
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AMERICAN
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ENGLISH STUDIES

BY

WHITELAW REID

VOLUME I

GOVERNMENT AND EDUCATION

NEW YORK

CHARLES SCRIBNER'S SONS

MDCCCCXIII

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INTRODUCTION

THESE volumes assemble some of the more important contributions made by Whitelaw Reid to the discussion of matters of public interest. They are designed to illustrate both his purely intellectual habit and his point of view as a citizen. The publicist is, in a measure, a man of action, exercising an influence which, if not always immediately obvious, is nevertheless often decisive, and Mr. Reid's career brought him into very close and effective contact with the subjects here treated. More than once he stepped down into the arena itself. The ideas on government embodied in many of these pages were developed not only in the study, but amongst other practical leaders, fighting for political ideals which were of value, in his opinion, solely as they found expression in just laws and the betterment of American life.

His nomination as Vice-President on the ticket with Benjamin Harrison in 1892 did not bring him his first experience as an active participant in political campaigning. He had assumed that rôle as early as 1856, when, being still too young to vote, he nevertheless took the stump for Frémont. Four years later, having then a paper of his own, "The Xenia News," in the Ohio town where he was

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born, he wrote vigorously in support of Lincoln's candidacy and made a number of speeches in the same cause. These episodes foreshadowed the labors of his maturity, simplifying his aim and fixing his vocation. Thenceforth, until the day of his death at the post of duty as Ambassador to Great Britain, he was entirely absorbed in public affairs. All his life he was talking and writing about them, and there were many occasions, here and abroad, —sometimes, he used ruefully to say, almost too many,—on which he was asked to speak about them. The task was not difficult. He spoke, indeed, with a natural facility, in a clear voice of unusual carrying power, and, having had much experience, he was wont to use his memory more than his manuscript, save in instances of long, sustained exposition, when the analysis of some historical theme or the portrayal of a great character made notes indispensable. He was ready on his feet, as numerous occasional remarks of his at dinners and the like plainly testified. But it was characteristic of his workmanlike methods and of his literary instinct to give to such studies as are here gathered together a form significant of the essayist, developing his subject with leisurely care and seeking to expose it in the light of constructive thought.

He spoke only when he had something to say,

and looked well to the basis of his convictions. When he spoke on education it was as a member of the Board of Regents, who not only had the instruction of the young at heart, but knew their needs from first-hand investigation, advocating principles which experience had shown him, when he himself had taught, to be in their interest. Before his appointment to the Spanish Peace Commission he had thought out his views on the retention of the Philippines. As is shown by the paper on that subject now reprinted, hard common sense and a practice of distinguishing fact from theory had led him whole-heartedly to commit himself then to the policy afterward officially adopted. If the reader seeks any light on Mr. Reid's success in the diplomatic service, first as Minister to France, then in the settlement of the negotiations with Spain and on other special missions, and finally on his British embassy, he may find it, perhaps, in the temper of the observations which this book contains on such topics as the Monroe Doctrine, anarchism, the statesmanship of Burke, or the strangely mixed qualities of Talleyrand. They point to the disinterested manner in which he approached a problem. He was a staunch believer in party organization, a devoted Republican, but impatient of the partisanship which colors a man's mental processes.

The last of the political portraits that he drew, the one of Jefferson, dating from but a few short weeks before his death, is typically scrupulous in its balancing of the lights and shadows in that perplexing career.

Intellectual honesty comes by nature, or it does not come at all. On the other hand, its operations, like those of any other of a man's inborn resources, rest largely upon training. The four papers here grouped under the head of "An Editor's Reflections," and expressive of Mr. Reid's ideas on journalism both in his early manhood and in his later years, explain to some extent, in the emphasis they place upon disciplinary studies, his attitude toward the business of life and of letters. In April, 1872, on the eve of his long career as editor of "The Tribune," he spoke at the University of the City of New York on the life of the journalist. No young man could be considered fit for it, he said, who did not have some adequate knowledge of the history of political parties in this country, or failed to add to that a comprehensive knowledge of the entire history of the United States. This, too, was only a beginning. It was the duty of the journalist to make himself acquainted with the general history of the world, to know the fundamental principles of common, constitutional, and international law,

to learn something about political economy, to acquire a training in logic, to seek familiarity with more than one foreign language, and to be fastidiously competent in the use of his own. It was a stiff programme. But at least the man who framed it could claim that he had framed it for himself. The biography of Mr. Reid, which is now in preparation, will show in detail what use he made of the instruments of character and professional activity he thus enumerated; but in the meantime these two volumes may serve to illustrate the nature and scope of some of his ideas, and the aptness of his motto, *Per Ardua ad Alta*.

ROYAL CORTISSOZ.

New York, June 1, 1913.

Most of the studies in this collection appear now in book form for the first time. For permission to reprint the few that have previously been published thanks are due, in the following instances, to the firms named: "Problems Flowing from the Spanish War," "Territorial Expansion," "Our Duty in the Philippines" (The Century Company); "The Rise of the United States" (The T. Y. Crowell Company); "The Practical Issues in a Newspaper Office," "In an Old Ohio Town" (Henry Holt & Company); "Thomas Jefferson," "The Scot in America and the Ulster Scot" (The Macmillan Company); "Talleyrand" (G. P. Putnam's Sons).

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THE RISE OF THE UNITED STATES

NEITHER George Canning nor his king called this New World into being, and it was not called into being by anybody for the purpose of redressing the balance of the Old. As to its most significant, and, for a long time, its leading settlements, it was called into being by Charles I, when he pursued Separatists, non-Conformists, and others, in the professed interest of the Church of England. Its growth was checked by the rise of Oliver Cromwell; and while the Protectorate lasted, the Puritan emigration ceased. Charles II revived it, and he and his brother James, by their treatment of the Puritans in England and the Covenanters in Scotland, did more than any other human power to make New England and other large sections of the United States what they are. Tudors and Stuarts alike, whatever their intentions, were helpful to the infancy of the new nation, and there is fitness in its possessing enduring monuments to commemorate them — Virginia, Maryland, the Carolinas, Jamestown, and James River.

At the beginning of this period, say at the opening of the seventeenth century, and near the close of Queen Elizabeth's long reign, all England was much less than London is now. The total population of England was a little over four millions, and what is now far the greatest city in the world had then possibly a quarter of one million within its

limits. A rapid increase was prevented, in fact, a material decrease had been caused, by the enormous death rate, due to epidemics which science had not learned to control, to unhealthful surroundings, to constant wars, and to a deplorable waste of human life in the ordinary administration of justice. Between 1592 and 1665, London had eight visitations of the plague. The sweating sickness and the smallpox were almost equally dreaded and equally uncontrollable. The unsanitary habits of the people were extraordinary. The very king for whom the first settlement in Virginia was named, according to the declaration of James Balfour, never washed even his hands. Prisoners were tortured, robbers were hanged, witches and religious men whose orthodoxy was not our doxy were burned. For trivial offences men and women were whipped or set in the stocks, or nailed by their ears to the pillory. Witchcraft was so firmly embedded in the faith of the people that the greatest legal writer of his time, Sir William Blackstone, said as late as when the American colonies were on the point of revolting, that every nation in the world had borne testimony to it, and that to deny it was to deny the revealed word of God.

This is, of course, not a fair picture of the England from which the colonists went out, though some of the noticeable features are accurately portrayed. We can faintly conceive the limitations of the England of that day, how little it was like the present world, when we add that it knew nothing

of the circulation of the blood, of vaccination, of gravitation, of the velocity of light, of illumination by petroleum, gas, or electricity, of communication by fast or cheap mails, of the telegraph or the telephone; that it had no newspapers, and that its books were few and dear.

Yet this England had Magna Charta and parliamentary government; had greater and better secured personal liberties than any other country in Europe, and was more jealously watchful of them; had an inbred respect for law, and for its officers, and, in spite of a degree of illiteracy that seems now surprising, probably led Europe also in diffused intelligence and in a reasoning devotion to religion. In the gallery of England's immortals, Milton was soon to be added to Shakespeare; and the nation was rapidly approaching the great contest in which religious zeal and a passion for civil liberty in an almost equal coöperation were to precipitate a revolution and execute a king.

Meantime, the land in which the new nation was to spring up, a land of rivers and lakes and unbroken forests beyond the Atlantic, lay palpitating with wild life under summer suns or blanketed under winter snows, practically unpeopled. The first feeble colony arrived at Jamestown seven years after the opening of the century; the little company borne by the "Mayflower" to Plymouth Rock, thirteen years after that. The only inhabitants at the beginning of the seventeenth century were the mysterious aborigines, whose origin, lan-

guages, and customs were alike unknown, whose trails through the forests were the only roads, whose patches of Indian corn were the only agriculture, whose clusters of wigwams were the only cities. Between the Great Lakes and the Gulf, from the Atlantic to the Alleghenies, there were in all less than two hundred thousand of them, in limits which now contain the second city in the world, seventeen great states, and a total population of over thirty millions.

At the beginning of the eighteenth century this New World had started into full life among the forests. Scattered and still feeble colonies, controlled and mainly peopled by Great Britain, lay in isolated settlements along the Atlantic coast, from Massachusetts to the Gulf of Mexico, and at several points were spreading westward toward the Alleghenies. By this time they had come to include a sprinkling of several northern races—soon to melt wonderfully into the Anglo-Saxon mould and to renounce other allegiance in order to seek the privileges of British subjects. There were Dutch in New York—in fact, for about half a century, New York was a Dutch city. There were Swedes in Delaware, and Germans in Pennsylvania, and to these were added the best France had to give in a considerable influx of the persecuted and exiled Huguenots. There were many sects, too, and these did not melt so readily into one mould. There were Puritans in most of New England, Baptists in Rhode Island, Episcopalians

in New York and Virginia, Presbyterians in New Jersey and the Carolinas, Quakers and Lutherans in Pennsylvania, Roman Catholics in Maryland. All of them insisted on freedom to enjoy their own religion,—many of them had come to an uninhabited country for that purpose,—but not all were ready to tolerate other people's religion.

At times there had been efforts to impose upon them the Established Church of England, but to this they thought consent impossible. Religion and education they fostered alike. The church and the schoolhouse went with every fresh pioneer settlement. But many of them left England to escape bishops, others to escape the ruling classes, and in their new homes they would submit neither to a prelacy nor to a nobility. They demanded the right of the English-born to participate in the government, but they were not ready to let everybody share it with them. In the early days of New England none but church members could vote or hold office. As late as 1679, hardly one grown man in Massachusetts out of five could vote. Cotton denounced democracy, thinking no doubt with Montesquieu, that liberty may be least safe under a rule of the mere majority; nobody dreamed of letting Indians or negroes vote; till long after the Revolution, a considerable property qualification was required from every voter.

In one way or another they were ruled by officers from England; and they brought with them the general body of English law. But they had or-

ganized parliamentary government in most of the colonies, on the English pattern, with more exact representation and under written constitutional arrangements more precise than England had ever employed. They looked to England for protection, spoke of it habitually as home, and held themselves under its authority; yet they already exercised a large measure of local self-government, rightly considered this a necessity of their remote situation and peculiar perils, and regarded any infringement upon it with even more than the historical Anglo-Saxon jealousy.

The old ideas of blind loyalty to the throne had been shaken, first by the Puritan revolt against Charles, and later by the deposition of James. They had twice seen Parliament set aside a king, and it was only a step from this to the belief that not the king, but the representatives chosen by the people, must always be, in the end, the controlling power of the state. From that again, the distant colonists found it only a step farther to the belief that in their remote isolation they should choose their own representatives instead of submitting to a rule by representatives chosen back in England for English purposes. Thus early had the "Mother of Parliaments" taught the sons of Great Britain beyond seas to better her instructions.

And yet a personal sense of loyalty to the sovereign remained down to the very outset of the Revolution, often as strong in America as in England, sometimes stronger, and generally more dis-

interested. Benjamin Franklin wrote privately, in 1768, to his friends at home of George III as "the best monarch any nation was ever blessed with." In 1769, when he had to report the refusal by the House of Commons to repeal offensive customs duties, he used even stronger language:

"I hope nothing that has happened, or may happen, will diminish in the least our loyalty to our sovereign or affection for this nation in general. I can scarcely conceive a king of better dispositions, or more exemplary virtues, or more truly desirous of promoting the welfare of all his subjects. The body of this people, too, is of a noble and generous nature, loving and honouring the spirit of liberty, and hating arbitrary power of all sorts. We have many, very many friends among them."

Seven years later came the bitter arraignment of the same sovereign in the Declaration of Independence, and the richest possession of the English crown was lost forever.

From the outset the colonists were thrown on their own resources, in a wild continent and among savage people. The survival of the fittest made them a picked body, a real *corps d'élite*. Their faculties were quickened by necessity, by danger, and by climate. The lonely life and the necessity for quick decisions, often without much opportunity for consultation, led to a marked personal independence, an ever-ready resourcefulness, and an absolute freedom of individual initiative, which speedily became general characteristics.

But at the beginning of the eighteenth century

their opinions and their traits had not worked out to the logical conclusion. With all their personal independence, the colonists never dreamed of standing alone; with all their free personal initiative, they still looked implicitly to the Mother Country for guidance.

The growth of these colonies, which for a long time was slow, painful, and intermittent, had of late become more rapid. Their population was only about 200,000 when James II was deposed and William and Mary came to the throne. A quarter of a century later, when the House of Hanover came in with the accession of George I, the tables compiled for the Board of Trade, giving in detail the whites and negroes in the colonies, showed an aggregate of 434,000. The number had thus more than doubled. In the next half century this again was trebled. By 1754, when the movements for taxing America were about to begin, there were 1,165,000 whites and 253,000 negroes, say, in round numbers nearly a million and a half.

The England which, after a variable but on the whole not unmotherly care of the colonies, was now to enter upon that unhappy experiment of arbitrary taxation, presented almost as strong a contrast to the England we have seen in the closing days of Elizabeth, as did the thirteen colonies of 1754 to the New World before Jamestown and Plymouth. In numbers it had grown from four millions to perhaps ten. In government it had passed

from Essex to Newcastle and Bute. Landmarks on that long road were a civil war, a commonwealth, a restoration, more discontent, a deposition, the choice of a new sovereign from abroad, and enormously increased power in Parliament. And now at last another royalist reaction, with revival of old prerogatives through parliamentary methods by purchased majorities, was to precipitate a crisis in the American possessions. Meantime, the nation had enjoyed an enormous extension of commerce, beginning with the revolution in 1688, had prospered on colonial trade, had won glory in foreign wars. Of its entire exports one-fourth was taken by its colonies in America; under the inspiring guidance of Chatham, England was rapidly coming to the front in both hemispheres; and this political leadership among the nations was followed by a sudden and enormous increase in national wealth.

But in the attempt now to begin for stretching the power of the crown in the colonies, one thing was forgotten. While the people that elected their sovereign by Parliament had thus made their own representatives supreme, few realized that Americans could learn the lesson. It scarcely entered many English minds that those dependent poor relations might in their turn demand an equal authority for *their* representatives. Ministers at this date were indeed curiously ignorant of the colonies. Distance, inattention, and misinformation coöperated to produce political blindness. An acute English historian, explaining how subservient and

prejudiced English officials in America misled their sovereign, said that in fact "his own governors, by their reports to him, wrote King George out of America." To them, and so easily enough to him, it seemed a natural thing that the colonists should be content to buy everything from England—unreasonable that they should want to manufacture things for themselves; a matter of course that they should accept interference from England in their domestic concerns, and pay English taxes—disloyal and rebellious that they should hesitate.

And yet these uneasy colonists had given splendid proof of their devotion. Unaided, they had captured Louisburg, then the greatest French stronghold in America, for the British crown. They had responded to Pitt's calls, involving both men and money, far beyond reasonable expectations. Nearly two-thirds of Abercrombie's force on Lake George had been sent from New England, New York, and New Jersey. Another year Connecticut had five thousand men under arms to support the British campaign, and Massachusetts seven thousand. When disasters came, the feeble colonists strained afresh their resources. Massachusetts sent out one in six of all its inhabitants capable of bearing arms, and Connecticut an equal or even greater proportion. While the war lasted that expelled the French from the Great Lakes and from the Ohio, New Jersey taxed herself at the rate of a pound per head for every inhabitant. Massachusetts levied on personal incomes at the rate of thirteen shillings

and fourpence to the pound, besides land taxes, poll taxes, and even colonial stamp taxes. Connecticut, though feebler in resources, was no whit behind. With such warmth did the colonists support the great sympathetic Minister of the crown, while he rescued Tennessee, Michigan, and the country of the Great Lakes, conquered the west, and conquered Canada. What might not have happened had Chatham but remained in power?

At this period the colonies had been developing in America for about a century and a half. England might well have taken pride in the result, for the race that had sprung up amid the trials of the western wilderness, though different from the race at home, had lost few of its conspicuous virtues and had found others. The colonists were, in the main, curiously orderly and law abiding. They were temperate, moral, generally religious. The world had never seen such widely scattered rural communities with a more general diffusion of intelligence and a smaller percentage of illiteracy. Everybody worked and enjoyed the fruits of his labor —there were no rich and comparatively few poor. There was a nearer approach to equality of opportunity than older countries could show, and to personal equality when the opportunity had been wisely improved. There was no governing class; all took part in the government, and the man who had been called to the public service, at the end of it dropped back naturally into his position, and

instead of making laws might again be making shoes. There were no palaces, but (away from the frontier settlements) there were very few hovels; and according to the standard of the times the mass of the population was probably as comfortably housed as in England, and with better surroundings, though often in unpainted dwellings of wood. The proportion of considerable landholders to mere householders was naturally larger than in older communities. Social life was everywhere simple, but not without dignity, or, in the rising cities, without grace. They had the English virtue of hospitality, accompanied by the unusual freedom from reserve or constraint which came with their environment. In a word, they were, in the main, like the best type of English middle-class rural population, but with the independence and alertness bred of the never-ending conflict with the wild country, wild beasts, and wild men. Chatham and Burke were proud of their Americans; it would have been well for Newcastle and Bute and men higher still, if at least they had understood them.

These last left such comprehension instead to a young Frenchman to whom the world a few years later was glad to listen. "Vast regions of America!" exclaimed Turgot, at the Sorbonne, in 1750. "Equality keeps them from both luxury and want, and preserves to them purity and simplicity with freedom. Europe herself will find there the perfection of her political societies and the surest support of her well-being. But," Turgot added,

in words that might have borne a profitable warning across the Channel, "colonies are like fruits, which cling to the tree only till they ripen."

How that predicted end was hastened with such an English people as we have been describing, by efforts to abridge or withdraw rights on which all Englishmen insisted, may now be seen in the events of the next twenty years. The tendency was noticeable in the later ministries of George II; the policy was pursued with continuity and earnestness from the accession of George III.

In 1750 the construction of more iron mills in the American colonies was forbidden, that there might be more demand for the English product. While the liberty to manufacture was thus hampered, the liberty to import slaves, under the guise of a right to trade between the Barbary Coast and the Cape of Good Hope, was in the very same year extended specifically "to all subjects of the King of England." In 1753 a new governor was instructed to withhold from the New York Assembly the right it had always exercised of considering and voting annually the allowances for the support of the government and of examining the accounts. This Englishman (Sir Danvers Osborne), when he found these men of English blood and parliamentary experience would not submit to such orders, was so horror-stricken at the situation in which he was involved, that he went out and hanged himself. The next year the colonies were

required to contribute to a general fund, and Halifax, by the king's command, proposed an American union for that purpose, with a congress of one commissioner from each colony to adjust the quotas. Ominous suggestion! Franklin had already favored the union, but with modifications. He would have no taxation by Parliament, unless with ample representation in that body, and legislation on an equal basis for all.

A year later, in 1756, the British commander-in-chief was reinforcing the recommendation of various royal governors for an act of Parliament levying a stamp duty, a poll tax, and an excise tax on all the colonies for a general fund, and, if any colony failed to pay promptly, providing means for collecting by royal warrants of distraint and imprisonment. He was succeeded the same year by Loudoun, who, under a commission prepared by Chancellor Hardwicke, was instructed to make the Colonial Assemblies "distinctly and precisely understand" that the king required of them "a general fund to be issued and applied as the commander-in-chief should direct," and likewise to pay for the quarters of the soldiers. When an attempt was made, under this, to billet officers of the army upon New York City, the mayor objected that it was contrary to the laws of England, the privileges of Englishmen, and common law. "Free quarters are everywhere usual," replied the commander-in-chief; "I assert it on my honor, which is the highest evidence you require. God

damn my blood, if you do not billet my officers upon free quarters this day, I'll order here all the troops in North America under my command, and billet them all upon the city myself." New York submitted, unwillingly enough, and soon after Philadelphia, under similar compulsion, did the same. While the troops were thus quartered in the principal cities, the frontiers were left open to the Indians and the French.

With such conditions prevailing in America, George III came to the throne in October, 1760. It took scarcely fourteen years more to precipitate the crisis. Early in 1761 the restrictions in the Acts of Trade were brought into court in Boston, and James Otis appeared to resist the call upon all executive officers and subjects of the colony to assist in their enforcement. His arguments were cogent, but what startled alike the court and the community was the defiant challenge he flung at the feet of the judges. He would sacrifice everything, he said, to "the sacred calls of his country, in opposition to a kind of power, the exercise of which cost one King of England his head and another his throne." The court, quite staggered for the moment, postponed a decision, and the chief justice wrote to England! Meantime, the fiery orator was elected to the Assembly, and next year we find him declaring there that no taxes could be arbitrarily levied without the consent of the legislative body. That was the advantage, he said, of being an Englishman rather than a Frenchman; and for

the colonists he held that the rights of a Colonial Assembly were the same as were those of the House of Commons for residents of England. To such outspoken tones did the policy of the Ministers carry the colonists in the first two years of George the Third's reign.

By the first day of the next year (1763) it was admitted that the plans of the ministry included the permanent quartering of twenty battalions on the colonies after the peace in Europe, the colonies themselves to bear the expense. It soon came out that the scheme went even farther, contemplating the withdrawal of the colonial charters, and the imposition of a uniform system of government throughout the colonies. Two years were spent in talking about this revolutionary scheme, while the colonists vehemently protested—the substance of their language being that their charters were inviolable, and that taxation by a Parliament in which they were not represented was tyranny. At last, the fateful Stamp Act was passed in February, 1765; but could not be signed by the king, except by commission. The pathetic fact was not known at the time that his reason was already unsettled. The patience of the colonists was now but nine years from the breaking-point.

The first effect of the Stamp Act was an outburst of universal opposition in the colonies, and a concerted movement to paralyze its enforcement by extorting the resignation of every stamp officer. The next and even more ominous effect was the

assemblage in New York of a Congress containing duly authorized representatives of nearly all the colonies. Against the opposition thus concentrated the act was powerless. Scarcely a stamp was sold, and after setting all America in a flame, the Stamp Act was repealed, thirteen months after it had been passed.

Then was the moment, perhaps the last moment, when the hands of the clock could have been turned back. But the goodwill aroused in America by the repeal was wasted. Sixteen months later (June, 1767), the hour had struck, and the Ministers carried through Parliament the bill decreeing the American Revolution. It was a bill reviving the effort to tax the colonists by a distant Parliament in which they were not represented, for purposes about which they had not been consulted, and reviving it less than a year and a half after they thought the mistake had been acknowledged and definitely abandoned by the repeal of the Stamp Tax. The new bill, as if nothing had happened, imposed certain duties on articles imported into America, including a tax of three pence a pound on tea.

The colonists instantly prepared to resist. Otis and other leaders counselled moderation, but submission was impossible. By a common impulse they decided on non-intercourse as the effective answer to an attempt to collect taxes on goods they were expected to buy. In New England, New York, and Pennsylvania alone, that answer cost British

merchants a reduction of over two-thirds in their sale of the taxed articles in a single year. The movement spread till before 1770 it included all the colonies, and as might have been foreseen, gave a wonderful stimulus to home manufactures. Within a year a single town in Massachusetts made eighty thousand pairs of women's shoes and was selling them throughout the colonies. The ministry resentfully talked of transporting leading men to England to be tried for treason under an old statute of Henry VIII. Then it sent more troops. Lord North, speaking for the ministry and the king, said: "America must fear you before she can love you. I am against repealing the last Act of Parliament, securing to us a revenue out of America. I will never think of repealing it until I see America prostrate at my feet." One of the songs of the day, which were often doggerel, but sometimes poetry, was soon sung freely in the streets of Boston. It might have been taken as the colonists' response to Lord North:

"Come, join hand in hand, brave Americans all,
By uniting we stand, by dividing we fall;
To die we can bear, but to serve we disdain;
For shame is to freedom more dreadful than pain.
In freedom we're born, in freedom we'll live;
Our purses are ready,
Steady, boys, steady,
Not as slaves, but as freemen, our money we'll give."

The government demanded that a Massachusetts legislature should rescind its acts, and dissolved it

when it refused. The legislative functions of the New York legislature had already been suspended. As the tension increased and there was more talk of using the troops, one colonist wrote: "We cannot believe that they will draw the sword on their own children, but if they do, our blood is more at their service than our liberties."

There was, as the circumstances made certain, constant friction in Boston between the troops and the exasperated citizens. Affrays were not infrequent. At last came the inevitable petty officer who loses his head in an emergency. One of this species gave the word to fire too soon, and the people were maddened by what was called the Boston massacre. But in the spirit of conformity to law, as they understood it, so characteristic of the colonists, they held a town meeting, opened it with prayer, considered the occurrence, and ordered that the soldiers concerned be tried for their lives in the civil courts. It was characteristic again that such popular leaders as John Adams and Josiah Quincy, under a conviction of their duty as lawyers, answered the appeal of the officer in command, appeared in his defence, and saved him. More friction following, the troops were ordered to leave the town, and were actually sent to the citadel. Conflicts occurred in New York and elsewhere, with similar excitement.

Once again the ministry wavered in a course that threatened such storms, and in March, 1770, re-

pealed all its taxes on America, save that on tea. The non-importation agreements relaxed. New York, which had held to them more firmly than any of the associate colonies, wearied of seeing its imports fall off five parts out of six, while the others profited by its abstinence, and so promoted a joint movement for resuming trade in everything but tea. By August, 1770, London was rejoicing at the return of American orders—and somewhat misconstruing them.

But, as if heaven had ordained that every opportunity should be thrown away, a month later the fortress commanding Boston, built and maintained by the colony to be garrisoned, as the charter guaranteed, by its militia under the command of its governor, was taken over by the regular troops; and the harbor of Boston made the rendezvous of all ships stationed in North America. The answer of Massachusetts to martial law was a commission to Benjamin Franklin to represent it in stating its grievances to the ministry in London.

Events were now moving in too resistless a current for that benignant messenger of peace to check them. On a paltry question of exempting its commissioners of customs from taxation on their salaries, the governor came again in conflict with the Massachusetts Assembly, and claimed for the crown an unheard of power.

A few months later (January, 1772), South Carolina was aggrieved at having been induced

to establish fixed salaries for the judges if made permanent officials, only to have their own judges forthwith removed, and an Irishman, a Scotchman, and a Welshman sent over to take these permanent places.

Two or three months later still, Virginia felt outraged at having its efforts to restrict the slave trade thwarted by an instruction to the governor, "upon pain of the highest displeasure, to assent to no law by which the importation of slaves should be in any respect prohibited or obstructed." An appeal was taken to the throne, and reached England just as Lord Mansfield had decided that a slave becomes free the moment he touches English soil. But not even that could secure a hearing for the Virginia appeal, or English consent to the Virginia law to restrict the slave trade.

His Majesty's ship "Gaspee" needlessly exasperated the Rhode Islanders by seizing live stock, detaining vessels, and making illegal seizures of goods. The chief justice gave an opinion against these acts. The admiral overruled the chief justice, and said if the people of Newport attempted to rescue any vessel, he would hang them as pirates. Thereupon, when the "Gaspee," pursuing the Providence packet, ran aground, a few men from Providence and Bristol boarded her, overpowered the offensive lieutenant and his crew, set them ashore, and burned the vessel to the water's edge. Commissioners were ordered to find the offenders and send them to England for trial. The chief

justice refused to permit apprehensions for transportation beyond seas. Then it was proposed to take away the charter of the colony.

Thus every month seemed to add to the popular ferment, and to spread it from one colony to another.

Meantime, what had it all been worth? During the progress of the "Gaspee" business the Stamp Office found that it had spent twelve thousand pounds in America to get a revenue of fifteen hundred, and even this revenue came only from Canada and the West Indies. That was what the Stamp Tax was worth. Ships and soldiers employed to enforce the law taxing tea had cost enormously, and the East India Company had lost the sale of half a million pounds' worth of tea per year, while the total revenue from the tax on it amounted to eighty-five pounds. That was what the Tea Tax was worth.

So at last the East India Company begged for relief, and asked leave to export to America free of all duties. Lord North preferred another way. He held to the tax in America, but gave the Company a drawback on such exports of all the import duties it had paid. The Company was warned that this meant trouble, but Lord North would listen to no objections. He said he meant "to try the question with America." So it was tried. The tea was sent to Boston, New York, Philadelphia, and Charleston. Boston threw it into the harbor, December 16, 1773. New York was ready to do the same,

but adverse winds kept the ship away. Philadelphia, through a town meeting of five thousand men, "persuaded" the consignee to resign and the captain to take his ship and cargo back to London. Charleston "persuaded" the consignee to resign, there was nobody to pay the duty or sell the tea, and it rotted in the cellars where it was stored. And, finally, when a tea ship at last reached New York (April 19, 1774), four months after the Boston occurrence, it was sent back the next day, while eighteen chests of tea found in another vessel were merely thrown into the bay. Lord North's experiment was complete! Also the substantial union of the colonies was revealed.

Franklin had been furnished with certain letters by the Governor and Lieutenant-Governor of Massachusetts, quite at variance with their public professions, and evidently designed to foment existing difficulties and secretly provoke the ministry to take yet more stringent measures against the colony. He thought it right to send those letters to the Speaker of the Assembly. Ultimately, though contrary to his expectation, they became public, and naturally aroused fierce resentment against the American-born officers, who were thus found deceiving and underhandedly conspiring against their countrymen, and bringing the military occupation upon them. The Assembly petitioned the king for the removal of the exposed governor and lieutenant-governor, and Franklin was instructed to pre-

sent the petition. Lord Dartmouth received it with his usual courtesy; but when it was referred to the Privy Council for a hearing, the whole case went off, not on the obvious guilt of the double-dealing officials, but on the alleged misconduct of Franklin in exposing them by showing their letters. Franklin, now venerable and distinguished throughout Europe, was kept standing at the bar while Wedderburne, the solicitor-general, insulted and lampooned him for stealing or betraying private correspondence—and this from a ministry that habitually violated the seal of every letter it cared for and could intercept in the mails! The Lords in Council roared with delight. The petition which all men knew to be true was dismissed as "groundless, vexatious, and scandalous." But years afterwards, when Wedderburne died, the king he had thus served said: "He has not left a greater knave behind him in my dominions." The king he had opposed could not say that of Franklin, the faithful servant of his own country, the idol of France, and the admiration of the world.

The work to which every step of the ministry had for years been tending was nearly finished. In March, 1774, Lord North carried through Parliament a bill closing the port of Boston till the tea was paid for, and till the king should be satisfied of the good conduct of the city for the future. Burke and Fox made the debate memorable and splendid, and Lord Dartmouth showed signs of the de-

sire to conciliate, always gratefully remembered in his relation to the colonies. But the same Lord Mansfield who had decided that a slave could not exist on English soil, while the ministry he supported was refusing to let Virginia limit the slave trade, now encouraged that ministry to the uttermost, exclaiming, "The sword is drawn, and you must throw away the scabbard. Pass this act, and you will be across the Rubicon." He told the truth, more exactly than he knew.

General Gage, military commander-in-chief for all North America, and now made civil governor of Massachusetts also, was sent out with four more regiments to close the port of Boston, quarter troops in the town, bring the ringleaders in the late disturbances to punishment for high treason, abolish town meetings, except for selecting town officers, appoint and remove sheriffs at pleasure, and give sheriffs so appointed the selection of juries. If the colony had been already conquered, harder usage could scarcely have been proposed. But General Gage thought the conquest easy. He had assured the king that the people of Massachusetts "will be lyons whilst we are lambs, but if we take the resolute part, they will undoubtedly prove very weak."

This time the answer of America was a Continental Congress. New York proposed it through her "Sons of Liberty." Virginia Burgesses, after being dissolved by the governor, held a meeting elsewhere, adopted it, and asked Massachusetts

to appoint the time and place of meeting. The Massachusetts Assembly engaged in that business, when General Gage, hearing what was on foot, sent to dissolve them, but found the door locked. It was not opened until five delegates had been appointed to attend a Continental Congress in Philadelphia on September 1, 1774—about five months after Parliament had passed the Boston Port Bill!

A convention of towns in Suffolk County, Massachusetts, resolved that a king who violates the chartered rights of his people forfeits their allegiance, and it therefore refused obedience to the recent act. One of the first things the Continental Congress did was to send Paul Revere to bear to Boston their warm approval of the Suffolk County resolutions. General Gage now undertook to arrest Adams and Hancock, as conspicuous leaders in this policy, and transport them to England for trial. He sent a body of regular troops to do it under cover of night. Warren started Paul Revere on a midnight ride, ahead of the British troops, to give the alarm. At Lexington these troops came upon a body of minute men commanded by the grandfather of Theodore Parker, ordered them to disperse, and as they still stood, grim but undemonstrative, fired upon them. Eight fell and ten more were wounded. Concord followed an hour or two later, the embattled farmers fired the shot heard round the world, and the war was begun. Frank-

lin, seeing that there was no more hope in London, was already upon the ocean, returning to take his place with his own people.

I have finished the story. What remains is merely the fighting—the ghastly civil war between Great Britain and her sons.

But the contest was not really between the British people and their colonizing sons, and as a matter of fact both profited by the result. Even the fighting was largely between Americans and Hessians. The ministry hired soldiers to carry on its war, because Great Britain did not readily furnish them. The actual contest was between what are now universally recognized as Anglo-Saxon principles of government and a movement under the king of the day that would have set England back to the times of Charles I. The colonists were inspired by the Protestant Reformation and by Magna Charta. The intellectual emancipation that came from the one and the fervor for personal rights that came from the other reached their natural development easier and quicker amid the untrammelled surroundings of a new world. Their triumph checked a reaction in England, and the British government of the nineteenth century was distinctly more advantageous to the people, more glorious for the nation, and a greater beneficence to Europe and the world, because of this struggle with the colonists in the last quarter of the eighteenth.

It used to be said that American histories of that period were unfriendly and unfair to Great Britain. Perhaps they were. At the close of this civil war with the Mother Country, Americans may have been somewhat in the temper of the Puritans after the Parliamentary wars, or of the Royalists after the Restoration. Certainly they had not reached that stage in the evolution of free government which enabled them, eighty years later, to close another civil war without a single execution and with a speedy return to the defeated side of all its political privileges. It has even been said that our histories now tend to perpetuate an old unfairness and bitterness. If that were ever true, I hope and believe it is true no longer. At any rate, Americans, while not always agreeing, accept in the main with pleasure the work upon that period of recent English historians like the lamented Lecky. They are satisfied with the admirable history of "The American Revolution," on which the Right Hon. Sir George Otto Trevelyan is still engaged. And they are likewise content with the complimentary report of what that Revolution led to in the luminous pages of "The American Commonwealth," by the Right Hon. James Bryce. I may take the liberty of here adding and adopting the lines of the great Victorian poet, with which one of these Englishmen introduces his work:

> "O thou, that sendest out the man
> To rule by land and sea,

> Strong mother of a Lion-line,
> Be proud of those strong sons of thine
> Who wrench'd their rights from thee."

When the war began, Edmund Burke estimated the population of the colonies at from one-fifth to one-fourth that of Great Britain. White and black, it scarcely reached two and three-quarter millions. When the war closed, there were 2,389,000 whites, and probably in all little short of three millions. Seven years later, at the first periodical census in 1790, there were nearly four millions. The war had cost the colonists one hundred and forty millions of dollars. Eighty years later they had another civil war, which left them with a debt of $2,844,649,626, and with a population of thirty-five millions; and to-day their debt is reduced more than one-half (to $1,284,461,413), and their population has increased to over eighty millions, to say nothing of the population of island dependencies. Then they formed a narrow fringe along the Atlantic coast, with a few frontier settlements breaking through the gaps in the Allegheny range to the fertile valleys on its western slopes; to-day they overspread a continent, and swarm in the islands of the sea.

To follow the effects of this rise of the United States farther now is beside my present purpose. That its echo was first heard amid the crashing of old institutions in the French Revolution cannot be doubted. It was certainly a factor in the subsequent rapid extension of popular rights through-

out Europe, the broadening of citizenship, the freer participation of the people in their governments. As it stimulated liberty by its political development, so it stimulated material welfare by its inventions, its products, and its opportunities. We can scarcely conceive now of a world without American food and American cotton, without the American applications of steam and electricity, or without the American outlet for superfluous energy and superfluous population.

The people of the new nation held, as firmly as they had while colonists, that there should be no taxation without representation, and they were some time in doubt as to whether there should be any representation without taxation. In several states ownership of a freehold of fifty acres or a town lot was necessary; in scarcely any could the suffrage be exercised without a return of considerable taxable property, real or personal. A reasonable degree of intelligence was also exacted and the illiterate were excluded. Far fewer offices than now were elective. The judges were generally appointed, sometimes for seven years, sometimes during good behavior. Even the delegates to the Continental Congress were chosen not by the people but by the legislatures.

There was no hindrance in learning trades; no limit to the hours of labor; no power to keep a man from working if he wanted to work and found work. The colonists would have accepted unre-

servedly those golden words with which Clémenceau lately thrilled the French Chamber of Deputies, but while accepting them would have wondered why he thought it necessary to say so obvious a thing in so solemn a way: "*J'estime que tout homme, qui a besoin de travailler et qui trouve du travail, a le droit de travailler; j'estime que la société et les pouvoirs publics ont le devoir de lui assurer l'exercice de ce droit.*"

The result of it all is the marvel of modern history. It was an English prelate and scholar who said of it, "Time's noblest offspring is the last." What in the final analysis made the success?—for who shall say the splendid growth will survive, if what made it be lost?

Well, first of all, it was made, as most successes are, by character. America in the making was intelligent, moral, religious, and religiously devoted to the education of children. It was desperately earnest. It was alert and industrious—almost without a class that only amuses itself. It was passionately attached to its personal rights. It had an inborn respect for authority and reverence for law. Its ancestors had been used to representative institutions for centuries, and it was thoroughly trained in parliamentary government.

And next the success was made by circumstance. The inefficient were sifted out—those left were a picked class. They were alone, in a wild but fertile and, as it seemed, boundless land. Opportunities

opened on every hand; the time, like the climate, was electric, and there was an absolute freedom for individual initiative.

It is not sure that such a success could be won now; it is not sure that such a government as they founded could be carried on now, if that character were materially changed. Is it even sure that the success could be maintained if those circumstances were materially altered, and particularly if that fecund freedom of individual initiative should be destroyed, by the collectivist or socialist tendencies of the times?

But such a catastrophe is not to be thought of. Whatever may be the wild speculations of the hour, whatever the temporary variations from the historic course, no vessel that carries the English-speaking races has lost its chart, on none has the compass gone hopelessly astray. The old head-lights still burn. Inspired by the same traditions, led by the same instincts, these races in either hemisphere, in whatever zone, on whatever continent or island, will surely in the end hold fast to those ancient characteristics of a strong, free people, and so keep secure their place in the van of human progress.

