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
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AMERICAN CATHOLICS

AND THE

ROMAN QUESTION

BY

MONSIGNOR JOSEPH SCHROEDER, D.D., Ph.D.

PROFESSOR OF DOGMATIC THEOLOGY IN THE CATHOLIC UNIVERSITY
OF AMERICA

Quam malae famae est, qui derelinquit patrem.
—*Ecclus.* III. 18.

The whole Catholic world, very jealous of the independence of its head, will never rest until justice has been done to his most righteous demands. (Leo XIII., Letter to Cardinal Rampolla, June 15, 1887.)

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
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TO MY DEAR FRIEND

RIGHT REVEREND SEBASTIAN G. MESSMER, D.D., D.C.L.

BISHOP OF GREEN BAY



PREFACE

THE following pages are an expansion of an article published by me on the same subject in the *American Catholic Quarterly Review*, January 1892. Certain qualified judges, whose desire was for me a command, having urged me to publish it separately, I felt it my duty to somewhat enlarge its scope and reinforce its argument. It is unnecessary to say that I have by no means either the intention or the pretension of exhausting such a subject in so few pages. I have proposed to myself primarily to show clearly and frankly the Catholic point of view from which the Roman question should be regarded, indicating the principal considerations which should be taken into account in a true conception and solution of it, and thus to disengage it from those prejudices and ambiguities with which the best-intentioned people sometimes surround it.

I must touch upon questions no less delicate than important in theology, in philosophy, and particularly in international law. Moreover, the matter is one that more than any other depends exclusively upon the supreme teacher and ruler of the Church. It will not, then, be superfluous to say

openly at the start what I believe to be the true Catholic attitude in this as in all other questions.

I profess, then, from the bottom of my heart, with Pius IX., that "the obligation by which Catholic teachers and writers are strictly bound is not restricted only to those doctrines which are proposed by the infallible judgment of the Church as dogmas of faith to be believed by all."

I declare, moreover, that here, as in all teaching, I look upon it as a sacred duty to avoid "the audacity of those who, not enduring sound doctrine, contend that 'without sin and without any sacrifice of the Catholic position, assent and obedience may be refused to those judgments and decrees of the Holy See whose object is declared to concern the Church's general good and her rights and discipline, provided only they do not touch the dogmas of faith and morals.'"

I am profoundly convinced that "this is grievously opposed to the Catholic dogma of the full power divinely given by Christ Our Lord to the Roman Pontiff of leading, ruling, and governing the Universal Church."¹

To the Roman question in particular we would apply the words of Leo XIII.:

"Every one should rely upon the judgment of the Holy See, and conform to it his sentiments."²

The principles to be followed in the present

¹ Encyclical "Quanta cura."

² Oportet Apostolicæ Sedis stare iudicio, et quod ipsa senserit, sentire singulos. (Encyclical "Immortale Dei.")

question are given with a perfect lucidity in the letter of Leo XIII. to Cardinal Rampolla. This letter can justly be called a masterly résumé of the question in all its phases and in all its extent. It will serve us, then, as our principal guide and support.


*Papa Beatissime, si minus perite, aut parum caute forte aliquid positum est, emendari cupimus a te, qui Petri et fidem et sedem tenes.*¹

J. S.


WASHINGTON, D. C.,

Feast of St. Joseph, 1892.

¹ St. Jerome to St. Damasus.



LIST OF REFERENCES



WORKS TO BE CONSULTED

I destini di Roma. Father Brunengo, S.J.

The Independence of the Holy See. Cardinal Manning.

La Question romaine internationale et anglaise et non pas seulement italienne. Bishop Vaughan, of Salford, England. [To my regret, I have not within reach the English original of this beautiful little work, and am compelled to rely upon the French translation made by the Abbé Moreau.]

Les Relations entre le Saint Siège et le Royaume d'Italie. Marquis de la Vega de Armijo. Translated from the Spanish by the Abbé Moreau.

Etude sur la Question romaine. Abbé Vennekens, Brussels, 1890.

La verita nella soluzione della questione Romana. A work authorized by Leo XIII. himself (1888).


I would also call attention to the numerous essays of Orestes A. Brownson on the same question, as well as to the following remarkable articles which have appeared in two of our best American reviews: "Liberty and Independence of the Pope," Very

Rev. Isaac T. Hecker, *Catholic World*, April 1882 ; and "Nationalism, the Conclave and the next Pope," Rt. Rev. Mgr. Bernard O'Reilly, *American Catholic Quarterly Review*, January 1892.

The celebrated French economist Leroy-Beaulieu has written in the *Revue des Deux Mondes* three articles under the title of "Le Vatican et le Quirinal depuis 1878" which have justly attracted general attention. The author is not a Catholic believer, and treats the Roman question mainly from the international point of view.—See also "The Foreign Policy of Italy," by the well-known Belgian writer Emile de Laveleye, in the *Contemporary Review*, March 1892.

Special mention is due to the *Civiltà Cattolica*, which has always taken a front rank among Catholic periodicals in its able defence of the rights of the Holy See.

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ANALYSIS

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
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
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**AMERICAN CATHOLICS AND THE
ROMAN QUESTION**



AMERICAN CATHOLICS

AND

THE ROMAN QUESTION

I. OPPORTUNENESS OF THE DISCUSSION

1. SOME time ago the *Catholic World* published an important article on the temporal sovereignty of the pope from the pen of one to whom we can apply a well-known phrase: *Cuius laus est in universa Americæ ecclesia.*¹ A distinguished Catholic priest, in his remarks on this article, incidentally called attention to an objection "which rises naturally in the minds of republican Catholics." He formulates this objection in the following words:

There is no use trying to enlighten the Catholic laity, unless you place in the clearest light the consistency between the right of the pope to independence and the right of the people to self-government. That the pope ought to be free to treat with all the nations of the earth of course all admit, but how his temporal sovereignty consists with republican principles is the question to be treated in an article addressed to the people of these United States; and Catholic writers should devote their energies to making clear this aspect of the great

¹ Very Reverend A. J. Hewit, *Catholic World*, December 1890.

and important subject. We Catholics live in the midst of fifty-five millions of people estranged from the Church and holding, theoretically at least, this latter principle; we cleave to it ourselves as well; in order, therefore, that we may give to the pope "reasonable service" in this matter, and give also to our fellow-citizens "a reason for the faith that is in us," and answer their demand "why we meddle with the affairs of Italy," we must have more on the subject.¹

We entirely agree with this conclusion. We are sincere Catholics and sincere patriots. A theoretical or practical consequence of Catholic doctrine can never conflict with true patriotism. Contradictions can therefore only be apparent; and objections on this score must be either inexact and grounded on a defective knowledge of Catholic teaching, or not to the point.

2. The appropriateness of treating the question is therefore manifest. Another consideration will prove its opportuneness and necessity. The pope, according to Catholic doctrine, is not only the infallible teacher, but also the supreme ruler of the Church. A Catholic owes the assent of faith to his doctrinal definitions, and perfect obedience to his orders and precepts. Entire docility in both cases is the characteristic of a true Catholic.²

¹ We may be allowed to mention that, before the above lines came to our notice, we referred to the difficulty, and answered it substantially, in an article in which we openly defended the application of the principles of self-government to France. See *American Catholic Quarterly Review*, January 1891, "Cardinal Lavigerie and the French Republic," p. 120, note.

² Summus autem est magister in Ecclesiâ Pontifex Romanus. Concordia igitur animorum sicut perfectum in una fide consensum requirit, ita voluntas postulat Ecclesiæ Romanoque Pontifici perfecte subiectas atque obtemperantes, ut Deo. Perfecta autem esse obedientia debet, quia ab ipsâ fide præcipitur, et habet hoc commune cum fide, ut dividua esse non possit . . . cuiusmodi perfectioni tantum christiana consuetudo tribuit, ut illa tanquam nota internoscendi catholicos et habita semper sit et habeatur. (Encyclical "Sapientiæ Christianæ," 1889.)

The following facts are undeniable: *First*, the pope himself does not cease advocating his claims to the temporal power. In the Encyclical "Inscrutabili," 21st April, 1878, he says: "Never shall we abstain from claiming that freedom be again restored to the Holy See by the recovery of the temporal power. Therefore we renew all the declarations and protestations of our predecessor, Pius IX., of blessed memory." Again: "It is our sacred duty," he says in an allocution to the College of Cardinals, March 2, 1880, "to preserve our right intact in spite of all opposition to the contrary, no matter whence it comes." This alone is enough to convince a Catholic that the "concordia animorum" forbids silence on this question; more especially at this time, when our Father in his distress and afflictions appeals to the hearts of his children for sympathy and redress.

Secondly, the Holy Father expressly calls upon the Catholics of the whole world to second his efforts in the defence of his rights and the restoration of his territorial independence, and thus prove themselves devoted and loyal Catholics. "The Catholics of the various States can never hold their peace until they see their chief, the teacher of their faith, the guide of their consciences, again possessed of true liberty and really independent."¹ Therefore the Holy Father doubts not "but that all Catholics all the world over will support, openly and unrestrained, these rights of the Holy See."²

¹ Letter to the Secretary of State, Cardinal Nina, August 27, 1878.

² Allocution, June 1, 1888.

Frequently he directs this admonition to the Catholics of Italy itself.¹ With an affectionate tenderness he reminds Catholic writers, and above all Catholic journalists, of this duty: "Therefore, my beloved sons, cease not, both by word of mouth and in your writings, to contend that the temporal sovereignty of the pope is necessary for the free exercise of his spiritual power."²

3. Just one more fact. The canonization of the Japanese martyrs had brought more than three hundred bishops to the feet of the great Pius IX. in 1862. Before departing they presented His Holiness with an address in which they unanimously and in a most forcible manner gave expression to their approval of his solemn utterances concerning the necessity of the temporal power; they declared that "the Head of the Church could never be subject to any prince, or even depend upon the hospitality of one;" that "it is the duty of all Catholics to defend the temporal sovereignty and the patrimony of St. Peter," for the maintenance of which rights they should be prepared to go with him "to prison and to death."³

Ever since the perpetration of the Piedmontese

¹ 3d January, 1858.

² Address to Catholic journalists, February 22, 1879.

³ Oportebat sane totius Ecclesiæ caput Romanum Pontificem nulli principi esse subiectum; immo nullius hospitem, sed in proprio dominio ac regno sedentem suæmet iuris esse. . . . Alto pariter et solemnî eloquio declarasti, te civilem Romanæ Ecclesiæ principatum eius que temporales possessiones ac iura, que ad universum Catholicum orbem pertinent, integra et inviolata constanter tueri et servare velle; immo Sanctæ Sedis principatus Beatique Petri patrimonii tutelam ad omnes Catholicos pertinere; teque paratum esse animam potius ponere quam hanc Dei, Ecclesiæ et iustitiæ causam ullo modo deserere (Alloc. 16 Sept. 1859). Quibus præclaris verbis nos acclamantes ac plaudentes respondemus, nos tecum et ad carcerem et ad mortem ire paratos esse. (Declaratio episcoporum, 8 Jun. 1862.)

robbery in 1870, this accord of the entire episcopacy with the Holy See has been manifested even more clearly on divers occasions. A Catholic, therefore, can entertain no doubt about it: obedience to ecclesiastical authority, to the pope and the episcopacy, puts upon every Catholic the obligation to defend to the utmost of his ability the temporal sovereignty of the head of the Church. What is the fundamental reason of this obligation? Is it the maintenance of a possession to which both from an historical and juridicial standpoint the popes have an inviolable right? No; it is to be found in the intimate relation existing between the temporal power of the pope and the divinely ordained independence and freedom of the head of the Church, which is the freedom of the Church itself. Hence our position in the Roman question is prescribed by the inviolable rights of our father, of the Church, and of all the Catholics of the world.

II. THE CATHOLIC POSITION

4. A few preliminary remarks must be made in order to define exactly from what motives and in what sense Catholics declare the temporal power to be necessary.

We treat this question from the Catholic standpoint, as in it is involved that twofold obedience which the Catholic owes. Our non-Catholic fellow-citizens must likewise accept the same standpoint as the basis of their criticism. We need not prove to a child of the Church that the pope, by divine

disposition, has the right and the duty to rule the Church in perfect independence of any earthly power, and that, by the same divine right, he is exempt from any secular jurisdiction whatsoever. He therefore is, as Leo XIII. expresses it, "by the express will of the Founder of the Church not subject to any secular power."¹

The right to this independence is essential to the papacy. The exercise of that right, however, is not absolutely necessary to the existence of the Church (*ut Ecclesia sit*), but it is necessary for the perfect development of its social life (*ut bene sit*). Providence availed itself of the temporal power as a means to secure to the popes the free and undisturbed development of their sublime prerogative.

In the early ages, triumphant and victorious through all the many and bitter persecutions, the Church had the stamp of her divine origin set upon her. Those years might be called the Church's infancy. The time came, however, when she was to put forth the full vigor of life. The freedom and independence of the head of the Church was, by divine Providence, to foster its steady growth, and thus it came to pass that the popes acquired the temporal dominion over Rome, the seat of their pontificate.² No unbiassed historian has ever called into question the legitimacy of this temporal dominion, and that, too, considering only its historical origin. This, for us, is a

¹ Letter to Cardinal Rampolla, 15th June, 1887.

