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

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the American *Anarchy*

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Democracy
in an Era of Bigness

the American *Anarchy*

by LIONEL GELBER

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Preface

A book, like the vicarious Puritan suitor, should speak for itself. A word may nevertheless be said here about the point from which this one starts. The case for democracy as a way of life has been enhanced by the example of its foes. We are on the right track. The purpose of the writer is, however, to scan afresh those elements in a mass society which make the fulfilment of democracy fall short of its promise.

The approach attempted is that of one whose main concern has been with questions of war and peace. Philosophers and theologians, lawyers and economists, historians and political scientists, sociologists and social psychologists have, by their analyses of the home front, shed light on the workings of democracy. Yet one major test is how it handles or mishandles its international relations. And it is as a student of these that this observer was led to set down his impression of the American scene as a whole.

Nor does he confine himself to it. As goes the United

States, so, in the middle years of the twentieth century, goes the civilized West. Political aspects of the modern crisis were dealt with by the writer before, during, and since the second world war in three previous volumes; on basic issues he stands now where he has always stood. And so far as these pages restate his views, the object is to show what, within the nature of a free social order, served to weaken the defense of our free world order. In the end this is a book not only about American trends but about that wider crisis which is the crisis of humanity.

LIONEL GELBER

New York,
Spring, 1953.

the
American
Anarchy

CHAPTER

I

The Revaluation of Man

At the heart of liberty there is moral conviction. Before men could win freedom they had to believe not only that they can be but that they ought to be free. Many are the threads of modern liberty, but by the eighteenth and nineteenth centuries they had been gathered together and woven into the social fabric of our time. The impelling force of those earlier years was a revaluation of man: an upward estimate of his attributes and his capacity to shape his own destiny; a new sense of his almost limitless potentialities if he were allowed fully to develop. In the twentieth century these first fine careless raptures have petered out. For the age is challenged by a devaluation of man. If liberal ideas had not been at a discount, or could not have been debased in their social application, the totalitarian recoil from them would have been less formidable. To most newly emancipated countries of the Orient a liberal philosophy of undevalued man is still alien; in the Occident authoritarian regimes have not revalued man

but have devalued him still further. And even in the democracies of the West much that purports to revalue may do the reverse. How and why that happens is the theme of these pages.

In domestic affairs, as in world politics, the issue of liberty is the issue of power: to curb arbitrary power through responsible power. But responsibility is more than a question of method. Legal and constitutional innovations may drastically refashion the pattern of power; in its modified form the contest of power proceeds. Nor does it entail only the classic confrontation between the individual and the State. Government bureaucracies, subject as they are to a democratic chain of command, may be less irresponsible than other bureaucracies which characterize a large-scale society. But wherever there is collective power—institutional, corporate, cooperative, official or voluntary, public, semi-public, or private—the problem of control arises.

The issue, then, is not one merely of freedom against organization. That antinomy is, in both the national and the international sphere, too simple and too stark. Between the individual and society the union has always been indissoluble. But as the individual is revalued and society grows more complex this relationship alters. We cannot have liberty unless we organize to promote and protect it. Yet the more we combine the more difficult it is to guard against the social irresponsibility that inheres within organization itself.

Nor is control or lack of control over the instruments of production all that affects the community. Not every consumer is a producer, but every producer is also a consumer. And as social well-being is diffused, the individual becomes more and more aware of this. In a mass society consumption may not only be personal and private but in some areas will be shared in common; con-

trol or lack of control over its instruments is therefore a matter that cannot be omitted from any democratic reckoning. A Marxian analysis would revalue man in terms of class; a doctrine of race, such as Hitler expounded, denies that man can be revalued at all. A large-scale democracy may espouse concepts that are broader than the one and more humane than the other. For it, as for them, organization remains the vehicle of history.

The will to freedom may be a moral impulse. But without man's intellectual liberation it could not be canalized and set to work. Science and technology might need some moral content; the open mind is nevertheless still a prerequisite of the open society. Copernicus in the sixteenth century, Galileo and Newton in the seventeenth, did not just signalize the rebirth of experimental science; as free objective inquiry was undertaken it cleared the ground for man's revaluation. We know now that man is unable to increase his powers for good without increasing his powers for evil. Yet until science struck a liberal note even the struggle for national and religious freedom constituted a clash of one sort of closed mind with another. During the eighteenth and nineteenth centuries the open mind could at last tackle the closed mind boldly and in force; the spirit of the age was sanguine enough to promise it a wide triumph at an early date. But the totalitarian reversion of the twentieth century exposed that pledge as premature and curiously naive. For the closed mind reasserted itself in new and more terrible fanaticisms; open-mindedness, harassed unexpectedly at home, has had to defend itself to the utmost abroad. The war of the open against the closed mind which the nineteenth century deemed itself on the verge of winning is, on either front, still far from won.

The open mind suffers, moreover, from the defects of its virtues. Liberalism may have been its main champion in public affairs; yet that, by its own mentality, is bound to be more handicapped than its adversaries. For the open mind is in fact many-minded; to be divided in mind is to be indecisive in policy. The liberal tradition which democracy at its best enshrines—tentative, relativist, tolerant—fetters by its own self-critical nature even as it sets loose. In an age of dynasts without dynasties, the dynamism of single-mindedness has been mostly on the other side.

Before it can ascertain where it is going from here, democracy must first ask how it got where it is. When Communist ideologues anticipate the collapse of the West from its own inner contradictions, they pay an unintended tribute: in a graveyard all is unanimous. But such contradictions as afflict our system do not corrode as grievously as those which pervade their own. If democracy falls short, it falls short of a target it itself erected. Only in the light of liberal expectations can liberal failures be appraised.

It may have been during the Renaissance and the Reformation that Europeans began to scrutinize their world and themselves with a fresh eye. An era of discovery, this was, however, one also of rediscovery. To Biblical aspiration and Greek thought—what Matthew Arnold would call Hebraism and Hellenism—anybody might now have recourse. Rome had furnished order and law. The Greeks, with their devotion to reason and beauty, with a concept of justice which would in the abstract render to each his due, bequeathed to the West one of its two main civilizing legacies. But their vision of society was a static, unprogressive one; for them the Golden Age of humanity lay in the past. That men are all equal in the sight of God it was for the Prophets of

Israel to proclaim. No doctrine would ever be as revolutionary as this; out of it sprang the twin ideal of peace and social justice for each and all alike—the Messianic notion of a better life here on earth in the future. To those who cherished that notion, existence had a purpose; righteousness among men stemmed from the moral governance of the universe. They did not drift rudderless upon uncharted seas.

As moral imperative and scientific method interacted, man could slowly be revalued. But persecuting theologies were themselves an obstacle. Luther and Calvin in rebelling against a single center of religious authority had, to their discomfiture, started something, in their own and other spheres, which they could not finish. Capitalism, already under way in medieval Catholic Europe and with Jews among its forerunners, would get a fillip from Protestant activity. Yet first wars of religion had to be halted lest Europe bleed itself to death. When Church and State were sundered, tolerance could supervene; a concomitant of military stalemate, the sway of the open mind would thus rest upon considerations of power. That brute truth was, however, obscured by the fortunate ascendancy of countries in which liberal ideas were to flourish. And for ignoring it the twentieth century itself would pay an exorbitant price.

Meanwhile in England the common law, a limited monarchy, and the supremacy of Parliament had reached a point sufficient to inspire John Locke and those of other lands who borrowed from him. What it deemed to be man's natural rights the Enlightenment of the eighteenth century would codify. Since the Middle Ages the individual had been coming more and more to the fore; Bacon and Descartes set in train the idea of progress. And now in its optimism the eighteenth cen-

tury would exalt Reason, Progress, and the inalienable Rights of Man. It was these which the American and French Revolutions invoked and tried to implement. Divine Right, as vouchsafed by the Creator, seemed to be passing from the ruler to the ruled.

But as outworn authority was shaken off, would individualism become anarchic? At what stage, if any, did freedom for the self become inimical to the freedom of others? The Industrial Revolution would be the economic counterpart of all that was revolutionizing politics. What occurred is familiar enough. Adam Smith, Jeremy Bentham, and the utilitarians of the nineteenth century added to Whig principles of civil and religious liberty the notion that for each man to pursue his own economic self-interest would result in the greatest good of the greatest number. Through the mechanism of the market system there was a self-equilibrating harmony; in enterprise, in government, and in the expression of ideas, freedom connotes an absence of restraint. In industry and commerce, as in other domains which were to be liberalized, a new middle class had for three centuries been stirring; such economic individualism would be the capitalist rationale. Success was the reward of competition; any, unimbued with the profit motive, who could not buy cheap or sell dear, might be trampled underfoot; the Rights of Man became the rights of economic man. From the dour rationalism of Machiavelli and Hobbes to the grim romanticism of Nietzsche there had been philosophers who depicted life as a struggle for power. And with Darwin that view would apparently soon have stamped upon it the imprimatur of science.

But each man for himself and the devil take the hindmost could scarcely be esteemed by its victims, young and old, as an axiom of liberty. Marring the country-

side, the dark, satanic mills of the early industrialists also disfigured the moral landscape. Social Darwinism coincided with second thoughts about the social validity of economic liberalism. The sort of conflict to which it portrayed men as implacably doomed ran—as did the population theory of Malthus and the wage theory of Ricardo—counter to Victorian optimism; post-Darwinians perceived that economic alleviation must also be allowed to evolve. And to their support science itself would afterwards rally. For contemporary biologists aver that the instincts of man are more altruistic than predatory, more cooperative than combative.

Yet as society advances from the primitive to the modern and from the individualistic economy of the nineteenth century to the large-scale collectivities of the twentieth, it is the incidence of competition that is changed rather than the thing in itself. The terrain shifts; the competitive battle is resumed. Great causes and great principles would never have been served at all if there had not always been some to serve them selflessly. But the number of such devotees is, in any one era, invariably a small one. And against them there is often group tyranny to demonstrate that the social and the selfish may go together. As the economy alters, the worst excesses of the old individualism are mitigated. But to it, and to its dissemination of risk capital, mass and class alike now owe inestimable benefits. And as its bad features are jettisoned can its good ones be retained? If they are not, the wheels may still turn—as they have in the Soviet Union. But under them will lie crushed much that was best, politically and intellectually, in individualism itself.

The ameliorative trend has, of course, been a twofold one. The lot of the worker, thrust into the dehumanizing travail of urban industrialism, had to be

improved and the system's own drastic fluctuations somehow ironed out. Social unrest brought collective bargaining in its train and recognition of trade unions—with better conditions of work, shorter hours, higher wages. Concurrently there are social insurance schemes, housing programmes, public health services, public education, public works, public assistance, nationalized enterprises, a plethora of boards to administer and mediate. And the heavier taxation through which such a welfare state is financed may by itself signalize a redistribution of wealth. Yet in the viability of the welfare state, capital also has a major stake. For under industrialism not only are men at the mercy of the machine—the machine itself has been at the mercy of the trade cycle.

It would have been anomalous for an epoch of invention to endure stoically a self-regulating economic mechanism that did not regulate. Too severe had been the depressions which entailed bankruptcy for the entrepreneur and reduced earnings for his employees or raised for them the hideous specter of unemployment. Socialism had long agitated for a radical transformation of the entire economy. Keynes argued while Franklin Roosevelt and Harry Truman tried to prove that capitalism might by itself yet correct its own unruly gyrations. In recent years, however, war and rearmament have done most to keep the pumps primed. Nor will State intervention, from the standpoint of responsibility and control, be the same in a democracy as it is in a dictatorship. The salient fact is that industrial society, whether free or unfree, cannot do without a vast amount of it.

The circle had been completed. The inventions of man date from the dim mists of antiquity. But as they proliferated in the new individualistic atmosphere of the eighteenth and nineteenth centuries, the material

foundations of modern society were recast. *Laissez faire* had repudiated mercantilism; yet even where the State dispensed with subsidies or tariffs, it backed private interests in foreign trade and overseas colonization. Now, however, State intervention had as its object the prosperity not of any one segment of the community but of the populace as a whole. Under middle-class guidance there had been no such general solicitude. Only through the State could the individual himself be protected from the social ravages of economic individualism.

That he might also want to be protected from a government which yet protects him would, in the twentieth century, be one phase of the liberal dilemma. In illiberal societies the techniques of industrialism fasten the yoke of the State upon the individual more harshly than ever. For despotic power which standardizes politically can therewith standardize economically and socially; through mass production, based on laborsaving devices and the division of labor, it is rendered thoroughgoing, total. Wherever there is uniformity in tools and regularity in their use, the scale of organization may, irrespective of regimes, be enlarged. And even in representative democracies the safeguards of law cannot prevent organization thus enlarged from becoming a law unto itself.

When, moreover, standardized techniques permeate the whole of life, life itself is wont to be standardized. The drudgery of labor in an office or at a conveyer belt may not be irremediable; nor, from ancient galley slave to feudal serf, has it been peculiar to industrialism. But to relieve monotony is not to ensure the flowering of individuality; an enforced standardization may—as mass leisure pursuits reveal—only be converted into an unenforced one. Autonomy of taste and independence of

outlook will be hard to cultivate in any standardized culture; the predicament of the individualistic springs from the character of large-scale democracy itself. For it is only through the ramified technology of modern industrialism that its nonprofit, collective undertakings —governmental, professional, vocational, philanthropic, educational—can operate. And the more man is revalued, the more does his existence also depend upon organization of that sort. In a totalitarian State all is organized; in a free society all may organize. Yet nowadays this, too, is a freedom which can itself only be observed within an intricate framework already organized. What the individual may or may not do on his own under these circumstances is, in practice, as much a criterion of liberty as any legal right which might nominally be his.

It is through large-scale organization that a marriage is achieved between the mass and the machine. Nor does this conjuncture take place merely where man is a producer and consumer of industrial goods and services: it occurs wherever men are linked purposively together. The group may be a natural or spontaneous aggregation; to organize is to formalize and acquire an aim. Where formerly room was scant, the many can thus participate functionally within a single fold. And wherever organizational techniques permit the individual to have a voice in wider affairs, they are a bedrock of democracy.

Organization may employ and emulate the machine. Between the two there is, nevertheless, an intrinsic difference. Objectivity is the hallmark of invention and science; the machine, as an agent not of life but energy, is wholly impersonal. Organization, though it extends beyond any one person, may, however, be in-

wardly as subjective as it is outwardly objective. Whether it humanizes or dehumanizes, whether it binds men together willingly or manipulates them unwillingly, it is human in context, sentient rather than inanimate in its stresses and strains. Toward morality the machine is neutral, passive, motionless until set in motion; since others must govern its use it can have no ethics of its own. But organization, while devoid of life, yet contains life; its use may be determined by an interior as well as an exterior power. A machine for men, it is likewise one of men. And as such it enlarges their virtues or frailties and reflects some of its own.

History, from the days of Babylon, Egypt, and Rome, has been replete with the annals of bigness. Yet, without contemporary organizational techniques, bigness could not so basically and so universally condition our epoch. Social customs and legal systems have long sought to banish anarchy from the relations between man and man, between man and the community, between the lesser community and the greater; democracy would attempt to reconcile liberty and order. But in the twentieth century a further organizational dimension has emerged; and on that new social plane, order and liberty must again be reconciled. Man since his early days has hit upon devices that yield a power over Nature which surpasses his own and which is quite detached from himself. Multiplying that power incalculably, technology not only creates but requires a more complex mass society. A liberal like Louis Brandeis might deplore bigness because it eliminated competition between small business units; because it made for the decline of the nineteenth-century entrepreneur and the predominance in the twentieth century of huge depersonalized agglomerations. By organizing against organi-

zation, these would be regulated. But then the regulatory institutions of democracy itself might take on a similar organizational hue.

Though the issues go beyond government, its own limitations illustrate their nature. Government cannot legislate for every phase of modern collective action. But even if it could, how deep will its writ penetrate? Legal justice may lay the groundwork for social justice—to liberate politically and render more secure economically. Yet wherever there is large-scale organization, governmental or nongovernmental, power will be concentrated in the hands of a few. Against its abuse, democracy, in certain areas, does no doubt erect safeguards. But so ambivalent is magnitude organized that the very instruments of social justice might in effect be wielded unjustly. To revalue man in the mass and yet devalue him as an individual would be for liberalism to attain its goal and yet miss it.

It is, moreover, this Sisyphean element in human institutions that marks off the Victorian effort to establish a free society from our own. Nineteenth-century liberals had faith in progress; in the twentieth century it is the antagonists of progress who have had the ardor of faith. At its most sanguine the nineteenth century realized how far from Utopia it was; invention and science were intimating, however, that Utopia itself might not be an idle dream. Darker views about man and his prospects did not lack exponents. Yet in so buoyant an age even skepticism often indicated no barren mood of negation but liberal openness of mind. Aware as it was of the human animal's competitive imperfections, it yet assumed that he is perfectible. And that assumption was the source of its optimism. Receiving justice, man himself, alone or in the mass, would be just. Careers, in the Napoleonic phrase, were open

to talent. Merit, by dint of capacity or diligence, would gain its due reward.

And that concept is the pith of democracy. Politically its liberal foundations are an equality of civil liberties in the courts of law, in the choice of government; in an array of freedoms—speech, press, religion, assembly—through which these are upheld. Economically its postulate has been an equality of opportunity in carving out a career, in earning a livelihood. Yet in such matters aristocracy also subscribes to an ideal of justice; with an eye to excellence its proponents had, ever since Plato, advocated the rule of the best. But democracy retorts that the best can emerge only if all have the same chance to develop. Competition, in other words, should not be unfair competition; it must not be weighted against those who neither inherit nor enjoy any extraneous advantage. Socially it took liberalism almost a century to grasp how unjust a one-sided individualism could be to other individuals. But neither is large-scale organization disposed to mete out justice with an even hand. For what satisfies the average may omit or overwhelm any who deviate from the norm. Yet it is the nonaverage, the exceptional, the individualistic who render society meaningful. Self-fulfilment is sound liberal doctrine but not when it is achieved at the expense of others. During the nineteenth century the pendulum swung too far in one direction. The opposite danger is what large-scale democracy now faces.

The nineteenth century believed with the rustic Thoreau that if you could make a better mousetrap the world would beat a path to your door. When business profit or direct utility is involved—and patent monopolies or vested interests do not intervene—so arcadian a result may still occur. But otherwise it does this less and less.

Responsibility between governed and governing is the democratic nexus—that of free individuals responsible to themselves, to others, to an accepted moral code. Yet such is the impact of large-scale organization that it intensifies both responsibility and irresponsibility. So irresponsible a mass society as the totalitarian State is rendered feasible by it; without its techniques the more socially responsible welfare State could not function. But organized magnitude introduces a degree of irresponsibility, private and public, corporate and group, which can impair democracy itself. This is the case, moreover, throughout a free society; and less almost in government than elsewhere. It is as though a structure alters in texture as it grows in size; changing the scale, as Lyman Bryson remarks, changes the institution. And a collectivized age is an institutional one. Wherever there is large-scale enterprise, the control which is tightened at one level becomes more elusive at another.

Mass production by lowering unit costs and, as returns increase, by inviting capital investment, may facilitate a higher standard of living: it is the economic base of man's revaluation. But while that is a liberal aim its accomplishment is not unremittingly or inevitably liberal. Mass production, with the assembly line as its emblem, may first have worked its spell in the United States where circumstances were ripe and propitious. When a unified Germany next went in for it, she was gingerly toying with a representative system of parliamentary government. But with her later, with Imperial Japan, and subsequently with the Soviet Union, the march of invention would show itself to have been technically a forward one and politically backward. Large-scale organization may spread social benefits. Between it and a free society, however, there is no indigenous or necessary correlation.

And that is why, even in politically responsible systems, there are spheres of action which, by being organizationally irresponsible, undermine broad democratic controls. In the West socialist and capitalist doctrines may, under varying party labels, oppose each other; the tactics and composition of rival armies tend to be alike. For the profit motive evokes only one sort of competitive urge; the counters change but the game is the same. Wherever there is institutional power, and not in government alone, the struggle for it between persons and groups will be as potent as ever. Liberty is more than holding at bay the monstrous regiment of commissars. As between free and unfree societies, bigness by itself must impose organizational resemblances. They differ qualitatively. Yet as they approximate each other quantitatively, the qualitative gap may narrow.

Breaking old authoritarian chains with one hand, liberalism had thus been forging subtle new ones with the other. Large-scale dictatorships strive to populate the Western world with devalued men, moral robots, political automatons; the weapons liberalism provided they turn upside down to extirpate liberalism itself. But though modern democracy is supposed to foster diversity, the mass standards it itself elicits are an organizational echo of the totalitarian recession toward the uniform society and the conforming individual.

Not that the mediocrity which ensues is identical in every large-scale system. The easygoing validity of representative democracy has been enhanced since the nineteenth century by the savage ferocity of militant alternatives. And yet the cause of man's revaluation had long passed from the comparatively idyllic stage which visualized it merely as a simple divorce by the individual from the ruling power. Democracy to Rousseau signified the General Will. Burke, however, had been

shocked by the spectacle of the French Revolution and against the mass he defended, as a shield for the individual or the minority, a patrimony of law and custom. But not only is the conflict between individual and collective rights transformed by large-scale organization. Privilege itself makes a fresh bow.

The mission of liberalism was in the eighteenth and nineteenth centuries to throw off controls. In the twentieth century it has been to decide which, as they are restored, would be just and which unjust. But is power, as its loci shift, always amenable to control? Liberty had once been regarded as an absence of restraint; today's restraints were designed to preserve wider liberties. Social liberalism and democratic socialism have diverged over who should own the means of production; now the question is one of how to plan and what. Employers, moreover, had held political power through economic power. Employees—through the voting franchise, through collective bargaining and the ability through strikes to withhold labor—would counteract with political power to acquire economic power. Large-scale organization thus strengthened democracy socially. By the same token, where there was no tradition of freedom, it socialized tyranny.

Between the closed economy and the closed mind the regressive tie has, in the twentieth century, been profound. On the continent of Europe democratic socialism derives a great deal from past statist benevolence. But Hitler's totalitarian polity did not only incorporate the social accomplishments of the Weimar Republic; paternalism was a heritage of that Prussian military state which Bismarck modernized. So also with Soviet Russia and Communist China where industrialism is reorganizing territories in which man has long been devalued. For there, as elsewhere, large-scale reform,

when liberal antecedents are lacking, ceases to be progressive. The totalitarian state, Left or Right, has been but an extreme example of how retrograde are the uses to which may be put the most contemporaneous of social mechanisms. Britain, less steeped than her continental neighbours in Marxian ideology, might do more than they to socialize herself and do it without abandoning parliamentary democracy. But that was not because she had stumbled upon a magic formula others can adopt for solving the liberal dilemma of liberty versus authority, private initiative versus State endeavor. It merely demonstrates how puissant among so homogeneous and civilized a people is a free nation's fidelity to freedom. For if organization is the vehicle of history, history is the key to history itself.

Conservatism with a flair for power that was inbred had sensed the liberal dilemma from the outset. Satisfied with things as they are, it raised eyebrows at liberalism's self-satisfaction over things as they were going to be. But to attain office, as the franchise was extended, votes had to be attracted; it also went reformist. Social services were more akin to a rural squirearchy's conception of *noblesse oblige* than the arid middle-class individualism of the early liberals; in Britain, at any rate, Disraeli and Shaftesbury presented Tory doctrine with warmth and sympathy. But conservatism everywhere still put the accent, in the vein of Alexander Hamilton, on property rights; still held that, as the State intervened on behalf of the little man against big aggregations of corporate power, it should make haste slowly. Economically where liberalism stood fifty years ago conservatism stands today.

In its attitude toward social reform conservatism has, however, been schooled against rebuff. As between rulers and ruled, it had a foot in both camps. To it Lord

Acton's famous liberal aphorism came therefore as no surprise; in its bones it always felt that power, irrespective of persons, party, station, class, or race, tends to corrupt. Taking a gloomier view than liberalism of man's innate goodness, conservatism had never expected as much of him. Little as it knew, at the high noon of liberal credulity, about Freud and his probings of the subconscious, it would not have been aghast to learn that the rational is less propulsive than the irrational or that the ego, now dormant, now alert, so thoroughly colors much of what we do. The more completely liberal optimism was confounded, on both the domestic and foreign scene, the more would conservative pessimism be endorsed.

Nowhere is justice, whether for the one or the many, continuous, automatic, self-generating. Yet the illusion that it might be did more to paralyze liberalism than all the fury of its foes. Events abroad have been but a lurid exaggeration of tendencies at home. The physical ruin that would be the consequence of air-atomic warfare is not only related to the moral ruin which German mass crematoria and Russian slave camps symbolize. Political irresponsibility in the democratic world which paved the way for the second German war and its dire sequel is an outgrowth of the moral irresponsibility that dwells in every large-scale society. The cult of Reason in the eighteenth and nineteenth centuries had dispelled *mystiques* only to beget one of its own. The votaries of progress, though evil abounded, could look forward and look with confidence. The twentieth century, observing how organized magnitude in the wrong hands may simply maximize evil, has lost confidence in itself and dreads to look forward.

Life, liberty, and the pursuit of happiness, that thunderous Jeffersonian phrase, must have seemed, amid the

social crudities of early industrialism, a goal incredibly remote. Yet liberalism did make amends for what was done at its behest. As a political party, its banner is unfurled less and less. A catalytic process, its revaluation of man would stand in contrast to the organized credos—whether of class, race, or nation—of totalitarian determinism. But if another brand of determinism is itself latent in large-scale organization, then large-scale democracies will also languish in its insidious grip.

The attitude of modern democracy toward the individual owes much to Biblical concepts of a free moral order. Yet the mechanism of man's revaluation is a morally lifeless mass technology. The Victorians took for granted that, into its dry bones, revalued man might himself breathe a semblance of his own sovereign moral life. That was easier said than done. For the nostrils of organized magnitude draw breath but never its own; blow fire but not through spontaneous combustion. Without science men could scarcely have been revalued. Yet in secularizing the age it has left them with ideological fevers rather than moral passion. Drained of moral content, justice itself may falter. And where the techniques of organized magnitude augment irresponsible power, there will be fewer inner moral checks to mitigate its abuse.

CHAPTER

2

Bigness and World Order

Between as within nations the prospects of liberty in the twentieth century have been and will be decided by a ceaseless struggle between responsible and irresponsible power. If the nineteenth century's revaluation of man fell short, it was because nowhere more than in the international sphere had it overestimated man himself. Through large-scale organization the nation-State could be welded now into a more efficient unit. But integration there entailed disintegration elsewhere. An interlocking world, which the machine seemed to unite, was in fact disunited by the very magnitude it had the technical means to organize. Totalitarian systems would illustrate how irresponsible power might be consolidated nationally. Internationally the democracies themselves were remiss in organizing together on any large scale their own power for peace. And for the follies of the twenties and thirties they would in the fifties still pay a heavy price. Overorganized where, for the sake of freedom, it should not have been, the world was

underorganized where such neglect was the supreme irresponsibility.

During the nineteenth century overseas countries shared more and more with Europe itself the center of the stage. From Napoleon Bonaparte I to the Emperor William II there were no global wars. Yet in Europe and America, in Asia and Africa, thousands died on the field of battle. Many of these local wars were wars of conquest. But the Italians, the Americans, and the Germans also waged wars of national unity—though wars of conquest and wars of unity were, for the Germans, one and the same. Not everywhere would national uprisings be crowned with success. But liberalism cherished an individuality whose values were national as well as personal. It therefore hailed the national cause as its own.

It was in for a rude awakening. For nationalism became absolute and thereby illiberal when State and race were identified. National freedom was a progressive aim. Within one sovereign fold, however, racial minorities would, like other minorities, ask that their rights be respected; a pluralistic nationalism as the nucleus of a relative internationalism was the principle that liberals espoused. Nor could men be revalued in the Occident without also being revalued in the Orient. In Asia, in Africa, as in Latin America, the quest for a better life was incited by the growth on other continents of large-scale industrialism. Searching for raw materials and preferential markets, the economy of the West accelerated the crass exploitation of underdeveloped lands and colonial territories. Domestically a ruthless industrialism was to have put upon it the brakes of social reform; so also there would be native resistance to economic imperialism. Meanwhile as nations vied commercially with each other the nineteenth century saw in their rivalry a guarantee of freedom. A pre-established

Benthamite harmony of interests would maintain peace abroad as it sustained liberty at home.

Nor was such a hypothesis a strictly pecuniary one to be justified in terms of pounds, shillings, and pence. Technology might serve morality. By bringing peoples into touch with each other, not only would freedom of trade be more lucrative for all concerned; understanding, a balm rather than an irritant, might be engendered between them. For if death is the great leveler, war is the great devaluer. When victory counts more than life itself, the human personality can no longer be sacred. War organizes each side at the expense of the individual; liberalism wished to organize all sides at the expense of war. And yet as the scale of war was enlarged not only did it involve the strength of nations rather than the resources of cities or princes; not only did it devalue more individuals, combatant and noncombatant, than ever before. Suddenly its major stake was the entire revaluation of man himself. For the democracies could always purchase a peace of surrender: but, with their power gone, they would forfeit their way of life. How to curtail war and yet preserve freedom has thus been the paramount issue of world organization. It is one, moreover, about which liberals themselves were calamitously irresolute.

Looking at the progress of invention, the development of continents, the march of science, they said that war did not pay. And that was so for countries which merely wanted to keep what they already possessed. Not until the middle of the twentieth century did the miseries of defeat induce second thoughts among peoples who had never subscribed wholeheartedly to this liberal thesis. And even among them exhaustion should not be confused with conversion.

Prodigious had been the yield of peaceful enterprise

since the Industrial Revolution. To ameliorate the human lot seemed to be the really serious business of an enlightened society. War as an interruption was, for those who were content with their place in the sun or whose sun had set, worse than war as waste. Yet the victor, to whom belonged the spoils, did not emerge from war's havoc empty-handed. In the United States, wars of independence and reunification bore liberal fruit and so, until the advent of Fascism, did those of Italy. Nor had the United States, like Italy in Africa, furthered herself hemispherically or oceanically without the threat of force or its actual use. To Germans and Japanese war in the liberal era was to be as remunerative; only Russia, having wounds to lick, would bide her time. It took the English-speaking peoples four centuries to spread around the globe; Germans and Japanese, with their national self-idolatry, fancied they could catch up and overtake them in one fell swoop. Without conflict in 1866 and 1870 the Reich would never have been unified. The brief continental hegemony it attained through the wars of 1914 and 1939 was a proud feat—a near success on each occasion. With their cities razed, their frontiers cracked and sliced up, the resurgent West Germans may now only sell themselves to the highest bidder. Even as a makeweight their views about the utility or disutility of war can still be vital.

Upon that question it is the Soviet Union which today has the last word. And for Russia, too, the ebb and flow of two German invasions, the Japanese menace, and the minor campaigns of the twenties might have demonstrated that war does not pay. Yet never have her own boundaries been so distended, never has her warlike power stretched so far.

Freedom at home, peace abroad, might thus be de-

sired by some peoples less than other things. To revalue men who themselves inherit the values of the West is in itself a herculean task. But not all cherish in common or have been conditioned by these values; not all, even where their moral values are ostensibly the same as ours, exhibit in history the moral fiber to stand up and affirm them. National self-interest and the universal interests of mankind would, in a view typical of the nineteenth century, coincide. They did, in fact, nothing of the sort. In the twentieth century organized magnitude so enlarges irresponsible power on a national scale as to render world affairs more unstable than ever before. The nineteenth century insisted upon the right of each State to its own sovereignty. But, and despite liberal doctrine, there was no invariable correlation between the individual freedom of States and the individual freedom of their subjects. As some countries organized for democracy others organized against it, and in organizing against it they would, in a deeper global sense, organize against any liberal organization of man.

