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AMERICAN
DIPLOMATIC QUESTIONS

■J^^^y^

AMERICAN
DIPLOMATIC QUESTIONS

BY

JOHN B. HENDERSON, JR.

Xcto gork
THE MACMILLAN COMPANY

LONDON: MACMILLAN & CO., LTD.
190 I

All rights reserved

Copyright, 1;h)1,
By the xMACMILLAN COMPANY.

Xorbjooli 5l3rf3a

J. S. Ctishiiis & Co. — Berwick * Smith

Norwood, Mass., U. S. A.

CONTENTS

I

THE FUR SEALS AND BERING SEA AWARD

I

PAGE

RissiAX AND American Claims in Bering Sea ... 3

II
The Life History of the Fur Seal 10

III
The Beginning of Pelagic Sealing 13

TV
Protests and Diplomatic Correspondence .... 14

V

The Paris Award and Regulations 34

VI

Efforts for Modification of Regulations .... 42

VII

The Present Situation 61

II

THE INTEROCEANIC CANAL PROBLEM

I
History of Canal Schemes 65

n

The Clayton-Bulwer Treaty 104

V

vi CONTENTS

III

PAGE

1850-1860— A Decade of Discussion 123

IV

The Blaine-Frelinghuysen-Granville Debates . . . 137

V

The Mosquito Troubles 159

VI

The Hay-Pauncefote Treaty 167

VII
The Three Problems. Neutralization 176

III

THE UNITED STATES AND SAMOA

I

The Islands — People — Government 209

II
Earlier History 215

III

Social Conditions in Apia — 1884-1889 219

IV
German Aggressiveness 222

V

The Washington Conferences 228

VI
The Reign of Dissensions 232

CONTENTS Vii

VII

PAOE

The Berlin Conff:rence an'd Convention .... 242

VIII
Triumph of Malietoa 257

IX
The Trial for the Kingship — Partition of Samoa . . 262

IV

THE MONROE DOCTRINE
Introduction 289

I
* Foreign Relations of the United States from 1783 to 1823 294

II

y The Revolting Spanish Colonies 299

III

V The Holy Alliance 306

IV

Framing the Monroe Doctrine 316

V

Reception of the "Doctrine" 336

VI
Panama Congress 342

VII

Spanish America and Cuija 359

viii CONTENTS

VIII

PAGE

Texas and Oregox 379

IX
Yucatan 385

X

Fre>-ch Intervention in Mexico 389

XI

From 1866 to 1896 " . . . .407

XII
Great Britain and Venezuela 411

XIII
Conclusion 443

V

THE NORTHEAST COAST FISHERIES
Introduction 451

I

The Industry 454

II

The Early English and French Fisheries .... 459

III
The Early American Fisheries 472

IV
From the American Revolution to 1812 486

CONTENTS ix

V

PAGE

Thk Convention of 1818 488

VI
1818 TO 1854 497

VII
Reciprocity and Treaty of 1854 508

VIII
The Treaty of Washington 513

IX

Return to Conditions of 1818 — Modus Vivendi . . . 519

X

Situation in 1901 526

I

•

THE FUR-SEALS AND THE BERING
SEA AWARD

THE FUR-SEALS AND THE BERING SEA AWARD

By treaty of March 30, 1867, in consideration of the sum
of ¥7,200,000, Russia ceded to the United States all her pos-
sessions in North America. These included the present ter-
ritory of Alaska, the Aleutian chain, and some isolated
groups of islands in the Bering Sea. The western boun-
dary of the territory so transferred to the United States was
described in the first article of the treaty as follows: —

The western limit within which the territories and dominion
conveyed, are contained, passes through a point in Bering's
Straits on the parallel of sixty-five degrees thirty minutes north
latitude, at its intersection by the meridian which passes midway
between the islands of Krusenstern, or Ignalook. and the island of
Ratiiianoff, or Xoonarbook, and proceeds due north, without limi-
tation, into the same Frozen Ocean. The same western limit, be-
ginning at the same initial point, proceeds thence in a course
nearly southwest, through Behring's Straits and Behring's Sea, so
as to pass midway between the northwest point of the island of
St. Lawrence and tlie southeast point of Cape Choukotski, to the
meridian of one hundred and seventy-two west longitude ; thence,
from the intersection of that meridian, in a southwesterly di-
rection, so as to pass midway between the island of Attou and
the Copper island of the Komondorski couplet or group, in the
North Pacific Ocean, to the meridian of one hundred and ninety-
three degrees west longitude, so as to include in the territory con-
veyed the whole of the Aleutian Islands east of that meridian.

An unusual example was here presented of a divisiomd
line between two empires passing almost midway tlirougli a
great ocean. The Ixuindary in question marks the ^ventern

3

4 AMEEICAN DIPLOMATIC QUESTIONS

limit within which the territories mid dominion conveyed are
contained. This terse description may be regarded as a
shorter and more convenient mode of expression than the
separate enumeration of a bewiklering number of islands,
yet it involved a confusing implication — that Russia
intended by these words to convey to the United States, not
only all the islands lying east of the imaginary line so desig-
nated, but, indeed, the actual sea itself, with full and exclu-
sive dominion over the same. This construction of the
intent and purpose of this clause of the treaty, however
novel or in ill accord with the usages of nations, gained
apparent weight from the fact that through a period of
many years Russia had persistently claimed extraordinary
rights of navigation and fisheries in Bering Sea, — rights
which even at that time were regarded by civilized nations
as beyond the sanction of international law. The impor-
tant question — had Russia, by her assertions, gained a valid
title to the waters of Bering Sea, and then, had the United
States really acquired by purchase a dominion over this ex-
tensive body of water, or even greater privileges of naviga-
tion therein than are enjoyed in common by all nations ? —
formed one of the issues in the Bering Sea arbitration trial,
held in Paris, in the spring and summer of 1893.

As early as the year 1800, Russia had established in
Alaska a chartered company, with exclusive rights of hunt-
ing and fishing in its waters and of trading with its native
population. In order better to protect the interests of this
flourishing business organization, the Emperor Alexander
the First, in 1821, issued an ukase, or proclamation, in the
following words: —

Section I. The transaction of commerce, and the pursuit of
whaling and fishing, or any other industry on the islands, in the
harbors and inlets, and, in general, all along the northwestern
coast of America from Behring Strait to the fifty-first parallel of
northern latitude, antl likewise on the Aleutian Islands and along
the eastern coast of Siberia, and on the Kurile Islands ; that is,
from Behring Strait to the southern promontory of the Island of
Urup, viz., as far south as latitude forty-five degrees and fifty

THE FUR-SEALS AND THE BERING SEA AWARD 5

minutes north, are exclusively reserved to subjects of the Eus-
sian Empire.

Section II. Accordingly, no foreign vessel shall be allowed
either to put to shore at any of the coasts and islands under Rus-
sian dominion as specified in the preceding section, or even to
ajjproach the same to within a distance of less than one hundred
Italian miles. Any vessel contravening this provision shall be
subject to confiscation with her whole cargo.

At the time of the promulgation of this law (1821), the
principle of absolute freedom of navigation in the open sea
was generally recognized, and no nation could rightfully
assert her sovereignty over the ocean further than three
marine leagues from her own shores. This distance was
considered the average range of a cannon shot, and, there-
fore, the limit wdtliin which a people could protect their marine
jurisdiction from the land. Seven years before that time
the American commissioners at Ghent had made the attitude
of the United States Government in this matter quite clear
by their determined opposition to England's threatened
assertion of jurisdiction over the Newfoundland banks.
Alexander the First either considered himself superior to
the operation of international law, or he may have regarded
the entire Bering Sea as a closed sea, or mare clausum, over
Avhich he could properly exercise sole control, even to the
total exclusion of all foreign vessels. The fact that in 1821
the waters of the Bering Sea washed only Russian shores,
which, in some respects, suggested a closed sea, probably led
the Emperor Alexander to regard his assertions of enlarged
dominion over the w'hole or any part of it as not oidy just
and right, but fully in keeping with the principles of inter-
national law. Bering Sea is in realit}' a vast ocean, com-
municating with tlie larger Pacific Ocean through many
channels of great width. It is, indeed, a part of the greater
ocean, and should properly be so considered, being separated
from it only by a line of islands that often lie many miles
apart.

The violation of legal principles concerning the extent of
marine jurisdiction, made by the Russian Emperor's ukase of

6 AMERICAN DIPLOMATIC QUESTIONS

1821, might have gone unchallenged by the world for many
years ; for, in those early times, very few merchant vessels
had occasion to visit those distant waters, and in general
little interest attached to their inhospitable shores ; never-
theless, fleets of American whalers had even before that
time found their way north of the Aleutian Islands, follow-
ing the custom of making annual summer cruises there-
abouts in pursuit of whales, which were abundant in the
cold waters of the Bering Sea. The Russian restrictions
upon navigation in the northern Pacific Ocean seriously em-
barrassed those hardy sea-rovers from New Bedford and
Nantucket. Througli their complaints to the State De-
partment in Washington, an American protest appeared
against these Russian assertions of sovereignty over so large
an expanse of ocean. Secretary of State John Quincy Adams,
in a communication of February 25, 1822, to Mr. Poletica,
then Russian Minister at Washington, said: —

I am directed by the President of the United States to inform
you that he has seen with surprise, in this edict, the assertion of
a territorial claim on the part of Russia, extending to the fifty-
first degree of north latitude on this continent, and a regulation
interdicting to all commercial vessels other than Russian, ujDon
the penalty of seizure and confiscation, the approach upon the
high seas within one hundred Italian miles of the shores to
which that claim is made to apply. ... It was expected before
any act which should define the boundaries between the United
States and Russia on this continent, that the same would have
been arranged by treaty between the parties. To exclude the
vessels of our citizens from the shore, beyond the ordinary dis-
tance to which the territorial jurisdiction extends, has excited
still greater surprise.

Mr. lV)letica replied February 28, only three days after
the receipt of Mr. Adams' communication: —

... I ought, in the last place, to request you to consider, sir,
that the Russian possessions in the Pacific Ocean extend, on the
nortliwest coast of America, from Behring Strait to the fifty -first
degree of north latitude, and on the opi)osite side of Asia, and
the islands adjacent, from the same Strait to the forty-fifth
degree. The extent of sea, of which these possessions form the

THE FUK-SEALS AND THE BERING SEA AWARD 7

limits, comprehends all the conditions which are ordinarily
attached to shut seas {mers fermees), and the Russian Government
might consequently judge itself authorized to exercise upon this
sea the right of sovereignty, and especially that of entirely inter-
dicting the entrance of foreigners. But it preferred only assert-
ing its essential rights, without taking any advantage of localities.

It thus became evident that the Emperor considered as
belonging to him alone, not only the Bering Sea, but also,
as a closed sea, all that portion of the Pacific Ocean which
lies north of latitude 51°; and that lie further considered it
a generous act on his part to leave all his imperial domain of
sea, except a mere hundred-mile belt about its shores, free
to the world for its commerce and navigation. IMr. Adams
replied to Mr. Poletica's note on March 30: —

This pretension is to be considered not only with reference to
the question of territorial right, but also to that prohibition to the
vessels of other nations, including those of the United States, to
approach within one hundred Italian miles of the coasts. From
the period of the existence of the United States as an indepen-
dent nation, their vessels have freely navigated those seas, and the
right to navigate them is a part of that independence. . . .

The Russian Emperor's position, in asserting mare clausum
over the Pacific Ocean as bounded by his own possessions on
either side, was made absurd by Mr. Adams' simple state-
ment that " tlie distance from shore to sliore on this sea in
latitude 51° north is not less than 90 degrees of longitude, or
four thousand miles."

England had no important interests directly violated by
the Russian ukase of 1821, but she possessed territory
vaguely and indefinitely bounded in the northwest part of
North America, and she detected in Russian claims of en-
larged jurisdiction over so great an extent of sea a precedent
that might in the future operate adversely to her own inter-
ests. Her protest, which was quite as vigorous as the one
from Washington, is found in tlie Duke of Wellington's
letter of November 28, 1822, to the Russian Ambassador at
London : —

8 AMERICAN DIPLOMATIC QUESTIONS

. . . The second ground on which we object to the iikase is
that His Imperial Majesty thereby excludes from a certain con-
siderable extent of the open sea vessels of other nations. We
contend that the assumption of this power is contrary to the law
of nations ; and we cannot found a negotiation upon a paper in
which it is again broadly asserted. We contend that no power
whatever can exclude another from the use of the open sea ; a
power can exclude itself from the navigation of a certain coast,
sea, etc., by its own act or engagement, but it cannot by right be
excluded by another. This we consider as the law of nations. . . .

These protests from the eagle and the lion succeeded in
enlightening the bear, for Russia immediately began to recog-
nize the feebleness of her asserted right to control the North
Pacific Ocean. After a short period of correspondence, Rus-
sia yielded all these exaggerated pretensions and made a
treaty with the United States (April 17, 1824), in which it
was agreed : —

. . . that, in any part of the Great Ocean, commonly called the
Pacific Ocean, or South Sea, the respective citizens or subjects
of the high contracting powers shall be neither disturbed nor re-
strained, either in navigation or in fishing, or in the power of
resorting to the coasts, upon points which may not already have
been occupied, for the purpose of trading with the natives, saving
always the restrictions and conditions determined by the follow-
ing articles.

The " conditions and restrictions " referred to illicit trading
and the formation of settlements.

By the fourth article of this convention Russia granted to
United States vessels, for a period of ten years, the privilege
of frequenting " without any hindrance whatever the interior
seas, gulfs, harbors, and creeks upon the coasts mentioned in
the preceding article for the purpose of fishing and trading
with the natives of the country." By this treaty also Rus-
sian possessions in North America were limited on the south
by the 54° 40' parallel of latitude.

When the stipulated period of ten years had elapsed, the
United States sought to renew the privilege of trading with
the natives of Alaska and of navigating the inner waters of

THE FUR-SEALS AND THE BERING SEA AWARD 9

the coast north of latitude 54° 40'. This favor Russia obsti-
nately refused to grant, although the remaining articles of
the treaty continued always in force. It seems to have been
suspected in the United States that Russia would considei-
her jurisdiction over a hundred-mile marine belt reestablislied
by the expiration of the fourth article of her treaty, notwith-
standing the fact that that part of the treaty surrendering all
claims to exclusive navigation of the Great Ocean or South
Sea remained operative. John Adams at the time expressed
himself in his diary as able to down Russian argument, but
unable to silence Russian cannon. American vessels contin-
ued, however, to navigate the Bering Sea with perfect free-
dom, and Russia never again actually asserted the right of
mare dausum over that body of water, nor apparently con-
sidered it otherwise than as a part of the great Racihc Ocean,
or " South Sea."

Such, then, Avas the situation in 1867, when the United
States purchased the territory of Alaska and came into pos-
session of all Russian rights of trade and navigation in
Bering Sea. Beyond its several tliousand miles of coast line,
this great territoiy was practically a ten^a incoi/nita to all but
a few adventurous explorers and trappers who had pene-
trated its vast wilderness. Its purchase was largely brought
about through a friendly feeling on the part of the United
States to meet half-way Russia's desire to dispose of her
American possessions, while at the same time slie hoped
rather than expected that the future might develop valuable
natural resources in this far-away region, when civilization,
in its westward progress, should gain its shores and ascend
its great river.

The description of the western boundary of the cession,
already referred to, led to some ambiguity, even at that day,
as to what extent of jurisdiction the United States might
rightfully claim over tlie waters of Bering Sea. The ques-
tion whether Russia intended to convey, or even could convey,
within the limits of law, dominion over the waters of Bering
Sea, outside the ordinarily recognized three-mile limit of ma-
rine jurisdiction, did not at once assume great importance.

10 AMERICAN DIPLOMATIC QUESTIONS

111 framing laws for the territor}- the following- year (1868),
Congress did not clearly signify the extent to which the
United States claimed jurisdiction in Bering Sea, but simply
enacted that the "laws of the United States relating to cus-
toms, commerce, and navigation, are extended to and over
all the mainland, islands, and waters of the territory ceded
to the United States by the Emperor of Russia . . . ", and
further enacted that, " no person shall kill any otter, mink,
martin, sable, or fur-seal, or other fur-bearing animals within
the limits of Alaska tenitory, or in the waters thereof. ..."
Thus the United States asserted its dominion over Alaska
and the ivaters thereof, the phrase "waters thereof" unfortu-
nately being left to the various interpretations of public
opinion, as shaped or fashioned by future national interests.
This ambiguity of expression was destined finally to play an
important part in a serious international complication.

Two great industries at once developed in Alaska, — the
salmon fisheries and the capture of fur-bearing animals. Of
these by far the most important was the pursuit of sealing.
The fur of seals is exceptionally fine, and being always in de-
mand, has commanded high prices in the markets of the world.

The fur-seal, known to zoologists as Callorhinus nrsimm,
resembles biologically a form of marine bear, and should
not be confounded with the true seal of our Pacific coast,
from which it differs in several respects.

There are three herds of these marine creatures that annu-
ally visit the islands of the North Pacific. These herds do
not mingle, but have each their own particular breeding-
ground, to which they annually repair. One herd inhabits
Robin Island, in the Okhotsk Sea ; one the Commander
Islands whicli lie on tlie Russian side of Bering Sea; and the
third (in point of numbers the most important, and known
as the "American herd " in contradistinction to the other
two, or "Asiatic herds""), inhabits tlie Pribyloft" Islands — a
group of small islands on the American side of Beiing Stni.
To these islands the seals resort in great numbers during the
latter part of Ma}'- or the first part of June. The males

THE FUR-SEALS AND THE BERING SEA AWARD 11

arrive first, and taking positions along the shoie, each pre-
empts, so to speak, a certain space sacred to himself, and
tliere awaits the coming of the females. As they appear,
arriving day by day from the sea, great confusion reigns
along the shores of the rookeries. Desperate struggles for
tlie females follow, and when a degree of peace is restored in
the course of a few days, there results an establishment of
many approximately permanent polygamous family groups
more or less densely crowded along the littoral of the islands.
The younger male seals, known as " bachelors," are unable
to cope with the older and stronger ones in their fierce con-
tests for possession of the females. They retire and herd
together, a discontented throng, at some distance from their
jealous elders. The old males keep constantly on the alert
to protect their homesteads from the intrusion of other males,
or to prevent the members of their own households from
deserting them. So jealous are they of their " wives " that they
dare not venture away from their positions on shore during
the entire breeding season, not even in search of food. Tlie
females, soon after landing, give birth to their young, each
bearing a single "pup." These helpless little creatures are
carefully nurtured by their mothers until they learn to swim
and can shift for themselves. The females in search of food
make fret^uent excursions to sea during the breeding season,
often going as far as two hundred miles from the island rook-
eries, at which distance they have been frequently observed
disporting themselves, or (quietly sleeping upon the surface
of the water. They alwaj-s return to the care of their young
and to the protection of tlieir watchful lords and masters.

Thus the seals constitutino- the " American herd " live
upon the Pribyloff rookeries from the time of their annual
coming in May and June until the late autumn, when the
forces of Boreas besiege the islands and the northern seas
become tempestuous. The seals then slip into the surf for
their long annual swim to the south. They migrate leisurely
liirougli various passes l)etween tlie Aleutian Islands, thence
southward in the open Pacific to about latitude ^]^)° (o))po-
site San Francisco), then making a long sweep inland they

12 AMERICAN DIPLOMATIC QUESTIONS

follow a northerly course along the American coast. No
landing is made until the following May or June, when, in
obedience to their instincts, they once more return to their
common rendezvous on the Pribyloff Islands, The life habits
of the seals of the Asiatic herds are in all respects identical,
their winter migrations being south along the Asiatic coast
to the neighborhood of Japan.

Under the organized sealing industry of the chartered
American Company, a fixed number of " bachelors " only were
killed, the female seals being left unmolested along with
old males, the pelts of the latter being quite useless for com-
mercial purposes.

Shortly after the discovery of the Pribyloff Islands in
1786, the number of fur-seals annually captured at the
rookeries has been variously estimated among the millions.
The unlimited slaughter of the seals and the consequent
danger of their extinction obliged the Russian Government
to enact prohibitory laws from time to time for their protec-
tion. At the time of the American acquisition of Alaska, the
Russian-American Company (chartered by Russia and which
enjoyed the monopoly of the Alaskan trade) was shipping
annually to New York and London upon an average forty
thousand skins. Notwithstanding this seemingly large yearly
capture, seals were vastly increasing in numbers.

In 1868-69 attention at Washington was especially directed
to the great value of the sealing industry, and also to the
wisdom of taking active measures to prevent a wholesale
slaughter of seals by rival companies that quickly occupied
the field when the Russian company went out of existence.
Unmindful of the future and eager for innnediate gain, these
irresponsible hunters sought to kill the goose for her golden
eggs. Accordingly the islands of the Pribyloff group were
declared to be a governmental reserve, and by vii'tue of an Act
of Congress, July 1, 1870, the killing of "any fur-seal upon
the islands of St. Paul and St. George or in the watere adja-
cent thereto, excepting during the months of June, July,
September, and October in each year " was prohibited. It Avas
also declared unlawful to kill such seals at any time by the

THE FUR-SEALS AND THE BERING SEA AWARD 13

use of fire-arms, or by any means which tended to drive them
away from those islands. The Secretary of the Treasury was
further empowered to lease to proper and responsible parties,
for a period of twenty years, " the right to engage in the bus-
iness of taking fur-seals on the islands of St. George and
St. Paul " ; Secretar}- Boutwell thereupon granted to the
Alaska Commercial Company the sole privilege of capturing
seals . upon tliose islands. The company according to the
terms of this lease was obliged to pay annually into the Treas-
ury of the United States the sum of $55,000, besides the
sum of 62J cents for each skin taken. Under proper restric-
tions such care was taken by the company in killing only the
"bachelors," — the two to four year old males, — that the
number of seals sojourning upon the islands each 3'ear showed
no signs of diminution, despite the fact that the company
was authorized to take annually one hundred thousand pelts.
During the twenty years' operations of the Alaska Commer-
cial Company in the Pribyloff Islands, the prices of sealskins
advanced from •§2.50 in 18G8 to ^^0 in 1890. At the expira-
tion of its lease, the company had paid into the Treasury of
the United States the large sum of $5,956,065.67.

The contract proved to be an exceedingly profitable one for
the company as well, and the reports of its success soon
spread far and wide. Expeditions were fitted out by ship-
owners in British Columbia, in Hawaii, and even in Australia,
to engage in the hunt for seals. As the Alaska Company
was protected in its monopoly of seal catching on the islands
of St. Paul and St. George of the Pribyloff group, and as the
few Russian islands, to which the other seal l)erds repaired,
were similarly protected by Russian laws, tlie method fol-
lowed by these free rovers was to drift about in tlie open
waters of tlie sea, often in the neighljorhood of tlie passes
between the Aleutian Islands, and thus intercepting tlie seals
in tlieir annual migration north or south, capture them
in the water. This metliod of attack was exceedingly de-
structive to the herd. It was impossible that a discrimination
could be made between the males and females, and in killing
the females a double slaughter was effected. Besides this,

14 AMERICAN DIPLOMATIC QUESTIONS

many of the animals were wounded and lost, and it was ap-
prehended by the American sealers that the continuation of
the practice of pelagic sealing would soon result in the exter-
mination of the species.

The Collector of the port at San Francisco, Mr. Phelps,
having been apprised of the dangers threatening the industry
so comfortably prospering in St. Paul and St. George, wrote
to the Secretary of the Treasury in 1872, asking permission to
despatch a revenue cutter to the scene of action for the pur-
pose of preventing pelagic sealing. Mr. Boutwell, the Secre-
tary of the Treasury, in reply said, " I do not see that the
United States would have the jurisdiction or power to drive
off parties going up there for that purpose unless they made
such attempts within a marine league of the sliores." This
was the first official expression touching upon the doubtful
words, " or in the waters thereof." It clearly indicated
that the government in Washington at that date interpreted
those words of the Act of Congress of 1868 to mean the ordi-
nary three miles of marine jurisdiction. Destructive to Ameri-
can interests as pelagic sealing might prove to be, the United
States in 1872 did not see its way clear in preventing it by
force ; accordingly no revenue cutter was sent to Bering Sea.

Each succeeding year witnessed an increase in pelagic
sealing. New vessels were being fitted out every season to
engage in the exceedingly profitable occupation of seal hunt-
ing in and about the [)asses of the Aleutian Islands, and fre-
quent incursions were made for tlie same purpose into Bering
Sea. Continued protests from the Alaska Company found
their way to Washington, and evidence of the gradual dimi-
nution of the herd through the wanton slaughter of seals by
the pelagic .hunters was repeatedly furnished to the autliori-
ties of the Treasury Department. It soon became distress-
ingly apparent that unless seal hunting in the open sea could
be prevented, the total extinction of the animals was a question
of only a few years.

Now if the United States could establish a claim of ynarc
clausum over Bering Sea, the problem of ways and means
of preventing pelagic sealing in Bering Sea would be solved.

THE FUR-SEALS AND THE BERING SEA AWARD 15

Could the same exclusive dominion be established over that
sea that the United States exercised over Ciiesapeake Ba}'
or Long Island Sound, her right to control its waters would
be complete. Then, with Revenue cutters on guard duiing
the season of the migration of the seals, marauders could
be warned away or their vessels seized and condemned under
the statute laws of 1808 and 1870 (^Supra). The temptation
to set up a claim of mare clausion was great.

In 1881, D. A. d'Ancona, Collector of the Port at San
Francisco, disturbed by reports of sealing expeditions which
were being fitted out in British Columbia, wrote to the Treas-
ury Department (as had his predecessor, ]Mr. Phelps, in
1872), asking for more definite information regarding the
extent of American dominion in Bering Sea. The reply of
Mr. French, Acting Secretary of the Treasur}-, March 12,
1881, marks a complete reversal of the position assumed by
the government in 1872, as expressed in Mr. Boutwell's letter
already referred to. Mr. French wrote as follows : —

You inquire into the interpretation of the terms " waters
thereof and "waters adjacent thereto," as used in the law,
and how far the jurisdiction of the United States is to be under-
stood as extending.

Presuming your inquiry to relate more especially to the waters
of western Alaska, you are informed that the treaty with Russia
of March 30, 1870, by which the territory of Alaska was ceded to
the United States, defines the boundary of the territory so ceded.
The treaty is found on pages (571 to ()7.'^ of the volume of treaties
of the Revised Statutes. It will be seen therefrom that the limit
of the cession extends from a line starting from the Arctic ocean
and running through Behring Strait to the north of St. Lawrence
Islands. The Yme runs then in a southwesterly direction, so as to
]tass midway between the island of .\ttou and Copper island of
the Komondorski couplet or group in the North Pacific Ocean, to
meridian of 193 of west longitude. All the waters icithi'n that
bonrtdary to the ivestern end of the Aleutian Archipelnr/o and chain
of I shut ds are considered as comprised within the waters of Alaska

I territory."

I

I Thus it will be seen that in order to gain the right to pro-

j tect seals while in Bering Sea, the United States yielded to

16 AMERICAN DIPLOMATIC QUESTIONS

the temptation and assumed jurisdiction over the entire
stretch of its waters (east of the imaginary line designated as
the boundary line of Alaska), claiming it to be a mer fermee^
or closed sea, in the same category indeed as any coastwise
harbor, notwithstanding the fact that Bering Sea is of vastly
greater geographical extent than any harbor. While believ-
ing herself justified in so doing, the United States made no
actual captures of sealing vessels at that time. Pelagic sealing
nevertheless continued. In 1886 Mr. Manning, Secretary
of the Treasury, addressed a letter to Collector Hagan of
the port of San Francisco, affirming the ruling of Acting
Secretary French, as follows : —

I transmit herewith for your information a copy of a letter
addressed by the Department on the 12th of March, 1881, to D. A.
d'Ancona, concerning the jurisdiction of the United States in the
waters of the territory of Alaska and the prevention of the killing
of fur-seals and other fur-bearing animals within such areas as
prescribed by chapter 3, title 23, of the Revised Statutes. The
attention of your predecessor in office was called to the subject on
the 4th of April, 1881. This communication is addressed to you,
inasmuch as it is understood that certain parties at your port con-
template the fitting out of expeditious to kill fur-seals in these
waters. You are requested to give due publicity to such letters,
in order that such parties may be informed of the construction
placed by this Department upon the provision of law referred to."

Fortified by this further statement of the government's
position regarding United States control of the waters of
Bering Sea, the Treasury officials on the Pacific coast deter-
mined to take a stand against further poaching in what had
been declared by their chief to be American waters. Accord-
ingly the United States revenue cutter Corwin proceeded to
Bering Sea, and in August of tliat year (1886) seized three
British vessels, — the Omvard, Carolina, and Thornton, — all
being at the time of their seizure considerably more than
three miles from shore. They were engaged as alleged, in
capturing seals in violation of Section 1956 of the Revised
Statutes of the United States, which made it unlawful to kill
seals " within the limits of Alaska territory or in the waters
thereof.'" These three vessels were taken to Sitka, tried

THE FUR-SEALS AND THE BERING SEA AWARD 17

before the District Court of Alaska, their masters found guilty,
and the vessels were accordingly confiscated and condemned
to be sold. In the trial of these vessels their owners advanced
the following argument in defence of their rights: —

The first question then to be decided is what is meant by the
"waters thereof.'' If the defendants are bound by the treaty between
the United States and Russia ceding Alaska to the United States,
then it ap])ears that Russia in 1822 claimed absolute territorial
sovereignty over the Behring Sea, and purported to convey practi-
cally one-half of that sea to the United States. But are the defend-
ants, as men belonging to a country on friendly terms with the
United States, bound by this assertion of Russia ? And can the
United States claim that the treaty conveys to them any greater
right than Russia herself possessed in these waters ? la other
words, the mere assertion of a right contrary to the comity of
nations can confer on the grantees no rights in excess of those
recognized by the laws of nations.

It also appears that the United States in claiming sovereignty
over the Behring Sea is claiming something beyond the well-recog-
nized law of nations, and bases her claim upon the pretensions of
Russia, which were successfully rejnidiated by both Great Britain
and the United States. A treaty is valid and binding between
the parties to it, but it cannot affect others wlio are not parties to
it. It is an agreement between nations, and would be construed
in law like an agreement between individuals. Great Britain was
no party to it and therefore is not bound by its terms.

Tlie American position, on the other hand, may well be
presented in the following words taken from the charge to
the jury, made by Judge Dawson of the District Court of
Alaska iu the libel proceeding against these vessels: —

All the waters within the boundary set forth in this treaty to
the western end of the Aleutian archi])elago and chain of islands
are to ])e considered as comprised within the waters of Alaska,
and all the penalties prescribed by law against the killing of fur-
beariiig animals must, therefore, attach against any violatiou of
law within the limits heretofore described.

If, therefore, the jury believe from the evidence that tlic drfeiid-

ants by themselves or in conjunction with others did, on or about

the time charged in the information, kill any otter, mink, nuii'tt'U,

sable, or fur-seal, or other fur-bcariug animal or auinials, on the

c

18 AMERICAN DIPLOMATIC QUESTIONS

shores of Alaska or in the Behring Sea, east of the one hundred
and ninety-third degree of west longitude, the jury should find
the defendants guilty.

In delivering this charge to the jury, Judge Dawson acted
under the advice of the Attorney General in Washington,
and the United States was now fully committed to the policy
of maintaining at any cost its position of absolute ownership
of the Bering Sea east of the line described in the treaty for
the cession of Alaska as marking the western boundary of
that dominion. The seizure and condemnation of these three
British vessels were immediately followed by a formal protest
from the British Minister in Washington, Sir Lionel Sackville-
West (letter of October 21, 1886).

An issue, accordingly, was squarely presented for future
diplomatic negotiations. Pending further discussion, Presi-
dent Cleveland very properly ordered all proceedings against
the three vessels stopped. The following summer, however,
the United States revenue cutter Richard Rush arrested
more British sealing vessels, — the W. P. Sawyard^ the Dol-
phin^ the Grace, the Anna Beck, and the Alfred Adams.
These, like the vessels captured the year before, were all
taken outside the ordinary zone of marine jurisdiction, and
their seizure intensified the feelings of resentment against the
United States that had already been manifested in Canada
after the condemnation proceedings of the previous year.
Another British protest quickly followed (Sackville-West to
Bayard, October 12 and 19, 1887), and the question, now
fairly launched into the sea of diplomatic discussion, became
the subject of a spirited correspondence.

In the meantime, however, Secretary of State Bayard had
made an attempt to find a settlement of the difficulty in an
international agreement for the regulation of the fur-seal
industry. Notes were addressed to Great Britain, France,
Germany, Russia, Japan, Norway and Sweden, inviting those
powers to "enter into such arrangement with the Govern-
ment of the United States as will prevent the citizens of either
country from killing the seals in Bering Sea at such times and
places and by sucli methods as at [)resent are pursued, and

THE FUR-SEALS AND THE BERING SEA AWARD 19

which threaten the speedy extermination of those animals
and consequent loss to mankind." It was ordered that no
seizures of sealing vessels be made during the season of 1888,
and the negotiations for international agreement seemed
promising for a successful issue, when, in June of that year,
the Marquis of Salisbury announced his intention of with-
drawing from the proceeding. This was owing to a request
received by him from the Canadian government to await the
completion of a memorandum it was preparing upon the sub-
ject of American and Canadian interests in Bering Sea. As
England's cooperation in any scheme of settlement of the
difficulty was absolutely necessary, the negotiations for an
international agreement, so happily begun, were unfortu-
nately abandoned.

During the autumn of 1888, a careful examination of the
" Bering Sea Question " was undertaken by a House commit-
tee, and an attempt was also made to obtain from Congress
a revision of the laws of 1868 and 1870 relating to Alaskan
fisheries, that should define more strictly the meaning of the
phrase employed in the old statutes, — "Alaska and the waters
thereof." There was lacking an unanimity of opinion in
Congress regarding the ri/hf of the United States to prevent
pelagic sealing by making captures of offending foreign
vessels when operating outside the ordinarily accepted three-
mile limit of marine jurisdiction. The press of the country,
and perliaps the greater weight of popuhir sentiment, inclined
toward the belief that a legal sanction could be found to justify
the seizures of these British vessels and Judge Dawson's deci-
sion was generally indorsed. Nevertheless, an irritating doubt
as to the authority of the United States to maintain jurisdic-
tional claims in the Bering Sea haunted the Senate corridors.
The extent and general configuration of that body of water
seemed to preclude tlie idea of a closed sea, — especially in
the light of the well-known fact tliat the modern tendency of
international usage was to restrict the scope of marine juris-
diction. All agreed that pelagic sealing was a pernicious
pi-actice and higlily detrimental to American interests, and
although the attempt to stop it hy force seemed to many a

20 AMERICAN DIPLOMATIC QUESTIONS

questionable proceeding, yet the policy, — "when in doubt, err
on the side of your country's cause," — prevailed. At all
events, any definite expression of Congress defining the vague
words, "or in the waters thereof," was most desirable.

The House passed a bill declaring that : " That section
1956 of the Revised Statutes of the United States was
intended to include and apply, and is hereby declared to apply
to all the waters of Bering Sea and Alaska embraced within
the boundary lines mentioned and described in the Treaty
with Russia, dated March 30, 1867, by which the territory
of Alaska was ceded to the United States. . . ." Senator
Sherman, Chairman of the Committee of Foreign Relations,
objected to the measure on the grounds that it "involved
serious matters of international law . . . and ought to be dis-
agreed to and abandoned, and considered more carefully here-
after." The House resolution was, however, amended and
passed the Senate March 22, 1880, as follows : —

" That Section 1956 of the Revised Statutes of the United
States is hereby declared to include, and apply to, all the
Dominion of the United States in the waters of Bering Sea."

The measure then, as finally passed, was no more explicit
in its object of determining the extent of United States juris-
diction in Bering Sea waters than was the law of 1868, for
what the State Department had especially called for and
desired was a definition by Congress of the very words
" Dominion of the United States in the waters of Bering Sea."

In March, 1889, the Harrison administration fell heir to the
responsibilities of maintaining the American position in this
controversy. Ex-Secretary Foster, in the North American
Revieiv of December, 1895, thus clearly states the situation as
it existed at that time : —

Three courses were open to President Harrison, and one of
them must b^ chosen without further delay. First: He could
abandon the claim of exclusive jiu'isdictiou over Bering Sea or
protection of the seals beyond the three-mile limit, recede from the
action of his predecessor as to seizure of British vessels and pay
the damages claimed therefor. Such a course would have met
with the general disapproval of the nation, and would have been

THE FUR-SEALS AND THE BERING SEA AWARD 21

denounced by his political opponents as a base betrayal of the
country's interests. Second : He could have rejected the argu-
ments and protests of the British Government, and continued the
policy initiated by his predecessor in the seizure of all British
vessels engaged in pelagic sealing in Bering Sea. But this course
had already been proposed to President Cleveland and decided to
be improper. The Hon. E. J. Phelps, who, as Minister to Great
Britain, had conducted the negotiations with Lord Salisbury
growing out of the seizures of 188G and 1887, in a lengthy de-
spatch to Secretary Bayard, reviewing the conduct of Canada
which had prevented an adjustment once accepted by Lord Salis-
bury, made the following recommendation : " Lender these circum-
stances, the Government of the United States must, in my opinion,
either submit to have these valuable fisheries destroyed or must
take measures to prevent their destruction by capturing the ves-
sels employed in it. Between these two alternatives it does not
appear to me there should be the slightest hesitation. ... I
earnestly recommend, therefore, that the vessels that have been
seized while engaged in this business be firmly held, and that
measures be taken to capture and hold every one hereafter found
concerned in it. . . . There need be no fear that a resolute
stand on this subject will at once put an end to the mischief
complained of." But this recommendation of Mr. Phelps was not
aj)proved by Mr. Bayard, who was unwilling to adopt a course
which might bring about a rupture with Great Britain, the prob-
able outcome of which would have been an armed conflict. In
view of this decision and the state of public sentiment, with a
prevailing opinion in a large part of the press and with public men
that the attitude of the government was legally unsoiind, and that
the interests involved did not under the circumstances stated jus-
tify the hazard of a great war between these two English-speaking
nations, the adoption of this second alternative by President Har-
rison would have been the height of madness. The only remain-
ing alternative was arbitration.

The idea of arbitration came only after a desperate attempt
throunfli a (lij)lomatic corres[)ondence with the Britisli foreign
office to establish the legality of the American position and to
justify United States seizures of the British vessels that had
already been made on the high seas.

No arrangements having been made to abandon the sealing
operations pe)iding a final settlement of the question, several
captures of British schooners were effected in the summer

22 AMERICAN DIPLOMATIC QUESTIONS

season of 1889, and the friendly relations between England
and the United States became very much strained. The
British Government resolved to take a firmer stand against
further molestation of their subjects engaged in catching
seals upon what they contended were the high seas, and before
the summer of 1890 opened, it presented through the note of
Sir Julian Pauncefote of June 14, 1890, the following vigorous
protest : —

The undersigned, Her Britannic Majesty's envoy extraordinary
and minister plenipotentiary to the United States of America, has
the honor, by instruction of his government, to make to the Hon.
James G. Blaine, Secretary of State of the United States, the fol-
lowing communication : —

Her Britannic Majesty's Government have learned with great
concern, from notices which have appeared in the press, and the
general accuracy of which has been confirmed by Mr. Blaine's
statements to the undersigned, that the Government of the
United States have issued instructions to their revenue cruisers
about to be despatched to Behring Sea, under which the vessels of
British subjects will again be exposed, in the prosecution of their
legitimate industry on the high seas, to unlawful interference at
the hands of American officers.

Her Britannic Majesty's Government are anxious to cooperate
to the fullest extent of their power with the Government of the
United States in such measures as may be found to be expedient
for the protection of the seal fisheries. They are at the present
moment engaged in examining, in concert with the Government
of the United States, the best method of arriving at an agreement
upon this point. But they cannot admit the right of the United
States of their own sole motion to restrict for this purpose the
freedom of navigation of Behring Sea, which the United States
have themselves in former years convincingly and successfully
vindicated, nor to enforce their municipal legislation against Ihit-
ish vessels on the high seas beyond the limits of their territorial
jurisdiction.

Her Britannic Majesty's Government are therefore unable to
pass over without notice the puV)lic announcement of an intention
on the part of the Government of the United States to renew the
acts of interference with British vessels navigating outside the
territorial waters of the United States, of which they have pre-
viously had to complain.

\

THE FUR-SEALS AND THE BERING SEA AWARD 23

The undersigned is in consequence instructed formally to pro-
test against such interference, and to declare that Her Britannic
Majesty's Government must hold the Government of the United
States responsible for the consequences that may ensue from acts
which are contrary to the established principles of international
law.

Mr. Blaine, the Secretary of State, had in the meanwhile
entered upon a lively correspondence with Lord Salisbury
in defence of the American case. Every argument that
could be brought to bear upon the subject in su})port of the
American position was marshalled by this brilliant states-
man in opposition to the English contention of a full legal
right to catch seals in the Bering Sea, or indeed in any
other sea not 7ner fermee outside of the three-mile limit from
shore.

Casting aside for the time all claims to mare clausimi, Mr.
Blaine urged that, " In the opinion of the President, the
Canadian vessels arrested and detained in the Behring Sea
were engaged in a pursuit that was in itself contra honos
mores^ a pursuit which of necessity involves a serious and
permanent injury to the rights of the Government and pco[)le
of the United States." In support of this argument he re-
viewed the history of sealing, alleging that ''• Those fisheries
had been exclusively controlled by the Government of Russia,
without interference and without question, from their origi-
nal discovery until the cession of Alaska to the United States
in 1867. From 1867 to 1886 the possession in which Russia
had been undisturbed was enjoyed by this government also.
There was no interruption and no intrusion from any source.
Vessels from other nations passing from time to time througli
IJehring Sea to the Arctic Ocean in pursuit of whales had
always abstained from taking part in the cajjture of seals.
This uniform avoidance of all attem[)ts to take fur-seal in
those waters had been a constant recognition of the right
held and exercised first by Russia and sul)se({ucntl3' by this
Government." He dwelt with [jarticular emphasis uj)on the
destructive character of pelagic sealing. '"The killing of
seals in the open sea involves the destruction of the female

24 AMERICAN DIPLOMATIC QUESTIONS

in common with the male. The slaughter of the female seal
is reckoned as an immediate loss of three seals, besides the
future loss of the whole number which the bearing seal may
produce in the successive years of life. The destruction
which results from killing seals in the open sea proceeds,
therefore, by a ratio which constantly and rapidly increases,
and insures the total extermination of the species within a
very brief period. It has thus become known that the only
proper time for the slaughter of seals is at the season when
they betake themselves to the land, because the land is the
only place where the necessary discrimination can be made
as to the age and sex of the seal. It would seem, then, by
fair reasoning, that nations not possessing the territory upon
which seals can increase their numbers by natural growth,
and thus afford an annual supply of skins for the use of man-
kind, should refrain from the slaughter in open sea, where
the destruction of the species is sure and swift."

"The entire business," he continued, "was then (before
1889) conducted peacefully, lawfully, and profitably — profita-
bly to the United States, for the rental was yielding a moder-
ate interest on the large sum which this government had
paid for Alaska, including the rights now at issue ; profitably
to the Alaskan Com[)any, which, under governmental direc-
tion and restriction, had given unwearied pains to the care
and development of the fisheries ; profitably to the Aleuts,
who were receiving a fair pecuniary reward for their labors,
and were elevated from semi-savagery to civilization and to
the enjoyment of schools and churches provided for their
benefit by the government of the United States ; and, last of
all, profitably to a large body of English laborers who had
constant employment and received good wages." Led on by
the impetus of his own reasoning, he attempted to set up a
prescriptive right acquired b}^ Russia through the acquiescence
of all nations in her large claim of jurisdiction over Bering
Sea. He asked, "Whence did the ships of Canada derive the
right to do in 1886 that which they had refrained from doing
for more than ninety years ? Upon what grounds did Her
Majesty's Government defend in the year 1886 a course of

THE FUR-SEALS AND THE BERING SEA AWARD 25

conduct in the Behring Sea which she had caiefulh' avoided
ever since the discovery of that sea? By what reasoning did
Her Majesty's Government conclude that an act may be com-
mitted with impunity against the rights of the United States
which had never been attempted against the same rights when
held by the Russian Empire ? " To justify further the Ameri-
can assertion of right in this case to seize foreign vessels, when
outside the three-mile limit and engaged in the pernicious prac-
tice of pelagic sealing, he called Lord Salisbury's attention to
parallel cases where England asserted the same privileges.
" It is doubtful whether Her Majesty's Government would
abide by this rule if the attempt were made to interfere with
the pearl fisheries of Ceylon, which extend more than twenty
miles from the shore line, and have been enjoyed by England
without molestation ever since their acquisition. . . . Nor is
it creditable that modes of fisliing on the Grand Banks, alto-
gether practicable but highly destructive, would be justified
or even permitted by Great Britain on the plea that the
vicious acts were committed more than three miles from
shore." No laws of tlie sea or land, however supported by
the approval of nations, should be used to protect acts in
themselves vicious or harmful to the world's best interest. To
quote again : "• In the judgment of this government the law
of the sea is not lawlessness. Nor can the law of the sea and
the liberty which it confers and which it protects, be per-
verted to justify acts which are immoral in themselves, which
inevitably tend to results against the interests and against
the welfare of mankind. One step beyond that which Her
Majesty's Government has taken in this contention, and piracy
finds its justification."

In reply to Mr. Blaine's argument. Lord Salisbury, in be-
half of England's position, stoutly maintained that in times
of peace no nation was privileged to seize and search upon
the high seas the private vessel of a friendly nation, save
upon the susjjicion of piracy, or in pursuance of some special
agreement. Continuing: '"But Her Majesty's (iovernment
must question whether this pursuit can of itself be regarded
as contra bonos mores^ unless and until, for special reasons, it

26 AMERICAN DIPLOMATIC QUESTIONS

has been agreed by international arrangement to forbid it.
Fur-seals are indisputably animals ferce naturce, and these
have universally been regarded by jurists as res nullius until
the}' are caught ; no person, therefore, can have property in
them until he has actually reduced them into possession by
capture. It requires sometliing more than a mere declara-
tion that the govennnent or citizens of the United States, or
even other countries interested in the seal trade, are losers
by a certain course of proceeding, to render that course an
immoral one. Her Majesty's Government would deeply re-
gret that the pursuit of fur-seals on the high seas by British
vessels should involve even the slightest injury to the people
of the United States. If the case be proved, they will be
ready to consider what measures can be properly taken for
the remedy of such injury, but they would be unable on that
ground to depart from a principle on which free commerce
on the high seas depends."

In answer to Mr. Blaine's contention that Russia had
gained a prescriptive right, through her exclusive control of
the Bering Sea fisheries, from the discovery of Alaska until
1867, and that the United States had since that date come
into possession of, and had continued to enjoy, these same ex-
clusive rights (thereby establishing more firmly her own pre-
scriptive title), Lord Salisbury referred to tlie numerous
American and English official protests (already mentioned
supra'), against the early Russian assumptions in Bering Sea.
He quoted as well the words of many prominent Ameri-
can statesmen, that had been uttered in condemnation of
Russia's illegal claims over the high seas in excess of the
ordinary three-mile limit of marine jurisdiction. In further
refutation of Mr. Blaine's argument, he furnished a long
list of British vessels tliat had been engaged in the pursuit
of sealing in Bering Sea since the acquisition of Alaska by
the United States. To Mr. Blaine's assertion that " The
President is persuaded that all friendly nations will concede
to the United States the same rights and privileges on the
lands and in the waters of Alaska which the same friendly na-
tions always conceded to the Empire of Russia" — he frankly

THE FUR-SEALS AND THE BERING SEA AWARD 27

replied : " Her ]Majestj"s Government have no difficulty in
making such a concession. In strict accord with the views
which, previous to the present controversy, were consistently
and successful!}' maintained by the United States, they have,
whenever occasion arose, opposed all claims to exclusive privi-
leges in the non-territorial waters of Behring Sea. The rights
they have demanded have been those of free navigation and
fishing in waters which, previous to their own acquisition of
Alaska, the United States declared to be free and open to all
foreign vessels."

"That is the extent of their present contention and they
trust that, on consideration of the arguments now presented
to them, the United States will recognize its justice and
moderation."

Not in the least disconcerted by these arguments from Lon-
don, nor by Lord Salisbury's seemingly clear exposition of the
principles of international law touching the case, iNIr. Blaine
again entered tlie lists with his adroit pen. He critically re-
viewed the history of Russian and American claims in the
Bering Sea, and by an ingenious argument to substantiate
his contention of a prescriptive right in the United States to
control the waters of Bering Sea, he endeavored to prove
tliat tlie protests of John Quincy Adams, and of otlier American
statesmen referred to by Lord Salisbury, against the Russian
claims of the ukase of 1821, were directed, not against Rus-
sian claims in Bering Sea proper, but only against the Russian
assertions to exclusive jurisdiction from Bering Strait along
the entire northvest coast of America to the fifty first parallel of
latitude. " Against this larger claim of authority," he urged,
(viz., extending farther south on the American coast to
the 51° north latitude), "Mr. Adams vigorously protested."
Mr. Blaine, therefore, drew a distinction between the
" Bering Sea," as sucli, and the " Pacific Ocean," main-
taining that the United States had never opposed bv word or
deed Russia's claim to exclusive jurisdiction north of tlie
Aleutian Islands, i.e. the Bering Sea, but liad only denied
Russia's right to exercise such control of the waters south of
the Aleutian Islands, i.e. the Pacific Ocean, and as expressed

28 AMERICAN DIPLOMATIC QUESTIONS

in the ukase of 1821 by the words, "All along the north-
west coast of America, from Bering Strait to the 51st parallel
of latitude." He endeavored further to show that the Eng-
lish protests against Russian sovereignty over the Paciiic
Ocean were made with a similar intention and meaning, and
therefore concluded, — Why should not the United States
enjoy the same exclusive jurisdiction over the waters of
Berinof Sea, that Russia had asserted and maintained without
opposition during so long a period of years ?

Lord Salisbury denied the correctness of Mr. Blaine's inter-
pretation of the words " Pacific Ocean," and insisted that by
the terms of the ukase the " Pacific Ocean " extended to
Bering Strait, and included the Bering Sea, and that, there-
fore, the American and English protests before referred to
were actually directed against Russian claims in the Bering
Sea, as well as against her claims over the ocean south of the
Bering Sea. He attacked the implied American contention
of mare clausuni as applied to the Bering Sea, and offered in
the end to arbitrate the whole matter.

The drift of these arguments had brought the American
and English contentions to a single issue, — the question
whether the protests of both the United States and England
against the hundred-mile limit of Russian sovereignty in the
Pacific Ocean from Bering Strait down the northwest coast of
America to 51° latitude, and down the Siberian coast to the
45° 50' latitude, were directed against those Russian claims in
the Bering Sea, or onl}^ in the Pacific Ocean exclusive of the
Bering Sea. Had Russia really been unmolested in her extra-
ordinary assumption of sovereignty in the waters of Bering
Sea, or had her claims been met and opposed by foreign pro-
test? Obviously, the discussion liinged upon the meaning of
the words '■' Pacific Ocean." Mr. Blaine, accepting this issue,
went so far as to say : "If Great Britain can maintain her
position that tlie Behring Sea at tlie time of the treaties with
Russia of 1824 and 1825 was included in the Pacific Ocean,
the erovernment of the United States has no well-"rounded
com[)laint against her. If, on the otlier hand, this govern-
ment can prove beyond all doubt that the Behring Sea, at

THE FUR-SEALS AND THE BERING SEA AWARD 29

the date of the treaties, was understood by the three signa-
tory powers to be a separate body of water, and was not
included in the phrase ' Pacific Ocean,' then the American
case against Great Britain is complete and undeniable."

Further argument was useless. Both powers stood firmly
by their respective positions, and the case, stripped of non-
essentials by the exhaustive pleadings of the English pre-
mier and the American Secretary of State, had been
narrowed down to comparatively simple issues. The ques-
tion called for an immediate settlement. That same year,
1890, the twenty-year lease of the Alaska Commercial Com-
pany expired, and the North American Commercial Company
succeeded with a fresh twenty-year lease. The seal herd
had by this time become greatly reduced in numbers, and
ample evidence was furnished by the alarming annual de-
crease of the size of the herd to demonstrate that the total
extinction of the species was already a promise of the near
future, unless some arrangement with England could be
made to prevent pelagic sealing. Canadians were deter-
mined to exercise their right of catching seals upon the high
seas, and the United States Government had become equally
determined to seize and condemn any vessel found " poach-
ing " in Bering Sea. It was feared that the following sea-
son's operation in Alaskan waters might bring the dreaded
clash between the two great powers. Their interests in the
North Pacific seemed hopelessly to conflict ; their determina-
tions to protect their own subjects in the exercise of their
so-believed respective rights were firmly fixed, and their
patience and good will were already sorely tried. It was
at this critical stage of the controversy the two nations
happily agreed to sul)mit the matter to a tribunal of arbi-
tration.

Owing to tliis rapid decline in numbers of seals resorting
to the islands, the North Ameiican (/ompany was restricted
by a Treasury order to a catch of only 20,000 pelts for the
year 1890, and pending the negotiation of a treaty of arbi-
tration, the ff)llowing agreement with England was effected
June 15, 1891 : —

30 AMERICAN DIPLOMATIC QUESTIONS

Modus Vivendi.

1. Her Majesty's Government will prohibit, until May next,
seal killing in that part of Behring Sea lying eastward of the line
of demarkation described in Article No. 1 of the treaty of 1867
between the United States and Russia, '* and will promptly use
its best efforts to insure the observance of this prohibition by
British subjects and vessels."

2. The United States Government will prohibit seal killing for
the same period in the same part of Behring Sea, and on the
shores and islands thereof, the property of the United States (in
excess of 7,500 to be taken on the islands for the subsistence and
care of the natives), and will promptly use its best efforts to
insure the observance of this prohibition by United States citi-
zens and vessels.

3. Every vessel or person offending against this prohibition in
the said waters of Behring Sea outside of the ordinary territorial
limits of the United States, may be seized and detained by the
Naval or other duly commissioned officers of either of the High
Contracting Parties, but they shall be handed over as soon as
practicable to the authorities of the nation to which they respec-
tively belong, who shall alone have jurisdiction to try the offence
and impose the penalties for the same. The witnesses and proofs
necessary to establish the offence shall also be sent with them.

4. In order to facilitate such proper inquiries as Her Majesty's
Government may desire to make, with a view to the presentation of
the case to that government before arbitrators, and in expectation
that an agreement for arbitration may be arrived at, it is agreed
that suitable persons designated by Great Britain will be per-
mitted at any time, upon application, to visit or to remain upon the
seal islands during the present sealing season for that purpose.

Signed and sealed in duplicate at Washington, etc.

The adoption of the modus vivendi put off, for a time at
least, all danger of collision in P)ering Sea, and the diplomatic
agents of England and the United States set about framing a
treaty and preparing a way for the trial of the cause. In the
meantime English and American vessels were sent to
Berinof Sea to control the waters wherein seals were to be
found and to enforce the modvs vivendi. The commanders
of these vessels were given full libert}'^ to search suspected
ships under either flag, and to arrest all offenders.

In accordance with the aoreement in the modus vivendi„

THE FUR-SEALS AND THE BERING SEA AWARD 31

Great Britain appointed Sir George Baden-Powell, INI. P.,
and Professor George Mercer Dawson commissioners to pro-
ceed to the Pribyloff Islands for the purpose of examining
into the fur-seal fisheries. On the part of the United States,
Dr. C. Hart Merriam and Professor Mendenhall were se-
lected in like capacity the following February.

Diplomatic efforts were immediately directed to shaping
the disputed questions for inclusion in the proposed treaty,
and to preparing the issues in succinct form for presentation
to a tribunal of arbitration. In this matter some slight diffi-
culty was experienced by Sir Julian Pauncefote, Mr. Whar-
ton, and Mr. Blaine, especially in reference to questions
touching the liabilities of each for injuries alleged to have
been sustained by the other by reason of killing seals in
liering Sea, or through arrests, etc. In November a com-
promise agreement was reached u[)on the phraseology of this
troublesome count ; having framed all the issues, the nego-
tiators were finally able to sign a treaty at Washington on
February 29, 1892.

The instrument opens with an expression that "The
United States of America and Her Majesty the Queen of
the United Kingdom of Great Britain and Ireland, being
desirous to provide for an amicable settlement of the ques-
tions which have arisen between their respective governments
concerning the jurisdictional rights of the United States in
the waters of Behring Sea, and concerning also the preser-
vation of the fur-seal in, or habitually resorting to, the said
sea, and the rights of the citizens and subjects of either coun-
try as regards the taking of fur-seal in, or habitually resorting
to, the said waters, have resolved to submit to arbiti-atiou the
questions involved. ..."

The parties then detei-mined upon a tril)unal to l)e composed
of seven arbitrators, two to be appointed by the Piesident of
the United States, two to be named ])y her Britannic Majesty,
one to be named by the President of the French Republic,
and one each by the King of Italy and the King of Sweden
and Norway. The arbitrators were to meet in Paris within
a stipulated time.

32 AMERICAN DIPLOMATIC QUESTIONS

The following five points, conceived to be the real issues in
the case, were expressed as foUow^s, the award to embrace a
separate decision upon each : —

1. What exclusive jurisdiction in the sea now known as
the Behring's Sea, and what exclusive rights in the seal fish-
eries therein, did Russia assert and exercise prior and up to
the time of the cession of Alaska to the United States?

2. How far were these claims of jurisdiction as to the seal
fisheries recognized and conceded by Great Britain?

3. Was the body of water now known as the Behring's Sea
included in the phrase " Pacific Ocean," as used in the treaty
of 1825 between Great Britain and Russia ; and what rights,
if any, in the Bering's Sea were held and exclusively exercised
by Russia after said treaty ?

4. Did not all the rights of Russia as to jurisdiction, and as
to the seal fisheries in Behring's Sea east of the water bound-
ary, in the treaty between the United States and Russia of
the 30th March, 1867, pass unimpaired to the United States
under that treaty?

5. Has the United States any riglit, and if so, what right
of protection or property in the fur seals frequenting the
islands of the United States in the Behring's Sea when such
seals are found outside the ordinary tliree-mile limit ?

The question of regulations was treated in the seventh
article of the convention as follows : —

If the determination of the foregoing questions as to the exclu-
sive jurisdiction of the United States shall leave the subject in
such position that the concurrence of Great Britain is necessary
to the establishment of regulations for the proper protection and
preservation of the fur-seal in, or habitually resorting to, the
Behring Sea, the arbitrators shall then determine what concurrent
regulations outside the jurisdictional limits of the respective Gov-
ernments are necessary, and over what waters such regulations
should extend, and to aid them in tliat determination the report
of a joint commission to be a))pointed by the respective (iovern-
ments shall bo laid before them, with such other evidence as
either Government may submit.

The high contracting parties furtliermore agree to cooperate in
securing the adhesion of other powers to such regulations.

THE FTU-SEALS AND THE BERING SEA AWARD 33

The eighth article of tlie treaty left the question of liabilities
for injuries alleged to have been sustained by the citizens of
either country in connection with the arrests and condemna-
tion of the English sealing vessels to be determined by the
arbitrators upon the submission to them of all the facts.

Agreeabl}' to the terms of the ninth article of the treaty,
by which '' Each government shall appoint two commissioners
to investigate conjointly with the commissioners of the other
government all the facts relating to seal life in Bering Sea,
and the measures necessary for its proper protection and pres-
ervation," Sir (leorge Baden-Powell, Member of Parliament,
and Dr. Dawson were retained by Great Britain, as were Dr.
Merriam and Professor Mendenhall by the United States, to
act as such commissioners. With full instructions to investigate
thoroughly the conditions of seal life and to ascertain what
permanent measures were necessary for the preservation of
the fur-seal species in the North Pacific Ocean, tlie joint com-
mission proceeded to Bering Sea and set to work gath-
ering material for the use of their respective governments in
the arbitration trial to be held in Paris. It is not a little
remarkable that side by side four scientists prosecuting the
same line of inquiry, considering together the same evidence,
and reading together the same incontrovertible facts, should
have arrived at such widely different conclusions. I'he
impartial observer must yield to the suspicion that the con-
clusions of the connnissioners were colored l)y a desire to fur-
ther the interests of their countries, and that their scientitic
investigation had not l)een wholly free from a trace of diplo-
macv. The American commissioners found overwhelminof
evidence to establish in their minds beyond all questions of
iloubt the fact tliat the seal lierd had greatly diminished in
size, and that such condition had been chiefly brought about
by the destructive practice* of pelagic sealing. They conse-
quently recommended its entire suppi-ession. Subsequent
history has proved the correctness of these conclusions, and
it is to V)e regi-etted that tlie case in Paris was complicated by
tlie radically differing leport of the British commissioners.
'I'hev, on the other hand, somewhat beurudcrinu-lv admitted a

34 AMERICAN DIPLOMATIC QUESTIONS

falling off in seal life, for which circumstance they insisted
that the killing on the islands by the American company was
the main cause, and they also discovered that pelagic sealing
in itself was not necessarily destructive to the herd. As a
remedy, if indeed a remedy were called for by existing condi-
tions, they proposed severe restrictions in relation to the num-
ber of seals annually taken upon the islands, and as an area of
protection to the seals, recommended a marine belt of ten
miles about the Pribyloff Islands, within which no pelagic
sealing should be permitted.

These two very contradictory reports necessarily formed
the basis for the consideration of tlie Paris tribunal, whose
office it was to determine a future course of action looking to
the preservation of seals in Bering Sea.

The tribunal met in Paris in the spring of 1893, and con-
tinued its sessions well into the summer. The arbitrators
chosen were Baron de Courcel (France), Marquis Emilio
Visconti-Venosti (Italy), M. Gregario W. W. Gram (Sweden
and Norway), Lord Hannan and Sir John S. D. Thomp-
son (England), and Justice John M. Harlan and Senator
John T. Morgan (United States). The American case was
conducted through the agency of the Hon. John W. Foster
(who had succeeded Mr. Blaine as Secretary of State), to-
gether with Edward J. Phelps, James C. Carter, Frederick
R. Coudert, and Henry Blodget as counsel.

Although it had been expressly disavowed by Mr. Blaine
that the United States put forth any claim to mare clausum
over the Bering Sea, it is nevertheless impossible to consider
the American position before the tribunal in Paris as other-
wise than an attempt to justify such a contention. While no
direct and formal allegation of the ap[)licability of the prin-
ciples of mare clanniim a[)pear in the proceedings, the United
States nevertlieless songlit to make good its position in Bering
Sea by maintaining tlie pi'opriety of early Russian assertions
of dominion over those waters, — or over at least a liundied-
mile belt about their shores. These Russian claims in Bering

THE FUR-SEALS AND THE BERING SEA AWARD 35

Sea cannot well be regarded other than assertions of mare
clausum ; and the attitude of the United States, taking shelter
behind these early Russian assumptions, necessarily committed
her in defence of those claims and principles. Again, the
United States, in attempting to justify herself for having ex-
ercised an alleged right of search upon vessels of a friendly
nation outside of her own legally recognized territorial waters,
and in the absence of treaty stipulations authorizing her to do
so, necessarily claimed sovereignty over the sea wherein the
acts of visit and search had been committed. There can be
no right of police over the high seas in times of peace other
than as directed against suspected common enemies or pirates,
and its exercise must assume proprietorship.

In the early days of Spanish and Portuguese exploration and
conquest, vast oceans were demanded as the property of the
State. With the growth of the British navy, ceilain exag-
gerated claims to marine proprietary rights were, for a period,
advanced by England ; but the spirit of modern times has
been so decidedly hostile to all attempts to estal)lish dominion
over the sea that to-day civilized nations are disposed to tol-
erate no infraction, however slight, of the broad principle of
mare liberum. The ultimate extent to which " territorial
waters " may be urged in accordance with the present law of
nations, includes only a marine belt of three miles along the
open coast, and all harbors and bays whose openings to the
sea do not exceed in width ten to twenty miles, or in general,
sucli inland bodies of water, the narrowness of whose entrances
from tlie sea and whose configuration clearly indicate them
to be enclosed seas. The United States has always been con-
spicuously foremost in tlie advocacy of freedom of the high
^'■as; slie was indccMl the first to protest against Russian lui-
willingness to accept tliese enlightened j)rinciples in the Pa-
cific. It is to be regretted that in this matter the United
States should have appeared before the tribunal and the civ-
ilized world in the unfortunate liglit of taking a step backward
in order to resuscitate and reclothe a defunct mediicval doctrine.

The American case supported the contention that Russia
had acquired (hnninion over Bering Sea Ijy prescription, — a

36 AMERICAN DIl^LOMATIC QUESTIONS

right or title gained by immemorial use. Alexander I. had
made formal proclamation of this title in his ukase of 1821,
and counsel contended that Russia had ever after enjoyed full
and undisturbed possession of her asserted proprietary right
over Bering Sea until by treaty of 1867 she had parted with
such rights to the United States. And it was urged that the
long period of time that Russia had remained in open adverse
possession of those waters, exercising all the privileges a
nation enjoys over a territorial expanse of sea without protest
or hindrance, had given her a full and complete prescriptive
title, — which title passed unimpaired to the United States.

The question of Russia's undisputed exercise of her alleged
rights in Bering Sea came before the tribunal as an issue of
fact to be proved or disproved by weight of evidence, and
the legal aspect of the question oi prescription^ its applicability
to the present case, and its scope and force as a principle of the
law of nations, were not touched upon by the arbitrators. It
may well be doubted that even had Russia really been left
undisturbed, as alleged, in her occupation of Bering Sea for a
century or more, a prescriptive right to its waters would conse-
quently ensue. There is abundant authority in international
law to demonstrate that rights gained through immemorial
usage do not appertain to the sea. All rights of navigation, fish-
ing, etc., upon the high seas are of a nature that do not depend
upon constant use for their validity. They may be used at
will, or never used at all, — for non-use cannot imply relin-
quishment. Because a nation never sailed a vessel across
the sea may she forever be denied the privilege? Because a
nation has alone fished in a distant sea may she forever bar
her neighbor from fishing there as well ? Again, it is con-
ceived that prescriptive titles may be acquired only in such
things as are inherently capable of acquisition, always imply-
ing an oi'iginal or })rior grant constituting at least a color of
title. It is incompatible with the doctrine of the freedom of
tlie high seas to sujipose any one nation is caj)able of ac(iuir-
ing riglits therein above, or greater than, tlie common rights
of all nations. Few in time past, and no one to-day, ventures
to assert that Berins: Sea falls within that class of enclosed

THE FUR-SEALS AND THE BERING SEA AWARD 37

waters which form an exception to the general rule of mare
liberum, or open free sea. Such then being the case, it is
almost certain that, even had the fact of universal acquiescence
in Russia's claims of dominion north of the Aleutian Islands
been satisfactorily proved, a resulting prescriptive title would
not have been accorded by any impartial tribunal.

It appeared at once that the American contention of Russia's
exclusive sovereignty could not be maintained. Reliance had
been placed in evidence afforded by certain Russian documents
to establish Russia's prescriptive right to jurisdiction over
those waters, and as a natural seqidtur the similar American
rights acquired by purchase. The testimony in question, upon
closer scrutiny, was found to be false, and the American case,
unsupported by proof, failed upon the first and second points.

The third point in the case, involving the true meaning of
the term " Pacific Ocean," as employed by Russia and Eng-
land in a treaty of 1825, and which in the full comprehensive-
ness of its meaning included the Bering Sea, was decided
unanimously in favor of the English contention. This
refuted Mr. Blaine's argument that English and American
expressions of protest against Russian assumptions in tlie
North Pacific had never been directed against Russian oper-
ations north of the Aleutian Islands or in Bering Sea. The
object of this count was to strengthen the American prescrip-
tive title to the waters of the Bering Sea in the event of deci-
sion favorable to the United States. But this issue having
already been disposed of adversely to the United States in
the first two counts, its value and importance were conse-
quently lost.

Failing, then, in tlie first three points in the case, the fourth
one became meaningless to the United States and was dropi)ed
without comment. This left the fifth and last issue in the
case, the only one upon which the American commissioners
could take a firm stand; the main force of the American
argument was brought to ])car upon it in an endeavor to
establish a right of property iji, or actual ownei'ship of, the
seals, and a consequent right of the United States to protect
its own property upon tlie high seas.

38 AMERICAN DIPLOMATIC QUESTIONS

The right of property in animals ferce naturce ordinarily
held or capable of acquisition by individuals or communities
was discussed at great length in an exhaustive argument by
Mr. Carter who endeavored to demonstrate the rightful Ameri-
can ownership of the seals. On this question, he urged:
" The United States hold that the ownership of the islands
upon which the seals breed ; that the habit of the seals in
regularly resorting thereto and rearing their young thereon ;
that their going out in search of food and regularly returning
thereto, all the facts and incidents of their relations to the
islands, — give to the United States a property interest
therein. . . ."

The common and civil law was ransacked for cases to sup-
port this claim, and a remarkably ingenious argument was
presented. The question was practically a unique one in
the field of international law, and no precedent could be
quoted either to sustain or defeat the American contention.
The common and civil laws recognized two classes of ani-
mals, — first, those that are domesticated and tame, such as
cattle, horses, dogs, etc., and in which man may possess abso-
lute ownership ; and secondly, those animals which wander
about at free will and are of a wild disposition, designated as
ferce naturce. In this latter class, man might enjoy, under
certain conditions, qualified property rights. When such
creatures are captured and detained, they become personal
property so long as they may be kept in actual possession ;
but the moment they escape and gain their liberty, property
right in them instantly ceases, unless, indeed, they wander
away animo revertendi, an intention according to habit of
returning, in which case a certain qualiHed ownership may
still exist. But the exact extent and scope of this property
right in animals fcra' 7iatura' that have left their confines
but purpose eventually to return are not altogether clear.
The particular and peculiar natures of the many species of
animals that may serve man and still be considered under tlie
head of animals ferce naturce^ are questions well calculated
to confuse jurists and tend to make generalization upon the
subject impossible. Thus, the owner of a swarm of bees

THE FUR-SEALS AND THE BERING SEA AWARD 39

loses no property rights in the bees when they fly away to
gather honey in fields other than his own ; but, upon the
same principle, it might be pertinently asked could Canada
claim in the United States the flocks of wild geese and ducks
that are hatched and bred about the northern Canadian
lakes but pass the winter seasons in the United States ; or,
could the United States claim in Canada the deer, elk, or
buffalo that cross for a day the northern frontier?

The seals could be considered domestic animals only by a
strain of the imagination, and as animals ferce naturce they
are born and live for a period of time each year on American
soil, and when they take their departure it is always with the
intention of returning. By analogous arguments, therefore,
from common law sources, the United States might have been
shown to possess a qualified property right in these animals,
sufficient even to Avarrant their protection when outside of
American jurisdiction upon the high seas. But to have
established such a right in the United States would have
been to recognize and to tolerate a violation of much better
established principles of international law, — the absolute
freedom of the high seas.

The arbitrators (the American commissioners dissenting)
decided against the American contention, holding, "That
the United States have no right to protection of, or property
in, the seals frequenting the islands of the United States in
Bering Sea, when the same are found outside the ordinary
three-mile limit."

Thus the American case was lost \\]}0\\ each and every legal
point involved. The United States was held to possess no
greater right in Bering Sea than was possessed in common by
all nations. The seals were considered to be animals strictly
ferce naturce^ and consequently, res nullius, or incapable of
ownei"ship when outside of national jurisdiction, or upon the
high seas.

Therefore all nations had a natural and perfect right to
catch these animals in any open sea, and consequently if any
restrictions upon these rights, or any regulations of sealing,
were to be effected, such could properly be made only through

40 AMERICAN DIPLOMATIC QUESTIONS

mutual consent and agreement of the parties concerned and
by treaty stipulation.

Having thus disposed of the legal question involved in the
dispute in a manner adversely to American interests, the com-
missioners took up the report of the scientific experts upon
the conditions of seal life in the North Pacific and upon the
Pribyloff Islands. They sought diligently through the laby-
rinth of conflicting testimony for a solution of the practical
question which was to preserve the seal herds.

Their deliberations finally took form in a set of regulations
which, by the terms of the treaty authorizing the tribunal,
should be binding equally upon the United States and Eng-
land. Briefly, the regulations were, first, there shall be no
killing of seals at any time or season within a zone of sixty
miles around the Pribyloff Islands ; second, from May 1 ta
July 31 shall be considered a closed season, within which
time subjects or citizens of neither power shall engage in
pelagic sealing in Bering Sea and the North Pacific Ocean
within the area described as " the high part of the sea in that
part of the Pacific Ocean, inclusive of Behring Sea, situated
north of the 35th degree of north latitude, or eastward of the
180th degree of longitude from Greenwich until it strikes
the water boundary described in Article 1 of the treaty of
1867 between the United States and Russia, following that
line up to Behring Straits ; " third, at other times, or during
the open season, only sailing vessels shall be permitted to take
part in sealing operations within such area ; fourth, these ves-
sels shall be provided with a proper license, etc. ; fifth, mas-
ters will record all catches in a log ; sixth, the use of nets^
fire-arms, or explosives are positively forbidden, though the
use of shotguns in the Pacific OcCan south of Bering Sea is
permissible. The regulations were to remain in force until
wholly or in part abolished through common consent of the
United States and Great Biitain, — and "Said concurrent
regulations sliaJl he mhmitted every five years to a new ex-
aynination in order to enable both governments to consider
whether in the light of past experience there is occasion to
make any modification thereof." The method of enforcing

THE FUR-SEALS AND THE BERING SEA AWARD 41

these regulations was left to the respective governments, with
the obligation of enacting each succeeding year such legisla-
tion as might be necessary to the proper enforcement of the
award. A recommendation was also made, in view of the
" critical condition to which it appears certain that the race
of fur-seals is now reduced," that the two governments
should agree to abstain from all killing of seals, either on sea
or on land, for a period of two or three years. This excel-
lent suggestion, to be acted upon only by the will of the two
powers, unfortunately was not accepted.

Despite all adverse criticism, there can be no doubt tliat
the arbitrators, in thus framing a series of regulations for the
protection and preservation of the fur-seals, acted conscien-
tiously and to the best of their knowledge. In performing
their duty of establishing a code of laws for the protection of
the fur-seal species, the task of the commissioners was a pecu-
liarly difficult one, far more so indeed than had been the bur-
den of adjudicating upon the purely legal questions involved
in the controversy. The arbitrators were at once confronted
and overwhelmed with a hopeless mass of variable and con-
flicting testimony concerning every feature of seal life, and
as jurists their steps were uncertain in the provinces of natu-
ral science. They desire first and foremost to provide a
system of laws that should be effective in protecting the seals
from extermination, and they wished as well, in accordance
with the natural ini})ulse of a judicial body, to place the
deprivations of enforced abandonment of a profitable indus-
try equally and equitably upon the subjects of both nations,
so far as proper and consistent with tlie primary and main
objects of the regulations.

i'he award and regulations were accepted witli becoming
grace by both countries. For a time murmurs of discontent
were heard frf)m the Canadian sealers, who at first believed
that the restrictions on pelagic sealing would forever ruin
their industry. A certain amount of bitterness against the
award and the legal conclusion of the arbitrators was also
api)arent for a season in many American newspapers, con-
tributed by those "who could not recover too suddenly from

42 AMERICAN DIPLOMATIC QUESTIONS

their mare clausum convictions regarding Bering Sea, and
who perhaps regarded all boards of international arbitration
as but sorry exponents of justice.

An Act of Congress was passed April 5, 1894, enforcing the
award as to American citizens, and some slight friction be-
tween the two powers was caused by the delay of the British
government in effecting concurrent legislation in relation
to British subjects. Orders in Council were shortly after
enacted (April 18, 1894), and the sealing season of 1894, the
first under the new regime, opened.

Notwithstanding the general feeling of satisfaction with
the award that soon succeeded a period of doubts concerning
its justice, it became apparent, at the close of the sealing season
the following autumn (1894), that the regulations were inade-
quate, and that they had evidently been made without that
accurate and scientific knowledge of seal life and conditions
which the authors of the articles should have possessed. The
pelagic catch was unusually and alarmingly large. Including
the captures made on the Asiatic side during the closed season
of May, June, and July, the number of skins taken at sea
amounted altogether to about 142,000 — a figure greatly in
excess of any previous year's catch.

Actual operations in Bering Sea soon developed the fact
that the sixty-mile inhibitive zone about the Pribyloff Islands
was entirely insufficient in extent to protect the seals. The
females, and occasionally the young males or bachelors, as
already shown, are in the habit, during the breeding season,
from May until December, of wandering away in search of
food, even to a distance of 200 miles at sea; they do not,
as the commissioners evidently presumed, remain on or near
the shores of the islands. They are driven to make these long
excursions on account of the scarcity of food near the shore,
a result naturally arising from the presence of so great a
number of animals subsisting entirely upon fish and other
forms of marine life. On the first of August, and the end of
the closed season, the sealing schooners appeared in force in
the Bering Sea and reaped a ricli harvest just without the
protective zone of sixty miles that had been established by

THE FUR-SEALS AND THE BERING SEA AWARD 43

the regulations about the Pribyloff Ishxnds. A majority of
the animals thus taken were females, and at that particular
time every female has dependent upon her a young seal. The
death of the mother invariably results in the death of the
"•pup" who awaits her return on shore. The unusually
high mortality of the young seals on the rookeries during
the season of 1894 gave silent testimony to the destructive
character of pelagic sealing in Bering Sea, for having de-
ducted from the total of dead " pups " found on the breeding-
ground whose deaths had resulted from overcrowding and
accident, an alarming proportion remained to indicate starva-
tion as the principal cause. The difficulty also of enforcing
the observance of a line of demarcation between protected
and unprotected waters, sixty miles at sea and entirely out of
sight of land, became apparent, and especially in this region
of dense and almost perpetual fog.

The main objection to the regulations, however, was dis-
covered to be in the shortness of the closed season (May 1
to July 31), during which time no seals were to be captured
within the geographical limits already given. The fleet of
sealing vessels ordinarily begins its operations in January,
when the seals are at the soutliern extreme of their annual
migration, and follows the herd in a northerly direction along
the coast, during the early spring months. Stationing them-
selves in and about the passes of the Aleutian Islands, to
which points the seals converge on their long swim to the
Bering Sea, the hunters were enabled vastly to increase their
catch. At tlie beginning of the closed season, the sealing
captains crossed over to the Asiatic side of Bering sea and
preyed upon the unprotected herds of the Commander and
Robin islands, to return again about August 1 to the vicinity
of the Pribyloff rookeries, where they hovered about, causing
great destruction to the herd, until the approaching storms
of autumn warned all sailing craft to leave tliose open
waters. The statistical results of the first season's operations
in Bering Sea and the North Pacific furnished ample grounds
for belief that tlie regulations had fallen far short of accom-
plishing the object for which they had been made. Secretary

44 AMERICAN DIPLOMATIC QUESTIONS

of the Treasury Carlisle, in answer to a House resolution,
said that from the statistics of the pelagic catch of 1S94, "-it
becomes evident that during the present season there has
been an unprecedented increase over preceding years in the
number of seals killed by pelagic sealers, both in American
and Asiatic waters. This increase has caused an alarming
decrease in the number of seals on the islands. . . .
The alarming increase in the number of seals killed by the
pelagic sealers . . . emphasizes the conclusion expressed
in my annual report to Congress that long before the
expiration of the five years, when the regulations enacted
by the tribunal of arbitration are to be submitted to the
respective governments for reexamination, the fur seal will
have been practically exterminated." jNIr. Gresham, Secre-
tary of State, expressed to the British Ambassador his anxiety
concerning the future welfare of the seals in his letter of
January 23, 1895: ". . . It would appear that there were
landed in the United States and Victoria 121,143 skins,
(operation of season 1891), and that the total pelagic catch,
as shown by the London trade sales and careful estimates of
skins transshipped in Japanese and Russian ports, amounts
to about 142,000, a result unprecedented in the history of
pelagic sealing. . . . This startling increase in the pe-
lagic slaughter of both the American and Asiatic herds has
convinced the President, and it is respectfull}^ submitted
cannot fail to convince Her Majesty's Government, that
the regulations enacted by the Paris Tribunal have not oper-
ated to protect the seal herd from that destruction which
they were designed to prevent, and that, unless a speedy
change in the regulation be brought about, extermination of
the herd must follow."

Further cause for American dissatisfaction in the matter
was found in the alleged indifference manifested by the
English Government in assuming its full share of obliga-
tion in the enforcement of the regulations. In the Act of
Congress (April 5, 1891), enforcing the Paris award for
that season, a section had been introduced to the effect that
if any licensed sealing vessel should be found within the

THE FUR-SEALS AND THE BERING SEA AWARD 45

waters covered by the award " having on board apparatus or
implements suitable for taking seals, but forbidden tlien and
there to be used (fire-arms), it shall be presumed that the . . .
apparatus or implements . . . were used in violation of this
act until it is otherwise sutliciently proved." Thus the burden
of proof was placed upon all masters of American sealing
craft, when arms were f(n-ljidden, to show when found in their
possession, that the same had not been used for the purpose
of killing seals. When enacting laws for the enforcement
of a Russian vivendi in 1891, the British Government had
deemed it proper to adopt this rule of evidence, ^ but in
1894, in the Orders in Council carrying into effect the Paris
award as to British subjects, this important provision was
omitted. In the absence of such equivalent legislation on
the part of Great Britian, the American sealing captains
were placed upon an unequal footing with their Canadian
brethren, and manifestly at a great disadvantage when
br(jught before the court charged witli violation of the law
forbidding the use of fire-arms in the capture of seals. In
his letter of May 10, 1895, to Sir Julian Pauncefote, Mr.
Uhl, then Acting Secretary of State, said in reference to this
question of evidence : —

"... Experience has shown it to be almost a practical
impossibility to detect a sealing vessel in the act of using
firearms for this one proliibited purpose. Although the search-
ing officer may be morally certain that firearms have been
used, and may properly consider the mere presence of fire-
arms on the vessel, if accompanied with bodies of seals, seal-
skins, or other suspicious evidence, sufficient justification
(even apart from the provisions of Section 10 of the Act of
Congress of April 6, 1894, which is applicable only to Amer-
ican vessels) for the sei/Aire of such a vessel, it must be
apparent that in proceedings for condemnation brought in a
court thousands of miles away from the place of seizure it

' " If a Rritish ship is found within Borini; Sea liavin.ic <>" board thrroof tish-
ing or shootinj? iinph'iiicnts or sealskins, or bodies of seals, it shall lie on the
owner or master of such ship to prove that the ship was not used or employed
In contravention of this Act." —(June IG, 1891, ',:i and 54 Victoria, Chapter 19.)

46 AMERICAN DIPLOMATIC QUESTIONS

would be almost impossible to secure conviction and forfeiture
on the ground of illegal use of weapons. Furthermore, under
the procedure necessarily following the seizure of a British
vessel the United States officer delivers the vessel, with such
witnesses and proof as he can procure, to the senior British
naval officer at Unalaska. At tlie trial no representative of
our Government is present, and the British Government must
conduct the prosecution and must trust to such proofs and
witnesses as the American officer could collect and furnish at
the time. Under such circumstances forfeiture of the vessel
could not be secured except in the clearest cases of guilt."

Suspicion also arose that England did not fully meet the
United States in the desire and determination to protect the
seals, because she had deemed a single war vessel sufficient for
the purpose of patrolling the North Pacific and Bering Sea
during the closed season of 1894, notwithstanding the fact that
the Canadian fleet of sealing schooners was almost twice as
large as the American fleet. The United States, on the other
hand, had despatched twelve armed vessels to the scene of
action, and so zealous had been their commanders in the per-
formance of their duties, that a score or more of complaints
from outraged shipowners for the too frequent, needless,
and fussy overhauling of their schooners were filed in
Washington.

At the close, then, of the first season's sealing operations
under the regulations of the Paris award, the " Bering Sea
question " again became acute. The most noticeable effect
of the enforcement of a closed season upon the American
side of the Pacific had been to drive the entire American and
Canadian sealing fleets across the ocean during the months of
May, June, and July, to take advantage of tliat favorable
period in attacking the Asiatic herds in and about Japanese
and Siberian waters. The resulting increase in the slaughter
of the Asiatic herds startled Japan and Russia. They imme-
diately expressed a desire to have the restiictive measures of
the Paris award extended to their side of the Pacific, and a
correspondence ensued with that end in view.

Thoroughly convinced of the inadequacy of the laws

THE FUR-SEALS AND THE BERING SEA AWARD 47

which had been framed to protect the seals from threatened
extermination, a strong appeal was made by Secretary
Gresham for English assent to a revision of the regulations.
His desire was to enlarge the closed season and also to
prohibit all pelagic sealing in Bering Sea.

The statistics of the year's catch, gathered from Canadian
sources, diii'ered from the American estimates, making the
total somewhat less ; the English Government, seeing no
immediate cause for alarm for the future welfare of the
herd, were not favorably inclined to making any changes in
the existing laws governing sealing operations. While still
engaged, however, in discussing tlie situation, the spring
months advanced, the sealing fleets cleared from their winter
ports, and the season of 1895 opened without any modifica-
tion of the regulations.

The statistical returns from the North Pacific and Bering
Sea at the end of the season of 1895 (the second under the
award), were not of a character to relieve apprehension ; they
served only the more firmly to convince the American Gov-
ernment that its fears for the future of the seal lierds were
well grounded, and that appeals for British consent to a
modification of the regulations were reasonable and proper.
Mr. Olney wrote Sir Julian Pauncefote, Maich 11, 1896.

... I desire also to call your attention to the unprecedentedly
large catch of seals in Bering Sea during the past season. The
total was 44,1^)9, as compared with .31,585 during the season of
1894. This is by far the largest catch ever made in Bering Sea, and
it is believed that another catch of similar size for the coming sea-
son will almost completely exterminate the fur-seal herd. I am
advised that the greater portion of the seals killed at sea were
females.

The total catch during the last season in the North Pacific
and I»ering Sea from the American herd was 56,291, as compared
with total for 1894 of 61,8.38, the small falling off being due to
the inclemency of the weather between January and May along
the northwestern coast, and also to the diminution of the seal
herd. . . .

In the spring of 1896 Russia again displayed some anxiety
for the welfare of her own sealing industry on the Asiatic

48 AMERICAN DIPLOMATIC QUESTIONS

side of Bering Sea, and broached the subject of an agreement
to extend the provisions of the Paris award to her side of the
Pacific Ocean. The Secretary of State eagerly seized this
opportunity to gain an ally, and Mr. Bayard, the American
Ambassador to Great Britain, was instructed to cooperate
with and aid the Russian representative in London in his
endeavors to secure Eng^land's consent to such legislation.
These laudable efforts on the part of Russia were not destined
to meet the success they deserved. Lord Salisbury received
the overtures with indifference and proposed to send two scien-
tific experts to the Bering Sea to make further investigations
into the conditions of seal life as affected by the regulations
and award, and incidentall}^ to extend their researches to the
Commander and Robin islands. Accordingly Mr. D'Arcy
Thompson and Mr. Macoun, on the parts of England and
Canada, proceeded to Bering Sea, to remain throughout the
season of 1896. Professor David Starr Jordan, a biologist of
great ability, was sent on tlie part of the United States to
cooperate with these English scientists and to make with
them a thorough and exhaustive study of the subject.

It was sincerely hoped in Washington that this scientific
commission, unlike the former one of 1892, would be enabled
to agree upon findings of fact, and that it might also reach
harmonious conclusions in relation to proper remedial legis-
lation. By proofs furnished through her own experts it was
expected, as it was greatly desired, to convince the English
Government of the necessity of a revision of the rules gov-
erning pelagic sealing, and to overcome, if possible, their stolid
determination to stand for the full five years on the letter
of the law regardless of consequences.

The season of 1896 opened with no changes in the regula-
tions; the mixed Canadian and American scientific commis-
sion were at the Pribyloff Islands, and several American and
British armed vessels patrolled the seas in search of violators
of the sealing laws.

Professor Jordan's report appeared early the following win-
ter, disclosing facts truly alarming to the government that had
struggled so earnestly to protect the herd. After noting

f

THE FUR-SEALS AND THE BERING SEA AAYARD 49

carefully the gradual decrease in the size of the American
herd from the beginning of pelagic sealing in 1880 to
about the year 1886, then showing that since that period
the steadily increasing rate of diminution of the number of
seals was in a direct ratio to the increasing size of the sealing
fleets, and further calling attention to the continuous and
rapid decline of seal herds in the last few years, — Dr. Jordan
was forced to the conclusion that " pegalic sealing . . .
has been the sole cause of the continued decline of the fur-
seal herds. It is at present the sole obstacle to their restora-
tion and the sole limit of their indefinite increase. It is
therefore evident that no settlement of the fur-seal question
as regards either the American or Russian islands can be per-
manent unless it shall provide for the cessation of the indis-
criminate killing of fur-seals, both on the sealing grounds and
on their migrations. There can be no open season for the kill-
ing of females if the herd is to be kept intact."

Dr. Jordan recommended that Congress should enact laws
absolutely prohibiting Americans from engaging in pelagic
sealing at any time or season. Such legislation, he believed,
would furnish an excellent example to England, and would
place the United States in a strong position for pressing her
arguments against the capture of seals at sea. As a final resort,
in case no understanding could be effected with Great Britain
looking to the prevention of all pelagic sealing, he recom-
mended the expediency of branding with hot irons all the
female seals upon tlie Pribyloif Islands, thereby rendering
their pelts commercially worthless, but in no manner injuring
the seals. This, he thought, would protect them from the
onslaughts of the pelagic hunters and enable the Pribyloff
herd to maintain itself by keeping up the yearly average
birth-rate.

The President was much concerned by the seriousness of the
situation as depicted l)y Dr. Jordan. He was again moved to
make strenuous efforts to induce Lord Salisbury immediately
to enter upon negotiations for a revision of the existing regula-
tions. The latter, however, would not accede to the Presi-
•dent's wish. Professor D'Arcy Thompson, in his report soon

50 AMERICAN DIPLOMATIC QUESTIONS

after made public in England, found substantially the same
facts and conditions as were reported by Dr. Jordan, but he
deduced therefrom a less startling conclusion. He saw no im-
mediate cause for alarm in the continuation of pelagic sealing,
but believed the killing of young males, — the "bach-
elors," — on the islands, as practised by the chartered Amer-
ican Company, to be highl}'^ destructive to the herd and
altogether a pernicious method. Basing its action upon these
findings and conclusions, the British Government failed to
see any urgent necessity for a modification of the regulations
before the end of the stipulated five years ; it declined flatly
to consider the matter at that time.

This refusal of the British Government to heed the warn-
ings so plainly written in all the statistical reports of sealing-
operations since 1894, and their stubborn determination not to
yield to the solicitations of the United States for a revision
of the laws, caused much disappointment at Washington.
Being thoroughly convinced that the Paris regulations
were ineffectual, — indeed, that they utterly failed to fulfil
the expressed object of their creation, — the United States
received with less grace each year the refusal of Great Britain
to consent to their revision. There was little consolation in
the reflection that Great Britain, in thus declining to act,,
stood squarely upon her rights under the Paris rules. These
only called upon the parties to submit the regulations " every
five years to a new examination in order to enable both
governments to consider in the light of past experience if
there is any occasion to make any modification thereof."'
England was consequently under no legal obligation what-
ever to reopen the question before the close of the season of
1898, and by that time it was feared in the United States-
there would be no seals left to consider in any light whatso-
ever.

Apart from her legal exemption, it was felt in Washington
that Great Britain was at least under a moral obligation to
consent to an immediate reexamination of rules that were
manifestly so defective. It was urged that the rules were
created for a definite puri)Ose ; they had since been proven to-

THE FUR-SEALS AND THE BERING SEA AWARD 51

be not only useless, but positivel}^ barmful, in tbat tbey
served to protect a nefarious practice. Hence the duty was
plain to alter them as soon as possible. England's reply, to
the effect that in her estimation the laws were not defective
and could well await the proper time for revision, seemed to
the American officials an extraordinary conclusion to draw
from the facts, — a conclusion so little in accord with all rea-
sonable deductions that it seemed unaccountable. The ad-
ministration was perplexed and annoyed. With some show
of feeling, the Secretary of State, Mr. Sherman, wrote to Mr.
Hay, the American Ambassador in London (May 10, 1897) : —

. . . On the other hand, I think I have shown that the British
Government has from the beginning and continuously failed to
respect the real intent and spirit of the Tribunal or the obliga-
tions imposed by it. This is shown by the refusal to extend the
regulations to the Asiatic waters ; by the failure to put in opera-
tion the recommendation for a suspension of the killing of the
seals for three, for two, or even for one year ; by the neglect to
put the regulations in force until long after the first sealing season
had been entered on; by the almost total evasion of the patrol
duty; by the opposition to suitable measures for the enforcement
of the prohibition against firearms ; by the omission to enact legis-
lation necessary to secure conviction of the guilty; and by the
refusal to allow or provide for an inspection of skins in the inter-
est of an honest observance of the regulations. ... A course so
persistently followed for the past three years has practically accom-
plished the commercial extermination of the fur-seals and brought
to naught the patient labors and well-meant conclusions of the
Tribunal of Arbitration. . . .

Congress displayed a similar feeling of resentment by con-
sidering a bill providing for the slaughter of the entire
American herd on tlie Pribyloff Islands the following season.
This very radical suggestion might be regarded as the flonrisli
of a trump card. It probably was intended to demonstrate
in a striking manner the fact that the United States could
speedily end tlie controvei-sy over the heads of all concerned,
and it was thereby hoped to arouse the London foreign office
from its attitude of indifference toward the question of the
seals. The measure seems, nevertheless, to have been seri-

52 AMERICAN DIPLOMATIC QUESTIONS

ously considered ; it actually passed the Lower House, though
it failed to reach a vote in the Senate.

However discouraging the failure to gain English consent
to modif}^ the sealing regulations for the season of 1897, a
hope still lingered that some form of action might yet be
taken by the two governments during the summer and au-
tumn of 1897, which would anticipate by one year the revision
of the sealing laws, and spare the diminishing herds the last or
fifth season's (1898) slaughter. Mr. John W. Foster and
Mr. Charles S. Hamlin, whose familiarity with the Bering
Sea questions especially fitted them for the duties involved,
were appointed in April, 1897, — " Seal Commissioners " : they
were instructed to bring about, if possible, and at an early
date, a general conference of delegates from the various
powers interested, to meet in Washington for the purpose of
coming to some understanding and settlement of the seal
question. Russia and Japan promptly accepted the invita-
tion to participate at such a conference, but Great Britain
demurred. The foreign office granted a willing consent to
a joint meeting of scientific experts to take place in the
autumn, " in order by due consideration of the reports drawn
up by the said experts to arrive at correct conclusions respect-
ing the condition of the seal herd frequenting the Pribyloff
Islands." It will be remembered that Professor Thomp-
son and Dr. Jordan were asfain in the field makino- final
observations upon the conditions of seal life, and their return
to their respective countries was expected in the autumn.
The British Government, however, was decidedly opposed to
a meeting at that time of regularly appointed diplomatic
agents with plenary powers to make a treaty — as it objected
to a convention of agents whose admissions would be in any
manner binding upon their governments. Even at such a
meeting of experts. Lord Salisbury objected to the presence
of delegates from Russia or Japan, which nations he declared
had no experts "in a position corresponding to that of the
commissioners who have been carrying on their investiga-
tions upon the Pribyloif Islands during the past two years.''
He further asserted as a sufficient reason for the exclu-

THE FUR-SEALS AND THE BERING SEA AWARD 53

sion of their delegates from the proposed technical confer-
ence, that " neither of the two countries in question possess
any direct interest in the herd frequenting those islands "
(Pribyloff).

The folly of seeking a settlement of the sealing ques-
tion without England's cooperation was at once recognized.
The sympathy of third parties might be grateful, but what
the United States really desired was England's consent
to amend or alter the conditions of a bad contract. The
British Government were especially unwilling to discuss the
merits or faults of the regulations with Japan or Russia, for
the simple reason that neither of these powers was in any
manner bound by them. Great Britain very properly declined,
fiirtliermore, to confer upon an equal footing with parties out-
side the compact. The English Secretary for Foreign Affairs
no doubt shrewdly suspected that England would be outvoted
in the conferences where Russian, Japanese, and American
interests would be identical and likely opposed to those of
Great Britain.

Upon the failure to secure English cooperation, the first
impulse of the American commissioners was to abandon the
projected conferences altogether, and to recall their invitations
from St. Petersburg and Tokio; but the enthusiasm which
was displayed by Russia and Japan in the cordial responses
of those powers to the American invitation made the with-
drawal of the United States from the negotiations extremely
awkward, if not impossible. It was also hoped by jNIr. Foster
and Mr. Hamlin that England might yield at the last moment
and send a diplomatic representative to the proposed conven-
tion. This hope proved a disappointment, for the conference
n[)ened in Washington (October, 1897), with the vacant
chair of the English delegate foreboding an impotent conclu-
sion to the meetings.

The agents of the three powers (Russia, Japan, and tlie
Inited States), soon came to unanimous conclusion that
under existing regulations the fur-seals inhabiting the North
Pacific Ocean and Bering Sea were "threatened with extinc-
tion, and that an international agreement of all tlie intcicsted

54 AMERICAN DIPLOMATIC QUESTIONS

powers is necessary for their adequate protection." To make
these conclusions more effective, the three powers entered into
a written agreement, calling for an international conference
to devise a new system of laws for the protection of the seals.
The agreement also prohibited pelagic sealing, so far as their
own subjects were concerned, until such prospective regula-
tions could be brought into force. This convention, signed
November 6, 1897, was of course made conditional upon
the adherence of Great Britain ; accordingly the instrument
was at once presented to the British Government, with an
urgent plea for its consent to become a party thereto.

Without awaiting a reply from Great Britain, Congress
passed a bill in December, 1897, prohibiting the killing of
seals by American citizens in the North Pacific Ocean, except
as they may be taken by the North American Commercial
Company on the Pribyloff Islands. The act also prohib-
ited the importation of sealskins into the United States,
whether ''raw, dressed, dyed, or manufactured," except
under most burdensome conditions. The object of this legis-
lation was not only to prevent Americans from engaging in
pelagic sealing, but also to discourage this practice in others
by destroying the American market for the skins. Its authors
no doubt hoped to force Great Britain into a treaty prohibit-
ing pelagic sealing.

Lord Salisbury declined to give his sanction to the provi-
sional treaty of Russia, Japan, and the United States. He
wrote to Mr. Hay (December 23, 1897) "... in the opinion
of Her Majesty's Government, no useful purpose could be
served by their taking into consideration at the present
moment the question of their adhesion to this convention " ;
and again (January 12, 1898), "It has been the wish of
Her Majesty's Government that an agreement shouhl be
arrived at on the seal fisliery question as well as on other
matters pending between the United States and Canada, but
they cannot in the present circumstances adliere to the con-
vention, which would inflict a serious injury on Her Majesty's
Canadian subjects, and which in their opinion is not required
for the protection of the seals in the open sea, while it makes

THE FUR-SEALS AND THE BERING SEA AWARD 55

no provision for restricting the destruction of the seals on the
Pribilof Islands by the American Company."

The provisional treaty, therefore, found an early grave in
the waste basket. In the meanwhile, however, events of
seemingly greater importance toward a final settlement of the
troublesome questions were transpiring in Washington. Im-
mediately following the conclusion of the convention between
the United States, Russia, and Japan, the proj)osed joint meet-
ing of the English, Canadian, and American scientific experts
took place (November 18, 1897). At this auspicious meet-
ing, the scientists were enabled to agree, and the resulting
joint statement of their conclusions in regard to sealing con-
ditions promised well for future successful negotiations with
Great Britain. At last there was a common basis of fact
upon which the two nations could stand in their deliberations
for a new set of regulations. Most important of all for Amer-
ican interests, these conclusions of the experts virtually sus-
tained the American position, calling for the very remedial
measures which the United States Government had been
striving to bring about for four years. The commissioners
agreed that there was ample evidence since the year 1884
that the fur-seal herd of the Pribyloff Islands had declined
greatly in numbers, but at a varying rate from year to year ;
that from given data, the former yield of the islands was
from three to five times as great as in 1896 and 1897 ; that
the death among the young fur-seals was very great ; that
actual count of these and of the females upon the islands con-
firms tlie belief in the diminution of the herd ; that a marked
decrease was to be noted in the twelve months from 1896 to
1897 ; that the method of driving and killing practised on
the islands by the American Chartered Company calls for no
criticism or objection ; that pelagic sealing involves the kill-
ing of males and females alike ; that the reduction of males
effected on the islands causes an enhanced proportion of fe-
males to be found in the pelagic catch (62 to 84 per cent) ;
that a large pro^jortion of females in the pelagic catch includes
not only adult females, ])oth nursing and ju'cgnant, but also
young seals ; that the polygamous liabit of tlie animal coupled

56 AMERICAN DIPLOMATIC QUESTIONS

with an equal birth-rate of the two sexes permits a large num-
ber of males to be removed with impunity from the herd ;
that the killing of females far in excess of the natural yearly
increment is the cause of the reduction of the herd ; that
actual extermination of the herd is not threatened so long as
the seals are protected on the island ; that the diminution of
the herd had already reached the point when the sealing in-
dustry either at sea or on the islands had become unprofitable.

Sir Wilfred Laurier, the Canadian Premier, and Sir Louis
Davies, Minister of Marine from Ottawa, happened in Wash-
ington during the course of the meetings of the seal experts.
Negfotiations of an informal character were then and there
entered upon with them for the purpose of temporarily set-
tling the sealing question upon the basis of the joint findings
of the scientific commission, the object being to bring about
as soon as possible a formal consideration of the question by
the British and the United States Governments. Mr. Foster's
proposal, however, for a modus vivetidi " providing for a com-
plete suspension of the killing of seals in all the waters of the
Pacific Ocean and Bering Sea for one year from December, 1897,
and for a suspension of all killing of seals on the Pribyloff Islands
for the same period," was not favorably received by the Cana-
dians. " There are difficulties in agreeing to that proposition
which I fear will be found insuperable," wrote Sir Wilfred Lau-
rier to Mr. Foster. " The fleet is preparing as usual ; the pro-
hibition of pelagic sealing for a year would practically destroy
the business for several years, because the masters, the mates,
and the crews, for the larger part belonging to other parts
of Canada, would leave British Columbia. The sum which
would likely be demanded as compensation is far beyond
what it would be possible for us to induce Parliament to vote,
even if we could recommend it. . . . I am in hopes that
you will not press for the immediate suspension of pelagic
sealing." So these efforts toward a preliminary discussion
of the regulation proved after all to be fruitless.

This last attempt, like the many others on the part of the
United States to induce Great Britain to modify the Paris
sealing regulations of 189-3 before the end of the stipulated

THE FUR-SEALS AND THE BERING SEA AWARD 57

five years, having failed, the Secretary of State had no alterna-
tive but to fall back upon the five-year clause in the award.
The sealing season of 1898, the fifth and last under the Paris
regulations, was entered upon with no change in the laws.

Mr. Sherman wrote to Sir Julian Pauncefote February 1,
1898: "The President has learned with deep regret that
the British Government has declined to adhere to the pro-
visional convention and has shown an indisposition to agree
to any appropriate measures for the suspension of the killing
of seals for the current season. He has therefore directed
me to bring to your attention the provision of the award of
the Paris Tribunal of 1893, which fixes the period when the
regulations adopted by that tribunal should be subjected to a
revision, and to ask that an arrangement be agreed upon with
as little delay as jiossible for such revision."

The sealing season of 1898 being the fifth and last under
the regulations, Great Britain at length consented to a review
of the laws, in accordance with the provisions of the award.
Instead, however, of conducting the negotiations directly
between the two powers, it was determined by mutual agree-
ment to carry on proceedings between Washington and
Ottawa, Canada assuming the responsibility of protecting her
own interests.

As an outgrowth of the visit of the Canadian Premier to
Washington in the autumn of 1897, a plan was discussed for
a joint Canadian and American commission whose members
should be appointed by the executive branches of the two
governments. It was proposed to place before this com-
mission the numerous subjects of controversy which had
arisen between the Dominion and the United States. One
of the most important subjects was the sealing question, in-
volving the adoption of a new set of regulations. The
scheme was favorably received by both parties, and an agree-
ment was signed in Washington on May 30, 1898, for the
creation of the commission ; its members were announced in
•luly, and the first meetings were held in Quebec the follow-
mg August. In October the commission adjourned to reas-
semble in Washington on November 1 ; sessions were then

58 AMERICAN DIPLOMATIC QUESTIONS

continued, with some slight interruptions, into the early
spring of 1899, when a further adjournment was made to
the following summer. The meetings, however, were never
resumed.

Unfortunately, the subject of pelagic sealing soon became
involved in the adjustment of other important questions be-
fore the commission. An idea was at first entertained that
the United States might do well to purchase from the Cana-
dian sealers their entire outfits, and thus nullify the very
pertinent argument of the Canadians that complete cessation
of pelagic sealing would bring financial ruin to a number of
British subjects who had already invested their capital in
vessels and in the paraphernalia needed for catching seals
in the open sea. This plan, however, was rejected, and
another method of settlement had to be sought.

The most important question before the commission, and
the one which presented the most stubborn difficulties, was
that of commercial reciprocity. The Canadian agents were
quick to seize upon the opportunity of securing a good bar-
gain through the eagerness of the United States to secure laws
absolutely prohibiting pelagic sealing. Accordingly, they
valued their " concession " in this respect the more highly,
and demanded in return what appeared to the Americans
to be an unreasonably large price in the shape of a free list
of American importations from Canada. The more this
question was discussed, the more hopeless of solution it ap-
peared to be. Finally the commission encountered an unsur-
mountable obstacle to all negotiations in the Alaska boundary
dispute; when adjournment took place (February, 1899), the
Bering Sea question — as, indeed, all tlie other issues before
the board — were left entirely unsettled.

It will be recalled that one of the points of disagreement
between the two powers in framing the Washington conven-
tion of February 29, 1892, had been in the matter of British
claims against the United States for the seizure and con-
demnation of Canadian vessels in Bering Sea. In 1886-87,
when the evils of pelagic sealing were first noticed by the
United States Government, a number of vessels hailing from

THE FUR-SEALS AND THE BERING SEA AWARD 59

British Columbian ports were seized, through orders from
Washington, by American revenue cutters, and afterward
condemned in libel proceedings at Sitka. These captures
had been made in what their masters maintained to be the
open high seas, — i.e. outside the ordinary three-mile limit
of marine jurisdiction. The case of the sealing schooner
W. P. Sayicard was appealed by her owners, and eventually
reached the United States Supreme Court, where, as a test case
for all the other vessels similarly libelled, it was expected to
obtain a definition of the term, "high seas." The case was
dismissed in Washington upon a technicality, and no decision
upon its merits was rendered. The owners of the condemned
vessels were, nevertheless, determined to obtain redress, and
the matter of damagfes for wronsfful seizure and confiscation
by the United States authorities having been taken up by
the British Government, the question drifted into diplomatic
channels and became a part of the greater " Bering Sea con-
troversy."

\Vhen it was finally agreed to arbitrate the whole ques-
tion, the claims of these Canadian shipowners naturally
came forward for recognition by the tribunal. In the con-
vention of February 29, 1892, with Great Britain, — in which
the jurisdictional rights of the United States in Bering Sea
waters were submitted to a tribunal of arbitration, — it was
stipulated that either party might submit to the arbitrators
any question of fact " involved in said claims and ask for a
finding thereon." The question of the amount of liability
of either government on the facts found was, however, left
subject to further negotiations.

The British agents accordingly presented to the arbitrators
at Paris all the facts in connection with the confiscation by
the United States of the Canadian sealing vessels. These
facts, which gave the exact locality of each vessel when
captured, its distance from shore, the number of skins
on board, etc., were agreed to by the United States agents,
and the ar}>itratoi's unanimously found the same to be true.
With the facts in each particular case thus accepted by both
the British and the American agents, and the jurisdiction of

60 AMERICAN DIPLOMATIC QUESTIONS

the United States in Bering Sea having been limited by de-
cision of the tribunal to the ordinary zone of territorial
waters, the seizure of these vessels outside of such territorial
waters stood acknowledged as illegal ; the United States
could therefore no longer evade the liability for damages to
their owners. The only question left to decide was the
amount of compensation due.

The following year (1894), the Secretary of State, Mr.
Gresham, signed an agreement with the Canadian authorities
to pay to them the lump sum of $425,000 in satisfaction of
these claims, but Congress refused to appropriate the money,
notwithstanding the fact that the full British claim amounted
to al^out §'850,000.

During 1895-96 efforts were continued to fix the amount of
compensation due satisfactorily to both sides. A treaty
between Great Britian and the United States was finally
signed in February of the latter year, providing for the
appointment of a tribunal to adjudicate upon all these claims.
It was to be composed of two members, — a Canadian and an
American, and, in case of disagreement, a third and neutral
member was to be called in as umpire. William L. Putnam
of Portland, Maine, Judge of the First Judicial Circuit of
the United States, was chosen by the President as commis-
sioner on the part of the United States, and George E. King,
a Justice of the Supreme Court of Canada, was likewise
selected at Ottawa.

The commission met in Victoria, B. C, and later in San
Francisco, where testimony was received orally as in open
court. No umpire was found necessary, and in December,
1897, the commissioners submitted their joint report to their
respective governments, their award being final. The total
amount of damages to be paid by the United States to the
injured shipowners was placed at $473,151.26. In finding
this sum, tlie commissioners included not only the value
of the vessels, their outfits and the skins confiscated, but
also the value of the probable catch which would have been
made had not the vessels been prevented from continuing
their operations throughout the sealing season. Each vessel

P

I

THE FUR-SEALS AND THE BERING SEA AWARD 61

estimated a prospective catch of 3500 to 5000 skins at a value
from $3.50 to -$12.50 each. On June 14, 1898, a joint reso-
lution of Congress appropriated the sum of 6473,151.26 to
pay the award, and two days later, the Assistant Secretary
of State, Judge Day, delivered a check upon the Treasury
to Sir Julian Pauncefote. Thus closed in amity the question
of the Bering Sea claims.

Deep regret was felt that the Joint High Commission had
been unable to frame a new set of regulations. Under the
five years' regulations of the Paris award, the seals were
to a certain extent protected, although that protection was
admittedly inadequate to preserve the herd; but since the
termination of those laws and the failure of the Canadian
commission to create new ones, the seals have been left
wholly and absolutely without protection while in the sea ;
the same distressing conditions which existed in Bering
Sea before 1894 prevail once more. During the season
of 1899 and the season of 1900 pelagic sealing was and is
to-day free to all without let or hindrance.

If the seals were in danger of extermination, even under
the protecting laws of the Paris award, as is generally
believed to have been the case, that danger must now be
vastly increased since all restrictions have been removed.
Now, still further to aggravate the situation, while Canadian
vessels are accorded perfect freedom to kill seals in Bering
Sea waters, American vessels are barred from all partici-
pation in pelagic sealing. The laws to this effect passed by
Congress in the winter of 1897 remain in force, and thus, in
tlie final slaughter which is promised, the Canadians will reap
all the profits.

The herd had become so diminished in numbers in 18*98
that the industry for that year was (juite unprofitable. The
Canadian sealing fleet of 1899^ was smaller than that of the
previous season, l)ut considering the depletion of the herd, an
alarmingly large catch of seals was made.^ A larger Heet
sailed last year,^ and the outlook for the present season is a

' Twenty-six British vessels. '■^.35,.?46 ; 5")% females.

^S.'j British vessels. Catch So.lOl, witii a large excess of females.

62 AMERICAN DIPLOMATIC QUESTIONS

discouraging one. Apparently nothing can be done to save
the animals from total extinction. Could the industry
be properly regulated, there is said to be no doubt that it
might flourish for all time. But the seals belong to no one
when outside the ordinary limits of marine jurisdiction, and
the high seas must be free to all. There is no legal remedy.
Possibly a balance will be found, and the yearly diminution
of seals will cause a corresponding falling off of hunters,
as pelagic operations become less renumerative. But the
chances are -strongly in favor of a total destruction of the
herd within a few years, unless some immediate understand-
ing can be had with Great Britain to check the onslaught.

The American compau}^ on the Pribyloff Islands took in
1899 and 1900, 16,812 and 22,470 skins respectively, the in-
crease in 1900 indicating a desire to gain as much as possible
from a dying industry.

In consequence of the unequal laws governing their opera-
tions, American pelagic sealing vessels have been driven
from the field. Danger of further conflicts in Bering Sea is
lessened, but the unjust conditions which are imposed upon
the Americans remain as a sequel to the closing of a diplo-
matic incident which from first to last has been disastrous to
American interests.

II

THE IXTEROCEANIC CANAL PROBLEM

II

THE INTEROCEANIC CANAL PROBLEM

The problem of interoceanic communication at some Cen-
tral American point is by no means a new one, as it finds its
origin in the very causes that led to the discovery of America.
The repeated voyages of Columbus were for the purpose of
finding an open waterway to the East Indies. The early
Spanish navigators explored every bay and cove and ascended
every river of Central and South America, in the hope of
discovering a passage through which their vessels might reach
those lands of boundless wealth of which Marco Polo had
given account. Their object was to find a short and direct
route " from Cadiz to Cathay." Since the days of the earliest
explorers, the history of Central America has been closely
associated with this question of an interoceanic waterway, —
first, to discover the natural one, if it existed, and in its
absence, to construct an artificial one.

A wagon road across the isthmus from Porto Bello to
Panama was constructed early in the sixteenth century for
transportation to and from the " El Dorado " that Pizarro
had discovered in Peru ; indeed, as early as 1530, Pedrarias
Davila, governor of Nicaragua, wishing to divert the transit
trade of Peru from Panama to his own flourishing colony,
conceived the plan of constructing short canals about the
rapids of the San Juan River, in order to make a waterway
between tlie " North " and " South " seas. The ])()ssibili-
ties and advantages of this open water connection between
the great oceans was also thoroughly appreciated by the
Spanish home authorities, for Charles V of Spain, in 153^,
ordered an exploration of the Cliagres River (at Colon) for
the purpose of ascertaining whether a ship canal could be
practically substituted for the wagon road ; and Phili[) II, in
F Go

66 AMERICAN DIPLOMATIC QUESTIONS

1561, sent his engineer to explore Nicaragua for the same
purpose.

From the earliest days of Spanish discovery and settlement
in Central America, down to the present moment, canal
schemes have originated, flourished, and died. Although
never quite abandoned, they have at various times been laid
aside, — as during the times of struggle between Spain and
the English freebooters in the West Indies, times when
pirates roamed the seas and infested the lagoons of the main-
land, and marauding expeditions laid waste the towns along
these coasts. But whenever a lull in hostilities occurred,
Spanish interest in the great canal was sure to spring up
anew, to be followed by further investigations and new pro-
jects. These earlier efforts, however, amounted to very
little, practically.

With the decline of Spanish power and influence, other
nations became interested in this fascinating canal problem,
notably Holland, Belgium, France, England, and finally the
United States. Volumes of maps and descriptions of favored
routes have been filed away in government archives and in
the records of private companies, among which are great
numbers of extravagant statements concerning the wonderful
topographical advantages offered by various favored sections,
along with astonishingly cheap calculations for canal con-
struction.

It would be useless to the purpose of this review to ex-
amine all the numerous schemes for the building of isthmian
canals from the beginning of the sixteenth century. Suffice
it to say, they furnish a history of failure and blighted hopes.
It might not be uninteresting, however, before proceeding to
the political and diplomatic history of the United States in con-
nection with this canal problem, to make brief reference to some
of the more prominent isthmian canal schemes which have
been projected during the present century.

No less than eight routes of supposed practicability have
claimed the attention and approval of engineers and those
interested in the construction of a waterway across Central
America. The six important ones are : —

THE INTEROCEANIC CANAL PROBLEM 67

I. The Teliuantepec Route. The isthmus of Tehiiantepec
forms the narrowest portion of Mexico, it being about 150
miles across, from ocean to ocean. Cortez established a line
of transit at this point, which was maintained for a number
of years ; but it subsequently yielded in favor to the admitted
superiority of the Nicaragua route. As early as 1550, Galveo,
a Portuguese navigator, declared the Teliuantepec route a
feasible one, and urged Philip of Spain to consider it. No
further notice seems to have been taken of it until about 1770,
when Charles III of Spain ordered the viceroy of Mexico to
locate a site for a canal across this isthmus. The result of
the viceroy's survey was discouraging, and the plan there-
after was abandoned as unfeasible.

II. The Niearaiina Route. This leads from the mouth of
the San Juan River to Lake Nicaragua, thence by several
proposed lines (preferably by way of Brito) to the Pacific
Ocean, a distance of 169^ miles. Of all possible routes, this
seems to have claimed the most favorable attention of Ameri-
can engineers. It is said to possess the best conditions for
the location of a lock-system canal, chief of which is the
existence of Lake Nicaragua, which, with portions of its out-
let (the San Juan River), provides many miles of natural
waterway, and an abundant and constant supply of water for
the locks. The climatic conditions of this locality are also
excellent. It is not unlikely that Philip of Spain would have
here attempted tlie work of canal construction in 1567, which,
in those days, would have been a labor of Hercules, had not
political complications at home diverted his attention from
his ambition across the sea.

La Condamine, the eminent French scientist, who, with a
corps of able in/jeuieurs, was sent 1)3^ his government (in
1735) to Soutli America for the purpose of conducting certain
astronomical observations, made an examination of Lake
Nicaragua and its outlet. He became much impressed with
the many advantages this route offered for the construction
of a canal, and so reported to his government, but France
was not then ready to undertake so great a project. England
seems always to have recognized the value of this route,

68 AMERICAN DIPLOMATIC QUESTIONS

and for two centuries persistently sought and held territory
near the mouth of the San Juan River, while American inter-
est has always been especially alive to its feasibility and
importance.