² *Idem*.

settled question in our present discussion. It is equally unnecessary to prove that the pope, since the spoliation of his States, September 20, 1870, no longer enjoys that liberty and independence which the nature and dignity of his office demand. *Verius in aliena potestate sumus quam nostra*—"We are more really in the power of another than our own." We might refer to two facts which will convince even the most ardent friend of Italian unity of the truth of these words of Leo XIII.: the outrageous scandals of which Rome was the scene in the early part of October, 1891, when the city echoed the cry "*Abasso il papa!*" and the infamous insult which was heaped upon the corpse of the great Pius amid the demon-cries, "*Al fume!*" These two events in the history of New Italy speak more than volumes.

A Catholic cannot rejoin: Let the pope look for a free abode elsewhere.

This is not the language of a child towards its father; and every Catholic should know that such a decision belongs to the pope alone, and that the successor of St. Peter is responsible for it to God and to no one else.

5. There is still another reason of much greater importance. The Catholic dogma of the primacy expressly teaches not only that it was instituted by Christ in St. Peter, and must continue for all ages in his successors, but also that from the beginning of the Church the bishop of Rome alone was the successor of St. Peter, and that to this day it is only *as bishop of Rome* that the popes succeed St. Peter

and possess the plenitude of apostolic power. We may add that it is a theological truth drawn from the teaching of faith that the primacy *iure divino* belongs, until the end of time, to the bishop of Rome alone, and that it therefore cannot be transferred even by the pope himself to another see. This is not the place to enter more fully into the explanation of this doctrine. The theological basis for the temporal power is to be found in the dogma: The bishop of Rome and he alone always was and is up to the present day the successor of St. Peter. The immutability of this relation between the primacy and the see of Rome only serves to enforce the argument. As to this, it is sufficient to say that no other see can become the "apostolic see of Peter." It is only the see of Rome in which the pope is "the successor of Peter, prince of the apostles." It must always remain true, because it is defined, that "the Roman pontiff is the successor of St. Peter;" that "the Roman Church possesses by divine ordination the primacy over all churches." The profession of faith, "I acknowledge the Roman Church to be the mother and teacher of all churches," can never be changed; the Church of Christ must always remain the "*Roman Catholic Church.*" The translation of the Apostolic See to another city, for instance to Cologne or Baltimore, would necessarily change those definitions and professions into these: "the Cologne Catholic Church," "the Baltimorian Catholic Church"! We will add that the apostolicity is a visible note of the true Church, and that no change could take place

without shaking the stability of the apostolic succession and without serious detriment to the whole Church. All this goes to prove that not even the pope has a right to effect such a translation. As to any other ecclesiastical or popular power, it is a proposition censured in the apostolic letters of August 22, 1851, as well as in the Syllabus, "that the primacy may by a decree of a General Council or by the verdict of all nations be transferred from the Roman bishop and the city of Rome to another bishop or city."¹ Such teaching was only the logical outcome of the Gallican and Febronian theory respecting the sovereignty of the people in the Church. In our own days it was Nuytz, professor in Turin, whose writings have brought about the condemnation of the aforesaid proposition. Would it be too bold to say that the same doctrine can be logically deduced from the following words of the Vatican Council?—

The holy and blessed Peter to this day, *and always*, lives, presides, and judges in the persons of his successors the bishops of the Holy See of Rome, which he has founded and consecrated with his blood. *Whoever therefore succeeds him in this see* obtains his primacy over all the Church, according to the institution of Jesus Christ Himself.²

Leo XIII. has expressed the perpetuity of this privilege as follows: "What may be said generally

¹ Prop. 35. Nuytz meant a "General Council" without and even against the pope; "auctoritate Ecclesie," as Febronius expressed it.

² Sanctus beatissimusque Petrus . . . ad hoc usque tempus et semper in suis successoribus, Episcopis Sanctæ Romanæ Sedis ab ipso fundatæ eiusque consecratæ sanguine, vivit et præsidet et iudicium exercet. Unde quicumque in hac cathedra Petro succedit, is secundum Christi ipsius institutionem primatum Petri in universam Ecclesiam obtinet. (Constitution "Pastor æternus," cap. 2.)

of the temporal power of the popes holds still more strongly and in a special way of Rome. Its destinies are written large across all its history; that is to say, as in the designs of Providence all human events have been ordered with regard to Christ and His Church, so ancient Rome and its empire were founded for the sake of Christian Rome; and it was not without a special disposition of Providence that St. Peter, the prince of the apostles, turned his steps towards this metropolis of the pagan world, to become its pastor and to hand down to it forever the authority of the Supreme Apostolate. It is thus that *the fate of Rome has been bound in a sacred and indissoluble way with that of the vicar of Jesus Christ.*"¹

6. But suppose this translation were possible, still we cannot find therein a solution of the difficulty; for elsewhere the same questions may arise.* It therefore remains true that the pope as bishop of Rome, and according to the natural order of things in Rome and from Rome, governs and directs

¹ Letter to Card. Rampolla.

* We will mention as a matter of curiosity a book published in Paris in 1885, under the equivocal title of "*Le Rétablissement du Pouvoir temporel, par le Prince de Bismarck*," in which the author, who is by no means a Catholic, undertakes to prove that the re-establishment of the temporal power of the popes is necessary from the point of view of international politics, that this question is very important especially for Germany, and that consequently the German and Austrian statesmen, and notably Prince Bismarck, are called to realize this desire of the Catholic world; that, finally, as Rome cannot be any longer the city of the papacy, it will be transferred to "a free, international, and neutral city." This city will be, according to the fantastic plans of the author, "the second eternal city, which is elevated like the first upon seven hills: Roma Nova—Constantinople, after the destruction of the Ottoman Empire" !

Two years ago a French Catholic author, the antipode of his compatriot Drumont by his predilection for the Jewish race, predicted to us the transition of the see of St. Peter to Jerusalem, and a series of great popes and great bishops of Semitic blood.

the affairs of the Church of God unmolested, and that in Rome at least he must not be subject to any secular authority, that is, the pope must also be the temporal ruler of Rome. In this sense Catholics in concert with the pope declare the necessity of the temporal power.

7. In the face of the many and luminous declarations in which the popes, and especially Pius IX. and Leo XIII., have affirmed the necessity of the temporal power for the free and independent exercise of their apostolic authority, a Catholic may raise the following questions: Are these declarations of the popes decisions or decrees of the Holy See to which Catholics are bound to give their religious assent (*assensus religiosus*), that internal and external obedience which the sacred authority of the Church demands, or do they exact more than this? That is, have the popes in their encyclicals and apostolic letters delivered a definitive and infallible judgment on this matter, and must Catholics respond to the infallible teacher by an act of faith?¹

Certain Italian and Italianizing theologians, turning theology into politics, were, and still are, fond of the following style of argument: If the pope and all the bishops of a General Council should decide that, under present circumstances, the Sovereign Pontiff needs the temporal power, we should not be obliged to submit, because they would not speak

¹ Not, of course, an act of divine and Catholic faith (*fide immediate divina et catholica*), which can be given only to revealed dogma proposed by the Church, but the act of mediately divine faith (*fide mediate divina vel ecclesiastica*), with which we must accept the teaching of the Church when she pronounces definitively on doctrines or on facts connected with revealed truths.

as doctors of the Church (*come maestri della chiesa*), their judgment having for its object matters which have not been revealed. This is purely and simply the Jansenistic distinction between the *right* and the *fact*. They pretend to admit the infallibility of the Church, but repudiate it as soon as she would exercise it; and yet they boast themselves true Catholics—Catholics better and more enlightened than the pope and the episcopate! The reasoning quoted above destroys the infallibility of the Church. The first thing required, nay, the essential supposition for the action of the Church's *magisterium*, is that this teaching authority cannot deceive itself when judging concerning the range of its power and the extent of its object. Her competency, then, is defined by the very fact of the definition; *in actu exercito*, as is said in the schools.

The encyclical "Quanta cura," December 8, 1864, indicates clearly that the infallibility of the Church and of the pope extends also to "things which bear on the general good of the Church" (*res ad bonum generale ecclesie pertinentes*). If the faithful are bound to believe with divine faith the right and necessity of the full and entire freedom of the head of the Church, his complete independence of every human power, who does not see how important it is to know the means which in certain circumstances constitute the principal and even the only way of assuring it? But in our days the circumstances are such that the pope must necessarily be the subject of a secular prince, if he is not a temporal sovereign himself. Therefore this temporal sovereignty is

intimately connected with the full liberty which belongs to the Holy See by divine right. Hence it can well be the subject of an infallible definition, even though it be a fact, because it has become and is a dogmatic fact. All Catholic theologians agree on this point. "No one has ever dreamt," says the *Civiltà Cattolica*, "that the temporal power is or could be the subject of a dogmatic definition, which is never issued except regarding revealed truths. But the sincere Catholic does not limit his obedience to the dogmas alone; he gives it to all the doctrines and teachings of the Church. This doctrine and teaching embraces, besides dogmas, many truths which are either dependent on dogmas, or connected with them by an interior or exterior bond.

"Now the necessity of the temporal power of the Roman Pontiff at the present time, although, as we have said, it is not and cannot be a dogma, is, however, contained in the doctrine and teaching of the Church, because it has been solemnly proclaimed by all the bishops of the Catholic world and by their head, the pope."¹

In these words the *Civiltà* indicates that as a matter of fact the necessity of the temporal power is already defined. We openly declare that we share in this opinion. But this need not be insisted upon here. For our present subject the two following conclusions are of importance:

(a) Every good Catholic must admit the intimate

¹ *Civiltà Cattolica*, January 15, 1876. See our article "Theological Minimizing," in the *American Ecclesiastical Review*, February 1891.

connection between the independence of the Holy See and its temporal power.

(b) Every good Catholic owes assent and obedience, at least religious assent, to those judgments and decrees of the Holy See in which the temporal power is declared necessary in order to secure the true independence of the head of the Church; he is, as the Syllabus expresses it, "bound to hold most firmly" what the popes have taught (*proposita et asserta doctrina*) on the necessity of the temporal power in the documents cited explicitly by the Syllabus itself (prop. 25, 26), and "to conform his judgment to the judgment of the Holy See."

The singular political theology of which we have spoken above was chiefly proposed and upheld by the *Mediatore*, "*giornale politico, religioso, etc.*" The acts of the Vatican Council refer at length to this journal. It was against its arguments that the theologians of the Council had drawn up a plan for a conciliar definition on the temporal power in the following words:

Renewing the decrees of the Apostolic See and of the Council, we condemn and proscribe the heretical doctrine of those who say that it is contrary to divine right that civil principality should be united to the spiritual power, and also the perverse opinion of those who pretend that the Church has no right to legislate with authority on the relations between this civil principality and the general welfare of the Church, and that, consequently, it is permissible for Catholics to depart from the decisions of the Church in this subject and to hold other sentiments.¹

¹ *Sacro approbante Concilio innovantes huius Apostolicæ Sedis ac præcedentium Concilliorum iussa ac decreta, damnamus atque proscribimus tum eorum hæreticam doctrinam, qui affirmant, repugnare iure divino ut cum spirituali potestate in Romanis Pontificibus principatus civilis coniun-*

The *adnotationes* of the same theologians, after having explained the *Mediatore's* theory, the substance of which is given above, add :

But these doctrines are really detestable, altogether perverse and dangerous, full of sedition and of scandal, and offensive to pious ears.¹

We know well enough that a plan for a conciliar definition is not a definition of a Council ; but this scheme, elaborated by order of the pope, approved by him and by the Episcopal Committee, and submitted to the bishops of a Council, surely furnishes us at least with a new proof of the definability of the doctrine in question, viz., of its intimate connection with the Catholic dogma of the primacy of Peter.

Pius IX. declared in his encyclical of June 18, 1859 :

We openly affirm that the civil principality is necessary to the Holy See, in order that it may exert without any obstacle its sacred power for the good of religion.²

Again in the apostolic letter of the 26th of March, 1860 :

God has willed that the See of St. Peter should be possessed of the civil principality, in order to protect and preserve the liberty of the apostolic ministry.³

gatur, tum perversam eorum sententiam, qui contendunt, Ecclesiæ non esse de huius principatus civilis ad generale christianæ reipublicæ bonum relatione quidpiam cum auctoritate constituere, adeoque licere catholicis hominibus, ab illius decisionibus hac de re editis recedere aliterque sentire. Acta et Decreta Concil. Vatic. (Coll. Lac. § vii, p. 572, 619 sqq.)

¹ Sed doctrinæ sunt istæ plane detestabiles, perversæ penitus ac perniciosæ seditionis ac scandali plenæ, quasque piæ aures non ferunt. (p. 622.)

² Necessarium esse palam edicimus Sanctæ huic Sedi civilem principatum, ut in bonum religionis sacram potestatem sine ullo impedimento exercere voluit.

³ Quo [civilis principatu] Deus hanc Beatæ Petri sedem instructam voluit, ad apostolici ministerii libertatem tuendam atque servandam.