It is, then, between the exercise of irresponsible power at home and the impact of such irresponsible power abroad that there has been the one certain correlation. Patriotism, through large-scale techniques, facilitates a psychic merger of the mass and the nation; personal liberty was not missed when, for many, another, emotionally more satisfying, freedom could be asserted. As the Russians moved from nineteenth-century Tsarism to twentieth-century Communism their chance to strike a blow for individual rights did not last long. The fault may or may not be theirs. The submissiveness they have displayed allowed them to be organized not only against their own freedom but against the freedom of others. They might have preferred liberty; with

them, as with the Germans, there has seldom been time to ascertain what, under less adverse circumstances, their preferences would be. In every great democracy, as in most small ones, liberty was never conferred but achieved. And those who have achieved it can only take those who have not as they find them.

When the Germans demolished the European balance of power, the way was clear for the Soviet incubus. And for their flight from responsibility in the domestic sphere, their ensuing exercise of irresponsible power internationally, they had less excuse than the Russians themselves. Germans, unlike the latter, were not outside the orbit of the West; from much that had opened the European mind since the fifteenth century they did not dwell in Muscovite seclusion. Nor did the French Revolution or the abortive democratic revolutions of 1848 pass them by; for the social reforms of nineteenth-century industrialism they were in the van. Yet even these were paternal rather than liberal in origin. So renowned a German exponent of man's revaluation as Kant himself had, like Luther before him, preached obedience to the State; while others developed genuine representative government, the well-drilled Prussian absolutism would receive its Bismarckian rationale in the pages of Hegel. For large-scale organization under the aegis of an industrialized, unified Germany the ominous pattern was set.

Fortified through the repulse of liberalism in Germany herself, German national power would recurrently vanquish liberalism elsewhere. The wars of 1914 and 1939, with their dire aftermath, were the gauge of its effect; in the twentieth century no other single factor would so thrust back and debase the free civilization of the West. Under Hitler the German mass did not only burst open the sluice-gates through which

could pour the Russian hordes; Western Europe may never regain the pre-eminence it had enjoyed since the Middle Ages. For where man is devalued through irresponsible power at home, there resides irresponsible power to devalue him still more abroad.

A world which the machine might bind together is thus one which it can also split asunder. Does this mean that our industrial environment makes the mass more aggressive than its primitive ancestors; that the tools which would revalue man have merely brutalized him? What it does signify, in the light of modern communications and long-range weapons, is that there have been no changes in man himself commensurate with the changes in his surroundings. Ethically he is much the same, technically he is not. With what he can do he leaps ahead; between technological gallop and moral jog-trot the distance is lengthened rather than reduced. And that cleavage is all the more pronounced when, as a social technique, large-scale organization advances on an ever broader front. Through it the power of man over man extends. But even where he would control that power, the control is always less than the power itself.

And that is why a world which has shrunk technically can yet be one that seems too big. The more intricately its units are organized, the more do they slip out of control. Totalitarian government may constitute a revulsion from all that is best in our free society. But the primordial had steadily lurked near the surface of civilization everywhere. Capitalism has not only exploited; its methods have themselves been exploited by modern dictatorships, whether Communist, Fascist or Nazi, for purposes that were anticapitalist. What renders a totalitarian system iniquitous is not merely the

evil to which it slides back but the massive social power which organized magnitude puts at its disposal.

Moral autarchy has, in other words, been the precursor of autarchic ferocities in other domains. The Benthamite concept of an automatic harmony of interests, never fully applicable anywhere, may be entirely obsolete in a collectivized, large-scale society. But Communism, Fascism, and Nazism are not a direct consequence of its internal breakdown; these ideologies ripened in countries where there had been, even less than in the democracies of the West, a free market economy or genuine representative government. How large-scale techniques could distort as they fulfilled liberal aspirations, modern democracies were to perceive. Their misuse, when adopted by traditionally illiberal societies, would imperil liberal societies as well.

If liberalism had not made headway in achieving responsible power, it might never have so misconceived the role of power itself. Its own world order the nineteenth century mistook for a natural order. Yet in that international sphere there was, even less than in the domestic sphere, a self-regulating Benthamite harmonization of national interests. A favorable European balance of power and the pervasive seapower of the predominant British were, for a productive century, global stabilizers. Since Napoleon I their function had, however, been not automatic but contrived. World war came again in 1914 when the new, large-scale power of the Germans could organize itself and its own group to overthrow these two stabilizers of liberal order. It was resumed in 1939 because one of them, the European balance of power, had not been maintained. Collective security sought between world wars to effectuate the revaluation of man. But in democratic countries the rule

of law is based on consent; only through the preponderant power of the many can the recalcitrant few ever be coerced. Before that occurred in world affairs, however, there had to be some explicit consensus about the foundations of world order. It remained implicit among the law-abiding until, in final crises, first principles were recalled. There could therefore be no consent for an organization of power to which the lawless would submit or through which they might, in good time, be brought to heel.

The problem of peace is the problem of order. But what kind of order shall we have?—that is the crucial question. The answer to it has so far been found through disorder, the disorder of war. The conflict between order and disorder is, nevertheless, not one merely between those who, discarding violence, would organize for peace and those who, preferring to take the law into their own hands, would organize for war. It may no doubt be reduced by the awful simplifications of war to that stark, final contrast. And among aggressive Powers there has, it is true, been a cult of war for war's sake. Yet their ruling elements, the saber-rattlers of Potsdam and Vienna before 1914, the demagogues of Rome and Berlin before 1939, the militarists of Tokyo until Pearl Harbor, the masters of the Kremlin today, have also meant it when they talked peace. But what each side has demanded is peace on its own terms.

All strive for peace. It is the nature of the peace over which they fight. Peace could always be had by the West, but on terms such as the Central Powers would have stipulated in 1914, the Axis group in 1939, or the Sino-Soviet bloc today. These we reject, and wars break out when aggressors fancy that they are capable of imposing them on us. For what we want is not

only peace but peace with freedom. The democracies have twice had their world order belatedly to defend; their adversaries have had one to establish. By comparison with that of the Nazis the Prussian concept may not seem so repugnant to observers like Mr. George Kennan—though Hitler did no more than press it to its logical conclusion. But, given a wider scope, it, too, in its time and place, was quite unbearable. And so would be that world order which Communist ideology adumbrates. Yet if present dangers are acute, it is because of what former enemies destroyed as much as because of what future ones may do.

The paradox of international anarchy is, then, that order has been the objective of all contestants. Nobody, that is, has sought disorder as an end in itself. Yet twice in the twentieth century there has been disorder on a large global scale and in every breast the fear lurks that a third, worse holocaust impends. For disorder flows from an organized attempt to recast society on an illiberal model, from the refusal of free peoples to be thus pushed around. But in this clash of motivation there is a curious anomaly. It will be remembered how in national histories the battle of freedom against tyranny is often depicted as a struggle between order and liberty. In world affairs the same antithesis occurs. For when free peoples will not knuckle under, it is they who become the agents of disorder and tyrant Powers the artisans of order.

Ultimately it is not things seen but things unseen which comprise the stakes of power. The ideology of aggressors tells us what their world order would be like. The ideology of democracies is the moral source of our own. Between precept and performance the gap may, alas, be wide. But free societies do conserve moral values without which there is no impetus for the enlarge-

ment of liberty itself. And so far as these can be extended globally, the quest of democracies is for a world order that will also be a moral order. Not that between international and domestic affairs any exact analogy is possible. But to vindicate its use of power a free world order must refresh itself at the springs of its own freedom.

This interaction of the moral with the political gains in emphasis as the United States becomes the mainstay of the West. The Spanish-American war has been described as her "great aberration." A greater, converse aberration was the recurrent failure of the American people to grasp world issues before irreparable damage had, as by 1917 and by 1941, been wrought. For neglect of these was not in their basic tradition but contrary to it. So far as the eighteenth century could discern the nature of a moral order in public affairs, the United States was, by her fundamental documents, dedicated to one. But that their free order at home relied upon a free order abroad, the Founding Fathers realized better than many of their twentieth-century descendants. They understood the role of power; dividing it constitutionally, they could not let it go against the nation internationally. They had cut themselves off from George III; Jefferson and Madison perceived, nevertheless, that the maritime power of Britain and the territorial safety of the United States were bound up together indissolubly. Only through British command of the seas could the Monroe Doctrine itself command respect. Yet as nineteenth-century Americans reforged their union in the fires of war and proceeded to build unmolested on this continent a free large-scale society, their own dependence on a free world order was lost from sight.

How this happened is a secret to nobody other than

some who compose historical works on American foreign affairs. From Napoleon I to the Kaiser Wilhelm II the British were so successful in keeping open the sea lanes that world order could be taken for granted. Americans immersed themselves in their own contests of power; they forgot the primacy of power in world politics because, for formative years, they were too effortlessly the complacent beneficiaries of benevolent oceanic power. They never grew accustomed to doing their share. Conscious of their own moral heritage, they waxed indignant at the immoral policies of European countries but admitted no connection between moral order and any organized world responsibility of their own.

As the twentieth century dawned the Anglo-American aspect of American world security was, however, plain to John Hay. And Theodore Roosevelt sensed it when, so as to ensure a Russo-Japanese equilibrium in the Far East, he also intervened in the gravest European crisis before 1914. Among American statesmen these were the first moderns. In hemisphere relations, those with Canada and Latin America, their realism was the sort Americans condemned in others. In global affairs it was the sort the United States should have embraced but would not.

And even after World War I she still spurned it. From errors in statecraft Woodrow Wilson was not exempt. But he may be credited with going one step further when he pioneered permanent American guarantees—to France and to the League of Nations—so that a favorable system could be maintained. His endeavor to convert American ideals of moral order into a broader concept of world order provoked the ridicule of Clemenceau and the demurrers of Lloyd George. They and their countries were, nevertheless, willing to

give his notions a try; it was Americans themselves who would not back up ideas rooted as deeply in the nation's past as the isolationist escapism to which they reverted. The world of George Washington had vanished. When the United States reneged on Wilsonian commitments, she proposed to pick up where he left off.

If Britain and France, France more than Britain, had not spilled their best blood in 1914-18, the point would not still be so crucial. But from the Pyrrhic victory of those years neither fully recovered. On them had reposed the power foundations of a liberal world order; but they, too, fell apart when the United States, again heedless of what she owed to it, would not join them in upholding it. From the League of Nations she abstained altogether. And she complained when these others, their hands full elsewhere, did not enforce against the aggression of Japanese in China the Washington Treaties which she herself had sponsored. Together Britain, France, and the United States were preponderant in 1919; by 1939 they had improvidently cast to the winds all that had been purchased with so much sorrow and sacrifice twenty years before. The English-speaking peoples cultivated the ever vengeful Germans, the French were piqued thereby into courting the unruly Italians. Within modern democracies the liberal dilemma was to arise from the equivocal nature of large-scale organization itself. Abroad it sprang from the incapacity of the free to organize at all. On the domestic scene you could invoke goodwill but exercise power, in the world arena you could invoke power but only exert goodwill.

The resort to goodwill did not, however, obviate the world contest of power. What it did was to transfer the initiative from responsible power which internationally was disorganized to irresponsible power which, undis-

turbed, was permitted to reorganize itself. Where, in its open-mindedness, liberal goodwill went astray was, between the wars, in imagining that what it meant by justice, others—Germany in foreign policy, Russia in domestic policy—also meant. Because they hated war as the antithesis of their principles, liberals were left by the victory of the West in 1918, by their own costly success in war, with a debilitating sense of guilt. Soon Germans—and Russians—were deemed more sinned against than sinning; the way to make a juster peace was to unleash forces that would again deprive us of peace entirely. Toward the revaluation of man the Germans had not gone as far as the peoples of the West. For many in the West the premise of policy was that they had—and have.

The vanquished, in attempting to reverse the verdict of history, would thus have as accomplices the victors themselves. Conservatives were to appease; it was liberalism, the Center and the Left-Center, which first sapped the moral bases of the 1919 settlement. Warlike ideologies it abhorred; willing to wound, it was afraid to strike. For to maintain power internationally you have to acknowledge its realities, and these revalued man in the twentieth century was sure he had outgrown. War in 1914 upset the more optimistic preconceptions of the age; the puzzled, erratic behavior of liberalism afterwards may have been a last, stubborn endeavor to reaffirm them in circumstances it had not anticipated. It was preoccupied with organized magnitude at home; the threat to peace of large-scale techniques, as employed elsewhere by illiberal regimes, caught it off guard. Arms as such were denounced by it as the cause of war. Wedded to a postulate of universal justice, to an order of reason which automatically fulfils itself, liberalism was reluctant to admit that free

nations are only as strong as the armed preponderance, actual or potential, which they themselves organize. Measures beyond a modicum of defense were suspected during critical years of being solely a malodorous plot hatched by arms manufacturers intent upon lining their own pockets. Those who declared that, in a world of large-scale power, democracies without a specially organized counteracting power would be themselves overpowered, incurred the wrath which every society reserves for any who have the temerity not only to be right but to be right before their time.

The two major conflicts of the twentieth century did not come because both sides were equally prepared for them. The total force which eventually would arrest aggressors was not organized at the outset; war might have been averted, or wrought less harm, if it had. The United States held the balance of power in 1917-18; in 1914 she was not only unarmed but uncommitted. If she had done earlier what she did later, the general peace might never have been shattered. And as then, so it was in Hitler's day. No one can honestly aver that British, French, or American preparations caused war in 1939; it was their paucity and not their amplitude which fanned Axis presumption. And unpreparedness in arms was but the mirror of unpreparedness in policy. Most conservatives did not consider militant Germanism a danger. Liberals, perceiving the danger, continued to hug their illusions. The Germans could reckon in 1939 with Russian and American neutrality: the preponderance of power which defeated the Axis eventually might have deterred it initially.

Hitler, as an organizer of large-scale despotism, had his Nazi concept of world order. And until the democracies recalled the power bases of their own they could not resist him. Nor can anv in their midst. first on the

Left and then on the Right, who delayed that recollection—the appeasers, the isolationists, the pacifists, the native Fascists—expiate their error by frenetic counsel on the Soviet issue. For Europe is devitalized today because the West was not adequately organized yesterday. The presence of Allied armies, financial aid from North America, the air-atomic power of the United States, and the mutual arrangements of the Atlantic pact may have bolstered her up; by herself she is no counterpoise to Soviet expansion. Pressure from Europe having slackened, with Japan vanquished and China Sovietized, Russia has, besides, never had so little to obstruct her in the Orient.

To the realities of power, the democracies have tardily awakened. And what they must now avoid is not a doctrine of power but an application of any such doctrine that might be as impercipient. To questions of world order Americans in particular have been unalert because, as the United States throve behind ocean barriers, her main frontiers, land and sea, would, by the twentieth century, be under friendly rule. Rugged individualism characterized American economic thought long after organized magnitude in corporate affairs had transformed American society. In matters of world order it persevered even longer. For the United States there have, since Pearl Harbor, been no free rides. But she is paying all the more at present because she paid less than others in the past.

Toward Russia, as toward Germany, open-mindedness in the West smoothed the path for those who were foes of the open mind. Assailed by doubts over their own society, liberals accorded illiberal dynamisms the benefit of the doubt. Wrongs which others had inflicted on these two countries must account for wrongs which they themselves inflict: redress the former and the latter will

some in the West who attributed world war to the inner need of monopoly capitalism to expand. For it is not through capitalism but through the military imperialism of nondemocratic nations that the twentieth century has thrice been robbed of its birthright.

If democracy had had a better start in Russia, her new large-scale despotism might not have been spared liberal censure. In Italy the parliamentary monarchy of Cavour would crumble from within; in Germany the Weimar Republic reposed not on popular German assent but on Allied opposition to the inveterate militarism of the Hohenzollerns. In Tsarist Russia, however, a decrepit feudalism, without any intervening period of substantial industrialization, had long been riding for a fall. Revolution there would have a genuine claim upon the moral sympathy of the West. And it passed over into a counter-revolution on the Left before counter-revolution on the Right elsewhere exposed the variant labels of large-scale tyranny, whether on the Left or the Right, as being a distinction without a difference.

The Russian Revolution was greeted in 1917 as a belated phase of the nineteenth-century movement toward the revaluation of man. But when the party-State swept constitutional procedures away, or bent them to its will, every other freedom, individual and economic, had been extinguished. The democracies have not fully grasped the effect of organized magnitude on themselves; that by it a credo of universal mass benevolence might be turned upside down was even harder to comprehend. The techniques of irresponsible power in all totalitarian regimes were the same; all gleaned foreign support, whether on the Right or the Left, by masking an ideology of power behind the power of ideology. But to liberal opinion the ideology on which the Soviet Union laid stress still seemed a frantic, lopsided version

of Western revolutionary idealism rather than a frigid, premeditated attempt to annul it. Since the defeat of Axis power, for which Russian armed power was indispensable, nothing fresh has been divulged about the social mechanics of Communist large-scale organization. But it has again been shown that, given abroad the same free hand that it enjoys at home, irresponsible power must, by the nature of its being, behave irresponsibly.

Yet by examining the social order of the Soviet Union we can perhaps descry in a clearer light some features of our own. Without a reign of terror its sovereign cabal would be hamstrung; their own deviations from doctrine have nevertheless been as conspicuous as those of the host they themselves have purged for having deviated. In discrepancies between word and deed, democracies are not alone; the latter, however, can deal with them openly. For ideologues would fit humanity into Procrustean interpretations of history as rigorous as they are neat; somehow history, with all its myriad contingencies—humanity, by the good within it as well as the bad—eventually thwarts them. The growth of big industrial aggregations under large-scale capitalism would, so Marx thought, reduce workers to a single proletarian level. But such a tendency did not alarm him: it might facilitate the expropriation of an ever smaller owning class and hasten thereby the advent of that which he desired, the classless society. His labor theory of value was, moreover, designed to suit this program. For Marx argued that only physical work created values that warrant economic recompense—or rather that no one kind of effort is worth more than another. Yet by disparaging the intelligence, by bracketing together muscular and mental exertions, an equalitarian concept of value was in fact as destined to devalue man,

and rob him of his deserts, as the most unbridled competitive individualism.

The remedy would be worse than the disease. Privilege and profit might be banished from a classless society. But so also would the contribution of a middle class, and no modern economy could do without one. The emergence of the middle class may have gone hand in hand with the rise of capitalism. Yet it will have its counterpart even when capitalism is modified or abolished. For wherever society becomes organizationally more complex, there must be some who plan and direct, manage and mediate. The larger the scale of that society, and whether it be democratic or totalitarian, capitalist, semicapitalist, or anticapitalist, the greater the necessity for precisely such a class.

By Soviet criteria, those of Stalin and Malenkov even more than those of Lenin and Trotsky, Marx might never have deemed himself a Marxist. For Russia he expressed little but disdain; he envisaged, as a crucible in which his equalitarian ideas should be tried out, a country that was less backward economically. Yet in being unindustrialized, Russia could begin the Soviet experiment with the social terrain comparatively uncluttered; in the wake of the Romanoffs what mostly had to be deposed was an upper class notoriously parasitical. Yet in Russia, too, modern technology would require differential rewards. For human skills are unequal, and, so that a mass society of organized magnitude could function, disparate incentives were reintroduced. Not that class distinctions had been jettisoned in Russia for top party members. But to set and keep going the large-scale apparatus of a mass society, Russia's masters discarded the utopian notion: from each according to his ability, to each according to his need. A new middle class, nonproletarian, professional, technical,

administrative, came forth, and from it the party ruling class drew its own recruits.

The bourgeoisie is dead, long live the bourgeoisie. A Soviet middle class would, of course, not work in the same atmosphere or have the same goals as the independent entrepreneurs of nineteenth-century capitalism. But elsewhere, too, bourgeois activity and initiative has been shifting in the twentieth century from the private and personal to the corporate and collective, the governmental and institutional. For organized magnitude elicits its own inner mode of operation; and it does so irrespective of the constitutional difference between a dictatorship and a democracy. Spiritually and politically these are opposed; in large-scale techniques they gravitate toward each other. Can a democracy remain spiritually and politically responsible, if organized magnitude renders it administratively irresponsible? The framework of power alters. The part played by those who exercise power within it will decide the issue.

Now as before the role of the bourgeois is the gauge of liberty. In the democracies it was the middle class which extracted such Whig reforms as would permit a wider enfranchisement. In the Soviet Union a middle class has also proved necessary; owing its privileges to a servile State, it itself must, however, also be servile. Not that class lines have formally crystalized in Russia. The emergence of a new class there exemplifies rather the social diversification which, through sheer occupational multiplicity, ensues in every large-scale society. For the same reason, and contrary to Marx, Russia, though a dictatorship, could not be one of or by the proletariat. Nor in welfare democracies does his concept of a class war cover the conflicts of power, collective and individual, public and corporate, to which they are actually prone; still less does it account for the tensions that

envelop any totalitarian system. For the State does not, as Marx predicted, wither away. In a modern dictatorship it swallows up the whole of society instead.

And when that occurs there lies concealed, behind an outer façade of impassive, rock like stability, an even greater instability. Political and economic power are fused and this eliminates any latitude for give and take between them. Corrective pressures of the one upon the other within the community become joint disciplinary pressures upon the community. Peaceful change being thus stamped out, change when it comes cannot be peaceful. Socialism in Britain, with its ethical presuppositions and its Fabian tactics, never subscribed, like its continental counterparts, to the doctrine of class war. Yet its enactments have not only been more radical than any adopted elsewhere in the West; the process of social revolution was electoral, legislative, nonviolent. For to the latent coercive power which dwelt in the majority, the non-Socialist minority bowed. Such consent implied, however, that, whenever the tide turns, a similar concurrence will be forthcoming from the other side. Yet where there is no political check on economic power, a total organization of large-scale power is responsible to nobody but itself. And in repressing violence it breeds violence since through violence alone can the dissident obtain redress.

War, moreover, may be an outlet to drain off such unrest. The defense of hearth and home can thus be canalized by an absolute regime in its own defense. Ideologically the Marxist spearhead may have been the power of dialectic. Politically the Soviet will is imposed through the dialectic of power. And in the end it is the temptations of power which heighten the world contest of power: a power that is irresponsible at home is lured on inexorably to pursue ever more glittering prizes

abroad. Nor is it a coincidence that peoples who may be most dazzled by them are those who have themselves rated martial values above the revaluation of man.

Not that they have always been in a position to choose between glory and liberty. In the struggle for the latter the few might look to none but themselves; about martial values, which combined obedience at home with valor abroad, rulers and ruled could be in easier agreement. Consent in a free society permits that accommodation between majority and minority which is the gist of democratic union. But Adolf Hitler was not the first to evoke a popular mass consent which would solidify union at the expense of democracy. For the hand that wields the lash may, above all, also furnish bread; to an empty stomach freedom is not particularly appetizing. Between wars the Soviet Union attracted liberal opinion not just because it and the democracies had the same enemies. The world slump during those years shook to its marrow the economic system of the West. Amid the anxieties of the time many wondered whether, in providing the mass with economic security, the Russian Communists had not, perhaps, unearthed the secret of social justice. Where equality is a necessity and liberty a luxury, the latter, it was felt, should await its turn. But that in a totalitarian society its turn is less and not more likely to materialize had yet to be understood.

Benevolent despotism is now new. Coupled with twentieth-century large-scale organization, it becomes a social tyranny utterly without precedent. By means of this, Russia's agrarian economy would be further industrialized; yet most Soviet technology had to be borrowed from the free societies of the West. An equalitarian mass security was established on a low, drab economic level; for its maintenance there would be drawn from

Russia's own national heritage the method of enforcement through insecurity: government by purge. Inseparable from the system, terror has thus been on as large a scale as the system itself. And because of that, any voluntary element of popular consent may droop and wane. Resignation to the inevitable, which is what a totalitarian system can extort, will have the same broad, mass result.

Here, moreover, foreign dangers, real or trumped up, can mend a rift between regime and people. For Russia the real dangers had vanished in 1945; she could no longer be caught in a German-Japanese vise. Unreal dangers were therefore fabricated. As a matter of fact, if Russia had demobilized her huge standing armies, it would have been harder for her to fling a network of intimidation over her smaller neighbors. And furthermore, her war-battered economy might, despite the goads of irresponsible power, have dissolved in chaos. It has, on the contrary, had full employment. But the Nazis, with their prewar mobilization of the large-scale German economy, could also boast of that; and, as the Sino-Soviet threat spurs on our own rearmament, so can we. Yet what we do in freedom the Russians do without it and against it. Economic security for the mass is based on other insecurities, at home and abroad, which the Kremlin itself aggravates.

There has, then, been no Communist Golden Rule to improve upon a capitalist rule of gold. Economic well being, as diffused by a totalitarian mass equality, is spread thin; what is equal on that one, bleak plane is, besides, all the more unequal on every other. The demand of the French Revolution for liberty, equality, and fraternity reverberated far and wide; and just as in the West liberalism would afterwards have to reject liberty without equality, so in the East an equality with-

out liberty must be anathema to it. For the equality which liberalism endorsed was not the equality of helots, but an equality in political rights, an equality before the law; the quintessence of democracy is equality of opportunity rather than such a stark equality in the mass as a dictatorship of the one, the few, or the many clamps down on the individual. A totalitarian society could not grant that ultimate liberty which is equality of opportunity and still be totalitarian. But so is equality of opportunity the final test of liberty in large-scale democracies, and it is not a test in which they themselves get full marks.

Everywhere in fact the revolutionary fervors which, since the fifteenth century, have made the modern world are, like a tidal wave, beating back upon it. Peace and freedom being an endless quest, the dilemma of liberalism, whether in domestic or international affairs, is as perpetual. The Victorians felt that they had either found correct solutions or, through scientific inquiry, could eventually discover them. What we are now learning is that most social or economic solutions are themselves inconclusive; that liberalism as the principle of the open mind must instead be an incessant search for better ones. The human predicament is that hidden obstacles loom up as each milestone is passed and that as one frontier is reached another unfolds. The revaluation of man is a liberal aim which influences modern democracies through a number of avenues; absolutist credos in the twentieth century exert popular appeal precisely because, with their readymade answers, there is nothing provisional about them. As the apostle of the open mind, liberalism can appraise no doctrine, not even its own, uncritically. For where the totalitarian belief is in its doubt of freedom, the democratic belief is in the freedom to doubt.

From neither society, the liberal and the illiberal, is conflict absent. But in the warrior cult of Fascists and Nazis and in the class war of Soviet Communism there is a change of venue; for arduous intellectual effort by each person they substitute the mentally effortless and psychologically comforting objectives of mass combat. Magnitude is thus organized to devalue rather than re-value man. Its yoke may be heavy; the pain of thought is one burden from which man is relieved. For between dictatorship and democracy the difference here is plain. In the one all are subject to the decisions of power, in the other each has some power of decision.

And so by the middle of the twentieth century many of the more generous hypotheses of nineteenth-century politics had wilted and lost their bloom. Between national and international affairs the interaction is continuous and profound. Liberalism, being addicted to reason in the former, was slower to detect unreason in the latter. At home it became a pursuit of goals—the reconciliation of individual liberty and social justice—which can never fully be won; that world politics were also an ever-recurrent duel it was loath to admit. A dissolvent of the *status quo* in domestic affairs, it disparaged the *status quo* elsewhere. Yet these were not the same. At home there was an order of freedom to be enhanced; abroad, lest worse befall, it was only through the defense of a stable world order that improvement itself would be feasible. Between 1919 and 1939 the "have" nations retreated gratuitously before the "have nots." From Manchuria to Ethiopia and from the Rhineland to Danzig not more but less justice was done.

And now Russia muddies the waters by her misuse of these terms. She still preens herself upon being the

champion of the "have nots" in the domestic affairs of other countries; of the wretched multitudes who, in an unjust social order, are trodden under foot. Playing that role, she would disrupt world order and commit international injustice in the name of a social justice which itself merely socializes injustice; ranking among the principal "haves," she is, with her Chinese ally, more expansive than most "have nots." The Nazis pursued global power through a particularist ideology, the Communists through a more universal one. But the perversion of liberal ideas under either auspices shows how, in international as in national affairs, that which does good can also do harm.

Large-scale organization as adopted by Germans and Russians, Japanese and Italians is a clue to the international anarchy of the twentieth century. Employed by some peoples for the revaluation of man, it has been employed by others for his devaluation. The Victorians in their optimism had thought that everyone would welcome self-government and that this, externally and internally, must, by itself, be a panacea for the ills of the body politic. But the liberal ideal contemplated both national freedom and representative democracy. When the emphasis is on sovereignty at the expense of democracy, liberalism itself is debased.

The two subjections of Czechoslovakia may have illustrated that a well-balanced democracy which is geographically vulnerable must also be buttressed by the support of other Powers. Underdeveloped countries, however, reveal internal weaknesses that might undercut any preconcerted external support, even if this were mutually acceptable. Self-government, liberalism has always contended, is better than good government. Yet bad government in liberated territories as exposed as

those of the Middle East, East Asia, or Southeast Asia not only bedevils their own national security; it saps the outer ramparts of our entire free world order.

Given time, such countries might learn to fend for themselves. But, as in the case of China, they may not be given time. History explains their quandary; it also explains why in other lands, too, technology has been like some modern chronometer moving anticlockwise. The contrast between France and Germany is, in this paramount respect, illuminating. The French were the first in Europe to experiment with a mass society—the democracy of the Revolution, the dictatorship of both Napoleons. And after her two defeats, in the 1870's and in the 1940's, it was representative self-government to which France reverted. But among Germans, democracy has twice been more involuntary in origin. The Weimar Republic was, and the Bonn Republic is, a constitutional relic of foreign conquest. Yet a lasting democracy must be the fruit of political self-conquest, that widespread awareness of civic responsibility in a citizenry without which paper safeguards against irresponsible power will be of scant avail. For among nations, as in Nature, the apple never falls far from the parent tree.

And that this is so Russia also exemplifies. Revolution smashed the mold of the Tsarist autocracy; large-scale organization refashions it there on traditionally Russian lines. The Russian people themselves may not be enamored of total duress by irresponsible Communist power; if they were, there would have been no necessity for the sanguinary farm collectivization, the slave labor camps, the permanent terror. Yet from the freeing of the serfs and the Duma's momentary flicker to the downfall of Kerensky in the midst of military chaos and political upheaval, the Russian people were unable to do for themselves what others in the West had done.

Not that all in Europe can boast of mature democratic behavior; unlike the Italians under Mussolini and the Germans under Hitler, the Russians under Lenin were, at least, dragooned again without advance notice. And indeed what many Germans lamented afterwards was the failure of the Nazis in war rather than a national tradition from which, in a large-scale society, such a regime could stem.

Modern democracy is the struggle to make organized magnitude serve a democratic purpose. But among peoples whose democratic purpose has been feeble, other stubborn continuities would, within a larger framework, resume their predominance. And what liberalism did not realize in time was what the impact of all that might be on our free world order; dissevering the shackles of the past at home, it was tripped up in foreign affairs by history from behind. Russian exiles may attribute the plight of their country to Communist ideology alone, to a plot by a Leninist camarilla whose tentacles were fastened upon a helpless land in an hour of military defeat and social collapse. There, as elsewhere, large-scale organization has enabled irresponsible power to be more intensively irresponsible. But while regimes alter, expansionist policies are bequeathed by one to the other. Russia's subjugation of alien nationalities did not begin with the Soviet regime. And if some day it were replaced by a confederated representative democracy, that might not suffice, despite *émigré* agitation, to keep these within the Russian fold.