III. The Panama Route from Colon, or Aspinwall, on
the Caribbean Sea, to Panama on the Pacific.

IV. The San Bias Route from the Harbor of San Bias to
the mouth of the Rio Chepo on the Pacific.

V. TJte Caledonian Route, across the isthmus of Darien,.
from Caledonian Bay on the Atlantic side to the Gulf of San
Miguel. This is the narrowest point of land separating the
great oceans to be found between the arctic circle and Cape
Horn.

To the Panama Route nature has contributed much
toward the possibility of constructing the work. There is
here a depression in the mountain range, the great Cordillera
of the Americas, furnishing a pass only 284 feet above the
tide. The distance from sea to sea is scarcely fifty miles,
and there are suitable harbors on either side. The ad-
vantages of a canal operated throughout upon sea levels,
thus avoiding the complications and inconveniences of locks,
are so very great that one turns away from Panama with
reluctance. One is inclined to hope that modern scientific
ingenuity may 3'et find means to surmount the obstacles pre-
sented by the floods of the Chagres River, the yielding sands
and soils of the isthmus, and the deadly climate of Colon
and Panama. The other two routes near Panama were once
supposed to be practicable, but careful surveys by more accu-
rate or less partial engineers have demonstrated the fact that
the mountain ranges crossing them present almost insur-
mountable barriers against the construction of a canal.

VI. The Atrato Route. The Atrato River has its rise iii'
Colombia, on the eastern slope of the Andes, and flows nortb
about two hundred miles, close to the foot of tliis great range
of mountains, finally debouching into the Gulf of Darien.
So fearful was Philip II of Spain that the Atrato River might
furnish to his enemies the coveted opening to the Pacific, and
tli'Mcby destroy the profits of his carrying trade by wagon road

THE INTEROCEANIC CANAL PROBLEM 69

icross the Panama route to Peru, that he issued, in 1542, a
'oyal order, imposing the penalty of death upon any one
.vho should attempt to enter that river. A veil of profound
nystery long enveloped this region, and for upward of two
lenturies tradition gilded the unknown with its usual
nagnificence. This most alluring river of the Atrato is
;eparated from the Pacific Ocean, along its entire course, by
I mere strip of land. This land, however, is the Cordillera,
)r summit of the Andes, and although it is furrowed on
he eastern side by numerous streams tributary to the
Vtrato, the explorer has always been confronted, at the
ources of these tributaries, by towering walls and impass-
ble heights. This, therefore, has been a region of brilliant
)romise and of sad disappointment.

Each of these routes possesses its own good and bad fea-
ures, its own peculiar advantages and disadvantages. Careful
urveys of them all, made in the light of modern scientific
iiethods, together with comparisons of their orographic,
lydrographic, and climatic conditions have resulted substan-
ially in the rejection of all except two from the list of practical
possibilities. These two are the Panama and Nicaragua routes.

The beginning of the nineteenth century found Alexan-
er von Humboldt making a critical examination of the
arious Central American routes. He discussed them at
3ngth in his " Personal Narrative of Travels," giving par-
icular emphasis to the superior advantages offered by the
licaragua route. Humboldt contributed to the world's
nowledge the first valuable information, from a scientific
oint of view, concerning this route ; his conclusions so in-
pired the Spanish Cortez that it passed a decree for the
nmediate construction of a canal through Central America,
•pain's power and influence in the Western Hemisphere,
owever, had by this time become far too feeble to carry out
ny such undertaking, and this last s[)asmodic effort to
waken her sj)irit of adiicvement in the New World expired
Imost with its concejition.

I>y the year 1824, nil of the Spunish- American colonies
ad secured their [)()litical freedom from Spain, aiul liad

70 AMERICAN DIPLOMATIC QUESTIONS

established themselves as free and independent republics, and
those whose geographical position and topography warranted
them in so doing stood ready to enter into treaty relations
with any foreign power thought to be able and willing to
construct an interoceanic canal within their borders. The
United States had, at this time, reached a point in its national
existence when the entire attention of its government was
no longer confined to matters purely internal and domestic.
For the first time it was then ready to consider the subject
of connecting the oceans at some favorable point between
North and South America. The Panama Congress, wliich
had been called to meet in June, 182(3, had for one of its
objects the discussion of this canal scheme, and the attention
of Mr. Clay, the American Secretary of State, was specially
directed to the importance of the question. Perhaps Ameri-
can activity was somewhat stimulated by the fact that at the
same time British influence was at work in Nicaragua, seek-
ing concessions for canal-building purposes.

A company was quickly formed in New York, called the
" Central American and United States Atlantic and Pacific
Canal Company." Encouraged by an Act of Congress, this
company set earnestly to work to present its bids for obtain-
ing a concession from Nicaragua before the English company
could anticipate it and get firmly located in the field. Suc-
ceeding in obtaining its concession, the American company
signed a contract in 182(3, with the Government of the Central
American Confederation, to construct a canal through Nica-
ragua "for vessels of the largest burden possible." Estimates
of cost did not exceed '$5,000,000. Great interest was excited
in the United States and in Central America, but owing to a
lack of funds necessary to the undertaking of so very large
an enterprise, this, the first American effort to construct an
isthmian canal, served bat to add one more example to the
long record of failures and disappointments.

In 1830 the king of Holland, at the head of a Dutch canal
company, secured from Nicaragua an exceedingly liberal con-
cession, so liberal, indeed, that it called from President Jack-i
son a strongly worded protest, predicated chiefly on those ,

THE INTEROCEANIC CANAL PROBLEM 71

political principles so recently enunciated in the celebrated
" Monroe Doctrine."

Following the failure of the Dutch company, which was
immediate and complete, a number of less pretentious efforts
on the part of American, English, and French companies ap-
pear and disappear in rapid succession in both Nicaragua and
Panama. The interest of Louis Napoleon, then a prisoner at
Ham, seems to have been keenly aroused to the importance
of the question. He organized a company known as " La
Canal Napoleone de Nicaragua," and in 1846 published a pam-
phlet advocating the Nicaragua route, which remains to-day
as a sort of exclamation mark in the history of the canal. Its
publication aroused new interest in Europe, and at the time
brought to its author much reputation for practical states-
manship. Napoleon was forced, however, to bide his time ;
but his opportunity he supposed had come at last, when from
his imperial throne in Paris he watched with satisfaction the
gathering of the war clouds in the United States. When
the storm of civil strife had threatened the disruption
of the Union, he undertook the task of overthrowing the re-
l)ublican institutions of Mexico and establishing in their })lace
a govennuent dependent on France, which would be at the
same time an ally, offensive and defensive, of the Confederate
States of America. \n this delusive dream his fancy had
sketched the dismemberment of the American Republic, the
aggrandizement of im[)erial France, and a final subjection of
Western interests to the domination and control of Europe.
The overthrow of the Southern revolt prevented the possibil-
ity of success, and his splendid revery was foi'ever dis[)elled
by the fortunes of war at Sedan. The building of a French
canal through Nicaragua was probably but a small part of
Napoleon's great Western project.

About the year 18.50 considerable enthusiasm was aroused
in Europe, and especially in France, over the report of certain
explorers in tlie lower istlimus. At one time there were
three ])arties of engineers (American, English, and Fjench)
struggling in the pestilential jungles and morasses b('lf)W
Panama in seaich of reported but imaginary depressions iii

72 AMERICAN DIPLOMATIC QUESTIONS

the mountains. The English and American surveyors left
the region in disgust, but the French company, encouraged
by the Societe de L'Etude of Paris, and by popular enthusi-
asm at home, continued to make investigations along the
lines of the Caledonian and San Bias routes. Between 1850
and 1855, a wealthy American, Mr. Kelly, who w^as charmed
by the mysteries of the Atrato River, spent a fortune in making
a reconnaissance of this region. The result of this active
exploration of the lower isthmus during the 3'ears 1850-55
was to place the Atrato, the Caledonian, and the San Bias
routes outside the limits of practical canal possibilities.

The " Central American and United States Atlantic and
Pacific Canal Company," launched with flying colors, and
doomed to disappointment, was succeeded twenty-two years
later by " The American Atlantic and Pacific Ship Canal Com-
pany," which was organized in New York, with Cornelius
Vanderbilt at its head. It secured from Nicaragua (Septem-
ber, 1849) a favorable concession to build a canal from any
point in the state on the Atlantic coast to some Pacific point,
together with a liberal land grant and a monopoly of steam
navigation on the rivers and lakes of Nicaragua. With so
promising a beginning the company despatched its engineer.
Colonel Childs, to make accurate and complete surveys of
the route. The Childs survey was the first really technical
examination made of the Nicaragua route ; and the line
adopted by him in 1850 has been practically approved and
accepted by engineers in all subsequent surveys. Preparatory
to embarking upon the great work of building a complete
waterway, the company operated a line of small steamers on
the river San Juan and Lake Nicaragua, continuing the transit
by stage coaches from the lake to the Pacific Ocean. The prof-
its of this preliminary enterprise were exceedingly large
during the })ioneer rush to the gold fields of Califonua. Al-
though the company for some years continued successfully to
operate this "temporary line" of transit even after the con-
struction of the Panama Railroad (completed in 1855), it
accomplished comparatively nothing toward the declared
object and purpose of its creation.

THE INTEROCEANIC CANAL PROBLEM 73

A series of diplomatic difficulties and entanglements then
arose between the United States and Great I>ritain touching
their respective rights in Nicaragua. These difficulties, to-
gether with political confficts in the United States, operated
to decrease public interest in the great undertaking, and so
delayed and crippled the American promoters, that tlie
Xicaraguan Congress lost entire confidence in their ability to
carry out the company's purpose. It finally (Maj^ 1858)
declared a forfeiture of the franchises of the American com-
pany and transferred similar rights to one Felix Belly of Paris.
The Belly company, however, was unable to secure the funds
necessary, even to begin the work, and its concession accord-
ingly lapsed. Out of this apparently hopeless confusion, the
American Com[)any succeeded in effecting a reorganization
under the name of the " Central American Transit Company,"
and as such continued to claim and exercise the riofhts and
franchises of the former company until 1869, when it sold and
transferred the same to an Italian company. After 1860 public
interest in the project seems to have wholly subsided in the^
United States until the year 1872, when President Gi-ant re-
vived the subject by ui-ging that the canal be built by the gov-
ernment as a national undertaking. In pursuance of his sug-
gestions, he appointed an " Interoceanic Canal Commission,"
consisting of the chief engineer of the army, A. A. Hum[)hi-eys,
the superintendent of the coast survey, C. P. Patterson, and
the chief of the Ijureau of navigation. Admiral Ammen, under
Avhose direction a series of exhaustive surveys of the X<^'huan-
tepec, Nicaragua, Panama, San Bias, and Atrato routes was
made. The report of the commission favored the Nicaragua
route as formerly surveyed by Colonel Cliilds, and steps were
taken to organi'/e a company for the management of tlie work.

From the more modest operations of the Americarn promoters
in Nicaragua one must turn for a moment to Panama, wliere,
by this time, the De Lesseps scheme was at the height of its
activity. Ferdinand de Lesseps, a Frencli engineer, had won
the confidence and admiration of the woild by his splendid
success in constructing the Suez Canal. He had revived the
I old scheme of a tide-water canal from Colon to Panama, and

74 AMERICAN DIPLOMATIC QUESTIONS

having organized a French company, and also secured liberal
franchises from the Colombian States, he took in hand the task
of raising the necessary funds for its construction. Throuo-h
the aid of the Paris Geographical Society, he caused a series
of surveys to be made in the lower isthmus, all of Avliich were
subsequently found to have been absurdh" superficial ; then,
in order to decide upon the best route and to stamp the
approval of the world upon his choice of it, he invited the
political authorities of Europe and America, as well as
the presidents of many geographic and scientific societies to
send delegates to an " International Scientific Congress." By
extraordinary cleverness and ingenuity De Lesseps carried
every point in this convention, which finall}- decided that a
tide-level canal could be built at Panama for 8140,000,000.
Hostile criticism of the undertaking in the United States,
foreshadowing a protest on its part against exclusive French
control of the work, filially brought De Lesseps to Wash-
ington for the purpose of overcoming threatened American
opposition. He managed the "preparatory arrangements"
for his grand scheme with marked ability, and the en-
thusiastic and readily excited French people struggled to
obtain shares in his company Avith as much zeal as they
had once before manifested in the purchase of stock in
the Mississippi scheme of John Law. Work was begun at
Aspinwall in 1881, and was continued for nearl}^ seven years,
when it was found that the canal, though not half finished,
had cost upward of $260,000,000. Further investigation
disclosed the hopeless insolvency of the company. The
scandals connected with the enterprise Avere so great as
to compel examination by the legislative authorities of
France, resulting in the discovery of corruption and fraud
in its management, whicli fairly astounded the world. Many
millions had been spent in buying the favor or silence of
the press and in purchasing the sujiport of legislators. The
names of many prominent officials of highest rank and posi-
tion in France were sadly smirched in the process of the in-
vestigation. The original intentions of the promoters were,
without doubt, honorable ; but before the work had progressed

THE INTEROCEANIC CANAL PROBLEM 75

a year, it became evident to those in ehai'ge of the operations
on the isthmus that the dithculties to be overcome had been
greatly underestimated. The soft, yielding character of the
soil, the heavy rains and floods, the miasmic climate, all added
new complications which vastly increased the labor and ex-
pense of the undertaking. To attain success it became neces-
sary greatly to enlarge the capital of the company, and to
accomplish this object it became equally necessary to encour-
age public enthusiasm by frequent and glowing reports of the
company's successful progress.

When an utterly h()[)eless future confronted the officers of
the company, when but a breath was needed to burst the
expanding l)ubl)le, the promoters still maintained their strug-
gle to suppress tlie truth. At last the expense became too
great. The crash came, carrying down many thousands of
French investors who had staked all upon the reputation and
promises of De Lesseps. Even to-day the great dredges
and massive machinery employed in this gigantic undertak-
ing, and representing many millions of cost, lie half buiied in
earth, corroded with rust, and draped in nature's veil of
tropical foliage. They lie at Colon like fallen monuments
to the greatest failure of the century. This is, of all, the
most melancholy event in the somewhat tragic history of
isthmian canal projects.

For a brief time financial success marked the operation of
the American Canal Company, in so far only as it undertook
tc) maintain a trans-isthmian overland route. In actual prog-
ress toward the building of tlie canal, the records of this, as
of all other canal companies, tell tiie old story of failure.

Just after the conclusion of the Frelinghuysen-Zavalla
treaty with Nicaragua (1884), a number of prominent busi-
ness men, encouraged by the liberal concessions promised to
the United States in that treaty, met in New York and
organized the " Provisional Canal Association." It was the
object of the energetic ])romoters of this association to form
a company whose distinguished personnel, whose financial
guarantees, whose advantages in the way of concessions, and
wliose command of engineering tah'ut wouhl make failure

w

76 AMERICAN DIPLOMATIC QUESTIONS

an impossibility. The association was neither chartered nor
incorporated ; it had no connection with the government ;
it was simply a private syndicate. Between two and three
million dollars were quickly subscribed, and Mr. Menocal
was sent to Nicaragua to secure the necessary concessions.
With an ample bonus paid in advance to tlie Nicaraguan
authorities, he met witli no difficulty in obtaining for his
clients (April 24, 1887) an exclusive right to build and
afterward to operate a canal for ninety-nine years. The
state l)ound itself "not to make any subsequent concession
for the opening of a canal l)et\A'een the two oceans during tlie
term of the present concession," and the association pledged
itself to expend a certain amount within a specified time and
to complete the work in ten years.

Upon Mr. Menocal's return to the United States the syn-
dicate caused a " Nicaraguan Canal Construction Company''
to be incorporated under the laws of Colorado with a nominal
capital of il2,000,000. As an adjunct to the "Association"
and in conformity witli tlie terms of their concession, the
Construction Company at once set about making necessary
final surveys and eliminating the technical uncertainties that
still stood in the way of the commencement of actual construc-
tion. Mr. Menocal letl this engineering expedition. The
survey covered a period of nearly three years, and was
a most exhaustive scientific investigation of the route.
Throughout the country considerable interest began to attach
to the progress of Mr. Menocal's investigations, and the Canal
Association had the heartiest good will of all for its future
success ; in fact, a general belief began to manifest itself
that the company should have the protection, as well as the
dignity, of a national charter. Under stress of sudden j)oi)-
ular enthusiasm, both Houses of Congress assented to the
proposition to charter the association, and ver^^ soon after the
introduction of the measure into the Senate the comi)any
received its articles of incorporation and was cliristened tlie
"Maritime Canal Company of Nicaragua" (February 20,
188!>).

The company was at once organized with •VlO,UOO,Oi><> i>t

THE INTEROCEANIC CANAL PROBLEM 77

stock ; new contracts were made with the Canal Construc-
tion Company, and the digging of the Nicaragua Canal ac-
tually began. Hon. Warner Miller of New York was made
2)resident of the Construction Company. Having raised
funds sufficient to undertake his contract with the Maritime
Canal Company, he pressed the work in Nicaragua with
great energy. Within one year the stipulated -"^2,000,000
had been expended to the entire satisfaction of an exacting
government in Nicaragua. In three years nearly five mill-
ions had been spent. Seemingly insurmountable difficul-
ties were overcome in building a line of railroad thirteen
miles from the coast to the foot-hills across the lagoon,
through the tangled masses of swampy jungle that inter-
vened. A canal two miles long was dug, breakwaters at
Greytown were constructed, the harbor was dredged, and
altogether satisfactory progress was being made when the
financial panic of 18l'o compelled the Construction Company
to suspend all operations. Despite all efforts to stem the
tide of adverse fortune, it soon after fell into the hands of a
receiver.

The officers of the Maritime Canal Company constantly
exerted themselves to keep fresh the lively public interest
wliich had been exhibited in their project from the l)eginning,
and tlieir efforts were rewarded by many demonstrations of
public enthusiasm. Iji January, 1891, tlie Senate Committee
oil Foreign Relations framed a bill authorizing the govern-
ment to gUiirantee an issiu^ of one hundred millions of the
Maritiuie Canal Company's bonds and to hold as a pledge a
ciMitroUing interest in the stock of the company. Although
the measure, which was warndy supi)orted by Senators Sher-
man and ]\Iorgan, did not become law, this incident of the
committee room served to demonstrate the trend of public
tliought upon the matter of governmental control of any Cen-
tral American sliip canal tliat should l)e built.

There was one reason in particular why tin; idea of gov-
eniincutal aid to the great undertaking contiinied to grow
in poj)uhirit3'. The tragic failure of the Panama Company
liad made a strong imj)ressiou upou tlic uiiuds of investors.

78 AMERICAN DIPLOMATIC QUESTIONS

That lamentable event had furnished the best proof of the
utter futility of any private corporation undertaking the
gigantic task of piercing the Central American Cordillera ;
none but a Hercules should attempt a labor of Hercules.
Aside from reasons relating to the physical side of the ques-
tion, the very nature of the project itself appeared to invest
it with a national rather than with a private character.
The difficulties, political and economic, as well as technical,
which surrounded the enterprise, removed all doubt that
the construction of the canal should be under the auspices
and protection of the United States Government. The use of
the canal when completed would necessarily be most inti-
mately connected with vital interests of the nation. Would
it then be safe to subject to the chances of private ownership
an undertaking which involved interests so complex and
important ? Public opinion then rapidly shaped itself into
a conviction that the canal should be built by the govern-
ment in order that it might at last be controlled by the
government.

Further reasons induced the stockholders themselves per-
sistently to seek governmental aid for their project. Periodic
political disturbances in Central America had caused the
Maritime Canal Company considerable embarrassment. A
genuine respect for any body of private citizens operating
within her borders could scarcely be expected from Nicara-
gua's turbulent political factions. At any moment Central
America was likely to go to war. Indeed, the efforts of the
company to prosecute the work at Greytown had been
hampered from the outset by quarrels between Nicaragua and
Costa Rica. The news of the annoying delays forced upon
the company by these frequent political disturbances reached
the United States, and deterred many who were otherwise
most enthusiastic in the cause of the canal from risking
ca[)ital in its development. Even while active work on the
part of the contractors was progressing in Nicaragua, the
lack of sufficient funds greatly handicapped the Maritime
Canal Comj)any's operations. In this awkward predicament
the promoters were in doubt as to the proper course to b&

THE INTEROCEANIC CANAL PROBLEM 79

pursued. It seemed doubtful whether it were better to open
:heir subscription books to foreign capital or to make another
ippeal for Congressional aid. The lirst course carried the
objectionable feature of permitting foreign influence to enter
.nto what they wished should be a purely American scheme ;
ind the second course at that time promised but little hope
if success. As a last resort, however, great pressure was again
jrought to bear upon Congress to guarantee the com})an3's
jonds and thus secure the stockholders from possible loss,
[n furtherance of this idea, a convention held at New Orleans
n November, 1892, in which six hundred delegates asseml)led,
■ome from every state and territory in the Union, unanimously
)assed resolutions calling upon Congress to lend its aid to the
'onstruction of the Nicaragua Canal. These representa-
ions of public will resulted in the reintroduction of a l)ill in
he Senate (December 23, 1892), authorizing a govern-
nental guarantee of the company's bonds to the extent of
<100,000,000 providing that in consideration of such guar-
antee the government should receive in absolute ownership
<80,500,000 of the capital stock.

The passage of this bill would most assuredly have placed
he United States Government in the position of owner of
he canal ; but there were diplomatic considerations that prc-
'ented the United States from thus suddenly converting the
■ompany's project into a national undertaking. These consid-
•rations must be examined later, but for the present, sufiice
t to say, tlie bill never passed beyond a stage of lively and
.nimated debate, and the Maritime Canal Company therefore
gained nothing by its call upon Congress. New issues of
he company's bonds were made, but tlie financial [)anic of
.893, which wrecked the Construction Company, so increased
he timidity and caution of investors as to render the success
if the new bond issue impossible. The Maritime Canal Com-
)any became substantially stranded. The next year anotlier
lesperate attempt was made to secure legislation in Congress
hat should place the company upon a firmer financial basis.
)n January 22, 1894, the old guarantee bill of ls92 was
eintroduced into the Senate with some modilications. liy

80 AMERICAN DIPLOMATIC QUESTIONS

this measure, governmental guarantee of $70,000,000 of the
company's bonds was called for and national ownership
of $70,000,000 of stock, and the Secretary of the Treasury
was authorized to control the construction of the work.
Thus the idea of absolute governmental ownership of the
canal, together with a governmental responsibility for its con-
struction, was contemplated by Congress. The measure bid
defiance to treaty stipulations of the United States, which
should have acted as an estoppel to any such legislation.
The bill was lost in the House, notwithstanding the fact
that a great majority in both branches of Congress strongly
favored government ownership and control of the Nicaraguan
Canal.

In 1895 Congress again took action in the same direction;
but, as before, the House refused to accept the measure which
the Senate had been willing to adopt. However, on March 2,
1895, Congress authorized the appointment of a commission
of three engineers for the purpose of reporting on the feasi-
bility, permanence, and final cost of the company's project;
$20,000 were appropriated for the purpose, and the company
added generously to the amount of the appropriation to help
defray the costs of the commission. The creation of this
commission was generally accepted as evidencing an inten-
tion of Congress, sooner or later, to extend its protection over
the Maritime Canal Company, by the absorption of its capital,
and ultimately to secure full control of the work. The same
field had been surveyed and resurveyed many times by com-
l^etent engineers, and further scientific investigation along
the well-known route was hardly necessary; however, the
commission (under General Ludlow) entered upon the task
with the seeming approval of the country.

The commission reported in November, 1895, to the effect
that the company's project for a ship canal in Nicaragua was
perfectly feasible, save for some detail in the company's plans
to which the commission duly excepted. The report recom-
mended still further investigation in order to obtain certain
additional data which the engineers deemed essential for a
final conclusion and a correct estimate of cost.

THE INTEROCEANIC CANAL PROBLEM 81

The opening of the year 1896 found the ^Maritime Canal
I!ompany almost exhausted in its struggle against adverse
'ate. Its adjunct, the Canal Company, as already noted, had
oundered in the financial storm of 1893, leaving the results
)f its labors in Nicaragua exposed to the destructive influ-
'Hces of merciless floods and to the devouring growth of
ropical vegetation. A new construction company had been
M-ganized the previous year (March, 1895), and chartered in
V^'ermont, to resume Avhere the old canal company left off.
Unfortunately, its available assets were quite dissipated in
iquidating the debts of the old company, and none were left
vith which to dig canals. All the efforts of the parent com-
)any to obtain funds had failed ; every attempt to secure
governmental aid had failed as well ; and six of the ten years
vithin which the canal should be completed, under its con-
ession from Nicaragua, had slipped away. The Ludlow
Commission had reported that further investigation into the
echnical features of the undertaking was necessary, and it
vas tlierefore quite likely that Congress would do nothing
oward rescuing the compan}' until such final investigation
•ould be made. The outlook for the company was gloomy.

Notwithstanding these unfavorable conditions, the friends
tf the company in the Senate and House continued to exert
hemselves in its behalf. Witli recommendations for imme-
liate action, the House Interstate and Foreign Commei'ce
'ommittee reported a bill calling for sucli national aid to the
■nterprise as might seem requisite to enable the company
0 obtain funds necessary to complete the work in Nicaragua
■Iready commenced. Tlie measure contemj^lated the practi-
al conversion of the company into a governmental concern.
The entire capital (a new issue of bonds being authorized)
vas to be retained by the United States, save the sum of
'7,000,000, which was to be left in the hands of tlie com-
)any"s original stockholders, to reimburse them for funds
•ctually expended in Nicaragua. Tliis bill passed tlu'ough
he various stages of committee-rooiu debate, and finally took
ts place upon the Senate calendar, tliough too late for action
bn-iiie tliat term.

82 AMERICAN DIPLOMATIC QUESTIONS

The measure was not again called up until January 18»
1897, when it became the special order of business in the
Senate for nearly a month. A vast amount of testimony^
from many sources, had been taken by the Senate committee
to demonstrate the necessities for passing the bill, and volumi-
nous documentary reports accompanied the Senate com-
mittee's recommendation. But behind the necessities of the
case there existed in the minds of mau}^ of the Senators an
uncomfortable feeling that the passage of the bill might
involve a neglect of those moral requirements placed upon
the nation by its treaty stipulations. Many advocates of
governmental control of the canal fully believed that the
Clayton-Bulwer treaty with England, binding the United
States never to secure sole control of any isthmian canal, had
long since become a dead letter ; yet that treaty had never
been formally abrogated, and all past attempts to avoid its
terms having failed, the treaty still stood as though fully and
unreservedly acknowledged. This treaty, made in 1850,
operated as a check, though as yet a silent one, upon any
such legislation as the Senate at that time contemplated^
Other influences, notably those of the great transcontinental
railways, steadfastly opposed the passage of the bill. It was^
finally tabled, and the hopes of the Maritime Canal Company
again withered.

Before the close of 1897 the President appointed a new
commission, consisting of Admiral AValker, Colonel P. €►
Haines, and Professor Lewis N. Haupt, to make a final and
complete survey of tlie entire Nicaraguan route. This com-
mission proceeded to Grey town in November, 1897, Avith a
corps of able engineers and a large force of assistants. It
was armed with the most perfect scientific equipment. The
sending of this commission — in this age of commissions —
was really to serve a tri[)lo purpose. First, it would gather
all the information needed by the govennnent to satisfy Con-
gress of either the feasibility or non-feasibility of the Nica-
raguan route, and it would add one more expert estimate of
cost to the many })revious ones on file. Secondly, it would
give the encouragement felt to be due those who clamored

THE INTEROCEAMC CANAL PROBLEM 83

or governmental control of the work. Thirdly, it would gain
ime. Time was the most necessary factor in the problem.
The administration fully realized the futility of agitating the
[uestion of governmental control of the w^ork, so lang as the
^layton-Buhver treaty remained unrevoked or unmodified;
iiid to accomplish either of these ends, negotiations of a some-
vhat delicate nature must first be had wdth Great Britain.
The occasion, however, for such negotiations was rendered in-
luspicious by the approaching conflict with Spain. England's
,'ood will was too valuable to challenge at such a time, con-
equently no actual efforts were made toward clearing away
he diplomatic difficulties that surrounded the canal problem
mtil the autumn of 1899.

In the meantime, however, the Maritime Canal Company
)egan to realize that misfortunes never come singly. The
)romoters not onl}^ deplored their numerous failures to secure
governmental aid and their consequent inability to raise tlie
unds necessar}- to continue the work, long since abandoned
n Nicaragua, but they also feared a revocation of their con-
:ession by the Central American state.

Nicaragua had already (1898) shown signs of uneasiness
it the company's helplessness. By a communication of Mr.
ilodrigues, Minister of the Greater Republic in Washington,
0 Mr. Olney (January 15, 1897), Nicaragua's objection,
uider the terms of the concession, to the Maritime

anal Company's connections with the United States (jov-
irnment, was set forth, and various acts of the company
ivere cited to show a forfeiture upon its part of all its
ights and privileges in Nicaragua. This w^as but the be-
ginning. It was obvious that Nicaragua had lost faith in
he company, though some allege that the government at
Managua was sorely in need of money, and wished to sell a
lew concession — their stock commodity; others maintain
diat it came about through the mutual jealousies of Nicara-
^'ua and Costa Rica. These two neighboring states had always
■herished the bitterest feelings toward each other. They
luarrelled over their boundaries; they quarrelled over their
respective rights on the San Juan River; and they (quarrelled

84 AMERICAN DIPLOMATIC QUESTIONS

over the ratio of their interests in the Maritime Canal Company.
Their mutual dislike had proved unappeasable by war. Did
Nicaragua desire to oust Costa Rica from her concessionary
rights, or did Costa Rica demand a more substantial interest
in the canal '? Whatever ma}^ have been the inner motives that
prompted her to do so, Nicaragua continued to give evidence
of a purpose to declare the forfeiture of the Canal Com-
pany concession. On June 5, 1897, she entered into contract
with the Atlas Steamship Company, whereby the latter se-
cured exclusive riglits of navigation and railroad construction
on the lagoon at the month of the San Juan River and along
the bank of that river. Sole privileges of navigation on Lake
Nicaragua were also granted to this English company. While
it was expressly stated in this contract with the Atlas Com-
pany that nothing in the instrument should be considered as an
obstacle to the carrying out of any contract the Nicaraguan
Government may have previously made in regard to the
opening of an interoceanic canal, yet the contract certainly
bore upon its face an affront to the ^Maritime Canal Company.
The latter company made vigorous protests, alleging gross
violations of its rights under its concession of 1887, and
called upon Congress to lend its support in resisting this
unwarrantable act on the part of Nicaragua.

The limit of grievances was not yet reached. In 1894,
just after the failure of the Construction Company, which, it
will be remembered, had held the contracts from the parent
(Maritime Canal) company, for the actual construction of
the canal, a number of wealthy men in New York and
Chicago became sufficiently interested in the ship-canal pro-
ject to make an investigation into the conditions of the work
along the route, with a view to purchasing necessary rights
and undertaking the fulfilment of tlie contract themselves.
Having visited the scene of operations the following year,
tliey reported that the Maritime Canal Company had been
unable, according to the terms of its concession, to keep
pace with fleeting time in the fulfilment of its obligations.
They discovered that the Nicaraguan Government was dis-
posed to agree with them in that the existing company conld

THE IXTEROCEANIC CANAL PROBLEM 85-

ever comply with the terms of its contract, and they further
iscovered a willingness on the part of Nicaragua to grant
hem a concession of their own. Accordingl}-, in 1898, a
anal syndicate was formed in New York City, among whose
irectors are to be found the names of W. R. Grace, J. D.
'rimmins, J. A. McCall, Warner Miller, J. J. Astor, George
Testinghouse, D. O. Mills, Levi P. Morton, G. T. Bliss, and
lany others well known in the financial world. This
erv substantial association, called the '' Grace-Eyre-Gragin
yndicate," at once proceeded to secure a concession from
icaragua, for which purpose its representatives appeared in
huiagua in the autumn of 18'J8. At that j^articular moment
antral America was just reaclnng tlie point in the usual cycle
[ its political affairs, Avhen several of its states were about to
lerge their own sovereignty uito that of a Greater Re[)ublic,
id their interests were to be united. They were to forswear
trever the old bickering and quarrelling in a bond of ever-
sting amity and peace. President Zelaya received the
ivoys of the newly formed company with marked cordiality.
1 a special message setting forth the great advantages which
ould accrue from granting a concession to the newly organ-
ed company, he called a special session of Congress for
16 purpose of considering the validity of the old con-
!Ssion of 1887 to the ^Maritime Canal Company, and the
opriety of granting a concession to the new company,
he date of the president's message is October 27, 1897.
hat same day a contract was signed. The next day the
iipreme Court pronounced the "Maritime" concession null
id void for non-user and other reasons. The 28th and 20th
ere devoted to discussion of the contract b}^ the Congress,
he next day, the 30th, it was accepted hy unanimous vote,
id the day after it was approved as law. At 12 o'clock
lat niglit (October 31) Nicaragua censed to exist as a
'Vereign state, and l)ecame a part of the Greater Kepub-
; of ('entral America, along witli lb)nduras and San Sal-
idor.

The contract thus hastily si-cuicd was considered by all
irties to be an actual concession infnturo, to take effect on-

86 AMERICAN DIPLOMATIC QUESTIONS

October 10, 1899, upon which date the Maritime concession
was declared to lapse. It differed in but few of its essential
features from the Maritime concession of 1887. The com-
pany paid for it -f 100,000, with a promise of -1400,000 more,
as a pledge of good faith. It bound itself to begin the exca-
vation of the canal within two years, and complete the same
within ten 3"ears. The concession was in perpetuity, and the
government bound itself by a declaration that no concession
or privilege theretofore granted should, in any manner,
" oppose, conflict, embarrass, or prejudice " this one. The
free navigation, use, or disposition of all waters in the state
were given to the company, which was also to retain ex-
clusive control of the management and operations of the
canal. The final articles set forth that it is " understood
that for the purposes of this contract the Cardenas-Menocal
contract (1887, to Maritime Company) shall cease to have
legal existence on the 9th day of October, 1899, and there-
fore all the foregoing stipulations shall take effect Avithout
further action, declaration, or law, on the 10th of October,
1899, or sooner, should Messrs. Eyre and Cragin, their heirs
or assigns, obtain the rescission of the Cardenas-Menocal
contract. ..."

A forfeiture of its concession from Nicaragua was natu-
rally the greatest calamity that could possibly befall the
Maritime Compan}^, and now the very worst had happened.
But the company still had to its credit nearly a j^ear of grace
before the contract came to its end, and the company's direc-
tors, undaunted by evil fortune, decided to make a final
and desperate effort to save the company's life. Their best
manner of seeking redress for the outrages which they felt
had been perpetrated upon them by a fickle, irresponsible gov-
ernment was through interposition of the State Department
at Washington. The right of the company thus to fall back
upon national protection was found, first, in its national
charter, which gave to Congress a privilege of supervision
over all its affairs ; and secondl}', because its concession
from Nicaragua and Costa Rica, by virtue of the quasi inter-
national character of its provisions, partook, in a measure,

THE INTEKOCEANIC CANAL PROBLEM 87

i the nature of a treaty. There can be no doubt that the
jmpany had need of every resource at its command to extri-
ite itself from the awkward position into which it had
illen, and it certainly played its strongest card in an appeal
) the Department of State (December 2, 1898). A corre-
)ondence ensued, calling upon Nicaragua to show cause for
s summary action in cancelling the contract of the j\Iari-
me Company, and farther asking for an opportunity on the
irt of the company to make a defence.

The year 1899 therefore opened with two rival canal com-
mies, each holding exclusive concessions from Nicaragua,
id each clamoring for public recognition.

Now a third company, operating in Panama, suddenly
ime forward witli a flourish of concessions and a budg-et
: seductive arguments, further to confuse the already be-
ildered Senate and House committees who had in charge
1 matters pertaining to Central American canals. AVhen
le old Panama Company reached its disastrous end in
^89, its scattered wreckage was put through a process of
anipulation by the courts of justice in France. Singularly
lOUgh, there remained some assets after the disaster, which,
; the careful management of the " liquidators," or receiv-
•s, were converted into a nest-egg for a new and more
ialthy company; this was duly organized imder the general
trporation laws of France on October 20, 1894. By decree

court, all the canal and canal works, the concessions, etc.,

the old company were transferred in full right to the new
le. An extension of time to 1904, and then to 1908, within
hich to complete the Panama Canal, was obtained fi-om the
olombian Government, and the new company set to work
riously and hopefully, though modestly in the matter of
:penditures, as compared with the reckless extravagance of
e previous management.

The sudden intrusion of this new factor on the commercial
ie of the canal problem led Congress into making an in-
istigation into the mei-its and piospects of all three compa-
es. From January 17th to the 25th, 1899, the Committee
1 Interstate and Foreign Commerce of the House lieard a

88 AMERICAN DIPLOMATIC QUESTIONS

presentation of the claims to governmental recognition and
encouragement by the agents of the three rival companies.

The Panama Company presented an unexpectedly stron^r
case. They had to their credit one fairly good and one excel-
lent harbor upon the Atlantic and Pacific sides of the isthmus,
nearly one-half of the entire work of excavation completed,
an existing railroad paralleling the route of the canal, o-ood
concessions, and a force of three thousand men actually at
work in the field. The company was shown to be solvent
and its prospects bright. It asked for no financial aid, only
to be spared adverse legislation. " We have a right to
assume," concluded the attorney for the company, " that the
Panama canal is a necessary, if not the controlling, factor iu
the solution of the isthmian canal problem."

The representatives of the Maritime Canal Company
devoted their testimony largely to a defence of the company's
rights under its concession from Nicaragua, and to explana-
tions why it had failed to complete the canal within the
ten years' limit as therein specified. They stoutly maintained
that their concession had not properly lapsed, notwithstand-
ing their own failures. As against the Panama route, they
urged the superior advantages of their own, alleging a better
harbor on the Atlantic side, fewer miles of actual canaliza-
tion, shorter canal termini for vessels with northern port
terminals, better advantages in the matter of trade winds;
and finally, as a convincing argument, they showed that the
Panama route involved diplomatic difficulties in the way of
exploitation, which made it far less deserving of public notice
than their own project in Nicaragua. Having referred to the
financial panic of 1893, and its effects upon the company, Mr.
Hiram Hitchcock, president of the Maritime Company, said:
" This condition of affairs has necessarily led to a Avaiting
attitude on the part of the company, during which time its
franchises and possessions have been actively coveted by
aspiring rival routes and interests, sometimes under the indi-
rect inspiration of foreign powers ; and it has encountered
criticisms and direct opposition of enemies in the United
States and Central America. In the face of all this, the com-

THE INTEROCEANIC CANAL PROBLEM 89

pany has remained solvent and faithful to its trusts, and it has
protected the enterprise and preserved it forthe people and gov-
jrnment of the United States." deferring to the Grace con-
;ession, he said, " It was entered into by Nicaragua in violation
)f the rights and interests not only of this company (Mari-
ime Company), but of the United States and of Costa liica."
The representatives of the Grace-Cragin syndicate ap-
iroaclied their examination by the House committee in the
] lunty manner of victors fresh from the fray, and bearing the
poils of victory — in the shape of a remai'kably liberal con-
ession from Nicaragua. They believed the ^Maritime con-
ession to have alread}- become a worthless instrument, and
isisted upon their own paramount rights to begin work Oc-
)ber 9, 1899. Upon that day, they asserted, the iNIaritime
ompany would be called upon by Nicaragua to open the
mal to navigation, which, needless to say, the Maritime
ompany would be unable to do; then the latter company
ould be obliged to stand forth and acknowledge its failure
' carry out the terms of its contract and accept its forfeiture
ithout further parley ; then the Grace Company, as a private
a-poration, would step in with a clear field, and, with the
•st of concessions from Nicaragua, it would enter upon
e task with every assurance of success. In substantia-
)n of their claims in regard to the forfeiture of the Mari-
ne franchise, they pointed out how the Nicaraguan Govern-
ntliad granted the Canal Association a generous concession
'iig witli ample time allowance, which siiould have assured
• opening of the canal for universal commerce before the
ISO of the century. '' They waited. . . . Tiieir chagrin and
i ^appointment may be imagined as the weeks and months
: led into years without the turning of a wheel upon the
k. . . . Tlie dredges have for years been wrecks, rest-
' ,^ on the bottom of Grey town I^agoon ; the railway is
1 ted out and overgrown ; the buildings are mere shells
:i(liiig upon rotted timbers; the harbor is filled with
'1, and the entrance from the sea is never, at the most,
r three feet in depth. Such of the property as has not
II destroyed has been realized upon. Much of the com-

90 AMERICAN DIPLOMATIC QUESTIONS

pany's property has been sold under judgments. Piers,
buildings', telegraph and telephone lines, steamboats, and
dredges are gone. The remnant of railway that remains re-
verts to Nicaragua next October. We were told that the
last sale of the company's assets was of hand tools, surveying
instruments, etc., sold to the Xicaraguan Government for a
few thousand dollars, part of which was paid to the compan}-.
The company's representative is now pushing the Govern-
ment for the balance, in order to pay his salar}' and that of
the watchman. To the Nicaraguans, at least, the attitude of
the company, claiming ability to cany out an enterprise in-
volving ''$100,000,000, pressing a claim of a few thousand
dollars against a Government which is the company's credi-
tor, is ridiculous."

Such, then, being the deplorable condition of the Maritime
Company, the representatives of the Grace Company believed
that any claim on the part of the former to an extension of its
franchises beyond October 9 of that year '' would be treated
by the Government of Nicaragua as the merest effrontery."

Before the committee examination into the status and
prospects of the three canal companies had terminated,
the Senate took into consideration a bill to amend the
old act incorporating the ^laritime Canal Company, its
purpose being, as in the previous year, to place the com-
pany more completely under the auspices and control of
the national government. Under this bill all the stock of the
company originally issued was to be recalled, and new
shares in j^lace of it were to be issued to the United States
Government, to Nicaragua, and to Costa Ilka. Thus the
financial bureau of the com[)any would be transferred to an
ol'lice in the Treasury Department. In the Senate bill a
guarantee of neutrality of the canal was inserted witli thv
following proviso : "The Nicaragua Canal being a necessary
connection l)etween tlie eastern and western coast lines ot
tlie United States, the right to protect the same against all
interruptions and at all times, is reserved and excepted ont
of this declaration of the neutrality of said canal and its free '
use by oilier nations."

'the ixteroceaxic canal troblem 91

While this bill was pending, the examination of the three
rival companies was progressing in the committee room, and
the facts developed there tended very considerably to modify
the ideas held by many in Congress upon the subject of the
canal problem. The original draft of the Senate bill was
entirely stricken out, and an amended form, entitled, " A
Hill to provide for the construction of a canal connecting the
Waters of the Atlantic and Pacific Oceans," was reported.
This amended bill made no mention whatever of the Mari-
time Compan}-, nor of any existing schemes in Central
America, but provided simply for tlie govermental purchase
nf a portion of territor}- along the proposed canal route in
Nicaragua, and called for an appro[)riation of the funds nec-
essary for the United States Government immediately to
undertake the work as a national project, irrespective of the
claims or rights of any private company. Here, then, for
:he first time, the Senate had reached that point to which it
lad for so many years been tending, — a declaration for an
American canal to be constructed by the government as a
national undertaking. The bill passed the Senate by a safe
nargin, and, attached as a rider to the River and Harbor
Bill, was turned over to the mercies of the House. There,
lowever, it encountered the unyielding opposition of S{)eaker
liced, and immediatel}^ became involved in the meshes of an
•ndless controversy over matters political, diplomatic, and
technical. It was consigned to the waste-basket on the last
lay of the session.

In the meantime, the Nicaraguan Canal Commission, of
whicli Admiral Walker was the chairman and which had been
•sent to Nicaragua under Act of June 4; 1897, had returned,
ind su])niitted to the President a [)reliminaiT re[)ort relative
t'» its progress ''in investigating the question of the proper
i"Ute, the feasibility, and cost of construction of the Nicara-
^^ua Canal" f-January, 1899). Three months later the final
report was prepared ; a synopsis of it, furnished by the
State Department (May 31, 18!)9), gave the results of the
two years' examination of the Nicaragua routes. It appeared
liy this synopsis that the tliree commissioners agreed as to the

92 AMERICAN DIPLOMATIC QUESTIONS

best route through Nicaragua (differing in some particulars
from the route selected by the Menocal survey), but they
disagreed seriously in their estimates of the cost of construc-
tion. Admiral Walker and Professor Haupt calculated the
sum as not exceeding f 118,11-3,790, while Colonel Haines be-
lieved the probable cost would reach quite -^16,000,000 more.
These figures were deduced from a generous estimate of the
expenses of actual construction ; nevertheless, there was left
to the imagination a formidable array of unknown quantities
which might call for extra millions.

The effect of this report, made by the most competent and
disinterested engineers, and after a prolonged and most care-
ful survey of the region, was, in one sense, encouraging to
the friends of the Nicaraguan Canal, and, in another sense, it
was quite the contrary. The feasibility of the Nicaragua
route was thoroughly established ; there could be no further
question u[)on that score, and the best course for the canal
from Greytown and Brito, as well as the most advantageous
disposition of locks and dams, were definitely fixed ; but the
amount of treasure the monster would consume was, after all,
highly problematic.

The recent appearance of the Panama agents in the con-
ferences of the Senate and House committees, and the sudden
awakening to new life and vigor of that once hopelessly
discredited French project, produced a marked effect upon
Congress. Had all been progressing smoothly in Nicaragua,
the case might have been different ; but the Nicaragua
canal project was becoming each year more and more en-
tangled in a welj of conflicting concessions, claims of
rival companies, and the vexations of diplomatic misun-
derstandings. The JNlaritime Company, that step-child of
the Senate and exponent of the. Nicaraguan route, was
dying on the street for want of the financial nourishment
the Senate had constantly striven to supply, but had
always failed to give. Year by year the determined efforts
of its friends to make the building of the Nicaragua Caiuil
a governmental project had also failed. In both brnnches
of Congress, and especially in the House, a strong under-

THE INTEROCEANIC CANAL PROBLEM 93

irrent of opposition to all Nicaraguan canal measures
nded to prevent successful legislation ; no^y came the
•eliminary Walker report, which, though cheerful and
)peful in tone, told a discouraging story of costs and diffi-
dties to be met. Congress began to look to Panama ;
?rliaps, after all, it would be unwise to ignore the enticing
•omises of the French company.

Panama had not been examined for many years ; indeed, it
> id never been investigated in the thorough and complete
anner in which the Walker commission had surveyed
icaragua. The same could be said of the other Central
merican routes, formerly considered within the realms of
issibility, but long since abandoned. Possibly Nicaragua,
ith her load of annoyances, could be cast aside, and another
id better route discovered. At all events, it were better to
;t upon full knowledge of all the conditions upon the isth-
us, than to commit the nation to a route which might
■utually prove less desirable. A further and more com-
■•ehensive investigation of all the possible routes was felt to
5 the proper course to pursue.

The State Department was embarrassed. Each year, when
le canal bills were under discussion, the Secretary felt the
vvkwardness of the diplomatic situation in which the country
as likely to be placed. Congress had a way of framing bills
I matters relating to the canal question, and of giving utter-
ice in the freest manner to policies, which were not in accord
ith the legal obligations of the country placed upon it by
eaty stipulations. In short, the legislative branch of the
overnment in this respect often worked to cross purposes
ith the executive, — while Great Britain anxiously looked
M witli a protest ready for filing the moment Congress
acceeded in converting its ship canal theories into law.
"learly, if Congress Avere determined upon building, owning,
lifying, and controlling a Central American canal, some-
umg must first be done in the matter of amending the
-layton-Bulwer treaty. Delay was necessary, — obviously
nother commission was the thing!
On tlie last day of the session, the day upon which the

94 AMERICAN DIPLOMATIC QUESTIONS

Senate bill for the construction of the Nicaragua Canal, as a
rider, was stricken from the River and Harbor Bill, a clause
was substituted in its place as follows : —

The President is authorized to make investigation of any and
all practicable routes for a canal . . . with a view to determining
the most practicable and feasible route for such canal, togethei
with the proximate and probable cost of constructing a canal at
each of two or more of said routes : And the President is furthei
authorized to investigate and ascertain what rights, privilege^
and franchises, if any, may be held and owned by any corpora
tions, associations or individuals, and what work, if any, has
been done by such corporations, associations or individuals in
the construction of a canal at either or any of said routes, and
particularly at the so-called Nicaraguan and Panama routes re-
spectively ; and likewise to ascertain the cost of purchasing all
of the rights, privileges and franchises held and owned by any
such corporations, associations and individuals in any and all ol
such routes, particularly the said Nicaraguan route and the said
Panama route ; and likewise to ascertain the probable or proxi-
mate cost of constructing a suitable harbor at each of the termini
of said canal, with the probable annual cost of maintenance of
said harbors, respectively. And generally the President is au-
thorized to make such full and complete investigation as to deter-
mine the most feasible and practicable route across said isthmus
for a canal, together with the cost of constructing the sam5 and
placing the same under the control, management and ownership
of the United States.

To enable the President to make the investigations and ascer-
tainments herein provided for, he is hereby authorized to employ
in said service any of the engineers of the United States Army
at his discretion, and likewise to employ any engineers in civil
life, at his discretion, and any other persons necessary to make
such investigation, and to fix the compensation of any and all of
such engineers and other persons.

So the session of 1899 closed with the canal question rest-
ing easily under the certainty of at least a year's delay.

The President at once appointed the members of the new
commission. They were Admiral Walker and his two col-
leagues of the former commission, ex-Senator Pasco of Flor-
ida, Alfred Noble, George S. Morrison, and Professor William ,
H. Burr of Columbia University, — three well-known niid ,

THE INTEROCEANIC CANAL PROBLEM 95

distinguished engineers, — (Tcneral (then Colonel) Ernst,
U.S.A., and Professor E. R. Johnson of the University of
Pennsylvania, a noted student of commerce and economics.
With the generous sum of a million dollars to defray ex-
penses, the new commission organized and proceeded to
Central America.

After this final series of crushing blows, only that hope
which springs eternal in the human breast could have in-
duced the promoters of the Maritime Company to continue
their fight for existence. Their only chance for success
had been in the fidelity of Congress to their cause ; ijovv,
in their darkest hour of adversity, the Senate had all but
deserted them. It was upon the Senate they had chiefl}^
relied, but now that body had passed a Nicaragua canal meas-
ure which utterly ignored them, and Congress had adjourned
in March with the creation of a new commission whose duty
it was to examine and report upon other routes as well as
upon their own. Their one course to pursue was to in-
duce Nicaragua to extend their privileges beyond the 9th of
the following October — the fatal day upon which that state
had arranged to celebrate the company's obsequies. Now, by
the last article in the Maritime Company's concession, it is
provided that : —

Any misunderstanding that may arise between the State of
Xicai-agua and the company in regard to the interpretation of the
present stipulations shall be submitted to a court of arbitrators
composed of four members, two of which shall be appointed by
the State and two by the com})any.

These arbitrators shall be designated by each of the parties
within the period of four mouths from the day on which one of
the contracting parties shall have informed the other in writing
of the want of agreement on the point at issue. Should one of
the parties allow the aforesaid tei-m to pass, it shall be considered
.'IS assenting to the opinion or claim of tlie other.

The company's last hope lay in this clause, and the directors
Sought to strengthen their position before Nicaragua by press-
ing their claims for a hearing through the State Department.
TIic latter assumed the burden with some hesitation, and a

96 AMERICAN DIPLOMATIC QUESTIONS

correspondence upon the subject was opened with Mr. Merry,
the United States Minister at Costa Rica, there being at that time
no diplomatic representative from Washington at Managua.
The company's chiim to an extension of time, under the terms
of its concession, was based upon the assertion that the revo-
lutions in Nicaragua within the last ten years — in reality a
protracted reign of political disturbances — and enforced
cessation of work caused by the investigations of the
various governmental commissions, together constituted
"events of main force," that are "duly justified and sufficient
to impede the progress of the work." Negotiations looking
to the settlement of the company's grievances progressed
slowly, and the 9th of October arrived before the formal protest
of the company, as set forth and required in the bond, reached
the Nicaraguan capital. By the company's failure to make
proper and due protest, and to present its case before the
time limit set upon the compan3^'s franchise had expired, the
Maritime Company lost its right to a tribunal ; but in def-
erence to an expressed interest in the company, shown by the
United States Government, Nicaragua waived her rights in
tlie premises and agreed to arbitrate. She at once appointed
two natives of Nicaragua to serve as jurors, and invited the
company to name two arbiti'ators ; the company selected two
men who were personally interested in the company, and
whom Nicaragua challenged, coupling her challenge with a
demand that all four arbitrators be Nicaraguans. To this
the company firmly objected, and with this hitch in the pro-
ceedings the matter remained unsettled.^

The future of the Maritime Canal Company was far from
bright. It did not seem likely that, if a tribunal of arbitra-
tion were agreed upon, its decision could be otherwise than
adverse to the company. Senator j\ I organ warmly cliampi-
oned its cause in 1899, but the following year Congress
showed a more decided tendency to sever itself from all
private or corporate canal schemes, and to retain a free hand

1 A tribunal was eventually agreed upon wliicli decided, in the autumn of
1900, adversely to tlie company. Asiainst tliis decision the company excejited
and lodged a protest in the l)cp;u'tuient oi ISlate.

THE IXTEROCEANIC CANAL PROBLEM 97

to prosecute the work, when the proper time should come,
IS a purely national undertaking.

The Grace Company also encountered numerous diffi-

•ulties. According to the provisions of its very liberal con-

iession, it was to begin its corporate existence on October

\ 1899. Six months from that day, i.e. April 9, 1900, it

,vas expected to be fully organized and equipped for work,

md four months from the date of its complete organization

t was expected to pay to Nicaragua the balance of the

■ <500,000 deposit. The members of this syndicate felt secure

n their rights and reasonably satisfied with the outlook.

Hiey awaited judgment upon the Maritime Company case,

onfident that their rivals would be forever silenced by decree

f the improvised court. They asserted perfect organization as

company, and their ability to furnish the funds necessary to

omplete the construction of the canal; and they declared

hemselves to be ready to pay the sum of -1400,000 still due

3 Nicaragua, the moment a demand should be made for it.

ncidentally they considered their franchise worth 85,000,000.

On the other hand, the syndicate was embarrassed by nu-

lerous difficulties. The good will of Nicaragua lierself,

n essential to success, was apparently lost. A decided

oolness toward the company on the part of the conces-

onary government developed into outspoken disfavor.

icaragua maintained that she blundered into granting the

ragin-Eyre franchise through a false belief that the syndi-

ite represented a governmental project, and that it had the

ipport of the President and the Congress of the United

tates. To-day Nicaragua expresses her desire to deal with

le United States directly and to rid herself of private

iinpanies, in all of which she has lost faith. In the second

ace, the Grace Syndicate never won the support, nor even

le confidence, of the men in the United States Congress

ho control tlie canal committees. Indeed, Congress was

sposed to regard the syndicate as a speculative concern

hose claims might be safel}' and properl}' ignored, sliould

Dngress decide to l)nild the canal as a government Avoik.

he growing conviction of Congress that the govern munL

u

I

98 AMERICAN DIPLOMATIC QUESTIONS

should undertake and maintain the work upon a national
basis promised an uncertain future to this Syndicate as it
augured ill for the moribund Maritime Company.^

Despite the excellent showing made b}^ the representatives
of the Panama Company in the Congressional investigation
of January, 1899, and the resulting appointment of a scien-
tific commission to examine that route, the star of that ill-
fated project lost lustre as the new j^ear (1900) approached.
Every one remembered too well the brilliant promises of the
old company, which had never been fulfilled ; indeed, the
whole distressing story of failure and fraud was too fresh in
mind to permit even the chance of its repetition.

Suspicion began to attach to the sudden revival of this
Panama scheme, and the impression gained ground, and
finally prevailed, that its sudden advertisement was, after
all, but a clever move, on the part of the transcontinental
railroad lobby, to divert public attention from the onlj' feasi-
ble canal route. Despite the prejudice it encountered in the
United States, the Panama Company continued its strenuous
efforts to impress the country favorably with its prospects.
The latest move of its promoters has been in the direction of
" Americanizing " the French company. As an initial step, it
organized in New Jersey, at about the beginning of the year
1900, the " Panama Canal Company of America," to which
the rights of the French company should eventually be trans-
ferred. In this manner the Panama promoters hoped to
place their project upon an equal footing with the otlier two
American companies in the race for governmental recognition.
Although the scientific commission was still in tlie Held
at the opening of the 5()th Congress (December, 1899), the
canal committees in both branches decided not to wait for
Admiral Walker's report, which was not due for many months.
A more propitious moment for carrying through a canal meas-
ure had never before existed. The private companies having
suffered themselves to become involved in difticulties from

1 The Grace Syndicate failed to meet its obligation to pay the balance of
$400,000 upon the stipulated date ; the Nicaraguan authorities accordingly
<liclared its franchise cancelled.

THE INTEROCEAXIC CANAL PROBLEM 99

rthich they could not extricate themselves, could be safely
gnored. The country at large favored the scheme of na-
:ional construction, the executive endorsed it, Nicaragua
iemanded it, and the surplus in the Treasury, for the first
inie in years, was in a condition to meet the financial obli-
gations necessary to undertake the work.

A " Bill to provide for the Construction of a Canal connect-
ng the Waters of the Atlantic and Pacific Oceans," Avas
; iccordingly introduced into the House by ^Ir. IIepl)urn,
m December 7 (1899), and a bill of similar purport was
)laced before the Senate ten days later by ]Mr. Sullivan.
Both measures provided for the immediate purchase of a
;trip of territory from Nicaragua and Costa Ivica and called
'or appropriations — one bill, of ■'ii'loO,000,000, and the other,
-»f $140,000,000 — to meet the expenses of construction.
The Senate bill authorized and requested the President to
legotiate with the Government of Great Britain for the
ibrogation or modification of the Clayton-Bulwer treaty,
•so far and to such an extent as to enable the United States
o own, construct, maintain, and operate under its exclusive
urisdiction, a canal. . . .'"

It also provided for the purchase of any valid outstanding
'oncessions from Nicaragua or Costa Kica, but the House
jill not only ignored the treaty rights of (ireat Britain, but
:he legal rights of the concessionary companies in Nicaragua
IS well.

In his report accompaiiyiiig the House Ijill ( 11. 1{. 2."')-)(S),
Mr. llcplmru expressly stated, in reference to these cnn-
jessionaries, that " it is not believed that any one of these
. . has any right or interest that he can conve}- to the
I nited States." In order to forestall any arguments of an
ithical character which might be urged against the bill, he
set forth, with considerable positiveness, his belief that tlie
Nicaragua Canal, when finally built, would be entitled to no
place in the field of international law, and further, that all
'Hsiderations of tlie Clayton-Bulwer ti-eaty could well be

It aside, for — ''It has been a dead letter frf)m the day
,tUe treaty was signed to the present moment."

100 AMERICAN DIPLOMATIC QUESTIONS

The passage of such a measure in Congress was at that
time considered by many to be particularly indiscreet, in
view of the fact that the Walker commission, for whose
expenses $1,000,000 had been appropriated, was still engaged
in the examination of the various routes. An international
scientific commission of high authority had recently pro-
nounced the Panama project entirely feasible and had placed
the cost at only $102,000,000 ; it seemed, therefore, highly
desirable that Admiral Walker's coming report should be
received before either Mr. Hepburn's or Mr. Sullivan's bills
should become law.

Both bills were amended in committee, and as amended
were reported back to their respective Houses in January
and February. Consideration of these bills for the moment
was delayed by the stress of other and more important busi-
ness, but the friends of both of them felt confident that early
action would be taken, and that some sort of a canal bill
would receive the sanction of both Houses before the end of
the term; the sudden appearance of the Hay-Pauncefote
treaty, with its unexpected provisions, effectually blocked for
a time all further action upon the pending bills. Although
it seemed highly improbable that final action on 'either
measure could be reached during that session of Congress,
the Hepburn bill nevertheless passed the House by the
overwhelming majority of 225 to 35 votes (May 2).

The bill ignored all the private companies, and enacted
that the United States Government should " acquire from the
states of Costa Rica and Nicaragua, for and in behalf of the
United States, control of such portion of territory now
belonging to Costa Rica and Nicaragua as ma}' be desirable
and necessary on which to excavate, construct, and defend a
canal of such depth," etc. It provided for such fortifications
along the route "as will be required for tlie safety and pro-
tection of said canal and harbors." An appropriation of
810,000,000 was called for to enal)le the Secretary of AVar to
enter upon contracts for " materials and work that may be
deemed necessary for the proper excavation, construction,
defence and completion of said canal, to be paid for as appro-

THE INTEROCEANIC CANAL PROBLEM 101

priations may from time to time be hereafter made, not to
exceed in the aggregate !|140,000,000."

The passage of this bill in the House marked the desire
so generally felt throughout the country that the United
States Government should construct an isthmian canal; but
its passage was also ill timed, in view of the fact that the
Hay-Pauncefote treaty was then before the Senate awaiting
confirmation. The provisions of the treaty and of the bill,
in so far as they related to the political control of the canal,
were diametricall}^ opposed, and the sudden passage of the
bill in pointed contempt of the treaty was a measure well
calculated to impugn the good faith of the nation. The
bill failed to pass the Senate.

On February 13 (1000), another canal bill was introduced
into the House by Mr. Levy of New York, which differed
essentially from all previous measures looking to the con-
struction of a Central American canal. Following the tenor
of the Hay-Pauncefote treaty, which was then before the
Senate, it provided for negotiations between the United
States and other maritime nations, with a view to securing
hiternational cooperation and contribution according to the
ship tonnage of the various nations in the construction of a
neutralized ship canal. This bill was far too radical to meet
with favor in the House.

A comprehensive glance at the history and develoj)ment of
the canal problem in Central America discloses the following
facts : —

First, it was the object of the early navigators to find a
natural strait connecting the two oceans.

Second, when the absence of such a natural waterway was
• lefinitely determined, the purpose was conceived to construct
an artificial one.

Third, a number of projects were considered and discussetl
looking to this end during the sixteenth, seventeenth and
eighteenth centuries.

Fiiiirlh, tlui Fiiited States became interested in tht- (pies-

102 AMERICAN DIPLOMATIC QUESTIONS

tion in the early part of the nineteenth century, after the
independence of the Central American states had been
established.

Fifth, other nations then became interested in the project,
and numerous surveys were made covering not less than six
possible routes. The early surveys were superficial, and wholly
worthless in the light of more modern engineering science.

Sixth, the result of later surveys has been to reject all
except the Panama and Nicaragua routes. French interest
became focussed upon Panama, and the United States favored
the Nicaraguan route.

Seventh, the failure and collapse of the French Panama
Company had left for a time a clear field to the American
companies in Nicaragua ; but when the latter companies
were driven to insolvency and inactivit}-, nothing less than
governmental aid seemed to promise success.

Eighth, the result of recent surveys, combined with the
experience of those who have attempted construction of the
work, has been to demonstrate that the physical difficulties
in the way and the probable cost of construction are greater
than formerly supposed. While the advanced skill of engi-
neering science has devised improved means of overcoming
physical difficulties, it has at the same time developed many
obstacles hitherto undiscovered.

Ninth, a recent phase of the question is a growing distrust
in the ability of any private company to complete the work
of constructing a Central American canal. For ten years
past Congress has tended toward a policy of placing tlie
work upon a national basis. This tendency reached its
culmination in the 5Gth Congress by the introduction of
bills into both Houses looking exclusively to governmental
construction of the canal.

The great majority of the people of Europe and America
have always believed that this convenient doorway to the
Pacific should be opened to the world's commerce. The
query naturally arises. Why, after three hundred years of
effort, has it never been done ? In spite of tlie ph3'sical
difficulties, the Avork has at all times been considered

THE INTEROCEANIC CANAL PROBLEM 103

feasible. The great advance in the efficiency of scientific
investigation has not tended to lessen these difficulties, but
the admitted resources of modern engineering are acknowl-
edged to be sufficient to overcome them. It would, of course,
require many millions to accomplish the task, but a greater
amount of private capital each year finds means of invest-
ment in other directions, while large sums prefer inactivity
to an investment so hazardous. There is lack of neither
skill nor capital. The majority of the people of the United
States are probably of the opinion that the ship canal would
pay dividends upon its capital within a few years after its
completion, yet every company that has undertaken its con-
struction has failed for lack of funds. For ten or fifteen
yeai"s political parties in the country have been united in the
belief that the government should undertake this work as a
national project ; and each year bills have been introduced
into Congress looking to that end, yet none of these bills
have become law.

It is true that a large transcontinental railroad interest has
steadily opposed these measures, but that opposition could
not by itself prevail year after year, against the desire of the
country at large. One must then look elsewhere for that
mysterious influence which seems to prevent the realization
of these hopes of triumph over the obstacles of nature. It
is probably to be found in the fear and distrust of each
other entertained by the commercial nations of the world.
Wliile each one hesitates to make the enormous expenditure
necessary to the construction of a Central Am'erican ship
canal, each would no douljt promptly condemn exclusive
ownership or control by one or even several of the other
nations. So far, the Powers interested have been unable or
unwilling to fix among themselves the political status of tlie
canal when it shall have been built. It is necessary, there-
fore, that preliminary to the commencement of the work —
work that will finally succeed in its object — some diplomatic
questions of a delicate and serious character calling for
adjustment must be met. For the United States, these ques-
tions have become more corn[)licated Ijv reason of tlie recent

104 AMERICAN DIPLOMATIC QUESTIONS

development of public sentiment which indicates a purpose
to claim, and possibly to demand, full and absolute political,
if not commercial, control of any Central American canal
wherever and whenever it may be built.

A review of the diplomatic aspects of this canal problem
must be taken, and to make its history the more intelligible,
it must be treated in connection with early events in Central
America, out of which these international questions arose.

II

The earliest Spanish discoverers and explorers in the
Western Hemisphere were followed almost immediately by
numbers of their countr3^nien who came to win fortune in
the New World. Considering the many perils of unknown
seas and the many risks ashore, these Spanish pioneers
founded flourishing colonies in Central and South America
in a surprisingly short time. The Anglo-Saxon navigators,
for the greater part, limited their field of exploration to the
mainland of North America, and the colonists from the colder
climates of Northern Europe sought regions where the win-
ters brought snow and ice.

For quite a hundred years the Spanish enjoyed an unlim-
ited monopoly of the trade connected with the Gulf of Mexico
and the Caribbean Sea. In the sixteenth century Spain, at the
zenith of her power and strength, grew opulent upon the rich
returns from her transatlantic possessions. But her fleets of
galleons, which took home the treasures of America, offered
great temptations to piracy by certain adventurous spirits in
Europe and America. In the early part of the seventeenth
century, the famous " Buccaneers of the Spanish Main " ap-
peared like so many harpies to prey upon these richly laden
vessels of Spain. They came in steadily increasing numbers,
sometimes founding settlements of their own in the West
Indian Islands, whence they made excursions for robbery and
plunder. Among these companies of roving freebooters a band
of Englishmen found for themselves a safe and convenient ren-
dezvous in the lagoons of the Mosquito Coast of Nicaragua.

THE INTEROCEANIC CANAL PROBLEM 105

They cultivated the friendship of the native Indians, and,
though unrecognized and unauthorized to do so by England,
they established upon these swampy shores an English set-
tlement, thus forming the nucleus of a future English pos-
session. In like manner, though many years later, another
band of English adventurers, who may doubtfully be spared
the name of pirates, took possession of points along the coast
of Yucatan, and appropriated to their own use certain islands
lying off the coast of Honduras, thereby founding the settle-
ment of Belize, later known as British Honduras, and more
recently created into a British colonial possession.

The terrible assaults of these desperate men upon Spanish
commerce led to many angr}^ protests from Spain, which
only drew from England an equal number of denials of
responsibility for her castaway and disowned subjects. Yet,
with her accustomed diplomatic shrewdness, England lost
no occasion to make })olitical recognition of her settlements
on the mainland of Central America. This was particu-
larly evidenced in her treaty with Spain of 1670. All
Spanish efforts to dislodge these unwelcome neighbors of
lier colonies, either by diplomacy or force, proved unavail-
ng. In course of time, however, and possibly through press-
ire of civilization, the character and aims of these piratical
settlers gradually assumed a better phase, and even before the
beginning of the eighteenth century the descendants of tliese
juccaneers became substantially honest and peaceful men.
They betook themselves to cutting logwood, cultivating the
mil, teaching morality to the Indians, and maintaining a <
crowing and profitable trade with the English colony of Ja-
iiaica. The early history of these two settlements of Belize
ml Mosquitoland is but the story of a ceaseless struggle by
England to maintain her questionable foothold on the conti-
lent against the efforts of the Spanish in Central America
o loosen it. Tlie degree of security enjoyed by these British
I'ttlers in Central America depended largely upon the vary-
ig fortunes of England and S]):iiii in the European wars in
>hich both powers were almost constMiitly involved. Thus,
I slate as 1814, by the treaty of Madrid, England was com-

106 AMERICAN DIPLOMATIC QUESTIONS

pelled to disavow all colonial claims in Mosquitoland, and by
the same instrument the English settlement of Belize was re-
duced to the status of a mere tenancy at will. The claims
of her subjects amounted to a bare lumbering privilege
granted to a company of Englishmen by the Spanish Govern-
ment.

In the future course of events, however, England found
further occasion to reestablish her lost prestige in Central
America. A few j^ears after the ratification of the Madrid
treat}', and just after Spain had lost her sovereignty over the
Central American states, the English again appeared on the
Mosquito shore. With much pomp and ceremony they
crowned the chief of the Mosquito Indians, " King of Mos-
quitia," and established an English protectorate over the
newly created kingdom. Under the sheltering wing of the
great British power, the southern boundary lines of Mos-
quitia suddenly expanded so as to include the mouth of the
San Juan River, that vital spot of Nicaragua's territor}'. lu
quite the same manner, and as suddenly, Belize ripened into
an English "possession," with a governor and other officers
of state, under the title of " British Honduras," which now
as a colony continues to flourish, time having cured the weak-
ness of its tenure upon the land, and cleared away the doubts
formerly cast upon its rights of existence.

The purpose of England's tenacious hold upon the main-
land of Central America became clearer when, in 1847, the
King of Mosquitia announced to the Nicaraguan Government
that, on and after January 1, 1848, he would " reassume his
lawful control " over the San Juan River. In pursuance of
this notice, he duly appeared at the river's mouth with a
force of English marines, and raised the colors of Mosquitia.
Some skirmishes with the Nicaraguan soldiers resulted, but
in the course of a few months, when the excitement had
sulisided, the English were thoroughly established in the
old town of San Juan del Norte at the mouth of the
San Juan River, which they clianged to the name of
" Greytown," and they were moreover strengthened in tlieir '
enlarged possessions by a new treaty with Nicaragua, which '

THE INTEROCEANIC CANAL PROBLEM 107

purported to recognize actual rights of sovereignty in the
Mosquito king.

These English encroachments upon American soil were
regarded with growing apprehension in Washington, not
only because it seemed to be a clear and open defiance of the
Monroe Doctrine, but also because it was foreseen that
English acquisition of territory, through which the proposed
Nicaraguan Canal must pass, would likely give rise in the
future to many serious difficulties. Prompt action on the
part of Congress was demanded by the American press to
check this dangerous advance of British influence in Nica-
ragua. The isthmus routes were as yet unappropriated,
and to gain an equal advantage with Great Britain, Presi-
dent Polk at once concluded a treaty with New Granada,
now known as the United States of Colombia, securing
to the United States exclusive rights of transit across tlie
isthmus, in return for our promise to maintain the absolute
neutrality of the transit line, and a further pledge to
guard, against all attack. New Granada's complete politi-
cal sovereignty over any line of transit the United States
might construct within her territory. While securing these
rights and .privileges' over the lower isthmus. President
Polk despatched Mr. Elijah Hise to Nicaragua to investi-
gate and re[)ort upon the recent acts of the British in con-
nection with the Mosquito king, and also upon the extent of
their encroachments, if any, upon the rights of Nicaragua.
He was not clothed with powers to enter upon any negotia-
tions whatever, the purpose of his mission as charge d'affaires
being, besides one of investigation, to use his influence in
establishing more cordial relations with Nicaragua. Hav-
ing arrived upon the scene, however, Mr. Hise became
convinced that his duty was to obtain for his country the
most liberal treaty possible from Nicaragua. He soon dis-
covered ample evidences of a British purpose to secure
possession of ports upon both coasts of Nicaragua, which
would enaVjle them absolutely to control the canal tliat it
was lioped might some day connect the oceans at that point.
The recent acquisition of California with its promises of

108 AIMERICAN DIPLOMATIC QUESTIONS

future wealth couvinced him of the utmost importance to the
United States of maintaining the route free from foreign in-
fluence. The canal was destined no doubt to be the main
high way connecting the two distant sections of the country.
In those early days the all but impassable deserts and unex-
plored mountain ranges of the West precluded the idea of
a direct overland communication by rail to the Pacific coast,
and consequently the importance attached to the Central
American route was then much greater in the public mind
than in later j^ears.

Cognizant of these conditions and full}' confident that the
government at Washington, when once it had been led to
appreciate the extent and motives of British aggressions in
Central America, would ratify them, he proceeded, though
unauthorized to do so, to conclude the articles of a new con-
vention with the very willing Nicaraguan Congress. The
treaty which he signed in June, 1849, gave to the United
States, besides the usual privileges of such an agreement, the
right to erect fortifications along the course of a proposed canal,
and to hold and fortify tlie ports at either end of the route.
In return for these privileges, the United States undertook
to guarantee Nicaragua's sovereignty from sea to sea over all
the territory she claimed. Such a compact, of course, not
only completely ignored British claims at Greytown, threat-
eninof at once to draw Eno-land and the United States into a
dispute, but it also involved an extravagant application of the
Monroe Doctrine which was far too radical to meet with the
views of President Taylor. A reaction from the aggressive
foreign policy of the Polk administration had set in; 'Sir. Hise
was recalled, and in his place Mr. E. G. Squier was despatched
with all haste to Nicaragua to grapple with the situation.

Mr. Squier's instructions were extremely conservative.
He was cautioned against all rash measures calculated to
infringe upon the rights of others or needlessly to provoke
hostility. He was assured that while the government was
at all times ready and willing to maintain the " Monroe Doc-
trine," that doctrine was not inconsistent with the idea and >
purpose that an interoceanic canal should " concede equal .

THE INTEROCEANIC CANAL PROBLEM 109

rio"lits of transit to all nations," and that it " should not be
hampered by any restrictions, either from local government
or the company building it."' Mr. Squier at once drew up
a treaty with Nicaragua which granted the United States a
rio'ht of way from sea to sea, and the United States in return
guaranteed Nicaragua's right of sovereignty over the route
and at both terminal ports ; the right was reserved to Nicara-
gua to make similar treaties with any other nation or nations
that cared to share this open right of way. Obviously, by
entering into such a compact with the United States, Nicara-
gua again violated her treaty of the year before with Eng-
land, and in guaranteeing Nicaragua's sovereignty over both
ports at either terminus of the proposed canal, the United
States necessarily stamped her disapproval upon the British
seizure of Greytown.

While Mr. Squier was negotiating this ver}^ liberal treaty,
the English resolved to strengthen even more firmly their grasp
upon Nicaragua and the canal route by obtaining landed inter-
ests at the Pacific terminus of the canal. A British expedition,
accordingly, started for the Gulf of Fonseca, in the territory of
Honduras, which was the supposed future Pacific entrance to
the inland waterway, for the purpose of seizing the islands in
this gulf, — points of the greatest strategic value. jNIr. Squier
hurried to Honduras, and in order to forestall these British
encroachments, he hastily concluded a preliminary treaty
witli Honduras (September, 184*J), whereby, pending final
negotiations, tlie Island of Tigre, in the (iulf of Fonseca, was
ceded to the I'nitedStates for a liiuitcd period. Now, strangely
enough, Mr. Squier's hasty mission to Honduras had scarcely
been accomplished, when the Britisli expedition appeared, and
upon the transparent excuse of an unpaid debt seized this
same Tigre Ishmd (Octoljer, 1841)). Thus, in their struggle
for the control of the territory through which the inter-
oceanic canal was likely to pass, the two powers came face to
face, and as the Englisli commander refused to surrender liis
newly acquired island, it seemed that war was inevitable. In
the meantime, the British had been no less active along the
Atlantic coast ; under pretext of definitely fixing the boun-

110 AMERICAN DIPLOMATIC QUESTIONS

daries of the Mosquito kingdom, its domain had been con-
siderably enlarged. The extent and character of the Hise
treaty (though never ratified by the United States) had
become known to England just before this time, but fortu-
nately the subtle forces of diplomacy had already been utilized
to avert an armed conflict, which the publication of the Hise
treaty would certainly have precipitated ; suddenly the news
of the Tigre Island incident came to intensify the existing
excitement in the United States.

In 1850 the American people had just come to a realizing
sense of the fact that Great Britain and the United States
were rivals for a controlling influence in Central America.
The United States had occupied itself in reclaiming its vast
domains and in creating new states in the wilderness which
lay beyond the Mississippi ; without thought of the effect
upon the world at large, or a care for the " balance of power "
in the Americas, territorial expansion westward had steadily
continued. Texas was absorbed into the Union, and Cali-
fornia, an empire in itself, was added to the growing body of
the nation. Oregon and Washington were definitely marked
out, and a lasting check was thereby placed upon British
hopes of further expansion on the Pacific coast. Contact
with the western ocean awakened thoughts of Oriental com-
merce, and here, for the first time, the influences were felt
that had been operating to draw apart the two great powers,
and that had made them rivals in Central America. Great
Britain enjoyed monopoly of Indian and Asiatic trade, and
when once that source of her commercial vitality was jeopard-
ized, her disfavor and enmity were aroused.

The success of American arms in Mexico had in a measure
intoxicated the people, and every advance in territorial gain
seemed more than ever to prove the truth in those early
prophecies that " a manifest destiny " would eventually place
the whole continent under the American flag. This eager-
ness for territorial aggrandizement was no more than the
outcome of a race between the North and South for exten-
sion of the slaveholding and free-soil area of the United
States ; but British statesmen saw in this mania for expan-

THE INTEROCEANIC CANAL PROBLEM 111

sion only a surer prospect of the extension of the United
States north into Canada and south into Mexico and Central
America. In the interest of her American colonial posses-
sions, Great Britain sought to oppose such advances. Tlie
British Government foresaw the importance to England of
a neutral Central American canal, and it anticipated the
movements of the United States that should seek to place
Central America under North American dominion, and de-
prive England of those joint proprietary rights in the canal
which her trade interests demanded.

When the British first laid claim to Mosquitia, the Ameri-
can people, unmindful, continued to attend to their own
domestic affairs; but when the British reoccupied the east
coast of Nicaragua, and seized Greytown, the United States
became aroused. The causes that for j-ears had been silently
operating to estrange the two nations now came to the
surface, and a spirit of jealousy shadowed the popular mind
in both England and the United States, and no doubt in-
fluenced both governments. The American people resented
these recent acts of British aggression in Nicaragua, which
they believed to have been inspired through feelings of en-
mity toward the United States. The mutual feelings of sus-
picion and distrust were enhanced by the determination of
Great P>ritain to stand by the assumptions of the Moscjuito
:;hief who obstructed the building of an American canal
through his territory. The belief had become general through-
out the country and especially in the Southern states, that an
ypen waterway through Nicaragua was absolutely essential to
the integrity and welfare of the United States. Tlie demand
for a neutral canal had become so urgent, its importance so
vital, that the people themselves were ready to risk war for
it if need be ; then came the British seizure of Tigre Island,
whicli completed the chain of events that had brought about
:he bitter jealousies of the two nations. The danger of war
in 1850 liad become alarming.

Mr. Clayton, the Secretary f)f State, fully appreciated
the gravity of the situation. As a practical statesman,
tie believed that tin; licmdits arising fnuu a great com-

112 AMERICAN DIPLOMATIC QUESTIONS

mercial enterprise belonged rather to a state of peace than
to a state of war, and perhaps already realizing, above and
beyond the excitement and passions of the moment, that an
interoceanic canal should be as free as the high seas them-
selves, he proceeded to open the way with the English ^lin-
ister at Washington toward the negotiation of a treaty, which
would not only be the means of preventing an immediate war,
but which would also outline those practical and conserva-
tive suggestions which he believed it would be necessary to
adopt to insure the completion of this great work.

The conclusion most earnestly sought was to induce Eng-
land to withdraw from Greytown, for in that occupancy the
Secretary saw the certaint}' of armed conflict. On this point
it was known that American sentiment was fixed and irre-
versible. In return for such a concession, however, Mr.
Clayton was willing to share with England in the political
control and use of the canal, for he saw no reason why any
one country should enjoy exclusive rights and privileges in
what was designed to be an international highway, which, to
be profitaljle and to subserve the purposes of its creation,
must be always open and always neutral. In this spirit of
friendship, and desirous of making the canal a " bond of in-
terest and peace " between the two nations, rather than a
"subject for jealous}-," he approached Mr. Crampton, the
British Minister in Washington, and invited his cooperation
in considering the terms of a treaty that would harmonize
British and American interests.

The danger in the situation was two-fold ; first, England
had seized new territory upon the American continent in
open defiance of the " Monroe Doctrine," which, in itself,
might be considered by Congress as a casus belli ; and, sec-
ondly, the territory so seized was the country about the
mouth of the San Juan River, which, of course, meant noth-
ing less forbidding than English ownership of the Atlantic
entrance to the proposed canal, — a condition of affairs mani-
festly intolerable to the United States.

To induce England to yield all her rights in Nicaragua •
would have been a most desirable consummation, but to oust ,

THE INTEROCEANIC CANAL PROBLEM 113

her at once from her position of vantage at Grey town was a
sine qua non of peace.

i\Ir. Clayton, blinded perhaps to the importance of the first
object by his extreme eagerness to accomplish the second, en-
tered upon the negotiation without feeling quite justified in
placing before England as an ultimatum the complete relin-
quishment of her claims over Mosquitia. He was prepared
to yield community of interests and joint control in the canal,
but feared to present this as the ultimate and only quid pro
quo for total abandonment of British territorial claims in Cen-
tral America. British statesmen were fully advised that ex-
clusive English control of the canal would not be tolei'ated
by the United States. A share in its management at best
was as much as England could reasonably expect, and as a
means of securing that share she already held Greytown, in
the name of the Mosquito king.

In the correspondence that took place between the Secre-
tary of State, Mr. Clayton, and Messrs. Bancroft and Law-
rence, successive American Ministers in London, and also in
the records of interviews between Mr. Clayton and Mr. Cramp-
ton, the British Minister in Washington, preparatory to the
actual negotiations for a treaty, the attitude of Mr. Clayton
and of the Tajlor administration toward the question of a
Central American canal is fully and most clearly set forth.
The Secretary of State was thoroughly in accord with the
popular view that under no circumstances should the United
States permit Great Britain or any other power to exercise
exclusive control of any isthmian transit route. Upon tlie
other hand, he did not seek for his own country the exclusive
control he denied to others, and in assuming his position he
followed the universally accepted theory of tlie complete
neutrality of shi[) canals. The doctrine of international fi-ee-
dom of transit as applying to artificial waterways had been
defended by Mr. Clay in 1826, and supported by unanimous
resolutions of Conofress in 1835 and ajjain in 1839. President
Polk hud not found this doctrine inconsistent with liis notions
of an aggressive Monroe Doctrine, and his successor, in his
annual message to Congress of 184!), liad declared tliat ''no

114 AMERICAN DIPLOMATIC QUESTIONS

power should occupy a position that would enable it hereafter
to exercise so controlling an influence over the commerce of
the world, or to obstruct a highway which ought to be dedi-
cated to the common use of mankind." The convention
concluded with Colombia three years previously contained a
special clause calling for a guarantee of neutrality of the pro-
posed isthmian transit route. No other ideas of the political
status of an interoceanic ship canal had ever been enter-
tained, — indeed, the very essence of the dispute that at that
time bade fair to involve the two nations in war, was fear on
the part of each that the other was seeking to gain for
itself the monopoly over the Nicaraguan route.

When once it was understood by both j\Ir. Clayton and
Lord Palmerston, as revealed by their correspondence, that
neither power actually sought this monopoly over the canal,
the way was at once cleared of the most formidable obstacles
to the conclusion of a treat}". England's stubborn determi-
nation to maintain her foothold upon the east coast of Nica-
ragua was still an annoying factor in the negotiations ; yet
Mr. Clayton had reason to believe that, as soon as both nations
had given a pledge not to seek exclusive control of the pro-
posed route connecting the oceans, Great Britain's object in
maintaining her territorial interests in Central America
would vanish, and she would then voluntarily and gladly
disembarrass herself of her charge.

Having in mind a policy thus broad and liberal, yet sub-
servient to his country's best interest, Mr. Clayton entered
upon the negotiations of a treaty with Great Britain desirous
of obtaining no exclusive privileges in Central America tliat
should be incompatible with the just rights of other nations ;
he was intent only on preparing tlie way for the construction
of a great international highway that should be open to the
world's commerce upon terms equal to all.

Final negotiations were immediately begun upon the ar-
rival in Washington of Sir Henry Bulwer (January, 1850).
At first Mr. Clayton persisted in liis representations that un-
less Great Britain were willing to abandon her Mosquito pro-
tectorate he did not believe the neutrality of the canal could

THE INTEROCEANIC CANAL PROBLEM 115

ever be thoroughly effected, and without this concession
in favor of a common ideal, and possibly as an earnest of
good faith, the treaty would likely prove to be an instrument
of empty words. But it seems never for a moment to have
been the intention of Great Britain to relin(![uish her holdings
in Central America, notwithstanding the fact that she was
perfectly willing to join with the United States in a guaran-
tee of neutrality of the canal. With considerable shrewd-
ness the British commissioner argued that as the United
States could have no real interest in existing British pos-
session in Central America except in so far as they might
appear to affect the neutrality of any future transit route,
all concern upon that score would be at once removed by the
signing of the proposed treaty, wherein, he alleged, England
was entirely willing to pledge herself never to make use of
her territorial possessions in Central America, or even to
avail herself of her influence over any Central American
state, to gain a dominion over the route inconsistent with
the strictest terms of neutrality.

Political conditions in the United States very consid-
erably favored Sir Henry Bulwer in the accomplishment
of his purpose to conclude a treaty without yielding any of
his country's territorial claims. Alarming reports of the
events connected with recent British encroachments in
Central America were just beginning to spread about the
country, and, in consequence, feelings of hostility towai'd
England were daily growing more outspoken and intense.
The press demanded the reasons for delay in the building
of the canal, and further demanded the immediate })ul)-
lication of the Ilise treaty. Congress also yielded to the
poi)ular clamor and called for all the correspondence ])er-
taining to the Central American canal. i\Ir. Clayton felt
keenly the danger in making public these documents at
that particular moment, and furthermore he betrayed his
anxiety to Sir Henry Bulwer ; the President, too, felt
mucli em])arrassed in continuing to withhold the desired
correspondence from Congress. Bulwer was quick to take
advantage of his opponent's confusion, and la; played upon

116 AMERICAN DIPLOMATIC QUESTIONS

Mr. Clayton's nervousness and evident desire to adjust the
matter speedily as possible.

In the very midst of these diplomatic troubles, news of the
Tigre Island incident arrived, and instantly popular excite-
ment throughout the United States arose to feverish height.
Indeed, Mr. Clayton himself, who hitherto had been struggling
to overcome the natural suspicions aroused in his breast by
Great Britain's persistent determination to cling to Mosquitia,
was thoroughly angered. His hopes for a satisfactory conclu-
sion of a treaty were wholly dispelled by this unfortunate
event. However, Great Britain's prompt disavowal of the
act restored harmony in Washington, though it left the coun-
try in a passively sullen mood. Negotiations were resumed
and hurried along, and on April 19 the treaty was signed.
In brief it provided : —

(1) Neither the United States nor Great Britain shall ever
obtain or maintain for itself any exclusive control over the
proposed ship canal.

(2) Neither power shall ever erect or maintain any for-
tifications commanding said canal or in the vicinity thereof.

(3) Neither power shall ever occupy, fortify, colonize,
assume, or exercise any dominion over Nicaragua, Costa
Rica, the coast, or any part of Central America, nor shall
either make use of any alliance or protection that either
affords or may afford, or make use of any intimacy, con-
nection, or influence that either ma}^ possess, to gain that end.

(4) Great Britain and the United States shall mutually
guard the safety and neutrality of the canal, and invite all
other nations to do the same.

(5) Great Britain and the United States will extend their
aid and protection to any canal company, having proper
authority and working under fair and reasonable terms.

(6) In order to establish a principle the two powers will
also extend their aid and protection to any other practical
means of transit across the isthmus, either by canal or rail.

Neither Mr. Clayton nor Sir Henry Bulwer was fully sat-
isfied with the convention. The Secretary of State felt
troubled by his failure to persuade Great Britain openly

THE INTEROCEANIC CANAL PROBLEM 117

md unreservedly to relinquish the Mosquito protectorate,
•et the main object of the treaty — the assured neutraliza-
ion of the canal, was satisfactorily accomplished. With that
[uestion settled, the Mosquito claims of England, so far as
he United States was concerned, had lost their greatest
ignificance. In fact, Bulwer wrote to Palmerston that, " We
lave no longer any interest in maintaining the INIosquitos
Indians] where they are, nor our protection over them in
: hat locality ; " but as Great Britain could not " honorably
bandon " her ties with the Indians, Bulwer frankly sug-
ested to the British foreign secretary that some arrange-
lent be made whereby the Mosquito Indians " could be
,'ithdrawn from the vicinity of the canal, and thereby
emove all cause of dispute [with the United States]."
^pon the whole, then, the satisfactory features of the treaty
- among which must be counted the probable exemption of
he country from a war with Great Britain — seemed at the
ime to outweigh its omissions.

The instrument was severely criticised in the Cabinet, and
fterward met with strong opposition in the Senate, notwith-
tanding which, however, it was soon ratified by a vote of 42

3 11.

The treaty was immediately endorsed by the British
rovernment. Before the exchange of ratifications was
ffected, however, Palmerston became disturbed by the
rabiguous nature of the phraseology of the first article,
nd being, moreover, desirous of removing any misappre-
ensions that he feared might still exist upon the subject,
e ordered Bulwer to announce to Secretary Clayton that
iritish interpretation of the language of the treaty left
naffected existing English possessions in Central America,
ulwer accordingly met the Secretary of State with the
■claration that " Her Majesty's Government does not under-
lud the engagements of tliat convention to apply to Her
lajesty's settlement at Honduras, or to its dependencies."
he word " dej)endencies" was soniewliat vague, and as it
uinted ominously tf) the Mos(|uito reservation, it no dou])t
ncovered to Mr. Clayton's vision the skeleton whicli la- liad

118 AMERICAN DIPLOMATIC QUESTIONS

been so anxious to conceal. There can be little doubt that
the great majority of senators, if not all of them, who had
voted for ratification, had assumed that the treaty called
for relinquishment of Greytown and all of ISIosquitia, — that
being but part of the agreement which they hoped would
inaugurate a new era of friendly cooperation of tlie two great
powers in the construction of the canal.

Even without a definite statement in the instrument to
the effect that Mosquitia would be abandoned, ]\Ir. Clayton
believed that that result would very soon be brought about
when once the treaty was in force, and he was undesirous of
surrendering the other advantages to his country, which he
supposed the treaty offered, simply on account of this new
assertion of England's unwillingness to yield lier Mosquito
pretensions. But the subject was a peculiarly delicate one ;
the Secretary's colleagues in the Cabinet (with the possihle
exception of Reverdy Johnson, the Attorney General), and
those of his personal friends, in Avhose confidence the nego-
tiations reposed, felt it to be a mistake to conclude a treaty
without a positive promise on the part of Great Britain to
withdraw entirely from Nicaragua.

Possibly Mr. Clayton entertained similar misgivings. The
j)olitical situation in the United States, however, wliicli
threatened at any moment to spring the mine of anti-British
feeling at home and thus wreck every effort he had made to
check further English aggression in Nicaragua, and to secure
a neutral waterway, impelled him to continue in his efforts
to reach an understanding, even though an ambiguous one.
Perhaps a half loaf were better in this case than none at all ;
at best, the treaty represented a mutual yielding of interests
which both nations considered vital and were extremely loath
to concede. From a first formed determination, then, to
refuse an exchange of ratifications upon the basis of Sir
Henry Bulwer's declaration and to abandon all further
negotiations, Mr. Clayton finally decided, as a last resort,
to try the plan of placing a construction U})on Sir Henry
Bulwer's reservation that might be more satisfactory to him-
self and yet acceptable to Great Britain. Mr. Clayton accord-

THE INTEROCEANIC CANAL' PROBLEM 119

ingly approached Sir Henr}- Bulwer with a proposition for
a counter-declaration, in which he proposed to limit the
term " dependencies " by making special mention of the
islands along the Honduras coast, expressly omitting refer-
ence to Mosquitia. Sir Henry Bulwer agreed to this with
the understanding that " it was not the intention in the treaty
to embrace whatever is Her INlajesty's settlement at Hon-
duras, nor whatever are the dependencies of that settlement."
To leave no room for "charges of duplicity against our
government," ^Nlr. Clayton addressed a Jiote to Mr. King,
Chairman of the Senate Committee on Foreign Affairs,
acquainting him with Sir Henry Bulwer's declaration, but he
omitted to mention in his note to Mr. King the word
"dependencies." ^Nlr. King was probably not surprised by
receipt of the Secretary's letter, for he had never supposed
that British Honduras was to be abandoned by Great Britain
under the terms of the treaty; he replied the same day
(July 4) that " The Senate perfectl}^ understood that the
treaty did not include British Honduras, — but," he added,
hi a tone of admonition to the Secretary of State, "3'ou
•^liould be careful not to use any expression which would
seem to recognize the right of England to any portion of
Honduras [^.g. outside of British Honduras]." Upon receipt
^f Mr. King's answer, ^Ir. Clayton sent a note (it had been
dready prepared) to Sir Henry Bulwer, in which he said: —

The language of the first article of the convention conchuled
)n the 19th day of April last, between the United States and Great
liritain, describing the country not to be occupied, etc., by either
jf the parties, was, as you know, twice approved by the govern-
nent, and it was neither understood by them nor by either of us
the negotiators), to include the British settlement in Honthnas
commonly called I>ritish Honduras, as distinct from tlie state of
Honduras), nor the small islands in the neighlwrliood of that settle-
nent which may be known as its dependencies.

To this settlement and these islands the treaty we negotiated
vas not intended by either of us to apply. The title to them it
s now and has been my intention thi'ougliout the wliole negotia-
ion to leave as the treaty leaves it, withcnit denying or attirming
>v in any way meddling with the same, just as it stood previously.

120 AMERICAN DIPLOMATIC QUESTIONS

The Chairman of the Committee on Foreign Eelations of the
Senate, the Honorable W. R. King, informs me that the Senate
perfectly understood that the treaty did not include British
Honduras.

With this last presentation of " declarations," ratifications
were exchanged the same day (July 4), and the treaty was
proclaimed as law the day after.

It appears to have been understood by both Mr. Clayton
and Sir Henry Bulwer that any amendments, alterations,
or qualifying statements in the treaty subsequent to its
ratification by the Senate would be considered of no force
whatever. Such being the case, these various statements on
the part of the negotiators, made just before the final
exchange of ratification, will serve only to show the inten-
tion of the parties who framed the instrument, but may
scarcely be accepted as part of the res gestce of the negotia-
tion. From the varying shades of meaning expressed
throughout these negotiations, — particularly as both negoti-
ators were not onlj^ sparring to gain advantage one over the
other, but were also endeavoring to shield their designs from
publicity — it is not easy to interpret the precise under-
standing of either. But it now seems reasonably certain
that Mr. Clayton did not anticipate British withdrawal from
Mosquitia as obligatory under the terms of the treaty, though
he expected such action to folloAv as a natural consequence of
the British promise not to fortify, etc., any point in Cen-
tral America, and also because he conceived Great Britain's
sole object in retaining her hold upon Nicaragua to have
departed upon ratification of the treaty. It is equally cer-
tain that the Senate did anticipate an immediate withdrawal
of all British claims on the Nicaraguan coast. Sir Henry
Bulwer's acceptance of Secretary Clayton's "counter-declara-
tion " would indicate that he had wavered in his determina-
tion to save Mosquitia for Great Britain; and yet, on the
other hand, his whole attitude, from the opening of the
negotiations to their close, demonstrates a fixed and dogged
purpose to the contrary. There can be but little doubt that
the Bay Islands were considered by both Mr. Clayton and

THE INTEROCEANIC CANAL PROBLEM 121

Sir Henry Buhver as part of the dependencies of British
Honduras. As for British Honduras itself — the former
Belize — there was no question in any quarter, not even in
the Senate, but that it was excepted from operation of the
treaty. This is confirmed by an ollicial exposition of the
convention which appeared in the National Intelligencer but
three days after its promulgation ; it was there asserted that
'"the British title to the Belize the treaty does not in any
manner recognize, nor does it deny it or meddle with it.
That settlement remains, in that particular, as it stood pre-
viously to the treaty." No mention, however, was here made
of the dependencies, and the people of the United States
were still left in ignorance of the uncertainties which existed
in official circles connected with that word.

President Taylor's death occurred on July 9, and about

one week later his successor in office. President Fillmore,

transmitted a communication to Congress, with which he

submitted a copy of the treaty itself. "Its engagements,"

lie said, "apply to all the five states which formerly composed

^he republic of Central America and their dependencies, of

^vhich the Island of Tigre was a part. It does not recognize,

iffirm, or deny the title of the British settlement at Belize,

\vhich is, by the coast, more than five hundred miles from

:he proposed canal at Nicaragua. The question of the Brit-

.sh title to this district of country, commonly called British

Honduras, and the small islands adjacent to it, claimed as

ts dependencies, stands precisely as it stood before the

reaty. No act of the late President's administration has,

n any manner, committed this government to the British

itle in that territory or any part of it."

Thus it seems clear enough that whatever misunderstand-
ng there may have been between the negotiators of the
reaty, that misunderstanding was in reference to Mosquitia,
md not to Belize, known as British Honduras, nor to the
3ay Islands. Furthermore, whatever may have been the be-
ief in Congress as to the meaning of the abnegatory clauses
if the first article (wliether or not prospective in charactei-,
^•equiring Great Britain to abandon her Central American

122 AMERICAN DIPLOMATIC QUESTIONS

possessions, or permitting her to retain tliem), the Senate
accepted the above message without protest, and would
thereby seem not to have been surprised or disappointed
as if by a new and astounding revelation.

Had Mr. Clayton been endowed with a keener sense of
that political foresight which was possessed to such a
marked degree by Washington and Jefferson, he would have
recognized his error in not holding out firmly against British
asserted rights in the " dependencies " of British Honduras,
and making British abandonment of the Mosquito protec-
torate a condition of all negotiation. There can be little
doubt that Palmerston eventuall}^ would have yielded, and
Mr. Clayton would have spared his country many unfortu-
nate misunderstandings with Great Britain, and years of
controversy between Washington and London.

With due respect for Mr. Clayton's skilful management of
a difficult international situation and for the ability which
he may have displayed in delivering the nation from possi-
ble war, an unpleasant appearance of double-dealing with
the Senate is inseparably connected with his correspondence
on the subject. Just why Mr. Clayton did not choose to
make Congress cognizant of the exact meaning of Bulwer's
qualifying note can now be understood, and his motives
appreciated; yet the questionable course which he saw fit
to adopt at a critical moment was a temptation to which he
should not have yielded — an error he should not have
committed. Had Mr. Clayton been less actuated by fear, he
might have utilized for his own benefit those very threats
of war which terrorized him into concluding a bad bargain.
That both Piulwer and Palmerston were alarmed by the pros-
pect of war, and that they were willing to direct their
course well within the lines of discretion, is made manifest
from certain portions of their correspondence while the treaty
was in course of negotiation.

Sir Henry Bulwer's tactics in the making of the treaty
have been a frequent theme of censure against English
diplomacy in this country. That he played his hand skil-
fully, reserving to best advantage his largest trum[) until the

THE INTEROCEANIC CANAL PROBLEM 123

last, cannot be denied; yet the method employed by that
shrewd statesman, in all fairness to both sides, cannot be
characterized as dishonest. It was " clever " in so far as he
outwitted his antagonist b}' playing upon his fears and profit-
ing by his errors in judgment. Mr. Buchanan, then in
private life, wrote to a friend shortly before the conclusion
of the treaty, — "If Sir Henry Bulwer can succeed in hav-
ing the first two provisions of this treaty ratified by the
Senate, he will deserve a British peerage." ,

Outside the ranks of the administration's most stanch
supporters the treaty met with general condemnation. No
objection was raised against those provisions of the agree-
ment which called for international guarantee of the neu-
trality of the canal, but the fatal omissions in the instrument,
when detected, brought forth the severest criticism upon the
document, and on Mr. Clayton fell the accusations of a
cowardly w^eakness. "The Nicaragua treaty is even worse
than I had su|)posed," again wrote Buchanan in May, 1850.

Buchanan's words were true and his criticism just. Tlie
United States had pledged itself never to seek or exercise
exclusive control over an}- Central American canal, nor to
acquire any territory on the isthmus. Great Britain, on the
other hand, had received a recognition of her claims in
Honduras and all of its vaguely defined dependencies.
Without actual surrender of anything, England had really
secured an excellent footing for subsequent territorial ex-
pansion in Central America.

in

Aside from the misun(l(;rstandings under wliich the Clay-
'ii-I)ul\ver treaty was concliKhMl, hotli Sir Henry Bulwer
md Mr. Webster, the newly a[)pointed Secretary of State
inder President Fillmore, realized that the instrument was
iiperfeet, and, in many resjjects, far from satisfactory.
They accordingly entered upon negotiations looking to the
>fttlement of several important questions left open by the
! eaty. One of these questions was to determine the actual

124 AMERICAN DIPLOMATIC QUESTIONS

status of Greytown — a matter rendered perplexing by
the chronic boundary disputes between Nicaragua and Costa
Rica. Indeed, this old-time quarrel had just then broken
out afresh. The negotiations dragged along wearily for
quite a year with the unhappy result of demonstrating to both
men the impossibility of a mutually satisfactory conclusion.

A series of unfortunate events now took place, which
seemed to sharpen the ill feeling already existing between
the two powers, and, because of the mutual jealousies and
suspicions thereby aroused, a deadlock resulted, making the
reconciliation of American and British interests in Central
America impossible for some time to come. Perhaps the
distressing political conditions in Central America, at that
particular time, were, in a large measure, responsible for
numerous British and American follies ; but, at all events,
both England and the United States were led into commit-
ting acts in Central America which were in open violation
of their treaty stipulations, and seemed to indicate bad faith
upon the part of both.

With the evident intention of making it perfectly clear to
all concerned that she still considered Mosquitia a part of the
dependency of British Honduras, Great Britain proceeded
formally to occupy Greytown with a military force, and
profited further by the occasion to reassert her protectorate
over the Indians. Having accomplished this, the British
commander urged upon the Nicaraguans the advantages they
would reap by abandoning their "pretended friends" (the
United States), and coming "to an understanding without
delay with Great Britain," for only in London could sufficient
capital and "spirit of enterprise be found for carr3'ing out
a project (the building of the canal) of such magnitude."
Thus were the Nicaraguans impressed with the fact of un-
impaired Mosquito control of their Atlantic coast and over
the port of Greytown. The United States was expected of
course to take notice. This new assertion of British sover-
eignty over Greytown soon brought American and British
subjects there resident into direct conflict. A crisis was
reached in November, 1851, when an American vessel, be-

THE INTEROCEANIC CANAL PROBLEM 125

longing to the American Canal Compan}', the Prometheus^
Avas tired upon by a British man-of-war, for refusing to pay
certain port dues to the Anglo-Mosquito authorities.

Tiie matter being reported to Mr. Webster, he promptly
renewed his efforts to reach an understanding with the Brit-
i:>h Minister regarding Central American affairs. The act
of liring upon the Prometheus was at once disavowed by Earl
Granville; but the issue which Secretary Clayton had care-
fully avoided was now sharply presented, and the Secretary
of State appreciated the urgent necessity for coming to a
clear and perfect understanding as to the construction of
the term — "dependencies of British Honduras." The
boundary dispute between Nicaragua and Costa Rica had
become violent, and in this quarrel the sympathies of the
United States and of England were arrayed upon opposite
sides. Costa Rica, which had always cultivated British
favors, claimed the right bank of the San Juan River, includ-
ing Greytown and a small adjoining settlement of Ameri-
cans who operated the temporary transit route across the
state. Nicaragua, on the other hand, insisted upon the
inclusion of Greytown within her limits, and she naturally
resented the English occupation of that port; she also denied
her neio'hbor's territorial rights to the south bank of the San
Juan River. In these contentions she was encouraged and
upheld by the sympathies of the United States.

Mr. Webster and Mr. Crampton, the English Minister (Sir
Henry Bnlwer having returned to England) entered \x\^o\\
the settlement of the new disputes by attempting first to
locate the true boundary line between the two little repub-
lics, thus hoping to eliminate one irritating factor from the
total of their differences. To accomplish this, of course, it
would Ije necessary to formulate a i)lan which would prove
acceptal^le to ])otli repul)lics as well as to themselves. On
April .30, 18r)2, an agreement was signed in Washington
which, as a tentative arrangement, provided that Greytown
and " Mos([uitia " should be receded to Nicaragua and a
resei'vation set apart for the Indians. The Costa Rican
territorial claims were ai-knowled'jfed as far nortli as the

126 AMERICAN DIPLOMATIC QUESTIONS

San Juan River, and full rights of navigation in the great
lake were also accorded her. The plan was ostensibly a
compromise measure, which would likely have relieved the
situation had it been accepted; but Nicaragua not onl}^ re-
jected the agreement with a show of indignation, but curtly
announced her displeasure at this instance of foreign med-
dling in her domestic affairs. Costa Rica's acceptance of
the plan was not in itself sufficient; so the efforts of Webster
and Crampton came to naught.

With matters in this unsatisfactory condition in Nicaragua
and "Mosquitia," the attention of the United States was
suddenly directed to Honduras. English capital had recently
become interested in a railway project to connect two Hon-
duran ports on the Atlantic and the Pacific oceans, and
thereby to establish a transit route which would compete
with the American transit route across Nicaragua, and also
with the Panama route still farther south. The Bay Islands

— a group lying off the Honduran and Guatemalan coasts

— had formerly been appropriated by Gieat Britain and con-
stituted, according to her assertions, a dependency of her set-
tlement on the mainland (Belize or "British Honduras'").
Her sovereignty over these islands had negligently been
permitted to lapse, but in the interests of her projected
schemes in Honduras, the British Government decided to
reoccupy them. Accordingly, on June 17, 1852, the London
foreign office announced that the islands of Ronatan, Bonacca,
Brabant, Helma, and Morant should constitute a colony, "to
be known and designated as the Colon}^ of the Bay Islands."
In August following the islands were formally occupied by
crown officials.

Whatever may have been the merit in the British conten-
tion of ownership of the Bay Islands, the moment chosen for
the overt act of their seizure was a most unfortunate one.
The amicable relations of the two nations had at all times
been more or less strained since the Tigre Island incident ;
and since the promulgation of an unsatisfactory treaty each
government had continued to view the acts of the other in
Central America with a high degree of suspicion and dis-

THE INTEROCEANIC CANAL PROBLEM 127

trust. The numerous failures thereafter to harmonize their
conflicting interests had only aggravated the situation; both
governments were more than ever ill disposed to grant
favors or yield a point in Central America. In fact, the
situation called for the most careful diplomacy, if their dif-
ferences were to be settled upon a peaceful footing; but
with an offensive bluntness, the British Government com-
mitted an act which, it must have foreseen, could only be
accepted by the United States as one of unwarranted aggres-
sion and in direct violation of the Clayton-Bulwer treaty.
The people of the United States were filled with indigna-
tion. The election of 1852 had brought the Democratic
party into power, and the new administration — if for party
reasons only — was strongly anti-British.

When Congress convened in December, the Senate at once
called for all the correspondence relating to British advances
in Central America, and General Cass of Michigan intro-
duced a resolution, asking, "What measures, if any, have
been taken by the Executive to prevent the violation of
Article I of the Treaty of July 4, 1850?" On January 4
(1853), the President sent a copy of such correspondence to
the Senate, which included the letters exchanged by Mr.
Clayton and Sir Henry Bulwer just before the concluding
ceremonies of the treaty. Then, it appeared for the first
time, that the full meaning of that instrument, with its
fatal reservation, was understood in the Senate. The scene
that followed in that chamber was sensational. One after
another of the senators arose to denounce, in the most vigorous
language, the treaty, Mr. Clayton, the preceding Whig
administration and Great Britain.

A resolution was drafted by the Foreign Affairs Committee
to the effect that England's title to Belize was worthless,
and tliat her occupation of the Bay Islands, and her position
in Mosquitia were in direct violation of the terms of the treaty
and in defiance of tlie prim-iijles of the Monroe Doctrine.
The debate which followed u[)on the presentation of this
resolution was characterized by an intemperate display of
partisan feeling that has not often been equalled in the Sen-

128 AMERICAN DIPLOMATIC QUESTIONS

ate. There can be no doubt that the bitterness of personal
abuse, and the feelings of hostility against England that
developed in this debate Avere induced, to some extent at
least, by political reasons, for the discussion soon assumed
a party cast. The Democrats, led by Douglass and Cass,
attacked the treat}-; the Whigs, under Sumner and Seward,
generally supported it. The committee resolution was
adopted, and the fury of the Senate finally spent itself in a
declaration reasserting the principles of the Monroe Doctrine. '

The storm at the capitol spread over the country, and the
feelings of enmity toward England became more than ever
pronounced. With an administration in power whose plat-
form was essentially anti-British, a vigorous diplomatic
campaign against England was expected. Mr. iSIarcy, the
Secretary of State, had already expressed an opinion, that
the Mosquito protectorate was void; that the erection of
the Bay Islands into a British colony was unwarranted and
in clear violation of the terms of the treaty, and that Avith
the exception of British Honduras, to whose occupation by
Enghmd he made no objection. Great Britain should at once
abandon all her territorial claims in Central America. He
was not to be shaken from his conviction that the American
interpretation of the phraseology of the Claj'ton-Bulwer
treaty, as held by the Democratic part}', was a correct one, and
that its acceptance by England shoukl therefore be insisted
upon. With such positive instructions Mr. Buchanan, the
American Minister in London, was directed to enter upon
negotiations with Lord Clarendon.

The earnest efforts of these two men to harmonize tlieir
conflicting views of the true meaning and intent of tlie
Clayton-Bulwer treaty resulted in a total failure. Lord
Clarendon made a lengthy statement in defence of his posi-
tion, in which he maintained that Belize was not a part of
Central America, as understood by the negotiators of the
treaty, as it had for many years been a British possession,
acknowledged by vSpain, later by the Central American states,
and, linally, recognized by the United States, as evidenced
by the fact that an American consul had been sent to Brit- '

THE INTEROCEANIC CANAL PROBLEM 129

ish Honduras in 1847 and had been permitted to carry on the
duties of his post under a British exequatur. As to the
Bay Islands, he maintained that they also had for some years
before the treaty been British territor}-, and were considered
a part, or rather a dependency, of Belize. To Mosquitia, he
maintained, the treaty in no way referred, but that it only
prohibited further colonization. Existing English posses-
sions were in no way affected by the treaty, the inhibitory
clauses relating merely to future acquisitions. Further
to sustain the correctness of his views. Lord Clarendon called
attention to the fact, that although this was fully evidenced
in the words of the treaty itself, yet, to remove all possible
doubt, the negotiators had thought it well, before final rati-
fication, to exchange written declarations upon the subject,
the purport of which had been to except British Honduras
and its dependencies from the operation of the treaty. Con-
tinued occupation of these territories, therefore, by England,
or any alterations in their political relations toAvard the
British Government, could not be regarded as an infraction
of the treat}'.

Mr. Buchanan was equally firm in his views, Avhich were
upon every point diametrically o[)posed to those of Lord
Clarend(m. With convictions so radically divergent, the
futility of compromise ought to have been foreseen, and the
Clayton-Bulwer treaty should then have been abandoned for
one more specific in its terms. The controversy was finally
closed by Clarendon's somewhat impatient statement that
Great Britain could not accept the Monroe Doctrine as an
axiom of international law, and that he would decline fur-
ther discussion of his country's original rights in Central
America. Thus ended the matter for a time, leaving Central
American affairs in the same unsatisfactory condition as
before.

About this time an American Canal Company was operat-
ing a temporary transit route across Nicaragua over tlie San
Juan River and Lake Nicaragua, and thence, by an overland
stage road from the lake, to the Pacific Ocean. Just inuncdi-
ately south of Greytown an American settlement, made up

K

130 AMERICAN DIPLOMATIC QUESTIONS

of the company's operators and that flotsam and jetsam of
wanderers who gather at pioneer posts, had sprung into
existence.

In an altercation between some Mosquito Indians and
Americans an Indian was killed, and the smouldering antip-
athies of the two towns began to blaze. An Anglo-Mos-
quito mob attacked the house of the American consul, and
the sailors of an American ship in the harbor came to their
countryman's rescue. A pitched battle ensued. When the
news reached Washington a gunboat was despatched to the
scene and indemnity was demanded from the Anglo-Mosquito
authorities. Upon their refusal to consider such a propo-
sition, the American gunboat proceeded to bombard and
destroy Greytown. This passage at arms did not help
to relieve the diplomatic situation between England and
the United States ; nor, indeed, was the general situation
in Nicaragua improved by events which immediately fol-
lowed. An American citizen named Walker gathered about
himself, in the Southern states, a band of followers who Avere
desirous of adventure, and, finding his opportunity in one
of the periodical civil wars in Central America, he made a
bold dash for the city of Granada, and soon placed himself
in control of Nicaragua. He was supported for a time by
one of the warring factions of this turbulent republic, but his
filibustering expedition, ostensibly carried out in the in-
terest of the United States, was, in reality, for the purpose
of extending the area of African slavery.

In every possible manner Walker antagonized British
interests in Nicaragua, and the belief became general in
England that the United States sought to acquire a Central
American state. A counter military demonstration, on the
part of Costa Rica, created the suspicion in America
that England was covertly taking a part in these struggles
along the canal route; and this belief elicited for Walker a
larger measure of sympathy throughout the United States
than he would have otherwise received. The Government
at Washington finally went to the length of receiving a
diplomatic agent, representing the Walker government at

THE INTEROCEANIC CANAL PROBLEM 131

Granada; the incident also stimulated the unfriendly feel-
ings between England and the United States, and served as
well to estrange from ourselves the good will of the Cen-
tral American states. Walker was eventuall}' deported and
tried; but before his death he made several warlike expedi-
tions into Central America, and succeeded in almost ho])e-
lessl}' entangling the United States in a triple contest, full
of ill will, between herself, England, and Nicaragua.

These events in Central America reopened all the old
wounds which the Cla^ton-Bulwer treaty had been designed
to heal, and another series of acrimonious discussions in the
Senate, levelled against British interference in Greytown
and in Nicaragua, tended in no w^a}^ to assuage the popular
anger.

Mr. Buchanan had been succeeded in London, in the fall
of 1855, by Mr. Dallas, and the latter was directed by the
President to make a strenuous effort to secure a settlement
of these Central American questions. These, along with
other grievances against Great Britain, were rapidly assum-
ing a dangerous aspect. The country was already deeply
agitated by the drift of internal political issues, and party
zeal was alarmingly strong. In the excitement and passions
of the period, there was no skill of prophecy that could fore-
tell the length to which either party might go, should for-
eign complication offer relief from the strain of that fearful
domestic difficulty — the slavery question.

The Dallas-Clarendon negotiations were hurried along,
and, on October 17 (1856), an agreement was reached, which
was immediately sent to Washington for confirmation. It
provided: (1) for the freedom of the port of Greytown under
nominal Nicaraguan sovereignty; (2) the establishment of a
reservation for the Mosquito Indians, thus abandoning the
British protectorate; (3) the limiting of the Belize settle-
ment within certain fixed lines; (4) the cession of the Bay
Islands to Honduras. The convention was made conditional
upon th(! ratification of a certain treat}' just drawn up be-
tween Honduras and Great Britain. This latter treaty
had been made in August, 185G, and constituted the Bay

132 AMERICAN DIPLOMATIC QUESTIONS

Islands a free teiritoiy, coming partially under the sover-
eignt}^ of Honduras, and 5-et free in the sense that it could
not be taxed, nor its subjects be called upon to perform mili-
tary duty, other than in their own exclusive defence. It
will be seen, therefore, that the ratification of the Dallas-
Clarendon agreement would oblige the United States to
acknowledge the Bay Islands to be a free territory, over
which a British protectorate would continue virtually tO'
exist.

It has been thought not a little remarkable that the execu-
tive, representing a party so radically anti-British, and so
positive in its demands that England should abandon, under
the terms of the Clayton-Bulwer treaty, all her Central
American possessions, should have accepted this convention
Avith favor. In his last annual message the following
December (1856) President Pierce said that the "occasion
of controversy on this point [British pretensions in Central
America] has been removed. . . . Should the proposed
supplemental arrangement be concurred in . . . the objects
contem[)hited by the original convention [Clayton-Bulwer
treaty] will have been fully attained."