In the allocution "Maxima quidem," June 9th, 1862:

We take pleasure in recalling the unanimous consent with which you [the bishops] have not ceased to teach that this civil principality of the Holy See has been given to it by a special design of Providence, and that it is necessary in order that the Sovereign Pontiff may never be subjected to any other prince or to any civil power, that he may exercise his supreme power with perfect liberty for the greater good of the Church and of the faithful.¹

In regard to these and other utterances on the same subject the Syllabus says after § IX:

Outside of those errors explicitly noted, several other errors are implicitly condemned by the doctrine expressly proposed and declared on the civil principality of the Roman pontiff, which should be firmly held by all Catholics. This doctrine is clearly taught in the allocution *Quibus quantisque* [here follows the citation of five other pontifical documents].²

See the "Declaratio Episcoporum" (June 8, 1862):

We recognize that the temporal sovereignty of the Holy See is necessary, and that it has been established by the manifest design of divine Providence; we do not hesitate to declare that in the present state of human affairs that temporal sovereignty is absolutely essential to the welfare of the Church and the free direction of souls.³

¹ Iuvat commemorare miram prorsus consensionem, qua . . . nunquam intermisistis . . . docere, hunc civilem Sanctæ Sedis principatum Romano Pontifici fuisse singulari divinæ Providentiæ consilio datum, illumque necessarium esse, ut idem Romanus Pontifex nulli unquam principi aut civili potestati subiectus supremam . . . potestatem . . . plenissima libertate exercere ac maiori eiusdem Ecclesiæ et fidelium bono, utilitati et indigentis consulere possit.

Præter hos errores explicitè notatos alii complures implicitè reprobantur *proposita et asserta doctrina*, quam catholici omnes firmissime retinere debent, de civili Romani Pontificis principatu. Eiusmodi doctrina luculenter traditur in Allocutione '*Quibus quantisque*,' 20 Apr. 1849, etc.

² Civilem enim Sanctæ Sedis principatum ceu quiddam necessarium ac providente Deo manifeste institutum agnoscimus, nec declarare dubitamus, fu presenti rerum humanarum statu, ipsum hunc principatum civilem pro bono ac libero Ecclesiæ animarumque regimine omnino requiri.

III. STATEMENT OF THE PROBLEM

8. We are now concerned with the task of reconciling this duty of Catholics with certain principles of modern and particularly of American public law.

We divide the objection into two parts, according to the two principles upon which it rests: *The people are sovereign*; and *Salus publica suprema lex*—private interest must be subordinated to the public good.

We must first agree on the terms we are to use. The harmony between the right of the pope to independence and the right of the people to self-government does not mean that the pope has a right to be the temporal ruler of Rome independently of the consent of the Roman people, and that at the same time the Roman people has actually a right to choose its own ruler.

Nor shall we prove that the temporal power is in harmony with republican principles in this sense, that the pope's right to monarchical government does not exclude the right of the Roman people to proclaim the republic.

We shall not strive to reconcile contradictions. The school of Fichte itself would find it difficult to do so; and surely no American principle demands it.

If two rights are contradictory, then one of them is no right, or, at least, one of them ceases to be a right because of this contradiction.

Our task is to prove that we give "reasonable service" to our Church and to our country.

Giving a reason for the liberty of thought and conscience guaranteed by our Constitution, we shall prove that as philosophers we admit, *in abstracto*, not only the republican principle, but also in a true sense a sovereignty of the people.

Giving a reason for our patriotism, we have only to prove that the Catholic view of the Roman question does not hinder us from being wholly and sincerely attached to our Constitution and from obeying the laws of our country. Freely giving a reason for the faith that is in us, we shall prove that neither the republican principle nor the right of the people to self-government has anything to do with the right of the pope to independence; in a word, that this right does not fall under any such principle.

The following words of Brownson are to the point: "Liberty is never to be understood as exemption from all restraints, nor from all restraints but those which are self-imposed, which are no restraints at all. . . . There is a strong tendency, and, I hold, a dangerous tendency, among us . . . to extol and defer to the alleged wisdom and good sense of the mass. . . . The genuine people, if their voice could really be heard, would be loud and earnest in condemnation of this tendency. . . . In the name of science, of knowledge, of wisdom, of virtue, of the people, . . . I for one solemnly protest against this servility to the mass, a servility to which a man never submits in good faith nor for

honest purposes. . . . Let us, then, cease our adulation of the mass, cease our insane efforts to adapt everything to the apprehension of the mass, to gauge the amount of truth we may tell by the amount the multitude can take in; and do our best to gain all truth, to nourish and invigorate ourselves for wisely-directed and long-continued efforts for the elevation of all men."

IV. INDIRECT ANSWER

9. We answer first: The objection is inadmissible in respect to the supreme authority of the Church, and doubly inadmissible because it views a Catholic question from an exclusively national standpoint. We will not pass over this reply, because we desire to define our position openly and without any equivocation. It is a distinguishing characteristic of Catholicity that both in doctrinal and practical teachings it is most logical. Every attempt to weaken the principle of authority on which it rests is objectively uncatholic and subjectively very dangerous for genuine Catholic sentiment.

We owe the pope a perfect, undivided, and absolute obedience in religious matters, not a *simulacrum obedientie*, which is contrary to the very nature of the virtue, as Leo XIII. remarks in the

¹ Works of O. Brownson, vol. xv. p. 299 *seqq.* A careful study of the articles, "Origin and Ground of Government," "Demagogism," and "National Greatness," would answer the objection we are considering.

We use the words "self-government" and "sovereignty of the people," although they cannot be strictly taken in their literal meaning. Their true sense will be made clear as we proceed. Let us also note that "republican principle" and "the right of self-government" are very different things; the one does not imply the other.

encyclical "Sapientiæ Christianæ." But the Roman question is a religious one, because intimately connected with the independence of the head of the Church ; and the pope has declared in unmistakable terms how every faithful child of the Church must consider the question and shape his practical conduct in accordance therewith.

10. Whether the pope is acquainted with our objections or not is of no importance whatever. As supreme ruler of the Church, in his judgments and commands he is in no way dependent on our assent. We have not only to believe all that he as the infallible teacher of the Church defines to be of faith ; we must also obey him when as ruler of the Church he prescribes matters governing our practical conduct.

To act otherwise would be to make our individual views the rule of our actions ; it would be to follow our own mind and not that of the Church, which the pope represents juridically, i.e., possessing the plenitude of all ecclesiastical power. *Si quæ vult tenet, et quæ non vult non tenet, non iam inhæret Ecclesie . . . sed propriæ voluntati*, as Leo XIII. says in the same encyclical, following St. Thomas.

Therefore we might simply reply to our opponents : We do not need to enter into your theories respecting the sovereignty of the people, etc.; you owe the head of the Church the same childlike obedience as a simple peasant who has perhaps never heard anything of your philosophico-political principles, or, if he did, would not understand them. This is the true Catholic position, as it was taught

by the divine Founder of the Church Himself, who has built it on Peter and on Peter alone.

11. In our religious duties we are not to look to nationalism as our guide, but to the Church's authority. As a matter of fact we know full well that the faithful performance of our duties as citizens of the United States does not bring us into conflict with any doctrinal or moral teaching of the Catholic religion. As Catholics, and precisely because we are Catholics, we should not allow any one to surpass us in that respect. But the objection supposes the opposite, which will explain our categorical answer.

If every nation of the world asserted its national standpoint as a condition *sine qua non* of its obedience to the pope, what would be the result? Have they not all the same right to hold their national traditions, customs, and regulations as we Americans? The Church, like a loving and just mother, always respects national peculiarities and all just claims founded on them. In this the Church gives us an example worthy of imitation. But just as she unites all in the unity of faith, she also desires all to be one in obedience to her visible head. *Ecclesia nationum, non vero nationalis!* This is the motto of the Catholic Church, which is contained in the apostolic dictum: "There is neither Jew nor Greek, there is neither bond nor free, there is neither male nor female; for you are all one in Christ Jesus."¹ Moreover history shows by sad examples to what

¹ Galatians III. 28.

an uncatholic result nationalism leads. Photius brought about the most terrible schism in the name of Greek sentiment against the Latins ; Luther disguised his apostasy by publishing in 1516 a " German theology " against " Romanism " ; Gallicanism sought a support in the so-called " traditions of the Church of France " ; Döllinger's lamentable desertion was already sealed when he set in 1863 the " German science " in opposition to the " Roman school." In short, all spurning of the authority of the Holy See must inevitably strengthen the hands of those whose battle-cry has ever been : Away from Rome ! All nationalizing in Catholic questions has at all times weakened the true Catholic spirit, made room for a diluted and vapid Catholicism, and prepared the way to that ugliest excrescence of nationalism which is known in some countries as " State Catholicism."

V. THE SOVEREIGNTY OF THE PEOPLE

12. Now let us attempt a *direct* answer and a complete solution. Our opponents say : " We have positive reasons to reserve our judgment on the Roman question. For, as Americans, we recognize the principle of popular sovereignty ; it is the ground-work of the Constitution of the United States, the support of our public and political life. But now, did not the Italian, or at least the Roman, people desire the fall of the temporal power of the pope ? Is it not a contradiction, then, for us to extol the sovereign will of the people of this country

and at the same time to approve of the restoration of the territorial independence of the pope? Is that not virtually to deny the sovereignty of another people?"

13. We ask, has popular sovereignty any place *in the Church*? The answer of Catholic doctrine is *No*. To enter deeply into a confirmation of this answer here would be out of place, but a concise explanation is necessary to illustrate the religious aspect of our question.

The Church is an institution essentially supernatural, to which all men, by the decree of God, must look for salvation. The Incarnate Son of God founded it immediately and in His own person, and gave it that authority which was to bring about that happy and blessed union here below whose highest ideal and archetype is in heaven, "that they all may be one as Thou, Father, in Me and I in Thee." But more than this. The divine Founder of the Church not only defined the spiritual power His Church was to exercise for that end, but He also designated in particular who were to exercise it. Upon St. Peter and his successors He bestowed the plenitude of pastoral power; to the successors of the other apostles—the bishops—He entrusted the direction of particular churches "in which the Holy Ghost had placed them." Every pope receives immediately from Christ the entire apostolic authority with which Peter, the first pope, was endowed. This authority is, therefore, neither in its origin nor in its exercise, dependent on the approbation of the Church, the bishops, priests, or

laity. The episcopacy, no less than the papacy, is of divine institution; it is an essential institution of the Church. Nevertheless it remains true that only one rules the whole Church; that only one possesses the fulness of power; that all others are subject to him; that he can judge all, but cannot be judged by any one; that he is the centre of unity about which all must gather to be partakers of the kingdom of God.

The constitution of the Church is, therefore, truly monarchical, though tempered to a certain extent with the aristocracy of the divinely instituted episcopacy, but not mixed with it. The rest of the faithful are the *ecclesia discens*. The authority of the Church does not proceed from them, nor does it depend on them, either immediately or mediately. Still, all the offices of the Church, the highest included, are within the reach of the humblest of its members. In this sense, and only in this sense, can we speak of a democratic element in the constitution of the Church.

Efforts to introduce the principle of popular sovereignty into the Church have not been wanting. The court theologian of Louis the Bavarian, Marsilius Patavinus, inaugurated the movement in the thirteenth century. He claimed that, according to the will of Christ, all ecclesiastical power is vested in the people. Gerson and Peter D'Ailly enunciated similar principles during the Great Schism of the West. The apostate, Mark Anthony de Dominis, sought to spread them in the seventeenth century. From his works the Gallicans, especially Richer,

drew their arguments; Jansenism, Febronianism and Josephism had recourse to the same theological arsenal for their weapons. At the time of the Vatican Council Döllinger renewed this theory, inasmuch as he claimed that the bishops at the Council are only mandataries of the people. The clear decisions of this Council dealt the death-blow to all these attempts. If, in spite of this, Catholics dare to assert, or write, that "the Church desires a non-Italian pope, who will grant the people a greater share in the government of the Church," we can only say that such an assertion is the untheological offspring of a narrow-minded nationalism.

Protestantism, to be consistent with its denial of the ecclesiastical principle of authority, was forced to place all ecclesiastical power in the hands of the people. It rejected the divine origin of the ecclesiastical hierarchy, transferred all power to the congregations, and degraded the "ministers of the word" to mere representatives of the people. Secular princes, whose aid could not be dispensed with, were made the highest representatives of the community. This was practically to convert the sovereignty of the people with regard to ecclesiastical matters into Cæsaro-papism.

14. We have now to consider the sovereignty of the people from a political, and especially from an American, standpoint. Is it a general principle? Is it an American principle, and in what sense?

Popular sovereignty can be understood to mean that the ultimate ground and original source of all

authority is the common consent of all ; the will of the people, and not God, of whom all paternity, all authority, is named in heaven and earth.¹ This principle is totally false, or rather no principle at all. Precisely in this sense did Hobbes and Rousseau, the founders of this modern theory, put forth their doctrine ; each one adding a shade of coloring of his own. Their set purpose, in asserting the sovereignty of the people, was to separate and estrange society from any and every relation to a personal God—to establish the State without God. Though it does not always openly avow it, Liberalism employs this principle in the sense of the *contrat social*, and for a like purpose. This theory of popular sovereignty renders it an immense service ; for it is a fruitful source whence are derived the means of furthering its plans, and legalizing State-absolutism. We are not to regard the sovereign power of the people in this atheistico-materialistic sense.

Anarchists and socialists openly declare that the sovereignty of the people is to be so understood, and that they intend to carry out their plans on that principle as soon as they have a majority in the legislative bodies.

The cynical saying of Bebel, *Ja gäbe es einen Gott, dann wären wir geleimt*—"If there were a God, we would be trapped"—leaves no room for conjecture on that head.