Toward Germany even more, liberalism had, for two decades, glossed over the awkward facts of historic continuity. The West would be cornered in the forties because during the thirties it deceived itself about the substantial popular assent which, whatever the regime, always nourished German imperialism; because it re-

garded Nazism as a fortuitous aberration rather than an authentic phase. So, too, with the Soviet Union today—national power which a conspiratorial band seized and organizational techniques which it enlarged are the means through which a Russifying totalitarian system maintains its sway. But if it makes history, history also made it.

Moral responsibility underlies political and social responsibility. Where nations develop the former they cannot forever be deprived of the latter; they regain freedom because, even when conquered, they do not in their hearts really lose it. But others, conquering or conquered, do not lose it because they have never had it. This does not condemn them forever to be, by some dark, implacable fate, what they always have been. A penchant for absolutism is not racially inborn; science demonstrates that national differences are not biological. But while this is reassuring in the long run, it makes no difference in the short run whether a denial of liberty or threat to peace has been culturally or ethnically conditioned. Measures to stave off disaster must be taken in either case. And they will not be, if the anthropological capacity of people to change is treated as political evidence that they have already done so. History foreshortened is history ignored.

Between the wars the English-speaking democracies, in their attitude toward Germany, missed that point. Thinking they had but to be open-minded, they themselves were the ones who reopened the dikes. Liberal hopes would be falsified because modern techniques will fortify despotism as well as liberty. Yet propensities toward despotism that are pretechnological have eased the task of twentieth-century despotism itself. For parallel to the revaluation of man there has been a self-devaluation—one in which the individual compensates

for his own lack of personal responsibility, willing or unwilling, with a collective overvaluation of his group, race, nationality or country. Nor is it only in dictatorships that he does this. But when things like that occur in democracies it contravenes all that is best within them. They are the imponderables of every totalitarian society.

Disparities in outlook did not matter so much when their strategic consequences were less far-reaching. Now nothing matters more. During the nineteenth century liberal influences transformed the West. But large-scale organization has since altered the global circumstances under which they can work themselves out. In adjusting itself to that new situation, our free world order was tragically slow. And so also in American life, as the setting for democracy is enlarged, democratic rights are modified. The manifestations of this may be social and economic. In the end the problem of liberty is, like the problem of peace, a moral problem.

CHAPTER

3

The Pre-Emption of Power

As between freedom and tyranny in the twentieth century, large-scale organization has played no favorites. But not only does it serve the one as well as the other; its sheer complexity obviates direct, simple controls. Technically it has made possible mass democracy; of man's revaluation it is, in actual practice, the medium. Yet it takes as it gives. Responsible power is what keeps society free; the more organized magnitude extends, the less responsible does its power become. Totalitarian dictatorship dams up explosive human impulses of which democracy would make constructive use. Repressing anarchy at home, its road to world order lies through anarchy abroad. American democracy, on the other hand, would dispel anarchy abroad; but at home it has reduced economic anarchy only to have other forms of anarchy emerge. Nor are they the sort that would have satisfied Proudhon and Kropotkin. For organized anarchy, as the child of institutional ir-

responsibility, diminishes liberty when it is supposed to be on the increase.

A mass society functions through large-scale units. In a modern democracy, however, the limits drawn between them and the state are only one of the criteria of freedom. The exercise of power within these large-scale collectivities, whether they be public or semipublic, private or semiprivate, how each one runs itself, may be as much a gauge of man's revaluation as the ballot box or the amount of social reform registered on the statute books. For the general energy that organization stores up may be employed in interests that are far from general. And when that happens, large-scale power which is socially irresponsible may confound all the nicely calculated lore of a politically responsible democracy. Organizational manipulation facilitates the manipulation of men. And when men are manipulated, whether as individuals or in the mass, they have been devalued.

If the sum is greater than its parts, so is its capacity for weal or woe. Every nation or State has its own legacy of law and custom. But while these can do without any particular individual they are, ultimately, each sustained by individuals. For the latter are like members elected at staggered intervals—one-third every two years—to the American Senate; they retire or die off but not all at the same time. And as they in their careers overlap, so is there a continuity in the life of the nation or State—one which seems to endow it with an organic will of its own. Dismissed by Hobbes, overstressed by Rousseau, this unbroken sequence, historically fragile and therefore socially precious, was cherished by Edmund Burke as the pith of civilization itself. From Hegel to Hitler extreme theories of the organic State have, in their mysticism, been incompatible with liberal efforts rationally to achieve a wider freedom. Yet the

nation does not exist apart from the living, the dead, the unborn of whom it is, has been, and will be comprised; nor does any other community or social grouping that endures. Each in his generation contributes to the whole, and its stamp he bears or reflects even if he would cast it off.

So inextricable are their ties that the morality of the individual and the morality of the group must, in principle, be one and the same. A few may have a higher or more impeccable sense of justice than their fellows. But there is usually first a common ethical heritage out of which abstract private codes may flow. And though justice is the touchstone of individual rights, it concerns more than individuals; it is real for them only when it has a concrete application within or between societies. And where these societies are free, large-scale techniques step up the dangers of a dualism which would allow the group a morality less strict than that of individuals. For liberty may suffer as some individuals gain ascendancy within the group and make its power subservient to their own. Behind a façade of organizational immunity lurks personal irresponsibility. Moral man and immoral society is, in Reinhold Niebuhr's phrase, thus too stark a confrontation. The eternal human drama of the good and the bad may be rehearsed in the individual breast; society is the stage on which it is enacted. And while society hands morality down it has none of its own. If man alone is moral, only man can be immoral. Organized power within a large-scale society is therefore neutral. Yet so far as it enables men to be more rather than less unaccountable, it also tempts them to its misuse.

Organized magnitude does not, however, merely enlarge the sphere of temptation. The advent of industrialism coincided with a decline in that traditional mo-

rality through which temptation might be withstood. The group has always expressed a mutuality of needs and wants; large-scale organization systematizes some groups and establishes others. But while it accentuates the interdependence of men in the economic, social, and political aspects of their lives, the new groupings it elicits are, like itself, mechanical; to the natural relationships of family, clan, church, neighborhood, club, voluntary association it adds other more synthetic, less personal ones. Since the earliest days of urban industrialism, men have been cut off in their daily work from accustomed moorings. And when they are thus uprooted, the silver cord of responsibility—between themselves and others—may be broken. Yet a contrary and concurrent trend has also been very important. Even as religion ebbed, its message of social justice inspired, for the reform of large-scale society, more elevated concepts of public responsibility. The industrialism in which men were tools to be exploited and cast aside could furnish the techniques of man's revaluation.

Nor in retrospect should we bewail too nostalgically or idealize overmuch what has been left behind. The mass of men, as Thoreau recalled, have always lived lives of quiet desperation; and Hobbes, who depicted their existence as poor, nasty, brutish, and short, also said it was solitary. Bonds were closer in preindustrial society, but upon its hewers of wood and drawers of water the burdens were infinitely more onerous; and then there were class shackles on the merchant and the artisan, disabilities for women, the mistreatment of children, the race dominance, the religious persecutions. It was because of these severities that the New World, with all its hardships, proved so strong a magnet; without them there would have been no impetus for the revaluation of man. Yet in an age of craftsmanship, the pre-

industrial worker could take personal pride in finished products that were his own; might feel himself, despite other gross inequalities, less like a cog in a machine. It is, however, not very remarkable that he should thus have been more at home in his particular surroundings. The narrower the horizon, the easier is it anywhere to be fulfilled. For organized magnitude exacts a heavy toll. Not that we can, on balance, regret the eclipse of a society that was richer and more gratifying principally for the few. What tantalizes is its replacement by one in whose enlarged structural limits ordinary human limitations pose new problems of power.

Politically, too, large-scale techniques might emancipate with one hand and yet foster with the other a covert enslavement. The appeal of modern dictatorships to a disoriented mass did, at any rate, come when workers had been alienated from their work and the individual from a more cohesive environment. Yet here again this merely accentuated pre-existing national tendencies. The cry may have gone up for a return to a more organic society. Hitler exploited large-scale techniques to restore through force Teutonic folk solidarity; the Soviet Communists would reintegrate the Russian economy by similar methods. Nor could either have done much else: having willed the end, they had to will the means. For in no other manner can the social consequences of a technological order—with its aimlessness, its despair, its *anomie*—be reversed. A large-scale society might, in other words, be organic and undemocratic or democratic and inorganic. The organic and the democratic, however, will not mix. Plato, who had only a small city-State for which to prescribe, sensed that; his preference was for the organic rather than the democratic. We in turn cannot share his taste, if we would stay free. Nor is there any one single thoroughgoing

cure, such as he propounded, for the ills of organized magnitude. The ills remain.

In an industrial society the same organizational process which uproots men spiritually bands them together again in other combinations economically. Deracinated vertically, they are, as it were, regrouped without roots horizontally. Mass production erects new foci of economic power; through similar large-scale techniques the State power regulates these for the common welfare and establishes social services of its own. The State does, of course, do more than this. It is a hub of national loyalties; and as other social ties are loosened, the mass relies on it emotionally as well as functionally. Coercing under law, the democratic State shelters the individual from lawless intimidation. What it will not do is protect him from intimidations that are lawful yet unjust. And these may not only be its own. The problem of liberty is not merely one of a contest of power between organized groups and the organized State, nor even one of civic rights for the individual within that State. Justice must nowadays also be found on an institutional plane; it is a question likewise of whether power is exercised responsibly or irresponsibly within the organized group itself. How to get a footing in such a unit, how to keep it, and how to improve upon it, is, for the individual, all-important. Here, as much as in the legislature and the court, is freedom's crucial zone.

The issue is one of control within large-scale organization, the degree to which power is scattered or centered within it. And, since corporate capitalism is the pioneer of organized magnitude in the Western world, a glance at it may shed light on the underlying relationship between democracy and technology. That it has been divorcing ownership from control is apparent. But in so doing it not only strikes at its own heart. It

demonstrates how, throughout our large-scale society, it is organizational control rather than wealth or legal rights that provides basic power. For noncapitalist or even anticapitalist undertakings may differ from it in ideological aspiration. Administratively they have all borrowed a collectivized leaf from the capitalist book.

The cleavage between ownership and control is one that Thorstein Veblen detected early in the century. The corporate revolution which ensued Messrs. Berle and Means were to survey and dissect. And to combat absentee ownership, Congress passed the Securities Exchange Act under which better methods of proxy voting were laid down. Yet here, as elsewhere, divide and rule is a secret of power. Not that this has been a stratagem peculiar to capitalism; but organizationally the corporate revolution is, for all brands of democracy, a portent. Limited liability in personal obligation may have facilitated the financial development of corporate capitalism. Limited liability in moral obligation permeates every sort of large-scale endeavor.

Dramatic in effect but undramatic as it unfolds, the capitalist revolution has been masked recently by the decorous behavior in the welfare State of corporate capitalism itself. Schemes of its own furnish more and more security, social and psychological, for its employees; nowadays it is less apt than large-scale labor to outrage public sensibilities. The fundamentals of the situation are unaltered and familiar—the dispersion of stock and its dependence on market fluctuations; the detachment between owners and the physical plant; the passivity of stockholders each with holdings as diverse as they are fractional; the ingenious devices of law through which a nonowning minority acquires control. For legality may underpin what is, in equity, unjust. Yet all that would be less baffling if the principle by

which it is governed were clear. When, however, there is neither majority will nor financial stake the exercise of power over huge segments of the economy becomes, by every liberal concept of democratic order and every conservative one of private property, inexplicable. Organized anarchy is the upshot. And corporate capitalism as its first exemplar may even pass the pragmatic test with flying colors—it works. Yet so far as an institutional pattern is thus set for the multifarious activities of a large-scale society, the question is not that it works but how.

If the corporate revolution results in legalized irresponsibility, this manifests itself in the authority enjoyed by directors who—with or without proxies—represent so much less than they control. And then under them is a body of executives whose day-to-day administrative transactions predetermine long-range policy; who can thereby gather the reins into their own hands. More and more, however, it is from top management that the Board fills its ranks. Ingrown, recruited with care, self-perpetuating, corporate oligarchies, directorial and managerial, exert, at any rate, an irresponsible power over employees which, save by the faintest kind of apostolic succession, they themselves received from no responsible power. And in their attitude toward stockholders, the nominal owners and their own ostensible employers, the corporate power they appropriate is no less irresponsible. For they, rather than spokesmen for stockholders, decide what amount of earnings it is in the interest of control to allot. Nor is it deemed odd when they, the reigning bureaucrats of corporate capitalism, are numbered among those who condemn government interventions through which democracy might be bureaucratized.

Credit for profits made is taken by the dominant ex-

ecutive group, and so it is not considered high-handed of them to dispose of these as they see fit. Whether any other directorial assortment might have done as well must, of couse, be utter conjecture. They may take advantage of their fortuitous power; they would never have obtained this without the capital risks which investors undertook at the outset. More illuminating is the occasional glimpse of a clash between stockholders and the self-appointed custodians of their property. For when one flares up the directors, as they point to the prosperity of the enterprise, can often wear an air of injured innocence. So also among benevolent despots the yardstick was, after all, not the good accomplished but whose interest in a showdown came first.

The possessing class are thus in the throes of a self-dispossessing process which they themselves cannot arrest. John Locke and Thomas Jefferson had concepts of property which the Industrial Revolution knocked into a cocked hat. But when nineteenth-century capitalism put property rights above human rights, it too had to be curbed. And whenever socialist legislation so curbs property rights that human rights are curtailed, the damage to the community will also be heavy. But when a corporate revolution undoes both property and human rights—that is, personal rights within the sphere of property—it moves in its totalitarian overtones from the revolutionary to the counter-revolutionary, from the revaluation to the devaluation of man. Materially such an economy may still offer substantial benefits. As long as it leaves room for varied types of enterprise, it is more flexible than a wholly socialized one. And while in each company the investor does not choose who is to manage his property, he may at least still choose between companies. Yet profits for stockholders become less and less the objective of corporate capitalism. They are that by-

product of solvency through which an enterprise is kept going and expands—a responsible means of which one major end, the power of directors and management, is an irresponsible one.

Other by-products are not to be minimized. When it facilitates higher living standards, mass employment, or the distribution of stock to a wider public, corporate capitalism is democratically inclined. But large-scale organization hinges in any mass society, and irrespective of ideology, on mass employment. So, too, with a wider dissemination of stock—to parcel it out in numerous small lots among a larger number of owners is to leave the latter as unorganized as ever and merely to augment further the organizational power of those in control. And that is still so when pension and insurance funds, foundations, endowments, open-end investment trusts, purchase big blocks of stock. For these, whether managed more responsibly or less, are subject themselves in their own investments to the same disabilities as the general public. Over the centuries the growth of democracy and the rise of capitalism were two facets of a single liberal trend. But now what might have been a democracy of owners is, for two-thirds of American industrial wealth, based neither on private ownership nor democratic representation as these two terms are normally understood.

The figures at which corporate executives set their own salaries might, in this context, seem to be a comparatively minor element. But they are organizationally symbolic. The larger and more intricate corporate capitalism becomes, the more it needs the best ability it can muster. Yet its intricacy and size would impede the discovery or training of such ability even if the search for it were, beyond a certain competitive stage, genuinely disinterested. Opportunity cannot, when executive

groups put their own interests first, be as open as they say it is. Theoretically, remuneration should be a morally well-grounded personal incentive; in fact, it generally indicates no due economic reward but corporate control. Nor is this impression lessened by the immense noncontributory pensions accorded executives and tax-preferred options for the purchase of stock.

In affairs of State posts of infinitely greater importance command nothing like the same recompense. Democratic governments err, of course, in the opposite direction; their chief servants are ludicrously underpaid. But the disparity between ministerial and administrative salaries in government, and executive salaries in corporate business, is nevertheless a token of the difference between responsible and irresponsible power. The public resented profiteering when most enterprise was still under the personal direction of its owners. Yet where ownership is divorced from control and stock is widely distributed, the burden of excessive salaries is not the only one that corporate executives impose; they also juggle expense accounts to provide themselves with private luxuries reminiscent of an older capitalism. The latter, however, was more intelligible as a system as long as there could be a relatively free ascent up the ladder of opportunity. But when management corporations kick the upper rungs out of that ladder, initiative dwindles and capitalism spurns its liberal origins.

Usually the decline of competition is regarded as the most conspicuous sign of this. But in a large-scale society the attention paid to the conflict of corporate versus individual business must not obscure the struggle for freedom in other collectivized areas of organized magnitude. Corporate capitalism under the Sherman and Clayton anti-trust laws is, moreover, far from being a total

monopoly; small and middle-sized undertakings—other than family farms—do still have considerable leeway. The tendency is, however, toward competition between the new products of a few big established enterprises rather than that of many firms in an open marketplace. Only bigness, as David Lilienthal points out, can afford the research and distribution facilities to develop these and put them across; yet when lesser businesses prosper chiefly as supply auxiliaries or service dependents of giant technological feudatories they exist not by a public right but on private sufferance. The result may be more varied goods, cheaper products, a higher mass standard of living. But it is also to sugar-coat that paradox of organized magnitude in which there is an indirect loss of competitive freedom as well as direct social gain.

Such, however, are the defensive advantages of bigness that American capitalists go unchallenged when they exhort their European counterparts to abandon restrictive practices and, in a free semicontinental mass market, let fresh energies flow. Their counsels of emulation, nevertheless, not only overlook historic dissimilitudes; what these also ignore is that, as between the two main sectors of the Atlantic world, economic differences are those of degree rather than kind. For legalized irresponsibility does not merely distort property rights. It subordinates to itself vast segments of the public domain. Walton Hamilton has shown how government by commission and administrative agency, how rate fixing in rail and air transport, how public franchise and patent license, constitute an *imperium in imperio;* a corporate estate within a democracy, upheld by the courts, whose liberal principles it contravenes. Not that this is racketeering; it has or gets the law on its side. Yet racketeering is after all only doing without law what legalized irresponsibility does with and

through it: the employment by private interests of organizational prerogatives which do not belong to them but upon which they have procured a prior lien.

And so the twentieth century witnesses a precapitalist concept of the organic revived in an ultracapitalist dress. For as expounded by Peter Drucker the enterprise is a goal in itself; it embodies a corporate value which omnipotently transcends the individualistic values from which capitalism sprang. Thereby, too, its controlling beneficiaries can temper the realities of irresponsible power with a collectivized romanticism—their rationale being one of self-elected trustees who work more for the common good than their own. And that they do render a service is indubitable. They are no social parasites, no lilies of the field who toil not neither do they spin. Spin they do and, ultimately, in a moral void. For the authority they exert is derived from others but is accountable to nobody. Success as the justification of their power is the old Machiavellian philosophy reasserted in a new organizational garb.

Not that corporate capitalism has an absolute authority to exert. But neither is its mandate a democratic one. Monopoly in a free society is seldom complete; oligopoly, its usual guise, is when a few rather than one dominate the market. For within it there may be countervailing power—a term adapted by J. K. Galbraith from the study of world politics: large-scale organization of one sort calling into existence, as between capital and labor or buyers and sellers, another. Nor are there only outer regulative sanctions which the general public, as voters and consumers, might also impose—through government and across the counter; the inner limits of corporate efficiency furnish brakes upon caprice. Yet of these two monitors, the inner and the outer, the inner one is indirect. And in any authority,

as direct inner deterrents shrink, an interior margin of moral irresponsibility develops. Corporate capitalism may be perfectly legal. But it does not have that legitimacy of power through which old-fashioned autocracy governed. Elsewhere in a large-scale democracy legitimate power itself will often be exercised in an irresponsible manner. The prerequisite of responsible power is nevertheless that it be legitimate.

Socialist critics, Marxian and non-Marxian, visualized social justice as a shift from the private to the public ownership of industry. No economy, capitalist, socialist, or communist, will correspond with fidelity to its ideological blueprints. And now what matters in both Communist Russia and the corporate sector of American capitalism is not ownership at all—that of the people in general or of proprietors in particular—but who acquires control. It is therefore of the utmost significance that these two antipodal ideologies, though antagonistic in everything else, operate through the mass technology of large-scale organization. The control of irresponsible by responsible power is, in the province of government, the mission of modern democracy. But where, in a mass society, the democratic State consists of bigger and bigger aggregations of semi-autonomous power, it does not suffice that they be outwardly law-abiding. For the hiatus between ownership and control which corporate capitalism exemplifies is, as an administrative dichotomy, characteristic of all organized magnitude. The twentieth-century corporation may be its prototype. But wherever there is large-scale organization, there is a split between responsibility and control.

One caveat may be entered. In nonprofit enterprise, when administrative authority is assigned through the normal procedures of representative democracy, it is no usurpation of power. From national government to lo-

cal utilities, from the TVA to the Atomic Energy Commission and the Armed Services, from research foundations to schools, colleges, universities, hospitals, museums, churches, voluntary movements, the credentials of organizational man are mostly legitimate ones. But in corporate capitalism ownership is not decisive for control. Is the mere legitimacy of institutional power elsewhere much more likely to prevent its abuse? For the corporate revolution is but one aspect of what, in Kenneth Boulding's phrase, is a wider organizational revolution. As an investor, man might prosper and yet be devalued. So also for the citizen, an increase in collective well-being may be accompanied by a decrease in individual rights.

Large-scale organization, by revamping the social order, transforms the instrumentalities, economic and political, of liberty itself. Soviet Russia was but the last to discover that, despite its doctrine of the classless society, a whole new middle class is required for mass production and mass exchange. But neither is the middle class, in the large-scale society of the West, what it once was. The independent entrepreneur, whether a substantial industrialist or a small tradesman, may still be very much in evidence. As typical of the bourgeois now is an employee making his sedulous way up the salaried echelons of some ramified, co-optive hierarchy. For against mammoth agglomerations it is not only more difficult for the individual to compete with a business of his own—low interest rates and high taxation also reduce the savings which once furnished private capital. Enterprise there may still be, but it tends to be within an administration already established. Similar organizational motivations develop, moreover, among the officialdom of profit and nonprofit undertakings alike.

And where formerly men of initiative could promote themselves they must, today, be promoted.

Human energies in a large-scale society are deflected into organizational grooves. Men are thus brought together; they are also set apart. For, in factory and office, technology erects occupational barriers. The division of labor may thereby result in classes insuperably redivided and again subdivided from each other; in an abridgement of opportunity which falsifies one of the chief postulates of democracy itself. So, too, there is danger that within each such occupational compartment a preclusive power may be exercised irresponsibly by insiders against outsiders, or by one group of insiders against another, for control. And as organizational man thus pursues his interests he will be found in every class and caste of the economy—wherever in fact there are organized units of common action. Liberal hypotheses may be eclipsed when he lays his hands on top corporate power. But these are subject, on every plane of large-scale democracy, to the organizational vicissitudes of legalized irresponsibility.

The modern welfare State is inconceivable without the statutory foundation that organized labor has gained for itself. But upon it, as upon capitalist enterprise, the effect of large-scale techniques is also a far-reaching one. The internal governance of trade unions may now be hierarchical; organizationally they, too, further stiffen up the very social order which they themselves render less unjust. Mass unemployment involves the entire economy; but to alleviate anxiety about jobs, and to prevent needless dismissals or harsh discipline, collective bargaining has done much. Some branches of corporate industry have, moreover, added their own network of social security—severance pay, retirement pensions, in-

surance and sickness schemes. And as benefits from these accrue, workers hesitate to waste them. They therefore fear transference to other, even better, jobs.

Nor is such a trend confined to a more fortunate section of employees. To seek contentment in their station, once basic organizational safeguards have been achieved, is a widespread tendency among the rank and file. The mobility of labor, like fluidity between classes, is one of the hallmarks of a free economy. But workers themselves may so exercise their collective power as to induce social immobility. Stakhanovism is the admission of Communist ideologues that without differential rewards the lower tiers of the Soviet economy will slow down. No democracy could approve, except in grave war emergencies, of any speed-up so intense. Yet workers frown upon more relaxed ones, too: upon piecework, upon most incentives for a personal effort beyond collective minimum wage guarantees.

Jobs may thereby be prolonged, hazards to health and safety avoided. But here, as with labor's traditional antagonism to technological change, is no momentary apprehension which might later be allayed. An issue is raised that runs deep throughout large-scale society. When the wages of the less skilled or less diligent are leveled up to those of the more skilled or more diligent, it is the latter who get less and the former who get more than their deserts. Not that trade unionism is alone in erasing differentials. But through it a good deal comes organizationally out into the open that, even when more flagrant, is elsewhere half concealed. For large-scale power, in making all uniform, can drag down as well as lift up. The self-interest of the class or group may be to stabilize and consolidate; that of the vigorous to push ahead. Yet often, too, organizational man constitutes a third category—one in which the collec-

tive inertia of the organized mass is exploited to advance purposes of his own. And if the rights of others are thereby overridden, the revaluation of man may in that context also be undone.

The more sheltered the pool, the more stagnant its waters. Large-scale organization does not call for the same personal attributes as the smaller competitive enterprise. The latter needs employees who are always on their toes; the former, more often than not, would be vexed by them. A corporate business may be protected through its cartel agreements from an ever-bracing threat of bankruptcy. And once the annual budget of a nonprofit institution—that of a government department, for example—has been passed, one of its worries will be to ensure expenditure for all items and ensure it within the period specified. For where power is collectivized, the mores themselves become organizational.

So, too, the conflict between competition and monopoly, which bigness produces, is social as well as economic. At all events the organized individual is not as free as he would seem to be if within, as between, organized entities competition is unfair. Deadwood, under the competitive conditions of nineteenth-century individualism, had to be pruned away remorselessly. Now the structure of organization invites deadwood itself to block fresh growth. Competition, for the individual as for the enterprise, thus remains. But it supplants what, in the broadest sense of the term, might be regarded as market criteria by organizational ones. Vocationally, at least, the freedom of the individual revolves around an interior rather than an exterior center of gravity at a time when the stakes of interior power have also been enlarged.

The struggle between the closed and open shop reflects a wider struggle throughout large-scale society

for security through organization—to further collective rights without damaging those of the individual. Yet in craft unions, by keeping low the number of apprentices, by excluding new members or expelling old ones, a self-constituted aggregation can quite legally decide rudimentary freedoms for others: the sort of job they may have, who might or might not employ them, the kind of life they are consequently to lead. And that law confers organizational power to circumvent the law itself is again demonstrated by the plight of racial and religious minorities. Even where fair employment practices are stipulated, industrial and craft unions have, like public and private enterprise, been reluctant to adopt them. But favoritism alone could render any large-scale system inflexible. Profit-sharing schemes and nontransferable pension rights do not only bind personnel to their present jobs; any newly employed who may reap benefits from them are selected, as far as possible, from among relations and friends. Organizational privilege would thus deny to the outsider opportunities upon which nonowning insiders had themselves by happenstance stumbled.

Nor does organized self-government only concern access to the industrial machine. In the theater, among musicians, none may defy it; it enables liberal professions to raise standards and yet put their own selfish group interests first. From corporate executive circles to the trade union itself, a free society has been transformed into a latter-day guild system, rigid, interwoven, tightly knit. And the organizational paradox of large-scale power is thus made clear. Being monopolistic it is prone, within as without, to grave misuse. Only through its techniques, as enforced by law, can a mass democracy nevertheless operate.

Organized magnitude will subject even responsible

power to legalized irresponsibility. Internally, for example, large-scale labor may still be more democratically controlled than large-scale capital. Yet it might take common action which is the reverse of democratic. For trade unions—could all jurisdictional disputes be settled—can only represent their own membership. At best their representation of society is therefore a fragmentary one; they have no mandate for it ever lawfully to be anything else. And that is how, when the whole of society is temporarily crippled or permanently weighed down by their demands, they may, in the assertion of a just right, wreak injustice.

The right to strike, as the *ultima ratio* of collective bargaining, is a democratic freedom. Employees can exercise through it an organized power to redress inequalities between themselves and the organized power of each employer. The latter, however, may not be a monopolist. In the sphere of organized pressure, trade unions, alone or with others, must strive for monopoly as the condition of their utility. Recognizing this, moreover, large-scale industry often gives them a voice in the management of production itself. And while that may not be in accord with Marxian theory, it is not necessarily democratic in principle either. For to neither party is the public weal a primary consideration.

Lest they be crushed between these two big millstones, smaller entrepreneurs have, for the sake of fair trade, also had to organize themselves. So, too, in the farming community there are price-fixing and scarcity devices under governmental auspices. The inefficient as well as the efficient may thus be bolstered up; that, however, is one upshot of large-scale organization, with or without the benison of law, everywhere. But farmers —unlike labor in its particular sphere or corporate capital with its patent and other monopolies—cannot debar

anyone from the pursuit of agriculture; and if they were to withhold from the market, for long rather than short periods, the products of their toil, they would be ruining their own capital investment. When agrarian or urban entrepreneurs organize, they have a material interest to preserve. Like organized professions and vocations, large-scale labor has only its skill and services to sell.

Workers are, nevertheless, consumers as well as producers. They will therefore think twice before letting the strike weapon wreck the economy. They may pause, too, over fellow trade unionists such as those, for instance, of the building trades who make housing so costly that, where subsidized projects do not suffice, wage earners themselves cannot be properly housed. As long, however, as the balance of advantage lies with them as organized workers rather than as unorganized consumers, what they lose on the swings they gain in the roundabouts. Nor is it merely with some or against others that men in a large-scale society are organized. For it renders the humanly impossible, that they might even be organized against themselves, technically possible.

This, at any rate, seems to happen when individuals cannot, as independent personalities, square the unorganizable in their beings with whatever has collectively to be organized. For modern functional groups—those of business, labor, and agriculture, of government and other nonprofit enterprise—might, in a large-scale society, hold each other at bay; as between giant institutions, they can thus maintain for themselves an equilibrium of freedom. But the liberty of the individual is not assured unless he has a fit place in one of these groups. He cannot stand up to any of them as an equal;

only within one of them can he, as a rule, stand at all. On what terms will they make room for him?

In a cartelized economy it is man, above all, who may be cartelized. So far as organized magnitude enlarges his opportunities he is revalued; but when these are curbed irresponsibly his freedom will shrivel up. And more than one liberal premise of the modern democratic State may thereby be impaired. For it alone among competing groups is supposed, in the general interest, to exert coercive power. In fact, when autonomous functional groups wield over the citizen the power of economic life or death, their coercive powers, allocated by law or shouldered voluntarily, are more real to him than those exercised by the State itself. And while the latter may, through legislation and administrative decrees, narrow the group's own range of discretionary power, a partial control will scarcely guarantee impartial justice. Between the immobile State of totalitarian organization and the social inelasticities of the West, the differences are still profound. But they will be so less and less if, while resisting tyranny ideologically, we do not also foil subjugation through techniques.

In public affairs representative democracy arranges for responsible power to control irresponsible power. Yet its own governmental processes are themselves hindered by organizational phenomena. And these are more noteworthy in the United States because she is technologically so pre-eminent. Nor was her political system, which antedates mass industrialism, as well designed for democratic control as its enthusiasts aver. Responsibility being dispersed under an eighteenth-century division of powers, it can also be shirked. In a parliamentary system, unitary powers obviate deadlock

between Legislature and Executive; where powers are sundered, there may be more check than balance. And it is this structural defect which has quickened the propensity of Congress to investigate, through committees of inquiry, matters which might otherwise be sifted in the continuous give-and-take of full parliamentary deliberation. Irresponsibility in the probe of abuses is the outcome of a political system which, in the relationship of Legislature and Executive, is itself unresponsible.

