it without themselves being capable of defending the country, and its duration afforded an opportunity for continuing the concentration of power in the hands of the stadtholder, to whom the Orangists now looked for defence and the negotiation of a peace based on the capacity for self-protection. In addition to these differences, the cry of "usurpation" on the part of the republicans was answered by the cry of "treason" on the part of the Orangists.

The calumnies incident to this quarrel have been to a certain extent re-echoed in the histories which have been inspired by these opposing points of view. On the one side, John De Witt is charged with being a wily politician, selfish, ambitious, incompetent, and at heart a traitor, who carried on secret correspondence with the enemy of his country, in order to purchase by ceding a part of its territories the privilege of continuing in power.¹ On the other side, De Witt is glorified as the embodiment of all human virtues and excellences, an upright and unselfish patriot, and a martyr to the principles of popular liberty; while William III is represented as a self-seeking usurper of power, aiming to obtain for himself a royal crown by

¹ *Sirtema de Grovestins, Guillaume III et Louis XIV.*

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collusion with conspirators against the very existence of the Republic.¹

De Witt's
conception of
public policy

It is in no respect necessary for the purpose we have in view to enter upon the controversy regarding the personal characters of these two great men, or even to estimate the inherent merits of the systems of government of which they were the champions. Our task is concerned only with the international effects of their conduct and policies, which cannot be justly appreciated without considering the age in which they lived and acted.

De Witt's conception of statecraft was controlled by the idea of material prosperity as the end for which the State exists, and in that respect he was thoroughly modern. The freedom in which he believed was the privilege of every citizen to exercise his powers in his own way and for his own profit, with only such restraint as might be necessary for the maintenance of good order and public security. To preserve this freedom was for him the purpose of the Republic, and all his policies grew out of this conception.

Seeing a great field of enterprise for Holland in foreign trade, he had aimed to develop it, protect it, and retain it; and, for that purpose, he had favored the maintenance of a navy strong enough to overmatch the strength of other maritime powers, particularly that of England. For the same reason he dreaded the creation of a royal dynasty in the Netherlands; for such a dynasty would tend toward military adventures upon the continent and ignore maritime enterprise, upon which the prosperity of Holland had been erected. If the stadtholderate were continued and put in possession of military force, it would, he believed, eventually transform itself — as it had threatened to do under the last stadtholder, William II — into a royal dynasty; and thus, in the end, result in the extinction of the Republic, and with it the decline of prosperity. In this belief he had proposed and defended the "Perpetual Edict," and had thereby brought upon himself the hatred of the Orangist

¹ Lefèvre-Pontalis, *Jean de Witt*.

party, which regarded his policy as designed merely for the purpose of retaining power in his own hands.

In his foreign policy also De Witt was inspired by his conception of the purpose of the Republic. He feared the power of England, and was determined as far as possible to resist it on the sea. On the continent he relied upon his diplomatic skill to counteract the waning influence of Spain by invoking the aid of France. He had not fully realized the inordinate appetite for territory and the spirit of depredation which the ally on whom he had most depended had now developed. Above all, he had not, until it was too late, suspected the resentment provoked by the formation of the Triple Alliance and the limits the Republic had endeavored to set to the ambition of Louis XIV.

In the modern constitutional era the result of De Witt's policies might have been different. They would at least have the benefit of such support as may be derived from the nominal acceptance of some principles of international justice. But it was an age in which no principles had a chance of prevailing unless supported by armed force, and in which armed force was seldom controlled by just principles. In such a time political idealism was certain to be misunderstood, and the instinct of national self-preservation turned toward the centralization of political authority and the development of military force as the sole guarantees of independence. Of these tendencies William III was the natural beneficiary, and he was certainly not the most unworthy. De Witt had incurred the hostility of Louis XIV, and the Republic appeared to be at his mercy. It is unnecessary to speak of other faults than those of judgment as the cause of the peril in which the Republic was thus placed, but it is not surprising that other faults were imputed. We now have reason to believe that De Witt honorably and heroically did all in his power to defend and to save his country, but the division of parties and the slow moving machinery of the federal administration rendered his efforts futile. In a time when political power was so little subjected to regulative principles, either in the constitution

The defects of De Witt's system in relation to his time

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of the State or in its international relations, the unstable equilibrium of a federative system was an inadequate construction. In such a time a free people, working out the problem of its own interests by the slow process of public debate, and finding its chief security in the balance of foreign powers, was an anachronism; and of this anachronism De Witt was destined to be the victim.

The murder
of the De
Witts

It was unfortunate for him that just at the moment when the salvation of the Republic demanded unity of action the State was torn and enfeebled by conflicting factions. For the immediate past De Witt was held to be almost solely responsible; and for the future William III, glorified by the sacred memories of a remoter and still more tragic past, was believed by many to be the only hope.

On a charge that Cornelius De Witt had attempted to employ an obscure man of proved criminal character to assassinate the Prince, — a charge supported only by this ruffian's own testimony, but which posterity has refused to credit, — that ardent patriot was arrested and imprisoned at The Hague.

The Grand Pensionary resigned his office and devoted himself to establishing his brother's innocence; but, unhappily for them, the populace was persuaded that both were traitors, and resolved upon summary vengeance. Cornelius De Witt was sentenced to perpetual banishment, but another fate was in store for him. While John De Witt was visiting his brother in prison preparatory to his exile, on August 20, 1672, the infuriated populace, crying "Kill the traitors," broke into the building, dragged both brothers into the street, and after brutally murdering them hung their mutilated bodies in the public square.

It is due to the memory of John De Witt to record the fact that the commission appointed to examine all his papers, private as well as official, — in which it was imagined some evidence of treason might be found, — in answer to the question what had been discovered, reported to the States General: "Nothing but honor and virtue."

After this sad tragedy, which sealed the unity of the

United Provinces with the blood of martyrdom, the Republic set itself with renewed vigor to the task of its deliverance. The murderers of John and Cornelius De Witt were not punished; for they were not regarded by public opinion as criminals, but as the mere instruments of a political revolution,—the irresponsible perpetrators of violence exercised in the name of the *raison d'État*, that veiled divinity whose most atrocious enormities are habitually excused on the ground that they are intended for the public good.

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The new policies of Holland

The new Grand Pensionary of Holland, Gaspard Fagel, gave himself unreservedly to the execution of the orders of the stadtholder.

From the moment when his domination began William III made opposition to French expansion the mainspring of all his vigorous and sometimes complex diplomacy, and with consequences to the ascendancy of France in Europe which at the beginning of his career it would have been difficult to imagine. Thenceforth, during the remainder of his life, William III became the champion of the balance of power in Europe, and he fulfilled his mission with a zeal inspired by the union of political expediency with the ardor of religious faith.

It was in one respect a propitious moment for William III to begin the great task to which he devoted the remainder of his existence. Louis XIV had not concealed his contempt for the "cheese-mongers, herringfishers and spice-peddlers" of Holland, nor for the purely mercantile conceptions of De Witt's diplomacy. To him it seemed an unpardonable impertinence that a race of mere tradesmen should dare to oppose his sovereign will. And the sentiment of the princes of Europe in general was not widely different from that of the King regarding the pretensions of the Dutch Republic. Its independence, commercialism, and especially the new forms of power which had been developed by the industry and economy of these self-governing people, were antipathetic—in so far as they were intelligible—to the tastes, the ideas, and the caste prejudices of all who adhered

The awakening of Europe

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to a system of absolute rule. Upstarts in government and heretics in religion, the Dutch burghers had no friends in aristocratic circles anywhere.

But when by a political revolution a prince of royal blood, whose lineage inspired respect, was struggling to defend his country from annihilation, the scene was changed, and all Europe became interested in the spectacle. Then at last it was understood that Holland was the bulwark not only of the Germanic liberties but of the political equilibrium of Europe. If Louis XIV held Holland in his grasp he would soon be in possession of the Spanish Netherlands; the Rhine would then present no formidable obstacle to his advance; and with such augmented power even the Alps could not restrain him. Already it was apparent that there was no single power in Europe that could successfully oppose him.

The ease with which in a few weeks Louis XIV had made himself master of all that part of the United Provinces that was not protected by the inundations proved with what rapidity he was able to make conquests. It had not seemed so serious a matter to take money in exchange for mere neutrality, but now even the princes who were in the King's pay began to feel that they had become conspirators in an enterprise that had gone far beyond their expectations; and they began to wonder who among themselves might be the next victim, and who indeed would be the last.

The influence
of Louis XIV
in Spain and
Italy

The wider the circle of observation was extended the more ominous appeared the preparations of Louis XIV for the establishment of a universal monarchy. Undoubtedly, the alarm would have been greatly augmented had the secret treaty of partition with the Emperor been suspected. But enough was known to excite general apprehension. Not only had Germany manifested an apathy which showed how completely the princes were already in the hands of Louis XIV, but there was an influential French party in Spain which had nearly succeeded in preventing the defensive alliance of that country with the Republic in 1671, and was even then actively engaged in striving to render it ineffectual;

for it had been ingeniously suggested at Madrid that, after all, the Dutch Republic was nothing but a revolted province of Spain that should be punished for its past rebellion, and that Spain might profit by recovering something from its dismemberment.¹

And when attention was turned toward Italy, the predominance which Louis XIV had already acquired in the peninsula seemed alarming. Through the influence of the French princesses who had married into the House of Savoy, that duchy — the gateway of France to Italy — was completely gallicized; and Charles Emmanuel had become almost a vassal of the King of France. Cosimo III, the Grand Duke of Tuscany, was seeking to obtain the favor of Louis XIV, of whose hostility he stood in awe; Venice and Genoa were too much reduced to resist him; and the friendship of Parma and Modena had been won by his good offices in reconciling their differences with Pope Alexander VII. Finally, Clement X, who at the time occupied the Holy See, would have been pleased to see all Christendom united under the Emperor and the Most Christian King, if only they would carry out his wish to join in a crusade against the Turks and drive them out of Europe. Nowhere in Italy, as it appeared, was there any effectual barrier to the advance of Louis XIV if after his conquest of Holland he should be inspired by the idea of restoring the Empire in its ancient seat of power by subordinating the petty Italian princes and some day demanding the imperial crown at the hands of the Pope at Rome.

Much of this alarm was no doubt unjustified, but it is greatly to the credit of William III that, beyond any other ruler of his generation, he was able to appreciate the peril to Europe. It was not in his power, with the resources at his command, to save his country by force of arms; but he perceived the possibility of saving it by the organization of Europe against his foe.

The tardiness
of the allies

When on September 24, 1672, the junction was at last

¹ See *Lecestre, La Mission de Gourville en Espagne.*

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effected between the troops of Austria and Brandenburg in the valley of the Leine near Hildesheim, the strenuous efforts of Frederick William to form a coalition of the German princes for the protection of the Empire had resulted in little more than timid promises; but the situation had become clear. On the twenty-second, a purely defensive alliance, after long debates, had been signed at Brunswick for the maintenance of the Peace of Westphalia by representatives of the Emperor, Denmark, Brandenburg, the Dukes of Celle and Wolfenbüttel, and the Landgrave of Hesse; but there was as yet no rupture with Louis XIV on the part of the Germans. The alliance was merely precautionary, but troops were present to give it emphasis. The war with Holland was threatening to become a European war.

The problem now was how to bring these forces into action, without which there could be no real aid to the United Provinces. The march toward the Weser and afterward toward the Rhine was painfully slow; and Amerongen, who accompanied the Elector, watched it with deep anxiety. Frederick William wished earnestly to hasten the deliverance of Holland, but Montecuccoli knew the reluctance of the Emperor to break with Louis XIV, and tried to temporize.

Obstructed by the pacific aims of the Archbishops of Mainz and Trier, the Elector of Brandenburg found it difficult to advance. After three months of wandering, the allies had brought no effective aid to Holland; and Fagel, the Grand Pensionary, compared their peregrinations to those of the children of Israel in the desert. The Republic would have already ceased to exist if it had not been for the inundations. In the meantime, the Prince of Orange was sturdily defending the points where the approach of the enemy was possible, but he had seen that more vigorous diplomacy was needed.

Frederick William's position was extremely hazardous to his interests; for, while he was the life of the German opposition to Louis XIV, his duchy of Cleve was already occupied by French troops, he was cut off from his own territory, the Emperor — who had again fallen under the

The trials of
Frederick
William

influence of Grémonville and Lobkowitz — was only half-hearted, and the other German princes, undecided what course to take, were disposed to wait and see what would happen before disclosing their growing apprehensions. At the same time, Holland, which had paid for service which it was not receiving, was uttering loud complaints and threatening to withhold the subsidies.

Almost deserted on the continent, where everyone was willing to profit by his action and disinclined to risk coming to his aid, the Elector sent his trusted representative Lorenz von Crockow to the King of England to press upon him the interests of Protestantism and represent the peril to which the Republic was exposed, at the same time offering his services as a mediator. It was a vain appeal. Charles II received the Elector's envoy coldly, announced his firm resolution to continue the war, and insinuated that Frederick William should not speak of "religion" when he was himself allied with so good a Catholic as Leopold I.

Ill provided with means, his soldiers drenched by the autumn rains, himself scolded by the States General for his tardy movements, his duchy at the mercy of Louis XIV, the cold of winter approaching, Poland invaded by the Turks and calling for his assistance, Frederick William found his loyalty as an ally and his faith as a Protestant put to a trying test. It was not to be wondered at that he began to consider seriously the idea of a separate peace with France.

Unfortunately for the Dutch Republic, neither Spain nor Austria intended to do more than defend their own interests; and both were indisposed to bring on a final rupture with France. For the salvation of Holland, on the other hand, it was desirable that the conflict should as quickly as possible take on a European character. With this in view William III was urgently pressing for a prompt junction of the allied armies with his own troops, and at the same time carrying on active negotiations at The Hague with Spain and Austria in the hope of stimulating more decisive action.

Although the Spanish government had issued a "declaration" that it would defend the Republic, no aid had thus

The delinquency of Spain

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far been furnished by its authority. Count Monterey, Governor of the Spanish Netherlands, without orders from Madrid, had promptly put himself at the head of his troops; but in Spain public opinion was still divided, and there was little disposition to take risks for the sake of the Hollanders.

Adrien Paets, who was sent by the States General as ambassador to Madrid, had experienced great difficulty in awakening Spanish interest; while Manuel de Lira, the ambassador of Spain at The Hague, complained of the tenacity of the States General in trying to dictate the course of conduct to be taken by their ally.

The Dutch insisted that the true solution was for Spain to take the "Generality," and offer an equivalent to France in Flanders or Hainault, which would give to France a better frontier and at the same time separate French territory from that of the Republic; on the principle that it was desirable to have France as a friend but not as a neighbor. But De Lira would not listen to such a suggestion.

Notwithstanding the difficulties of the negotiation, it was evident that Spain could not totally abandon the Republic. This was made even more clear by the exaggerated demands of Louis XIV, at a short-lived congress convoked at Köln in May, 1673, for the purpose of negotiating a general peace. No one of the alternatives proposed by him was acceptable either to Holland or to Spain, and it was made apparent that united resistance was the only course remaining.

The defection
of Brandenburg

Until March, 1673, it appeared possible that the menace of a coalition would change the mind of Louis XIV; but by that time the ultimate defection of Frederick William was deemed certain. On June 21, discouraged by the obstacles he had encountered and the failure of the Republic to pay the subsidies, the Elector signed with Louis XIV the Treaty of Vossem, in which he agreed "not to give aid in the future to the enemies of His Majesty," and to keep his army on the farther side of the Weser. In return, the King of France promised to forget the past and restore to the Elector the places occupied by the French troops. It was a great victory for the King's diplomacy, by which

the Republic was deprived of its only important ally. As an inducement Louis XIV had promised to sustain the Elector's claim for the unpaid subsidies due from the States General, and in addition to pay him three hundred thousand livres when the ratifications were exchanged, and one hundred thousand yearly for five years, beginning with July 1, 1674.¹

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The defection of Brandenburg was bitterly condemned in Holland, but it proved a benefit to the cause of the Republic by placing it temporarily entirely at the mercy of Louis XIV. Turenne, sent to prevent the approach of the allied armies, had already done his work too well; for he had not only prevented their advance, he had followed them in their retreat, and had invaded the Empire.

The formation
of a general
alliance

It was the moment for which William III and Lisola had anxiously waited. Unless the Emperor was prepared to lose all prestige, it was now necessary for him to show his hand. Spain was at last ready for action, and her ambassador at Vienna, Don Pedro Ronquillo, informed the Emperor that the purpose of Louis XIV was not merely to ruin the Republic, but to take possession of the Spanish Netherlands also, as a step to the establishment of a universal monarchy.²

The reign of the Chevalier Grémonville and Prince Lobkowitz was at an end. The former soon left Vienna, where for nine years he had beguiled Leopold I, and Prince Lobkowitz was soon overthrown. On August 28, 1673, Austria and Spain united for their mutual protection; and, on August 30, was signed at The Hague an alliance between the Republic, Austria, Spain, and the Duke of Lorraine.³

It was the triumph of the persistent efforts of Lisola

¹ The treaty was antedated June 6, 1673. The complete text is given by Pufendorf, *De rebus gestis Friderici Wilhelmi Magni*, Berlin, 1695; the published part by Dumont, VII, Part I, p. 234 et seq.

² For the instructions, see Lonchay, *La rivalité de la France et de l'Espagne aux Pays-Bas*, p. 264.

³ For the treaty, see Dumont, VII, Part I, p. 240.

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and the final defeat of Grémonville in the long diplomatic duel in which they had been engaged. The secret treaty of partition was now at last mere waste paper. Hapsburg and Bourbon were again at war, and the two branches of the House of Austria were again united by a solemn bond in a common cause, — the rescue of the Dutch Republic.

Changed character of the war and defection of England

With such a coalition arrayed against him, it appeared for a moment probable that Louis XIV would confine his attention to the United Provinces, and thus avoid a general European war. It was clearly possible for him to insist upon the terms which had been already offered him by the Republic,— namely, the cession of the “Generality,” — which would have sufficiently humiliated the United Provinces without destroying them, and at the same time would have removed the *raison d’être* of the new alliance. But the rescue of Holland was only the ostensible object of the coalition, and this was soon apparent to Louis XIV. Its real purpose was, like that of the Triple Alliance, to put an end to his policy of expansion; and Spain now entertained the hope of winning back all that had been lost by the Treaty of Aix-la-Chapelle.

It was, therefore, too late for the King of France to conceal his real intention, which was to obtain by force the coveted Spanish Netherlands. At Aix-la-Chapelle he could well afford to make terms which disarmed the coalition, for at that time he felt sure of ultimately attaining his end by means of the treaty of partition with the Emperor; but, now that he and the Emperor were at war, that agreement had no longer any existence.

Compelled, therefore, to continue the war or abandon all he had so far gained by it, Louis XIV found the centre of hostilities suddenly changed. The struggle was no longer that of the Dutch Republic against the vengeance of the invader, it was a renewal of the old conflict between the Bourbon and Hapsburg dynasties for supremacy in Europe. A French army was already in possession of cities of the Empire, the Spanish Netherlands had again become a battleground, and hostilities had spread as far as Sicily. The war

had in fact become European, and William III had little difficulty in developing the coalition of The Hague into a still more formidable array of powers.

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In England public opinion had at last found expression. The marriage of the King's brother James, Duke of York, with a Catholic princess, Mary of Modena, had produced great excitement; and it was believed that the troops which Charles II was preparing to send to Zeeland for the Dutch war were really intended to be employed in destroying religious freedom in England and imposing Catholicism upon the country. Sir William Coventry violently attacked the French alliance in Parliament, demanded peace with the Republic, and carried a resolution refusing supplies until an effort to make peace had been made and failed. The contents of the secret treaty of Dover were more than suspected, and Charles II was finally compelled against his will to discontinue the war. Sir William Temple, through the mediation of the Spanish ambassador, found it easy to negotiate the Treaty of Westminster,¹ which the Republic was eager to conclude, and it was signed on February 9, 1674, thus ending the Anglo-French alliance.²

After the tardy awakening of the Emperor, the German princes — even some of those most closely allied with Louis XIV — began to take courage, and resolved to oppose him. In June, 1674, the Diet of Regensburg declared war on the King of France in the name of the Empire. Then followed a long procession of adhesions. On June 20, the Duke of Brunswick-Lüneburg; on July 1, the Elector of Brandenburg; on July 10, the King of Denmark; on January 26, 1675, the Bishop of Osnabrück, and on August 16, 1675, the Bishop of Münster abandoned Louis XIV and joined the coalition. It appeared for a time as if all Europe had united to stay the advance of the conqueror.

The adhesions
to the new
alliance

The desertion of the Republic by the Elector of Bran-

¹ For the details of the negotiation of peace between the United Provinces and England, see Sicama, *Sir Gabriel de Sylvius*, in the *Revue d'Histoire Diplomatique*, XV, pp. 113, 116.

² For the treaty, see Dumont, VII, Part I, p. 253.

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Sobieski's
election as
King of
Poland

denburg and the renewal of his treaty with Louis XIV, followed so quickly by his adhesion to the new alliance, is explained in part by conditions in the East. Events in Poland had revived the Elector's interest in that kingdom and renewed his aspirations to the Polish throne.

On October 18, 1672, King Michael, unable to withstand the assaults of the Turks and threatened with a revolt of the nobles, had signed a humiliating peace with the Sultan. The resentment felt throughout Poland, seconded by the influence of Pope Clement X, — who sent money from Rome to renew the war, — brought to the front a heroic figure in the person of John Sobieski, who threw himself passionately into the cause, and led a new attack upon the Turks which resulted in a series of brilliant victories.

The death of King Michael on November 10, 1673, rendered necessary a new election to the throne of Poland, and even before his last illness the customary intrigues at Warsaw to secure or control the succession had recommenced.

It was in expectation of the King's death that Frederick William had abandoned his campaign and returned to Berlin, for he was once more hopeful that either he or his son might be the successful candidate. But his hopes were once more frustrated; and, as he no doubt believed, largely through the influence of Louis XIV. Sobieski, who had been brought up in France and had married a French woman, was on May 21, 1674, chosen King of Poland. He was, no doubt, primarily indebted for this elevation to the popularity he had won by his heroic deeds; but he was known to be devoted to French interests, and his election had received French support.

Neither the Elector of Brandenburg nor the Emperor could forgive the interference of France in this election, in which the hopes of both had been bitterly disappointed. Leopold I had a twofold cause for resentment; for Sobieski's election had not only resulted in the defeat of the Emperor's candidate, — Prince Charles of Lorraine, — it had elevated to the throne of Poland an enemy who had been in collu-

sion with rebels against his authority in Hungary, where Sobieski was so popular that it had been at one time proposed to elect him King.

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Even during the period of his neutrality, Frederick William never ceased to feel a sincere interest in the rescue of Holland; and, after his recent disappointment, he hardly needed the urgency of the Emperor to induce him to join the new alliance. He had, indeed, suffered from the parsimony of the Dutch Republic regarding the subsidies, and from the apathy of the Emperor in the previous campaign; but he now had a new cause of offence on the part of Louis XIV, which he regarded as sufficient to absolve him from his recent treaty obligations.

The diplomacy
of Louis XIV
in the East

Having succeeded in putting upon the throne of Poland a king of whom the French ambassador at Warsaw wrote that he was as zealous for Louis XIV "as if he had the honor of being born his subject," the King of France had exercised all his influence to bring about a peace between Poland and the Turks, in order that Sobieski might be free to turn his forces against the Emperor and the Elector of Brandenburg, and thus cripple their activities on the Rhine by keeping them occupied at home. To the Emperor, Sobieski's interference might mean the loss of Hungary; to Frederick William, the loss of Prussia, — which he had once held as a vassal to Poland, — and which the King of Poland might now endeavor to reclaim.

But this ingenious move on the part of Louis XIV was doomed to failure. Clement X persistently inspired the patriotism and religious zeal of the Poles in their fierce struggle with the Turks; and the King of France was obliged to content himself with promoting turbulence among the Hungarian rebels, and the more promising prospect of provoking an attack on Brandenburg by the Swedes.

Temporarily relieved of anxiety regarding the East, Frederick William, with renewed promises of subsidies from Holland and Spain, again placed himself at the head of his army, and marched to the defence of the Count Palatine of the Rhine, whose territories Turenne, with the purpose

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The war of
Sweden and
Brandenburg

of preventing a German advance for the defence of Franche-Comté, was then devastating.

But Louis XIV required only a short time to create a situation in the North that recalled the Elector of Brandenburg for the protection of his own domain. The bitter poverty of Sweden rendered it easy for the King of France to turn the hungry troops of that nursery of mercenary soldiers toward the spoils of Brandenburg. Swedish credit had fallen so low that the young king, Charles XI, who had just begun his reign, was not able to equip the necessary ships for the protection of Swedish commerce, or even to pay the expenses of an embassy which he wished to send to Russia.

In these circumstances the mere threat of the French envoy that the subsidies would be no longer paid if the Swedes did not make war on Brandenburg, was sufficient to set that impecunious government in motion. Frederick William was thereby rendered innocuous to Louis XIV so far as activity on the Rhine was concerned, and obliged to face a new enemy in the North.

After personal interviews with William III, in March and May, 1675, at Cleve and at The Hague, with a view to engaging the sea power of Holland in an attack upon Bremen, — which, with the bishopric of Verden, had fallen to Sweden by the Peace of Westphalia, — the Elector succeeded in obtaining an agreement, signed on May 15 by the Prince of Orange, the deputies of the States General, the representatives of the Emperor, and those of Spain and the three Dukes of Brunswick, whereby these allies were bound to urge upon the King of Denmark an attack on Sweden in the region of Bremen, to unite in opposing all who in any way aided the King of France, and on June 15 unitedly to declare war on the Swedes.

The Swedish army had already invaded Brandenburg; but, on June 28, 1675, at Fehrbellin, Frederick William routed the enemy with such brilliant success as to win for himself the surname of the "Great Elector"; and it is from this victory that, in the opinion of one of its most illus-

trious representatives, the House of Hohenzollern dates its success in laying the foundations of its future greatness.

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III. THE PEACE OF NYMWEGEN AND THE PACIFIC CONQUESTS OF FRANCE

The community of interest which had awakened Europe from its lethargy and inspired the Coalition of The Hague was now disappearing in the conflict of particular interests which were not only inharmonious but incompatible. The changed relations of the powers

The success which had attended the efforts of the Prince of Orange in Holland placed him at once in the front rank of the military commanders and diplomatists of his time. He had already so far rescued his country from the destruction with which it had been threatened as to expel the invader from Utrecht, Gelderland, and Overijssel. In truth, even at the beginning of 1674, Holland was practically saved; and the Hollanders were ready to recognize the change as the work of William III. On February 2, 1674, the States of Holland had declared the stadtholderate hereditary in the male line of the House of Orange-Nassau, the States of Zeeland had promptly followed their example, and on April 20, 1674, the States General had ratified this action.

But since the formation of the Coalition of The Hague great changes had taken place in the relations of the powers. The war for the repression of the ambitions of Louis XIV was passing into a conflict of particular interests that carried it beyond all central control. Even in Holland, for whose rescue the war had begun, now that the danger-point was passed there was strong desire for peace upon such terms as it might in the changed conditions be possible to obtain. In truth, the main object of continuing the conflict was the preservation of the Spanish Netherlands to Spain; yet the promises of military and financial aid from Madrid were either unfulfilled or performed in a dilatory manner that rendered them ineffectual. The Dutch burghers, particularly those of Amsterdam, were growing weary of a war in which Holland was exhausting its resources without

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making perceptible progress toward the conclusion of a favorable peace; and certain others of the allies were desirous of ending a war from which they were to derive no direct benefit.

The effects of
the war with
Sweden

With the attack of Sweden on Brandenburg the conflict had passed into a new phase of its development; for, while this assault was an immediate outgrowth of the previous conditions, it was in reality not only a separate engagement but one involving entirely new motives and consequences. Holland had embarked in the war with Sweden in order to prevent the union of the Swedish forces with those of France on the Rhine; but now that this junction had been prevented there was no particular advantage to be gained by the Republic in continuing the war, which was seriously affecting the commercial interests of the Dutch merchants and shipowners. After so much cost and suffering, a strictly foreign war seemed to them a burden which they were not called upon to bear.

On July 17, 1675, the Elector of Brandenburg had obtained from the Imperial Diet a formal declaration of war upon Sweden; but now that it had been shown that Louis XIV could not completely paralyze the energies of the Empire by calling in the Swedes, the purpose of that declaration seemed to the Germans to have been in the main accomplished. On the other hand, the vigor exhibited by Frederick William, who was loudly demanding "satisfaction" in the form of territorial concessions, had become alarming. If he should annex Western Pomerania, — which had been acquired by Sweden through the Peace of Westphalia, — it would seriously disturb the equilibrium of Germany. Not wishing Sweden expelled from the Empire for the sole profit of the Elector of Brandenburg, there was no enthusiasm on the part of the other German princes in the further prosecution of the war. Only Christian V of Denmark, the Bishop of Münster, and the Dukes of Brunswick, who hoped to receive some of the spoils stripped from Denmark's hereditary enemy, were anxious to impose a crushing defeat on Sweden.

On the other hand, Louis XIV and Charles XI were unceasingly active in preparing new embarrassments for the Elector. In Poland the Marquis of Bethune, brother-in-law of Sobieski, had induced the King to sign with Louis XIV, on June 11, 1675, the secret treaty of Jaworow; in which he promised, for two hundred thousand écus, to attack Frederick William in the Duchy of Prussia as soon as peace with the Turks should be concluded.¹

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The campaigns of 1675 were not so favorable to France as they had promised to be at the beginning of the year. A revolt against Spanish rule at Messina had resulted in an invitation to Louis XIV to intervene and take possession of that city; but the diversion had not borne the expected fruits. The population, once free from Spanish rule, left to the French the trouble of protecting the independence of the city, without rendering any aid in return. Sicily did not rise in revolt, as had been expected, while Naples and the other Spanish possessions in Italy displayed no desire for a substitution of French rule. The only result of the enterprise advantageous to France was the withdrawal of the Spanish troops from Roussillon, which was in consequence surrendered to the French.

The situation
in France

On the Rhine Montecuccoli showed himself an equal match for Turenne, who was killed in battle, while Marshal Créqui was taken prisoner, with no substantial gains to balance these misfortunes.

In Germany the energetic movements of Frederick William against the Swedes had produced a bewildering effect upon the allies of France. The tradition of Swedish invincibility had been rudely shattered by the check given to the Swedes in their march toward the Rhine and their expulsion from Brandenburg.

Immediately after the withdrawal from the alliance with France and his separate peace with the Dutch Republic, Charles II had regarded the occasion as favorable for winning personal glory as the arbiter of Europe, conciliating

Charles II's
proposal of
mediation

¹ This treaty, which remained secret until the nineteenth century, may be found in Moerner, *Staatsverträge*, pp. 701, 704.

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public opinion in England, and incidentally rendering some service to Louis XIV, of whom he secretly remained a friend and even a paid dependent. He had, therefore, promptly offered to mediate between Louis XIV and the coalition, and proposed the assembling of a congress for peace at Nymwegen.

Although official negotiations regarding the Congress were opened early in 1675, there was no serious thought of meeting until January, 1676. D'Estrades, Colbert de Croissy, and D'Avaux — whom Louis XIV named as his representatives — were among the first to arrive at Nymwegen, which they reached in the following June; but the policy of the King of France being to negotiate a separate peace with each of the members of the coalition, and these being indisposed to be thus separated in detail, the negotiations did not begin effectively until 1677.

In truth, William III not only from the first distrusted the mediation of Charles II, but he had no inclination to end the war; partly because he wished further to consolidate his own authority in the United Provinces by continuing the struggle to a point where he could make his own terms and become the virtual master, as well as the saviour, of the Republic; and partly because he was unwilling to abandon his allies. The time had passed when the Prince, who had once hoped to save his country through the influence of Charles II with Louis XIV, was willing to accept his mediation, which he now felt would be prejudicial to the interests of the Republic.

The secret
agreement of
Charles II and
Louis XIV

In his suspicion of the real purposes of Charles II the Prince displayed a keen penetration. When the King of England abandoned the French alliance, Ruvigny — who had replaced Colbert de Croissy as French ambassador at London — was inclined to abuse him for his perfidy; but he soon received instructions from Louis XIV to continue good relations with Charles II, and to offer him the same subsidy for England's neutrality as had been given for the alliance. For years Louis XIV had paid Charles II an annual pension of one hundred thousand pounds sterling.

He was now ready to continue the pension in exchange for the King's clandestine assistance. Charles II did not dare to entrust this transaction to his responsible ministers; but, on February 26, 1676, he personally transcribed, signed, and sealed with his own hand the secret treaty which Ruvigny laid before him.¹ In this manner Charles II received from the King of France the money he coveted but could not obtain from Parliament for his own private purposes, and Louis XIV received from him all the assurance such a shameful transaction could give that England would not range herself with his enemies, as he feared might otherwise be the case. Ruvigny was able to write triumphantly to his royal master: "The King of Great Britain has engaged not to conclude a treaty without the consent of the King of France, and to prorogue or dissolve Parliament, if that be necessary." Charles II had "upon his honor as a King" placed the foreign policy of his kingdom, and even the meeting of its Parliament, in the hands of the King of France.

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In making this secret bargain with Charles II Louis XIV fully realized the immense value of the neutrality of England and of the personal friendship of the King in the execution of his designs. He perceived that the character of the war on the continent had been radically altered by the alliance of Spain and the Emperor with the Republic. It was now on his part in reality a war for the reduction of the combined power of the Hapsburgs, and no longer merely a question of humiliating or further weakening the Dutch Republic, the complete overthrow of which had been found impossible. What the King of France now aimed at was the immediate conquest or cession to himself of Franche-Comté and as much as possible of the Spanish Netherlands. The coalition, on the other hand, was fighting to prevent any gains by France, and hoped to recover from her the acquisitions made by the peace of Aix-la-Chapelle, to restore

The significance of this bargain for Louis XIV

¹ For the treaty, see Sirtena de Grovestins, *Guillaume III et Louis XIV*, II, pp. 539, 540.

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to the Duke of Lorraine his lost duchy, and to reconquer Alsace for Austria.

In these circumstances, if Louis XIV could not have the alliance of England, his next best advantage was in possessing its neutrality. This was difficult to secure; for public opinion in England was opposed to France, and the King and the Parliament were in perpetual conflict. As there was little hope of winning the Parliament, he had pursued the more practicable course of retaining the good offices of the King, which might prove sufficient for his purpose in keeping England neutral through the King's prerogative of pro-roguing or dissolving Parliament.

Arlington's
scheme of
marriage for
William III

The most important step to be taken in the dissolution of the Coalition of The Hague was to secure, if possible, the immediate separation of the Dutch Republic from its allies; but the chief impediment to this act of desertion was the firm resistance of William III. As a means of overcoming the opposition of the Prince of Orange, after Sir William Temple's failure to enter into private negotiations with him on that subject, Arlington, — who hoped by some good fortune to recover his former position at Court, — with the idea that William III might thus be brought under English influence, had devised and urged the scheme of offering to the Prince in marriage his cousin Mary, eldest daughter of James, Duke of York; and, in spite of the misgivings of Ruvigny, who feared that such a marriage might be prejudicial to the interests of his master, Arlington was sent to The Hague to make the proposal.¹

As grandson of Charles I, William of Orange stood next to the daughters of the Duke of York in the succession to the English throne; and by his marriage with Mary the relationship to the House of Stuart — which a few years later was to make him king of England — would have received an added bond. But the Prince of Orange suspected the intentions of Arlington, whom he felt he had reason to distrust; and, alleging as his reason the youth of the Princess, who

¹ On the visit of Arlington to The Hague, see Siccamo, *Sir Gabriel de Sylvius*, in the *Revue d'Histoire Diplomatique*, XV, pp. 118, 119.

was then only thirteen years old, he declined the offer. His purpose was to remain loyal to the allies of the Republic, to obtain for it a peace that would leave its possessions and its integrity unaffected, and above all to guarantee the future security of the United Provinces and of Europe against the ambitious designs of the King of France.

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While William III was seeking to evade the mediation of Charles II, Louis XIV was anxious, for reasons already stated, to avoid any other outside influence. Pope Clement X had desired to mediate between the Catholic powers, and in a letter to the Emperor had offered his good offices. He had expressed his wish that a congress should not be held in a Protestant city, as had been proposed, on the ground that he could not send his nuncios into a heretical country. His plan was for the negotiations to be managed by three representatives of the Holy See, who should be stationed respectively at Versailles, Vienna, and Madrid. This arrangement, which entirely ignored the Protestant powers, was, however, pleasing neither to Louis XIV nor to the Emperor; for the former expected to be supported by England, and the latter by the Dutch Republic and the Protestant princes of Germany. The proposals of the Pope were, therefore, rejected.

The desire of
the Papacy to
mediate

Offended on account of the disregard of his wishes by the Catholic sovereigns, Clement X had decided to take no part in the Congress; especially since Nymwegen, a Protestant town, had been designated as the place of meeting. But Clement X having died while the negotiations were in progress, Innocent XI — who was chosen Pope on September 21, 1676 — decided to pursue a different course, and appointed the papal nuncio at Vienna, Bevilacqua, to represent him at Nymwegen.

Although the papal nuncio displayed an impartial spirit, — which he carried so far as even to select his dwelling at a point equidistant between those of the French and the Spanish plenipotentiaries, — and visited and received with the same cordiality both Catholic and Protestant delegates, he was not able to overcome the prejudices of Louis XIV,

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who from the beginning resented his presence, as if it were directed against himself. In preparing the credentials of Bevilacqua the papal chancellery had used the expression "*utrumque regem*," thus placing the King of France and the King of Spain on the same level. Louis XIV considered this an offence to his dignity and complained of it as an insult.

The dispositions of the powers

The struggle in England between Charles II and the Parliament seriously complicated his functions as mediator, and nearly paralyzed his efforts to serve the interests of Louis XIV. To conduct the mediation at Nymwegen he had chosen Lord Berkeley, Sir William Temple, and Sir Leoline Jenkins,—the latter a "typical royalist," who had formerly served as Secretary of State. It was, however, upon Sir William Temple that the responsibility of the mission principally rested.

"Our counsels and our conduct," writes Sir William, speaking of the Congress, "resemble those floating islands which wind and sea chase hither and thither." Without effective organization, impeded by vexatious contentions regarding precedence and ceremony, like the Congress of Westphalia, the Congress of Nymwegen drifted on with small results. In the meantime the war was briskly waged on all sides, in the hope that a victory in the field would have its effect upon the councils of the various powers. But, in truth, the peace which finally emerged from the negotiations was not decided either by arms or by an appeal to definite principles of settlement; it was the work of the persistent diplomatic activity of Louis XIV, who controlled the proceedings of the Congress through the mediation of Charles II, and at the same time prosecuted his private negotiations with the separate powers with the purpose of making a good bargain with each of them.

The bond of union between the allies most difficult to sever was that which united the Emperor and Spain. Leopold I wished to effect a settlement on the basis of the Peace of Westphalia. His plenipotentiaries proposed that the King of France should restore to the Emperor and the

other allies all that had been taken from them, with indemnity for the damages they had suffered. Spain took for its base the Treaty of the Pyrenees. "His Most Catholic Majesty," ran the Spanish note, "demands the restitution of all that which has been taken from the kingdoms of Spain since 1655; all the ruins, demolitions, and conflagrations should be made good."

The Elector of Brandenburg and the King of Denmark wished to continue the war until the Swedes should be driven out of Germany. The Elector would thus keep and extend his conquests in Pomerania, and Christian V would claim the recovery of what had been taken from Denmark by Sweden through the Treaty of Copenhagen of 1660.

Since these powers were disposed to prolong the struggle until their objects were accomplished, it was necessary either (1) to accede to their demands, (2) continue the conflict, or (3) detach them one after another from the coalition.

There was at the Court of France a strong disposition to end the war, which had become a heavy burden. The people were murmuring under their load of taxation; deputies of Bordeaux, whose trade had been greatly injured, had secretly visited the Prince of Orange in the hope of peace; and in Brittany and Normandy discontent had reached the point of open revolt. Colbert's able administration of the finances had not been adequate to the growing needs of the war; and, while Louvois was urging its continuance, Colbert was pointing out the ruin that might follow from its longer duration.¹

Determined not to yield to the Hapsburg demands, and at the same time wishing to end the cost of the war, Louis XIV resolved first to win the friendship of the United Provinces

¹ From 1670 to 1679 the annual expenses of the kingdom had increased from 77 million to 128 million livres. The country had been impoverished by the war, and Colbert resorted to every expedient to increase the revenues. See Lavissee, *Histoire de France*, Tome VII, p. 377.

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The conflict
between the
States General
and William III

by his moderation, and then to deal with the other members of the coalition one by one.¹

For a time it seemed as if it would be impossible to make a separate peace with the Dutch Republic on account of the stout resistance of William III. When Colbert de Croissy opened this subject with Sir William Temple, the reply showed plainly that the Prince of Orange would oppose all plans to substitute private arrangements for a general peace. "As to the Prince," said Sir William, "his good faith and his loyalty are too well known to me to permit me to suppose that he would sacrifice the interests of the allies for advantages personal to himself." And when Sir William spoke of the subject directly to the Prince, his reply was, "It is necessary above everything else to satisfy Spain, and my particular interest will never prevail in a negotiation with which the future of Europe is intimately connected."

But legally the States General possessed the right to make peace and to declare war, and the Prince of Orange had not yet so firmly established his authority in the Republic as to bend that body entirely to his will. Even Fagel, the Grand Pensionary, who was devoted to the cause of the Prince, was convinced that, after such a long and trying struggle, peace was indispensable to the Republic; and he confided to Sir William Temple that it was inevitable, since there was "not a single person in Holland who was not in favor of it."

In July, 1677, as a result of the intrigues of the French agents at The Hague, the peace party, headed by the city of Amsterdam, was ready and eager to make a separate treaty with France. The Prince, however, remained unshaken in his position; but the tide was too strong for him to resist.

¹ The little consideration that Louis XIV had for the loss of life by continuing the war is shown in the following sentence of a letter to his ambassador, Courtin, written on July 3, 1677: "Whatever the loss of men which the continual action of arms may cause, I am always easily able to complete the troops which I oppose with so much success to my enemies." See Miguet, *Négociations*, etc., IV, p. 487.

The situation was now different from that which existed three years before, when William III had decided to hold aloof from English influence. The Coalition of The Hague was morally disintegrated, since the Republic, which had inspired it, was about to desert it. The Prince, therefore, decided to go to London and use his influence with Charles II.

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The marriage
of William III
and its effects

In the previous year the subject of the English marriage had been reopened by Sir William Temple, and William III had given it new consideration. He was now impressed with the idea that this union might have great advantages; and that, instead of subjecting himself to other influences by an English marriage, his own influence might perhaps dominate the situation. In June, 1677, therefore, one of the Prince's favorite chamberlains, Bentinck, was sent to London to prepare for his visit to England, which followed in October.

With a frankness and promptitude that astonished his uncles, William III urgently asked for the hand of Mary. The King and the Duke of York wished first to speak of international politics, and took the ground that peace should come first and marriage afterwards. But the Prince insisted upon the marriage as a preliminary to any discussion of affairs whatever; and on November 4, 1677, the marriage ceremony was performed.

Before the end of November William III had returned with his bride to Holland, but not without having proved his quality in England. Charles II and the Duke of York had proposed terms for a general peace which would be acceptable to Louis XIV and retain his good will toward the Stuart dynasty; but William III, aided by the King's first minister, Danby, who knew the temper of Parliament and wished to end the influence of the King of France over Charles II, recommended terms which it was certain would not be accepted without compulsion. In the end, however, a compromise was agreed to, according to which Louis XIV was to keep Franche-Comté, but to restore Lorraine to the son of Charles III, and all conquests in the Spanish Netherlands to Spain, except Maestricht, which was to be re-

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Louis XIV's
renewed
activity

turned to Holland. Seven "barrier" cities also were to be surrendered to Spain.

Charles II was of the opinion that Louis XIV would be content with this arrangement, and the Earl of Feversham was sent to France to submit these proposals; but, as the Prince had hoped and believed, they were promptly rejected.

This was a decided triumph for William III. Under the influence of Danby, who urged Charles II to resent the rebuff implied in the rejection of his proposals, on December 31, 1677, a treaty of alliance was concluded between England and Holland, for the purpose of enforcing peace on the terms previously proposed.¹ To give this new alliance effect, the English troops that had been in the service of France were recalled, and an army of twelve thousand soldiers and a fleet of thirty ships were ordered to be fitted out for the aid of the coalition.

Thus, in the course of a few months, Louis XIV found his royal protégé, under the influence of William III, not only dictating to him an unacceptable peace, but actually in alliance with Holland and apparently arming to attack him. What seemed worst of all, the King of England had summoned Parliament — which by previous agreement had been adjourned until the following April — to meet on January 28, 1678.²

Holding William of Orange responsible for the changed situation, Louis XIV now resolved that he would at any price make a separate peace with Holland. Taking advantage of the fears among the Dutch republicans that the matrimonial alliance of William III with the House of Stuart would too greatly increase the power of the stadtholder, he used every means to revive the republican party in Holland; and the strong desire for peace among the Dutch

¹ For the treaty, see Dumont, VII, Part I, p. 341 et seq.

² In December, 1677, Charles II had accepted two million livres after long bargaining as the price of his promise, at the same time reproaching the King of France with risking nothing but his money, while he was risking his crown "in opposing the universal desire of his subjects." See Mignet, *Négociations*, etc., IV, p. 499.

burghers, combined with the intrigues of the French agitators, finally determined the States General, in opposition to the wishes of the stadtholder, to conclude a separate peace. To force the issue, Louis XIV announced that, unless an agreement were reached before August 10, hostilities would be resumed. The negotiations suddenly displayed new life; but on August 9, when the Dutch were disposed to conclude a treaty, the French plenipotentiaries insisted upon two new requirements: (1) that Holland should cause the conquests made from Sweden by Denmark to be immediately restored; and (2) that the Republic should send an embassy to Louis XIV to compliment him on the conclusion of the peace.

On the morning of August 10, 1678, while the allies were rejoicing that the negotiations had been broken off and the negotiators were preparing for their departure, D'Estades, Colbert de Croissy, and D'Avaux visited the Dutch delegation, and complained that the obstinacy of its members was preventing peace. Beverningk objected that the last requirements could not be conceded. "You hold then only to that? and, that obstruction removed, you are willing at once to sign a peace?" "Yes," replied the Dutch delegates; and within five hours, at a single sitting, the treaty was finished and the separate peace was signed.¹

The Prince of Orange, considering that it was dishonorable to abandon the allies, continued fighting after the treaty was signed, apparently in the hope that it would not be ratified at The Hague,²—yet the treaty was in substance a complete triumph for the Republic. By its terms France restored to Holland all that had been conquered, including Maestricht; the King promised to return to the Prince of Orange all his estates, which he had appropriated; a favorable treaty of commerce was concluded; the *droit*

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The separate
peace between
France and
Holland

¹ For the treaty, see Dumont, VII, Part I, p. 350 et seq.

² In a letter of August 15 to Fagel, William III declared that it was only on that day that he had heard that the peace was signed. He had, however, already learned that it would be signed.

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d'aubaine was abolished; and full liberty of trade was accorded to the Dutch ships, even with the enemies of France.

But, from another point of view, the treaty was also a triumph for the King of France. He had by the long war inflicted a heavy punishment on the Republic for its part in the Triple Alliance, and by the separate peace he had begun the dissolution of the coalition. Besides, the new treaty of peace with France rendered nugatory the Anglo-Dutch alliance for the enforcement of a peace with Spain and the Emperor. He was now free to deal with each of them in the manner most advantageous to himself.

But Louis XIV had not trusted to this separate peace alone to repair his relations with England. Uncertain whether he could ultimately depend upon Charles II, he had adopted new tactics with him. Through Barillon, his new ambassador in London, he had offered Charles II two hundred thousand pounds sterling, and had consented to cede to Spain three of the seven barrier cities, if the King would prorogue Parliament. When, however, through the opposition of Danby, this offer was declined, he had provided the ambassador with funds to induce Parliament to refuse to vote money for the war, on the plea that the King did not really mean to prosecute it, but was intending to employ the money in raising troops for the restoration of Catholicism and the suppression of Protestantism in England.

Louis XIV's
double rôle in
England

The hostile relations of the King and the Parliament had rendered easy the secret control of England in the matter of neutrality. So long as the King was able and willing to carry out his private engagements with Louis XIV, the King of France was ready to pay him for his complicity; but, the moment he failed in this, he found it not difficult to alarm the Parliament regarding the purposes of the King — who was more than suspected of treasonable intentions — and thus to cut off his supplies of men and money.

Although public opinion in England was in favor of a Dutch alliance and a war with France, the King did not enjoy sufficient public confidence to obtain a favorable response to his demands. To his announcement that, "in

accordance with the wishes of the country," he had made an alliance with the Dutch Republic, in order to defend Flanders from falling to Louis XIV, the House of Commons had replied, that he must begin by insisting upon the reduction of the French conquests to a point which would restore the conditions which existed at the Peace of the Pyrenees.

As Charles II had no intention of going so far as this, and was merely aiming to increase his supplies of money either from the Parliament or from Louis XIV, he was greatly irritated at this venture of the Parliament to control his foreign policy, and decided to resume his pecuniary relations with his royal patron of France. Accordingly, Montagu, the English ambassador at Versailles, was instructed to offer, for six million livres yearly, to be paid for three years, the renewed support of England in bringing the coalition to terms; but Louis XIV, who perfectly understood why the offer was made, and knew the inability of Charles II to do what he proposed, considered the bribe too high and declined to pay it. At a later time, when Parliament in its urgency for immediate intervention seemed to be beyond his secret control, Louis XIV decided as a last resort to comply with the demands of Charles II; but, although a new private treaty to this effect had been drawn up on May 17, 1678, the separate peace of France with the Republic in August rendered its execution unnecessary to Louis XIV; and, there being no service rendered, the money was never paid. Finally, the Parliament, fearing that the unpaid troops the King had already raised might be used by him against the Protestants, voted the sum necessary to pay them off, on the condition that they be at once disbanded; and thus war with France was finally averted.¹

¹ On account of his hostility to Danby, — the minister of Charles II who wrote the letter of March 25, 1678, instructing Montagu to demand money of Louis XIV, — the ambassador revealed to Parliament the whole transaction, which reflected on the King and caused Danby's fall.

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The dissolution
of the
coalition

The Anglo-Dutch menace being now practically removed, Louis XIV next turned his attention to a peace with Spain. In the preceding April he had drawn up in his negotiations with Holland a list of demands and concessions.¹ It embodied what he considered indispensable to the defence of France. It is true that, when the war was begun, France was not threatened; but now that it was to be closed, it was not unreasonable, and not without advantage to the peace of Europe, that the frontiers of France should be fixed at such a remove from the capital as to increase the safety of the kingdom from invasion.

To Spain, however, the new exactions, which threw upon that monarchy the whole burden of loss occasioned by the war, while the Dutch Republic came out of it without losing any territory, seemed insupportable. Exhausted, and almost ruined, as the country was, Spain was indisposed to make the required sacrifice.²

At The Hague, both William III and Sir William Temple were active in postponing the ratification of the treaty of August 10; and the difficulties of effecting a reconciliation between France and Spain were put forward as an excuse for delay. The Spanish ambassador, De Lira, urged that Spain could not possibly give up Bouvines and Beaumont, and implored the States General to aid in obtaining their release. The mediation thus undertaken proved successful, and on September 17, 1678, a treaty of peace was signed at Nymwegen by the French and Spanish plenipotentiaries, by which the King of France returned to Spain nine places, — including Charleroi, Ghent, and Limburg, — but kept Franche-Comté, Valenciennes, Cambrai, Condé, Bouchain, Aire, Saint-Omer, Cassel, Ypres, Mauberge and other towns, thus considerably extending the frontiers of France.

¹ For details, see Lonchay, *La rivalité de la France et de l'Espagne aux Pays-Bas*, pp. 286, 287.

² The relations between the French and the Spanish ambassadors at The Hague had become so strained that, on August 2, 1678, the people of the French embassy were attacked with pistols by those of the Spanish embassy; and two Frenchmen were wounded.

Spain having been thus separated from the coalition, on February 5, 1679, the Emperor also abandoned it. The Treaty of Münster was renewed; Freiburg in the Breisgau was ceded to France; Philipsburg having fallen into the hands of the Imperials, the previous right of the French to garrison it was renounced; and the Duchy of Lorraine was to be restored to the young duke, Charles IV; but, on account of his refusal to accept the conditions, this last stipulation did not become effective.

Separate treaties were soon negotiated with the Dukes of Brunswick also, at Zell, on February 5, 1679, and with the Bishop of Münster, at Nymwegen, on March 29, 1679, by which their portions of the conquests from the Swedes in Bremen and Verden were restored to Sweden.

For a time it appeared as if the Elector of Brandenburg would be the favorite of fortune in the war. He had not only expelled the Swedes entirely from Western Pomerania; but when, in December, 1678, Charles XI invaded the Duchy of Prussia and proposed to restore it to Poland, the Elector, hastening to the rescue on the ice of the Frisches Haff, nearly annihilated the Swedish army, and in the following February drove the remnant of it into Livonia.

The disappointment of Brandenburg

Abandoned by the Emperor, who had made his peace with Louis XIV without recognizing his obligations to his ally, Frederick William, elated with his victories, determined not merely to retain his conquests but to punish the Emperor for deserting him, and seized the occasion to revive and assert the ancient claims of the Hohenzollerns to a good part of Silesia.¹

But permanent victory does not consist merely in winning battles. A triumphant conqueror in the field, Frederick William was vanquished at Nymwegen. His plenipotentiaries at the Congress, William von Blaspel and Christopher von Somnitz,² had been instructed to insist on Brandenburg being considered not merely as a member of the Empire but

¹ For the nature of these claims, see Himly, *Histoire de la formation territoriale des États de l'Europe centrale*, II, pp. 49, 50.

² A part of the time Otto von Schwerin.

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as a belligerent power on its own account, and as such demanding "satisfaction" in the form of the cession of Pomerania and the complete exclusion of Sweden from Germany. This, the Elector contended, was necessary both for the security of Brandenburg and for the peace of the Empire.

In March, 1679, however, after all the strenuous efforts of his representatives at Nymwegen and the ineffectual importunities of Schwerin with Charles II at London to intervene in behalf of Brandenburg, Frederick William found himself isolated, with no friend in Europe except the King of Denmark. The situation was rendered more embarrassing by the fact that, even before the separate peace between France and Holland, the Elector's minister, Meinders, had been furnished with elaborate instructions for privately negotiating a peace between Brandenburg and France; which made it impossible for Frederick William to justify his loud and bitter complaints of desertion by his allies.

It is needless to follow the long and sinuous course of the negotiations for peace with France. Louis XIV, whom Frederick William had so many times deceived, was resolved this time to inflict upon him a humiliation and a punishment that would be deeply felt. The Rhenish provinces of Brandenburg were at his mercy, and it hardly needed a military menace to bring the Elector to terms. Accordingly, on June 29, 1679, at Saint-Germain-en-Laye, a treaty of peace was signed by the Elector with France and Sweden, by which the Treaties of Westphalia were recognized as "the most solid and most assured foundation of the tranquillity of the Empire"; and Brandenburg restored to Sweden all the conquests in Pomerania, with a slight rectification of the frontier.¹

On October 12, at Nymwegen, the Swedes made peace with Holland also, and on November 27, at Fontainebleau, Denmark concluded a treaty by which Wismar and the island of Rügen were restored to Sweden.

On November 15 was concluded at Saint-Germain-en-

¹ For the treaty, see Dumont, VII, Part I, p. 408.

Laye a new treaty of alliance with Saxony, by which another elector was added to the influence of Louis XIV.

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This general pacification, which in its totality is known as the "Peace of Nymwegen," was a bitter disappointment to Frederick William and Christian V of Denmark, whose brilliant military exploits were made entirely unavailing through the dissolution of the coalition without their obtaining "satisfaction" from Sweden. On the other hand, Louis XIV seemed for the moment to have won the firm allegiance of his Swedish ally by insisting upon the return of the conquered provinces. As for the Emperor, if he made no gains he at least suffered no great loss, except the diminished prestige of having waged war without important results.

Results of the
Peace of
Nymwegen

The one clear inference from the terms of the Peace of Nymwegen was that Louis XIV had no one to fear. He had not only accomplished practically all that he intended at that time, but he had prepared for free action in the future. He had shown his moderation — one might say almost his generosity — in his treatment of Holland, which had come out of the war not only without the loss of territory but with a highly advantageous treaty of commerce. He had demonstrated his military power in resisting single-handed a European coalition in a war fought entirely on foreign soil. He had displayed his diplomatic skill in promptly dissolving the coalition which he had successfully opposed in the field, and in dictating his own terms to every one of the allies. He had besides this considerably increased the territories and strengthened the frontiers of France at the expense of Spain, which was compelled to yield to all of his demands. The Peace of Nymwegen was, therefore, from every point of view a triumph for Louis XIV; but it was not of a nature to give tranquillity to Europe, and contained the seeds of future strife. The King of France had not negotiated as an equal, but as a master.¹

¹ The negotiations of the Peace of Nymwegen are recorded in full in the series of *Mémoires et Documents*, in the Archives des Affaires

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The new pre-
tensions of
Louis XIV

But the triumph of Louis XIV did not end with the signature of the treaties. He had discovered a way to make new conquests in a time of peace. As a memorial of his achievements and a prelude to his further pretensions, he caused a medal to be made at Paris which bore the inscription: "*Pace in leges suas confecta*"—"Peace made in accordance with his own laws."

Like the Emperor Frederick I in 1158 at the Diet of Roncaglia,¹ and Philip IV of France in expropriating the English possessions in Guyenne,² Louis XIV laid claim in the name of the law to that which he had, through the subtle phraseology of the treaties, acquired indirectly by the sword.

The French jurists were now set to work to discover what rights had been conveyed to France by such expressions in the treaties as "*leurs bailliages, chastellenies, gouvernances, prevostez, territoires, domaines, seigneuries, appartenances, dependances, et annexes,*"—which included everything possessed, or to which there was an ancient claim, by any of the cities or overlordships that had come under his dominion, "by whatever name they might be called."

The first indication of this procedure grew out of the trouble with Spain, in December, 1679, over the title "Duke of Burgundy" employed in the full powers of the Spanish plenipotentiary, Baron de Christin. The French councillors Pelletier and De Worden refused to accept his credentials, on the ground that this title did not belong to the King of Spain. In the Spanish reply of May, 1680, a modification of the full powers was refused. Louis XIV then announced that if by the following July 15—afterward extended to September 15—the title was not renounced, he would "take possession of all that he believed belonged to him by virtue of the Treaty of Nymwegen." The King of Spain under this pressure renounced the title of Duke of Burgundy; but the military executions previously ordered

Étrangères at Paris. A good general *résumé* may be found in Vast, *Les grands traités*, II, pp. 23, 46.

¹ See Volume I of this work, pp. 287, 289.

² See Volume II of this work, pp. 4, 5.

were not countermanded, and French soldiers proceeded to occupy some twenty-odd places, which rendered the King of France practically master of the entire Duchy of Luxemburg.

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In order to give a form of legality to this novel procedure in the interpretation of treaties, Colbert de Croissy instituted a judicial examination of the titles acquired by France through the treaties with Spain and the Emperor, including the disputed territories which had been comprised in the Treaty of Münster at the Peace of Westphalia. In taking this course Louis XIV was not entirely without justification, since the Empire had itself raised questions of interpretation, based on certain ambiguities of the text, in the case of the cessions in Alsace; the Germans contending that the feudal and imperial privileges of certain cities and princes under the Empire still belonged to the Empire and were not absorbed by the cession of these territories in the sovereignty of the King of France, while the French jurists maintained that not only were these privileges entirely transferred to the sovereignty of the King, but also all the dependencies of every kind of which these cities and princes were the suzerains.

The *Chambres de Réunion*

To settle these points, Louis XIV organized the celebrated *Chambres de Réunion*, — one at Metz in 1679, the other at Breisach in 1680. The duty of these chambers was to examine into the fiefs in Alsace and in the three Bishoprics of Verdun, Metz, and Toul which might thus be claimed by the King of France as ultimate possessor of all the feudal rights of his subjects. The Parliament of Besançon also was charged with similar duties for Franche-Comté.

Thus by the application of the principles of feudal law as understood by his own jurists, in a period of peace, Louis XIV adjudged to himself, and afterward occupied by force wherever there was resistance, some eighty fiefs which were not, it was held, intended to be included in the cessions.

The policy of the *réunions*, while professing to be legal,

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gave no opportunity for legal defence on the part of those who were dispossessed. The avidity with which the procedure was conducted and the remorseless cruelty with which the decrees were executed soon completely destroyed the confidence in the good faith of the King which had been inspired by his comparative moderation in negotiating the treaties. Not only the cities and princes whose prerogatives were thus absorbed by the sovereign, but all the countries of Europe were astonished if not enraged by this summary procedure. It was undoubtedly one of the greatest errors of the Grand Monarch's reign.

The reversal
of relations in
the North

As regards the technical legality of the *réunions*, opinions have differed widely; and it is no part of our purpose to discuss it here. But practically and historically the benefits to France were more than overbalanced by the bitter hostility to Louis XIV which this course created. The worst mistake of all, perhaps, was the annexation of the Duchy of Zweibrücken, which was then claimed through inheritance by the King of Sweden. Louis XIV coolly informed his faithful ally, Charles XI, that he must do homage to him as suzerain for Zweibrücken, or the duchy would be united directly with the crown of France. The King of Sweden of course refused, and Louis XIV, as a consequence, lost the good will of the only ally who had remained faithful to him throughout his war with the Coalition of The Hague.

It is true that at this time Frederick William had returned to his alliance with Louis XIV, from whom he was again receiving a subsidy of ten thousand livres per annum, and had pledged his vote as Elector to the King of France in case of a vacancy in the Empire;¹ but the alliance was, as it had always been, in reality an enforced relation; for the Elector had great need of the French subsidies, and entertained the hope that the detachment of Sweden from France might render Louis XIV less disposed to sustain the Swedish cause in Germany.

¹ See the treaty of October 25, 1679, in Moerner, *Staatsverträge*, pp. 704, 708.

And yet, even for such equivocal friendship as Frederick William showed to France Louis XIV was willing to pay the price so welcome to the empty pockets of Brandenburg. In the four years from 1680 to 1684, the French envoy Rébenac disbursed in presents alone a hundred and sixty thousand livres, of which forty-seven thousand went to Meinders, the Elector's Secretary of State, and thirty-two thousand to Paul Fuchs, an influential privy councillor. The wife of the Elector, Dorothea, was loaded with presents, and promised to cultivate the "perfect friendship" of her husband with the King of France. Even the Elector himself was not forgotten, and at one time he received as an "exceptional present" the sum of one hundred thousand livres.¹

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Notwithstanding all these evidences of personal favor, Frederick William, who was German to the core, winced under the encroachments upon the Empire occasioned by the *réunions*; but when Rébenac pointed out that these were merely the legal consequences of the Treaties of Nymwegen, the Elector, who deeply resented the desertion of himself by the Emperor in his separate peace with France, was inclined to consider them as judgments visited upon the Empire for which he was not responsible. With this feeling, on January 11, 1681, he gave his practical sanction to the *réunions* by signing a new treaty with Louis XIV in which he promised his aid to France without reserve.

The capture of Strasburg in a time of peace, however, deeply touched the pride and affections of Frederick William; but the annexation of Zweibrücken was welcome to him, and served to hold in check his feelings of resentment. Believing that he would now have an opportunity to chase the Swedes out of Germany with French approval, on January 22, 1682, he signed still another treaty with France, in which Louis XIV promised to end his aggressions upon the Empire with the appropriation of Strasburg, at the same time increasing his annual subsidy to four hundred thousand livres, while the Elector on his part agreed to

¹ For details, see Waddington, *Le Grand Electeur*, II, pp. 468, 469.
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The diplomatic
paralysis of
Europe

sanction all the results of the *réunions* that had been so far accomplished.¹

Unfortunately for the repose of Europe, the Peace of Westphalia had left the fate of Strasburg and the ten imperial cities quite uncertain; for, although Upper and Lower Alsace and the Sundgau, with the "prefecture" of the ten cities had been ceded in full sovereignty by the Treaty of Münster, the eighty-seventh article of that treaty had introduced a qualification that enveloped the cession in a veil of obscurity. Mazarin had left the question unsettled, and in the early part of his reign Louis XIV himself had treated the city of Strasburg as an independent city-republic under the protection of France.

Since the Treaty of Nymwegen, however, Louis XIV considered the discussion regarding the meaning of the Treaty of Münster as permanently closed; for, although restitution of the Alsatian cities had been urged by the Emperor's plenipotentiaries, their claims had been rejected.² At all events, Strasburg having through the astute audacity of Louvois, on September 30, 1681, capitulated, he enjoyed the advantage of full possession.

The Emperor having shown his inability to protect the Empire, the Elector of Mainz had suggested that "a new emperor" was necessary; and the proposal was put forth that, as a preliminary, the Dauphin be at once chosen King of the Romans, with the understanding that Alsace be restored to the Empire, and that a united effort be made to expel the Turks from Europe.

Leopold I, at last alive to the peril of his dynasty, was in the meantime earnestly endeavoring to reconcile the Hungarians by treating them with greater liberality, and to maintain peace with the Turks; but Louis XIV, determined to keep him preoccupied in the East, had brought

¹ For the treaty, see Moerner, *Staatsverträge*, p. 715 et seq.

² For the terms proposed and refused regarding the question of Alsace at Nymwegen, see Dumont, VII, Part I, p. 382; also Vast, *Les grands traités*, note to p. 117; and the full discussion by Legrelle, *Louis XIV et Strasbourg*.

his impalpable and mysterious influence over the Oriental enemies of the Empire to the height of its efficiency. Tekeli, the chief of the Hungarian rebels, was receiving subsidies from France, and the Grand Vizier, Kara-Mustapha, was started on the road to Vienna.

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Contemplating still further inroads upon both the Empire and the Spanish Netherlands, Louis XIV was desirous of securing at least the neutrality, and if possible the support, of the United Provinces; but the hostility of William III seemed to be unconquerable. Unable to destroy the influence of the stadtholder by sowing the seeds of opposition among the remnants of the De Witt administration, and accustomed to the bribery of sovereigns, the King resolved to obtain the Prince's favor by secret purchase.

The effort of
Louis XIV to
win the Prince
of Orange

Count D'Avaux, who knew the character of William III, was convinced beforehand of the uselessness of such an undertaking; but, in obedience to the commands of his royal master, he ventured to approach the Grand Pensionary Fagel with an offer of two million livres, if he could dispose the Prince to unite with France; proposing as an inducement to the Prince the title of Count of Holland, the rank of generalissimo in the French army, and several millions in cash.

Fagel, amazed at this audacity, repelled the offer with indignation, and declined to offend the Prince by even addressing him upon the subject. Incapable of comprehending how any one could spurn his "generosity," Louis XIV next resolved to accomplish his end by the use of compulsion.

The Principality of Orange, a small enclave in the heart of France, which gave the title of "Prince" to its sovereign rulers, the Counts of Nassau, had long been an asylum for French adherents of the Calvinistic faith, and especially since the guarantees accorded them by the Edict of Nantes had been so openly and violently disregarded. In order to constrain the Prince, the King decreed first that French students should no longer be permitted to attend the Calvinist College; then that all French subjects within the limits

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Vienna

of the principality must leave its territory; then that its walls and fortifications be destroyed; and finally, in 1682, he appropriated it altogether.

Although Holland was not in a position to aid the Emperor in the defence of his capital against the attack of the Turks, the Prince of Orange and the States General urged him to make terms with Tekeli; for they realized how powerless Europe was to resist the aggressions of Louis XIV so long as the whole force of the Empire was directed toward the East. In May, 1683, the Sultan's army was at Belgrade, and on July 17 began the siege of Vienna. Resistance to French aggressions on the Rhine was for the moment impossible.

While the Pope was straining every nerve to encourage activity against the Infidel in Poland, the French diplomats were using all their powers of dissuasion; but Sobieski had passed completely from under French influence and took pleasure in showing his independence. As an elective king, he had been refused the honor of the title "Majesty," and had been forced to content himself with the lower rank of "Serene Highness"; and the Queen of Poland, who had planned a triumphant visit to her native France, having been informed that, not being an equal, she would not be accorded the hand of the Queen, had abandoned her journey. Urged on by the Pope, Poland plunged actively into the fray under the energetic leadership of Sobieski; and most of the princes of the Empire, both Protestant and Catholic, with the conspicuous exception of the Elector of Brandenburg, offered aid. But Louis XIV forbade his subjects to join in the struggle against the Turks, resumed the work of the *réunions*, and assembled an army in Alsace. In September, 1683, when the danger at Vienna was at its height, he again invaded the Spanish Netherlands with thirty-five thousand men.¹

¹ While Vienna was besieged, Louis XIV was preparing, in case it fell, to assert himself as the saviour of the Empire, and thus establish his complete predominance. For this purpose, says Voltaire, "He had an army on the frontiers of the Empire ready to defend it against the

Too proud, even in a state of debility and prostration, to submit without resistance to the process of vivisection so exasperatingly carried on by the *réunions*, Spain, which under the influence of Don John had been vainly seeking the friendship of France, resolved to declare war.

On September 12, 1683, the united armies of Germany and Poland defeated the Turks. Vienna was saved and the pursuit of the invaders began. But the conflict between Spain and France, begun on December 11, came too quickly for the Empire to render assistance.

The renewal
of war with
Spain

Aid was sought by Spain at every court in Europe, but none was prepared to offer effective intervention. Leopold I had, in 1682, negotiated with Sweden,¹ with Holland,² and even with England for a new alliance against Louis XIV, and William of Orange had done all in his power to revive the coalition; but the Prince was still embarrassed by the republican traditions, and was rendered powerless to act by the peaceful inclinations of the rich traders and shipowners, no longer distrustful of the monarch who had in the Peace of Nymwegen treated them with unexpected moderation and restored their commercial privileges.

In England Charles II was still the pensioner of Louis XIV, and so entirely at odds with the Parliament that both were incapable of effective action.

In vain was help implored by Spain. All the powers proved unresponsive, and resistance only increased the suffering of the beleaguered towns, subjected to a merciless bombardment in which women and children perished by hundreds in their homes. Of the six hundred houses which composed the city of Luxemburg, seventy-seven were entirely destroyed by fire, ninety-seven were left in complete ruins, one hundred and seventy-three were partly demolished, and ninety-five were found roofless when the city, on June 4, 1684, capitulated.

Turks whom his previous negotiations had brought there." — *Siècle de Louis XIV*, p. 234.

¹ See Dumont, VII, Part II, p. 37.

² See Dumont, VII, Part II, p. 19.

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The Truce of
Regensburg

Under the influence of William of Orange, Holland finally proposed a diplomatic inquiry; and in June, 1684, a conference was held at The Hague to discuss the pretensions of Louis XIV. The threat of the Spanish ambassador, the Marquis de Moncayo, to abandon the Spanish Netherlands to France revived for a time the fears of the Hollanders, who dreaded the complete loss of equilibrium in Europe, in which they had found their safety; but, once more, Louis XIV outwitted the powers by treating separately with the States General. By a treaty signed at The Hague on June 29, 1684, France was allowed to retain Luxemburg, Chimai, Beaumont, and Bouvines, restoring to Spain only Dixmund and Courtrai,¹ with the promise of a truce of twenty years, which the States General agreed to enforce upon the King of Spain.²

In the meantime Louis XIV had offered a similar truce of twenty years to the Empire also. At the Imperial Diet held at Regensburg, with the aid of his German allies and the persuasion of the French ambassador, Verjus de Crécy, — who was liberal in subsidies and prodigal in assurances, — all the pretensions of the King of France were recognized, and on August 15, 1684, the truce was signed. It left France in possession of Strasburg with full sovereignty, and in peaceable occupation of all the cities and seigneuries awarded to the King by his *Chambres de Réunion*.³ Spain, which had authorized Leopold I to negotiate in her behalf at Regensburg, soon afterward accepted the conditions recommended by the Emperor; and thus was completed the diplomatic triumph of "Louis le Grand" — as the municipality of Paris had entitled the King — by the Truce of Regensburg, which was the crown and conclusion of the Treaties of Nymwegen.

¹ For the seizures of territory in the Spanish Netherlands through the *réunions*, see Lonchay, *La rivalité de la France et de l'Espagne aux Pays-Bas*, p. 297 et seq.

² For the treaty, see Dumont, VII, Part II, p. 79 et seq.

³ For the text, see Dumont, VII, Part II, p. 81 et seq.

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1789, Munich, 1905, containing exhaustive bibliography; Michels, *Zur Vorgeschichte von Ludwigs XIV Einfall in Holland*, Halle, 1900; Sirtema de Grovestins, *Guillaume III et Louis XIV: histoire des luttes et rivalités politiques entre les puissances maritimes et la France*, Paris, 1868.

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CHAPTER III

THE FORMATION OF THE GRAND ALLIANCE

The broader
ambitions of
Louis XIV

THE outlook of Louis XIV for a vast extension of personal power in Europe was never so brilliant as in the years immediately following the Peace of Nymwegen. In the long duel between Bourbons and Hapsburgs the advantage of the kings of France had never been so great. The larger part of the great heritage of Charles the Bold had now passed from the House of Hapsburg, and the last war had shown that Louis XIV was capable of resisting the combined power of the two branches of that dynasty. Three great fields of conquest now seemed to offer to the vision of the triumphant king the glory of increased dominion.

Of these the first was the dream of the Spanish succession. Charles II, King of Spain, — who had lived on his nurses until he was five years old, and was such an imperfect sketch of a human being that he was not expected to outlive his prolonged infancy, — had in defiance of all expectation reached a marriageable age, and immediately after the Peace of Nymwegen had married Marie-Louise of Orléans, a niece of the King of France; but six unfruitful years had practically proved the marital incapacity of the King, and left the question of succession always open.

Notwithstanding the ancient theory of "natural limits," which assigned to the Kingdom of France all the territory between the Pyrenees, the Alps, and the Rhine, those limits had never been fully reached. Pursuant to the policy of Richelieu and Mazarin, — the classic standard of French diplomacy, — even should the dream of the Spanish succession come true, there might be still further territorial acquisitions from the Empire. The complete appropriation

of Alsace by the *réunions* and the recent capitulation of Strasburg were long steps in this direction, but further encroachments upon the Empire would still be necessary for the rounding out of the kingdom if the aspiration for a reunited Gaul was to be fully satisfied.¹

But the "natural limits" of France in the direction of the Empire were not the boundaries of Louis XIV's ambition. If Leopold I should die, what was to prevent the election of the King of France to the throne of the Caesars? And even if Leopold continued to live, what was there to hinder the election of the Dauphin as "King of the Romans"?

It is true that, to appease the Germans, Aubréy had been sent for a short time to the Bastille for writing his book on "*Les Justes Prétentions du Roi sur l'Empire*" in which he vindicated the historic claims of Louis XIV to the crown of the Empire. But this was merely because the publication was considered untimely and impolitic; and Bossuet, with entire approval, in 1685, in his funeral oration on Le Tellier, did not hesitate to refer to Louis XIV as "*ce nouveau Constantin*" and "*ce nouveau Charlemagne*." Nor were these expressions mere figures of rhetoric employed by a court preacher for the purpose of flattering the vanity of a sovereign. Directly after the Peace of Nymwegen the King had secretly negotiated with three Electors at once for the control of their votes, in case the imperial throne should become vacant; and at one time he seemed to have all the suffrages in hand except that of Bohemia.²

But it was not in Germany alone that he intended to become a new Charlemagne. He had already displayed his power at Rome; and, outside of the Papacy, Italy presented no formidable obstacle to his domination. The Venetians had become mere observers of the political drama of Europe. The Spanish possessions in Italy were as helpless as were those in the Netherlands. The Dukes of Modena, Mantua, and Savoy were counted and treated as "mere valets of a powerful master." Of the two keys of Northern Italy,

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¹ See Volume I of this work, p. 601.

² See Vast, *Revue Historique*, LXV, p. 23 et seq.

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Pinerolo and Casale, the former had been in the possession of the French since 1631, and the latter, to the surprise of Europe, had been occupied by French troops in 1681.¹

Thus far, with the exception of the attempt to crush Holland, the policy of Louis XIV had been, in the main, in some sense a national policy. He had aimed to extend and to strengthen the frontiers of France, and this was the continuation of the system of Richelieu and Mazarin. But after the Peace of Nymwegen, a new period opens in the history of France and of Europe; for the broader designs of the King, hitherto concealed, were now becoming manifest. Not content with the security of France, he was now thinking of winning for himself other kingdoms, and even dreaming of imperial dominion. "All-powerful in the Mediterranean, heir of the Crown of Spain, holding England at his discretion, he believed he had succeeded in infeodating Germany. Emperor and King, he would have governed directly the half of Europe. . . . He would have become the sovereign arbitrator of all quarrels, the judge of crowned heads, the providence of peoples, the pacificator of the world."²

I. THE REVIVAL OF THE COUNTER-REFORMATION

Louis XIV's
championship
of religious
unity

It is interesting to note with what unanimity great monarchs have sought support for their political aspirations in the realm of religion. Nearly all of the great organizers of empire have become the apostles of some form of religious faith, to which they have sought to make the rest of the world

¹ Casale was occupied on the same day as the capitulation of Strasbourg, and the incident gave to the power of Louis XIV an appearance of omnipresence that frightened Italy as the *réunions* had frightened the Empire. The negotiations for this citadel had been conducted with the dissipated Duke of Mantua, Charles III, to whom it belonged, through Count Mattioli, who sold the secret to the Spaniards. The occupation was, however, afterward forced on the Duke of Mantua, and Mattioli strangely disappeared. He is supposed to be the "*Man with the Iron Mask*," the mysterious prisoner who died in the Bastille in 1703. See Funck-Brentano, *L'homme au masque de velours noir dit le masque de fer*, Paris, 1894.

² Vast, *Revue Historique*, LXV, p. 44.

conform. So far as their personal lives were concerned, neither Constantine nor Charlemagne was a very consistent Christian, but they were strenuous champions of religion, and found advantage in its unity. It is true also that this championship assumed a new intensity, and even a new ferocity, at the moment when they realized that the conquest of nations was greatly facilitated by a previous conquest of souls.

For nearly a century the Edict of Nantes, which had made an end of the internal religious wars of France by securing toleration to the Huguenots and opening to them on equal terms all offices in the State, had stood as a monument to the wisdom of Henry IV. The austerity of life habitual among the Calvinists and the increasing worldliness of the Court had practically kept them in the background, and so far as the peace of France was concerned there was no new reason for opposing them.

But for the King a new motive for crushing out heresy had come into being. If he wished to renew the glories of the reign of Charlemagne, it would be necessary to discover some form of human interest more universal than merely personal devotion to which appeal might be made. Like other imperial rulers, he perceived that, in order to dominate Europe, he must become the champion of religious unity.

In 1681, in the midst of the *réunions*, Louis XIV suddenly commanded the Court to be religious; and, forthwith, every courtier became a missionary. The intendants in the provinces occupied by Huguenots were instructed to make "converts," not of the ungodly but of the Calvinists, and immense zeal was displayed in the work of "conversion." From the moment it was understood that piety was esteemed at Court, and that blasphemy, libertinage, and indifference would obstruct preferment, religion suddenly became the fashion. Not being adepts in theological argument, the intendants resorted to more palpable forms of persuasion and invented the *dragonnades*. Priests and soldiers were quartered in pairs in the houses of the Huguenots; the former to show

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The hostility
of Louis XIV
to the Pope

them the way of life, and the latter to supply sufficient motives for pursuing it.

If Louis XIV could not tolerate any authority but his own within the State, it was even harder to accept the existence of a superior power outside of it. Throughout the whole of his reign he had been at variance with every occupant of the Holy See. During the persecution of the Huguenots, up to the moment of the total suppression of their rights in France, the Pope had never been consulted. When at last his judgment was expressed, Innocent XI declared that the methods adopted were against the true interest of the Roman Catholic Church.¹

Apparently more Catholic than the Pope, the King was nevertheless perpetually at war with Rome. The reason for this anomaly is obvious. He regarded himself as the head of the Church in France. The truth is, Louis XIV was not a Roman Catholic in the ordinary sense; but an advocate of the independent rights of national churches, presided over in each case by the ruling monarch. For him religion was an appanage of royalty.

When, in 1677, the papal nuncio, by direction of Innocent XI, urged Louis XIV to request the Kings of England and Sweden to mollify the laws concerning Catholicism in their kingdoms, he declined to take any action, on the ground that the King, "as their master," had a right "to impose on his subjects whatever laws were pleasing to him."²

The nature and education of Louis XIV completely unfitted him for any form of obedience. He had no sense of the sacredness of obligations, whether in law, religion, or morals. It seems never to have occurred to his mind that the Edict of Nantes was a solemn compact, expressly declaring itself to be "perpetual," which he himself had sworn to observe. His inordinate personal vanity and egoism beclouded and

¹ "Le pape ne reçoit pas fort bien les nouvelles de toutes les conversions qui se font en France, et a même dit qu'on se relevait d'une erreur pour retomber dans une autre."—Gérin, *Recherches*, p. 319.

² The King to the Duke d'Estrées, January 8, 1677, Archives des Affaires Étrangères, "Rome," vol. 250.

distorted every human relation. He never considered himself bound by a treaty, and in his "Mémoires" he assures his son that "treaties" have no more serious significance than "compliments"! His conduct was as contradictory as his principles were arbitrary. Exterminating Calvinism at home, he promoted it in Hungary; holding that kings rule by divine right, he nevertheless encouraged their subjects to revolt against them; establishing Catholicism in France as the sole form of tolerated faith, he conspired with the Sultan to wage a murderous war with Christendom; and having failed to accomplish his purposes by bribing the King of England, he rendered him impotent by bribing Parliament.

Had Louis XIV been capable of seriously considering any large human interest beyond art and literature, — which he encouraged because they reflected glory upon his reign, — Europe might have entered upon an era of legal and religious development that would have changed the course of all subsequent history. It was at this time that the philosopher Leibnitz, whose great intellect had grasped the need of applying reason to the problems of existence, was engaged in forming a plan for reconciling and reuniting the Catholic and Protestant princes of Germany by a larger spirit of toleration and the recognition of fundamental truths that were held in common. Innocent XI, who earnestly and sincerely desired to restore the unity of Christendom, and was devoting his energies to policies of conciliation, with the support of the Sacred College, expressed his approbation of the plan in writing. The Emperor and fourteen Protestant princes of Germany had shown themselves favorable to it; but "Louis XIV, not content with enfeebling the Pope in his own State, . . . traversed his policy even in Rome, and opposed with all his power, through his ambassador, the success of the project of union."¹

For the unity of Christendom as a whole, or the progress of justice and mutual confidence among princes, Louis XIV had no sympathy. He preferred a divided Europe. To him force was the highest court of appeal, and apart from force

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Louis XIV's
interest in
disunion

¹ Foucault, *Mémoires*, II, p. 245.

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he had no conception of authority. The root of his antipathy to Innocent XI was not a mere difference of personal opinions or interests, it was a contradiction of fundamental principles. He practically denied the authority of the Pope altogether, and instructed his ambassador at Rome to say to Innocent XI: "I am absolute master of my subjects, ecclesiastic as well as laic, and no one whatever has the right to interfere with what I think fit to command them."¹

The attitude of Louis XIV toward the Papacy explains the practical impossibility of reviving Roman Catholicism as a universal religion in Europe. The national monarchies were in rebellion against it. The absolutism of the Church was opposed by the absolutism of the State, and the "divine right" to command was equally claimed by both. The terrors of another world and the terrors of this world were in conflict.

As an aspirant to imperial power Louis XIV had need of the Pope, but he was unwilling to yield to his authority. For this reason he was anxious to seem more religious than Innocent XI; for, as the Abbé Legendre well said, "When princes are in bad relations with Rome it is precisely then that they testify the most zeal for religion, for fear that the people, seeing them embroiled with the Pope, will accuse them of having no religion whatever."²

The alarm
concerning
the influence
of France

The efforts of Louis XIV to place himself at the head of Christendom did not, however, appeal to those who were loyal to the Roman Church. It was too evident that he regarded religion not as a matter of conviction and obligation but as merely an instrument of power, and his zeal deprived him of the confidence and sympathy of the Catholic world almost as completely as of that of the Protestants. While the Protestants — particularly in Holland and England — regarded him as the chief protagonist of Romanism, and therefore a dangerous enemy of their faith, Romanists perceived on the other hand that he was not a loyal servant

¹ The King to the Duke d'Estrées, September 27, 1685, Archives des Affaires Étrangères, "Rome," vol. 296.

² Legendre, *Mémoires*, Paris, 1683.

of the Roman Church and that he really took no part in the great forward movement for the revival of Catholicism in Europe.

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As a result of this equivocal position the influence of France was dreaded on every side. In the eyes of faithful Catholics Louis XIV was regarded as disloyal to Rome, an ally of the Sultan, and an organizer of rebellion on the part of heretics against a Catholic ruler who was endeavoring to repress heresy and defend Christendom.

On the other hand, Protestants were convinced that he intended their total destruction. Daniel Cosnac, Bishop of Valence, did not hesitate to say before the Assembly of the French Clergy that Protestantism must be everywhere exterminated. In Holland and in England this announcement awakened a feeling of terror regarding the intentions of Louis XIV. In England, the designs of France had long been suspected. The negotiations of Louis XIV with Charles II had not remained an absolute secret, and even the existence of the Treaty of Dover and the personal subsidies paid to the King of England were fully known to a few and partly understood by many. The idea that Roman Catholicism was through French aid to be revived in England had as a consequence become a kind of popular obsession, and behind the scenes the influence of the King of France was generally believed to be working in the dark. The story of Titus Oates regarding the alleged "popish plot" had not only created among English Protestants needless panic at the time, it had excited the popular imagination to such a degree that French influence in every form had come to be detested.

Until his death, on February 6, 1685, Charles II was secretly in the pay and under the influence of Louis XIV as regards the foreign policy of England; but, in reality, the interest of the King of France did not extend far beyond the wish to maintain the neutrality of England, in order that he might be free to carry out his schemes upon the continent. The power of England, if left free to act according to the wishes of the nation, would have been exercised against these schemes. It was necessary, therefore, to paralyze

The revival
of Catholicism
by James II

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the action of Parliament by controlling the policy of the King. Under cover of furnishing funds for the promotion of Roman Catholicism, which served Charles II also as a reason for receiving them, the independence of England had been sold to France.

By seeming to comply with the wishes of the country during the last years of his life, Charles II had been able to govern without Parliament, which, he privately informed Barillon, he intended never again to assemble. Selfish and corrupt as his existence was, his purposes had never been so far carried into effect as to produce revolt; and his rule, which was at least nominally Protestant, had seemed more acceptable than that which was expected upon his death, when his brother James, Duke of York, an avowed Roman Catholic, would come to the throne.

On the second Sunday after the accession of James II, it became evident that Roman Catholicism was to be actively revived in England, for the Queen's chapel was at once opened and the celebration of mass made public. The Protestant preachers of London were loud in their denunciations, but the King showed no signs of concealing his religious faith.

It was soon clear that James II desired and expected the continuance of the French subsidies; but, as he had promptly summoned Parliament, — for the suppression of which Louis XIV had been paying, — he had nothing to offer, and payment was accordingly withheld.¹

Thus, at the beginning of the reign of James II, instead of still more intimate relations with the Court of France, which had been expected, all the signs of the time pointed to a new foreign policy from which French influence was to be eliminated. The treaties with Holland were renewed, the centre of French intrigue was broken up by sending the Duchess of Portsmouth back to France, and the Austrian ambassador, Count Thun, wrote a jubilant despatch to the Emperor rejoicing in the prospects of the new reign.

¹ At the beginning of his reign James II received five hundred thousand livres from Louis XIV, for which he expressed his lasting gratitude; but there being no further need, the payments were discontinued.

But the obstinate sincerity of James II in contending for what he esteemed his royal prerogatives soon brought him into conflict with the English nation. Parliament was promptly dismissed, never to meet again while James II occupied the throne, and an open campaign for the revival of Roman Catholicism in England was begun. The revolution, which had long been preparing, was becoming a fact; and Louis XIV, who cared more for the neutrality of England than for the fate of the English Catholics, obtained without subsidies all that he desired, — the continued impotence of England for effective international action.

The mantle of distinction for active negotiation which Louis XIV had so long borne was now to fall upon other and younger shoulders. Since the Peace of Nymwegen William of Orange had never ceased his efforts to form a new coalition for the purpose of restraining the further ambitions of the King of France.

The efforts of
William III for
equilibrium

Unable to interest the thrifty burghers of Amsterdam in any ventures likely to bring upon them the vengeance of Louis XIV, and therefore not fully master of the decisions of the States General, he could not carry on strictly official negotiations; but this did not prevent his employment of his trusted friend, George Frederick, Count of Waldeck, in sounding and inspiring the German princes.

The controlling idea of William III's policy was the re-establishment of European equilibrium, which had been destroyed by the predominance of Louis XIV and the dissolution of the coalition against him by the Peace of Nymwegen; but in the conditions which then existed the task seemed one of superhuman magnitude. On October 10, 1681, an "Association" with Sweden had been formed by Holland for the purpose of maintaining the treaties of Westphalia and Nymwegen,¹ to which the Emperor had adhered on February 28, 1682, and Spain on May 2 of the same year; but the compact was purely defensive and of little real significance, except as the beginning of a wider union.

¹ See Dumont, VII, Part II, p. 15 et seq.

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More modest, and yet more practical, were Waldeck's efforts under the personal direction of William III to form a military combination among the smaller German princes for the defence of the Empire. Gradually augmented by accessions of greater importance, this union was joined by the Emperor on June 10, 1682, in what is known as the "Laxenburg Recess," or "Waldeck's Alliance," in which the Emperor and the Elector of Bavaria agreed to place twenty thousand men on the Upper Rhine, the Allies twenty thousand on the Middle Rhine, and the Duke of Brunswick-Lüneburg was urged to place twenty thousand on the Lower Rhine, for the defence of the Empire.¹ Thus, through the quiet but persistent activity of William III and Waldeck, the protection of the Empire from French invasion had been prepared for when the siege of Vienna by the Turks attracted the attention of Europe toward the East.

Brandenburg's
revulsion from
the French
alliance

In spite of all efforts to win his allegiance to the union, the prince most important to its effectiveness, the Elector of Brandenburg, had remained firm in his alliance with the King of France. In strained relations with Leopold I, on account of his desertion at Nymwegen and his disregard of Frederick William's claims in Silesia, and with the United Provinces on account of the unpaid subsidies, in January, 1685, the Elector still belonged among the clients of France in the Empire. But the accession of the Duke of York to the throne of England, combined with the persecution of the Huguenots in France, made a deep impression upon Frederick William, who perceived in these events a heavy blow to Protestantism in Europe.

Soon afterward followed a visit from the Brandenburg General Spaen to the Prince of Orange at The Hague. His frequent conversations with William III and Fagel excited the suspicions of the wary Count d'Avaux, always on the watch for any defection from his royal master; and the arrival of Amerongen "as if to report upon some matter which he could not trust to the pen" confirmed the apprehensions of the French ambassador.

¹ For the text, see Dumont, VII, Part II, p. 23 et seq.

These visits were in reality the prelude of a new *entente* between the United Provinces and Brandenburg. Encouraged by the confidences of Spaen and the report of Amerongen, the Prince sent a Huguenot pastor, Gaultier de Saint-Blancard, as a secret emissary to Berlin to sound the feelings of the Elector regarding the dangers to Protestantism.

The mission was opportune, for Frederick William, whose mind was already filled with the idea that a powerful league existed for the total extermination of Protestantism, was eager to discuss the subject with the ardent Huguenot. The result of the discussion was that Frederick Diest, the Brandenburg envoy at The Hague, was instructed to propose a coalition of the Protestant countries for their mutual protection. But the zeal of the Elector did not stop with this proposal. Upon his return to The Hague in March, Saint-Blancard reported to the Prince of Orange that Frederick William counselled him to dispute the right of James II to the throne of England, and to effect a landing for this purpose on the English coast with ten thousand men.¹ As evidence of his interest in the Protestant cause, his own well-advanced plans for the conquest of Swedish Pomerania were at once abandoned, on the ground that all the Protestant nations should stand together and that the support of Sweden was necessary in the coming conflict.

A succession of events now served to widen the chasm that had opened between the Elector and his French ally. On May 26, 1685, the death of the Elector Palatine Charles opened the way for the accession of a Catholic prince, Philip William of Neuburg, to the Palatinate of the Rhine, thus leaving the Electoral College of the Empire with only two Protestant electors against six Catholics. The change was so important that the French diplomatist Cheverny exclaimed, "*Adieu! le parti protestant!*"

The complete
alienation of
Brandenburg
from France

To the mind of Frederick William, the one who most intended to profit by the destruction of Protestantism without being subject to the restraints imposed by the Papacy was

¹ See Erman et Reclam, *Mémoires pour servir à l'histoire des réfugiés français*, I, 366.

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his own powerful ally, the head and front of militant Catholicism in Europe, Louis XIV. When, therefore, the King of France, in the name of his sister-in-law, Elizabeth-Charlotte of Orléans, only daughter of the Elector Charles, advanced pretensions to a large portion of the Palatine inheritance, Frederick William — although Philip William of Neuburg was a rival and a Catholic — firmly supported his cause against the French claims.

According to French law, these claims may have had some foundation; but, according to the German laws, as understood by Frederick William, and by which he contended the case should be governed, they had none; and his envoy, Spanheim, was instructed to present strongly at Versailles the judicial arguments in favor of Philip William. The opposition of Brandenburg was further shown by the fact that, although the French ambassador at Berlin, Count Rébenac, was furnished with credentials from Louis XIV authorizing him to be present when the last testament of Charles was examined, it was read in the Privy Council without notice to the ambassador. On the next day, Frederick William publicly announced his decision to support the claims of Neuburg and counselled rejection of an arbitration by the Pope, which Louis XIV had proposed. At the same time, to reinforce the Protestants in the Electoral College, it was suggested that a ninth electorate be established to be filled by Ernest Augustus, Duke of Hanover, of the House of Brunswick-Lüneburg.

Rapprochement of Brandenburg and the Emperor

As usual the *volte-face* of Frederick William was in appearance not abrupt; but a steady trend toward reconciliation with the enemies of Louis XIV showed plainly that he was once more about to reverse his alliances.

His relations with Austria were still tensely strained, especially as regards his Silesian claims; for Leopold I had decided that it was not possible to permit a Protestant prince to establish himself in Silesia. Nevertheless, Meinders and Fuchs were charged to discuss with the Emperor's envoy, Baron von Fridag, the means of settling that question; and, to win the friendship of Leopold I, the Elector resolved to

send a contingent of five thousand troops to aid him in his war with the Turks. At the same time, his relations with Rébenac, who was aware of the secret defection from France, became so unpleasant that in the heat of his passion the Elector at one time so far forgot himself as to threaten to have the ambassador thrown out of the window.

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The same motives that inspired the Elector to cultivate closer relations with the Emperor impelled him to a change in his policy toward Sweden. Animated by his ardor for the cause of Protestantism, which now took entire possession of him, he instructed his envoy, Pierre Falaiseau, sent on special mission to Stockholm, to urge upon the Swedish Court the formation of a great Protestant coalition to oppose the designs of France, and furnished him with a secret memoir in which were set forth the perils to which the Protestant countries, Lutheran and Calvinist alike, were exposed by the Roman Catholic revival.

The reconcilia-
tion of Bran-
denburg and
Sweden

Assured of the co-operation of Charles XI in opposing the designs of France, Frederick William next turned his attention to Holland, and sent his most trusted privy councillor, Paul Fuchs, to The Hague to lay foundations for united action. Rébenac, who suspected his intention, endeavored to prevent the journey, but his efforts were unavailing.

The alliance
of Holland and
Brandenburg

In truth, the Prince of Orange was even more anxious for an understanding than Frederick William himself, and his influence was steadily growing in Holland. The *dragonnades* with which Louis XIV was pursuing the Huguenots in France and the accession of James II to the throne of England had filled even the stolid merchants of Amsterdam with alarm. Calvinist dominies and French refugees at The Hague seemed to divine the meaning of Fuchs' mission, and increased effect was given to it by their indefatigable appeals to the religious sentiments of the burghers, always ending with the question, "Is not the Elector of Brandenburg the true protector of our faith?"

Having thoroughly sounded the feelings of the country, Fuchs finally disclosed his instructions to the States General; and, on August 23, 1685, a treaty of amity was signed,

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in which a compromise was effected regarding the overdue subsidies, indemnity was offered and accepted for the capture of a Brandenburg vessel by the Dutch in Guinea, and the defensive alliance of 1678 was renewed until 1700.¹

The most important article of the treaty was the fourth, which provided that, in case of new troubles in Christendom, the contractants would unite upon the measures to be taken for their common defence. D'Avaux, who day by day had kept a close watch on the movements of Fuchs, was apprehensive that there was a transaction taking place prejudicial to his royal master, but found it difficult to penetrate the secret. Rébenac had been promised the privilege of seeing all the official correspondence, but it was so arranged that this should be of a merely perfunctory character, and that the real negotiations should be reported to Berlin only in private letters addressed directly to the Elector, so that even his Secretary of State, Meinders, did not know their contents.

The new
exaction of
Louis XIV

In spite of this well-guarded secrecy, D'Avaux, a few days after the treaty was signed, managed to secure a copy of it, which he hastened to communicate to Louis XIV.

The King's action was prompt and vigorous. Rébenac was ordered in the following October to obtain from Frederick William a written declaration promising that he would inviolably observe all his previous engagements with the King of France, and binding himself to take no future steps with any other power that would in any respect enfeeble the force of the treaties he had previously concluded with him, — a statement which, if shown to the States General by D'Avaux, would deprive the new alliance of all its value and place the Elector in a position of complete vassalage to the King of France. His reply was, that, having already given His Majesty all necessary assurances, any further declaration would be not only superfluous but in a sense "outrageous," as implying a lack of confidence on the part of the King.

The revoca-
tion of the
Edict of Nantes

It was in these acute circumstances that a blow fell upon Europe which filled every Protestant country with dismay.

¹ For the treaty, see Dumont, VII, Part II, p. 111 et seq.

In January, 1685, the Huguenots, finding their position intolerable, had complained to the King that the Edict of Nantes, which had afforded them a peaceful refuge, "seemed to have lost its protecting leaves and branches, and that nothing remained of it to offer them shelter from persecution except the decaying trunk." On October 18, 1685, their humble petition was answered by the revocation of the Edict.

By this one act the hand was turned back on the dial of French history more than a hundred years. As a consequence of it, more than two hundred thousand of the most earnest, industrious, and skilful subjects of the King were moved to emigrate to countries where they were permitted to worship in their own way; thereby depriving France almost entirely of certain branches of profitable industry, which were transplanted to England, Holland, Prussia, and America. But the economic loss to France was small compared with the blow to the moral prestige of the King and the bitter hostility created against him in every Protestant country.

It has been generally represented that Louis XIV signed the Revocation of the Edict of Nantes as an act of religious devotion under the influence of Madame de Maintenon and his indulgent confessor, Père La Chaise. It is true, that between the Peace of Nymwegen and the Revocation of the Edict the King had passed through a distinct change in his interior life, but it does not fully account for this complete alteration in his policy. He had been an ardent lover of a succession of women; and, outside of wedlock, there had been born to him eleven children, whom he publicly acknowledged as entitled to the recognition of the "dignity of their birth." But the procession of beauties capable of profoundly touching his now waning passions had already passed. The last of them, Madame de Maintenon, the "pious" widow of the crippled Scarron, had dared to appeal to the King's conscience, on account of his double adultery with Madame de Montespan, had induced his return to his marital duties to the Queen while she lived, and soon after the Queen's death in 1683, had been clandestinely married to him.

In 1681, Madame de Maintenon wrote: "The King begins

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The motives
of Louis XIV
in signing the
Revocation

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to think seriously of his salvation." And a few weeks after the Queen's death she wrote again: "Père La Chaise inspires the King to great things. All his subjects will soon serve God in spirit and in truth."¹

There were, however, deeper reasons for the King's act than Madame de Maintenon suggested, and the deepest of them all was certainly not a state of penitence for a sinful life.²

The rôle of
Charlemagne

Beginning with the *réunions*, Louis XIV seriously regarded himself as the "new Charlemagne," and aspired to conform to the traditions of his prototype. With the idea that he was destined to be the continuator of the Holy Roman Empire, a new motive took possession of his mind. It was easier now to direct his action, and Père La Chaise had an easy task. Charlemagne had not been embarrassed by Calvinism. The Protestant heresies not only divided belief, they profoundly affected its character. They recognized an authority superior to that of the King. As La Bruyère well said, Calvinism was a "*culte ennemi de la souveraineté.*" It was the parent of independence, personal and national. It respected the individual, and laid the foundations of the State on the rights of the individual as its only logical basis. Protestantism must, therefore, be rooted out. An influence so powerful as religion must be solely at the service and command of the King.

The indignation
of Frederick
William

Considered merely as an act of internal administration, the Revocation of the Edict of Nantes would no doubt have awakened strong feelings of revulsion among the co-religionists of the Huguenots everywhere; but this blow, struck by the hand of the professed protector of the Germanic liberties, at the height of his power and at the moment of his violent encroachments upon the Empire, made a far deeper impression. Frederick William, already exasperated,

¹ Lavissee, *Histoire de France*, Tome VII, II, p. 61.

² "La question religieuse eut si peu de poids dans les décisions du gouvernement que le clergé et les catholiques firent entendre à maintes reprises de généreuses protestations." — De Rochas, *Note sur quelques documents inédits relatifs à la révocation*, Paris, 1880, p. 31.

notwithstanding his customary prudence, could not suppress his indignation. On November 8, the Elector replied with his celebrated Edict of Potsdam, in which he deplored the "persecutions" directed against the Protestants in France and promised them an inviolable asylum in his own territories, even marking out the route to be followed under the protection of his ministers resident, and offering to the refugees exemption from taxes for ten years.

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It was a noble act, which did equal credit to the Elector's humanity and his judgment, for it resulted in bringing a valuable accession to the population of Brandenburg and the Rhenish provinces afterward forming the Kingdom of Prussia. But it was also an act of bravery, for the King of France challenged the word "persecution" as if it were meant as an insult. Frederick William replied that he had as much right to call the King's action "persecution," as His Majesty had to characterize Protestantism as "heresy," Calvinism being the Elector's own religion. In his zeal he placed an interdict on the "papal cult," and even forbade under pain of corporal punishment attendance upon mass by his own subjects in the Roman Catholic embassies, where some hundreds were accustomed to worship at Berlin. But, having made this display of righteous indignation, which had carried him beyond the rule of tolerance, he did not really execute his prohibitions; and, in the following December, acting in the interest of peace, he gave new assurances of loyalty to his treaty engagements with France.

It was not, however, in Brandenburg alone that the Revocation excited deep animosity against Louis XIV. In Holland it had the effect of finally reconciling the merchants of Amsterdam with the stadtholder, and rendered popular the alliance with Brandenburg, which proved the wisdom and foresight of William III. In all the Protestant countries of Europe the sentiment excited by the Revocation became at once a bond of mutual sympathy between them, and the common wish to resist the designs of Louis XIV served to unite them as participants in a common cause.

The prepara-
tions for resist-
ing Louis XIV

A few days after the news of the Revocation was received

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at The Hague, it was reported by the French chargé, Saint-Dédier, that the Prince of Orange had said he could not believe that the King acted in that matter "from pure zeal for the Catholic religion, nor from his hatred of Protestantism," but that "His Majesty's whole policy was by this means to range all Catholic princes by his side"; and that "it was time for the Protestants to see what they had to do, since that which had been begun in France was the commencement of a general conspiracy against the Protestants."¹

Two steps must, therefore, be taken in opposition to this movement: first, the Protestant states must be combined in a powerful league for their common defence; and, second, the Hapsburg powers must be united for the protection of Spain and the Empire from the encroachments of Louis XIV.

A third step, which in the mind of William III was daily assuming increasing importance, was to prevent an active alliance between France and England; and, if possible, to throw the weight of England, essentially a Protestant power, into the opposite scale of the balance, and thus redress the lost equilibrium of Europe.

The relations
of William III
and James II

The realization of this last-mentioned purpose by means of direct influence over James II was obviously impossible. Always imbued with an exaggerated notion of royal authority, since he had ascended the throne he had become the impersonation of the most intense spirit of absolutism. So long as he was merely Duke of York, his relations with his son-in-law, the Prince of Orange, had been friendly and even amiable; but, as King of England, he demanded instant and unqualified obedience to his commands, and treated his son-in-law as merely a junior member of his family.

For every reason, — personal, religious, and political, — the aims and activities of these two members of the House of Stuart were certain to come into collision. One of the first demands of James II had been that the illegitimate son of Charles II, the Duke of Monmouth, who was in exile at The Hague, be required to leave Holland, and this request

¹ Archives des Affaires Étrangères, November 8, 1685, "Holland," 143.

was granted. The son of the late King by Lucy Walters, — a mistress who had subsequently become infamous for her lewd life, — the Duke aspired to the Crown of England; and, declaring himself a Protestant, endeavored by this means to displace his Catholic uncle. Several attempts had been made to induce Charles II to declare the legitimacy of the Duke of Monmouth; but, although he could pardon him for many irregularities, it was well known that the Duke was not recognized by his father as entitled to the throne, and James II had no serious difficulty in suppressing the Monmouth rebellion, which ended on July 15, 1685, with the execution of the presumptuous duke.

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The success of James II in crushing the revolt of Monmouth exalted his sense of power, but it also excited his apprehensions for the future. The growing importance of William of Orange, who was already regarded by many as the most serious and capable champion of Protestantism, was beginning to be felt in England as well as upon the continent; and it was not unnatural that James II should see in him, the grandson of Charles I and the husband of the legitimate successor to the throne, a more dangerous rival than the enemy of whom he had disposed by the execution of Monmouth.

The inclination of James II toward France

Had James II been willing to accept a line of action permitting the free expression of the national will, there would have been nothing for him to fear from the Prince of Orange. He would in that case have won his friendship and at the same time have removed every ground of hostility on the part of the nation. But James II distrusted Parliament and was not sincere in his relations with the United Provinces. He wished to restore Roman Catholicism, abolish the Habeas Corpus Act, establish a close alliance with France, and by means of a centralized political administration govern England as an absolute ruler.

On July 16, 1685, James II assured Barillon that "he had been educated in France and eaten the bread of His Majesty, and his heart was still French." And yet he did not have the steadiness of character to avail himself of the benefits

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which a frank and loyal friendship with France might have afforded him. Resolute only in his absolutism, he wholly neglected the means by which he could make his will effectual. With all his professions of friendship, Louis XIV could not trust him, and Barillon was again instructed to resort to his old tactics of keeping King and Parliament divided; but the indiscretions of the King rendered the task superfluous.

The new aspirations of Leopold I

Abandoning the prospect of obtaining any immediate aid from England in his plans for resisting the dictatorship of Louis XIV in Europe, William of Orange became all the more active on the continent. The Protestant powers alone were not strong enough to resist the ambitions of Louis XIV; and Waldeck — now raised by the Emperor to the rank of a prince — was, therefore, set to the task of uniting the Hapsburgs with the Protestant princes in opposition to Louis XIV.

Everything, so far as Leopold I was concerned, seemed favorable for such a union. The marriage of Charles II of Spain with Marie-Louise of Orléans had suggested a possible solution of the Spanish succession; but, several years having passed without the birth of an heir, the previous situation had not been essentially changed.

Leopold I, who regarded himself as the rightful head of the House of Hapsburg, had been more fortunate than the King of Spain in maintaining the family line. By his marriage with the Spanish Infanta Margaret, who had died in 1673, he possessed an advantage in the game of the Spanish succession in the person of a marriageable daughter, Maria Antonia. By his second wife, Eleanor of Neuburg, who had in 1678 borne him a son, the Archduke Joseph, he was likely to have still other children, and one was soon expected.

By a judicious distribution of family claims the Emperor now hoped eventually to absorb the whole of the Spanish inheritance. Maria Antonia was to be married to Max Emmanuel, the young elector of Bavaria, whom Leopold I hoped by this means to attach to the fortunes of his House by securing for him, even during the lifetime of the King

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of Spain, the viceroyalty of the Netherlands. Joseph would, of course, succeed to the Empire; and Maria Antonia was required to sign a renunciation, to be ratified by her husband, of the right to succeed to the throne of Spain, which would thus be reserved for a son who might be born to him.

It remained, however, for the Emperor to render his devices acceptable to the Court of Madrid, where the marriage contract with Max Emmanuel might meet with opposition, and would certainly be regarded as hostile by Louis XIV. In spite of the attempt at secrecy, the King of France was not long kept in ignorance of the fact that his previous co-partner in partitioning the spoils of Spain was scheming to outwit him; and the Marquis de Feuquières was speedily despatched to Madrid to defend the interests of his royal master.

Louis XIV's
opposition to
the arrange-
ments of
Leopold I

Intending to keep the renunciation on the part of Maria Antonia entirely secret, Leopold I requested the King of Spain to approve the marriage, but failed to communicate the marriage contract. When this document was asked for at Madrid, not daring to furnish it, the announcement was made by the Court of Vienna that the courier to whom it was entrusted had fallen into the hands of corsairs.

When Feuquières arrived at Madrid at the end of March, 1685, he found the Court uninformed of the terms and conditions of the proposed marriage, and not altogether favorable to it; and he was at once able to thwart the most important part of the Emperor's scheme. He had been instructed by every means to oppose making Max Emmanuel Viceroy of the Spanish Netherlands, and he promptly placed in the hands of Charles II a memoir which in substance threatened him with war if he should decide to establish the Elector of Bavaria in the Spanish provinces.¹

The excitement at Madrid was intense, and for the first time in his life Charles II attended in person a meeting of his council. His reply was conciliatory but indefinite. The Queen urged him to make an explicit promise for the sake

¹ The instructions of Feuquières are printed by Morel-Fatio, *Recueil des Instructions*, XI, Espagne, I, p. 341.

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of peace; but, feeble and inexperienced as he was, the King replied that he "would rather die" than yield to the threats of Feuquières.

Not being able to extort a more satisfactory answer than he had already received, Louis XIV decided to treat it as if it were a complete compliance with his wishes. At the same time it was pointed out that any change in the Spanish Netherlands would be regarded as a violation of the peace. At The Hague Count d'Avaux represented that the alleged plan of Leopold I was a "pure chimera." But on July 15, 1685, the marriage of Max Emmanuel and Maria Antonia was celebrated with great pomp at Vienna. In the following October the Empress Eleanor presented Leopold I with a second son, Charles, — the expected candidate for the throne of Spain.

The conten-
tions of France
and Austria at
Madrid

It was a decisive moment for the plans of William of Orange. A collision between Louis XIV and Leopold I, which the Prince of Orange above all desired, now seemed inevitable.

An important element in the situation was the attitude of Madrid, and a heated diplomatic battle was begun at the Spanish Court. Undoubtedly the Queen had great influence with the feeble Charles II, and it was vigorously exercised in the interest of France; but the Queen-Mother, Maria of Austria, was a more experienced antagonist. With her powerful aid the Austrian ambassador, Count von Mansfeld, was using every effort to destroy French influence in Spain. It was perhaps, he intimated, the Queen's fault that Charles II had no children. It was even proposed to put the question to a test by giving the King a mistress; with the intention, if the supposition proved correct, of applying to Rome for a divorce.

Max Emmanuel already enjoyed a great reputation in Spain because of the valor he was displaying in the war with the Infidel, and the Queen-Mother was strongly inclined toward the Elector's young bride, her granddaughter, Maria Antonia, as a possible future Queen of Spain. Every day the French ambassador grew more unpopular at Madrid,

until at last he was insulted and his people were stoned in the streets.

Abandoning for the moment the claims of the Dauphin, Louis XIV suggested that, in case Charles II should have no direct heir, the Kingdom of Spain might go to the Dauphin's second son, Philip, Duke of Artois; and thus the union of France and Spain under one crown might be avoided. But this proposal did not appease the wounded feelings of the Spanish nobles, who preferred to choose their own sovereign rather than to have one forced upon them.

Nor did Leopold I succeed better in his plans for his second son, — called "Charles" to flatter the King whose heir he was intended to become, — with the intention of sending him to Spain, there to grow up as a Spanish prince. When at last the enforced "renunciation" of Maria Antonia became known at Madrid, the Spaniards would not hear of it, and thus were repudiated all the foreign schemes.

In the meantime, the Elector of Brandenburg and the Prince of Orange were busily engaged in weaving a network of alliances by which the Protestant and Catholic powers were to be combined against Louis XIV. In spite of the opposition of Rébenac, on January 4, 1686, a treaty between Brandenburg and Austria was concluded, by which the Elector, who felt the necessity of awaiting the end of the war in the East before an open rupture with France, pledged himself to aid Leopold I by furnishing seven thousand men for the protection of Hungary.¹ On January 12, the United Provinces renewed the defensive treaties with Sweden. On February 10 a similar compact was concluded between Sweden and Brandenburg, and on April 1, the Elector concluded with the Emperor a defensive alliance for twenty years.²

But the notable single achievement of the year was the formation of the League of Augsburg, of July 9, 1686, between the Emperor, the Kings of Spain and Sweden, and the German princes of the circles of Bavaria, Suabia, and

The League
of Augsburg

¹ For the text, see Londorp, XII, p. 255.

² Moerner, *Staatsverträge*, p. 750 et seq.

CHAP. III Franconia for the defence of the Treaties of Westphalia and
 A. D. Nymwegen, to which the Elector Palatine and the Duke of
 1684-1697 Holstein-Gottorp adhered in the following September.¹

Although the precise origin of this league is veiled in considerable obscurity, it is probable that Prince Waldeck, at the instigation of William of Orange, had no small part in promoting it. It is evident from the absence of records, however, that the negotiations were conducted with great secrecy, and it is probable that Waldeck's part in them was chiefly oral.² It is known that its final conclusion was due chiefly to the activity of Count Gustave von Hohenlohe, the Emperor's representative in Franconia.³ Neither Brandenburg nor the United Provinces were, in fact, signatories of this treaty, and the practical importance of it was long greatly exaggerated, particularly in France, where it was considered as an act of aggression.⁴ The abstention of the United Provinces and of Brandenburg from participation in this league, which they had certainly favored and promoted, seems at first remarkable; but it ceases to be so in the light of the greater enterprise which they were then considering. That enterprise, for which they wished to be untrammelled, was of a far bolder nature. The League of Augsburg was intended merely to hold Louis XIV in check upon the continent; but the Prince of Orange, supported by the Elector of Brandenburg, perceived that the key to the security of Protestantism and the maintenance of European equilibrium was to be sought in the control of the power of England.