In Rousseau's system the source of all right is

¹ Ephesians iii. 15.

the people, i.e., the majority of those who call themselves the people's representatives, or the State, the government of which is determined by the people. In its political enactments, this sovereign people recognizes no divine or natural law—no inborn or acquired right. Whatever is legal is, according to this theory, allowable and good. Every change of government, every revolution, is *ipso facto* justifiable when it is accomplished by the people, or in their name. *Quod populo placuit legis habet vigorem*—The will of the people has the force of law—under all circumstances.

Shall we, can we, as Christians and as citizens, defend our position on any political question with this notion of popular sovereignty? No; never. That would mean, in other words: To be a good American citizen, one must tread under foot, at least theoretically, the rights of God and man; or, the American citizen as such is a revolutionist against any and every authority above his own! In the name of all that we hold sacred in our religion, in the name of our patriotism, we decline to defend our position on the Roman question, or on any other political or politico-religious question, against the representatives of that principle, whether they call themselves socialists or not. We can come to no understanding with materialism, or make any concessions to it. We are a Christian people. We despise a Robespierre who, in the name of the people, wished to do away with the existence of God by an enactment of the State; we have just as little in common with modern political deists, who are

striving to place Almighty God on the retired list with a pension.

On political events, then, such as the overthrow of an existing government, we pass judgment according to the divine and natural law; according to the eternal principles of justice which worldly power may thrust aside and despise, but which it can never subvert or destroy. Our only question, therefore, can be the following:

Is it not a principle of natural law that God, the fountain-head of all authority, has placed political authority in the hands of the people, and that all government, whether monarchical or democratic, derives its authority directly from them?

Any one has a perfect right to hold this doctrine, and we do not oppose it ourselves. Most Christian philosophers and theologians have been and still are of the opinion that the popular consent is the proximate basis of civil society, and that the civil power as held by particular persons comes only mediately from God but immediately from the people. But it cannot be laid down as an unquestionable philosophical principle of the natural law. It is at most but an opinion, even though it be a very probable one. There are many acknowledged authorities who do not even recognize the sovereignty of the people to be a principle in that sense, but defend the opinion that the will of the people only designates the bearer of public authority, while God Himself confers on him immediately the power to rule. It would be preposterous to deny this fact, and not at all courteous to assert that the

defenders of the last opinion have no good reason for it, and that the opposite must be perfectly obvious at first glance to all.¹ Moreover, it is well to remark that those who hold to the more democratic opinion do not concede to the people the right on the plea of popular sovereignty to violently rid themselves of a lawfully constituted government which has lost favor in its eyes. This would be to sanction revolution indiscriminately, as Rousseau has done. They likewise admit that there may be other legitimate titles to the exercise of supreme civil authority, as there have been at all times and are to this day.

As Catholics, we are entirely free to embrace either one of these two opinions. The Church has defined nothing in this matter. She has been content, at all times, to confront revolutionary machinations with the apostolic doctrine (on that account none the less evident to reason) that God, the author of nature, created man a social being and therefore willed that authority without which a well-ordered society of free agents cannot be conceived. Therefore, all civil authority is mediately from God. In very truth, then, do the bearers of it reign by the grace of God.

When a people determines to adopt a constitution it can, most assuredly, without detriment to the

¹ The authorities for both opinions are cited in the works of Costa-Rossetti, S.J., who strenuously defends the first: *Philosophia Moralis*, p. 598, *seqq.*; *Philosophisches Jahrbuch*, 1888-90; *Die Staatslehre der Christlichen Philosophie*. St. Thomas treats this question, q. 2, 9, 10, a. 10; q. 12, a. 2; q. 106, a. 1; q. 90, a. 3; q. 92, a. 3. One of the most ardent and profound advocates of the rights of the people is Suarez, *Defensio Fidei*, l. 3, c. 2; *De Legibus*, l. 3, c. 4. See also Brownson's *Origin and Ground of Government*.

natural law, choose a democratic as properly as a monarchical form of government. It can positively declare through its representatives that in the government about to be established the supreme authority, divinely ordained, actually proceeds from the people; and that their representatives are only to exercise it as their delegates. In such a State or society the theory of popular sovereignty has the effect of a fundamental law, by which every loyal citizen must abide; which he is to look to for the preservation of his civil and political rights, and which accordingly must guide him in the performance of his duties. Thereupon the representatives of the people may declare: We accept the democratic theory as the principle of the government under which we are going to live. A parliament with a thousand members could not do more than this. It is beyond its competency to change a question of natural and public law into a general principle which shall be universally binding. And if in our day the theory of popular sovereignty has been recognized in most States and has passed into current public law, it is significant of nothing but that modern governments have accepted it as the groundwork of their constitution. This is precisely the case in our glorious Republic. With us the sovereignty of the people is at the bottom of all civic obligation. Indeed, nowhere do we see it exercised so liberally. But the framers of our Constitution, who were by no means hostile to the interests of religion, did not dream of approving the theory of

popular sovereignty in the atheistical sense of a Rousseau. Just as little did they wish to decide the abstract question about the origin of civil authority. Considering the peculiar condition in which our people lived, they simply looked upon a constitution founded on the sovereign will of the people as the best for our country.

From what has been said we draw a twofold conclusion. In the first place, we, as citizens of the United States, have an indisputable right to hold popular sovereignty in the highest esteem; to proclaim aloud that it is the best system of government for the American people, because it accords best with our character and the traditions of our country. But, on the other hand, it would be most ridiculous for us to maintain that we had thereby established a principle which is binding for all time and must be accepted by all nations. With precisely the same right might another system be adopted elsewhere, which might meet equally well the desires and be practically as well adapted to the necessities of that country as our system is to us. Did we attempt to impose our political views on other peoples, whose character and wants may be totally unlike ours, we would be untrue to our American sense of liberty. No. A true American is proof against the madness of Chauvinism. God forbid that this foreigner should ever be naturalized here!

The whole matter may be summed up as follows:

There is no popular self-government in the Catholic Church.

No Christian can defend the right of the people to self-government in the sense of Rousseau's theory.

Any Catholic may defend as true the opinion that civil authority comes immediately from the people and mediately from God.

Every Catholic of the United States can, like any other citizen, acknowledge the right of self-government guaranteed by the Constitution, and his religious principles need not suffer in the least. He may also consider this system as the best one for this country. He may also advocate that it be introduced into all countries for which it is suitable. Finally, he, like every other citizen, has the obligation to render obedience to the government established according to the principles of the Constitution.

Now, it may be asked, does all this remain true, if we judge the Roman Question as the pope does? if we not only desire the restoration of the temporal power, but also defend it?

Yes, even in this case, it all remains true. Nor do we contradict in any way our political views, or act contrary to our civil duties. If we Catholics acted otherwise we would be illogical and disloyal to our religious convictions.

15. Let us consider in the first place the *national standpoint*. As citizens of the United States we must unreservedly acknowledge the Constitution, in the above sense, and fulfil our duties accord-

ingly. The obligation of a good citizen extends no further; it cannot extend further unless the liberty guaranteed by this very Constitution be such only in name. Or is it perhaps American to say: Every nation of the earth *must* be governed according to the same principles? This would be a ridiculous assumption. Is it necessary to pronounce death-sentence on all monarchies in order to be a true republican? This would be a contradiction of the very principle of self-government, which allows a people to transfer the supreme authority to any form of government which it may prefer, monarchical or democratic. Indeed, one can be a good citizen of any State without maintaining its form of government to be absolutely or even relatively the best. If this were not so what would become of liberty of thought? of liberty of science and research? It would be downright tyranny if a government or a people strove thus to fetter free thought.

Must a citizen of the United States approve of every revolution by which governments are overthrown? Such theories would declare revolutions the order of the day! Even the American people, notwithstanding its sovereignty, has no right violently to overthrow the Constitution; it has not even a right to forcibly oust the President or a majority in Congress before their term of office has expired. Thus, though every form of government be an immediately human institution, still from the very nature of the case it is a *permanent mode* of exercising au-

thority, and the people must pay deference to it as such.'

16. Now what must our judgment be on the spoliation of the Papal States by Victor Emmanuel, considering it simply as a *political* event?

Let us first merely glance at the overthrow of the pope's temporal power. The Italian or Roman people as such did not perpetrate that robbery. It was Freemasonry and the Piedmontese thirst for spoils which committed the outrage. The Roman plebiscite of October 2, 1870, was a mere comedy and can in no way be said to have been the manifestation of the "sovereign will of the people," even if we allowed that the subjects of the pope were sovereign. At present, however, we only wish to lay stress on the ground of principle. We therefore say: the pope is as legitimately and rightfully the sovereign of the Papal States as any monarch or executive ruler the whole world over. The legitimate form of government in his kingdom was always a purely monarchical one. Therefore the temporal power could not be set aside upon the plea of popular sovereignty—not by the Romans and much less by

¹ We utterly deny the right of revolution, or the right to resist for any purpose whatever, legitimate government in the legal discharge of its functions. We repeat, then, that the right of rebellion and revolution on the part of the people is no right at all. The people can never have the right to act, save through the forms prescribed by the supreme authority. (Brownson's *Works*, xv. p. 338.) The people of the United States and of the several States can amend the Constitution, but only constitutionally, through the government. The notion which has latterly gained some vogue, that there persists always a sovereign people back of the government or constitution or organic people, competent to alter, change, modify, or overturn the existing government at will, is purely revolutionary, fatal to all state government, to all political authority, to the peace and order of society, and to all security for liberty either public or private. (*Id.*, vol. xviii. p. 431.)

other Italians—except by the violation of justice and fidelity.

But it will be asked: Has not the spoliation of Rome been at least approved as a *fait accompli* by the other powers? History answers *No!*

From the point of view of the law of nations, the occupation by force of arms of the pontifical territory by Italy is a conquest which is devoid of international sanction, and which is justified neither by the necessity of legitimate defence nor by the exigency of repression.

The papacy has never committed upon its neighbor any act of aggression which could authorize a defensive war involving as its fatal result the confiscation of the territory of the assailant. Besides, this taking possession has not been regularized by any treaty stipulating the renunciation of ownership in favor of the possessor, or by the general consent of the political community of nations. Yet in 1815 the treaty of Vienna sanctioned anew the temporal sovereignty of the popes, after the spoliation of Napoleon I., and thus the fate of the papacy, closely bound up with the fate of the European equilibrium, finds itself equally under the ægis of the general treaties which form the international code.

The recognition of the title of King of Italy, no more than the transfer of the foreign ministers to the new capital, implied the sanction of the dispossession of the papacy. For no one is ignorant that this double act was accompanied by express declarations and formal reservations which left no

doubt of the intention of the powers not to prejudge the situation.¹

It is certainly very regrettable, as the Marquis de la Vega de Armijo has said, that the passive attitude of the nations, and particularly of the Catholic nations, has permitted Italy to realize the occupation of Rome. The great war between Prussia and France which arose at the moment will explain to a certain point this apparent indifference, but it can never excuse it entirely. Fouqué might have repeated, in the presence of this sad spectacle: "It is more than a crime, it is a blunder." But it is equally necessary to recognize the importance of the following facts, which must never be left out of sight.

The Italian Government, almost to the very eve of the occupation of Rome, had caused the declaration to be made to the powers by the minister of foreign affairs (August 29, 1870) that it would regulate with the Catholic world the conditions of the transformation of the pontifical power. The representatives of the powers, on being officially acquainted with this declaration, signified to the Italian Government that their governments would not consider the occupation of Rome as a final solution of the Roman question, and reminded it of its duty to "effectually guarantee" the perfect spiritual independence of the head of the Catholic religion and the entire personal liberty of the

¹ See "*Lettre de Léon XIII. au Cardinal Rampolla*," by T. D. F. T., Bruxelles, Vennekens, pp. 41, 43.

pope.¹ Thereupon the minister Visconti Venosta declared to the Chamber: "Italy assumes with confidence, in the face of Europe and of Christendom, the responsibility of protecting the Holy See;" and still more: "The sovereignty of the pope bears the seal of the ages, and is recognized by the powers, either by solemn treaties or by diplomatic relations which they maintain with it;"² and again: "The Roman question concerns all the nations; it is 'more than international.'"³ The Senator Cadorna, president of the council of state, recognized in 1871 that the final rearrangement of the Roman question was for Italy an "international obligation," and that "the absolute necessity of an effective liberty for the pope created a right for all Catholics and for all their respective governments."⁴

On the other hand, the powers have never recognized the "Law of Guarantees" as a sufficient assurance of the independence of the Holy Father; eight years after the invasion of Rome, the Italian government took the risk of soliciting before the tribunal of Europe, at the Congress of Berlin, 1878, a diplomatic ratification of the *fait accompli*. The powers responded by a categorical refusal.

The attitude of the same powers has been

¹ See the declaration made by Bismarck, October 8, 1870; by M. Jules Favre, in the name of the French Government, September 6, 1870; and the reports in which the ministers to Italy of the various governments express the sentiments of the latter: notably the reports of Mr. Minghetti, minister at Vienna (December 10, 1870), of Mr. Barral, minister at Brussels (September 12, 1870), of Mr. Melegari, minister at Berne (September 6, 1870), and of Mr. Cadorna, minister at London.

² April 21, 1871.

³ April 22, 1871.

⁴ See Vaughan, chap. iv.; Vennekens, chap. ii.

entirely different towards other Italian sovereigns despoiled of their territories, such as the dukes of Modena, Parma, and Florence, and the king of Naples, with whom all diplomatic relations were broken off immediately after the annexation of their states to the new kingdom.