Constitutional procedures may be an institutional mold through which the politics of the present are predetermined by the ideas of the past. But as the old shapes the new, the new reshapes the old. Operational differences between large-scale governments—and despite national variations—are thereby effaced; in an age when public administration is so all-important, these resemble each other administratively more and more. Through lobbies, influence, or the necessities of the case, organizational monopolies might, in a large-scale society, be underwritten by law. But even where it is intended that government itself should keep the upper hand, the legislature is unable to spell out a grant of power in every minute detail. Authorizing more than it could oversee, it cannot control all that it authorizes. Legalized irresponsibility begins at the fount of legality.

It is, however, not unlimited. A specific authorization may confer wide latitude; within every public administration there is a tug-of-war between organizational interests and inwrought constitutional controls. Where power is legitimate, as among government servants, it can still be mishandled. But such political responsibility as legitimizes even the marginal power of a cabinet minister or high official is what corporate management lacks. Junior permanent officials, moreover, have, as in ancient China, to pass civil service examina-

tions. Many candidates are thus selected on grounds of :apacity alone. Nevertheless, if they seek advancement, it is sometimes still helpful, once the threshold of the :ivil service has been crossed, to belong to the right political party.

Then, too, every administration can, in recruiting personnel, interpret set rules to suit its own conven-.ence. Organizational patronage might thus supplement or wholly supplant party patronage. And even if no wires are pulled, even if rules of appointment are not suspended during emergencies of war or peace, a public bureaucracy will still contrive to perpetuate itself in its own image. For seniority may be invoked to block the promotion of the able; conversely, it might be flouted when some less qualified favorite is preferred. Not that government bureaucracies differ in this respect from hose of other large-scale institutions. But the latter can be a law unto themselves: more hidebound when it pleases them—or less circumscribed than government bureaucracies by civil service rules. The stamp of large-cale techniques is, however, everywhere the same. Bu-eaucracy, inside or outside government, can exert a col-ective power which is not its own for purposes which organizationally are.

The organizational revolution is, then, more deep-eated than any managerial one. The latter would pre-uppose a centralization of control. In Soviet Russia, as n Nazi Germany, there has been such a centralization. 'et in Communist countries the new managerial class .oes not control the State; the State, under a camarilla f party chieftains, controls it. Still less in large-scale emocracies does organizational man, when he has a ollectivized power to manipulate, succeed in manipu-ating the entire State; he is harder to control, but so is :. For organized anarchy denotes a free society in

which, as controls are multiplied, there is more need and less chance of controlling them responsibly.

A democracy, without cooperation among its own citizens, can neither make laws nor enforce them. A seesaw between the cooperative and the competitive is in fact that which keeps it free. The competitive, in the age of classical liberalism, was overdone; modern liberalism sought to bring the two into some juster relationship. But a large-scale order alters both the competitive and the cooperative, or, rather, from it both re-emerge in fresh proportions. A world of science and technology rests upon the open mind—that faculty of the trained intelligence through which men school themselves into an attitude of objectivity. Common processes elicit a common approach in which an objective temper is common to all. The spirit, however, in which men work together may be less objective than the methods employed; though the common task is an impersonal one, they will not treat their own interests impersonally. These may evoke a collective defense against a threat, real or imagined, from outside the organization. Yet what is thus protected in common might itself simultaneously be the prize of an interior contest for power.

Ambition, jealousy, prejudice, the animosity of rivals are neither banished nor attenuated by technical disciplines and cooperative exigencies. In any organized social mechanism, as the personal subdues the impersonal and harnesses it to its private will, the lesser power acquires the greater. For the contemporary mind is divided; within it the grandly objective and the crassly subjective dwell side by side. The most cooperative of *milieus* will thus contain tensions as competitive as they are disguised. And the higher they crop out on the organizational pyramid, the more social power they involve.

Men will, of course, sink their own differences so as to compete in common against other groups or undertakings. And they do the same when the collective power of the entrenched is mobilized against third parties who seek entry or opportunity. The competitive is still uppermost as any one person or faction obtains inner control of a wider segment of institutional power, public or private. For large-scale organization supersedes the individualistic by the cooperative only to extend to some individuals—or to smaller groups within bigger ones—an unearned increment of organizational power.

North America has thus also been having its social revolution. But it is not the one envisaged by many radical thinkers. For within democracies a change in the control of property is no assurance of democratic control. The nineteenth-century entrepreneur had to carve out his own authority for himself; at his buccaneering worst a still nascent technology would delimit the scope of his ventures. And the most adventitious power may be redeemed when it is a palpable one that can be identified, defined, assayed, and measured. As for the heirs of the old-time capitalist, estate and gift taxes pare down economic privilege bequeathed through any mere accident of birth. Today, however, organizational privilege connotes a species of pre-empted power with little of such traditional ballast. For it is nepotism without inheritance, a system of connections without the nexus of responsibility.

There is accident here, nonetheless, and design also through which the fortuitous can be consolidated. An initial lodgment in a going concern or an existing institution may derive from either accident or design; the competitive achievement of interior control is seldom an accident. And while the incidence of privilege

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is modified thereby, privilege still persists. For upon what others have started it erects for itself a legalized ownership of nonowning privilege. And if this is empire-building, it is the organizational imperialism of those for whom actual occupancy is the decisive occupational warrant.

The possession of power in a large-scale society is thus not confined to the power of possessions. Organized magnitude separates these two from each other; upon the positions created for those who move in and take over, the social order of modern America confers an honor which formerly went to men of quite another caliber. Prestige, as has been discerned by C. Wright Mills and other recent critics, is commensurate with organizational rank. To acquire that rank is a supreme objective; and when an individual can find no fit place within a large-scale enterprise or institutional group, he becomes virtually an economic outcast. To obtain a toehold is, however, but to surmount the first such hazard. The individual will not go far if he falls afoul of persons or groups who have organizationally pre-empted power. Nor can he be confident afterwards of getting a better opportunity elsewhere. Across the democratic promise of an open society shadows cast organizationally will be long ones. As centers of authority expand in size they shrink comparatively in numbers. And above a certain level there may be toward personnel a freemasonry of the ascendant which ensures that any who offend in one quarter are blacklisted in most.

Institutional taboos are thus not only coterminous with the enlarged scale of social organization. So also are the pains and penalties visited upon any who have the audacity to violate them. For the twentieth century, which exhibits the paradox of poverty amid plenty, dis-

plays another of the same genre: the more regulations are devised justly to redistribute power within the State, the more is the lone individual at the mercy of organized forces which he individually cannot withstand.

A society to which individualism gave birth is one in which individualism dares less and less to declare itself. Armies, with their hierarchical codes of drill and obedience, demonstrate how any tightly organized collective movement will regiment and make all conform. Bigness, though it boasts of looking in its rising executives for initiative and imagination, puts a premium upon qualities that cancel these out. Technical aptitudes they should have; spiritually, if he knows on which side his bread is buttered, organizational man must devalue himself. And this is so even when the common purpose to be executed is an altruistic one, when the majority of its executants are themselves altruistic. Always there will be some who seek to master any association, private or public, in the interests of one or a few. In the most nonpolitical of aggregations there is inevitably a complaint of "politics." And usually it is a well-founded one. For as large-scale organization concentrates power, so is inaugurated the struggle to capture it. So also individuals who are above or beyond that battle may, even though good at their jobs, be passed over. For in a stratified society each must back and be backed by his own inner organizational nucleus—a group, a coterie, a clique. In every large-scale enterprise—whether it be a business corporation, a trade union, a government department, any institutional staff—the unaffiliated is the most vulnerable of men.

A mass society which metes out justice on a larger scale than ever before can, through its own remedial techniques, do injustice. Not that organizational man is at heart a man of ill-will. Behind the system's co-

operative façade he is as kindly as its underlying competitiveness permits; and the rapier, where he and his co-workers toil cheek-by-jowl, is, as a weapon, handier than the bludgeon. The prospect of survival or success within a collectivity, big or small, is what must govern his moods, his manners, his conformities—the degree to which he is, or is not, morally responsible. And the material security it provides can accentuate his psychic insecurity. For often it is his own organizational future that he is afraid to jeopardize when, in the presence of injustice done another, he holds his tongue. Within as between coteries there will be feuds, intramural intrigues. A pre-emptive system enables an inside group of noncompetitors, or a cluster of competitors who can in the mutual interest yet collaborate, to summon competitively against outsiders a common organizational power.

And where the closed mind thereby gets control, the damage inflicted upon wider liberties may be substantial. When buried away in small or isolated localities, the parochial mentality, with its fears, hatreds, and suspicions, was relatively disorganized. Today, through organizational techniques, it can be enlarged to a provincialism which is militant, delocalized, and highly extensible. And when this is cast, unobstructed, on a bigger screen there is in the main no light and shade but only those deceptive monochromes which serve half-truths better than truth itself.

A standardized ethos would in any case have been the result of a large-scale environment based on standardized techniques, one which raises the standard of life through the standardization of its units and products. Though a tool for the physical revaluation of man, the machine is devoid of human values. Those therefore who attend it or are attuned to it, those who organiza-

tionally fit into a social pattern at once so repetitive and yet so lifeless, must themselves have less respect for the human personality. The machine may liberate the mass from the ancient thralldoms of manual labor; monotony for workers can, in both office and factory, be reduced by refinements and further invention. But it is far from evident that a higher, widespread, material standard generates a less commonplace one. For the cultural vapidity of our time is not merely a problem of how leisure shall be used—and for many leisure still is scant. It is also one of the epoch's wholesale adjustment to the uniform matter-of-factness of large-scale technology. Democratically a man may consider himself as good as his neighbor and believe in letting the best man win. But in the equalitarian atmosphere of a mechanized society, the best man is he who is the same as all other men.

The institutional attachments of organizational man are too artificial for him to imbue them with the sentiments or solidarity of the clan. Fascist Italy and Nazi Germany tried to fuse the large-scale with the primitive; all that their frenzies revealed was that the devaluation of man can thereby be organized more thoroughly than his revaluation. Yet in free societies, too, he is as gregarious an animal as ever. And as their ways of life are standardized, what organizational man does is to standardize even the natural expression of his social instincts. Quite innocently and without ulterior motive, it is proper that he join service clubs and play games with others. In so doing, however, he often wishes to prove that he is no organizational misfit but a regular fellow: one of the boys who will never go against the stream or march out of step. For to suit the common mold may be the condition of his acceptance by the group; the path to preferment is the beaten

path. And in a large-scale society a Philistinism such as this may not only be a matter of habit or taste. So as to be favorably regarded, it is a competitive necessity to ape and trim.

Nor is the conformist drift a question merely of compliance or dissent on current public issues. Among the politically minded it may come to that; freedom of expression (restricted anyway, as will be seen, where there is organized anarchy) cannot flourish when the climate is adverse. But social conformity is, in a large-scale culture, embedded deep. What engenders it is an awe of authority that is strictly organizational; compulsions, more covert than overt, which enhance timidity among the political and nonpolitical alike. Nor when he asserts himself inexpediently is the group maverick, the individual who lacks any organizational support of his own, deemed a hero but a fool. For he who exposes himself to its reprisals, society seldom forgives: to trouble its conscience is to be the worst of all troublemakers.

The wheel may thus go a full circle. The liberal nineteenth-century ideal of unintimidated independence has, in twentieth-century American democracy, been yielding to organizational constraint. The alienation of the modern individual, how he is socially uprooted, might be deplored. More serious is the degree to which in large-scale undertakings the like can employ organizational power to deprive the unlike of rights which, lest man be devalued, must be within the range of all. Totalitarian policy has been to abolish or subordinate to the absolute State every association in which dissidents might combine to resist its fiat. But a plural society riddled with an organizational exclusiveness, whether formally legalized or informally observed, cannot be a genuinely free one either. For democracy, pit-

ting against total power a totality of human powers, should aim at the all-inclusive. To be sovereign and free, a people must have a system that, directly or indirectly, is responsible to it. But when in a large-scale democracy the loci of organizational responsibility are themselves hard to fix, power within it will still be irresponsible.

CHAPTER

4

The Depreciation of Merit

It is through the principle of merit alone that man's revaluation can be carried out. And for him to be rewarded justly, that is in consonance with the quality of the talent expended or the effort made, each individual has to have approximately the same chance as everyone else to show what he can do. In the collectivized economies of the twentieth century, and whether the auspices be capitalist or socialist, this entails for the many a leveling up, for the few a leveling down. Yet for the individualistic the problem of freedom is thereby still far from solved. For, as large-scale organization flattens out one set of social inequalities, another springs up. St. Matthew's parable of the buried talents was a lesson against sloth. A pastoral age might cast the inept into outer darkness. But in a large-scale society, when the quantitative throttles the qualitative, merit, as a dynamic of democracy, is itself depreciated.

The concept of a career open to talent may be traced back to Plato. Yet he did not propound it as the

core of a democratic system; nineteenth-century liberalism could think of it in no other terms. And will the large-scale societies of the twentieth century now sustain that liberal doctrine? For they put Plato into reverse; as they look after that which is common to all, they overlook that which is unique in some. From a Nietszchean worship of the great man there has, of course, been a revulsion; the modern vogue in biography is one set not by Thomas Carlyle but by Lytton Strachey. Yet Lewis Mumford, seeking to rehumanize the conduct of life, reminds us what civilization owes to a Solon, a Confucius, a Buddha, a Moses, a Jesus, a Mahomet—to the advent of a universal personality. For history has been an amalgam of ideas at work, forces in motion, and exceptional men through whom, at decisive junctures, events do turn one way or the other.

In our own time the Mussolinis, the Hitlers, the Stalins have, by their resemblance to conquerors of the past, represented the obverse side of that medal. Yet it is no less true that, without figures as outstanding as a Churchill or a Roosevelt, our free world order might also have been overcome. What, moreover, has been significant about each of the totalitarian dictators is not that he differs from the mass but that he has been so authentically one of it. What, in war and peace, is as significant about the best champions of democracy is that the abler they are the less are their gifts merely those of the people they lead. And whether the realm be that of high politics or creative achievement in other fields, this lesson is vital. A large-scale society that cuts everyone down to size will be left with size and little else.

Yet not all social scientists lament the depreciation of merit. Stuart Chase approves of some who would have men hew to the average. And then David Ries-

man has depicted peer group norms which shape American middle-class conformities: a nonindividualistic society worried about individual relationships; one that is susceptible to novel influences in leisure pursuits and yet, in its preoccupation with these, is, at an hour of world crisis, oddly self-enclosed. Less reassuring is the somber portrait of white-collar stratification painted by C. Wright Mills. And while this is the structural consequence of a large-scale system, it is more than that. Big business would, for instance, comb colleges and universities for bright young recruits. Yet it itself not only requires institutional conformity in its own executives; it has the insolence to ask that wives and families also toe the mark. More serious still is it, though, when personnel directors, in both public and private undertakings, boast of weeding out lone wolves at every level—as if these, too, do not have lives to live.

A society of Tadpoles and Tapers may be the price of large-scale cooperation. But it costs some more than others—and especially where it discriminates in the sphere of age, race, and religion. For then there is nothing its victims can do to avert a harsh, organizationally predestined fate. The most chameleonic will be impotent; and for robust independence the guerdon of defiance is double jeopardy. In no zone are the liberalizing instrumentalities of organized magnitude employed more illiberally.

A concentration of power centralizes control. Organizationally, however, it also decentralizes its own controls. The larger the organization is, and whether public or private, the more must routine administration, down successive layers of hieratic authority, be delegated. Responsibility, in brief, is diffused and being diffused can ultimately be evaded. Nor is this organizational escapism a question merely, as between the

centripetal and the centrifugal, of large-scale mechanics; among those concerned, it is one also of will. To let George do it is the occupational disease of organizational man; for where it is prudent to conform, the circumspect, the astute, the adroit will all alike play safe. When power is limited, responsibility has a precise locus; as power expands, responsibility may be shifted back and forth. Outwardly determinist, organized magnitude is yet inwardly indeterminate.

The problem of control is further complicated when one large-scale organization becomes officially dependent upon another. State business undertakings in North America have, more or less, been in the province of transport, public utilities, or industrial defense. The net of nationalization is spread by the British more widely. And State profit-making enterprise in Britain is nominally as responsible to the British public as private corporations to their own stockholders. Even less often than the latter, however, can the electorate register a specific opinion about any particular one of their companies; when the government which supervises public corporations is voted in or out of office the polls have spoken on its stewardship of other, vaster issues. But now organized welfare stretches out internationally; and there, for the delegation of power, the supranational tugs empirically at the administrative leash of the politically sovereign. The combined boards of the wartime Allies set precedents in functional cooperation. United Nations agencies and activities, organs of European and Atlantic unity, tread the same path. All would fortify a free world order; and federalists of one international stripe or another urge them to go further and faster. But to keep power administratively responsible is difficult in a large-scale democracy. It will not be easier as democratic processes are superimposed internationally.

As an example of organizational ambiguity, so characteristic a device of large-scale endeavor as the committee may be cited. Legislative committees and committees of inquiry as set up by representative bodies or in conjunction with them do not, as a rule, have administrative or managerial duties to discharge. But where, in public and private undertakings, a committee does exercise such power the manner in which it proceeds should be scrutinized. An appointed committee is, of course, more likely to be hand-picked than an elected one. And the goal it seeks is a common denominator of agreement. It is likely therefore to be selected from the colorless, from those amenable to any who are organizationally in control. Meeting behind closed doors, a committee may become a discreetly privileged sanctuary for ascendant coteries or groups. With it as an inner fulcrum of power, a larger organized power can be moved.

The picture is not all dark. Committees vary in importance. Where the members of one are personally uncommitted, its very impersonality may conduce to decisions that are unbiased. And those of corporate business, when executive self-interest is not directly engaged, do have a yardstick in profit and loss, dollars and cents, for whatever they advise or do. No telltale gauge of that sort can, however, be applied to institutional committees—those of government officials, national and local boards, university trustees and faculties, hospital administrators and staffs, or of any organization in which a nonprofit collectivized power has been delegated administratively. Altruism is a potent force, and so is high-minded public service. Some will risk a good deal to go to bat for others, or for a dissentient view, when the treatment of a man or a measure is not on a basis of merit. But human motives are mixed, and in an

organizational society those thrive best who adapt themselves to it. He who fights and runs away will, however, not only live to fight another day. He may lose the fighting habit.

Not that institutional committees always shun responsibility. There may be occasions when they are so composed as to welcome it. Nevertheless when they do shoulder responsibility for policies adopted or for institutions in whose name they deliberate or act, it is not a direct, intimate, personal one. For the more a large-scale unit belongs to everybody, the more it belongs to nobody. It pulls men up by the roots but can have none of its own. And where the decisions which govern it are anonymous, so is the moral responsibility for them. What on its merits is just may organizationally have no merit. And that is why committee members, jealous of private or professional reputations, would long hesitate to assent openly to much which, in closeted sessions and behind a screen of collective anonymity, they do or condone. For downright incompetence committees may be disbanded; unless a dereliction is financial, none is accountable for it individually. Large-scale power can, through the device of a committee, be delegated democratically. But the gist of democracy is that all who are fit may bear responsibility and that all who are responsible should be held responsible. So far as responsibility can be dodged through committees, a contrivance devised for responsibility becomes in itself an irresponsible one.

Especially in the world of education should note be taken of the degree to which organizational interests outweigh others. That the principle of merit may be depreciated where there is competition for money or power is, while a grave matter, not wholly surprising. When education, with all its cloistered virtues, also

flouts that principle, no cooperative pursuit will be immune. As a main custodian of man's revaluation, its business is one not of things but of the mind; in that contemplative sphere, above all, competition is free only when merit is the arbiter. Yet in a mass democracy higher education has had to be developed on a commensurate scale. And here again organized magnitude runs true to form.

In colleges and universities a few who devote themselves to study and research might earn more elsewhere. Most fare as well as they could have done in other vocations. And though the stipend is modest, they are allowed a scope for self-expression which should in theory make that sacrifice worth their while. But for the overworked majority such academic compensation is, in an inflationary era, an ever-receding goal; and they have, moreover, the same competitive hurdles to surmount as in any other large-scale endeavor. To get a post, to hold on to it, to achieve promotion, to attain objectives that are institutional rather than intellectual —organizational man is actuated on the campus by incentives much the same as his fellows off of it. And if he is petty or irascible, other professionals can at least afford books, leisure, travel, and recreation which he needs no less than they. A modicum of economic security may, after straitened years, be gained through advancement in rank. But whatever he learned in a tense organizational scramble uphill, he cannot unlearn overnight.

The problem of academic freedom is deemed nowadays to be one of liberty for Left-wing opinion at a time when the Communist menace has given reaction a new lease on life. And in faculty affairs the strain thus produced will last as long as the East-West crisis itself. But there is also an internal problem of aca-

demic freedom—and it is one in which some of the Right may not frown upon individualism among their colleagues as severely as some of the Left; one, more frequently, in which orthodox and heterodox are politically quite inapposite as labels. For pressure to conform ideologically might come from above; socially it emanates from within the academic group itself. Scholarship and science have tended to draw on a genteel class with tastes as simple as its income has been small. A few with loftier antecedents may, at older universities, be groomed or selected for top posts; and when these are wedded to native ability the principle of merit receives a lucky fillip. But for most its recognition is less conveniently facilitated. What is not accorded them, they, when they have any appointive power, will not be eager to accord. For a job is a job, and an undertaking dedicated to nonmaterial values can still be pervaded by a low-charged materialism, a class consciousness which is scarcely conscious of itself. As a social bond, inverted snobbery also has an old school tie and it is not a piece of neckwear.

In professional jealousy there is, of course, nothing new. And from it none of the arts is exempt. But the exercise of organizational power lifts personal rivalries to a larger plane; and it adds a dimension of its own. Medicine, for example, is as noble a pursuit as any. Yet when it is organized in professional associations, public hospitals, and teaching departments, the same competitive struggle for institutional control will be waged there as elsewhere. Less than others, however, can organized medicine ignore merit indefinitely. For if it did, the effect upon the well-being of society would be felt concretely and at once by all.

Generally speaking, however, the influence of education is slow and indirect. And when, as organized, it

must work through delegated powers, it has two strikes against it. Head administrators, engrossed in activities typical of their large-scale culture—fund raising and a sleepless attempt to keep themselves or their institutions in the public eye—have passed on the selection of faculty personnel to faculties themselves. And such an assignment may circumvent the intervention of trustees who would appoint for reasons other than competence. But what guarantee is there that faculties themselves will not also be irresponsible?

This query is all the more germane at a time when top university officers are seldom equipped to understand a great deal that goes on around them. In a society with organizational values the position they hold is presumed automatically to instil wisdom. To their *obiter dicta* solemn heed is paid therefore by the press; but few, when elevated to administrative office, have contributed to ideas or learning as much as colleagues who linger perforce in the shade. Perhaps the notion is that the less you know of your own field the more comprehensive will be your view of every field; perhaps knowledge as such is, even for organized education, not a primary requisite. Years ago, at any rate, the eminence of a head educator lay in the caliber of the men he would search for, acquaint himself with, and recommend. But university presidents have now renounced what was once for them a major task. And when organizational power is delegated first to deans and then down to departmental chairmen and staff committees, a democratic concession to workers' self-government seems to have been made. An academic salient of bureaucratic irresponsibility can just as readily be established. For there, as elsewhere, ruling coteries may wield the collective institutional power so as to fortify their own. Academic freedom, like freedom of the

press, can be demanded by those who want it for themselves but are less disposed to share it with others.

Organized magnitude, by diffusing power, impedes action. Yet Janus-faced, it also enables things to get done while personal responsibility for them is sidestepped. When large-scale institutions assert that they are looking for good men, that often means outsiders whose candidacy will be congenial to insiders. In contentious fields which bear upon war and peace, for instance, differences of opinion cover events since before the turn of the century; departmental power has long been apt to discover merit in those whose views coincide with its own—or, better still, have deferentially had none to express. Nor will a newcomer who wishes intellectually to break loose be safe in doing so until his tenure is confirmed; until he, also, is permanently ensconsced. For academic and editorial chairs are alike in this: they may adorn a liberal profession even as, in their exercise of organizational power, they are illiberal. And that, too, is why over some contemporary issues a gulf has on occasion yawned between the best thinking and organized teaching.

For the independent scholar and scientist the contest of power in a large-scale society is more and more an unequal one. Over the centuries the universities took their cue from him and his academies; but now it is only in a collectivized structure that he himself can either function professionally or earn his daily bread. Nor will he be sure of the reasons for either outright rejection or a disheartening nonadvancement: there may be vanquished but, organizationally, no admitted victors. As far, however, as science delves into processes rather than opinion, nonconforming intellectuals might serve it with less personal risk. Its alliance with bigness is not always to its own ultimate advantage. In

laboratory research the cooperative tends to be paramount; yet that, too, without fresh innovating ideas, might run dry. And this danger grows as government, the armed services, the super-corporations mobilize science. For specific applied projects are their concern and not the general enrichment of knowledge.

In every sphere the creative depends upon the untrammeled individual. Gian-Carlo Menotti has observed how, in American music, the conductor rates above the composer. Yet this is characteristic of a large-scale society which, by itself, has neither time, capacity, nor inclination to evaluate merit. The interpreter does not only mediate in a popular idiom or through mass media; when publicized he lends the stamp of authority and thus becomes a well-rewarded expositor of ideas which others, comparatively unrewarded, have, by the sweat of their brow, worked out. Genius, like the wind, bloweth where it listeth. But the first-class is also rare. Without it there could be no living tradition of intellectual freedom receptive to genius itself; none to cultivate the soil and keep it fertile so that on it the finest seeds will take root and, in due season, burst forth. Yet large-scale society attaches more importance to the position than the person. It is not therefore what he says but where he says it from that counts.

On behalf of the open mind, against the anxieties and rancors of the era, the learned world purports to stand firm. And very often it does. But the exalted pronouncements of university pundits about broader responsibilities cannot banish large-scale irresponsibility from within their own institutions. To smile at the antics of the herd is for intellectuals, academic and nonacademic, a cherished indoor sport. Yet organizational power may enable them to run with a smaller herd against the nonconforming individual even as they

themselves scoff at bigger ones. And if intellectuals would thereby depreciate merit, more can scarcely be expected of those whose pretensions are less.

The nineteenth century conceived of progressive societies moving, in the Victorian accents of Sir Henry Maine, from status to contract. Man is revalued as the hard crust of privilege and custom dissolves; mutual compacts to which he could now subscribe would augment and not curtail liberty. But totalitarian systems exhibit how intensively, through modern techniques, retrogression might also be organized. And even in large-scale democracy, while the individual has moved toward a voluntary freedom of contract, he may be constricted by countervailing rigidities of organization under which he is reduced again to a status that is involuntary. For the machinery of organized magnitude can not only be manipulated by vested institutional interests. Even where the competitive element does not enter, as when age factors are considered impersonally, it is capable of a mechanical discrimination which does immense social harm.

Seniority, when it reposes solely on a pre-emption of power, may, by cramping opportunity, violate some of the most vaunted canons of liberal democracy. But it is seniors among insiders, rather than seniors as such, who are thus favored; large-scale organization, when it takes on new workers, can in fact be exceedingly unjust toward older applicants. Medical authority does not endorse mandatory rules that retire employees at sixty and sixty-five. But common sense rebels when job seekers over forty are told that they are too old by employers who are themselves over forty. Nor does the argument avail that workers on the threshold of middle age may be more mature or more reliable than their juniors. For the predicament of such outside applicants is

sharpened by the nongovernmental pension schemes under which older jobholders are themselves retired. The door is shut on latecomers because there will not subsequently have accrued to their credit a sufficient backlog of premiums. Irrelevant in hiring an employee is his own individual merit, much less the well-being of a particular enterprise or institution. For here, too, is a delegation of power, but one to formulas—an abdication of responsibility to actuarial indices and half-baked theories about chronological age.

Pension schemes are a humanitarian feature of social security in the large-scale society of the twentieth century. They have an opposite effect when they victimize some so that others will benefit. The social wastage incurred by mass unemployment is the worst phase of an economic slump. But then all, at least, are, or may be, in the same storm-tossed boat. For institutionalized human wastage there is no such consolation. Morally nothing can be as stultifying as organizational techniques which would devalue man by casting him on a scrap heap for extraneous, predetermined reasons which have little to do with the state of general employment or the suitability of the individual himself.

And as with large-scale discrimination on grounds of age so also with large-scale discrimination on grounds of race. In folklore the early bird catches the worm; but folk antipathies would first have him belong to the right flock. Under modern liberalism the trend has been toward racial emancipation; the mechanics of bigness, however, may conversely be used for the organizational manipulation of prejudice. The color bar in the United States has, for millions of her Negro citizens, converted the American dream into a racial nightmare. Even where their civil liberties are sustained at the polls and in the courts, even when minimal fair em-

ployment practices can be legally enforced, their civil rights are sparse. For vocationally most of them still languish in semibondage. And to their upgrading, when they are employed as unskilled labor, trade unions may be as opposed as any.

Exceptions do, no doubt, occur. Employment and educational opportunities have, of late, undergone some improvement. Engineers being in demand, large corporations recruit Negro engineers on the same basis as others. And occasionally the guilty conscience of a free society will extol what some Negroes have accomplished as if to reassure itself about the fair chance denied the rest. Because of his simple origins, however, the Negro is held down rather than thrown back. If he were to be accepted as an individual on his merits, he would be contributing as an equal to Western culture for the first time. Anti-Semitism, on the other hand, affects a Caucasian people who have long been civilized. When large-scale democracy makes Jews unwelcome, it is discriminating against an ancient community which is one of its own main progenitors. Frequently the segregation which Negroes encounter is ostracism through brute force, actual or potential. Against Jews the pressures nowadays are more subtle and as such more typically organizational.

In Eastern Europe and Moslem lands the persecution of Jews has been endemic. But in the democracies of the West their citizenship is unimpaired, their economic rights formally unabridged. How anti-Semitism can disrupt and contort so enlightened a country as France, the Dreyfus case exhibited at the close of the nineteenth century. And today in Russia—with her Communist satellites—State activity and mass attitudes do not only reveal anti-Semitism again at work; it differs from that of Tsarist times since, in courting Ger-

man favor and wooing Arab sentiment, it may become an item of Soviet foreign policy. Germans, at once so modern and yet so barbaric, were the ones, however, who signalized Nazi conquest by employing the techniques of large-scale organization systematically to decimate in cold blood the historic Jewries of continental Europe. Yet in free societies also there persists a polite, nonviolent discrimination against Jews; unavowed and unremitting, it is one which freezes them out even as room for them is found. Jews have lived in Western Europe as long or longer than inhabitants of majority stock; the ancestors of some who migrated from Eastern Europe to the freedom of Western Europe and the New World had previously fled from the West. And here, during the liberal heyday of private initiative, social barriers may still have been high; to a decent economic opportunity, nevertheless, the road seemed open. But now, with the corporate revolution of the twentieth century, control of enterprise is more organizational than individual. Even industries like motion pictures, which were established by Jews, are passing under the control of others. From control of the principal corporate industries of organized magnitude they do not, however, have to be nudged. No such control ever was theirs.