II. THE INTERNATIONAL SIGNIFICANCE OF THE ENGLISH REVOLUTION

The absolutism
of the Stuarts

During the reign of Charles II, England had witnessed a succession of intrigues and conspiracies in which the King himself was the central figure and the most culpable partici-

¹ Dumont, VII, Part II, p. 122 et seq.

² See Müller, *Wilhelm III von Oranien und George Friedrich von Waldeck*, II, p. 12, 13.

³ Erdmannsdörffer, *Deutsche Geschichte*, I, p. 717.

⁴ Fester, *Die Augsburger Allianz von 1686*.

part. Under James II there was a momentary promise of better things, but the fanatical nature of the monarch, supported by his serene sense of absolute authority, soon destroyed all hopes of improvement.

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The fundamental vice of the Stuart dynasty had always been an exaggerated conception of the rights of the Crown, wholly excluding any solemn sense of obligation to administer the affairs of England in conformity with the laws of Parliament.

Not only the practice of the dynasty but the theory invented by servile scholars and ecclesiastics to support its unmeasured pretensions had aroused dissent among thoughtful men. "The royal power," says Sir Robert Filmer in his "Patriarcha," "exists by the law of God; there is no inferior power that can limit it. The father of a family governs without other law than his own will, not by the laws and wishes of his sons or his servants. . . . No man can say that there is a law for the King. . . . General laws, made by Parliament, can for reasons known to the King, and by his authority, be mitigated or suspended as he alone may judge advisable; and by his oath of coronation he is bound to observe only good laws, of which he is the judge."¹ The Parliament of England, the same writer declares, is only an imitation of the States General of France, which have no other power than to present requests to the King.

In his "Jus Regium," George Mackenzie, Lord Advocate of Scotland, declares that "monarchy by its nature is absolute; and consequently all pretended limitations are contrary to the nature of monarchy."²

Thomas Hobbes, in his "Leviathan," notwithstanding the fact that he bases monarchy upon an alleged "contract" between king and people, maintains that the will of the prince is the touchstone of good and evil, and that "every subject should be willing to profess Popery, Mohammedanism, or Paganism, if the King ordains it."³

¹ Filmer, *Patriarcha*, London, 1680.

² Mackenzie, *Jus Regium*, London, 1684.

³ Hobbes, *Leviathan*, London, 1651.

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On July 21, 1683, the University of Oxford in solemn convocation commended the principles of absolutism in a manner so positive that Hallam was provoked to regard its action as "covering the University with shame." The decree denounced all the liberal literature of the time as "destructive to the sacred persons of princes"; but this decision was afterward the subject of repentance when James II imperiously dictated his will to Magdalen College, and in 1709 the decree was publicly burned by order of the House of Lords.

The spirit of
revolt against
absolutism

There was never a moment even during the reign of the Stuarts when beneath the surface there was not among the English people a spirit of revolt against absolute government. There were always those who felt with Algernon Sydney, — who dared to say it, — that "what is not just is not law"; although it seemed for a time that those who expressed that sentiment would follow him to the scaffold. John Locke, who became the accepted theorist of the Revolution of 1688, sought safety in exile, and remained in Holland until the tide turned against the King. The subsequent popularity of his writings proves how completely he expressed what was already vaguely in the minds of the people, — a revolt of convictions that preceded the revolt under arms.

It is true, that in its first expression this revolt was religious rather than political; but this fact only proves how intimately associated are forms of religious feeling and types of government. As a general rule, revolutions have their birth in some form of violence done to the consciences of men; and empires have been founded and destroyed by mutations of religious faith.

In England the bond of association between the monarchy and Protestantism was extremely strong, for it was through the religious independence of the kingdom that its political independence had been developed and maintained.¹ When, therefore, Protestantism was menaced by the behavior of James II, and the future of England seemed in danger

¹ See Volume II of this work, pp. 416, 417.

through alliance with a dominant Catholic power on the continent, the national existence was believed by many Englishmen to be at stake, and revolution was regarded as a sacred obligation.

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It is an instructive commentary on the theory of absolute monarchy to note that those who have most profited by it have almost invariably disregarded in others the prerogatives they have claimed for themselves. We have seen how, in his anxiety to take advantage of the neutrality of England by rendering it impotent for action on the continent, Louis XIV continually thwarted the efforts of Charles II in relation to Parliament. Acting by "divine right," as his own theory of royal prerogatives maintained, it probably never occurred to Louis XIV that it was shameful for one king to frustrate the will of another, since his opponent was, upon his own theory, equally with himself the medium of the divine will upon the earth.

The illusion of royal pretensions

But the treatment of Charles II by Louis XIV was in no respect an exceptional instance. He had acted in a similar manner with every other monarch, including the Pope, except the Sultan.

When James II found that the former subsidies from France were not continued, in spite of his assurances to Barillon that "his heart was still French," he had passed for a time entirely from under the influence of Louis XIV. However much the King of France may have desired the re-establishment of Roman Catholicism in England, which he continued to urge upon James II as a sacred obligation, he instructed his ambassador to let it be known by the leaders of the party in opposition to the King that they need entertain no fear of France in case they made trouble for their sovereign in Parliament.

Upon one point, however, notwithstanding the intimations of the French ambassador to the contrary, there was general agreement in England. It was the universal conviction that the two kings were secretly in league to destroy Protestantism; and a report received at The Hague early in August, 1686, from the Dutch envoy at London, Van Citters,

The fears for the fate of Protestantism

CHAP. III contained forebodings of an Anglo-French alliance for the
 A. D. purpose of an attack on the Republic.
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Although it is not credible that James II intended at that time to undertake the responsibilities of an unpopular foreign war, it is certain that he regarded with little favor his Protestant nephew, who was so clearly eligible to the throne of England; and that Louis XIV resented both the attitude and the growing influence of William of Orange, whose negotiations on the continent had not escaped his attention.

In the meantime, while Europe was seeking means to defend itself against the aggressions of Louis XIV, William of Orange made no secret of his personal hostility to him, and openly declared that a union of France and England under the direction of the monarch who had revoked the Edict of Nantes would signify the ruin of Protestantism, the subjection of the United Provinces, and the permanent impossibility of restoring the political equilibrium of Europe. Believing himself designated by Providence to prevent that catastrophe, he resolved that, cost what it might, such a union should never be accomplished.

The visit of
 Frederick
 William to
 Cleve

It was in these circumstances, that the Elector of Brandenburg, in the summer of 1686, made his famous visit to Cleve to meet in person the Prince of Orange.

The journey was planned long before it occurred, and had given great disquietude to Rébenac, who fully understood its purpose. Frederick William had been deeply stirred by the anti-Protestant attitude of Louis XIV; and his own failing health, which had several times interrupted the plans for the journey, had caused him to brood over the persecution of his co-religionists and his own duty regarding them.

Hesitating, in his condition of health, to break openly his alliance with the King of France, he could not repress an unconquerable hostility toward him. While the League of Augsburg was forming, he had with his own gouty fingers prepared a military plan which he had hoped might be adopted by the allies, in which he counselled the raising of a hundred and forty-two thousand men by the Emperor, the Empire, and Spain, to operate in two corps from Lorraine

and Burgundy, leaving Sweden to hold back Denmark, while he himself with the Prince of Orange should lead fifty-seven thousand Brandenburgers and Hollanders "directly upon Paris"¹

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A few months later, although strongly pressed to join the League of Augsburg, distrusting the policy of a combination against Louis XIV that was wanting both in aggressive purpose and sufficiency of means, he declined to do so; but wrote that he regarded it as "conformed to the interests of the Empire," and promised to promote it. It was to the Prince of Orange rather than to the ill-organized League of Augsburg that he turned for the realization of his hopes.

Having arrived at Cleve at the end of July, 1686, between the fourth and the seventh of August the Elector held long conversations with the Prince of Orange, and on the fourteenth attended a review of the Dutch troops on the plain of Mookerheide, near Nymwegen, where in 1574 Louis and Henry of Nassau fell in battle with the Spaniards.

The meeting
of the Elector
and William
III

All the memories that clustered round the scene of that struggle for religious freedom and all the circumstances of the time in which they met combined to fix their attention upon the dangers that then confronted Protestantism. The presence of leading Huguenot refugees at Cleve, among them the celebrated pastor Claude, — who is mentioned in a letter as visiting the Elector on August 9, — and the arrival of the despatch of Van Citters regarding the alleged Anglo-French designs on Holland in the midst of these conversations render it certain that the resistance of the Protestant powers to the policy of Louis XIV was one of the subjects seriously discussed.

For a long time historians gave credit to the story of Pufendorf, that the invasion of England by William III for the purpose of constraining James II was one of the propositions discussed by the Elector and the Stadtholder; but since Von Ranke dismissed it as a legend, because ex-Marshal Schomberg, who was said to have been present, is proved to have been at the time in Portugal, Pufendorf has

¹ See Fester, *Die Augsburger Allianz*, pp. 71, 72.

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been treated as the inventor of a fable. But the absence of Schomberg by no means proves that an ultimate invasion of England by William III for the purpose of constraining James II to conform to the will of the nation may not have been discussed in these interviews, as Pufendorf, a well-informed contemporary and an experienced historian, reported: first, because such a course of action had been suggested to the Prince of Orange by Frederick William himself at the time of James II's accession; and, second, because it is known from the letters of Schomberg that he encouraged an alliance for this purpose between the Stadtholder and the Elector through his fellow-countryman and co-religionist, pastor Claude, who was present at Cleve.¹

The importance attached to the attitude of England

There is, therefore, no reason to doubt the substantial truth of Pufendorf's report that plans of action against James II of England were discussed at Cleve, and became from that time forward the basis of the policies of the Prince of Orange and Frederick William upon the continent. The time was not then ripe for the invasion of England, nor for any aggressive action against Louis XIV. The League of Augsburg was, therefore, to be encouraged, but restrained from becoming prematurely aggressive. Until the Emperor could be liberated from preoccupation in the East by a decisive victory over the Turks, there was little chance of success in an open conflict with Louis XIV; nor would it be prudent to provoke him to action so long as there was danger of a union between France and England. The key to the future security of Protestantism was to be found in changing the attitude of England toward Holland and the Protestant cause on the continent; for if, as in 1672, France and England were again to make war on the Dutch Republic, the old danger of the dismemberment of the United Provinces would be revived.

The defeat of the Turks and new aggressions of Louis XIV

Before the Elector had returned to Potsdam an event of immense importance for the future of the Empire had occurred. On September 2, 1686, Buda was taken by assault by

¹ See Pagès, *Le Grand Electeur et Louis XIV*, pp. 573, 574; and Waddington, *Le Grand Electeur*, II, pp. 567, 568.

the Imperial army, and the capital of Hungary, after remaining for nearly a hundred and fifty years in the hands of the Infidel, was at last once more occupied by the Hapsburgs.

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The victories of the Emperor in the East revealed to Louis XIV the necessity of prompt action if he wished to profit by the preoccupations of Leopold I, for the end of the war against the Infidel would permit the Emperor to demand the restoration of the territories annexed to France through the *réunions*. In September, 1686, therefore, Louis XIV resumed his aggressions, hoping thereby to transform the Truce of Regensburg into a permanent recognition of his territorial acquisitions, upon the condition that they were not to be extended.

As a justification for violating the truce, the King of France complained that he was menaced by the League of Augsburg, — a compact which, as we have seen, was in no sense aggressive, — and in December, 1686, he demanded of the Emperor and the Empire the conclusion of a peace on the basis of the Truce of Regensburg, by which all his expropriations would be recognized, setting as a limit of time for these concessions March 31, 1687.

This demand created in Germany a great commotion, and the Elector of Brandenburg in particular was highly exasperated; but, realizing how inopportune a conflict at that time would be, he did everything in his power to avert it. Intent upon his war with the Turks, Leopold I also was disposed, if possible, to avoid a conflict on the Rhine. Innocent XI gave assurance of the Emperor's intention to adhere to the truce, even if the war in the East were ended; and Louis XIV, satisfied for the moment with the tacit recognition of his right to erect new fortifications at Hüningen and Giesenheim, in April, 1687, abandoned his demand for the definitive recognition of his annexations.

Although the time for contesting the claims of Louis XIV had not arrived, and the intention to continue the observance of the truce was sincere, the tension of feeling in Europe was still great. On every side the pretensions of the Grand Monarch kept alive a spirit of opposition to him.

The question
of "immuni-
ties" at Rome.

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With incomprehensible obstinacy he had disputed the sovereign rights of the Pope within the city of Rome. The immunity granted to foreign embassies had there been carried to an excess not only abusive but intolerable. The practice had grown up of extending exemption from the municipal laws to persons and to houses having no connection with the families or palaces of the foreign ambassadors. In this way, whole streets had been filled with thieves, lewd women, counterfeiters, and professional assassins, who were beyond the reach of the courts of justice, because the arms of a foreign power were placed over the doors of their domiciles, or because they bore a *lettre de familiarité* attesting their dependence upon some ambassador. These privileges were openly sold by the majordomos of the embassies, thus affording to them a source of income and a means of exercising authority in their neighborhoods. Under cover of this protection every form of crime was practised, and whole quarters of the city — at one time amounting to nearly a third — were thus withdrawn from the jurisdiction of the police.¹

The Holy See had long resented and endeavored to suppress this evil, but had encountered great difficulties in the attempt. Most of the powers had, however, respected the earnest wish of Innocent XI to abolish it, but Louis XIV persistently maintained the right of his ambassador to accord these "immunities."

Soon after his accession, Innocent XI had announced that he would receive no diplomatic officer who would not previously consent to abandon this practice; and with the death of the French ambassador, D'Estrées, in January, 1687, an opportunity was presented for testing this decision.

Disputing the Pope's right to lay down conditions to his representative, Louis XIV instructed the new envoy, Lavardin, to enter Rome with an escort of a thousand soldiers and demand an audience of the Pope. Innocent XI not only refused to receive Lavardin, he promptly excommunicated him, and placed the church in which he was to take the com-

¹ See *Revue des Questions Historiques*, XXIII, pp. 20, 21.

munion under interdict. In response, the King caused an edict to be registered by his parliament declaring the Pope's bull invalid, and threatened to confiscate the papal estates if it was not withdrawn; but his opposition was unavailing.

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Whatever profit Louis XIV had expected to derive from his strenuous Catholicism was completely neutralized by his unfortunate relations with the Pope, whose authority he could not tolerate. Not only in the matter of the appointment of ecclesiastics in his own kingdom, — where he disputed the supremacy of the Holy See over the bishops, — but everywhere he found himself in conflict with the policies of Rome. All of the Catholic princes of Germany had been gradually alienated from him, and even Victor Amadeus, the gallant young duke of Savoy, had finally dared to disobey him. Much against his inclination, in 1686, the Duke, afraid of his powerful neighbor, had at his command inflicted a bloody persecution upon the feeble sect of Waldenses; but, in 1687, so strong was the influence of the papal interest in the war with the Turks, that he ventured to disobey the King by answering the call of Innocent XI to take part in the war against the Infidel, and undertook the forbidden journey to Venice.

The insubordination of Louis XIV to Rome

The effort of Louis XIV to secure for his devoted follower, William von Fürstenberg, the post of coadjutor to the Archbishop of Köln, *cum futura successione*, supported as it was by the use of French money and the menace of French arms, created in the Empire a universal irritation; for it was not only an unwarranted encroachment upon ecclesiastical jurisdiction, it plainly had for its object the military subordination of the archbishopric to France. Leopold I urged the Pope to annul the proceedings; but Innocent XI, who did not wish unnecessarily to arouse the King of France, suspended action until a later time.¹

In England, the re-establishment of Roman Catholicism was moving forward at a rapid rate. In June, 1687, James II insisted upon a public reception to the papal nuncio, and in the following January three apostolic vicars arrived from

The efforts of James II to re-establish Romanism

¹ See *Revue des Questions Historiques*, XXX, pp. 76, 127.

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Rome to aid in reorganizing the Catholic hierarchy in the kingdom. A month later, the King's illegal attack upon Magdalen College at Oxford ended in the installation of one of these vicars as the head of that ancient foundation, which was then transformed into a Roman Catholic seminary.

Had it not been for the King's obvious intention to restore the Roman religion by the exercise of his absolute authority, it would have been difficult, perhaps, to place James II in the wrong. The Declaration of Indulgence of April 27, 1688, in principle, appeared to be most just and reasonable. All dissenters from the Established Church were treated by it with equal liberality; and Quakers, Anabaptists, and Independents, equally with Roman Catholics, rejoiced in the freedom it accorded them. William Penn, who was believed by many to be the chief author of the Declaration, appeared at the head of a deputation to thank the King for this act of religious toleration; and grateful addresses were presented by all the previously proscribed bodies. But even the non-conformist Protestants recoiled before the obvious determination of James II to re-establish Roman Catholicism as a dominant religion. To them this meant the ultimate loss of both religious and political liberty. What they desired was a form of toleration which would respect the rights of conscience in the individual without the risk of placing Romanists in control of the State.

Had James II been willing to govern England as a constitutional monarch, his efforts for the relief of the Roman Catholics from their religious disabilities might have proved effectual. The laws forbidding them the right of public worship were in fact unjust, but the nation did not have faith in the King's sincerity. If, like Louis XIV, he had managed to have a genuine quarrel with the Pope, it would no doubt have rendered him more popular in England; but his differences with Innocent XI over appointments, while they alienated from him the sympathies and confidence of Rome, were not of a nature to win for him the popular support.

The advantage of this situation to the Prince of Orange

was soon to become apparent. The alleged, but disputed, birth of a son to the Queen of England, on June 10, 1688, after six years had passed without a sign of maternity, proved to be the turning-point in the tide of English sentiment. Until this unexpected event occurred the succession to the throne seemed secure to Mary of Orange, but with it suddenly ended the prospect of a Protestant sovereign as the successor of James II. The popular disappointment led to scandals of a kind that thoroughly agitated the nation. The suddenness of the birth had prevented the presence of the dignitaries whose testimony is usual on such occasions, and a charge of fraud was invented and circulated. Persons highly placed in the kingdom reported, and many were led to believe, that the child presented as the lawful heir to the throne had been foisted on the country by being introduced into the Queen's bed in a warming-pan.

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The birth of
a prince in
England

The trial of seven Protestant bishops, including the Archbishop of Canterbury, for petitioning the King to withdraw his second declaration of indulgence, coming in close connection with the appearance of the Catholic heir to the throne, — as it was assumed the supposititious child of Mary of Modena was intended to be, — created a feverish popular excitement, accompanied by public rejoicing when the jury in the case of the bishops finally returned its verdict of not guilty.

This combination of occurrences rendered inevitable the revolution that had long been preparing. The King had now completely lost public confidence. Fear existed that, in addition to the foreign troops already at his command, French aid would be invoked; and behind all these suspicions was the gratuitous supposition of a "popish plot."

For this extraordinary situation William of Orange was already prepared. He had long believed that, in order to restrain England from a future alliance with France, it was necessary to detach the English people from the policies of James II. Since England was a Protestant country, it should be made to count as a Protestant force in the equilibrium of Europe, where it was needed as a counterweight to

The attitude of
William III
on toleration

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the predominance of France. With this conviction he had calmly awaited the occasion when he would be called upon to intervene for this purpose by force of arms. That occasion had now arrived.

Fully and accurately informed regarding the state of public feeling in England through the reports of Dykvelt,¹ who in 1687 had been sent to London for the purpose of entering into confidential relations with the English Protestants, William III had advocated granting religious toleration, but he had refused to express his sanction of the revocation of the Test Act, which excluded Roman Catholics from public office. On November 4, 1687, this decision had been made in the form of a public declaration widely circulated both in England and on the continent.²

James II had not only proposed, he had insisted upon toleration; but it was believed that he intended eventually by the exercise of his royal prerogative to make England an exclusively Roman Catholic country. William III, on the other hand, was believed to be sincere in his love of toleration, limited only by the determination to prevent Romanism from dominating the State. In advocating the principle of toleration so far as the rights of conscience are concerned, while opposing the abolition of the Test Act, the Prince of Orange had found the formula which expressed the desire of the English nation.

The prepara-
tions of Wil-
liam III and
recall of Brit-
ish troops

As a result of the mission of Dykvelt and the later reports of another confidential agent, Zuylesteyn, an understanding was finally reached that, if military action should at any time become advisable, the Prince of Orange should be consulted and should assume the leadership. In these negotiations with political personages in London, the Prince seems not to have contemplated the complete overthrow of James II, much less the substitution of himself as King of England. At The Hague prayers continued to be offered

¹ Everard van Weede, Lord of Dykvelt.

² Over forty-five thousand copies of Fagel's letter containing the declaration of the Prince of Orange regarding toleration are said to have been sold in England before 1688.

for the royal family of England, including the infant prince now regarded as the probable heir to the throne, and outwardly there was every sign of friendship. The aim of William III was the control of the foreign policy of England by the friends of Holland and of Protestantism, and the frustration of the designs of Louis XIV.

Such was the attitude of William III when a series of events occurred which seemed to render necessary some decisive action.

After the end of Monmouth's rebellion, the six regiments of English and Scotch troops which had been recalled from Holland had been returned. The demand of James II that they be placed under Roman Catholic officers had, however, excited suspicion. This demand had been refused by the States General, and their peremptory recall early in 1688, — which it was believed had been ordered under the influence of Barillon, — was taken as a signal of alarm; for it was at this moment that Louis XIV was disclosing his designs upon Köln, and his attitude toward the United Provinces was considered menacing. When the release of the troops was refused, James II did not conceal his indignation, and in March he ordered all British subjects engaged in foreign service to return to England.

Taking advantage of the state of feeling between James II and the United Provinces, Louis XIV advised the King to intimidate the Dutch by making a show of hostility against them; and James II had the weakness to accept the advice. On April 19, 1688, an agreement was concluded with Louis XIV by which the King of France promised to contribute five hundred thousand livres for fitting out an English fleet, and also to pay for the maintenance of two regiments of the British troops recalled from Holland.

This action confirmed the truth of Van Citters' reports that there was collusion between James II and Louis XIV, and gave color to the supposition of their intended co-operation in continental affairs. In May, William III had reached the conclusion that, unless there was armed opposition, James II would attach England to the policies of Louis XIV,

James II
accepts aid
from Louis
XIV

The invita-
tion to Wil-
liam III to
bring an army
to England

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with the result that the conditions of 1672 would be repeated, and the United Provinces would be again left without defence. He did not hesitate, therefore, to say to Edward Russell, that, if he should receive an invitation from important persons in England, he was disposed to bring an army to their aid in settling the affairs of the kingdom.

The message did not long remain unanswered. On June 30, 1688, a letter to the Prince of Orange was signed by seven of the most influential statesmen in England, extending to him an invitation to land there with an armed force before the end of the year.¹ Admiral Herbert, an eminent officer who had been displaced because of his opposition to the repeal of the Test Act, in the guise of a common sailor, carried this extraordinary invitation to Holland and delivered it to the Prince.

So bold a step could probably never have been taken by men of high intelligence had it not been for the peculiar circumstances of the moment; but it was not doubted that the Prince of Orange, representing the deepest convictions of the English nation, would have a far different reception from that which had been accorded to the Duke of Monmouth.

The success of
William III
with the
States General

From the point of view of William III the enterprise necessarily assumed a serious character. He was not an absolute monarch, ruling over a people accustomed to obey his will and ready to follow him wherever he might lead. His people were republicans, accustomed to consider carefully all that they undertook, and little disposed to embark upon a sea of military adventure. Without their support he would be entirely helpless, and there was in the United Provinces a party certain to obstruct and if possible to thwart his plans. Even if he should win the assent of the States General to his enterprise and with their aid be provided with troops and a fleet to transport them to England, the withdrawal of these forces would leave the United Provinces exposed to invasion by Louis XIV.

While the Prince was conscious of all the impediments to

¹ The signers were Lords Shrewsbury, Devonshire, Danby, and Lumley, Bishop Compton, Edward Russell, and Henry Sidney.

the success of his plan, he was not for a moment inclined to abandon it as chimerical. He had solicited the invitation to come to England, and he was not disposed to disappoint those who had imperilled their lives in a cause which he felt was his as well as theirs.

Opposition in the United Provinces was, however, soon overcome. Count d'Avaux labored incessantly to revive and embolden the anti-Orange party, but his efforts were unavailing. Since the Revocation of the Edict of Nantes there had been awakened among the Dutch burghers a bitter feeling of resentment toward Louis XIV. Against this sentiment of sympathy with the outraged Huguenots, Count d'Avaux, who was already *persona non grata* to the Prince, was powerless. The recall of the British troops by James II had produced a double effect upon the Hollanders; it deprived them of a valued means for their own defence, and it suggested their use in England as an instrument for the repression of Protestantism. When to this state of feeling was added evidence that a secret understanding existed between James II and Louis XIV, the Prince of Orange had completely won his cause in the States General. To the imagination of the time the only alternative to the success of the expedition was another humiliation and probable defeat of Holland through an Anglo-French alliance.¹

The policy of Louis XIV in this critical situation was peculiarly complicated. It would have been easy for him to check the plans of William III by preventing his leaving the continent, but he had other interests to consider. If he could not force England into an active alliance with himself, which he found difficult, he could at least keep the English occupied, and thus render them powerless on the continent as he had so long succeeded in doing, by leaving James II to contend with his domestic troubles. His own interest seemed to him to lie in preparing for the inevitable contest over the Spanish succession by rendering the frontiers of France as strong as possible on the Rhine; for he

The activities
of Louis XIV
on the Rhine

¹ See Sirtena de Grovestins, *Guillaume III et Louis XIV*, V, pp. 462, 466.

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would there ultimately have to face the combined forces of the Empire, which was already organizing to resist his plans with regard to Spain. With the progress of the war in the East, it was becoming evident that this resistance would be more formidable than it had ever been. By the beginning of 1688, Hungary had not only been redeemed from occupation by the Turks, but the crown of that kingdom had been declared hereditary in the male line of the House of Hapsburg, and the eldest son of Leopold I, Joseph, had been crowned king with the assent of the nation.

The death of Maximilian Henry, Archbishop of Köln, in June, 1688, finally opened the question of succession to the archbishopric; and Louis XIV, determined to force the election of Fürstenberg, prepared to occupy the principality with his troops. The election did not result in a choice; and the final selection, therefore, fell to the Holy See. Innocent XI submitted the question to the College of Cardinals, who, on August 26, named the rival candidate, Joseph Clemens of Bavaria; and the Pope confirmed their choice.

Louis XIV was enraged, and resolved to make an exhibition of his power. The time was not propitious for engaging in a general war, for France was not in a financial condition to resist the whole of Europe; and the fall of Belgrade, on September 6, 1688, foreshadowed a speedy termination of the conflict with the Turks, by which the Emperor and the German princes would be released for the defence of the Empire in the West. If, however, the King of France could quickly strike a few telling blows, he might be able to force an early peace, by which he could confirm his previous conquests. On September 24, 1688, therefore, he issued a declaration of war, and two armies crossed the German frontier. The Dauphin with the main body of troops began the siege of Philipsburg, another division invaded the Palatinate, and to intimidate the Pope Avignon was occupied.

The accusations of Louis XIV against the Pope

To justify his action, Louis XIV complained of the existence of the League of Augsburg, — which really had no aggressive intention, — and claimed that the entrance of his troops into the archbishopric of Köln had for its main

object to retain the Prince of Orange upon the continent and save England.

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In a spirit of rather inconsequent accusation, Louis XIV further declared that the real cause of the war was the conduct of Innocent XI. To his ambassador at Rome he wrote: "The cessation of the war which is still progressing advantageously to Christendom in Hungary can be imputed only to the Pope, as well as the disadvantages which our religion may suffer from the divisions which His Holiness is fomenting among all the Catholic princes." At the same time he wrote to his ambassador at Constantinople: "I have decided to give protection to Cardinal Fürstenberg, . . . and to garrison my troops at Bonn and Kaiserwerth to prevent those of the Emperor from taking possession of those places; but I shall send a greater number into the Palatinate." He then added, that, as he was about to attack the Emperor and compel him to withdraw his troops from Hungary in order to employ them on the Rhine and in Italy, "the ambassador is authorized to let these intentions be known at Constantinople, with the purpose of showing how weak the Court of Vienna really is, and how easily the Turks could regain all they have lost in the last campaigns, if they took advantage of the present state of affairs in Europe." "I do not doubt," he says, in a despatch of October 18, 1688, "that the Turks are profiting from the terror which my arms have carried into the entire Empire."¹

It is from these side-lights upon the policy of Louis XIV that we are able to comprehend his inactivity regarding the expedition of the Prince of Orange to England. At the price of a solid alliance with England, Louis XIV would perhaps have endeavored to prevent the departure of the Prince from Holland; but the comparative indifference of James II and his own immediate interests made it convenient for him to remain passive. He had, in fact, previously offered to aid in preventing the embarkation of the Prince and his army; but James II, not wishing to seem dependent upon him

The relations
of Louis XIV
with James II

¹ See the citations in *Revue des Questions Historiques*, XXXIII, pp. 119, 127.

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for protection against invasion, refused to accept the offer. In fact, it was not believed at the English Court until it was too late that the armament of William III was really intended for the invasion of England.

From the beginning of his reign the foreign policy of James II had been undecided; but indecision at this critical moment was certain to prove fatal. His attitude on the subject of defence against the Prince of Orange was to Louis XIV so inconsiderate that at one moment the King of France made an effort to save him in spite of himself. The English ambassador at Versailles, Bevil Skelton, becoming alarmed by the preparations of the Prince of Orange for his expedition, requested Louis XIV to instruct Count d'Avaux to inform the States General that he, the King, was under obligation to regard any hostile movement against James II as a rupture with France; and, believing that this statement would check the plans of William III, this instruction was authorized. Had James II supported this representation, it is not improbable that the States General would have considered it inexpedient to provoke the hostility of Louis XIV; but when Van Citters inquired of the King if it was true that he had a secret treaty with France, he declared that he had no such treaty, that he was no "Fürstenberg requiring the protection of a patron," and that the King of France had no authority to act for him. To emphasize the indignation of James II with this transaction, Skelton was recalled from France and committed to the Tower.

The ambiguity
of James II's
attitude

It was difficult for Louis XIV to insist upon an understanding of which James II denied the existence, and in fact there was no formal treaty. While Van Citters refused to believe the truth of the King's reply, Louis XIV was too much offended by the tone of it to attempt any further assistance, and decided to permit James II to work out his own problem of defence.

The importation of troops into England from Ireland and Scotland without a frank and clear declaration of the use to be made of them served to augment the suspicion with which the King was regarded, and the fact that the new additions

to the army were largely composed of Roman Catholic troops commanded by Roman Catholic officers gave to these preparations a sinister appearance.

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There were two courses open to James II, either of which might have prevented his fall; a firm alliance with France on the one hand, or an alliance with Holland on the other. By the first he might at least have secured the active intervention of Louis XIV to occupy William III in Holland and prevent his expedition to England; and by the second, which would have made the Prince of Orange a supporter rather than a foe, he might have re-established himself in the confidence of his people. Unhappily for him, he was indisposed to accept either alternative; and, in consequence, he at the same time incurred the hostility of the Prince and lost the protection of the King of France.

It was this blindness to the importance of a wise and consistent foreign policy that led to the final overthrow of James II. While his conduct in domestic matters was exasperating to the English people, this alone would probably not have proved fatal to him. It is true, that he was not trusted by the nation; but the cause of distrust was not merely that the King was a Roman Catholic in his religious convictions. He might have been avowedly a Catholic king, so far as his personal faith was concerned, and still have retained the confidence of the nation had his public policy been truly national. What alienated confidence from the King was that his policy was strictly dynastic, and in opposition to the will of the nation. It was never forgotten that he was half-French by lineage and wholly French in his ideas and sympathies, a Bourbon of the Bourbons. As such he was an absolutist in feeling, and aimed at establishing absolutism as a system. Like his brother, Charles II, he was believed to be in secret relations with Louis XIV; and since the Revocation of the Edict of Nantes, Louis XIV, always regarded with aversion in England, was universally detested.

The antagonism of dynastic and national policies

In spite of his denials, judged by every practical test, James II was in sympathy with the most atrocious acts of Louis XIV. In 1686 he had caused to be burned by the

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public executioner the book of the Huguenot pastor Claude, in which he recounted the persecutions to which his church had been subjected; and had prevented by an arbitrary decision the charity of the English people in behalf of the suffering refugees, requiring that, in order to be eligible to obtain it, they must first receive the sacrament in the Anglican church. No previous king of England had ever so disregarded the feeling of the nation concerning the dominance of France upon the continent. Even Charles II had been compelled by Parliament to abandon his open treaty relations with Louis XIV for the subjugation of Holland, and was forced by the will of the nation to make peace with the United Provinces. The conflict between the national and the dynastic policies had in 1688 become so tense that the King did not dare to call a parliament to abrogate the Test Act, knowing that it would with practical unanimity vote for resistance to the aggressions of France.

The attitude of
Europe toward
the English
Revolution

It is, in fact, impossible to comprehend the English Revolution of 1688 without an understanding of the European situation which rendered it inevitable. The conflict between the dynastic and the national policies in England was in reality not only a local but a European issue. Locally, the question was whether the personal will of the sovereign or the will of the nation as expressed through Parliament should prevail. But, even locally considered, that issue was vitally related to the European situation, because it practically determined the part England was to play in the course of events in Europe.

The same conflict that was agitating England was dividing Europe also, and the English Revolution was only part of a greater movement of resistance. In England, James II was disputing the authority of the laws of Parliament; on the continent, Louis XIV was violating the treaties which constituted the public law of Europe. In both cases the aggressions were actuated by the same spirit and defended by the same theory, — the non-existence of legal restrictions upon the will of the sovereign.¹

¹ This was clearly seen by the Huguenot pamphleteers in Holland,

The Catholic princes of Europe, and even the Pope, could, therefore, passively look on while the Protestant Prince of Orange crossed the North Sea with an army and dethroned a Catholic king; for as much as the Protestants of England needed William of Orange to help them in resisting the absolutism of James II, the sovereigns of Europe needed the aid of England in overcoming the absolutism of Louis XIV. In the eyes of the Pope, the Emperor, and all the princes of the Empire, William of Orange had a better right to invade England than Louis XIV had to take possession of the archbishopric of Köln and to subjugate the Palatinate.

It is impossible to deny that considerations of religion played a certain rôle in causing the English Revolution of 1688, but an analysis of the motives immediately operative in the minds of the principal actors in that extraordinary drama shows that it was not caused by differences of religious faith alone. It is true, no doubt, that without the excitement produced over questions of religion the English Revolution of 1688 would not have occurred, or at least would not have occurred in the way it did. The strong undercurrent of feeling that led to the revolution was the terror of the English and the Dutch Protestants, produced by the foreboding that, if not resisted, a reign of absolutism like that which had crushed the Huguenots in France would in time overwhelm and destroy them also. They were, therefore, they believed, compelled to resist in order to preserve their existence. But, when it came to the time of action, the danger to liberty of conscience was not so great as it had seemed. In England, in spite of the popular cry of "No popery!" the Pope was not arrayed among the enemies of the English nation; and Louis XIV was openly accusing him of encouraging the expedition of the Prince of

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The subor-
dination of
religious
motives

who produced a quantity of literature against royal absolutism. The chief of these writings was the series of memoirs by Jurien, *Les soupirs de la France esclave qui aspire après la liberté*, published in 1688, and followed by many others. The State, Jurien argues, ought to be reformed, for states are depositories of sovereignty superior to that of kings. See Sirtena de Grovestins, *Guillaume III et Louis XIV*, V, pp. 424, 427.

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Orange.¹ In Holland, the King of France, although he had said there would be a diplomatic rupture with France if the States General moved against James II, was not threatening an invasion of the country. In the Empire, there was no alignment of Catholics against Protestants, and the aggressions of Louis XIV at that moment were all directed against Catholics; — against the Pope in Avignon, against the decision of the College of Cardinals in Köln, and against a Catholic Elector in the Palatinate. His only ally, who was soon to desert him, was the Protestant King of Denmark, while included in the League of Augsburg were the Emperor and the King of Spain.

Outside of England, there was nowhere any strictly religious question in controversy, and even in England there was no doctrinal debate. It was the political aspect of religion only that was anywhere at issue, — the right of the sovereign to dictate in matters of a religious nature and to abolish laws and guarantees already in existence. The fears in which the spirit of revolt had its origin no doubt in part persisted, but the revolt itself was not to be suppressed by removing immediate apprehensions. A resolution had been reached to dispute the pretensions of the King as being in principle dangerous, and a conflict had thus become inevitable.

The conciliatory efforts of James II

When at last, in September, 1688, James II became convinced that William of Orange was really intending to invade England with an army, he sought to regain popular favor by making concessions; but it was too late. On September 21 his minister at The Hague was authorized to deny the existence of any treaty with France, and to offer as a proof of it to unite with the Dutch in maintaining the Treaty of Nymwegen and the Truce of Regensburg.

But these concessions and assurances made no serious impression. The English attributed the King's conciliatory spirit to his fear of the Prince of Orange, to whom alone they felt indebted for the concessions granted; while the Dutch

¹ See the letter to Cardinal d'Estrées, in Dumont, VII, Part II, p. 167.

accepted the explanation of Van Citters, who affirmed that the King's professions of amity were intended only to arrest the preparations of the Prince. The only practical effect, therefore, was to complete the alienation of Louis XIV, who had already violated the treaties which James II offered to aid in defending. When afterward James II implored the assistance previously offered and refused, Louis XIV coolly informed him that he was not at that time prepared to furnish any aid.

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Thus delivered from the fear of an attack upon Holland, the Prince of Orange was ready in October for his descent upon England. The "papist wind," as the unfavorable breeze from the West was called, which had prevented his sailing, having ceased on the nineteenth, he set sail from Helvoetsluis with about fifty vessels of war and a fleet of transports bearing an army of more than twelve thousand men; but a storm dispersed his fleet in the middle of the North Sea, and he was obliged to return. On November 1, without the loss of a ship, he was again ready to set sail; and, four days later, after eluding the English fleet which lay at Harwich, William III, accompanied by ex-Marshal Schomberg, with his entire armament entered the bay of Torbay, where he landed without opposition.

The descent
of William III
upon England

The banners of the Prince of Orange bore the legend:

PRO RELIGIONE PROTESTANTE — PRO LIBERO PARLAMENTO
JE MAINTIENDRAI

To the intense disappointment of the Prince there was no popular demonstration in his favor, and the foreign army seemed for a time to be an object of aversion. Had the King shown wisdom and courage, the Prince of Orange would no doubt soon have found himself without support in England; but from the first James II had entertained the idea of flight and prepared for it. The alternatives before him were the acceptance of a free parliament and submission to its conclusions on the one hand, or a temporary asylum with Louis XIV and the hope of full restoration with the aid of France

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on the other. He decided to seek refuge in France, and after some mishaps, on December 22, succeeded in leaving England.

Unwilling to use force unnecessarily, the Prince of Orange had quietly waited, in conference with his English friends, with the intention of finally imposing conditions upon the King; but the flight of James II left England without a monarch. On December 24 the Peers invited the Prince to summon a Parliament, and on the twenty-sixth the Commoners made a similar request. Parliament having assembled, on February 6, 1689, the throne was declared vacant by the Peers, and the Prince of Orange and the Princess Mary were declared King and Queen of England. The two Houses confirmed the act, and on the thirteenth William III and Mary II were formally proclaimed the sovereigns.

III. THE DIPLOMACY OF WILLIAM OF ORANGE TO THE PEACE OF RYSWICK

The significance of the King's flight

The flight of James II to France confirmed in the minds of the English people the convictions they had formed regarding the King's secret intentions. If he had been willing to call a parliament and conform to its decisions, there was no reason why he should resort to flight at all; and, if his object was simply to avoid bloodshed by temporary withdrawal, he might have retired to Scotland or Ireland in his own dominions. The fact that the fugitive king took refuge in France was an open confession that, as he had assured Barillon, "his heart was still French," and that it was upon French support that he intended to rely in his extremity.

Although the Prince of Orange was a foreigner by birth and personally cold, reserved, and unsympathetic, he had rightly interpreted the national sentiment regarding the attitude of the King, and the flight to France was proof that even in the King's own judgment it was William of Orange and not himself who represented the will of the nation.

The aims of William III

William III had, indeed, come to England to contend for a free parliament and the Protestant religion; but it was not the internal interests of the English nation that had

brought him there with a Dutch army. The expedition could never have received the support of the States General and the people of the United Provinces if its purpose had been merely to place the Prince upon the throne of England, much less if it had been only to settle certain constitutional questions for the benefit of Englishmen.

The invasion of England by the Prince of Orange was intended by him as an indirect attack upon the policies of Louis XIV. This was the understanding in Holland, and without it participation in the expedition by the Dutch army and navy would have been impossible. The interest of the United Provinces in this bold and dangerous adventure grew out of the fear of ultimate extinction as a Protestant nation in case there should be an eventual alliance between Louis XIV and the King of England. From this point of view their salvation depended upon success in changing the attitude of England toward the struggle with France. So long as England continued to be held in a state of neutrality by the controversies between King and Parliament, the Grand Monarch would have a free hand upon the continent. To the imagination of the time this signified that he would gradually encroach upon the Empire until he was master of its destinies, then annex the Spanish Netherlands and absorb the United Provinces, and finally unite the crowns of France and Spain; thus establishing a practically universal monarchy in which Catholicism would be the official religion, and every form of dissent would ultimately be exterminated. If, as was feared, England should fall so completely under the control of James II that he would be able to form an open alliance with Louis XIV for the annihilation of Protestantism, the destruction of the Republic and the subjugation of Europe would be even more speedily accomplished. To prevent this catastrophe, England must be ranged with the United Provinces and the other Protestant powers of Europe in their conflict with the King of France.

This then was the chief purpose of the bold enterprise of William III in invading England. Louis XIV perfectly understood it, and had for that reason offered his aid to

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The relation
of the Revolution
to the conflict
with
Louis XIV

James II to prevent it. James II understood it also, but it was only after William III had actually landed in England that he became fully aware that he had to choose between submission to the will of the nation and the abandonment of his kingdom. The way was still open to him to retain his throne. There was no attempt to force his abdication. He still had the opportunity to abandon his dynastic policies and accept the will of the nation. Had he embraced that opportunity, he would have received the support of his people, the Prince of Orange and his army would have quietly withdrawn from England, the United Provinces would have been satisfied, all the continental powers, including the Pope, would have approved his action, and his rule would have continued. The alternative was an appeal to Louis XIV to compel the English nation to restore him to his throne and sustain his prerogatives as an absolute monarch. In England, therefore, after the King's flight, the conflict was not so much with James II as with the power that since the Treaty of Dover had frustrated the will of the nation in international affairs. Seen in its wider relations, the English Revolution of 1688 was merely an act in a more comprehensive drama, — the conflict of Europe with the plans and pretensions of Louis XIV. Had it not been for the interest of Holland in that conflict and the relations believed to exist between the Kings of France and England, the Revolution might never have occurred.

The precau-
tions of
William III
for the safety
of Holland

From the first, William of Orange and Frederick William of Brandenburg had comprehended the wider import of the opposition to James II that had been preparing in England; and together they had labored to fortify resistance to Louis XIV on every side. The Great Elector did not live to witness the invasion of England, but he was deeply interested in it, and to the last encouraged the Prince of Orange to carry out the plan he had proposed at the time of James II's accession to challenge his tenure of the throne.

In preparing for his expedition to England William III had taken care not to leave the United Provinces unprotected. When in 1687 the Prince of Wales was born, the Elector had

been deeply moved. At his court was a noted Huguenot refugee, the French ex-Marshal Schomberg, whom he had taken into his service and made the generalissimo of his armies. That experienced officer, who bitterly resented the persecution of his co-religionists in France, was devoted to the Prince of Orange, and accompanied him on his voyage of invasion. In February, 1688, General Spaen had been sent to The Hague; and, according to Count d'Avaux, the Elector then promised to place nine thousand Brandenburg troops in the Duchy of Cleve to cover the defence of Holland on the lower Rhine, while the Prince was absent in England.¹ With characteristic finesse, Frederick William denied the report; but after his death, which occurred on May 9, 1688, the promised troops were furnished by his son, Frederick III, who succeeded him as Elector.²

In June of that year a new and closer alliance with Brandenburg had been concluded, and Frederick III, — as zealous for the common cause as his father, the Great Elector, — had in July united with the Landgrave of Hesse, the Elector of Saxony, the King of Sweden, the Bishop of Münster, the Elector Palatine, and the princes of the Circle of Westphalia to resist an attack by Louis XIV.³ A few weeks before his embarkation, William of Orange and Frederick III held a conference at which the last military agreements were made; and soon afterward Brandenburg troops took possession of Köln to prevent a sudden sally of the French, and the promised army for protecting the United Provinces was sent to Cleve.⁴ On October 22, Ernest Augustus of Hanover joined the other confederates in the Magdeburg Concert,⁵ and

¹ See Waddington, *Le Grand Electeur*, II, pp. 585, 586.

² To the last moment of his life Frederick William was deeply interested in the invasion of England. Only a few days before his death the password given out to the garrison at Potsdam was "London and Amsterdam."

³ See Moerner, *Staatsverträge*, p. 500 et seq.

⁴ Erdmannsdörffer, *Deutsche Geschichte*, I, p. 728.

⁵ Although the Magdeburg Concert is far less referred to by historians than the League of Augsburg, it was vastly more important. It

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Louis XIV's
decision to
sustain
James II

twenty-two thousand men were stationed on the middle and lower Rhine.

The ability of William III to accomplish his main purpose of throwing the weight of England into the balance of Europe depended upon the action of Louis XIV. It seemed quite certain that the new ruler of England, surrounded on every side by domestic problems, would soon suffer from a reaction by which he would be kept fully occupied in England; and that the English nation, once rid of its absolute monarch and confronted with constitutional questions, would have little inclination to plunge into a foreign war in which the national interests were not seriously at stake. In that case, Louis XIV would still have the advantage of England's neutrality, while the United Provinces would remain weakened by the absence of the stadtholder, its chief military commander, together with a great portion of its army. If, therefore, the King of France, without making a show of hostility, should leave England to reckon alone with her new sovereign, his own position on the continent would for some time at least remain essentially unaltered, leaving him free to employ all his resources against his continental foes.

But Louis XIV had already decided this question. He had resolved that he would never passively submit to the loss of control in England.

Louis XIV
forces war
upon England

The decision of Louis XIV to take up the cause of the fugitive king and compel his restoration enabled William III to attain the chief object he had in view in the invasion, namely, to enlist all the forces of England against the Grand Monarch. Without Louis XIV's open hostility, the whole theory underlying the Revolution might soon have been discredited. Opposition to James II was chiefly based on the supposition that he was acting in collusion with France, and that Louis XIV was in reality the *deus ex machina* of his dynastic policies. Had the King of France not interfered in the conflict between James II and his people, the pre-

was aggressive in character, whereas the League of Augsburg was only defensive. See Moerner, *Staatsverträge*, pp. 505 and 772.

ponderant influence of Louis XIV over the last two sovereigns might soon have been forgotten, and William of Orange might have been made to appear as the hated foreigner and usurper.

In fact, William III was not received in England with enthusiasm, and he did not possess the personal qualities to make himself liked on his own account. He had come and had been accepted as a political necessity. But in the absence of manifest hostility on the part of Louis XIV, William III could not easily have drawn England into a war with France. It is true, that English sympathies were against the persecutions and English interests were adverse to the aggressions of the King of France; but there were too many domestic problems to be solved in England to allow a foreign war in which no great material advantage was to be gained to become popular. The most that William III could have done without an open challenge from Louis XIV would have been to throw the moral weight of England against the policies of the King of France.

But, to the great delight of William III, his antagonist without hesitation espoused the cause of James II and attempted to enforce his restoration to the throne; and from that moment the die was cast. It was thereafter indisputable that, as an English historian has expressed it, in taking refuge in France the fugitive king had simply "gone home." The whole theory of the Revolution was thereby justified. England had no choice. If the struggle of constitutionalism against absolutism was to be maintained, England must join the continental powers in resisting the predominance of France.

The circumstances in which William of Orange came to England presented many serious obstacles to the realization of his purpose. There was in England a strong party attached to the fortunes of James II and expecting to derive advantage from his policies. Violence on the part of the stranger who had brought a foreign army to the soil of a proud and independent nation would instantly have turned the popular sentiment against him. The proposal on his part to involve England in a continental war for the defence

The prudent
 policy of
 William III

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of Holland would have alienated a large portion of the nation from him. But it was a characteristic of William III to do nothing to force public opinion. In the matter dearest to him he did nothing even to hasten its development. The English nation desired to re-establish its constitution, and the Parliament was its normal instrument for the ascertainment and expression of the national will. It was to its free decisions that he owed his accession to the throne, and it was only through its free deliberations that he could hope to retain it.

As regards religion, although the Queen was an Anglican and he was a Calvinist, thus representing together the convictions of the greater part of the nation, he did nothing to embarrass or exasperate the Roman Catholics.¹ Having announced the broad principle of toleration, in spite of opposition he remained true to its spirit.

His high intelligence as a statesman was soon made evident by his abstention from every form of arbitrary action. While maintaining the authority of the Crown, he recognized that the source of its power was the will of the nation. He did not even try to impose upon Parliament his own ideas. The time came when he found it necessary to silence its dissensions, but not until the nation realized the danger of its internal conflicts. Since the time of Elizabeth England had never been so free to follow in the way marked out by the national will. When at last it found itself engaged in war because of French aggression, instead of reproaches for having caused the conflict William III received the loyal support of the nation he had come to save, and to which he was more than ever indispensable.

If William III was chiefly indebted for his success to his own self-control and moderation, he owed it in part also to Louis XIV's sense of his own omnipotence. Accustomed to think lightly of England's power of resistance, Louis XIV

Louis XIV's
belief in the
weakness of
England

¹ Parliament, however, was not so lenient. A statute was passed expelling Roman Catholics from London and Westminster. Subsequently they were deprived of arms and forbidden to possess a horse worth more than five pounds.

did not realize the immensity of the task that was before him. Since the Treaty of Dover he had regarded England as a mere dependency. Had the national will been entirely free to express itself, there would have been no attempt to humiliate the United Provinces, no dictation by him of the Treaties of Nymwegen, no confiscations by the *Chambres de Réunion*, no appropriation of Luxemburg and Strasburg, and perhaps no Revocation of the Edict of Nantes. The effacement of England's international influence by means of subsidies had proved a comparatively easy undertaking, and Louis XIV believed that a few heavy blows on his part would still ruin the cause of William III and restore the country to James II. As a naval power, France was still superior to England; and with Ireland anti-Orangist, Scotland still doubtful, and the loyalty of the army to the new sovereign as yet untried, it seemed probable that the Revolution might end in failure.

It was, however, necessary to strike quickly. On November 26, 1688, soon after the landing of the Dutch army in England, Louis XIV declared war on the United Provinces. Receiving with cordiality James II and his family upon their arrival in France, without a formal declaration of war with England he immediately began preparations for the restoration of the fugitive king.

The prospects of success were greatly heightened by the situation in Ireland, which at once declared for James II. On March 12, 1689, James II, in response to an invitation to come to Ireland, arrived at Kinsale with a fleet fitted out by Louis XIV at Brest, well supplied with money, arms, munitions, and a body of French officers, accompanied by Count d'Avaux as political adviser.

The attitude
of Ireland and
Scotland

The plan of James II was, after organizing the undisciplined and ill-armed Irish forces numbering some fifty thousand men, to drive the adherents of William III from the North of Ireland, then to proceed to Scotland, where a rising in the highlands in favor of James II was expected, and finally to descend into England for the recovery of the throne.

In Scotland there had been a period of indecision growing

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out of the conflict of parties; but soon after the arrival of James II in Ireland, on March 26, a convention assembled at Edinburgh decided that he had "forfeited the crown" and a commission was sent to London to offer it to William and Mary. Without waiting for their acceptance, the new rulers were publicly proclaimed in Scotland.

On May 4, after Ireland was in full revolt with the support of France, William III published a manifesto setting forth the manner in which Louis XIV was supporting James II, and on the seventeenth followed it with a declaration of war.

England was now at last, with its full consent, brought into open hostility with Louis XIV, but it still remained uncertain who would profit by this conflict; for, although William III was now permitted to employ the forces of England against the King of France, it was certain that he would be for some time occupied with the revolt of Ireland and prevented from acting freely on the continent.

The comple-
tion of the
Grand
Alliance

Diplomatic action on the part of William III was, however, now greatly facilitated. He had resolved from the first to retain in his own hands as a royal prerogative the direction of foreign policy, but to act in harmony with the prevailing desires of the nation. The preliminaries for the Grand Alliance — as the offensive union for the war with France was afterward called — had been already arranged at The Hague. The attack of Louis XIV upon the Empire and his declaration of war upon Holland had made their union necessary, and on May 12, 1689, the treaty of offensive alliance was signed at Vienna.¹

With the progress of the revolution in England the tide had turned on the continent, and the intimidations of Louis XIV were answered with defiance. Continued victories over the Turks had inspired new courage in the Empire and permitted resistance to the new aggressions of France. At Madrid French influence had received a blow by the death of the Queen, and Charles II was more closely drawn to the Court of Vienna through his marriage with Maria of Neu-

¹ See Dumont, VII, Part II, p. 229 et seq.

burg, a sister of the Empress. The purely defensive League of Augsburg was being rapidly transformed into a network of aggressive alliances inspired with new confidence by the accession of the Prince of Orange to the throne of England. Before the end of the year, on December 20, after having previously concluded compacts with the United Provinces for aggressive action in the war with France,¹ William III added England to the Grand Alliance, with the announced purpose of reinstating the conditions prescribed by the Treaties of Westphalia and the Treaty of the Pyrenees.² All Europe was now leagued against France.³

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In place of the vast diplomatic combination by which Louis XIV had isolated the United Provinces in 1672, the Prince of Orange had gradually built up a coalition greater than any which had previously existed in Europe, by which in turn Louis XIV was left in complete isolation. Diplomacy had reached its limit, and for the next four years there are few diplomatic changes or negotiations to record. William III had succeeded in uniting Europe so completely that little remained for him to do; and the Grand Monarch, cut off from regular diplomatic intercourse by the dismissal of his ambassadors from most of the foreign courts, was reduced to secret operations through obscure agencies, mostly of an ecclesiastical character.⁴

The progress
of the war on
the continent

Since the autumn of 1688, when Louis XIV began his open attack on the Empire, he had taken possession of Philippsburg, Mannheim, and Frankenthal, and had devastated the Palatinate with fire and sword, burning Heidelberg, Speyer, Worms, and many other cities. He had created a feeling of horror throughout Germany by re-enacting the

¹ For the treaties with the United Provinces, of August, 1689, see Dumont, VII, Part II, p. 236 et seq.

² See Dumont, VII, Part II, p. 241. Spain acceded to the Grand Alliance on June 6, 1690. See Dumont, VII, Part II, p. 267.

³ Denmark had formed an alliance with England on August 15, 1689. See Dumont, VII, Part II, p. 237.

⁴ Barillon had been immediately sent away from England on the accession of William III, and Rébenac left Madrid on March 25, 1689, after the failure of his mission.

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scenes of the Thirty Years' War. But these cruelties were a sign of weakness rather than of strength. Fully comprehending that in the end he could not overcome the powerful coalition that confronted him, Louis XIV wished as quickly as possible by his excesses to strike terror into the hearts of his enemies, and thus force upon them an early peace. The area of the conflict was, however, rapidly widening; and, while the Brandenburg troops drove the French out of the electorate of Köln, occupied Kaiserswerth and besieged Bonn, the Prince of Waldeck, as generalissimo of the United Provinces, under the orders of William III, led the Dutch forces augmented by Spanish and English auxiliaries under Marlborough into Brabant, and the Duke of Lorraine with sixty thousand men invested Mainz. Driven back from the Rhine, the French, under the command of Luxemburg, — the ablest disciple of Condé in the art of war, — soon made the Spanish Netherlands the principal seat of hostilities, which by concentration changed the character of the conflict in both a military and a political sense; for the German princes, united for the defence of their country, presently showed signs of weakening when the struggle was diverted from the Rhine and centred upon Brabant and Flanders.¹

The war for
the recovery
of Ireland

In the meantime, William III was preoccupied with the war in Ireland. The island had suffered much from the stern domination of England, and had never forgotten that it was subject to a conqueror. Cherishing fondly the tradition of its independence, it had never ceased to struggle under the yoke imposed upon it. Devotedly Roman Catholic in religion, the majority of the population had long suffered a cruel deprivation of religious freedom, which had been partly restored during the latter part of the rule of James II. The welcome accorded to him was, therefore, fervent and the devotion of the people manifest, but from the first there was a contradiction of purposes fatal to the perfect concord of the fugitive king and the Irish patriots.

James II's idea in coming to Ireland with the aid of the

¹ The military movements are well outlined by Lonchay, *La rivalité de la France et de l'Espagne*, pp. 311, 322.

King of France was to use the island as a stepping-stone for remounting the throne of England. The aim of the Irish, on the contrary, — with the exception of the Protestants, who were greatly in the minority, — was to secure the entire independence of the kingdom, and to make Roman Catholicism the official religion to the exclusion of every other.

The harsh and arbitrary measures resulting from the attempt of James II to rule the country, with whose sentiments his own policies were in conflict, together with the poverty from which it suffered, rendered his short reign an unhappy one for all. The heroic defence of Londonderry by its Protestant population, the sending of Schomberg to Ireland with an inadequate army, and the efforts of William III to rouse the English Parliament to the serious character of the situation produced no change. It was not until William III, discouraged with the quarrels of Whigs and Tories, dissolved the Parliament which had placed him upon the throne and called a new one, that he was able to embark for Ireland.

On June 14, 1690, William III landed with his army at Carrickfergus. At the battle of the Boyne, fought on July 1, in which William III was wounded and Schomberg was killed, the forces of James II were so completely routed and demoralized that he fled at once to Dublin, and soon afterward to France. The war in Ireland had still to be continued, but the battle of the Boyne was the turning point. In asserting that this brief conflict decided the future of Europe as well as of Ireland, as a historian has done,¹ there may seem at first to be some exaggeration, for it is by the combination of events, and not by any single action, that the course of history is determined; but the reconquest of Ireland, which followed as a result of this battle, established beyond question the position of William III in England, which in turn was decisive for the success of the Revolution of 1688 and for the fate of Europe in the struggle on the continent.

Returning to England in the following September, William III, though received as a hero, was encompassed with serious parliamentary problems. The English navy had

The return of
William III
to Holland

¹ Siretana de Grovestins, *Guillaume III et Louis XIV*, VI, p. 205.

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suffered a damaging defeat by the French, on June 30, in the battle of Beachy Head, which left France triumphant on the sea. While the war in Ireland continued and while the French were in command of the channel, the prospect of rendering active aid to the allies on the continent was not promising. Yet, on January 18, 1691, William III set out for Holland, which he reached with difficulty.

During the absence of the Stadtholder in England, the Grand Pensionary, Fagel, to whose hands the government of Holland had been confided, had died, and had been succeeded by Anthony Heinsius, who was thenceforth the confidential representative of William III and practically the governor of the United Provinces.

The presence of William III, returning from his successful expedition not only a crowned king but a victor in battle, made a deep impression upon the Dutch people and upon all Europe.

In his speech to the States General he said: "When I took leave of you, I informed you of my intention to go to England to save that kingdom, thanks to your aid, from a deluge of evils present and to come. Providence has blessed my enterprise, and the nation has offered me the crown of three kingdoms. I have accepted it, not through ambition, — God is my witness, — but to place the religion, the welfare, and the peace of Great Britain in a position of safety, and to be able to protect more effectually the allies, and particularly the Republic, from the preponderance of France. . . . If it please God for me to become the instrument which Providence may use in restoring peace to Europe and establishing the security of your state, I shall have lived sufficiently and shall descend with tranquillity to my grave."

The Congress
of the Grand
Alliance at
The Hague

At the time of the King's arrival there had assembled at The Hague representatives of all the states composing the Grand Alliance. On October 20, 1690, the Duke of Savoy had joined the Alliance, and had accepted a condition stipulated by the Protestant princes to the effect that he would release all the Waldenses whom he held in prison, and restore

to their parents the children who had been taken from them to be educated in the Roman faith.¹

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Besides the ambassadors and other diplomatic agents of the greater powers, many princes of the Empire were present in person; among them the Elector of Brandenburg, the Elector of Bavaria, Max Emmanuel, — who, on December 12, 1691, was to receive his letters patent as governor of the Spanish Netherlands,²— the Landgrave of Hesse-Darmstadt, and the Dukes of Brunswick, Würtemberg, and Holstein.

The representatives of the allies had just signed an agreement that no one of the powers that had joined the Grand Alliance would treat with the King of France until he had subscribed to the following conditions: First, the restitution of all the conquests made by France since the Peace of Westphalia; second, satisfaction to the Holy See and reparation of the outrages committed against the Court of Rome under the pontificate of Innocent XI; and third, rehabilitation of the Protestants in France and a promise to accord to them the liberty of conscience of which they had been deprived by the Revocation of the Edict of Nantes.

The moment seemed to have arrived when merely local political interests were to be temporarily laid aside in the effort to enforce the recognition of principles of justice as the basis of international relations. It is true, that the last of the three conditions just named implies a right of intervention on the part of the associated powers which had not been established, and would not have been generally accepted by themselves; for the Peace of Westphalia left the regulation of religion to each separate sovereign within his own jurisdiction, and the right of foreign powers to enforce toleration upon one another had never been asserted or even

¹ See Dumont, VII, Part II, p. 272 et seq.

² For the efforts of Louis XIV to win over Max Emmanuel by the intermediary of Villars and the means used by Leopold I to retain his allegiance through the influence of Kaunitz and to secure for him the governorship of the Spanish Netherlands, see the details given by Legrelle, *La diplomatie française et la succession d'Espagne*, I, p. 289 et seq.

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recognized by any one of them. From this point of view, the last demand of the allies, though just, was no doubt excessive; still, these resolutions indicate a deeper sense of equity and a firmer resolution to support it than had ever before been displayed by any similar international conference. It was at least an effort to challenge the reign of absolutism, and to impose upon the disturber of the peace of Europe a respect for treaties and for the rights which they embodied.

William III
before the
Congress

The welcome given by the Congress to William III was a tribute such as had never been paid to any sovereign of his generation. It was sincere, spontaneous, and enthusiastic, recognizing in him not only the King of England, Scotland, and Ireland but the champion of the national liberties of Europe. He was hailed and treated as a great deliverer. With a spirit of fraternity unknown in any previous international assembly, the princes had waived among themselves all regard for ceremonial, and had met upon a plane of equality; but to William III they displayed every mark of deference.

A man of action and not of words, he earnestly wished to inspire his allies with courage. In his discourse to the Congress he said:

“The states of Europe have too long given themselves up to a spirit of division, of indolence, and of inattention to their highest interests; but, if the dangers with which France threatens them recall them to the realization of their past errors, they also show the necessity of repairing them. It is no longer a time to deliberate but to act. Already the King of France has rendered himself master of all the strong places bordering upon his kingdom, which were the only barriers that we possessed against his ambition; if we do not at once oppose him in this, he will soon take all the rest. The special interest of each is bound up with the general interest of all. The forces of the enemy are considerable, and he will sweep everything before him like a torrent. We must rescue with the sword the liberties of Europe which he means to stifle, or else submit for ever to the yoke of servitude. As for me, I shall spare neither my credit, nor

my forces, nor my person to obtain this glorious result; and I shall come in the spring at the head of my troops to conquer or to perish with my allies."

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The courage and energy of William III had an electrical effect upon the Congress, which immediately undertook to fix the quota of troops to be furnished by each of the allies. The Emperor, England, and Spain each agreed to place in the field twenty thousand men; the United Provinces, thirty-five thousand; the Duke of Savoy and the Elector of Brandenburg each twenty thousand; the Elector of Bavaria, eighteen thousand; the Dukes of Brunswick, sixteen thousand; the Elector of Saxony, twelve thousand; the Circles of Suabia and Franconia, ten thousand; the Landgrave of Hesse, eight thousand; the Bishop of Münster, seven thousand; the Duke of Würtemberg and the Bishop of Liège, each six thousand; the Elector Palatine, four thousand; making in all an army of two hundred and twenty-two thousand men. When this formidable roll-call was ended, it seemed as if Louis XIV was doomed to complete overthrow.

The absence of Sweden and Denmark from the list of contingents just given requires explanation. During the Congress of The Hague they had proposed mediation. Secure from attack by France, owing to their geographical position, and anxious to profit from the war by securing the trade which the other maritime powers were losing on account of it, the Scandinavian kingdoms were not enthusiastic in opposing Louis XIV. Denmark had already in exchange for liberal subsidies made an agreement with England, and was, therefore, less independent; but Sweden, relying largely upon the traffic in mercenaries, was eager to obtain money for military service. Taking advantage of these propensities of the Scandinavian powers, Louis XIV was ready to pay for the division and discouragement of the allies by schemes of mediation; but William III would not listen to proposals which could only have the effect of weakening the Grand Alliance. As for subsidies, all the German princes were in need of money, and the maintenance of their armies fell by necessity very heavily upon England and the United Prov-

The indecisive
character of
the conflict

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inces, already overburdened. William III's policy, therefore, was to make a quick campaign and to bring his opponent to a peaceful disposition by a rapid succession of telling blows.

The Congress of The Hague foreshadowed a decisive victory for the Grand Alliance, but its promises were never fully kept. As in every great coalition composed of stronger and weaker powers, the weaker placed their reliance upon the stronger, and there were many disappointments. The delinquencies of Spain caused the loss of the important fortress of Mons, taken by the French in March, 1691, just as William III was coming to the rescue. The Bishop of Münster and the Duke of Hanover remained immobile. The capitulation of Namur brought the enemy within three days' march of the Dutch frontier. The Elector Palatine was occupied in defending his own territory; the French troops released by the fall of Namur were sent to the Rhine; and the Hessians, who should have joined the army of the Rhine, went by orders from Vienna to protect the Mosel. It was only when the King of England was personally on the scene that the allies made perceptible progress in the field. Yet nothing decisive happened on either side.

The plans for
a descent upon
England

In the meantime, every one was growing weary of the war. Ireland had been reduced to obedience, but political conditions in England gave new hope to James II, who in January, 1692, believed that he would be welcomed by the nation, if he landed there.

William III had, indeed, many troubles, and had made mistakes. He had not found it possible to accept party government, the Whigs were jealous of the favor shown to the Tories, there was the full measure of court intrigues, Parliament had not adopted the King's conception of toleration in matters of religion, and taxation had become burdensome. In these circumstances, James II believed that a descent upon England with an armed force would secure his restoration to the throne.

Louis XIV assented to his views, and a fleet was fitted out under the command of Admiral Tourville to clear the

Channel and prepare the way for James II to follow with an army. A general pardon — with certain prominent exceptions — was prepared; and, in the middle of April, 1692, James II proceeded to Normandy to await the action of the fleet.

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A contrary wind prevented the expedition from sailing for several weeks, and in the meantime the Dutch and English vessels were assembled to dispute the passage. On May 19, the great naval battle of La Hogue was fought, in which the heavier ships of the French fleet were burned and the lighter ones dispersed, utterly destroying French dominance upon the sea; and the invasion of England had to be abandoned.

Although diplomatic activity was rendered difficult by the fact that nearly all Europe was engaged in hostilities with France, Louis XIV lost no opportunity to discourage and divide the allies, with the purpose of dissolving the Grand Alliance, as he had dissolved the coalition against him in 1684.

*Dissensions of
the allies*

In 1691 he attempted to gain the ear of the King of Spain through Père Blandinières, who had access to the confessor of Charles II, and afterward through Père Guzman and the papal nuncio at Madrid; but these efforts produced no results.

With Ernest Augustus, Duke of Hanover, he had for a time more success. Through his influence a "third party," as it was called, began to be organized in Germany with the aid of Sweden, for the purpose of insisting upon peace without further warfare. The new elector of Saxony, John George III, was at the same time engaged in suspicious negotiations with France. To break up this movement, Leopold I decided to attach the Duke of Hanover to himself by creating for him a ninth electorate in the Empire; and, on March 22, 1692, an "eternal union" was signed between the Houses of Hapsburg and Hanover. Finding himself isolated by this desertion, the Elector of Saxony was compelled to adhere once more to the Grand Alliance; but the elevation of Hanover to the rank of an electorate created great jealousy among the German princes. Christian V of Denmark and Ulrich

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of Brunswick-Wolfenbüttel were greatly offended by the favor shown to Ernest Augustus, who by a succession of inheritances had from a mere princeling come to be the head of the House of Brunswick-Lüneburg, and now claimed possession of nearly the whole Brunswick inheritance.¹

Max Emmanuel, Elector of Bavaria, who by the grace of the King of Spain was enjoying almost royal authority in the Spanish Netherlands, was especially irritated by the promotion of Ernest Augustus. There was also another reason for believing that Max Emmanuel might be approached with proposals by Louis XIV. Before the birth of their son, Joseph Ferdinand, — destined to play an interesting part in the Spanish succession, — the Elector's wife, Maria Antonia, daughter of Leopold I, angered by her husband's marital infidelities, and wishing to spite him, had voluntarily renewed the renunciation of the Spanish succession which the Emperor had forced upon her in the interest of his son Charles at the time of her marriage, and had died in giving birth to the Prince.

The proposed
mediation of
Sweden

In the hope that Sweden might succeed in obtaining consent to mediation, Count d'Avaux was sent to Stockholm, and in July, 1693, was furnished with a memorial containing a list of the concessions to the Grand Alliance which Louis XIV was then ready to grant; for, being unable to strike a decisive blow, the King of France was now desirous of making peace. Having devastated the countries occupied by his armies, they could no longer live upon the products of the fields, the crops were poor, and the treasury of France was depleted. He therefore declared himself willing to renounce in favor of the Elector of Bavaria all his rights in the Spanish Netherlands, in case of the death of Charles II without an heir, — intending to exchange them afterward for the

¹ It was claimed that the creation of the ninth electorate by the Emperor for his own advantage was illegal, being a violation of the Peace of Westphalia and the Golden Bull of Charles IV, the Constitution of the Empire. See Volume I of this work, p. 39. The eighth electorate had been created by the Treaty of Westphalia.

Kingdom of Naples or the Duchy of Milan;¹ to surrender Montroyal and Trarbach in compensation for Strasburg; to demolish his recently erected fortifications and bridges on the Rhine; to return Philipsburg fortified, and Freiburg in the condition in which it was when taken; to procure from the Princess of Orléans a renunciation of her territorial claims in the Palatinate; and to treat equitably the Duke of Lorraine. But the Emperor required the return of Strasburg, the States General were indisposed at the time to end a war in which they had gained nothing, and William III demanded to be recognized by Louis XIV as King of England.

The Elector of Bavaria, so far as he was personally concerned, would gladly have accepted the offer of Louis XIV; but the mediation of Sweden was too strongly opposed by the Emperor and William III to render it available, and the proposals were without result.

Although the arms of Louis XIV were in general victorious whenever battles were fought, he gained no victory sufficiently decisive to destroy the hopes of the coalition and render possible a general peace; yet an early termination of the war was becoming imperative. France was exhausted; the King had passed the age of military ambition; and Louvois, who had chiefly inspired the war and organized the French armies, had died in 1691.²

The reconciliation
of Louis
XIV with the
Papacy

The most conspicuous indication of a chastened spirit on the part of Louis XIV was his inclination to resume friendly relations with the Papacy. He had found it decidedly unprofitable to be more Catholic than the Pope, — a course which had alienated the Holy See from the policies of France and united the Catholic powers with the interests of the Protestants.

¹ For the mission of Delahaye to induce Max Emmanuel's acceptance, see Legrelle, *La diplomatie française*, etc., I, p. 373.

² Upon the death of Louvois, Pomponne was recalled from his long retirement and replaced Colbert de Croissy as Minister of Foreign Affairs; a position which he held until his death in 1699, when he was succeeded by his son-in-law the Marquis de Torcy.

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Innocent XI, who had died in 1689, had triumphed in the conflict over the "immunities," and Louis XIV had been compelled to abandon his pretensions in that controversy. Under the next pope, Alexander VIII, who reigned only two years, to the great grief of that pontiff conditions remained essentially unaltered; for the King would not annul the offensive ordinances of 1682 regarding the independence of the Gallican Church, and the Pope like his predecessor insisted that they were null and void. At the next papal election, in July, 1691, the French cardinals employed every means to obtain a conciliatory successor to Alexander VIII, and succeeded in electing Innocent XII; who, although of a pacific disposition, insisted upon the rights of the Holy See. After two years of negotiation, in 1693, the French clergy were compelled to admit that the resolutions of 1682 were in violation of the canons of the Roman Church. "At the feet of Your Holiness, we declare our inexpressible sorrow," ran the humble retraction. Peace was then re-established, and Louis XIV wrote to Innocent XII that he would withdraw the orders he had given for the execution of the odious articles.

The separate
peace of
France with
the Duke
of Savoy

It was his impotence to overcome with force alone the troops of the Grand Alliance that wrung from the King these tardy concessions. To his endeavors to prevent a peace with the Turks, — who had profited by the double attack upon the Empire, — he had endeavored to add a vigorous anti-imperial movement in Italy; and for the success of this enterprise he required at least the neutrality of the Pope.

The Duke of Savoy, Victor Amadeus, although a member of the Grand Alliance, had never entirely severed his relations with the Court of Versailles. Considering the danger to which he would be exposed in case separate agreements should be made by the allies without regard to his interests, this prudence was justifiable; for, at the same time, the Emperor himself, by the intermediation of a Venetian agent, Count Velo, was in secret relations with Verjus de Crécy and Morel, representatives of the King of France, regarding the terms of peace.

Anxious to recover the places taken from him by the French during the war, Victor Amadeus received with pleasure the offer of Louis XIV to restore to him most of the captured cities and fortresses; but indiscreetly revealed these secret proposals to Heinsius and the Emperor, who discouraged his acceptance. After long negotiations, however, since William III refused to admit as a condition of peace the cession of the fortress of Pinerolo to the Duke of Savoy, — who really had no claim upon it, as it had been taken from the Duke of Mantua,¹ — Victor Amadeus, fearing that his interests would not be protected by the allies, on July 29, 1696, concluded a separate peace with France.² The conditions were a vague promise to put him in possession of the Duchy of Milan in exchange for Savoy, in case the King of Spain should die without an heir; the marriage of his daughter, the Princess Adelaide, to the King's eldest grandson, the Duke of Burgundy; and, in consideration of this marriage, the enjoyment of "the honors reserved for crowned heads."³

Having mollified the feelings of the Catholic princes by his concessions to the Pope, and having made a break in the Grand Alliance by detaching the Duke of Savoy, Louis XIV now began a systematic attempt to dissolve the coalition.⁴

The heavy burden of the war was beginning to be seriously felt in Holland, whose trade had suffered seriously from it in addition to bearing a great part of its cost, and the merchants and shipowners were complaining of the military policy which the stadtholder had brought upon the country.

Diplomatic relations with France having ceased with the outbreak of the war, the Polish resident at The Hague, an Italian named Mollo, was secretly sent to Paris by the States

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Secret negotiations between France and Holland

¹ See page 172 of this volume.

² For details, see Vast, *Les grands traités*, II, p. 157.

³ For details of these negotiations, see Legrelle, *La diplomatie française et la succession d'Espagne*, I, p. 437 et seq.

⁴ The weakness of the coalition was already becoming evident. By the Treaty of Vigerano, of October 7, 1696, the Emperor and the King of Spain agreed to withdraw their troops from Italy; which permitted Louis XIV to concentrate his forces in the Netherlands and on the Rhine.

CHAP. III General to express the desire for peace in Holland. Mæ-
 A. D. stricht was chosen for a confidential exchange of views, and
 1684-1697 on October 15, 1694, Dykvelt was sent to confer with the
 French agents, Harlay de Bonneuil and Callières, who had
 left France clandestinely for this purpose. Dykvelt de-
 manded the recognition of William III as King of England,
 the restitution of Strasburg to the Empire, and the erection
 of barrier fortresses in the Spanish Netherlands for the future
 protection of the United Provinces.

These negotiations, which came to nothing on account of
 Dykvelt's impatience with the meagre offers and tardy pro-
 cedure of the French agents, were resumed in June, 1695,
 at Utrecht, between Callières and Boreel, burgomaster of
 Amsterdam. Better conditions were then offered by France,
 including a secret article recognizing William III; but in
 September, the allies having learned of these interviews,
 they were broken off without result.¹

In March, 1696, Callières again returned to Holland with
 new instructions, and Heinsius presented a project which
 included the recognition of William III; the restitution of
 Strasburg, Luxemburg, and all the places taken by the
réunions, with Lorraine and Pinerolo; the exemption of
 Dutch vessels from the tax of fifty sous a ton; protection for
 the Protestant consuls established in France; and finally
 the regulation of all outstanding questions on the basis of
 the treaties of Westphalia and Nymwegen.²

The King of France was unwilling to submit to these
 terms. He declined to recognize William III until after the
 peace was signed, whereas Heinsius demanded recognition
 as a previous condition of signature; he was not disposed to
 surrender Strasburg; and would permit prayers to be made
 in the houses of Dutch consuls only on condition that no
 Frenchman be allowed to be present.

When through his ambassador at The Hague, Count von

¹ Callières wrote a famous book on diplomacy entitled, *De la manière de négocier avec les souverains*, Paris, 1716.

² For the details of these negotiations, see Legrelle, *La diplomatie française et la succession d'Espagne*, I, p. 457 et seq.

Kaunitz, the Emperor's views were consulted, he at first insisted absolutely upon the restitution of Strasburg, Lorraine, and Pinerolo. The negotiations over Strasburg consumed a year. The renewed instructions to Callières indicate the sincere desire of Louis XIV to conclude a peace, and betray a solicitude for the security of France. He consented, first, to restore Philipsburg, Kehl, Breisach, and Freiburg, if he were allowed to retain Strasburg; later, to surrender both Freiburg and Strasburg, provided the latter place were stripped of its fortifications and delivered over to its own citizens; and, finally, to return it to the Empire as it was when he took it, if the obligation were accepted not to increase its defences, and to permit the continuation of worship by the Catholics; but the Emperor would not accept these terms, and demanded in addition, that, the King of France and the Dauphin should formally renounce the Spanish succession.

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The hesitation
of Leopold I

In making this demand he had touched upon the King's most sensitive point. The declining health of Charles II rendered it probable that his death was imminent, and it was Louis XIV's anxiety to secure the succession that inspired his eagerness to end the war and dissolve the coalition before the question of the succession became definitive.

The allies also were interested in the new problem which Europe would soon have to solve. The States General were particularly disquieted. Even William III was at this time desirous of peace, for neither England nor the United Provinces wished the Spanish Netherlands to fall either to Louis XIV or to Leopold I.¹ The addition of those provinces either to France or to the Empire would disturb the equilibrium of Europe, and the union of the Crown of Spain with that of France or with the Crown of Austria would create a still greater preponderance of either the Bourbons or the

¹ To the original treaty of the Grand Alliance, of May 12, 1689, was appended a separate secret article, by which, in case Charles II of Spain should die without an heir, Leopold I and his heirs should be recognized as the rightful sovereigns of all the Spanish possessions. See Dumont, VII, Part II, p. 230.

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Hapsburgs in Europe. Both England and the United Provinces preferred that the Elector of Bavaria, or one of the junior grandsons of Louis XIV, — the Duke of Anjou, or the Duke of Berry, — should become King of Spain, upon condition that these princes and their posterity should be ineligible to the throne of France, with the Spanish Netherlands under a separate government. Callières, understanding the wishes of his royal master, would discuss none of these solutions; maintaining that the question of the Spanish succession had no relation to any of the provisions of the treaties of Westphalia and Nymwegen, which were to be the basis of the proposed peace.

The Congress
of Ryswick

On September 6, 1696, Heinsius announced that, in view of Louis XIV's proposals, there seemed to be no obstacle to peace, and officially accepted the mediation of Sweden. On February 4, 1697, the other allies, with the exception of Spain, followed the example of Holland. Harlay de Bonneuil, Verjus de Crécy, and Callières received instructions from Louis XIV to meet the plenipotentiaries of the allies and to sign a treaty of peace on the basis of the treaties of Westphalia and Nymwegen, restoring all the places taken by the *réunions*, including Strasburg.

With Sweden as mediator, in the person of Baron Lilienroth, a congress was appointed to be held in the château of Ryswick near The Hague.¹ The Emperor, not wishing the coalition dissolved before the question of the Spanish succession was ripe for solution, which was almost momentarily expected, endeavored to postpone the opening of the negotiations; but, understanding that William III and the United Provinces intended to proceed without him, he sent his delegates to Holland, and the Congress opened on May 9, 1697.

¹ The Emperor had proposed Aix-la-Chapelle as the place for the meeting of the Congress, but Louis XIV objected to sending his plenipotentiaries to an Imperial city. Leopold I returned the compliment by objecting to Ryswick, which Louis XIV had proposed and William III approved. The château was admirably adapted to the ceremonial of a Congress, being situated midway between The Hague, where the allies were to reside, and Delft, where the French were to take their quarters.

Like the other great international congresses that had preceded it, the Congress of Ryswick assembled tardily, progressed slowly, and gave little promise of results.

The States General were represented by Heinsius, Dykvelt, and William van Haren; the Emperor, by Count von Kaunitz, Von Stratmann, and Baron von Seilern; the King of England, by the Earl of Pembroke, Viscount de Villiers, and Sir Joseph Williamson; the King of Spain, by Francis de Quiros,¹ resident at The Hague, and Count de Tirimont; and the Elector of Brandenburg, by Von Schmettau and Von Danckelmann. The princes of the Empire were not, however, permitted to treat separately, and the negotiations for the Empire were conducted exclusively by the Imperial delegates under the instructions of the Emperor.

The Congress would apparently never have concluded its labors but for the intervention of William III. He greatly desired peace, but wished it to be general, and not as at Nymwegen based upon a group of separate settlements dictated by the King of France.²

The private negotiations of William III with Louis XIV

For him the future attitude of Louis XIV toward England was of first importance; and, early in July, his trusted friend and servant, William Bentinck, whom he had made Earl of Portland, was sent to consult with Marshal Bouffiers near the French camp and to ask for satisfaction upon three points: — First, that the King of France should not further support James II, who should be invited to leave France; second, that he should not require that the partisans of James II be amnestied and restored to the possession of their goods; and, third, that he should not forbid the Prince of Orange to receive in his principality the French who wished to establish themselves there. Upon these conditions,

¹ For his persistent and successful pleading for the return of Luxemburg to Spain, see Lonchay, *La rivalité de la France et d'Espagne*, p. 337 et seq.

² The financial condition of England was deplorable, the country being on the verge of bankruptcy. For a detailed account of the financial situation, see Koch, *Die Friedensbestrebungen Wilhelms III*, pp. 45, 47.

CHAP. III William III was ready to urge Spain and the Emperor to
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Louis XIV replied, that he could not honorably expel James II from France, but he would promise not to assist him. He would not require amnesty for the partisans of James II. As for the Principality of Orange, he could not allow it to become an asylum for malcontents, who in the very heart of France might sow the seeds of discontent and become a cause of new conflicts.

When, in the course of the negotiations, Bentinck proposed an article to be inserted in the treaty of peace in which the two kings should mutually promise "in the same terms" that neither would aid directly or indirectly the enemies of the other, Louis XIV seemed greatly shocked that William III should assume an equal footing with himself, and replied: "This equality can not be admitted, since the submission of my subjects and the tranquillity of my kingdom do not cause me to fear either factions or rebellions."² As the result of patient and skilful negotiation, however, Bentinck finally carried the points essential to an honorable peace, and from this moment the proceedings at Ryswick rapidly moved to a conclusion.³

The terms of
 the Peace of
 Ryswick

The Peace of Ryswick was embodied in four separate treaties between France and Spain, England, the States General of the United Provinces, and the Emperor and the Empire, respectively, and a separate commercial treaty with Holland. All of these treaties, except the one with the Emperor and the Empire, were signed on September 20, 1697; and all the

¹ For the details, see Grimblot, *Letters of William III and Louis XIV and of Their Ministers*, I, pp. 8, 16.

² William III was, however, in no respect disposed to admit the superiority of any other sovereign. In his instructions to his plenipotentiaries at Ryswick he had enjoined upon them "to take care in no sort to yield the precedence to the ambassador of any king whatsoever." — Koch, *Friedensbestrebungen*, etc., p. 57.

³ For the correspondence containing the negotiations, see Legrelle, *Notes et documents sur la paix de Ryswick*; and for the activity of William III in the peace negotiations generally, Koch, *Die Friedensbestrebungen Williams III von England in den Jahren 1694-1697*.

allies were treated with a degree of moderation that marked a decided change in the attitude of Louis XIV.

Spain obtained the restitution of the towns in the Spanish peninsula taken by the French in the last war, and in the Spanish Netherlands Luxemburg, Courtrai, Mons, Ath, and their dependencies, together with all the places annexed to France since the Peace of Nymwegen, except eighty-two cities and villages retained by France for special reasons.¹

In the treaty with England, William III was recognized as King, and the King of France agreed not to aid his enemies; restitution was made of everything taken during the war; commissioners were to be named to regulate the conflicting claims regarding Hudson's Bay; and the Principality of Orange was returned to William III.²

The States General promised to restore Pondicherry to the French East India Company; the Dutch were exempted from the *droit d'aubaine* in France; the treaty of commerce relieved the Dutch vessels of the tax of fifty sous per ton; and, in case of war, a free ship was permitted to discharge its cargo, if it did not consist of contraband of war.³

The term fixed by France for the signature of the treaties having passed, the Emperor still hesitated in the hope of obtaining an agreement from Louis XIV regarding the Spanish succession; but the King of France, who was ready to sacrifice much to retain a free hand in that transaction, having consented to abandon the Spanish Netherlands to the Duke of Bavaria, firmly refused to make a further concession.

By disputing over the terms of the promised restitutions, the Emperor lost Strasburg altogether, Louis XIV now refusing to abandon it. On October 30, unable to continue the war alone, Leopold I accepted for himself and the Empire the following terms: the obligations of the Peace of Westphalia and the Peace of Nymwegen were renewed; France restored all that had been taken outside of Alsace by the *réunions*, Strasburg being formally ceded to France; in re-

¹ For the treaty, see Vast, *Les grands traités*, II, p. 214 et seq.

² For the treaty, see Vast, *Les grands traités*, II, p. 202 et seq.

³ For the treaty, see Vast, *Les grands traités*, II, p. 190 et seq.

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turn, Kehl, Freiburg, Breisach and its dependencies on the right bank of the Rhine, together with Philipsburg, were restored to the Empire; the Duke of Lorraine to be re-established in his duchy, with free passage for French troops across his territories.

Such extensive concessions, after a struggle that had cost so much of the blood and treasure of France, seemed to denote the substantial defeat and humiliation of the Grand Monarch; for he was surrendering nearly all he had gained during the whole of his reign of more than fifty years. But Louis XIV was not thinking chiefly of the security and prosperity of France, which were easily within his grasp. His mind was dominated by a dynastic ambition which France alone could not satisfy; and instead of a permanent peace on the basis of the great principles laid down at Münster and Osnabrück, the Congress of Ryswick gave to France the doubtful benefit of freedom for new adventures more costly and less fruitful than those which have just been recorded.

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CHAPTER IV

THE DIPLOMACY OF THE SPANISH SUCCESSION

IN his conflict with the Grand Alliance, Louis XIV had three points to gain: first, to obtain by treaty the sanction of Europe for retaining the territorial acquisitions provisionally conceded by the Truce of Regensburg; second, to overthrow William III and restore James II; and, third, to punish the United Provinces for aiding in the English Revolution. He had failed in every one of these objects. The balance of gain and loss at Ryswick

William III, on the other hand, had also three points to gain: first, to obtain the recognition of himself as King of England, and thus end the support of James II by Louis XIV; second, to associate England and the United Provinces for their mutual protection in the future; and, third, to destroy the power of Louis XIV in Germany, and thus establish the permanent security of the Protestant states. The Peace of Ryswick accorded to him every one of these results.

Measured by any fair criterion of success, therefore, Louis XIV was defeated; yet France remained not only unconquered but by far the most powerful single state in Europe.

For the first time during the reign of the "Grand Monarque" the feeling was openly expressed by Frenchmen that the national interests had been neglected. The Peace of Ryswick was so unpopular at Paris that the expression "*Tu es bête comme la paix*" became an idiom; and the *gamins* of the city sang on the streets:

"Les trois ministres habiles
En un seul jour
Ont rendu trente-deux villes
Et Luxembourg
A peine ont-ils sauvé Paris
Charivari."

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Yet Louis XIV, who had it in his power both to give to Europe a permanent peace and to France added security, was apparently regardless of the national interests.

The policy of Richelieu and Mazarin, which was truly national, had been to strengthen the frontiers of France by the acquisition of the Spanish Netherlands. In 1697 Louis XIV had almost secured that result. Had he not thwarted his own plans by ambitious encroachments upon the Empire, he might with apparent ease have obtained a better frontier for France; but his main thought was of the Spanish succession, and to enter upon the pursuit of it with a free hand he sacrificed nearly all he had won by a lifetime of war and diplomacy.

And yet he pretended that the Peace of Ryswick was to him a satisfactory settlement. "I have dictated the conditions of all the treaties, I have prescribed the limits of time within which they might be accepted," he wrote to Chateauneuf, his ambassador to the Sultan; "and that superiority which I have always preserved would have still longer postponed the conclusion of the treaties, if the powers leagued against me had been in a condition to make new efforts."

In this estimate of his achievements France and Europe receive no consideration. It was from his sense of personal superiority, and not from the benefits secured for his people, that he derived his satisfaction. He was now, it is true, free to use all the resources of his kingdom for an object that did not concern the nation, namely, to place a member of his family upon a foreign throne; and that freedom was the only triumph he had won at Ryswick.

I. THE TREATIES OF PARTITION

The Spanish
monarchy

The time had now come for active negotiation to obtain the Spanish succession; for the frail life of Charles II of Spain was on the point of extinction. His second marriage had brought him no children, and the future of his kingdom had become a subject of European interest.

The purpose of Louis XIV was, having dissolved the coalition against himself and having made peace, to obtain by diplomacy what Europe in a state of open hostility would not have permitted him to claim.

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A. D.
1697-1715

The Spanish monarchy was in some respects the richest heritage then existing in the world. Comprising the whole of the Iberian peninsula, except Portugal, Spain held the key to the Mediterranean, and could lock the door at Gibraltar against all the ports of the Atlantic. Guarded on the north by the Pyrenees, her other frontiers, with one exception, were her own maritime coasts. Under the rule of the monarchy were also the Balearic islands, Sardinia, the Kingdoms of Naples and Sicily, Milan, and the Catholic Netherlands; these last filling a great part of the basin formed by the Meuse and the Mosel, including the greater part of Hainault, Flanders, Brabant, Namur, and Luxemburg.

Such were, in rude outline, the possessions of the Spanish monarchy in Europe. To these must be added the vast and rich colonies in Africa, America, and the oceanic islands, — forming together the most magnificent empire then existing. Held in absolute sovereignty by a childless ruler, this stupendous heritage was to be disposed of either by his will and testament, by the laws of inheritance, or by an agreement of partition among the claimants. It seemed not improbable, in view of various claims and rivalries, that partition in some form would be the fate awaiting the monarchy.

Materially, morally, and economically Spain had fallen into decadence.¹ No country has been more fortunate in the gifts bestowed upon it by nature and happy chances, or more deeply cursed with blight and impotence, than Spain between the fifteenth and eighteenth centuries. In the time of the Arab domination the peninsula was a rich garden, supporting a population of thirty millions. In 1500 it had been reduced to ten millions and at the end of the

The decaden-
cence of
Spain

¹ For the condition of Spain under Charles II see Gädeke, *Die Politik Österreichs in der spanischen Erbfolgefrage*, I, Chap. III.

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seventeenth century, under Charles II, to five millions.¹ The long and costly wars, the sacrifices made to military life in conquered lands, the emigrations of colonists to America, the decrees of the Inquisition,² the deportation of the Jews and Arabs, and the sterility of the inhabitants who remained left the country weakened in its vital forces.

The dominance of ecclesiasticism not only withdrew from the population nearly a third of its whole mass to live a life of contemplation in monasteries and convents, but its dogmatism devitalized the energies of the laity. A fourth part of the year was devoted to religious fêtes and ceremonies, or to preparations for them. Industry was regarded with contempt, and business enterprise was looked down upon. Idleness and mendicancy sapped the country of its productive strength. Manual labor was almost entirely laid upon the shoulders of foreigners. Together with the vigor that had been developed in earlier generations by toil and struggle, the power of military and political organization also had departed. The control of the country passed under mortmain to corporations of the clergy. The price of commodities was fixed by law, and the exportation of manufactures was forbidden. Roads and canals were neglected. Gold and silver were received in great quantities from Peru and Mexico, and as far as possible were kept in the country. Thus for a time everything seemed without effort to pour into the lap of indolence; with the result that ignorance, superstition, lethargy, and stagnation became the characteristic traits of a people who a century earlier had come near to the realization of a universal empire.

The extravagance of the Court

Unhappily, the pride, the pomp, and the luxury of a court that still aimed to be the most magnificent in Europe lingered on in the midst of increasing poverty. Its prodigality was notorious. The civil list of the King's household

¹ See Gädeke, *Die Politik Österreichs in der spanischen Erbfolgefuge*, I, p. 67.

² The Inquisition caused 31,912 persons to be burned alive in Spain; 291,450 were sentenced to punishment and the confiscation of their goods; and more than 100,000 families voluntarily left the country to escape its judgments. Llorente, *Histoire de l'Inquisition d'Espagne*, IV, p. 271.

amounted to much more than a third of all the revenues of the kingdom. When money was plentiful it had been lavished in the most reckless fashion upon objects of no importance. Even the gratings of the prisons of Madrid were covered with elaborate in-wrought decorations and carefully gilded. In one year the candles burned in the royal chapel cost seven thousand ducats. Public ceremonies absorbed vast sums. One of the journeys of Philip IV is said to have been accompanied by a cortège of carriages six leagues in length.

A horde of courtiers and officials sapped the public treasury with salaries and pensions. According to a report of the elder Count von Harrach, more than forty thousand persons were employed in two or three departments of the administration. By a curious system of accumulation, a person promoted to a higher office in the State retained the salaries of the lower ones which he no longer occupied, in such a fashion that the same individual often received four or five salaries at once.¹

As the Spanish nation gradually lost its military vigor, it had been necessary to depend more and more upon the forces of its allies, who were insistent upon money for their troops, which was usually freely promised but always tardily paid. The drains upon the resources of Spain made by the Triple Alliance and the League of Augsburg were considerable; and yet the records of the time are full of complaints of the financial delinquencies of Spain.

In the midst of this extravagance and impoverishment, great sums were expended in presents to foreign princes, ambassadors, and other influential personages, for the purpose of promoting the interests of Spain. At Rome and Vienna in particular millions were disbursed in gratuities. Nearly all the great aristocratic families of Rome received money from Madrid, and the chief ecclesiastics of Vienna were regularly in the pay of Spain.

¹ Between four and five hundred lackeys were employed in the royal palace, yet the state carriages had become useless because there was no money with which to repair them.

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1697-1715

To meet these enormous expenses, there was no adequate fiscal system. The direct taxes were unequal in the different parts of the monarchy, the nobles were universally exempt, and the burden fell almost entirely upon the common people. It was chiefly from lotteries and from indirect duties that revenue was raised.¹ This indirect taxation was a heavy burden. Practically all the necessaries of life were taxed, both food and clothing. "*Les impôts montent jusqu'aux herbes au pot,*" wrote the French ambassador at Madrid in 1698; and another writer informs us that the peasants ate most of their vegetables without salt or vinegar, because the taxes upon them were so heavy.

Since 1500 the mines of Potosi had furnished enormous sums of precious metal from which the Spanish government had collected a large percentage in the form of an import tax; but the amount of metal extracted had steadily diminished since 1589, and in 1698 this was only a quarter of what it once had been. Moreover, the richly laden treasuries had long since excited the cupidity of corsairs, and depredations upon them had become an industry in which Dutch, Portuguese, and English pirates were engaged, not to mention the treasure taken as prize in war. To make good some of these losses, the temptation arose to put more alloy in the coin of the realm, and millions were fabricated by the debasement of the coinage.

Decay of the
army and navy

In such circumstances, it was plainly impossible for Spain to occupy an important position as a military power. In fact, the once splendid army no longer existed. At one time it had been reduced to two or three thousand men; and at the end of the last war in the Spanish Netherlands the monarchy had not been able to place in the field more than eight thousand ill-paid soldiers, who lived by rapine. It is incredible to what an extent the military spirit had become extinct in Spain. During the war between France and the Grand Alliance it had required a month to recruit and equip a regiment at Madrid. Only vagabonds were disposed to

¹ At the end of the seventeenth century the total income of the Crown had fallen from 500 to 30 million reales.

join the army, and these deserted after a few parades. Even the officers were lacking in discipline, and for money released the conscripts who wished to return to their homes. When they were rebuked, they replied: "The King commands in the palace, but here *we* command." And the Council of War, instead of inflicting punishment, replied: "What of that? We shall have peace in one way or another!"

From a great naval power Spain was reduced almost to impotence. At the beginning of his reign Charles II possessed eighteen war-ships. In 1698 there were but two to guard the ports and coasts of Spain, and the colonies were practically without protection. Of the thirteen at his disposal in Italy, seven were hired from Genoa.

Nominally a despotism built up by the energetic concentration of power and ruthless conquest, the Spanish monarchy in the hands of a feeble sovereign was exposed to serious dangers from within. Composite in its origin, it had never been made entirely coherent. Castile was the dominant constituent, but Aragon, Catalonia, and the other ancient kingdoms retained many of their laws and customs, as well as the traditions of their autonomy, not unmixed with jealousies and antagonisms.

The political
weakness of
Spain

As for the outlying portions of the Spanish dominions, they were in no sense truly Spanish; and many of them cherished the resentment of conquered provinces. We have seen how readily Messina threw itself into the hands of France. Naples was always on the edge of revolution, and subject to the ancient pretensions of the Holy See. At Milan the municipal senate embodied the traditions of the Lombard liberties, and was exposed to the ambitions of France and Savoy.

At Madrid itself the power of the King was not in reality absolute. It was limited by the authority of the Cortes, and especially by the influence of the Church, which had through the power of the Inquisitor General transformed the kingdom into a theocracy, and made of the sovereign its docile servitor.

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With a monarch mentally and physically as feeble as Charles II, there was an opportunity for a great statesman, acting as his minister, to rehabilitate the monarchy; but during his entire reign no really master mind had appeared upon the scene. Antonio Toledo, Count d'Oropesa, was designated by Alexander Stanhope, the English ambassador, as the "ablest man" of his time in Spain; but, in 1691, accused of too intimate relations with Portugal, he was summarily dismissed by Charles II and banished to his estates. Guided alternately by the conflicting counsels of venerable dignitaries without foresight, energy, or initiative, often supplemented or frustrated by the dominating influence of the Queen, Maria of Neuburg, the unhappy monarch saw his administration drift aimlessly on to the impotence and humiliation that inevitably awaited its end.

The intrigues
of the Spanish
Court

It would be unprofitable to follow in detail the struggle of the adverse elements to gain ascendancy by the exercise of direct influence upon the King.

Since the marriage of Charles II with Maria of Neuburg, her power over the mind of her husband had become unlimited, and for a long time it was exercised vigorously against France and in the interest of Austria. So complete was her authority after the fall of Oropesa, and under the nominal primacy of her creature, Admiral Melgar, that, although the King hated her, and even mocked her behind her back, "when she looked at him," as an observer wrote, "she made him tremble to his very bones." Supported by the Queen Mother and a group of Germans whom she had made her intimates at Madrid, she had waged a continual warfare against the hopes and designs of Louis XIV. The Queen Mother had been still more active. To the end of her life she had labored earnestly to cause the entire succession to be transferred to her grandson, the young electoral prince of Bavaria, Joseph Ferdinand. Soon after her death, the ecclesiastical primate of Spain, Cardinal Porto Carrero, Archbishop of Toledo, and Count Oropesa,—who, to the surprise of the Court, was admitted in his riding habit into the chamber where the King was believed to be dying,

— after a midnight meeting and decision of the Council of State, had obtained in the interest of the young electoral prince of Bavaria a secret testament conveying to him the succession, subject to the approval of the clergy and the Cortes.¹

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1697-1715

Had it not been for the King's unexpected recovery, this *coup de main* might have rendered unnecessary the long contest over the Spanish succession; but the apparently mortal illness turned out to be nothing worse than a case of indigestion. The secret will was deposited in the archives of the Council of State, but as soon as the influence of the Queen — who was ill at the time when the act was obtained — could be brought to bear upon the King, Oropesa was compelled to resume his exile.

Although Maria of Neuburg was bitterly opposed to the pretensions of France, she was almost equally hostile to the succession of Joseph Ferdinand. Her candidate was her nephew, the second son of Leopold I and her sister, Eleanor of Neuburg, the young archduke Charles. To this project as well as to the designs of France, the secret testament promised for a time to be a fatal blow. It was, however, owing to the temporary illness of the Queen that her moribund husband had been induced to sign it, and upon her recovery she is believed to have lost no time in compelling him to destroy the document.

The candidacy
of the Arch-
duke Charles

The field being thus again clear for action, a serious campaign was undertaken in behalf of the Archduke Charles, first by sending to Madrid the younger Count von Harrach² from Vienna to sound the disposition of the Court, and later by the permanent mission of the elder Von Harrach,³ one

¹ By the last will and testament of Philip IV, September 14, 1665, his daughter Margaret, grandmother of Joseph Ferdinand, had been expressly designated as the successor to the entire heritage in case of the death of Charles II without heirs. For the full text in Spanish, see Legrelle, *La diplomatie française*, etc., I, p. 550 et seq.

² For the full text of the report of Aloys Louis von Harrach, called the younger, in which he gives interesting sketches of all the chief personages of Spain, see *Historische Zeitschrift*, XXIX, p. 91 et seq.

³ Ferdinand Bonaventura von Harrach.

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of the most astute and experienced of the counsellors of Leopold I.

To the official instructions of the elder Von Harrach, which related mainly to questions connected with the Peace of Ryswick, was added a secret supplement, consisting of an elaborate argument to establish the claim of the Archduke Charles to the whole of the Spanish succession. The method pursued in this demonstration was very simple. It consisted in counting the generations from Philip I, the father of the Emperor Charles V, which showed that the Archduke Charles represented the sixth generation of that monarch's successors. All others living of that or any previous generation, it was contended, were excluded by formal renunciations.¹

The renun-
ciations

An examination of the Hapsburg genealogy from the time of Philip III shows three lines of descent: (1) through Anna, whose marriage with Louis XIII gave birth to Louis XIV; (2) through Philip IV, whose children were Maria Theresa by his first wife, and Charles II and Margaret by his second wife; and (3) Maria, the mother of Leopold I.

The descendants of Anna, it was contended, were excluded from the succession by her renunciation of her claim to the throne in favor of her younger sister, Maria. The descendants of Maria Theresa were excluded by the renunciation made at the time of her marriage with Louis XIV. The descendants of Margaret also were excluded by the renunciation of Maria Antonia made upon her marriage with Max Emmanuel of Bavaria. There remained, therefore, only the descendants of Maria, the mother of Leopold I, whose claim was represented by the Archduke Charles.

Upon the assumption that these renunciations were valid, it would be difficult to answer the argument which Count von Harrach was instructed to present; still, there were plainly two exceptions to be taken. Margaret had been expressly recognized in her father's will as entitled to the

¹ For the claims to the Spanish succession, see Table VI, at the end of this volume.

succession after her brother Charles and his descendants,¹ which would appear to exclude the collateral claims through Maria; and, if Maria's descendants were to be considered, it would not be the Archduke Charles, but Leopold I, and after him his elder son, Joseph, who would be the immediate heir to the Spanish throne.

But were the renunciations valid? If, as the theory of "divine right" through strict priority of birth maintains, sovereignty passes by inheritance on the principle of primogeniture, by what right can a human will intervene to set aside by an arbitrary act the order of nature, which is in effect a divine decree? If such an act can be justified on the ground of mere political expediency, then any other convenient ground may furnish an excuse for thwarting the divine will, and the whole theory of "divine right" is swept away.

But to disprove the Austrian thesis, it was not necessary to show that every renunciation is invalid. In the case of Maria Theresa, the renunciation was only conditional, and had been bought for a price that had never been paid. Louis XIV could, therefore, justly contend that, since the contract had not been fulfilled by Spain, the renunciation of Maria Theresa was invalid; and, there being no Salic law in Spain, the Dauphin was the legitimate heir to the throne, if Charles II left no descendant. In the case of Margaret the renunciation was, in the first instance, forced upon her by her father, Leopold I; and, if afterward she herself repeated it, she could only renounce her own right, not the right of her unborn son, Joseph Ferdinand, over which she had no control. If the will of Philip IV was valid, the claim of Joseph Ferdinand could not be thus set aside in favor of the Archduke Charles.

To the modern mind all these discussions seem arid and academic, but to that age they appeared to be vital. The unity of the State required the sanctity and the perpetuity of the dynasty; and, to support this dignity, the theory of

The crisis in
the system of
divine right

¹ For the will of Philip IV, see Legrelle, *La diplomatie française, etc.*, I, p. 558.

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divine right had been invented, and the absolute authority of the King had been proclaimed.

Dismissing the renunciations as incompatible with the fundamental law of the monarchy, and in themselves mere accommodations to avoid the consequences of a rigorous application of the theory of divine right, it is clear that, from the point of view of strict legitimacy, if not Louis XIV himself, then certainly the Dauphin stood nearest to the throne of Spain in case Charles II should die without heirs. To Spain this would signify the practical annexation of the Spanish monarchy, with all its possessions, to the Crown of France. To Europe it would mean the establishment of a universal monarchy; for such a concentration of power and resources in a single absolute ruler would destroy the equilibrium of Europe, and render his will everywhere preponderant.

In some form, therefore, it was necessary to avoid the logical consequences of the theory on which the whole system of absolutism was now seen to repose. In the person and pretensions of Louis XIV, this system was soon to be challenged by the rest of Europe, and particularly by William III of England, who represented a different order of ideas based on national independence and the sovereignty of the national will, as exemplified by his own election to the English throne.¹

The necessity
for compromise

It was not, however, in the clear light of consistent theory that the battle was to be fought or the triumph won; for political development seldom moves forward on the straight lines of logical reasoning. As at an earlier time it had been expedient to concentrate and consecrate royal rights and authority for the preservation of the State; so it was now found necessary to set limits to the power thus created to prevent a universal monarchy. France and Spain could not be permitted, whatever "divine right" might have to say about it, to be under the control of the same absolute master.

¹ And yet not consistently, as his part in negotiating the partition treaties will show.

Even Louis XIV, whose interests as well as his convictions called for a rigid application of the principle of hereditary divine right, was not entirely averse to compromise. He had himself advocated it by proposing to divide the whole Spanish inheritance between himself and Leopold I. He had again suggested it by offering to send one of the sons of the Dauphin to Spain, to be reared and educated as a Spanish prince, with the pledge that, if he should be permitted to wear the crown of Spain he should renounce all claims to the crown of France. Thus his proposals, like those of Leopold I, were confessions that "divine right" must be set aside in the interest of peace and amity between nations, as he himself had already set it aside in recognizing William III as King of England. All these acts were, in truth, so many tacit admissions that the system of absolutism, deriving its authority from a superior source and not from the will of the nation, is not entirely adapted to the uses of this world.

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Even with the co-operation of the Queen, who informed Count von Harrach that it would be easy to secure the consent of the King to the succession of the Archduke Charles, but difficult to obtain the approval of his ministers, that persistent diplomatist failed to advance the cause of the Archduke at Madrid.¹ The sentiment of Spain was plainly against him. When the Peace of Ryswick was signed, the joy at Madrid was great, and the reluctance of Leopold I to sign the treaty, after having failed to satisfy the Spanish expectations of aid in the war, rendered the Germans unpopular at the Court. The Queen also suffered in public esteem through her German associations and sympathies; and at last Count von Harrach, weary of a

The failure of
Von Harrach's
mission

¹ On June 25, 1697, Harrach had succeeded with the aid of the Queen in obtaining a letter from Charles II substantially promising the succession to the Archduke Charles, but it proved illusory. This letter may be found in Gädeke, *Die Politik Österreichs in der spanischen Erbfolgefrage*, I, p. 25 of the Appendix. By a typographical error the date is there given as May. That this date is erroneous is shown by Harrach's *Tagebuch*, p. 26, and the text in the Staatsarchiv.

2

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hopeless task, and feeling that his close relations with Maria of Neuburg were an embarrassment rather than a help to him in obtaining the good will of the ministers, ended in denouncing her to her friends.¹

In truth, so strong was the hostility toward the Queen, whose influence was deeply resented by Cardinal Porto Carrero, that in order to preserve her power at Court, she was obliged, much against her inclination, to induce the King to recall Count Oropesa; and, on March 5, 1698, he reappeared at the palace under a pledge to sustain the Queen and to favor the Archduke Charles. But the Cardinal had by no means lost his personal ascendancy over the King. Availing himself of the absence of the Queen at her devotions, he and his ecclesiastical friends surrounded the superstitious king and persuaded him "by irrefutable arguments" that his vigorous consort was possessed of devils, — a compliment which the people had already ascribed to himself! When the Queen returned and learned of this effort to destroy her authority over her feeble husband her fury seemed to justify the accusation against her. A terrific scene ensued, and the poor king, completely unnerved and undecided whom to obey, turned for a time to his ecclesiastical advisers. During the short remainder of his life his misery and indecision stripped him of the little power he had formerly possessed, and left him a helpless victim to the prevailing influence of the moment.

The influence
of the Marquis
d'Harcourt

During the period of estrangement between Spain and France Louis XIV had relied upon his ecclesiastical agents, Père Blandinières and Père Duval, for information regarding the Court of Madrid; but after the Peace of Ryswick he began to reconstitute his diplomatic representation, which had been since 1689 almost non-existent; and one of the ablest of French diplomatists, the Marquis d'Harcourt, was sent to Madrid. His mission was to inform his master

¹ A satirical poem of the time had the verse:

"Rey innocente
Reina traidora
Pueblo cobarde
Grandes sin honora."

accurately of the disposition of Spain regarding the Spanish succession, in the belief that the Spaniards could be made favorable, if a party were formed to promote the idea, to the candidacy of the Dauphin or one of his sons. The difficulties to be overcome were well understood; but, as the instruction ran, "if it is considered how much hatred the Spaniards have for the Queen and the Germans, the general sentiment of the whole nation permits of the belief that there will be found enough persons dissatisfied with the government to reveal their most secret thoughts to the King's ambassador."¹ That this expectation was not unfounded is evident from the report of the English ambassador, Alexander Stanhope, who in March, 1698, wrote: "The general inclination as to the succession is altogether French, their aversion to the Queen having set them against all her countrymen; and, if the French king will content himself that one of his younger grandchildren be king of Spain, without pretending to incorporate the two monarchies together, he will find no opposition either from *grande*es or common people."

The Marquis d'Harcourt neglected no opportunity to cultivate the good will of the ministers who in case of an interregnum caused by the death of Charles II would have a voice in the government of Spain; and the Cardinal Porto Carrero, as the chief ecclesiastic of the kingdom, was especially propitiated. As Louis XIV became more certain of his ground, the ambassador was instructed to insist upon the rights of the Dauphin, and to let it be known at Madrid that the King of France "would employ all his force to secure that great succession."

Owing to the diminished influence of the Germans at Madrid, the disfavor in which the Queen was held, and the inability of Leopold I to send troops to Spain to support the pro-Austrian party, it would not perhaps have been difficult, so far as Spain itself was concerned, if the occasion had arisen, for Louis XIV to impose his will upon the coun-

The revival
of the idea of
partition

¹ For the detailed instructions to Harcourt, see Legrelle, *La diplomatie française*, etc., II, p. 140 et seq.

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try. The Hessian regiment that was already at Madrid had created so much irritation that it had to be sent away. The acceptance of one of Louis XIV's grandsons as king, it was felt, would at least preserve peace with France without the absorption of the Spanish monarchy by its powerful neighbor, and this solution was constantly meeting with increased public favor. But, as Harcourt pointed out in his despatches, it was less with Spain than with the rest of Europe that the real difficulty lay. The attempt to force the situation would be sure to cause a European war.

Of this Louis XIV also was persuaded, and his immediate problem, therefore, was in what manner to avert the general opposition which he foresaw. The succession was in fact a European question, and for a long time every failing pulse-beat of the languishing king had caused renewed anxiety in every European capital.

One of the best informed and most brilliant of the historians of France has at this point asserted, but without furnishing the evidence with which he usually supports his statements, that Louis XIV at this time had the prudence to recoil from encumbering his dynasty with the débris of the Spanish monarchy, because the absorption of such a mass of scattered dominions would destroy the nationality of France, whose power lay in its compact unity.¹ But, while it may well be argued that such a "political agglutination" would have been disastrous for the French nation, if it had been possible to insist upon it, there is no evidence whatever that the question was regarded by the Grand Monarch from this point of view, or that he was for a moment deterred by this thought from forcing the hand of Spain.² That which actually restrained his action was not the result that might follow from the union of the two monarchies, but the evident obstacles in the way of accomplishing that union. He knew that Europe would not consent without a fierce struggle to the accession of the Dauphin

¹ Legrelle, *La diplomatie française*, etc., II, p. 184.

² The instructions to Harcourt prove that Louis XIV at that time wanted Charles II to recognize the Dauphin as his only heir.

to the whole of the Spanish succession. And what would be the situation in Spain if, in order to place the Dauphin upon the throne, parts of the heritage were awarded to other powers as the price of their assent?

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It was not easy for Louis XIV to accept the alternative of partition, but circumstances led him to incline toward it. Important changes had occurred in Europe which had a bearing on his decision. During the war that preceded the Peace of Ryswick he had strenuously endeavored to revive his influence in the East, and to aid his cause as far as possible by inducing Poland to attack Austria or Brandenburg, and also by encouraging the Turks in their war with the Empire.