ORGANIZATION IN AMERICAN LIFE

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WE all believe in our form of government. In fact, we are intolerant believers in it. Every child learns to think that it is the best in the world, not only for us but for all men. Every demagogue learns to bellow first from the cart tail his unlimited, unquestioning certainty of that superiority and universal applicability.

I shall not dispute the belief—but I wish to define the facts about it. If our form of government is the best, it cannot be so because it is the cheapest. On the contrary, it is one of the most expensive in the world; with more paid lawmakers than any other, higher salaries generally for subordinates, though with very unworthy scrimping in some of the most important places, like the judiciary, higher pay on government contracts, more lavish appropriation for internal improvements, and the costliest army in proportion to number and work. Our form of government cannot be the best because it is the most efficient. On the contrary, it is one of the slowest in the world; the most complicated, cumbrous, and limited. Our foreign representatives have been again and again humiliated by appeals from citizens abroad whom we could not or did not protect against impressment, with our passports in their hands, into the military service of other countries. Every few years we are all humiliated before the world because of riotous outrages on Italians, or on Chinese, or on other foreigners, which some state

has not suppressed or atoned for, and the nation has no adequate control of. So recently as 1902 there could be found for five months no power in the State of Pennsylvania or in the United States to stop disorder and riot in the coal mines, and finally that imperative work had to be done by voluntary effort outside the constitutional processes or authority of the high office that successfully intervened.

Even within the spheres in which it will work, our form of government is not the easiest to manage. On the contrary, it requires, to keep it running successfully, more public spirit, more study about candidates, more time for multitudinous elections, local, state, and national; more watchfulness of public officials, and a higher average of intelligence than any other in the world; and no one has ever shown that without this alert and devoted public spirit, this unremitting attention, and this high average of intelligence, it could have achieved its best successes or could now maintain them. Some of our states repudiated their public obligations, and it took vehement and long-continued effort to get the disgraceful action reversed. The whole country was convulsed for years in the struggle to prevent payment of the national debt in a depreciated medium at half price. The greatest city on the continent fell under the almost absolute domination of a vulgar thief. We had to have years of strenuous exertion by the city's best men of all parties, thousands of speeches and ten thousands of columns of newspaper exposure—in fact, the whole

community had to be laboriously worked up to a state of excitement bordering on hysteria or epilepsy to get that thief put in jail and his gang turned out of office. Even then, how long did the gang stay out?

The men who formed this complicated and delicately balanced government had no notion of the conceit prevailing nowadays about its universal applicability, or even about universal participation here in its conduct. In their day the idea that it could be applied to the so-called inferior races was foreign not only to their convictions, but even their speculations. They simply did not think of the notion or fancy it worth talking about. They never dreamed of applying our form of government to the native races of America; and as to the blacks, they did n't imagine it needful to mention them as an exception — so unthinkable was it to the majority that the blacks should be included — when they solemnly declared that all men were born free and equal, and then went on calmly buying and selling slaves and enacting fugitive slave laws just as usual. Not until 1865 was it even established throughout the United States that every man, black or white, has the right to sell his own labor; and in 1902, in Pennsylvania and New York, there were still found a great many persons, including a pitiful number of exceptionally ignorant or emotional clergymen, and some people called statesmen, who considered such a right on the part of some white men so doubtful that they were not ashamed to urge, for

the sake of peace and coal, that it should be submitted to arbitration.

Well, in spite of these defects and limitations, this government of ours has, after all, accomplished in its short career a very respectable work in the world. The magnitude and myriad-sided development of this work have been recited by many an eloquent voice and pen, at home and abroad, though nowhere more persuasively and effectively than by an old citizen of Pittsburg, in a book called "Triumphant Democracy." That clear eye saw and proclaimed the triumph in 1886. Since then the whole world has come to recognize the young Republic as the very Samson among the nations which Mr. Carnegie then depicted. But if the things we have been saying are so, if they have any foundation whatever, if our government does in any measure have these defects, then the old question of the Philistines comes up with insistent force—"Wherein lies its great strength?"

To the answer to that question and the reasons for the answer I think it timely to ask consideration. If our form of government is unusually expensive and dilatory and liable to go wrong without eternal vigilance and perpetual agitation; if it is often found so much worse than other forms in executive efficiency, in economy, in promptness of action, and in continuity of policy, what makes it better?

The answer has become a truism. Its strength lies in the quality of man it develops. The real

merit is not in the machinery, but in the skilled intelligence absolutely required to frame and to work it; in the combination of respect for authority on the one hand with training in individual initiative on the other, which this work brings out and which the government has thus far scrupulously and religiously guarded.

We brought the respect for authority from the birthplace of the common law; and in proportion as harshness from its officers was resented in the old home, in like proportion the law itself was instinctively elevated into a pillar of cloud by day and of fire by night in the wilderness of the New World. We found the initiative in the necessities of an untamed continent; we were driven to it, shut up to it at every turn—in the imperative beginning of orderly self-government at a thousand isolated spots—in the long protracted struggle with wild lands, wild beasts, and wild men,—till it became the inheritance of the race; till under its stimulus men found their solitary way through trackless woods to make lonely clearings or start frontier settlements across the Alleghenies, through trackless prairies to possess the Mississippi Valley, through alkali deserts to wrest their gold from the mountains, and at last through the Sierras to scatter up and down the enchanted shore of the Pacific. To such a continental conquest of nature and of men have those two traits of the Fathers brought us—their respect for authority and their widest freedom of individual initiative. These, with

the original vigor of the stock, have made Americans what they are; and by consequence have made this blessed country of ours the joy and pride and hope of our lives. To harm either is criminal—whether to break down respect for authority by unlawful combinations, tricky evasions, and open defiance of order, or to cramp the widest freedom of the individual in any lawful enterprise or labor anywhere. Whoever or whatever now dares to interfere with the permanent union of these two traits and their continued development in the American life is an enemy to the Republic —whether known as Political Boss, or as Trust, or as Trades Union.

But let me not be misunderstood. Nobody can doubt the need in politics of appliances for finding and enforcing the will of the party majority. Nobody can question the economies and public benefits in business from great consolidations of capital. Nobody can deny the right of labor to combine for higher wages and shorter hours and healthful conditions of work. I mean no arraignment of organization itself, either in politics or finance or labor — only of that tyrannical organization, that unrepublican organization, that abandonment of the underlying essentials of democratic success and that reversion to the principles of an absolute monarchy or a military despotism, which refuses to recognize that it has reached the limits of its own right when it invades the rights of others, and so saps the very springs that have lifted us to this floodtide of

national prosperity. Indeed, instead of opposing I appeal for organization, but only for organization of the kind which a distinguished ex-President of the United States once commended in a persuasive address[1]—the organization which seeks coöperation instead of the one that suppresses individual judgment and demands exclusive control; the organization which aims at the helpful union of men of like minds and interests, or the needful strength to meet competition, not at monopoly; which minds its own business, and is willing that whoever is not with it should have equal liberty, in this land of liberty, to do the same.

Such an organization does not exclude young lawyers from references unless they have made their peace with the men who nominated the judges. It does not keep all rising young men out of the public service unless pledged to support the bills the boss wants, or to protect or punish the corporations as he may direct. It does not evade state laws, circumvent national boards, and conceal its operations alike from the state that charters and the stockholders that support it, in efforts to monopolize business or to crush competition. It does not declare that nobody shall labor or sell the products of lawful labor save on its terms or under its orders. It is coöperative and beneficent, not restrictive and monopolistic; it protects its own rights without harm to the rights of others, and instead

[1] Hon. Grover Cleveland, on Founder's Day, Carnegie Institute, Pittsburg, November 7, 1901.

of narrowing the doors to young men and checking aspiration, it maintains the old glory of the land, the freest opportunity for all, with hope of the richest rewards for the worthiest.

Such organization knows the spirit of this people and has learned the secret of their triumphs. It stimulates instead of checking the alertness, the ingenuity, the self-reliance, the independence, the courageous and indomitable ambition, which from the very beginning in this land have created and compelled that individual initiative of which we have been speaking. In politics it does not crush, on the contrary, it welcomes the democratic spirit in party councils and the freest debate as the surest road to political harmony. In business it does not dread, on the contrary, it expects and prepares for competition; it does not resist and bewail, on the contrary, it rejoices in the power of growing capital which is the offspring of intelligence and thrift, and the begetter of public prosperity. In the industrial world it does not degrade labor into a dull, mechanical level of limited and uniform production; on the contrary, it inspires the individual workman with the certainty of rewards in proportion to his skill and his right living. It preserves for all, in public life or in private, in the ranks of capital or of labor, the theory of our government from the beginning—not against classes, as the demagogues tell you, but against fixed classes; it maintains, as the priceless distinction of our social state, the fluidity and easy transfusion of classes, giving

constantly to the intelligent and industrious in any one the hope of rising by their intelligence and industry to any other.

Years ago a laboring man on strike said to me: "There is no use any longer in talking to us about saving and rising out of our class; about ever becoming an employer and one's own master. That stage of the world has passed. I and my fellows must be day laborers to the end. We must fix our eyes solely on one thing, the day's wages, and make common cause, so that the slowest or poorest workman may be put to no disadvantage by the skill or industry of his fellows, in getting bread for his children." It is the most dangerous delusion of the times, undermining the foundations alike of industrial progress and of public honesty; and its only logical outcome is either a permanent and unrepublican fixity of classes or the hopeless Dead Sea of Socialism.

The same declaration about the impossibility of rising under existing conditions was heard in New York when a young boatman named Cornelius Vanderbilt was beginning to run a little ferry to Staten Island. It was heard in Washington when a young portrait painter named Morse was developing the telegraph. It was heard in my own calling when Bennett and Greeley and Raymond started, and heard again when they died. It was heard in Pittsburg when Andrew Carnegie was a messenger boy, and it was heard again when he retired to begin giving away his three or four hundred mil-

lions. But after Vanderbilt came Scott and Cassatt, Huntington, Morgan, Hill, and Harriman; after Morse came Cyrus Field and Edison and Westinghouse and Bell and Marconi. The development of the newspapers did not stop with Bennett and Greeley and Raymond; the development of the iron industry has not been closed by the organization of the United States Steel, and Schwab is not the last day laborer to rise from the iron mills. The chances for the young man are and must be kept as good to-day as they ever were; in fact, they are and must be made as much better as the scale on which this Western World is moving grows yearly and monthly more colossal. But now, as in all past times, with political managers or in spite of them, with the trusts or in spite of them, with trades unions or in spite of them, the chances are to him that can see and seize them,—the tools are to him who can use them. "A man's a man for a' that."

THE DANGER-POINT IN IMMIGRATION

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EVERYBODY knows the old, old story about the resolutions at the first town meeting in New England: "Whereas, The earth is the Lord's, and whereas, We are the Lord's people; therefore, Resolved," etc. We could pass that resolution to-day in any town meeting in the country, *nem. con.* What is more, the conquest of nature and of man achieved from one side of this continent to the other since the "Mayflower" landed, and the happy deliverance thus far out of all our perils, give the American people warrant for believing in that resolution; and they do believe in it, exactly as they believe in sunrise or in the star-spangled banner. Well, then, if we *are* a new chosen people in this new land of promise, is there any danger that we, too, may be outnumbered and led astray, as were the chosen people of old? The Puritan conquered the land from the Indians. His sons conquered it from the French and the Dutch. His grandsons conquered it from the English. His great-grandsons conquered it from slavery. Can their descendants conquer it from itself?

Before we make any hasty answer on that question, let us remember that those descendants are now in a minority in the land conquered and preserved by their ancestors. They are in a minority, even if we reinforce them with all later immigration from the same stock. This is no longer a Puritan people. It is no longer a combination even of

Puritan and Cavalier, as in the days of the Revolution. The proof is not clear that it is any longer an Anglo-Saxon people. We must take in the whole Indo-Germanic family to be sure of a mere majority now in the new world which we still think of as simply the outgrowth of the seed piously planted by British pioneers at Plymouth and at Jamestown.

We have accustomed ourselves to consider immigration as a sure index of national power and guarantee of national prosperity, and I heartily join in every word of grateful recognition for the marvellous results it has brought and is still bringing us. But have we adequately considered the extraordinary change in the character of our immigration? Have we noted, for example, where our greatest accession came from in 1902, or in the year preceding? The largest immigration into all the ports of the United States in both years was from Sicily, Sardinia, and in lesser degree from other parts of Italy; and in 1903 there were fifty-two thousand more of them than the year before. And the next largest immigration? The second on the list for both years were the Croats, Slavs, and other races of Austria-Hungary, and there were thirty-four thousand more of them in 1903 than the year before. And whence came the third largest number, pressing hard on the heels of the Sicilians and the Croats? From the Empire of Russia, and there were nearly twenty-nine thousand more of them in 1903 than the year before. China and Japan sent us as many as England and Scotland in 1902.

This change in the sources is not due to any diminution in the volume of the human stream perpetually pouring upon our shores. It is not that the reservoir is low and that so we are draining dregs. On the contrary, our total immigration for 1903 was over a hundred thousand greater than for any other year ever recorded in our history, and more than two-thirds of all the steerage immigrants came from the three countries first named—Italy, Austria-Hungary, and Russia. As compared with either of these the German immigration was but a fifth as great and that of Ireland still less. Little Greece sent us between a third and a half as many as Ireland.

Look at another aspect of it. In 1900 the total white population of the United States of any stock that had been in this country more than one generation was not quite forty-one millions. Not only were the representatives of the Pilgrims completely submerged, but even when reinforced by all the whites of any race or origin that had been in the country for more than one generation, they came within six millions of being still outnumbered by the later comers and the negroes. In New York City the actual foreign-born population is 37 per cent, to say nothing of the greater number born of foreign parents. When this is sometimes flippantly dismissed with the remark that New York is only a foreign city on the fringe of the country anyway, we should remember that the tendency is the same everywhere. All the cities of twenty-

five thousand inhabitants or over throughout the United States contain less than one-fifth of our native-born population, while they have nearly one-half the whole foreign-born population — more than half of the Italians, Poles, Russians, and Irish.

For seventeen years there has been a steady decline in immigration from the lands of our ancestors and of their kinsfolk — that is to say, from England, Scotland, Ireland, Wales, Germany, Denmark, and Switzerland. During the same period there has been a steady and progressive increase from Italy, Austria-Hungary, Russia, Spain, Portugal, Greece, Belgium, Roumania, etc. And, finally, to give an analysis by races rather than mere nationalities, 28 per cent of the whole immigration in 1902 was Italian, 11 per cent of it was Polish, 9 per cent was Hebrew, and 15 per cent was Slovak, Croatian, Slavonian, and Magyar — these races thus making practically two-thirds of the whole immigration.

We have emphatically and even vociferously made everybody else, from all over the world, at home in our Father's house. But as we look around at the variegated throng, do we always feel just as much at home ourselves? I will yield to none in reverence for our ancestors and pride in the work they did. But perhaps even these ancestors, viewing now from above, as we love to think, these scenes of their glorious achievements, might be better pleased with imitation than with praise, and

might think it as important for us to preserve their work as to glorify it. And so I venture to take the past for granted. The men who made New England hold securely and forever a page resplendent as any in the world's history. The government they were perhaps the most potent factors in founding has developed into the greatest and most powerful agency in modern civilization. Let us leave it at that.

I ask, then, consideration of something different and more pressing. Are we, their sons, managing this heritage of our Fathers so as to further their ends? How are we likely to leave it to our sons? Will it still fulfil the purpose of those great men who, according to the eulogium of Mr. Gladstone, struck out at one blow the most perfect form of government yet devised by human intelligence?

A common notion seems to be that their real purpose in starting this government was a missionary one. They wanted, as our stump orators declaim with unction, "to make America spell Opportunity." So interpreting the purpose of the Fathers, we have developed a continent in order that, first of all, it might bestow the benefit of their and our labors, in the shape of Opportunity, on the just and unjust, on the fit and unfit, of every class and race and nativity under the sun.

We did n't stop at trifles; all comers were long welcomed—not merely those who sought a land where they might worship God according to the dictates of their conscience, or those others whose

necessity and courage led them to the struggles of a new world where they hoped to build homes and a community of freemen trained under Magna Charta, like the land and the homes they had left. These, to be sure, were gladly received; but so also were the ignorant, the depraved, the law-breaker, and the pauper, the man who proclaimed that property was robbery and the man who proclaimed that government was tyranny, the socialist, the communist, and the anarchist—our spacious doors swung inward with an equal hospitality for all.

Far less altruistic was the homely purpose of the plain, unrhetorical founders of the Republic themselves. "To form a more perfect union, establish justice, insure domestic tranquillity, provide for the common defence, promote the general welfare and secure the blessings of liberty to ourselves and our posterity, we do ordain and establish this constitution." Who says we took the only or the wisest course to fulfil this high purpose, to discharge with fidelity this sacred duty, when we flung down the bars to men who knew nothing of liberty or of justice or of domestic tranquillity?

"To secure the blessings of liberty to ourselves and our posterity." Have we scrupulously remembered that purpose since we took from our Fathers this most complicated and delicately balanced government ever set up by the wit of man? It was designed specifically for the wants, and it taxed in its conduct the ability, of a race second

at least to none in the world, a race trained to free institutions, to the widest individual initiative, and to ordered liberty under law ever since Runnymede. We invited almost without discrimination every immigrant just escaped from generations of government by others, and in turn every negro just escaped from generations of slavery, to the same power with ourselves in guiding that complicated and delicately balanced machine. We neglected the safeguards of the Republic held essential by the Fathers, and threw away one after another almost every requirement they had maintained in the thirteen colonies or elsewhere, for either intelligence or character or thrift among those permitted to have equal voice with us in framing our laws, in levying our taxes, and in determining our expenditures and our general policy.

"To secure the blessings of liberty to ourselves and our posterity." Did we do that, when under such guidance we gradually forgot the old order of march, followed as faithfully by our Fathers as the Israelites followed the pillar of cloud by day and the pillar of fire by night,—the Puritan order of march, in which every advance was fortified first by the meeting-house and then by a school-house, while next and only next the garrison, fresh from meeting-house and school-house, went into town meeting?

Well, we shall never grind with the water that has passed the mill. This free people will never take away the welcome we have given to the

pauper and the illiterate, to the communist and the anarchist, from abroad whom we have already made at home among us; will never withdraw the suffrage from the man who now has it, but cannot read his ballot; from the man that votes without ever paying taxes, or from the man that has been convicted of crime, but has been pardoned out just before his term expired in order that he may again render us his help in securing the blessings of liberty for ourselves and for our posterity. What is done is beyond recall; and with all its faults the achievement is colossal and of world-wide beneficence. But if, in the onward rush of this magnificent development, no great harm has yet resulted —if, indeed, good has come because of, or in spite of, our having so largely lost sight for the time of the purpose declared in the Constitution—is it wise to continue indefinitely on the changed course?

Grant that thus far, as we cast our drag-net over all lands and classes and races, and make haste to divide with them on equal terms the rule in our Father's house, we have still been able to leaven the lump—not wholly, but measurably and beyond expectation. Nevertheless, are we sure that as the lump grows larger the leaven from our relatively diminishing numbers will still hold out? Can the nation deal so much better than Wall Street with huge masses of undigested securities? Or is the time approaching when, instead of continuing, with the amazing success of the past, to assimilate these incongruous and heterogeneous

additions to our body politic, we may find that they are beginning to assimilate us?

Are we then really taking a safe course to preserve the blessings of liberty for ourselves and for our posterity when we hesitate now to sift out of our immigration not merely the pauper and anarchist and the poor Chinaman, but, with less invidious discrimination, more of the notoriously undesirable elements; or when we hesitate to exclude peremptorily from the suffrage—national, state, or municipal—any newcomer who cannot read the laws before he votes for lawmakers, and who does not pay taxes himself when he votes taxes upon others?

Shall we find that safe course by roaming the oceans to drag in semi-tropical and revolutionary communities, to be made states in the American Union, equal from the start with ourselves, with sometimes, perhaps, a balance of power that may enable them to govern us and the land of our Fathers? Such questions have burst upon us too suddenly out of recent expansion to justify at the outset harsh criticism of any rash or ill-considered proposals that may rise to the surface in the first froth of public discussion. But I venture to predict that the time will come within the lives of many of us, when the man who shall propose the incorporation as a state into this government of the United States of America of any island of the sea, the Philippines, the Sandwich Islands, or Porto Rico, or Cuba, will be hunted from political life as

a public enemy, whether he be animated merely by lingering reminiscences of the filibusters and the slavery propaganda, or whether he represents a sugar trust in Wall Street or a sagebrush trust in the United States Senate.

Are we finding that safe course when we hold public meetings for an immigrant detained and about to be deported, to protest against the enforcement of the law in his case, since the poor man was merely under contract for preaching anarchy (or, to give an explanation lately made by some of his friends, was merely an anarchist under contract to visit trades unions); while we have not one word of protest against the arrest and deportation of a laborer when he is guilty—the wretch!—of coming under a contract to earn an honest living by honest toil? Away with the honest workman! we exclaim; his stay might help to free white labor and to weaken the padlocks on the close shops; but as for the preacher of anarchy, how dare you in this free country interfere with his liberty of opinion?

Are we taking that safe course to preserve the blessings of liberty for ourselves and our posterity if, after fighting four years to free negro labor at the South, we now, under this new guidance, permit organizations unknown to the law to enslave white labor in every building and manufacturing centre at the North? Are we following that safe course if a workman, however intelligent or industrious or competent and deserving, is deprived of

the right to earn his living on terms mutually satisfactory to himself and to his employers? Are we following that safe course if an honest artisan can be driven from his employment and denied work anywhere at his trade because he obeyed the call of the governor of his state, on the militia of the state, to maintain order in the state?

Well, we have seen no occasion, our Fathers have seen no occasion, in which in the end some inspiration did not bring the American people to a sober and sane second thought. We will not doubt that somehow in some time these dangers, too, will be successfully met. But neither will we doubt that if we still refuse to sift our immigration; if we still refuse to require from newcomers some intelligence and some character and thrift before we ask them to help us conduct our own government; if we neglect to hinder the plan of politicians for gathering in new states in the American Union from the Caribbean Sea, from the Chinese Sea, or from Polynesia; if we refuse to protect individual initiative and fail to keep white labor free at home; if we persist in making this land an asylum for the anarchist and outcasts from every other civilized land in the world, the common sewer for Christendom,—if we still persist in all this, then, to the imperfect vision of the human eye, the path of our unexampled progress seems likely some day to lead into hopeless entanglements and end in an *impasse*, from which advance is improbable.

Yet so the dwellers in the sun, whom some fanciful astronomers have been lately imagining, must be hopeless as they see the huge spots which from time to time roll over and envelop it, and must conclude, when buried in these sinister shadows, that the end of all things is approaching. At that moment of deepest gloom, from our more distant point of view, such shadows become trivial and transient, and out of them all shines forth again the resplendent orb of day, effulgent, benignant, without a cloud to dim its glory and radiant with the hope of the world and the ages.

Spots may seem to dim the lustre of our Puritan prospect now, clouds may roll about the national path, but where to us it sometimes appears to narrow into pitfalls or impassable morasses, the serene vision of the men of the "Mayflower," from their cerulean heights, may already perceive it broadening again into a highway,—the true highway of the God of our Fathers, along which He led a people He really chose, from Plymouth thus far, and, if they but hearken, will lead them still.

THE DIPLOMATIC POINT OF VIEW

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I

NO politics can be known in the embassy. Democrats or Republicans, Independents, Prohibitionists, Populists, Woman Suffragists, or miscellaneous reformers, foreign voters or native, candidates defeated or candidates elected, all are American citizens, all support the President and the government the embassy represents, and all are alike in their right to regard the American ambassador as their public servant.

When William Jennings Bryan expressed his thanks for treatment at our embassies which was plainly due to a man whom nearly half the American people had more than once approved for their highest office, and when the President responded that, if any ambassador had failed to extend such treatment in such a case, his shrift would have been short, there was a fit recognition of what has been the uniform policy of our government and what it should always remain. No ambassador has the right to carry his politics on the outward voyage beyond Sandy Hook. From that moment he represents the President and the government of the whole American people, and the service he is sent to render is due alike to all.

I may venture to suggest that the converse ought to be true,—that there ought to be no politics at home in dealing with the embassy's work. It is of course a matter of plain national interest, not to

speak of national self-respect, that a diplomatic officer, like his colleagues of the army and navy, while engaged in active service is entitled to support from home, and should be held secure from attacks in the rear. Is it not just as plain that his work should be passed upon solely on national grounds, and held equally secure from mere partisan attack?

There are other kinds of attack—attacks from the front and by friends—which a diplomat may have to encounter. Here is a great London newspaper, describing in detail the trials of "A Persecuted Ambassador." "Why," it frankly asks,

> "Why are we so brutal to the American ambassador? We turn him into a sort of lecturer and demand from him at every turn speeches and yet more speeches, versatility and yet more versatility. We launch him on an oratorical tour from Land's End to John o' Groats, in placid forgetfulness that he may after all have some business of his own or his country's to attend to. One can imagine Whitelaw Reid at this moment, frantically preparing himself for the fray by re-reading all the standard authors he has forgotten, composing character sketches of famous Americans by the bushel, working up local color, and dictating not less than one address a day! Only by thus arming beforehand will he be able, when he has settled down among us, to feel himself a free man."

Now please to observe under what sort of a crossfire the hapless ambassador is placed. There are the demands, and yet all these expected speeches are in violation of the fixed and long-standing rule

of our own State Department! Here, if I may venture on the indiscretion of quoting it,—here are its precise terms:

> "It is forbidden to diplomatic officers to participate in any manner in the political concerns of the country of their residence; and they are directed especially to refrain from public expressions of opinion upon local political or other questions arising within their jurisdiction. It is deemed advisable to extend a similar prohibition against public addresses, unless upon exceptional festal occasions, in the country of official residence. Even upon such occasions any reference to political issues, pending in the United States or elsewhere, should be carefully avoided."

Really, however much appearances may sometimes tend to a contrary view, the work of speech-making is not the chief duty for which the country sends out its ambassador. There are graver tasks, and by the record as to them the final judgment is made up. We have long been admirably served in London. Nevertheless, Reverdy Johnson, and James Russell Lowell, and Edward J. Phelps, and Robert T. Lincoln, and Thomas F. Bayard, and then the man who passed from the ambassadorship to the front rank of modern secretaries, John Hay, and the laurelled and radiant Choate, not to speak of others, all, more or less in spite of themselves, drifted into becoming known as occasional and always successful speech-makers.

Yet the brilliancy of the whole distinguished array has not dimmed the fame of the silent Benjamin Franklin, agent in London for the colonies, or

those earlier Ministers for the Republic, John Jay and Charles Francis Adams,—the one of whom by a great and unpopular act of statesmanship helped the tottering infant nation to its feet, while the other guarded it with austere fidelity and splendid success throughout as great dangers as it has encountered since Valley Forge. And now, can any one recall a notable public speech either of them ever made in the whole course of his diplomatic career? Verily I say unto you, an ambassador cannot live on speeches alone!

At one of the Gridiron Club dinners in Washington a newspaper man was placed under hypnotic influence, told that he was the American Ambassador to the Court of St. James, and instructed to make an after-dinner speech for a London banquet. He promptly began: "Gentlemen, blood is thicker than water. Oh, how we love our kinsfolk in the land of our ancestors. Hands across the sea. Common language, common blood, common literature, the supremacy of the Anglo-Saxon race. We are brothers all. Three cheers for the king."

Well, those are good phrases. We have heard them before. They were right and there is no harm in using them again. But as means for persuading the people of the two countries to mutual goodwill, they have served their purpose, and have ceased to-day to be a part of the working-tools of diplomacy on either side of the Atlantic. There was a time in our own history when some of us thought a Philadelphia arm in arm Convention a useful

object-lesson. In that day and under those circumstances it did serve its purpose. But nobody thinks it needful now to see South Carolina and Massachusetts delegates walking arm in arm into a national assemblage, in order to be convinced that they feel and know they belong to the same undissolved and indissoluble Union. So nobody needs now to be told of clasping hands across the sea, or of common blood, or a common literature, to know that Great Britain and the United States, in the nature of things, do inevitably sustain peculiar relations to each other not held by either with any other nation, that they are now on very good terms, better than for over a century, and that from this time on, the better they know each other, and the more frequent and intimate their intercourse, the better and more durable will be their good understanding.

Some one spoke the other day of the duty of our embassy as consisting merely in "jollying the English." In so far as this means that, whenever an ambassador has to say anything, he should say a friendly thing if he can, the remark is well enough. Surely the meanest disposition in the world is that which grudges uttering the truth because it may be pleasant to others to hear it.

But there is a duty of an ambassador more important even than promoting goodwill—highly important as we all consider that to be. The very people and government to whom he is accredited would recognize the superior and imperative

nature of this other duty. An ambassador is sent to look after the interests *of his own country*. Happy his lot if the interests of the country that sends him and those of the country to which he is sent are not conflicting. That is an ideal state, but it is not to be counted on anywhere definitely as a permanence. If unhappily these interests are ever found to conflict, the most injurious and the most treacherous fault an ambassador can commit is to sacrifice or imperil the interests of his own country, whether merely through a judgment warped by the subtle influence of his foreign associations, or in the deliberate and sordid hope of remaining *persona grata* in the country in which he temporarily resides.

We are sometimes liable to a curious self-deception in such matters. We assume that a man is necessarily succeeding when the country to which he is sent praises him. It is, of course, most agreeable to us to hear such praise; yet we never base our estimate of any other agent's success in the agreements we send him to make for us entirely on the pleasure the opposite side shows about his work. Long ago I have heard of diplomatic servants enshrined in the popular regard at home because of a foreign approval which found no echo in the secret records of our State Department. We can never afford to lose sight of two facts about the real business of our ambassadors: that their first duty is to look after the interests of their own country, and that the greatest of these interests is, now and always, peace—the peace of justice.

With all our modern improvements, our diplomacy has no better standards yet than those set by John Jay and Charles Francis Adams. Neither was exactly a "jollier," and perhaps neither was at the moment exuberantly popular in the capital to which he was accredited. But they retired with the sincere respect of both countries, deserve to be honorably remembered in the annals of both, and are sure at least of lasting names and the gratitude of coming generations in the land they served.

It was a happy and illuminating phrase of our great Secretary of State when in a humorous vein he told us that our foreign policy consists chiefly in the Golden Rule and the Monroe Doctrine. It requires but another word, in fact, to make it completely comprehensive. To the Golden Rule and the Monroe Doctrine we need only add the Dix Doctrine to sum up the whole body of State Department instructions for our dealings with foreign nations. No one, no New Yorker, no American, ever forgets the Dix Doctrine—"If any man hauls down the American flag, shoot him on the spot." Neither that nor the Monroe Doctrine is international law, but both are sure to remain fundamental parts of American international policy, and when you illumine both by the Golden Rule, you have set forth what I firmly believe is the sincere and devout wish of the United States with regard to all its foreign relations and the work of all its representatives in the diplomatic service. Our use for

the big stick is much the same as that of the quiet citizen, to keep off footpads and the dogs. We covet no nation's lands or other possessions. We seek only to preserve and protect our own. We have a passionate preference, manifested on all suitable occasions through more than half a century, for doing this whenever practicable by international arbitration rather than by war. We sincerely wish the prosperity and advancing freedom of all; and I fully believe we are to-day, from Atlantic to Pacific and from President to humblest citizen, as peace-loving a nation as exists in the world.

II

No one, I trust, will ever find me unmindful of the rights and just claims of the profession I honor most in the world and am the proudest to have served. No man can have spent his life in newspaper work without being led by all his habits and instincts to sympathy with newspaper workers and a readiness to facilitate their efforts. And yet may I hint that there might, in fact there must, come a time when it is the duty of a diplomatic officer to report first and exclusively to the government instead of reporting to the newspapers!

It is perfectly true that an open course is the best; that a free people wish to know from day to day what is being done in their name and by their authority; that our government is not adapted to secrecy and does not like to make a mystery of its movements and its policy.

But the Japanese have been showing on a great scale that there is a duty in war which under any sagacious government must come before the duty of furnishing bulletins for the daily press. Diplomacy, if it is to be sagacious or successful, even the diplomacy of a Republic, must be somewhat in the same class. Neither can always be advantageously conducted *coram publico.*

There is another phase of our newspaper activities that merits more serious consideration from all of us than we generally give it. The free Press largely rules a free country. It may make peace or war; it has done both. But it is quite capable of fomenting very grave difficulties which it never desired or intended or even thought of. In our great distances, and isolation between two oceans, and general feeling of remoteness and elbow-room and independence, it has sometimes been apt in moments of excitement to measure its words as little in dealing with a high-spirited and sensitive nation as with a candidate for town constable or the board of aldermen. Is it not time for the Press, when it exercises the power, to recognize also the obligations of rule, — consideration, moderation, and a scrupulous regard both for the rights and the susceptibilities of others?

We have ourselves resented at times with unwonted asperity the slightest foreign interference in our own domestic discussions. More than once those of us of maturer years have seen this country lashed into a fury almost belligerent

merely by the critical or carping references in foreign newspapers. It might be well now, in some quiet hour, to consider the other side, and reflect how they may feel over our free-spoken comments on their affairs. Have we not, in fact, taken sides and led our people to take sides, habitually and even vehemently, on almost every foreign question that comes to our notice? Would it not comport better sometimes with our position now if we were a little less dogmatic in laying down the duty of this or that nation in its own domestic affairs, and a little less partisan in our view of the unhappy conflict between contending nations? Do not misunderstand me. I am arraigning no one, and making no criticisms of others which I do not take to myself also. But has not the time come in the development of this country and in the increased intimacy and importance of its relations to other countries, when we may advantageously practice a little more reserve in commenting upon other people's affairs, a little more impartiality between countries at war, and a friendlier tone to each when we are on good terms with both, and have every interest to remain so? What is good policy for individuals in the disagreements of their neighbors might sometimes in these international cases be pretty good policy for newspapers too and for the people at large,—an attitude of friendly neutrality,—while meantime diligently minding their own business and letting that of other people alone.

SOME INTERNATIONAL QUESTIONS

SOME INTERNATIONAL QUESTIONS

I

THE MONROE DOCTRINE AND THE POLK DOCTRINE

TO the average American the Monroe Doctrine seems so natural and necessary that he is always surprised at the surprise with which the pretension is regarded by Europe. Not one of our citizens out of a thousand has any doubt of its propriety or of our duty to maintain it. The slightest show of foreign opposition would call a practically unanimous country to its defence.

At the same time there is no very intimate familiarity with the circumstances of its origin, or the varying scope we have given it, and little attention has been paid to the changed conditions that must now affect its application. Considered at present merely in the old light, as a barrier against the reactionary designs of the Holy Alliance upon the new republics we had just recognized in the American continents at the close of the French Revolutionary and Napoleonic period, its condition somewhat resembles that of a long-neglected barrel around which has accumulated the débris of years. The hoops, the thing that made it a barrel, have dropped away; only the pressure of the débris outside holds the staves together. Remove that and the barrel would tumble to pieces. Keep up the outside pressure and it may last indefinitely.

I do not say that the illustration exactly fits the

case, or that the Monroe Doctrine would disappear if Europe ceased to oppose it. I do say that under a show of European opposition it would be likely to last indefinitely; and that in a long absence of such opposition it may hold together less tenaciously. The things that made the Monroe Doctrine have disappeared,—the danger that the infant republics should be strangled by their cruel stepmother and her allies; that the Holy Alliance should check the spread of republican institutions or overturn them in any place where they deserve to exist; or that Europeans should attempt now, under the shadow of the United States of the twentieth century, to colonize alleged unoccupied lands in America. Under such circumstances it may be easy, after a while, for us to look over the Monroe Doctrine again in the light of the present situation of the American continents and of our present necessities. We will certainly not abandon it; but we may find, if nobody is opposing us, that perhaps its extension, quite so far beyond the original purpose of Mr. Monroe and Mr. Adams as the fervor of our patriots has carried it, may prove to be attended with wholly unnecessary inconvenience to ourselves.

For the sake of precision it may be well at the beginning to restate a few facts about it, not always remembered. The doctrine is not international law. It is not American law. It consists merely of declarations of policy by Presidents and Secretaries of

State, and these are not uniform. There is a Monroe Doctrine, suggested in part by Mr. Canning, extended and formulated by Mr. John Quincy Adams, and adopted by Mr. Monroe, in his message to Congress of December 2, 1823. There is a Polk Doctrine, starting in disputes about our northwestern frontier and in an intrigue of the slave power for the seizure and annexation of Yucatan, collaborated by Mr. James Buchanan and his chief, and adopted by Mr. Polk, in his messages to Congress of December 2, 1845, and April 29, 1848. The Monroe Doctrine held that (1) "the American continents, by the free and independent condition which they have assumed and maintained, are henceforth not to be considered as subjects for future colonization by any European power;" and (2) that, as "the political system of the allied powers is essentially different . . . from that of America . . . with the existing colonies or dependencies of any European power (in America) we have not interfered and shall not interfere; but with the governments who have declared their independence and maintained it . . . we could not view any interposition for the purpose of oppressing them or controlling in any other manner their destiny by any European power, in any other light than as the manifestation of an unfriendly disposition toward the United States." The second of these propositions was the one suggested and cordially welcomed by Great Britain; the first was met by instant dissent. Both, though resting wholly on the

Presidential declaration, without a statute or resolution of Congress to sustain them, have become incorporated into the general American faith. But neither of them declares against any but republican institutions for the future in this hemisphere; in fact, about the same time we were recognizing two emperors, Iturbide in Mexico and Dom Pedro in Brazil. Neither of them objects to transfer of dominion to Europeans by cession, purchase, or the voluntary act of the inhabitants; and neither of them gives any pledge to any South American state that we would interfere in its behalf against the use of force for the collection of debts or the redress of injuries, or indeed against any European attack.

The Polk Doctrine, starting from Mr. Monroe's statement about colonization, says: (1) "It should be distinctly announced to the world as our settled policy that no future European colony *or dominion* shall, with our consent, be planted *or established* on any part of the North American continent;" and again, quoting Mr. Monroe as opposing the extension of the European system to this hemisphere, Mr. Polk says: (2) "While it is not my purpose to recommend . . . the acquisition of the dominion and sovereignty over Yucatan, yet . . . we could not consent to a transfer of this dominion and sovereignty to either Spain, Great Britain, or any other European power." Thus, professing only to re-affirm the Monroe Doctrine, the Polk Doctrine extends it to forbid specifically the establishment or

acquisition of dominion anywhere in North America, and inferentially anywhere in this hemisphere, by any European power.[1] Not merely are they forbidden to claim unsettled lands and colonize them, or to interfere with the liberties of the Spanish-American Republics we had just recognized; but they must never take dominion, by cession, by purchase, by voluntary appeal of inhabitants, or otherwise. Under the Polk Doctrine no American nation could part with any of its territory to Europeans to secure any advantage for itself; nor could its people determine their own destiny at their own will. Under that doctrine Germany could not buy a coaling station off the coast of Chili, or on the

[1] General Grant restated the Polk Doctrine even more specifically (without reference, however, to Mr. Polk) in his letter to the Senate of May 31, 1870, concerning his plan for annexing San Domingo, as follows: "The Doctrine promulgated by President Monroe has been adhered to by all political parties, and I now deem it proper to assert the equally important principle that hereafter no territory on this continent shall be regarded as subject of transfer to a European power."