That, of course, is contrary to popular legend. But then so also is the current divorce between ownership and control. The Jewish minority has at best never had wholehearted acceptance; and whatever alters the distribution of power can impinge upon its economic prospects adversely. When Jews, at any rate, discover that numerous avenues of employment and advancement are blocked or narrowed for them sooner than for others, they are thrust into trades or professions where the individual can still be self-employed. Edged away from the

center of economic and social power, they are thereupon castigated for overcrowding spheres on the circumference which remain. Not that all who would take up such vocations are permitted to prepare for them. Jews usually have greater difficulty than others in getting admitted to private colleges and universities. In medicine a quota system regulates the number of Jewish students who may enter. In some other professions the prejudice of clientele might render it foolhardy for Jews to gamble on a protracted and laborious training.

Where a large-scale society is responsible Jews will be treated accordingly, where it is irresponsible their historic vulnerabilities come into play. There are no physical indignities to be borne. As proprietors of small or even substantial middle-sized undertakings Jews in business face the same competitive situation as others; as employees elsewhere their opportunities on certain white-collar planes, while frequently circumscribed, are adequate. But a fractional democracy is a frustrating one. And Jews feel this especially since the prophetic tradition of Judaism and Christianity is the moral core of liberal idealism itself. The legacy they inherit and their own racial insecurities may have put Jews in the vanguard, intellectual and political, of collectivizing reform. And it would be but another irony of large-scale organization if the movement some of them thus espoused were now to backfire upon the Jewish community as a whole. For social justice is never complete; the same cooperative techniques which render it more widespread can also systematize a relative injustice. Organized magnitude does not only fan from within competitive tensions and group monopolies. So far as these are vented in terms of race prejudice, the scale of such animus may thereby also be enlarged.

A free society in which civil liberties are observed

while civil rights are infringed is not an entirely free one. It is a democratic imperative that a clear abuse of power by the State must be called to account; but other, critical sectors of large-scale democracy are administratively unaccountable. Voluntary undertakings—artistic, philanthropic, public affairs—that appeal to a common citizenship will, in making their bid for a broad allegiance, take Jews into their councils. A contrary drive, such as the anti-Semitism of social clubs and Society, should not be pooh-poohed—it is symptomatic of how, when the financial or public support of the Jewish community is not needed, organizational power tends spontaneously to express itself. No fair employment legislation, even where there are jobs for Jews, ensures that they will be promoted on their merits. But when technical aptitudes are scarce, eligible Jews may not be discriminated against; there might, on the lower and middle tiers of institutional power, be jobs for them. Control is in a category of its own. And where control is irresponsible democracy cannot be less so.

The absence of Jews from control, from the top administrative sancta of large-scale society, might not affect many individuals. But it again raises the question of whether opportunities and rewards in a mass democracy are what they are proclaimed as being. Peripheral privilege is bestown; crumbs from the high table will be better than a starvation diet. Populous Jewish communities have voting power in key metropolises of the United States; American Jews therefore find the path to most kinds of political or judicial office, up to the Cabinet and the Supreme Court itself, a less rugged one. The reform of medical education in the United States and Canada owed much to a report by a Jew associated with a noted philantropic foundation; another similar institution appoints a Jew who was an Ambassador to

one of its important posts. Some are established by Jews; a few appoint Jews to their boards of trustees. Yet anti-Semitic barbs within the halls of Congress itself attended the career of the Jew who had been at the head of the Tennessee Valley Authority and the Atomic Energy Commission; dislodged, he has admired bigness more than it admires him. So also an American Jew becomes Master of an old Oxford College—no comparable academic honor having ever been conferred on any of his origin at home. And even if it had, one swallow—nor, at well-spaced intervals, two or three—does not make a summer.

The facts of institutional life are evident. On the directorial and managerial layers of top organizational power—that of basic corporate industries, the largest banks and insurance companies, most of the leading universities—Jews, by tacit agreement, do not rank.

Ability is needed at the apex of large-scale society more than elsewhere. But enough of it will not come forth unless it is recognized and allowed proper scope. The principle of merit is one which the elite of organizational power, bland, shrewd, pontifical, are prone to laud. The vulgarity of the fanatic and the intolerance of the zealot they would despise. But the example set by them is not what they intend; men of reason, they nevertheless demonstrate more plainly than their subordinates the moral fissures within organizational man everywhere. For with them, as with others, word and deed do not always mesh. Having conformed so as to attain power they do not, in the framing of institutional policy, stop being conformist. And when its own would-be proponents let the principle of merit go organizationally by default, it suffers not from any direct blow but from attrition through acquiescence. Yet they can do little else; if there were more scrupulous respect for insti-

tutional justice, they themselves might not be where they are. Until nerves of power are touched, top executives will nowadays exhibit a considerable breadth of view. The open mind itself may thus furnish a liberal cloak behind which privilege is steadfastly entrenched.

Inner monopoly is the child of outer monopoly. The bigger the team, the more necessary is it to inspire teamwork. But teamwork can cover a multitude of sins and everything depends on the nature of the game, on who enforces the rules, and on who is calling the signals. The problem of competition is, then, not one merely of private initiative in an oligopoly of corporate Titans; not one only of public incentives when the economy is half socialized or at least supervised by the welfare State itself. Where organizational acceptability is for each person the price of livelihood or career, there can be an unfair competition more pervasive and more inexorable than any displayed hitherto in the domain of markets or supplies. In enterprise or ideas the essence of nineteenth-century liberalism was individual risk. Against danger, whether of war or peace, the twentieth century does not only collectivize its precautions; fewer are disposed, save in armed combat, to go out by themselves and meet it. So also it is the noncontroversial figure who may be all things to all men: to deviate from the norm somewhere is to be estranged everywhere. The secret of power in a large-scale unit is to go along with one's fellows even as one would master them.

Men and measures cannot be assayed responsibly, that is on their merits, where control is irresponsible. According to Adam Smith there was an invisible hand which expedited the market transactions of a free economy. And large-scale society also has an invisible hand

but it is one that can manipulate as well as liberate, one which serves the organizational power of some before it conveys wider benefits. Not that this is a premeditated plot in the style of melodrama; insiders are themselves caught up in a collusive social process the moral implications of which they may not quite realize. It is taken for granted that they will draw upon the collective strength as their own. So merged in their outlook are personal interests and institutional prerogatives, that they can rig with the most proprietary of airs a power to which they may belong but which does not belong to them. Organized magnitude, as distinguished from feudalism or precorporate capitalism, substitutes in place of property a property of place. Incumbency is all.

Rules of seniority may not only be a hierarchical sanction but, like so much else in a large-scale society, become morally equivocal. Squatter's rights, though an accident to begin with, are irradiated somehow with virtue. Those employed first in an enterprise or institution, when they have but to wait for the ripened fruits of organizational privilege to fall into their laps, will not work harder; others, less fortunate in their timing, might sink into despair, since between proficiency and advancement there is no logical connection. Yet priority of tenure, while unjust to some, is just to others. After years spent in any undertaking, public or private, a man's future should be secure. Those on the middle rungs may be protected thereby from the capricious above as well as the overambitious below. Nor will a politic novice, once he has made his way into any closed circuit of power, stick out his neck or step on organizational toes. The sycophant achieves seniority in turn by ingratiating himself with his seniors; the mediocrity, displaying no sharp competitive threat, gets the appro-

bation of his peers. To the principle of merit devotion will be avowed by every ideological hue on the spectrum of democracy—and even by some that are not democratic. On no current topic is the cleavage between rhetoric and reality so deep.

In the welfare State two streams of social obligation converge. The first is a spiritual one of genuine altruism derived from the profoundest religious sources of Western civilization. The second is the practical sympathy elicited when, like the Puritan witnessing another led to the gallows, all feel that there, but for the grace of God, go I. Seers and sages have long wanted to do something for the reform of society; technology provides the means. But such is the interaction between every large-scale mechanism and man's own fallible nature that, at a certain point, self-interest will foster apathy rather than concern. Irresponsibility leaves the victim of organized magnitude—whether it be public or private, socialist or capitalist—bewildered and helpless; helplessness is also the apologia of its buck-passing beneficiaries. A system of pre-emption might be too vast, too intricate, for even the most powerful to unravel or rectify; heads are shaken and hands washed as a single gesture of mock resignation. Yet they cannot abandon a system which they did not make but which makes them what they are: if they would stay the course they must run the race as others run it. For organized magnitude does not only modify the relationship of the individual to society. It revives old moral problems in a new setting.

A large-scale society must technically be a cooperative one. But egoistic purposes which once had to be served through private devices can, through it, now also be served institutionally. What technology does is to endow

competitors with gratuitous modern instruments of collective power. Social power could neither be organized nor extended without machines. Fundamentally the contest of power is as ever a contest of men.

And because it is such a contest we cannot, as Reinhold Niebuhr has suggested, hold the unit to a less stringent code of behavior than the individual. For organized magnitude may, in the last analysis, only be a dominant person or group of persons technologically writ large. Moral yardsticks, where the temptations of power increase, should therefore be stronger and not weaker. One law for the rich and one law for the poor is the nadir of legal justice: one ethic for man and another for organizational man would permit large-scale organization to get inwardly more out of control than it is. Moral irresponsibility may be the upshot of structural irresponsibility. Rather than accord formal recognition to so anarchic a dualism, a wise morality will seek unremittingly to bridge the discretionary gap which yawns between the self-regarding and the truly disinterested. Organizational phenomena conduce to organizational hypocrisy. Yet, for man and for groups of men, morality, like justice, must be one and indivisible. To waive this basic, unitary axiom is to release collective power from such inner personal deterrents as may still restrain it. Candor about existing social discrepancies is better than cant. Yet, lest it degenerate into utter cynicism, the observer will insist not only upon what is but upon what ought to be. Man himself could never be revalued if what ought to be had not goaded him on from what was and from what, no less, still may be.

Moral protest alone can never redeem a large-scale system which even standardizes its own double standards. But this might at least prevent the fundamentals

of a free society from being obscured. For saying one thing about the principle of merit and doing another, modern democracy could, moreover, also damage itself technically: it may organize against every danger except dry rot. Unlike nineteenth-century individualism, which crushed many or pushed them to the wall, the spirit of the age acknowledges a wider social responsibility: administratively, however, collective enterprise, public and private, is more and not less irresponsible. Victorian liberalism, in caring for those at the bottom of society, proved cruelly inadequate; yet by kindling the belief that there is always room at the top, it was, for any who were resolved to get on in the world, a superlative exercise in morale. Not that to the pinnacle, whether one of class or office, career or wealth, more than a few could ascend. But as long as competition seemed fair, or as long as the economy appeared sufficiently flexible to give the venturesome a chance, the broad trend was not inequitable; reform would expand rather than abbreviate opportunities. But when it is the venturesome whom large-scale organization penalizes, they themselves do not only lose heart: the juices of progress evaporate. Democracies are exhorted to stand fast against totalitarian inroads. Yet to resist illiberal societies with intelligence, they must have faith in their own.

Organized anarchy and moral anarchy are brothers under the skin. An order of privilege, being inequitable, cannot be a moral order; and where there is no moral order man is devalued. Large-scale organization, in a world at peace, could offer the second half of the twentieth century a more abundant life than humanity has ever known. Yet social justice in a technological era should not only raise the minimal subsistence levels of

the mass. It must, in Browning's phrase, still encourage a man's reach to exceed his grasp if his aim is a good one. For without freedom to do that he may, as his lot is bettered, not really be free at all.

CHAPTER 5

Democracy and Error

War, said Clemenceau, is too serious a matter to be entrusted to the generals. So also a large-scale democracy is too serious a matter to be entrusted to experts—even though, without their technical skill, it would falter, grind to a halt, and collapse. The leadership of those whose talents are such as to command a following may be either democratic or undemocratic, politically responsible or irresponsible. A good deal rests here on a people's own will to freedom; upon whether a tradition of liberty, or a popular hankering for it, is strong enough to shape the course of events. But in the realm of government there is another, coordinate, sphere of leadership to be considered: that of officials whose prestige, while organizational, is derived from special training; and that of public men, politicians and intellectuals, whose influence on opinion is presumed to have a similar expert genesis. Among electors and elected the amateur and the layman must, in a democracy, still have the final say. But before that stage arrives much in his own

outlook, or in the actual conduct of affairs, may have been decided for him.

Under modern conditions the political expert is a technician who, whether his province be big or small, has been educated for his job. Education and leadership are therefore related inextricably. That we must educate our masters was a famous cry in nineteenth-century England as the masses were given the vote. A democracy which revalued man could not proceed without universal literacy. Yet literacy itself, contrary to the sanguine expectations of nineteenth-century liberalism, is no assurance that minds will be open and freedom cherished; the Germans, from the middle of the nineteenth century to the middle of the twentieth, were but the first to show how a nation could be both literate and illiberal. And even if education is taken to be something beyond literacy, it consists mostly of a training that is vocational or technical. Yet there is no moral anchorage through techniques—only a vaster spread of sail.

That the mass, literate or illiterate, is untrustworthy some thinkers have always argued: from Plato to Santayana the solution advocated has been rule by an elite. And what happens to lucubrations such as theirs in a large-scale society the Soviet Communists, the Italian Fascists, the German Nazis have amply demonstrated. Kings, in the Greek Utopia, might at least have been philosophers. As engineers, which is what Thorstein Veblen proposed, their latter day reincarnation would have put efficiency above justice. To bring these two together, to unite technical progress with moral enlightenment, may be the inmost quest of modern democracy. But where overspecialization is accompanied by moral ignorance, the expert himself is bound to be irresponsible. And where he is that, as he often was in misjudg-

ing world issues between the wars, he is even technically inept.

The era of bigness, with the national and the international so interdependent, requires an expert leadership which might handle and advise upon the enlarged scale of public affairs. To preserve peace, or win a war when it comes, is still the cardinal task of government. By the same token the political role of the technician in a modern democracy can, over and above routine administration, be appraised through the specialized qualities he contributes to the making of foreign policy.

The revaluation of man testifies to a sense of moral order: a free world order is both a manifestation of great imponderables and the political framework within which they can operate. Their further development is hampered, however, by the effect abroad of the moral anarchy which organized anarchy fosters at home. As a producer in a large-scale society, the worker on an assembly line, the office clerk, or the store employee can discern little meaningful relationship between his labor and the product as a whole. But so also, at critical turning points in our free world order, most Americans lacked, as citizens, any instructed comprehension of wider duties and global interests. To lock the stable door after the horse is stolen, as nowadays must often be done, may protect other livestock. But where were the watchmen when a keen vigil might have saved all?

The marriage of science and bigness in an air-atomic age conferred upon some physicists and chemists a technical power which, in its planetary repercussions, has been superorganizational. But we must still reckon with the key role of intellectuals who, as publicists or politicians, have traded upon their expertness in the conventional fields of democratic governance and opinion. Atomic spy revelations and malfeasance by junior di-

plomatists indicate how, from within the official setup of a large-scale society, the scale of treachery may also be enlarged. Yet to betray the West it was not necessary to traffic in administrative secrets or in those of nuclear fission. For that had already been done, and in plain view, by unofficial intellectuals, as well as by isolationists and appeasers with official connections, whose counsel between the wars predisposed the free peoples to lower their guard. Error is not treason. But when organized magnitude renders either co-extensive with society itself, it can scarcely afford more of one than the other.

Like every *mystique,* that of the expert arises from fear of the unknown. For he does not only summon up the marvels of technology; without him none can plumb its mysteries. Yet this is a worship of power rather than that respect for merit which was the moral pith of nineteenth-century liberalism. Outsiders may be overwhelmed and insiders bewildered by large-scale organization; those within it who exercise control must themselves rely on others who can keep the machinery up to date and well oiled. For the mechanics of a mass economy the ministrations of the technician were never more essential. To its politics his contribution has come under a cloud.

Nineteenth-century optimism about the engineer, the specialist, the expert survived the first world war. It chilled abruptly after a second one in which the savage Teutonic debasement of science exhibited how large-scale techniques could at once bless mankind and be its most stupendous curse. For we are made facile and yet barbarized by that stress in modern education on know-how rather than ideas, on that knowledge of things which is knowledge without thought or thought without principle. Totalitarian society is frightening not only because it resurrects past tyrannies; it shows how me-

chanics which the mind begat can also expedite a new obscurantism which would stamp out the mind's own autonomy. Today in Russia even the arts are enslaved. But humanism has likewise had its defections. Some creative artists, from Richard Wagner to Ezra Pound, have freely set themselves against the revaluation of man. Irresponsibility with them, however, did not get far; it, like old-fashioned tyranny, was circumscribed by its medium. Klaus Fuchs, his confederates and accomplices, had no power other than knowledge; yet as birds of ill omen they were more than traitors. The fruits of secret research on the largest cooperative scale were what they transmitted to the East. To the West they demonstrated how the inner perils of organized magnitude could match those outer ones which atomic discoveries themselves first luridly dramatized. For here, too, knowledge was power—power over the well-being of other men, self-willed, politically illiterate, morally vacuous, physically illimitable.

The disaster potential of a single episode like that has never before been so high. But great, too, was the harm wrought by political experts whose own irresponsibility, with or without organizational manipulation, rendered more acute the prewar irresponsibility of the English-speaking democracies in world affairs. Nor are these the career diplomatists who have been so often a butt of criticism. For the public service, which legalizes any institutional irresponsibility among permanent government bureaucrats, also hems it in and rings it round by formal safeguards. What has to be scrutinized is the politically less inhibited role of unofficial experts or of experts whose government service may be temporary. First, however, there may be a few additional comments upon the part played by the official as such.

Technical proficiency is not his sole bureaucratic ad-

vantage. For even where this is scant he can always ensconce himself within a redoubt of indispensability. With the experience which officials accumulate, others, could they get it, might do as well; what outsiders are denied is continuity of knowledge. In government, in every kind of large-scale organization, public or private, there are secrets of policy and knacks of procedure to which access is restricted. Technical byproducts of collective power, these are transmuted by organizational man into his own specialized private power. For by cold-shouldering rivals, inside or outside, he shields whatever is technically familiar to himself alone and thereby augments the dependence of the whole undertaking upon experience he has gained in its service. The unattached professional, however, must sink or swim in less secluded waters; he does not compete under conditions as sheltered as the career official nor with resources that are so fully pre-empted. Organizational privilege may, through their group associations, be at the disposal of lawyers, physicians, and other professionals who are not institutionally employed. But in every bureaucracy, public or private, it is his grip on large-scale power which is the technician's main capital asset.

This does not mean that as a government servant he is politically irresponsible. Democracy would never endure if he were. But bureaucratic irresponsibilities stem from administrative functions; and the problem is to prevent these from encroaching upon the paramount sphere of elected representatives themselves. For the civil service does not, after all, merely implement, irrespective of party complexion, legislative enactments and the purposes of the Executive: in a large-scale society its daily operations must unavoidably also create policy. Between administrative exigencies and any set rules of political neutrality, officials are perpetually torn. Yet

only through so incessant a tension can democratic liberties be maintained. If such correctives had been more potent within the German civil service, it might have done less to deliver the Weimar Republic to ultranationalism and the Nazis. It has been condemned for an ideological amorality which would serve every sort of regime. More heinous was the fact that, while ostensibly neutral between parties, it took the anti-Weimar side and thereby did much to hasten the downfall of the entire system. In a genuine democracy, official neutrality rules can, when applied to unofficial spheres, be overdone.

As large-scale organization, governmental and nongovernmental, recruits trained personnel it removes them from partisan and controversial warfare, from domains in which as men of thought and men of action they might also be needed. Atrophy of the political muscles may, among nongovernmental employees, ensue. Corporate business and private or semipublic institutions do let their experts serve in government as administrative officials. But only the top rank is free otherwise to take a stand on current issues. Most nongovernmental employees, so as to preserve their own organizational futures, would be chary of political differences with any above or around them who in hiring and firing, in promoting and passing over, possess organizational power. To ride herd is a prerequisite of success in a mass society. But it is not only in strictly organizational affairs that the individual conforms. His citizenship is reduced by them to the second class, he is in some degree politically emasculated.

Overstimulation is, on the contrary, what can afflict government experts. For these are so situated organizationally that they might interpose their own wills in transactions for which legislators are elected and minis-

ters chosen. Organizational power is derived by them from the administrative structure; but it is also the latter which confines them behind the scenes. A growing segment of the intellectually vigorous must thus keep silent when vital questions are debated publicly. This does not presage that all will be quiet on every official front. But civil servants, though they tug and pull, can never lead out in the open. Bottled up institutionally, officials only have organizational outlets for energies which would expand beyond them.

The career servant of government is, however, not the only expert in the public affairs of a large-scale society. Unofficial experts hold a watching brief in the general interest against both elected and permanent officials. And since there are no formal credentials, anybody may regard himself, or be regarded, as an expert. But some intellectuals—writers, editors, scholars, lecturers, broadcasters, politicians, drawn from many disciplines—do make a special bid for leadership on grounds of specialized knowledge. And as an opinion-forming element in a free society they should be less irresponsible than any other since greater weight is attached to their words. These words, moreover, reverberate all the further when they carry with them an institutional authority; when uttered by a person who is deemed sapient not because of what he, in himself, may be but because of the post he has organizationally chanced to occupy. Yet if, from an orderly long-range point of view, such mislead, censure is sporadic and not always well directed; positions in most cases stay intact and so does prestige. Maturity in the individual is a capacity for looking both fore and aft. But it is harder to find this in a collective body where, as the scale of action is enlarged, responsibility is diffused. Nor do spectacular postwar attempts by Congressional committees to ferret

out Communists from government, or stage political inquisitions on events in East Asia, ensure that the irresponsible will eventually be brought to heel. For crime may be punished in the courts. Against impolicy there is no law.

And if we would search for impolicy in our time, it did not begin at Teheran and Yalta. For those who sit in judgment might recollect that in our generation freedom sold itself down the river when the victors of 1918 let war recur at all; that their own party affiliations should make them the last and not the first to cast stones. In no zone more than this has large-scale democracy revealed moral and political irresponsibility. Yet from Versailles onward a host of experts, official and unofficial, had been sounding the alarm. But others who misstated world issues helped, by softening up the West, to precipitate the second German onslaught. Of that dire event the enfeeblement of Western Europe, the Eurasian predominance of the Soviet Union, are the catastrophic sequel. And as far as Americans were to blame for it, they were not the pre-atomic agents of Communist Russia but, like their appeasing counterparts in Britain, patriotic citizens of unimpeachable respectability.

After 1919 the United States contracted out of that free world order to whose restoration she had, with others, just lent herself. Psychologically her contribution to disorder was as profound. Barely scratched by war, she had let down partners who were maimed physically and spiritually. There was scarcely a mistake made by them during the next two decades which they did not attribute to the lack of assistance from their rich, erstwhile associate. Americans still scolded them about the higher global moralities; the great moralizer became, by her abstention, the great demoralizer. And the United

States demoralized not only through her negative behavior. Positive American influences were also destructive.

For mischief may not only be done by a cold intellectualism devoid of moral responsibility. Moral responsibility without intellectual responsibility can, by virtue of its ethical attractions, mislead even more. Americans had always inveighed against those power foundations of our free world order which were not all that they should be; the realities of power which, nevertheless, still made possible a free world order were somehow unmentionable. In the Occident the revaluation of man had been impeded by economic injustice; in the Orient it also ran up against colonialism and the exploitation of colored races by white. After 1914, however, humanity moved forward under the shadow of forces, Teutonic and Slavonic, which could only decivilize. And as perfectionists in the West found excuses for these, the free world was discomfited and confused.

Between the wars when Britain ruined herself by allowing a strong Germanic power to be revived she received much encouragement from across the Atlantic. In England John Maynard Keynes had, as an expert, warned against the economic consequences of the peace; yet quite as devastating were to be the intellectual consequences of Keynes himself. And then, later, Arnold Toynbee may have been so full of past and future civilizations that, in current writings on the Nazi threat to our own, he could do little more than reflect the mood of the hour. Even after Poland had been overrun E. H. Carr was hailed for several volumes in which the Victorian architects of German power were given a pat on the back and Munich itself would be approved as a near-example of peaceful change.

From the outset there had, among Americans, been

sympathetic vibrations. The German revisionist school came into fashion; in the books and journals of the period the aggressors of 1914 would be treated as no worse than the other belligerents; they therefore could hardly be reproached for attempting to expunge Versailles and get their own back. Napoleon may have lost the battle of Waterloo on the playing fields of Eton. Recent history as expounded at Harvard and Yale was, with its Anglophobe and Germanophile undertones, more likely to embolden a conqueror than give him pause. The open mind may thus have been open but not to its own defense; and an echo of that epoch can still be detected in Mr. George Kennan's exposition of American foreign policy in the twentieth century. A free world order which did not understand the foundations of power on which its own freedom reposed could not act in unison to keep them in good repair. But popularizers would not take up a point neglected by scholars. What paved the road to war? No fundamental conflict of world order but lesser disputes, nationalist or imperialist, as fomented by bankers and munition makers and of little moment therefore to the United States herself.

Alger Hiss, in a generation of large-scale tragedy, was a minor figure. But if he is symbolic of anything it is, as an official, of a personal irresponsibility which was more than organizational—and one which seems to have been nourished by the intellectual irresponsibility of his age. It may, at any rate, be significant that Hiss embarked on his career in public affairs through so demoralizing an international venture as the Nye Munitions Inquiry of the United States Senate. American neutrality laws which followed did much to wreck the peace and, but for Rooseveltian glosses before Pearl Harbor, might, until too late, have paralyzed our free world order irretrievably. Yet, on the subject of war origins, the

isolationist propaganda behind that legislation served the anticapitalist doctrine of Moscow as well as the strategic designs of Berlin. For here, as elsewhere, extremes of Right and Left would meet.

This is not to acquit some financiers, some industrialists, some cartelists—with their legal technicians and their pliant appointees among government officials, at home and abroad—of culpability in reviving the German menace. But it is not a long jump from corporate irresponsibility in national affairs to the irresponsible exercise of that domestic power in international affairs: more incongruous were the bedmates it found among critics of capitalism itself. Reinhold Niebuhr writes about the irony of American history. The supreme irony, however, is when misconceptions of history form the stuff of history. As if to justify its rejection by the United States, expert voices among the English-speaking peoples did not only assail the moral validity of the 1919 peace settlement; the pre-Nazi effort of German nationalists to reverse the verdict of 1918 was accelerated by self-demoralization in the camp of the victors. Publicists and public men rated the moral claims of its antagonists above, or the same as, those of our free world order. Psychological warfare had thus done its work for Germany before major hostilities again broke out.

Fixing the spotlight on the peace treaties was, after 1919, to the interest of the vanquished alone—those which proved unenforceable being modified in practice anyway. The damage wrought by the warmakers and not the compromises reached by the peacemakers was what had weakened the economy of Europe. And it is such further debility, Pelion piled on Ossa, which has since provided Russia with current opportunities again to expand. As free peoples had, despite the brave Gene-

van experiment, been dissuaded from organizing effectually for peace, so were their foes nerved thereby to organize for war. The threat of renewed disorder in the fifties stems from the disorder that the preponderant English-speaking democracies themselves failed to regulate in the twenties and thirties.

In the public affairs of a society which depreciates merit, past performance and present influence are not necessarily correlated. If experts have organizational power—academic, political, editorial—their mistakes will not be held against them; if they possess little or none, their judgment may go unheeded even though it has been vindicated rather than discredited by events. After the atomic spy disclosures in Canada, the United States, and Britain, the dangers of betrayal from within to the Soviet Union should not be minimized. But what about those insistent demoralizers, again wearing a mantle of expertness, who, in the decisive years of the late thirties and early forties, did more to immobilize our free world order than any wretched domestic Communist prior to the ghastly traffic in atomic plans and research? Nor is the question they raise the same as that of the ex-Communist. For what they did emerged, as it were, from inside the fold, from within the bosom of the family itself.

The mettle of leadership would not be so difficult to assess if some clear boundary could be demarcated between the strictly political and the strictly technical. But in foreign affairs, at least, the dividing line is more and not less blurred than ever before. The problem for democracy is therefore not only that of the technician who, as an official adviser or expert negotiator, manipulates power and can yet organizationally eschew responsibility. In coping with issues of war and peace, on which everything else depends, the public man, whether in or

out of office, must nowadays himself have some of the technician's skill. And as the expertness of the official and the politician overlap, so, in a mass society, are large-scale techniques a cloak for both. Not that these alone are a source of irresponsibility. But they blend with others and, through sheer organizational extent, render them more potent.

If largeness of view had been a concomitant of large-scale power, the mid-century crises of our free world order might have been averted. But those who led, after 1919, in its self-impairment were men long accustomed to corporate irresponsibility. Conservatism in Britain was dominated by industry and finance rather than the aristocrat and the squire; by the Baldwins, the Neville Chamberlains, and the City of London rather than by the Churchills, the Edens, the Cranbornes. So also business in the United States would be represented by a Harding, a Coolidge, a Hoover, and a Taft. Yet it was the Republican Party itself which, at the turn of the century, had harbored not only politicians as mean-spirited as Henry Cabot Lodge but others, like John Hay and Theodore Roosevelt, with more wide-ranging concepts. Trade and commerce among the English-speaking peoples set the balance sheet above any power balance. Nor could opponents on the Left have been more statesmanlike since they put social services before rearmament and made allowances for enemy demands even as, unarmed, they boggled at conceding all of them. In an epoch of self-demoralization the sentimental fed the crass.

Though the variants of American isolationism were many, their effect, from Left to Right, was similar. The tendency may now be, with the radical Right under Senator McCarthy baiting the conservative Right under President Eisenhower, to give all sections of the latter a

clean bill of health. By the nineteen fifties, however, the fundamentals of American foreign policy had been settled; it is the record of earlier years which must be consulted for any evaluation of subsequent claims. In the noninterventionism of Senator Vandenberg there seemed to be an old-fashioned homespun quality; Charles Beard, though he otherwise deprecated the parochial in politics, had it too. Democracy, moreover, is a political system in which all may change their minds. But it is only a private person who should be free to do this with impunity; leadership, being constantly on trial, is something else again. A large-scale society might, on other questions, be inured to irresponsibility; in the matter of its own self-preservation, there is no safe margin. Grounds for public confidence, if they cannot always be moral, must, at least, be practical ones; it is the starkest expediency which has, however, been the most inexpedient. Senator Taft, who opposed Atlantic measures to withstand Russia as he had opposed those against Hitler and Hirohito, would not broaden his view until after the issue was decided. But since Pearl Harbor, many former isolationists have, as politicans and as experts, been living down the harm they once did. And if it is as easy for them, in their public careers, to have been wrong as to have been right, so may it be for others. Bad qualifications, by a Gresham's Law of leadership, drive out good.

After Pearl Harbor there was no point in the isolationist activities of men like Senator Vandenberg. Still less could John Foster Dulles persist with prim apologetics for German dynamism—with slight foreshadowings of what, had the Nazi war gone otherwise, might have turned into a collaborationist approach. Not to climb opportunely on the internationalist bandwagon of the new era would have been poor politics. Politically indispen-

sable, too, were the Republican votes which Senator Vandenberg was afterwards to garner in the Senate for Administration bills. Seldom had the fiber of leadership in a large-scale democracy been tried as during the precarious days of the Nazi-Soviet pact. Yet then, as France fell and Britain tottered, America First and the Communist Party marched together in the same direction. And as saboteur of a free world order, America First stuck it out—from the Nazi invasion of Russia to the Japanese assault on Hawaii—six dire months longer than its erstwhile comrades-in-arms. But some of those who deemed the United States immune have, such is organizational power, since enjoyed a curious immunity. They might, as latter-day paladins of the free world, assert themselves emphatically. If their own cosmic misjudgments had once prevailed, there would be no free world order for us now to defend.

