AMERICA AFTER THE WAR

By An
AMERICAN
JURIST

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The general interest aroused by the communications of An American Jurist while the series was in the course of publication in the New York *Times* during the month of January is the warrant for their reproduction in book form.

It should be said here that the title, "An American Jurist," was not of the author's choosing. As the communications were published anonymously, it was necessary to indicate in some manner the quality and the authority of the writer and they were described in the *Times* as coming from the pen of An American Jurist, an ascription of authority which, while appropriate and accurate, the author's modesty might have disclaimed.

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CHAPTER I

AMERICA AND THE WAR

When the national authorities acted, and America became a belligerent in one of the most stupendous wars in history, the duty of Americans to their country was clear: they were bound to sustain the successful prosecution of the war by every legitimate means in their power. Nevertheless, without impropriety they may continue to differ concerning the ends and the ultimate effects of the war on the future of the nation and on civilization in general. The right to freedom of opinion does not, however, abro-

gate the duty of an American not to embarrass his Government by useless discussion. No further debate, for example, concerning the propriety of a war is admissible in any orderly state after war is once duly declared. The laws which underlie national existence do not permit individual or domestic opposition to the national authority in time of war; but the liberty postulated of a republic does permit a reasonable discussion, in the abstract, of the future national problems affected by the war.

All modern wars between nations are in the last analysis founded on national interest and national honor, which are almost identical terms. Other causes may be assigned by political parties, and in popular governments other causes are often necessarily assigned when the citizenship is indifferent to the national honor or oblivious of the urgency of

the paramount national interest. The United States had an ample *casus belli* on which to found a declaration of war against Germany. The conduct of Germany prior to 1917 had violated the principal laws of war (*jura belli*), to the great injury of the American nation. The wonder is that American politicians and even the national authorities so long absolutely ignored or tolerated what was generally apparent. But underneath all the causes avowed for America's entering the war lay that mainspring of national action—the national safety and the national interest. Prior to 1914 it had long been foreseen by thoughtful men that America would sooner or later be obliged to enter into a war with Germany. The present time was certainly an opportune time for America to begin hostilities that were inevitable. Long anterior to the present war Germany was

known to regard with invidious eyes this hemisphere, its institutions, its pretensions, and its peculiar and phenomenal development. It should be confessed that America in the past has not been most favorably regarded by European governments. Between the political thought of Europe and the political thought of America lies a great abyss far deeper than the separating seas. Only time can satisfactorily bridge this chasm.

Between Germany and America in particular there has long been a latent misunderstanding. Since 1870, given an opportune moment, American interests would have been unhesitatingly assailed by Germany with all the force and power it could command. For this reason, if for no other, it was the interest of the American Government to meet the inevitable issue with Germany at least as

soon as it did, and it is its duty to wage the war with all the power and force it can command.

Some of the provocative causes ably stated by President Wilson in his address to Congress, April 2, 1917, and assigned as reasons for the entrance of America into a foreign war, have not become of less moment now that America is at war. Their indirect purpose was the conviction of those Americans who think little concerning the laws which control the struggles for human and national existence. That America was justified in her declaration of war for many reasons not stated by the President the world in the end will concede. Her imperiled national interests alone afforded ample justification for such a declaration. But in pragmatic England and in practical America political and national movements are singularly pro-

moted by sentimental considerations, sometimes pertinent, at others irrelevant, but always skilfully manipulated by those more discerning public men who have closer at heart the national interests and well-being, and who themselves need no other incentive besides the national interests for even such an extreme action as public war.

For the honor of humanity it is sad to have to admit that sentiment of itself is never a valid reason of state for extreme national measures. In the minds of statesmen of any country sentiment is not the real reason for war, though it is often made use of by public men in order to influence some desired public action. Patriotism is not a sentiment. It is to belittle the nobility of mankind to affirm that the love of God, of family, of country, of liberty, and of justice is a sentiment. This natural affection is *a priori*

and inborn; it is dictated by the sense of self-preservation; it is an elementary principle of being. For country, family, and liberty men will fight until the end of time. In well-constructed human beings sentiment plays a minor part. At so grave a time as this Americans need no such artificial stimulus as sentiment to induce them to support their Government in an international issue involving the safety of their country, their families, and their liberty. As is the case with most abstractions, sentiment would not at any time be a safe criterion for public measures. It is as often ill founded as well founded, and consequently it is never a prudent or a deliberate reason for the great finality of a nation. It is the national interest and honor alone which in the end control the external actions of a state. In any discussion of the problems involved in

this war, therefore, sentiment should be allowed to play only a minor part. Alliances between nations are not determined by considerations of sentiment. Common interests and advantages for the time being afford the sufficient inducement for either defensive or offensive alliances of nations.

Since the ascent of Prussia to the hegemony and direction of Germany, English public men have been with reason profoundly disturbed. They have seen with disquietude the long commercial supremacy of England challenged with effect by Germany; they have seen the colonial policy of England and the integrity of its widely extended empire frequently menaced by unmistakable overtures. Indeed, for the last fifty years thinking men in England and elsewhere have foreseen that a struggle between the English and the German em-

pires was inevitable. Men in both nations have long been shouting, "*Delenda est Carthago!*" to the increasing discomfiture of the rest of the world. Both Germany and England have in their own way silently prepared for the struggle, indirectly by alliances and international conversations, and directly by increased armaments either on the land or on the sea. It would have been far better for the Entente Allies if England had not confined her preliminary preparations so largely to the seas. Her allies have been forced to bear the brunt of her oversight. Indeed, it would have been far less costly to the British Empire itself had England's preparations on land kept better step with the pace of the German Empire. Mr. Lloyd George has lately admitted that England somewhat neglected the obvious duty to arm on land, and that the neglect would not

occur again. England's excuse for neglect is no mystery. She used her national resources the better to extend for the time being her challenged commercial supremacy.

In so far as America was concerned, England's increased armament was never disquieting. All the other external actions of England were not, however, so reassuring to America. Anterior to the War of 1914 many English statesmen endeavored to come to an understanding with Germany. In such a possible understanding lurked the greatest peril to this country. As existing national alliances and ententes are very temporary, it is thought by some public men, even in England's own empire, that this country has not yet escaped all ultimate danger of such an association. Regardless of that now remote possibility, the interest of America in the pres-

ent conflict unquestionably lies with England and her allies. To aid France Cardinal Richelieu did not hesitate to promote Protestantism. He was a statesman of the first order. Any minatory combinations of the great powers which the future may unfold are too remote to furnish ground for any hesitancy on the part of America to coöperate heartily with England and her allies throughout the present war. Nevertheless, the American aims in the final issues of the war are not and cannot be identical with the ends of England. In Asia their separate interests have of late widely diverged. It is reasonably clear that the pronounced aims of Mr. Lloyd George are not even now the aims of most of the other leading public men of England. It is therefore safe to predict that the program of Mr. Lloyd George will not be prominent in the final adjust-

ments of the pending war by the powers.

As to the respective merits of the two leading belligerents, England and Germany, in the War of 1914, America has not hesitated to form an opinion. England is a free and great country. Her public men are far more astute in the business of government than the German public men or any other public men. Even the English colonial empire, the duration of which is much involved in this war, has, since the independence of America, been admirably administered in the main, and the high commercial principles applied in colonial administration have produced good results. If we except the loss of liberty and independence of some of the subject populations of England, there has been little to condemn in the English colonial system. In all her colonies England has had since 1783 more regard for justice and human

rights than has ever been displayed by any other colonial system. It is this fact which has made the dependent status tolerable in the English colonies and dependencies, and in several instances even desirable for them. It is the general opinion in America that the colonial system of England has for a century been more nearly perfect than any other colonial system known to history. There is not, however, a general consensus in America that the English colonial system either in India or Egypt is abstractly justifiable. But taking the English colonial system as it is, this country, as a whole, has not viewed with favor the desires of Germany to disrupt or partition it.

It is not extreme to affirm that the ambition of Germany to enter the ranks of the great colonial powers has been contemplated with disfavor not only in

America, but by the entire non-Germanic world. America in the main distrusts, with or without sound reason, all colonial systems whatever, but particularly the German. Of those existing it undoubtedly favors the British. American sympathies with the colonial system of England have in the pending conflict been much promoted by the conviction that since 1914 the Germans have deliberately violated the laws of war, laboriously built up since the time of Grotius. The early attempt of England to starve by a new system of blockade the civilian population of Germany did not meet with prompt condemnation in America because of the coarse German methods of warfare and the instinctive conviction of Americans that Germany was as hostile to America as to England. It was foreseen from the outset that the War of 1914, beyond all other modern wars, was

bound to be a war *à outrance,* and that American interests were likely to be gravely imperiled by the leading belligerents. The President and the present Government were evidently from the beginning deeply concerned, and they acted with caution and uniform discretion. As the sequel showed, their concern was well founded.

Americans are not a thoughtless people, and they are now beginning to think of the future, after the present war shall end. That the past alliances between nations have not been of long duration history demonstrates to them. At present America finds herself engaged on the side of four or five powers of the first rank; some of them have long been friendly to America, others not uniformly so. The alliance, or, if preferred, the present coördination, of America with the Entente powers, is en-

tirely fortuitous; it is pursuant to no treaty, or even international conversation. It is dictated, as all other international arrangements and alliances have, in fact, been dictated, solely by the best interests for the time being and the supposed safety of the allied countries. All such alliances are at best but temporary. In the past England and France have more often been enemies than allies. In the more general conflicts of the world America and England have heretofore been uniformly enemies. France and Russia have in turn been enemies and allies. Prussia and England have been both allies and enemies. France and Prussia have been allied against England, while Austria, France, and Russia have been allies against England and Prussia combined. The past combinations, indeed, have been very curious and inconsistent. In each in-

stance the supposed interest of the allies alone governed. The course of history never stops. What has been will be again.[1]

[1] The inconsistent alliances between European countries are enumerated by a recent French writer as follows:

The alliances of Burgundy and England against France, then of Burgundy and France against England; of France, Venice, and Turkey against Austria and Spain; of France, Saxony, and the Palatinate against Austria; of France, Sweden, and the Netherlands against Spain and Austria; of France and Prussia against Austria and England, then of Austria, France, Sweden, and Russia against Prussia and England; of France, Spain, and the United States against England; of all the nations of Europe against France; of France, England, and Piedmont against Russia; of France and Italy against Austria; the moral or immoral entente of Prussia, England, and France against Austria; alliance of Prussia and the North German States, morally aided by England, against France; of France and Russia against Germany, Austria, and Italy, with England in the background; of Japan and England against Russia; in order to bring about the present combination, in which fabricators of empty phrases see the supreme struggle between "civilization" and "barbarism," but in which well-informed minds see only a new and intense form of a conflict of interests dividing Europe and the world. [Translated from "Hier, Aujourd'hui, Demain," p. 155, Bourassa.]

That the policy of America in the present war should be formulated by its statesmen, and not by its politicians, is evident. Statesmen govern a country with an eye to the future good of the nation. Politicians are mere opportunists. The difference between them is marked. Taking into consideration the brevity of all international alliances, the imperative duty of American statesmen is to make sure that in the course of a temporary alliance with European powers the best interests of the American nation are not imperiled. There are with the allies of America outstanding problems of grave importance. Any error in regard to them will inflict untold miseries upon posterity. Most international alliances, while necessary, are full of ultimate dangers. For this reason European alliances have not been heretofore favored in America. That they

have now become necessary and must long continue is generally admitted, although it is a departure from an ancient tradition. Unintentionally, America has against her will at last been forced to enter a new and difficult foreign arena. The great question is, Will it adequately prepare for the new responsibilities which the entrance entails? If it does not, the future of America will be unnecessarily jeoparded, and the natural course of American history will be much influenced.

To the world in general the "United States" par excellence is known as "America." In the course of these papers America has therefore been accepted as the more familiar title of the United States. Only in some instances, where greater particularity was essential to clarity, has the official designation been employed.

CHAPTER II

BELGIUM AND LUXEMBURG

To enforce Belgian neutrality is not the primary reason why America engaged in the war against Germany, nor is the violation of the spirit of American democracy the real reason. The great injuries suffered by the Belgians in the present war have been deplored by Americans, who have done much to alleviate the plight of Belgium. Throughout their entire national existence Americans have evinced a marked sense of public justice; they have showed themselves to be in the main a just and kindly people. But as America was not a party to the neutraliza-

tion of Belgium, it is doubtful whether an infraction of Belgian neutrality by any of the parties to the Neutrality Treaty of November 15, 1831, could by the law of nations be vindicated by America. This was obviously the conclusion at first reached at Washington. Americans could and did protest against the violation; but officially America had no standing to protest or to vindicate a treaty of neutralization to which America was not a party.

It is unfortunate that the state of political parties and the conditions of her parliamentary government did not permit England to act with more efficiency in the first days of the War of 1914. That the safety of Belgium was in the first instance adequately protected by any of the guarantors of her neutrality is not clear. The preliminary pourparlers in 1914 between England and Ger-

many, when examined carefully, leave the impression that the English ministers did not insist firmly enough on the right of Belgium to immunity from invasion in the event of war. Up to July 31, 1914, Sir Edward Grey said to the French representative, "The preservation of the neutrality of Belgium might be, I would not say a decisive, but an important factor in determining our attitude." (British White Book of 1914, No. 119.) Would Sir Edward not have been justified in making his declaration stronger?

Belgium, in the eyes of America, presents one of the most melancholy as well as one of the most heroic spectacles in modern history. Her sad plight has excited their profound sympathy. That Belgium will emerge intact and resume her national existence, Americans hope and expect. What the ultimate destiny

of Belgium may be in the centuries to come is another matter which no statesman of Europe would venture to predict. But one thing may be affirmed: Belgium in the future is not going to repeat her present experience if it can be helped.

It is an error to assume that Belgium is the cause of the war of 1914 or even the cause of England's belligerency. Belgium is only one incident of the great war, not its *causa causans*. Many people in this country have lost sight of the fact that this war is in its origin a war for supremacy in the Balkans, which incidentally set on fire the long-conflicting pretensions of Germany and England. To the people of the Orient the present war is one for the control of the European approaches to the far East. To the average American the war is one for the principle of democracy. But what-

ever the object of the war, Americans in or out of public life, with ample justification, have come to believe that the triumphant success of Germany in Europe would be disastrous to America. It is not compatible with the safety of America that there should be only one great power in Europe and that power unfriendly to America. The arrogations of such a power would soon extend to this hemisphere; they would menace its integrity, and possibly destroy for centuries the national policies and the proper development of America. This is a correct, if instinctive, conclusion for Americans.