We have not here to examine the question whether the annexation of other Italian territories was legitimate, or if it was at least legitimized by the consent and the well-being of the people. But in treating the Roman question solely from the political point of view, and particularly from the point of view of the law of nations, we observe that the powers have not wished to tie their hands in presence of the "accomplished facts" at Rome, and that in their eyes and in the eyes of the Italian Government itself the Roman question has an altogether special and unique character, a character truly international. All recognize accordingly the perfect exactitude of the words of Leo XIII.:

This principality has a sacred character, which is peculiar to it, and shared with no other state, because upon it depends the security and stability of the liberty of the Apostolic See in the exercise of its sublime and important functions.¹

The interior reason of this fact is the intimate connection which the temporal power of the popes has with their spiritual power, as we shall see more clearly still as we now go on to

¹ *In quo quidem principatu . . . inest similitudo et forma quedam sacra, sibi propria, nec cum ulla republica communis, propterea quod securam et stabilem continet Apostolicæ Sedis in exercendo augusto et maximo suo munere libertatem.* (Allocution, May 24, 1884.)

give expression to our Catholic convictions on this question by considering its *religious aspect*.

17. The dearest of all the liberties which our Constitution permits us to enjoy is liberty of conscience, the freedom to openly profess our religious faith and practise it by fulfilling the duties which it enjoins upon us.

As Catholics we believe that the successor of St. Peter is divinely appointed by God to rule the entire Church, independently of any earthly power; and that all Catholics owe him unqualified obedience. Furthermore, we believe that the bishop of Rome and he alone is the successor of St. Peter. Our faith then teaches us that the bishop of Rome ought by divine right to rule the Church with freedom and independence, and that we owe him childlike submission. It is therefore the will of God that the freedom of the pope be secure in Rome, in order that he may be truly independent in leading the whole flock of Christ.

This conclusion no Catholic can deny without serious detriment to the dogma of the primacy of the bishop of Rome. The following conclusion is just as certain: Against the will of God there is no sovereignty upon earth, whether it be that of a Cæsar, of a people, or of all people taken together.

The Holy Father indicates clearly this difference in the encyclical which he has just addressed to the bishops of France (February 16, 1892):

Whatever be the form of government of a nation, it cannot be considered as so definitive that it should remain immutable. The Church of Jesus Christ alone has been able to preserve and

will surely preserve unto the end of time its form of government. And, far from needing to change its essential constitution, *it has not even the power to renounce the conditions of true liberty and of sovereign independence* with which Providence in the general interest of souls has endowed it.

But in regard to purely human societies, it is a fact engraven a hundred times in history that time, that great transformer of everything here below, operates profound changes in their political constitutions.

Hence, no Catholic can ever approve of any act or condition of things by which the pope is bereft of perfect liberty.

Illa autem, quæ sursum est Jerusalem, libera est, quæ est mater nostra! "Free she must be, that Jerusalem which is our Mother!"¹ *Itaque fratres, non sumus ancillæ filii, sed liberæ, qua libertate Christus nos liberavit!* "We are not the children of a slave, but of a mother who is freeborn." We claim for her that freedom which Christ our Lord purchased for her.² These grand words come to the mind of a Catholic when he raises his eyes and looks aloft to the Roman Church, the mother and teacher of all the churches of the globe. The Lamentations of Jeremias are inadequate to give expression to his sorrow, when this Jerusalem, "the Ruler of nations," "the Queen of the Provinces," is robbed of her freedom.

The Roman Church then must be free in the person of her bishop, the head of the Church. But if the pope has received from God the right to exercise his sublime office most fully and without

¹ Galatians iv. 26.

² Gal. ii.

molestation, he is thereby entitled also to the means necessary for the perfecting of that liberty, and has a right to determine and demand them.

Accepting, then, the doctrine of the primacy, (a) common-sense must tell every one that the pope is truly free in Rome when he is in no way subject there to another, or dependent upon another; and that this independence has its surest guarantee, and is most effectually secure against every extraneous influence, when the pope himself is likewise the temporal ruler of Rome.

If we consult (b) history, we find that the popes ever since the division of the Roman Empire have possessed a certain political power in Rome, which for the past eleven centuries has been of a truly regal character.

Now (c) the Christian concept of the Church and of divine Providence tells us that God, "Who loves nothing dearer than the freedom of His Church,"¹ thus shaped events that the freedom of the head of the Church should be made secure by his temporal power—"singulari scilicet prorsus divinæ Providentiæ consilio factum est, ut Romano Imperio in plura regna variasque ditiones diviso, Romanus Pontifex . . . civilem principatum haberet."²

Furthermore (d) the events of the last twenty years sadly but unmistakably prove that the pope is no longer free to exercise his office in Rome in a manner becoming its importance and dignity since

¹ St. Bernard.

² Pius IX., Allocution "Quibus quantisque," April 20, 1849; Leo XIII., letter to Card. Rampolla.

Victor Emmanuel forcibly entered by the Porta Pia and took possession of Rome as king of Italy; for the pope, in spite of all guarantees, is completely dependent upon government measures and the whims of ministers, the chambers of Parliament, and the rabble.

Lastly, (e) we know from the clear and positive utterances of the popes themselves "that the temporal power of the pope is necessary at present in order that he may, freely and independently of any power or secular prince, rule and guide the entire Church."¹

The last reason alone would be more than sufficient. The pope is the competent judge in this question; every Catholic must accept humbly his declaration. But we add, and Pius IX. emphasized it in the allocution quoted above, that the episcopacy of the whole world more than once has repeated these same declarations of the head of the Church.

It is not incumbent upon Catholics, therefore, to defend the temporal power because the pope was the legitimate prince of Rome, who was unjustifiably and violently despoiled of his temporal possessions. No, the real and true reason is a deeper one. They defend the liberty of the pope because he is pope, i.e., because he has been lawfully constituted the head of the Church by Jesus Christ. It is a question, therefore, of defending that liberty and independence to which the divine

¹ Pius IX., Allocution, "Maxima quidem," June 9, 1863; Leo XIII., l. c.

Founder of the Church has given His representative an inalienable right. In defending his own rights he is defending our rights as Catholics. The means to preserve intact this freedom is the temporal dominion. Therefore we conclude that just as no power on earth has the slightest right to destroy the freedom of the Sovereign Pontiff, which God wills, so also no emperor or king or people has any right whatever to deprive the pope of the temporal power which he needs and must have in order to govern the Church with the freedom willed by Christ. The sovereign freedom of the successor of St. Peter is to-day necessarily conditioned by his temporal sovereignty ; therefore the latter, through the former, is rendered sacred and inviolable, and *to attack it is to assail Christ Himself in the person of His representative.*

Victor Emmanuel had accordingly no more right to deprive the pope of the Papal States than had Napoleon I. The occupation of Rome will always be a sacrilege no matter by what people it is effected. We say a *sacrilege*, for such in very truth it is, being "a sin against the immunity of a sacred place;" and as prescription has no force in sacred things and against ecclesiastical rights, the spoliation of Rome cannot be legalized by any title whatever. Hence the Constitution "Apostolicæ Sedis" places the ban of excommunication (*speciali modo Romano Pontifici reservata*) upon "all who either themselves or through others invade, destroy or retain the cities, lands, places or rights belonging to the Roman Church, or who usurp, disturb or retain the su-

preme jurisdiction therein; also on all who give help, counsel or favor to any of the acts aforesaid.”¹ Is not this excommunication of itself sufficiently expressive for every Catholic, who knows that it is the severest ecclesiastical punishment, and always presupposes grave sin? Can there be any law or principle to justify that sin? Knowing this, must not every Catholic openly condemn the invasion and retention? Unless he does so he is in direct opposition to the pope and to himself, and solicitude for the maintenance of a so-called political or national principle would lead to the denial of an undeniable Catholic principle.

A remark of St. Thomas on a similar subject may appropriately illustrate these deductions. The Angelical Doctor, along with the majority of mediæval theologians, defends, as is well known, the opinion that civil authority proceeds immediately from the people. In treating of the laws and customs of the Old Testament he makes the objection: “With the Jews the election of rulers was not sufficiently provided for, since no direction had been given to the people in this regard.” He replies as follows: “That people was governed under the special care of God; whence it is said (Deut. vii. 6.): ‘The Lord thy God has chosen thee to be His peculiar people;’ therefore the Lord did not commit the election of the supreme ruler, the choice of the king, to the people, but reserved it to Himself, as

¹ *Invadentes, destruentes, detinentes vel per se vel per alios civitates, terras, loca, aut iura ad Ecclesiam Romanam pertinentes, vel usurpantes, perturbantes, retinentes supremam iurisdictionem in eis nec non ad singula prædicta, auxilium, consilium, favorem præbentes.* (I. 12.)

is clear from Deut. xvii. 15: 'Thou shalt set him king whom the Lord thy God shall choose.'"¹

Hence according to Aquinas there could be no question about the election of a ruler—the exercise of the sovereignty of the people in the proper sense of the term—because there can be no right of the people against the ordinances of God. Now, reasoning from analogy, we say God provides in a special manner for His "peculiar people," the Holy Catholic Church, and in her, more especially, for the Roman Church, whose bishop by His express command was to be the successor of St. Peter and the head of the Church. By the special providence of God it came about that the temporal sovereignty also over Rome was given to the successors of St. Peter, in order that they might exercise freely and independently their sublime office. Hence with regard to the Roman people it is true that since they are the objects of God's special providence, He has not committed to them the election of a ruler, but has reserved to Himself, i.e., to His Church, the right to determine by the election of the pope the person who is to be the king of Rome.

It is our duty to speak plainly and forcibly. The religious aspect of the Roman question is for us the most important. Our non-catholic fellow-citizens will not recognize this argument as the

¹ Ad primum ergo dicendum, quod populus ille sub speciali cura Dei regebatur: unde dicitur (Deut. vii. 6.): Te elegit dominus Deus tuus ut sis ei populus peculiaris. Et ideo institutionem summi principis . . . electionem regis non commisit Dominus populo, sed sibi reservavit, ut patet Deut. xvii. 15: Eum constitues regem quem Dominus Deus tuus elegerit. (1. 2. q. 105, a. 1.)

only true one, because they reject the religious principles on which it is grounded. They deny moreover the spiritual sovereignty of the pope; hence, *a fortiori*, his right to independence. But they cannot gainsay our right to remain true and loyal to our religious principles. Do we Catholics enjoy only a partial and imperfect liberty of conscience? They cannot but respect consistency; and shameful compromise and cowardly faint-heartedness will surely not gain their esteem. Let us cling therefore, above all, to the great American principle that we are free citizens and esteem religious liberty above all else. Let us proclaim clearly and positively that as Americans we hold firmly to our Constitution, to the right of self-government and to republican principles, and believe that in general civil authority comes only mediately from God and immediately from the people; but we maintain that there may be other legitimate titles to such authority. We have neither the right nor the intention of imposing our views upon others. Just as it is not contradictory to our republican principles that monarchies exist elsewhere, so also we cannot reject *a priori* a constitution that does not recognize the sovereignty of the people. In any case, not even the most sovereign people in the world can have a right to violate the ordinances of God! But we Catholics behold in the papacy an immediate institution of God, and in the temporal power the necessary condition of the divinely-ordained freedom of the pope. Therefore no right in the world, not even the right of self-government, can be appealed

to against that freedom ; and we may apply to the Roman question : “ Quod Deus coniunxit homo non separet ” — “ What God hath joined let not man put asunder ! ”

18. We will conclude this part of our argument with the words of Brownson, who was always proud of being an American citizen, and whom all Americans claim as their own : “ It is enough to say that the pope never was a subject of any temporal prince, and never can be. He represents Him Who is King of kings and Lord of lords. He is above all earthly monarchs, by the law of Christ ; . . . the status of prince belongs to him by right of his office as vicar of Christ, for by that office he is declared independent, and clothed with plenary authority to govern all men and nations in all things relating to salvation.”¹ “ The Roman or ecclesiastical state was a donation to the Holy See or to the Church of Rome. Gifts to the Church are gifts to God, and when made are the property, under Him, of the spirituality, which by no laws, heathen, Jewish, or Christian, can be deprived of their possession or use without sacrilege. They are sacred to religious uses, and can no longer, without the consent of the spirituality, be diverted to temporal uses without adding sacrilege to robbery. Whoso attacks the spirituality attacks God. The temporal power of the pope is therefore not within the category of any earthly human government, but is the property of the spirituality. Victor Emmanuel, in

¹ See vol. xli, *Pope and Emperor*, p. 456.

despoiling the pope, has usurped Church property, property given to God and sacred to religious uses. The deed, which our eminent jurists and Protestant divines sympathize with and applaud, strikes a blow at the spirituality, at the sacredness of all Church property, of Protestant churches as well as Catholic churches—at the sacredness of all eleemosynary gifts and asserts the right of power when strong enough to divert them from the purposes of the donors. . . . Are they [the Protestant divines] so intent on crushing the papacy that they are quite willing to cut their own throats?"¹

VI. SALUS PUBLICA SUPREMA LEX

19. We cheerfully admit this principle. It does not militate against the re-establishment of the temporal power, but is rather a confirmation of its usefulness and necessity. It shows both in a brighter and clearer light. Let us therefore briefly consider its essence and the deductions made from it in the light of Christian jurisprudence and according to the teaching of Christian moralists.