And it is from this angle that the rise of John Foster Dulles should be surveyed. It was as party technician that, in the new bipartisan epoch, he would win his spurs. But, as an expert on international affairs, he had revealed at their most crucial testing-time the gravest inexpertness. His appointment as Secretary of State illustrated how merit in techniques, organizationally conceived, can yet depreciate merit. Mr. Dulles was no champion, during its grimmest years, of our free world order. And if American power is to be vivified by moral force, the United States should have spokesmen who, in freedom's cause, have never vacillated.

In a democracy men possess the right to make their own mistakes. But when these involve their fellows, the latter must protect themselves. A free society bears the cost of honest error as the price of freedom. When, however, its very survival has been imperiled, a lax attitude toward irresponsibility is in itself irresponsible. For er-

ror in leadership there are no legal penalties; political ones should, in a mature democracy, be therefore more surely enforced. Over the converted sinner Heaven rejoices most. But even in the Church he is more likely to become a saint than a bishop.

It is, however, not only former isolationists whose individual irresponsibility has capitalized on large-scale irresponsibility. These, despite past inexpertness, may be reinstated as experts. Former Communists, whether of the Stalinist or Trotskyite dispensation, are accepted as experts not in spite of but because of past inexpertness. Merit, as a yardstick, is thus turned upside down; and cults of the renegade further cheapen democratic values. Not that ex-Communists admit to political incompetence. If they did, they could never cash in as experts on major issues of war and peace. For them it is their god rather than its votaries who failed; theirs is the injured pride of the misled rather than the contrition of the misleading. But to have been the one disqualifies as much as to have been the other, and in fact they frequently were both.

The case against the ex-Communist resembles that against the pro-Fascist and pro-Nazi elements of America First. Yet none identified with organized isolationism served the interests of our free world order; where, however, these synchronized with those of the Soviet Union, Communists would oscillate on the side of the angels. At its inception America First was thus the more inimical: its influence, far surpassing any possessed by American Communists, did much, when freedom itself hung in the balance, to keep America aloof. But in later years, while Communist infiltration of the State Department should not be exaggerated, there can be no doubt of what the West lost and the East gained by Soviet atomic espionage. In this only a few Communists

were directly engaged; many had deemed it best to renounce their Party allegiance before it occurred. What happens, nevertheless, when they do win out—when their organizational apparatus is merged with the organizational apparatus of the State—may be seen in every captive nation of the Soviet orbit.

Morally and ideologically, ex-Communists cannot box the political compass and still pose as mentors whose counsel their intended victims should accept. For years they did not only misrepresent the character of Russian society; at the drop of a hat in the Kremlin they would have disrupted our own. Yet former Stalinists and Trotskyites have made so good a thing out of a dubious past that to challenge their capacity for responsible judgment is itself deemed irresponsible. Such inside knowledge as they have could be imparted quietly; as students of the Soviet economy and Russian methods there are more reliable experts. Ideological racketeers may propagate the myth that as ex-Communists they are now the most trustworthy of anti-Communists. But they still play Russia's game when they divert the attention of a democracy from other crucial issues to make it take sides in what is nothing less than a civil war in a political underworld.

And that is the standpoint from which should be considered the question of whether Mao Tse-tung, threading his way through the labyrinths of the State Department, marched to Peking across the Potomac. Organizationally pro-Soviet influences did what they could in Washington, as in Ottawa, when, during the second world war, any issue of war aims and the coming peace arose. The problem is whether the postwar campaign against them, as waged by former comrades, has not since been blown up for personal rather than public reasons; whether the supporters and colleagues of ex-

isolationists, who themselves wrought damage, can with no compunction join ex-Communists as the outraged guardians of the national interest. For such is the relation of diplomacy and power that even the most adamantine resistance to Mao Tse-tung by every American government official could not have made much difference for long.

What are the facts? Though Japan had been defeated by the United States, it was Russia who, after 1945, reaped in the Far East the fruits of victory; Eurasian and expansionist, she could resume that ascendancy on the mainland of East Asia from which the Japanese dislodged her forty years before. In the long run only a massive full-scale American invasion of the region might have buttressed Chiang Kai-shek or, as Theodore Roosevelt had desired, established a Far Eastern equilibrium. The fate of China was sealed when, while the United States rushed pell-mell to bring the boys home, Russian armies stayed intact; when the American people, for one last delusive interlude, fancied that they could maintain peace by potential rather than actual power. And in Korea the subsequent enforcement of the United Nations Charter taught the United States that her preoccupations do not cease when her occupations are abandoned.

Illicit machinations in the State Department had to be unearthed. But as compared with atomic espionage, there is little evidence that these seriously affected the course of events. Nobody has intimated that the talons of Alger Hiss stretched to Downing Street; yet Winston Churchill, as well as Joseph Stalin and Franklin Roosevelt, took part at Teheran and Yalta. So also with the development of policy in the Far East—the same brute circumstances, geographic and strategic, as eventually

permitted Russia to lord it over Prague would underpin Mao Tse-tung at Peking. American power in being, suitably deployed, might, here or there, have altered that grim picture—nothing else could. But these realities, as ex-Communists and ex-isolationists get themselves into the act, tend to be obscured.

Foreign policy, above all, must be framed against a rich background of full acquaintance with the vital interests of a free world everywhere. And about these it is grotesque that ex-Communists, any more than ex-Fascists or former Nazis, should presume to speak. Leadership against a new threat to the West devolves properly upon those who, whether on the Right, the Left or the Center, have today nothing to retract from yesterday. And good judgment, being personally as well as democratically responsible, must be its earmark. Ex-Communists, if they had possessed this, would never have been what they were; nor can the sincerest of recantations transform a man's nature. Humiliated, unbalanced, obsessed, the vocal among them are still impelled by that absolutist temper which they once found so fascinating in Communism itself; any concern they now feel for Western democracy is colored by a score they have to settle with a cause which let them down or which it had become prudent to desert. About Communists in sensitive areas, Americans may be perturbed. What they do not realize is the extent to which posts now held in universities and trade unions, on editorial staffs and as book reviewers, by former Trotskyites and ex-Stalinists enables some of them to take in each other's intellectual washing and thereby cleanse themselves. Addicted to the relentless in casuistry and dialectic, habituated to working in clandestine networks of cells and cabals, they are adept at organizational techniques through which dis-

sentient views can either be boycotted or maligned as suits the neurotic pattern of their own political rehabilitation. Fanaticisms alter. Mentalities do not.

Pre-atomic Communists, Trotskyite and Stalinist, may thus lay bare their souls and yet not tell all. Others who ill-served our free world order, the pro-German demoralizers, the former America Firsters, are criticized less than their critics. Yet for their moral amnesty it is Hitler's heirs in the Kremlin whom they have most to thank. And it would be less disquieting if in each of these quarters, on the Right as well as the Left, self-exculpation had not turned so brazenly into self-righteousness. For it, too, thinks the whole world is mad save thee and me, John—John's own sanity being noted as a matter of doubt. And in so irrational an atmosphere the only guilty ones could soon be those who have nothing to explain away.

Irresponsibility in the defense of our free society has, then, had, during the twentieth century, no one source. But without the irresponsibility which a large-scale structure facilitates there would have been less leeway for the irresponsible in opinion and leadership. Statesmanship is not only wisdom in public affairs: it is wisdom in time. When political experts go amiss they are, however, more loath afterwards than other men to eat their words: judgment entails foresight, and to acknowledge a lack of it would be for technicians to disparage their own wares. As palliation of intellectual ignominy they therefore contend that everybody, or almost everybody, was wrong; if all are leveled down to the same plane of mediocrity, fewer competitive differentials of merit have to be recognized and accorded their due. Then, too, there are those who, having ignored or misconstrued the lessons of history, excuse such irresponsibility by saying that none now, only history itself, can

decide; by postponing all assessments, that is, to a later date when they no longer have any immediate bearing. But history is sheer antiquarianism unless it illumines the past in the present; here and now; in yesterday's future which is today as much as in today's future which is tomorrow. Without perspective there can be no vision. Yet it is this for which a technically trained generation is educated least of all. In an age of technology the expert is long on his own speciality, short on its relation to everything else. Organizational relationships may give him power. A corresponding responsibility will, in the deeper unrelatedness of organized anarchy, be far to seek.

Not that an exact clairvoyance in public affairs is possible. It is the architect, the engineer, the craftsman who can see ahead more clearly: controlling his own material, he exercises judgment within precise, technically well-defined limits. And the experimental scientist in his laboratory, the medical practitioner as he treats his patient, the surgeon as he operates on him, must be able to do the same. So also for large-scale planning in the modern State, there will be prediction founded on systematic economic research. Yet here social controls may be organized to ensure that the envisaged result is not wholly left to chance. World politics are, however, destitute of any single, overriding control. The limits for valid prediction will therefore be as precise or imprecise as international anarchy itself. Yet we invite chaos when we throw in the sponge and despair entirely of charting our global course in advance. Irresponsible leadership may, as a plea in extenuation, strike a fatalistic note: that since events are unforeseen, what it did was the best that could be done. But the fatality is in a large-scale order which conduces to the irresponsible—not in the events themselves. Nor, in matters of war and peace, should too much be made of the thesis that,

when they are foreseen, it is the prediction itself which shapes events to a predicted end. For if this were so, to warn against a danger would be to bring it about.

On so cardinal an issue as the advent of war in 1939, for instance, all the turns had been called. No crystal ball was necessary to perceive that, with the forces then in play, there might be a Nazi-Soviet pact which could again put Europe at the mercy of Germany; or that, in any final crisis, Anglo-American unity would, to preserve our free world order, be forthcoming. A calculation of national interests and international probabilities can be gleaned from history; what history cannot do is make certain that there will be those with power or influence who may digest its lessons wisely—that to these attention will be paid. Dictatorships have one leadership principle, democracies another. But when among the latter there was a breakdown in leadership, there was a breakdown in peace itself.

An expertness that is sound will predict soundly. In a mass society, however, the first-class is suspect, conformity the road to organizational success. In one of humanity's darkest hours the wartime conjuncture of Churchill and Roosevelt was a stroke of miraculous good fortune. Yet Churchill only became a prophet with honor in his own country when it was in the most desperate straits—when indeed little but honor remained. Nor would Roosevelt, though in office, rise to full stature until after the blow had fallen. And by then the Russian alliance alone could redress the strategic balance. But what the war proved had been plain before the war. Separately the English-speaking peoples might be the puppets of uncontrollable forces. In unison they could direct events or, at least, prevent them from getting out of hand.

It was the genius of Churchill and Roosevelt to refashion the very circumstances which had aligned them

in leadership together. And neither, it may be recalled, could, with their superb personal talents, be deemed an average man. The imprescient leadership of average men was, in fact, what had let our free world order rattle so needlessly down to the brink of catastrophe. As a patriot, Churchill must have been heart-stricken when his gloomiest prognostications were fulfilled; as an expert who understood history before he made it, little could take him by surprise. And only a society which still bred the exceptional might produce leaders who, in saving it from its enemies, would save it from itself.

On what, then, does the reputation of experts depend? One innate difference between those who are occupied with public affairs and those who follow other professions is in the incidence of surveillance. Organizational phenomena may, throughout a large-scale society, depreciate merit. Yet where, for example, scholarship or science have original work to exhibit, this will, at least, have to undergo the scrutiny of other scholars or scientists. As a matter of fact in every learned profession the skill of members must thus pass muster before fellow specialists. But where they have professional contacts with individuals who are not part of the profession, it is these which determine at last how a professional man is regarded. A surgeon who is maladroit, a lawyer who is obtuse could not disguise his deficiencies for long. For each bears a direct responsibility to the person who consults him; his experience as a technician is the cumulative result of tangible satisfactions accorded particular clients or patients. In public affairs, however, the satisfaction which has to be given is a general one; tangible though they are, the responsibility for them is so dispersed as to be intangible. And now as large-scale enterprise—governmental, institutional, corporate—absorbs trained experts, these acquire the same organizational

incentives as laymen themselves. Many are still kept alert professionally by love of the work for its own sake. Other, more concrete, stimuli are the need of most.

Democratic leadership, though it draws on expert pursuits, is distinguished from learned professions in a number of additional respects. The former has a sphere which co-extends with that of the entire social order; the latter function within bounds set by themselves. Even where the responsibility of learned professions is at its most personal and direct, each discipline maintains, neat and inviolate, the arcana of specialized knowledge. A mass democracy, however, as it gathers everybody within its embrace, must strive perpetually to surmount barriers between the expert and inexpert. Organizational man as a civil servant or party stalwart may play his cards close to his chest. The leader whose appeal is to public opinion or the votes of the public must talk to the people in the language of the people. For politics touches their lives all the time, learned professions only some of the time. To the ordinary citizen public affairs may thus be deceptive: made to seem less recalcitrant than they are, they annoy and disillusion when their full intricacy appears. And indeed this mood was one element in that post-Wilsonian demoralization of the English-speaking peoples which, with isolationism and appeasement, would culminate in the second world war. Simple panaceas were not feasible overnight. Responsibility for world order was therefore abjured altogether.

Many of the ills by which humanity is beset may be written in the stars and concealed from it beforehand. But statesmanship is the art of sorting out the remediable from the irremediable. The mid-century plight of our free world order, flowing from evils that were foreseen and could have been forestalled, was not inevitable.

Nor has what happened disproved the liberal credo that men, by opening their minds and applying their intelligence, can in common revalue themselves and reshape their destiny. What it does prove is that a mass democracy may, through its own social techniques, allow itself to become the creature rather than the master of events. And even if organized magnitude did not make for the irresponsible use of large-scale power, a free society would be handicapped by a lag between prediction and fulfilment. For it is this delay which enables political leadership to escape the consequences of its own folly. A surgeon or lawyer has, as it were, to deliver the goods on the spot. In public affairs there is often an interval during which an issue tends to grow stale or alters circumstantially. When it does come to a head, those who mishandled it or misinformed opinion about it are covered, in their incompetence, through the passage of time. A bored, forgetful, or uncomprehending populace is, by then, too engrossed in other questions to keep the record straight.

Mass publicity in a mass society caters to this mass amnesia. Marx may have said that religion is the opiate of the people; it is mass propaganda that totalitarian movements, Communist, Fascist, and Nazi alike, have employed first to convulse and then, rendering docile, benumb. Not that large-scale publicity has the field, in a modern democracy, to itself; the obvious physical fact is, nevertheless, that above its clamorous suasions the still, small voice gets less and less chance to register. In opinion industries the accent of organized magnitude has been on the brash, the strident, and the sensational. Political leadership, also seeking out the mass, soon learned that to establish a reputation it, too, must be seen and heard incessantly; that how this is done matters less than being sure it is done; that volume and

reiteration, rather than a consistent expertness, are what count. Stereotyped familiarity with a name is so important for intervention in public affairs that, even when obtained in another, quite disparate, sphere, it ranks above any relevant specialized capacity. From Charles Lindbergh to some of the more literate stars of stage and screen there has been a transferred access to the public mind which is as irresponsible as it is vast. As if by some medieval alchemy which would transmute base metal into gold, the influence of the inexpert is, through the organized magic of mass publicity, itself made expert.

Not that popular idols are deemed omniscient. They would lose half their charm if they were. For people may not wish their heroes always to be vindicated in judgment. Excellence, by contrast with one's own inadequacies, can be, and often is, a strain; relief may be had in the huddle of the group, the conformity of the mass. The artificer of large-scale publicity, in working up public reputations, must realize that the mass of men, dimly conscious of their defects, are beguiled and consoled by leaders who share many of these with them. For man in the aggregate, pulling others down to his own level, would devalue himself; and it is frequently in spite of himself that he has to be revalued. "I told you so," is the most unendearing of admonitions. For with that reminder the public, as if in a glass darkly, perceives, shudders, and recoils from its own torpid image, its own inferiorities, its own infirmities, its own irresponsibility.

A large-scale order is the province of experts, and only through expert leadership can it continue safe and free. In each of the major crises of the twentieth century such leadership has, ultimately, emerged; yet if it had done so sooner, if there had been more of it in time,

humanity might have learned from one ordeal how to spare itself another. Mass democracy, with whatever in an organized anarchy that is ambivalent, still stands for the principle of merit. When nothing less may suffice, qualified leadership comes, at last, into its own. But a more ample supply will not steadily be available if, in the day-to-day business of society, the pressure is all the other way.

CHAPTER

6

Foreclosure and Dissent

"It ain't so much peoples' ignorance that does the harm," said Artemus Ward, "as their knowin' so much that ain't so." The truth may, in the Biblical phrase, make you free. But over what truth is men have always pondered, wrangled, and fought. The corrective processes of free communication enable that conflict to be waged lawfully and within a stable order. In government and thought they are the pivot of any democracy; upon them liberalism has therefore insisted. But in the eighteenth and nineteenth centuries its task was ideologically a less subtle one than that which it now faces. For then reform and privilege were frank in their confrontation; though they were out to throttle each other, their political vocabulary was the same. Today we utter the same words to mean quite different things. If truth is the first casualty of war, it fell wounded in the struggle of 1914-18 and has never recovered. The civilized West defends its revaluation of man; but the Nazis, with their mass plebiscites, and the Communists, with their peo-

ples' democracies, have employed the language of liberty to destroy liberty itself. Yet within our own household, too, democratic values are inverted by some to whom free expression is a stock in trade.

The imbalance which large-scale organization brings everywhere in its train is also imported by it into the realm of opinion. The classic philosophers of free expression were not alone in stirring up a static society; without them, however, innovation might have had a still harder row to hoe. They envisaged conditions of debate that were politically more just; but the techniques they contemplated had not gone as yet beyond the invention of the printing press. As truth grappled with falsehood it would not, averred John Milton, be put to the worse in a free and open encounter; Thomas Jefferson wanted to leave undisturbed even those who sought to dissolve the American Union or change its republican form, so confident was he that reason might safely combat error. John Stuart Mill realized, nevertheless, that truth, having temporarily been suppressed, would have to be rediscovered later. When Holmes and Brandeis upheld the notion of a free marketplace of thought, they were restating liberal principles of individual initiative and the open mind which the nineteenth century had bequeathed to them—the faith that, in ideas as among persons, merit, undepreciated, will triumph.

In the modern economy, however, it is large-scale rather than small-scale undertakings which have the power to compete. Less and less is there a self-regulating exchange of goods and services: so also in the marketplace of thought, as the range of communication has expanded, freedom for unorganized opinion contracts. Man is devalued unless he possesses an unobstructed access to the flow of ideas. Yet the bigger the mass—untutored or

lethargic—the more these have to be selected or simplified. And when they are selected or simplified to further a particular rather than a general interest, even the clash of ideas is manipulated. Totalitarian government may have to resort to the calculated mendacities which treat white as black and black as white. Yet in a democracy, too, free expression is cramped by opinion techniques which, making all white or all black, omit every nuance between.

Liberty in a mass society is maintained through the action and counteraction of one organized pressure upon another. Constitutional safeguards remain; brokerage between large-scale interests leaves a margin of unorganized freedom. And it is here that there will still be scope for individual bent or idiosyncrasy. In the politics of modern democracies, for instance, the lobby has incurred odium because of the sinister influence it can exercise. Yet it may call forth others—whether in a public or private interest—and so far as it does an equilibrium of power might be established. Political parties themselves illustrate the general situation. In English-speaking democracies candidates and platforms endeavor to reconcile diverse tendencies, sectional and economic, while on the continent of Europe it is these which parliamentary blocs would crystalize. Under the European system a variety of views can be enunciated even though the unity of the nation is riven; the party system among the English-speaking peoples protects national unity but the ordinary citizen has less opportunity to do more than choose between large-scale alternatives. Not that it would be illegal for him to submit to others an alternative of his own. In an oligopoly of opinion, however, it is harder and harder for an individual view, without organized backing, to get itself heard. Large-scale instrumentalities which are themselves monopolistic thus

become the chief means for that exchange of ideas which, properly conducted, would be the antithesis of monopoly.

A democracy to be well rounded must be well informed. And that is why opinion industries, though they deal in imponderables, are for it the most basic of all. But in the middle years of the twentieth century there has not only developed an organizational foreclosure of the self-regulating market for free communication. World crisis has also made information media less punctilious about keeping it open. An organizational tightening-up is thus accentuated by an ideological one. For every nation the war of ideas is an important phase of the global contest; upon the United States its impact is all the greater because her world role is so new. Never before has she been in the van. No longer aloof internationally, Americans must inevitably be less detached from global affairs ideologically.

Accompanying the rise of large-scale organization, the problem is a deeper one than any presented by the appearance on North American soil of the Soviet evangel. This, nevertheless, has complicated it. For Communists would exploit that free market of ideas to whose obliteration they themselves are dedicated. If the United States had but to cope with sabotage on the German model of 1914-18, there would be less ground for alarm. Since then, however, the Fifth Column, paid or unpaid, has become an organizational weapon for the strategic paralysis of every democracy. The atomic spy trials in Canada, Britain, and the United States revealed how far espionage can penetrate when pro-Soviet ideologues burrow governmentally with or without benefit of party; that the Communist Party itself would stop at nothing was now incontrovertible. And that is why its infiltration of unofficial key institutional posts—information media,

At the liberal premise of an open mind and a fair forum for all, commissars scoff as much as any gauleiter. The servile genuflections of the tamed artist, the trammeled intellectual, the caged scientist are outward and visible signs of how under Communism the soul of man is devalued. But in a democracy it is not only the law and the courts which must uphold any marketplace of thought. To have a right of free communication without an adequate chance of fulfilling it can be tantamount to having no right at all. For as large-scale organization transforms opinion industries, they exhibit the same structural irresponsibility as other big corporate and collectivized endeavors. Yet in them such irresponsibility is compounded when its effect, by virtue of their overall function, is upon the entire social order. For it is but a step from technical irresponsibility to irresponsible attitudes toward public questions; from freewheeling organizational power, confined within the enterprise, to its organized extension, promotional and preclusive, over the free exchange of ideas.

Here, as elsewhere, the marketplace breaks down when those who control factors of production may, thereby, also control factors of consumption. Free expression is the touchstone of other freedoms. And in an organized anarchy competition is as acute as ever. But since this is within groups and between large-scale interests, it is their spokesmen who dominate the exchanges and not any who, in the classic liberal tradition, may have something of their own to say.

Politically, every lawabiding citizen is still as free as ever to enter the marketplace of thought. Economically, as information media are concentrated in fewer and fewer hands, he may be debarred. Independent opinion, if it is to rise above the din of mass instrumentalities,

requires suitable outlets of its own. But these seldom pay their way. Costs are such that newspapers, magazines, books, the theater, motion pictures, radio, and television must couch their appeal to as wide an audience as possible. And that in turn accelerates monopolistic trends which push out from spheres of taste to those of public policy.

Mass media, it may be contended, do not sweep all before them. Franklin Roosevelt, for example, could so dramatize himself and his program that, at critical junctures, he was repeatedly re-elected over press opposition; and Harry Truman, though much less charismatic as a leader, also defied it successfully in the presidential election of 1948. But to the public ear, office and party had given them a large-scale access of their own before other large-scale interests tried to unhorse them. Dwight Eisenhower, with his greater fame and on a fair consideration of the issues, might still have won in 1952. Disquieting, nevertheless, were the excessive campaign costs, the ability of the victors to purchase more time than the losers on radio and television, the inability of the latter thus to counteract a one-sided coverage by most daily newspapers and some popular magazines.

Communication is foreclosed when serious views cannot be disseminated because they have no prior organized backing. Nor will the problem be solved by reducing campaign expenses—by permitting all candidates to frank their mail and by prescribing additional unpaid time on radio and television. Some who cannot now afford to stand might thus be enabled to do so and unsavory political bargains, as the price of financial support, be thereby eliminated. But though an equalization of campaign opportunities could be arranged, other perennial inequalities for those who are not candidates per-

sist. Freedom is not only in listening to politicians but in so speaking out that, above and beyond large-scale interests represented by them, they too will listen.

The theory of a free marketplace assumes that whoever has the capacity may set up shop for himself. But in opinion industries this is no longer practicable even for those with substantial resources—so exorbitant is the overhead for production and distribution, so huge are the sums wanted for capital investment. Everywhere the tendency is for old units to combine rather than for new ones to emerge. Liberty in this domain has never meant that you must furnish your adversary with a rostrum. But what it does predicate is that, for the individual who wishes to have one, there will always be room. When dissent can neither be expressed through existing organs nor establish a mouthpiece of its own, it is the existing organs that hold sway. Before organized magnitude had recast opinion industries the chief danger to free expression lay outside the press. In authoritarian societies it still does. Today, however, in large-scale democracies the boot is on the other foot. Freedom of the press in an oligopoly of opinion is what the press asks for itself but is organizationally less willing to accord. Liberalism in the second half of the twentieth century must therefore revise an historic aim and seek freedom of utterance in spite of the press as well as through it.

Yet among information media, as in other aspects of a mass society, organized magnitude brings great benefits. Circulation needs may induce many to stoop to the lowest common denominator. Fault in the newspaper field especially has been found with chain ownership, one-paper towns, the influence of advertisers and special interests. But when use is made of the better newsgathering services the facts can be conveyed inexpensively to

areas of opinion that would otherwise not obtain them. And if mass media knit together a mass democracy, it is mass advertising which renders mass media profitable. Without this manufactured commodities could not be marketed in large numbers; there would not be—that ultimate product of mass production—as high a standard of living. But here, too, the organizational instrumentalities which revalue man can also devalue him. A press lord may be high-minded, radio commentators or syndicated columnists might be experts with a deep personal sense of social responsibility. They are made functionally irresponsible through a lopsided privilege in public discussion which they, and they alone, so inordinately enjoy.

Many who have a large-scale apparatus at their disposal are, moreover, neither high-minded nor morally responsible. And power such as theirs is peculiarly insidious when, as in radio and television, opinion media are anyhow natural monopolies. Upon ear and eye in the relaxed intimacy of hearth and home, mass suggestion can be soft-spoken as well as loud. Until of late audiences had to be built up slowly, painfully, and under physically delimited modes of communication. But today when large-scale techniques maximize a far-flung intrusiveness, there is a plenitude of advantage with a minimum of effort.

Radio and television may, when misused, thus do more than newspapers to cripple or distort any fair public exchange of ideas. For comment which is verbal has to be caught on the wing, and attention given to it cannot be given elsewhere. Publications, however, do not evaporate; they may be perused and compared when convenient. To counter tendentious comment on the air, another viewpoint would have to be expressed on the same broadcast or telecast or under analogous conditions.

Nor do intermittent set debates with invited guests erase organizational prerogatives. The topic that ought to be discussed might not always be selected; those taking part may not be the best qualified to do so. Yet participants will at least have been conceded that democratic imperative, the right to talk back. From day to day, week to week, and month to month, however, it is the steady rain that soaks. The Tower of Babel had no rules of parliamentary procedure but neither, amid the clamor of tongues, did it have any technological means of so amplifying a few voices above all the rest.

Yet among newspapers, too, there is large-scale irresponsibility and its ambit is also vast. The dispatches which they publish from their own correspondents or from news agencies (and abbreviations of which may be broadcast or telecast) endeavor to report rather than persuade. The syndication of the so-called column is, however, in a different category because as a thoroughfare of opinion the traffic it bears is so predominantly a one-way traffic. Within its immense orbit it spins, not unlike some radio or television commentaries, pontifical, hollow in timbre, gigantically resounding, overleaping every natural barrier to human communication. Ancient social moorings may have slackened in the life of modern urban man; information media tend more and more to cap for him, in the domain of opinion, an existence governed throughout by delocalized power. Many newspapers themselves come under absentee ownership. Yet whatever the ownership, each has its own local community to serve. And where there is objection to the views of staff correspondents or to an editorial policy, these may, at any rate, be rebutted subsequently on the same or an adjoining page—although here, also, an editor, having the last word, will always decide for himself whether and how to print even a letter of dissent. But a

syndicated columnist can, like a chain broadcaster or telecaster, editorialize to his heart's content, and only his peers in large-scale power may have a proper chance to reply.

For in a free society where mass techniques must be employed so as to withstand mass techniques, the private individual is not technologically equipped to argue back. When he himself has been misrepresented, he cannot be certain that suits for slander or libel will redress injury by getting the actual facts known; newspapers wishing to discourage such proceedings may not publicize those that are held. Nor, more generally, can the critic of a syndicated columnist retort with an article or letter of refutation whenever one should, in fairness, be published. Each separate newspaper which reproduced a particular column would have to be tracked down and space in it procured; to cross swords with a syndicated columnist an antagonist must have a system of distribution as sure and as multifarious as his own. For large-scale techniques and instantaneous circulation bestow on the syndicated columnist so huge a public, and thereby so disproportionate a power over opinion, that every dispute with him is hopeless from the start.

> *'I am Sir Oracle,*
> *And when I ope my lips let no dog bark!'*

The danger to free expression is, then, that the mass market will nullify any open marketplace of ideas. Yet where there is a smaller coverage one also develops—wherever, that is, publications adopt large-scale methods. External evidence of irresponsibility will not, for instance, be as manifest in media which spurn the taste of the multitude; internally these are put, through organizational techniques, in a similar manipulative class.

Among newspapers and magazines the caprice of publishers has often been described; the larger their undertakings, however, the less can they keep all the reins within their own hands. Ownership and control may in some corporate branches of the opinion industry not formally have been divorced; organized magnitude still confers upon insiders privileges which are as fortuitous as they are far-reaching. Organizational man as executive and editor can pre-empt on behalf of himself, his coterie, or his group a social mechanism of arbitrary large-scale power which, by his own unaided efforts, he himself could never have devised. But in opinion industries irresponsibility of that sort is worse than in others because the degree of free expression which is thereby facilitated or foreclosed may determine the viability of all democratic freedoms.

In ideas, as in business enterprise, the concept of an open marketplace is derived from the liberal principle that merit, forging ahead, can win out—that the odds, when uneven, will not be so immutably. Large-scale organization, however, sets up a disequilibrium of competitive opportunity which, within the province of opinion, outsiders can seldom undo; through it, by a kind of social geometric progression, disparities are increased rather than reduced between those who own or have access to mass instrumentalities and those who do not. Everywhere in a large-scale democracy a more just equalization of economic opportunity is tempered by organizational inequities that contravene the principle of merit. But among information media irresponsibility is felt beyond their own precincts; impalpable as opinion itself, it is limitlessly prehensile. And while most free citizens of a modern democracy would resist a frontal attack on their liberties, they will not band together against an erosion which is surreptitious, hard to

discern or pin down, indefinable in detail but cumulatively definite. For magnitude giveth and, like the Almighty, magnitude taketh away.

The vulgarizers among opinion industries are thus not alone in irresponsibility. Media whose exterior good taste is irreproachable may, as pillars of the marketplace, also be weak reeds to lean upon. Nor could the stylistically irresponsible flourish if the gravitational pull of the mass were not a downward rather than an upward one. It has, for example, been found that British radio listeners, whose schooling was never more than elementary, are unresponsive to any sort of educational program; they wish to be entertained in their own fashion and not enlightened in that of anybody else. And yet in insisting upon such norms the mass confuses itself. For only shock treatment can arouse it. Public issues have to be pitched at it episodically, with no logical sequence of cause and effect, coming whence and going none knows whither. Yet for understanding there must be perspective and for perspective there must be background, history. Mass media cannot, by their nature, provide these. And in its own nature the mass would have for them neither the patience, the leisure, nor the will.