Mr. Cleveland carried it so far in the Venezuela matter, in his special message of December 17, 1895, as to propose appointing a commission to determine the boundary between Great Britain and Venezuela, and resisting by every means in our power "the appropriation by Great Britain of any lands, or the exercise of governmental jurisdiction over any territory which . . . we have determined . . . belongs to Venezuela."

Both these utterances are quite outside the original scope of the Monroe Doctrine, and are either variations or extensions of the Polk Doctrine.

The representatives of the United States at the Hague Peace Conference (obviously with this body of executive declarations in mind) only signed its agreements on condition that "Nothing contained in this Convention shall be so construed as to require the United States of America to depart from its traditional policy of not intruding upon, interfering with, or entangling itself in the political questions or internal administration of any foreign state; nor shall anything contained in the said Convention be so construed as to require the relinquishment by the United States of America of its traditional attitude toward purely American questions."

confines of Patagonia,—not even if the recognized sovereigns agreed to sell it and the inhabitants earnestly desired the transfer; nor could Venezuela pay its European debts by ceding—possibly even by leasing—the little island of Marguerita off its coast.

I suppose the logical basis of our original assertion of the Monroe Doctrine to have been our own national interests; and the only ground for any recognition or toleration of it by other nations to have been the national right, generally claimed, to hold our own interests paramount within the natural and legitimate sphere of our influence. Such a claim is known in international practice. What other nations cannot so clearly understand is why Patagonia, close to the Antarctic Circle and the southern frigid zone, should be in our sphere of influence any more than theirs; or, if it is, why the Azores and Morocco, less than a third as far away from us, are not also within our sphere of influence.

It is always an advantage, in any effort to see all around a subject, to find the other man's point of view. Perhaps we may get a clearer insight into the action of the European mind on this subject if we should try to work out some European Monroe Doctrine, and especially some European Polk Doctrine.

China, or at any rate China and Russia combined, hold a position in Asia far more command-

ing than that of the United States in the three Americas. In both cases, at the outbreak of the Spanish-American War, the governments were as absolutely committed to the despotic as we are to the republican idea; and there was no obvious proof that the overwhelming majority of their people did not believe in their system as much as the corresponding majority of our people believe in ours. Suppose China, or China and Russia together, had taken ground that the Asiatic continent, being entirely occupied by the existing governments which were mostly in form and principle like their own, was no longer a field for colonization or conquest by any American power; and on that ground had warned us off Manila and the Philippines?

Great Britain, entrenched at the north and at the south of Africa, and reaching thence in each direction yet farther and farther toward the point where her two lines of settlement must meet, holds a position on the continent of Africa comparable at least to that of the United States on the continents of America. In connection with the minor colonies by other governments of like tendencies toward constitutional monarchy with England herself, Belgium, Portugal, and Germany, she has the immensely preponderating influence. Suppose Great Britain, with the concurrence of the rest, had said to the United States that Africa, having already had governments under their control and committed mainly to the ideas of the constitutional monarchy set up over her whole extent (so far as

it is accessible excepting through their territory), is no longer a field for colonization by Republics, and so had warned us off, say, from Liberia?

Would the United States have cheerfully accepted that doctrine in Asia, or even in Africa? Suppose it had been announced when Dewey was compelled to leave Hong Kong, and had his choice between falling upon the national enemy at Manila or turning his back upon the Spaniard and steaming home across the Pacific? Or suppose that after the war China and Russia had called upon us to give up what we had conquered and restore the Philippines to Spain?

With our mental vision possibly a little clarified by this glimpse of how the boot might look on the other leg, it may be useful now to consider dispassionately the present advantage to us of the two doctrines, and particularly the doctrine of Mr. Polk; and to count from the only point of view a representative government on its own initiative has any right to take, that of the interest of its citizens, whether it is now worth to them what it might cost.

What would be our present precise motive for aggressively asserting against the world the two doctrines, as to countries farther away from us than half Europe and Africa are? One obvious advantage, from the point of view of our naval and mercantile marine, must always be remembered, and never undervalued,—that of making naval and coaling stations scarce for our commercial

rivals and possible enemies. And yet our position would seem a little curious, spending hundreds of millions on a Panama canal, so as to open to all the world on equal terms the trade on the Pacific, in which, until a canal is dug, we have such an enormous natural advantage ourselves, and then saying, "Nevertheless, by our Polk Doctrine we can still delay you or hamper you a little about coaling stations!" But as to the old grounds of the Monroe Doctrine, are we afraid now of peril to our own institutions? Have we any interest in forcing the maintenance of similar institutions elsewhere beyond the legitimate sphere of our influence, unless at least they give promise of bringing to others something akin to what they have brought to us? If it be true that in considerable parts of the regions to the south of us they have resulted, through the three-quarters of a century since the doctrine was announced, in tumult, lack of development, disaster, and chronic revolution, what is the precise real advantage for our citizens which the United States derives from meddling, and aggressively insisting that the world must continue to witness this result of so-called republican institutions on so colossal a scale?

In the short period since the escape of Mexico from her colonial government, in 1821, a statistical historian has counted three hundred revolutions, successful or abortive. There is one particular South American state, in which, for one reason or another, and in one way or another, we have

of late greatly interested ourselves. The table of Venezuela's revolutions, forcible removals of chief magistrates, and civil wars, with dates and duration of each, has a melancholy significance. From 1811, when it proclaimed its independence, till 1903, it has had, under dictators, supreme chiefs, self-proclaimed presidents, and otherwise, over thirty changes, has spent over twenty-five years under three dictatorships, each violently overthrown, and has had civil war for twenty-nine years. No doubt as to this government, too, which has sustained its independence, and, to use the stately language of Mr. Monroe, whose independence, on great consideration and on just principles, we acknowledge, we could not view any interposition for the purpose of oppressing it or controlling in any manner its destiny by any European power except as a manifestation of an unfriendly disposition toward the United States. It is directly within the sphere of our influence, as Cuba was, and if there should ever arise an imperative necessity for the restoration of order from the outside, the task would be ours rather than that of any European nation. But would that task be quite so imperative or exclusive if, instead of overhanging the Caribbean Sea and the Gulf of Mexico, this nation were double as far away from us as half Africa is?

Such turbulent and revolutionary governments commit offences against foreigners; sometimes injure foreign residents, sometimes affront or injure foreign vessels in their waters, sometimes run in

debt and fail to pay. What then? Is the Monroe Doctrine, or, still more, the Polk Doctrine, to be construed into an international bankruptcy act, to be enforced by the United States for the benefit of any American Republic against all European creditors? Or, on the other hand, is it to degenerate into an international collection agency, maintained by the United States for the benefit of European powers which may have just claims against American Republics? In a recent conspicuous case the President has very properly and wisely given a practical negative to both these questions; while under his guidance the Secretary of State, with consummate skill, has secured the precedent that European powers first procure our consent before attempting to collect debts by force on these continents, and then only on their promise not to take territory. Perhaps it is also a useful precedent, secured at the same time, that under such conditions the game does not prove worth the candle.

But what then? What alternative is left? Shall we simply say to any European creditor that, as to any debt of any American Republic, the only rule is *Caveat emptor?* Must the lender under any circumstances be merely told that he should have considered the risks before he made the loan, and that now he has no remedy? When the debtor country has no assets save its custom-houses and its lands, must the United States, a power aiming to stand at the head of the world's civilization, say for all time, "You shall not touch the only assets of your

debtor, because it is an American Republic"? And, assuming that to be just, and our determination, are we ready to carry that doctrine, in case of need, as far afield as to Uruguay and Paraguay and Patagonia—and then to fight for it?

That is the vital point in the whole subject, as Mr. Loomis indicated in a sagacious address. It is better to consider the question before a case springs up and the patriotic temper of the people is aroused. Obviously, we shall either modify the present extreme extensions of the old doctrine, which carry it far beyond any national interest it now serves, or some day or another we shall have to fight for it—and ought to, unless we mean to play the part of a vulgar braggart, and loudly assert what we are not ready to maintain. How far would it really have concerned our interests in the case of the Argentine troubles, which prostrated the Barings and brought on a great financial crash in London, if Great Britain had found it necessary for the protection of the rights of her people to take steps in that remote country, twice as far from New York as London itself is, which would seem to infringe upon the extreme extensions of the Monroe Doctrine by Polk and Buchanan? Happily the case did not arise. But some day and with some nation it is reasonably sure to. We may better now, in a time of profound calm, and when there is no threat to affect our dignity or disturb the serenity of our judgment, give serious consideration ourselves to this question: "How far south do we mean now, in

the twentieth century, to push the Monroe Doctrine and the Polk Doctrine, and hold ourselves ready at any challenge to fight for them?"

I am not seeking to prejudge the question or even to influence the answer. I am only presenting the subject in a light in which it has never yet had from the American people at large that serious and solemn consideration which should always precede acts of war.

In this day, in the light of the last hundred years and with the present unassailable strength of representative government on this continent, it is for us to say if there is any ground of justice or right on which we rest the Monroe Doctrine, save that of our proper predominance, in our own interest, and in the interest of republican institutions generally, within the legitimate sphere of our national influence. Unless we stop there, we cannot stop logically short of a similar care over republican institutions wherever they exist on the surface of the globe. For in an age of fast steamers and wireless telegraphy, the American continents can no longer be treated as shut up to themselves and measurably isolated from the rest of the world. Oceans do not now separate; they unite. Buenos Ayres is actually nearer in miles to Cadiz and Madrid than to New York, and so is more than half of all South America.

Under such considerations, if no foreign interference arises suddenly to affect the national judg-

ment, it is at least among the possibilities that we may find two changes taking place in the national view of the ideas grouped under the popular term of the Monroe Doctrine. We may see a considerable increase in the stringency of their application, where our interest clearly calls for them, within the natural sphere of our influence. We may see them slowly moderated as to remote countries, which under changed modern conditions are no longer exclusively within that sphere. No one denies that the Gulf of Mexico, the Caribbean Sea, and the waters of both oceans about the Isthmus are within that sphere. They must be forever dominated by the great Republic. It cannot tolerate a nuisance at its doors, and the races that people those shores must keep the peace and preserve order as to us, and conform to ordinary international obligations toward the world. To this the moral duty of our strength points and our material interest binds us. It was on this ground our action toward Cuba was justified; and reasons of equal strength would no doubt be found to conduct us again to similar action in any similar emergency throughout that whole region, on the continent, in the islands, or on the other ocean, at least from Los Angeles to Lima.

Toward the rest of the American continents it may some day prove more convenient for us to assume less responsibility. We shall certainly never cease to manifest our friendly interest in those countries. We do have a relation toward them which the rest of the world can never have,

and we shall hope that the progress of the century may make it closer. A railroad through the three Americas will draw us more intimately together. The currents of trade will change. The legitimate sphere of our influence will thus widen throughout those nations with the years; and it might be increased rather than diminished by a moderation of our extreme claim to interfere now with any exercise of their own sovereignty as to territory, government, or otherwise, to which their calm judgment of their own best interests may bring them.

II

ANARCHISM

Not long ago a man without an enemy was assassinated in New York State in the presence of a multitude of friends. There was absolutely no cause save a political one—he was at the head of the government. It was either a political offence or the act of a lunatic. The assassin was promptly arrested, absence of lunacy was established, and, to the credit of the progress in the administration of American justice since previous Presidential assassinations, he was fairly but much more promptly tried and more promptly executed.

The crime was committed within a few miles of the Canadian frontier. Suppose the assassin had been able to escape to Canada. Could any British authorities have hesitated under any circumstances to give up a man who had sought on their soil after such an act the asylum their treaties have invariably granted for a political offence!

Bear in mind that the latest and only provision in any treaty of extradition between Great Britain and the United States that could apply to the case at all, that of March 11, 1890, expressly stipulates that fugitives from justice shall neither be surrendered nor punished for crimes of a political character; and further that on the question whether a crime is of a political character the decision of the government in whose jurisdiction the criminal is found must be final. It is pertinent also

to recall that after the attempted assassination of the third Napoleon in Paris by Orsini, by which a large number of victims were killed and many more maimed, the French government suggested to Great Britain the surrender or further provision for the punishment of participants in this or kindred plots who had found asylum in London, and were in fact believed to have there originated and perfected their conspiracies; that the British government did not comply; and that the Prime Minister who attempted to comply, Lord Palmerston, was thereby driven from office. It is equally pertinent to remember that never, with the exceptions of Belgium, Russia, and Luxemburg, until some time after this assassination at Buffalo—never in fact until June 14, 1902, did the United States have a treaty for such surrender with any other nation, that its Ministers had more than once been cautioned against encouraging requests for such a clause in negotiations for any treaty, and that the only additional countries it has such treaties with to-day are Brazil and Denmark. At the time, therefore, although we had already suffered from two previous Presidential assassinations, we had not only made no agreement with Great Britain, but we had never made an agreement with any nation of the first rank (save one) to return such a prisoner ourselves, and were in no position to demand as a right more than we had stipulated to concede; while Great Britain was in some sort committed against such return in the conspicuous

case I have named. On the other hand, let us always gratefully remember that when there was thought to be some reason for imagining that the assassin of Abraham Lincoln might seek an asylum in England, our representative then at the Court of St. James, Mr. Charles Francis Adams, was able to report promptness and goodwill at the Foreign Office in facilitating any application that might be made for his surrender. It is also most gratifying to remember, as that accomplished student of international law, Professor John Bassett Moore, of Columbia, reminded us in his "Case of the Salvadorean Refugees," that in June, 1894, a third of a century after the Orsini case, the Court of Queen's Bench delivered up to France a fugitive charged with the explosion at the Café Vêry, holding that "in order to constitute an offence of a political character, there must be two or more parties in the state, each seeking to impose the government of their own choice on the other," and that the offence must be "committed by one side or the other, in pursuance of that object."

Of course this last decision makes the extreme case, as I have stated it, of a possible refusal to surrender the assassin of McKinley quite beyond all probabilities. Without a reasonable doubt he would have been surrendered at the earliest moment at which the requisite formalities could have been concluded. But it would have been an act of sympathy and international comity, due to the goodwill of the British government of the day and its

abhorrence of an atrocious crime, and not to the established law and practice of nations, or consistent with any uniform practice of its own.

The state, then, of international law at the time of our last Presidential assassination, the record of some foreign governments and the tenderfootedness of a part of our own treaty-making power on the subject of extradition are such that it may be useful to seize the occasion for reviewing our own actual attitude toward the most startling and, in view of certain tendencies of the age, the most dangerous of modern crimes.

At the outset we may take it for granted, I think, that it is not consistent with the dignity of the United States to be dependent on mere international comity or on isolated decisions, or on national sympathies or political currents at the moment in the country from which it may seek to reclaim such a criminal. As little is it consistent with the justice of the United States that it should leave its own attitude toward a foreign call on it for the surrender of such a criminal, to depend on the effect similar circumstances might produce upon the disposition of its Administration then in power. *Lex scripta manet.* This is too serious a business to be left to good understandings and prevailing political currents. It surely ought to be embodied, for any two lands between which such a case can arise, in a written and solemn engagement which shall be for both of them the supreme law, — in fair

weather or in foul, in times of cordiality or in times of alienation.

It was only in 1882 that the Chief Secretary for Ireland, the real ruler of that land under the British sovereign, was assassinated in Phoenix Park. Suppose one of the men implicated in the plot had sought asylum in the United States? — as one of those thought to be involved in a subsequent plot did — the person known for a time as "No. 1" and afterward as Tynan. Who does not know what would have been the temper, not merely of large classes of our population, but of many leaders in both political parties, in view of the feeling about Irish affairs then existing among us, toward any attempt at his extradition? Who does not see that the best intentions of the party in power here might have had a chance at least to end, in such a case, just as the best intentions of Lord Palmerston did, in nothing but political disaster? Can we afford to leave, or encourage other nations to leave, at the mercy of such fluctuating circumstances the punishment of a crime which strikes at the foundation of organized government itself?

The exact state of our own treaty law on the subject is this:

Practically every extradition treaty the United States now has in force contains a clause which stipulates that "the provisions of the present convention shall not be applied in any manner to any crime or offence of a political character." Trivial variations in phraseology occur in several of

the treaties, but nothing materially restricting the meaning till we come to those already alluded to with Belgium in 1882 and with Luxemburg in 1883. There, for the first time, appeared an agreement that "an attempt against the life of the head of a foreign government, or . . . any member of his family, . . . comprising . . . murder, assassination, or poisoning, shall not be considered a political offence."

It took the second Presidential assassination to bring us to that. Even then we were disposed to draw back, and requests for a similar agreement were set aside in the case of larger and more important nations. It took the third Presidential assassination to bring us, late and reluctant, to the present conventions with Brazil and Denmark. That with Denmark is of similar purport with the Belgian treaty. That with Brazil adds also to its exemption of heads of government the governors of states. With England, France, Germany, Austria, Spain, Italy, Mexico, Chili, the Argentine Republic—with most of the world, in fact, we have no such agreement, but stand where we were. And our Department from the outset has held that "as a general rule there can be no extradition to a foreign state without treaty."

Statesmen have not hesitated to defend the old position, according to their lights. Thus Mr. Jefferson, as Secretary of State, wrote in 1792 to our Ministers:

"Most codes extend their definition of treason to acts not really against one's country. They do not distinguish between acts against the government and acts against the oppressions of the government. The latter are virtues, yet have furnished more victims to the executioner than the former. . . . The unsuccessful strugglers against tyranny have been the chief martyrs of treason laws in all countries. . . . Treasons, then, taking the simulated with the real, are sufficiently punished by exile."

Under that doctrine, strained to the limit, sustained by existing treaty protection for political offences, and unrelieved by the general human abhorrence of monstrous crime, Czolgosz might have been sufficiently punished by exile.

Mr. President Tyler, in construing the treaty with Great Britain, said, in a document no doubt from the pen of his Secretary of State, Daniel Webster:

"In this . . . enumeration of crimes the object has been to exclude all political offences, or criminal charges, arising from wars or intestine commotions. Treason, misprision of treason . . . and other offences of similar character are excluded."

In quite recent years, men whose views controlled treaties have been known to object successfully to an agreement that the murderer of a king or a czar should be distinctly excluded from the protection accorded to "political criminals."

Great Britain has at times eagerly sought what she has not always been willing to grant. She demanded from Denmark and the Low Countries the

delivery of the regicides, and secured it. Again, in 1799, she secured from Hamburg the return of Napper Tandy and other Irish insurgents. On that occasion Napoleon Bonaparte addressed to the Senate of Hamburg this vehement reproach:

> "Your letter does not justify your conduct. Virtue and courage are the support of states; servility and baseness their ruin. You have violated the laws of hospitality in a manner which would bring the blush of shame to the wandering tribes of the desert."

It was an irony of fate that his nephew, the third Napoleon, should be found demanding in a graver case a like violation of the laws of hospitality, and should meet a refusal from the very nation that had profited by the act of the Senate of Hamburg. "Ought English legislation," exclaimed Count Walewski, his Minister for Foreign Affairs, "to give hospitality to assassins, contribute to favor their designs, and shelter persons who by their flagrant acts put themselves outside the pale of common rights and under the ban of humanity?" But his eloquence was in vain, and the only remedy was the outburst from officers of the French army, formally and fervently declaring their eagerness for a settlement "with the foul land which contains the haunts of these monsters who are sheltered by its laws." Nor is the United States able to claim that it is clearly and beyond possibility of question above the like reproach. If the assassin of that spotless President of the French Republic, M. Sadi

Carnot, had escaped to our shores, we should surely have returned him as a voluntary act; but we had not, and we have not to this day, a treaty with France that would have required our surrendering him to justice.

The progress we have made since the assassination of McKinley starts us on the road to remove such reproaches. But for two exceptions the treaty with Brazil might be taken as embodying what in these days must be held the obvious duty of any civilized nation in the premises. It fails, however, to include all those who in either country stand in the line of succession, and it unhappily limits its exclusion of these crimes from the category of political offences rigidly to the case when they are "unconnected with political movements." Through the meshes of that last clause half the assassins in question could claim a right to escape. But with the precedents already established and with the present temper of the Senate, there seems to be no reason now why we might not promptly conclude treaties with all nations on the basis of that with Russia, merely extending it so as to include those in either country in the direct line of succession to the headship of the government, and perhaps adding also in some form the protection of the Brazilian treaty for governors of states.

The commonplaces of international law and of our own practice on the subject are no doubt too famil-

iar to require more than the briefest statement. Our government sprang from a revolution, and naturally cannot hold revolt against unjust rule a crime. No nation can be required to enforce within its own boundaries another nation's laws. The easiest and proper place to try for a crime is where it was committed. No nation can be expected to send back for such trial persons accused of acts which it does not hold criminal. It may even admit their criminality, and yet, before returning them, stipulate against a punishment greater than it thinks warranted by the nature of the crime. In proportion to the liberality of its own institutions, a nation will be predisposed to as lenient a view as possible of political offences arising out of efforts to liberalize to a similar point the institutions of other nations. The general exemption of political offences from the operation of extradition treaties among the more advanced nations thus has its origin in the nature of things. It cannot be prevented, and it ought not to be.

But since we began this exemption, enormous changes in the conditions affecting many revolts against established authority have occurred, without leading to any corresponding change in our policy. The movement from which many recent political offences spring is one not against an oppressive authority in favor of a more just one, but against any authority. Sometimes its advocates dream of an entire change in the principles of government, by which it shall cease to protect indi-

vidual rights in property, and materially modify individual rights of the person. If they do not thus stop short at communism, they go on to the overthrow of all existing government, the destruction of all authority.

These are principles that have nothing in common with the liberal institutions to which we are devoted, and struggles for which by others we have been unwilling to punish. They are principles as antagonistic to our welfare as to that of any monarchy or any autocracy. There is no reason in our views or our interests why we should protect fugitives guilty of crimes in the promotion of such principles, and no reason in the nature of things why any organized government of any sort should. They are necessary outlaws in all nations. The most vital question which every successful effort of theirs raises for us, and for all the world, is not, What form of government shall we favor? but, Shall we have any form of government? Their methods are those of the conspirator rather than the revolutionist, and their weapons the dynamite bomb, the revolver, and the dagger. It is not to be tolerated that the fame of our Republic should be sullied by the slightest shade of sympathy in its international policy with these enemies of mankind who may seek shelter under our historic favor for political prisoners.

If this summary of what I have termed the commonplaces of the subject has not outrun approval, we will then be ready to regard it as imperative on

the United States, as a first step and at an early day, to free every extradition treaty it has with any other nation from their present quasi protection under the guise of mere political offenders for the assassins of heads of government. We will be apt, I think, to go farther and approach at least the views jointly expressed to us in the December following the assassination of President McKinley by the governments of Germany and Russia. They thought this, with previous anarchistic crimes and attempts upon the lives of chief magistrates, rendered it terribly evident that a struggle against the menace of anarchy is an urgent necessity for all governments. They accordingly proposed concert of action in measures to check the anarchistic movement, the strengthening of the penal code against anarchists, and particularly the expulsion of anarchists from countries of which they are not subjects.

The President had already recommended to Congress measures for keeping them out of the country, for deporting them if found here, or for their punishment; as well as an agreement by treaties making anarchy an offence against the law of nations. The response of Congress was a law merely forbidding the future admission of anarchists, or the naturalization of such as may be here. Meantime nothing is done to limit their present asylum here, and little to restrain their open propagandism.

At the same time the bill for protecting the life

of the President failed, because certain Senators held that the head of the government was entitled to no greater protection before the law than its humblest or most worthless and vicious citizen. Their motives are beyond reproach, but to me at least their logic and law seem to belong not to the America of which we are so proud, but to the *sans-culotte* period in France.

The efforts to overturn established governments or to throw all governments into chaos by the assassination of chief magistrates seem to have grown steadily more frequent and monstrous through the past century. The resulting situation is as bad now as at any period in the world's history more recent than the Roman Empire in the days of its decadent Caesars. In forty years we have ourselves lost three noble Presidents by assassination, besides having a distinguished Secretary of State and his son murderously assaulted and the former maimed for life. In an imperfect list of assassinations, successful or attempted, on sovereigns or other chief magistrates during the last century, I have counted up over forty,—more than one in three years, nearly one every other year! And among them were the emancipating Czar of Russia, the emancipating President of the United States, the humane King of Italy, and the blameless and progressive President of France. To these might be fairly added that most pitiful figure of all, the sad and suffering Empress of Austria. The men who committed some of these

crimes are said to have enjoyed our hospitality and to have been chosen by lot for their infamous work at meetings under our protection. In at least one case a public meeting has been held to rejoice over the assassination of one of the most liberal and liberty-loving of modern kings, if not to claim a share of the credit.

Is this our loftiest conception of law and of human rights? I present that foreign suggestion for surveillance of the anarchists and for their expulsion from all countries of which they are not subjects or citizens; and I ask whether the representatives of the Emperor and the Czar in that crisis came nearer than the American Congress to the demands of the highest Christian civilization?

PROBLEMS FLOWING FROM THE SPANISH WAR

PROBLEMS FLOWING FROM THE SPANISH WAR

MEN are everywhere asking what should be our course about the territory conquered in this war. Some inquire merely if it is good policy for the United States to abandon its continental limitations, and extend its rule over semi-tropical countries with mixed populations. Others ask if it would not be the wisest policy to give them away after conquering them, or abandon them. They say it would be ruinous to admit them as states to equal rights with ourselves, and contrary to the Constitution to hold them permanently as territories. It would be bad policy, they argue, to lower the standard of our population by taking in hordes of West Indians and Asiatics; bad policy to run any chance of allowing these people to become some day joint arbiters with ourselves of the national destinies; bad policy to abandon the principles of Washington's "Farewell Address," to which we have adhered for a century, and involve ourselves in the Eastern question, or in the entanglements of European politics.

The men who raise these questions are sincere and patriotic. They are now all loyally supporting the government in the prosecution of the war which some of them were active in bringing on, and others to the last deprecated and resisted. Their doubts and difficulties deserve the fairest consideration, and are of pressing importance.

But is there not another question, more important, which first demands consideration? Have we the right to decide whether we shall hold or abandon the conquered territory, solely or even mainly as a matter of national policy? Are we not bound by our own acts, and by the responsibility we have voluntarily assumed before Spain, before Europe, and before the civilized world, to consider it first in the light of national duty?

For that consideration it is not needful now to raise the question whether we were in every particular justifiable for our share in the transactions leading to the war. However men's opinions on that point may differ, the nation is now at war for a good cause, and has in a vigorous prosecution of it the loyal and zealous support of all good citizens.

The President intervened, with our army and navy, under the direct command of Congress, to put down Spanish rule in Cuba, on the distinct ground that it was a rule too bad to be longer endured. Are we not, then, bound in honor and morals to see to it that the government which replaces Spanish rule is better? Are we not morally culpable and disgraced before the civilized world if we leave it as bad or worse? Can any consideration of mere policy, of our own interests, or our own ease and comfort, free us from that solemn responsibility which we have voluntarily assumed, and for which we have lavishly spilled American and Spanish blood?

Most people now realize from what a mistake

Congress was kept by the firm attitude of the President in opposing a recognition of the so-called Cuban Republic of Cubitas. It is now generally understood that virtually there was no Cuban Republic, or any Cuban government save that of wandering bands of guerrilla insurgents, probably less numerous and influential than had been represented. There seems reason to believe that however bad Spanish government may have been, the rule of these people, where they had the power, was as bad; and still greater reason to apprehend that if they had full power, their sense of past wrongs and their unrestrained tropical thirst for vengeance might lead to something worse. Is it for that pitiful result that a civilized and Christian people is giving up its sons and pouring out blood and treasure in Cuba?

In commanding the war, Congress pledged us to continue our action until the pacification of the island should be secured. When that happy time has arrived, if it shall then be found that the Cuban insurgents and their late enemies are able to unite in maintaining a settled and peaceable government in Cuba, distinctly free from the faults which now lead the United States to destroy the old one, we shall have discharged our responsibility, and will be at liberty to end our interference. But if not, the responsibility of the United States continues. It is morally bound to secure to Cuba such a government, even if forced by circumstances to furnish it itself.

At this point, however, we are checked by a reminder of the further action of Congress, "asserting its determination, when the pacification of Cuba has been accomplished, to leave the government and control of the island to its people."

Now, the secondary provisions of any great measure must be construed in the light of its main purpose; and where they conflict, we are led to presume that they would not have been adopted but for ignorance of the actual conditions. Is it not evident that such was the case here? We now know how far Congress was misled as to the organization and power of the alleged Cuban government, the strength of the revolt, and the character of the war the insurgents were waging. We have seen how little dependence could be placed upon the lavish promises of support from great armies of insurgents in the war we have undertaken; and we are beginning to realize the difference between our idea of a humane and civilized "pacification" and that apparently entertained up to this time by the insurgents. It is certainly true that when the war began neither Congress nor the people of the United States cherished an intention to hold Cuba permanently, or had any further thought than to pacify it and turn it over to its own people. But they must pacify it before they turn it over; and, from present indications, to do that thoroughly may be the work of years. Even then they are still responsible to the world for the establishment of a better government than the one they destroy. If

the last state of the island should be worse than the first, the fault and the crime must be solely that of the United States. We were not actually forced to involve ourselves; we might have passed by on the other side. When, instead, we insisted on interfering, we made ourselves responsible for improving the situation; and, no matter what Congress "disclaimed," or what intention it "asserted," we cannot leave Cuba till that is done without national dishonor and blood-guiltiness.

The situation is curiously like that of England in Egypt. She intervened too, under far less provocation, it must be admitted, and for a cause rather more commercial than humanitarian. But when some thought that her work was ended and that it was time for her to go, Lord Granville, on behalf of Mr. Gladstone's government, addressed the other great European Powers in a note on the outcome of which Congress might have reflected with profit before framing its resolutions. "Although for the present," he said, " a British force remains in Egypt for the preservation of public tranquillity, Her Majesty's government are desirous of withdrawing it as soon as the state of the country and the organization of proper means for the maintenance of the Khedive's authority will admit of it. In the meantime the position in which Her Majesty's government are placed toward His Highness imposes upon them the duty of giving advice, with the object of securing that the order of things to be established shall be of a satisfactory character

and possess the elements of stability and progress." As time went on this declaration did not seem quite explicit enough; and accordingly, just a year later, Lord Granville instructed the present Lord Cromer, then Sir Evelyn Baring, that it should be made clear to the Egyptian ministers and governors of provinces that "the responsibility which for the time rests on England obliges Her Majesty's government to insist on the adoption of the policy which they recommend, and that it will be necessary that those ministers and governors who do not follow this course should cease to hold their offices."

That was in 1884—a year after the defeat of Arabi, and the "pacification." The English are still there, and the Egyptian ministers and governors now understand quite well that they must cease to hold their offices if they do not adopt the policy recommended by the British diplomatic agent. If it should be found that we cannot with honor and self-respect begin to abandon our self-imposed task of Cuban "pacification" with any greater speed, the impetuous Congressmen, as they read over their own inconsiderate resolutions years hence, can hide their blushes behind a copy of Lord Granville's letter. They may explain, if they like, with the classical excuse of Benedick, "When I said I would die a bachelor, I did not think I should live till I were married." Or if this seems too frivolous for their serious plight, let them recall the position of Mr. Jefferson, who originally declared that the purchase of for-

eign territory would make waste paper of the Constitution, and subsequently appealed to Congress for the money to pay for his purchase of Louisiana. When he held such an acquisition unconstitutional, he had not thought he would live to want Louisiana.

As to Cuba, it may be fairly concluded that only these points are actually clear: (1) We had made ourselves, in a sense, responsible for Spain's rule in that island by our consistent declaration, through three-quarters of a century, that no other European nation should replace her—Daniel Webster, as Secretary of State, even seeking to guard her hold as against Great Britain. (2) We are now at war because we say Spanish rule is intolerable; and we cannot withdraw our hand till it is replaced by a rule for which we are willing to be responsible. (3) We are also pledged to remain till the pacification is complete.

In the other territories in question the conditions are different. We are not taking possession of them as we are of Cuba, with the avowed purpose of giving them a better government. We are conquering them because we are at war with Spain, which has been holding and governing them very much as she has Cuba; and we must strike Spain wherever and as hard as we can. But it must at once be recognized that as to Porto Rico at least, to hold it would be the natural course and what all the world would expect. Both Cuba and Porto Rico, like Hawaii, are within the acknowledged sphere of our influence, and ours must necessarily be the

first voice in deciding their destiny. Our national position with regard to them is historic. It has been officially declared and known to every civilized nation for three-quarters of a century. To abandon it now, that we may refuse greatness through a sudden craven fear of being great, would be so astonishing a reversal of a policy steadfastly maintained by the whole line of our responsible statesmen since 1823 as to be grotesque.

John Quincy Adams, writing in April of that year, as Secretary of State, to our Minister to Spain, pointed out that the dominion of Spain upon the American continents, north and south, was irrevocably gone, but warned him that Cuba and Porto Rico still remained nominally dependent upon her, and that she might attempt to transfer them. That could not be permitted, as they were "natural appendages to the North American continent." Subsequent statements turned more upon what Mr. Adams called "the transcendent importance of Cuba to the United States;" but from that day to this I do not recall a line in our state papers to show that the claim of the United States to control the future of Porto Rico as well as of Cuba was ever waived. As to Cuba, Mr. Adams predicted that within half a century its annexation would be indispensable. "There are laws of political as well as of physical gravitation," he said; and "Cuba, forcibly disjointed from its own unnatural connection with Spain, and incapable of self-support, can gravitate only towards the North American Union, which,

by the same law of nature, cannot cast her off from its bosom." If Cuba is incapable of self-support, and could not therefore be left, in the cheerful language of Congress, to her own people, how much less could little Porto Rico stand alone?

There remains the alternative of giving Porto Rico back to Spain at the end of the war. But if we are warranted now in making war because the character of Spanish rule in Cuba was intolerable, how could we justify ourselves in handing back Porto Rico to the same rule, after having once emancipated her from it? The subject need not be pursued. To return Porto Rico to Spain, after she is once in our possession, is as much beyond the power of the President and of Congress as it was to preserve the peace with Spain after the destruction of the "Maine" in the harbor of Havana. From that moment the American people resolved that the flag under which this calamity was possible should disappear forever from the western hemisphere, and they will sanction no peace that permits it to remain.

The question of the Philippines is different and more difficult. They are not within what the diplomatists of the world would recognize as the legitimate sphere of American influence. Our relation to them is purely the accident of recent war. We are not in honor bound to hold them, if we can honorably dispose of them. But we know that their grievances differ only in kind, not in degree, from those of Cuba, and having once freed them

from the Spanish yoke, we cannot honorably require them to go back under it again. That would be to put us in an attitude of nauseating national hypocrisy; to give the lie to all our professions of humanity in our interference in Cuba, if not also to prove that our real motive was conquest. What humanity forbade us to tolerate in the West Indies, it would not justify us in reëstablishing in the Philippines.

What, then, can we do with them? Shall we trade them for something nearer home? Doubtless that would be permissible, if we were sure of thus securing them a better government than that of Spain, and if it could be done without precipitating fresh international difficulties. But we cannot give them to our friend and their neighbor Japan without instantly provoking the hostility of Russia, which recently interfered to prevent a far smaller Japanese aggrandizement. We cannot give them to Russia without a greater injustice to Japan; or to Germany or to France or to England without raising far more trouble than we allay. England would like us to keep them; the Continental nations would like that better than any other control excepting Spain's or their own; and the Philippines would prefer it to anything save the absolute independence which they are incapable of maintaining. Having been led into their possession by the course of a war undertaken for the sake of humanity, shall we draw a geographical limit to our humanity, and say we cannot continue

to be governed by it in Asiatic waters because it is too much trouble and is too disagreeable—and, besides, there may be no profit in it?

Both war and diplomacy have many surprises; and it is quite possible that some way out of our embarrassing possession may yet be found. The fact is clear that many of our people do not much want it; but if a way of relinquishing it is proposed, the one thing we are bound to insist on is that it shall be consistent with our attitude in the war, and with our honorable obligations to the islands we have conquered and to civilization.

The chief aversion to the vast accessions of territory with which we are threatened springs from the fear that ultimately they must be admitted into the Union as states. No public duty is more urgent at this moment than to resist from the very outset the concession of such a possibility. In no circumstances likely to exist within a century should they be admitted as states of the Union. The loose, disunited, and unrelated federation of independent states to which this would inevitably lead, stretching from the Indian Archipelago to the Caribbean Sea, embracing all climes, all religions, all races, —black, yellow, white, and their mixtures,—all conditions, from pagan ignorance and the verge of cannibalism to the best product of centuries of civilization, education, and self-government, all with equal rights in our Senate and representation according to population in our House, with an equal voice in shaping our national destinies—that would,

at least in this stage of the world, be humanitarianism run mad, a degeneration and degradation of the homogeneous, continental Republic of our pride, too preposterous for the contemplation of serious and intelligent men. Quite as well might Great Britain now invite the swarming millions of India to send rajas and members of the Lower House, in proportion to population, to swamp the Lords and Commons and rule the English people. If it had been supposed that even Hawaii, with its overwhelming preponderance of Kanakas and Asiatics, would have become a state, she could not have been annexed. If the territories we are conquering must become states, we might better renounce them at once and place them under the protectorate of some humane and friendly European power with less nonsense in its blood.

This is not to deny them the freest and most liberal institutions they are capable of sustaining. The people of Sitka and the Aleutian Islands enjoy the blessings of ordered liberty and free institutions, but nobody dreams of admitting them to statehood. New Mexico has belonged to us for half a century, not only without oppression, but with all the local self-government for which she was prepared; yet, though an integral part of our continent, surrounded by states, and with an adequate population, she is still not admitted to statehood. Why should not the people on the island of Porto Rico, or even of Cuba, prosper and be happy for the next century under a rule similar in the main

to that under which their kinsmen of New Mexico have prospered for the last half century?

With some necessary modifications, the territorial form of government which we have tried so successfully from the beginning of the Union is well adapted to the best of such communities. It secures local self-government, equality before the law, upright courts, ample power for order and defence, and such control by Congress as gives security against the mistakes or excesses of people new to the exercise of these rights.

But such a system, we are told, is contrary to our Constitution and to the spirit of our institutions. Why? We have had just that system ever since the Constitution was framed. It is true that a large part of the territory thus governed has now been admitted into the Union in the form of new states. But it is not true that this was recognized at the beginning as a right, or even generally contemplated as a probability; nor is it true that it has been the purpose or expectation of those who annexed foreign territory to the United States, like the Louisiana or the Gadsden Purchase, that it would all be carved into states. That feature of the marvellous development of the continent has come as a surprise to this generation and the last, and would have been absolutely incredible to the men of Thomas Jefferson's time. Obviously, then, it could not have been the purpose for which, before that date, our territorial system was devised. It is not clear that the founders of the government expected even all

the territory we possessed at the outset to be made into states. Much of it was supposed to be worthless and uninhabitable. But it is certain that they planned for outside accessions. Even in the Articles of Confederation they provided for the admission of Canada and of British colonies which included Jamaica as well as Nova Scotia. Madison, in referring to this, construes it as meaning that they contemplated only the admission of these colonies as colonies, not the eventual establishment of new states ("Federalist," No. 43). About the same time Hamilton was dwelling on the alarms of those who thought the country already too large, and arguing that great size was a safeguard against ambitious rulers.