Obviously, this convention was a compromise which left
Great Britain firmly established in Belize, doubtfully so in
the Bay Islands, but did away entirely with her influence in
Nicaragua. The Senate did not share the President's opti-
mism, but promptly condemned the instrument, though
finally, after considerable discussion, ratified it with certain
amendments. The most important of these amendments,
struck out the clause making the treaty conditional upon
the acceptance of the British-Honduran treaty of August,
1856. This particular amendment, however, was unsatisfac-
tory to Lord Clarendon, for, by making an unconditional
surrender of the Bay Islands to Honduras, he alleged it.
would leave unprotected a large number of British subjects-
who had taken up their abode there with the natural expec-
tation of protection from the home government; however,
since the Senate could not accept the conditions placed upon
the retrocession of the Bay Islands, as already set forth, he:

THE INTEROCEANIC CANAL PEOBLEM 133

would propose a new basis of settlement, which was, —
cession of the Bay Islands to Honduras, according to certain
conditions to be incorporated in a new treaty between Great
Britain and Honduras.

If the Senate had been unwilling to agree to conditions
already known, it was not to be expected it would accept
conditions that were unknown. Nothing short of the un-
qualified retrocession of the Bay Islands to Honduras was
acceptable ; and, as Great Britain declined to accede to that
pro^^osition, the Dallas-Clarendon convention failed of rati-
fication (May, 1857). Thus the two powders were thrown
back once more upon the unsatisfactory Clayton-Bulwer
treaty, with British officers at Greytown, a British protec-
torate over Mosquitia, together with British occupation of
the Bay Islands, and full sovereignty over Belize.

In the fall of 1856 Mr. Buchanan w^as elected President
upon a Democratic platform extolling tlie Monroe Doctrine,
and calling for a vigorous foreign policy. He appointed
General Cass, Secretary of State, w^hose radical views ui)on
the subject of the Clayton-Bulwer treaty were well known,
as he had upon former occasions in the Senate led his party
in fierce opposition to that conqjact. Mr. Cass innnediately
concluded an agreement with Nicaragua which made secure
American rights along the route of the proposed canal, and
further accorded the United States the unrestricted right of
transit for troops and munitions of war. The neutrality of
llie canal was guaranteed, and the influence of both parties
pledged toward securing international cooperation toward
that desirable end. Great Britain objected to this agreement
upon the ground that it violated the Clayton-Bulwer treaty
of 1850. It was never ratified.

Such was the diplomatic situation of the "canal problem"
in the fall of 1857, and in accordance with the spirit of his
party's platform, the President decided to remove embar-
rassment, at once and for all time, by abrogating tlie Clayton-
Bulwer treaty and proceeding thenceforth upon an entirely
new basis. "The fact is," the President urged upon Con-
gress, "when two nations, like Great Britain and the Ignited

134 AMERICAN DIPLOMATIC QUESTIONS

States, mutuall}- desirous, as they are, and I trust ever may
be, of maintaining the most friendl}- relations with each
other, have unfortunately concluded a treaty which they un-
derstand in senses directly opposite, the wisest course is to
abrogate such a treaty by mutual consent and to commence
anew. Had this been done promptly," he continued, "all
difficulties in Central America would most probably ere this
have been adjusted to the satisfaction of both parties. The
time spent in discussing the meaning of the Glayton-Bulwer
treaty would have been devoted to this praiseworthy pur-
pose, and the task would have been the more easily accom-
plished because the interest of the two countries in Central
America is identical, being confined to securing safe transits
over all the routes across the isthmus."

Lord Napier, the British Minister in Washington, scenting
danger in the hostile attitude of the Buchanan administra-
tion, approached the President with a new plan of settlement
which he said his government was desirous of suggesting.
An arbitrary abrogation of the Clayton-Bulwer treat}', he be-
lieved, would surely lead to acts in Central America which
would disrupt the diplomatic relations of the two countries;
this he was anxious to prevent. His proposition included
two alternatives : a mutual abandonment of the treat}^ with
a return to the status quo ante^ in which case both powers
would be left free to act in Central America just as if no
treaty had ever been made ; the other alternative was to
lay the treaty, with its ambiguous phraseology and mis-
understood provisions, before some European court of arbi-
tration.

The President could accept neither of these propositions.
That portion of the treaty which especially called for revision
involved principles relating to the Monroe Doctrine, and the
President suspected that those principles would not stand the
test of a European tribunal. And, on the other hand, a
formal recognition by the United States of the complete
validity of English rights, as previously claimed in Central
America, would be wholly impracticable.

With these avenues closed, Lord Napier then presented to

THE INTEKOCEANIC CANAL PROBLEM 135

the President a tliird scheme for the settlement of the diffi-
culty. He explained that the British Government was about
to despatch an agent to Central America for the purpose of
concluding a series of treaties with those states. In these
prospective compacts he declared his government intended to
make a disposition of Mosquitia and of the Bay Islands, in
accordance with the wishes of the United States, as expressed
in the amended form of the Dallas-Clarendon convention.
Now, if this could really be accomplished, the President would
have no cause to feel otherwise than satisfied. " To him it
was indifferent," the President said, " whether the concession
contemplated by Her Majesty's Government was consigned to
a direct engagement between England and the United States,
or to treaties between the former and the Central American
republics." After a period of argumentative sparring, into
which he entered with abundant caution, in order to make it
clear to Lord Napier that onl}- a settlement of those vexed
Central American matters upon a basis of the American inter-
pretation of the Clayton-Bulwer treaty, would be acceptable
to the United States, the President consented to await the
results of British negotiations in Central America before
making any further move toward its abrogation.

Sir William Ouseley, the British agent in question, after
a preliminary sojourn in Washington, proceeded to Central
America upon his diplomatic mission. He was for a time de-
layed by a series of misadventures, brought about by the tur-
bulent condition of affairs existing in Nicaragua ; and it was
not until 1860 that Lord Napier was finally enabled to sub-
mit to Mr. Piuchanan tlie three treaties which Great Britain
had concluded with (iuatemala, Honduras, and Nicaragua re-
spectively.

The first of these treaties was designed to adjust the
boundary lines of Britisli Honduras, which were liberally en-
larged in favor of England, so as to include nearly all she had
ever claimed in that region. As tlie oriirinal settlement of Be-
lize had never figured as a cause of serious contention between
the United States and England, the President was inclined to
accord his approval to tliis agreement.

136 AMERICAN DIPLOMATIC QUESTIONS

The second treaty — the one with Honduras — retroceded
to that republic the Bay Islands, with the conditions that the
recipient should never part with them to any other nation, and
that British subjects, continuing to reside there, should be un-
molested in their property rights and religious freedom. By
this same instrument, England abandoned her territorial
claim along the shores of Honduras, occupied b}'^ the ^losquito
Indians, on the sole condition that Honduras should pay to
the Indians an annual indemnity of -f 5000 for ten years. This
treaty also met with the President's approval, although he
would have preferred the release of English territorial rights
less hampered by conditions.

The third treaty (with Nicaragua) was the most important
one to American interests. By this compact England withdrew
from her protectorate over Mosquitia, but Nicaragua was re-
quired to establish a reservation along her shores for the Ind-
ians, permitting them to exeicise local self-government, and
also allowing them at any time to incorporate themselves
absolutely into the body politic of Nicaragua, sliould they
so desire. In this contingency, the reservation would be
abandoned. Nicaragua was also obligated to pay annually
to the Indians the sum of -f^SOOO for a period of ten years, in
default of which Great Britain reserved the right to interfere
in behalf of her former charges. Greytovvn was to become a
free port under Nicaraguan sovereignty.

At last it seemed that all went well in Central America.
Had England absolutely and unconditionally surrendered all
her territorial claims in Honduras and Nicaragua, it would
have been more satisfactory to the United States ; yet, upon
the other hand, this arrangement was a long move in the
right direction, and it appeared to be a victory for the Ameri-
can interpretation of the Clayton-Bulwer treaty, and a vindi-
cation of the Monroe Doctrine as well. In his last annual
message (December 3, 1860), President Buchanan expressed
his satisfaction in the happy results of his diplomacy. " Our
relations with Great Britain," he said," are of the most friendly
character. Since the commencement of my Administration
the two dangerous questions arising from the Clayton and

THE INTEROCEANIC CANAL PROBLEM 137

Bulwer treaty and from the right of search claimed by the
British Government have been amicably and lionorably ad-
justed. The discordant constrnction of the Clayton and
Bulwer treaty between the two Governments, which at differ-
ent periods of the discussion bore a threatening aspect, liave
■esulted in a final settlement entirely satisfactory to this
jrovernment."

The country at large acquiesced, and it Avas confidently
' lOped that the matter was forever settled, and that the
roublesome Clayton-Bnlwer convention would be permitted
0 rest peacefully in the archives of the State Department.

Thus closed in peace and concord a decade of bitter con-
roversy growing out of this treaty. Fundamentally, the
iiotives of these disagreements may be largely traced to sus-
'icion. While neither party actually sougJit a monopoly of
olitical control over the canal route, each power distrusted
iie other, and was ready to detect in every move of its oppo-
ent, a covert attempt to secure those forbidden advantages,
lut the hope that the controversy was forever ended proved
aiii. Twenty-one years later. Great Britain found lier sus-
icions verified. The United States did covet a monopoly of
le canal, and openly proclaimed her intention of acquiring
The ("layton-Bulwer treaty was scanned anew for its
nperfections, and the old-time quarrel was fought over
lice again, but upon new lines of argument.

IV

From 1860 to 1865 the United States was engaged in a
ruggle at home that rendered Central American affairs
miparatively of little importance ; nevertheless, the subject
a canal was never entirely lost sight of. In IB.")*) a series
riots at Panama interfered witli the freedom of transit over
e isthmian railway, and the United States found herself
ider obligation to use military force to relieve the inieriupted
ute. Upon tliis occasion tlie Secretai-y of State, Mr. Marcy,
sclaimed any desiie for exclusive advantage in tliat line of
insit; lie went so far as to announce the American inten-

138 AMERICAN DIPLOMATIC QUESTIONS

tion of inviting other nations to join in a '' guarantee for the
neutrality of that part of the isthmus."' Six years later, revo-
lutionary movements in Colombia again menaced the safety
of the railway, and the Government at Bogota called upon
the United States to lend aid in suppressing the rebellious
uprising that endangered the freedom of transit between
Colon and Panama.

Mr. Seward, the new Secretary of State, felt that the burden
imposed upon the United States to maintain alone and single-
handed the integrity of the Panama route against the
numberless revolutions of a Latin-American state was unjust.
The route was open to the world's commerce, and the responsi-
bility of its protection, he believed, should rest equally upon
the shoulders of all beneficiaries. The interest of the United
States was in no manner " different from that of other mari-
time powers." He instructed Mr. Adams and Mr. Dayton,
Ministers to London and Paris respectively, to ascertain
whether Great Britain and France would '' unite with the
United States in guaranteeing the safety of the transit route
and the authority of the new Granadian confederation."

At the close of the Civil War, a more lively interest in a
ship canal was manifested, and steps were soon taken to
encourage more friendly relations with the Central American
states. American interests in Central America had been per-
mitted to decline, and they were greatly in need of the stimu-
lus which fresh treaties would give them.

The United States emerged from its four years' conflict
with enlarged ideas of her position in the world ; the seeds of
a new and more agressive foreign policy liad been sown. The
progress of those ideas is marked by the Alaskan purchase,
the attempts to secure naval bases in the West Indies, the ex-
pulsion of the French from Mexico, and by the evidences of
a belief, then gradually forming in the minds of tlie i)eople,
that the United States should exercise sole political control
over any Central American canal that sliould ever be built.

Mr. Seward first gave expression to this new canal policy
in 1866, when he directed Mr. Adams, the American Minister
in London, to broach the subject to Lord Clarendon of the

THE IXTEROCEANIC CANAL PROBLEM 139

(Jnited States purchase of Tigre Island as a coaling station
the same island that had tiguied so prominently in British-
\merican relations in 1850). Would such action on the part
if the United States be considered by Great Britain as a vio-
ation of the Clayton-Bulwer treaty? In his letter to Mr.
Vdams, Secretary Seward hinted that the Clayton-Bulwer
reaty was void because it related to the building of a certain
•anal which had never even been undertaken. "It may be a
• luestion," he said, " whether the renunciatory clauses of the
reaty are to have perpetual operation." The matter was not
)ressed by Mr. Adams, but the episode is important here, as
demonstrating the birth of a new sentiment, which was in
iter years destined to expand into a national policy.

The Dickinson-Ayer treaty with Nicaragua, which stands
1 force to-day, was ratified in June, 1808. It cedes to the
Jnited States a right of way, though not an exclusive one,
IT canal building purposes ; it guarantees freedom of ports
nd neutrality of canal, subject to the political sovereignty of
'icaragua. The United States also agreed to use its influence
) induce other commercial nations to cooperate with it in
uaranteeing such neutrality.

This treaty, therefore, like the one concluded with Colom-
ia, twenty years previously, contemplated tlie neutrality
I the canal; in this respect it was in full accord with the
mvisions of the Clayton-lUilwer treaty. A new treaty
as also made with Colombia (1868), in the negotiations
»r which Mr. Seward exhibited a decided change of senti-
ent from 1862, touching the neutrality of the isthmian
lUte. He inserted a clause in the draft of this Colombian
eaty which provided that enemies of the United States
lould be excluded from the use of the proposed canal in
nies of war. The Colombia Government rejected the arti-
e, adding in its place a clause favoring international con-
ol. The treaty was given full discussion in the Senate,
It failed of ratification. Had the Senate accepted this
,'reement with Colombia, it is quite certain that Great
ritain would have jjrotested against it as a violation of the
ilayton-Bulvver treaty. iS^o doubt Mr. Seward well knew

140 AMERICAN DIPLOMATIC QUESTIONS

this, and he was probably intending to hasten an issue with
Great Britain by this practical exposition of his theories.

Upon the inauguration of President Grant in 1870, a keen
interest in the interoceanic problem was revived, and the
new policy calling for exclusive American control of a Cen-
tral American canal rapidly gained adherents. It was strongly
urged by General Grant, and soon found many champions
among the public men of the day.

There were several causes for the rapid development of
this policy during the Grant administration. Many, who
theretofore had never considered the question of canal neu-
tralization in the light of a national issue, had their interest
suddenly aroused by the French operations under De Lesseps
at Panama. The prospect of European influence in the lower
isthmus brought many converts to the extreme views of the
administration, — and they, as is usual with most converts,
exhibited great zeal in their new cause. The Monroe
Doctrine, which had recently been fittingly and successfully
applied in Mexico, had left its impression in a general revival
of those principles which led the American mind to protest
against any form of foreign aggrandizement on this con-
tinent. Indeed, the maintenance of these principles seemed
sufficient reason in itself to warrant a demand for an exclu-
sive American control of au}^ ship canal enterprise in the
Western Hemisphere. As most Americans, according to their
own varying interpretations, believed in the wisdom of the
Monroe Doctrine, they came perforce to accept what appeared
to be a mere corollary or incident of that well-established
faith.

After the period of reconstruction and the consequent re-
union of the states, the need of such a canal continued to
grow in importance, especially as the Pacific seaboard states
rapidly developed a marvellous commercial growth. With
two coasts to defend, the military value of such an American
waterway, from the Atlantic to the Pacific, came more than
ever to be appreciated. Consequently many began to argue
that there could be no safety in a canal wliose international
guaranty should keep it at all times open as the high seas.

THE INTEROCEANIC CANAL PROBLEM 141

Thus the idea that the interoceanic canal should be con-
structed, owned, and then solely controlled by the United
States, came so generally to be accepted by all political
parties that it may be said in 1880 to have become crystallized
into a definite national policy.

The most formidable obstacle, however, which stood just
in the way of realizing this ideal was the Clayton-Bulwer
treaty. Consequently each administration, since that of
President Grant, has in turn made some attempt to remove
this obstruction. With the general acceptance of the more
radical theories of American monopoly of the canal route, it
has been difficult for many legislators to comprehend how
their predecessors could have entertained dissimilar views
upon the subject ; for this reason the Clayton-Bulwer treaty
has been frequently denounced in Senatorial debate within
the last twenty years, as a monument to American imbecility.
These critics are apparently unmindful of the conditions
under which the treaty was originally made and of the
diplomatic negotiations which followed its ratification. Act-
uated by the conviction that the agreement is a jjrejudicial
one, senators have for twenty years periodically sought to
abrogate it.

Prior to 1880, however, no systematic effort, because of its
supposed antagonism to American interests, had been made
to repudiate the Clayton-Bulwer treaty, for although the
growing sentiment in the United States, calling for American
control of the canal, conflicted with the provisions of that
treaty, up to that year the instrument itself was generally
accepted as a binding agreement," and no actual attempt was
made by those who regarded it with disfavor to abrogate or
otherwise avoid it. On the contrary, great solicitude was
at times manifested lest Great Britain should violate its
provisions. When Belize was transformed from a British
settlement to a colonial [)ossession, American protests were
made predicated upon tlie provisions of the Clayton-Bulwer
treaty. Upon other occasions as well, when Great Britain's
motives in "adjusting*' her Central American boundary
lines were brought into question, the Clayton-Bulwer treaty

142 AMERICAN DIPLOMATIC QUESTIONS

was quoted to the British Minister in Washington as a
sufficient condemnation of England's conduct.

As already noted in the development of this new theory
of American political control of the canal, the operations of
the French company under De Lesseps, at Panama, played an
important part. Fearing that the French might realize their
Central American objects and thereby gain for themselves an
undue military advantage over the United States, President
Hayes, in March, 1880, sent a special message to Congress
declaring the policy of this country to be " An American
canal under American control." He said : " The United States
cannot consent to the surrender of this control to any Euro-
pean power or combination of European powers. If existing
treaties . . . stand in the way of this policy . . . suitable
steps should be taken ... to promote and establish the
American policy. ... It is the right and duty of the United
States to assert and maintain such supervision and authority
over any such interoceanic canal across the isthmus ... as
will protect our interests." At another time President Hayes
asserted that the United States should consider the banks
of the Nicaragua Canal as a continuation of the Ameri-
can shore line, which doctrine would, of course, claim the
right in the United States to hold, fortify, and defend
the same.

Following this exposition of the executive's position on
the canal question — which was the first official and public
declaration of the new policy — Congress passed several reso-
lutions recommending the repudiation of the Clayton-Bulwer
treaty. These resolutions were inspired by the same fear that
had actuated President Hayes, and were also aimed at France
and her Panama canal scheme.

The growing opposition to the Clayton-IUilwer treaty and
to the principles for which it stood reached one of its crises
in 1881-82. In the early part of that year rumors were cir-
culated in Washington that several European powers, at the
request of Colombia, were considering the advisability of
adopting some plan of concerted action looking toward a
joint guarantee for the neutralization of the French canal at

THE INTEROCEANIC CANAL PKUELEM 148

Panama. Colombia had again declined to make a treaty
with the United States which would bind her to accept the
sole guarantee of the latter for the neutrality of the isthmian
transit route; the situation in Central America seemed un-
satisfactory. President Garfield, in his inaugural address,
March 4, 1881, touched upon this question, though with con-
siderably more calmness than had been displayed by his
predecessor. While declaring that the United States wished
to follow no narrow or exclusive policy, nor sought exclusive
privileges, yet on the other hand, it was the ^ right and duty
of the United States to assert and maintain such supervision
and authority over any interoceanic canal across the isthmus
... as will protect our national interests."

But the Secretary of State, Mr. Blaine, was more deeply
moved by the threatened danger to American interests. He
was wholly in sympathy with the popular movement demand-
ing the abrogation of the Clayton-Bulwer treaty ; he felt that
the time had arrived for action, and he precipitated a contro-
versy with Great Britain by a bold and altogether defiant
stroke. On June 24, 1881, quite in disregard of the obliga-
tions imposed upon the country by the Clayton-Bulwer treaty,
he issued a circular letter to the powers of Europe, informing
one and all that the United States would in future tolerate
no foreign interference in the matter of political control of
any isthmian canal ; assurance being given, however, that the
United States Avould itself "positively and efficaciously"
guarantee the neutrality of any such route ; also, that no
assistance or aid from any other power to this end was neces-
sary; furthermore, he gave notice to all that any insistence
on the part of European nations to have a share of responsi-
bility in the neutralization of the canal would "partake of
the nature of an alliance against the United States." fn
furtlier elaboration of this recently adopted and somewhat
novel attitude of his country toward the subject of canal
•'lualizatioii, Mv. Blaine especially desired that tiic various
liploniatic envoys of the United States, to whom lie liad ad-
Iressed his circular letteis, should " not represent this position
IS a development of a new policy." He alleged, on the con-

144 AMERICAN DIPLOMATIC QUESTIONS

traiy, that it was "nothing more than the pronounced ad-
herence to principles long since adopted."

It is difficult to see just how Mr. Blaine had been enahled
to justify to himself the correctness of this last statement,
especially in view of the fact that the American canal policy,
as set forth in his circular note, had been but the actual out-
growth of the previous decade, while the theory of a com-
pletely neutralized canal, on the other hand, had obtained in
the United States for more than half a century.

No doubt the British Government was surprised by the
receipt of Mr. Blaine's circular letter. The full statement of
the new American position had been made in complete disre-
gard, if not in open contempt, of the Clayton-Bulwer treaty.
The British Minister for Foreign Affairs, Lord Granville, was
pointedly brief in reply, and his answer bears a hint that he
suspected Mr. Blaine felt the weakness of his own position.
He merely said that the matter in question had already been
settled by the engagements of the Clayton-Bulwer treaty,
and that " Her Majesty's Government relied with confidence
upon the observation of all the obligations of that treaty."

Mr. Blaine anticipated the issue to be presented, and be-
fore the receipt of Granville's note, he despatched to Mr.
Lowell, the American Minister in London, a lengthy commu-
nication upon the subject (November 19, 1881). The letter
is no less remarkable for its plausibility than for its lack of
logical consistency.

1. "This convention [Clayton-Bulwer]," he said, "was
made more than thirty years ago, under exceptional and ex-
traordinary conditions which have long since ceased to
exist, — conditions which at best were temporary in their
nature and which can never be reproduced. The remarka-
ble development of the United States on the Pacific coast
since that time has created new duties for this government,
and developed new responsibilities upon it, the full and com-
plete discharge of which requires, in the judgment of the
President, some essential modifications in the Clayton-Bulwer
treaty."

2. "The interests of Her Majesty's Government, [in a

THE INTEROCEANIC CANAL PROBLEM 145

Central American canal] . . . are so inconsiderable in com-
parison with those of the United States, that the President
hopes" for a readjustment of the treat}'.

3. At present the treaty " concedes to Great Britain the
control of whatever canal may be constructed." This is
necessarily the case because of England's great sea power.

4. The United States (owing to its position in the West-
ern Hemisphere) " will not consent to perpetuate any treaty
that impeaches our rightful and long-established claim to
priority on the American continent."

5. Great Britain practically liolds tlie route to India, her
fortifications at all the important strategic points secure to
her the mastery of the Mediterranean and the Sed seas, and
this, together with the controlling interest in the Suez Canal,
practically converts those waters into a mare clausum
Therefore, he argued, " If a hostile movement should at any
time be made against the Pacific coast, threatening danger to
its people and destruction to its property, the Government of
the United States would feel that it had been unfaithful to
its duty and neglectful toward its own citizens, if it per-
mitted itself to be bound by a treaty which gave the same
right through the canal to a warship bent on an errand of
destruction that is reserved to its own navy sailing for the
defense of our coast and the protection of the lives of our
people. And as England insists by the might of her power
that her enemies in war shall strike her Indian possessions
only by doubling the Cape of Good Hope, so the Govern-
ment of the United States will equally insist that the inte-
rior, more speedy, and safer route of the canal shall \m
reserved for ourselves, while our enemies, if we shall ever be
80 unfortunate as to have any, shall be remanded to the voy-
age around Cape Horn."

6. ". . . Only by the United States exercising supervision
can the Isthmus canals Ije definitely and at all times secured
against the interference and obstruction incident to war. A
mere agreement of neuti-alit}^ on paper l^etween tlie great
powers of Europe might prove ineffectual to preserve the
canal in time of hostilities. The first sound of a cannon

146 AMERICAN DIPLOMATIC QUESTIONS

in a general European war would, in all probability, annul
the treaty of neutrality, and the strategic position of the
canal, commanding both oceans might be held by the first
naval power that could seize it." This would likely embroil
the United States in foreign wars.

7. The United States is less likely to be engaged in
foreign wars than are the European powers. Therefore to
her should be entrusted the care of the canal.

8. Other powers are extending their Central American trade,
while France is building a canal. The Clayton-Bulwer treaty
leaves the United States powerless to assert her just rights on
the isthmus, while these other powers are free to control the
situation.

9. *' One of the motives that originally induced this gov-
ernment to assent to the Clayton-Bulwer treaty, not distinctly
expressed in the instrument, but inferable from every line of
it, was the expected aid of British capital in the construction of
the Nicaraguan Canal. That expectation has not been real-
ized, and the changed condition of this country since 1850
has diminished, if it has not entirely removed from consider-
ation, any advantage to be deiived from that source."

Therefore the United States asks that "every part of the
treaty which forbids the United States fortifying the canal
and holding the political control of it in conjunction with
the country in which it is located should be cancelled;" that
"every part of the treaty in which Great Britain and the
United States agree to make no acquisition of territory in
Central America should remain in full force ; " and that a
neutral zone about each terminus of the canal, of liberal
extent, should be preserved by agreement of the great powers
of the world.

Ten days later, Mr. Blaine despatched another letter to Mr.
Lowell, upon the same subject. The ai-gument of " Tempora
mutantur'''' was further elaborated. Mr. Blaine did not hold
the Clayton-Bulwer treaty to be a void, but rather a voidable,
instrument ; it had always been a cause of friction between
the two governments, a compact "misunderstandingly entered
into, imperfectly comprehended, contradictorily interpreted.

THE INTEROCEANIC CANAL PROBLEM 147

and mutuall}- vexatious," for which reasons, he inferred, its
provisions could not properly be accepted as a guide to the
action of either party in Central America. A full historical
account of these nianj- contradictory interpretations of the
vexatious treaty, throughout the period of Sir William
Ouseley's mission to Central America, down to 1859, is
given. The numerous quotations presented demonstrate
clearly enough the dissatisfaction felt in the United States
throughout that period. He concludes, that for harmony's
sake, the objectionable features of the convention should be
removed by the common consent of the parties.

The weakness in Mr. Blaine's position is at once apparent.
His argument amounts to a statement that the United States,
having found the obligations of its contract irksome, and an-
tagonistic to its new political policies, it therefore deems it
fitting and proper to avoid them. The particular reasons ad-
vanced in support of his contention are, for the most part,
quite unsatisfactory. The vast growth of the Pacific states, con-
nected by numei'ous railway systems with the East, had been
made under the very restrictions he complained of, and the
ability of the West coast to protect itself had been strength-
ened by its marvellous advance in population and wealth.
It is true, the inteiests of the United States were prol)ably
greater in a Central American canal than were the interests
of Great Britain, yet the measure of interest cannot affect the
legality of the contract. England might easily have asserted
her own great interests in the I'oute by simple reference to
her merchant marine, which exceeded many times in value
that of the United States ; her own territorial possessions on
the North American continent, having a Pacific coast line as
well, though less in extent than that of the United States,
demanded protection of their interests. The route from
Halifax to Vancouver would be shortened as well as the
mute from New York to San Fi-ancisco.

Mr. Blaine's contention that the terms of the Clayton-
Bulwer treaty, uniting Great liritain and the United States
in joint protection of the Isthmian Canal, would give to tlie
former virtual control, is scarcely true — and if true, could

148 AMERICAN DIPLOMATIC QUESTIONS

have no weight as an argument in this discussion. If Great
Britain coukl gain control of the canal, to the injury and
prejudice of the United States, it would not be by virtue of
any provisions in the Clayton-Bulwer treaty, but by reason of
her superior naval strength, — a fact lying wholly outside
the issue in question. On the contrary, the very obligations
from which Mr. Blaine sought relief, being equally binding
upon both governments, prevented the " control " of England
over the canal. The treaty called for a joint guarantee of
neutrality — a guarantee, it must be remembered, which tied
England's hands, as well as our own. There is no pardonable
excuse for avoiding a contract because of the superior
strength of one of the parties.

The claim to priority on the American continent, and to
that position of vantage which gives to the United States a
greater right in the management of all the political ventures
in the Western Hemisphere, is a claim only to be upheld by
military strength ; such asserted right can be maintained
only by force — it cannot be supported in the law. If this
argument of Mr. Blaine were to be brought forward as a
positive finale of the discussion, it could only indicate that
the United States had decided to abandon its treaty pledges,
to assert its control of the canal, and then stand by the
consequences. But Mr. Blaine had no intention of thus
conveying an ultimatum to Great Britain ; his argument con-
cealed no threat, — it was made solely in the hope that it
might convince the British Minister that England's interests
were not sufficiently important to give her any part in the
maintenance of an open waterway connecting the Atlantic
and Pacific oceans. As such, it could only be considered a
political argument, possessing but little of legal force.

The exposition of Great Britain's position along the route
to India, and lier alleged control of the Suez Canal, as an
argument for a similar course to be followed by the United
States, along lier route from the East to the West, was not
sufficiently grounded on fact, even had it been relevant, to
invest it with argumentative force. At that time tlie neu-
tralization of the Suez Canal had not been thoroughly effected,

THE INTEROCEANIC CANAL PROBLEM 149

but Great Britain was the central figure in the attempt then
being made, and later carried out by treaty of Constantino-
ple, to secure the perfect neutrality of the Suez Canal. By
this agreement Great Britain estopped herself from acquiring
the control of that canal which her great naval strength
might have given her. Her position along the route, through
the Mediterranean and Red seas, had nothing more to do with
the legal status of the Suez Canal than our own naval sta-
tions along tlie Atlantic and Pacific coasts might have with
the Isthmian Canal.

Mr. Blaine's assertion that "only by the United States ex-
ercising supervision, can the Isthmian Canal be definitely, and
at all times, secured against the intei-ference and obstruction
incident to war,'' is a statement much more susceptible of
refutation than of proof. It is manifestly easier for two to
stand guard than for one, and still more eas}^ for three to
protect than for two ; when all are willing and are pledged
to stand guard, there becomes no further need for the sentry.
With the United States alone doing guard duty upon the
banks of the canal, what is there to prevent any two war-
ring powers from blockading the route? What is there,
3ven to prevent their closing the way against American-
ships? The force of this contention by Mr. Blaine can be
better appreciated in the fervency of patriotic sentiment,
but logically it fails. As an argument for abrogation of that
oart of the Clayton-Buhver treaty calling for international
guarantee, it was of little force, for there is every reason to
mppose that no single nation can perpetually maintain the
reedom of an interoceanic sliip canal.

Mr. Blaine's fear that France might gain entire control of
Jie Panama Canal was without reasonable foundation. De
^esseps made no claim for his country's exclusive interests
n the result of his labors. He himself demanded interna-
ional agreement for the protection of the route ; and had he
lot done so, or had France assumed a right to exclude all
)ther nations from a share in its political management, it is
'-ertain that Great Britain would have protested as vigorously
18 the United States. Indeed, there is no reason to suppose,

150 AMERICAN DIPLOMATIC QUESTIONS

judging from the attitude of the commercial powers to\Aard
the subject, that the other nations of Europe would have per-
mitted France to control the Panama Canal to their disad-
vantage.

It is difficult to see, as contended by Mr. Blaine, wherein
the Clayton-Bulwer treaty gives promise of British capital
for the construction of the canal. English money had never
been solicited for the purpose. Mr. Webster, as Secretary of
State, two 3'^ears after the ratification of the treaty, declared
that tlie necessary means could easily be obtained in this
country. There is no evidence to show that the United
States ever expected to draw upon English sources for a
proportion of the funds necessary for the building of the
canal.

Lord Granville replied in two despatches, dated January
7 and 14, 1882. At the outset, he arraigned the principles
upon which Mr. Blaine had founded his arguments as
" novel in international law." Denying the charge of
Great Britain's control of the Suez route, he hastened
"cordially [to] concur in what is stated by Mr. Blaine as
regards the unexampled development of the United States on
the Pacific coast . . . but Her Majesty's Government can-
not look upon it in the light of an unexpected event, or
suppose that it was not within the view of the statesmen who
were parties on either side of the Clayton-Bulwer tieaty.
The declarations of President Monroe and of his cabinet in
1823 and 1824 . . . show at least . . . twenty-six years
anterior to the treaty . . . there was a clear prevision of the
great future reserved to tlie Pacific coast. It is . . . an
inadmissible contention that the regular and successful oper-
ation of causes so evident at the time . . . should be held to
have completely altered the condition of affairs to the extent
of vitiating the foundations of an agi'eement wliicli cannot be
supposed to have been concluded without I'areful thought and
deliberation." Great Britain, as well as the United States,
has important interests connected with the waterway between
the Atlantic and Pacific oceans. Such a canal, he urged, "is
a work whicb concerns not merely the United States or the

THE INTEROCEANIC CANAL PROBLEM 151

American continent, but the whole civilized world. . . .
Her Majesty's Government are as anxious as that of the
United States that, while all nations should enjoy their
proper share in the benefits to be expected from the undertak-
ing, no single country should acquire a predominating
influence or control over such a means of communication."
Its universal and unrestricted use should be secured upon
an inteinational basis. This, he reminded Mr. Blaine, was
the attitude of the United States in the past, and to save all
annoyance and ti-oul)le, and to subserve the best interests of
all alike, this should be their attitude in the future.

To the historical objections presented by Mr. Blaine, Lord
Granville replied at much greater length in his second
despatch of Januar}' 14. The substance of the letter is con-
densed in its closing paragraph, which sets forth that the
various differences which arose between the two ofovernments
out of the Clayton-Bulwer treaty, and to which Mr. Blaine
refers, related, not to the general principles of the treaty,
(neutralization, international control, etc.,) but to that por-
tion of the instrument forbidding new acquisitions of teni-
tory in Central America. These old quarrels found their
origin in allegations that Great Britain was violating the
provisions of the treaty by accjuiring Central American
territory. This portion of the treaty Mr. Blaine does not
now attack, but desires, on the contrary, to retain intact ;
indeed, it was in defence of those very principles of neutrali-
zation that the United States objected to (Jreat P)ritain's move-
ments in Central America. In his liistorical review, Mr.
lilaine stops at the very point wheie the controversy should
l)egin. In 18<!0, upon the conclusion of the tliree liritish
treaties witli the Central American States, the old disputes
l^etween England and the United States were entirely set-
tled, and Piesident Buchanan, in his annual message of
that year, said : " The discordant constructions of the Clay-
ton-Bnhver treaty between the two governments, which at
• lifferunt j)eriods of the discussion bore a threatening aspect,
have resulted in a final settlement entirely satisfactory to
this government."

152 AMERICAN DIPLOMATIC QUESTIONS

Here then was an estoppel to Mr. Blaine's "historical
arguments."

The Garfield administration soon after coming to a tragic
end, President Arthur's Secretary of State, Mr. Frelinghuy-
sen, resumed the controversy with Lord Granville. His
first letter upon the subject (to Mr. Lowell, May 8, 1882) is
a state paper of considerable strength.

Mr. Frelinghuysen maintained that the construction of an
isthmian canal, open to all ships, at all times, would expose
our Western coast to attack, destroy our isolation, oblige us
to improve our defences, increase our navy, and compel us,
contrar}^ to our traditions, to take an active interest in
European affairs. The physical conformation of this con-
tinent is (.ne of our greatest safeguards, and any change
made in it might most injuriously affect the interests
of the Republic; hence the severance of the isthmus must
be effected in harmony with those interests. Relating to
the canal, there is no conflict between American political
claims and the material interests of other nations. The
Panama Railroad and the Suez Canal, without any inter-
national pledges of neutrality, have remained open and in
service during the most turbulent times. If no protectorate
were found necessary for them, it can scarcely be required
for the Isthmian Canal. He therefore considered it " un-
necessary and unwise, through an invitation to the nations
of the earth, to guarantee the neutrality of the transit of
the isthmus, to give their navies a pretext for assembling
in waters contiguous to our shores, and to possibly involve
this republic in conflicts from which its natural position
entitles it to be relieved." Such international agreements
— calling for interference by force — are apt to breed dis-
sension and trouble. In times of peace they are harmless
and useless, and in times of war they often cannot be
enforced. Besides this, such an agreement would lead to
foreign intervention in American affairs, which the tradi-
tional policy of the United States would make it imj)ossible
to tolerate. A protectorate of European nations over the •
isthmus transit would be in conflict with the Monroe Doctrine. .

THE INTEROCEANIC CANAL PROBLEM 153

The treaty had two primary objects, — the construction of
the Nicaragua Canal, and the dispossession of Great Britain
from her Central American settlements. To this end, the
parties agreed not to exercise any dominion over, fortify, or
colonize, Nicaragua, Costa Rica, the Mosquito coast, or any
part of Central America. Yet Great Britain exercises do-
minion over Belize or British Honduras, — an area equalling
Massachusetts, Connecticut, and Rhode Island, — and the
impression prevails that since 1850 Great Britain has con-
siderably increased the region in Central America over
which she assumes control. Such dominion seems incon-
sistent with the provisions of the treaty. At the time of tlie
conclusion of the Clayton-Bulwer treaty, English domin-
ion in Belize consisted merely in a privilege to cut wood
and establish saw-mills in a territoiy established by metes
and bounds. It was referred to by Sir Henry Bulwer in
1850, as a "settlement"' at Honduras. His letter to Mr.
Clayton, excepting this settlement and its dependencies from
operation of the treaty, was made after the conclusion of same,
and was unknown to the President and Senate. In 1859 Great
Britain made a treaty with Guatemala, in which her "settle-
ment " was referred to, as " Her Ikitannic Majesty's settle-
ments and possessions," and the commissioners appointed
to mark the boundaries discovered the British area to have
greatly expanded. The United States never gave assent to
tliis conversion of a liritish settlement into a British pos-
session under full British sovereignty. "Under treaty of
1850, while it is binding, the United States have not the
right to exercise dominion over or to colonize one foot of
territory in Central America. Great Biitain is under the
same rigid restriction. And if Great Britain has violated and
continues to violate tliat provision, the treaty is, of course,
voida])le at the pleasure of the United States."

Referring then to Lord Granville's mention of President

Buchanan's message of December 3, 1860, in which the

xecutive expressed his entire satisfaction with the outcome

"f negotiations ai-ising under the Clayton-Bulwer treaty, Mr.

|Frelinghuysen said: —

15-4 AMERICAN DIPLOMATIC QUESTIONS

" It is well known that the parties to the Clayton-Bulwer
treaty anticipated that a canal by the Nicaragua route Avas
to be at once commenced. Under the assumption of a pro-
tectorate of Mosquito, British authority was at that time
in actual and visible occupation of one end of the Nicaragua
route, . . . and it was intended by this treaty to dispossess
Great Britain of this occupation. This object was accom-
plished in 1859 and 1860 by treaties between Great Biitain,
Guatemala, Honduras, and Nicaragua. ... It was to this
adjustment, which was one of the prime objects of the treaty,
and not to the colonization of British Honduras, that ISh.
Buchanan alludes. ..."

An ample review of the negotiations between Sir Henry
Bulwer and Mr. Clayton, which led up to the treaty, was
then given, in order to show that the primary object of the
parties was to insure, at the earliest possible moment, the
completion of the particular ship canal for which a concession
had already been made by Nicaragua to citizens of the United
States (August 29, 1849). It is to this particular canal,
(Nicaragua Canal) Mr. Frelinghuysen urged, that all the pro-
visions of tlie first seven articles of the Claj'ton-Bulwer treaty
apply.

Coming then to the seventh and eighth articles of that instru-
ment, which provide for the course of action to be followed by
the two governments toward any other Central American
scheme for connecting the oceans, Mr. Frelinghuysen insisted
that reference was only made therein to such projects as were
then in contemplation, i.e. at tlie time the treaty was signed.
All that part of the treaty (Articles 1 to 7) relating to one
particular canal (the Nicaragua Canal) had lapsed by failure
to construct the canal to which it especially referred. Tlie
canal "now (188'2) in question" was the Panama Canal,
and the position of the United States in reference to that is de-
termined by a convention between the United States and New
Granada (United States of Colombia), concluded in 184G,
and still in force. In this treaty, the United States is placed
in the position of sole guarantor of the neutiality of any
route across the Isthmus of Panama. The United States

THE INTEROCEAMIC CANAL PROBLEM 155

protectorate is therefore exclusive in its character, and should
Great Britain claim, under the Clayton-Bulwer treaty, a
right to join the United States in the protection of this
route, "the United States would suhmit that experience has
shown that no such joint protectorate is requisite ; that the
Clayton-Bulwer treaty is subject to the provisions of the
treaty of 1846," between the United States and Colombia.

Furthermore, the United States having successfully exer-
cised her protectorate over the Panama Railroad route, for
upward of thirty years, during the most turbulent times.
Great Britain has no right, at this lale date, to demand any
share in the guarantee of any canal hereafter to be built
across the isthmus.

In conclusion, Mr. Frelingliuysen maintained that both his-
tory and theory su])port him in his position against a joint
protectorate with Great Britain over the Panama transit
route, and finally that the United States cannot take part in
extending an invitation to the powers of the world to co-
operate with them upon the basis of the Clayton-Bulwer
treaty ; and that the United States " would look with disfavor
upon any attempt at a concert of political action by other
powers in that direction."

This letter of Mr. Frelingliuysen is, perhaps, the best ex-
position of the American case that has ever been made for
the abrogation or modification of the Clayton-Bulwer treaty.
The arguments are set forth with great earnestness and
much plausibility ; but despite the elalmrate preparation of
the brief, it was completely traversed by Lf)rd Granville's
reply to Mr. West (December 30, 1882).

To offset Mr. Frelinghuysen's contention that the Clay-
t<in-l>ulwer treaty had reference only to the interoceanic
routes then in contemplation. Lord (iranville needed but to
offer in quotation the treaty itself, wliich declared " that
neither the one nor the otlier of the high contracting parties
would ever obtain or maintain for itself any exclusive control
Dver any nhip canal which mii/ht he constructed between tlie
Atlantic and Pacific Oceans, by way of the river San Juan."
Having then declared for a principle, as well as for the accom-

156 AMERICAN DIPLOMATIC QUESTIONS

plishment of a particular object, the parties agreed " to extend
their protection by treaty stipuhitions to any other practicable
communications, whether by canal or railroad, across the
isthmus which connects North and South America, and espe-
cially to the interoceanic communications, should the same
prove to be practicable, whether by canal or railway, which
are now pro})osed to be established by way of Tehuantepec
or Panama." The use of the words ^'•general principle'" and
'■'•especially,''^ in reference to Tehuantepec and Panama, seem
to remove all doubt as to the construction of the treaty.
Granville's position was still further strengthened by the
general acceptance of this construction of the treaty in the
United States for many years following its ratification.

General Cass, while Secretary of State in 1857, had asserted
to Lord Napier that "the United States demanded no exclusive
privileges in the interoceanic passages of the isthmus." All
of the treaties made since 1850, by Great Britain and the
United States with Central American states, acknowledged
the principle of joint protection. From one of these American
treaties (that of June 21, 1867, with Nicaragua), Lord Gran-
ville called attention to the fact that the United States not
only "agreed to extend their protection to all such routes,
guarantees," etc., but it did further "agree to employ their
influence with other nations to induce them to guarantee such
neutrality and protection." Therefore, as the United States
had seen fit to pledge itself to the carrying out of that " gen-
eral principle " established by the Clayton-Buhver treaty and
opposed to all ideas of exclusive control, by treaties since
made, they could not now consistently fall back upon the
Colombian treaty of 1848, as giving them exclusive rights
upon the isthmus.

It was to Mr. Frelinghuysen's contention tliat certain acts
of Great Britain, in violation of the terms of the Clayton-
Buhver ti-eaty, had voided the treaty itself, and liberated the
United States from its operations, tliat Cxninville especially
turned his attention. These alleged acts on the part of
Great Britain, it will be recalled, were the conversion of a
more restricted ricjht of settlement in Honduras to a full-

THE INTEROCEANIC CANAL PROBLEM 157

fledged colony, and to the unlawful extensions of the boun-
dary of this British possession. Lord Granville furnished, an
historical account of Belize, showing that while originally the
occupation of this territory by Englishmen was maintained
under the sovereign laws of Spain, yet by conquest it had
subsequently become English territory, as acknowledged by
Spain, and later by the Central American states. All these
acts, which secured to Great Britain the sovereignt}^ over her
Central American territory, had been committed before 1850.
In that year, and while the Cla3'ton-Bulwer treaty was awaiting
ratification, Mr. Clayton, the Secretary of State, acknowledged
this British possession. Finally, to close the discussion. Lord
Granville pointed to the postal convention of 1869, between
Great Britain and the United States, which formally recog-
nized British Honduras as a "colony" of Great Britain.

Mr. Frelinghuysen returned to the discussion, and the con-
troversy with Lord Granville was urged along, though with
signs of diminishing vigor on the part of the United States.
Notliing new was developed in what might be termed this
supplementary correspondence, — the old lines of argument
were preserved, and the same facts reiterated. The end of the
debate was only brought about when the line of argument
returned once more to Mr. Frelinghuysen's former charge of
Great Britain's bad faith in creating a "colony " in Honduras
since the ratification of the Clayton-Bulwer treaty. Lord
Granville's curt reply to this repeated assertion was simply
that the United States, through its official mouthpiece, had
expressed its satisfaction and recognized English rights in
Honduras. The Monroe Doctrine, which had crept into the
discussion, he dismissed with a query, — Why had it not
api)lied during the past thirty years? If the defenders of tlie
Monroe Doctrine could accept tlie Clayton-Bulwer treaty in
1850, they could equally recognize it in 1883.

The only effect of this two years' controversy was to
establish all the more firmly the validity of the Clayton-
Bulwer treaty. Whatever ills its [jrovisions may liave im-
l)osed upon the United States, there was no escape fiom
the treaty through the avenues of logic or by recourse to

158 AMERICAN DIPLOMATIC QUESTIONS

legal arguments. The merits of the case belonged to Great
Britain. There was no position which either Mr. Blaine or
Mr. Frelinghuysen had taken, which was not disproved by
admissions elsewhere made ; at every turn there appeared
to be an estoppel.

The reason for this utter failure of American statesmen
to free the nation from a burdensome treaty is at once
clear. For twenty-five years after the conclusion of the
treaty the principles embodied therein had been accepted by
the United States as sound and wise. On such a basis other
treaties had been negotiated, authoritative endorsements had
been made, and the whole course and tenor of the nation's
thought and attitude toward the question had apparently
built an impregnable bulwark about the treaty itself, as it
had consecrated the principles for which it stood. Whenever
the Clayton-Bulwer treaty shall be attacked, another diplo-
matic victory will be given to British statesmen, and another
defeat scored at home. The treaty is not void, and cannot
be avoided upon purely legal ground.

If the conviction Avhich has apparently seized upon tlie
public mind that full American control of any Central Ameri-
can canal is necessary to the safety and welfare of the United
States, and must be a condition of any waterway to be con-
structed, and if this conviction persists, the time will soon
come when the United States will feel itself justified in
adopting the only rational plan for dissolving the obligations
of the Cla3'ton-Bulwer treaty. That plan is, — boldly to pro-
claim its abrogation and take the consequences of a breach
of faith, whatever those consequences may prove to be. One
way short of so radical a procedure would be to offer to
Great Britain some manner of compensation for the relin-
quishment of her rights under the treaty. But the assumption
should not be made that the United States is so great a
sufferer under the provisions of that treaty. The subject
will be discussed under the title " Neutralization of the
Canal."

THE INTEROCEAMC CA.NAL PKUJ3LEM 159

The results of the Blaine-Frelinghuysen-Granville con-
troversy greatly displeased the executive ; it was unsatis-
factory to Congress ; it was regarded as a humiliating defeat
by the country at lai'ge. Tiie conviction was general in
Washington that the United States had been duped in 1850,
and had been afterward seduced into the damaging admis-
sions, which now arose like ghosts, to frighten the nation into
the observance of a self-sacrificing compact. Many believed
it to be an exaofcrerated sense of virtue that bound the nation
to the fulfilment of those agreements. Technically, perhaps,
it was thought. Great Britain's position in Belize was justi-
fied; but honestly, as the human heart appreciates the word,
it was not; Granville's arguments did not seem to ring
quite true.

But especially discontented with the outcome of this cor-
respondence was a numerous group of C'ongiessmen, who
persistently asserted that the salvation of the United States
depended upon the immediate construction of an isthmian
canal that should be entiiely American in every particular.
President Arthur himself had been of this opinion, and he
at once entered upon the task of putting his convictions
into execution, notwithstanding the unfavorable outcome of
the recent diplomatic encounter with Great Bi-itain. Having
convinced himself that the Panama Canal (then in process
of construction) could never come under the full American
control, which he felt to be a necessary condition to liis
country's safety, he determined that the United States should
construct a canal of its own in Nicaragua. Mr. Freling-
huysen prepared the way by concluding a new treaty with
Senor Zavala, Special Envoy from Nicaragua (1884).

This treaty was made in total disregard of the conven-
tion nf 1850. It established a per})etual alliance between
the United States and Nicaragua; the Unitcil States
should construct a canal and then maintain an exclusive
control over it. A strip of territory upon either side of the
route was transferred to the United States in fee simple.

160 AMERICAN DIPLOMATIC QUESTIONS

Nicaragua's territorial integrity was guaranteed, and the
United States placed itself in the position of protector of
the smaller republic.

It may readily be surmised that the ratification of this
treaty would certainly have reopened the Clayton-Bulwer
controversy. It would necessarily have provoked a contest
between the Monroe Doctrine and the treaty obligations of
the United States. The Senate, however, was unwilling to
incur the risk of such a debate, and a vote of thirty-two yeas
to twenty-three nays left the treaty unconfirmed. A recon-
sideration was then ordered, and the matter, still unsettled,
continued over into the Cleveland administration.

The new Democratic President entered his office with
ideas on this question differing radically from those of his
predecessor, or rather from those of his last four predecessors.
In his first message of December 8, 1885, Mr. Cleveland
took occasion to make public these views. Referring to the
Frelinghuysen-Zavala treaty, which he had previously with-
drawn from the Senate, he said : —

My immediate predecessor caused to be negotiated with
Nicaragua a treaty for the construction, by and at the sole cost
of the United States, of a canal through Nicaragua territory, and
laid it before the Senate. Pending the action of that body
thereon, I withdrew the treaty for re-examination. Attentive
consideration of its provisions leads me to withhold it from
re-subniission to the Senate.

]\Laintaining, as I do, the tenets of a line of precedents from
Washington's day, which proscribe entangling alHances with
foreign States, I do not favor a poHcy of acquisition of new and
distant territory or the incorporation of remote interests with
our own.

I am unable to recommend propositions involving paramount
privileges of ownership or right outside of our own territory,
when coupled with absolute and unlimited engagements to defend
the territorial integrity of the State where such interests he.
While the general project of connecting the two oceans by means
of a canal is to be encouraged, I am of opinion that any sclieme
to that end to be considered with favor should be free from the
features alluded to. . . .

THE INTEROCEANIC CANAL PROBLEM 161

Whatever highway may be constructed across the barrier
dividing the two greatest maritime areas of the world must be
for the world's benetit — a trust for mankind, to be removed from
the chance of domination by any single power, nor become a point
of invitation for hostilities or a prize for warlike ambition. An
engagement combining the construction, ownership, and operation
of such a work by this government, with an offensive and defen-
sive alliance for its protection, with the foreign state whose re-
sponsibilities and rights we would share is, in my judgment, incon-
sistent with such dedication to universal and neutral use, and
would, moreover, entail measures for its realization beyond the
scope of our national polity or present means.

The lapse of years has abundantly confirmed the wisdom and
foresight of those earlier Administrations which, long before the
conditions of maritime intercourse were changed and enlarged by
the progress of the age, proclaimed the vital need of interoceanic
transit across the American Isthmus and consecrated it in ad-
vance to the common use of mankind, by their positive declara-
tions and through the formal obligation of treaties. Toward
such realization, the efforts of my Administration will be ap{)lied,
ever bearing in mind the principles on which it must rest, and
which were declared in no uncertain tones by Mr. Cass, who,
while Secretary of State, in 1858, announced that " what the
United States want in Central America, next to the happiness of
its people, is the security and neutrality of the interoceanic routes
which lead through it."

The attitude of the executive througliout both of Mr.
Cleveland's administrations served to check the attempts to
re[)udiate the Clayton-Bulwer treaty which were demanded
from influential sources; indeed, the earnest efforts of Mr.
Blaine and Mr. Frclinghuysen to abrogate that convention
have never since been revived, although the ("layton-Bulwer
treaty has never ceased to be regarded in other tlian a most
unfavorable light. On two occasions, indeed, since 1883, the
provisions of the treaty have Ijeen invoked in siudi a manner
as to indicate our renewed adherence to it.

It will be recalled that by the treaty of Managua, between
^ireat Britain and Nicaragua, concluded by Sir William
Ouseley in 1860, the former abandoned her protectorate over
Mos(juitia — that strip of territory lying along the gulf coast

162 AMERICAN DIPLOMATIC QUESTIONS

of Nicaragua. By the terms of this instrument, Nicaragua
had guaranteed to pay a certain indemnity to the Mosquito
Indians. Probably inspired by the liope that the United
States would support her against any British quarrel she
might stumble into, Nicaragua persistently refused to pay
the promised yearly stipend to the Indians ; the latter
clamored for their paj-, and called upon Great Britain to
enforce her treaty rights. Accordingly, in 1880, a demand
to this end was made upon Nicaragua; but in consequence
of the latter's continued refusal to abide by the terms of her
contract, the matter in dispute between the two nations was
submitted to the Emperor of Austria for arbitration. At
first the administration felt that the United States had been
slighted, and that the Monroe Doctrine had been violated as
well. It appeared to be a clear case of "foreign intei-ference"
on the Western continent ; but for several reasons the Presi-
dent believed an American protest would be ill advised.
Great Britain was clearly acting within her own rights as a
party to a treaty, and the United States had fully approved
of the convention when first concluded (Buchanan Message,
1860). Although a foreign tribunal of arbitration threatened
the renewal of British claims in Mosquitia, there was simply
no help for it, except in the use of force. As apprehended,
the arbitration proceedings (July, 1881) resulted in the rees-
tablishment of the English protectorate over the Mosquito
reservation ; but consolation was sought by the Senate in
reaffirming the principles of the iMonroe Doctrine. The
episode called forth no direct protest from either Mr. Blaine
or Mr. Frelinghuysen.

The commercial and moral effect of the restoration of
British influence carrying enlightened Anglo-Saxon rule along
the Mosquito sliore, was almost magical. Immigration set in,
business revived, and the dilapidated village of Bluefields
became a commercial centre where Biiiish and American
ca[)ital sought investment. A large fruit trade was opened
with New Orleans, and American capital began the exploita-
tion of Mosquito resources upon a comparatively large scale.
"^I^his rapid development of Mosquitia operated adversely to

THE INTEROCEANIC CANAL PROBLEM 163

Nicaragua's prospects in the race for wealth. Jealousies
soon arose, and Nicaragua appealed to the United States
to protect her in lier efforts to regain control of the Indian
reservation. Acts were committed by Nicaraguan officials
in contempt of Mosquito and English authority at Bluefields
and elsewhere within tlie limits of the reservation. A crisis
was reached in 1888, which renewed the old controversy, in
which the United States again reprimanded Great Britain
for violation of the Clayton-Bulwer treaty. ]Mr. Bayard, the
Secretary of State, opened the new diplomatic skirmish by
a sharp remonstrance. His letter of November 23, 1888, to
Mr. Phelps, American Minister at London, took the position
that a continuance of the protectorate of Great Britain over
the Mosquito territory would be regarded by the United States
as conflicting with the provisions of the Clayton-Bulwer treaty.
He maintained that Great Britain was usingr her Managua
treaty as a mere cloak to shield her in the continued exercise
of sovereignty along the Central American coast ; that the
United States, being no party to the Austrian arbitration pro-
ceedings, was not bound nor committed to an admission of
British right of interference between Nicaragua and the
Indians within her borders ; he therefore insisted that the
United States was free to oppose a British protectorate in
Central America, as being wholly inconsistent with her general
views and political policy.

Mr. Bayard's appeal was to the iNIonroe Doctiine quite as
much as to the Clayton-Bulwer treaty; but liis somewhat
elaborate argument had the fatal weakness of many American
state papers — the presentation of a political theory or jiolicy
against generally accepted tenets of international law. What-
ever objections the United States might interpose to British
actions, they were rendered nugatory by the simj)le fact that
Great Britain was acting consistently within the limits of a
treaty wliich the United States herself had sanctif)ned; and
finally, she was clearly justified under the award of a lril)iin:il
assented to by Nicaragua.

Loid Salisbury i-eplied to Mr. Bayard some months later
(March 7, 1889). He denied any English claim of sovereignty

164 AMERICAN DIPLOMATIC QUESTIONS

over the Mosquito Indians, and asked only for the Nicaraguan
observance of the Managua ti-eaty to offer Great Britain the
opportunity she desired to withdraw from the affairs of the
Indian reservation.

For some years Mosquitia continued to prosper under
British rule. The increasing number of American immi-
grants to Bluefields contributed a decided American flavor
to Mosquito politics. Although British influence remained
paramount, this fact was more than ever manifested in 1892,
when the Mosquito authorities placed a duty upon importa-
tions received at Bluefields in excess of specified rates pre-
viously fixed by treaty between Nicaragua and the United
States, — Nicaragua having become unable to abide by her
tariff pledges to the United States, as her own sovereignty
along the coast had been entirely suspended. The Mosquito
tariff act presented an auspicious occasion to Nicai-agua to
reopen the old controversy with Great Britain ; a correspon-
dence ensued, in which the United States was necessarily
soon involved. In a letter to the American Minister in Lon-
don, tlie Secretary of State, Mr. Foster, declared witli great
emphasis, that Nicaragua's sovereignty over ^losquitia had
not been impaired ; her concessions to Great Britain being,
in their nature, tribal and not territorial. '' A suppositi-
tious Mosquitia is not to be arbitrarily substituted for the
territory allotted to and reserved for the residence of the
Mosquito Indians by the sovereign.'" "• The United States
cannot look with favor upon any attempt, however indirect,
on the part of Great Britain to render illusory the sover-
eignty of the Republic of Nicaragua over the Mosquito
Indians and the territory reserved for their dwelling." A
lengthy discussion might have resulted, which would no doubt
have brought forth much learning upon the subject of suze-
rain rights, had not more stirring events in Mosquitia sud-
denly diverted attention, from academic debates between
London and Washington, to the consideration of an inune-
diate military interference on the spot. In the usual course
of Central American history, Nicaragua and Honduras, along
with most of the adjoining states, became involved in war.

THE INTEROCEANIC CANAL PROBLEM 165

Mosquitia remained neutral, which in the estimation of
Nicaragua, chiiming sovereignty over tlie reservation, was
nothing less than disloyalty. Accordingly Nicaraguan troops
swept into the reservation, seized and occupied Bluefields
(February, 1894) against the combined protests of the native
Indian Chief, Clarence, and his political supporter, the Brit-
ish Consul. The U. S. S. Kearsarge was wrecked while
hastening to the scene ; but upon the arrival of a British
war vessel, and the landing of marines, the Nicaraguan
troops retired, leaving, however, a Nicaraguan commissioner
in the hands of the foreigners at Bluefields. This sudden
flurr}' at arms had a sobering effect upon the English authoi-i-
ties, who, since the Austrian arbitration, had been inclined to
disregard in toto Nicaraguan claims to sovereignty over Mos-
quitia. The Nicaraguan commissioner was therefore accepted
as a factor in a new provisional govei'nment formed for Mos-
quitia. The infusion of the Nicaraguan element into the
governmental affairs of the reservation soon brought discon-
tent among the foreigners, which resulted in a nocturnal coup
d etat overthrowing the provisional government and again
placing Chief Clarence in control. In consequence of this,
Nicaraguan troops soon appeared near Bluefields, in fighting
array, and demanded the restoration of the Nicaraguan
authorities.

Such was the crisis wlien the United States fully awoke to
the importance of events taking place in Central America.
Explanations were demanded; the Clayton-Bulwer treaty was
carefully reread at the State Department; American citizjns
in Bluefields were cautioned to take no jjart in acts violating
Nicaraguan sovereignty in Mos({uitia, and Great Britain was
asked to withdraw her troops. England yielded, the marines
departed, and a dci^lorable condition of political confusion
resulted in Moscjuitia. A resumption of Nicaraguan sov-
' leignty in liluefields, with its attendant abuses and extor-
tions, soon brought about a sc(;oiid coup d'Stat^ in wliich
American, English, and Indians all combined to cast out the
intoleral)le rule of Nicaragna. The United States was thus
placed in the awkward position of favoring the legitimate

166 AMEKICAN DIPLOMATIC QUESTIONS

rule of Nicaragua over Mosquitia, which the business inter-
ests of American citizens there resident had twice prompted
them to overthrow.

The Indian Chief (Clarence) was scarcely established in
office, with a " council of state " of American and British
citizens to aid him in directing the affairs of ]\Iosquitia,
when the Nicaraguan army again appeared. England having
already abandoned hope for the fulfilment of her Mosquito
projects, held aloof. The United States, to be consistent,
encouraged Nicaragua. Bluefields was taken, Clarence fled
to Jamaica, all American and British subjects including the
British Consul, who were suspected of complicity in the last
Mosquito uprising, were seized, and with scarcely a pretence
of trial, were summarily banished.

Through the exercise of an unusual amount of tact by
the United States authorities, Nicaragua relented, and par-
doned the exiles, many of whom returned to Bluefields to
resume their former occupations ; but further efforts to
maintain a Mosquito nation were seen by all parties to be
useless, and in November, 1894, the Indians voluntarily
declared for incorporation into Nicaragua. " Mosquitia "
became the Nicaraguan state of " Zelaya," with which change
the last remnant of Great Britain's grasp upon it faded.

England's demand for indemnity growing out of the ban-
ishhient of her Consul, Mr. Hatch, resulted in the seizure of
the Nicaraguan port of Corinto (April, 1895). The event
caused some excitement in the United States, but it marked
the final episode of British interference in Nicaragua. The
claim was paid, and the British warships sailed away, leaving
behind, for the first time in a century, no shadow of English
authority in Nicaragua.

Since 1895 a number of American citizens have continued
under Nicaraguan authority to live and do business in Bhie-
fields ; l)ut frequent signs of their irritation have come to the
surface, indicating their disrespect for a governmental system
that thrives upon revolution and permits many deeds of injus-
tice under excuse of military necessity. Could Great Britain
be induced to sanction the abrogation of the Clayton-Buhver

THE INTEROCEANIC CANAL PROBLEM 167

treaty and free the United States from the ban of territorial
expansion in Central America, it is probable that, sooner or
later, a fourth coup d'etat in Bluefields might transfer the
State of Zelaya to the United States. Such a consummation
would be pleasing to those members of Congress who favor
the immediate construction of the proposed canal as a national
undertaking.

VI

As already noted, the views of President Cleveland, touch-
ing the political status of the Central American Canal, being
more in accord with those entertained by the country pre-
vious to 1870, precluded the possibility of any definite action
looking to the abrogation of the Clayton-Iiulwer treaty under
liis administrations. From 1885 to 1889 and from 1893 to
1897 no renewal of Mr. Blaine's and Mr. Frelinghuj^sen's
efforts in that direction were undertaken, notwithstanding
the fact that the treaty received several denunciations in
Congress, and public opinion throughout the country was
becoming more and more fixed against the toleration of
foreign influence in the management of the canal.

President McKinley at first gave to the public no hint of his
own position in the matter ; but in his second annual message
(December 1898), moved by the new conditions which had
arisen within the short space of a year, he recorded himself a
champion of the doctrine of an " American Canal." Me said
in reference to the Nicaraguan Canal: — " Tlie construction
of such a maritime highway is now more than ever indispen-
sable to that intimate and ready intercommunication between
our Eastern and Western seaboaids demanded by the annex-
ing of the Hawaiian Ishiiids and the prospective expansion of
our influence and commerce in the Pacific, and that our
national policy now more imperatively than ever calls for its
control by this government, are propositions wliich I doubt
not the Congress will duly appreciate and wisely act upon."

Thus Pi-esident McKinley came to endorse the ultra-Amer-
,ican principle of the political status of a Central American

168 AMERICAN DIPLOMATIC QUESTIONS

canal as supported by Presidents Hayes, Garfield, Arthur, and
Harrison. The position of the executive was concurred iu
by Congress, and approved by the country at large.

Events growing out of the Spanish War went far to con-
vince a conservative minority, who doubted the wisdom or
expediency of abrogating the Clayton-Bulwer treaty, that
they had probably erred in judgment. The long voyage of the
Oregon from San Francisco to Santiago, at a time of national
peril, furnished the only proof still lacking to demonstrate
the necessity of a canal connecting the oceans which should
be under the military protection of the United States Gov-
ernment. The expansion policy of the United States in the
West Indies, and the acquisition of a Pacific empire with its
promises of trade and of a greatly enlarged American mer-
chant marine, further stimulated the desire of the country
for a ship canal under American control. Shipping subsidies
were under discussion in the Senate ; a greatly increased
navy was called for to protect distant possessions ; new and
unlooked-for conditions suddenly transformed the nation into
an alert and aggressive power. With these changes of
national sentiment, public interest became more than ever
aroused in the completion of the Nicaraguan Canal. Unani-
mous committee reports in both houses of Congress favored
prompt construction by the United States Government; a
growing disposition in Congress manifested itself for the ac-
quisition of a strip of Nicaraguan and Costa Rican territory,
in order that the canal might lie wholly witliin American
soil. Resolutions of Congress again declared the Clayton-
Bulwer treaty to be void. The press was unsparing in its
attacks upon the old compact, and never before had all par-
ties so persistently clamored for the immediate undertaking
of the work upon a national basis, although in defiance of
treaty obligations.

In January, 1900, a rumor became current that negotiations
were in progress to conclude a new treaty with Great IJritain
relative to the ship canal. Knowing the sentiments of the
administration on the subject, the proponents and friends of
the canal rejoiced in the prospect of final delivery from the

THE IXTEROCEANIC CANAL PROBLEM 169

diplomatic entanglements which for fifty years had prevented
the realization of their hopes. The people at last concluded
that the Clayton-Bulwer treaty was to be abandoned. A con-
gratulatory tone pervaded the press comments, while the
appearance of the new treat}' was eagerly awaited. Surmises
were rife that Great Britain, having encountered evil fortune
in South Africa, and being in danger of European intervention,
had consented to withdraw her Central American pretensions
for the sake of assured American friendship. It was also sus-
pected that in order to humor Canada, England might ask of
the United States concessions in Alaska, and give in return
all that was deiyanded relative to the canal. On February
5, the Hay-Pauncefote Convention was signed, sent to the
Senate, read and immediatel}' referred to the Committee on
Foreign Relations. It was entitled, "A Convention between
the United States and Great Britain to Facilitate the Con-
struction of a Ship Canal to Connect the Atlantic and Pacific
Oceans, and to Remove any Objection which Might Arise out
of the Convention Commonly Called the Clayton-Bulwer
Treaty." The agreement called for the construction of the
canal under the auspices of the United States (iovernment, to
be done at its own expense and to carry with it the enjoyment
of all the rights incident to such construction. The " General
Princi[)les " of neutralization as established in the eighth
article of the Clayton-P>ul\ver treaty were to be preserved,
and to that purpose a set of rules analogous to those con-
tained in the Constantinople treaty (October 29, 1888) were
adopted. These rules called for — (a) fieedom of transit in
times of war or peace to all vessels of all nations ; (/>) a free-
dom from blockade ; (e) a code of procedure for war vessels
entering and leaving the canal ; {d) no fortifications ak)iig
the route. The high contracting parties should call upon
the other powers to unite with them in guaranteeing neu-
trality of the canal.

When the text of the convention was made public a few
la3-s later, it bewildered the country. Those wlio endorsed
he principles of neutralization, for which the new treaty
tood, were amazed, because the administration had already

170 AMERICAN DIPLOMATIC QUESTIONS

pledged itself to quite the opposite theory in reference to the
canal. All others who read the words of the treaty were no
less disappointed than astonished. The Clayton-Hulwer treaty
was not abrogated in the instrument, as they thouglit would
be the case ; on the contrary, its principles were reaffirmed.
The new agreement did not abandon the old ; it supple-
mented and enlarged upon it. Those features of the old
convention relating to the neutralization of a canal, which
had been denounced for so many years as objectionable, were
emphasized and perpetuated in the new instrument. The
disabilities placed upon the United States by the old conven-
tion, in the matter of acquisition of Central American terri-
tory, not being expressly removed, were, in consequence,
recognized by the new. And finally and above all other con-
siderations, the despised Clayton-Bulwer treaty Avas acknowl-
edged to be binding and in force, — creating thereb}^ a new
and effective estoppel to future efforts seeking British consent
to its abrogation.

In the committee-room the following amendment to the
treaty was appended to the instrument by Senator Davis : —

It is agreed, however, that none of the immediately foregoing
conditions and stipulations in sections, Nos. 1, 2, 3, 4, 5, of this
article, shall apply to measures which the United States may find
it necessary to take, for securing by its own forces the defense of
the United States and the maintenance of }niblie order.

This amendatory clause was based upon a provision in the
Constantinople treaty of 1888 touching the neutralization of
the Suez Canal, and was meant by Senator Davis to supply an
omission which had occurred through "oversight" of the ne-
gotiators. It will be seen that the Davis amendment at once
robbed the instrument of its main purpose — the neutraliza-
tion of the route, — and, if adopted, would virtually ludlify
the treaty.

The appearance of the Hay-Panncefote agreement brought
the subject of neutralization of the canal to a linal and defi-
nite issue, and its acceptance or rejection by tlie Senate would
indicate the course the United States must tinally adopt. The
alternatives were : —

THE IXTEKUCEANIC CANAL PROBLEM 171

(1) A canal neutralized to the use of the woikV.s com-

merce by a joint guarantee of all nations, and

(2) A national waterway belonging to the United States,

and over whicli it exercises full control.

The sudden presentation of this issue in so positive a form
brought forth many virulent criticisms by the more radical
advocates of American exclusiveness in a canal policy. The
apparent change in the President's sentiments from 1898 to
1900 on the subject of canal equalization gave to the oppo-
nents of the Hay-Pauncefote treaty the handle of a whip
wherewith to flay the administration. It was inevitable that
the "canal question" should develop a political aspect, and
before the close of the session it began to accommodate
itself to party needs. The Republican supporters of the
President were openly accused of seeking to perpetuate a
vicious anti-American compact. Railroad interests, tlie
Trusts, and a snobbish catering to British policies were
alleged as the causes. In the House, the Hepl)urn Bill,
which wholly ignored the C'layton-Buhver treaty, and was in
direct opposition to the principles of the agreement awaiting
confirmation in the Senate, was passed by a large majority of
votes to the discredit of American methods of negotiation
with foreign nations.

The 1st Session of the 51st Congress came to a hurried
adjournment in early June without having ratified the
Hay-Pauncefote treaty or even having acted upon the Davis
amendment: and the matter was postponed to the following
December. On account of the delay, the period for ratifi-
cation of the treaty was extended by nuitual agreement to
March 4, 19U1.

Botli party platforms, adopted in the National Conventions
immediately after the adjouniinent of Congress, endorsed the
policy of absolute and exclusive American control of tlie
(■anal. The accei)tance of sncli a plank in the Republican
platform at Pliiladel])liia could only be regarded as a party
expression of disapproval of the j)osition assumed by the
executive toward a neutralized waterway connecting the
"ceans. This protest from the party, which had been presum-

172 AMERICAN DIPLOMATIC QUESTIONS

ably won over to a neutral canal, and which was supposedly-
backing the ratification of the treaty, greatly lessened its
chances for adoption by the Senate the following session.

An unusual degree of interest in canal legislation was
manifested at the opening of Congress on December 4, 1900.
Two important events were looked forward to, — the appear-
ance of the canal commission's report^ and an early vote
upon the Hay-Pauncefote treaty. The preliminary leport of
the Isthmian Canal Commission was submitted to Congress
with the President's message. It contained in a condensed
form the outcome of one and a half years' exhaustive study
of all the possible canal routes across Central America. The
advantages or disadvantages of these various routes were con-
sidered from their physical, political, and strategic points of
view. The probable costs of construction were estimated,
and the location of each possible route with reference to full
and complete ownership by the United States was investi-
gated.

Basing their calculations upon the statistics of entrances
and clearances at European, North and South American ports,
the commission came to the conclusion that the freight
tonnage passing through the canal would be sufficient to
warrant its commercial success. To meet the requirements
of modern sea-going vessels, in view of their constantly in-
creasing size, the report recommended a greater depth and
width of channel than ever before proposed. The uniform
low water depth of 35 feet, with a bottom width of 150 feet,
together with a double system of locks, furnished a more
extravasfant basis for estimates of cost than had ever before
been considered.

Abandoning all other routes as impracticable, the commis-
sion found the probable cost of the Nicaragua and Panama
canals each to be about $200,000,000. In the case of the hitter,
the estimated cost of completion was placed at $142,342,579,
but this amount, added to the sum required to buy out the
French company already in the field, would make the final
cost of the two routes about equal.

1 Fur crcatit)U of this couiiiiissiun, see page 94.

THE INTEROCEANIC CANAL PROBLEM 173

A careful comparison of the advantages offered by these
two waterways led the commission into a close examination
of the rights and privileges owned under franchises by the
various canal companies interested in Central America. All
such franchises of course stood directly in the way of the gov-
ernment undertaking the construction as a national project.
The report concludes as follows : —

''1. The estimated cost of building the Nicaragua Canal is
about $58,000,000 more than that of completing the Panama
Canal, leaving out the cost of acquiring the latter property.
This measures the difference in the magnitude of tlie ob-
stacles to be overcome in the acutal construction of the two
canals, and covers all physical considerations, such as the
greater or less height of dams, the greater of less depth of
cuts, the presence or absence of natural harbors, the presence'
or absence of a railroad, the exemption from or liability to
disease, and the amount of work remaining to be done.

" The New Panama Canal Company has shown no disposi-
tion to sell its property to the United States. Should that
company be able and willing to sell, there is reason to
believe that the price would not be such as would make the
total cost to the United States less than that of the Nicara-
gua Canal.

" 2. The Panama Canal, after completion, would be shorter,
have fewer locks and less curvature than the Nicaragua
Canal. The measure of these advantages is the time re-
quired for a vessel to pass through, which is estimated for an
average ship at twelve hours for Panama and thirty-three
hours for Nicaragua.

" On the oilier hand, the distance from San Francisco to
New York is -Ml miles, to New Orleans 579 miles, and to
Liverpool ^580 miles greater via Panama than via Nicaragua.
The time required to i)ass over these distances being greater
than the difTerence in the time of transit through the
canals, tlie Nicaragua line, after completion, would be some-
what the moi-e advantageous of the two to the United
States, notwithstanding the greater cost of maintaining the
longer canal.

174 AMERICAN DIPLOMATIC QUESTIONS

" 3. The Government of Colombia, in which lies the Pan-
ama Canal, has granted an exclusive concession, which still
has many years to run. It is not free to grant the necessary
rights to the United States, except upon condition that an
agreement be reached with the New Panama Canal Com-
pany. The commission believes that such agreement is
impracticable. So far as can be ascertained, the company is
not willing to sell its franchise, but it will allow the United
States to become the owner of part of its stock. The com-
mission considers such an arrangement inadmissible.

" The Governments of Nicaragua and Costa Rica, on the
other hand, are untrammelled by concessions and are free to
grant to the United States such privileges as may be mutu-
ally agreed upon."

And the report in conclusion sa3'S : —

" In view of all the facts, and particularly in view of all the
difificulties of obtaining the necessary rights, privileges, and
franchises on the Panama route, and assuming that Nicara-
gua and Costa Rica recognize the value of the canal to them-
selves, and are prepared to grant concessions on terms which
are reasonable and acceptable to the United States, the com-
mission is of the opinion that ' the most practicable and feas-
ible route for' an isthmian canal to be 'under the control,
management, and ownership of the United States ' is that
known as the Nicaragua route."

The report, being so thoroughly in accord with the estab-
lished American preference for the Nicaragua route, gave
great satisfaction. The chai-acter and ability of the com-
missioners and the thoroughness of their investigations have
no doubt settled for all time the choice of routes. The field
is clear in Nicaragua, the concessionary companies have been
disposed of, and, with abundant means in the Treasury and
popular favor to hasten the consummation of the project,
there remains but one obstacle to postpone or defeat the
undertaking. That obstacle is the Clayton-Bulwer treaty.

Soon after the convening of Congress in December 1900,

THE INTEROCEANIC CANAL PROBLEM 175

the Hay-Pauncefote treaty was called up for consideration,
and for some days the Senate in executive session consid-
ered the adoption of the Davis amendment, along with numer-
ous other amendatory clauses offered by various senators.
The Davis amendment was agreed to on December l-> (65
toll), — a clause which, as already slu)wn (p. 170), com-
pletely transformed the character and purpose of the treaty.
On December 20, two additional amendments presented by
Senator Foraker were adopted. One of these consisted of
the insertion of the w^ords " which convention is hereby
superseded," just after the words " Claj'ton-Bulwer Conven-
tion," in the second article of the instrument. The second
amendment provided for striking out the entire third article of
the convention, which abandoned article had called upon the
parties to bring the convention to the notice of the other
powers, and to invite them to adhere to it.

The ratification of the treat}^ so amended by the Senate
took place the same day (December 20, lltOO),and the instru-
ment was immediately returned to the President for delivery
to Lord Pauncefote.

As the treaty now stands, it is virtually a compromise
between absolute neutralization and complete American con-
trol. It provides for the construction of the route as a purely
American project under the auspices of the government, and
gives to the government fidl management of the waterwa}-,
tiie fixing of tolls, etc. The "neutralization" of the route
is then effected, so far as the two powers concerned are
able to guarantee its neutralization. It shall be open in time
of war as in time of peace to all vessels of all nations, with-
out discrimination, save when there is war against the United
States ; then the United States may take such measures as it
may find necessary to protect itself, even to tlie closing of the
canal against the vessels of the enemy. This reservation of
course defeats the absolute neutrality of the route, and the
denial of the rights of the other great powers to co(»perate
in such a guarantee also removes the canal from the class
of neutralized waters. Should Great Britain decide to ratify
the treaty as already accepted by the Senate, the status of the

176 AMERICAN DIPLOMATIC QUESTIONS

Nicaragua Canal would be that of a private waterway, with
provisons, however, relating to its control, which give to it the
semblance of a neutralized channel.^

VII

The " Canal question " involves three sets of problems, all
of which call for definite solution before the actual work of
excavation shall begin. These problems relate, first, to the
physical features of the undertaking and its cost ; second, to
its commercial aspects and probable value to the United States ;
and third, to the political status of the waterway — in other
words, shall it be controlled by the United States alone, or
shall it be neutralized by common consent of all nations?
These three questions are of paramount importance.

1. To the first of these questions (the engineering fea-
tures and cost), much attention has already been given. It
may be assumed that reasonably correct estimates have been
made by the United States Government through the ex-
haustive researches of its recentl}^ appointed scientific com-
missions. The civil engineer and the geologist are enabled to
base their calculations upon actual facts ; with the utmost pre-
cision they have measured the amount of earth to be removed;
they have ascertained the hardness of rock to be encountered,
and have probed the underlying strata to great depths with a
view of obtaining a perfect knowledge of their character.
The water-levels of the lakes and rivers have been accurately
measured, and the most advantageous sites for dams and locks
have been located. The harbors have been sounded, and their
approaches most carefully studied. From the engineer's
standpoint, then, the problem has already been solved. The
conclusions are definite, and tlie Nicaraguan Canal is beyond
all doubt a physical possibility.

In so far as it is possible to compute the cost of so gigantic

an enterprise, this has also been calculated. It is true that

these estimates vary, yet their differences are not discourag-

ingly great. The most expensive of them all in no way

1 Great IJritain declined to accept the treaty as amended.

THE INTEROCEANIC CANAL PROBLEM 177

removes the undertaking from the limits of a financial possi-
bility. The last phase of tlie problem connected with the
physical aspects of canal construction relates to the choice
of routes. This has been nairowed down to Panama and
Nicaragua. It was the chief object of the last isthmian com-
mission, wliich has already submitted its preliminary report,
to make a final selection. American preference has so lono-
inclined toward the completion of the latter route, that the
adoption of the other is extremely unlikely ; however, in case
of any future change of sentiment to Panama, the physical
features of tliat route have been as thoroughly investigated,
and its feasibility equally demonstrated.

2. The second class of considerations involves the com-
mercial aspects of the proposed route, — Will it pay ? This
feature of the canal question has perhaps been too little
considered. The people of the United States have been
rather inclined to assume that so splendid a triumph of engi-
neering science must surely receive the reward of commercial
success ; and for proof of this, the satisfactory earnings of the
Suez Canal have been offered in evidence. The contemj)lation
of huge enterprises affects the mind somewhat after the
manner of wine, and care should be taken lest the splendor
of achievement shall dim the judgment. It must be borne
in mind that ships follow tlie shortest and best routes, and that
freight seeks the cheapest highways. It should be noted that
the Nicaraguan ("anal does not furnish the shortest route from
New York to the Philippines, nor from the ports of China
and the East Indies to London or New York ; the fact must
also be considered that the Suez route offers greater induce-
ments to steam vessels in the way of coaling stations and
shorter laps between ports.

Again, the five competing railroad systems across the conti-
nent of North America have so reduced the freight rates in
the last fifteen years that assertion has been frefjuently made,
if not thorougldy proved, that any all-water route from the
Pacific to the Atlantic coasts cannot com{)ete with the all-
rail routes. The products of tlie Pacific slope whicli would
have to Ije shi[)ped first by rail to the coast and then trans-

178 AMERICAN DIPLOMATIC QUESTIONS

shipped to a vessel, might be enabled to reach their Atlantic
destination at less cost by the all-rail journey. Indeed, when
railroads have come into direct competition with water routes,
the latter have often declined in commercial importance. The
canal and river systems of the United States, once the commer-
cial highways of the nation, have, in many instances, become
virtually abandoned in the presence of competing railways.

On the other hand, there is a great unknown quantity of
trade that may be promoted by this "marriage of the oceans."
With the Suez isthmus already pierced, there remains but the
breaking of the Central American barrier to complete an open
road to vessels around the world in a comparatively straight
course. How far the realization of this prospect, so pleasing
to the imagination, is likely to prove commercially successful,
should be the subject of thorough, accurate, and scientific
investigation. An original outlay of two hundred millions is
too great a sum to be hazarded witliout at least a fair promise
of return, — a return that is susceptible of demonstration by
better evidence than mere conjecture or sentiment.

The commercial aspect of the question is somewhat neu-
tralized, if not overshadowed, by military considerations. If
the canal is necessary for national defence, its probable suc-
cess or failure, as a commercial venture, is of little relative
importance. The original cost and the yearly outlay there-
after would be charged to the legitimate expense column.
However, estimates of the strategic value of the canal to the
United States involve inquiries which come more fittingly
under the third class of considerations relative to the " Canal
problem."

3. With the physical elements of the problem removed^
and the practicability of the undertaking determined, there
still remain problems of utmost importance to be solved be-
fore connecting the oceans. These considerations are of a
political nature. What sliall be the legal status of the can.al
when constructed ? Shall it be open, like the high seas, to
the world's commerce ? Shall it be neutralized by common
I)ledge of all nations, or shall it be regarded as a private
waterway belonging to the United States?

THE INTEROCEANIC CANAL PROBLEM 179

Whenever the work is actually begun, this question will
necessarily become vital; indeed, it has already become so.
It cannot be evaded. The commercial powers of the world
are too alert to permit their trade interests to be jeopardized,
and these interests must be reckoned with. To avoid all
future complications in this respect, the political status of the
canal should be determined in advance.

One of the following plans must be adopted : —

1. Exclusive American political control.

2. An " understanding " with Great Britain to divide the re-
sponsibility of maintaining the canal and securing its neutrality.

3. A treaty or arrangement with the great commercial nations
of the world whereby the absulute neutrality of the canal shall be
guaranteed to all ships of trade or Avar.

The second of these schemes may be eliminated from the
list, for the advantages and disadvantages growing out of
dual control in such a waterway are practically identical with
those of the first scheme — sole American control. This nar-
rows the problem of the political character of the canal to the
alternatives of exclusive American control or complete neu-
tralization.

There is some confusion as to the true meaning of the word

"neutralization." Statements are frequently met in the

press, in party platforms, and in the declarations of Congress

that the Nicaragua Canal should be a '• neutral " waterway,

and open to all vessels of any Hag, but that the United States

should at the same time reserve to herself the riglit of closing

the canal in times of war against the vessels of an enemy.

Again, it has been fietjuently asseited in Washington that

tlie United States is willing to "guarantee the neutrality"

)f the canal, but for reasons involving her own safety, she

c^annot consent to the participation of other nations in such

G^uarantee. This position was taken by JNIi'. Blaine in his

•orrespondence with Lord Salisbury in 1881, when he seri-

)usly maintained that there was no need of international

•oflperation to this end l)ecause the United States was herself

^villing and competent "positively and efficaciously to guar-

I

180 AMERICAN DIPLOMATIC QUESTIONS

antee " such neutrality. In a vague sort of way this has
ever since been the canal doctrine in the United States.

The reservation of any special privileges for American
ships in time of war is considerably at variance with the
idea of a neutral canal; and the belief in the sufficiency of
American guarantee indicates a decided misconception of
the meaning of '•neutralization." United States guarantee
of neutrality really means nothing more than her promise to
defend the open waterway against attack. No nation can
give a guarantee against the attack of another ; it can only
pledge its resistance against such attack. No nation can
"positively and efficaciousl}" guarantee" neutralit}', unless,
indeed, it be sufficiently strong and powerful to enforce the
guarantee, — even then it could not reallj- give more than a
promise to defend the canal route in case another sought to
hold or destroy it.

Neutralization means an exemption from all warlike opera-
tions, and this condition can onl}^ be effected by an agree-
ment of all parties to abstain from such warlike operations.
It consists of that immunity from attack that can only be
secured b}^ general consent. " Neutralization is the assign-
ment to a particular territory or territorial water of such
a quality of permanent neutrality in respect to all future
wars as will protect it from foreign belligerent disturbance.
This quality can only be impressed by the action of the
great powers by whom civilized wars are waged, and by
whose joint interposition such wars could be averted "
(Wharton Digest, § 145).

It thus becomes evident that if the United States is really
sincere in its determination to accomplish the neutrality of
the Central American Canal, it defeats its own object by
declining to accept international cooperation to that end —
for by that means only can neutralization be secured.

The " American Canal doctrine " of to-day, geneially ad-
vocated, does not in reality contemj^late neutralization. It
promises merely to keep the canal open in times of peace;
to defend it in times of war ; and to close it against enemies
of the country.

THE INTEHOCEANIC CANAL PROBLEM 181

With this understanding of the word " neutralization,"
(and it admits of no other interpretation) tlie issue is sharp
and clear between an Ameiican-owned canal, controlled by
the United States, and a neutralized canal as desired by the
commercial nations of the world and called for by the
Clayton- F)ul\ver treaty.

The question resolves itself into this, — should the Nicara-
gua or Panama Canal be neutralized ?

Arguments for or against this proposition may spring from
three sources, viz. : —

(a) International Law. Are there any legal duties im-
posed upon the United States as owner of a ship
canal passing through the territory of another state,
. and connecting two high seas, — in other words, is
the United States under any legal obligation to
accept the neutralization of such a canal?
(6) Precedents. Is the United States obUged by any
precedents relating to ship canals in general, or to
the Central American Canal in particular, to unite
with other nations in a joint guarantee of canal
equalization ?
"Precedents" as here used would naturally include all the
treaties, agreements, or official declarations of the United
States which can be taken to indicate not only its interna-
tional obligations but also national sentiments upon the
subject.

(f) Self Interests. Do the best interests of the United
States require her monopoly of the Central Ameri-
can Canal, or are they better subserved by a neutral-
ized Central American canal?
International law does not tbrow direct light uiioii this
question, and there is in consequence much confusion among
the various autiiorities as to the status of a shij) canal in tiie
'Inmain of public law. It is only in com[)aratively leccnt
years that the advances of science have made possibh' the
construction of gi-eat artificial cliannels connecting oceans,
and the very few such waterways alieady in existence have
not had sufficient time to establish for themselves a legal code.

182 AMERICAN DIPLOMATIC QUESTIONS

The application to them of legal principles is indirect ; they
can only be made thr6ugh the more or less doubtful analogies
of natural straits, arms of the sea, territorial waters, and the
high seas. The value of such comparison is not always to
be relied upon ; but the general advance of liberal sentiments
relative to the freedom of the seas, as developed in the
progressive evolution of international ethics, is far more
significant. This would indicate a decided tendency toward
impressing an international character upon ship canals con-
necting open seas.

The protracted controversy concerning mare clausum and
mare liberum, which lasted for more than a hundred years,
long since resulted in complete victory for the adherents of
the latter doctrine. The high seas are free to all vessels, but
natural straits connecting the high seas, when narrow, and
lying within the territory of a single power, may or may not
be entirely free, according to circumstances. Their exact
position in law has not yet been satisfactorily determined,
though it may be confidently asserted that the trend of
modern usage is to witldiold from nations, through whose
territory such waterways pass, exclusive control over their
navigation.

It is to-day generally agreed tliat bodies of water answer-
ing to the description of a strait ought to be free because
they are in a greater or less degree necessary to navigation ;
and only such limitations upon their full freedom of naviga-
tion are allowable as the security of the state through which
the strait passes seems to demand. When the interior waters
of a state terminate at either end in the open sea, the result-
ing freedom of navigation in them, in times of war, might
operate as a serious menace to the welfare of such state;
hence it is that certain modifications of the free rights of
navigation in such waters may be made by special compact.
Yet the fact is not altered tliat they do in a measure belong
to the world's commerce. A sovereign may not debar alien
vessels from innocently using such courses, and his own
sovereignty over them has been practically limited to the
extent of collecting only such dues from passing vessels as

THE INTEROCEANIC CANAL PROBLEM 183

may reimburse him for the expense of keeping the way
lighted, buoyed, and properly charted. Denmark no longer
can collect revenue from the sound dues she formerly exacted.
Such is the case in regard to the Gut of Canso, the Straits
of Magellan, and, theoretically at least, -to those at Gibraltar.
The Dardanelles and the Bosphorus are anomalous, in that
their navigation continues to be regulated entirely by treaty.
Tiiese straits do not, however, connect two open seas — the
Black Sea being a body of water " neutralized " by inter-
national agreement, and its free navigation being in some
respects restricted; hence the Bospliorus and the Dardanelles
do not, strictly speaking, fall within the class of natural
channels connecting the high seas. In regard to artificial
Avaterways connecting two open seas, a number of elements
enter which would seem to remove them at once from the
operation of international law, and to exclude them from
the class of natural waterways.

It has been asserted by high authorities that an artificial
canal, linking two open seas, and being also a navigable
waterway, should therefore be open to the world ; that it
should be regarded as a part of the high seas, and that its
freedom of use is a corollary to the rule governing the
open oceans it connects, it being a necessity to naviga-
tion. A canal, therefore, becomes a public way, like the
arms of the sea, and should be regulated by the same laws
that direct the world's shipping. On the other hand, it has
l>een as freely asserted by equally good authority, that the
fact of an artificial channel not liaving been granted by
nature to the use of man, but being wliolly the work of man
himself, invests it with the character of private or national
ownersliip. One cannot well avoid this conclusion. To
assert that a nation may not construct a waterway tlirough
its own territory without conceding its fiee navigation, is to
lussert that a natif)n is not sovereigfn within its own limits.
There is no public law that permits a nation to send its
armies across the territory of a neutral power, or in any manner
to assume a right of transit over its domains. Convenient
loutes of overland transit, such as railways, are obviously

184 AMERICAN DIPLOMATIC QUESTIONS

under the protection and control of the sovereign power
whose territory they traverse. A great transcontinental rail-
road might be considered necessary to the world's commerce,
yet no one would seek to invest such a route with an inter-
national character. Should the nations of Europe claim a
voice in the management of our transcontinental railroads, we
should at once resent the suggestion as an assumption wholly
without reason or law. If railroads are subject only to the
municipal law, why should canals when substituted for roads
become international in character? Tlie approaches to a
canal are a part of the territorial waters of a state, and the
waters of the canal must necessarily be under the jurisdiction
of the tenitory within which they lie.

Again, no ship canal necessarily involving great labor and
cost of construction will ever likely be built by any one
nation for philanthropic reasons, and the builders must of
necessity have the right to levy tolls. If it were a natural
waterway, no nation could derive profit in such a manner ;
nor could a company of stockholders frame a constitution
for its government. There can be no rules or regulations
conflicting with the freedom of vessels upon the high seas ;
therefore, if the waters of a canal are a part of the liigh seas
there would naturally be no need of treaty regulations govern-
ing them.

Again, no nation or even combination of nations has the
right to construct a ship canal through the territory of
another without the latter's consent. This fact necessarily
implies the right of a sovereign to construct a canal of liis
own, for he could not well transfer to another a right he him-
self does not possess. If he constructs a canal through his
own territory, it would seemingly then belong to him, and
not to the world at large ; and if he transfers such a privilege
to another, the latter should stand in the place of the seller.

In the municipal law, the government is authorized, under
certain restrictions, to condemn private property for the use
of the state. International law has not reached in its de-
velopment so advanced a state ; yet it may reasonably be sup- .
posed that at some future time there will be an understanding ,

THE INTEROCEANIC CANAL PROBLEM 185

between the great nations of the -woild, allowing them, under
proper conditions, to condemn territory for the use and interests
of the world in general. Such a canal could ofTer no question
as to its position in public law, for the element of private
ownership would be entirely eliminated.

Reasoning on this subject is much confused, because a ship
canal, partaking of the nature of an arm of the sea and also
of any artificial transit route through the territory of a state,
admits of the conflicting arguments which a double analogy
must always furnish. One is, however, enabled to maintain
with fewer violations of recognized legal piinciples that a
canal built by a nation through its own territory and con-
necting two open seas is not a public highway, uncondition-
ally open to the world's use. It would be going too far to
assert that Avhen a nation at great expense connects two
oceans by a channel within its own domain, it possesses no
more right over its transit regulations than does the world in
general.

Considering, then, the various attributes of ship canals, as
compared with those of natural waterways, one is led to
assume that if the Nicaragua Canal shall be constructed by
the United States, it will not become " an arm of the sea " ;
and that the United States will not necessarily be deprived
by international law of the superior rights of the builder and
private owner.

If international law has not yet fully extended its system
over artificial channels coiniecting open seas, commercial
powers have already felt the need of such an advance. Ex-
perience has partially, if not fully, demonstrated the advisa-
bility of such control over ship canals, and the tendency
therefore is to invest them with international character. This
seems to call for some definite understanding on the subject
among the various nations interested.

Although the qualities l)elonging to an artificial waterway
do not entitle the nations of the world, as a rig])t, to a voice
in its control, yet for the sake of liarmony, for the best inter-
ests of tlie builder, and in order better to serve those whose
[)atronage is desired in the use of the channel, it has been

186 AMERICAN DIPLOMATIC QUESTIONS

found desiial)le to guarantee the safety and neutrality of the
passage by treaty stipulations. The importance of a canal
which will shorten by many hundreds of miles the usual
commercial routes, is coming to be considered too great to
be left to the control of any one nation. In the struggling
competition of trade, nations are indisposed to tolerate any
handicap which tends to interfere with its equality. In time
of war, it would become necessary for a belligerent to blockade
or to hold against the enemy a point so important as a ship
canal. Commerce would be interi'upted, and the very object
for which the canal was constructed would be defeated. It is
natural, therefore, that nations have come to look upon ship
canals as subjects of international regulation. Indeed, from
the moment the construction of the Suez Canal was contem-
plated, this idea of international concert for its guarantee of
neutrality was considered a sine qua non of its financial suc-
cess. Prince Metternich had declared that its success must
depend upon confidence in its neutrality, and De Lesseps him-
self fully appreciated, as he acknowledged, the truth of his
statement. In the Act of Concession given by the Viceroy
of Egypt, and endorsed by the Sultan in 1856, a pi-omise was
solemnly made that " the Grand Maritime Canal from Suez to
Pelusium and its dependent ports would be open forever, as
neutral passages to all sliips of commerce passing from one sea
to the other, without any distinction, exclusion, or preference
of persons or nationalities. . . ." The mere promise of
Egypt in 1856 (then, as now, under the suzerainty of the
Sultan of Turkey) to maintain this status was regarded as
inadequate, and the principal nations of Europe, except Rus-
sia, signed a treaty in 1873, agreeing that the Suez Canal
should be open to the warships of all parties to the agree-
ment. Even this treaty was deemed insufiHcient to determine
clearly and positivel}^ tl)e international character of the canal;
and in 1887 the Convention of Constantinople was signed by
all the great European powers, again excepting Russia.
This convention declared that the canal shall forever be open
and free, in time of war as well as in time of peace, to the
ships of all nations. Its approaches shall never be block-

\

THE INTEROCEAXIC CAXAL PROBLEM 187

aded ; no act of war shall take place upon it ; and hostile
ships leaving from either terminus must allow a period of
twenty-four hours to elapse between departures. No perma-
nent fortifications are permitted ; no nation may mass its
naval strength within the waters of the canal nor land troops
or material of war along its shores. When the neutrality of
the canal is threatened, the Khedive or Sultan may call upon
the signatory powers for assistance. Turkey, in whose
territory the canal lies, is entitled to exercise sovereignty
over it, but no contracting power may enjoy any special
advantages or privileges in it. All powers are invited to
join in this comprehensive guaranty.

Although Russia has never been willing to join in the gen-
eral European guaranty, her attitude was made clear when, in
the Turko-Russian War she assured the powers that she had
no intention of threatening the neutrality of the canal, as she
regarded that route as belonging to tlie world and sacred to
its commerce.

It is safe therefore to conclude that international law of
itself places no restrictions upon American control of a Cen-
tral American Canal; further inquiry, however, develops the
fact that nations have come to look upon interoceanic ship
canals as a pro})er subject for treaty stipulations. The powers
could not as of right demand the neutralization of the Central
American Canal ; but they will surely expect the United States
to admit it for the common interest of all.

This expectation is in accord with the general theories
accepted by the United States until recently. This is fully
demonstrated by a long line of precedents. Indeed, the
neutralization of the canal is the traditional policy of tlie
United States. From 1825, when Mi'. Clay declared that
the benefits of a trans-isthmian canal "• ouglit not to be exclu-
sively appropriated to any one nation," until 1881, when Mr.
Blaine advanced the opposite theory, American statesmen of
all parties were intent on securing a passageway for ships
across the isthmus, whose absolute freedom of transit should
be secured by international guarantee. Every administration
from that of President John Quincy Adams, to that of Presi-

188 AMERICAN DIPLOMATIC QUESTIONS

dent Grant, who first favored exclusiveness on the isthmus, has
indorsed these broad theories favoring the international charac-
ter of ship canals. Since the Grant administration, President
Cleveland and President McKinley have also supported this
traditional American policy. During that period of heated
controversy over the Clayton-Bulwer treaty from 1850 to 1860,
it was not the object of the United States to obtain exclusive
proprietary rights in the canal. On the contrary, it was to
the maintenance of the neutrality of the proposed route that
American argument was wholly directed. From 1860 to
1880 the only concern manifested in respect to isthmian
matters was lest Great Britain should violate her agreements
by acquiring Central American territory, thereb}^ threatening
the neutrality of the route, and lest France might insist upon
monopoly of control at Panama.

A glance at the history of the interoceanic transit problem
in Central America reveals the fact that all nations interested
in its solution, including the United States and the Central
American states themselves, have invariably insisted upon the
strict neutrality of any Central American canal. This con-
dition has at all times been demanded. In its treaties bear-
ing upon this subject the United States has fully recognized
this principle ; and in its diplomatic correspondence relating
thereto, it has so frequently reaffirmed these views that no
confusion or doubt can exist as to its position. This is finally
set forth in three canal treaties now in force ; the Clayton-
Bulwer treaty with England, the Dickinson-Ayers treaty
with Nicaragua, and the treaty with Colombia of 1816. All
previous United States treaties and all preliminary drafts of
treaties with Central American states concerning a canal, kept
in view this principle of neutrality. In the Colombia treaty
the United States, by its 25th article, " guarantees positively
and efficaciously to New Granada, by the present stipulation,
the perfect neutrality of the before-mentioned isthmus, with
the view that the free transit from one to the other sea may
not be interrupted or embarrassed in any future time while
this treaty exists."

The Dickinsou-Ayers treaty with Nicaragua (1867) in its

THE INTEROCEANIC CANAL PROBLEM 189

fifteenth article declares that " The United States hereby agree
to extend their protection to all such routes of communication
as aforesaid, and to guarantee the neutrality and innocent use
of same. They also agree to employ their influence with
other nations to induce them to guarantee such neutrality and
protection."

The Clayton-Bulwer treaty of 1850 recites that neither
government will ever " obtain or maintain for itself any
exclusive control over the said ship canal." The purport and
aim of this instrument is to place a safeguard of guaranteed
neutrality over any isthmian canal. After going to the
length of asserting that neither power shall annex Central
American territory, the two parties agree to ask all other
nations to unite in similar engagements.

The change of sentiment in regard to neutralization, first
officially championed by Messrs. Blaine and Frelinghuysen,
was not intended as a complete reversal of the former doc-
trine on the subject. This new American policy contemplated
a guarantee of neutralit}^ to be given by the United States
alone. As both these statesmen believed that an American
guarantee was sufficient to that end, their views become rather
a modification of the generally accepted theories of neutrali-
zation, as secured by concerted action of the powers. Both
were entirely willing to pledge the United States " positively
and efficaciously to guarantee," etc. They cannot therefore
be said to have fully repudiated the ideals of a neutral
passageway through tlie isthmus, although tlie method they
advocated to effect tluit end would have been inadequate.

It is only within the past few years that advocates of an
unqualifiedly American canal have come forward. This
ultra-American theory is exemplified by a Mouse document
presented in March 1900, by Mr. Hepburn of Iowa, who
aigues in. favor of a Nieai-aguan canal so controlled Ijy tlie
I'nited States that discriminations against foreign vessels
may be made even in times of peace.

An adherence to the principles of neutralization is also
evidenced in the numerous charters and concessions whicli
have been granted during the past twenty years to various

190 AMERICAN DIPLOMATIC QUESTIONS

American canal companies. In most of these instruments a
neutral waterway is called for. Indeed, neither Nicaragua
nor Colombia could grant the exclusive right to control a
canal through her territory without violating treaty stipula-
tions with European powers.

Thus it appears that the doctrine of canal neutralization
is the traditional policy of the United States, as well as of
Great Britain, the European nations, and the Central Ameri-
can states ; that the doctrine changed in American diplomacy
to neutralization as secured by American guarantee alone ;
and it further appears that the theory of sole control as op-
posed to neutralization is of comparatively recent origin.

To-day the idea seems to prevail that the geographical
position of the United States in connection with its commer-
cial interests, its safety in time of war, its political relations
with its neighbors, and lastly, its obligations to its commer-
cial marine, all combine to warrant a disregard of precedent
and to justify the demand for complete political control of the
Central American canal. In other words, American interests
in the isthmian canal are so great that the United States
cannot afford to be governed simply by precedent. In de-
termining, therefore, the political attitude toward the pro-
jected canal, the elements of self-interest will no doubt figure
far more prominently than considerations of precedent.

It is not unreasonable to assume that in the development
of national needs and conditions, cases may arise where it
would be unwise to adhere to ancient customs merely for the
sake of consistency. The mind is apt to cling, as by instinct,
to the traditions of the past. Well-grounded precedents in
law have often so effectually blinded the eyes to reason that
a century of progress has scarcely been sufficient to effiice
them from the statute books. Hoary abuses, when dignified
by age, have defied correction for centuries.

Precedents cease to have validity when the circumstances
on which they are based cease to exist. The obligations to
follow them are purely theoretical. In this particular case
there may be special reasons why the past should be dis-
regarded. As observed, tlie subject of ship canals connectinj^

THE INTEROCEANIC CANAL PKOBLEM 191

high seas, being comparatively modern, has not yet found
a definite place in public law, though evidence tends to prove
that ship canals do possess a quasi-international character,
and that their owners are under some manner of oblisfation
to the world to keep them inviolable from hostile attack. At
best, the precedent is but doubtfully fixed in law, and might
be fittingly ignored should self-interest so demand. Indeed,
an exclusive American control of the Nicaragua Canal might
in itself establish a new precedent more valuable than the
old.

Abandoning, therefore, all thought of the past, the subject
may be considered solely from the standpoint of the future,
— Is it to the best interests of the United States to construct
the canal as a national undertaking and to maintain over it
sole financial and political control? Do those interests favor
the repudiation of all existing treaties bearing upon the sub-
ject? Do they call for a denial of the spirit of public law?
The preponderance of public sentiment in the United States
is in the affirmative.

The advocates of American monopoly of the canal rqute
contend that the safety of the United States demands this
course ; that the protection of the country being of the first
importance, all other considerations should be regarded as
secondary. They maintain that a neutralized canal would
expose both of the American coasts to hostile attack. In
case of war, the United States would be compelled to permit
an enemy's fleet, while bent upon an errand of destruction,
to pass unchallenged tlirough a neutral canal. In time of
peace, it would be obliged to maintain a largely augmented
fleet in both Pacific and Atlantic waters; in short, to double
its navy. Now, on tlie other hand, were the United States to
fortify the banks or the entrances of the route, a hostile fleet
could be debarred from its use; at the same tinn; the Ameri-
can navy would be vastly inci-eased in effectiveness by exclu-
sive freedom of passage. In this manner a squadi'on could be
quickly ti'ansf erred from the Atlantic to the Pacific, while
tlie enemy would be relegated to the long voyage by way of
Magellan.

192 AMERICAN DIPLOMATIC QUESTIONS

Furthermore, a neutralization of the canal by general com-
pact would likel}' prove, when the test came, to be nothing
more than a paper agreement. The route not being fortified,
an enemy might seize the canal and hold it as a base, greatly
to the prejudice of the United States.

They further maintain that there are circumstances con-
nected with the neutralization of the Suez Canal which should
serve as a warning to those who advocate an equality of
interests in the isthmian canal. Great Britain holds the con-
trol of that route. Her occupation of the territory through
which the passage has been cut furnishes all the proof neces-
sary that England would not hesitate to seize the canal, if the
defence of her Indian possessions seemed to call for such ac-
tion. The same conditions and necessities would drive the
United States to a similar course in Nicaragua. How much
better it is, they say, to avoid all cause of future misunder-
standing, by promptly asserting the right to fortify and hold
the canal.

They also maintain that commercial interests demand an
American monopoly of the route. Efforts are being made,
through subsidy and various other measures, to restore the
prestige of the American merchant marine. To-day the sea-
carrying trade of the world is almost wholly commanded by
Englishmen. The discrimination in tolls that could be made
in favor of American shipping through the isthmian canal
would no doubt furnish a decided stimulus to this growing
American industry.

Possibly the strongest arguments for an " American Canal "
are found in the application of the Monroe Doctrine to the sub-
ject of canal equalization. While those principles, as enun-
ciated by President Monroe in 1823, only denounced foreign
interference in the domestic affairs of the American states,
they have since been extended into a broader doctrine which
gives to the United States this very right of interference. The
result of nearly seventy years of varying interpretations of
this political creed has tended to remove tlie Western conti-
nents from the sphere of European influence, and to spread
the mantle of a United States protectorate over their whole

THE INTEROCEANIC CANAL PROBLEM 193

extent. The Nicaragua Canal, by virtue of its geographical
position, and also because of the American interests, which
it is particularly designed to serve, seems to fall appropriately
under the operations of this doctrine.

The nations of the Old World have already completed their
short cut to the Orient, and opened the way to their colonies.
They are entirely free to make any disposition of their own
route. The United States claims no right to interfere, and
asks no voice in its management. Therefore, when the United
States shall construct her short route from the Atlantic sea-
board to California, Alaska, and Pacific islands, she has a
right to insist upon its exclusive control. A joint guarantee
of the Nicaragua Canal would reduce the United States to the
lower plane of importance and influence in Central America
occupied by the nations of the Old World. This should never
be permitted ; b}^ her position in the Western Hemisphere,
the United States should enforce the claim to those privileges
which her paramount interests there clearly entitle her to
enjoy. The United States is lieir to the Western Hemisphere.
The same "manifest destiny" which impelled the fathers to
leach forth to tlie Pacific Ocean will likewise urge their sons
to follow a sclieme of rational expansion which will extend
the shore line of the United States to the Nicaraofua Canal.
This course, they say, is inevitable. The first step in tliis
direction has been taken in Cuba and the West Indies. The
unlocked for acquisitions in the Pacific will make the second
step more tlian ever necessary. The territory intervening
between the Rio Grande and the San Juan rivers, they insist,
must eventually come under the control of the great northern
state. This fair land is misruled by a number of irresponsible
governments, the merest travesties upon republican institu-
tions. They are unal)le to maintain order, or to protect
United States capital seeking investment there. Peaceful
conditions in Mexico will probably end with the resignation
or death of Piesident Diaz, and a return to tnmuUuous poli-
tics may be confidciitly expected. Aiiicricau int(;rest will
sooner or later demand the acquisition of these states, when
the canal will be actually upon American soil.

194 AMERICAN DIPLOMATIC QUESTIONS

With such a future of expansiou in mind, it would be
unwise, they believe, to hamper the government by pledges
of neutrality or promises against fortifying the canal. Sup-
pose, for instance, that Jefferson had been confronted by a
previous agreement never to acquire territory west of the
Mississippi River, or that Polk had been prevented by some
former treaty stipulations from establishing full American
sovereignty over the narrow entrance to San Francisco Bay.

Let there be no future mistakes such as the Clayton-Bulwer
treaty. The parting of the ways is at hand; there can be
reconciliation between the doctrine of American control of
the canal as dictated by self-interest, and enjoined upon us by
the Monroe Doctrine, on the one hand, and the doctrine
of canal equalization as demanded by European interests on
the other. The United States, therefore, must abandon all
its treaties which call for international control of the channel.
It should acknowledge its breach of faith, and take the con-
sequences, whatever they may be. This action would prove
less serious than to abandon the Monroe Doctrine, and accept
European dictation in any part of the Western Hemisphere,
and open a convenient passageway to the fleets of Europe.

The advocates of a policy of neutralization hold, on the
contrary, that the greatest good demands the entire freedom
of commercial transit. They found their theory upon the
broad principles of mare Uberum., and in accordance with
the development of international law. The inviolability of
the canal is a condition contemplated in all fairness by the
world at large, and it is also a condition wholly consistent
with the best interests of the United States. It is a policy
dictated by practical wisdom.

Wars are not the outgrowth of open and free competition,
but too often result from trade restrictions of one kind or
another. The tendency of modern times is to remove as far
as possible, all barriers to free and untrammelled commerce.
The progress of internatiojial law has been in the direction of
securing and safeguarding the common interest of the whole
family of nations in opposition to the tendencies of local
greed and aggression. The same policy that calls for an

THE INTEROCEANIC CANAL PROBLEM 195

"open door" in China, for universal freedom of trade com-
petition, for the removal of protective tariffs, also calls for
the unrestricted use of all commercial highways. The com-
mercial isolation of the United States should not be main-
tained. The great extension of her commerce has already
brought her so intimately in connection with other powers,
that her own commercial interests have in a great measure
become indentical with theirs. To close so important a high-
way as the Nicaragua Canal involves the adoption of a policy
opposed to progress and civilization ; it would remove the
United States from the commercial fellowship of nations,
and bring upon her every form of retaliatory legislation.
With the enmity and jealousies engendered by so narrow and
selfish a policy, the way would be constantly open to disagree-
ment and war upon slight provocation. The sympathies of
the world would be against the United States, and other
nations would find common cause aofainst her.

The neutralization of the canal is an inevitable result, and
it does not comport with the progressive character of Western
ideas to delay or seek to avoid it.

The principles of the Monroe Doctrine are in no manner
violated by equalization of the route. It would not introduce
the political system of the Old World into the New, nor give
to Europe a right of interference in the affairs of the Ameri-
can continent. On the contrary, a guarantee of neutrality
is the very opposite of interference. It is a pledge of non-
interference. It places a lasting check upon the advance of
foreign influence at a particularly vital spot in the Western
continent.

Such an agreement does not contemplate the yielding of
the United States to any foreign influence or control of the
canal, but ex[)ressly removes all [)0ssibility of sncli interfer-
ence or control by any one or more nations. It does not,
tlien, even violate the spirit of the Monroe Doctrine ; it is
ratlier directly in line witli it. It exacts a promise from tlie
most [)owerful and most rai)acious nations of tlie worhl, made
iirm and binding by treaty regulations, to al)stain I'rom any
kiiid of interference in the affairs of the isthmian canal.

196 AMERICAN DIPLOxMATlC QUESTIONS

But even should the dogma of Monroeism be infringed upon
by the proposition of a neutral Central American waterway,
there is no reason why that doctrine should not be disregarded
in the furtherance of a better cause. It would be folly to
cling to a doctrine simply for the sake of the doctrine itself, or
for any other sentimental reason. The object of every general
policy is for the general good. If, in any particular case, the
application of a theory, however sound in a broader sense, is
found to be unwise, it should be cast aside. If logic and
reason show that the best interests of the United States are
subserved in assuming the entire responsibility of managing
the political affairs of the canal, and a consistent observance
of the Monroe Doctrine equally demands it, then it is proper
to follow the Monroe Doctrine, — otherwise, as in this case,
by all means abandon it.

Assuming further that the Monroe Doctrine Avould be en-
croached upon by conceding a joint guarantee of neutrality,
it may be asked : By what right does the United States den}'
the privilege European nations claim to look after the wel-
fare of their commercial interests in the Western Hemispliere?
There can be no reasonable doubt that foreign nations will be
solicitous about the advantagfes to accrue to their commerce
by maintenance of the freedom of transit through the Nica-
ragua Canal. The United States has not only commercial
but territorial interests in the Eastern Hemisphere, and is
also demanding an open door in Asiatic ports. How may she
be justified, then, in denying to foreign nations in America
what she herself claims elsewhere ?

The neutralization of the canal would moreover avoid tliose
dangerous aggressive tendencies which must surely be engen-
dered by commercial advantages retained only through force
of arms, both in defiance of the rights of others, and contrary
to the better'instincts of justice prevailing at home.

The imposition of differential tolls would excite universal
disapproval, and would call upon the United States the denun-
ciation of all commercial nations. The commercial and politi-
cal interests of several European nations in the Far East, aside
from the desire to defend a vital principle of justice, would

THE INTEROCEAXIC CANAL PROBLEM 197

force them to combine against the United States, should the
latter persist in chximing the privilege to close the canal
against their ships. Each maritime power would immedi-
ately call upon Nicaragua or Colombia, as the case might be,
for the observance of those treaty rights secured to them by
" most favored nation " clauses. There need be no occasion
for self-deception in this matter. England's determined re-
sistance to American attempts to avoid the obligations of the
Clayton-Bulwer treaty demonstrates her probable attitude
toward the freedom of transit thiough the Nicaragua Canal.

France is solicitous concerning the maintenance of this
principle, as plainly shown by her Central American treaties;
and one cannot well sup[)Ose that German}- or Russia would
permit itself to be handicapped by any navigation disabilities
that other nations escape. The United States might, indeed,
defy the nations of tlie world, were the cause a just one. In
this case she would be defending, against overwhelming odds,
a principle which has been condemned by the civilized world,
including herself. Nations, like individuals, cannot afford
to ignoie the good-will of their fellows. To persist in this
policy is simply to invite troubles wliich would far outbalance
any temporary trade benefits which might at first accrue
through a monopoly of the wateiway.

At all events, the policy would have to be abandoned
sooner or later; but while upholding this position of supposed
vantage in Cential Ameiica, the United States would be sub-
jected to the greatest amount of needless expense, aimoyance
and risk. Upon the United States alone would devolve the
duty of preserving order and protecting the canal. In times
of the profoundest peace the United States would be obliged
to police the route in a thoroughly effective manner; in time
of thieatened disturbance a large military force would be
required upon the scene. The United States would have to
be prepared always to despatcli troops to the line of the canal.
Foreign vessels departing upon long journeys via Nicaragua
or Panama must be assured of finding the way clear. No
Central Ameri(;an revolution must l)e permitted to interfere,
no political disturbances, riots, or threats of lawlessness in

198 AMERICAN DIPLOMATIC QUESTIONS

the neighborhood of the channel could be tolerated, which
would in any way render hazardous peaceful passage through
the canal. The danger of hostile acts committed when un-
friendly relations exist between two nations would have to be
provided against. For all " accidents " the United States
would alone be responsible under her sole guarantee. Thus
the United States would undoubtedly be forced to assume
a more or less active, though unwelcome, interest in the
never ceasing revolutions of those turbulent Central Ameri-
can states.

The liabilities of the United States would only begin here.
To fulfil her promise alone and unaided to maintain the
" strict neutrality " of the canal, she would needlessly burden
herself with a task which under the most favorable conditions
of universal peace would prove irksome and expensive, and
which, upon the outbreak of hostilities at home or abroad,
might become onerous in a high degree. But granting
immunity from foreign intervention, in times of peace, what
would be the extent and character of her obligations toward
nations in time of war? The political complications in East-
ern Asia, consequent upon territorial changes, have already
sown the seeds of jealousy and bitter feeling in Europe. It is
not unlikely that conflicts of European powers will result.
In case of any war between two or three great maritime
powers, and particularly in the event of one growing out of
interests in Eastern Asia, the isthmian canal would, beyond
question, become involved. This would naturally lead to a
naval demonstration at one or the other entrance to the canal.
Suppose, for instance, that England, free from treaty obliga-
tions to observe the neutrality of the canal, should attempt
to blockade the Atlantic entrance, to prevent the entrance or
exit of 1^'rench, German, or Russian vessels. Would it not
become the duty of the United States at once to raise the
blockade? Tlie injured party might come to her assistance,
but would that not inevitably draw lier into a foreign war?
— a war in which, in all probability, the United States would
not have the slightest material interest. Then, it may safely
be assumed that from the moment the United States consti-

THE INTEROCEANIC CANAL PROBLEM 199

tutes herself the sole guardian of the open route from the
Atlantic to the Pacific, she takes upon herself a grave respon-
sibility,— a responsibility which may prove exceedingly bur-
densome. The almost inevitable conclusion presents itself
that the first European war would thus convert the United
States from a neutral power into an unwilling participant.
This should be reckoned a large price to pay for the advan-
tages to be gained from an " American Canal."