The effect of
the situation
in the East

In both these efforts he had been disappointed. In Poland, John Sobieski, whose wife was bitter in her feelings of resentment toward France, and in his latter years entirely dominated her husband, had remained wholly beyond the influence of French diplomacy until his death in 1696. In the election which followed the candidate of Louis XIV for the throne of Poland, the Prince of Conti, had been defeated; and, after a hard contest, the prize had been borne off, with the aid of Leopold I, by the Elector Frederick Augustus of Saxony, a vigorous prince devoted to the House of Austria.¹

But an incidental result of this election was more important to the European situation than the election itself. It brought to the front as the commander of the Imperial forces in the war with the Turks in place of the Elector, who had been in command, Prince Eugene of Savoy, whose energy and skill as a general, in July, 1696, destroyed and scattered the Turkish army. In the meantime, Peter, the young czar of Russia, had declared war upon the Turks. Overwhelmed with enemies, in January, 1698, the Sultan had accepted the mediation of England and the United Provinces in the hope of securing an early peace, to which Leopold I

¹ In order to become King of Poland, the Elector of Saxony, who was the head of the Corpus Evangelicorum, was obliged to become a Catholic, which he did without hesitation.

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— whose treasury was depleted and who at this time wished to devote his attention to the Spanish succession — was also strongly inclined. After long negotiations, in November, 1698, the plenipotentiaries met at Carlowitz; and, on January 26, 1699, peace was signed between the Emperor, Poland, Venice, and the Sultan.¹

The Peace of Carlowitz disclosed an immense decline in the force of the Ottoman Empire, which surrendered nearly half of the territory it had formerly possessed in Europe. It marked the end of the period during which the Turkish power seriously threatened Christendom. The greatest gains fell to Austria, which received Transylvania, almost all of Hungary, and the greater part of Croatia and Slavonia. Poland obtained Kameniec, and numerous conquests in Podolia and the Ukraine. To Venice were ceded the Morea and portions of Dalmatia. Russia still continued the war.

At last, the policy of crippling the Empire by revolution in Hungary and war with Turkey had met with a decided check. The Austro-Hungarian monarchy was now for the first time during the reign of Leopold I free to act effectively in the affairs of Western Europe.

Louis XIV's
return to
the idea of
partition

These changes imposed a new rôle upon Louis XIV. It was evident that Europe would not in these circumstances permit the union of the French and Spanish monarchies. But the success of Leopold I in the East might also have another consequence. The Emperor had been diligently working to obtain from Charles II a testament by which the whole of the Spanish heritage would pass to his son Charles.² In that event, the old empire of the Hapsburgs would, perhaps, in time be reunited; and, even if it were not, the House of Austria would acquire a new preponderance in Europe. It was, therefore, the turn of the King of France to appeal

¹ For the treaty, see Dumont, VII, Part II, p. 448 et seq.

² Besides the somewhat illusory promise already given by Charles II to Leopold I, there was the will of Philip IV, which expressly named the descendants of the Infanta Maria, mother of Leopold I, as the heirs of the entire monarchy in case those of Margaret should fail. See the will in Legrelle, *La diplomatie française*, etc., I, p. 558.

to the principle of equilibrium,— a principle which since the Peace of the Pyrenees France had systematically disregarded.

The serious financial distress caused by the previous war rendered it extremely doubtful if France could again face a European coalition for the purpose of acquiring the whole of the Spanish succession. The King of France had not only lost his former prestige among the princes of Germany, but the Emperor had made great progress in binding them closer to himself by his successful war in the East. Other influences also aided in giving him ascendancy. Frederick of Brandenburg was ambitious to obtain the title of King of Prussia, and needed the good will of the Emperor. The Elector of Hanover and the King of Poland owed their elevation in a great degree to the favor of Leopold I. Max Emmanuel of Bavaria, though disposed to be agreeable to France, was not inclined to deliver himself over to his powerful neighbor without reward. Undoubtedly, to change this adverse situation would require time; and yet the slender thread upon which hung the life of Charles II was liable to snap at any moment. Without ceasing to utilize Harcourt's expert services in building up a pro-French party in Spain, therefore, Louis XIV set himself with diligence to sounding the King of England regarding the candidacy of Joseph Ferdinand of Bavaria and a scheme of partition in which England should first of all be consulted.

The candidacy of the young electoral prince for the throne of Spain was now seen to possess certain advantages for France. There had been an influential party at Madrid in favor of it, and it would satisfy the Spanish desire to maintain the independence of the monarchy. The accession of the Prince would place the House of Wittelsbach under lasting obligations to France; with which there was already a close connection, the Dauphin having married the sister of Max Emmanuel. If England and Holland should approve, the wishes of Leopold I need not be consulted. He would be assigned some morsel of the inheritance; but the House of Bourbon would have the choice of its portion,— which

Conditions
favoring the
Bavarian
candidacy

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it might afterwards trade off to its advantage,— and the junior grandsons would thus be provided for. Such an arrangement would at least secure peace for France until the treasury could be made more adequate for war; for, with England and the United Provinces against him, Leopold I could not prevent partition.

In England the Peace of Ryswick had been received with great enthusiasm. Its advantages to English prestige and commerce were incontestable; for it not only marked the definitive triumph of the Revolution of 1688, it placed in the hands of William III the balance of power upon the continent, and thus created a powerful means of contributing to the pacific development of British interests. With this rejoicing in victory there was also in England a strong desire for peace. The cost of the war had created not only a new burden of taxation but the beginning of an enormous national debt, which had its origin in the effort to raise money for the war in 1692.¹ Having obtained an advantageous peace, Parliament was opposed to the further maintenance of a large army, on the ground that a standing army is “inconsistent with a free government, and absolutely destructive to the constitution of the English monarchy.”

In these circumstances, William III was well pleased with the disposition of Louis XIV to support the cause of a neutral candidate for the throne of Spain and to divide the heritage. It is true that during the war the allies were bound by the secret article promising to sustain the claims of Leopold I to the Spanish succession; but time had entirely changed the conditions. The war was over, the treaty of alliance had been superseded by the treaty of peace, and a new candidate, Joseph Ferdinand, had come into the world, whose accession would avoid the too great increase of either the Bourbon or the Hapsburg power.

The new position of Louis XIV was, in March, 1698, taken with extreme adroitness. At Madrid he was through Harcourt urging the claims of the Dauphin to the whole

Negotiations
of Louis XIV
and William
III

¹ See Lodge, *The History of England*, p. 381, for the origin of the national debt of England.

succession. At Versailles he was negotiating through the new English ambassador, William Bentinck, Earl of Portland, and at London through Count Tallard, the new French ambassador, with William III for the participation of England and the United Provinces in a treaty of partition.¹ In case he succeeded at Madrid, he could claim that he was following the expressed wishes of the Spanish nation. If he failed there, he could defeat the aims of Leopold I by demanding the execution of the partition treaty. In any event, each operation would help the other; for Spain would prefer to be ruled by a French prince rather than submit to a division of the monarchy, and the maritime powers would sooner yield to the wishes of France in dividing the spoils than see a French prince mount the throne of Spain.²

In the correspondence of William III and the Dutch Grand Pensionary, Heinsius, we have a clear revelation of the King's state of mind. "I shudder," he says, on March 25, 1698, "when I think of the unprepared state of the allies to begin a war and the present dilapidated state of Spain." He was expecting few concessions from France, which, he believed, still possessed the military force to compel the acceptance of the Dauphin or one of his sons by Spain. Such a step, however, would necessitate war, and neither Europe nor France desired it. In truth, it was fear on both sides that brought William III and Louis XIV together; for, while the acceptance by Spain of a French prince was dreaded by the Anglo-Dutch interests, the King of France was in constant apprehension that Leopold I might prevail at Madrid.

¹ For details of these negotiations, see Legrelle, *La diplomatie française*, etc., II, p. 226 et seq.; and for the instructions to Tallard and Portland's report of conversations, Grimblot, *Letters of William III and Louis XIV*, I, pp. 243, 290.

² That Louis XIV in the course of these negotiations did not abandon the idea, if circumstances favored it, of pressing the full claims of the Dauphin, we have ample proof in the instructions to Harcourt concurrently with the negotiation of the partition treaties.

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The general idea of a partition having been accepted by the two monarchs, the difficulty of fixing its terms soon became apparent. Tallard at London, under the instructions of his royal master, although one of the keenest of traders, found William III an equally astute bargainer; and the transaction which was designed to dispose of whole kingdoms belonging to neither of the contestants advanced but slowly.

The progress
of Harcourt
at Madrid

In the meantime Harcourt and the two Von Harrachs had been busy at Madrid. With consummate skill the former was steadily building up a French party; and in April, 1698, had succeeded in winning the favor of Cardinal Porto Carrero for the cause of France. With the aid of the secret agent of Louis XIV, Père Blandinières, he made much progress with the other influential ecclesiastics also. Even the Queen was not proof against his subtle advances, for which the way was paved by means of importing from Paris numerous presents which appealed to her feminine nature, and which were administered in small quantities, in order to continue and extend her interest.

In July, 1698, after desperate efforts, Von Harrach learned, in answer to his demand, that an act on the part of Charles II in favor of the Archduke Charles would require approval by the Cortes, and that great obstacles existed on account of the claims of the electoral prince of Bavaria, whose mother's renunciation had never been confirmed at Madrid. About the same time the English ambassador wrote: "This people's inclination is for a French prince, provided they can be assured the same shall never be king of France. . . . They would rather have the devil than see France and Spain united; but it is scarce conceivable the abhorrence they have for Vienna, most of which is owing to the Queen's very impudent conduct. . . . They have much kinder thoughts for the Bavarian, but still rather desire a French prince."

The Parti-
tion Treaty
of October 11,
1698

On May 29 Louis XIV had instructed Tallard to lay before William III two alternatives, to which he added a third, as follows:

First, "one of my grandsons would have Spain, the Indies, the islands, countries, and places which belong at present to that monarchy, with the exception of the Kingdoms of Naples and Sicily, and Milan, which the Archduke would have for his share, on condition that they should never be united to the Imperial Crown; the Low Countries, in the state in which they now are, would be ceded to the electoral prince of Bavaria. Though England and Holland cannot pretend to have any claim to share in this partition, I would nevertheless consent, out of regard to the King of England, to leave to those two nations, by this first alternative, Ceuta and Oran, for the security of their commerce."¹

Second, "the electoral prince of Bavaria shall have the kingdom of Spain and all that depends at present on that monarchy, with the reserve of what is contained in the following exceptions, viz.: the Kingdom of Navarre, the towns of Fontarabia and St. Sebastian, and the Duchy of Luxemburg, which should be given to the Dauphin; the Kingdoms of Naples and Sicily, and Milan, to the Archduke."²

Third, "if the King of England should still make the same difficulties on the cession of the Duchy of Luxemburg, I consent that you shall propose to him a new alternative. The electoral prince of Bavaria should have the monarchy of Spain and what now depends upon it, with the exception of the Kingdom of Navarre, which should be ceded to my son, with Milan, Finale, and the places on the coast of Tuscany; the Archduke should have the Kingdoms of Naples and Sicily."³

William III having demurred to many of the conditions proposed, on July 11, Louis XIV was so cheerful over the news sent to him by Harcourt from Madrid that he informed his ambassador, he would no longer "treat with the

¹ See Grimblot, *Letters of William III and Louis XIV*, II, pp. 9, 10.

² Grimblot, as before, p. 11. The King of France also consented that the Spanish part of San Domingo might be taken by the English.

³ Grimblot, as before, p. 12.

CHAP. IV King of England regarding the partition of the Spanish
 A. D. succession, except on advantageous conditions."¹
 1697-1715

But, notwithstanding this resolution, the negotiations moved slowly on, with the certainty—as now appears from the full correspondence—that an agreement would at last be reached. It was not, however, until September 8, after Count Tallard had followed William III to Holland, that everything was concluded at The Loo, the summer residence of the Prince of Orange. The treaty was not definitively signed for both England and the United Provinces until October 11, 1698. It was then agreed that, in case Charles II died without issue, the Kingdoms of Naples and Sicily, with the places then depending upon the Spanish monarchy situated on the coast of Tuscany, the province of Guipuscoa, and particularly the towns of Fontarabia and St. Sebastian, and likewise all places on the French side of the Pyrenees should be given to the Dauphin, in consideration of his right; that the Crown of Spain, and the other kingdoms and places both within and without Europe should descend to the electoral prince of Bavaria, whose father, the Elector, was to be the guardian of his son and the administrator of his affairs till he came of age; and that the Duchy of Milan should be reserved for the Archduke Charles. The treaty was to be communicated to the Emperor and the Elector by the King of England and the States General. If they did not agree to it, the portion of the party not agreeing should remain sequestered until an accommodation could be reached. By a secret clause it was provided that, in case the electoral prince should receive his share, but die without issue before his father, the Elector was to succeed him in that portion.²

The second
 will of Charles
 II and death
 of Joseph
 Ferdinand

Until the middle of August, when the terms of partition were virtually settled, no one of William III's English ministers had been taken into his confidence; and even after

¹ Grimblot, *Letters of William III and Louis XIV*, p. 59.

² For the treaty, see Grimblot, as before, II, Appendix. Also Dumont, VII, Part II, p. 442 et seq.

the treaty was signed its provisions were not generally known in England.

At Vienna and at Madrid, with the exception of Harcourt, there was equal ignorance of what was happening. In the meantime, Von Harrach had quarrelled with the Queen, while the cause of France had been greatly improved. But when the Court of Spain learned that a partition treaty had been signed between Louis XIV and William III, by which the monarchy was secretly parcelled out without regard to the wishes of the King and Cortes of Spain, a storm of indignation followed. Charles II promptly called a council of state; and, on November 14, the will of Philip IV was confirmed, and the whole succession awarded by a new testament to the electoral prince of Bavaria, the Queen being named as regent during his minority.

Louis XIV offered a formal protest against the complete disinheritance of the Dauphin, but he relied upon Max Emmanuel to prefer the treaty rather than the will of Charles II, since the former made the Elector guardian of the Prince, while the latter placed him under the regency of the Queen. The Emperor also, though defeated in his expectations, it was thought, would prefer the treaty to the will; since the former secured Milan to the Archduke, while the latter excluded him altogether.

When at last the news reached Leopold I, who had not even suspected the existence of the treaty of partition, he endeavored to bear his misfortune with good grace. What he might have done eventually is, however, uncertain; for on February 6, 1699, all these elaborate negotiations were nullified by the death of Joseph Ferdinand, at Brussels.¹

In these circumstances William III was inclined to apply the secret clause of the previous treaty by which, in case of

¹ The age of Joseph Ferdinand is erroneously stated by different writers. Gädeke, I, p. 49, the best authority on the point, places his birth on October 26, 1692; which would make him six years, three months, and ten days old at the time of his death. There were stories that the child was poisoned, but it is considered by the best authorities that these were malicious inventions.

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The continu-
ation of the
policy of
partition

the death of the electoral prince, the Elector of Bavaria should take his place; but, as William III himself realized, there were serious obstacles to be overcome. "I cannot comprehend," he wrote to Heinsius, "how we shall ever be able to declare our having intended the succession to the monarchy for the Elector of Bavaria; and still less to communicate it to the Imperial Court; so that we are in no small labyrinth, and may it please God to help us out of it!" Clearly, since whatever right Joseph Ferdinand had possessed came to him through his mother, Max Emmanuel had no just claim to any portion of the Spanish inheritance; and even in the partition treaty nothing had been accorded to him, except conditional succession to his son *after* the Prince had entered upon his heritage.

Louis XIV had no intention of transferring even a part of the Spanish monarchy to the Elector of Bavaria. As there were now only two legitimate pretenders, the Dauphin and the Archduke Charles, negotiations were continued on the same general plan as before, with the added advantage to the cause of Louis XIV that he knew from the reports of Harcourt the Spaniards would never permit the Kingdom either to be divided or to pass to the Archduke Charles. It would be a French prince, not a German, who would be preferred at Madrid. Given the alternatives of a partition or a French prince without partition, there could be no doubt what the final decision would be. A new treaty would, however, serve the purpose of propitiating the maritime powers and at the same time render easier the *coup de main* that was necessary to settle the question at Madrid.

The Partition
Treaty of
March 25,
1700

The new partition treaty of March 25, 1700, was a masterly stroke on the part of Louis XIV, but it is unnecessary to dwell upon the details of the negotiations by which it was completed. During the whole process the French ambassador at Vienna, the Marquis de Villars, was tranquillizing the Emperor and his councillors, while Harcourt was striving night and day through his powerful pro-French party at Madrid to obtain a testament from Charles II bequeathing the whole monarchy to one of Louis XIV's grandsons!

On May 6 a copy of the new partition treaty was sent to the Emperor for his adhesion without alteration within three months, in default of which the part assigned to the Archduke Charles would be awarded to some other prince!

Stupefaction reigned at Vienna. Although flattering in appearance, the treaty was deeply humiliating to the Emperor. The Archduke Charles was accorded the Crown of Spain with all "the other kingdoms, islands, estates, countries, and places which the Catholic King now possesses, as well outside of Europe as within," *except* that the Dauphin reserved, for himself and his heirs, the territories named in the previous treaty of partition, together with the Duchy of Lorraine, in exchange for which the Duke of Lorraine was to have the Duchy of Milan. The exceptions excluded the House of Austria entirely from Italy, augmented the power of France immensely, and left the future king of Spain almost at the mercy of his powerful neighbor. But the most painful wound of all was to have the portion of Austria measured off and handed out by the King of France, the King of England, and half a dozen Dutch deputies, through the Dutch envoy, Hopp, as the designated intermediary! It was "admirable," said the Emperor, with biting sarcasm, to see the King of France treat with other foreign powers who had nothing to do with the division of the monarchy, and refuse to treat with him as the legitimate heir to the entire succession. "Think only of the treaty," replied Villars; "do not lose time in forming useless projects!"

If Vienna was indignant, Madrid was furious at this second project of dismemberment.¹ In June the Council of State of Spain met and decided with only one dissenting voice that the monarchy should be accorded undivided to a French prince. Innocent XII, whose advice was sought, referred the matter to the cardinals, who recommended the same solution.² The Spanish juriconsults, after a

¹ The Queen is said to have been so angry that upon hearing of it she broke all the furniture in her room.

² Klopp, *Fall des Hauses Stuart*, VIII, 625, IX, 33, X, 162, denies the authenticity of this correspondence, and considers the letter of Inno-

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solemn consultation, recognized the right of succession as belonging to the French line. The clergy and the people of Spain became excited over the false report that by a secret treaty portions of the American colonies were divided between the Protestant nations, England and Holland. The pressure upon the King's resistance became irresistible. On October 2, 1700, he signed a last will and testament in favor of one of the grandsons of Louis XIV, Philip, Duke of Anjou;¹ and on November 1 it became effective by his death.

II. THE REACTION OF EUROPE AGAINST THE UNION OF FRANCE AND SPAIN

Acceptance
of the throne
of Spain for
Philip of
France

The last will and testament of Charles II, by which the grandson of Louis XIV was designated as the future king of Spain, undoubtedly expressed the deliberate preference of the Spanish nation. The decision to name a French prince combined the advantages of respect for the established principles of legitimacy, of terminating peacefully the long and bitter state of hostility between two neighboring countries, and of preserving unimpaired the integrity of the Spanish monarchy.

All Europe at once asked the question, Would Louis XIV accept the will, or would he insist upon the execution of the treaty of partition? When, on November 9, 1700, information of the purport of the testament of Charles II reached Fontainebleau, where the Court was then residing, the answer was uncertain. The King at once assembled in the apartment of Madame de Maintenon the Dauphin, the Chancellor of France, the governor of the royal household, and Torcy, the secretary of state for foreign affairs, to deliberate

cent a fraud on the part of Forbin-Janson in the year 1702; and Landau, *Rom, Wien, Neapel während des spanischen Erbfolgekrieges*, Leipzig, 1885, has written an excursus on the question. See, however, Legrelle, *La diplomatie française*, etc., III, p. 372 et seq., who reprints the correspondence in the Appendix.

¹ For the last will of Charles II, see Dumont, VII, Part II, p. 485.

upon the action to be taken. The Dauphin insisted upon the prompt acceptance of the testament; but the King withheld his decision. The next day Torcy proposed to accept the testament in secret, in order to reassure the Spaniards, but to negotiate with England and Holland for their approval as the most certain way to avoid a war; but it was decided to accept the inheritance at once, and the Spanish ambassador was so informed. On the sixteenth, at Versailles, Louis XIV presented his grandson to the ambassador with the words: "*Vous pouvez le saluer comme votre roi.*" After Castellodosrius had kissed the hand of the young prince and made a complimentary speech to him in Spanish,— of which the seventeen-year-old boy did not understand a word,— the King had the doors flung open and presented the Prince to the waiting courtiers with the announcement: "*Messieurs, voilà le roi d'Espagne!*" "Be a good Spaniard," was the royal injunction, ". . . but remember that you were born French, to maintain the union between the two nations; it is the means of rendering them happy and of conserving the peace of Europe." When the ambassador was informed that Philip V would begin his journey to Spain on December 1, he exclaimed: "*Quelle joie! Il n'y a plus de Pyrénées; elles sont abimées, et nous sommes plus qu'un!*"¹

The question has been much discussed, how far and in what sense the will of Charles II was a triumph of French diplomacy. The result finally obtained was persistently sought by every means within the power of Harcourt, and he pursued this course with the knowledge and approval of Louis XIV, who rewarded him by making him a duke. It is, however, unjust to Louis XIV to represent, as some writers have done, that he had consciously and purposely duped William III and Heinsius. The truth is, that the partition treaties contained greater advantages for the French nation than the inheritance by a French prince of the Crown of Spain; for they would have added consid-

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The double rôle of French diplomacy

¹ This expression, "*Il n'y a plus de Pyrénées!*" has been erroneously attributed to Louis XIV.

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erably to the strength of France as a European power, whereas a mere dynastic triumph by which a Bourbon prince was placed on the Spanish throne was of no great national importance to the people of France. The chief motive which inspired the treaties of partition was not, however, the greater advantage of France, but the fear that the whole succession might otherwise fall by the will of Charles II to the Archduke Charles; which would restore the Hapsburg Empire by the union of Spain, Italy, and Germany under the rule of a single monarch.¹

The logic of Louis XIV's diplomacy regarding the succession did not involve insincerity toward England and Holland, or even toward Leopold I. It consisted in presenting to Spain two alternatives,—either of which would prevent the triumph of the House of Hapsburg and rebound to the glory of the Bourbon dynasty,—the partition of the Spanish monarchy or the succession of a French prince to the entire inheritance. For three years the Grand Monarch did not know which of these alternatives would be accepted. When at last the patriotism of the Spanish nation and the pride of the dying king prevented the monarchy from being dismembered and called for his grandson to be the future king of Spain, the die fell as Louis XIV had wished it to fall; but it was a result which he had almost ceased to expect.

The abandon-
ment of the
partition
treaty

Louis XIV has been accused not only of insincerity in his negotiations with England and Holland, but also of downright perfidy in not executing the treaty of partition to which he had solemnly agreed. It is true, that, whenever his view of expediency affected the fulfilment of his engagements, his regard for treaty obligations was not great; but in this case his decision to abandon the treaty was not without extenuation. It was, in fact, monstrous for three foreign

¹ The will of Charles II provided that if the crown of Spain were not accepted by the Duke of Anjou, or if he should die without leaving descendants, it should go next to the Dauphin's third son, the Duke of Berry, then to the Archduke Charles of Austria, and finally to the Duke of Savoy, or their descendants, under the same conditions.

powers to conspire in secrecy for the dismemberment and distribution of an inheritance to which two of them had no claim whatever. If the justification of such a measure was to be found in the necessity for the peace of Europe, that appeared to be equally provided for by the will of Charles II; which, with the approval of the Spanish nation, designated a foreign prince as King of Spain, with the qualification that he should never be King of France; a condition that did not exist when the partition treaty was negotiated, and which now seemed to render it unnecessary. To insist upon the fulfilment of that treaty against the will of Spain would undoubtedly have caused a European war; and, even in the event of sustaining the treaty, its execution would have imposed upon an independent nation not only the loss of a great portion of its territory but a monarch whom it had deliberately rejected.¹

It is no reproach to Louis XIV, therefore, that he did not plunge Europe into war in fulfilment of an unjust engagement. William III and Heinsius, who distrusted the intentions of Louis XIV, were none the less full of resentment when they saw that their laborious negotiations had come to nought, and that a French prince was to have the entire succession; and the apology of Louis XIV for abandoning the treaty, set forth on November 12, 1700, in an elaborate memorial, did not abate their indignation. "The two monarchies of France and Spain remain separated, as they have been for so many years," ran this ingenious document. "This equal balance, desired by all Europe, subsists much better than if France were aggrandized by the acquisition of the frontiers of Spain, or of Lorraine, or even of the kingdoms of Naples and Sicily. . . . It may be added, that the uneasiness which the English and the Dutch have expressed for their commerce in the Mediterranean will cease when they learn that the kingdoms of Naples and Sicily do not change masters, and that they will find in their ports the same advantages which they

¹ In all these negotiations no voice was raised in defence of the people's right to determine their own destiny or even to intervene.

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feared to lose by the union of those kingdoms with the Crown of France."¹

These arguments had little effect upon William III, who in a letter to Heinsius, of November 16, calls the motives of the memorial "shameful." "We must confess we are dupes," he says; "but if one's word and faith are not to be kept, it is easy to cheat any man."

The people of England and Holland, however, were not so much displeased with the situation as William III and Heinsius were; and it soon became evident that public opinion in both countries regarded the will of Charles II as a far better solution of the succession problem than the treaties of partition. In fact, if France and Spain were to be kept distinctly separate as before, Europe saw many advantages in the accession of a French prince to the Spanish throne. Leopold I naturally thought differently; but the prospect of amity between the two monarchies, which had so long disturbed the peace of Europe with their quarrels, was welcomed not only by themselves but by most of their neighbors.

The new instructions to Harcourt

Under a monarch of a different temperament from that of Louis XIV, the closer relationship between France and Spain might have inaugurated a new era of well-being; but his spirit of personal domination could not be long repressed. His instructions to Harcourt, written on November 17, foreshadow the evils which William III and Heinsius feared. "The good of his kingdom," says the letter of the King, "will demand some day that the King of Spain take measures to exclude the English and the Dutch from the commerce of the Indies"! "Finally," concludes this remarkable document, "you ought to make evident the certain advantages which religion will receive from the perfect understanding between my crown and that of Spain"!²

¹ For this memorial, see Grimblot, *Letters of William III and Louis XIV*, II, p. 463 et seq.

² For the instructions, see Legrelle, *La diplomatie française*, etc., IV, pp. 495, 505.

Thus, on the first day after the public acceptance of the Spanish inheritance, Louis XIV began to frame policies for the joint action of the two monarchies, to which he gave the assurance of his armed support; and among these policies were the exclusion of the English and the Dutch from the commerce of the Indies, which the treaty of partition was intended to secure to them, and a united support of the Catholic religion!

With the exception of the Emperor, the powers of Europe, after a short period of surprise and indecision, decided to acknowledge Philip V as King of Spain. William III would have offered resistance, if he could have obtained support in England; but this was impossible. "I am pressed on every side to recognize the King of Spain," he wrote to Heinsius; but he resolved to postpone recognition as long as possible and insensibly to lead the people on to war.¹ Heinsius was equally powerless in Holland, where the interest in trade dominated over every other, and fear existed that another war would not only completely exhaust the country but render it entirely subject either to William III or Louis XIV.

The acquiescence of Europe

When, therefore, Leopold I undertook to obtain allies for the purpose of disputing the claim of the Duke of Anjou to the entire Spanish succession, he found that the indignation of Vienna was not widely shared. Villars was openly insulted in the streets and war was threatened, but without the support of the maritime powers there was no hope of preventing the accession of Philip V. In the Empire itself Leopold I could count upon the Elector Palatine and the Elector of Hanover, and by recognizing Frederick III as King of Prussia he won the alliance of the Elector of Brandenburg;² but, as this recognition was known to be against the real wishes of the Emperor, it was in effect

¹ William III was convinced that Louis XIV meant to dupe him, and that war would necessarily follow.

² For the treaty conceding the royal dignity to the Elector of Brandenburg, dated November 16, 1700, see Dumont, II, Part I, supplement, p. 400.

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a diminution of his own prestige, and proved to be a cause of offence to other German princes, who resented the establishment of a new royal house in the German Empire.

On the other hand, while Leopold I was powerless to reorganize the Grand Alliance against Louis XIV, the princes of Europe were flocking to the King of France. The King of Portugal, the Duke of Savoy, the Electors of Bavaria and Köln, and most significant of all the new pope, Clement XI, all sought to enter into cordial relations with France and promptly recognized Philip V as King of Spain.

The revived
ambition of
Louis XIV

Long discipline as a ruler seemed for a time to have taught Louis XIV lessons of wisdom; but the elation of spirits produced by the triumphal entry of Philip V into Spain and his enthusiastic welcome at Madrid destroyed in a moment all that years of trial and experience had done to balance the mind of the Grand Monarch. He now felt that he was himself not only King of France but practically King of Spain also, and a new access of his disposition to dominate soon plunged all Europe into war.

The redeeming features of the accession of a French prince to the whole of the Spanish monarchy were: first, the provision that the two crowns were to be kept forever separate; second, that the Spanish Netherlands, being permanently secured to Spain,— a weak and distant power, — would always stand as a quasi-neutral barrier between the United Provinces and France; and, third, that Anglo-Dutch commerce would suffer no disadvantage because of the new relations between France and Spain. It required only a few months to show that all these supposed benefits were illusory; that Louis XIV intended to prepare for the ultimate union of the two monarchies, and in the meantime to impose his own will in Spain as he had imposed it in France.

On February 1, 1701, the King registered in the Parliament of Paris letters patent, already prepared in December, by which he reserved to the Duke of Anjou and his de-

scendants all their natural rights to the Crown of France.¹ This was a plain infraction of the form of security which the will of Charles II had furnished; for, although there were two lives and many possibilities between the Duke of Anjou and his immediate right of accession to the throne of France, the action of Louis XIV could have no other motive than to provide for an ultimate union of the two monarchies. Five days later, without notice, French troops were sent into the Spanish Netherlands to replace the Dutch garrisons located in the barrier cities, which they were occupying in conformity with previous agreements. The Dutch soldiers were not expelled, but they were virtually made prisoners of war, to await the action of the States General.

Although the Republic, for the time, suppressed its indignation at this action, and, on February 28, 1701, recognized the new king of Spain, it did not hesitate to demand the evacuation of the Spanish Netherlands by the troops of France, to concentrate its vessels of war, to increase its land forces, and to call upon England to render aid in maintaining its rights.

Louis XIV quickly perceived that his action had produced a rising tide of hostility both in Holland and in England, and he took prompt measures to offer reassurance. Early in March he announced that he would withdraw the French troops as soon as Spanish soldiers could take their place, and proposed a conference to settle the points at issue. But the States General resolved not to be isolated, and asked that the English ambassador be admitted to the conference, at the same time handing to Count d'Avauz a statement of their demands, which included ten barrier cities, the entire withdrawal of French troops from the

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Louis XIV's
efforts at
reassurance

¹ For the text, see Legrelle, *La diplomatie française, etc.*, IV, p. 215. A few days before signing the letters patent, Louis XIV said to the Constable of Castile: "Les nations française et espagnole seront tellement unies, que les deux désormais n'en formeront plus qu'une." See Flassan, *Histoire générale et raisonnée de la diplomatie française*, IV, p. 209.

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Spanish Netherlands, a promise that no part of them should ever be ceded to France, and some "satisfaction" for the Emperor in regard to the succession.

Seeing in this manifesto a covert intimation that the Grand Alliance might be revived by an appeal to England and the Emperor, Louis XIV offered to confirm the Peace of Ryswick; but immediately began to build defences at Antwerp and Ostend and to construct a line of fortifications between the Scheldt and the Maas, while resorting to the old tactics of appealing to the commercial interests of Amsterdam for the maintenance of peace.

The refusal to admit the English ambassador to the negotiations as a contracting participant confirmed the Dutch suspicions of the intention to isolate as well as divide the Republic, and a new and more forcible appeal for protection was made to William III.

The changed
sentiment in
England

In the meantime, the conduct of Louis XIV had produced its effect in England also. The Tories were indifferent to the fate of Holland, but as the evidence of the danger to Europe accumulated, public sentiment, which William III was steadily directing toward resistance to the new designs of his enemy, was slowly awakening. Reports of a Jacobite plot to assassinate the King and make a descent upon England for the restoration of James II, whatever their origin, led the Parliament to regulate the succession to the throne by designating a Protestant princess, Sophia, the widow of Ernest Augustus, Elector of Hanover,— a granddaughter of James I,— and her descendants, in case William III and the Princess Anne should die without leaving children. Following upon this important decision, came the appeal of the States General for aid; and Parliament, incited by the renewed fear of French intrigues, not only voted large appropriations for the army and navy, but ordered ten thousand men to be sent to the Netherlands and authorized the King to conclude alliances for the safety of England and the independence of Europe.

William III had again succeeded in drawing England

once more into opposition to Louis XIV; but he was not disposed to recommence open hostilities at once. At The Hague, on June 9, Count d'Avaux was instructed to permit the English ambassador, Alexander Stanhope, to join in the negotiations; but Stanhope insisted that he could not proceed without a representative of the Emperor. As Leopold I had already begun a campaign against France in Italy for the possession of Milan, Louis XIV refused to admit an Imperial plenipotentiary to the conference; holding that he could not allow England and Holland to act as arbitrators between himself and the Emperor, with whom he was at war. In consequence, Count d'Avaux was recalled from The Hague, all negotiations were ended, and war became apparently inevitable.

In these circumstances it was natural that Leopold I should seek the alliance of the two maritime powers, and that they in turn should associate themselves with him; but the difference between their aims was an obstacle to the full satisfaction of the Emperor. England and Holland had already formally recognized Philip V as King of Spain. They could not, therefore, consistently unite with Leopold I to dethrone him, and to put the Archduke Charles in his place. Nor was it their purpose to force Spain to abandon the king whom the nation had chosen and so enthusiastically welcomed. Their object was to prevent the ultimate union of Spain with France, and particularly that immediate exercise of authority by Louis XIV in Spain and in the Spanish possessions which was almost equivalent to the immediate annexation of the country to the French monarchy.

At every available point thus far, Louis XIV was acting as if he were virtually King of Spain. In fact, Spain seemed almost to have lost its identity and to be absorbed by France. French soldiers were defending Milan, French ships were guarding the coasts of the Spanish colonies in America, French merchants were carrying on the Spanish trade, French slave-vessels had the monopoly of the

The revival of
 the coalition
 against France

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"Asiento," and the garrisons of the Spanish Netherlands took their orders from French officers.¹

But in the opposition to the overweening power of France there was enough of common interest to furnish a basis for an alliance, and under the direction of William III and Heinsius it was soon found. On September 7, 1701, a treaty was signed at The Hague between the Emperor, England, and the United Provinces by which it was agreed that, "if war became necessary," Leopold I should receive "a just and reasonable satisfaction" in the matter of the Spanish succession, and that the maritime powers should be granted "a particular security" as respects their commerce and their territory.²

Louis XIV was to have two months within which to make a friendly arrangement upon this basis. If he declined to make such an arrangement, the three allies would unite to conquer the Spanish Netherlands, to be erected into a barrier between France and the United Provinces; Milan, as an Imperial fief should be restored to the Emperor as necessary to the security of the Austrian possessions; and Naples and Sicily should also be delivered to the Emperor, as a further security and to maintain the commercial rights of England and Holland. Whatever parts of the American colonies might, in case of war, fall into the hands of the allies as necessary to their commerce should be retained at the conclusion of hostilities, for which the contractants pledged themselves not to treat separately. While the commercial privileges enjoyed under Charles II by the English and the Dutch should be continued, trade with the Spanish colonies should be prohibited to the French.

These were drastic demands, which Louis XIV was certain not to admit; yet it was through his own intemperate conduct that they were made. Still it is doubtful if the English people would have sustained William III in the

The rupture
of diplomatic
relations with
France

¹ After June, 1701, says Baudrillart, *Philippe V et la cour de France*, I, p. 71, "*Louis XIV parla et agit en maître.*" See also the examples cited to show the extent of his authority in Spain.

² For the treaty, see Dumont, VIII, Part I, p. 89 et seq.

long and costly war necessary to maintain all these requirements had it not been for a fresh act of hostility on the part of Louis XIV.

On September 16, 1701, at Saint-Germain, where the Grand Monarch had generously maintained James II in royal state, the exiled king died after a long illness. As a consolation to his dying relative, Louis XIV promised to recognize his son, James Edward, a boy of fourteen, as James III, King of England.

When William III, who was at The Loo, heard of this violation of the Treaty of Ryswick, he ordered the English ambassador at Versailles to return to England at once without a farewell audience. Heinsius gave a corresponding order to the Dutch ambassador; and, owing to this rupture of diplomatic relations, the treaty of September 7 was never formally submitted to Louis XIV.

The effect in England of the imprudent and wholly useless act of recognizing James Edward was as much of an offence to Parliament, which had just determined the royal succession, as to William III. The whole English nation was aroused. The new parliament voted large appropriations for the conduct of the war, and passed a bill of attainder, which declared that James Edward would be guilty of high treason if he ever set foot on English soil, and a bill of abjuration, by which all officers of the Crown were required to repudiate his claims.

Thus, at last, the hostility of William III to Louis XIV was transformed into a permanent traditional opposition on the part of the English nation. It was a costly and yet a useful legacy to England, and it was his last; for before war had been declared, on March 9, 1702, this strenuous warrior and astute statesman, whose fortunes had been so wonderfully advanced by the mistakes of his enemies, suddenly died. For fourteen years he had ruled three kingdoms to which he was essentially an alien. Personally unsympathetic and never really loved in England, he had nevertheless been politically necessary to the nation. Voluntarily chosen as the instrument for asserting the national will,

The death of
 William III

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he had in reality bent it to his own purposes. With a broader view of continental politics than was possessed by any Englishman of his time, he had seen the relation of England's well-being to the affairs of the continent, and events had forced the country to follow him.

It is no small merit in a statesman to penetrate to realities where others are misled by appearances, yet this distinction can justly be claimed for William III. The highest possible tribute to his discernment is the fact that his policy became the permanent policy of England. The coalition he had formed to prevent the absorption of the Spanish monarchy by France continued to resist the forces of Louis XIV until it won a final victory and saved Europe from the reign of absolutism by which it was again threatened at the time of his death. As an English historian has well said of him: "No one is unaware that he established our Constitution upon a permanent basis. But it is not for our Constitution only, but for our policy, for our definitive situation among the nations of the world, that we are indebted to him."¹

It is only in the light of two centuries of international development that the full significance of these words can be appreciated; for it was not merely the annexation of the Spanish Netherlands, or even the appropriation of all the European territories of Spain, that was involved in the threatened absorption of the Spanish monarchy by France. It was the control of the chief Atlantic and Mediterranean ports, of the American colonies, and of the commerce of the world that was at stake. The rescue of Holland, the permanent separation of France and Spain, and the independence of the states of Germany,—these were the objects to which William III devoted his life; and these were the foundations of the future development of Europe as a system of independent sovereign states and of the future formation of the British Empire.

In her speech before the House of Lords three days after the King's death, his successor, Anne, the daughter of

¹ Seeley, *The Growth of British Policy*, II.

James II, revived courage at The Hague and Vienna by declaring her determination to maintain the alliance and "to reduce the exorbitant power of France."

On May 15, 1702, the allies unitedly declared war on Louis XIV, and on September 28 the Imperial Diet formally associated itself with the Emperor in prosecuting the war. Thus practically all Europe was, in form at least, arrayed against France and Spain in a conflict which for more than a decade was to be bitterly contested in Italy, in Bavaria, on the Rhine, and in the Netherlands.

The isolation
of France
and Spain

To aid himself in facing this powerful coalition, Louis XIV had endeavored to form a league of resistance; but the financial condition of France no longer permitted the extravagant expenditures in subsidies which marked the early years of his reign. On April 6, 1701, Victor Amadeus II, after much hesitation, in return for a promise of marriage of his second daughter to Philip V, a heavy subsidy for his troops, and the title of generalissimo of the French army in Italy, had formed a new alliance with Louis XIV; and on June 18, 1701, King Peter II of Portugal had recognized Philip V and closed his sea-ports to the enemies of France and Spain; but they were not long faithful to their engagements.

On May 16, 1703, the English resident, Paul Methuen, concluded a treaty of alliance with Portugal by which Peter II agreed to furnish troops and open his ports for an attack on Spain, and at the same time to admit English commerce in the Portuguese colonies.¹

In September, 1703, Bavaria having fallen into the hands

¹ For this treaty of alliance, to which all the allies were admitted, see Dumont, VIII, Part I, p. 127. The famous "Methuen Treaty" is, however, that of December 27, 1703, which was negotiated by John Methuen, father of the English resident, the object of which was to procure for English commerce, particularly woollen goods, a market in Portugal in exchange for preferential duties on Portuguese wines. It gave to England and to Portugal the advantage of an alliance through which Spain could be held in restraint, and was the basis of permanent commercial relations between the two countries until its abrogation in 1834. For the latter treaty, see Martens, *Recueil des principaux traités*, etc., 1791, 1817, Supplement I, p. 41 et seq.

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of the enemy after the battle of Höchstädt, the Elector was driven from his electorate, but compensated for his loss by being permitted to exercise practically full sovereignty in the Spanish Netherlands, of which Louis XIV had vainly endeavored to obtain the complete cession to France in payment of the services he was rendering to the Spanish monarchy.

In October, 1703, Victor Amadeus II, having received attractive offers from the Emperor, with whom he had been constantly in secret negotiation, and fearing that Louis XIV meant eventually to deprive him of Savoy without obtaining for him possession of Milan, abandoned his alliance with France and became generalissimo of the Imperial forces in Italy.

The year 1704 added to these misfortunes, and on July 24 Gibraltar was captured by the English.

Louis XIV's
interest in
the North
and East

In this extremity Louis XIV looked vainly for new alliances, and awoke to the fact that Europe had undergone a great transformation. The time had passed when the King of France by an alliance with the Sultan could preoccupy the Emperor in the East, and when he could paralyze the princes of the Empire by subsidizing Sweden.

Northeastern Europe had become the theatre of new ambitions, and entirely new forces had entered upon the scene. Henceforth there were to be two great centres of political and military activity in Europe, and the course of events in each was to be more and more affected by the operations of the other.

Until the end of the seventeenth century Russia had been excluded from participation in the international development of Western Europe. Within a vast area a great empire had been gradually forming that was now to be brought into contact with the more fully developed civilization of the West and South. With the accession of the Romanoffs in 1613 order had been restored in Russia, and its wonderful modern development began. Before 1689, when Peter the Great came to the throne as sole master of the Russian Empire, the Moscovite power had reached such a height

that instead of being the prey of Sweden and Poland, as had been expected, it had turned the tide of their preponderance, and was threatening to overwhelm them with its invasions.¹ It was to this new situation in the North and East that Europe was now compelled to devote a portion of its attention.

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Isolation from the rest of Europe and the long struggle with barbaric tribes upon its eastern borders had held Russia since its Christianization in the tenth century in a state of comparatively arrested development similar to that of Western Europe four or five centuries earlier. When in the fifteenth century Constantinople was taken by the Turks, Moscow, which was a centre of Greek civilization, became in a sense its successor, and aspired to be for the East what Rome had been for the West, thus becoming a seat of the ancient imperial culture as modified by the authority of the Christian religion in its Greek as distinguished from its Latin form.

The ambitions
of Peter the
Great

It is the distinction of Peter the Great to have blended with this survival of the past something of the practical arts and the modern spirit borrowed from England and Holland as the result of his visits to those countries in 1697 and 1698. Abolishing the patriarchate, he made himself the head of the Church, as Henry VIII had done in England. His reforms having been resisted by the old-time militia, or *Streltzi*, he destroyed its organization and created a modern army obedient to his will. Possessing no ports and no navy, he built ships and endeavored to open his empire to maritime commerce.

Russia having emerged from the condition in which it was occupied chiefly with internal organization and provisions for its own defence, he gave to the traditional foreign policy of his country a new direction. To expel the Turks from Europe and regain Constantinople had long been the dream of the Russian Church, which regarded itself as an exile from its ancient capital. To give this aim efficiency Peter

¹ For the previous attempt at negotiation between France and Russia, see Vassileff, *Russisch-französische Politik, 1689-1717*, pp. 1, 13.

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the Great conceived the policy of constructing a navy on the Black Sea with the intention of pushing out to the Mediterranean and developing foreign commerce. At the same time he formed the design of obtaining a port on the Baltic, at the mouth of the Neva, where St. Petersburg was afterward built and the Russian capital established. Thenceforth, Russia, until then regarded as a negligible quantity in the affairs of Europe, had to be counted with as an important European power.

The coalition
against
Sweden

The immediate obstacles to the new policy of Russian expansion were Sweden, Poland, and Turkey. At the close of the Thirty Years' War Sweden was one of the most vigorous of the European nations, and war was its chief industry. Had its resources permitted the kingdom to sustain and employ its military strength for its own development, instead of shedding the blood of its sons upon foreign battlefields, Sweden might have become, as at one time it promised to be, the undisputed mistress of the Baltic; but the poverty of its soil and the policy of selling its military force to other countries, in spite of numerous wars fought on its own account with Denmark, Poland, and Russia, prevented the expansion of Swedish power. The acquisitions of Sweden on the Baltic were, however, of great extent; and the possession of Esthonia, Livonia, Ingria, and Carelia effectually excluded Russia from the coveted coasts of the Baltic.

When, in 1697, Charles XI of Sweden died, leaving his son Charles XII, who was only fifteen years old, as his successor, the opportunity had seemed to be offered for Russia to divest Sweden of her Baltic empire.

Fredrick Augustus I, King of Poland, was an ambitious soldier whose base of action in Saxony as well as Poland rendered him a formidable competitor for territorial expansion. He had formed the design of obtaining from the war with Turkey Moldavia and Wallachia, which would have extended the dominions of Poland to the Black Sea. He hoped also eventually to absorb Silesia, which would have connected Saxony with Poland. Had he succeeded in

executing these plans, he would have possessed an empire extending from the Baltic to the Black Sea, and from the Elbe to the Dnieper, an area greater than the whole of Germany, with every advantage for still wider extension.

To Frederick Augustus I, Patkul, a Livonian nobleman who had been despoiled of his estates by Sweden, made appeal for the reconquest of Livonia by Poland in the hope of obtaining their restoration. Since peace had been made at Carlowitz between the Sultan and the Emperor, the time did not seem favorable for the greater design of Frederick Augustus I, and Patkul was entrusted by him with the formation of an anti-Swedish coalition. In September, 1699, an offensive alliance was formed with Denmark against Sweden, and in the following November the Czar adhered to it. The Elector of Brandenburg was invited to join this league, with permission to take Swedish Pomerania; but not wishing to embark upon that enterprise before he had fully confirmed his new dignity as King of Prussia, Frederick III decided to maintain his neutrality.

Imagining that Sweden would prove defenceless against the triple combination, Poland, Denmark, and Russia, each with the expectation of territorial aggrandizement, began a war with the intention of dividing among themselves the Swedish possessions on the Southern and Eastern shores of the Baltic.

Never had there been a more erroneous calculation. The young king, Charles XII, who was still a mere boy, proved to be a most energetic and courageous warrior. His enthusiasm was so contagious that in a few months the military spirit of Sweden was fully aroused. Without giving his enemies time to unite, he struck out at them with a violence and a certainty of aim that astonished Europe. The Danes had attacked the Duke of Holstein, brother-in-law of Charles XII, whose duchy they intended to appropriate; but the young king at the head of eleven thousand men, having rendered the Danish fleet inactive, promptly threatened Copenhagen, and King Frederick IV was compelled at Travendal to accept all the Duke's demands.

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The victories of
Charles XII

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Having won this unexpected victory, he next proceeded, against the urgent advice of his generals, to the Gulf of Finland, where the Czar was entrenched at Narva, and with only eight thousand men attacked and defeated an army of forty thousand Russians. Then, landing in Livonia, he marched to Warsaw, where he attacked Frederick Augustus I of Poland, and in 1702 compelled him to retire to his electorate of Saxony.

The efforts of
the West to
mediate

The desperate struggle in the North, although disconnected with the question of the Spanish succession, in which the Northern powers had no direct interest, was not without its effect upon the course of events in Western Europe. Regarding Charles XII and Frederick Augustus I as desirable allies, whose united forces if turned against Leopold I would greatly embarrass and possibly entirely prevent the Emperor's activities against France, Louis XIV, in the hope of turning the armies of Sweden and Poland against the Emperor, in April, 1700, had sent an envoy, Du Héron, to Warsaw to negotiate for an alliance with Frederick Augustus I and a "solid peace" between Poland, Sweden, and Denmark; but Du Héron soon became convinced that reconciliation between Poland and Sweden was impossible.

In February, 1701, at Birsén, where a conference was held between Frederick Augustus I and Peter the Great to strengthen their alliance against Sweden, Du Héron endeavored to persuade the Czar to permit the King of France to mediate between him and Charles XII; but, although diplomatic correspondence was for some time continued with the Russian Chancellor, Golowin, the negotiation bore no fruit.¹

In the effort to obtain the good will of Charles XII in the war of the Spanish succession, England and Holland also had sought to divert Russia from the attack on Sweden. The main interest of the maritime powers was not, however, the expectation of active aid against Louis XIV, but the preservation of their Baltic trade; for they feared the Russian mastery of the Baltic. Urging their dissatisfaction with

¹ See *Recueil des instructions*, VIII, Russie, pp. 93, 94.

the assault of the Czar upon their "friend and ally,"—as they called Sweden,—the pressure of their mediation had the effect of impelling Russia to approach France with assurances of friendship, and Golowin in his correspondence referred to Louis XIV and the Czar as "the two heroes of the century," whose alliance would be "an object of admiration to all Europe." But Louis XIV did not fully relish the presumption of the Russian chancellor in ranking his own half-barbaric master with himself, and after the Czar had politely declined French mediation and genially promised to "recompense" the offer of the King of France on "some similar occasion," Louis XIV had for a time desisted from his attempt to induce Russia to end the war.

Having declined the mediation of France, the virility of Russian diplomacy, unschooled as it was, soon became evident in the attempt of the Russian envoy Dolgorouki to persuade Du Héron that it was for the French interest that the war should continue, as it would prevent Sweden and Poland from uniting with the coalition against France; and especially that it would be in the French interest to aid the Czar in obtaining a Baltic port, which would ruin the Dutch commerce in the North, and enable Russia with the help of France to control the Baltic trade. Patkul also in a personal interview with Du Héron urged the advantage to France that would result from promoting the designs of Russia; but Louis XIV, who was seeking to obtain immediate help in resisting his enemies, was not disposed to advance Russian interests, and had long refrained from sending an envoy to the Czar at Moscow, fearing that this might offend Charles XII, whom he wished to draw to his side in the war of the succession.

The Franco-Russian attempts at negotiation

It was, however, impossible for Louis XIV to regard without interest the situation in the North, from which he always hoped to derive some profit. What he really aimed at was, if practicable, to end the attack on Sweden, which he then hoped to use to his advantage in Germany, and to induce Poland and Russia to make war on the Emperor.

The outlook for this scheme was not at any time pro-

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pitious, but Louis XIV did not entirely abandon it. On September 28, 1702, elaborate instructions had been prepared for Baluze, secretary of the mission to Poland, who was designated as a special envoy to the Czar.¹

As appears from these instructions, the first object was to prevent a union of Russia with the enemies of France. Of this there was great danger. On January 16, 1702, the King of Poland had concluded an offensive and defensive alliance with the Emperor against France. The Czar was not unlikely to do the same. He was already disposed to furnish troops to the coalition, and had already offered in exchange for subsidies to lend soldiers to Holland.²

The envoy was further instructed always to work diligently for a reconciliation between Russia and Sweden. As a diversion an invasion of Transylvania by the Cossacks was proposed; and the conquest of that province was declared to be easy, since the Emperor was fully preoccupied on the Rhine and in Italy, and Russia could count upon the help of France.

On March 24, 1703, Baluze arrived in Moscow, where he was received by Golowin on the day of his arrival; and soon afterward, in the Chancellor's dwelling, the Czar, who came *incognito*, gave him his first audience. Suspicion was, however, strong on both sides, and neither ventured to make proposals; and in the following July this first mission of Louis XIV to Peter the Great came to an end without result.

The situation
in the North
and in the
West

The battles won by the young king of Sweden promised for a time to give him a predominating rôle in Europe. "He dreams only of war," wrote one of his generals; "he listens no longer to advice; he believes that he is divinely inspired to do what he does." A brilliant succession of victories seemed to justify the self-confidence of Charles XII. In 1703 he captured Thorn and Dantzic; and in February, 1704, convoked an assembly at Warsaw, deposed Frederick

¹ For the instructions, see *Recueil des instructions*, Russie, I, p. 94 et seq.

² See Vassileff, *Russisch-französische Politik*, p. 24.

Augustus I, and named a Polish noble, Stanislas Leszczinski, King of Poland.

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But in the meantime Peter the Great had repaired the defeat of Narva. In 1703 he had taken the Swedish fort at the mouth of the Neva, demolished it, and laid the foundations of St. Petersburg on the ground where Saint Alexander Nevski had formerly won his glorious renown. In the same year he justified his maritime policy by capturing two Swedish vessels, "an unheard-of victory." In 1704 he recaptured Narva, and devastated Livonia and Esthonia with a vigor that recalled the exploits of Ivan the Terrible.

In the meantime Charles XII was wreaking his vengeance on Frederick Augustus I, whom he had chased from Poland into Saxony, where he was levying contributions from the electorate from his camp under the walls of Leipzig.

The moment seemed to Louis XIV opportune for inducing the impetuous King of Sweden to turn his forces against the Emperor. In May, 1705, Leopold I died, and his son, Joseph I, was chosen Emperor. As if to show his indifference to the Imperial authority, Charles XII traversed Silesia without asking for permission, and was receiving and redressing the complaints of the Protestants of Austria and Hungary. Europe, divided, was trembling before him; for on whichever side he might throw the weight of his influence in the war of succession, it was believed, his will could determine the issue. France, on the point of being invaded, had been beaten at Ramillies and Turin, the greater part of the Spanish Netherlands was in the hands of the allies, and on June 6, 1706, the Archduke Charles, whom the allies had now resolved to support for the entire succession, had been unanimously recognized as king by the States of Flanders. On the twenty-fifth of the same month the allies, having advanced upon Madrid from Portugal, had driven Philip V from his capital and had proclaimed Charles III King of Spain.

At this low ebb of his fortunes Louis XIV hoped that Sweden, his long subsidized ally, would be under Charles XII, as it had been under Gustavus Adolphus, the firm

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The effort of
Louis XIV to
secure the
alliance of
Charles XII

friend of France in the conflict with the Emperor. All the efforts of his envoys were, therefore, directed toward that result. French diplomacy was at the same time active in trying to induce the Sultan to attack the Emperor and also Russia. The Czar, it was argued, as soon as he had made peace with Sweden would build a great fleet on the Black Sea and unite with the Emperor to drive the Turks from Europe. In the meantime, while the Sultan was being urged to attack the Czar, peace with Russia was to be urged upon Sweden, in order that the Swedish army might be retained in Germany to fight for France against the Emperor.

The maritime powers well understood that the union of France and Sweden at that moment would change the face of Europe. The Peace of Alt-Ranstädt, signed on September 24, 1706, by which Frederick Augustus I renounced the crown of Poland, and surrendered Patkul to be broken on the wheel as a traitor, left Charles XII free to employ his sixty thousand soldiers, already in the heart of Germany, against Joseph I. He had also, besides the French urgency, a strong motive for doing so; for Joseph I had refused to deliver twelve thousand Russian prisoners who had taken refuge in Austria, and Charles XII was disposed to march on Vienna to demand that they be surrendered to him.

Having already lost Italy, failed in his efforts to make a separate peace with Holland, and strongly desiring to terminate the war, on January 20, 1707, Louis XIV ordered a French officer, Ricous, to the camp of Charles XII to ask for the King's mediation; but Ricous fell ill, and Jean Victor de Besenval was sent instead, with the same instructions, arriving at the Swedish camp in March.

At this juncture, Marlborough, on April 26, 1707, arrived from The Hague at the camp of Charles XII, to divert him if possible from interfering with the plans of the Grand Alliance. Graciously received, the English general soon discerned that, whatever the disposition of Charles XII toward Joseph I might be, as a firm Protestant the King of Sweden had no thought of aiding the monarch who had revoked the Edict of Nantes. Seeing a map of Russia spread

out on the King's table, and observing the fire in his eye when the name of the Czar was mentioned, Marlborough's discernment reassured him that it was not the Emperor who had most to fear from Charles XII. Under pressure brought at Vienna, Joseph I soon afterward not only delivered the Russian prisoners, but recalled the Austrian officers who had passed into the service of the Czar, and upon the demand of Charles XII surrendered to the Protestants of Silesia a hundred churches of which they had been deprived.

Peter the Great, who was at the time quite ready to make peace with Sweden, had sought to obtain the mediation of England and Holland; but those powers, not wishing Charles XII to be left free to attack the Emperor, preferred to keep him occupied with Russia, and declined to mediate.¹

The decision
of Charles XII
to invade
Russia

In May, 1707, the Czar sought to approach France in the hope of procuring the mediation of Louis XIV. In Hungary the French agents had again succeeded in stirring up revolt against the Emperor, using Prince Rakoczy as the instrument of French diplomacy, and it was through Rakoczy that the Czar now made his appeal to France.² On September 4, 1707, a treaty was entered into between the Czar and Rakoczy, in which the Prince was offered the crown of Poland as his reward if through the mediation of Louis XIV a favorable peace could be obtained with Charles XII.³ In addition, the Czar promised after peace with Sweden was concluded to declare war upon the Emperor and to sustain the cause of Rakoczy in Hungary.

In the meantime French diplomacy had not been inactive in trying to promote a peace between Charles XII and the Czar. Besenval had been instructed to propose to the King of Sweden a treaty of peace with Russia, and a mo-

¹ See Vassileff, *Russisch-französische Politik*, p. 36.

² For the negotiations, see Fiedler, *Aktenstücke zur Geschichte Franz Rakoczy's und seiner Verbindungen mit dem Auslande*, Vienna, 1855, I, p. 312.

³ For the treaty, see Fiedler, as before, I, p. 308 et seq.

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mentary hope was created at Versailles that the Swedish and Russian armies could be united against the Emperor.

In order to win over Charles XII, De Solar was sent to urge French mediation upon him; but negotiation was found to be impossible. The King would not listen to the suggestion of peace until everything won from Sweden should be restored. In August, 1707, he had already decided upon the invasion of Russia. In January, 1708, he advanced toward Grodno, in Lithuania. On July 15, at Golowtschin, the Russians were beaten; but the impetuous youth was destined to learn a lesson of which he had no expectation. As the Russian army retreated it left for the Swedes to traverse a country so completely ravished that existence in it was impossible. "I will treat with the Czar in Moscow," was the proud boast of the King. But winter came on, the Cossacks clung like wolves to the flanks of his army, his provisions were captured or had to be destroyed to save them from falling into the hands of the enemy. Twelve thousand men were lost in one day from cold, fatigue, or wounds received. At Poltawa, which Charles XII attempted to besiege, the Czar's troops descended upon his half starved and ill clothed army of thirty thousand survivors with sixty thousand men. On June 27, 1709, the army that had made all Europe tremble during the moment of indecision at Leipzig was completely annihilated; and Charles XII, painfully wounded, fled to Turkey and took refuge with the Sultan.

The effects of
Charles XII's
defeat

The defeat of Charles XII at Poltawa was more than a victory for Peter the Great, it marked the beginning of a new era in the history of Russia and a new adjustment of relations in Europe. In one day Sweden transferred to her Muscovite rival the military prestige which she had enjoyed since the Thirty Years' War, and fell to the rank of a third-class power. Russia had upon that battlefield definitively entered upon the scene of European politics.

While this victory gave Peter the Great an opportunity to complete the internal reforms necessary to his empire, it secured the future of his new capital, St. Petersburg, and gave him a firm foothold on the Baltic. Stanislas Leszczin-

ski,—whom Charles XII had made King of Poland, and who had been recognized by France,—fled to Swedish Pomerania, and Frederick Augustus I was restored to his throne. In October, 1709, the former alliance between Russia, Poland, and Denmark against Sweden was renewed, with Russia the virtual master in the North.

The success of Peter the Great found Louis XIV at the lowest point of the ebb-tide of his fortunes. Since 1706 he had been desperately striving to dissolve the coalition, but the "triumvirate," as it was called,—Heinsius, Marlborough, and Prince Eugene of Savoy,—was inseparable and unconquerable. The war had proved costly, but the determination to control Louis XIV was strong, and the resources of the allies were superior to those of France. The French ministers who directed the finances and organized the French armies were not remarkable either for talent or for administration. The commanding generals were often court favorites to whom, as Saint Simon complained, "the King believed he could give, as also to his ministers, capacity together with their commission."

French diplomacy had long proved impotent, because it was no longer capable of making friends. To Marlborough the war was both an interesting and a profitable occupation; Heinsius easily overcame the renewed appeals to cupidity with which the French agents endeavored to win over the Dutch merchants and shipowners; and Prince Eugene was winning laurels in Italy, while the pride of Vienna had received a wound too deep to be easily healed.

The defeat and flight of Charles XII, with whose help Louis XIV had hoped to be able to retrieve his fortunes, were, therefore, a heavy blow to the King of France. An elaborate memorial by an unknown but evidently practised hand has come down to us,¹ in which the King is advised to abandon all hope of Sweden and to form an alliance with

¹ This *Mémoire sur une négociation à faire pour le service du roi* has been attributed with high probability by Rambaud to Torcy, but the authorship is not certain. The text may be found in *Recueil des instructions*, VIII, Russie, p. 114 et seq.

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Russia, Poland, and Denmark, to which, it is suggested, Brandenburg might easily be added; but, although negotiations with the Czar in a different sense were soon begun, this proposal did not meet with the approval of the King, who regarded the existence of Sweden as necessary to the maintenance of a balance between the powers of the North. Left thus without the support of a new ally, Louis XIV now turned his thoughts toward peace.

III. THE PEACE OF UTRECHT

Conditions
favorable to
peace in 1710

At the beginning of 1710 there were many conditions which seemed favorable to the conclusion of peace. Since the death of William III the stadtholderate had again been suspended in the United Provinces, which had revived the ancient republican traditions, with Heinsius as Grand Pensionary. The change had considerably affected the position of the Republic as a military power; for the maritime and commercial interests, which had been overruled under William III, had again resumed their influence, and these were favorable to peace.

Connected with this change in the Republic was the altered attitude of Prussia. Dying without a direct heir, William III had made his kinsman, Prince Friso of Nassau-Dietz, by his last will and testament the heir of all the possessions of the House of Orange. In opposition to this act, Frederick I of Prussia claimed priority of right through descent from Prince Frederick Henry of Orange, the father of Louisa, wife of the Great Elector. Unwilling to permit this rich inheritance to pass to the King of Prussia, the States General had ignored the Brandenburg claims; and, as executors of the will of William III, had assumed the administration of his estates in so far as they were within their jurisdiction, and had protested against the Prussian occupation of Mörs and Lingen lying within the territories of the Empire.

Dissatisfied with this treatment, and with the delays in paying the subsidies promised by the maritime powers,

Frederick I was not less discontented with the attitude of the new emperor, Joseph I. Ambitious, energetic, and domineering by nature, that monarch pursued a policy in marked contrast with the wavering and unstable disposition of his father, Leopold I. Compelled to make terms with the victorious Charles XII in 1707, and released from fear of his interference by the conflict waging between Sweden and Russia, Joseph I had become more peremptory than before in his relations with his allies, offering Prussia no aid in its claims to the Orange inheritance, and pursuing his own interests with a zeal and independence that boded ill for the future of the alliance. Friction between the Dutch and the English interests also had from time to time strained their relations; and of this coolness Louis XIV had been quick to take advantage, particularly as to the Dutch claims for "barrier" territory, which the Republic was eager to occupy, but which Marlborough, for fear of wounding the pride of the Spanish Netherlands, was disposed to limit as much as possible.

More than a century had passed since James VI of Scotland had ascended the English throne as James I, thus forming a dynastic union of the two crowns in the person of the same sovereign; but the constitutional union of the two countries had not been consummated until 1707. There had been difficult problems to solve, religious and economic, and during this long period a definitive solution had not been found.

The Union of
England and
Scotland

While this separation continued, the danger was very great that a conflict of interests would not only sever the slender tie that bound the two crowns together, but that Scotland, where a pro-French party existed, might accept the claims of the Pretender, James Edward, and thus confront England with an enemy in the North. A French invasion of Scotland at a critical moment might conceivably determine the issues of the war.

The Act of Union of May 1, 1707, was at once followed by a French plot to excite rebellion in Scotland and to land an army there. An expedition was assembled at Dunkirk

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with the papal blessing and the gift of a hundred thousand crowns from the papal treasury; and, on March 1, 1708, James Edward issued a proclamation charging Queen Anne with being a "usurper," promising amnesty to those who offered no resistance, and attempting to disarm the fears of the Presbyterians and Episcopalians regarding religion with equivocal promises of toleration; but the expedition ended in failure.

The sole result of this misguided enterprise was to arouse and confirm the patriotism of England. With greater unity of purpose and more intense enthusiasm than before, the English people resolved to support the war with France.

The disunion
of the allies

Notwithstanding the new stimulation of warlike feeling in England, the tide of influences tending toward peace had considerably increased. The exhaustion of France, emphasized by the victories of Marlborough in the Netherlands in 1708-1709, pressed Louis XIV toward negotiation; but, urgent as peace had become for the Grand Monarch, he was not blind to the divisions of his foes.

It had become clear to all that in the relations of the allies particular interests were prevailing over the common cause. In 1708 Louis XIV had obtained possession of a copy of a secret treaty which James Stanhope had forced upon the Archduke Charles, in which it was agreed that during the continuance of the war and after the conclusion of peace English merchants were to enjoy the exclusive privilege of sending ten ships yearly to trade with the Spanish colonies in America. The King of France lost no time in sending this document to the States General, who were thus made acquainted with the march their ally was stealing upon them.

While this clandestine act tended to alienate the States General from England and prepared the way for secret negotiations on their part with France, the Emperor was widening the gulf between himself and the princes of the Empire, who bitterly complained of his course. At Vienna Catholic influence was powerful, and in court circles the question began to be asked if it would not be better for

Joseph I to make peace with the Most Christian King and cease his alliance with heretics against him. The Emperor himself had gradually come more and more under Roman Catholic influence, but he was inflexible in his resolution to continue the war. The religious attitude of Joseph I did not, however, win for him the favor of the Pope, who was using all his power to aid France and defeat the allies. Joseph I was forbidden to demand taxes in Parma and Piacenza for the prosecution of the war, and Clement XI threatened with excommunication all who paid them. Charles III, as the Archduke now styled himself, as King of Spain demanded recognition in Naples, but the Pope refused it. When the Emperor replied by making reprisals in the papal territories, Clement XI, having failed to curb him with ecclesiastical anathemas, resorted to arms in defence of his rights; but, receiving no support from Louis XIV, the Pope was soon obliged to make a formal peace with his antagonist.

The drift of Joseph I toward Rome in religion, while it did not prevent opposition to the Pope in temporal affairs, occasioned serious personal defections among the Protestant princes of Germany, who feared a revival of the Hapsburg pretensions to sovereign authority in the Empire based upon the idea of religious unity.

In addition to the defections from the Emperor's cause in Germany, the maritime powers regarded with distrust the growing power of Joseph I in Italy, while he gave so little support to the military operations in Spain. The Duke of Savoy was dissatisfied with the limited lot which the Emperor assigned him in the Italian peninsula, and was at the same time jealous of the progress England was making in the Mediterranean, where Gibraltar and Port Mahon were retained as military and naval bases for the sole benefit of the British Empire. Finally, Portugal, deriving little profit from the war, was seeking a private understanding with France.

No man of his time combined in equal degree the military genius and the conciliatory temper of the Duke of Marlborough. Almost equally great in war and diplomacy, the

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The diplomatic
efforts of
Marlborough

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hero of Blenheim clearly comprehended the dissolution of the Grand Alliance that was impending, and foresaw the consequences that would follow to the advantage of Louis XIV.¹

The desertion of the common cause by the United Provinces would have been a deathblow to the coalition, and of this there was real danger; for Heinsius had been for some time in secret communication with Versailles through Petkum, the resident minister of the Duke of Holstein-Gottorp at The Hague.² To prevent this desertion, in March, 1709, Marlborough was appointed a commissioner to negotiate with Holland a treaty by which England would secure Dutch support in the matter of the Protestant succession in exchange for the aid of England in obtaining for the Republic the coveted "barrier" against France.

The need for a new agreement between England and Holland had become imperative; for Louis XIV had almost incessantly endeavored to make approaches to Heinsius for the purpose of a private understanding. Nothing but the firmness of the Grand Pensionary had stood in the way of his success. The inclinations of the commercial classes, who had suffered much from the war, were as usual pacific; but, as one of the French emissaries remarked, "*C'était un opéra d'approcher ce ministre!*"

On March 5, 1709, Rouillé, President of the Parliament of Paris, was sent by Louis XIV to Holland to offer the abandonment of the whole Spanish monarchy by Philip V, with the exception of Naples and Sicily, and the cession of Ypres and Menin to the Dutch as a barrier, if the States General would make peace. The Dutch agents who met him were, however, not disposed to accept this bait. Later

¹ Since 1703 Marlborough had been secretly endeavoring to negotiate a peace advantageous to England through correspondence with Berwick, a natural son of James II, who had married Marlborough's sister, Arabella Churchill, and entered into the military service of France. For the correspondence, which extended over five years but came to nothing, see Legrelle, *La diplomatie française*, etc., V, pp. 664, 680.

² The correspondence of Petkum is printed in Appendix V of the Fourteenth Report of the Historical MSS. Commission, pp. 317, 366.

even larger concessions were offered. It seemed as if the Grand Monarch were at last upon his knees begging for peace with the Dutch Republic.¹

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On May 18, Marlborough arrived at The Hague, where the French minister of foreign affairs had already been sent by Louis XIV to reinforce the persuasion of Rouillé. We have from the hand of Torcy himself striking portraits of his two antagonists: Marlborough, elegant in manner, fascinating in speech, apologetic for the attitude of his country, insinuating and captivating, appealing to noble and lofty sentiments, and carefully concealing the advantages he hoped to win; on the other hand, Heinsius, direct and straightforward, simple in speech, and sturdy in supporting the right of the Republic to adequate means of defence.

Believing that every man has his price, Louis XIV endeavored to use bribes, offering two million livres each for the concession of Naples, the retention of Strasburg, and the maintenance of the fortifications at Dunkirk. But Marlborough, whose character was in his time bitterly attacked, and who was certainly not faultless, as well as Heinsius, refused to be bought. On the other hand, the zeal of Torcy had revealed the weakness of France and the discouragement of the humbled king, who with his own hand had written his approval on his minister's instructions.²

Marlborough won a victory for England in holding the United Provinces to the alliance, but he had in reality over-shot the mark. It was Heinsius who now, in the name of the Republic, drew up a series of preliminaries to a peace, forty in number, which treated Louis XIV as an utterly prostrate foe. For England this document demanded the recognition of the Protestant succession, the destruction of Dunkirk, the cession of Newfoundland, the expulsion of the Pretender from France, and a favorable treaty of commerce. For itself the Republic demanded of France the cession outright of seven towns, including Lille. All the places which

Holland dictates the terms of peace

¹ For the details of the negotiations, see Legrelle, *La diplomatie française*, etc., V, pp. 446, 465.

² The details are fully given by Torcy, in his *Mémoires*, I.

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had been taken from the Spanish Netherlands were to be surrendered, and either to be occupied as barriers or delivered to Charles III as King of Spain. A part of Spanish Gelderland was to be annexed by the Republic, and the reductions of the French tariff of 1664 on Dutch goods were to be restored. French trade with the West Indies was to be prohibited, and such additional concessions were to be granted to the other allies as might be determined by a congress to be called for the conclusion of a general peace. The King of France was to obtain the entire abandonment of the Spanish monarchy by Philip V to Charles III within two months from June 1, 1709. The thirty-seventh article even required Louis XIV, in case of resistance, to furnish the allies with French troops for the purpose of enforcing these conditions upon Spain.

As might have been foreseen, these drastic demands, handed to the French plenipotentiaries on May 22, 1709, awakened deep resentment in France. On June 2 Rouillé was ordered to leave The Hague, whence Torcy had already departed, and all of Louis XIV's offers were recalled.

The Anglo-
Dutch Barrier
Treaty

Marlborough's success in reviving the interest of Holland in the Grand Alliance had been procured by the promise of aid in obtaining the barrier cities for the protection of the Republic, but it was not without reluctance on the part of England that this concession had been made; for the Dutch, once masters of the frontiers of the Spanish Netherlands, might easily close them to British trade. English policy was, therefore, to restrict their number as far as possible; while Dutch policy, on the other hand, was to obtain the greatest available increase of protection for the Republic.

Charles Townshend, whom Marlborough left at The Hague to complete the Barrier Treaty, had, therefore, a difficult task before him; for, in addition to the disclosure regarding the secret commercial treaty of England with the Archduke Charles, already referred to, it was discovered that, in August, 1709, another secret treaty had been forced upon the Archduke, by which the island of Minorca had been formally

ceded to Great Britain. Heinsius denounced this second treaty as a grave violation of the terms of the Grand Alliance, and accused England of bad faith.

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While Marlborough was declaring that he would never sign a treaty which accorded all that the Dutch demanded in their claims for a barrier, Heinsius was so deeply offended by the secret negotiations with Spain that Townshend was compelled to make new concessions in order to appease him; with the result that the Barrier Treaty of October 29, 1709, between Great Britain and the United Provinces granted to the Dutch the right to occupy and fortify some twenty border towns in the Spanish Netherlands, and to close the Scheldt,—to the great injury of British commerce, as well as to that of Flanders,—together with the promise of English support of the Dutch claims in Spanish Gelderland, and other important advantages. In return England obtained no benefit, except the promise of the Republic to require as a condition of peace that Louis XIV should recognize the rightful title of Queen Anne and the Protestant succession, which was really no concession but an almost necessary part of Dutch policy.¹

Townshend had, in fact, under the pressure of circumstances, exceeded his instructions; and at first the council of British ministers refused to ratify the treaty. But Heinsius, who believed he had obtained by it the predominant influence of Holland in the future settlement with France, was firm in his insistence; and, in the face of violent denunciation in England, the treaty was ratified.

The success of Holland in forcing upon England disproportionate concessions, like that of England in securing by secret treaties exclusive advantages from Spain, illustrates the impolitic character of such short-sighted procedure; for no treaty of this kind is likely to be of substantial and lasting benefit unless it creates mutual satisfaction. The evil consequences of all these separate agreements were soon apparent. Instead of drawing England and Holland closer together, the Barrier Treaty, being unequal, drove

Effects of these negotiations on the alliance

¹ For the treaty, see Dumont, VIII, Part I, p. 243 et seq.

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them farther apart; for the British ministry at once began to think of establishing a better balance by demanding concessions in other matters to compensate the private benefits afforded to their ally. On the other hand, the apparently closer intimacy of the two maritime powers, each of which seemed to be acquiring special advantages with the connivance of the other, awakened the jealousy of the other members of the Grand Alliance, who seemed to be left out of the bargain. Prussia resented the action of England in favoring the Dutch acquisition of Spanish Gelderland, which Frederick I coveted; the other German princes saw no prospect of corresponding benefits; and Portugal was alarmed by the progress of the two rival sea powers, especially England's strong foothold in the Mediterranean. When, in addition to the Anglo-Dutch arrangements between themselves, the demands made of Louis XIV by the two powers in the forty articles were made known, all the allies, perceiving to what extent their private expectations had been disappointed, relaxed their interest in the contest. At the end of 1709 the bond between the maritime powers was, therefore, far less strong than it seemed, and the Grand Alliance as a whole had suffered a serious relapse.

The secret reports of Petkum and Florisson

At the beginning of 1710 the only obstacle to an early peace was the mistaken idea that it could be concluded upon the terms dictated in the forty preliminary articles already mentioned. Although Louis XIV had rejected these demands and recalled his plenipotentiaries from The Hague, he abandoned the negotiations with reluctance. The defeat of Charles XII of Sweden at Poltawa had ended all hope of aid from the North, and he was prepared to make all reasonable sacrifices. Heinsius was fully aware of the Grand Monarch's extreme exhaustion, and the situation of France was further affected by the evident disposition of Philip V to make a separate peace with the allies.¹

Notwithstanding the poverty of his treasury, the harsh terms imposed upon him, and the danger of isolation by the desertion of Spain, Louis XIV bravely resisted the effort

¹ See Legrelle, *La diplomatie française, etc.*, V, p. 479.

to administer to him the humiliation proposed by the thirty-seventh article of the Anglo-Dutch demands. He negotiated with the Jewish money lenders, sent the ornaments of the palace to the mint, and prepared to pawn the jewels of the crown to meet the expenses of further resistance.¹ In the meantime diplomacy, which after the rupture at The Hague could no longer operate openly, continued to seek for better conditions of peace through secret and subterranean channels. Use was again made of the obscure but indefatigable Petkum, who oscillated more or less in the shadow between Heinsius and Torcy. The French minister was prepared for almost any concession, if Heinsius would only retract the demand that the King of France should turn his arms against his grandson to expel him from the throne of Spain, in opposition to the wishes of the Spanish people, and enforce the succession of the Archduke Charles. This was a humiliation to which the King, no matter what the consequences, could never give his consent.

Notwithstanding the stolid insistence of Heinsius and the States General that the preliminaries dictated at The Hague be accepted as the basis of peace, on January 3, 1710, Torcy sent from Versailles, with the approval of the King and his Council, a counter-project composed of five articles.

In the meantime, further soundings of the disposition of the Republic toward peace were taken by the intermediation of a merchant of Ypres named Florisson, whose Dutch origin commended him for such a secret mission. Florisson was received by Heinsius with coolness; but through this medium it was learned at Versailles that five of the provinces had not approved of the demands so deeply humiliating to Louis XIV, and that article thirty-seven might be open to revision. On January 27, however, Petkum reported that nothing could be changed in the preliminaries of May 22, except perhaps the demand that Louis XIV should promise, if necessary, to use force against his grand-

¹ Discontent in France was at this time so great that bread riots were frequent, and the statues of the King were plastered with insulting placards; while his life was threatened in anonymous letters.

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The confer-
ences at Ger-
truydenberg

son; adding that in this sense the negotiations might be resumed.

The situation of France was now desperate. The kingdom, in spite of all the sacrifices made and new taxes imposed, possessed neither money nor credit. The army was in a condition of distress, and Villars was regarded as the only general capable of commanding it. Unless an unexpected victory could be won in the field, France was at the mercy of her enemies.

In these circumstances the Abbé de Polignac, a suave and persuasive ecclesiastic, and Marshal d'Huxelles, a taciturn but imposing soldier, were chosen as plenipotentiaries to open negotiations for peace.

On February 15, it was learned at Versailles that all the articles except the thirty-seventh must be accepted as final before further negotiations could begin. It was, therefore, "to treat of article thirty-seven" that the plenipotentiaries started on their journey to meet the Dutch agents, Buys and Van der Dussen, on March 9, 1710, in the little village of Gertruydenberg near Dordrecht.

The discussion between the four plenipotentiaries began with the assumption on the part of the Dutch representatives that, since Louis XIV possessed absolutely no right to the Spanish succession, he was responsible for all the cost and inconvenience that had resulted from his determination to exclude the rightful heir, Charles III; to which the French envoys replied that, since the United Provinces had signed two partition treaties which recognized the rights of the House of Bourbon, it was too late to consider the assertion that Louis XIV possessed no right whatever in the matter of the Spanish succession. At this point, Buys asserted that it was useless to discuss article thirty-seven; since it was substantially implied in article four of the preliminaries, to which the King of France had already assented. To this the French envoys answered, that, since they had met to discuss and modify article thirty-seven, it was impossible to admit that it had already been substantially accepted; or even any part of the preliminaries, which were to serve as

a basis of peace only upon condition that an agreement should be reached regarding the form of the article in dispute.

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It is unnecessary to follow in detail the long and tedious negotiations in which a determination to impose upon France the humiliation of expelling the grandson of Louis XIV — who had already been recognized by the United Provinces as the legitimate king of Spain — was met by the moral impossibility of accepting such a task. The French plenipotentiaries offered to renounce all compensation on the part of France, and finally Torcy went to the extreme length of proposing the grant of liberal subsidies to the allies to enable them, in case of resistance, to compel the abdication of Philip V. The King and the Dauphin assented to it; and on June 5, the King of France wrote personally to his envoys, instructing them as a last resort, in order to restore peace to Europe, to present this offer to the Dutch deputies.

The rejection
of the French
offers

On June 23, the deputies still showing no signs of relenting, Louis XIV sent to his envoys their final instructions. The monthly subsidy offered to aid the allies in dethroning Philip V was raised from five hundred thousand to a million livres; Valenciennes would be ceded to Holland, if the Dutch would renounce further demands in behalf of their allies; Alsace, with the exception of Belfort, should be given to the Duke of Lorraine, on condition that the fortifications were to be destroyed; every claim of compensation to Philip V was abandoned; only the restoration of their estates to the Electors of Köln and Bavaria was required. These conditions were stubbornly declined. The deputies insisted imperatively on the execution of article thirty-seven within two months, and on July 25 Polignac and Huxelles returned to France.

The Dutch burghers seemed for the moment to be having their revenge for the humiliation of 1672, and peace appeared to be farther off than ever. By the end of 1710 the victories of Vendôme in Spain and the political changes in England had, however, completely altered the situation. The battle of Villaviciosa, fought on December 10, 1710,

Secret negotia-
tions between
England and
France

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proved that it was not in the power of the allies to expel Philip V from Spain; while the weakening of Marlborough's influence at court, the dismissal of his relatives Godolphin and Sunderland from the government, and the ascendancy of the Tories over the Whigs in the English elections revealed a situation advantageous to the interests of France.

After being for twenty-two years in the minority, the Tories, who had opposed the war, were again supreme in England; and the Duchess of Marlborough no longer enjoyed the intimacy and confidence of the Queen. The time had come when England could be approached by Louis XIV in the hope of tempering the harsh terms that Marlborough and Heinsius had imposed upon him.

Although the new ministry under Robert Harley, Earl of Oxford, was eager to end the war and have an understanding with France, the situation in England did not permit of the summary dismissal of a popular hero like Marlborough or of a sudden defection from the Grand Alliance. By means of an obscure person, the Abbé Gaultier, who had been as a priest attached to the French embassy during the mission of Tallard in London, communications were opened between the Earl of Jersey and other members of the Catholic party in England and Torcy, by which the French minister was assured of Harley's disposition to make peace with France.¹ The rôle of mediation in the pacification of Europe thus passed from The Hague to London; and, on January 21, 1711, Gaultier was able to present to Torcy at Versailles the suggestion of a plan for peace with England which, he represented, would undermine and destroy the Grand Alliance.²

The death of
Joseph I and
its consequences

On April 17, 1711, occurred an event which altered the entire situation regarding the Spanish succession. The death of the Emperor, Joseph I, gave the throne of the

¹ Gaultier's first secret despatch to Torcy is dated December 18, 1710.

² The outline of the plan originated in England, but was made to appear to come from France. See Weber, *Der Friede von Utrecht*, pp. 32, 34; and Courcy, *La coalition de 1701*, I, pp. 269, 273.

Hapsburgs to the Archduke Charles. From that moment insistence upon the Austrian right to the crown of Spain would be equivalent to a demand for the reconstitution of the Hapsburg predominance in Europe. This was almost as objectionable as the complete union of France and Spain. In the name of European equilibrium, therefore, a change of policy was now justifiable.

While the death of Joseph I thus withdrew from the Archduke Charles the support which the maritime powers had given him in his aspiration for the throne of Spain, it gave occasion to Louis XIV to oppose his accession to the Empire. To prevent the perpetuation of the Hapsburg dynasty in the imperial office, the Grand Monarch declared himself in favor of Frederick Augustus, Elector of Saxony and King of Poland, as the successor of Joseph I.

To promote this candidacy, and in the hope of making himself a mediator in securing the pacification of the North and the rehabilitation of Sweden, Louis XIV entered into negotiations with Peter the Great, at the same time sending an envoy to Warsaw to offer his support in the imperial election to the King of Poland.

In July, 1710, at the instigation of Louis XIV, the Sultan had declared war on Russia; and the knowledge of this fact had so offended the Czar that he had ignored the direct and indirect approaches of France.¹ But at this time Peter the Great was anxious to secure French mediation with Turkey; and, in June, 1711, Gregor Volkoff was sent to Paris to request this service. Louis XIV was ready to offer it, but upon terms which the Czar could not accept: (1) Russian aid to the Hungarians; (2) the Czar's opposition to the election of the Archduke Charles and his support of the King of Poland; and (3) intervention to obtain the recall of the Danish and Saxon troops serving as mercenaries to the allies. In addition to these demands, Louis XIV was eager to restore Charles XII, then a fugitive at Bender, to his kingdom, and to make peace between him and Peter

¹ See the account of the missions of Baluze and Vété in Vassileff, *Russisch-französische Politik*, pp. 49, 52.

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the Great. But all these enterprises failed. On July 21, 1711, the Czar signed a peace with Turkey without the aid of French mediation, and Volkoff was recalled. Frederick Augustus did not bestir himself for the mediation with the Grand Alliance which Louis XIV expected of him; and, on October 12, 1711, the Archduke was elected Emperor to succeed his brother, with the title of Charles VI.¹

Progress of the
Anglo-French
negotiations

In the meantime the secret negotiations between Louis XIV and England were making astonishing progress. Through the correspondence between Gaultier and Torcy it was known at Versailles that England was ready to make peace, if Louis XIV would erect a barrier satisfactory to Holland and the Empire; invest the Duke of Savoy with the places the allies had promised him; recognize Queen Anne as the legitimate sovereign of Great Britain, and accept the Protestant succession; demolish the port and fortifications of Dunkirk; concede to England the permanent possession of Gibraltar, Port Mahon, Newfoundland, and Hudson's Bay, with most favored nation treatment by Spain; and renounce the "Asiento,"² or French monopoly of the slave-trade.

Owing to the illness of Harley, at the end of July, 1711, the negotiations fell into the hands of Henry St. John, — afterward created Viscount Bolingbroke, — then secretary of state for the Northern Department, a man of quick intelligence, astute character, and undeveloped conscience, who was destined to play the leading part in the conclusion of peace.³

Matthew Prior, who had been secretly sent to Paris to

¹ See *Recueil des instructions*, VIII, Russie, p. 128; and Pologne, I, p. LXIV.

² The word "Asiento" is the Spanish for "treaty," but applies specifically to the slave-trade, of which France had been given a monopoly.

³ There was in England no Secretary of State for Foreign Affairs in the proper sense until March 27, 1782. Foreign policy was practically in the hands of the Prime Minister, the details being carried out since 1539 by two Secretaries of State, at the head of the Northern and the Southern Departments, as they were called, and usually jealous of each other.

explain the English demands to Torcy, after an animated discussion of the terms of peace, in the beginning of August, 1711, returned to London with the assurance of an *entente*. From this time on the negotiations assumed a more open and official character, and Nicolas Ménager, deputy of Rouen in the Council of Commerce, on account of his expert knowledge of commercial affairs, having assisted at Gertruydenberg, was sent with Gaultier to London to arrange preliminaries.

In England the question was now gravely asked, For what had the war been carried on with so much sacrifice? The nation had spent a hundred million pounds sterling in battling with France. St. John answered: "To win the Spanish inheritance for the Hapsburgers; to conquer a protecting barrier against France for the States General; and to secure English commerce." The preponderance of the peace party in England

Stated in this manner, the folly of longer continuing the war was self-evident; for it was known that there was no advantage to England in placing the Archduke Charles on the throne of Spain, if he were to be likewise Emperor, that a satisfactory barrier could be secured for the Dutch, and that English commerce and colonies were not at the time greatly endangered by France. St. John's statement was meant as an argument for peace and as a reproach to the Whigs, who, he claimed, had carried on the war in their own commercial and financial interest.

But so summary an answer did not quite truly state the case. England had been menaced by the prospect of a close union between France and Spain, by consequent exclusion from the commerce of the world, and by the disturbance of that balance between the powers of Europe upon which the safety, and even the independence, of England depended. Opposition to Louis XIV's dynastic ambitions had, therefore, been a necessary policy for the welfare of the English people.

But the time had now come when war seemed no longer advantageous, and peace was earnestly desired. It was felt in England that the preliminary articles in which Heinsius

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The instructions of
Ménager

had dictated the terms of peace were too severe. In seeking to modify them, therefore, the Tory government was undoubtedly acting in what it believed to be the best interest of the country. As for the allies, circumstances had changed; and all of them were either accused or suspected of making private arrangements with France to their own advantage.¹

The concessions which Louis XIV was at this time ready to make were already well known by the English ministry. They were officially and formally stated in the instructions to Ménager of August 3, 1711. First of all, the recognition of Philip V as King of Spain would be required. The Treaty of Ryswick would form the basis of an understanding with the Empire; Breisach and Kehl would be surrendered by France, and the Rhine would become the frontier; the electors of Bavaria and Köln would be re-established in their possessions; France would retain Lille, Tournai, Aire, Béthune, Douai, Ypres, and Condé; the Emperor Charles VI would have Sardinia, Sicily, and Naples; the Duke of Savoy would be assigned Milan. The question regarding the demolition of Dunkirk was to be postponed as long as possible, but England would receive Gibraltar, with entire freedom of commerce in all Spanish ports and the privilege of the "Asiento"; Newfoundland, if necessary, would be ceded, with the reservation of a French right to catch and dry fish upon its shores, but not Nova Scotia.

At the end of August, Ménager and Gaultier were in the full tide of bargaining with the English negotiators at London, consisting of Harley, — who had then become Lord Oxford, — Shrewsbury, St. John, Dartmouth, and Jersey, with Matthew Prior as secretary.

To block the proceedings, the Whigs, who, although no longer in power, wished to urge the further prosecution of the war, started the tale that the negotiations were at bottom intended to secure the royal succession to the Pretender; and that even Queen Anne, who had long countenanced the idea that James Edward's birth was illegitimate,

¹ See a summary of these accusations in Sichel, *Bolingbroke and His Times*, I, pp. 330, 335.

had developed an affection for him and secretly hoped for his final recognition. The participation of Jersey, an ardent Jacobite, in the negotiations for peace, gave color to this construction; and certain misguided adherents of the Pretender undoubtedly expected that peace with France would be followed by the desired restoration.¹

Upon one point the mind of Louis XIV was now fixed, — Philip V must remain King of Spain. At Gertruydenberg he had been ready to abandon his grandson, even to furnish financial aid in forcing his abdication; but the strong desire of England for peace had revived his hopes, and he was no longer willing to make sacrifices without compensating concessions. The conclusion of the preliminaries

So far as the English commissioners were concerned, it was St. John who was the soul of the negotiations. His one constant thought was to obtain commercial advantage and colonial expansion for England; for it was only by material gains in this direction that he could hope to justify the Tory leadership in concluding a peace with France. As for the allies, their interests would be considered in the congress that would be called when the Anglo-French preliminaries were concluded; and beyond mere preliminaries neither St. John nor Ménager intended at that time to go. When St. John for strategic effect declared that the Queen was unwilling to make peace with a power that harbored the Pretender, the French agent replied, that they were not negotiating a peace, but merely the conditions of a peace to be determined by a future congress in which such questions could be properly regulated; and this reply was accepted.²

On October 8, after the preliminaries had been elaborated, altered, rejected, and finally under the pressure of St. John accepted, three documents were signed: the first containing the special advantages to be secured by England; the second a general article regarding the treatment

¹ See Sichel, *Bolingbroke and His Times*, I, pp. 335, 356.

² With the death of Lord Jersey on September 6, the influence operating in the interest of James Edward seems to have disappeared.

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to be accorded to the allies; and the third relating to the Duke of Savoy.¹

The first document, kept strictly secret, bound the King of France to make the concessions which England had demanded as conditions of peace; and, to deceive the Whigs, specifically declared that the initiative in the negotiations had been taken by the King of France. Ménager, after passing by "deserted staircases under the guidance of discreet servitors," was received in private audience by the Queen and assured by her of her personal interest in concluding peace; and on the fourteenth returned to France with the preliminaries duly signed, leaving Gaultier in London.

The second and third documents alone were intended to be shown to the allies. Lord Strafford was sent to Holland to explain the situation; but the States General manifested their discontent with the indefinite character of the satisfaction proposed for the Republic and for the other members of the Grand Alliance.

The necessity
of leading the
allies

The problem now was to induce the States General, the Duke of Savoy, the King of Prussia, and the Elector of Hanover to participate in a congress for concluding peace. Torcy was rather pleased than otherwise with the dissatisfaction of the States General; for he now hoped to be able to conclude a separate peace with England, and on November 2 made a proposal to this effect. But the English ministry were not prepared to face the country with the total abandonment of their allies. The Imperial ambassador, Count Gallas, had already indignantly withdrawn from the court; the friendship of the Dutch, of the German princes, and of the Duke of Savoy was too valuable to be thrown away; and even the further offer on the part of Louis XIV to demolish the port and fortifications of Dunkirk without compensation was not sufficient to induce a total desertion of the allies. Without their assent it was inexpedient to recognize Philip V as King of Spain, and at this

¹ For the details of the negotiation, see Weber, *Der Friede von Utrecht*, pp. 45, 58.

price accept the concessions offered to England. Peace for England was to be desired, but consideration for the allies was also necessary. The question was how far that consideration should go and what form it should take. St. John's hatred of Austria, his fear of the commercial rivalry of Holland, and his indifference to the fortunes of the German princes rendered it certain that this consideration would go no farther than necessity required.

As early as April, 1711, St. John had instructed the English ambassador at The Hague to inform Heinsius that the English ministers were engaged in trying to arrange preliminaries of peace with France; but the interests of the Republic, it was assured, would be carefully considered, and the Grand Pensionary was given to understand that Holland must trust to the Queen's loyalty and follow in England's wake.

The adherence of Holland to England's programme was, in fact, necessary to its success. The constant endeavor to secure it, while stoutly asserting that no private and special advantages were being sought, sufficiently proves how essential the English ministry regarded it. But the desire to go forward with the assent, if not with the inward approval, of Holland was not inspired by the sense of complete solidarity between the two countries that had prevailed in the last years of William III. In truth, they had become rivals rather than partners. Dutch policy was entirely actuated by the exigencies of commerce; and, as has been said, "varied according to the most profitable direction in which to ship barrels of herring and sacks of coffee." If the English deceived the Dutch with regard to the advantages they were secretly obtaining from France, the Dutch statesmen were equally anxious to resume secret negotiations for their own benefit with Louis XIV. In fact, the coalition was dissolving, as all coalitions in the end dissolve, because it was believed to be no longer advantageous to continue it.

The chief interest of Holland lay in the execution of the Barrier Treaty of 1709 with England, but St. John

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The relations
of England
and Holland

contended that circumstances had changed since it was concluded, and that so extensive a barrier as had then been promised would be prejudicial to the other allies. Still, ran the correspondence, Holland should have her barrier; but to get it she must make peace upon terms agreeable to England. The congress would be held in any one of four cities, two of them Dutch, which France might prefer;¹ but it must be held quickly, or the war would have to go on, in which England could not longer bear the principal burden.

When, on December 22, 1711, the treaty of friendship and alliance was renewed between England and the United Provinces, its omissions marked the coolness which had developed between them. There was no confirmation of the Barrier Treaty of 1709. The alliance was, indeed, nominally renewed; but it was no longer really cordial. England had taken the Republic in tow, and the period of Holland's subordination had begun.

The date for the opening of the peace congress was fixed for January 12, 1712, at Utrecht, and accepted by France. On December 17 the Parliament assembled, and the Queen, in high state, in her address from the throne announced her continued adherence to the Grand Alliance, her intention to obtain "reasonable satisfaction" for the allies or to continue the war, and the arrival of the plenipotentiaries at Utrecht; she then left the House of Lords, in which the Parliament was assembled, returning immediately afterward *incognito* to hear the debate, in which Lord Nottingham declared that "no peace could be secure and honorable which left Spain and the Indies to the Bourbons!"

The effect was electric. The preliminaries, although they had not specifically pledged the ministry to the continuance of Philip V as King of Spain, were really based upon that assumption.

As a counterpoise, resolutions were passed by the ministry in the House of Commons denouncing in turn the shortcomings of each of the allies, condemning the Barrier Treaty

¹ The four cities proposed were Nymwegen, Utrecht, Liège, and Aix-la-Chapelle.

of 1709 as "destructive to the trade and interests of Great Britain," and flaying Townshend and the ministry that had negotiated the treaty as "enemies of the Kingdom."

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The Congress for the conclusion of peace at Utrecht, after ten days spent in fixing the ceremonial, opened on January 29, 1712. England was represented by Dr. John Robinson, Bishop of Bristol, who had resided thirty-six years at the Scandinavian courts and had mediated peace between Sweden and Denmark; and Lord Strafford, ambassador at The Hague, described by St. John as "*un seigneur propre à brusquer une entreprise comme un colonel de dragons.*" Prior was named as third plenipotentiary, but was retained at Paris. For France appeared Marshal d'Huxelles, the Abbé Polignac, and Ménager. Each of the seven States of the United Provinces had one representative,—except Holland, which had two,—of whom Van der Dussen and Buys were the best known and most prominent in the conferences. The Emperor had declared that, until he was assured that the preliminaries arranged in London were not binding, and were not prejudicial to the allies, he could not participate in the Congress. The Portuguese envoy at The Hague announced that he had received no mandate regarding the conclusion of peace. The representatives of Prussia and Savoy said the same, but added that they would probably soon receive orders to go to Utrecht. The resident ministers of Saxony, Hesse, and the other German princes asserted that they must wait upon the decision of the Emperor.

Opening of
the Congress
at Utrecht

Thus the conferences began at Utrecht with only two members of the Grand Alliance represented; but, it having been agreed in the first session that the London preliminaries were binding only upon France, and not upon the allies, early in February Zinzendorf, the Imperial ambassador at The Hague, and his colleague, Von Consbrüch, together with the representatives of the German princes, appeared at Utrecht.¹

¹ A full list of the plenipotentiaries is given by Vast, *Les grands traités*, III, pp. 44, 45.

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The ceremonial had already been agreed upon, and such momentous questions as the kind of carriage, the number of horses, and the staff of servants to be allowed to each plenipotentiary having been settled, it was decided that all were to enter the conference room at the same time, and seat themselves without distinction. But Zinzendorf, who had come more with the intention of hindering than promoting an understanding, insisted that, as the representative of the Emperor, he must have precedence over all, and that Charles VI should at once be formally recognized as Emperor. To this the French would not listen. The English and the Dutch also felt scandalized by such pretensions. In the meantime all further proceedings were blocked, until it was agreed that the allies should be referred to only in general terms until the question of the Emperor's title was determined.

The instructions of England

The positions of the powers in the Congress and the aims and motives of their representatives can be best understood by a brief summary of their official instructions.

The English ministry desired an immediate conclusion of a general peace that would afford to Great Britain the advantages which France had agreed to accord in the preliminaries. Robinson and Strafford were, therefore, directed to win the support of the United Provinces by promising them a satisfactory barrier against France and certain advantages to their commerce. The English plenipotentiaries were to maintain the obligations of the preliminaries so far as the concessions to England by France were concerned against all opposition. As regards the crown of Spain, it must not be united with the crown of France; but, this point settled, there was no obligation either to maintain Philip V on the throne of Spain or to remove him from it. As regards the allies generally, it was intended to carry out the promise of the Queen and secure for them a "reasonable satisfaction." Strasburg should be restored to the Empire as a free city; Kehl and Breisach also should be returned; in Alsace the provisions of the Treaty of Westphalia should be observed; Landau should be returned to the

Empire, the fortifications between Basel and Philipsburg destroyed, and Rheinfels delivered to the Landgrave of Hesse-Cassel; the Elector of Brandenburg must be recognized as King of Prussia, and put in possession of Neuchâtel; the Elector of Hanover must be recognized as a ninth elector of the Empire; the Principality of Orange and other estates of William III within the limits of France should be restored to their rightful owners; Portugal was to be treated as the engagements in the English treaties required; the Duke of Savoy was to recover Nice and all other territories taken from him by France, with certain towns as a barrier. But most of these terms were subject to modification, and certainly did not reveal the full intentions of the ministry, which were not confided to Robinson and Strafford.

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In the French instructions it was pointed out that there existed in England both popular and official reasons for desiring peace, which would no doubt be concluded by the English government mainly with a view to the interests of England rather than with regard to the benefit of Europe as a whole. As a consequence, preliminaries had been agreed upon which were substantially equivalent to a private assurance of peace. This friendly relation was to be recognized and maintained throughout the conferences, with the expectation and belief that England also would adhere to it, and thus the two powers would practically act together in constraining the others to an acceptance of the terms which they would agree upon. The King of Spain was to be assured of his throne and retain the Indies, but a partition of the Spanish dominions in Italy and the Netherlands might be necessary to satisfy the demands of the allies. The Spanish Netherlands might, for the sake of peace, be given to a foreign prince; the Duke of Savoy might be propitiated with Milan; as the Dutch would be separated from France by the disposal to be made of the Spanish Netherlands, a limited barrier would suffice for them, and this would be accorded. The Elector of Bavaria, Max Emmanuel, must be restored to his electorate and indemnified for his losses. If the Spanish Netherlands were not given

The instructions of France

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to him, and he were not restored to his hereditary estates, then he should be given the Kingdom of Naples, to which the King of Spain would add Sicily. The King of Prussia and the Elector of Hanover would be recognized as rightfully possessing these titles; but, as to the Orange possessions, it was contrary to French interest to deliver them to a foreign and above all a Protestant prince. As for the demands of Austria, the King of France was not disposed to make concessions; and the restoration of Strasburg and the surrender of sovereignty in the ten Alsatian cities could not be considered.

As regards the order of procedure, the fate of the Spanish monarchy should have the first place; next, the satisfaction of the Electors of Bavaria and Köln; then, questions of commerce; and, finally, the barriers for Holland and the Empire.¹

The instructions of the Emperor

The one enemy to whom Louis XIV had no concession to make, and against whom all his wrath continued to burn, was the Emperor. This was perfectly understood by Charles VI. He was aware that the Congress of Utrecht was about to decide the question of the Spanish succession, that England and France had substantially come to a separate agreement, and that the Dutch Republic would be obliged to follow the lead of England. Expecting no benefit from the Congress, the Emperor's policy was, if possible, to prevent it; if not, to obstruct and finally dissolve it without permitting it to reach any positive result.

The question of separating France and Spain

The results of the Congress were determined more by events occurring outside of its walls than by any of its deliberations. The Marshal d'Huxelles, in accordance with his instructions, presented proposals which reserved for Philip V the retention of Spain and the Indies. The concessions to England were faithfully adhered to, but the other allies were treated as if France were the victor and entitled to dictate the terms of peace. Not one of the allies

¹ Details are fully given by Weber, *Der Friede von Utrecht*, pp. 175, 190, where the disposition of Louis XIV toward the North and the Italian princes is also stated.

outside of England was disposed to accept them, and even in England loud and indignant protests were uttered by the opposition, which advocated continuing the war.

The effect of protest was simply to drive the French and the English negotiators closer together by giving them a new solidarity of interests. They had initiated the peace conferences, and they must not fail; but it was not at Utrecht that they could be made to succeed.

St. John was prepared to grant to Philip V the whole kingdom of Spain and the Indies, as the French required; but on February 8, 1712, the Duke of Burgundy, who had become the Dauphin, died, and on March 8 his eldest son, the Duke of Brittany, passed away, leaving only one frail and sickly child of two years as heir to the crown of France. Nothing but the doubtful chance of this child's survival, it now appeared, could prevent the ultimate union of the crowns of France and Spain in the person of Philip V.

The question of the Spanish succession had reached its most menacing stage. A renunciation of the French crown by Philip V might solve the problem; but the French jurists declared that, even if procured, the renunciation would not be valid. An individual act could not set aside a constitutional right imposed by a higher power.

While the situation thus created was a delicate one for France it was equally difficult for England. Marlborough had been recalled and deprived of office, Halifax was thundering against the conspiracy of the ministry with the French, and the Pretender was believed by the Whigs to be in some way mixed up with the course of events.

The unwillingness of Philip V either to surrender the Kingdom of Spain or to renounce the throne of France for the moment completely paralyzed the proceedings at Utrecht. But it was not an easy task, even if Philip V were willing to renounce the throne of France, to make Europe believe that a renunciation previously declared to be legally invalid could secure the permanent separation of the two monarchies, and it was certain that their union could never be accepted.

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The renun-
ciation of
Philip V

The real problem now was to settle the question of succession in such a manner as to satisfy the demands of Europe regarding its future security. As matters stood, if Philip V made no decision, he was by the letters patent registered in the Parliament of Paris, while still King of Spain, separated from the throne of France by only one fragile barrier, the life of a feeble infant. How, in these circumstances, could satisfactory guarantees against a union of the two monarchies be obtained?

The pressure of Oxford and Bolingbroke was insistent that such absolute renunciations be furnished as would satisfy the European powers that the two crowns would never be united. To Englishmen, who had already rejected that doctrine, the dogma of "divine right" made no appeal. The French plea of the invalidity of a royal renunciation based upon this principle was, therefore, wholly unacceptable; and Louis XIV was made to understand that without the assurance of a permanent separation of the two crowns, the English ministry was powerless to conclude a peace.

It thus became necessary for the Grand Monarch to choose between the abandonment of Spain or France by Philip V, and to press this choice upon his grandson. It was for the aged king a hard struggle. On April 18 he wrote to Philip: "Every day increases the necessity for peace; and, the means of continuing the war being exhausted, I shall find myself obliged to treat upon conditions equally disagreeable for me and for Your Majesty."

Philip V remained for a time immovable. He was unwilling to renounce his rights in France and determined not to abdicate the Spanish throne. The correspondence of Louis XIV with his grandson during this period is pathetic in its pleadings and its despair.¹ Not until every argument had been exhausted, after the most strenuous efforts of

¹ See for the correspondence, Courey, *Renonciation des Bourbons d'Espagne au trône de France*, pp. 121, 141. Also Baudrillart, *Philippe V et la Cour de France*, I, pp. 449, 501.

the French ambassador at Madrid, Bonnac,¹ with the aid of the powerful Princess des Ursins, who ruled the King through her dominating influence over the Queen, did Philip V finally, on May 29, choose between the alternatives of abandoning Spain with the promise of an Italian kingdom composed of Savoy and Sicily, or retaining Spain by renouncing France. His preference was to remain King of Spain, but the decision had to be forced upon him. As a last resort, to compel action by Philip V, Bonnac had been furnished with an autograph letter from Louis XIV in which he said to the King of Spain: "After having given to Your Majesty all possible marks of the tenderness which I have for you, it is just that I think of my kingdom, and that I end the war which it is no longer able to continue. You will not be astonished then if I sign the peace *without you*, on the conditions which my enemies propose to me."²

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But it was not necessary to deliver the letter; and it was returned, as directed, unopened to the writer. The renunciation was now but a question of time.

The decision of Louis XIV to end the war was already known by the English ministry. St. John, who could not hasten peace at the council board at Utrecht, now resolved to enforce it in the field. Without any other authority than his own decision, on May 10, he took the dangerous step—for which the ministry was afterward impeached—of sending to the Duke of Ormond, who had taken Marlborough's place as captain-general of the British troops, a secret order forbidding him to engage in battle with the enemy, at the same time communicating this order to the Court of France. Ormond obeyed the order and tried to keep the secret, but it reached the ear of Prince Eugene, who by proposing a battle obtained the open admission that the Duke was under orders not to participate further in the war.

The "Re-
straining
Orders"

Since May, 1712, England had been in reality, though not officially, at peace with France; and the Grand Alliance was

¹ The instructions of Bonnac may be found in *Revue Diplomatique*, XI, p. 102.

² See Courcy, *Renonciation*, etc., p. 113.

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thus substantially at an end. The withdrawal of the English forces from the conflict left the French preponderant in the field, with the result that after the battle of Denain, of July 24, important fortresses fell into their hands, and the campaign which Marlborough believed would end with the occupation of Paris terminated in the strengthening of France.¹ Thus, at Utrecht, Louis XIV was able to treat the members of the Grand Alliance, with the exception of England, as if they, and not he, were the vanquished.

Bolingbroke's
mission to
France

The defection of England from the Grand Alliance was now virtually complete. St. John — who on July 7 was created Viscount Bolingbroke — was sent to France, for it was at London and Paris, and not at Utrecht, that England was to demand the reward of her services.

To relieve the ministry as far as possible of responsibility, the legality of the renunciations was referred to the learned doctors of the University of Oxford; and to them the drafts of these documents were accordingly sent. In the meantime, Bolingbroke endeavored to obtain from Louis XIV the highest price for the advantages accorded to France. Graciously received by the King at Fontainebleau on August 20, he charmed the Grand Monarch with his courteous manners, his alert intelligence, and his excellent French. The Duke of Savoy was regarded as a traitor to France, but was esteemed by Queen Anne as her most loyal friend. To obtain for him a satisfactory barrier and the cession of Sicily by Philip V was the chief mission of Bolingbroke.

Returning to London laden with rare gifts from the King of France, and elated with the success of his mission, Bolingbroke bore a letter in which the King commended him to the Queen as "*un ministre le plus capable d'abrégé et d'aplanir les difficultés de la négociation.*"

It was too much for the jealousy of Lord Oxford, who

¹ After the battle of Denain, Louis XIV wrote, on July 27, 1712: "Rien n'est plus capable de favoriser et d'avancer les négociations de la paix . . . que de reprendre cette supériorité que mes troupes avaient eue pendant si longtemps et qu'elles avaient malheureusement perdue depuis quelques années."

for a time placed the negotiations in the hands of Lord Dartmouth; but in his care they prospered so indifferently that they were afterwards again intrusted to Bolingbroke, who may be regarded as the responsible author of the Peace of Utrecht.

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On November 5, 1712, at Madrid, in the presence of the Spanish Cortes, the grandson of Louis XIV, with his right hand on the Gospel, swore that he, for himself and his descendants, solemnly renounced the throne of France. The document signed by him had been carefully prepared and approved by the jurists of Oxford as well as by those of the two kingdoms.¹ On the nineteenth and twenty-fourth of the same month were executed corresponding renunciations of the crown of Spain by the Duke of Berry and the Duke of Orléans.² These renunciations, with the cancellation of the letters patent of 1700 by which Philip V retained his rights in France, were ratified, and on March 15, 1713, duly registered, in that kingdom.

Execution of
the renuncia-
tions

What, then, had become of the "divine right" on which Louis XIV had built his life and his reign? It had been nullified and solemnly set aside in the interest of political expediency. The system of absolutism did not fall with it, but its logical foundation was swept away. Another "inviolable law" had been substituted for it, — a *contract* between princes dictated by the interests of their peoples.

And this new principle of public law, thus solemnly recognized, had made possible what the doctrine of legitimacy, under the conception of *droit divin* as the basis of human government, had not been able to secure, namely, the peace of Europe.

At the end of the ceremonies of March 15, Lord Shrewsbury, the new English ambassador to France, despatched two couriers, one to London and one to Utrecht, to announce that the stone of stumbling had been removed. The bitter,

¹ See Bonnac's account of the ceremony in Courcy, *Renonciation*, etc., pp. 211, 224. See also the text of the Act, pp. 230, 239. Also in Vast, *Les grands traités*, III, pp. 50, 54.

² See the text in Courcy, as before, pp. 240, 242.

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The provisions
of the Peace
of Utrecht

costly strife that had for twelve years agitated Europe, ruined France, exhausted Spain, and drained the resources of all the powers engaged, could now be terminated.

We need not return to Utrecht, except to record the terms upon which peace was concluded, for it was not made possible by anything that had happened there.¹ The Queen of England declared that, if the allies did not promptly accept the conditions offered them, she would negotiate a separate peace with the King of France. That peace had, in fact, already been assured by the renunciations; and was rendered certain by the signature, on January 30, 1713, of a treaty between Great Britain and Holland recognizing the Protestant succession and promising the barrier.²

On April 11, 1713, seven treaties were signed at Utrecht between France and Great Britain, the United Provinces, Prussia, Portugal, and the Duke of Savoy.³ Only the Emperor and certain princes of the Empire refused to accept the conditions offered by France and resolved to continue the war.

The results of the peace, so far as the general interests of Europe are concerned, were as follows:

¹ A complete history of the negotiations is found in Weber, *Der Friede von Utrecht*.

² For the text, see Dumont, VIII, Part I, p. 314.

³ These seven treaties included a treaty of peace and friendship and a commercial treaty with Great Britain (see Dumont, VIII, Part I, p. 339 and p. 345; and Vast, III, p. 68 and p. 87, with valuable notes); a treaty of peace and friendship and a treaty of commerce with the United Provinces (see Dumont as above, p. 336 and p. 377; and Vast, p. 141); a treaty of peace, friendship, and commerce with Prussia (see Dumont, p. 356, and Vast, p. 120); a treaty of peace, friendship, and commerce with Portugal (see Dumont, p. 353, and Vast, p. 112); and a treaty of peace, friendship, and commerce with the Duke of Savoy (see Dumont, as above, p. 362, and Vast, p. 129). As the interests of Spain were in the hands of Louis XIV, there was no Spanish plenipotentiary at Utrecht, and no treaties were at that time signed by Spain. On March 26, 1713, however, the "Asiento" had been transferred to Great Britain at Madrid. See Calvo, *Recueil des Traités*, II, p. 78. All the treaties of Utrecht were, however, afterward confirmed there by Spanish plenipotentiaries, those with England and Savoy on July 13, 1713; that with Holland on June 26, 1714.

Queen Anne and the Protestant succession in Great Britain were recognized by France; contested possessions in America, — Hudson's Bay, Newfoundland with Nova Scotia,¹ and St. Christopher, — besides Gibraltar and Minorca, were ceded to England, together with the exclusive monopoly of the slave trade, or rights of the "Asiento"; freedom of trade with the colonies and a moderate tariff were likewise accorded; and the port and fortifications of Dunkirk were to be destroyed.

These colonial and commercial gains, although not sufficient in the eyes of the Whigs, who insisted upon further advantages, marked an immense advance in the development of the British Empire, and popular joy in England expressed itself in public celebrations of the peace.