Nevertheless, the objectors still argue, the Constitution gives no positive warrant for a permanent territorial policy. But it does! Ordinarily it may be assumed that what the framers of the Constitution immediately proceeded to do under it was intended by them to be warranted by it; and we have seen that they immediately devised and maintained a territorial system for the government of territory which they had no expectation of ever converting into states. The case, however, is even plainer than that. The sole reference in the Constitution to the territories of the United States is in Article IV, Section 3: "The Congress shall have power to dispose of and make all needful rules and regulations respecting the territory or other property belonging to the United States." Jefferson

revised his first views far enough to find warrant for acquiring territory; but here is explicit, unmistakable authority conferred for dealing with it, and with other "property," precisely as Congress chooses. The territory was not a present or prospective party in interest in the Union created under this organic act. It was "property," to be disposed of or ruled and regulated as Congress might determine. The inhabitants of the territory were not consulted; there was no provision that they should even be guaranteed a republican form of government like the states; they were secured no right of representation and given no vote. So, too, when it came to acquiring new territory, there was no thought of consulting the inhabitants. Mr. Jefferson did not ask the citizens of Louisiana to consent to their annexation, nor did Mr. Monroe submit such a question to the Spaniards of Florida, nor Mr. Polk to the Mexicans of California, nor Mr. Pierce to the New Mexicans, nor Mr. Johnson to the Russians and Aleuts of Alaska. The power of the government to deal with territory, foreign or domestic, precisely as it chooses was understood from the beginning to be absolute; and at no stage in our whole history have we hesitated to exercise it. The question of permanently holding the Philippines or any other conquered territory as territory is not, and cannot be made, one of constitutional right; it is one solely of national duty and of national policy.

As a last resort, it is maintained that even if the

Constitution does not forbid, the Monroe Doctrine does. But the famous declaration of Mr. Monroe on which reliance is placed does not warrant this conclusion. After holding that "the American continents, by the free and independent condition which they have assumed and maintained, are henceforth not to be considered as subjects for future colonization by any European Power," Mr. Monroe continued: "We should consider any attempt on their part to extend their system to any part of this hemisphere as dangerous to our peace and safety. With the existing colonies or dependencies of any European Power we have not interfered, and shall not interfere." The context makes it clear that this assurance applies solely to the existing colonies and dependencies they still had in this hemisphere; and that even this was qualified by the previous warning that while we took no part "in the wars of European Powers, in matters relating to themselves," we resented injuries and defended our rights. It will thus be seen that Mr. Monroe gave no pledge that we would never interfere with any dependency or colony of European Powers anywhere. He simply declared our general policy not to interfere with existing colonies still remaining to them on our coast, so long as they left the countries alone which had already gained their independence, and so long as they did not injure us or invade our rights. And even this statement of the scope of Mr. Monroe's declaration must be construed in the light of the fact

that the same Administration which promulgated the Monroe Doctrine had already issued from the State Department Mr. Adams's prediction, above referred to, that "the annexation of Cuba will yet be found indispensable." Perhaps Mr. Monroe's language might have been properly understood as a general assurance that we would not meddle in Europe so long as they gave us no further trouble in America; but certainly it did not also abandon to their exclusive jurisdiction Asia and Africa and the islands of the sea.

The candid conclusions seem inevitable that, not as a matter of policy, but as a necessity of the position in which we find ourselves and as a matter of national duty, we must hold Cuba, at least for a time and till a permanent government is well established for which we can afford to be responsible; we must hold Porto Rico; and we may have to hold the Philippines.

The war is a great sorrow, and to many these results of it will seem still more mournful. They cannot be contemplated with unmixed confidence by any; and to all who think, they must be a source of some grave apprehensions. Plainly, this unwelcome war is leading us by ways we have not trod to an end we cannot surely forecast. On the other hand, there are some good things coming from it that we can already see. It will make an end forever of Spain in this hemisphere. It will certainly secure to Cuba and Porto Rico better government. It will furnish an enormous outlet for the energy

of our citizens, and give another example of the rapid development to which our system leads. It has already brought North and South together as nothing could but a foreign war in which both offered their blood for the cause of their reunited country—a result of incalculable advantage both at home and abroad. It has brought England and the United States together—another result of momentous importance in the progress of civilization and Christianity. Europe will know us better henceforth; even Spain will know us better; and this knowledge should tend powerfully hereafter to keep the peace of the world. The war should abate the swaggering, swashbuckler tendency of many of our public men, since it has shown our incredible unreadiness at the outset for meeting even a third-rate Power; and it must secure us henceforth an army and navy less ridiculously inadequate to our exposure. It insures us a mercantile marine. It insures the Nicaragua Canal, a Pacific cable, great development on our Pacific coast, and the mercantile control of the Pacific Ocean. It imposes new and very serious business on our public men, which ought to dignify and elevate the public service. Finally, it has shown such splendid courage and skill in the army and navy, such sympathy at home for our men at the front, and such devoted eagerness, especially among women, to alleviate suffering and humanize the struggle, as to thrill every patriotic heart and make us all prouder than ever of our country and its matchless people.

TERRITORIAL EXPANSION

TERRITORIAL EXPANSION

PARTISANSHIP stops at the guard-line. "In the face of an enemy we are all Frenchmen," said an eloquent imperialist once in my hearing, in rallying his followers to support a foreign measure of the French Republic. At this moment our soldiers are facing a barbarous or semi-civilized foe, who treacherously attacked them in a distant land, where our flag had been sent, in friendship with them, for the defence of our own shores. Was it creditable or seemly that it was lately left to a Bonaparte on our own soil to teach some American leaders that, at such a time, patriotic men at home do not discourage those soldiers or weaken the government that directs them?[1]

For good or ill, the war was fought. Its results

[1] My Dear Sir: I have received your letter of the 23d inst., notifying me of my election as a vice-president of the Anti-Imperialist League. I recognize the compliment implied in this election, and appreciate it the more by reason of my respect for the gentlemen identified with the league, but I do not think I can appropriately or consistently accept the position, especially since I learn through the press that the league adopted at its recent meeting certain resolutions to which I cannot assent. . . . I may add that, while I fully recognize the injustice and even absurdity of those charges of "disloyalty" which have been of late freely made against some members of the league, and also that many honorable and patriotic men do not feel as I do on this subject, I am personally unwilling to take part in an agitation which may have some tendency to cause a public enemy to persist in armed resistance, or may be, at least, plausibly represented as having this tendency. There can be no doubt that, as a matter of fact, the country is at war with Aguinaldo and his followers. I profoundly regret this fact; . . . but it is a fact, nevertheless, and, as such, must weigh in determining my conduct as a citizen. . . .

Charles Jerome Bonaparte.

Baltimore, May 25, 1899.

are upon us. With the ratification of the Peace of Paris, our Continental Republic has stretched its wings over the West Indies and the East. It is a fact and not a theory that confronts us. We are actually and now responsible, not merely to the inhabitants and to our own people, but, in international law, to the commerce, the travel, the civilization of the world, for the preservation of order and the protection of life and property in Cuba, in Porto Rico, in Guam, and in the Philippine Archipelago, including that recent haunt of piracy, the Sulus. Shall we quit ourselves like men in the discharge of this immediate duty; or shall we fall to quarrelling with each other like boys as to whether such a duty is a good or a bad thing for the country, and as to who got it fastened upon us? There may have been a time for disputes about the wisdom of resisting the Stamp Tax, but it was not just after Bunker Hill. There may have been a time for hot debate about some mistakes in the antislavery agitation, but not just after Sumter and Bull Run. Furthermore, it is as well to remember that you can never grind with the water that has passed the mill. Nothing in human power can ever restore the United States to the position it occupied the day before Congress plunged us into the war with Spain, or enable us to escape what that war entailed. No matter what we wish, the old continental isolation is gone forever. Whithersoever we turn now, we must do it with the burden of our late acts to carry, the responsibility of our new position to assume.

When the sovereignty which Spain had exercised with the assent of all nations over vast and distant regions for three hundred years was solemnly transferred under the eye of the civilized world to the United States, our first responsibility became the restoration of order. Till that is secured, any hindrance to the effort is bad citizenship—as bad as resistance to the police; as much worse, in fact, as its consequences may be more bloody and disastrous. "You have a wolf by the ears," said an accomplished ex-Minister of the United States to a departing Peace Commissioner last autumn. "You cannot let go of him with either dignity or safety, and he will not be easy to tame."

But when the task is accomplished,—when the Stars and Stripes at last bring the order and peaceful security they typify, instead of wanton disorder, with all the concomitants of savage warfare over which they now wave,—we shall then be confronted with the necessity of a policy for the future of these distant regions. It is a problem that calls for our soberest, most dispassionate, and most patriotic thought. The colleges, and the educated classes generally, should make it a matter of conscience—painstakingly considered on all its sides, with reference to international law, the burdens of sovereignty, the rights and the interests of native tribes, and the legitimate demands of civilization—to find first our national duty and then our national interest, which it is also a duty for our statesmen to protect. On such a subject we have

a right to look to our colleges for the help they should be so well equipped to give. From those still regions of cloistered thought may well come the white light of pure reason, not the wild, whirling words of the special pleader, or of the partisan, giving loose rein to his hasty first impressions. It would be an ill day for some colleges if crude and hot-tempered incursions into current public affairs, like a few unhappily witnessed of late, should lead even their friends to fear lest they have been so long accustomed to dogmatize to boys that they have lost the faculty of reasoning with men.

When the first duty is done, when order is restored in those commercial centres and on that commercial highway, somebody must then be responsible for maintaining it—either ourselves or some Power whom we persuade to take them off our hands. Does anybody doubt what the American people in their present temper would say to the latter alternative?—the same people, who were ready to break off their Joint Commission with Great Britain and take the chances, rather than give up a few square miles of worthless land and a harbor of which a year previously they scarcely knew the name on the remote coast of Alaska. Plainly it is idle now, in a government so purely dependent on the popular will, to scheme or hope for giving the Philippine task over to other hands as soon as order is restored. We must, then, be prepared with a policy for maintaining it ourselves.

Of late years men have unthinkingly assumed

that new territory is, in the very nature of our government, merely and necessarily the raw material for future states in the Union. Colonies and dependencies, it is now said, are essentially inconsistent with our system. But if any ever entertained the wild dream that the instrument whose preamble says it is ordained for the United States of *America* could be stretched to the China Sea, the first Tagal guns fired at friendly soldiers of the Union, and the first mutilation of American dead that ensued, ended the nightmare of states from Asia admitted to the American Union. For that relief, at least, we must thank the uprising of the Tagals. It was a Continental Union of independent sovereign states our Fathers planned. Whosoever proposes to debase it with the admixtures of states made up from the islands of the sea, in any archipelago, east or west, is a bad friend to the Republic. We may guide, protect, elevate them, and even teach them some day to stand alone; but if we ever invite them into our Senate and House, to help to rule us, we are the most imbecile of all the offspring of time.

Yet we must face the fact that able and conscientious men believe the United States has no constitutional power to hold territory that is not to be erected into states in the Union, or to govern people that are not to be made citizens. They are able to cite great names in support of their contention; and it would be an ill omen for the freest and most successful constitutional government in

the world if a constitutional objection thus fortified should be carelessly considered or hastily overridden. This objection rests mainly on the assumption that the name "United States," as used in the Constitution, necessarily includes all territory the nation owns, and on the historic fact that large parts of this territory, on acquiring sufficient population, have already been admitted as states, and have generally considered such admission to be a right. Now, Mr. Chief Justice Marshall—than whom no constitutional authority carries greater weight—certainly did declare that the question, what was designated by the term "United States," in the clause of the Constitution giving powers to levy duties on imposts "admitted of but one answer." It "designated the whole of the American empire, composed of States and Territories." If that be accepted as final, then the tariff must be applied in Manila precisely as in New York, and goods from Manila must enter the New York custom-house as freely as goods from New Orleans. Sixty millions would disappear instantly and annually from the treasury, and our revenue system would be revolutionized, by the free admission of sugar and other tropical products from the United States of Asia and the Caribbean Sea; while, on the other hand, the Philippines themselves would be fatally handicapped by a tariff wholly unnatural to their locality and circumstances. More. If that be final, the term "United States" should have the same comprehensive meaning in the clause as to

citizenship. Then Aguinaldo is to-day a citizen of the United States, and may yet run for the Presidency. Still more. The Asiatics south of the China Sea are given that free admission to the country which we so strenuously deny to Asiatics from the north side of the same sea. Their goods, produced on wages of a few cents a day, come into free competition in all our home markets with the products of American labor, and the cheap laborers themselves are free to follow if ever our higher wages attract them. More yet. If that be final, the Tagals and other tribes of Luzon, the Visayans of Negros and Cebu, and the Mohammedan Malays of Mindanao and the Sulus, having each far more than the requisite population, may demand admission next winter into the Union as free and independent states, with representatives in Senate and House, and may plausibly claim that they can show a better title to admission than Nevada ever did, or Utah, or Idaho.

Nor does the great name of Marshall stand alone in support of such conclusions. The converse theory that these territories are not necessarily included in the constitutional term "the United States" makes them our subject dependencies, and at once the figure of Jefferson himself is evoked, with all the signers of the immortal Declaration grouped about him, renewing the old war-cry that government derives its just powers from the consent of the governed. At different periods in our history eminent statesmen have made protests on grounds

of that sort. Even the first bill for Mr. Jefferson's own purchase of Louisiana was denounced by Mr. Macon as "establishing a species of government unknown to the United States;" by Mr. Lucas as "establishing elementary principles never previously introduced in the government of any territory of the United States;" and by Mr. Campbell as "really establishing a complete despotism." In 1823 Chancellor Kent said, with reference to Columbia River settlements, that "a government by Congress as absolute sovereign, over colonies, absolute dependents, was not congenial to the free and independent spirit of American institutions." In 1848 John C. Calhoun declared that "the conquest and retention of Mexico as a province would be a departure from the settled policy of the government, in conflict with its character and genius, and in the end subversive of our free institutions. In 1857 Mr. Chief Justice Taney said that "a power to rule territory without restriction as a colony or dependent province would be inconsistent with the nature of our government." And now following warily in this line, the eminent and trusted advocate of similar opinions to-day, Mr. Senator Hoar of Massachusetts, says: "The making of new states and providing national defence are constitutional ends, so that we may acquire and hold territory for those purposes. The governing of subject peoples is not a constitutional end, and there is therefore no constitutional warrant for acquiring and holding territory for that purpose."

We have now, as is believed, presented with entire fairness a summary of the more important aspects in which the constitutional objections mentioned have been urged. I would not underrate a hair's breadth the authority of these great names, the weight of these continuous reassertions of principle, the sanction even of the precedent and general practice through a century. And yet I venture to think that no candid and competent man can thoroughly investigate the subject, in the light of the actual provisions of the Constitution, the avowed purpose of its framers, their own practice and the practice of their successors, without being absolutely convinced that this whole fabric of opposition on constitutional grounds is as flimsy as a cobweb. This country of our love and pride is no malformed, congenital cripple of a nation, incapable of undertaking duties that have been found within the powers of every other nation that ever existed since governments among civilized men began. Neither by chains forged in the Constitution nor by chains of precedent, neither by the dead hand we all revere, that of the Father of his Country, nor under the most authoritative exponents of our organic act and of our history, are we so bound that we cannot undertake any duty that devolves or exercise any power which the emergency demands. Our Constitution has entrapped us in no *impasse*, where retreat is disgrace and advance is impossible. The duty which the hand of Providence, rather than any

purpose of man, has laid upon us, is within our constitutional powers. Let me invoke your patience for a rather minute and perhaps wearisome detail of the proof.

The notion that the United States is an inferior sort of nation, constitutionally without power for such public duties as other nations habitually assume, may perhaps be dismissed with a single citation from the Supreme Court. Said Mr. Justice Bradley, in the Legal Tender Cases: "As a Government it [the United States] was invested with all the attributes of sovereignty. . . . It seems to be a self-evident proposition that it is invested with all those inherent and implied powers which, at the time of adopting the Constitution, were generally considered to belong to every government as such, and as being essential to the exercise of its functions" (12 Wall. 554).

Every one recalls this constitutional provision: "The Congress shall have power to dispose of and make all needful rules and regulations respecting the territory or other property of the United States." That grant is absolute, and the only qualification is the one to be drawn from the general spirit of the government the Constitution was framed to organize. Is it consistent with that spirit to hold territory permanently, or for long periods of time, without admitting it to the Union? Let the man who wrote the very clause in question answer. That man was Gouverneur Morris of New York, and you will find his answer on

page 192 of the third volume of his writings, given only fifteen years after, in reply to a direct question as to the exact meaning of the clause: "I always thought, when we should acquire Canada and Louisiana, it would be proper to govern them as provinces, and allow them no voice in our councils. In wording the third section of the fourth article, I went as far as circumstances would permit to establish the exclusion." This framer of the Constitution desired then, and intended definitely and permanently, to keep *Louisiana* out! And yet there are men who tell us the provision he drew would not even permit us to keep the Philippines out! To be more papist than the Pope will cease to be a thing exciting wonder if every day modern men, in the consideration of practical and pressing problems, are to be more narrowly constitutional than the men that wrote the Constitution!

Is it said that, at any rate, our practice under this clause of the Constitution has been against the view of the man that wrote it, and in favor of that quoted from Mr. Chief Justice Marshall? Does anybody seriously think, then, that though we have held New Mexico, Arizona, and Oklahoma as territory, organized or unorganized, part of it nearly a century and all of it half a century, our representatives believed all the while they had no constitutional right to do so? Who imagines that when the third of a century during which we have already held Alaska is rounded out to a full century, that unorganized territory will even then

have any greater prospect than at present of admission as a state? or who believes our grandchildren will be violating the Constitution in keeping it out? Who imagines that under the Constitution ordained on this continent specifically "for the United States of *America*," we will ever permit the Kanakas, Chinese, and Japanese, who make up a majority of the population in the Sandwich Islands, to set up a government of their own and claim admission as an independent and sovereign state of our American Union? Finally, let me add that conclusive proof relating not only to practice under the Constitution, but to the precise construction of the constitutional language as to the territories by the highest authority, in the light of long previous practice, is to be found in another part of the instrument itself, deliberately added three-quarters of a century later. Article XIII provides that "neither slavery nor involuntary servitude shall exist within the United States, *or any place subject to their jurisdiction*." If the term "the United States," as used in the Constitution, really includes the territories as an integral part, as Mr. Chief Justice Marshall said, what, then, does the Constitution mean by the additional words, "or any place subject to their jurisdiction"? Is it not too plain for argument that the Constitution here refers to territory not a part of the United States, but subject to its jurisdiction—territory, for example, like the Sandwich Islands or the Philippines?

What, then, shall we say to the opinion of the

great Chief Justice?—for, after all, his is not a name to be dealt with lightly. Well, first, it was a dictum, not a decision of the court. Next, in another and later case, before the same eminent jurist, came a constitutional expounder as eminent and as generally accepted,—none other than Daniel Webster,—who took precisely the opposite view. He was discussing the condition of certain territory on this continent which we had recently acquired. Said Mr. Webster: "What is Florida? It is no part of the United States. How can it be? Florida is to be governed by Congress as it thinks proper. Congress might have done anything—might have refused a trial by jury, and refused a legislature." After this flat contradiction of the court's former dictum, what happened? Mr. Webster won his case, and the Chief Justice made not the slightest reference to his own previous and directly conflicting opinion! Need we give it more attention now than Marshall did then?

Mr. Webster maintained the same position long afterward, in the Senate of the United States, in opposition to Mr. John C. Calhoun, and his view has been continuously sustained since by the courts and by congressional action. In the debate with Mr. Calhoun, in February, 1849, Mr. Webster said: "What is the Constitution of the United States? Is not its very first principle that all within its influence and comprehension shall be represented in the legislature which it establishes, with not only a right of debate and a right to vote in both Houses

of Congress, but a right to partake in the choice of President and Vice-President? . . . The President of the United States shall govern this territory as he sees fit till Congress makes further provision. . . . We have never had a territory governed as the United States is governed. . . . I do not say that while we sit here to make laws for these territories, we are not bound by every one of those great principles which are intended as general securities for public liberty. But they do not exist in territories till introduced by the authority of Congress. . . . Our history is uniform in its course. It began with the acquisition of Louisiana. It went on after Florida became a part of the Union. In all cases, under all circumstances, by every proceeding of Congress on the subject, and by all judicature on the subject, it has been held that territories belonging to the United States were to be governed by a constitution of their own, . . . and in approving that constitution the legislation of Congress was not necessarily confined to those principles that bind it when it is exercised in passing laws for the United States itself." Mr. Calhoun, in the course of the debate, asked Mr. Webster for judicial opinion sustaining these views, and Mr. Webster said that "the same thing has been decided by the United States courts over and over again for the last thirty years."

I may add that it has been so held over and over again during the subsequent fifty. Mr. Chief Justice Waite, giving the opinion of the Supreme

Court of the United States (in National Bank *v.* County of Yankton, 101 U.S. 129-132), said: "It is certainly now too late to doubt the power of Congress to govern the territories. Congress is supreme, and, for all the purposes of this department, has all the powers of the people of the United States, except such as have been expressly or by implication reserved in the prohibitions of the Constitution."

Mr. Justice Stanley Matthews of the United States Supreme Court stated the same view with even greater clearness in one of the Utah polygamy cases (Murphy *v.* Ramsey, 114 U. S. 44, 45): "It rests with Congress to say whether in a given case any of the people resident in the territory shall participate in the election of its officers or the making of its laws. It may take from them any right of suffrage it may previously have conferred, or at any time modify or abridge it, as it may deem expedient. . . . Their political rights are franchises which they hold as privileges, in the legislative discretion of the United States."

The very latest judicial utterance on the subject is in harmony with all the rest. Mr. Justice Morrow of the United States Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit, in February, 1898, held (57 U.S. Appeals, 6): "The now well-established doctrine [is] that the territories of the United States are entirely subject to the legislative authority of Congress. They are not organized under the Constitution nor subject to its complex distribution of

the powers of government. The United States, having rightfully acquired the territories, and being the only government which can impose laws upon them, has the entire dominion and sovereignty, national and municipal, federal and state."

In the light of such expositions of our constitutional power and our uniform national practice, it is difficult to deal patiently with the remaining objections to the acquisition of territory, purporting to be based on constitutional grounds. One is that to govern the Philippines without their consent or against the opposition of Aguinaldo is to violate the principle—only formulated, to be sure, in the Declaration of Independence, but, as they say, underlying the whole Constitution—that government derives its just powers from the consent of the governed. In the Sulu group piracy prevailed for centuries. How could a government that put it down rest on the consent of Sulu? Would it be without just powers because the pirates did not vote in its favor? In other parts of the archipelago, what has been stigmatized as a species of slavery prevails. Would a government that stopped that be without just powers till the slaveholders had conferred them at a popular election? In another part head-hunting is, at certain seasons of the year, a recognized tribal custom. Would a government that interfered with that practice be open to denunciation as an usurpation, without just powers, and flagrantly violating the Constitution of the United States, unless it waited at the polls for the

consent of the head-hunters? The truth is, all intelligent men know—and few even in America, except obvious demagogues, hesitate to admit—that there are cases where a good government does not and ought not to rest on the consent of the governed. If men will not govern themselves with respect for civilization and its agencies, then when they get in the way they must be governed—always have been, whenever the world was not retrograding, and always will be. The notion that such government is a revival of slavery, and that the United States by doing its share of such work in behalf of civilization would therefore become infamous, though put forward with apparent gravity in some eminently respectable quarters, is too fantastic for serious consideration.

Mr. Jefferson may be supposed to have known the meaning of the words he wrote. Instead of vindicating a righteous rebellion in the Declaration, he was called, after a time, to exercise a righteous government under the Constitution. Did he himself, then, carry his own words to such extremes as these professed disciples now demand? Was he guilty of subverting the principles of the government in buying some hundreds of thousands of Spaniards, Frenchmen, Creoles, and Indians, "like sheep in the shambles," as the critics untruthfully say we did in the Philippines? We bought nobody there. We held the Philippines first by the same right by which we held our own original thirteen states,—the oldest and firmest

of all rights, the right by which nearly every great nation holds the bulk of its territory—the right of conquest. We held them again as a rightful indemnity, and a low one, for a war in which the vanquished could give no other. We bought nothing; and the twenty millions that accompanied the transfer just balanced the Philippine debt.

But Jefferson did, if you choose to accept the hypercritical interpretation of these latter-day Jeffersonians,—Jefferson did buy the Louisianians, even "like sheep in the shambles," if you care so to describe it; and did proceed to govern them without the consent of the governed. Monroe bought the Floridians without their consent. Polk conquered the Californians, and Pierce bought the New Mexicans. Seward bought the Russians and Alaskans, and we have governed them ever since, without their consent. Is it easy, in the face of such facts, to preserve your respect for an objection so obviously captious as that based on the phrase from the Declaration of Independence?

Nor is the turn Senator Hoar gives the constitutional objection much more weighty. He wishes to take account of motives, and pry into the purpose of those concerned in any acquisition of territory, before the tribunals can decide whether it is constitutional or not. If acquired either for the national defence or to be made a state, the act is constitutional; otherwise not. If, then, Jefferson intended to make a state out of Idaho, his act in acquiring that part of the Louisiana Purchase was

all right. Otherwise he violated the Constitution he had helped to make and sworn to uphold. And yet, poor man, he hardly knew of the existence of that part of the territory, and certainly never dreamed that it would ever become a state, any more than Daniel Webster dreamed, to quote his own language in the Senate, that "California would ever be worth a dollar." Is Gouverneur Morris to be arraigned as false to the Constitution he helped to frame because he wanted to acquire Louisiana and Canada, and keep them both out of the Union? Did Mr. Seward betray the Constitution and violate his oath in buying Alaska without the purpose of making it a state? It seems—let it be said with all respect—that we have reached the *reductio ad absurdum*, and that the constitutional argument in any of its phases need not be further pursued.

If I have wearied you with these detailed proofs of a doctrine which Mr. Justice Morrow rightly says is now well established, and these replies to its assailants, the apology must be found in the persistence with which the utter lack of constitutional power to deal with our new possessions has been vociferously urged from the outset by the large class of our people whom I venture to designate as the Little Americans, using that term not in the least in disparagement, but solely as distinctive and convenient. From the beginning of the century, at every epoch in our history we have had these Little Americans. They opposed Jefferson as to getting Louisiana. They opposed Mon-

roe as to Florida. They were vehement against Texas, against California, against organizing Oregon and Washington, against the Gadsden Purchase, against Alaska, and against the Sandwich Islands. At nearly every stage in that long story of expansion the Little Americans have either denied the constitutional authority to acquire and govern, or denounced the acquisitions as worthless and dangerous. At one stage, indeed, they went further. When state after state was passing ordinances of secession, they raised the cry, —erroneously attributed to my distinguished predecessor and friend, Horace Greeley, but really uttered by Winfield Scott,—"Wayward Sisters, depart in peace!" Happily, this form, too, of Little Americanism failed. We are all glad now—my distinguished classmate at Miami,[1] who wore the gray and invaded Ohio with Morgan, as glad as myself, —we all rejoice that these doctrines were then opposed and overborne. It was seen then, and I venture to think it may be seen now, that it is a fundamental principle with the American people and a duty imposed upon all who represent them, to maintain the Continental Union of American Independent States in all the purity of the Fathers' conception; to hold what belongs to it, and get what it is entitled to, and, finally, that wherever its flag has been rightfully advanced, there it is to be kept. If that be imperialism, make the most of it!

[1] The Hon. Albert S. Berry, M.C. from the Covington, Kentucky, District.

It was no vulgar lust of power that inspired the statesmen and soldiers of the Republic when they resisted the halting counsel of the Little Americans in the past. Nor is it now. Far other is the spirit we invoke:

> "Stern daughter of the Voice of God,
> O Duty! If that name thou love—"

in that name we beg for a study of what the new situation that is upon us, the new world opening around us, now demand at our hands.

The people of the United States will not refuse an appeal in that name. They never have. They had been so occupied, since the Civil War, first in repairing its ravages, and then in occupying and possessing their own continent, they had been so little accustomed, in this generation or the last, to even the thought of foreign war, that one readily understands why at the outset they hardly realized how absolute is the duty of an honorable conqueror to accept and discharge the responsibilities of his conquest. But this is no longer a child-nation, irresponsible in its nonage and incapable of comprehending or assuming the responsibilities of its acts. A child that breaks a pane of glass or sets fire to a house may indeed escape. Are we to plead the baby act, and claim that we can flounce around the world, breaking international china and burning property, and yet repudiate the bill because we have not come of age? Who dare say that a self-respecting Power could have sailed away from

Manila and repudiated the responsibilities of its victorious belligerency? After going into a war for humanity, were we so craven that we should seek freedom from further trouble at the expense of civilization?

If we did not want those responsibilities, we ought not to have gone to war, and I, for one, would have been content. But having chosen to go to war, and having been speedily and overwhelmingly successful, we should be ashamed even to think of running away from what inexorably followed. Mark what the successive steps were, and how link by link the chain that binds us now was forged.

The moment war was foreseen, the fleet we usually have in Chinese waters became indispensable, not merely, as before, to protect our trade and our missionaries in China, but to checkmate the Spanish fleet, which otherwise held San Francisco and the whole Pacific coast at its mercy. When war was declared, our fleet was necessarily ordered out of neutral ports. Then it had to go to Manila or go home. If it went home, it left the whole Pacific coast unguarded, save at the particular point it touched, and we should have been at once in a fever of apprehension, chartering hastily another fleet of the fastest ocean-going steamers we could find in the world, to patrol the Pacific from San Diego to Sitka, as we did have to patrol the Atlantic from Key West to Bar Harbor. Palpably this was to go the longest way around to do a task that had to be done in any event, as well as to de-

moralize our forces at the opening of the war with a manoeuvre in which our navy has never been expert—that of avoiding a contest and sailing away from the enemy! The alternative was properly taken. Dewey went to Manila and sank the Spanish fleet. We thus broke down Spanish means for controlling the Philippines, and were left with the Spanish responsibility for maintaining order there—responsibility to all the world, German, English, Japanese, Russian, and the rest—in one of the great centres and highways of the world's commerce.

But why not turn over that commercial centre and the island on which it is situated to the Tagals? To be sure! Under three hundred years of Spanish rule barbarism on Luzon had so far disappeared that this commercial metropolis, as large as San Francisco or Cincinnati, had sprung up and come to be thronged by traders and travellers of all nations. Now it is calmly suggested that we might have turned it over to one semi-civilized tribe, absolutely without experience in governing even itself, much less a great community of foreigners, probably in a minority on the island, and at war with its other inhabitants,—a tribe which has given the measure of its fitness for being charged with the rights of foreigners and the care of a commercial metropolis by the violation of flags of truce, treachery to the living, and mutilation of the dead, which have marked its recent wanton rising against the Power that was trying to help it!

If running away from troublesome responsibility and duty is our rôle, why did we not long ago take the opportunity, in our early feebleness, to turn over Tallahassee and St. Augustine to the Seminoles, instead of sending Andrew Jackson to protect the settlements and subdue the savages? Why, at the first Apache outbreak after the Gadsden Purchase, did we not hasten to turn over New Mexico and Arizona to *their* inhabitants? Or why, in years within the memory of most of us, when the Sioux and Chippewas rose on our northwestern frontier, did we not invite them to retain possession of St. Cloud, and even come down, if they liked, to St. Paul and Minneapolis?

Unless I am mistaken in regarding all these suggestions as too unworthy to be entertained by self-respecting citizens of a powerful and self-respecting nation, we have now reached two conclusions that ought to clear the air and simplify the problem that remains: First, we have ample constitutional power to acquire and govern new territory absolutely at will, according to our sense of right and duty, whether as dependencies, as colonies, or as a protectorate. Secondly, as the legitimate and necessary consequence of our own previous acts, it has become our national and international duty to do it.

How shall we set about it? What shall be the policy with which, when order has been inexorably restored, we begin our dealings with the new wards of the nation? Certainly we must mark our

disapproval of the treachery and barbarities of the present contest. As certainly the oppression of other tribes by the Tagals must be ended, or the oppression of any tribe by any other within the sphere of our active control. Wars between the tribes must be discouraged and prevented. We must seek to suppress crimes of violence and private vengeance, secure individual liberty, protect individual property, and promote the study of the arts of peace. Above all, we must give and enforce justice; and for the rest, as far as possible, leave them alone. By all means let us avoid a fussy meddling with their customs, manners, prejudices, and beliefs. Give them order and justice, and trust to these to win them in other regards to our ways. All this points directly to utilizing existing agencies as much as possible, developing native initiative and control in local matters as fast and as far as we can, and ultimately giving them the greatest degree of self-government for which they prove themselves fitted.

Under any conditions that exist now, or have existed for three hundred years, a homogeneous native government over the whole archipelago is obviously impossible. Its relations to the outside world must necessarily be assumed by us. We must preserve order in Philippine waters, regulate the harbors, fix and collect the duties, apportion the revenue, and supervise the expenditure. We must enforce sanitary measures. We must retain such a control of the superior courts as shall make

justice certainly attainable, and such control of the police as shall insure its enforcement. But in all this, after the absolute authority has been established, the further the natives can themselves be used to carry out the details, the better.

Such a system might not be unwise even for a colony to which we had reason to expect a considerable emigration of our own people. If experience of a kindred nation in dealing with similar problems counts for anything, it is certainly wise for a distant dependency, always to be populated mainly, save in the great cities, by native races, and little likely ever to be quite able to stand alone, while, nevertheless, we wish to help it just as much as possible to that end.

Certainly this is no bed of flowery ease in the dreamy Orient to which we are led. No doubt these first glimpses of the task that lies before us, as well as the warfare with distant tribes into which we have been unexpectedly plunged, will provoke for the time a certain discontent with our new possessions. But on a far-reaching question of national policy the wise public man is not so greatly disturbed by what people say in momentary discouragement under the first temporary check. That which really concerns him is what people at a later day, or even in a later generation, might say of men trusted with great duties for their country, who proved unequal to their opportunities, and through some short-sighted timidity of the moment lost the chance of centuries.

It is quite true, as reported in what seemed an authoritative way from Washington, that the Peace Commissioners were not entirely of one mind at the outset, and equally true that the final conclusion at Washington was apparently reached on the Commission's recommendation from Paris. As the cold fit, in the language of one of our censors, has followed the hot fit in the popular temper, I readily take the time which hostile critics consider unfavorable, for accepting my own share of responsibility, and for avowing for myself that I declared my belief in the duty and policy of holding the whole Philippine Archipelago in the very first conference of the Commissioners in the President's room at the White House, in advance of any instructions of any sort. If vindication for it is needed, I confidently await the future.

What *is* the duty of a public servant as to profiting by opportunities to secure for his country what all the rest of the world considers material advantages? Even if he could persuade himself that rejecting them is morally and internationally admissible, is he at liberty to commit his country irrevocably to their rejection, because they do not wholly please his individual fancy? At a former negotiation of our own in Paris, the great desire of the United States representative, as well as of his government, had been mainly to secure the settled or partly settled country adjoining us on the south, stretching from the Floridas to the city of New Orleans. The possession of the vast unsettled

and unknown Louisiana territory, west of the Mississippi, was neither sought nor thought of. Suddenly, on an eventful morning in April, 1803, Talleyrand astonished Livingston by offering, on behalf of Napoleon, to sell to the United States, not the Floridas at all, but merely Louisiana, "a raw little semi-tropical frontier town and an unexplored wilderness."

Suppose Livingston had rejected the offer? Or suppose Gadsden had not exceeded his instructions in Mexico and boldly grasped the opportunity that offered to rectify and make secure our southwestern frontier? Would this generation judge that they had been equal to their opportunities or their duties?

The difficulties which at present discourage us are largely of our own creation. It is not for any of us to think of attempting to apportion the blame. The only thing we are sure of is that it was for no lack of authority that we hesitated and drifted till the Tagals were convinced we were afraid of them, and could be driven out before reinforcements arrived. That was the very thing our officers had warned us against,—the least sign of hesitation or uncertainty,—the very danger every European with knowledge of the situation had dinned in our ears. Everybody declared that difficulties were sure to grow on our hands in geometrical proportion to our delays; and it was perfectly known to the respective branches of our government primarily concerned that while the delay went on it

was in neglect of a duty we had voluntarily assumed.

For the American Commissioners, with due authority, distinctly offered to assume responsibility, pending the ratification of the treaty, for the protection of life and property and the preservation of order throughout the whole archipelago. The Spanish Commissioners, after consultation with their government, refused this, but agreed that each Power should be charged, pending the ratification, with the maintenance of order in the places where it was established. The American assent to that left absolutely no question as to the diminished but still grave responsibility thus devolved.[1] That responsibility was avoided from the hour the treaty was signed till the hour when the Tagal chieftain, at the head of an army he had been deliberately organizing, took things in his own hand and made the attack he had so long threatened. Disorder, forced loans, impressment, confiscation, seizure of waterworks, contemptuous violations of our guard-lines, and even the practical siege of the city of Manila, had meantime

[1] Protocol No. 19 of the Paris Commission, Conference of December 5, 1898: "The President of the Spanish Commission having agreed, at the last session, to consult his government regarding the proposal of the American Commissioners that the United States should maintain public order over the whole Philippine Archipelago pending the exchange of ratifications of the treaty of peace, stated that the answer of his government was that the authorities of each of the two nations shall be charged with the maintenance of order in the places where they may be established, those authorities agreeing among themselves to this end whenever they may deem it necessary."

been going on within gunshot of troops held there inactive by the nation which had volunteered responsibility for order throughout the archipelago, and had been distinctly left with responsibility for order in the island on which it was established. If the bitterest enemy of the United States had sought to bring upon it in that quarter the greatest trouble in the shortest time, he could have devised for that end no policy more successful than the one we actually pursued. There may have been controlling reasons for it. An opposite course might perhaps have cost more elsewhere than it saved in Luzon. On that point the public cannot now form even an opinion. But as to the effect in Luzon there is no doubt; and because of it we have the right to ask a delay in judgment about results there until the present evil can be undone.

Meantime, in accordance with a well-known and probably unchangeable law of human nature, this is the carnival and very heyday of the objectors. The air is filled with their discouragement.

Some exclaim that Americans are incapable of colonizing or of managing colonies; that there is something in our national character or institutions that wholly disqualifies us for the work. Yet the most successful colonies in the whole world were the thirteen original colonies on our Atlantic coast; and the most successful colonists were our own grandfathers! Have the grandsons so degenerated that they are incapable of colonizing at all, or of managing colonies? Who says so? Is it any one

with the glorious history of this continental colonization bred in his bone and leaping in his blood? Or is it some refugee from a foreign country he was discontented with, who now finds pleasure in disparaging the capacity of the new country he came to, while he has neither caught its spirit nor grasped the meaning of its history?

Some bewail the alleged fact that, at any rate, our system has little adaptability to the control of colonies or dependencies. Has our system been found weaker, then, than other forms of government, less adaptable to emergencies, and with people less fit to cope with them? Is the difficulty inherent, or is it possible that the emergency may show, as emergencies have shown before, that whatever task intelligence, energy, and courage can surmount, the American people and their government can rise to?

It is said the conditions in our new possessions are wholly different from any we have previously encountered. This is true; and there is little doubt the new circumstances will bring great modifications in methods. That is an excellent reason, among others, for some doubt at the outset as to whether we know all about it, but not for despairing of our capacity to learn. It might be remembered that we have encountered some varieties of conditions already. The work in Florida was different from that at Plymouth Rock; Louisiana and Texas showed again new sets of conditions; California others; Puget Sound and Alaska still others;

and we did not always have unbroken success and plain sailing from the outset in any of them.

It is said we cannot colonize the tropics, because our people cannot labor there. Perhaps not, especially if they refuse to obey the prudent precautions which centuries of experience have enjoined upon others. But what, then, are we going to do with Porto Rico? How soon are our people going to flee from Arizona? And why is life impossible to Americans in Manila and Cebu and Iloilo, but attractive to the throngs of Europeans who have built up those cities? Can we mine all over the world, from South Africa to the Klondike, but not in Palawan? Can we grow tobacco in Cuba, but not in Cebu? or rice in Louisiana, but not in Luzon?