The return for so great a price — a price that means no
less than a departure from a cherished and time-honored
policy — should indeed be great. It should be a national
advantage, so great and valuable that it is absolutely indis-
pensable to her safety and welfare.

Is the advantage, then, of fortif3dng the canal and closing
it against foreign measures of aggi-ession worth so great a
sacrifice? — for only in time of war against the United States
would she desire to bar the route against naval vessels, and
then only against the ships of an enemy. Under present con-
ditions this might indeed be considered a doubtful advantage.
The value to the United States of exclusive control of this
route in periods of hostility will depend very largely upon
the relative size of her own and her adversary's navy. The
peculiar nature of a long narrow channel through a region
of tropical jungle is such as to render it extremely doubtful
whether a large protective force could secure its use, — even
against an inferior foe.

A canal with its series of locks, dams, and artificial embank-
ments, presents many vulnerable points to methods of modern
attack. A resolute enemy equipped with efficient appliances
might easily destroy the use of the passage for months, an act
wliich tlie most extraordinary vigilance could not prevent.
In case of war, wlieii u superior navy might invest the place,
the advantages to the United States of tlie possession of the
passage might be turned into an actual disadvantage. A
blockade might then be effected at either terminus of the
route, and maintained to the great injury of the United
States. The imprisonment of American war vessels in the
^ canal, either by blockade or by the destruction of a dam or

200 AMERICAN DIPLOMATIC QUESTIONS

lock, might easily result in the most serious calamities. In
fact, the fear of this very contingency, and of the loss of ves-
sels by explosion of mines placed in the channel, would likely
render its use impracticable in times of war.

Assuming that it were possible so effectively to guard the
channel that its use could be preserved to the United States
in times of conflict, and closed against the enemy, the fact
yet remains that the United States is wholly unprepared to
maintain with safety the exclusive control over the route.
The protection of the American coasts depends, after all,
upon the strength of the navy, and all outlying posts which
must be guarded are of value only as they may be defended
without too great a division of strength.

While the policy of the United States calls for an annual
increase in the navy, there are other powers whose needs will
require them, not only to keep pace with the general advance
in armament, but to maintain for many years to come larger
naval fleets than that of the United States. Such being the
case, American efforts to retain a position of exclusiveness
on the isthmus may prove, after all, to be of doubtful expedi-
ency.

It may often be asserted that England's military occupa-
tion of Egypt and her fortifications along the route to India,
together with her ownership of a controlling interest in the
Suez Canal itself, virtually invest her with political proprie-
torship of that channel. But while it is true that the free-
dom of transit into the Red Sea has not been subjected to the
test of a general European war yet, there has been no act of
England so far that violates the terms of the Constantinople
agreement. She claims no extraordinary political rights over
the canal itself, and makes no attempt to fortify the route.
Iler line of possessions and naval stations from Gibraltar to
llong Kong, are permitted in no way to threaten the neu-
trality of the canal. On the contrary, England has always
taken the initiative steps in bringing about international agree-
ments to secure its neutral character. Her superior naval
strength undoubtedly would give her the power, in case of
war, to effect a blockade of the Suez Canal without entering

THE INTEROCEANIC CANAL TROBLEM 201

within the zone of neutrality. This fact, however, cannot
be regarded as an evidence of England's bad faith, or cited
to disprove her belief in the neutrality of interoceanic high-
ways. The position of the United States, with islands and
coaling stations on either side of Central America, would
place her in somewhat the same attitude toward the Nicara-
gua Canal.

By following, therefore, the spirit of international law, by
observing her treaties, and by inviting the nations of the
world to join in keeping open the canal, the United States
deprives herself of one doubtful advantage, and at once
relieves herself from a host of perplexities.

With the neutrality of the canal guaranteed by interna-
tional agreement between the great maritime powers, there
would be no need of fortifications ; because in the face of so
powerful a combination none would dare to violate the free-
dom of the route. American armies would not be needed to
defend its banks ; American ships would not be called upon
to raise a blockade or disperse a threatening squadron. The
United States would escape the many pitfalls of foreign
entanglements which the selfish policy of sole political con-
trol must inevitably place in her path ; and thus, — the advo-
cates of neutralization maintain, — by the adoption of a more
liberal policy in Central America, " an inexhaustible source

of international conflict " would be avoided.

\

Ill

THE UNITED STATES AND SAMOA

Ill

THE UNITED STATES AND SAMOA

Differences between nations are necessarily of a serious
character, because the settlement of such disputes affects
directly or indirectly the fortunes of many individuals.
They are also attended with danger, because close behind
international misunderstandings lurks the spectre of war.
In every heart exists a belligerent chord, and the most im-
partial of men will magnify the shortcomings of other nations
while they laud the virtues of their own. Race prejudices are
always more or less acute. War quickly appeals to popular
favor when quarrels over personal rights or privileges expand
into national issues, and then patriotism is likely to assume
the form of blind passion without reason or forbearance.

However trifling, then, an international dis[)ute may appear,
it possesses, nevertheless, a hidden element of danger. It is
partly on this account that the Samoan imbroglio, though
now happily relieved, is worthy of attention. In the world's
history the story of Samoa can never expect to find a more
prominent place than a footnote. In the annals of diplo-
macy it must figure as a farce. Robert Louis Stevenson
aptly characterized the Samoan wars as an " infinitesimal
affray " ; Samoa was like a tea-pot in which a tempest raged
while three great nations jostled each other in fussy endeavors
to keep the little pot from boiling over.

If the Samoan episode appears trivial to the general
observer, it possessed nevertheless a pathetic side to the
philanthropist, who could not fail to see in this South Sea
enterprise of England, Germany, and the United States,
another demonstration of the withering influence of civiliza-
tion upon semi-barbarous peoples. The assumed ])urden of the
white man to protect and educate the black one often results
in the undoing of the latter. The result comes naturally,

205

206 AMERICAN DIPLOMATIC QUESTIONS

for, ill the long run, the law which proclaims the survival of
the fittest regulates human affairs as it controls all organic life.
When the lion is hungry the lamb dies ; when the man with
a rifle takes to expansion, the man with the spear yields his
estate. In Samoa the operation of this law was unique.
The unfortunate natives were only saved from immediate
extermination through the jealous watchfulness of three pro-
tectors. The duty in Samoa of each protector was ostensibly
to shield the natives from the rapacity of the other two. In
the meantime, the Samoans lost all control over their own
affairs, and were crushed under the weight of an "autono-
mous government," created by their kindly disposed friends.
The inevitable end — the loss of their territory — has just
recently been effected, and their ultimate race extinction is
simply deferred.

Tlie history of American political relations with Samoa is
primarily of interest because it reveals the first genuine
instance of departure from a time-honored policy of non-
intervention in the domestic affairs of alien nations. In
assuming the responsibilities of fashioning and maintaining a
system of government for this little group of islands in the
mid-Pacific, the United States entered into treaty relations
with two great powers, pledging itself to protect a people it
had not accepted into the Union, and in whose interests it
had not the least concern.

Since the famous farewell address of President Washing-
ton, until quite recently there have been few public officials
of the United States who have not expressed belief in a doc-
trine of non-interference in the political affairs of other
nations. This principle, which had become as much a tenet
in the American political creed as any enactment of the con-
stitution, was forcibly expressed by Washington, who realized
that his country was destined to attain great wealth and
influence, could it be spared tlie exhausting drain of need-
less wars. He foresaw the great danger of meddling in the
chronic quarrels that tormented the nations of Europe. Simi-
lar sentiments were expressed in the strongest language by
John Adams and Thomas Jefferson. President Fillmore, in

THE UNITED STATES AND SAMOA 207

his annual message of 1851, pitliily characterized the nation's
maxim. '' Friendly relations with all, but entangling alliances
with none."

Frequent temptations have been held out to the people
of the United States to depart from their traditional policy,
— and especially when the sympathies of the country were
aroused by appeals from weak nations suffering impositions, —
or when neighbors of the Western world were struggling to
obtain their independence, and asked for aid or moral sup-
port. But every appeal to assume an interest or to share a
responsibility in the domestic concerns of alien nations has
been consistently refused by the government.

Mr. Seward, when Secretary of State, in declining an invi-
tation from France to join in the exercise of a moral influ-
ence upon the Emperor of Russia, said : —

Our policy of non-intervention, straight, absolute, and peculiar as
it may seem to other nations, has thus become a traditional one
which could not be al)andoned without the most urgent occasion,
amounting to a manifest necessity.

Mr. Frelinghuysen, Secretary of State, instructing a diplo-
matic representative in Chili (January 9, 1882), said: —

The President wishes in no manner to dictate or make any
authoritative utterance to either Peru or Chili as to the merits
of the controversy existing between those republics. . . . Were
the United States to assume an attitude of dictation towards the
South American republics, even for the purpose of preventing
war, the greatest of evils, or to preserve the autonomy of nations,
it must be prepared by army and navy to enforce its mandate, and
to tliis end tax our people for the exclusive benefit of foreign
nations.

This fundamental jjrinciple of the American government
was observed for nearly a century.

It is true that in its earlier history tliere are numeious
instances when the government sent out military expeditions
to attack bands of pirates, or to redress wrongs committed
upon the rights of American citizens. Several naval demon-
strations were made in the Mediterranean in the first part

208 AMERICAN DIPLOMATIC QUESTIONS

of the century, for the purpose of suppressing the buccaneer-
ing propensities of the Barbary pirates who flaunted the black
flag from various strongholds on the North African coast.
A letter from the Dey of Algiers, in 1815, to the " happ}-,
the great, the amiable James Madison, Emperor of America,
may His reign be happy and glorious," was answered by a
broadside from Admiral Decatur's fleet, for the Dey had been
tolerating acts of piracy upon American commerce. But
none of these examples of interference could be quoted as
exceptions to the rule of non-intervention. On several
occasions the operations of the Monroe Doctrine have seem-
ingly led the United States to swerve from this same policy ;
but in those instances there was the reason of jeopardy to
American interests — reasons sufficient to exclude those acts
of threatened belligerency from the category of wilful and
useless meddling.

The Samoan affair, indeed, marks the beginning of a new
epoch in the history of American foreign relations. Com-
menting thereon, Mr. Gresham, the Secretary of State, in a
report to the President, May 9, 1894, said: —

This duty is especially important [of reviewing the facts of the
case], since it is in our relations to Samoa that we have made the
first departm-e from our traditional and well-established policy of
avoiding entangling alliances with foreign powers in relation to
objects remote from this hemisphere. Like all other human
transactions, the wisdom of that departure must be tested by its
fruits. If the departure was justified, there must be some evidence
of detriment suffered before its adoption, or of advantage since
gained, to demonstrate the fact. If no such evidence can be
found, we are confronted with the serious responsibility of hav-
ing, without sufficient grounds, imperiled a policy which is not
only coeval with our Government, but to which may, in great
measure, be ascribed the peace, the prosperity, and the moral
intiuence of the United States. Every nation, and especiiilly
every strong nation, must sometimes be conscious of an im]nilse
to rush into difficulties that do not concern it, except in a liigldy
imaginary way. To restrain the indulgence of such a propen-
sity is not only the part of wisdom, but a duty we owe to the
world as an example of the strength, the moderation, and the
beneficence of poi)ular government.

THE UNITED STATES AND SAMOA 209

"Whether or not the signing of the treaty of Berlin in
relation to the Samoan matter actually planted the seed of
a new political religion must be left to individual opinion,
yet the fact is certain that since the making of that treaty in
1889, a " new school," advocating a more generous foreign
policy, has sprung into existence. Supporters of an aggressive
foreign polic}" argue that conditions have changed, and that
the United States, being no longer a fledgling among nations,
must assume its proper share of responsibility in furthering
the common welfare of mankind.

The term " Samoa " is applied to a group of twelve small
islands whose combined area scarcely exceeds that of Rhode
Island. It is one of the many island systems of Polynesia,
which, like constellations upon a map of the heavens, dot the
Southern Pacific chart, converting that vast region into a
veritable island world. The position of tliis particular group
is approximately between latitudes 13-15 south, and longi-
tudes 168-173 Avest, and it lies upon the direct route taken by
vessels from Western American ports which ply via Honolulu
to the Australasian colonies. The principal port, in fact
the only port worthy the name, is Apia, situated on the island
of Upolu. At that point foreign mercantile interests in the
archipelago centre, and there for many years the consular
representatives of several countries resided.

The islands are of volcanic origin, and rise boldly from
the sea, — the isolated mountain-tops of a great submerged
range. From summit to coral-fringed base, they are blessed
with luxuriant tropical vegetation, and charm the eye with
iiurpassing loveliness.

The central position of the group, with its fine climate
and tlie amiable chaiacter of its peo[)le, attracted many
wanderers to its shores. In the earlier part of the cen-
tury Samoa was visited by a few roving trader.-s wlio came
to barter their calico j)rints and cliciip bau])h's foi- co])ra
and tortoise sliell. Numerous adventurers of a recogni/ed
South Sea type, mostly escaped convi(;ts from Australia,
p

210 AMERICAN DIPLOMATIC QUESTIONS

deserters from ships, and the nondescript ne'er-do-wells
who infested the Pacific islands in the earlier days, drifted
in the course of their wanderings to Samoa. They came
from time to time, either for gain or adventure, or else to
escape the consequences of crimes committed in more civilized
parts of the world. At that early day in the far-awa}^ haven
of the Central Pacific, retribution followed slowly the mis-
deeds of men. Missionaries came and found in Samoa a
congenial field. Whalers from New Bedford and Sydney
touched at the islands for fresh supplies, and to enjoy a
period of revelry. Those are recorded by South Sea chroni-
clers as the romantic days of the small trader and the ubiqui-
tous "beach-comber," — the days of native simplicity and
welcome that preceded the modern period of organized com-
mercial enterprise. With German, English, and American
trading firms soliciting business upon the islands, Samoa
entered upon an era of foreign interference and arrogance,
— an era of mischievous political plots and counter-plots,
of bitter jealousies and war. The Samoans then discovered
that the white men, whom they had revered as superior
beings, were morall}^ no better than themselves, if, indeed,
they were quite as good. The natives were wholly disen-
chanted when they found at last that the white man's
anxious solicitude for their welfare was a negative charity
based on greed. Finally tlie Samoans realized that they
must accept willy-nilly the invincible white strangers who
had settled among them, and whom they could never drive
away.

As earl}^ as 1850, England, Germany, and the United States
were represented by commercial agents in Apia; and in 1854
the great South Sea trading firm of Godeffroy and Company,
of Hamburg, a chartered monopoly, established itself upon
Upolu. For many years thereafter the history of Samoa was
the history of this well-organized trading company. Under
the able leadership of its first manager, Theodore Weber, who,
it appears, was both chief of the firm and German Consul, tlie
company prospered marvellously. By a mortgage system
admitting of skilful manipulation of titles, which was quite

THE UNITED STATES AND SAMOA 211

beyond the native understanding, large tracts of land fell
to the company's portion, and these were industriously con-
verted into plantations of cocoanuts. The methods of Godef-
froy and Company, from a purel}^ commercial point of view,
liave been denounced as unscrupulous, but the testimony of
rivals should be carefully weighed. One must also bear in
mind that the honor line is exceedingly hard to trace in all
dealings of civilized with semi-civilized peoples. In course
of time rival American and English trading concerns sprang
into existence at Apia. Fierce competition between these
companies, where the volume of business could scarcely sup-
port one, often induced their zealous managers to adopt unfair
methods for the purpose of gaining native favor and trade.
The efforts of the three consuls, who were usually strongly
prepossessed in favor of their kinsmen, to protect the traders
of their own nationality, led to many official blunders. Sev-
eral hundred foreigners — principally German, Englisli, and
American — resided at Apia. The jealous competition of the
traders reacted upon these, and each partisan faction espoused
with intense enthusiasm the cause of its own nationality.
Seemingly incapable of regulating their own affairs within the
municipality of Apia, the sterner interference of home govern-
ments was often invoked, for the purpose of restoring order
where chaos reigned. Commercial rivalry ripened into
national jealousy, and all within the confines of a mile of
ocean beach. When the situation at Apia became hopelessly
involved, and wholly beyond the possibility of local a<ljust-
ment, England, Germany and the United States took tlie
matter in hand. Therein lay the motive of Samoa's woes,
and the perplexing problem of her relief. Therein also lay
the causes of the United States' abandonment of her time-
lionored policy of non-interference.

The native Samoans are generous, emotional, aniial)h' in
disposition, of pleasing and even courtly manners, and much
given to ceremony and merriment. There is much of good
and little of evil in them. They are willing to kill white
men only because white men kill them. Nature has so fully
responded to their simple wants that they are inclined to

212 AMERICAN DIPLOMATIC QUESTIONS

indolence and easy enjoyment of nature's bounty. They
possessed no real property in fee. A political economy based
upon communal ideas weakens the incentive to acquire large
private wealth, hence it was difficult for the "government"
to tax its subjects. Their own system of government Avas
essentially of the patriarchal type. Every community or clan
had a " royal " family, the chieftainship being hereditary as
to the family, but elective as to the individual. When
a chief was selected by vote of his neighbors, he was usually
dignified by honorific titles. The well-known name of
" Malietoa," the " Pleasing Hero," is one of these. In a
measure the chief was a sacred being, of greater influence —
if he proved popular — than of actual power over his people.
His son succeeded to his name and position only when elected
to do so. A chief having attained very great popularity or
military success might have honorific titles bestowed upon
him by clans other tlian his own; and should he receive in
this manner the recognition of five different clans, he was
considered the Supreme or Highest Chief, and accorded
kingly honors. The idea of royalty, as understood in
Europe, seems rather to have been a foreign innovation in
the islands.

When Samoa became a treaty-making power, the necessity
for a stronger central government with a definite and respon-
sible head was felt. The step from a patriarchal form of
government was easily taken under the tutelage of the
whites, but true conceptions of a king apparently never
sank deeply into the Samoan consciousness. To revolt
against the de facto king because he had enjoyed an inning of
several years and should therefore give other worthy men a
chance to realize their ambitions, was entirely proper and
legitimate according to Samoan custom. The peoph^ there-
fore had little idea of "government," as understood by
modern civilized nations, and consequently a strong central
power levying taxes and actually enforcing judicial decrees
was not properly comprehended. The Samoans were unable
to appreciate the utility of contract obligations ; they rejoiced '
in peace, but tribal disturbances were more or less frequent i

THE UNITED STATES AND SAMOA 213

throughout the islands. The white man was given the
lieartiest welcome, and has never since found an enemy
among the Samoans, except when his own misdeeds have
driven the simple natives to desperate retaliation.

n

Previous to the year 1872 no interest whatever in the
United States attached to these distant islands. They Avere
of neither political nor commercial importance. In that
year, however, Admiral Meade, who was cruising about the
Central Pacific in the U. S. S. Narragansett, entered into an
agreement, quite upon his own authorit}^ with a certain
cliief on the Samoan island of Tutuila, whereby the local
chief granted to the United States the exclusive privilege
of establishing a naval and coaling station in the harbor of
Pago-Pago. In return for this favor the chief expected the
friendship, and if need be the protection, of the United
States. The value of a coaling station in that locality was
appreciated, especially in the event of the completion of an
isthmian canal. When Admiral Meade's agreement with the
chief reached Washington, the Senate hesitated to sanction
the " friendship and protection " part of the bargain, and no
action was taken upon the matter. Soon after tliis (1873),
having been urged by " certain highly respectable per-
sons" who represented to the government the importance
of the growing trade between the United States and the
South Sea Islands, President Grant sent Col. A. B. Stein-
berger as United States Commissioner to Samoa, with in-
structions to make a full report concerning the conditions,
commercial possibilities and general importance of the islands.

A report was soon made, and Mr. Steinberger was again
invested with authority (1874) to revisit the islands for the
purpose of "observing and reporting upon Samoan affairs, and
impressing those in authority there with the lively interest
which we take in their happiness and welfare." Instead of
leturning at once to Samoa to carry out tlie object of his

214 AMERICAN DIPLOMATIC QUESTIONS

mission, it is alleged that Mr. Steinberger proceeded directly
to Hamburg, and there entered into contract relations with
the president of the great trading firm of Godeffroy and
Company, pledging himself to their interests. Mr. Stein-
berger, who seems therefore to have become an adventurer,
and unfaithful to his trust, proceeded thence to Samoa under
the mask of United States Commissioner, but in reality to
carry out the terms of his Godeffroy contract. He arrived
in Samoa in the early part of 1875, and devoted his energies
to the interests of his new business. He soon became in-
volved in Samoan politics. Internal dissensions con-
vulsed the islands, the primary cause of disturbance being
the rivalry of two members of one family, who claimed each
the coveted title of ''Malietoa." Under a new form of gov-
ernment, but recently adopted, Malietoa Laupepa, the "king"
was in retirement, and the country was ruled by Councils of
State. Mr. Steinberger gained great favor among the natives;
and with the aid of some other white men, who were in
sympathy with his projects, he prevailed upon the Samoans
so to alter their constitution that Malietoa Laupepa should
become, for a limited number of years, the recognized king,
and he, Steinberger, should be made Prime Minister. While
acting in such a capacity, he represented to the Samoans that
their islands were under the protection of the United States.
In course of time rumors of tliis condition of affairs reached
Washington, and Congress speedily called for information in
relation to Steinberger, his mission and his powers, which
resulted (May, 1876) in the Senate's repudiating any consid-
erations of a United States' protectorate over Samoa, and dis-
avowing all interference in Samoan domestic concerns. In
the meantime, however, a British war vessel happened along,
and the enemies of Steinberger took the opportunity of
having that reputed adventurer seized and deported. By
the same movement, Malietoa, the king, was dethroned and
held prisoner. Instantly the islands blazed into war, and tlie
vacant throne became a prize for several contending chiefs.
The prospect of never ending tumult which followed the
downfall of Steinberger (encouraged by the interference of

THE UNITED STATES AND SAMOA 215

several rival foreign factions in Apia), finally induced the
Samoans to pray for an English protectorate over their
distracted country. When the fact became known to the
foreigners in Apia, the German and American representa-
tives and residents were greatly alarmed. For once they
forgot their commercial rivalries, and acted together, their
interests being united in a common cause against English
annexation. With the connivance of the German Consul, as
is supposed, the American commercial agent at Apia hoisted
his flag over the city, and proclaimed a United States pro-
tectorate. A similar occurrence took place a j^ear later, when
an English commissioner arrived at Apia for the purpose of
extorting certain treaty concessions from the king. Upon
this occasion English persuasion w^as rendered the more
potent by a squad of marines from a vessel lying in the
harbor; and the American flag was again hoisted by the agent
over the government building, in order to proclaim to the
world, and especially to the British commissioner, that any
treaties relative to Samoa should be made in Washington.
Hoth of tliese somewhat hasty acts were disavowed.

The efforts made by tlie natives for English annexation
(iroved unsuccessful, and the disappointed chiefs returned
from their mission abroad only to find the land still in the
:hroes of civil war. Encouraged by the flag-raising pro-
pensities of the American Consul, they turned to the United
"States, in the hope of finding relief in an American protecto-
ate. Mamea, a high chief, proceeded to Washington (1877),
jut there he found no disposition on the part of the
uithorities to depart from a policy that opposed all en-
angling alliances with foreign nations. The generous offer
if iiis realm was declined by the President, but the object of
lis mission to the United States was not wiiolly defeated,
b; concluded a treaty in Washington, Jannary KJ, 1878,
\ hereby the United States w^as granted '' the privilege of
atering and using the port of Pago-Pago, and esiablishing
herein and on thesliores thereof, a station for coal and other
laval sui)plies"; tlie treaty further guaranteed, that there-
tter Samoa would " neither exercise uor authorize any juris-

216 AMERICAN DIPLOMATIC QUESTIONS

diction within said port adverse to such rights of the United
States, or restrictive thereof." In return for these con-
cessions it was provided in the treaty, that : —

If, unhappily, any differences should have arisen, or should
hereafter arise between the Samoan Government and any other
government in amity with the United States, the Government of
the latter will employ its good offices for the purpose of adjusting
these differences upon a satisfactory and solid foundation.

This treaty was made by the United States more in the
desire not to appear wholly indifferent to the friendly
advances of the Samoans than for any importance it attached
to Samoa, or advantage to be gained by close political or
commercial relations with her. It was indeed felt by many
that the mere offer to use friendly offices in case of difficulty
was a rash promise that might some day call for fulfilment,
especially as Germany, with her preponderance of commercial
interests in the islands, would probably sooner or later seek
forcibly to acquire the group.

The Samoans, however, proceeded to make treaties of
similar character the following year with England and Ger-
many, granting to each exclusive rights in certain harbors
for naval and coaling stations. In the case of the German
treaty the Samoans were far more generous, through coercion
it is said, and granted to the energetic German representa-
tive certain concessions that appeared to be incompatible
with the favored nation clause in the American treaty. This
fact excited some feeling of displeasure, which was no doubt
more keenly felt in the American consulate at Apia than in
the State Department at Washington. To American citi-
zens in Samoa it suggested imposition on the part of Ger-
many, and convinced them of Germany's intention to
secure a grasp upon the islands that would lead to ulti-
mate annexation. There can be little doubt had Ger-
many then made a coup d'etat, and formally seized the
islands with a graceful recognition of American and Eng-
lish rights in their respective harbors, the world would not
have been profoundly moved or the United States greatly
shocked. But the American Consul, who hoped for an

THE UNITED STATES AND SAMOA 217

American Samoa, became alarmed by the evidences of Ger-
man intrigue, and he decided it to be his duty to thwart
Teutonic ambition in the island. The breach between the
United States and Germany in Samoa was thus begun, and
English subjects in Apia took sides with the Americans
against the greater rival.

Civil dissensions between various native factions continued

anabated throughout the year 1878. The followers of

^ Malietoa Telavu and the adherents to the old regime of the

" Councils of the Chiefs " took to the bush, Samoan fashion,

o glare at each other over their rude fortifications, to brandish

iercely their arms and to fill the forests with their war-

■ries. It was during this long period of strife that the

oreigners in Apia for their own safety obtained from both

varring factions the recognition of a strip of territory, in-

luding the municipality of Apia, as neutral and sacred from

11 hostile attack. Over this tract of land the three nations,

liich were in treaty relations with Samoa, were authorized

1 exercise the rights of extra-territoriality. In regard to

le native wars, the three consuls in Apia proclaimed of-

cially the strictest neutrality ; but notwithstanding their

etermination to hold aloof from any participation in the

•oubled affairs of Samoa, their languishing trade interests

impelled them to intervene. In the light of later Samoan

story, it is not a little remarkable that all three consuls,

icked by the concurrent opinions of several naval captains

the harbor, were enabled to unite in the selection of

alietoa Telavu as the ruler of Samoa. They thereupon

rew the weiglit of their influence in his favor. Desultory

fliting continued, nevertheless, for over a year, when peace

IS finally restored only by the interposition of Captain

'inhart of the German cruiser Bismarck.

Though peace had been accomplished by no less vigorous

•asures than a bombardment of native villages, Samoan

litics continued in a most unsettled condition. The three

iisuls decided to take a still more active j)art in the nian-

'■ment of local affairs, if for nothing more than to insure

• stability of the government they had united in establish-

218 AMERICAN DIPLOMATIC QUESTIONS

ing. Accordingly they entered into a compact with Mahetoa
Telavu, agreeing to support his government, he to accept
three advisers, — a German, an Englishman, and an Ameri-
can. The successor of Tehivu was to be chosen " by the three
protecting powers" (March 24, 1880). Such an agreement
as this bore all the earmarks of a protectorate; but both
England and the United States declined to regard the agree-
ment as more than a "• scheme of arrangement between the
consular body and the government of the islands for the
protection of the foreigners." Malietoa Telavu, however,
was explicitly recognized as head of the Samoan Govern-
ment, and upon his death in 1881, Malietoa Laupepa was
recognized as his successor. On March 19, 1881, Laupepa
was duly anointed king, according to native custom, and
installed at Mulinuu, the royal seat of Samoa.

In some other islands of the goup there was opposition to
Laupepa. Possibly his too close association with the foreign-
ers who sustained him displeased some of the ''old party."
At all events, a native anti-administration faction crowned a
certain high chief Tamasese as opposition king to Malie-
toa Laupepa, and the rifles and spears were again brought
into use. Captain Gillis, of the U. S. S. Lackawana, happen-
ing in port, succeeded in quelling the rebellion by bringing
about a compromise. Malietoa Laupepa was to remain king,
and Tamasese was created vice-king (July 12, 1881).

At last all native factions were appeased, and the con-
suls were reasonably in accord. Peace continued for several
years ; no one heard of Samoa's troubles ; and seemingly all
was well.

Those who profess to comprehend the untutored savage
mind, maintain that primitive peoples cannot long remain in
peace. Be that as it may, the period of rest from July, 1881,
to the early part of 1885 proved to be only the calm that
precedes the storm. With all due allowance for native vacil-
lation and the savage's readiness for an affray, the foreign-
ers in Apia must be held guilty for bringing about the
troubles which followed, and the Germans must accept a
little more than equal share in the guilt.

THE UNITED STATES AND SAMOA 219

in

A glance at the somewhat complex social conditions which
existed at Apia in 1884-89, the years of greatest disturbance,
is necessary to an understanding of the series of events which,
beginning about that time, culminated in the tripartite treaty
of Berlin.

1 The municipality of Apia was governed wholly by the

consular representatives of England, Germany, and the

L nited States ; and the private property within this neutral

irea generally belonged to citizens of one or the other of

hese three powers residing and doing business in the islands.

To the Samoans, Apia was, to all intents and purposes, a for-

ign city, over which they exercised no control whatever.

lere was concentrated tlie wealth of the islands, and within

he neutral zone at Mulinuu resided King Malietoa Lau-

•epa and his Vice-King Tamasese, the nominal heads of a

eculiarly weak and unstable government. In the environs

f Apia in every, direction the painted sign-posts of foreign

roperty holdings stealthily advanced, sometimes moving on

y night into the wilderness that surrounds the neutral strip

f the municipality.

In Apia proper the foreign population was composed of

iree distinct elements, that quarrelled among themselves or

ited in friendship as their own separate and rival interests

'tated. Of these three elements the German was the most

■1,'ressive and commanding. Their commercial interests in

inoa, embodied in the Godeffroy firm (reorganized into

a " Deutsche Ilandels- und Plantagen-Gesellschaft f iir Siid-

i--Inseln zu Hamburg''), greatly exceeded those of the

inerican and English residents (combined. A vast amount

capital hiid been expended in inipioving their large planta-

•ns scattered tliroughont tin; islands, and their excellent

ide had beim estai)lished by thirty years of constant vigi-

ue and toil. To the Germans in Apia, the prestige of their

I untry and the success of their great "firm" had almost

l.come synonymous terms. Nothing should be permitted to

220 AMERICAN DIPLOMATIC QUESTIONS

check their company's growth, — not even an unfriendly-
native king. To " aid " in framing laws for Samoa, to incite
a revolution, or to depose a hostile government, must be ac-
cepted as legitimate acts if the company's interest demanded
them; in short, any means were permissible to that end. It
is not to be wondered that the Germans regarded the Ameri-
can and English traders somewhat in the light that a game-
keeper regards a poacher within his preserves. When the
latter evinced a tendency to adopt their own tactics for in-
fluencing native legislation, the Germans resented their bold-
ness, and bitter feelings were aroused ; when they hinted at
annexation, the Germans lost their equanimity of temper.
The predominance of their commercial interests was their
excuse for all acts of interference in native affairs, and in the
passively hostile attitude which they sullenly maintained
toward the other foreigners in Apia.

The English element was a smaller, but in some respects a
no less active, one. On the veranda of the British consulate
and at the counter of McArthur and Company they discussed
with much feeling the growing influence of the Germans,
and plotted for the advancement of their own business affairs.
England was known to favor imperialism, and she was con-
stantly alive for the absorption of new territory. Her ships
ranged the seas, and her commanders were quick to act.
With an avowed policy of expansion in London, the English
residents felt their strength in Apia. They watched the
Germans narrowly, and resented their meddling with the
natives. They also had considerable influence over the lat-
ter, by reason of the activity of the London Missionary
Society, whose workers in Samoa had succeeded in favorably
impressing the religiously inclined aborigines.

The American element in Apia consisted of a mere hand-
fid of men who rallied around the premises of an American
iirm to denounce tlie German and English attempts to gain
greater influence in the islands. Their trade was a grow-
ing one, but they felt liampered by tlie knowledge that the
United States would probably never care to annex the group.
It would be unfair to say that they always held aloof from

THE UNITED STATES AND SAMOA 221

the purely domestic affairs of the Samoans, or that they
constantly maintained tliat attitude of strict neutrality
toward warring factions in the islands that the traditions of
their country should have prompted them to observe. Theirs
was the position of eager spectators whose interests led them
from time to time to take a part in native politics, chiefly
to thwart the machinations of their English and German
neighbors.

In general, therefore, the one motive in Samoa was to
acquire commercial advantage. When competition is fierce
between citizens of several nationalities, in a neutral land and
under a weak and dependent government, the temptation to
secure a controlling influence in the councils of the nation
becomes too great to withstand. It was impossible, under
such conditions, for these commercial strugglers to eliminate
the sense of patriotism from their efforts to increase their
trade. Race prejudices were fed by business rivalry, and a
clash was always imminent.

Each foreign faction was headed by a consul who was
quick to discern the right and slow to detect any wrong in
the acts of his "subjects." Under the laws of extraterri-
toriality these officials enjoyed considerable authority and
power. They exercised judicial functions and supervised the
governmental affairs of tlie municipality wherein those of
their own nationality resided. In an advisory capacity they
exerted a decided influence over tlie native government. As
might be supposed, where all the elements were so favorable,
political feelings were intense, and occasionally ran riot. The
atmosphere was constantly charged with rumors of intrigue.
Tlie movements of native factions were keenly watclied in the
light of possible advantage to be gained by any threatened
political change. Every act of the king or his vice-king
was examined under the lens of a jealous interest, to deter-
mine whether it savored of preference for German, English,
or American.

Besides these foreigners whose residence in Apia was osten-
sibly for legitimate purposes of trade, men of a lower social
stratum, a bar-room riff'raff of decidedly uncertain charac-

222 AMERICAN DIPLOMATIC QUESTIONS

ter, infested the place. The South Sea Islands appear to
furnish the conditions necessary to the development of an
unprincipled class of men who are always ready to breed
dissensions among native peoples, whom, by glibness of
tongue, they influence to evil. Thieves profit by confusion.
These adventurers, like stormy petrels scenting the tempest
from afar, were a constant menace to peace in the islands.

King Malietoa I^aupepa, installed in a shanty at Mulinuu,
gloomily contemplated the shadow of his slender authority.
He was thoroughly dependent upon the cooperation of the
consuls to repress the little rebellions that sprang up like
weeds in his garden. He was nevertheless much loved by
his people. Laupepa has often been described as a gentle,
lovable old man, of the most generous impulses, but pitifully
weak. Tamasese, the vice-king possessed no distinctive
qualities, either good or bad, and his popularity among his
people was but luke-warm.

Out in the bush, a great clnef and warrior, a man of high
courage and principle, of large and enthusiastic following,
Mataafa by name, rested upon his arms. He may be said to
have been at that moment in a quiescent state. He was
ambitious for the throne, disliked Tamasese and bore a strong
friendship for his kinsman, Malietoa Laupepa.

Mataafa's personality was very striking, combining great
vigor Avith a kindly, generous nature. He possessed a clear
sense of justice, and was a good friend and a bad enemy.
From childhood a curse rested upon this ambitious warrior.
For some uncivil act he committed toward his elders he had
been denounced by a relative who, as a prophet of evil
fortune, cast upon him a future of great disappointment.
Never should he rule Samoa, yet never should he rest from
his vain efforts to reach the throne.

IV

During the earlier eighties the plantations of the German
firin in the vicinity of Apia had been subject to petty pilfer-
ings of the natives. The managers of the company had
made frequent complaints about these thefts; the German

THE UNITED STATES AND SAMOA 223

Consul had demanded of Malietoa that he shouhl warn his
subjects more positively against midnight raids upon the
German fruit trees. A number of light-fingered citizens had
been caught in the act of making away with an armful of green
cocoanuts or a bunch of bananas; they had been duly tried
and sentenced to imj^risonment, but it was discovered by the
watchful Weber, the head of the firm, that the back door of
the jail was open; Weber's convicts were not paying the full
penalty of their misdemeanors. In October, 1884, the German
Consul addressed a letter to King Malietoa, calling his atten-
tion to this lapse of justice, and suggested to him in no
uncertain language that a continuation of such a condition
of affairs would be accepted as an insult to the German Gov-
ernment. The Arcadian simplicity of Samoan life did not
develop that fineness of discrimination between meum and
tuum that the Teutonic representative in Apia believed
should be observed. The king no doubt felt the delicacy of
his position; it required more tact than ^Malietoa jjossessed
to serve two masters at the same time. He attempted to
reform his judiciary at a ruinous expense of popularity among
his subjects, but his reforms were not sufficiently comjjlete
to meet the requirements of the exacting Germans; so Mr.
Weber of the firm decided to constitute himself both judge
and jailer of the realm. In the absence of the German Con-
sul he arranged for a treaty between the Berlin and the
Samoan governments wliich would virtually place the man-
agement of native affairs into his own hands. .This docu-
ment he placed before tlie astonished Malietoa, with a demand
that he sign it Ijlii id folded, or, to put it more clearly, before
its provisions could become known to other foreigners in
Apia. Some German men-of-war were in the harbor. The
unfortunate monarch was at his wits' end. He hastily ap-
l)ealed to the representatives of England and the United
States for protection ; and to the queen of Phigland he
despatched a formal application for immediate annexation.
The Germans in Apia were outraged by this display of inde-
pendence on the part of the king; they pressed him the
harder to sign the paper, and demanded au abject apology for

224 AMERICAN DIPLOMATIC QUESTIONS

his delay and impertinence in consulting the English and
Americans. Sorely harassed by threats, Malietoa yielded.
In November he and his companion, Tamasese, appeared at
the German consulate, made public humiliation in the dust,
and signed Mr. Weber's treaty. Doubtless feeling himself
to be between two evils (the German man-of-war on the one
hand and the wrath of his subjects on the other), he appealed
in his distress to the Emperor of Germany (December 29,
1884): —

I write to inform your Majesty that I am deeply distressed
on account of the troublesome acts done by subjects of your coun-
try in Samoa.

I humbly beseech your Majesty to listen to my complaint.

The first matter of complaint of which I have to inform your
Majesty is the agreement which was made on the 10th of Novem-
ber between the Government of Germany and the Government of
Samoa. The method in which it was brought about was very
improper, for we did not desire to make it because we were not
allowed to see the documents so that we could considt about it
and consider it.

I wrote to the German consul to ask him to give me a copy of
the agreement, in order that we should thorouglily understand its
meaning. He replied that he refu.sed to give me or my govern-
ment a copy of the agreement until after we had accepted it.

I assented to the agreement, and our names, Malietoa and Tupiia,
were signed to it on account of our intimidation by threats. I
also inform your Majesty of our withdrawal from the agree-
ment on account of its containing many impracticable clauses.

I therefore beg your Majesty will not assent to that agreement.

I also appeal to your Majesty with reference to the troublesome
acts of Mr. Weber, a subject of your country.

He is continually trying to cause divisions among the people in
order to bring about disturbances and war in Samoa. 1 have
received nuich information respecting his working for the pur-
pose of causing troubles to arise in Samoa again.

-He is continually scheming and offering lu-ibes to some Samoan
chiefs to induce them to comply with his wishes, and thus cause
a rebellion in my country.

I com])laiu to your ISlajesty on account of this improper con-
duct of Mr. Weber, so that he may be compelled to desist from
acts by which the blood of the people of my country may be shed.

THE UNITED STATES AND SAMOA 225

I hope and pray that God will bless your Majesty and your
Government.

I am, your Majesty,

Malietoa, King of Samoa.

No more effective state paper has ever been written, but
the German Consul-General, Herr Steubel, was not the man
to permit the advantage he had just gained to slip from his
grasp. Resolving upon an extreme policy, at an opportune
moment (emulating the example of a former American C(ui-
sul), he hoisted the German flag over Mulinuu (January 23,
1885), and nailed to a tree the following interesting procla-
mation: —

Let all the people of Samoa observe during tlie long period that
Malietoa has been king, the Government of Germany has been
treated with unkindness and injury, and all agreements that have
been made between the Governments of Germany and Samoa liave
been repeatedly violated. For that reason I must now make
arrangements necessary for the protection of the subjects of my
government and their possessions. This is my view of that which
is necessary to be done : that I should take possession of the
lands of the village and district of Apia, in which are included
Mulinuu and the Harbor of Apia, to hold possession under the
supreme control (that u-as under the Government of Malietoa) for
the Government of Germany. This is the sign of this — I have
hoisted the flag of His Imperial German Majesty in Mulinuu.
This is the meaning of it (the hoisting of the flag), that only tlie
Government of Germany will rule for the present over that })()r-
tion of territory.

Samoans, I tell you now plainly, that it is only the territory
that is called the Municipality that is taken possession of, but
no other portion of land in Samoa is taken possession of.

It is good, too, that you should ])e well acquainted with the reason
of that whi(;h is done. It is no unkindness at all to San)oa. Tlie
German Government only wish for Samoa to have a strong gf)v-
ernment that shall maintain cordial relations with the Govern-
ment of Germany. "When a peaceful solution of these ditticulties
is effected, the lands now taken possession of will be given u]» again.

I beseech you to be at ])eace and to have coutidence in the
Government of Germany and myself; then Samoa will iiidccd be
prosperous.

I)K. StKUIJKL, ImI'KKIAI. (iKKMAN CoNSL.'L.

226 AMERICAN DIPLOMATIC QUESTIONS

It might be presumed that Dr. Steubel needed rest after
such an effort, but those hicking in humor seem never to
tire; besides, this was Dr. Steubel's busy day. To Malietoa,
he wrote : —

. . . Ah'eady, on the 4th of November [1884] your Highness
wrote to me that the prisoners who in February, last year,
escaped, in consequence of the order of your Government, out of
the German prisons, woukl be brought back. Subsequently I made
an agreement [the blindfold episode already referred to] with
your Highness' Government. I supposed that difficulties which
arose formerly would be removed thereby. Your Highness' Gov-
ernment, however, renewed the old inimical attitude towards Ger-
many. Not all the prisoners were brought back, and those who
were escaped again soon after, and your Highness' Government
did not think of taking the trouble to return the prisoners. In a
letter which your Highness wrote to me on the 20th of Novem-
ber you say that it is generally known that Samoa was to be
taken by force by the German Government.

Since then the followers of your Highness . . . Seumanu and
Lauati have repeatedly, in meetings, designated Germany as a
robber land, and a country of slavery, and as a country without
religion. . . . Germany can no longer look upon this state of
affairs with equanimity. . . .

Hence the German flag-raising over the municipality. To
the American and British consuls, who had at once protested
against Dr. Steid)ers assumption of authority, he wrote that
by way of reprisal he had attached, in the name of the Impe-
rial German Government, all the territory forming the
municipality of Apia, as far as the rights of sovereignty of
King Malietoa and his government are concerned, and that
he would hold the same as security for the due fulfilment of
existing treaty obligations by the Samoan Government.

Malietoa's apparent complacency in yielding to the impor-
tunities of the now cordially disliked Germans injured him
in tlie eyes of his subjects. Tamasese hoped to profit by his
disofrace, for and)ition had flowered in his breast. The vice-
king suddenly announced his separation from INIalietoa's
government, and he proceeded at once to set up liis own
endjlem of sovereignty in a near-by village. A German mil-

THE UNITED STATES AND SAMOA 227

itaiy officer, Captain Brandeis, arrived on the scene as a
clerk of the German firm. He took up his residence Avith
Tamasese, and began the process of tutoring that hopeful
candidate for the throne.

In far-away Berlin, the Kaiser may possibly have been
touched by ^Nlalietoa's pathetic letter, — at all events, he felt
that his representatives in Samoa had gone too far. The
German Government quickly disavowed any responsibility
for the events of the past few months and for the con-
duct of Consul Steubel. Of the improper course of Mr.
Weber (in reality a private citizen) it fully disapproved.
Had the Germans in Apia thereupon promptly restored the
statu quo of November, 1884, and then set about gaining
their desired reforms in a less aggressive manner, possibly
the humbling of the Samoan Government and the flag-raising
incident at Mulinuu would have blown over as a harmless
political squall; but they were not so disposed. Dr. Steubel
kept liis flag waving defiantly for twelve months, — through-
out the entire year of 1885, — during which time the social
relations of the three consuls and the citizens of the three
powers residing at Apia were greatly strained. The Ameri-
can and English residents generally gave their sympathy to
the mucli-abused ^lalietoa, and the Germans were more and
more openly supporting Tamasese. Among the natives mur-
murings of discontent were heard on all sides. Two parties
were formed — the followers of Malietoa and the followers of
Tamasese. The position of the former at Mulinuu, so near
the irrepressible Weber, who " rested not," became too deli-
cate even for the sensibilities of a barl^arian, and lie tliere-
fore moved into Apia proper, and raised liis flag in more
friendly surroundings. The German Consul at once pulled
it down, and then the docile Malietoa quietly moved out ol
the foreign concession into one of his own native villages,
and there once more raised his colors. Protests of the consuls
became the order of tlie day.

In Ai)ril, 188G, Admiral Knoi-r, commanding a squadron
of three (Jcrman vessels, arrived in ])ort and oix-ncd negotia-
tions with Tumasese, significantly ignoring .^bllietoa, whom

228 AMERICAN DIPLOMATIC QUESTIONS

he addressed simply as " High Chief." Mistaking the object
of the admiraFs mission, Malietoa addressed to him a letter
reviewing at great length the story of his sorrows. " Your
Excellency," he concluded, " let the righteous dealing and
the kind regard of the Government of Germany be manifest
toward our islands, so feeble and so few." But the admiral's
ear belonged to Dr. Steubel and not to Malietoa, and it was
to Tamasese that he fired a royal salute.

The luckless Malietoa, now wholly discouraged and believ-
ing that the Germans seriously meant to crown his rival,,
directed another appeal to the American Consul for protec-
tion ; and in reply to this the sympathetic Mr. Greenebaume
unfurled the American colors over Apia, and proclaimed an
American protectorate (May 1-4, 1886). An American and
an English man-of-war arrived ; the German flag was fly-
ing at Mulinuu over a proclamation setting forth that the
municipality of Apia was under German control ; the Ameri-
can flag fluttered over Apia above a document which warned
all passers-by that Samoa was an American possession.
Tamasese was in open revolt, with German encouragement
behind him. Malietoa was gathering about him his clans on
the other side of Apia, and the Americans and English were
giving him consolation and selling him arms. The outlook
was threatening.

The summary action of Consul Greenebaume in pro-
claiming a protectorate over Samoa disturbed the State-
I)ei)artment at home. The situation seemed to call for the-
fulfilment by the United States of its obligation under the
treaty of 1878, to use its good oflices in behalf of the Samoan
Government, although that obligation could scarcely be
carried to the extent of lendinc: its flagf to the threatened
ruler. Instructions were accordingly sent by the United
States to its rej)resentatives at London and IJerlin, to annouce-
that the protectorate over Samoa set up by Consul Greene-
baume was unauthorized. Recognizing, however, the serious-
ness of the situation in Apia, and desiring to remove all

THE UNITED STATES AND SAMOA 229

causes of irritation between Germany and the United States,
Secretary Bayard suggested a conference to the German
and English ministers at Washington. This was made with
the view of reaching some mutual understanding for the
reestablishment of order in Samoa. The Secretary of State
cannot be said to liave gone too far in tlius seeking to relieve
the unfortunate condition of affairs in Apia. He recognized
the dangers of a civil war in the islands where American and
German sympathies were so keenly arrayed on different sides ;
and he probably realized the difficulty of keeping American
residents at Apia in the straight and narrow path of neu-
trality should the threatened war break out. He met with
a hearty response from both England and Germany, both
of which powers probably shared with him a belief that their
unruly subjects in Samoa were causing altogether too much
trouble.

It was therefore agreed that before any definite steps
should be taken, a commission, composed of an agent from
each government, sliould visit the ishmds for the purpose
of investigating and reporting u[)on their political and social
conditions ; thus, after more perfect knowledge liad been
gained of the needs the situation might call for, representa-
tives of the interested governments would meet and take
such action as seemed necessary. Mr. Bates, American, Mr.
Thurston, English, and Mr. Travers, German, visited Samoa
in the summer of 188G as an international commission, and
their reports were returned to their respective governments
in the following spring.

News of the action of the three powers came to Apia
none too soon. The tension was relieved by the shifting of
responsibility beyond the seas. Preparations had to be
hastily made for the arrival of tlie commissioners; the Ger-
man flag came down, the American flag was folded and put
away for another occasion ; Tamasese was disowned and cast
aside ])y liis German protectors; Malietoa was urged into
an agreement to keep the peac(% whicli he was pledged to
follow unless actually attacked by the rebt;l 'I'aniasese.
I'inally, ;dter much persuasion, the '" lie[tr('sentatives of

230 AMERICAN DIPLOMATIC QUESTIONS

Malietoa and his Government'' and the "Representatives of
Tamasese and his Party " were induced to sign an agree-
ment of perpetual peace, to live " in friendship and cordial
relations." When the commissioners stepped ashore on the
beach at Apia, the temple of Janus was closed ; outwardly,
at least, the consuls had resumed friendly social relations.

The reports of the three commissioners were somewhat
tinged by the prejudices which infected the air of Apia, but
in essential details they agreed. The unanimous conclusion
was reached that the natives were wholly incapable of main-
taining a stable or efficient government. Their interests, as
well as the interests of foreigners residing and doing business
in Samoa, would be better served, they all declared, by the
establishment of a form of government in which the three
powers might exercise supervision. Armed by these docu-
ments, the Secretary of State and the British and German
ministers at Washington, met in conference (June and Jul}',
1887), to take up the task of "preserving order in Samoa."

The United States entered into these negotiations "to
establish peace and a better understanding " with feelings of
some hesitation, if not of diffidence, as if constrained into
committing a second error in order to mitigate a former
mistake. The administration had no desire to embarrass
the country by assuming responsibility for good government
in Samoa. The weak and helpless little nation had granted
the United States a favor, and had asked in return the merest
shadow of American protection; the time had come when the
rights and the independence of this nation were threatened
with extinction, and the good offices of the President had
*been invoked. American trade interests were not of suf-
ficient importance to warrant a very large share of attention
to the social or political affairs of Samoa.

(iermany, whose paramount commercial interests gave her
a livelier regard for Samoan affairs, was far more concerned
in the political conditions of the islands, and she was, more-
over, less hampered by conservative notions in her foreign
relations. It is more than doubtful if she was genuinely
interested in the welfare of Samoa. Her desire was mani-

THE UNITED STATES AND SAMOA 231

festly to establish some form of governmental machinery in
the islands that would not operate adversely to her com-
mercial interests.

England regarded with disfavor Germany's growing influ-
ence in Polynesia, and entered into the negotiations with the
sole idea of protecting her own trade in that part of the
world. She may have desired as well to checkmate some of
the suspected colonial schemes of the Kaiser.

Discussions at the conference which followed, soon de-
veloped wide divergencies of opinion. The German Minister
favored a scheme to place the management of Samoan affairs
in the hands of one foreign official, who should be chosen
Ijy the power having the greatest commercial interests in the
islands, and who should be designated, " adviser to the
king." This would of course establish German control ;
Ijut Herr von Alvesleben contended that this was only
proper in view of the larger German investments in the
group. The plan proposed by the Secretary of State was
that of an executive council, composed of the king, the vice-
king, and three foreigners — an American, an English, and a
German subject ; but to this the German objected, as being
no solution of the difficulty whatever. In this he was un-
doubtedly correct, as subsequent events have fully demon-
strated, for the trouble, being entirely caused by the rival
interest of three sets of foreigners, could in no wise be
relieved by tlie addition of a second oilicial head to each
faction. For oljvious reasons the (Jerman Minister's plan,
though apparentl}' favored by the English Minister, could
not be accepted by the United States because of its somewhat
false position of intermediary. Mr. Bayard declared that
the German proposition was not in accord with the principles
upon which they were to proceed, as it auionnted to the
reduction of Samoa to a German possession.

Failing to come to a conclusion, the conferences were
closed for the time being (July 26, 1887), with the under-
standing that the political affairs of the islands should
remain in statu quo until the members of the commission
<ould meet atrain after haviufr consulted further witli their

232 AMERICAN DIPLOMATIC QUESTIONS ,

home governments. Thus the matter rested, it being believe(
in Washington that the question would be readily adjustec
within a few months, when the commissioners were again t(
meet.

VI

News of the adjournment of the conference without a defi
nite conclusion no sooner reached Apia than the old reign o:
dissension began anew, and so vastly complicated became
the situation in those turbulent little islands, that hac
not the greater forces of nature intervened at a most criti
cal moment, it is possible a war between Germany and th(
United States might have resulted. For their hasty acts o:
the previous year. Consuls Steubel and Greenebaume hac
been dismissed, and were replaced by Herr Becker and Mr.
Harold M. Sewall respectively. The former entered upor
his duties as German Consul with a determination to foUo'w
to its rational conclusion the policy Steubel had inaugurated;
his aim was to complete the task that his predecessor had
been forced to abandon. This he set about doing with a
lofty disregard for the Washington agreement just entered
into by the representatives of the three powers. Malietoa
had already been marked as a victim by Steubel, on account
of his supposed unfriendly attitude toward the Germans,
but circumstances had prevented the former consul from
perfecting his plans ; he was still recognized as the lawful
sovereign by England and the United States, and Tamasese
had perforce been abandoned by Steubel at a moment when
his scheming had almost succeeded in making him king.

Mr. Becker immediately cast about him to discover a good
excuse for stripping the unfortunate Malietoa of the last
vestige of his power. Some glaring misdeed, still better an
atrocity, was needed. It was found, thongli a slender one.
About six months before this time, in a bar-room brawl, some
German sailors had fallen into an altercation with a few
natives, and a rough-and-tumble fracas ensued, out of which
all parties emerged with bruises. The natives who had ■
participated in this " riot " were found guilty of assault .

THE UNITED STATES AND SAMOA 233

by the German municipal judge, and although the event
liad taken place within the limits of Apia, and therefore
without the jurisdiction of the native king, Malietoa was
held responsible for the outrage of " trampling upon the Ger-
man Emperor." This event had taken place previous to the
Washington conference, but at the time it w^as not seriously
considered. It was now suddenly revived. Before the king
could more than catch his breath to reply, Becker declared
war upon him " by order of His ]\Iajesty, the Emperor of
Germany." Like the opportune happenings of a fairy tale,
four German men-of-war appeared in the harbor. In less
than a month from the closing of the conference in Wash-
ington, war was declared by Germany upon ^lalietoa, martial
law was proclaimed in Apia, and Tamasese was heralded as
king.

Mr. Sewall and the English Consul at once came forward
to protest: —

^Vhereas the Government of Germany has this day pro-
' laimed Tamasese King of tSamoa,

Now, therefore, we, the undersigned representatives of the
United States of America and Great Britain, hereby give notice
that we and our governments do not and never have recognized
Tamasese as King of Samoa, but continue as heretofore to recog-
nize Malietoa.

We advise all Samoans to submit quietly to wliat they cannot
help; not to fight, whatever the provocation, but to await peace-
ably the result of the deliberations now in progress, which alone
;in determine the future of Samoa.

The stroke having now been given in earnest, the German

onsul determined to prosecute his campaign with the utmost

■ igor. In the hope of winning recruits by means of oratory,

Tamasesi; stump speakers were conveyed on (icruum ves-

'Is to different islands to harangue the natives ; in ccitain

'•wns where the orators were coldly received, the discourtc-

iis villagers were shelled by the gunboats. I'pon declara-

ion of war, Malietoa hastily took to the bush, and his

iipporters began to rally about him. ('a])tain Braudeis

roeeeded to fortify Tamasese's position at Mulinuu. The

234 AMERICAN DIPLOMATIC QUESTIONS

chief Mataafa with his warriors then emerged from his soli-
tude and went to Malietoa's aid.

With such important and exciting events in progress, i1
could scarcely be expected that the foreigners in Apia shoulc
remain calm. As Becker made no concealment of the objeci
of his schemes, — to get rid of jNIalietoa and to crowi
Tamasese as his own puppet king, — the American and Eng
lish spectators soon became bluntly outspoken ; the employee
of the German firm assumed a swaggering demeanor ; th
Americans and English used insulting language.

The first object of the German Admiral, as ranking office
among the Germans, was to capture JNIalietoa. He issued a)
invitation to him to surrender, coupled with threats of ven
geance upon his people if he declined the invitation. In Sep
tember (1887), the thoroughly cowed king answered th
summons in person, having first turned over the care of hi
people to his powerful ally, Mataafa. The entrance of th
sorrowful Laupepa into Apia as a prisoner of war was a teai
ful event. In a farewell address to his followers he said : -

On account of my great love to my country, and my grej
affection to all Samoa, this is the reason that I deliver up m
body to the German Government. That Government may do f
they wish with me. The reason of this is because I do not desii
that the blood of Samoa shall be spilt for me again. But I (
not know what is my offence which has caused tlieir anger to ii
and to my country. . . . Taumasanga, farewell ; Manono an
family, farewell. So, also, Salafai, Tutuila, Ansa, and Atu
farewell.

To Mr. Sewall, who he believed should have more vigo
ously exerted the " good offices " heretofore mentioned, 1
wrote : —

When the chief Tamasese and others first moved the presei
troubles, it was my wish to punish them and put an end to tl
rebellion, but I yielded to the advice of the British and Americi
consuls. Assistance and protection was repeatedly promised
me and my government if I abstained from bringing war apt i
my country. Relying upon these promises, I did not put dov,
the rebellion. Now I find that war has been made upon me 1

THE UNITED STATES AND SAMOA 235

the Emperor of Germany, and Tamasese has been proclaimed King
of Samoa. I desire to remind you of the promise so frequently
made by your government, and trust that you will so far redeem
them as to cause the lives and liberties of my chiefs and people
to be respected.

As a hero, then, amid the lamentations of his people, Malie-
toa Laupepa was deported in exile to distant lands. For
several years he disappears from view.

These events occurring in the face of the agreement to
leave Samoa matters in statu quo were not overlooked at
Washington. The action of the Germans was clearly in con-
tempt of this mutual understanding. There is a positive-
ness in German manners, which, although not intended to
give offence, is sometimes as irritating as an unfriendly act.
The Secretary of State was annoyed by the dash Mr. Becker
had taken into forbidden fields, but he felt more offended by
the arrogance of his authority. In the ensuing correspond-
ence, Bismarck persistently laid the blame upon the American
consuls, one and all, whose conduct in Apia, he declared, had
always been hostile to German interests. Secretary Bayard
could only reply that it was the German and not the Ameri-
can consuls who had brought about Samoa's troubles.

With Malietoa out of the way, the main obstacle to the
success of Becker's plans was removed. Mataafa, however,
was arming ; but Tamasese was already armed, tlie alert
lirandeis having looked to that. The next step was to
silence the American and English consuls who were openly
hostile to his schemes. It will be remembered that the port
of Apia and a narrow strip of land on either side were neu-
tral territory over which the three powers exercised the right
of extraterritoriality. The municipality was governed by a
tripartite arrangement, the citizens of the three ])()wers pre-
sunud>ly sharing about equally the control of urban affairs,
and enjoying in equal proportion the spoils of ollice. The
judge of the municipal court at this time was a (ierman sub-
ject wliose term liad some time since elapsed, and who should
have been succeeded by an American, according to tlic stipu-
lated system of rotation in oflicc. An Anglo-Saxon judge was

236 AMERICAN DIPLOMATIC QUESTIONS

not what the Germans in Apia wanted at that particular junc-
ture, so Mr. Becker began a process of elbowing out the
foreigners from the councils of the municipalic}'. To ac-
complish this task satisfactorily required some very skilful
manoeuvring, but Mr. Becker was fully equal to the occa-
sion. For some weeks, with various excuses, he absented
himself from the regular consular meetings, thus preventing
the necessary quorum for the consideration of municipal
affairs. Finally appearing at an appointed meeting, he took
advantage of the fact that the American Consul, Mr. Sewall,
was not present, although it is believed he knew that the
belated official was hastening to the meeting. He quickly
left for his home to write a letter to Mr. Sewall, in which he
said that lie regretted to be obliged to consider the municipal
government to be in abeyance, " since you have refused to
take part in the meeting." By resort to such a doubtful
method, he succeeded in abrogating the neutrality of Apia,
while he instantly became deaf to all the protests and de-
nunciations showered upon him by the indignant Americans.
He duly announced that Apia was Samoan territory, over
which Tamasese ruled.

The German flag still flying at Mulinuu no longer tres-
passed therefore upon neutral territory ; the king himself
resided in a German house on German land ; the king
governed Apia, and the (iermans controlled the king. To
cap the climax, Tamasese appointed a German judge to pre-
side over the courts of Apia. Captain Brandeis was made
Prime Minister, and Mr. Weber, of the German firm, was
the power behind the throne. At last German persistence
was crowned with full and complete success.

The Tamasese- Brandeis Government continued in active
operation from the latter part of 1887 until September 1888,
when its career drew to a sanguinary close. After the excite-
ments of revolution were well over, and the ruffled tempers
of the foreigners in Apia had had time to subside, it
was found that the new government was not a wholly
bad one after all. Brandeis appears to have been a man of
considerable ability and, for a professional instigator of

THE UNITED STATES AND SAMOA 237

revolution, one possessing a fair sense of justice. It seems
to have been his aim to administer his government with
strict impartiality toward the business interests of the
several nationalities. Roads were built; taxes, though some-
what excessive, were well applied, and many needed reforms
were instigated. Indeed, many of the foreigners in Apia
who had bitterly opposed the change gradually became recon-
ciled to the new conditions. But the fault of the Tamasese-
Brandeis Government lay in its origin. In the nature of
things it could nut last. The seizure and deportation of
Malietoa never ceased to rankle in native breasts, and ])aek
in the forests plots were continually hatching against Tam-
asese and German rule. No government, in fact, that strictly
enforced its decrees could long remain popular with the
iasy-going Samoans. From day to day dissatisfied natives
Irifted into Mataafa's camp, for Mataafa had Malietoa blood
n his veins, and stood for the vindication of his exiled
cinsman.

The ambitious Taraasese, within the limits of his circum-

jcribed powers, like tlie beggar on horseback, rode too liard.

lie liad gained honors, and he craved distinction. lie began

issuming honorific titles, finally dubljing himself with the

ligliest of them all, the sacred name of "Malietoa." The

lUegiance of many of Tamasese's own best supi)orters was at

>est none too sure, and a host of these became indignant

v'ith their monarch for this unholy folly. The clansmen of

dalietoa, who regarded Tamasese as a mere usurper, sliielded

•y German forces, felt their tenderest sentiments outraged.

he one consistent and uncompromising enemy to the new

L^ime in Apia was the American Consul, Mr. Sewall. The

iimasese-Brandeis Government had been conceived in a spirit

f unfricndliiHjss to his (.'ouiitry, and liad been planned and

xccutcd l)y the Germans in disregard of their obligations.

II fact, it was being maintained in defiance of liis own

rotests, and tlie complaints of his Secretary of State. lie

•It himself to have been hoodwinked in the abrogation of

. lie neutrality of Apia, and he eould iKjt forgive Becker for

I is duplicity.

I

238 AMERICAN DIPLOMATIC QUESTIONS

In August, 1888, Mataafa suddenly became aggressive and
made an attack, though unsuccessful, upon Tamasese at
Mulinuu, and then retired to marshal his strength for another
assault. Instantly all the suppressed antii:)athies of the two
parties in the islands rekindled, — the Tamaseses rallied
about the king at ]Mulinuu ; Brandeis dug trenches in active
preparation to meet the coming assaults. From neighboring
islands the sympathizers of Mataafa came in their canoes to
share in the threatened conflict. In Apia the price of arms
and ammunition reached a fabulous figure, and could only
then be bought by the natives upon a declaration showing on
which side they were to be used.

To strike terror into the hearts of the " rebels," the Ger-
man warship Adler proceeded to bombard native villages
along: the coast that were known to favor Mataafa. It was
then that Commander Leary of the U. S. S. Adams addressed
a letter to the German captain which w^as calculated to remove
all doubt as to which side in the coming contest he and the
American citizens in Apia had given their sympathies. He
said: "The revolutionists had an armed force in the field,
within a few miles of this harbor, when the vessels under your
command transported the Tamasese troops to a neighboring
island with the avowed intention of making war on the isolated
homes of the women and children of the enemy. Being the
only other representative of a naval power now present in
this harbor, for the sake of humanity, I hereby respectfully
and solemnly protest in the name of the United States of
America, and of the civilized world in general, against the
use of a national war vessel for services as were yesterday
rendered by the German corvette Adler.'''' This well-directed
protest was followed by a series of thrusts on the part of Com-
mander Leary that stung the German Captain's temper. The
best of jokes may be pushed too far, and in this respect Com-
mander Leary probably transgressed. His iinal offence, by in-
viting through inference or implication, the commander of the
Adler to meet him in combat, in no way relieved the tension.
Upon this particular occasion the German man-of-war had
taken position to bombard a native village, and Leary

THE UNITED STATES AND SAMOA 239

steamed in betAveen him and the shore, announcing that if
the German commander intended to carry out his purpose he
would be obliged to tire through the Adams.

In September, 1888, ]Mataafa, having been crowned king
by his own supportei's, led another attack upon the gov-
ernment forces under Tamasese and Brandeis which were
intrenched upon either side of Apia. The battle of Ma-
tautu (September 12) raged all day and well into the night,
and was perhaps the greatest battle ever fought upon the
islands- The amount of ammunition expended is said to
have been something quite extraordinary, and " the noise
deafening" ; when the smoke cleared away the government
forces were found to have been driven back into their
stronghokl of Mulinuu. Only about forty dead were left
upon the field, no doubt a humiliating disappointment to
both sides.

With American and Englisli sympath}- avowedly in favor
of Mataafa and hostile to the Germans, social relations in
Apia were rapidly reaching an uncomfortable stage. Those
ordinary amenities that render endurable the association
of men of opposing interests were cast aside. Opportunities
came daily for the commission of unfriendly acts which served
to inflame further tlie growing enmity of Germans and Ameri-
cans. For example ; one Scanlon, an American half-cast,
owned a house near ]Mulinuu which was raided by Tamasese
men, more for the purpose of adding Scanlon's pigs to their
rations tlian on account of any especial ill-feeling toward
Scanlon himself. The matter came before Connnander
Leary, who welcomed an ineidt'nt that furnished another ex-
cuse for an adventure. With military ])omp and a show of
force he occupied the Scankju house and declared his inten-
tion of shelling Tamasese across the way. The (iermans
were greatly outraged In' this ^'meddling" in Samoan aft'airs,
but they nevertheless advised the king to shift his quarters.
It was thus by American threats that Tamasese and his
warriors were obliged to abandon their fortified position at
Mulinuu and take to the bush. Then it may be said the
point of war was almost reached between the supporters of

240 AMERICAN DIPLOMATIC QUESTIONS

the two native factions, — the Germans and Americans in
Apia. So critical indeed had the situation become, that the
various consulates were converted into veritable fortresses
for the refuge" of their citizens.

After a series of inconclusive skirmishes between the
forces of Mataafa and Tamasese, Dr. Knappe, the German
Consul (Becker had been recalled), decided upon a final
stroke, — to disarm and probably capture Mataafa. In the
small hours of the morning of December 18, 1888, a force of
150 marines was silently landed from the German war ves-
sel and was proceeding inland when suddenly the woods
became alive with Mataafa warriors. The squad of blue-
jackets only retired after a desperate struggle, leaving 50
dead and wounded in the jungle. The following telegram
reached Washington soon after : —

Three war ships undertaken to disarm Mataafa. Landed at
night force to prevent retreat. Mataafa's men fired on and forced
to fight. Germans routed. Twenty killed, thirty wounded.
Germans swear vengeance. Shelling and burning indiscrimi-
nately regardless of American property. Protest unheeded. Na-
tives exasperated. Foreigners' lives and propei"ty in greatest
danger. Germans respect no neutral territory. Americans in
boats flying. American flag seized in Apia harbor by armed
German boats, but released. Admiral with squadron necessary
immediately.

The Mataafans were jubilant. They had made a great
and valuable discovery, as had the Caribs of Porto Rico
when they lield a Spaniard under water to discover whether
or not white men bore a charmed life.

If the relations between the Anglo-Saxons and Teutons in
Apia had been bad before, they now became worse. Herr
Knappe accused the American and English consuls of compli-
city in the massacre of German soldiers, and a volume of native
testimony was adduced to prove the cliarge. Whatever might
be the value of a native oath, it is certain that the English
Consul, Mr. de Coetlogon, did not give a signal to the
natives at the time of the landing of marines from the Adlrr.

THE UNITED STATES AND SAMOA 241

and it is equally certain that the American Vice-Consul,
Mr. Blacklock, did not set a trap for the luckless German
blue-jackets. The infuriated Knappe, goaded to desperation
by the miscarriage of his plans, determined upon immediate
revenge, and he prepared for an active campaign against
Mataafa. He began by proclaiming martial law over Apia,
including Americans and English under its operation.
They declined to heed the proclamation. Such were the
social conditions in Apia at this trying period, that when
the British Consul protested against German martial law
over his subjects, Dr. Knappe replied: "I have had the
honor of receiving your Excellency's agreeable communica-
tion of to-day. Since, on the ground of received instructions,
martial law has been declared in Samoa, British subjects, as
well as others, fall under its application. I warn you, there-
fore, to abstain from such a proclamation as you announce in
your letter. It will ])e such a piece of business as shall make
yourself answerable under martial law. Besides, your proc-
lamation will be disregarded."

Accounts of the desperate condition of affairs in Apia
needed none of the usual colorings of sensational journalism
to excite the people of the United States. In its plain, un-
varnished recital it was sufficient to create alarm; Germany
had broken her pledge; the American flag had i3ractically been
fired upon. War with Germany was seriously discussed.
The truth of the war rumors which spread over the country
was apparently corrol)orated, both by the firm attitude of
the government at Washington, and Ijy the immediate reen-
forcement of the American fleet in Samoa.

In answer to Vice-Consul Blacklock's stirring cable.
Admiral Kiml)erly was hurriedly sent to Apia. He ar-
rived on tlie U. S. S. Trenton, m March (ISS'.I), and fmind
a formidable array of warships anchored in the harbor,
all ch-ared for action and awaiting developments. I'pon
this bellicose scene, a bolt, as from heaven, fell. The
imagination could supply no more dramatit; sequel to this
gatiiering of warships. A Inirricane (March Id) destroyed
all tlie vessels in the harljor save one, the Calliope (English),

242 AMERICAN DIPLOMATIC QUESTIONS

which, after a memorable battle against the elements, suc-
ceeded in safely steaming out to sea. In the common dis-
aster, all belligerents forgot their quarrels and animosities ;
Mataafans liastened to the relief of German sailors, and
Tamaseses heroically rescued Americans. The power of
Germany and of the United States in Samoa was thus sud-
denly and utterly broken. The great storm cleansed and
sweetened the torrid air of Apia. Seemingly, providence,
according to its own methods, had undertaken to cure the
Samoan distemper. Before this terrible catastrophe had
arrived, however, the Samoan imbroglio had again fallen
into the hands of the three powers for adjustment.

VII

It is pleasing to note a prevailing calmness of tone in the
official correspondence between Washington and Berlin dur-
ing this period (1887-89), relative to Samoa. It contrasts
strongly with the feverish and hysterical temper of the com-
munications between the consuls in Apia, and in letters to
their home governments. Mr. Bayard and Mr, Blaine on
the one hand, and Prince Bismarck on the other, were con-
tinually prodded by communications from Apia sounding
many alarms and craving sanction for many deeds of doubt-
ful propriety. The communications passing between these
premiers indicate, almost without exception, a desire for
moderation. Each hopes that the impetuosity of his excited
officials in Samoa may be pardoned, in order that the ques-
tions at issue may amicably be settled. Between the lines
of these formal despatches a trace of weariness may often
be detected, which might render a fairly correct reading,
despite the actual words used, to be, "• Tliey are at it again ;
will they never stop? Your men have done wrong ; control
them better, and I sliall try to control mine ; " and finally,
"It is of no use ; we must ourselves settle their difficulties,
and over their heads, — let us meet for the purpose."

In October, 1887, Mr. Bayard cabled to Berlin tliat the
state of affairs in Samoa " is very distressing, and can only

THE UNITED STATES AND SAMOA 243

be made worse by a continuation of the war " ; that Mr.
Sewall has been instructed to " preserve a strict neutrality " ;
and suggests the "advisabilit}' of the immediate election of
a king and a vice-king, as agreed to in the conference." The
reply that " all the important chiefs who had assembled had
formally recognized Tamasese as king," indicates a miscon-
ception in Berlin of the true situation in Samoa. "The
conduct of Malietoa," said Bismarck, "had become unbear-
able, maltreating the Germans, and finally permitting out-
rages upon those who were properly celebrating the birthday
of the emperor [the prince referred to the bar-rcjom brawl
before mentioned] ; that the German Government had deter-
mined to deal with him personally." On January 17, 1888,
Mr. Bayard forwarded to the United States Minister in
Berlin a long communication, reviewing in detail the events
in Samoa following the adjournment of the commission, and
complaining of the course of the German representative in
Apia. This unwarranted course consisted in forcibly creat-
ing Tamasese king, in aljrogating the neutrality of the i)ort,
and in ignoring the protests of the American Consul — all
alleged to be in derogation of the understanding of the three
powers to leave the situation in statu quo until a final
settlement. Mr. Bayard continued : —

The conclusion at wjiich T am forced to arrive from the review
of recent events in Samoa is that the present unfortunate situation
there is due not to any action on the part of the representative
of the United States, but to the fomentation by interested for-
eigners of native dissensions, and to the desire exhibited in a
marked degree by those in charge of local German interests to ol>
tain personal and commercial advantages and political supremacy.

Closing the despatch, he said : —

Owing, doubtless, to her commercial preponderance in the
islands, to Germany the primary oi)ject lias seemed to be the
estahlishment of a stronger government. To the United States,
the object first in importance has seemed to be the preservation
of native independence and autonomy. And so regarding the
matter, this Government, while not (piestioning Germany's assur-

244 AMERICAN DIPLOMATIC QUESTIONS

ances of the absence of any intention on her part to annex or
establish a protectorate over the islands, has been compelled to
dissent from propositions which seemed to subordinate all other
considerations to the strengthening of the German commercial
and landed interests in the islands, and correspondingly to
diminish, if not entirely to destroy, the probability of the estab-
lishment of a Samoan Government, and of the neutralization of
the group, at least in respect to the powers now immediately
concerned.

During the peaceful continuance of the Tamasese Govern-
ment, until the autumn of 1888, but few despatches of real
importance concerning Samoan matters passed between the
powers. Both England and the United States felt dissatis-
fied with the situation ; and while resenting the action of
Germany in overturning the native government and setting
up a king of their own choosing, they appeared to be adverse
to further interference, so long as affairs in the islands moved
along smoothl}^ and the new government gave reasonable
satisfaction to all parties. In the autumn of 1888, however,
when Mataafa entered upon the scene in open rebellion
against Tamasese and the German regime, the questions of
neutrality and of German aggression were reopened. Mr.
Bayard wrote to Berlin, November 21, 1888, that as often
stated theretofore, "the desire of this Government is to see
a lawful and orderly condition of affairs established in Samoa,
under a government freely chosen by the Samoan people.
As to what chief may be at the head of that government, it
is to this government a matter of indifference. ... If any
cause of complaint should arise out of differences between
the consuls at Apia, the matter should be taken up by their
respective governments, and settled at once directl}' between
them and not be left to be tlie subject of contention in
Samoa."

As the revolution progressed, and the situation in Apia
became more acute, the communications between the powers
took on a slight degree of petulance. Count Arco-Valley,
the (ierman Minister in Washington, reported to the State
Departme^it, January 10, 1880, that ; —

THE UNITED STATES AMD SAMOA 245

The German forces were landed after the German commander
had given notice of his intention to the commanders of the Ameri-
can and British men-of-war, the reason for landing being that some
German plantations were in danger.

Upon so landing, the Germans were attacked by the Samoans
under the command of Klein [a newspaper correspondent], an
American citizen, and lost fifty men killed and wounded. A
state of war with Samoa is therefore announced by Germany, and
as an American is alleged to have been in command of the attack-
ing Sauioan force, Count Arco is instructed to make complaint to
the United States.

Count Arco is also ordered at the same time by his government
to say that the treaty rights of the United States shall be
respected under all circumstances, and all the rights of the treaty
powers.

The German Government also begs the United States to join
them in an active way to restore calm and quiet in the island —
equally for the three treaty powers.

Mr. Bayard disclaimed any responsibility for Klein, and
called Count Arco-Valley's attention to the agreement of the
three powers in 1887 to leave to the Samoans the free election
of a king according to their own will and custom. He added
(January 12, 1889): —

It would seem most opportune if such an election could now
practically be held, and I feel assured that it would do much
towards ending the turbulent and bitter discontent which has led
to the shocking internecine warfare among these islanders, and
finally involved them in a deeply regrettable conflict with German
forces, which is sincerely deplored by the United States.

Prince Bismarck was less complaisant. On January 13,
(1889), he wrote, in reference to the midnight raid of the
German blue-jackets: —

. . . This unprovoked attack is said to have taken place
under the leadership of an American named Klein. On this
occasion more than fifty German soldiers and officers were killed
and wounded.

In consofpience of this we have been ti-aiisplaiitcd from the ter-
ritory of mediatorial negotiations, by which the i)ii])erial consul in

246 AMERICAN DIPLOMATIC QUESTIONS

Apia was trying to reconcile the contending parties, and for
which he had sought the cooperation of his English and
American colleagues, into a state of war with the assailants, to
our regret.

We shall carry on the contest which has been forced upon us
by Mataafa and his followers, with the utmost consideration for
English and American interests. Our military measures have
in view only the punishment of the murderers of German
soldiers and the protection of our countrymen and their property.
As they, on their part, are at war with Tamasese, our interference
will necessarily assume the character of assistance to Tama-
sese. . . .

The words " unprovoked attack " and the " murder " of
German soldiers, are especially interesting, in the light of the
fact that the armed marines were admittedly landed with
hostile intent. It seems almost unworthy of the man of blood
and iron to refer to the defeat of his troops in legitimate
warfare as a "murderous crime." What if, in the darkness
of that night, those same marines had succeeded in surpris-
ing their enemy, and had fallen upon the guard of Mataafa ?
Would it have been a "murderous crime" or merely a
" regrettable incident " ?

Count Arco-Valley complained that the task of settling
these difficulties by amicable arrangement " has been ren-
dered difficult by the fact that the officer in charge of the
American consulate and the commander of the American
war vessel [Leary] have, during the present revolution on the
Samoan Islands, openly taken part against Chief Tamasese,
who is recognized by the imperial government, and have sup-
ported Mataafa." In this the count may not have been so
very far from the truth, and Mr. Bayard in his reply was also
substantially correct in saying that " neither of these officers
has assumed on behalf of the Government of the United
States, to recognize Chief Mataafa, or to do any act contrary to
the rival claims of Chief Tamasese, other than to take neces-
sary steps to protect Americans and their interest in those
islands." In the same communication (January 18, 1889)
he sounded the key-note of the American policy in Samoa as
follows : —

THE UNITED STATES AND SAMOA 247

Deep as is the regret felt by this Government for the lament-
able conflicts which have lately taken place between Germans and
the adherents of one of the native factions in Samoa, and however
sincere our hope that the unfortunate occurrence may be satisfac-
torily settled, this Government continues to feel it to be its duty
to maintain its attitude of consistent neutrality, and not abandon
the belief professed and acted upon for three years or more, that
the best assurance of peace and guaranty for the equal protection
of the rights of the three treaty powers in Samoa will be found
in permitting and assisting the natives freely to choose their own
king, who should be recognized by the three powers and assisted
by them in the administration of good government.

In closing the letter, he urged that : —

The objection to Tamasese is wholly on the part of the pre-
ponderating number of his own countrymen who deny that he was
ever chosen by popular will, or that he is acceptable to them ; to
insist, therefore, upon his rule is to substitute the will of foreign-
ers for the Samoan native government for which the majority
have manifested their strong desire and which the treaty powers
had certainly agreed to respect.

When news of Dr. Ivnappe's proclamation of martial law
reached Washington and Berlin, Secretary Bayard protested
vigorously, and Bismarck realized that his energetic officer
in Apia was over zealous. On February 1 he addressed
the State Department: —

When the state of war was declared against jNFataafa the
commander of the German squadron issued a proclamation by
which the foreigners established in Samoa were subjected to mar-
tial law. International law would, to a certain extent, not pre-
vent such a measure, but as Prince Bismarck is of the opinion that
our military authority has gone too far in this instance, the mili-
tary commander has received telegraphic orders to withdraw the
pait of his proclamation concerning foreigners.

In negotiation with Mataafa our consul at Samoa has asked
that the administration of the islands of Samoa might be tempo-
rarily handed over to him, which demand not being in conformity
to our previous promises regarding the neutraHty and indepen-
tleiice of Samoa, Mr. Kiiai)pe has heen ordered by telegram to
withdraw immediately his demand.

248 AMERICAN DIPLOMATIC QUESTIONS

This seemed indeed to be a very large concession from
Prince Bismarck; clearly he was not in accord with Dr.
Knappe's scheme to gain political control of the group, or,
if so, he disapproved of the consul's methods. Becker and
Knappe had played a high-handed game in Samoa, and had
lost, and Bismarck seems to have become weary of the sham
that was being conducted in the name of Germany. On
February 4, he instructed the minister in Washington to
represent to the Secretary of State that : —

The present situation in Samoa regarding the interests of the
three treaty powers renders it necessary to renew the attempt to
bring the future of those islands to an luiderstandiug.

The position of the three treaty powers in the civilized world
makes it their duty to stop the bloody combat accompanied by
barbarous customs of those not numerous tribes, for whose wel-
fare, according to the judgment of the civilized world, it is a duty
of the treaty powers to provide.

Prince Bismarck, in consecpience, considers it a duty of the par-
ticipating governments to put an end, by the agreement of the
treaty powers, to the troubles which have originated in Samoa,
and by restitution of peace among the Samoans themselves, and
so make an end of future bloodshed and the horrors of a civil war
conducted with barbarous cruelty among the natives.

The best remedy seems to be a resumption of the consultation
wliich took place between the representatives of Germany, Eng-
land, and the United States, in the year 1887, at Washington, and
at that time adjourned without any possibility of their represent-
atives coming to any agreement.

In consequence, I have been requested by Prince Bismarck to
propose to you to resume with Germany and the British Govern-
ment the consultation regarding the Samoan question. . . .

Tlius Germany opened the door and the United States most
willingly entered. Mr. Bayard's reply was ready the follow-
ing day (February 5th) : " The President . . . requests me
to say that he fully shares in the desire expressed by the prince
chancellor to bring the blessings of peace and order to the
remote and feeble community of semi-civilized people inhabit-
ing the islands of Sanu)a; and that he clearly recognizes the
duty of the powerful nations of Christendom to deal with these

THE UNITED STATES AND SAMOA 249

people in a spirit of magnanimity and benevolence." "The
sooner this conference can be resumed, the better," he added.

John A. Kasson of Iowa, William Walter Phelps of New
Jersey, and George H. Bates (the former commissioner to
Samoa) were appointed United States commissioners to meet
in Berlin similarly qualified plenipotentiaries of Germany
and Great Britain. The spirit of their instructions was
embodied in two short sentences: "The obligation of tlie
United States in the South Pacific is to protect the rights
and interests of American citizens who may be residents
tliere, and engaged in lawful pursuits. We have no desire to
dominate." The commission was instructed by Mr. Blaine: —

First, To ask the restoration of the status quo. While
the President was unwilling to consider that action of Ger-
many, which immediately followed the suspension of the
conferences at Washington, as intentionally derogatory either
to the dignity or the interests of the other treaty powers, yet
lie could not but regard it, under the circumstances, as an
abrupt breach of the joint relations of the three powers.

Second, To seek for the organization of a stable govern-
mental system for the islands, whereby native independence
and autonomy should be preserved free from the control or
the preponderating influence of any foreign government ;
and also free " from all occasions of trouble arising from and
fostered into mischievous activit}' by the avarice and eager-
ness of competing merchants and laud speculators, and the
irregular conduct of foreign ot'hcials, who are, perhaps natur-
dly and excusably, l)ut most injudiciously sympathetic witli
lie prejudices and immediate interests of their resident
•ouutrymen."

'Jhird, To effect some system of adjustment and registry
>f land claims.

Fourth, To seek the adoption of some form of regulations
or the imjjortation and sale of fire-arms and alcoholic liquors,
hat fatal combinaticjn where peace is desired.

Fifth, To use discretionary powers in adjusting tlie ques-
ions of neutrality and govermnent in the municipality of
Vpia.

250 AMERICAN DIPLOMATIC QUESTIONS

The commission met in Berlin, April 29, 1889. Prince
Bismarck was chosen to preside over the meetings, which
continued until June 14, on which day the General Act of
Berlin was signed by the plenipotentiaries. During the
course of the discussion (at the 5th session, on May 22d),
Mr. Kasson introduced the subject of restoring the status quo
in Samoa. Prince Bismarck replied that the principle of
election in the clioice of a king by the natives was acceptable
to him, but that he was bound to make one exception in the
person of Mataafa, on account of the outrages committed by
his adherents, and under his authority, upon dead and wounded
German sailors lying on the field of action. Sir Edward Malet,
(English) thought the exception fair and reasonable, and sug-
gested that as Malietoa had been released by Germany, " Ave,
therefore, propose that in the interest of the peace and the
prosperity of the islands, it should be intimated to the
Sanioan people that if they will take Malietoa as king, such
act on the part of the Samoans shall receive the sanction of
the treaty powers."

This seemed to all parties a good solution of the difficulty.
With two rival chieftains in the field (Mataafa and Tama-
sese), it was felt that if the first selection of a ruler under
the new system were left to the natives, it would cer-
tainly lead to a renewal of civil war. As Mataafa was
persona non grata to the Germans, and Tamasese's influence
among the natives was waning, the restored Malietoa ap-
peared to be the logical candidate. His former popu-
larity in the islands would no doul)t be enhanced by the
martyrdom he had suffered in his country's cause, and he
was moreover entirely acceptable to the three treaty powers.
Sir Edward Malet's proposal was referred to a committee on
revision, and subsequently adopted.

This first restriction in the " autonomous " scheme of gov-
ernment for Samoa proved a mistake, as future events
showed. It would probably have been wiser in the end had
liismarck overcome his very natural prejudice to INIataafa
and permitted the natives from the beginning a freer rein
in the choice of their kincr.

THE UNITED STATES AND SAMOA 251

The treaty as finally ratified provided an elaborate system
of government for the islands, and the United States stood
pledged, for the first time in its history, to share the respon-
sibilities of good government in another nation and to assume,
in a measure, the role of protector.

It will be seen that a variety of causes, leading step by
step, in the settlement of the Saraoan difficulty, induced the
United States to ignore those precedents which the wisdom
of its earlier statesmen had established. American trade
relations in Samoa were comparatively insignificant, and the
number of American citizens residing there was ridiculously
small. From a political point of view, the Samoans were
like children, and it was recognized, both at Washington in
1887, and at Berlin in 1889, that a purely native government
could not maintain itself. No two of the powers would
consent to invest the other with exclusive control, so the only
possible solution of the proljlem seemed to be a tripartite
agreement to establisli and support some form of government
at Apia in which all three powers would participate.

15 Lit just there lay the weakness, perhaps tlie folly, of the

American attitude toward the wliole (juestion ; it was fear

that the rule of another nation in Samoa would operate

idversely to the private interests of American citizens in

Apia. It would have been far more economical, if expense

s a consideration, to have bought outright all the American

irivate interests in the islands, or indeed, from a sentimental

Uandpoint, if the sense of ownership is pleasant, to liave

)argained with Germany and England for American annexa-

ion of the group. Possibly an altruistic desire to promote

he ha})piness and welfare of the natives by aiding them in

he establishment of good government may have influenced

he United States to some extent, but this supposition will not

tear too close analysis. Nations do not scatter the seeds of

"hilantiiropy l)roadcast, but are far more likely to j)]aiit their

rops wliere the soil is good or the jxtsitiou is advantageous

i)r military or other good reasons. At all events, the United

■tates drifted out of an old chamiel into a new one. In

.igning the treaty of Berlin, the American nation entered

252 AMERICAN DIPLOMATIC QUESTIONS

into an " entangling alliance " with foreign powers that at
once involved it in foreign political affairs that concerned it
the very least.

In substance the General Act of Berlin provides as fol-
lows : —

Article I

A declaration respecting the iiulejjendence and neutrality of the
islands of /Samoa, and assuring to the resiwctive citizens and subjects
of the signatory jiowers eqncdity of rights in said islands, and 2)ro-
viding for the immediate restoration of peace and order therein.

It is declared that the islands of Samoa are neutral territory,
in which the citizens and subjects of the three signatory powers
have equal rights of residence, trade, and personal protection.
The three powers recognize the independence of the Samoan
Government and the free right of the natives to elect their chief
or king and choose their form of government according to their
own laws and customs. Neither of the powers shall exercise any
separate control over the islands or the government thereof.

It is further declared, with a view to the prompt restoration
of peace and good order in the said islands, and in view of the
difficulties which would surround an election in the present dis-
ordered condition of their government, that Malietoa Laupepa, who
was formally made and appointed king, on the 12th day of July,
1881, and was so recognized l)y the three powers, shall again be
so recogiuzed hereafter in the exercise of such authority unless
the three powers shall by common accord otherwise declare; and
his successor shall be duly elected according to the laws and
customs of Samoa.

Article II ,

A declaration respecting the modification of existing treaties and
the assent of the Samoan Government to this act.

Article III

A declaration respecting the establishment of a supreme court of
justice for Samoa and defining ifsjurisdictio)).

Section 1. A supreme court shall be established in Samoa,
to consist of one judge, who shall be styled chief justice of
Samoa, and wlu) shall ap})oint a clerk and a marshal of the
court. . . .

THE UNITED Sl'ATES AND SAMOA 253

Section 2. With a view to secure judicial iudependence and
the equal consideration of the rights of all parties, irrespective of
nationality, it is agreed that the chief justice shall be named
by the three signatory powers in common accord; or, failing
their agreement, he may be named by the King of Sweden and
Norway. He shall be learned in law and equity, of nu\ture
years, and of good repute for his sense of honor, impartiality,
and justice.

His decision upon questions -within his jurisdiction shall be
final. He shall be appointed by the Samoan Government upon
the certificate of his nomination as herein provided. He shall
receive an annual salary of six thousand dollars ($6()00.()0)
in gold, or its equivalent, to be paid the first year in equal pro-
portions by the three treaty powers, and afterwards out of
the revenues of Samoa apportioned to the use of the Samoan
Government, upon which his compensation shall be the first
charge. . . .

Section 4. The supreme court shall have jurisdiction of all
questions arising under the provisions of this general act, and the
decision or order of the court thereon shall be conclusive upon all
residents of Samoa. The court shall' also have a})pellate jurisdic-
tion over all municipal magistrates and officers.

Section G. In case any question shall hereafter arise in Samoa
respecting the rightful election or appointment of king or of any
other chief claiming authority over the islands, or respecting the
validity of the powers which the king or any chief may claim in
the exercise of his office, such question shall not lead to war, but
shall be presented for decision to the chief justice of Samoa, who
shall decide it in writing, conformably to the provisions of this
act and to the laws and customs of Samoa not in conflict there-
with ; and the signatory govei'uments will accept and abide by
such decision.

Section 7. In case any difference shall arise between either of
the treaty powers and Samoa which they shall fail to adjust by
mutual accord, such diffeience shall not be held cause for war, but
shall be refen-ed for adjustment on the principles of justice aud
equity to th(^ chief justice of Samoa, who shall iiuikc his decisiun
thereon in writing.

Section 9. Upon the organization of the supreme court tliere
shall be transferred to its exclusive jurisdiction: —

d) All civil suits concerning real i)roperty situated in Samoa,
and all rights affecting tlie same.

(2) All civil suits of any kind between natives and foreigners
or between foreigners of different nationalities.

254 AMERICAN DIPLOMATIC QUESTIONS

(3) All crimes and offences committed by natives against for-
eigners or committed by such foreigners as are not subject to any
consular jurisdiction. . . .

Section 10. The practice and procedure of common law, equity,
and admiralty, as administered in the courts of England, may be
— so far as applicable — the practice and procedure of this court ;
but the court may modify such practice and procedure from time
to time as shall be required by local circumstances. The court
shall have authority to impose, according to the crime, the pun-
ishment established therefor by the laws of the United States, of
England, or of Germany, as the chief justice shall decide most
appropriate ; or, in the case of native Samoans and other natives
of the South Sea Islands, according to the laws and customs of
Samoa.

Section 11. Nothing in this article shall be so construed as to
affect existing consular jurisdiction over all questions arising be-
tween masters and seamen of their respective national vessels. . . .

Article IV

A declaration respecting titles to land in Samoa and rest7'aini7ig
the disposition thereof by natives, and jwoviding for the investigation
of claims thereto and for the registration, of valid titles. . . .

Section 2. In order to adjust and settle all claims by aliens of
titles to land, or auy interest therein in the islands of Samoa, it
is declared that a commission shall be appointed, to consist of
three (3) impartial and competent persons, one to be named by
each of the three treaty powers, to be assisted by an officer, to be
styled natives' advocate, who shall be appointed by the chief
executive of Samoa, with the approval of the chief justice of
Samoa. . . .

Article V

A declaration respecting the municipal district of Apia, providing
a loccd administration therefor, and defining the Jurisdiction of the
municipal magistrate. . . .

Article VI

A declaration respecting taxation and revenue in Samoa.

Section 1. The jiort of Apia shall be the port of entry for all
dutiable goods arriving in the Samoan Islands ; and all foreign
goods, wares, and merchandise landed on the islands shall be there
entered for examination. . . .

THE UNITED STATES AND SAMOA 255

Article YII

A declaration respecting arms and ammunition and intoxicating
liquors, restraining their sale and use. . . .

Article VIII
General disjjositions.

Section 1. The provisions of this act shall continue in force
until changed by consent of the three powers. Upon the request
of either power after three years from the signature hereof, the
powers shall consider by common accord what ameliorations, if
any, may be introduced into the provisions of this general act.
In the meantime, any special amendment may be adopted by the
consent of the three powers, with the adherence of Samoa. . . .

The assent of Samoa to this general act shall be attested by a
certificate thereof signed b}^ the King and executed in triplicate,
of which one copy shall be delivered to the consul of each of the
signatory powers at Apia for immediate transmission to his
Government. . . .

It "will be observed that the first article of the act sets
forth the recognition of the "independence of the Samoan
Government and the free right of the natives to elect their
chief or king and choose their form of government according
to their own laws and customs." The act then proceeds to
evolve a system of "autonomous government" for the patient
Samoans as follows : First, the king is to be elected and sup-
ported by the natives (salary later fixed at 81800 a year);
then in the same clause it is recited that tlie powers -will
select the king. Next comes a chief justice to be appointed
by the three powers jointly at a salary of s^GOOO ; he is pro-
vided with a clerk and a marshal, whose compensation is to
be derived from official fees. The jurisdiction of the Supreme
Court, w'hich is both original and appellate, covers all ques-
tions arising under the general act, and all questions con-
cerning the powers of the king. This court hear« differences
between native Samoans, reviews the quarrels of foreigners,
and exercises a right of appellate jurisdiction over all land
titles and litifjation arisiufj therefrom. In itdditioii to this and

256 AMERICAN DIPLOMATIC QUESTIONS

to the police courts of the municipality of Apia, duly pro-
vided for, the consuls of the three nations represented in
Samoa continued to maintain judicial functions according to
the various laws of extraterritorialit3\

The business of the islands is conducted at Apia, at which
port the vessels that keep alive the trade of the nation arrive
and depart, and it is there that the bulk of the revenues is col-
lected. Accordingl}- a municipal council with a chairman or
president is established. The president draws •'^5000 a year.
He is the chief executive of the district, and advises the king
""in accordance with the provisions of the general act, and not
to the prejudice of tlie rights of either of the three treaty
powers." This council has upon its table the affairs of the
municipal district of Apia, which in fact must virtually be
the affairs of Samoa, as it collects the customs revenue as well
as the taxes at the only point of export and import in the
nation, and where the great majority of the tax-payers reside.
The council appoints its own subordinate officers for the dis-
trict. All its legislative acts, however, are inoperative and
of no effect until approved by the consuls of the tliree
treaty powers in Samoa.

A land commission is established for the examination of all
claims and titles to real property, their holdings being subject
to review by the Supreme Court.

The salaries of all these officials, none of whom, excepting
the king, were likely to be native islanders, are to be paid the
first year by the contracting powers, and thereafter from the
native treasury.

Besides this corps of officials and their lists of rules and
regulations, the act provides a system of revenue containing
a schedule of export and import duties, and embracing a code
of laws covering internal taxation.

On the face of tlie treaty it plainly appears tliat the gov-
ernment provided for Samoa by tlie three powers was a joint
protectorate pure and simple, — that the Avords "autonomous
government" contained in the paper were devoid of all mean-
ing, while the act itself, in recognizing the " independence of
the Samoan Government, and the free right of the natives to

THE UNITED STATES AND SAMOA 257

elect their chief or king and choose their form of govern-
ment according to their own laws and customs," was a farce.
There is no word in the treaty that left to the king any actual
power in his own realm. Every function of legislative or
judicial government was to be performed by foreigners, who
were appointed, and maintained if need be by the power of
foreigners. The nation's revenues were to be collected, held
and disbursed by the agents of the three contracting powers ;
and finally, the consular representatives of the three powers,
whose sanction is necessary to every legislative act, mani-
festly controlled the nation's polic}'. An examination of the
treaty therefore discloses tlie fact that instead of securing to
the native Samoans an autonomous government, as it pur-
ported to do, it simpl}' stationed a cordon of foreigners about
the native king who should conduct the business of the nation
in a manner not prejudicial to the interests of their home gov-
ernments ; and lastly it confirmed in tlie consuls their supe-
rior rights over all to control the destinies of the islands.

VIII

When the fury of tlie famous luirricane was spent, the war
clouds that had hung low over Samoa for more than a year
dispersed, and the islands were left distressed, but in peace.
News of the efforts of the three powers at Berlin to solve the
Samoan social problems had reached Apia, and all, natives
and foreigners alike, remained expectant, — the latter no
doubt vastly relieved. Tamasese's straw palace fell, and that
disappointed monarch, bereft of (lerman sup[)ort, sulked in
silence in liis native village. The (ierman and Ameriean
flags were lowered, and the angry-worded ])roclamations were
torn down to be ])urned and forgotten. Dr. Knai)j)e, the
Orlando Furioso of tlie islands, was rej^laced by tlie more
astute Dr. Steubel. The once popular Malietoa Laupepa,
released from political bondage, returned from iiis long exile
in tlie Cameroons to find his power and [prestige belonging to
another, his old ally and kinsman, Mataafa. Mataafa had
fought in the trenches, and had suffered and bled for the

258 AMERICAN DIPLOMATIC QUESTIONS

cause of Samoa against the aggressions of the "invincible
strangers." He was the hero of the wars, and richly deserved
all honors. But when the Berlin treaty reached Samoa, it
was Malietoa, to the amazement of the natives, who was re-
commended as sovereign. The two chiefs found themselves
in a most embarrassing and aggravating attitude of rivalry.
Probably no other candidates for royal honors in the world
would have kept the peace under such circumstances. These
two remarkable persons began a contest of civility, each
pressing upon the other the acceptance of the crown. It
was only by the extraordinary complaisance of Mataafa (a
rare piece of good fortune for the foreigners who stood by
the treaty) that Malietoa was at last accepted as king, and
Mataafa, the Warwick, was content Avith the lesser dignity
of vice-king.

The Samoans in due time gave their formal adherence to
the treaty, and the foreigners in Apia celebrated the event.
Chief Justice Cedarcranz (appointed by the King of Sweden)
and Baron Senfft von Pilsach, the president of the municipal
board, arrived, and took up the burden of their duties. The
land commission set to work upon its seemingly endless task,
and the wheels of the massive governmental machine were
set in motion. For about one year all went well, or at least
apparently so ; but the seeds of dissatisfaction were in the
soil and were maturing slowly. Now and then the natives
betrayed rebellious symptoms, — the powers, they cried,
recognize our independence and sovereignty, and accord us
the right to elect our own king according to our own fashion,
— a fair election would make Mataafa king; we, the majority,
want Mataafa, why must we be saddled with Malietoa, who
is not our choice ? The Supreme Court entered ui)on tlie
usual routine of judicial duties, issuing warrants and other
writs, which were duly served upon the people according to
civilized custom, but which were as duly misunderstood and
disregarded by the natives. The tax gatherers under tlie
foreign regime appeared on time to collect the governmental
dues, but they entered empty houses.

The relation of the native kings to the official foreigners

THE UNITED STATES AND SAMOA 259

was far from satisfactory. Malietoa's salary, out of which lie
paid all his own expenses, amounted, all told, to scarcely ^95
a month — a beggarly allowance for even a Samoan prince
— while the monthly stipends of the chief justice, the presi-
dent of the municipality, the chief of police and the private
secretary of the chief justice were, respectively, $500, 8-415,
$140, and 8100 a month, — in all 81155. The difference was
too apparent. The natives had so often tasted the bitter
fruits of deceit in their dealings with foreigners, that sus-
picion quite naturally stole into their minds that they were
again being duped. The treaty in one sentence accorded
them rights which in the next sentence it took away. The
government was almost entirely an alien one which they, the
natives, were obliged to maintain upon a scale of generous
salaries. They realized that their own king, the only
native officer, was a mere figurehead. As an additional
cause of grievance they were being taxed to support a gov-
ernment not of their own creation, and were ])eing pnmiptly
prosecuted by the courts if tliey failed to pay. It also
appeared that the land commission was confirming too many
dubious titles in the German, English, and American traders
to seem entirely just to the Samoans — surely, they were
being plucked.

While Malietoa was nominally king, all the pomp and
ceremony of that Gilbertian office, as well as the manage-
ment of the few affairs left to the native government, fell to
the share of Mataafa. The latter having the stronger per-
sonality of the two, and being all the time conscious of the
moral support of the people, regarded the venerable Malietoa
as "his poor brother," and maintained toward his superior
an attitude of friendly and good-humored contempt. On May
31, 1891, Mataafa departed from tlie company of his col-
league and took up his abode at Malie, a town some miles
to the west of Apia, where he continued to live in royal
manner attended by retainers and entertained by the visit-
ing delegations of chieftains from all parts of tlie kingdom.
To the apprehensive foreigners of Ai)ia the d('j)artun' of
Mataafa from his post of duty by tlie side of Maliet(ja at

260 AMERICAN DIPLOMATIC QUESTIONS

Miilinuu was no less than a signal for a revolutionary out-
break. The government officials trooped en 77iasse to Malie,
to persuade the disaffected monarch to return ; and though
they plied him with argument, he politely, but none the
less firmly, declined to resume his former status of vice-
king. In Apia preparations were again made for war ; but
to the forbearance of Mataafa himself, be it said, peace was
maintained, — this, too, in spite of the fact that the govern-
ment declared Mataafa a rebel, and his estates confiscated.

The position of the latter at Malie was an anomalous one.
While enjoying the outward signs of royalty, and to all in-
tents and purposes exercising the offices of a ruler over the
native peoples, he conducted himself, nevertheless, in a
manner wholly consistent with the scheme of government
established by the powers. He recognized ^Nlalietoa as king,
obliged his folloAvers to pay their proper dues into the legiti-
mate treasury, and he sent his subjects, when arrested for
any cause, to the Apia courts for trial. Still his attitude
was an ominous one, and a nervous apprehension rested over
Apia, lest at some unexpected moment the rebel forces
would sweep into the city. That such an occurrence did
not take place surprised every one.

As might very naturally be expected, such unsatisfactory
relations between the two rulers could not long continue.
Malietoa became jealous and threatening ; Mataafa gradually
became offensive. On December (5, 1892, United States
Vice-Consul Blacklock, reporting upon the condition of
affairs in the islands, wrote : —

Ever since Mataafa's establisliinent at Malie he has endeavored
to gather strength, and there is not the slightest doubt had he
been successful in getting sufficient following, he would have
made war u])on IMalietoa. He has done everything in opposing the
Government exce])t making war; he has defied its t'ourts, ob-
structed its officials in the execution of their duties, harbored
refugees from justice, succored and supported prisoners escaped
from prison, and at the present moment is living in open defiance
of the King and Government and all the laws of the country,
keeping up an armed force and ])hnKlering foreigners' i)huitati()iis
for subsistence. Time and again have white officials, who went

THE UNITED ST.VTES AND SAMOA 261

to Malie with warrants for the arrest of offenders, been driven
away by ]\Iataafa"s sokliers, and warned against attempting any
arrest under penalty of death.

The expediency of sending war vessels to Apia to assist the
government in enforcing its decrees became a subject of cor-
respondence in Washington, for the situation in the islands
changing from bad to worse, the question had arisen as to
the advisability of taking active measures to disarm Mataafa.
June 19, 1893, Mr. Gresham wrote to Sir Julian Paunce-
fote : —

The Government of the United States, while heretofore in-
clined to confine its action to participation in the maintenance of
the system of government devised by the General Act to the ex-
ecution of the process of the supreme court and to keeping up
such naval representation in Samoan waters as should suffice for
the protection of American life and property in those islands, is
now prepared to go further, in view of the reported rebellious
attitude of Mataafa and his followers, and will join in an active
demonstration for the purpose of surrounding and disarming them.

Sir Julian in reply, a few days later, reported that '* Her
Majesty's Government will heartily cooperate with the other
two treaty powers in the manner and for the i)ur[)oses
mentioned."

Accordingly, with the ready consent of Germany, another
man-of-war episode took place in Samoa (July 18, 1898).
Before the arrival of the U. S. S. Philadelphia, which had
been hastily despatched to the islands to assist in tlie dem-
onstration, Mataafa siirrcnidered to the combined German
and English forces and was deported, as had formerly been
Malietoa, to the Marshall Islands, where, witli a nund^er of
chiefs who bore him company, lie was maintained in exile
at the joint expense of tlie three powers.

With the powerful Mataafa out of the way, and Malietoa
consequently strengthened in Ins position as kiui;, tlie govern-
ment should have ])rosper('d. In ib(! early i)art of 1S94, an
uprising of Tamaseseites disturbed tlie repose of the king,
but the three consuls, and king Malietoa stood together

262 AMERICAN DIPLOMATIC QUESTIONS

through the crisis. The revolution, after a series of skir-
mishes, and a vast deal of parleying, came to a close in Sep-
tember. This revolt was led by young Tamasese, the son of
the former king, and a new candidate for royal honors. Its
object was the overthrow of Malietoa : because " he has done
much evil"; because "it is now more than twenty years
since he has become king and he has done nothing for these
islands"; and because "Samoa is completely drained by the
payment of taxes." The latter reason was perhaps the urgent
one, for according to most reliable authorities, any tax at all
is too much for the Samoan natives. This rebellion was
suppressed with a severity which called from Robert Louis
Stevenson, then residing at Vailima, the bitterest reproaches
upon the three powers. Still another of those distressing
man-of-war episodes took place, in which native villages
were shelled and defenceless women and children killed.
The ferocity of white men seems at times to be little less
than that of more primitive people.

IX

After a period of a few years the "autonomous govern-
ment" of Samoa, as provided by the Berlin treaty, was
found to be a failure. At first the evident friction between
parts of the governmental machine had been charitably
overlooked, as the result of newness, and it was hoped, when
once tlie pace was set, the system would prove satisfactory.
As time progressed, all who were in a position to know became
convinced that the scheme adopted for the islands was not
only ineffective but actually pernicious. The discord which
seemed inevitable among the various heads of that triple
dominion soon became manifest. The authority of the chief
justice and that of tlie president of the municipality came
into more or less conflict. The land commission toiled
faithfully, but with exasperating interruptions, while its
decrees bred dissensions as they displeased this or that fac-
tion in Apia. Tlie three consuls and the numerous officials
of different nationalities interpreted the provisions of the

THE UNITED STATES AND SAMOA 263

Berlin Act as best suited their own or their country's political
and commercial interests. It is not surprising, therefore,
that the old racial enmities cropped out anew. It became
apparent, even to its most radical supporters, that the treaty
government could never fulfil expectations. The natives
soon came to ignore the authorities. The jirocess of the
Supreme Court was seldom served, and when served, it was
of little avail. The influence of King Malietoa gradually
declined, until the last vestige of his power as native ruler of
Samoa left him king in name only. The government had no
authority whatever outside the settlement of Apia, and even
within the little municipality itself, its impotent character,
combined with its cumbersome structure, made it seem like
the creation of a comic opera. The testimony of travellers,
the reports of consuls, and the dismal complaints of the
natives operated in a very short time to prejudice the admin-
istration in Washington against the maintenance of the
Berlin Act.

At one of the sessions of the conference in Berlin (1880),
Count Bismarck had said, with f idl approval of the other pleni-
jjotentiaries, that the arrangements would "be limited t(j a
period of three or five years, to put them to the test.'' The
act also provided for amendment (Art. 8, Sec. 1) after tliree
years from date of signature — " the powers shall consider,
by common accord, what ameliorations, if any, may be intro-
duced into the provisions." Taking advantage of these
provisions, meetings presided over by Robert Louis Steven-
son were held in .Vpia in 1892, to adopt proposals for cer-
tain desirable changes in the act. These proposals were
forwarded to the three signatory powers, witii the expressi'd
liO{»e that "they, tlie powers, might be willing to consider
the opinion of persons on tlie spot, and intimately acquainted
witli the interests involved." The ^Vmerican Consul, Mi-.
Sewall, also represented to the goverinuent in Washington
the pressing need of that "revision of llic licilin .Vet" which
was contemphitt'd when it was originally executed. The
I nited States (iovernnient aloni^ appears to have been moved
,by the Stevenson memorial, for it, at least, made some ellorl

264 AMERICAN DIPLOMATIC QUESTIONS

to bring about a convention for reconsideration of the act.
Both Germany and Great Britain declined to entertain the
proposition, and the unsatisfactory governmental system, as
originally adopted at Berlin, continued to exist, to the dis-
tress of the natives, and to the annoyance of all concerned.

Referring to the many troubles of Samoa since the Berlin
Act had gone into force. President Cleveland said in 1893,
"This incident, and the events leading up to it [American
interposition in Samoa], signally illustrate the impolicy of
entangling alliances with foreign powers."

The next year President Cleveland repeated his views upon
the subject : —

The present government has utterly failed to correct, if indeed
it has not aggravated, the very evils it was intended to prevent.
It has not stimulated our commerce with the islands. Our par-
ticipation in its establishment against the wishes of the natives
was in plain defiance of the conservative teachings and warnings
of the wise and patriotic men who laid the foundations of our free
institutions, and I invite an expression of the judgment of Con-
gress on the propriety of steps being taken by this Government
looking to the withdrawal from its engagements with the other
powers on some reasonable terms not prejudicial to any of our
existing rights.

In December, 1895, the President was moved once more to
touch upon the Samoan matter in his third annual message
to Congress : —

In my last two annual messages I called the attention of the
Congress to the position we occupied as one of the parties to a
treaty or agreement by which we became jointly bound with Eng-
land and Germany to so interfere with the government and con-
trol of Samoa as in effect to assume the management of its affairs.
On the 9th of May, 1894, I transmitted to the Senate a special
message . . . and emphasizing the oi)inion I have at all times
entertained, that our situation in this matter was inconsistent with
the mission and traditions of our government, in violation of the
principles we profess, and in all its phases mischievous and vexa-
tious. I again press this subject ui)on the attention of the Con-
gress, and ask for such legislative action or expression as will lead
tlie way to our relief from obligation both irksome and unnatural. '

THE UNITED STATES AND SAMOA 265

Notwithstanding the dissatisfaction felt in Samoa and in
the capitals of all three of the contracting powers (espe-
cially in Washington, where more conservative ideas of
foreign relations existed than in either London or Berlin),
no further attempt was ever made to alter the Berlin Act.
The Samoans continued to complain ; the foreigners in the
islands controlled their jealousies as best they could, and all
waited and hoped for some change. Relief came suddenly
and in a most unexpected manner.

In 1898 news of tlie death of one of the chiefs who had
accompanied Mataafa in his exile to the Marshall Islands dis-
tressed the Samoan natives. A large majority were dissatis-
fied with the rule of Malietoa Laupepa, as they had condemned
the manner in which that monarch had been thrust upon
them. They had never ceased to hope that justice would
yet be done their favorite chieftain, the great Mataafa. The
fear lest he, too, might succumb to the unhealthy climate of
the Marshalls, and suffer the disgrace of dying in exile,
brought about a persistent clamor for his pardon, and for his
restoration to his own people. Even Laupepa, his rival,
joined in the i)etition to the powers for the pardon and
return of Mataafa. The old hero was released, and he soon
after reappeared in his native province, amid the rejoicings
of his devoted followers. He was under strict [)romise to
keep the peace, and to respect the riglits of King Malietoa
Laupepa — there should be no more revolutions.

Mataafa had scarcely arrived in Samoa when King ^Malietoa
Laupepa died. This was in August, 18'J8. According to
Samoan customs, there is no direct succession to the crown,
nor can the king appoint his successor. The manner of
selecting a ruler is peculiar. Only tliose belonging to certain
clans or families are eligible ; and of these, the one who has
liad bestowed upon him, by the i)eople of his own or of otlier
provinces, a certain number of honoi-ilic titles, is accepted as
monarch over all. It usually ]iai)pens that tlie bestowal of
honors is carried to an unwarrantable degree during an
♦•lection period, and numberless disputes arise between
, claimants as to the authority of a tribe to grant titles, and

266 AMERICAN DIPLOMATIC QUESTIONS

the rights of the recipients to receive tliem. Thus the last
step in a Samoan election, according to native custom, is a
war of succession.

With the throne left vacant by Laupepa's death, three
candidates for royal honors at once presented themselves:
Mataafa, the veteran, fresh from his enforced retirement ;
Malietoa Tanu, a young boy, son of the dead king ; and
Tamasese, who, it will be recalled, had been created, by the
Germans, king of Samoa in opposition to Malietoa Laupepa,
in 1888. Each aspirant was of royal blood — i.e. belonged
to families who were eligible to the kingship, and had, there-
fore, substantial claims for the honor of succeeding Laupepa.
Tamasese had a comparatively small following of several
hundred men. Tanu was popular in Apia, and was supported
by many foreigners, especially by the Americans and English,
and supposedly by the Protestant missionaries ; Mataafa had
practically the solid backing of all native Samoa. He was
the popular idol. Delegations of natives from all parts of
the island rallied to his support. Thousands of his adherents
came to Apia in the hope of witnessing the triumph of their
favorite chief, and to assist in the ceremonies of his anoint-
ment as king. The result of the native election (November
14, 1898) was in favor of Mataafa, both Tanu and Tamasese
showing a pitiful weakness in face of the overwhelming
strength of the Mataafa party. Tamasese had been induced
at the last moment to withdraw in favor of Tanu. The
latter, despite the inequality of the contest, and no doubt
influenced by his foreign friends and supporters, decided
to contest the election with Mataafa. He maintained that
]\Iataafa was not eligible to the office, owing to the fact
that he had suffered exile, and that he had returned to
Samoa only with the express understanding that he should
never seek to gratify his royal ambitions.

Tlie sixth section of the third article of the Berlin Act
provides that: —

In case any question shall hereafter arise in Samoa respecting
the rifj;htful election or appointment of King or of any other chief
claiming authority over the islands . . . such question shall not

THE UNITED STATES AND SAMOA 267

lead to war, but shall be presented for decision to the chief justice
of Samoa, who shall decide it in writing, conformably to the pro-
visions of this Act and to the laws and customs of Samoa not in
conflict therewith ; . . .

The choosing of a king, therefore, fell at last to the Supreme
Court, according to the stipulations of the tripartite Berlin
Act ; but the selection of a ruler from the candidates was,
nevertheless, to be made by the court in strict accordance
with tlie laws and customs of Samoa. William L. Cliambers,
an American, was chief justice, under authority of the three
signatory powers, and upon him, therefore, fell the responsi-
bilities of the occasion. An excited popular interest, both
native and foreign, became inflamed during the period of the
trial. The Teutonic element in Apia warmly espoused the
cause of Mataafa, and his case was vigorously conducted in
court by Herr von Bulow, a German lawyer well versed in
Saraoan traditions.