The United Provinces were allowed to retain certain cities of the Spanish Netherlands until the Emperor was ready to make peace; when, it was agreed, they would be delivered to him, with suitable barriers to be occupied by Dutch troops, and a part of Upper Gelderland would be permanently annexed to the Republic.

Portugal was recognized as sovereign on both banks of the Amazon, but obtained no other advantage.

Frederick III, Elector of Brandenburg, already recognized as king by the Emperor as Frederick I of Prussia, who had been succeeded by his son Frederick William on February 25, 1713, was now formally recognized as the first king of Prussia, and King Frederick William I was accorded a part of Upper Gelderland and the Principality of Neuchâtel, but renounced all claim to the Orange possessions in France.

The Duke of Savoy, Victor Amadeus II, was ceded Sicily, with Savoy and Nice restored to him, and in addition permitted to retain the territories in Italy given him by the Emperor Joseph I, and granted the title of King; thus laying the foundation of an important Italian monarchy, destined in the course of time to extend to the entire

¹ With regard to the French fishing rights, see the valuable historical note in Vast, *Les grands traités*, III, pp. 79, 81.

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The end of
the war of
the Spanish
succession

peninsula. He was besides accorded the right of future succession in Spain, in case the Bourbon dynasty should become extinct.¹

Thus isolated, Charles VI could not vindicate the claims his plenipotentiaries had made for him at Utrecht. In the following August, Villars took possession of Landau, and in November of Freiburg and Breisgau. On November 26, negotiations between the Emperor and France were opened at Rastadt. On December 4, it was agreed that peace should be concluded between them on the basis of the treaties of Ryswick; and, on March 6, 1714, the Treaty of Rastadt was signed by the Emperor. At Baden in Aargau, on September 7, the princes of the Empire adhered to the Treaty of Rastadt. France retained Strasburg and Alsace, with Landau in addition. The Emperor acquired the Spanish Netherlands, Milan, Tuscany, Naples, and Sardinia, in full sovereignty.² Breisach, Kehl, and Freiburg were also restored to the Empire. In return the Emperor re-established the Electors of Bavaria and Köln in their electorates.

On November 15, 1715, at Antwerp, the transfer of the Spanish Netherlands from Spain to Austria was consummated, and the promised barrier for the United Provinces was erected with the guarantee of Great Britain.³

Thus were finally liquidated the problems of the Spanish succession. It was also the end of the long struggle between the forces brought into collision by the dynastic ambitions of Louis XIV and the determination of William of Orange to defeat them. The victory was on the side of the Sovereign State System established by the Peace of Westphalia, which France had done so much to create and Louis XIV so much to endanger. The Treaties of Utrecht, Rastadt, and Baden, like the Treaties of Westphalia, mark the close

¹ For an account of the *Auto Accordato*, changing the Spanish law of succession, see Courcy, *Renonciation*, etc., pp. 243, 252, and 294.

² The details of the negotiation of the treaties of Rastadt and Baden, are given by Courcy, *La coalition de 1701*, II, pp. 101, 353. Also a very full account of the treaties between Spain, Savoy, England, Holland and Portugal on pp. 357, 517, with important documents.

³ For the treaty, see Dumont, VIII, Part I, p. 458 et seq.

of a conflict between abstract rights in which the spirit of imperialism suffered defeat; and even more decisively than in 1648 the principle of diffused and balanced power had been asserted.

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But the year 1715 also marked the end of an epoch by the disappearance from the scene of many of the personages who had given it character. On June 8 the Electress-dowager Sophia of Hanover passed away, chagrined that at the age of eighty-four she must die without having become Queen of England, leaving her son, George Lewis, heir to the throne. On August 1 Queen Anne followed her, and George I was proclaimed King of England, — a change which ended Bolingbroke's diplomacy with France and Spain, and drove him and the Tory party from office. On September 1 the Grand Monarch also ended his career.

With the exception of Charles VI and Philip V, the contestants in the war of the Spanish succession were now at peace; but new problems had arisen and were pressing for solution. New actors also had come upon the scene, and the centre of interest was transferred to another field. It was the North and the struggle for the Baltic that now engaged the chief attention of statesmen and threatened radical changes in the map of Europe.

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CHAPTER V

THE STRUGGLE FOR SUPREMACY IN THE NORTH AND IN ITALY

The principle
of equilibrium
accepted

THE Peace of Utrecht appeared for the moment to have restored to Europe the equilibrium that had been so long disturbed by the ambitions of France. Not only the importance of balanced power among the nations but a deeper and broader view of international obligation was now again brought home to the thoughts of men.

Knowing how much both France and the rest of Europe had suffered from the ambitions of Louis XIV, Fénelon, in a dissertation presented before the Congress of Utrecht, wrote: "Neighboring states are not only under obligation to treat one another according to the rules of justice and good faith; they ought in addition, for their own safety, as well as for the common interest, to form a kind of general society and republic." He then proceeds to point out that, the passions of men and the ambitions of rulers being what they are, "each nation is on this account under the necessity of incessant watchfulness to prevent the excessive aggrandizement of each one of its neighbors, . . . for the aggrandizement of a nation beyond a certain limit changes the general system of all the nations that have relation to it. . . . Everything which changes or alters this general system of Europe is dangerous and entails infinite evils."¹

The principle thus enunciated is as old as international diplomacy,² and it had at length come to be distinctly recognized by the statesmen of Europe as the foundation of public security.³ Louis XIV, who had done more than any other

¹ *Œuvres de Fénelon*, Paris, 1872, IV, p. 360.

² See Volume I of this work, p. 361.

³ See Dupuis, *Le principe d'équilibre et le Concert Européen*, pp. 25, 31.

sovereign of his time to violate it, had at last not only accepted but had openly appealed to it, and in the phrasing of the renunciations distinctly avowed it. In them it was formally stated that their purpose was "to establish an equilibrium between the powers of such a kind as to prevent the union of many in a single one, so that the balance of equality, which it is desired to assure, could not incline to the advantage of one of these powers to the risk and injury of the others."¹

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In fact, the great problem at Utrecht was how best to set the equilibrium of the European states against the private interests of the dynasties. The result was, in effect, the creation of a dynastic deadlock in which the ambition of sovereigns to absorb one another's possessions might thenceforth be rendered impotent.² In this sense the Peace of Utrecht was a protest against absolutism, and especially against the idea that nations are, like private properties, transmissible by inheritance. It was the vindication and the triumph of the constitutional ideas of William III over the absolutist ideas of Louis XIV.³

But this was not the only result of the long and ruinous war of the Spanish succession. It had also furnished an impulse to constructive thought. The Abbé de Saint-Pierre, impressed by the miseries inflicted upon France and the hollowness of the glory attributed to Louis XIV, not only refused to accord to him the title "*Le Grand*," but boldly laid down the doctrine that "great power cannot make a great man."

Starting with the idea of the moral and legal equality of sovereign states, Saint-Pierre wrote his essay on the "*Projet de la Paix Perpétuelle*," published at Utrecht in 1713, dur-

¹ See Giraud, *Le traité d'Utrecht*, p. 124.

² Note the formal recognition of the principle of equilibrium in Art. II of the treaty between Spain and England of July 13, 1713.

³ Emile Bourgeois lays emphasis upon the fact that after 1713 the ideas of Locke not only superseded those of Bossuet even in France, but became recognized as principles of international law. *Manuel historique de politique étrangère*, I, p. 249.

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ing the conferences of the Congress, in which he pointed out the causes of the misfortunes that had befallen Europe, and elaborated a plan for avoiding them in the future.

Founded primarily on the conceptions of Émeric Crucé in the "Nouveau Cynée"¹ and of Sully in the "Great Design,"² the plan of Saint-Pierre comprised the formation of a universal alliance of sovereigns to secure themselves against the misfortunes of war by abolishing the separate use of force, perfecting their laws, and submitting their differences to judicial decision; with the understanding that, in case of refusal to execute treaties or to obey the rules and judgments imposed, the other members of the alliance should compel a refractory sovereign to comply by arming unitedly against him, and charging to his account the expense of this forcible restraint.³

Admirable as the aims of the excellent Abbé were, they overlooked certain elements of human nature which two centuries of further development have not entirely eliminated from the life of nations. It was in the name of real, as distinguished from merely ideal, equality, and for the rule of justice as men saw it from their own point of view, that international strife was yet to continue. Prevented, or at least postponed, by the exhaustion and domestic troubles of the powers that had made their peace at Utrecht, war was soon again to agitate Europe by the renewal of the conflict that was still smouldering in the North.

I. THE PERIL OF SWEDEN AND THE BATTLE FOR THE BALTIC

The exile of
Charles XII

In 1709, the alliance between Denmark, Poland, and Russia against Sweden had been renewed, and Pope Clement XI had absolved the Poles from their allegiance to King Stanislas. Projects for the partition of Poland were made and

¹ See Volume II of this work, p. 374.

² See Volume II of this work, pp. 550, 552.

³ See Molinari, *L'Abbé de Saint-Pierre*, Paris, 1857; and Pascal, *Les projets de l'abbé Saint-Pierre*, Paris, 1900.

discussed, but Frederick Augustus of Saxony, after offering to divide Poland with King Stanislas, repudiated the proposals of Prussia for a partition and decided to maintain the integrity of the kingdom and permit Sweden to furnish the spoils of war.

In order to prevent the commotion in the North from influencing the war of the Spanish succession, the Emperor, England, and Holland had, on March 31, 1710, signed a treaty neutralizing the Empire, which had had the effect of holding the two conflicts apart, but did not obtain the adhesion of Charles XII.¹ Since his flight from Poltawa, that headstrong and impracticable monarch had remained at the Turkish fortress of Bender on the Dniester. Early in 1711 the Grand Vizier had offered at the head of a hundred thousand Turks "to carve a way home for the King of Sweden in whichever direction he liked best"; but Charles XII chose to remain in his asylum in the vain belief that he might eventually lead a Turkish army into Poland; and, on July 21, 1711, peace was concluded between the Czar and the Sultan at the Pruth. Broken soon afterward at the instigation of Charles XII, peace was again renewed by the mediation of England and Holland on April 15, 1712,² and finally confirmed at Adrianople on June 5, 1713.

In the meantime Charles XII had abused the Turkish hospitality, diverted the money that had been given him to pay the expenses of his departure, refused to leave Bender, and at last, when force was resorted to, engaged in a pitched battle with his hosts, in which he was twice wounded and with only forty adherents kept at bay twelve thousand men until the house in which he had taken refuge was burned down and he was overpowered and captured by the Janissaries.³

¹ See Dumont, VIII, Part I, p. 249. A congress of the neutral German powers was assembled at Brunswick in December, 1712, for the purpose of enforcing neutrality, but ended in March, 1713, without producing any result. It was reassembled in 1714, but bore no fruit.

² Sir Robert Sutton, the British ambassador, was, however, recalled for his activity in promoting the peace.

³ See the graphic account in Bain, *Charles XII and the Collapse of the Swedish Empire*, pp. 212, 217.

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While astonished Europe compared his heroism to that of Achilles and Hercules, and a medal was struck to commemorate the event, Peter the Great and Frederick Augustus I rejoiced in his quarrel with his only effective ally.¹ A turn in the tide of feeling toward Russia brought his assailants into disgrace and the King found himself for a time again in favor at Stamboul, but the Peace of Utrecht had in the meantime changed the situation in Europe; and the treaty of June 5, 1713, ended the Russo-Turkish conflict.² Although Charles XII then decided to return to Sweden, it was not until November 11, 1714, that the exiled king, after an absence of fifteen years from his kingdom, arrived at Stralsund.

The defects
of Charles
XII's policy

During this long absence, Sweden had fallen into a desperate condition. Its resources exhausted, its throne practically vacant, many of its possessions lost or imperilled, the kingdom which Gustavus Adolphus had expanded to a vast empire, appeared at the mercy of its foes.

At first glance it seems unaccountable that a warrior so impetuous as Charles XII could have been content to remain so long in a foreign land while his kingdom was falling into decay. The explanation is to be found in the fact that, comprehending the limitations of his own resources, he entertained the chimerical idea of overpowering Russia by stimulating the Turks to exhaust the resources of the Czar. By this expedient he believed he was seriously crippling his most powerful enemy without expense to his own kingdom, and making the Sultan fight his battles for him.

In order to estimate correctly the value of Charles XII's policy, it is, however, necessary to recall what had occurred during the years of his exile and the condition of his country upon his return.

¹ In the hope of drawing Charles XII into the war of the Spanish succession, Louis XIV had, on September 1, 1712, made an alliance with him at Bender; but, apart from the subsidies then promised and afterward paid, Charles XII derived no benefit from the alliance, and none was received by France.

² For the treaty, see Dumont, Supplement II, Part II, p. 110.

The battle of Poltawa was by no means a final defeat of Sweden, but merely the temporary relief of Russia. It was, indeed, the end of Charles XII's mad scheme of a Swedish invasion into the heart of that vast empire, but it would not have prevented the further defence of the territories of Sweden, or even further aggression upon Russia, if Charles XII had promptly returned to his kingdom; while he might have accomplished through diplomatic representatives all the results effected by his presence in Turkey.

The absence of the King, who insisted upon regulating the minutest affairs from a distance, was disastrous to his kingdom, which suffered much from division of counsels but chiefly by delay. In November, 1709, the Danes, disregarding the Peace of Travendal, made an attack upon Scania which ended in their establishing a foothold there; and only the splendid generalship of Stenbock in 1710 had held the enemy at bay. In the meantime, all of Sweden's Baltic provinces had fallen into the possession of the Czar, who had also successfully invaded Finland. As a consequence, Poland had been evacuated by the Swedes and the army withdrawn to Swedish Pomerania, with King Stanislas as a refugee in the Swedish camp.

Although without the possibility of obtaining effective allies during the war of the Spanish succession, Charles XII might nevertheless have profited from it by adhering to the compact of neutrality of March 31, 1710, which would have secured the safety of his German possessions without cost to him; but, believing that the maritime powers, in spite of their absorption in a costly war, would aid him against Denmark, on November 30, 1710, he had, against the advice of his friends, formally repudiated the offer of neutrality.

Thus, the security of the Swedish possessions was made to depend solely upon their own defensive powers against all his enemies at once, while he awaited the uncertain fortunes of the Russo-Turkish conflict.

With this opportunity of aggression, the Danes in 1712 had invaded and occupied the Duchy of Bremen, while the coalition against Sweden worked its will on the Baltic. It is true

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that the Peace of the Pruth was broken and war with Russia resumed by the Turks at the instigation of Charles XII; but this was of no direct profit to Sweden, and even if the war had not soon ended with the Peace of Adrianople, it is difficult to see how the conflict between Turkey and Russia could ever have been more than a diversion of the attack upon Sweden. Whatever the personal influence of Charles XII at Bender may for a time have been, it is certain that his return to Sweden was too long delayed, and that his separation from Stockholm by a distance of seven hundred miles rendered impossible the needed unity and promptness of counsel regarding public policy between him and the Swedish Senate.

The condition
of Sweden in
1715

There was rejoicing in Sweden when it was learned that the King had arrived at Stralsund; but, instead of returning to his capital, where confusion and despair were almost universal, he remained in his Pomeranian fortress, ordering troops to be sent to him, and at the same time opposing by his royal authority all the measures for the salvation of the kingdom suggested by the Senate and the Riksdag. Frederick I of Prussia had at one time been ready to promise him aid, and the Emperor Charles VI had also been favorably disposed toward him; but the time had now passed when an alliance with either would have been possible upon any terms that Charles XII was inclined to consider. Frederick William I, having become King of Prussia, was endeavoring to expel the Swedes from Germany, and the Emperor, offended by the obstinacy and discourtesy of Charles XII, had lost all sympathy with him. At this moment of Sweden's helplessness Prussia had already acquired possession of Stettin in sequestration,¹ and the Elector of Hanover, long considered by Charles XII as his "best friend," had occupied Verden and was coveting Bremen, then in possession of the Danes, who were willing to sell it to Hanover.

¹ This was by agreement of Prussia with Russia and Poland in the Treaty of Schwedt, of October 6, 1713; see Dumont, VIII, Part I, p. 407. Droysen regards this treaty as one of the most important in the history of Prussia, it being the decisive step in Prussia's Baltic policy.

Frederick William I would have been ready to aid Sweden in opposing Russia in exchange for Swedish possessions in Pomerania; but, finding Charles XII utterly intractable, on June 12, 1714, Prussia had formed an alliance with Russia, and in the spring of 1715 declared war on Sweden.¹ The Elector of Hanover soon afterward also declared war,² and before the autumn of 1715, Sweden was confronted by a formidable confederacy of foes, consisting of Russia, Saxony, Denmark, Poland, Prussia, and Hanover, who had formed a compact to divide among themselves the spoils of the Swedish empire now steadily crumbling to pieces.

At this critical moment Sweden was internally plunged in the depths of the most bitter poverty. Her last army had been dispersed, and only half the number of troops necessary to defend the frontiers of the kingdom could be raised. The taxes, which had long been on a war basis, did not furnish a third of the funds needed for defence. The bells of the churches were sold, and the cannons captured in former wars were sent to the mint to be coined into money. Nothing but the firm statesmanship of Count Horn prevented revolution and the dethronement of Charles XII.

With unflinching courage and a tranquillity of mind that revealed the invincible quality of his nature, the King gathered about him seventeen thousand men to defend Stralsund against the united forces of his enemies; but, on December 12, 1715, the battered remains of the fortress had to be abandoned, and Charles XII, after narrowly escaping capture by the Danish ships, landed from a small boat on the shores of Sweden.

Had events not radically altered the traditional relations of Sweden and France, there might have been a last hope

The impediments to action by Western Europe

¹ For the treaty, see F. Martens, *Recueil des Traité*s, V, "Allemagne," p. 112.

² The Elector's treaty with the Czar was signed on October 28, 1715, at Greifswald. It may be found in Störk, *Das Greifswalder Bündnis*, where a history of the negotiations is given. It guaranteed to Hanover Bremen and Verden, and to Russia Ingria, Carelia, and Esthonia; but not Livonia, as Ranke erroneously states.

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for Charles XII in a Franco-Swedish alliance; but the entire international situation was in a state of transition that rendered France for the moment powerless to offer aid. The accession of the Elector of Hanover to the throne of England as George I had not only reversed the English ministry, it had vitally affected the whole system of England's foreign policy, and particularly the recent friendship with France. The Whigs, who had just come into power, were making political capital of the *entente* with their ancient enemy and bitterly condemning the Peace of Utrecht. Marlborough had been replaced at the head of the army, Bolingbroke and Ormond were accused of treason and had sought refuge in France, and Oxford was impeached and sent to the Tower. Townshend, who had been commended to George I, was made the head of the new ministry with the duties of secretary of the Northern Department, and James Stanhope, a distinguished soldier and an able diplomatist, was placed in charge of the Southern Department for the conduct of foreign affairs.

At Paris, Lord Stair had accused Louis XIV just before his death of violating the treaty of peace because so little progress was made with the demolition of Dunkirk, and especially because of the construction of an immense canal at Mardyck; which, it was alleged, was designed to create a new port to take the place of Dunkirk. One of the last acts of Louis XIV was to refuse to discontinue this construction; which, it was alleged, was intended only for the necessary drainage of the country.

In the meantime the Pretender, who had been compelled, as the treaty required, to leave France and had taken refuge in Lorraine, issued a proclamation, claiming the succession to the English throne. The conduct of Louis XIV regarding the Pretender had been entirely correct; but the Protestant succession was believed in England to be seriously threatened, and the intentions of France were regarded with distrust.¹

¹ Count de Croissy, a brother of Torcy, who in May, 1715, had been sent to Berlin to arrange a peace for Sweden, had urged Charles XII to make peace in the North and send troops against England to aid the "Pretender." See Chance, *George I and the Northern War*, pp. 77, 78.

Philip V had perforce submitted to the demand for the renunciations, but with wounded dignity, and had secretly aimed at securing for himself the regency during the minority of the infant Louis XV. He was openly favorable to the Pretender, and a strong party inclined to support him was believed to exist in France.

In these circumstances, there was small hope of active intervention in the affairs of the North on the part of France, which was too much absorbed in repairing its own fortunes to indulge in needless foreign complications. In truth, the effort to obtain equilibrium in Western Europe had created a condition that seriously impeded further international action.¹ Even England, notwithstanding the interests of George I as Elector of Hanover, had no inclination at the moment to undertake a new foreign war, or to embark precipitately in the affairs of the North. The only real interest of Great Britain in the Baltic was for the safety of her commerce;² but the policy of Hanover was not without influence upon the action of the British ministry. As for the Dutch Republic, its chief preoccupation was the execution of the Barrier Treaty. With a depleted treasury, and solicitous chiefly for its commercial interests, there was little likelihood that it would waste much substance in the North.

While as King of England the policy prescribed for George I was one of moderation, with a general interest in maintaining a state of equilibrium in the North, as Elector of Hanover he was called upon to play a different and even to some extent a conflicting rôle; for it was greatly to the advantage of the electorate to round out its territory by retaining Verden and acquiring Bremen, which involved complicity with the enemies of Sweden.

The dual
relations of
George I

With any reasonable degree of skill and caution on the

¹ In 1714, while still at Bender, Charles XII had received subsidies from Louis XIV, who also offered his mediation. See Chance, *George I and the Northern War*, pp. 76, 80, for the futile mission of De Croissy.

² Interesting statistics regarding the amount of British trade in the North are given by Chance, *George I and the Northern War*, p. 6.

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part of Charles XII, the existing treaties between England and Sweden and the indisposition of the English people to be made the tool of Hanover would have prevented hostile action against him by Great Britain; but Charles XII scorned anything that savored of diplomacy. George I had become King of England not because of any preference for his person or any design to form a closer union with the House of Brunswick, but because he was a Protestant and maintained the Protestant succession. Had James Edward been willing to change his religion, he would have been far more acceptable; for he had personal charms and graces, as well as accomplishments, which the German prince entirely lacked. Ignorant of the English language, laws, and sentiments; coarse in person, low in morals, and cold in his manners, George I was ill adapted for winning the hearts of Englishmen. Being, as he was, merely a political necessity, there was for him and the suite of foreign courtiers and advisers who accompanied him to England, and whose dictatorial pretensions were offensive, no affection and no enthusiasm. Any wish or policy that was merely personal to the King or suggested by his Hanoverian *entourage* was quite certain to awaken English opposition.

When, therefore, Count Gyllenborg came to London as the ambassador of Charles XII to plead for the friendship of England, the circumstances would not have been unfavorable to his cause had it not been for the blind obstinacy of the Swedish King, whose ships were at the time preying upon British commerce in the Baltic.

The Privateering Ordinance of February 8, 1715, authorized commissions to be issued not only to Swedish but to foreign privateers to capture and condemn as prize enemy or neutral ships under conditions that seriously hampered all commerce in the Baltic; and many English as well as Dutch vessels had been condemned without reasonable warning. The result was, that, without the least intention to aid the predatory designs of George I as Elector of Hanover, a British fleet was sent to the Baltic to compel the respect of the Swedes for the rights of British commerce; and

George I was thus enabled to engage privately with the King of Prussia that it should be used "in support of the operations in Pomerania against Sweden."

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The continued indifference of the King of Sweden to the British complaints regarding the injury to neutral commerce not unnaturally justified the ministry in treating Sweden as an enemy; while, on the other hand, the course of George I in appropriating Bremen and Verden led Charles XII to consider him his most treacherous foe. Between the King of England and the Elector of Hanover the Swedish King made no distinction, with the result that he was less and less disposed to make terms with a power that might have been of great utility to him at the moment of his extremity.

The growth
of British
hostility to
Sweden

Great Britain, whose interest it was to maintain political equilibrium in the North and to prevent the preponderant intrusion of Russia upon the Baltic, was thus insensibly led into hostility to Sweden and made the accomplice of Hanoverian expansion upon the continent. Without doubt, it was to the advantage of England to have so important a port as Bremen in the possession of Hanover; and, when Sweden was so blindly and incorrigibly unfriendly, it was almost inevitable that England should prefer relations with the Czar, whose mastery of the Baltic did not at the moment appear to be a conspicuous danger.

A not less important transformation than that which had taken place in England had occurred in France. Determined that his influence should survive himself, and resolved to transmit his power to no single individual, Louis XIV had refused to appoint Philip V Regent during the minority of the child Louis XV, and had put the government of France in commission. The Council of Regency established by the will of the Grand Monarch was composed of the Duke of Orléans, the Duke of Bourbon, the Duke of Maine, and the Count of Toulouse, with Marshal Villeroy, Huxelles, Tallard, and Harcourt, and the existing ministry. Thus, by a singular inconsequence, Louis XIV, the inaugurator of absolute monarchy, at his death transferred his authority to a select

The Regency in
France and
the Abbé
Dubois

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oligarchy composed of widely differing elements, with a prescribed division of powers.¹

As constituted by Louis XIV, the regency included two conflicting parties: the first, an old court party, headed by the Duke of Maine and closely associated with Spain, Ultramontane influence, and Madame de Maintenon; the other, headed by the Duke of Orléans, inclining toward association with the Jansenists, the Parliament, and the younger and less satisfied forces in the nation.

The "Regent" himself, — as Philip of Orléans was soon entitled, — intelligent, accomplished, devoid of conscience, and dissipated in his habits, was without marked personal ambition; but, under the influence of the Abbé Dubois, who had been his preceptor, and other advisers, he resolved to form his own council and to undertake the command of the military household, which together with the tutelage of the young king had been left by the will to the Duke of Maine. On September 12, 1715, the will of Louis XIV was substantially set aside, the Duke of Orléans was duly legalized as Regent, and the Abbé Dubois became at first the confidential, and soon afterward the official, chief counsellor of the regency.

The son of a country physician, Dubois had been educated at Paris, at thirty-four had become the preceptor of the Duke of Orléans, — at that time the Duke of Chartres, — and had obtained a powerful influence over him, which he had not ceased to exert. As a secretary of Tallard in London, in 1698, he had acquired a taste for diplomacy and some experience in it. He had also accompanied the Duke of Orléans during his military campaign in Spain in 1708, when the Duke incurred the undying hatred of Philip V on account of the popularity he had won, which led to the suspicion on the part of the King that the Duke aspired to be a compromise candidate for the Spanish throne.

Upon Dubois' experience in England, and especially the friendships that had been formed there, — which included an acquaintance with James Stanhope, — and upon the

¹ See Lavisse, *Histoire de France*, VIII, Part II, p. 2.

alienation between Philip V and the Regent, the future of France and of Europe were soon in great measure to turn; for Dubois was deeply impressed with the value for the regency of an alliance with England, since the Regent, as head of a party, was compelled to pursue a policy of his own in opposition to the aims of Philip V.

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Although at first occupying only a modest position as a councillor in ecclesiastical affairs, Dubois soon became the secret director of the foreign relations of France. The system adopted by him was entirely different from that of Louis XIV; for the stability of the regency, menaced by the machinations of the Spanish Court and its French adherents, seemed to him to require a new international alignment.

Compelled, as he had been, by Louis XIV to renounce the throne of France, Philip V had not relinquished the idea of obtaining the regency; and, in case of the death of the infant Louis XV, he hoped to place one of his own sons upon the French throne. In these plans he was inspired by his second wife, Elizabeth Farnese, — niece of Francis Duke of Parma, and Cosmos, Grand Duke of Tuscany, — who was ambitious for her sons, and by the Abbé Alberoni, his adventurous prime minister.

An Italian, like the Queen, whose marriage he had brought about, Alberoni, the son of a Parmesan gardener, had been brought to Spain by Vendôme as a humble but talented ecclesiastic, had won the favor of the all-powerful Princess Orsini,¹ had thereby gained the confidence of Philip V, and had risen to the highest place of power in the kingdom. With marvellous insight into the needs of the decayed monarchy, he had repaired its finances, reorganized its army and navy, and cherished the hope of restoring its ancient predominance in Europe.

¹ This remarkable woman, known in France as the Princesse des Ursins, during the period of her power at Madrid may be said to have almost governed Spain. The arrival of Elizabeth Farnese as Queen was, however, the end of her domination and was immediately followed by her public disgrace.

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To accomplish his purpose, Alberoni aimed at destroying Austrian influence and expelling the Austrians from Italy, — which he intended to reconquer for Spain, — overthrowing the regency in France, and eventually placing one of the sons of Elizabeth Farnese upon the French throne. With Italy recovered and France in close alliance with Spain, that monarchy, reinvigorated and reorganized within, would possess more than its ancient grandeur.

The task which Alberoni had set for himself rendered desirable the friendship of England, which he studiously endeavored to gain; and, on December 14, 1715, Philip V, in spite of his aversion to heretics, signed a treaty of commerce with England which was intended to supplement the Treaties of Utrecht.¹

There was, however, a serious obstacle in the way of a close intimacy on the part of England with Spain, which was still at war with the Emperor; for George I, who desired the support of Charles VI for his claims to the throne of England, — to which there was strong opposition in Vienna, — and also the Imperial investiture of Bremen and Verden, was not disposed to incur the Emperor's disfavor by too close an *entente* with Spain. On the other hand, Charles VI, who was seriously menaced by Spain in Italy, was greatly in need of the naval support of England. A *rapprochement* between them was thereby facilitated which soon resulted in their reciprocal guarantee of their possessions.² Debarred by this alliance from the close relations with England desired by Alberoni, Philip V, already in strained relations with France on account of his hostility to the Regent, was placed in a position of practical isolation.

While George I was anxious to obtain from Sweden the cession of Bremen and Verden for Hanover, he was even more solicitous regarding his security upon the throne of England; for since his accession the Pretender had been actively plotting to supplant him, and rebellion aided by conspiracies in England was brewing in Scotland, while France was covertly

The secret negotiations of George I with Peter the Great

¹ For the treaty, see Martens, A., Supplement I, p. 111.

² See the treaty of June 5, 1716, in Dumont, VIII, Part I, p. 476.

and Spain more openly encouraging James Edward by furnishing him with funds to promote invasion.

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In his anger with George I on account of his wish to appropriate Bremen and Verden, Charles XII, it was reported, intended to furnish military aid to the Pretender; and, in fact, liberal offers had been made to the King of Sweden to induce him to furnish troops for the invasion of England, but he had refused to accept them.

To guard against the international conspiracy that was forming to accomplish his dethronement, George I was negotiating on all sides for recognition and support. He had succeeded in winning the Emperor, the United Provinces, and Denmark, but Prussia had declined to take any risks.

At London, in March, 1716, the Russian ambassador, Kurakin, was informed by Townshend that, if the Czar would guarantee the Hanoverian succession, George I would, as King of England, guarantee the Russian conquests; but, on account of the long friendship of England and Sweden, it would be necessary first to negotiate with Russia a treaty of commerce favorable to English trade in the Baltic, which would then render possible a political alliance. England, Townshend assured the ambassador, would furnish twelve or fifteen war-ships, if Russia would furnish eight or ten thousand men, for the purpose of forcing immediate peace upon Sweden on terms advantageous to themselves.

Drafts of treaties were prepared, and England was about to embark in open war with her ancient ally; but during the delays in completing the negotiations, in August, 1716, the Jacobite rebellion was ended, so that the guarantee of the Hanoverian succession had ceased to be of first importance. With the argument that the aid of Russia was needed against Swedish support of the Pretender swept away, there was no sufficient ground on which an offensive alliance with Russia against Sweden could be defended before the Parliament; and thus England was saved from plunging openly into the Northern war.

It was not long, however, before George I comprehended what a misfortune it would have been if he had committed

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The reaction
against Rus-
sian intrusion

England to the support of the Czar against Sweden. The capture of Wismar and the occupation of Mecklenburg by Russian troops filled him, as it did also other German princes, with alarm; and the marriage of the Czar's daughter Anna to the Duke of Holstein-Gottorp and his niece with the Duke of Mecklenburg, celebrated at Dantzic in the midst of Russian troops, added to the fear that Peter the Great had the intention of making permanent conquests on the German coast of the Baltic.¹

At London Gyllenborg protested that his master, Charles XII, was not in league with the Pretender, that the Privateering Ordinance was only meant for Sweden's legitimate protection, that satisfaction would be given for damages to England's trade, and intimated that Charles XII might be induced, in exchange for England's support against Russia, to cede Bremen and Verden to Hanover. For a time it seemed as if the fear of Russian designs in the Baltic would turn the tide in favor of Sweden; but, as usual, Charles XII showed no disposition to accept the advice of his ambassador, and the negotiations had no result except to temper the instructions to Admiral Norris, in command of the Baltic fleet, who was directed to send a memorial to the King of Sweden before making any attack. As imperturbable as ever, Charles XII sent the document back unopened.

In Hanover the retention of Russian troops in Mecklenburg created a feeling of violent antagonism to the Czar; and Bernstorff, George I's Hanoverian minister, is said to have proposed the seizure of the Russian ships, and even the person of Peter the Great, until his soldiers had evacuated Germany.

The Triple
Alliance of
1717

In order to deal with such a delicate situation at closer range, in spite of objections from his English ministers, George I, accompanied by Stanhope, in July, 1716, left London for his electorate. He came with a firm determina-

¹ See Ward, *Great Britain and Hanover*, Oxford, 1899, pp. 95, 96. Also the diplomatic correspondence between England and Russia published in *Transactions of the Royal Historical Society*, New Series, XIV (1900).

tion not to enter into closer relations with the Czar, whom he was beginning to regard as a greater menace to the peace of Germany and to the equilibrium of the North than the King of Sweden, then braving the attack of a powerful coalition. To all of Peter the Great's proposals, therefore, he resolved to turn a deaf ear until the Russian troops were withdrawn from Germany.

In the meantime, the affairs of England had taken on a new form. In 1715, nothing had appeared more improbable than an alliance between England and France. French public opinion and the influence of the old court party were undoubtedly favorable to the Pretender, while the blood and treasure so freely expended by France to secure the establishment of Philip V on the throne of Spain rendered logical a warm sympathy between those two monarchies.

The ambition of Philip V to become the Regent of France and to control the succession in the interest of one of his sons in the event of the young king's death, and the existence of a strong party in France in favor of Philip V's designs seriously complicated the relations of the Duke of Orléans with Spain. To overcome the opposition to himself as Regent, it was necessary for him either to yield to the wishes of Philip V regarding the succession or to counterbalance his influence by some new form of policy.

In the situation then existing George I and the Regent each needed external support; the former to secure his succession against the ambitions of the Pretender, the latter to protect the regency against the opposition of Philip V. An alliance between George I and the Regent would have the effect, on the one hand, of preventing France from uniting with Spain to sustain the claims of the Pretender, and on the other, of affording to the Duke of Orléans a means of neutralizing the hostility of the King of Spain to the regency.

Although this policy was the reverse of that which had become traditional, it commended itself to the Abbé Dubois as possessing a practical advantage for the Regent; and he, therefore, urged its adoption. As England and the United Provinces were already in close alliance, and Holland fur-

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nished a convenient avenue of approach, it was decided that a Franco-Dutch *entente* should be the first step to be taken in the new direction. Accordingly, the French ambassador at The Hague, Châteauneuf, in May, 1716, was instructed to open with the Grand Pensionary negotiations upon the subject of an alliance, and at the same time to pay court to the merchants of Amsterdam; while Dubois renewed his acquaintance with James Stanhope by opening a friendly correspondence with him.

When it was learned at Versailles that George I and Stanhope would pass through The Hague on their way to Hanover, in July, 1716, Dubois, travelling under the disguise of a private collector of rare books and manuscripts, undertook a secret mission to The Hague, where as if by accident he intercepted Stanhope, with whom he had a number of personal interviews, at last leading up to the subject of an Anglo-French alliance.¹

Stanhope's first demand, before entering upon negotiations, was that the Pretender should be expelled from France, whither he had returned since the failure of his cause in Scotland. He also pointed out that it would be difficult for the King of England to accept the Treaty of Utrecht as a basis for a future alliance, since George I was already the ally of Charles VI, who had never recognized that treaty.

Undeterred by these obstacles, Dubois succeeded in obtaining the assent of Stanhope and of the King to a further discussion. In the following August, furnished with full powers to negotiate, he proceeded to Hanover; and there lodging in the same house with Stanhope in relations of closest intimacy, the terms of a Franco-English alliance were, after an interesting diplomatic battle, finally agreed upon.

At the price of abandoning the Pretender and demolishing Mardyck, Dubois obtained on October 10, 1716, the confirmation by England of the Treaties of Utrecht; thus securing for the Regent England's guarantee of the exclusion of the Spanish Bourbons from the throne of France, which prac-

¹ See the full account of these interviews and of the succeeding negotiations in Bourgeois, *Le secret du Régent*, p. 95 et seq.

tically assured the succession to the Duke of Orléans in case of the death of the infant king. On the other hand, the treaty procured for George I the French support of the Hanoverian succession against the Stuart pretensions, and thereby a free hand in pursuing his interests in his electorate.¹

Returning to The Hague, on January 4, 1717, Dubois obtained from the States General their adherence to the treaty signed at Hanover, thus creating the Triple Alliance of England, France, and the United Provinces.²

If the Triple Alliance of 1717 served the purpose of the Regent in creating for him a formidable defence against the designs of Philip V and Alberoni, it was still more useful to George I and his Hanoverian ambitions. With the support of the Emperor, secured in the previous summer, and that of France and Holland, England was now free from anxiety regarding the succession, and George I could bring pressure upon Prussia in his opposition to Peter the Great. In truth, the Triple Alliance of 1717 was Stanhope's triumph, making England the virtual arbiter of Europe, and placing in the hands of George I the balance of power in the North.

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Effects of
the Triple
Alliance of
1717

Hostile as the Whigs had been to the Treaties of Utrecht, they now began to perceive their value to England. They had not only accomplished the main object of the long and costly war to prevent the union of France and Spain, they had incidentally secured the Protestant succession, improved the commercial position of Great Britain, and made George I predominant on the continent. It was in vain, therefore, that the extreme Whigs, under the lead of Townshend, denounced Stanhope's diplomacy as Hanoverian rather than English. Whatever its leading motive, it placed the King of England in the ascendancy and gave that country the first place in international influence.

In France the effect was different. While the Triple Alliance secured allies for the Regent, it did not satisfy the prevailing sentiment of the French nation, which was strongly Jacobite and favorable to close relations with Spain. To

¹ For the text, see Lamberty, IX, p. 560.

² For the treaty, see Dumont, VIII, Part I, p. 484.

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the French public the alliance seemed mysterious and incomprehensible; but by the few who knew of the secret mission of Louville to Spain for the purpose of sounding and if possible conciliating Philip V, which had resulted in ignominious failure, the new alliance was understood to be a necessary part of the Regent's system of self-defence.¹

In a certain sense, the policy initiated by the alliance with England was personal and secret, primarily conceived in the private interest of the Regent. His position in France was new and peculiar. Under Louis XIV the foreign policy of France was openly and frankly dynastic, for the interest of the nation was assumed to be, as the absolutist theory of government required, the interest of the sovereign, who regarded the kingdom as his property. But the regency was merely a public office, and the Regent himself only the first servant of the State. Still, aspiring to the throne, and temporarily representing it, he had need of power and prestige, which without a personal policy it was impossible for him to obtain. Hence the development of a secret diplomacy alongside the public and official diplomacy, which it aimed covertly and indirectly either to guide and direct or clandestinely to obstruct and render abortive. While Marshal d'Huxelles, who had displaced Torcy at the head of the council for foreign affairs, prepared the official instructions, it was henceforth Dubois who saw to it that they were executed as he and the Regent personally desired.

British approval of Stanhope's diplomacy

The opposition of Townshend and of his brother-in-law, Horace Walpole, at that time British *chargé d'affaires* at The Hague, to the Triple Alliance was based on the assumption that Stanhope's diplomacy was merely personal to George I rather than national. "That war of the North," Townshend had exclaimed, "will be our ruin"; and Horace Walpole had declared, "I do not see why the whole system of Europe should be turned upside down on account of Mecklenburg." But the King was firm in his decision, and the efforts to arouse opposition had no result, except to dis-

¹ For an account of Louville's mission, see Bourgeois, *Le secret du Régent*, p. 64 et seq.

credit Stanhope's opponents.¹ In Holland Heinsius had offered a like resistance; but public opinion had overwhelmed him, and the commercial advantages which it secured to the Republic placed the seal of approval upon the Triple Alliance.

The participation of Holland in the new combination of powers served to mask the personal character of Stanhope's and Dubois' negotiations; for, on the one hand, it prevented the Whigs from asserting that George I was being subordinated by France as Charles II had been by Louis XIV; and, on the other, it enabled the Regent to point to the Triple Alliance as a safeguard to European peace.

In the middle of January, 1717, George I returned to London, and early in February public feeling was set ablaze by the startling announcement that the Swedish ambassador, Count Gyllenborg, had been arrested in London and his papers seized. A short time afterward Baron Görtz, the chief adviser of Charles XII, was by order of the States General at the request of George I detained and imprisoned at Arnheim, while on his way from Holland to Germany, and his papers also were taken from him.²

Such a double violation of the law of nations caused a great commotion, which was not diminished when it was discovered that the correspondence related to a plot on the part of Gyllenborg, Görtz, and Sparre, the Swedish ambassador in Paris, to support the cause of the Pretender by landing in Scotland twelve thousand Swedish soldiers; and it was reported that Charles XII was already preparing ships for their transportation.³

The menace of foreign invasion caused liberal appropriations to be made by the Parliament for the national defence

¹ Townshend was soon afterward dismissed from the Northern Department and Paul Methuen took his place.

² Notwithstanding much urgency, the papers were not sent to England but placed under seal and retained in Holland.

³ Some knowledge of the plot had long been possessed by the British government, the correspondence having been systematically opened and examined.

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and silenced for the time the criticism of Stanhope's diplomacy. It was undeniable that Great Britain was being drawn into the operations against Sweden through Hanover's acquisition of Bremen and Verden, but this was now offset by the exposure of what was denounced as an attack on English liberty. "How can the King of Sweden better secure himself the recovery and possession of his duchy," Görtz had written in a letter to Gyllenborg, "than by reducing King George to be nothing more than an elector of the Empire?" The Swedish opposition to George I had, indeed, been provoked by his conduct as Elector of Hanover; but it was now, as it appeared, acting against him as King of England, and had assumed the form of an assault upon the Protestant succession.

The designs
of Görtz

There was both truth and error in the conclusions of the English people regarding the disclosures made by the intercepted correspondence of Görtz and Gyllenborg.

George Henry Baron von Görtz, descended from a noble Franconian family, had at the beginning of the century, entered into the service of the Duke of Holstein-Gottorp, by whom he was held in great esteem. But the little duchy offered too limited a field for the abilities and ambitions of this extraordinary man, who greatly admired Charles XII; and, at the time of Sweden's lowest estate, Görtz passed into his service.

Feared and hated by the Swedish people as a meddling foreigner, Görtz nevertheless enjoyed from the first the complete confidence of Charles XII, and became so powerful in the State, although nominally in the employ of the Duke of Holstein, that he was called in Sweden the King's "Grand Vizier."

Perceiving that, with the sea-power of Great Britain and the land-power of Russia combined against her, Sweden must eventually be completely at their mercy, Görtz had resolved to eliminate either Peter the Great or George I from the coalition against Sweden, and then to turn all the force of the kingdom against the remaining enemy.

Of the two antagonists Peter the Great seemed the more

likely to make terms which Charles XII would accept. The Czar had been seriously offended with the demand of George I that the Russian troops be driven out of Germany; and it was believed that in return for some concessions to Russia on the Baltic he would be inclined to permit Sweden to compensate herself for her losses there by the annexation of Norway at the expense of Denmark.

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To carry out his scheme of making terms with one or the other of the chief antagonists of Sweden, and also in the hope of raising a loan of money, in the month of July, 1716, — about the same time as Dubois' first interviews with Stanhope, — Görtz had established himself at The Hague.¹

In choosing The Hague as the scene of his efforts to save Sweden from ruin Görtz merely followed the example of all who wished to survey Europe from its political centre; for Holland was at that time not only the seat of publicity, where gazettes were published and the news of the world first made known, but The Hague was then considered the most important diplomatic post in Europe, from which all the great capitals were easily accessible, and where all the powers were in the habit of sending their most mature and sagacious diplomatists.²

The negotia-
tions of Görtz
at The Hague

Upon his arrival at The Hague Görtz had made his first visit to Châteauneuf, the veteran representative of France, to whom he proposed that the Regent should mediate a peace between Sweden and Russia. It was the moment when the Triple Alliance was forming, and the Regent was disinclined to intervene, on the ground that it would "give umbrage to the allies of the North."

At the same time the Russian ambassador, Kurakin, had applied to Châteauneuf to conclude an alliance between France, Russia, Prussia, and Frederick Augustus I of Poland, "or such other princes of the Empire as the Regent might

¹ For the endeavors of Görtz to obtain loans of money in Holland for Sweden, see Chance, *George I and the Northern War*, pp. 157, 162.

² The Hague in the eighteenth century has been justly described as "Le rendez-vous des ambitions, la foire des nouvelles, l'auberge de l'Europe politique et politiquante."

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judge good." But the Regent did not wish to be drawn into the Northern war, and Kurakin had received the answer that France was willing to negotiate with Russia a treaty of commerce, but was not disposed to form any new political relations.

The truth was, that the regency had in fact abandoned Sweden to its fate, and was aligning itself with the Anglo-German interests. On September 17, 1716, a secret treaty with Prussia had committed France to support the surrender by Sweden of Stettin, Usedom, and Wollin to Frederick William I,¹ and the Triple Alliance had soon afterward bound the regency to defend the claims of Hanover against Sweden.

Thus debarred from obtaining the mediation of France, Görtz decided upon a double negotiation with Russia and England, in which he hoped to play off the one against the other, in order to make peace with the one that would accept the terms least disadvantageous to Charles XII.

In this decision Görtz displayed his prudence, for these were the only really dangerous antagonists of Sweden, being the centres of two groups of powers whose interests were different and even opposed: first, Denmark and Hanover, which had drawn England into the fray; and, second, Russia, Prussia, and Poland. The first group was interested in securing the Baltic and North Sea ports; the second, in stripping Sweden of the Baltic provinces. But neither Denmark and Hanover on the one hand, nor Prussia and Poland on the other, would by themselves constitute a serious menace to Sweden.

While Gyllenborg had been striving to conciliate the English ministry at London, Görtz had used every effort to open negotiations with Peter the Great. Already in possession of Livonia, Ingria, Carelia, and a part of Finland, with a fleet of thirty vessels at his command, the Czar was in fact already master of the Baltic. By making peace with him Görtz hoped to save the Swedish possessions in Germany.

To promote his plan Görtz boldly gave out that he was

¹ The secret treaty is printed by Droysen, *Geschichte der preussischen Politik*, IV, 2, I, p. 179.

already in negotiation with the Czar's agents; but, in fact, up to the time of his arrest and the loss of his papers he had received no other encouragement than mere rumors that Peter the Great was disposed toward peace and would grant him an audience when he came to Holland on his approaching visit to Western Europe.

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For the moment Görtz had been placed in great embarrassment. He had expected to raise a loan of money in Holland, to procure French mediation with Russia, and through Gyllenborg to carry on negotiations with England; but all his plans had ended in failure. Hemmed in by his enemies on the Baltic, Charles XII had made a bold dash to master Norway, then held by the Danes; for thus he hoped, if compelled to suffer losses on the inland sea, to open for his kingdom a greater future on the Atlantic. The lack of means had compelled his retreat, but the movement had the advantage of indicating to the Czar that Charles XII had turned from the defence of his Baltic provinces to obtain compensation from Denmark, and that freedom to pursue that enterprise might be bought by peace with Russia.

The Jacobite
intrigue

For Charles XII money had now become a pressing necessity, and Görtz in his desperation began to think of obtaining it from the adherents of the Pretender, who were numerous in France and Scotland and by no means entirely discouraged even in England itself. To promote this scheme, Sparre at Paris and Gyllenborg at London were directed by Görtz to sound the disposition of the Jacobites. The Pretender himself was known to be actively plotting at Avignon, where under papal protection he was holding his little court as "James III, King of Great Britain and Ireland." On October 23, 1716, Gyllenborg sent word to Görtz that Sweden must renounce Bremen and Verden or overthrow the Hanoverian dynasty; which, on account of the general dissatisfaction with the government, could, he represented, be easily accomplished. Ten thousand Swedish troops with arms for fifteen or twenty thousand English and Scotch revolutionists, would be sufficient to overthrow George I and establish James Edward in the kingdom. A few days later he informed Görtz

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that he had conferred with the Jacobite leaders in London, who were ready to send to The Hague or to Sweden, as might be preferred, sixty thousand pounds sterling for the expedition, if they could have a word from Charles XII promising his aid. Similar assurances were soon afterward received by Görtz through Sparre from Avignon.

In the meantime Görtz had obtained from Charles XII his written permission to make "a loan of money from any source, and upon any conditions, that would be for the service and interest of his master"; but Charles XII had in no way entered into the conspiracy regarding the Pretender, and Görtz dared not in the King's name undertake to sign or promise a contract of the kind demanded.

When, therefore, the English government apprehended Gyllenborg, although the correspondence with the Jacobites disclosed a Swedish intention to borrow money and a Jacobite intention to purchase Swedish aid for the Pretender, it did not convict the King of Sweden of personal complicity with the Jacobites. On the contrary, the correspondence itself showed plainly, as was the fact, that pains had been taken to conceal from Charles XII the real nature of the transaction Görtz was endeavoring to negotiate. It was intended by the conspirators, if England were actually to be invaded by Swedish troops, to employ some other motive for the invasion, in order to obtain the King's consent.¹

The Czar's
attempt to
secure a
French
alliance

In December, 1716, Peter the Great had arrived at Amsterdam and remained in Holland until the following April, engaged in securing artisans and sailors and in trying to borrow money to complete his navy. Between Russia, which was threatening to absorb or control the Baltic trade, and England, which was now convinced that Sweden was conspiring with the Pretender to overthrow the Hanoverian dynasty, the position of Charles XII was, indeed, desperate.²

¹ See for the complot, Chance, as before, pp. 167, 184; Syveton, *L'erreur de Görtz* in *Revue d'Histoire Diplomatique*, IX (1895) and X (1906); and Lemontey, *Histoire de la Régence*, II, p. 386.

² Although war had not been formally declared upon Sweden by England, on April 2, 1717, a British fleet had sailed for the Baltic under command of Sir George Byng, with orders "to join in all opera-

If British commerce could have been protected, Görtz and Gyllenborg disavowed, and Bremen ceded to Hanover, the treaties of friendship between England and Sweden might have been renewed and the navy of England employed for the recovery of the Swedish provinces, the possession of which by the Czar was a menace to Great Britain's Baltic trade. It was the fear of such an agreement that made Peter the Great anxious for a French alliance; but Charles XII was too much blinded by resentment toward George I, and by his determination to yield to no one, to seek or accept conciliation with England. On the contrary, he demanded the immediate surrender of Gyllenborg; and Jackson, the English minister at Stockholm, was at once arrested, to be held until the Swedish minister was delivered to Charles XII.

It was in these circumstances that Peter the Great made his famous visit to Paris in April, 1717. The Regent would have preferred that he remain in Holland, for he had no desire to enter into political relations with the enemy of George I, nor, in fact, to take any part in the northern embroglio.¹ But courtesy to so powerful a sovereign could not be prudently withheld, and the Czar was received at Paris with marked civility, fêted and banqueted, with his numerous suite, who bore away the most vivid impressions of the charms and delights of Parisian hospitality.²

It was not, however, for pleasure that the Czar had come

tions with the Danes as may most effectually annoy the Swedish fleet and prevent their country from being supplied with provisions." If the Russians asked his help, he was to reply, that the friendship of His Majesty with the Emperor would not permit aiding them while Russian troops remained in the Empire. See Chance, *George I and the Northern War*, pp. 214, 215.

¹ The Czar also had been suspected of complicity in the Jacobite conspiracy against George I, but although this suspicion had been removed (see the correspondence in Guichen, *Pierre le Grand et le premier traité Franco-Russe*, pp. 103, 127), the relations between George I and Peter the Great continued to be unfriendly on account of the retention of Russian troops in Mecklenburg.

² For a detailed account of his reception, see Le Glay, *Les origines historiques de l'alliance française*, p. 221 et seq.; and Guichen, *Pierre le Grand*, p. 165 et seq.

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to Paris. He had been successful in the war with Sweden, and he was seeking an ally who would help him to retain the spoils he had won. In the possession of these he felt himself to be far from secure; for England and Hanover were hostile to Russia, the Emperor was in alliance with England, Denmark was as much opposed to Russia as to Sweden, and since the presence of Russian troops in Germany Frederick Augustus I of Poland had mistrusted the Czar's designs and had been seeking closer relations with George I. Thus, Peter the Great found himself in danger of complete isolation in the North, with the chance of a strong combination against him.

Before his arrest and imprisonment, Görtz had visited Paris and laid siege to the Regent to obtain his mediation with Russia, but in vain. At an earlier period the Regent, fearing the Czar's possible union with the Hapsburgs, had endeavored to approach him with a view to an understanding, and Prussia had used good offices to promote this end;¹ but since the conclusion of the Triple Alliance in the previous January the situation had entirely changed.

Up to the moment of this last event, the regency had been deeply interested in the prospect of an alliance with Russia, even though it might involve the ruin of Sweden. Subsidies had, indeed, been continually supplied by France to Charles XII;² but the weakness of Sweden had greatly diminished the value of that kingdom as a foil to be used against the Emperor, and it was hoped that Russia and Prussia might in future serve the purpose for which the Swedes, along with the Turks and Hungarians, had been employed by Louis XIV. The Triple Alliance had, however, rendered this plan impracticable.

The approaches of France to Russia had already so far committed the Regent before the Triple Alliance was concluded that the blank refusal of an *entente* would have given

The negotiations of France and Russia

¹ For these negotiations, see Vassileff, *Russisch-französische Politik*, pp. 63, 71.

² These subsidies had been promised to Charles XII at Bender by a treaty of September 1, 1712.

offence to Peter the Great; and the Regent was, therefore, disposed to act with caution. Huxelles had strongly favored close political relations with Russia and was opposed to the Triple Alliance, which he disliked and would have been pleased to destroy. Dubois, on the contrary, was determined that no political alliance should be made with the Czar which would be offensive to George I; maintaining that Russia was a distant power, whose predominance in the North, even if it could be made useful to France, was not certain to be continued when Peter the Great should pass away and his unpromising son should succeed him.

In this contest between the official and the secret diplomacies of France, it was Dubois who bore off the palm of victory. To him the one important matter was to maintain intact the Treaties of Utrecht, which barred the Spanish Bourbons from the throne of France; and the Anglo-Dutch alliance was for this purpose the mainstay of the regency.

It was from this point of view that the negotiations with Russia were to be conducted. Since it was necessary for France to take a position regarding the crisis in the North, Dubois was resolved that it must be taken for the benefit of the Triple Alliance, or at least in such a manner as not to disturb that corner-stone of the Regent's system. It was between Sweden and England, therefore, rather than between Sweden and Russia that France was now most anxious to make peace.¹

When negotiations were resumed by Peter the Great in person at Paris, his zeal for an alliance with France became from day to day more and more manifest. Russia was ready, he said, in all respects, to be to France more than Sweden had ever been; and, in fact, since that empire had fallen, to take its place in the French system. He asked nothing from France that had not already been accorded to Sweden. The subsi-

¹ See the instructions to La Marck, the French ambassador to Sweden, who, on March 7, 1717, was ordered to urge Charles XII to make peace. Geffroy, *Instructions aux ambassadeurs*, etc., II, Suède, p. 283.

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dies France had paid to Charles XII had brought no return; but if paid to Russia, he argued, they would procure the friendly and efficient co-operation of a really powerful ally in the North, great commercial advantages, and in addition the support of Prussia and Poland, already allied with Russia.

But it was not a question of what Russia could or would do for France. The intention of the regency was fixed and unalterable, — nothing could be undertaken that would in the least endanger the Triple Alliance.

The Treaty of
Amsterdam

Without the intention of forming any political compact, and merely with a view of retaining his friendship, after the Czar's departure from Paris the Regent directed Châteauneuf to reopen negotiations with him at Amsterdam, but to make no haste in reaching a conclusion.

Much time was spent in wrangling over purely ceremonial questions, — the French firmly refusing to accord to Peter the Great the title "Majesté Czarienne" proposed by Kurakin; — but a treaty was finally concluded on August 15, 1717, in behalf of France, Russia, and Prussia,¹ which was in reality neither one of alliance nor even of commerce. No binding future obligations were undertaken, except that by the secret articles Russia was to guarantee the Treaties of Utrecht and Baden, and France was to guarantee the peace that should be made in the North, but only after it should have been concluded by the previous agreement of the powers.

In brief, the compact was, as it was intended by Dubois that it should be, entirely illusory. It was of such a nature that even the secret articles could be at once shown to England and Holland without giving the slightest occasion for offence; and this disclosure appears to have been promptly made, much to the disgust of Peter the Great, who upon learning of it declared that until he knew in what manner the contents of the treaty had been divulged he could enter into no further negotiations with France.²

¹ For the treaty, see Dumont, VIII, Part I, p. 490.

² Campredon to Dubois, in *Sbornik*, XL, p. 410.

Thus, Russia, except for the alliance of Prussia, was left in isolation, while confronted by the growing hostility of her former allies in the North. These had been rendered distrustful by the Franco-Russian negotiations, for they feared that France might be secretly furnishing to Russia financial aid that would seriously affect them; but they were soon reassured upon this point. The true nature of the Treaty of Amsterdam was not difficult to infer when, soon after its terms were settled, the Czar withdrew his troops from Mecklenburg. The aggressive period of the coalition against Sweden was now ended, and the failure of Peter the Great to obtain from France the support he desired may be considered the first decisive step toward the pacification of the North.¹

II. THE QUADRUPLE ALLIANCE AND THE PEACE OF NYSTAD

In the negotiations of France with Peter the Great, Dubois, Dubois' policy of general pacification having already become a member of the Council for Foreign Affairs, had gained another triumph. The chief need of France at the time was repose; and the rôle of the regency, if it was to render the Regent in the eyes of Europe the most eligible ruler of that monarchy, was that of a general peacemaker.

This, then, was the policy which Dubois intended to pursue: in conjunction with England and the United Provinces to render permanent the Peace of Utrecht; and to complete it by composing the affairs of the North through French mediation, and those of Italy through the reconciliation by England of Charles VI and Philip V upon the basis of the existing treaties. Personal as it was in its leading motive, the end sought was not unworthy of high statesmanship. It was intended to prove to Europe that France under the regency was to be no longer a disturber of the public peace, but the most unselfish and beneficent of peacemakers. The

¹ Although the Treaty of Amsterdam gave Peter the Great little satisfaction, it marked the beginning of permanent diplomatic relations between France and Russia.

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effect of such a policy, it was calculated, would be to render the Duke of Orléans in the eyes of all the nations necessary to the maintenance of the peace of Europe.

What then were the obstacles to the execution of this magnificent programme? First of all, the hostility of Charles VI and Philip V; and second, the desire of the powers of the North to appropriate the spoils of Sweden. The two obstructions to Dubois' pacific policy, though far removed in space, were intimately connected in the realm of action; and, in fact, so closely interlaced as to present one complex European problem. The future of the Baltic and the future of the Mediterranean were linked together in a manner that rendered them inseparable.

The bond of union between the questions relating to the Baltic and the Mediterranean was the identification of the interests of the regency and of England. The hopes of the Regent hung upon the exclusion of the Spanish branch of the House of Bourbon from the throne of France. For this purpose the Treaties of Utrecht, which guaranteed the renunciation of Philip V, must be maintained; and for this the alliance with England was necessary. It was, therefore, the secret intention of the Regent to maintain the Triple Alliance, which was possible only by serving the English interests.

In the North the interest of England was to secure its commerce in the Baltic both against Swedish depredations and Russian domination; but the interest of George I was also, as Elector of Hanover, to obtain permanent possession of Bremen and Verden for his electorate; and to acquire this advantage for Hanover all the influence of Great Britain was likely to be drawn into the conflict.

In the Mediterranean the interest of England was, first of all, to retain Gibraltar and Port Mahon, taken from Spain; and second, to maintain a balance between the claims of the Emperor Charles VI and Philip V in Italy.

Thus far neither of these contestants had abated any part of his pretensions. Charles VI had not recognized Philip V as King of Spain, and demanded as a condition new aggrandizements in Italy, — Sicily, the sovereignty of Parma and

Tuscany, dear to the heart of Elizabeth Farnese, and the cession of Montferrat and a part of the Duchy of Milan for the Duke of Savoy. Philip V, on the other hand, would yield to none of these demands.

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Two valiant and capable diplomatists were pitted against Dubois and Stanhope in this battle for peace. In the North Görtz, liberated from captivity, conceived the bold idea of a reconciliation between Sweden and the Czar by sacrificing the Baltic provinces then in his possession, in order with his support to turn all the force of Sweden toward the conquest of Norway, thus making Sweden an Atlantic rather than merely a Baltic state, with the wide ocean for its horizon.¹

The schemes
of Görtz and
Alberoni

In the South Alberoni was busy with the regeneration of Spain. The army and navy were undergoing reorganization and the finances had been placed upon a sound foundation. His policy was to rehabilitate and extend the entire Spanish monarchy, which with all its vast colonial interests was not only to be kept intact, but the disposal made of the Spanish possessions in Italy by the Treaties of Utrecht was to be challenged, and the treaties themselves were to be nullified by force of arms.

While the regency had prepared the way through its treaty with Peter the Great for mediating a peace in the North that would serve the interest of England, Stanhope had in return undertaken to promote a reconciliation between the Emperor and the King of Spain, which by leaving Philip V secure on his Spanish throne would prevent his eligibility for that of France.

For this task England was in a favorable position, for the alliance with the Emperor opened the door for such mediation at Vienna, and the desire of Alberoni to win or neutralize the influence of England rendered intimacy with the British representative welcome at Madrid. He was instructed to urge upon Alberoni the importance of reconciliation with the Emperor, proposing to Philip V for one of his sons the

¹ There were in the meantime inconsequential negotiations conducted by the Holstein-Gottorp minister, Fabrice, for which see Chance, *George I and the Northern War*, pp. 240, 251.

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Duchy of Parma and Piacenza, if he would abandon France to the Regent and Italy to the Emperor; and at the same time the ambassador at Vienna was directed to induce Charles VI to recognize Philip V.

At Madrid the British proposal was coldly received. Dubois would have added Sardinia to the bribe; but Stanhope opposed this, on the ground that, if the Emperor took Sicily, as he demanded, Sardinia must be reserved as compensation to the Duke of Savoy, who would by this transaction be divested of Sicily, already in his possession.

The precipita-
tion of the
conflict

The project of a general peace was now menaced by renewed preparations for war. Relations between the Emperor and Philip V had been recently strained anew by the arrest and imprisonment at Milan of Moline, the Grand Inquisitor of Spain, while travelling with a passport from the Pope, and the seizure of his papers by the Imperialists. Urged on by Elizabeth Farnese, Philip V thought the occasion ripe for the recovery of Italy, and in August, 1717, Spanish forces occupied Sardinia, which Philip V refused to evacuate.

War being thus actively renewed, the attitude of the powers was soon defined. England was already bound by the treaty with the Emperor to defend his claims in Italy. Spain must, therefore, be opposed; and Alberoni, whose policy was to destroy the Treaties of Utrecht, must be vanquished.¹

Would France also take sides with the Emperor against Philip V? That would be a complete inversion of the policy of Louis XIV; and, in effect, a revival with the aid of France itself of the Grand Alliance which had opposed the attempt to place Philip V upon the Spanish throne.

In France the government of the Regent was beset with serious difficulties. Neither the economies suggested by Noailles nor the credit promised by the Scotch adventurer John Law, had saved his administration from vigorous censure. In addition there were religious difficulties growing out of strained relations with Rome. Behind all was the

¹ For the contention that the alliance with the Emperor was itself a violation of the neutrality of Italy on the part of England, see Bourgeois, *Le secret du Régent*, p. 203.

antagonism of those who condemned the Triple Alliance as a surrender to England. There was, however, but one way to overcome this opposition, namely, to move straight forward and insist upon the policy of pacification in the face of all obstacles. To retreat was now impossible, and to advance in any direction without England was equally so. To abandon the Triple Alliance was to surrender the Treaties of Utrecht, and the abrogation of those treaties would be a death-blow to the hopes of the regency. If war must come, the Regent determined to place France in opposition to the ambitions of Elizabeth Farnese and Alberoni, and to compel Philip V to recede from his pretensions.

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Fortunately for the prospects of the peace policy, the war in Italy was not yet in the full tide of activity, for the Emperor had not taken the steps he would be obliged to take if peace could not be obtained by mutual concession. In the North there was also a lull in the conflict; for, upon regaining his liberty, Görtz had met the Czar in Holland, had offered him large concessions for the sake of peace with Russia, and to Frederick William I the cession of Stettin, if Prussia would aid Sweden in regaining Bremen and Verden. Both Peter the Great and the King of Prussia had listened with interest to the seductions of Görtz, and conferences were soon to be held for the purpose of negotiating a peace between Sweden, Russia, and Prussia.

The embarrassments of Dubois and Stanhope

There was still a chance, therefore, for a general pacification; but it was rendered difficult by Alberoni's warlike operations in the South and Görtz's peace proposals in the North.

Stanhope, not less than Dubois, was seriously embarrassed by the situation; for while he had failed to reconcile the Emperor and Philip V, Dubois had proved equally powerless to disengage England from the embroglio in the Baltic, and the Hanoverian policy of Stanhope was creating an amount of criticism in England which threatened to wreck the ministry.

Through his influence with the Regent Dubois' policy of peace had now become official in France, but for this reason

Dubois' visit to London

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it threw upon him an enormous responsibility. The old court party, represented in the foreign office by Marshal d'Huxelles, inspired by a different order of ideas, was secretly impeding the success of Dubois' programme of action. With the Earl of Peterborough, — a disappointed Whig who had turned Jacobite and hated the Emperor bitterly because of personal slights received from him, — secretly serving the interest of the Duke of Parma, and traversing Europe with a plan of his own to form a league of the Bourbons and the princes of Italy against the Emperor, upon the understanding that Philip V should renounce the throne of France to the Regent; and with Huxelles, who was more interested in the success of Peterborough's scheme than in Dubois' peace policy, instructing the French agents, La Marck at Stockholm and Rottembourg at Berlin, in a sense opposed to the plan of pacification agreed upon, the Abbé required all of his skill and patience to preserve his hold upon the Regent.¹

If his plan of action was to be carried through, there was no time to be lost; and, on September 20th, 1717, Dubois set out for London, where he and Stanhope could take counsel together. To watch the situation in his absence and to prevent his adversaries from gaining the ear of the Regent, a capable spy, Nancre, commandant of the Swiss guards, was left on duty at Paris, with whom Dubois carried on a close correspondence. In addition Chavigny, a keen diplomatist attached to the foreign office, was charged with the task of watching Huxelles and reporting his actions.²

Received in special audience by George I, Dubois explained his mission as aiming to obtain a reconciliation between the Emperor and the King of Spain, and to ascertain the views and expectations of His Majesty regarding peace in the North.

With Stanhope his relations were friendly and intimate, and even the painful knowledge of the prevailing hostility to the Regent in France was not concealed from him. So

¹ See Bourgeois, *Le secret du Régent*, pp. 228, 234.

² For an account of Dubois' preparations and journey, see Bliard, *Cardinal Dubois*, I, p. 282.

impressed was Dubois by the feeling of cordiality and sympathy in London for the regency, that in October he wrote to his master the assurance that he was better served by his friends in England than by his own ministers.

In the midst of constant festivities, the conversations went on daily, Dubois insisting that if the Emperor were not moderate in his demands the Regent could not support his claims, and Stanhope insinuating in reply that indifference to the rights of Charles VI would render the King of Spain, the Regent's "chief enemy," more confident and obstinate than ever.

By November 1 the conclusion was reached that, if the Emperor would surrender his claim to the throne of Spain and recognize Philip V as King, England and France would unite in urging upon Philip V the abandonment of his pretensions in Italy in exchange for the estates of Parma and Tuscany for one of his sons. If the two sovereigns should agree to these terms, peace between them might be happily concluded. If the Emperor consented and Philip V refused, the Triple Alliance should array itself against Spain and secure peace by enforcing these conditions.

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The double
check to
Dubois'
policy

The arrival of the Emperor's plenipotentiary, Pendtenriedter, sent to London to negotiate on the subject, suddenly arrested these plans for peace by his blank refusal to entertain for a moment the idea of his master's surrender of his right to the crown of Spain when he was able to send an army of fifty thousand men into Italy to maintain it without making any renunciation whatever. Unless Philip V immediately evacuated Sardinia, it would be impossible, he affirmed, to begin any negotiation at Vienna.

The grave assurance of this solemn and formal physical giant — who was more than seven feet high — was at first imposing; for he had acquired the conviction that George I, as a prince of the Empire, would in all circumstances maintain the cause of Charles VI without regard to the attitude of France. It required the best arguments of Stanhope to convince him that the interests of England and those of Hanover, while closely allied, were not in all respects identical.

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But an impediment to the progress of the negotiations more serious than Pendtenriedter's stolid self-complacency was unexpectedly discovered in disturbing rumors from Paris and the official silence and indifference that followed them. The Regent had in Dubois' absence been won over to Peterborough's scheme of a Bourbon alliance with the Italian princes against the Emperor. Alberoni had offered the Duke of Orléans the recognition of his eventual right to the crown of France in exchange for his support of the claims of Philip V in Italy. Alberoni appeared to have triumphed, and Dubois seemed to himself abandoned.

The turning
of the tide
against
Alberoni

The skill and coolness with which the disappointed envoy returned to the conflict reveal his indomitable will and his inexhaustible self-confidence. But, happily for his plans, an accidental occurrence had already changed the Regent's determination. The ill health of Philip V had apparently endangered his life; and, at the instigation of Alberoni and the Duke of Parma he had made a will in favor of Elizabeth Farnese, by which, in the event of his death or madness, she should assume the regency of Spain.

With this knowledge the Regent was again eager to resume the negotiations with England, and on December 8 Dubois wrote to Stanhope that he would soon return to London authorized to conclude a treaty of alliance with the Emperor. Alberoni's eagerness to promote the Farnese ambitions had overshot the mark, and from this time forward the Regent was resolved to overthrow the Italian influence at Madrid.

On December 25, after the Regent had refused to participate with Spain in an expedition against Charles VI, even with the annexation of Flanders as a reward, Dubois returned to London carrying full powers to conclude a treaty with the Emperor in conjunction with England and Holland; and Nancreé was despatched soon afterward to Madrid to procure, if possible, the adhesion of Philip V to a general agreement for peace.

It was Alberoni who was now to be treated as the real enemy of the regency in Spain. This ambitious Italian, having obtained the rank of a cardinal, had, with the con-

nivance and support of the Queen, to whose family interests he was entirely committed, become in reality the master in the kingdom. To thwart his purposes, destroy his influence, drive him from power, and save Spain from war by promoting a revolt against the rule of the Italians had become in December, 1717, the settled policy of both France and England.

But a minister like Alberoni was scarcely less formidable than a sovereign. Fully entrenched in power through the services he was rendering, acting in the interest of a queen whose influence over her husband was unlimited, Alberoni had already given to Spain forces of resistance such as that country had not possessed for a century, and these forces were practically altogether at his own command.

Diplomatically Spain was isolated, but Alberoni was not long in discovering a way to repair this deficiency. The Triple Alliance, whose formation had for its result the isolation of Spain, was weak in two directions. In France it was based upon the personal interest of the Regent and did not conform to the traditions, sympathies, and affinities of the French nation. In England it was more solidly founded upon the national interest, but here too it was at least open to attack on the ground that it existed for the benefit of George I as Elector of Hanover rather than in the interest of Great Britain.

For Alberoni, therefore, it was easily possible to oppose the Regent of France and the King of England by aiding or exciting rebellion in those countries. For this purpose he espoused the cause of the Pretender, invited him to Spain, and offered him money and troops for the invasion of Scotland. At the same time a *junta* was formed in Paris to overthrow the regency of the Duke of Orléans, and the Spanish ambassador, Cellamare, was instructed to furnish all possible aid and encouragement to this revolt.

In the North Görtz was laboring with equal assiduity to prevent Bremen from falling to Hanover, and to thwart every effort for an understanding between George I and Peter the Great. While Görtz was urging upon the Czar peace with Sweden and war with Hanover, Frederick William I of

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The schemes
of Alberoni
for the over-
throw of the
Regent

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Prussia was declining all proposals by George I, openly avowing fear of Russia; and Charles XII, relying upon an arrangement with the Czar, — still uncompleted, — in January, 1718, confidently resumed hostilities against the Danes with an army of thirty-five thousand men in Norway.

Discerning the community of interest between Sweden, Russia, Prussia, and Spain, Alberoni conceived the plan of a coalition of these powers for the purpose of first reconciling Russia and Sweden, and then uniting their forces to overthrow George I and establish the Pretender in England; intending thus to destroy the Triple Alliance and force a change in the regency of France. Such a combination was in complete harmony with the plans of Görtz, and it was almost inevitable that their schemes should be brought into such connection as to form one vast conspiracy.¹

Dubois'
methods and
motives

But nothing of all this was hidden from Dubois. At the same time that Alberoni was plotting in France, the Regent was equally active in Spain. The overthrow of Alberoni and the expulsion of Italian influence from power had become the necessary condition of Dubois' success. While his two adversaries were urging on their masters upon the path of conquest, the one in Italy, the other in Norway, Dubois had the advantage of working for a great cause, the peace of Europe; and, if war became necessary, he could justly claim that it was because the antagonists would not listen to reason and make due concessions in the interest of peace.

In conjunction with Torcy, the most experienced diplomatist of his time in France, he took counsel of the highest French authorities in the law of nations and the history of events. The learning of Saint-Prest, the historiographer of treaties; the opinions of Saint-Pierre, the theorist of peace; the expert information of cartographers and genealogists

¹ The statements of Voltaire regarding the perfection of an international plot at the time of Gyllenborg's arrest, *Histoire de Charles XII*, Livre VIII, are not only without documentary basis but are anachronisms. See Syveton, *L'erreur de Görtz*, *Revue d'Histoire Diplomatique*, X (1896), pp. 522, 526.

were solicited and studied with a view to a final formulation of terms that could be openly defended.

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As for the motive underlying this procedure, it was, no doubt, primarily to serve the Regent, his master; but, if peace, a righteous peace, could be imposed upon the belligerents, would not this policy serve France and Europe also better than the wars of conquest proposed by Görtz and Alberoni?

It is true that the idea of alliance with the Hapsburgs was a reversal of the traditional policy of France, that an *entente* with the Emperor to force the hand of Philip V may have seemed to Frenchmen like an act of violence to the instincts of their race, and it is certain that the official ambassadors of the time were not appropriate instruments for negotiations in this sense; so that a new diplomatic organism, a secret diplomacy in respect to its agents as well as its objects, had to be improvised by Dubois. But, judged either by the customs of his time or by the standards of to-day, the efforts of Dubois to serve his master and to pacify Europe, in spite of the censure to which he has been subjected, are not entirely unworthy of respect, while his skill, energy, and constancy in circumstances of great difficulty display his extraordinary adaptation to his task.

The Emperor Charles VI not less than George I had occasion to feel disturbed by the growing power of Russia and the inclination of Peter the Great to gain a foothold in Germany. If George I, as Elector of Hanover, was anxious to secure the Imperial investiture of Bremen and Verden, Charles VI was not less interested in retaining the friendship of a prince who was not only of importance in the Empire but also the King of England.

The attitude
of Charles VI

In 1716 the Emperor had come to the rescue of the Venetians against the Turks, and a bitter struggle had followed. Thus preoccupied in the East, and possessing no fleet with which to resist the attack of Spain upon Sardinia, Charles VI had not been able to offer a prompt resistance to Alberoni's warlike measures, which, on July 1, 1718, included the occupation of Sicily; but on July 21, as the consequence

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of Prince Eugene's victories over the Turks at Peterwardein the Peace of Passarowitz ended the war which the Emperor and Venice had waged against the Sultan, and Charles VI was thus at last free to concentrate all his energies upon the war with Spain.¹

If the Emperor was to maintain his supremacy in Italy, he still needed all his resources; and the English alliance, which alone could render him important aid at sea, was in the existing circumstances more than ever necessary to him. Parma, Piacenza, and Tuscany, fiefs of the Empire, were hereditary estates of the Farnese and Medici families, and Elizabeth Farnese was urging the recognition of the right of her sons to the succession when the childless Duke and Grand Duke should pass away; while the suzerainty over them was also claimed by the Pope. Sicily and Sardinia were already in the possession of Spain, and the Austrian domination at Naples was not too well secured. In addition, the Duke of Savoy, nominally King of Sicily, but in fact dispossessed by Spain, was coveting Milan as compensation.

It is not astonishing that in this extremity Charles VI, who still pretended to be King of Spain, and was surrounded by a group of Spaniards who for reasons of their own were hostile to the Bourbon dynasty, should welcome aid from England and France against the ambitions of Philip V.

Notwithstanding the lofty assumptions of Pentenriedter, Stanhope had long known that Charles VI was not unapproachable with regard to the renunciation of his pretended rights to the Spanish throne. As the warlike intentions of Alberoni became more manifest, the readiness of Charles VI to accept the joint alliance of England and France for the purpose of imposing conditions of peace upon Philip V was much accelerated; and as early as April 4, 1718, Count Zinzendorf had communicated to Stanhope the Emperor's de-

¹ For the treaty, see Dumont, VIII, Part I, p. 524 et seq. The peace gave the Morea to Turkey and left to Venice only the Ionian and a few other islands. For Austria, however, an advanced and impregnable position at Belgrade had been gained.

cision to participate in the treaty which the English and French negotiators were preparing at London.

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While Stanhope and Dubois were elaborating the plan of pacification and endeavoring to induce the Emperor to make the renunciations demanded of him, Görtz was busy in the island of Lofö, one of the Åland group, negotiating with the Russian commissioners a separate peace with Sweden. The Åland conferences

From May 23, 1718, when Görtz arrived in Lofö, "the eyes of all Europe were anxiously fixed upon this rocky islet in the Gulf of Bothnia where the peace of the North was about to be decided."

So large and optimistic were the pretensions of Görtz that the Russian commissioners never suspected the extreme exhaustion of Sweden. The courage of the King, the devotion of the army, and the pretence that Hanover and Denmark were on the point of concluding a treaty with Charles XII were all skilfully exploited by this shrewd diplomatist to cast a glamour over the miserable weakness of the kingdom.

In the meantime Görtz took occasion to spread the belief that peace with Russia was already assured. George I, alarmed by the prospect of a Russo-Swedish alliance, hastened to offer to Charles XII a million rix-dollars and the friendly good offices of England if he would permit Hanover to annex Bremen and Verden; and Prussia, fearful of being abandoned by the Czar, became anxious for an understanding.

To the proposal of George I Charles XII returned an absolute refusal; but suggested that, if England would supply Sweden with twelve battle-ships, he would permit Bremen to be retained by Hanover until the money paid for that duchy to Denmark had been repaid, — a proposition which the English government could of course not accept.

With a show of superiority and condescension that stupefied the Russian negotiators, Görtz, with everything at stake, continued his desperate game at Lofö until he had obtained with the sanction of the Czar an offer to restore Finland, Livonia, and Esthonia to Sweden, on condition that Ingria, with Narva, St. Petersburg, and a part of Carelia, were ceded to Russia. An alternative offer was that, if Ingria, Livonia,

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and Esthonia were ceded to him, the Czar would restore Finland to Sweden and aid Charles XII to recover his German possessions and conquer Norway. When Görtz presented these terms to his master at Gothenburg, the King, with his characteristic independence, declared that these terms were "too high-flying," and sent the diplomatist back to Lofö to obtain better conditions.¹

The collision
of the two
systems

The time had now arrived when the two groups that had been working in opposition should at last come into open collision. In March, 1718, Alberoni had instructed the Spanish ambassador at The Hague, Beretti-Landi, to form a union with Sweden; and negotiations had at once been opened with an agent in the confidence of Charles XII. At the same time Beretti-Landi received offers of aid from the Russian envoy at The Hague, Golowkin; and the Russian ambassador at Paris, Baron Schleinitz, was directed to inform the Regent that, if he continued to pursue the negotiations with England for the restraint of Spain, he would soon be confronted with a coalition of the powers of the North against France.

The intention of this announcement was by intimidating the Regent, to detach him from England; thus weakening the support of George I, and as a result isolating the Emperor. For this purpose Spain was ready to furnish Charles XII with money; Sweden was to conclude peace with Russia; and these two powers, uniting, were to restore the Swedes to their possessions in Germany, establish the Russians in Mecklenburg, and thus prevent the possibility of the Emperor's action in Italy.

Alberoni had thoroughly spun his web. In France the Regent was to be overthrown by a domestic revolt, and in England the Elector of Hanover was to be driven from the throne by the Pretender. The Duke of Maine was to be established in the regency, and the Pretender was to be recognized and enthroned in England. In France the Spanish

¹ For a full account of the Åland conferences, see Baumeister and Arndt, *Beiträge zur Geschichte Peters des Grossen*, Riga, 1774-1784, III, Appendix.

ambassador, Cellamare, under the orders of Alberoni, became the centre of a vast conspiracy operating from Paris. Nancré at Madrid was so fully won over to the Farnese point of view that he advised the Regent to abandon the negotiations with England. Huxelles, holding the same views, secretly and at last openly strove to ruin the projects of Dubois. Since May, 1718, the Abbé, left practically without other support than his friends in England and the English ambassador at Paris, had no ground for hope except his personal influence with the Regent, who was harassed on every side by secret and open enemies.

In June, notwithstanding these embarrassments, Stanhope and Dubois agreed upon four points: (1) Charles VI should renounce the throne of Spain and recognize Philip V; (2) Sardinia should be restored to Charles VI, who would cede it to the Duke of Savoy in exchange for Sicily; (3) the succession of Parma and Tuscany should be guaranteed to the sons of Elizabeth Farnese; (4) Charles VI and Philip V should have four months in which to accept these conditions. In case of refusal, England and France would unite to enforce their acceptance. In order to render these conditions effective, on June 15, Sir George Byng sailed to the Mediterranean with twenty ships of the line, under orders to compel the Spaniards to abandon hostilities.

The earnestness with which England had entered into these negotiations is evident from the sacrifices the ministry was prepared to make in order to render them successful. Stanhope, who in person visited Spain for the purpose, offered to restore Gibraltar,¹ if Philip V would accept the conditions proposed, which in substance had been presented to him before Admiral Byng arrived in the Mediterranean; but Alberoni, who was already in possession of both Sardinia and Sicily, relying upon the success of his military preparations for the invasion of Italy, rejected all offers aiming at a peaceful settlement.

The Quadruple
Alliance

¹ Stanhope did not, however, fully appreciate the value of Gibraltar to Great Britain, and has been censured for his willingness to sacrifice it.

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On July 17, the Regent laid the conditions agreed upon by Stanhope and Dubois before the Council of Regency. The Duke of Maine opposed the idea of an alliance with England to enforce them; but the next day the preliminaries were signed at Paris, and on August 2 Dubois and Stanhope concluded the definitive treaty at London.¹ The adhesion of the Emperor two weeks later rendered the Quadruple Alliance a certainty; for, although the United Provinces did not openly join this coalition until more than a year afterward, the union of the four powers to impose peace upon Spain was already practically assured.

The triumph
and disap-
pointment of
Görtz

In the meantime the opposition had not been idle. At the end of July Görtz had returned to his "enchanted island," as Lofö was called by him, to resume negotiations for peace between Sweden and Russia. The Russian commissioners had anxiously awaited his reappearance, but the delay finally counted in his favor and had the effect of accelerating the negotiations. On August 26, at Åbo, the Czar signed a treaty by which, in consideration of the cession to him of the Baltic provinces, he promised to aid Sweden to obtain compensation from Denmark and Hanover.

Görtz in joyful triumph sought the signature of his master, but encountered the same obstinacy that had always characterized that imperturbable monarch. Charles XII, declaring that he would not surrender realities in return for illusory promises, firmly refused to approve the treaty.

The refusal was to Görtz a crushing blow, for it was only by the most strenuous exertions that he had raised money to equip the army, improve the navy, and impart to the kingdom the deceptive appearance of strength with which by skilful exaggeration he had imposed upon the credulity of the Russian commissioners.

The obstinate King paid little attention to the protests and arguments of his minister, and Görtz returned to what seemed a hopeless task at Lofö. In doing so he was fully conscious of the grave danger in which he was personally placed, for he was in reality not a regular minister of state

¹ For the treaty, see Dumont, VIII, Part I, p. 531 et seq.

in the Swedish kingdom, but a jealously regarded alien whose only authority grew out of his personal relation to the sovereign who had clothed him with almost supreme power in matters of administration. In his effort to serve his master he had incurred the resentment of the people, and in standing for the succession of the Duke of Holstein-Gottorp as the legitimate heir to the throne he was exposed to powerful opposition by the court faction which favored the candidacy of the Princess Ulrica as more likely than the young prince to restore peace to the realm when the tempestuous Charles XII should pass away. Between the fear that the King's death might suddenly destroy all his hopes for the future of Sweden and the obstacles which while living the monarch was placing in his way, Görtz began to realize the helplessness of his situation; for, while Charles XII intrusted him with almost arbitrary administrative power, he treated his diplomatic endeavors with contempt, and refused to strengthen his hands by himself determining the question of the succession.

Thus paralyzed by the failure of the negotiations of Görtz in the North, the coalition which Alberoni had hoped to form was menaced in the South by the Quadruple Alliance, which was bent upon his overthrow. He, however, had not been idle. Fully aware of the real significance of the alliance, he perceived that the Emperor's adhesion was the pivotal point in the treaty; for, without his renunciation of his claims to the Spanish throne, the Regent's motive would be destroyed, and without the Regent's support the Quadruple Alliance would fall to pieces.

Alberoni's
 activity in
 Italy

Alberoni's aim was, therefore, to overpower the Emperor by creating an alliance against him in Italy, and to weaken the Regent in France by raising a storm of dissent from his policies.

Of the Duke of Parma he was sure, but the resources of Parma and Piacenza were inconsiderable. But other Italian princes might be induced to respond to the cry, "Let us drive the Germans out of Italy!" The Duke of Savoy was offered a defensive and offensive alliance and the service of

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Spanish troops, paid from the revenues of Sicily, for the conquest of Milan. But the expulsion of the Germans from Italy was not an easy task. The Italians might well have resented their intrusion, but their union was impossible. The sense of national unity did not exist. The proposals of Spain were regarded with suspicion, the princes were jealous of one another, and Alberoni's scheme of uniting Italy against the Emperor proved impracticable. It was Spain, not the Emperor, that was soon to be placed on the defensive.

The conspiracy
of Cellamare

The efforts to overthrow the Regent by creating revolution in France were equally ineffectual. Inflammable materials were by no means wanting. The adherents of the Pretender were scattered about Europe and particularly numerous in France, breathing forth enmity to the Hanoverian dynasty because it was Protestant, German, and, as was alleged, "anti-English," and especially condemnatory of the close relations of the regency with George I. In France the influence of the old court party had always been exerted to promote the cause of the Jacobites, and never more earnestly than since the advent of the regency. The Spanish ambassador, Cellamare, had long before received formal orders from Alberoni to enter into close relations with these malcontents and to give them every encouragement.

The question has been much discussed by contemporaries and by historians whether this opposition to the Regent was in fact more than mere rhetorical censure, and how far it was a real peril to the regency. Argenson in his "Mémoires" represents that his father, by unearthing the conspiracy against the Regent, "saved his authority, his honor, and perhaps his liberty and his life," at a moment when he was "betrayed and on the verge of a revolution."¹ Lemontey, on the contrary, refers to the cabal against the Regent as merely a "*conspiration de grammairiens*," and declares with one of the conspirators, Boisdavy, "It is not in the Bastille, but in an asylum for the feeble-minded, that such visionaries should be placed."² The truth is, that there were four or

¹ Argenson, *Mémoires*, I, p. 39.

² Lemontey, *Histoire de la Régence*, II, p. 411.

five factions whose antipathies, for different reasons, were strongly excited against the Regent and his policies; but there was no strong leader, no heroic purpose, and no spirit of personal sacrifice sufficient to create a real revolution and produce a civil war. As Saint-Simon has well expressed it, inaction was at that time the great evil in France. The absolutism of the previous reign had destroyed all personal initiative. "No harmony, no courage, except at the fireside, a servile habit which ruled everywhere, and which, at the least lifting of the eyebrow, made every one tremble, those who were capable of figuring in the first or second place even more than the others."¹ Had Philip V appeared in France with an army, the regency might have passed into his hands.

In another quarter diplomacy had already given place to action. The occupation of Sicily by the Spanish troops had driven the Duke of Savoy into the arms of the Quadruple Alliance, and on August 22 Admiral Byng under orders to preserve the neutrality of Italy pending the acceptance of the terms imposed by the allies, incited to battle by the action of the Spanish fleet, had destroyed it off Cape Passaro on the coast of Sicily.

The triumph
of Dubois

Decisive events now followed rapidly. On September 24 all the councils of the regency, except that of finance, were suppressed, and Dubois was named secretary of state for foreign affairs. His policy had now become openly and formally official, and the Quadruple Alliance represented the deliberate purpose of France. In England the nomination was celebrated as a victory. In France he now possessed the authority of a minister who had won his place and was able to hold it firmly.

There was still time for Alberoni to accept the terms of the Quadruple Alliance, but neither he nor Philip V was inclined to do so. On the contrary, irritated by the course pursued by the Regent, on December 10, the King ordered the French ambassador, Saint-Aignan, charged with conspiracy, to leave his dominions within twelve days. Unwilling to create a rupture, the ambassador refused to depart unless dismissed

¹ Saint-Simon, *Mémoires*, IX, p. 314.

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in writing. The ministers hesitated, but on the eleventh the written order of expulsion was placed in his hands, and the following day, at seven o'clock in the morning, an armed detachment of troops entered the hotel of the embassy, the ambassador and his wife were compelled to dress in haste, and were then hustled into a carriage to be driven to the frontier.

In the meantime Dubois had become aware of the conduct of Cellamare, and on December 5 his couriers had been arrested and his papers seized. Upon the ambassador's request they were returned to him, but twenty-four hours later they were confiscated and carried to the Louvre, among them the correspondence with Alberoni and the evidence of his conspiracy. On December 13 he was sent to Blois under arrest, and when later he was conducted to the frontier it was necessary to protect him from the indignation of the populace.

The conduct of Spain, and particularly the efforts of Alberoni to excite revolt against the government of France placed the policy of the Regent and the influence of Dubois in a new light.

Alberoni's
efforts of
resistance

On December 25, 1718, Philip V published a declaration in which he solemnly arraigned the Regent as a "private person" who, in the name of the King of France, had "trodden under foot the most sacred rights and had broken the union which had cost the life of a million men, and for which Louis XIV had risked everything, even to his own State." Stigmatizing the Regent as "a rebel to the Most Christian King and a traitor to his country," he appealed to the French army to unite with the Spaniards to defeat their common foes.

Alberoni, while endeavoring to justify himself to the Regent, on the ground that it was the King who was responsible for the non-acceptance of the terms required by the Quadruple Alliance, was, nevertheless, ceaseless in his activity to strengthen his means of resistance.

The utter failure of Görtz to obtain at Lofö terms of peace with Russia left Spain without the desired aid in the North. It had been expected that Sweden, Russia, and Prussia would

before the winter be able to place forty thousand troops in Germany, who would occupy Brunswick-Lüneburg, and by taking possession of Holstein force Denmark to make peace and support the Russians. Hanover would then be at the mercy of the Northern allies, and an attack on Scotland would so completely preoccupy England that there would be no disposition to carry on war in Germany for the defence of the electorate. The British fleet would be required at home; and would, therefore, be obliged to leave the Mediterranean and thereby withdraw English support from the Emperor in Italy. But the hope of "something considerable from that quarter" was now dispelled. The death of Charles XII, who was killed on December 11, by a shot in the head while in the trenches before Frederikshald ended all possibility of a Swedish attack in Scotland. It was fatal also to the plans of Görtz. Arrested immediately after the death of the King, he was thrown into prison, which he left to ascend the scaffold in expiation of his acts under the condemnation of hostile judges.

It was only to Russia that Alberoni could now look for aid; but, although Peter the Great was in correspondence with Beretti-Landi, and large subsidies were promised for Russian help, nothing practical resulted from the appeal. Still undaunted, Alberoni persisted in fitting out an armada for the invasion of Scotland under the command of Ormond; but the ships were dispersed by storms, and the expedition ended in total failure.

Practically delivered from apprehension of a serious conflict with Sweden, in December, 1718, England formally declared war upon Spain; France followed in January, 1719; and by the following April the French army had invaded the kingdom of Philip V. On June 12, 1719, Philip V informed the Prince of Conti that he had engaged in war with France only through love for his native country in the hope of delivering it from what he had believed to be an unwelcome rule; but that, since France seemed content with the existing government, he was disposed to unite with the Regent in restoring peace. To this end he was ready to yield to the

The proposals
of Philip V

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Emperor Sicily and Sardinia, if his eldest son by Elizabeth Farnese could be established in the estates of Parma and Tuscany; he would also make a suitable arrangement with the Duke of Savoy, conclude peace with England on condition that Gibraltar and Port Mahon were surrendered and indemnity paid for the destruction of the Spanish fleet, and renounce for himself and his successors the crown of France, except that the Infante Don Philip, his second son, should succeed to the throne of France in case of the death of Louis XV, with the understanding that the two crowns should never be united. In order to manifest the "love" which had been inspired in him by "the great qualities and wise government" of the Regent, he would agree to procure from the Three Estates of France consent that the French Netherlands and Burgundy should be ceded to the Duke of Orléans with the title of King; and that Alsace should be restored to the Emperor, whose daughter should marry the Duke's son, the Duke of Chartres, with the Austrian Netherlands as a marriage portion.

This extraordinary programme terminated with the proposal that France, Spain, and the Emperor should unite to reduce the pride of George I, "who acted as if he were the arbiter of Europe, dividing its kingdoms to suit his fancy, with the purpose of raising himself above the sovereigns of Germany, and even the Emperor, by means of the power of Great Britain." To limit this power, it should be divided. England should be given to George I, if he accepted these terms of peace; Scotland and Ireland to James III, "the legitimate king, who, being a powerful claimant to the English crown, would keep King George within his proper limits."¹

To this proposal the Regent made no reply. It was too chimerical for serious consideration; but it well illustrates how completely the foundations of the absolutist theory of the State had been swept away. The grandson of Louis XIV would dispose of kingdoms as if they were mere family orna-

¹ For the full text, see Baudrillart, *Philip V et la cour de France*, II, pp. 367, 370.

ments, but legitimacy was no longer the basis of distribution. George I, although to the Bourbon mind only an interloper, might have England, if he would only be peaceable, and the "legitimate king" should be content with Scotland and Ireland!

Resistance to the Quadruple Alliance had become for Alberoni a measure of self-preservation. In September, 1719, his hopes of success appear to have been still unextinguished. It was intended that a fleet, under the command of Ormond, should sail from Santander to Brittany; but a rebellion of the officers prevented its departure, and like the other ill-organized ventures of Alberoni this one also failed.

Astute and resourceful as the Cardinal was, his schemes were too complicated to be practically fruitful. Although not lacking either in courage or ingenuity, he was wanting in energetic and consecutive action; and his plans, magnificent in conception, ended in disaster.

With great practical insight, Stanhope perceived that Philip V could be brought to accept the Quadruple Alliance only through the disgrace and dismissal of Alberoni. Dubois joined with him in this conviction. On November 18, therefore, an agreement was concluded at The Hague between France, Great Britain, and the Emperor, granting to Philip V three months in which to accept the terms of the Quadruple Alliance, and announcing that in default of adhesion to the treaty within that time the sons of Elizabeth Farnese would be *ipso facto* forever excluded from the heritage of Parma, Piacenza, and Tuscany. At the same time the war was vigorously prosecuted in Catalonia, which was always eager for revolt.

But one additional stroke was necessary to decide the fate of Alberoni. Regarded by Philip V as blameworthy for having pretended that Spain was capable not only of self-defence but of successful aggression, and abandoned by Elizabeth Farnese as incapable of securing the Italian heritage for her children, the unfortunate minister was soon made the scapegoat of all the sins of the court, and held responsible

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The last intrigues and fall of Alberoni

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for all the misfortunes of the kingdom. Even the nurses of the royal children dared to vent their petty spite upon him. But the *coup de grâce* was reserved for the Duke of Parma, whose subject he was by his birth. The agents of the Quadruple Alliance had long been in negotiation with the Duke to procure his influence for the disgrace of the Cardinal, and France and England now urged that course upon him as the only means of escape from the vengeance of the Emperor. Before the end of November, the Marquis di Scotti was sent to Madrid with personal letters from the Duke of Parma for the King and the Queen, in which Alberoni was represented as the chief obstacle to the peace of Europe, and accused of asserting in his private letters that the real cause of trouble was the passion for power of his royal master.

This accusation, which was not entirely without foundation, was decisive. The King issued a decree forbidding the Cardinal to take part in any public business, to present himself in the palace, or to appear before any member of the royal family. He was at the same time ordered to leave Madrid within eight days, and Spanish territory within three weeks.

Adhesion of
Philip V to
the Quadruple
Alliance

In bitter anger, and with imprecations against his late master, Alberoni, after being accused of carrying off the will of Charles II, left the kingdom in disguise, never to return, and sought a secret asylum in a convent near Bologna. The announcement of his fall was received with joy at London and Paris, where it was regarded as a prelude of peace. But in this Stanhope and Dubois were mistaken. There was truth in Alberoni's accusation that the real obstacle to peace was the determination of Philip V to resist the terms that had been imposed upon him. Having dismissed the offensive minister, Philip V still hoped to recover Gibraltar and Minorca, to retain Sardinia, receive indemnity for the loss of his fleet, obtain the restoration of all that had been taken in the war, and to enforce the recognition of his sons' rights to the Italian heritage without an Imperial investiture.

For a time Stanhope feared that the Regent would be satisfied with the disgrace of Alberoni and conclude a sep-

arate peace with Spain. But the desires of Philip V were thwarted by the excess of his demands. The Regent was firm in his support of the terms imposed by the Quadruple Alliance. Elizabeth Farnese was fearful that her sons would be excluded from Italy, and on January 26, 1720, Philip V issued a royal decree declaring that, in order to restore the peace of Europe, he would sacrifice his personal interests and those of his kingdom and adhere to the Quadruple Alliance. On February 16, Beretti-Landi deposited with the plenipotentiaries of the Emperor, the King of France, and the King of England the formal act of adhesion; and, on May 20, this adhesion was officially ratified.

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Thus was finally confirmed and renewed the renunciation of the crown of France by Philip V; while the evacuation of Sicily, the abandonment to the Emperor of the former Spanish possessions in Italy, the recognition of the Farnese claims to Parma, Piacenza, and Tuscany, and the restoration of Sardinia, — immediately transferred by the Emperor to the Duke of Savoy as compensation for the loss of Sicily, which the Emperor retained, — completed the work of the Quadruple Alliance.

In the North the death of Charles XII had suddenly changed the entire situation and rendered possible negotiations for peace. In Sweden the execution of Görtz was followed by the triumph of the nobles, who had been held in check during the King's lifetime, and the country fell under the influence of an oligarchy that excluded the Duke of Holstein from the throne, secured the succession to the Princess Ulrica, — whose husband, Frederick of Hesse, soon became by her abdication the recognized ruler, — under the leadership of the so-called "party of freedom and parliamentary government." With the death of Charles XII absolute monarchy in his kingdom had come to an end.

The reconciliation of
Sweden and
Hanover

Although Sweden was strongly disposed toward peace, a general pacification presented a difficult problem; for Russia, Denmark, Prussia, and Hanover were all demanding territorial concessions which in their aggregate amounted to a wholesale dismemberment of the former Swedish empire.

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The only hope for the rescue of Sweden from destruction lay in the mutual jealousies and hostilities of these rival powers. As a means of preserving a foothold in Germany, the Swedish ministers would have been pleased to make peace first of all with Russia, in order to obtain support in resisting the claims of Denmark, Prussia, and Hanover; but Peter the Great was too exacting. Believing the kingdom to be defenceless, he arrogantly claimed possession of all his conquests.

In order to withstand the wholesale demands of the Czar, which if granted would have left him absolute master of the Baltic, the Swedes were obliged to make generous terms with the other groups of claimants. In preparation for this opportunity, George I had, on August 14, 1719, made an agreement with Prussia by which their interests were to be mutually secured in the settlement with Sweden. On November 20 Bremen and Verden were ceded to Hanover for a million crowns, and George I, as King of England, undertook the mediation of a general peace.¹

The pacification of the North

After long and trying negotiations, through the mediation of England, on January 21, 1720, Prussia concluded a separate peace with Sweden by which, in return for the cession of Stettin, Western Pomerania, Usedom and Wollin, the alliance of Frederick William I with the Czar was abandoned;² and on the same day Great Britain and Sweden formed a defensive alliance.³ On June 3 Sweden concluded peace with Denmark at the expense of the Duke of Holstein-Gottorp, from whom Schleswig was taken and restored to Denmark under the guarantee of England and France.⁴ Frederick Augustus I of Poland had already signed an armistice with Sweden, which later was followed by a definitive peace.

Thus Russia, completely isolated, remained the only power hostile to the Swedish kingdom. Encouraged by England,

¹ For the treaty, see Dumont, VIII, Part II, p. 15 et seq.

² For the treaty, see Dumont, VIII, Part II, p. 21.

³ For the treaty, see Dumont, VIII, Part II, p. 18.

⁴ For the treaty, see Dumont, VIII, Part II, p. 29.

whose fleet was sent to the Baltic for Sweden's protection, the ministers still resisted the demands of Peter the Great for the surrender to him of all the conquests he had made on the Baltic. But, although England would gladly have employed means to restrain the ambitions of the Czar and prevent the surrender of the Swedish provinces, their recovery seemed too great a task to be attempted. In February, 1721, Stanhope, the master mind in English diplomacy, who had been raised to the peerage as Viscount Mahon and Earl Stanhope, passed away, and the failure of John Law's Mississippi scheme and the bursting of the South Sea bubble had created a financial crisis in both England and France. On August 30, 1721, with the advice of both governments, and through the mediation of France, the Peace of Nystad ended the conflict between Sweden and the Czar.¹ Peter the Great, who declared that he did "not wish to see from his windows the grounds of his neighbor," obtained the cession of Livonia, Esthonia, Ingria, and a part of Carelia, but was induced to restore Finland, and paid an indemnity of two million rix-dollars. It was a small price for the mastery of the Baltic.²

III. THE READJUSTMENT OF DISTURBED RELATIONS

The triumph of the Quadruple Alliance and the Peace of Nystad afforded to Europe a short period of tranquillity. The problems of the Spanish succession and the future of the Baltic had at last found what promised to be a permanent solution, but it was a solution which introduced into the system of European states two anomalies: a Bourbon dynasty in possession of the thrones of France and Spain, and a monarchy more Asiatic than European in virtual command of the Baltic. Both of these results could not fail to be disturbing elements in the European system; for, if the two Bourbon monarchies should ever really unite in a common

The results
of the general
pacification

¹ For the treaty, see Dumont, VIII, Part II, p. 36.

² An excellent detailed account of the negotiations is given by Chance, *George I and the Northern War*, p. 444 et seq.

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policy, they would possess a greater preponderance than had ever been enjoyed by any single power of Western Europe; and if the Russian Empire, invigorated by the infusion of Western ideas and fully armed with the weapons of a more highly developed civilization, should make use of its newly acquired power, Northeastern Europe would be almost at its mercy.

A certain period of repose was, however, assured to Europe by the exhaustion of all the contestants after such long and costly wars, and by the fact that there was no vigorous personality to form and execute new policies, since Peter the Great, now approaching the end of his career, had attained the main object of his ambition in the North.

As usual in such circumstances, diplomacy, having no very clear and distinct aims to direct its activities, was reduced to a series of experiments and readjustments by which it was believed some slight advantage might be obtained, but without any definite common purpose or far-reaching plan.

Dissolution
of the Quad-
ruple Alliance

The definite end for which the Quadruple Alliance had been formed having been accomplished, it was natural that it should be superseded by other combinations; and especially as strong reasons for a new adjustment had already come into existence. Among these reasons was the disappointment of Spain in not securing the restoration of Gibraltar, a growing coolness between France and England now that their common interests had been served, and a disposition on the part of all three to prevent the too great development of Hapsburg power, immensely augmented by the concessions wrung from Spain.

Besides the actual execution of the settlement provided for by the Quadruple Alliance, there were many outstanding questions between Charles VI and Philip V which it had been agreed should be considered and settled by a congress, in which England and France should act as mediators. After long discussions the place where it was to assemble had been decided upon, and the plenipotentiaries had been invited to meet on October 15, 1720, at Cambray; but the desire of the powers to determine in advance certain matters pertaining

to themselves prevented its assembling until more than three years had elapsed.

The most important of the differences between Spain and England was the question of Gibraltar. The Regent regarded himself as in honor bound to aid Spain in securing its restoration; but, although Stanhope had at one time offered to surrender it, the occasion had passed, and English sentiment was opposed to the idea of restoring it to Spain. In June, 1720, in a personal letter to Philip V, George I had promised that, as soon as he could obtain the consent of Parliament, he would return the fortress. The Spaniards were not satisfied with this uncertainty, and refused until Gibraltar was actually restored to deliver the *cedulae* for the ships which by the terms of the "Asiento" the English were entitled to send to America for carrying on the slave-trade.

Another difficulty arose from the sudden refusal of Philip V to submit his renunciation of his claim to the throne of France to the ratification of the Spanish Cortes, unless Charles VI would at the same time submit his renunciation of the throne of Spain to the ratification of the Austrian Landtag; and it was not until September 27, 1721, that a guarantee signed by England and France was accepted in place of these ratifications. But even then the strife was not ended, for Charles VI had in his renunciation assumed the title "King of Spain," and Philip V that of "Archduke of Austria"; and it required two months of negotiation before the form of the documents could be rendered mutually acceptable.

In April, 1721, a change in the ministry in England brought Robert Walpole to power, with Townshend as secretary of state for the Northern and Lord Carteret for the Southern Department.¹ Under this administration domestic policy, guided by Walpole and based firmly on the idea of peace, was devoted to repairing the shattered finances and extending foreign trade, while external relations were completely subordinated to it, in spite of Carteret's ambitious designs, which

The peace
policy of
England

¹ For Carteret's able services in the pacification of the North, see *Chance, George I and the Northern War*, p. 333 et seq.

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Dubois' am-
bition for the
cardinalate

were restrained by the less adventurous spirit of Townshend and the King's substantial common sense.¹

The success of this pacific policy, however, required a good understanding with Spain; which, chiefly on account of Gibraltar and the refusal to grant the *cedulae* for the slave-ships, it was difficult to obtain, until the personal ambition of Dubois finally came to the rescue.

Since 1720 Dubois' strongest desire was to obtain the hat of a cardinal. As it was the custom of the papal court in conferring this honor upon a subject of any one of the three great Catholic powers, — France, Spain, and Austria, — to consult the wishes of the others, Dubois was anxious to win the favor of the Emperor and of Philip V; which, on account of their differences, was not an easy task.

Before the death of Stanhope, George I, at his suggestion, had written a personal letter to the Regent asking him to reward his faithful minister by securing for him the coveted honor; and much French gold, sent to Rome for this purpose, is said to have poured into the coffers of Clement XI. But the Pope declined to bestow the cardinalate, and it soon became evident that without the assent of Austria and Spain success was not to be expected.

The situation in the North gave Dubois an opportunity to please the Emperor, who already had some reason to be well disposed toward him; but in seeking the favor of Philip V more serious obstacles had to be overcome, for there was at the Spanish court a strong antipathy to him as the chief adviser of the Regent, and even the aid of the Duke of Parma was not sufficient to remove it. At Madrid the vulnerable point was, however, the ambition of Elizabeth Farnese for her sons; for since the fall of Alberoni she had been in need of foreign support for the accomplishment of her plans in Italy.

Dubois was not long in finding a means of conciliation.

¹ Carteret is reported to have said to Henry Fox, "I want to instill a noble ambition into you; to make you knock the heads of the kings of Europe together, and jumble something out of it that may be of service to this country." See also Morley, *Walpole*, pp. 68, 69.

It was the offer of a defensive alliance between France and Spain, with the prospect of a future triple coalition in which Spain, France, and England would secretly unite to enforce upon the Emperor the wishes of Elizabeth Farnese regarding the establishment of her children in Italy.

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Although desirous of a good understanding with Spain, the English ministry was suspicious of a close alliance between Spain and France. When, however, it was learned that, on March 27, 1721, such an alliance had actually been concluded at Madrid,¹ and England was invited to unite with these two powers in a treaty of friendship, the suggestion was favorably considered.

The alliance of
France, Eng-
land and
Spain

The draft of a treaty presented at London by the French ambassador proposed that France and England should guarantee to the sons of Elizabeth Farnese the immediate recognition by the Emperor of their hereditary right of succession to the estates of the Duke of Parma, with a promise to support the interests of Spain at the Congress of Cambrai. In reply it was declared that this engagement could be accepted only on condition that Philip V would recognize the Hanoverian succession in England, and would agree to England's retention of Gibraltar. It was also demanded from France that she would never wage war against the Austrian Netherlands, and would even defend them from attack by any other power. By removing in this manner the chronic causes of conflict between the three powers, Walpole hoped to render permanent their peace and amity.²

Spanish honor was deeply involved in the return of Gibraltar, but the advantage to be gained by the English alliance was now urged as a reason for accepting the promise of George I to submit the question to the English Parliament with an agreement to restore the fortress if permission were granted. It was by no means probable that Parliament would ever freely consent to the surrender of the Key to the Mediterranean; yet, for the sake of the children of Elizabeth Farnese,

¹ For the treaty, see Martens, *Recueil*, A, Supplement I, p. 449.

² The negotiations are fully detailed by Bourgeois, *Le secret de Dubois*, pp. 262, 290.

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Philip V agreed to recognize the Protestant succession and to renew the "Asiento."

The proposal for the practical neutralization of the Austrian Netherlands by France met with less favor. If these provinces could have been erected into a separate state, as was done a century later by the creation of the Belgian monarchy, and neutralized by all the powers together, it would have been the means of avoiding many future conflicts; but the question was not at that time of a European guarantee, and it was unreasonable that France alone should undertake to maintain the neutrality of territory belonging to a rival power like Austria.

Although this concession was refused by France, so strong was the British interest in peace with Spain, that, on June 13, 1721, a secret treaty of defensive alliance was concluded between the three powers at Madrid, by which the estates of Parma and Piacenza were guaranteed to the Farnese children, and the signatories undertook to urge upon the Emperor the demands of Spain in the Congress of Cambray.¹

The Spanish
marriages

As for the treaty itself, whatever may be said of the motives that inspired it, all the contractants were on the whole satisfied; ² but it was Philip V who, in spite of the sacrifice of Gibraltar for the future of the children of Elizabeth Farnese, was most happy over the alliance. Spain had at last emerged from her isolation among the great powers, the allies of the Emperor had been transferred to himself, and the Italian inheritance had been guaranteed to the children of the Queen.

But this was not the full measure of the joy felt at the Spanish court. A few weeks after the signature of the new treaty of alliance between Spain, France, and England, marriages were arranged between Louis XV and the only daughter of Philip V, Maria Anna Victoria; and also between Don Louis, heir to the Spanish throne, and a daughter of the

¹ For the treaty, see Dumont, VIII, Part II, p. 34; for the negotiations, Bourgeois, *Le secret de Dubois*, pp. 262, 290.

² Townshend had bitterly opposed the treaty, but the King had insisted upon it and Walpole supported it.

Regent, Mademoiselle de Montpensier. The only obstacle in the way of the arrangement was the difficulty in obtaining the assent of the young king of France. The eleven-years-old lad is said to have wept bitterly when he was informed that he was to marry a child of three; but, with a choking voice, when told it was his duty, his assent was given.

The exchange of the future royal brides was carried out with solemn ceremonies on the Isle of Pheasants in the Bidassoa, where Mazarin had made the peace of France and Spain when Louis XIV brought Maria Theresa to Paris amid the national rejoicing, and both nations now acclaimed with equal fervor the new pledges of peace and friendship.

The triumph of Dubois was soon rendered complete by his success at Rome. To the last, in spite of large sums of money paid and influence brought to bear, in which the Pope's favorite nephew, Albani, and even the Pretender were used as instruments, Clement XI had declined to accord the purple to the ambitious minister, who by the favor of the Regent had already become Archbishop of Cambray; but the death of the Pope and the election of his successor afforded to Dubois a better opportunity. By the adroitness of Cardinal Rohan a written promise was obtained from Cardinal de Conti that, if he were elected pope, Dubois should be made a cardinal; but when Cardinal de Conti had become Innocent XIII he was not willing to confer the promised honor until Cardinal Rohan threatened that, if the red hat were not immediately bestowed, he would disclose the written agreement and the circumstances under which it had been made. Finally, on June 16, 1721, the coveted distinction was accorded to the Archbishop of Cambray, and the document which had compelled it was surrendered to His Holiness. A week later the Regent presented the new cardinal to Louis XV as "a prelate whom the Pope had been pleased to honor for his great services in upholding the throne of His Majesty and preventing a schism in the Church!"¹

¹ The popular impression was quite different. "Tout le monde est indigné, et cela fait bien du tort à la religion, de voir placer dans une

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The maritime
ambitions of
Charles VI

The alliance of France and England with Spain placed Charles VI in a position similar to that in which the Quadruple Alliance had placed Philip V; since, like that compact, it was a combination formed with the purpose of enforcing certain concessions from a reluctant monarch. It promised to be equally effective; for Charles VI was already confronted by a powerful enemy in the North. Peter the Great had made his peace with Sweden and held Poland almost as a subject province, whose crown he had offered to bestow upon a French prince if he would marry his daughter. Frederick Augustus I of Saxony remained the nominal Polish king, but his tenure of the throne depended upon the will of the Czar, who was able to dethrone him. Moreover, Charles VI was initiating a commercial policy which made it seem to the advantage of Great Britain to hold firmly to the alliance with France and Spain.

During his Spanish campaigns Charles VI, who had witnessed the prosperity of the seaport towns of Spain, had been inspired with the advantage that might accrue to Austria if proper use were made of the opportunities offered for the extension of foreign commerce.