An alarm is raised that our laboring classes are endangered by competition with cheap tropical labor or its products. How? The interpretation of the Constitution which would permit that is the interpretation which has been repudiated in an unbroken line of decisions for over half a century. Only one possibility of danger to American labor exists in our new possessions—the lunacy, or worse, of the dreamers who want to prepare for the admission of some of them as states in the American Union. Till then we can make any law we like to prevent the immigration of their laborers, and any tariff we like to regulate the admission of their products.

It is said we are pursuing a fine method for restoring order, by prolonging the war we began

for humanity in order to force liberty and justice on an unwilling people at the point of the bayonet. The sneer is cheap. How else have these blessings been generally diffused? How often in the history of the world has barbarism been replaced by civilization without bloodshed? How were our own liberty and justice established and diffused on this continent? Would the process have been less bloody if a part of our own people had noisily taken the side of the English, the Mexican, or the savage, and protested against "extreme measures"?

Some say a war to extend freedom in Cuba or elsewhere is right, and therefore a duty; but the war in the Philippines now is purely selfish, and therefore a crime. The premise is inaccurate; it is a war we are in duty bound to wage at any rate till order is restored—but let that pass. Suppose it to be merely a war in defence of our own just rights and interests. Since when did such a war become wrong? Is our national motto to be, "Quixotic on the one hand, Chinese on the other?"

How much better it would have been, say others, to mind our own business! No doubt; but if we were to begin crying over spilt milk in that way, the place to begin was where the milk was spilled—in the Congress that resolved upon war with Spain. Since that congressional action we have been minding what is made our own business quite diligently, and an essential part of our business now is the responsibility for our own past acts, whether in Havana or Manila.

Some say that since we began the war for humanity, we are disgraced by coming out of it with increased territory. Then a penalty must always be imposed upon a victorious nation for presuming to do a good act. The only nation to be exempt from such a penalty upon success is to be the nation that was in the wrong! It is to have a premium, whether successful or not; for it is thus relieved, even in defeat, from the penalty which modern practice in the interest of civilization requires—the payment of an indemnity for the cost of an unjust war. Furthermore, the representatives of the nation that does a good act are thus bound to reject any opportunity for lightening the national load it entails. They must leave the full burden upon their country, to be dealt with in due time by the individual taxpayer!

Again, we have superfine discussions of what the United States "stands for." It does not stand, we are told, for foreign conquest, or for colonies or dependencies, or other extensions of its power and influence. It stands solely for the development of the individual man. There is a germ of a great truth in this, but the development of the truth is lost sight of. Individual initiative is a good thing, and our institutions do develop it—and its consequences! There is a species of individualism, too, about a bulldog. When he takes hold he holds on. It may as well be noticed by the objectors that that is a characteristic much appreciated by American people. They, too, hold on. They remember, be-

sides, a pregnant phrase of their Fathers, who "ordained this Constitution," among other things, "to promote the general welfare." That is a thing for which "this government stands" also; and woe to the public servant who rejects brilliant opportunities to promote it—on the Pacific Ocean no less than the Atlantic, by commerce no less than by agriculture or manufactures.

It is said the Philippines are worthless—have, in fact, already cost us more than the value of their entire trade for many years to come. So much the more, then, are we bound to do our duty by them. But we have also heard in turn, and from the same quarters, that every one of our previous acquisitions was worthless.

Again, it is said our continent is more than enough for all our needs, and our extensions should stop at the Pacific. What is this but proposing such a policy of self-sufficient isolation as we are accustomed to reprobate in China—planning now to develop only on the soil on which we stand, and expecting the rest of the world to protect our trade if we have any? Can a nation with safety set such limits to its development? When a tree stops growing, our foresters tell us, it is ripe for the axe. When a man stops in his physical and intellectual growth he begins to decay. When a business stops growing it is in danger of decline. When a nation stops growing it has passed the meridian of its course, and its shadows fall eastward.

Is China to be our model, or Great Britain? Or,

better still, are we to follow the instincts of our own people? The policy of isolating ourselves is a policy for the refusal of both duties and opportunities—duties to foreign nations and to civilization, which cannot be respectably evaded; opportunities for the development of our power on the Pacific in the twentieth century, which it would be craven to abandon. There has been a curious "about face," an absolute reversal of attitude toward England, on the part of our Little Americans, especially in the East and among the more educated classes. But yesterday nearly all of them were pointing to England as a model. There young men of education and position felt it a duty to go into politics. There they had built up a model civil service. There their cities were better governed, their streets cleaner, their mails more promptly delivered. There the responsibilities of their colonial system had enforced the purification of domestic politics, the relentless punishment of corrupt practices, and the abolition of bribery in elections, either by money or by office. There they had foreign trade, and a commercial marine, and a trained and efficient foreign service, and to be an English citizen was to have a safeguard the whole world round. Our young men were commended to their example; our legislators were exhorted to study their practice and its results. Suddenly these same teachers turn around. They warn us against the infection of England's example. They tell us her colonial system is a failure; that she would be

stronger without her colonies than with them; that she is eaten up with "militarism;" that to keep Cuba or the Philippines is what a selfish, conquering, land-grabbing, aristocratic government like England would do, and that her policy and methods are utterly incompatible with our institutions. When a court thus reverses itself without obvious reason (except a temporary partisan purpose), our people are apt to put their trust in other tribunals.

"I had thought," said Wendell Phillips, in his noted apology for standing for the first time in his antislavery life under the flag of his country, and welcoming the tread of Massachusetts men marshalled for war,—"I had thought Massachusetts wholly choked with cotton-dust and cankered with gold." If Little Americans have thought so of their country in these stirring days, and have fancied that initial reverses would induce it to abandon its duty, its rights, and its great permanent interests, they will live to see their mistake. They will find it giving a deaf ear to these unworthy complaints of temporary trouble or present loss, and turning gladly from all this incoherent and resultless clamor to the new world opening around us. Already it draws us out of ourselves. The provincial isolation is gone; and provincial habits of thought will go. There is a larger interest in what other lands have to show and teach; a larger confidence in our own; a higher resolve that it shall do its whole duty to mankind, moral as well as national, in such fashion as becomes

time's latest offspring and its greatest. We are grown more nearly citizens of the world.

This new knowledge, these new duties and interests, must have two effects—they must extend our power, influence, and trade, and they must elevate the public service. Every returning soldier or traveller tells the same story—that the very name "American" has taken a new significance throughout the Orient. The shrewd Oriental no longer regards us as a second or third class Power. He has just seen the only signs he recognizes of a nation that knows its rights and dares maintain them,—a nation that has come to stay, with an empire of its own in the China Sea, and a navy which, from what he has seen, he believes will be able to defend it against the world. He straightway concludes, after the Oriental fashion, that it is a nation whose citizens must henceforth be secure in all their rights, whose missionaries must be endured with patience and even protected, and whose friendship must be sedulously cultivated. The national prestige is enormously increased, and trade follows prestige—especially in the farther East. Not within a century, not during our whole history, has such a field opened for our reaping. Planted directly in front of the Chinese colossus, on a great territory of our own, we have the first and best chance to profit by his awakening. Commanding both sides of the Pacific, and the available coal-supplies on each, we command the ocean that, according to the old prediction, is to bear the bulk

of the world's commerce in the twentieth century. Our remote but glorious land between the Sierras and the sea may then become as busy a hive as New England itself, and the whole continent must take fresh life from the generous blood of this natural and necessary commerce between people of different climates and zones.

But these developments of power and trade are the least of the advantages we may hopefully expect. The faults in American character and life which the Little Americans tell us prove the people unfit for these duties are the very faults that will be cured by them. The recklessness and heedless self-sufficiency of youth must disappear. Great responsibilities, suddenly devolved, must sober and elevate now, as they have always done in natures not originally bad, throughout the whole history of the world.

The new interests abroad must compel an improved foreign service. It has heretofore been worse than we ever knew, and also better. On great occasions and in great fields our diplomatic record ranks with the best in the world. No nation stands higher in those new contributions to international law which form the high-water mark of civilization from one generation to another. At the same time, in fields less under the public eye, our foreign service has been haphazard at the best, and often bad beyond belief—ludicrous and humiliating. The harm thus wrought to our national good name and the positive injury to our trade have been more

than we realized. We cannot escape realizing them now, and when the American people wake up to a wrong, they are apt to right it.

More important still should be the improvement in the general public service at home and in our new possessions. New duties must bring new methods. Ward politics were banished from India and Egypt as the price of successful administration, and they must be excluded from Porto Rico and Luzon. The practical common sense of the American people will soon see that any other course is disastrous. Gigantic business interests must come to reinforce the theorists in favor of a reform that shall really elevate and purify the Civil Service.

Hand in hand with these benefits to ourselves, which it is the duty of public servants to secure, go benefits to our new wards and benefits to mankind. There, then, is what the United States is to "stand for" in all the resplendent future: the rights and interests of its own government; the general welfare of its own people; the extension of ordered liberty in the dark places of the earth; the spread of civilization and religion, and a consequent increase in the sum of human happiness in the world.

OUR DUTY IN THE PHILIPPINES

OUR DUTY IN THE PHILIPPINES

THE chaos of opinion into which the country was thrown by the outbreak of the Spanish-American War ceases to be wholly without form and void. The discussions of a year have clarified ideas; and on some points we may consider that the American people have substantially reached definite conclusions.

There is no need, therefore, to debate laboriously whether Dewey was right in going to Manila. Everybody now realizes that, once war was begun, absolutely the most efficient means of making it speedily and overwhelmingly victorious, as well as of defending the most exposed half of our own coast, was to go to Manila. "Find the Spanish fleet and destroy it" was as wise an order as the President ever issued, and he was equally wise in choosing the man to carry it out.

So, also, there is no need to debate whether Dewey was right in staying there. From that come his most enduring laurels. The American people admire him for the battle which sank the Spanish navy; but they trust and love him for the months of trial and triumph that followed. The Administration that should have ordered him to abandon the Eastern foothold he had conquered for his country—to sail away like a sated pirate from the port where his victory broke down all civilized authority but our own, and his presence alone prevented domestic anarchy and foreign spoliation

—would have deserved to be hooted out of the capital.

So, again, there is no need to debate whether the Peace Commissioners should have thrown away in Paris what Dewey had won in Manila. The public servant who, without instructions, should in a gush of irresponsible sentimentality abandon great possessions to which his country is justly entitled, whether by conquest or as indemnity for unjust war, would be not only an unprofitable but a faithless servant. It was their obvious duty to hold what Dewey had won, at least till the American people had time to consider and decide otherwise.

Is there any need to debate whether the American people will abandon it now? Those who have a fancy for that species of dialectics may weigh the chances, and evolve from circumstances of their own imagination, and canons of national and international obligation of their own manufacture, conclusions to their own liking. I need not consume much time in that unprofitable pursuit. We may as well, here and now, keep our feet on solid ground, and deal with facts as they are. The American people are in lawful possession of the Philippines, with the assent of all Christendom, with a title as indisputable as the title to California; and, though the debate will linger for a while, and perhaps drift unhappily into partisan contention, the generation is yet unborn that will see them abandoned to the possession of any other Power. The nation that scatters principalities as a prodigal does

his inheritance is too sentimental and moonshiny for the nineteenth century or the twentieth, and too unpractical for Americans of any period. It may flourish in Arcadia or Altruria, but it does not among the sons of the Pilgrims, or on the continent they subdued by stern struggle to the uses of civilization.

Nevertheless, our people did stop to consider very carefully their constitutional powers. I believe we have reached a point also where the result of that consideration may be safely assumed. The constitutional arguments have been fully presented and the expositions and decisions marshalled. It is enough now to say that the preponderance of constitutional authorities, with Gouverneur Morris, Daniel Webster, and Thomas H. Benton at their head, and the unbroken tendency of decisions by the courts of the United States for at least the last fifty years, from Mr. Chief Justice Waite and Mr. Justice Miller and Mr. Justice Stanley Matthews of the Supreme Court, down to the very latest utterance on the subject, that of Mr. Justice Morrow of the Circuit Court of Appeals, sustain the power to acquire "territory or other property" anywhere, and govern it as we please. Inhabitants of such territory (not obviously incapable) are secure in the civil rights guaranteed by the Constitution; but they have no political rights under it, save as Congress confers them. The evidence in support of this view has been fully set forth, examined, and weighed, and, unless I greatly

mistake, a popular decision on the subject has been reached. The constitutional power is no longer seriously disputed, and even those who raised the doubt do not seem now to rely upon it.

In thus summarizing what has been already settled or disposed of in our dealings with the questions of the war, I may be permitted to pause for a moment on the American contributions it brought about to international morality and law. On the day on which the American Peace Commissioners to Paris sailed for home after the ceremonial courtesy with which their labors were concluded, the most authoritative journal in the world published an interview with the eminent president of the corresponding Spanish Commission, then and for some time afterward president also of the Spanish Senate, in which he was reported as saying: "We knew in advance that we should have to deal with an implacable conqueror, who would in no way concern himself with any preëxisting international law, but whose sole object was to reap from victory the largest possible advantage. This conception of international law is absolutely new; it is no longer a case of might against right, but of might without right. . . . The Americans have acted as *vainqueurs parvenus*."[1]

Much may be pardoned to the anguish of an old and trusted public servant over the misfortunes of his native land. We may even, in our sympathy,

[1] London *Times*, December 17, 1898.

endeavor to forget what country it was that proposed to defy the agreements of the conference of Paris and the general judgment of nations by resorting to privateering, or what country it was that preferred to risk becoming an asylum for the criminals of a continent rather than revive, even temporarily, that basic and elementary implement of modern international justice, an extradition treaty, which had been in force with acceptable results for over twenty years. But when Americans are stigmatized as "*vainqueurs parvenus*," who by virtue of mere strength violate international law against a prostrate foe, and when one of the ablest of their American critics encourages the Spanish contention by talking of our "bulldog diplomacy at Paris," it gives us occasion to challenge the approval of the world —as the facts amply warrant—for the scrupulous conformity to existing international law, and the important contributions to its beneficent advancement, that have distinguished the action of the United States throughout these whole transactions. Having already set these forth in some detail before a foreign audience,[1] I must not now do more than offer the briefest summary.

The United States ended the toleration of privateering. It was perfectly free to commission privateers on the day war was declared. Spain was equally free, and it was proclaimed from Madrid

[1] "Some Consequences of the Treaty of Paris," *The Anglo-Saxon Review*, London, June, 1899.

that the Atlantic would soon swarm with them, sweeping American commerce from the ocean. Under these circumstances, one of the very first and noblest acts of the President was to announce that the United States would not avail itself of the right to send out privateers, reserved under the Declaration of Paris. The fast-thickening disasters of Spain prevented her from doing it, and thus substantially completed the practice or acquiescence of the civilized world, essential to the acceptance of a principle in international law. It is safe to assume that Christendom will henceforth treat privateering as under international ban.

The United States promoted the cause of genuine international arbitration by promptly and emphatically rejecting an insidious proposal for a spurious one. It taught those who deliberately prefer war to arbitration, and, when beaten at it, seek then to get the benefit of a second remedy, that honest arbitration must come before war, to avert its horrors, not after war, to evade its penalties.

The United States promoted peace among nations, and so served humanity by sternly enforcing the rule that they who bring on an unjust war must pay for it. For years the overwhelming tendency of its people had been against any territorial aggrandizement, even a peaceful one; but it unflinchingly exacted the easiest, if not the only, payment Spain could make for a war that cost us, at the lowest, from four to five hundred million dollars, by taking Porto Rico, Guam, and the Philippines.

It requires some courage to describe this as either a violation of international law, or a display of unprecedented severity by an implacable conqueror, in the very city and before the very generation that saw the Franco-Prussian War concluded, not merely by a partition of territory, but also by a cash payment of a thousand millions indemnity.

The United States promoted the peaceful liberalizing of oppressive rule over all subject peoples by making it more difficult to negotiate loans in the markets of the world to subdue their outbreaks. For it firmly rejected in the Cuban adjustments the immoral doctrine that an ill-treated and revolting colony, after gaining its freedom, must still submit to the extortion from it of the cost of the parent country's unsuccessful efforts to subdue it. We therefore left the so-called Cuban bonds on the hands of the Power that issued them, or of the reckless lenders who advanced the money. At the same time the United States strained a point elsewhere in the direction of protecting any legitimate debt, and of dealing generously with a fallen foe, by a payment which the most carping critic will some day be ashamed to describe as "buying inhabitants of the Philippines at two dollars a head."[1]

[1] There has been so much misconception and misrepresentation about this payment of twenty millions that the following exact summary of the facts may be convenient:

When Spain sued for peace in the summer of 1898, she had lost control of the Philippines, and any means for regaining control. Her fleet was sunk; her army was cooped up in the capital, under the guns of the American fleet, and its capture or surrender had only been delayed till the arrival of reinforcements for the American army, because of the fears

All these are acts distinctly in accord with international law so far as it exists and applies, and distinctly tending to promote its humane and Christian extension. Let me add, in a word, that the peace negotiations in no way compromised or affected the Monroe Doctrine, which stands as firm as ever, though much less important with the

expressed by foreigners and the principal residents of Manila that the city might be looted by the natives unless American land forces were at hand in strength ample to control them. The Spanish army did so surrender, in fact, shortly after the arrival of these reinforcements, before the news of the armistice could reach them.

In the protocol granting an armistice, the United States exacted at once the cession of Porto Rico and an island in the Ladrones, but reserved the decision as to the control, disposition, and government of the Philippines for the treaty of peace, apparently with a view to the possibility of accepting them as further indemnity for the war.

When the treaty came to be negotiated, the United States required the cession of the Philippines. Its Peace Commissioners stated that their government "felt amply supported in its right to demand this cession, with or without concessions," added that "this demand might be limited to the single ground of indemnity," and pointed out that it was "not now putting forward any claim for *pecuniary* indemnity, to cover the enormous cost of the war." It accompanied this demand for a transfer of sovereignty with a stipulation for assuming any existing indebtedness of Spain incurred for public works and improvements of a pacific character in the Philippines. The United States thus asserted its right to the archipelago for indemnity, and at the same time committed itself to the principle of payment on account of the Philippine debt.

When it became necessary to put the Philippine case into an ultimatum the Peace Commissioners did not further refer to the debt or give any specific reason either for a cession or for a payment. They simply said they now presented "a new proposition, embodying the concessions which, for the sake of immediate peace, their government is, under the circumstances, willing to tender."

But it was really the old proposition (with the "Open Door" and "Mutual Relinquishment of Claims" clauses added), with the mention for the first time of a specific sum for the payment, and without any question of "pacific improvements." That sum just balanced the Philippine debt—40,000,000 Mexican, or, say, 20,000,000 American dollars.

disappearance of any probable opposition to it; and that the prestige they brought smoothed the way for the one hopeful result of the Czar's conference at The Hague, a response to the American proposal for a permanent International Court of Arbitration.

A trifling but characteristic inaccuracy concerning the Peace Commission may as well be corrected before the subject is left. This is the statement, apparently originating from Malay sources, but promptly indorsed in this country by unfriendly critics, to the effect that the representative of Aguinaldo was uncivilly refused a hearing in Paris. It was repeated, inadvertently, no doubt, with many other curious distortions of historic facts, by a distinguished statesman in Chicago.[1] As he puts it, the doors were slammed in their faces in Washington as well as in Paris. Now, whatever might have happened, the door was certainly never slammed in their faces in Paris, for they never came to it. On the contrary, every time Mr. Agoncillo approached any member of the Commission on the subject, he was courteously invited to send the Commissioners a written request for a hearing, which would, at any rate, receive immediate consideration. No such request ever came, and any Filipino who wrote for a hearing in Paris was heard.

Meanwhile we are now in the midst of hostilities with a part of the native population, origi-

[1] General Carl Schurz, at the Chicago Anti-Expansion Convention, October, 1899.

nating in an unprovoked attack upon our troops in the city they had wrested from the Spaniards, before final action on the treaty. It is easy to say that we ought not to have got into this conflict, and to that I might agree. "I tell you, they can't put you in jail on that charge," said the learned and disputatious counsel to the client who had appealed from his cell for help. "But I *am* in," was the sufficient answer. The question just then was not what might have been done, but what can be done. I wish to urge that we can only end this conflict by manfully fighting through it. The talk one hears that the present situation calls for "diplomacy" seems to be mistimed. That species of diplomacy which consists in the tact of prompt action in the right line at the right time might, quite possibly, have prevented the present hostilities. Any diplomacy now would seem to our Tagal antagonists the raising of the white flag— the final proof that the American people do not sustain their army in the face of unprovoked attack. Every witness who came before the American Peace Commission in Paris, or sent it a written statement, English, German, Belgian, Malay, or American, said the same thing. Absolutely the one essential for dealing with the Filipinos was to convince them at the very outset that what you began, you stood to; that you did not begin without consideration of right and duty, or quail then before opposition; that your purpose was inexorable and your power irresistible, while submis-

sion to it would always insure justice. On the contrary, once let them suspect that protests would dissuade and turbulence deter you, and all the Oriental instinct for delay and bargaining for better terms is aroused along with the special Malay genius for intrigue and double-dealing, their profound belief that every man has his price, and their childish ignorance as to the extent to which stump speeches here against any Administration can cause American armies beyond the seas to retreat.

No; the toast which Henry Clay once gave in honor of an early naval hero fits the present situation like a glove. He proposed "the policy which looks to peace as the end of war, and war as the means of peace." In that light I maintain that the conflict we are prosecuting is in the line of national necessity and duty; that we cannot turn back; that the truest humanity condemns needless delay or half-hearted action, and demands overwhelming forces and irresistible onset.

But in considering this duty, just as in estimating the Treaty of Paris, we have the right to eliminate all account of the trifling success, so far, in the Philippines, or of the great trouble and cost. What it was right to do there, and what we are bound to do now, must not be obscured by faults of hesitation or insufficient preparation, for which neither the Peace Commissioners nor the people are responsible. I have had occasion to say before what I now repeat with the additional emphasis subse-

quent events have warranted—that the difficulties which at present discourage us are largely of our own making; and I repeat that it is still not for us, here and now, to apportion the blame. We have not the knowledge to say just who, or whether any man or body, is wholly at fault. What we do know is that the course of hesitation and inaction which the nation pursued in face of an openly maturing attack was precisely the policy sure to give us the greatest trouble, and that we are now paying the penalty. If the opposite course had been taken at the outset,—unless all the testimony from foreign observers and from our own officers is at fault,—there would have been either no outbreak at all, or only one easily controlled and settled to the general satisfaction of most of the civilized and semi-civilized inhabitants of the island.

On the personal and partisan disputes already lamentably begun, as to senatorial responsibility, congressional responsibility, or the responsibility of this or that executive officer, we have no occasion here to enter. What we have a right to insist on is that our general policy in the Philippines shall not be shaped now merely by the just discontent with the bad start. The reports of continual victories that roll back on us every week, like the stone of Sisyphus, and need to be won over again next week; the mistakes of a censorship that was absolutely right as a military measure, but may have been unintelligently, not to say childishly, conducted,—all these are beside the real question.

They must not obscure the duty of restoring order in the regions where our troops have been assailed, or prejudice our subsequent course.

I venture to say of that course that neither our duty nor our interest will permit us to stop short of a pacification which can end only in the establishment of such local self-government as the people are found capable of conducting, and its extension just as far and as fast as the people prove fit for it.

The natural development thus to be expected would probably proceed safely along the lines of least resistance, about in this order: First, and till entirely clear that it is no longer needed, military government. Next, the rule of either military or civil governors (for a considerable time probably the former), relying gradually more and more on native agencies. Thirdly, the development of dependencies, with an American civil governor, with their foreign relations and their highest courts controlled by us, and their financial system largely managed by members of a rigidly organized and jealously protected American Civil Service, but in most other respects steadily becoming more self-governing. And, finally, autonomous governments, looking to us for little save control of their foreign relations, profiting by the stability and order the backing of a powerful nation guarantees, cultivating more and more intimate trade and personal relations with that nation, and coming to feel themselves participants of its fortunes and renown.

Such a course Congress, after full investigation

and deliberation, might perhaps wisely formulate. Such a course, with slight modifications to meet existing limitations as to his powers, has already been entered upon by the President, and can doubtless be carried on indefinitely by him until Congress acts. This action should certainly not be precipitate. The system demands most careful study, not only in the light of what the English and Dutch, the most successful holders of tropical countries, have done, but also in the light of the peculiar and varied circumstances that confront us on these different and distant islands, and among these widely differing races,—circumstances to which no previous experience exactly applies, and for which no uniform system could be applicable. If Congress should take as long a time before action to study the problem as it has taken in the Sandwich Islands, or even in Alaska, the President's power would still be equal to the emergency, and the policy, while flexible, could still be made as continuous, coherent, and practical as his best information and ability would permit.

Against such a conscientious and painstaking course, in dealing with the grave responsibilities that are upon us in the East, two lines of evasion are sure to threaten. The one is the policy of the upright but short-sighted and strictly continental patriot—the same which an illustrious statesman of another country followed in the Sudan: "Scuttle as quick as you can."

The other is the policy of the exuberant patriot

who believes in the universal adaptability and immediate extension of American institutions. He thinks all men everywhere as fit to vote as himself and wants them for partners. He is eager to have them prepare at once, in our new possessions, first in the West Indies, then in the East, to send Senators and Representatives to Congress, and his policy is: "Make territories of them now, and states in the American Union as soon as possible." I wish to speak with the utmost respect of the sincere advocates of both theories, but must say that the one seems to me to fall short of a proper regard for either our duty or our interest, and the other to be national suicide.

Gentlemen in whose ability and patriotism we all have confidence have put the first of these policies for evading our duty in the form of a protest "against the expansions and establishment of the dominion of the United States, by conquest or otherwise, over unwilling peoples in any part of the globe." Of this it may be said, first, that any application of it to the Philippines probably assumes a factional and temporary outbreak to represent a settled unwillingness. New Orleans was as "unwilling," when Mr. Jefferson annexed it, as Aguinaldo has made Manila; and Aaron Burr came near making the whole Louisiana territory far worse. Mr. Lincoln always believed the people of North Carolina not unwilling to remain in the Union, yet we know what they did. But next, this protest contemplates evading the present respon-

sibility by a reversal of our settled policy any way. Mr. Lincoln probably never doubted the unwillingness of South Carolina to remain in the Union, but that did not change his course. Mr. Seward never inquired whether the Alaskans were unwilling or not. The historic position of the United States, from the day when Jefferson braved the envenomed anti-expansion sentiment of his time and bought the territory west of the Mississippi, on down, has been to consider, not the willingness or unwillingness of any inhabitants, whether aboriginal or colonists, but solely our national opportunity, our own duty, and our own interests.

Is it said that this is Imperialism? That implies usurpation of power, and there is absolutely no ground for such a charge against this Administration at any one stage in these whole transactions. If any complaint here is to lie, it must relate to the critical period when we were accepting the responsibility for order at Manila, and must be for the exercise of too little power, not too much. It is not imperialism to take up honestly the responsibility for order we incurred before the world, and continue under it, even if that should lead us to extend the civil rights of the American Constitution over new regions and strange peoples. It is not imperialism when duty keeps us among these chaotic, warring, distracted tribes, civilized, semi-civilized, and barbarous, to help them, as far as their several capacities will permit, toward self-government on the basis of those civil rights.

A terser and more taking statement of opposition has been attributed to a gentleman highly honored by Princeton University and by his townsmen there. I gladly seize this opportunity, as a consistent opponent during his whole political life, to add that his words carry great weight throughout the country by reason of the unquestioned ability, courage, and patriotic devotion he has brought to the public service. He is reported as protesting simply against "the use of power in the extension of American institutions." But does not this, if applied to the present situation, seem also to miss an important distinction? What planted us in the Philippines was the use of our power in the most efficient naval and military defence then available for our own institutions where they already exist, against the attack of Spain. If the responsibility entailed by the result of these acts in our own defence does involve some extension of our institutions, shall we therefore run away from it? If a guarantee to chaotic tribes of the civil rights secured by the American Constitution does prove to be an incident springing from the discharge of the duty that has rested upon us from the moment we drove Spain out, is that a result so objectionable as to warrant us in abandoning our duty?

There is, it is true, one other alternative—the one which Aguinaldo himself is said to have suggested, and which has certainly been put forth in his behalf with the utmost simplicity and sincerity by a conspicuous statesman at Chicago. We might

at once solicit peace from Aguinaldo. We might then encourage him to extend his rule over the whole country,—Catholic, pagan, and Mohammedan, willing and unwilling alike,—and promise him whatever aid might be necessary for that task. Meantime, we should undertake to protect him against outside interference from any European or Asiatic nation whose interests on that oceanic highway and in those commercial capitals might be imperilled![1] I do not desire to discuss that proposition. And I submit to candid men that there are just those three courses, and no more, now open to us—to run away, to protect Aguinaldo, or to back up our own army and firmly hold on!

If this fact be clearly perceived, if the choice between these three courses be once recognized as the only choice the present situation permits, our minds will be less disturbed by the confused cries of perplexity and discontent that still fill the air. Thus men often say, "If you believe in liberty for yourself, why refuse it to the Tagals?" That is right; they should have, in the degree of their capacity, the only kind of liberty worth having in the world, the only kind that is not a curse to its possessors and to all in contact with them—ordered liberty, under law, for which the wisdom of man has not yet found a better safeguard than the guarantees of civil rights in the Constitution of the United States. Who supposes that to be the

[1] The exact proposition made by General Carl Schurz in addressing the Chicago Anti-Expansion Convention, October, 1899.

liberty for which Aguinaldo is fighting? What his people want, and what the statesman at Chicago wishes us to use the army and navy of the United States to help him get, is the liberty to rule others, —the liberty first to turn our own troops out of the city and harbor we had in our own self-defence captured from their enemies; the liberty next to rule that great commercial city, and the tribes of the interior, instead of leaving us to exercise the rule over them that events have forced upon us, till it is fairly shown that they can rule themselves.

Again it is said, "You are depriving them of freedom." But they never had freedom, and could not have it now. Even if they could subdue the other tribes in Luzon, they could not establish such order on the other islands and in the waters of the archipelago as to deprive foreign Powers of an immediate excuse for interference. What we are doing is in the double line of preventing otherwise inevitable foreign seizure and putting a stop to domestic war.

"But you cannot fit people for freedom. They must fit themselves, just as we must do our own crawling and stumbling in order to learn to walk." The illustration is unfortunate. Must the crawling baby, then, be abandoned by its natural or accidental guardian, and left to itself to grow strong by struggling, or to perish, as may happen? Must we turn the Tagals loose on the foreigners in Manila, and on their enemies in the other tribes,

that by following their instincts they may fit themselves for freedom?

Again, "It will injure us to exert power over an unwilling people, just as slavery injured the slaveholders themselves." Then a community is injured by maintaining a police. Then a court is injured by rendering a just decree, and an officer by executing it. Then it is a greater injury, for instance, to stop piracy than to suffer from it. Then the manly exercise of a just responsibility enfeebles instead of developing and strengthening a nation.

"Governments derive their just powers from the consent of the governed." "No man is good enough to govern another against his will." Great truths, from men whose greatness and moral elevation the world admires. But there is a higher authority than Jefferson or Lincoln, Who said: "If a man smite thee on thy right cheek, turn to him the other also." Yet he who acted literally on even that divine injunction toward the Malays would be a congenital idiot to begin with, and his corpse, while it lasted, would remain an object-lesson of how not to deal with the present stage of Malay civilization and Christianity.

Why mourn over our present course as a departure from the policy of the Fathers? For a hundred years the uniform policy which they began and their sons continued has been acquisition, expansion, annexation, reaching out to remote wildernesses far more distant and inaccessible then than the Philippines are now—to disconnected

regions like Alaska, to island regions like Midway, the Guano Islands, the Aleutians, the Sandwich Islands, and even to quasi protectorates like Liberia and Samoa. Why mourn because of the precedent we are establishing? The precedent was established before we were born. Why distress ourselves with the thought that this is only the beginning, that it opens the door to unlimited expansion? The door is wide open now, and has been ever since Livingston in Paris jumped at Talleyrand's offer to sell him the wilderness west of the Mississippi instead of the settlements eastward to Florida, which we had been trying to get; and Jefferson eagerly sustained him. For the rest, the task that is laid upon us now is not proving so easy as to warrant this fear that we shall soon be seeking unlimited repetitions of it.

That danger, in fact, can come only if we shirk our present duty by the second of the two alternative methods of evasion I have mentioned—the one favored by the exuberant patriot who wants to clasp Cuban, Kanaka, and Tagal alike to his bosom as equal partners with ourselves in our inheritance from the Fathers, and take them all into the Union as states.

We will be wise to open our eyes at once to the gravity and the insidious character of this danger—the very worst that could threaten the American Union. Once begun, the rivalry of parties and the fears of politicians would insure its continuance. With Idaho and Wyoming admitted, they did not

dare prolong the exclusion even of Utah, and so we have the shame of seeing an avowed polygamist with a *prima facie* right to sit in our Congress as a legislator not merely for Utah, but for the whole Union. At this moment scarcely a politician dares frankly avow unalterable opposition to the admission of Cuba, if she should seek it. Yet, bad as that would be, it would necessarily lead to worse. Others in the West Indies might not linger long behind. In any event, with Cuba a state, Porto Rico could not be kept a territory. No more could the Sandwich Islands. And then, looming direct in our path, like a volcano rising out of the mist on the affrighted vision of mariners tempest-tossed in tropic seas, is the spectre of such states as Luzon, and the Visayas and Haiti.

They would have precedents, too, to quote, and dangerous ones. When we bought Louisiana we stipulated in the treaty that "the inhabitants of the ceded territory shall be incorporated in the Union of the United States and admitted as soon as possible, according to the principles of the Federal Constitution, to the enjoyment of all the rights, advantages, and immunities of citizens of the United States." We made almost identically the same stipulation when we bought Florida. When one of the most respected in the long line of our able Secretaries of State, Mr. William L. Marcy, negotiated a treaty in 1854 for the annexation of the Sandwich Islands, he provided that they should be incorporated as a state, with the same degree of sov-

ereignty as other states, and on perfect equality with them. The schemes prior to 1861 for the purchase or annexation of Cuba practically all looked to the same result. Not till the annexation of San Domingo was proposed did this feature disappear from our treaties. It is only candid to add that the habit of regarding this as the necessary destiny of any United States territory as soon as it has sufficient population has been universal. It is no modern vagary, but the practice, if not the theory, of our whole national life, that would open the doors of our Senate and House, and give a share in the government, to these wild-eyed newcomers from the islands of the sea.

The calamity of admitting them cannot be overrated. Even in the case of the best of these islands, it would demoralize and degrade the national suffrage almost incalculably below the point already reached. To the Senate, unwieldy now, and greatly changed in character from the body contemplated by the Constitution, it would be disastrous. For the present states of the Union it would be an act of folly like that of a business firm which blindly steered for bankruptcy by freely admitting to full partnership new members, strangers and non-residents, not only otherwise ill qualified, but with absolutely conflicting interests. And it would be a distinct violation of the clause in the preamble that "we, the people, . . . do ordain and establish this Constitution for the United States of *America*."

There is the only safe ground—on the letter

and the spirit of the Constitution. It contemplated a continental union of sovereign states. It limited that union to the American continent. The man that takes it farther sounds its death-knell.

I have designedly left to the last any estimate of the material interests we serve by holding on in our present course. Whatever these may be, they are only a subordinate consideration. We are in the Philippines, as we are in the West Indies, because duty sent us; and we shall remain because we have no right to run away from our duty, even if it does involve far more trouble than we foresaw when we plunged into the war that entailed it. The call to duty, when once plainly understood, is a call Americans never fail to answer, while to calls of interest they have often shown themselves incredulous or contemptuous.

But the Constitution we revere was also ordained "to promote the general welfare," and he is untrue to its purpose who squanders opportunities. Never before have they been showered upon us in such bewildering profusion. Are the American people to rise to the occasion? Are they to be as great as their country? Or shall the historian record that at this unexampled crisis they were controlled by timid ideas and short-sighted views, and so proved unequal to the duty and the opportunity which unforeseen circumstances brought to their doors? The two richest archipelagoes in the world are practically at our disposal. The greatest ocean on the globe has been put in our hands, the

ocean that is to bear the commerce of the twentieth century. In the face of this prospect, shall we prefer, with the teeming population that century is to bring us, to remain a "hibernating nation, living off its own fat—a hermit nation," as Mr. Senator Davis has asked? For our First Assistant Secretary of State, Mr. Hill, was right when he said that not to enter the Open Door in Asia means the perpetual isolation of this continent.

Are we to be discouraged by the cry that the new possessions are worthless? Not while we remember how often and under what circumstances we have heard that cry before. Half the public men of the period denounced Louisiana as worthless. Eminent statesmen made merry in Congress over the idea that Oregon or Washington could be of any use. Daniel Webster, in the most solemn and authoritative tones Massachusetts has ever employed, assured his fellow Senators that, in his judgment, California was not worth a dollar.

Is it said that the commercial opportunities in the Orient, or at least in the Philippines, are overrated? So it used to be said of the Sandwich Islands. But what does our experience show? Before their annexation even, but after we had taken this little archipelago under our protection and into our commercial system, our ocean tonnage in that trade became nearly as heavy as with Great Britain. Why? Because, while we have lost the trade of the Atlantic, superior advantages made the Pacific ours. Is it said that elsewhere on the Pacific we

can do as well without a controlling political influence as with it? Look again! Mexico buys our products at the rate of $1.95 for each inhabitant; South America at the rate of 90 cents; Great Britain at the rate of $13.42; Canada at the rate of $14; and the Hawaiian Islands at the rate of $53.35 for each inhabitant. Look at the trade of the chief city on the Pacific coast. All Mexico and Central America, all the western parts of South America and of Canada, are as near to us as is Honolulu; and comparison of the little Sandwich Islands in population with any of them would be ridiculous. Yet none of them bought as much salmon in San Francisco as Hawaii, and no countries bought more save England and Australia. No countries bought as much barley, excepting Central America; and even in the staff of life, the California flour, which all the world buys, only five countries outranked Hawaii in purchases in San Francisco.

No doubt a part of this result is due to the nearness of Hawaii to our markets, and her distance from any others capable of competing with us, and another part to a favorable system of reciprocity. Nevertheless, nobody doubts the advantage our dealers have derived in the promotion of trade from controlling political relations and frequent intercourse. There are those who deny that "trade follows the flag," but even they admit that it leaves if the flag does. And, independent of these advantages, and reckoning by mere distance, we still have the better of any European rivals in the

Philippines. Now, assume that the Filipino would have far fewer wants than the Kanaka or his coolie laborer, and would do far less work for the means to gratify them. Admit, too, that, with the Open Door, our political relations and frequent intercourse could have barely a fifth or a sixth of the effect there they have had in the Sandwich Islands. Roughly cast up even that result, and say whether it is a value which the United States should throw away as not worth considering!

And the greatest remains behind. For the trade in the Philippines will be but a drop in the bucket compared to that of China, for which they give us an unapproachable foothold. But let it never be forgotten that the confidence of Orientals goes only to those whom they recognize as strong enough and determined enough always to hold their own and protect their rights! The worst possible introduction for the Asiatic trade would be an irresolute abandonment of our foothold because it was too much trouble to keep, or because some Malay and half-breed insurgents said they wanted us away.