That the status of Belgium was not the primary cause of the war, history demonstrates. Belgium never has been, according to the publicists' definition, a completely sovereign state. Belgium as a state was the product of the fears of

Europe. Torn away from Holland only in 1830, Belgium, by the concerted action of England and France, was erected into an independent, but neutralized, state by the convention of the five great powers convened in London in the year 1830. In the erection of a single state composed of the Flemish and the Walloon provinces, formerly a part of the United Netherlands, the racial diversities of the Flemings and the Walloons were not much considered. Consequently, the new state was from its inception left to wrestle with the always deplorable bilingual problems. The choice of a reigning house for the new kingdom was not even left to Belgium, but was dictated by the great powers. The choice of the English queen's uncle as the first sovereign was agreeable to England, and the arrangement for his speedy marriage to the daughter of Louis Philippe, then King

of France, was most pleasing to France, as the future dynasty was not likely to be hostile to French susceptibilities.

It will thus be perceived that Belgium was allowed to enter the family of nations only provisionally and because the great powers deemed it the best solution of a very dangerous territorial problem. From the days of Cæsar to those of Napoleon, the valley of the Meuse has been the pathway and the battle-field of all the armies of Europe. In 1830 neither France nor England was willing that either separately should have paramountcy in the territory since known as Belgium. In 1830 an English foothold in the Low Countries would have met the opposition of all the other great powers. At that time Prussia was not in a position to enforce its own views in regard to the territory now called Belgium. It very reluctantly consented to the propo-

sals of England and France to sever it from Holland, as did Austria and Russia; but all the powers recognized that England's interest in the Belgian littoral was greatest. Indeed, her interest was vital. England has long feared that the littoral of the Low Countries might pass into powerful and unfriendly hands, and the supreme effort of her statesmen has been directed to frustrating this eventuality. That her apprehension is both legitimate and natural cannot be denied. Her bitter enemy, Napoleon the Great, discerned that "Antwerp was a pistol turned against the heart of England." What he neglected to add was that Belgian territory is a highway which leads with equal directness to either Paris or Berlin.

The terrain of both Belgium and the Grand Duchy of Luxemburg is very unfortunately situated as regards three of

the great powers of Europe. The present German invasion of these territories is by no means the first instance of a violation by the powers; it is computed by competent authority to be the one hundred and nineteenth invasion. For this reason Belgium has been called the "Cockpit of Europe." Every military scientist in Europe has long formulated possible plans for military movements on Belgian territory, as the military archives of all the great powers might disclose.

The international situation of the Grand Duchy of Luxemburg and of Belgium is almost identical. If anything, Luxemburg was more effectually neutralized than Belgium. A public man is in no position to form a correct opinion upon the international status of Belgium and the obligations of the guarantors of its neutralization if he is not entirely

familiar with the Luxemburg neutralization treaties of 1839 and 1867, their construction by the great powers, and the subsequent attitude of the signatories to such treaties. The international status of Belgium was fixed by Articles VII and XXV of the treaties of November 15, 1831, and by Articles I and II of the treaty of April 19, 1839. The neutralization of Luxemburg was finally effected by the treaty of London, signed May 11, 1867, on the part of Great Britain, France, Italy, Russia, and Prussia. By Article II of that treaty the "high contracting parties engaged to respect the principle of neutrality stipulated by the present Article." By the prior treaty of 1839 the powers collectively guaranteed the peaceful possession of Luxemburg to the King of Holland in the fullest, most absolute, and most unqualified manner. The object of the Luxem-

burg treaty was to prevent the possibility of Luxemburg passing under the control of any of the great powers. The effect of the treaty of 1839 was to make Luxemburg inalienable. The English construction of her obligations under the treaty of 1839 concerning the practical neutralization of Luxemburg was not, however, fortunate for Belgium in 1914. On the threshold of the existing hostilities, as appears from that most important document, the "British White Book," published in England by authority in the first days of the present war, M. Cambon, the French ambassador, asked the English foreign minister, Sir Edward Grey, "what the British Government thinks of the violation of Luxemburg by the Germans." Sir Edward Grey referred him "to the views expressed in 1867 by Lord Derby and Lord Clarendon." (White Book,

No. 148). Sir Edward's answer involves a historical retrospect. In 1867 France, prior to the final treaty of that year, was negotiating for the acquisition of the Grand Duchy of Luxemburg. This expressely violated the treaty of 1839, on which Prussia relied. In Parliament Sir Robert Peel strongly protested against the purchase of Luxemburg by France, following closely the annexation of Savoy and Nice, "because the holding of Luxemburg is a matter of first importance for France, for defensive or offensive operations against Germany." The question in substance in 1867, when France was in treaty for Luxemburg, really was, What obligations the collective guarantee of the integrity of the territory of Luxemburg entailed on the signatory powers, and whether, if one power disregarded or retired from the treaty, the others were

obligated either individually or jointly to enforce by arms the obligations of the treaty? Prussia insisted on the binding nature of the obligation, as it was clearly her interest to do then. Count Bismarck was firm on this point. On June 14, 1867, according to Hansard (p. 1910, seq.), Mr. Labouchère, M. P., in the course of Parliamentary debate on the treaty of 1839 said:

> . . . The guarantees entered into by this country for the independence of Belgium and of Turkey stood on very different ground from that given recently with respect to Luxemburg. Nobody could contend that the possession of Luxemburg, either by France or Germany, would menace or disturb our interests.
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> . . . . . .
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> At the time when a war with America seemed likely, we might have felt grateful to the Emperor of the French for stepping forward with a guarantee affecting Montreal

and the Canadian lakes; but would his own subjects have been pleased?

. . . . . .

According to M. Moustier, the Foreign Minister of France, the "neutrality" of Luxemburg might not be inconsistent with the passage of troops through the Duchy. The noble Lord appeared to have admitted that a violation of the treaty would be constituted if an army marched through the territory, but a glance at the map would show that it was almost impossible that war could be waged between France and Germany without an army passing through the Luxemburg territory. If, therefore, we were to take Count Bismarck's view of our obligations, we should be bound to go to war. *Nothing had done so much harm to the English name as a certain recklessness in undertaking obligations and a great discretion in fulfilling them.* . . .

. . . Even supposing that England might be brought to raise armies and find treasure for a war to prevent a Dutch province from becoming German or French, was it likely that our colonies would incur the risks of war for such an object?

The nature of the obligation of the powers under the Luxemburg guarantee of 1839 was in 1869 a subject of deep concern both in England and on the Continent. Prussia was particularly apprehensive. Nevertheless, Lord Stanley, then English foreign secretary, informed Prussia: "No interest of ours was either directly or indirectly involved and we stood absolutely free and unfettered. The security of Belgium is an entirely different matter." (Hansard, Vol. CLXXXVI., p. 1253, seq.)

Now, Great Britain was a party to the neutralization of Luxemburg. Lord John Russell, not then in power, alone protested against any such narrow construction of the obligation of England under the treaty of 1839, and he bravely stated that the position of the English Government had created a very unpleasant feeling on the Continent.

(Hansard, Vol. CLXXXVIII., p. 975.)

The relation of Saguntum to the Carthaginians was singularly like Belgium's to Germany. The Roman contentions concerning Hannibal's violation of the treaty relative to Saguntum probably offer the nearest parallel to England's present contentions concerning the German invasion of Belgium in derogation of the Belgian treaty of 1831. In the negotiations for peace the Roman argument is not likely to be overlooked by those trained in the art of diplomacy.

The attitude of the powers to the Luxemburg treaties leaves the impression that the right of a signatory to contravene or to withdraw from its conventional guaranty is not clearly denied in public law. The alleged right of a signatory to violate the pact is a grave matter, and it certainly shocks the moral sense of private people when a party to

a neutralization treaty withdraws and then violates it. But the nature and extent of the obligation of a guarantor of neutrality is, in international law, not so clearly laid down as it should be. The English position that there was no obligation of the parties to the Luxemburg treaty to enforce it by a resort to arms, unless their own interests were also violated, leaves a very unpleasant impression when applied to Belgium. That a treaty of neutralization was violated with impunity in the instance of Luxemburg must be conceded, and this is the unhappy lesson of Luxemburg. The uncertainty of the attitude of the great powers in regard to neutralization treaties long stared Belgium in the face, and consequently its apprehensions were first directed to one great power and then to another. The annexation of Korea by Japan in 1910, with the consent of the

powers, after Japan had guaranteed the independence of Korea in 1904, was ominous for Belgium.

If the often-avowed projects for the neutralization of either Mexico or Canada by the great powers ever come to maturity, America will then be confronted by a set of problems concerning neutralized countries of the gravest importance to her own internal safety and security. It is highly desirable, therefore, that the status of neutralized countries and the nature of the obligations of the guarantors of neutrality should receive a closer consideration than they yet have received in the law of nations. A neutralized state may, in some of its aspects, yet prove embarrassing for America. In late public utterances of many leading Americans regarding neutralized countries there seem to be certain assumptions quite inadmissible in

respect to a Canada or a Mexico neutralized by the powers. Had the former Republic of Texas been neutralized, as once proposed, or had California been ceded to Great Britain by Mexico, as once attempted, the intricacy of the law of neutralization would now be more apparent to Americans. If the United States had joined in the proposed neutralization of the former Republic of Texas by England and France, would it then have been at liberty to recede from the treaty when Texas itself desired to be annexed to the United States? If the United States first had denounced such a treaty and declined to engage in it further, would France and England then have been obligated to enforce the neutralization of the Republic of Texas by a recourse to arms? Such are the serious questions which a treaty of neutralization presents.

According to the British "White Book," on the first signs of the great conflict of 1914 Sir Edward Grey officially inquired in Paris and Berlin whether the French and German governments are "prepared to engage to respect the neutrality of Belgium so long as no other power violates it." (114.) The German chancellor replied that Germany would like to know what France is prepared to do. (122).) The reply from Paris was "that the French Government are resolved to respect the neutrality of Belgium, unless some other power violated it." (125.) On August 1, 1914, the German ambassador at London asked Sir Edward Grey whether, if Germany gave a promise not to violate Belgian neutrality, England would engage to remain neutral. Sir Edward Grey did not think "we could give a promise of neutrality on that condition

alone." (123.) The German ambassador then suggested that the integrity of France and her colonies might be guaranteed by Germany. No definite reply was vouchsafed. England simply refused to be bound. Evidently the great war of the empires, long predicted, was at hand, if all the conditions favored it. In that event Belgium was left in a very perilous position, for every military expert in Europe had announced that its territory would inevitably be a battlefield of the warring powers.

CHAPTER III

THE BALKANS

That the War of 1914 could be confined to the Balkans no profound English statesman could have believed; yet the early efforts of both England and Germany in 1914 were apparently directed to that end alone. Had the war been so confined, it would have been satisfactory only to Austria-Hungary. It must have been known in England from the first menace of hostilities against Serbia by Austria-Hungary that in any such conflict Serbia would not be abandoned by Russia. The Balkan history of the last half of the century preceding demonstrated that Russia could not

abandon the Slavs to Austrian domination. That Germany would stand by Austria-Hungary as against Russia was equally clear. The French ambassadors in London and St. Petersburg most frankly stated "that France would adhere to Russia at every step." (White Book, No. 6.) The only possibility of preventing the extension of the Balkan war to all Europe was that England should promptly declare its intention to stand with France and Russia in the event of a European war. If England so declared, she was advised by Russia, France, and Italy that a general European war involving all the great powers could be avoided. This is proved by the official documents contained in the British White Book of 1914. The Russian foreign minister, M. Sazonoff, in July, 1914, stated to the English representative in St. Petersburg that if

England "took her stand with France and Russia, there would be no war," but that if England "failed them now, rivers of blood would flow," and England "would in the end be dragged in." (No. 17.) On July 27 the Russian ambassador in London deplored the effect of the impression that England would stand aside. (No. 47.) M. Paléologue, the French ambassador at St. Petersburg, urged England to the same effect. On July 29 the Marquis of San Giuliano gave to the British ambassador Italy's opinion, "If Germany believed that Great Britain would act with Russia and France, it would have a great effect." (No. 80.) President Poincaré in behalf of France, on July 30, 1914, stated to the British ambassador at Paris, "if his Majesty's Government announced that England would come to the aid of France in the result of a conflict

. . . there would be no war." (No. 99.) President Poincaré reiterated this in his letter to King George V of England, dated July 31, 1914. But England did not, or could not for some reason, act. It seems now as if a titanic struggle in Europe was fated by errors of policy from the beginning, and that it was beyond the powers of the statesmen of any single country to prevent the dire calamity. The apprehensions, the fears, and the rival ambitions of the nations of Europe all tended to make a general war inevitable when the Balkan fires were relighted in 1914.

The preliminary transactions between the powers in July and August, 1914, when the war between Austria and Serbia loomed up, are contained in the British White Book. On July 24, 1914, the French ambassador at St. Petersburg gave the British ambassador to under-

stand "that France would fulfill all their obligations entailed by her alliance with Russia, if necessity arose, besides supporting Russia strongly in any diplomatic negotiations." (No. 6.) On July 29, 1914, Sir Edward Grey communicated to Sir Francis Bertie in Paris that the Balkan war "would then be a question of the supremacy of Teuton or Slav—a struggle for supremacy in the Balkans; and our idea had always been to avoid being drawn into a war over a Balkan question." (No. 87.) The British ambassador at St. Petersburg had previously stated to the French ambassador that "direct British interests in Serbia were nil, and a war on behalf of that country would never be sanctioned by British public opinion." (No. 6.)

That the British interests in the Balkans were not "nil," England knew, and it is now apparent to the world that Eng-

lish interests in Serbia are not nil. Had Russia been triumphant and Austria-Hungary effaced, a great Slav power under the hegemony of Russia would have been erected in the Balkans. This would have been most disturbing to English susceptibilities, and to Great Britain's interests in Asia and Africa. Since the war began it has been correctly stated in England by an English subject, who has devoted much critical attention to the "Eastern questions," that in the event of Russia's triumph in the Balkans English imperialists would have been obliged to promote the military strength of the German Empire as a counterpoise to the dreaded Russian ascendency. Now that the Central powers are for the moment in practical control of the Balkans, the danger of the Balkans to English interests is no longer concealed in England. The Balkan question is, in

fact, an ominous spectre in all intelligent governmental circles in England, for in it are involved many future perils to the different powers, but most directly of all to the extended English Empire.

The Austria-Hungary war of 1914 against Serbia was "the postponed sequel of the war of 1912." That Germany would aid Austria against Russia was certain. Ever since the days of Frederick II of Prussia the inhabitants of Germany have been in fear of Russian invasion. It was to prevent the overweening growth of Russia that occasioned the first partition of Poland. It was a national fear of Russia in Germany which in the end mobilized even the Social Democrats behind German diplomacy in the present Great War, (English "Contemporary Review" for September, 1914).

The Balkan question is not compli-

cated. When the Ottoman Empire had been virtually destroyed in Europe, the Balkan question became primarily an issue between Austria and Russia for the hegemony of the small States through which led most directly the land passages from Europe to Asia, Africa, and the seas adjacent. For a time Russia and Austria worked in close association in the Balkans. Austria was allowed predominance in Serbia and Russia in Bulgaria. It was when Russian diplomacy became most influential in Serbia also that the general European peace was first threatened.