The American and English residents suspected that the
lively German interest in Mataafa's success was owing to
some secret understanding with that chief by which, in the
event of his election as king of Samoa, he w'as to submit him-
self to the w'ill of the German CJovernment, and even aid in
securing for it tlie ultimate control of the islands. Indeed,
at that very time, rumors were rife in Apia that Germany
contemplated a decisive movement toward that end. Tlie
usual jealousies and racial antipathies in .\[>\,i were there-
fore greatly stimulated. The Germans did not conceal their
desire ultimately to win Samoa for themselves ; but for the
present they had no hesitancy in asserting that Mataafa had
been rightfully and proj)erly elected king, and tliat they sup-
ported him solely through a sense of justice. Mataafa, it will
be remembered, was the former arch enemy of the (icnnaiis.
He was in command of those forces wdiieh, in the jjolitical
disturbances of 1887-H,S, had ambushed and killed some fifty
German marines from the Adh'r. This act had called ilowii
upon him the dcnunciatictiis of the ficnnan ( Jon ciiinitiit. and
had left him barred from ruling over Samoa by a protocol of
tlie Berlin Act, — a condition insisted upon, as already stated,

268 AMERICAN DIPLOMATIC QUESTIONS \

by Count Bismarck before the signing of that instrument.
The attitude of the Germans in suddenly befriending their
former enemy in Samoa served all the more to arouse
American and English suspicion in their motives.

It was upon the operation of this protocol that the Tanu
party based its claims in court ; — but thereupon Herr Rose,
the German Consul-General, came forward and officially
withdrew his government's objection to ]\Iataafa upon that
score. Seemingly, then, Tanu was left without ground to
stand upon. The eligibility of Mataafa having been acknowl-
edged by the Germans, — the only party who might rationally
object to his choice, — and his eligibility having been accepted
by Judge Chambers in writing, the result of the judicial in-
vestigation seemed to be fully assured in Mataafa's favor.
Pending the trial, an agreement was signed by the representa-
tives of Tanu, binding themselves and their clients to abide by
the decision of the chief justice. Mataafa, firmly convinced
of his rights, refused to enter upon such an agreement.

"After a trial of eleven days of patient investigation,"
wrote Judge Chambers afterward to his brother in New
York, " two sessions each day and a hard study every night
of Samoan genealogies, customs, titles, and practices, I came
to the conclusion, from a legal and conscientious point of
view, besides upon the treaty and the laws and customs of
Samoa not in conflict therewith, that Tanu, the son of the late
King Malietoa, and who, by the gift of the people, had been
endowed with the name of Malietoa, was the duly elected
king." By the same decision Tamasese was created vice-king.

Judge Chambers' decision was based, first, upon the pro-
tocol, which, he held, for all time barred Mataafa, and there-
fore left no other candidate in the field but the young Tanu ;
and, secondly, upon the fact that upon young Tanu only had
been conferred, by the natives, the requisite number of hono-
rific titles which, according to their custom, would entitle
him to the kingship. The indignation of the Germans, and
of the majority of natives, was very great when the result
of tlie trial was proclaimed ; indeed, when the opinion was
first read, December 31, 1S08, a riot was only averted by

THE UNITED STATES AND SAMOA 269

an armed force of marines landed from an English man-of-
war, — a demonstration in which the justice was himself
fully prepared to join.

The decision was at once accepted by the English and
American consuls-general, Messrs. Maxse and Osborn, but
was indignantly scorned by the German Consul, Herr Rose.
With the Germans solidly opposed to the ruling of the court,
and in open and avowed sympathy witli the defeated party,
Mataafa was encouraged to resist this decree of the court.
Conditions were favorable for a revolt. A German vessel
was in the harbor, and ^Nlataafa's warriors were restless and
hard to restrain ; for weeks they had been preparing to
defend the cause of their chief, and the moment was now
at hand. It was a period of intense excitement, and the
Mataafans felt that their leader had been greatly wronged.
For one day only was there hesitancy and suspense, and
then the Mataafa forces broke from their camp at Mulinuu
and swept into Apia, headed, as the Americans alleged, by
German officers, one detachment of the "rebels" actually
being led by the president of the municipality, Herr
Johaness Raffel. The Tanu supporters could not withstand
the " rebel " assault ; they fled in every direction, many
taking refuge upon the British gunboats at anchor in the
harb<jr, while the chief justice was himself obliged to seek
safety in flight. Mataafa was at once in control, and, with
some pomp, crowned himself king.

In the midst of this confusion, the three consuls succeeded
in effecting a truce C January 5, 1899), by the uiianiindus
acceptance of the Mataafa Government as the "Provisional
government of Samoa,"' which it was expected would at least
keep the peace until a way out of the difficulties could be
decided upf)n. The text of this consular agreement took the
form of the following proclamation: —

Owing to the events of the last few days and to the urj^ent neces-
sity of establishing^ a stron<; jirovisifjual government for Samoa,
we, the undersigned ctjnsular representatives of the three treaty
powers, declare as follows : —

1. The Mataafa party, represented by the High Chief Mataafa

270 AMERICAN DIPLOMATIC QUESTIONS

and the following thirteen chiefs . , . who lately acted in be-
half of said party, and who are now in de facto possession of the
government, are recognized to be the provisional government of
Samoa, pending instructions from the three powers.

2. The President [of the Municipality] to be the Executive of
the said Provisional Government.

3. Nothing in this proclamation shall be taken as modifying or
abrogating the rights of the three treaty powers in Samoa, either
individually or collectively, or of their Consular representatives
as now existing.

Given at Apia this 4th day of January, 1889.

EosE,

Imp. Gov. Consul Gen.

L. W. OSBOBX,

U. S. Con. Gen.
Ernest G. B. Maxse,
H. B. M. Consul.

So far as the affairs of Apia were concerned, the presi-
dent of the municipality, Herr Raffel, was thereby placed in
control as the executive officer of the provisional govern-
ment.

This action was a decided victory for the German Consul,
Herr Rose, as it gave the color of virtue to the revolution
against the legally chosen Tanu. With Herr Raffel in con-
trol, and with the sympathy of nearly all Samoa behind them,
the Germans in Apia were in a position to bring about peace
with the probable acceptance of King jNIataafa by the powers.
To accomplish these ends, moderation and a very keen
appreciation of what was fitting and proper to do under
the circumstances were necessary. However, both Herr
Raffel and Consul Rose, being men of uncertain temper and
somewhat wanting in tact, permitted their better judg-
ment to be so far overcome by the excitements of the moment
that the very next day after the proclamation they seized
the courthouse, barred the doors, and issued a notice that the
Supreme Court had adjourned until further notice from
the provisional government. In reply to this startling notice,
Captain Stiirdee, of the English man-of-war, Porpoise, upon
which the chief justice had taken refuge, issued a statement
to the effect that the Supreme Court having been " illegally

THE UNITED STATES AND SAMOA 271

closed by the provisional government, and the orders of the
chief justice posted at the courthouse torn down by armed
troops of the government, the chief justice, supported by
the United States Consul General and Her British Majesty's
Consul, under the protection of the armed forces of the Por-
poise^ will hold a court to-day at noon. If resistance is met,
which it is hoped wall not be the case, fire will be opened to
support the rights of these two great powers."

Thereupon Herr Raffel, no doubt recalling the words of
Louis XIV, declared himself to be the Supreme Court, and en-
couraged by the German Consul, he took formal possession
of the building in the name of the provisional government.
According to his threat, Captain Sturdee sent ashore liis
marines, who accompanied Mr. Chaml)ers to tlie courthouse
and assisted him in taking forcil^le possession of the prem-
ises. In this attempt to oust the Germans, personal encount-
ers between high officials took place, and Mr. Chambers
resumed his seat amid the mingled cheers and jeers of the
divided spectators. An indignant German resident violated
the sanctity of the courthouse by wilfully smashing its
windows, whereupon Justice Chambers ordered him to be
arrested, fined and committed to jail. Herr Raffel there-
upon released his compatriot, and the German Consul pro-
tested against the action of the American judge in fining
a German su})ject. The American and English consuls
returned sharp answers to Herr Rose, and thereafter even
the semblance of peaceful relations ceased between the rival
factions. As among the natives themselves, Avar l)etween
the whites in Apia was virtually declared, and tlic maiiiies
from the Ensflisli and German gunboats in the harl>()r were
quite ready to respond to any caH. In the meant inu'. Mat-
aafa witli a force of several thousand wan-iors held Miiliniiu,
the royal seat, and bade defiance to all avIio should seek to
dislodge him. In Apia a reign of terror was inaugurated;
throughout the island a season of riot and pillage began.

When tidings of this new Samoan upheaval reached the
outer world, the three treaty powers seemed at a hjss to know
just how to act. The occasion was an auspicious one for the

272 AMERICAN DIPLOMATIC QUESTIONS

American press to open an assault upon Germany. Criti-
cism of Germany was at that moment acceptable to all par-
ties, as the Admiral Diedrich episode at Manila Bay was still
fresh in mind. The history of German intrigue in Samoa
was fully reviewed in highly colored accounts, and the story
of the lively careers of consuls Steubel and Knappe were
glowingly rehearsed to demonstrate Germany's hostile atti-
tude toward the United States. In these jjroceedings was
found another link in that chain of evidence which proved
the enmity of Germany. The German Government, it was
insisted, should be called upon to answer for a gross viola-
tion of the Berlin Act. That Consul Rose and President
Raffel were wholly in the wrong there could be no doubt,
for had they not refused to accept the final decision of the
Supreme Court, in violation of treaty regulations ; had they
not furthermore encouraged the defeated party into open
revolt against the law of the land; had they not seized the
courthouse, broken the jail, and were they not to be charged
with having instituted a reign of anarchy ? The valor of
the Americans and English in upholding the decision of the
chief justice against great odds was highly commended, and
a desire was generally manifested for a warship to be sent
at once to the scene.

The German side of the case was simply that the decision
of Chief Justice Chambers was biassed, and decidedly unjust ;
indeed, it was so outrageous it could not be tolerated. In
justification of their conduct the Germans insisted that they
had only sought to prevent the imposition of a weakling upon
the people who was not the choice of the Samoans, and whose
succession to tlie throne would inevitably lead to war. Tiiey
charged the missionary party with complicity (Mataafa l)eiiijj
a Cath(jlic), and Justice Chambers with corruption. If they
had exceeded the bounds of propriety in their methods to
relieve the situation in Apia, it was because of their zeal to
riglit a wrong as quickly as possible.

Much anxiety was nevertheless felt upon all sides lest the
signatory powers would seek to ui)hold the acts of their
agents in Samoa, and thus expand the disturbances in the

THE UNITED STATES AND SAMOA 273

islands into an international qnarrel. Obviously the course
of wisdom lay in disregarding the recent happenings in Apia,
and proceeding at once to a review of Justice Chambers'
decision.

Germany first relieved the tension by a disavowal of the
course w^hich had been followed by her consul-general in
Apia, and by the bestowal of a reprimand upon Herr Raffel,
which caused that indignant official to resign his position.
The Parliamentary Secretary for Foreign Affairs announced
that England was awaiting further information before recog-
nizing Mataafa as king of Samoa. This evidence of a con-
ciliatory policy on the part of Great Britain further eased
the situation.

The first move of the United States after a hasty diplo-
matic parley in Washington between Secretary I lay and
the representatives of Great Britain and Germany (where
assurances were given that the matters would be peaceably
settled) was to despatch a war vessel with a commander of
high rank to the scene. Accordingly the U. S. S. Philadel-
phia, Admiral Kautz in command, was immediately ordered
to Samoa, arriving at Apia on the 9th of March, 189!>.
The admiral was instructed to enforce order, but to take no
decided steps in upholding either party without urgent
necessity.

The situation that Admiral Kautz discovered upon his
arrival in Apia was a troublesome one with wdiich to deal.
An official deadlock existed. Mataafa w^arriors were active,
and desultory fighting continued in all the islands. Tiie ad-
miral, as senior naval officer in the harbor, called a meeting
of the three consuls and of the naval commanders then in
port. A two days' ccjnference was held, as a result of which
Admiral Kautz issued a proclamation mi Maidi 11. setting
fortli that "it is agreed that the so-calk-d provisional gov-
ernment, under the Higli Chief Mataafa and thirteen otlier
chiefs can have no legal status under the lii'iliii treaty, and
can tlierefoi-e not be recognized by the eonsuhir and naval
rejjresentatives." The proclamation oi-dei-ed Mataafa and his
warriors to disperse (juietly to their hoiiies : it alsn uphil<l

T

274 AMERICAN DIPLOMATIC QUESTIONS

the decree of Chief Justice Chambers, and ordered that the^
chiefs of the Tanu party, who had been deported to other
islands, should be returned to their own homes ; it ordered
that the decrees of the court should be respected, and ended
in a threat that unless these things sliould be done, military
force would be employed to carry out the purposes of the
instrument.

Admiral Kautz, no doubt, assumed that a majority vote of
the consuls was sufficient to authorize any such proceeding
— an opinion which was not shared by the German Consul.
The latter held that unanimity of consular agreement was-
required to order the dissolution of the provisional govern-
ment. Two days later he met the admiral's proclamation
by a counter-proclamation which gave —

Notice to all Samoans : By the proclamation of the Admiral
of the United States, dated March 11, it was made known that
the three Consuls of the signatory powers of the Berlin treaty, as
well as the three commanders of men-of-war, had been unanimous
in deciding to recognize no more the provisional governmelit com-
posed of Mataafa and thirteen chiefs.

I, therefore, make known to you that this proclamation is quite-
false. I, the German Consul General, continue to recognize the
provisional government of Samoa until I have received contrary
instructions from my government.

Rose, German Consul General.

Apia, March 13, 1899.

Instead of dispersing, as ordered by Admiral Kautz, the^
Mataafa party became more aggressively defiant and bold..
They occupied and fortified positions within the neutral area
of the municipality. More Tanu supporters were cap-
tured and deported to other islands. The triumpli of
]\Iataafa seemed to be complete when Admiral Kautz inter-
fered by force of arms. His ultimatum to the rebellious
chieftain to cease hostilities carried with it the threat of a
bombardment to begin at one o'clock, March 15. When
that moment arrived, the Mataafans refused to yield their
positions in Apia, and the shelling process began. Ameri-
can and English marines were landed, and fought side by

THE UNITED STATES AND SAMOA 275

side, the Germans taking no part. The war was carried on
in all the islands. The Philadelphia^ and the English vessels,
Porpoise and Royalist, began a systematic bombardment of
the coast villages which were known to be in sympathy with
Mataafa. This method of warfare upon the defenceless
natives, the women and children of the villages along the
coast, had been roundly denounced b}' Captain Leary when
the Germans had adopted the same tactics against Laupepa
and Mataafa in 1888 ; and it is difficult to find justitication
for it at any time, whatever may be the provocation. To
fire upon non-combatants is not only opposed to all rules of
civilized warfare, but in these particular cases it would seem
to be the refinement of inhumanity. The worst oiTence of
the natives was the desire to elect a king according to their
own custom, — a privilege accorded them in the treaty, and
for some mysterious reason denied them. In one encounter
(April 1), a squad of American and English sailors, led by
several officers from the Philadelphia, were surprised by
Mataafans, and a number killed and decapitated, including
two American officers.

Mataafa was, however, soon obliged to retire from Muliimu,
and Tanu was thereupon crowned king (March 23) in the
presence of some natives and the American and English
officials. Mataafa continued in open rebellion, with head-
quarters in the bush, and a number of engagements of more
or less importance ensued. During the latter part of April
news reached Apia of the appointment by the three signatory
powers of an investigating commission. Only then was a
truce declared. Both [)arties rested upon their arms, and
in a sullenly expectant mood the opposing foreign factions
in Apia consented to await the coming of the commission.

As soon as it was possible, the diplomacy of the tliree
interested nations was brought to bear upon the situation.
Fortunately all three powers assumed an unexpectedly com-
plaisant attitude, and in tliat (|U.iitfr where calmness and
forbearance were least expected they were most readily forth-
coming. In a speech before the IJeichstag, fni the 14tli of
April, Herr von iJuhnv declared that it "would be simply

276 AMERICAN DIPLOMATIC QUESTIONS

criminal to let loose war between three great and civilized
nations " because of such a quarrel. From Germany, the
traditional offender in Samoa, came a proposition for a Joint
High Commission, representing the three powers, to proceed
at once to the scene of disturbance. The proposed commis-
sion should restore order in the islands, ascertain the causes
of the present trouble, and report to their home government
its recommendations for future legislation.

No more promising method of a settlement could be
devised. The United States and Great Britain at once
accepted the proposition from Berlin, and general satisfac-
tion was felt when the State Department announced the
appointment of such a commission. The personnel of the
commission inspired confidence, and the fact that the German
and English members were selected by their respective gov-
ernments from among the diplomats residing in Washington,
and who were presumably in touch with American opinion
on the subject, gave further promise of a satisfactory con-
clusion. The commission departed from San Francisco
April 25, on the U. S. S. Badger^ arriving in Apia on May
13.

The three commissioners were, — for the United States,
Judge Bartlett Tripp, of South Dakota (elected Chairman);
for Great Britain, Sir Charles Eliot, Second Secretary of the
British Embassy at Washington ; and for Germany, Baron
Speck von Sternberg, First Secretary of the German
Embassy in Washington.

The commission carried full authority to establish a pro-
visional government in Samoa, and to enforce order. All
officials under the Berlin treaty, or those representing their
governments in Apia, were instructed to surrender their
authority to the commission. Thus by acquiring full juris-
diction over the islands, tlie commission would not be
hampered in tlie fulfilment of the more important duties
with which it was charged. These duties were a careful
inquiry into the social and political condition of the islands ;
an examination of rival claims to the throne, and a review
of the chief justice's decision. The commission was further

THE UNITED STATES AND SAMOA 277

charged to make investigation into the causes that led to
the recent riots and disturbances, as well as to the bombard-
ments that followed on the part of the American and English
war vessels, and to the various arrests and acts of violence
which had taken place. Finally, the commission was in-
structed to " consider the provisions which might be neces-
sary for the future government of the islands or for the
modification of the final act of Berlin," and report ac-
cordingly.

On their arrival, the commissioners found a condition
of nervous excitement existing in Apia. ]\Iataafan forces
surrounded the municipality ; native and white soldiers
patrolled the streets of the town, six men-of-war lay at
anchor in the harbor, and all business was suspended. Their
reception by the usually demonstrative natives, as well as by
the whites, was unexpectedly cold. This lack of cordiality
was owing to the fact that the natives distrusted the com-
petency or ability of a committee wholly ignorant of Samoan
customs to satisfactorily adjust their difficulties. The com-
mission lost no time in entering upon its double task. The
first step was to disarm the natives, which was successfully
accomplished within two weeks by promises of restoration of
the arms or their equivalent in money after peace had been
secured. After a series of meetings with the residents,
native and foreign, the commission reached the conclusion
that the decision of the chief justice was valid. "The
decision declaring Tanu to be king was the law of Samoa,
and all who refused oljedience to it violated not the decision
alone, but the treaty upon which it was based " wrote Mr.
Tripp. Hence, a vindication of Admiral Kautz.

The provisional government of Mataafa and Ilerr Kaffel
wliicli liad been inaugurated by the three consuls in Januaiy,
having ceased to exist, the commission declared I'anu to be
king ; but that y&ung man, already wearied of tlie uncertain
glories of political life, and l)eing, moreover, ambitious to
adopt the career of a missionai-y, promptly abdicated I Then
arose tlie question as to the advisability of abolisliing the
kingship. The various islands were canvassed, and many

278 AMERICAN DIPLOMATIC QUESTIONS

meetings held with chiefs in various parts of the group,
which resulted in a discovery that the larger sentiment of
natives and foreigners favored the plan of the commission
to do away entirely wdtli that ofiice. In the wisdom of this
reform both Tanu and Mataafa agreed, the latter chief no
doubt concluding to abandon his struggle against what now
seemed to him to be the decrees of fate. Another provisional
government was thereupon established consisting of the
three consuls, with the president of the municipality, Dr.
Solf (Herr Raff el had resigned), as adviser. Pledges of
peace between the rival native factions were secured, and
harmony reigned when the commission departed upon the
liomeward journey, July 18. INIr. Chambers left the islands,
Mr. Osborn was designated Chief Justice, and Dr. Solf re-
mained president of the municipal council. There was
no king.

Before leaving the islands the commissioners reached an
agreement recommending a new form of government for
Samoa. Their conclusions were embodied in a preliminary
draft of treaty before the three powers for the amendment or
the modification of the Berlin Act. Accompanying the draft
of treaty was a joint report explanatory of the proposed
reforms.

The conclusions of the commissioners had been arrived at
in a logical manner. First, the ills of Samoa and the evils
which caused them were investigated and classified, and then
to each category of evils were proposed such remedies as
seemed to the commission best calculated to remove or at
least to minimize them. These " evils " were grouped under
four heads.

1. Those evils which appear inevitably to attend the
election of a king in Samoa, and his subsequent efforts to
exert his authority.

2. Those evils due to the rivalry of foreign nationalities and
to the disposition of the whites to take sides in native politics.

3. A class of evils having origin in the fact that there is
no law or government in the islands outside of Apia other
than native customs.

THE UNITED STATEvS AND SAMOA 279

4. The evils arising from the insufficient enforcement of
the customs reguhitions allowing the distribution of arms
among the natives.

To offset these four prime causes of dissension in Samoa,
the joint report proposed, — first, the abolition of the king-
ship. That, it was l)elieved, could be effected with'out even
tlie regrets of the natives. The office was a "comj)aratively
modern institution," of which it was " impossible to say any
good whatever." In place of the kingship a "S3^steni of na-
tive government analogous to that which works successfully
in Fiji " was proposed. This system of native government
contemplated a division of the islands into administrative
districts, corresponding to those recognized by Samoan usage,
and over each of which a native chief would preside. These
chiefs were to meet annually in council ; native courts would
be established with jurisdiction over minor crimes, and in
accordance with native laws and customs.

Tlie second class of evils which found origin in the jeal-
ousies of the foreign factions in Apia were recognized to be
the most difficult of all to meet. Hostility among the
foreigners "-permeates all departments of life." ''The
traders on the one side combined against those on the other.
. . . The municipal council is divided." Reforms were
declared never to be judged upon their merit, Ijut always
"by party considerations," — all officers were found to be
partisans. As a cure for these evils three measures were
proposed : (a) the appointment of an administrator to be
chosen by a neutral power, and who should possess a large
measure of authority ; (i) the appointment of three dele-
gates by the signatory powers to assist the administrator and
also to exercise such consular powers as may become neces-
sary. They, together with the administrator, form a " legis-
lative council"; (c) the abolition of consular jurisdiction
and the consequent abandonment of extraterritoriality, tliere
being no real need of three separate judicial systems in the
island. '' Hitherto consular jurisdiction has been a jjowcrful
means of end)ittering internal strife in Apia. ICaeh nation-
ality has its own law, and the consul who adniinisteis th;it

280 AMERICAN DIPLOMATIC QUESTIONS

law was popularly regarded not as an impartial judge but
as the protector of his own nationality. We believe that by
abolishing this outward sign of separate internal institutions,
and by submitting all nationalities to one court and one law,
a great advance will be made in the direction of removing
petty rivalries and jealousies, and restoring good relations
between the various white colonies."

To meet the third class of evils — the lawlessness prevail-
ing outside the municipality of Apia — the joint report
proposed the enlargement of the jurisdiction of the chief
justice over all the islands, so as to include all cases be-
tween natives and foreigners.

The strict enforcement of customs regulations according
to law it was believed would remedy the evils of the fourth
class, and such reform was therefore urged.

In brief, the recommendations of the commission for the
alteration of the Berlin Act were for the abolition of the king-
ship and of consular jurisdiction, the extension of the juris-
diction of the Supreme Court and the establishment of native
courts, the creation of a neutral administrator of large
authority and the appointment of a tripartite council which
should act as a legislative council, each councillor being
charged at the same time with consular duties.

These recommendations were made as offering the best
possible solution of the difficulties so long as the three inter-
ested nations should continue to maintain their positions in
Samoa, but the commissioners frankly admitted that no
wholly satisfactory arrangement could be made while the
triple-dominion continued.

We do not think it will ever be possible to do away with this
state of things under a tripartite administration, and we take this
opportunity of recording our opinion that the only natural and
normal plan of government for these islands, and the only system
which can assure permanent prosperity and tranquillity, is a gov-
ernment by one power. We regard it, however, as beyond our
province to make any but a general statement on such a subject,
and we have endeavored to amend existing arrangements in such
a manner, that they may prove, if not entirely satisfactory, at
least workable.

THE UNITED STATES AND SAMOA 281

The action of the Joint High Commission was generally-
approved in the United States. Those who had followed
the course of Samoan history found in the proposed abolition
of the kingship the removal of the chief cause of dissension
in the islands. Most of the quarrels in Apia had no doubt
originated in the more or less open attempts of one or another
foreign faction to create a puppet king, who would do the
bidding of his masters. With this source of dissension
removed, the rival factions would have far less cause of
disagreement.

In October, 1899, negotiations were begun in Washington
for a joint consideration of the proposals made by the com-
mission, and for the amendment or alteration of the Berlin
Act. In Samoa, the probable partition of the group had
for some time been hinted at, the current opinion being
that Germany would insist upon the retention of Upolu,
and that Great Britain would take the larger but less
important island of Savaii. Neither Great Britain nor the
United States seems to have contemplated such action at this
particular moment, nor to have considered the possibility at
that time of abrogating m toto the Berlin Act. From Ger-
many again came the rational proposition of the hour. All
three powers had been impressed by the assertion of tlie
Joint Commission that " the only system of government that
can assure permanent prosperity and tranquillity is a govern-
ment of one power"; but the dilhculty lay in making a sat-
isfactory arrangement to that end. Indeed a division of tlie
islands among the three powers appeared to both England and
the United States a hopeless accomplishment, however desir-
able such a solution of the difficulties might be. Tlie rival
interests of Germany and Great Britain in the Pacific seemed
to preclude any such action — at least upon a thoroughly
friendly basis. However, the German foreign office in-
sisted that tlie time for partition had come, and upon
no other basis could the Samoiui (liHiculty be adjuslcd.
Ultimate apportioimient of the islands was iiR'vitahlc, and
no time, it maintained, could be more apj)ropriat(' than
the present for such action. The tripartite goveiiiiiit'iit

282 AMERICAN DIPLOMATIC QUESTIONS

had proved a failure and a source of danger in the past ;
it would likely be the same in the future, were it permitted
to exist.

In a scheme of partition the interests of the United States
clearly entitled her to the retention of Tutuila and its valu-
able harbor of Pago- Pago, and perhaps to no more ; but the
interests of Germany and Great Britain in the Pacific were
far more complex ; neither power could well retire from Apia.
In the first attempts to reach a conclusion in the matter of
partition of the islands, it became very apparent that the
group was, after all, too small for a satisfactory division, and
the question soon narrowed itself down to whether Great
Britain or Germany should retire from Samoa, in considera-
tion of benefits to be granted, and leave the other in sole
possession. The extent of land owned in Samoa by the
Germans greatly exceeded the holdings of other nationalities.
Their investments were larger, their trade greater. They
had been the first to exploit the islands commercially, and
had always taken a more direct and active interest in the
government and politics of the Samoans. Their claim to the
group was probably stronger than that of England.

An understanding was reached in November, and it was
quite fitting that Great Britain agreed to withdraw entirely
from the islands. By Anglo-German treaty, signed Novem-
ber 14 (1899), Germany retained full possession of all the
islands of the Samoan group west of longitude 171° W.
This included the entire group, with the exception of Tutuila
and some near-by smaller islands of little or no importance.
As a compensation for her abandonment of all Samoan claims,
Great Britain accepted from (iermany the hitter's rights in
the Tongan Islands, a group lying several hundred miles south
of Samoa ; England also received the German islands of
Choiseul and San Isobel, of the Solomon group. Germany
also made certain other concessions to England in Africa.

On December 2 (1899), a treaty was accordingly signed
in Washington by the representatives of the three powers.
As this document marks the final episode of American
complicity in Samoan affairs, it is (pioted in full.

THE UNITED STATES AND SAMOA 283

A Convention signed at Washington, December 2, 1899, between
the United States, Germany, and Great Britain, to adjust amicably
the questions between the three Governments in respect to the
Samoan group of islands.

The President of the United States of America, His Imperial
Majesty the German Emperor, King of Prussia, and Her Majesty
the Queen of the United Kingdom of Great Britain and Ireland,
Empressof India, desiring to adjust amicably the questions which
have arisen between them in respect to the Samoan group of
Islands, as well as to avoid all future misunderstanding in respect
to their joint or several rights and claims of possession or juris-
diction therein, have agreed to establish and regulate the same by
a special convention; and whereas the Governments of Germany
and Great Britain have, with the concurrence of that of the
United States, made an agreement regarding their respective
rights and interests in the aforesaid group, the three Powers
before named in furtherance of the ends above mentioned have
appointed respectively their Plenipotentiaries as follows :

The President of the United States of America, The Honorable
John Hay, Secretary of State of the United States;

His Majesty the German Emperor, King of Prussia, His Ambas-
sador Extraordinary and Plenipotentiary, Herr von HoUeben; and

Her Majesty the Queen of Great Britain and Ireland, Empress
of India, the Right Honorable Lord Pauncefote of Preston, G. C. B.,
G. C. M. G., Her Brittanic Majesty's Ambassador Extraordinary
and Plenipotentiary :

who, after having communicated each to the other their respec-
tive full powers, which were found to be in proper form, have
agreed upon and concluded the following articles :

AllTICLK I

The general Act concluded and signed by the aforesaid Powers
at Berlin on the 14th day of June, a.ij. 1H.S9, and all previous
treaties, conventions and agreements relating to Samoa, are
annulled.

Aktu'lk II

Germany renounces in favor of tlie United States of America
ill her rights and claims over and in respect to the Island of
Tutuila and all other islands of the Samoan group east of Longi-
tude 171° west of Greenwich.

284 AMERICAN DIPLOMATIC QUESTIONS

Great Britain in like manner renounces in favor of the United
States of America all her rights and claims over and in respect
to the Island of Tutuila and all other islands of the Samoan group
east of Longitude 171° west of Greenwich.

Reciprocally, the United States of America renounce in favor
of Germany all their rights and claims over and in respect to the
Islands of Upolu and Savaii and all other Islands of the Samoan
group west of Longitude 171° west of Greenwich.

Article III

It is understood and agreed that each of the three signatory
Powers shall continue to enjoy, in respect to their commerce and
commercial vessels, in all the islands of the Samoan group privi-
leges and conditions equal to those enjoyed by the sovereign
Power, in all ports which may be open to the commerce of either
of them.

Article IV

The present Convention shall be ratified as soon as possible,
and shall come into force immediately after the exchange of
ratifications.

In faith whereof, we, the respective Plenipotentiaries, have
signed this Convention and have hereunto affixed our seals.

Done in triplicate, at Washington, the second day of December,
in the year of Our Lord, one thousand eight hundred and ninety-
nine.

John Hay [seal.]

HOLLEBEN [seal.]

Pauncefote [seal.]

The treaty was ratified by the Senate, January 16, 1900.

The trials of the Samoans, which they had endured for many
years under the administration of three jealous protectors,
are ended. Whether they will in future fare better or worse
under the single rule of Germany is a matter that concerns
only them and Germany, — the United States is happily
relieved from all further responsibility in the matter. The
entangling alliance so freely criticised by President Cleve-
land and by Secretary Gresliam has been broken, not because
of Washington's advice, but because it proved burdensome

THE UNITED STATES AND SAMOA 285

and dangerous to the peace of the United States. After a
trial of ten years the outcome of the Berlin Act may
be viewed in the light of Mr. Gresham's prophesy. The first
departure of the United States from a traditional and well-
established policy of avoiding entangling alliances, was
not a successful venture. No evidence can be found of
detriment suffered before, nor of substantial advantages
afterward gained, to demonstrate, in this particular case, the
wisdom in the change of that national policy of non-inter-
ference. The responsibilities imposed upon the United States,
as a party to the Berlin Act, brought onl}' vexatious cares,
expense, the loss of several naval vessels, and many lives.
Several times it threatened to involve the country in war.

Among the assets, if there are any, may possibly be counted
the acquisition of Tutuila, and its valuable harbor of Pago-
Pago ; but the acquisition of this can hardly be ascri])ed to
the results of the Berlin treaty. American riglits in this
harbor antedated that treaty, and were held in abeyance so
long as the triple dominion existed. United States' trade with
Samoa is at best very small, and its increase in the decade
from 1889 to 1899 was but a meagre return for the amount
of energy expended in its behalf.

The disposition of the islands, according to the recent
treaties, is wholly satisfactory to all parties. Germany has
a coveted satisfaction of ruling supreme over Samoa (barring
Tutuila). A strong national sentiment, possibly the out-
growth of an early interest felt in colonial expansion in tlie
South Seas, has placed the German valuation upon Samoa far
in excess of its real value. For the gratification of this sen-
timent, Germany was willing to give England substantial
compensation elsewhere, with whicli compensation England
is apparently perfectly content.

The United States has acquired all it lias ever desired or
really needed in Samoa, — a valua])le liarbor and coaling
stati(jn. None of the islands secured by the ti-eaty are suf-
ficiently large or po})ulous to present any troublesome prob-
lem for their government. The island of Tutuila has ;i total
superficial area of somethinLC ovei- two hundred s(]uare niih's.

286 AMERICAN DIPLOMATIC QUESTIONS

and has an estimated population of about three thousand.
The natives are peaceful, unarmed, and well disposed to the
United States. The harbor of Pago-Pago is an ideal one,
said to be the best in the Pacific; it is, moreover, susceptible
of easy defence. Its strategic value is very great. Several
much smaller islands to the east and south of Tutuila (of no
particular importance) fall to the share of the United States ;
but as these are of no real value to any one except their
own native inhabitants, they are not likely to become a
burdensome care.

Contracts have been made for the improvement of Pago-
Pago harbor, for coal-sheds, docks, etc. On February 12,
1900, the President formally placed the island of Tutuila
under the administration of the Navy Department, and Com-
mander B. R. Tilley, U. S. N., became first military governor.

Here, the " Samoan episode " closes.

\^\

TV
THE MONKOE DOCTRIXE

IV

THE MONROE DOCTRINE

The instinct of self-preservation is the first law of nature.
As a natural law governing all living creatures, it takes
precedence over the social or artificial regulations of man-
kind. Under whatever municipal code an individual exists,
he may freely ignore it when necessary to preserve his life ;
his only solicitude, if placed on trial, need be to prove that
his alleged wrongful acts were committed in self-defence.
And so it is, to a certain extent, with nations. Like indi-
viduals, they stand before the public law — the law of
nations — with definite rights and duties. First and fun-
damentally, they possess the right of sovereignty and inde-
pendence, and a freedom of action that is limited only by
the obligation to respect similar rights in other nations.
As in the case of individuals, the exercise of their own
rights must be without injury to others.

The international law permits one nation to violate the
sovereignty of another in but few exceptional instances.
Thus, iov humanity's sake, a continued course of cruelty
or needless bloodslied on the part of any one power may
arouse international concern and justify intervention. Hut
any act intending to destroy the existence of a nation or U>
limit its sovereignty, when committed under the plea of sclt-
dt'fence, must find its justification in a code iiiglicr tlian
international law. In the connnon law, homicide in sell-
defence is justifiable. In this respect, therefore, there is a
distinction between tlu; connnon and the public laws, the
latter not yet having fully come to recognize self-def('n<,'e
as a justifiable cause of action. Hut though the public

289

290 AMERICAN DIPLOMATIC QUESTIONS

law has not clistinctl}' provided for acts committed under
the plea of self-preservation, it is constrained to tolerate
them.

The propriety of all defensive acts must be judged by the
peculiar circumstances surrounding them, for it is obviously
impossible to frame definite and specific rules to govern all
cases, as it is impossible to measure, with accuracy, the amount
of danger that, at any given time, may threaten a state from
without.

It may be said, therefore, that the duty of states to respect
the sovereignty of their neighbors is subordinated to their
natural right of self-preservation, — all social laws being in
abeyance when existence is in question. History furnishes
a long list of infringements upon the sovereignty of states
by others which, appearing to have been committed in a
spirit of self-protection, have been allowed to pass as excus-
able. Such extreme cases as the actual invasion of foreign
territory, in order to protect persons or property, to suppress
insurrection, or to put down race rebellions, are upon record,
and often they have been regarded as entirely proper. Thus,
under certain circumstances, one state may actually assert
its sovereignty to the extent of using violence to accomplish
ends within the territory of another, and still not run coun-
ter to the dictates of law. The doctrine of self-protection
may take such extremes, but it is unfortunate that some
international arbiter has not yet been constituted to deter-
mine the good faith of the nation or nations so intervening.
In Europe the greater nations exercise a watchfulness over
each other by a quasi agreement, expressed or implied,
known as the " Balance of Power," whereby all are pledged
to prevent any one power from encroaching too greatly upon
anotlier, and thereby unduly acquiring a strength and influ-
ence that might prove dangerous to the welfare of the others.
To this general policy may be attributed the present integrity
of the Ottoman Empire. In the same manner was Belgium
established, and now upheld and maintained as an inviolable
state ; for such reasons have the Balkan states been shifted
to and fro at the will of the greater powers.

THE MONROE DOCTRINE 291

It is impossible to anticipate what course of action may
suddenly be made necessary by national complications,
and it would be useless, therefore, to attempt a definition
of all the extraordinary powers a sovereign state may exert
in a moment of extreme danger. Suffice it to say, it may
do anything within reasonable bounds ; the consciousness of
right that exists in all hearts will give sanction, provided it
is clear, and above all doubt, that the danger is real and tliat
the act done is in good faith, and not prosecuted beyond the
^strict requirements of self-defence.

-The celebrated Monroe Doctrine of the United States finds
its origin and its justification in principles of a similar char-
acter. In this instance there was no actual intervention, —
no overt act on the part of the United States in derogation
of what, in the public law, had been accepted as the sov-
ereign rights of other nations. In this case Mr. Monroe did
not choose to wait until the actual commission of threatened
acts which, in his judgment, would endanger the integrity
and peace of the United States, but gave notice to the
European jDowers that certain enumerated acts, if perpe-
trated, would be resisted by forcible intervention by hi;* , •.
government. The doctrine in its character is rather prophy-i^ '
lactic than curative, — preventive rather than remedial.

In so far as the Monroe Doctriiie forbids other soverei}xn
powers to do what properly belongs, as of right, to all sov-
ereign powers, it can find no place in international law. It
is useless to seek, through ingenious argument, to invest it
with the sanctiofi of an international code. It was purely^
and simply one of those measures of self-defence which, fall-
ing outside the legal prerogatives of a sovereign state, is
justified among civilized nations only by virtue of an extreme
necessity. This has been essentially the American view." It
is quite certain that the other civilized nations of the world
liave not accepted the principles enunciat('<l in this doctrine
as a part of the public law, nor do they admit that its exist-
ence is, or ever was, necessary to tlie safety of the United
States. In fact, the many protests from abroad clearly
indicate that the world in general has regarded tiiis national

292 AMERICAN DIPLOMATIC QUESTIONS

policy of the United States as wholly beyond the public law
or the requirements of national self-defence.

In respect to colonization, all authorities seem to agree that
territory, unoccupied and belonging to no one, may be appro-
priated and held by any nation when its subjects enter it
with the intention of remaining. So far as the Monroe Doc-
trine relates to colonization, the question at once arises —
was there any territory properly res nullius, or belonging ta
no one, in either of the American continents when President
Monroe issued his edict against colonization in 1823 ? If
not, the interdict was useless ; if there were territory capable
of appropriation at that time, the declaration, under the inter-
national code, was clearly illegal. It proposed a third requi-
site to the right of colonization, to wit; the consent of the
United States. No amount of argument can reconcile the
proposition with the public law, nor can any considerations
of self-defence invest it with strict legal authority. If such
were the case, the United States would be justified in seizing
Canada, and Great Britain would be wrong in seeking to
defend a colony that threatened the United States with a
contiguous boundary line of three thousand miles.

Now, to what length a nation may go in throwing off its
obligations to respect the sovereignty of its neighbors on the
score of self-preservation, or even of protection or immunity
against less serious attack, is a question of politics rather
than of law. In the nature of things there can be no exact
and ascertainable measure of danger or of security ; it is
manifestly difficult to say at just what point one may bid
another come no nearer.

Bearing in mind, then, that forcible intervention in the
affairs of other nations is excusable only when committed in
self-defence and when the danger is real, imminent, and di-
rect,— not speculative and contingent, — and only when the
interference is itself actually necessary, and is kept within
the limited bounds authorized by the circumstances of the
case, and, furthermore, when the interference is not resorted
to with a view of aggression or spoliation, — then, and from
such standpoint only, can the so-called ''legal aspects" of

THE MONROE DOCTRINE 293

the Monroe Doctrine be examined. Was the United States
threatened from abroad in 1823 ? If so, do the dangers
which threatened the United States in 1823, and called into
being the principles of the Monroe Doctrine, threaten the
country now? Would a new colony of European origin in
South America be a menace to the best interests of the United
States to-day ? If a doctrine that found its origin in a genu-
ine call for self-preservation is no longer upheld and sustained
by that necessity, is its continuance as a national policy longer
justified ?

The widest divergence of opinion is to be found in the
United States upon this subject, no two writers to-day agree-
ing precisely upon the propriety, the wisdom, or the value of
the Monroe Doctrine as a defensive measure. Indeed, all
phases of the doctrine, from its alleged origin in the political
conditions of our earlier national existence, its authorship,
its applications, in fact, its very meaning, have furnished
ground for endless discussion. Suffice it to say, the princi-
ples involved grew out of certain conditions of our national
growtli, and the doctrine was then invoked as a defensive
measure to meet what seemed to be a menace to our institu-
tions. That which sprang out of an emergency has become
a vital principle in the foreign policy of the United States ;
indeed, it seems to have become a sort of fetish for national
worship, — the ignis fatuus of American politics. Created
as it was to meet the exigencies of the time, it has been
expanded into a national determination that the new world
must be kept sacred from all European colonization or use.
In the course of changing administrations, and with the conse-
quent changes of opini(m at the White House and the Capi-
tol, the doctrine has too often been distorted from its original
meaning, and sometimes used to serve the ends of party
warfare. It has been quoted as authority for constituting
the United States Government the guardian and protector
of all the nations of the American continents. By some it is
limited to defensive measures ; by others its interpretation
would justify all sorts of forcible aggression. From a mere
right to i)rotect ourselves, the Monroe Doctrine has been

294 AMERICAN DIPLOMATIC QUESTIONS

converted into a right to annex Cuba and any other of the
West India Islands. In it is found the right to construct
the Nicaragua Canal on foreign soil, and subject its shores to
American jurisdiction ; for, by seizing and controlling these
outposts, and, in fact, all other contiguous or adjacent lands,
it is urged that the United States would be following a con-
sistent policy of self-defence. There is a danger that the
more powerful and formidable the United States becomes,
and the more grasping and insatiate its policy of expansion,
the more unrestrained will become the Monroe Doctrine. It
may, in time, be too frequentl}' construed to justify acts which
never entered the conceptions of its author.

A clearer understanding of the principles embodied in the
Monroe Doctrine may be obtained by glancing at a few inci-
dents in the history of our foreign relations from the ending
of the Revolutionary War (1783), to the close of President
Monroe's administration (1824).

Although the Monroe Doctrine itself, as announced in
1823, was ostensibly a defensive measure against the threat-
ened aggressions of a powerful European alliance, there can
be no doubt that it was also the announcement of a general
policy that had been gradually forming in the American
mind for a number of years. This sentiment was the natural
outgrowth of the antagonism between the principles of demo-
cratic government, as adopted in the United States, and the
opposing doctrines of monarchical government, which ob-
tained u[)on the continent of Europe.

When the Revolutionary struggle was over, and England
had acknowledged tlie independence of the United States
(treaty November 30, 1783), the newly created nation was
exhausted and disorganized ; its resources were small, and
the country was great only in its future possibilities. The
territory it occupied was a mere strip along the eastern
coast of the vast and little-known American continent.
On its entire northern frontier lay English colonies that

THE MONROE DOCTRINE 295

were more than passively unfriendly ; British fortifications
and hostile Indians along the lakes and upper Ohio River
impeded expansion to the west. On the south and the
southwest, France and Spain overshadowed the pioneer
republic in extensive domain.

Under these conditions, the earlier American statesmen
were tempted to profit by the rivalries of European nations,
and thus obtain by foreign alliances, the strength necessary
to carry the republic through the critical period of infancy.
A single venture in this direction (the treaty with France,
of 1778) taught the fathers a useful lesson. It was but a
few years later that France, finding herself involved in war
with Great Britain, promptly called upon the United States
to fulfil lier treaty obligations. This the United States was
unable to do. To invite another war with England would
have been suicidal ; to remain neutral was to offend France.
In either case, the legitimate result of meddling in the affairs
of Europe seemed to be war ; and although actual war was
in this instance avoided, a bitter party-spirit, aroused b}'
French sympathizers, produced dissensions threatening the
peace of the nation. From the first, hoAvever, the wiser
statesmen of the period realized not merely the advisability,
but the necessity, of holding aloof from ail foreign entangle-
ments. This sound principle found its best expression in
^^ashington's farewell address, and long continued to be tiie
watchword of succeeding administrations, and the corner-
stone of the nation's foreign policy. Each Presi<lent in turn
guarded this vital principle of non-iiiter\eiitioii. and the
young nation greatly [jrospered in its career, paying no
tribute to tlie demands of needless war. Underlying the
reasons usually given for maintaining an isolated political
l)osition in the world, namely, the weakness of the country,
and its physical inability to cope with tlie ohler European
nations, a subtle motive is easily traced. It was felt that the
system of popular government inaugurated by the United
States would I)e watched with some apprehension by the
crowned heads of Europe. If tlie exi)eriment in constitu-
tional government should prove successful, its effect on

296 AMERICAN DIPLOMATIC QUESTIONS

European forms of government was obvious. Indeed, in
some of the European nations a decided liostility had already
been manifested against tyrannical institutions. The belief
that absolutism was divinely ordained, or that it represented
the best form of government, was being rudely shaken
throughout Europe. Royalty was naturally suspicious of all
movements toward popular institutions, and the fear that mon-
archical Europe would regard somevvliat sullenly the success
of democracy in America, was not unreasonable. Here, then,
was a source of danger to be guarded against ; the liberty so
dearly bought was truly worth the price of eternal vigilance.
A double peril was therefore presented to the struggling
young nation at the very beginning : Eirst, the danger of
being tempted into unfortunate alliances with stronger
powers ; and secondly, that of unprovoked attack by the
forces of monarchical government from purely political mo-
tives. In those days royalty commanded stronger armies
and navies than the United States could possibly support.
The ideas of popular sovereignty and the divine right of
kings were essentially antagonistic ; and the notion that the
crowned heads of the old world might seek to strangle the
[_i.nfaut giant of the new, was not altogether unreasonable.
Mr. Jefferson expressed this apprehension as early as 1785,
when he wrote to Monroe from Paris, urging him to add his
"testimony to that of every thinking American, in order to
satisfy our countrymen how much it is in their interest to
preserve uninfected by contagion those peculiarities in their
government and manners to which they are indebted for
those blessings." In his second annual address of December,
1798, John Adams said ; —

To the usual subjects of gratitude I cannot omit to add one of
the first iniportauce to our well being and safety; I mean that
spirit which has arisen in our country against the nieuacps and
aggression of a foreign nation. A manly sense of national honor,
dignity, and independence has appeared which, if encouraged and
invigorated by every branch of the government, will enable us to
view undismayed tlie enterprises of any foreign power and be-
come the sure foundation of national prosperity and glory.

THE MONROE DOCTRINE 297

But it was Jefferson wlio grasped the idea of foreign an-
tipathy more definitel}', perhaps, than had any of his contem-
poraries. Although a strict constructionist, he viohited his
convictions of constitutional interpretation and purchased the
Louisiana territory to keep it out of the hands of France or
England, either of which he regarded as a dangerous neigh-
bor. " Previous, however, to this period," he urged upon a
liesitating Congress '• we had not been unaware of the
danger to which our peace would be perpetually exposed
whilst so important a key to the coiinnerce of the Western
country remained under foreign power." This sudden
acquisition of a large contiguous territory, bringing into the
nation an empire to be settled and prepared for statehood,
strengthened the bonds of the federation, and gave fresh
vigor to the Republic. It also furnished additional reason
for the strict observance of the principles of non-interfer-
ence, and for redoubled watchfulness against all manner
of foreign aggression. With new cares and responsibilities,
these principles developed still more rapidly, and found final
expression in President Monroe's famous message twenty
^^ears later.

The purchase of Louisiana gave to the Ignited States a
.'olor of title to the Spanish province ot West Florida, and
ixisting conditions at h(tiuu and in Spain made it likely that
he L'nited States could acquire tliis valuable strip of coast
and. The title in question was perha[)s less complete than
he determination to secure it ; for after a proclamation to
he effect that the United States would hold the territory
•ending future settlement, President Madison addressed the
■enate, January 3, 1811, as follows : —

Taking,' into view tlie tenor of these several coiiiimniications,
16 posture of tilings with which tlicy arc connected, the intimate
•lation of the country adjoinin},' the United States eastward of
ic river Perdido to their security and tranquillitv, and llie pecnl-
I interest they otherwise have in its destiny, I recominend to
I'- consideration of (Jongress the seasonableness of a ilethiiatiou
lat tlie United States could not see without serious in<niietii(le
,iy part of a neigliburing territory in which tliey have in dilfer-

298 AMERICAN DIPLOMATIC QUESTIONS

ent respects so deep and so just a concern pass from the hands of
Spain into those of any otlier foreign power. . . . The wisdom of
Congress will at the same time determine how far it may be expe-
dient to provide for the event of a subversion of the Spanish
authorities within the territory in question, and an apprehended
occupancy thereof by any other foreign power.

Two months later Congress indorsed the policy of the
President in a resolution declaring : —

Taking into view the peculiar situation of Spain and of her
American provinces, and considering the influence which the des-
tiny of the territory adjoining the southern boundary of the
United States may have upon their security, tranquillity, and com-
merce, . . . the United States, under the peculiar circumstances
of the existing crisis, cannot, without a serious inquietude, see any
part of the said territory pass into the hands of any other foreigii
power.

Here then was a shadow of the Monroe Doctrine cast before.
The " destiny " of the Republic was proving itself; it figured
here as a factor in determining a question of foreign policy.
The acquisition of East Florida (the remaining portion of
the old Spanish province that constitutes in part the present
state of that name) was made in quite the same spirit, i.e. to
remove the liability of attack from contiguous territory. In
point of fact, Florida had long been a refuge for outlaws :
it was the rallying-point for many filibustering expeditions,
both Spanish and English, against the United States. In the
War of 1812 it had been used b}^ England as a base of hostile
operations. The resolutions of Congress of 1811 could with
equal propriety be applied to the case of East Florida.
General Jackson was sent to clear the way for annexation —
a task he accomplished in his own vigorous way.

In relation to these earlier accessidiis of territory, the
s])irit and purpose of the Monroe Doctrine is apparent,
though ill defined and crudely ex})ressed. The nation, how-
ever, had not yet reached that point of development and
strength when even in self-defence, it could proclaim a [)olicy
seemingly antagonistic to European interests. When the
War of 1812 had closed the Tnitcd States entered ui)uii a

THE MONROE DOCTRINE 299

new era. Old party lines were dissolving, and the violent
issues of the past twenty years were obsolete. The formative
period of its existence was over, the experiment of demo-
cratic government was succeeding admirably. The nation
had greatly expanded in territory and wealth, and was
assuming a degree of self-confidence, a sense of power, tluit
enabled it to study its own foreign policies in a calm, philo-
sophic light, and to speak of them, if need be, more authori-
tatively. For forty years a nebulous public sentiment had
been steadily approaching the positive form it subsequently
took ; in 1823 a definite threat coming from without, it sud-
denly crystallized into a clearly and an openly expressed
policy.

II

The immediate causes leading to the enunciation of the
Monroe Doctrine in 1823 are to be found in a series of
events beginning with the revolutionary movements in South
and Central America and culminating in the threat on the
part of a European alliance of strong powers to intervene
in behalf of Spain and in the interests of monarchical
government.

The operations of Napoleon in Spain had left that already
palsied nation in a deplorable condition of helplessness.
Profiting by her weakness, her American dependencies
l)egan, one after another (fr(un 1812 to 1820) to set up
their own standards, and establish tliemselves as independent
republics. In the South American struggles for freedom,
North American sympathy was strongly aroused. Neutrality
was duly proclaimed, but material aid was continually fur-
nished by citizens of the United States to the S(juth and
Central Americans, while frequent expressions of sympatliy
were made by Congress. Even before the colonies had
actually revolted, and while absolutism in Spain was receiv-
ing a thrust from the I-'rcndi army. .IflTcisoii, walcliing the
contest from afar, understood well tiie import of events and
the }»rol)able effect on tlie cause of popular government. lie
wrote U) (Jovernor Claiborne (Octoljer 29, 180«): —

300 AMERICAN DIPLOMATIC QUESTIONS

The truth is that the patriots of Spain have no warmer friends
than the administration of the United States ; bnt it is our duty
to say nothing and to do nothing for or against either. If they
succeed we shall be well satisfied to see Cuba and Mexico remaui
in their present dependence, but very unwilling to see them iu
that of either France or England, politically or commercially.
We consider their interests and ours as the same, and that the
object of both must be to exclude all European influence from
this hemisphere.

In this statement from high authority the historian
Schouler finds the germ of the Monroe Doctrine. When
the Spanish dependencies began to declare their indepen-
dence, and the grasp of the Old W^orld upon the new one
began to loosen, Jefferson's bold statement found active
support in all directions. Henry Clay, the leader of his
party in Congress, exerted himself to the limit of his
oratorical powers in the " emancipation of South America."
The continual assaults upon the administration of Monroe
by this opposition leader may have caused the President
to recognize the independence of tlie revolted colonies sooner
than he otherwise would have done, although it is clear from
the words of nearly all his annual messages, that Monroe
had his heart in the success of freedom's Aiuse in the
Western Hemisphere quite as fully as had (?lay, but he
moved more cautiously and with far more deliberation than
the eloquent and ifnpetuous member from Kentucky. In
the autumn of 1817, the first year of Monroe's presidency,
he sent a commission to South America for the purpose of
investigating the political conditions and of determining if
there were any bona fide revolutionary governments worthy
of recognition. The commission was composed of men
well-known for their radical views of republicanism, yet in
this respect they differed in regard to the proper course to be
pursued by tlie United States in the matter of recognizing
the sovereignty of the seceding Spanish colonies.

In the midst of cabinet discussions regarding this ques-
tion, news suddenly came from abroad (during the early
part of 1818) that a movement had been inaugurated in

THE MONROE DOCTRINE 301

Europe to intervene in the affairs of South America. Fur-
ther confirmation of these first reports came from several
foreign ministers resident in VV^isliington. John Quiney
Aclams, the Secretary of State, instantly became alive to the
situation, and somewhat curtly announced that " if the Euro-
pean alliance undertook to settle matters which concerned
us so closely, and without consulting- us, they should not be
surprised if we acted without consulting them." Monroe
shared in these ap[)rehensions of the Secretary of State and
feared that the rumors of a European combination to aid
Spain in maintaniing her old-time supremacy in the Americas
might prove true. Mr. Adams at once sounded the British
Minister in regaid to England's attitude toward the South
American cpiestion ; indeed, the President desired Great
Britain to join with the United States then and there in
recognizing the independence of the South American colo-
nies.

Across the Atlantic, the American Minister in London,
Richard Rush, was instructed to watch closely the intentions
of the reported European alliance, one of the alleged objects
of which was to interfere in behalf of Spain in America.
Rush approached the English Premier, Castlereagh, whose
sympathies were tliought to be with tlie Euro[)eau alliance,
though the commercial interests of his country called for
a greater freedom of trade with the West Indies and Central
America than Spain had l)een \\illiiig to grant. Castlereagh,
however, believed this end could be effected by European
mediation, and that by securing to S[)ain her complete
supremacy over her colonies, she might bi' coerced into
adopting more liberal trade regulatinns as a just compen-
sation for services rendered. Rush could not succeed in
winning over the conservative Castlereagh to his original
proposition, that of cliecking all future juggling with tlie
question l)v a prompt acknowledgment of the independence
of Soutli America.

Great relief was felt in Washington upon the declaration
of the allied powers of Europe, whose intci-fcrcnce in South
America was so much feared by Monroi- and his cabinet,

302 AMERICAN DIPLOMATIC QUESTIONS

that they did not contemplate using force to subjugate the
revolting Spanish colonies. In his annual message of
November 16, 1818, President Monroe said : —

From the view taken of this subject, founded on all the informa-
tion that we have been able to obtam, there is good cause to be
satisfied with the course heretofore pursued by the United States
in regard to this contest, and to conclude that it is proper to
adhere to it, especially in the present state of affairs.

Only two months later, however, the President called
together his cabinet to discuss the subject of recognizing the
independence of Buenos Ayres, a measure he proposed and
defended vainly against the adverse counsels of his advisory
board. About this time Adams refers in his diary (May 29,
1819) to an episode that again places on record his views
relating to the policy of the United States toward foreign
interference in the affairs of the American states. The
Russian Minister, Mr. Poletica, had been instructed from
Petersburg to use all his influence with the administration to
keep the United States from rupturing the bonds of amity
that existed between them and Spain. The snapping of
tender ties of course related to the recognition of the South
American states, and Mr. Poletica went so far as to intimate
that unless the United States followed a policy in harmony
with the aims of the European alliance she would find her-
self, however unwilling, obliged in the end to "follow the
impulse of P^urope combined."

I related to him [Mr. Poletica] all that has been done by us
concerning the South American question ; told him we were con-
vinced that Buenos Ayres at least would maintain her indepen-
dence of Spain ; that sooner or later they must be recognized as
an independent power ; that we had thought that the time would
before now have arrived when they might justly claim this as a
right, but from the time when we learnt that the allies had
determined, that whatever might be the event of their mediation,
not to use force against the South Americans, the President had
concluded that we might also forbear to take an immediate,
decisive part in their favor.

At the opening of Congress in December, 1819, nothing

THE MONROE DOCTRINE 303

further had been done toward the recognition of the South
American states. The President said in his annual message
(December 7, 1819) : —

This contest has from its comiiiencement been very interesting
to other powers, and to none more so than to the United States
A virtuous people may and will confine themselves within the limit
of a strict neutrality ; but it is not in their power to behold a con-
flict so vitally nnportant to their ueighbors without the sensibility
and sympathy which naturally belong to such a case.

At the reading of the next annual message, November 4,
(1820), the situation was little changed. No further threats
from the European alliance having come across the sea, the
United States had not been moved to act. The President
said : —

No facts are known to this Government to warrant tlie belief
that any of the powers of Europe will take part in the contest,
whence it may be inferred, considering all circumstances which
must have weight in })roducing the result, that an adjustment will
finally take place on the basis proposed by the colonies. To pro-
mote that result by friendly counsels with other powers, includ-
ing Spain herself, has been the uniform policy of this Govern-
ment. ,

Henry Clay never ceased his attacks uiion the administra-
tion fiu- wliat he considered its almost criminal negligence in
abandoning the great cause of liberty. I>y extending our
recognition of their sovereignt}' it would not only give en-
Cf)uragement to the states struggling to free themselves from
the clutches of tyranny, but it would give as well "additional
tone, and hope, and countenance to the friends of liberty
throughout the world.'" Chiy saw deeper reasons why the
I'nited States should lend a hand to her Southern neighbors.
In a great speech at Lexington in 1H21, lie said: —

It was evident after the overthrow of i;ona]tarte that the
alliance, by which that event was unexpectedly brought about,
would i>ush the j)rinciple of Iciiilimdni, a softer and covered name
for despotism, to the uttermost extent. Accordingly, the present

304 AMERICAN DIPLOxMATIC QUESTIONS

generation has seen, with painful feeling, Congress after Congress
assembling in Europe to decide without ceremony, the destiny and
affairs of foreign independent states. And if we, the greatest
offender of all against the principle of legitimacy, had not been
brought under their jurisdiction, and subjected to their parental
care, we owed the exemption to our distance from Europe and to
the known bravery of our countrymen. But who can say, that
has observed the giddiness and intoxication of power, how long
this exemption will continue ? It had seemed to him desirable
that a sort of counterpoise to the holy alliance should be found in
the two Americas in favor of national independence and liberty,
to operate by the force of example and by moral influence; that
here a rallying-point and an asylum should exist for freemen and
for freedom.

Adams agreed with Clay in the broad principles, but dif-
fered with him only in the course the United States should
practically adopt before occasion called more loudly for ac-
tion. He told Mr. Clay that he never doubted the final issue
of the struggle in South America, and that he believed it to
be better policy to take no active part. " The principle of
neutrality," he continued, "to all foreign wars was, in my
opinion, fundamental to the continuance of our liberties and
our Union." Wishing well to the cause of freedom in South
America, he had yet to see better evidences that the South
Americans meant to establish " free or liberal institutions of
government."

As events turned out, Clay's vision seems to have proved
the clearer, but Adams' conservative action was probably the
wiser. However, no more alarming threats from abroad
came, and our recognition of tlie South American states was
not effected until May, 1822.

The previous year Spain had ratified the treaty ceding the
Floridas, and with that vexed question off the programme,
tlie State Department found itself greatly relieved. With
these pressing details out of the way, the administration was
free to turn its attention to a more remote but much more
important matter. The solicitude of the President and
Secretary Adams was at once directed to the consideration
of permanent opposition to European intervention in the

THE MONROE DOCTRINE 305

Americas. As already noted, the idea had been more or less
steadily evolving for a number of years, and had found
occasional expression as one circumstance or another had
inspired it in the writings and speeches of JelTerson, Madi-
son, Adams, and Clay, and members of Congress. At hist
the nation had arrived at the point when its own sense of
powei-, that gratifying feeling of selj>c(mjjdeiir'p^ gave the
assurance of weight to any foreign policy it might clioose to
adopt, and especially in reference to such matters as related
purely to the advancement of Western-world interests. With
one exception the newly created states of Central and South
America, established republican forms of government, and it
seemed more than ever to be true that the political world
was dividing itself into two camps, — the one in Europe fol-
lowing the older conservative ideas of government, and the
other in the Western Hemisphere embracing tlie more pro-
gressive ideas of republicanism.

The President and his caljinet were fully aware of the
natural antagonism l)etween these diametrically opposing
political systems. Already from an alliance of [jowerful mon-
archs, murmurings of hostility to popular government had
come from abroad. No direct conflict was in prospect, but it
was well to ])repare for it. In his annual message of Decem-
ber 3, 1822, President Monroe went to work upon tliat struc-
ture whose foundations had already been hiid and cemented,
and which, in the following year, he com[)k'ted in all its
towering pro[)ortions.

Wlietlier we reason from the late wars [in Europe] or from those
menacing syiuptonis which now appear in Europe, it is nianifpst
that if a convulsicju should take place in any of those countries it
will proceed from causes which have no existence and are utterly
unknuwn in these states, in which there is but one order, that of
the people, to whom the sovereignty exclusively belongs. Should
war break out in any of those countries, who can foretell the
extent to which it may be carried or the desolation which it may
spread? Exempt as we are from these ciiuses, our intern;il tran-
quillity is secure; and distant as we are from the troubled scene,
and faithful to first principles in regard to other powers, we
miglit reasonably presume that we should not be molested by

306 AMERICAN DIPLOMATIC QUESTIONS

them. This, however, ought not to be calculated on as certain.
Unprovoked injuries are often inflicted, and even the peculiar
felicity of our situation might with some be a cause for excitement
and aggression. . . . The United States owe to the world a great
example, and, by means thereof, to the cause of liberty and
humanity a generous support.

The following year the anticipated threat from Europe
came. The allied sovereigns aimed a blow at the new
exponents of democracy, and the protesting answer of the
United States was given sharp and clear in the President's
message (1823).

Ill

After the fall of Napoleon at Waterloo, the four powers
Austria, Russia, Prussia, and England, that had previously
allied themselves for the purpose of opposing the advance
of the " man of destiny," met by their representatives in
Paris, in the fall of 1815, and there renewed their politi-
cal ties by a fresh treaty (November 20). In this conven-
tion the four allied monarchs, expressing their desire to " fix
beforehand the principle which they proposed to follow in
order to guarantee Europe from dangers by which she may
still be menaced," adopted four resolutions : first, to pre-
vent Napoleon from regaining power ; second, to maintain
the government of France ; third, to keep their army of
occupancy in France safe from attack , and fourth, to meet
again at the expiration of three years in order to consult
further, and " take such measures as should then seem to
be best fitted to preserve the peace and happiness of
Europe."

This quadruple alliance has been erroneously referred to
by authors as the "Holy Alliance." The real "Holy Alli-
ance " was quite a different combination, and originated in
this way. The Czar of Russia was much elated by the defeat
of Napoleon. To him the triumph of the allies — of which
he was one — over this seemingly invincible foe, appeared to
be no less than a direct act of God to save the righteous,

THE MONROE DOCTRINE 307

and to confound the wicked. He became so impressed with
the truth of this remarkable manifestation of Divine Provi-
dence, that, in order to better merit the favors of the Su-
preme Being, he determined, thereafter, to rule his empire
strictly in accordance with the principles of the Christian
religion, and still further, to induce his neighbors to do like-
wise. In this happy resohe the king of Prussia and the
Emperor of Austria joined with the Czar, and the league
was christened the " Holy Alliance." England, Avhen invited,
declined to become a party, — Castlereagh, the English Secre-
tary for Foreign Affairs, reporting to the ministry that the
Czar was no doubt mentally unbalanced. Even Metternich
called the treaty "verbiage." At all events, the league was
formed, the signers declaring that they " in consequence of
the great events [those leading to the defeat of Napoleon]
. . . and of the blessings which it has pleased Divine
Providence to shed upon those states. . . . Declare solemnly,
that the present act has no other object than to show . . .
their unwavering determination to adopt for the only rule
of their conduct . . . the prece^jts of their holy religion, the
precepts of justice, of ciiarity, and of peace. . . ." The
three sovereigns would ''remain united by the bonds of a
true and indissoluble fraternity." Considering themselves
"only the members of one Cin-istian nation," they looked
upon themselves as "delegated by Providence to govern
three branches of the same family, to wit : Austria, Prussia,
and Russia." They confessed that there was really no other
sovereign than "Him to whom alone power belongs of right,"
etc. The title of the league is derived from the closing para-
graph of the treaty (September 2t), 1815) : —

AuTicLK III. — All powers which wish solennily to profess the
sacred principles which have delegated this act, and who shall
acknowledge how important it is to the lia])i)iiu*ss of nations, too
long disturbed, that tliese truths shall lit'iK-eforth exercise upon
Inujian destinies all the inHiiencp which l)fl(ings to thtMii, shall
be received with as much readiness as aiTcctioii. into this Holy
Alliance.

Into this combination I-'rance, Si)ain, Na[)les and Sardinia

308 AMERICAN DIPLOMATIC QUESTIONS

entered. The Holy Alliance accomplished nothing, and there
is no reason to suppose that its members intended to use
other than their own good examples to accomplish the ends
in view. It was a foolish pledge, conceived in a moment of
religious fervor, and as completely disregarded in the practi-
cal lives of the signers as though it had never been made.
There is no evidence whatever, tending to show that the allies
had combined for the purpose of opposing the growth of lib-
eralism. It is the other league, — the Quadruple league
that had organized to defeat Napoleon, and that had re-
newed its bonds in the treaty of Paris, November 20, 1815,
— wherein the propaganda of absolutism was afterward born.
Now it so happened that this quadruple alliance, a few
years later, quite lost its original identity. England had
withdrawn from it, and France and Spain had entered.
With the fall of Napoleon, the original purposes for its
existence naturally became extinct ; but instead of dis-
solving, the alliance continued to live, and to take to itself
entirely new objects and ideals in accordance with the chang-
ing political conditions in Europe. Now because these new
ideas seemed to be in harmony with the vague ideas expressed
in the Czar's Christian Family Compact of September 26, 1815,
the alliance took shelter under the wing of that forgotten
association, and borrowing its title, which, to the zealous
monarchs appeared a good one, plumed itself the " Holy
Alliance."

Napoleon had stood before the world as an exponent of
liberal ideas, notwithstanding the fact that he filled the
thrones of Europe w'ith his relatives and created himself
Emperor of France. Upon his final defeat and exile, a re-
vival of absolutism set in throughout Europe, except, per-
haps, in England, wdiere liberal ideas had gained too firm a
footing ever to be uprooted by the mere changing tides of
popular sentiment. In France, the same people, wiio fifteen
or twenty years before had idolized Benjamin Franklin, the
apostle of democracy, and who had followed Napoleon in his
march against absolutism, now welcomed the restoration of
the Bourbons witli wild acclaim.

THE M().\I{()E DOCTRINE 309

Ever} where royalist mobs tore down tlie emblems of
popular government ; fi-iends of liberalism were silenced or
shot ; the nation was purged of its democratic sentiments, and
absolutism was rampant. The Bourbons were resurrected,
and with great pomp and ceremony Louis XVIII was
crowned king. In Austria, the reaction was equally pro-
"nounced. Metternich, the uncompromising enemy of progres-
sive ideas, earnestly exerted himself to stamp out every vestige
of liberalism, both at home and abroad. He induced Ferdi-
nand, king of Sicil}-, to Avithdraw his promises of granting
a constitution to his people, and created himself the moral
protector of the precious doctrines of divine right.

In Spain this same reaction against constitutional govern-
ment was carried to a most astonishing extent. Fertlinand
V'll reentered Spain in 1S14, and was received by the people
with the most extravagant demonstrations of welcome. He
immediately proceeded to undo, with tlie heartiest ap[)roval
of his subjects, all that had ever been previously accomplished
in Spain in the way of progress. The constitution was burned
in the market-place of Madrid ; the Cortes was dissolved and
abolished, and all of its decrees were declared void. Tho.se
suspected of liberal taint were exiled, and their writings
destroyed. The prisons were crowded with those who
failed to manifest proper enthusiasm in the backward move-
ment. The lands of the Church were restored, the clergy
exem{)ted from taxation, and the inquisition reestablished.
The remarkable feature of this movement in Spain lies in the
fact that it found its heartiest sup[)ort in those, who, so few
years before, had eagerly clamored for constitutional govern-
ment. In the short s[)ace ot two years S[)ain fell back into
the lap oi {\n' dark ages, but her transatlantic colonies
breathed a purer atmosphere. They were already in revolt.

In Ku.s.sia and in Prussia the general C(tn version against con-
stitutional goNernnicnt had nut l»ccn so niaikcd, j)ossil)Iv
because the political pciididiim had not swung so far in the
other direction, and the ret uiiiing swing was c(»n('spondinglv
short. The pobtical systems <if these two nations, houever,
jvere wholly autocratic.

310 AMERICAN DIPLOMATIC QUESTIONS

Such was the color of political creeds in Europe when the
ambassadors of the four powers forming the Quadruple Alli-
ance, in accordance with their agreement of 1815, met in
conference at Aix la Chapelle, October 1818. At this meet-
ing it was. decided to withdraw the allied army of occupa-
tion from France, that country having been thoroughly
won back to the principles of absolutism, and having a legiti-
mist on the throne. France was therefore taken into the alli-
ance that was originally formed against her, making thereby
a quintuple alliance. At Aix, the allies made a declaration
that the tranquillity of Europe depended largely upon the
united action and watchfulness of the five sovereigns com-
posing the league, and that the league " has no other object
than the maintenance of peace and the guarantee of those
transactions on which the peace was founded and consoli-
dated." "The repose of the world will be constantly our
motive." Thus it will appear that the allies had virtually
constituted themselves into a society for the regulation of
European politics. The league had not yet declared the
specific object of suppressing all popular movements against
absolutism, but the reactionary movement in that direction
throughout Europe had left its impress upon the hearts of
the legitimate rulers, and, barring the English, the five rulers
in question were firm adherents to the theory that royal
power is based on divine right.

The exact meaning in the declaration of the allies at Aix
was not altogether clear, but it pointed in the direction of
assuming control of all European political affairs, and of
insuring monarchical institutions. To this the English cabi-
net looked askance, remembering that "we have a i)arlia-
ment and a public, to whom we are responsible, and that we
cannot permit ourselves to be drawn into views of policy
which are wholly incompatible with the spirit of our govern-
ment." Soon after the adjournment at Aix, the allies were
called upon to act, and therefore to interpret, the true mean
ing of their vague declarations. It then became fully evi-
dent that they considered themselves the guardians nf
Europe, — of its peace, its progress, its religion, and its

THE MONROE DOCTRINE 311

morals ; that it had become a society whose main object was
the perpetuation of monarchical institutions, and that its
paramount duty was to suppress, wherever found, all popular
movements against such forms of government.

Great popular movements recur in the lives of nations with
a strange regularity. Like the waves of the sea, with corre-
sponding depressions between, these movements hurl them-
selves against the bulwarks of conservatism, and as quickly
subside. So have the waves of liberalism risen and fallen in
Europe ; but, as in the swelling tides of the ocean, each suc-
ceeding wave reaches a higher point. The tremendous
enthusiasm in Spain that greeted the reestablishment of
Ferdinand VII when at its very climax, in 1820, suddenly
cooled. The revolt of her American colonies had begun
about eight years before, and had depleted Spain of her
resources. The last dollar had been squeezed from the treas-
ury, the last available man had been forced into the army,
the last ship had sailed away with arms and ammunition,
and all to no purpose. In 1820, the last regiment that could
be mobilized for transatlantic service rebelled, and in a
moment all S[)ain was in a ferment of revolution against the
tyranny and oppression of Ferdinand. An incoming wave
of liberalism swept over Spain, over Nai)les and Sicily, tlien
over Portugal, and threatened to inundate France. Ferili-
nand was forced to grant a constitution to the jjeople, and
absolutism in Naples, Sicily, and Portugal collai)sed. Fright-
ened by the signs, Louis XVIII hastilv called upon tlie allies
to megt, which they accordingly did at Troppau, October,
1820. The English ambassador at Tro[)pau was a silent
spectator; the Frencli envoys (juarrelled among themselves,
and the original founders of the alliance — Russia, Prus.sia,
and Austria — were left to act as they saw lit. Now. if the
rulers of peoples receive their right to govern tlirough Divine
Grace, and if they are the agents of (iod, whose mission on
earth is to govern the cliildi'(;ii ot iin-ii according to the will
of Heaven, then it must necessarily follow that all attempts
to depose a legitimate monarc.-h are wicked. All liberal
movements, therefore, are unholy ; all revolutions against

312 AMERICAN DIPLOMATIC QUESTIONS

the old hereditary families are sacrilegious. Such was the
line of argument advanced at the conference. The three
powers declared that, having crushed out the arch fiend
of military tyranny and oppression (Napoleon), they now
found themselves called upon to "put a curb on a force no
less tyrannical, and no less detestable — that of revolt and
crime."

Suiting their actions to their words, the allies called upon
the aged king of Naples to meet them in Leybach in January,
1821, and take council with them concerning the suppression
of a revolution which had forced him to accept a constitution
and a parliament. While that old monarch was theorizing
in Leybacii, the king's son joined the popular party against
him. The allies sent an Austrian army into Italy which de-
feated the prince, suppressed the rebellion and restored the
old king upon the throne of Naples as an absolute ruler.
Insurrections in Piedmont and in Greece were in the same
manner crushed by the forces of the allies.

At Leybach, a new declaration of principles was issued,
which was, in effect, a repetition of the Troppau circular.
It announced that the}' (the allies) had " taken the people of
Europe into their holy keeping, and that, in future, all useful
and necessar}' changes in the legislation and administration
of states must emanate alone from the free will, the reflected
and enlightened impulse of those whom God has rendered
responsible for power."

The next year the allies met in Vienna, adjourning thence
to Verona (October, 1822), when the matter of the Spanish
revolution was taken into most serious consideration. Spain
was distressed by civil dissensions, Ferdinand had been driven
into reassembling the Cortes, and the cause of liberalism was
again advancing. It appeared more and more improbable
that the exliausted nation could succeed in holding her trans-
atlantic colonies, all of which were in revolt, and most of
which had, to all intents and purposes, already acquired their
independence. Ferdinand begged the aid of the alliance to
regain his American possessions, and the great powers hesi-
tated. Russia, Prussia and Austria, which stood firmly

THE MONROE DOCTRLNE 313

by their anti-liberal doctrines, declared they would never
recognize the seceded colonies until Spain herself had
done so.

English sentiment had not yielded to tlie [jrinciples of the
allies. The notions of divine right were distasteful to a people
who had prospered for centuries under constitutional govern-
ment, and the principle of forcible intervention adopted by
the allies seemed to the English ministry to be wholly im-
proper. In the course adopted by the allies toward the
revolutionary movements in Italy, England had no interests
directly affected, but she had nevertheless protested against
the unwarrantable interference of the powers in the affairs of
Naples. But in tlie proposed movement against liberalism in
Spain, to be discussed by the allied agents of the powers at
Verona, England had a more direct and more substantial
interest.

In earlier days, Spain's economic policy with her trans-
atlantic colonies had been a rigidly exclusive one, but during
their revolt, many of the tightly drawn commercial lines had
been cut, and old barriers of trade broken down. English
merchants luid greatly profited thereby, and within a few
years they had built up a large and growing trade in South
America and the West Indies. In a continuance of these
favorable conditions lay the motive of England's action. At
the time of the meeting of the allies at Verona, the statesmen
of England had about decided to send commercial agents, if
not consular rei)resentatives, to the larger cities of South
America — a course of action wliich ill accorded with the
policy of the allies toward Scmth America. I>iii;land was
not prepared, on the other hand, to go to the extremity of
recognizing the indei)endeiice of tlie new states at once, as
tlie United States had done tlie picvious year ; yet to prevent
a revived of c(»mmercial exclusion in the Spanish ((ijonies,
England was willing to take decided action. l-'.nghind l)e-
lieved that if Spain could subdue hei- rebelli<ins colonies, she
would be coinpelhMl at last to grant them commercial free-
''oin; yet influenced by representations and petitions of lu-r

vn commercial cla.sses, England was jjcrfectly willing to

314 AMERICAN DIPLOMATIC QUESTIONS

see the colonists secure their independence, in the belief that
political relations could be equally well established with them.

"Again the English had," wrote M. Beaumarchais, author
of " La Doctrine de Monroe " (p. 6), " the rare good fortune
of finding their own particular interests conform to the
noble cause of liberty, and they furthered well their real
purposes by posing before Europe, either hesitating or hos-
tile, as disinterested champions of Justice and Right."

Lord Castlereagh, the Prime Minister, was chosen to
represent England at the Congress of Verona, and the
ambassador drew his own instructions, which were to oppose
strenuously any proposed intervention in Spanish affairs.
He further instructed himself to make known the intention
of his country to follow her own commercial interests by
sending diplomatic agents to South America.

The death of Castlereagh, before the meeting of the allies,
brought Mr. Canning forward as Prime Minister, and he
appointed the Duke of Wellington in Castlereagh's place to
represent England at the Congress. At Verona the allies
signed a secret treaty (November 22, 1822) to which only
the names of Metternich, Chateaubriand, Bernstet (Prussia)
and Nesselrode appear. The first two articles of this instru-
ment are of especial interest.

The undersigned, specially authorized to make some additions
to the treaty of the Holy Alliance, after having exchanged their
respective credentials, have agreed as follows : —

Article L — The high contracting powers, being convinced
that the system of representative government is equally as in-
compatible with the monarchical principles as the maxim of the
sovereignty of the people with the divine right, engage mutually,
in the most solemn manner, to use all their efforts to put an end
to the system of representative governments, in whatever country
it may exist in Europe, and to prevent its being introduced in
those countries where it is not yet known.

Article II. — As it cannot be doubted that the liberty of the
press is the most powerful means used by the pretended sup-
porters of the rights of nations, to the detriment of those Princes,
the high contracting parties promise reciprocally to adopt all
proper measures to suppress it, not only in their own states, but
also in the rest of Europe.

THE MONROE DOCTRINE 315

It will be noted that in this treaty of November 22, 1822,
in which England took no part, the allies, " make some
additions to the Treaty of the Holy Alliance.'' Thus it
appears how these four powers (the original Quadruple Alli-
ance), by assuming to amend a treaty not originally of their
own making, had appropriated to themselves the title and
doctrines of the former Holy Alliance. One important step
Avas taken at Verona. The Congress adjourned with the
understanding that France, in the name of the Holy allies,
should send an army into Spain, " to put an end to the system
of representative government " which was struggling for
existence beyond the Pyrenees. A French army, under the ,
Due d'Angouleme, crossed the frontier, and after a feeble .
resistance from the revolutionists, restored Ferdinand to a
despotic throne (April, 1822). The next step of the allies 1
seemed to be reasonably certain, — a movement against South
American revolutionists. Their efforts against liberalism
in Europe had been eminently successful, as demonstrated
in Naples, in Sicily, in Piedmont, and lastly in S})ain. Fer-
dinand, having been reinstated upon his throne, begged
lustily for help to subjugate his colonies, both in the interest
of Spain and in the cause of absolutism. The advisability
of taking such a step had already been broached at Vienna,
and freely discussed at Verona. Reports of these contem-
plated movements in the Americas liad reacht-d Washington,
and had impressed the administration with a deep feeling of

' concern. It was feared that France might demand Cuba as
a price for restoring Ferdinand, and it was (luite certain
that if the allies did interfere in America, the newly created
republics would inevitably fall into the liands of the moie
powerful European nations. In order to determinr upt)n a
course of 'Action relative to Spain's seceding ('(donics. the
allies agreed to meet again in the autumn of 182:). In tli(3
meantime, however, the activity of Cainiing had niarsliiillcd
tlie forces that opposed the ideas and j)roJL'cts of tlic Hulv
Alliance, and su(hh'nly and unexpecte<ily to the allii-s, tlicre
came fr(nii Washington a waining to stojt. As thi-y (h-vci-

I oped in strength and rcsoui'ces, the people of the I'nilud

316 AMERICAN DIPLOMATIC QUESTIONS

States had for many years been preparing a mine to be sprung
when the proper time came. It was Canning who signalled
the danger from abroad; it was Adams who placed the
charge in position and adjusted the fuse, and it was Monroe
who applied the match. The statement that the United
States would resist the advance of the allies into the new
world, as hinted in President Monroe's Message of 1823,
together with the knowledge that England's sympathy was
pledged to the United States, was quite sufficient to check
any designs which the Alliance may have devised to stifle
the cause of liberalism and constitutional government in the
Western Hemisphere.

IV

When Canning became Minister of Foreign Affairs he
was perplexed in regard to the proper attitude he should
take toward the struggling Spanish-American colonies.
England's commercial classes inclined toward the indepen-
dence of these newly created republics ; but true to her
conservative notions, as well as to treaty pledges to Spain,
England was unprepared, even in her own interest, to welcome
immediately the seceded Spanish colonies into the brother-
hood of sovereign states. An unwillingness to leap as far
as her strength will permit is a characteristic of British
foreign relations, yet in this particular instance, a leap too
far might have proved a leap into the dark, as the strength
of all combined Europe seemed to favor the reduction of
Spanish-America in the cause of absolutism ; such a political
error might have isolated Great Britain. Canning was will-
ing to go mucli further in this direction than had been his
more temporizing predecessor. Lord Castlereagh. He pro-
tested vigorously against the proposed interference of Europe
in America. He was willing that the new states should
remain Spanish or be free, indeed it is said tliat he almost
preferred them to return under a modified Spanish rule ;
but in order to satisfy the requirements of English com-
mercial interests, they must, under no circumstances, pass

THE MONROE DOCTRINE 317

under other European sovereignty. "Neither justice, nor
humanity, nor the interests of Europe or of America," he
said to Polignac, " allow that the struggle . . . should be taken
up afresh by other hands." Again, England was far in
advance of continental Europe in the development of consti-
tutional government ; having progressed in her ideas favor-
able to popular suffrage, she too, it may reasonably be inferred,
viewed with some disfavor the resubjugation of a people
who had practically acquired their emancipation from the
tyranny of absolute monarchy. ^Ir. Canning was, in no
sense of the word, an enthusiastic admirer of the people of
the United States. From his own writings, expressions are
not wanting indicating an actual aversion for the keen, ag-
gressive people across the Atlantic, but in the impending
danger that threatened both, the one commercially, the
other politically, he turned to the United States. He well
knew that the people of the United States sympathized with
the Spanish colonies in their struggles for freedom ; indeed,
they had already recognized several of them as sovereign
states. He knew, also, that Americans regarded the advance
of despotism and the action of the allies with no little sus-
picion and disfavor. Why not, therefore, utilize this senti-
ment to his own advantage ? He began his reconnoitering
tactics at once by seeking Mr. Hush, the American JVIinister,
in London. On August 16, 1823, while discussing with
]\Ir. Rush matters connected with the northwest boundary
of the United States, the conversation drifted into Spanish
affairs. Mr. Rush spoke of a recent statement made by
Mr. Canning, to the effect that England disclaimed all
intention of seizing any Spanish colony, and hoped France
entertained no sucli i)urpose. Mr. Canning seized the occa-
sion to sound the American Minister as to what he believed
the (lovernment of the United States would say to a project
of going hand in hand with England in order to prevent
France, or tlie other powers of the alliance, from interfering
in Spanish America. l\Ir. Rush wrote : —

He did not think that concert of action wijuld become neces-
sary, fully believing that the .siinjile fact of our two countries

318 AMERICAN DIPLOMATIC QUESTIONS

being known to hold the same opinion would, by its moral effect,
put down the intention on the part of France, if she entertained
it. This belief was founded, he said, upon the large share of the
Maritime power of the world which Great Britain and the United
States shared between them, and the consequent influence which
the knowledge of their common policy on the question involving
such important maritime interests, present and future, could not
fail to produce on the rest of the world.

Without instructions from home, Mr. Rush did not feel
at liberty to commit himself upon so important a matter.
Several days after this conversation, Mr. Canning wrote to
Mr. Rush that his government had nothing to conceal on
the subject. It conceived the recovery of the colonies by
Spain to be hopeless, and the recognition of them to be a
question only of time and circumstance. He asserted that
the English Government was "by no means disposed to
throw any impediment in the way of an arrangement between
them and the mother country by amicable negotiations."
England, he maintained, desired for herself no part of their
territory, but he added, " it could not see any part of them
transferred to any other power with indifference."

Such being England's views, urged Mr. Canning, why
not, if the United States acceded, publish them to the world?
" A proceeding of such a nature," he continued, " would be
at once the most effectual and the least offensive mode of
intimating the joint disapprobation of Great Britain and the
United States of any projects which might be cherished by
any European power, of a forcible enterprise for reducing
the colonies to subjugation on the behalf or in the name of
Spain ; or of the acquisition of any part of them to itself by
cession or by conquest." Mr. Canning supplemented his
note by another a few days later, calling Mr. Rush's atten-
tion to the fact that additional reasons for haste had devel-
oped. France expected shortly to accomplish her military
objects in Spain, and notice had been sent to England tliat
when this was done " a proposal would be made for a Con-
gress in Europe, or some other concert and consultation,
specifically on the affairs of South America."

THE M(JNKOE DOCTRINE 319

Mr. Rush still hesitated to answer, fearing to complicate
the United States in tlie political broils of Europe, — a most
undesirable step, he believed, for his country to take ; more-
over, he felt certain that the President would sanction no
such radical departure from the fundamental principles of
American politics. He cautiously replied to the British
Secretary that he could safely say the United States agreed
with ]\Ir. Canning in all he had said concerning the future
status of the Spanish colonies. He concluded, however,
with the following vigorous words : " We should regard as
unjust, and fruitful of highly disastrous consequences, any at-
tempt on the part of an}' European power to take possession
of tliem by conquest, by cession, or on any other ground or
pretext." Lack of instructions from Washington did not
warrant him in joining with Mr. Canning in an open declara-
tion to that effect. A little later, Mr. Rush wrote to Can-
ning, that his government " would regard as objectionable
any interference whatever in the affairs of Spanish America,
unsolicited by the late ^jrovinces themselves, and against
their will. It would regard the convening of a Congress
to deliberate upon their affairs as a measure uncalled-for,
and indicative of a policy highly unfriendly to the tranc^uil-
lity of the world. It could never look with insensibility
upon such an exercise of P]uropean jurisdiction over com-
munities now of right exempt from it, and entitled to
regulate their own concerns unmolested from abroad."

Mr. Canning continued to urge Mr. Rush to join him in
an open declaration, because the congress of the powers would
soon meet, and England was desirous of arming herself before-
hand witli an American declaration, in order tliat she might
not enter the lists alone and single-handed against the designs
of the allies. Mr. Rush still liesitated. Comnnmication
Avith the United States recjuired many weeks, and by that
time an answer from Washington would be of little avail.
Again the British Secretary prodded Mr. Hush. ''They
[L nited States] were the first jirtwcr ('stal)lish('(l on that
continent, and now confessedly the IcadiiiL;- power:" they
were connueted with Sdutli Aiucric;i by tlieir geograjjliic

320 AMERICAN DIPLOMATIC QUESTIONS

position, and with Europe by their relations. Was it possi-
ble that they could with indifference see their fate deter-
mined by Europe ? Had not a new epoch arrived in the
relative position of the United States toward Europe, which
Europe must acknowledge ? Were the great political and
commercial interests which hung upon the destiny of the new
continent to be canvassed and adjusted on the Eastern Hemi-
sphere without the cooperation or even knowledge of the
United States ? These were flattering suggestions to Mr.
Rush; and finally moved by such representations he consented
to rely upon his general power as a Minister Plenipotentiary,
and to take the desired stand with Mr. Canning, provided
England would first recognize the independence of the South
American states. To this Canning would not agree, and the
project of a joint American and English statement fell through.
Annoyed by his failure to secure the cooperation of the
United States, Canning decided to proceed alone. Turn-
ing to France, he made known to the French Ambassador,
Prince Polignac, England's determination to oppose the
interference of the allied powers in Spain's behalf to sub-
due her colonies. To his surprise, no doubt, Polignac
declared that France entertained no such intention, and,
furthermore, that France fully agreed with England in that
the South American states were, to all intents and pur-
poses, free and should not be molested. Polignac further
disclaimed any intention on the part of his government
to seek any exclusive commercial advantage in Spanish
America. To Canning these statements of Polignac were
too extraordinary to be true ; he distrusted the French
diplomat, as the latter appears to have distrusted the Eng-
lishman, so Rush was not made acquainted by Canning with
the results of the Polignac conferences in time to forward
them to Washington before the end of the year (1823). As
it was largely against Frant;e that the animus of the Monroe
declaration was directed, it is not unlikely that had such a
disclaimer from Polignac reached President Monroe before
his message had been framed, its tone might have been con-
siderably modified.

THE MONROE DOCTRINE 321

When Rush's despatches rehiting his interviews with
Canning reached Washington in September (1823) the
President was phmged into a sea of doubt and perplexity- .
He fully realized the importance of the question as he saw
plainly the appi-oach of the dreaded clash ; it was the spirit
of absolutism, angered and jealous, which was seeking to
arrest the progress of democracy in the Western Hemi-/
sphere. To him the subjugation of the South American
colonies by France, or by the combined forces of the Holy
allies, pointed directly to the absorption of those coloni s
by the great powers and their forcible return to the sway
of imperialism. It meant the hedging in of the United
States by its natural enemies, and the possible overthrow of
republican institutions at home. He was determined from *
the first to act, but in just what manner was the question, i
To unite with (ireat Britain in a joint declaration to the
powers for the furtherance of any end whatever, would be to
enter upon an entangling alliance; indeed, to subvert a sacred
policy of his country. To issue a declaration such as the
occasion called for would involve an interference in tlie affairs
of foreign nations, and if issued alone by the United States
it might avail nothing against tlie forces of combined Europe.

Jefferson was then in retirement at Monticello, reuKJved
from the cares and vexations of public life, but to this aged
statesman, Monroe turned f(jr advice. To Madison as well,
also in retirement at his Virginia home, the President for-
warded copies of the Rush-Canning correspondence, solicit-
ing his counsel in this critical matter. The replies of these |
two men are valuable historical documents. That of Jeffer- ^
son is as follows : —

IMoxTicELLO, October 24, 1823.

Deak Sih, — Tli(! (niPstion jji'psentod by the letters you have
sent me, is the most iiiomeiitous whicli has ever been offered to
my contemplation since that of Indeiiendenee. That made us a
nation, this sets our compass and points the course whicli we are
to steer thi()u<,di the ocean of time opening' on us. And never
could we endjark on it under ciicumstances nun-a auspicious.
Our first and fundamental niaxim should be, never to entangle

322 AMERICAN DIPLOMATIC QUESTIONS

ourselves in the broils of Eurpj^e. Our second, never to suffer
Europe to intermeddle with cis-Atlantic affairs. America, North
and South, has a set of interests distinct from those of Europe,
and peculiarly her own. She should therefore have a system of
her own, separate and apart from that of Europe. While the
last is laboring to become the domicil of despotism, our endeavor
should surely be, to make our hemisphere that of freedom. One
nation, most of all, could disturb us in this pursuit; she now offers
to lead, aid, and accompany us in it. By acceding to her propo-
sition, we detach her from the band of despots, bring her mighty
weight into the scale of free government, and emancipate a con-
tinent at one stroke, which might otherwise linger long in doubt
and difficulty. Great Britain is the nation which can do us the I
most harm of any one, or all on earth ; and with her on our side f
we need not fear the whole world. With her then, we should'
most sedulously cherish a cordial friendship ; and nothing would
tend more to knit our affections than to be fighting once more,
side by side, in the same cause. Not that I would purchase even
her amity at the price of taking part in her wars. But the war
in which the present proposition might engage us, should that be
its consequence, is not her war, but ours. Its object is to intro-
duce and establish the American system, of keeping out of our
land all foreign powers, of never permitting those of Europe to
intermeddle with the affairs of our nations. It is to maintain our
own principle, not to depart from it. And if, to facilitate this,
we can effect a division in the body of the European powers, and
draw over to our side its most powerful member, surely we should
do it. But I am clearly of Mr. Oanning's opinion, that it will f
prevent instead of provoke war. With Great Britain withdrawn
from their scale and shifted into that of our two continents, all
Europe combined would not undertake such a war. For how
would they propose to get at either enemy without superior
fleets? Nor is the occasion to be slighted which this proposi-
tion offers, of declaring our protest against the atrocious violar
tions of the rights of nations, by the interference of any one in
the internal affairs of another, so flagitiously begun by Bonaparte,
and now continued by the equally lawless Alliance, calling itself \
Holy. .

1 could honestly, therefore, join in the declaration proposed,
that we aim not at the acquisition of any of those possessions,
that we will not stand in the way of any amicable arrangementi
between them and the mother country ; but that we will oppose,"
with all our means, the forcible interi)osition of any other power,
as auxiliary, stipendiary, or under any other form of })retext, and

THE MONROE DOCTRINE 323

most especially, their transfer to any po-wer by conquest, cession,
or acquisition in any other way. I should think it, therefore,
advisable, that the Executive should encourage the British govern-
ment to a continuance in the dispositions expressed in these let-
ters, by an assurance of his concurrence with them as far as his
authority goes ; and that as it may lead to war, the declaration of
which requires an act of Congress, the case shall be laid before
them for consideration at their first meeting, and under the rea-
sonable aspect in which it is seen by himself.

Madison's reply is no less interesting, and merits free
quotation : —

Oct. 30, 1823.

Dear Sir, — I have just received from Mr. Jefferson your let-
ter to him, with the correspondence between Mr. Canning and Mr.
Rush, sent for his and my perusal, and our opinions on the sub-
ject of it.

From the disclosures of Mr, Canning it a])pears, as was other-
wise to be inferred, that the success of France against Spain
would be followed by an attempt of the Holy allies to reduce the
revolutionized colonies of the latter to their former dependence.

The professions we have made to these neighbors, our sympa-
thies with their liberties and independence, the deep interest we
have in the most friendly relations with them, and the conse-
quences threatened by a command of their resources by the Great
Powers, confederated against the rights and reforms of which we
have given so conspicuous and persuasive an example, all unite in
calling for our efforts to defeat the meditated crusade. It is par-r
ticularly fortunate that the policy of Great Britain, though guided
by calculations different from ours, has presented a cooperation
for an object the same with ours. With that cooperation we have
nothing to fear from the rest of Europe, and with it the best
assurance of success to our laudable views. There ought not,
therefore, to be any backwardness, I think, in meeting her in the
way she has proposed ; keeping in view, of course, the spirit and
forms of the Constitution in every step taken in the road to war,
which must be the last step if those short of war should be with-
out avail.

It cannot be doubted that ]\Ir. Canning's proposal, though made
witli the air of coiiHultation as well as concert, was founded on a
pre-determination to take the course marked out, whatever might
be the reception given here to his invitation. liut this considera-
tion ought not to divert us lioiu w hat is just ami proiier in itself.

324 AMERICAN DIPLOMATIC QUESTIONS

Our cooperation is due to ourselves and to the world ; and whilst
it must ensure success in the event of an appeal to force, it doubles
the chance of success without that appeal. . . .

In November (1823) the cabinet meetings began, and it
may well be imagined that the principal topic of interest was
the subject of the Holy Alliance and its suspected Western
schemes ; just how to express the defiance of the United
States in the most judicious and practical manner, brought
forth considerable divergence of opinion.

In the cabinet were John Quincy Adams, Secretary of
State, Calhoun, Southard and Wirt. Mr. Calhoun advised
following the advice of Jefferson, and giving to Mr. Rush
discretionary powers to join with Great Britain in the decla-
ration referred to. To this proposition Adams vigorously
objected, in which opinion he was supported by the Presi-
dent, who, according to ]\Ir. Adams' own diary, "was averse
to any course which should have the appearance of taking a
position subordinate to that of Great Britain." Mr. Monroe
then suggested the idea of sending a special representative
to the proposed congress of the allies to protest against all
interference in South America, but tliis plan found no favor
in the cabinet. On November 13, Adams entered in his
diary : —

I find him yet altogether unsettled in his own mind as to the
answer to be given to Mr. Canning's proposals, and alarmed far
beyond anything that I could have conceived possible, with the
fear that the Holy Alliance are about to restore immediately all
South America to Spain. Calhoun stimulates the panic, and the
news that Cadiz has surrendered to the French has so affected the
President that he appeared entirely to despair of the cause of
South America. . . .

To Addington, the British Minister in Washington, who
pressed him for an answer to Canning's proposition, the
Secretary said that the measure " was of sucli nuignitude,
such paramount consequence as involving the whole future
policy of the United States . . . that the President was

THE MONROE DOCTRINE 325

anxious to give it the most deliberate consideration, and to
take the sense of his whole cabinet ujjon it."'

News suddenly arrived announcing the success of the
French troops in Spain, of the fall of Cadiz, and the restora-
tion of Ferdinand to absolute power, which, according to
Adams' diary, thoroughly dejected the President, and caused
widespread alarm throughout the country. The press viewed
the situation somewhat hysterically, and popular feeling
turned decidedly in favor of an English alliance. Adams
held firmly to his original position that the United States
should stand alone. He seemed to doubt Canning's sincerity;
it perhaps appeared to him, who was more familiar than his
colleagues with the methods of foreign diplomacy, that pos-
sibly Canning had, after all, by his cries of wolf, only been
trying to frighten the United States into guaranteeing Cuba
to Spain. Somewhat caustically he wrote in his diary : " I
soon found the source of the President's despondency with
regard to South American affairs. Calhoun is perfectly
moon-struck by the surrender of Cadiz, and says ' the Holy
allies, with ten thousand men, will restore all Mexico and
all South America to the Spanish dominion.'"

Calhoun's proposition to instruct Mr. Rush to act in
conjunction with Mr. Canning "in case of any sudden
emergency of danger," was accepted by the President,
though in opposition to the views of the Secretary of State.
A draft of instructions was actually drawn up by the unwill-
ing Adams, and was brought before the cabinet, much amended
and interlined, for examination. Mr. Adams then insisted
that if the U'nited States must join Great I>ritain in such a
movement, or in such a declaration of princi[)les, the English
(iovernment should first acknowledge the indei:)endence of
tiie South American states. The United States, he insisted,
having acknowledged the independence of the Spanish-
American states, "had a right to oljject to the interference
of foreign powers in the affairs of those territories. To
Cireat Britain, it might be objected that although possessing
the option, she liad no distinct right so to do. Slie regarded
those territories as still dependencies of Spain, and in that

326 AMERICAN DIPLOMATIC QUESTIONS

character she might allow, not only Spain, bnt pro re nata
other powers, as allies of Spain, to interfere in reducing
them by force, to obedience. Such a proceeding was im-
possible to the United States, from the mere fact of their
recognition of the independence of the territories in
question."

While discussion was proceeding in the cabinet over the
form of instructions to be sent to Mr. Rush, a new phase
of the question suddenly developed and called for con-
sideration.

Baron Tuyll, the Russian Minister in Washington, read to
Mr. Adams certain despatches he had received from Count
Nesselrode. One of these was the exhibition of " passionate
exultation at the counter revolution in Portugal and the
impending success of the French army in Spain ; an ' lo
Triomphe ' over the fallen cause of [popular] revolution, with
sturdy promises of determination to keep it down. ..."
Mr. Adams believed the expression of these sentiments called
for some sort of answer from the United States; " My pur-
pose would be," declared Mr. Adams " in a moderate and con-
ciliatory manner, but with a firm and determined spirit, to
declare our dissent from the principles avowed in those com-
munications, to assert those upon which our own government
is founded, and while disclaiming all intention of attempting
to propagate them by forpe, and all interference in the polit-
ical affairs of Europe, to declare our expectation and hope
that the European powers will equally abstain from the
attempt to spread their principles in the American hemi-
sphere, or to subjugate by force any part of these continents
to their will."' The President agreed with ]\Ir. Adams in
this respect, and at the next meeting of the cabinet he read,
from a rough draft, the annual message to Congress he was
preparing to deliver to that body on December 2. In this
draft he had inserted not only his views upon the matters
in question, but had also added some lines covertly intended
for the Czar as a reply to Nesselrode's despatches to Baron
Tuyll. Of this preliminary draft of the message Mr. Adams ,
wrote in his diary under date of November 21, 1823 : —

THE MONROE DOCTRINE 327

... Its introduction was in a tone of deep solemnity and of
high alarm, intimating that this country is menaced by imminent
and formidable dangers, such as would probably soon call for
their most vigorous energies and the closest union. It then pro-
ceeded to speak of the foreign affairs, chiefly according to the
sketch I had given him some days since, but with occasional vari-
ations. It then alluded to the recent events in Spain and Por-
tugal, speaking in terms of the most pointed reprobation of the
late invasion of Spain by France. It also contained a broad ac-
knowledgment of the Greeks as an independent nation , and a
recommendation to Congress to make an appropriation for send-
ing a minister to them.

The members of the cabinet generally accepted the draft
of the message with approval, but Adams objected to its
whole tone as one of combined fear and aggression. It ap-
peared to him to he the cry of an alarmist ; it breathed an
air of direct defiance which he believed to be Avholly un-
necessary; and at last it might precipitate a war, — the most
unfortunate of possibilities. Adams desired to "take thai
ground of earnest remonstrance against the interference of
the European powers by force with South America, but to
disclaim all interference on our part with Europe ; to make
an American cause, and adhere inflexibly to that." He
wished particularly to avoid mention of the allies, or refer-
ence in hostile manner to any nation, his idea being solely
the enunciation of a principle.

Notwithstanding Adams' desire to deal circumspectly with
personalities in public utterances, he still clung to the idea
of issuing a manifesto of some sort to Baron Tuyll in answer
to the Russian des})atches. A comment in his diary upon a
paper he had prepared for this purpose and had introduced
in the cabinet meeting of November 25, is a valuable ex-
tract as showing not only his own views at the moment, but
also to what extent he was tlie real author of the " decla-
ration " in the President's message to appear later.

"The paper itself," he wrote, "was drawn to correspond ex-
actly with a paragraph of the President's message which he had
read me yesterday, and which was entirely conformable to the

328 AMERICAN DIPLOMATIC QUESTIONS

system of policy which I have earnestly recommended for this
emergency. It was also intended as a firm, spirited, and yet con-
ciliatory answer to all the communications lately received from
the Russian Government, and at the same time, an unequivocal
answer to the proposals made by Canning to Rush. It was meant
also to be eventually an exposition of the principles of this gov-
ernment, and a brief development of its political system as hence-
forth to be maintained : essentially republican — maintaining its
own independence, and respecting that of others ; essentially pa-
cific — studiously avoiding all involvements in the combinations
of European politics, cultivating peace and friendship with the
most absolute monarchies, highly appreciating and anxiously de-
sirous of retaining that of the Emperor Alexander, but declaring
that, having recognized the independence of the South American
States, we could not see with indifference any attempt by Euro-
pean powers by forcible interposition either to restore the Spanish
dominion on the American continents, or to introduce monarchical
principles into those countries, or to transfer any portion of the/
ancient or present American possessions of Spain to any othey
European power."

Only a week before the message of the President was due,
the question of how to j^roceed against the threatened
dangers from Europe was by no means settled ; indeed,
Adams seems to have had the only clear conception of the
true necessities of the occasion. The form of instructions to
Rush was not determined upon ; the President's draft of
message met with the vigorous opposition of the Secretary
of State, and Adams' suggestion of a manifesto to Baron
Tuyll found no supporters in the cabinet. Monroe considered
Adams' sentiments in his proposed letter to Baron Tuyll to
be too vigorous, and to Europe, too offensively republican ;
they might even estrange Great Britain, whose friendship in
the impending crisis was absolutely essential. Calhoun also
doubted the necessity or even the advisability of publishing
"so ostentatious a display of republican principles." Adams
defended his manifesto by urging tluit "as the Holy allies
had come to edify and instruct us with their principles, it
was due in candor to them and in justice to ourselves, to re-
turn the compliment." Again Callioun averred that as the ^
President's message, which covei-ed tliis very subject, was

THE MONROE DOCTRINE 329

directed to the people of the United States aud not to any
foreign sovereign, it woidd be less likely to give offence.
Southard agreed with Mr. Adams. " If the Czar and the
Holy allies choose to sing to us the praises of despotism,"
he said, '^ they cannot take umbrage at our chorus for free
institutions, even though directed to them."

Up to this time (about a week before the convening of
Congress), Mr. Wirt, the Attorney General, who had been
absent from these important cabinet meetings, now appeared
upon the scene, and with a mind uninfluenced by the former
spirited discussions, he proceeded to examine Mr. Adams'
draft of manifesto from a purely common-sense point of viewl
Might it not, after all, seem to be mere bombast, for if the
allies should actually begin hostile operations against South
America, would the United States back up Mr. Adams' dec-
laration with men and guns ? To this Adams could only
reph', "It is, and has been to me, a fearful question."
Uj)on that point he said in his diary : —

'My paper and the paragraph woidd certainly conunit us as far
as tlie Executive constitutionally could act on this ])oint ; and if
we take this course, I should wish that a joint resolution of the
two Houses of Congress should be proposed and adopted to the
same i)urport.

Five days before the annual message became due, the situ-
ation in the cabinet was still one of coidusion. Adams in-
sisted upon pouring hot shot into the Czar by a letter to Tuyll
containing a most thorough indorsement of republican insti-
tutions. To this the President still demurred, fearing that
England might take offence at the rabid republicanism of the
document, and withdraw frctin her position of harmony with
the United States. Monroe was conservative, and Adamsi
extreme; but on the other hand, the President desired in his]
message to score France and the Holy allies both for their
interference in S[)ain aiul their contemplated interference in
America. He wished to recognize the independence of
Greece, to all of whieh Adams objected, insisting that lie
should ''dis<daim all intention of i)itt;rferiug with these, and

330 AMERICAN DIPLOMATIC QUESTIONS

make the stand altogether for an American cause ; and that
at the same time, the answer to be given to the Russian com- 1,
munications should be used as the means of answering also '
the proposals of Mr. George Canning, and of assuming the
attitude to be maintained by the United States with ref-
erence to the designs of the Holy Alliance upon South
America." At this point their relative positions were re-
versed, the President assuming a bold and defiant attitude,
and his Secretary counselling him to follow a more conserva-
tive course. Mr. Wirt did not believe that the people of
the United States sympathized with the South Americans
sufficiently to fight for their cause, in which case he ques-
tioned the propriety of issuing any menace Avhatever, — at
least he thought the temper of our own people should first
be ascertained by consulting Congress. Calhoun supported
the President ; the people would fight, he believed, and
should fight rather than permit the Spanish colonies to be
reduced by the allies ; but he objected to Adams' plan of
manifesto to Baron Tuyll, to wliich, on the other hand.
Southard and, strangely enough, the cautious AVirt gave
full approval.

All of this wrangling seems now to have been quite need-
less, for it really made but little difference whether the prin-
ciples the administration wished to proclaim to the world
should find expression in a letter to the Russian Ambassador
or should be embodied in the President's message to Con-
gress. Almost at the very last moment. President Monroe
seems to have adopted the changes in the draft of message
so urgently insisted upon by Mr. Adams. The message, as
finally prepared, expressed sympathy with tlie constitutional
manifestos of Spain and Greece ; but it disclaimed all in4
tention of interfering abroad, and refrained from censurina
either France or tlie Holy allies. '

The protest against interference on the part of the allies
in South America constitutes, however, only one part of
the "Monroe Doctrine." In the same message, though in
a preceding part of the document, occurs another exposition •
of a foreign policy, which the President took occasion to ,

THE MONROE DOCTRINE 331

propose as one worthy of future recognition by the United
States. This related to the attitude which, for its own
safety, the United States should thereafter assume toward
all foreign schemes of colonization upon the American con-
tinents. It was a policy embodying a principle so thor-
ouo-hly in harmony with the general view announced by
the President in reference to foreign aggressions in the
western world, that it has been accepted as a part of the
"Monroe Doctrine."

In tlie early part of the century, an American exploring
expedition had descended the Columbia River to its mouth,
and visiting the coastal regions of Oregon, had established
over a very considerable, though ill-defined region of terri-
tory, an American claim of title. Spain also had territorial
claims along the Pacific coast, as far north as Vancouver
Island, which, however, she yielded to the United States
(north of 42°) by treaty of 1819. English claims in the
northwest were exceedingly indefinite, but all cause of fric-
tion between England and the United States, arising from
disputed boundary lines on the Pacific coast, was removed by
the agreement of 1818, leaving for a term of years the terri-
tory claimed by both parties free and open to the subjects of
each. Far to the north and west, an immense and vaguely
bounded territory, belonged to Russia. Even in those early
days, some trade relations existed between citizens of the
United States and the native Alaskan Indians. INIisunder-
standings arose, and Russia took occasion in a correspond-
ence which followed, to make known hur claims along the
Piicific coast of North America, from P)ering Straits to the
mouth of the Columbia River. In 181G, a Russian chartered
company made settlements and established a regular trading-
post near San Francisco. This advance of the Russians, far
to tlie south, caused some dissatisfaction in Washington; but
so doubtful were all territorial titles along the Pacific coast
in those early days, tliat no positive stand was made against
this Russian advance. In 1H21, however, Alexander, Em-
|)t'ror of Russia, issued an ukase, in which he announced bis
claim to the northw(!st coast of America, (b)Wii to llie olst

332 AMERICAN DIPLOMATIC QUESTIONS

degree of latitude, and forbade the approach within one hun-
dred miles of his shores by any foreign vessel. This extraor-
dinary assumption of marine jurisdiction met with instant
protests from both Washington and London. Mr. Adams
bestirred himself to gather arguments to disprove this exag-
gerated claim of Russia, which Mr. Poletica, the Russian
Minister in Washington, sought to defend upon the grounds
" of first discovery, first occupation, and upon that which
results from a peaceable and uncontested possession of more
than half a century." Mr. Poletica was succeeded by Baron
Tuyll, who brought the discussion to a close by asking that
the matter be settled in St. Petersburg by negotiation with
Mr. Middleton, the American Minister at that capital. Mr.
Adams, in July, 1823, told Baron Tuyll " that we should
contest the right of Russia to any territorial establishment
on this continent, and that we should assume distinctly the
principle that American continents are no longer subjects for
any European colonial establishments." He then instructed
Mr. Middleton that : - —

There can, perhaps, be no better time for saying frankly and
explicitly, to the Russian Government, that the future peace of
the world, and the interest of Russia herself, cannot be promoted
by Russian settlements upon any part of the American continent.
With the exception of the British establishments north of the
United States, the remainder of both the American continents
must henceforth be left to the management of American hands.
It cannot possibly be the purpose of Russia to form extensive
colonial establishments in America. The new American repub-
lics will be as impatient of a Russian neighbor as the United
States ; and the claim of Russia to territorial possession, extend-
ing to the nist parallel of north latitude, is equally incompatible
with r>ritish pretensions.

The very same day he wrote to Mr. Rush, acquainting
him with the latest phases of the northwest-territory dis-
pute. He said: —

A necessary consequence of this state of things [independence
of the Spanish American colonies] will be, that the American
continents, henceforth, will no longer be subjects of colonization.

THE MONROE DOCTRINE 333

Occupied by civilized independent nations, they will be accessible
to Europeans and to each other on that footing alone, and the
Pacific Ocean in every part of it will remain open to the naviga-
tion of all nations in like manner with the Atlantic.

Incidental to the condition, of national independence and
sovereignty, the rights of anterior navigation of their rivers will
belong to each of the American nations within its own territories.

The application of colonial principles of exclusion, therefore,
cannot be admitted by the United States as lawful upon any part
of the northwest coast of America, or as belonging to any Euro-
pean nation.

Fortunately tlie dispute was amicably settled by the nego-
tiations in St. Petersburg. In the treaty of 1824, Russia I
accepted the parallel of 54° 40' as the southern limit of her /
American territory.

The statement of Mr. Adams, that the American conti-
nents would no longer be subject to colonization, was seized
upon by President Monroe. It dovetailed perfectly with the
policy he and his cal)inet had determined upon as a clieck
against the Holy Alliance.

The words of the annvuil message of December 2, 1823,
which constitute tlie ''Monroe Doctrine" are as follows, —
those aimed at Russia coming first : —

At the proposal of the Russian Imperial Government, made
through the minister of the Emperor residing here, a full
power and instructions have been transmitted to the minister
of the United States at St. Petersburg to arrange by amicable
negotiation the respective rights and interests of the two nations
on the northwest coast of this continent. A similar proposal had
lieen made Ijy His Imperial Majesty to the Government of Great
Britain, which has likewise been acceded to. The Government
of the United States has been desirous by tliis friendly proceed-
ing of manifesting tlie great value which they have invariably
ittaclied to tlie fiiendslnj) of the Emperor and their solicitude
to cultivate the best understanding witli his Government. In the
di.scussi(jiis to which this interest has given ri.se and in the arrange-
ments by which they may terminate the occasion lias been judged
]>ro))er for asuprfinrf, an a jri'incijde in trhich the rifjhts and interests
of the United States are iovoJrcd, that the Ameriran continents, by
the free and indepi'iali'iit conilitioii n-hlcli fhc/ Imrf ussmni'd and

334 AMERICAN DIPLOMATIC QUESTIONS

maintain, are henceforth not to be considered as subjects for future
colonization by any European powers.^

After a digression upon other topics, the President turns
to the subject of the threatened interference in South
America by the allied powers of Europe : —

"It was stated at the commencement of the last session that
a great effort was then making in Spain and Portugal to
improve the condition of the people of those countries, and
that it appeared to be conducted with extraordinary modera-
tion. It need scarcely be remarked that the result has been
so far very different from what was then anticipated. Of
events in that quarter of the globe, with which we have so
much intercourse and from which we derive our origin, we
liave always been anxious and interested spectators. The
citizens of the United States cherish sentiments the most
friendly in favor of the liberty and happiness of their fellow-
men on that side of the Atlantic. In the wars of the Euro-
pean powers in matters relating to themselves we have never
taken any part, nor does it comport with our policy so to do.
It is only when our rights are invaded or seriously menaced
that we resent injuries or make preparation for our defence.
With the movements in this liemisphere we are of necessity
more immediately connected, and by causes which must be
obvious to all enlightened and impartial observers. The
political system of tlie allied powers is essentially different
in this respect from that of America. This difference pro-
ceeds from that which exists in their respective Governments;
and to the defence of our own, which has been achieved by
the loss of so much blood and treasure, and matured by the
wisdom of their most enlightened citizens, and under which
we have enjoyed unexampled felicity, this wliole nation is
devoted. We oive it therefore, to candor and to the amicable
relations existing between the United States and those powers
to declare that we should consider any attempt on their part to
extend their system to any portion of this hemisphere as danger-

1 Italics not in the message.

THE MONROE DOCTRINE 385

ous to our peace and safety. With the existing colonies or
dependencies of any European power we have not interfered
and shall not interfere. But with the Governments who have
declared their independence and maintained it, and Avhose
independence we have, on great consideration and on just
principles, acknowledged, we could not view an}^ interposition
for the purpose of oppressing them, or controlling in any-
other manner their destiny, by any European power in any
other light than as the manifestation of an unfriendly dis-
position tou'ard tlie United States. In the war between those
new Governments and Spain we declared our neutrality at
the time of their recognition, and to this we have adhered,
and shall continue to adhere, provided no change shall occur
which, in the judgment of tlie competent authorities of this
Government, shall make a corresponding change on the part
of the United States indispensable to their security.