Have you considered for whom we hold these advantages in trust? They belong not merely to the seventy-five millions now within our borders, but to all who are to extend the fortunes and preserve the virtues of the Republic in the coming century. Their numbers cannot increase in the startling ratio this century has shown. If they did, the population of the United States a hundred years hence would be over twelve hundred mil-

lions. That ratio is impossible, but nobody gives reasons why we should not increase half as fast. Suppose we do actually increase only one-fourth as fast in the twentieth century as in the nineteenth. To what height would not the three hundred millions of Americans whom even that ratio foretells bear up the seething industrial activities of the continent! To what corner of the world would they not need to carry their commerce? What demands on tropical productions would they not make? What outlets for their adventurous youth would they not require? With such a prospect before us, who thinks that we should shrink from an enlargement of our national sphere because of the limitations that bound, or the dangers that threatened, before railroads, before ocean steamers, before telegraphs and ocean cables, before the enormous development of our manufactures, and the training of executive and organizing faculties in our people on a constantly increasing scale for generations?

Does the prospect alarm? Is it said that our nation is already too great, that all its magnificent growth only adds to the conflicting interests that must eventually tear it asunder? What cement, then, like that of a great common interest beyond our borders, that touches not merely the conscience, but the pocket and the pride of all alike, and marshals us in the face of the world, standing for our own?

What, then, is the conclusion of the whole

matter? Hold fast! Stand firm in the place where Providence has put you, and do the duty as just responsibility for your own past acts imposes. Support the army you sent there. Stop wasting valuable strength by showing how things might be different if something different had been done at the outset. Use the educated thought of the country for shaping best its course now, instead of chiefly finding fault with its history. Bring the best hope of the future, the colleges and the generation they are training, to exert the greatest influence and accomplish the most good by working intelligently in line with the patriotic aspirations and the inevitable tendencies of the American people, rather than against them. Unite the efforts of all men of goodwill to make the appointment of any person to these new and strange duties beyond seas impossible save for proved fitness, and his removal impossible save for cause. Rally the colleges and the churches, and all they influence, the brain and the conscience of the country, in a combined and irresistible demand for a genuine, trained, and pure Civil Service in our new possessions, that shall put to shame our detractors, and show to the world the Americans of this generation, equal still to the work of civilization and colonization, and leading the development of the coming century as bravely as their fathers led it in the past.

HOW THE UNITED STATES FACED ITS EDUCATIONAL PROBLEM

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LET us begin by stating the elements of the problem.

First, then, a new and vast country, developing at the outset with painful slowness, later with startling rapidity, under a self-governing people.

Next, important characteristics among this people derived from the land which first ruled them—a vehement attachment to their personal rights—and a belief, which never admits a question, in the imperative duty of giving the best possible education to their children.

Next, a growing tendency toward universal suffrage, creating a political necessity for the nearest practicable approach to universal intelligence.

Next, a habit of thought, fervidly religious at the outset, but diverging into many forms of religion; strenuous, therefore, at once in a demand for religious freedom and in hostility to an established church.

And finally, a continent to be conquered from its primitive wildness and savagery to the uses of civilized man, a task sometimes shortening the years parents could spare their children for education, and impressing on what education they did get a new and very practical bent, in order to promote these material conquests through scientific means. We hear occasionally about the Science of History—more, in fact, at times than some of us be-

lieve. But, given these elements of the problem, we may well imagine that the philosophic student might on such data almost construct the history of educational evolution in the United States from first principles and without reference to the records. Thus:

It would be clear that at the outset every religious sect would start private schools, and would try to sweep into them not only the children of its own faith, but all others it could lay its hand on.

It would be equally clear that wherever it could, it would load the support of these schools on the whole tax-paying community. There would thus arise public schools (by which an American always means tax-supported schools), giving sectarian instruction.

But when different sects, nearly or quite balancing each other in influence, disputed the control in a new and unconventional community, where there were no roads through these novel perplexities any more than through their forests, and where they had to blaze their trails for themselves, it is clear that this sectarian instruction would in the end be so modified as to include only tenets common to all, and would tend in fact to become less doctrinal and more ethical—a teaching merely of morals and of duties to each other.

In course of time many of the churches would be dissatisfied with this and would revert to private schools at their own cost and under their own exclusive control. The burden of supporting these

would be so considerable that they would object to being taxed also for the support of public schools for other people's children.

But in a country controlled by popular suffrage and among a people passionately convinced that the success of their government depended on the widest diffusion of intelligence, it is evident that a system of free public schools supported by public taxation, when once started, could never be abandoned. It would be thought a necessary measure of self-defence in the government to educate all the rising generation for the duties of citizenship, the poorest of them as well as the richest, and the pagan no less than the Puritan. The public school system, free to all and supported by public taxation, would inevitably become, therefore, a fixed feature of public policy.

Now, with the two systems in force, it would be obvious that the one where tuition was free would grow the faster; and equally obvious that those who paid for their own and were taxed for the other would wish to limit as far as possible the scope and consequently the cost of the one they did n't use. Two rival theories as to taxing everybody for the education of the rising generation would thus develop: one, that such taxation was necessary and justifiable only far enough to fit them for the common duties of citizenship; and the other that it was also to the public interest to fit them for anything. Heavy taxpayers would naturally lead in the first; those who felt less the burden of taxation, or

paid no taxes, in the second. As heavy taxpayers are never in the majority, and as the readiness to vote burdens on others is apt to be more marked in those who do not bear like burdens themselves, it would be natural to expect the tendency in the long run, in a democratic government, to be found in favor of the most liberal appropriations and the widest scope for the studies.

The first class would hold that only reading, writing, and arithmetic were necessary, with perhaps the history of the country and the nature of its government. To tax them for teaching other people's children more than that, Latin or algebra or chemistry, they would regard as robbery. But the second class, those depending on the free public schools rather than on the sectarian schools for the education of their children, would wish it carried as far as the children seemed capable of receiving and profiting by it. They would easily persuade themselves, too, of the sound public policy and justice of this, since they would argue that the more the child knew and the more its judgment was developed, the better and more useful member of a self-governing community it would make.

Thus could be easily foreseen a struggle between those who wished to limit the free public school system to primary education and those who wished to carry it through secondary schools to colleges and universities. The one side would hold that the free secondary and university education, besides harming the taxpayer through unequal

burdens, would harm many of those encouraged to take it for the reason that it cost nothing; since it would educate them beyond their intellect and disqualify them for what they are fit for, in the effort to qualify them for tasks they never can be made fit for—spoiling good farmers or blacksmiths to make worthless lawyers or doctors or speculators. The other side would hold that the more education one is found capable of receiving, the better fitted he will be to do whatever he finds to do—that the better education you give him, the better farmer or blacksmith he will make, if that is to be his vocation.

Finally, our philosophic student would infer that in the long run, in a country without an established church or a governing class, constantly tending toward universal suffrage and toward the changes wrought by enormous and highly varied immigration, the side likely to prevail would be the one making all education, from the lowest rung at the foot of the educational ladder to the very highest, open to the poorest child on the sole condition of capacity to receive it. He would further infer that of those who set their foot on this ladder many would be intensely eager to get off it again to begin making a living, and eager while on it for a great variety of special studies that they thought would help them in the varied pursuits they expected to follow.

It may be briefly said that something like this is the exact history of two centuries of educational

evolution in the United States. It seems to be ending in a system, ranging from the alphabet to the classics, the modern languages, literature, history, civics, the higher mathematics, and science, with a strong leaning to practical applications of science in all fields of art and industry, sustained absolutely at the public expense and free to all, with every grade open to the poorest and most friendless pupil in the grade below, on the single requirement that his standing there fits him for it. That is all that is necessary to-day in the greatest city of the New World to carry the child of the Ghetto or of the Levantine push-cart quarter from the primer to a fairly earned degree of Bachelor of Arts in the College of the City of New York, or to an equivalent degree, involving equal study and to a considerable extent along equally varied lines, in its Normal College for Women.

This system had grown in the early years of the present century into a total enrolment in the schools, colleges, and universities of the United States, public and private, of 17,539,000 pupils, of whom 16,127,000 were in public institutions supported by taxation. When the enrolments for certain special interests, evening schools, reform schools, Indian schools, schools for deaf, blind, feeble-minded, etc., were added, the grand total was reached of 18,187,000. Nearly one-fourth of the total population is at school in a nation of eighty millions![1]

[1] United States Commissioner of Education, *Report*, December 1, 1904.

The system thus developed, though varying somewhat in the different states, is characterized by certain general peculiarities.

First, as to religion in the schools. Broadly speaking, religious instruction is not compulsory in any public schools and not permitted in the most. Religious exercises at the daily opening of the school were long encouraged, and are still common, but seem to be growing less frequent, especially in the great cities. The language of the New York City charter probably states, though in a somewhat involved fashion, the ground which most city schools throughout the Union and many of those in the country are fast approaching:

"No school shall be entitled to or receive any portion of the school moneys in which the religious doctrines or tenets of any particular Christian or other religious sect shall be taught, inculcated, or practised, or in which any book or books containing compositions favourable or prejudicial to the particular doctrine or tenets of any particular Christian or other religious sect shall be used, or which shall teach the doctrines or tenets of any other religious sect, or which shall refuse to permit the visits and examinations provided for in this chapter. But nothing herein contained shall authorize the board of education or the school board of any borough to exclude the Holy Scriptures, without note or comment, or any selections therefrom, from any of the schools provided for by this chapter; but it shall not be competent for the said board of education to decide what version, if any, of the Holy Scriptures, without note or comment, shall be used in any of the schools; provided that nothing herein con-

tained shall be so construed as to violate the rights of conscience, as secured by the constitution of this state and of the United States."

Under this, the reading of a chapter of the Bible at the opening of the school is still common.

The New York state constitution prohibits aid from public funds to denominational schools, or to schools where any denominational tenet or doctrine is taught; and similar prohibitions are general in other states. The New York provision reads as follows:

"Neither the state, nor any subdivision thereof, shall use its property or credit or any public money, or authorize or permit either to be used directly or indirectly, in aid or maintenance, other than for examination or inspection, of any school or institution of learning wholly or in part under the control or direction of any religious denomination, or in which any denominational tenet or doctrine is taught."

To discuss the effects of this general policy might approach too closely to contentious domestic questions. One may be permitted, however, to say that in the prevalent American view it certainly throws a greater work upon the family and the church; but that, where these both do their full duty, it is probable that no harm results.

As to the extent of the public school education. The doctrine is rapidly gaining ground in most of the states that it should be carried at the public expense from the primary branches straight through the secondary schools and on to the universities,

for all who are found capable, able, and desirous to continue such a course. In more than half the states free universities are already to be found.

As to its character. "I would found an institution," said Ezra Cornell, "where any person can find instruction in any study." The sentiment has been inscribed on the walls of the Capitol in his native state at Albany, and it is beginning to expand the available courses of study, not only in the colleges and universities, but largely also in the secondary schools, and sometimes even in the primaries. A reaction against the excessive extension of this elective system is setting in; and there is a good deal of complaint, especially in the primary schools, where it is often said the attention of the children is distracted to so many other things that they do not learn reading, writing, and arithmetic as well as they should. But in the secondary schools and the universities there is an enormous multiplication of studies and of separate courses of study, designed for the varying wants of the pupils, with reference to the varied vocations they expect to enter. The tendency is strongly to the practical side, and scientific and technological studies are greatly in favor.

As to the time taken for public education. This tendency to specialize at school with reference to what the pupil expects to do to earn a living is accompanied with another peculiarity—a haste, once almost a craze, to get out of school and get to work at one's life-business at the earliest practicable mo-

ment. Nowhere else has there been the like feverish anxiety to keep the studies of the secondary schools or of the universities within such a range that the pupil may think he has received a liberal education, but get through it in fewer years than formerly. He even tries now to complete the usual college course in three years, instead of the traditional four; and would like the course in the professional school for a doctor or lawyer to be two years instead of three or more. In fact, he often begrudges every month between the primary school and the entry on his business or profession, and fears that those taking still less time than himself for liberal studies will get ahead of him in the race of life.

As to women. In all the public schools, primary and secondary, there are apt to be as many girls as boys. In the colleges and universities the proportion may be smaller, but in those supported by public taxation both sexes are admitted on equal terms, as well as in many others. It begins to be considered, however, that coeducation is chiefly commended by its economy. A state university can, of course, educate such girls as seek its classes at less cost to the taxpayers than if a separate institution had to be built up for them and a second set of professors engaged. But aside from this, it is coming to be thought in many quarters that better results may be had in separate institutions. Thus one of the richest and most independent of the new universities, that of Chicago, endowed

by Mr. John D. Rockefeller, came to adopt the segregation of female students, and another, the Stanford University of California, is limiting the female students to one-third or less of the entire number. There are, however, many well-endowed and admirably equipped colleges for women alone, sometimes independent, sometimes affiliated with a great university like Harvard or Columbia; and the number of women pursuing their education through colleges and universities is already large and rapidly increasing.

A final peculiarity of the American system may be noted: *the extraordinary readiness of rich men to found colleges and universities;* to endow chairs in them, or make to them gifts of libraries or museums, or to help on the lower schools in a multitude of ways. Two American citizens, both noted for other benefactions, have given forty millions of dollars to four educational enterprises alone—Andrew Carnegie to the Carnegie Institution for Original Research and to a fund for pensioning college professors; John D. Rockefeller to the Chicago University and to the General Education Board. Another, Leland Stanford, gave what promises, when the estate is fully settled, to amount to from thirty-five to forty millions for the university founded in memory of his lost son. Ezra Cornell founded, financed, gave to, and solicited for the university in western New York which bears his name till it now has property and endowment amounting to about twelve millions or more.

Matthew Vassar, a brewer, founded the first college for women in America, at Poughkeepsie, New York, and gave and secured for it two millions and a half. To call the long roll of similar benefactions would exhaust both time and patience. In ten years the gifts to universities, colleges, and schools of technology in the United States amounted to a hundred and fifteen millions of dollars. The tide was steadily rising, for in the last of those years, 1902, the gifts to such institutions amounted to sixteen and three-quarter millions.

The basis of this whole system is, of course, the common primary or elementary school. The enrolment in the primary schools in the different states generally equals about twenty per cent of the population, and the average daily attendance about sixty-nine per cent of the enrolment. The average length of the school term throughout the country is one hundred and forty-seven days; the annual cost, roughly speaking, is about two hundred and fifty millions of dollars. The general tendency is to make attendance compulsory between the ages of six and fourteen, and to apply the penalties for non-attendance to the parent. The home rule disposition of a democracy leaves the business management of the school to the people of the locality, but the state alone passes upon the fitness of the teacher.

In the state with whose educational system I have the greatest familiarity, that of New York, the average of daily attendance rises to seventy-

six per cent of the enrolment; and the compulsory education law is supplemented and made far more effective among the mixed population of our great cities by rigid laws against child labor. Whether parents wish it or not, it is thus made difficult for the children to lose their American birthright to a sound elementary education.

A more distinctive feature of the American system is the secondary school. In countries where free tuition is not carried up to the university, there is apt to be a vague, undeveloped territory between the primary schools and the universities, filled sometimes and to a certain extent by tax-supported high schools, but more frequently by private high schools. The distinguishing feature of the free common school system of the United States is the completeness with which it fills this gap between the primary schools and the colleges or universities. This began almost with the beginning of the colonies. In 1647 Massachusetts required by law the establishment of a primary school wherever there were fifty families in a settlement or township; and a grammar school which should be capable of fitting students for college wherever there were a hundred. Connecticut and Maryland required a grammar school in every county town. Other colonies in one way or another made provision for secondary education at the public expense. But as the troubles preceding the Revolutionary War increased, these grammar schools or

high schools fell into some neglect and many communities were without them. Then sprang up a system of private academies, often under sectarian control, and sometimes receiving subventions from the public treasury, though never under public control. The two long continued to occupy the field together. The differences between them have been incisively stated by the accomplished Commissioner of Education in the State of New York, Dr. Andrew S. Draper:

> "The function of the academy was to prepare for college and incidentally for life; that of the high school is to prepare for life and incidentally for college. The one was classical, with some practicalities; the other is severely practical and generally in the best sense, with classical appurtenances. The academy was essentially an advanced school for boys; the high school is as essentially coeducational."

Meantime the various states were slowly feeling their way toward more harmonious and better articulated systems of education entirely under public control and at the public expense. New York was the first. Its organization of secondary schools in 1784 was intended to fit into the primary education on the one hand, and to lead, on the other, to colleges and universities. Indiana outlined such a system in 1816, Pennsylvania began state support of secondary and higher education in 1838, and many large towns in other states did the same. But the system was still disjointed and irregular.

At the close of the Civil War a new educational movement began to be increasingly felt throughout the United States. Amid all the vivid pictures left on my mind by what I saw during that gigantic convulsion, none, even of Gettysburg or Shiloh, bring back such a thrill as these of Washington in 1862:

First, a calm, sunshiny day when the great bronze Statue of Liberty was hoisted to the dome of the still unfinished Capitol and slowly settled to its place above that exquisite structure, almost within eyesight of Confederate troops on the other side of the Potomac. Not even the Conscript Fathers, advancing the price of public land across the Tiber on which the armies besieging Rome were then encamped, were finer than that.

The others came under my eye as a young official of the House of Representatives. When the fitful flame of the nation's life seemed flickering with every fresh bulletin from the field, Congress calmly considered and passed three bills. One gave free a hundred and sixty acres of land to any citizen on the sole condition that he should occupy and develop it. Another reached across mountains and deserts to bind together in an indissoluble union the East and the farthest West by the Pacific Railroad. The third and the greatest—signed, as Dr. Draper reminds us, by Abraham Lincoln with the same penful of ink with which he had just signed the second call for three hundred thousand soldiers—gave of the public lands to every state

as much as was needed to found a free university for the sons and daughters of the state.

From that inspiring act came the two great impulses that have almost transformed American education in the last forty years: the vast expansion of the secondary schools and the development of the state universities. Between them, when the system is complete, they put within reach of any child of the Republic a free university education.

We are not deluded with the conceit that our secondary school system is yet the best possible means for fitting children either for college or for life. What we may say is that it is the best means yet devised and put into operation for placing within reach of the greatest number of children the opportunity to climb the educational ladder as high as they can; and that the education thus afforded tends in the main to develop, even out of the masses of imported raw material, the kind of citizens who have thus far made the fortunes of the country.

Statistics of attendance in these schools are scarcely available in any satisfactory form before 1876. In that year there were in the public high schools of the country only about 23,000 pupils, and in the corresponding private schools about 74,000. By 1902 the proportions were remarkably reversed. There were then in the 6292 public high schools 551,000 pupils, and in the private schools 105,000; or, roughly speaking, about one in every

twenty-three of the youth of the land was pursuing some form of higher education, while the door was open to as many of the others as showed themselves qualified to enter it.

The nature of the instruction varies in different localities. In a general way it may be said that the standard curriculum toward which educational authorities are striving would include either modern or ancient languages, mathematics, English, and science for about one-half the work of a four years' course, while the rest would be made up of studies chosen by the pupil or the parents.

Perhaps a better idea may be given by taking first the requirements of a good secondary school, and next the bewildering array of "electives" it is apt to allow. For this purpose the high school of St. Louis may be selected. All its pupils who complete its four years' course have been required to study English, algebra, plane geometry, physics, biology, history, and Shakespeare, and to these they must give somewhat more than half their time. Then, under the guidance of the authorities, studies sufficient for the rest of the time must be made up out of a long list, including ethics, civics, economics, psychology, arithmetic, bookkeeping, commercial law, higher algebra, solid geometry, trigonometry, chemistry, penmanship, phonography, drawing and history of art, Latin, German, French, Spanish, and Greek.

A more conservative and, as I must think, a wiser class of schools leaves less to the choice of the pupils

or parents, but allows an election between scientific and classical courses. In the first they have Latin and either German or French, with algebra, history, English, geometry, trigonometry, botany, and chemistry. In the classical course they generally carry Latin and English through the four years, Greek through three, and German and French through two, with algebra, geometry, and history. Still others (as ordered by the State of Minnesota, for example) arrange most of the studies already named into three courses, called respectively English, Literary, and Classical, and between these the pupils or their parents make choice. Where students were preparing for college, it was found in 1902 that a little over one-half took a classical, a little less than one-half a scientific course. A more definite idea as to the present bent of secondary school education may be given by the facts that in 1898, out of over a million students, 306,000 studied algebra, 274,000 Latin, 147,000 geometry, 113,000 physics, 78,000 German, 58,000 French, 47,000 chemistry, and only 25,000 Greek.

The general tendency was summed up in the pregnant statement by Elmer Ellsworth Brown, then Professor of Education in the University of California, afterward United States Commissioner of Education, that in consideration of secondary school curricula, it is now coming to be thought that "what is good preparation for life is good preparation for college. More and more the question of college entrance requirements is coming to be a

question as to what is best for the schools; and a situation in which certain demands of the colleges were once the determining factor, now finds its determining factor in the demands of the public high school." To this I may add that in 1902 the pupils entering college from the tax-supported high schools stood, as to those entering from academies or private schools, in the proportion of 2⅓ to 1. They comprised less than a quarter of a million boys and nearly a third of a million girls.

Naturally, then, the secondary schools are striving to make the education they give stand on its own merits, and to avoid having it narrowed into a process of cramming for college examinations. Help is given to this effort by some of the colleges themselves, which do away with entrance examinations altogether, in the case of pupils from certain schools whose certificates of fitness for entry they accept. This means that it is the school that is examined, its methods, fitness, and thoroughness; and that it is the daily work of the pupil that counts, not the accidental performance on a few points on a single day of apprehension and nervous strain. The school is thus sustained in trying to give its pupils a rounded mastery of their subjects and to rate their work by both its average quality and its quantity. The pupil is stimulated to learn his subject for its own sake, not to think only of what he must know to "pass" on the questions of some particular college.

Methods of instruction, too, are changing. There

is an abandonment of mere learning by rote and of old routine; a greater tendency to throw the student on his own resources and make him think for himself; a vast extension of practical illustrations, and particularly of laboratory work, in physics, chemistry, and the biological sciences. Text-books often come then to be used chiefly to formulate and explain what the pupil has already found out.

The Massachusetts system still keeps the inspiration of its great educator, Horace Mann, and leads the country in carrying free secondary education into the remotest hamlets. By state law, every township is compelled to furnish high school education to every child within its limits prepared to receive it. I may be pardoned for the belief that in other respects the system of secondary schools in New York stands at the head or at least abreast of the foremost, the best in organization and inspection, with as good results as any, and on the largest scale. There are eight hundred secondary schools in that single state. Independent of their support through local taxes, they have been discriminatingly aided from the literature fund since 1790, on constant inspection of schools and examination of pupils by the state regents, to the extent of over four and a half million dollars. In 1903 they had 95,000 students, spent in the year over seven million dollars, and had net property to the amount of thirty-four millions. The whole country had only fourteen times as many secondary schools in its

forty-six states, with only eight times as many pupils. The secondary school attendance in the whole country has doubled in thirteen years; it has doubled in New York in nine years. Yet while attendance at the primary school is compulsory, that at the secondary schools is not—the state feeling that it has exhausted its right of self-protection against ignorance when it has compelled its children to acquire an elementary education. The secondary schools are held to a high standard by inspections, examinations, and special allowances for special efficiency; while the attempt of feeble beginners to masquerade as fully equipped schools is rigidly repressed. As the state superintendent explained it, there is nothing to be said against their starting before they are qualified to give a full four years' course, but everything to be said against a fifty-cent piece having the effrontery to try to pass itself for a dollar.

Throughout the Union the secondary schools are generally to be found in good buildings—often, especially at the West, better than the church or the court-house. The farther west you go, the more noticeable it is that in the newest and roughest settlements the one important structure visible in the landscape is the large, substantial, and attractive two-story schoolhouse. So it is in the deserts of Arizona and on the shores of Puget Sound; so it is in the remotest and most isolated communities in Montana or in Wyoming or in Idaho. The hardy pioneer himself may still be liv-

ing in an adobe or in a sod cabin; but his child, that royal personage who holds the sovereignty of the future, must be schooled in what is to him a palace.

And now let me refer more briefly to the top of the system, the colleges and universities. No doubt, with reference to the wisest conservation of educational force, there are too many of them. One may count up about four hundred and fifteen. Of these not less than 275 are under some sort of sectarian or denominational control, while over 40 are state institutions. The severest critic would admit that at least 16 are not unworthy to stand in the class headed by Harvard, Yale, Columbia, and Princeton. The scope and quality of others may not be rated so high, but more and more the education they impart grows worthy of the degrees they grant. The collated reports of 328 of them show a total of 6207 professors, associate and adjunct professors, receiving an aggregate of over nine and a half million dollars in salaries, or an average of over $1500 per year. In denominational colleges the average salary falls to $1180; in the state institutions it rises to nearly $1800, and in those independent of both church and state control to over $1900. In these colleges and universities there were in 1902, one hundred and sixty-one thousand students. If you add the numbers in separate professional schools of law, medicine, and theology, there were in all over two hundred thousand students pursuing university studies.

There has been an enormous expansion in the oldest and best universities within the past twenty-five years. Their teaching force has been doubled or even trebled; the standards for admission and for thoroughness of instruction have both been raised; there has been a great broadening of scope, and while the Humanities have not been displaced, there is far greater attention than formerly to modern languages, to literature, history, economics, civics, and to science pure and applied.

The feeling was early and widespread, particularly at the West, that the government should support colleges and universities as well as the primary and secondary schools. As far back as in 1816, the constitution of the new State of Indiana provided that "it shall be the duty of the General Assembly, as soon as circumstances will permit, to provide by law for a general system of education, ascending in regular gradation from township schools to a state university, wherein tuition shall be gratis and equally open to all." Other states moved in the same direction, but the great impulse came in the passage of the Land Grant Act in the second year of our Civil War. It gave each state in the Union public land in proportion to its representation in Congress, to the smallest ninety thousand acres, to the largest over a million, "for the endowment and maintenance of at least one college, whose leading object shall be, without excluding other scientific and classical studies, and including military tactics, to teach such branches

of learning as are related to agriculture and the mechanic arts . . . in order to promote the liberal and practical education of the industrial classes in the several pursuits and professions of life." Congress has since increased this princely endowment by an annual appropriation of twenty-five thousand dollars in cash to each institution founded under this act.

There are now forty of them. They have twenty-seven hundred instructors, thirty-three thousand students, sixty thousand graduates, twenty-two millions of productive funds, and an aggregate annual income of six millions of dollars. In all, the ideal of a free university education for anybody qualified to enter is approximated. Fees, where any are charged, are low. Cornell takes free six hundred students from the state secondary schools on regents' certificates of fitness. Others take all their students free. With all the effort is to complete and crown the work of the free primary and secondary school system.

Their general characteristics are less prominence for the old collegiate "Humanities," greater attention to science and particularly to applied science with reference to agriculture and the industrial arts, a greater variety and freedom of choice in elective studies, military training, and the admission of women. One of them, which may be taken as a fair average type, divides its work into eleven different colleges or schools, ranging from literature and the arts to science, engineering, agri-

culture, music, ancient and modern languages, and library science. Then its school for post-graduates gives advanced instruction in twenty-seven subjects, beginning with the languages and mathematics and extending to chemistry, civil, mechanical, electrical, and sanitary engineering, agriculture, horticulture, etc. In short, they undertake most of the work of the older universities and do it well, but add many things the old ones never touched, bringing the instruction more into relation with the daily life of the majority of the people. Half a dozen of them might be named which maintain practically as high standards and offer as wide a range and as sound instruction as the best of the old universities. They draw fresh blood and their chief strength from the robust product of the common schools; they are yearly becoming more and more the colleges of the common people, often, especially at the West, of all the people; and their graduates are coming forward among the most prominent and most useful of the people's leaders.

I have tried to show some features of the system that is growing up in the United States to carry any capable child in all the land from primary school to university at the public expense; aiming to give every human being within our borders his chance, and to make America more than ever the home of Opportunity—aiming, first of all, in the golden words which Abraham Lincoln signed and made alive, "to promote the liberal and practical education of the industrial classes." In that lies our

hope to preserve and perpetuate ordered liberty under law over a united country that stretches from the tropics to the Arctic Zone, and from ocean to ocean. In that lies our hope to make our vast immigration from every clime and race capable of sharing and carrying on a complex system of government that has hitherto taxed the best resources and best qualities of the best native stock the world ever saw. In that lies our trust that they can never be long misled by any corpse-lights from the graveyard of lost hopes and abandoned ambitions, where collectivism and communism hold sway; never maddened by the more lurid temptations that blaze the way to militant anarchism. The secondary school and the state university are our antidote to all that gospel of despair, with its low level and dreary monotony, its withdrawal of all incentive to rise, and its fatal obstruction of the individual initiative which has thus far been the greatest single cause of our marvellous growth. And for every other ill, as for this, our remedy is light, and again light, and to the end more and more light. Withal we try to keep in sight as well as we can the real object of a true education, as John Ruskin stated it: "To make people not only *do* the right things, but *enjoy* the right things—not merely industrious, but to love industry—not merely learned, but to love knowledge—not merely pure, but to love purity—not merely just, but to hunger and thirst after justice."

UNIVERSITY TENDENCIES IN AMERICA

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THE nineteenth century is commonly said to have made greater progress for the human race than all that preceded it since the dawn of the Christian era. However great, it was a progress made possible by the diffusion of learning; it was very largely stimulated by American colleges and universities, and was in nothing more remarkable or more valuable than in the progress of these colleges and universities themselves. Their growth in influence, the change in their character, resources, and scope since the Civil War have been almost revolutionary.

I recall a conversation with Professor Huxley, with which I was honored in my younger days. To my question what, on the whole, he thought the greatest achievement of the century, even then nearly four-fifths passed, he replied, not as I had been expecting,—the telegraph, or the telephone, or the ocean cable, or steam navigation, or the photograph, or Bessemer steel. All these he brushed aside, in order to select as the greatest and most beneficent discovery of the nineteenth century,—antiseptic surgery! Surely, in a like spirit, we can hold as secondary the wonderful strides America has made in subduing a continent, in spreading out over the islands of the sea, in gaining and maintaining independence, and even in abolishing slavery; while we find its noblest

achievement in building up from ocean to ocean a gigantic system, free practically to the poorest as well as to the richest child of the Republic, under which any man can learn anything. Not in the armies that have so heroically borne our flag, not in the navies whose eight-inch guns, fired on the other side of the globe, shattered an ancient monarchy at ten thousand miles range; not in the inventions that amaze, nor in the growth that bewilders, nor even in the general diffusion of comfort that beggars the world for parallels, is our greatest glory to be found. Rather is it in the mind that has been enlightened, in the life that has been shaped and directed,—in a word, it is in the kind of man that America rears.

In government aid, state or national, for education, and in private gifts for education, the world has never seen wealth lavished as it has been on this continent during the century just closed, and especially during its last twenty-five years. What is to come of it all? We may no doubt claim now the widest diffusion of learning in the world; but how can we best entitle ourselves to claim also the highest and best learning of the world? Before essaying to answer that question, we may find it profitable to pause for a moment on some current complaints about what we have.

One is that education is too cheap and open to everybody; and that in consequence, largely at the public expense, whole classes in the community are educated out of fitness for anything that, with

their limitations of intellect or character or environment, they are capable of doing. We spoil a good day laborer, it is said, or a promising young farmer or mechanic, to make an unsuccessful shopkeeper or a worthless lawyer. But this is only another way of saying that the man has missed his vocation, and you have to look back of the schools to find the cause for that. The world is full of misfits, among the uneducated as well as the educated. Educating a man—if it be a real education and not a smattering you give him—does not intellectually unfit him for finding what he can do. He may develop a distaste for it, but that is the fault not of the education but of the character, inherited and developed by environment, that was brought to be educated. Other things being equal, an educated man is far better qualified than an uneducated one to find out what he is fit for and to keep at it. "Know thyself" is one of the first maxims of philosophy; and to help their students to that knowledge is one of the highest and most sacred duties of the college. The man that is really educated has learned his limitations, and found out at least what he is not fit for. It is the half-educated person, good-naturedly carried forward in classes and studies from which his intellectual or other limitations under discriminating and honest teaching would have excluded him, that is unfitted by his so-called education for what he can do, and not fitted for anything else. To avoid turning a lad's head by letting him think he has mastered a study "well enough"

when he has been found incapable of grasping it at all, is as much the duty of the conscientious educator as to teach him what he is capable of learning. When he is relentlessly turned back from the preparatory studies that are beyond him, there is the less danger of his being drawn from the productive work he should remain at, to the profession he is unfit for. No doubt, in the interest of the state and the community, the true rule for the secondary schools as well as the colleges—if the ideal could be attained—would be to make it easy for every youth to get all the education his capacity will warrant and his circumstances permit, and difficult for him to try for any more.

Another current complaint is that many of these colleges are little beyond pretentious high schools; that they degrade degrees by giving them to unfit graduates; degrade learning by lowering its standards; and degrade men by making them charlatans while calling them and making them think themselves scholars. There is an element of justice here, as there is apt to be in widespread complaints of almost any sort. But it is not true that a community is worse off for having feeble colleges; though certainly it would always be better off if it had better ones. In various educational publications—and among others in one sent under the authority of the State of New York to represent the condition of our education in the World's Fair at Paris—there is free censure of the State of Ohio for dissipating on thirty-six small colleges energies which

might make one or two great ones. But does not this miss the real objection to the condition in Ohio? If there is a valid objection at all, it must be less that the colleges are not large, than that they are not good.

A third complaint, then, and a just one, is that an undignified and unworthy competition for students among some weak colleges and universities has lowered courses of study, cheapened degrees, deceived students, and generally degraded education. The aim has been to see how soon they could turn students out, not how much they could teach them. Thus the vulgar ambition to use the numbers admitted and the fees received as a test and advertisement of success has led to the spectacle of some schools clamorously announcing, almost in the shrill fashion after which the street merchant vends his wares, that you can get as much here, owing to our superior process of cramming, in two years as you can get at the shop across the way in three, —and so have just a year saved in your lifetime in which you can be busy making money. In other schools the very source is poisoned by the admission of students without adequate preparation, on the plea that the superior facilities in the college will make up for any deficiencies in the preparatory work. One way or the other, swarms of struggling institutions which look first to numbers and fees, and only afterward to thoroughness and adequate scope, do bring discredit upon education, do give many young people a distaste for any work

they are fit for in the world, do draw to the cities shoals of people who would live better and stand higher in the country, and do crowd the professions with worthless lawyers, physicians, and clergymen who ought to be at the plough. But it is the sham, not the education, that does the harm; and that sham should be hunted down relentlessly, whether found in the colleges themselves, or in the medical or other professional schools of the universities.

There is a just complaint, too, against institutions of a better class for the low and bookkeeping spirit in which matters of learning are sometimes treated. Thus this question is occasionally made the vital one, not what has he learned? but how many hours has he given to the study? and above all is there a system of educational hocus-pocus, a plan for the student to hoist himself to the educational ceiling by a tug at his educational bootstraps, through the ingenious process of counting these same hours twice—once for the college and once for the professional training that is to follow! Grave, grown men, who imagine themselves engaged in promoting advanced learning, have been found to write out the details for this educational sleight-of-hand, and insinuatingly explain to ingenuous youth how the time devoted to this or that particular study may be contrived, like Box and Cox's bedroom, or like Goldsmith's furniture, a double debt to pay, a chest of drawers in college and a bed of down in the law school! To make hours of study rather

than maturity of mind and acquirement the preliminary for professional courses, and then to select the studies so that these hours can be counted first on the preliminary and again on the professional work, is the sort of shifty thrift that in less ideal realms is apt to bring a man to the constable.

Nevertheless, after its bad fashion, this practice does meet another popular complaint. If a boy is to work his way in life, parents often say, he cannot spare so much time before getting at it. The young man kept in college till twenty-two, and in professional studies three or four years more, starts at twenty-five or twenty-six, it is complained, in a competition that can only be disastrous, with the boy who set up for himself at eighteen. Now, if the end of educating a man is only to get him ready to keep a shop, or run a factory or an iron-mill, or to go into Wall Street, or in some way merely to make money, I am not much inclined to dispute that contention. At least it is difficult to match from among college or university graduates such an array of non-collegiate names, representing the greatest present business success, as will readily occur to every one. The men who consolidated the Astor fortune came, it is true, from Heidelberg, but the man who founded it did not. The founders of the Vanderbilt, the Morgan, the Moses Taylor, the Goelet, the Mackay, the Gould, or the Cooper fortunes came from no college at home or abroad. Take the most conspicuous business successes, confessedly won and maintained by high ability,

now or recently at the front in New York. C. P. Huntington, for example, was emancipated from schools of any kind long before he was eighteen. So were John and William Rockefeller, and so—not to weary you with mere enumeration—so was Andrew Carnegie. The latter even goes so far as to hold college training a positive disqualification for business. "The graduate has not the slightest chance," he says, "as against the boy who swept the office."

Mr. Grover Cleveland, who gave this subject some consideration, remarked acutely enough that the methods in great enterprises had so changed of late as to demand a higher grade of education, and that the new competition easily distanced the self-made man who started young without equal equipment for the race. In the field particularly of applied science and invention Mr. Cleveland had much reason for his belief; and the tendencies of an age in which the engineer, the chemist, and the electrician threaten to be kings are sure to do a great deal more to confirm it. But the fact remains that, within the general knowledge, the very greatest business successes of recent years, the greatest quite up to this present moment, have been more generally won by men who were at work before twenty instead of in college.

What then? Must men who expect to follow business careers abandon the joy and comfort of a liberal education? There are several answers. One is the *argumentum ad hominem*. The success-

ful self-made man scarcely ever favors that course himself, when it comes to the education of his own sons. Another is that there are specialized courses provided by all the leading colleges now, which partly meet the wants of those who think they *must* begin life by seventeen or eighteen.

But, more conclusive than either, there are better things to aim at than mere money-making,—at least for those not pressed by an inexorable necessity,—higher joys than that of simple business success. If there are many who must forego these for the sake of beginning life prematurely,—sweeping out the shop, as Mr. Carnegie puts it, in the hope of coming some day to own the shop,—that is no reason why the institutions of higher learning should not develop along the best lines for the sake of the steadily increasing number in this prosperous land who *can* take time for the best things. This is no longer a young, poor people on a wild, unexplored continent, struggling desperately with hard circumstances to make a beginning. It is a great nation, rich with the unprecedented progress and accumulated prosperity of a hundred years. The average man no longer needs, like the sons of the pioneers, to sacrifice the highest things of which he is capable for the sake of getting into the shop early, so as not to be outstripped in the mere race for a living. Success in American life hereafter will be measured with more characters than merely the dollar-mark; and American education must be shaped in the future to fit the man, rather

than merely his business. Many, no doubt, who will hold deservedly high places in the twentieth century must be at work by eighteen or earlier; but that is a reason for giving them such an education as they need and can assimilate, not for lowering the college standard, to the detriment of all the rest, in order to give them the deceptive decoration of a diploma thus depreciated and undeserved.