At this fateful epoch in the world's history the most immediate of all the problems of the moment is, What will become of Russia, Turkey, and the Balkans? The interest of America in this question is not direct. That the Balkan questions should be intruded at all into

American policies is highly undesirable. There are indications that there is already a rift in the entente between America and England on this point. Mr. Balfour significantly announced to Parliament, July 29 of last year, "America had [has] no interest on the Continent" of Europe. This announcement is apparently not in accord with late official declarations at Washington, nor is it consistent with all the causes officially assigned for America's entrance into the European War.

With proper regard to the future safety of the United States, it cannot be conceded that it is the policy of the United States to promote the proposed neutralization of any of the Balkan States, under some guaranty by the great powers, to be contained in the final treaty of peace which will terminate the present general war. The United States

has no national interest in the Balkans. Even if the Balkan States should urge the United States to become a party to their neutralization, it is to be hoped that it will decline.

The proximity of a feeble power to a great one makes neutralization guaranties highly coveted in the weaker state. For this reason it has been suggested that Canada and Mexico should ultimately be neutralized by international guaranties of the great powers. That any such neutralization of Canada or Mexico would be inimical to the interests of America in any future war between the United States and a great European or a great Asiatic power, military men will concede. In any such war it would be indispensable to the security of America that its military forces should immediately bar any approach to this continent through the open doors of either

Canada or Mexico. While Americans prize liberty in the abstract, the first care of their Government should be the liberty of Americans, and not that of some remote people alien to them in blood and institutions. It was some such reason in all probability which induced the astute English statesmen to refrain from taking a final position in regard to the true construction of the Luxemburg treaties already mentioned.

CHAPTER IV

THE SEQUEL OF THE WAR

When the present Great War shall have subsided, how will America stand in relation to the rest of the world? In what way will her peculiar interests be affected by the possible international arrangements which will in the usual course conclude the war? These are now questions of more than ordinary moment to the future peace and prosperity of America. No doubt the questions themselves are receiving the anxious consideration of the present Government.

The interests of America most concerned in the final treaties which will

embody the consummation of this greatest of modern wars may be classified as (1) Mexican, (2) Canadian, (3) West Indian, (4) Asiatic, and Pacific. Cursory suggestions in regard to each of these interests are contained in these articles. It is not pretended that they are other than tentative; but it is thought that at this important moment the suggestions, such as they are, may serve to stimulate their better discussion.

To some extent the interests indicated must be affected by the outcome of the present World War. That at the end of the war the alliance between Germany, Austria-Hungary, and the Ottoman Empire will not be disrupted is most probable. It is a natural alliance dictated by the interests of the German Empire, Austria, and Turkey. The alliance ought not to be regarded as offensive to America. Nor is its continuation hostile

to the best interests of America, for in that event France, England, Italy, and Japan of the great powers will necessarily be interested to remain in very close and friendly association with America. An alliance of the Central powers will make the continuation of the "Entente" highly desirable for England, France, Italy, Japan, and America. There will thus be a new and more effective "balance" of the great powers. Such an association of the great powers must tend to the advantage of America, for it conduces to a more satisfactory solution of the pressing Mexican and Japanese problems in particular.

At the moment it looks as if Russia would usurp the place of the Balkans in the chancelleries of Europe. If Russia remains intact, and a stable government of all the Russias comes soon, that Russia will for the time being adhere most

closely to France and America seems probable. But the Russian situation is not reassuring. That a permanent form of government is likely to arise in Russia within a decade is not probable unless the monarchy is meanwhile restored.

What, then, is to become of the vast Russian domain in the event of more serious internal commotions is with reason troubling every statesman in every state in Europe. For a long time to come the final destiny of Russia and her Asiatic provinces must necessarily continue to usurp the most important place in the diplomacy of Europe. If Russia should by any means drift back to her former dynasty, it will apparently be under a modified and more liberal constitution. That disorder and insecurity of property will be allowed to continue in Russia is most improbable. In time the property classes and the intelligent no-

bility of Russia will doubtless make some overt effort looking to a reaction and the restoration of the ancient and historic monarchy. Should the monarchy be restored with the consent of the Russians, America will have little to apprehend. The ancient dynasty of Russia has exhibited the greatest friendliness to America and in the most critical moments of American history. It is to this friendship that America owes the princely domain of Alaska and its dependencies. It was not advantageous to Canada or the English interests that Alaska should pass to America, but the Russian dynasty ignored their opposition and ceded Alaska to America. Such friendly generosity on the part of the late dynasty and its conduct in the civil war of 1861–65 Americans are not likely to forget when the American problems to the north of the 49th degree of

north latitude become more critical, as they necessarily will with time.

America is not interested in imposing any particular form of government on Russia. With the internal government of any country in Europe America has no concern so long as American institutions are not menaced by that country. America has no interest in the forms of government adopted by European countries. Lloyd George, who stands preeminently for the democracy of England, has very recently stated that such was the English position concerning the domestic institutions of all foreign countries. Mr. Balfour, who is personally a representative of a very different class of Englishmen, the professional governing aristocracy of England, in July of last year officially stated that "no one was foolish enough to suppose that it would be possible to impose" on a for-

eign country "a constitution made outside of that country." He very properly added that "nations must make their scheme of liberty for themselves according to their own ideas and based on their history, character, and hopes."

This statement has much commended itself to the intelligence of most thoughtful Americans. America has now nothing to fear from Germany so long as England, France, Italy, and Japan are not estranged.

The present entente between France and England is likely to be durable. As the French ambassador, M. Cambon, said in London to Sir Edward Grey, in July, 1914: "It could not be to England's interest that France should be crushed by Germany. Great Britain would then be in a very diminished position with regard to Germany. In 1870 Great Britain had made a great mistake in allow-

ing an enormous increase of German strength. . . ." (119.) That France should continue an independent and undiminished state has now become important to English security. The safety of both powers is seen to depend in the future upon their entente. Had Russia, by means of this war, assumed the hegemony of Europe, and had France continued in close alliance with her on all Eastern questions, the English understanding with France might speedily have been jeoparded; but no such condition is now likely to ensue within any reasonable space of time. Therefore the continued entente between France and England is measurably sure to endure for a considerable space after this present war is terminated.

The future position of Russia is admitted in Europe to be uncertain. That Russia will be reconstructed ultimately

on the ancient plan and in conformity with the principles of the governments most nearly adjacent to her is generally regarded in Europe as the most natural solution. In Asia the future of Russia excites apprehension. Japan would have ground for alarm if the naturally strong, disciplined, and effectual German system were by any chance extended to the Pacific. Japan is therefore directly interested at present in preserving a good understanding with all the Entente powers, including America. That this *entente cordiale* will conduce to the interests of America is apparent. It can be destroyed only by the improbable disruption of the alliance between the Central powers of Europe.

The problems of America after the war will not be confined to foreign affairs. The inevitable increase in taxation by the Federal Government, the

probable rapid diminution in the remuneration of labor, and the increased cost of living due to the war will doubtless create popular unrest such as has never before been known in America. That the Government will prove equal to the maintenance of order there is no reason from its past history to doubt. The attachment of Americans to their familiar institutions is so great that mere adversity or misfortune alone will not cause them to change their institutions. The perpetuation of the republic in America is for a long period as certain as any human institution of government can be, but the need for fostering the interests already indicated will be made apparent to the Government when the period of unrest becomes acute.

CHAPTER V

MEXICO

After the general peace ending the present Great War the American Government will be compelled to pay closer attention to the disturbed state of Mexico. The great increase of America's national debt, her increased taxation, and the artificial limitations placed on her ability to cope with either England or Germany in world commerce will compel America to promote better conditions of trade and intercourse on her own continent. To this end Mexico must be pacified and the Government made more stable. Stability and security are pressing needs not only of the property

classes in Mexico, but of the Mexican laborers as well. Without prosperity in Mexico, humanitarians should clearly understand, the condition of its lower classes cannot be ameliorated. Moreover, the safety and the freedom of Americans' trade is directly involved in the Mexican problem. After the general peace the American Government will not long be suffered to continue a policy of inaction and indifference to the internal conditions of Mexico.

Other and more peremptory motives will ultimately lead America to a revision of its policy of inaction. No scheme of defensive warfare which omits a reference to Mexico can be complete for the United States of America. The northern boundary of Mexico, as fixed by the Treaty of Guadalupe Hidalgo in 1848 and the Gadsden Treaty of 1853, extends along the southern fron-

tier of the United States for nearly 2000 miles. The occupation of Mexico by a European or Asiatic power of the first rank at war with the United States doubtless would and should be prevented. At the first sign of such a possibility the seaports of Mexico would be a subject of serious consideration by the military authorities of the United States. That Mexican ports should not offer a harbor for the enemy would be a matter of as much concern in Washington as that the harbors of the Chesapeake or of San Diego and San Francisco Bay should not offer them a safe landing. If Mexico were then neutralized, the neutrality of Mexico would inevitably be subordinated to considerations involving the safety and the integrity of a great and populous nation. America has a high and commendable moral conception of the effect of a country's neu-

tralization, but in the last resort it cannot deliberately permit itself to be destroyed. The world would not expect that America would allow itself to be overrun from Mexico.

It is not only the military significance of Mexico which makes it of serious importance to the United States, but its trade, and the unlimited possibilities of its greater development under a stable Government. Properly governed, Mexican commerce with its nearest neighbor, the United States, would be of incalculable value not only to the Mexicans themselves, but to America. The fertile areas, the valuable mines, and the unlimited resources of Mexico would, if properly developed under a competent and orderly Government, add prodigiously to the riches and the foreign trade of the United States. The configuration of Mexico in reference to the

United States makes it certain that Mexico and the United States are destined to some closer commercial association and some defensive alliance. Had the mountain chains of North America run east and west instead of north and south, the future history of the countries, now under separate and distinct governments, would be very different from what it is destined to be. The configuration of the territory of a nation with reference to that of bordering nations is a most important factor in both its economic and its political development. We have only to glance at the histories of Greece and Italy to be convinced of the truth of this statement.

The history of Mexico since its escape from Spanish domination in 1821 shows a lamentable defect in the capacity of Mexicans for self-government. Since its virtual independence of Spain, with the

exception of the régime of Porfirio Diaz from 1884 to 1911, the history of Mexico is a tale of almost continuous warfare, in which Maximilian's empire is a mere episode. During all this long period life and property have been insecure, and the misgovernment such as no neighboring power of the first rank other than the United States would have suffered to endure so long in any country contiguous to it. Instead of receiving commendation for its toleration of Mexico's misgovernment, the Government of the United States has been censured by all the older political communities of Europe. That the Washington Government is largely responsible for the disorder of Mexico is believed in Europe. The Monroe Doctrine prevents any foreign nation taking the place of Spain in Mexico, and it morally obligates the United States to do that which it will

not permit any foreign Government to do. Unless something is soon done by America to set the Mexican house in order, it is reasonably sure that some sort of foreign intervention will be suggested at no distant time after the general peace. European activities in this hemisphere will not subside with the general peace. They can be regulated only by the prompt action of America in the interest of tranquillity in Mexico.

It is within the power of the Washington Government to bring about a better state of things in Mexico. Nor need the exercise of this power imperil the independence of Mexico. This would be deplored in America. The hegemony of the United States in North America can, if desired, be asserted as effectually in Mexico as in Cuba, and with as favorable results. It is the conviction of any real necessity for action which has been lack-

ing at Washington, and it is the want of conviction which is receiving the censure of the rest of the world. The Government at Washington is constituted for the purpose of promoting the safety and the highest development of the United States. The Government cannot always wait for popular mandates concerning every detail of its foreign policies. The people expect their Government to govern and they have a right to expect that it will govern well. As yet the great mass of Americans have not seen fit to intrude their opinions on the Mexican question; but this state of things is unlikely to last.

Ignoring the defects of the Spanish administration of three centuries, it must be conceded that the great and interesting cities of Mexico were founded under Spanish rule. The admirable architecture of Mexico, which bids fair to

be influential in the future of California from San Diego to San Francisco, is also due to Spain. Any permanent excellence in the laws of Mexico is derived from Spain.

It has been lately remarked in an influential American journal that the population of Mexico, like that of other countries, is composed of three classes, "upper, middle, and low" ("Tragic Story of Martyred Mexico"). Under Spain the upper class of Mexicans was perhaps more highly refined than that of any other part of North America. He who would have a correct idea of high society in Mexico a century since must turn to the pages of Mme. Calderon de la Barca, the wife of the first Spanish minister accredited to Mexico after its independence ("Life in Mexico"). It is a document of no little value, published at the instance of the historian Prescott.

At the present day the general refinement of the upper class of Mexico remains quite equal to that of the more intelligent classes of the United States. This fact Americans are apt to ignore. Few Americans who adventure into Mexico come to know the inner life of the Mexicans.

It is the orderly upper class of Mexico who would most welcome the security which the United States is alone able to afford to Mexico. That the life of the lower classes of Mexicans, the Indians and the mestizos, could be ameliorated by the friendly and proper intervention of the United States there can be no question. That the present state of things in Mexico will be allowed by America to continue indefinitely it is counter to the course of history to suppose. It is the duty of the Government of the United States to undertake the

pacification and reorganization of Mexico very soon after the general peace, and to see to it that there is set up in that unfortunate and superlatively beautiful country, close to the United States, a Government worthy of its potentialities. It is only in this way that the United States can fulfil on this continent its natural responsibilities and its high destiny. When it is the national will that peace and security shall be brought about in Mexico by Washington, it can be accomplished with no impairment of Mexican independence. This the history of American intervention in Cuba demonstrates. That intelligent Americans would deplore the loss of independence by Mexico is certain. Only a few American adventurers desire its annexation by the United States. The intelligent classes of America recognize clearly the natural limitations imposed by their

form of government, and it is the intelligent classes of all countries who in the end frame its policies. The continuation of an independent, but a more orderly and safer, Mexico is the only wish of the people of the United States at the present time.

Under the auspices of a patriotic and eminent American, Archbishop Ireland of St. Paul, a brief, but powerful, picture of the degraded political conditions long prevailing in Mexico has very lately been given to the world. The sketch of the revolutionary governments since the expulsion of Spain is concise and accurate. The rapine, the murderous conduct, and the general disorder and insecurity of the Mexico of a century past are there given with substantial accuracy and without exaggeration. It makes a sorry picture.

Constant revolutions in Mexico mean

that there can be no stability either in public or private affairs. The insecurity of the property of American nationals in Mexico the American Government has the power to ignore; but no great Government can persistently neglect such interests without condemnation in the end. Action will follow the more spirited condemnation that must soon exhibit itself after the general peace. In view of the established foreign policy of America, formulated in the Monroe Doctrine, it is not safe for America to continue to ignore the Mexican depredations committed against foreign subjects and citizens. America must either act in Mexico or allow other nations to intervene. There is no third choice left to her. That America will patiently suffer foreign intervention in Mexico would be counter to her history. Therefore it is reasonably certain that the Mexican

problem will be taken up by Washington soon after the next general peace.