On the Adriatic, since by the Peace of Passarowitz Austria had secured the privilege of commerce with the whole of the Ottoman Empire, Trieste promised to become an important emporium of trade with the Levant; while the ports recently acquired by the transfer of the Spanish Netherlands to Austria presented an opportunity for extended commerce on the Atlantic. The possession of Naples and Sicily opened a field for commercial expansion in the Western Mediterranean; and the decline of Venice, whose power both on land and sea had been much reduced by the wars with the Turks, created an opportunity for the development of the Emperor's maritime projects in the East.

While so many conditions were favorable to Austria's becoming a great sea-power, it was certain that both on the

des premières places de l'Église un homme connu pour être sans foi et sans religion." — Barbier, *Journal historique*, I, p. 141.

Mediterranean and the North Sea opposition would arise. In 1722 the Emperor founded the Ostend Commercial Company, with glowing prospects of success;¹ but Holland, whose policy had always been to stifle the maritime enterprise of the Spanish Netherlands and to control their commerce, now appealed to the previous concessions to Dutch ships and the prohibition of participation in the Indian trade imposed upon the ports of the Spanish Netherlands by the treaties of Westphalia and subsequent conventions with the Kings of Spain, which they held to be binding upon their Austrian successors.² England, aiming at the empire of the sea, and fearing the appearance of a new competitor, supported the claims of Holland, and the Ostend Company soon found itself the object of international contention.

The opposition of the maritime powers to the Austrian sea-policy was rendered more effective by the fact that Charles VI was at the time and during the remainder of his life preoccupied with the question of the Austrian succession, — a preoccupation which affected not only his domestic policies, but also his foreign diplomacy. The Pragmatic Sanction

After the death of his infant son, it appeared not improbable that the male line of the House of Austria would become extinct with the death of Charles VI. In order to secure the possession of the Austrian estates to his own descendants, as head of the House of Hapsburg he issued a decree setting aside all collateral claims and confirming the entire succession to Maria Theresa, the eldest of his daughters, in case no son should be born to him. This decree, being only a household law, required the recognition of the hereditary estates; and, to give it complete security, that of the Empire and the foreign powers also. The "Pragmatic Sanction," as this new rule was called, being of great importance to Charles VI, assent to it became an item of value in the negotiations of foreign powers, and until the end of his life played a rôle in all international bargains in which the Emperor was concerned far in excess of its importance to the

¹ See Rousset, *Recueil historique*, II, pp. 5, 42.

² See Rousset, *Recueil historique*, II, pp. 43, 76.

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peoples whose interests were bartered for it, only to prove illusory in the end.

With the Austrian estates themselves no great difficulties were encountered; but with some of the princes of the Empire, and especially with Prussia, a different fortune was experienced. Like his brother Joseph I, Charles VI was ambitious to render the House of Hapsburg really dominant in the Empire. To this ambition the greater princes of Germany were opposed. So strenuous was the hostility to the Emperor's pretensions, and particularly to the Pragmatic Sanction, that diplomatic relations between Prussia and Austria were for a time broken off; while Bavaria and Saxony, having direct claims to the whole or a part of the succession, through marriage with descendants of Leopold I and Joseph I, were indisposed to abandon their rights of inheritance, even when they had been formally renounced.¹

Would Europe sustain the Pragmatic Sanction? That was the question which for twenty years dominated all others in the mind of Charles VI and kept him the constant prey of anxiety. His supremacy in Italy, the maritime interests of the Austrian possessions, and every other consideration within and outside of the Empire were subordinated to that dearest dream of the Emperor's life, the recognition of the Pragmatic Sanction.

Dubois' obstruction of the Congress of Cambray

In ignorance of the secret engagements of France and England with Spain, Charles VI wondered why the mediators did not meet his plenipotentiaries at Cambray, where his differences with Spain were to be ended, as he supposed, with the aid of his friends in the Quadruple Alliance. Philip V and especially Elizabeth Farnese were also eager for their secret allies to redeem their promises, and secure from the Emperor the recognition of their claims in Italy; but neither France nor England was urgent in beginning the business of the Congress.

This hesitation on the part of Dubois was owing to his desire to render more effective the union of France and Spain

¹ The order of descent from Leopold I as shown in Table VII at the end of this volume.

in carrying out the traditional Bourbon policy of opposition to the House of Austria. "It was more important," he said, "to care for the perfection of the treaty than to hasten its conclusion; and the presence of a few plenipotentiaries at Cambray could accomplish nothing." England, on the other hand, was in no haste to execute a treaty from which all the real advantages had already been derived, or to reconcile Spain with the Emperor, against whom a united opposition might be useful in frustrating his maritime policy.

The system created by Dubois and Stanhope had already borne its fruits so far as France and England were concerned. Walpole appeared to have no interest in foreign affairs, except to promote British commerce; and it was not forgotten by Dubois that Townshend had in the beginning not only opposed the Anglo-French alliance which Stanhope had created, but also the alliance of England with France and Spain, whose promises were yet to be fulfilled or frustrated at Cambray. The Congress, if assembled, might afford an opportunity for George I to show himself the arbiter of Europe. He was a prince of the Empire, and might find it to his interest to side with the Emperor for advantages in return. In that event the alliance of France, England, and Spain would prove a disappointment, and the whole house of cards would fall in ruins. It would be far better, Dubois thought, to hold fast to the English alliance without exposing it to any new risk, and at the same time privately to strengthen the bonds between France and Spain.

In January, 1722, it appeared probable that Dubois would no longer be able to postpone the work of the Congress. Elizabeth Farnese was becoming anxious about the Italian inheritance promised to her children, and the advisers of Charles VI were more than ever resolved to force the powers to declare their intentions.

But Dubois had discovered a reason for delay that could be rendered plausible to the Court of Spain. The strife over the Austrian succession was comparable in importance to that which had involved all Europe in the war of the Spanish succession. In March, 1722, he wrote to his confidant,

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The scheme
of Dubois for
Bourbon pre-
dominance

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Chavigny, at Madrid: "The Emperor may die without a male heir, and that death may open the splendid opportunity to extend the succession of Don Carlos to almost the whole of Italy. In place of exposing oneself to failure in little enterprises, it is preferable to form only great ones, and to combine everything in such a manner as to assure success."

Chavigny, who had been sent to Spain to dissuade the Spanish court from precipitation in urging on the work of the Congress, was instructed to convince Elizabeth Farnese that it was not for the highest interest of Don Carlos to demand the immediate investiture of his future heritage. By delaying action a far more brilliant future might await him, for the Austrian possessions in Italy could not be transmitted by the Emperor to his daughters, Don Carlos would have indisputable rights to Parma, Piacenza, and Tuscany, and his claims could in future be extended to all the Italian territories that had once belonged to Spain.

In May, Philip V was so far convinced as to agree to accept the Cardinal's larger plan, but the rapacity of the Queen could not submit to postponement. Chavigny's advice was rejected, his influence resented, and his recall demanded. To reconcile the Regent to an immediate invasion of Italy in behalf of Don Carlos, his marriage with Mademoiselle de Beaujolais, the Regent's daughter, was proposed by Philip V. As the proposal promised to bind still more closely the two monarchies in opposition to the House of Hapsburg, the marriage was arranged, and Mademoiselle Beaujolais was sent to Madrid.

The Cardinal's
last negotiation

The Farnese ambitions having thus suddenly become those of the Regent also, the problem now was how to create an effective coalition against the Emperor.

At the conclusion of the Peace of Nystad, Dubois had been disposed for a time to form an alliance between France and Russia, which Peter the Great had earnestly desired. Russia, the Czar had long before contended, would gladly perform the task which Sweden had performed for France in holding the House of Austria in check in the North, thus preoccupying the Emperor at home. Peter the Great, it was thought,

for the sake of a French alliance, might even be induced to guarantee the permanent possession by France of the provinces of which the Hapsburgs had been divested in former wars. By thus rendering the Czar "the arbiter of the Empire," the Emperor would be made powerless in the rest of Europe, and France and Spain could impose their will in Italy.

The inexpediency of such an alliance at the time of the Peace of Nystad, in spite of its apparent advantages, had grown out of the existence of the Quadruple Alliance, in which the Emperor was a partner; and especially the danger of alienating George I, a prince of the Empire, who at that time required the Emperor's favor in regard to Hanover, and was bitterly hostile to the Czar. It might, however, now be possible, Dubois thought, under the changed conditions, to reconcile George I to the admission of Russia into the triple alliance of France, Spain, and England; or at least to obtain his sanction of a close *entente* between France and Russia.

After the Peace of Nystad the "Emperor of all the Russias," as Peter the Great now styled himself, had made war on Persia, and at the end of 1722 had returned in triumph to St. Petersburg, having added to his possessions some of the Shah's richest provinces on the Caspian Sea.

With war against the Emperor imminent in Italy, the Russian alliance which in 1721 had seemed so advantageous to France appeared in 1722 almost necessary. Negotiations were, therefore, promptly resumed; and, in October, the French ambassador, Campredon, was instructed to let it be known at St. Petersburg that a marriage between the Regent's son, the Duke of Chartres, and the Princess Elizabeth might perhaps be arranged. The essential condition, however, would be the previous election of the Duke of Chartres to the throne of Poland, which distinction would be accepted as the dower of the Princess.¹

The instructions to Campredon place in the foreground the securing of the Polish throne for the Regent's eldest son

¹ See Vandal, *Louis XV et Elisabeth de Russie*, p. 53.

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as a precondition absolutely essential to the celebration of the marriage; for, it is plainly stated in the instruction, so eligible a prince as the Duke of Chartres would otherwise certainly not seek in marriage the Princess Elizabeth, who was said to have retained "*quelques traces de la rudesse de sa nation.*" The Czar, on the other hand, it was argued, should be "exceedingly happy" to form "the most distinguished alliance he could have in Europe"; while this relation, without the occupation of the throne of Poland by a French prince, would be of no solid value to France, since the Russian monarchy after the death of Peter the Great "might easily fall back into the obscurity from which he had drawn it."

Dubois' plan
of alliance be-
tween France,
England, and
Russia

The advantages which France was expected to derive from the alliance with Russia, were, in fact, far greater than the instructions to the French ambassador at St. Petersburg revealed. The Czar, according to Dubois' plan for a treaty, was to guarantee the European system already established by the Treaties of Utrecht, Rastadt, Baden, London, and The Hague. On the other hand, France, with England, — if England's participation could be obtained, — would guarantee the conquests of Peter the Great on the Baltic. The three powers would agree mutually to defend one another from attack, with the exception of any difference that might arise between Russia and Turkey; for Dubois had no intention to sacrifice the Ottoman Empire to Moscovite ambition, or to renounce the means of constraint upon the new ally by abandoning a traditional friendship that had so often proved advantageous to France.¹ But there were still other benefits in view. The Russian Empire opened a vast field for the extension of the growing industry and commerce of France, with outlets into fertile and undeveloped provinces not yet

¹ The desire to place a French prince on the throne of Poland was not new, and was a part of the system by which France aimed at holding in check the House of Austria. This system consisted in maintaining alliances with Sweden and Turkey, by which the Hapsburg power could be counterbalanced. Poland, situated between these allies, if under the influence of France, would complete the Eastern line of possible attack, which would thus be extended almost unbroken from Stockholm to Constantinople.

in contact with Western civilization, to be approached by the Caspian and the Black Seas, the routes to Persia and unknown Central Asia.

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To secure the participation of England in the new alliance, Dubois conceived the idea of offering to act as mediator between George I and Peter the Great. After long insistence, early in 1723, the Czar yielded to the wishes of France so far as to promise not to intrude upon Lower Germany, with special reference to reassuring George I regarding the safety of Hanover; but all the efforts of Chavigny, — who was sent on a special mission to obtain the assent of England to join in a triple alliance, — including the promise of a heavy bribe to the King's mistress, the Countess von Platen, were without result.

Two reasons weighed with the Cardinal in hesitating to sign a separate treaty with Russia: the difficulty of securing for the Duke of Chartres the assurance of the Polish succession until the marriage with the Princess had been actually celebrated, and his preoccupation in securing his own continuance in power after the approaching majority of Louis XV. For months Campredon was left without a word from the foreign office. Daring no longer to show himself at the imperial palace, and reduced to the extremity of borrowing money to pay the postage on his letters, the wretched ambassador was at last compelled to take to his bed and give out word that he was ill.

Dubois' hesitation and death

Dubois has been accused of lightening his own labors, when his table became too heavily freighted with diplomatic despatches, by throwing them unread into the fire, to avoid the trouble of answering them. Whatever truth there may be in this story, he received fifteen couriers from Campredon before acknowledging one of his despatches; and then informed him that in no case would France consent to the marriage until after the election of the Duke of Chartres to the throne of Poland. As for the treaty of alliance, it would have to await further negotiations with England.

But the Cardinal never signed the despatch. Since August, 1722, he had been prime minister of France; and when,

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on February 16, 1723, the regency came to an end with the legal majority of Louis XV, the King had continued him in this office. Received as a member of the French Academy, he had been hailed as another Richelieu. Having attained the highest honors that could be awarded to a Frenchman, he had returned to the traditional policy of France, — opposition to the House of Hapsburg. His overtures to Peter the Great were intended to aid in restoring this system, in which he was anxious to include Great Britain. His aim was the complete isolation of the Emperor. What might have happened if the negotiations with Russia had continued under Dubois is uncertain; for on August 10, 1723, the Cardinal's career suddenly ended with his death.

The foreign
policy of the
Duke of
Orléans

The Duke of Orléans, who succeeded Dubois as prime minister of France, with Count Morville as minister of foreign affairs, favored the Russian alliance with Peter the Great, and in October, 1723, success seemed probable; for the Czar had expressed his willingness to have an understanding with England. Chavigny was instructed to impress upon Hanover the advantages of an English alliance with Russia, to urge opposition to the Pragmatic Sanction, and to propose a plan — said to have been suggested by Dubois — for abolishing the Imperial dignity altogether and transforming the Empire into a system of separate States.¹ The maritime ambitions of Charles VI seemed to furnish an effective argument; for an alliance with the Czar, it was contended, would impose an effective restraint upon the action of the Emperor. But the bad relations of George I and Peter the Great rendered illusory all hope of an alliance between them. On October 12, 1723, the King of England signed a family compact with his son-in-law, Frederick William I of Prussia, which the Czar believed to be directed against himself; and, as a retort, he received a Jacobite agent at St. Petersburg, with a proposal to unite with France and aid the Pretender.

In the midst of the negotiations between France and Russia, on December 2, 1723, the death of the Duke of Orléans put an end to his plans, and the accession of the Duke of

¹ See Bourgeois, *Le secret de Dubois*, p. 374.

Bourbon to the position of prime minister brought in a radical change in the foreign policy of France. His aim was to undo the work of Dubois in promoting the interests of the House of Orléans, to disregard the influence of Elizabeth Farnese, and to maintain intact the friendship of France and England, which an alliance with Russia would jeopardize.

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The Duke of Bourbon's reversal of the Orléans policy

When Peter the Great learned of the change of government in France, he promptly abandoned the project of marrying his daughter into the House of Orléans, but continued his efforts for a political alliance. These were, however, finally rendered fruitless by the demand of the Duke of Bourbon that England be included in the treaty. The Czar declared his willingness to resume diplomatic relations with Great Britain and Hanover; but to pass at once from a condition of open hostility to one of alliance was in his eyes impossible. Till the end of his life, however, he clung to the hope of arranging a French marriage for the Princess Elizabeth. In October, 1724, he suggested the substitution of the Duke of Bourbon for the Duke of Chartres, with the expectation of the Polish crown; but a definite answer was not returned. If we may trust a well supported tradition, Peter the Great never entirely lost hope of a French alliance, and the draft of a treaty with France was found upon his table at the time of his death.¹

On January 26, 1724, in the quaint old town of Cambray, — where in 1508 the Emperor Maximilian I, Louis XII of France, and Ferdinand the Catholic had formed their league against Venice, and where twenty-one years later the Emperor Charles V and Francis I were reconciled by the famous "Paix des Dames," — the long postponed congress was assembled to reconcile the differences between Spain and the Emperor.

The Congress of Cambray

But the Congress had come too late. New conditions had supervened which made its work more or less of an anachronism. The maritime powers had become irritated by the Emperor's creation of the Ostend Company, the French support of the Farnese interests had weakened, and the Duke of

¹ See Vandal, *Louis XV et Elisabeth de Russie*, p. 78.

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Bourbon was determined that the future of France should not pass into the keeping of the House of Orléans.

Still other events not less important had occurred to change the situation. On January 10 Philip V, debilitated and verging upon madness, had abdicated the throne of Spain, in order to end his days in religious devotion; and his son Don Louis had succeeded him. In the midst of the Congress, on August 31, the young king died; and Philip V resumed the crown. Count Monteleone, a Sicilian in the service of Spain, was sent to Paris and London to revive interest in the fortunes of the Farnese princes, and even to urge in their behalf immediate war upon the Emperor; but to the indisposition of the Court of France was added the indignation of England when the ambassador reminded George I of his unfulfilled promise to ask Parliament for permission to restore Gibraltar, and even menaced him with the loss of commercial privileges if the fortress were not promptly surrendered.¹

In these circumstances negotiation marched slowly at Cambray. Without real sympathy with Spain, and in a state of estrangement from the Emperor, both France and England offered only a cold and formal mediation which gave no promise of early fruits, when a blow fell which aroused a storm of fury at Madrid.

On October 29, 1724, the French Council of State secretly resolved that the Spanish Infanta, who had been brought to France for her education as the wife of Louis XV, should be sent back to Spain.²

¹ For an account of the negotiations at Cambray, and Monteleone's mission, see Syveton, *Revue d'Histoire Diplomatique*, VIII, pp. 176, 189.

² The reason for this decision, which was kept secret until the following March, was the strong desire of the Duke of Bourbon and his Council to prevent the possible transfer of the crown to the Duke of Orléans in case of the death of Louis XV without an heir. It was, therefore, decided that the young king should marry immediately; but, as the Infanta of Spain was only nine years old, immediate marriage necessitated the choice of another princess. On August 15, 1725, Louis XV was married at Strasburg to Maria Leszczinska, daughter of Stanislas, former King of Poland.

When, on March 9, 1725, the announcement of this decision was made at Madrid by the Abbé Livry, who was sent as a special ambassador for the purpose, Philip V in his rage cried out, "Ah the traitor!" and returned to the trembling abbé the still unopened letter of the Duke of Bourbon. Diplomatic relations were at once broken off, all French consuls were expelled from Spain, and Mademoiselle Beaujolais, the *fiancée* of Don Carlos, was indignantly despatched to Paris.¹ Thus came to nothing the ill-starred mediation of France and England in the Congress of Cambrai.

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The shock produced by the rupture between France and Spain on account of the repudiation of the Spanish marriages was soon followed by an event of even deeper import. On April 30, 1725, a treaty of offensive and defensive alliance was signed at Vienna between Spain and Austria by which the whole system of European politics was thrown into confusion.

The Treaty
of Vienna and
the mission of
Ripperda

In November, 1724, as soon as it was perceived that Monteleone's mission to Paris and London was certain to end in failure, a new programme of action had been decided upon at Madrid. Since France and England would not make war upon the Emperor, in order to force him to accept all that Spain had demanded in Italy, there remained the alternative of trying to secure the objects aimed at by direct negotiations with Charles VI.

The fertile brain of Elizabeth Farnese now conceived the scheme of a double union with the House of Austria. The Emperor should be asked to give the hand of the Archduchess Maria Theresa, who by the Pragmatic Sanction was to inherit all the Austrian possessions, to Don Carlos, who should then be chosen King of the Romans. His younger brother, Don Philip, should be proposed for the younger Austrian archduchess, Maria Anna, who should be provided for in Italy. The two monarchies should then unite to defend and enforce all these family interests, obtain the restoration of Gibraltar and Minorca to Spain, and secure to Charles VI the recognition of the Pragmatic Sanction and the pro-

¹ For details, see Villars, *Mémoires*, p. 307. .

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tection of the Ostend Company; which, as an extra inducement, should be accorded exceptional commercial privileges with the Spanish colonies.

In order to make these advances to Charles VI with due secrecy and reserve, it was necessary to send to Vienna a man of diplomatic skill and experience; yet he must be sufficiently obscure to escape public observation, and furnished with such credentials as would permit, if the proposals were rejected, of a complete disavowal of his authority to negotiate.

Such an emissary was available in Baron Ripperda, an adventurer of Dutch birth but descended from parents of Spanish origin, who in 1718 had been sent to Madrid by Holland with the title of ambassador, but had been recalled and dismissed on the charge that he was more subservient to Spain than to the country by which he was accredited. Of insinuating manners, adventurous spirit, and an excellent linguist, he had been serviceable to Alberoni as a diplomatic spy; and through this association had been held in esteem at court until Alberoni's fall, when, having lost credit, he had dropped into comparative obscurity at Madrid, where he continued to reside. Not having any official character, yet possessing the desired qualifications for this delicate mission, without the knowledge of Grimaldo, the head of the Spanish foreign office, Ripperda was selected to negotiate a private understanding with the Emperor.

The secret instructions of Ripperda

On November 22, 1724, without exciting the slightest suspicion, Ripperda's formal instructions had been secretly prepared by the King, Elizabeth Farnese, and Orendayn, who from a clerk in the foreign office under Grimaldo had risen through the favor and influence of the Queen to be a minister of state, and since the fall of Alberoni was the person most in her confidence.

If the idea of the proposed marriages were regarded with favor at Vienna, Maria Theresa should receive as a dowry, to be enjoyed after the Emperor's death, all the hereditary estates of Austria in Germany; while Maria Anna should inherit those in Italy, to which Parma, Piacenza, and Tus-

cany would be added by Don Carlos' renunciation. Thus all the Austrian possessions in Germany and Italy were ultimately to be divided between Elizabeth Farnese's two sons.

As for the Austrian Netherlands, they should be restored to Spain. If that could not be, then they were to be given to the younger son, Don Philip, and Maria Anna, to be returned to Spain in case the pair should die without heirs.

If the marriages were agreed upon, Spain would promise to recognize and aid in enforcing the Pragmatic Sanction, and to protect and promote the Austrian plans for maritime and commercial development. Upon this basis the Emperor might be assured of a lasting peace and union with Spain, and through this alliance obtain a guarantee for the inheritance by his daughters of all the Austrian possessions in Germany and Italy.

In return the Emperor should promise active aid in securing the restoration to Spain of Gibraltar and Minorca. In case of a refusal by George I to surrender them to Spain, the two powers would unite in a war to exclude him from the throne of England, and give their support to the Pretender.

Finally, united, the two powers would work everywhere for the re-establishment of the Roman Catholic faith.

Although the instructions as a whole were secret, Ripperda was intrusted by the Queen with a secret more sacred still, which was not contained in the written document. As a ruling monarch Philip V, and as a public minister Orendayn, were under obligations to have some consideration for the interests of the Spanish Kingdom; but Elizabeth Farnese, the real author of the proposal to form an alliance with the Emperor, was chiefly interested in providing a brilliant future for her sons. Ripperda was, therefore, orally informed by the Queen that the principal aim of his mission was to secure the marriages. If that could be accomplished, all else might be modified.

But Ripperda also had his secret. The mission with which he was intrusted could, if successful, lift him to greater heights than those from which Alberoni had fallen. The satisfaction

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of Elizabeth Farnese's dearest ambition would make him prime minister of Spain.

Having arrived at Vienna in January, 1725, Ripperda made no attempt to conceal his true name at the octroi of the city, and openly announced that he was charged by Philip V with a mission to Peter the Great at Moscow! As an authorized envoy he possessed the right to visit the Chancellor of the Empire, Count Zinzendorf, whom otherwise it might have been difficult to see. Recalling his acquaintance with the Count in Holland, at the first interview he disclosed his real object, namely, to negotiate a treaty of peace and alliance between Spain and Austria, on condition of marriages between Don Carlos and Don Philip and the Austrian arch-duchesses. In proof of his assertion, he handed the Chancellor the credentials given him by the King of Spain, which commended him to the Emperor, and requested to be allowed to present immediately his proposals to an authorized minister. Although Charles VI was astonished, he charged Zinzendorf to hear what Ripperda had to propose, and the *pourparlers* began at once.¹

Ripperda's
negotiations
at Vienna

Without the least hesitation or embarrassment Ripperda represented that he was an important personage at Madrid, that he enjoyed the entire confidence of the Court, and that he was destined upon his return to be prime minister of Spain! He declared that he himself was the original author of the idea of a direct *rapprochement* with Austria; — a plan which, he alleged, as a good Catholic and a true Spaniard, he had long had in his mind, and which had been only recently accepted by the King.

The occasion for this change of policy on the part of Philip V, he affirmed, had been the proposal by the Duke of Bourbon to conquer for him the Kingdom of the Two Sicilies. Sicily and Naples — possessions of Charles VI — were to be attacked by French and Spanish troops; while the Czar of Russia and the Sultan of Turkey, by arrangement with France, were to invade Silesia and Hungary, and thus en-

¹ For a detailed account, see Syveton, *Revue d'Histoire Diplomatique*, VIII (1894), p. 365 et seq.

gaged the Emperor at home. Philip V had rejected with scorn this infamous proposal; and the Queen, who was a bitter enemy of France, and had long wished to recall her daughter from Paris and marry her to the Infante of Portugal, had profited by the occasion to carry out the idea of a family alliance with the House of Austria!

These ingenious falsehoods, the figments of Ripperda's fertile fancy, appealed to the secret fears and suspicions of the Emperor, and received in the subsequent rejection of the Spanish Infanta by France an apparent confirmation. The Duke of Bourbon had, in fact, not only not proposed the conquest of Sicily, but had positively refused to aid in the invasion of Italy which Monteleone had urged upon him, and Elizabeth Farnese had at the time no suspicion that the marriage of the Infanta with Louis XV would be repudiated at Versailles.

Even more effective than Ripperda's impudent fictions was the manner in which the proposal of the marriages was presented. The Spanish court, Ripperda explained, had every hope that the Emperor would yet be blessed with a son, who would succeed him in the Empire. The sons of Elizabeth Farnese also had the most brilliant prospects. Of the children of Philip V by his first marriage, Don Louis was already dead, and Don Ferdinand was so frail that he would in all probability never wear the crown. Don Carlos would almost certainly become King of Spain, while Don Philip would inherit the duchies of Parma, Piacenza, and Tuscany. When, therefore, the future son of Charles VI became Emperor, the archduchesses would be well provided for, and the Austro-Spanish alliance would be continued with Maria Theresa as Queen of Spain, while both monarchies would enjoy perfect security and unite in giving peace to Italy.

If, on the other hand, the Emperor should have no son, and Maria Theresa should inherit all the Austrian possessions, Don Carlos would, in that case, renounce the throne of Spain to his brother Don Philip, the husband of Maria Anna, and assume the rule of the Austrian estates. In order that he might be fitted for this contingency, Don Carlos

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The delibera-
tions at Vienna

would be at once sent to Vienna to be educated at the Imperial Court.

Eager as the Emperor was to have peace and friendly relations with Spain, the marriages, which were in Ripperda's proposals the preconditions of a *rapprochement*, were from the Austrian point of view of doubtful expediency. "What was to be done regarding the existing French engagements?" the Chancellor had asked of Ripperda; who in confusion had replied: "They would be broken!" "What, then, would be the value of the engagements you propose, since all the princes and princesses in question are still very young? These might also in time be broken!"

The Austrian Council argued that although the arguments for a Spanish alliance were good, those for the marriages were open to question. Ripperda had quietly treated Don Ferdinand as practically non-existent; and yet, so far as was known, he might live, marry Mademoiselle Beaujolais, and thus place a French Queen upon the throne of Spain. What then would become of Don Carlos? In summarily despatching the heir to the Spanish throne, in order to make the prospects of the Farnese princes appear more brilliant, Ripperda had raised a difficult question.

But the Austrian analysis of the situation revealed other grounds for hesitation. If the Emperor gave two of his daughters to Don Carlos and Don Philip, the union of Austria and Spain would excite the jealousy of all the other courts of Europe; and, if a son should be born to the Emperor before the marriages were actually celebrated, Spain, disappointed in losing the expected heritage, would probably abandon Austria in the midst of danger.

On the other hand, if Don Carlos as husband of Maria Theresa should upon the Emperor's death claim all the Austrian possessions, there would undoubtedly be opposition from the maritime powers to a Bourbon supremacy so predominant; a war of succession would follow; and dismemberment would probably occur. Spain, unable to preserve the whole Austrian monarchy for the Bourbon princes, would be satisfied with securing for each of them a portion,

perhaps in Italy, while Austria might fall to the lot of Bavaria, Bohemia to Saxony, and Hungary might become an independent kingdom. When the Hapsburg heritage was thus weakened by division, France and Holland would perhaps divide the Austrian Netherlands between them, and the Turks would try to reclaim what they had lost.

Ripperda perceived that, if he could entirely isolate the Emperor from all other alliances and attach him closely to Spain, he could then take advantage of his helplessness and impose the marriages as a necessity growing out of the dependent position in which Austria would then be placed.

Leaving almost everything to Zinzendorf to formulate, except the question of who should be Grand Master of the Order of the Golden Fleece, — which both the Emperor and Philip V had hotly disputed, — and a few other points upon which his master was sensitive, — and which were, therefore, left out of the negotiation, — Ripperda sent to Madrid for approval the drafts of two treaties, one of peace and one of alliance.

It was at this moment that the announcement of the rejection of the Infanta at Paris reached Madrid and awakened a frenzy of indignation against France. The mediation of Louis XV and George I at Cambray was scornfully rejected, and Ripperda was informed that, with slight modifications, the treaties would be accepted. All engagements with France were considered as annulled; and in his wrath Philip V invited Charles VI to unite with him in war upon France for the recovery of the provinces taken from Spain and the Empire by Louis XIV, the assertion of the right of succession to the throne of France by the Spanish princes, and the annihilation of French and English commerce.

With regard to the marriages, Ripperda was doomed to disappointment; for the utmost concession he could wring from the Austrian Council of State was, that the Emperor would consent that one or the other of his three daughters, when of suitable age, should marry one or the other of the sons of Philip V. Having obtained this general promise, which he intended to insist should be made more definite

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The apparent
triumph of
Ripperda

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Illusory char-
acter of the
Treaties of
Vienna

in the future, on April 30, 1725, Ripperda signed with the Emperor two treaties, one of peace between Spain and Austria and one of defensive alliance. On May 1, a treaty of commerce also was signed.¹

In appearance Ripperda had won a great diplomatic battle, for he had made peace, and even an alliance, between Spain and the Emperor, and rendered apparently needless the mediation of France and England at Cambray; but in reality he had yielded every advantage to Austria and acquired practically nothing for Spain. The Emperor had merely bound himself to accept the friendship of his former enemy, and to offer his own in return; but Philip V had promised large sums of money together with naval protection for Austrian commerce, and had loaded Spain with new responsibilities. The important points in dispute before the Congress of Cambray were left unsettled, the Italian duchies still remained fiefs of the Empire, and the Farnese marriages were as far as ever from realization. Spain had placed herself virtually at the mercy of the Emperor, so far as the treaties were concerned. It was for Philip V a complete surrender.

The Spanish court had, indeed, surprised Europe by a dexterous move in the moment of its humiliation; but why did Ripperda, a man of keen intelligence, sign such an unequal compact?

His main object was to secure the Farnese marriages. The only way was first to separate Austria from other alliances, to arouse the jealousy of Europe, and especially of the German princes, to bind the Emperor to Spain as his only friend, and then to extort from him what he would not otherwise bestow, his consent to the desired marriages.

If Ripperda was false to the real interests of Spain, he was at least true to Elizabeth Farnese, whose secret agent he really was; for his own fortune was linked with her success. Aside from this, Spain and Europe were nothing to him. Although the treaties were in reality hollow, the mere fact

¹ For the treaties, see Dumont, VIII, Part II, p. 106 et seq., and for a full account of the negotiations, Syveton, *Revue d'Histoire Diplomatique*, VIII (1894), pp. 364, 394.

that a secret alliance between Spain and the Emperor had been concluded at the moment of the French rebuff was sufficient for his purpose.

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Grimaldo, who was opposed to the whole procedure, was ordered to publish the treaties of peace and commerce; but the treaty of alliance was kept secret. Its chief value for the purposes of Ripperda was in letting Europe imagine it more dangerous than it really was. Gradually the conviction spread that the marriage of Maria Theresa and Don Carlos was stipulated in one of the secret articles. It was the effect Ripperda had desired to produce. Don Carlos might some day, it appeared, like the Emperor Charles V, become the master of Germany, Italy, and perhaps Spain. What then would become of the equilibrium of Europe?

While the secret treaty of alliance excited the imagination, those of peace and commerce offered sufficient evidence that the negotiations had been conceived in a spirit of hostility to England as well as to France. It is true that the peace between Spain and Austria formally confirmed the Quadruple Alliance; but in substance it was its epitaph, and called forth from Count Morville and the Duke of Bourbon the exclamation, "*Cette paix monstrueuse!*" But it was the treaty of commerce that most excited London and Amsterdam, for they saw in it a declaration of war directed against their attitude toward Austria's maritime enterprises: while France experienced the strange sensation of picturing a Bourbon prince — for such Don Carlos was — as the future heir of the whole Hapsburg heritage arrayed in hostility to France.

The reaction of
Europe

Reaction against the Treaties of Vienna was not long delayed. France and England promptly renewed their intimacy. In June George I and Townshend set out for Hanover, accompanied by the French ambassador at London, Count de Broglie, for the purpose of forming a league to force the Emperor to abandon his new relations with Spain.

In Germany the idea of a marriage between Don Carlos and Maria Theresa had been received with much apprehension. For Prussia the Austro-Spanish alliance was almost a menace; and, in August, Frederick William I entered into

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the negotiations for the formation of a league to oppose it. At the same time efforts were made at Madrid through the aid of Grimaldo to produce a rupture with the Emperor, but these were doomed to failure. Orendayn, sustained by Elizabeth Farnese, was accorded new honors, the English ambassador was informed that friendship with George I depended upon the immediate restoration of Gibraltar, and Ripperda was named ambassador plenipotentiary at Vienna with the title of Duke.

Ripperda now openly declared that he would soon return to Madrid as prime minister, treated with contempt the new French ambassador, to whom he refused precedence, — which France had insisted upon and enjoyed for more than sixty years, — and publicly announced that Spain would soon make war on England for the recovery of Gibraltar and Minorca. The purpose of this bravado was to force the hand of the Emperor regarding the Spanish marriages; which, he frankly avowed, were the only cause of his remaining in Vienna. Chiefly in order to hasten his departure, Zinzendorf was in favor of yielding to his importunities; but the Council was divided in opinion. Then, suddenly, on September 3, 1725, at the castle of Heerenhausen, in Hanover, a treaty was signed by the plenipotentiaries of England, France, and Prussia which ensured the success of Ripperda.¹

The Treaty
of Hanover

The real meaning of the Treaty of Hanover was well understood at Vienna, and Ripperda lost no time in giving it emphasis. The signatories mutually guaranteed not only all their possessions but all their rights, and stipulated the number of armed forces they would furnish to defend them. These rights were so defined as to include resistance to any possible injury to any one of the allies, and thus was presented a solid front to the whole line of the Austro-Spanish intentions.

In order to make the new league appear as formidable as possible, the signatories bound themselves to enter into no

¹ For the treaty, see Dumont, VIII, Part II, p. 127 et seq.; for the negotiations, Syveton, *Revue d'Histoire Diplomatique*, VIII, pp. 414, 418.

separate negotiations with other powers, by which they meant to destroy the hope of detaching any one of the allies in the interest of either Spain or Austria; and at the same time provided for future accessions to the treaty. The maritime interests of Holland rendered it probable that the Dutch Republic would join in the alliance, and the explicit confirmation of the Treaties of Westphalia and of Oliva indicated a purpose to associate not only the princes of the Empire but all the powers of the North to maintain the equilibrium of Europe.

The effect produced was precisely what Ripperda had anticipated. Charles VI found himself isolated and even menaced. His only refuge seemed to be in a still closer compact with Spain.

Ripperda was prompt in pressing his advantage. More furiously than ever he now returned to the question of the marriages. Flattering the Empress, making costly presents to the Imperial ministers, closeted in private audience with the Emperor, to whom his high official position now gave him personal access, he urged the cause of Elizabeth Farnese, from whose gratitude he had everything to expect; and on November 5, 1725, he succeeded in obtaining from Charles VI a new secret alliance in which the marriages were distinctly promised.¹

The success of
Ripperda's
diplomacy

The new treaty did not, indeed, accord to Spain all that Ripperda had desired; but in it Charles VI promised, without more definite specification, that "two of his daughters," when they became marriageable, should be married to Don Carlos and Don Philip. As an additional concession to Elizabeth Farnese, in a later article the heiress of the Austrian monarchy, Maria Theresa, was by name promised to Don Carlos, "in case the Emperor should die before she became marriageable"; but it was further stipulated that in no case should the crowns of Spain, Austria, and France, or any two of them, ever be united.

The treaty of political alliance was now made complete.

¹ For the secret treaty, see *Revue Historique*, CIV (1894), pp. 90, 95; and Del Cantillo, *Tratados de Paz*, Madrid, 1843, p. 231.

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Each contractant engaged to defend the other in case he was attacked on land or sea. As Charles VI possessed only three or four seaworthy ships and Philip V had developed a considerable navy, the Emperor seemed to have acquired a valuable ally for the protection of his foreign commerce. On the other hand, if George I did not peaceably surrender Gibraltar and Minorca, Charles VI promised to aid Spain in reconquering the fortress. The first enterprise, however, was to be the dismemberment of France.¹

Ripperda prime
minister of
Spain

His work at Vienna having been accomplished, Ripperda hastened to seek his reward in Spain. Within two weeks after his return to Madrid he was prime minister. Personally the King had not intended, and did not desire, this promotion. It was obtained through Ripperda's false and impudent assurance that Charles VI could feel complete confidence in the success of the alliance only on condition that the negotiator who was responsible for it should be intrusted with power to execute it, and had requested his elevation to the highest position in the monarchy! Elizabeth Farnese, determined not to displease the Emperor, and recalling what she owed to Ripperda in behalf of her sons, sustained this plea, and Philip V, as was his habit, yielded to her persuasion. But Ripperda was not content with being placed over all the other ministers of the King, and insisted upon being "Universal Minister," — an expression of his own invention. All the business of all the departments of government was submitted to his personal direction, and Grimaldo, as well as the other ministers, were practically displaced or reduced to the position of mere clerks to their arrogant master. But his deception did not end with his accession to power. Alleging that it was the Emperor's desire, Ripperda induced the King to name his son, then a youth of nineteen, ambassador of Spain at Vienna; and then, representing that it would be gratifying to the Court of Spain, he obtained for the young man from the Emperor the title of Prince of the Empire.

¹ Regarding the value of the treaty to each of the signatories, see an excellent analysis by Syveton, as before, pp. 423, 428.

Having obtained by fraud the possession of almost absolute power in Spain, Ripperda managed for a time to maintain it by mingled mendacity and bravado. Through a secret agent he informed the Duke of Bourbon that he would endeavor to reconcile Philip V with France, if Louis XV would repudiate the alliance with England and Prussia. At the same time he informed the English ambassador that his policy was directed solely against France, and that all the complaints of Spain against England and Holland could be easily satisfied between them. To prevent the accession of Holland to the Treaty of Hanover, he secretly offered to extend to the Dutch merchants all the privileges that had been granted to the Emperor. But all these fictions were neutralized by his boisterous declarations unguardedly made in his conversations at Madrid.

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At first, intoxicated by his rapid rise to power, Ripperda seems to have deceived himself even more than others. Since the fall of Alberoni Spain had lost the vitality his administration had inspired. The army was disorganized, the navy out of repair, the fortresses were in ruins, the supplies exhausted, and the finances in a deplorable condition. All these deficiencies, as they were forced upon his attention, Ripperda believed he could speedily repair; but he was so completely the victim of his imagination that he identified the formation of plans and the issuance of orders with the realization of the needed reforms.

The only solid ground under the feet of Ripperda was the enforced support of Elizabeth Farnese. If that should fail him, he would be lost. But the plans of the Queen required war, and it could not be long postponed; for war alone could solidify the Austro-Spanish alliance, and thus fully secure the dependence of Charles VI upon Spain, which was necessary for the Farnese policy.

Ripperda's
equivocal
policies

Unfortunately for Ripperda, Spain was in no respect prepared for war. The imperative demand of the Emperor in March, 1726, for one million *écus* with which to equip his army, purchase the alliance of Sweden and Poland, and prevent the States General from declaring the adhesion of

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Holland to the Hanover alliance, fell upon Ripperda like a thunderbolt. Unable to find the funds necessary to put Spain on a war footing, how could a million *écus* be sent to Charles VI? The only hope was in the arrival of the annual galleon laden with gold and silver from America. This was not yet due, and might never come; for the counter-alliance was making warlike preparations, and the treasure-ship might fall into the hands of the English or Dutch on its way to Spain.

Ripperda argued against the necessity of sending money to Germany. It would not be needed, he said, until war actually broke out. As for the German princes, it would be foolish and improvident to place money in their hands to be spent on their favorites and mistresses. But, it was replied, the princes of the Empire would not remain neutral. If they did not obtain money from Vienna, they would seek it at London. Opposed by England, France, Prussia, Hanover, and the other powers that might be added to the league against the Austro-Spanish alliance, Charles VI would soon be rendered helpless.

Suddenly Ripperda discovered that the hatreds and menaces he had so recklessly scattered throughout Europe were about to burst out in flame. Philip V and Elizabeth Farnese ordered the minister to insist that the Emperor should immediately begin war with France, and to urge him to send Field-Marshal Stahremberg to take command of the Spanish forces. They had taken the "Universal Minister," who seemed omnipotent, at his word: and war, which Ripperda had so recklessly invoked, now seemed to have become inevitable. All the efforts to divide the allies had failed. The rebuilding of the navy, which Ripperda had ordered, had to be stopped for want of funds, and the Emperor refused to move until he was supplied with the promised subsidies.

The failure of
Ripperda's
administration

Driven to desperation, Ripperda, who had secretly intrigued to effect a reconciliation with France, in the hope of averting the storm, was now trembling lest Philip V might discover his perfidy. At one moment he assured the Austrian ambassador that there was plenty of money in sight. The

shipload of silver from Peru would soon arrive. He was confiscating valuable cargoes of the enemy. In the next moment he confessed that two or three years were necessary to organize Spain for the coming war.

To Ripperda's incoherence Vienna replied that the war which had been provoked now seemed imminent, and the million écus must be sent at once. At the same time moderation on the part of Spain was strongly counselled.

At Madrid the minister's incoherence was equally manifest and even more disastrous. The King and the Queen began to notice the contradictions in his conversations, his assurance one day of the complete preparation of Spain for any eventuality, and on the next his declaration that hostilities must be postponed. The Queen was particularly anxious for war, and Ripperda's inconsequence of ideas was not only a constant disappointment, it was beginning to shake confidence in his judgment. The fate of the kingdom had been placed in his hands, for his control of affairs was absolute. Finally his change of moods became seriously disquieting, for his incoherence was not confined to his utterances, it was bringing confusion into his administration. By taking everything upon himself, the "Universal Minister" was introducing disorder into all the departments of the monarchy.

In these circumstances, the enemies of Ripperda lost no time in combining against him. Although he had become odious to the entire nation, — and, as a contemporary said of him, had "wrought the miracle of making French all the Spaniards who had been Austrian," — relying on his power over the Queen, he sought to persuade her that the Emperor would be pleased if Grimaldo were expelled from court and confined in a fortress, and others sent into exile. But even the Queen, over whom he sought to exercise his tyranny as the keeper of her secret, fearing that his conduct might force the abdication of the King, refused to defend him. Nothing then remained to prolong his power but the thought that the dismissal of Ripperda might weaken the alliance with the Emperor. A private conference between the King, the Queen,

The fall of
Ripperda

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and the Austrian ambassador, Königsegg, ended this delusion, and it was decided that Ripperda must be dismissed from office. But, as the possessor of so many of the royal secrets, he was not to be rudely discharged. A disagreement with the King over the nature of his duties led to his retirement with a pension, and apparently upon his own volition; but his rage at the loss of power led him to a course of extreme imprudence. When it became clear to him that his influence with the King and Queen was ended, Ripperda sought asylum in the English embassy, under the pretext that this course was necessary as a protection from his enemies, and from this retreat demanded of Philip V a passport that would permit him to retire to Holland, with permission for his son to join him there "with a few thousand pistoles that had been sent to him at Vienna." In the meantime, the ambassador, Stanhope, returning to Madrid from a journey at night, found the ex-minister installed in his embassy as a self-invited guest. Ripperda in his anger disclosed to him all the secret contents of the Austro-Spanish treaties, assuring him that Don Carlos and Don Philip were to marry the two elder archduchesses, and affirming that Philip V and Charles VI had agreed to support the Pretender, recapture Gibraltar and Port Mahon, and recover from France Alsace, Franche-Comté, the Duchy of Burgundy, Navarre and Rousillon.

Stanhope explained to the King that, since the Duke of Ripperda was not accused of any crime, he had accorded him protection in his embassy. The King requested that the fugitive be not permitted to escape; and the next day, La Paz, who had succeeded him, demanded of Ripperda his papers, especially the secret correspondence with the King and Queen. Ripperda replied that all his correspondence, as belonging to the embassy, had been left with his son at Vienna. When asked to explain his disbursements of money, he could give no clear account of them, but insisted excitedly upon his passport and his liberty, together with the retention of his pension.

This insistence excited suspicions of Ripperda's past conduct. To avoid the violation of diplomatic immunity,

Stanhope, having no wish to retain his guest, endeavored to arrange for his transfer to a convent, — a plan which the other ambassadors approved and tried to urge upon the King; but Philip V, annoyed by the incident, demanded that he be surrendered. The Council of Castile issued a judgment that Ripperda, being guilty of *lèse-majesté*, was not entitled to the right of asylum; and, on May 24, in spite of Stanhope's protestations, soldiers entered the embassy building and by force took possession of Ripperda, who was escorted to the castle of Segovia, the prison where Francis I had been confined.

The misconduct of Ripperda was soon fully exposed, and no time was lost in seeking out and recalling his secret agents. The younger Ripperda and his secretary were arrested by the Emperor at the request of Philip V, and seals were placed by Zinzendorf on the archives and private papers in the embassy. When these were examined it was discovered that a private agent had placed in a bank at Vienna in the name of the Duke of Ripperda some two million and a half florins.¹

The fall and exposure of Ripperda contributed greatly to the solution of the grave problems which complicated the European situation, but not without serious consequences as the result of his secret diplomacy.

War between
England and
Spain

His fall left two hostile groups of powers of European magnitude confronting each other without the settlement of any of the differences that had divided them; but the disgrace of the Duke of Bourbon on June 11, 1726, and the accession to power of Cardinal Fleury, the former preceptor

¹ Fearing the publicity of the secret relations of himself and the Queen with Ripperda, the King never brought the Duke to trial for his misbehavior. After two years of imprisonment he escaped from his prison by bribing the persons having charge of him, leaving his faithful servant to occupy his bed, so that his flight was not discovered for twenty-four hours. Returning to The Hague, he fell in with an adventurer of his own stamp who represented the Sultan of Morocco, whom he accompanied to that country, where after some adventures, which legend has greatly exaggerated, he died in 1737. For details regarding the end of Ripperda's career, see Syveton, as before, pp. 568, 583.

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of Louis XV, were soon to alter the international relations of France, and thus lead to a new grouping of the powers.

The relations between Spain and England were, however, too strained to be easily adjusted. Stanhope, enlightened by Ripperda's disclosures, obtained possession of an elaborate project for the invasion of England by the Pretender with the support of Spain. In order to cut off supplies, a British fleet was sent to intercept the Spanish treasure expected at Cadiz. Philip V, irritated by the attitude of England, broke off diplomatic relations with George I and began the siege of Gibraltar. In 1727 the two countries were at war.

Philip V now urgently demanded of the Emperor the aid he had promised in the last treaty of Vienna. Already provoked by the attitude of George I, who accused him of being in secret agreement with Spain to support the Pretender, Charles VI indignantly recalled his ambassador from London and dismissed the English ambassador at Vienna;¹ but, fearing to imperil his maritime interests by engaging in a struggle that promised him no profit, on the pretext that Philip V had not fulfilled his obligations, he remained inactive.

In the meantime the two coalitions had greatly increased their strength. That of Hanover had on August 9, 1726, obtained the adhesion of Holland, and on March 14, 1727, that of Sweden.² On the other hand, on August 6, 1726, the Emperor had formed a defensive alliance with Catherine I of Russia,³ had obtained the support of the Elector Palatine and the Elector of Trier, and by the Treaty of Wusterhausen, of October 12, 1726, had regained the friendship of Prussia.⁴ In this treaty the Emperor and King Frederick William I had mutually guaranteed their possessions, and Prussia

¹ For the Emperor's provocation, see Höfler, *Der Congress von Soissons*, I, p. xl.

² See Dumont, VIII, Part II, pp. 133 and 142.

³ See Dumont, VIII, Part II, p. 135.

⁴ Dumont, VIII, Part II, p. 139, prints the treaty, but treats it as apocryphal. For the authenticity of it, and the reasons for concluding it, see Erdmannsdörffer, *Deutsche Geschichte*, II, p. 425 et seq.

agreed to recognize the Pragmatic Sanction on condition that Maria Theresa should be given in marriage to a German and not to a Spanish or French prince.¹

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Had the Emperor complied with the demands of Philip V, all Europe would have been plunged into war; but his prudence restrained him, and Cardinal Fleury, who was already in secret relations with Spain, with the aid of Walpole, sought to avoid a general conflict. On May 31, 1727, the preliminaries of a general peace were signed at Paris. By secretly promising to Philip V succession to the crown of France in case Louis XV should die without the birth of a dauphin,² Fleury induced Spain also to accede to the preliminaries, and a congress for the settlement of all outstanding differences was agreed upon, to meet in the following year.

The Congress
of Soissons

Before the assembling of the congress important changes had taken place in Europe. In May, 1727, Catherine I of Russia had died, leaving a mere child, Peter II, as her successor. In June George I, on his way from Hanover to Osna-brück, had been stricken with paralysis, leaving the throne of England to his son, George II, to whom he had not spoken a word for many years.³

On June 14, 1728, the congress was opened at Soissons with a discourse by Zinzendorf and a reply by Fleury. In France the opinion prevailed — which we now know to have been unfounded — that Zinzendorf's object was to gain time for the arrival of the Spanish treasure-ship; when, it was thought, he, together with Russia, Prussia, and Poland, would

¹ For the secret mission of the Abbé de Montgon to France, see Baudrillart, *Philip V et la cour de France*, III, p. 279 et seq., where the instructions are fully given in which Philip V, notwithstanding his repeated renunciations, declares, "*Je dois et veux succéder à la couronne de mes ancêtres.*"

² See Baudrillart, as before, III, p. 305 et seq.

³ It was now that Robert Walpole, whom it was expected George II would promptly dismiss, for the first time came into complete control of foreign affairs. "The friendship of Queen Caroline now gave him the same pre-eminence in the counsels of the King as Townshend had in the previous reign enjoyed by his favor with the Duchess of Kendal." See Morley, *Walpole*, pp. 101, 102.

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openly come to the aid of Spain.¹ Fleury, on the other hand, although sincerely desiring peace, feebly permitted Chauvelin, to whom he had intrusted the conduct of foreign affairs, to revive the anti-Hapsburg tradition. In November Zinzendorf returned to Vienna without having accomplished any result, and the Congress of Soissons, like that of Cambridge, made no progress.

The Treaty of
Seville

It was at Versailles, London, Madrid, and Vienna far more than at Soissons that the problems of Europe were to receive a solution. Elizabeth Farnese, having nothing to gain from the Congress, insisted upon a more definite understanding with the Emperor regarding the Austrian marriages. Charles VI replied that it was necessary to obtain the assent of France; and, with the expectation that Fleury, by opposing the union of the archduchesses with the Spanish princes, would furnish an excuse for refusing, Zinzendorf was instructed to open the subject at Versailles. But the Cardinal was too adroit to fall into the trap of being made responsible for obstructing the wishes of the Queen of Spain. Instead, he refused to manifest the least objection, thus leaving Charles VI to explain his own reluctance the best he could, at the same time preparing the way for a better understanding between France and Spain.

The expedient was entirely successful. Elizabeth Farnese perceived that she had nothing to hope for from the Emperor, not even the possession of the Italian duchies by her sons. Both Spain and Austria began in secret to approach France and England; Spain to secure with their aid the Italian duchies for the Farnese princes, and Austria to obtain their guarantee to the Pragmatic Sanction.

The refusal of Charles VI to make a declaration regarding his intentions determined Elizabeth Farnese, who thought thus to isolate him, to abandon the Emperor and enter a new combination. By the Treaty of Seville, of November 9, 1729, between Spain, France, England, and Holland, Philip V restored to the French, English, and Dutch commerce the privileges which had been withdrawn by the

¹ See Villars, *Mémoires*, p. 356.

Treaties of Vienna, and in return Elizabeth Farnese was accorded the permission of the three powers to send six thousand Spanish soldiers to Italy to take possession of Parma and Piacenza, without recognizing the Emperor's right of investiture.¹

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Fleury had, however, missed his opportunity to become the "arbiter of Europe," which Villars declared him to be; for his anti-Hapsburg policy in frustrating the Congress of Soissons and isolating the Emperor at Seville, — a policy at first imposed upon him against his will by Chauvelin, — had left the Emperor and his allies without the pale. It was reserved for England to complete the peace. Just as war was about to break out in Italy, in January, 1731, the Duke of Parma died. Imperial troops at once took possession of the duchy, while Spain protested. In the meantime, anxious for the recognition of the Pragmatic Sanction, Charles VI had modified his pretensions regarding the Ostend Company;² and England, perceiving in this concession a basis for a general peace, together with Holland, on March 16, 1731, signed with the Emperor a treaty of peace and alliance, in which he admitted the right of the Spanish garrisons to occupy the duchies. It was specified in the treaty that England and Holland would guarantee the Pragmatic Sanction, and that the Emperor would not give Maria Theresa in marriage to a Bourbon prince.³

England's
completion of
the general
peace

Thus, by the sacrifice of his maritime policy, Charles VI obtained from England and Holland the sanction of his plan

¹ For the treaty, see Dumont, VIII, Part II, p. 158. The question of surrendering Gibraltar had been raised; but, though it was submitted to Parliament, the proposal was voted down. Elizabeth Farnese considered it of far less importance than English support for her sons' ambitions in Italy.

² The Emperor was ready to abandon the Ostend Company, with the understanding that the Austrian Netherlands should send only two ships each year to the East Indies, and offered England and Holland a favorable tariff, — an arrangement agreed upon in the following treaty.

³ For the treaty, see Dumont, VIII, Part II, p. 213. And for two secret articles, Syveton, *Revue Historique*, LIV (1894), pp. 96, 97.

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for the Austrian succession, and freed himself from the dependence upon Spain into which the ambition of Elizabeth Farnese and the wiles of Ripperda had lured him. Even after the treaty of March, 1731, was signed a Spanish envoy arrived in Vienna to press the project of the Austrian marriages; but it was too late. The death of the youngest of Charles VI's three daughters had nullified the right of choice which he had reserved in the last treaty of Vienna with Spain; and it had never been intended that Maria Theresa should be given to Don Carlos.

Since Elizabeth Farnese now had no other means of accomplishing her purpose in Italy, on July 22, 1731, by the Queen's advice, Spain adhered to the treaty signed at Vienna on March 16 by the Emperor, England, and Holland; and, escorted by an English fleet, Don Carlos entered upon the peaceable possession of his heritage of Parma and Piacenza. In France a dauphin had already been born, which ended the pretensions of the Spanish Bourbons to the French throne. At last a general peace had been attained; and, the purely private purposes for which treaties had been made and broken and all the powers filled with alarm having been temporarily accomplished, Europe seemed likely to enjoy a period of repose.

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CHAPTER VI

THE RIVALRY FOR EUROPEAN AND COLONIAL SUPREMACY

*The new array
of the powers*

THE peace of 1731 was for England not only a diplomatic triumph, it secured immense advantages to English commerce. By the Treaty of Seville England had regained all the commercial privileges of which Spain had sought to deprive her by the Treaties of Vienna, and by the new alliance with the Emperor Austrian rivalry at sea had been eliminated through the recognition of the Emperor's plans for the Austrian succession.

For France the peace had another aspect. It not only left England in the coveted position of a successful arbiter, but it was based upon a foundation which, in the opinion of Louis XV's advisers, could not be accepted,— the guarantee of the Pragmatic Sanction.

Diplomatic relations had been resumed between France and Spain, but it could not be readily forgotten that the late Austro-Spanish alliance had not only been directed against France, but it had even contemplated the partial dismemberment of that kingdom by restoring to the Empire the conquests made by Louis XIV. In refusing to promise the hand of Maria Theresa to Don Carlos, Charles VI had been actuated by an imperial as well as a dynastic motive; for he intended to marry his eldest daughter to Francis of Lorraine; thus closely uniting with the Hapsburg family that duchy, which Louis XIV had once proudly declared belonged to him more than to any other.

To Chauvelin, who was intrusted with foreign relations, the true policy of France seemed to be a return to the system of Richelieu and Mazarin by creating a new league of German princes under French protection and forming alliances to check the Hapsburg influence in the North and East.

In the formation of a new *Fürstenbund* progress had been already made; but it had been without the support of England, which was not inclined to encourage the further increase of French influence in Germany.¹ The return of England to the alliance with the Emperor had destroyed the intimacy with France, and Fleury did not hesitate to call the English "traitors."² Displeased because he could not draw England into his schemes for opposing Charles VI, the Cardinal held more closely to Spain, and complained that, after obtaining from the Treaty of Seville "the lion's share," — the restitution of commercial privileges, and silence regarding Gibraltar, — George II had deserted Louis XV.

Since nothing but the influence of England at Madrid now held the Imperial and Spanish courts together, it was only a question of time when the Austro-Spanish *entente* would come to an end. It was clear that a new array of the powers was imminent, in which France and Spain would be pitted against the Emperor and England. It was chiefly owing to the good sense and moderation of Walpole that the European explosion did not occur sooner than it did.

I. THE DIPLOMACY OF THE AUSTRIAN SUCCESSION.

In February, 1733, the death of Frederick Augustus I of Poland necessitated the election of a successor. The young electoral prince of Saxony, Frederick Augustus, who offered himself as a candidate for the throne left vacant by his father, awakened no enthusiasm either within or without the Polish kingdom; for the Poles preferred a prince of their own nation, and neither Russia, Austria, nor Prussia had at that time any interest in perpetuating the Saxon dynasty.

The Polish nobles were favorable to the exiled king, Stanislas Leszczinski, father-in-law of Louis XV, who was vigorously urged upon the Poles by France. The three neigh-

¹ See Slothouwer, *Un effort pour la formation d'un Fürstenbund en 1723*, in *Revue d'Histoire Diplomatique*, XIII (1899), pp. 188, 198.

² Höfler, *Der Congress von Soissons*, II, p. xxiii.

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boring powers, fearing the predominance of French influence in Poland, were, however, bitterly opposed to his restoration; but, in September, Stanislas appeared in Poland and was again chosen king by the acclamation of the nobles. Russia immediately sent troops to Warsaw, and before France could come to the King's assistance Stanislas found himself once more a refugee in Dantzic.¹

In the meantime Prince Frederick Augustus had won the support of Russia by promising Courland to Count Biren, a favorite of the Czarina Anna, — who had succeeded the short-lived Peter II on the Russian throne, — and had procured the friendship of the Emperor by recognizing the Pragmatic Sanction. Having promised these two powers "an eternal alliance," Frederick Augustus, through the double influence of Russian troops and Saxon gold, was chosen King by a new electoral assembly, and in October was proclaimed as Frederick Augustus II.

Although Fleury had little real interest in the Polish kingdom, Louis XV regarded it as a point of honor to sustain his father-in-law and place him if possible upon the throne to which he had been elected by the magnates; and Chauvelin's policy of hostility to the Hapsburgs was thus greatly promoted by the family pride of the King and the enthusiastic support of the French nation. Although Charles VI had played only a secondary part in the substitution of the Electoral Prince for King Stanislas, he was regarded as the instigator, and war with him was immediately declared.² By stimulating the ambition of Elizabeth Farnese with the idea of new conquests for Don Carlos in Italy, and that of Charles Emmanuel III, — who in 1730 had succeeded Victor Amadeus II as King of Sardinia, — with the promise of conquering Milan, France induced Spain and Sardinia to embark with her upon a war with the Emperor.

¹ On the situation in Poland in general and the French interest in the succession, see the interesting article by Waliszewski in the *Revue d'Histoire Diplomatique*, II (1888), p. 41.

² On August 6, 1726, Austria and Russia had pledged themselves to act together in Poland. See Dumont, VIII, Part II, p. 131.

The most immediate effect of the war of the Polish succession was the signature of the first *Pacte de famille*, — a secret alliance made at the Escorial, on November 7, 1733, in which the two Bourbon monarchies pledged to each other "eternal and irrevocable union," guaranteed each other's territories, and united in a war of conquest in Italy; to be followed eventually, if occasion required, with an attack upon England for the recovery of Gibraltar. Both contractors solemnly bound themselves not to recognize the Pragmatic Sanction, not to permit the election of Francis of Lorraine as King of the Romans, and not to lay down their arms without common consent.¹

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The first *Pacte de famille* and England's neutrality

The reason for this compact was primarily the necessity of a close alliance in prosecuting the war with Charles VI; but it was, in fact, directed almost as much against England as against Austria, for Spain was irritated by the retention of Gibraltar and the constant encroachments of illicit English commerce, and France was dissatisfied with the neutrality of England in the war of the Polish succession.

It was not until 1734 that the existence of the *Pacte de famille* was known in England; but when its import was understood Walpole's difficulty in maintaining England's neutral attitude was greatly increased. The sympathies of both the King and the Queen were strongly German, and both disliked the French. Standing almost alone in the midst of a bitter parliamentary opposition, and with the majority of the ministry inclined toward war, Walpole's only hope of peace at one time seemed to consist in his powerful personal influence with Queen Caroline, who knew how to control the King. But in 1734 this nearly failed him. At a moment when the pressure was strongest and the national honor, as well as loyalty to the Emperor, seemed to demand intervention, Walpole, in answer to the Queen's arguments for war, replied: "Madame, there are fifty thousand men slain this year in Europe, and not one Englishman!"

It was clearly inexpedient for England to permit France

¹ For the treaty, see Del Cantillo, *Tradados de Paz*, p. 277.

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England's
abstention
from the war

and Spain to destroy the balance of Europe by conquests in Italy and on the Rhine, and yet it was an advantage for English commercial and colonial progress to avoid as far as possible a waste of life and money while England's rivals were draining their resources and exhausting their energies in making a few territorial conquests of doubtful permanence. But the cause of the Emperor was not one to arouse great moral enthusiasm. He was hard, selfish, and unyielding. Aid from England and Holland would only render him less tractable, and prolong a war which might otherwise be more easily terminated. To maintain the neutrality of the maritime powers, to convince the Emperor that England and Holland would sacrifice nothing merely to sustain the pride of the Empire, and by diplomacy to separate France and Spain — this was Walpole's policy.

The Peace of
Vienna

Fleury, quite as much as Walpole, was theoretically a friend of peace; but the forces with which he had been compelled to deal, — the personal pride and sense of family honor of Louis XV and the resentment of the French nation on account of the dethronement of King Stanislas, — had been for him irresistible. Walpole, through his brother Horace, then ambassador at Paris, with whom he was in constant private as well as official communication, took pains to impress upon the Cardinal the possibility that the Emperor, in order to save himself, might secretly come to a separate agreement with Spain by yielding to Elizabeth Farnese's ambition and promising Maria Theresa to Don Carlos. In that case, he urged, France would be isolated, and the Austro-Spanish union would dominate Europe.

To prevent such an eventuality, Fleury entered into private communication with Vienna. His proposal was that Lorraine be accorded to King Stanislas during his life-time, with eventual transfer to France, and compensation to Duke Francis in Italy. In return France would assent to the marriage of Maria Theresa and the Duke of Lorraine and accept the Pragmatic Sanction.

On October 3, 1735, preliminaries of peace were secretly

arranged between France and Austria at Vienna.¹ Austria was to abandon Naples and Sicily to Don Carlos; the King of Sardinia was to receive Tortona and Novara, with the Imperial fiefs of Langhe and Montferrat; Stanislas Leszczinski was to occupy the Duchies of Lorraine and Bar during his life, and upon his death they were to pass in full sovereignty to France; Francis of Lorraine was to be affianced to Maria Theresa, and to be indemnified for the loss of Lorraine by the transfer to him of Tuscany upon the death of the reigning duke, who had no posterity; Austria was to recover the parts of Lombardy which had been conquered by the allies; and France was to recognize the Pragmatic Sanction.

Whatever may be said of a method of adjustment by which territories and their inhabitants were freely traded away without their knowledge or consent, as an expedient for peace the transaction was at least ingenious. France secured by it, with the consent of the Emperor, Imperial territory of great value in rounding out the national domain; Don Carlos became the ruler of an important kingdom; Charles Emmanuel, although not entirely satisfied, also received at least a *douceur*; and the Emperor recovered a part of what he had lost in the war, in addition to acquiring from France that which he most desired, and had long supposed it impossible to obtain,—the recognition of the Pragmatic Sanction.

There were much delay and serious friction before these preliminaries were carried into effect. The Emperor quibbled over the details of the transfer of Lorraine, and had to be menaced with further losses before, on November 18, 1738, the peace between France and Austria was finally signed;² and it was not until April 21, 1739, that Spain, after much irritation, at last adhered to the treaty of peace.³ In the meantime Duke Francis had ceded Lorraine and Bar

¹ For the protocol of the preliminaries, see Dumont, Supplement II, Part II, p. 546.

² For the treaty, see Wenck, *Codex juris gentium*, I, p. 1.

³ For the treaty, see Del Cantillo, *Tradados de Paz*, p. 303.

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to King Stanislas,¹ who formally renounced the crown of Poland in exchange for the duchies. The King of Sardinia also finally acceded to the treaty of peace upon the terms required of him.²

The diplomacy
of France in
the Orient

Although the pacific policy of Walpole had exempted England from loss in the war of the Polish succession, and had eventually brought about peace, it permitted France and Spain to gather valuable fruits from their participation in the war with Austria. The primacy in Europe had now reverted to Louis XV, who was regarded as the "master and arbiter," while Fleury passed for the first European statesman of his time. The Bourbon compact, though temporarily strained by Fleury's secret negotiations with Austria, had established that dynasty firmly in Italy and greatly enhanced the prestige of France.

But the Cardinal's success was not confined to Italy and the practical acquisition of Lorraine for France. He had also won a great diplomatic victory in the East. In 1736 a Russian army had been sent to Azoff for the purpose of gaining for Russia access to the Black Sea, on which the Russian right of navigation had been successfully contested by the Turks. War had followed, and Austria, in secret alliance with Russia, hoping to find compensation in the Balkan peninsula for the recent losses in Italy, offered mediation, with the intention of thereby aiding her ally and at the same time serving her own purposes.

Wholly ignorant of the Austro-Russian alliance, the Sultan accepted the Emperor's mediation, only to find that Russia demanded the annexation of the whole country skirting the Black Sea on the North as far as the Caucasus, the right of free navigation on the Black Sea, and the independence of Moldavia and Wallachia. Charles VI, as mediator, declared that this demand was only moderate; while, in recompense for his good offices, he claimed for Austria the district of Novi Bazar. The Sultan indignantly refused these

¹ For the treaty, see Koch, *Recueil de traités*, I, p. 318.

² For the treaty, see *Traité publics de la maison royale de Savoie*, II, p. 517.

conditions. The Emperor then invaded Servia, took possession of Nisch, and declared war on Turkey.

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Since the time of Francis I, France had enjoyed a practical monopoly of the Levant trade, with the special privilege of protecting all persons of the Roman Catholic faith within the dominions of the Sultan. The preservation of the territorial integrity of the Ottoman Empire had thus become, and long continued to be, a dogma of French diplomacy. Now that it was menaced by two great powers, Fleury embraced his opportunity to intervene. The French ambassador at Constantinople, Villeneuve, a man of remarkable energy, aided by French officers in the Turkish army, succeeded in restoring the courage of the Turks, with the result that Nisch was retaken and siege laid to Belgrade. The Austrian general, Neipperg, took refuge with Villeneuve, who had accompanied the Sultan in the field, and was soon persuaded by him to ask for full powers to treat for peace.

Through the mediation of Villeneuve, by the Treaty of Belgrade, signed on September 10, 1739, the Emperor returned to the Sultan Servia, Western Wallachia, and Belgrade itself, which the Turks had not captured.¹ On the eighteenth Russia also signed a peace, having gained by the war only a narrow strip of territory between the Dnieper and the Bug, without having reached the Black Sea, which still remained a Turkish lake.² In the following year the Sultan, as a reward for Villeneuve's services, renewed and enlarged the "Capitulations," which rendered Turkey for commercial purposes almost the same to France as a vast colonial empire.³ As a further safeguard of French interests in the East, on July 19, 1740, Villeneuve procured a treaty of mutual defence between Turkey and Sweden.

¹ For the treaty, which fixed the limits of Austria in the Balkan peninsula down to 1878, see Wenck, I, p. 326.

² For the treaty, see Wenck, I, p. 388.

³ For the Capitulations of 1740, which are still the law for the French in the Ottoman Empire, — although many of the privileges then accorded to France have since been granted to other nations, — see Wenck, I, p. 538, and Testa, I, p. 186.

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The War of
Jenkins' Ear

While France was thus exercising a preponderating influence upon the course of events, the peace policy of Walpole was becoming every day more difficult to maintain. Walpole's interest in peace was not inspired by any of those moral ideals which in more recent times have been invoked to show the inherent wickedness of war. His political philosophy was frankly utilitarian. The aim of England, he held, should be to grow rich and strong by building up commerce and developing colonies. If others desired to exhaust themselves in unprofitable quarrels, England should simply leave them to their devices, and not drain the public treasury and shed the blood of Englishmen for purely imaginary benefits.

But the time had come when the parliamentary opposition saw its chance to force a change of policy, or at least to utilize an attack upon Walpole's administration as a means for accomplishing his overthrow.

The Treaty of Utrecht authorized only a single British ship each year to trade with the Spanish colonies in America; but, under cover of this legal privilege, an extensive illicit trade had been carried on. Indignant with these violations of treaty rights, the Spanish government had frequently searched and captured British ships engaged in these encroachments, and this procedure had often been executed with a rigor as harsh as the provocations were exasperating. Terrible tales of cruelty and suffering had been told by returning sea captains. Letters were read in the House of Commons reporting that seventy British sailors were dying in chains in Spanish dungeons. There was no serious investigation of the truth of these stories, or any attempt to learn what provocation there might have been for capture and imprisonment. The famous Captain Jenkins informed Parliament how, seven years before, his ship had been searched by a Spanish *guarda-costa* and his ear torn off, with the taunt that he might carry it home to his king. When asked what he thought when he was thus treated, he replied in a beautifully balanced sentence that had probably been prepared before-

hand, "I commended my soul to my God and my cause to my country!"

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The piety and patriotism of Captain Jenkins formed a telling background for the stories of Spanish cruelty, and the honor of England seemed to call for war. Walpole admitted that the conduct of the Spanish captains had sometimes been excessive, and arranged for plenipotentiaries to regulate the future relations of English and Spanish trade in a friendly conference. But the parliamentary opposition would not listen to such a solution. In vain Walpole declared that in case of war France would unite with Spain, and that England could not hope for aid from Holland, Sweden, or the Emperor. In May, 1739, the plenipotentiaries met, but the public discussions had aroused the anger of both countries. England demanded the abolition of the right of search. Spain was determined not to surrender "a right which was her only defence against British buccaneers." Denunciation on both sides fanned public feeling to a flame, and in spite of Walpole's resistance, in October, 1739, war was declared, amidst the cries of the populace at the doors of the Houses of Parliament, "A free sea or war!"

Although Walpole declared that the war was "unjust, impolitic, and dishonorable," he did not at once resign his office. His adversaries contended that he would try to end the war by surrendering the right of British ships to navigate freely in American waters, — a right they were resolved not to yield. His fall was, therefore, predetermined; for the British nation was behind the hostility to Spain. In fact, the moment had arrived when a world-struggle for commerce and colonies was to begin in earnest. Hitherto the great conflicts had been European, and chiefly dynastic. But now, with the exception of the Austrian succession, the great dynastic problems appeared to have been solved. The House of Hanover was firmly established in England, and the Pretender had become an itinerant intriguer whose cause seemed hopeless. The separation of the crowns of France and Spain was also assured. The pre-

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the world-
struggle for
commerce
and colonies

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dominance of the House of Bourbon, now represented in Italy by Don Carlos, foreboded, indeed, future dangers for Europe; and, if it continued to be united by the *Pacte de famille*, would certainly present a formidable obstruction to Great Britain's policy of commercial and colonial expansion.

National interests had already engendered a conflict between England and Spain, and it was probable that they would soon produce a similar antagonism between England and France; for, on account of the rivalry of the French and English colonies in North America and the competition for supremacy in India, it was in France rather than in Spain that British policies were likely to find their most powerful opponent. It created no great surprise, therefore, when in September, 1740, Fleury, fearing that if France did not support Spain in the war with England, Philip V would throw himself into the arms of the Emperor, urged on by public opinion in France, decided to send a fleet to America to aid the Spaniards.

But to the end Walpole stoutly resisted the parliamentary opposition; and, while carrying on the colonial war with Spain and sending a fleet to the West Indies to check the naval operations of the French, resolutely sought to maintain the peace of Europe, now disturbed by changes of a different character.

The death of
Charles VI
and its effects

By the death of the Emperor Charles VI on October 20, 1740, the value of the Pragmatic Sanction was put to a practical test. To the neglect of his army, his finances, and the substantial interests of his people, and against the advice of his ablest counsellors, who like Prince Eugene had warned him of the weakness of mere paper guarantees, he had placed his faith in the assurances for which he had so dearly paid.

It was a necessary consequence of the purely dynastic growth of the chief European states that their coherence was centred almost entirely in the person of the monarch. Aside from the imperial office, which was in fact an administration rather than a sovereignty,¹ Charles VI was King of

¹ For the opinions of the time, see Koser, *Historische Zeitschrift*, LXI (1889), pp. 276, 277.

Hungary and Bohemia with their numerous dependencies, and as Duke of Austria ruler over Styria, Carinthia, Carniola, and the Tyrol, — lands belonging to Austria by conquest and inheritance, — with possessions regarded as personal to the House of Austria in Italy and the Netherlands. After continuous occupation of the Imperial throne for more than three hundred years the German Empire as a whole seemed in some sense to be a hereditary appanage of the Hapsburg dynasty; and the other Imperial princes, even the most powerful, were looked upon at Vienna as rightfully subordinate to the Emperor.

Had Charles VI prepared for the succession of Francis of Lorraine, — who on February 12, 1736, had married Maria Theresa, — by at once causing him to be elected King of the Romans, and thus securing to him the imperial power upon his own death, the chances for preserving the Hapsburg inheritance intact would have been greatly increased. But the Emperor had been too weak for such a *coup d'État*. Within the Empire the mediaeval idea of local independence had survived its disappearance in the great centralized monarchies. Since the Peace of Westphalia the princes had exercised a recognized sovereignty within their own dominions, and in Brandenburg-Prussia royal power had been established. In purchasing guarantees for the Pragmatic Sanction, Charles VI had yielded Naples and Sicily to Don Carlos, Lorraine to France, and a part of Lombardy to the King of Sardinia, and had abandoned in the interest of England and Holland the Ostend Company; but he had not satisfied his immediate neighbors, upon whose good will and support it was necessary to depend.

Among the former allies of Austria there was not one upon whom firm reliance could be placed for the active enforcement of the Pragmatic Sanction. Prussia, under Frederick William I, had been on the whole loyal to the Emperor; who in return had shown little favor to his ally. But the last days of Frederick William I, who had died in May, 1740, were embittered by the feeling that Charles VI had disregarded his rights in the succession of Berg and

The attitude
of the powers
toward Austria

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Jülich. Through his prudence and economy the late king had greatly increased the resources of Prussia, leaving to his brilliant son and successor, Frederick II, — who was soon to acquire the surname “the Great,” — a well filled war chest, a thoroughly disciplined army, and the ambition to round out the monarchy by conquest and make it a great and powerful military state.

As Elector of Hanover, George II had been a true Imperialist; but, as King of England, he had been obliged to resist the Emperor’s maritime policy, and Walpole, while appreciating the value of the Empire as a balance to Bourbon ambitions, was opposed to sacrifices on the part of England in the interest of the House of Hapsburg.

The Elector of Bavaria, Charles Albert, had been friendly so long as the plan for his son’s marriage with the Archduchess Maria Anna was under consideration, but when that was abandoned he had resumed his attitude of hostility and announced his candidature for the imperial office.

The Elector of Saxony, in whose behalf the war of the Polish succession had been undertaken, was by every consideration of honor under obligation to the House of Hapsburg, to which he largely owed his elevation to the throne of Poland; but Frederick Augustus II had no inclination to forego his own advantage out of gratitude to Austria.

In Italy there was no prospect of support for the Hapsburg interests; for the King of Sardinia, recalling the epigram of his ancestor, that Lombardy was “an artichoke to be eaten leaf by leaf,” was hoping to increase his dominions at the expense of Austria; and Elizabeth Farnese, who was now through Don Carlos all powerful in Naples and Sicily as well as in Spain, desired to recover Parma, which had been yielded to Charles VI, or to create a new principality, for her second son, Don Philip.

Much, therefore, depended upon the action of France. If the love of peace had really been the controlling motive of Fleury’s diplomacy, he might have averted war by imposing a mutual restraint upon the powers; but the opportunity to crush the House of Hapsburg seemed to

have arrived, and Marshal Belle-Isle, appealing to the traditional French hostility to Austria, urged upon the aged cardinal a far-reaching plan of dismemberment, by which Maria Theresa would be left little more than the Kingdom of Hungary, while the Imperial throne was to be filled by the Elector of Bavaria under the tutelage of France.

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In March, 1739, Frederick William I had concluded with Fleury a secret engagement by which France had recognized the Prussian claim to the greater part of the Duchy of Berg, and when the news of the death of Charles VI reached him, Frederick II was preparing to take possession. In reply to the circular letter announcing to the courts of Europe the succession of Maria Theresa, he, with the other sovereigns,—except Louis XV,—expressed his intention to keep the engagements with the late emperor which the existing treaties required. Soon afterward, however, it was claimed that the guarantee of the Pragmatic Sanction by the King of Prussia had been given upon condition that the Emperor would guarantee the Prussian succession to the Duchy of Berg; and, since Charles VI had failed to keep that engagement, the entire treaty was invalid.

The ideas and purposes of Frederick II

It was a surprise to Europe that the high-minded young philosopher and moralist who a few years before, in the calm of his seclusion at Rheinsberg, had written the "Anti-Machiavel," in which the great Florentine was pilloried as a pervert, and the highest ideals of political virtue were eulogized, was disposed, for purely political reasons, to take advantage of a helpless woman's weakness. But the exigencies of kingship in an age of low political morality present temptations even to an intelligence capable of the noblest reflections upon the duties of a prince. Voltaire, for whose keen intellect the young king had a sincere reverence, had filled his mind with a passionate love of ideas, but had not inspired him with any fundamental principles.¹

¹ The influence of Voltaire upon Frederick II had been to stimulate his scepticism regarding accepted ideas and doctrines rather than to impart to his mind any positive direction. While in a complimentary

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As absolute as Louis XIV in his conception of his mission as a king,¹ Frederick II was not, like the Grand Monarch, governed by a sense of his own personal omnipotence. He perfectly comprehended the mechanism of the State, his own limitations, the necessity of action, and of action in terms of force. Where Louis XIV would have looked for success in vast and complicated combinations, Frederick II sought it in the instruments he could positively command, and not in those which were liable to miscarry or prove illusory. He was the founder of a different school of statesmanship from that which Louis XIV had established. He, too, was a keen and far-sighted diplomatist; but his diplomacy was primarily based upon the conceptions of *Realpolitik*,—the superiority of a strong army and a full treasury to a formidable net-work of intrigues and promises.

At a glance the young king perceived that his kingdom lacked territorial completeness. He perceived also that the position in which the House of Hapsburg was placed presented an opportunity for the immediate expansion of Prussia, and that the foresight and parsimony of his prudent father had provided him with the means of realizing this enlargement. To give effect to his thought, he promptly exhumed the ancient claims to Silesia which the Great Elector had not been able to press; and, on December 16, 1740, he marched a Prussian army into that province, at the same time instructing his envoy at Vienna to demand its immediate cession. In return for this he offered to guarantee the Austrian possessions in Germany and to support Francis of Lorraine for the imperial office, with Maria Theresa as co-regent.

way he had commended the *Anti-Machiavel* as a work "worthy of a prince" and fit to be "the catechism of kings and their ministers," he had dissuaded the young enthusiast from the study of Wolf's *Jus Gentium*, a work which placed international obligations upon the ground that States, like persons, have inherent rights and are bound by corresponding duties.

¹ Frederick II called Prussia "*un pays despotique et monarchique.*"

In this procedure Frederick II entertained no bitterness of feeling toward Austria or Maria Theresa. He felt that Charles VI had failed to sustain the rights of Prussia to Berg, that the annexation of Silesia was a political necessity, and that it must be promptly secured. His demand was not one of sentiment but of pure political calculation. He would gladly have avoided war and spared his army and treasury, if he could have accomplished his end in another way. He was, in fact, disposed to revert to the system of William III of Orange and the Great Elector in opposing the ambitions of the House of Bourbon, and formally proposed to Vienna the formation of a coalition for that purpose, to be composed of Prussia, Austria, Russia, England, and Holland. As a condition of this combination, however, he demanded the immediate cession to Prussia of the whole of Silesia.

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The motives
of Frederick II

In spite of the hesitating and uncertain answer of Fleury to the circular letter recalling the promise of France regarding the Pragmatic Sanction, it was believed at Vienna that the sacrifice of Lorraine had fully appeased the Bourbon ambitions so far as France was concerned, and that the coalition proposed by Frederick II would only unite more closely the interests of France and Spain and thus occasion new losses in Italy; and the scheme was, therefore, rejected.

The Austrian
rejection of
Frederick II's
proposals

But Frederick II was not to be turned from his purpose. As firmly as Louis XIV, the King of Prussia claimed to rule by divine right; but he had a more coherent view of divine participation in the upbuilding of the Prussian monarchy than the Grand Monarch had ever expounded regarding the development of France. For what reason had his provident father gathered treasure and disciplined troops, without ever using them to make the will of Prussia's King respected in the world? Obviously because Divine Providence, watching over the kingdom, had given Frederick William I this wisdom, in order that he, the son, coming to power at this auspicious moment, should use these resources for the augmentation of the State! And so, with a logic which found

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acceptance in Prussia, the young king convinced himself, and also his subjects, that he was divinely appointed to give to the monarchy which his ancestors had pieced together from the heritage of Brandenburg and the spoils of Sweden, Poland, and other enfeebled powers, like a great mosaic whose complete pattern Heaven had not yet fully revealed, the consummate glory which in the Councils of Eternity had been wisely planned. Absolutism had made a distinct advance since the time of Mazarin. It was no longer in Bossuet's stately but dogmatic fashion supporting its claims by its interpretation of the Scriptures, it was in the spirit of inductive philosophy adducing proofs of the divine sanction from the opportunities which Providence was furnishing to Prussia. Frederick II was profiting doubly by ruling over a pious people and by his pupilage to Voltaire.

The deliberate character of Frederick II's plans

As early as 1731 Frederick II had determined that when he came to the throne he would round out the scattered dominions of Prussia.¹ It required no further intimation of the designs of Providence to indicate to him the additions needed to complete the royal domain and redeem it from its hybrid condition of "intermediateness between an electorate and a kingdom."² A glance at a map of Brandenburg-Prussia in 1731 shows that the transformation of the Hohenzollern state into a compact kingdom required much aggressive work. The Prince might easily mark out for future conquest not only Berg and Jülich to strengthen Cleve and Mark, as well as Silesia, but Mecklenburg, the remainder of Western Pomerania, — then still possessed by Sweden, — and especially Polish Prussia, needed to connect East Prussia with Eastern Pomerania and to exclude Poland entirely from the shores of the Baltic. All these the young prince had mentioned as future conquests necessary to the greatness of Prussia.

In constructing this new map of the Prussian kingdom

¹ See the *Denkschrift* of 1731 in the works of Frederick the Great, XVI.

² "Zwitterwesen zwischen Kurfürstentum und Königreich."

juristic considerations had no weight.¹ Assuming the divine right of a ruler to build a kingdom, such discussions seemed to him superfluous; for the accomplished fact would in time be a sufficient indication of the divine intention, and both the claims of others and the preferences of peoples might then pass unnoticed. What had passive populations to say regarding the political system of which they should form a part? Who but sovereigns could decide such questions? And how could sovereigns decide them, except as a Higher Power, whose instruments they were, gave them the strength to accomplish their purposes?

If, therefore, the occupation of the possessions of a helpless woman with the purpose of appropriating them without an appeal to any principle of law seems to our age unworthy of the author of the "Anti-Machiavel," it is but fair to consider that Frederick II, although professing to be a philosopher, merely followed the practice and applied the political philosophy of his time. All that renders his act exceptional is that he had assumed the rôle of an apostle of ideas rather than that of a champion of brute force.

The judgment at Vienna was less charitable. To Maria Theresa and her advisers Frederick II's action appeared unmanly, perfidious, and unworthy of a king. Without giving notice he had taken possession of Austrian territory by armed force, and then dictated terms which he would not have thought of suggesting had he believed Maria Theresa capable of defending her rights.

The resistance
of Austria

It is characteristic of the new king of Prussia that he entered the contest with Austria without elaborate diplomatic preparations; but this does not indicate that he set

¹ The motives that actuated Frederick II are frankly stated by himself. See his *Histoire de mon temps*, I, p. 117. As for the question of right, when his Minister, Podewils, timidly reminded him that whatever right to Silesia Prussia may once have possessed was renounced by subsequent treaties, he replied: "The matter of right is an affair of the ministers; that is, your affair. It is time to work in secret, for the orders to the troops have been given." — *Politische Korrespondenz*, I, p. 90.

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little value upon alliances.¹ Knowing perfectly that the storm would soon break, that Austria was not only weak from a military and financial point of view but also without loyal allies, Frederick II was certain that he could obtain possession of Silesia without help from others, and that when the province was once in his power Austria could not expel him from it.

But we may safely credit Frederick II with a still more penetrating comprehension of his opportunity. Not requiring allies for his immediate designs, there was no reason why he should embarrass himself with engagements to execute purposes ulterior to his own, and perhaps in conflict with his interests. Once in possession of Silesia, he could perhaps without the cost of a conflict retain a considerable part of it, and still be free to choose his future allies.

Frederick II's
position of
advantage

The occupation of Silesia was, however, in itself a diplomatic advantage, not only in further negotiations with Austria, but with the other German princes also. Of these the Elector of Bavaria was the most ambitious. Denying the validity of the renunciation of his wife, the younger daughter of Joseph I, Charles Albert not only aspired to the Imperial throne, but claimed a right of succession to the entire Austrian heritage.² Frederick Augustus II, Elector of Saxony and King of Poland, advanced similar claims, and filed a protest against Maria Theresa's inheritance of the crown of Bohemia. Nothing could be more certain than that Frederick II could, if he desired, without great cost to himself, obtain their support in a general scheme of spoliation.

But Prussia now possessed a still greater advantage. The relations of France and Spain, England and Holland, rendered it probable that if one of these groups should ally itself with Austria, the other would seek an alliance with

¹ On December 16, 1740, Frederick II made a treaty of defensive alliance with Russia, but it was of no value to him. See Wenck, I, p. 529.

² See p. 404 of this volume, and also Heigel, *Der Österreichische Erbfolgestreit und die Kaiserwahl Karls VII.*

Frederick II. France was only awaiting developments in Germany to enter the contest for the destruction of the House of Hapsburg, while Spain was preparing to join in the scheme of dismemberment by appropriating Parma and Piacenza.

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The victory of Frederick II over the Austrian forces at Mollwitz, on April 10, 1741, gave to these possibilities an immediate precipitation. The King of Prussia suddenly found himself of European importance, and instead of needing to seek allies they were flocking to him.

Effect of
Frederick II's
action upon
England

It now seemed evident that Austria was an easy prey, and that without great risk something might be gained for each. In fact, by the seizure of Silesia, Frederick II had disturbed the equilibrium not only of Germany but of Europe as well, and held in his own hand the balance of power. With Russia practically eliminated on account of internal disorders, and counterbalanced by Sweden, which was aiming to recover the provinces which Peter the Great had taken away, there were two nearly equal groups of powers confronting each other: Austria, England, and Holland on the one hand, and France and Spain on the other. As between these combinations, Prussia, victorious in the field and fully prepared for a bitter war, could apparently give success to whichever side Frederick II might incline. He had suddenly taken in Europe a position similar to that which Charles XII of Sweden had occupied at the time of the war of the Spanish succession, but in the exercise of his power he was to manifest a far more skilful hand.

The attitude of England regarding the action of Frederick II had been weak and vacillating, because English opinion was divided. The reasons for this were twofold: first, the double, and far from identical, interests of George II as King of England and as Elector of Hanover; and, second, the parliamentary struggle then being carried on to accomplish the overthrow of Walpole.¹

¹ For a very full account of the contest, see Wiese, *Die englische parlamentarische Opposition und ihre Stellung zur auswärtigen Politik*, etc., (1740-1744).

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George II regarded the young king of Prussia as a dangerous neighbor for his Hanoverian electorate, and looked with little favor upon the augmentation of his power in Germany. Moreover, it was a tradition of British diplomacy to sustain Austria as a balance to French preponderance; and at that moment, when the House of Bourbon had become formidable by the *Pacte de famille*, when England was already at war with Spain and war with France seemed imminent, this policy was more imperative than ever. Still, while popular feeling in England was sympathetic with Maria Theresa, war with so important a power as Prussia in behalf of purely Austrian interests had seemed to Walpole ill advised. While the King would have been glad to form a coalition with Holland, Denmark, Russia, Saxony, and Hesse to avert the annexation of Silesia by Frederick II, and for a time hoped to succeed in such a plan, without strong support, which was not available, the English government was not disposed to offer warlike resistance to the designs of Prussia; and the English ambassador at Vienna, Robinson, was, therefore, instructed to urge upon Maria Theresa the cession of a part of Silesia as a condition of peace with Prussia in exchange for Frederick's guarantee of the Pragmatic Sanction.

The interven-
tion of France

However cruel the wound to Hapsburg pride might have been, it would no doubt have been wiser to follow Walpole's advice; but Maria Theresa and her advisers were not aware of all the dangers to which her patrimony was exposed, and the counsel of England was rejected.

With the faith of youth and inexperience Maria Theresa, until she was cruelly undeceived, placed absolute confidence in the professed friendship of France for Austria; but the peaceful inclinations of Cardinal Fleury, who was nearly ninety years old, were overruled by the vigorous insistence of Belle-Isle and the anti-Hapsburg party; and after the victory of Frederick II at Mollwitz Belle-Isle was sent on a secret mission to rouse the opposition of the German princes to the pretensions of Austria. Notwithstanding the offer of an alliance, Frederick II was not willing to

accept it until Louis XV was ready to promise military aid; but when it had become certain that the English mediation must fail, and that Austria would make no concession, with the understanding that a French army would be sent to Germany to support the Elector of Bavaria, on June 4, 1741, Frederick II signed a secret treaty with France.¹ In this treaty Louis XV guaranteed to the King of Prussia the retention of Lower Silesia, and promised that Russia, which was then inclined to aid Austria, should be kept occupied by a war with Sweden for the recovery of the provinces ceded to Russia by the Peace of Nystad. In return, Frederick II renounced his claims to the duchies of Jülich and Berg, and agreed to cast his electoral vote for the candidate most acceptable to France.

On May 28, Belle-Isle had secured the conclusion of a treaty between Spain and Bavaria at Nymphenburg, guaranteed by Louis XV, who since November, 1740, had been paying subsidies to the Elector.² The truth could not much longer be concealed, for on August 15 a French army had crossed the Rhine.

By the intervention of France the war of the Austrian succession had suddenly become European. In the attempt to disguise the fact of French aggression, it was represented that the troops sent to Germany were not acting in the name of France, nor against Austria, but were merely loaned for the defence of Bavaria, in accordance with previous treaty obligations. The forty thousand French troops were, however, commanded by Belle-Isle, who was also at the same time accredited by Louis XV as his am-

¹ For the negotiations, see Koser, *Geschichte Friedrichs des Grossen*, I, pp. 329, 337.

² The treaty here referred to is printed by Martens, *Recueil*, N, Supplement I, p. 721, and by Del Cantillo, *Tradados*, p. 346. There has been much discussion over an alleged treaty of Nymphenburg, said to have been signed between France and Bavaria on May 18, or 22, 1741. This is represented by Heigel and Droysen as a falsification, although Ranke, after seeing their argument, considered the treaty genuine. See Heigel, *Zur Geschichte des sog. Nymphenburger Traktats*, Munich, 1884; also De Gardien, *Histoire générale de traités de paix*, III, pp. 254, 255.

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bassador to the Imperial Diet at Frankfort, which was about to elect a new emperor. When denial would no longer serve his purpose, the Cardinal endeavored to excuse the hostile attitude of France by pretending that the French guarantee of the Pragmatic Sanction implied the qualification, "save the rights of another"; and in fact denied the validity of the entire treaty, on the ground that Charles VI had neglected to procure the ratification by the States of the Empire of the definitive peace signed at Vienna between France and the Emperor; which proved, if anything, that France and Austria had never legally ceased to be at war!

Effects of the
French inter-
vention in
England and
Germany

The reaction of England against the French intervention in Germany was delayed by Walpole's disinclination for war and his hope of inducing Maria Theresa to appease Frederick II by ceding to him a portion at least of Silesia. English public opinion, however, was strongly on the side of immediate intervention to counteract French influence in Germany. It was for England a point of honor, Walpole's enemies contended, to defend the Pragmatic Sanction; and the hesitation of the ministry, it was declared, was owing to the shameful sacrifice of British interests to those of Hanover. When in September, 1741, George II, who, in spite of Walpole's dissuasion, had gone to Hanover, negotiated a treaty of neutrality for the electorate with Prussia, Walpole was made the object of a bitter public attack.¹ When it became known that the King, as Elector of Hanover, intended to vote for the French candidate for the imperial office, the hour for Walpole's fall had arrived, and there was a belief that he might even end his life in the Tower.

On January 24, 1742, Charles Albert of Bavaria was elected Emperor as Charles VII;² but, although events in

¹ The pamphlet literature of the time is described by Wiese, *Die englische parlamentarische Opposition*.

² For a detailed and extremely graphic account of the election of Charles VII, see the extract from the *Mémoires* of the Prince de Cröy in *Revue d'Histoire Diplomatique*, VIII (1894), p. 592.

Germany exercised an influence, it was not they alone that determined Walpole's fall. The war with Spain had not brought victory to Great Britain, either in the West Indies or the Mediterranean. So fierce was the opposition on this account that the prime minister on January 31 decided to resign. On February 9 the King created him Earl of Orford, and two days later he abandoned office.

The French intervention had produced even more decisive results in Germany. On September 19, 1741, Bavaria and Saxony had formed an alliance to divide the Austrian heritage.¹ All of the electors had deserted the House of Hapsburg. Sweden, inspired by France, had declared war upon Russia; but this had little practical bearing upon the situation, since the revolution of December, 1741, in Russia had brought the Czarina Elizabeth, a daughter of Peter the Great, to the throne, and made an end of German influence at St. Petersburg. "*La France est ici en bénédiction,*" wrote the French ambassador, La Chétardie, one of the chief conspirators in the revolution; and the English ambassador reported, "The ambassador of France is the real prime minister."²

Abandoned on every side, Maria Theresa, when she found herself deserted by Russia as well as by England, in order to reduce the number of her assailants, upon the urgent advice of her ministers, on October 9, 1741, had made a strictly secret compact with Frederick II at Kleinschnellendorf, in which Austria agreed to surrender the important town of Neisse to Frederick II, and subsequently to cede to him Lower Silesia, on condition that he would release her army for use elsewhere; but, after the fall of Prag, on November 26, he had resumed hostilities. On the day when Charles Albert was crowned at Frankfort, however, the Austrians, inspired by Maria Theresa's courage and determination, had invaded Bavaria; and in February, 1742, were in possession of his capital.

¹ See Karge, *Die russisch-österreichische Allianz von 1748 und ihre Vorgeschichte*, pp. 6, 19.

² See Vandal, *Louis XIV et Elisabeth de Russie*, pp. 163, 165.

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The pro-
Austrian policy
of Carteret

In England the fall of Walpole was followed by the ministry of John Carteret, a brilliant diplomatist, who chose for his portfolio the administration of foreign affairs in the Northern Department. The first fruit of his ministry was the Treaty of Breslau of June 11, 1742, between Frederick II and Maria Theresa, which prepared the way for the Peace of Berlin, of July 28, by which Silesia and the County of Glatz were ceded to Prussia, under the guarantee of Great Britain and the United Provinces.¹

In the meantime Spain had acquired an ascendancy in Italy dangerous to the King of Sardinia; and on February 1, 1742, Charles Emmanuel had broken off his alliance with France and Spain and signed a convention with Austria for the defence of Lombardy against the Spaniards.²

English co-operation in protecting the Austrian Netherlands against the French met with only a partial success, but Carteret finally succeeded in obtaining not only troops but subsidies from the States General, and England's intervention eventually served to neutralize the aggression of France. By a treaty of defensive alliance of November 18, 1742, with Frederick II, who, having obtained the cession of Silesia, was content for the time being to remain neutral, Carteret was able to protect Hanover from a French invasion.³

In fact, the Treaty of Breslau proved a turning point in the rescue of Austria. By temporarily eliminating Prussia from the conflict, Maria Theresa was able to place the French in a perilous position; for Belle-Isle's army was suddenly left isolated at Prag. Fleury, who was approaching his end, hastened to make overtures for peace, in which he threw the responsibility for the war entirely upon Belle-Isle; but Maria Theresa refused to negotiate, published his letter, and sent a stinging reply, in which she declared she would receive no project of peace from the Cardinal. In consequence, Belle-Isle was ordered to retreat from Prag, and

¹ For these treaties, see Wenck, I, p. 734 and p. 739.

² For the treaty, see Wenck, I, p. 672.

³ For the treaty, see Wenck, I, p. 640.

Maria Theresa soon afterward celebrated the restoration of her Bohemian domains by her coronation there as Queen of Bohemia.

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The intervention of England had produced such a marked effect in the fortunes of Maria Theresa, that she hoped to drive the Bourbons from Italy; but the maritime powers were not disposed to support this adventurous undertaking. England's main purpose was the mastery of the sea, and subsidiary to this the weakening of the Bourbon dynasty.

The effects of
the English
intervention

In Russia the influence of France had proved of short duration. The Czarina Elizabeth, having secured firm possession of the throne, had determined not to intervene in the affairs of Europe, but to guard against the loss of the provinces taken by Peter the Great. On December 11, 1742, Great Britain secured the neutrality of Russia;¹ and, through the anti-French influence of the Chancellor, Bestusheff, the plans of La Chétardie to render Russia subservient to France were doomed to disappointment. From Vienna, Constantinople, Paris, and London reports were soon afterward received at St. Petersburg that France was intriguing to arm Turkey and Denmark against Russia, and to secure advantages for Sweden. Finally a despatch from Amelot to Count de Castellane, the French ambassador at Constantinople, was intercepted by the Russian Chancellor, Bestusheff, who was in the pay of England, and shown by the Austrian ambassador, Botta, to the Czarina. In this document the French minister of foreign affairs had stated that the accession of Elizabeth "was destined to reduce Russia to nothing," and that the Porte should profit by the occasion to act with Sweden and regain ascendancy!²

In May and June, 1743, the "Pragmatic Army" — composed of English, Hanoverian, and Hessian troops — overran Bavaria, and with the Austrian forces took possession of nearly the entire electorate; and, on June 27, prac-

¹ For the treaty, see Wenck, I, p. 645.

² See Waliszewski, *La dernière des Romanov*, pp. 287, 318.

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tically deserted by the French, Charles VII was compelled to sign a capitulation by which the remaining Bavarian troops were neutralized.

On August 18 negotiations between Russia and Sweden resulted in a treaty of peace by which Russia acquired the Eastern part of Finland, and had thus once more become of importance in the contest. The spell which La Chétardie had exercised over the Czarina was, however, now entirely broken; and it was in vain that Frederick II authorized his envoy, Mardefeld, "to throw money out of the window" in his effort to destroy the influence of Bestusheff and establish the prestige of Prussia.

In the following September, by the Treaty of Worms, the King of Sardinia joined with Great Britain and Austria in a defensive alliance, in which he promised Maria Theresa to furnish troops for the security of her estates in Lombardy, "in order that she might act more vigorously in Germany."¹ Thus, the English intervention had finally placed Maria Theresa in a position to concentrate her forces upon resistance to France.

Renewal of
hostilities
by Prussia

But it was not mainly against France that Maria Theresa wished to direct her energies. She had already become an apt pupil in that school of *Realpolitik* of which Frederick II was the founder and consummate master. It was Frederick II who, even under the cloak of neutrality, was her real adversary; and she was only awaiting her opportunity to recover Silesia.

It did not require the open intimation of her intention "to act more vigorously in Germany," expressed in the Treaty of Worms, to arouse the apprehensions of Frederick II. "The views of Austria, which are known to me," he said to one of his ministers, "render it my duty to crown my work in Silesia and assure it." With this purpose, on May 22, 1744, he concluded a new treaty of alliance with the Emperor Charles VII, the Elector Palatine, and the Landgrave of Hesse at Frankfort,² to which France acceded

¹ For the treaty of September 13, 1743, see Wenck, I, p. 677.

² For the treaty, see Wenck, II, p. 163.

on June 6; and, making the intention of Austria to renew the war his excuse, in the following September he invaded Bohemia, captured Prag, and forced the Austrian troops to withdraw from Bavaria. Then, having shown his ability to retain one conquest by making another, and fearing to excite a general coalition against himself, his sense of prudence restrained him.

His caution was fully justified, for Maria Theresa on January 8, 1745, formed a new alliance at Warsaw with Great Britain, Holland, and Poland-Saxony.¹ Charles VII, having only just regained his capital, which he was barely able to retain, died on January 20, 1745, and his son, Maximilian III, who succeeded him as Elector of Bavaria, was not inclined to play the rôle of his ambitious father. On April 22, by the Treaty of Füssen, the Elector renounced all pretension to the estates of the House of Austria, and in return for full re-establishment in his electorate agreed to guarantee the Pragmatic Sanction and cast his vote in the imperial election for the Archduke Francis, husband of Maria Theresa.²

The situation was thus completely changed.³ Frederick Augustus II, though suggested by France as a desirable candidate for the Empire, was not acceptable to Frederick II; for he had, by the quadruple alliance of January 8, 1745, bound himself to defend Bohemia, and by a separate agreement with Austria to aid in securing the restoration of Silesia. Nor could Frederick II hope to win for himself the support of the electors. There was, indeed, no available

¹ For the treaty, see Wenck, II, p. 171.

² For the treaty, see Wenck, II, p. 180. For the negotiations, see Preuss, *Der Friede von Füssen*, Munich, 1894.

³ After the death of Charles VII, on January 31, Frederick II wrote to Louis XV: "Monsieur mon frère, depuis que l'empereur est mort il me semble qu'il y a un changement si prodigieux dans les affaires d'Allemagne qu'il faut songer à de nouvelles mesures à prendre." The reply of Louis XV offered no aid in Germany, but exhorted Frederick II to seek the friendship of the Elector of Saxony and support his election as Emperor.

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candidate for the Empire about whom the enemies of the House of Hapsburg could rally.

Since his private reconciliation with Austria at Breslau, Frederick II had derived no profit from his alliance with France. Soon after Cardinal Fleury's failure to negotiate a separate peace with Austria, on January 29, 1743, the aged minister had died; and in the following October, when Louis XV was himself directing foreign affairs, a second secret *Pacte de famille* had been concluded between France and Spain, with the design of opposing Austria in the Netherlands and in Italy rather than in Germany. Thus, practically isolated in Germany, and confronted by a strong coalition, Frederick II, even when his victorious army was at the gates of Dresden, was not averse to peace.

The divergence
of English and
Austrian
policies

The divergence of the aims and policies of Maria Theresa and George II was, however, soon to produce its effect at Vienna. While Austria sought to concentrate the force of the allies upon the recovery of Silesia, England wished to direct it chiefly against France.¹ Opposition to Frederick II had at London never been more than half-hearted, and the main object of English diplomacy had been to render Prussia content with the possession of Silesia, reconcile Austria to this sacrifice, and unite the whole of Germany against the Bourbons. Indignant as Maria Theresa was with France and Spain, she had never ceased to perceive in Frederick II her really dangerous foe. The repeated efforts of George II through his ambassador at Vienna to end the conflict between Austria and Prussia had always been displeasing to her, and she was often on the point of appealing to the generosity of France, her open enemy, rather than endure the reproaches of an indifferent friend.

On August 26, 1745, this divergence in the interests of the allies reached a stage that was critical. George II, who was at Hanover, had entered into negotiations with Frederick II with a view to the conclusion of peace between Prussia

¹ In May, 1745, at Fontenoy and elsewhere the Pragmatic Army had suffered severe defeats and a great part of the Austrian Netherlands was in the hands of the French.

and Austria, and had brought strong pressure at Vienna to secure acceptance of the preliminaries.¹ All arguments were in vain. Maria Theresa refused to withdraw the troops that were set to watch the further moves of Prussia.

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Reluctant as he was to sign a separate agreement, George II felt at last compelled to do so. The Young Pretender, Charles Edward, aided and abetted by France, had announced his intention to invade England, had even attempted to execute it, and in April, 1744, war had been formally declared upon France, whose fleet had been prevented from an attack upon England only by the storm which had dispersed it. Carteret, who by the King's favor had become Earl Granville, had been driven from power by parliamentary opposition based on his alleged excessive interest in Hanover, his inability to separate Prussia from France, and his failure to obtain from the States General the fulfilment of their obligations in the war. A new ministry and the disturbed state of the country imperatively demanded the King's presence in England. Without waiting for Austria's assent to the preliminaries, therefore, George II made a separate peace with Frederick II, in which he guaranteed Silesia to Prussia, threatening Maria Theresa with the withdrawal of all British support if she did not accede to the terms contained in the preliminaries of Hanover.²

Although Maria Theresa was unable to drive Frederick II from Silesia, the presence of Austrian troops at Frankfort sustained the Hapsburg interests in the imperial election; and, against the protest of the Elector of Brandenburg and the Elector Palatine, on October 4, 1745, the Archduke was elected Emperor under the title of Francis I.³

Strengthened by her husband's election to the Empire, Maria Theresa continued to resist the pressure of England to enforce the preliminaries of Hanover, and even opened

¹ For the preliminaries of Hanover, see Wenck, II, p. 191.

² For details, see Borkowsky, *Die englische Friedensvermittlung im Jahre 1745*, Berlin, 1884.

³ For the negotiations of France and Prussia to prevent the election, see Zevort, *Le marquis d'Argenson*, p. 138 et seq.

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negotiations with France. Her indignation with George II was still more deeply stirred when the pillaging of Frederick II's camp brought into her possession the secret correspondence of her English ally with the King of Prussia. Had it not been for the strong anti-Hapsburg prejudice of the Marquis d'Argenson, who in November, 1744, had been intrusted with the conduct of the foreign affairs of France, and the lack of expedition in the exchange of views with Louis XV, it is probable that she might have succeeded by the use of these disclosures in negotiating a peace with him.¹

The system of
D'Argenson

A doctrinaire in international politics, the Marquis d'Argenson was theoretically favorable to the cause of Prussia, without being able to give his preference much practical effect. His ministerial programme rested upon the proposition that France was "alone able to exercise efficiently an armed arbitrament which should assure the repose of Europe."² The rôle of France, "favored with a wise king and ministry, and needing nothing additional for her own welfare," he said, should be to maintain the equilibrium of Europe for the benefit of mankind. The four powers necessary to be restrained were Austria, Russia, Spain, and England; any two of which, being in close accord with each other, would create a danger for the rest. The means to be employed to force these powers "to become happy," were: (1) to unite the princes of the Empire against Austria, elevate a new dynasty to the imperial throne in place of the House of Hapsburg, and expel the Germans and the Spaniards also from Italy; (2) to regain the friendship of Russia by sending to her French emissaries, artists of all kinds, and subsidies, and to restrain her military action by leaguings Denmark and Sweden

¹ From June, 1744, when Amelot left the foreign office, until November, 1744, when D'Argenson assumed office, Louis XV undertook to be his own minister of foreign affairs, but was not equal to it. See Baschet, *Histoire du Dépôt des Archives des Affaires Étrangères*, p. 254.

² His *Traité de politique*, composed in 1737, is analyzed by Zevort, *Le marquis d'Argenson*, p. 3 et seq.

against her; (3) to repress the chimerical designs of Spain; and (4) to keep England preoccupied at home, in order to prevent the use of her force and wealth in making war and disturbing the balance of Europe. For this purpose France should possess a navy worthy of her dignity as a peacemaker, so that she might protect Holland from the commercial rivalry of England and the Spanish colonies from her contraband trade. To accomplish this task, France had no need of fixed allies, but should depend upon Europe as a whole, since her rôle as the defender of civilization would always sufficiently justify her conduct and secure to her general recognition as a universal arbiter!

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Such was the system of ideas now to be brought into competition with the *Realpolitik* of Prussia and Austria and the expansive policies of England. The first test of its coherence was the pressing demand of Frederick II for effective aid in the war with Austria.

The defection
of Frederick II
from France

On June 21 he had said to Valory, Louis XV's minister at Berlin: "Hope is the kind of money with which you have for a long time sought to pay me, and which affords me no relief; I declare to you that I wish no more of it, I require deeds." On July 22, he said to the minister, who had followed him to his camp and complained that he was treated like the valets and women who accompanied the army, "If you find yourself ill at ease here, I can give you no other advice than to return to Berlin, where the other ministers are. Moreover, I think there is nothing of importance for you to negotiate here, inasmuch as France to this moment has turned a deaf ear to the subject of subsidies, so that I have no great cause to be content."

A month later, without the knowledge of France, the preliminaries of Hanover had been concluded by Frederick II, George II, and the States General. On September 5 Frederick II even refused the little subsidy then offered to him, as "fit only for a Landgrave of Darmstadt"; and informed Valory that he hoped to find in himself "resources that would take the place of ungrateful friends."

Believing in the possibility of making terms with France

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The Treaties
of Dresden

and maintaining a coalition against Prussia, Maria Theresa not only refused to accept the terms which the English ambassador, Robinson, urged upon her, but showed him a new draft of the Treaty of Warsaw in which she pledged herself to protect Saxony against the designs of Frederick II, and the Czarina Elizabeth so far emerged from her neutrality as to declare that a further attack on Saxony would call twelve thousand Russian troops into Germany for its defence.¹

But Maria Theresa was not able to expel the Prussian troops from Silesia, and was obliged to accept the preliminaries of Hanover. Frederick II, feeling himself practically abandoned by France, and fearing the intervention of Russia, was now ready to make a profitable bargain; and on December 25, 1745, he signed at Dresden two treaties of peace: in the first he restored to Frederick Augustus II, as Elector of Saxony, all his conquests in that electorate, in return for one million écus and the renunciation by the Queen of Poland, daughter of Joseph I, of all her rights in the estates ceded to himself in the Treaty of Breslau; in the second treaty Maria Theresa again renounced to him Silesia and the County of Glatz in exchange for his recognition of Francis I as Emperor.²

The advantage
of the peace
for Frederick II

Thus France was left to continue alone a conflict which involved neither the honor nor a single essential interest of the French nation. Left without real support, Frederick II had skilfully maintained the conquest of Silesia by surrendering what did not belong to him. When he was urged to make himself "the pacificator of Europe," he smiled, and answered: "The rôle is too dangerous! . . . If fortune had not favored me, I should have been a monarch without a throne. . . . I am now assured tranquillity for about a dozen years, and I shall henceforth not attack even a cat,

¹ For the negotiations with the Czarina, and the differences of view of her ministers, see Karge, *Die russisch-österreichische Allianz von 1746*, p. 56 et seq.

² For the treaties, see Wenck, II, p. 194 and p. 207.

except to defend myself; I would not stir if Prince Charles of Lorraine were at the gates of Paris."¹

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With wonderful perspicacity Frederick II comprehended the advantage of peace to Prussia; and there was something almost preternatural in his accurate prediction of the "dozen years" of growth, repose, and economy that he had secured without real cost to his kingdom.

In June, 1744, La Chétardie, the French ambassador who at the beginning of Elizabeth's reign had been regarded as her real "prime minister," had received peremptory orders to leave Moscow, where the Court then was, within twenty-four hours. In his attempt to overthrow Bestusheff, and to draw Russia into the Franco-Prussian alliance against Austria, he had been defeated and exposed. His correspondence had been *perlustrée* in the official *chambre noire*, deciphered by the expert Goldbach, and the most odious passages had been exhibited to the Czarina; wherein her "vanity," her "light-mindedness," her "giddiness," and her "deplorable conduct" were assigned as reasons why she was "incapable of serious negotiation."²

The rupture
between
France and
Russia

Argenson still clung to the belief that the friendship of Russia could be recovered. La Chétardie was disgraced and banished from court, and a successor, Allion, was sent to St. Petersburg to repair the breach; but the case was hopeless and the choice unfortunate. In vain was Allion ordered to flatter the Czarina by conceding to her the title of "Empress," which France had so long refused; and Louis XV's attempt to regain Elizabeth's confidence by a personal letter, almost sycophantic in its tone, was not more successful. Argenson had sought to recover the good graces of the "Empress" by the present of a writing desk "with pigeon-holes, a clock in the centre, all in violet wood, with compartments garnished with bronze ornaments," at the cost of seven thousand livres; and, failing in this, tried to bribe her min-

¹ Prince Charles of Lorraine, brother of the Emperor Francis I and leading Austrian general.

² For the details, see Zevort, *Le marquis d'Argenson*, p. 175; and Waliszewski, *La dernière des Romanov*, p. 342.