" The late events in Spain and Portugal show that Europe
is still unsettled. Of this important fact no stronger proof can
be adduced than that the Allied Powers should have thought
it i)roper, on any principle satisfactory to themselves, to have
interposed by force in the internal concerns of Spain. To
what extent such interposition may l)e carried, on the same
princijole, is a question in which all independent powers whose
governments differ from theirs are interested, even those
most remote, and surely none more so than the United
States. Our policy in regard to Europe, whicli was adopted
at an early stage of the wars wliich have so long agitated that '
quarter of the globe, nevertheless remains the same, which is,
not to interfere in the internal concerns of any of its Pow-
ers; to consider the government de facto us the legitimate
government for us; to cultivate friendly relations with it,
and to preserve those relations by a frank, firm, and manly
I)olicy, meeting, in all instances, the just claims of every
l)Ower, submitting to injuries from none. But in regard to
these continents circumstances are eminently arid conspicu-
ously different. It is impossible tliat the allied powers
>lu)uld extend their political system tf) any ])ortion of either
'•ontinent witliout endangering our jjcacc and ha]ii)iness; nor

336 AMERICAN DIPLOMATIC QUESTIONS

can any one believe that our southern brethren, if left to
themselves, would adopt it of their own accord. It is equally
impossible, therefore, that we should behold such interposi-
tion in any form with indifference. If we look to the com-
parative strength and resources of Spain and those new
Governments, and their distance from each other, it must be
obvious that she can never subdue them. It is still the true
policy of the United States to leave the parties to them-
selves, in the hope that other powers will pursue the same
course." ^

Reviewing the course of events that culminated in the dec-
larations of President Monroe in his annual message to Con-
gress of 1823, several facts are to be noted : —

1. The United States by adopting a republican form of
government brought upon itself the enmity of absolutism.

2. Physical weakness obliged it to follow a policy of polit-
ical isolation. Intermeddling in the affairs of others was
likely to invite troubles, and the young republic could not
endure the strain of useless wars. By frequent expressions
of its statesmen the nation substantially pledged itself to
abstain from interference with the concerns of Europe.

3. With this determination to hold aloof from the politi-
cal affairs of the old world, a dominant feeling prevailed,
that the old world should not interfere in the affairs of
the new.

4. It became apparent in the summer of 1823 that certain
powers of Europe, allied together for the purpose of suppress-
ing rebellion and perpetuating the theories of divine right of
kings, were about to extend the scope of their operations
to South America, by aiding Spain in crushing rebellion in
her colonies.

5. George Canning, the English Minister for Foreign
Affairs, was embarrassed as to the proper course to pursue in
relation to the South Americuin colonies of Spain. liritish
commercial interests demanded the recognition of the new ,

1 Italics not in message. '

THE MONROE DOCTRINE 337

states, while other considerations opposed such a course.
Finding a solution of the difficulty in American cooperation
against the Holy Alliance, he sought to enlist the United States
in a plan he had devised to oppose the scheme of the allies.

6. Interference on the part of the allies in South and
Central America, it. was feared, would lead to territorial
grants to them, followed, in all probability, by the estab-
lishment of monarchical rule, and eventually the overthrow
of republican institutions in all the new world, including
the United States.

7. Previous to 1823, Russia had by proclamation and ac-
tual settlement sought to acquire title to portions of the
Pacific coast of North America, claimed by both England
and the United States. Pending negotiations for settlement
of these difficulties, the President took occasion to express in |
his message of 1823, his* belief that thenceforth the United |
States could permit no European colonization in North or I
South America.

The ^lonroe Doctrine includes several distinct statements,
as follows: —

(a) Tlie American continents are henceforth not to be
considered as subjects for future colonization by any Euro-
pean powers.

(J)) The political system of the allied powers is essentially
and radically different from tliat of America, and, being de-
voted to the defence of our own system, we owe it in can-
dor to those powers to declare that we should " consider any
attempt on their }):irt to extend their system to any i>oi'liou
of this hemisphere as dangerous to our peace and safety."

('•) Having acknowledged the independence of certain
goveriunents (in America), we couhl not view interi)osi-
tion on the part of any European power, for the j)nr[)ose of
oppressing or otlierwise controlling them, in any other light
than as a manifestation of unfriendly disposition toward the
United States.

(d) The foreign policy of the Unit(;d States would rt-main
the same; that is, not to interfere in the internal affairs of
any European [)ower.

338 AMERICAN DIPLOMATIC QUESTIONS

(g) Circumstances being radically different on these con-
tinents, it is impossible that the allied powers should extend
their political systems into either of them without endanger-
ing our peace and happiness ; therefore it is impossible that
we should behold such interposition with indifference.

Barring the first statement in regard to colonization, which
expressly lays down a principle for future guidance, the
declaration was a defensive measure, directed against the
threatened interference of the European powers constituting
the Holy Alliance. There has since been endless discussion "•
as to whether the President intended by these words to
establish a principle that should ever afterward be followed
by the people of the United States. Whether the President'
intended this or not, the principles enunciated at that time
have frequently been appealed to since, and the " doctrine "
itself has been accepted as the corner-stone of America's
foreign policy. There can be little doubt, however, that
President Monroe had no intention of proclaiming to the
world an inviolable principle for all time to come. Being
confronted by a definite threat, he met it by a definite state-
ment. He mentions in his message the particular reasons
for his opposition to the " Allied Powers," and refers in par-
ticular to " these powers " constituting the Holy Alliance, as
the object of his attack, because they represent, and seek to
perpetuate, a system of government from the evil influences
of which we had escaped and the revival of wdiich we regarded
with abhorence.

Monroe's biographer, Daniel C. Oilman, says : —

It appears to me probable that Monroe had but little conception
of the lasting effect which his words would produce. ... It was
because he pronounced not only the opinion then prevalent, but
a tradition of other days, which had been gradually expanded,
that liis Avords carried with them the sanction of })ublic- law.

The messafre was received in the United States with feel-
ings of deepest satisfaction. The danger had been squarely
met, and the people were relieved in the knowdedge that the
President could be depended upon to act projjcrly should the
anticipated crisis occur. The spirit of the doctrine had been

THE MONROE DOCTRINE 339

struggling for expression for a number of j-ears, and, in
voicing it, the President touched a chord which vibrated in
every American heart. From all political parties the admin-
istration received the warmest commendation, while a most
friendly feeling made itself apparent throughout the United
States toward England, winch had now become a silent politi-
cal partner. In England that portion of the message which
related to interference in America on the part of the allied
powers of Europe was enthusiastically received, and the Eng-
lish press was fulsome in its praise of President ]\Ionroe.
The British Government felt relieved of a burden by the
positive attitude of the United States. The message had
come at a most opportune moment ; the allies were pressing-
Great Britain to meet them in convention at Paris, with
a view of settling the Spanish-American question. Mr.
Canning, though hesitating to isolate his country from the
rest of Europe, knew that the proposed settlement would be
unsatisfactory to England. Mr. Monroe's message relieved
the situation and settled the matter in just the way Great
Britain desired. Canning afterward boasted, "I called the i
New World into existence to redress the balance of the Old." /

The other part of the message, relating to colonization,
was not so acceptable to Great Britain. There being at
that time much uncertainty as to the extent and ownership
of unoccupied land in the great Northwest, Canning main-
tained that England "could not acknowledge the riglit of
any power to proclaim such a i)rinciple, much less to bind
other countries to the observance of it. If Ave were to be
repelled from the shores of Amei-ica, it would not matter to
us whether that repvdsion were effected l)y the Ukase of
Russia, excluding us from the sea, or b}- the new doctrine
of the President, prohilnting us from the land. But we
cannot yield obedience to cither." Tlie declaration was '' very
extraordinary"; one which His Majesty's Govennnent was
" prepared to coml)at in the most unequivocal manner." The
right of colonization was one that, as heretofore, may be exer-
cised " without affording the slightest umbrage to the
United States."

340 AMERICAN DIPLOMATIC QUESTIONS

The powers of Continental Europe were surprised and
indignant ; Monroe was a dictator of the worst character,
while the United States was an upstart nation, that main-
tained unwarrantable pretensions, and sought to establish
wholly inadmissible principles in contempt of the civilized
nations of the world. The declaration of this presumptuous
people should be resisted by all powers possessing interests
in the Western Hemisphere. But just back of the out-
stretched wings of the noisy American eagle, France and
Russia believed they detected the British lion. If Eng-
land had, after all, joined the allies in their schemes, it
is much to be doubted whether the President's message of
1823 would have seriously embarrassed them in tlie ultimate
perfection of their Spanish American plans ; but the realiza-
tion that Great Britain, with her powerful navy, endorsed,
in the main, the sentiments of President Monroe, cast a
gloom over the propagandists of divine right, and the great
South American project was abandoned.

Although the Colombian Congress resolved that the doc-
trine of the North American President was " an act eminently
just and worthy of the classic land of liberty," the message
does not seem to have been welcomed with loud acclaim in
South America. Events following soon after convinced the
people of Spanish America — suspicious by nature, and at
heart distrustful of the Anglo-Saxon — that the United
States did not intend to uphold the doctrine, and that if it
were meant as a promise of protection to them, it was false.

Soon after the reading of the President's annual message,
Henry Clay, Speaker of the House of Representatives, caused
to be introduced the following resolution : —

Resolved by the Senate and House of Representatives of the
United States of America in Congress assembled, That the people
of these states would not see, without serious inquietude, any
forcible intervention by the allied Powers of Europe, in behalf
of 8})ain, to reduce to their former subjection those parts of the
continent of America which have proclaimed and established for
themselves, respectively, independent governments, and which
have been solemnly recognized by the United States.

THE MONROE DOCTRINE 341

This attempt to place the seal of Congressional approval
upon the Monroe Doctrine, and give it thereby a more
authoritative character, failed in less than two months after
its enunciation by the executive. Several reasons have been
assigned for this failure; one is, that Congress considered the
alleged threats of the allies as empty vaporings, unworthy of
notice ; another is, that members of Congress, believing the
danger to be past, were unwilling, in the absence of clear
evidence of hostile intentions from abroad, to lay down a
principle so wide and sweeping in its cliaracter, and one that
might possibly be regarded by friendly nations as offensive.
Still another reason is advanced why ]\Ir. Clay's resolution
was consigned to the table. Mr. Clay was well known to
be a candidate for the presidejicy. His strength was great
throughout the South and the West, and his influence as
Speaker in the House was a powerful one. John Quincy
Adams also was looking in the same direction as Mr. Clay ;
General Jackson was a possible candidate, and the same may
be said of Calhoun. The " Monroe Doctrine " carried within
it the elements of unbounded popularity ; its chami)ion in
Congress might become a political hero. The opponents of
Clay therefore combined against him, and he found himself
in the awkward attitude of fathering a measure which was
doomed in advance. He yielded to necessity, and consented
to the shelving of his resolution.

]\Ir. Poinsett of South Carolina also moved a simihir reso-
lution, which met the same fate, but political jealousy can
hardly be charged for the failure of Mr. Poinsett's motion.

In his last annual message to Congress, the following year
(December 7, 1824), President Monroe again took occasion
to reaffirm the policy announced in his previous message.

. . . Separated as we are from Europe by the great Atlantic
Ocean, we can have no concern in the wars of the European (Gov-
ernments nor in the causes wliich produce tliem. The balance
of jiower between them, into whichever scale it may turn in its
various vibrations, cannot affect us. It is the interest of tlie
United States to preserve the most friemlly relations with every
power and on conditions fair, equal, and applicable to all. I5ut

342 AMERICAN DIPLOMATIC QUESTIONS

in regard to our neighbors our situation is different. It is impos-
sible for the European governments to interfere in their concerns,
especially in those alluded to, which are vital, without affecting
us; indeed, the motive which might induce such interference in
the present state of the war between the parties, if a war it may
be called, would appear to be equally applicable to us. It is grati-
fying to know that some of the powers with whom we enjoy a
very friendly intercourse, and to whom these views have been
communicated, have appeared to acquiesce in them. . . .

An occasion was about to be presented to the United
States Government which would indicate the extent to which
the country was willing to go in pledging its material sup-
port to the Monroe Doctrine. In the negotiations and
debates relative to an invitation from the South American
states to send delegates to a general Congress of the
Americas, every shade of sentiment touching the Monroe
Doctrine is found. So widely divergent were opinions in
Congress upon this subject, that the doctrine, after running
the gantlet of the Senate and House, emerged sadly dis-
figured. But in these debates, as with Clay's resolution,
a series of political considerations became involved. The
reluctance of Congress on this occasion to endorse the policy
w^as, after all, scarcely a test of popular sentiment on the
subject.

VI. PANAMA CONGRESS

I Simon Bolivar was the Washington of South America.
It was his voice that stirred the people to patriotic ardor ;
it was his martial skill that brought them victory, and won
for them the prizes of liberty. His statue adorns the public
squares of South American cities ; his memory is revered
from Panama to Buenos Ayres ; he is declared to be the
hero, the lil:)erator of South America. At his instance, the
states of Colombia in 1822 (then New Granada) began mak-
ing treaties of alliance, offensive and defensive, with other
South American states, whose independence from Spain had
been practically won. In that and the following year, the

THE MONROE DOCTRINE 343

various independent states of South America formed a feder-
ation, bound together by the closest ties of friendshijj and
common interest.

The central object of this confederation was to maintain
independence by mutual aid and support, and to shield them-
selves against all harmful foreign influence. Like their
North American neighbor, they had watched with consider-
able apprehension the threatened movement of the European
allies to aid Spain in their resubjugation, and they recognized
the necessity of standing firmly together. It was therefore
agreed among them that ''a general assembl}' of the American
states shall be convened," for the purpose "of cementing . . .
Thtimate relations," and Panama was suggested as a convenient
meeting place. There seems to have l)een no original inten-
tion on the part of these " formerly Spanish " provinces to
ask the United States to cooperate with them when they made
tlieir treaties of alliance, but the publication of President
Monroe's message, of December, 1823, with its encouraging
words for all newly created republics in the Western Hemi-
sphere, seemed clearly to entitle the United States to a
voice in their proposed Congress, should such a desire mani-
fest itself at Washington. In the spring of 1825, the
ministers of Colomlna and ^Mexico, Messrs. Salazar and
Obregon, cautiously approached the Secretary of State with
a proposition from their respective governments, to the effect
that, should tlie United States desire to participate, her dele-
gates would find welcome at the Congress of the Americas,
soon to convene at Panama. This invitation came imme-
diately after the inauguration of President Adams (March,
182")). The President was known to be a hearty supporter
of the principles of the Monroe Doctrine ; he had been
Secretary of State under Monroe, and had enjoyed, as such,
the full confidence of the President during the preparation
of liis famous message. The Secretary of State was Henry
Clay, and lie liad always been the champion in Congress
of the South American states ; indeed, some of his greatest
speeches had been niadf in their cause. It was then reason-
able to suppose that the ailiiiiiiistratioii wouhl be favorable

344 AMERICAN DIPLOMATIC QUESTIONS

to this plan of a general Congress. Knowing now that
Adams, to a very large extent, was the real author of the
Monroe Doctrine, one looks with considerable interest to
the reply of the President to Messrs. Salazar and Obregon,
because it is, from the highest source, an official and authori-
tative interpretation of the Monroe Doctrine. During the
cabinet discussions of 1823, Avhen the phrasing of that por-
tion of the President's message relating to foreign affairs
was under discussion, and Mr. Adams was urging the ac-
ceptance of his own copy, Mr. Wirt, the Attorney General,
had asked him if he intended that the country should sus-
tain, by force of arms, the somewhat aggressive policy he
advocated. Mr. Adams could only then reply that that
very question had given him no little concern, and he could
not fully answer it. Now the same question was subtly
asked by South America, — Would the Unite*d States confer
with those who had joined in arms against European aggres-
sion, or perhaps, would she go a step further, and ally her-
self with them ?

The President replied to the invitation of the two minis-
ters through Mr. Clay, saying : —

That of course the United States could not make themselves
a party to the existing war with Spain. The President believed
such a Congress as was proposed might be highly useful in set-
tling several important disputed questions of public law, and in
arranging other matters of deep interest to the American conti-
nent, and strengthening the friendship and amicable intercourse
between the American powers ; but, before such a Congress assem-
bled, certain conditions should be complied with, namely, the
fixing of the subjects to be discussed at the Congress, the powers
to be given to the commissioners, and the mode of organizing the
Congress. . . .

A cautious reply. In the following November (1825),
these same diplomatic agents of Colombia and ^Mexico re-
ported to Mr. Clay, renewing their invitation upon this
occasion, by formal notes from their home governments.
They stated that while it was impossible to enumerate,

THE MONROE DOCTRINE 345

definitely, all the topics which would likely be presented for
consideration, at the proposed Panama Congress, they could
at least state that the discussions would include the manner of
resistance to any attempted colonization by European powers
on the American continent, and would include also the
methods of resistance against possible interference in behalf
of Spain against her former colonies. They would also dis-
cuss certain matters of international law, the abolition of the
slave trade, and the independence of Haiti. Numerous other
subjects were to be brought up, which more particularly con-
cerned the South American states, and which the United
States delegates would not be required or expected to discuss.
It was particularly appropriate, as these representatives be-
lieved, for the American states to assemble in Congress, in
order to consider their own interests — the nations of the
Old World had long since been doing the same thing.

Mr. Clay thought that the ministers who extended this
invitation to the United States had not even yet been sul'fi-
ciently explicit as to all preliminary arrangements, to satisfy
the President. The President wished to know exactly to
what extent discussions at Panama might go, and just how
far the United States might be placed under obligations by
the resolutions adopted at the Congress. Both Adams and
Clay felt the necessity of caution. It is far safer to declare
a policy than to pledge oneself to abide by it. The Presi-
dent deliberated well ; he believed that preliminary matters
could be satisfactorily arranged later, so he dismissed the
ph'uipotentiaries from Col()iiil)i;i and Mexico, with the state-
ment that lie would send commissioners to the Congress at
I'anama, if the Senate, which was shortly to convene, would
consent.

In Ills annual message the following montli (December 0,
182o), the President spoke of the proposed Panama Congress,
and of the invitation to the Ignited States to participate.
"The invitation has l)een accepted," he wrote, "and minis-
ters on the i)art of the United States will be commissioned to
attend at those delil)erations, and to take part in them, so far
as may be compatible witli that neutrality, from wliidi it is

346 AMERICAN DIPLOMATIC QUESTIONS

neither our intention, nor the desire of the other American
states, that we should depart."

To the Colombian and Mexican ministers, the President
had said he would send delegates to the Congress, " should
the Senate of the United States . . . give their advice and
consent " ; to the Senate he simply said, " Ministers on the
part of the United States ivill he commissioned to attend."

It was generally supposed to be the custom, as well as
within the law, for the executive, in the creation of a new
mission, simply to nominate envoys for the purpose, in which
case, if the Senate did not agree with the President in the
expediency of the suggested mission, it could exercise its
authority by declining to confirm the nominations. The
President's numerous political enemies in the Senate chose
to avail themselves of this opportunity to attack the adminis-
tration, and a bitter discussion of the constitutional right
of the President to create tlie mission to Panama followed.
On December 26 (1825), the President sent a special mes-
sage to Congress on the subject, in which he remarked : —

Although this measure was deemed to be within the constitu-
tional competency of the Executive, I have not thought proper
to take any step in it before ascertaining that my opinion of its
expediency will concur with that of both branches of the Legisla-
ture, first, by the decision of the Senate upon the nominations to
be laid before them, and, secondly, by the sanction of both Houses
to the appropriations, without which it cannot be carried into
effect.

In defence of his policy he went on to say : —

It will be seen that the United States neither intend nor are
expected to take part in any deliberations of a belligerent char-
acter ; that the motive of their attendance is neither to contract
alliances nor to engage in any undertaking or project importing
hostility to any otlier nation.

The President further suggested that the South American
nations " in the infancy of their independence " and through
mere inexperience, had failed in some of their duties to otlier
nations; that tlirough the friendly means of a general Con-

THE MONROE DOCTRINE 347

gress, such mistakes against the United States might be cor-
rected. In this document from the White House, a number
of other reasons were urged — all seemingly sufficient to the
President — that the United States should be represented
in a general Congress of the Americas. The following sig-
nificant words are noteworthy : —

An agreement between all the parties represented at the meet-
ing that each will guard by its own means against the establish-
ment of any future European colony within its borders may be
found advisable. This was more than two years since announced
by my predecessor to the world as a principle resulting from the
emancipation of both the American continents. It may be so
developed to the new southern nations that they will all feel it
as an essential appendage to their independence.

The message closes with the nomination of Richard C.
Anderson of Kentucky, and John Sargent of Pennsylvania,
" to be envoys extraordinary and ministers plenipotentiary
to the assembly of the American nations at Panama."

A storm of disapproval met the reading of this message.
In the Senate many expressed indignation at the President's
assumption in nominating delegates to the Panama conven-
tion, without first having asked the consent of Congress, and
were moved to expressions of greater wrath by the Presi-
dent's bold assertion of his constitutional right to send such
envoys as he proposed. They railed against his " patroniz-
ing effrontery " in asking if Congress did really concur in
his opinion of the expediency of the Panama mission, when
he had already signified his intention to send delegates.

A bitter prejudice was engendered in both branches of Con-
gress, against tlie President's project, quite aside and apart
from the merits of the question itself.

There were also many in Congress who did not favor
sending commissioners to Panama, for any reason whatever,
as they distrusted the volatile character of the Spanish
descendants ; and as they doubted their capacity for self-
government, they wished to luive no jtolitical connections with
them. It would be unwise, they said, to entangle ourselves

348 AMERICAN DIPLOMATIC QUESTIONS

ill their affairs, — we should be free to use our own discre-
tion how and when to apply our recently advanced foreign
policy. The United States, they urged, had notliing to gain
and everything to lose by sending representatives to such a
gathering.

In reviewing the long and particularly acrimonious debate
aroused by the President's special message of December 26,
one can hardly fail to be struck by the persistency and
vindictiveness of the opposition. It seems indeed to have
been out of all proportion to the importance of the issue. A
hidden cause for so much venom may be found in the fact
.that the enemies of the measure were all from the South, and
[represented slave-holding constituents. The Spanish-Amer-
' ican states had abolished the institution of slavery, and were
desirous of conferring with the United States at Panama, as
intimated by Messrs. Salazar and Obregon, upon the pro-
priety of abolishing the slave trade. Haiti was a negro repub-
lic, a nation of former slaves, and these southern members
of Congress wished no official notice to be taken of them, and
they resented the suggestion of conferring with them in any
manner whatever. Randolph, Hayne, Van Buren, Buchanan,
Polk, Calhoun and Burton, led an opposition that seemed
invincible ; " other states will do as they please," said Hayne,
"• but let us take the high ground tliat these questions belong
to a class which the peace and safety of a large portion of
our Union forbids us to discuss. Let our government direct ,
all our ministers in South America and Mexico to protest
against the independence of Haiti; but let us not go into
council on the slave trade and Haiti." White, of Tennessee,
exclaimed, " Let us cease to talk of slavery in this House, I
let us cease to negotiate upon any subject connected with
it." Shadows of coming events were here cast before.
Calhoun appointed the Committee on Foreign Affairs, and
he selected its members with a purpose. The committee
returned an unanimous report, to tlie effect that it was
not expedient for the United States to be represented at
Panama. T\\o. Senate tlien went a step farther, and passed a
resolution consurinsf the President.

THE MONROE DOCTRINE 349

On the loth of March (1820), Mr. Adams, still undismayed,
sent a special message to the House of Representatives, in
which he sought to demonstrate to tliat body the great im-
portance of the Panama mission. The message is too redo-
lent of the flowers of rhetoric, but it is a remarkably vigorous
paper. Here and there occur expressions that throw con-
siderable light upon Adams' conception of the extent and
scope of the Monroe Doctrine, and which, coming from a
joint author of the doctrine itself, are of great value : —

But objects of the highest importance, not only to the future
welfare of tlie whole human race, but bearing directly upon the
special interests of this Union, toill engage the deliberations of the
Congress of Panama whether we are represented there or not.
Others, if we are represented, may be offered by our plenipotenti-
aries for consideration having in view both these great results —
our own interests and the improvement of the condition of man
upon earth. It may be that in the lapse of many centuries no
other opportunity so favorable will be presented to the Govern-
ment of the United States to subserve the benevolent purposes
of Divine Providence; to dispense the promised blessings of the
Redeemer of Mankind ; to promote the prevalence in future ages of
])eace on earth and good will to man, as will now be placed in their
power by participating in the deliberations of this congress. . . .

The late President of the United States, in his message to
Congress of the 2d December, 1823, while announcing the nego-
tiation then pending with Russia, relating to the northwest coast
of this continent, observed that the occasion of the discussions to
which that incident had given rise had been taken for asserting
as a principle in which the rights and interests of the United
States were involved that the American continents, by the free
and independent condition which they had assumed and main-
tained, were thenceforward not to be considered as subjects for
future colonization Ijy any European power. The principle had
first been assumed in that negotiation with Russia. It rested
upon a course of reasoning equally simple and conclusive. With
the exception of tlie existing European (u)lonies, wliich it was in
nowise intended to disturl), the two continents cf)nsisted of several
sovereign and independent nations, wliose territories covered their
whole surface. By this their independent condition the United
States enjoyed tlie right of coniniercial intercourse with every part
of tlieir possessions. To attempt the establishment of a colony in

350 AMERICAN DIPLOMATIC QUESTIONS

those possessions would be to usurp to the exclusion of others a
commercial intercourse which was the common possession of all.
It could not be done without encroaching upon existing rights of
the United States. The Government of Russia has never dis-
puted these positions nor manifested the slightest dissatisfaction
at their having been taken. Most of the new American Republics
have declared their entire assent to them, and they now propose,
among the subjects of consultation at Panama, to take into con-
sideration the means of making effectual the assertion of that
principle, as well as the means of resisting interference from
abroad with the domestic concerns of the American Governments.

In alluding to these means it would obviously be premature at
this time to anticipate that which is offered merely as matter for
consultation, or to pronounce i;pon those measures which have
been or may be suggested. The purpose of this Government is to
concur in none which would import hostility to Europe or justly
excite resentment in any of her States. Should it be deemed
advisable to contract any conventional engagement on this topic,
our views would extend no further than to a mutual pledge of the
parties to the compact to maintain the principle in application to
its oivn territory, and to permit no colonial lodgments or establish-
ment of European jurisdiction upon its own soil ; and with respect
to the obtrusive interference from abroad — if its future charac-
ter may be inferred from that which has been and perhaps still is
exercised in more than one of the new States — a joint declaration
of its character and exposure of it to the world may be probably
all that the occasion would require. . . .

The condition of the islands of Cuba and Porto Rico is of
deeper import and more immediate bearing upon the present in-
terests and future prospects of our Union. The correspondence
herewith transmitted will show how earnestly it has engaged the
attention of this Government. The invasion of both those islands
by the united forces of Mexico and Colombia is avowedly among
the objects to be matured by the belligerent States at Panama.
The convulsions to which, from the peculiar composition of their
population, they would be liable in the event of such an invasion,
and the danger therefrom resulting of their falling ultimately
into the hands of some European power other than Spain, will
not admit of our looking at the conseciuences to which the Con-
gress at Panama may lead with indifference.

After giving assurances that the "assembly will be in its
nature dij)lomatic and not legislative — merely consultative,"

THE MONROE DOCTRINE 351

Mr. Adams takes up the question of whether " the measure
might not have a tendency to change the policy hitherto in-
variably pursued by the United States of avoiding all entan-
gling alliances and all unnecessary foreign connections."
"Mindful of the advice given by the father of our country,"
he declares that the counsel of Washington in that instance,
"like all counsels of wisdom," was founded upon the fact
that "• Europe had a set of primary interests " all her own,
and having but a remote relation to us, could only involve
us in needless dispute, did we concern ourselves about them,
but now, having " more than realized the anticipations of
this admirable political legacy," by our growth and expan-
sion we have arrived at a point when " America has a set of
primary interests which have none or a remote relation to
Europe ; that the interference of Europe, therefore, in those
concerns should be spontaneously withheld by her upon the
same principles that we have never interfered with hers,
and that if she should interfere, as she may, by measures
which may have a great and dangerous recoil upon ourselves,
we might be called in defence of our own altars and firesides
to take an attitude which would cause our neutrality to be
respected, and choose peace or war, as our interest, guided by
justice, should counsel." Following the same idea he con-
tinues : —

To the question which may be asked, whether this meeting
and the principles which may be adjusted and settled by it as
rules of intercourse between the American nations may not give
umbrage to the holy league of Euro[iean powers or offence to
Spain, it is deemed a sufficient answer that our attendance at
Panama can give no just cause of umbrage or offence to either,
and that the United States will stipulate nothing there which
can give such cause. Here the right of inquiry into our pur-
poses and measures must sto[). The holy league of Europe itself
was formed without iuquiring of the United States whether it
would or would not give umbrage to them. The fViir (if giving
umbrage to the lioly league of Europe was urged as a motive for
denying to the American nations the acknowledgiueut of their
independence. That it would be viewed by Sjiain as liostility to
her, was not only urged, but directly dcchirrd liy herself. The

352 AMERICAN DIPLOMATIC QUESTIONS

Congress and Administration of that day consulted their rights
and duties and not their fears. Fully determined to give no
needless displeasure to any foreign power, the United States can
estimate the probability of their giving it only by the right which
any foreign state could have to take it from their measures.
Neither the representation of the United States at Panama nor
any measure to which their assent may be yielded there will give
to the holy league or an}' of its members, nor to Spain, the right
to take offence ; for the rest the United States must still, as here-
tofore, take counsel from their duties rather than their fears.

Considering the lukewarmness with which Mr. Adams, as
Secretary of State, had approached the subject of acknowl-
edging the independence of the South American states, and
considering his extreme caution and reserve as President in
accepting the invitation to participate in the Panama Con-
gress, one may wonder at the zeal displayed in his appeals
to Congress to send representatives to the isthmus. He
threw himself against the opposition of Congress with all his
strength ; he made the matter a personal one, as though the
refusal of Congress to approve his scheme amounted to no
less than an insult, and a personal affront to him. Whatever
may have induced him to experience so decided a change of
heart, suspicion will remain that a reason of some weight
is to be found in the very obstacle itself, — the opposition of
Congress. Thoroughly aroused by the thrusts of his polit-
ical enemies, now considered his personal enemies, the Presi-
dent was moved to great earnestness as he penned this
message. Seemingly in a spirit of inspiration he concluded
the paper.

That the Congress at Panama will accomplish all, or even any,
of the transcendent benefits to the human race which warmed
the conceptions of its first proposer it were perhaps indulging too
sanguine a forecast of events to promise. It is in its nature a
measure speculative and experimental. The blessing of heaven
may turn it to the account of human improvement ; accidents
unforeseen and mischances not to be anticipated may baffle all its
high purposes and disappoint its fairest expectations. But the
design is great, is benevolent, is humane.

I

THE MONROE DOCTRINE 353

It looks to the jnelioration of the condition of man. It is
congenial with that spirit which prompted the declaration of our
independence, which inspired the preamble of our first treaty
with France, which dictated our first treaty with Prussia and
the instructions under which it was negotiated, which filled the
hearts and fired the souls of the immortal founders of our
Eevolution.

The long acrimonious debate in the Senate was closed
]\Iarch 14, 1826, by the appointment of Messrs. Anderson
and Sargent as Ministers Plenipotentiary. The President
had triumphed then in the Upper House, but at a great cost
of ill feeling. The Lower House read his message, and in
ten days the Committee on Foreign Relations placed before
the House the resolution that, " it is expedient to ap})ro-
priate the funds necessary to enable the President of the
United States to send ministers to the Congress of Panama."
Tlie Ways and Means Committee immediately reported a
l)iU making the necessary appropriations to defray the ex-
penses connected with the mission.

The debate in the House was, perhaps, less bitter than it
had been in the Senate, but the same opposition to the meas-
ure developed that had characterized the discussions of the
Upper House. The Southern members arrayed themselves
solidly against a project that, in their estimation, led the
United States into forming embarrassing alliances with South
Americans, — a project that might induce the United States
to take action with foreign nations upon the slave trade, and
that might disgrace their country by undue familiarity with
tlie negro republic of Haiti. Already the Southern mem-
bers souglit to taboo any discussion touching upon slavery.
Daniel Webster came to the President's rescue by Avarmly
defending the message of March 15. He insisted that it
was not the duty of tlie House, nor their constitutional riglit
to decide " what shall be discussed by [)articuhii' ministers,
already appointed, when they shall meet the ministers of
other powers," — that matter, he maintained, l)elonged to
executive discretion and responsibility. It was for the
House only to vote the necessary ;ii)pn>piiati()n. He declared
2 a

354 AMERICAN DIPLOMATIC QUESTIONS

that he looked "... on the message of December, 1823, as
forming a bright page in our history. I will neither help to
erase it or tear it out ; nor shall it be by any act of mine
blurred or blotted. It did honor to the sagacity of the gov-
ernment, and I will not diminish that honor. It elevated
the hopes and gratified the patriotism of the people. Over
those hopes I will not bring a mildew ; nor will I put that
gratified jjatriotism to shame."

The force of Daniel Webster's logic did not convince
the members from the South. The necessary appropriation
bill was finally passed, but a heavy tail to the kite was
attached by the following resolution : —

It is therefore the opinion of this House that the Government
of the United States ought not to be represented at the Congress
of Panama except in a diplomatic character, nor ought they to
form any alliance, offensive or defensive, or negotiate respecting
such an alliance with all or any of the South American republics ;
nor ought they to become parties with them, or either of them, to
any joint declaration for the purpose of preventing the interfer-
ence of any of the European powers with their independence or form
of government, or to any compact for the purpose of preventing
colonization upon the continents of America, but that the people
of the United States should be left free to act, in any crisis in such
a manner as their feelings of friendship toward these republics
and as their own honor and policy may at the time dictate.

The way being at last cleared, on May 8 (1826), Mr. Clay,
the Secretary of State, instructed the two envoys : —

" The assembly of a Congress at Panama, composed of dip-
lomatic representatives from independent American nations,
will form a new epoch in human affairs." With the idea
before them that the republican nations of the New World
shouhl meet to examine and pass upon their own interests,
whicli were now distinct and sej)arate from the interests of
the Old World, the commissioners were to devise means of
preserving peace in future among the American nations.
They were to assist in the revision of a number of vaguely
expressed or unsatisfactory principles of international law,
especially as related to the sea — " to propose a joint decla-

THE MONROE DOCTRINE 355

ration of the several American states, each, however, acting
for and binding only itself, that vrithiu the limits of their
respective territories no new European colony will here-
after be allowed to be established."

On the question of the interoceanic canal, should it come
before them for consideration, they were to take the stand
that — " If the work should ever be executed so as to admit
of the passage of sea vessels from ocean to ocean, the bene-
fits of it ouglit not to be exclusively appropriated to any one
nation, but should be extended to all parts of the globe upon
the payment of a just compensation or reasonable tolls."

The Congress of Panama assembled on the 22d of June,
1826, but neither of the American representatives was pres-
ent. ]\Ir. Anderson, one of the commissioners, was Minister
at Bogota at the time of his appointment to Panama ; he
died on his way to attend the meeting. The other Ameri-
can delegate, jNIr. Sargent, had been so long delayed by the
lengthy debate in Congress over the expediency of his mis-
sion that he was unable to effect his departure from the
United States in time to be present.

The Panama Congress proved to be a fiasco ; neither the
United States, Chili, Brazil, nor Buenos Ayres was repre-
sented, and without the cociperation of these, the largest and
most important states of the Western Hemisphere, the reso-
lutions of the Congress necessarily reached a ""lame and im-
potent conclusion." The more soul-inspiring and magniticent
the utterances of the few delegates present at the convention,
tlie more ridiculous they appeared. A treaty of i)erpetual
union and confederation, a sort of offensive and defensive
alliance, was entered into by the delegates — the purpose
being to j)ledge all the American states to aid each other in
maintaining their own integrity. Of all the states repre-
sented, Colombia alone ratified the treaty. Indeed, had the
delegates of the United States been in attendance at the con-
ference, they could not have subscribed to the resolutions
that were ad(^pted.

A resolution to meet again the following year in South
America was only responded to by the two United States

356 AMERICAN DIPLOMATIC QUESTIONS

delegates. These men, with bulky instructions in their
pockets, found themselves alone at the appointed time and
place. Their sense of humor was no doubt severely taxed.
In fact, the South and Central American states had already
begun their careers of civil strife; they had neither the time
nor inclination to deliberate over matters relating to the
common welfare.

As the Panama Congress proved to be a hopeless failure, \
chief interest in the event, as previously suggested, is to be I
found solely in the numerous interpretations of the Monroe
Doctrine, which it elicited. The many opinions — coming
directly from President Adams and his Secretary of State,
Mr. Clay, from the most prominent statesmen of the country,
and as embodied in the resolutions of both Houses of Con-
gress — • throw a flood of light upon the contemporaneous
construction of the doctrine.

Although in these Panama debates the principles, enun-
ciated by President Monroe, were more or less overshadowed
by other political considerations, yet enough was said bearing
directly upon the interpretation of the doctrine to illustrate
the views of the statesmen of the period on the subject.

First and foremost, Adams, no doubt the actual author
of that part of the doctrine bearing upon future colonization
by European powers in the Western Hemisphere, and prob-
ably a joint author of the rest of the message included in
the " Doctrine," was the one who, of all others, could speak
most authoritatively upon the subject. In reference to the
enunciations of his predecessor in office, he said : " Our
views would extend no further than to a mutual pledge of
the parties to the compact to maintain the principle in appli-
cation to its own territory, and to permit no colonial lodge-
ments or establishments of European jurisdiction upon its
own soil." The hesitation of the President to accept the
invitation of the South Americans, and afterward his insis-
tence that the functions of tlie plenipotentiaries should be
diplomatic only, and in no sense legislative or binding upon
the government, shows definitely that he was not of a mind
to pledge the country to execute a policy which he had him-

THE MONKOE DOCTRINE 357

self taken so prominent a part in framing. This, too, was in
spite of the fact that he believed the Americas had a system
and interests of tlieir own, removed from and perhaps op-
posed to those of Europe. When called upon to act, there-
fore, President Adams narrowed his former position and
declared a new doctrine. " Let every state defend the integ-
rit}'' of its own territory." That, after all, was a useless.
suggestion.

Clay followed the sentiment of his chief, — the United
States should not be obliged to guarantee the execution of
the principles of the Monroe Doctrine.

The Senate and House passed resolutions, reaffirming the
policy of non-interference, asserting the broad principle
that the people of the United States should be left free to
act, in any crisis, as their own honor and policy might dic-
tate. ]\Ionroe Doctrine or no Monroe Doctrine, in case of
foreign aggression, tlie Government of the United States
should always be at liberty to follow the course of action
that the necessities of the occasion called for. There should
be no fixed rule to govern future contingencies and embarrass
the nation. Daniel Webster seems to have voiced the ma-
jority opinion of Congress during tliis Panama debate, when
he said : —

It [Monroe's Declaration] did not commit us, at all events, to
take up arms on any indication of hostile feeling by the powers
of Europe towards South America. If, for example, all the states
of Eur()i)e had refused to trade with South America until her states
should return to their former allegiance, that would have furnished
no cause of interference to us. Or if an armament had been fur-
nished by the allies to act against provinces the most remote from
us, as Chili or Buenos Ayres, the distance of the scene of action
diminishing our api)rehensi(m of danger, and diminishing also our
means <jf effeetual interposition, might still have left us to con-
tent ourselves with remonstran(;e. But a very different case
would have arisen, if an army, e(iuipi)ed and maintained by tliese
powers, had been landed on tlie shores of the Gulf of Mexico,
and commenced the war in our own immediate neighborhood.
Such an event might justly be regarded as dangerous to ourselves,
and, on that ground, call for decided and immediate interference

358 AMERICAN DIPLOMATIC QUESTIONS

by us. The sentiments and the policy announced by the declara-
tion, thus understood, were, therefore, in strict conformity to our
duties and our interest.

In this same debate, James K. Polk, member from Ten-
nessee, declared : —

When the message of the late President of the United States
was communicated to Congress in 1823, it was viewed, as it should
have been, as the mere expression of opinion of the Executive,
submitted to the consideration and deliberation of Congress, and
designed probably to produce an effect upon the councils of the
Holy Alliance, in relation to their supposed intention to interfere
in the war between Spain and her former colonies. That effect
it probably had an agency in producing ; and if so, it has performed
its office. The President had no power to bind the nation by such
a pledge.

With the close of the year 1826, the Monroe Doctrine is
found to be limited by the following qualifications : —

1. No future colonization on the W^estern Hemisphere
by the European powers can be permitted to take place.
The United States will ask the new Spanish-American
republics to adopt this rule so far as their own territory is
concerned.

2. The United States shall remain free to adopt any
course its honor and policy may dictate touching alliances
with foreign nations and touching the practical operation of
the Monroe Doctrine.

3. The republics of the Xew World have a set of primary
interests of their own, but the United States will not join
with any of them in a declaration against interference from
abroad.

In short, therefore, the statesmen of the day believed the
prinuiry object of the Monroe Doctrine had been accomplished
— the Holy Alliance was dead, and Russia had al:)andoned
her West coast colonization scliemes. The measure l)eing
protective onl}-, its principles might revive as occasion called
them into life ; but it was distinctly to be understood that,
beyond a point of self-defence, the United States had no

THE MONROE DOCTRINE 359

intention of assuming a role of guardianship over the Western
Hemisphere, nor of constituting herself the protector of
South America.

VII. SPANISH AMERICA AND CUBA

From the close of the administration of John Quincy
Adams, in 18:29, to the beginning of Polk's administration,,
in 1845, there occurred a series of events connected with
Spanish-American interests which apparently called for
action on the part of the United States Government involv-
ing the principles of the ^lonroe Doctrine, but which were,
nevertheless, permitted to pass unnoticed. It has been said
that during that period the doctrine was dormant. All
attempts to secure legislative action upon the subject failed
in Congress, and the ^lonroe Doctrine was remembered only
as the policy of a past administration. It was, however,
universally endorsed as a good policy to revive, should occa-
sion demand it. In those days the words of President
Monroe did not apparently receive the broad interpretation
that has been given to them in more recent years. The
attitude of the country toward Europe, during this period,
was one that would likfly have been assumed, even had no
Holy .Vlliance ever threatened to meddle in American affairs,
and had no defiant message been sent back across the sea.
The position assumed by all those who controlled the foreign
policy of the United States was simply one of self-defence,
and in the absence of definite threats from abroad, the
<l<jctrine was not invoked.

The feelings of cordial sympathy in tlie United States
toward South Americans, which had been so freely extended
when those people were struggling for their liberty, sensibly
cooled when Sj)anish America finally succeeded in severing
its political relations with Spain. In a very short tiiiu' tlio
South American states gave evidence of a woful lack of
political stability. Any sort of permanent confederation
among the various states was soon shown to be impossil)h'.
A regular succession of revolutions distressed the land, ami

360 AMERICAN DIPLOMATIC QUESTIONS

the insatiate cupidity and reckless extravagance of their
political leaders augured ill for the perpetuation of repub-
lican government in South America.

Although the ]Monroe Doctrine had been intended by its
authors only as a defensive measure for the United States,
South Americans clamored for its application whenever they
encountered difficulties with Europe. Believing, as they did,
that the doctrine was promulgated as much for their bene-
fit as for the Xorth Americans, they loudly denounced the
United States as a monster of bad faith, when the latter re-
fused to become a part}- to their quarrels or declined to give
them material aid, or even the full quota of sympathy which
they felt to be their due.

In 1829, the Malavinas Islands (Falklands), which be-
longed to England, were seized upon by the Buenos Ayrean
authorities, who, as successors of Spain, claimed a right to
the group. The following year, the attention of the United
States was drawn to the fact by the arrest of some North
American seal hunters on the Falkland shore. The arrest
seemed to be unjustified by the circumstances, — the fisher-
men having merely followed a customary privilege granted
by England, — and the American sloop of war, the Lexington,
not only liberated the prisoners, but in retaliation deported
the Buenos Ayrean governor (1831). The English there-
upon resumed control, and complaint of the Argentine
Republic, that this act involved a gross violation of the
Monroe Doctrine never ceased to be pressed in Washington.
The United States never admitted a claim for indemnity,
and has always maintained that it was no party to the con-
troversy between Buenos Ayres and Great Britain, — the
rights of the latter havino- Ions' antedated those of the
former in the Falklands. Had the same construction been
placed upon the words of President Monroe that has
frequently been applied since. President Jackson miglit
well have regarded this incident as 'oiie demanding the
interference of the United States, — at least to the extent
of investigating the disputed claims of Great Britain to the
Falkland Islands. Tlie executive, however, ap])ears to have

THE MONROE DOCTRINE 3C)1

entertained no fears of European colonization in the Western
lleniispliere, when located at so distant a point from the
United States as the Falkland Islands.

In 1885, Brazil and Buenos A3a'es recognized the indepen- i
dence ofHul-uguay by a treaty made through the mediation of I
England, Some yeava later, Buenos Ayres threatened to
attack tlie newly created nation it had so recently recognized,
antl Brazil called upon Great Britain and France for aid in
maintaining the integrity of Uruguay. In answer to tliis
call those two powers established a naval blockade along
the coast of Buenos Ayres. The United States having no
live interest in the dispute, and feeling itself in no way
threatened by such an act of European intervention, refused
to interpose. Again the United States was roundly de- A
nounced in South America for the abandonment of her^)
principles.

Throtigh her foothold in Central America along the Mos-
quito coast and in Honduras, England had, for many years,,
been gradually encroaching upon Nicaragua. Great Britain's-:
claims to territory in Central America dated from the seven-
teenth century, althotigh some of these claims were judged,
in the United States, to be of doubtful origin. Up to
ls§35, extensions of her Belize boundary lines had been
made gradually and noiselessly; but in that year the Englisli
made so decided a territorial advance into Honduras and
Xicaragtia, that the Central Ameri(;an authorities appealed
to the United States. President Jackson was reminded that
• it had always been the policy of the United States to pre- I
vent and resist European settlements in America." Gejieral /
Jackson thought it inexpedient to interfere. From a more Ij
modern point of view, lie woidd seem not to have been imbued
with the spirit of Monroe's message, for a similar iiio\h! on
the pai-t of (ireat Britain in Venezuela, in IHOC*, caiist'd great
ixcitcment in the United States, notwithstanding tlie fact
that Venezuela is considerably itirthei' reiiiove.i I'idiii (he
United States than is Xicai'agua. Siibseqnently, however,
!)i'itish territorial advances into Central America have Ijeeii
"l»posed ])y the I'nitecl Slates, up«jii the soh; ground of

362 AMERICAN DIPLOMATIC QUESTIONS

violation of the Monroe Doctrine, but not seriously until
the subject of an interoceanic canal had come forward more
prominently.

In 1842, and again two years later, England found it
necessary to besiege San Juan, for the sake of impressing
upon the natives a respect for the validity of her terri-
torial claims. These decidedly aggressive acts were passed
unnoticed in Washington.

Other instances might be cited which prove to a certain
extent that for a number of years after the famous message
had been issued, it was not viewed by contemporar}^ states-
men in the same light in which it is generally regarded
to-day. The particular danger against which ^Nlr. Monroe
had directed his protest had ceased to exist. Its principles
were only to be revived in case such acts of aggression or
armed interference in America seemed actually to threaten
the safety of the United States. The idea that the United
States should offer its military forces to South or Central
America, at its bidding, was never entertained. It was
never denied that European nations had tlie right belonging
to any sovereign power to use force in South or Central
America, if necessary, in the collection of debt, or to obtain
redress for grievances. However, while the United States
for a considerable period took little cognizance of European
intervention in South and Central America, President
Monroe's declaration was by no means forgotten ; this is
particularly evidenced in relation to Cuban affairs.

The proximity of Cuba to the American shores has always
made it the sul)ject of jealous watchfulness by the United
States, and during each administration from that of Presi-
dent Monroe, a share of attention has been directed to it.

As early as 1809, Jefferson looked longingly toward Cuba,
although he feared the dangers of a general expansion
policy. He wrote to President Madison : " I would imme-
diately erect a column on the southernmost limit of Cuba,
and inscribe on it a ne plus ultra as to us in that direction.
. . . Cuba can be defended by us without a navy, and this
develops the principle which ought to limit our vicAVS."

THE MOXKOE DOCMHIXE 363

President ]\Iadison was not so tliorouglih' in favor of the
annexation of Cuba. His views, as expressed in a letter to
"Williaui Pinkney, in 1810, retiect the sentiment whieh thir-
teen years hiter crystallized into a national doctrine. " The
position of Cuba gives to the United States so deep an
interest in the destiny, even, of that island, that although
they might be an inactive, they could not be a satisfied spec-
tator at its falling under any European Government, which
might make a fulcrum of that position against the commerce
and security of the United States." These views of Presi- •
dent Madison were at that time more acceptable to the people (V
of the United States than was the idea of actual annexation. \

During the two administrations of President Monroe, great
anxiety was felt in Washington lest Cuba might be seized
by some European power. The English press, and some of
the more infiuential Ijritish statesmen, constantly insisted
upon the acquisition of the island, as an offset to the prej)()n-
derating influence in West Indian affairs, which the cession
of Florida had given to the United States. While tlie British
Government does not seem to have seriously contemplated
the occupation of Cuba, apprehension lest it might decide
upon such a course kept the administration not a little agi-
tated. This fear was enhanced by the fact that numbers of
pirates infested the Cuban coast and prej'ed upon England's
commerce. The Spanish Government was utterly unable to
suppress these marauders, and the threatened British demon-
strations against them, if actually made, would almost cer-
tainly lead to a seizure of the island itself".

The Frencli invasion of Spain, in IH'I'I, also gave rise to
many alarms in the United States, in respect to the fate of
Cuba. It was generally believed that Spain must, sooner or
later, lose lier liold upon tlie island, and that Cuba would
naturally fall to the share of i-'raucc. — or pciliaps of (ii'cat
Britain, who was known to be i'urnishing the means to the
constitutional government of Spain to resist F(!rdinand and
]iis French allies. It had always been one of Jolin Quincy
Adams' fixed ideas that tlie acquisition of Cuba would eventu-
ally become a necessity to the political interests of the

364 AMERICAN DIl'LUMATIC QUESTIONS

Union. He was moved by the threatened loss of Cuba by-
Spain to instruct Mr. Nelson, the American Minister at
Madrid (1823) : —

. . . These iskmds from their local position are natural append-
ages to the North American continent, and one of them [Cuba]
almost in sight of our shores, from a multitude of considerations,
has become an obiect of transcendent im})ortance to the com-
mercial and political interest of our Union. ... lu looking foi'-
Avard to the probable course of events for the short period of half
a century, it is scarcely possible to resist the conviction that the
annexation of Cuba to our Federal Republic will be indispensable
to tlie continuance and integrity of the Union itself.

I Mr. Adams did not then consider the moment auspicious
I for the annexation of Cuba to the Union, but he believed,
! nevertheless, that

. . . There are laws of political as well as physical gravita-
tion ; and if an apple, severed by the tempest from its native tree,
cannot choose but fall to the ground, Cuba, forcibly disjoined
from its own unnatural connection with Spain, and incapable of
self-support, can gravitate only towards the North American
Union, which, by the same law of nature, cannot cast her off from
its bosom.

Jefferson was still of the opinion that possession of Cuba
b}' Great Britain " would indeed be a great calamity to us,"
but he advocated the acquisition of Cuba by peaceful means
only.

The publication of President Monroe's message of 1823
may have had a decided influence upon France in checking
her alleged Cuban designs ; nevertheless, al)undant rumors
V of Freiich plots to acquire the island continued to vex
I Presidents Adams and Jackson. The continued withholding
of Spanish recognition of Coloml)ian and Mexican indepen-
dence determined those states to attempt the seizure of Cuba
and I'orto Rico, sliould Spain persist in her stubborn policy of
maiidaining war against them. The ])ossibility of tlius trans-
ferring the theatre of Spanish-American hostilities to ('ul)a

THE MONROE DOCTRINE 365

aroused Mr. Clay's apprehensions. He accordingly sought
to induce Spain to yield at once to the demands of Colombia
and ^Mexico, and he threatened, moreover, to bring about the
occupation of Cuba by United States armies, rather than
suffer the dangers of a foreign war in the islands " whose
fortunes have such a connection with the j^rosperity of the
United States." At this juncture a French fleet appeared in
Cuban Avaters (1825), and the fact drew from the Secretary
of State an emphatic protest. He wrote to the American
Minister in Paris : " With the ho[)e of guarding before-
hand against any possible difficulties on that subject that
may arise, you will now add that we would not consent to
the occupation of those islands [Cul)a and Porto Rico] by
any other P^uropean power than Spain under any contingency
whatever." At the same time. President Adams took occa-
sion to announce through the various American Foreign
Ministers to all European powers that the United States
'• desired no change in the political condition of Cuba ; that
they were satisfied that it should remain open, as it now is,
to their commerce, and that they could not with indifference
see it passing from Spain to an}- European power."

Similar statements were freely expressed during the Jack-
son, Van Buren, and Tyler administrations. Anxiety upori'
the subject of European intervention was never permittedl
wholly to relax, chiefly on account of the fact that the
Cubans themselves were generally in a ferment of rebellion
against the extortionate and 02)pressive rule of the mother
country. O[)portunities for intervention were therefore
frecjuent, and tlie prize was unusually tempting.

Some disagreements between (ireat Britain and Spain,
growing out of a treaty for the suppression of the slave trade
in Cuba, again lirought forth rumors of English intention
to occupy the island. Mr. Vail, the American Minister in
.Madrid, was instructed (1840) " to assure the Spanish Gov-
ernment, that in case of any attempt, from wliatever quarter,
t(» wrest fi-om her this jxirtion of her territory, slie may
securely dejjend upon the militiuy and naval resources of
the United States to aid her in preserving or recovering it."

366 AMERICAN DIPLOMATIC QUESTIONS

Three years later, Daniel Webster, as Secretary of State,
addressed the United States Consul in Havana, to the same
effect, his letter being also used as a basis of instructions to
Henry Irving, the American Representative in Spain. He
said : " The Spanish Government has long been in possession
of the policy and wishes of this government in regard to
Cuba, which have never changed, and has repeatedly been
told that the United States never would permit the occupa-
tion of that island by British agents or forces upon any
pretext whatever ; and that in the event of any attempt to
wrest it from her, she might securely rely upon the whole
naval and military resources of this country to aid her in
preserving or recovering it."

/ Until about the beginning of the Polk administration, the
,'^ -/American policy toward Cuba appears therefore to have
L ■ [been a consistent one, and wholly in accord with the avowed
jprinciples of the Monroe Doctrine. The idea of annexation
found a few hearty supporters : but even among its cham-
pions, that notion was prompted by expediency rather than
from a desire for territorial gain. Such ideas were especial!}'
manifested at those times when the safety of the United
States was supposed to be imperilled by European intrigues
to seize Cuba. To prevent that contingency the United
States was willing to go to any length. It would guarantee
Cuba to Spain, and pledge to her the use of its army and
navy ; if forced to it, it would annex the island. Upon that
point, the application of the Monroe Doctrine was clear and
never disputed. After the close of the Mexican War thel
policy of the United States toward Cuba underwent con-j
siderable change. A fever of expansion seized the people,,
and the foreign policy of the nation became bolder. Covetous
eyes were cast toward the " Pearl of the Antilles." The prin-
ciples of the INIonroe Doctrine were neither forgotten noi'jj
overlooked, but they were considerably distorted and per-lr
verted to meet political and selfish ends. The purchase of
the island was impossible, first, because Spain always indig-
nantly refused to part with "her faithful colony"*; and,
secondly, because the slave-holders of the Southern states,,

THE MONROE DOCTRINE 367

and later the anti-slaveiy party in Congress, successfully
thwarted every effort the national government made looking
toward purchase. Indeed, the great slavery controversy .
that soon came to overshadow a4 other questions in national A
politics affected any action respecting Cuba. It colored
every discussion on the ^Monroe Doctrine, as it tinged every
phase of American politics.

From about 1845 to the beginning of the Civil War,
our connection with Cuban affairs is marked by a desire
for^anne^^ation not so mucix as.^. measure of self -protection,
as too often asserted, but as a means of extending the slave-
holding area of the country. To maintain itself in Congress,
the slave power had need of more representatives, and to get
a larger representation in Washington, additional territory
was essential. The land hunger which sharpened the appe-
tite for Texas was equally strong for Cuba, and this period
I'f fifteen years preceding the Rebellion of the Southern
states, developed a series of attempts on the part of the 1
I'nited States to obtain the island either by purchase or by r
force.

In 1845-47, a strong popular sentiment in favor of the
purchase of Cuba prevailed in the Western states, which,
championed by the press, soon spread over the entire country.
The movement was given fresh impetus by reports that
Great Britain was again contemplating the seizure of Cuba
— this time for the purpose of holding Spain's valuable pos-
session as a security for the payment of Spanish bonds.
The ])ulk of the Spanish debt was owned in London, and the
interest was greatly in arrears. The President was therefore
called upon to act immediately. i\Ir. Polk's aggressive for-
eign [)olicy was relied upon by the country, espcicially by the
South and West, to accomplish this cherished ol>ject.

On .Jaiuuiry 17, j.i^4H^*resident Polk sent lengthy and
••profoundly conrKh-nlial " instructions to .Mr. Saunders, th(^
Anjorican Minister in Madrid, touching ui)on the (;xtreme
danger of English annexation of the island, which he
soiigiit to prove by a full account (jf Pritisii aggrt'ssion in
Central America. lie authorized Mr. Saunders to urge

368 AMERICAN DIPLOMATIC QUESTIONS

upon the Spanisli Government the advisability of parting
with Cuba to the United States, but he hastened to give
assurances that the United States woukl not seek to acquire
it "except by the free will of Spain.'' It was to be by
"fair purchase" only, and $100,000,000 was suggested as a'
maximum price. Popular feeling in Spain was outraged
by the very suggestion of releasing this gem of her few
remaining possessions. " It was more than any minister
would dare," replied Mr. Saunders to Mr. Buchanan, " to
entertain any such proposition ; sooner than see the island
transferred to any power, they would prefer seeing it sunk
in the ocean." It thus became clear that the purchase of
Cuba was entirely out of the question.

In 1849-50, during the presidency of Gen. Taylor, an inci-
dent occurred in connection with Cuban affairs which brousflit
to light a new phase of the Monroe Doctrine. Among the
many political disturbances and revolutionary movements
which illustrate the history of Cuba, one in particular, the
Lopez rebellion of 1819-50, received its main, if not entire,
support, in the United States.

Narciso Lopez, a Venezuelan by birth, once prominent in
Spanish military service, became the leader of a revolution-
ary party in Cuba. In the summer of 1849, he organized
an expedition in New York, made up for the most part of
Mexican war veterans, and was about to embark in the
cause of " Cuba libre " when he was arrested by the United
States authorities. President Taylor thereupon issued a
proclamation (August 11, 1849) in whicli he announced that
" It is the duty of this government to observe the faith of
treaties and to prevent any aggression by our citizens upon
the territories of friendly nations. I have therefore thought
it necessary and proper to issue this my proclamation to
warn all citizens of the United States, who shall conduct
themselves with an enterprise so grossly in violation of our
laws and our treaty obligations, that they will thereby sub-
ject themselves to the heavy penalties denounced against
them by our acts of Congress, and will forfeit their claim to
the protection of their country. No such persons must

THE MONROE DOCTRINE 369

<ixpect tlie interference of this government in any form on
their behalf, no matter to what extremities they may be
reduced in consequence of their conduct."

There can be no question of the official neutrality of the
United States Government, but the fitting out of filibuster-
ing expeditions could not be prevented. Undismayed by
the failure of his first attempt, Lopez travelled through the
Southern states, where he found both cordial sympathy and
material aid for his project. A second expedition was or-
ganized (1850) under the auspices of some wealthy Southern,
[)lanters, but met with reverses in Cuba. Lopez was then
prosecuted by the United States for violation of the neutral-
ity laws, but having escaped conviction, he proceeded to
organize a third expedition. Tliis time, along with many
American citizens upon his staif and within his ranks, he
was captured, sentenced, and executed in Havana b}- the
Spanish authorities. Public indignation in the United
States, especially in the South, was keenly aroused by the
execution of the Americans in Havana. Anti-Spanish dem-
onstrations took place in New Orleans. Spain at once ap-
pealed to France and England for protection against any
American attack upon Cuba which now seemed imminent.
Tliese two powers despatched naval forces to the West In-
dies, and declared their intention of repelling any invasion
of Cuba. While tlie United States Government disclaimed
any purpose of f()rcil)ly seizing Cuba, the naval demonstra-
tion of England and France in Cuban waters was most offen-
si\c. The act l)r()nght fortli a protest from thr administration
l)rcdicated upon the Monroe Doctrine, for the action of these
two powers could only be regarded by the United States
" with grave disapproval, as involving on the part of Euro-
l)ean sovereigns combined action of protectorship over Ameri-
can waters." Great Britain and France, being strongly urged
by Spain, went still farther. \n April, 1852, the Frencli and
English diijlomatic agents in Washington proposed to tlie
United States the signing of a tripartite agreement, by \irtue
of which the parties should disavow all })resent or future
intention to obtain possession of tlie island of Cu]):i, and
2>i

370 AMERICAN DIPLOMATIC QUESTIONS

should bind themselves to discountenance all attempts to
that effect.

President Fillmore's attitude toAvard Cuba was made
known in his annual message of 1852, in which he gave
assurance that the United States not only contemplated no j
designs against Cuba, but that he " should regard its incor- '
poration into the Union at the present time as fraught with
serious peril." Its acquisition by the United States against
Spanisli opposition he regarded "as a hazardous measure."'
Notwithstanding these views, the invitation of France and
Great Britain was declined by the President for several
good reasons. While it might have been reassuring to know
that both England and France stood pledged to keep their
hands off Cuba, — a pledge falling quite in line with the
^Monroe Doctrine, — yet it was considered improper to admit
European nations into the councils of the I'nited States
upon an equal footing relative to the affairs of a territory so
essentially connected with American interests.

The Secretary of State, Mr. Webster, had already given
the Spanish Minister little hope to expect the President to
consent to the desired arrangement with Great Britain and
France. His objections to the measure lay principally in
the direction of avoiding entangling alliances, and in the
desire of the United States " to keep itself free from national
obligations, except such as affect directly the interests of the
United States themselves." The death of Mr. Webster, in
the summer of 1852, transferred the entire subject to his suc-
cessor, ]\Ir. Everett. The latter, in a communication to
Comte de Sartiges (December 1, 1852), reviewed the atti-
tude of the United States in this matter, and although lie
made no mention of the Monroe Doctrine as such, his refer-
ence is clear when he says : "Tlie President does not covet
tlie acquisition of Cuba for the United States. At the same
time he considers the condition of Cul)a as mainly an Ameri-
can question. The pro])osed convention proceeds on a differ-
ent principle. It assumes that the United States liave no
other or greater interest in the question than France or Eng-
land, whereas, it is only necessary to cast one's eye on the

THE MONROE DOCTRINE 371

map to see how remote are the rehitions of Europe, and how
intimate those of the United States with this ishind."

The principles of the Monroe Doctrine were not only
adhered to by the President, but the interpretation of its
words was enlarged into a protest against permitting either]
European voice or arms to control the destinies of New!
World territories that lay near the borders of the United
States. Beyond doubt the position was well taken. To
have entered into such an agreement would not only have
violated the older doctrine against entangling alliances Avith
Europe, but would have bound American hands in a particu-
larly awkward manner. If the United States desired to
prevent European annexation of Cuba, it would have been
consummate folly thus to curtail her freedom of action. Of
all tlie Si)anis]i-AmericHn states, Cuba came nearest home.
A concentration of foreign interests there would have proved
a danger not to be tolerated for a moment. In case of any
such threat from abroad, the true policy of the United
States would have been to seize tlie island at once.

On .lanuary 4, 1854, one month after the refusal of the
United States to take part in the proposed tjy,fMuJiite conven-
tion, Mr. Cass of Michigan introduced into the Senate a
joint I'esolutioh'decIaringT^ ' "'

" Tlie American continents, by the free and iniiependent con-
dition wliich they have assumed and maintain, are henceforth not
to be considered as subjects for future colonization by any Euro-
pean power." And while " existing rights should be respected,"
and will be by the United States, they owe it to their own '' safety
and interests" "to announce, as they now do, that no future
European colony or dominion shall, with their consent, be i)lanted
or estaljlished on any part of the Xorth American continent."
And should the attempt be made, they thus deliberately declare
that it will he viewed as an act originating in motives regardless
of their " interests and their safety," and which will leave them
free to adopt such measures as an independent nation may justly
adopt in defiMiee of its riglits and its honor.

That while the United States disclaim any designs upon tlie
Island of Cuba, inconsistent with the laws of nations and with
their duties to Spain, they consider it due to the vast importance

li

372 AMERICAN DIPLOMATIC QUESTIONS

of the subject to make known in this solemn manner that they
should view all efforts on the part of any other power to procure
possession, whether peaceably or forcibly, of that island, which, as
a naval or military position, must, under circumstances easy to be
foreseen, become dangerous to their southern coast, to the Gulf
of Mexico, a.nd to the south of the ^Mississippi, as unfriendly acts
directed against them, to be resisted by all the means in their
power.

John P. Hale, of New Hampsliire, moved to amend this
resolution by the insertion of the word " Canada." No
action was taken on the resolution, but its introduction pro-
voked a lengthy discussion upon the subject of European
interference on the Western continent, in which the princi-
ples of the Monroe Doctrine were very generally endorsed.
The Southern members advocated an extension of the doc-
trine into a justification for seizing Cuba, while the Northern
members, though less decided in their opinions, were still
willing to press the words of jNIonroe into the service of
acquiring territory which lay to the north of the United
States. Only Mr. Howard of Texas ventured the belief that
the Monroe Doctrine did not mean " that every settlement
upon any sand-bank on this continent is an offence which is
to result in war."

To succeed President Fillmore, the Whigs failed to
elect their candidate, General Scott. He had been the
war hero of 1845, but was reduced in 1852 to the "peacock
of politics, all fuss, feathers, and fireworks." The Demo-
cratic party, demanding an aggressive foreign policy, and
decrying the " old f ogyism " of Taylor and Fillmore, tri-
umphantly placed Franklin Pierce in the White House.
The slavery question had made the annexation of Cuba a
party issue, and the Democrats looked to Pierce to carry out
their wishes in this respect. In his inaugural address, tlie
President declared that the policy of his administration wonld
not be controlled " by any timid foreboding of evil from expan-
sion." Indeed, he further declared, " it is not to be disguised
that our attitude as a nation, and our position on the globe,
render the acquisition of certain possessions not within our

THE MONROE DOCTRINE 373

iurisdiction eminently important for our protection, if not, in
the future, essential for the preservation of the rights of com-
merce and the peace of the world." This pointed clearly to
Cuba. The Southern Democrats were greatly encouraged, .
and a persistent clamor arose for the acquisition of the island. \
With that purpose in view, the American ministers to
ICngland, P' ranee, and Spain were chosen. Pierre Soule of
Louisiana was sent to ^Madrid. He was a radical Cuban
annexationist, and had attacked President Fillmore most
bitterly the previous year in Congress, for his lack of sympa-
thy with the Lopez filibusters. Mr. Soule was determined
to acquire thelsland, and entered upon his mission to Spain
with that single purpose before him. President Pierce's Sec-
retary of State, William ^larcy, was the conservative element
of the administration ; he frequently instructed Mr, Soule to
bring about a readjustment of the commercial relations be-
tween Spain and the United States ; and althougli he spoke
of purchasing Cuba, he did not believe Spain would be " at all
inclined to enter upon such a negotiation." " Nothing will
be done, on our part, to disturl) its [Cuba's] i)resent connec-
tion with Spain, unless the character of that connection should
be so changed as to affect our present or prospective security.
While the L'nited States would resist, at every hazard, tlie
transference of Cuba to any European nation, they would
exceedingly regret to see Spain resorting to any power for
assistance to uphold lier rule over it. Such a dependence on
foreign aid would, in effect, invest the auxiliary with the
character of a protector, and give it a pretext to interfere in
our affairs, and also generally in those of the North Ameri-
'•an continent."

These mild instructions were not pleasing to Mr. Soule,
nor were they in accord with the sentiments of the political
party in power. Having arrived in ^Lulrid, Mr. Soule soon
rejjorted that S]»;iin was in a liopeless state of auarchy. a:!d
that tliere was abuii(l;iiit evidence tending to sliowtlmt the
aid of (li-eat liritain and I-'raiice was to be again invoked to
forestall any attemi»ts to l)ring al)out Cuban in(h'pen(hMici^
or annexation to the I'nited States. .Mr. .Marcy thereu]ioii

.374 AMERICAN DIPLOJMATIC QUESTIONS '

authorized Mr. Soule to reopen negotiations at once for the
purchase of the island, raising, upon this occasion, the price
offered to ^130,000,000. If, however, the Spanish prejudice
to a sale was found to be too strong to overcome, Soule
was authorized to suggest delicately to Spain that she might
permit Cuba to detach herself from her dominion, and to
become a free nation ; in this indirect way the same object
could ultimately be accomplished.

Just at that moment, the alleged illegal seizure of the cargo
of an American vessel, the Black War7-io7\ by the customs au-
thorities in Havana, suddenly brought the two nations almost
to the verge of war. This Spanish assault against American
shipping was eagerly caught up by the South as an excuse
to substitute force for diplomacy, and President Pierce was
very nearly induced to give way to the passionate appeals of
his own party leaders. The slavery party raised the stand-
ard of the Monroe Doctrine, and had their counsels pre-
vailed, a peculiar adaptation of those principles would have
resulted. It had, for many years, been a favorite object of
Great Britain to do away with the institution of negro slavery
in Cuba. Spain had, from time to time, displayed a willing-
ness to accede to England's repeated solicitations in this
respect, and especially at those moments wlien English good-
will or cooperation was desirable in maintaining inviolate
her control over the island. The South pretended to regard
the emancipation of Cuban slaves as a measure fraught with
the gravest danger to the United States. The absorption of
a free-soil Cuba into the tinion was, from their point of view,
undesirable. With Cuba as a slave state added to tlie Union,
"slavery might bid defiance to its enemies."

In 1855, the Richmond Enquirer, a leading Democratic
orsran, declared that the " menace of a design to Africanize
Cuba, or to emancipate the slaves, would be a grievous act
of hostility, and would authorize the United States to take !
any means of retaliation, or to wage war." The freedom of
the Cuban slaves would leave that island in the control of a
vast number of blacks who might at any moment convert ^
Cuba into a second Haiti or Santo Domingo. At the very

THE MONROE DOCTRINE 375

least, emancipation in Cuba would greatly imperil the policy
•of the United States touching the question of human slavery.

Mr. Soule's diplomac}- did not bring about a satisfactory
settlement of the Black Warrior affair. The President was
far from being satisfied with the results of Mr. Soule's hot-
headed methods, and the Democrats called all the more
loudly upon its President for action — for a swift retaliation
upon Spain, and for the immediate annexation of Cuba.

The more conservative Secretary of State, Mr. Marcy, was
driven to a new plan for the settlement of the vexatious
82)anish-American question, which plan he hoped would
bring about the desired results Avithout a resort to arms.
Convinced that continuance of Soule's efforts in ^Madrid
would be unprofitable, he proposed (June, 1854) the ap-
pointment of an extraordinary commission, to be composed
of " two distinguished citizens " who should act in conjunc-
tion with Mr. Soule in reenforcing the demands of the United
■States against Spain. The project creating such a commis-
sion, however, was al^andoned, and as a substitute therefor,
Mr. Soule was instructed (August, 1854) to meet and con-
sult with Messrs. Buchanan and Mason, the American min-
isters in London and Paris.

I am directed by the President to suggest to you a particular
step, from which he anticipates much advantage to the neg(jtia-
tions with which you are charged on the subject of Cuba. . . .
It seems desirable that there should be a full and free interchange
of views l)etween yourself, Mr. IJuchanan and Mr. INIason, in order
to secure a concurrence in reference to the general object.

The simplest and only very apparent means of obtaining this
end is, for tlie three ministers to meet, as early as may be, at some
convenient central i)oint (say Paris), to consult together, to cora-
parn ojjinions as to wliat may be advisable, and to adopt measures
for ])erfeet concert of action in aid of youi- negotiations .'it Madrid.

\Vlii]p the I'resident has, as I have; before liad occasion to state,
full confiden<-e in your own intelligence and sagacity, he conceives
tliat it cannot be otlicrwisc tlian agreeable to yon, and to yonr col-
leagues in (Jrcat Britain and France, to have the considtation sug-
gested, and tlius to bring your common wisdom and knowh'dge to
bear .sinndtaneously ui)on the negotiations at Madrid, London, and
I'aiis.

376 AMERICAN DIPLOMATIC QUESTIONS

Accordingly, the three American ministers met in confer-
ence at Ostend, October 0,-1854, and adjourning to Aix la
Chapelle, there signed a report on the 18th of the same
month. This series of resolutions is known as the " Ostend
Manifesto.'.' "*" -'

After a lengthy argument in favor of the acquisition of
Cuba, and an enumeration of the many advantages which
would accrue to both Spain and the United States by virtue
of a transfer of sovereignty in Cuba, the report advises the
offer to Spain of $120,000,000 for the island. Should Spain
decline the offer, the use of force is proposed to accomplish
the same end. The advisability of such radical measures
was based on the broad principles of self-preservation, — the
Monroe Doctrine. " Our past history forbids," it reads,
" that we should acquire the island of Cuba without the con-
sent of Spain, unless justified by the great law of self-pres-
ervation, but," the authors hasten to add with a flourish of
virtue, " we must, in any event, preserve our own conscious
rectitude, and our own self-respect." It became a ques-
tion, they asserted, whetlier or not the continued possession
of Cuba by Spain amounted to a menace "to our internah
peace, and the existence of our cherished Union." If suehi
be the case, as they believed it was, then we would be justi-'
tied by " every law, human and divine," in wresting it from
Spain.

The position taken by Messrs. Buchanan, Soule and Masoi
was certainly many degrees beyond the farthest limits of the-'
Monroe Doctrine. The latter called for opposition to for
eign aggression in the Western continent, and expressly stated
that no action would be taken against those European powers
already holding territory in the New World — unless they
sought to expand their holdings. The true motives of the
Ostend Manifesto were, after all, too thinly veiled. The
wordsM5f Mr. Monroe had been obviously tortured into the'
furtherance of a scheme to extend the slave-holding area of
the United States. The administration promptly condemned
the manifesto.

The policy of forci])le acquisition, in case amicable nego-

\

\

THE MONROE DOCTRINE 377

tiations for purchase should fail, was too radical even for
President Pierce. Mr. Marcy referred to it as " a robber
doctrine," which would Ining sluune upon the adminisBrafion,
and would disgrace the nation in the eyes of the world.
" We cannot afford to get it " (Cuba), he said, " by robbery
or by theft."

The Ostend jNIanifesto was left entirely unmentioned in
the President's annual report to Congress. The following
winter resolutions in Congress calling for the report, and all
the correspondence relating thereto, were suppressed, and
every effort was made by the administration to prevent the
publicity of the document.

From 1854 to the outbreak of the Civil War, Cuba con-
tinued to occuj^y a prominent place in tlie foreign affairs
of the United States. From the close of the Kebellion down
to the late Spanish War, this same interest in Cuba was kept
alive, but in the absence of any definite threats by other
nations to acquire the island, there were no discussions in
Congress relative to the subject. After the collapse of slav-
ery in the United States, the desire for Cuban annexation
largely disappeared, nor was it revived until very recently.

During the past thirty-five years, several revolutions in
Cuba brought about relations between the United States and
Spain which were substantially similar to those which existed
prior to the breaking out of the late Spanish-American War,
— conditions Avith which every one is familiar. If not
actually desiring annexation, the United States has, upon
all occasions, manifested a deep interest in Cuban indepen-
dence, and has sometimes with diiliculty preserved a neutral
attitude.

In this relation, one incident is noteworthy in its bearings
upon tlie Monr(je Doctrine. Tlie Cespides rebellion in Cuba
liad dragged along for many years, witli the customary record
of cruelties and bai'biiritics wliich seems generally to have
marked Spaiiisli-('ul);in warfare. The inability of Spain to
suj»press the rebellion induced President (Jrant, in his an-
nual message of December 7, 1875, to hint at intervention.
Spain had stubbornly refused to listen to mediation; and

378 AMERICAN DIPLOMATIC QUESTIONS

as tlie conditions seemed to warrant the United States in
recognizing the independence of the island, intervention
was looked to as the only means left for ending a hopeless
conflict. In his note of Noveml)er 5, 1875, to INIr. Gushing,
the American Minister in ^Madrid, the Secretary of State, ]\Ir.
Fish, had already anticipated these suggestions of the Presi-
dent. He wrote : —

In the absence of any prospect of a termination of a war, or of
any cliange in the manner in which it has been conducted on either
side, he [the President] feels that the time is at hand when it may
be the duty of other governments to intervene, solely with a view
of bringing to an end a disastrous and destructive conflict, and of
restoring peace in the island of Cuba. Xo government is more
deeply interested in the order and peaceful adnunistration of this
island than is that of the United States, and none has suffered ns
the United States from the condition which has obtained there
during the past six or seven years. He will, therefore, feel it his
duty at an early day to submit the subject in this light, and ac-
companied by an expression of the views above presented, for the
consideration of Congress.

Copies of this note were sent to the American ministers at
the various European courts for the purpose of ascertaining
the attitude of these governments toward intervention in
Cuba. It seems also to have been Mr. Fish's desire to
secure Great Britain's cooperation. The replies of all the
governments wldch had thus been approached, were unfavor-
able, and the matter was put aside. In a short time, liow-
ever, the fact that ]Mr. Fish had seen fit to admit — indeed,
to invite — European councils upon a matter so essentially
American in all its bearings, brought upon him the odium
of having neglected the proper observance of his country's
traditions, and to having violated the principles of the Monroe
Doctrine. ]\Ir. Fish appears to have been sensitive to this
accusation, and to have evaded an explanation of his course
in seeking aid from abroad to oust Sjjain from Cuba.

Intervention in behalf of Cuba in 1898 was not predicated
directly upon the ]\Ionroe Doctrine, although the Senate
Committee on Foreign Affairs in April of that year, sub-

THE .M(lXKOE DOCTRINE 379

niitted a report upon United States relations with Spain and
with Cuba, in which the following significant words occur :
" We cannot consent upon any conditions that the depopu-
lated portions of Cuba shall be recolonized by Spain any more
than she should be alloAved to found a new colony in any
part of this hemisphere or islands thereof. Either act is
regarded by tlie United States as dangei'ous to our peace A
and safety."' Intervention was therefore favored upon the \*
grounds of necessity as contem])lated by the Monroe Doc- y
trine, — it being justified by tlie Cul)an situation, which had '
'' become a menace to the world, and especially to the peace
of the United States^"

The resolution of Congress declaring war u[)on Spain for
the relief of Cuba (April 19, 1898) was not, however, based
upon the Monroe Doctrine. It merely recited the fact that
the people of Cuba were, and of right ought to be, free.
The United States also disclaimed any intention or disposi-
tion "to exercise sovereignty, jurisdiction, or control over
said island, except for the pacification thereof, and asserts
its determination when that is accomplished to leave the
government and control of the island to its people."

VIII. TEXAS AND OREGON

James K. Polk entered upon tlie presidency in 1845,
pledged to his party to complete the annexation of Texas,
and to secure the whole of (Jregon, to the Russian frontier
of 54° 40' north latitude. The slavery question under- ,
lay both propositions, and the princi})les of the ^Monroe
Doctrine were, appealed to by the President in both cases.
The South, in order to maintain strength in Congress, was
determined to accpiiie moi-e territory open to the extension
of slavery, and the North found a i)arallel necessity e()ually
prt'ssing to increase anti-slavery votes in Congress by tlie
acfpiisition of more free-soil domain, i'^nr llie South, the
Western progress of slavery was checked at the Sal. in. • Iliver,
which, by agreiiment with Spain in 1X21, was recogni/.ed to
be the boundary line iietween Louisiana and Texas. Texas

380 AMERICAN DIPLOMATIC QUESTIONS

was then a province or state belonging to Mexico, although
a large immigration of Americans from the Southern states,
taking their slaves with them, gave to it a decidedly Ameri-
can cast, and established in Texas a strong political party,
orthodox in the slavery creeds, and earnest in its agitation
for annexation to the United States, In 1829 the Mexican
Government abolished slavery, in consequence of which act
Texas revolted, and seven years later established itself as an
independent republic.

The Texans at once sought incorporation into the Union,
and the Southern states clamored for its annexation against
the opposition of the North. The issue became a vital one
in the campaign of 1844, and Polk, the Democratic candi-
date, was on the side of annexation. Mexico had never
acknowledged the independence of her seceding state, and
was supposedly ready to fight rather than yield it to the
United States.

The underlying motive for the acquisition of Texas was
so apparent that a better reason for annexation had to be
found, in order to circumvent the opposition of the North.
Mr. Calhoun, Secretary of State under President Tyler, had
become alarmed by his own zeal for its acquisition, and feared
the North would become too vigorously aroused when his real
motives were thoroughly understood ; but Polk Avas fully
equipped and ready to meet the situation. It was known in
Congress that France and England were unfavorably im-
pressed with the idea of Texan incorporation into the Union,
on account of a supposed disturbance of the " balance of
power" on the Western continent, which such a territorial
change would bring about. In his message of December,
1845, Mr. Polk said : —

Even France, . . . most unexpectedly, and to our unfeigned
regret, took part in an effort to prevent annexation and to impose
on Texas, as a condition of the recognition of her independence
by Mexico, that she would never join herself to the United
States . . . and lately the doctrine has been broached in some of
them [i)owers of Europe] of a '' balance of power " on this conti-
nent to check our advancement. The United States . . . cannot

THE MONKOE DOCTRINE 381

in silence permit any European interference on the North Ameri-
can continent, and should any such interference be attempted,
will be ready to resist it at any and all hazards.

It is well known to the American people and to all nations that
this government has never interfered with the relations subsisting
between other governments. We have never made ourselves par-
ties to their wars or their alliances ; we have not sought their ter-
ritories by conquest; we have not mingled with parties in their
domestic struggles ; and believing our own form of government
to be the best, we have never attempted to propagate it by in-
trigues, by diplomacy, or by force. We may claim on this conti-
nent a like exemption from European interference. The nations
of America are equally sovereign and independent with those of
Europe. They possess the same rights, independent of all foreign
interposition, to make war, to conclude peace, and to regulate their
internal affairs. The people of the United States cannot, there-
fore, view with indifference, attempts of European powers to
interfere with the independent action of the nations on this con-
tinent. . . .

The President had already said in his inaugural address
of the previous March : —

Xone can fail to see the danger to our safety and future peace,
if Texas remains an independent state, or becomes an ally, or de-
pendency of some foreign nation more powerful than herself.

Was it not necessary, therefore, to take Texas, before
Europe might intervene between her and Mexico, and, in
the confusion of civil war, perhaps gain a foothold in the
Lone Star state?

The scarecrow of European aggression in Texas was so
obviously a pretence that it was never seriously considered
Ihy the government ; but it disguised tlie real situation and
furnished a sootlnng balm for the conscience. Tlie aequisi-
'tion of Texas, sooner or later, both on account of its geo-
/graphical position and tlie tcm[)cr of its people, was a inoi-al
certainty ; hut to take it in assumed fear that some other
nation miglit do so, was a clear perversion of tlie Monroe
J)octrine.

382 AMERICAN DIPLOMATIC QUESTIONS

An exemplification of the " Polk Doctrine " was fui-ther /
given in the matter of the Oregon territory dispute, to which /
the President referred in the same message of December, 1845.

The term, "' Oregon," was applied to a large district of
territory lying between the Rocky Mountains and the Pacific
Ocean, and embraced, in part, what now constitutes the pres-
ent province of British Columbia and the states of Washing-
ton, Oregon and Idaho, — a total area of about six hundred
thousand square miles. The United States' claim to this
territory was based upon the Louisiana Purchase, the explo-
rations of Captain Robert Gray in the Columbia River (1792),
the discoveries of Lewis and Clark (1804-06), American
settlements at Fort Hall and Astoria in 1808 and 1811, and
the treaty of 1819, by which all Spanish title along the Pacific,
north of latitude 42°, was surrendered to the United States.
Li 1824 Russia agreed to limit the southern boundary of
her American possessions at latitude 54° 40', and the United
States at once set up a territorial claim to that line. This
was contested by Great Britain, but an agreement to exer-
cise joint sovereignty over the territory from the Columbia
River on the south to 54° 40' on the north, the disputed por-
tion, temporarily suspended the controversy. Liimigration
of American and British subjects into this disputed territory
began, and it was tacitly understood by these early settlers
that eventually a majority among the residents would control
in the final determination of sovereignty. With a better
knowledge of this great territory came an appreciation of its
value, and the Democratic party in 1844 took up the battle- )
cry of the '^ whole of Oregon or none." With "Fifty-four
forty or fight " upon its banners, James K. Polk was elected.
He at once entered upon negotiations for the acquisition of
the entire extent of his party's territorial claim, as far as
the Russian frontier.

In his inaugural address, he asserted that the American
title was "clear an<l un({uestionable " and "already are our
people preparing to perfect that title by occupying it with
their wives and children." An earnest attempt was made
by the President in the summer of 1845 to reach an iukUt-

THE MONROE DOCTRINE 383

standing through diploniutic negotiation with Great Britain,
for as he afterward dechired : " In deference to what had
been (h)ne by my predecessors, and especially in considera-
tion that a proposition of compromise had been thrice made
bv two preceding administrations to adjust the question on
tiie parallel of 40° ... I deemed it to be my duty not
abruptly to break it off."

Great Britain refused to consider any proposition of com-
promise settlement that was not based upon a free naviga-
tion of the Columbia River, which privilege the President
was naturally unwilling to grant. The fourth attempt there-
fore to adjust the Oregon boundary having failed, a deter-
mination to make good the entire claim by force swept over
tiie country, and war seemed inevitable. The President
then fell back upon the Monroe Doctrine. In liis first annual
message to Congress (December 2, 1845), he said : —

Near a quarter of a century ago the principle was distinctly
announced to the world, in the annual message of one of my
predecessors, that " the American continents, l)y the free and
nidependent condition which they have assumed and maintain,
are henceforth not to be consideied as subjects for future coloni-
zation by any European powers."

This principle will apply with greatly increased force should
any European power attempt to establish any new colony in North
America. In the existing circumstances of the world the present
IS deemed a proper occasion to reiterate and reaffirm the principle
avowed by Mr. Monroe and to state my cordial concurrence in its
wisdom and sound i)olicy. The reassertion of this princii)le, espe-
fially in reference to North America, is at this day but tlie promul-
'^ation of a policy which no European power should cherish tlu';
disposition to resist. Existing rights of every European nation
should be respected, but it is due alike to our safety and our inter-
•^'sts tliat the efficient protection of our laws should be extended
over our whole territorial Hunts, and that it should be distinctly
;iimouneed to the world as our settled policy that no future Euro-
pean colony or donunion shall with our consent be planted or
estal)lished on any part of the North American continent.

Mr. I'olk had no ihjultt experienced a change of heart since
Ins declaration in Congress duriner the Pananui debate that

384 AMERICAN DIPLOMATIC QUESTIONS

the Monroe Doctrine was " viewed, as it should have been, as
the mere expression of opinion of the executive . . . designed
pioljably to produce an effect upon the councils of the Holy
Alliance in relation to their supposed intention to interfere
in the war between Spain and her former colonies. The
President had no power to bind the nation by such a pledge."

Had the territory of Oregon been res nulUus, a domain
upon which no claim rested, and therefore open to coloniza-
tion by any nation according to the terms of international
law, the application of the Monroe Doctrine to the case
would be clearer. In such event, a foreign power would
actually have been seeking colonization upon the American
continent, and that part of Monroe's message dealing with
colonization would have been violated, had any such attempt
to acquire Oregon gone unchallenged by the United States.
As it was, both the United States and Great Britain claimed
the territory in question. It was not a domain 7'es nullius.
Great Britain did not seek to extend her dominion, but only
to retain what she considered properly belonged to her.
Obviously, then, the only settlement of such a question was
to be found in a minute comparison of claims, the better
one to prevail. In case amicable negotiations failed, an
appeal to arms could only be made upon the broad principle
of the final resort to settle quarrels.

Happily the controversy was closed by a compromise set-
tlement upon the 49th parallel before tlie rough arbitrament
of war became necessary.

The expressions of President Polk, touching the Monroe
Doctrine, as already quoted, modified to some extent the
true meaning of the original declaration. The prohibition
of EiiiOpiiaJiji-omilliQii, as well as colonization, would impl)^
that no transfer of territory to European nations could be
permitted, even through voluntary conveyance. The acqui-
sition of territory in North America by any means whatso-
ever was interdicted to foreign powers. He restricted the
principle, however, to the North American continent. By
his ai)plication of this principle in the case of Oregon, an
implication follows that no foreign power claiming territory

THE MUNKOE DOCTRINE 385

in North America would be permitted to complete its title,
should that title admit of doubt in the United States.

Notwithstanding the positive attitude he thus assumed,
tlie President was nevertheless willing to change his attitude
when the compromise offer from England reached Washing-
ton,— to partition the Oregon territory north of the Colum-
bia River, over which he believed our title was " clear and
unquestionable."

A few weeks after the reading of the President's message,
Mr. Allen, of Ohio, in the face of considerable ()p[)Osition,
introduced into the Senate the following resolution: —

Resolved, That Congress, thus concurring with the President,
and sensible that this subject has been forced upon the attention
of the United States by recent events so significant as to make
it impossible for this government longer to remain silent, without
being ready to submit to and even to invite the enforcement of this
dangerous doctrine, do hereby solemnly declare to the civilized
world the unalterable resolution of the United States to adhere
to and to enforce the principle, that any effort of the powers of
Europe to intermeddle in the social organization or political
arrangements of the independent nations of America, or further
to extend the European system of government upon this continent
by the establishment of new colonies, would be incompatible with
the independent existence of the nations, and dangerous to the
liberties of the people of America, and therefore would incur, as
by the right of self-preservation it would justify, the prompt
resistance of the United States.

The bill expired in the committee room of foreign affairs
when tlie treaty with England, of June 20, 184G, was con-
cluded, by which the Oregon dispute was settled. Thus an
attempt to secure Congressional expression upon the Monroe
Doctrine again failed.

IX. YUCATAN

One other event occurred toward tlie close of Polk's ad-
ministration, which is interesting on account of its bearing
upon tlie Monroe Doctrine. In a Senate debate upon the
I'residciit's special message of April 29, 1848, relating to
2c

386 AMERICAN DIPLOMATIC QUESTIONS

Yucatan, a considerable range of opinion concerning the
application of the doctrine was expressed. The speech of
John C. Calhoun, made at that time, is an especially valuable
contribution to the literature of tlie subject.

In this message the President submitted to the considera-
tion of Congress certain communications from the governor
of Yucatan, setting forth the unfortunate condition t6 which
the country had been reduced by an uprising of the native
Indians. The Indians were represented as carrying on a
war of extermination against the whites, and the latter,
" panic-stricken and destitute of arms," had been brought to
a deplorable condition of suffering and misery. In despera-
tion they had appealed to the United States for protection,
and offered in return the " dominion and sovereignty of the
peninsula." A similar appeal had been made, along with
the same offer of sovereignty, to the Spanish and English
governments.

The President added : "• Whilst it is not my })urpose to
recommend the adoption of any measure with the view to the
acquisition of the ' dominion and sovereignty ' over Yucatan,
yet, according to our established policy, we could not consent
to a transfer of this ' dominion and sovereignty,' either to
Spain, Great Britain, or any other European power." Quot-
ing from Monroe's and his own messages of 1823 and 1845,
he continues : "■ Our own security requires that the establislied
policy thus announced should guide our conduct, and this
applies with great force to the peninsula of Yucatan. ... I
submit to the wisdom of Congress to ado[)t such measures as
in their judgment may be expedient to prevent Yucatan
from becoming a colony of anj' European power, which in no
event could be permitted by the United States. ..."
/ Yucatan was a state belonging to Mexico, but her iidiabit-
ants remained neutral during the war between the United
States and iMexico, then in progress. A bill had been intro-
duced into the Senate to enable the President to order mili-
tary occupation of Yucatan, which funiislied tlie subject of
debate already referred to.

Aside from feelings of humanity, that naturally art)used

THE :monroe doctrine 387

Mr. Polk's desire to send prompt relief to a suffering people,
he believed that an urgent necessity called upon him to
nuuntain the integrity of the ^Monroe Doctrine. He believed
the doctrine not only forbade foreign interference for pur-
poses of dominion or control, but he further considered that
the dut}' of the Ignited States extended to the prevention of
foreign interposition, even when offered in friendly spirit and
u])on the invitation of American states. John C Calhoun
was then a mendjer of the Senate, and the only survivor of
President Monroe's cabinet. In his estimation, the true char-
acter of the ]\Ionroe Doctrine was misunderstood both by the
chief Executive and by the masses of the people. Emi-
nently qualified to speak, he delivered a speech in the Senate,
]\lay 15, 1848, carefully reviewing the circumstances under
which the declaration of President Monroe was promulgated,
and gave as unavoidable deductions a series of conclusions.
It is difficult to qualify them.

1. The declaration was made to meet but one special and
particular condition, to wit; — the threatened interference of
the Holy Alliance in Spanish- American affairs, for the pur-
pose of preserving the revolting colonies to Spain, and forcing
tlieir continued allegiance to moiiarehiral institutions. The
daiigt'r soon after ceased to exist, and tlie warning of the
United States, supported by the sympathetic attitude of
Great IJritain, had served its purpose. Tliat part of the
declaration, therefore, must be considered in connection with
the cirt'umstances under which it was announced ; otherwise
it '-would have involved the alisurdity of asserting that the
attempt of any European state to extend its system of gov-
ernment to this continent, the smallest as well as the greatest,
would endanger the peace and safety of our country."

-. The next declaration, tliat the interposition of any
JCiiropean power to oppress the governments of this conti-
nent, or to control their destiny in any manner whatever,
would be I'egarded as a manifestation of an unfriendly dispo-
sition toward the United States, arose from the same condi-
tions, and "lu'longs to the history of that day." It was an
ap[)endage to the last declaration. Tlic goviriimciits ri'feiTcd

388 AMERICAN DIPLOMATIC QUESTIONS

to were those just freed from Spain, and the Executive made
use of the words "any European power," for the sake of en-
couraging the young republics.

3. In regard to the use of the word "colonization," as
employed by Monroe, it had a specific meaning — "the estab-
lishment of a settlement by emigrants from the parent coun-
tr}'', in a territory either uninhabited, or from which the
inhabitants have been partially or wholly expelled." This
part of the doctrine was also directed to a certain source of
irritation — Russian colonization on the northwest coast. To
include the whole continent as under the ban, was manifestly
an impropriety, as a large part of the continent had not
asserted nor maintained its independence ; British and Rus-
sian America then exceeded in area the whole of the United
States. This portion of the message originated with Mr.
Adams, and had not been freely discussed in the cabinet.
" I will venture to say," asserted Mr. Calhoun, " that if tliat
declaration had come before the cautious cabinet, (for Mr.
Monroe was among the wisest and most cautious men I have
ever known,) it would have been modified and expressed with
a far greater degree of precision, and with much more deli-
cacy in reference to the feelings of the British Government."^

4. In another respect as well, Mr. Calhoun believed,
President Polk did not understand the famous declaration.
" They were but declarations, — nothing more. Declara-
tions announcing in a friendly manner to the powers of tlie
world that we should regard certain acts of interposition of
the allied powers as dangerous to our peace and safety ; in-
terpositions of Euroj^ean powers to oppress the republics
which had just arisen upon this continent, having become
free and independent, as manifesting an unfriendly disposi-
tion, and that this continent having become free and inde-
pendent, was no longer the subject of colonization — not one
word in any one of them in reference to resistance."

5. Dur country, then, is not expected inexorably to follow a
simple declaration as though it were a fixed principle. Such
a course would make the United States a party, willing or
unwilling, to all the wars, just or unjust, of the several Ameri-

THE MONROE DOCTRINE 389

can states. " We are not to have quoted upon us, on eve^y
occasion, general declarations to wliicli any and every mean-
ing may be attached." Whether the country intends to
resist by force any interposition from abroad rests with
Congress, and must be decided upon the merits of the case
itself. It should be asked — does such interposition affect the
safety of the country ? Is it to the best interests of the
nation to resist it, and if so, are our interests involved suffi-
ciently great to make war expedient? In some particular
instances this would be proper — proper because wise — and
^Ir. Calhoun cited the cases of Cuba and Texas. Here he
"would resort to the hazard of war with all its calamities."
In the case of Yucatan, the only duty devolving upon the
United States was to respond to a cry for help.

From this review of the ]\Ionroe Doctrine, the following
deductions seem to be clear : —

The safety of the United States did not demand the
annexation of Yucatan.

The occupation of this country b}^ Great Britain or Spain
would not have been for the purpose of dominion. It would
have been only the friendly interposition of another power
at the solicitation of Yucatan herself.

Occupation of this sort could not properly be called
colonization.

The doctrine as enunciated by its authors did not apply
in this case.

There was but a slight desire in the United States to annex
Yucatan. The country was regarded as practically worth-
less, and its admission into the Union to ))e a mistake. It is
not easy to determine, however, what iinal action the Senate
might have taken in the matter, had not the incident been
closed by a treaty between the whites and the Indians whicli
put an end to their difficulties.

X. Tin: 1 KENCH INTERVEXnoX FN MEXICO

There is no event in the history of the .Moin'oc Doctrine in
which the principles it emlxtdies have had sucli direct and

390 AMERICAN DIPLOMATIC QUESTIONS

unquestioned application as in that of the French invasioij^(^
of Mexico. The circumstances in this case were in many
respects strikingly similar to those that called forth the
doctrine in 1823. In this instance, the threat from abroad
was consummated by an actual landing of European forces
upon North American soil for purposes of dominion. The
object of this invasion was for the very purpose of establish-l
ing monarchial institutions upon the Western Hemisphere,]
and the territor}^ so invaded, bordering upon the United
States, brought the movement well within the threatened line
of danger to American interests. All the conditions neces-
sary for an American protest existed. Indeed, the situation
in jNIexico, brought about by French intrigue, fully justified
the action of the United States on primary principles which
authorize the use of force in self-defence. The excuse of a
national policy to be followed or maintained, could have car-
ried no argument for intervention half so potent. While
the Monroe Doctrine, properly considered, is fundamentally \
a plea for self-protection, there is a magic influence in its 1
phrases which casts a spell upon the American people when
they are repeated, — a spell that has at times blinded the
eyes to right or wrong in the excess of patriotism it seems
to have inspired. In the French invasion of Mexico, the
threatened danger "fo the United States was so real and
apparent that no juggling with magical words was necessary
to satisfy the national conscience that interposition was neces-
sary ; and it will be noted that in all the official despatches
relating to this international episode, no mention whatever
is made of the Monroe Doctrine, no statement refers to a
" well established policy," no precedent is exhibited, and no
offerings are made upon the altar of a "manifest destiny."

With the establishment of the republic in 1821, Mexico
entered upon an era of political convulsion that is probably
unparalleled in the annals of any other nation, if tlie example
of turbulent Haiti be excepted. In the course of forty years
the fires of as many revolutions were lighted ; seventy-two
rulers, either monarchial or republican, were seated and de-
posed. The primary cause of the chronic coiulition of civil

THE MONROE DOCTRINE 391

war which characterized this period of Mexican history is to
be found in the coiitroversies—betweeB—bhe--" clerical " and
-liberal" partiej._of_tliQ_ State.

The Catholic church was supreme in Spain, and its sacred
symbols were brought to the New World emblazoned upon the
banners of her conquerors ; with them Catholicism invaded
Mexico, and the Church became the richest and greatest power
in the land. The republic inherited a colossal and corrupt
ecclesiastical system that fattened upon the enormous wealth
of its own landed interests, all of which were exempted from
taxation. So great had become the power of the church in
the Mexican Republic that it overshadowed all governmentj
civil and military. Through vast accumulation of wealth,
and because of its hold upon the minds of a superstitious
people, the Catholic church became a wholly tyrannical
institution. The Clerical party represented the monar-
cliical, aristocratic, and despotic elements of the nation,
while the progressive Liberals stood upon a platform of
" equal rights," " freedom of worship," and a general reform
of abuses. The bitter struggle between these two parties
raged fiercely in 1858-60, with Miramon (Conservative) and
Benito Juarez (Liberal) as opposing leaders. The nation had
been reduced by ceaseless war to a condition of social and
political chaos ; guerilla bands wandered about the country
upon errands of plunder, and the smaller groups of banditti,
like wolves, left the mountains and infested the highways ;
every semljlance of law and order disappeared; murder and
pillage were legitimized, and tiie term "government" was a
mockery. These deploral)le conditions in Mexico invited
foreign intervention because, in the turmoil of constant revo-
luti6n7~jVIexico had neglected her international obligations.
During the Miramon-Juarez struggles, offers of mediation
from England and France were declined by Juarez because
he suspected a design to impose monarchical institutions
upon Mexico.

In 1801 Juarez emerged from the confusion, triumphant
over his enemies, and with the "army of the constitution"
he entered the capital. Juarez was always considered a good

392 AMERICxVN DIPLOMATIC QUESTIONS

leader and a just man ; in many respects he was a remark-
able character, whose memory will continue to be cherished
in Mexico ; although in control of the government he was^
quite unable to prevent the disorder and riot which imme-
diately followed his inauguration as president. Foreign in-
tervention again became imminent, and the Conservatives,
— or, in other words, those inclined to monarchical institu-
tions — supported by the church, conspired in its favor. The
fpolicy of Juarez, to suppress the monasteries, to confiscate the
wealth of the clergy, and to guarantee full religious liberty
to all, were measures altogether too radical in a country so
completely dominated by ecclesiastical orders. Envoys of
the Conservatives appeared in Europe, in 1861, to induce
Spain to reestablish an empire in Mexico. Napoleon III of
France was also approached, and that ambitious monarch at
once grasped this opportunity to launch the great project
that lay near his heart ; Earl Russell, on the part of Great
Britain, was finally induced to assume, though reluctantly,
a share in a tripartite scheme olinterYmit ion in .Mfild^P.'

France, Spain, and England, no doubt, had each some
grounds for interposition. In the case of France, the col-
lection of a debt long overdue gave her, as a creditor govern-
ment, a right to take action in lier own interests. It appears
that during his presidency Miramon had issued bonds to
the extent of $15,000,000, realizing upon them, accord-
ing to his fullest expectations, less than -S^l, 000,000 in cash ;
and the largest holders of this doubtful Mexican paper were
French citizens. Juarez, on coming into power, promptly
repudiated this debt. Other claims, amounting to many
millions of dollars, were suddenly resurrected from the waste
basket by the French Government. Their validity had
always been questionable, though some of them were, no
doubt, just. S[)ain relied upon a_yiolated treaty to justify
her action, and Great. 13 ri Lain, found ample cause for armed
intervention in certain atrocities committed by Miramcui!&
ol'licers in tlie British Legation at Mexico. A large sum of
money had been stolen from the legation safe, and various
English consulates had been sacked ; for these enormities no

THE MONROE DOCTRINE 393

redress had been offered by the Mexican Government, and
none conld be obtained by Great Britain tlirongh any means
short of force. The three powers, having decided to con-
duct a joint intervention^ signed an agreement in Lon(h)n
( OHoBeiv IMl), declarnig that : —

The high contracting parties engaged not to seek for them-
selves, iu the employment of the coercive measures contemplated
by the present convention, any acquisition of territory, nor any
special advantage, and not to exercise in the internal affairs of
^lexico any influence of a nature to prejudice the right of the
^lexican nation to choose and to constitute freely the form of its
government.

Their purpose was ostensibly to secure payment of their
claims, and if necessary, to seize certain Mexican ports, at-
tach their customs receipts, and hold them as a pledge.
Accordingly, on the Tth of January, 18(32, an allied fleet of \
the three nations, supplemented by a French military force, \
appeared at Vera Cruz, and demanded of Juarez, the I^iberal \
leader and president of the republic, immediate payment '
f)f the claims against Mexico. Juarez could only assert the
inability of his ginermnent to meet such demands ; he
frankly and truthfully stated that the treasury was empty.
The allies then proclaimed to the people of Mexico their
intention. They had not come, they assured them, for con-
(juest, nor for the purpose of interfering with Mexican poli-
tics ; furthernu)re, their intentions were not primarily hostile,
— on the contrary, they came with a friendly hand out-
1 retched toward "a people whom Providence had favored
with many gifts, but who used their forces and exhausted
their vitality in civil wars and perix-tual convulsions."
They came merely to obtain reparation for the nniny griev-
ances wliich had been iiillictcd upon their subjects i)y Mexi-
cans. This declaration sounded ^\■ell, but the pj-esidcnt
resented the display of^ force, and called ii|miii tlie allies to
leave Mejdcan territory. Ignoring- :ill jiioniises of peaee,
given in a conference lield witii .Juarez at Soledas, a Freneli
determination to press hostilitit's against Mexico at once be-

394 AMERICAN DIPLOMATIC QUESTIONS

came manifest. This sudden determination convinced the
English and Spanish commanders in Mexico that their
French ally had motives ulterior to those expressed in the
conference at London, and that it was contemplating a
course of action in which they could take no part. They
accordingly withdrew their forces, leaving the F^i-ench alone.
Then, relieved of his allies, the French commander, un-
mindful of the pledge given by his emperor, and of his
own assurances to Mexico, declared war upon the Mexican
Ggyjernment. He issued at the same time a proclamation
calling upon all good Mexicans to rally about his standard
as it warned all foolhardy ones who sliould dare to oppose
it ; with this preliminary flourish he commenced his march
to the city of Mexico, expecting an easy and splendid entry.
At Puebla, about halfway on his journey to the capital, a
Mexican army, under the flag of Juarez, met and defeated
the French invaders, obliging the latter to fall back to
Orizaba to await reenforcements from home. These, in
due time, arrived, with Marshal Forey in command.

Napoleon's instructions to Forey left no further doubt
upon the true object of his intervention in Mexico. The
emperor was kindly solicitous for the welfare of the Mexi-
cans, but " of course," he wrote, " if they prefer a monarchy,
it is to the interest of France to support them in that view.
... In the present state of civilization of the world, the
prosperity of America is not indifferent to Europe ; for she
it is who feeds our manufacturers and keeps our commerce
alive. It is to our interests that the Republic of the United
States may be powerful and prosperous, but by no means
that she should take all the Gulf of Mexico, and hence com-
mand the West Indies, as well as South America, and be tlie
sole dispenser of the products of the New World. . . . If, on
the contrary, Mexico conserves her independence and main-
tains the integrity of her territory ; if a suitable government
be constituted there, with the assistance of France, we sliall
have restored to the Latin race, from the other side of the
ocean, its strength and prestige ; we shall have guaranteed ,
their security to our colonies of the West Indies and those,

THE .MONROE DOCTRINE Sd3

of Spain ; we slmll have established our beneficent influence
to the centre of America ; aiul tliat influence, by creating
immense openings to our commerce, will procure for us the
indispensable materials for our industry. Mexico, thus re-
generated, will always be favorable to us ; not only by
acknowledgment, but also because its interests will be in
harmony with ours, and it will find a point of support in its
good relations with the European powers. Now, therefore,
our military honor pledged, the exigence of our politics, the
interest of our industry and our commerce make it our duty
to march on Mexico, to plant there boldly our standard, to
estaljlishjthgrea-nionarchy, if it is not incompatible with the
national sentiment of the country — but at all events, a gov-
ernment whicli promises some stability."

Napoleon III entertained the brilliant project of reestab-J
lishing the power of the Latin race in the Western Hemi-'
sphere, and of restoring to France her lost prestige in the
Aniei"icas. He felt that he alone might be able to accomplish
this great achievement. Spain was virtually dead ; her
former colonies in Central America had not fulfilled the
promises of freedom ; the French were the only branch of
the Latin race that had given sufficient evidence of those
qualities which insure success and progress ; they alone had
lived up to the glorious destinies of the Latins. Upon him,
then, rested the burden of quickening to new life the race
that was once supreme, but which now bent before the
masterful energies of the Anglo-Saxons. Eastern questions
belonged to England ; Western (questions must look to
France for solution. Mexico offered the stage for the first
act of his heroic drama. Tiie Clerical party, the monarchists,
and the many sympathizers of the old regime in Mexico,
would come to his supi)ort. lie would s\vce{) aside the
quarrelling political factions ; he would exterminate the ban-
ditti, and found upon the site of the ancient Aztec cai)itol
the seat of a new Lai in l^mpirc, which, in the fulness of time,
would outshine the old one. The I'nited States and its
Monroe Doctrine perhaps stood in his way, but he believed
the United States was too busily engaged in its own desper-

396 AMERICAN DIPLOMATIC QUESTIONS

ate affairs to seriously trouble liim ; lie realized, however,
that he must act with cautiou, and not unduly alarm the
watchful authorities at Washington, — hence, the resurrected
French claims, the convention of London, the proclamation
of his general in Vera Cruz, and the Soledad Conference.
No doubt Napoleon was encouraged by the mild tone of
American protest. He had well chosen his time, for at that
particular moment it was inexpedient for the United States
to make enemies abroad.

Marshal Forey, with his letter of instructions, arrived at
Vera Cruz, in Septemlier, 1862, and immediately assumed
command of a largely augmented French force. After over-
coming the resistance of the Mexicans in several hard-fought
battles, Forey entered the capital June 10, 1863, an^d estab-
lished a provisional government, consisting of a regency, in
which he himself was the central tigure. A branch of the
new government, styled the " Assembly of Notables," lost
no time in reporting to Napoleon that the Mexican nation
" adopts a monarchical and hereditary form of government
under a Catholic prince " who shall take the " title of Em-
peror " — the choice for ruler being, " His Imperial and Royal
Highness, the Prince Ferdinand Maximilian of Austria."

The Archduke, Maximilian of Austria, was a member
of the House of Hapsburg, — a man of ambition, of honest
intentions, of small political sagacity, and of little experience
in worldly affairs. He was a tool in the hands of Napoleon.
Before accepting the honor of an emperor's crown in iNIexico,
he desired undoubted assurance that the choice of himself was
in reality the choice of the Mexican people, and Napoleon's
officials in Mexico were clever enough to obtain for the arcli-
duke every assurance he needed on that score. Finally con-
vinced, and therefore believing himself to have the support
of " an immense majority " of Mexicans, he accepted the
lionor. He was crowned at Miramon, and in eTune, 1864, was
welcomed into the city of Mexico with great demonstrations

of joy-

The pleasing personality of the emperor, along with his
good sense in recognizing the Liberals in the matter of

THE MONROE DOCTRINE 397

ap.piiintments, gave to the opening of his reign promises of
a most flattering nature. Many influential men among the
Liberals, wearied at last with perpetual war, came to his side,
believing that possibly, after all, Napoleon had better solved
their political problems than they themselves had been able |
to do. Maximilian in fact became even popular.

However, all the emperor at first gained in the good-will
of his subjects, was soon lost by a woful lack of judgment in
the management of his imperial oflice. He fell readily into
the hands of the Clerical party, and under the influence of
their fawning adulation he entered upon a stupidly blind
policy of antagonizing the Liberals at every turn, — those
whom he liad at first conciliated, and upon whose friendsliip
he most depended. He finally sealed his own doom by the
astonishingly foolish error of recalling from exile the notori-
ous generals, Miramon and Marquez, the former leaders of the
Conservatives, and whose inhuman and barbarous cruelties
on the field of battle had disgusted even their OAvn soldiers.
No more flagrant offence could have been offered than the
restoration to military power of these two detestable and
bloodthirsty men.

An emphatic Avarning from the United States in April,
1866, caused Napoleon to withdraw the French forces from
North America, thereb}' depriving Maximilian of his only
real support. Al)andoned to his fate by those who had
placed him upon the throne, he carried on a despairing fight
against the swelling forces of Juarez, and he finally paid the
supreme price of his life for the glories of a four years' reign .
in Mexico, — a reign that was conceived and conducted in error. |

He was executed June 10, 1H67.

Bearing in mind the readiness with wliich the various
administrations at Washington luid invoked the Monroe
Doctrine whenever adjacent territory had been threatened
witli invasion from abroad, one would naturally expect to
lind a piompl and decided warning from the United States,
wlien tlie three allies signed the London Convention, and es-
pecially when they appeared a few months later with a demon-
stration of force at Vera Cruz. Such, however, was not the case.

398 AMERICAN DIPLOMATIC QUESTIONS

Tliere were several reasons Avliy President Lincoln and his
cabinet chose to adopt a cautious policy. In the first place,
the United States had substantial claims of her own against
Mexico, and being thorouglily disgusted with the childish
follies of her Southern neighbor, had only herself declined
to become a party to the London Convention, because of
her established policy of non-alliance with foreign powers.]
The Secretary of State, William H. Seward, had not failed,;,
from the beginning, to obtain the most convincing and satis-
factory assurances from France that the object of the inter-
vention was solely for the purpose of collecting a debt, and
was in no wise intended to be converted into a political
movement. Although the Monroe Doctrine had, on previ-
ous occasions, been loosely regarded as a general inhibition
against foreign intervention of any kind whatever in the
Western continent, a more reasonable construction of Mr.
Monroe's words could not give them so broad a meaning.
The allies, it was thought, had an undoubted right to use
force in the collection of just claims against Mexico, and the
United States had no right to interpose so long as her own
safety was in no manner involved.

Another reason why IVIr. Seward chose to adopt a compla-
cent attitude of neutrality, a course for wliich he had later
to endure the accusation of cowardice, must be taken into
account. His responsible position at the head of the Depart-
ment of State was, at that particuhir moment, fraught with
the greatest difficulties. A mistake in the management of
foreign affairs would almost surely have invited disaster,,
and this particular matter called for the utmost delicacy
of diplomatic treatment.

The civil war that had been threatening the United States
for a quarter of a century had at last come ; -any violation
of the Monroe Doctrine, however offensive to the people of
the United States, would probably have been disregarded be-
cause of other and greater dangers. Mr. Seward neverthe-
less anxiously watched the progress of the allies ; he sought
constantly to conciliate the three powers, though expressing
alwa3\s his country's displeasure with any foreign meddling

THE MONROE DOCTRINE 399

in Mexico which might tend toward an overthrow of its
legitimate government. England's attitude toward the
United States Government he well knew to be unfriendly,
and the unfortunate affair of the Trent was fresh in every
mind ; a further offence to England, under the circumstances,
would have been inexpedient and possibly unsafe.

When Napoleon's inner motives came to light, and the
English and Spanish withdrew their forces from Vera Cruz,
tlie new danger thrust itself upon the State Department.
Success of the Rebellion, and the division of Anglo-Saxon
power in America, was clearly in direct' line with French
interest. That ]Mr. Seward was fully alive to the dangerous
situation is apparent in the cautious tone of his despatches.
It was only when Appomattox closed this critical period
of American history that the administration was enabled
to assume its proper attitude toward the French invasion
of Mexico. With a veteran army to back the demand,
Napoleon Avas requested to abandon at once his project in
^lexico. The ^Monroe Doctrine was vindicated.

A few quotations selected from a voluminous mass of offi-
cial despatches will suffice to indicate the position of the
government in this matter, at its various periods, from
1861 to 1866, and to present as well a budget of official lit-
erature upon tlie doctrine under discussion.

When the intervention was first decided upon by the three
powers, Mr. Cass, Secretary of State, wrote to Mr. McLane,
September 20, 1860 : —

While we do not deny the right of any other power to carry
on hostile operations against Mexico, for the redress of its griev-
ances, we firmly object to its holding possession of any part of
that country, or endeavoring by force to control its political des-
tiny.

This opposition to foreign interference is known to France, Eng-
land, and Spain, as well as the determination of the United States
to resist any such attempt by all the means in their power. . . .
I have already referred to the extent of the principle of foreign
interference whicli we maintain witli regard t(j Mexict). It is pro])er
to add that while tliat principle denies the right of any power to

400 AMERICAN DIPLOMATIC QUESTIONS

hold permanent possession of any part of that country, or to
endeavor by force to direct or control its political destiny, it does
not call in question its right to carry on hostile operations against
that republic for the redress of any real grievaiices it may have
suffered. But we insist that such hostilities be fairly prosecuted
for that purpose and be not converted into the means of acquisition
or of political contract.

Replying to the invitation extended by the three allies
that the United States should become a party to tlie London
Convention, and join them in the recovery of their claims
against Mexico, Mr. Seward said : —

. . . the President does not feel himself at liberty to ques-
tion, and he does not question, that the sovereigns represented have
imdoubted right to decide for themselves the fact whether they
have sustained grievances, and to resort to war against Mexico
for the redress thereof, and have a right also to levy the war sev-
erally or jointly. The United States have a deep interest, which,
however, they are happy to believe is an interest held by them in
common with the high contracting powers and with all other
civilized states, that neither of the sovereigns by whom the con-
vention has been concluded shall seek or obtain any acquisition of
territory or any advantage peculiar to itself ... or to exercise
" any influence of a character to impair the right of the Mexican
people to choose and freely to constitute the form of its own gov-
ernment. ... It is true, as the high contracting parties assume,
that the United States have, on their part, claims to urge against
Mexico. Upon due consideration, however, the President is of
■opinion that it would be inexpedient to seek satisfaction of their
claims at this time through an act of accession to the convention.

On March 3, 18(32, when Napoleon's diiplicit}^ had scarcely
become suspected, Mr. Seward addressed Mr. Adams, Minis-
ter to Great Britain, as follows : —

The President, however, deems it his duty to express to the
allies, in all candor and frankness, the opinion that no monarchi-
cal government which coidd be founded in Mexico, in the presence
of foreign navies and armies in the waters and upon the soil of
Mexico, would have any prospect of security or permanence.

Later in Marcli, 18G2, the administration became con-
vinced of Napoleon's real intentions in Mexico, and upon Mr.