It is nowadays through large-scale reiteration that ideas are, as in assembly-line manufacture, communicated and put across. The open mind has, through scientific method, created a mechanized society; and in this mass media will be a boomerang if, while concentrating power, they distract from powers of concentration. For large-scale organization does not only fortify the interior conformities of the group; exterior conformities are rendered by opinion industries simultaneously pervasive. Ideally, the better a society is organized the better should be the chance for the well-organized mind. In fact, organization which is social rather than mental

saves people from the necessity of thinking for themselves. For here, as elsewhere, man may be devalued in the domain of intangibles even as large-scale tangibles revalue him socially. And when that occurs his entire revaluation can be falsified.

Foreclosure may be one means of manipulating opinion. But it is not the only one. For while its opposite, disclosure, is an essential of the open marketplace there are circumstances when even this can be politically irresponsible. Over international affairs foreclosure might enable interested parties to shape the course of public discussion; by the wrong kind of disclosure the democratic conduct of foreign policy will, nevertheless, also be hobbled. What purports to inform may likewise misinform; and when that involves national attitudes on war and peace the boundaries between liberty and license have been crossed. The question is whether a democracy serves its own interests when a vital sector of government must operate in a glass house and on a large-scale sounding board. For year after year public men, who are themselves wont to denounce foreign espionage, voluntarily divulge State secrets—matters of arms and strategy—so as to figure in the headlines and reverberate in the broadcasts. Not for nothing have the arts of advertisement gone further in the United States than elsewhere. Fear of Communist transmission belts has rendered her apprehensive about entering into confidential commitments with some of her allies. But more of the latter fear those leakages in American public life which demonstrate that a demagogic overpublicized loyalty can be almost as damaging as unpublicized disloyalty. So also government officials, terrorized by the manner in which a few Congressional investigations have been held, refrain from recording their advice with candor lest this

afterwards be dug out to their own detriment and that of their country.

It is as it should be when a marketplace of ideas is buffeted by all the winds of doctrine. But at a time when foreign and domestic problems interact as they do, the difficulty is not merely one of ideological conflict. Nor is it simply one of distinguishing between what the recklessly self-glorifying would publicize and what governmental information a democratic society is entitled to get. The issue raised is none other than that of closed versus open diplomacy.

The mass media of every large-scale society have the organized capacity to inflame or calm the populace, to provoke friction between peoples or assuage it. In a totalitarian dictatorship this, however, is done uniformly and by decree from above. In a modern democracy some play with fire, others seek to extinguish it. Hostile propaganda across the frontiers will, in a mass era of psychological warfare, rise and fall with the temperature of world politics as a whole; attempts in the United Nations to outlaw it by a separate and specific treaty are therefore doomed to futility. For differences between sovereign countries are not the same as those within them. Yet the same manipulative techniques may be used by special pleaders to incite when they should tranquillize and to muffle when they should speak out. The Assembly and the various Councils of the United Nations would never accomplish anything if there were no mutual concessions previously extracted in private. Some of their failures, contrariwise, may be ascribed to wilful attitudes by governments which publicity at home might have overcome. And opinion industries are responsible when they recognize where there must and where there must not be full disclosure. For international affairs a

free marketplace, neither overweighted by organized pressure nor kept uninformed, is one in which a democratic balance is struck.

If there were fewer analogies between national and international government, disenchantment over the latter might have been less rife. After the first world war, with the founding of the League of Nations, men were the dupes of their own liberal hopes: they almost fancied that to air quarrels was to heal them. And again in 1945, many expected that under the United Nations the public opinion of a peace-loving world would be mobilized on behalf of the weak against the strong; through it the strong might acknowledge a power stronger than power itself. But mass media which hasten the attainment of that goal are so constituted that they can also hinder it. When princes and autocrats possessed irresponsible power, secret diplomacy was more irresponsible in objective than in method; open diplomacy, on the other hand, can pursue even the most responsible of objectives irresponsibly. For diplomacy may be too open if it degenerates into a bid for the applause of the galleries at home; if the appeal on all sides is to the intransigent nationalism of the mass. Without give-and-take there can be no diplomacy; but this is ruled out when every transaction is publicized as it is negotiated. The menace of civil war has not hung over twentieth-century democracies nearly as often as that of international war. Yet this would have been the case if the rough-and-tumble of domestic politics matched hazards in the international sphere. One day the latter may be no more dangerous than the former. But national sovereignties will have to be abolished before that halcyon time and their place taken by one overriding, well-integrated world State.

The League of Nations did not, after all, collapse be-

cause diplomacy between the wars was less open than had at first been anticipated. It never recovered from the reluctance of the United States to join. From it, moreover, the three chief aggressors of the period—Japan, Italy, and Germany—would not only depart later with little more than a reprimand; those on both shores of the Atlantic who, together, could preserve a free world order without war did not unite until much already had been lost through war. The League and other collective agencies did not correspond to the configurations of world power; if Geneva bumbled, the utmost publicity there could not stop the rot. The ends of peace were plain. The power to enforce them lay elsewhere.

And then after 1945 the *débâcle* of the West in East Asia was bruited about. Over another crucial issue, the abrupt switch in American policy toward Germany, a more studied reticence hovered. Its potential consequences were never fully publicized before that portentous change had been speeded up beyond recall. Mass media, so eager on occasion to expose, promoted this fateful *volte face* unquestioningly; Congress, which examines everything else, proceeded on the unexamined hypothesis that Germany's interests would lie with the West. And so the American public could not be warned that in the long run German nationalism, as revived through the Bonn Republic, had most to get from Moscow; that, in the absence of East-West agreement, land and brethren in Soviet clutches can be repossessed through another Russo-German agreement; that in fostering the restoration of an industrially powerful West German State the bipartisan policy of the United States might itself have played into Russia's hands. World War III can result from such irresponsibility, and if it does this may be proof that a manipulated large-scale democracy, being selectively informed, is not really an in-

formed one. But the proof will again have come too late.

Opinion industries, like government itself, thus waver between foreclosure and disclosure. It is not enough therefore that mass media watch each other and that government also be watched. It is as important that views independent of them all should be heard. For a diplomacy which may be treated or mistreated in accordance with the interests of mass media is, to those who reject organized conformities, not an open one either. War and peace is the major issue of the twentieth century; and open diplomacy can be the most democratic of procedures if citizens are apprised generally of what goes on, if new departures in policy are fully debated. Yet when proposals, prior to submission for approval, are being negotiated, there should not be the sort of publicity which makes diplomacy itself impossible.

That, at any rate, is why a large-scale intrusion may be only less irresponsible than a deliberate overemphasis or a manipulated blackout. International assemblies and world conferences which government representatives attend are not, after all, exact replicas of a Parliament, a Congress, or a Chamber elected by its own people. For in these an Administration relies on party support to pass its measures; in a body such as the United Nations, however, various organs have specified powers but there is no Executive with an assigned initiative. Sovereign members act on their own or in *blocs,* other than the Soviet, of their own choosing; alignments, shifting back and forth, have to be rearranged afresh for each separate decision. The vicissitudes of diplomacy cannot, for information purposes, thus be handled in the same way as news on the home front. Nor, until complete, are the transactions of government there always publicized. Woodrow Wilson may have stipulated open covenants

openly arrived at. Yet, as a steward of the democratic process, he himself, in domestic affairs, did not, since he could not, arrive openly at open covenants.

Disproportion of power renders the marketplace inoperative. One-sided publicity is therefore a mode of debate almost as undemocratic as no publicity whatsoever. And since this is so there is a case against, as well as for, that mass spotlight—whether published, broadcast, or telecast—which darkens as it illumines. Open diplomacy is, moreover, a liberal concept and it is one that may likewise be balked by those oratorical crudities in which, as they repudiate democratic principles, Nazis, Fascists, and Communists have indulged. If only by contrast, nevertheless, these bear witness to the lasting practicality of diplomatic etiquette and the courtesies of protocol. For as safeguards of today's negotiation and tomorrow's accommodation they are no outworn relics of a bygone age. What can serve peace is neither the decorum of the past alone nor, by itself, the mass information technique of the present, but some judicious blend of the two.

Whenever public issues are discussed, the conditions of debate will govern its character. And this is so of domestic as well as of international affairs. Controls in opinion industry may be no more irresponsible, they may even be less, than in others of a large-scale society. In no other single one does a structural irresponsibility have so widespread and so immediate a social effect. Newspapers, radio, and television, by the sheer volume of their daily coverage, can do most to make or mar a free marketplace of ideas. But motion pictures encroach upon their domain, and then there is the publication of books and periodicals which has yet to be considered. Common, however, to the staffs of all mass media is a

hard-boiled demeanor—one which is induced by an organizational power that extends beyond the organization itself.

A large-scale society that is depersonalized for the many may be overpersonalized for the few. Once upon a time no man was a hero to his valet. Nowadays, without the techniques and technicians of mass publicity, he can scarcely be a hero at all. What tells is manipulated pressure—fame in one province, be it apposite or inapposite, being exploited in another. Not that all Big Names, so typical of organized bigness, are undeserving of further promotional renown. But even where there is merit, it is often used for purposes that depreciate the principle of merit itself. Old World snobberies of birth and origin may be deemed out of date and undemocratic. Yet how much better is the taste of a commercialized Society which, with less polish than glitter, revolves around Broadway and Hollywood, the chic parfumeurs and couturiers, the smart saloon rather than the brilliant salon? For when an aristocratic tradition was secure it could fuse love of money with contempt for trade and had no need to publicize itself. The Big Name snobbery, which mass media now fan and foment, is as caste-conscious. Open by reason of birth, it is as closed to most values other than its own.

To overvalue the Big Name is to devalue all other names. For, as with every snobbery, what matters is who says it and not by whom it has already been or may again best be said; in opinion industries, as everywhere else in a large-scale society, what impresses is institutional rank, authority through affiliation. This, or some prior fanfare, is therefore an automatic short cut to a hearing. And as he runs information media a burden is lifted, through the ready-made indices of Big Name labels, from organizational man. For when he does not

have to go beyond them, there is no other criterion by which he must pick and choose. An organizational power which is itself not based on merit will scarcely take pains operationally to observe that principle. Yet the less it does the less, in an oligopoly of opinion, is free communication free.

Not that large-scale interests have it all their own way. Freedom of the press might, in practice, be a monopolistic freedom to foreclose and manipulate. When, however, a covert abuse of power becomes flagrantly overt, others will still affirm their sense of outrage. For some opinion industries are not only larger than life; when morally irresponsible they might envenom the social order itself. And that is why an anti-Semitic film such as *Oliver Twist* provoked an uproar and had to be toned down; why there were protests over the cinematic whitewash of the Nazi generals Rommel and Rundstedt and thereby of an inveterate German militarism. It was through similar mass media that Hitler himself deployed his mass campaign for the devaluation of man. To spike their guns is not therefore to curtail freedom but to preserve the freedom of those who have at their command no equal means of wholesale, large-scale rejoinder.

Media that prey upon youthful susceptibilities have especially to be guarded against, and it is, above all, to defend the young that general regulations for radio and television have been devised, that motion picture and television industries have their own self-regulating codes. How well each of them discharges its task is a moot point; and so also is the question of whether children need to be similarly protected from comic books and cheap magazines. Adult books and the theater do not, on the other hand, exert uniform simultaneities of organized mass influence. Theirs is the province of the mature;

censorship in that domain derogates from the liberty of the individual as much as a lack of it in the domain of the immature. And this should be remembered by every element which seeks to impose a minority interest rather than preserve a minority right. For to demand tolerance and not sustain it is to weaken the fabric of democracy itself.

Government censorship of books, whether it be local, sectional, or national, is, of course, no new hurdle to be surmounted. Less dramatic but more devastating is that unofficial censorship of books which, by its very nature, resides within a large-scale society. Book publishers, poised between author and public, deal in singularly individualistic products. Less adaptable than others to organized magnitude, their branch of the opinion industry has, significantly, been more loath than the rest to abandon its traditional open-mindedness. Literature, in any marketplace of ideas, must conserve and revitalize. But for the publication of books, as for everything else, the marketplace has been recast. And when books are designed to attract the mass they will have the traits of their kind. It was, after all, not the philosopher but the court jester who stood at the foot of the throne.

The relatively poor sale of serious books in North America has been a severe indictment of secondary and college education throughout the length and breadth of the continent. So far as these deal with world politics a democracy can be anxious over its own fate and yet disinclined to probe below the surface of events. A manipulated treatment of public issues by mass media could be circumvented through the circulation of books that deviate from one or other dominant trend. But they do not sell and are not read precisely because they themselves have behind them neither an organized pressure nor potential group backing—or are some-

how unpalatable to those, whether on the Right, the Left, or the Center, which exist. Not that there is always a bed of roses for the undissenting to lie upon: it is the trivial, the semiescapist, and such fare as mass recreational media purvey, which stay as often in possession of the field. The manifold increase in costs of book publication would alone compel publishers to give the public more of what it wants: as between their own solvency and an author's nonconformity they have little choice. Nor is this merely a damper upon free expression. The destiny of our free world order hinges on American leadership. Over this one topic the quality of discussion is therefore of unprecedented importance. But that quality will only be as high as an educated public, parrying large-scale foreclosure, tries to make it.

It is, then, books of ideas that have less and less chance of being published. Educational texts, vocational, technical, and scientific treatises are always in demand. Nonfiction of a descriptive sort may even be displacing fiction in popularity; soft cover and paper reprint houses can spread works of entertainment and established classics, ancient and modern, far and wide. Against books which fit into none of these categories, or which diverge from current group trends, the cards are stacked. Nor is the atmosphere improved by the vogue, with its commercialized stress on Big Name celebrities, of book clubs and best sellers. For a sheeplike uniformity in readership may ensue. Against the sounding brass of organized pressure the unorganized whisper in vain.

Formal works of scholarship do not, oddly enough, have quite so hard an economic furrow to plough. These are intended for a specialized circle and, though they do not pay their way, their publication is frequently subsidized by universities or research foundations. Yet serious books, independent of institutional

patronage, have as great, often a greater, contribution to make to the marketplace of thought. They cannot play their part if they are unread when published or are not published at all. In an organized anarchy the role of the creative intellectual thus becomes a more and more ignominious one. A free society riddled with Big Name values is, nevertheless, better than the utter devaluation, moral and political, with which Soviet writers purchase a hearing. The latter have honors heaped upon them which smother by the attention given; in the former, unless the appeal is to the taste of the mass or the views of a particular group, there is a neglect which muzzles through indifference. Spiritually, however, the smothered die while the muzzled live on, and, living on, cannot be muzzled entirely.

Information media that review books could, of course, do a lot to buck the tide. And some are valiant in the attempt. Most, however, ride along with waters by which they themselves are kept afloat. Public affairs may be their sphere. Yet they will often do less to publicize works that could share the marketplace of thought than to build up books that divert from it. Large-scale interests might, in an oligopoly of opinion, compete with each other; an individual standpoint which satisfies none of these will seldom be noticed sufficiently to catch on. And then, too, there is not only manipulation with works selected for review, for prominence or obscurity, as settled media policies decree; wherever organizational man exerts staff power, connections of his own, personal or literary, political or ideological, may be favored. Serious books which, as a result, are shunted aside, publishers cannot afford to advertise, booksellers do not stock or display, and people will not know about. When free expression is not estopped at its source it is clogged in mid-channel.

Magazines, however, can be taken in one's stride more easily than books. As information media their mass influence is that much greater. And so far as they carry reviews they are adjuncts to the world of literature; so far as they furnish a less hasty consideration of news and public issues they supplement other mass instrumentalities. But they also have a mission to perform that is peculiarly their own. As published reading matter, though produced at longer intervals, they are like newspapers; less constricted by time or geography they tend, in their distribution, to resemble the bigger hookups of radio and television. Democracies such as Britain and France can, through their smaller territorial expanse, go in for national newspapers which facilitate a nationwide cohesiveness. The daily press of the United States and Canada must, however, rely on a more localized readership. Chain ownership, news services, syndicated columns and articles may, at their worst, be very irresponsible in control and effect; at their best they do counteract a purely sectional coverage. Most general periodicals are, in content and scope, wholly delocalized. Perused with more care than newspapers, more popular than serious books, magazines constitute a major segment of North America's opinion industry.

As mass media their standards of taste may be those of others in a large-scale society. But will their behavior in the marketplace of ideas also be the same? Specialized magazines, those whose sphere is that of a profession, a vocation, a trade, an industry, a hobby, a religion, or a public movement, do what they are supposed to do within the limits they set for themselves. So also do many whose sole endeavor is to relax and entertain. The problem of free exchange arises from information media that are nonspecialized in scope. For periodicals have every right, as they foster their own particular in-

terest, to make a bid for general interest. But those are irresponsible in their manipulations which, while purporting to foster a nonspecialized interest, actually have other, unadmitted aims. And as they manipulate so do they foreclose.

Physically the modern periodical is a superb example of mass production. But communication is streamlined through its large-scale techniques, and where these operate freedom is diminished. The most irresponsible of newspapers may still publish material that is from agencies which are objective in their reporting; if they have no editorial stranglehold on the newsgathering source, they cannot help but allow an undoctored modicum of the facts to seep out. News magazines, when so disposed, compensate for the absence of editorial columns by an editorialized treatment of the news. Yet public issues are handled by general periodicals in a manner as subject to organizational proclivities. And these deceive all the more because, within the broad ambit of declared policies, undeclared ones can so often be pursued. What ostensibly appear as articles or book reviews independently conceived or independently written are not seldom camouflaged extensions of the editorial page itself. Contributors, that is, must conform to organizational directives or let more protean writers get the nation's ear. And many do conform who, as between no access to the marketplace or a manipulated one, prefer the latter.

For here again an enlargement in the scale of enterprise entails irresponsibility in the exercise of power. Magazines must compete both for readership and for advertising revenue not only with rivals in the same field but also with rival fields such as radio, television, organized sports, and motion pictures. To increase circulation

or hold their own they popularize themselves by adopting newspaper devices—the human interest story, the slice of life, the colorful style which eschews abstract ideas. And as a corollary of this, periodical literature has been converted into a Mecca for those trained on newspapers as reporters; less and less welcome are writers schooled to assay public questions reflectively. In depicting events and describing people the good reporter may be a technician of skill and integrity with pride in his craft. Yet undue stress on merit in techniques can, as elsewhere in a large-scale society, be at the expense of merit in other respects.

The decline of the unsolicited "think piece" from outside contributors is but one phase of this insistence on reportage. A Big Name may be bromidic in utterance; ghosted or unghosted, his platitudes, being commercially exploitable, will be seized upon. The views of others, however, if they are to be published in current magazines, must either comport with an editorial slant or not run counter to it. On a contentious topic, over which a specific organizational approach is desired, articles are more and more likely to be staff-prescribed or staff-written.

Opinion of genuinely independent origin is thereby not only elbowed out. Preclusive editorial notions can be foisted upon an unsuspecting, uninformed, or apathetic public as spontaneous views freely submitted and freely launched. There have been protests when digest magazines planted material, prepared for reprint, elsewhere. Yet these protests emanated from journals which are themselves assiduous in having important "think pieces" tailor-made according to their own specifications. There has in fact developed a new class of magazine writers who have to be intellectual jacks-of-all-trades-

men not with expert claims in the world of ideas or policy but with a journalistic expertness which is organizationally adaptable.

These procrustean techniques owe much to the hour in which we live, to an era of ideological warfare when even between governments ideas are weapons. But they are sharpened in the United States by her emergence as the prime power of the West. Toward free expression the easygoing temper of noninterventionist days could not anyway have readily been maintained; organized pressures are now playing for keeps. And so in large-scale media, feast and famine will alternate—an excess of information on what are deemed nonessentials, a paucity where open-mindedness would hurt. Yet magazines have less excuse for their deficiencies than daily mass prints: snap judgments and a technical one-sidedness in presentation can both be avoided. It is the pretense of all-inclusiveness that hoodwinks the public most: not only how material is published but what is omitted. That an important aspect of world affairs has been dealt with irresponsibly one year is never acknowledged the next. Yet, over paramount issues, it is not merely their treatment which matters but their treatment in time. And when a lapse is common to all, no one periodical will confess remorse. Profferred wisdom in retrospect and the articulations of hindsight, readers seldom learn what, among counsels of foresight, was, though available, excluded.

Before ideas clash in the marketplace they must be allowed to reach it. Through the pre-empted sieve of large-scale power, these may never get out into the open or are, when they do, still at its mercy. The serious-minded reader fancies that in one or another general magazine, or among all of them, a full diversity of current views is laid before him. But this is to be as

naive about an unmanaged exchange of opinion as Benthamites once were about an automatic harmony of economic interests. Whether of ideas or commodities, the marketplace has, in the twentieth century, been transformed by the same set of circumstances.

In no other industry, however, do the inner irresponsibilities of bigness have as big an outer impact. Where there is owner control, its behests, in magazines as in newspapers, must be obeyed. But where control has to be decentralized, insiders, by themselves or in a coterie, can exercise a discretionary power which stretches from organizational competition to the competition of ideas. Nor will outsiders, independent writers who may thereby be hushed or thwarted, dare burn their bridges by querying staff motives or editorial good faith. They always hope to break through; to invite the charge of sour grapes is, in so unequal a contest, not to mend but further offend. Yet events do not wait and it is society, partially or belatedly informed, which, when these take it unawares, pays the price. Especially over foreign policy is the problem of free expression the problem of—free expression for whom? Large-scale schizophrenia is often exemplified by newspapers and periodicals, radical and conservative alike, that denounce arbitrary power but are themselves high-handed within their own administrative and organizational bailiwick. For here, too, appearance and reality are at odds. Even when opinion industries attack privilege in others, they take privilege—great as it already is—as their due.

The fact is, nevertheless, that where each does not consider itself responsible for keeping open the marketplace, none will. Information media may have axes of their own to grind; an oligopoly of opinion is one in which grindstones are also monopolized. Mass periodicals operate on a large scale, and their costs, like those

of daily newspapers, are commensurately prohibitive. But not all general magazines are in that class; some which seek a serious readership are designed for a smaller circulation. Yet even to establish one of these was never as unfeasible economically as it now is. A few, as mouthpieces for themselves, have been inherited or founded by men of means; other, nonpopular ones—weeklies, fortnightlies, monthlies, and quarterlies—must look for financial support to nonprofit bodies. And though they are thus bound to groups or institutions, many do contrive to be editorially detached. Yet a careful analysis of what such periodicals accept and reject might reveal that their attitude is less disinterested than it seems.

Personal and private commitments beyond those which a magazine publicly avows will, in the nature of things, be inexplicit. Writers who rub against these are therefore not always in a position to know where or how. Owner editors who will not publish views at variance with their own can do as they please—more, at any rate, than others. But when sponsors and editors are not the same, the former delegate power to the latter; and in sponsored magazines, as everywhere else, delegated power gives organizational man his innings. For what enables him to be editorially irresponsible is that his backers, while answerable for him, hesitate to make him answerable to themselves. In the major crises of the twentieth century intellectuals have, for instance, had to stand up and be counted; editorial insiders who failed in that test will, by their foreclosures and manipulations, hold it against any who did not. But organizational advantage may take numerous forms. And it will do so all the more when those who keep such publications going, those by whom institutional or semipublic funds are raised or allotted, assume that their duty ends there.

Open-minded, they would accord editors a free hand. But that in some hands editorial power may serve to close rather than open a marketplace of thought is a subtlety of argument which frequently escapes the open-minded themselves.

Nor are journals of opinion devoted politically to the liberal cause necessarily liberal in their editorial practices. Not that they themselves are conscious of the degree to which they sail under false colors. But they also illustrate, by their inhospitality to dissent when it is not a brand of their own, the characteristic ambiguities of organized power. And the cloven hoof may be detected in the house formulas they enjoin for articles published and often for books reviewed, the ascendancy of cliques among staff personnel and favored contributors. The fact is that liberalism has taken on the color of an environment which it itself did much to change. In a large-scale society it, too, has power to implement as well as a creed to defend. Upon the innate conformities of the social order, moreover, are superimposed those which world crises induce. And to these liberal publications respond with opposing conformities of their own.

It is the current fashion to speak of a Communist line, a neo-isolationist line, a State Department line. But when liberal organs may be said to have a fixed line, they likewise have been converted into group instruments of organized pressure. Hitherto their mission was a double one: to maintain an open-minded exchange of ideas while each advanced a view of its own. Yet now the techniques of power, administrative and in pursuit of a line, might obviate all except the line itself. Liberal journalism is thus torn between two functions—one that is organizational and one that is intellectual. Today the ideological battle is fought with passion rather than reason. An authentic liberalism must, however, be not

only within but above the battle. For only as it is also above the battle can it help keep open that marketplace of ideas on which its own life depends. Liberal organs whose columns are closed to differing viewpoints indicate how irresponsible in a large-scale order even liberalism itself may become. Among the ironies of organization, this minor one is a portent.

But taking opinion industries as a whole, it is not remarkable that human behavior should be the same in them as in others. From a democratic standpoint, however, their role in society is a more important one and so therefore is that of those whom they employ. Between the man of ideas and public opinion the anonymous, preclusive power of organizational man is interposed. Being, by the nature of his techniques, a trained and literate person, he might himself aspire to be a man of ideas. And information media are such that he will not only be preoccupied with the inner personal conflicts of organizational power; when he takes orders as well as gives them, the outer impersonal use of that power may go against the grain. For in opinion industries, mind and energy are not seldom devoted to the furtherance of interests that taste or conscience would repudiate. And organizational man, despising his job, may not only hate himself. As he shifts upon others the white glare of publicity, he has, as it were, to hide his own light under a bushel.

Yet for him to kick over the traces could be quixotic. Where merit is depreciated, his sort of white-collar expertness is, with popular mass education, never in short supply. And perceiving that their services may thus be purchased a dime a dozen, information media conclude that, as Sir Robert Walpole said of the House of Commons in his day, all those men have their price. They do not. But in a large-scale society the technical exten-

sion of organized power extends the range in which moral issues arise. The ugly cynicism that permeates editorial and other opinion sancta is not inexplicable. The large-scale ambivalence of the industry as a whole intensifies the organizational ambivalence of its beneficiaries.

When, nevertheless, there is so much shouting at the top of one's lungs, it is hard to believe that foreclosure and manipulation are at work. But the din does not come from all quarters in equal measure. Nowadays it is through organized factions—be they liberal or conservative, progressive or reactionary—that voices tend to be heard; and to step in turn on the toes of each rival interest is to invite virtual exclusion from the marketplace. Not that truth, refused a free and open encounter with error, will always succumb. But justice delayed might be justice denied. In a large-scale democracy, even where there is no concerted suppression, the problem is often one of being able to intervene with ideas when they are fresh and can still do the most good. For it is not only the marketplace which has altered; in international affairs, for example, the tempo and span of events no longer leaves time for sound counsel to be spread about slowly but surely. When its full expression is retarded, or confined to narrow circles, the public may be misinformed and thereby misled—with unwise policies accepted and wise ones, until too late, waved aside. That a second world war would be the outcome of isolationism and appeasement had thus been forecast. But in the English-speaking world a demoralizing leadership was not all which proved remiss; the more influential sections of the opinion industry were hand in glove with it. For they may have to gear themselves to mass inertia. To pander to this is to let a conscious irresponsibility exploit an unconscious one.

The mass might be sluggish. But many of those who would act if they could seem to be beating the air. In every walk of life, before anyone can feel himself responsible, he has to have a sense of personal participation. And that, assuredly, the cooperative endeavors of modern society ought to give. Revalued man, as old servitudes are lifted and new securities established, should, as never before, be the master of his fate and the captain of his soul. Yet as bigness levels barriers of communication and accentuates participation on one plane, it baffles him by rendering the levers of power ever more remote. Will they appear less so if, as Lyman Bryson contends, the emphasis should now be on community affairs, on self-discovery, on an amateur cultivation of music and the arts? To democratize these is a step forward. But that will not compensate for any de-democratization in more decisive spheres.

Politically it was a postulate of nineteenth-century liberalism that, accorded the franchise, an emancipated citizenry would make the most of its chance to participate in public life. But even when men are so disposed, they are tantalized and deterred by the altered conditions of debate; by the difficulty of competing in a large-scale arena among large-scale interests. A group society may visualize liberty as a just equilibrium between majority wishes and minority rights. Yet it is an unjust one for the unorganized individual when organized conformities, majority and minority, dominate the marketplace.

Participation in a mass democracy cannot, of course, be the same as it was in a Greek City-State. Political representation must be deputized; institutionally, throughout a large-scale society, there is a delegation of control. But indirect channels can be open ones. They are not open when opinion is so canalized that it often ceases to be free. Yet most people, even if they were

cognizant of such foreclosure, would not deem it abnormal. That they really enjoy vicarious rather than actual participation is evidenced by the time-honored popularity of organized sports, the voluntary numerical preponderance of many spectators over a few participants. Yet here, nevertheless, what attracts are luck and skill. In the game of power staged by large-scale society, prowess that is bold, independent, or unacquiescent may be a handicap rather than an advantage. Relegated to the sidelines, unshackled and yet ineffectual, it might sink into passivity and despair. Political atrophy can, throughout the whole of society, be the upshot. And one long habituated to this will be inert even when opportunities do occur for it to make choices of its own.

Until all soap boxes are swept away there is no police State. But neither is there an open marketplace for free expression when large-scale stentorian devices, irresponsibly controlled, would so magnify some voices as to dwarf or drown out all others. Liberal democracy, as it revalued man, relied too credulously on the power of truth. Truth, in an organized anarchy, must still reckon with power itself.

CHAPTER

7

The Projection of America

Europeans, like others who have come down in the world, may vent their spleen upon an American benefactor: what they resent is, *au fond,* the twentieth century. The East-West schism calls into being the first peacetime alliance between Western Europe and North America; but this in turn may have a social impact which will be culturally as well as strategically far-reaching. For strength in the defense of the West entails a unification of European economies and a speeding up in European productivity on the North American model and with North American assistance. Not that Western Europeans are strangers to the machine process; with their ideas and inventions they have, since the Middle Ages, been its pioneers. But what they face today is its outright, full-blown application to their own society; and the prospect of that is, to many of them, still repugnant. Twice they bore the brunt when Germany used modern technology as a means for devaluing rather than revaluing man; in the United States mate-

rial prosperity and a materialistic outlook have gone together. Yet it is to preserve the revaluation of man, as both Europeans and Americans conceived it, that Atlantic unity has now been forged. And such unity cannot be implemented to the best advantage unless, on the European sector, cooperation which is diplomatic and military is enlarged in other respects. But the more Europe does things in the American way, the more will the American way of life itself be projected.

Must this projection of America bring in its train all the phenomena of bigness? About some manifestations of irresponsible power, traditional and contemporary, Europe has had nothing to learn from across the Atlantic; against earlier ones the United States herself once took shape. The question now is whether large-scale techniques can refashion the economy of Western Europe freely and in freedom; whether, by so doing, they will not modify other aspects of existence. A young, amorphous society such as North America's did not only offer room, territorial and institutional, for experimentation; a new half-developed pattern of civilization could be recast more easily than one long set. Yet the obstacles that impede the transformation of Western Europe are physical as well as psychic. And Americans will have to realize this, just as Europeans must understand what is American by design and what but a sign of the times.