The common good is to be placed above that of the individual; hence duties towards society precede, generally speaking, those towards self. The temporal welfare of the people is the immediate

¹ See vol. xviii, *Sardinia and the Holy Father*, p. 451. This article carries the greater weight with it because it was written in 1871, a year after the spoliation of the Holy See, and in order to refute the arguments of Dr. Thompson and other Protestants who pretended to defend the "sovereignty of the Roman people," saying that the sovereignty of the Roman State "is in the category of all earthly sovereignties."

end of civil society. Government exists not for its own sake but for the people. A change of government or a change in the form of government, brought about by any event whatsoever, may be legitimate, even though effected by unlawful means. It suffices that the former state of affairs has become hurtful or impossible, and that, consequently, the welfare of the entire society requires the subsequent situation to be upheld by all. Even he who does not admit the lawfulness of our War of Independence, or of the Belgian revolution of 1830, must concede that the governments thus established are perfectly legitimate. But if the above conditions do not exist, the members of such a society may tolerate the change of government, but cannot directly lend their aid to confirm or maintain it.

20. If the claims of different societies be compared, precedence must be given, other things being equal, to the highest and most important. Since every society is made up of a number of rational beings united for the attainment of some more or less definite end, it is evident that the dignity of a society depends upon the loftiness of its end and on the number of intelligent beings who are striving for that end. This truth must always be kept in mind when considering civil and religious society, the State and the Church.

The State has for its immediate end the temporal welfare of its subjects; the Church, the eternal welfare of all mankind. Just so far as the importance of eternal salvation exceeds that of temporal happiness, by so much the Church, by divine ap-

pointment the mediator of eternal happiness, must take precedence in dignity over every civil society. There exists therefore a true subordination of the State to the Church. The Church cannot be made subservient to the State, and no transitory temporal considerations can prevent her from using the means necessary for the attainment of her sublime end.

The ecclesiastical as well as the civil power are both supreme in their respective domains; but, though each has its own sphere, they should act conjointly for the welfare of humanity. But the Church, because of her exalted end, is superior to the State, "as the soul is superior to the body, and as the sky is above the earth."¹ "Or should the spirit give place to the flesh, the celestial to the terrestrial?"²

Moreover, the Church surpasses also in excellence the civil organization of any people or nation, because her activities embrace a wider field. Her welfare is the welfare of all her children who are scattered over the entire globe; nay, more: it is that of all men, for whom indeed she was instituted.

This is why, in case of a conflict of jurisdiction between Church and State, e.g., when both claim jurisdiction in the same matter, precedence must be given to the Church. This is no "mediæval theory." It is Catholic teaching, which can be proven by sound reason and which Leo XIII., in union with

¹ St. Chrysostom.

² St. Gregory Naz.

the fathers and theologians, has clearly and distinctly explained.¹

Suppose that the temporal advantages of a nation come in conflict with the welfare of the Church, to which that nation belongs, or hinders the Church in the attainment of her end, then evidently that nation must make its temporal interests subservient to the higher interests of the Church—which is identical with the nation's own higher interests, and with those of the faithful at large.²

These are the conclusions which faith and reason draw from the principle *Salus publica suprema lex*.

21. *The welfare of the whole Church demands the re-establishment of the temporal power.*

The objection brought against this principle when applied to the Roman question may be stated thus, in clear terms :

“Private interests must give way when there is a question of public welfare or of the common good. Now, the welfare of the Romans and Italians, that is, the public welfare of Italy, demands the maintenance of the present political situation of their country ; consequently the pope's temporal power must be permanently abolished. It is therefore his duty to renounce his claims to temporal sovereignty, or at any rate Catholics need not strive to re-establish it.”

¹ Particularly in the encyclicals *Immortale Dei*, *Quod Apostolici Muneris*, *Humanum Genus*, *Diuturnum*. There is no need of citing authors in confirmation of the above-mentioned principles; they may be found in any treatise on Christian Jurisprudence. Cf. especially Cardinal Hergenröther, *Staat und Kirche*, viii., “Die Lehre von der Superiorität der Kirche und ihrer Gewalt über das Zeitliche.”

² On the subject “How the Church, notwithstanding her higher aim, or rather by means of it, promotes the temporal well-being of nations,” cf. Leo XIII., encyclical “*Humanum Genus*.”

The first proposition is true, but it proves just the contrary of what our opponents deduce from it.

Facts show the second proposition to be false; but even granted it to be true, it would prove nothing against us. Hence, in any case, the conclusion is false.

As the temporal welfare must be subordinate to the spiritual, so likewise must the incidental claims of a single nation be subordinate to the demands of the Church and the Catholic world at large. Now the Roman question means the security of a spiritual good, the security of ecclesiastical liberty, through the territorial independence of the head of the Church; a claim most intimately associated with the well-being of the Church and the interests of two hundred millions of Catholics.

Hence *Salus rei-publicæ Christianæ* *suprema lex!*

Rome, therefore, belongs to the Church, to her visible head, and therefore to the whole Catholic world. The Papal States are the incontestable heritage of the common Father of Christendom, "the patrimony of Peter." Romans and Italians would have no right to rob Rome of its essential character, that of the centre of the Church, the capital of the Catholic world, even though their claims were unanimous, and they really did gain a national advantage by despoiling the pope, and subjecting the vicar of Christ to a temporal king.

No, Rome is not a city like any other! It is neither an Italian city nor a modern capital; it is the city of the apostles, and the metropolis of the Christian world. It is the heritage of St. Peter, the

property of the Church Universal, the head and the heart of Christendom.

Italy, therefore, owes it to the Church, to the Catholics of the whole world, as well as to the pope himself, to restore to him that liberty and independence indispensable to the government of the Church, viz., his temporal power.

This is the unbending logic of philosophy, the logic of the ecclesiastical standpoint, the logic of Catholic consciousness.

The following proposition stands out clearly in the light of present events. In order to enjoy sovereign liberty, as the head of the Church, the pope must be a temporal sovereign. Only lately three enemies of the papacy have furnished eloquent commentaries upon the outrageous occurrences of last October—commentaries that must come home forcibly to the blindest adherents of nationalism and modernism. They were the speech of Minister Rudini at Milan; the circular of the Jew Lemmi, the Grand-Master of Italian Free-masonry, to the Italian .∴ Brethren; and the agitation of the demagogue Menotti Garibaldi against the so-called Guarantee Law.

It is true, as some timid persons are fond of saying, that the Church will survive, though days of worse captivity and still greater affliction be in store for the venerable sufferer in the chair of St. Peter. She lived through ages of persecution when almost all her popes reddened the chair of St. Peter with their life's blood and she would live through the same ordeal again, by virtue of the

divine life dwelling within her. But are these the sentiments of a child realizing the sublime dignity of its mother? Is this the language of one who glories in his faith and is proud of being a Catholic? Every true Catholic understands the *non possumus* of the successor of St. Peter in an entirely different sense; and from deep conviction proclaims with him that "the temporal power of the pope is at the present time not only useful but necessary for the liberty of the Church." Necessary, because the Church has not only a right to live, but also the right to live free and unmolested! Necessary, because she has not merely the right to conceal herself in the catacombs, under the surveillance of a questor, by the grace of the State, but she has the right to show her everlastingly youthful, beautiful, and venerable countenance to all people! Because she has not merely the right to pass by the palaces of the mighty in the ragged garb of a poor servant-maid, a beggar imploring a place of shelter, but she has the right to pass majestically through human society, a royal personage with power to command and a gracious blessing for all, a queen adorned with that royal crown which the eternal King placed on her brow when He purchased her upon the cross at the price of His Precious Blood!

22. *The re-establishment of the temporal power a benefit to Italy itself.*

It only remains for us to show in a brief way that in the Roman question it cannot be said that Rome and Italy must sacrifice their temporal advantage for the common good of Christianity. The opposite

is true. We will only mention the following facts :

a. It is not true that the overthrow of the pope's temporal power was the work of the Roman or Italian people, and that the present situation fulfils their desire. We do not mean that the Italians may not be justly reproached for lack of energy in proclaiming their Catholic sentiments. Nevertheless, Leo XIII. gave expression to the truth, when he said, on different occasions, that the great majority of the Italian people faithfully adhered to the Roman See. It was the confirmation of this fact by the grand demonstration of October 1, 1891, in St. Peter's, when, with twenty thousand pilgrims, not less than forty thousand Romans and Italians knelt at the feet of the Sovereign Pontiff, that induced the Grand-Master Lemmi to issue a most violent circular.¹

Apropos of the absurd deception of the plebiscite, says Mgr. Vaughan,² let us hear the Jewish editor of the *Libertà*, Edoardo Arbib. He is assuredly an impartial witness.

"The plebiscites," he says, "were made in the midst of the terror of the Revolution. The government is legal, because it has force to sustain it, but it is certainly not the government desired by the

¹ The well-known liberal deputy, Fazzari, presented the following programme to his constituents: "The reconciliation between the Roman See and our government is the highest need, the most urgent necessity and the sincerest wish of our Fatherland." He was elected to Parliament by an immense majority. Distinguished conservatives wrote to him: "*All Italians feel the truth of your resolution, but few have the courage to declare it openly to the official world.*" Cf. *La Conciliazione tra il Papato e l'Italia*. Florence, 1887.

² Chap. vi.

people. The true Italy, the real Italy, is with the pope, remains with the pope, and hopes in the pope—*è col Papa, sta col Papa, e spera nel Papa.*

“Do you see how the churches overflow and how the ballot-boxes are deserted? How few go to vote! And do you know why? Because they do not believe in you; because you appear to them a transitional government, destined to disappear.”

It cannot be too often repeated that the invasion of Rome is before all and solely a carrying out of plans woven in the anti-Christian and anti-religious sects, whose war-cry is the destruction of Catholicity, and by that means of Christianity, by the annihilation of the spiritual power of the head of the Church. Already in 1856 Cavour declared at the Congress of Paris that he “would bring about the fall of Rome and would shake the edifice to its very foundations.” His plan miscarried at the time, but Mamiani already could say “that an eighth power had sat in the Congress of Paris—it was the Revolution.” Crispi, who has called himself “the First National Conspirator,” “Son of 1789,” has also declared: “Between us and the pope there can be no truce.” According to him and according to Mazzini: “It is the vocation of the Italian people to destroy Catholicism.” Who is the chosen poet of the Italian Revolution? Carducci, the author of the “Hymn to Satan”! And what was the real reason of the apotheosis of the infamous Giordano Bruno and of the grotesque saturnalia celebrated,

with the concurrence of the government, in the city of the popes, if not his unbelief and his ferocious hatred against the Church and the Holy See? The honors rendered to such a man signify, then, that it is necessary to dechristianize the world and drive men to revolt against the authority of the vicar of Christ.¹

b. Far from having promoted the welfare of Italy, the proclamation of Italian unity has caused it to suffer greatly and has well-nigh ruined it. Rome and all Italy are suffering from the *mal di Roma*, the Roman plague, that is, financial embarrassment and poverty, the outcome of the mania for political ascendancy. The straits in which New Italy finds herself plainly verifies the saying of Thiers: "*Qui mange du pape en meurt*"—"He who eats pope dies of it." The Italians, whose sensitiveness in money matters is proverbial, understand the practical application of the well-known adage: *La farina del diavolo va tutta in crusca*—"The devil's meal all turns into bran." Even those who out of inborn cowardice join in the cry *Evviva l'Italia unita* will tell a stranger in a significant and plaintive way: *Si stava meglio quando si stava peggio*—"We fared much better when we were worse off"!

A living proof of what sort of blessings the new kingdom is showering on the population of Italy is the great mass of poverty-stricken Italian emigrants who daily land on our shores.²

¹ See Vaughan, chap., iv.; Vennekens, chap. 1.

² Cf. *La question Romaine au point d' une financier*; Office of the *Osservatore Cattolico*, Milan. E. de Laveleye, in the *Contemporary Review*.

c. National honor and glory! That Providence selected Italy for the seat of the papacy is her fairest fame, her greatest glory. It was the popes who added the most celebrated pages to Italy's history. The glorious traditions of the land, its splendid achievements in the domain of science and the arts, are all to this day most intimately connected with the names of the popes.¹

“Those who appreciate aright the lessons of history and Italian traditions, and do not separate the love of the Church from love of country, will see with us that in union with the papacy lies precisely Italy's most fruitful source of prosperity and greatness.”²

In regard to the cry *Roma, capitale d'Italia!* Massimo d'Azeglio, one of the most skilful politicians of the Garibaldian party, has already said: “All the lofty minds of Italy are convinced that it is impossible to make of Rome the capital of Italy. It is, moreover, no mystery to any one that the Italian government, beginning with the king, do not feel themselves at home there. They do not receive there the visits of sovereigns, and those that they do receive are surrounded with formalities which proclaim loudly that Rome is ‘the natural See of the Roman pontiffs, the centre of the life of the Church, and the capital of the Catholic world;’ and that consequently the true sovereign of the city of the apostles can be no other

¹ Leo XIII. to the Italian bishops, February 15, 1898, and letter to Cardinal Rampolla.