The inconvenience suffered by American citizens, the perils of their commercial intercourse, the jeopardy of American and foreign capital invested in Mexico, make it unwise and impolitic for the Washington Government to continue a policy of inaction and indifference to Mexico. It would seem almost unbelievable that for years past no return transportation can be purchased between the commercial capitals of America and Mexico. There is at a time of peace between the United States and Mexico no certainty that an American landed at Vera Cruz or Laredo will be allowed to reach Mexico City or to return from there. What other Government besides the American would so patiently endure such a condition of things for so long a period?

Now that ententes between America and other powers are in order, it would seem that a better entente between Mexico and the United States, the most desirable of all ententes for America, will not be much longer delayed. The construction of the Panama Canal makes it expedient and even imperative for the safety of the rapidly increasing population and wealth of the United States that the future joint foreign policy of the United States and Mexico should be definitive and uniform. The protection of the Panama Canal against foreign aggression makes it equally imperative that America should come to a speedy understanding whereby American troops and munitions may be forwarded by land routes to Panama. Only in this way can "American liberty" be effectually safeguarded against the inevitable foreign aggressions which time in the ordinary

course of events will surely develop. After the episode of Maximilian, Americans have no further justification for believing that never again will Mexico be the subject of foreign attempts at her regeneration or even her domination. All history is one long record of more repetitions whenever similar conditions again develop.

CHAPTER VI

CANADA

From President Washington's first administration until a comparatively recent period American public men have not been unmindful that permanent European domination of Canada was undesirable for the United States. In the last century startling events have brought home to thoughtful Americans the apprehension that the territory to the north of them might be susceptible of developments which would prove hostile to their security and safety. The apprehension was made particularly great by events leading to the Mexican War, and again during the American Civil

War of 1861–65. The peace of America doubtless may be endangered by events in a Canada not independent. In possible foreign complications in which America may be involved, unless some closer coalition meanwhile take place, Canada will be a point of danger for America. Happily, any disturbance due to such possible conditions seems at the moment postponed. Nevertheless, there are latent forces at work in the great Canadian problems which forbid Americans to remain indifferent to the fate of their Northern neighbor.

Closely allied in origin, condition, and disposition, native Americans and the native British Canadians present characteristics which are markedly similar. A common language, as Bismarck said, the greatest possible bond between separated peoples living under different governments, a common jurisprudence,

political and educational institutions not dissimilar except in the single Province of Quebec, but above all a close and almost interdependent agriculture and commerce, all tend irresistibly to draw Canada and the United States together. With no safe winter ports of her own in the Atlantic basin, the economic interests of Canada and the United States are in all essentials the same.

But Canada has been far-distanced in national wealth and population by the United States. Canada remains relatively a poor state at the present time. The notable over-exploitation of her resources has caused the internal and the economic problems of Canada to come to be such as to compel a large and intelligent portion of her population to recognize that Canada cannot much longer remain as she is. Canada must draw closer either to England or to the United

States. Tradition would reconcile the British part of her population to the proposed scheme of "imperialistic federation with England and her dependencies." But their personal interests dictate that Canada should draw closer to the United States. The prolific descendants of old French Canada would no longer offer a substantial resistance to some union with the United States. They perceive that their coreligionists have been safe under the Government of the United States and that their church is protected there, while in western Canada it meets with a marked hostility.

The serious problem of the future of Canada is never very far from the thought of intelligent Canadians of all antecedents and all schools of political opinion. No American who has made a close study of the political literature and the state of the politics of Canada can

fail to recognize that some speedy political change is now in order in Canada. This change will doubtless be much facilitated by the present Great War. Mr. Bonar Law prophetically said in December, 1915, "After this war the relations between the Dominions and the Mother Country can never be the same again." This is generally recognized by Canadians.

There have been times in the last century when Canada could have come closer to the United States with little opposition from England or from Canadians, but no cordial response to the proposal was made in America. The close and changing majorities of political parties in the United States have disinclined the average American politician to view with favor any near political union between the United States and Canada. If Canada were to be incor-

porated in the United States, and the different Canadian Provinces were to become States, what would their politics be? This question has not been lost sight of by American politicians. If the Canadian States should all incline to one great political party in the United States, the balance of parties would be disturbed, and one or other great political party might lose power at Washington for a very long period. This has been the real reason of the indifference of American politicians to any closer political union between Canada and the United States. Forty years ago it was the recognition of this attitude of American politicians that disinclined many public men in Canada to favor openly any movement looking to a closer political union between Canada and the United States. The average Canadian politician was not then willing to risk his po-

litical future in view of the cold reserve of the American fraternity. Yet this was the period in which the merger of Canada and the United States could have been most easily effected.

But, while long quiescent, such questions will not down in Canada. Even at the present moment they are being discussed, particularly in the Province of Quebec, with much interest and ability. "Independence" or "Imperial Partnership," together with the *tertium gaudens,* "Union with the United States," are favorite topics with a large and important class of polemical Canadian writers. In England the same topics are being much discussed by such writers as Mr. Lionel Curtis ("The Problem of the Commonwealth," The Macmillan Company). Singularly enough, in America these same subjects are receiving scant attention in any quarter.

The reasons for the more marked Canadian interest in these questions so important to her future are not far to seek. The internal politics of Canada are, if anything, now in a less elevated and satisfactory state than internal politics in the United States. What Sir Charles Dilke said in 1890, "that the tone of politics is, on the whole, higher in Canada than in the United States," is no longer true. The efficiency of the governments of the large cities in Canada is also more unsatisfactory than it is in the large cities of the United States, where the municipal resources are greater. But above all other reasons for a certain manifest inquietude in Canada is the apprehension occasioned by the exploitation of the natural resources of the country with the public funds. After the confederation of the Canadian Provinces and their quasi-independence, all the ad-

venturers of Lombard Street seem to have taken up their abode in the Dominion of Canada. The expense of the present war to Canada bids fair to bring the results of this excessive exploitation to a speedy and accurate reckoning. The financial condition of Canada is, in fact, such that it can be saved only by the speedy intervention of England or the United States after this war shall end. That the financial rehabilitation of Canada should be undertaken by the United States alone would be more consistent with the policy of "America for the Americans." It would amply repay either America or England to assist the development of Canada, for in the end it is destined to be a prosperous country.

That the projected imperial federation, by which all the countries having close political relations with England

shall be federated into one great imperial state, with England at the head, will be in the interest of the United States ought not for a moment to be admitted by Americans. Imperial federation would, if anything, be even less desirable for the United States than would be the independence of Canada under some neutralization guaranteed by the great European powers. It ought to be of profound interest to the people of the United States that either the independence of Canada or its absorption in some great scheme of British imperial federation is destined to come about very speedily after the present war. That it is so destined is now generally admitted both in Canada and in England. If the present war produces no other changes in the British Empire, it is at least certain to produce some change in the international status of Canada.

If Canada should become actually sovereign and independent,—and this is a consummation not only in the interest of the Canadians themselves, but the best solution for the United States,—any guaranty of the neutralization of the new power by European powers would be most undesirable for the United States. With an absolutely independent Canada commercial treaties and some definitive offensive and defensive alliance could be made by the United States. It would be highly necessary for the United States that the arrangements be made speedily. They would not at first be rejected by an independent Canada, for her foreign relations would be on the same plane as those of the United States, while the United States would furnish to Canada her natural or primary markets.

The "Imperial Federation League,"

the program of which imports the political, military, and economic reorganization of the entire British Empire, was founded in the year 1884. Ever since, with varying fortunes and support, the project has continued to grow. With the close of the present war the negotiations for federation will be ripe for consummation. In any such reorganization of the British Empire, Canada, from its geographical position, will necessarily have a leading place. Canada is much nearer to both Europe and Asia than is the United States. As early as 1764 it was suggested by Thomas Pownall, one of the very few able administrators up to that time sent by England to the North American colonies, that the seat of Government of the British Empire should be transferred to America. This premature suggestion long afterward attracted the attention of Mr. Gladstone,

who considered it highly interesting. Portugal acted on Pownall's suggestion and transferred its dynasty to its Brazilian Empire. With the inevitable alterations in the diffusion and extent of the population of the British Empire, it is not impossible that the project of Pownall may some day be revived. But whether revived or dismissed, imperial federation will necessarily alter essentially the entire military program of the British Empire. Imperial arsenals, dockyards, and fortifications in Canada would become inevitable. That they would excite the lively apprehensions of Americans there can be no justification for doubting. Imperial federation would, indeed, be little less menacing to the permanent peace of America than the independence and neutralization of Canada under some guaranty of the great European powers. Imperial fed-

eration would permanently intrude European questions into the foreign policies of America. Canada would then necessarily become a participant in every European, Asiatic, and African problem of the federated empire.

That a speedy change of some kind in the political status of Canada is under way is apparent not only from the public utterances of Mr. Bonar Law and the imperialists in Canada and England, but from the Canadian evolutions of the last fifty years. The official construction of the Canadian militia laws in 1855, 1862, 1868, 1883, 1899, and 1904; the English colonial conferences of 1887, 1902, and 1907; the Canadian naval program of 1910 in aid of Great Britain—none of all these things has received the attention in the United States which its importance to them deserves. Proud of its inherent strength, America has re-

mained strangely indifferent to a program which some day is destined to move it profoundly.

There is in Canada an important part of the population who favor absolute independence of Great Britain. These "nationalists," as they term themselves, think that a self-governing state ought not to be dependent or subordinate in any respect. It should be free to control its own destiny. The nationalists argue that it is to the interest of Canada to control its own policies and foreign relations, and that Canada can fulfil its high destiny only by entering the family of nations as a completely sovereign state. If the absolute independence of Canada should ever be realized, it probably would be the best solution of the Canadian problem for the United States. The territory now embraced in the United States is already so extended that

its proper and efficient government is not free from difficulties. To enlarge the number of States of the Union any further would not diminish its problems or promote the more efficient government of the United States, while it might menace the permanency of the Union. With an independent republic of Canada relations could easily be established which would increase the safety and the prosperity of both Canada and the United States. Canada, from its extent and the character of its population, is naturally a democracy and likely to remain such. The United States, if well governed, is likely to continue indefinitely a republic. Monarchical institutions do not and cannot flourish in such countries as Canada and the United States unless artificially fostered.

On the other hand, some kind of union of Canada and the United States would

much simplify the collection of revenue under the protective system, as well as the plans for the defensive warfare of both countries. Closely allied, the two countries would be in an insular position, separated from the rest of the world by vast seas. With a great navy and a moderate standing army, the two countries combined could resist the aggression of the entire world. Probably the desirable results indicated could be attained without political union if Canada were an independent state and in a position to enter a league of the republics of North America. The British scheme of imperial federation would frustrate any such desirable league.

That between Canadians and Americans there is at present the most friendly feeling is a fact the value of which cannot be overestimated. That a period of general good feeling should be availed

of to place both nations in a position reciprocally advantageous is evident. The common problems for the two countries are of more importance to them than any other, and their proper solution will call for a high order of statesmanship in both Canada and the United States. With Europe both Canada and the United States have minor interests, but with each other their interests are reciprocal and of paramount importance.

After the present World War is at an end the problem of adequate labor for Canada is likely to become acute. There is at all times insufficient labor in Canada. Ever since the day of Sir Alexander Galt, an able Canadian, schemes for the increase of labor have formed a part of Canadian policy. One of the most powerful Canadian arguments against conscription at the present time

is that it will stifle European emigration to Canada. Deprived of immigration for a long period, suggestions of Indian and coolie labor will fall no longer on unwilling ears in Canada. Under imperial federation the hitherto insoluble problem for the British Government concerning the disposition of the surplus labor of India would tend to make its introduction into Canada reasonable certain. That such a policy would be actively resented in the United States is not doubtful. The Asiatic problem is in the United States fundamentally and primarily a labor problem. If Asiatic laborers should swarm in either Canada or Mexico, they could not long be kept out of the United States. This is only one additional reason why the problems of Canada should continue to interest the people of the United States.

CHAPTER VII

THE WEST INDIES

The group of islands between Florida and South America are collectively designated, in common parlance, the West Indies. These islands are all directly within the proper sphere of American influence and not within the proper sphere of influence of Europe. In all these islands America has a most direct interest that they shall not be utilized as the future bases of hostilities directed against either North or South America. As the islands lie directly in the trade routes of the American hemisphere, it cannot be claimed with justice that either Europe or Asia has an equal com-

mercial interest in them. American interests of all kinds in the West Indies are plainly paramount to the interests of all other powers. Consequently most of the larger islands in the West Indies have already passed under the control of America, and the rest in course of due time bid fair to follow.

Any examination of the personal interests of the West Indian Islands will disclose that economic influences prompt them to seek incorporation with America. In those of the islands which have already come under American domination the agricultural and other island resources quickly revived, whereas under European domination they languished or disappeared. In the process of extinguishing the proprietorship of Europe in the West Indies all the economic conditions are aiding America. The islands of the Atlantic stand in a

peculiarly close relation to America. America has no colonial possessions on the mainland of Europe, Africa, and Asia, and it would be highly impolitic for her to accept any colonial jurisdiction in any part of Europe, Africa, or on the mainland of Asia. If territories in those quarters of the world were presented to her, it would be the act of the enemies rather than the act of the friends of America. In all the Americas and their adjacent seas lie all the best interests of America. The West Indies are directly within the American sphere of interest.

The islands of the Pacific other than those belonging to the great powers, including Japan, do not occupy the same relation to America as the Asiatic mainland. America has already acquired large and important island possessions in the Pacific, and her tenure of these is

morally superior to that of any of the other great powers exclusive of China and Japan. As one of the leading countries bordering on the Pacific Ocean, America has the most direct concern in the islands of the Pacific. The economic interests of the rapidly developing portion of the United States lying west of the Rocky Mountains in the trade of the Pacific are already so extensive that the general Government cannot ignore them. The Pacific States of America would not long tolerate governmental indifference to their paramount interests. The trade and commerce of the Pacific are most important for the long future of the Western United States. The proximity of the cities of San Diego, Los Angeles, San Francisco, Portland, Tacoma, and Seattle to the Pacific Ocean tends to develop certain characteristics peculiar to all the Pacific. The trade intercourse

between the Atlantic States of America and the West Indies creates a very close bond.

The facilities of intercourse between countries bordering on the same seas always create common interests in all the peoples of the seaboard districts. Their daily intercourse tends to produce a certain uniformity of temperament, manners, and culture in the populations of coast towns lying on the same seas without much regard to their respective nationalities. All the peoples living on the Mediterranean show marked similarities, and to acute observers they are distinguishable from their countrymen living remote from the Mediterranean. So the peoples living on the sea coast of the North Atlantic basin are much influenced by certain common forces not felt by their countrymen of the interior. The inhabitants of New York and Boston

are, for instance, in closer touch with the thought and interests of London and Bordeaux than are the inhabitants of the cities in the middle States of America. It is obvious that the thought of London, New York, and Boston is greatly affected by common interests and by the facility of their intercourse by sea. Daily and hourly the ships come and go between them with peculiar messages for themselves only. In the great towns of middle America the thought of London or Bordeaux has little or no direct influence.