Akin to this tendency to cheapen the lower degrees for the sake of students who lack the time to earn them is another error, barely showing itself, in quarters more advanced, of which whispers begin to be heard. This is the fault of encouraging post-graduate study for the higher learning, less for its own sake than for the degree. Thus one reads in a recent and important educational authority about the respective advantages of divers ways and means of "studying for the Doctorate, as the goal to which the graduate student presses on." It is a high ambition, no doubt. And yet there have been educational authorities with a loftier view of their mission, who sought to lead their students to move on a higher plane and strive for a worthier goal. If students are encouraged to select what advanced learning they are to seek, and to shape the course of study they adopt in any measure with reference simply to its degree-producing powers,—if they do not seek it for itself and choose the course purely because it is the most helpful to the end, then our post-graduate courses must have less value and our degrees

must convey less distinction. The man who serves his imperilled countrymen in an alarming crisis by a supreme act of devotion may well prize the Victoria Cross with which his proud and grateful country distinguishes him. But if he laid his course, not as a patriot to do his duty to his imperilled countrymen, but merely as an adventurer, feeling the need of decoration, to hunt for the quickest and easiest opportunity to get it, the cross wears another aspect if won, and carries an altogether different value.

There are objectors, too, who question the advantage of the present overwhelming tendency, especially at the West, toward collegiate and university coeducation. Certainly, in no part of the educational field has greater progress been made than in the facilities for the education of women; and shrivelled must be the soul that would have it otherwise. Vassar, Smith, Wellesley, Bryn Mawr, have long marked a higher standard than similar schools for women in other lands; and now colleges abroad, like Girton and Newnham, enjoying high university affiliations, are at last finding their worthy counterparts here in Radcliffe and Barnard and others. It is an inspiring progress, and even if it may have been carried in some institutions to an illogical development, the error, if error there be, will cure itself. But certainly it must be admitted that the western trend to direct coeducation in colleges and universities is plainly at variance with another development we have all

regarded as characteristic of progress toward the higher education,—the process of differentiation and specialization. Grant at once, as a thing nobody in this age dreams of questioning, the right of woman, quite as clear as the right of man, to learn everything. But the fact remains that the great majority of women seeking an advanced education will probably in time come to do the same thing the men do,—specialize it with reference to the life they are going to lead; and the girl graduate from one of the great coeducational universities is not, as a rule, going to lead the same life as the bachelor of science, or the bachelor of electrical engineering. If the highest progress be in differentiation and specialization of effort, then women are entitled to that progress as well as men; and university coeducation, though, perhaps, as yet the most economical, is manifestly not the best way of supplying it. On the disadvantages that some think they find in throwing the two sexes into the intimacy of a common college life at the most impressionable period, when their thoughts ought to be on their books and are so easily kindled instead into dreams of love and matrimony, I do not imagine it profitable to dwell. The parents who send their sons and daughters to coeducational institutions know what they are doing. One can only say about the system they are likely to select, what Mr. Lincoln said about the book: "If you like this kind of a book, then I reckon this is just about the book you would like."

An acute English observer, Mr. Bryce, remarks that German universities are popular, but not free; English universities free, but not popular; and American universities both popular and free. Let us hope that these characteristics in our system may be preserved in their purity. Long may we continue to have our universities popular in the sense that they are open on equal terms to every rank and condition of life—that they have no unwritten laws restricting them to the sons of gentlemen of birth or distinction, and making them uncomfortable for anybody else. Long may they remain free, in the sense that the instruction is limited only by the desire to seek and to teach the truth. But the popularity will be harmful if it degenerates into a vulgar catering for numbers by throwing down the bars of admission which time and experience have sanctioned; and the liberty will be disastrous if it degenerates into license, whether for the students in their conduct, or for the professors in their teaching. The freedom for a student which absolves him from the obligations of a gentleman is no better and no worse than the freedom for a professor which absolves him from the duties of a patriot, and converts his relations to his country into general railings against its present and its past policy, rather than the exercise of an influence, justly belonging to the highly educated and highly placed, upon the country's future. It is a misfortune for the colleges, and no less for the country, when the trusted instructors

are out of sympathy with its history, with its development, and with the men who made the one and are guiding the other.

It was suggested at the beginning of these remarks that the splendid gifts of learning which illuminate and ennoble our history, and in an unprecedented degree our recent history, entitle us to expect for our country the highest and best learning of the world. But what is the highest and best? Or, if that question be too abstract for a conclusive answer, what is the highest and best for this country? What sort of education does a republic most need in the days of its overwhelming success and unparalleled prosperity? Perhaps a solution may be easier if we state the problem differently. What defects of human character does a republic tend to develop, that the higher education should correct?

Well, our critics, foreign and domestic, are free-spoken enough to leave us little difficulty in finding answers to that. We are conceited beyond endurance. We brag like Bombastes. We are slow to believe that other people can teach us anything. We have the provincial idea that because we are conspicuously ahead in some things, we are ahead in everything. We reach conclusions without seeing a subject on all sides, and are then intolerant of diversity of opinion. We value big things simply because of their bigness. We live in a whirl of money-making, or amusement, or excitement of some kind; we rarely take time to think of other

things, and, because we are too busy for it ourselves, we let the newspapers make up our minds for us. When acting collectively we are liable to go off at half-cock, and are swept by sudden waves of popular excitement, like the French. We do so many things in a hurry that often we fail to do some of them thoroughly. We come to think that pretty well is good enough; that veneer is better than the solid mahogany, looking just as well and costing far less; that a chromo is as good as the oil-painting from which a casual glance does not distinguish it; that a plaster cast of the Venus of Milo is, "for practical purposes," about as good as the broken and discolored old marble in the Louvre; that a machine-made American carpet is as good as the rug from the looms of India; a pot-metal vase for the garden as good as one of bronze or marble; an iron cornice, painted stone color, as good as one of the carved stone; always the thing that has been done by wholesale by machinery, "more in the prevailing style," and just as good for practical people as the thing patiently wrought in every line to individual beauty by a trained and beauty-loving intelligence.

Do not these superficial defects go deeper? Has there not been a constant tendency, developed by democratic institutions thus far everywhere, in ancient times as well as our own, to level down; sometimes to pare off individualism in character or action; often to resent and pull down superiority, to encourage mediocrity, and to try to believe, if

not to avow, as a necessary article of true democratic faith, that mediocrity is equal to the best and just as good? Naturally, this tendency, which a republic generally seems to develop, will lead to treating men not as individuals, but in great masses. It thus invades the field of education and converts the noblest work confided to man—the moulding, one might almost say the very creation of individual character—into high-pressure arrangements for the production of scholars by wholesale; into schemes to shape and manufacture characters and lives like watches or steam-engines by machinery.

Should the best American education tend to control this bias of republican institutions or be controlled by it? If the latter, then let us make our colleges and universities bigger and bigger; crowd more scores and hundreds of eager, immature individual human units into each class, and deal with them in gross; run our institutions as one or two (for better reasons, no doubt) are already run, on full time or overtime, like a factory, summer and winter, spring and autumn; show the students how to make one hour count for two; veneer and varnish them as quickly as possible; and let each educational factory be rated by the rapidity of its methods and the quantity of its output. But if the best education for a republic should tend to counteract the defects it develops, and to elevate and strengthen it for a long and successful life, is it not clear that we shall do better with less wholesale processes, that our effort must be to exert individ-

ual influence upon the individual youth to be trained with reference to his individual wants, and that if changes are to occur, it is better colleges we want instead of bigger ones?

Consider the extent to which we have gone in banishing the parent or teacher from his old close and intimate influence with the individual boy. The most fashionable educational tendency of the day, particularly in our large cities, eliminates family influence from the school period almost at the outset by abandoning our excellent secondary schools, or even the local private schools, in either of which that influence might still be maintained. The boy must not be made a mollycoddle. He must not be kept tied to his mother's apron strings. He must learn to rough it with other boys, and dig his strenuous way through the rough and tumble of a distant boarding-school without being able to run always to sympathizing parents in trouble or in trivial illness. That, we are told, is the only way to make a man of him. He must not be guarded from evil. To do that long is impossible; therefore take him away from his family life, expose him early to contamination, and let him learn to conquer it, if he can, by fighting his battle alone. And so the boy must be thrown more with other boys than with parents or teachers from the outset, and must be sent at a tender age to St. Paul's or St. Mark's, or Groton or Lawrenceville, or the Pacific coast equivalents, for a four or six years' stay. Then the

parents, who have scarcely seen him save at vacations, part with him again, and he enters one of the big colleges. Here he finds himself in a class of several hundred freshmen, with little possibility for more than a speaking acquaintance with the professors in the class-room, and less likelihood of much close contact with them outside. The individual and social substitutes for family influence that make up the refined life of the English university are largely lacking in the American system, and the young men in these big colleges are still necessarily dealt with in the mass, and given their education by wholesale.

Consider next how the intense practicality of our education hitherto—the insistent demand for something from the colleges that would let the student think himself liberally educated, and yet let him begin life early—has drawn us away from the highest aims. Let us revert again to the inquiry, What sort of an education does a republic most need for its most favored citizens in the days of its bewildering success and prosperity? Do not the very quality of its defects and the nature of its dangers compel the answer that what the Republic thus needs is not merely or mostly knowledge? No doubt it must always strive for an education that will place the experience of the world in all ages at its service. But beyond and far above that must be its development of the disposition for reflection, the power to consider dispassionately, the capacity to reason accurately, and then to reach

just judgments on these acquired facts. One of the easiest tasks in the world is to learn things. The child does it almost by instinct. One of the hardest tasks in the world is to think about things exactly, judiciously, correctly; to estimate, to weigh, to give the proper value to each, to reach sound conclusions,—in a word, to make the knowledge of things of the most value for the conduct of life. When the crude knowledge has thus been assimilated by the reflective mind, as the ruminating animal assimilates the crude food for the physical frame, there has come a new quality to the student. Out of the things he has learned and the philosophy that has taught him their meanings and relations has come the faculty of seeing straight and of thinking straight, and from this follows, as certainly as the needle follows the pole, the crowning gift of living straight. Knowledge as the basis there must be: knowledge of what the world has done and is doing, in civics, in economics, in everything relating to the history or the science of government; knowledge of man,—the being to be governed,—of the motives that influence his conduct, the circumstances that change his purpose, what his mind is and how it works; knowledge of the languages he works with, of the literature that inspires him and the laws that govern him; knowledge of the ideas he cherishes, the faith he holds, the customs and prejudices that hold him. But all these are as nothing, and may even be worse, without the reflection, the reasoning, the judgment,

that transmute them into charts for our guidance and safeguards against our dangers. First, then, the Republic, where every citizen is a ruler, needs knowledge, of course, for its citizens; but next and more it needs the judgment which can vitalize knowledge; and then the character, born of the right principles coming from the two, which fructifies both and becomes the most precious possession of the state.

In thus noting the need of more direct personal contact and individual influence between teacher and taught, or in noting the need of strengthening the college course where it has been weakened by changes making it more attractive to practical people who are in a hurry to begin life, there is not the slightest intention to disparage or undervalue the undeniable merits of what we have. Surely, enough has been said already to show an adequate appreciation of our progress under the present system and the marvels it has wrought. But it is fair, I think, to say, in a general way, and with admission in advance of the thousands of exceptions, that hitherto our education in this country has been to make a living. The country is old enough and prosperous enough now to warrant us in expecting that henceforth it will be more an education to make a life. I would plead, then, for a system that would put the most into one's life, rather than for that which enables one quickest to begin life and earn a living. That, too, has its place, supremely important in the past, highly important

still and always. But let us not deceive ourselves as to proportions and values. It is not the highest. To make a life, full, rounded, with balanced character and serenity of judgment, with trained capacities for the highest work, the highest appreciation, the fullest and purest enjoyment,—that is a greater thing than to make a living!

Unless these observations have wholly missed their purpose, they must now have led us at least to consider, if not to accept, two propositions which seem to me to sum up the next advances for American colleges and universities. They need now to give more individual attention to the individual pupil, and they need to lead him on paths to the best learning for the best life, rather than merely for the quickest business or professional success. The first proposition does not point to big colleges; and the second does not point to university development exclusively on the lines thus far most in favor. Bigger colleges must mean less individual influence on the eager immature mind; the specialization most in favor now in our universities is that which leads to ways to make a living, and while no one would want less of that, the highest education must give more of something else.

We started in America with the English idea of a college. Later we grew into the German idea of a university. We changed the English college, after the American fashion, by making it bigger and, as we thought, more practical. Then we rejected the

English idea of a university, partly because the "shrieks of locality," as some politicians once expressed it, made such a grouping of colleges at one spot difficult, if not impossible; but still more because the English idea chiefly encouraged what might be called pure learning, as distinguished from the professional and specialized teaching which was a more marked characteristic of the German university. The outcome is, first, colleges sometimes as big as half a dozen English ones, and then certain professional, scientific, and technical schools added, and the whole called a university. But this has been attended by material changes in the course of the college intended to facilitate entrance to, and perhaps quicken passage through, the university. It all makes, beyond question, an admirable outcome for the practical people that needed and organized it. But it is not the best outcome now for a people who have outgrown their early needs.

When the next Stanford has another forty millions or more to expend in an effort to give his country an institution of learning worthy of its glorious present and its bewildering future, why not begin with the idea of an eminent church dignitary of the West, that a university, primarily considered, is less a school than an atmosphere? Let him create the atmosphere by grouping and organizing his colleges in close and friendly emulation, as at Oxford or Cambridge. Then let him see to it that the entrance requirements admit only students capable of using the opportunities he offers, and that the

colleges prescribe only those courses of study which the best experience of the world has found to furnish the best basis for any profession, or for further intellectual training in any direction. When he has thus secured them the best start, let him open to the graduates of these colleges a real university, comprising the best features of both the English and the German type, with the splendid encouragement Oxford and Cambridge offer for the further prosecution of learning for its own sake, and with all the professional, scientific, technological, and other schools and courses we have already adapted from German models and improved upon from our own experience.

Suppose some one had the power to plant Dartmouth and Williams, Amherst and Bowdoin, and Brown and Smith in one neighborhood, retaining for each its separate organization, its individual merits and inspiring history, and to build on them the University of New England. Who does not perceive that here would be an atmosphere of learning, an emulation and inspiration for the best work, an authority, a dignity, a promise, and potency such as the New World has never yet seen in the educational field? Of course it is wildly impossible. But in dealing with younger institutions, or in establishing new ones with the colossal pecuniary power some educational benefactors now wield, such a system could be begun. In that direction might be found a realization of the higher aims that have been indicated. In such a group of

colleges, none need be so overgrown as to make individual contact between the pupil and the professor impossible; or if one is, a smaller one, beside it, will have the same atmosphere and the same university control and advantages. None need dilute its course by "electives" which belong in the university, or lower its course to accommodate the haste of those who must begin life early. From such a group of colleges the true university would rise naturally, broad-based and spreading at will in every direction to which the trained mind, now competent to choose for itself, would seek to extend its studies. But the more stimulating atmosphere and the more strictly collegiate training would alike insure the direction of larger numbers to the fields of languages, history, philosophy, mathematics, and pure science, which give the training more needful and more useful for a republic than anywhere else, and which properly rank first in an institution of the highest learning that aims to cover all the great departments of intellectual life. The opportunity for differentiation and specialization in educational effort would be greater than ever, but it would be put where it belongs, not with the youth in his plastic, uncertain, formative period, but with the trained young man, competent to select and eager to pursue. Thus when the graduate passed from the college, whether he devoted himself chiefly to the highest learning or sought at once an education in applied science or in a profession, he would, at any rate, carry into the uni-

versity a mind fit for the work it demands. To borrow the happy illustration of President Stryker of Hamilton, the college would have made the intellectual iron that came to it into steel; and therefore the university would not be wasting its time in trying to put a fine edge upon pot-metal.

Perhaps it is a fanciful idea that we shall ever group colleges anywhere in a great university in America, as circumstances that can never be reproduced did group them, six or seven centuries ago, on the banks of the Cam and the Isis. We have gone far, with good results, on another road. The old universities sprang from a desire for a wider learning than the schools of the cathedrals and monks would furnish. So the American university of to-day sprang from a need for a wider and more practical learning than those English and Continental models furnished; and we can no more afford to lose this widening and extension than we can afford to go back to the schools of the cathedrals. But the universities that sprang up in the fourteenth and fifteenth centuries held on to the best in the schools they replaced. Now that we have the leisure and the opportunities which great growth and great prosperity confer, it should be our instinct to hold on to the best in the university system which we replaced with our own a hundred years ago. Whether the exact organization can be reproduced or not, the essentials are surely within reach.

First, the university atmosphere, which can be

obtained only by the flocking of teachers and pupils to a great educational centre.

Secondly, the individual influence of the teacher upon the pupil, especially throughout the collegiate course, which can best be attained in colleges of moderate size, under the university, by methods of instruction less formal and more vitalizing to the immature mind than merely by lectures and written examinations, and by the more intimate association, in commons and elsewhere, between professors and students.

Thirdly, the old college course as the best training for the new university work,—the humanities, to recur to the finely descriptive phrase by which our fathers designated a thorough education in the classics (to which we would gladly add also modern languages), and philosophy; next, pure mathematics, and next, science.

This ideal college course once mastered, the pot-metal has been made steel, fit for the miracle-working uses to which the university then really opens the door. Then, and not till then, is the time for the man in a hurry, who nevertheless wants a genuine liberal education, to consider how much farther and whither he will go. Then, and not till then, with disciplined mind and enlarged vision, he is competent to make his own choice from the "electives," decide in what direction his life is to turn, and what further learning he will find of the most worth for his aim, whether that be profit, or the service of his fellow men in politics or else-

where, or merely pure intellectual enjoyment. This collegiate course was the best basis for the higher learning the best systems of the eighteenth and nineteenth centuries had to offer. It is the best basis still, as we turn to the wider and better attainments the twentieth century has to offer. It has formed for generations of our race the badge of the best title any of the race has ever worn in any land, or can wear,—the proud title of scholar and gentleman.

It is to the high duty of perpetuating and enlarging that exalted type we have the right to summon our institutions of the most advanced learning. We demand from them the combination of exact knowledge and ripe reflection that makes the scholar; the combination of right thinking and right living that makes the gentleman. There we have the greatest possibility of our colleges and universities, the consummate flower of our educational system, the inspiration and guide of progress, the safeguard of society, the ornament and defence of the Republic.

We have lately seen the close of a century which in the splendor of its discoveries and the rapidity of its progress surpassed all that went before it. We stand at the dawn of a century that is to surpass it still more. The Republic closed the old century with a continental population of not far from eighty millions, and perhaps fifteen or sixteen millions more in its dependencies. The new century, before its close, may see that population,

even if the ratio of increase be reduced to a third or fourth of the present average, rising to the almost incomprehensible number of three hundred millions. The Republic enters this new century with the control of the continent of the future, of the ocean of the future, and of the two richest archipelagoes of the world. It will pass no self-denying ordinance against growth. It faces the dazzling prospect with undazzled eyes, and scorns to shrink back from greatness through craven fear of being great. From insignificant beginnings it moved to the head of the material progress of the nineteenth century. The field of the American universities is not merely material, but intellectual and moral. It is their task in the twentieth century to see to it that this Republic of our love and pride, whose world-wide extent and illimitable opportunities thus confuse the understanding and bewilder the imagination, shall respond not unworthily to the wider duties of its fortune, shall rise to pre-eminence in more than material progress, and march at the head of the culminating civilization of the world.

EDUCATION IN ENGLAND

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FROM the English came our first educational ideas; to them we long looked, in colonial days and later, for the highest types of collegiate and university education; from them we got the religious control so long felt in so many of our schools, as it is still felt in theirs. More important still, from them came the fervid, almost fanatical belief in the necessity of education, which we, in accordance with our custom, broadened far beyond their original view, and have clung to through two centuries, and over a continent and many islands, with a tenacity which, if it were not American, might be called truly British. Plainly, the educational fever runs in the blood!

I shall treat, then, briefly, of some details of past and present English educational work. But I shall do no violence to the maxims either of Dogberry or Don Quixote; shall enter upon no comparison with our own work in similar fields. There are two reasons. First, all comparisons between countries are apt to be odious. Secondly, unless far more time were taken than is at our disposal for a careful statement of varying circumstances, all comparisons are sure to be unfair.

In any consideration of English education for the masses, it must be remembered that a national system for it did not exist before 1870, and could not be said to have reached good working order before 1892. The government gave no assistance

whatever for elementary schools (*i.e.*, for what we should call common schools, or primary schools) until 1834, when the House of Commons made its first appropriation of £20,000. This was to be used solely for new school buildings. Not till 1839 did the government make an appropriation for more direct aid to popular education.

Yet meantime England had somehow trained Shakespeare and John Milton. She had also trained the Pilgrims, who began in the Colony of Massachusetts Bay that common school system which is now the pride of every American.

Until William E. Forster in 1870 carried through the bill to provide for public elementary education in England and Wales, the government itself could hardly be said to have taken much share in real educational provision for the poorer classes, and not a great deal even for the middle classes. Nevertheless, such as their system was, and for what it undertook, it had long been of rare excellence. It had admirably accomplished—for a certain number—the highest aim of education; it had been a wonderful developer of character. Public schools, Eton and Harrow, Winchester and Rugby, and many another leading up to and coöperating with the two universities, had been such a nursery of statesmen, of soldiers and sailors and great proconsuls and civil administrators throughout the Empire on which the sun never sets, as the world had never before seen. It may have been a fanciful notion, attributed to the Iron Duke, that Waterloo

was won at Eton, but certainly the secret of Anglo-Saxon superiority in the seventeenth and eighteenth centuries was largely to be found in the British schools and universities.

The secret of some other things was to be found in the chaotic and undeveloped state of popular elementary education. The long reign of Queen Victoria had but recently begun, when in February, 1839, Lord John Russell wrote to the Lord Lansdowne of the day: "I have received Her Majesty's commands to make a communication to Your Lordship on a subject of the greatest importance. Her Majesty has observed with deep concern the want of instruction which is still observable among the poorer classes of her subjects. All the inquiries which have been made show a deficiency in the general education of the people, which is not in accordance with the character of a civilized and Christian nation." Continuing to speak for Her Majesty, Lord John went on to specify a lack of qualified teachers, imperfect teaching, deficient inspection of the work done by the schools of both the Established Church and the Non-Conformists, and finally the neglect of the subject by Parliament.

Four years later, inspectors reported that the teaching in these schools was so bad that only half the scholars learned to read and only a quarter of them to write. And four years after that, now almost in the middle of the nineteenth century, Macaulay, in a speech in the House of Commons,

gave the reason: "How many of these teachers," he said, "are the refuse of other callings,—discarded servants, or ruined tradesmen, who cannot do a sum of three; who would not be able to write a common letter; who do not know whether the earth is a cube or a sphere, and cannot tell whether Jerusalem is in Asia or America; whom no gentleman would trust with the key of his cellar, and no tradesman would send of a message."

Even as late as 1861, about the time our Civil War broke out, the Newcastle Commission reported almost as unsatisfactory a state of affairs. It considered that only about one-fourth of the children in the schools got a tolerable facility in reading, writing, and arithmetic—the great majority leaving school between the ages of ten and eleven. It told of a public school with such primitive facilities that, when the writing lesson was given, four boys were required to carry ink bottles up and down between the desks, so that each boy in turn might dip his pen in the ink. And finally this commission said concerning the private school teachers in one part of London: "None are too old, too poor, too ignorant, too feeble, too sickly, too unqualified to regard themselves and to be regarded as fit for school-keeping. Domestic servants out of place, discharged barmaids, vendors of toys and lollypops, keepers of small eating-houses, of mangles or small lodging-houses, needlewomen who take in plain or slop work,

milliners, consumptive patients in an advanced stage, cripples almost bedridden, persons of at least doubtful temperance, outdoor paupers, men and women of seventy or eighty years of age, persons who spell badly, who scarcely write, and who cannot cipher at all,—such are some of the teachers, not in remote rural districts but in the heart of London." In recalling this and other accounts of the time, it is well to bear in mind that in all countries reformers have sharp voices and use many staccato notes.

But Matthew Arnold was not of that class; yet he reported in 1869 that nearly half the children he examined had been less than one year at school, and half the rest for less than two years.

Now, to end this statement of earlier conditions, which has been really necessary to a comprehension of the present situation, it should be added that the schools thus described might be either purely private enterprises, sometimes aided a little by local taxation, or might be under the management either of the Established Church of England, or of the British and Foreign School Society, representing the bulk of the Non-Conformist churches, or of sundry minor religious organizations. By far the greater number were under some distinct and positive sectarian control. Great sums had been invested by the different denominations in school buildings and in supporting schools, when there was little other support for them. Their work had

come gradually to be supplemented not only by fees, but by allowances from the local taxation, and finally from the government. Thus the churches controlled the schools: the local taxpayers had a pecuniary interest in them, the parents who paid fees had, and finally the general government had.

As would be naturally inferred, the churches that built them up insisted on religious teaching. In the case of the Established Church this meant the Bible, church hymns, the church catechism, and particularly the doctrine of the Trinity; and at first pupils coming into such a school from Non-Conformist families, from Agnostic or Jewish families, or from aggressive unbelievers, had to receive the same instruction. Here, of course, was one opening for trouble; and another was to be found among local taxpayers, not connected with the Church of England, or perhaps with any church. With Non-Conformist schools the difficulty was somewhat different. They were disposed to be content with what was known as Cowper-Temple teaching; *i.e.*, as legally defined in the Act of 1870, without "religious catechism or religious formulary, distinctive of any particular denomination." Subject to that restriction, whatever religious instruction the local authorities desired could be given. This Cowper-Temple teaching, though apt to be satisfactory to the majority of Non-Conformists, did not satisfy the Established Church, or the unbelievers, and might not always satisfy the local taxpayers. As

a matter of fact, however, it evoked little protest, excepting from the Established Church.

Now, it is easy for an American to say that all this confusion and dissatisfaction could be avoided by confining the public schools to secular instruction, and leaving religious training to the church and the family. But it is not so easy to show how vested rights, going back often for a century or more, can thus be preserved; nor is it easy to show how the churches, which invested and were encouraged to invest their money and labors for one purpose, are to be reconciled to the arbitrary diversion of their investment, long afterward, to another purpose. Between 1869 and 1876, houses for over a million school-children were erected by denominational agencies, and the total of voluntary subscriptions for that purpose in that time was over £3,000,000. Besides the claim in equity which on the basis of such facts the churches assert, it is probably true that the majority of the English people, however much they may differ as to details, and to whatever rival sects they belong, would be still more discontented if all religious teaching were to disappear from their schools. There is increasing impatience, no doubt, with the conflicting demands and disputes of the churches, a growing tendency to say "a plague on both your houses; let the tax-paid education be purely secular!" But in spite of such outbursts, I believe the decided majority of the taxpayers still think religious instruction a necessity for the rising generation, and do not think

they would have adequate security for getting it, if it were excluded from the tax-supported schools. Until 1870 the daily reading of the Bible was an essential condition of getting any government aid for an elementary school, and it is still habitually read in most of the schools, even where not required by any authority.

The leading English lines of thought on the subject finally found expression in two organizations which have contended for many years. The Birmingham League advocated a national system of education, to be compulsory on all, free to all, and unsectarian, but not to exclude undenominational religious instruction. The National Education Union represented the Established Church, and was organized to oppose the efforts of the Birmingham Union, and to hold on to the church hymns and the church catechism. Untiringly the contest rages. A most hotly fought measure was Mr. Birrell's bill (passed after long debate in the Commons and thrown out by the Lords), which attempted a considerable advance toward the ideals of the Birmingham League. The way in which the other side regarded it was hinted in the epithet by which many of the London newspapers had the habit of describing it—Bir-religion.

During the popular debates over this measure, I received a letter from the editor of "The Salisbury Times," besides several from private sources, all calling my attention to a startling statement made

in a speech on the subject at a political meeting in Salisbury by a well-known and perfectly reputable Conservative candidate, to this effect:

"In Australia, since religious teaching was abolished in the day schools, crime has increased 75 per cent. In the United States in 1850 there was one crime to every 3422 of the population, but to-day there is one criminal for every 300. In Denver, out of 10,000 boys, 2000 of them have been in jail. Now, we do not want the same thing to happen in Great Britain."

I was asked if these statements were not misleading, and I prepared such a reply as careful inquiry seemed to show that the facts warranted.[1] But there was at the moment no such storm centre in British politics as this religious phase of the educational question; and on second thoughts it appeared wiser for a diplomat to obey the old rule to avoid getting in any way involved in the domestic debates of the country to which he was accredited—even if it should be at the temporary cost of not promptly correcting misapprehensions about his own country.

Now, it would have been easy, first, to call attention to the curious fact that the statements were strikingly like some unwise stories published from time to time, some only a few years earlier, in American reviews of high standing, concerning an alleged increase of juvenile crime in London,

[1] Valuable aid in securing the facts was kindly furnished by Dr. Draper, the New York Commissioner of Education, by Mr. Eugene A. Philbin, of the Board of Regents, and by Professor Elmer E. Brown, National Commissioner of Education. The reports of his predecessor, Dr. W. T. Harris, also shed much light on the subject.

following the extension there of the free school system. Next, as to the allegations concerning the United States, it might have been said at once that they were inexact, and that, even if they had been accurate, they would have needed to be made more complete to avoid giving an inaccurate impression.

They were inexact because the latest census statistics available, those furnished by the Census Office in 1904, show that instead of one criminal to every 300 of population, there is only one to every 990; also that there has been a reduction between 1890 and 1904, not merely in the proportion of criminals to total population, but also in the actual number of criminals, in spite of the increase of population; and finally, that the Census Office believes that its own returns of criminals before 1880 were imperfect, making the number previous to that date too small, and consequently exaggerating the increase in the next decades.

Next, even if these allegations had been exact, they would still have given an inaccurate impression anyway. It is obviously misleading to point to the number of criminals and say that is the work of our educational system, without showing whether these criminals have ever been under the system. Plainly you must know what proportion of the whole population has not been taught at all in our schools, and next what proportion of the criminals that illiterate part furnishes. Thus, in the largest states, New York and Pennsylvania, the wholly

illiterate are only 4 per cent of the population, yet they furnish 33 per cent of the prisoners. If you add to the wholly illiterate in those states the others enumerated as very deficient, you find that the two classes furnish 60 per cent of the prisoners.

Again, it is obviously misleading to use statistics of crime as evidence of a bad effect of the educational system, without mentioning that, while the educational system has been steadily extending, the number of criminals in the same period has been shrinking—having been in the whole United States 132 to the 100,000 of population in 1890, and only 101 in 1894.

And again, it is obviously misleading to hold the educational system responsible for an increase of prisoners clearly caused by changes in the laws. Thus, in the State of Massachusetts, in a period of thirty-five years (between 1850 and 1885), commitments by the courts increased, yet crimes against persons and property rapidly decreased, and all crimes excepting intemperance decreased. Now, more rigid laws against drunkenness and the more frequent arrests that followed can hardly with fairness be charged to the growth of the educational system!

As to the Denver case I know less, but from the report of the Juvenile Court of Denver for 1904 it appears, not that one boy in five was sent to jail each year, but that in the six years previous to the establishment of the court, about one boy in seven out of the total population of boys between

ten and sixteen years of age had been, as the court said, under the old system "thrust into jail." In the two years after the establishment of the court, it tried but seven hundred and nineteen cases and committed only forty-four.

Whether religious instruction should be enforced upon everybody in English schools is purely a question for English people. We have no right and no disposition to meddle with it; and I venture to think the facts just cited prove that there is nothing in either our educational or our criminal record to make it needful for any of them to import us into it.

And yet I cannot help feeling that on the general subject we might profitably take a hint from the old country. Whatever else we may say about the English schools, they do turn out well-behaved, orderly boys and girls, respectful to those set over them, grounded in the morals of Christian civilization, with an instinctive sense of obedience to law and a becoming regard for the authorities that represent it. Would we be any the worse off if we had more of these qualities here? May it not happen that in our effort to keep all questions of religion and morals in what we consider their proper place, they may in reality be left without any place in the training of a good many children? If the interest of the Republic requires that every child should be compelled to learn to read its laws, does not the same interest as imperatively require

that every child should be taught, and should be unable to escape being taught, the absolute necessity of respect for those laws and of prompt and dutiful obedience to the officers of the law? Does not the interest of the Republic further demand that the coming citizens shall have some idea of our old beliefs in the Fatherhood of God and the brotherhood of man, or at least shall be thoroughly grounded in the great principles of the moral law, without which neither ordered liberty nor civilization itself can exist?

If English schools, according to our ideas, go too far in teaching creeds, may we not be going too far the other way, in some parts of the country at least, in excluding altogether, or in giving too little space to teaching unsectarian religion and morals, to enforcing respect for authority, and to training the habit of mind that secures unhesitating obedience to law, and to its officers? In London the policeman, the representative of law, often controls the biggest and angriest crowd by lifting his hand, in cases where the New York policeman has to lift his club. Nay, here the giddy chauffeur, for a single example out of many, gayly snaps his fingers at the uplifted club, and has to be run down on a motorcycle. Even then, when caught, he is apt to tell the presumptuous policeman he means to have him "broken" for his pains. Such a threat in London would railroad him to a long term in jail. The mere failure to stop, the moment a policeman lifts his hand, is generally in England un-

thinkable; the imagination is staggered to conceive the punishment that might befall the foolhardy person who should venture on such unprecedented lawlessness. Some cause has produced this difference. Is it improbable that early training in a school that could be nowise escaped by the growing boy had something to do with it?

It has been seen that even yet, to use a Hibernicism, the English system of elementary education is notably unsystematic. Besides purely private schools, sometimes receiving government aid, and some old public schools having endowments running back for a century or more and also receiving government aid, there are "provided schools," *i.e.*, council schools, or, in American parlance, common schools; and "non-provided schools," that is, voluntary schools, largely under church control. The two classes last named had accommodation in 1906 for about three and one-half million scholars each. Both receive aid from local taxation and also from the state. They had between them an average attendance in that year of five and one-fourth millions, or over 86 per cent of the registration. To support the work of elementary education thus distributed, aside from other resources, there were public grants of nearly eleven and one-half million pounds—say fifty-seven million dollars.

To indicate the nature of instruction thus given we may take the London "provided schools" as favorable examples. The curriculum, as first fixed

by the board in 1870, included instruction in morality and religion, reading, writing, arithmetic, geography, English grammar, English history, elementary physical science, elementary social economy, drawing, singing, mensuration for boys, needlework for girls, and physical exercises, besides a few discretionary subjects. By 1902 the latter had been materially enlarged, and the head teacher now had the liberty of selecting, according to the capacity and desire of the pupils, from algebra, geometry, mechanics, animal physiology, botany, chemistry, hygiene, bookkeeping, shorthand, Latin, French, and German. Nearly all upper class boys also attend special centres for manual training, and upper class girls for domestic economy.

American critics of tendencies in their own schools sometimes object to the "fads and frills" which, as they say, keep the children from learning "the three R's." It will be observed that the London elementary schools likewise provide for a good many so called "frills." But it must be noted that these are not permitted to take the place of the essentials. Whatever else a London child may learn at a "provided school," he must and does learn to read, write, and cipher. Two out of the three at least he generally learns remarkably well. Nothing is apt to strike an American more, when he comes to know the product of English elementary schools, than their thoroughness in these essentials. I have rarely seen a domestic servant who did not have a fairly good handwriting, spell with more

accuracy than some of our own misguided college professors, and compose a clear letter, well expressed, in civil phrases, not offensive by an unwarranted familiarity or wanton assurance in demanding the time of a stranger, not verbose or slangy; in fact, likely, by its appearance and manner at least, to create a good impression. Would that we could say as much for all the graduates of our colleges.

In most of the London schools there are three departments, those for boys, girls, and infants. An average number for the three would be about one thousand. There are also schools in which the sexes are not separated. About half the teachers in 1869 were women and girls, by 1900 they had become three-fourths. Certified masters of schools are paid about £129 per annum, say $640; and certified mistresses about two-thirds as much. Pupil teachers are put in training, on application and favorable reports, at fourteen years of age; and after a year, study only half the day, teach the other half, and are paid a graded salary which, at the end of three years more, rises to £30 for boys and £24 for girls. Women are eligible for educational committees, and their service seems to be popular.

The general limit for compulsory attendance at elementary schools was thirteen years, but the local authorities now have the power to raise it to fourteen, and the prevailing tendency is toward an exercise of this power. The penalty on parents for neglect is £1 with costs. The pupils are graded by

various standards, known as standard 1, the lowest, and so on up to standards 5 and 6, which represent the highest elementary work, and standard 7, which denotes the distinct extension of the work into the secondary field.

Discipline in the schools is generally very well maintained; pupils of both sexes are early taught obedience, courtesy, and respect—sometimes even yet in the old way! Persuasion and kindness are first tried; the effort is to lead the pupil by rewards rather than to drive him by punishments. But the hard-headed local authorities have generally not the remotest intention of spoiling the child in order to spare the rod, and the traditional cane is still served out to the head-masters and the head-mistresses along with the other school supplies. It is not often used, and never without care and some thought of possible legal reprisals, but it is there, and it is used if needs must. Perhaps the lad's opinion of Archbishop Temple, at Rugby, may be taken as the ordinary schoolboy's general notion about this application of discipline, when it does come: "He's a beast, but a just beast."

There is a marked tendency in most of the elementary schools to freshen the work, take it away from the old routine methods, and make it a real process of drawing out the latent capacities of the child and encouraging it to think, to feel its own way, and to learn for itself. There are many illustrations and experiments, occasional excursions and object lessons. Efforts are made to use the

successes of pupils as an abiding stimulus for the schools, and the permanent tablet on the wall serving as an "honor board" is a frequent feature. The local authorities sometimes offer a valuable picture as a prize to a class or a school that in some way distinguishes itself, and with a thrift almost Yankee in its subtlety gain by what they give, since the picture remains as the permanent adornment of the schoolhouse!

In 1861 Matthew Arnold, after inspecting foreign school systems, returned to report to the Royal Commission on Endowed Schools, which had sent him out, with the appeal: "Organize your secondary and your superior education." Ten years later Professor Huxley, in the first London School Board, urged an arrangement by which a passage could be secured for children of superior ability from the elementary schools to schools in which they could obtain a higher instruction. No educational system, he said—in a notable speech, now familiar, I think, to most American educators—no such system would be worthy the name of a national system, "unless it established a great educational ladder, the bottom of which should be in the gutter and the top in the university, on which every child who had the strength to climb might, by using that strength, reach the place for which nature intended him."

But the appeal of Matthew Arnold is not yet fully answered, the dream of Professor Huxley

not yet fully realized. Unsystematic as the primary education has been found, secondary education is still more so. There are in London "higher grade schools," "organized science schools," and "higher elementary schools." Some of these are merely the highest class of elementary schools, reaching up into subjects proper to the first years in secondary education; some others represent a rather confused effort to promote secondary education, technical education, and commercial art education side by side; some of them give efficient instruction in chemistry, physics, electricity, physiology, botany, French, German, algebra, geometry, trigonometry, English literature, and history. It is not clear that many of them enable their students to pass on to the universities. A "higher grade" school at Leeds has a superior record in that respect, ninety-three of its pupils having matriculated at London University, and sixty-five having taken university degrees.

There is another development of secondary education directly from the elementary schools, generally more practical in its nature, and tending often to scientific or technical courses. This is the one stimulated by a system of scholarships, junior, intermediate, and senior, offered by the London County Council and open to competition by the pupils in the elementary schools. About six hundred junior scholarships are thus given in a year to boys and girls under thirteen years of age, and nearly all go to pupils of the council schools. These keep the

children at a higher grade council school or at a secondary school for two years, pay fees where there are any, and give the pupil for his maintenance for the two years an allowance of £20; but the parents of the children receiving them must have an income less than £150, say less than $750. The boy or girl who gains one of these scholarships gets tuition one year beyond the usual fourteen year limit, and is then able to compete for an intermediate scholarship. These again are open to any under sixteen, whose parents have an income of less than £400 a year; and when won, secure any fees in secondary schools, together with an allowance of £55 for maintenance for two years. There are about one hundred of them a year for all London, and they practically denote the high-water mark of council school education. There are still, however, seven or eight senior scholarships a year, and these carry the successful contestants for three years at a university, with tuition fees and a maintenance of £30 a year. This, it will be observed, constitutes a genuine scheme of state supported secondary education. It is not open to all who may have passed through the lower classes and feel like keeping on. But it is open to the selected few who have shown special qualifications for a higher training, and whose parents are poor; and to these most hopeful and most deserving children of the empire their government extends not merely free tuition, but free support.