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The failure of
France to
enlist the
Turks

isters. But he afterward regretted the "*beau bureau*," and the "*argent perdu*" given to the wife of the Chancellor.¹ Allion remained for some time at St. Petersburg, but his presence made no impression. Confidence between the two governments had come to an end.

The lack of skill in the conduct of the foreign policy of France in this period resulted not only in the loss of Russian friendship, but in a coolness on the part of the Ottoman Empire at a moment when its support was much needed.

The attitude of France toward Turkey had always been that of a superior toward a useful subordinate whose services had often proved valuable, but with whom it was not expedient to make a binding engagement. It was to a French renegade, Bonneval, who had become a Mussulman and had taken the name Achmet-Pacha, that the Turks owed a full realization of the manner in which they had been treated when, after having been invited by Louis XIV to take up arms against Austria, he had signed the Peace of Ryswick without consulting them, leaving them to feel the whole weight of the German Empire. When, therefore, the French ambassador, Castellane, in 1745, endeavored to incite the Turks to keep Russia occupied and prevent the Czarina from coming to the aid of Maria Theresa, he was politely informed that Turkey was at peace with the enemies of France, and that he was attempting a task as difficult as "digging a well with a needle."²

Soon afterward thirty thousand Russians were assembled on the shores of the Baltic waiting to be transported in English ships to fight the battles of Austria in the Netherlands.

The Austro-
Russian
alliance

With the loss of French support, Prussia had been left without a friend at St. Petersburg. All the efforts of Frederick II to corrupt the ministers had proved ineffectual. The Czarina had reached the conclusion that, as she herself expressed it, "the increase of the power of the King of Prussia was not only unendurable but dangerous."

¹ See Zevort, as before, pp. 175, 178.

² As the war of Turkey with Persia did not end until October, 1746, immediate action on the part of Turkey was not to be expected.

A few days before the signature of the Peace of Dresden, a Prussian courier on his way to St. Petersburg with despatches from Frederick II to his minister, Mardefeld, had been arrested by the Russian police, his letters opened and deciphered, and the discovery made that Frederick II was in secret negotiations for peace with Saxony and Austria.

Both the Czarina and her ministers were convinced that the security of Courland and Livonia now depended upon an alliance of Russia with Austria and Denmark.¹ Before the public confirmation of the peace reached St. Petersburg she had ordered her ministers to open *pourparlers* for alliances at Vienna and Copenhagen. On May 22, 1746, a treaty of defensive alliance, with a plan for the mobilization of troops contained in secret clauses was concluded between Russia and Austria; and on June 10, a similar alliance between Russia and Denmark.²

Finding himself unable to tempt the venality of Bestusheff,—who had just received six thousand ducats for his participation in the Austro-Russian treaty, and was soon to claim ten thousand pounds sterling from the English negotiators,³—Frederick II recalled his minister from St. Petersburg after the Czarina had ordered her ministers not to treat with him.⁴

Although the Peace of Dresden ended the conflict between Austria and Prussia, a state of war still existed between Austria and England on the one side, and France and Spain on the other; with Sardinia hovering between the contestants in nominal alliance with Austria.

The Congress
of Aix-la-
Chapelle

In England a decided change of public opinion had oc-

¹ See Karge, as before, p. 65.

² For the treaties, see Martens, A, Supplement I, p. 292; and Koch, *Recueil de Traités*, I, p. 432.

³ Lord Chesterfield, speaking of the English negotiations referred to at St. Petersburg, remarked: "One cannot call that negotiation, but dealing with usurers and extortioners who knew neither reason nor measure."

⁴ The final and permanent rupture between the two courts did not occur until 1750. See Waliszewski, *La dernière des Romanov*, p. 387.

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curred. The Young Pretender, Charles Edward, defeated at Culloden on April 15, 1746, had become a hopeless fugitive. The menace to the existence of the Hanoverian dynasty had passed. The war with France had brought important victories in America, and the colonists were inclined to pursue it; but on the continent the losses had been heavy, the Dutch allies were clamoring for peace, and an enormous public debt stared the taxpayers in the face.¹ By June, 1747, a general desire for peace prevailed both in France and England; and on September 30, 1747, Lord Sandwich intimated to the Marquis de Puy sieux, who in the preceding January had succeeded Argenson as minister of foreign affairs in France, that George II was ready to send plenipotentiaries to a congress for peace to be held at Aix-la-Chapelle.

In France peace was even more desired than in England. The burden of taxation had been sorely felt, and the original purpose of the war had been almost forgotten. In the Netherlands French arms had been victorious under the great general, Maurice of Saxony; but his attack upon the United Provinces, like that of Louis XIV in the previous century, had produced a revival of the Stadtholderate; and, on May 1, 1747, the Republic had chosen William IV of Orange to lead its forces and preserve its integrity.²

In accordance with the wishes of the three powers, France, England, and Holland, a congress was invited to meet at Aix-la-Chapelle in January, 1748; but it did not really assemble until the following April.

The Anglo-French preliminaries

So far as France and Austria were concerned, it was Argenson and his "system" that were responsible for the continuance of the war. Louis XV readily yielded to the popular pressure for peace, and declared that he intended to negotiate "like a king and not like a merchant."

The chief obstructions to a general peace lay in the

¹ A peace conference had already been held at Breda on September 30, 1746; but it came to nothing.

² William IV was descended from John William Friso, of Nassau-Orange, whom William III had made his heir.

conflict between the interests of France and England. Of these the question of the restoration of Dunkirk presented the greatest difficulty, since it lay nearest to the heart of the French. There were also reclamations for France in the Netherlands. Then came the momentous questions regarding the North American, West Indian, and East Indian possessions, which vitally touched the future development of world-empire.

It is needless for our purposes to follow the long, involved, and complex negotiations which, after weeks spent in discussing trivial matters, such as passes, couriers, precedence, and the neutrality of the place of meeting, preoccupied the plenipotentiaries who conducted them.¹ The main procedure and the final results alone are of importance.

The first step was the draft of preliminaries by Lord Sandwich, who represented England, and St. Severin, who represented France. Austria and Spain were held aloof by them for later consideration.

On April 30 an agreement was reached for the mutual restoration of the conquests of England and France in Europe and America, and the maintenance of the territorial *status quo* in Germany and Italy. In accordance with the first part of this understanding, France regained Cape Breton and Louisbourg,—which had been taken by the English,—but lost all the conquests made by her armies in Europe. In addition, Louis XV, as required by the Treaty of Utrecht, consented to abandon the Pretender. In compliance with the second part, Austria would cede Parma and Piacenza to Don Philip, the second son of Elizabeth Farnese, and grant to the King of Sardinia a great part of the Duchy of Milan. Silesia was to be formally abandoned to Prussia. In return Austria should be guaranteed the maintenance of the Pragmatic Sanction, and Francis I should be recognized as Emperor. If these conditions were not accepted, England and France were to make a separate peace.

¹ A full account of these negotiations may be found in Beer, *Zur Geschichte des Friedens von Aachen im Jahre 1748*.

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The Peace of
Aix-la-Chapelle
of 1748

When Maria Theresa's plenipotentiary at Aix-la-Chapelle, Count Kaunitz, learned the terms of the preliminaries agreed upon between England and France, he was deeply disturbed, for he too had been in private negotiation with Versailles. He had believed that, if Silesia were to be mentioned in the treaty, it would be only as a guarantee to the Treaty of Dresden; that, if Parma and Piacenza were to be given to Don Philip, it would be with a future reversion to Austria; and that France would show no particular interest in the increase of Sardinia.

The Empress demurred to the sacrifices demanded of her; but, as she had nothing to offer to France without still greater renunciations, she was compelled to accept these terms. Still, she had emerged from a long and bitter struggle in full possession of nearly the whole of her inheritance. On the other hand, the gains of England were not great in consideration of the immense sums expended. Those of France were of no real importance, notwithstanding the fact that her navy had been nearly annihilated during the war; while the conquests freely surrendered in the Netherlands were considerable. Spain, under Frederick VI since the death of Philip V on July 11, 1746, had shown little aggressive spirit; yet Elizabeth Farnese had won a new triumph in establishing her second son in a principality. The Dutch Republic, which had been again almost at the mercy of France, had come out of the war without loss of territory, and serenely claimed the restoration of the right to fortify the barrier cities which had been taken during the war. It was Frederick II, who had already enjoyed three years of armed peace, who had emerged from the conflict with the greatest gain. The area of new territory which he had added to Prussia was greater than all the conquests of Sweden at the Peace of Westphalia after eighteen years of warfare; greater even than the extent of the whole of Alsace and Lorraine combined, and almost equal to all the territory won by the kings of France in Europe by the battles of a hundred years.

On May 31, 1748, Sardinia, with a show of reluctance,

acceded to the preliminaries of April 30, and Spain followed on June 28. On October 18 the final treaty of peace was signed at Aix-la-Chapelle by France, Great Britain, and Holland, on October 13 by Spain, on October 23 by Austria, and on November 7 by Sardinia. On December 4, at Nice, the protocol for the restitutions and evacuations was ratified by all these powers, and the Peace of Aix-la-Chapelle was thus consummated.¹

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II. THE CONTEST FOR COLONIAL SUPREMACY.

In concluding the Peace of Aix-la-Chapelle it was England that Louis XV had wished to appease; for in America and on the sea England had proved a dangerous foe, while Spain had shown herself a weak ally.

The colonial rivalry of France and England

Since the Peace of Utrecht both France and England had made great advances in their colonial and commercial enterprises. This progress had been made in great part because of the temporary cessation of their traditional antagonism, their alliance under the regency, and the prudence exercised by Walpole and Fleury. But the time had now arrived when the ancient rivalry was to break out afresh and to be pursued with a vigor and tenacity hitherto unknown.

The conflict between England and Spain, in which France had gradually permitted herself to become involved, had its origin in questions concerning contraband trade, and had no relation to territorial possessions. To strip Spain of her colonies in South and Central America had never been a part of British policy. In North America the physical contact between the colonies of England and Spain was but slight; being first established in 1732, when the settlement of Georgia carried the English colonial frontier as far south as Florida, then a Spanish possession.

But the contacts and rivalries of England and France were territorial rather than merely commercial. In North

¹ For the final treaty, see Wenck, II, p. 337.

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America the area actually held by France in 1713 was twice as great as that occupied by England, while the territories in dispute between them at that time were as extensive as the whole of the French possessions. By the Peace of Utrecht, England had obtained Newfoundland, Nova Scotia, and the great area south of Hudson's Bay, but between her Atlantic colonies and this last named accession lay the great mass of the French possessions, including all of Southern Canada and the region of the Great Lakes. In addition, a chain of French fortresses extended the whole length of the Mississippi valley to Louisiana and the Gulf of Mexico. In 1748 France was the preponderant power in North America, possessing the heart of the entire continent, while England occupied little more than a narrow strip of sea-coast on the Atlantic.

In the West Indies the two powers were about equally balanced. In 1660, thirty-five years after the first permanent settlements were made, they had agreed to divide the West India islands, and to unite in a common policy to suppress the natives, who had proved troublesome. France was confirmed in the possession of Guadeloupe, Martinique, Grenada, and some smaller islands; while England's share included Barbadoes, Nevis, Antigua, Montserrat, and several others of smaller size, St. Christopher being reserved for use in common. The natives of these islands were in great part driven out to San Domingo, St. Lucia, and St. Vincent; which for a time were in dispute, but in 1748 were declared to be neutral. Cuba and Porto Rico were held by Spain; St. Eustatia, Oruba, and Curaçao by the Dutch; and St. Thomas by Denmark. Since 1655, when it was taken by the English at the command of Cromwell, Jamaica had always remained a possession of England.

The beginnings
of Eastern
trade

Not only in North America and the West Indies, but in the Far East also, France and England had long been engaged in an enterprise of conquest which had brought them face to face in India.

The Portuguese, whose maritime discoveries had gradually led them to the Far East, were the first to establish them-

selves in India.¹ The first viceroy, Almeida, was sent out to Calicut in 1505; but it was to Albuquerque, who a few years later became master of the fine harbor of Goa on the Malabar coast, that Portugal owed the immense development of her East Indian trade. The just and humane administration of Albuquerque, whose conquests were in spirit more commercial than military, was followed by a grasping and narrow-minded policy which alienated the native princes. The trade of the Far East, however, including that with the rich Malay islands and China as well as India, for a long time remained a Portuguese monopoly; but migrations from Portugal to the East, so extensive as to threaten to depopulate the little kingdom, finally centred the chief interest of the Portuguese upon the profitable coast-wise traffic, and left the field open for the Dutch, who, in 1595, entered vigorously upon it, made permanent settlements, and soon acquired the greater part of the Eastern trade.

Where the Portuguese had made enemies the Dutch made friends; and, in 1602, the various Dutch companies which had been formed for mercantile adventure were consolidated by the States General in the East India Company,—the first great stock company for the exploitation of the Oriental trade, which it extended as far as Japan. The establishment of Batavia and the control of Java, together with the adjacent islands, in 1618 gave to the Dutch Company a supremacy in the Eastern trade.

The English lost no time in following the example of the Dutch, whose success had been largely owing to their confining their efforts to such conquests as were commercially most profitable. In 1599 an English company had been chartered for the development of the East India trade in imitation of the Dutch companies; but the consolidation of these gave Holland for a long time the lead in the race for colonial empire, which the possession of the best ports enabled them to maintain. The rivalry soon led to open

¹ For the rivalry of the Portuguese and the Venetians and the reason for the success of Portugal, see Volume II of this work, pp. 267, 269.

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The develop-
ment of rival
trading com-
panies

violence, and although Holland was the smaller and weaker power, the Dutch were able to stir up opposition among the natives which rendered difficult the progress of their English competitors.

Notwithstanding the obstacles to be overcome, the London East India Company made great progress. The Dutch company had at times earned an annual dividend of sixty per cent, but the London company sometimes attained to one or even two hundred per cent of profit in a single year. In 1640, when the company acquired its great factory at Madras, it was obliged to make vast extensions to its London dockyards, which themselves yielded an immense return; for the company built its own ships, made its own masts, yards, sails, cordage, gunpowder, casks, and even baked the bread for its sailors, thus greatly augmenting its profits. The business was so remunerative that William III, after the example of the Dutch, imposed a tax of five per cent upon the company's stock. In 1698, the enterprise was so successful that another company was formed; but in 1702 they were combined in one great association under the name the United Company of Merchants Trading to the East Indies, with a capital six times as great as that of the original enterprise.

Spain had been excluded from the East Indian trade by the concessions made to the Dutch Republic in the Treaty of Münster of 1648, when all the conquests made from Portugal during the time it belonged to Spain were surrendered; and the colonial ambitions of the Spaniards, although in possession of the Philippines, were mainly centred upon the Western Hemisphere.¹

In France the traders of Brittany and Normandy had long endeavored, but with no great success, to extend their commerce to India. The founding of the French East India Company by Colbert in 1664, followed by a settlement at Surat — one of the finest ports of the Mogul Empire — in 1668, was the beginning of the rivalry with England, which

¹ The trade of Manila was chiefly with Mexico, the voyage to Acapulco requiring five months.

already had a factory there. Soon afterward the French company obtained Pondicherry, on the Eastern coast of the peninsula, captured by the Dutch in 1693 but restored by the Peace of Ryswick.

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It was here that the chief centre of French influence in the East was established by a succession of able and far-sighted administrators. The possession of a considerable territory acquired by the company, together with the right to coin money, enabled the governor, Dumas, to obtain nearly all the trade of the Carnatic. In 1720 Mauritius, having been abandoned by the Dutch, was occupied by the French under the name the Isle of France, furnishing an important port of call on the route to India, which developed into a valuable and thriving colony.

It was inevitable that Madras and Pondicherry should become serious competitors in the struggle for supremacy in India, for colonial control had now come to be regarded as essential to commercial prosperity. It was the necessary basis of exclusive privilege, and monopoly was considered by the economists of the age as the easiest and most certain path to wealth. To possess the sources of supplies was to control the volume and direction of trade, which thus became practically a private possession. The Spaniards and the Portuguese strictly prohibited strangers from settling or even visiting in their colonies. The French and the Dutch were not so exclusive, but they also restricted trade with their colonies as far as possible to their own ships; and the English navigation laws, directed expressly in the first instance against the Dutch, confined imports from British colonies to British vessels. The rights of commerce were bought and sold as special privileges even among competitors of the same nation. The Stuart dynasty had no real interest in colonies, and apparently no conception of their value, except as sources of revenue by the sale of charters to the highest bidders. William III, whose ideas had been formed in Holland, was the first after Cromwell to perceive in commerce and colonies an inexhaustible source of national wealth for England. Encouraged by him the

The transformation of the companies into States

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Whigs, in opposition to the Tory landowners, developed the sea-ports, founded companies for trade, and fostered the colonies as new avenues to the riches they could not extract from the soil, already in the hands of others. The government in England, unlike that of France, until the middle of the eighteenth century, had left the colonies to private enterprise; but a new epoch had already dawned. The clash of private interests had invoked the interest of governments, the value of colonies was beginning to be understood, and a desperate struggle for supremacy was impending. The periods of discovery and occupation were passing into that of military expansion and defence. Europe had at last traversed the oceans and had set out upon a course of universal domination. A new imperialism had taken possession of men's thoughts, new frontiers were to be established where maps had not yet been made, and in the name of conflicting nations the battles of kings were to be fought beyond distant seas upon the soil of unexplored continents. However inert the European courts might be regarding colonial development, in India private interests were gradually assuming political importance; for the colonies had already developed into armed and fortified camps, the nuclei of future states about to become the fecund seeds of empire. Action upon the native princes by the colonists with a view to promoting their own interests and impeding the progress of their competitors could have no other issue, and France under the vigorous administration of Dumas had already established a foothold in Indian politics which rendered necessary a similar course on the part of England.

The political
state of India

The great Mogul monarchy, founded in the sixteenth century by the hordes of Moslems under Babar, had extended over the whole of India. The empire was too vast to be ruled with vigor from Delhi, but was kept in subjection first by the migratory movements of the sovereign in a manner which recalls the restless energy of Charles the Great, and afterward by a settled system of local administration by means of officers intrusted with government within their assigned districts, *subadars* (viceroys) and *nawabs*, or *nabobs*

(governors), who were chosen by them. These were at first mere collectors of taxes for the *padishah*, or Grand Mogul, at Delhi, who had made the *rajahs*, or local hereditary princes, subject to tribute. As it passed on from the *ryot* who cultivated the land to the *zamindar* who owned it, to the *jagirs* who collected the tribute, and then to the *nabobs*, the amount constantly diminished, a portion of it remaining in the hands of the collectors. Gradually rising to a position of wealth and power truly royal by means of extortions which the system favored, the nabobs at length became the virtual rulers of the country, and when in 1707 the merciless administration of the last of the really capable Grand Moguls, Aurungzebe, ended with his death, his duplicity and intolerance left the Empire a prey to discord which the apathy of his successors failed to remove. In place of the strong central government which had once dominated the whole of India from Delhi, there came into existence a loose Asiatic feudalism in which corruption, rivalry, and at times even anarchy, prevailed. The prize of empire was thus ready to be seized by any hand strong enough to grasp and retain it. The nabobs were engaged in perpetual war with one another, each striving to enlarge the extent of his domain; the native Hindoo rajahs, who regarded the Mongol viceroys as intruders, were in constant rebellion against them, in the effort to regain their original authority; and the fierce Mahrattas, hardy native horsemen bent on conquest, did not cease to ravage the country with fire and sword.

Such was the condition of India when Dupleix, a dreamy youth whom his father had sent to India as a means of discipline, having amassed a fortune and won distinction as an organizer under the French East India Company, in 1730 was intrusted with the government of the French settlement at Chandernagor. So efficient were his methods that by bringing European products instead of coin to his Indian colony he soon turned the tide of threatened financial ruin into a great success. Pushing always farther into the interior and opening communications with the native mer-

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The designs
and diplomacy
of Dupleix

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chants, he made Chandernagor rich by the extension of its commerce, which in rivalry with the Dutch he pushed beyond Hindostan to China and Japan. In 1741, after the resignation of Dumas, who had rendered Pondicherry the most important of all the French factories, Dupleix was invited by the company to become his successor. He at once perceived that the field offered unlimited opportunities, but that it would require both war and diplomacy to win the first place in India. The directorate at Paris regarded the enterprise solely from the point of view of immediate commercial profit, but Dupleix after twenty-five years of experience with the native princes perceived that they were ripe for subordination to a protectorate which might in time render India a French possession.

Fully aware of the opposition to be expected from the English, Dupleix believed it possible to forestall and outwit them. His plan was by claiming authority from the Grand Mogul to overcome the pride and haughtiness of the native princes in dealing with mere merchants; to show them that France, and France alone, was able and willing to protect them and give them peace and riches; and thus, by gradually acquiring an ascendancy over them, to render them subservient to French interests and finally with their aid drive all competitors from the country.

In Dumas' archives at Pondicherry Dupleix found documents from Delhi which, unused by that viceroy, gave him the right to claim a rank and make a display as great as that of the neighboring princes. He understood the superiority of European soldiers and tactics in comparison with the rudimentary military knowledge and discipline that underlay the show and superficial splendor of Oriental power. He resolved, at first in the face of ridicule on the part of his French associates, to surpass in outward magnificence all his neighbors; and with such success that the splendor of his person and his fêtes completely dazzled the native princes, who recognized his superiority as Nabob of Pondicherry, and rendered homage to him as vassals. Gradually this prestige extended throughout a great part of

India, and Dupleix could without exaggeration imagine a time when a French viceroy would revive and wield a power more real than that of the Grand Mogul.

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The next step in the execution of his plan was the creation of a real military force, to give substance to these pretensions; not with the purpose of using it against the natives, whom he proposed to rule equitably through their princes, but to maintain this prestige and to employ it against the English. To this end he reorganized and strengthened his little army of some four hundred men, fortified Pondicherry, and quietly prepared for the struggle which he knew was sure to come. With meagre resources from the Company, without aid or interest on the part of its directors or the Crown, out of his own private purse he carried forward his plans for the protection and expansion of the colony. In September, 1743, he suddenly received orders from Paris: "Reduce absolutely all expenses one half, and suspend all work on fortifications."

Dupleix's
defence of
Pondicherry

The command fell upon him as a heavy blow, accompanied as it was with the announcement that the effort to prevent the Hapsburg succession would probably involve France in war with England. In view of this event he was coolly directed to make a treaty with the English at Madras, by which the trade of both countries might be peacefully carried on; and he was at the same time informed that La Bourdonnais would visit Pondicherry with a French fleet.

The French fleet did not arrive; and Morse, the English governor of Madras, scornfully refused to treat with Dupleix, adding that he had been instructed by his government to regard the French as enemies. The war soon followed; and Pondicherry, whose fortifications were still unfinished, was exposed to the risk of capture or destruction. While begging military and naval support from Paris, notwithstanding the orders to the contrary, Dupleix proceeded to complete the defence of the town, voluntarily lending to the company half a million livres.

The French governor was well aware of his peril, and, distrusting his powers of resistance, resolved to avert

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it by diplomacy. On the Coromandel coast, at Arcot, between Pondicherry and Madras, Anwar-ud-din Kahn, a soldier of experience and great courage, then ruled over the whole of the Carnatic. It was to him that Dupleix now turned for an ally. The past services which Dumas had rendered to the Nabob had won his sympathies for the French and rendered him easily accessible. He yielded readily to Dupleix's solicitations and informed Morse that he would permit no attack by the English on the French possessions, or by the French on the English, since both Pondicherry and Madras were *enclaves* within his territories. Thus Pondicherry was saved; but it was by the temporary loss of French prestige. Dupleix, whose policy was to render the Indian princes dependent upon France, to his great humiliation had found himself dependent for the safety of the colony upon an Indian nabob.¹

The capture
of Madras

The future now turned chiefly upon which power could first obtain the command of the Indian seas.

If the urgent appeals of Dupleix had received attention at Paris, the French would at once have become masters of the situation in India. It was, however, an English fleet under Commodore Barnett that first reached Madras in 1745; but Morse requested its commander to confine his operations to the sea, and it was not until July, 1746, that the French fleet under La Bourdonnais arrived at Pondicherry. An engagement then took place in which the French were in fact worsted; but Commodore Peyton, who had succeeded to the command of the English fleet, believing he had lost the battle, sailed away, leaving La Bourdonnais the victor. With this advantage Dupleix advised an immediate attack upon Madras; and, on September 21, La Bourdonnais finally consented to make it. In the meantime Morse had sought the promised protection of the Nabob but he had neglected to send him the customary gift expected when a favor was requested, and Dupleix obtained his non-intervention by promising him possession of Madras after

¹ See the detailed account of the negotiations in Hamont, *Dupleix*, pp. 1, 27.

the French should have taken it. Thus the town was compelled to surrender, the English were made prisoners of war, and all the property of the East India Company passed into the possession of the French.

It was a master stroke for the prestige of France in India, but it was soon to be followed by another even more effective. Anwar-ud-din promptly demanded the delivery of Madras to himself; but La Bourdonnais, without consultation with Dupleix, had signed a treaty with Morse by which he agreed to restore the town to the English at the price of a heavy ransom, of which he personally was to receive a considerable share. Dupleix disputed his right to make this convention, and resolved not to execute it. In the meantime, Anwar-ud-din sent an army of ten thousand natives to enforce possession; but Dupleix organized an energetic resistance, and with a handful of European troops and a contingent of seven hundred sepoy defeated the Indian army. La Bourdonnais, after a bitter personal quarrel with the governor, having suffered much damage to his vessels by a storm, abandoned Pondicherry and left Dupleix to make the most of his victory.¹

Having demonstrated the superiority of European troops and tactics over those of the Indian princes, Dupleix now proclaimed himself, in the name of the King of France, "Governor General of India"; but his supremacy was of short duration. During the winter of 1747 he made repeated attacks upon St. David, where two hundred Englishmen had fortified themselves; but, although he succeeded in negotiating a treaty of peace and amity with the Nabob, his forces were not sufficient to dislodge the English. On August 11, 1748, Admiral Boscawen arrived with an English squadron of overwhelming force, and English preponderance was for a time restored. The siege of Pondicherry, however, proved ineffectual; and, on October 17, after immense losses, the attempt to capture the town was abandoned. In December news arrived of the peace signed at Aix-la-Chapelle; and, in conformity with its terms, in the

Restoration
of the balance
in India

¹ For the details, see Hamont, *Dupleix*, pp. 51, 69.

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following August Madras was restored to Admiral Boscawen.

Although Dupleix had won a great name as a heroic leader, both in India and Europe, the Peace of Aix-la-Chapelle undid his work, and the balance between the contestants in India was restored. The causes of conflict were, however, in no respect diminished, and the embers of hostility still glowed hotly in the rival colonies. A new period in the struggle for supremacy in India was soon to open, for England had awakened to a consciousness of the true nature of her colonial rivalry with France.

Alliances with
the native
princes

England and France were now nominally at peace, but the presence of two bodies of armed men representing conflicting interests in a part of the world remote from the control of their respective governments was certain to impart to their rivalry a military character. It was the dream of Dupleix to rule the Carnatic, and eventually the whole of India, by placing in power native princes who would be subservient to French control.

An opportunity for the execution of this policy was soon afforded by the ambition of Muzuffar Jung, who in 1748 aspired to the position of Subadar of the Deccan, and that of Chunda Sahib, who desired to become Nabob of the Carnatic. With the aid of Dupleix, who offered them money and counsel, they overcame Anwar-ud-din, who was killed in battle. Arcot was occupied, and Muzuffar Jung, after being proclaimed Subadar, made Chunda Sahib, who had proved himself a vigorous warrior, Nabob of the Carnatic. The only remaining obstacle to the complete conquest of the province was the presence of Admiral Boscawen at Madras.

At first the Admiral was disposed to support Chunda Sahib; but when it became known that he was in close alliance with Dupleix, to whom he chiefly owed his success, it was thought expedient to join forces with Nasir Jung and Mohammed Ali, the rivals and opponents of the new subadar and the new nabob. With the aid of French officers on the one side and English officers on the other, a bitter war was waged between these native chiefs, in which Nasir

Jung was killed, and Muzuffar Jung was confirmed in the rulership of the Deccan. Immense treasure fell into the hands of the French, and war proved more profitable than commerce. At Pondicherry the spoils were divided, Dupleix being appointed governor of all the territories south of the river Kistna, with fortresses and a salary of ten thousand pounds sterling; fifty thousand pounds were distributed among the French soldiers; the same sum, with land yielding forty thousand pounds a year, was presented to the French Company; and Chunda Sahib was made Nabob of the Carnatic under the French governor.

Thus the modest merchants who only a few decades previously had humbly sought the favor and protection of secondary native chiefs were now the virtual lords of a vast area whose wealth had become proverbial. Dupleix assumed all the state and ceremony of an Oriental prince, holding splendid *durbars* at which, magnificently attired in colored silks and sparkling with costly jewels, he suffered himself to be approached only on bended knee. His dream of empire seemed in 1751 almost fulfilled.

The lesson of this brilliant and sudden success was not lost upon the English, whose prestige with the natives had steadily suffered from the defeats which had overwhelmed their unfortunate native allies. The victories
of Clive

Among those who had been made prisoners of war at Madras was a young Englishman, Robert Clive, who, like Dupleix, had come to India to seek his fortune, and in 1744 had been appointed a writer in the service of the East India Company. Like the great Frenchman with whom he was to contest the possession of an empire, he was at school held in small esteem by his masters; but his love of initiative, his imperious temper, his fearlessness, and his aversion to control, united with a vigorous intelligence, marked him as a youth born to be a leader.

Without other military training than that derived from actual fighting, Clive was soon in the front rank of the little band of soldiers at Madras and soon reached the grade of Captain. Able to bring his magnetic influence to

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bear upon the natives by his knowledge of their language, he was quick to grasp the principles upon which Dupleix had won success, and perceived that the way to the conquest of India was a judiciously chosen alliance with the Indian princes, that native armies were unable to resist European tactics and organization, and that these forces under European leadership could be made effective.

It was clear that unless the French were resisted by the same means they had adopted, they would soon be supreme in India and the English could no longer maintain an existence there. The fortress of Trichinopoly, which commanded the district of Tanjore, whose waters could be cut off by its occupants, was the objective of a French attack. The knowledge of this fact brought the Rajah of Tanjore into alliance with the English, and it was determined that the possession of this point of vantage by the French must be prevented. The English Governor, Saunders, resolved to hold this point, and Clive thus found his opportunity to win distinction.

The English having taken possession of the town, it was promptly laid under siege by the French; but, in order to entice away a part of the investing force, Clive planned and executed a successful attack upon Arcot, the capital of Chunda Sahib. The expedient proved effective; and, as the result of heroism hardly paralleled in the history of warfare, the prestige of England in India was fully redeemed. By pursuing Dupleix's methods with even greater personal vigor and courage, Clive saved the English Company from ultimate expulsion from the field where it was destined finally to create an undisputed empire. The bold capture and defence of Arcot, followed by the death of Chunda Sahib, was the turning-point of English fortunes in India; but without the example set by Dupleix, who had conceived the plan of ultimate conquest, it is doubtful if even the valor and energy of Clive would have borne such unexpected fruits.¹

¹ For the life and activities of Clive, see the admirable biography by Wilson, *Lord Clive*, London, 1911.

The relations of France and England in India had been exasperating, but it was a quarrel that arose in the solitudes of North America that was soon to precipitate a long and sanguinary conflict in which the greater part of Europe would be involved.

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The English colonies, stretching along the Atlantic sea-coast from the Penobscot river on the North to the Spanish possession of Florida on the South, formed a narrow rim of sparsely populated territory extending about two hundred miles into the interior. This strip of territory, composed of a continuous row of colonies under the sovereignty of the King of England, was populated by emigrants from different European nations, — England, Scotland, Ireland, Holland, Sweden, and various states of Germany,¹ — differing in religious beliefs, in family traditions, in types of colonial government, in the purposes for which they had left their European homes, and in the nature of the soil and modes of cultivation of the areas they inhabited. Pilgrims and Puritans, fleeing from the Anglican persecution and mostly of English blood, occupied New Hampshire, Massachusetts, Rhode Island, and Connecticut, which together formed New England. The population of New York, New Jersey, Pennsylvania, and Delaware was more composite, comprising Dutch Calvinists, Swedish and German Lutherans, strict Anglicans, Quakers, and Scotch Presbyterians. Maryland, Virginia, North and South Carolina, and Georgia were peopled with inhabitants chiefly of English blood, but with a mixture of other races, mainly Catholic in Maryland, and largely Anglican farther South.

The English
possessions
in America

The natural conditions were as varied as the human elements composing these settlements. In New England the soil was difficult to cultivate and the climate severe, necessitating a laborious and frugal life on the part of a hardy race. The middle colonies possessed a more fertile country, yielding more bountiful crops of fruits and cereals, with the ad-

¹ On the German immigrations, see the valuable introduction in *Learned, Guide to the MS. Materials Relating to American History in the German State Archives*, Washington, 1912.

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vantage of bays and rivers penetrating more deeply into the interior and affording conditions of life more diversified and more responsive to human effort. The southern colonies possessed many of these physical advantages with a milder climate and still more fertile fields, adapted to the cultivation of sugar-cane, cotton, and tobacco,—products that encouraged slave labor on the plantations and were more in demand for exportation to Europe than those of the less generous North.¹

The entire population of the English colonies, thus divergent in respect to race, religion, interests, sentiments, and conditions of existence, numbered in the middle of the eighteenth century about one million two hundred thousand souls.

The French
possessions
in America

The French possessions in America were of a different character. They were of vast extent, stretching from the Gulf of St. Lawrence to Lake Superior, encompassing all the other inland seas, and connecting the rivers uniting to form the Mississippi, whose banks La Salle in the name of Louis XIV had in 1682 claimed for France. In all respects these territories were in striking contrast with the more compact body of the thirteen English colonies. Vast forests and prairies, marvellously traversed and connected by natural waterways, gave to the French control of the still unexplored recesses of the continent, whose real extent was then but vaguely known. But this immense empire was for the most part unpopulated. The white inhabitants of Canada, chiefly confined to the province of Quebec, numbered only about sixty thousand, composed entirely of French colonists. At Detroit there was a settlement of a thousand or twelve hundred. At New Orleans a similar colony existed. The remainder of the white population occupied a chain of military posts, held by small garrisons of regular soldiers and surrounded by groups of friendly Indians, extending westward to Lake Winnepeg; eastward to the St. Lawrence

¹ The Hudson's Bay Region, Nova Scotia, and Newfoundland were very thinly populated, and the delimitation of Nova Scotia was in dispute.

including the southern extremity of Lake Champlain, where Fort Saint-Frédéric, or Crown Point, then formed the frontier fortress of "New France," regarded by the colonists of New England and the Hudson river as a constant menace; and southwestward, reaching out toward the Mississippi, along the great waterways, such as the Illinois, Maumee, and Wabash rivers, thus cutting off the westward expansion of the English colonies by this vast but as yet unpopulated domain claimed by France.

Thus were brought face to face on the one hand the expansive pressure of a virile, vigorous, and growing population that strongly resented opposition, and on the other a territorial claim on the part of a foreign and frequently hostile power, supported only by military occupation and the sparse settlements of a different race.

The disputed territories

For the most part the French and English settlements were separated by wide stretches of primeval forest and high mountains, peopled only by the Indian tribes who were their only inhabitants. The colonies of New York and Pennsylvania had not attained more than half their present westward extension, and the same was true of other colonies to the south. The intermediate country, rich, fertile, and well watered, was of necessity a debatable land. Largely occupied by the Confederation of the Five Nations, over which George II by the Treaty of Utrecht claimed the right of a protectorate, it was natural that the English colonists should regard it as their legitimate field of westward expansion; but the erection of a fort by the English at Oswego so irritated the Governor of Canada that he protested against it, to which the Governor of New York replied with bitter complaints against the establishment of the French fort Saint-Frédéric on the southern extremity of Lake Champlain.

To these causes of friction was added the dispute regarding the frontiers of Nova Scotia. The French pretended that when the cession of "Acadie" was made to England in the Treaty of Utrecht only the southern part of the peninsula east of the Bay of Fundy, including Annapolis, was intended to be conveyed; while the English claimed the whole country

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south of the river and gulf of St. Lawrence, comprising what is now known as New Brunswick and the northern part of Maine. This whole region, as far west as Lake Champlain and Lake George, France insisted upon retaining; and even in what was conceded to be "Acadie," the French peasants who had made their homes there were reluctant to pass under the rule of the English, "whose language was strange to them and whose religion they detested."

In the struggle in America, as in India, the natives were a factor not to be entirely ignored. In the North, wherever the French had come in contact with them, they had won their friendship, especially at Quebec and Montreal. "These Indians," as a French historian has said, "converted to Catholicism, much attached to religious rites which, thanks to the tolerance of the missionaries, were not irreconcilable with their barbarous customs in time of peace and their habitual cruelties in time of war, were always ready to take the tomahawk against the English. They furnished to the French expeditions excellent scouts, guides of the first order, and frequently served as intermediaries in the negotiations carried on with the wild tribes of the interior."¹ The Iroquois, on the other hand,— who occupied the region lying between Lake Champlain, the Saint Lawrence, the Great Lakes, and the Ohio,— while nominally in alliance with the English, were weakened by the long conflict with Canada and not always firm in their devotion to a race but little considerate of their welfare. West of Pennsylvania the majority of the Indians, as a result of the more generous treatment they had received under the influence of William Penn, were loyal to the English and hostile to the French.²

The develop-
ment of hostilities in America

As early as 1750 the French had resolved to maintain their ground in the disputed parts of "Acadie," to drive the English from their posts on Lake Ontario, and to outstrip

¹ Waddington, *Louis XV et le renversement des alliances*, p. 8.

² The French explorations and settlements and the early Indian wars resulting from them are brilliantly and authoritatively treated in numerous works by Francis Parkman.

them in the region of the Ohio river. Open attacks by French soldiers could not well be made in time of peace; but by official instructions sent from Paris on April 15, 1750, La Jonquière, the French governor, was authorized to incite the Indians against the English settlers.¹ To enable him to render aggression still more effective, Acadians were disguised as Indians. Thus, under the cover of peaceful relations, hostilities of a barbaric nature were continually carried on with the English colonists by the orders of the *Roi Très-Chrétien*. The English, on the other hand, believing in their right to occupy "Acadie," did not hesitate to employ military measures, even in a time of nominal peace; and Fort Lawrence was erected at the head of the Bay of Fundy, in spite of an active resistance by the Acadians in the course of which many lives were lost.

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The arrival of Duquesne as governor of Quebec in 1752 was the signal for a vigorous attempt on the part of France to obtain command of the Ohio valley. An English company, composed chiefly of merchants and bankers of Virginia and Maryland, having obtained large landed concessions on the banks of the Ohio, as well as a monopoly of the trade with the Indians in that region, aided by the governors of Virginia and Pennsylvania, determined to oppose the French advance. In the winter of 1753-1754 a young officer of militia, George Washington, then only twenty-two years of age, was sent by Governor Dinwiddie of Virginia to remonstrate with the French officers, who were establishing forts on Lake Erie, and at other points in the disputed region.

Young Washington was politely received and was promised that his letter would be sent to Canada, but his mission was fruitless.

Whether or not the lands watered by the Ohio river had been, as alleged, bought by the English from the Indians under a treaty said to have been made at Lancaster in 1744, and whether these lands really belonged to Pennsylvania, or, as it was claimed, to Virginia, are questions of small

¹ See the evidence cited by Waddington, *Louis XV*, etc., pp. 15, 16.

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present importance; it seemed clear to the English colonists that this unexplored and unoccupied region at least did not by any title whatever belong to France. Dinwiddie, therefore, in January, 1754, announced to London his purpose of taking possession of the region by military force, obtained an appropriation of ten thousand pounds sterling from the Virginia assembly, and decided to erect a fort at the junction of the Alleghany and Monongahela rivers where they unite to form the Ohio,—now the site of Pittsburg. During the construction of this fort the French appeared upon the scene; and, on April 17, the Virginians were ordered to desist and to retire. The French, having superior numbers, took possession of the place, completed the unfinished fort, and in honor of their governor named it Fort Duquesne.

Open conflict
between
France and
England

Although obliged to retreat, Washington, with a hundred and fifty Virginians, had not receded far when a small detachment of French soldiers, under the command of De Jumonville, was sent out to order the Virginians to leave the contested territory. The two bodies met, and De Jumonville was killed by an Indian. The French commander, Contrecoeur, promptly organized a strong body of French soldiers, Canadian militia, and Indians, and open war began.

It is not within the scope of this work to narrate the military operations which followed, and which gave rise to recriminations that long obscured the real nature of the events. Bad faith in reporting the circumstances of this conflict was charged on both sides; the French commander of the expedition sent to avenge the death of Jumonville, De Villiers, pretending that the band attacked by the Virginians was composed of mere "*parlementaires*," whose object was to make a peaceable communication, and that Jumonville was basely "assassinated" before he could make his mission known; Governor Dinwiddie, on the contrary, claiming that, by the language of Contrecoeur's instructions, the detachment was "a body of soldiers sent to enforce the retirement of the Virginians," suddenly transformed, after the fact of their defeat and capture,

into "ambassadors" by "*les beaux discours*" of the French.

It is due to the good name of Washington to record his solemn assertion that, although by the terms of the capitulation of Fort Necessity signed by him, — but written in the French language, which he did not understand, — Jumonville was declared to have been "assassinated," he did not even know of Jumonville's existence; was not aware of the quality attributed to his detachment; and that, in the document referred to, he was deceived by the interpreter.¹

It is difficult in such border warfare to apply with rigor the ethical or even the legal principles which confessedly ought to govern military action. In this battle for supremacy the savage instincts of the native tribes were secretly and afterward openly appealed to, and both contestants set a price on the lives of their enemies by offering a reward for their scalps, no matter how taken.² It is, however, greatly to the credit of the Indians that, on more than one occasion, they expressed their preference to remain neutral, and declined the inducements offered to them to participate in the war. The noble response of the Five Nations of the Iroquois, made on October 12, 1754, in answer to Duquesne's invitation to join in an attack upon the English settlements, is a document that deserves to be permanently recorded. "We of the Five Nations," runs this reply, "labor constantly for good relations, while our French Father and our English Brothers, both equally ambitious, dispute over lands that belong to no one but ourselves. We are surprised that you who are given to prayer have no fear of chastisement. Let the Crowns of France and England make their decision,

¹ See Waddington, *Louis XV et le renversement des alliances*, pp. 26, 33; also Parkman, *Montcalm and Wolf*, Boston, 1888; and Dussieux, *Le Canada sous la domination française*, Paris, 1855, who gives the text of the capitulation.

² On August 14, 1753, Prévost reports to the French government the payment of 1800 livres for 18 scalps taken from the English "dans les différentes courses"; and Governor Shirley of Massachusetts, on December 24, 1755, instructs Major Johnson to offer a premium for every scalp taken from the enemy.

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War in
America
rendered
inevitable

or at least compose their quarrels between you French and English by yourselves, without involving the savages as you do in such a fashion that we find ourselves enclosed between these two brothers, who both seem to wish to drive us to the centre of the earth. We pray you, our Father, by this token to be pleased to act with mildness in this enterprise, in order that we may remain tranquil on our lands."¹

It is necessary to remember that the opposing forces in this contest were not personal but imperial interests. It is true, that the English colonists in America were not disposed to yield to a foreign and unfriendly power the possession of the vast *Hinterland* that bounded their settlements on the West, or to remain exposed to future invasion from the North. But the contest was in reality a war between governments rather than a conflict of races. It is freely admitted that "the perfidious conduct of La Jonquière and Duquesne was in obedience to the injunctions of their Court and the suggestions of their minister."² And the same may be said of the English governors. As early as 1750 Shirley and Lawrence had been secretly authorized to act together in the North to expel the French from their positions. On both sides during the deceptive conversations between the French minister of foreign affairs, Rouillé, and the English ambassador, Lord Albemarle, at Paris, secret military instructions were given to the colonial governors authorizing their aggressions. In the autumn of 1754, without notice to France, it was decided that Braddock was to be sent to America to attack the French at four points: Braddock himself was to lead two regiments of regulars against Fort Duquesne; two regiments of colonials under Shirley were to be sent against Fort Niagara; New England militia were to seize Crown Point, the key of Lake Champlain; and another body of New Englanders under Lawrence was to take Fort Beauséjour. Soon afterward in April, 1755, a French expedition under Baron Dieskau

¹ From the report of a council of the Five Nations at Montreal, in the "Correspondance du Canada," Archives des Colonies, Paris.

² Waddington, "Louis XV et le renversement des alliances," p. 43.

was sent to Canada with three thousand troops; and in the following summer, without a declaration of war, and without a serious effort on the part of the two governments to avert a conflict, hostilities on a large scale were opened, under cover of friendly intentions, which resulted in Braddock's defeat and death and the capture of Dieskau during his attempt to invade the valley of the Hudson river. By the fatality of their conflicting purposes in India and America, France and England had at length become involved in a contest for colonial expansion that could not end until one or the other of the contestants had been driven from the field.

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During the entire period between the Peace of Aix-la-Chapelle and the defeat of Braddock there had been opportunity for a friendly adjustment of the issues in India and America, but there was no serious intention of compromise on either side.¹ In truth, the Peace was regarded by both governments as a temporary truce, and both were only waiting for the moment when it might be to their advantage to renew the contest. Each had secretly hoped to obtain from the course of events in Europe some advantage without prematurely exposing its intentions, but it was impossible that a fiction so palpable should continue longer.

The delicacy
of the
European
situation

The profit to be drawn by either side from the state of Europe was extremely doubtful. The relations of England and Spain had been readjusted by a treaty signed at Madrid on October 5, 1750, in which the rights possessed by the South Sea Company regarding the Asiento had been abandoned in return for a hundred thousand pounds sterling;² but the *Pacte de famille* between France and Spain still bound the two monarchies to a common policy in case France should become involved in war.

The Austro-Prussian situation remained practically unchanged: England and Russia in alliance with Austria, and France in nominal alliance with Prussia; but Prussia and

¹ For the details of the very tedious negotiations, see Waddington, *Louis XV*, etc., pp. 51, 113.

² For the treaty, see Wenck, II, p. 464; Del Cantillo, p. 400.

CHAP. VI England were less friendly than before. In fact, since 1750
 A. D. diplomatic relations had been broken off. Frederick II had
 1731-1756 given offence in England by withholding the payment of instalments due on the debt secured by the revenues of Silesia, which he had assumed at the time of its annexation, and George II had been further displeased on account of Frederick's coquetting with the Jacobites.

Although the general relations of the powers in July, 1755, remained unchanged, it was certain that the Anglo-French conflict would in some way affect the European situation as a whole; for each side would seek some new adjustment for its own advantage by which the existing equilibrium would be disturbed. The changes about to occur were, however, of such a radical character that no statesman in Europe would have been able to predict them, or even to believe that they were possible. In order to comprehend them, it is necessary to consider the forces which had been silently, and in great part secretly, operating in Europe during the period from 1748 to 1755.

III. THE REVERSAL OF THE ALLIANCES

The secret
 diplomacy of
 Louis XV

In 1744, after the death of Cardinal Fleury, Louis XV had for about five months undertaken to be his own minister of foreign affairs; but, although he had a profound sense of his *métier de roi*, and wished to be, like his great-grandfather, Louis XIV, an absolute master, such was his timidity — his "pusillanimity" even — that, "after having carefully sought out the right course, and being clear in his own mind, he almost always decided, although with regret, for the wrong one when it was proposed by his ministers or by his mistresses."¹

Thus, while persuaded "that an honest man would not remain at his court," after strenuous exertions to make a wise decision, in spite of his desire to be independent, Louis XV usually found himself overruled by his own weakness

¹ Boutaric, *Correspondance secrète*, I, p. 3.

and finally compelled to do that which he himself did not approve.¹

Constantly suspecting the conduct and motives of others, and cherishing a private opinion that there was value in his own ideas which might be vindicated if they were properly carried out, alongside the official diplomacy of the regular ministry the King had organized a secret diplomacy, conducted by himself, which was inspired by purposes that not only differed from those of the orders which he himself publicly authorized, but were sometimes even intended to frustrate them. Such was the pitiable outcome of the advice given to Louis XV by the Duke de Noailles after the death of Fleury, which for a few months the timid king had conscientiously tried to follow: "Do not allow yourself to be governed, be the master. Never have a favorite nor a prime minister. Listen to and consult your Council, but decide. God, who has made you a king, will give you all the necessary light, so long as you have good intentions."

While the Duke de Noailles, who in 1744 was named minister without a portfolio, was still at his side to make suggestions, Louis XV had found himself able to maintain a quasi-independence; although Argenson had complained of the Duke's presence in the Council, on the ground that, without the responsibility of a prime minister, he was "*un inspecteur inopportun*," who mixed himself up with everything, yet was master of nothing. When this resource finally failed the King, the courage with which the Duke had inspired him had not proved sufficient, and the secret diplomacy was organized; perhaps in the hope that in some mysterious way his private illumination would be divinely guided to a good result.

The mechanism of the secret diplomacy

The mechanism of this esoteric venture was as perfect

¹ "Quand il avait pris une résolution importante," says Boutaric, "il ne savait comment l'exécuter; sa timidité lui faisait même jouer un rôle odieux." Toward the end of his life, his then mistress, Du Barry, having insisted on the disgrace of a minister of war in whom he had confidence, the King said bitterly: "Il faudra bien qu'il tombe, car il n'y a que moi qui le soutienne."

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as it was complicated, amounting to an organized conspiracy against the King's own official diplomacy, over which he himself presided in person. He had his own *chambre noire* in which to *perlustrer* the official despatches, and his own secret cipher code for the conduct of correspondence with his private agents. At Paris the first clerk of the foreign office, Tercier, was also the secret secretary of the King. In various parts of Europe certain ambassadors, ministers, and secretaries of embassy, supplemented by special correspondents who had no connection with the official diplomatic service, were in the King's private employ and paid out of his private purse, so that not infrequently one policy was pursued officially and another — often the contrary — by the monarch's personal direction.¹ As a consequence an ambassador's secretary was sometimes in the confidence of the King, received private instructions from him, and in obeying them checkmated the negotiations of his superior, without the least suspicion on his part of the disloyalty practiced upon him. At first the Prince de Conti, and afterward the Count de Broglie, served as the secret ministers, or, as they were happily called, "*les vizirs de poche*," of the King in the administration of this curious system. Tercier received and transmitted the instructions and despatches, the *valet de chambre* Lebel conveyed them to and from the monarch, and it was not until 1753 that the existence of this surreptitious correspondence appears to have been suspected by the official world.²

The interest
of Louis XV
in Poland

The first object toward which the secret diplomacy of Louis XV had been directed was the succession to the crown of Poland. As son-in-law of the dethroned king Stanislas Leszczinski, he had never ceased to feel a deep interest in that kingdom. He had bitterly resented the inter-

¹ Among the King's confidants, besides the Prince de Conti and Count de Broglie, were such eminent men as Breteuil, Vergennes, Saint-Priest, Alleurs, D'Havrincourt, and La Touche.

² For a full account, see De Broglie, *Le secret du Roi; correspondance secrète de Louis XV avec ses agents diplomatiques, 1752-1774*, Paris, 1879.

ference of Austria and Russia in its affairs, and the first phase of the secret diplomacy of Louis XV had been, therefore, to arrange for the election of a French prince to the Polish throne, when it should again become vacant.¹

In 1745 a number of Polish magnates had visited Paris with the purpose of ending the anarchy of the ancient republic by offering the throne at the next election to a French prince, and had thought of the Prince de Conti, a grandson of the Prince de Conti who had been a candidate for the Polish throne in the time of Louis XIV, but had been excluded by the choice of the Elector Frederick Augustus of Saxony.²

Louis XV had approved of this new proposal and had immediately entered into secret collusion with the Prince to obtain for him the coveted crown. A Pole named Blandowski, a secret agent of the Prince, had presented the matter to Argenson, then in charge of foreign affairs, affirming that the King had authorized the project; but Argenson had refused to believe the agent, although his brother had advised him that there might be truth in his representations, and counselled him to speak of the matter to the King. This Argenson dared not do; but, to test the King's attitude, he addressed to Issarts, then French minister to Poland, an instruction in the contrary sense. The King signed it, and Argenson felt assured, without directly consulting him, that his royal master did not approve of the project. He deceived himself, however; for Issarts was one of the King's secret agents, and knew that the official instruction was not to be obeyed!

The King's private design had gradually widened out to a really great conception, nothing less than a league between France, Sweden, Poland, Prussia, and Turkey for

¹ The Near Eastern Question appears to have appealed much more strongly to Louis XV's imagination than the fate of India or of America, which did not greatly arouse his interest except as it touched his royal pride to be beaten in a struggle for colonies.

² The Prince de Conti had in 1742 vainly aspired to the hand of the Czarina Elizabeth, and was still aspiring to a throne. See Vandal, *Louis XV et Elisabeth de Russie*, pp. 229, 232.

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Results of
Louis XV's
diplomacy
in 1755

the purpose of restricting the power of Austria and Russia; and his secret agents had been busy at Stockholm, Warsaw, Berlin, and Constantinople to carry out his designs.

In pursuing this plan Louis XV had found it necessary to revert to the idea of close alliance with the Sultan, from which Noailles had dissuaded him.¹ In 1748 Des Alleurs had, therefore, been sent to Constantinople to re-establish good relations with Turkey. The invasion of Finland by Russia in 1750 had rekindled the patriotism of the Swedes, previously divided by the quarrels of the "Caps," who were paid by Russia, and the "Hats," who were under the influence of France. The menace of an attack by the Turks, under the incitement of France, had caused the Czarina to recede from her project of annexing Finland. The accession of the new king of Sweden, Adolphus Frederick, had strengthened French influence in the North, and Broglie had won a brilliant success in Poland in opposing the intrigues of Russia. Thus, at Constantinople, at Stockholm, and at Warsaw the secret policy of the King had already borne promising fruit.

In 1755 this work was crowned by the mission of the Chevalier de Vergennes to Constantinople. In order to induce the Turks to menace Russia with a new invasion, Vergennes carried with him twenty thousand livres worth of presents for the Turkish officials, and was authorized, if necessary, to spend a million.² As a result of his activities he was soon able to report the imminence of a Tartar invasion that would have kept St. Petersburg preoccupied until the Ottoman armies were on the march. Only a signal from Versailles was wanting, but this signal did not come.

The alignment
of the powers
in 1755

The reason for this change of policy was a new situation which had resulted from the activities of England, and soon afterward produced a relation between France, Austria, and Russia which could not have been predicted.

When in 1755 the events in America rendered inevitable

¹ See p. 501.

² For a detailed account of Vergennes' mission, see De Marsangy, *Le chevalier de Vergennes: son ambassade à Constantinople*, Paris, 1894.

the long impending war between France and England, the alignment of the powers still continued as it was at the time of the Peace of Aix-la-Chapelle: England, the United Provinces, Austria, and Russia forming one group, France, Spain, and Prussia the other; but, while the association of these powers remained unbroken, important changes had occurred in their relations to one another.

In the first group England and Austria, although still in nominal alliance, were no longer in quite cordial relations. Maria Theresa had never forgiven the failure of George II to support her rights in Silesia. The United Provinces no longer occupied an independent position, being wholly under the influence of England, a too predominant partner who had kept the Stadtholder in a relation of tutelage not always acceptable to the States General,¹ and there had been friction over the execution of the Barrier Treaty somewhat irritating to Austria. With Russia the relations of England were excellent, and those of Russia and Austria were intimate and cordial, all three of these powers being at the time united in their distrust of Frederick II.

In the second group France was still in alliance with Spain, but the indifference of Louis XV to the Farnese interests at the Congress of Aix-la-Chapelle had created a coolness which the Bourbon relationship and the *Pacte de famille* had not entirely overcome. This alienation had manifested itself on the part of Spain in approaches to Austria and in improved relations with England not entirely favored at Versailles. The relations of France and Prussia remained unbroken, and the treaty of 1741, by which France maintained German troops in the service of Prussia, was still in force; but Frederick II was resentful of the patronizing spirit of Louis XV, toward whom he felt a personal antipathy that was not always concealed, and in return the King of France personally regarded his ally as "an exigent person," never content with the subsidies

¹ The wife of William IV was Anne, a daughter of George II, who after 1751 acted as regent during the minority of her son, William V.

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The Anglo-
Austrian
impasse

granted him,—mainly in his own interest,—whose philosophy was unbecoming in a king and whose irreligion was a scandal. The Franco-Prussian alliance had, in fact, become an anachronism, maintained by France only in deference to the anti-Austrian tradition, and by Prussia to escape the alternative of isolation.

The real character of all the alliances was soon to be put to the test. The issue of the moment was, which of the two contestants for world-empire could obtain the most aid from the European situation.

In order to render the Austrian alliance of practical value to England, it was necessary that Austria should threaten France by throwing a strong military force into the Netherlands. Would Maria Theresa weaken her home defences to serve the interests of England? That was the question to which the English ambassador, Keith, was to obtain an answer at Vienna. But the regard of Maria Theresa was fixed upon Frederick II. He was to her always the real enemy. Why should she turn her arms against the French, whose aid she hoped in time to secure for the recovery of Silesia? Would George II, in return for services in the Netherlands, help her to recover her lost province?

The occasion was opportune for discussing the griefs of Austria regarding the past conduct of England, and Kaunitz, who had become the chief adviser of Maria Theresa, did not hesitate to improve it. In a *note verbale* of June 15, 1755, to Keith, after reminding him that Great Britain could not expect more decisively to dispose of the troops of the Empress if they were in the pay of George II, Kaunitz bitterly exposes the proposterous character of the British demands. As for the past services rendered to Austria by England, they had been amply repaid by the blood and ruin of Her Majesty's subjects, while her allies prospered and opened for themselves new avenues to wealth and commerce. And what sacrifices did England now propose? Her Majesty, Kaunitz continues, had included Hanover in the *casus foederis*, but the King of England promises nothing in his quality of elector. Nevertheless, while comprehending

"the difference between a treaty promised and a treaty concluded," the Empress is willing to comply with the principal part of England's request upon certain conditions; the most important of which is "that His Britannic Majesty engage to conclude as soon as possible the subsidiary treaties which he has already declared himself willing to make, and to employ for the defence of the Empress against the King of Prussia the Russians who will pass to the pay of England."¹

Plainly, the two governments had reached the parting of the ways, because their interests were no longer identical. For England the main object was to oppose France; for Austria, to oppose Prussia. To place a great Austrian army in the Netherlands, Maria Theresa must deplete her force of resistance to Prussia. To meet the demands of Austria in the matter of subsidies, George II must raise the money in England. This was intrinsically difficult; and the violent opposition of William Pitt,² whose oratory commanded the House of Commons, soon rendered it impossible. The ministry, he thundered, was not English. In fact, it was not a ministry. When treaties with Russia and Hesse were laid before Parliament, Pitt opposed them, as he did a grant for the maintenance of the troops of Hanover.³ In August, 1755, the Anglo-Austrian alliance had reached an *impasse*.

But the loss of Austrian support was not the only misfortune for England. The United Provinces, exposed to a French attack, were anxious for their own safety, and the States General were disposed to neutrality. Thus in August, 1755, England was practically isolated, with the prospect of a formidable opposition on the continent.

The Anglo-Russian alliance

¹ For the full text, see Waddington, as before, pp. 136, 139.

² William Pitt, the elder, afterward Lord Chatham, and destined to play a great rôle in the affairs of England, wished to pursue energetically the war with France for the colonies, but opposed the costly defence of Hanover as a royal rather than a national policy.

³ The subsidies were afterward voted by the Parliament, but too late to cement the alliance with Austria.

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In this emergency negotiations were opened at St. Petersburg for a new treaty with Russia; and, on September 30, a treaty was signed by which, in exchange for large subsidies in money, thirty-five thousand Russian troops were to be placed at the disposal of England.¹

For what purpose were these troops to be used? On October 30, 1750, England had adhered to the Austro-Russian treaty of alliance of 1746, excepting certain secret articles directed expressly against Frederick II, of which England was not aware. The treaty was, therefore, in the eyes of Russia a continued adherence to the combination of Russia, Austria, and England against the Franco-Prussian alliance; but the opposite intentions of the signatories were soon to be made evident. The purpose of England was to defend Hanover from an attack by France. The purpose of Russia was to strengthen the combination against Prussia. When the test came, the isolation of England would have been as complete as it was before, had it not been for a new alliance on the part of England which shattered all previous combinations and destroyed the European equilibrium.

The position
of Frederick II

The conflict between France and England placed Hanover in an exposed position; for, so long as France and Prussia were in alliance and Austria distrustful of England, that electorate was not only in danger of being made a pawn in some possible transaction on the part of the continental powers, but liable to invasion. There was, therefore, after the *impasse* with Austria had been reached, a strong motive for George II to secure the safety of the electorate by a defensive alliance with Frederick II.

There was also on the Prussian side a new reason for seeking the protection of England. In January, 1753, Frederick II had obtained possession of a copy of certain secret articles between Austria and Russia, exchanged on June 2, 1746, for the recovery of Silesia and the partition of Prussia.

Although this compact had not begun to be carried into effect, and was not likely to be speedily executed, the existence of a conspiracy on the part of Austria and Russia

¹ For the treaty, see Wenck, III, p. 75.

for a future attack upon Prussia was regarded by Frederick II as evident. It was well known that Maria Theresa had never ceased to resent the loss of one of her richest provinces, and she had never fully recovered from the humiliation of surrendering it which had been forced upon her by her allies. Determined to be strong through her own might, she had resolved to reorganize her army, fill her treasury, confide her affairs to younger and more efficient ministers; and thus, by imitating the vigor and intelligence of her formidable rival, redeem the past, and abolish the traces of mediaevalism that had been a source of weakness to her predecessors. In this spirit she had undertaken great internal reforms. When they were completed, and when, as she herself tersely expressed it, "Providence had relieved her by death of councillors too prejudiced to give useful advice, but too respectable and meritorious to be dismissed," she intended to recover what in the time of her weakness and adversity she had lost.

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It does not lie within the scope of our narrative to describe the radical internal reforms which, by the advice of Count Haugwitz, the Empress adopted in her own estates; resulting in the remodelling of the army, and the reorganization of the treasury, the system of taxation, and the administration of justice.¹

The designs of
Maria Theresa

With equal ability Count Kaunitz, who had represented Austria in the Congress of Aix-la-Chapelle, had proposed a reform in foreign affairs. Belonging to the high nobility, originally intended for the Church, and a student of jurisprudence, Kaunitz had acquired in his diplomatic missions a thorough knowledge of the European situation.

The idea of a reform in the foreign relations of Austria proposed by Kaunitz was new, and at first seemed impracticable. An unalterable fate seemed to have condemned the House of Hapsburg to suffer the relentless opposition of the House of Bourbon. The experience of centuries appeared to confirm the belief that this rivalry must be per-

¹ The subject of these domestic reforms is well treated by Bright, *Maria Theresa*, pp. 64, 84.

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petual; but Kaunitz thought otherwise. Alliances, he contended, should not be based upon preconceived principles when the facts of experience and the emergence of new interests indicate the expediency of a change. England and Holland were mainly interested in their own affairs, Russia and Saxony could not be depended upon, and Austria was thus left without a trustworthy friend. Austria and France were not of necessity irreconcilable opponents. On the contrary, he contended, both France and Spain had many interests in common with Austria. The old system of opposition had proved unprofitable for both. Without the consent of France Silesia could never be recovered. The Empress herself had become convinced of this, and had assented to Kaunitz's idea of making a great effort to secure if not the friendship at least the neutrality of France in the hope of recovering Silesia.¹

The mission
of Kaunitz
to France

Without disturbing existing relations with other powers, from 1750 to 1753, Kaunitz, as ambassador to France, had labored steadily to acquire the friendship of Louis XV and to undermine the relations of France and Prussia.²

At the end of Kaunitz's mission to Paris, although no great dependence was placed upon the friendship of the maritime powers, the wisdom of still retaining it had been apparent;

¹ For details, see Striedler, *Kritische Forschungen zur österreichischen Politik* (1748-1756), pp. 7, 26. Over the point whether or not Maria Theresa approved the proposal of Kaunitz as a means of regaining Silesia a lively controversy has originated. Von Arneth, in his *Geschichte Maria Theresias*, IV, stated that the Empress fully accepted Kaunitz's plan to win the friendship of France *with the purpose of isolating Prussia* and regaining Silesia. Beer, on the contrary, in his *Aufzeichnungen des Grafen William Bentinck über Maria Theresia*, contends that Maria Theresa absolutely rejected this proposal, and in this has been followed by Ranke, Schäfer, Danielson, Dove, Koser, and others. The literature on both sides is given by Striedler, as above, pp. 10, 11; who concludes in the light of new documentary evidence that the plan of Kaunitz was accepted by Maria Theresa when it was first presented in 1749 as a means of regaining Silesia.

² Ranke, *Ursprung des siebenjährigen Krieges*, p. 76, makes the curious statement that Kaunitz was sent to France "um ihn von seiner Vorliebe für die Franzosen abzubringen!"

for, while the ambassador had been kindly received, and had constantly displayed a spirit of amity for France, no ostensible progress had been made in the essentials of his mission. At its beginning Kaunitz had expected much of the French minister Puysieux, who set less value upon the alliance of France with Prussia than his predecessor, Argenson, had; but that statesman was misled by his belief that the foreign policy of the Empress was confidentially influenced, if not directly inspired, by England. In his anxiety not to be made the dupe of English designs, Puysieux had unconsciously fallen a victim to his own groundless suspicions, and Kaunitz made his overtures in vain.¹

As early as April, 1751, the ambassador was convinced that the alliance with France had no hope of success unless new motives could be applied. In spite of all the influence he could bring to bear France still held to the alliance with Prussia, and so he was obliged to inform the Empress; to whom he even advised entering into closer relations with Frederick II, not apparently with a serious purpose, but for strategical effect at Versailles. If France could be made to believe that England, for reasons of her own, was trying to induce Austria to be entirely reconciled with Prussia regardless of Silesia, it would seem evident that the past attitude of France in holding aloof from Austria had only furthered England's design! It was thus that, in his extremity, Kaunitz hoped to influence Puysieux by utilizing his self-deception regarding the policy of George II and his supposed influence with Austria.

The intensity of Maria Theresa's indignation with Frederick II was, however, such that, although she perfectly understood the intention of Kaunitz, she caused him to be informed that she would under no circumstances compromise the future by taking the step he had suggested; and his mission ended with no result, except to lay foundations for future action by gaining the favor of the King's mistress, Madame de Pompadour, then all powerful at Versailles.

When, therefore, in January, 1753, Kaunitz was recalled

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The inflexibility of
Maria
Theresa

¹ See Striedler, as before, pp. 47, 48.

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from France to become the Austrian Chancellor of State, the prospect of an Austro-French alliance was no longer seriously entertained. In the instructions given to Stahremberg, his successor, there is no sign of hope that the aid of France for the recovery of Silesia could ever be obtained. Unsatisfactory as they were, the alliances with England and the United Provinces had still to be maintained. In one respect only had a change in the situation favorable to Austria occurred. On June 14, 1752, a treaty had been concluded by Austria with Spain at Aranjuez in which the affairs of Italy had been settled upon the basis of a mutual guarantee of the territorial *status quo*.¹

The frailty of
the Franco-
Prussian
alliance

Thus, in June, 1755, no definite readjustment of the alliances had occurred. England, as we have seen, was practically isolated. France, on the other hand, was equally so, unless reliance could be placed on the support of Prussia, which would enable Louis XV to attack Hanover, and thus cause George II to understand that war with France in America and on the sea might involve the loss of his German electorate.

As early as March, 1755, the probable superiority of England on the sea had suggested to France the idea of a vigorous "diversion on land," beginning with an attack on the Austrian Netherlands; but an occasion for it was difficult to find, since the Empress had declared through Stahremberg her "extreme regret" at the prospect of a rupture between France and England, and this attitude of Vienna rendered such an invasion open to the reproach of being unjust and violent.² At that time the solidarity of England and Austria was presupposed in France, and the combined menace of a landing in England with the aid of the Pretender, the invasion of Hanover, the occupation of the Netherlands, and the incitement of the Turks to attack

¹ For the treaty, see Wenck, II, p. 707; Del Cantillo, p. 412.

² See Waddington, as before, pp. 157, 159. Frederick II advised calling on Austria to execute her engagements as guarantor of the Peace of Aix-la-Chapelle, and in case of refusal to invade the Netherlands and to hold them as an equivalent for Canada.

Hungary was seriously considered. But, in fact, all plans of action were merely tentative. The aversion of the Court to a European war, for which France was ill prepared, the indolence and timidity of Louis XV, the incapacity of the ministry for initiative, and Madame de Pompadour's fear of losing her hold on the King, if he were absent on military duty, all combined to impose inaction.

By a strange infatuation, Louis XV had refused to believe that events in America would lead to war with England.¹ Frederick II, more clairvoyant, clearly discerned the inevitable consequences of the course pursued, and counselled prompt action against Hanover. To this Rouillé, the new minister of foreign affairs, answered, that Frederick II might himself easily undertake that project; adding that he "would find in the electorate wherewith to indemnify himself amply for the expenses which the war would require." But the wily king, on May 6, 1755, reminded the minister that he had to face "every summer sixty thousand Russians in Courland, on the confines of Prussia," and that the Saxons had already made engagements with England.² He also availed himself of the occasion to make the gentle insinuation that in 1745, notwithstanding the treaty of alliance with France, his states were menaced with an invasion of the Austrian and Saxon armies.

Thoroughly informed by his active and intelligent representative at Paris, Knyphausen, Frederick II was astonished and disheartened by the indecision and indifference of the French Court, which seemed to treat him as a convenient ally but disregarded all his counsels. Anticipating a possible attack upon Prussia by Austria and

¹ In the autumn of 1755, after diplomatic intercourse had been suspended, secret negotiations were continued between France and England through private persons in the hope of an armistice. See Waddington, as before, pp. 185, 186.

² For the question whether or not Frederick II, as stated by Bernis, at this time offered to invade Bohemia with forty thousand men if France would invade the Austrian Netherlands, see Masson, *Mémoires et lettres du Cardinal de Bernis*, I, p. 210, and Broglie, *Histoire et diplomatie*, pp. 28, 32.

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Russia, and placing little confidence in the disposition of France to offer him efficient aid in case of an invasion, Frederick II had no inclination to attack Hanover, or to emerge from a state of neutrality in the quarrel with England. Since the ministry of France had no "fixed system," and offered him no sure support, anticipating the co-operation France might soon demand of him, on August 9, 1755, he informed Knyphausen that his treaty with France "bound him to defend French territory in Europe, *but not in America*!" Thus France, as well as England, was in fact practically deserted by her most trusted ally at the critical moment of a conflict already engaged.¹

The deter-
mination of
Louis XV to
renew relations
with Russia

The only practical result of the advice of Frederick II was, apparently, to turn the attention of Louis XV toward Russia, against whose influence in Poland he had been for several years directing his secret diplomacy, culminating in the mission of Vergennes to Constantinople and the attempt to incite the Turks to attack the Czarina.

It was in 1755 more than ten years since diplomatic relations between France and Russia had been practically broken off; for, after the summary dismissal of La Chétardie in 1744, Allion, the envoy of lower rank who succeeded him, had never been able to win the good graces of the Czarina, and had been himself recalled in October, 1747.²

Apart from the fact that Frederick II had alleged his fear of Russia as an excuse for not wishing to attack Hanover, there were many reasons for renewing, if possible, the relations of France with Russia.³ England was known at the time to be engaged in important negotiations at St. Peters-

¹ The dilatory attitude of France in regard to renewing the Treaty of 1741 with Prussia illustrates the ineptitude of French diplomacy at that time.

² Not in 1746, as stated by Vandal, *Louis XV et Elisabeth de Russie*, p. 204; but in 1747, as stated by Waliszewski, *La dernière des Romanov*, p. 397.

³ Russia had been refused admission to the Congress of Aix-la-Chapelle, and had not signed the treaty of peace. "If we admit here the mercenary powers," Saint-Severin, the French plenipotentiary, had loftily remarked, "we shall never end."

burg.¹ Was it possible to prevent their success? At all events it would at least be interesting to know the real attitude of Russia; and the secret diplomacy of Louis XV was now set in motion to ascertain the intentions of the Czarina.

French historians have made much of the alleged personal predilection of the Czarina Elizabeth for France and her secret sentiment for Louis XV. The evidence for this inference regarding the daughter of Peter the Great is not overwhelming, and the long rupture of friendly relations between Russia and France can hardly be explained by the devotion of Bestusheff to the English and the Czarina's tacit submission to the domination of her chancellor. It is true, that the vice-chancellor, Woronzoff, who was not in perfect harmony with his chief and was seeking to supplant him, was not favorable to the English alliance and might easily be won for the French. It was through him, therefore, that advances were possible, and it was by his assistance that they were about to be made.²

In order to prepare the way for the renewal of relations with Russia, on June 1, 1755, a Scotch Jacobite, one Mackenzie Douglas, who had served the cause of the Pretender and was then a refugee in France, was sent by Louis XV on a secret mission to St. Petersburg. The primary object of his visit was to ascertain the condition of the country, the disposition of the Court, and the exact state of the Anglo-Russian negotiations. His instructions, concealed in a tortoise-shell snuff-box provided with a false bottom, minutely prescribed the route by which he should travel, which required him to enter Germany by Suabia and to visit on his way Bohemia, Saxony, and Prussia, passing through Courland and Livonia to St. Petersburg. He was furnished with a secret code, in which *renard noir* stood for the British am-

¹ The proposed subsidies to Russia had already been openly discussed in Parliament.

² Vandal represents that the Czarina, first in 1753, and again in 1755, had, through private channels, revealed her personal desire for the renewal of diplomatic relations with France. Vandal, *Louis XV et Elisabeth de Russie*, pp. 258, 259.

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bassador; *le renard était cher* signified that English influence was still predominant; *l'hermine en vogue*, that the old Russian party was triumphing; and *les martes zibelines sont en baisse*, the diminishing credit of Bestusheff.¹

This secrecy was considered necessary in view of the fate that had befallen a French spy named Valcroissant, who in 1754 had been captured by the Russian police and imprisoned in a fortress. To avoid a similar fate, Douglas travelled in the guise of an English gentleman interested in mineralogy. His nationality, it was thought, would not only preserve him from suspicion but enable him to approach Sir Hanbury Williams, in whose negotiations Louis XV was interested, but perhaps make it possible also to secure a personal presentation at court, and thus find an opportunity to converse with the Czarina. In this respect the French emissary was doomed to disappointment. Williams at once suspected him as a Scotchman and a Catholic, and not only refused to introduce him but rendered his presentation at court impossible.

The legend of
Mademoiselle
de Beaumont

According to a story often retold and long believed, Douglas was accompanied on this mission by a person whom he presented as his niece, under the name Mademoiselle Lia de Beaumont. Compelled to leave St. Petersburg on account of the intrigues of Williams and Bestusheff, Douglas — so runs the tale — had presented the young lady to Woronzoff. The vice-chancellor obligingly procured for her an introduction to the court, and even a place among the young maids of honor in the palace of Her Majesty the Czarina, who graciously received her, and assigned her an apartment, which she shared with a young princess.

Thus brought into close intimacy with the Czarina, Lia de Beaumont is said to have ascertained the willingness of Her Majesty to receive a regular diplomatic representative from the Court of France. In explanation of suggestive whispers which did not escape the ears of her imperial hostess, Lia finally confessed that she was in reality the

¹ For the instructions, and the code, see Boutaric, *Correspondance secrète*, I, pp. 203, 209.

Chevalier Eon de Beaumont, the secretary of Douglas, and had resorted to this disguise for the purpose of delivering to Her Majesty a letter from the King of France.

The Czarina, the story runs, far from being offended by this romantic adventure, was pleased with the imposture, and authorized the reception of an official representative of Louis XV.¹

Careful investigation has discredited this interesting fable, rendered plausible by the fact that the slender figure, beardless face, and effeminate appearance generally of the Chevalier Eon long made the question of his sex a matter of public curiosity, never satisfactorily determined until after his death.

Sober history is, therefore, reduced to the prosaic statement, that, after the departure of Douglas, through a French merchant resident in Russia, named Michel, it was learned that the Czarina would receive a regular diplomatic representative, on condition that Louis XV was disposed to enter into a declared alliance with Russia.²

The war in America, which was the primary cause of the testing of the alliances, was, in truth, a matter that might have been settled without involving all Europe in the quarrel. A strict and universal neutrality would have compelled the contestants to adopt some plan of conciliation, or measure their strength against each other without disturbing their neighbors.

The Anglo-
Prussian ne-
gotiations

It cannot be said that either of the two adversaries deliberately intended to provoke a general war. Each was seeking, and England the more actively, to protect itself from aggression by other powers. War had not yet been formally declared, although it was already in operation. Until George II could secure the safety of Hanover, he was reluctant to enter formally upon a war with France.

¹ The story is told by Gallardet, *Mémoires de la Chevalière d'Eon*, Paris, 1836, which is untrustworthy and confessedly "romanesque." — *Historische Zeitung*, XLI (1879), p. 403. A more serious account is found in Homberg and Jouselin, *Le Chevalier d'Eon*, Paris, 1904.

² See Vandal, *Louis XV et Elisabeth de Russie*, p. 268.

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As early as September, 1755, rumors of a *rapprochement* between England and Prussia were afloat, and Frederick II instructed Knyphausen to let it be known by the French minister of foreign affairs that "rather singular and important overtures" had been made to him. Rouillé was at first incredulous; but the insinuations of Stahremberg, who was laboring to win France for Austria, finally impressed him. The result was that in November the departure of the Duke de Nivernais, already designated as the new ambassador to Prussia, was hastened, in order to prevent if possible an *entente* between Prussia and England. On the second of December Frederick II directed Knyphausen to deny that he was being drawn to the side of England, and to assure Rouillé that all the rumors that had come to him were "only malicious insinuations" invented by his enemies, who intended to alienate him from France; that "there was not a word of truth in them"; and that he had made "no engagement with England or signed any treaty with the Court of London." On the nineteenth Knyphausen informed his master that he "could not sufficiently express the joy afforded to the Sieur Rouillé and his colleagues" by the explanation he had just transmitted; and that he had been authorized to say in reply, "The King had never placed faith in the malicious insinuations made by the enemies of Frederick II, whose assurance was received with sincere gratitude as a new pledge of friendship."

The cautions of
Knyphausen

The error of Frederick II in concealing his secret negotiations with England, instead of frankly confiding his intentions to his ally, was pointed out by Knyphausen. "The Kingdom of France," he says in a despatch of January 21, 1756, "is governed by a prince wholly given up to dissipation and little sensible to glory, who dreads war as a calamity which would considerably increase a burden that he feels himself incapable of bearing." He then speaks of the ministry as "but slightly enlightened regarding the true interests of the kingdom, divided in counsel, and incapable of resolution"; and of Madame de Pompadour as a woman "who has a particular interest in the maintenance of peace,

and who cannot fail to have the greatest repugnance for whatever could interrupt the pleasures and inaction of the King, upon which are based her credit and existence at court." For these reasons France would willingly consent to respect German territory, would not press Frederick II to attack Hanover, and would concentrate effort against England alone, if confidence in Prussia's loyalty to the alliance could still be retained. On the other hand, if the attitude of Prussia gave warrant for the inference that there was "a secret understanding with England" regarding future action, "the King of France would not only be humiliated by this lack of confidence in him, but would suspect that this treaty contained mysteries dangerous for France, and there would result from it a leaven of bitterness that would produce continual fermentations."

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This frank and loyal advice was without result. On January 27, 1756, Frederick II informed the Duke de Nivernais, lately appointed French ambassador to Prussia, who had arrived at Berlin on the twelfth, that a treaty with England had already been signed at London on the sixteenth. The "Treaty of Westminster," or more properly of White Hall, between England and Prussia regulated the pending differences between them regarding the Silesian debt; and contained an agreement by the two governments to resist any foreign invasion of Germany.¹ Although it was called a treaty of "neutralization," its effect was to guarantee on the part of Prussia the security of Hanover from a French attack, and on the part of England a defence of Prussia, including Silesia, from aggression by Russia. As seen at

The alliance of
England and
Prussia

¹ For the treaty, see Wenck, III, p. 84. On September 1, 1755, Frederick II, in response to advances made from Hanover, had caused the attention of England to be called through the Duke of Brunswick to the fact that the treaty between Prussia and France would expire in the following spring, and that negotiations with England might be found convenient. Regarding the date of this treaty see an important note by Broglie, *Histoire et diplomatie*, p. 47. On December 7 Frederick II had decided to conclude the treaty with England. See Koser, *Geschichte Friedrichs des Grossen*, II, pp. 341, 342; and for the details of the negotiation Waddington, as before, pp. 197, 223.

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St. Petersburg, the new treaty registered the substantial defection of England from the Anglo-Russian alliance. As viewed from Paris, it was the practical abandonment by Prussia of the alliance with France; and at Vienna it was evident that, while Prussia enjoyed the guarantee of England against invasion by Russia, Frederick II was left entirely free to attack the Austrian possessions whenever he pleased, without restraint on the part of England.

The explanation to the powers

The Earl of Holderness, the English secretary of state for the Northern Department, who had superintended the negotiation of the treaty with Russia, and also that with Prussia, attempted to justify the action of England in making the compact with Frederick II, on the ground that "it was the accord with Russia that had determined the King of Prussia to unite himself with England"; and that "the Czarina Elizabeth might, therefore, take to herself all the glory of having assured the peace of Europe by one stroke of the pen."

This explanation did not satisfy the Russian Court; which insisted that, although no adversary had been distinctly named, the "common enemy" intended in the recent treaty of Russia with England was no other than Frederick II, with whom they had solemnly bound themselves not to negotiate without previous confidential communication with each other.

Nor did Frederick II find it easier to explain his action in uniting with the enemy of Louis XV. The news that the Treaty of Westminster had been signed without consultation with France, and in the face of all denials that negotiations were taking place, produced in France an explosion of indignation. The treaty was interpreted by Frederick II as merely an agreement for the "neutralization of Germany," rendered necessary by the danger to which Prussia was exposed from Austria and Russia, in case of a French invasion of Hanover; and Frederick II even reproached the French ministry with a course of conduct "which obliged the allies of France to think of their own security."

Innocent as the Anglo-Prussian alliance might seem when considered merely as a declaration of neutrality, its evident effect was to identify, to a certain degree, the interests of England and Prussia on the one hand, and those of Austria, Russia, and France on the other. Considered from the point of view of royal susceptibilities, Maria Theresa, the Czarina Elizabeth, and Louis XV,⁴ for the first time, seemed to have a common grievance. Each had lost confidence in a former ally, and these two former allies were still engaged in secret negotiations with each other.

The confer-
ences at La
Bastille

During the Anglo-Prussian approaches, in spite of Frederick II's assurance of their non-existence, Stahremberg had neglected no opportunity to ridicule the pretensions of loyalty with which the King of Prussia was endeavoring to solace the anxiety of Louis XV.

In August, 1755, at the very beginning of the *rapprochement* between George II and Frederick II, Kaunitz, who appears to have been well informed, had instructed Stahremberg to request Louis XV to appoint some confidential person to receive a communication from Austria designed to open an important negotiation.

Already sure of the favor of Madame de Pompadour, Stahremberg had encountered no difficulty in obtaining a favorable reply.¹ At her suggestion the Abbé de Bernis, afterward Cardinal, had been named by the King to enter into secret negotiations with Vienna.²

¹ The story that Madame de Pompadour had been won by a flattering letter from the Empress, in which she was addressed as "*Ma chère cousine*," though repeated by respectable historians, is apparently a fable. De Broglie risks the statement, "C'est une pure invention de Frédéric." *Histoire et diplomatie*, p. 66.

² Bernis was by no means the mere courtier which his enemies have represented him to be. He was an excellent scholar and a man of intellectual resources, although his admission to the French Academy at the age of twenty-nine is said to have been due to the favor of Madame de Pompadour rather than to his literary merits. When he besought a benefice from Fleury, the Cardinal refused him, saying, "You have nothing to hope for while I live." To which he coolly replied: "Well, Monseigneur, I shall wait!" From 1751 to 1755 he was ambassador at Venice.

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On September 1, 1755, the first interview between Stahremberg and Bernis had taken place at La Babiolle, a little country-house of Madame de Pompadour near Meudon, not far from Paris, in the presence of the hostess, all others being excluded.

Here, at first in silence, and not without astonishment, Bernis and Madame de Pompadour had listened, with carefully guarded expressions, to Stahremberg's instructions from Kaunitz.¹

The proposal on the part of Austria was of rather a startling nature. It was nothing less than a project for a secret league between Austria, Saxony, and other German states to attack Prussia with two hundred thousand men and reduce the Prussian possessions to the limits of the Electorate of Brandenburg before the Thirty Years' War. The price offered for the neutrality of France was the establishment of the son-in-law of Louis XV, Don Philip, in the Netherlands, in exchange for the duchies of Parma, Piacenza, and Guastalla, which were to be returned to Austria, and the support of the Empress in securing the succession to the crown of Poland for the Prince de Conti. Silesia and the County of Glatz were to be recovered for Austria.

The proposal was treated very adroitly by Bernis.² For the insinuations against the loyalty of Frederick II proof was demanded, but no engagement was made. The negotiations were, however, continued. The satisfaction of Louis XV with regard to the proposed concessions in the Netherlands was evident, yet it was not until the news of the Anglo-Prussian treaty of January 16, 1756, was received at Paris that any decided change had occurred in the attitude of France. From that moment Bernis entirely altered his tone. Believing that the Anglo-Prussian treaty contained secret articles of the greatest consequence, "since without a great interest Frederick II would not risk losing the alliance with France," it appeared to him,

¹ See Arneht, *Geschichte Maria Theresias*, IV, p. 390.

² For the details, see Waddington, as before, pp. 296, 311; also Masson, *Mémoires et lettres du Cardinal de Bernis*, I.

as it did to Louis XV, that the situation was entirely altered.

The indisposition of Frederick II to renew the treaty with France about to expire, the possibility that Austria, if repulsed, might unite with England in attacking France from the Netherlands, and the necessity in that case of facing two wars instead of one combined to give the approaches of Austria a new significance.

Although Bernis was thus substantially won over to the views of Austria, so far as the neutrality of France was concerned, indecision still marked the attitude of the French ministry of foreign affairs. It required all the influence of Madame de Pompadour, joined to the personal inclination of the King, over whose decision she presided, to tilt the balance to the Austrian side. In the end, the really decisive argument was the fear that Austria, in case the neutrality of France could not be procured, would resume negotiations with England,— which the reported arrival of an important instruction to the English ambassador, Keith, at Vienna tended to strengthen;— and that thus, through the defection of Prussia, France would be isolated, and a new combination might be formed against her in which English influence would prevail.

In the course of the negotiations something more than mere neutrality had been demanded of France. It had now become a question of mutual defence and guarantee by France and Austria of their European possessions. The aim of Kaunitz, not at first clearly apprehended at Paris, was to draw Louis XV into the coming conflict with Prussia.

In a note of April 19, 1756, Stahremberg stated that, in default of the signature of the proposed treaties of defence and guarantee by France, "the Empress, equally exposed on the side of Prussia and the Court of London, whose measures she had refused to adopt, would for her security be obliged to renew her treaties with her ancient allies." This was, in fact, in the nature of an ultimatum, and it produced the desired effect. On May 1, 1756, two conventions were signed: one of neutrality on the part of

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England

Austria regarding the war in America, and on the part of France in relation to the Netherlands; the other a mutual guarantee for the protection of their possessions in Europe, for which each promised, in case of need, a force of twenty-four thousand men, or an equivalent in subsidies.¹

By the treaties of Westminster and Versailles England had become the ally of Prussia, and France of Austria. This transformation has been justly described as being for Europe "the most profound, and by its consequences the most grave, of the diplomatic revolutions of the eighteenth century"; and yet, so far, these new engagements were supposed to mean nothing more than the neutralization of Prussia and Austria in the conflict between France and England. It did not require a long time, however, to make it evident that, if Austria and Prussia should become involved in war, all Europe would almost inevitably be drawn into the conflict.

As the Treaty of Westminster had caused deep indignation in France, so the Treaty of Versailles produced great irritation in England. In order to restrain French action against Hanover, George II had hoped to confront France with a league composed of Austria, Russia, and Prussia. The Treaty of Versailles dispelled this illusion. On May 13 Keith in a private audience politely informed Maria Theresa that the new treaty would be considered in England as a rupture of past relations, and implored her so to modify it as to prevent that disaster. In reply Her Majesty assured him that, if this result followed, it would not be owing to any fault of hers, since it was the Court of London which had abandoned the old system by entering into close relations with the King of Prussia; the news of which, she affirmed, had fallen upon her "like a paralytic stroke."

¹ For the conventions, together forming the so-called "Treaty of Versailles," but in reality signed at the country-house of Rouillé at Jouy-en-Josas, see Wenck, III, pp. 139, 140. There were also five secret articles, having relation chiefly to the other powers, intended to strengthen the defensive alliance. See De Gardin, *Histoire générale des traités de paix*, IV, p. 19; and Koch, II, p. 11.

The old alliance, she declared, in spite of her fidelity to it, she now considered dead, as she had been obliged to look for her security elsewhere. She could not comprehend how England was surprised to see her make engagements with France, when she was only following the example of England in uniting with Prussia.

In vain Keith, appealing to the Empress on the ground of his deference for her noble qualities, attempted to impress her with the danger of rejecting the friendship of George II, who had supported her father in his extremity, and who had displayed his devotion to her in her hour of danger when she came to the throne. In a last effort to storm the citadel of her feelings, he declared his inability to believe that the Empress and Archduchess of Austria would "humiliate herself to the point of throwing herself into the arms of France." "Not into the arms, but to the side of France," she replied with vivacity; pointing out that she had but two real enemies, the King of Prussia and the Sultan of Turkey, and that, since England had abandoned her and left her in isolation, she had sought new friends for the protection of her hereditary possessions. With the good understanding she had with the Czarina Elizabeth, "the world would see that the two empresses were in a condition to defend themselves, and would not have to be afraid of their enemies, however powerful the latter might be."

While the former friendship between Austria and England was thus gradually lapsing into hostility, a similar revolution of feeling was developing among the maritime powers. Since the Treaty of Utrecht England and the United Provinces had been substantially united in their foreign policy, for English influence had been predominant; but the moment had arrived to test the meaning of the treaty of February 6, 1716, which pledged the services of six thousand men upon England's requisition. The English ships had already arrived at Helvoetsluys to embark the troops, and the Provincial States had under consideration the question of delivering them, when the news of the Treaty of Versailles

The relations
of the maritime
powers

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reached Holland. As soon as it became known that the majority of the States had arrived at the conclusion that the *casus foederis* did not call for the aid demanded, the English government attempted to intimidate the Republic by seizing Dutch merchant vessels, under the pretext that they were carrying contraband of war. Resenting this form of persuasion, although exposed to the hostilities of both France and England, the States General decided, without prejudice to their treaty obligations, to maintain a strict neutrality.

Louis XV formally recognized this decision, but George II refused to do so; and the neutrality of the Republic revealed a divergence of interests that practically ended the long period of harmony between the two maritime powers.

Emboldened by the example of Holland, Denmark and Sweden, on July 12, 1756, united in the formation of a maritime union, and armed a squadron for the protection of their commerce against the attempt of England to cut off all trade with France by sea.¹ It was the beginning of a long contest for freedom on the ocean against the arbitrary laws of war which Great Britain, in her struggle for trade and colonies, attempted to impose upon her commercial rivals.²

The attitude
of Russia
toward
England

The Treaty of Westminster, in which George II had promised to defend Frederick II from foreign invasion, had created both embarrassment and indignation at St. Petersburg. How was this last engagement of England to be reconciled with the Anglo-Russian treaty of September 30, 1755, which, after long consideration, the Czarina had ratified only two days before under strong pressure on the part of England?

The Czarina saw plainly that she had been juggled with by her English ally, who had promised her heavy subsidies for thirty-five thousand troops to be used in Germany, and had afterward promised Frederick II to protect him from foreign invasion! Against whom, then, were these troops

¹ For the Maritime Union of Stockholm, see Wenck, III, p. 148.

² After the decision of the United Provinces to remain neutral, England declared all Dutch ships bound for French ports liable to capture as prizes of war.

to be used? Was not Frederick II the "common enemy" referred to in the treaty?

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With fine ingenuity, wishing still to retain a nominal friendship with England, Elizabeth proposed, "in order to leave no room for later interpretation and to prevent all misunderstanding," to add to the treaty of September, 1755, a secret clause to the effect that her engagement bound her to act "only in case the King of Prussia should attack the possessions of His Majesty the King of Great Britain, or those of his allies."

This qualification completely annulled the treaty as it was understood and intended by George II, and rendered nugatory, so far as Russia was concerned, the entire negotiation; for, since Frederick II was bound to protect Hanover from invasion, the contingency of his attacking it was practically excluded from calculation. The British ambassador, Sir Hanbury Williams, after months of labor to secure the treaty, was stupefied by the result, and refused at first even to receive the explanatory clause. Compelled either to receive it or to admit that all his efforts had been in vain, he forwarded the document to London, with the comment that it would at least oblige Frederick II to keep his promise regarding Hanover, since if he did not Russia was ready to attack him with a greater army than the treaty called for; but Holderness declined to accept the Russian interpretation, and demanded that the original agreement be adhered to, by which Russia was to aid England against any adversary, whoever he might be.

In boasting that "the two empresses were able to defend themselves," Maria Theresa had not made a miscalculation, and the whole drift of events was bringing them closer together. Both had long been hostile to Frederick II and had entertained designs upon his territories. Now both were in strained relations with George II and felt that they had suffered from his infidelity.

The relations
of Russia and
Austria

In these circumstances it was not difficult for the Austrian ambassador, Count Esterhazy, to widen the breach that had already opened between the Russian and the English courts.

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For this purpose he possessed a powerful ally in Woron-zoff, whose personal ambition had set him at variance with the protagonist of the British alliance, Bestusheff, who as chancellor had long sustained and promoted English influence at St. Petersburg.

On April 10 the secret negotiations had proceeded so far that the draft of a new treaty between Russia and Austria had been prepared, in which it was provided that each signatory should furnish an army of eighty thousand men for a simultaneous attack upon Prussia, to be continued until Austria had recovered Silesia and Glatz, and Russia had acquired the former Polish province of Prussia, to be re-joined to Poland in exchange for Courland and Samogitia, which were to pass to Russia. Sweden and Saxony were to be invited to join the league, the former with the promise of Prussian Pomerania, the latter with that of the city and district of Magdeburg. But the zeal of Esterhazy and the haste of Russia were not in harmony with the policy of Kaunitz, who did not wish to precipitate an attack upon Prussia before the Austro-French alliance had been completely consolidated and rendered effective for united action.

The second
mission of
Douglas to
St. Petersburg

The new relations between France and Austria introduced a new element into the diplomacy of Louis XV. Since Austria and Russia were now united in their aims, the attack upon Russia by the Turks, which Vergennes had been sent to Constantinople to incite, had become of doubtful expediency, and a *rapprochement* between France and Russia became a matter of serious interest.

Accordingly, in the spring of 1756, Douglas was sent on a second mission to St. Petersburg, and this time the Chevalier d'Eon was designated as his secretary.¹ As the mission was not yet strictly official, and the manner of their reception could not be foreseen, the pair appear to have travelled separately.

Upon their arrival Douglas is said to have taken his lodgings in the house of the French merchant, Michel, — al-

¹ At the same time a Russian secret agent was sent to France. See Waliszewski, *La dernière des Romanov*, p. 416.

ready referred to, — in the guise of a clerk of that obliging trader, while Eon was domiciled with Woronzoff, ostensibly to look after his private library, — which consisted of a single shelf full of books, — until the vice-chancellor could arrange for the official recognition and establishment of the mission.¹

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Through the haze of this rather grotesque situation two clear purposes on the part of France stand out: (1) to complete the alienation of Russia and England, and (2) to promote Louis XV's secret plan for the advancement of the Prince de Conti. For the first object Douglas, with the aid of Woronzoff, and the Austrian ambassador, Count Esterhazy, were to labor with the Russian Council, while Eon was to secure the interest of the Czarina either in the candidacy of the Prince de Conti for the crown of Poland or the still more ambitious project of obtaining for the Prince Her Majesty's hand in marriage.²

For this purpose Eon is said to have borne a personal letter from Louis XV to the Czarina, carefully concealed in the binding of a handsome copy of Montesquieu's "Esprit des Lois," together with secret codes for use in correspondence with himself or the Prince de Conti, should the "Empress" be disposed to communicate directly with them.³

Elizabeth accepted the letter from the King of France, but declined to receive the secret code. It is reported, however, that she consented so far to amuse herself with the secret diplomacy as to receive Eon in private audiences, in order to discuss with him the desires of the King of France; and it is not impossible that, in order to render these visits less open to observation, the Chevalier was permitted to enter her palace in the feminine disguise to which he was peculiarly adapted and sometimes assumed.⁴

¹ See Homberg and Jouselin, *Le Chevalier d'Eon*, the latest work on the subject, which gives the authorities for the statements in the text.

² Homberg and Jouselin, as before, p. 23.

³ Waliszewski, *La dernière des Romanov*, p. 433, wholly eliminates Eon in this connection and makes Douglas the bearer of the letter and cipher.

⁴ See Homberg and Jouselin, as before, p. 24, note.

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The change
in Louis XV's
secret
diplomacy

It soon became evident that an alliance with Russia would impose upon France no inconsiderable sacrifices; for, while the Czarina would enter into no compact that would involve her in the quarrel between France and England, she insisted upon a treaty in which the *casus foederis* would include the obligation of Louis XV to aid her against all her enemies.

Thus France, whose chief interest in Europe was peace, could procure an alliance with Russia only at the price of a possible war in which the French nation had no direct interest. Not only must the future of Poland be left in abeyance, but the negotiations of Vergennes at Constantinople must be abandoned and even reversed. In short, the whole aim of Louis XV's secret diplomacy must be modified.

So far as the Prince de Conti was concerned, a change was rendered necessary by another cause. The nomination of Broglie as Louis XV's ambassador to Poland, in 1752, had surprised and mystified the French Court. Madame de Pompadour had not rested until she had found the explanation in the King's purpose to advance the interest of the Prince de Conti. This personage, who had attempted to counteract her influence with the King, was the object of her particular hatred, and Louis XV was soon induced to abandon all thought of the candidature of the Prince, and soon afterward transferred the direction of his secret diplomacy to the Count de Broglie.

The King's secret purpose now became "an indissoluble alliance with Austria, and entire liberty for the Poles in the choice of their King." With the new interest of France in the policy of Austria new sympathies had been created. "Madame de Pompadour," wrote Stahremberg after the Treaty of Versailles was signed, "is enchanted with the conclusion of that which she regards as her work, and has assured me that she will do her best in order that we may not halt upon a road so beautiful." To facilitate progress along this seductive path, she promised that whenever he wished personally to converse with the King upon any subject she would prepare the way by procuring for him

a private audience. The King had been completely drawn into the Austrian net; and, while Europe was filled with "stupefaction," and even "consternation," at the reversal of French policy, Louis XV had never seemed more happy than he appeared after the treaty with Austria was signed.¹ Bernis, who was proud of his success and wished to go on with his work, was even more enthusiastic. As the tide in favor of Austria rose at court, even the ministers who had demurred gave their adhesion to the *fait accompli*.

Would Louis XV, who had so completely changed his policy with respect to Austria, make the great sacrifices demanded of him in order to obtain an alliance with Russia? There was no national interest at stake that made it necessary for him to do so. Russia could offer him no aid in his conflict with England. To obtain even a defensive treaty with Russia applying only to Europe he must undo all that he had accomplished by his secret and official diplomacy combined. Not only this, but he must engage to defend the Czarina, as well as the Empress, against any power that might attack them. And what service would he have from them in return? Simply their promise to protect France in Europe at a moment when it was practically safe from serious attack on the continent.

The status of
the Franco-
Russian ne-
gotiations

It was, therefore, extremely doubtful in the early part of 1756 if France and Russia would reach an understanding. There was but one influence that could accomplish that result, the effort of Austria. Stahremberg at Versailles and Esterhazy at St. Petersburg labored steadily to unite the two allies of Austria in a triple alliance, but without success.

Broglie, who had made progress with his work in Poland, hated Austria, and was intensely displeased with the new order of things; and before the end of the year the King found it necessary to write to him: "I have seen by all your letters, Count de Broglie, that you have trouble in accepting the new system which I have adopted; you are not the only one, but such is my will, it is necessary that

¹ See Bernis, *Mémoires*, I, p. 272.

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you concur." And later, in words that must have tried his representative's faith in his master's memory, the King wrote: "Having always had in view the intimate union with Vienna, it is my work; I believe it good, and I wish to maintain it."¹

And yet, although Louis XV was wholly committed to the defensive alliance with Austria, in June, 1756, no progress had been made toward an alliance with Russia, — not to speak of an aggressive compact; — and it required many months of subsequent negotiation and a new European situation before even an *entente* was reached.

The beginning
of the Seven
Years' War

In the meantime England had placed Hanover under the protection of Frederick II, and was, therefore, without fear of loss upon the continent. But neither France nor England possessed an ally capable of vitally affecting the struggle already engaged in the colonies and upon the ocean. So far as the colonial war was concerned, Europe appeared to have been practically neutralized.

For more than a year the battle for colonial supremacy had been waged spasmodically without a declaration of war on either side.

In India the situation had been somewhat more under control than in America. In 1753 it had been agreed that the two governors, Dupleix and Saunders, should be recalled, and that two commissioners should be appointed to compel the trading companies to live in peace "so long as the two governments are in that relation." In 1754 Dupleix had been obliged to renounce his splendid dream of empire. It was the end of French predominance in India, a calamity which the French historians have never ceased to lament.² It was also the beginning of English ascendancy.

In America the conflict had long since become irrepressible. The permanent possession of a vast continent was at stake, — a white man's continent as yet in great part unpopulated, except by a few tribes of savages, and whose im-

¹ See Boutaric, *Correspondance secrète*, I, pp. 214 and 216.

² See the touching description of Dupleix's disgrace in Hamont, *Dupleix*, pp. 208, 278.

mense natural resources were of more value, as they were also of greater extent, than those of the whole of Europe.

Military operations in the colonial conflict had already been considerable, both on land and sea, and the English government had fully made up its mind regarding the course to be pursued. Its responsible head, the Duke of Newcastle, had some time before exclaimed: "All North America will be lost, if we tolerate such proceedings; no war could be worse for our country than to endure such conduct. The truth is, the French claim possession of the whole of North America, except the shore-line, within which they would compress our colonies; but we cannot and will not suffer it." On May 18, 1756, England formally declared war upon France, and on June 9 the challenge was accepted.

But on August 29 Europe was startled by a far more exciting announcement. Frederick II had become convinced of the existence of a conspiracy for his overthrow and the dismemberment of the Prussian monarchy. Believing that the impending peril was inevitable, but that the moment for his enemies to strike had not yet arrived, he had resolved to invade Saxony, and the Seven Years' War had begun.

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CHAPTER VII

THE DIPLOMACY OF THE SEVEN YEARS' WAR

ON August 28, 1756, Frederick II, in the presence of the English ambassador at Berlin, Sir Andrew Mitchell, had mounted his horse at the head of his army before the castle at Potsdam, and set out for the invasion of Saxony. On the twenty-ninth he had crossed the Saxon frontier with a previously prepared declaration, written with his own hand, in which it was stated that, "in the inevitable war with Austria," he possessed proofs of the complicity of Saxony in a conspiracy against Prussia; but this manifesto was not published, and another declaration of a more colorless nature was given out.

From a purely military point of view his action may have been a stroke of genius; but conceived and executed, as it was, in a state of mental exaltation produced by the tension of an anxious situation, it placed him in an unenviable light in the eyes of his contemporaries. He had counted first of all upon proving by the capture of the Saxon archives at Dresden that a coalition had been formed against Prussia in which Saxony was a guilty partner, and then upon dissolving the hostile league by the force and rapidity of his military action.

In both respects he was doomed to disappointment. On September 9 the Prussian troops entered Dresden, and against the almost bodily resistance of Maria Josepha, the wife of the Elector-King, the door of the ministerial chancellery was broken open, and three sacksful of suspected diplomatic despatches were sent to Berlin for examination. Unfortunately for Frederick II, the captured documents did not justify his action. The policy of Saxony had, in fact, been peaceful and conservative, aiming to secure the safety of

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the electorate by a defensive alliance with England on the one hand and Austria on the other, but without the subser-
vency to the latter which the King had supposed he would be able to prove.¹ As the event showed, it was not the hostility but the neutrality of Saxony which Frederick II had wished to forestall by incorporating the entire Saxon army, against its will, in his own aggressive force; thus permitting his unobstructed advance into Bohemia without leaving a possible enemy in his rear.

Frederick II was equally disappointed in his second expectation. He had hoped by his *coup de main* to become at once master of the military situation, as he had in his attack upon Silesia; but he soon found himself confronted with an opposition so powerful as to imperil the existence of his kingdom.

Relying upon the ability of England to restrain Russia, he had believed that France would remain practically neutral, thus leaving Austria isolated and unprepared for his attack. "Are you sure of the Russians?" he had asked Sir Andrew Mitchell on May 12. "The King, my master, thinks so," the British ambassador had replied.²

That was the critical moment in the development of Frederick II's policy.

On July 26 the Prussian minister at Vienna, Klinggräffen, by command of Frederick II, demanded of the Empress in private audience an explanation of the movements of the Austrian troops. The reply was, that, in the existing circumstances, she was obliged to consider her own security and that of her allies; but that no injury to any one was intended. Frederick II did not believe this. Pointing to a picture of the Empress which adorned his apartment, he had said to

¹ That Count Brühl, the Saxon prime minister, hated Frederick II, and that the Saxon government distrusted the designs of Prussia, the captured documents clearly proved; but not the hostile engagements of Saxony.

² Frederick had steadily maintained that, so long as he was in accord with England, he had nothing to fear from the Russians. See *Politische Korrespondenz*, VI, p. 27.

Sir Andrew Mitchell, "This lady wishes war; she shall soon have it."

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The King of Prussia had then insisted upon a more decisive statement. "Peace or war," he wrote to his minister at Vienna; "the Empress must decide." Impatiently he had awaited the answer, every day becoming more irascible in his feelings toward his minister and the Empress on account of the delay. On August 25 the answer had come; but Maria Theresa, while giving positive assurance that no offensive alliance against Prussia then existed, had declined to promise that she would never in the future make war upon Frederick II. Within three days he had led his army into Saxony.

Was his secret purpose one of defence or one of conquest? Historians of high authority have given different answers, and it is difficult to decide between their arguments; for intentions, even when openly avowed, are often difficult to verify. That Frederick II desired ultimately to round out and connect his possessions by new conquests, does not appear doubtful; but his immediate purpose in the sudden invasion of Saxony remains a subject of debate.¹

I. THE COALITION AGAINST PRUSSIA

At the moment when Frederick II crossed the Saxon frontier the coalition against him had not been completed. He had long been aware of the Austro-Russian secret articles of 1746; but they were signed before the Peace of Aix-la-Chapelle, and years had passed without aggressive action.

The coalition
rendered
inevitable

Still, Frederick II was not in error regarding the unfriendly attitude of Austria and Russia. Maria Theresa had never

¹ Klopp, *Der König Friedrich II von Preussen*, 1867, maintained that Frederick's design was to make new conquests; but Arneht, Beer, and Ranke, in the light of further investigation, rejected this conclusion. Later, Max Lehmann, *Friedrich der Grosse und der Ursprung des siebenjährigen Krieges*, 1894, revived the contention that Frederick II's motive was aggressive rather than defensive; and many other modern German historians have favored this view. Naudé, *Beiträge zur Entstehungsgeschichte des siebenjährigen Krieges*, 1896, on the other hand rejects it.

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forgiven him for robbing her of Silesia; and Kaunitz was planning, with the aid of Russia, the recovery of the lost province. Bestusheff had been charged by the Czarina with the examination of a secret plan of action against Prussia communicated by Esterhazy in behalf of the Empress. In his report the Chancellor had called attention to the fact that Frederick II had increased his army from eighty thousand to two hundred thousand men, and filled his war-chest "with the revenues of Silesia and the millions levied upon Saxony."¹ The King of Prussia, he had declared, "coveted Hanover on the one side and Courland on the other, and had become the most dangerous of neighbors."

Austria, however, wished no action until the negotiations with France could be made more definite, and no *entente* between France and Russia had yet been concluded. The statement of Maria Theresa was, therefore, strictly truthful; and there was, perhaps, an opportunity for Frederick II to counteract the hostile intentions of his neighbors. His aggression upon Saxony wholly changed the situation. Before that act France entertained no intention of joining in an attack upon Prussia; and it is hardly credible that Louis XV without new reasons would have been so imprudent as to plunge his kingdom into a European war, in which France had little or nothing to gain, at a moment when peace in Europe was so important to him in his conflict with England.

But when a Prussian army had taken possession of Saxony, with whose court the Bourbon dynasty was connected by the marriage of the Dauphin with Maria Josepha, daughter of the Elector and King of Poland, the case was different. When, a few days later, Bohemia was invaded by two Prussian armies, one from Saxony and one from Silesia, the clauses of guarantee and defence in the Treaty of Versailles had suddenly come into automatic operation, and France was under obligation to aid Austria in repelling the Prussian attack. Thus, the coalition which Austria had been endeavoring

¹ The exact military strength of Prussia in 1756 is stated by Koser, *Geschichte Friedrichs des Grossen*, II, pp. 396, 399.

to form against Prussia, but had not succeeded in completing, was suddenly rendered inevitable.

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It was not merely the invasion of Saxony and Bohemia without a *casus belli* that excited Europe and stimulated the formation of a general coalition against Prussia. The further disregard of the rights of sovereignty on the part of Frederick II made his conduct seem intolerable.

The conduct
of Frederick II
in Saxony

The Saxon army had been concentrated in a fortified camp at Pirna. The ministers of Frederick Augustus II, the Elector-King, who had personally desired to withdraw his forces into Poland, advised that, if neutrality on the part of Saxony were refused, all further negotiation should be abandoned, and the country defended to the last man; but his generals, in view of their wide separation from the help of Austria, changed his mind.

On September 12, therefore, Frederick Augustus II offered to deliver to Prussia Pirna, Wittenberg, and Torgau, with hostages, for the duration of the war, as security for the neutrality of the Saxon army.

On September 13 Frederick II replied to this offer, "Your fate must be made inseparable from mine"; and a messenger was sent to demand that the army and administration of Saxony be transferred to himself, to be used against Austria. On the next day he wrote to Prince Ferdinand of Brunswick, "They will soon all be Prussians."

The control of the Saxon army was not, however, so easy as Frederick II had supposed; for Frederick Augustus II was not willing to comply with his demand. When General von Arnim came to his camp to expostulate, Frederick II said to him: "Saxony must share my lot and the same danger as my kingdom. If I am fortunate, the King of Poland will not only be indemnified, but I shall consider his interest as my own. . . . I must have the troops, otherwise there is no security. I am playing a great game.¹ . . . There is no other way, the army must march with me and take an oath of allegiance to me!"

When Von Arnim objected that history furnished no pre-

¹ "Ich spiele ein grosses Spiel."

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cedent for such procedure, Frederick II replied, "Yes, it does, but perhaps you do not know that I take some pride in being original."

Day after day the King of Prussia impatiently awaited the complete surrender of his brother elector and king to his demand. In the meantime plans for storming the camp at Pirna were formed and approved by Frederick II; but his generals were doubtful of their success.

From the first Maria Theresa had regarded the invasion of Saxony as an attack upon Austria, and had not awaited the appearance of a Prussian army upon her own territories before setting her armies in motion. While Frederick II was impatiently waiting for hunger to do its work in the camp of Pirna, the Austrian approach forced his army to advance to meet it, and, instead of pursuing the siege of Pirna, to engage in the battle of Lobositz; in which, on October 1, nearly equal forces suffered nearly equal losses without any advantage on the Prussian side. On October 15, however, Frederick II's generals succeeded in forcing the capitulation of the Saxon army; which, under Prussian officers, was then incorporated in that of Prussia. As a German historian has expressed it, "Their bodies were in his power, and their souls must deliver to him their oath of allegiance." The King's generals protested that the captives should not be forced into unwilling service, but he insisted that the army was in his possession, and it must obey his will.¹

The efforts of
Frederick II
to explain his
position

When Frederick II realized the hostility he had awakened, he sought to make his apologies to Europe and to stay the storm of reprobation which his conduct had caused. The resentment in Poland was intense, and the Polish Reichstag at Grodno for a time menacing; but the anarchy of the Republic rendered it impossible for it to take any action.

In France Frederick II vainly attempted to counteract the Austrian and Saxon influence by giving assurance that he intended no permanent tenure of Saxon soil, and called

¹ For details, see Koser, as before, pp. 409, 424.

attention to the fact that Louis XIV had treated Sardinia much as he was treating Saxony.¹

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In the United Provinces, a different course was followed. There Frederick II attempted to evoke the spectre of a Catholic league, to be headed, it was said, by Austria and France, for the purpose of abolishing the Protestant faith; but the Dutch burghers were not much affected by the efforts of the disciple of Voltaire to pass himself off as the protagonist of the sanctity of religion. To the Dutch, who set so high a value upon their own rights as neutrals, the violation of Saxon neutrality seemed the last enormity. What was to become of the smaller and weaker states, and eventually of Europe, if a strong military power, carving out for itself an empire in the midst of civilized communities, could by sudden conquest appropriate whole nations bodily, take possession of their revenues by a word of command, and force foreign armies to participate in the process of further conquest? If this theory were legalized by consent, what might in future become of the Dutch Republic?

The terror and indignation which the violence of Frederick II had produced in Europe now greatly facilitated the formation of a coalition to restrain him. Russia was not only ready and willing to participate, but it had been necessary to restrain her zeal. France, on the other hand, had only after long negotiation been induced to sign a defensive treaty with Austria; for Louis XV had wished to have peace on the continent during his struggle with Great Britain.

The plans of
Kaunitz for
completing
the coalition

The system of Kaunitz's diplomacy just before the invasion of Saxony had been to restrain Russia and stimulate France, to the end that the three monarchies might be united in a common assault upon Prussia when the favorable moment should arrive.

The aggression of Frederick II precipitated action both at Versailles and at St. Petersburg. Russia and France, it was decided, must be at once associated by the adhesion of the former to the Treaty of Versailles. This triple compact having been concluded, France must then be urged on to the

¹ See p. 203 of this volume.