² Leo XIII. to Cardinal Rampolla.

than the august prisoner of the Vatican. On the other hand, according to the unanimous opinion of Italian and foreign statesmen, no city is better situated and better constructed to be the capital of the country than Florence—*Fiorenza la bella*.”¹

d. Even from an international standpoint, Italy's great misfortune is and will be the Roman question. Even without Crispi's notorious declarations, his angry speeches, and his frivolous article in the *North American Review*, it is as clear as daylight to the unbiassed mind that Italy keeps an immense standing army, which consumes millions upon millions, for no other purpose than to guard her spoils against the protestations of the Catholic world. For that very reason the Roman question will always be a question of the day, despite the tricks of diplomacy, until the sacred right of St. Peter's successor is restored to him. Never will the two hundred million children of the pope cease to accuse Italy of the crime committed against their common father, and demand back his freedom. They will be louder in their claims, the longer the head of the Church is kept in prison. The world's legions of soldiery are not able to smother the voice of the pontiffs and deaden the ring of its echo in the hearts of the faithful or prevent its re-echo from their lips.

e. *National unity*. Is there a unity more precious and more strong than religious unity? And would not Italy in living at peace with the pope

¹ See especially Leroy-Beaulieu and de Laveleye.

see that unity powerfully cemented which is the foundation of every other and the source of immense advantages, even in the social order?

And now can there be any question about the lawlessness of a state of affairs which leaves to so many subjects of the usurper no other alternative than to transgress a religious duty and refuse obedience to the Church and the vicar of Christ, or to look upon the Italian kingdom in its present form as the enemy of the Holy See and of the Church? We say Italy in *its present form*; for the union of all under the sway of the king of Piedmont is not at all a necessary condition for the oneness of the nation. Were the popes ever opposed to a federative union of Italy? Did not the united cities of the land in earlier times find precisely in the papacy their most active representative, protector, and defender?

Finally, would not united Italy be powerful enough without having Rome as its capital? Would it not, above all, be a more blissful union? Italian unity is not considered to be destroyed by the independence of the principality of Monaco and the republic of San Marino; it would no more perish by the cession of a territory in which the Sovereign Pontiff would find the guarantee of his spiritual independence.

Furthermore, Leo XIII. has never, as far as we know, raised his voice against such an Italian kingdom as would be compatible with the independence of the Holy See. "He knows very well," says Bishop Vaughan, "he has clearly indicated it, and

we all can see, that Italy would be the most happy and the most really united of countries if she would only be willing to concede a little civil principality to the head of the Church, who lives on its borders, to guarantee his independence.

"This union in peace of the consciences of a Catholic people would be for her not only an immense glory, but a formidable rampart."¹

23. Would it not be a benefit, in the best sense of the word, to all civilized nations, if the popes should again be universally acknowledged and appealed to as the arbitrators in international differences?

But in order that all nations may resort in every instance to such an arbiter and peace-maker with full confidence, he must be entirely independent, a prince himself in his own free right. Who is there who does not pray for such an arbitrator? All, including the enemies of the Church, must admit that there can be no person better qualified for that sacred trust than the pope. Therefore the *salus publica*, the public good of humanity, on this account also, demands his perfect liberty.

We add: The papacy, from a purely human point of view, is the most beneficent of all social institutions. As Leo XIII. remarked in his letter to Cardinal Rampolla, the temporal power has rendered "to Italy and to Europe, even in the political and civil order, most signal services."

The popes have been the soul and the genius of

¹ Chap. II.

the most noble and useful enterprises which are the honor of the human race. Watchful sentinels, they have uttered the cry of alarm at the approach of every social danger, and have always been and are pre-eminently in our day the most solid barrier against the rising tide of socialism and of anarchy.

Moreover, the pope is the most august representative of what forms the basis of civilized society—moral force. He is the incorruptible guardian and the indefatigable and generous defender of the principles whose maintenance is essential to the very existence of society—the principle of authority, paternal and civic, and the principle of justice, private, political, and international. He is, finally, the foremost initiator of all the moral good which operates in the world; he is the vivifying and luminous centre whence go forth continually, like so many rays, encouragement for feebleness and timidity, exhortations for cowardice and apathy, consolation for those who struggle or who suffer, and inspiration for those who ask only a field for action.

It is, then, out of gratitude as well as from an instinct of self-preservation and self-interest that the peoples should guarantee to the popes the possession of a power of which they have made such noble use in the service of universal humanity.

24. *The Papal States and the District of Columbia.*—The relation of the District of Columbia to the United States strikingly resembles the relation of Rome to the Catholic Church. We shall indicate

the line of thought. The Constitution explicitly states that "Congress shall exercise exclusive legislative power in all cases whatever over a district" set apart for the government of the nation.¹ Now, the inhabitants of the District of Columbia are more numerous than those of certain States ; nevertheless they have no representatives in Congress, no right to vote on national issues in the district, not even the right to elect municipal officers. The proximate reason of such a wise measure is the independence of the legislative and ruling power of the United States ; the ultimate reason, the welfare of all the States, of the whole country. Did the decree of 1801 ask the consent of the Washingtonians ? By no means. Are the people of Washington "sovereign" ? Can they change this article of the Constitution, even if its population of two hundred thousand unanimously demanded it ? Not at all. What would be the answer of Congress, of all Americans, to such claims ? Simply this : It is an honor and a privilege for Washington to be the capital of the United States ; but its citizens must sacrifice some political rights exercised by other citizens, because *Salus publica suprema lex!*—the welfare of the whole country demands it!

We say *à pari* and *à fortiori* : According to the divine constitution of the Church, Rome is the centre and capital of the Catholic world, the seat of the government of the Church. Hence the Roman pontiff must have "exclusive legislative power"

¹ Constitution of the United States, art. i, § 8, ¶ 17.

over Rome. Therefore Italy is honored with the highest privilege of divine Providence, but it has at the same time the sacred duty towards all Catholic nations, towards Catholics of the whole world, to sacrifice certain political or national rights, if such there be, in order to insure the complete independence of the pope and thereby the well-being of the whole Catholic Church.¹

VII. WHAT SHOULD BE THE SOLUTION OF THE ROMAN QUESTION.

25. We see that the Roman question exists; that it has not been settled, but always left open. It is not only an Italian question, it is not only a European question, it is an international question, in the fullest sense of the term. Its solution is not

¹ Rev. H. A. Brann, D.D., in his learned pamphlet, *The Schism of the West*, draws the following weighty argument from the necessity of the freedom of papal elections:

"We learn from this schism how dangerous it is to the peace of the Church to permit any secular power to have influence in the Conclave. The election of the pope should be absolutely free so as to forestall excuses for schism. Hence the place of the Conclave should be subject to no prince. The popes should be temporal sovereigns; their territory, be it great or small, absolutely inviolable; and in that territory the Conclave ought to be held. The Schism of the West furnishes arguments for the restoration of the temporal power of the pope. There are some, I know, who dream of a possible spiritual independence of the Papacy, without temporal power. But we ask when or where the popes were absolutely free, *de iure* and *de facto*, except when they were temporal sovereigns. They should be perfectly free *de iure* as well as *de facto*, and this is only possible with the temporal power restored. All the facts of history are against the platonic dream of a spiritual independence of the papacy when it is subject to king, kaiser, or mob. The restoration of the temporal power is therefore a necessary guarantee to the freedom of the Conclave. The attempt of Crispi, the late prime-minister of the king of Sardinia, to get a pledge from the *Dreibund* to coerce the future Conclave to elect a pope who would sanction Sardinian usurpation, shows what is to be expected of any civil government which can claim the pope as a subject."—*The Schism of the West and the Freedom of Papal Elections*. New York, Benziger Brothers, 1862, pp. 30, 31.

only useful and possible, it is necessary. It is then an error, from a political as well as from a religious point of view, to think that time can ever render acceptable to the Holy See the situation in which it is now placed by the invaders of Rome. Such an affirmation would be altogether inexcusable in the mouth of a Catholic.

26. We do not ask when God will hear the supplications of the Catholic world for its captive father; or how, under the present circumstances, Providence will give to the Bishop of Rome the temporal sovereignty over the Eternal City. History tells us that the pope was robbed of his sovereignty one hundred and seventy times, and that each time it was restored to him; our own century has been the witness, both in 1815 and 1849, of how wonderfully God directs His Church in troublous times, and prepares new triumphs for her in the person of her persecuted head. But to appeal to divine Providence is not to demand of it a miracle, or to expect such a thing and in the mean time cross one's arms. This providence exists, and faith tells us that it extends in a special manner to the beloved spouse of Christ, His Church, and in the Church in a most special manner to the Vicar of Christ. But we know also that Providence does not dispense us from doing what in us lies to further its designs; that it requires the co-operation of men, and that it permits the most cruel trials to the Church precisely in order to stimulate and fortify our zeal in the works of faith.

27. *To whom belongs the duty of co-operating with*

the designs of divine Providence with regard to the Holy See? This duty is incumbent, first, upon those who by their crime have acted directly against the designs of Providence, upon those who have destroyed its work,—the Italian Government.

It is incumbent also upon those who have not prevented the crime, although they could and should have done so, or who have at least encouraged the invaders of Rome by their silence; upon the Christian governments, especially the Catholic governments.

Finally, it is incumbent upon all the Catholics of the world, who ought to do all in their power to lead the authors of the crime to make reparation for it.

28. *In what should this reparation consist?* It consists in rendering to the chief of the Church “the civil sovereignty which in the designs of Providence is ordained as a means for the regular exercise of the apostolic power, as being the efficacious safeguard of its liberty and independence.”

29. *To whom belongs the right of determining the conditions under which the re-establishment of the civil power should be made?*

This right does not belong to the Italian Government, nor does it belong to the other powers, either to each of them separately or to all united; it belongs solely and exclusively to the pope. The exercise of his divine rights is in question; he alone is their depository, he alone is their guardian, and consequently he alone has the right of deter-

mining the conditions under which they should be exercised.

30. *Can this solution be pacific, and how?*

Yes, it can be pacific; moreover, it is desirable from every point of view that it should be so; it is such a solution which Catholics above all demand, after the example of the Holy Father himself.

The Holy Father has clearly indicated his ardent desire that the re-establishment of the civil sovereignty should be "a work of pacification," that it should be brought about by "reconciliation," that it should "bring to an end the unfortunate disagreement between Italy, such as it is at present officially constituted, and the Roman pontificate."¹

And the more to indicate their sincere desire to arrive at such a pacification, neither Pius IX. nor Leo XIII. has ever required that the Pontifical States should be returned to them in their original extent. Taking into account the circumstances of the case and the present condition of Italy, Leo XIII. has "taken care to put at the basis of this pacification the justice and the dignity of the Apostolic See, and to claim a state of things in which the Roman pontiff should be subject to none, and enjoy a full and not an illusory liberty."¹ This state of things which the Holy Father demands is more explicitly determined by the declaration "that the indispensable condition for a pacification of Italy is the restitution of real sovereignty to the Roman pontiff."¹ In the same document the Holy

¹ Leo XIII. to Cardinal Rampolla.

Father indicates clearly that this sovereignty should extend in the first place over "the city of Rome, the natural see of the Sovereign Pontiffs, the centre of the life of the Church, and the capital of the Catholic world."

At Rome, continues the Holy Father, "the pope ought to be placed in such a condition of freedom, that not only shall his liberty not be contravened, in fact, by any one whoever he may be, but that this shall also be absolutely evident to every one; and this not owing to conditions subject to change and at the mercy of events, but from their nature stable and lasting." He warns the statesmen "who imagine other projects and plans" that "these are vain and useless attempts;" and that he will never accept an adjustment "which, under specious pretences, leaves the pontiff in fact in a state of true and real dependence." Finally he sums up the restitution that he requires, and consequently the programme of pacification, in the following words: "Without the restoration of a true and effective sovereignty, we do not see any open way to an understanding and peace."

31. Some non-catholic journals have spoken lately of the "desires, more or less avowed, of the court of King Humbert" for a reconciliation with the Holy See. These desires are, they say, based on the conviction that the interest of the dynasty counsels an agreement with the Vatican, in order to resist the rising flood of radicalism and socialism.

We readily believe that they are beginning to

see at the Quirinal the truth of the words of Victor Emmanuel, *Roma è fatale*—that the revolutionary logic goes on from the overthrow of altars to the overthrow of thrones. They will undoubtedly recognize that the future of a dynasty cannot be founded on the *débris* of the most august and the most legitimate of thrones.

But will the court have the courage and the strength necessary to extricate itself from the machinery of the revolution? We would be glad to hope so, but unfortunately history teaches us that such returns are not possible except to vigorous and heroically-tempered souls.

32. A liberal journal, speaking of these "desires of the court," adds with a world of reason that the Roman question is the heel of Achilles to the Triple Alliance, especially in view of the Catholic sentiments of the Austrian court and of the great majority of the people of that empire. It thinks likewise that an agreement with the Holy See "concluded under the auspices of a foreign power would hardly please the Italians."¹

It may certainly be admitted, as a great defender of the Holy See has said,² that a too marked interference of another power in the regulation of the Roman question might wound the sensibilities of Italian patriotism. But there is for the most interested party in the case a very simple means of warding off this inconvenience, which is to dispense with all intermediaries, and take to itself the initia-

¹ *L'Indépendance* (Belgium), February 3, 1892.

² Verspeyen, in his excellent *Bien Public*, Feb. 4, 1892.

tive in the steps which are commended to it both by justice and by its own interests. Is this not the way that Leo XIII. himself has often suggested in his memorable allocutions, in proclaiming that the independence of the Holy See had nothing incompatible with the greatness and the prosperity of Italy?

One might perhaps do well to look over the Gospel with King Humbert, and read again the parable of the prodigal son: "I will arise and go to my father's house"!

From the Quirinal to the Vatican it is not so far!