Those seeking the old universities, and many

of those seeking scientific courses at the new ones, still resort, if they can, either to schools conducted for private profit, or to the public schools, so called, *i.e.*, endowed schools, like Harrow, Rugby, Westminster, St. Paul's, Manchester Grammar School, and thirty or thirty-five more. Many of these are ancient foundations, and they have borne a vital relation to some of the proudest pages of English history. At least two of them, Winchester and Eton, were well endowed for the time and in successful operation before the discovery of America. A much larger number were established before the colonies at Jamestown and Plymouth were; and most of the more noted ones before our Declaration of Independence. These schools belong, therefore, to our history, too. They recall to us as well as Englishmen, in their scrupulously guarded rolls, the successive generations of eminent men, whose achievements are a part of our inheritance. They make alive again the proud records above the sacred dust of myriads of the great departed all over the land, from stately cathedrals to the quiet churchyard of the remotest hamlet. This sacred dust it was that gave the inspiration to Oliver Wendell Holmes's eulogy of England and her illustrious dead, and justified his vivid outburst:

> "One half her soil has walked the rest,
> In poets, heroes, martyrs, sages."

These public schools are in general splendidly healthy and useful yet; within their field and for

their purposes unsurpassed in the educational work of the world. But their field, until recent years, has been almost exclusively the humanities; and their aim, senior wranglerships and double firsts in the universities, the front benches in the House of Commons, and responsible places all around the world in the administration of the empire, or in their most esteemed services, the army, the navy, and the church. Till 1851 mathematics was not compulsory at Eton, nor French till 1862. Natural science was scarcely noticed.

An English educational writer has unfairly said that "England is the country where dead systems live." A student of her educational history might be tempted to accept that judgment if he looked merely to the fact that it was only as late as 1895, and after the notable report of Mr. James Bryce on the best methods of establishing a well-organized system of secondary education in England, that a central organization was created to coördinate all these previous divergent and unregulated schools which furnish the links between the elementary schools below and the universities above, as well as the technical and scientific schools that ought to be above. Before that date the most considerable part of the secondary education work was under the control of the Charity Commission! The Science and Art Department had been administering the newer plans to meet the special demand for technical instruction, and had the disposition

of an income for this purpose of nearly a million pounds (five million dollars) per annum. The Education Department had charge of the elementary schools, and, as has been seen, had developed from these some interesting advances into the secondary field. At last, in 1900, a board of education was created, which took over the secondary educational work of the Charity Commission, of the Science and Art Department, and of the Educational Department.

The work thus finally coördinated had reached great proportions. In 1892 the Charity Commissioners reported the educational endowments in England alone, available for secondary education, as producing an income of over £697,000 a year, say three and one-half million dollars—not to reckon at all the value of their buildings and sites. In 1897 the Educational Department made a census of English secondary schools. Its returns were thought to be vitiated by including many not really entitled to rank as secondary schools; but it reported 6209 of them, with pupils numbering almost ten in the thousand of the whole population. The Science and Art Department received the customs and excise money (popularly "the whiskey money"), and from this fund technical schools were given nearly £864,000 in 1900, while the sum raised for the same purpose by rates (local taxes) amounted to £106,000 more, say in all over four and three-quarter million dollars. Under the latest legislation this goes to the county councils, and

the councils of county boroughs and of urban districts. It must be spent on secondary education. They have authority to raise more by local rates, but this in the case of counties must not exceed a two-pence rate.

At present the regulations forbid teaching more than thirty-five scholars together at one time. They permit fees that may be approved by the board, but require that one-fourth of the school places be open without fees to pupils from elementary schools who pass a satisfactory entrance examination. The number of such schools in England and Wales recognized by the board and given state aid was six hundred and eighty-nine, in the years 1905–06, and the number of pupils was ninety-four thousand six hundred and eighty-nine.

As early as 1895 the feeling that general secondary education was in danger of being neglected in the rush for scientific or technical or trade training, took shape in the form of a requirement for compulsory literary and commercial instruction. At the same time religious instruction is not made compulsory, and only non-sectarian instruction is permitted.

I have not mentioned Scotch or Irish schools. The systems are different. There is only space to note that as to Scotland general popular education began early and has been thorough, almost universal, and highly successful; while as to Ireland the religious question has been even more controlling and more embarrassing than in England. In

all three there is more than ever before an acceptance of the idea tersely expressed by President Roosevelt to Mr. Moseley, that while education alone may not make a nation, it would surely be ruined without it.

Attendance at English elementary and secondary schools is still apt to stop at the age of fourteen, if not earlier, but the tendency begins to be toward a longer stay. Sports are still an absorbing part of the school work, and interest in them is almost as necessary for the teacher as scholarship. The teachers are not so apt to show individuality and energy as they are to be careful and pertinacious. Much attention has been paid to the training of teachers of late years, but the system of "pupil teachers" has still to eke out the supply. In the great cities there is an enormous and interesting development of evening schools. Trade schools are increasingly numerous and popular. In the great technical schools there is a noticeable absence of pupils who seek easy electives, and are there chiefly for the degree. Often the work is not very rapid, but it is apt to be thorough. In all these directions the admonition of the Prince of Wales on his return from his eastern trip has been heard, and England has "waked up."

It will have been noted that in elementary schools the prevailing tendency of late years has been toward sense-training, object lessons, and manual employment. So among secondary schools the tend-

ency has been toward studies fitting for practical scientific, or manufacturing and commercial life. Both are more democratic than the historic public schools; and there begins to be a greater mingling of classes in the more recent secondary schools, in the scientific technological schools, and in the newer universities to which they lead.

Naturally, then, the chief new development of educational activity has been in the expansion or creation of advanced institutions to carry on this practical training beyond the secondary stage. Until less than a century ago, there were only two universities in England and Wales. Now there are ten. Practically all the new ones yield the preeminence in the old classical, mathematical, and philosophic training to Oxford and Cambridge, while they strive to occupy more thoroughly the less developed field of scientific and technological work. Then there are twenty-three technical institutions in England and Wales, recognized by the Board of Education, and two hundred and thirty-one schools of art applied to the industries.

The universities have been slowly led to examinations for the various kinds of secondary schools, some of which serve as leaving examinations for the schools and others as matriculation examinations for the universities, though often used by the recipients for other purposes. Oxford and Cambridge took up this work near the middle of the last century, first separately, then in a joint board. Subsequently, London University undertook it on

a large scale, and Durham, Victoria, and Birmingham have moved in the same direction. The City and Guilds of London Institute also held examinations for technical schools and classes throughout the country.

A word in closing might be given to the Rhodes scholarships at Oxford. We have almost a hundred young American graduates there, distributed through the colleges of that venerable and illustrious university. They are chosen on examination, two from each state and territory; they are given free the best the university can offer through a three years' stay, and they receive from the fund an allowance of £300, say $1500, per year for their maintenance. The purpose of the great man who founded this trust was to increase intimate and friendly relations between the most highly educated classes of the mother country and those of her "giant offspring of the West;" and to further a good understanding between the three nationalities included in the arrangement, England, Germany, and the United States. I have met with these Rhodes scholars at their annual reunion at Oxford; and I am glad to testify at home to their admirable appearance and conduct, and to the favorable opinions of them expressed to me by the Oxford dons with whom I conversed. As one saw them together, breaking in upon the cloistered quiet of those historic halls, he might almost imagine himself at a big Middle West college in our own country. He would scarcely be able to single

out the German Rhodes scholars from the rest, and quite unable to tell Americans from Australians or Rhodesians or Newfoundlanders or Cape Colonists or New Zealanders. But about them all was the air of new worlds and a new era. One might almost fancy their eyes had already seen the glory of the time when, under the leadership of the English-speaking peoples, the war drum throbbed no longer, and the battle-flags were furled, in the parliament of man, the federation of the world.

IN AN OLD OHIO TOWN

IN AN OLD OHIO TOWN

FIRST of all, let me make my best acknowledgments for the most gratifying honor of my life. To come back to Xenia, to the dear old town which in my boyhood treated me so much better than I deserved, and around which centre my earliest and happiest recollections, is always a pleasure; to come, an absent son, summoned by the council for the opening of the new City Hall, is more than a pleasure—it is a grateful duty.

We have been hearing, however, of late, that it is no longer quite prudent to make public confession of the fact that one was born in Ohio. It is going to be a political crime, a sort of pleading guilty to political disability. The fault, you will observe, is not entirely in living here; it attaches even to the error of having been so inconsiderate as to be born here. Massachusetts, a few years ago, might people half the legislatures and executive chambers of the Northwest, and crowd their delegations in Congress, and gather in the prizes of half the diplomatic service; it only added to the glory of the Puritan Commonwealth that stood there on her bays, and spoke for herself. Virginia might fill offices with similar frequency on lines of emigration a little further south, and it only added to the pride of the whole country in what they delighted to call the Old Dominion, the Mother of Presidents. But when her greatest offspring, the first-born of the Ordinance of 1787,

became the Mother of Presidents too, and when *her* wandering sons, in turn, came to the front, all over the Union, in war, or politics, or business, the feeling seemed suddenly to change. A huge detective society was forthwith formed, whose duty was not only to note with disparagement every advance of an Ohio man, but to ferret out and to "spot" every advancing man in any other state who could be suspected of having been born in Ohio. When found, the order was simple and peremptory: "Hunt him down!"

Well, with the changed conditions of our local emigration, that becomes something of an undertaking. Forty years ago the chief native source of supply for the hardy settlers who toiled westward in the old Conestoga wagons,

> "Who crossed the prairies, as of old
> Their fathers crossed the sea,
> To make the West, as they the East,
> The homestead of the free,"

was in New England, and particularly in Massachusetts. For the past fifteen or twenty years it has been in Ohio. There is no land into which their lines have not gone. There is no state or territory to the westward Ohio emigrants have not largely helped to people. Call over the familiar names of the pioneer families of Greene County, and see where you will find their living representatives. Take the Galloways, the Townsleys, the Kyles, the Turnbulls, the Harbines, the Baughmans, the Mc-

Coys, the Colliers, the Gowdys, the Shields, the Sterretts, the Deans, the Collinses, the Puterbaughs, the Hivlings, the Nisongers, the Snyders, the Ankenys, the Barbers, the McMillans, the Millers, the Bells, the Corrys, the Stevensons, the Laugheads, the Whitemans, the McHattons, the Maxwells, the Armstrongs, the McClungs,—what one is there that has not more members in the West than here at the old home? "You can take your horse and buggy," said one of our emigrants, "on the banks of the Miami, and drive to the base of the Rocky Mountains, stopping every night at an Ohio man's house."

So the huge detective society, of which we spoke, has plenty of work on its hands. For wherever this Ohio emigrant went, he carried with him the Ohio basis,—education, manliness, self-reliance, enterprise; in a word, the Ohio blood,—and he made his way. One day an Ohio emigrant turns up in the Senate from Kansas, the next, in the Supreme Court from Georgia, the next, in some other conspicuous place he has fairly earned and to which the people of his adopted state help advance him; but every time the detective society groans and hoots and exclaims: "Another Ohio man in office—is nobody else to have a show? Hit his head. Never mind where he spent his life or what he has done; he was born in Ohio!" And yet the truth is that if Ohio were to be represented as Massachusetts and Virginia have been, she has not nearly offices enough! A comparison in appointments is difficult;

but one as to elections may easily be made. Go no further back than the beginning of this political period—say about the time the Republican party arose—and take the representation in Congress. In 1856 there were in the two Houses twenty-three men of Virginia birth, fourteen from Massachusetts, and, notwithstanding her size, only twenty from Ohio. To-day there are still twenty-one of Virginia birth, thirteen from Massachusetts, and thirty-five from Ohio. But if Ohio were to be represented merely in proportion to population, as Virginia was in 1856, she should still have thirteen more! If in proportion not only to her size but to the quality of her product, perhaps we ought modestly to refrain from saying how many more yet it would be fortunate for the country to get her to furnish!

A friend of mine recently received a dispatch about which there has been some talk. It congratulated him on his election to the Senate because he had never apologized for being "a Stalwart." Well, here is a wandering Ohioan who has never apologized and never means to apologize for his birthplace.

The tools to those that can use them. If you don't like men of Ohio birth in public life, find better men, and persuade the people that they are better. But don't resort to the puerile course of condemning them merely because of their birth—breaking their heads because they were once within the prohibited lines of longitude. There have been times when

one's being an Ohioan was not an objection to his serving the state. When you had Edwin M. Stanton as Secretary of War, and Ben Wade as Chairman of the Committee on the Conduct of the War, and John Sherman as Chairman of the Finance Committee, was there anybody uneasy, anybody less than grateful, that the noblest Roman of them all, Salmon P. Chase, was at the same time Secretary of the Treasury? When you had Grant at the head of one army, nobody wanted to drive Sherman away from another because he also was born in Ohio. Even Sheridan was forgiven the offence of his birthplace; and McPherson was mourned as sincerely as if he had not been another of those pushing Ohioans. When Gillmore was bombarding Fort Sumter, and revolutionizing our artillery practice and coast defence, his birth in Ohio was not thought to injure the range of his projectiles; and when Steedman and Garfield, political foes, but brothers in patriotic devotion, left a disheartened chief and rode without orders toward the sound of the enemy's cannon, till through fire and blood they found the Rock of Chickamauga, the nation in its gratitude for their heroism quite overlooked the crime of their birth.

And so, once again, let us fall back upon the motto of the great Scotchman so recently gone from us: "The tools to him that can use them." If you want fewer of these Ohioans in prominent places, match them! Or surpass them! Till then, why not frankly recognize the position of the great

state that produced them, the centre of the national population, the focus and very flower of its freest, manliest development. Peopled mainly by Massachusetts and Virginia influences, of the best, most adventurous, and self-reliant types, it nourished a population strongly marked by the most desirable characteristics of this dual origin, and it holds, because it deserves, the legitimate successorship to both, in its present place at the National Council Board, and in the physical and the intellectual strife of the continent.

Why Virginia and Massachusetts were able to assert and so long maintain their leadership, our historians have fairly shown. Why the power and place of both should have passed so unmistakably and conspicuously to the "territory northwest of the Ohio, and the Connecticut Reserve," some Western Buckle may yet find it a most interesting study to trace.

He would note the fine mingling of races—the first actual blending of the Virginia and Massachusetts strains, with a strong infusion of the sturdy Scotch-Irish from over the Pennsylvania border. He would appreciate the gain in climate to each —the winters permitting greater activity than in New England, but not encouraging the laxity of more southern regions. He would observe not only the fertility of the soil, but the boundless mineral resources that almost compelled a more varied industry. And having thus recognized three of the

notable four classes of physical agents to which the philosophical historian of civilization referred all the external phenomena by which the development of man has been permanently affected, he would not fail also to find in the fourth, or "the general aspect of nature," an equal significance. We do not sufficiently appreciate the total difference between the stern face nature showed the hardy pioneers in Ohio and the easier dandling she gave to the less strenuous sons of the prairie. Here was no marking out the lines of a farm with a furrow, to be followed by an immediate entry upon its cultivation. The land was covered with dark and pathless forests. It was threaded by rivers, the Muskingum, the Scioto, the Miami, the Maumee, which were the first means, and yet the most dangerous, for penetrating the wilderness. Their banks were lined by the bravest Indians of the West, the tribes that rallied around Logan and Tecumseh, the Wyandots, the Cherokees, the Delawares, and the Shawnees, the last of whom, at their capital in your own county, scarcely four miles from where we stand, achieved the distinction of holding as their prisoner the most famous pioneer of the West, Daniel Boone himself. There were no railroads to bring the luxuries of civilization to the frontiersman's cabin. You can track the emigration across the plains by the lines of empty fruit cans and the bottles that once held —let us hope—Apollinaris water. But you could track the pioneers through the white oak and black walnut forests of Ohio only by the blaze of the

tomahawk on the trees, the marks of the struggle with bear or panther, the sadder marks that told, too often, of the Indian ambush. There were no telegraphs, as now, in many of our frontier settlements, to keep them feeling the throbbing pulses of a feverish world outside; no newspapers to distract them with the daily records of crime the world over; scarcely even an occasional mail to bring a three months' old letter from wife or sweetheart left behind. They lived isolated lives, in the heart of the forest, fighting nature and fighting the Indians.

Sobered by these severe surroundings, nerved by these difficulties, purified by these deprivations, this mingled strain of Puritan, Cavalier, and Scotch-Irishman bred in the forests and on the clearings between the river and the lake, the self-reliant race that has given this state its place in the Republic. Whether she can maintain it or not, who can tell? Emigration is draining away her best blood, as it did that of Virginia and Massachusetts; and it does not always happen that under the luxuries of an older civilization the children emulate the high virtues of their hardy ancestry. But whatever the future may have in store, we can say of our state, our gracious Mother, as Webster said of Massachusetts, the Past at least is secure. The place she has, she has earned.

Nor does there seem any immediate danger of her losing it. None of us, whatever our politics, are hanging our heads for the Administration that is just drawing to a close. Whether we approve its

policy or not, we agree that under it we have come to unprecedented prosperity; that our business has been well and honestly managed; that the public service is clean, and the public faith untarnished. It has indeed given us peace with honor; and the man whom you three times chose governor retires from a most difficult presidency, upon which he entered amid universal prophecies of failure, far more popular with the whole country than when he was elected, and with the reasonable certainty that twenty years hence, when the petty grudges of the disappointed are forgotten, his Administration will be reckoned by both parties one of the most creditable and fortunate in our history.

Two years ago, before the Convention of Ohio Editors, I ventured the prediction that, whichever party succeeded, the next President too would be an Ohio man. One party missed its opportunity by failing to choose the one man, clean, incorruptible, able, patriotic, whom it had a fair chance to elect. So of course, when Henry B. Payne, of Cleveland, was not nominated by the Democrats, there was nothing for the country to do but elect the distinguished citizen of Mentor, who had been nominated by the Republicans. Now, a little further in advance, let us hazard another non-partisan prediction, and challenge the horror of the society for the detection and exposure of Ohioans, by declaring that the state which has given the country Grant and Hayes and Garfield will once more furnish the President in 1884!

We shall all be happy over it, too. Ohioans rarely lose the state pride and the personal satisfaction in a success worthily won by a fellow citizen that make your politics dignified, and even the fiercest of your political battles measurably free from petty meanness. It was from political opponents, charmed by a chivalric courtesy never lost in the sharpest struggles, that Senator Pendleton fairly earned that most complimentary and agreeable of political sobriquets, "Gentleman George." When Henry B. Payne came promptly forward at the beginning of a feverish Presidential campaign, to say that he utterly scouted the charges against James A. Garfield, because he knew him thoroughly, and, though a vehement political foe, had implicit trust in his personal honor, he gave the true type of Ohio politics and Ohio manliness. Long may his tribe increase; and long may all the parties in the dear old state continue to put such men at the front.

But all this while we have been thinking about our state. What we are more concerned with to-night is our city. That name may be used now, no doubt, without reproach,—its gloss is a little worn off. But having helped to get this city charter, I remember being quizzed by a neighboring and unneighborly newspaper for having found ways to use the new title fifty-seven times in a single issue of the paper, the week afterward. Admonished by the old experience, I shall be careful not to speak of the city of Xenia too often to-night.

Indeed, as one looks around, he may be permitted to wonder whether he is in the old town at all. This isn't the way we did things, in my time, in Xenia. McMillan Hall was the best we had then, and we were careful to keep that under, or rather over, good moral influences, by putting it in the loft, with one end resting on "The Torch-Light" office, and the other on the local depository of the American Bible Society. Now we are met to open a new City Hall, and it takes the form of this elegant Opera House, as big as some of the New York theatres and a great deal prettier than many of them. What would Joseph Vance and the pioneers who, with him, laid out the town, have said if before their eyes closed forever on those lovely slopes they found in the wilderness, they had been invited to attend a town meeting in this hall! Even I, so young a resident that I have hardly yet recovered from the disgrace of having been detected (by one of the dear old ladies of the town, with a painfully precise recollection of dates) in editing a political newspaper and exhorting people how to vote before I was old enough to vote myself,—even I am forced to rub my eyes to be sure that all this is real. A theatre —in Xenia!—with folding chairs—and a dress circle—and galleries—and good stage scenery—and, above all, this portrait of Shakespeare—it passes belief. Why, I remember a lad here, of ten or eleven years of age, coddled too much perhaps by anxious parents and a physician, who was told

he must quit studying so hard, and take to light reading. Light reading was a phrase not well understood in sober families in Greene County in those days, and so the lad asked for particulars. "Oh, any light thing you please," answered the physician; "take Shakespeare!" The next week came along a doctor of another school, a Boanerges of the faith, Dr. McMaster, over whose more distinguished son you have lately been rearing a memorial shaft, on the peaceful hillside beyond the Shawnee. According to the fashion of the day, the lad was promptly "examined," and after Catechism and Psalm Book and Latin declensions, followed questions of books. The advice about light reading thus came out. "Very bad advice," groaned the good doctor; "a very bad lesson for a boy. But what light reading have you?" Then Shakespeare was confessed and the horror was complete. "To think," exclaimed the doctor, "of the son of so good a man wasting his time and corrupting his mind with that frivolous and profane writer of plays!" And so Shakespeare was summarily taken away, and in its place light reading was furnished in the shape of Rollin's "Ancient History," in eight volumes! Not till nearly a year later did a kinder fate and a younger clergyman, your own sainted McMillan, substitute Plutarch's "Lives" and the "Percy Anecdotes"! And now, in this same place, after a special act of the legislature and an overwhelming vote of the people, you have built your new Town Hall in the guise of an Opera House,

and as you entered to-night the drop-curtain faced you with the portrait of Shakespeare above it!

Well, it is a public-spirited enterprise, worthily executed by your faithful official servants. You have your Town Hall and Opera House. What are you going to do with it? Doubtless it shows that this community no longer regards life as simply a struggle, but is willing to be entertained and even amused, as well as instructed.

The amusements will be sure to come. Let us only hope that they will be up to the intellectual and moral level of a county second in these regards to none in the state or the nation. Of what passes for oratory, too, you will be sure to have an abundance, and we may well hope that, while you are about it, you will get the best. Even then, the intellectual treats this platform may bring you will not surpass the memories of your youth. This community has been used to the eloquence of Henry Clay and Thomas Ewing and Thomas Corwin. It has heard in turbulent times the fiery appeals of another, whose courage and force even his bitterest foes had to recognize, Clement L. Vallandigham. Under the trees before the Court House it heard Salmon P. Chase end an impassioned defence of the Free Soilers against disunion charges with the outburst: "We in Ohio are accustomed to look on the union of these states as we look on the broad arch of heaven above us, undissolved and indissoluble." I have listened to nearly every

prominent orator of the country in this generation, and have yet to hear nobler eloquence than resounded in the court-room yonder when Thomas Corwin rescued from a Calvinistic jury, who believed that murder deserved hanging, an Irish manslayer from Bellbrook; or more persuasive teaching than fell from the lips of our Yellow Springs neighbor, Horace Mann. You give your speakers a finer platform now,—match the old eloquence if you can.

Let us hope, too, that amid these more elegant surroundings you will still keep up the good old wholesome Greene County respect for politics; and that your Opera House will not wean you away from that careful attention to political discussion,— and discussion on both sides, too,— which used to centre about a Town Hall. I wonder if, among the disappearing traditions of pioneer Xenia, there has yet faded out all recollection of the way the last jurymen in the old log court house in 1804 were sworn. Arthur St. Clair came up from Cincinnati, with cocked hat and sword, to serve as prosecuting attorney. The story ran that he hunted in vain for a Bible, but at last found something he thought would do, and upon it jury and witnesses "took their Bible oath." The volume turned out to be a tattered copy of the "Arabian Nights' Entertainments." In my boyish days in politics here, when things went wrong, when a candidate broke his pledges or an out-township ally was found

to have deceived us and worked for the other man, it was the irreverent and rather vulgar habit to say that our politicians anyway were lineal descendants of Arthur St. Clair's witnesses, and their oaths were no better. Let us dignify, not degrade politics. Let us realize—may this Town Hall perpetually teach—that to "go into politics" is to deal with the highest objects of human concern; and that the pretended feeling of contempt for those who do, merely because they do, which grows fashionable now, is the sure sign of a snob. Next to the ministry of God, the highest career open to human ambition is the service of the people.

This place ought, besides, to become the centre and incitement for some special intellectual stir, in the community, from the community, and about the immediate concerns of the community. It should stimulate what we may call a real municipal life. Till you have that, you lack the best gift of our republican institutions. These are not the best form of government because they insure the best immediate results,—because they are the cheapest, or the simplest, or the most efficient. They are the best because you have to work for them, and work to keep them, and be perpetually active in running them. They are what you make them; and are the best because in the making of them you yourselves are exercised and trained and built up to the best measure of free, American manhood. Government by the people must always be expen-

sive, generally slow, and, in the main, carried on only through the strain of a perpetual excitement and tumult of debate. But therein lies the very secret of its superiority. It is not the mere reaching the goal that helps the athlete: what does him the real benefit is his running the race. It is not simply the gathering of the crops that makes the farmer's life the best; it is the work of growing them. It is not the government you get that makes republicanism the best; it is the work you have in getting it. And till you bestow that work on your own municipal affairs you are not getting as much out of the great privilege of republican institutions as you ought to get.

Rightly used to stimulate and develop a true municipal life, this hall may likewise give you some other mode of dealing with affairs besides the newspapers; and perhaps I may be permitted to say that the tendency to let these do all your thinking in public affairs is not an unmixed good. Useful as they always must be in their place, and unsurpassed in their sphere as the journals of Xenia certainly are, it is just as well to avoid entire dependence upon them for municipal discussion. So, too, in the atmosphere of spirited inquiry which we may hope the influences centring here will develop, should come broader views of life and duty: a recognition of the fact that something can often be said on the other side; a wider toleration than is always common in rural communities, of what

other people think, and of their right to think it, in politics, education, temperance, or religion.

On some special topics this Town Hall should never be silent. I may venture to name three. It should keep the municipal attention fixed with ceaseless watchfulness on questions of public morals, of municipal taxation and indebtedness, and of educational necessities.

On the first of these there is no need to dwell in Xenia. Here, if anywhere in Ohio, that is the one topic sure never to be neglected. To the second your attention may not have been so faithfully called.

The growth of municipal taxation and municipal indebtedness is in fact one of the stealthiest and most seductive of our foes. Governor Dennison once told me he was a great believer in the wisdom of a young man's running in debt— and my worst enemy could n't deny that I practised faithfully on his advice! Half the municipalities of the country seem to have the same notion, and they don't limit the time for running in debt to their youth, either. Six years ago Senator Blaine estimated the municipal debt of the country at five hundred and seventy millions, and that of the counties at one hundred and eighty millions more. The exhibit startled the country. General Walker, the Superintendent of the Census, is taking the utmost care now to develop the latest facts upon the subject. To the officer in special charge of the inves-

tigation, the Hon. Robert P. Porter, of Chicago, I am indebted for a summary of what has already been ascertained. He says:

"The Census of 1870 was, as you doubtless know, sadly defective, as the office at Washington could not, under the old Census law, deal directly with the officials of the cities, counties, villages and towns, and school districts throughout the country. This I am attempting to do in the present investigation. There are in the United States 330 cities with a population of 7500 and upward, and there are no less than 6016 incorporated towns and villages with a population of less than 7500, making a total of 6346 incorporated towns and villages which have to be dealt with directly from this office. The above calculation does not include the New England States, Pennsylvania, Illinois, and Indiana. Where the township has a financial existence we deal with the township, and the number of townships in the three states I have referred to is 4000, making an estimated total of 11,846 cities, towns, and townships, to say nothing of the 2700 counties of the country, all of which have to be dealt with separately. But these statistics will not be completed until we have returns from all the school districts, numbering, at a rough guess, between 70,000 and 80,000 divisions, to the financial officers of which schedules have been sent and a correspondence opened. I give these facts that you may be the better able to appreciate the immense detail involved in the collection of these statistics.

"When the present investigation is ended I shall be able to show a complete analysis of this vast amount of local indebtedness, which will reach to nearly $900,000,-000, comprising an exhibit of the purposes for which it was contracted, the amounts contracted each year from

1860 to the close of 1880, the amounts maturing each year from 1880 to 1900, and the rates of interest they bear. I have already complete returns from all but some 200 of the towns of 1000 population and upward."

Nine hundred millions of local debts, county, village, and city, wholly outside of all the state and national indebtedness! The figures are almost appalling. And yet this is only the part of the extravagant local expenditure which you have n't paid for. What has been paid, the rapidly rising tax rate shows. Note the figures in this suggestive extract from the report of the Hon. R. B. Strang, Chairman of the Commission to devise a plan for the government of the cities of Pennsylvania. He said:

"Without referring to particular cities or making invidious distinctions, it is perhaps sufficient to say that a carefully prepared table, showing the increase of population, valuation, taxation, and indebtedness of fifteen of the principal cities of the United States, from 1860 to 1875, exhibits the following result:

Increase in population	70.5 per cent
Increase in taxable valuation	156.9 per cent
Increase in debt	270.9 per cent
Increase in taxation	363.2 per cent

"It must be borne in mind that this alarming increase in debt and taxation occurred during a period of great apparent national prosperity, when money was plenty, when property commanded enormous values, and when it was easier to apply the maxim 'pay as you go' than at any period in our national history."

And now let us bring the examination into a nar-

rower compass. In a paper by Simon Sterne, intended to show substantially that universal suffrage in large cities is a failure, the figures are collated showing the population, taxation, and indebtedness of five cities, in 1860 and in 1875. I omit the details and will read you merely the respective percentages of increase in these fifteen years:

	Population	*Taxation*	*Indebtedness*
Brooklyn	82.7	313.4	356.9
New York	28.5	430.9	504.1
Philadelphia	30.6	317.8	152.3
Providence	98.7	443.3	529.8
Newark	65.2	558.8	2,658.2

This system extends over the whole country. In most cases the figures are not so startling; and yet it has been but a little while since two cities, one near New York, another in the South, became openly bankrupt—the debts being said to be actually greater than the taxable property; while in more than one western county we have had the distinct repudiation of bonds for indebtedness which nobody disputed, solely because the county thought it couldn't tax heavily enough to provide the interest, without driving off its population!

Let me give you only one more contrast in figures. In 1875 the amount raised by the New York civic government was $35 for each man, woman, and child within the boundaries,—while the immense and luxurious city of London taxed its inhabitants only $10 each!

I waste no time in enforcing upon an audience like this the significance of such alarming facts. It is enough to state two or three obvious conclusions:

(1) Such municipal indebtedness tends to promote wanton extravagance in public affairs.

(2) It tends to demoralize private life.

(3) It tends to weaken the sense of public honor.

There was a third topic on which it was thought that the influence of this hall should keep the municipal attention fixed—the direction of your educational necessities. No thoughtful observer has failed to notice the growing discontent, especially in heavily taxed communities, with some features of the existing system. It tries to teach too much. It teaches little thoroughly. In giving a smattering of a multitude of subjects, it neglects the essentials. It unfits boys for mechanics and manufacturers, without fitting them for the professions. Its tendency is to make them discontented with the country where they are wanted, and to lure them to the cities where they strive in vain to find a place in ranks already overcrowded. It reduces the producers. It over-educates great numbers for the only work they can do, at the expense of taxpayers, who are only damaged by the result of the expenditure.

These are among the current objections. Doubtless they overstate the case, but they do point to a dangerous discontent, and they do centre about one undeniable weakness. It is true that the sys-

tem is top-heavy; that the basis is too flimsy for the ever spreading superstructure. As a result we turn out too many who will go through life ignorant of arithmetic because they have spent their time on chemistry, deficient in English grammar because they were laboring with Latin or French. And it is true that this flashy shell of an education dissatisfies many with the real work of their lives.

Meantime, what is the chief defect to be found throughout the whole working of our industrial system? Is it not just what such an education has absolutely organized,—a chronic, inbred lack of thoroughness? Who learns a trade now, as the apprentices did fifty years ago? What master workman is able to get apprentices? In what trade do the men of middle-age find the average workman as thoroughly master of all its details as he was when they first began to be employers? In what one is there a supply of boys coming up under such training as surely to make them the full equals of the old hands?

Well, what is the remedy? Obviously, nothing will restore the old conditions. All over England and America the apprenticeship system seems doomed, and as yet there are only glimmerings of something that may come to take its place.

Here, then, are three grave facts:

Common schools too wide to be deep enough;

A growing lack of thoroughness in the industrial world; and

A growing discontent on the part of the heavier

taxpayers with an educational system that somehow doesn't seem to them to produce what is just suited either to the trades or to business and the professions.

Does not the mere grouping of the facts suggest the remedy? Strengthen the basis of the school system before you increase the superstructure. Teach fewer things, but teach them so they will be absolutely known. Make the course of study more compact and manageable; postpone the accomplishments; banish even science and drawing, and first give the child what will be essential for the practical business of life, and a basis for self-improvement.

Then meet the obvious want by establishing in county seats, or wherever the population is large enough to warrant it, free or partly free industrial schools. There teach your science, your drawing, and whatever else may tend to make better artisans. In the great cities extend the system to free technical schools, such as are now beginning in New York, where boys may learn the principles, and even some of the practical detail of the trades,—of painting, of carriage-building, of plumbing, and the like. This is the plan to which England is already largely resorting, which has long been established in France, Germany, Belgium, Switzerland, Sweden, and to which we must soon come. The multitude of common schools may thus be freed from a work they cannot do properly, while the attempt to do it spoils the work

they can and should do. In such a system, says Professor Huxley, is to be found the only available remedy for the losses from the downfall of apprenticeship. To such a system one of the shrewdest of our United States Consuls, in a recent unpublished report, traces the growing success of certain important branches of British manufactures. To such a system some of our own statesmen are beginning to look for the surest means of developing our native industries, and checking the unwholesome tendency away from the trades, into trade.

Since the foregoing was prepared the State Department has received and I have been permitted to examine a most interesting report on the progress of technical schools in England, and particularly those in textile fabrics in Bradford and through the West Riding, from the Hon. C. O. Shepard, the alert United States Consul at Bradford. After reciting the endowments, income, and other provision for a large number of these schools, the numbers of pupils in attendance, and the specific results attained, he summarizes his conclusions in a statement which I have been permitted to copy, and which I shall venture to read to you:

"Let me add a few remarks as to the objects of technical schools and the best means of securing them.

"(1) They are intended to supplement the education of the ordinary school with an education specially calculated to increase a man's knowledge of his trade or busi-

ness, and so to make him a more useful member of society and a larger contributor to the Nation's wealth.

"(2) They should, in my opinion, form a part of the National system of education, and the scholars should largely consist of boys and girls drafted from our public elementary schools. I include girls because I believe that no system of technical education will be complete which does not make provision for their training. In all art schools girls take a very high place, and it is my opinion that greater facilities ought to be afforded them for earning a livelihood by the use of their artistic taste and acquirements in relation to all trades or manufactures in which a designer's skill is required. This will apply particularly to the manufacture of fancy stationery, pottery, and every variety of textile fabrics.

"(3) The course of instruction should include lectures by competent men upon subjects of technical interest, such as the daily discoveries of science afford.

"(4) Arrangements should be made in connection with every school for granting certificates or diplomas to deserving students, and every care should be taken in the election of the Board of Examiners and the choice of subjects and questions to make the examinations fairly severe, and such as to give the certificate or diploma real value to its possessor.

"(5) Examination in technological subjects might be adopted by the educational department of any State in the event of its undertaking to carry on the work of technical education, and would no doubt be found of great practical value.

"I am glad to know that a few technical schools have already been established in the United States, principally in the engineering and iron trades. I earnestly hope ere long to hear that a system of thorough technical educa-

tion has been adopted for the whole country, as I do not know of any other means whereby the resources of the Nation are more likely to be developed, or its manufactures improved, than by increasing the knowledge and perfecting the skill of its artisans. English manufacturers acknowledge that their most successful rivals are in those countries or localities where technical education has been carried to the highest point."

I take the greater pleasure in being able to give you this early access to an important public document because, from an independent point of view and across the ocean, it comes as a confirmation of the suggestions already offered. The whole idea is yet in its infancy, but there is at least reason to believe that the next great advance in our educational system will give us fewer studies and more thoroughness in our common schools, with separate industrial schools for some of the excluded branches; and whether this be a correct or mistaken forecast, it is clear that no worthier or more important question can challenge the discussion and watchful attention which it is one of the functions of the Town Hall to stimulate.

One thing more. Here is the place to revive your local history, watch your wandering sons, and keep green the early memories. Here would be the perfect field for some worthy successor, if you only had one, to the lamented William Mills. Here you might fitly recall the fact that the foremost literary editor of America, William D. Howells, was once

a Greene County boy, his father living a few miles to the westward of Xenia, at what were then called the Eureka Mills; that the foremost sculptor of America, J. Q. A. Ward, was born only a little way out of the Miami Valley, to the north of us, at Urbana; that another president of the National Academy, the admirable landscape artist, Worthington Whittredge, was born in the valley, a few miles from Clifton in this county. And you keep with you still a real poet, whom you need to chide because, having given such charming proof of what he can do, Mr. Coates Kinney now persistently defrauds the world of the further work he ought to do.

Here, too, should be told over the fast fading story of the heroism and devotion of your sons in the war. Do not let this younger generation forget that the first field officer given to death for the Union, from Ohio, was John W. Lowe, the first colonel this town sent out, and that he fell as you would have had him fall, sword in hand, in front of his regiment, cheering them to the advance upon the intrenched army of Floyd and Wise. Do not let them forget the political leaders you followed before the war, Harlan, and Gest, and Hivling, and, before them all, Joshua Martin. Do not let them forget the good fellows of your earlier political activity. The echoes in the Town Hall of Xenia should still linger lovingly on the names of John Boyd, and John McWhirk, and Albert Galloway. Teach them the pure fame of your old lawyers and officials, Ellsberry, and Barlow, and Winans,

and Scott, and Coke Wright. Teach them to revere those devoted public servants who left their indelible impress on the education and morals of this community, the old clergy of the town, Beveridge, Smart, McMillan, Armstrong, Gill, Simmons, Steele. Above all, teach them to hold in everlasting honor the memory of the men who found this county a wilderness and left it to you a magnificent heritage, the fairest in our eyes the sun kisses between the river and the lake. Honor and reverence for the virtues of our pioneers, the settlers of 1800–1810—Kentuckians, Virginians, Pennsylvanians, who fought the Indian and the wild beast, felled the forest, built first a church and then a court-house, lived hard and solitary lives, but with courage and constancy, in their place, nobly served their day and generation. A few of them, with whitening locks and rugged faces, seamed with the privations and struggles of three-quarters of a century ago, still go in and out among us—lacking, I am sure, no token of the love and reverence in which their descendants hold them. Heed them well, for it is a sight not long vouchsafed us. In a few months or years at best the very last pioneer settler of Greene County must have passed over to the majority.

"Heroic spirits! take your rest!
Ye are richer, we are poorer;
Yet, because ye have been with us
Life is manlier, Heaven surer."

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
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