THE MONROE DOCTRINE 401

Seward fell the burden of opposing French aims without
offending the French emperor. It at once became Mr. Sew-
ard's object to prevent Great Britain and France from com-
bining in a common cause against the United States. The
task of the di]3lomatist was certainly not an easy one. Both
powers were thought to favor the success of Southern arms
against the North, and both were actually united in an
aggressive movement against Mexico, which was hostile to
American interests. At such a moment the observance of
a mere political tenet was of little relative importance. The
Secretar}' wrote to ^Ir, Dayton, ^Minister to France, March
31, 1862, as follows : —

You will intimate to ^Ir. Tliouvenel that rumors of this kind
[ tliat France is a party to the scheme to " subvert the republican
American system in ^lexico"] have reached the President and
awakened some anxiety on his part. You will say that you are
not authorized to ask explanations, but you are sure that if any
can l)e made, which will be calculated to relieve that anxiety, they
^\•ill be very welcome, inasmuch as the United States desire noth-
ing so much as to maintain a good understanding and the most
cordial relations with the government and the people of France.

It will hardly be necessary to do more in assigning your rea-
sons for this proceeding on your part than to say that we have
more than once, and with perfect distinctness and candor, in-
formed all the parties to the alliance that we cannot look with
indifference upon any armed Eiu'0])ean intervention for political
(Mids in a country situated so near and connected with us so
closely as ^lexico.

Mr. Seward sul)seqnently exi)lained the miklne.ss of his
protest by saying, that 'tuitions, lU) more tlian individuals,
can wisely divide their attention upon numy subjects at one
tinie."^ The one subject of civil war at home was fully
ample to occupy the attention of every branch of the gov-
ernment.

The assurances given that Fi-ance did not intend to colo-
nize Mexico or to take Sonora or any other section of the
country y;f?r??m«^n^/_y enabled tlie Ignited States Government
to defer tlie definite protest which it held in readiness to pre-

1 Bancroft's Life of Seward, Vol. 2, p. 425.
2u

402 AMERICAN DIPLOMATIC QUESTIONS

sent at a more auspicious moment. To Mr. jMotle}^ Minister
to Austria, Mr. Seward wrote, September 11, 1863 : —

When France made war against Mexico, we asked of France
explanations of her objects and pnrposes. She answered, the,t it
was a war for the redress of grievances ; that she did not intend
to permanently occnpy or dominate in Mexico, and that she
should leave to the people of Mexico a free choice of mstitu-
tions of government.

But the vigorous campaign of the French had begun to
alarm the people of the United States. Mr. Seward ad-
dressed Mr. Dayton, September 21, 1863 : —

. . . The United States government has hitherto practised
strict nentrality between the French and Mexico, and all the
more cheerfully because it has relied on the assurances given by
the French government that it did not intend permanent occupa-
tion of that country or any violence to the sovereignty of its peo-
ple. The proceedings of the French in Mexico are regarded by
many in that country and in this as at variance with those assur-
ances. Owing to this circumstance, it becomes ver}^ difficult for
this government to enforce a rigid observance of its neutrality
laws. The Pi-esident thinks it desirable that you should seek
an opportunity to mention these facts to Mr. Drouyn de I'Huys,
and to suggest to him that the interests of the United States,
and, as it seems to us, the interest of France herself, require
that a solution of the present complications in Mexico be made
as early as may be convenient upon the basis of the unity and
independence of Mexico. I cannot be misinterpreting the senti-
ments of the United States in saying that they do not desire an
annexation of Mexico or any part of it, nor do they desire any
special interest, control, or influence there, but they are deeply
interested in the reestablishment of unity, jjcace, and order in tlie
neighboring republic, and exceedingly desirous that there may
not arise out of the war in Mexico any cause of alienation between
them and France. . . .

A threat is here veiled only by expressions of good-will ;
but numerous letters written by Mr. Seward to the French
Minister about this period, indicate the extreme dissatisfac-
tion felt by the United States (lovernment against France,,
which was held in restraint only by domestic war at home.

THE MONROE DOCTRINE 403

When Droiiyn de Lhiiys (the French Minister of Foreign
Affairs) intimated the emperor's desire for the United
States to recognize Maximilian, Mr. Seward adroitly replied
that " a determination to err on the side of strict neutrality,
if we err at all," was all the emperor could expect of the
United States. But he continued more openl}^ : —

Happily the French Government has not been left uninformed
that, iu the opinion of the United States, the permanent establish-
ment of a foreign and monarchical government in Mexico will be
found neither easy nor desirable. You will inform Mr. Drouyn
de I'Huys that this opinion remains unchanged. On the other
hand, the United States cannot anticipate the action of the people
of Mexico, nor have they the least purpose or desire to interfere
with their proceedings, or control or interfere with their free
choice, or disturb them in the enjoyment of whatever institutions
of government they may, in the exercise of an absolute freedom,
establish. It is proper, also, that Mr. Drouyn de I'Huys should
be informed that tlie United States continue to regard Mexico as
the theatre of a war Avhich has not yet ended iu the subversion
of the Government long existing there, with which the United
States remain in the relation of peace and sincere friendship ;
and that, for this reason, the United States are not now at liberty
to consider the question of recognizing a Government which, in
the further chances of war, may come into its place. The United
States, consistently with their jjrinciples, can do no otherwise than
leave the destinies of Mexico iu the keeping of her own people,
and recognize their sovereignty and independence in whatever
form they themselves shall choose that this sovereignty and inde-
pendence shall be manifested.

With the actual crowning of Maximilian, Congress could,
not restrain its indignation, nor longer remain silent. Mexi-'
can affairs then began to compel consideration in the United
States, and even to assume importance superior to the en-
grossing excitements of the civil war. The press clamored
for a positive reassertion of the Monroe Doctrine, and Con-
gress responded to the call, heedless of the consequences.

On April 4, 1864, the House passed the following resolu-
tion without a dissenting voice : —

The Congress of the United States an^ unwilling l)y silence to
have the nations of the world under the impression that they are

404 AMERICAN DIPLOMATIC QUESTIONS

indifferent spectators of a deplorable event now transpiring in
the republic of Mexico, and tliey think iit to declare that it does
not accord with the policies of the United States to acknowledge
any monarchical government erected on the ruins of any republi-
can government in America under the auspices of any European
power.

The publication of this act, which represented as truly the
feelings of the administration as it did the feelings of the
country, came perilously close to causing war between France
and the United States — a war which, coming at that time,
might have very materially changed the future destinies of
the United States. The French Minister for Foreign Affairs
demanded of Mr. Dayton, *■' Do you bring us peace or do you
bring us war? "

It required a quick counter-move on the part of Mr. Lin-
coln and his Secretary of State to repair tlie dam which
Congress had nearly opened to the devouring flood, "Sir.
Seward hastened to instruct ^Ir. Dayton to report, " that the
proceedings of the House of Representatives were adopted
upon suggestions arising within itself, and not upon any
communication of the Executive Department, and that the
French Government would be seasonably apprised of any
change of policy upon the subject which the President might,
at any future time, think it proper to adopt ; " and to report
also that the question of a policy toward Mexico was an
executive one unless Congress should agree by a two-thirds
vote of both Houses, and that the opinions in the House, as
demonstrated by the resolution, were '• not in harmony with
the policy of neutrality, forbearance, and consideration which
the President has so faithfully pursued "

When the Civil War closed the hands of the administra-
tion were unloosed, and Mr. Seward was tlien enabled to
assume a more defiant attitude toward French aggression in
Mexico, but he li()[)ed nevertheless to accomplisli by peaceful
means what Generals (irant and Sheridan insisted should be
done by the direct threat of military force. In September,
1865, he announced in a firm but conciliatory manner, that as
France and the United States had armies confrontin<j each

THE MONKOE DOCTRINE 405

other on the Mexican frontier, '' a time seems to have come
when both nations may well consider whether the permanent
interests of international peace and friendship do not require
the exercise of a thoughtful and serious attention to the politi-
cal questions to which I have thus reverted."

The " political questions " referred to, were that the
United States favored republican institutions on the Ameri-
can continent, and the French did not.

The United States refused to recog-nize Maximilian's Gov-
ernment ; and on December IG, 1865, Mr. Seward gave the
direct warning to Napoleon that ended the affair, so far as
the Monroe Doctrine was concerned. He instructed Mr.
Dayton to announce that : —

It has been the President's purpose that France should be
respectfully informed upon two points, namely : first, that the
United States earnestly desire to continue and to cultivate sin-
cere friendship with France ; secondly, that this policy would be
brought into imminent jeopardy unless France could deem it
consistent with her interests and honor to desist from the prose-
cution of armed intervention in Mexico to overthrow the domestic
republican government existing there, and to establish upon its
ruins the foreign monarchy which has been attempted to be inau-
gurated in the capital of that country.

With the change of condition in the United States which
reunited its strength and gave to it a large veteran army,
ready to proceed at once to Mexico, Napoleon saw the down-
fall of his scheme. He awoke at last from his dream of
Western Empire.

With the withdrawal of the French troo^is from Mexico,
a movement was begun in Austria to raise an army to pro-
ceed to Mexico in support of the deserted Maximilian. .Mi'.
Seward protested, but upon Austria's pro})Ositi()n to despatcii
a sniaUer force, Seward replied that the (|uestion of military
aid for Maximilian was not to Ije discussed, ami should the
Austrian (iovernment persist in its determination, the Aiiicri-
(Mu Minister to Vienna would be expected to ri'tirc. llie
.Austrian project was accordingly abandoned "in considera-
tion of all the . . . circumstances."

406 AMERICAN DIPLOMATIC QUESTIONS V

Thus closed the episode with a complete vindication of
those principles upon which the original Monroe Doctrine
was founded, but without mention of the Doctrine itself, and
witliout the slightest allusion to its author. This was the
first overt act in American history looking to the establish-
ment of European monarchy on the Western continent ; the ;
only case where the threat was made good by actual inva-;
sion — the only case, indeed, which really threatened the]
interests or safety of the United States. Yet the adminis-
tration, being fully alive to the situation, preferred to justify
American intervention upon those broad grounds of self-
defence tliat are recognized by all civilized nations, and
accepted by all authorities as sanctioned by the public law.
It did not choose to summon specifically the Monroe Doctrine
in its defence. No precedent was needed, no appeal to sen-
timent was necessary, there were no doubters to be soothed
or cajoled by magical words. American intervention in
Mexico involved no ulterior political schemes which had to
be hidden under the cloak of a " national policy," or clothed
with the appearance of right by the sanctity of a popular
slogan. The danger to the United States of a new European
empire, planted upon her very borders, was too real to call
for sleight-of-hand methods to arouse opposition to it. There
was no party to be led on by high-sounding phrases,
j The principles of the Monroe Doctrine were fully vindi-
icated, as they always must, and always will, be when the
\proper occasion calls. Those principles belong, not to the
United States alone, but to all nations alike. The Monroe ■
Doctrine was not alluded to, because the object of that
declaration had long since been fulfilled ; because from
Mr. Seward's point of view, if it could be regarded as a
*' national policy " at all, it had fallen into disgrace ; and
finally, because a purely national policy can have no authori-
tative place in international law.

To William H. Seward is due a credit, not generally ac-
corded him, for the able manner in which he defended
American interests against the schemes of Napoleon III,
also for his skill as a (lii)loina(ist in conciliating foreign

THE MONROE DOCTRINE 407

enemies to the Northern cause, while he opposed at the same
time their advance in Mexico. His adroitness in preventing
Great Britain and France finding a common grievance against
the United States during the trying period of the Civil War
is worthy of great praise. An equal distinction is no less
due him for his independence and good judgment in declin-
ing to justify his intervention in Mexico on the ground of a
domestic political policy when the universal principle of self-
defence offered him sufficient argument.

XI. 1866-1896

From the close of the Mexican episode in 1866 to the
present day, there has been but one important international
(juestion involving the Monroe Doctrine that has given rise
to serious discussion, — the case of Venezuela and Great
Britain in 1896. From time to time, debates in the Senate
concerning the revocation of the Clayton-Bulwer treaty with il
England (1850) have taken place, in^mosF'oFwhicir^discus-
sions the relation of the doctrine to the policy of American
control of an isthmian canal formed a part ; but during this
period of three decades the country has been singularly free
from vexatious diplomatic questions, arising from acts of
European aggression upon the Western continents.

President Grant in his second annual message (Decem-
ber 5, 1870) proposed the annexation of Santo Domingo.
Among other reasons for taking it, he submitted that if
the United States did not acquire the island — the natives
being prepared to welcome American sovereignty — " a free
poit will be negotiated for by European nations in the Bay
of Samana." He declared that ''The acquisition of Santo
Domingo is an adherence to the Monroe Doctrine ; it is
a measure of self-j)rotection ; it is asserting our just claim
to a controlling influence over the great commercial traffic
soon to flow from west to east by way of the Isthmus of
Darien. ..."

Like Mexico, the Dominican Republic had led a checkered
political career after its declaration of independence in 1844.

408 AMERICAN DIPLOMATIC QUESTIONS

In 1861, Pedro Santana, a party leader and prominent revo-
lutionary general, proposed the retrocession of the island to
Spain, hoping thereby to secure for its inhabitants freedom
from the vexations of continual war.

The United States was just then too busily occupied with.
home affairs to take very serious notice of Santo Domingo.
Nevertheless, hearing of Santana's action. Secretary Seward
announced to Spain that " the Government of the United
States would regard with grave concern and dissatis-
faction, movements in Cuba to introduce Spanish authority
within the territory of Dominica," Spain was also much
occupied with internal difficulties, yet not wishing to lose
so excellent an opportunity to recoup her lost fortunes in
the West Indies, she disregarded Air. Seward's warning
and sent a body of troops to Santana's aid. Spain's wel-
come in Santo Domingo was less cordial than she had been
led to expect. The Dominicans waged a relentless guerilla
warfare upon the Spanish troops. In 1865, the governor
general and his military captain, Maximo Gomez (later of
Cuban fame), were obliged to withdraw, with a parting
farewell thrust from the Dominicans, to the effect that,
" The united Dominican people, without regard to rank or
color, have planted the white cross of the Republic upon the
principles enunciated by the great mother of free nations,,
that America belongs to Americans, and we will endure all
our trials over again, sooner than desert it."

At the time of President Grant's message, therefore, the
Spaniards had abandoned all intention of subjugating the
island, and no actual negotiations upon the part of any foreign
power had been made, nor were likely to be made, to secure
a port witliin the Bay of Samana. It is difficult, then, to
see just how the doctrine ap})lied to the case.

This, as has been already intimated, was not the first per-
version of the Monroe Doctrine ; President Polk had em-
ployed much the same tactics in furthering the annexation of
Texas. A stuffed bird in both cases had to be substituted
for a living one at which to shoot.

The real merits of tlie question respecting the annexation

THE MONROE DOCTRINE 409

of Santo Domingo had notliing to do with the Monroe doc-
trine, and the admission of the ishmd into the Union was
considered by Congress in reference only to the actual value
or worthlessness of the territory. Unfortunately the debate
in Congress was so characterized by bitterness of personal
feeling and antagonism to the President, that the friends
of General Grant felt obliged to withdraw the bill before
a vote could be taken upon it.

Shortly after the close of the Civil War a movement was
inaugurated in Congress looking to acquisition of territory
north of the United States. A series of conflicts between
upper and lower Canada had awakened the British Govern-
ment to the advisability of uniting her Canadian posses-
sions into a single dominion. This was accomplished by
what is called the British North American Act. This act
united in close ties of confederation the provinces of
Ontario, Quebec, Nova Scotia, New Brunswick, Prince
Edward Island, ^lanitolja, and British Columbia, with a
I'arliament at Ottawa. More cordial feelings between the
})rovinces were thus brought about by the acknowledgment
(tf mutual interests and dependence.

In some quarters objections were made in the United
States that this act of Great Britain was in violation of the
spirit of the Monroe Doctrine, because it seemed to be
antagonistic to the proper fulfilment of the destiny of those
provinces, which eventually would become a part of the
United States. Mr. Seward declared that '• Biitish Colniii-
l)ia, by whomsoever possessed, must be governed in t-ou-
formity with the interests of lier people and of society upon
the American continent."

Congress also considered a resolution which voiced the
uneasiness of the (;ountry at witnessing "such a vast con-
'omcratioii of American states, established on the monar-
cliial principle, such a proceeding [the confe(h;ration] being
in contravention of the traditionary and constantly declared
principles of the United States, and endangered their most
important interests."

In this case, as in the preceding one, the ap[)lication of

410 AMERICAN DIPLOMATIC QUESTIONS

the Monroe Doctrine is not clear. INIr. JMonroe expr(3bsh^
stated that, " With the existing colonies or dependencies of
any European power we have not interfered and shall not
interfere."

Certain political distnr!)ances in South America, from 186-t\
to 1871, drew from Washington further statements relating]
to the Monroe Doctrine. An alliance of South American'
states, including Chili and Peru, were involved in ditificul-
ties with Spain, growing out of the unsatisfied claims of
Spanish citizens. In the war that followed a Spanish
fleet bombarded Valparaiso (March, 186(3), and the United
States was looked to by the allies for an assertion of
the Monroe Doctrine. Mr. Seward wrote to Mr. Kirk-
patrick, the American Envoy to Chili (June 2, 1866) that
the Government of the United States will "maintain and
insist with all the decision and energy which are compatible
with our existing neutrality that the republican system
which is accepted by any one of those [South American]
states shall not be wantonly assailed, and that it shall not be
subverted as an end of a lawful war by European powers."
However, Mr. Seward declared it was not the intention of
the United States to go beyond this position. In South
American wars, where European powers did not seek the
establishment of monarchical government, the United States
could not be expected to take part.

In the early part of 1895 Great Britain was moved to
indignation by the arrest and forcible detention by Nicara-
guan authorities of Mr. Hatch, the acting British Consul,
and certain other British subjects in the Mosquito Reser-
vation. These men were denied a trial, and summarily
expelled from Nicaraguan territory. Nicaragua alleged that
they had instigated riots against her sovereignty in Mosqui-
tia, but she failed to give the prisoners a hearing before
a court of justice. Great Britain at once presented a
claim of 15,000 i)ounds sterling, and receiving no satisfac-
tory promise of payment from Managua, promptly sent a
war vessel to Corinto to enforce her demands. '

Ni(;aragua appealed to the United States. Mr. Gresham .

THE MONROE DOCTRINE -til

replied that Nicaragua must deal directly with Great
IJritain. In a telegram of April 2-4, to Mr. Bayard in Lon-
don, he said : " The President advises tiiat you say un-
officially and confidentially to Lord Kimberley, that while
disclaiming any right to interfere in pending settlement of
claim for pecuniary reparation, compliance with Nicara-
o-ua's request [extension of time for payment] would avoid
embarrassment to commerce of this and other countries,
and be very satisfactory to the LTnited States."

This, Lord Kimberley willingly granted, and the claim
was soon after settled.

Commenting upon this episode, the President in his an-
nual message the following December, said : '' While the
sovereignty and jurisdiction of Nicaragua was in no way
questioned by Great Britain, the former's arbitrary conduct
in regard to British subjects furnished the ground for this
proceeding [seizure of Corinto]."

The landing of an armed British force in Central America
provoked considerable commeut in the press throughout the
country concerning the duty and probable action of the
United States. The matter was closed, however, without
an official appeal to the doctrine.

XII. GREAT BRITAIN AND VI:NEZUELA

The latest application of the Monroe Doctrine by our
government was made in 18'.>o-*>H. In his third annual mes-
sage (December 2, 18U5), President Cleveland used the fol-lj
lowing words : —

It beiii},' a])j)arent that the Ijoiuidar}' dispute between Great
P.ritain and the Republic of Venezuela concerning the limits of
Jiritish (Juiana was approaching an acute stage, a definite state-
ment of the interest and policy of the United States as regards
the controversy seemed to be required both on its own account
and in view of its relations with the friendly powers directly con-
cerned. In July last, therefore, a desjjattrh was adflrcssed to our
Ambassador at London for coniiinmication to the British (Jovcrn-
ment in which the attitude of the United States was fully and

412 AMERICAN DIPLOMATIC QUESTIONS

distinctly set forth. The general conclusions therein reached
and formulated are in substance that the traditional and estal>-
lished policy of this government is firmly opposed to a forcible
increase by any European power of its territorial possessions on
this continent ; that this })olicy is as well founded in principle
as it is strongly supported by numerous precedents ; that as a
consequence the United States is bound to protest against the
enlargement of the area of British Guiana in derogation of the
rights and against the will of Venezuela ; that considering the dis-
parity in strength of Great Britain and Venezuela the territorial
dispute between them can be reasonably settled only by friendly
and impartial arbitration, and that the resort to such arbitration
should include the whole controversy. . . .

It had long been known in the United States tliat there
existed a boundary dispute between Great Britain and
Venezuela, but in view of the fact that many of the
boundary lines in South America were vaguely defined and
had for many years caused more or less irritation between
the South American republics, the settlement of this par-
ticular one was not considered important to American inter-
est. This was the case even regardless of the fact that one
of the contestants represented a European power. The dis-
pute between Great Britain and Venezuela originated in
conflicting Dutch and Spanish territorial claims in the
northeastern part of the South American continent, — Eng-
land being the successor of the Dutch in Guiana, while
Venezuela based her claims upon Spanish title. It be-
came apparent in 1840 that these early territorial claims
were in conflict. Unsuccessful attempts to define the lines
characterized half a century of correspondence between the
rival claimants. From time to time, as the territory in dis-
pute became better known to settlers, the quarrel broke
out anew, but as often to be abandoned on failure of an
understanding.

In 187G, Venezuela called the attention of the United
States to the alleged encroachments of British Guiana upon
her soil, hijang especial em[)hasis upon English advances in
the region lying about the mouth of the Orinoco Kiver.
From that time to. 1895, Venezuela upon several occasions

THE MONROE DOCTRINE 413

had urged the United States as the " oldest of the republics
of the new continent," and therefore the one called upon " to
lend the others its powerful moral support in disputes with
European nations," to intercede in its behalf. Without
exception, the replies from Washington expressed sj-mpathy
with Venezuela in her controversy. In some instances assur-
ances were given that if Great Britain were wrongfully seek-
ing to extend the lines of her Guiana colony, such action
would be regarded by the United States as an unjustifi-
able encroachment upon the Western Hemisphere, and
therefore a subject coming clearh" within the scope of the
Monroe Doctrine. Moved by these representations, Mr.
Frelingliuysen, in 1882, had offered to propose to Great
Britain a submission of the question to the arbitrament
<jf a third power, should Venezuela so request. In a
letter to Mr. Baker, American Minister resident at
Caracas (January 31, 1883), he outlined the attitude of the
United States — one of strict impartiality, but favorable to
the employment of good offices toward inclining Great
Britain to arbitrate. There was a word of caution to Mr.
Lowell, the American Minister in London (July 7, 1884), not
to commit the United States '• to any determinate political
solution" of the question, which at that time indicated
clearly the conservative attitude of tlie government. In
this letter Mr. Frelingliuysen stated tliat '• The moral posi-
tion of the United States in these matters [alleged foreign
encroachments in the Ameri(.'asj Avas well known through
the ciuuiciation of tin; Monroe Doctrine, Init formal action
in the direction of applying that doctrine to a s})eculative
case affecting Venezuela seemed to be inopportune, and I
could not advise Venezuela to arouse a discussion of the
point."'

\'enezuela readily accepted the arbitration proposals of
the United States, but not without some show of embar-
rassment. Should the United States use its good offices in
an endeavoi- t(j incline (ireat Bi'itain to submit the
matter to the arbitrament of a third power, the ('nite(l
States, therefore, as mediator in the case, Mould likelj' be

414 AMERICAN DIPLOMATIC QUESTIONS

debarred from acting in the capacity of umpire ; and the
United States alone was acceptable as an umpire to Vene-
zuela. On the other hand, while the United States was
perfectly willing to name an umpire, it could not do so
with propriety, unless a concurrent request came from both
parties to the dispute.

Further English advances near the mouth of the Orinoco
River in 1886 were viewed with alarm and dismay, and war
was almost precipitated by the despatch of a Venezuelan
gunboat to Barima Point with engineers and equipment ta
construct a lighthouse in that locality of disputed owner-
ship. At this same time a Venezuelan note was addressed
to the British authorities that should Great Britain object
to this assertion of sovereignty over Barima, diplomatic
relations between the two nations would instantl}^ cease.
Even at this critical juncture, public interest in the United
States was not greatly moved. Mr. Bayard, voicing his
friendly concern in the adjustment of the dispute, felt
warranted in tendering to the British Government the
good ofifices of the United States, in an endeavor ta
promote an amicable settlement of the respective claims,
with which the secretary coupled an offer to act as arbi-
trator, should such proposal prove acceptable to both coun-
tries. In a communication to Mr. Phelps, December 30,
1886, Mr. Bayard touched upon the responsibility of the
United States in relation to the South American republics,
in which he mentioned " the doctrine we announced two
generations ago " ; such responsibility he declared to be
entirely consistent and compatible with an "attitude of
friendly neutrality and entire impartiality." Me said fur-
ther : "It is not supposed for a moment that any idea of
political or territorial expansion of authority on the Ameri-
can continent can control Her Majesty's counsellors in any
action they may take in relation to Venezuela. . . . The
dispute with Venezuela is merely one of geographical limits
and title, not of attempted political jurisdiction."

With the clash of authority at Barima Point, Venezuela
assumed a more a<xsrressive attitude toward (ireat Ihitain.

THE MDNHOE DOCTRINE 415-

Her Minister in Washington constantly reminded Mr. Bayard
of the Monroe Doctrine. " The viohition of the territory
oi Venezuela," he urged, " has been gradually accomplished
bv means and under pretences which, in view of the ante-
cedents of the case, appear scarcely credible. The repre-
sentative of Great Britain at Caracas formally declared, in
1850, that the acquisition which has now been so tenaciously
insisted upon, was not even thought of. By this acquisition,
(ireat Britain gains possession of territories which she did
not formerly pretend to claim, and violates the stipulations
made with Venezuela in the convention signed at that time
through reliance on the sincerity of those declarations."

Great Britain declined to accept tiie friendly offices of the
United States, and the British Minister at Caracas secured
his passport preparatory to abandoning his diplomatic post.
English men-of-war a[)peared in the Orinoco and at La Guira,
and for the moment war seemed inevitable. Just at
this anxious moment of suspense the unfortunate bound-
ary dispute was more than ever complicated by the dis-
covery of gold in the interior district of Caratal, — a region
claimed by Venezuela, and now suddenly occupied by British
miners, who, with the usual independence of gold miners^
refused to recognize any sovereignty but their own. The
matter was still further aggravated by the firmer attitude
assumed toward Great Britain in Washington. Mr. Bayard
wrote to Mr. Phelps, February 17, 1888 : "The Government
of the United States has hitherto taken an earnest and
friendly interest in the question of Ijoundaries so long in
dis[)ute between Cireat Britain and Venezuela, and, so far
as its disinterested counsels were admissible, has advocated
an amicable, final, and lionorable settlement of the dispute.
We have followed this course on the assumi)tion that the
issue was one of liistorical fact, eminently adaptable for admit-
ting arbitration, and that the territorial claims of each party
had a fixed limit, the right to which would without ditlicnlty
be determined according to the evidence. Tlie claim now
stated to have been f)Ut fmlh l)y the authorities of British
Guiana necessarily gives rise to grave dis(piietudc, and creates

416 AMERICAN DIPLOMATIC QUESTIONS

an apprehension that the territorial claim does not follow
historical traditions or evidence, but is apparently indefi-
nite. ... It may be well for you to express anew to Lord
Salisbur}' the great gratification it would afford this govern-
ment to see the Venezuelan dispute amicably and honorably
settled, by arbitration or otherwise, and our readiness to do
anything we properly can to assist in that end."

In the spring of 1888 Congress called for the corre-
spondence relating to the Venezuelan controversy, and thus
the matter came more prominently before the country.
Although the subject was duly discussed by the press, even
then it did not occur to the people of the United States that
the question of a South American boundary could, to any
very great or serious extent, affect American interests.

From 1888 to December, 1895, amicable relations between
Venezuela and Great Britain were greatly disturbed,
although diplomatic intercourse was resumed in the form
of several special Venezuelan envoys to London, who labored
earnestly, though in vain, for a friendly adjustment of the
boundary difficulties. During this period of seven j^ears
British subjects continued to emigrate to the Caratal gold
district, where they founded numerous settlements, and so
far won the confidence of the native Indian tribes that the
latter were often willing to unite with them in forcibly resist-
ing Venezuelan authority. In the year 18'J5 the boundary
dispute had again reached a dangerous crisis, owing to
some hostile encounters, within the disputed area, between
British settlers and the Venezuelan police. Venezuela's
appeals to the United States for protection were so persistent
that President Cleveland was finally induced to step into
the arena. A somewhat vigorous correspondence took place
between Washington and London, the burden of the discus-
sion between Mr. Olney and Lord Salisbury being the apj)!!-
cability of the Monroe Doctrine to the case.

The annual message of the President (1895) was followed,
two weeks later (December 17), by a special message to Con-
gress, submitting tlie Olney-Salisbury letters, and furtlier
sustaining, in ;u'guni('nt;;livo foiin, the attitude- whicli the

THE MONROE DOCTRINE 417

administration had seen lit to take. Then, for the first time,
the whole tangled question came before the American people
as a matter of vital importance. For several months it was
the aljsorbing topic of the press. The journals bristled with
inflammatory editorials. England was roundly denounced
as a nation of robbers and the natural enemy of the United
States. The usually quiet antipathy to Great Britain,
which would seem to be an inherited American instinct,
suddenly came to the surface, and the people of the country
called for a prompt vindication of the Monroe Doctrine.
An intensity of bitter feeling against England Avas excited,
pointing ominously to armed conflict ; while the more con-
servative elements of the country stood amazed and alarmed
at the seriousness of the situation.

The position taken by Mr. Olney was substantially as
follows: If Great Britain were encroaching upon Venezuela,
as Venezuela alleged, by an unwarranted extension of her
Guiana boundary, such Britisli aggression constituted an
attempt to extend the sovereignty of a European power,
along with its S3stem of government, to a portion of the
American continent ; an act which clearly fell within the
interdiction of tlie Monroe Doctrine. The only way to
determine whether (ireat Britain was merely occupying
territory that rightfully belonged to her, or whether she
was seeking to extend her sovereignty, was by means of
a careful examination and comparison of the historical evi-
dences that supported the conflicting claims ; therefore the
United States must insist that the matter be submitted to a
tril)nnal of arbitration. Should such a tril)unal find that the
.Britisli claims to the disputed territory were just, the whole
matter wouhl fall outside tlie operation of the Monroe Doc-
trine, and the United States would hold her peace; but, on
the contrary, should such a tribunal lind that Great Britain
was seeking to ap]:)ropriate territory belonging of rigiit to
Venezuehi, then it would become the duty of the United
States, in the interest of her own safety, and in conformity
with a great })rin(iple, to oppose such an advance by every
means in her pcnvcr.

2 B

418 AMERICAN DIPLOMATIC QUESTIONS

The British position was, in substance, that the Monroe
Doctrine had no bearing upon tlie boundary dispute in South
America ; that that doctrine had been created to meet cer-
tain ends, and had long since fulfilled its purpose ; that the
interest and safety of the United States was in no manner
threatened ; and, therefore, the British-Venezuela quarrel
being no affair of the United States, the intervention of the
latter was wholly unwarranted.

The two letters of Secretary Olney and Lord Salisbury on
this subject are most important documents in the historical
development of the Monroe Doctrine, and free quotation
from them cannot well be avoided. Only those parts of the
letters relating to the merits of the territorial claims are
omitted.

Mr. Olney to Mr. Bayard.

No. 804.] Department of State,

Washington, July 20, 1895.

His Excellency Thomas F. Bayard,

Etc., etc., etc., London.

Sir: I am directed by the President to communicate to you his
views upon a subject to which he has given much anxious thought
and respecting which he has not reached a conclusion without
a lively sense of its great importance as well as of the serious
responsibility involved in any action now to be taken.

It is not proposed, and for present purposes is not necessary, to
enter into any detailed account of the controversy between Great
Britain and Venezuela respecting the western frontier of the
colony of British Guiana. The dispute is of ancient date and
began at least as early as the time when Great Britain acquired
liy tlie treaty wdth the Netherlands of 1814 " the establishments
of Demerara, Essequibo, and Berbice." From that time to the
])rosent the dividing line between these " establishments " (now
calkd P>ritish Guiana) and Venezuela has never ceased to be a
subject of contention. The claims of both parties, it must be
conceded, are of a somewhat indefinite nature. On the one hand
Venezuela, in every constitution of government since she became
an independent State, has declared her territorial limits to be
those of the Captaincy General of Venezuela in 1810. Yet, out
of *' moderation and prudence," it is said, she has contented her-

THE MONROE DOCTRINE 419

self with claiming the Essequibo line — the line of the Essequibo
Kiver, that is — to be the true boundary between Venezuela and
British Guiana. On the other hand, at least an equal degree of
indetiniteness distinguishes the claim of Great Britain. . . .

To the territorial controversy between Great Britain and the
Republic of Venezuela, thus briefly outlined, the United States
has not been and, indeed, in view of its traditional policy, could
not be indifferent. The note to the British Foreign Office by
which Venezuela opened negotiations in 1876 was at once com-
municated to this Government. In January, 1881, a letter of the
Venezuelan Minister at Washington, res])ecting certain alleged
demonstrations at the mouth of the Orinoco, was thus answered
by Mr. Evarts, then Secretary of State : . . .

Subsequent communications to Mr. Bayard direct him to ascer-
tain whether a ^Minister from Venezuela would be received by
(rreat Britain. In the annual Message to Congress of December
.')d last, the President used the following language:

" The boundary of British Guiana still remains in dispute between
Great Britain and Venezuela. Believing that its early settlement,
on some just basis alike honorable to both parties, is in the line
of our established policy to remove from this hemisphere all
causes of difference with powers beyond the sea, I shall renew
the efforts heretofore made to bring about a restoration of diplo-
matic relations between the disputants and to induce a reference
to arbitration, a resort which Great Britain so conspicuously
favors in ])rinciple and respects in practice and which is earnestly
sought by her weaker adversary."

And P^ebruary 22, 1895, a joint resolution of Congress declared

"That the President's suggestion . . . that Great Britain and

Venezuela refer their dispute as to boundaries to friendly ai'bitra-

tioii be earnestly recommended to the favorable consideration of

both i)arties in interest."

The important features of the existing situation, as shown by
the foregoing recital, may be briefly stated.

1. The title to territory of indefinite but confessedly very large
extent is in dispute between Great Britain on the one hand and
the South American Re])ul)lic of Venezuela on the other.

2. The disparity in tlie strength of the claimants is such that
Venezuela can hope to establish her claim only through peaceful
methods — through an agreement with her adversaiy either upon
the subject itself or upon an arbitration.

.'». The ('(jntrover.sy, with varying claims on the part of Great
Britain, lias exi.sted for more than half a century, during which

420 AMERICAN DIPLOMATIC QUESTIONS

period many earnest and persistent efforts of Venezuela to estab-
lish a boundary by agreement have proved unsuccessful.

4. The futility of the endeavor to obtain a conventional line
being recognized, Venezuela for a quarter of a century has asked
and striven for arbitration.

5. Great Britain, however, has always and continuously refused
to arbitrate, except upon the condition of a renunciation of a large
part of the Venezuelan claim and of a concession to herself of a
large share of the territory in controversy.

6. By the frequent interposition of its good offices at the
instance of Venezuela, by constantly urging and promoting the
restoration of diplomatic relations between the two coimtries, by
pressing for arbitration of the disputed boundary, by offering to
act as arbitrator, by expressing its grave concern whenever new
alleged instances of British aggression upon Venezuelan territory
have been brought to its notice, the Government of the United
States has made it clear to Great Britain and to the world that
the controversy is one in which both its honor and its interests
are involved and the continuance of which it cannot regard with
indifference.

The accuracy of the foregoing analysis of the existing status
cannot, it is believed, be challenged. It shows that status to be
such that those charged with the interests of the United States
are now forced to determine exactly what those interests are and
Avhat course of action they require. It compels them to decide
to what extent, if any, the United States may and should inter-
vene in a controversy between and primarily concerning only
Great Britain and Venezuela and to decide how far it is bound
to see that the integrity of Venezuelan territory is not impaired
by the pretensions of its powerful antagonist. Are any such right
and duty devolved upon the United States ? If not, the United
States has already done all, if not more than all, that a purely
sentimental interest in the affairs of the two countries justifies,
and to push its interpositicm further Avould be unbecoming and
undignified and might well subject it to the charge of impertinent
intermeddling with affairs with which it has no rightful concern.
On the other hand, if any such right and duty exist, their due
exercise and discharge will not permit of any acition tliat shall
not be efficient and that, if the power of the United States is ade-
cpiate, shall not result in the accomplishment of the end in view.
The question thus presented, as matter of i)rincii)le and regard
being had to the settled national i)olicy, does not seem difficult
of solution. Yet the momentous practi(%il conseipiences depend-
ent upon its determination require that it should be carefully con-

1

THE MONROE DOCTRINE 421

sidered and that the grounds of the conclusion ai-rived at should
be fully and frankly stated.

That there are circumstances under which a nation may justly
interpose in a controversy to which two or more other nations are
the direct and immediate parties is an admitted canon of inter-
national law. The doctrine is ordinarily expressed in terms of
the most general character and is perhaps incapable of more spe-
cific statement. It is declared in substance that a nation may
avail itself of this right whenever Avhat is done or proposed by
any of the parties primarily concerned is a serious and direct
menace to its own integrity, tranquillity, or welfare. The propri-
ety of the rule when applied in good faith will not be questioned
in any quarter. (.)n the other hand, it is an inevitable though
unfortunate consequence of the wide scope of the rule that it has
only too often been made a cloak for schemes of wanton spoliation
and aggrandizement. We are concerned at this time, however,
not so much with the general rule as with a form of it which is
]ieculiarly and distinctively American. Washington, in the sol-
emn admonitions of the Farewell Address, explicitly warned his
countrymen against entanglements with the politics or the con-
troversies of European powers.

" Europe has a set of primary interests which to us have none
or a very remote relation. Hence she must be engaged in fre-
quent controversies the causes of which are essentially foreign
to our concerns. Hence, therefore, it must be unwise in us
to implicate ourselves by artificial ties in the ordinary vicissi-
tudes of her politics or the ordinary combinations and collisions
of her friendships or enmities. Our detached and distant situa-
tion invites and enables us to pursue a different course."

During the administration of President ^Monroe this doctrine
of the Farewell Address was first considered in all its aspects
and with a view to all its practical consequences. The Farewell
Address, while it took America out of the field of European i)oli-
tics, was silent as to the part Europe might be permitted to play
in America. Doubtless it was thought the latest addition to the
family of nations should not make haste to prescribe rules for the
guidance of its older ineniV)ers, and the expediency and pro])riety
of serving the powers of Europe with notice of a complete and
distinctive American policy excluding them from interference
with American political affairs might well seem dubious to a
generation to wliom the French alliance, with its iiiaiiifi)ld advan-
tages to the cause of American independence, was fresh in mind.

422 AMERICAN DIPLOMATIC QUESTIONS

Twenty years later, however, the situation had changed. The
lately born nation had greatly increased in power and resources,
had demonstrated its strength on land and sea and as well in the
conflicts of arms as in the pursuits of peace, and had begun to
realize the commanding position on this continent which the char-
acter of its people, their free institutions, and their remoteness
from the chief scene of European contentions combined to give
to it. The Monroe administration therefore did not hesitate to
accept and apply the logic of the Farewell Address by declaring
in effect that American non-intervention in European affairs neces-
sarily implied and meant European non-intervention in American
affairs. Conceiving unquestionably that complete European non-
interference in American concerns would be cheaply purchased
"by complete American non-interference in European concerns,
President Monroe, in the celebrated Message of December 2, 1823,
used the following language : . . .

The Monroe administration, however, did not content itself
with formulating a correct rule for the regulation of the rela-
tions between Europe and America. It aimed at also securing
the practical benefits to result from the application of the rule.
Hence the message just quoted declared that the American conti-
nents were fully occupied and were not the subjects for future
colonization by European powers. To this spirit and this pur-
pose, also, are to be attributed the passages of the same message
which treat any infringement of the rule against interference in
American affairs on the part of the powers of Europe as an act
of unfriendliness to the United States. It was realized that it
was futile to lay down such a rule unless its observance could be
enforced. It was manifest that the United States was the only
power in this hemisphere capable of enforcing it. It was there-
fore courageously declared not merely that Europe ought not to
interfere in American affairs, but that any European power doing
so would be regarded as antagonizing the interests and inviting
the opposition of the United States.

That America is in no part open to colonization, though the
proposition was not universally admitted at the time of its first
enunciation, has long been universally conceded. We are now
concerned, therefore, only with that other practical application
of the Monroe doctrine the disregard of which by an European
power is to be deemed an act of unfriendliness towards the United
States. The precise scope and limitations of this rule cannot be
too clearly apprehended. It does not establish any general pro-
tectorate by the United States over other American states. It
does not relieve any American state from its obligations as fixed

THE MONROE DOCTRINE 423

by international law nor prevent any European power directly
interested from enforcing sucli obligations or from inflicting mer-
ited punishment for the breach of them. It does not contemplate
any interference in the internal affairs of any American state or
in the relations between it and other American states. It does
not justify any attempt on our part to change the established
form of government of any American state or to prevent the
people of such state from altering that form according to their
own will and pleasure. The rule in question has but a single
purpose and object. It is that no European power or combina-
tion of European powers shall forcibly deprive an American state
of the right and power of self-government and of shaping for
itself its own political fortunes and destinies.

That the rule thus defined has been the accepted public law
of this country ever since its promulgation cannot fairly be
denied. Its pronouncement by the Monroe administration at
that particular time was unquestionably due to the inspiration
of Great Britain, who at once gave to it an open and unqualified
adhesion which has never been withdrawn. But the rule was
decided upon and formulated by the Monroe administration as
a distinctively American doctrine of great import to the safety
and welfare of the United States after the most careful considera-
tion by a Cabinet which numbered among its members John Quincy
Adams, Calhoun, Crawford, and Wirt, and which before acting took
both Jefferson and Madison into its counsels. Its promulgation
was received with acclaim by the entire people of the country
irrespective of party. Three years after, Webster declared that
the doctrine involved the honor of the country. " I look upon
it,*' he said, " as part of its treasures of reputation, and for one
I intend to guard it," and he added,

" I look on the message of December, 1823, as forming a bright
page in our history. I will help neither to erase it nor to tear it
out; nor shall it be by any act of mine blurred or blotted. It did
honor to the sagacity of the Government, and I will not diminish
that honor."

Th(nigh the rule thus highly eulogized by Webster has never
been formally affirmed by Congress, the House in 18(54 declared
against the Mexican monarchy sought to be set up by the French
as not in accord with the policy of the United States, and in 1889
the Senate expressed its disapproval of the connection of any
Kuro])ean pf)wer with a canal across the Isthmus of Darien or
< 't'Utral America. It is manifest that, if a rule has been openly

424 AMERICAN DIPLOMATIC QUESTIONS

and uniformly declared and acted upon by the executive branch
of the Government for more than seventy years without express
repudiation by Congress, it must be conclusively presumed to
have its sanction. Yet it is certainly no more than the exact
truth to say that every administration since President Monroe's
has had occasion, and sometimes more occasions than one, to
examine and consider the Monroe doctrine and has in each
instance given it emphatic endorsement. Presidents have dwelt
upon it in messages to Congress and Secretaries of State have
time after time made it the theme of diplomatic representation.
Nor, if the practical results of the rule be sought for, is the
record either meagre or obscure. Its first and immediate effect
was indeed most momentous and far reaching. It was the con-
trolling factor in the emancipation of South America and to it the
independent states which now divide that region between them
are largely indebted for their very existence. Since then the most
striking single achievement to be credited to the rule is the evacu-
ation of jNIexico by the French upon the termination of the civil
war. But we are also indebted to it for the provisions of the
Clayton-Bulwer treaty, which both neutralized any interoceanic
canal across Central America and expressly excluded Great Brit-
ain from occupying or exercising any dominion over any part of
Central America. It has beeu used in the case of Cuba as if jus-
tifying the position that, while the sovereignty of Spain will be
respected, the island will not be permitted to become the posses-
sion of any other European power. It has been influential in
bringing about the definite relinquishment of any supposed pro-
tectorate l)y Great Britain over the Mosquito Coast.

President Polk, in the case of Yucatan and the proposed volun-
tary transfer of that country to Great Britain or Spain, relied
upon the Monroe doctrine, though perhaps erroneously, when he
declared in a special message to Congress on the subject that the
United States could not consent to any such transfer. Yet, in
somewhat the same spirit. Secretary Fish affirmed in 1870 that
President Grant had but followed "the teachings of all our his-
tory " in declaring in his annual message of that year that exist-
ing dependencies were no longer regarded as subject to transfer
from one European power to another, and that when the present
relation of colonies ceases they are to become independent powers.
Another development of the rule, though apparently not neces-
sarily required by either its letter or its spirit, is found in the
objection to arbitration of South American controversies by an
European power. American questions, it is said, are for Ameri-
can decision, and on that ground the United States went so far as

THE MONROE DOCTRINE 425

to refuse to mediate in the war between Chili and Peru jointly
with Great Britain and France. Finally, on the ground, among
others, that the authority of the jVIonroe doctrine and the prestige
of the United States as its exponent and sponsor would be seri-
ously impaired, Secretary Bayard strenuously resisted the enforce-
ment of the Pelletier claim against Hayti.

"The United States, [he said,] has proclaimed herself the pro-
tector of this western world, in which she is by far the stronger
power, from the intrusion of European sovereignties. She can
point with proud satisfaction to the fact that over and over again
has she declared effectively, that serious indeed would be the
consequences if European hostile foot should, without just cause,
tread those states in the New World which have emancipated
themselves from European control. She has announced that she
would cherish as it becomes her the territorial rights of the feeblest
of those states, regarding them not merely as in the eye of the
law equal to even the greatest of nationalities, but in view of her
distinctive policy as entitled to be regarded by her as the objects
of a peculiarly gracious care. I feel bound to say that if we
should sanction by reprisals in Hayti the ruthless invasion of her
territory and insult to her sovereignty which the facts now before
us disclose, if we approve by solemn Executive action and Con-
gressional assent that invasion, it will be difficult for us hereafter
to assert that in the New World, of whose rights we are the
peculiar guardians, these rights have never been invaded by
ourselves."

The foregoing enumeration not only shows the many instances
wherein the rule in question has been affirmed and applied, but
also demonstrates that the Venezuelan boundary controversy is in
any view far within the scope and spirit of the rule as uniformly
accepted and acted upon. A doctrine of American public law thus
long and firmly established and supported could not easily be
ignf)red in a jiroper case for its application, even were the con-
siderations upon which it is fouiuled obscure or questionable. No
such objection can be made, however, to the Monroe doctrine
understood and defined in tin; manner already stated. It rests,
on the contrary, upon facts and principles that are both intelligible
and incontrovertil)le. That distance and three thousand miles of
intervening ocean make any permanent political union between
an European and an American state unnatural and inexpedient
will hardly be denied. But physical and geographical considera-
tions are the least of the objections to such a union. Europe, as
Washington observed, has a set of primary interests which are

426 AMERICAN DIPLOMATIC QUESTIONS

peculiar to herself. America is not interested in them and ought
not to be vexed or complicated with them. Each great European
power, tor instance, to-day maintains enormous armies and fleets
in self-defence and for protection against any other European
power or powei's. What have the states of America to do with
that condition of things, or why should they be impoverished by
wars or preparations for wars with whose causes or results they
can have no direct concern? If all Europe were to suddenly fly
to arms over the fate of Turkey, would it not be preposterous that
any American state should find itself inextricably involved in the
miseries and burdens of the contest? If it were, it would prove
to be a partnership m the cost and losses of the struggle but not
in any ensuing benefits.

What is true of the material, is no less true of what may be
termed the moral interests involved. Those pertaining to Europe
are peculiar to her and are entirely diverse from those pertaining
and peculiar to America. Europe as a whole is monarchical, and,
with the single important exception of the Republic of France, is
committed to the monarchical principle. America, on the other
hand, is devoted to the exactly opposite principle — to the idea
that every people has an inalienable right of self-government —
and, in the United States of America, has furnished to the world
the most conspicuous and conclusive example and proof of the
excellence of free institutions, whether from the standpoint of
national greatness or of individual happiness. It cannot be
necessary, however, to enlarge upon this phase of the subject —
whether moral or material interests be considered, it cannot but
be universally conceded that those of Europe are irreconcilably
diverse from those of America, and that any European control of
the latter is necessarily both incongruous and injurious. If, how-
ever, for the reasons stated the forcible intrusion of European
powers into American politics is to be deprecated — if, as it is
to be deprecated, it should be resisted and prevented — such
resistance and prevention must come from the United States.
They would come from it, of course, were it made the point of
attack. But, if they come at all, they must also come from it
when any other American state is attacked, since only the United
States has the strength adequate to the exigency.

Is it true, then, that the safety and welfare of the United States
are so concerned with the maintenance of the independence of
every American state as against any European power as to justify
and require the interposition of the United States whenever that
independence is endangered? The question can be candidly
answered m but one way. The states of Americt^ South as well

THE MONROE DOCTRINE 427

as North, by geographical proximity, by natural sympathy, by
similarity of goveriiinental constitutions, are friends and allies,
commercially and politically, of the United States. To allow the
subjugation of any of them by an European power is, of course, to
completely reverse that situation and signifies the loss of all the
advantages incident to their natural relations to us. But that is
not all. The people of the United States have a vital interest in
the cause of popular self-government. They have secured the
right for themselves and their posterity at the cost of infinite
blood and treasure. They have realized and exemplified its
beneficent operation by a career unexampled in point of national
greatness or individual felicity. They believe it to be for the
healing of all nations, and that civilization must either advance
or retrograde accordingly as its supremacy is extended or cur-
tailed. Imbued with these sentiments, the people of the United
States might not impossibly be wrought up to an active propa-
ganda in favor of a cause so highly valued both for themselves
and for mankind. But the age of the Crusades has passed, and
they are content with such assertion and defence of the right of
popular self-government as their own security and welfare de-
mand. It is in that view more than in any other that they believe
it not to be tolerated that the political control of an American
state shall be forcibly assumed by an European power.

The mischiefs apprehended from such a source are none the
less real because not immediately imminent in any specific case,
and are none the less to be guarded against because the combina-
tion of circumstances that will bring them upon us cannot be pre-
dicted. The civilized states of Christendom deal with eaxdi other
on substantially the same principles that regulate the conduct of
individuals. The greater its enlightenment, the more surely
every state perceives that its permanent interests require it to bo
governed by the immutable principles of right and justice. K;u-h,
nevertheless, is only too lial)le to succumb to the temptations
offered by seeming special opi)ortunities for its own aggrandize-
ment, and each would rashly imperil its own safely were it not to
remember that for the regard and respect of other states it must
be largely dependent upon its own strength and power. To-day
the United States is practically sovereign on this continent, and
its fiat is law upon the subjects to which it confines its interpo-
sition. Why? It is not because of the pure friendship or good
will felt for it. It is not simply by reason of its high character
as a civilized state, nor because wisdom and justice and equity are
the invariable characteristics of the dealings of the United States.
It is because, in addition to all other grounds, its infinite resources

428 AMERICAN DIPLOMATIC QUESTIONS

combined with its isolated position render it master of the situa-
tion and practically invulnerable as against any or all other
powers.

All the advantages of this superiority are at once imperilled if
the principle be admitted that European powers may convert
American states into colonies or provinces of their own. The
principle would be eagerly availed of, and every power doing so
would immediately acquire a base of military operations against
us. What one power was permitted to do could not be denied
to another, and it is not inconceivable that the struggle now going
on for the acquisition of Africa might be transferred to South
America. If it were, the weaker countries would unquestionably
be soon absorbed, while the ultimate result might be the partition
of all South America between the various European powers. The
disastrous consequences to the United States of such a condition
of things are obvious. The loss of prestige, of authority, and of
weight in the councils of the family of nations, would be among
the least of them. Our only real rivals in peace as well as ene-
mies m war would be found located at our very doors. Thus far
m our history we have been spared the burdens and evils of
immense standing armies and all the other accessories of huge
warlike establishments, and the exemption has largely contributed
to our national greatness and wealth as well as to the happiness
of every citizen. Ikit, with the powers of Europe permanently
encamped on American soil, the ideal conditions we have thus far
enjoyed cannot be expected to continue. We too must be armed
to the teeth, we too must convert the flower of our male population
into soldiers and sailors, and by withdrawing them from the vari-
ous pursuits of peaceful industry we too must practically annihilate
a large share of the productive energy of the nation.

How a greater calamity than this could overtake us it is difficult
to see. Nor are our just apprehensions to be allayed by sugges-
tions of the friendliness of European powers — of their good will
towards us — of their disposition, should they be our neighbors,
to dwell with us in peace and harmony. The people of the United
States have learned in the school of experience to what extent the
relations of states to each other depend not upon sentiment nor
principle, but upon selfish interest. They will not soon forget
that, in their hour of distress, all their anxieties and burdens
were aggravated by the possibility of demonstrations against
their national life on the |)art of powers with whom they had
long maintained the most harmonious relations. They have yet
in mind that France seized upon the api)arent oiiportunity of our
civil war to set up a monarchy in the adjoining state of Mexico.

THE MONROE DOCTRINE 429

They realize that had France and Gi*eat Britain held important
South American possessions to work from and to benefit, the
temptation to destroy the predominance of the Great Republic in
this hemisphere by furthering its dismemberment might have
been irresistible. From that grave peril they have been saved in
the past and may be saved again in the future through the opera-
tion of the sure but silent force of the doctrine proclaimed by
President Monroe. To abandon it, on the other hand, disregard-
ing both the logic of the situation and the facts of our past expe-
rience, would be to renounce a policy which has proved both an
■easy defence against foreign aggression and a prolific source of
internal progress and prosperity.

There is, then, a doctrine of American public law, well founded
in principle and abundantly sanctioned by precedent, which
•entitles and requires the United States to treat as an injury to
itself the forcible assumption by an European power of political
control over an American state. The application of the doctrine
to the boundary dispute between Great Britain and Venezuela
remains to be made and presents no real difficulty. Though the
dispute relates to a boundary line, yet, as it is between states, it
necessarily imi)orts political control to be lost by one party and
gained by the other. The political control at stake, too, is of no
mean importance, but concerns a domain of great extent — the
British claim, it will be remembered, apparently expanded in two
years some -"^UjOOO square miles — and, if it also directly involves
the command of the mouth of the Orinoco, is of immense conse-
quence in connection with the whole river navigation of the
interior of South America. It has been intimated, indeed, that
in respect of these South American possessions Great Britain is
herself an American state like any other, so that a controversy
between her and Venezuela is to be settled between themselves
as if it were between Venezuela and Brazil or between Venezuela
and Colombia, and does not call for or justify United States
intervention. If this view be tenable at all, the logical sequence
is plain.

Great Britain as a South American state is to be entirely differ-
entiated from (ireat Britain generally, and if the boundary ques-
tion cannot be settled otherwise than by force, British Guiana,
Avith her own independent resources and not those of the British
Empire, should be left to settle the matter with Venezuela — an
arrangement which very possibly Venezuela might not object to.
Jiiit the proposition that an European ]X)wer with an American
<lependency is for the jnirposes of the Monroe doctrine to be
I'lassed not as an I^uiopt'iiii l)ut as an American state will not

430 AMERICAN DIPLOMATIC QUESTIONS

admit of serious discussion. If it were to be adopted, the Monroe
doctrine would be too valueless to be worth asserting. Not only
would every European power now having a South American
colony be enabled to extend its possessions on this continent
indefinitely, but any other European power might also do the
same by first taking pains to procure a fraction of South American
soil by voluntary cession.

The declaration of the Monroe message — that existing colonies.
or dependencies of an European power would not be interfered
with by the United States — means colonies or dependencies then
existing, with their limits as then existing. So it has been inva-
riably construed, and so it must continue to be construed unless it
is to be deprived of all vital force. Great Britain cannot be
deemed a South American state within the purview of the Monroe-
doctrine, nor, if she is appropriating Venezuelan territory, is it
material that she does so by advancing the frontier of an old
colony instead of by the planting of a new colony. The differ-
ence is matter of form and not of substance and the doctrine if
pertinent in the one case must be in the other also. It is not
admitted, however, and therefore cannot be assumed, that Great
Britain is in fact usurping dominion over Venezuelan territory.
While Venezuela charges such usurpation, Great Britain denies
it, and the United States, until the merits are authoritatively
ascertained, can take sides with neither. But while this is so —
while the United States may not, under existing circumstances
at least, take upon itself to say which of the two parties is right
and which wrong — it is certainly within its right to demand that
the truth shall be ascertained. Being entitled to resent and resist
any sequestration of Venezuelan soil by Great Britain, it is neces-
sarily entitled to know whether such sequestration has occurred
or is now going on. Otherwise, if the United States is without
the right to know and have it determined whether there is or is
not British aggression u])on Venezuelan territory, its right to pro-
test against or repel such aggression may be dismissed from
consideration.

The right to act u])on a fact the existence of which there is no
right to have ascertained is simply illusory. It being clear,
therefore, that the United States may legitimately insist upon
the merits of the boundary question being determined, it is
equally clear that there is but one feasible mode of determining
them, viz., peaceful arbitration. The impracticability of any
conventional adjustment has been often and thoroughly demon-
strated. Even more impossible of consideration is an ;q)])eal to
arms — a mode of settling national pretensions unhappily not yet

THE MONROE DOCTRINE 431

wholly obsolete. If, however, it were not condemnable as a relic
of barbarism and a crime in itself, so one-sided a contest could
not be invited nor even accepted by Great Britain without dis-
tinct disparagement to her character as a civilized state. Great
Britain, however, assumes no such attitude. On the contrary,
she both admits that there is a controversy and that arbitration
should be resorted to for its adjustment. But, while up to that
point her attitude leaves nothing to be desired, its practical effect
is completely nullified by her insistence that the submission shall
cover but a part of the controversy — that, as a condition of arbi-
trating her right to a part of the disputed territory, the remainder
shall be turned over to her. If it were possible to point to a
boundary which both parties had ever agreed or assumed to be
such either expressly or tacitly, the demand that territory con-
ceded by such line to British Guiana should be held not to be in
dispute might rest upon a reasonable basis. But there is no such
line. The territory which Great Britain insists shall be ceded to
lier as a condition of arbitrating her claim to other territory has
never been admitted to belong to her. It has always and con-
sistently been claimed by Venezuela.

Upon what principle — except her feebleness as a nation — is
she to be denied the right of having the claim heard and passed
upon by an impartial tribunal? No reason nor shadow of reason
apijears in all the voluminous literature of the subject. " It is to
be so because I will it to be so" seems to be the only justification
Great Britain offers. It is, indeed, intimated that the British
claim to this particular territory rests upon an occupation, which,
whether acquiesced in or not, has ripened into a perfect title by
long continuance. But what prescription affecting territorial
rights can be said to exist as between sovereign states? Or, if
tliere is any, what is the legitimate consequence? It is not that
all arbitration should be denied, but only that the submission
should embrace an additional topic, namely, the validity of the
asserted prescriptive title either in ])oint of law or in point of
fact. No different result follows from the contention that as
matter of principle (ireat Britain cannot be asked to submit and
ought not to submit to arbitration her political and sovereign
rights over territory. This contention, if applied to the whole
or to a vital ])art of the possessions of a sovereign state, need not
be controverted. To hold f)therwiso miglit he equiv^alent to hold-
ing that a sovereign state was bound to arbitrate its very existence.

But Great Britain has herself shown in various instances that
the principle has no pertinency when cither the interests or the
territorial area involved are not of controlling magnitude and her

432 AMERICAN DIPLOMATIC QUESTIONS ]l

loss of them as the result of an arbitration cannot appreciably
affect her honor or her power. Thus, she has arbitrated the
extent of her colonial possessions twice with the United States,
twice with Portugal, and once with Germany, and perhaps in
other instances. The Xorthwest Water Boundary arbitration of
1872 between her and this country is an example in point and
well illustrates both the effect to be given to long-continued use
and enjoyment and the fact that a truly great power sacrifices
neither prestige nor dignity by reconsidering the most emphatic
rejection of a proposition when satisfied of the obvious and intrin-
sic justice of the case. By the award of the Emperor of Ger-
many, the arbitrator in that case, the United States acquired San
Juan and a number of smaller islands near the coast of Van-
couver as a consequence of the decision that the term " the chan-
nel which separates the continent from Vancouver's Island," as
used in the treaty of Washington of 1846, meant the Haro chan-
nel and not the Rosario channel. Yet a leading contention of
Great Britain before the arbitrator was that equity required a
judgment in her favor because a decision in favor of the United
States would deprive r>ritish subjects of rights of navigation of
which they had had the habitual enjoyment from the time when
the Rosario Strait was first explored and surveyed in 1798. So,
though by virtue of the award the United States acquired San
Juan and the other islands of the group to which it belongs, the
British Foreign Secretary had in 1859 instructed the British
Minister at Washington as follows :

" Her Majesty's Government must, therefore, iiiider any circum-
stances, maintain the right of the British Crown to the Island of
San Juan. The interests at stake in connection with the reten-
tion of that Island are too important to admit of compromise and
Your Lordship will consequently bear in mind that, whatever
arrangenaent as to the boundary line is finally arrived at, no set-
tlement of the question will be accepted by Her Majesty's Gov-
ernment which does not provide for the Island of San Juan being
reserved to the British Crown."

Thus, as already intimated, the British demand that her right
to a portion of the disputed territory shall be acknowledged be-
fore she will consent to an arbitration as to the rest seems to
stand upon nothing but her own ipse dixit. She says to Vene-
zuela, in substance : " Yo\i can get none of the debatable land
by force, because you are not strong enough ; you can get none
by treaty, because I will not agree ; and you can take your chance ,
of getting a portion by arbitration, only if you first agree to abau-

THE MONROE DOCTRINE 433

don to me such other portion as I may designate." It is not
perceived how such an attitude can be defended nor how it is
reconcilable with that love of justice and fair play so eminently
characteristic of the English race. It in effect deprives Venezuela
of her free agency and puts her under virtual duress. Territory
acquired by reason of it will be as much wrested from her by the
strong hand as if occupied by British troops or covered by British
fleets. It seems therefore quite impossible that this position of
Great Britain should be assented to by the United States, or that,
if such position be adhered to with the result of enlarging the
bounds of British Guiana, it shoukl not be regarded as amounting,
in substance, to an invasion and conquest of Venezuelan territory.

In these circumstances, the duty of the President appears to
him unmistakable and imperative. Great Britain's assertion of
title to the disputed territory combined with her refusal to have
that title investigated being a substantial appropriation of the
territory to her own use, not to protest and give warning that the
transaction will be regarded as injurious to the interests of
the people of the United States as well as oppressive in itself
would be to ignore an established policy with which the honor
and welfare of this country are closely identified. While the
measures necessary or proper for the vindication of that policy
are to be determined by another branch of the Government, it is
clearly for the Executive to leave nothing undone which may
tend to render such determination unnecessary.

You are instructed, therefore, to present the foregoing views
to Lord Salisbury by reading to him this communication (leaving
with him a copy should he so desire), and to reinforce them by
such pertinent considerations as will doubtless occur to you.
They call for a definite decision upon the point whether Great
Britain will consent or will decline to submit the Venezuelan
boundary question in its entirety to impartial arbitration. It is
the earnest hope of the President that the conclusion will be on
the side of arbitration, and that Great Britain will add one more
to the conspicuous precedents she has already furnished in favor
of that Avise and just mode of adjusting international disputes.
If he is to be disappointed in that hope, however — a result not to
be antici|)ated and in his judgment calculated to greatly embarrass
tlie future relations between this country and Great Britain — it
is his wish to be made acquainted with the fact at such early date
as will enable him to lay the wliole subject before Congress in
his next annual message.

I am, sir, your obedient servant,

KiciiAKD Olnkv.
2f

!

434 AMERICAN DIPLOMATIC QUESTIONS

Lord Salisbury to Sir Julian Pauncefote.

No. 189.] FoRKiGN Office,

November 26, 1895.

Sir, On the 7th August I transmitted to Lord Gough a copy
of the despatch from Mr. Ohiey which Mr. Bayard had left with
me that day, and of which he had read portions to me. I in-
formed him at the time that it coukl not be answered until it had
been carefully considered by the Law Officers of the Crown. I
have therefore deferred replying to it till after the recess.

I will not now deal with those portions of it which are con-
cerned exclusively with the controversy that has for some time
past existed between the Republic of Venezuela and Her Majesty's
Government in regard to the boundary which separates their do-
minions. I take a very different view from Mr. Olney of various
matters upon which he touches in that part of the despatch ; but
I will defer for the present all observation upon it, as it concerns
matters which are not in themselves of first-rate importance, and
do not directly concern the relations between Great Britain and
the United States.

The latter part however of the despatch, turning from the
question of the frontiers of Venezuela, proceeds to deal with prin-
ciples of a far wider character, and to advance doctrines of inter-
national law which are of considerable interest to all the nation.^
whose dominions include any portion of the western hemisphere.

The contentions set forth by Mr. Olney in this part of his
despatch are represented by him as being an application of the
political maxims which are well known in American discussion
under the name of the Monroe doctrine. As far as I am aware,
this doctrine has never been before advanced on behalf of the
United States in any written communication addressed to the
Government of another nation; but it has been generally adopted
and assumed as true by many eminent Avriters and politicians in
the United States. It is said to have largely influenced the Gov-
ernment of that country in the conduct of its foreign affairs :
though Mr. Clayton, who was Secretary of State under President
Taylor, expressly stated that that Administration had in no way
adopted it. But during the period that has elapsed since the
Message of President Monroe was delivered in 1823, the doctrine
has undergone a very notable development, and the aspect which
it now presents in the hands of Mr. Olney differs widely from its
character when it first issued from the pen of its author. The
two propositions which in effect President Monroe laid down

THE MONROE DOCTRINE 435

were, first, that America was no longer to be looked upon as a
field for European colonization ; and, secondly, that Europe must
not attempt to extend its political system to America, or to con-
trol the political condition of any of the American communities
who had recently declared their independence.

The dangers against which President Monroe thought it right
to guard were not as imaginary as they would seem at the present
day. The formation of the Holy Alliance; the Congresses of
Laybach and Verona; the invasion of Spain by France for the
purpose of forcing u})on the Spanish people a form of government
which seemed likely to disappear, unless it was sustained by
external aid, were incidents fresh in the mind of President Mon-
roe when he penned his celebrated Message. The system of
which he speaks, and of which he so resolutely deprecates the
application to the American Continent, was the system then
adopted by certain powerful States upon the Continent of Europe
of combining to px-event by force of arms the adoption in other
countries of political institutions which they disliked, and to
uphold by external pressure those which they approved. Various
portions of South America had recently declared their indepen-
dence, and that independence had not been recognized by the
Governments of Spain and Portugal, to which, with small excep-
tion, the whole of Central and South America were nominally
subject. It was not an imaginary danger that he foresaw, if he
feared that the same spirit which had dictated the French expe-
dition into Spain might inspire the more powerful Governments of
Europe with the idea of imposing, by the force of European arms,
upon the South American communities the form of government
and the i)olitical connection which they had thrown off. In
declaring that the United States would resist any such enterprise
if it was contemplated, President Monroe ado})ted a policy which
received the entire sympathy of the English Governnnmt of that
date.

The dangers which were apprehended by President Monroe
have no relation to the state of things in which we live at the
present day. There is no danger of any Holy Alliance imposing
Its system upon any portion of the American Continent, and there
IS no danger of any European State treating any part of the
American Continent as a fit object for European colonization. It
IS intelligible that Mr. Olney should invoke, in defence of the
views on which he is now insisting, an authority wh.ich enjoys so
high a popularity with his own fellow-countrymen. ISut the cii-
cumstances with which President Monroe was dealing, and those
to which the present American Government is addressing itsfU,

436 AMERICAN DIPLOMATIC QUESTIONS

have very few features in common. Great Britain is imposing
no " system " upon Venezuela, and is not concerning herself in
any way with the nature of the political institutions under
which the Venezuelans may prefer to live. But the British
Empire and the Republic of Venezuela are neighbours, and they
have differed for some time past, and continue to differ, as to the
line by which their dominions are separated. It is a controversy
with which the United States have no apparent practical concern.
It IS difficult, indeed, to see how it can materially affect any State
or community outside those [jrimarily interested, except perhaps
other parts of Her ^Majesty's dominions, such as Trinidad. The
disputed frontier of Venezuela lias nothing to do with any of
the questions dealt with by President Monroe. It is not a ques-
tion of the colonization by a Euro})ean Power of any portion of
America. It is not a question of the imposition upon the com-
munities of South America of any system of government
devised in Europe. It is simply the determination of the frontier
of a British possession which belonged to the Throne of England
long before the Republic of Venezuela came into existence. But
even if the interests of Venezuela were so far linked to those of
the United States as to give to the latter a locns stcuuU in this
controversy, their Government apparently have not formed, and
certainly do not express, any opinion upon the actual merits of
the dispute. The Government of the United States do not say
that Great Britain, or that Venezuela, is in the right in the mat-
ters that are in issue. But they lay down that the doctrine of
President Monroe, when he opposed the imposition of European
systems, or the renewal of European colonization, confers upon
them the right of demanding that when a European Power
has a frontier difference with a South American community,
the European Power shall consent to refer that controversy to
arbitration ; and Mr. Olney states that unless Her Majesty's
Government accede to this demand, it will " greatly embarrass
the future relations between Great Britain and the United
States."

Whatever may be the authority of the doctrine laid down by
President Monroe, there is nothing in his language to show that
he ever thought of claiming this novel prerogative for the United
States. It is admitted that he did not seek to assert a Protector-
ate over Mexico, or the States of Central and South America. Such
a claim would liave imposed upon the United States the duty of
answering for the conduct of these States, and consequently the
responsibility of controlling it. His sagacious foresight would
have led him energetically to deprecate the addition of so serious

I

THE MONROE DOCTRINE * 43T

a burden to those which the Ilulevs of the United States have to
bear. It follows of necessitj^ that if the Government of the
United States will not control the conduct of these communities,
neither can it undertake to protect them from the consequences
attaching to any misconduct of which they may be guilty towards
other nations. If they violate in any way the rights of another
State, or of its subjects, it is not alleged that the Monroe doctrine
will assure them the assistance of the United States in escaping-
from any reparation which they may be bound by international
law to give. Mr. Olney expressly disclaims such an inference
from the principles he lays down.

But the claim which he founds upon them is that, if any inde-
pendent American State advances a demand for territory of
which its neighbour claims to be the owner, and that neighbour is
the colony of a European State, the United States have a right to
insist that the European State shall submit the demand, and its
own impugned rights to arbitration.

I will not now enter into a discussion of the merits of this method
of terminating international differences. It has proved itself val-
uable in many cases ; but it is not free from defects, which often
operate as a serious drawback on its value. It is not always easy
to find an Arbitrator who is competent, and who, at the same
time, is wholly free from bias ; and the task of insuring compli-
ance with the Award when it is made is not exempt from diffi-
culty. It is a mode of settlement of which the value varies
much according to the nature of the controversy to which it is
applied, and the character of the litigants who appeal to it.
Whether, in any particular case, it is a suitable method of proced-
ure is generally a delicate and difficult question. The only parties
who are competent to decide that question are the two parties
whose rival contentions are in issue. The claim of a third nation,
which is unaffected by the controversy, to impose this particular
procedure on either of the two others, cannot be reasonably justi-
fied, and has no foundation in the law of nations.

In the remarks which I have made, I have argued on the
theory that the Monroe doctrine in itself is sound. I must not,
however, be understood as expressing any acce[)tance of it on the
part of Her Majesty's Government. It must always be mentioned
with respect, on account of the distinguished statesman to wlinm
it is due, and the great nation who have generally adopted it.
I^ut international law is founded on the genei-al consent of
nations; and no statesman, however eminent, and no nation, how-
ever powerful, are competent to insert into the code of interna-
tional law a novel principle which was never recognized before,.

438 AMERICAN DIPLOMATIC QUESTIONS

and wliich has not since been accepted by the Government of any
other country. The United States have a right, like any other
nation, to interpose in any controversy by which their own inter-
ests are affected ; and they are the judge whether those interests
are touched, and in what measure they should be sustained. But
their rights are in no way strengthened or extended by the fact
that the controversy affects some territory which is called Ameri-
can. Mr. Olney quotes the case of the recent Chilean war, in
which the United States declined to join with France and England
in an effort to bring hostilities to a close, on account of the Mon-
roe doctrine. The United States were entirely in their right in
declining to join in an attempt at pacification if they thought fit ;
but Mr. Olney's principle that " American questions are for
American decision," even if it receive any countenance from the
language of President Monroe (which it does not), cannot be sus-
tained by any reasoning drawn from the law of nations.

The Government of the United States is not entitled to affirm
as a universal proposition, with reference to a number of inde-
pendent States for whose conduct it assumes no responsibility,
that its interests are necessarily concerned in whatever may befall
those States simply because the}' are situated in the Western
Hemisphere. It may well be that the interests of the United
States are affected by something that happens to Chile or to Peru,
and that that circumstance may give them the right of interfer-
ence ; but such a contingency may equally happen in the case of
China or Japan, and the right of interference is not more exten-
sive or more assured in the one case than in the other.

Though the language of President Monroe is directed to the
attainment of objects which most Englishmen would agree to be
salutary, it is impossible to admit that they have been inscribed
by any adequate authority in the code of international law ; and
the danger which such admission would involve is sufficiently ex-
hibited both by the strange development which the doctrine has
received at Mr. Olney's hands, and the arguments by which it is
supported, in the despatch under reply. In defence of it he
says:

That distance and 3,000 miles of intervening ocean mol'e any
permanent political union between a European and an American
State nnnatural and inexpedient will hardly be denied. But phys-
ical and geographical considerations are the least of the objections
to such a union. Europe has a set of primary interests which are
peculiar to herself; America is not interested in them, and ought
not to be vexed or complicated with them.

THE MONROE DOCTRINE 439

And again :

Thus far in our history we have been spared the burdens and
evils of immense standing armies and all the other accessories of
huge warlike establishments; and the exemption has highly con-
tributed to our national greatness and wealth, as well as to the
happiness of every citizen. But v:itli the Poicers of Eitrope jier-
inanently encam}')ecl on American soil, the ideal conditions we have
thus far enjoyed cannot be expected to continue.

The necessary meaning of these words is that the union be-
tween Great Britain and Canada; between Great Britain and
Jamaica and Trinidad ; between Great Britain and British Hon-
duras or British Guiana are " inexpedient and unnatural."
President Monroe disclaims any such inference from his doctrine;
but in this, as in other respects, Mr. Olney develops it. . He lays
down that the inexpedient and unnatural character of the union
between a European and American State is so obvious that it
"will hardly be denied." Her Majesty's Government are pre-
pared emphatically to deny it on behalf of both the British and
American people who are subject to her Crown. They maintain
that the union between Great Britain and her territories in the
Western Hemisphere is both natural and expedient. They fully
concur with the view which President Monroe apparently enter-
tained, that any disturbance of the existing territorial distribution
in that hemisphere by any fresh acquisitions on the part of any
European State would be a highly inexpedient change. But they
are not prepared to admit that the recognition of that expediency
is clothed with the sanction which belongs to a doctrine of inter-
national law. They are not prepared to admit that the interests
of the United States are necessarily concerned in every frontier
dispute which may arise between any two of the States who pos-
sess dominion in the Western Hemisphere ; and still less can they
accept the doctrine that the United States are entitled to claim
that the process of arbitration shall be applied to any demand for
the surrender of territory whicli one of those States may make
against another.

1 have commented in the above remarks only upon the general
aspect of Mr. Olney's doctrines, apart from the special considera-
tions which attach to the controversy between the United King-
<h)m and Venezuela in its present phase. This controversy has
luidoubtedly been nuide more difficult l)y the inconsiderate action
of tiie Vene/.uelan Government in breaking off relations with Her
Majesty's Government, and its settlement has been correspond-
ingly delayed; but Her Majesty's Government have not surreu-

440 AMERICAN DIPLOMATIC QUESTIONS

dered the hope that it will be adjusted by a reasonable arrangement
at an early date.

I request that you will read the substance of the above despatch
to Mr. Olney, and leave him a copy if he desires it.

S.

President Cleveland in submitting the above correspond-
ence to Congress concluded his message as follows : —

Without attempting extended argument in reply to these
positions, it may not be amiss to suggest that the doctrine ujion
which we stand is strong and sound because its enforcement is
important to our peace and safety as a nation, and is essential to
the integrity of our free institutions and the tranquil maintenance
of our distinctive form of government. It was intended to apply
to every stage of our national life, and cannot become obsolete
while our Republic endures. . . .

In the belief that the doctrine for which we contend was clear
and definite, that it was founded upon substantial considerations
and involved our safety and welfare, that it was fully applicable
to our present conditions and to the state of the world's progress,
and that it was directly related to the pending controversy and
without any conviction as to the final merits of the dispute, but
anxious to learn in a satisfactory and conclusive manner whether
Great Britain sought, under a claim of boundary, to extend her
possessions on this continent without right, or whether she merely
sought possession of territory fairly included within her lines of
ownership, this Government proposed to the Government of Great
Britain a resort to arbitration as the proper means of settling the
question to the end that a vexatious boundary dispute between
the two contestants might be determined and our exact standing
and relation in respect to the controversy might be made clear.

It will be seen from the correspondence herewith submitted
that this proposition has been declined by the British Govern-
ment, upon grounds which in the circumstances seem to me to be
far from satisfactory. It is deei)ly disappointing that such an
appeal actuated by the most friendly feelings towards both nations
directly concerned, addressed to the sense of justice and to the
magnanimity of one of the great powers of the world and touch-
ing its relations to one comparatively weak and small, should
have produced no better results.

The course to be pursued by this Government in view of the
present condition does not appear to admit of serious doubt.
Having labored faithfully for many years to induce Great Britain

THE MUNKOE DOCTRINE 441

to submit this dispute to impartial arl)iti-ation, and having been
now finally apprized of her refusal to do so, nothing remains but
to accept the situation, to recognize its plain requirements and
deal with it accordingly. Great Britain's present proposition
has never thus far been regarded as admissible by Venezuela,
though any adjustment of the boundary which that country may
deem for her advantage and may enter into of her own free will
cannot of course be objected to by the United States.

Assuming, however, that the attitude of Venezuela will remain
unchanged, the dis])ute has reached such a stage as to make it
now incumbent upon the United States to take measures to de-
termine with sufficient certainty for its justification what is the
true divisional line between the Republic of Venezuela and
British Guiana. The inquiry to that end should of course be con-
ducted carefully and judicially, and due weight should be given
to all available evidence, records, and facts in support of the
claims of both parties.

In order that such an examination should be prosecuted in a
thorough and satisfactory manner I suggest that the Congress
make an adequate appropriation for the expenses of a Commis-
sion, to be appointed by the Executive, who shall make the neces-
sary investigation and report upon the matter with the least
possible delay. When such report is made and accepted it will
in my opinion be the duty of the United States to resist by every
means in its power, as a wilful aggression upon its rights and in-
terests, the appropriation by Great Britain of any lauds or the
exercise of governmental jurisdiction over any territory which
after investigation we have determined of right belongs to Vene-
zuela.

In making these recommendations I am fully alive to the
responsil)ility incurred and keenly realize all the consequences
that may follow.

I am nevertheless firm in my conviction that while it is a
grievous thing to contemplate the two great English-speaking
peoples of the world as being otherwise than friendly competitors
in the onward march of civilization, and strenuous and worthy
rivals in all the arts of peace, there is no calamity which a great
nation can invite which ecjuals that which follows a supine sub-
mission to wrong and injustice and the consequent loss of national
self-respect and honor, beneath which are shielded and defended
a people's safety and greatness.

After a sliort controversy Congress provided for the
appointment of an American Commission of Jurists to inves-

■142 AMERICAN DIPLOMATIC QUESTIONS

tigfate the territorial claims of Venezuela and Great Britain
in order to enlighten the government upon the question as
to whether Great Britain's action in South America should
be accepted by the executive as an extension of European
dominion on the American continent. The President there-
fore appointed a commission " to investigate and report
upon the true divisional line between the republic of Vene-
zuela and British Guiana." In asking Congress for an ap-
propriation to defray the expenses of such an investigating
l)oard, the President said: " When such report is made and
accepted, it will, in my opinion, be the duty of the United
States to resist by every means in its power, as a wilful
aggression upon its right and interest, the appropriation by
Great Britain of any lands or the exercise of governmental
jurisdiction over any territory which after investigation we
have determined of riglit belongs to Venezuela.

" In making these recommendations, I am fully alive to the
responsibility incurred, and keenly realize all the consequences
that may follow."

The commission at once entered upon the arduous labor
of examining a voluminous mass of documentary evidence
furnished by Venezuela and somewhat good-naturedly by
England, but before the final conclusion of their task had
been reached, the British Government yielded to the repeated
solicitations of the United States, and agreed to arbitrate
with Venezuela. For that purpose a treaty was drawn up
in Washington and afterward signed (February 12, 1897) by
the British and Venezuelan representatives. By this conven-
tion a tribunal of arbitration was appointed, consisting of
two English judges, two American judges, and a president
of the tribunal who should be selected by the four members
of the court already designated.

In June, 1899, the commission assembled in Pai-is. It con-
sisted of Professor Martens, the distinguished Russian
authority upon international law, the Chief Justice of the
United States, Justice Brewer of the United States Supreme
Court, Baron Russell, Lord Chief Justice of England, and
Sir Richai'd Collins, Lord Justice of Appeals of Great Brit-

THE MONROE DOCTRINE 443

ain. The Venezuelan case was presented by ex-President
Harrison, Gen. B. F. Tracy, M. Mallet-Prevost, and the
Maniuis de Rajas. The British case was conducted by Sir
Richard Webster, Sir Robert Reid, and others. A verdict
was rendered on October 3, which was of a compromise
nature.

The rendering of this award ch)sed an incident of Ameri-
can intervention in snpport of the principles of the Monroe
Doctrine whicli has been considered fortunate by many, only
in so far as its ending was a ha})py one. British feeling had
been greatly aroused against the United States by what
appeared to be an unwarranted meddling in an affair belong-
ing only to Great Britain and Venezuela. On the other hand,
the belief had been general in the United States that Eng-
hmd's unwillingness at first to arbitrate the dispute gave evi-
dence of her aggressive designs in South America. The
positive tone of Mr. Olney's letters and of President Cleve-
land's messages indicated that Anglo-American affairs were
nearing a crisis, and that the two great powers were peril-
ously close to an open rupture. When the moment for
sober thought arrived, it was generally conceded that a war
so appalling in its prcjbable consequences between these two
nations of one language and of a common purpose in the
advancement of civilization and constitutional liberty would
have been totally unjustiHed by the circumstances in the
case. It has since been freely said that the wise resolution
of Great Britain to yield was j)rompted by the wishes of the
Queen, who cherished a desire to preserve peace during her
reign between the two great nations of kindred race.

XIII

The course of the Cleveland administration in using the
Monroe Doctrine as a means for com])elling (ireat Britain to
arlntrate her differences with Venezuela called forth much
criticism. The opponents of Mr. ()lney"s radical position
argued that the Monroe Do(;trine having been established to
meet a certain end, it had accomplished its purposes and was

444 AMERICAN DIPLOMATIC QUESTIONS

now functus officio. It being at best but a domestic policy,
its observance could not properly be enforced against foreign
nations. It had no place in international law, and conse-
quently it was unreasonable to expect other powers to recog-
nize it. Indeed, it was not even an established principle of
American diplomacy, for it had upon many occasions been
disregarded when it might with propriety have been appealed
to ; whenever proclaimed, it had been accepted by the coun-
try as merely the expression of a policy which imposed no
obligation upon the government to enforce it. Finally, it
was insisted that the occupation by Great Britain of some
hundreds of miles of comparatively worthless territory in
South America, theretofore considered as belonging to
Venezuela, in no manner affected the rights or interests
of the United States. On the contrary, some critics rather
openly hinted that the settlement of the disputed area by
British subjects would give to the territory better chances
for development under an assured good government, and
that England's occupation of the tract would therefore
inure to the advantage of American trade. So far as the
wilds of the upper Orinoco were capable of civilized occu-
pation, it would be better for the commercial interests of the
world if they were under British jurisdiction than under the
uncertain rule of a nation whose weak and faltering govern-
ment has been throughout its history subject to constant
revolution. American trade with Great Britain and with
British possessions far exceeded the slender volume of Ameri-
can commerce with Venezuela. Indeed, to have imperilled
even for a year the five hundred millions of trade with
Great Britain for the sake of the annual two or three millions
with Venezuela would have been a quixotic proceeding. This
suspected expansion of British territory in South America
involved no danger to the safety of the United States.
England already possessed Canada with a contiguous boun-
dary line of nearly 3000 miles. The islands of Newfoundland,
Bermuda, the Bahamas, Jamaica, together with numerous
smaller islands of the Lesser Antilles and Trinidad, already
formed a chain of English naval posts along the coast of

THE MONROE DOCTRINE 445

the United States. Belize and British Guiana supplemented
these outposts, and all of these English possessions, barring
the last, are nearer to the United States than is the territory
in dispute, — indeed, a direct line from the southernmost
point of Florida to the mouth of the Orinoco River is about
1(300 miles. The addition of this tract of land to existing
English possessions in the Western Hemisphere would have
been, after all, a matter of little consequence. The country
was a tropical jungle, where the maintenance of military
forces would be impossible, on account of its extremely
unhealthy climate ; and such military posts as England
would be likely to establish thereabouts would be located
in her existing Guiana colony. Under these circumstances,
the danger to the United States arising out of British occupa-
tion appeared to be wholly imaginary. If British acquisi-
tion of this disputed territory lying so far distant could be
justly regarded as threatening the safety of the United
States, by similar process of reasoning, to what deplorable
condition of helplessness is the American Government re-
duced by the cordon of English possessions, naval stations,
and fortified positions which have threatened it for one
hundred years !

Whatever may have been the dangers of European coloni-
zation in 1823, that danger had ceased to exist. English
liberty is as well guaranteed as American liberty. The
Englisli colonist is as jealous of his rights and as determined
in the support of human freedom as is the American.
Wherever he or his descendants go, industry, trade, com-
merce, civilization, and religion go with them. In reality,
the English (iovernment in its actual administration more
nearly approximates that of the United States than does the
Government of Venezuela.

Finally it was asked. If liritish occupation of the disputed
"territory entailed such disastrous consequences upon the
United States that the risk of war were better, wouhl not
the nation's safety have demanded at the start a positive
denial of British rights in th(! ])remises, and a refusal to con-
sent to the arbitration of the boundary lines? To insist

446 AMERICAN DIPLOMATIC QUESTIONS

upon Great Britain's acceptance of arbitration, to institute
an ex 'parte commission to determine British rights and
to dictate the course she was to follow in the settlement
of this dispute, was as much an effront as peremptorily
to order the British Government to withdraw its pretensions
from Venezuelan territory. In either case the United States
assumed a high degree of authority which Great Britain
refused to acknowledge ; in either case, war was a possible
outcome. In short, therefore, the opponents of the admin-
istration policy held simply that the United States was not
threatened in any way by British advances in Venezuela, and
therefore the circumstances in the case did not justify the
country in going to the extremity of a war with England.

Those who defended the stand taken by the administra-
tion asserted that while the occupation of a portion of Ven-
ezuela by Great Britain did not in itself endanger American
interests, it violated a well-established policy of the American
people. This cardinal principle of American diplomacy had
been so long revered it should be maintained at all hazards.
To abandon the Monroe Doctrine at tliat particular time
would be to open the entire South American continent to the
rapacious and land-hungered nations of Europe.

After all is said on both sides of the controversy there is
but one point which merits serious consideration. That one
point determines the applicability of the doctrine in every
case, — that is, the safety of the United States.

Self-defence is an essential principle of existence. It is
a law of nature that no rules of society can accurately define.
Because the Monroe Doctrine Avas an invocation of this
great principle of which Mr. Monroe was in no wise the
author, because it came opportunely, because it was so ably
expressed, because it met with enthusiastic approval at the
time, it has lived and obtained a permanence in American
politics as though it were a principle purely American and
of American discovery. In reality it is only a special or a
new name for a principle of life that is as old as the existence
of man. The new name has supplanted the old in the Aincri-

THE .MOXKUE DOCTKINE 447

can inijid, and whenever a threat, real or fancied, has come
in the shape of aggression in the Western Hemisphere, the
United States Government has asserted its right to inter-
pose — the right of self-protection, but called instead tlie
^lonroe Doctrine. The phrase "Monroe Doctrine"' has
heen preferred, and in the course of three-quarters of a
centur}' it has wrought a weird and enchanting influence on
the American intellect. The mind becomes ind)ued with a
vague sense of past traditions resulting in a confusion of
sentimental ideas which impair the powers of discrimina-
tion, and thus the original purpose of the Monroe Doctrine
and the defensive principles which it represents are often
lost sight of. Indeed, the circumstances under which tlie
Doctrine was originally enunciated, as well as the condition
of American political life pi'evious to 1823, were of a nature
to give ^Ir. Monroe's declaration a peculiar significance.
Fear of European aggression in the Americas was the par-
ticular danger that gave tlie "doctrine"' birth. The United
States was comparatively a weak natioii, its system of gov-
ernment was experimental, and it was in conflict with the
monarchical principles of Europe ; and jealous Europe was
feared. The Spanish possessions were in revolt, arul offered
a tempting field for the exploitation of European arms. The
American people were impressed with the danger that lurked
in every European advance ; the Monroe Doctrne voiced the
apprehension in a manner that satisfied every American
citizen.

The American nation is no longer weak ; its system of
government is no experiment. Absolutism in Europe has
almost disappeared, and liberal constitutioiud monarchies
and republics have taken its place. There is no holy alli-
ance, there is no scheme to subvert republican forms of gov-
ernment, but the people of the United States have not yet
outlived the inherited fears of their grandfathers, and they
still cherish the appi-chensic^ns they beciueatlit-d. 'I'hcy cling
to the words that proclainuul their fears, the words which
-Mr. Monroe annount.-ed. Thus to-da}' the same cry of alarm
«)f three generations ago is still uttered ; the Monrou Doctrine

448 AMERICAN DIPLOMATIC QUESTIONS

lias become a magic symbol, and an idol for national worship.
Thus it comes about in course of time, after that doctrine
has undergone numerous modifications, after it has been dis-
torted in various ways to meet the requirements of party
politics, that it has lost, to some extent, its original meaning.
The "doctrine" is supported on other grounds than those
of self-protection ; admittedly British occupation of certain
tracts of land in Venezuela could not conceivably endanger
the peace, safety, and integrity of the United States, yet the
Monroe Doctrine seemed to call for action to prevent such
occupancy.

The position may be maintained with considerable force
that when a political principle obtains a superstitious hold
upon a nation that compels its blind observance regardless
of consequences it is time to cast it aside. To consign the
iNIonroe Doctrine to its appropriate place of political signifi-
cance in American history is by no means to deprive the
American people of self-protection. It is only to rid the
mind of a disturbing factor in the determination of foreign
questions — to leave the judgment free to measure danger by
the exigencies of the present, and not the remembrance of the
fears which are of the past.

The acquisition of the Philippine Islands necessarily opens
new fields of diplomacy to the United States Government.
To some extent at least the older policy of political isolation
must give way to that of a more intimate connection with
foreign powers ; it is therefore all the more important that
every habit of thought should be suppressed which prevents
clear and reasonable consideration of all diplomatic questions.

There need be no apprehension lest the people of the
United States will always be alert and watchful of their own
interests. A higher principle than devotion to the Monroe
Doctrine will guide — principles of an organic law upon
which the Monroe Doctrine is founded, and of which the
Monroe Doctrine was but a single expression.

THE NORTHEAST COAST FISHERIES

THE NORTHEAST COAST FISHERIES

One of the most perplexing problems which the Govern-
ment of the United States has been called upon to meet, in con-
nection with its foreign relations, is the northeastern fishery
question. It formerly concerned the rights of American citi-
zens to catch fish within the territorial waters of Canada and
Newfoundland, and io use the shores of these provinces either
for the purpose of drying and curing their fares or to pro-
cure bait. The consideration of these rights necessarily
involved a host of incidental legal questions — such as the
nature of territorial jurisdiction over the ocean within the
three-mile limit of shore, the doctrine of headlands and
the rights of vessels under local laws of commerce and navi-
gation. It involved also the interpretation of numerous
treaty stipulations, some of them more or less ambiguous ;
and these interpretations, furthermore, were too often dis-
torted by the exigencies of party politics. Since the begin-
ning of our national existence this (piestion has brought
almost constant care and vexation to both American and
English statesmen, and thus far it seems to have defied all
efforts at permanent and satisfactory adjustment. J>rief
respites have been found in the awards of arbitration tribu-
nals, while new conventions and treaties have sufficed tem-
porarily to allay irritation ; but after all, the old (piarrel of
the fishermen constantly recurs in some form mo less aggra-
vating and threatening than before.

The circumstances wliich have given tliis (piestion eminent
importance have been of a nature to render its solution pecul-
iarly ditficult. The great economic value of the fisheries,
both in the matter of providing employment for thousands
of men and in the matter of furnishing to the world a

451

452 AMERICAN DIPLOMATIC QUESTIONS

staple article of food, has excited the earnest solicitude of
the governments of both Great Britain and the United
States. Each has necessaril}' sought to secure for its re-
spective subjects the greatest possible advantage in the
prosecution of so important an industry.

These fishing operations on the part of Americans have
required in the past not only the occupancy of Canadian
waters, but equally the occupancy and use of Canadian
shores ; and as a quid pro quo for granting these privileges
British subjects have naturally demanded as large remunera-
tions as they could reasonably obtain. On the other hand,
American fishermen have always desired, and sometimes
demanded as a national right, the privilege to follow their
game into British territorial waters, and the United States
Government has always sought to obtain for them these
important privileges on terms least objectionable and oner-
ous to the nation at large. In pursuit of their voca-
tions, American and Canadian fishermen have necessarily
been brought side by side into direct personal contact,
thus affording occasion for the breeding of jealousies and
bitter feelings of resentment for real and fancied wrongs.
It is not remarkable that collisions from time to time have
resulted, which have always served to complicate the settle-
ment of the public issues involved.

It has been said that fishermen are the " wards of nations."
They enjoy certain special immunities in times of war, and
in many respects they receive from their governments all the
fostering care and protection required at the hands of a guar-
dian. Formerly they were specially encouraged and protected
both by England and the United States, on the ground that
the character of their calling peculiarly fitted them for the
naval service. From this nautical school the hardiest and
best sailors have been drafted. In this connection it is
interesting to note the fears of an English writer, expressed
as early as 1670, who viewed with alarm the growth of the
cod-fisheries in the New World. He wrote : "New England
is the most prejudicial plantation in this kingdom, ... of
all the American plantations, His Majesty has none so apt

THE NORTHEAST COAST FISHERIES 453

for building or shipping as New England, nor any compara-
tively so qualified for the breeding of seamen, — principally
by reason of their cod and mackerel fisheries, and, in my
opinion, there is nothing more prejudicial, and in prospect
more dangerous, to any mother kingdom, than the increase
of shipping in her colonies, plantations, or provinces." Sir
Joshua Child's utterance proved prophetic. Thus were the
governments of England and of the United States stimulated
to nurture with greatest care the industry that furnished
their best naval reserves.

The chief difficulty in the way of a permanent and satis-
factory settlement of this question has been to discover some
suitable return to the Canadians for the privileges asked by
American fishermen, to ivit : the right (should the necessity
demand), to fish in Canadian territorial waters, and unmo-
lested to secure bait and supplies ashore. No compensation
yet devised for such privileges has remained mutually satis-
factory for more than a few years. The partial reduction of
tariff duties or the total omission to tax specified articles in
favor of Canadian trade has been tried with but indifferent
success. The American producers of articles whenever
brought thus into active competition with Canadian 2)i'od-
ucts, have invariably raised their voices in angry disap-
proval, — chiefly upon the ground that they were being
sacrificed fur the benefit of fishei-men in whose success or
failure they had no interest whatever. Congress has always
been compelled sooner or later to abandon this scheme of
settlement as impracticable. The admission of Canadian
fisli free of duty into United States ports has always been
regarded by Canada as the proper price for her fishery con-
cessions to the United States, but this seemingly rational
method of adjustment has been at all times most vigorously
opposed by our own fishermen. They insist tliat tlie bene-
fits to the nation of a free fishery are general, and that the
burdens of its maintenance should be equally so ; moreover,
tliey stoutly maintain that they cannot successfully compete
with their Canadian brethren in the United States markets
without the sanu; tariff protfction ai;corded to other indus-

454 AMERICAN DIPLOMATIC QUESTIONS

tries. Therefore a solution which seems on its face to be
perfectly just and rational has always come eventually to
be abandoned as impracticable.

The payment of a lump sum or an annual license tax to
Canada has at times been considered as a hopeful adjust-
ment of the question, but this means of settlement has
always met with a determined opposition from the agricul-
tural classes throughout the country.

Thus it is that, abounding in difficulties, aggravated by
frequent encounters of the fishermen, — especially during
periods of ill feeling between England and the United States,
— complicated by private claims and confused by numerous
minor issues, the fishery question has remained an unsolved
problem for nearly a century and a quarter.

The most valuable food fishes inhabit the cold waters of
northern seas. A great ocean river, having its origin in the
polar seas, and known as the " Labrador Current," sweeps
to the south along the entire shore of British America, past
Newfoundland, and down the New England coast. Round-
ing Cape Cod, and following thence a southern course, it
plunges downward, to pass beneath the warmer and lighter
waters of the Gulf Stream, and is finally lost in the abyssal
depths of the middle Atlantic. The presence of this body
of cold water near the coast greatly influences the climate of
Labrador and Newfoundland, rendering their shores bleak
and desolate, while it prolongs the rigorous winters of New
England. As a seeming recompense for so much of cheerless
cold and gloom, it brings to these maritime provinces the
conditions necessary for a marvellous wealth of marine life,
which has proved of almost incalculable value to their in-
habitants. The coastal waters of these provinces teem with
cod, herring, mackerel, and a variety of other fish of great
commercial value.

Of the various kinds of food fish taken in these waters,
the first in importance is the cod, which remarkable fish ex-

THE NORTHEAST COAST FISHERIES 455

ceeds in commercial value any other product of the ocean, —
possibly excepting the herring, which, in northern Europe,
forms the basis of a colossal industry. The natural home of
the cod is in the shore waters extending from Greenland to
Massachusetts, but they are taken in small numbers as far
south as Hatteras. They frequent the coast waters of moder-
ate depths, having no definite migratory habits other than
during certain seasons to pass to and from somewhat deej^er
water offshore, in order to find a temperature more appro-
priate, or perhaps necessary to their existence. The largest
and best cod are those which betake themselves from the
shore stations to the more suitable conditions that seem to
be offered by those "elevated tablelands" of the Atlantic, —
those great submarine plateaux that lie to the south and east
of Newfoundland, and to the east of Nova Scotia and New
England, and which are known as the " Banks." Here, at a
depth of fifty to four hundred feet, they are found in countless
numbers. Notwithstanding the fact that for several hundred
years the Banks have furnished to the fishermen millions of
cod, the supply seems to be but little less abundant than
when first discovered. On shore stations their decreas-
ing numbers may be attributed to the exhaustive raids
made upon the smaller species of fish which serve the larger
ones as food, rather than to the direct catch of shore cod.
On tlie Maine and Massachusetts coasts cod have long
since ceased to exist in quantities sufficient to warrant ex-
tensive operations as are now carried on by the fleets of
American vessels employed on the Banks. Bartholomew
Gosnold, in 1002, arriving at Cape Cod, reported that the
fish were so abundant that they "did vex the ship." With
due allowance for Gosnold's enthusiasm, the prevalence of
cod in New England in colonial days is evidenced l)y the
flourishing business carried on along its shores b}^ the
early settlers, even so late as the revolutionary era. The
decline was felt, liowever, even before that period, and it
continued in increasing ratio on account of the steady
development of manufacturing interests in New England.
The damming of rivers to secure water power for machinery

456 AMERICAN DIPLOxMATIC QUESTIONS

to a great extent destroyed the spawning grounds of the fish.
Cod, however, still exist all along the New England shores
in varying quantities, though the supply is scarcely sufficient
some seasons to meet the demands of local markets.

Every portion of the fish is of use. The flesh, as a staple
article of food, forms the basis of an enormous export trade
to all parts of the world ; the entrails, head, and bones, are
extensively used for fertilizing lands ; the swimming bladder
is employed in the manufacture of gelatine, and the oil ex-
tracted from the liver is well known as a valuable agent in
the materia medica ; the skin is utilized in the manufacture
of glue.

A number of cities on the Maine and IMassachusetts coasts
are famous as rendezvous for large fleets of fishing vessels
which make their annual cruises to the Banks for the pur-
pose of gathering the harvests of the sea. jNIany of these
cities owe both their origin and their prosperity to the
energy, industry and success of their fishermen. The busi-
ness is probably of less relative importance to-day, although
the number of men employed in 1000 was about 35,000, the
catch 162,218,921 pounds, and its value 84,385,102.

The method of fishing on the Banks is from small boats
wdth hand lines and trawls, the latter being long lines upon
which are attached several hundred hooks. They are an-
chored and buoyed at both ends, and left out during the
night. In the morning the trawl is brought up, the fish that
have feasted unwisely are removed, and the hooks are rebaited
to repeat the operation. The bait used is the soft-shell clam,
the capelin (a small fish from the bays of Newfoundland),
and the squid (a mollusk of the cuttle-fish order, which is
principally taken in Newfoundland waters). When the
American fishermen use clams as bait they take a supply,
iced or salted, from the United States, being enabled thereby
to avoid the necessity of touching the Dominion coast ; in
former times, however, a call at some Canadian or Newfound-
land port was made imperative for obtaining supplies of
capelin or squid, neither of which occurs abundantly in the
United States. A class of Canadian longshoremen followed

THE NORTPIEAST COAST FISHERIES 457

the business of catching and providing these articles of bait
to American fishermen, the rates being about •$! a barrel,
though it sometimes happened, in the confusion of their mis-
understandings, that the Canadians declined to supply their
rivals with the necessary bait.

Formerly, when fishing on the coast stations, the cod were
taken ashore, cleaned, split open, and spread out to dry in
the sun upon "stages," or rudely constructed wooden plat-
forms. Thus prepared, the fish will keep indefinitely. Bank
fishermen never resort to this means of curing their fish, the
run into port consuming too much valuable time. The fish
are carefully salted or iced, and packed away in the holds of
the vessels, and thus brought home. The decline of shore
fisheries for cod, and the substitution in late years of a better
class of Bank fishing vessels carrying ice, has materially
changed the relations of American and Canadian cod-fislier-
men. The former maintain they are independent of all
privileges the Canadians might seek to offer them, yet the
fact remains that shore privileges in Newfoundland are still
considered valuable for purposes of transshipment of cargo,
refitting, purchase of bait, ice, and provisions.

The mackerel is a pelagic free-roving fish, appearing at
times in vast numbers within the shore waters from the Gulf
of St. Lawrence to Cape Hatteras. They appear and disap-
pear suddenly, and without known reason, to the joy or de-
spair of the masters and crews of a large fleet of American
mackerel schooners. The capriciousness of this excellent
food fisli is lial)le to bring to its pursuers either very great
profit, or complete disappointment. Governor Winthrop, in
l<)-jl>, relates: "There was such a store of exceeding large
and fat mackerel u[)on our coasts this season as was a great
benefit to all our plantation, since one boat with three men
would take in a week ten hogsheads, which were sold at
Connecticut for tliree pounds ten shillings a hogshead."
American fishing schooners have long frequented Canadian
territorial waters in the prosecution of the mackerel fisliery,
and many disputes have arisen between the two governments
concerning the value to American citizens of this privilege.

458 AMERICAN DIPLOMATIC QUESTIONS

The uncertain nature of the fish renders all calculations re-
specting future catches virtually impossible ; hence, it is the
more clitiicult to agree upon regulations for future seasons to
ofovern the mackerel fisheries.

When the mackerel first appear in the early summer months
along the New England coasts, the fleet of American fisher-
men set out in pursuit, following tlie school of fish into the
Gulf of St. Lawrence, where they remain throughout the sum-
mer. As the mackerel frequent shallow water, the American
fishermen, having no right to do so, are often tempted to
approach the shore and carry on their operations within the
forbidden territorial waters of Canada. This has been even
recently one of the principal grievances of the Canadian
fishermen. The method employed by Americans in the
mackerel fishery is the "purse seine," This mode of fish-
ing is attended with many difficulties and dangers in the
shallow waters of the Gulf of St. Lawrence, where violent
squalls are frequent, yet as a method of capturing fish it is
most effective. The Canadians object to the use of the purse
seine, even when employed outside the three-mile limit of
their jurisdictional waters, for, they maintain, it " vexes " the
fish, interferes with their breeding, and tends to drive them
away altogether from the Gulf. For this reason they hold
— on the score of contra bonos mores — that the Americans
have no right to use this kind of seine in the Gulf of St. Law-
rence. In asserting their right to fish as they choose upon
the high seas, the attitude of American and Canadian fisher-
men is the exact reverse of the positions assumed by their
respective governments in relation to pelagic sealing in Ber-
ing Sea. The most serious difficulties of the fishery ques-
tion to-day are connected with the rights and privileges of
the American mackerel fleet.

The herring fisheries of the United States, until within
recent years, have occupied a relatively subordinate place.
In northern Europe this industry is carried on with great
vigor, the annual yield sometimes reaching the extraordinary
number of 2,500,000,000 fish. The herring on the west side
of the Atlantic have their range within the limits of the

THE NORTHEAST COAST FISHERIES 459

Labrador current. They swarm in countless numbers on
the Banks, and indeed throughout the Canadian and New-
foundhmd shore waters, but they were not formerly pursued
by Americans with the energy and zeal justified by their
value as an article of food. B}" treaty with England, Ameri-
can fishermen obtained the right to catch herring about the
Magdalen Islands, and in 1839, just after the commencement
of the fishery, a record is given of 146 American schooners
"taking nearly 700 barrels each." A generous estimate of
1,000,000 barrels of herring taken annually from Dominion
and Newfoundland waters has been given by Professor Hinds.
A large part of these were taken, however, for fertilizing
purposes.

As carried on to-day the herring is largely a shore fishery.
The young herring swim in vast schools close along the mar-
gin of the water, having certain definite courses which they
follow. The fishermen construct "weirs" or pocket-like
traps, extending out from the land and crossing the track
of the fish. In tliese labyrinths, the herring become im-
prisoned in great numbers. They form the basis of a
rapidly growing " sardine " canning industry in New Eng-
land. The herring, being practically a shore fishery, does
not figure prominently in the disputes between the two
governments.

In a lesser degree, pollock, haddock, hake, halibut and
other species of fish, of more or less commercial value, figure
in the comprehensive phrase " Northeast Coast Fisheries " ;
but the greater importance of the cod and mackerel over
other varieties of fish included within the term, warrants
the omission of all others from a historical review of the
subject.

n

As early as 1415 English fishermen resorted to Iceland to
catch cod. There is evidence tending to prove that before
the voyages of Columbus, the codfishery of the Newfound-
land Banks was known to the Basque and Normandy fisher-

460 AMERICAN DIPLOMATIC QUESTIONS

men. This supposition is supported by the fact that, as early
as 1504, only seven years after the discovery of Newfound-
land by the Cabots, Basque fishermen are known to have
visited the Banks, and in 1557 their fishing operations in
the New World had increased in extent to the employment
of some fifty or more vessels.

The English do not seem promptly to have follow^ed up
the advantages gained for them by the discoveries of Cabot
in 1497. Possibly the superior naval forces of her enemies
deterred her at that time from asserting jurisdiction over
the waters of North America. These waters had been re-
ported, first by Cabot, and soon after by other English
voj'agers, as marvellously rich in fish. For nearly a century
England made no attempt to colonize the newly discovered
territories. The French were more alert in grasping the
importance of the new industry thus disclosed to the world,
and during the early and middle portions of the sixteenth
century, enterprising merchants of Dieppe, St. Malo and
Rouen, sent their vessels to the Banks in annually increasing
numbers. By the year 1540, they had established fishing
stations on the shores of Newfoundland, and in 1577 their
fleet mustered 150 ships. At that time Spain and Portugal
were also w^ell represented on the Banks, but the thirst for
gold, which consumed the Spanish adventurers of that period,
soon lured away her fishermen to the West Indies ; and the
Portuguese soon found more congenial fields for exploratioii
in Brazil. By the end of the century Spanish and Portu-
guese ships disappeared almost entirely from the fishing
grounds.

English vessels, fitted out in London and Bristol, came to
Newfoundland as early as 1540, and continued yearl}^ to visit
the region, though their operations were not carried on with
the vigor that characterized the efforts of the French fisher-
men of that period. Verranzo, Chabot, Cartier, Robeval de
la Roche and other voyagers of the sixteenth century were
conspicuous in establishing the supremacy of France in tliis
part of the New World ; and Chamj)lain, who founded Quel)ec
in 1008, gave his country a still firmer hold on these shores.

THE NORTHEAST COAST FISHERIES 461

— a hold that took the English a centurj' and a half to
loosen. The principal, if not the sole object of acquiring
territory in northeastern America at this early period, was
to obtain a control of the fisheries which were regarded by
both English and French as far the most valuable possession
of the New World. It was not until 1583, however, that
England fully awakened to the necessity of protecting her
interests in America. In that year Sir Humphrey Gilbert,
with a royal patent from Queen Elizabeth, landed at St.
Johns, Newfoundland, for the purpose of establishing a
colony. To a motley group of fishermen of various na-
tionalities, who happened to be gathered in the harbor,
he read a proclamation, setting forth the intention of his
sovereign to assume control of the waters about Newfound-
land to the distance of 200 leagues. This order was enforced,
notably in one instance, when that redoubtable old sea rover,
Sir Francis Drake, cruising thereabouts some years later,
seized several Portuguese fishing vessels as prizes ; and
although his captures Vv^ere made many miles from land, he
appropriated to his own use tlieir cargoes of fish and oil.
This tardy effort at colonization, followed by an attack on
the right of free fishery, was not an unqualified success,
though there is little doubt that it gave a great impetus to
English fishing interests in North America. Sir Humphrej^'s
settlement languished, and in 1610 another attempt to colo-
nize the forbidding shores of Newfoundland was made by
John Guy of Bristol. Sir Francis Bacon was a patron of
this scheme, and his prophetic utterance that the fisheries
of Newfoundland would prove more valua])le than all the
mines of Peru, lias been amply verified by time.

John Guy's colony reaped a harvest of sorrows, but it gave
another lease of life to English fishery interests. Five years
later (161.5) 2.50 Englisli vessels, emi)lo3'ing over 10,000 men,
were engaged in fishing along the coast, and profits arising
therefrom grew apace. In 1623 another colonizing scheme in
Newfoundland was carried out by Sir George Calvert, after-
ward Lord Baltimore, the founder of the colony of INIary-
land. He was granted by King James a large tract of land

462 AMERICAN DIPLOMATIC QUESTIONS

extending from Trinity Bay to Placentia, which he named
"Avelon." Baltimore's hardy followers were beset and
harassed by the French who, from their strongholds on the
mainland, were determined to possess Newfoundland, hoping
thereby to secure to themselves the control of the fisheries.

By the middle of the seventeenth century, the resident
population of Newfoundland had increased to 2000, the
greater part of which followed fishing for a livelihood. Be-
sides them, several thousand fishermen from France and
England came annually in the spring season to her shores,
returning in the autumn to their homes across the Atlantic
with full fares of fish and oil.

This already extensive and rapidly growing industry of
the English soon fell into the hands of a number of mer-
chants and shippers who resided in London and in the west
coast cities of England. These men having ample means,
fitted out numbers of superior vessels, and manning them
with skilful crews, began a systematic exploitation of the
Newfoundland fisheries. It naturally came to pass that the
interests of these English fishermen and of those who had
settled permanently as colonists in Newfoundland came into
conflict. The former sought the most desirable harbors and
shore stations for erecting their stages to cure and prepare
their fish, and the resident colonists naturally selected these
advantageous coast situations as places for permanent settle-
ment ; and thus a petty warfare between settlers and sailors
took place every summer on the southern Newfoundland
coast. The interests of the English merchants were para-
mount in the estimation of the sovereign, it being conceived
that the only real value of the desolate island of Newfound-
land to the mother country consisted in its control of the
fisheries, for which control a mere nominal possession of the
island was quite sufficient.

Legislation at London accorded precedence and preemi-
nence to the rights of fishermen over those of the Newfound-
land settlers. Laws enacted by the English Parliament
between 1630 and 1640 proved to be oppressive and highly
injurious to the colonists, and the enforcing of many cruel

I

THE NORTHEAST COAST FISHERIES 463

and unjust regulations, under the plea that the fisheries must
be preserved to England, both as a means of profit and as a
nursery for her seamen, covered a period of more than a hun-
dred years. The building of houses and cultivation of the
soil were prohibited within six miles of the shore, and numer-
ous other barriers to prospective colonization gave great
annoyance to existing settlers. In fact, the London Board
of Trade, in whose hands the regulation of the English
fisheries had been placed, pursued its radical policy so far as
to send Sir John Berry to Newfoundland in 1670 with orders
to burn and destroy all dwellings, and drive the wretched
owners from the island. Under such adverse conditions,
British colonization in Newfoundland dwindled into insiof-
nificance in the jjresence of a protected interest of pre-
dominant importance. At that dark period of her history,
Newfoundland was generally regarded beyond the Atlantic
as " a great English ship moored near the Banks during the
fishing season for the convenience of English fishermen."

The era of oppression upon the Newfoundland settlers
reached its culmination in the passing of the statute, 10 and
11 William and Mary (1698), entitled : "An act to encourage
the trade of Newfoundland," which was, in reality, an act to
discourage immigration and to foster the interests of fisher-
men alone. By one of the provisions of this statute, referred
to as "infamous" in the annals of Newfoundland, a judicial
system was established for the colony, to be administered by
the "fishing admiral." This system abolished the plan of
dispensing justice, already in vogue in tlie colony, and created
in its stead a form of impromptu courts, held by the captains
of the English fishing vessels whenever they happened in
port. The captain arriving first in a harbor was constituted
"Admiral of the Port," the second, " Vice-Admiral," etc.,
in whom was vested the exercise of all judicial functions.
The rule of these generally ignorant, and too often vicious,
men soon brought all semblance of law and order into con-
tempt, and resulted in conditions bordering on anarcliy.
This statute remained in force many years, and did much to
letard the growth of the colony. Indeed, it may reasonably

464 AMERICAN DIPLOMATIC QUESTIONS

be questioned whether NewfouncUand has ever fully recov-
ered from the many sacrifices she has been forced to make in
preserving the monopoly of the fisheries to her mother
country. The wealth of her large bays and coastal waters
may be said to have brought to the island benefits and
damages in about equal proportions.

The history of the fisheries, from the early part of the
seventeentli century to the treaty of 1763, is merely the story
of English and French conflicts for mastery in the regions
lying about the Gulf of St. LaAvrence, and south on the main-
land of Massachusetts, — the primary object of these many
encounters being to secure control of the inexhaustible
riches of the neighboi'ing seas.

Throughout the sixteenth century, the flags of France
were the more numerous on the fishing grounds ; and after the
disappearance of the Spanish, the French remained for many
years a formidable rival of the English. They clung tena-
ciously to the shore stations they had established in New-
foundland during the sixteenth century, and were always
ready to figlit for the maintenance of their full rights on the
Banks. In 1577 they employed no less than 150 vessels, and
about this time the fisheries were deemed of suflicient im-
portance to be placed under the protection of the French
Government.

Seeking a permanent base of operations on the continent,
the French set up a claim to Nova Scotia, which, together
with Cape Breton, New Brunswick and a part of Maine,
constituted a great tract of country known later as Acadia.
Basing their rights upon early discovery and upon a grant
of Henry IV of France to Pierre de Gast, Sieur de Morts,
in 1603, the French occupied this territory, built Port Royal,
and established a thriving fishery at Canso. It was the
intention of the French monarch to found a colony at some
point accessible to the Banks, from which, as a base, the
business might be easily and successfully conducted. Cod
was becoming a necessity as a food in France, and was es])e-
cially suitable for use on the many religious fast days of that
period. The settlement of Acadia fullilled all the needs of

THE NORTHEAST COAST FISHERIES 465

this desire to secure the bank fisheries for his own sub-
jects. The first French emigrants to this country, however,
came into immediate collision with English subjects, who,
taking shelter behind a royal patent from the English sov-
ereign to Sir William Alexander, in 1(321, set up a claim of
their own to the greater part of the territoiy constituting
Acadia. Here, then, began in earnest the quarrel that, last-
ing more than a century, terminated only in the total extinc-
tion of French sovereignty in Canada. Charles I of England,
having married a French princess, was prevailed upon to
abandon all settlements in Canada, Nova Scotia and Cape
Breton occupied by his subjects ; and by the treaty of St.
Germains (1(582) the French were made secure in their
possession of Acadia.

With so favorable a base for aggressive operations, the
French began at once to extend their fisheries and to enlarge
their dominion. They boasted that they would eventually
drive English colonists into the sea. Within three years
they obtained privileges from the English Government for
drying their fish on the southern shore of Newfoundland by
payment of a duty of 5 per cent on the product. In twenty-five
years more, by seizing the chance of an opportune moment,
they established a colony at Placentia, on the large ba}^ of
that name Csouth shore of Newfoundland). In a short time,
and apparently through the favor and sympathy of the English
sovereign, they were relieved from tlie 5 per cent duty which
had been previously exacted of them in return for shore privi-
leges. Growing bolder by success, they carried their sphere
of influence along the entire southern coast of Newfoundland,
establishing here and there fishing stations and small settle-
ments — meeting only occasional checks in their progress
from the English settlers on the island.