The immense mass and weight of America are already exercising an irresistible force in attracting the West Indies to it. As President John Adams said, "There are laws of political as well as of physical gravitation." This force is now almost irresistible in the West Indies. It has been sought in vain to coun-

teract it by subsidies to the islands from European governments or by the special privileges called reciprocities. Notwithstanding these encouragements, the trade of the West Indies continues to seek its natural American channels. This invariable tendency of trade is observable even in the distant North Atlantic island of Bermuda, where the flag alone continues British, and this only because the flagstaff is of good English oak.

Except as coaling ports and dockyards the West Indies are now of very little importance to the European powers. From the economic point of view the West Indian Islands still retained by Europe are positively disadvantageous to Europeans, and their longer retention is prompted only by motives of ambition or sentiment. That the European powers could continue to hold their West

Indian possessions during a war with America is unlikely. It would be an indication of friendliness on the part of Europe to follow the example of Denmark and cede all the West Indies to America. Their usefulness to Europe as coaling stations will cease with scientific changes in the nature of the methods of propulsion, and as dockyards their importance will decrease with the increasing radius of commercial vessels. Any necessary European user of the islands could be better provided for by stipulation in the acts of cession to the United States.

Owing to its fertility, its temperate climate, and the abundance of its food supply, the population of America is bound to increase with leaps and bounds after the war. The United States is more than half as large as China and Europe combined, and yet its continental

population is only about a hundred millions at present. It will in time readily support and maintain more than seven hundred millions. That it is destined to be densely populated and highly developed is certain. When America is in the condition of Europe as regards density of population and internal development, the West Indies will belong exclusively to America. The Caribbean Sea and the Gulf of Mexico will be what they now are, the American Mediterranean, but with this difference: they will be, as they should be, exclusively under American domination.

In the general peace to follow the present World War the Entente statesmen could do much toward the better definition and limitation of the American spheres of influence in the West Indies. That they will not neglect this Americans feel confident, despite unofficial dis-

claimers that no advantage whatever for America is sought by the war. It would be detrimental to Americans if the public authorities should neglect the real interests of America at a time when the foreign powers are in the mood to make concessions of things of no value to them from any point of view. If the European powers attached any real value to their empty titles of sovereignty in the West Indies, the case would be different. The continuation of Europe in the West Indies can have no adequate moral foundation, while it is, and ought to be, displeasing to America.

By reason of the mere coöperation of America with England in the present Great War England's precarious tenure of her widely extended empire has already been assured for an indefinite period beyond her reasonable hopes. If England does not recognize this fact, her

statesmen do, and it is her statesmen who control the immediate future of the British West Indies. That the peace negotiations could be made the means of transferring Jamaica and Nassau, for example, from England to America is not doubtful if English statesmen are willing to consent. They certainly will not consent if they are not asked by America to make the cession.

When America is as densely populated as its resources and situation promise, the now potential resources of the West Indies will not fail to be utilized on the mainland. With *la petite culture,* or intensive cultivation by small proprietors, the production of food in the West Indies may be made almost unlimited. Charles Kingsley, in his charming sketch of the West Indies, fifty years ago, pointed out that the same space of ground in the West Indies is capable of

producing 133 times the amount of food producible in the wheat-growing areas of America. The food supply of a nation in the last analysis is the fundamental purpose of government. Without an abundance of food the progress of a nation is seriously hampered. Its limit of development is determined only by the limitation of its own natural food-giving areas. A nation dependent on another nation for food is at all times in a more or less dangerous position. That the United States will not in the end be indifferent to the food areas of the West Indies is certain.

The completion of the Panama Canal by the United States and the importance to America of keeping it open at all times for the coastwise commerce of the United States give a new strategic importance to the possession of the West Indies by the United States. In the possession of

a European power the West Indian Islands are a menace to the peace of America. They can be retained by Europe only with some latent design hostile to America. In a war exclusively between European or Asiatic powers their custody has only some remote significance. The retention of the West Indies by Europe because it promotes its world commerce would justify its possession of the shores of all parts of the world. It is an argument the validity of which cannot be admitted in America. World commerce in the end must be regulated by a superior and binding law of nations and not by hostile and armed citadels seated in foreign countries or at points immediately adjacent to them.

CHAPTER VIII

ASIA AND THE PACIFIC

That the present Great War and its solutions will have a lasting effect on the future of Asia and the Pacific Ocean as an international highway is clearly discerned by the leading eastern Asiatic powers. Both have therefore prepared for representation in the final peace council. The late action of China is peculiarly significant. It nominally entered the war in order to safeguard its national future. China was unwilling that its interests in the peace conference should be abandoned to the great European powers. China is a belligerent because it does not intend that the final

decisions of the peace conference in regard to the future of the Orient shall go by default. In this action Chinese statesmen have acted astutely. The time has doubtless come for China to cry halt to European aggressions. These aggressions have gone further than is consistent with the interests of America. America has a supreme interest in Eastern Asia, the "open door." The success of the "open-door" policy demands that eastern Asia, in common with the rest of the world, shall be left to govern itself consistently with the general law of nations. The abstract right of the Chinese to govern themselves can no longer be ignored. As an American doctrine it is rapidly coming to the fore. The right of the Chinese to govern themselves is as well founded as the right of Americans to govern themselves, and by Americans it cannot be safely chal-

lenged. The American Government at Washington has been theoretically consistent in upholding the plea of "Asia for the Asiatics"; but it has lacked the power and will to enforce either the integrity of China or the "open-door" policy.

The "open-door" policy was first pronounced by the American secretary of state, John Hay, in 1899. The "open door' graphically prefigures little more than equal commercial opportunities for all foreigners, including Americans, in China and its dependencies or provinces. The doctrine of the "open door" is unfortunately much complicated by railway and other concessions granted by China to Europe. These cessions have diminished the sovereignty of China throughout extensive provinces of its empire. But the most formidable obstacles to the "open door" are the ex-

clusive territorial ambitions of both Russia and Japan, not opposed by England or France. The Russians and the Japanese have virtually closed the "open door" in Mongolia and Manchuria. Their action is regarded in the Orient as fatal to the American plan of the "open door." Wherever Japan or Russia has encroached on Chinese territory the door is no longer left wide open.

The particular pretensions in China of Japan and Russia have hitherto been consistently supported by England and France of the present Entente powers without great regard for the American "open-door" policy. The history of Manchuria and the Chinchow-Aigun railway project would alone demonstrate the accuracy of this statement. It therefore becomes a serious problem for America, where, if anywhere, she is to

look for an ally if she ever concludes to enforce her "open-door" policy in the Orient. If America concludes that she must enforce the "open door" by herself, and the time is fast approaching when the great States lying west of the Rocky Mountains will insist on some sort of Federal action about the "open door," it is evident that the military strength of America after the present war must be maintained even when it shall be placed on a peace footing. Otherwise America will be in a very exposed situation. Japan has promised to return to China after the war the territory of Kiao-chau, leased to Germany by China and now held by Japan. If the German protectorate is not so returned after the war, what is to be the sequence and significance of the refusal?

Kiao-chau is a minor matter. America is one of the great powers having di-

rect interests in the Pacific Ocean. With the exception of China and Japan, no other power has such extensive interests in the highways of the Pacific as America. The Pacific furnishes the western boundary of the United States, and the greater trade of the vast region of America lying west of the Rocky Mountains will sooner or later be over the Pacific with the Orient. The territorial interests of England and France in China are not comparable with those of America. The real interests of England and France are in southern Asia and in the southern Pacific. How America is to safeguard effectually its particular interests in China and the Pacific is destined to be one of the greatest problems for American statesmen.

It is obvious that the proper foreign policy of America turns upon two great principles, the Monroe Doctrine and the

"open door." The practical application of the Monroe Doctrine is confined to the Western Hemisphere; the "open door" to the Eastern. Unless America is prepared to enforce both, it would have been more conducive to the peace of America had they never been formulated. The safety and the prosperity of America are, however, so intimately concerned with both policies that they cannot be abandoned. Therefore America must be prepared to enforce them whenever they are flagrantly assailed, or America will lose its rightful place as a great power.

America has become a great nation by reason of its natural resources, its constantly augmenting population, and its ever-growing commerce. The natural resources will cease to be developed, the population and the commerce of the

country will cease to grow, if neglected by the Government at Washington; they require an intelligent and an energetic national policy for their proper conservation. American merchants are free to seek the protection of any more powerful government, and if America neglects its own merchants, they will seek a more splendid flag. American commerce will inevitably follow her merchants. It is essential, therefore, that the foreign policy of the United States shall be made to measure up to its responsibilities if the country is to continue permanently successful and powerful. Unless a nation coöperates closely with its merchants and fosters their foreign commerce by every legitimate means in its power, national prosperity will surely cease, and political decadence follow. There can be no successful domestic com-

merce in a country where the foreign commerce is not intelligently promoted by the Government.

The acquisition of the islands of the Pacific now under American dominion was pursuant to the best national policy. Hawaii, Samoa, Guam, and the Philippines are not only important points of call, but important protected refuges for American shipping in the Pacific. The retention by America of these islands does not violate the principle of "Asia for the Asiatics." None of them was acquired from an Asiatic power. America is a co-owner of the shores of the Pacific, and one of the largest. In the distant future its commerce on the Pacific will far surpass in importance to America that of the Atlantic side. The future of American commerce forbids America to neglect or to abandon its rightfully acquired island possessions in

the Pacific. No European power, indeed no Asiatic power, questions the right of America to the Pacific islands which have passed under its flag. It holds them by a completely valid title, and it must not part with them, or it will be false to its trust and to the future good of the American nation.

America, unlike England, has never sought territorial possessions remote from its proper shores. Every acquisition of outlying lands has had direct reference to the proper sphere of American influence and to the immediate interests of its domestic territories. Had the Philippines been owned by China or Japan, America would not have acquired them. They were ceded to America by a European power in deference to the superior interests of America in the trade of the Pacific. America, unlike the European powers, has never sought

any territory or "sphere of influence" on the Asiatic mainland. The American title to the Philippines is not derogatory to any Asiatic power. The islands are rightfully American and they are a tremendous and natural auxiliary to the long future of the rich trade between Asia and America. If the Philippines are abandoned by America, the descent of America into the ranks of the decadent and nerveless powers will be rapid and certain. Asia is not impressed by a foreign power which exhibits neither strength nor consistency, for Asiatics are quick to realize that without these qualities no nation can be either successful or permanent.

CHAPTER IX

AMERICA AFTER THE WAR

After the present war the conditions of the world will be greatly changed, and America can never again be quite the same. The isolation of America will have ended; its relations to foreign powers will be reversed. But the value of its alliance with France, England, Italy, and Japan and "preparedness" will for a long period be worth to America all they have cost, and the cost has been already prodigious. The internal problems of America after the war will not be diminished. Only a few of the problems, foreign and domestic, have been noticed in the preceding pages. There

are many others. By means of the war it will have become evident to Americans that a very prosperous nation, with an extended and exposed territory, cannot safely be left longer undefended, and that the future measures for the defense of the country must be more commensurate with its dangers and the national potentiality. Americans will not hereafter rely on the isolated position of America, nor will they easily resume their former policy of trusting the defense of the country wholly to chance. If they do, they will in the end suffer untold miseries, and the prosperity of America will vanish as quickly as it appeared.

Not only must the American be made a more efficient government from every point of view, but it must be kept efficient. America can never again, after this war, safely return to its indiffer-

ence to the military situation of the country. It has chosen to assert itself as a great power in the world, and it must recognize the responsibilities and the risks which the assertion involved, or it will fall as other weak countries have always fallen. There is now no intermediate choice for Americans. They must be up and onward or fall to pieces.

In the future America must be made able to stand by itself; it can safely trust to the permanency of no alliance; it must be prepared at all cost to resist aggression from any and every quarter. To do this it must be kept a strong as well as a rich nation. The enmities and the jealousies created by the present war will not subside for a century. If they should, a rich nation, helpless and unprepared to defend itself, is certain, when a good opportunity offers, to be attacked. A nation with the sharp enmities cre-

ated by American policies is in a particularly dangerous situation. Only by remaining prepared can America hope to escape unscathed.

The methods thus far characteristic of American democracy are not conducive to the permanent peace of America. The constant rotation in office, which is a principle of democracy, often brings into power men not trained in either statecraft or diplomacy. Many of the successful lawyers and the prominent politicians promoted to high office at Washington are not profoundly trained in the art of government. Some of them have little familiarity with even the foreign relations of America, while only a few of them are deeply versed in the finer art of diplomacy. Such things are not easily acquired by men not in public life; they require a lifelong training.

The rest of the world asserts that the

foreign policy of America has been characterized by a certain abrupt directness which is inconsistent with the usages of diplomacy and is unnecessarily disturbing to the peace of the world. The directness of American diplomacy is too often mistaken by foreign states for either menace or a sign of unfriendliness. When it is mistaken for menace, America is left in a very unsafe position unless prepared for sudden attack. It does not diminish the danger to plead that the "directness" of America in diplomatic negotiations is not intended to be minatory or unfriendly, or that American diplomacy is only one phase of a government in which the people rule. The necessity that American diplomats shall not disregard "popular opinion" doubtless too often obligates them to a sort of spectacular diplomacy which is certainly not consistent with diplomatic

usage as hitherto understood. The exigencies of politics in America often require an administration to submit its foreign policies at every stage to the people, although the electors themselves have no settled foreign policy upon which the administration and its diplomatic corps can rely. Perhaps the greatest disadvantage of democracy as a principle of government is observable in the history of American foreign relations. There is in America no such thing as a settled foreign policy binding on successive administrations. This is not so in France or England. The defect can be corrected only by greater loyalty of Americans to constituted authority and by a deeper popular conviction, gleaned from hard experience, that matters of foreign policy should proceed on a settled and permanent principle which must be determined by competent

governmental agents trained in the art of diplomacy.

The accusation of the world that American diplomacy too frequently exhibits an unfriendly attitude which is not sufficiently conciliatory is in part due to the unusual frankness characteristic of American diplomacy. To be effectual, diplomacy must be reticent. Much of the information imputed to diplomats should, if repeated, be confined to the archives of the State Department. The English foreign minister, Mr. Balfour, in August, 1917, lucidly and satisfactorily explained to Parliament the real reasons for diplomatic reticence. His explanation must have been very disquieting to some diplomats in America. Not only should diplomacy be reticent, but it should be stately. European diplomacy has been built up on a policy of compromise, facilitated by a distin-

guished conciliation and marked official politeness. The diction of diplomatic intercourse should at all times be one of extreme civility. The use of the term "demand" in international negotiations is, for example, equivalent in European diplomacy to hostilities. In American diplomacy the term "demand" has not had the same significance. It has been used on several occasions with very awkward results. Doubtless America has occasionally had diplomats of exceptional ability, but it has had more of inadequate attainment. If America is to continue to pursue its past diplomatic methods, it should have a greater force always behind it. The Japanese statesman Count Okuma is reported to have said in 1915, "Diplomacy, to be really effective and successful, must be backed up by sufficient national strength." The directness and the exigencies of

American diplomacy make it particularly necessary that America should be prepared for hostile eventualities.