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The embar-
rassments in
the negotia-
tions between
France and
Russia.

utmost possible degree of active participation in the war with Prussia.

It was, in fact, only through the mediation of Austria that the *rapprochement* between France and Russia was possible. The aims of the two governments were widely different, but sufficiently compatible to permit Austria to influence both of them. The interest of France was to alienate Russia entirely from England; that of Russia to involve France in the war with Prussia. Kaunitz aimed to accomplish both these results by the union of the two powers in a common cause with Maria Theresa.

It was, therefore, Esterhazy who played the grand rôle in the French negotiations at St. Petersburg, which his firmly established position enabled him to do; while Douglas, really under his protection rather than an independent negotiator, was forced to follow the Austrian lead.

In order to conclude a treaty with Russia, it was necessary for France to sacrifice Poland. To this Louis XV had become reconciled, but the Russian basis for a treaty required the sacrifice of Turkey also. In June, 1756, the direction of Vergennes' diplomacy at Constantinople had, therefore, been suddenly changed, and he had been informed that it was the intention of the King of France, "in order to deprive England of the aid which the Czarina could give," to form an alliance with Russia.¹

In conformity with this new policy, Vergennes had with much address informed the Porte that, owing to the war in which France was involved with England, Louis XV had been constrained to change his system of alliances; but that this arrangement, occasioned by an imperative necessity, was only provisional, and that when the crisis was past France would return to her former policy.

The effect had been that the Porte had ingeniously suggested that, since France had found it necessary to ally herself with a power more or less hostile to the Ottoman Empire, it might be expedient for the Porte also to make some new alliances, which had long been sought, and which

¹ See the instruction in Marsangy, *Le chevalier de Vergennes*, I, p. 344.

France had formerly commended; for example, with Prussia and Denmark!

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If the situation was embarrassing for Vergennes, it was rendered much more so for Douglas by the fact that the Czarina would listen to no project of a treaty with France in which the *casus foederis* did not include the contingency of a war between Russia and Turkey.

At first this obstacle seemed to be insurmountable, and Douglas found himself in an *impasse*; for he did not dare to include Turkey openly in the *casus foederis*, and he could make no progress without this concession. Esterhazy, who would have been pleased to destroy permanently the friendly relations between France and Turkey, felt no scruples in urging acceptance of the Czarina's terms, but Douglas hesitated. While a despatch was on its way to St. Petersburg positively forbidding the inclusion of Turkey among the powers against which France was willing to pledge assistance to Russia in case of a war between them, Douglas was induced, under the pressure of Esterhazy's counsel, to sign a *declaration secrétissime* by which France promised Russia, if war with Turkey should occur, to furnish aid to Russia in money, but not in troops!

This compromising act, — which placed it in the power of Russia to destroy in the future the friendly relations between France and Turkey, and which might, if suspected, even drive the Porte into alliance with Prussia and Denmark, — was promptly repudiated at Versailles, and brought upon Douglas a violent denunciation for his imprudence. Rouillé hastened to disavow the act at Constantinople also, as a step taken without the knowledge of the King or his ministers, and which had provoked their indignation.¹

Louis XV's repudiation of Douglas' secret concession

At St. Petersburg Louis XV came at once to the rescue with a personal letter to the Czarina, in which he besought her to annul the declaration; and, as an act of favor to the King, Elizabeth complied with his request. The offensive

¹ Vergennes was instructed to explain to the Porte in case there was the least suspicion of the secret arrangement. As there was none, Vergennes remained silent. See Marsangy, as before, II, p. 12.

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Completion of
the Coalition
against
Prussia

document was torn up in the presence of Douglas, and thus the only serious obstacle to obtaining the adherence of Russia to the Treaty of Versailles was removed.

On December 31, 1756, by the adherence of Russia to the Austro-French treaty of defensive alliance of the previous May, the policy of Kaunitz made a decided step in advance.¹ In February, 1757, after much wrangling over the amount of the subsidies to be paid to Russia by Austria, an agreement was reached by which each of the contractants was to place eighty thousand men in the field against the King of Prussia, and Russia was also to act with a fleet of from fifteen to twenty vessels of the line and at least forty galleys.

On March 21, a treaty was signed at Stockholm by which Sweden joined the Coalition with Austria and France.²

On May 1, just a year after the first treaty of Versailles, a second treaty was signed, also at Versailles, between France and Austria. By this new convention France passed entirely into the hands of Austria, the signatories expressly pledging themselves "to reduce the power of the King of Prussia to such limits that it would no longer be possible for him in the future to trouble the public tranquillity." Besides the twenty-four thousand auxiliaries promised in the first treaty, France engaged to pay six thousand soldiers to be furnished by Württemberg and four thousand to be furnished by Bavaria, to act in Germany with an army of one hundred and five thousand French and mercenary troops, to grant Maria Theresa an annual subsidy of twelve million florins, and to continue the war until she had recovered Silesia. In return, the Empress promised to Louis XV full sovereignty in a half dozen cities of the Austrian Netherlands, the remainder with Luxemburg to pass to Don Philip in exchange for Parma, Piacenza, and Guastalla, when these last were returned to Austria.³

The triumph of the diplomacy of Kaunitz was thus rendered complete, and the influence of Bernis was at its height.

¹ See Martens, *Recueil A*, Supplement III, p. 33.

² For the treaty, see Koch, II, p. 29.

³ For the treaty, see Koch, II, p. 43.

He had in reality, in close sympathy with Madame de Pompadour and with the full confidence of the King, for more than a year controlled the foreign policy of France, in which Rouillé was a mere figurehead. In January, 1757, he had been named a minister without portfolio, and in June he became minister of foreign affairs in a government completely dominated by the pro-Austrian party, with Belle-Isle, who had now become a fervent sympathizer with Austria, as minister of war. The invasion of Saxony had completely turned the tide in France and crowned with success the intrigues of Stahremberg. At Versailles "*la cause de la Dauphine*" had become the ruling passion of the day, beside which the war with England over distant colonies seemed an adventure of secondary importance.

It was fortunate for England that this diversion of the thought and energies of France had occurred, for up to this point the fortunes of war had been discouraging to the English ministry. The defeat of Braddock on the Monongahela had been followed by the loss of Minorca, and the defence of England from threatened invasion had left Hanover exposed to attack. "All the independent powers," Newcastle wrote, "should be alarmed by that alliance against nature, above all the Protestant courts, since it is against them that it is directly and almost openly made." "We have hardly a vessel to add to our fleets or a battalion to send to America or to the Mediterranean," he had written in a confidential letter in June, 1756. It was plain that a counter-coalition would have to be organized, or England would have to "abandon Europe to France and sustain alone, during many years, an unequal struggle against that power."

The discouragement of England

But where could allies be found to oppose France in Europe? Sir Hanbury Williams had labored desperately to prevent the union of Russia with Austria and the reconciliation with France. Money had been freely spent, and Bestusheff had been heavily bribed, but Esterhazy had triumphed at St. Petersburg. Sweden, Saxony, and Bavaria had for a time been counted upon; but the Swedes had now joined the coalition against Prussia in the hope of recovering Pomerania,

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Saxony was incapable of action, and Bavaria on July 31, 1757, had made treaties with France to furnish more than six thousand men to aid in attacking Prussia.¹ The United Provinces, then under the regency of Anne, widow of the Stadtholder William IV, were, in spite of strong English influence and her devotion to the cause of her father, George II, determined to maintain their neutrality. Spain and Portugal were at the time in friendly relations with England, but in the circumstances nothing could be expected of them.

In this situation nothing appeared more probable than the eventual loss of Hanover by George II. Frederick II had by the Treaty of Westminster promised to protect the electorate; but, confronted by three great powers, the value of his promised protection was not great. On the other hand, England had by the same treaty agreed to protect Prussia from foreign aggression; but, with Hanover threatened with invasion from France, and lacking in resources for carrying on a colonial war in which the destinies of two continents and the stake of world empire were involved, it was difficult for George II to offer effective aid to Prussia.

But, in truth, Frederick II had never imagined that his pledges would involve military action on his part in the interest of England. What he had had in mind was the restraint of Russia by English influence. Nor had George II and his ministers supposed that the attempts at "neutralization" would ever involve England in war with Russia. What he had aimed at was the protection of Hanover from the French. But both were soon to discover what a guarantee of neutralization might mean when the *status quo* is disturbed.

In less than two years by the reversal of alliances the equilibrium of Europe had been completely destroyed. It is, perhaps, worth while at this point to reflect for a moment upon the manner in which that calamity had come to pass.

The colonial war was on all sides distinctly recognized as in no respect an affair of any of the powers, except the two that were directly engaged in it. The purpose of England

The disappearance of European equilibrium

¹ For the treaty, see Martens, *Recueil N*, Supplement II, p. 620.

had been to hold Europe aloof from the colonial quarrel. The intention of France had been the same. The Anglo-Prussian treaty of Westminster was not of a nature to provoke a war. It was, in principle, merely a compact for mutual defence in Europe. But even the first treaty of Versailles was not in itself of a nature to provoke a war, for it also was only a defensive compact of the same character as the Anglo-Prussian treaty. All that rendered it extraordinary was that it implied the reconciliation of two monarchies that had long been hostile. In fact, Louis XV had no real occasion to sign it, except so far as England was concerned; for he had nothing to fear from Frederick II.

On the other hand, Frederick II had in reality nothing to fear from Louis XV, whose interest was peace. The disturbing cause was the determination of Maria Theresa to draw Louis XV into a war for the recovery of Silesia; but that purpose might never have been realized if Frederick II had not become a second time aggressive, and would not have existed if it had not been for the forcible annexation of Silesia.

The Seven Years' War, so far as the participation of Europe was concerned, was, in the final analysis, a repercussion of Frederick II's conquest of Silesia and invasion of Saxony. The author of "Anti-Machiavel" had appealed to force as the arbiter of nations, and thereby rendered his own political philosophy an anachronism in the history of ideas. Notwithstanding the sacrifices it would involve on the part of the Prussian people to save his kingdom from destruction, he had a second time exposed it to the wrath of Europe. He had believed France preoccupied, Russia incapable, the German princes indifferent, and Austria really formidable only through her own newly acquired strength.

It is not until we turn aside from the inconsistencies and illusions of Frederick II, and see him bravely expiating his fault, dedicating his whole being to the salvation of his state in the moment of supreme danger; in skill, fortitude, and indomitable persistence the greatest military commander of his time; that we comprehend how his contemporaries came

CHAP. VII to regard him as an almost superhuman being, and why all
 A. D. men have united in calling him, without reserve, "Frederick
 1756-1763 the Great."

The perilous
 position of
 Frederick II

At the time when the last links of the Coalition against him were being forged, the King of Prussia had taken up his winter quarters in Dresden, in the palace of Count Brühl, whose papers he had confiscated. There, almost in solitude, he brooded upon his situation, and formed his plans for military action in the spring. He expected no serious military help from any foreign power. For a long time he had constantly received from Sir Hanbury Williams, through Sir Andrew Mitchell, words of hope that English influence might prevail in favor of Prussia at St. Petersburg, and that Russia might be induced to postpone or abandon action against him; but that encouragement had proved illusory. He had fancied that the indolence and incapacity of Louis XV and the preoccupations of France in the war with England would render the French alliance of as little practical value to Austria as it had formerly been to himself. "In the spring it will be seen what Prussia is," he wrote to the Queen; "and that we, through our strength and discipline, shall come through with the number of the Austrians, the impetuosity of the French, the fierceness of the Russians, the masses of the Hungarians, and with all that will be opposed to us."

From Germany itself Frederick II looked for no active aid. The Emperor Francis I had in January, 1757, proposed that the military contingents of the Imperial circles be increased threefold and be placed at his own disposal. Frederick II, on the other hand, had requested his electoral colleagues to provide protection for his states; at the same time giving assurance that he sought no conquests, and that so soon as they could be evacuated with safety to his own possessions the Saxon territories would be restored. The princes had shown themselves indisposed to take up the cause of Brandenburg, only twenty-six out of eighty-six voices favoring the proposal of Frederick II. For the Imperial execution proposed by Austria there were sixty votes; but Frederick II, who knew the limitations upon united Imperial

action, had no fear in this quarter. "I scoff at the Reichstag and all its resolutions," wrote the King, when he learned of the conclusions reached, and exercised freely his exceptional powers of sarcasm at the expense of the Emperor.

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And yet Frederick II was not unmindful of his danger. His own death, his possible capture and imprisonment, as well as the defeat of his armies, were gravely considered by him. "Should such a misfortune as capture befall me," he wrote in an instruction to the Court at Berlin, "I shall sacrifice myself for the State, and my brother must then be obeyed; who, with all my ministers and generals, shall answer to me for it with his head that neither a province nor a ransom be offered for me, but the war be continued and its advantages followed up exactly as if I had never existed."

Such heroic utterances, supported by equally heroic action, go far toward causing us to forget that it was really Frederick II himself who had been the disturber of the peace of Europe. The Electorate of Brandenburg had in three generations grown from a small principality to a powerful military monarchy, in which conquest was the law of its development. Since the Peace of Westphalia, — which had, in theory at least, recognized the existence of a system of legally co-equal and independent sovereign states, which all were solemnly bound to respect, — Europe had repeatedly been convulsed with wars of conquest that threatened to destroy that system. No consideration of race, of religion, of natural boundaries, of popular preference, of public peace, or even of dynastic right had restrained the ambition of those who had sought to enlarge their borders by the power of the sword. In the school of dynastic domination Brandenburg had been an apt pupil. There, more than anywhere else in Europe since the time of Gustavus Adolphus in Sweden, frugal living, rigorous economy, Spartan discipline, and military rule had combined to build up the State. The very name of the Prussian monarchy was derived from the Polish duchy which Frederick William I of Brandenburg had raised to a

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sovereign state just a hundred years before.¹ By thrift in war and diplomacy the House of Hohenzollern, descended from a Suabian family through Frederick, Burggrave of Nuremberg, who in 1414 had obtained Brandenburg from the Emperor Sigismund, partly as a gift and partly in payment of a debt, had already become a dangerous rival to the ancient House of Hapsburg.²

How dangerous it was, the Seven Years' War was to demonstrate. But the aggressor had already been brought to bay, and stood before the judgment bar of Europe awaiting the verdict of the sword, to which he had so confidently appealed. The situation was tragic, but it was the logical *dénouement* of the drama of which the first act had been the attempt to dismember the Hapsburg monarchy when the head of that house had fallen and left to its heiress a heritage of uncertain promises and rapacious foes.

The lack of
cohesion in
the Coalition

Had the Coalition against Frederick II acted with unity, promptness, and force, he would have been completely crushed in the first campaign; but the conditions for such action did not exist. In theory the Coalition had agreed to a concerted attack upon Prussia, but in practice the plans for its execution proved to be immature. They were wanting in unity of conception because there was a lack of cohesion among the powers themselves.

Although Russia and France were expected to co-operate with Austria in bringing Frederick II to terms, the relations between these two auxiliaries were of the loosest character. After Douglas had secured the adhesion of the Czarina to the Treaty of Versailles, the Marquis de L'Hôpital, attended by a suite of some eighty persons, was sent by France as ambassador to St. Petersburg. The embassy had been fitted out with great extravagance, with the expectation of making a deep impression at the Russian capital; but nothing of the kind occurred. The aged marquis, though a lieutenant-general, took no personal interest in the plan of campaign

¹ See p. 30 of this volume.

² See Volume II of this work, p. 63.

of the Russian forces, which acted without relation to the other armies of the coalition.

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Even at St. Petersburg the presence of L'Hôpital was of little consequence. There were, in fact, two courts in that capital with which contact was important, but the ambassador of France appears to have obtained no intimacy with either. Beside the court of the Czarina Elizabeth, which formed an extremely exclusive circle to which strangers were admitted only on formal occasions, the Grand Duchess Catherine, wife of Peter, heir to the throne, who was destined to play such a leading rôle in the future of Russia, held court in her own independent fashion and created a centre of political influence.

The coolness of the Czarina for France is evident from the fact that she kept Louis XV two years waiting for an answer to a personal letter. Even the sumptuousness of L'Hôpital's style of representation reacted against him; for, beholding such evidences of wealth on the part of the King's ambassador, the Czarina and her ministers were rendered eager for large subsidies, and finally for a loan of money, from France; and, failing to obtain them, interpreted the failure as a sign of indifference or distrust.

Frederick II had planned in the campaign of 1757 to let the enemy take the initiative. The Austrians were expected to advance first, then the Russians, and finally the French. He hoped to meet them singly in succession, and then by penetrating into Bohemia to force Austria to make peace.

The retreat of
Frederick II
and the invasion
of Prussia

In April, however, he decided to surprise the Austrians by invading Bohemia at once, and succeeded in forcing them back to Prag, which he then besieged. On May 6 he won a victory in the field, but could not drive the Austrians from the Bohemian capital; and, after enormous losses, at Kolin, on June 18 he suffered a severe defeat, and was obliged to evacuate Bohemia. On August 30 the Russians won a sweeping victory over the Prussian army under Lehwaldt at Gross-Jägersdorf; on September 7 Frederick's ablest gen-

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eral, Winterfeldt, was killed near Görlitz; and on September 13 the Swedes, as well as the Austrians and Russians, were on Prussian soil.¹

Added to these misfortunes was the inactivity of Prussia's only ally, George II. Frederick II had urged the organization of an Anglo-Hanoverian army in Northwestern Germany and the sending of a fleet to the Baltic against the Swedes and Russians, but no action had been taken. At London the state of political parties was such that a mixed ministry held the places of power, and could agree upon nothing relating to the war on the continent. A strong popular feeling opposed the shedding of English blood over the fate of Courland, Prussia, or even Hanover, and the commercial classes were indisposed to disturb the trade relations with Russia by sending a fleet to the Baltic. The war in Germany was, therefore, so far as England was concerned, left to the inadequate action of the Hanoverian and mercenary troops.

On July 26, near Hastenbeck, in Hanover, the Duke of Cumberland, who commanded this force, had been severely defeated by the French; and, on September 8, furnished with full powers by George II, the Duke negotiated at Kloster Zeven a convention by which the occupation of Hanover was surrendered to the French, the mercenary troops were disbanded, and the Hanoverian troops confined within prescribed limits.

The colonial
war and the
action of
England

Would England endure this humiliation? The sacrifice seemed enormous, but circumstances were strongly against resistance. Not only was the government enfeebled by divided counsels, but the misfortunes of the colonial war had increased. In the Far East thrilling events had occurred. In April, 1756, the strong rule of Ali Vardi, who had made himself master of Bengal and suppressed the Mahratta incursions, had come to an end; and a less efficient and capri-

¹ Regarding the inexplicable retreat of the Russian army under Apraxine, see Waliszewski, *La dernière des Romanov*, p. 449, who attributes it to an expectation that, owing to the illness of the Czarina Elisabeth, the accession of the Grand Duke Peter, a friend of Frederick II, would reverse the policy of Russia.

cious prince, Surajah Dowlah, had succeeded him as Nabob of Bengal. The enormities of this ruler had rendered him so odious that Clive, who had returned to India, had been ordered to expel him from Calcutta, which the Nabob had taken from the English. The capture of the fortress had been followed by the murder of a hundred and twenty-three Englishmen who were driven into the fatal "Black Hole."¹ After the place had been retaken by the English, at the outbreak of the war between France and England, Surajah Dowlah had appealed for aid to the French, who were anxious to continue the existing agreement of neutrality; but the exigencies of the situation had resulted in hostilities and the capture of Chandernagor by the English. Thus war had been renewed in India, with the result that, by the battle of Plassey, — fought on June 23, 1757, — England had won a victory that was in the end to give India to the English by opening "a career of conquest which made a small island in the western seas the greatest Mohammedan power in the world."

Although this event was, in its effect, one of the most momentous in the history of the eighteenth century, it had practically no influence upon the opinions or the decisions of the time. The losses in America were esteemed at London to be of far greater importance. Fort William Henry, on Lake George, had been taken by the French, an expedition against Louisbourg had failed through a storm which had damaged and scattered the English fleet, and the outlook for the cause of England in the colonies was extremely gloomy.

Pitt, who was to become the great leader in the expansion of England, had been a member of the Newcastle ministry, and since November, 1756, had himself been prime minister; but even he had not yet perceived that the conquest of America was to be made in Europe, and was hampered by his indisposition to waste the substance of England on the preservation of Hanover. Still, neither public sentiment nor the inclination of George II favored the surrender of the elec-

¹ For the circumstances of the incident, see Wilson, *Lord Clive*, p. 70.

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torate to the French or the total abandonment of Frederick II. The position of England, then engaged in war upon four continents, made resistance difficult; but so extreme was the desire to regain the ground lost that Pitt was ready, in order to obtain the help of Spain, to surrender Gibraltar, but the offer was declined.

To send English troops for the defence of Hanover was at the time impossible; but ratification of the convention of Kloster Zeven was refused, direct and indirect subsidies to the amount of two and a half million pounds sterling were voted by Parliament, and Prince Ferdinand of Brunswick was placed at the disposal of Frederick II for the reorganization of the army in Northwestern Germany.

The victories
of Frederick II
at Rossbach
and Leuthen

In his extremity Frederick II had sought to renew relations with France. At Paris opinions with regard to the value of the Austrian alliance and the expediency of totally crushing Prussia were known to be divided. Louis XV was, however, personally firm in his opposition to Frederick II, organized a fresh army to be sent against him, and declared his determination not to negotiate with him apart from Austria. The answer was received by the King of Prussia on the very day when the Austrians, having taken possession of a great part of Silesia, had already reached his capital, with the French supported by the Imperial army of execution previously summoned by Francis I about to advance upon Prussian soil.

But a few weeks entirely changed the situation. On November 5, at Rossbach, in Saxony, Frederick II defeated the French and Imperial troops; on December 5 he destroyed the principal force of the Austrians at Leuthen, in Silesia; while, in the meantime, Ferdinand of Brunswick, with a reorganized force, including the troops of the Landgrave of Hesse-Cassel, prevented a union of the French with the Swedes, who, through the retreat of the Russians, were left unsupported.

Thus, at the end of 1757, notwithstanding the exposure to which his kingdom had been subjected, Frederick II found himself in a position of temporary safety, which he en-

deavored to make permanent by overtures to France. Bernis had become alarmed at the consequences of the Austrian alliance, and wrote to the French ambassador at Vienna, "I give my voice for peace"; but both Louis XV and Kaunitz considered that, while their anti-Prussian policy had suffered a check, it had by no means met with a defeat, and preparations for a new campaign were at once actively begun.

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The year 1758, both in a diplomatic and a military sense, added vigor to the war. In London the successes of Frederick II in the field awakened great enthusiasm, and it began to be perceived that the fortunes of England were closely connected with the fate of Prussia; for the success of France upon the continent would greatly embarrass England in the colonies.

The strengthening of the Anglo-Prussian alliance

New subsidies were offered, but Frederick II, who demanded military and naval aid, at first refused to receive them. "I prefer," he said, "not to mix up money in the affair."

Sir Andrew Mitchell was astonished at this position, which he could not comprehend; for, with half his territories occupied by foreign troops, and in the midst of a costly campaign, Frederick II was evidently in need of money. The real reason for his refusal, we now know from his subsequent instructions to his ambassador at London, was his wish to force England to send to Germany troops rather than money, in order that English hostility to Austria and Russia, which he suspected George II of wishing to conceal, might be made more evident.

The persistence of Frederick II in forcing that issue so excited the irascibility of Pitt, who had firmly resolved not to send English soldiers to Germany, that Sir Andrew Mitchell was unjustly charged by him with favoring the Prussian system, and was summarily recalled; but, at length, when England promised to assume the support of a large increase of mercenaries in the army of Ferdinand of Brunswick, on April 11, 1758, a new treaty of alliance which provided new subsidies was signed.¹

¹ For the treaty, see Wenck, III, p. 173.

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The fall of
Bestusheff

So long as Bestusheff remained in power at St. Petersburg there existed a channel of information and a means of influence from which England had not ceased to profit, and Frederick II was not in error in believing that George II did not desire too openly to reveal the hostility of England to Russia. So intense was the French opposition to the Chancellor that in January, 1758, Bernis proposed to the allied courts a combined effort either to force his resignation or to compel him to adopt without reserve an acceptable policy; but Kaunitz was not disposed to proceed to this extremity, and French influence had not been sufficiently strong to carry out the project.

In February, however, the intrigues of Bestusheff's enemies resulted in accomplishing his overthrow. The precise manner in which his fall was occasioned still remains obscure, for the documents relating to it appear to have been destroyed; but in some way his arrest, dismissal, and exile were connected with his relations to the secret designs of the Grand Duchess Catherine and the retreat of the Russian army under Apraxine. Whatever the cause may have been, at about the same time the Chancellor, the Archduchess, and the General were all three publicly disgraced, and the Czarina manifested a new zeal in the prosecution of the war against Frederick II. With Woronzoff as chancellor, the secret code which Eon had carried to St. Petersburg was brought to light, and an active private correspondence between the Czarina and Louis XV, whose letters had long remained unanswered, was finally begun.

The new alliance of the Catholic powers

A letter of Pope Clement XIII, dated August 19, 1758, by which the title of "*Majesté Apostolique*" was conferred upon Maria Theresa, was intended by the Holy See to rally the Catholic princes to the side of the Empress, but had an effect quite different from that which was designed.¹ This interference excited the indignation of the Protestant princes, who saw in it an attempt to revive the opposition to Protestantism. As a consequence Frederick II now seemed to

¹ See Wenck, III, p. 178.

be charged with the rôle of defending the freedom of religion.¹

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So far as France was concerned, some new impulse of this kind was needed to revive interest in the war. The spirit of the French people was never at a lower ebb. The follies and extravagances of the Court had debauched the public life of France, and the population took little real interest in the effort to suppress Frederick II, whose heroic resistance had even awakened admiration and respect.² The war had brought no gain or glory to France. The treasury was low, and the army was dispirited, sadly disorganized, and scattered in little groups over a wide area which destroyed its efficiency. The generals were in great part court favorites sent out to win laurels, but incapable of earning them. Hanover had been evacuated and a disastrous retreat of the French army had followed. The English were sending expeditions against the French coasts and preparing to strike a telling blow in America, where Montcalm was bravely fighting to defend Canada.

In a memorial to the King Bernis expressed the opinion that peace should be made, but Louis XV would listen to no project of that kind. To mark his personal esteem for Bernis, however, he caused the minister to be made a cardinal, and October 9 accepted his resignation.³

In September Bernis had written to the French ambassador at Vienna, Count Stainville, — who in recognition of his services had in the previous August been made Duke de

¹ It is, however, impossible to consider Frederick II as the protagonist of Protestantism. Protestant as well as Catholic powers were in the Coalition against him, and no religious issue was at stake.

² On April 7, 1758, Bernis wrote to Stainville, the French ambassador at Vienna: "Notre nation est plus indignée que jamais de la guerre. On aime ici le roi de Prusse à la folie parce qu'on aime toujours ceux qui font bien leurs affaires; on déteste la cour de Vienne parce qu'on la regarde comme la sangsue de l'État, et l'on se soucie fort peu de son aggrandissement et du nôtre."

³ On the situation and disposition of the powers at the time, see *Fleys, Louis XV, Marie-Thérèse et la paix de l'Europe en 1768*, *Revue d'Histoire Diplomatique*, XI (1879), p. 28.

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Choiseul,¹— that he should “make efforts with the Court of Vienna to the end that it might decide to sacrifice its ideas of vengeance,” since “there is no solid hope, and on the contrary many well founded fears, for the continuation of the war”; but these efforts had no other result than to open a discussion regarding “a new base for the alliance of the two crowns.”

When in November Choiseul arrived in Paris to succeed Bernis in charge of foreign affairs, there was no longer any thought of peace. The new minister was enthusiastically Austrian in his sympathies and owed his influence with the King largely to the favor of Madame de Pompadour, who had come to regard Bernis as too much disposed to consider “*les fantaisies du public*,” as she was pleased to describe the wishes of the French people for peace.

The beginning
of Choiseul's
diplomacy

Although Choiseul was a firm partisan of the alliance with Austria, he clearly perceived that the only dangerous enemy of France was England. He aimed, therefore, so to modify the engagement with Austria as to enable France to concentrate more attention upon her real antagonist. His first official act was intended to be in this direction, but its effect was to renew the Austro-French alliance upon a basis that disregarded the only reason of state that had ever existed for wasting the energies of France in Germany. The promised cession of the Austrian Netherlands to Don Philip was eliminated, the Empress abandoned the right to recover Parma, Piacenza, and Guastalla, and the obligation to aid Maria Theresa in recovering Silesia was balanced only by the slight prospective recompense of occupying Ostend and Nieuport. The other important modifications of the alliance were the payment to Austria of two hundred and eighty thousand florins a month, the withdrawal of the obligation to maintain twenty-four thousand soldiers in Bohemia, and the engagement to keep a hundred thousand men on the Rhine. By restricting the participation of France to the

¹ His special service at Vienna had been to arrange a marriage between the future Louis XVI and the Archduchess Marie Antoinette of Austria.

West of Germany, Choiseul hoped to be able to concentrate more force upon the war with England. The practical result was that the military operations of France in Germany were only a slight embarrassment to Frederick II, of small utility to Maria Theresa, and entirely without value to the interests or prestige of France, whose treasury was drained, and whose blood was shed on foreign battlefields, with no appreciable benefit.¹

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It is no part of our task to follow the extremely interesting military operations of the Seven Years' War, which can be understood and appreciated only when studied in detail.² It is sufficient to state that, at the end of 1758, the gains of the coalition, notwithstanding severe fighting, were inappreciable. Although an enormous sacrifice of life and money had been made, the *status quo* remained essentially unchanged. The Russians had penetrated to the very heart of Frederick II's possessions, had entirely occupied East Prussia, and had ruined a part of his territory with fire and sword; but they had gained no permanent advantage. As for the Swedes, they had simply made an ineffectual parade in Pomerania. The French, driven from North Germany, beaten at Crefeld, and compelled to retreat in order to find safe winter quarters, had nothing to show for their hard campaign. The Austrians were scarcely more successful. They had prevented the Prussian advance into Moravia, but they had acquired no territory from the enemy; and, after winning nominally victorious battles, had retired within their own borders.

The military
results of 1758

On the other hand, Frederick II, although successful in forcing the enemy to evacuate his possessions, had made no positive gains. He had displayed all his admirable qualities as a leader in the face of overwhelming numbers, but the rescue of his kingdom and the continued existence of his armies were due even more to the ineptitude of the generals who opposed him than to his own inherent force of attack and resistance.

¹ For the Treaty of December 30, 1758, see Wenck, III, p. 185.

² The military details are given with great clearness and completeness in Waddington, *La guerre de sept ans*, Paris, 1899-1908.

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The policies
of Pitt

Through the energetic action of Pitt the year had brought forth for England results of a more decided character. In previous administrations, when in opposition, Pitt had been the most bitter opponent of the policy of sacrificing English interests to those of Hanover. He had stormed more tempestuously against the subsidies proposed for the defence of the electorate than any other orator in the House of Commons, but when it came to the point of choosing between the extinction of Prussia by the coalition and the defeat of France on the continent, Pitt had seen that nothing could so weaken and exhaust the resources of Louis XV as the prosecution of that fatal conflict in which the King of Prussia was so bravely withstanding a world in arms. From that moment Pitt became the advocate of heavy subsidies to oppose France on the continent, and saw that the costly preoccupation of France in Germany signified the future impotence of England's enemy in that great struggle for world empire in which the two rivals were then engaged.

It was, however, from the point of view of victory on the sea, in America, and in India, that Pitt's foreign policy received its entire orientation. For the continent, in itself, he cared nothing, except to keep it busy with its own concerns.

It was this far-seeing minister, — a man without wealth, great lineage, or social position, and whose political status depended entirely upon his own personal force, — who now inspired the energies of England, and the effect was momentous. Hated by the King, he yet exercised a complete dominion over his decisions. "I gave him no orders to treat," George II said, when his son sent him for ratification the convention of Kloster Zeven. "No, Sir," replied Pitt, "but you gave him very full powers!"

It was this splendid fearlessness, combined with his devotion to the imperial interests of Great Britain, that made this courageous commoner the great Englishman of his time. His plans were simple but grand. They included the absorption of the interest and energies of France in Europe, the harassing of the French ports and destruction of French commerce, the sending of strong reinforcements to Clive in

India, and the speedy overthrow of French power in America, to be followed by the annexation of Canada to the English colonies and the mastery of the great interior waterways of the American continent, the St. Lawrence, the Ohio, and the Mississippi.

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All these great schemes were successfully carried forward. The cost was enormous. For the year 1758 more than ten million pounds sterling were appropriated, of which nearly a fifth was expended in foreign subsidies. The navy received an unprecedented development. Seven ships were detailed to blockade the French ports on the channel, and expeditions were sent to bombard them, which Fox, who thought the operation useless, said "like breaking windows with guineas"; but Pitt, believing that France would not yield until the war was brought home to the French people, aimed at terrorizing them into submission. Fifteen ships were ordered to stop French commerce in the Mediterranean and put the Spanish ports out of business, while forty-one ships were sent to reinforce the fleet at Halifax, and sixty thousand English seamen swarmed over the seas to annihilate the trade and destroy the power of France. Young and courageous men were everywhere placed in command. As a result, Louisbourg fell in July. Expeditions were directed against Canada. Fort Frontenac was taken, giving Lake Ontario to the British as a base, with the French fleet as a prize of war. Soon afterward Fort Duquesne, abandoned by the French when their supplies were cut off in the North, fell into the hands of the British, who renamed it in honor of Pitt. And thus the command of the Ohio, and as a sequel that of the Mississippi, passed from the brave French pioneers and martyrs of empire who had striven to claim it for their distant and incapable king, by whom they were left to struggle on with inadequate defence while he was dissipating the resources of his people in an illusory adventure in Germany.¹

The results
of Pitt's
policies

¹ Louis XV was at the time paying out annually in subsidies to the Empress and to the German mercenary princes fifty million livres, besides the expense of his own army.

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Progress of
the war be-
tween France
and England

Although Choiseul was aware that the struggle with England would be a long one, he did not doubt that the resources of France would in the end prove superior.

In January, 1759, he wrote to Kaunitz: "As to peace with England, the King thinks that it is by pursuing the war against that power that we shall enfeeble the King of Prussia. We shall support that opinion at the risk of losing our colonies, but this danger afflicts us without frightening us, and we hope that in 1760 the resources of England, notwithstanding her success, will be exhausted, and that we shall be in a condition then to put forth the efforts that will render her reasonable."

The events of the year revealed the illusory character of these expectations.

A brave general, but devoid of aptitude for the peculiar duties to which he was assigned, Lally Tollendal, had been sent, to use his own expression, "to drive the English out of India." His motto, which he declared to be "sacramental," was: "No Englishman in the peninsula." But the fortunes of war led to a quite different result. The siege of Madras in January, 1759, after heavy losses, resulted in the retreat of the French. The capture of Masulipatam in March proved an unprofitable victory, for it was soon afterward through a treaty with the Viceroy of the Deccan recovered by the English. The naval encounters brought no advantage to the French. To this were added the bitter personal quarrel of Lally Tollendal with the Marquis de Bussy, second in command; the lamentable relations of the French governor with the native chiefs; and, finally, the revolt of the Lorraine regiment, which the government that had so bountifully subsidized the armies of Austria, had left for ten months entirely unpaid. The year 1759 did not witness the isolation and fall of Pondicherry, which soon followed, but with such leadership disaster was foredoomed.¹

The situation in America was not more favorable to France, but it was not through the fault of the able and heroic Mont-

¹ For the administration of the French interests and the end of the French domination in India, see Hamont, *Lally-Tollendal*, Paris, 1887.

calm, who was sacrificed by a government unworthy of his devotion. In January Bougainville had arrived in France to report the exposed condition in which Canada was placed, but it seemed too late to repair the damage of previous neglect. The war on the ocean had rendered the French navy incapable of offering the necessary aid, and it was only a question of sending munitions and provisions to enable Canada, now abandoned to its own powers of resistance, to meet the attack of the English.¹

In April Montcalm clearly foresaw the coming defeat of France in Canada. His last hope was the defence of Quebec, and he gallantly prepared to defend that stronghold until some unexpected change in the course of events might occur. The story of that memorable siege has a conspicuous place in the annals of both the contending nations, for it recounts a struggle of almost unparalleled heroism on both sides, in which the prize was the greatest ever contended for by rival powers, the ultimate mastery of a dominion surpassing in extent many times over the whole of Europe.

Begun early in July, the siege did not end until September 13, when the English under General Wolfe had under cover of night scaled the heights of Abraham. In the battle which ensued upon the open plain Montcalm was mortally wounded while rallying his little army, which was soon thrown into confusion. The death of Wolfe at the moment of victory for a time paralyzed the further action of the English; but the field was already won, and with that victory the supremacy of the English in Canada. Montreal still remained in possession of the French, and a really great effort on the part of the Court of Versailles might still have changed the final result; but there was nothing to hope for from a government more influenced by illusions than by realities.

On the continent the year brought forth many changes, but none profoundly affecting the balance of forces. The death of Anne, Regent of the United Provinces, in January, produced no change in the relations with England. Before

The effects of
England's sea
policy on the
maritime
powers

¹ For the situation in Canada, see Waddington, *La guerre de sept ans*, III, p. 252.

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her death the Princess of Orange had implored her father to end the arbitrary treatment of the Dutch shipping; but, although George II replied with conciliatory assurances, the vessels of the Republic were captured and condemned by the English prize courts on the plea of illicit commerce with the belligerents.

The Danish ships were exposed to the same vexations. "No navigator of any country," wrote the Danish prime minister, Bernstorff, "however innocent may be his business, has ever obtained a just sentence before these Doctors Commons, whose name will descend with horror to posterity." The indictment was vigorous, but not without justification, and the arrogance of Great Britain upon the sea was to be dearly paid for in the following decades.

It was only with the greatest difficulty that the neutrality of Holland was maintained. In his letters to Count d'Affry, the French ambassador at The Hague, Choiseul urged him "to sound the tocsin of the sea against the English." The idea of a neutral league of the maritime powers occurred to him, and he endeavored to realize it at Stockholm as well as at The Hague.¹

Under the strong pressure of the maritime powers, Parliament found it expedient to pass a law, bitterly opposed by the proprietors of privateering vessels, who had gathered a rich harvest from their spoils, permitting the owners of the ships seized to obtain their liberation by depositing a sum of money. A commission of Dutch delegates visited London to negotiate an arrangement; but its purpose was frustrated by delay, and the sacrifices passively endured became the seeds of permanent estrangement between England and the United Provinces.²

The renewed
animosity of
Spain toward
England

During the life-time of Ferdinand VI of Spain, under the ministry of Richard Wall, an Irishman who had passed into the service of Spain and enjoyed the entire confidence of the King, the relations of that monarchy with England had not

¹ See Bourguet, *Le duc de Choiseul en Hollande*, *Revue Historique*, LXXIX (1902), p. 298.

² See Coquelle, *L'alliance franco-hollandaise*, p. 53 et seq.

been unfriendly, while French influence at Madrid had been relegated to a secondary rôle. The confirmed melancholia which darkened the last years of Ferdinand VI threw the whole responsibility for the conduct of affairs upon the ministry, and in his few lucid moments the King approved the proposals laid before him by Wall, to whom all foreign affairs were intrusted. But the death of Ferdinand VI in August, 1759, brought to the throne the Farnese prince who since 1735 had ruled at Naples, and with him a change in the policy of Spain, which with the other maritime powers had suffered much from the capture of its merchant ships by England.

Notwithstanding the existing relations of nominal friendliness between England and Spain, there had been abundant cause of complaint during the last years of Ferdinand VI. Even Wall had loudly remonstrated with the British ministry, and had said in a note to the Spanish ambassador in London, "If they wish to live in accord with us, they have many occasions for manifesting their friendship in place of the fine phrases in which they are so prodigal, by returning to us the great number of ships which they detain in their ports to the great detriment of our nationals."

The policy of Pitt had been at any cost to cut France off from all external commerce. As for the rights of neutrality, it was clear that they must suffer from this system; but war must pursue its end, the destruction of the power of the enemy. Determined to isolate France completely, he refused to renounce his method, and all remonstrance was in vain.

The accession of Charles III to the throne of Spain seemed a favorable occasion for renewing the former close relations between the Bourbon monarchies. As early as January, 1759, Choiseul, through the French ambassador at Naples, the Marquis d'Ossun, had endeavored to interest Don Carlos in checking the development of England's maritime power; but, as King of Naples, Charles III did not feel prepared to risk the interests of his kingdom by taking decided action.

Choiseul's
effort to
obtain the
mediation
of Spain

In September, 1759, Ossun, — who at the request of Don Carlos accompanied him to Spain, — in response to the offer of the new king to mediate between France and England,

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presented to him a note containing the conditions upon which Louis XV was prepared to negotiate.

The design of this note was, of course, to convince Charles III of the value of a close relation with France. England was represented as an "insatiable monster," which must be restrained, unless Spain was prepared to sacrifice her commerce and lose her colonies.

Don Carlos, through his Neapolitan minister at London, San Severino, communicated with Pitt his readiness to mediate; but Pitt, who did not desire Spanish mediation, affirmed that it was not the intention of England to retain all her conquests, and promised to send to Lord Bristol, the British ambassador at Madrid, instructions which would enable him to confer with the minister of His Catholic Majesty.

The French note had contained a sentence pointing out how "essential it was to Spain that the equilibrium of possessions established by the Treaty of Utrecht be not altered"; and, in a communication prepared without the knowledge of Wall, and made through the Spanish ambassador, Abreu, at London, Charles III had the indiscretion to say, "The King cannot regard with indifference the derangement which these conquests involve for the equilibrium established by the Treaty of Utrecht." To this insinuation Pitt made no response, for its menacing character rendered necessary an explanation at Madrid.

Failure of
Choiseul's
tactics

So long as Charles III was under the influence of Ossun, his sympathies were strong for France. When he was informed of the fall of Quebec, he declared "the news had frozen his blood." But when he discussed the subject with Wall, who assured him that England would never conclude a treaty with France in which Prussia did not participate, and that the friendship of Prussia, whose presence in Germany was necessary as a check to the ambitions of Austria in Italy, was of great value to Spain, the idea of mediation appeared less attractive; for an offensive alliance with France — at which Choiseul was aiming — would probably be the consequence of insistence, and for this he was not prepared.

The failure of Choiseul to procure Spanish intervention rendered more evident the embarrassment of France.

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In December, 1759, the French minister had reached a turning-point in his European policy. In a memorandum sent to Madrid on December 24, he wrote: "The superiority of land forces is doubtless of great importance; but, since commerce has become the object of all the powers, it is demonstrated by events that the preponderance is on the side of that one which has the empire of the sea." The two Latin powers, standing firmly together, could, he thought, prevent the maritime supremacy of England.

The changed
attitude of
France

There was another reason in the mind of Choiseul why Spain should join with France in immediately restoring the disturbed equilibrium of the powers. "We know," he wrote, "that the Court of Vienna has no other object, no other thought, no other urgency than that of crushing the King of Prussia; and that it would tranquilly sacrifice for that purpose all the possessions of the allies. We apprehend that, after the war, the King of Prussia, being crushed, the House of Austria might resume its relations with England and a tone with the European powers which would be as little agreeable to us as to Spain. In accordance with these reflections, . . . we recognize that the King of Prussia is sufficiently abased, and that it is not to our interest for this prince to be totally destroyed."

Evidently the whole attitude of France had changed. As the war had progressed the inexpediency of uniting with Austria and Russia to crush and partition Prussia had become apparent. The colonies having already been practically lost, France was beginning to realize the error of conducting two wars at a time when she was in need of all her energies to face her great antagonist on the sea. Eliminating the question of the colonies, what was to be the state of Europe when Austria and Russia were triumphant, Poland sacrificed, the Sultan alienated, and Prussia effaced from the map, if indeed that achievement should in the end prove possible?

To remedy the evils already produced, or in the way of

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accomplishment, Austria and Prussia must be reconciled before the destruction of the latter should be made complete. To render this possible, a separate peace between France and England must first be obtained. Then, by the union of France, Spain, and England together, pressure could be brought to bear upon Austria and Prussia in a general congress, and thus the peace of Europe could be restored.

But how, in the circumstances, could France hope to obtain acceptable terms from England? That was the problem to which Choiseul was now to address himself, and with this new direction in the policy of France the Seven Years' War entered upon a new phase of its development.

II. THE OBSTACLES TO A EUROPEAN PEACE

The drift
toward peace

After nearly four years of bitter warfare no one of the continental powers had made any great gain. All were anxious for peace, but not in the same degree.

In the great duel for maritime and colonial supremacy France had already lost. England also, burdened with the heavy expenses of the war, possessed a numerous peace party; but the inflexible resolution of Pitt not to conclude the struggle until France was completely stripped of her colonies and not to sacrifice Prussia to the Coalition rendered it extremely difficult for overtures of peace to be made.

Toward the close of 1759 Choiseul had not hesitated to let the Empress understand that France was reduced to an extremity which demanded a separate peace with England. "We shall not make peace on land without her," he wrote to his cousin, Count de Choiseul, then French ambassador at Vienna; "we destroy ourselves from year to year in her behalf; but it is necessary to recognize in advance that we shall be compelled by circumstances to make our peace with England as soon as possible; and as to the war, . . . it is not everything to have courage, it is needful to have the

means of sustaining it; and not to speak clearly of our situation would be to deceive our allies."¹

To this frank confession Kaunitz made no reply, except to observe that Louis XV might abandon the maritime war, at the same time informing Spain that France was no longer able to defend her colonies, and assure Spain that unless she was ready to defend them for her she was in danger of losing her own. In reporting this advice, the ambassador did not fail to add: "He has not appeared much frightened by our calamities."

The cold indifference of the Austrian Court to the sacrifices of France was as evident as the growing alienation of Choiseul. At Vienna the dominant sentiment was hatred of Frederick II, and this was the standard by which friends were measured. "You hate the English intensely," Maria Theresa remarked one day to the French ambassador; "I wish that you would hate still more the King of Prussia." All who did so were *personae gratissimae* at the Court of Austria. Madame de Pompadour, whom Stahremberg reported to be of the opinion that "there could be no hope of a sure and durable peace without the decrease of the King of Prussia"; and whose "hatred for this prince," he said, "equals her sincere attachment to our court," was made the object of special attentions. Her devotion was recognized by the gift of a work-table adorned with a portrait of Her Majesty set in diamonds, and costing nearly eighty thousand livres. The King was present when it was delivered, and expressed his satisfaction with the honors bestowed by the Empress upon his mistress.

These affabilities had become the more necessary as Choiseul's waning interest in the war had become apparent. Stahremberg's influence at Versailles had from the beginning been founded primarily upon Madame de Pompadour's pro-Austrian sentiments, and so long as these remained unaltered France would continue to make sacrifices. No other course

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The attitude
of Austria
toward France

Impediments
to a continen-
tal peace

¹ In 1759 the total expenses of the monarchy amounted to five hundred million livres, and the revenues to three hundred million, leaving a deficit of two hundred million.

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was open to Choiseul, for his own status as minister depended upon the favor of the potent enchantress who held the affections of the King. Stahremberg, on the other hand, was powerless to oppose the minister, whose credit with her had been skilfully maintained; for, as the ambassador reported to Kaunitz, "outside of the essential base of our political system, she understands nothing, and he could represent matters to her in such a manner as to confuse or deceive her completely."

Adherence, at least in form, to the Austrian alliance was, therefore, necessary until a European peace could be enforced upon Maria Theresa; but the condition of the French finances did not justify the continuance of two wars, and Choiseul was more than ever anxious to conclude a separate peace with England.

Some months earlier, even before his endeavor to obtain the intervention of Charles III, Choiseul had written to L'Hôpital: "I believe it would be possible to terminate this war honorably and promptly, if we were not engaged — England and ourselves — in the quarrel of our allies; but our engagements are different from those of the English, since the allies of England would be satisfied if they could be left as they were before the war, while we have agreed with ours to procure for them indemnities and conquests. That is the real impediment to peace."

It was evident that the Austrian alliance, which had cost France so much, would in the end prove wholly valueless unless the permanent friendship of Austria could be secured by the recovery of Silesia. Loyalty to this alliance on the part of France was, therefore, necessary; for otherwise Austria, which would continue to be a great power even without the recovery of that province, might become once more an enemy. Could not Russia, which had "nothing to fear and little to hope from Austria," continued the minister, "undertake the task of mediating a peace between Maria Theresa and Frederick II?"

But the Czarina had no inclination to play the ingeniously devised rôle that Choiseul had suggested. On the contrary,

her pretensions fully justified his theory of the real obstacle in the way of peace, — the expectation of territorial acquisitions by the allies; for Russia not only coveted, but even openly demanded, the cession of Eastern Prussia, the domain upon which rested the royal title of the Elector of Brandenburg. Without conceding Prussia to Elizabeth and Silesia to Maria Theresa there was no prospect of a continental peace.

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In the previous summer Knyphausen, then Prussian ambassador at London, in view of the dissensions in the English cabinet and the peace policy of Newcastle, who wished to destroy the influence of Pitt by terminating the war, had proposed to Frederick II the idea of a congress of all the powers for the negotiation of a general peace. His chief argument in favor of it was that a separate peace between England and France would deprive Prussia of her ally and leave her at the mercy of the Coalition. The proposal of a general pacification, on the contrary, if accepted, would prevent Prussia from being deserted in the negotiations for peace; and, if declined, would throw upon the allies the moral responsibility for the continuation of the war.

The Anglo-Prussian proposal of a general congress

Frederick II had comprehended the value of this suggestion, and had written a letter to George II in which, "in the name of humanity and for the good of the human race," he proposed that the courts of London and Berlin should declare to the powers of the Coalition that they were disposed to favor the opening of a congress, in order to end a "burdensome and sanguinary war" and establish an honorable peace.

George II, desirous of territorial compensations for Hanover, had at first signified his wish that success in the field might furnish the occasion for a peace that would cause his "subjects to forget their misfortunes"; but the sentiment for peace was so strong in England that even Pitt seemed to favor pacific overtures.

The Prussian defeat at Kunersdorf had increased the desire of Frederick II for the termination of the war, and the evident design of Choiseul to make a separate arrangement,

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if possible, with England had considerably strengthened it. On October 29, 1759, a declaration had been prepared at London in which it was stated that the two kings, "touched with compassion for the misfortunes which the war had caused and would continue to occasion, were prepared to send their plenipotentiaries to a place that might be found most convenient, in order there to treat conjointly of a solid and general peace."

Duke Lewis of Brunswick, then acting as regent for the young stadtholder William V of the Netherlands, had been requested to deliver copies to the ambassadors of France and Russia and to the minister of Austria at The Hague.¹ In November he had accepted the mission; but Frederick II, reanimated by the more favorable course of the war and believing the Coalition about to dissolve, then considered his situation less desperate than it had been after the battle of Kunersdorf, and was less inclined to convoke a general congress.

The attitude
of the Coalition
toward the
congress

Although Choiseul would have preferred a separate peace with England, he had not opposed the idea of a general pacification; taking pains, however, to make it plain that the negotiations were to deal with two entirely separate conflicts, which must be considered as altogether distinct. At The Hague the French ambassador, Count d'Affry, in December had long conversations with the English ambassador, General York, in which the possibility of peace was discussed; but their interviews served only to make it clear that while France intended "to keep the two wars separate," the English would participate in no negotiations in which Prussia was not included.²

The attitude of Austria and Russia was more belligerent. In their replies there was no note of peace. After a long delay Austria offered a counter-declaration, in which it was stated that the allies were disposed "to terminate the wars

¹ On the conferences at The Hague, see Coquelle, *L'alliance franco-hollandaise*, p. 120.

² For these conversations, see Bourguet, *Le duc de Choiseul et l'Angleterre*, *Revue d'Histoire Diplomatique*, XVII (1903), p. 456 et seq.

which had already for some years subsisted between England and France on the one side, and His Majesty of Prussia, the House of Austria, and Her Majesty the Empress of Russia on the other," and were ready to send plenipotentiaries to the congress "on condition that hostilities should not be suspended during the continuance of the negotiations." "After all," said Kaunitz, "a congress is not a peace; a congress has been known to break up!"

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Repulsed by England in the matter of the Spanish mediation, incapable of making a separate peace for France, and bound to the Coalition by ulterior interests, yet not wishing to see Prussia entirely crushed, Choiseul treated the suggestion of a congress as a "comedy" which could not be frankly accepted, nor yet openly repudiated. Even if the congress were convoked, the war would go on; if it were opposed by France, how could Choiseul hope to induce Pitt to a separate agreement? But there was still another embarrassment. Sweden and Poland, through which France might hope to have some influence in controlling the action of the congress, had not been included in the Anglo-Prussian invitation. With them excluded, if France opposed the wishes of Austria and Russia, she would be left to the mercy of England. If she accepted them, England, as Prussia's ally, would make her pay dearly for consenting to the dismemberment of Prussia; and who would defend her against the English demands? The situation was accurately described by Stahremberg in a despatch to Kaunitz, in which he said of Choiseul: "If the negotiations for peace are submitted to a congress, he will not remain the master; and it is much to be feared that the other ministers, who with all the public here long for peace, may force his hand."

Choiseul did not wish a general pacification of Europe until he had first made use of all the advantages the alliances of France might afford in concluding peace with England. His aim was, therefore, to frustrate the convoking of a general congress; and it was not until the middle of January, 1760, that the views of the allies were sufficiently harmonized to permit of a final reply to the Anglo-Prussian proposal;

Reply of the
Coalition to the
Anglo-Prussian
proposal

CHAP. VII and not until April 3 that it was presented to Duke Lewis of
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Its purport was: (1) that, since the Anglo-French war had nothing to do with the war of the allies against the King of Prussia, the King of France was ready to treat of his personal peace with the King of England by the mediation of the King of Spain; and (2) that, with regard to the war with the King of Prussia, the allies were disposed to assent to the idea of a congress; but, as they were bound by their treaties not to make peace except conjointly, it would be necessary, in order that they might be able to have an understanding upon this subject, that invitations be extended to all the powers engaged in this war, including the King of Poland, Elector of Saxony, and the King of Sweden.

The reasons that had prevailed with the Coalition in formulating this reply were equally potent for considering it unsatisfactory. The elimination of England from the situation by a separate peace with France would leave Prussia without defence in the congress; with the result either that there would be no general peace, which was most probable, or that Prussia would be practically effaced from the map. The mediation, or "interlocution," of Spain, — as San Severino had called it, — was objectionable to England, whereas a settlement of Anglo-French affairs in a general congress would avoid not only such interference by Spain but also giving unnecessary offence to Charles III by finally rejecting his mediation. Further, the difficulties with France once removed by a separate treaty of peace, there would be no argument for inducing Parliament to continue the subsidies for Prussia, which would be equivalent to a total abandonment of Frederick II. In January the British cabinet had been confidentially informed that, with the army of Frederick II reduced one-half, the best officers either killed or made prisoners, his remaining troops worn out with hard service and discouraged by lost battles, and his kingdom partly occupied by the enemy, he could not unaided sustain the assault of the combined powers.

Although favorable to a general congress, except when

temporarily encouraged by a new ray of hope for his army, Frederick II was by no means averse to an understanding between France and England, provided he could be included in it. In the conferences between the diplomatic representatives at The Hague, the Prussian minister, Hellen, assured Affry that, "if France wished to make proposals to England in which His Majesty of Prussia was included, they would be heard"; and this was in agreement with the expressions of York, who was officially instructed that if — in addition to Hanover, Hesse, and Brunswick — Prussia could be included in the negotiations, George II would be ready to negotiate for a separate peace with France.

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The secret
diplomacy of
Frederick II

At London Knyphausen was directed to urge this course as the most likely to be effective; and, in fact, as strictly necessary to the salvation of Prussia. In his extremity the lively imagination of the King was fertile in schemes for the promotion of peace at the expense of his neighbors. Austria, it was suggested by him, might find compensation for Silesia in Bavaria; and he at one time fancied that Russia might be reconciled by the offer of the city and territory of Erfurt, which belonged to the Elector of Mainz, as compensation to the King of Poland.

To facilitate the *rapprochement* of England and France, Frederick II attempted privately to reach the ear of Choiseul, and through him of Louis XV, first by letters addressed to Voltaire with the understanding that they were to be shown to the minister, and afterward by a secret emissary, Baron Edelsheim of Gotha. "France," he wrote confidentially to a friend in Paris, the Bailli de Froullay, "can withdraw with honor from the sad situation in which she is placed, if she desires a separate peace with us, England, and our allies. If France consents to maintain the equilibrium of Germany, and to oblige her allies to subscribe to this by making common cause with England, she can expect to obtain conditions much more favorable than she will be able to have in any other case." "Only a few strokes of the pen," he considers, would be needed "to end a discord so fatal for Europe."

The letter to the Bailli de Froullay, carried to Paris by

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The results
of Frederick
II's secret
diplomacy

Edelsheim, was read by Louis XV, discussed with Choiseul, and answered in a friendly tone in a report made by Froullay. The separate peace between France and England was insisted upon as the best means for securing the general peace, but Frederick II was assured in the report that France had no intention to derange the equilibrium of Germany or to exhaust the King of Prussia. France was ready either to receive or to offer proposals, if England was ready to negotiate. For the rest, an explicit explanation was not considered timely; but Choiseul's remark, "You know very well that it is not I who made the treaty with Vienna," addressed to Froullay and reported by him, afforded a ground of hope to Frederick II.

The whole correspondence was forwarded to Knyphausen with instructions to lay it before the British ministry, and especially to speak of it to Pitt. "You see," observed Frederick II in his despatch, "that France is resolved to make peace with England, in order to have occasion not to make another campaign. If the British ministry finds it possible to agree with France on the preliminaries, I believe the matter could be settled and soon concluded. As to my fate, I would place it in the hands of England, . . . being persuaded that I could not put it in better hands, and that she would take the necessary precautions that France should not dupe us in regard to me."

In thus confiding his interests to England Frederick II believed that England would either insist upon including him in a peace with France, or require France to remain neutral for the duration of the war on the continent; while, in either case, England would continue to aid him in resisting Austria and Russia.

In his expectation that France would accept this arrangement, Frederick II was doomed to disappointment. On April 14 Affry, under instructions from Choiseul, made it clear to York, who reported it to London, that, while France was ready to include Hanover, Hesse, and Brunswick in the separate negotiations with England, it would be absolutely impossible to include the King of Prussia.

And yet it was true, as we now know from a part of Choiseul's instruction to his representative at The Hague which could not be communicated to the British ambassador, that it was not against the interest of Frederick II that France was now acting. "We cannot be useful to the salvation of the King of Prussia," he writes, "without the separation of the two wars and the conclusion of our private peace. Every other means is useless to attempt in the face of allies as furious as ours for the total abasement of the House of Brandenburg." But on this point it was impossible to speak clearly to England, for fear she might "communicate these confidences relative to the King of Prussia to the courts of St. Petersburg and Vienna." To save Prussia, France must have a free hand, and be able to meet her allies in the general congress without the embarrassment of an unsettled conflict with the ally of Frederick II. Such at least was Choiseul's theory.

But the main object of the French minister was not to rescue Prussia. As Affry stated in his reply of April 15, Choiseul was placing the British ministry in a position which he believed highly advantageous to France. Convinced that public sentiment in England was strongly for peace, he intended to force George II for the sake of his Hanoverian interests to accept a direct understanding with France or to submit to the mediation of Spain, whose conception of what was reasonable would then have to be respected unless England was prepared, as Choiseul believed was not the case, to risk driving that power into making common cause with France in the colonial war.

End of the
pourparlers for
peace in 1760

Arrangements had been agreed upon for a person in the confidence of the French government to proceed to London to discuss secretly the preliminaries of peace; but on April 25 York was directed to inform the French ministry through his colleague at The Hague that this would be unnecessary, since England would enter upon no negotiations in which the King of Prussia was not formally included.

This ultimatum was chiefly owing to the influence of Pitt; who, in reality, was not yet ready for peace, and considered

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that the French proposal was designed only to separate England from her ally, while France retained her own alliance with Austria and Russia. When England had been thus isolated, he argued, France would refuse to abandon the colonies that had been taken from her, would then break off the negotiations, and attempt to influence public opinion by complaining of England's excessive cupidity, and by holding the British ministry responsible for the failure to make peace. As a result of this procedure, Prussia would resent the bad faith of England in deserting her, the British ministry would lose caste both at home and abroad, the war would not be ended, and England would have gained nothing by this proposed perfidy to her allies.

Thus ended for the time the efforts for peace. France, bound to her allies by the fear of complete isolation if she did not adhere to them, insisted upon considering the two wars as entirely distinct; while England, on the other hand, would take part in no negotiations in which Prussia was not included.

It was now a question of how most energetically to prosecute the war.

Frederick II, whose situation was still extremely grave, had not been idle. The hope of exciting the Turks against Austria and Russia had long been entertained at Berlin, and the reports of Rexin, the Prussian secret agent at Constantinople, now promised the early conclusion of a treaty with the Sultan and the invasion of Hungary by a Turkish army. These expectations were illusory, but they served to rekindle the enthusiasm of Frederick II, whose condition had been desperate. The immense losses sustained by his army had reduced it to less than a hundred thousand men. With such a force, confronted by two hundred and thirty thousand Austrians, Russians, Swedes, and Imperials — not counting the French — he was forced to act strictly upon the defensive. The war had become for him a battle for existence.

Nothing but indecision or lack of co-operation on the part of the allies could possibly save him from complete ruin;

The altered relations of the allies

but, fortunately for him, dissension had already entered their cabinets. CHAP. VII
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Choiseul had been perfectly loyal in advising Kaunitz of his attempt to open separate negotiations with England, but this candor had not preserved the Austrian chancellor from mistrust of France.

The relations between Austria and Russia had been strained by the demand of the Czarina for the guarantee of her claims to East Prussia, a pretension that seemed at Vienna to possess quite a different character from the Austrian right to Silesia. Maria Theresa and Kaunitz were annoyed by the exigence of an ally who found it necessary to assert a claim which seemed to imply distrust of the Empress; and it was not until late in May, after Woronzoff had refused to permit the Russian troops to march unless the guarantee was given, that the treaty, reluctantly signed on April 1, 1760, was finally ratified under this compulsion.¹

Although Austria was under formal obligation to make no engagement without the knowledge of France, this secret guarantee was for a long time unknown at Versailles. But there was another secret article which it would have been even more inconvenient to communicate to Louis XV, — a positive agreement with regard to a future war with Turkey, by which Austria was bound to aid her ally in case Russia should demand it.

This second engagement was closely connected with the first, for Russia had no intention of retaining East Prussia. It was, in part at least, to be returned to Poland, of which it had been a feudatory before it became independent under the Great Elector;² and, in exchange, Poland was to be required to cede to Russia the Polish rights in the Ukraine, thus bringing that territory into the possession of a strong power instead of a weak one. Such a menace to the Ottoman frontier would in all probability involve Russia in a war

¹ For the new treaty, which contained the guarantee in a secret article, see Martens, *Recueil*, A, Supplement III, p. 60.

² See p. 29 of this volume.

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The revival
of Louis
XV's secret
diplomacy

with Turkey, and Austria had engaged to support the Czarina against the Sultan.

Although these agreements still remained secret, the designs of Russia regarding Prussia were well understood at Versailles; for, even before the secret conventions were signed, Woronzoff had informed the French ambassador at St. Petersburg that, "if the Empress and the King of France would consent," it was the intention of the Czarina to exchange Prussia for the Ukraine. L'Hôpital had raised no objection, merely saying that it would first be necessary to obtain the consent of Austria, and the King could then consider the matter. Stahremberg also had, by instructions from Vienna, opened the subject to Choiseul, who, having lost all hope of a separate peace with England, was resolved to continue the war, and confidentially assented to overlook the intentions of Russia, provided that France be in no way connected with the matter. But when Esterhazy imprudently revealed this compliance, Choiseul retracted his assent, demanded that Esterhazy withdraw his statement, and claimed the right of Louis XV to examine the agreement before pronouncing his decision. Soon afterward L'Hôpital was recalled, and Baron de Breteuil was substituted in his place.¹

Clearly, although the secret engagement regarding Turkey still remained unknown in France, a decided *contretemps* had occurred in the Franco-Russian relations.

The situation had become extremely embarrassing for France. It was necessary to continue the war; and, therefore, to remain in close alliance with Russia. On the other hand, it was not desired at Versailles that Prussia should be totally destroyed, or that Russia should greatly increase her predominance either by acquiring additional territory on the Baltic, as was feared, or by further encroaching upon, and thereby disabling the Ottoman Empire, as was proposed.

What, then, was to be done to prevent one or another of these consequences?

¹ L'Hôpital still remained for some time at St. Petersburg, and during this time Breteuil had only the rank of a minister plenipotentiary.

At this point the secret diplomacy of Louis XV again comes into action. The King, perceiving the error that had been committed by abandoning the traditional French policy of maintaining a line of allies in the East to restrain the House of Hapsburg, to whose chariot of triumph France was now chained by the Treaties of Versailles, began to recoil from the consequences of that alliance. Must he tacitly assent to the predominant partnership of Austria and Russia, continue without reward to help fight their battles, and passively witness the division of the spoils between them? Officially that was precisely the attitude imposed upon him, but personally and secretly he revolted against it. The official instructions directed the new ambassador to derive all possible benefit from the alliance with Russia for the continuation of the war and the making of peace; but the secret instructions authorized him, as far as possible, to obstruct the designs of Russia, and even to retard the action of the Russian armies!

The dilemma in which France was now placed by the agreement of Austria and Russia for the dismemberment of Prussia opened a long vista into the future. Was it reasonable to believe that those two powers would unite in partitioning Prussia, which was strong, and not combine in the future for the division of Poland, which was weak?

The dilemma
of France
regarding
Russia

Sweden had long ago ceased to be the great power she was at the Peace of Westphalia. Turkey, with Austria and Russia united against her, was doomed to gradual division by the complicity of her two Northern neighbors. If Poland were effaced, the entire Eastern line of restraint on the House of Hapsburg would be swept away. What then could save France from the preponderating pressure of the Empire upon the Rhine?

Evidently, there was the alternative of clinging closely to the Russian alliance, of being more Russian than Austria herself, and of awaiting the day when Austria and Russia would find their interests conflicting, when the Empire of the Czars might take the place of the former Eastern line of allies, — Sweden, Poland, and Turkey, — as Peter the Great

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had once proposed, and in moments of danger keep the Empire of the Hapsburgs under discipline in the East.¹

It was, in fact, this "duel of opinions" that now brought the secret diplomacy of Louis XV again into play, while the official diplomacy continued loyal to the anti-Prussian Coalition. How far the King alone stood for the one view and Choiseul for the other is a matter of dispute, and there are many reasons for believing that the two contradictory lines of action were merely the results of indecision, growing out of the difficulty of totally abandoning the Russian alliance on the one hand and of preventing the execution of the designs of Russia on the other.²

It was, in truth, a decisive moment in the history of Europe, a turning-point the far-reaching significance of which was not sufficiently appreciated either by the King or by his minister; and yet it had been very clearly pointed out by Bernstorff, the foreign minister of Denmark, in a private letter to Choiseul. "The war of Germany," wrote the minister, "was kindled, not merely for a mediocre or a passing reason, — for some little provinces or places more or less, — but for the existence of the new monarchy which the King of Prussia has erected with an art and a promptitude which have surprised a part of Europe and deceived the other; it was started because the question was to be decided, if that new monarchy, — composed of different pieces which have not yet all the connection nor all the extent which are necessary to them, but which is entirely military, and which still has all the vigor, all the agility, and all the cupidity of young and meagre bodies, — should continue to exist, and if the Empire should have two chiefs, and its Northern part a prince who, having made of his states an armed camp and of his people an army, if allowed a little leisure to round out and

¹ Something analogous to this has now happened in the existing Franco-Russian alliance.

² Vandal regards the secret diplomacy as directly in conflict with the official. See Vandal, *Louis XV et Elisabeth de Russie*, p. 364 et seq. Waliszewski, on the contrary, regards Choiseul as really adhering to the principles of the secret diplomacy. See Waliszewski, *La dernière des Romanov*, p. 500 et seq.

establish his power, might become the arbiter of the great affairs of Europe and the make-weight in the balance of the powers." ¹

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The opportunity had arisen for reducing to impotence the menacing greatness of the Prussian monarchy. For that purpose France had for three years, at enormous cost, armed more than a hundred thousand men and fought six great battles. Now that the time had arrived when apparently nothing remained but for Russia to give the *coup de grâce* to the enemy, the conclusion was arrived at that the whole effort had been of doubtful expediency.

Plainly there were two distinct policies between which to choose: either to withdraw from the war and throw the influence of France boldly and forcibly on the side of maintaining the old system and preserving for Frederick II a sufficient basis to make his alliance of future value to France; or to trust and support the Russian alliance, accomplish the purpose for which the war was begun, and rely upon a close friendship with Russia to restrain the too great preponderance of Austria.

The secret instructions to Breteuil

In fact, neither of these policies was adopted, but a compromise between them, which left France eventually without any firm and loyal friend in the East.

Choiseul had chosen Breteuil as the new ambassador to Russia in the hope that he, with his youth, his personal attractions, and his greater vigor, not only might influence more effectively than L'Hôpital had done the personal inclinations of the Czarina, but win for France the friendship of the Princess Catherine, whose future importance the minister of France had the discernment thus early to appreciate. It was, in a sense, a shrewdly conceived idea of saluting the rising sun; for Elizabeth's end was likely to be near, and Catherine, who held different views, as wife of the next Czar, Peter III, would have a great rôle to play. ²

¹ *Correspondance entre Bernstorff et Choiseul* (1758-1766), p. 112.

² According to Vandal, it was the intention of Choiseul to employ the young ambassador for the purpose of gaining the affections of Catherine in a manner not permitted by a strict code of morals.

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The King, with a more definite purpose, lost no time in grafting upon the official policy his own secret diplomacy, by issuing to the young ambassador a private instruction, the aim of which was to destroy Russian and re-establish French influence in Poland.¹

This document, which placed Breteuil in possession of a negotiation which the King declared was "unknown to all his ministers," but was to modify all the official instructions, expressed the desire of Louis XV "to protect the liberties of the constitution of the Republic of Poland, preserve it from all danger to subjection on the part of neighboring powers, . . . and to see that the Republic should choose to govern it a prince who would be agreeable to His Majesty." The prince whom the King had in mind was Xavier of Saxony, third son of Frederick Augustus II, — whose life was expected to be of short duration, — and the favorite brother of the wife of the Dauphin, whose influence it was expected would be advantageous to France. Russia's part in the war must, if possible, be so restricted that her power to dictate the terms of peace would be limited. In brief, Breteuil was to destroy the idea of the cession of Prussia with the intention of an exchange for the Ukraine; to labor to obtain instead an indemnity in money from Prussia or England; and "*to relax, if circumstances permit, the operations of the Russians, in order that they may not put their services and their success at too high a price; and that, on the contrary, the arms of His Majesty may secure to him the principal part in the negotiation of the peace!*"

The divergent
aims of Louis
XV and
Choiseul

Louis XV profoundly distrusted Russia, whose domination over Poland he resented. Choiseul was of a different mind. To him the main interest of France was the early conclusion of the war with England. The divergence of views between the King and his minister is rendered unquestionable by the secret instructions sent to Breteuil. In order to prevent as far as possible the embarrassment of contrary instructions from the French foreign office, he was explicitly directed to

¹ For the terms of the secret instruction to Breteuil, see Vandal, as before, p. 373 et seq.

color his reports to Choiseul in such a manner as to impress him with the danger that would arise from the aggrandizement of Russia, and thus to elicit from the minister orders compatible with the private views of the King.¹ In brief, the ambassador was charged to aid his royal master in procuring official instructions from the King's own minister in harmony with the secret diplomacy, which aimed at limiting as much as possible the activity of Russia in the war!

This was at the moment when the fortunes of Frederick II were at their lowest ebb. "I am at the end of my resources," he had written on January 1, 1760; "the continuation of the war means for me utter ruin." On March 19 he confessed in private correspondence, "I tremble as I look forward to the next campaign." In May the same discouragement prevailed. "I have already wrought miracles, but the worst of modern miracles is that they have to be done all over again." And yet at the end of that year, in spite of new reverses, the condition of Frederick II's affairs, even from a military point of view, were considerably improved.

The Russian generals hardly needed the restraining action of Louis XV's ambassador to prevent their crushing Frederick II.² Their own lack of initiative and of co-operation with Austria seemed for a time to assure their want of success, and Frederick II held them at bay until the imperative orders of the Czarina, who was impatient with their inaction, urged them on to Berlin, which they entered on October 9, 1760.³

The fluctuations
of Russia

The news of this blow rendered the King of Prussia almost desperate, and Europe believed his cause was lost. Although his capital was soon evacuated, Frederick II found himself enclosed between the Russians and the Austrians in a territory of less extent than that of the electorate of Branden-

¹ Vandal, as before, p. 377.

² Saltuikoff's plan of campaign was, "an ingenious method of avoiding a general engagement at all hazards, and keeping out of harm's way as much as possible."

³ The Russians profited by their occupation of Berlin to exact a contribution of a million five hundred thousand thalers and two hundred thousand thalers as *douceurs* for the troop.

CHAP. VII burg. But on November 3, at Torgau, the Austrians were
 A. D. forced to retreat, after heavy losses; and the Russians, learn-
 1756-1763 ing of this reverse, retired into Poland.

It is difficult to judge to what extent the interests of Prussia were indirectly favored by the secret diplomacy of Louis XV. It is known that Breteuil was furnished by the King with a million livres "to divide among the members of the ministry as he will judge necessary to seduce them."¹ While the proof is not positive, it is at least highly probable, that the renunciation of the Russian plan to occupy Dantzic as a military base was owing to Breteuil's appeal to Woronzoff. Louis XV had previously loaned the chancellor a hundred and fifty thousand écus; and on January 3, 1761, sent a secret instruction to Breteuil in which he said: "Cause Count Woronzoff to understand, that, if he is as truly attached as he assures me, he would act in a manner in conflict with his professions, not only if he supported such a design, but even if he did not hinder it. Should the remittance of the debt he owes me have the effect of preventing this blow, I should consider the money well used."²

The policies
 of France
 and Russia

Although the ministers and generals of the Czarina were not unapproachable by foreign influences, nothing could alter the inflexible determination of Elizabeth herself to crush "the disturber of the peace of Europe," as she never ceased to regard the King of Prussia. Frederick II himself, believing that the Russian court was venal, offered large sums to the favorite courtiers of the Czarina, in the hope of turning her purpose; but while she might be thwarted in the field or in the council chamber in matters of detail, no one dared to oppose her fixed resolution to destroy the King of Prussia.

The negotiations opened between Woronzoff and Breteuil in February, 1761, having borne no fruits and indicating no real change of purpose, constitute an almost negligible episode.³ They serve, however, to reveal the conflicting pur-

¹ Quoted by Waddington, *La guerre de sept ans*, IV, p. 465.

² See the full text of the letter in Vandal, as before, pp. 387, 389.

³ See the criticisms of Vandal's account of them in Waliszewski, as before, pp. 508, 524.

poses which at that time paralyzed action on the part of France.

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In Choiseul's opinion peace with England had now become imperative. The situation in America and India was desperate, and French commerce was almost driven from the sea. The attempt of the French to recapture Quebec had ended in failure, Montreal had fallen, and Pondicherry was on the point of capitulation.

On the Russian side the support of France for the dismemberment of Prussia and the acquisition of the Ukraine provinces by the Czarina was necessary to counteract the opposition of Austria to Russian aggrandizement. This support, it was believed at St. Petersburg, could be obtained from Choiseul by Russia's offering to mediate a peace between France and England. By this offer, it was thought, France might be drawn into supporting the territorial claims of the Czarina; and, if she should succeed in procuring a separate peace between the two maritime powers, France would be better able and more disposed to throw her force into the continental war, and thus aid in accomplishing Russia's purposes.

The new path of negotiation with England through Russian mediation opened for a time seductively before Choiseul, for the cession of the Ukraine to Russia at the expense of Poland seemed to him a small price to pay for the good offices of Russia in concluding the colonial and maritime war with England. The Czarina was ready to sign with France a new treaty by which the interests of the two countries would be separately secured without the inclusion of Austria. Russia might thus in time become the needed ally of France in the East, — as Peter the Great had often urged. The fate of Poland would then be of subordinate importance, since the great empire of the Czars might become a substitute for that complicated system of alliances in the North and East which had been so costly to maintain and so uncertain of continuance.

It was with joy, therefore, that in April, 1761, Choiseul was assured by Breteuil, "The keenest desire of Russia is

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to obtain aggrandizement on the side of the Ukraine at the expense of Poland, and we can and should derive from this a great gain. . . . The Poles will not be content with it, and the Turks may very likely be offended; but, without doubt, these considerations can yield to the advantage of assuring, or at least facilitating, the return of our possessions in America."

Louis XV's
mistrust of
Russia

While Choiseul, personally, would have been pleased to strengthen the ties with Russia and to accept the hand of friendship the Czarina was offering, Louis XV, who cared little for his colonies but thought much of French influence in Poland, was as imperative in obstructing peace as his minister was solicitous of promoting it. At St. Petersburg Breteuil had completely fallen in with the plan of a close alliance with Russia, the cession by Poland of a portion of the Ukraine, and the Russian mediation between France and England. On June 8, 1761, his royal master administered to him a sharp reproof, informing him that he had gone too far in his overtures with the Russians, from whom the King "expected no advantage," except to prevent their treating with his enemies. "I have reason to believe," he added, "that my authorizing the Russians to take possession of the Ukraine would only increase the coolness of the Turks with regard to me. I would in this case pay too dearly for an alliance contracted with a state where intrigue acquires a new force every day, even to the extent of rendering fruitless the explicit orders of the sovereign, and where the uncertainty of the succession does not admit of reliance upon even the most solemn engagements."

With naïve frankness the King concludes his secret orders by saying: "I am aware of the difficulty of reconciling the instructions which I send you with those which you receive from the Duke de Choiseul; but I require of you that you use every effort to recall my minister to principles more favorable to Poland than those by which he appears to be guided, but without exciting him too much or rendering him suspicious!"

Thus, wholly apart from the intrinsic difficulties of a

Russian mediation, its success was thwarted by the King's secret opposition.

Parallel with the futile negotiations with St. Petersburg, Choiseul carried on a long correspondence with Vienna. After a full exchange of views, in which it was made clear to Kaunitz that France was extremely anxious for the conclusion of the war, Choiseul, in his instructions to his cousin at Vienna, in February, 1761, openly accused the Austrian chancellor of opposing the idea of peace; and made the significant statement that, "after having made the advances of friendship and union which Austria had treated so lightly," the King of France considered that "he would not fail in performing his duty to his allies if he should pursue the course which he esteemed most suitable to the interests of his kingdom."¹ Without intending to abandon the Austrian alliance, Choiseul had now resolutely determined to pursue the policy of a separate peace between France and England.

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The tension
between France
and Austria

III. THE PEACE OF PARIS AND OF HUBERTUSBURG

It is needless for our purposes to follow in detail either the conversations of Galitzin, the Russian ambassador at London, with the English ministry, or the more direct approaches of Choiseul through his emissary, Bussy, and the English agent, Stanley, which occupied the months from April to October, 1761.²

The renewal
of negotiations
with England

The constant and insurmountable obstacle to peace with England, except upon terms which France could not accept without humiliation, had not been removed. On October 25, 1760, George II had died, and George III had succeeded him; but, although the policies of the new king — whose chief aim was to establish his personal authority rather than to extend his colonial empire — were opposed to those of Pitt, the time had not come for the Great Commoner to

¹ See Waddington, as before, IV, pp. 465, 481.

² For the details of these negotiations, see Waddington, as before, IV, pp. 494, 601.

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abdicate; and Galitzin was soon made to understand that England denied the right of powers possessing neither fleets nor colonies to intervene in a war purely maritime and colonial.

It was Pitt who prepared the instructions of Stanley; and there was, therefore, little prospect of success by direct negotiation. Since the King of Prussia had receded from his objections to a separate peace between France and England, there was, however, no obstacle to overcome in this respect. Choiseul had, in fact, made the principle of *uti possidetis* the basis of the negotiation; but without fixing the date when it would come into effect. Pitt at once perceived that France would claim the restitution of the English conquests in the colonies in compensation for the restoration of the conquests made by France from the allies of England, the Landgrave of Hesse and the Duke of Brunswick. But, as he remarked to Galitzin, he did not mean that England should sacrifice her maritime empire to the demands of France on the continent. "France," he declared, "must not flatter herself that Hanover will serve as a road for her to America and India." Stanley was, therefore, instructed to receive suggestions regarding acquisitions and compensations only *ad referendum*.

On June 14, 1761, the little island on the coast of Brittany called Belle-Isle was occupied by a British force. It was the first time during the war that France had lost territory of her own in Europe.

Would Belle-Isle also fall under the principle of *uti possidetis*? Could any condition of distress force upon the French the acceptance of such a loss? But, if not, the principle of possession would have to be abandoned, and England could name the terms of exchange. At first it was thought the island would be surrendered; but when Bussy demanded that it be immediately evacuated, Pitt coolly replied: "You may be assured that we have no wish to retain Belle-Isle, but it will have to be taken into account." It is not surprising, therefore, that soon afterward Bussy reported to Choiseul: "It appears certain, Monseigneur, that this minister

is determined to continue the war or make us purchase peace at an unreasonable price." CHAP. VII
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When Choiseul laid down the principle of *uti possidetis* as the basis of negotiation and announced that "the States of the allies of Great Britain in Germany" were to be included, he furnished Pitt the opportunity to present through Stanley, on June 29, the following conditions of peace: the cession of the whole of Canada and all the islands in the river and gulf of St. Lawrence, with exclusively English rights of fishing in those waters; the cession of Senegal and the island of Gorée on the west coast of Africa; the demolition as required by the Treaty of Utrecht of the fortifications reconstructed at Dunkirk; the equal division of the neutral Antilles; the restitution of Minorca; and the immediate evacuation of all the French conquests in Germany, including Wesel.¹ The English conditions and the relations of France with Spain

The questions of Dunkirk and the restoration of the French fishing rights lay nearest to Choiseul's heart. "Give us the fisheries and save for us the point of honor regarding Dunkirk, and the peace is made," Choiseul is reported to have exclaimed to Stanley; but this was not meant as final. The Council had yet to consider the subject.

In his subsequent instructions to Bussy the minister of France named three points for discussion: Cape Breton, with the right of France to catch fish in the Canadian waters; Dunkirk, which was considered a point of honor; and Senegal, which was necessary for the slave trade.

Pitt was firm on all these points. When incidentally Bussy declared regarding the neutral Antilles, "We could treat of that subject only conjointly with Spain, on account of the pretensions of His Catholic Majesty," Pitt exclaimed, "Spain has nothing to do with the negotiation between the two crowns, and England will never permit that she be admitted."

It was precisely here that the last hope of France was to be sought. By joining the grievances of Spain in the same

¹ A possession of the King of Prussia on the Rhine, then occupied in the name of Austria.

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negotiation with the interests of France Choiseul hoped that the fear of being compelled to face a war with both monarchies would turn the balance, and that even Pitt would make concessions.

To justify the introduction of the Spanish grievances,¹ Choiseul announced the previous agreement of France to employ good offices in the affairs of Charles III. The negotiations between Louis XV and the King of Spain had, however, in reality contemplated the union of their forces against England; but Choiseul was sincere in his desire for peace, and on July 7 wrote to Ossun to admit this openly at Madrid. "It is not the war properly considered which causes the King to desire peace," he said to the ambassador; "it would, perhaps, be advantageous to continue the war, but we have interior troubles which fatigue the King to excess, which introduce bitterness into his life, and which only peace can suppress." The negotiations for an offensive alliance which was under consideration were, therefore, to be suspended, in the hope that peace with England and a pacific settlement of the Spanish grievances might be concluded.

The interven-
tion of Austria

It is evident that in July, 1761, the separate peace between France and England, though involving enormous concessions by France, was by no means impossible. But in addition to the large demands of Pitt another impediment now made its appearance. Stahremberg had been permitted by Choiseul's loyalty to the Austrian alliance to follow closely the course of the correspondence between Paris and London. Suspecting that the result of the negotiations would be the final withdrawal of France from the Austrian alliance, Stahremberg recalled to Choiseul the obligation undertaken in the treaties to submit the arrangements for peace to the approval of the Empress. In brief, perceiving the probability of success in arranging a separate peace with England, Stahremberg now resolved to impede it by introducing the reserves of Austria.

¹ These were chiefly three in number: (1) the seizure of Spanish ships; (2) exclusion from the Newfoundland fisheries; and (3) British settlements in Honduras to cut logwood.

In giving consent to the separate negotiations with England, Austria had demanded that all the possessions taken from Prussia be retained; and that the King of England, both as king and as elector, should agree to furnish no further aid, either in troops or in money, to the King of Prussia, and to engage that the troops of Hanover, Brunswick, and Hesse be not permitted to afford such aid.

These conditions were communicated to Pitt; and, to embroil the matter further, Kaunitz presented through Stahremberg a memorandum which, if adhered to by France, would unquestionably terminate the Anglo-French negotiations through the refusal of England to comply with its terms.¹ Choiseul, while affirming the loyalty of France to the Austrian alliance, maintained the essential and absolute separation of the two wars; but the attempt to introduce the affairs of Spain into the negotiations, combined with the reserves and restrictions imposed by Austria, evoked a reply from Pitt which rendered further efforts for peace almost hopeless. He insisted upon the immediate evacuation of the places taken by France on the continent, including Wesel, expressed his intention to continue the support of Frederick II to the end, and declined to discuss any questions relating to Spain. Although the conversations dragged on for two months longer, it was practically certain at the end of July that a separate peace between France and England was impossible of realization.

It was, in fact, only in order to confront the English ministry with a solid offensive alliance between France and Spain before the war was renewed that Choiseul protracted the negotiations; and, on July 30, he announced to Ossun that the war was about to be resumed, and with more fury than ever.

It was now the aim of Choiseul to reanimate the desire of Charles III for a union of the two monarchies against England, which during the negotiations for peace he had been endeavoring to repress. Unfortunately for the success of his revived intention to excite anew the warlike feelings of

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The Franco-Spanish Pacte de famille

¹ See Waddington, as before, IV, p. 557.

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Spain, he had consented in the later stages of the negotiation with Pitt to conclude peace with England without further reference to the Spanish grievances. Choiseul had now to overcome first of all the prejudice he had thus created.

When, therefore, in August, Ossun insinuated to His Catholic Majesty that, "if he could declare himself before the approaching autumn, that would deliver a decisive blow to the commerce of England," Charles III, resenting Choiseul's indifference to the interests of Spain in his solicitude to make peace for France, declared that there remained important measures for him to take both in the Indies and in Europe before he would be in a condition to act with efficiency.

But this reserve was of short duration; for, the attempt to settle directly the differences between Spain and England having failed, there remained no other alternative than a union with France, and on August 15, 1761, was signed at Paris and ratified at St. Ildefonse on the twenty-fifth the famous *Pacte de famille*, by which Louis XV and Charles III contracted "to perpetuate in their posterity the sentiments of Louis XIV, their common ancestor, and to cause to subsist forever a solemn monument of the reciprocal interest which should be the basis of the desires of their hearts and of the prosperity of their royal families."¹ By the terms of this family compact between the two branches of the House of Bourbon every enemy of either became the "common enemy of both."

The substance
of the Franco-
Spanish
compact

The new treaty made definite provision for the sea and land forces to be furnished by Spain. Regarding the operations of war and the conditions of peace, "the two monarchies of France and Spain, in the entire extent of their domination, will be regarded and will act as if they formed one single power." The *droit d'aubaine* was reciprocally abolished throughout both kingdoms, including the Two Sicilies, and subjects of both nations were empowered to dispose freely of all their possessions either by testament, gift, or otherwise, and their heirs had equal rights with native subjects. On

¹ For the text, see Wenck, III, p. 278; and Del Cantillo, p. 468.

both sides privileges of trade were accorded, with no higher customs duties than were required of natives.

On the same day a secret convention was signed, by which Spain engaged to declare war on England on May 1, 1762, if peace were not concluded before that date with full recognition of the Spanish grievances. The restoration of Minorca to Spain was stipulated, "if God should so bless the united forces that they would not be obliged to surrender it." By another article the contractants affirmed their intention to require Portugal, even by force, to espouse their cause.

A few days after the final ratification of the treaty the negotiations between France and England were definitely broken off. Instead of being intimidated by the union of the Bourbon monarchies, Pitt took prompt occasion, on September 18, to present to the British cabinet a resolution terminating with a declaration of war against Spain. The suave assurance of Wall, reported from Madrid through Lord Bristol, that "the Catholic King had never been more desirous of maintaining good relations with His Britannic Majesty than in the existing circumstances," had jarred upon the tense sensibilities of the minister as discordant with the truth; and his frank, bold nature answered it, as he felt that it deserved to be answered, with a firm acceptance of the challenge which the family compact had insinuated and yet had not dared to utter openly.¹

But the answer of Pitt did not express the views of the Cabinet or of the King. On October 5 his resignation was offered and accepted. Lord Granville, who presided, remarked: "I perceive that the gentleman is determined to leave us; I am not sorry, for otherwise it is we who would be obliged to leave him."

The opinions of Lord Bute, Newcastle, and others who formed the majority had prevailed, leaving Pitt unsupported except by his brother-in-law, Temple, who resigned with him; and yet, although King, Council, and even Parliament

¹ The intercepted letters of Fuentes, Spanish ambassador at London, and Grimaldi, Spanish ambassador at Paris, had proved that the *Pacte de famille* had been signed on August 15.

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were against him, it was Pitt who represented the temper and spirit of the British nation. England, under his vigorous and imperious leadership, had carried to a successful issue the most stupendous conflict undertaken up to that time by any modern nation; a conflict in which, as Burke expressed it, "the British island seemed to struggle with equal arms against the rest of Europe." The war had begun under what had seemed to be adverse conditions, and had by Pitt's unflinching resolution resulted in British supremacy in America, in Asia, and on the sea. The pride of Englishmen had never been so heightened, the power of England had never seemed so great.

The humility of Pitt in the presence of George III, when the King accepted his resignation and offered him for his services "any form of liberality in his power to accord," his tears, his recognition of the royal "benevolence," his acceptance of a pension of three thousand pounds sterling, all seem in strange contrast with his firm, fearless, almost defiant power during the years when he had controlled the destinies of his country as an uncrowned king. But neither his contemporaries nor posterity have failed to admire his ardent patriotism, his devotion to duty as he discerned it, and the clearness of his vision as the founder of a world empire. His faults and his foibles were too evident to be denied, the energy of his character was more conspicuous than his sense of equity, and the complete realization of his dreams might have proved a fatal misfortune even to his own country; and yet it must be admitted that, more than any other Englishman of his time, he was the incarnation of the character and aspirations of the people of England, who regarded his fall as a public calamity, and continued after his retirement to express for him every manifestation of admiration.

Lord Egremont, who succeeded Pitt in the Southern Department of foreign affairs, and the Earl of Bute, who succeeded Holderness, followed for a time the same policy as the former administration, but in a different spirit. To the fictitious pretence of friendly feeling which had aroused Pitt's indignation, Egremont replied with studied politeness

England's
declaration
of war with
Spain

that "the King of England, confident in the friendly assurances of Spain so often repeated, refused to believe that a treaty emanating from that power could contain anything prejudicial to Great Britain," but the rumors spread abroad of the warlike intentions of Spain obliged him to ask for explanations.

The reply was not long retarded. Wall had in the meantime informed Lord Bristol at Madrid that the rejection of Choiseul's reasonable proposals indicated the intention of England to complete the ruin of France and then to attack the possessions of Spain in America, adding that he had advised Charles III to defend his rights.

This information produced much excitement in the English cabinet, and Lord Bristol was ordered to demand a categorical reply to the question regarding Spain's intentions; and, in case it were refused, to state that this refusal was equivalent to a declaration of war. This order was promptly executed, with the result that, on December 10, the purpose of Charles III was expressed in the words of his minister: "Your Excellency may retire when and in whatever manner he finds most convenient. This is the only reply which, without detaining you, His Majesty has commanded me to make to you."

Having been delayed through the refusal of post-horses, Bristol was unable to leave Madrid for a week; and it was not until his arrival in Portugal that he could forward copies of the correspondence. The rupture with Spain being thus complete, the English cabinet declared war on January 2, 1762. In the meantime, the family compact had been published, and it was known that the friendly professions of Spain had been made only for the purpose of permitting the treasuries to arrive from America.

The resignation of Pitt had been to Frederick II a heavy blow. Not to speak of the sympathy between the two men as types of character in which a bold, firm grasp of interests and a heroic temper were united, each had received substantial benefit from the aims and loyalty of the other. Frederick II had aided Pitt by draining the resources of France in the

The accession
of Peter III
to the throne
of Russia

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continental war, and Pitt had aided the King of Prussia by furnishing him with substantial subsidies. Would England pursue this policy when Pitt's strong hand was removed from the conduct of affairs, and especially when England had to face two enemies instead of one? Frederick II had many reasons to doubt it.

At the end of 1761 Frederick II was in a desperate situation. He had been vainly hoping for the intervention of the Sultan, with whom in the previous March he had made a treaty of friendship and commerce.¹ In December he was ready to hire an army of Tartar horsemen to ravage the hereditary estates of Austria; but, although his emissaries were endeavoring to conclude a bargain with the Tartar khan, these auxiliaries were not at his disposal, and in the presence of a hundred and thirty thousand Austrian and Russian troops he could only muster about fifty thousand. In the first days of January, 1762, he wrote to a friend: "It seems to me that we ought now to think of preserving for my nephew, by way of negotiation, whatever fragments of my possessions we can snatch from the avidity of my enemies. Be persuaded that if I saw a gleam of hope — even by running the greatest risks — of re-establishing the State on its ancient foundations, I would not use such language; but I am convinced that, morally and physically, it is impossible."

On January 5, the day before Frederick II wrote these words, an event had occurred at St. Petersburg which not only opened for him a way of rescue, but by its ultimate results changed the entire political situation and, in great measure, determined the future destiny of Europe. The daughter of Peter the Great, the Czarina Elizabeth, had passed away; and the Archduke Peter, husband of Catherine of Anhalt-Zerbst, her bitter enemy, had succeeded her.²

The first act of Peter III, who entertained for Frederick II an almost servile admiration, was to despatch messengers to

¹ For the treaty of March 22, 1761, between Prussia and Turkey, see Wenck, III, p. 270.

² The Russian succession from Peter I is shown in Table VIII, at the end of this volume.

the Russian generals to forbid further hostilities, and to the King of Prussia to announce to him the Czar's sentiments of loyal friendship.

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Frederick II had hoped, in the event of the Archduke's accession to the throne, only for his neutrality; and as soon as he learned of the event he sent a courier to express his congratulations and to solicit peace, for which he was even ready to sacrifice Eastern Prussia. To his amazement, Peter III not only made no demand for territory but freely offered him his alliance.

The alliance
of Russia
and Prussia

On May 5, 1762, peace was formally signed between the two monarchies, and on June 8 they formed an offensive and defensive alliance.¹ The Russian troops together with the Austrian, still occupied Silesia, and twenty thousand men were thus by a stroke of the pen transferred from one side of the contest to the other.

Not only were Austria and France thus suddenly deserted, but Prussia from a crushed and almost extinguished monarchy unexpectedly sprang into the place of leadership in Europe. More German than Russian, the main thought of Peter III was for his ancestral duchy of Holstein-Gottorp, still held by Denmark. To him the vast empire of which he had become the sovereign was of importance chiefly as an instrument for the recovery of his hereditary duchy. After his alliance with Frederick II, — of whom in his excess of adulation he said, "I hope that my master will not discharge me; if he orders it I shall go to make war in hell with all my empire," — Peter III's next step was preparation for an invasion of Denmark. Together with his "master" this young enthusiast, — whose impetuous nature and undisciplined mentality were from the first recognized as a danger to the interests of the Moscovite empire — dreamed of remodelling the map of Europe upon some harebrained plan of his own conception.

Although Peter III was full of deference for the genius of Frederick II, he was in all other relations arbitrary and imperious. His life with Catherine of Anhalt had been for her a constant torture, and after his accession she trembled lest

The character
and purposes
of Peter III

¹ For the treaty, see Wenck, III, p. 209.

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she should be divorced and sent to a convent, or subjected to a fate even worse. In self-defence she felt compelled to seek her husband's ruin. The hostility of the Czar for everything Russian, his contempt for religion, his disdain of counsel and his frequent fits of intoxication soon made his rule unbearable to the court, the clergy, and the army; while the patience, devotion, and intelligence of Catherine drew to her side all the controlling forces of the empire.

The Czar's attitude toward the allies of Russia was unendurably insolent. A prince of Holstein having visited St. Petersburg, the Czar demanded that the foreign ambassadors should make the first call upon him. Count Mercy-Argenteau, who had succeeded Esterhazy as the ambassador of Austria at St. Petersburg, announced that his official character did not permit of his showing this honor to a secondary prince. Breteuil, whose credentials classed him only as a minister plenipotentiary, did not decline to make the first visit, but demanded that the prince should first notify him of his arrival. This personage having refused either to call upon the ambassador or to notify the minister, Woronzoff was instructed to inform them that they could not present their credentials to the new czar or have an audience of him unless they had satisfied the pretences of the prince. In return Louis XV, resenting this indignity, declared that "it would be unfitting that the ambassador of Russia accredited to him should be received at court while his minister was denied access to the Czar."

The questions of local ceremony were resolved after the departure of the prince, but the injury to the royal sensibilities remained, and a violent correspondence followed, in which Peter III claimed his right to the title of "Emperor"; which France declined to accord, although Elizabeth had, as a concession *ad hoc*, been addressed during the latter part of her reign as "Empress of Russia."

The foreign policy of the Czar was even more disquieting to the former allies of Russia than his ceremonial pretensions. His purpose to take possession of Dantzic and to reclaim from Denmark Holstein and Schleswig, which France

had guaranteed, disquieted Versailles; while his requirement as a condition of peace that all the possessions of Prussia conquered during the war be restored, created alarm at Vienna. Finally, the probability that he would completely affirm his mastery in Poland, the fact that the Russians had already taken possession of Pomerania in the interest of Frederick II, and that the King of Prussia had, on May 22, made peace with the Swedes,¹ who after expending eight million thalers had gained nothing by the war, augured the complete predominance of the Russo-Prussian alliance.

But the feeble hold which Peter III had upon his own people — more Oriental than European in their habits and conceptions — rendered easy the consummation of his fall. On July 9, 1762, on the eve of his departure to take command of his army of sixty thousand men in Pomerania, the Czar was arrested by the order of Catherine, — supported by her intimate favorites the Orloff brothers, — and forced to abdicate in favor of their son, the Grand Duke Paul, a child of eight years; and, a week later, under circumstances which are not precisely known, the Czar was assassinated while a prisoner in the castle of Ropcha.²

The fall of Peter III once more changed the face of affairs at St. Petersburg. The ambitious German princess whom Elizabeth had disgraced, whose father had served as a Prussian general, and whose marriage with the Archduke Peter had been arranged by no less a personage than Frederick II, was at once proclaimed by the troops and endorsed by the clergy as "Empress of all the Russias" under the name of Catherine II.

Although Catherine II was obliged to repudiate the policies of her murdered husband, and in her first public manifesto referred to Frederick II as "a disturber of the public peace," she did not revert to the policy of the Czarina Elizabeth. The Russian troops that had been placed at the

¹ For the Treaty of Hamburg, of May 22, 1762, see Wenck, III, p. 307.

² See Waliszewski, *Le roman d'une impératrice*, p. 159, who says: "L'histoire de la conspiration de 1762 est encore à faire."

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disposal of Frederick II were recalled, but the former relations with Austria and France were not renewed.

The result of this attitude was to leave Austria in practical isolation. In France, then fully absorbed in the renewed war with England, the secret diplomacy of Louis XV had definitely shaped the attitude of that monarchy toward Russia for many years to come. In September the King wrote to Breteuil: "You know already, and I repeat it here very clearly, that the aim of my policy with Russia is to remove her as far as possible from the affairs of Europe. . . . Everything that can plunge her into chaos and cause her to enter into obscurity is advantageous to my interests." In harmony with this declaration, the representatives of France at Stockholm, Constantinople, and Warsaw were directed to do all in their power to diminish and oppose the influence of Russia.

The situation
of the powers

The two great conflicts which had so strangely intermingled in the "Seven Years' War" had now in the course of its development become practically separated. Russia, which had been united with Austria and France in the coalition against Prussia, had now passed into a state of neutrality; and, with the recall of Bestusheff as Chancellor by Catherine II, good relations with England were re-established. On the other hand, Spain, which had long remained neutral, was fully launched upon the maritime and colonial struggle into which she had been drawn by France.

In the Austro-Prussian conflict, Frederick II, who had so long despaired of peace, was now in a position to impose it; for Austria, whose star had seemed for several years to be in the ascendant, was reduced to a merely defensive position, and her allies had all substantially abandoned her; while in August, 1762, Frederick II was again master of Silesia.

On the sea — for the war had practically terminated in America and India by the defeat of France — the conflict had been renewed with vigor, and heavy losses had been inflicted on the French and the Spaniards. In February Martinique had been taken, thus depriving France of her seat of government and principal naval base in the West

Indies; and, on August 12, Havana, with immense booty, was captured by the English. On September 25 an expedition that had sailed from Madras landed at Manila and took the town by storm; thus obtaining the key to the Philippines. Immense exactions in money were made from the inhabitants of the captured cities, and it was not only proved that war could be made a source of pecuniary profit, but the necessity of possessing a powerful fleet for the defence of distant colonies was demonstrated.¹

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In spite of the success of British arms, Lord Bute — who was the chief favorite of the King — and a great majority of the Cabinet, including Newcastle, who was its nominal head, desired peace. This was not unnatural, for all the British successes were ascribed to the policies of Pitt, whose predictions had been justified.

Renewal of
negotiations for
peace between
England and
France

Even before the capture of Havana the preliminary negotiations for peace between England and France, which had been broken off by Pitt, had been resumed by Bute at London. In September the Duke of Bedford was sent to Paris to conduct the negotiations there, but the object of his mission was so unpopular in England that he was hooted in the streets as he set out upon his journey.

While the preliminaries were being arranged at Paris between Bedford and Count Choiseul, — whom the Duke de Choiseul had recalled from Vienna to take charge of the foreign office while he occupied himself chiefly with the army and navy, — the Duke de Nivernais was sent to London to negotiate directly with Bute.²

The strategic points of the negotiation had already been placed in evidence by Choiseul and Pitt; and, in view of the complete supremacy of England on the sea and in the colonies, there was little opportunity for a diplomatic battle.

The negotiators were in no respect able to change these fatal circumstances. Nivernais, who was accompanied to

¹ The prizes of the British fleet in the Pacific amounted to about eight million dollars in one month.

² For an account of his activities, see Perey, *Le duc de Nivernais* (1754-1789), Paris, 1891.

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London by the Chevalier d'Eon, upon whom he relied for most of the labor of the mission, is represented by his devoted secretary as appearing, even in the midst of the most trying circumstances, "like Anacreon crowned with roses," and so little sensible to the ordinary feelings of mankind that, "though separated from his wife, he did her no harm," and "though he had a mistress, he did her no good." A man "with no disquietude in his head and no wrinkles on his brow" was certainly well adapted to submit to the renunciation of an empire. Bedford, on the other hand, though sent on a mission of peace, was a man of "obstinacy and proverbial avarice," of "no great capacity, but haughty and difficult," who went to Paris with the purpose of ending the war by dictating to France the terms of the future treaty.

Opposition to
peace in Eng-
land and Spain

In England an immediate peace was not desired by the greater part of the nation. The hatred of Spain was intense, and the people felt that if Pitt were in power the war would not end until all the desirable French and Spanish colonies were in the possession of Great Britain; for on the high tide of success it was not realized what perpetual enmities such a sweeping victory would engender. To induce the Parliament to favor the idea of peace and to quell the opposition to the government in urging it, Bute employed Henry Fox to bribe the members; and as much as twenty-five thousand pounds sterling is said to have been paid out in a single day. Frederick II, to whom Bute had refused to pay the subsidies which Pitt had accorded, instructed his ambassador to excite public discontent with the government; and a lively campaign of pamphlets attacking and defending the ministry for its peace policy was prosecuted. Honors and offices, as well as money, were employed to prepare for the acceptance of the preliminaries when they should be laid before Parliament, and a solid cohort known as "the King's friends" was thus organized.

In France the chief impediment to peace was the attitude of Spain. The Spanish ambassador at Paris, Grimaldi, was not inclined to yield to Bedford's imperative demands, and

believed that, if the struggle were continued, Spanish valor might yet retrieve the fortunes of war.

The cession of Louisiana to England had been demanded, and France was disposed to accord it; but Charles III opposed this concession, on the ground that the Spanish colonies would be directly confronted by the English on the Northwest as well as the Northeast, and the Gulf of Mexico would be open to English trade, which thus far had never been permitted, all English commerce in those waters being contraband. A line, he suggested, might be drawn from the western extremity of Georgia to the Mississippi; the territory lying south of that line and east of the Mississippi, as far as Florida, to be considered neutral in the sense of being abandoned to the savage tribes from which all Europeans would be excluded.

This scheme of creating a barrier between the Spanish and the English colonies Choiseul rejected as wanting in efficacy, since Florida could more easily be invaded from Georgia, already an English colony; but Charles III refused for a time to accede to the preliminaries. As an alternative, he endeavored through Abertini, the representative of Naples at London, to obtain a separate peace with England, only to learn that he could procure no better terms.

To overcome the hesitation of Charles III, on October 6, Louis XV, upon Choiseul's advice, wrote to him: "I would wish with all my heart that Spain should not suffer from a war which the personal tenderness of Your Majesty for me has caused you to undertake. If New Orleans and Louisiana can be useful to Your Majesty for the restitution of Havana, or to indemnify you for the compensations which you would give to the English, I offer the possession of them to you."

The free gift of the whole of North America west of the Mississippi seems at the present time a generous proposal; but it had been already declined by the English, to whom it had been offered in exchange for Havana, and the King of Spain was not greatly moved by such benevolence. Although Choiseul had informed Ossun, for the benefit of Charles III, that the colony was "the most beautiful and the most fertile

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Louis XV's
effort to in-
fluence Spain

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as to soil of all those which France possesses in America," he confidentially expressed the opinion that it was a "burdensome possession, which cost France eight thousand livres a year, without bringing in an écu."

For a time it appeared as if the negotiations would be rendered entirely fruitless by the obstinacy of Spain. On both the French and the English side, however, so far as the governments were concerned, the wish for peace was strong. But both Choiseul and Bute dreaded the assembling of Parliament, where Pitt was certain to appear and exercise a powerful influence, which might overthrow the ministry. The opening had been fixed for November 8, but the preliminaries were not nearly ready for signature. Time must be gained; but, although Bute proposed postponement, his colleagues objected. Nivernais was well aware of the storm that would break when Parliament was assembled, and that unless that body could be presented with preliminaries already signed it would be the end of the negotiations. By the ruse of writing a note explaining his views to one of his colleagues, with the understanding that it should be shown to the ministry, a postponement of the meeting of Parliament until November 25 was obtained. In the meantime, by means of great exertions, Choiseul had procured the reluctant assent of Charles III to the preliminaries of peace, which were signed at Fontainebleau, on November 3, 1762.

Peace accepted
by the English
Parliament

Bute was thus able to present to the English Parliament, upon which every variety of royal pressure had been previously exercised, the outline of a treaty already agreed upon. When the debate opened, Pitt, who was ill, was not expected to be present; but, to the surprise of all, accompanied to the doors of the House of Commons by a shouting multitude, he was borne in on the arms of his servants, pale and emaciated, his face rendered the more ghastly by his black velvet costume, his legs wrapped in flannel and his shoulders supported by a crutch. For three hours and a half he denounced those who had "sacrificed the public faith by an abandonment of the allies." The concessions made to France would restore her maritime power. None of the French or

Spanish colonies should be returned. Why were Martinique and Havana taken, if they were not meant to be retained?

Arrogant as this plea for absolute British supremacy was, it voiced the prevailing sentiments of the nation. It was an age of conquest and expansion. The cost of the war and the sacrifices made had been enormous. Why should their legitimate fruits be thrown away?

Such were the feelings and reasonings of the time. Lord Bute did not dare show himself on the streets of London without his body-guard of hired boxers. Mud was thrown at his carriage, and every form of public insult was offered to his person. But the treaty was adopted by three hundred and nineteen votes. The sixty-five members who voted against the treaty, Horace Walpole said, "*were not bribed!*" The victory for the Court was complete, the Whig party was substantially destroyed, and the Princess-Dowager could with reason exclaim, "Now my son *is* King of England!"

On February 10, 1763, the treaty between England, France, and Spain was signed at Paris.¹ By its terms Great Britain made an incalculable advance in her imperial development, France was ruined as a colonial and maritime competitor, and Spain was reduced to a subordinate position.

France ceded to Great Britain Canada, with all the disputed territory east of the Mississippi River, Nova Scotia, and Cape Breton; and agreed to evacuate the territories of Hanover, Brunswick, Hesse, and Prussia, to restore Minorca to the English, and to dismantle Dunkirk. England, in exchange, granted to France the right of fishing in the Gulf of St. Lawrence and on the coast of Newfoundland, together with the islands of St. Pierre and Miquelon as shelters and places on which to dry fish, on condition that they should not be fortified; restored Belle-Isle, Guadeloupe, Martinique, and St. Lucia in the West Indies, retaining Grenada, St. Vincent, Dominica, and Tobago; returned to France Gorée,

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The Peace
of Paris

¹ For the treaty, see Wenck, III, p. 329; and Martens, *Recueil*, 1st ed., VI, 5, B, I, p. 173. For the negotiations, see Bedford, *Correspondence*, II and III; Perey, *Le duc de Nivernais*, and Barthélemy, *Le traité de Paris*, in *Revue des Questions Historiques*, XLIII (1888).

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but retained Senegal in Africa; and in India required France to abandon all her conquests since 1749, thus leaving her only a few trading posts.

Spain yielded on all three of the grievances against England, surrendering the claim to the Newfoundland fishing rights, consenting that all disputes regarding prizes be settled by the British courts, and conceding the right of the English to cut logwood in Honduras. In order to recover Havana and Manila, Florida was ceded to Great Britain; and, to compensate Spain for this loss, Louisiana was ceded by France to Spain. Portugal, which had been occupied by Spain during the war, was evacuated.

Sweeping as the gains of Great Britain were, even greater concessions might have been obtained; for, although Great Britain had doubled her national debt by the expenses of the war, she was not at the end of her resources.¹ Unpopular in England, because Pitt's policy was not followed in retaining all the islands and denying to the French a share in the fisheries, the Peace of Paris was resented as a deep humiliation by France, and especially by Spain.

The Peace of
Hubertusburg

Almost equally bitter against England were the feelings of Frederick II, who considered himself unfairly deserted by his ally. Fortunately for him, however, the defection from Austria had been even more embarrassing to his principal adversary.

On November 24, 1762, an armistice between Austria and Prussia had been signed which left the Prussian forces favorably placed in the field for continuing the war with the Imperial contingent allied to Austria. Frederick II, on the ground that the Imperial princes were not included in the armistice, did not cease hostilities with them; and, after having made great sacrifices for the Austrian cause, they found themselves deserted by their ally. As a result, when, on December 30, the plenipotentiaries of Austria, Prussia, and Saxony met to make peace in the castle of Hubertusburg, between Dresden and Leipzig, Frederick II was in a

¹ The national debt in 1762 was about £133,000,000.

position to recover all that had been lost in the course of the war.¹

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1756-1763

Not less than Maria Theresa and Frederick Augustus II, — who during these years had remained in Poland a helpless spectator of the war, — Frederick II, after six years of desperate fighting in which more than a million lives had been lost, was anxious to end hostilities. As he himself has confessed, "The army was ruined and too degenerate for brilliant exploits to be expected of it. . . . The old officers had perished, . . . the young were of an age that did not promise great services, . . . and the troops were in a condition that did not justify the confidence of those who commanded them."

The state of all Germany was deplorable. "Whole districts, which before the war could have been counted among the most prosperous, were transformed into a wilderness; numberless villages lay in ashes, or were abandoned by their inhabitants; the fields lay fallow because everything was wanting with which to cultivate them, and misery and lamentation, the true satellites of the fury of war, reigned in every direction."

At Hubertusburg questions of ceremony were quickly resolved. The proceedings were conducted in writing, the Saxon plenipotentiary, Fritsch, serving as intermediary. On January 23, 1763, the Prussian representative, Hertzberg, reported, "All I fear is that Herr von Callenbach — the Austrian plenipotentiary — will delay the negotiation too long by his slowness and excessive circumspection." But the battle over details, though stubborn and tedious, was not of long duration. The main point of controversy had already been conceded by Maria Theresa. Silesia was to be renounced to Frederick II.

On February 15, 1763, in the morning, — for, as Frederick

¹ The castle of Hubertusburg, built by Frederick Augustus II of Saxony in 1721, had fallen into decay during the Seven Years' War, having been stripped of its costly furniture and ornaments, so that nothing fit to be occupied was left but the chapel and the servants' quarter. See Beaulieu-Marconnay, *Der Hubertusburger Friede, nach archivalischen Quellen*, Leipzig, 1871.

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II laughingly said, "A treaty ought not to be signed in the evening, but when fasting, as when vows are taken!" — the Peace of Hubertusburg was signed between Prussia on the one side and Austria and Saxony on the other.¹ The Empress-Queen of Austria renounced all the territories ceded to the King of Prussia by the Treaties of Breslau and Berlin, and in addition the County of Glatz, which Austria had occupied before the war. The King of Prussia restored to the King of Poland, Elector of Saxony, all the territories which the former had occupied belonging to the latter. Frederick II agreed to give his vote for the Archduke Joseph at the next imperial election. Finally, all previous treaties not contrary to these provisions were confirmed.

Thus ended the Seven Years' War, from which Frederick II, though chastened and exhausted, emerged as a victor. His kingdom was less prosperous than when he began his reign but he was thankful for deliverance from complete destruction.

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CHAPTER VIII

THE DIPLOMACY OF CONCILIATION AND PARTITION

Consequences
of the Seven
Years' War

THE Seven Years' War was a period not only of enormous sacrifice but of deep humiliation for all the continental nations, not excepting Prussia. To the rulers of Europe the struggle had disclosed not only their own weakness, but the loss of prestige which the system of political absolutism had suffered. For the leading statesmen, particularly in France, the war had brought discredit and reproof. Although the masses had suffered in silence, they were not unconscious of the spoliation to which they had been subjected. Austria, Russia, Sweden, and Spain also had laid their wealth and their lives upon the altar of the god of war, but had derived no benefit; while France had been humbled by defeat and divested of her richest colonies.