Cromwell seized Acadia in 16o4, duiing a ])eri()d of per-
fect peace between the two nations, on tlie alleged ground
that its transfer to the French by Charles I in 1(582 was
fraudulent and traitorous: l)iit upon llie restoration of the
Stuarts this valuable territor}^ was again restored to France
(tn'aty of Breda, 10(57), to the intense disgust of all Eng-
2 II

466 AMERICAN DIPLOMATIC QUESTIONS

lish fishermen, and other English subjects who had borne the
brunt of conflict with the ambitious and aggressive French-
men of North America.

The New EngLand colonists south of Acadia, who, by this
time, were becoming sensible of their increasing vigor and
strength, and who, moreover, were acquiring a degree of self-
confidence inspired by their triumphs over the many difficulties
attending their early settlements, looked upon the growth of
French power in the New World with bitter jealousy, inten-
sified as well by local conflict of interest. Not only as British
subjects with the usual antipathy against Frenchmen, but in
defence of their own colonial interests and welfare, they
opposed, whenever opportunity offered, the development of
French power and influence in Acadia or elsewhere in North
America.

After the breaking out of hostilities between France and
England, on the accession of William and Mary to the throne.
Sir William Pliips of Massachusetts, with a band of hardy
fishermen, made a successful attack on Port Royal (1690),
and took formal possession of all Acadia in the name of
King William. Phips' victory resulted in the alleged an-
nexation of that great province to Massachusetts. Similar
attempts were made upon Newfoundland, and among them
a desperate effort to dislodge the French from Placentia ;
but in retaliation St. Johns was successfully besieged by a
French fleet. The peace of Ryswick (1697) closed hostilities,
leaving the French in the New World in full possession of
their previous claims, and Acadia was specifically restored to
them. Their right to Placentia and to a considerable extent
of the Newfoundland shores was confirmed. The indigna-
tion of the English colonists in America, aroused by this
surrender of Acadia, was very great. It readily occurred to
these people that the mother country attached but little
value to her American possessions, or else had consented to
sacrifice her interests here as mere pawns on the chessboard
of European politics.

The new governor of Acadia, Villabon, announced, soon
after the treaty of 1697, that he had received orders from his

I

THE NORTHEAST COAST FISHERIES 467

home government to arrest any foreign vessels found tres-
passing on the French shores, the southern limit of -which he
placed at the Kennebec River. The way was now opened
to the goal of French ambition in America, and Villabon set
about to secure full and immediate control of the fisheries.
French fishing vessels, some five hundred in numl)ur, and
many of them well armed, soon practically enjoyed a monopoly
of the fisheries along the coasts and in the Gulf of 8t. Law-
rence, the returns proving exceedingly remunerative. In
order better to maintain this monopoly, he inaugurated a
military campaign in Newfoundland, the full possession of
which was ever dear to the French. Success attended their
arms, and in a very short time nearly every desirable settle-
ment, port and harbor in the island fell into their hands, and
Newfoundland became virtually lost to England. Frencli
enterprise had secured to them an almost absolute monopoly
of the fisheries, and they held besides the territory from
Maine to Labrador, including Newfoundland.

The hostilities incident to this great advance of Frencli
interests were terminated by the treaty of Utrecht in 1713,
which very consideraljly altered the political situation in the
North, and may be said to have inserted a wedge that ulti-
mately rended and destroyed French prestige and monopoly
of the fisheries in North American waters. B}^ this famous
compact the stronghold of Placentia was yielded by France,
and all Newfoundland restored to England. A reservation
was made, however, securing to the French a concurrent and
equal right of fishery with English subjects along the coast
of Newfoundland, from Bona Vista to Cape Riche by the
north, and of using the shores for curing, etc. Acadia again
became English territcjry, France retaining only the island of
Cape Breton. An instance is given in this treaty of a nation
establishing l^y agreement its exclusive sovereignty over a
wide exi)anse of high seas, for l)y one of its articles the
French were jjrohibited from approaching within thirty
leagues of the coast of Nova Scotia.

The French were Ijy no means discr)uraged by sucli re-
verses, and continued to press their fishing operations with

468 AMERICAN DIFLOMATIC QUESTIONS

their accustomed vigor. On the Newfoundland coast, within •
tlie area allotted to them, where they enjoyed concurrent
fishing rights, they at once began to assert an absolute and
exclusive right, and forbade the settlement of the region by
English subjects. In Cape Breton, where their fishing fleet
of some 400 sail rendezvoused, they constructed the famous
fortress of Louisburg. This position was maintained with
a sort of desperate determination as the last barrier against
English advance. It was designed and considered by the
French Government to be absolutely impregnable. It re-
quired twenty-five years to build, at a cost of $5,000,000.
Upon its great walls were placed 200 pieces of heavy artil-
lery, which gave defiance to all assault. Within these
massive fortifications reposed a city with full complement of
public edifices, churches, parks and the homes of several thou-
sand fishermen, by whose persevering industry the city was
made prosperous. In the building of this fortress, — " the
Dunkirk of America," — upon a low sandy spot in a desolate
island, a mere outpost in the vast wilderness of a new coun-
try, one finds a glaring example of the ill-judged policy that
has so generally characterized French colonial operations.
The splendid scale upon which this great fortress was built
measures the earnest and extraordinary interest felt by the
French at that period in the northeastern fisheries.

Louisburg was regarded by British subjects in America,
and especially in Massachusetts, as both an insult and a
menace. The aggressiveness of the French in prosecuting
the fisheries ; their unreasonable and exaggerated claims on
the Newfoundland coast, combined with the uneasiness and
jealousy produced by the contemplation of their position of
vantage and strength in Cape Breton, greatly irritated and
inflamed the colonists. They believed that French chicanery
and effrontery had accomplished what her arms had failed
to achieve, and it was thoroughly believed and constantly
asserted tliat tliere could be no lasting peace in America
until Gallic influence had been extirpated from the continent.

In 1744 war again broke out between England and
France, and the long-cherished plan of striking a blow at

THE NORTHEAST COAST FISHERIES 41)9

Louisburg was immediately set on foot in New England.
Massachusetts colony organized an expedition with Pep})er-
rell, a merchant of Kittery, Maine, at its head. With some
English ships as allies he maintained a siege under many
difficulties for nearly two months, and was finally rewarded
by the capitulation of the fortified city on June 10, 174").
The capture of Louisburg was an event of great importance.
Smollett refers to it as "the most important achievement of
the war of 1744," as it accomplished much toward balancing
English reverses across the Atlantic. Pepperrell was made
a baronet, and all the expenses of the campaign which had
been borne by Massachusetts were subsequently repaid to
the colony. The English colonists were jubilant over the
success of their expedition, but they were as suddenly disap-
pointed and chagrined when the English surrendered Cape
Breton with a restoration of Louisburg only three years
later in the peace of Aix la Chapelle. Again had the mother
country profited by the valor of her American subjects in
furthering her ends in Europe, and again had the French
reaped triumph from defeat in North America.

Louisburg was promptly rebuilt and strengthened, and a
vigorous effort was made by France to revive her fishing
industries, which had suffered severely by the war. It is
estimated that of the 560 French fishing vessels employed at
the beginning of the war of 1744, only about 100 remained
after the fall of Louisburg ; these carried on their opera-
tions almost entirely on the Newfoundland coast. Although
the F'rench were reaching the period of decline in the pros-
I)erity of their North American fishing interests, yet despite
all discouragements tliey had no intention of abandoning tlie
valuable industry. Reinstated in Cape Breton, the Frencli
at once resumed their old system of aggression. The ancient
quarrels, involving questions of boundary and of fishing
rights, were revived. Seemingly incapable of peaceful rela-
tions with others, when their interests were touclied, they
began to renew their attacks on Newfoundland, and to make
liostile raids into Nova Scotia. War again l)roke out l)etween
England and France in 1756, one of the causes of which was

470 AMERICAN DIPLOMATIC QUESTIONS

these French aggressions upon Nova Scotia and Newfound-
land ; and it gave the British subjects in America the oppor-
tunity they especially desired — to remove, if possible, the
humiliation brought on them by the disgraceful peace treaty
of Aix la Chapelle. A strong British fleet commanded by
Lord Amherst, with the gallant Wolfe second in command,
and supported by nearly one-third of the fighting strength
of Massachusetts, again captured Louisburg in 1758, and
razed its battlements to the ground ; the following year
Wolfe marched into Canada and captured Quebec. With
the fall of these two strongholds, French power in the New
World was broken, and Great Britain became mistress of
her possessions in North America.

It was during this same war that the attempt was made by
the British authorities in Nova Scotia to remove from that
colony all vestiges of Latin influence, by forcibl}^ expelling
the French settlers from the land. The execution of this
harsh and cruel policy furnishes the saddest chapter in the
somewhat romantic history of Acadia. Thousands were de-
ported to the Virginia and New England colonies, where
they found a scant welcome, and many hundreds perished
miserably through exposure and want. The pathetic incidents
connected with the depopulation of the French village of
Grand Pre, conducted by the unwilling Lieutenant Winslow,
who declared the duty " very disagreeble to my natural make
and temper," gave to Longfellow the theme for " Evange-
line." If the chroniclers of the time are reliable, the natives
of Grand Pre were not altogether the simple-hearted, peace-
loving people depicted by the poet, but were rather a
troublesome and somewhat vicious colony of fishermen
who lost no opportunity to inflict injury upon tlie New
England skippers who came in contact with them. Candor,
however, compels one in forming estimates of the moral
qualities of the French and English fishermen of the seven-
teenth and eighteenth centuries, to divide honors about
equally between them. If the French in Nova Scotia were
sullen and unruly under English dominion, and if they enjoyed
harrying New Englanders when they came to the Bay of

THE NORTHEAST COAST FISHERIES 471

Fundy, they probably found ample justification for their mis-
deeds in the bad treatment they had themselves received.

In dravi^ing up the treaty of peace which was concluded
in Paris in 1763, much dil^culty was encountered by the
plenipotentiaries in adjusting the fishery question which
appears to have claimed consideration beyond all other
topics. France, driven to extremities, seemed willing
enough to lose all of Canada, but she insisted upon the
retention of some parcel of territory as a basis from wliich
to carry on her fisheries. Strong opposition to any fish-
ing concessions manifested itself in England, it being ear-
nestly contended that the fisheries alone were worth more
than possession of all Canada. It was finally agreed that
France should continue her use of the shores of Newfound-
land from Bona Vista to Cape Riche, as had been previously
stipulated in the treaty of Utrecht. French fishermen were
not allowed to fish elsewhere within three leagues of the
shore ; and along the coast of Cape Breton an interdiction of
fifteen leagues was placed against them. The islands of St.
Pierre and Miquelon were ceded to France in full right, to
serve as shelter to its fishermen, and the French engaged
not to fortify or to effect permanent settlements upon the
same.

The French fishery interests had again suffered severely
by these wars, although after the treaty of Paris, through
generous bounties and every kind of governmental encour-
agement, they slowly revived, and in course of time recov-
ered a share of their former prestige. France having sided
with the American colonists in their war of independence,
suffered the loss of St. Pierre and Micjuelon, but by the
treaty of Versailles in 1783, these islands were restored, to-
gether with an extension of privileges theretofore granted
on tlie shores of Newfoundland, giving them an area of shore
line for curing, from Cape St. John to Cape Ray. Tlie
phraseology of this treaty, defining tlie nature of the rights
of France on the Newfoundland shore, furnished another sub-
ject of contention to English and French statesmen, until a
true meaning was agreed upon in 1881, nearly a century

472 AMERICAN DIPLOMATIC QUESTIONS

later. The French insisted upon their exclusive right to
occupy the shore areas allotted to them, even as against Brit-
ish settlers.

Despite continued ill-feeling between French and English
fishing interests, both have nevertheless prospered, and the
friction between them has gradually diminished ever since.

Ill

In seeking a home for themselves and their posterity, the
Pilgrim Fathers were largely influenced in their choice of a
place of settlement by the value they attached to the fisher-
ies of New England. Enthusiastic descriptions of the abun-
dance of cod in that region had reached them in England.
The reports of Gosnold in 1602 ; of Pring, who explored
the harbors of Maine in 1603 ; of Waymouth in 1605 ; of
Popham and Gilbert who settled in Maine in 1608 ; and of
the romantic John Smith who caught 47,000 cod at Monhe-
gan in 1614, and who devoted pages " writ with his oune
hande " to the wealth of the fisheries in the New World, and
especially in New England, — all of these had been read and
considered by the Puritans before making their exodus to
the West. Before abandoning forever the shores of the
Old World, they executed contracts with certain merchants
in England, to whom they agreed to furnish fish, hoping
thereby to defray the expenses of their voyage. In his his-
tory of Virginia, John Smith takes credit to himself for
having been largely instrumental in inducing the Pilgrims
to come to the New World on account of his favorable repre-
sentations regarding the New England fisheries. In a dis-
course on the trials of the New England colonists and their
wonderful industry in fishing, he enumerates the English
ships that had made " exceeding good voyages " to the
coasts, and continuing, says, "at last, upon these induce-
ments, some well-disposed Brunists [Puritans], as they are
termed, with some gentlemen and merchants of Leyden and
Amsterdam, to save charges, would try their oune conclu-
sions, though with great losse and much miserie." He

I

THE NORTHEAST COAST FISHERIES 473

refers later to the prosperity of the little band in 1634 —
" since they had made a salt worke wherewith they preserv
all the fish they take, and have fraughted this yeare a ship
of an hundred and four score tun."

The Pilgrims lost no time in entering upon the business
of fishing. Within ten years after their landing at Plym-
outh Rock, they carried on an export fish trade with Eng-
lish and Dutch settlers in New York ; indeed, fishing became
the 2)rincipal occupation and chief source of revenue of the
people of New Plj-mouth, and tlie rapid settlement of Mas-
sachusetts after the founding of that colony was greatly
promoted by the great profits arising from the fishing
interests on its coast. The colonists at Plymouth found
remunerative occupation, while English vessels at Monhe-
gan and other points along the coast of Maine reported fish
in great abundance.

It was during the infancy of the Massachusetts colony
that Salem, Gloucester and Marblehead were founded, and
they soon became centres of great importance for fishing
and other associated interests. The first Massachusetts
ship visited the Banks of Newfoundland in 1645 — a pioneer
destined to have an abundant following. Some friction
between the fishermen of Plymouth and Boston manifested
itself, but all such differences were finally adjusted by unit-
ing the two colonies in 1692, and the fisheries of the greater
Massachusetts flourished more extensively than ever. At
the close of the seventeenth century, the merchants of Boston
exported to Portugal, Spain and Italy about 100,000 quin-
tals of cod, worth 8400,000 annually.

In 1731 the fisheries of this colony employed about
6000 men. Ten years later the cod fishery had become
exceedingly prosperous ; the annual product being about
•J30,000 quintals, valued at 8700,000. One hundred and
sixty fifty-ton vessels were owned at Marblehead alone ;
and it is estimated that in all Massachusetts counted about
400 fishing vessels, together with multitudes of smaller
fishing craft operating along New England shore stations.

A variety of causes contributed to tiie decline of the New

474 AMERICAN DIPLOMATIC QUESTIONS

England fisheries from 1740 to 1763. As already noted, the
struggles between the French and English in Nova Scotia,
Cape Breton and Newfoundland were especialh/ acute at
that period, and the New Englanders, as British subjects,
were expected to answer repeated calls to arms. Fishermen
were impressed into the royal navy, or were drafted into
military expeditions by land against the traditional foe ;
and, as is usual in war, industrial pursuits languished.

After the final capitulation of Louisburg and the fall of
Quebec, the fishing interests of the British colonies revived,
and the coast towns of New England would have greatly
increased in population and wealth, but for the threatening
controversies which soon led to the American Revolution,
and the final separation of the thirteen colonies from the
mother country. The commencement of actual hostilities
of course suspended all fishing operations until the restora-
tion of i^eace in 1783.

The important role plaj^ed by the fisheries in the causes
that led to the Revolutionary War does not appear to be fully
appreciated. Other causes assumed greater and more gen-
eral prominence in popular discussion because they affected
interests more extended in their nature, and exerted an influ-
ence on a greater number of the colonists. England had
watched with jealous eyes the steadily growing trade — the
expanding commerce and the rapidl}' increasing marine
power of the New England colonies. This colonial trade
had already extended to the ports of Europe and South
America, and to the Spanish, French and English West
Indies as well, where American fish found ready market to
be paid for in sugar, molasses, rum, bullion and bills of
exchange payable in European cities. The commercial
prestige of New England began to interfere in no slight
degree with the foreign trade of English merchants, and
the excellent nautical training acquired by New England
fishermen and sailors began to arouse the apprehension of
Englishmen who demanded exclusive dominion in all that
pertains to British industries.

The policy of curtailing American commerce by legislative

THE NORTHEAST COAST FISHERIES 475

enactment began with the restoration of the Stuarts, and was
maintained by a series of more or less stringent navigation
laws which imposed the most injurious and oppressive bur-
dens upon the colonists. In 1733 Parliament placed a duty
in New England on rum, sugar and molasses imported from
the islands of the West Indies other than British, the aim
being to check the prosperous trade that had sprung up be-
tween Boston and the French, Dutch and Spanish islands.
This measure, along with other measures restricting export
trade from New England, tended to work great injury to the
fishing interests. The merchants of Boston complained bit-
terl}', saying that the fisheries were their mainstay of life,
and that to prevent trade with the West Indies was to do no
less than render their fisheries of little value — in short, to
convert their gold into dross. An English fleet was sent
over to enforce the tariff law, but its commander reported,
"ye fishermen to be stubberne fellowes," and in spite of his
vigilance, the West Indian trade continued as before, in defi-
ance of Parliamentary action. The act of 1733 was renewed
in 17<34, and the vigilance of the authorities doubled. The
jurisdiction of the admiralty courts was enlarged, and
determined efforts were made by the officers of the crown
to collect the duties. For this purpose commanders of the
English men-of-war were commissioned to act as revenue
collectors.

The field having just been cleared of the annoying compe-
tition of French fishermen, the Americans were about to enter
upon an era of great prosperity. Their fishing stations were
located at Canso, in tlie Bay of Chaleur, and extended along
the Labrador coast, and a certain renewal of former successes
was just in sight. The navigation laws of England, how-
ever, operated so adversely to American interests that the
Englisli fishermen, untrammelled by these exactions, soon
regained a monopoly in the fishing business. Many New
England skippers became discouraged and took their vessels
and outfits abroad, where they sold tlicin to llieir more fortu-
nate rivals. By evasions of the law, however, many of the
merchants and fishermen of Boston, Salem and Gloucester

476 AMERICAN DIPLOMATIC QUESTIONS

still managed to maintain themselves, but only at the cost of
frequent collisions with the king's officers.

The effect upon the fisheries, caused by the renewal of the
navigation laws of 1764, is well set forth in the petition of the
common council of Massachusetts to the House of Commons
for their abrogation. It recites that the importation of mo-
lasses from the West India Islands is of the greatest import-
ance, not merely because it is a valuable and useful commodit}',
but, — " If the trade, for many years carried on for foreign
molasses can no longer be continued, a vent cannot be found
for more than one-half the fish of inferior quality which are
caught and cured by the inhabitants of the province, the
French not permitting fish to be carried by foreigners to
any of their islands unless to be bartered or exchanged for
molasses ; that if there be no sale of fish of inferior quality,
it will be impossible to continue the fishery ; the fish usually
sent to England will then cost so dear that the French will
be able to undersell the English in all the European markets."
Thus it will be seen that tlie fisheries, which formed the
basis of New England commerce, and which may be said to
have been the very life-blood of all its commercial enterprise,
had a most intimate relation to the causes that soon brought
about the dismemberment of the empire.

The final act of Great Britain in its policy toward New
England, and which at last brought on the w^ar, was aimed
directly against the fisheries, its purpose being to starve the
rebellious colonists into submission by destro3'ing their most
important industry. Pending the discussion of the bill in
the English Parliament " to restrain the trade and commerce
of the provinces of Massachusetts Bay and New Hampshire,
the colonists of Connecticut and Rhode Island and Providence
plantation, in North America, to Great Britain, Ireland, and
the British Islands in the West Indies; and to prohibit such
provinces and colonies from carrying on any fisheries on the
banks of Newfoundland or other places therein to be men-
tioned, under certain conditions, and for a time to be limited,"
an examination of witnesses from Massachusetts by a com-
mittee of Parliament elicited the statements that the enforce-

THE NORTHEAST COAST FISHERIES 477

ment of such an act would deprive over sixty-two hundred
inliabitants of Massachusetts of the means of livelihood, and
throw out of employment ten thousand persons. An expert
witness from Nantucket declared tliat the great number of
people then engaged in the fisheries in New England, if de-
prived of the right of following their calling, could onl}'
subsist "perhaps three months."

After a stormy debate in both Houses of Parliament, the
bill was passed March 21, 1775. The passage of this act, so
well calculated to destroy the fisheries of the New England
colonies, was soon followed by a motion of Lord North, then
the British Premier, that the " House do resolve itself into a
committee of the whole to consider the encouragement proper
to be given to the fisheries of Great Britain and Ireland."

During the entire period of the war, the fisheries of New
England as a business ceased, and the fishermen took an
active part in the conflict. In the negotiations of the colo-
nies with France, seeking her aid against England, a proposi-
tion was advanced to attempt jointly the capture of Canada
and Newfoundland, and if successful, to divide between France
and the United States all fishing privileges accruing there-
from. The plan was never seriously entertained by France,
and was lost sight of in the United States, amid the stirring
events of the Revolution.

Although systematic prosecution of work was necessarily
abandoned during the war, the importance and value of the
fisheries were steadily kept in view, and after the termination
of the conflict the necessity of preserving these interests is
evidenced by numerous resolutions of Congress, and is further
indicated in the debates of various state legislatures (espe-
cially in New England), and in frequent utterances of the
public men of the times. It seems to have been believed by
many American statesmen of that day that because New
England fishermen had contributed their share of Ijlood and
treasure in the joint struggles against France for the purpose
of securing fishery riglits in the Canadian waters, it followed
as a natural and legal consequence that Americans must have
a perfect riglit to their continued enjoyment quite irrespective

478 AMERICAN DIPLOMATIC QUESTIONS

of any territorial changes, — in which respect it made no
difference whether Canada and Newfoundland should remain
under the sovereignty of England or pass to the United
States at the conclusion of hostilities. In the light of a
better understanding of the public law on this subject, it
now seems clear that the fishery rights must attach to and
adhere to the ownership of and sovereignty over the terri-
tories in whose w^aters the fish are found. Americans should
have been left free to fish on the Banks, for they lie wholly
without the limits of territorial marine jurisdiction, and are
therefore free to the world, — but the right to catch fish in
Canadian waters, that is, within the three-mile limit of ordi-
dary marine jurisdiction, was wholly a different matter. In the
one case (the Bank fishery) no fears should have been enter-
tained at any time touching the question of American rights.
The public law settles this matter, and gives all nations the
right to fish outside territorial waters. In the other case,
a continuance of inshore fishing by Americans in Canadian
territorial waters, as enjoyed by them while British colonists,
could not have been allowable as an international right, nor
could such right have been legally based on the relations of
the parties existing prior to the- peace of 1783. The appre-
hensions of the statesmen of the period lest Great Britain
should attempt in a spirit of retaliation to perpetuate the
interdictions of Lord North's Bill and thus seek, perhaps by
force of arms, to cut off Americans from all participation in
the northern fisheries, were possibly well founded. It was
determined, at all events, to make the question of the fisheries
a prominent subject of the treaty of peace with England.
The fishery interests of the country were supposed to be so
intimately associated with its commercial prosperity that no
conditions interfering with their full development could be
tolerated ; indeed, it was urged in many quarters that their
importance warranted a continuance of the war, if need be,
to preserve them inviolate.

The firm purpose of Congress to insist upon a full recogni-
tion of these fishing rights as a sme qua non of commercial
relations with England was supported by all its members,

THE NORTHEAST COAST FISHERIES 479

barring certain delegates from the extreme South. These
legishitors represented constituents who had never partici-
pated in the fisheries, and who therefore felt their import-
ance less keenly. Mr. Gerry, of Massachusetts, replied to
their protests against making free fishery an important
feature of the coming peace negotiations : " It is not so
much fishing as enterprise, industry, employment. It is not
fish merely, which gentlemen sneer at, — it is gold, the prod-
uct of that avocation. It is the employment of those who
would otherwise be idle, the food of those who would other-
wise be hungry, the wealth of those who would otherwise be
poor, that depend on your putting these resolutions into the
instructions of your minister."

After a lengthy debate (1779) Congress instructed John
Adams, who was then in Europe acting in a diplomatic
capacity, and to whom had been entrusted the responsibility
of negotiating a treaty of peace with England, " that the
common right of fishing would in no case be given up " ;
" that it is essential to the welfare of all the United States
that the inhabitants thereof, at the expiration of the war,
should continue to enjoy the free and undisturbed exercise
of their common right to fish on the Banks of Newfound-
land, and all other fishing banks and seas of North America,
preserving inviolate the treaties between France and the said
States " ; " that our faith be pledged to the several states
that without their unanimous consent no treaty of commerce
shall be entered into, nor any trade or commerce whatever
carried on with Great Britain, without the explicit stipula-
tion hereinafter mentioned. You are, therefore, not to con-
sent to any treaty of commerce with Great Britain without
an explicit stipulation on her part not to molest or disturb
the inhabitants of the United States of America in taking
fish on tlie Banks of Newfoundland, and other fislieries in
the American seas, anywhere except within the distance of
three leagues of the shores of the territories remaining to
Great Britain at the close of the war. If a nearer distance
cannot be obtained by negotiations, you are to exert your
most strenuous endeavors to obtain a nearer distance in the

480 AMERICAN DIPLOMATIC QUESTIONS

Gulf of St. Lawrence, and particularly along the shores of
Nova Scotia ; as to which latter, we are desirous that even
the shores may be occasionally used for the purpose of carr}--
ing on the fisheries by the inhabitants of those states."

Before actual negotiations for a treaty of peace Math Eng-
land were entered upon, innumerable difficulties had arisen
to dishearten American legislators, and these difficulties
tended to weaken the obligatory force of previous congres-
sional resolutions on the subject. The war dragged on
remorselessly, exhausting the slender resources of the country
and discouraging the brave men who were sacrificing their
all in the cause of freedom. To-day peace was in sight, to-
morrow it seemed farther away than ever ; and the disheart-
ened patriots realized too well that the English ministry was
firm in its determination to withhold any fishery concessions.
Other important concessions besides the fisheries had to be
secured from England, and form a part of any treaty of
peace — such as the navigation of the Mississippi River,
the delimitations of boundaries, indemnities, etc. ; but first,
and above all, independence, the primar}^ object of the war,
was to be obtained at any and all cost. The yielding of this
concession alone, in the judgment of Congress, would be so
distasteful to the mother countr}- that it might not be well
to jeopardize the treaty by making other demands scarcely
less distasteful to England. Might it not prove unreasonable,
or at least impolitic, to prolong a war begun for freedom,
simply to keep inviolate a single commercial privilege which
might be as well secured by subsequent treaty ? In a gloomy
mood Congress therefore declared that, "although it is of
the utmost importance to the peace and commerce of the
United States that Canada and Nova Scotia should be ceded,
and more particularly that their equal common right to the
fisheries should be guaranteed to them, yet a desire of termi-
nating the war has induced us not to make the acquisition
of these objects an ultimatum on the present occasion." It
was thus that in July, 1781, the instructions to Mr. Adams of
1779 were overruled, much to the chagrin of that zealous
patriot.

THE NORTHEAST COAST FISHERIES 481

In addition to the obstacles in the way of a probable reten-
tion of full fishing rights alread}' mentioned, others of a
most serious character suddenly presented themselves from
an unexpected source. France had given to the struggling
colonists not only moral support, but that substantial and
material aid without which a successful issue of tlie war for
independence would have been next to impossible. American
friendship for France was sincere and profound. Confidence
in her motives was without suspicion and undisturbed by
doubt. American gratitude recognized the full measure of
obligation due to an act of disinterested beneficence and
kindness. In the progress of efforts toward peace, the
disagreeable and startling fact became apparent that our
ally entertained some schemes of self-interest hardly com-
patible with the generous motives which had been originally
ascribed to her. Traces of French reserve in the proposed
adjustment of questions growing out of the war were
first detected in the matter of the fislieries ; but the benefit
of presumed innocence was for some time accorded to the
action of the French Government, and its motives were
ascribed to the accomplishment of ends not prejudicial
to American interests. It subsequently came to light,
however, that Count de Vergennes, the astute Minister of
State at Paris, had carefully mapped out a course of action
relating to the fisheries, in the event of American indepen-
dence, which looked to the enjoyment of a monopoly of this
valuable industry by France and Spain to the entire exclu-
sion of the Americans. This seemingly inconsistent attitude
of the French premier toward his ally across the ocean may
be fully understood when considered in connection with the
grand scheme he had planned for so sliaping the destinies
of the new republic as to hold them permanently under
French influence. The people of America w^ere to have
"liberty," of course, but liberty under French domination.
In no event did he propose to permit the growth of the new
nation to interfere with the interests of his own country, it
being his intention, on the contrary, to train his protege into
a subservient and useful ally of France. According to De
2i

482 AMERICAN DIPLOMATIC QUESTIONS

Vergenues, the territorial limits of the United States were
to be confined to a narrow strip along the Atlantic seaboard ;
they were to be " circumscribed," he wrote, " with the great-
est exactness, and all the belligerent powers [England,
France, and Spain] must bind themselves to prevent any
transgression of them." In the furtherance of his project to
perpetuate the glory of France on the Western continent,
and to humiliate his Anglo-Saxon enemy, he flattered himself
upon having made an excellent beginning. By timely aid to
the United States in its period of distress he had won the
gratitude and confidence of the young nation, and it needed
but the exercise of vigilance and political sagacity to guide
its future steps in paths of his own making. As a guardian
it was necessary to gain control of the nation's diplomatic
bureau, and for himself to negotiate for his ward its treaty
of peace with Great Britain. The young eagle's wings were
to be clipped at once.

French diplomatic agents in Philadelphia exerted all their
influence over Congress to bring about this end, and with
such skill, be it said, that in July, 1781, Congress instructed
the peace commission (now to be enlarged by the appoint-
ment of Jay, Franklin, Jefferson, and Laurens), to take no
initiative in the coming negotiations for peace without the
knowledge and consent of the king of France, and, "ulti-
mately to govern ourselves by their advice and opinion,
endeavoring in our whole conduct to make him sensible how
much we rely on His Majesty's influence for effectual sup-
port." Madison bitterly denounced this resolution of Con-
gress as a "sacrifice of the national dignity." About one
year later an intercepted letter of Marbois, a French diplo-
mat in the United States, to De Vergennes, when made pub-
lic, aroused great and well-merited indignation, as it furnished
the first real proof of French duplicity toward the United
States. It had a wholesome effect in determining the course
of action to be followed by the peace commissioners in Paris.

The letter is in part as follows : —

But Mr. Samuel Adams is using all his endeavors to raise in
the State of Massachusetts a strong opposition to peace if the

THE NORTHEAST COAST FISHERIES 483

Eastern States are not thereby admitted to the fisheries, and in
particular to that of Newfoundland . . . and if the States should
agree relative to the fisheries, and be certain of partaking of them,
all his measures and intrigues would be directed toward the con-
quest of Canada and Nova Scotia ; but he could not have used a
fitter engine than the fisheries for stirring up the passions of the
eastern people, by renewing the question which has lain dormant
during his two years absence from Boston. He has raised the
expectations of the people to an extravagant pitch. The public
prints hold forth the importance of the fisheries. The reigning
toast in the East is " May the United States ever maintain their
rights to the fisheries." It has often been repeated in the delib-
erations of the General Courts, " no peace without the fisheries."
However clear the principle may be in this matter, it would be
useless, and even dangerous, to attempt informing the people
through the public papers. But it appears to me possible to
use all means for preventing the consequences of success to
Mr. Samuel Adams and his party ; and I take the liberty of sub-
mitting them to your discernment and indulgence.

Jefferson did not act upon the peace commission, and
Laurens did so only at its close. Jay, who was then Minis-
ter at Madrid, had resided long enough abroad to become
thoroughly imbued with a distrust in the genuineness of
French and Spanish friendship toward his country, and
he deprecated his instructions to abide by the wishes of
any European sovereign. John Adams fairly blazed with
indignation at the humiliating conditions placed by Con-
gress upon himself and his associate commissioners, and he
determined to rebel against the meddling interference of the
French court, whose treachery to the United States touch-
ing the fisheries he thoroughly understood. Franklin, then
United States Minister at Paris, had grown more com-
plaisant to French intrigues, or possibly he feared them less
than did his colleagues, but lie nevertheless yielded to the
proposals of Adams and Jay, and the negotiations were con-
sequently carried on by the three American peace commis-
sioners entirely upon their own responsibility, and without
the aid or advice of De Vergennes or of the French court.

The firmness of these men in adhering to their ultimatum
that a fishery clause granting ample rights to Americans

484 AMERICAN DIPLOiVIATIC QUESTIONS

was one of the conditions of peace with England, and their
courage in ignoring French interference, though done in
open defiance of instructions from Congress, secured the
excellent foundation upon which have rested all the fishery-
rights and privileges the United States has since enjoyed in
Canadian waters. To John Adams especial credit is due.
His steadfastness of purpose inspired his colleagues to share
with him the risk of disobeying legislative commands in so
important a matter, and of assuming the responsibility-
incurred in slighting the French court at a critical moment
when foreign sympathy^ could ill be spared.

The discussions of the commissioners concerning the fish-
eries were long and tedious, and the opposition of the Eng-
lish to any satisfactory form of concession in relation to
them was only" gradually and with great difficulty overcome.
Had the fishery interest been the only one involved, the
matter might have been settled after a comparatively easy
diplomatic struggle, but to retain the fisheries deprived
the American negotiators of capital to draw upon in pay-
ment for the other equally valuable concessions which they
demanded.

On one occasion, when the phraseology of the fishery
clause was under discussion, an English commissioner objected
to the word " right " of fishing instead of liberty^ as a term
obnoxious to his countrymen, to which Mr. Adams replied :
" Gentlemen, is there or can there be a clearer right ? In
former treaties — that of Utrecht and that of Paris — France
and England have claimed the right to use the word. When
God Almighty made the banks of Newfoundland, at three
hundred leagues distant from the people of America, and at
six hundred leagues distant from those of France and Eng-
land, did He not give as good a right to the former as to
the latter ? If Heaven, at the creation, gave a right, it is
ours at least as much as it is yours. If occupation, use,
and possession give a right, we have it as clearly as you. If
war and blood and treasure give a right, ours is as good as
yours. We have been continually fighting in Canada, Cape
Breton, and Nova Scotia for the defence of this fishery, and

THE NORTHEAST COAST FISHERIES 485

have expended beyond all proportion more than you. If,
then, the right cannot be denied, why should it not be
acknowledged and be put out of dispute ? Why should we
leave room for illiterate fishermen to wrangle and cldcane ? "
As finally signed on September 3, 1783, Article III of the
treaty of Paris stands as follows : —

It is agreed that the people of the United States shall continue
to enjoy unmolested the right to take fish of every kind on the
Grand Bank, and on all the other banks of Newfoundland; also
in the Gulph of St. Lawrence, and at all other places in the sea,
where the inhabitants of both countries used at any time hereto-
fore to fish; and also that the inhabitants of the United States
shall have the liberty to take fish of every kind on such part of
the coast of Newfoundland as British fishermen shall use (but
not to dry or cure the same on that island) ; and also on the
coasts, bays and creeks, of all other of His British Majesty's
dominions in America; and that the American fishermen shall
have the liberty to dry and cure fish in any of the unsettled bays,
harbours and creeks of Nova Scotia, Magdalen Islands, and Lab-
rador, so long as the same shall remain unsettled ; but so soon as
the same, or either of them shall be settled, it shall not be law-
ful for the said fishermen to dry or cure fish at such settlement,
without a previous agreement for that purpose with the inhabit-
ants, proprietors or possessors of the ground.

It will be observed, then, that in regard to the fisheries,
very few privileges enjoyed by the American colonists (as
British subjects) were denied to them as American citizens by
the treaty of Paris. The Bank fishery was recognized by
England to be beyond her legislative control, and therefore
open and free to the world ; likewise the fishery of the (iulf
of St. Lawrence. The treaty rights to take fish in the in-
shore waters of Canada were ample ; all that marine area,
including the ]>ays and creeks of the Dominion coast,
was left free to American fishermen. Two restrictions only
were placed upon them, first, that they should not use the
Newfoundland shores for purposes of drying or curing their
fish, — and second, they should not, upon all the balance of
the British-American coast (where such privileges were
granted), so locate their stages as to molest or annoy the

486 AMERICAN DIPLOMATIC QUESTIONS

inhabitants. This latter restriction was a proper and wise
one, and could have called for no reasonable complaint. The
withholding from American fishermen of the Newfoundland
shores for the purpose of curing fish was regarded as unfortu-
nate, for these being nearer the Banks were more convenient
for the establishment of shore stations. Had American citi-
zens been accorded this one additional right to the others
acquired by the < treaty, there would virtually have been no
distinction drawn between American and English fishermen
in their freedom of movements in Canadian territorial
waters or on Canadian soil.

IV

At the close of the Revolutionary War, the fisheries were
substantially annihilated, and their restoration to a condition
of vigor was neither immediate nor rapid. An order issued
by proclamation (July, 1783) in London, prohibited the
importation of American fish into British West Indian
ports. This action was a telling blow to the greatly weak-
ened American industry, and adverse tariff regulations in
various foreign markets added to the causes that retarded
its growth. To offset these depressing foreign influences,
efforts were made by Congress to stimulate the languishing
fisheries by means of bounties. In 1789 an act was passed
allowing a bounty of five cents per quintal on all dried, and
five cents a barrel on all pickled (salted) fish exported, and,
at the time, imposing a duty on fish imported into the United
States. Even this encouragement seems to have been insuf-
ficient, for the fishermen of Gloucester soon after presented
a petition to Congress setting forth a grievous story of their
losses, with a prayer for further measures of relief.

The necessity of reviving the fisheries seems to have been
generally accepted by the legislators of the period. The
reasons given were not simply that the industry was in itself
a valuable one and promised wealth to its followers, but
higher considerations of national utility were advanced for
its encouragement. President Washington, in 1790, an-

THE NORTHEAST COAST FISHERIES 487

nounced that " our fisheries and the transportation of our
own produce oifer us abundant means for guarding ourselves
against depending upon foreign vessels." The views of Con-
gress are reflected in its reply to the President's message :
" The navigation and the fisheries of tlie United States are
objects too interesting not to inspire a disposition to promote
them by all the means which shall appear to us consistent
with their natural progress and permanent prosperity."

The fishermen's appeal was answered, and in 1792 a new
law was created abolishing the bounties on exported fish,
and in lieu thereof a specific tonnage allowance was made to
all American vessels engaged in the fisheries. This law was
more or less altered by subsequent legislative acts, until
finally all bounties and allowances to fishermen were abolished
in 1854. These various l)ounty acts had always met more
or less opposition on constitutional grounds. A generation
later, Senator Benton opposed them with all the vigor and
strength which that parliamentary leader possessed. Fur-
ther legislative measures were taken to improve the condi-
tion of the fisliermen by the act of 1793 authorizing the
customs officials to grant to fishing vessels licenses " to
touch and trade " at any foreign port or place. The object
of this act was to enable the fishermen to purchase in foreign
i^orts, — and free of all duties, — needful supplies of salt,
provisions, fishing gear, etc. This privilege was certainly of
great benefit to the fishermen, who availed themselves of it
to carry on regular trading operations in Newfoundland and
in Canadian ports. Thus it soon led to abuses that later
ushered in a series of diplomatic complications, and added
to the " fishery question " new elements of controversy.

Despite these earnest efforts to infuse new life into the
crippled fisheries, they rallied but slowly from the shock of
war. Statistics of the yearly catches from 1789 to 1812 in-
dicate a wavering increase in vessels and tonnage employed,
but the fishermen had nevertheless reason to rejoice in fairly
bright prosi)ects for renewal of the pros[)erity they had
enjoyed before tlie Revolution. When their hopes were
about to be realized, the sliadow of tlie approaching political

488 AMERICAN DIPLOMATIC QUESTIONS

crises of 1812 depressed the fisheries. Jefferson's Embargo
measures brought great distress to the fishermen, and the
advent of war soon after drove them from the Banks, and
completely paralyzed their industry.

Immediately following the withdrawal of the British
forces from the United States at the close of the Revolu-
tionary War, a strong dislike was manifested for the " Tories,"
or those who had remained loyal to England throughout the
struggle for independence. Numbers of these disaffected
people emigrated to Nova Scotia and to Canada ; not a few
of them established homes in Newfoundland. These disap-
pointed men, no doubt nurturing feelings of resentment^
regarded with jealous interest the operations of American
fishermen in Canadian waters. As loyal emigrants making
new settlements on the coasts of New Brunswick and Nova
Scotia, they were naturally loath to recognize the rights of
American fishermen under the treaty of 1783, namely, to
use British shores for drjdng and curing their fish ; and they
were in a mood to record eagerly any transgression of privi-
leges by their old enemies as they were always vigilant to
detect them in misdeeds of any kind. These unfriendly
settlers along the Canadian shores were largely instrumental,
it is known, in causing the British colonies in 1807 to make
protests to their home government against the conduct of the
Americans ; later, upon the outbreak of hostilities between
England and the United States, and the consequent abroga-
tion of all former treaties between those powers, they took
the opportunity to urge upon the British Government a
refusal to renew any fishing privileges Avhatever in their
waters. These appeals, backed by many representations of
the pernicious moral influences exerted by New England
fishermen over the inhabitants of Nova Scotia and Labrador,
through their evasions of custom duties, illicit trading, etc.,
soon convinced the British ministry that England had been
far too generous for her own good in granting such extended

THE NORTHEAST COAST FISHERIES 489

and valuable fishery rights to her seceded colonists. Accord-
ingly, at the close of tlie War of 1812 (though before the
battle of New Orleans), when the American peace commis-
sioners arrived in Ghent for the purpose of making a new
treaty with England, they were met at the outset by the asser-
tion of the British commissioners that " it was thought proper
in candor to state, that in relation to the fisheries, although
it was not intended to contest the right of the United States
to them, yet so far as respected the concessions to land and
dry fish within the exclusive jurisdiction of the British, it was
proposed not to renew that without an equivalent," and fur-
ther, that " the British Government did not intend to grant to
the United States gratuitously the privileges formerly granted
by treaty to them, of fishing within the limits of the British
sovereignty, and of using the shores of the British territo-
ries for purposes connected with the British fisheries." John
Quincy Adams, speaking for the American commissioners,
replied that they had not intended to mention the subject
of fisheries, that question not being one of the subjects of
difference in the war just concluded.

Although it had become apparent before 1812 that different
conceptions of the force and character of the third article of
the treaty of Paris were held in England and the United
States, then for the first time, the opposing views, as to the
exact nature of American claims to the inshore fisheries as
expressed by that article, came face to face.

The English held that the liberties accorded the Americans
by the third article of the treaty of 1783 to fish within the
territorial waters of Great Britain and to land on the shores
of Nova Scotia, to dry and cure fish, were in the nature
of a grant or a concession, and were liable, as are all such
treaty rights and privileges, to abrogation by subsequent
war between tlie parties. The British commissioners as-
sumed, therefore, tliat these inshore privileges had been ter-
minated by the War of 1812, and that should the United States
desire a renewal or modification of them, such could only be
obtained through new treaty stipulations. They drew a dis-
tinction, however, between the fisheries on the Banks (or in

490 AMERICAN DIPLOMATIC QUESTIONS

all waters lying without the marine jurisdiction of Great
Britain) and those fisheries that were prosecuted within such
marine jurisdiction (vaguely regarded then as all waters lying
within three leagues of the shore). The former, they were
willing to concede, belonged equally to all nations, — as fixed
and permanent a right as the navigation of the high seas ;
the latter, the inshore fisheries, belonged to England alone,
and any transfer of privileges to other nations by treaty to
participate therein was necessarily in the form of a contract,
— and contracts between nations are cancelled by war.

The American commissioners took a radically different view
of the situation. It will be remembered that in 1782, when
the treaty of Paris was being negotiated, John Adams, sup-
ported by the opinions of many prominent men of New
England, had stoutly contended that these inshore fisher-
ies of Canada, together with all landing privileges to cure
fish, belonged to Americans, in equal right, as well as they
belonged to England. They had fought and bled for them,
and as American citizens they were entitled to them quite as
much as were the Canadians who had chosen to remain
British subjects. Mr. Livingstone, Secretary of State, in
writing of the bank fisheries to Benjamin Franklin, January
7, 1782, said: —

The arguments on which the people of America found their
claim to fish on the banks of Newfoundland arise, first, from their
having once formed a part of the British Empire, in which state
they always enjoyed, as fully as the people of Britain themselves,
the right of fishing on these banks. They have shared in all the
wars for the extension of that right, and Britain could with no
more justice have excluded them from the enjoyment of it (even
supposing that one nation could possess it to the exclusion of
another), while they formed a part of the empire, than they could
exclude the people of London or Bristol. . . .

Upon the same principle that Mr. Livingstone supported
the American right to the Bank fishery, namely, previous
enjoyment of them as British subjects, Mr. Adams and his
colleagues claimed the inshore fisheries of Canada. He

THE NORTHEAST COAST FISHERIES 491

maintained that these natural rights, enjoyed as British
subjects before the Revolution, had never been yielded or
lost by the war of independence, nor forfeited by the result-
ing changes in sovereignty over Canadian waters. As " ten-
ants in common " with Great Britain, the Americans held all
fishery rights in northeastern waters, both open and terri-
torial, and by the " partition " of the territory of North
America, effected in the treaty of 1783, these fishery rights
were in no manner destroyed or abridged. He wrote some
years later (1822): —

The inhabitants of the United States had as clear a right to
every branch of the fisheries, and to cure fish on land, as the
inhabitants of Canada or Nova Scotia. . . . the citizens of Boston,
New York, or Philadelphia had as clear a right to these fisheries,
and to cure fish on land, as the inhabitants of London, Liverpool,
Bristol, Glasgow or Dublin ; fourthly, that the third article was
demanded as an ultimatum, and it was declared that no treaty of
peace should be made without that article. And when the British
ministers found that peace could not be made without that article,
they consented, for Britain wanted peace, if possil)le more than
we did ; fifthly, we asked no favor, we requested no grant, and
would accept none.

Following the same line of argument, Rufus King, in
addressing the Senate in 1818, said that the fisheries "on
the coasts and bays of the i)rovinces conquered in America
from the Frencli were acquired by the common sword, and
mingled blood of Americans and Englishmen — mendjers of
the same empire, we, with them, had a common right to these
fisheries ; and, in the division of the empire England con-
firmed our title without condition or limitation ; a title
equally irrevocable with those of our boundaries or of our
independence itself."

In a celebrated pamphlet on the " Fisheries and the Mis-
sissippi," in which this controversy over American fishery
rights is discussed at great length, John Quincy Adams
said : —

As a possession it was to be held by the people of the United
States as it had been held before. It was not, like the land parti-

I

492 AMERICAN DIPLOMATIC QUESTIONS

tioned out by the same treaty, a corporeal possession, but, in the
technical language of the English law, an incorporeal hereditament,
and in that of the civil law a right of mere faculty, consisting in
the power and liberty of exercising a trade, the places in which it
is exercised being occupied only for the purposes of the trade.
Now, the right or liberty to enjoy this possession, or to exercise
this trade, could no more be affected or impaired by a declaration
of war than the right to the territory of the nation. The inter-
ruption to the exercise of it, during the war, could no more affect
the right or liberty than the occupation by the enemy could affect
the right to that. The right to territory could be lost only by
abandonment or renunciation in the treaty of peace, by agree-
ment to a new boundary line, or by acquiescence in the occupa-
tion of the territory by the enemy. The fishery liberties could
be lost only by express renunciation of them in a treaty, or by
acquiescence, on the principle that they were forfeited, which
would have been a tacit renunciation.

Again : —

... in consenting by that treaty [1783] that a part of the North
American continent should remain subject to the British jurisdic-
tion, the people of the United States had reserved to themselves
the liberty, which they had ever before enjoyed, of fishing upon
that part of the coasts, and of drying and curing fish upon the
shores, and this reservation had been agreed to by the other con-
tracting party.

In substance, then, the American position at Ghent, as
regards tlie inshore as well as the open sea fisheries, was :
that the people of tlie United States liad done as much as
the English to win and protect the fisheries ; that as Brit-
ish subjects tliey had always enjoyed them ; that at the
close of the Revolutionary War a treaty (1783) had been
made recognizing the independence of the United States and
making a partition of tlie territory of North America ; that
so far as the fishery rights were concerned, they were simply
incorporeal hereditaments owned alike by England and the
United States, as tenants in common in North America ;
that the third article of the treaty of Paris recognized this
to be the case, and Ijy its terms simply defined those rights
and recorded tliem, but did not create nor grant tliem to the
United States ; that all tliese fishery rights belonging to the

THE NORTHEAST COAST FISHERIES 493

United States' citizens as a natural heritage of their former
allegiance to Great Britain (and being in no wise a conces-
sion from England) were by nature perpetual, and not liable
to revocation by war between England and the United
States, — and therefore they had not been lost by the War
of 1812. Consequently, American fishery rights were not a
proper subject for discussion or negotiation at that time.

The American commissioners went still farther to substan-
tiate their contention that the inshore fisheries of Canada
and the right to use Canadian shores for curing and drying
fish belonged to the United States as an inviolable right.
They maintained that as these liberties of fisliing were not
created but merely defined and recorded by the third article
of the Paris treaty, that article, like all treaty clauses per-
taining to matters of partition or boundaries or territory,
was of that particular class of treaty articles which is perma-
nent and not affected by subsequent suspension of friendly
relations between the parties. Thus they considered their
position doubly strengthened, and beyond question correct.

The arguments of Mr. Adams and the members of the
commission who supported him were clearly unsound. While
British colonists, the Americans certainly possessed all the
rights of other English subjects in British territorial waters,
and shared with them the obligations and duties which such
possession imposed. These obligations had called for tlie
protection of the fisheries against French aggressions, and
the American colonists answered the call as a duty, and per-
formed it well. After the war of independence, England
retained Nova Scotia, Newfoundhind, and Labrador, and as
an inseparable condition, the jurisdiction over their marginal
belts of ocean; the Americans ceased to be British subjects,
and were at once relieved of all duties and obligations to
defend Englisli territory or protect Englisli waters, and in a
like manner they were certainly deprived of the privileges
of ownersliip over such alien territory and waters. Had the
contention of Mr. Adams been sound, the United States
with equal justice could have pressed a claim for possession
of Quebec or Halifax, for by tlie "common sword and min-

^

-494 AMERICAN DIPLOMATIC QUESTIONS

gled blood of Americans and Englishmen " those strongholds
were won and defended. By the same argument the Eng-
lish could have claimed the right to navigate the Mississippi
River, which had been conceded to them by the treaty of
1783, and which Mr. Clay (one of the commissioners at
Ghent) declared to be forfeited by the War of 1812.

Again, had the United States an inherent and natural
right to the inshore fisheries of Canada, and to the perpetual
use of its shores, why had these shore privileges been limited
by the treaty of Paris ? Why had the United States accepted
the privilege of curing and drying fish in Nova Scotia and
Labrador, and relinquished it in Newfoundland ? If Ameri-
can citizens had been entitled as of right to use a part of
the Canadian coast, they were equally entitled to use all of
it. On the Newfoundland coast, where shore privileges
were most desired, and where long usage would have set up
an easement or prescriptive title fully as well as to the Nova
Scotia or Labrador coast, Americans had been denied all
landing privileges.

Furthermore, a review of the instructions of Congress to
the commissioners, who negotiated the treaty of Paris, devel-
ops the fact that it had not been the intention or object of
the United States Government to insist upon a continuance
of the inshore fisheries which had formerly been enjoyed as
a right. Congress did insist on the right to fish on the
" Banks of Newfoundland and other fisheries in the Ameri-
can seas, anywhere excepting within the distance of three
leagues of the shores of the territory remaining to Great
Britain at the close of the war, if a nearer distance cannot
be obtained by negotiation." A full expression of the
policy of the government in 1782 is given in a report of a
committee of Congress on certain resolutions adopted by the
legislature of Massachusetts touching the fisheries (1781).
An elaborate argument is there set forth to demonstrate the
freedom of the high seas, and to prove that the Bank fishery
may not be properly a})propriated by any power. These
Banks, " the nearest point of which is thirty-five leagues dis-
tant from Cape Race, are too far advanced in the Atlantic

THE NORTHEAST COAST FISHERIES 495

to be a dependence of the shores." Thus a distinction was
at that time made between the Bank and the shore fishery.
All expressions of Congress signifj'ing a determination to
retain the fisheries, at all hazards, refer only to the open sea
fisheries ; for at that period of uncertainty it was feared that
England might even refuse to yield her pretended sovereignty
over the Banks. The spirit of John Adams' instructions in
1782, as gathered from congressional actions previously taken
upon the subject, was to insist as a right upon the freedom
of the high seas for American fishermen, and to secure for
them by negotiation the largest possible inshore privileges.
Finally, it will be noted that in the third article of tlie treaty
itself the word "right" is used in connection with the Bank
and deep sea fishery, and the word " liberty " with reference
to the shore fishery.

Failing to make good the doctrine that Canadian inshore
fisheries belonged to the United States, not by treaty stipu-
lation, concession or grant, but by natural and inherent
right, the second contention of our commissioners at Ghent
was equally bound to fail, namely, that the third article of
the treaty of Paris belonged to that class of treaty obliga-
tions which are exempt from abrogation by war. The second
proposition is in a measure a corollary to the first. It will
readily be seen that all treaty stipulations must beh^ng to
one or the other of two classes. Those covering acknowl-
edgments of independence, cessions or partitions of territory,
delimitations of boundaries, acknowledgments of preexisting
rights and stipulations made in contemplation of war, — all
of which may be regarded as executed stipulations, — are not
subject to abrogation by war. All such as include mere
grants of privileges, or rights, may be regarded as executory
stipulations, and are necessarily terminated by war between
tlie parties. Mr. Adams and his colleagues at Ghent clung
persistently to the idea that the fishery clause of tiie Paris
treaty belonged to the first class of treaty stipulations men-
tioned, and therefore that this in the same manner as the
first article of that treaty (acknowledging the indejiendence
of the United States), and in the same manner as the second

496 a:\ierican diplomatic questions

article (defining the boundaries of the United States), stood
inviolate and unaffected by the war that had just been con-
cluded between the parties. In defending his position lie
afterward wrote : —

In case of a cession of territory, when the possession of it has
been delivered, the article of the treaty is no longer a compact
between the parties, nor can a subsequent war between them
operate in any manner upon it. So of all articles, the purport of
which is the acknowledgment by one party of a preexisting right
belonging to another. The engagement of the acknowledging
party is consummated by the ratification of the treaty. It is no
longer an executory contract, but a perfect right united with a
vested possession, is thenceforth in one party, and the acknowl-
edgment of the other is in its own nature irrevocable. As a bar-
gain the article is extinct ; but the right of the party in whose
favor it was made is complete, and cannot be affected by a si;b-
sequent war. A grant of a facultative right or incorporeal
hereditament, and specifically of a right of fisher}-, from one
sovereign to another, is an article of the same description. It
is analogous to a cession of territory, and is in fact a partial and
qualified cession. The right is consummated by the ratification
of the treaty. The possession is vested by the exercise of the
faculty.

So that whether the third article of the treaty of 1783 be con-
sidered as an acknowledgment of preexisting liberties or as a
grant of them, to be exercised within British jurisdiction, it was
in its nature permanent and irrevocable.

Only on the assumption that the treaty article in question
created no new privileges but merely recognized an existing
one, can Mr. Adams' somewhat ingenious argument be
accepted as sound. However, as it is universally agreed
that a nation has full jurisdiction over its marginal waters,
Mr. Adams' contention must be regarded as wholly unten-
able. With a mind uninfluenced or clouded by considera-
tions of the national needs and popular clamors of a ^^eriod,
one may often look back over the distance of years and
obtain a clearer view of political conditions and of interna-
tional questions than was possible to the men who were
called upon to grapple with them. The very nearness to
difficulties occasionally distorts the vision of great men and

THE NORTHEAST COAST FISHERIES 497

leads them into absurdities of reasoning that afterwards
seem ahuost inexcusable. John Quincy Adams was prob-
al)ly less influenced by the popular clamor of the day
than by a certain family tradition in regard to the North
American fisheries. His father, at Paris in 1782-8o, had
defied the consequences of disobedience to his country's com-
mands, and had staked his reputation as a patriot in order*
to wrest from Great Britain those very fishery rights that
he, the son, thirty-one years later at Ghent, found himself
called upon to protect. As a New Englander he was satu-
rated with the belief that the fisheries constituted the most
valuable American industry. It was the calling which for
generations his countrymen and their ancestors had fol-
lowed almost without interruption. The fisheries formed
the very basis of the great commercial interests of his own
New England. Under no circumstances must they be for-
feited through neglect or fault of his. Their loss meant
to his people the greatest of calamities. Thus may one
appreciate the mental attitude that permitted in John
Quincy Adams so decided a warp in his reasoning upon
this subject.

A satisfactory adjustment either of tlie fisheries, or the
navigation of the ^Mississippi River, proved to be impossible,
iind it was finally agreed to sign a treaty that should remain
silent on these two important subjects. Hence it is that no
mention whatever is made of the fisheries in the treaty of
Ghent (1814).

VI

The inal)ility to reacli an understanding at Ghent, in regard
to the fisheries left that question in a most unsatisfactory
condition. The war clouds of 1812 had no sooner blown
away tlian the New England fisliermen appeared in force in
Canadian waters. A series of collisions with the Canadians
immediately took i)lace. English autliorities, assuming that
all American fishery privileges in British waters had lapsed
■by the war, arrested numbers of Boston and Gloucester
2k

498 AMERICAN DIPLOMATIC QUESTIONS

schooners on various charges of trespass, and condemned
them as prizes in the Halifax courts. The disputed ques-
tion of American fishery rights was frequently left to the
rude arbitrament of American fishermen and the Dominion
police, resulting in a severe strain upon the recently restored
amicable relations between Great Britain and the United
States. In the United States, where Mr. Adams' doctrine
that American fishery rights had survived the war still
obtained, feelings of anger and hostility to Great Britain
grew more and more intense. Fortunately the tension was
soon relieved by the Convention of 1818, wherein a com-
promise of the troublesome fishery question was effected.
The first article of this treaty, the one relating to the
fisheries, is as follows : —

Whereas differences have arisen respecting the liberty claimed
by the United States for the inhabitants thereof, to take, dry, and
cure fish on certain coasts, bays, harbors and creeks, of His Bri-
tannic jNIajesty's dominions in America, it is agreed between the
high contracting parties, that the inhabitants of the United States
shall have forever, in common with the subjects of His Britannic
]\Iajesty, the liberty to take fish of every kind on that part of the
southern coast of Newfoundland which extends from Cape Ray
to the Rameau Islands, on the western and northern coast of
ISTewf oundland from the said Cape Ray to the Quirpon Islands ;
on the southern shores of the Magdalen Islands, and also on the
coasts, bays, harbors, and creeks, from Mount Joly, on the south-
ern coast of Labrador, to and through the Streights of Belleisle,
and thence northwardly indefinitely along the coast, without-
prejudice however, to any of the exclusive rights of the Hiulson
Bay Company ; and that the American fishermen shall also have
liberty forever, to dry and cure fish in any of the unsettled bays,
harljors, and creeks of tlie southern part of the coast of New-
foundland hereabove described, and of the coast of Labrador;
but so soon as the same, or any portion thereof, shall be settled, it
shall not be lawful for the said fishermen to dry or cure fish at such
portion so settled, without previous agreement for such purpose
with the inhabitants, proprietors, or possessors of the ground.
And the United States hereby renounce forever, any liberty
heretofore enjoyed or claimed by the inhabitants thereof, to take,
dry, or cure fish on, or within three marine miles of any of the
coasts, bays, creeks, or harbors of His Britannic Majesty's do-

THE NORTHEAST COAST FISHERIES 499

minions in America, not included within the above-mentioned lim-
its. Provided, however, tliat the American fishermen shall be per-
mitted to enter such bays or harbors for the purpose of shelter
and of repairing damages therein, of purchasing wood, and of
obtaining water, and for no other purpose whatever. But they
shall be under such restrictions as may be necessary to prevent
their taking, drying or curing fish therein, or in any manner
abusing the privileges hereby reserved to them.

It will be observed tliat under this new arrangement
Americans were permitted to fish in all waters falling within
British marine jurisdiction, on the south coast of Newfound-
land between Cape Ray and the Rameau Islands, and on
the west and north coasts thereof between Cape Ray and
the Quirpon Islands ; on the southern shores of the INIagda-
len Islands and upon the Labrador coast from Mount Jolly
northward indefinitely. The coasts of Nova Scotia, New
Brunswick, Lower Canada, Cape Breton, more than half of the
south coast, and all of the east coast of Newfoundland, were
excepted from this grant of fishery privileges. It must be
borne in mind that the Bank and all open sea fisheries were
entirely free to the world, for at this time no nation pre-
tended to control the high seas.

The privileges of landing for the purpose of curing and
drying fish were withheld from the United States, except
upon the south shores of Newfoundland from Cape Ray to
the Rameau Islands, and except upon the coast of Labrador,
— and here the right was only granted within unsettled bays
and harbors. In all other bays or harbors of the Dominion,
American fishermen were fully privileged to enter for cer-
tain designated purposes, — ^' shelter," " repairing damages,"
*' purchasing wood," and '•'•obtaining water," but for no other
purj)ose whatever.

The adoption of tliese regulations was called in the
United States a " compromise," because American statesmen
still contended that the United States owned the Canadian
fisheries by a title as good as that of Great Britain, and that
by the relinquishing of jurisdictional privileges over certain
parts of the Canadian coast, and accepting England's recogni-

500 AMERICAN DIPLOMATIC QUESTIONS

tion of them on other parts of the coast, a genuine compro-
mise had been effected. It is curious to note the light in
which this fishery clause was regarded by eminent statesmen
of the period, and indeed by many since. Never abandoning
the idea of John Quincy Adams that the United States pos-
sessed and always had possessed an inherent and natural
right to the inshore fisheries, a right that had survived the
operation of war, they firmly believed, and as solemnly ar-
gued that, by the convention of 1818, England granted no
fishery privileges to the United States, no rights of landing
to cure fish or to obtain supplies, but, on the contrary, the
United States had simply consented to certain restrictions on
those rights and privileges always possessed. This erroneous
conception of the spirit of the convention might be dismissed
as an innocent historical or legal curio, had it not vitally
affected the interpretation of the words, and later given rise
to much misunderstanding between England and the United
States.

The adherents to this view found proof of their contentions
in that part of the fishery clause wherein the United States
expressly " renounces forever any liberty," etc. They urged
that in the use of these words Great Britain acknowledged
those preexisting and natural rights. The insertion of that
phrase had been insisted upon by our commissioners, Messrs.
Rush and Gallatin, and was reluctantly allowed by the Brit-
ish representatives, who were actuated by a strong desire to
settle the troublesome quarrels of the fishermen as quickly
as possible, and to remove the whole question from discussion.
This fallacious theory of a "natural and inherent right " has
never entirely lost its influence, even to the present day.
It has been defended by the j^onderous arguments of many
legal writers, as it colored the deliberations of government
officials.

With the promulgation of the new rules and regulations
of 1818, the future of American fishermen seemed particu-
larly bright. Congress encouraged them the following j^ear
with increased bounties. The fisheries had suffered greatly
through the vicissitudes of war. Blissfully ignorant of,

I

THE >?ORTHEAST COAST FISHERIES 501

and probably caring little for, the diplomatic wrangles
over the legal nature of their rights, the fishermen took
immediate advantage of the privileges just opened to them,
and sought to restore their industry to a paying basis.
In the course of a few years, however, a harvest of new and
unforeseen troubles ripei;ed to confound the men who had
fishing interests in charge. Fresh quarrels grew alarm-
ingly, and in the course of some years reached a degree of
intensity that forboded another war with Great Britain.
Happily such a calamity was averted in time, though not
before the " Fishery Question " had given evidence of its
liability sooner or later to embroil the nation in armed
conflict.

In 1819, Parliament enacted a statute to carry out the
provisions of 1818. This statute authorized local regu-
lations to declare it unlawful for foreign vessels to take, dry,
or cure fish within three marine miles of any coast, bays,
creeks, or harbors in any part of His Majesty's dominion
in America, not included in the limits of the treaty. It de-
fined with particularity the privileges of American vessels
in all such bays, creeks, harbors, etc., — i.e., to enter only
for the purpose of obtaining shelter, repairs, wood and water,
— and it provided that if any vessels were caught violating,
or preparing to violate, those laws, or that refused to depart
from such bays, etc., when ordered to do so, they should be
liable to certain enumerated punishments and fines. No
objection could be found to this act itself, but in alleged
conformity to it, and for the purpose of carrying out its pro-
visions, the provincial legislatures of British America, from
time to time, enacted series of laws relating to the fisheries
that were far more stringent and rigid in their nature than
justified by the original parliamentary act. These provincial
regulations manifested a spirit of unfriendliness, and it was
often asserted that they were executed with a severity and in
a manner wholly unwarranted and improper. By the narrow-
est construction of the terras of the treaty they restricted the
rights of Americans in every possible way. In accordance
with these laws, the Canadian police authorities detained

502 AMERICAN DIPLOMATIC QUESTIONS

American fishermen upon the most shadowy pretexts, and
otherwise vexatiously harassed them, sometimes confiscat-
ing their vessels upon the merest suspicion of offence.
Wliile these burdensome regulations were unnecessarily
severe, and perhaps maliciously enforced, it is more than
probable that American fishermen were not always guiltless
of the offences charged to their account.

A new form of fishery was at that period rapidly develop-
ing which brought into Canadian waters conditions entirely
novel, and which, not having been anticipated by those who
framed the convention of 1818, were not provided for in that
instrument. Mackerel had appeared in vast quantities, and
with them, in close pursuit, a large fleet of American schoon-
ers. The modus operandi of the mackerel fishery is entirely
different from that of the cod fishery. The latter, even
at that day, was carried on for the most part on the
Banks, or in localities generally well removed from the
debatable waters of British sovereignty. The men who
confined themselves to cod fishing had less occasion to seek
shore stations, either for bait or shelter. The mackerel fish-
ery, on the other hand, constantly lured its followers within
the three-mile limit of the Nova Scotia and New Brunswick
shores, for it is the habit of these fish to hover about the
shallower reaches of the sea near land. Large quantities of
bait were cast upon the waters to tempt the fish within range;
this process, of course, necessitated frequent landing at
Canadian ports to procure fresh bait supplies ; besides this,
the nets employed in taking mackerel demanded for their
proper preservation occasional drying upon shore. Now
neither of these acts fell within the list of privileges guar-
anteed to American fishermen in Nova Scotia or New Bruns-
wick by the treaty of 1818. As American fishermen were
perliaps not overconscientious in these matters, disputes
between them and the Canadians grew more and more fre-
quent, and the situation soon became painfully acute. Num-
bers of New England vessels were held on charges of "fishing
within the prescribed limits " ; " hovering within shore dur-
ing calm weather without ostensible cause, having on board

THE NORTHEAST COAST FISHERIES 503

ample supplies of wood and water " ; " lying at anchor and
remaining inside of bays to clean and pick fish"; "selling
goods and buying supplies " ; " landing and transhipping
cargoes of fish."

The fishermen of the United States were privileged by the
treaty to take fish of every kind on the southern shores of
the Magdalen Islands. This involved the herring fisher}^, and
herring are certainly included in the comprehensive term —
"•fish of every kind." From the peculiar mode of taking
tliis kind of fish, resort to the shore was necessary for haul-
ing seines and constructing weirs, but the Canadian authori-
ties remained inflexible in their determination to prevent
such landing. It is true that on these islands no landing
privileges were expressly guaranteed in the treaty, but it
was contended in Washington that as the fishery of the
Magdalen Islands was principally for herring, — a mode of
fishery carried on from the shore, — the right to prosecute
it at all must of necessity presuppose the right to use the
shore. At all events, whether or not landing privileges are
inseparable from the right to take herring, American fisher-
men continued to land on the Magdalen Islands, despite the
opposition of the natives. A petty warfare resulted that
kept full the measure of ill-feeling between New England
and Canada.

A subject that provoked much discord, and that soon in-
volved the two powers in anotlier diplomatic controversy,
arose from opposing theories eutertained in Great Britain
and the United States concerning the line of ''three-mile
limit" as applied to the Ijays and harbors of British America.
Several American vessels, including tlie Washint/ton in 184o,
had been seized within the Bay of Fundy and other " bays **
of the coast, at a greater distance than three marine miles
from the shore. The Canadian authorities, to make sure of
their position in thus seizing foreign vessels outside a tliree-
mile line from the shore, had appealed to the crown lawyers
at London to ascertain definitely wliether Americans had a
right, under the treaty of 1818, to fish in the bays of Fundy
and of Chaleurs, or to navigate the Strait of Canso ; or, in

504 AMERICAN DIPLOMATIC QUESTIONS

other words, to learn whether the doctrine of " Headlands '*
applied to these great bodies of water. The reply of the
queen's counsel assured them of their undoubted right to
exclude all foreign vessels from fishing in any of the larger
bays of British America. " Except," they wrote, " within
certain defined limits, to which the query put to us does not
apply, we are of opinion that, by the terms of the treaty,
American citizens are excluded from the right of fishing
within three miles of the coast of British America ; and
that the prescribed distance of three miles is to be measured
from the headlands or extreme points of land next the sea
of the coasts, or of the entrance of the bays, and not from
the interior of such bays or inlets of the coast ; and conse-
quently that no right exists on the part of American citizens
to enter the bays of Nova Scotia, there to take fish, although
the fishing, being within the bay, may be at a greater dis-
tance than three miles from the shore of the bay, as we are
of opinion that the term ' headland ' is used in the treaty to
express the part of the land we have before mentioned, ex-
cluding the interior of the bays and inlets of the coasts."

Although the term " headland " does not appear in the
instrument referred to, the British interpretation of the
" three-mile limit," as applied to all harbors, bays, or inden-
tations of the coast, was made clear by this decision of the
.royal counsel.

It was held in the United States that the phrase " within
three marine miles of any of the coasts, bays, creeks, or har-
bors," indicated an imaginary line three miles distant from
and following the sinuosities of the shore. Thus all bays
over six miles wide at their entrances would be free to their
fishermen, except, of course, within three miles of shore.
This question became a pressing one about 1840, and pre-
cipitated a lengthy discussion between Washington and Lon-
don. Theoretically, the question of "headlands" has never
been definitely settled, and the many authorities in interna-
tional law furnish as yet no fixed rule for guidance. In gen-
eral it may be said that the tendency of the law of nations is
to restrict the extent of marine jurisdiction. In the matter

THE NORTHEAST COAST FISHERIES 505

of harbors and bays, international usage has long established
the propriety of reserving within the limits of national
jurisdiction bodies of water, or arms of the sea, the en-
trances to which from the ocean may exceed six miles in
width. i\Iany examples of this can be found in England
and France ; in the United States no one doubts the legality
of our claim to the full jurisdiction over Chesapeake and
Delaware bays, and over Long Island Sound, all of whose
entrances from the open sea measure more than six miles from
headland to headland. An approximate rule only may be
formulated respecting the length of the line from headland to
headland that may reasonably be claimed to form a divisional
line between the open ocean and jurisdictional waters. This
may be somewhat vaguely stated as double the length of a
cannon shot ; or, in other words, all bays, recesses of the sea,
or inland waters connected with the ocean, whose entrances
may be defended by cannon placed upon the opposing head-
lands, are properly subject to the jurisdiction of the nation
possessing their shores.

The English construction of the terms "three marine miles
of any of the coasts, bays," etc., was undoubtedly correct, so
far as that principle governs the smaller indentations of the
seacoast, but the gross error in their contention lay in the
effort to include within the definition of " bays " such great
bodies of water as the Bay of Fundy or the Bay of Chaleurs.
The distances from headland to headland at the entrances of
these great estuaries measure no less than sixty miles, clearly
excepting them from the most liberal designation of closed
seas.

The British Government, however, showed some signs of
relenting, though not of receding from the i)ositi()n it had
taken regarding the closed nature of the Bay of Fundy. In
1845 Lord Aberdeen announced that out of considerations of
courtesy Great liritain would yield to the United States the
riglit of her fishermen in that bay, " provided they do not
approach, except in the cases specified in this treaty of 1818,
within three miles of the entrance of any bay on the coast of
Nova Scotia or New Brunswick." Mr. Everett, the Ameri-

506 AMERICAN DIPLOMATIC QUESTIONS

can Minister to the court of St. James, very properly declined
to receive this privilege as a favor, but reiterating the Ameri-
can claim, he explained that it was "not for the sake of detract-
ing from the liberality evinced by Her Majesty's Government
in relaxing from what they regarded as their right, but it
would be placing his own government in a false position to
accept as a mere favor that for which they had so long and
so strenuously contended as due them from the convention."

The colonists of Nova Scotia and New Brunswick were
greatly disturbed by Lord Aberdeen's proposed "concession."
Fearing it indicated a weakening in the face of American
contentions, and that it might perhaps presage a more gen-
eral yielding of all the large bays of the Dominion to the
operations of foreign fishermen, they hurriedly despatched
an envoy to London, who appeared before the colonial office
wdth representations " of the injurious consequences cer-
tainly to result to Her Majesty's American subjects, were the
negotiations wdth ]Mr. Everett to be concluded on the basis
proposed." The policy of the colonial secretary was accord-
ingly abandoned, and tlie Bay of Fundy was again declared
to be a closed sea. The vexatious shipping regulations of the
Dominion were even more strictly enforced than before ;
seizure of American vessels was continued ; and the ani-
mosity which had been smouldering in New England against
its northern neighbors nearly blazed into war.

The Canadians, on their side, were thoroughly indignant at
what they considered the persistent lawlessness on the part
of American fishermen, and they displayed their resentment
in still another form. Tlie Strait of Canso, between Nova
Scotia and Cape Breton, affords a shorter and safer route to
vessels making the Gulf of St. Lawrence from tlie south.
This narrow passage is in certain places not more than a
mile in wddth. When the navigation of two seas is free, the
navigation of a channel connecting them should also be free,
although it may for certain reasons be made subject to a
toll regulation. The Canadians insisted that the Strait of
Canso fell within the description of territorial waters, and
they consequently denied the right of passage through it to

THE NORTHEAST COAST FISHERIES 507

American fishing vessels. American fishermen were not jus-
tified in tarrying in the strait or fishing therein, but its pro-
hibition merely as a channel of communication was distinctly
an unfriendly act.

The affair of the Washington had not been forgotten ;
claims for indemnity were presented by her owners and the
matter was laid before the British authorities. In 1852 this
claim along with others was referred to a commission in
London. By decision of an umpire, the Bay of Fundy was
declared not to be a iimre clausum within the meaning of the
treaty of 1818. In this matter, then, the American contention
was sustained, and one of the unhappy subjects of contro-
versy growing out of the fisheries was laid at rest.

About this time (1847-54) commercial relations with the
Canadian provinces were beginning to develop along new
lines. The free-trade policy of England had opened her
ports to the world's trade, and this to a large extent had
deprived the Dominion of her most valuable markets ; and
her merchants hopefully turned to the United States. To
enter American markets with their products became to them
an object of prime importance. In 1847 overtures were
made to Congress for reciprocity, Canada promising full
freedom to American fishermen in return for a remission of
tariff duties upon her fish. For several years Congress
refused to consider the question, and the colonies vented
their displeasure by an increased naval force to patrol their
Avaters and terrorize American fishermen. It was soon sus-
pected that there was a method in this madness of a Do-
minion navy, and the attempt, supposed or real, to coerce
the United States into a reciprocity treaty, by annoying her
fishermen, provoked an animated discussion in Congress.
Mr. Ilamlin, of Maine, declared that the sending of a naval
force to the fishing grounds, pending negotiations, was "noth-
ing more nor less than to comjtel the United States to legis-
late under duress," and to this he, for one, was unwilling to
submit. A growing sentiment manifested itself to despatch
to Canadian waters a naval force of etpial proportions. Mr.
Webster promised the people of Massachusetts that the

508 AMERICAN DIPLOMATIC QUESTIONS

administration would protect the fishermen, " hook and line,
bob and sinker." An American war vessel was sent to the
scene ; the relations of the two countries became most criti-
cal and war was again predicted. When popular excitement
was running high, the Governor General of Canada, Lord
Elgin, came to Washington (1854) for the purpose of mak-
ing a commercial treaty with the United States. It was a
most inopportune time for the success of his mission, not
only on account of the ill-feeling throughout the East toward
Canada and the decided opposition in Congress to any form
of reciprocal trade relations with her, but it was also the
moment when political parties in the United States were
absorbed in a desperate struggle over the Kansas-Nebraska
Bill, and were too deeply agitated by the threatening aspect
of the slavery question to give willing heed to less important
affairs. Notwithstanding these obstacles. Lord Elgin suc-
ceeded. In the short space of a fortnight, a treaty " Extend-
ing the Right of Fishing and Regulating Commerce and
Navigation between the United States and the British pos-
sessions in North America," was signed (June 5, 1854).

VII

Up to this point in the history of the fisheries, the discus-
sions relative to the rights and liberties of citizens of the
United States in Canadian waters, and all negotiations look-
ing toward larger British concessions, had been almost wholly
free from entanglement with the many concurrent diplomatic
questions between Great Britain and the United States.
With the exception of that famous dispute concerning the
navigation of the Mississippi River, which had been for a
time associated with it, the fishery question was fought out
alone, and upon its own merits. By the year 1854, the most
important of the legal points involved in the old controversy
had l)een disposed of. Although the doctrine of " inherent
and natural right " to the fisheries still found its supporters*
those notions liad been practically abandoned, and the rights
of American citizens in Canadian waters were admittedly

THE NORTHEAST COAST FISHERIES 509

based upon the convention of 1818. England had receded
from her contention of mare dausum in regard to the Bay
of Fundy. Barring some minor disputed points, there existed
between the two governments a fairly good understanding
as to the broad principles of law underlying the question.
In future, American rights in the inshore waters, and upon
the shores of Canada, were to become matters of purchase,
and the whole fishery question, with its record of strife and
contention, was transferred from the domain of law to that
of political economy. What are the fisheries worth to New
England, and what will be a suitable quid pro quo were the
queries to be answered. The compensation Canada most
desired for the freedom of her shore waters was commercial
favors. The fisheries, therefore, became associated with
commercial reciprocity, and the two questions have become
so thoroughly associated, that to-day they cannot well be con-
sidered separately. Altliough those larger and more serious
disagreements which had formerly characterized all negoti-
ations concerning the fisheries, and which had rendered their
successful termination so difficult, were removed, minor issues
of a legal nature were yet to appear, and to produce at times
a high degree of irritation.

The treaty of 1854 permitted a free exchange of nearly
all the land and sea products of Canada and the United
States. The first article relating to the fisheries is as
follows : —

It is agreed l)y the high contracting parties that in addition to
the liberty secured to the United States fishermen by the above-
mentioned convention of October 20th, 1818, of taking, curing, and
drying fish on certain coasts of the British iSTorth American Col-
onies therein defined, the inhabitants of the United States shall
liave, in common with the subjects of Her Britannic Majesty, the
liberty to take fish of every kind, except shell fish, on the sea-
coasts and shores, and in the bays, harbors, and creeks of Canada,
New Ih-unswick, Nova Scotia, Prince Edward's Island, and of the
several islands thereunto adjacent, without bein^ restricted to any
distance from the shore, with permission to land upon the coasts
and shores of those Colonies and the islands thereof, and also upon
the Magdalen Islands, for the purpose of drying their nets and

510 AMERICAN DIPLOMATIC QUESTIONS

curing their fish ; provided that, in so doing, they do not interfere , i

with the rights of private property, or with British fishermen, in ^ 8
the peaceable vise of any part of the said coast in their occu- -)
paucy for the same purpose.

By the second article, Canadian fishermen were accorded
similar privileges in American waters north of latitude 36°.

With the sole exception of taking " shell fish," the Ameri-
cans were practically placed upon the same footing with
British subjects in the prosecution of the fisheries in Cana-
dian waters. By the fifth article it was stipulated that the
treaty " is to remain in force for ten years and further, until
the expiration of twelve months after either party shall give
notice of a wish to terminate the same."

The effect of this agreement upon American fishermen
was almost magical. Their disputes were immediately for-
gotten, and harmony reigned. In Canada, where formerly
the American fishermen had been regarded as enemies, they
were now welcomed as the best of friends. The Canadians
rejoiced in the new and extensive markets opened to their
produce, and their trade soon quadrupled. Nova Scotia and
New Brunswick entered upon a period of extraordinary pros-
perity, and their fisheries leaped at a bound from conditions
of adversity to those of great prosperity. But such delight-
ful tranquillity upon the fishing grounds was not destined
to last many years ; a variety of causes led to the abrogation
of the treaty of 1854 by the United States at the end of the
stipulated ten years. The first note of alarm was sounded
by the Maine and Massachusetts fishermen themselves, who
began to complain that the free admission of Canadian fish
into the United States crippled their own industry. Owing
to cheaper labor, and their greater proximity to the fisheries,
the Canadians were enabled to undersell the New England
fishermen in the Boston markets. The extent of the free list
of Canadian products was so great that it largely curtailed the
revenues the government needed. Senator Sherman estimated
this loss ujjon the single item of lumber to be ^5,000,000 a
year. It soon became evident that the price being paid
Canada for the freedom of her fisheries was too great.

THE NORTHEAST COAST FISHERIES 511

Notwithstanding these very urgent reasons for altering the
laws at the end of the stipulated ten years, it is probable that
tlie regulations would have continued in force for a longer
period had it not been for the Rebellion in the United States,
At the beginning of the Civil war trade conditions in the
United States materially changed. The necessary increase
of taxes, together with radical changes in currency values,
producing increased cost of labor, enabled the Canadian
fanner to supplant the American in his own markets. The
unfriendly attitude of the Canadians toward the Government
during the civil conflict furnished an additional incentive
to withdraw the advantages which the treaty of 1854 con-
cededly gave them. The Canadians had exhibited a marked
disposition to profit by the difficulties of the United States ;
Montreal and Quebec harbored the most virulent enemies of
the Northern cause, and at one time the Provinces were sus-
pected of contemplating the seizure and annexation of Maine.

Notice was given in March, 18G5, and the following year
the treaty was terminated. With the abrogation of the
reciprocity treaty, the provisions of the agreement of 1818
again came into force, the stipulations contained in the treaty
of 1854 having been based upon and declared to be "in addi-
tion to those of the convention of 1818." Therefore the old
scheme of restricting American fishermen to certain limited
areas of inshore waters of Newfoundland, to the coastal
waters of Labrador and to the southern shores of tlie
Magdalen Islands, together with contracted landing privi-
leges, was revived.

The Canadians were greatly disappointed by the reces-
sion of the reciprocity treaty. The largely increased vol-
ume of their export trade and the gratifying prosperity of
their fisheries, both directly resulting from the freedom of
the American markets, immediately declined and withered.
Referring to economic conditions in Nova Scotia, the editor
of the Halifax Chronicle said that from the abrogation of
the reciprocity treaty, " we have retrograded with the most
frightful rapidity." Bitter complaints of the "selfish pol-
icy " of the United States arose from every side.

512 AMERICAN DIPLOMATIC QUESTIONS

With the return to those conditions which had existed
prior to 1854, tlie same okl quarrels and encounters among
the fishermen reappeared. Lord Monck, the Canadian
Governor General, promptly issued notice to Americans that
inasmuch as their general fishery rights had ceased, any
infractions of the laws relating to them would forthwith be
severely punished. Trouble began to threaten even before
the close of the first fishing season. The Canadians there-
upon adopted a license system granting full fishery privi-
leges to American schooners on payment of an annual tax.
New England skippers generally availed themselves of this
arrangement, but each succeeding year the price of licenses
was increased (50 cents a ton in 1866, i'l.OO in 1867, and
$2.00 in 1868), until by the year 1869 the duty had virtually
become prohibitive, and American fishermen refused to pay it.

The various provinces of Canada having consolidated into
the Dominion of Canada, the Parliament at Ottawa, in 1868,
issued in reference to the fisheries a new code of laws which
was thought by Americans to be needlessly severe. Canadian
maritime officials redoubled their vigilance ; as a result a
large number of New England fishing smacks were captured,
and they generally suffered the penalty of forfeiture. The
fishermen's quarrels assumed constantly increasing violence,
and so much bitterness was aroused in the New England
States that open rupture with England again seemed prob-
able. In evident desperation an order was issued in 1870
by the Governor General of Canada to the effect " that
henceforth all foreign fishermen shall be prevented from
fishing in the waters of Canada." To enforce this question-
able edict, the Dominion assumed the expense of fitting out
cruisers to patrol the waters of Nova Scotia, especially those
waters in and about the Bay of Fundy, where, it was alleged,
American captains purchased bait and supplies in open viola-
tion of the law. Four hundred American vessels were
boarded, and of these fifteen were detained and afterward
condemned. When the situation had Ijecome most threaten-
ing, the fishery question was once more set at rest by the
treaty of Washington (1871).

THE NORTHEAST COAST FISHERIES 513

VIII

In 1870, a number of Anglo-American claims growing out
of depredations committed during the war had accumulated,
and were pressing for adjudication. These claims were
gathered together and by the agreement of a joint high
commission were referred to various boards of arbitration.
It was an opportune moment to settle the fishery dispute,
which, true to its old-time traditions, had reawakened and
demanded an immediate settlement. It therefore fell in
with the other issues under discussion at that time and the
subject was included in the comprehensive Anglo-American
treaty of 1871.

The eighteenth article of this latter instrument renewed
the provisions of Article 1 of the reciprocity treaty of 1854,
it being further stipulated in the treaty that it should remain
in force for a period of ten years, and for two years after
notice of its termination by either party ; Article 19 ex-
tended the privileges of fishing in the territorial waters of
the United States as far down as the 30th degree of latitude ;
Article 21 provided for the free admission into American and
Canadian ports of fish and fish oil. During the negotiation
of the treaty, the United States commissioners offered to
pay to Canada the sum of $1,000,000 in return for full
American privileges in their inshore fisheries in perpetuity.
This sum was thought by the commissioners tendering it to
be greater than the real value' of these inshore fisheries, but
the amount was probably not too great for a positive guar-
antee of freedom from further molestation. The offer was
declined by the English commissioners as insufficient in
amount, but the discussion of a money consideration led to
the insertion in the instrument of the following article
(22d):-

Inasmuch as it is asserted by the Government of Her Britannic
Majesty that the privile<,'es accorded to the citizens of the United
States under Article 18 of this treaty are of greater value tlian
those accorded by Articles 19 and 21 of tliis treaty to tlie subjects
of Her Britannic Majesty, and tliis assertion is not admitted by
2l

514 AMERICAN DIPLOMATIC QUESTIONS

the Government of the United States, it is further agreed that
commissioners shall be appointed to determine, having regard to
the privileges accorded by the United States to the subjects of
Her Britannic Majesty, as stated in Articles 19 and 21 of this
treaty, the amount of any compensation vs'hich, in their opinion,
ought to be paid by the Government. of the United States to the
Government of Her Britannic Majesty in return for the privi-
leges accorded to the citizens of the United States under Article
18 of this treaty ; and that any sum of money which the said
commissioners may so award shall be paid by the United States
Government, in a gross sum, within twelve months after such
award shall have been given.

Article 23 provided that the three commissioners proposed
in the previous clause should be appointed, one by the Presi-
dent of the United States, one by the queen of England,
and the third conjointly by the two ; though in case they
failed to agree upon some one within three months, the
choice of the third commissioner should then fall to the
Austrian Ambassador in London.

It will therefore be observed that by this treaty the Cana-
dians secured one of their most cherished desiderata, — the
abolition of all United States customs duties upon the
products of their fisheries. The American fishermen in
return gained perfect freedom in Canadian inshore waters,
— though at what seemed to them to be a ruinous cost, i.e.
free Canadian fish ; they had already realized their inability
to compete successfully upon even terms with Canadian
fishermen.

Believing that their government had given too great a
price for a free Canadian fishery, the New England fisher-
men thought it simply preposterous that the United States
Government should be willing to pay in addition, a money
consideration.

The agreement to leave to an Austrian (under certain
conditions) the choice of a member of this proposed board
was unfortunate. It might reasonably have been feared
that a selection from Vienna would have been prejudiced, as
the ambitions of the house of Hapsburg had but recently
been frustrated by the United States in the threat to expel

1

THE NORTHEAST COAST FISHERIES 515

Maximilian and his French army from the Western continent.
The United States Government realized the blunder too late,
and in the attempt to free itself from the mistake of its com-
missioners, it fell into even greater difficulties. The acting
Secretary of State, Mr. J. C. Bancroft Davis, proposed to
the British Government the names of a number of foreign
ministers in Washington whose knowledge of the English
language qualified any one of them to act as the third com-
missioner in question. The name of Mr. Delfosse, the Belgian
Minister, had been purposely omitted from the list, for the
reason that the intimate political relations between England
and Belgium (strengthened by the ties of close kinship in
their royal families) seemed to disqualify any Belgian from
acting in such a diplomatic capacity. Lord de Grey, one of
the British commissioners who had signed the treaty of
Washington, had given it as his opinion that Belgium and
Portugal need not be considered in this connection, for their
treaty arrangements with England " might be supposed to
incapacitate " their representatives from acting upon such a
commission. A desire became evident on the part of the
British Minister in Washington to delay the choice of a third
arbitrator until the end of the stipulated period, when the
selection would fall into Austrian hands. Finding that
tlie United States entertained objections to Mr. Delfosse, the
English Government accordingly offered him as their choice,
no doubt anticipating a lengthy discussion which would waste
time. Upon further rec^uest to name some other person for
neutral member of the board, the British premier suggested
that the American and British Ministers at The Hague
should select jointly some Dutch subject, but the recently
appointed American Minister to that capital felt his inability,
through a lack of acquaintance with the people, to make an
intelligent choice ; so that scheme was abandoned. Mr.
Thornton, the British Minister in Washington, wrote that
circumstances seemed to point either to the selection of
Mr. Delfosse or to the alternative provided for in the treaty.
The three montlis' allotted time was about to expire, and
there appeared to be no escape from an appointment by the

I

516 AMERICAN DIPLOMATIC QUESTIONS

Austrian. An extension of time, however, was agreed upon,
for Canada, still anxious for reciprocity, had sent proposals
to Washington for a new treaty of commerce and fisheries
which would do away with the proposed board of arbitra-
tion, and entirely dispense with all additional compensa-
tion for the freedom of her fisheries. A draft of treaty
was presented, the provisions of which almost totally
removed protective duties from Canadian products, but
guaranteed in return perfect freedom to American fisher-
men. The proposition was submitted to the Senate in 1874,
and met with an unfavorable report the following year.
The matter of the unselected commissioner accordingly
revived.

The stipulated time as extended had passed, and in 1875
the British premier requested an identical note to the
Austrian Ambassador in London, asking him to name the
third commissioner. For various reasons the correspon-
dence dragged on for over a year without results, but
at length the Secretary of State, finding himself between
Scylla and Charybdis, and being exceedingly desirous of
closing the matter as quickly as possible, decided that
Mr. Delfosse's selection would likely prove the lesser evil of
the two ; he accordingly suggested to the British authori-
ties, in 1877, that the United States would not oppose the
appointment of the Belgian if the British Government still
desired his selection. It was agreed, however, upon a
request from London, that in conformity with the treaty
stipulations. Count Beust, the Austrian Ambassador at Lon-
don, should name Mr. Delfosse, — which he proceeded to do-
at once.

Thus the United States was placed in the unfortunate and
wholly false attitude of having requested Mr. Delfosse's ap-
pointment, and was therefore all the more hopelessly estopped
from afterward excepting to any reward he might see fit to-
make. Much adverse criticism was expressed in the United
States when all the correspondence was published, which
brought to light the clever diplomatic tactics of Great Britain
in taking advantage of the American commissioners' blunder

THE NORTHEAST COAST FISHERIES 517

(1871) in thus leaving the choice of the third arbitrator to one
whose feelings toward the United States might be unfriendly.

Both Count Beust and Mr. Delfosse were probably un-
aware of the proceedings that had taken place between the
English premier and Mr. Fish, relative to the selection of
a third commissioner. The former would doubtless have
evinced some delicacy in venturing to propose Mr. Delfosse ;
and the latter, had he felt that he was persona non grata in
this connection, would certainly have declined to serve.

The board convened at Halifax, June 15, 1877. The
commission was composed of Sir Alexander Gait (British),
E. H. Kellogg (American), and Mr. Delfosse as the neutral
member. Secretaries, official reporters, and a host of cleri-
cal assistants, together with an array of counsel, combined
to make an imposing gathering.

Newfoundland at once presented a claim for compensation
to the amount of '914,880,000, for privileges enjoyed by
American fishermen in her waters and upon her shores
during the past twelve years, but the argument in support
of this claim was met by the answer that such demands
were fully covered by the remission of American tariff
duties upon her fish. The American counsel further
insisted that the jurisdiction of the board was restricted to
the duty of ascertaining how much more valuable, if more
valualjle at all, free Canadian fisheries were to the United
States than similar j)rivileges in American waters combined
with free importation of Canadian fish into the United
States were to the Canadians. On November 23 of the
same year the award was found, the following verdict being
rendered, together with the dissenting opinion of the
American commissioner: —

The commissioners appointed, etc. . . . Award the sum of five
millions five luindred thousand dollars in gold to ])e paid by the
government of the United States to the government of Her Bri-
tannic Majesty in accordance with the provisions of the said treaty.

Signed at Halifax, etc. . . .
Mauuick Delfosse.
A. T. Galt.

518 AMERICAN DIPLOMATIC QUESTIONS

The United States Commissioner is of opinion that the advan-
tages accruing to Great Britain under the treaty of Washington
are greater tlian tlie advantages conferred on the United States
by said treaty, and he cannot therefore concur in the conclusions
announced by his colleagues.

And the American commissioner deems it his duty to state
further that it is questionable whether it is competent for the
board to make an award under the treaty except with the unani-
mous consent of its members.

E. H. Kellogg,

Commissioner.

News of the award was received in the United States with
astonishment, the feeling being general that the country
had been wronged. The sum was grossly excessive. It
was estimated that the remission of duties on Canadian fish
cost the government about 8350,000 yearly, and this added
to the sum awarded at Halifax made the total cost of Cana-
dian fisheries for twelve years about 810,000,000. The true
value of the fisheries of Canada was computed to be worth
about 825,000 a year. The Senate committee on foreign
affairs chafed under the injustice of the decision, and its
members began to consider the suggestion in ]Mr. Kellogg's
dissenting opinion that a majorit}- decision alone was insufifi-
cient to bind the United States. A disposition was quite
manifest to evade, if possible, the payment of so unreason-
able a sum. However, the feeling finally prevailed that it
was a debt of honor, and the award was paid. A resolution
was immediately taken to abrogate the treaty at the " earliest
period consistent with Article 33 " of that instrument.

The treaty of Washington had gone into effect July 1,
1873 ; notice was given at the end of the stipulated ten
years, and the treaty articles referring to the fisheries were
terminated on July 1, 1885 — two years later. Thus the
status of the fisher}' question reverted for the third time
to the conditions of the convention of 1818.

Before the abrogation of the fishery clauses of the treaty
of Washington, an incident occurred in Canadian waters
(January 6, 1878), that brought to the attention of the

THE NORTHEAST COAST FISHERIES 519

State Department a new difficulty connected with the sub-
ject. One Sunday some American fishermen were haulino-
their herring seines near the settlement of Long Harbor in
Newfoundland. It appears that a local statute was in force
forbidding such desecration of the Sabbath. A native mob,
whose religious scruples had been offended, set upon the
luckless Americans and drove them from the region. This
adventure brought to light the variance between the impe-
rial law and local regulations. The question at once arose
— Which are paramount, treaty rights or local ordinances?
The British Foreign Office at first contended that the treaty
was made subject to all local laws or harbor regulations that
•affected all people alike, but ultimately acknowledged the
supremacy of treaty riglits, and consented to have all local
laws at variance with them suspended. The Secretary of
State, jNIr. Evarts, urged that "this government conceives
that the fishery rights of the United ates conceded by
the treaty of Washington, are to be ty rcised wholly free
from the restraint and regulations of tlie atutes of New-
foundland." Tlie matter was closed by Great Britain paying
the sum of -"^75,000 damages to the outraged American
fishermen.

IX

With tlie alirogation of the treaty of Washington in 1885,
and the consequent revival of the numerous restrictions im-
posed by the convention of 1818, it was fully expected that
the quarrels of tlie fishermen would begin anew. To
mitigate the losses the Americans would undoubtedly suffer
by tlie sudden withdrawal of privileges they had enjoyed in
the midst of a fishing season, an agreement was made with
Canada to continue in operation the fishery clauses of the
Washington treaty during the remainder of the season
1885. The Dominion cherished the hope that an ' «i "e
procity treaty would soon be made, and negotiations wei
once entered upon with that o1)ject in view. President C\e\ <
land in his annual message of December 8, 1885, proposed in

520 AMERICAN DIPLOMATIC QUESTIONS

the interests of " good neighborhood," that a joint high com-
mission should be appointed, " charged with the consideration
and settlement upon a just, equitable, and honorable basis,
of the entire question of the fishery rights of the two gov-
ernments and their respective citizens on the coasts of the
United States and British North America." The fishery
interests, he insisted, were intimately related to other gen-
eral questions dependent upon contiguity and intercourse.
This of course pointed directly to reciprocity, but the New
England fishermen protested so loudly against any change
of arrangements, that the President's recommendations to
Congress were adversely considered.

To understand clearly the opposition of American fisher-
men in 1885 to any change in the regulations of 1818 that
placed upon them so many disabilities, and against which
they had so steadily clamored for years, a glance at the
changing character of the fisheries becomes necessary. In
the earlier part of the century, American fishermen were
almost wholly dependent upon their shore privileges, both
for the purpose of refitting, obtaining supplies and bait,
and for drying and curing their catch. The fishing grounds
along the Maine coast, having long before become practically
exhausted, the Canadian inshore waters were next exploited,
and the most liberal privileges to fish in such waters were
sought by the Ameri<3ans. Gradually, however, American
cod fishermen withdrew to the richer fisheries of the Banks^
employing larger vessels and taking with them the necessary
supplies of salted or iced bait to last the entire cruise.
Thus they became more and more independent of the shore
privileges they had formerly sought. The drying and
curing process having also been abandoned for better
methods, the necessity for landing on Canadian soil was
again lessened.

The sudden rise of the mackerel fishery (about 1850)^
again made inshore privileges of value to a class of fisher-
men that followed it exclusively, for, as already observed,
this business was for the most part carried on within British
territorial waters. Even before this time (1885), the use

THE NOKTHEAST COAST FISHERIES 521

of the purse seine had supphmted the old method of " chum-
ming " for mackerel. This was carried on in deeper water,
and without the use of bait. Halibut fishing in the vicinity
of the provincial shores was at one time profitable, but it,
too, was found to yiekl better results in offshore waters.
Herring alone remained in 1885 a purely inshore fishery, but
its importance was rehitively small ; owing to constant
disagreements with the natives, with whom this occupation
brought our men in close contact, the practice of purchasing
herring from the provincial fishermen gradually came to be
adopted. Thus in 1885 the shore privileges, for which
American statesmen had so strenuously contended, had
become of comparatively little value to American fishermen.
But the privilege of entering Canadian ports for certain pur-
poses was still desirable, for all the contingencies of long
voyages and lengthy sojourn upon the Banks could not
always be provided against before departure from home..
Continued boisterous weather often prevailed, and om
account of the delays caused thereby, together with acci-
dents that are likely to occur in such exposed stations, the?
right to enter any nearl)y harbor to refit or purchase fresh
supplies was useful though not perhaps al)solutely necessary.
These privileges were already provided for by the treaty
of 1818, except the one privilege of Ijuying bait. While
this single privilege was less important in some respects
than the others, it was still considered to be worth a price,
though not so great a price as the remission of duty upon
Canadian fish. Aside from the quarrels in which these
fishermen so often found themselves involved when they
visited Canadian ports, American ski[)pers found other good
reasons for aljstaining, as far as possible, from the necessity
of making port during the fishing season. A run ashore
consumed valuable time, and invariably demoralized their
crews ; the more frecpient the calls in port the less efficient
became their men. Not a few of the shrewd(!r captains of
"bankers" would have quietly welcomed the excuse to offer
their men that all laufling on Canadian shores was prohibited.
It will be remembered that the treaty of 1818 gave the

522 AMERICAN DIPLOMATIC QUESTIONS

right to American fisherinen to enter any of the harbors of
British America for the purposes of shelter, repairing
damages, purchasing wood and obtaining water, but "• for no
other purposes whatever." The Dominion Government inter-
preted this phrase technically and strictl3\ The seizure of
the American vessel David J. Adams in Digby Harbor, May
7, 188G, for landing and purchasing* bait and ice, was fol-
lowed soon after by several other seizures upon the same
charge. The trial of these alleged culprits brought to the
front the limitation of privileges in Canadian ports which
was imposed upon Americans by the Dominion laws as based
upon the treaty of 1818.

The United States contended that while it was perfectly
true that the right to purchase bait in Canadian harbors, and
also the right to enter such harbors for any other purposes
than shelter, repairs, and to obtain wood and water, had been
expressly denied in the treaty of 1818, nevertheless, subse-
quent legislation on the part of both Canada and the Ignited
States had so far modified that clause of the treaty that a
liberal interpretation of the phrase in question would give
full freedom to New England fishing vessels to purchase
all needful supplies in Canadian ports, and in general, to
perform, without let or hindrance, all acts necessary for
refitting. It was contended that in 1818, when the treaty
was made, commercial vessels of the United States were
absolutely prohibited from British American ports, and the
privileges granted to fishing vessels in that year were excep-
tions to the rigid navigation laws of Great Britain. Since
then, and notably by an act in 1830, and by the Imperial
Shipping and Navigation Act of 1849, these restrictions
upon American commercial vessels were removed. With
the removal therefore of all former disabilities upon trading
vessels, were not the few remaining disabilities upon fishing
vessels (imposed by the treaty of 1818) also removed?
Great Britain replied tliat these disabilities had not been
removed, as she had then drawn, and did now draw, a
distinction between fishing and trading vessels. The former,
she contended, had no connnurcial privileges whatever ; and

THE NORTHEAST COAST FISHERIES 523

only with the understanding that they would not transport
merchandise, they were accorded, by most civilized nations,
certain special immunities from harbor and port regulations.
They carry no clearance papers or manifests, and are free
to come and go at Avill. Trading vessels, on the other
hand, are strictly held to these formalities. For the protec-
tion of revenue laws and to prevent illicit trade, all commer-
cial vessels are obliged to carry ships papers that indicate
clearly their ports of departure and destination, and an
inventory of cargo as well. These laws are very stringent,
and therefore if American fishing vessels desire to become
merchant vessels also, they must comply with the usual
regulations imposed upon merchant vessels.

For obvious reasons the captains of fishing schooners were
unwilling to be burdened with ships' papers. The nature of
their calling made their movements more or less uncertain,
and to be obliged by their clearances to call at Halifax when
St. John's ha[)pened to be the more convenient port, would
be an intolerable nuisance. The Druid of Gloucester, in
1886, furnished an example. With supplies for the Ameri-
can mackerel fleet she took out clearance papers for Harbor
de Bar in tlie Magdalen Islands; but finding later that the
fleet she sought was off Prince Edward Island, she proceeded
to that point, and disposing of her cargo of provisions, put
into the nearest port, — which happened to be Alalpeque, —
to obtain a return cargo of fish. Tliere she passed an unlia[)i)y
week in the toils of the revenue officials of that port.

As already mentioned (page 487), Congress had })assed an
act in 1793 authorizing fishing vessels to take out licenses
to " touch and trade " at any foreign port, and to make pur-
chases necessary fen- their own use without being subjected
to the customs regulations of the United States. The form
of this permit was not the same as a clearance, but was a
document to be shown to customs officers of liome ports, in
order to exempt the holder from certain customs dues.
The argument that the "touch and trade'* licenses were
understood as " conferring U])on the vessel a riglit to land
and receive on boai'd a (■ar<''t» of merchandise in tlic same

524 AMERICAN DIPLOMATIC QUESTIONS

manner as if she were not engaged in the fisheries " was
scarcely sound.

On the trial of the David J. Adams, charged with purchas-
ing bait and ice in contravention of the terms of the treaty
of 1818, the admiralty court in Halifax found some diffi-
culty, because the Imperial Act of 1819, enforcing the
provisions of the treaty of 1818, prescribed no penalty for
such purchases, the only penalties mentioned being for
"fishing and preparing to take fish " within the prohibited
waters. To hold that buying bait was necessarily for the
purpose of " preparing to fish " within prohibited waters was
scarcely logical.

The real grievance of American fishermen, however, was
in the aggravating and needlessly severe port regulations
of tlie Dominion, and also in the harsh manner of their exe-
cution. One of these statutes was so framed that the
captor was entitled to one-half the profits of confiscation,
and the burden of proof to show innocence practically fell
upon the defendant captains. The practice of purchasing
bait and landing to transship cargoes, and the doing of
numerous other acts necessarily connected with the refitting
of a ship, such as purchasing new water casks, material for
mending nets or sails, were declared illegal. For these
reasons, and often upon very slight pretexts, American
vessels were detained to the great discomfiture and annoy-
ance of the fishermen. It was rather, then, to tlie strained
and unfriendly spirit manifested in the interpretation of their
laws than to the laws themselves that the Americans directed
their complaints.

Tlie Canadians, on the other hand, charged that the Ameri-
cans sought, contrary to law, to use their ports as a base for
fishing operations, and thus to exercise and enjoy in common,
privileges which they well knew had not been conceded to
them. Having exhausted their own fisheries by overexploita-
tion, replied the Canadians, tlie Americans had demanded all
the privileges of British subjects in Canadian waters, and
furthermore they actually assumed and used them in defiance
of treaty prohibitions, and in perfect contempt of all local

THE NORTHEAST COAST FISHERIES 525

regulations. The seizures of their vessels were compara-
tively few and far between, considering the persistency with
wliich the Americans violated their laws. For all privileges
granted them, the Americans were unwilling to make any
return. The Canadians reiterated their willingness to remove
at any time the regulations so obnoxious to the American
fishermen, and to grant them the fullest liberties in their
ports, if the United States would but compensate them for
such concessions. Their price, they said, was free Canadian
fish into the United States, but this the Americans who sought
favors of them opposed with all their influence in Congress.

A treaty with England was signed in Washington, Febru-
ary 15, 1888, providing for a commission to designate and
describe the British waters in which the United States should
enjoy full right to fish, and in like manner to enumerate
and state specifically the harbors and other waters in which
such rights would thenceforth be denied. One article recited
that whenever the United States Government should remove
the tariff duty upon the products of the Canadian fishery,
then the privilege of entering all ports, harbors, etc., of the
Dominion coasts would be accorded Americans for the fol-
lowing purposes, namely : —

" 1. The purchase of provisions, bait, ice, seines, lines, and
all other supplies and outfits.

" 2. Transshipment of catch, for transport by any means
of conveyance.

" 3. Shipping of crews."

Tlie draft of treaty went to the Senate strongly recom-
mended by President Cleveland, but failed to become law.
Pending action by Congress, the following Modus Vivendi
was agreed upon in February, 1888, which Ijy tacit consent
has continued to remain in force by renewal each year to
tlie present time : —

1. For a period not exceeding two years from the i)resent date,
the privilege of entering the bays and liurbors of the Atlantic
coasts of Canada and Newfoundland shall l)e granted to the
United States fishing vessels by annual licenses at a fee of J$1.50
per ton — for the following purposes : —

526 AMERICAN DIPLOMATIC QUESTIONS

The purchase of bait, ice, seines, lines, and all other supplies
and outfits.

Transshipment of catch and shipping of crews.

2. If, during the continuance of this arrangement, the United
States should remove the duties on fish, fish oil, whale and seal
oil (and their coverings, packages, etc.), the said licenses shall be
issued free of charge.

3. United States fishing vessels entering the bays and harbors
of the Atlantic coasts of Canada or of Newfoundland for any of
the four purposes mentioned in Article 1 of the convention of
October 20, 1818, and not remaining therein more than twenty-
four hours, shall not be required to enter or clear at the custom
house, providing they do not communicate with the shore.

4. Forfeiture to be exacted only for the offences of fishing or
preparing to fish in territorial waters.

5. This arrangement to take effect as soon as the necessary
measures can be completed by the Colonial authorities.

For the past twelve years, therefore, the regulations gov-
erning the Canadian fisheries are those of the convention of
1818, as modifiecl by the words of the Modus Vivendi of
1888. -,Tlie arrangement did not prove altogether satisfac-
tory^ at first to either party, and the continued successful
operation of the plan depended largely upon the good-will
and forbearance of both.

X

Changing conditions in the methods of fishing have oper-
ated more largely in the last ten years to do away with the
troublesome " fishery question " than have a century of diplo-
matic skirmishes. At the present moment those chronic
differences of the fishermen seem to be almost forgotten,
and until new and unforeseen complications arise, the Avhole
matter will probably remain at rest. The liability to fur-
ther rupture with Canada concerning these rights lies
to-day rather in associated diplomatic cj^ucstions still unset-
tled between the two powers and in the adjustment of which
the fishery regulations are likely to be utilized in the shift-
ing game of international politics. The fishermen at least
are satisfied with present conditions. Each year since 1888,
and including the last, the Modus Vivendi has been renewed ;

THE NORTHEAST COAST FISHERIES 527

and under its provisions American captains desiring the use of
Canadian ports for purposes of procuring bait, transsliippincr
cargoes, purchasing provisions, refitting, etc., may purchase
licenses at the cost of *^1.50, multiplied by the registered
tonnage of the vessel.^

But each year the value of such privileges to our fishermen
has been diminishing, and the vast majority of United States
fishing vessels do not care to avail themselves of them. In
1898, out of 1427 New England schooners engaged in fish-
ing, only 7U took out licenses, and the year before only 40
bought the right to enter Canadian ports for the purposes
mentioned in the Modus Vivendi.

The inshore cod fishery of Canada, though still prosecuted
by Canadians, has been wholly abandoned by Americans.
The entire American fleet, wliich is equipped for cod and
other " ground " fish, follows the Bank fishery. The use
of larger, faster and better equipped vessels, the carrying
of ice to pack away the catch, the use of iced or salted bait,
has almost totally obviated the necessity of touching at
Canadian ports, and our fishermen declare themselves to be

1 The form of license is as follows : —

(Name) (Master or Owner) of the

United States Fishing vessel tons register, of ,

having paid to the undersigned, Collector of Customs at the port of

the sum of .$ , being one dollar and fifty cents per registered

ton, the privilege is hereby granted to said fishing vessel to enter the bays
and harbours of the Atlantic coasts of Canada, for the purchase of bait, ice,
seines, lines and all other supplies and outfits, and the transshipment of catch,
and shipping of crews.

This license shall continue in force for the year , and is issued in pur-
suance of the Act of the Parliament of Canada of 1802, entitled, "An Act
respecting Fishing Vessels of the United States," 55-50 Victoria, chapter 3.

This license, while conferring the above-mentioned privileges, does not
dispense with a due observance by the holder, or any other person, of the
laws of Canada, and will become null and void, and forfeited forthwith, and
the vessel will become ineligible to ol)tain a license in future, if any goods or
supplies, or other advantages obtained hereunder are sold or transferred to
any United States fishing vessel that has not obtained a license.

Dated this day of a.d. lKi»

Collector of Customs at the Port of

For Minister of Marine and Fisheries.

528 AMERICAN DIPLOMATIC QUESTIONS

entirely independent of the rights or privileges which the
Canadians have to offer.

By freezing their fares they are enabled to bring them
home and to cure their fish upon American soil, thus doing
away with one of the most aggravating causes of dispute in
former years. Those American fishermen who resort more
particularly to the Banks adjacent to Newfoundland admit
the convenience of a license for using Canadian ports, espe-
cially in the contingency of prolonged unfavorable weather ;
but whatever may be the value of such privileges — even if
made general and open to all — the fishermen are unanimous
in the belief that they are not worth the price of free Ameri-
can markets to Canadian fish and fish products. Rather
than suffer the great injury to their business, which they say
free competition with the Canadians would cause, they
would cheerfully forego the benefits given them by the
Modus Vivendi.

As heretofore shown, the chief difficulties arising out of
the fisheries in the last few years have been produced by
the use of the purse seine. This method of fishing for
mackerel was extensively followed by American skippers in
the shallow waters of the Gulf of St. Lawrence, but the
employment of these large nets was denounced by the Cana-
dians upon the supposition that it tended to scatter the
schools of fish, to interfere with their habits of breeding, and
to cause them ultimately to abandon those waters. They
alleged, therefore, that the use of this seine constituted an
act contra bonos mores. Whether the Canadians were justi-
fied in those apprehensions or not, the Americans neverthe-
less continued the practice, basing their right to do so
(beyond three miles from shore) upon the broad rights of
mare liherum.

These points of difference offered an excellent foundation
for future diplomatic distuibances, but two causes happily
appeared which no doubt prevented the maturing of these
seasonal (puirrels into a more serious international disagree-
ment. The American fishermen l)egan of their own volition
to abandon the use of tlie purse seine, and to return to the

I

THE NORTHEAST COAST FISHERIES 529

more primitive, but after all the more effective, method of
"chumming"; secondly, the mackerel began to disappear
from Canadian waters, in consequence of which, each suc-
ceeding year has found fewer American vessels in the Gulf
of St. Lawrence. Since 1880, indeed, the mackerel have
almost wholly abandoned their former haunts in the Gulf of
St. Lawrence, although reports of the present year give evi-
dences that they are renewing their annual migrations to
the more northern station. However, the abandonment of
the purse seine has removed the prime causes of discord, and
if the American mackerel fleet should resume operations in
• the Gulf, there is no special likelihood of conflict.

The northeast coast fisheries are in a most prosperous and
flourishing condition, as may be realized from the fact that
in 181)9 the number of "ground fish" from the Banks (cod,
haddock, hake, etc., excluding mackerel) landed at Boston
and Gloucester, amounted to 15.5,367,808 pounds, valued at
•5^3,525,268. A substantial increase is thus shown over the
business of the previous year, which amounted to 128,088,295
pounds, Avitli estimated value of -92.585,010. Reports for 1900
indicate that the fisheries are steadily increasing in value. ^

It is greatly to be hoped that the present regulations may
continue in operation undisturbed by the intrusion of other
diplomatic issues. Therein lies the chief danger of a per-
petuation of this stubborn quarrel of a century between the
United States and Canada.

At last the American fisherman seems to be satisfied, and
the Canadian fisherman is equally without cause of complaint.
Time has reconciled disputes which the wisdom of statesmen
failed to adjust, and it has successfully composed those ques-
tions which diplomacy could not permanently solve. And
thus tlie lesson is once more tauglit tliat war postponed is the
l)eginuing of peace. Let it be ]io{)ed tliat the cordial relatiitns
between the two great nations in interest tlius cemented
by tunc, may continue as long as time itself may last.

2h

//)

^

The Peace Conference at the Hague and its
Bearings on International Law and Policy

By FREDERICK W. HOLLS, D.C.L.,

A Member of the Conference from the United States 0/ America.

8vo Cloth $3.00

Edward Everett Hale in The Forum says : —

"Mr. Holls's closing chapter is of profound interest and importance. In
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not only in schools of law, but in all schools of the higher education. For
we must all take care that the generation which created the Hague Confer-
ence shall comprehend its j)urp(_>se, antl know what are its achievements.
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estimation in which they were held was the author of this volume. Among
the few defects in his history of the Peace Conference at the Hague is the fact
that it does not make the reader understand the large part which he himself
took in the proceedings. , . . But every one ought to be grateful for the clear
statement of the course of the discussion and the effect of the conclusions."

The Outlook says : —

"This is a book of reference which the student of International Law must
put in the first rank. Mr. Holls writes so interestingly, however, that the
' book is not too technical for the general reader. Since the beginning of the
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Conference at the Hague. It is now well to emphasize what the Conference
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the body of internatiimal law, aliove ail, in the binding tugctlier of the nations
into a federatitm for justice. The establishment of a permanent international
court of arbitration is the great monument which will commemorate the
Hague Conference. It will dissipate many prevalent misconceptions."

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World Politics. By Paul S. Reinsch, Ph.D., LL.B., Assistant
Professor of PoUtical Science, University of Wisconsin.

Economic Crises. By Edward D. Jones, Ph.D., Instructor in
Economics and Statistics, University of Wisconsin,

Government in Switzerland. By John Martin Vincent, Ph.D.^
Associate Professor of History, Johns Hopkins University.

Political Parties in the United States, 1846=1861. By Jesse
]\Lacv, LL.D., Professor of Political Science in Iowa College.

Essays on the Monetary History of the United States. By

Charles J. Bullock, Ph.D., Assistant Professor of Economics,
Williams College.

Social Control: A Survey of the Foundations of Order.

By Edgar Alsworth Ross, Ph.D.

THE MACMILLAN COMPANY

66 FIFTH AVENUE, NEW YORK

University of British Columbia Library

DATE

DUE

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91962

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1965

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FORM No. 310

UNIVERSITY OF B.C. LIBRARY

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