When French might was supreme in Europe so was French culture, and when Britain ruled the waves oversea peoples took their cue from her. During the *Pax Britannica* the United States herself, though dependent spiritually, could go her own way politically and economically. But interdependence in a large-scale world does not only change all that: it augments even between free peoples the social pressure of the leader upon the

led. American enterprise has been promoted at home through the arts of mass persuasion, through advertisement and publicity. The United States will, in any of her endeavors abroad, be suspected therefore of trying to proselytize; of seeking to make over in her own image. Yet the objective circumstances, the stern necessities of a common Atlantic defense, do not only prompt American influence; it is they, more than any exigent cultural salestalk, which foster American techniques and thus a style of life which may imitate that of North America. Americanization is, in a superficial sense, for export. More profoundly, free Europe might, in its social system, react to bigness as have the United States and Canada. On the historic culture of Western Europe the effect may be adverse. It will be worse off if its own small-scale weakness leaves it a prey to the Soviet's large-scale strength.

The lesson of the twentieth century is that organization can, in both war and peace, alone withstand organization. The liberal dilemma is thereby repeated on a world stage. A free, large-scale society provides more security and better opportunity for man in the aggregate; the sledding, for individuality as such, is rougher. And so, when there is a mammoth oligopoly of global power, is it also among nations. Some, where situated by geography beyond the line of fire, may toy with neutralist Third Force illusions. Others, to remain free, have thrown in their lot with the grouping of the free.

Nor is physical annihilation in an air-atomic age the only danger. Not since the barbarian invasions has the culture of the West been so menaced by conquerors who decivilize through State policy as well as through the havoc of war itself. Across the length and breadth of Europe the Germans under Hitler may have employed the methods of bigness savagely to massacre noncombat-

ant millions. But Russia's industrialization of captive domains reveals a large-scale, peacetime technique of living death; how, as distinct peoples, the enslaved may be killed off nationally while their live energies are harnessed for national aims other than their own. The peasant economies of Eastern Europe have always been socially retrograde. Yet now they are being further depressed to the drab mass levels of their Soviet overlord. And in them youth is mistaught, intellectuals liquidated. For while a middle class is revived within Russia herself, it is the bourgeois elsewhere who might do most to turn satellite nations against her. That large-scale techniques would, by their own automatic working, unite mankind internationally was once a liberal dream. But when Hitler and Stalin could, through them, denationalize the conquered, while making their own subjects more nationalistic, these had become methods to divide rather than unite.

And with this as the threat, a renovating American impetus serves to preserve even as it transforms, for better or for worse, the culture of Europe. But here Western Europe exhibits a paradox of its own. Restrictively with its guilds and monopolies under government tutelage, its wage and currency differentials, its patchwork of frontiers and customs duties, it itself has in fact been overorganized. What Western Europe may now do, as it tends to combine economically and federate politically, is to mobilize a semicontinental defense potential on a grander North American organizational scale. Wages might thereby be raised, social benefits spread more equitably, the cooperative role of trade unions be accepted less grudgingly, the discontent allayed which nourishes Communism itself. But many European employers would rather dispense with the techniques of mass production and lowered unit costs than share with

their employees privilege and profit. Until these are widely adopted, Western Europe cannot stand on its own feet. The issue is one not of less butter or fewer guns but of both in more abundance.

Vested interests and small-scale economic individualism are, however, not all that bar an increase of productivity in Western Europe. A single mass market could be the natural outgrowth of a political union as big and as geographically compact as the American. Yet the economic viability of that American union never rested on world trade; indeed, it is just now becoming aware of its own dependence for vital minerals on foreign sources of supply. If Britain, France, and the other countries of Western Europe are to feed themselves and maintain a higher standard of living, it is not from their neighbors next door that they must buy raw materials or to whom they must sell finished products but in the four corners of the earth. The United States may urge closer large-scale integration upon her trans-Atlantic allies. But she herself hampers the disposal of their surplus output through her own tariff vagaries; and they are handicapped by the reappearance, under American auspices, of competition from Japan. Nor, as East-West trade contracted, did the loss of East European and East Asian markets hasten an expansion of their industrial capacity at home.

Yet half solutions for the problem of a split continent in a split world are better than none. A further complication, however, is the fact that the politics of Western Europe are as awkward as its economics to fit into the same large-scale mold. Germany has evinced the most aptitude for mass production; France the least; and Britain falls somewhere between the two. But now the United States herself has financed and quickened the postwar restoration of West German power. France and

Britain must therefore stick together lest, in any West European union, the Germanic element become supreme. Yet Britain cannot merge her national sovereignty with an overriding semicontinental one unless she relinquishes those oceanic connections which give her strength in Europe itself. No member State may, in the very nature of federations, have exterior ties of its own; Britain, as a component of European union, would have to divest herself of an Empire which belongs to her and of a Commonwealth to which she herself also belongs. Nor could the Anglo-American factor separately persist —one which twice saved our free world order and whose lines must blur with so basic a realignment of forces.

Strategically—though not within a European Army—Britain is already committed in Western Europe up to the hilt, and economically she may be committed as far as other obligations allow. But unless she takes part unreservedly in any full, large-scale integration of Western Europe, the chief makeweight against Germanic preponderance would be France. And the French, with their continental allies, cannot discharge such a role alone. Britain, as the birthplace of the Industrial Revolution, has a mass production economy in which there are still remnants of an earlier one of specialized crafts and handicrafts. In France, however, the artisan and the manufacturer of luxury goods have been predominant. An Old World culture has thus persevered at the cost of the nation's own safety—her technological inferiority spelling disaster in 1914 and subjugation in 1940. Bled white by recurrent German aggressions, bearing heavy recent burdens in Indo-China and North Africa, France needs to reconstruct her economy and yet lacks vigor for doing it.

But from bigness Western Europe has shied away for reasons that are not merely economic or political. There

are historic grandeurs for it to cherish. Culturally it is distressed by the impact upon these of large-scale industrialism; psychologically, having lost out in other spheres, it clings all the harder to the one in which it can still feel superior. Western Europe, apart from native Communists, wishes to be Russified much less than it wishes to be Americanized—though the desire of West Germans to clinch their revival might yet presage another Russo-German agreement for world mastery. Most West Europeans have no doubt of where, as between an Atlantic revaluation and a Teuto-Slavonic devaluation of man, they must stand. What they seek within the Atlantic household itself is to yield to American leadership only what the situation requires. But where to draw the line, how to go forward technologically while holding back culturally, may be no simple task. The more the Grand Alliance prepares to resist common dangers in common, the more pervasive is a resistance movement against Western Europe's own chief ally.

The extrovert qualities of American culture were better adapted than Europe's introvert ones to a mechanical civilization. Over the centuries the United States herself had drained off many of Europe's own more adventurous spirits. An immigrant, pioneering stock; a wealth of untapped natural resources encouraging prodigalities of waste—to these, conjoined, may be traced not only the economic expansion of the United States but the psychological expansiveness of her sons. To that, moreover, can also be attributed the munificence with which they have come to the rescue of free countries, to a materialism that is not wholly materialistic. In the past America has been improvident with human as well as natural resources. Today it displays a wastefulness which is a by-product of all this and of its high standard of living.

And now to enlarge the scale of productivity in Western Europe may be more nearly to approximate that social order, with its group conformities and organizational ambiguities, which exists across the Atlantic. As, however, new influences pass through the alembic of local tradition they themselves might be transformed. For it is the diversity of local tradition which Western Europe would preserve that could modify in each country any uniform process of duplication. In Britain, long before the economic individualism of the Manchester School, the eccentrics, for whom she was renowned, testified to individualistic traits which ran deep; as between group convention and personal indiscipline, her upper and middle classes mixed a stout blend of private independence and public solidarity. Since the second world war, a socialized economy which raises living standards for workers has cushioned the shock inflicted by a drastic recession in Britain's world power and general prosperity. But as her upper classes decline, so also may that equilibrated national character which they typified. Among the French of all classes, on the other hand, individuality has often asserted itself at the expense of solidarity. More social benefits have been accorded the workers of Britain than of France. And because of this there is among the latter less of an antidote to unrest; Jacobinism, to the delight of Moscow, simmers on. A common, semi-European approach would have to wipe out disparities in social legislation. But it is these very disparities which, in the meantime, prevent some steps toward one from being taken—which, for example, make Britain all the more reluctant to enter the sort of West European federation that has been drafted.

Blueprints for the reconstruction of Europe must thus allow for stresses and strains in which the political, the

economic, and the cultural cannot be segregated from each other, in which these are often simply varying facets of a single problem. But where structural resemblances do nevertheless appear, they are likely to overshadow historical differences. That, however, may not be reproduced which, while native to the American scene, is not inherent in bigness itself. Lawlessness, for instance, is rendered more extravagant in the United States by the mere size of things. Yet this is a heritage of rustic, frontier days. Large-scale techniques permit it to be organized more lavishly; for the worst ravages of crime Europeans must themselves look homeward. In that final degradation of civilized society, the totalitarian State, America the raw has bred fewer evils than Europe the ripe. Only in Latin America has there been dictatorship, old style and new. Yet its local tradition, half-autochthonous and half-European, is, it may be noted, more European than North American.

Culturally what West Europeans can probably anticipate from any large-scale metamorphosis of their economy is that the qualitative will shrink and the quantitative hold sway. Yet it is the qualitative which nurtured the culture of Europe and made it incomparably what it has been. The custodians of Europe's patrimony are the thinker, the artist, the creative scholar, the man of letters. In a technological society, however, it is the technical expert rather than the free intellectual who will be taken seriously. Some men of ideas do carry weight and express themselves on a plane of discourse higher than that of the average. But they are a new breed—radio commentators, newspaper columnists, figures who have access to large-scale power and command the mass prestige that goes with it.

Not that bigness, East or West, exhibits an anti-intellectualism which underrates the importance of

ideas. If ruling authority in a totalitarian State had less respect for ideas, it would not subordinate them in such morbid detail to its own fierce will; in a large-scale democracy, if unmanaged opinion were to the interest of organized pressure, the marketplace of thought might be less prone to manipulation and foreclosure. To the potency of ideas all this may, like psychological warfare itself, be a tribute. It is, to say the least, a very back-handed one.

The paradox of democracy thus recurs. To keep its liberties intact Western Europe, in alliance with North America, must enlarge, politically and productively, the scale of its economy. Yet it cannot assimilate the techniques of bigness without these leaving their impress on much else besides. Among intangibles thus affected, the projection of America would differ from those Germanizing or Russifying influences which devalue man to the extent that America's own culture differs from the German or Russian. Cultural imperialism is not, however, the issue which the projection of America provokes; what ensues is an accelerated similarity of response to increasingly similar stimuli. And that, too, is why comparisons between the immaturity of American civilization and the maturity of European are stale, jejune, out of date. The question is less one of North America catching up to Western Europe or of Western Europe being dragged down by North America than of the two being implicated and transformed by socio-economic forces to which, over the centuries, they both gave birth.

To Western Europe the projection of America is a problem of adjustment between partners within a single Atlantic community. In Asia the United States, as the leader of the West, is the residuary legatee of bitterness engendered by the Orient's struggle to throw off the yoke of the Occident. Europe's attitude toward America

might be that of a disgruntled poor relation who has had to move from the head to the foot of the family table; Asia's is that of those who, discovering how liberty might but replace old ills by new, cannot always distinguish friend from foe. Western Europe may have to be reorganized as one on a larger scale; free Asia, at once primitive and effete, with its huge space, its dense population, its monstrous social decay, embodies, in contrast to the organized magnitude of North America, magnitude unorganized. There, as in Europe, a machine economy would dissolve treasured cultural patterns. Yet an impoverished agrarian one merely invites fresh shackles from without. Vast Asian tracts may have been held back by the heavy hand of exploiting foreigners; others are on the verge of chaos because their social order blocked progress. For the plight of the Orient, its own culture is fundamentally to blame.

Two imponderables underly the revaluation of man: first, a Judaeo-Christian tradition that asserts the inviolable worth of the humblest in the sight of God; second, a heritage of reason, logic, and open-mindedness that makes possible the rule of law in government and science alike. At home these principles may have been honored by the Occident more in the breach than the observance; as it exercised suzerain power in the Orient, it honored them still less. Yet even there such liberal aspirations as Asia cherishes came from its contact with the West; such democratic unity and technological strength as the Orient possesses was brought by the Occident. And now, as modernizing techniques become more widespread, the issue for Asia is not only whether these henceforth are to be autonomous or, under Sino-Soviet auspices, imposed. It is also whether the venerated religions of a culture steeped in piety will, with their scant esteem for the individual, impede any

Asian revaluation of man. For it is where the sanctities themselves sanctify life that there may develop civic virtue and with it in public affairs an accepted moral frame of reference. Gandhi's spinning wheel was an old symbol of new values. But the age of electronics dawns, and these will have to adapt themselves on short notice to that.

In Asia the era of Western imperialism was brief. The indigenous disabilities of the Orient stem from a vaunted otherworldliness which hallows between caste and class the grossest social injustice; from a pride in impracticality on which privilege, native and foreign, battens; from disdain for the power politics of the Occident when the abuse of power by Asians themselves has also been iniquitous. Land reform and technical assistance from the West may alleviate mass poverty and improve peasant health: without birth control the standard of living in most of the Orient, as in overpopulated Italy, must be low. Yet these concrete measures will not alone ensure any Asian revaluation of man: the Orient must somehow rise above its past if its future is to be free.

In Western Europe an individualistic and humanistic culture may now have to compromise with technological necessities. The ancient social traditions of Asia, however, have been conformist rather than nonconformist. In the most powerful democracy of the West there is the sort of irresponsibility that bigness introduces; among Europeans with little or no democratic background, large-scale organization is the chief tool of totalitarian irresponsibility. Can Asian peoples, as they are modernized technically, acquire inner moral resources which will keep them free politically? An awakened Turkey has been advancing toward democracy; Israel, with her social democracy, is in Asia only

cartographically; other, greater Asian sovereignties, India, Pakistan, Indonesia, have barely crossed the threshold of independent nationhood. And the ominous fact is that where twentieth-century techniques are adopted wholesale by Oriental countries themselves—semi-Asian Russia, Imperial Japan, Sovietized China—organized illiberalities may not diminish but increase.

Yet, as with free Europe so with free Asia, productivity for power will alone give it power for freedom. As the enemy of Asia's enemies, the Russian oppressor might still pose as a veritable St. George about to slay the dragon of oppression. And just as he alters his disguise to suit his purpose, so has the United States been countering him with alternate instruments of policy. In Western Europe, among her own Atlantic allies, what she fosters is supranational organization. But in the Orient nothing like that would be feasible. Asia's first need is for more robust nation-States on which to build; there it is nationalism which America espoused. Nor are these two area policies, being regional variations on a single global theme, inconsistent ones. Yet a point is soon reached at which they no longer serve the same final world objective.

The racial arrogance of the white man, and the global crises which loosened his grip, may have expedited the retreat of empire in the Orient. Nationalism, however, arrived at a climax there before social organization was ready for it. On the Indian subcontinent, as unified by the British, there has been an uneconomic partition and strife which is religious as well as political. The United States backed the cause of Asian liberation; unbridled nationalism in Asia works, nevertheless, to her immediate detriment. For the vestigial power in the Orient of her major Atlantic allies is linked with their own productive capacity, with important strategic interests

common to all, with that free world order of which each is a pillar. Yet Asian countries cannot switch from revolt against the West to identity with it virtually overnight.

A contest of power, the world crisis is also one of social dynamics. Those by which Western Europe is actuated are akin to North America's; what they require is an enlargement of the scale on which they can function. But while nationalism bestirs Asia, its society has been static; dynamics other than nationalism with which to ward off envelopment by the Sino-Soviet bloc must therefore be furthered. Nor is the Orient repelled by everything Moscow has to proffer: Soviet material standards, which are so inferior in the eyes of the West, appear superior to the downtrodden of Asia and Africa. Eventually the static totalitarian elements within Communism may themselves stifle its own dynamic ones. But until this happens the United States must not only prop up others to hold the fort with her. The projection of America will be retarded if, within her own mass economy, dynamic elements should ebb and wane. Over the years it cannot impart more *élan* to a free world order than it itself emits.

The projection of America is an exercise in survival. As such it is one in which the foreign and the domestic again intermingle. That within large-scale organization which widens opportunities, and thereby releases human energies, is its own prime energizer; that which constricts them stultifies the entire system. And the manner in which bigness resolves this central dilemma could well bear upon the whole vast future of mankind. The rise and fall of civilizations may be a cycle in which the West, too, having gone up, must, by some inexorable Newtonian law, also decline. But a society that posits the capacity of men to determine their own fate will not

only rebel against theories of a doom that is foreordained: by its very act of rebellion so dark a contingency might be averted. For one revitalizing feature sustains it which is *sui generis*. Liberty regenerates itself. Modern civilization may esthetically not be as splendid as some of its predecessors: it is, when free, less brittle. An order that revalues man is one that is constantly nurtured by life-giving juices of its own. But about their ceaseless flow there is nothing automatic. Without power the West would be crushed; unless it combats its own structural rigidities, that power cannot lastingly be replenished. Time will be on the side of democracy only as long as it is organized for, rather than against, self renewal.

CHAPTER

8

Man Against Man

If men were incorruptible, power would not corrupt. Progress, until the era of world wars, could be visualized as a twofold sequence: a technological one in which great new instrumentalities of power emerged and a political one through which these might be subjected to responsible democratic control. What liberalism would not foresee was that even when they had the tools and techniques to organize for their own welfare, the more men did with one hand the more they might undo with the other. By standardizing materially and thereby raising the standard of living, a large-scale society permits the individual to enjoy a better life. Less clear was it that by so doing he would escape standardization. Extending the power of men, the machine could not be mastered unless men also mastered themselves. The nineteenth century, blithely cocksure, fancied it could be like the sorcerer in the legend who unlocked, as he pleased, and might lock up again the secrets of Nature. More like that sorcerer's apprentice, for whom a little

knowledge was so dangerous a thing, the twentieth century, crestfallen, bewildered, heartsick, has no magic formula to accomplish all that liberalism bade fair to do.

The conflict between individual and collective rights could be anticipated. But a freer economy which facilitates the growth of corporate and institutional power lags one step behind in making that power organizationally responsible. Interior elements of irresponsibility tend, in a society of magnitude, to outstrip exterior control. And in appraising moral shortcomings it is this innate factor of structural ambivalence which must be reckoned with. Contemporary lawlessness is often attributed to *anomie,* to lives led without roots. Yet in a pre-technological society men were no paragons either; the collectivizing process that uproots them, however, also multiplies the temptation to violate traditional codes. A racketeering half-world, with its bribed officials and tipped or overtipped clerks, is one in which the pettier sort of insider vends at a price minor routine privileges of which he can organizationally dispose. And from the sharp corners cut by private enterprise to the chicaneries of employees, from the venalities of politicians to self-seeking intrigue among institutional bureaucrats, from organized crime to the totalitarian menace itself—what is novel here is not human wickedness but the scale on which, when it pre-empts power, it now may operate. Industrialism cried out for social justice and provided methods and means toward its achievement. Simultaneously it expanded the scope of evil and rendered it more immanent.

In openness of mind, science and liberalism are of the same family. As an individualistic philosophy, however, the latter did not underrate the force of self-interest. For about Man in general man may be objec-

tive. But where the ego has its own direct interests to be considered only a saint will be detached—might, as it were, get outside of himself. Technical innovation and personal morality can therefore seldom be synchronized. The first, though insentient, never stands still; the second, as evinced by sentient man, is burdened by his own immemorial fallibilities. Disinterested are the techniques employed by the intelligence when it devises instruments of power. In its own use of the finished product it itself may be much less disinterested.

Recoiling against that underestimation of man which is the essence of tyranny, liberalism on the whole overestimated him. Perhaps it could do nothing else. For man may not live up to his full potentialities; he is more likely to do this when his aim is high. Without a redemptive concept of moral order he could never be revalued. And it is through large-scale techniques that, for the mass, his revaluation can be attained. Yet organized anarchy is, in a free society, their innate result. The collective revaluation of man in terms of moral order, the individual devaluation of man through the processes of organized anarchy—modern democracy fluctuates between these two twentieth-century polar extremes. Society may conserve the power that is developed within it; but there are discretionary margins beyond law or administrative rule in which that power is exercised, and here only private moral controls avail. The moral code of a group or of society may be superior to one of man at his worst and inferior to one of man at his best. Ethical demands must be the same upon men in their collective organized capacity as upon each individual. For if they are not, organizational man, sheltered by impersonal large-scale irresponsibilities, could be personally still more exempt. A less stringent moral-

ity for society might coincide with actualities. But so would one for man himself. Man cannot be held to the best that is in him, if society is let off.

Not that compromise is invariably reprehensible. In matters of war and peace a free world order has often served liberty by an alignment with Powers that are not free; and, as social justice is pursued in domestic affairs, individual and collective interests must each yield some of their rights. Expediency has, however, to be resisted and principle kept alive every step of the way; and in that unremitting struggle there is a task for institutional religion. Yet it, too, is not immune to the backslidings of magnitude. Organizational man as cleric and hierarch can display the foibles of his kind. Other black marks against institutional religion have accumulated. It, nevertheless, furnished noble examples of altruism long before science and scholarship did the same. Secularism, in disarming bigotry and curbing persecution, has had to wage against them a mighty battle. But when secularism thereby affirms the revaluation of man, its own inner drive is a moral one. It is when organized power loses this impulse that the secularizing becomes totalitarian and intolerance may warp the spirit of religion itself.

Autre temps, autre moeurs. The decline of ordinary good manners in a large-scale society is consonant with its moral disorientation. New types forge ahead. Hitler and his louts clothed the *furor teutonicus* in modern dress; in the Soviet Union a generation of technocrats has stepped forth more parochial in outlook and less cultivated in taste than Russia's own pre-industrial revolutionaries. But elsewhere, too, as organizational distinctions replace traditional ones, the greater informality of our time is no unmitigated boon. For a cooperative society is not always a generous one; nor is

good fellowship which insists on group conformity as benevolent or as artless as it seems. Those who were secure in an age of more elaborate courtesy could afford that appreciation of merit which is magnanimity: self-respect might be coupled with respect for the individuality of others. But organizational man, despite collectivized or pre-empted securities, may still be too insecure about himself and his position for ease, for breadth, or for genuine warmth.

Nor is that surprising. In a large-scale society the game is played without surcease and with invisible counters: it is one in which the prize of control may be substantial and yet lack substance; one from which the victor carries off no concrete trophies that he himself might afterwards retain and possess. Opportunities can be multiplied for some and restricted for others by organized magnitude; as between insiders, as well as against outsiders, the struggle for power is correspondingly intense. And from the suave to the brusque, organizational man runs the gamut of civilities as part of his competitive institutional technique. Yet as he rises in a large-scale hierarchy, whether it be corporate or governmental, academic or administrative, the strain often tells. What overweening ambition does, how it causes earlier simplicities to be shed, is one of the classic themes of literature. But latter-day Caesars feed on a synthetic meat whose vitamins are more concentrated than nature's own.

Liberty is not enough. For while a dictatorship may be a society in which all are equal and yet unfree, a democracy is not authentically one if, though free, it is devoid of brotherhood. Pluralism is a liberal concept of group individuality in a social order centralized for some purposes and decentralized for others; under it, however, personal rights could still be vitiated by the

quest for organizational advantage of the self or the coterie within the group. So also gregariousness may accompany group collaboration and yet be no more than the pagan solidarity of the tribe or the crowd; brotherhood, Judaeo-Christian in its undertones, would fuse unity and diversity. Respecting the moral autonomy of the individual, it is a spur of man's revaluation and the crown. With its famous triune battle cry, the French Revolution thus sounded a note that still reverberates: not liberty alone, not equality alone, not these two as a pair, but all three—liberty, equality, and fraternity—together. For liberty and equality might, as basic principles, interact upon each other. The tension between them, when fraternity is scant, can nullify much that they otherwise accomplish.

Discord between technology and morality may have been anticipated. But the nineteenth century counted on education to mediate and render less inharmonious. That education might in fact set them further apart, that it might turn against liberalism itself, few suspected. For it was through education that, as minds were opened, power would be humanized. Without mass literacy there can be no mass democracy; the machinery of the latter presupposes that information media are consulted, that ideas may be pondered as well as exchanged, that the sense of personal responsibility will be keen. All this does occur in a free society; unless it did, imperfectly but sufficiently for it to function, liberty would perish. Yet not only does their destination recede as men organizationally approach it; they themselves are diverted from the main road through uncharted detours and up blind alleys.

Education can, even politically, be a two-edged sword. Against despotism it has often been an agent of revolt. In a modern dictatorship it instills acceptance of the re-

gime and a hatred of any that are free. Orthodoxy, secular or religious, has always tried to guard its wards against dangerous thoughts; in the twentieth century large-scale techniques may be employed with which, as dissent is stamped out, uniformity can be inculcated. And should any of the downtrodden still endeavor to strike a blow on their own behalf, they may be proscribed by the police State with the same thorough, organized ferocity. Nor, where there is a total monopoly of power, can resort now be had to the classic street insurrection: the oppressed must await the collapse of the regime in war, a factional quarrel between rival heirs, or some change in the constellation of diplomacy along with which ideological straitjackets may be loosened. Barring these eventualities, however, dictatorship banks on the schooled docility of an indoctrinated populace to help it keep itself in the saddle. Unlike tyranny of yore, it must educate the mass, but in doing this still serves its own purposes.

Civilization, as H. G. Wells said, may be a race between education and catastrophe. Yet in the West, too, has not education itself done much technologically to set on foot and heat up so precarious a contest? In world affairs, as totalitarian power is offset by the regirded power of the democracies, another global conflagration may be averted. That leaves it as imperative as ever to ask of what, in a large-scale society, education is to consist; what its efficacy can be; by whom it will be handled and administered. Why, despite its output of trained intelligence, is society still so unenlightened? The gifted few who blaze trails are not alone in merit; it is they, however, who have zest and vision for pushing toward far horizons. Mass inertia—whether of the willingly or unwillingly inert—does, by contrast, figure high among social intractabilities. But the failures of education are

due to more than the sloth of the multitude. The educated show faults in themselves for which the mass as such cannot be blamed.

What the dedicated are in religion the selfless may be in art and thought, in science and scholarship. And when they can work on their own, when they do not have to act with or through others, organizational cross currents will pass them by. Yet just as the morally exceptional may not be intellectually exceptional, so the intellectually exceptional may not be morally exceptional. Education itself has, in a large-scale society, become an enterprise of magnitude—one with all the organizational flaws of other similar, human undertakings. And even science, as a branch of organized knowledge, demonstrates how, within inquiries which are procedurally disinterested, there may lurk the most profound social irresponsibility. When the atomic age began, it was stunned by the effect of its own accomplishments and clamored for a moral stocktaking. Yet no guilt lay in an attempt to forestall the invention of the atomic bomb by Nazi scientists. It is when such an extension of power can be used against, as well as for, civilized society that science becomes uncontrollable.

Of its own techniques the twentieth century is, moreover, not only as much victim as beneficiary. The earlier liberal faith in the inevitability of progress caused a wishful misreading of history. In revaluing man the moral strategy of modern democracies was a sound one; tactically they were naive to assume that all peoples shared the same goal. Through their own constitutions they had long striven to render power politically responsible. But vast power was also being generated in organizational zones less susceptible to control and in other countries where there were not even such constitutional safeguards as prevailed in the West. History

itself, as the incubus of an unjust past was shaken off, would be treated in a more scientific fashion. Yet between the enthusiasm for progress of liberal historians and the moral nihilism of illiberal ones, the realities called for some middle ground. These, however, would take longer to find, or were grasped less clearly, in international than in national affairs. Those who were realistic about the domestic scene were often unrealistic about world politics. And when utopian irresponsibility between the wars thus played into the hands of its own enemies, liberalism reached its nadir.

To relate the old with the new seemed less necessary when all might be rebuilt afresh. But what if it could not? For the past lived on, the bad with the good, the former still devaluing man, the latter pointing to his revaluation. Liberalism did not go astray when it sought a more rational reordering of society; it erred in glossing over much that past—and present—exhibited of man's own irrationality. Perceiving how education conquered this in some quarters, it was unprepared for the conquest of education in others by the irrational. Not that education underwent the same misuse in democracies as in dictatorships. Yet training has to be technical if a large-scale mechanism is to be operated; mass education was bound to lay stress on that. Greater numbers could, through it, also be developed in other ways. But even this has not had as direct an effect as was presumed—and for reasons that hamper large-scale democracy in every aspect, individual and organizational, of its existence. A free self-regulating economy and a free self-regulating world order are, as liberal hypotheses, both obsolete. So, too, mass education may open minds and yet be no automatic guarantee of an open society.

Nor, in its own formal affirmations, could liberalism escape the structural ambiguities of organized magni-

tude. It might, as a credo of moral responsibility, keep its hands clean. Yet whenever it, too, employed positive institutional techniques, these were as equivocal as any. It still strove for a free society in which, between individual and collective rights, there can be some just synthesis; a program of power, governmental and nongovernmental, invited the corruptions of power. Reforming bigness and being commensurately enlarged in scale, it itself became in practice less flexible, less open-minded, less free. The bewildering illiberalities of organizational liberalism are thus not merely those of pious frauds—the veiled intolerance of its opinion media; the disingenuous exercise of pre-empted power in the learned and official worlds. They are a gauge of the administrative irresponsibility which emerges whenever inner controls evade control.

Hardening of the moral arteries is the occupational disease of every organized pressure or large-scale interest. When, however, it is conservative ones which display these symptoms they, at least, are spared the odium of having pretended to be something that they are not. Setting their sights low, never oversanguine about the nature of man, they raised no great expectations of others—or of themselves.

And what, in the light of all this, shall we do temporally to be saved? The ancient verities are never outworn, but they alone will not now suffice. Personal integrity is, as ever, a prerequisite; without judgment even it will not get us far. For power may be mishandled by incompetents or obscurantists who are honest; the expert or the technician is often too specialized, too intent upon a compartmentalized sphere of his own. Experience by itself, knowledge untempered by judgment, is therefore inadequate for social decisions that are com-

prehensive and just. Ideally the more arid our technology, the more it calls for moral imagination, a wisdom in leadership which transcends moral responsibility itself. But large-scale society is not disposed to elicit or utilize the very qualities it needs most. We shall, if history is any guide, have to settle for less.

It is from history, as a matter of fact, that may be derived a sense of realism which will prevent us from hoping too much or despairing too soon. The nineteenth century thought it knew where it was going and did not. The twentieth century knows that it does not and wishes that it did. The more intricately society is organized the more complex is the reconciliation of liberty and security: the equipoise these two achieve internationally will determine the future of the human race. For technology has backfired. Did it unite all men or, in uniting some, divide them from others more profoundly? Power, through it, was concentrated in peace but not for peace. And so the West would have to fight a second world war before it took to heart whatever lessons the first had taught.

Paradox in the organization of freedom may contribute to hazard in the organization of peace. But if democracy ever doubts whether it is on the right course, a glance at totalitarian rigors will reassure it. Less reassuring is any self-scrutiny whose criteria of man's revaluation are those which democracy itself has set. Social justice can, in a mass society, enlarge the scale of well-being. Yet fresh corruptions of power result when power is extended or even redistributed. Man versus the machine remains a major issue of the twentieth century, the question being how to control it so that it can be exploited in common to the common advantage. And one phase of this question is the problem of its use by

some or many against others, that in an organized ar
archy of man against man. For the terrain of freedor
may expand and change. The battle for democrac
never ends and is never finally won.

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