The proper conservation of all the elements of a nation's strength is a prime duty of a great government. When a nation's territory is so situated that it has an extensive coast bordering on the open seas and a large population dwelling on the seaboard, and yet the nation has no commercial marine and no seafaring men, there is evidently something awry in the governmental policies or some omission on the part of the government. After the present war America will in all probability be reinstated in the leading position which it once held on the high seas. It is now becoming apparent in America that it is not good policy to abandon transportation of American commerce to foreigners. Americans at last begin to see, also, that

a commercial marine is an important auxiliary in waging successful warfare, defensive or offensive. Had America in 1914 possessed a great mercantile marine and an adequate armed force, the entire course of the general war in Europe would have been different. That America should in the future maintain a mercantile marine has already become a common conviction in the American coast towns. It is to be hoped that this conviction will become general.

The building up of a commercial marine will be one of the after-war problems; but the greatest of all such problems will be "preparedness." In a democracy preparedness meets with an opposition not tolerated in states existing under more centralized forms of government. Before discussing the problems of the American commercial marine and "preparedness," it will be best to

consider the characteristics of American democracy, for they affect both preparedness and the commercial marine of America.

CHAPTER X

DEMOCRACY

In the course of the polemics of the pending war, Democracy has been much emphasized by the politicians. Democracy, as a principle of government, has the defects of its virtues. In ancient times it was thought to be fatal to freedom. In modern times it is generally believed to promote freedom and liberty, but to fail in efficiency. That it is necessarily inefficient old-fashioned native Americans deny. It is by no means certain that a democratic republic cannot be made equal to all the exigencies of national life. It is, however, the fact that to Americans of the old school democ-

racy means something quite different from the rampant kinds of democracy which many politicians of the present day applaud.

At the foundation of the general Government of the United States "democracy" stood for a popular government of an ordered and highly conservative kind. To Americans of the old school, democracy, in a glorified sense, consequently became almost the equivalent of civil liberty. Such Americans are confident that popular judgment in the end will sustain civil liberty and order and refrain from excesses. This is the problem. Will it? Unfortunately, there is a new theory of democracy coming up in America, a theory which some modern politicians would carry to extremes. If this new school were to triumph, we should have a weak and spasmodic form of democracy, with a government badly

adapted to times of stress and confusion. Thus far in its history the United States has proved to the world that a democratic republic may be highly efficient and powerful even in times of war. The new school of democracy deprecates any efficiency for war, and in this respect their departure from a historic creed separates them from the American democrats of the old school. President Wilson has recently showed that he has no lasting sympathy with the new school and that he favors a militant democracy of the historic type. It is to be hoped that his present conviction will not again change after peace ensues.

Let us inquire what modern Americans really mean by democracy. Democracy has been defined by Mr. Balfour as a government in which the ultimate control lies with the people. It is obvious that Mr. Balfour's definition is

wide enough to embrace a great many forms of government other than republics. In political theory the ultimate control lies with the people in many European kingdoms; but in England above its democracy, is a great political aristocracy which, disguise it as we may, arrogates to itself in some way the supreme and perpetual direction of the Government. To some modern Americans the Government of England is therefore not a pure democracy. What most Americans mean by democracy is a government where there are no class distinctions and where the people rule not ultimately, but primarily and all the time. Such was the Jeffersonian conception of American democracy. With a simple and homogeneous people such as Americans were at the inception of the republic, that form of democracy worked admirably. As the nation has

grown more complex, the art of government on the principles of democracy has become difficult, and it is less certain that a government in which the people rule all the time is efficient enough to weather the perils which beset nations.

What many Americans prize most in their democracy is not, however, the efficiency it produces, but the kind of careless and unrestrained liberty which they associate with their own form of democracy. Of the inestimable value of perfect, ordered liberty there can be no question. The trouble is that perfect, ordered liberty cannot always be protected or even maintained without an efficient government. Thus the profound problem for American democracy is, Can democracy organize and maintain a government sufficiently efficient to assure and protect ordered liberty permanently? Old-fashioned conservative

Americans believe that in time democracy can do this. They, however, rarely philosophize about their democracy; they accept it as a perfectly natural and stable institution for a great state. This is a favorable sign, for to be great, a state must be strong and well ordered.

To the more than fifty millions of native Americans whose progenitors voluntarily severed their connections with Europe nearly three centuries ago democracy is not so much a political creed as a mental habit. They were born democrats and know nothing else. As Henry Clay said, "Monarchy in the American Colonies before the Revolution was only a theory." America was of necessity essentially a democracy from the very beginning. Of aristocratic or monarchical institutions colonial Americans had no actual experience. With privilege and recognized

distinctions of rank they were totally unfamiliar. It is significant that present-day Americans remain indifferent to all titles except the military. In America even the signs of authority are rarely visible. With the machinery of their own form of government most Americans rarely come into contact. They vote at stated times, and they take a more or less active or passive interest in the preliminaries which lead to popular elections for public office; but never through their entire life do most of them come in contact with the high officials of their general Government. In large portions of America even the police, in other countries the most familiar agents of governmental authority, are unknown. Yet all Americans are dimly aware that a great governmental structure exists at Washington, and that at times it exerts a tremendous power,

which on the whole they believe is working for the good of the country at large. Only in some vague way do they associate their prosperity and the actual freedom they enjoy with democracy.

Up to this point of their history it has not been indispensable for Americans to inquire whether or not democracy is the best principle for their country. Let the Government alter materially its relations to the governed, let the nation be utterly vanquished by a foreign enemy, or let a long period of retarded development intervene, and the spirit of inquiry concerning the merits of democracy would be easily aroused in America. That the examination would be thorough there is good reason to believe, for the general intelligence of the people of the country is singularly alert when interest and necessity demand final and serious public action.

With all its advantages democracy, like all other human institutions, is not without its peculiar defects. It is conceded to be inefficient in particulars where more centralized governments are efficient. As Mr. Balfour has lately remarked, democracies require a very high order of statesmanship to guide them successfully. The main defect of democracies is that they are apt to give rise to a large political class. Democracies generally are a paradise for petty politicians. In modern America the professional politicians stand almost apart from the excellent and industrious citizens of the country. It is generally admitted that as a rule they do not as a body now compare favorably with Americans in other vocations. Of course there are exceptions to this rule. A politician is not necessarily a demagogue or a corrupt man; but with a

formidable part of the American politicians politics is a sort of science of democracy which they pervert for their own purposes. A breach of a private trust is always deplorable and it is generally condemned. When politicians do not consider the welfare of the state or of the country, but the advantage of public measures to themselves or their party, it is a breach of a public trust. A breach of a public trust is the most serious offense which can be committed against human society. Yet among politicians this offense is not uncommon, and by the public it is often too freely condoned.

It is fortunate that the most eminent public men of America are not its professional politicians. They are those whose mastery of the science of government segregates them from the regular politicians of the country. By sheer

force of intellectual eminence a few public men have won in America a recognized place in the national councils. Without such men the condition of public affairs would be hopeless indeed. Fortunately, Americans do not ignore the distinction between their politicians and their statesmen. They honor their statesmen and distrust their politicians.

The term "democracy" seems lately to have become in the public discourse of the politicians the equivalent of the term "republic," and yet the terms are far from being equivalents. A republic may exist without democracy, and democracy without a republic. To a republican form of government Americans, from the first settlements of North America, are so committed that no other form of government is now either possible or consistent with the national habits and the historical development of

the country. A republic flourishes in America because it is the form of government best suited to the national habits and temper. In America a republic is as much the product of the natural and original conditions of the country as are its fauna and flora. A democratic republic is, in fact, the normal government of Americans. There is probably not a single American living who does not hope for the perpetuation of the established government. That no other form of government could at present flourish here is manifest. The problem is, Will the conditions which have long favored democracy continue? Of all the dangers which beset a democratic republic, the greatest is the multitude of demagogues and petty politicians whom popular governments foster. If a radical change shall ever come about in American political institutions,—and

history proves that no one form of government is perpetual,—it will doubtless be largely due to the abandoned character and the insincerity of the professional political class. The experience of mankind teaches that under all forms of government the mass of the people is powerless to react against the general perversion of the political class of the country except by a revolution.

A long period of suffering from corruption and inefficiency of the established republican government in America might bring about a change. If through deplorable necessity a change in the constitution of government shall ever become imperative in the long future of the American nation, it will doubtless be due to the incurable public corruption of the politicians and to the consequent breaking down of the executive, legislative, and judicial institutions

established by the Constitution. Their demonstrated incapacity to perform well the true functions of government might suddenly bring about a revolution and change. That there is at present any serious degeneration in American political institutions impartial observers do not detect. The executive continues to be highly intelligent, disinterested, and efficient; the legislative bodies, while not free from all reproach, are in the main fairly representative and seldom corrupt. The Federal judiciary remains above all just criticism or reproach. That the various legislative bodies, the weak spots of the Government, will in course of time become even more truly representative of the more elevated thought and desires of good and conscientious Americans most of them continue to hope and trust.

That there is a modern tendency to

chicanery and what the French call *chantage savant* in American politics some, perhaps not many, elevated Americans are at times forced to suspect. If this suspicion should ever ripen into a general conviction, it would be a sign of danger for democracy. The defects referred to are not, however, yet sufficiently grave to constitute a menace to existing institutions, but that they are sufficient to constitute a possible danger ahead is not to be ignored. That the problems of the American form of government are sufficiently grave to demand greater attention from the men in public life all Americans out of public life believe. Before the defects of democracy are entirely eradicated, any attempt to impose American democracy as a system on foreign states may be premature.

A recent issue of an American journal,

the organ of a religious faith embracing many millions of American citizens, contains a serious and a significant reference to the democracy of the American politicians. This journal pertinently asks "whether the object of democratic governments is the happiness, welfare and progress of a nation, or the mere perpetuation of democratic institutions which systematically neglect any or all of these objects of government." It then proceeds to point out that democracy has been tried only by highly civilized and enlightened peoples with some measure of success. It admits that democracy has proved up to the present to be the government best suited for America, where, although lacking in efficiency, it has justified itself in results. The journal adds in substance: "Democracy has not yet been able to impose itself on the world as a principle, for it is

in the experimental stage. It has never yet succeeded with others than enlightened and fully civilized peoples." Without the obligation of accepting or denying the truth of this particular conclusion of the journal in question, a reflecting reader will at once admit to himself that it is true that democracy is still on trial as a principle, and he will naturally conclude that any effort on the part of Americans of the present century to impose their own system, however admirable for themselves, on other countries is both premature and in direct conflict with the leading principle of democracy itself. A consistent democracy leaves to the people of every country the right to form their own government, as the English foreign minister, Mr. Balfour, very lately said, "according to their own ideas, and based on their own history, character, and hopes."

The world has a very long history, and that American democracy is even yet in the experimental stage must be admitted by every reflecting man. Until recently American democracy has been conservative and just. The older democracies were not exempt from serious defects. They were not fair to property, and therefore perished. Certain recent democratic theories of taxation, very much favored by the modern school of democrats, have not yet been worked out in America in detail. On the practical results of the application of these theories the ultimate fate of democracy in America much depends. If it shall be proved that the new theories stifle individual initiative, destroy property and energy, and are subversive of all the arts and the sciences peculiar to high civilization, it will be safe to affirm that either these unjust theories must be quickly aban-

doned or else that democracy will not establish itself as a recognized principle for the world. If such fallacious theories of taxation are persisted in after being demonstrated unsound, it is safe to affirm that then it will be democracy which will be forced to give way to some other system of government productive of better results to mankind. A system of taxation is dangerous to the stability of government in exact proportion to its injustice. It must be remembered that liberty, freedom, and justice are not inconsistent with forms of government other than democracies. There have been democracies in the past which have subverted both liberty and justice. The great constitutional lawyer, Mr. Justice Story, thought that democracies could maintain themselves only where the people were superior and highly enlightened. His conclusion is entitled to some

consideration by thoughtful men even in democracies, for he contributed much toward the success of the republic instituted by the established democracy of America.

Doubtless Americans are justified thus far in regarding their own political institutions as the best for themselves, for no other form of government has ever produced for so long a period so much happiness among so many people in so great an extent of country. Nevertheless, it is highly inexpedient for American democracy to endeavor to force democracy as a principle at this time on the other nations of the world. No monarchical nation would be willing to accept its political institutions from a foreign power. Nor can a foreign country be forced even by a successful war to act against the national predilections, customs, and traditions. Nothing so cer-

tainly tends to the perpetuation of monarchy in Europe at the present time as the proclamation of a democratic power that a particular monarchical country must accept democracy as a principle.

It is to be feared that the American proclamation of democracy as a universal principle of government is disquieting to those of our own allies whose régime is aristocratical, if not absolutely monarchical. It takes no note of the real strength of European aristocracies at the present time. Lord Northcliffe has evidently detected this danger, for he has announced that America is not now fighting for democracy ("Current Opinion Magazine" for October, 1917). In Europe the aristocracies, while having undergone a great inherent change, still possess a commanding influence in all European states. Some years since a distinguished French

writer, Count Melchior de Vogüe, well pointed out the radical changes which had taken place in the modern constitutions of European aristocracies.

Although aristocracies of any kind may be distasteful to Americans, they ought not to shut their eyes to the fact that the aristocratic classes are in Europe still strongly intrenched and greatly respected by most Europeans. The aristocracies of Europe, however now constituted, are seriously attached to monarchical institutions, which they naturally associate with the ideals that they most cherish in life. In order to abolish monarchy in Europe it will be necessary to uproot the whole social order of all European states except Switzerland. An American propaganda for democracy outside of America is therefore inexpedient, as it tends to shock and alienate the aristocratic classes in the

various countries of the European allies of America. In Europe the aristocracy as a body is evidently beginning to wonder where the entente with America is leading them, and, if the truth were known, the American proclamation of democracy as a universal principle is becoming a powerful influence in Europe for a speedy peace. Many Europeans, quite outside of Germany and Austria, begin to see that if the Hapsburgs and the Hohenzollerns are to be forcibly ejected from their hereditary kingdoms, the royal houses of Windsor, Savoy, Spain, Holland, Denmark, and Sweden will soon be expelled. Now, the governing aristocracies of all these countries are by no means ready to abdicate, nor are their kings, whatever Mr. Lloyd George and his followers may have in contemplation for England's particular royalties. It is a formidable undertak-

ing for America to attempt to establish a universal democracy on the debris of the last of the thrones of Europe.