Patriotism, in any high and reasonable sense, had not been in any way involved in the continental struggle, which was merely a contest between alien combatants for the possession of certain disputed territories. The inhabitants of Silesia, about whose destiny the war was primarily waged, had had no voice in deciding who should be their master; and Saxony had been ruined by invasion without the slightest consideration of its rights.

Although they were helpless in the sphere of outward action, these passive populations, whose resources were consumed in devastating one another, were by no means inactive in the realm of thought. A new conception of life, of society, and of human rights was in process of formation. A few were beginning to think about public questions, and even about the true nature of the State. The ideas of Montesquieu, of Voltaire, of the writers of the "Encyclopédie," and of Rousseau were agitating the minds of men.

The words "happiness," "liberty," and "law" were often heard in private conversation. "If the laws are good, manners are good," Diderot had said; and Helvetius, "The vices of a people are concealed in its legislation." The feeling of unrest was general, particularly in France,—the most advanced in civilization of all the continental nations. The question of taxes was a pressing one, and books and pamphlets were appearing on that subject. The "Contrat Social" of Rousseau, which was published in 1762, openly proclaimed "the principle of appeal to the people and of popular sovereignty, and made of government a sort of commission revocable at the will of the country."¹

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The theory of royal absolutism was not, however, at once endangered by such reflections, but it was profoundly modified in the mind of every one who gave it consideration. The *culte du roi* that was popular during a great part of the reign of Louis XIV in the reign of Louis XV had become impossible.

The dogma which claimed for the king divine prerogatives and clothed him with absolute hereditary authority had ceased to be regarded as a sufficient support for the institution of monarchy. Frederick II had been intelligent enough to discern this; and it was he, the hero of the Seven Years' War, who now became the accepted model of royalty. He, at least, had shown himself a capable ruler, and had successfully protected his possessions. He had very early announced his theory of the royal function; which was not expressed by the formula, "*L'état, c'est moi*," but in the aphorism, "The King is the chief servant of the State."²

With the younger monarchs a new conception of public policy, not less dynastic but far more enlightened,—a "benevolent despotism," as it came to be called,—began to be applied in practice. Chastened, if not contrite, all the

¹ For the thought of the time, see Rocquain, *L'esprit révolutionnaire avant la révolution*, p. 235 et seq.

² See, for the development of the absolutist theory, Koser, *Historische Zeitschrift*, LXI (1889), p. 246.

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rulers of Europe for the time dreaded war; yet all the motives which had formerly led to it still existed. The result was an effort for aggrandizement by conciliation and mutual compensation not less disturbing to the equilibrium of Europe than the wars of conquest.

I. THE SUBORDINATION OF FRANCE

The comparative status of the powers

Both in prestige and in strength France, as a result of the Seven Years' War, had fallen to the rank of a third-rate power. In a conflict in which all the participants had endured heavy losses France had suffered most. "It is singular," wrote Bernis, "that all of the courts have failed of their objects in that war. The King of Prussia intended to work a great revolution in Europe, to render the Empire alternative between the Protestants and the Catholics, to barter States, and to take those which were most to his liking. He has acquired much glory by dominating the courts of Europe, but he will leave to his successor a power possessing little solidity. He has ruined his peoples, exhausted his treasury, depopulated his States. The Empress has increased the idea entertained of her courage, of her power, and of the excellence of her troops; but she has accomplished none of the objects she had intended. Russia has shown to Europe the most invincible soldiery led in the worst possible manner. The Swedes have played without utility a rôle subaltern and obscure. Ours has been extravagant and shameful."

The Cardinal's generalizations afford an impressive summary of the parts played by the various participants in the war; and it is with justice that he assigns the least enviable one to France, whose conduct was unredeemed by elevation of purpose, military success, or fruitful diplomatic action. The first among the continental powers had been reduced by the war to a position of inferiority to all the rest with which it had been engaged, whether as an ally or as an adversary.

The causes of this abasement of France are to be found

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not only in the conflict with England, which resulted in the destruction of her navy and the loss of her colonies, but even to a greater extent in the obligations assumed in the treaties with Austria. The maritime and colonial losses would have proved a serious blow to France, but they alone would not have lowered her rank among the continental powers. This last misfortune was the result of the exhaustion of her resources in a continental war in which she had no vital interest, and of her continued abandonment of her policies to the influence of Austria.

The dependence
of France upon
Austria

Since the Treaty of Versailles of May 1, 1756, France had ceased to have a constructive policy. Bound to Austria, and for a time to Russia, she had sacrificed her own interests to their demands. When peace was finally made, France had no ally in Germany except Austria, and no ally in the North except Sweden, at that time isolated and impotent.

Compelled to rely exclusively upon Austria, or to seek a new combination of the powers, Choiseul, with the approval of Louis XV, clung to an alliance which was already a dependence, and was soon to be rendered a subjection. Having deliberately designed to save Prussia from destruction, it would have been logical for Choiseul to have entered promptly into friendly relations with Frederick II. Having secretly opposed the designs of Russia upon Poland and Turkey, it would have been timely for him to obtain new assurances of their security. But no step was taken in either of these directions. The art of negotiation seemed suddenly to have been entirely lost in France, or at least confined to the devious devices of the King's secret diplomacy. The traditional system of keeping a check on the predominance of the House of Hapsburg was entirely abandoned, and France became almost completely infeodated in the Hapsburg system.

Unfortunately for France her obligations to Austria did not cease with the conclusion of the war. The secret treaty of December 30, 1758, bound France to a strict subservience long after peace with Prussia had been proclaimed. Article III of that treaty had stipulated, instead of a con-

The servitude
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Austria

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tingent of twenty-four thousand men to serve in Bohemia, as had been promised in the original Treaty of Versailles, a sum of money equivalent to three million, three hundred and sixty-odd thousand florins, to be paid annually during the war. The heavy drafts upon the French treasury, which caused a large annual deficit, had rendered impossible the payment of these subsidies to Austria during the last four years of the war. As a result, in 1763, when peace was established, France owed Austria about thirty-four million livres, the payment of which was then by agreement distributed over the next seven years, extending the final term for liquidating the debt to 1769.

Thus, while France was pinched with poverty to pay off a debt incurred by a past war, Austria found herself in a better financial condition than she had ever before enjoyed; establishing her credit on the ruin of that of France, and practically obtaining from her ally a war indemnity after the war was concluded which enabled her to pay her own debts, increase her armament, and promote her prosperity in every sense.¹

While Austria very quickly recovered from the exhaustion caused by the Seven Years' War, France continued to be enfeebled by the drain upon her resources. The chicanery by which this was accomplished indicates how complete the subjection to Austria had become. As France was under obligation to aid Austria if again attacked by Frederick II, the constant possibility of renewed war with Prussia was a matter of lively interest at Versailles; and this menace was employed with a skill as expert as its pretexts were plausible. So long as the King of Prussia remained armed the Empress must also be prepared for war, for only thus could the *casus foederis* between France and Austria be kept from becoming operative. Thus France was made to believe that peace depended upon the strength of her ally rather than upon her own strength; and year after year while France remained stationary, or even receded, in

¹ See the famous "*V Conjectures raisonnées*" prepared by Favier, in Ségur, *Politique de tous les cabinets de l'Europe*, I, p. 217.

armed efficiency, Austria, Prussia, and Russia were all recovering and advancing their military power.

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In these circumstances it is not strange that no European nation sought the alliance of France, whose friendship had become of slight practical value. The position of France was, therefore, no doubt, one of security; but the price paid for it was complete subserviency to Austria. As long as that continued, peace could, apparently, be counted upon; and that was sufficient for the ministers of Louis XV. Nothing seemed to them so desirable as tranquillity. But each year France was sinking into debt, becoming more and more defenceless, more and more dependent upon the traditional enemy, more and more a negligible quantity in the affairs of Europe.

The passivity
of France

Austria, however, seemed to acquire day by day a new vigor, and a new degree of consideration and of credit. Sought for by the Turks, caressed by the King of Prussia, skilfully handled by Russia, implored by Poland, she had only to choose between them.¹

In fact, Austria, having assumed the place of *protectrice* to France, had also become the residuary legatee of her prestige; for she, and she alone, could determine what in particular circumstances France would do.

As soon as the preliminaries of peace between France and England had been signed, the Count de Choiseul—who as a reward for this service had been raised to the peerage as Duke de Praslin—wrote to Vergennes: “The King will remain faithfully united to his old allies, and particularly to the Court of Vienna. You have then to change neither your language nor your conduct in regard to what may interest Their Imperial Majesties, and you should continue to live in the most perfect harmony with their minister at Constantinople. As to Russia, we do not yet know with sufficient precision what are its sentiments and relations to be able to fix our judgment upon the degree of intelligence and confidence which will be established between our court and that of St. Petersburg.”

¹ See, as before, the analysis of the situation made by Favier.

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The secret
designs of
Russia and
Prussia

The misgivings with regard to Russia were not groundless. On the day before the preliminaries of peace were signed at Fontainebleau, Catherine II had concluded with Frederick II a secret treaty of "perpetual peace and alliance," in which they mutually promised to sustain each other with troops and money. If Prussia should be at war with France or with England, instead of troops Russia would furnish six hundred thousand roubles for the expenses of the war; and, if Russia should be at war with Persia or Turkey, Prussia would furnish the same aid. Russia guaranteed to Frederick II all his possessions, conformably to the treaties of Dresden and of Breslau, and above all "irrevocably and forever" Silesia and the County of Glatz; and, in return, the King of Prussia guaranteed to Russia all the territories she actually possessed.

In separate secret articles the two contractants undertook engagements regarding Denmark, Courland, and Poland of the greatest significance for the future. The King of Prussia promised to use his good offices with Denmark concerning the claims to Holstein; and, "in case Russia should be obliged to make war on Denmark in order to procure the satisfaction which is due," he agreed to furnish fifteen thousand men to facilitate that enterprise.

The Duchy of Courland, belonging to Poland, was ruled by Prince Charles, — son of Frederick Augustus II, — who had been elected by the unanimous vote of the magnates, and to whom the duchy had been guaranteed by the Czarina Elizabeth.¹ Catherine II desired to restore her favorite, the Duke de Birén, and Frederick II, in consideration of the cession to him of the "seigneurie of Würtemberg," agreed to displace Prince Charles and establish the Duke de Birén in his place; thus combining to exercise their authority in Courland as, in the terms of the treaty, "the interests of the two powers required." With regard to Poland as a whole, "it being very advantageous to Russia and Prussia that Poland should have its own king," it was agreed that, after the death of the reigning king, they would "try to

¹ See Heyking, *Aus Polens und Kurlands letzten Tagen*, p. 14.

place upon the throne a Piast,¹ and would employ all possible means to support him on it."²

Thus, even before the Peace of Hubertusburg, Prussia and Russia had formed that understanding which was to prove so fateful for Poland and the future of Europe.

Although in the recoil from the policies of Peter III Catherine II had found it expedient at the time to repudiate the alliance with Frederick II, and had even declared him to be an "enemy," she quickly perceived that he was weary of war, and that their common interests might be served by an alliance. Together, without the cost of war, they might work their will in Eastern Europe. But in this co-operative enterprise Russia must be the leader, and she the superior.³

Peter the Great had coveted the title "Emperor of all the Russias"; Elizabeth, as a matter of courtesy, had personally been accorded this honor, even by France; and Catherine II now not only formally claimed it, but determined to enforce upon Europe the recognition of her claim.

In January, 1763, the Czarina distributed to the foreign ambassadors at St. Petersburg and published in the court gazette a circular in which she declared her intention to exact in the correspondence of her court the imperial title.

Louis XV, who, following the example of the Grand Monarch, was jealous in matters of precedence, could not look with favor upon this "usurpation" of a title superior to his own, which, he considered, carried an attain to the pre-

¹ A native Polish noble who would be dependent upon Russia and Prussia and under their influence. In their treaty of alliance of June 8, 1762, Frederick II and Peter III had already agreed to prevent Poland from ever becoming a hereditary monarchy. See Angeberg, *Recueil*, p. 1.

² This treaty of November 2, 1762, is not mentioned by Tétot, and is not found in the collections. It is cited by Marsangy, *Le chevalier de Vergennes, son ambassade à Constantinople*, II, p. 214, and is in the Archives des Affaires Étrangères at Paris, "Turkey," vol. 139.

³ The famous "Testament of Peter the Great," so long regarded as an authentic outline of the policy of Russia in this period, is now rejected as a forgery. See the interesting comparison of the different texts by Breslau in *Historische Zeitschrift*, LXI, 1879, p. 385.

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rogatives of his dynasty. An acrimonious exchange of notes followed, in which he said: "Titles are nothing in themselves; they have reality only as they are recognized, . . . Sovereigns themselves cannot attribute to themselves titles of their choice; the assent of their subjects does not suffice; that of other sovereigns is necessary; and each crown, free to recognize or to refuse a new title, can also adopt it with the modifications and conditions which it deems suitable." Only upon condition that it "should carry no prejudice to the customary ceremonial," would France recognize the imperial title of the Czarina. Elizabeth, it was asserted, had subscribed to that condition, and had formally avowed that the "*complaisance du Roi* was very agreeable to her."

But Catherine II was of another mind. She would accept no condition and no other title. Breteuil was soon afterward transferred to Stockholm, and an "*inconnu*" was sent to succeed him at St. Petersburg, where he was coldly received. The two courts through the entire reign of the offended empress were in latent hostility. "As a German, as a princess, as a rival, and above all as a woman," a French chargé d'affaires wrote long afterward, "she hates us with all the hates"; and Choiseul stated to Kaunitz, "The distance between our states is the only thing that hinders our reciprocal enmity from making a startling sensation."

The condition
 of Poland

The real reason for this mutual animosity was not merely the pride of a king and the wounded sensibilities of an empress. It was the future destiny of Poland.

In 1763 the ancient republic was territorially — Russia alone excepted — the most extensive state in Europe; greater in geographical extent than all the states of Germany put together. Its name signifies "the plain,"— a broad unbroken expanse of country, without natural frontiers or means of defence, except for the Carpathian mountains on the south-west. The population consisted of some fifteen or sixteen million souls, spread unequally, and in parts sparsely, over this vast area. While called a "republic," it was, in fact, an elective monarchy; including a score of

local governments, subsisting under the Crown, and the Grand Duchy of Lithuania. Ethnographically and religiously — considered as a whole — Poland was wanting in unity, as it was politically; consisting of Poles proper, Lithuanians, and Germans. The Poles in general were Catholics in religion; but the population contained also Lutherans, Orthodox Russians, and many Jews, the latter chiefly in the cities. Dissidents, including the Orthodox Russians as well as Protestants and Jews, were often subjected to severe repression and entirely excluded from certain employments.

While the neighboring states were under a strong central authority which affirmed and enforced their political unity, Poland was characterized by local freedom and a certain equality between the nobles, great or small. The landowners held their estates for the most part allodially, and not feudally, having little subordination to one another or to the king. They formed "fraternities," or "confederations," among themselves, which were practically self-governing. As a result of this free organization, it was the Diet, composed of the representatives of the nobles, rather than the Crown, which made the laws and governed the country. Even the ministers of the king were irremovable by him, and held their positions for life. The *liberum veto*, or right of an individual member of the Diet to refuse assent to a law, and the elective royalty, which enabled the electors by *pacta conventa* to obtain from the king new concessions at each election, completed the anarchical condition of a kingdom in which no one was obliged to obey the king.

That which tended most to render difficult the centralization of power in the hands of the kings of Poland was the absence of a middle class, — a genuine *bourgeoisie*, — which the king could employ for the control of the great nobles. Between those of noble pretensions, great or small, and the peasants, who were helpless, there were no efficient constituents of the State. A few great families practically ruled the immense areas covered by their estates and filled the great public offices, such as that of chancellor, treas-

The divisions
of Poland

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urer, marshal of the court, *hetman*, or general of the army, and the governorships of provinces. These by agreement determined the public policies; to which the king, who was practically powerless, was obliged to submit. Below them were the "confederations," constituting an organized opposition to all central authority, and aiming solely at the protection of their local liberties.

A patriotic party had always existed which sought to strengthen the central authority as the only means of securing the permanent independence and unity of the Polish nation; but counsels had been divided, and Poland had long been regarded as a probable victim of ultimate dismemberment.¹ Foreign intervention had become habitual. Since the Crown had, in 1668, with the death of John Casimir, ceased to be hereditary, every royal election had been an international crisis. France, Sweden, Austria, Prussia, and Russia had supported their favorite candidates, sometimes with menaces, sometimes with money, and sometimes with armed force. Europe had come to dread a Polish election as a public calamity that might easily engender another war of succession.

Foreign nations had long had permanent *clientèles* among the Polish nobles. Of the great families, the Potocki and Branicki were in general favorable to French influence; and had, accordingly, adhered latterly to the Saxon party. The Czartoryski, on the other hand, placed their faith in Russia. Both factions claimed to be intensely patriotic, — the one fearing the influence of Russia as tending to the subjection and ultimate absorption of Poland, the other seeking in Russia the protector of its own policies and the safeguard of Polish unity. Each of these parties possessed armies to support their views. On October 3, 1763, the death of King Frederick Augustus II again opened the question of the succession and brought these opposing forces into collision.

¹ The partition of Poland had often been proposed. In 1749 King Stanislas I said: "We shall be the prey of some famous conqueror; perhaps the neighboring powers will agree to share our States."

Catherine II and Frederick II had, as we have seen, prepared for this eventuality; and they now acted in accordance with their agreement. On October 26 Catherine II informed her ambassador at Warsaw that the new election was of "the greatest importance for the real interest of the Russian Empire . . . and to the special advantages which result from its direct influence in the political system of all Europe." He was instructed to secure the acceptance of the imperial title by the Polish government, the solemn recognition and confirmation of the new duke of Courland, the protection of the Russian Church in the kingdom, the maintenance of the *liberum veto* in the Diet, the non-augmentation of the armed force of Poland, the election of Count Poniatowski,— a former lover of Catherine II, whom she had "resolved to elevate to the throne of Poland,"— and, finally, a vote of the Diet, asking for the "solemn guarantee of the fundamental laws, constitutions, privileges, and liberties of the Republic" by Russia. As a means for the accomplishment of these ends the ambassador was ordered to work faithfully with the trusty Count Keyserling and the Princess Czartoryska, "who are devoted to us." He was provided with a hundred thousand roubles, in the form of a draft on Amsterdam, and informed that, "although we have ordered all the preparations for war, and although a great part of our military forces already massed on the frontiers are ready to cross them upon the first notice, it is nevertheless important to our glory and that of our empire to show to the world that Russia, in all the most important matters, knows how to negotiate and to act alone, . . . and that her physical forces are sufficient to support them effectively in case of need."¹

The interven-
tion of Cath-
erine II

Undoubtedly, a new and powerful force had entered the field of European politics. Frederick II's preparations were not so comprehensive; but, as a partner in the enterprise of imposing upon Poland a king who would reign in the interest of the Russo-Prussian alliance, it was his intention that his subjects should not furnish any aid to the

¹ For the full instruction, see Angeberg, *Recueil*, p. 3.

CHAP. VIII Polish patriots. Accordingly, on November 5, he issued a
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 frontier to take any action, during the vacancy of the
 throne, by which the attitude of Prussia would be
 compromised.¹

On January 24, 1764, however, he thought it necessary to publish at Warsaw a declaration, in which he said: "The false reports which are spread abroad, and which the enemies of public tranquillity do not cease to propagate, that the Courts of Prussia and Russia wish to profit by the present circumstances to dismember Poland or Lithuania . . . have induced the undersigned to deny them"; to which he added: "Far from wishing to aggrandize himself, His Majesty the King of Prussia labors, and will constantly continue to labor, only to maintain the states of the Republic in their entirety."

The attitude
 of France and
 Austria

Although the union of Russia and Prussia in their design to control the royal election in Poland was not positively known in France and Austria, it was more than suspected. Relying entirely upon Austria, Choiseul had taken no active measures to influence the election, and was personally indisposed to intervene in any manner; preferring that the Poles should be left free to choose their own king. Maria Theresa made the same profession; and, on March 16, 1764, following the example of Frederick II, she also made a public declaration at Warsaw, in which she stated in the most solemn manner that she considered the Republic of Poland "a sovereign and independent state, whose right, assured by the laws and constitutions of the country, to choose a king with full liberty of suffrage cannot be in any way restrained."

Two weeks later Catherine II and Frederick II sealed their previous compact by an additional secret article, in which they solemnly agreed not only to hinder the kingdom of Poland from becoming "hereditary and absolute," but "to prevent and destroy by all possible means, and with

¹ See Angeberg, as before, p. 13.

common accord, all views and designs which could lead to that result."¹

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In the previous October, immediately after the vacancy of the Polish throne had occurred, Vergennes had been instructed to sound the disposition of the Sultan regarding the affairs of Poland, with the suggestion that the vigilance of the Turks should be exercised, since it was "quite generally thought that the Czarina and the King of Prussia intended to profit by the interregnum in Poland to assure for themselves certain parts of the kingdom to which they form pretensions or which are to their advantage."

The attitude
of the Sultan

Vergennes was directed to call the attention of the Porte to the fact that Russia already had introduced troops into Lithuania, and that the King of Prussia had increased the number he ordinarily maintained in ducal Prussia; but he was not to urge action. As regards candidates for the Polish throne, he was informed of Louis XV's preference for the young elector of Saxony, but was not to propose intervention in behalf of any person, or to make any accusations against St. Petersburg or Berlin.²

The instruction reveals at the same time the desire and the weakness of the King of France. He suspected the concerted action of Russia and Prussia for the ultimate dismemberment of Poland, and he was anxious to oppose their designs and to promote the candidacy of the Elector of Saxony; but he was not prepared even to propose the co-operation of the Turks in support of his wishes.

A change in the office of Grand Vizier rendered impossible for Vergennes the immediate execution of his orders to sound the intentions of the Porte. To his surprise, he was finally informed, that "the Sublime Porte had no other intentions than to do honor to the privileges of Polish liberty."

This attitude — ostensibly perfectly correct — was substantially that of Frederick II; for it soon appeared that

¹ For this article, signed on April 11, 1764, see Wenck, III, p. 481; and Angeberg, p. 17.

² See Marsangy, *Le chevalier de Vergennes*, II, p. 226.

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the Porte was opposed to the election of any foreigner, and desired the election of "such a Pole as the electors thought suitable." Vergennes, the most astute of the French diplomatists of his generation, could find no fault with this reply, and even expressed his "gratitude" for it; and yet, in effect, it was a frustration of the policy of France.

Vergennes was incredulous of the real intentions of the Porte until the course of the negotiations clearly showed that the entrance of Russian troops into Poland was a matter of indifference to Constantinople. On April 13, 1764, a large body of the most eminent Polish patriots addressed an appeal to the Sultan, Mustafa III, urging him to intervene in their behalf; but their prayer was in vain. The Ottoman ministry took the ground, that a protest addressed to Russia in behalf of Poland would itself be "an infraction of the rights of Polish liberty."

Nothing, then, was to be expected of the Turks. Berlin and St. Petersburg had been active at Constantinople, and France had lost her traditional ally. The Porte had concluded that Prussia and Russia were strong, and that France had become weak; and the Ottoman defection afforded another proof of the abasement and subordination of the monarchy which under Louis XIV had been able to move the armies of the Sultan almost at the word of command.

The declaration
of Louis XV

Left thus without any resource for enforcing his policy, Louis XV was compelled to accept the situation as it was. In order to place himself in the most favorable light before Europe, and particularly before Poland, he issued a declaration which, as a statement of principles, does him great honor, and would do him greater honor still if the principles were those in which he really believed, rather than those which circumstances forced him to accept.

The declaration affirmed in the most precise and solemn manner that "he considered upon that occasion only the advantages of the Republic; that he entertained no other wish or desire than to see the Polish nation maintained in all its rights, in all its possessions, in all its liberties, and

especially in the most precious of its prerogatives, that of giving itself a king by a free election and a voluntary choice. . . . It is for the nation itself to determine its choice by consulting its own advantage, without regard to foreign influences; and His Majesty will recognize as King of Poland and as an ally of his crown, and will even sustain and protect, whoever shall be elected by the free choice of the nation and conformably to the laws and constitutions of the country."¹

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The historic significance of this document does not consist mainly in the light it throws upon the position of France regarding the Polish election. It is a statement of importance in the development of the fundamental law of Europe. It was, as compared with the pretences of absolutism, a new doctrine; and at the same time a doctrine practically recognized by all the great powers. It had long been contested by the adversaries of England, but now it was universally admitted; not, indeed, as applying to all nations, but to those which chose to apply it. All were solemnly bound by their declarations and agreements to do the same thing, namely, to promote the independence of Poland.

A preliminary convocation of the Diet preparatory to the royal election at Warsaw convinced Catherine II and Frederick II that the patriotic party would oppose their attempt to influence the choice of a king of Poland. In order to prevent that opposition and strengthen the party infeodated with Russia, under the pretext of co-operating in maintaining order, Catherine II sent an army into Polish territory, while forty thousand Prussian troops were stationed near the frontier. On April 14, 1764, a group of fifteen senators issued an energetic protest against the violation of Polish freedom by the presence of a Russian army; but it was disregarded.

The menaces
of Russia

Determined to enthrone her favorite, Poniatowski, the Czarina ordered her troops to enter the Polish capital and surround the castle where the Diet was in session.

¹ For the full text, see Marsangy, as before, p. 254.

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Many senators and *nuntii* — as the members of the lower chamber were called — refused to appear in the Diet. "You cannot open the assembly in the presence of the Russians and so many soldiers who usurp the places of our brothers; I stop the activity of the Diet," André Makronowski is reported to have cried. At these words sabres were drawn. "Strike," proudly exclaimed the *nuntius*, "strike, I shall die free and for liberty."

Determined not to submit to the Russian intervention, Makronowski is said to have hastened to Berlin to appeal to Frederick II, who, after a long conversation, said to him, "You are the most feeble; it is necessary to yield." "Sire," replied his visitor, "that is not the example Your Majesty has given us; alone, you have resisted Europe." "Without a certain occurrence, I was lost," said Frederick. "But it happened, and the talents of Your Majesty gave fortune time to act," the Pole retorted. "You are accustomed," urged Frederick, "to receive your kings from Russia." "She has given us one," answered the *nuntius*, "and we will have no more from her hand; but Your Majesty will never appear in our country except to play a secondary rôle. . . . Play the rôle that befits your glory; give us your brother, Prince Henry, as a king."

But Frederick II had no thought of interfering with the plans of his powerful ally, although for a moment he seemed to dread the possible consequences of her success. "What is this rumor so widely circulated regarding the marriage of the Empress with Poniatowski?" he asked anxiously, as he imagined what might happen in such a case. "I have written to both of them not to commit that folly."¹

The election of
Poniatowski

The presence of the Russians had provoked a civil war. Poniatowski — whose mother was a Czartoryska and said to have been a descendant of the House of Jagellon² — openly defended the presence of the Russian troops and proposed to send a message to the Czarina, "to thank that

¹ The conversations are reported by Rulhière, *Histoire de l'anarchie de Pologne*, II.

² See Volume II of this work, p. 52.

august, virtuous, and magnanimous princess for the services which she is rendering to the Republic." Under the presidency of the Prince Primate, Archbishop Guesne, the Diet was obedient to the will of the Russian party, and while the Branicki and the Potocki, deprived of their offices, were compelled by the presence of foreign troops to seek safety on their estates, a fraction of the Diet, on September 7, elected Poniatowski King of Poland, under the title Stanislas II; voted new laws which increased the royal revenues; placed the army under his command; and, in direct violation of the agreement with Frederick II that the King of Poland should not be made "absolute," conferred upon him by new *pacta conventa* powers which no king of Poland had ever before possessed.

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Guesne 2

Louis XV, on the ground that soldiers had taken the place of diplomats, and that "acts of violence were to be substituted for peaceable negotiation" in Poland, directed his ambassador at Warsaw, the Marquis de Paulmy, to leave the country. The scene of his final audience with the Prince Primate, to whom he presented his letter of recall, was made as humiliating as possible for France. The usual courtesies were omitted; and the ambassador, left standing, was told to "say what he had to say." Paulmy drew from his pocket the letter of recall, which stated the reason for his departure.

"You cease, then, to recognize the Republic?" demanded the archbishop. "I recognize," replied Paulmy, "the Republic divided and the city of Warsaw delivered to foreign troops." "Well," replied the archbishop, "since you do not recognize the Republic, you and all the ministers of France, you may go and seek it where you please. We no longer recognize an ambassador: I salute the Marquis de Paulmy." "*Serviteur, Monsieur l'Archevêque de Guesne,*" replied the Marquis, and left the room without being attended, or receiving the customary military honors.

Guesne

In thus endeavoring to eliminate France from the affairs of Poland, the archbishop perfectly understood his rôle. The helplessness of Louis XV was at once demonstrated.

The appeal to Turkey

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No one of the powers was disposed of itself to challenge the dictation of Russia in forcing the election of Stanislas II. Austria had no desire to engage in another war against two united adversaries like Russia and Prussia. Sweden was reduced to practical impotence in the affairs of Europe. England was indifferent to the fate of Poland and desirous of securing Russian trade, which the financial troubles of Holland were obliging her merchants to surrender to an active competitor. There remained only the Ottoman Empire, and Vergennes did all in his power to excite the apprehensions of the Porte.

"The new king of Poland," he said to the Reis Effendi, "forced by system and convenience to become the oppressor of his country, when he should be its deliverer, will be reduced, in order to maintain himself, to be the slave of Russia."

"It will be Russia, then, who will govern the Poles?" asked the Reis Effendi.

"No; she will leave to the King the appearance of authority, she will even furnish him the means to enslave his subjects; but, at the same time, she will hold him in such complete dependence that he will be exactly in the same relation to her as a khan to the Ottoman Empire. The Porte having a capital interest in not suffering Poland to be reduced to the condition of a Russian province, it is for Turkey to establish the ancient constitution in all the points which have been changed. She ought on this point to exercise foresight; and, if she would assert herself with the tone of authority which is proper for her, I would almost dare to be responsible for her success."

The Reis Effendi manifested indignation at the conduct of Russia, but the conversation had no other result than to raise the question of the attitude to be taken regarding the recognition of the new king of Poland.

Recognition of
Stanislas II
by France
and Austria

Maria Theresa had offered no resistance to the activities of Russia in Poland. When it came to the question of formally recognizing the new king, she expressed her intention to conform to the decision of Versailles. In striking

contrast to the bold initiative to which France had in the past long been accustomed, Louis XV referred the matter to the Sultan. "The King," the Duke de Praslin wrote to Vergennes, "has sought from the commencement of the interregnum to harmonize his course with that of the Ottoman Court, which has refused our advances. To-day it is seeking us, and His Majesty, who has not wavered in his principles, will gladly lend himself to this concert, which it has been the first to propose, . . . and will suspend the recognition of the King of Poland until your reply is received."

The attitude of the Porte was undecided. A firm protest by the three powers united might have prevented Poland from becoming a Russian province; but during the delay Stanislas II, a man of intelligence and not wholly devoid of patriotism, was daily employing the extraordinary powers with which he was invested to subdue opposition within his kingdom, and one by one the Polish magnates were accepting his authority. In the meantime the new Polish ambassador to Turkey, Alexandrowitz, was kept waiting on the frontier. After more than a year of hesitation, during which the Porte took no decisive action and was negotiating with Warsaw regarding the terms on which the ambassador might be received, the courts of Austria and France finally became reconciled to the election of Stanislas II, and at the end of the year 1765 it was decided that he should be formally recognized by them.

As conditions of this recognition Louis XV required that the archbishop should offer an apology for his treatment of Paulmy; that the Polish magnates who had been devoted to the cause of France should be restored to their offices and their estates; and that certain favors be shown to the sons of the late king, Frederick Augustus. These conditions having been accepted, recognition was finally accorded by both France and Austria; and, in April, 1766, diplomatic relations with the new king were established.

The death of the Emperor Francis I on August 18, 1765, brought to the throne of the Empire the eldest son of Maria

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Choiseul's
attempt to
incite the
Turks

Theresa, Joseph II, who was also named by his mother as Co-regent of Austria; while the fatal illness of the Dauphin of France in the following December opened the succession to the crown to the Duke de Berry, already designated as the future husband of the Emperor's sister, Marie Antoinette. Thus was added to the Austro-French alliance a new bond of sentiment; while the return of the Duke de Choiseul to the French foreign office, in April, 1766, to supersede the Duke de Praslin, marked a more vigorous activity in behalf of Poland.

Choiseul's first despatch upon resuming that office, addressed to Vergennes, shows clearly that the minister was fully conscious of the position in which France had been placed by the alliance between Russia and Prussia. "Denmark," he says, "from fear of Russia, and in the illusory hope of acquiring the part of Holstein belonging to the Grand Duke, surrenders herself with humility to the wishes of the Czarina. Sweden, through extraordinary circumstances, deliberates and acts only by the orders of the Moscovites. The King of Prussia is managed, and supports all the operations of St Petersburg. England sees with pleasure the consolidation of that alliance of the North with foresight that, if a rupture with France should occur, it would embarrass us, in spite of our allies, with a formidable war. Although I foresee no fear of war for several years, . . . I perceive with pain that a league is preparing in the North which will become, perhaps, some day formidable for France."

He frankly admits that France had little ability to prevent that misfortune, and the conclusion at which he arrives is: "It is, then, Russia that we should attack." The means for this attack, he continues, is to excite a war on the part of Turkey which may, perhaps, "hurl from the throne she has usurped the Empress Catherine." "The King has charged me," he continues, "thus to present to you the existing situation, in order that you may know the desire His Majesty has that the Porte should engage in war with Russia. There is no longer a question of occupying yourself

solely with the little current affairs of the embassy, it is war with the Turks which should be the only object of your labor and your meditations."

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Vergennes, thoroughly familiar with the disposition and actual condition of the Ottoman Empire, while agreeing with Choiseul that Russia was the principal enemy of France, and should be resisted as far as possible, perceived the absolute inutility of dependence upon the Turks, whose inefficiency he portrays in a vivid manner.

The immobility
of the Porte

The Sultan, Mustafa III, he describes as the victim of twenty-seven years of captivity before he came to the throne, "delivered over to uncertainty and a fluctuation of resolutions little indicative of force"; the Grand Vizier as "animated by a sincere spirit of equity and of rectitude, but without any knowledge of the interests of the state which he governed"; and the Reis Effendi, as "an honest man, discreet and impartial, not wanting in spirit or in judgment, but overwhelmed by the current of business, and not profiting by the reflections which experience could furnish him."

As for the Turks in general, he says, "enervated, and still more abased, war is repugnant to them." Although "the pride and ambition of Russia or other circumstances may triumph over their inertia, provoke them, and drive them into that which they seem so anxious to avoid, . . . I hope for nothing at present; still," he concludes, "I shall never despair of the Turks, because they are so little regulated in their ideas and views, that that which appears impossible at one time may become possible at another."

The effect of this description upon Choiseul was to call forth from him an instruction to act with energy in reanimating the hostility of the Turks to Russia. The prestige of the Ottoman Empire in Europe, he declares, having been lost, should immediately be regained. The deplorable state into which it had fallen was the best possible reason for a foreign war, the classic remedy for internal feebleness or disorder. Russia was adjusting the frontiers of Poland so as to facilitate an attack on Turkey. The Empress Catherine, "a little German princess who has mounted on steps of

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crime to a throne which is a rival to that of the Grand Seigneur, if the Turks do not take care, will render that throne superior." Vergennes was, therefore, to inflame the Turks against Russia; being careful, however, to take no step that would compromise France. "His Majesty," the minister concludes in his despatch of June 19, 1766, "in order to succeed in his design, puts no limits to the expense, and authorizes you to employ in the execution of it the money which you deem necessary."

The system of
the North

In his apprehensions of Russia's designs Choiseul was in no respect misled. The new Russian minister of state, Panin, who fully enjoyed the confidence of Catherine II and was thoroughly familiar with the affairs of Denmark and Sweden, where he had been ambassador, had formed a plan for a great coalition of the North, to be composed of Prussia, England, Sweden, Denmark, the United Provinces, and the Protestant princes of Germany, to serve as an instrument of Russian aggrandizement and to thwart the purposes of the Catholic powers, Austria, France, and Spain.

In August, 1765, Russian influence had won a complete victory in Sweden, and the friends of France were overwhelmed.

On February 5, 1766, England entered into a treaty of alliance and commerce with Sweden:¹ and this was followed, on June 20, by a treaty of friendship, commerce, and navigation between England and Russia.² The "system of the North" was making rapid progress, and Russia was acquiring a free hand for the prosecution of her ulterior purposes, which included the gradual appropriation of Poland, the establishment of Russian predominance on the Black Sea, and the final occupation of Constantinople, from which the Turks were to be expelled.

Frederick II's
suspicions of
the system

These far-reaching ambitions were not unknown to Frederick II, who perceived in the formidable coalition at which Catherine II was aiming a serious peril for Prussia;

¹ For the treaty, see Wenck, III, p. 515.

² For the treaty, see Wenck, III, p. 572.

for this system might at some time by isolating Prussia leave him at the mercy of his ally. When an attempt was made to draw Saxony into the Russian combination, — a state so necessary to him in case war with Austria should be renewed, — while showing every mark of friendship to Catherine II, he considered the expediency of securing his position by a *rapprochement* to Austria, in the belief that Joseph II would be more peacefully inclined than the Empress Maria Theresa; but her influence still prevailed, a proposed meeting between the two monarchs at Torgau had to be abandoned, and the opposition of the Austrian and the Prussian policies regarding Poland presented a barrier to the reconciliation which Frederick II desired.

The Polish question had itself already assumed a form which rendered difficult the relations of Frederick II and Catherine II. A German and a Lutheran by birth, the Empress of Russia had comprehended the rôle played by religion in her great empire, in which the chief bond of unity was the Greek Church, and she had early in her career adopted the Orthodox faith, of which she had now become the titular protector. Not only within the Russian Empire, but outside of it, wherever adherents of the Greek Church existed, the influence of the Empress had a powerful hold upon its confessors, who were numerous both in Poland and in the Ottoman Empire. Fully appreciating the advantage thus afforded her in compelling these countries to respect her power, Catherine II employed it with skill and energy in supporting her political policies.

Virtually the creature of Russia, Stanislas II was compelled to urge upon the Polish Diet the removal of the restrictions which excluded dissidents from office, and to demand equality of treatment in all respects for the adherents of Greek orthodoxy; but his efforts had proved ineffectual, and the Catholic Poles, who were in power, in November, 1766, refused to make concessions, and the King found himself in the embarrassing position of being obliged to repudiate the will of the power that had placed him on the throne, or to enter into open conflict with the nation over which he ruled.

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The interven-
tion of Russia
for religious
equality

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the culmination of its development in the eighteenth century, and occupied, relatively to other states, the highest position of power which it has at any time attained.

From the Peace of Paris until 1766, George III and his ministries were engaged in the endeavor to fortify the royal predominance, and foreign affairs received practically no attention. The important problem of the time for Great Britain was the organization of the great empire which had come under her dominion, in order to secure its retention and future development. The debt incurred by the Seven Years' War was heavy and the prospective cost of defending the colonies as imperial possessions promised to be considerable, although the anticipated expenses at present seem trivial,— a sum of only one hundred thousand pounds sterling being necessary for the maintenance of twenty thousand soldiers in America.

Bute's ministry having ended in failure, under that of Grenville, on March 22, 1765, a resolution was carried to impose certain stamp duties upon the American colonies. Hitherto the colonies had, through their own assemblies, contributed liberally for their own defence, and felt disposed to do so in the future; but they were unwilling, after their voluntary contribution to the war with France, to accept the Stamp Act, a measure dictated by the Parliament of England, in which they were in no way represented; and, as a consequence, a constitutional question of profound significance was thereby raised.

It was to discuss this issue that Pitt, who had long been absent from Parliament, in January, 1766, under Lord Rockingham's ministry, made his reappearance in the House of Commons. To his keen political intuition the Stamp Act, which had already produced a disturbed condition in the Colonies, was not only a capital error but a violation of a fundamental principle of the British constitution. Declaring it to be "a subject of greater importance than ever engaged the attention of this House," he denied the right of the kingdom to lay a tax upon the colonies. "I rejoice," he exclaimed, "that America has resisted." "The Com-

moners of America," he affirmed, "represented in their several assemblies, have ever been in possession of the exercise of this their constitutional right of giving and granting their own money. At the same time this kingdom, as the supreme governing and legislating power, has always bound the colonies by her laws, by her regulations and restrictions of trade, in navigation, in manufactures — in everything except that of taking their money out of their pockets without their consent." All Englishmen, everywhere, he contended, possessed, and must be permitted to enjoy, equal rights and be held to equal duties.

As a result of the examination of this constitutional question, on March 18, 1766, the Stamp Act was repealed; and the King, comprehending the magic of Pitt's name, in July urged him to form a ministry. Enfeebled by illness in both mind and body, the "Great Commoner" accepted the task; but it was far beyond his diminished powers to thwart the policies of George III, and incompatible with his ideals and principles to render them triumphant. Had he been in perfect health, or twenty years younger, this one man might have materially altered the course of history. In becoming Earl Chatham, and withdrawing his influence from the branch of the British legislature which he had so long been able to dominate through his power to interpret the thought and will of the nation, he lost the influence he had formerly possessed; and, as an English historian has said, his ministry produced "a fatal and melancholy record." As Lord Chesterfield wittily said of him, "he had fallen upstairs," and could never afterward stand independently before the people.

But the principle of which Pitt made himself the chief exponent possessed a vitality which was wanting to his broken body and failing faculties. The absolutism which he boldly challenged and the constitutionalism which he as bravely defended had entered upon a conflict which could not end until one or the other was defeated. He had participated in a debate which was to create a new epoch in

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The renewal
of Pitt's
diplomacy

history, and end in the complete overthrow of the principles which had long dominated Europe.

In order to prevent a recurrence of the conflict with France and Spain, and the possible loss of the colonies he had preserved and won for Great Britain, Pitt's first move in foreign policy was an attempt to form a continental alliance that would place a permanent restraint upon those powers, in whose family compact he discerned a future danger to the British Empire. His aim was to unite with Russia and Prussia, with the support of Sweden, Denmark, Holland, and all the available German princes, in a strong continental coalition to balance the combination of France, Spain, and Austria. Special envoys were promptly despatched to St. Petersburg and Berlin, "to establish a firm and solid system for the maintenance of the public tranquillity."

The attempt indicates the clearness of Pitt's discernment. Choiseul and Grimaldi were planning the means to restore what had been lost to France and Spain by the Peace of Paris. France was seriously engaged in rebuilding her ruined navy in expectation of making an attack upon England in conjunction with Spain when the favorable moment should arrive. The discontent in America, Pitt foresaw, might easily furnish such an occasion. Their emissaries were believed to be already at work in stimulating the opposition of the colonies. If England could be isolated, — and all the maritime powers were at this time resenting the treatment their commerce had received from England in the last war, — with Austria bound to protect France from invasion by land on the side of the Netherlands, the successes of Great Britain in the previous conflict might conceivably all be reversed.

The *entente* with Russia, for commercial and defensive purposes, presented no difficulty; but Frederick II was not disposed, even with Pitt at the head of the British government, to resume his former alliance. His desire was to repair within his kingdom the devastations of war, to build up his army, and to await his opportunity, in close association with Russia, to profit by the weakness of Poland,

whose province of West Prussia intervened between his Prussian and Brandenburg possessions, and presented a barrier to free communication between them. The probability of a new conflict between England and France, in which he had no interest, made it expedient for him to avoid being drawn into an unprofitable alliance, and he skilfully avoided it.

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While Pitt was anxious to establish a balance of power on the continent favorable to England, it was only for defensive purposes. His principal object was to secure the conquests already made. India he considered "the greatest of all objects"; and his design of claiming the conquests in India as possessions of the Crown, and not permitting them to be treated as the private property of a chartered company, was statesmanlike. Had the reforms he proposed with a view to giving a "just and beneficent government to the people of India" been executed, and not thwarted by selfish intrigues, colonial history would, perhaps, have been spared some of its darkest pages.¹

It was the irony of fate that, on June 14, 1767, during the illness and absence of Pitt, Charles Townshend, without consultation, proposed the import duties on goods entering the American colonies which finally produced the irreparable estrangement between them and the mother-country. Helpless and half paralyzed, the great minister lingered on in office until October, 1768, in such a pitiable state of incapacity that he could not endure an audience of the King or speak of politics; and his final public appearance before his death, ten years later, appeared to his contemporaries like a resurrection from the grave.

The temporary return of Pitt to power had produced a deep impression in France. Choiseul redoubled his activities in constant expectation of a renewal of the war with England. Louis XV was personally much agitated by the possibility of another encounter with the great minister. For twenty-five years he had considered The Hague as one

The secret
diplomacy of
Louis XV at
The Hague

¹ During Pitt's last ministry several important treaties were negotiated between Great Britain and the Princes of India.

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of the principal stations of his secret diplomacy, for here everything was eventually and usually very promptly known, and the diminished importance of the United Provinces in the affairs of Europe rendered it all the more convenient as a watch-tower for observing the other nations.

For many years the French ambassador to The Hague, the Marquis d'Havrincourt, was an active agent of the King's secret cabinet, and played a large rôle in furnishing information regarding the Polish question. With Pitt's accession to power the intentions of England became the chief object of interest at Versailles, and the future of America largely occupied the mind of the King. Fear was entertained that England would not only enter into a coalition with Russia and Prussia, but force Sweden to do the same, and even that Joseph II, upon the death of Maria Theresa, would be detached from France, tempted perhaps by a share in the spoils of Poland.

After the death of Havrincourt in 1767, Breteuil, who was well versed in the diplomacy of the North by his missions in St. Petersburg and Stockholm, was sent to The Hague to succeed him; while Broglie took the place of Tercier at Paris, upon the death of this confidant of the King in the same year, as the director of the secret cabinet. It was in this period that Louis XV, in his zeal to keep a close watch upon his foreign office, directed that copies of all official instructions sent out to those who were in the secret should be made and sent to him for his private archives. His passion for secret oversight and direction — inconsequential in effect — had with advancing years become a complete obsession.

The ineffectual
rapprochement
 of France and
 Prussia

The possibility of a future estrangement on the part of Austria had increased the desire of Louis XV to renew diplomatic relations, so long suspended, with Prussia; and, at the end of October, 1768, the preliminary negotiations resulted in the appointment of the Count de Guines as French ambassador at Berlin, and of Baron von Goltz as Prussian ambassador at Paris.

The principal recommendations of the Count de Guines, who was a soldier and not a diplomatist, were his personal elegance, his courtesy, and his accomplishments in music and conversation, which were intended to charm and win the King of Prussia; whom Choiseul described in his instructions to the ambassador as "an ardent genius seeking every kind of glory, who receives eulogies with complacency, and even adulation when seasoned with intelligence."

The principal inducement to be offered to Frederick II to resume intimate relations with France was a favorable treaty of commerce, of which it was esteemed Prussia stood in need; but neither this proposal nor the solemn warning Guines was instructed to impress upon the King of the essential antagonism between Prussia and Russia was sufficient to win the friendship of Frederick II, who had formed a plan of his own in which Russia was to play an important part. The French ambassador was instructed to insinuate that in guaranteeing to the Empress of Russia the safe possession of all her estates and in pledging himself to defend them against Turkey, who was his natural ally, he had exposed Prussia to the danger of a new Austro-Russian combination, or even to the more probable peril of a new attack by Austria, in case Russia should be preoccupied in a conflict with the Ottoman Empire.

To his surprise Guines found a cool reception at Berlin. "There exists nowhere a court like this," he wrote to Choiseul. "They pay no more attention to the diplomatic corps than if it did not exist," he continues. "When the King gives us an audience it is in the last room of his apartment. We have no place marked. We present no strangers of our nation who appear at the court. If a minister of state has anything to communicate to us, he sends a lackey to seek us, and the same custom is observed for audiences of the King and the Queen. When she has fêtes, at supper-time we go home; with permission to return when they have risen from the table!"

The Russian ambassador, Guines noticed, was quite differently treated; so much so, indeed, that the Count was

CHAP. VIII moved to raise an issue regarding the question of precedence; which, however, did not end to his satisfaction.
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The truth was that Frederick II was only trifling with France, from which he expected nothing of solid advantage, while he was at the time engaged in serious negotiations with Russia and Austria. Choiseul, whom Catherine II referred to as "*le souffleur de Mustapha*," had at last succeeded in arousing the Turks, and Frederick II was planning either to end the war before Prussia should be involved in it, or to derive from it new territorial advantages.

II. THE CRISIS IN THE EAST AND THE PARTITION OF POLAND

The Sultan's
 declaration of
 war on Russia

The civil war in Poland had opened the eyes of Choiseul to the loss of French prestige and the increased power of Russia. To offset, and if possible to terminate, the humiliation of France in seeing Poland delivered over to Russian domination, the minister had resolved to redouble his efforts to arouse the Ottoman Empire to opposition by awakening fear of Russia's progress; and the course of events had finally rendered the mission of Vergennes at Constantinople a complete success.

On October 6, 1768, the violation of the Turkish frontier at Balta and the taking of Cracow by the Russians had turned the scale in favor of war, and it was on that day tempestuously declared. Obreskoff, the Russian resident at Constantinople, was summoned to the presence of the Grand Vizier. "Have you not engaged with us to leave in Poland only for a short time seven thousand men? And how many are there to-day?" "About twenty-five thousand," was the reply. "Well, traitor, well, perjurer," exclaimed the Grand Vizier, "you yourself avow your infidelity. You do not blush before God or men at the excesses and horrors which, to the shame of humanity, your troops have committed, and still commit, in a country that does not belong to you. . . . I announce to you that the Most August, Most Powerful, Most Formidable and Invincible Emperor, my master, whose glory and triumphs God perpetuates,

finds himself in the necessity of declaring war upon you. Go then, and wait in the next room for his orders!"

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Escorted by a guard of janissaries, the unhappy resident was conducted to the Palace of Seven Towers, where, in accordance with Turkish custom, he was detained as a prisoner of state.

Upon Vergennes' advice, a manifesto was addressed to the powers of Europe, in which it was declared that "Russia has dared to destroy the liberties of Poland; has forced the Poles to recognize as king a person not of royal blood, nor designated by the will of the people; and has caused those who were unwilling to recognize him to be massacred, and their goods and estates to be pillaged and devastated."

Thus, Turkey answered Russia's intervention in the name of religious liberty by claiming the championship of political liberty. Vergennes, who had inspired this decision, could write some time afterward: "I have executed the will of the King; but I bring back the three millions sent to me for this purpose. I have not needed them."

The gage of battle had been thrown down by the Sultan; but no one of the powers, not even Turkey herself, was prepared for war. The position of Frederick II was peculiarly embarrassing. Russia had been taken by surprise; and, fully preoccupied with Poland, in November the Czarina appealed to the King of Prussia for an assurance of his fidelity to the alliance.

The attitude
of Frederick II

While Frederick II was not oblivious of the advantages that might accrue to Prussia from a serious conflict between his too predominant partner and the Ottoman Empire, he perceived the danger that might result from Prussia's being drawn into it; which would, perhaps, leave him unable to prevent Austria's recovery of Silesia. It was, therefore, for him a moment of serious reflection; and it was at this time, in the tranquillity of Sans Souci, that he meditated upon "the historical mission of Prussia," and in this same month of November wrote his famous "Testament Politique."

Starting from the principle that the *raison d'État* ought

CHAP. VIII / to be the sole guide for the conduct of a sovereign, Frederick
 A. D. II fixed his attention upon the future development of his
 1763-1775 kingdom. "One of the principal aims of Prussia should
 be," he wrote, "the occupation of certain places on the
 Vistula, which would enable Prussia to defend Eastern
 Prussia against Russia." In brief, Prussia must acquire the
 Polish province of West Prussia, and thus connect East
 Prussia with Eastern Pomerania and the main body of what
 had become the Kingdom of Prussia. By what means was
 this result to be accomplished?

It might be achieved by continuing the alliance with
 Russia and obtaining the support of Catherine II; but
 that support might involve the necessity of active partici-
 pation in the war against the Turks, thus affording to
 Austria an opportunity to recover Silesia.

On the other hand, if Maria Theresa should be dis-
 posed to forget the past, the desired result might be ac-
 complished through the wish of Austria to prevent Frederick
 II from aiding in the aggrandizement of Russia. At all
 events, it was in the interest of Prussia, if possible, to pre-
 serve the peace; and, accordingly, on November 9, Frederick
 II ordered his minister at Constantinople, Zegelin, to offer
 his mediation to the Porte.

The attitude
 of Austria

In desiring a continuation of peace, the policies of Prussia
 and of Austria were identical; for neither Maria Theresa,
 nor Joseph II, nor Kaunitz, was at the time inclined to array
 their country either with Russia, whose further aggrandize-
 ment was dreaded, or with Turkey, the traditional foe
 of Christendom.

The activity of Choiseul in exciting the Turks against
 Russia not only failed to obtain approbation at Vienna,
 but constituted a point of divergence between the French
 and Austrian policies that furnished to Austria a substantial
 reason for a *rapprochement* with Prussia.

Frederick II, as we have seen, had already, in 1766,
 sought to approach the Court of Vienna through a personal
 interview with Joseph II. The occasion now seemed op-
 portune to revive this project. Accordingly, by the advice

of Kaunitz, who succeeded in overcoming the scruples of Maria Theresa, the Austrian minister at Berlin, Nugent, had been, on October 14, 1768, instructed to declare that Austria had forever abandoned the idea of trying to recover Silesia, and to propose to the King of Prussia that the two monarchies work together to preserve the neutrality of Germany; and it was suggested that negotiations in this sense might be opened in a personal interview between the King and the Emperor.

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Frederick II gladly accepted this proposal. "We are Germans," he said. "What matters it to us, if the English and the French fight over Canada and the islands of America, . . . or that the Turks and the Russians take to their horses? . . . The Empress and I have a long time endured ruinous wars: what do we finally gain by it?"

Both monarchies, it was admitted, would be endangered by the further aggrandizement of Russia in Europe. "Your Majesty is more exposed than we," observed Nugent. "It is true," replied the King. "Let the Russians extend their domains as far as they please toward the Black Sea and its surroundings, . . . but on the side of Europe. . . ."

His sentence was not finished, and the conversation turned on the Emperor, who was known to be an admirer of the King of Prussia; but his meaning was understood. Both monarchs had an interest in arresting the westward expansion of Russia.¹

But in spite of the identity of interests on the part of the two German powers, the vexed question of Silesia still remained to disconcert their understanding. Re-luctant as he was to embark in a war against the Turks in order to retain the friendship of Catherine II, Frederick II, on December 15, assured her of his loyal intentions and his readiness to prolong their treaty engagements; but he never intended to send troops to aid her against Turkey, if he could arrange to secure equal advantages from Austria.

Kaunitz, on the other hand, was eager to separate Frederick II from his Russian ally. To this end, in December,

¹ See Arneth, *Geschichte Maria Theresias*, VIII, p. 562.

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he submitted to his sovereigns an elaborate memorial, in which he explained the ambition of Russia to absorb Poland and to re-establish the Greek Empire by the expulsion of the Turks from Europe, and dwelt upon the danger to Austria of such a powerful rival. By an alliance with Prussia, he suggested, this end might be averted, and Silesia might be recovered. Prussia could be given Courland and the greater part of Polish Prussia in exchange for Silesia. Thus, the recovery of the lost province might be effected at the expense of Poland, and the progress of Russia might be blocked.

To this scheme — which shows that in December, 1768, Kaunitz was not averse to the dismemberment of Poland — both Maria Theresa and Joseph II stoutly objected. Neither believed that Frederick II would ever consent to surrender Silesia, and the Empress at least had scruples against the spoliation of the Republic.

Vergennes, whose clear intelligence had already grasped the ultimate outcome of the crisis in the East, — though in ignorance of Kaunitz's readiness to appease the appetite of Prussia, — in a report to Louis XV on the Russo-Turkish war, asked the significant question, "Who knows if the dismemberment of Poland might not become the seal of reconciliation between the two contending parties?"

But, although it was at this time distinctly placed before them, the Austrian monarchs were not in favor of that solution. A friendly interview between the Emperor and the King of Prussia was, however, arranged, to occur at Neisse, in August of the following year.

The tactics of
Frederick II

In the meantime, Frederick II was carrying on his dilatory negotiations with Guines at Berlin; rendering him as jealous as possible of Russia, and at the same time exciting the misgivings of both Russia and Austria, through whose suspicions he expected to enhance the value of his alliance by giving the impression that his friendship was sought on every side. Choiseul, whose policies were severely criticised by the court favorites at Paris, left without reinforcement at Vienna, was becoming discouraged; and, at the moment when the Porte most needed to be sustained, Ver-

genness was ordered back to France. Thus, at last, the secret diplomacy of Louis XV, which had spasmodically, but not coherently, been made official, was doomed to complete failure; and the influence of France, violently opposed at St. Petersburg, disregarded at Vienna, enfeebled at Constantinople, and trifled with at Berlin, ended in impotence and abject humiliation.

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Frederick II, receiving no solid satisfaction from Vienna, was extremely anxious to end the war in the East by mediating between the Sultan and the Czarina; but in the meantime was obliged to cling to the Russian alliance. This, however, the Czarina refused to renew, except upon condition that Prussia make common cause with Russia in the war with Turkey.

Although embarrassed, Frederick II was by no means helpless. By a few dexterous turns he might even make himself the arbiter in the Eastern Question. By his alliance with Russia he might be able to force the hand of Austria; and, by holding himself open for negotiations with the Emperor, he would be able to restrain at the proper moment the too extravagant exactions of his powerful ally. The situation was difficult, but he was determined to be its master and not its victim. Dreading war as a possible cause of ruin to his monarchy, he had resolved to improve his fortunes by astute diplomacy.

Although Frederick II was strongly inclined toward a renewal of the Russian alliance, he was fully conscious of the great danger to which the Prussian monarchy was exposed by the aggrandizement of Russia. In March, 1769, he wrote to his brother Henry: "It is a terrible power, which in half a century will make all Europe tremble. Sprung from those Huns and Gepides who destroyed the Empire of the East, they may soon attack the Empire of the West, and cause the Austrians emotions of pain and penitence that, by a mistaken policy, they have called that barbarous nation into Germany, and have instructed it in the art of war. I see no other remedy than by forming in time a league of the greatest sovereigns to resist this dangerous torrent."

Frederick II's
plan of con-
ciliation

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Entertaining this opinion of his ally, it is easy to comprehend his readiness to negotiate with Austria. Happily for our comprehension of his motives in conducting these negotiations, the King of Prussia, without the least reserve regarding his intentions, has been so obliging as to explain them for the benefit of posterity in his own admirably clear and forcible language. "I have read," he says in his "Mémoires," "the beautiful allegory of Boiardo;¹ I seized then by the hair the occasion which presented itself; and, by force of negotiation and intrigue, I succeeded in indemnifying our monarchy for its past losses by incorporating Polish Prussia with my older provinces."

The process by which this design was realized has been so minutely detailed by Frederick II himself, and by others who have supplemented his narrative with information from other sources, that it would be a work of supererogation to repeat here all the particulars of that transaction.² It is sufficient to indicate the principal turning-points in the long and complicated negotiations by which the result was accomplished.

No ground has so far been discovered for disputing the claim of Frederick II to the parentage of the project for reconciling the interests of Prussia, Russia, and Austria by despoiling Poland. "The object of this partition," he informs us, "consisted in permitting Russia to continue tranquilly the war with the Turks, without fearing to be arrested in her enterprise by a diversion which the Empress-Queen was in a position to make," thus exempting Prussia from being drawn into a conflict between these two powers. With Poland as an ample field of compensation for all three monarchies, why, he suggested, should they any longer impoverish their subjects with destructive wars? Why not amicably bury their differences, and console themselves in a reasonable way at the expense of their powerless neighbor?

The practical difficulty which confronted the King of

¹ In the *Orlando Inamorato*.

² See the text of the *Mémoires*; and Duncker, *Aus der Zeit Friedrichs des Grossen*, Leipzig, 1876.

Prussia was how to present this proposal so as to render it effective. Catherine II might not receive with approbation a suggestion to divide with her neighbor what was practically already almost her own possession; and Maria Theresa might not be disposed to enter into the scheme at all, or to be satisfied with anything less than the restoration of Silesia.

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Frederick II's
proposal
to partition
Poland

In approaching Catherine II, Frederick II employed the ruse of attributing the idea of partition to the Count von Lynar, who had come to Berlin to attend his daughter's wedding. This personage, the King of Prussia, on February 2, 1769, informed Solms, his minister at St. Petersburg, had conceived "*une idée assez singulière*," namely, that the face of the affairs of Europe might be changed by one stroke, if Russia would offer to the Court of Vienna for its assistance against the Turks, say, the city of Lemberg and its environs and the Zips, — a district of Poland that had once belonged to Hungary, — at the same time assigning to Prussia the Polish province of West Prussia, with the bishopric of Ermeland, — an enclave of East Prussia, — and the right of protecting Dantzic; while Russia herself, as an indemnity for the expenses of the Turkish war, might take such a part of Poland as she would consider suitable. In that case, there being no longer any jealousy between Austria and Prussia, they could unite in aiding Russia against the Turks.

The plan, the King informed his minister, appeared to him "seducing," but perhaps more "brilliant than solid," and he might use his judgment about communicating it — of course not as Frederick II's own proposal, but as an outside suggestion — to the Czarina's minister of foreign affairs, Count Panin.

After some misgivings, Solms finally decided to present to the Russian minister this so-called "*Mémoire du Comte Lynar*," as "the ingenious theory of a speculative German."

To his gratification, as well as his surprise, as Solms informed his master on March 3, 1769, Panin — also in a purely speculative sense — freely discussed the question,

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and seemed ready to make concessions both to Prussia and Austria; not, however, for aid in merely driving the Turks beyond the Dniester, but for uniting to expel them from Europe, and thus assuring "the repose of Christendom, which they had so long disturbed"!

The obstructions to a triple alliance

Among the obstacles to a triple alliance between Austria, Prussia, and Russia, was the existing relation of Austria with France. So far as Prussia was concerned, the aim was simply to eliminate France from all consideration; and, in March, 1769, the recall of the French ambassador from Berlin was a first step in this direction.

It now remained to separate if possible Austria and France. The settlement of the Eastern Question would then be confined to an agreement between the three Eastern powers.

Two possible victims of such a combination were in view, — Poland and Turkey. The fundamental question was simply, what would the mutual jealousies of the powers permit? Russia, the youngest of the European monarchies, might enlarge her borders in both directions, and Austria could do the same; but Prussia could expand only by appropriating a part of Poland. Neither Prussia nor Austria could regard with complacency a wholesale appropriation of the Ottoman Empire by Russia; for Austria also had territorial aspirations in the East, and Prussia might at any time be in need of an ally able to hold in respect both Russia and Austria. From Frederick II's point of view, therefore, all the signs pointed toward Poland as the future victim of the new triple alliance.

The reception given by Count Panin to the suggestion of partition was not encouraging for the plans of Frederick II. Russia demanded, as conditions of continuing the existing alliance, that it be prolonged to eight years; that Prussia should join with Denmark in defending the liberal constitution of Sweden, which rendered that monarchy comparatively powerless; that Saxony should be attacked in case an effort were made to overthrow King Stanislas; that Prussia should join with Russia in defending the dissidents

in Poland and at the same time furnish aid against Turkey. In return, Russia would guarantee the Brandenburg succession in Ansbach and Bayreuth, under the laws of the Empire.

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It was a heavy price for Prussia to pay. Frederick II resolved not to pay it; and leisurely continuing the negotiations with Russia turned toward Austria.

In this direction the outlook for the formation of a triple alliance was less brilliant still, but it furnished the condition that made Frederick II appear for the moment master of the situation. In order to prevent possible invasion by Russia on the one hand or Turkey on the other, Austria had massed troops upon her frontiers, had even advanced them beyond the legal limits upon both Polish and Turkish soil, and had drawn a line beyond which, it was announced, the belligerents must not pass. Included in the territory thus occupied by Austria, was precisely that mountainous region known as the Zips, mentioned in the so-called "Mémoire du Comte Lynar." There were, indeed, ancient rights to justify this occupation; but the act was, nevertheless, though in form a purely "pacific penetration," apparently based upon the principle of aggression.

Disquieted by the attitude of Austria, in May, 1769, the Russian ambassador at Vienna demanded if the treaty between Austria and Russia of June 16, 1753,— in which the two powers had united against the Turks,— was regarded as still in force.¹ The answer was that the Empress considered the treaty annulled by the Russo-Prussian alliance of 1762; that Austria had a treaty of perpetual peace with Turkey; and that she would observe it as long as the Turks remained faithful to it.

The effort for
an Austro-
Prussian
entente

Although Austria professed that no aggression was intended, the occupation of the Zips at the same time that Prussia was proposing a partition of Poland in which this very district was mentioned was subject to the interpretation that a *rapprochement* between Austria and Prussia

¹ For the treaty, see Martens, *Traité de la Russie avec l'Autriche*, I, p. 185.

CHAP. VIII was contemplated; particularly as the Austrian Court had
 A. D. declared that "future action would depend upon that of
 1763-1775 Prussia."

Preoccupied with the war with the Sultan, the Czarina, though suspicious, at the time offered no objection to Austria's attitude; for the Turkish army in the summer of 1769 was already defeated and driven to the Danube, leaving Moldavia and Wallachia open to the Russian advance.

On August 25, the appointed meeting of Frederick II and Joseph II, who came as Count von Falkenstein, took place at Neisse, in Silesia. The two sovereigns met in the most intimate fashion, spending three days together, dining at the same table. Frederick II was voluble and seductive. Joseph II, armed beforehand with precautions furnished by Kaunitz, was on his guard, but irresistibly fascinated by the personal charm of his brilliant host, whose conversation enchanted the young emperor. Kaunitz was declared by the King to be "*la première tête de l'Europe.*" Everything Austrian was praised, everything French decried. When he was young, the philosopher of Sans Souci confessed, he was ambitious; but, having become old, he had become the apostle of abstinence and virtue. The predominating note was the peace, tranquillity, and future prosperity of Germany; which, it was agreed, both sovereigns ought to promote by their friendship and neutrality.

With regard to Russia, opinions were freely exchanged. "So long as you do not have us, that alliance with Russia is necessary to you," said the Emperor; "but it costs dearly and is often inconvenient for you." "That is very true," replied the King.

When the Emperor had dwelt upon the danger arising from the aggrandizement of Russia, which, he represented, Prussia and Sweden ought to resist, the King replied: "In time neither you nor I, but all Europe, will be required to restrain those people. The Turks are nothing compared with them! . . . In twenty years an alliance will be necessary against Russian despotism."

Toward the close of the interview an exchange of notes

between the two sovereigns was begun, but it did not go beyond effusive compliments and vague assurances. The really strategic points — the future of Poland, the continuation or transformation of the existing alliances, the question of mediation in the Russo-Turkish war — were passed over almost in silence. The indifference of Austria to the desires of France and the suspicions of Prussia regarding the designs of Russia were clearly disclosed, and the assurance that neither of the two German powers wished for war prepared the way for a better understanding.¹ Apart from this meagre outcome the conference bore no fruits. The impressions formed of each other by the two sovereigns are, however, worth recording. "He is devoured with ambition," Frederick II wrote soon afterward of the Emperor. "It is certain that the old mistrust is still in his soul, and even more in his character," Joseph II wrote of the King.

The most important result of the royal meeting at Neisse was the effect of this mysterious interview upon St. Petersburg. In the light of the apparent *rapprochement* between Prussia and Austria, the Czarina believed she might have cause to fear for the permanence of her recent conquests in the East, possibly for the continuation of her influence in Poland, and certainly for the constancy of her ally. As a consequence, the Russian conditions for the prolongation of the alliance with Prussia were considerably reduced; and Frederick II, on October 12, 1769, renewed the treaty with Catherine II without being drawn into the Russo-Turkish war.

In truth, he was now disquieted by a different form of anxiety. By the middle of November the Russians had occupied Bucharest, and all Europe was watching with interest the triumphant advance of the Czarina's armies.

¹ Although no formal treaty was concluded, by an exchange of notes it was declared, "Foi de roi et parole d'honnête homme, si jamais le feu de la guerre se rallume entre l'Angleterre et la maison de Bourbon, ils maintiendront la paix. . . ." It was equally promised that if any other war occurred, they would observe exact neutrality regarding their possessions. It was the complete renunciation of Silesia by Austria.

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The results of
the conference
at Neisse

23 Oct 1769 N.S.
cf. Martens, 11, 48 ff.
Sessé, 76.

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More than ever, therefore, there was need of an *entente* between Prussia and Austria. It appeared to be the only means of restraining the ambition of Catherine II, now emboldened by her sweeping victories in the East.

In this situation Frederick II urged Austria to offer her mediation between the Turks and Russia. Kaunitz at first hesitated to intervene, and the attitude of France made it difficult for him to do so; for it was at this moment, in December, 1769, that Mercy-Argenteau, the Austrian ambassador to France, returned to Vienna to arrange the details of the approaching marriage of the Archduchess Marie Antoinette with the Dauphin of France, bringing with him a memorial from Choiseul strongly urging the policy of continuing the Russo-Turkish war as long as possible. Disturbed by the interview at Neisse, which had awakened at Paris suspicions of Austria's secret defection from France, Choiseul wished to strengthen the bonds with Austria, to keep Russia occupied in the East, and to leave Frederick II in danger of being ultimately drawn into the Russo-Turkish conflict. Thus, it was hoped, the subjection of Poland might at least be postponed. But, in February, 1770, Kaunitz offered to the Turks the mediation of Austria, if they desired it, and informed Choiseul that Austria's policy was to end the war as soon as possible. It was a clear signal that Austria was drifting toward an understanding with Frederick II.

The divergence
of the powers

A deep line of cleavage had now appeared in the policies of France and Austria; and, indeed, a sharp division of Europe into two groups of powers, those of the East and those of the West, which were assuming the character of two distinct systems.

The influence of France in the East had been sacrificed by the inconsequence of her policy; that of England by her voluntary inactivity.

After her splendid victories of the Seven Years' War, England's foreign policy was comparatively neglected; displaced from public interest by internal controversies, parliamentary conflicts, and ministerial disputes over the

regulation of the vast empire which Great Britain had won by that war.

The only foreign powers from which England had anything to fear were France and Spain; but Louis XV was opposed to a renewal of the war, Choiseul had not yet completed the rehabilitation of the French navy, and Spain alone was not able to dispute British supremacy on the sea. Still, occasions for friction were not wanting. In 1769 the annexation by France of Corsica, bought from Genoa during a period of insurrection which the Genoese were unable to suppress, greatly stirred the war spirit in England, as being a menace to the British position in the Mediterranean; and a quarrel with France and Spain over the Falkland islands nearly involved the three powers in war.¹

The real danger for England — although its magnitude was not then apparent — was the growing revolt in America. Blood had already been shed in Boston, and the colonists had opened a constitutional debate which the political condition of England at that time rendered it difficult to terminate. The King's attempt to restore royal absolutism by the control of Parliament was undermining the British Constitution at the moment when the growth of the empire depended upon a liberal conception of imperial administration. With Chatham in power, the course of events might have been different; but a servile ministry gave free scope to the royal predominance, with the result that Ireland and America were on the point of open insurrection.

In the East, the interests of Great Britain were commercial rather than political; and the fate of Poland, even the fate of Turkey, was at that time indifferent to English statesmen. The time had not arrived when Great Britain felt that the Russian advance was a menace either to her Mediterranean interests or to her Indian empire.

The open enemy of France, Russia, which furnished a rich supply of raw materials and a profitable market for

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¹ For the declarations of Great Britain and Spain on this subject, see Wenck, III, p. 815.

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the manufactures and colonial products of Great Britain, seemed at the time to be England's natural friend. Even the conquest of the Black Sea ports and the possible extension of Russian commerce to the Mediterranean offered at that time no apparent disadvantage to British trade; which, by means of a better merchant marine, it was believed, would profit in the South, as it was already profiting in the North, by Russia's approaches to the sea.

While, therefore, England and France — which was still by the *Pacte de famille* closely allied with Spain — regarded each other with jealous eyes, and were looking forward to a time when war between them might be resumed, Austria, Prussia, and Russia formed a group by themselves, practically detached from Western Europe, — although the nominal alliance of Austria with France and Spain was still in force, — and thus were able to settle the Eastern Question in their own way and to their own advantage.

The fortunes of
war in the East

The Turks, although they were dispossessed of Moldavia and Wallachia, had no thought of accepting the mediation which Austria offered them. Pursuing her purpose of driving the Turks from Europe, and re-establishing the Byzantine Empire, the Czarina had sent her favorites, the two Orloff brothers, to arouse the Greeks and aid them to throw off the Turkish yoke. Two Russian fleets, one commanded by Spiritoff and the other by Elphinston, an English admiral, were sent to the Mediterranean to support the insurrection;¹ but the Greeks did not respond as had been expected, the insurrection ended ingloriously, and the expedition completely failed.

Thus, partially favored by the fortunes of war, the Sultan was seeking allies rather than mediation; which Frederick II, through Zegelin, was urging upon the Sublime Porte. Although he had begun the war in defence of the liberties of Poland, in March, 1770, Mustafa III was, nevertheless, ready to make an alliance with Austria at the ex-

¹ This was the first time a Russian fleet had ever appeared in the Mediterranean.

pense of the Republic. In April, Kaunitz declined the proposal, and urged the Sultan to seek friendly intervention.

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Frederick II — who in May had inferred from a conversation with the Austrian ambassador at Berlin, that the Court of Vienna, if satisfied with sufficient compensations, would not consider his own pretensions regarding Poland as excessive — continued to press the idea of ending the war, and offered to open negotiations with St. Petersburg in behalf of the Sultan. To render mediation acceptable to Catherine II, however, it was necessary to impress her with the idea that Austria was planning hostilities; and to give verisimilitude to this impression, it was expedient to exaggerate as much as possible the offensive preparations at Vienna.

In the meantime, the campaign resulted in brilliant victories for the Russian fleet, which, on July 5, 1770, destroyed the Turkish fleet; and the Russian army, which was in possession of the Danube provinces, was everywhere triumphant. As a consequence, on August 12, 1770, the Turks, urged on by Zegelin, asked officially for Austrian mediation.

When, therefore, on September 3, Frederick II and Joseph II had their second interview, this time at Neustadt, in Moravia, the situation was more favorable for an *entente*.

The meeting
at Neustadt
and its result

In the meantime, Austria, having unearthed historic claims to the Zips, had advanced her lines of occupation into territory unquestionably belonging to Poland; and this encroachment strengthened the hands of Frederick II in pressing the Czarina to accept mediation as an alternative to war with Austria.

At Neustadt the part played by Joseph II in person was rendered subordinate by the presence of Kaunitz, who took entire charge of the serious conversations. If Russia should pass the Danube, urged Frederick II, Austria could not reasonably refrain from war. Kaunitz, formal and argumentative, was forced to yield to the superior mental agility of the King, and was so far influenced by him as to permit

CHAP. VIII Frederick II to press mediation at St. Petersburg upon
 A. D. this ground.¹
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The fall of
 Choiseul

In a visit to the Russian Court, Prince Henry, furnished with this weapon, in October and November labored for the acceptance of mediation; but the victorious Czarina preferred to make peace directly with the Turks, hoping thereby to retain all her conquests. Panin offered the suggestion of a triple alliance between Russia, Austria, and Prussia; but, as this proposal contemplated no compensations, it met with no favor at Berlin.

In the conversations at Neustadt, Kaunitz had spoken of the co-operation of France in forcing upon Russia the acceptance of mediation; for Choiseul still remained a faithful adherent of the Austrian alliance, and the marriage of the Dauphin with Marie Antoinette, in April, 1770, was an additional bond between the two courts. But Choiseul, who had enjoyed the protection of Madame de Pompadour, had a bitter enemy in her successor, Madame du Barry, and the moment had arrived to accomplish his overthrow.

More than any other Frenchman of his time, Choiseul had, in spite of his errors, rendered distinguished services to France. Upon the death of Stanislas Leszczynski, in 1766, he had accomplished without friction the incorporation of Lorraine. He had desired a more effectual rôle for France in the Orient. He had rebuilt the French navy and made extensive preparations for recovering from England the lost colonies. His popularity was great, and his ability unquestioned. But the King, who feared a renewal of war with England, did not desire a vigorous minister, liable to derange the quiet and the pleasures of the court; and, on December 21, 1770, Choiseul was dismissed and retired to Chanteloup.

The fall of the "Roi-Choiseul" was the complete abdication of France as an efficient force in the international

¹ Kaunitz had prepared a long "Catechism," containing ten points elaborately presented; but Frederick II disarmed him by praising it and begging for a copy for future direction, without really discussing it.

affairs of Europe. England was left free to follow her own policies in America. Poland was entirely abandoned to her fate. The Ottoman Empire was left without support. The Duke d'Aiguillon, who assumed charge of the foreign affairs of France, had no large conception of policy. The secret diplomacy of the King fell by neglect to a still lower level of inconsistency; and, undirected and unrestrained by any master hand, ambassadors and ministers sought their own pleasures while acting at cross purposes.¹ Until it was redeemed by Vergennes, French diplomacy was in a condition of anarchy.

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In one direction only was the influence of France worth mentioning. The condition of Sweden had for a long time been almost as confused as that of Poland. Under the existing constitution the royal authority had been greatly reduced; and Prussia, which coveted Swedish Pomerania, and Russia, which intended the annexation of Finland, had agreed to maintain this condition, with the intention of profiting by the helplessness of the kingdom.

The accession
of Gustavus
III in Sweden

The death of Adolphus Frederick, in 1771, brought to the throne his brilliant son, Gustavus III, at that time residing in Paris. The young king, whose popularity was universal, had no difficulty in obtaining from France subsidies for the re-establishment of the royal authority in Sweden, and Vergennes was sent to strengthen the Franco-Swedish alliance and aid the King in his undertaking. With this support Gustavus III was able by a *coup d'état* to recover his royal prerogatives and to save his country from dismemberment.²

Although France was thus able to frustrate the designs of Prussia and Russia in Sweden, and through the skilful diplomacy of Vergennes temporarily even to reconcile Sweden and Denmark, in the East the field was completely

The abandon-
ment of the
East to the
three powers

¹ The French Embassy at Vienna was left vacant from May, 1770, to January, 1772, when it was filled by a mere *roué*, Prince Louis de Rohan.

² For details, see Marsangy, *Le comte de Vergennes, son ambassade en Suède*, Paris, 1898.

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abandoned to the three powers, Austria, Prussia, and Russia.

On January 5, 1771, Frederick II took a decisive step by writing to the Czarina that, if she wished to avoid war with Austria, she would content herself with the annexation of Azoff and Kabardia, with the right of navigation on the Black Sea, and renounce Moldavia and Wallachia.

Would Austria actually join with the Turks in resisting the Russians? That was now the momentous question both at Berlin and St. Petersburg.

At Vienna, the main question was, on the other hand, would Prussia join with Austria in forcing mediation upon Russia, or was Frederick II pushing Austria on to resistance without intending to support her action with armed force?

Kaunitz was ready to purchase Prussia's offensive alliance by permitting the annexation of Courland, on condition that Austria should retain the Zips; but Maria Theresa would not listen to it. She would have neither war nor partition. Kaunitz, on the contrary, wished to avoid war by means of partition. Russia would certainly yield, he thought, when confronted by two powers united against her; and, as for the partition, it would be but a slight affair. Courland was at best only a fief of Poland, and the Zips had once belonged to Hungary. If Poland could be induced to assent, Russia could not well oppose.

The fall of Choiseul removed a serious obstacle to the closer *rapprochement* of Austria and Prussia, and incidentally also to an *entente* with Russia; for the French alliance had rendered both those powers suspicious of Austria, while at the same time it had made it necessary for her to hold aloof from them. But now that the influence of France had been practically eliminated, a triple alliance of the Eastern powers with compensations was daily becoming more acceptable.

The principle
of partition
accepted

Frederick II.'s secret purpose of basing peace on an alliance of the three rival powers, at the expense of Poland, was now in a fair way to be consummated; for Austria was disposed to force the Czarina's hand, and an impression was

beginning to be made at St. Petersburg. In a conversation with Prince Henry, who still remained at the Russian Court, on January 8, 1771, the Czarina casually let drop the question, which the so-called "Mémoire du Comte Lynar" had ingeniously suggested, "*Why should not everyone take something?*"

A few days later Frederick II received from his brother a report of this conversation. "This proposal is *à propos*," he wrote in his "Mémoires"; "for, after having examined everything, it was the only means which remained of avoiding new troubles and of contenting everyone."

The principle of mutual compensations being thus virtually accepted, it only remained to work out the details. Since all were disposed to aggrandize themselves at the expense of others, there was no longer any obstruction to actual partition, except agreement regarding the lines on which the spoils should be divided. By conceding largely to others Prussia would gain the more, for the balance of the powers would have to be retained. But if Russia were to take large gains from Turkey and Poland were left for the future, only slight accessions of territory from the Republic could be expected. Nothing short of a serious crisis could justify a wholesale depredation. The occupation of the Zips was a precedent of dismemberment, but it was comparatively insignificant.

On January 24, Frederick II wrote to his brother at St. Petersburg: "The Austrians will never consent to the abasement of the Porte. What you have held out to view, Ermeland,"—the compensation suggested at St. Petersburg for Prussia,— "is not worth the expense of six sous" . . . "I shall await more favorable events for making some acquisition."

The alliance of Austria with the Turks, while Prussia remained uncommitted, would furnish that occasion, for Frederick II would then become the virtual arbiter of the Eastern Question. Of this possibility Joseph II was well aware; and, to prevent it, he desired to draw Frederick II into an alliance against Russia. By proposing to the Sultan the alliance of Austria, on condition that Prussia join

The Austrian
counterplot

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with them in opposing Russia, the Emperor thought, he could either force Frederick II to abandon Russia or ruin his credit in the East by his failure to support the Turks, whom he had always caressed as the natural enemies of Austria.

In the midst of all this chicanery, in which the lives and destinies of great populations were mere pawns in the sport of sovereigns, one noble figure rises above their conspiracies in a spirit of rebuke. Maria Theresa, writing to the Emperor, placed on record her unswerving devotion to principles of rectitude. Believing Russia unjustly attacked, she would not side with the Sultan; nor, on the other hand, was she willing to destroy the Turks. "Honesty and candor," she wrote, formed her accepted maxim. "My decision will be considered feeble and timid, I confess; but I do not possess the force to decide upon a war which I believe to be unjust, and thus against my conscience."¹

Although opposed to Austria's participation in the Russo-Turkish war, Maria Theresa's confidence in Kaunitz rendered her conscientious scruples ineffectual; and both the Sultan and Frederick were officially informed that Austria was prepared to enter into an alliance with Turkey against Russia, on condition that Prussia would do the same.

The urgency
of Frederick II
for the parti-
tion of Poland

But Frederick II was too astute to be drawn into the Austrian net. While maintaining that his treaties with the Czarina only required him to sustain her in Poland, he evaded the proposal of Austria to enter into the Turkish quarrel, on the ground that the Court of St. Petersburg was already weakening, and that peace might soon be concluded.

Perceiving clearly that his advantage lay in complete neutrality, while exaggerating the dangers resulting from a continuation of the war, Frederick II firmly resolved to maintain his ground. In February Prince Henry returned to Potsdam with full information regarding the position of the Czarina. The project of partition was no longer a chimera.

¹ See for the entire text, Arneth, *Maria Theresa und Joseph II: ihre Correspondenz*, I, p. 326.

From this moment the policy of Frederick II assumed an aggressive form. Austria, he declared, had already begun the dismemberment of Poland by the occupation of the Zips, and was prepared to sustain her action by war. Since it was now impossible to preserve the territorial integrity of the Republic, he argued, it was necessary to maintain the balance of the powers. No other method was open than to imitate the action of Austria; and, in the language of the Czarina, for "everyone to take something." Russia could abandon the left bank of the Danube, and make good the loss in Poland, at the same time offering the Republic in return portions of Moldavia and Wallachia.¹

In March, 1771, exhaustive researches in the archives of Prussia were undertaken with the intention of finding something to match the historic claim of Hungary to the Zips. The results were meagre, but "pretensions relating to Poland," based on ancient rights, were soon talked of and made subjects of negotiation.

Panin, who regarded Poland as already a vassal state of Russia, and understood how flimsy were the alleged "ancient rights" of Prussia, was opposed to partition; but Catherine II, who was not averse to a definite augmentation of her realm with the free consent of all who were able to oppose it, was favorably disposed toward the idea of a pacific arrangement.

The hour was approaching when action was to give place to speculation. In April, 1771, it was believed in the diplomatic circle at Berlin that it was already near. On the second of that month, the minister of Sweden said to his colleague of France, who reported it to Paris, "The King of Prussia has arranged everything, and peace will be signed in less than four months. Poland will be the sole victim."

The prediction would, no doubt, have proved correct, had it not been for the attitude of the Court of Vienna, where the purposes of Frederick II were well known and a new policy had been adopted. Since Prussia would not join

¹ See the confidential despatch of Frederick II to Count Solms, of March 2, 1771, in Angeberg, *Recueil*, p. 85.

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with Austria in opposing Russia, Austria would join with Turkey in placing a limit to Russia's ambitions; and, when the proper moment had arrived, Austria and Russia would make their peace with each other at the expense of the Ottoman Empire, leaving Prussia out in the cold!

With the aid of France, such a plan might have been successful; but France was no longer at Austria's command. "It is a piece of good fortune," remarked Frederick II to his minister, Finckenstein, "that France is in the state of exhaustion in which she is at present; the Austrians, deprived of French aid, will be more tractable and mild."

It was, however, by no means certain that Austria and Russia might not come to a private understanding which would induce the Czarina to desert her ally, and reserve for herself the whole of Poland. This was, in fact, the policy of Panin. Mistrusting the good faith of Frederick II, he opened direct negotiations with Vienna; intimating to the Austrian ambassador at St. Petersburg, Lobkowitz, that, in order to retain the friendship of Austria, the Czarina might be willing to sacrifice that of Prussia; at the same time declaring that Frederick II was the sole author of the scheme to dismember Poland, and that Austria might eventually obtain Moldavia and Wallachia without the trouble of fighting for them. When this was reported to Vienna, the Emperor wrote to his brother Leopold, "It is clear that the King of Prussia lied to us in proposing the dismemberment of Poland as coming from St. Petersburg."¹

In reply to Panin's proposals, Lobkowitz informed him that Austria could not reconcile with her interests the separation of Moldavia and Wallachia from the Ottoman Empire; and, in order to force Prussia and Russia apart, and exclude Frederick II from any territorial aggrandizement, on May 7, Kaunitz instructed the Austrian ambassador at Berlin, Swieten, to repudiate any scheme of partition, declaring that Maria Theresa was ready to renounce her occupation of the Polish provinces, if everyone would do the same.

¹ For the entire text, see Arneth, as before, I, p. 342.

At Vienna it was believed that Frederick II had been unmasked, and that all that was needed to destroy the Russo-Prussian alliance, or at least to disappoint Prussia's plans for aggrandizement, was a demonstration on the part of Austria which would prove to Russia the value of Austrian friendship and the worthlessness of Prussia's support. With this intent, on July 6, 1771, a secret treaty was signed with Mustafa III, in which Austria united with Turkey "to deliver from the hands of Russia, by means of negotiation or by means of arms," the possessions of the Sublime Porte then occupied by the Russian armies.¹

Thus, Kaunitz believed, he would at the proper moment be able to reveal to Catherine II the power of Austria to nullify all her victories over the Turks, and at the same time demonstrate to her the insincerity of Frederick II; who, it was thought, would offer to his ally no substantial aid.

If the Austro-Turkish alliance had itself been a work of sincerity, the course of events might have been affected by it; but, in truth, it was simply a device on the part of Joseph II and Kaunitz to force the hand of Russia, and to secure for Austria a larger share in the spoils of Poland. For the assistance rendered the Sultan was to pay in subsidies eleven million two hundred and fifty thousand florins; Austria was to be accorded the most favored nation treatment; frontier questions were to be settled to the satisfaction of Vienna; and, finally, the part of the territory of Wallachia included between Transylvania, Temesvar, the Danube, and the Aluta, was to be ceded to Austria. Assent to these provisions was obtained from the Empress Maria Theresa, on the ground that they would enable Austria to defeat any scheme of partition which Frederick II might propose. Resort to arms was not contemplated, unless the Russians insisted on retaining their conquests.

Although the terms of the treaty between Austria and

¹ For the treaty, see Angeberg, *Recueil*, p. 92; and Wenck, III, p. 820.

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Frederick II's
check to the
plans of
Kaunitz

Turkey were secret, the fact of an understanding was soon made public by the military preparations; but the effect was different from what Kaunitz had anticipated, Prussia and Russia were driven closer together. The hostile intentions of Vienna were the very arguments advanced by Frederick II to urge the Czarina on to a settlement with Turkey in which "everyone would take something"; and the menaces of Austria only made the alliance with Prussia seem the more necessary at St. Petersburg.

Invited by the Czarina to endeavor to induce the Court of Vienna to accept the idea of partition which the two allies were now freely discussing, Frederick II, in a long audience, on August 13, said to Swieten: "I am sorry that my project has not met with the approbation of Their Imperial Majesties. It was the basis of an understanding which came to me, and which I proposed because I wished to find a means to terminate an affair which could go too far. I shall still seek for twenty other ideas, if I can, and propose them to you; perhaps you can find one which you can make your own. Look here, I am old, my brain is used up; so only hollow ideas come to me, but you should examine and judge them. Moreover, in politics I am only a novice in comparison with Prince Kaunitz."

But all this ingenious badinage and subtle flattery, by which the King of Prussia was wont to disarm his antagonists in negotiation, seemed at the time to be unavailing. Without desiring war, he was compelled to prepare for it; thereby meeting, though with reluctance, the attempt of Kaunitz to prove to Catherine II the insincerity of her ally with new evidence of his loyalty.

On September 5, in a private conversation with the Prussian minister at Vienna, Rohd, Maria Theresa allowed her personal views to afford a glimpse beneath the mask of Kaunitz's diplomacy. Her wish was, she said, only to find a means of avoiding recourse to arms, and she was ready to accept any reasonable expedient. The Turks were unreasonable, and only the King of Prussia could bring them to reason. She was willing to let the Russians make them-

selves the masters in the Crimea, but not of Moldavia and Wallachia.

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This frankness on the part of the Empress revealed to Frederick II the fact that the menace of war with Russia was mainly an expedient of Kaunitz to increase the share of Austria in the spoils of Poland. He could, therefore, safely show himself belligerent. He would thereby obtain the best possible terms from Russia; and Austria, when the right time came, would accept the situation.

Treating the idea of Russia's surrender of the two provinces, Moldavia and Wallachia, as an Austrian *ultimatum*, he proceeded on October 1 to send to the Czarina a definite plan for the partition of Poland, urging her to abandon the two Turkish provinces, and promising on this condition to furnish military aid against Austria.

The observation of Maria Theresa that the decisions of the Turks depended largely on the action of the King of Prussia had not escaped Frederick II's attention. Accordingly, Zegelin was instructed to indicate plainly to the Sublime Porte how little dependence was to be placed upon Austria, and to urge direct negotiation with Russia.

The triumph of
the policy of
partition

While the Russian armies had been occupied in the war with Turkey, Russian authority in Poland had been weakened, and Frederick II was besought by the Czarina to send Prussian soldiers there. On October 30 he replied, that he was ready to occupy the Palatinate of Posen, but only on condition that Russia would sign the treaty of partition. "I shall not cause a cat to march," he wrote to Solms, "before the treaty is signed"; and again, on November 6, "*Pas de partage, pas de Prussiens!*"

Victorious but exhausted, the Russians were obliged to yield. On December 25 Frederick addressed to the Czarina a memorial on the most favorable moment for dismembering Poland between Prussia and Russia, "without concert with Austria." "It is best," runs this interesting document, "that possession be taken before any negotiation with the Turks is begun, because it will make them swallow the pill gently, if they are informed that it is an equivalent for

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which Wallachia and Moldavia are restored to them; and further by causing them to see that the Austrians, on their side, have given us the example by acting the same. As for the Poles, we must expect them to cry aloud, . . . for that nation, vain and intriguing, cries out about everything; but the army on the Vistula will cause these clamors to cease; and, after the conclusion of peace with the Turks, it will pacify Poland." ¹

Although Frederick II was quite ready to exclude Austria altogether from the partition, Catherine II wished to make Austria's participation in it the condition of peace with the Sultan. On January 27, 1772, the Russian ambassador at Vienna, Galitzin, presented to Kaunitz the Czarina's conditions. Contrary to his habit, the ambassador reports, Kaunitz was "all ears," and the conversation ended with his admission that the demands of Russia regarding Turkey were entirely just! On the next day he gave to the ambassador his formal consent in writing to the Russian proposals. Austria, he declared, would prefer that there be no partition of Poland; but, if there was to be one, she could not remain indifferent to the destruction of equilibrium by the aggrandizement of her neighbors, and, was, therefore, ready to enter into negotiations regarding the division. A declaration signed at Vienna on February 19, at Berlin on February 28, and at St. Petersburg on March 5, 1772, on the basis of equality in the division of the spoils, formally adopted the policy of the partition of Poland, and laid the foundation of the Triple Alliance of Austria, Prussia, and Russia.

The scruples of
Maria Theresa

There is little of permanent interest in the efforts of the three participants in this process of dismemberment to overreach one another; and it is, therefore, needless to relate them here.² In the division Frederick II showed himself as astute in claiming for Prussia the provinces he most coveted as he had been in enforcing the principle of partition. In all these negotiations his was the master

¹ For the full text, see Angeberg, *Recueil*, p. 95.

² A detailed account may be found in Sorel, *La question d'Orient au XVIII^e siècle*.

hand, and no pains were taken to conceal the motives by which he was actuated.

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At Vienna the conscience of the Empress, though ineffectual in its influence upon the course of events, at least entered its protest upon the record. For this there was a moral necessity, since the part played by Austria was the most perfidious of all. In the treaty with Turkey "to restore to the Porte by means of negotiations or by means of arms" the territories invaded by Russia, Austria had solemnly promised that peace would finally be concluded "without the independence and liberties of Poland suffering the least attaint"; and two million florins had been already received from Turkey in accordance with its terms. It is not without reason, therefore, that Maria Theresa, finding herself the victim of circumstances which she could not control, lamented the necessity by which she was bound. "The too menacing tone with the Russians, our mysterious conduct with our allies as well as with our adversaries," she wrote, "all this has resulted from seeking to profit by the war between the Porte and Russia in order to extend our frontiers and to win advantages of which we did not dream before the war. We wished to act *à la prussienne*, and at the same time to maintain the appearance of honesty. . . . Although events should enable us to gain the district of Wallachia, and even Belgrade, I should always regard them as too dearly bought at the cost of honor, of the glory of the monarchy, of our good faith, and our religion. . . . We have by our moderation and fidelity to our engagements acquired the confidence, I may even venture to say the admiration of Europe, and the respect and veneration of our enemies. One year has lost it all. I confess, it is difficult to endure it, and that nothing in the world has cost me more than the loss of our good name. Unfortunately, I must admit that we have deserved it." ¹

The century and a quarter that separated the Partition of Poland from the Peace of Westphalia marked a constant decline in the regard for the principles of interna-

The relation
of the Partition
to Public Law

¹ See for the entire text, Arneth, as before, I, pp. 362, 363.

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tional justice, and the faith of nations. In the treaties of Münster and Osnabrück, the doctrine of territorial sovereignty was formally consecrated as the foundation of the public law of Europe. During this period it had suffered many infractions, but it had never before been openly defied and repudiated. Now force and conspiracy were unblushingly substituted for the idea of law in the relations of sovereign states. Without regard to race, language, religion, or any criterion of national existence, a nation that menaced no one was subjected to a process of vivisection in the interest of conspiring sovereigns and their ministers.

The Treaties of Westphalia endeavored to impose upon Europe the principle of equality between sovereign states, and by implication a principle of justice as their rule of action; but they had neglected to define and to limit the principle of sovereignty itself. By deriving the idea of law from the will of the sovereign, the Age of Absolutism had planted the seeds of international anarchy; and it had only brought forth its natural and inevitable fruit. The conscience of Maria Theresa revolted against it, but it was Frederick II and Catherine II who had logic on their side; for, if the will of the prince is law, the prince who possesses the most power — that is, the one who commands the most effective forces — becomes the legitimate lawgiver.

The Acts of
Partition

On July 25, 1772, in the name of the "Holy Trinity," the Treaties of Partition were formally concluded by Austria, Prussia, and Russia;¹ and, on September 18, 1773, many of the magnates of Poland, bought up with foreign gold, signed agreements with each of the three powers by which the Acts of Partition received their assent. In the meantime, King Stanislas II had appealed to Louis XV and George III to intervene in behalf of the Republic and save it from dismemberment. In a diplomatic note of protest addressed to the representatives of the other powers resident in Warsaw, the royal ministry declared that it plainly appeared from the terms of the treaties of partition themselves that "the only

¹ For the texts, signed on August 5, see Angeberg, *Recueil*, pp. 97, 103.

motive of the enterprise of the dismemberment of Poland was the force of these powers," and sounded a note of warning regarding the possible consequences to the other monarchs, if they passed over in silence this act of aggression; but no aid was proffered from any quarter. In his reply to the appeal of King Stanislas II, George III wrote to his "Good Brother": "Justice ought to be the invariable guide of sovereigns. . . . I fear, however, misfortunes have reached the point where redress can be had from the hand of the Almighty alone, and I see no other intervention that can afford a remedy." Louis XV, who was represented by Frederick II as "infinitely displeased," did not even reply to the King of Poland's appeal. The reason for this apparent indifference was correctly stated by the same shrewd observer to be, "the total exhaustion of finances, on account of which the Crown of France was not in a condition openly to oppose." In fact, although the plunder of a recognized monarchy by three royal confederates awakened throughout Europe a feeling of surprise and a sentiment of condemnation, no formal complaint was expressed by any government. It was not until Frederick II laid claims to the port of Dantzic, thus directly menacing English commerce in the Baltic, that any sign of interference was manifested; but even this opposition was withdrawn when, by the Edict of May, 1774, England was guaranteed all the commercial rights she had formerly possessed in Polish Prussia.

Thus, without a single act of armed resistance,¹ territory measuring more than twenty-five thousand square miles, containing a population of nearly five million inhabitants, was under protest severed from the Republic of Poland. To Prussia went the long-coveted Polish Prussia,—including Ermeland,—except Thorn and Dantzic, with the northern districts of Great Poland, with about six hundred thousand inhabitants; to Austria, the Zips and almost all of

Partitions of Poland
1772
(Pop. 4,000,000 in 1772)
to Prussia

¹ Frederick II boasted in his *Mémoires* that the partition of Poland was "the first example in history of a pacific partition between three powers."

of Frederick II
1772
644
1775
3,000,000
1772
1775
3,000,000

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Red Russia, with Lemberg, forming the kingdom of Galicia, and the southern portion of Little Poland, containing in all about two million six hundred thousand inhabitants; to Russia, a great part of the country drained by the Dūna and the Dnieper, and extending nearly to the Desna, with one million six hundred thousand souls.

But these were only the first-fruits of the conspiracy against Poland. The policy of partition once tacitly admitted, Poland was destined to become the involuntary peace-offering for the settlement of every controversy between the three allies, until the Republic was reduced to a mere geographical expression.¹

The end of the
crisis in the
North

A collateral influence in persuading Catherine II to share with her two neighbors in the spoils of Poland was the rehabilitation of Sweden under her energetic regenerator, Gustavus III. Even the urgent counsels of his uncle, Frederick II, had not deterred the young king from the determination to restore the influence of his kingdom and control its destiny. His *coup d'état* proved entirely successful, and Sweden once more became a power in the North. With the intention of keeping Russia fully occupied in the South, Gustavus III had urged the Turks to continue the war, at the same time entering into an alliance with France for the support of the Sultan. At last stirred to action, in 1773, France fitted out a fleet with the intention of aiding the Turks, which led England to send to the Mediterranean an opposing naval force. The Congress of Bucharest, which since November, 1772, had been endeavoring to end the Russo-Turkish war, dissolved without accomplishing any result; Russia insisting upon the "independence" of the Tartars and the possession of strongholds in the Crimea, which the Turks on religious grounds refused to concede.

¹ The Triple Alliance, Frederick II wrote to his brother Henry, "will unite the three religions, Greek, Catholic, and Calvinist; for we would take our communion from the same consecrated body, which is Poland; and if this is not for the good of our souls, it will surely be a great object for the good of our States." — Letter to Prince Henry of April 9, 1772.

In March, 1773, it seemed possible that the crisis in the North, joined with the crisis in the East, might lead to a general European war; but Catherine II, yielding to the persuasion of England and Prussia, decided to recognize the changed situation in Sweden, and the cession of Holstein to Denmark, in July, 1773, by the Grand Duke Paul, in exchange for Oldenburg, which was then assigned to the cadet line of the ducal house of Holstein-Gottorp, amicably removed the causes of disturbed relations in the North.

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Although the termination of the crisis in the North enabled Catherine II to concentrate her attention upon the war with the Turks, the ground lost nearly turned the scale in favor of the Ottoman Empire. The Russian fleet was no longer effective, and the army, weakened by the massing of troops on the Swedish frontier and in Poland, was driven back over the Danube; the Tartars, soon weary of their subordination to Russia, revolted from their so-called "liberator"; and the Cossack pretender, Pugatscheff, taking advantage of the popular belief that Peter III still lived, impersonated the murdered Czar, and menaced the Czarina with a revolution intended to drive her from the throne. It was the moment for the Sublime Porte to make an advantageous peace; but the new Sultan, Abdul-Hamid, who in January, 1774, succeeded Mustafa III, became the tool of the war party, and the occasion was lost. The temporary embarrassments of Catherine II were, however, of short duration; and, on July 21, 1774, the Turks were forced to sign a treaty of peace at Kutchuk-Kainardji.

The end of
the Russo-
Turkish war

This epoch-making treaty secured for Russia the "independence" of the Tartars, the strongholds of the Crimea, the possession of Azoff and Kobardia, amnesty and religious liberty for the inhabitants of Moldavia and Wallachia, the right of Russian subjects to visit Jerusalem and practise in the Holy City the rites of their religion, free navigation for Russian ships on Turkish waters and the use of Turkish harbors, and a substantial indemnity for the costs of the war.¹

¹ For the treaty, see Martens, *Recueil*, A, I, p. 507; A, IV, p. 607; B, II, p. 286.

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Effects of the
Peace of
Kutchuk-
Kainardji

The peace between Russia and Turkey gave to the Eastern Question an entirely new aspect. By according to Russia a perpetual right of intervention as the guardian of the religious interests of the Orthodox Greek Church, the Sublime Porte exposed the Ottoman Empire to unending embarrassments. "The nation is predestined to destruction," wrote Kaunitz, "and a small but efficient army could at any time expel the Turks from Europe."

This was, in fact, the general opinion at the time; but it left out of account the jealousies of the powers. No one of them was willing that the *coup de grâce* should be administered by any other; and a hundred and forty years of continued effort have not concluded what then seemed an easy task. The attempt to accomplish it has proved a long and cruel tragedy, the last act of which Europe is still awaiting.

The presence of a decadent empire destined to ultimate dismemberment was to exercise a baleful influence upon the future international development of the whole of Europe. Austria could not permit the re-establishment of the Greek Empire by Russia through the conquest of Constantinople, and Russia could not allow the German Empire to extend its sway over the Balkan peninsula. Nor could the other powers calmly contemplate the disturbance of European equilibrium by the division of Turkey between these rival aspirants for southward expansion, which implied the ultimate command of the Aegean islands and the virtual supremacy in the Mediterranean of either St. Petersburg or Vienna. Joseph II did not long hesitate to demand of Catherine II territorial indemnity to balance the Russian gains in Turkey, but the spirit of compromise that had yielded a portion of Poland was not extended to the far more coveted spoil that marked the road to empire on the sea. By a revival of ancient rights, however, Austria laid immediate claim to the district of Bukovina; and the Turks, not being able to dispute it, by a treaty of May 7, 1775, permitted it to be annexed to Austria as a part of Galicia, and Russia did not oppose.

While in the East passive populations were still subjected

to the arbitrary will of absolute sovereigns, in the West of Europe a radical political transformation was preparing.

In France the monarchy had brought the nation to depths of humiliation in violent contrast with the proud ascendancy it had enjoyed under Louis XIV. The American colonies had been lost, the French empire in India had not become a reality, the influence of France in the East had been transferred to Russia. Within, the kingdom, exhausted by long and unprofitable wars, was financially impoverished and badly administered. A corrupt court, a bankrupt treasury, an oppressed population, — these were the heritage which Absolutism had bequeathed to the most advanced nation of Europe.

On May 10, 1774, Louis XV, devoured by a loathsome disease, ended his career. During his last illness, Besenval wrote of him, "No one manifested the least interest in him, so completely had he lost the respect of the people."¹ During the passage of his body on the way to the grave, the cortège was saluted with cries of "*Voilà le plaisir des dames!*"

But the hostility to Louis XV was not owing merely to his personal vices. "With Louis XV," justly observes a French historian, "disappeared the prestige of royalty. It was never to return. The monarchy of '*droit divin*' was henceforth condemned." It was condemned precisely because of its pretensions, which were no longer supportable. Four years before his death Louis XV had destroyed the "Parliament" of Paris and exiled its members; declaring that he "held his crown from God alone," and that the prerogative of legislation belonged only to him, "*sans dépendance et sans partage.*" "That period of four years, in which a Du Barry was seen to reign by the side of a monarch degraded by debauch, in which rogues and miscreants alone remained upon the scene, in which there were only disorders, injustices, and violences; in which principles, morals, duties, all were forgotten,— that brief and shameful period brought to fruition that which the whole reign of

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The abasement
of the monarchy
in France

¹ Besenval. *Mémoires*, I, p. 292.

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Louis XV had been preparing."¹ To the last the King had clung to his royal supremacy. When he received the sacrament he bade the Cardinal Roche-Aymon to say for him that he asked pardon of the people for the scandal his life had caused, even though, he added, he owed "an account for his conduct to God alone."

The new conception of monarchy

Although the monarchy had fallen so low, new hope was inspired by the prospect of a new king. When the young Duke de Berry learned that by the death of his grandfather he had become King of France he fell upon his knees and lost consciousness, so overwhelming did the task appear to him. When he had regained his senses he embraced his young wife and cried out, "What a burden! but you will help me to bear it"; and again, overcome with stupor, rubbing his eyes as if to see clearly, "What a burden! at my age! . . . and they have taught me nothing!"

It was upon the heads of this young pair that the errors of a mistaken theory of the State were to be expiated. And yet, in 1774, there were no signs of such a revolution as fifteen years later was to shake the whole of Europe to its foundations and set in movement great armies for the rescue of tottering thrones.²

A change in the conception of the State had undoubtedly taken place, but it was not a change which then menaced the existence of royalty. At that time the most advanced form of public opinion did not demand more than the reform of the monarchy; but, in France at least, a reform had become imperative. The attack upon Absolutism had already begun. Did sovereignty reside in a single individual, or in the entire body of the nation? That was the question which men were asking and answering. It was denied that kings derive their authority from God alone; and yet, as the symbol of national unity, the king was still considered indispensable.

It was, in fact, the complete triumph of William III of

¹ See for a detailed account of this period, Rocquain, *L'esprit révolutionnaire avant la révolution*, pp. 281, 314.

² See Wahl, *Vorgeschichte der französischen Revolution*, I, p. 188.

Orange over the Grand Monarch that now confronted Louis XVI. All the most coherent thought of the time was inspired by the English Constitution and the Revolution of 1688. "By the expulsion of a king, who had violated his oath," ran one of the most popular pamphlets of the day, "the great and true principles of society were for the first time propounded. . . . All these principles of passive obedience, of divine right, of indestructible power, — that scaffolding of false notions upon which until that time royalty was sustained, — all that was overthrown."

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We are accustomed to think of the French Revolution as the beginning of that general disturbance by which the whole of Europe was swept into the maelstrom of war; but, in truth, the causes of that gigantic conflict were not confined to France. The revolt in America against the recrudescence of Absolutism, the awakened civic consciousness in the Austrian Netherlands and in the Dutch Republic, and the reaffirmation of long forgotten privileges in France, were all symptoms of a great and irresistible movement of thought, the recoil from political dogmas which were no longer acceptable to enlightened minds. After all that Europe had endured since sovereign will had been substituted for principles of universal obligation, it was a logical necessity that the Age of Absolutism should be followed by the Revolutionary Era.

Premunitions
of the Reve-
lutionary Era

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TABLE I

A LIST OF POPES, EMPERORS, AND OTTOMAN SULTANS FROM
1648 TO 1775

Year of Accession	Popes	Emperors	Ottoman Sultans
1648	237. Innocent X since 1644	Ferdinand III since 1637	Mohammed IV
1655	238. Alexander VII	Leopold I	Solyman II
1658			
1667	239. Clement IX		
1670	240. Clement X		
1676	241. Innocent XI		
1687			
1689	242. Alexander VIII		
1691	243. Innocent XII		
1695			
1700	244. Clement XI		
1703		Joseph I	Ahmed II
1705		Charles VI	Mustafa II
1711			Ahmed III
1721	245. Innocent XIII		
1724	246. Benedict XIII		
1730	247. Clement XII		Mahmud I
1740	248. Benedict XIV		
1742		Charles VII, of Bavaria	
1745		Francis I, of Lorraine	
1754			Osman III
1757			Mustafa III
1758	249. Clement XIII	Joseph II	
1765			
1769	250. Clement XIV		
1774			
1775	251. Pius VI		

TABLE II

RULERS OF FRANCE, ENGLAND, AND SCOTLAND FROM 1648 TO 1775

Year of Accession	France	England	Scotland	
1648	Louis XIV, from 1643 to 1651 under the regency of Anne of Austria	Charles I, since 1625; executed January 30, 1649	Charles I, since 1625	
1649 1651		The Commonwealth	Charles II The Commonwealth	
1653		Oliver Cromwell, as Lord Protector		
1658		Richard Cromwell, as Lord Protector		
1660		Charles II	Charles II	
1685		James II	James II	
1689		William III and Mary; William alone from 1694	William III and Mary; William alone from 1694	
1702		Anne	Anne	
1707			Formal Union of England and Scotland as Great Britain	
1714			Anne	
1715	Louis XV	George I		
1727		George II		
1760		George III		
1774	Louis XVI			

TABLE III

RULERS OF SPAIN, PORTUGAL, AND THE HOUSE OF SAVOY FROM
1648 TO 1775

Year of Accession	Spain	Portugal	Savoy
1648	Philip IV, since 1621	John IV, since 1640	Charles Emmanuel II, Duke of Savoy, since 1638
1656	Charles II	Alfonso VI	Victor Amadeus II, Duke of Savoy
1665		Peter II, as regent	
1667			
1675			
1683	House of Bourbon Philip V	Peter II, as king	
1700			
1706		John V	Victor Amadeus II becomes King of Sicily
1713			Victor Amadeus II becomes King of Sardinia
1720			
1724	Louis I, for seven months		
1724	Philip V, a second time		
1730			Charles Emmanuel III, King of Sardinia
1746	Ferdinand VI	Joseph	
1750			
1759	Charles III		
1773			Victor Amadeus III, King of Sardinia

TABLE IV

RULERS OF THE SCANDINAVIAN KINGDOMS, POLAND, AND RUSSIA
FROM 1648 TO 1775

Year of Accession	Sweden	Denmark	Poland	Russia
1648	Christina, Queen since 1632	Frederick III	John II, Casimir, till 1668	Alexis, of the House of Romanoff, since 1645
1654	Charles X			
1660	Charles XI		Michael Koributh Wieszowski	
1669				
1670		Christian V		
1674			John III, Sobieski	
1676				Feodor III
1682				Peter and Ivan, under the regency of Sophia
1689				Peter I, the Great
1697	Charles XII, till 1718		Frederick Augustus I (Augustus II of Saxony)	
1699		Frederick IV		
1704			Stanislas Leszczinski	
1709			Frederick Augustus I, a second time	
1719	Ulrica Eleanora, elected queen			
1720	Frederick I, elected king			
1725				Catherine I
1727				Peter II
1730		Christian VI		Anna

Year of Accession	Sweden	Denmark	Poland	Russia
1733			Frederick Augustus II (Augustus III of Saxony)	
1740				Ivan VI Elizabeth
1741				
1748		Frederick V		
1751	Adolphus Frederick			
1762				Peter III
1762				Catherine II
1764			Stanislas II, Poniatowski	
1766		Christian VII		
1771	Gustavus III			

TABLE V

THE RULERS OF THE UNITED PROVINCES OF THE NETHERLANDS AND
BRANDENBURG-PRUSSIA FROM 1648 TO 1775

Year of Accession	The Netherlands ¹	Brandenburg-Prussia
1648	William II, of Orange, Stadtholder, since 1647	Frederick William, Elector of Brandenburg since 1640, and Duke of Prussia since 1657, the "Great Elector"
1650	Suspension of the Stadtholderate	
1653	John De Witt chosen Grand Pensionary of Holland	
1672	William III, of Orange, chosen Stadtholder	
1688		Frederick III, Elector of Brandenburg and Duke of Prussia
1701		Frederick III recognized by the Emperor "King of Prussia" as Frederick I
1702	Second suspension of the Stadtholderate; Heinsius Grand Pensionary till 1720	
1713		Frederick William I, who is recognized by the Congress of Utrecht as "King of Prussia"
1740		Frederick II, King of Prussia, called "the Great"
1747	William IV, of Orange, chosen Stadtholder	
1751	William V, Stadtholder, till 1759 under the regency of Anne, daughter of George II of England	

¹ The previous stadtholders of the United Provinces were: (1) William I, of Orange, the "Silent," 1559-1584; (2) Maurice, 1584-1625; (3) Frederick-Henry, 1625-1647.

TABLE VI

SHOWING THE CLAIMS TO THE SPANISH SUCCESSION

Philip III—Margaret, sister of the Emperor Ferdinand II
1598-1621




TABLE VII

SHOWING THE CLAIMANTS TO THE AUSTRIAN SUCCESSION





TABLE VIII

SHOWING THE SUCCESSION OF PETER THE GREAT



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
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
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




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
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