Let he who can and ought cause the conflict to cease, by restoring to the pope his proper position, and forthwith all these difficulties will disappear. Moreover, Italy would benefit greatly in all that constitutes its true glory and the happiness of a people, or deserves the name of civilization; for as Italy has been designed by Providence to be the nation nearest to the Papacy, so it is destined to receive more abundantly from the latter such salutary influence, if only it does not fight against or oppose them. ¹

VIII. THE DUTY OF CATHOLICS IN REGARD TO THE ROMAN QUESTION

33. "From all this it may be easily understood how incumbent it is on the Roman pontiffs and how sacred is their duty to defend and uphold the civil sovereignty and its lawfulness; a duty which is rendered still more sacred by the obligation of an oath [which every pope has to take after his election]. It would be folly to pretend that they would themselves sacrifice along with the temporal

¹ Leo XIII. to Cardinal Rampolla.

power that which they hold most precious and dear : we mean that liberty in the government of the Church for which their predecessors have always so gloriously struggled. We certainly, by the grace of God, will not fail in our duty.”¹

There are certain Catholics, fortunately not at all numerous, who do not love to hear such language from the mouth of the Vicar of Christ. According to them the best policy would be for the pope to be silent regarding the Roman question. The words cited from Leo XIII. contain an energetic and clear response to such advice, which is equally devoid of authority and of Catholic sense. Others would wish at least to be themselves dispensed from treating the Roman question in the press and in public assemblies. We have given them above the response dictated by the Catholic conscience.

The popes know better the fidelity of the true children of the Church and their attachment to the Holy See. Far from supposing silence on their part, they see, on the contrary, in the action of the Catholic peoples the firmest support of their hopes and of their claims.

Hence it is that Leo XIII., after having spoken of his own duty, adds the following words, which show well the confidence of the father in his children :

The whole Catholic world, very jealous of the independence of its head, will never rest until justice has been done to his most righteous demands.

¹ *Ibid.*

34. Pius IX. has indicated clearly in what manner Catholics should co-operate with the views of Providence and second the efforts of their common father. These are his words :

The Church of God in Italy is suffering violence and persecution, and the Vicar of Christ has neither liberty nor the free and full use of his power. We therefore think it opportune, and we greatly desire, that the bishops, who in many ways have constantly shown their union in the defence of the rights of the Church and their devotedness to this apostolic see, should call upon the faithful under their jurisdiction to make every effort, as far as the laws of each country may permit, to induce their governments not only to examine carefully the serious condition of the head of the Catholic Church, but also to take such measures as may insure the removal of the obstacles which restrict his true and perfect independence. ¹

35. It is by the people that great things are done in our day. It is they who, so to speak, trace for their governments the road which they are to follow. Now the governments represent the rights of the minorities as well as those of the majorities of their citizens, and they will not be able in this matter to ignore their numerous Catholic subjects.

Says Bismarck to the Prussian Chamber of Deputies :²

As the representative of the government, I must place myself at an independent point of view, and I must recognize that the Papacy is not an Italian institution, but a universal one. And because it is universal, it is also for German Catholics a German institution.

We would add, that because it is universal it is also for American Catholics an American institution, that is to say, it concerns intimately the

¹ Allocution "Luctuosis," March 12, 1877.

² April 22, 1887.

rights and the religious interests of the Catholics of America.

Usurping Italy does not fear anything so much as this manifestation of Catholic sentiment. It is on that account that she has interfered at home with the petitions which were being drawn up in favor of the pope. It is on that account that she has stifled the voice of bishops and priests by a new and tyrannical penal code, according to which the mere expression of an opinion in favor of the temporal power is liable to punishment. It is on that account, finally, that by her diplomatic agents she has made desperate efforts to crush out the public and solemn protestations of the Catholic nations.

It is only several weeks ago that the Austrian minister, the Count Kalnoky, indicated in the open Chamber that the condition of Rome was always an open question. Hence interpellations and explanations without end in the Italian Chamber!

Italy will not be able to long resist such a pressure from the public conscience, and must finally decide herself to make up her mind to pay her "international debt." The unanimous explosion of a sentiment so just, so noble, and so legitimate will be considered everywhere as the voice of Eternal Justice, whose echo resounds in the hearts of the believers of the Old World and of the New.

Being, then, conscious of our strength, let us bring it to bear in our associations, in our assemblies, and above all in our Catholic Congresses. Just claims do not nowadays secure a hearing in any other way. So only does a numerical minority

gain public recognition. Those who stand aside and content themselves with calling upon Heaven to witness their protest will never prevent the usurping power from demanding the order of the day.

Our efforts should be persevering and unanimous. In order to have these two qualities, they should before all be frank and decided. Let us not content ourselves with declaring vaguely that independence is necessary to the Holy See, since there is question precisely of guaranteeing this independence by a designated method. Common action supposes an unequivocal platform. Such a platform is furnished us by the popes, and by the situation itself; it can be no other than this: The independence of the Holy See by the re-establishment of the temporal power of the pope.

36. Certain journals have shown a great zeal in proving to Italian Catholics that it is upon them above all that the duty is incumbent of acting in behalf of the Holy See. Articles have even been written to urge them to take part in the political elections of their country, and to instal their deputies at Montecitorio in order to defend there the rights of the pope.

Certainly the Italian Catholics should be in the front ranks of the soldiers of the Holy See. They have already made great efforts, and will make still more. Their first need, unhappily too long neglected, is a powerful *organization*. But in regard to their participation in the political elections, it must be said that in abstaining thus far they

have only followed hitherto the watchword of the Holy Father; the formula *ne electi ne electori* is simply the putting in practice of the response of the Holy Father, *Non expedit*. We have not here to indicate the manifold reasons for this attitude of the Holy See: they are more numerous and more serious than any one would think at the first glance. M. Leroy-Beaulieu, as a profound politician, recognized it, and declared that "the situation of a political party in Italy would be more difficult than in any other country." But in any case, the Holy Father is here also the only judge of the situation, and it is not becoming in a Catholic to criticise his attitude. Moreover, these criticisms hide too easily a specious excuse for those who would desire to throw upon the Italian Catholics alone the accomplishment of a duty which is incumbent upon us as well as upon them: for the duty of Catholics is as international as the Roman question itself.

37. The more active and vigorous international action is in this case, the greater will be its weight, the more powerful its efficacy, and the more speedy its success. Again, the more outspoken Catholics are in a country where they enjoy greater liberty the greater will be their influence on public opinion. It is this conviction that the German-American Catholics at the congress of Buffalo (September, 1891), have well expressed in their resolutions, so clear and so energetic, on the subject of the temporal power.

Their open and decided language has also been

justly appreciated and loudly approved by the Catholic organs of the highest standing in the Old World.

In the inspiring language of Father Hecker: "We have the right, as well as the duty, as one of the members of the Catholic Church, to voice what we know to be the unanimous conviction of our fellow-Catholics on this continent, who are no idle spectators of passing events at Rome, who do not listen with deaf ears to one whom they delight to call by the endearing name of father; and when the government of the king of Italy makes, or allows others to make, his position in the Eternal City 'intolerable,' then we have the common right and the common duty to raise our voice, and in the unmistakable tones of sincerity to warn him—*beware!*"¹

The Catholic people of the United States, whatever be their mother-tongue, are profoundly attached to the Holy See: let us go to them, let us give them an opportunity of manifesting their attachment, let us speak to them clearly and warmly of the unworthy situation in which the chief of the Church is placed, and they will be happy to give us resplendent proofs of their filial sentiments towards the common Father of the Faithful. This is abundantly evidenced by the grand mass-meeting of workmen which was held a few days ago under the auspices of the Most Rev. Archbishop Corrigan in the city of New York. We have just read with real pleasure and admiration the masterly

¹ *Catholic World*, April, 1882.

discourse of one of our most distinguished Catholic laymen, Judge Dunne, and the excellent resolutions enthusiastically adopted in that memorable assembly.

Let us aid, in the mean time, the captive Peter alike with our charity and with our prayers, and take heed that we may in no way incur the reproach of the Holy Spirit: "Of what an evil fame is he that forsaketh his father." Let us follow the example which he gives us. "We place our trust in God," said Leo XIII. in an address, "and are determined to contend with all our might for the freedom of the Church and its head. . . . We are, moreover, not alone in this conflict."

No, Holy Father, you are not alone in this conflict! Your devoted bishops and priests, all your faithful children, pray and protest with you! Our trust, like yours, is in the Lord, who above all else loves the freedom of His Church! The day will come, the longed-for day of deliverance! The successor of the prince of the apostles will again ascend the venerable throne which centuries have erected for the papacy, to shed new lustre upon the Church, to spread over all the world the beneficent influence of the apostolic word, to be free again to bestow his blessing, without let or hindrance, upon the Eternal City and the entire world—*Urbi et Orbi!*



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APPENDIX



APPENDIX

TWENTY THESES ON THE ROMAN QUESTION

I.

The head of the Catholic Church, as the successor of St. Peter, has a right, which by reason of his sublime office and the explicit will of Jesus Christ is divine and inalienable, to direct and govern the whole Church, freely and independently of every earthly power.

II.

Only the bishop of Rome is or has ever been the successor of St. Peter in the primacy. It is theologically certain that this prerogative of the Roman Church is immutable, and can never be transferred to any other episcopal see.

III.

To insure the permanent liberty and independence of the head of the Church, divine Providence has so shaped events that after the age of persecu-

tion the popes became by the most legitimate means, without offence or opposition, the masters of Rome even in a political sense, and have remained such until our own day.

IV.

The violent measures of which the Holy See became the victim in the year 1870, could not change these designs of divine Providence. On the contrary, the events of the last twenty years have only served to prove more clearly that the temporal power is an indispensable condition for the normal government of the Church, and a necessary guarantee of the complete freedom and independence of the pope.

V.

The political independence of the popes has always been assailed by the enemies of the Church and the destruction of the temporal power in our day was instigated by the anti-christian and anti-religious sects, and effected by their instrumentality with the open and avowed purpose of shattering and destroying the spiritual power of the pope and of the Church.

VI.

The Roman question is therefore a religious and not a merely political question.

VII.

The spoliation of the Holy See by the Italian Government in 1870 was consequently not only a flagrant violation of the principles of natural and public right, a breach of the most solemn treaties, and an infraction of the very primary provisions of international law, but also a crime done against the Church of God herself, her property and her freedom, and hence a true sacrilege.

VIII.

Although the Christian powers permitted the spoliation of the papal states without the solemn protest which they should have made, they reminded Victor Emmanuel's government immediately after the event of its duty to make the independence of the head of the Church secure, and the Italian Government has thus far tried in vain to obtain from them an explicit recognition or approval of the occupation of Rome.

IX.

The circumstances under which the law of guarantees was framed, and the manner in which it is understood and executed by the Italian Government, prove clearly and unmistakably that it was a deceit practised upon the Catholic people concerning the real intention of the revolution, and while appar-

ently acknowledging the pope's dignity, it was really a means of degrading it. It is, in fact, a defiance of divine Providence and an insult to the Catholics of the whole world.

X.

This law and the general attitude of the Italian Government towards the Holy See, is a breach of the pledge which it gave to the Christian powers both before and after the taking of Rome, to guarantee full freedom to the pope and to settle the Roman question "with the Catholic world."

XI.

By these and similar declarations the Italian Government itself has acknowledged the international character of the Roman question, and thus has given the lie to Crispi's words that "the question is a purely Italian one."

XII.

The Roman question is in reality an international question, because (a) it is concerned with the most vital interests of Catholics of all nations and of all tongues, and (b) the pope is the highest representative of that moral power which is the basis of a civilized society, and which alone can effectively guard it against the anarchical designs of socialism in its many forms.

XIII.

The Christian powers cannot leave the Roman question to be solved by the Italian Government as it sees fit; for they have to protect the religious interests of their Catholic subjects, which are intimately connected with the liberty and independence of the Papacy.

XIV.

A peaceful solution of this question is most desirable. It can be attained either by the voluntary action of the Italian Government or by the diplomatic influence of the other powers.

XV.

Far from being detrimental to the true interests of Italy, such settlement would make the political independence of the country secure, promote its credit and influence abroad, bestow upon its people the blessing of true unity at home, elevate its religious and moral power, increase the material and financial prosperity of the land, and correspond to the urgent desire of an overwhelming majority of the Italian people.

XVI.

The principle that even violent changes in the political conditions of a people can be legitimated.



by circumstances cannot be applied to the Roman problem, as it is not a question of dynastic claims or the temporal interests of a particular nation, but rather of the inalienable rights of the head of the Church, the spiritual interests of Catholics throughout the world, and indeed the most important social interests of all nations.

XVII.

As the pope has again and again solemnly declared his love for peace and expressed his desire for a settlement which would not compromise his dignity, and the Italian government, far from taking any steps to meet this wish, has more than once forcibly suppressed the endeavors of its Catholic subjects to that end, the latter alone is answerable not only for bringing about the strained condition of affairs, but also for its continuance.

XVIII.

The only final solution of the Roman question must assure to the Holy See a true territorial sovereignty as a guarantee of its real and manifest independence; and the acceptance of this principle alone can furnish the basis of future negotiations.

XIX.

It belongs to the pope alone to determine the details of the adjustment which, in view of the existing situation in Italy and the present condition

of society at large, is necessary for the attainment of that sovereignty.

XX.

The Catholics of the whole world are in honor bound to use every endeavor for the re-establishment of the temporal sovereignty of the head of the Church. Systematic silence is not only disobedience, but cowardice.