Nor can Americans afford to disregard the fact that even in republican France there still exists a powerful aristocratic class who, while ever loyal to France, never allow themselves in times of peace to come into personal contact with the officialdom of the republic. The old French aristocracy still believe, as Bismarck believed, that a republic is not the most formidable government in a military sense for France. They are convinced that republican politics lead to corruption and tend to weaken France. The old French aristocracy, in other words, do not believe in the principle of democracy. Americans should bear in mind that it is not absolutely impossible that in some circumstances France may yet become a mon-

archy and join some future league of the kings. It is quite significant that even the most advanced republican officials in France have had the moderation to recognize that, so long as the existing democratic institutions of France are not threatened directly from without, the political principles of foreign states should not be provoked by France even in time of war. Concerning the revolution in Russia, official France has been notably reticent. The action of America has been otherwise, and not in accordance with American precedent. A revolution in Russia is not necessarily a democratic manifestation.

After the revolt of the Spanish provinces from Spain, the United States thought it decorous to wait five years before any formal recognition of their independence. Whether the future Government of Russia, as it shall be ulti-

mately reorganized, may not take exception and umbrage to the speedy recognition by America of the Revolution remains to be seen. The pendency of the Great War is the justification, doubtless, for the prompt American action toward the Russian Revolution. It would seem unfortunate that it was not possible for America to coöperate with the Russian military authorities in their offensive against Germany without the necessity of a recognition of the Revolution before some form of government that showed greater indications of permanency had been erected in Russia. It is apparent that the Republic of France has been more cautious in its attitude toward the Revolution in Russian, while the democracy of England has spoken with hesitation. The long holding back in London of the first American despatches from Washington to Russia would seem to in-

dicate some doubt on the part of the English authorities about the wisdom of the speedy American indorsement of the Russian Revolution.

So long as the principle of democracy in America is not questioned by Europeans, it is impolitic for America to challenge the principle of monarchy in Europe. If Europe becomes restless or resentful of American influence, monarchy as a principle will quickly reincorporate itself with the aid of the powerful European aristocracy. It may then conclude that its own favorite institutions cannot survive if menaced overtly by the American democracy. It is not impossible that in that event America will be plagued by a powerful European coalition endeavoring to undermine it in all directions. America has no proper concern with democracy as a principle of government except in so far as it relates

to America. In America democracy has the right and the duty to maintain itself by every means in its power, but it is impolitic for America to project itself unnecessarily against the monarchical predilections and traditions of Europeans. America cannot afford to occupy the position of *provocateur* of European revolutions. It is a maxim that "revolutions often react and devour their nurses." The freedom and security of Americans are too important to be jeoparded by hostile and intrusive assertions of Americans that democracy is the only proper governmental principle.

Wise Americans do not forget that democracy has not yet solved in America some of the peculiar problems of popular government which require a longer period of time for their proper solution. The efficient government of great cities on the principle of democracy is only one

of the many existing problems of democracy. The comparatively new civic communities in America have not had time to create a civic spirit. It is thought that it takes 500 years to consolidate and train any civic community. But, whatever the reason may be, thus far democracy has not solved in America the problem of the orderly and the economic government of great cities. Under no other form of government is the administration of great municipalities so bad and so extravagant as it is in America. Unjust and excessive municipal assessments and taxation, the exploitation of the municipal resources by designing demagogues, a general wasteful extravagance, and an ineffective police are familiar spectacles in the larger American cities. These things threaten property and menace the prosperity of the whole country. Peaceable, old-fash-

ioned citizens of districts adjacent to large cities in America have been actually ruined by the unjust exploitations of the municipal authorities. Their outlying lands have been taken from them through unjust assessments fomented by civic political exploiters, and no adequate redress has as yet been discovered for this form of municipal injustice. Of all governments the municipal is that which touches most closely the welfare of the people, and it is most important to them that it should be good and efficient.

Until the democratic municipal governments of America are made far better, as they doubtless will be and must be in the course of time, American democracy has no complete title to justify itself as a general principle for the world. It is generally admitted that democracy will be able to solve its munici-

pal problems only after a much longer period of time. Meanwhile democracy in America will have problems enough of its own without undertaking to spread democracy as a principle throughout Europe.

The inefficiency of democracy as a principle of government was lately emphasized by the disclosure of the deplorable situation of the shipping of the United States. At the outbreak of the present war in 1914 America, with a coast-line far greater than that of any country in Europe and with a large maritime population once training and sending to sea the most skilful sailors in the world, had virtually no merchant shipping. Her coast people, who naturally follow the sea, had deserted it. Why this was puzzled thoughtful Americans. It has been suggested that there has long been a great shipping trust, representing

all the large European companies, English, French, and German alike. It is said that the shipping laws of America have been made in the interest of the foreign shipping trusts and not in the interest of the American nation. It is evident that this explanation ought not to be accepted without proof, for it may be an unjust reflection on Congress. That the destruction of American shipping is due to other causes than corruption in Congress is the better and more conservative opinion. Unfortunately, that explanation reflects on the capacity for government of democracy.

With all its defects, educated and influential Americans of the best traditional type believe that democracy is a necessary principle of free government in America. They continue to hope and believe that the manifest defects in the operation of the democratic political in-

stitutions of America can and will be obviated in time. But the wisest of them are convinced that the principle of "America for the Americans" is endangered by any premature attempt of Americans to impose the principle of democracy at this time on the governments of Europe as a world principle. America is making war against Germany not to extend democracy or the peculiar institutions of America, but, as Lord Northcliffe has rightly conjectured, in order to defend American nationality and American freedom against the assaults of a formidable and unscrupulous foreign enemy. That America will and must succeed in the war admits of no doubt; but in order to succeed it is quite unnecessary for Americans to obscure the plain issue with Germany by the discussion of a political philosophy not yet complete.

The time is doubtless coming in the world when the security of a personal liberty will be a first principle of all governments, no matter what form they may assume. Tyrannies everywhere will pass away forever. Monarchies will be as liberal and as free as republics. A more intelligent and trained public will no longer in any country be deluded by mere oratorical phrases. Governments of all kinds will be recognized as an intricate business, and they will be given over to the most capable, the most efficient, and the best trained. The United States will then form no exception to a universal principle. It will become more practical and less idealistic. The demagogues and the visionaries in America will then be required by an intelligent public to yield their influence to more capable men. Then only will liberty be well ordered and permanent

in the world, and democracy triumph as a universal principle. When this comes about there will be no need of an American crusade to impose the principles of democracy on the world. The world will then be safe for democracy and democracy safe for the world.

Since America has declared war against Germany the conduct of its democracy has justified the expectations of the most ardent Americans. Democracy in the United States has thus far displayed a loyalty and a quiet dignity rivaling France. It has submitted to unprecedented and drastic military measures of the Government without a murmur and with a readiness and loyalty not exceeded in the German Empire. With such a citizenship any Government may be well satisfied. This conduct of the American people points to a long reign of order under the republic. But the

real test of democracy and republican institutions will come after the war, when the politicians begin again their mischievous appeals for total disarmament and for the neglect of our war defensive with the hope of capturing a discontented and impoverished people. If democracy passes through the ordeal safely, proves conservative, and continues to exhibit an intelligent and elevated political outlook, discarding the coming socialistic program of the extreme political demagogues, the republic will be safe for a long, a conservative, and an interesting future. It will, however, be compelled to correct that fatal defect of democracies—excessive governmental extravagance in the wrong direction. While America has been able to stand up in the past despite the gross extravagance of its governmental machine, the time is coming when a non-

productive extravagance in the wrong directions will have to cease if democracy is to prove permanent. If the attitude of the American democracy proves as correct toward the notorious improvidence of the politicians at Washington as it has thus far proved toward the pending war, democracy will have vindicated itself completely, and the republic will be safe for a long time to come.

CHAPTER XI

AN AMERICAN MERCHANT MARINE

THERE can be no more imperative duty than that immediately after the present war the American Government shall, cost what it may, speedily revive its merchant marine. Once the acknowledged mistress of the seas, America is now bound hand and foot by the great foreign ship-owning powers of the world. It is thus rendered helpless in war, and placed in times of peace at unnecessary disadvantage. Even the Government mails and the private despatches are wholly at the mercy of foreigners, as America has no fast mail-ships of its

own. Almost every ton of freight produced in America pays rich tolls to aliens and is covered in transit by strange flags. American merchants are thus placed by a government policy, as wrong as impolitic, at the mercy of foreign ship-owners, while Americans citizens are humiliated by being forced to seek passage on foreign vessels even when approaching or quitting their own shores. And yet America claims to be one of the richest and most advanced countries of the world. Why is it that its sea-borne commerce is deliberately handed over to foreigners, its defensive warfare allowed to be paralyzed, and its citizens driven from the gainful occupation of the seas? A government policy which suffers these things is as incompetent as it is unwise. Until this particular wrong to American citizens is remedied, America cannot be reckoned among the great and formid-

able powers of the world. Any of the great foreign governments may at will interdict or impede American trade. This the American Government can prevent only by the reëstablishment of its once prosperous merchant marine.

In the early days of the republic the merchant marine and the foreign commerce of America were sedulously and intelligently protected and fostered by the American Government. The deep-sea fisheries, those nurseries of the navy, were until 1866 encouraged by special bounties. The result of this protection was that America gained the War of 1812 on the seas, although the victory was waived by the Treaty of Ghent, which in effect repealed the laws favorable to the American merchant marine. Had it not been for the Federal statute of 1817, still in force, which closed coastwise commerce to foreigners, America

to-day would have barely a ship left on the high seas. Between the years 1830 and 1838 the American merchant marine somewhat flourished because American wooden ships could be built more cheaply and American mariners were acknowledged to be the most skilful afloat. But with the coming of steam power and iron and steel ships all this natural advantage was lost. In 1858, when it was proposed to remedy the condition, the Southern slave-owners began openly to play into the hands of the foreign shipmasters and to oppose any governmental encouragement necessary to enable American shipmasters to compete with the cheaper-manned and -built foreign ships. This Southern opposition is now thought by well-informed men to have been the first move of the Secessionist party in the United States.

In President Cleveland's administra-

tion, to which the modern American Navy owes so much, it was made evident that something must be done to restore the American merchant marine. Accordingly the act of 1845, authorizing the Federal Government to contract for carrying the mails on American ships, was substantially reënacted in 1891; but unfortunately the act of 1891 did not offer sufficient encouragement to American shipmasters. In 1912, foreign-built ships at last became entitled, after a long opposition, to American registry, but the higher American operating scale frustrated also this law. The tariff bill of 1913 was on sound principles. It gave a five per cent. discount of duties on merchandise imported in American bottoms; but the act was rendered futile by the favored-nation clauses in all American treaties. It is intimated that Congress realized this when the law was enacted

and that it was intended to be inoperative.

When the present war broke out in 1914 the shocking condition of the American merchant marine was brought forcibly home to Americans. All the foreign commerce immediately retired from America, and America had virtually no ships of its own. It was then proposed by patriotic Americans to buy all the foreign ships in sight, but this "dollar project" was immediately frustrated by foreign nations as well as by principles of the international laws of war. Withal, the war would have quickly revived shipbuilding and American shipping had it not been for the enactment of the "La Follette-Alexander Bill," one of the worst pieces of demagogic class legislation the world has ever beheld. This measure enabled American sailors to desert at will, while it prevented replacing

them with such sailors as are freely employed by both English and French shipmasters. By the enactment of useless and unwise details the bill made the operating cost of American ships so excessively dear that no freights whatever could be earned by American-owned vessels. The La Follette-Alexander Bill should have been entitled "a bill for driving American ships off the high seas." Passed on November 4, 1914, this iniquitous law has rapidly driven the remnant of American commerce off the seas. It handed over the Pacific commerce to Japan. A more wicked and a more unpatriotic measure than the La Follette-Alexander Bill has never been enacted by Congress. It is obvious that, unless this sort of legislation is soon put a stop to, Congress ought to give place to a more efficient kind of legislature. The Americans are a patient people, but

they are impatient in the end when reform is necessary. If necessary, they will reform Congress or any other governmental organ which stands persistently in the way of national progress. Possibly it cannot be said with accuracy that the neglect of the American merchant marine is the result of deliberate treachery to American institutions. That it is a manifestation of a certain sort of inept demagogy which often produces in popular governments very bad results for the time being is, however, evident.

To employ a euphemism, the worst has not been said concerning this "mistaken policy" of the American Congress. In time of war a great merchant marine is indispensable to many successful military operations. Without the aid of merchant shipping battles may be lost

and the country subjugated by a foreign power.

The rapid transport of troops by sea is a military necessity. It can be accomplished rapidly only by the employment of the national mercantile marine. To operate as an efficient auxiliary to the defense of the nation the merchant marine must be kept always in a state of the highest efficiency; the gross tonnage must be large, and the individual ships speedy and roomy. Three gross tons is reckoned the minimum for the transportation of a soldier and ten gross tons the minimum for a horse. In 1914–15 Germany had 5,090,331 gross tons of steel merchant shipping capable of landing at least 1,000,000 soldiers with adequate supplies on any enemy coast within a brief time. England was far better supplied with transport facilities, having

nearly 21,000,000 gross tons. The condition of the United States was negligible. It was not adequate to convey rapidly by sea even the small army necessary for the defense of the Panama Canal or Cuba. A hostile occupation of Cuba by an enemy force might prove fatal to the United States, and, what is more, easy of accomplishment by a great European power at war with America.

A merchant marine in time of war is essential for the collection of war material. America procures from Chile most of the sodium nitrate from which is made nitric acid, essential to the manufacture of guncotton and smokeless powder. Perhaps a hundred highly desirable articles for war material, not all of them indispensable, are derived from foreign countries, and can be conveyed in times of war only in domestic bottoms properly convoyed. In a hundred ways

a nation deprived of a mercantile marine by bad laws is placed at a great disadvantage in times of war as in times of peace.

In 1865 American deep-water tonnage carried seventy per cent. of its exports and sixty-five per cent. of its imports. But in 1914 almost all the exports and imports of America were carried by foreigners, who thrived with the profits paid to them by the American producers. Thus the millions of freight moneys which should have found their way into American banks were deposited in London and Berlin.

After the war, if America would remain at a high stage of national efficiency, the present laws affecting its merchant marine must be speedily altered. There is doubtless in America a popular disapproval of bounties and subsidies to American shipmasters. This spirit,

correct in the abstract, is much perverted and encouraged by demagogic politicians, who prefer to waste the public moneys in grossly extravagant expenditures more directly profitable to themselves or their constituents. A well-directed campaign of education may be necessary to prove to the people of the interior of America that a great merchant marine is essential to their protection and to the prosperity of the whole nation. Americans learn quickly, and they can be made to unlearn as quickly, if desired. When they come to perceive that the nation can be neither strong nor highly prosperous without a merchant marine, they will readily consent to all measures necessary for the upbuilding and the maintenance of American shipping.

The merchant marines of all the great powers have been built and maintained

by bounties, favorable discounts, or subsides. The greater European governments are most liberal to their ship-owners and to the national shipping interests generally. This policy is not animated by a desire to favor ship-owners, *qua* ship-owners, but to strengthen and fortify the whole nation. England has led the way in the development of English shipping by liberal subventions or bounties to English ships built on certain lines and convertible into armed cruisers. The English Government has not hesitated to make large advances of the public funds to English companies engaged in the business of overseas transportation. English postal subsidies to the fast English steamship lines are most liberal. In fact, the whole scheme of the law of England is designed to foster foreign commerce in English-built ships. Germany, France, and Japan all subsi-

dize in one way and another the ships under their flags. They recognize by their laws the fundamental importance of seaborne commerce under the national flag. The time has come when America must do the same or grow weaker and weaker as a power.

If American ship-builders are at a natural disadvantage, it must be overcome by necessary legislation. If the cost of maintenance of American ships is greater by reason of the greater cost of labor, or because of the unjust demands of labor-unions, then the American Government which tolerates such things must foot the bill in the interest of the whole nation and a determined national policy. Nothing will pay the nation better than large and liberal encouragement to American ship-builders and American ship-owners. Such a policy will in all probability result in the ultimate inde-

pendence of the ship industries of the country. In the end they will be made self-supporting, for shipmasters always fear to rely on the Government's continuing liberality. They naturally seek to become independent and self-supporting.

Cost the nation what it may, there can be no better investment of the public funds than in the support and maintenance of the American mercantile marine. When stately American ships cover every sea, when ocean greyhounds, American bred, carry Americans more swiftly and safely than the mail-boats of other nations; when the American flag floats proudly in every foreign port, then, and not until then, will America be a supremely great power. May that day speedily come!

CHAPTER XII

PREPAREDNESS

The worst foes of a long era of peace for the world are the idealists known as extreme pacifists and the socialistic dreamers. These fantastic thinkers forget that man is a dominating and a fighting being. In peace man struggles for mastery and success in human society; his victories in peace are the results of the lesser forces skilfully employed in a warfare of a social variety. Collectively, men love warfare more than peace. The will to dominate, which cannot be eradicated from human nature, impels men, combined in nations, to the use of the major forces whenever they

are necessary to attain national domination. The weapons employed in national force are called "armaments." If nations were to disarm by agreement, they would soon improvise the more primitive weapons necessary to enable them to carry out their new schemes of national domination. Battles might for a time be less scientific, but human ingenuity would make them hardly less sanguinary or less savage. It is idle to think that wars would be avoided because of national disarmaments. New and cheaper arms hastily improvised would be substituted for the abandoned armaments, but wars would not cease, and will never cease, while mankind remain masterful and contending beings. If nations were disarmed, the numerically weak nation would be placed at a greater disadvantage. The nations of millions would soon overcome and depress the nations

of thousands by the very force of numbers. Disarmament, to be effectual, would require the redistribution of countries into districts of equal content.

The men termed "pacifists" are of two varieties: those who would promote peace by sensible endeavor, and those who believe that wars may be eradicated by some scheme of universal disarmament or the total neglect of military education. The second kind of pacifists are called "extreme pacifists" because they believe that every warlike preparation is a moral offense. Extreme pacifists, in the very face of danger to their country, would consent to render it an easy prey for the enemy. Of all dangers to the state the extreme pacifists are the greatest. Every cultivated or thoughtful man is in some degree a pacifist. He loves peace and he believes in the substitution of arbitration for force

in the greatest possible number of international differences. But he recognizes that some national differences can be solved in only one way, and that way is by the employment of the national force in war. There have been wars from the very morning of history, and there will be wars until the night sets in for all mankind. There is not in Europe or in Asia a single eminent statesman who believes for one instant that warfare will ever be a thing of the past.

Preparedness has to do with the national necessity called war. If a nation is right-minded, and there are nations which are not so, the extremity of war will be avoided whenever possible. But whenever a war is inevitable, a right-minded nation will be prepared to meet it, and that kind of nation will survive in the struggle for human existence. If a nation neglects preparation for war, and

leaves itself exposed to every hostile aggression, that nation will be exterminated pursuant to the law which dooms all weaker beings in the struggle for existence. A nation which neglects preparedness is a weak or a decadent nation; it is a nation which lacks sense of proportion, one where the pursuit of wrong ideals has dulled the national intelligence. It is a nation which has decided to neglect its progeny and its future. Deliberately such a nation has chosen to be trampled on in the end by the more aggressive and the more enduring types of men and nations. America is not such a nation. It will end in being prepared for all eventualities. That is preparedness.

The first requisite for national preparedness, in view of the complicated, costly, and scientific military apparatus now employed in warfare, is a highly ef-

ficient civil government. The main efficient in modern warfare is a treasury balance on the right side, a prosperous national agriculture, and a rich and profitable national commerce. In a strong government all the national industries and organizations are sustained and made successful by judicious and highly scientific measures. Nothing good in the state is allowed to fall down. The education, the morale, the health, and the prosperity of the people of the nation are at all times maintained by governmental regulations at the highest stages of national efficiency. This desirable condition can be brought about only by a government conducted on the highest possible plane. Good government is essential to a strong and powerful nation and to preparedness.

Preparedness for America takes into consideration the extent of the territory

to be defended. America has four military fronts open to enemy attack. The Pacific coast-line is exposed to attack by any great Asiatic power. The Atlantic coast is exposed to the hostile actions of any European power at war with the United States. Mexico and Canada, both weak countries, are not able to defend their neutrality, and the territories of either or both may be readily used as a base by any great power or combination of powers at war with the United States. Future wars will probably be conducted by groups of powers allied for the time being. An attack on America may be simultaneously made on all its fronts. Preparedness for America, therefore, presents the problem how best to defend the country against hostile attacks from any or all directions. Preparedness in America is not an aggressive, but a defensive, policy for a naturally peaceful

and rich country living under a lax and decentralized government in times of peace. In times of war American Government, like the Roman, becomes more highly centralized, indeed a virtual dictatorship of an extremely powerful kind. The difficulty in America is that the conversion from one form of government adapted to peace to the other form more adapted for war takes time. In modern warfare there is little time given for preparedness. Consequently, if America wishes to continue as it is, it must live under a régime of preparedness. Most sensible men who love peace and security support a national scheme for minimum preparedness.

If Canada and Mexico were by proper and friendly treaties committed to some general alliance by which the whole of North America was obligated to resist hostile aggressions from across the seas,

the problem of preparedness would for the United States be much simplified. America would then be virtually an insular country. The first line of defense would be exclusively on the high seas, and this line could be held for a long time by a powerful and efficient navy. For the purposes of the exterior line of defense America should possess in the Pacific a modern fleet equal to that of the greatest Asiatic power. In the Atlantic, America should maintain a fleet equal to that of the greatest European power. With a coast-line of 6000 miles to guard, a little navy is of no use to the country. It would be better for America to abolish the naval service altogether than to trust its defense to a small navy. A navy of the size here suggested would be an adequate protection for a great and a rich country and enable it to

meet the attacks which are sure to come in the future of the nation.

The second line of defense for the proper security of America consists of the modern fortifications and military protective works necessary to guard the harbors and landing-places available for an enemy. To guard the second line the strongest possible modern fortresses should exist not at some points of the coast, but at all necessary points. Kept fully equipped with ordnance of the greatest power and range and with all the most advanced auxiliaries of modern defense, the second line of defense would be a protection to the country of the most efficient kind which it is overt treason in the military and the congressional authorities to neglect. The supplements to this second line of defense, the routes of quick communications, have not yet re-

ceived all the attention their great importance demands of the authorities. There is now no system of strategical railways in America. But this defect can be readily overcome. The third line of defense is the army. The character and quality of this branch of the national defense is the supreme military problem.

The United States will soon have to protect over two hundred millions of prosperous and peaceful citizens. It is thought by the best military authority that a standing army, for the effective defensive purposes of such a vast population, should consist of at least half a million men. This would be only one fourth of one per cent. of the population. Two hundred thousand soldiers would be required in the West and as many more in the East. One hundred thousand would be held in a central position, where they could easily be mobilized

either on the Southern or the Northern borders as the need developed. Such a regular army, if highly trained and disciplined in the most modern and scientific methods, would be the nucleus of the greater army of national defense. Under-disciplined, carelessly trained, or obsoletely armed and equipped, a regular army of even 500,000 would be worse than useless to the nation. An efficient modern army requires not only the most modern equipment, but an abundance of trained officers possessed of the best attainable military education. The Military Academy and the war colleges in America must therefore be kept superior to the best foreign standards. That they are so now many traveled Americans very much doubt; there are too many signs to the contrary.

It is generally assumed that a standing army has not been popular in America.

Certainly many American politicians of the easy-going, every-day variety have been opposed to a standing army, and the demagogues among them have long proclaimed that a standing army is a menace to liberty. But all Americans are not of the politician kind. Some of them are beginning to be convinced that in such a vast country, so rich and so largely populated, a regular army has become necessary for defense. A regular American Army, as most intelligent men believe, would have little power to harm liberty. Many civilians are now convinced that the power for good of a regular army would more than compensate for any risk it entails. A regular army would not bring about a perpetual dictatorship a day sooner. America will not submit to a dictatorship until the country has become so fallen and so utterly wretched as to be able to be saved

from disorder in no other way. When America has fallen into that degraded condition, no regular army will be necessary to bring about a dictatorship. When the time is ripe, a dictatorship will come about in America by acclamation, just as it came about in ancient Rome. In all probability the American Republic will not for centuries fall through the rise of a dictator or through the machinations of ambitious men. If it falls, it will be through a conquest by stronger powers.

It is thought by skilled military men to be possible for a combination of powers at war with America to land in North America in a comparatively brief space of time a million trained soldiers, properly equipped. There are now at least eight of the great powers each of which has an army of far more than two and a half million men. To cope with half

this number speedily, a regular army of 500,000 men, scattered throughout the United States, is conceded by experts to be wholly inadequate. A large part of the regulars would be required at the principal military stations throughout so vast a country. The regular army in America must therefore be largely supplemented by a national army quickly mobilized for the purpose of defense. A national army should be composed in the last extremity of all the men of military age. Probably there would never be an occasion when all would be called into the field.

The old militia system is obsolete and useless for defense. The testimony of the leading military authorities in America, from Washington down, is, in substance, that a militia is not an effective military arm of the nation. Since Washington complained of the militia it

has become, under modern conditions, even less effective. However well disposed and patriotic the militia may be, it requires immediate reorganization in every war. It is always reorganized as a national army. Consequently, it has become the general opinion in the country that the old militia system is obsolete and that it must give way to universal military service, preferably on the Swiss plan. The Swiss or the Australian plan seems to be the most democratic and the least expensive plan for the national army of a republic. The time it requires for training is short; it interferes little with the ordinary pursuits of the young men of the nation, while its cost to the republic is comparatively small.

The Swiss system gives to every male under age, as a part of his general education, a compulsory military training of

about one year. Thereafter the only additional military training necessary is about sixty-five days for the infantry, seventy-five for field artillery, and ninety days for the cavalry. The subsequent trainings, known as "repetition courses," are confined to eleven days annually. After their twenty-third year the young men are placed in the reserve. The reserve is called upon only in cases of dire necessity. The Swiss system, if adopted in the United States as in Australia, would have the merit of not seriously interfering with the civil life and industries of the country, while it would create a national army of millions of men, trained, disciplined, and effective for all purposes of defense. Together with the regular army and navy, this system would render the country invulnerable to attack, and thus tend to make it immune from hostile aggression.

The unfortunate tendency in America has been toward a general indisposition to undergo military hardships of any kind. The inclination of the young men in particular is to seek the softer, the slouching, and the indifferent phases of life. This tendency would be overcome if the Swiss system were adopted. Intensive military training promotes the general health, discipline, and order in ways most valuable for the country at large. A hardy body of young men, drilled, disciplined, and obedient to authority, would invigorate the whole country and stimulate the desired public order in all directions. Besides, universal military training would create a patriotic spirit and a love of country, without which no country can be in a healthy or a sound condition. Unless in such a condition, a nation is not prepared to meet all the vicissitudes of national existence,

and it ultimately would fall down before stronger and better-prepared nations.

If the United States were to adopt the Swiss system, a great national auxiliary army of the highest efficiency for all purposes would at once spring into being. Universal military service is thoroughly democratic and consistent with modern pressure. Modern military movements are so speedy that there is now no time given to create an army. An army must in modern times be in existence and able to be mobilized, thoroughly armed and equipped within a few days. Every man enrolled in the general army should always know his station in the event that the general army is quickly mobilized. Mobilization requires that the arms and equipment of the army shall always be ready. The greatest test of the military efficiency of a nation is the speed with which mobilization may be effected.

In order to mobilize speedily, everything must be ready. Modern guns and military material have become so elaborate and scientific that they cannot be improvised within a moderate space of time. They must be always on hand. Nothing can now be left to the future or chance. The general staff should therefore always know that all the necessary military equipment and appliances for the army and navy are ready to meet an attack from any quarter. The expense to the nation of being ready is small compared with the cost to a rich nation caught unprepared. Improvidence and lack of military preparation have cost the United States far more in the aggregate than the largest standing army has cost the most warlike nation in Europe.

The cost of maintaining a proper and efficient military establishment in the

United States in time of peace would be far less than the cost of a hurried and nervous preparation on the eve of a great war. Statistics show that the cost of the past wars conducted by the United States under the old plan of voluntary enlistment and improvised preparation for war has been the greatest of all modern wars. Indeed, the expenditures for military purposes in the United States have in recent years been almost as great as those of the most efficient military powers in Europe. In the United States only has the vast expenditure for military purposes been wasted and useless. From the present outlook it would appear that Americans have now determined to substitute an intelligent scheme of defense for the past wasteful extravagance amounting to national debauch. How best to accomplish it is the problem of preparedness.

All the former national wars of America have been conducted in circumstances more favorable than will occur again. The adversaries have been either weak nations or the terrain has been of America's own choice. Conditions have greatly changed. In the employment of the old rifle or musket American farmers and frontiersmen of the last century needed little training to make them efficient; they were accustomed to the use of these arms. With the disappearance of large game and the old frontier life, all this former advantage has been lost. In the use of modern weapons of defense no other nation is now more unskilled than the American. In modern warfare neither arms nor their proper employment can be suddenly improvised. Their production and their skilful use require a long period of preparation in times of peace.

Unless America arouses itself to the necessity of preparedness as a policy, it is doomed sooner or later to destruction as a great power. There are elements of dissolution within every organism; there are also foes external as well as foes internal. Preparedness would postpone the natural operation of these forces for centuries, perhaps. Of all the enemies of a great nation the worst are the dreamers who see ahead an era of universal and perpetual peace. As man is constituted, perpetual peace is impossible. The life of nations, like the life of man, is one long struggle. Only that nation will survive which is strong in all directions.

THE END